THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS:

THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PRoviNCE OF ST. JosEPH

Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.
VoL.

IX

JULY, 1946

No.3

VIRTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

T

HE Church today is faced with its perennial problem of
clerical and religious vocations in a more than usually
acute stage. The problem itself, with its consequent
problems of fostering and promoting vocations, has theological
roots, the study of which goes far towards concentrating effort
on the heart of the problem; and, indeed, goes to the depths of
much of modern disorder within the family, the nation, and
society. It is the purpose of this study to expose those theological roots to plain view.
Such an aim must not be interpreted as in any way a reflection on the highly intelligent attention the problem of ecclesiastical vocations has been receiving in this country. Under
the auspices of The Missionary Union of The Clergy, conferences have been held in different parts of the country year by
year, and studies have been made from almost every angle of
the question of vocations. 1 The acute needs of the Church for

1 Confer Vocation Conferences of September, 1944, for the conference held in
New York City; September, 1945, for the conference held in New Orleans; and
the forthcoming issue for the conference held in January, 1946, in Washington, D. C.

887

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WALTER FARRELL

vocations have been brought out in these conferences with no
mincing of words; needs confirmed by fact and authority.
There has been complete honesty in the facing of the shortage
of vocations, and the possible causes of this shortage.
Most of the effort in these conferences has, naturally, been
concentrated on the promotion and fostering of vocations. The
encouragement of vocations is not a matter of selling individuals on a career of service, at great benefit to the individual
himself; nor has this mistake been made. It has been clearly
seen, and explicitly stated, that a vocation to the religious state
or to the priesthood is a supernatural gift; only God, then, can
he its author.
At the same time, there has been the entirely just conviction
of a human part to be played in the development or decay of
what God has given. It is along the line of this human part in
vocations that most of the studies of the Vocation Conferences
have proceeded. It has been seen that our human efforts must
revolve mostly around the removal of impediments to the fulfillment of vocations, encouraging the necessary dispositions
to their development, and nourishing their growth. A vocation
to the priesthood or religious life is nothing less than an invitation to serve in the divine household. " Religion is a virtue
whereby a man offers something to the service and worship of
God. . . . Wherefore those are called religious who give themselves up entirely to the divine service .... " 2
Taking into consideration the essential nature of vocation
and the human efforts possible in its favor, we find a real point
of comparison with the war-time problem of morale. The
comparison, far from being tenuous, has real roots ·as we shall
see in the course of this study. The attempts to build up
morale, or to sustain it at a high level, were efforts to increase
the willingness of men to serve their country and even to make
great sacrifices in that service. On the basis of this much of a
ll" Religio, autem, ... est quaedam virtus, per quam aliquis ad Dei servitium
et cultum aliquid exhibet. Et ideo antonomastice religiosi dicuntur illi qui se
!.otaliter mancipant divino servitio .... " Summa Theol., II-II, q. 86, a. 1 corp.

VIRTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

889

comparison, it would seem that vocation, on its human side,
could be seen as the fruit of high religious morale, as the superb
efforts of men in the crises of combat were seen as the fruit of
high patriotic morale.
It is true that throughout the war, morale remained a
throughly mysterious factor; certainly there was little official
effort to give it a sharp definition. The efforts to foster it were
worthy of the vagueness of their goal. Among the means emphasized, a large place was given to activities calculated to distract men- movies, theatrical skits, radio programs, offic.ers'
clubs, and enlisted men's beer gardens. Clothes, food, and living
conditions were given much more attention than in any past
war. There was a strenuous and highly important effort to
keep the mail coming in. To a much lesser degree, there was
some educational effort toward the realization of the purposes
of the war, the training, the methods adopted. All of these
things Uil Joubtedly played their part. Yet the results consistently confounded the efforts of the morale builders. For high
morale was found among men who were in no position to be
distracted; who had little food, insufficient clothes, and miserable living conditions; and who were far beyond the reach of
the most zealous postman. On the contrary, the depths of
morale were often plumbed among the very men who were
within the fullest reach of the combined efforts of all the morale
builders.
There has been no such bumbling in the promotion: and
fostering of vocations. Education in the meaning of religious
and priestly life is persistently stressed. Greater efforts are
being made to furnish adequate information and material for
first-hand appreciation of this or that community. With the
fundamental motivation of charity, loyalty, piety, self-sacrifice
and zeal have been stressed. Nevertheless, there has been some
vagueness, a confusion of incidental or dispositive elements
with essential and direct causes, that is unnecessary and not at
all helpful.
It seems possible to focus the efforts to foster and promote

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WALTER FARRELL

vocations still more sharply by unearthing the theological roots
of the human dispositions of vocations. A clear delineation of
the fundamental and essential elements should do away with
any least scattering of our thought and action in favor of
vocations. Actually, an investigation of the theological roots
of religious and priestly vocation not only contributes to the
work of fostering vocations but also lays the foundations for
highly important conclusions in several different fields of human
action. It will, for example, explain much that has been
mysterious about patriotic morale, give some penetrating insights into family spirit and discipline, and give opportunities
for highly interesting speculations on social relationships. Nor
is the reason for this wide field of application obscure; in fact it
might be made completely clear, and be effectively summarized,
by saying that the theological roots of religious and priestly
vocation make clear the reason, beauty, and attractiveness of
all service to others.
The obvious note common to vocation and patriQtic morale
is that of service. Nor is this just any kind of service. It is
service in the very humble sense of work to be done by a handmaid, a servant. It is significant that the statement of this
condition is made by theologians through the Latin word
famulatus, a homely or terrible word according as it means the
state of being a servant or of being a slave.
At any rate, there are some plain implications in this common
note of service. There is, first of all, an essentially implied subjection, a fulfilling of assigned tasks and obedience to orders.
This subjection itself is a kind of reverence and honor, even
when it is no more than an external subjection wit;h external
reverence and honor; there is in it a recognition of superiority,
in fact, a superiority that has about it an air of clarity and
inviolability difficult to dispute. Vaguely, it is the kind of
superiority recognized in something that is old enough to reach
far back into the past; more sharply, it is the superiority
attached to a thing that reaches back to and beyond our beginnings and embraces them.

VffiTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

341

This type of superiority is readily seen by a man, who recognizes without difficulty that he did not start himself. As a
consequence, there is established an intimate kind of order in
a man's life by this service demanded in the name of religious
vocation and patriotic morale: it gives him a clear sight of what
is above him. If once a man sees clearly what is above him,
all that is above him, he knows beyond cavil what belongs
beneath him; and by that fact he knows his own place with
complete certitude.
The importance of a knowledge of his place is of incalculable
value to a man. Without it, he cannot recognize usurpers of
his life and his rights, let alone heat them off; nor can he
protect himself from making a wreck of his life and a fool of
himself through the assumption of roles for which he was never
fitted. In proportion to the importance of the hierarchy this
state of service reveals in a man's life, there are extreme demands made by it upon a man: results like combat service in
wartime or the holocaust of one's life in religion approach the
utmost that can be asked of men; the reverence and honor
implied in subjection do not come easily to the pride of man;
and order is never maintained without effort. If we are to find
the roots of vocation and patriotic morale, we must look to the
immediate sources of all good acts, that is, to the virtues; for
this is clearly a matter of solidly good action, and every good
act is an act of virtue. 8
Specifically, then, it will be necessary to trace service to
others to the particular virtue from which it proceeds. If that
virtue is well understood, its proper acts clearly seen and
thoroughly analyzed, the ultimate reasons for the reverence,
honor, and consequent subjection demanded in the name of
service will be uncovered. Our procedure in this paper will be
as follows: 1) a determination of and an analysis of the virtues
of service, namely, religion, piety, patriotism, and observance
8 ••• virtus et quae bonum facit habentem, et opus ejus bonum reddit; et ideo
necesse est dicere omnem actum bonum ad virtutem pertinere. Summa Theol.,
II-II, q. 81, a. corp.

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WALTER FARRELL

in that order; 2) a thorough study of the primary acts of each
of these virtues in order, namely, the first act of religion, the
first act of piety, and so on. In the study of the virtues, much
attention will be paid to the virtue of Religion for it is here that
St. Thomas has his most explicit treatment of the principles
involved in the service of others; much that will be said of the
other virtues is implicit in Thomas' treatment of the virtue of
Religion, and thus dependent on a thorough understanding of
that virtue. The same will be true of the study of the acts of
the virtues. The act of devotion, which is the primary act of
the virtue of Religion, will be dealt with at considerable length;
most of the conclusions relative to the primary acts of the other
virtues of service are implicit in St. Thomas' treatment of the
act of devotion. We begin our investigation with the virtue of
Religion because we have already seen that the very notion of
service to God, the essential notion of religious vocation, places
it squarely under the virtue of Religion. 4

* * * * * *
Virtue of Service to God-Religion
As St. Thomas analyzes the virtue of religion, he sees it as
primarily a matter of honesty. Its chief concern is with the
payment of an unpayable debt, or, at the very least, a recognition of this debt. It has about it the flavor of justice in that
it has to do with our relations with another, namely God. It
measures up to the notion of justice inasmuch as it deals with
debts; but it falls far short of the equality of payment that
strict justice demands. It is, then, a virtue annexed to justice,
but distinct from it; a potential part of justice, falling short of
full payment but doggedly proceeding as best it may to the
straightforward dealing with debt that is the essential mark
of an honest man. St. Thomas has put this succinctly:
Two points must be observed about the virtues annexed to a 'principal virtue. The first is that these virtues have something m
4

Summa ·Theol., 11-11, q. 86, a. 1 corp. Cf. footnote 2 suyra.

VIRTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

848

common with the principal virtue; and the second is that in some
respect they fall short of the perfection of that virtue. Accordingly
since justice is of one man to another, . . . all the virtues that are
directed to another person may by reason of this common aspect
be annexed to justice. Now the essential character of justice consists in rendering to another his due according to equality ....
Wherefore in two ways may a virtue directed to another person
fall short of the perfection of justice: first, .bY falling short of the
aspect of equality; secondly, by falling short of the aspect of due.
For certain virtues there are which render another his due, but
are unable to render the equal due. In the first place, whatever man
renders to God is due, yet it cannot be equal, as though man
rendered to God as much as he owes Him. . . . In this respect
religion is annexed to justice since, according to Tully, it consists
in offering service and ceremonial rites or worship to some superior
nature that men call divine. 5

The debt, which is the sole concern of the virtue of religion,
is not to be described by a vague wave of the hand at the
wonders of the universe, the complexity of the life of man, or
the simplicity of a child. It can be laid on the line in so many
words, a challenge to the honesty of man, with no blurring of
the outlines of the debtor's obligations. The virtue of religion
is concerned with the debt man owes God under the precise
formality of First Principle; God is the source, the start, the
beginning of man's beginnings, the absolute first principle of
man's being and of his guidance or direction to happiness.
• . . . in virtutibus quae adjunguntur alicui principali virtuti, duo sunt consideranda: primo quidem, quod virtutes illae in aliquo cum principali virtute conveiliant; secunda, quod in aliquo deficiant a perfecta ratione ipsius. Quia vero
justitia ad alterum est, . . . oumes virtutes quae ad alterum, possunt ratione convenientiae justitiae annecti. Ratio vero justitiae consistit in hoc quod alteri reddatur quod ei debetur secundum aequalitatem ....
Dupliciter ergo aliqua virtus ad alterum existens a ratione justitiae deficit: uno
quidem modo, in quantum deficit a ratione aequalis; alio modo, in quantum deficit
a ratione debiti. Sunt enim quaedam virtutes quae debitum quidem alteri reddunt,.
sed non possunt reddere aequale. Et primo quidem quidquid ab homine Deo redditur, debitum est, non tamen potest esse aequale, ut scilicet tantum homo ei
reddat, quantum debet. . . . Et secundum hoc adjungitur justitiae religio, quae,
ut dicit Tullius, ... superioris cujusdam naturae, quam divinam vocant, curam
caeremoniamque .affert. Summa Theol., 11-II, q. 80, a. unic.

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WALTER FARRELL

" ... it belongs to religion to show reverence to one God under
one aspect, namely as the first principle of the creation and
government of things." 6 ". • • religion denotes properly a
relation to God. For it is He to Whom we ought to be bound
as to our unfailing principle; to Whom also our choice should
be resolutely directed as to our last end; and Whom we lose
when we neglect Him by sin, and should recover by believing
in Him and confessing our faith." 7
It is particularly important here to read the words of St.
Thomas most carefully, for it is essential to understand exactly
the precise nature of the debt with which religion has to deal.
Throughout its whole field, religion looks to the first principle
of men; that is the " one aspect " under which it pays reverence
to God. Even when referring to the last end of man, religion
does so, not under the formality of an infinite good to be possessed, but under the formality of a first principle of guidance
and government. It is a moral virtue which is properly about
means to the end, not the end itsel£.8 Unless this rigid limitation of the object of religion is kept clearly in mind, it will be
extremely difficult to distinguish its activities from those of
charity, to speak accurately about its acts, and to establish
clearly the proper supremacy of religion.
From the fact that God is man's first principle of being and
of government, we have a double statement of the divine excellence. God is not infinitely good because He is the last end,
and so the first principle of direction or government; rather,
it is because of His infinite goodness that He is the last end.
• Ad religionem autem pertinet exhibere reverentiam uni Deo secundum unam
rationem, in quantum scilicet est primum principium creationis et .gubemationis
rerum. Unde ipse dicit Malach. I, 6: Si ego Pater, ubi honor meus? Patris enim
est producere et gubernare. Summa Theol., IT-IT, q. 81, a. S.
" . . . religio proprie importat ordinem ad Deum. Ipse enim est cui principaliter
alligari debemus tamquam indeficienti principio: ad quem etiam nostra electio
assidue dirigi debet sicut in ultimum finem; quem etiam negligentes peccando
amittimus, et credendo, et fidem protestando recuperare debemus. Ibid.,
I.
Confer ibid., a. 1, ad Sum et 4um.
8 ••• est virtus moralis, cujus est esse circa. ea quae sunt ad finem. Summa
Theol., 11-11, q. 81, a. 5 corp.

VIRTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

845

On the other hand, as first principle of being, God has all the
infinite excellence undeniable to the first cause. The recognition of this divine excellence is the fundamental payment by
religion of man's debt to God.
The good to which religion is directed, is to give due honor to God.
Again, honor is due to someone under the aspect of excellence: and
to God· a singular excellence is competent, since He infinitely surpasses all things and exceeds them in every way.9
By one and the same act man both serves and worships God, for
worship regards the excellence of God, to Whom reverence is due:
while service regards the subjection of man, who, by his condition,
is under an obligation of showing reverence to· God. To these two
belong all the acts ascribed to religion, because, by them all, man
bears witness to the Divine excellence and to his own subjection to
God.... 10
This, then, is the double note of the religious debt man owes
to God: reverence for the divine excellence and subjection to
the divine principality. Actually, the two are different sides of
one and the same act of worship; and this act, in its essential
nature, is no more than an honest recognition of the first principle of man's being and government. By recognizing that
divine principality, man is at the same time protesting the
divine excellence which brought him into being and directs him
to happiness, and his own orderly position beneath that supremely excellent Being.
The debt is paid by the acts of religion. Its payment is a
matter of honesty, a matter of order, and a matter of great
privilege. By it, the very foundation of all order is established
in a man's moral life; he recognizes that his place in the world
9 Bonum autem ad quod ordinatur religio, est exhibere Deo debitum honorem.
Honor autem debetur alieni ratione excellentiae. Deo autem competit singularis
excellentia, in quantum omnia in infinitum transcendit secundum omnimodum
excessum. Summa Theol., 11-11, q. 81, a. 4 corp.
10 ••• eodem actu homo servit Deo et colit ipsum; nam cultus respicit Dei
excellentiam, cui reverentia debetur; servitus autem respicit subjectionem hominis,
qui ex sua conditione obligatur ad exhibendam reverentiam Deo. Et ad haec duo
pertinent omnes actus qui religioni attribuuntur, quia per omnes homo protestatur
divinam excellentiam et subjectionem sui ad Deum. . . . Summa Theol., 11-11,
q. 81, a. S ad 2um.

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WALTER FARRELL

is beneath God, while at the same time he has an insight into
his own dignity from the knowledge he has of his sources.
Obviously, man's subjection to God is not a humiliation of
himself, since it is one and the same act of recognition of the
truth of divine excellence.
We pay God honor and reverence, not for His sake (because He
is of Himself full of glory to which no creature can add anything) ,
but for our own sake, because by the very fact that we revere and
honor God, our mind is subjected to Him; wherein its perfection
consists, since a thing is perfected by being subjected to its superior;
for instance, the body is perfected by being quickened by the
soul ... 11
This is man's place, this is where he belongs; and a man is not
humiliated, debased, or impeded in his progress to perfection
by being in his proper place any more than the human eye is
humiliated, debased, or impeded by being in its propel," place in
a human head.
This is a paltry payment for so great a debt. Indeed, the
magnitude of the debt is itself a complete guarantee that our
payment will be inadequate.
Religion is . . . a moral virtue . . . and observes a mean . . . in
actions directed to God, by establishing a kind of equality in them.
And when I say equality, I do not mean absolute equality, because
it is not possible to pay God as much as we owe Him, but equality
in consideration of man's ability and God's acceptance. 12
On this score, then, we need not be afraid of going too far;
since the debt exceeds our greatest efforts to liquidate it, there
can be no question of our ever paying too much.
11 ••• Deo reverentiam et honorem exhibemus, non propter seipsum, quia ex
seipso est gloria plenus, cui nihil a creatura adjici potest, sed propter nos, quia
videlicet per hoc quod Deum reveremur, et honoramus, mens nostra ei subjicitur;
et in hoc ejus perfectio consistit; quaelibet enim res perficitur per hoc quod subditur
suo superiori, sicut corpus per hoc quod vivicatur ab anima, ... Summa Theol.,
II-II, q. 81, a. 7 corp.
u . . . religio est virtus . . . moralis . . . et medium in ipsa accipiatur . . .
secundum quamdam aequalitatem inter operationes quae sunt ad Deum. Dico
autem aequalitatem non absolute, quia Deo non potest tantum exhiberi, quantum
ei debetur, sed secundum quamdam considerationem humanae facultatis, et divinae
acceptionis. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 81, a. 5, ad Sum.

VIRTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

847

And it is possible to have too much in matters pertaining to the
Divine Worship, not as regards the circumstance of quantity, but
as regards other circumstances, as when Divine worship is paid to
whom it is not due, or when it is not due, or unduly in respect of
some other circumstance. 13
There can be no such thing as too much religion, though it is
possible to have serious neglect of things that must not be
neglected under the invalid excuse of religious exercises.
On the other hand, we are not to be blamed or discouraged
at the miserly amount we can pay on our debt to our first
principle.
Virtue is praised because of the will, not because of the ability: and
therefore if a man fall short of equality which is the mean of
justice, through lack of ability, his virtue deserves no less praise,
provided there be no failing on the part of his will.H
A man who throws his life on the counter in payment of his
debt of religion is hardly making a princely gesture if we consider the infinite perfection and riches of God. What will this
add to the life of God?
In offering a thing to a man on account of its usefulness to him,
the more needy the man the more praiseworthy the offering, because
it is more useful: whereas we offer a thing to God not on account of
its usefulness to Him, but for the sake of His glory, and on account
of its usefulness to us.15
On both counts, then, this is the supreme religious gesture:
for by it a man has given all that he has to give, and he has
by that fact touched the peak of moral perfection, if only for
the moment of his victorious surrender.
Ibid.
" ... laus virtutis in voluntate consistit, non autem in potestate; et ideo deficere
ab aequalitate, quae est medium justitiae, propter defectum potestatis, non diminuit
laudem virtutis, si non fuerit defectus ex parte voluntatis. Summa Theol., q-. 81,
a. 6, ad 1um.
15 ••• in his quae exhibentur
aliis propter eorum utilitatem, est exhibitio
laudabilior quae fit magis indigenti, quia est utilior. Deo autem non exhibetur
aliquid propter ejus utilitatem, sed propter ejus gloriam, nostram autem utilitatem.
Ibid., ad 2um. Confer 8Upra, footnote 11.
13

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WALTER FARRELL

The virtue of religion is a household virtue. It puts man in
his proper place as a servant in the divine household, busying
him in that humble service that is yet his greatest perfection
and at the same time his full tribute of reverence and honor
to the divine excellence. Religion is busy about the household
tasks. " God is related to religion not as matter or object, but
as end: and consequently religion is not a theological virtue
whose object is the last end, but a moral virtue which is properly about things referred to the end." 16 Faith, hope, and
charity, looking directly to God as to their object, are the
superiors of the virtue of religion; religion bows to them and
moves at their command. But this is the only obeisance
religion need make in the company of virtues.
In the busy moral life of man, the life consumed in handling
the means to the end of man, religion stands supreme.
Whatever is directed to an end takes its goodness from being
ordered to that end; so that the nearer it is to the end, the better
it is. Now moral virtues ... are about matters that are ordered
to God as to their end. And religion approaches nearer to God than
the other moral virtues, in so far as its actions are directly and immediately ordered to the honor of God. Hence religion excels among
the moral virtues.' 7

This, then, comes first: before justice and all its other allied
virtues, before temperance and its allied virtues, before fortitude and its allies, before prudence itself; for this is the fundamental virtue for the orderly conduct of man's moral life.
It is important to notice that for a man thus to apply himself and his acts to God by religion, two conditions are essential.
16 ••• Deus non comparatus
ad virtutem religionis sicut materia vel objectum,
sed sicut finis. Et ideo religio non est virtus theologica, cujus objectum est ultimus
finis; sed est virtus moralis, cujus est esse circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Summa
Theol., 11-11, q. 81, a. 5 corp. Confer ibid., ad 1um.
1't ••• ea quae sunt ad finem, sortiuntur
bonitatem ex ordine in finem; et ideo
quanto sunt fini propinquiora, tanto sunt meliora. Virtutes autem morales, ...
sunt circa ea quae ordinantur in Deum sicut in finem. Religio autem magis de
propinquo accedit ad Deum quam aliae virtutes morales, in quantum operatur ea
quae directe et immediate ordinantur in honorem divinum. Et ideo religio praeminet inter alias virtutes morales. Summa Theol., 11-II, q. 81, a. 6 corp.

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For cleanness is necessary in order that the mind be applied to
God, since the human mind is soiled by contact with inferior things,
even as all things depreciate by admixture with baser things, for
instance, silver by being mixed with lead. Now in order for the
mind to be united to the Supreme Being it must be withdrawn from
inferior things; and hence it is that without cleanness the mind
cannot be applied to God .... Again, firmness is required for the
mind to be applied to God, for it is applied to Him as its last
end and first beginning, and such things must needs be most immovable. . . . 18'
Without this spiritual cleanliness and stability, religion will not
play a predominant role in a man's life, which is to say that
human life will be fundamentally disordered throughout.
With this cleanliness and stability, however, religion can
proceed to its acts: internal acts, which are religion's principal
and per se acts; and the external acts which are secondary and
ordered to the internal acts.
Now the human mind, in order to be united to God, needs to be
guided by the sensible world. . . . Wherefore in the Divine worship it is necessary to make use of corporeal things, that man's mind
may be aroused thereby, as by signs, to the spiritual acts by means
of which he is united to God. Therefore the internal acts of religion
take precedence of the others and belong to religion essentially,
while its external acts are secondary, and subordinate to the
internal acts. 19 These external things are offered to God, not as
though He stood in need of them, ... but as signs of the internal
and spiritual works, which are of themselves acceptable to God.
18 Munditia enim necessaria est ad hoc quod mens Deo applicetur, quia mens
humana inquinatur ex hoc quod inferioribus rebus conjungitur; sicut quaelibet res
ex immixtione pejoris sordescit, ut argentum ex immixtione plumbi. Oportet autem
quod mens ab inferioribus rebus abstrahatur, ad hoc quod supremae rei possit
conjungi. Et ideo mens sine munditia Deo applicari non potest. . . . Firmitas
etiam exigitur ad hoc quod mens Deo applicetur; applicat enim ei sicut ultimo
fini et prima principia; hujusmodi autem oportet maxime immobilia esse. Summa
Tkeol., II-II, q. 81, a. 8 corp.
19 Mens autem
humana indiget, ad hoc quod conjungatur Deo, sensibilium
manuductione, ... Et ideo in divino cultu necesse est aliquibus corporalibus uti,
ut eis quasi signis quibusdam mens hominis excitetur ad spirituales actus, quibus
Deo conjungitur. Et ideo religio habet quidem interiores actus quasi principales, et
per se ad religionem pertinentes; exteriores vera actus quasi secundarios, et ad interiores actus ordinatos. Summa Tkeol., II-II, q. 81, a. 7 corp.

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WALTER FARRELL

Hence Augustine says: The visible sacrifice is the sacrament or
sacred sign of the invisible sacrifice.20
Man, being what he is, must have external religious acts; but
these will always remain secondary and ordered to the internal
acts by which he is religiously united to God, i. e., by which he
reverences and honors God, subjecting himself.
Looking back, now at the virtue of religion (from which
vocation springs) we see it as a virtue working at the payment
of the debt due to God as the First Principle of our being and
government. It does this by its tribute of reverence and honor
for the excellence of God, of subjection for the divine principality; both ·by the single act of worship, which is no more than
the honest recognition of God's superior place.
Religion, then, is a matter of honesty in meeting one's debts;
it is a matter of order, of hierarchy in a man's life, in recognizing the superiority of the first principle; and a matter of privilege, for by that very subjection which puts order in a man's
life, he is himself perfected.
The debt religion deals with is unpayable of its very nature;
obviously, we cannot in our turn he first principle to God. We
can never, then, pay too much on that debt; there can be no
excess in the matter of religion, there can be only abuses of the
circumstances of time, place and so on in the placing of religious
acts. On the other hand, there is no room for despair at the
paltriness of our best efforts in meeting this debt, for the
measure of our efforts is not our power to pay but our willingness to acknowledge the debt and offer what we have.
Religion is a moral virtue, busy with the means by which
a man strides to his last end. So, it is beneath the theological
virtues which soar directly to that last end. But it is supreme
among all the moral virtues because, among them, it approaches
most closely to the end of man's whole life. Its external acts
20 ••• hujusmodi e:xteriora non e:xhibentur Deo, quasi his indigeat: . . . Sed
e:xhibentur Deo tamquam signa quaedam interiorum, et spiritualium operum, quae
per se Deus acceptat. UndeAugnstinus dicit in 10 de Civ. Dei, cap. 5, parum a
princ.: Sacrificium visibile invisibilia aacrificii sacramentum, id est sacrum signum
ut. Ibid., ad 2um.

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351

(necessary because man is what he is, a creature of body and
soul) exist only for the internal acts by which man actually
pays the debt due to God, the debt of worship. For these acts,
internal and external, he needs cleanliness and stability. In
proportion as he plunges into things beneath him, he becomes
increasingly incapable of religious acts; as he fixes his hold on
wavering supports, he has less capacity to hold fast to the immovable principles of his being and government.
This summary of the characteristics of the virtue of religion
will, as we shall see, take on peculiar significance in dealing with
the household virtues that establish order in the domestic, the
patriotic, and the social world. For what has been said of religion relative to the whole life of man is proportionately true
of these virtues in their own proper sphere. It is time now to
look at these virtues and their origin in some detail.

* * * * * *
Objects of Service Other Than God
Under God, man has other principles of his being and government which, by the very fact of sharing in the principality of
God, lay solid claim to reverence and subjection from men.
The descent from religion through these other virtues will be a
gradual one proportioned to the lessening share in the divine
principality enjoyed by these other principles .
. . . whatever man renders to God is due, yet it cannot be equal,
as though man rendered to God as much as he owes Him. . . . In
this respect religion is annexed to justice. . . . Secondly, it is not
possible to make to one's parents an equal return of what one owes
to them ... ; and thus piety is annexed to justice, for thereby, as
Tully says (loc. cit.), a man rendeTs service and constant deference
to his kindred and the well-wishers of his country. Thirdly, according to the Philosopher, man is unable to offer an equal meed for
virtue, and thus observance is annexed to justice, consisting according to Tully (loc. cit.) in the deference and honor rendered to those
who excel in worth. 21
21 ••• quidquid ab homine Deo redditur, debitum est, non tamen potest esse
aequale, ut scilicet tantum homo ei reddat, quantum debet. . . . Et secundum hoc

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WALTER FARRELL

according to the various excellences of those persons to whom
something is due, there must needs be a corresponding distinction of
virtues in a descending order. Now just as a carnal father partakes
of the character of principle in a particular way, which character is
found in God in a universal way, so too a person who, in some way,
exercises providence in one respect, partakes of the character of
father in a particular way, since a father is the principle of generation, of education, of learning and of whatever pertains to the
perfection of human life: while a person who is in a position of
dignity is as a principle of government with regard to certain things:
for instance, the governor of a state in civil matters, the commander
of an army in matters of warfare, a professor in matters ofilearning
and so forth. . . . Therefore, just as, in a manner beneath religion,
whereby worship is given to God, we find piety, whereby we honor
our parents, so under piety we find observance, whereby reverence
and honor are paid to persons in positions of dignity .22
God is the absolutely first principle of our being and government. This divine principality is shared by our parents, as the
first in the line of secondary causes; it is further shared by our
country; and, in varying degrees, by individual men. From
all of these we, in some sense, spring; by all of them we are
guided to happiness, governed. To all of them, then, in lessening degrees, we owe unpayable debts.
adjungitur justitiae religio. . . . Secunda, parentibus non potest secundum aequalitatem recompensari quod eis debetur ... ; et sic adjungitur justitiae pietas, per
quam, ut Tullius dicit loc. cit. sanguine iunctia patriaequae benevolia officium et
diligens tribuitur cultus. Tertio, non potest secundum aequale praemium recompensari ab homine virtus . . . et sic adjungitur justitiae obaervantia, per quam, ut
Tullius dicit, loc. sup. cit., homines aliqua dignitate antecedentes quodam cultu et
honore dignantur. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 80, a. 1.
•• . . . necesse est ut eo modo per quemdam ordinatum descensum distinguantur
virtutes, sicut excellentia personarum quibus est aliquid reddendum. Sicut autem
camalis pater particulariter participat rationem principii, quae universaliter invenitur in Deo, ita etiam persona quae quantum ad aliquid providentiam circa nos
gerit, particulariter participat proprietatem patris, quia pater est principium et
generationis, et educationis, et disciplinae, et omnium quae ad perfectionem humanae
vitae pertinent; persona autem in dignitate constituta est sicut principium gubernationis respectu aliquarum rerum; sicut princeps civitatis in rebus civilibus, dux
autem exercitus in rebus bellicis, magister autem in disciplinis; et simile est in aliis.
. . . Et ideo sicut sub religione, per quam cultus tribuitur Deo, quodammodo
invenitur pietas, per quam coluntur parentes, ita sub pietate invenitur observantia,
per quam cultus et honor exhibetur personis in dignitate constitutis. Summa Theol.,
11-II, q. 102, a. 1.

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Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways, according to their various excellence and the various benefits received
from them. On both counts God holds first place, for He is
supremely excellent, and is for us the first principle of being and
govemment. In the second place, the principles of our being and
government are our parents and our country, that have given us
birth and nourishment. Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his
parents and his country, after God. Wherefore just as it belongs to
religion to give worship to God, so does it belong to piety, in the
second place, to give honor to one's parents and one's country. 28

* * * * * *
Virtue of Service in the Home-Piety
The virtue of piety, as it is spoken of by St. Thomas, extends
to both parents and country. However, since in ordinary usage
we speak of piety towards country as patriotism, throughout
the rest of this paper we shall reserve the word " piety " for
piety towards parents, calling piety towards country "patriotism." 24
Piety, then, ranking immediately below religion among these
virtues dealing with unpayable debts, has for its work towards
parents in the narrower field of domestic life what religion does
towards God in the whole field of moral life. 25 What has been
said of the virtue of religion can be said, preserving the proper
proportion, of the virtue of piety; it has exactly the same task,
in a narrower and secondary field, to be performed in proportionately the same way.
•• ... homo efficitur diversimode aliis debitor, secundum corum diversam excellentiam et diversa beneficia ab eis suscepta. In utroque autem Deus summum
obtinet locum; qui et excellentissimus est, et est nobis essendi et gubernationis principium; secundario vero nostri esse et gubernationis principia sunt parentes et patria,
a quibus et in qua nati et nutriti sumus. Et ideo post Deum est homo maxime
debitor parentibus et patriae. Unde sicut ad religionem pertinet cultum Deo
exhibere, ita secundario gradu ad pietatem pertinet exhibere cultum parentibus et
patriae. Summa The.ol., ibid., q. 101, a. 1. Cf. ibid., q. 81, a. 4.
•• The question as to whether the difference between piety and patriotism is
merely verbal or real, with its consequent question of one or two virtues expressed
by these words, is a matter of discussion among theologians.
•• Cf. supra, footnotes 22 and 28.

2

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WALTER FARRELL

... the good to which religion is directed is to give due honor to
God. Again, honor is due to someone under the aspect of excellence:
and to God a singular excellence is competent, since He infinitely
surpasses all things and exceeds them in every way. Wherefore to
Him is special honor due: even as in human affairs we see that
different honor is due to different personal excellences, one kind to
a father, another to the king, and so on.26
Like religion, then, piety is a matter of honesty, of order, and
of privilege. It is a matter of honesty, for it is a matter of
paying a debt: the debt we owe our parents as principles of our
being and government. More concretely, we owe them reverence and subjection; reverence for their excellence (or superiority
to us) as principles, and subjection by reason of that principality. Both of these, reverence and subjection, are actually
paid in one and the same act of veneration or honor, just as
religion in its one act of worship both reverences God and
subjects man to Him. There is a sharp difference here between
the subjection of a man to parents as a principle of direction
and the subjection involved in the reverence paid to a principle
of being.
The prince is compared to the father as a universal to a particular
power, as regards external government, but not as regards the father
being a principle of generation: for in this way the father should
be compared with the divine power from which all things derive
their being.27
A father is a principle of being immediately under God as first
principle; but he is a principle of external government only
mediately, under the state which is the immediate participant
•• . . . Bonum autem ad quod ordinatur religio, est exhibere Deo debitum
honorem. Honor autem debetur alieni ratione excellentiae. Deo autem competit
singularis excellentia, in quantum omnia in infinitum transcendit secundum omnimodum excessum. Unde ei debetur specialis honor; sicut in rebus humanis videmus
quod diversis excellentiis personarum diversus honor debetur, alius quidem patri,
alius regi, et sic de aliis. Summa Theol., 11-II, q. 81, a. 4.
'" Princeps comparatur ad patrem, sicut universalis virtus ad particularem,
quantum ad exteriorem gubemationem, non autem quantum ad hoc quod pater est
principium generationis; sic enim comparatur ad ipsum virtus divina, quae est
omnium productiva in esse. Summa Theol., II-II, q. IM, a. S, ad lum.

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355

of the principality of God as first principle of direction or government. The reason for this is not hard to see. The governing
principle of all means (with which these virtues of the unpayable debts alone deal) is the end. Now God is the final end of
man, and so the first principle of direction or government; the
state is an intermediary end further ordered to the final end of
man's happiness, and, as an end, can be a limited principle of
direction or government; but parents are in no sense an end
of the children. What principaljty they have in government
will be participated from the state, or exercised by way of
regency during the immature years of the child. 28 This last is
of no small importance; it really means that the dependency of
the child under this aspect, and so its obligation to honor, reverence, and give subjection, is quite complete during these years,
though it steadily diminishes with maturity. The obligation to
honor, reverence, and subjection to parents as principles of
being endures unchanged for all time.
In this regard, a full statement of the parents' principality of
being reveals the great responsibility this principality lays upon
the parents. ". . . a father is the principle of generation, of
education, of learning and of whatever pertains to the perfection
of human life: ... " 29 • In the ordinary discipline and training of
children, the father is acting as a principle of being, not as a
governor; whoever exercises any share of this training and
discipline is really sharing in the principality of the father as
principle of being. 80
In this matter of the unpayable debt to parents, it is also
true that there can be no such thing as overpaying the debt;
there cannot be too much of piety. What a:buses creep in here
•• Ibid.
•• . . . pater est principium et generationis, et educationis, et disciplinae, et
omnium quae ad perfectionem humanae vitae pertinent. Summa Tkeol., ll-11, q.
1M, a. 1.
•• " . . . so too a person who, in some way exercises providence in one respect,
partakes of the character of father in a particular way, since a father is the principle of generation, etc." (ita etiam persona quae quantum ad aliquid providentiam
circa nos gerit, particulariter participat proprietatem patris, quia pater est principium et generationis, etc.) Summa Tkeol., Ibid.

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WALTER FARRELL

are due to other circumstances than the circumstance of quantity. The debt is unpayable by its very nature; it cannot be
overpaid. The very best we can give in payment will still seem
paltry; yet, our payment is not to be judged by our incapacity
but by our will to pay the debt. 31
Piety, like religion, is a matter of order. It does for the
domestic sphere what religion does for all of moral life; showing
man clearly what is above him, and by that fact making plain
his own place in the domestic circle. It establishes, then, the
fundamental order in the home. The child is beneath the
parent, the son beneath the father, in a subjection of reverence
and honor; yet that subjection is not to the child's degradation
but to its perfection. For the payment of this debt to parents,
like the payment of the religious debt to God, is not for the
perfection of the parents or their utility, but primarily for the
perfection of the child. 32 Our reverence and honor and subjection add nothing to the principality of the parents; they add
much to the perfection of ourselves. 33 True enough, parents
have not the infinite perfection of God, and so there is none of
the same impossibility of our working for their benefit. But
this payment of the debt of piety will, of itself, do no more for
the parents than ease a little of the hunger of the human heart
for appreciation and gratitude.
Accidentally, it may indeed
happen that our parents have dire need of our assistance; in
that case, in the name of the honor we owe them as principles,
we are obliged to come to their assistance. But this is by way
of exception and accidentally: in themselves, the parents are,
in their capacity of principles, to provide for the child, not the
child for the parent.
We owe something to our parents in two ways: that is to say, both
essentially and accidentally. We owe them essentially that which
is due to a father as such; and since he is his son's superior through
being the principle of his being, the latter owes him reverence and
service. Accidentally, that is due to a father which it befits him to
receive in respect of something accidental to him, for instance, if he
31
32

Confer supra, footnotes 12 and 14.
Confer supra, footnote 11.

33

Ibid.

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357

be ill, it is fitting that his children should visit him and see to his
cure; if he be poor, it is fitting that they should support him; and
so on in like instance, all of which come under the head of service
due. 34
Since a father stands in the relation of principle, and his son in the
relation of that which is from a principle, it is essentially fitting for
a father to support his son: and consequently he is bound to support him not only for a time, but for all his life, and this is to lay
by. On the other hand, for the son to bestow something on his
father is accidental, arising from some momentary necessity, wherein he is bound to support him, but not to lay by as for a long time
beforehand, because naturally parents are not the successors of
their children, but children of their parents. 35

Just as religion does not look primarily to the goodness of
God but to His excellence and principality, so piety does not
look primarily to the goodness of parents; goodness is the proper
object of love, not of piety. This reverence, honor, and subjection owed to parents is not in itself dependent on love for
the parents; it is a debt that flows from their very position as
principles of being and direction. Love, of course, will increase
piety, and piety will usually lead to love and the increase of
love. But this right to the payment made by piety, is not one
which the parents surrender by the character of their lives. 36
•• ... parentibus ... aliquid debetur dupliciter: uno modo per se; alia modo
per accidens. Per se quidem debetur eis id quod decet patrem, in quantum pater
est: qui cum sit superior, quasi principium filii existens, debetur ei a filio reverentia
et obsequium. Per accidens autem aliquid debetur patri, quod decet eum accipere
secundum aliquid quod ei accidit; puta si sit infirmus, quod visitetur et ejus curationi intendatur; si sit pauper, quod sustentetur, et sic de aliis hujusmodi, quae
omnia sub debito obsequio continentur. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 101, a.
Confer
ibid., ad lum.
•• ... quia pater habet rationem principii, filius autem habet rationem a principia existentis, ideo per se patri convenit ut subveniat filio; et propter hoc non
solum ad horam debet ei subvenire sed ad totam suam vitam, quod est thesaurizare.
Sed quod filius aliquid conferat patri, hoc est per accidens ratione alicujus necessitatis instantis, in qua tenetur ei subvenire, non autem thesaurizare quasi in longinquum, quia naturaliter non parentes filiorum, sed filii parentum sunt successores.
Summa Theol., II-II, q. 101, a.
ad
•• " The object of love is the good; the object of honor or reverence, however, is
something excellent." ( ... objectum amoris est bonum; objectum autem honoris
vel reverentiae est aliquid excellens.) Summa Theol., II-II, q. 81, a. 4, ad Sum.
ad
Confer ibid., q.
a.

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WALTER FARRELL

How far should that respect for parents go? Well, at the very
least, it must include not only honor, but all the becoming acts
that rule the relations of one man to another. " ... in veneration, there is to be understood not only honor, but also whatever else pertains to the becoming acts by which one man is
ordered to another." 37
Like religion, piety also demands, as conditions dispositive
to its activity, a certain cleanliness and stability. After all,
it is looking to what is above; the sordidness that infects the
mind from commerce with what is beneath man is no preparation for consideration of superior things. Moreover, the whole
activity of piety circles around the principles of man's being
and government; and principles, as stable, enduring elements
in a man's life, demand a firmness and loyalty from the man
who would hold fast to them. 88 As with the acts of religion,
where the external ones are ordered to and exist for the internal
acts, so in the acts of piety; the honor, reverence, and subjection externally manifested are for the internal by which
alone a man takes his proper place in the family, really venerating the parents to whom he is so hopelessly indebted. 39 The
debt of piety extends beyond parents to all blood relations, yet
never loses that essential aspect of a debt to parents; for the
veneration we give blood relations is precisely because of their
relationship to common parents. 40
A house without piety can hardly lay title to the hallowed
name of home. It is lacking in fundamental order; it is not so
much disordered as in chaos. No one really belongs here, for
no one has his place in such an establishment.
The child's
37 ••• in cultu non solum intelligitur honor, sed etiam quaecumque alia quae
pertinent ad decentes actus quibus homo ad alium ordinatur. Summa Theol., II-IT,
q. 102, a.
ad 1um.
•• Confer supra, footnote 18.
•• Confer supra, footnote 19.
•o "The honor due to our parents includes the honor given to all our kindred, since
our kinsfolk are those who descend from the same parents." (In cultu autem
parentum includitur cultus omnium consanguineorum, quia etiam consanguinei ex
hoc dicuntur quod ex eisdem parentibus processerunt .... ) Summa Theel., II-II,
q. 101, a. 1.

VIRTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

859

rights are as vague as his obligation; the parents' responsibilities as dimly seen as their duties. It is a topsy-turvy domestic
world committed to a condition of civil war and selfish rivalry.
It is a dishonest establishment, since it has eliminated the fundamental honesty involved in the recognition of the fundamental
domestic debt. It is no place of privilege or perfection for the
child, who is given no reason here for that reverence, honor and
subjection that would do so much to perfect him; there is no
hierarchy here, the child must fight for what he can get, and,
of course, the child loses, never more emphatically than when
he has his way.

* * * * * *
Virtue of Service to Country-Patriotism
Pa..triotism, or piety towards one's country, is the next virtue
in the descending scale of these virtues which deal with unpayable debts. It operates in the particularized field delimited by
the principality of one's country in the being and government
of a man. It is a principle of being in a tertiary sense, below
the secondary principles who are the parents; it is a principle
of government in a secondary sense, beneath the first principle
of government who is God. This has all been explained in the
past few pages. In this sense, a man's country is one of his
sources, his principles; as such it lays valid claim in justice to
reverence, honor and subjection from him. The facing of this
debt is, in the patriotic field, a matter of order, honesty, and
privilege as it was in the domestic and religious domains.
The common good is not the object of patriotism, any more
than the goodness of God, or the welfare of the parents is the
object of religion and piety. These virtues do not look to the
good but to the excellent by reason of principality; what patriotism aims at is the recognition of the superiority of one's
country, in the limited field of its superiority, and the subjection
of man in that same limited field. Patriotism, then, is not
primarily a matter of love ef country as it is a matter of service
to country, fundamentally, the service implied in the veneration

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WALTER FARRELL

of country that includes reverence, honor and subjection. Love
of country contributes to patriotism, as patriotism does to love
of country; but they must be clearly distinguished, as charity
and religion must be distinguished, if we are to understand the
true place and dignity of patriotism.
Preserving the proper proportions, all that was said of religion
and of piety must be repeated of patriotism. It guarantees
the fundamental order in the national scene, showing a man his
proper place by insisting on what is above him; thereby letting
him know with certainty what is beneath him, that he might
protect his rights as well as fulfill his duties. Patriotism is
primarily a matter of honesty, not of sentiment; there cannot
be too much of it, nor is the least offering to be despised if the
will behind it is above the reproach of stinginess or selfishness
in payment of this unpayable debt.
too, has its external and internal acts, of which the external are ordered to the internal. In our usual consideration of
patriotic acts, we concentrate on the good to the state coming
from them; actually, they exist for the internal act of patriotism by which a man really pays on the debt to his principles
of being and government. For the payment of this debt is not
for the utility of the principles but of the debtors to those principles; it does not, itself, add to the principality of the state,
but it does, in itself, add considerably to the perfection of the
citizen. For the object of patriotism is not the common good,
but the debt owed to the principality of the state; it exists for
the ordering of a man within the national life, and for the
ordering of all his acts that contribute to that nationallife. 41
For the activity of patriotism, it is necessary to have, by way
of disposition, a certain cleanliness and stability, on proportionately the same grounds as was outlined above for the activities
of the virtues of religion and piety. For patriotism, too, looks
" "Piety extends to our country in so far as the latter is for us a principle of
being: but legal justice regards the good of our country, considered as the commo11
good ... " ( ... pietas se extendit ad patriam, secundum quod est nobis quoddam
essendi prindpium; sed justitia legalis respicit bonum patriae, secundum quod est
bonum commune: ... ) Summa Theol., II-II, q. 101, a. S, ad Sum.

VIRTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

361

to superior principles; cleanliness is essential for the vision
of superior things, stability for the continued contact with
principles.
Without patriotism, the nation is no longer a community
but a mob whose members are intent on destroying each other.
There is no order, no hierarchy, no basis for anything but chaos.
No reverence, honor or subjection. Consequently, the national
life of the community is basically undermined by a fundamental
dishonesty which totally disregards the fundamental debt of the
citizen. The individual citizen, of course, loses; he has no place
here, all the privileges of his place and the perfection of it is
denied him; he cannot detect usurpers of his rights, nor defend
himself against them. The national life going on about him
must be as terrifying to the individual citizen as the ravings of
a maniac are to a sane, normal person. 42

* * * * * *
Virtue of Service to Men-Observance
The virtue of observance has to do with a double debt, the
debt owed to those in authority and that owed to superiors in
virtue and knowledge. St. Thomas insists that both are unpayable, but not for the same reason: the virtuous and the learned
cannot, on that score alone, lay claim to principality over other
men; while those constituted in authority unquestionably do
in the principality of the state .
. . . the fact that a man has perfection of science and virtue does
not give him the character of a principle in relation to others, but
merely a certain excellence in himself.43
It belongs to persons in positions of dignity to govern subjects.
Now to govern is to move certain ones to their due end: ... But
•• A detailed analysis of the virtue of patriotism can be fouud in Qualities of
Citizenship in St. Thomas, by Gerard Joubert, 0. P., Catholic Univ. Press (Washington, 1942) .
•• Ex hoc autem quod aliquis habet perfectionem scientiae vel virtutis, non
sortitur rationem principii quantum ad alios, sed solum quamdam excellentiam in
seipso. Summa Theol., ll-II, q. 102, a. 1, ad 2um.

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WALTER FARRELL

every mover has a certain excellence and power over that which
is moved. Wherefore a person in a position of dignity is an object
of twofold consideration: first, in so far as he obtains excellence of
position, together with a certain power over subjects: secondly, as
regards the exercise of his government. In respect of his excellence
there is due to him honor, which is the recognition of some kind of
excellence; and in respect of the exercise of his government, there is
due to him worship, consisting in rendering him service, by obeying
his commands, and by repaying him, according to one's faculty,
for the benefits we receive from him. 44
The man constituted in authority, precisely as such, participates the principality of the state. When service to him is
viewed formally in relation to the common good, that service
is a work of patriotism and deserves no further treatment here.
But when it is viewed in a more personal fashion, in relation,
namely, to the glory or utility of the one constituted in authority, then it comes squarely under observance. It is in just this
way that we are talking about the principality of legitimately
constituted superiors and the debt owed them when we speak
of the virtue of observance. 45 In this sense there is little difficulty appreciating the validity of the superiority to which
the debt of reverence and subjection are due. It is a shared
principality-shared either with the parents or with the state
according to the particular office and work of this individual
•• ... ad eos qui sunt in dignitate constituti, pertinet gubernare subditos.
Gubernare autem est movere aliquos in debitum finem, ... Omne autem movens
habet excellentiam quamdam et virtutem supra id quod movetur. Unde oportet
quod in eo qui est in dignitati constitutus, primo consideretur excellentia status
cum quadam potestate in subditos; secunda, ipsum gubernationis officium. Ratione
igitur excellentiae debetur ei honor, qui est quaedam recognitio excellentiae alicujus;
ratione autem officii gubernationis, debetur ei cultus, qui in quodam obsequio consistit, dum, scilicet aliquis obedit eorum imperio, et vicem beneficiis eorum pro suo
modo rependit. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 102, a. 2.
•• ... personis in dignitate constitutis potest aliquid exhiberi dupliciter: uno
modo in ordine ad bonum commune, puta cum aliquis eis servit in administratione
reipublicae: et hoc jam non pertinet ad observantiam, sed ad pietatem, quae cultum
exhibet non solum patri, sed etiam patriae. Alio modo exhibetur aliquid personis
in dignitate constitutis pertinens specialiter ad personalem eorum utilitate vel
gloriam: et hoc proprie pertinet ad observantiam secundum quod a pietate distinguitur. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 102, a. S.

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363

superior-and partakes of the same character of a debt beyond
our power to pay. All that was said, then, of religion, piety,
and patriotism, carefully preserving the proper proportion of
a steadily diminishing principality, must be said of the virtue
of observance in regard to those constituted in authority. It
hardly seems necessary to repeat those details again in this
paper, particularly if it is kept in mind that all these virtues are
concerned with a fundamental order, and that their absence
means chaos in the particular field of action proper to each
virtue.
The debt owed to the learned and virtuous is, however,
another matter. St. Thomas himself insisted that such preeminence did not give one man principality over another, as we
have noted on the preceding page. It might be argued that
excellence in learning and knowledge, in whomever it is found,
is a kind of principle to others by way of inspiration and emulation moving other men to greater efforts. St. Thomas seems
to suggest that this excellence in learning and virtue makes men
potentially constituted in authority/ 6 though he does not press
the point as the basis for honor and reverence to these people;
he merely uses this as an explanation of why he reduces such
honor and reverence to the virtue of observance.
The real reason why men incur a debt to the virtuous and
learned is not because of the principality they enjoy over other
men, but simply because virtue and learning are things for
which no payment can be made. The implication plainly made
here is that such excellence is a boon to those who haven't got
it, as well as a perfection of those who have. 47 In this light,
•• "Yet, forasmuch as science, virtue and all like things render a man fit for
positions of dignity, the respect which is paid to anyone on account of any excellence whatever belongs to the same virtue." (Verum, quia per scientiam et virtutem,
et omnia alia hujusmodi aliquis idoneus redditur ad dignitatis statum, reverentia
quae propter quamcumque excellentiam aliquibus exhibetur, ad eandem virtutem
pertinet.)
Sum'lni:£ Theol., II-II, q. 102, a. l, ad 2um.
47 " It belongs to special justice, properly speaking, to pay the equivalent to those
to whom we owe anything. Now this cannot be done to the virtuous, and to those
who make good use of their position of dignity, as neither can it be done to God,
nor to our parents." ( ... ad justitiam specialem proprie sumptam pertinet reddere

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WALTER FARRELL

observance furnishes a fundamental principle of order to the
social life of men. It is highly unlikely that we shall ever meet
a man who is inferior to us in every way; that is, in every
man there will be some title to superiority on the basis of which
he has just claim to the payment we reserve for unpayable
debts, namely, honor and reverence, with a certain amount of
subjection. It is worth noting that there is no question here of
mineral, plant, or animal excellence in our neighbors; but of
excellence of mind and will, the distinctively spiritual excellencies. Contempt for men, then, would necessarily involve an
inversion of the social order possible only in a condition of
blindness that would obscure all of another man's excellency.

* * * * * *
Primary Act of Religion-Devotion

(Religious Morale)

These household virtues of religion, piety, patriotism, and
observance are the virtues which attend to the orderly management of a man's life with God, with his family, with his fellow
citizens, and with his fellow men. As virtues, they are good
habits which, therefore, exist for the acts which spring from
them. As we have seen, all of them have both internal and
external acts, of which the external exist for the internal acts.
aequale ei cui aliquid debetur. Quod quidem non potest fieri ad virtuosos et ad
eos qui bene statu dignitatis utuntur, sicut nee ad Deum, nee ad parentes.) Summa
Theol., II-II, q. IO(t, a. I, ad Sum.
" Wherefore in two ways may a virtue directed to another person fall short of the
perfection of justice: first, by falling short of the aspect of equality; ... For
certain virtues there are which render another his due, but are unable to render
equal due. In the first place, whatever man renders to God is due, yet it cannot be
equal. ... Secondly, it is not possible to make to one's parents an equal return.
. . . Thirdly . . . man is unable to offer an equal meed for virtue. . . . " (Dupliciter ergo aliqua virtus ad alterum existens a ratione justitiae deficit a ratione
aequalis; uno modo, in quantum deficit a ratione debiti. Sunt enim quaedam virtutes
quae debitum quidem alteri reddunt, sed non possunt reddere aequale. Et primo
quidem quidquid ab homine Deo redditur, debitum est, non tamen potest esse
aequale . . . Secundo, parentibus noll- potest secundum aequalitatem recompensari.
. . . Tertio, non potest secundum aequale praemium recompensari ab homine
virtus .... ) Summa Theol., II-II, q. 80, a. unic.

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365

Among these internal acts, one will be first. This one act, then,
is the immediate reason for the existence of the virtue and for
all the other acts of the virtue; in the analysis of that one act,
we have the quintessence of the virtue and all its activity.
We have seen the ordered interrelation of these virtues; they
begin with religion and descend in a gradual scale proportioned
to the gradually diminishing participation in the principality
that in its fullness is proper to God. What is said of one of
them can be said of all the others, keeping the proper proportion of the principles to which they make payment on an unpayable debt. This same thing, then, will be true of the acts of
these virtues, and particularly of the first act to which all others
are ordered; what can be said, for instance, of the first act of
religion can also be said of the first act of piety, of patriotism,
and of observance-always keeping the proper proportion of
these virtues. If, then, we can obtain a sharp, accurate knowledge of the first act of religion, we have the key to the secret of
the orderly management of all man's relations with others: with
God, with family, with country, with fellow men.
This first act of religion is called devotion. 48
Devotion comes from the idea of dedication and those were called
devout or devoted who in some way dedicated themselves to God
so as to be utterly His. Therefore devotion is nothing other than
promptitude of will in those things that concern the worship of God.
Since it is evident that this is a special act, it follows that devotion
is a special act of the will.49
•• An exhaustive study of the texts of St. Thomas to trace the development of his
thought on devotion can be found in " The Thomistic Concept of Devotion," by
John W. Curran, 0. P., THE THOMIST, Vol. II, no. 3 & 4 (July, 1940 and October,
1940). This study is of considerable importance, for St. Thomas' solution of the
problem of devotion is one of his strikingly original contributions to theological
thought.
•• Devotio dicitur a devovendo: unde devoti dicuntur qui seipsos quodammodo
Deo devovent ut ei se totaliter subdant; . . . Unde devotio nihil aliud esse videtur
quam voluntas quaedam prompte tradendi se ad ea quae pertinent ad Dei famulatum. . . . Manifestum est autem quod voluntas prompte faciendi quod ad Dei
servitium pertinet, est quidem specialis actus. Unde devotio est specialis actus
voluntatis." Summa Theol., II-II, q. 82, a. 1.

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WALTER FARRELL

Devotion is the act of the will by which man offers himself to God
to serve Him Who is the ultimate end. 50
We are not far wrong in the use of the word in its adjectival
form, speaking of a devout prayer, a devoted wife, a devoted
patriot, devoted children; for in all of these cases we are emphasizing the reverence, honor and subjection that is expressed
in particularly willing service.
Devotion is the first and most important act of religion. The
internal acts, as we have seen, are the most important acts of
religion; of these there are just two, namely, devotion and
prayer. Devotion is the more important of these two.
The will moves the other powers of the soul to its end, . . . and
therefore religion, which is in the will, directs the acts of the other
powers to the reverence of God. Now among the other powers of
the soul the intellect is the highest, and the nearest to the will; and
consequently after devotion which belongs to the will, prayer which
belongs to the intellective part is the chief of the acts of religion,
since by it religion directs man's intellect to God.51

It is easy to understand the importance of the key position of
devotion if we follow the three immediate implications of its
source in the will of man. It subjects the will of the creature to
the Creator; the whole will, for devotion has no other material
than willing to offer. Now the whole moral life of a man is successful or unsuccessful according to the nod his will gives to
virtue or to vice; the consent of the will is, by devotion, given to
the service of God. Thus, the whole moral life of a man is
offered in the act of devotion. 52 We must be careful here not to
identify devotion with its heroic degree, just as we must not
"" ... devotio sit actus voluntatis hominis offerentis seipsum Deo ad ei serviendum, qui est ultimus finis, . . . Ibid., ad lum.
01 ••• voluntas movet alias potentias animae in suum finem, ... et ideo religio,
quae est in voluntate, ordinat actus aliarum potentiarum ad Dei reverentiam. Inter
alias autem potentias animae intellectus altior est, et voluntati propinquior; et ideo
post devotionem, quae pertinet ad ipsam voluntatem, oratio quae pertinet ad partem
intellectivam, est praecipua inter actus religionis, per quam religio intellectum
hominis movet in Deum. Summa Theol., 11-11, q. 83, a. 3, ad lum.
•• Curran, "The Thomistic Concept of Devotion," THE THOMIST, II, 4, p. 554,
574, 578.

VIRTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

867

identify charity with heroic sanctity. Any degree of devotion
offers the whole will of man to the service of God, as any degree
of charity loves God above all things; and devotion is, in fact,
found in beginners and the imperfect, as also is true charity.
Devotion not only offers the whole will, it offers a prompt
will. Devotion offers the will itself to God. " And since it is impossible to conceive of sluggishness in such an offering, a special
promptitude is to be found in devotion," 58 not as a mere accidental mode of the act of devotion, but as part and parcel of
that act.
Finally, devotion stamps a :r;node upon every other act of
religion, and every other act that is ordered to the service of
God.
The mover prescribes the mode of the movement of the thing
moved. Now the will moves the other powers of the soul to their
acts, and the will, in so far as it regards the end, moves both itself
and whatever is directed to the end. . . . Wherefore, since
devotion is an act of the will whereby a man offers himself for the
service of God Who is the last end, it follows that devotion prescribes the mode to human acts, whether they be acts of the will
itself about things directed to the end, or acts of the other powers
that are moved by the will.54
The mode imposed by devotion on every other act of religion is
that of prompt, even eager, service.
Obviously, then, devotion is not to be detected by touch,
sight or smell; the " odor of sanctity " is a purely metaphorical
description. This act of religion is an act of the will; not a
matter of emotion. Without it there are no acts of religion;
the payments on the unpayable debt of religion are made with
prompt will or they are not made at all. This act of devotion is
•• Ibid., pp. 576, 577.
•• ... movens imponit modum motui mobilis. Voluntas autem movet alias vires
animae ad suos actus; et voluntas secundum quod est finis, movet seipsam ad ea
quae sunt ad finem. . . . Et ideo cum devotio sit actus voluntatis hominis o:llerentis
seipsum Deo ad ei sei:viendum, qui est ultimus finis, consequens est quod devotio
imponat modum humanis actibus, sive sint actus ipsius voluntatis circa ea quae
sunt ad finem, sive etiam sint actus aliarum potentiarum, quae a voluntate
moventur. Summa Tkeol., 11-ll, q. 82, a. 1, ad lum.

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WALTER FARRELL

the core of man's religious life; that life stands or falls with the
presence or absence of devotion.
This act of devotion in its highest degree is what we mean by
the human side of religious vocation. This eager will to serve
God, carried to the length of stripping oneself of all else that
the service might be complete, is what we mean when we say
that this person has a vocation. This is the thing to be fostered,
protected, nourished for the good of the Church and the welfare of men. This is religious morale in its highest form. To
know the causes of devotion, to be aware of the threats to it and
the impediments that hinder it, is to be in a position to work
most effectively in the cause of vocations.
God is the principal and extrinsic cause of this all-important
act of devotion. Nevertheless, there is much to be done on our
side, both by way of causing devotion and by way of removing
the impediments to it. Considering the fundamental importance
of devotion for all of a man's religious and moral life, the
concrete determination of our possibilities in its production is
worthy of the most careful consideration.
First of all, we can, obviously, prepare ourselves.
It belongs to a virtuous man not only to make good use of his
matter or instrument, but also to prepare opportunities for that
good use. 55
He that prepares not his soul before prayer by forgiving those
against whom he has anything, or in some other way disposing
himself to devotion, does not do what he can to be heard by God,
wherefore he tempts God implicitly as it were. And though this
implicit temptation would seem to arise from presumption or indiscretion, yet the very fact that a man behaves presumptuously
and without due care in matters relating to God implies irreverence
towards Him. 56
•• Ad virtuosum pertinet non solum convenienter uti sua materia vel instrumento,
sed etiam praeparare opportunitates ad bene utendum; ... Summa Theol., II-IT,
q. 117, a. 8, ad 2um.
••me qui ante orationem animam suam non praeparat, dimittendo quid adversum
aliquam habet, vel alias ad devotionem se non disponendo, non facit quod in se
est, ut exaudiatur a Deo; et ideo quasi interpretative tentat Deum. Et quamvis
hujusmodi interpretativa tentatio videatur ex praesumptione seu indiscretione pro-

VffiTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

369

Our preparation, in other words, must at least consist in removing the impediments to devotion. Where there is no concrete impediment, there still must be some positive preparation
for this first and all-important act of religion.
Among the impediments mentioned, just in passing, by St.
Thomas are all those inferior things that enmesh the mind of
man and debase it, 57 since without purity the mind cannot be
applied to God. Then, too, there is the consideration of all
foreign matters that distract the mind from things that are apt
to awaken the love of God within us. 58 Perhaps some of the
most powerful impediments to devotion are to be found in those
things that contribute, at least in their disordered state, to selfsufficiency and presumption.
Science, and anything else conducive to greatness, is to man an
occasion of self-confidence, so that he does not wholly surrender
himseif to God. The result is that such-like things sometimes
occasion a hindrance to devotion; while in simple souls and women
devotion abounds by repressing pride. 59
With these impediments eliminated, we are ready, on our
side, to put the positive causes of devotion to work. One of
these is, of course, love.
. . . charity both causes devotion (inasmuch as love makes one
prompt to serve one's friend) and feeds on devotion. Even as all
friendship is safeguarded and increased by the practice and consideration of friendly deeds.60
venire, tamen hoc ipsum ad irreverentiam Dei pertinet quod homo praesumptuose
et sine debita diligentia se habeat in his quae ad Deum pertinent. Summa Theol.,
II-II, q. 97, a. 3, ad 2um.
57 Summa Theol., II-II, q. 81, a. 8 corp. vid. supra, footnote 18.
58 • • • the consideration of anything whatsoever that does not pertain to things
apt to awaken our love of God but distracts our mind from them impedes devotion
(consideratio quorumcumque ad hoc non pertinentium, sed ab eis mentem distrahentium, impedit devotionem.) Summa Theol., II-II, q. 82, a. 3, ad 1um.
•• Scientia et quidquid aliud ad magnitudinem pertinet, occasio est quod homo
confidat de seipso; et ideo non totaliter se Deo tradat. Et inde est quod hujusmodi
quandoque occasionaliter devotionem impediunt; et in simplicibus et mulieribus
devotio abundat, elationem comprimendo. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 82, a. 3, ad Sum.
60 • • • charitas
et devotionem causat, in quantum ex amore aliquis redditur

3

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WALTER FARRELL

this consideration (of God's goodness) awakens love which is
the proximate cause of devotion. 61
The root cause of devotion, however, from the aspect of our
part in it, is meditation. The matter is so important that we
had hetter let St. Thomas talk for himself at some length.
But the intrinsic cause on our part must needs be meditation or
contemplation. For it was stated above that devotion is an act of
the will to the effect that man surrenders himself promptly to the
service of God. Now every act of the will proceeds. from some consideration, since the object of the will is a good understood ....
Consequently meditation must needs be the cause of devotion, in so
far as through meditation man conceives the thought of surrendering himself to God's service. Indeed a twofold consideration leads
him thereto. The one is the consideration of God's goodness and
loving kindness ... and this consideration awakens love which
is the proxi,mate cause of devotion. The other consideration is that
of man's own shortcomings, on account of which he needs to lean
on God . . . and this consideration shuts out presumption whereby
man is hindered from submitting to God, because he leans on his
own strength. 62
Matters concerning the Godhead are, in themselves, the strongest
incentive to love and consequently to devotion, because God is
supremely lovable. Yet such is the weakness of the human mind
that it needs a guiding hand, not only to the knowledge, but also
promptus ad serviendum arnica, et etiam per devotionem charitas nutritur; sicut et
quaelibet amicitia conservatur et augetur per amicabilium operum exercitium et
meditationem. Summa Theol., II-II, q.
a.
ad
01 • • • haec consideratio excitat dilectionem, quae est proxima devotionis causa.
Ibid., a. S, corp.
02 Causa autem intrinseca ex parte nostra oportet quod sit meditatio
seu eontemplatio. Dictum est enim art. 1 huj. quaest. quod devotio est quidam voluntatis
actus ad hoc quod homo prompte se tradat ad divinum obsequium. • Omnis autem
actus voluntatis ex aliqua consideratione procedit, eo quod bonum intellectum
est objectum voluntatis. . . . Et ideo necesse est quod meditatio sit devotionis
causa, in quantum scilicet homo per meditationem concipit quod se tradat divino
obsequio. Ad quod quidem inducit duplex consideratio: una quidem quae est ex
parte divinae bonitatis et beneficiorum ipsius ... et haec consideratio excitat
dilectionem, quae est proxima devotionis causa. Alia vera est ex parte hominis considerantis suos defectus, ex quibus indiget ut Deo innitatur . . . ; et haec consideratio excludit praesumptionem, per quam aliquis impeditur ne Deo se subjiciat,
dum suae virtuti innitur. Summa Theol., II-IT, q.
a. S.

VIRTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

871

to the love of Divine things by means of certain sensible objects
known to us. Chief among these is the humanity of Christ, according to the words of the Preface, that through knowing God visibly,
we may be caught up to the love of things invisible. Wherefore
matters relating to Christ's humanity are the chief incentive to
devotion, leading us thither as a guiding hand, although devotion
itself has for its object matters concerning the Godhead. 63

Meditation, then, from our side is the principal cause of
devotion. It is to be noticed that St. Thomas has not made an
exhaustive nor exclusive statement of the material for the
meditation which leads to devotion; he has done no more than
lay down the most general principles. From these principles,
the world itself is laid open as a book for our meditation: anything that pertains to the goodness of God, to His loving kindness, and (though Thomas took this as obvious after all that
was said on the virtue of religion and its object) anything that
pertains to the excellence of the first principle. On the other
hand, all that pertains to the defects of man will also lead to
devotion to one who carefully considers them. By way of example, St. Thomas says that the very things that are an occasion of impeding devotion can be a cause of its increase: " If
a man perfectly subjects his knowledge, or any other perfection whatever, to God, from that very fact, his devotion is
increased." 64 The strong language of St. Thomas makes the
formidable conclusion inescapable: without meditation there
can be no devotion.

* * * * * *
•• Ea quae sunt Divinitatis, sunt secundum se maxime excitantia dilectionem, et
per consequens devotionem, quia Deus est super omnia diligendus; sed ex debilitate
mentis humanae est quod sicut indiget manuductionem ad cognitionem divinorum,
ita ad dilectionem per aliqua sensibilia nobis nota; inter quae praecipuum est
humanitas Christi, secundum quod in Praefatione dicitur: Ut, dum vi.ribiliter Deum
cognoscimus, per kunc in invisibilium amorem rapiamur. Et ideo ea quae pertinent
ad Christi humanitatem, per modum cujusdam manuductionis, maxime devotionem
excitant; cum tamen devotio principaliter circa ea quae sunt Divinitatis consistat.
Ibid., ad flum.
•• Si tamen scientiam et quamcumque aliam perfectionem homo perfecte Deo
subdat, ex hoc ipso devotio augetur. Summa Tkeol., 11-ll, q. 82, a. Sad Sum.

WALTER FARRELL

Primary Act of Piety-Domestic Devotion (Domestic Morale)
We have seen the exact parallel and the intimate interdependence of the virtues that deal with the settlement of unpayable
debts-religion, piety, patriotism, and observance. They are
arranged in a descending grade, with a steadily more limited
field; but so exactly parallel that what is said of one can be said
of another, keeping in mind the difference in the field of each
virtue. This same thing is, obviously, also true of the principal
act of each of these virtues. All of them demand reverence and
subjection to principles of being and operation; and that reverence and subjection is primarily in the will of men. " It belongs
to the same virtue to will to do something, and to have the will
prompt to do it, because both acts have the same object." 65
From this, St. Thomas concludes that devotion is an act of
religion; it can be as validly concluded that each of these household virtues has a parallel act of devotion which can be accurately described from the detailed description St. Thomas has
already given of religious devotion.
To escape the dangers of ambiguity, let us use the word
" morale " instead of " devotion " to describe the first act of
each of these virtues; thus, we shall talk of religious morale,
domestic or filial morale, patriotic morale, and social morale.
We are now in a position to delineate in detail what Thomas
makes clear only in principle concerning the acts of these virtues
under religion.
Domestic or filial morale, then, is the prompt will to give oneself to the service of parents. It effects both the reverence of
parents and the subjection of children in one and the same act of
veneration or service. It is a matter of order, putting both
children and parents in their proper place in the family hierarchy; a matter of honesty, the payment of a debt due to the
parents as principles of being and government-and this in65 ••• ad eamdem virtutem
pertinet velle facere aliquid, et promptam voluntatem habere ad illud faciendum, quia utriusque actus est idem objectum. Summa
Theol., II-II, q. 82, a. 2. Confer ibid., q. 81, a. 1, ad Sum; q. 101, a. 1; q. 102, a. 1.

VIRTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

373

eludes generation, education, discipline, and all things that
pertain to the perfection of human life; a matter of privilege,
for it is precisely in this subjection to a superior that the child is
himself perfected.
This domestic morale is the first act of the virtue of piety.
From it, and through it, all other acts that pertain to, or are
ordered to, the family must flow; and this under pain of there
being no family acts at all. Domestic morale puts its stamp of
promptitude on all other moral acts pertaining to the family,
marking them with a mode of willingness that is proper to
domestic morale and shared by all other family acts; for it is
the mover to the ends of the family, and its characteristics are
the characteristics of all motion to the family goals.
Moreover, all other family acts, both internal and external,
exist for the sustenance and increase of this family morale. It is
internal and first; all external acts are ordered to the internal,
and all internal acts ordered to the first internal act. The
obedience, respect, courtesy and so on which is demanded of
children in the name of piety, in fact all that pertains to the
perfection of the child's life, are not for show, not for the gratification of the parents, but for the domestic morale which is
piety's act of devotion; ultimately, then, for the reverence of
parents through the perfection of the child in its inner act of
domestic morale.
Domestic morale is caused by love and causes love. It is,
above all, brought about through meditation (or loving
thought) on the excellence of the parents as principles, on the
initial and enduring dependence of the child on the parents, and
on all things that reveal or emphasize either this excellence or
this dependence. It is caused and increased by a conscientious
preparation for family acts, and particularly for this supreme
act of domestic morale. Its impediments will be all base things
that enslave the mind and heart of man, things beneath the
level and dignity of the family; for purity is an essential for the
consideration of such superior things as the principles of our
6jJ

66

Summa Theol., II-II, q. 102, a. 1.

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WALTER FARRELL

being and government. It will be impeded by any exaggeration
of the child's independence; and everything that contributes to
the glorification of the child's own capacities can easily be an
occasion of the presumption that nullifies the possibility of
domestic morale. What lowers the child's estimation of his
parents will certainly undermine, if not destroy, domestic
morale. And this domestic morale will be seriously hindered
by all that distracts the mind from the fundamental considerations of parental excellence and filial subjection; things, for
instance, like a home that for most of the time has nobody in it,
extremes of amusement, activities outside the home, or ceaseless
activity within the home. Domestic morale demands, and
cultivates, a certain firmness and stability, for it swings around
the principles of being and government.

* * * * * *
Primary Act of Patriotism-Patriotic Devotion
(Patriotic Morale)
The same body of truth that has been esta:blished concerning
religious devotion is applicable, with the proper limitations, to
the first act of the virtue of patriotism, patriotic devotion or
patriotic morale. It is the prompt will to serve one's country.
It is the
first act of the virtue of patriotism, the first and
fundamental subjection that fixes a man's proper place, establishing the hierarchy of patriotism. With this act order is established and continued; inferior things cannot usurp places above
men, men can know their rights and their duties. It, too, is a
matter of order, of honesty which makes payment on.an unpayable debt, and of privilege, perfecting the citizen by the very
subjection to a superior. It recognizes one's country as a principle of being and of government; in that recognition there is
implied the reverence for excellence and the subjection to
principality which make up the essence of the honor due to
one's country.
It is the first and most fundamental act of the virtue of

VIRTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

375

patriotism. From it, all other acts that pertain to or are ordered
to one's country must flow; and all other acts, internal or external, are ordered to and exist for this internal act of patriotic
morale. We have made much of civil obedience, of military
service, of political duties, and rightly so. Yet, in emphasizing
these things, it must not be overlooked that their absence is
much more damaging to the delinquent citizen than it is to the
country; for all these external things are for the internal act of
patriotic morale which perfects the individual citizen.
Morale building, then, in the sense of patriotic morale, is not
really a mysterious affair. Love of country will cause patriotic
morale, and will be caused by patriotic morale; but the two
are not so closely tied together as to be inextricable. Love
is not the spring from which patriotic morale flows; its reverence
and subjection are due to the country under the precise aspect
of a principle of being and government. It is not unusual to find
an intense patriotic morale in men who have been very badly
treated by their country; whatever the treatment received, it
still remains true that this country is a principle of their being
and government.
The immediate and most direct cause of patriotic morale
from our side is meditatio11.,reiterated consideration of the excellence of that principle of our being and its consequent
superiority in that limited field, and our dependence on and
subjection to it. Immersion in baser things, in interests inimical
to country, or beneath the dignity of patriotic thought is certainly an impediment to the development of patriotic morale;
for without purity, men cannot apply their minds to superior
things. What lowers our country and its leaders in our estimation is a definite impediment to morale, undermining our estimation of their excellence; it should be a grave threat indeed to
the common good that would justify revelation of things that
go far to impede patriotic morale. Again, what tends to
exaggerate our independence of our country, in the political
field in which we depend on it, is again hindrance to political
morale, fostering a political presumption that is basically false.

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WALTER FARRELL

Then, too, there must be some preparation of soul ·for the
placing of patriotic acts, particularly of the first act which is
patriotic morale. And there must be a certain firmness or
stability on the part of the citizens in this matter, since they are
here dealing with things as enduring and immobile as principles.
A nation that attempts to exist without patriotic morale, i. e.,
without the first act of patriotism, is hoping for the impossible;
in fact, it is to all practical purposes already dead. Where
patriotic morale is at a low ebb, that is, where this first act of
patriotism is a lukewarm, flaccid thing, the country will be disordered, dishonest, and debasing to its citizens. A semblance
of external order might be kept by a reign of terror, and for a
short time; but the fundamental principles of order have been
disregarded. Here there is no place for a man; and so, no place
for his superiors or his inferiors. There is no hope for justice
where the fundamental debts of the citizens are denied. There
is none of the perfecting action of discipline. The external acts
won by paternal bribery or terroristic brutality are by no stretch
of the imagination ordered to the perfection of the individual
citizen. This is a nation which is the enemy of its citizens, and
whose citizens are everyone an enemy of the nation.

* * * * * *
Primary Act of Observance-Social

Devotion (Social Morale)

Social morale, the first act of the virtue of observance, has
the same role to play in the relationship of individual men that
domestic morale plays in the family and patriotic morale in the
state. It furnishes the foundation of mutual respect among
men, recognizing and respecting superiority of virtue and learning, and the universal scope of men's varying excellencies. It,
too, demands purity, abstraction of mind from baser things,
and a certain stability. It, too, springs from love and causes
love; it, too, demands meditation on the excellencies of men and
the subjection of ourselves. It is a matter of order, of honesty,
and of the privilege of perfection. Without it, men are enemies.

VffiTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

877

No surer confirmation of this need be sought than the tragic
effectiveness of the tale-bearer and the gossip who focus men's
minds, not on the excellencies of men, but on their deficiencies;
of the braggart who focuses his attention on his own excellencies and blinds himself to his inferiority to other men better
in one way or another. A veneer of civilization may hide this
enmity of man to man for a time; but it is not possible to make
fundamental disorder appear orderly. All other acts pertaining
to or ordered to the social life of men must flow from and be
ordered to this social morale, which imprints its eager stamp on
every act in the properly ordered social life of men. It is a
prompt will to serve men, recognizing the just grounds of that
service and perfecting itself in that recognition.

* * * * * *
Conclusion

Before concluding this brief study, one more implication of its
investigation of the virtues of service should be pointed out,
that is, the very close interdependence of these virtues in a
gradually descending scale. Piety hangs from religion as the
superiority of parents hangs from their share in tlie principality
of God; patriotism hangs from piety and religion; observance
from religion, piety, and patriotism. Obviously, if religion is
cut off at the top of this chain, the rest will not hang in midair; if the debt due to God is denied, the shared debt due to
others will hardly be taken seriously. The collapse of morale
in our time has its fundamental causes; it will not be stayed by
superficial remedies.
The obvious conclusion of this study has been the identification of religious vocation, on its human side, with an intense act
of devotion, the primary act of the virtue of religion. And the
recognition of the first act of the virtue of patriotism as that
mysterious thing which the moderns identified vaguely as
"morale" has been seen as nothing other than patriotic devo-

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WALTER FARRELL

tion, an act of virtue to be cultivated through the cultivation
of the virtue.
In the course of this double clarification, much has been said
of all the virtues of the household, the virtues dedicated to the
service of others in payment on unpayable debts: the virtues
of religion, piety, patriotism, and observance with their proper
acts. There is still much to learn a:bout these virtues and the
morale which is their first and fundamental act. Indeed, this
study has been hardly more than an opening up of horizons for
further and much more profound thinking on the household
virtues through the explicit statement of what St. Thomas left
implicit in his treatment of these virtues. The further implications of such an explicit statement are so vast as to furnish
abundant material for profound and extensive study. That
further study must, however, be left to other and more capable
hands.
WALTER FARRELL,

Dominican HO'Ulle of Studiu,

Waahmgton, D. C.

O.P.

WAYS TO KNOW GOD
THE "SYMBOLIC THEOLOGY" OF DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE
AND ITS FACTUAL PRESUPPOSITIONS '1.

I. Preparatory Considerations
1. The Areopagitica.

One may distinguish three main
spiritual currents which powerfully fashioned Western men1 The author, Sister Theresia Benedicta a Cruce, 0. C. D., who in the world was
Dr. Edith Stein, mailed the manuscript of this article to Professor Marvin Farber,
tht' editor of the Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, in the
fall of 1941. Prof. Farber submitted it to the present translator for use and
publication. Since then no reliable information has been obtainable on the fate
the author suffered. She had left the Carmelite convent at Lindenthal-Cologne
and found refuge in the convent of Echt in Holland. Because of her Jewish descent
either she was forced to leave Germany or it was considered prudent to have her
lt'Bve. It has been reported, by apparently reliable sources, that she was later
arrested by the Germans and put in a concentration camp in Poland, where she
is said u; have died, presumably being killed. But no definite confirmation of thi!
has reached this country. On Dr. Stein's previous work in philosophy and her
intellectual and religious development, see the article by J. Collins, "Edith Stein
and the Advance of Phenomenology," Thought, 1942, XVII, 68i; also "The Fate
of .Edith Stein," ibid., 1948, XVIII, 824.
The study presented here is obviously intended as a sort of introduction to
further investigations into the problem indicated by the title. Whether any of
these studies are extant we do not know; a great work on ontology, to which the
author referred in a letter to Professor Farber of the same date as this manuscript,
was completed. The printing of it, however, was forbidden by the German authorities; the fate of the book is unknown at the present time. This information is owed
to the courtesy of Professor Farber.
The reader acquainted with Husserl's phenomenology will recognize his influence
in the present article. It seems to have been the intention of the author to make
use of certain ideas, developed within Husserl's school, for the elucidation of metaphysical and theological problems. Her having grown up, as it were, in the
atmosphere of phenomenology-she was for many years Professor Husserl's assistant
-causes the author to use a certain technical language the rendering of which
into English is not always easy. It has been the endeavor of the translator to
avoid such technicalities as far as possible, so as to make the text intelligible to
those not acquainted with this particular branch of contemporary philosophy. Anyone who wishes to know more about it should consult Marvin Farber's Phenomenology
as a Method and as a Philosophical Discipline, Buffalo, 1928. Although there
remain certain passages in connection with which some explanation or comment
might be desirable, the translator has refrained from adding anything to the original
text. R. Allers.

879

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SISTER THERESIA BENEDICTA A CRUCE

tality throughout the Middle Ages and have descended from
there as a still effective living heritage to our own times. Revelation as contained in the Scriptures is presupposed therein
as a firm foundation. The three currents are different means
by which to comprehend this Scriptural content, to appropriate
it internally, to incorporate the Divine Word into the products
of human endeavor, and thus to attain a living whole built up
from Divine and human wisdom. The effect of these three
currents is plainly visible in the work of St. Thomas, and the
influence they had in later times was, perhaps, furthered more
by the writings of Aquinas than by those of any other author.
The three currents referred to are Greek thought, particularly
that of Aristotle, the life work of St. Augustine, and the legacy
Upon the mention of these names the
of the "Areopagite."
reader realizes immediately that there can be no question of
three strictly separate currents. The minds of St. Augustine
and of Dionysius were formed, each in its own way, by Greek
thought; their work represents the first great attempt at clarification, which was resumed later under their guidance. For this
reason the influence of these two authors is essentially of another nature than that exercised by the Greek philosophers.
Some may be surprised at seeing the "Areopagite" placed
side by side with Aristotle and St. Augustine; but this is hardly
an exaggeration of his influence. Acquaintance with the ideas
and writings of Dionysius seems today to be limited to a small
circle of specialist scholars and some few " amateurs." But
the range of his influence is much wider than that of the knowledge about him. He dominated Western thought from the
9th to the 16th century, having been recognized as an authority
by the Church since the 6th century and considered as one of
the great sources used in the fights for purity of doctrine. In
the literature on Dionysius published during the last decades
the statement that this writer owed his great influence mainly
to his name recurs constantly. He has so far been spoken of in
the present article as the " Areopagite." This usage springs
from a certain embarrassment on the part of the author. The

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WAYS TO KNOW GOD

books under discussion emerged towards the end of the fifth
century under the name of Dionysius; that is, we have no
earlier testimonies of their existence. The writer did not call
himself Areopagites. But he speaks of St. Paul as his teacher
and he dedicated his works to a fellow priest Timotheus; he also
refers in some passages, as if he were an eyewitness, to certain
events which were generally considered to be the eclipses at the
death of Christ and the death of the Virgin; 2 furthermore, his
letters are all addressed to persons bearing names pertaining to
the Apostolic age. It was, therefore, assumed that the author
was no other than the member of the Areopagus of whose conversion we hear in the Acts. 8 Early .doubts concerning the
authorship were gradually silenced and came to the fore again
only in the age of Humanism. A thorough analysis of the
spiritual environment as it can be gathered from certain peculiarities of the Areopagitica led, a few decades ago, to the generally accepted conclusion that these texts cannot possibly have
originated during the Apostolic age. 4 The majority of experts
hold today that the works were written at the end of the fifth
century.
It has become customary to call the author" Pseudo-Dionysius." The quotation marks used hitherto with the name
"Areopagite" are, presumably, sufficient to. indicate that the
present writer does not consider the author of the " Areopagitica " as the disciple of St. Paul. If he is called from now on
Dionysius or Areopagite, no misunderstanding need be feared.
To comment on the question of who speaks by or hides under
this name does not pertain to the scope of the present article.
The intentions of the author in assuming the name of Areopagite cannot be determined as long as we do not know who the
actual author was.
• Let. VII, P. G., III, 1081 ff.; De divin. nom., c.
• Acts, XVII, SS f.

§

P. G., III, 681 ff.

• The studies to be considered in first line are by P. J. Stiglmayr and H. Koch.
For the literature on Dionysius see 0. Bardenhewer, Geschichte dl?/1' altchristlichen
Liti?/T'atur, Freiburg i. B.,
Vol. IV.

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SISTER THERESIA BENEDICTA A CRUCE

We have in our hands, however, as an indubitable possession
the corpus Dionysiacum, consisting of four long treatises and
ten letters. There are 23 Greek and 32 Latin manuscripts of
these works in the Occidental libraries. The facts of the entrance into and the influence upon medieval spiritual life of this
corpus are discernible with an unusual clarity. It is a mere
legend that the Areopagite was the first bishop of Paris and
buried in the Abbey of Saint Denis. But it is a historical fact
that the Areopagitic writings started their victorious march
through the Western world from this Abbey. It is not within
the scope of this article to follow the historical development of
the influence of these works. The intention is rather to present
one aspect of the peculiar spiritual world to be envisioned in the
Areopagitic texts and thus to allow their factual importance to
shine forth. The standpoint assumed here may be of interest
to the philosopher as well as to the theologian.
2. The order of being and knowledge according to Dionysius.
Through all the existing writings of Dionysius runs one Leitmotif. St. Albert the Great has used, to render this fundamental
idea, the words of Ecclesiastes: Ad locum, unde exeunt, fiumina
revertentur, ut iterum fluant. 5 This refers, first, to the order
of being: every being proceeds from God as the First and turns
back to Him again. The iterum fiuere after reunion does not
indicate separation but an inclining towards that which stands
on a lower level to lead it upwards too. Therein is implied a
further fundamental feature of the Dionysian world picture:
the order of degrees or steps which he calls Hierarchy. He
defines it as " the whole order of the holy things subjected to
it." 6 The task is to lead back all creation to the Creator.
Like the law of proceeding and returning, of which the hierarchy
is a part, it is not only an order of being but also one of knowledge. A nay, proceeding from the inaccessible light which by its
overluminous splendor veils the First Being to the eyes of
• St. Albert, Opera, ed. Borgnet, Paris, 1892, vol. XIV, p. 1. Commentaria in
Dionysium (Eccles., I, 7) .
• Hier. Eccles., I, § 8, P. G., m, 878. IS 7ras V1I'OKe!fJoF.IIfAII lepwll M-yos,

WAYS TO KNOW GOD

888

creatures, falls first on the beings closest to Him in the created
order, that is, the pure spirits, illuminates them, and is passed
on, in manifold diffraction, to the lower orders down to the
lowest capable of illumination. This applies, in a
sense,
to any being whatsoever. Not all things, indeed, can receive
Divine illumination in such a manner as to become capable of
the knowledge of God and of a free striving towards Him; this
is the case only with the created spirits, angels and men. But
even the lowest creatures, devoid of reason and life, may serve
as tools and symbols of Divine Being and Operation. To this
extent they too are part of the hierarchical order of being and
knowledge, and accordingly are mentioned in the Areopagitic
treatises on the Celestial and Ecclesiastical Hierarchies. But
only the heavenly spirits and the ordained members of the
Church are carriers of the hierarchical operation, messengers of
God, destined to carry the Divine light through creation.
8. The Degrees of" Theology." The following discussion will
consider in some detail one particular aspect of the wider context which the foregoing introductory remarks have sketched.
It is the doctrine contained in the Areopagitic texts on the
knowledge of God, which is in fact the only knowledge with
which Dionysius is truly concerned. He has given a brief survey
in his work on Mystical Theology/ a work of only a few pages
but of great importance because of its content and the enormous influence it gained. It is to this treatise that Dionysius
owes his name "Father of Mystics." This small work must not,
however, be considered as if it were a treatise on mysticism or
a theory of mysticism in the modern sense. To avoid this misunderstanding in the very beginning, one has to realize the
meaning the Areopagite gives to the term "theology"; he does
not conceive of it as either a science or a systematic doctrine
about God. The students of Dionysius emphasize that by
" theology " he means the Scriptures, the word of God, and by
" theologians " he means the authors of the holy books. This is
indubitably true; even a desultory perusal of the Aeropagitica
'P.O .• ill, 997ft'.

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SISTER THERESIA BENEDICTA A CRUCE

easily convinces the reader that the terms are mostly employed
in the sense indicated. But this interpretation does not, it would
seem, do full justice to the texts. The very name of "Mystical
Theology " points to the essential meaning, because it no longer
refers-as will become evident presently-to a speaking about
God. By applying the name of theologian to Daniel, Ezechiel,
or St. Peter, Dionysius intends to indicate not only that these
men are the authors of the books or letters bearing their names,
but also that they are inspired-according to our parlance-and
that they speak of God because God has taken hold of them,
or that God speaks through them. In this sense, the angels too
are theologians, and Christ is the highest of all theologians as
the living Word of God. We reach finally a point where God
Himself has to be designated as the First Theologian. The
diverse theologies distinguished in the theatise on Mystical
Theology are, therefore, not "disciplines" or branches of
science, but diverse manners of speaking of God and the diverse
ways or modes of the knowledge of God (or of our non-knowledge of Him) expressed thereby. Mystical theology figures as
the highest degree of this knowledge. The best rendering of
" mystical theology " would perhaps be " secret revelation."
God is known only when He reveals Himself, and the spirits to
whom He reveals Himself pass on the revelation. Knowledge
and manifestation belong together. The higher, however, the
degree of knowledge, the more dark and mysterious it becomes,
the less it proves feasible to express it in words. The ascent to
God is an ascent in darkness and silence. 8 ·while still at the
foot of the mountain, one may find expressions which prove
somehow adequate expressions. Dionysius himself used such
terms in the works he dedicated to positive theology, 9 i. e., in
the treatises dealing with the chief truths of faith, particularly
with the doctrine on the Trinity and the Incarnation, which he
8 The image of the ascent of a mountain is taken from the story of Moses climbing
the holy mount (Exod. XIX) which Dionysius interprets, in accordance with
Patristic tradition, in a mystical sense. Theol. Myst. I, § S, P. G., ITI, 969 ff.
• " Positive " is used here as opposed to " negative," not in today's general use
of opposed to " speculative."

WAYS TO KNOW GOD

885

says are discussed more fully in his Fundamentals of Theology, 10
and also in relation to the meaning of the Divine names taken
from the spiritual, to which questions he devoted his work on
Divine Names. 11
The Symbolic Theology, on the other hand, studies the names
which are applied to things Divine but taken from the sensible
world. This treatise has not been preserved. The Areopagite
speaks of the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation in
the second chapter of the treatise On Divine Names 12 when he
distinguishes the " theology of difference " from the " theology
of unity"; the former deals with the properties of the Divine
Persons, the latter with the attributes of the whole Deity.
Longer expositions on symbolic theology, as understood here,
are contained in the second and the fifteenth chapters of the
Celestial Hierarchy 13 and in the ninth letter to Titus. 14 A
detailed statement is found in On Divine Names, c. III, sec. 5. 15
The approach which starts from the sensible world is the
lowest of all and allows for breadth. Dionysius declares that it
amounts to a relaxation of the mind when it steps down, in the
Celestial Hierarchy, from the purely spiritual vision" into the
width of manifold shapes of diverse kinds," that is, to the level
of the angels. 16 The more simple the object-and its simplicity
increases with the degree of spirituality-the greater the range
to he embraced by one look, namely, a spiritual look to achieve
10 This work is lost. The critics do not believe that it ever existed or that any
others existed of those to which the author refers but which are not contained in
the corpus Areopagiticum. Cf. Hugo Koch, " Der pseudoepigraphische Charakter
der dionysischen Schriften," Theol. Quart. Schr., 1895, LXXVII, 362 fl'.
11 Scheeben, Dogmatik, Freiburg i. B., 1873, vol. I, p. 423, refers to this treatise
as " the richest work of Patristic times dealing ex professo with the whole doctrine
De Deo uno." This evaluation refers to the Dionysian text plus the commentary
by Maximus Confessor.
12 P. G., ill, 6S5 If.
18 P. G., III, 1S5 If., S25 If.
"P. G., III, nos If.
16 P. G., III, 91S If. If one were not to limit the meaning of "theology"
to
words, but to extend it to all kinds of discussion of things Divine, one would have
to take account of the whole treatise on Ecclesiastical HieJTarchy; to make use of
the narrower sense appears, however, advisable, if only for external reasons.
16 P. G., III, lOSS f.

4

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SISTER THERESIA BENEDICTA A CRUCE

which the mind must concentrate itself with a greater effort
than it needs in the contemplation of the sensible world, and the
greater also becomes the wealth of meaning expressed by brief
words. Accordingly the Fundamentals of Theology and the
treatise On Divine Names permitted a briefer treatment than
proved feasible in the Symbolic Theology. Now, however, on
the level of " mystical theology " we are going to " encounter,
in the immersion into the darkness which is above all comprehension, not only poverty of words but a total lack of words
and of understanding." 17
The way leading to this knowledge is that of negation: the
approach to God by the denial of that which He is not. This
procedure is also one of ascent since it begins at the lowest
level. Positive theology uses the opposite procedure. To ascertain anything in regard to that which is fundamentally
beyond all positing one has to begin, in positive theology, with
that which is more closely related to the object. God is, indeed,
in a higher sense life or goodness than He is air or stone. Negation, on the contrary, must start with things most distant from
Him; it is true in a higher sense that He is not drunken or angry
than that He is not known or named. Negative theology thus
climbs the scale of creation to ascertain on each of its steps that
the Creator is not to be found there. It proceeds farther and
examines all the names positive theology attributes to Him, and
sees itself forced to declare that the meaning of these names
does not prove adequate to Him Who is above all sense.
Negative theology is finally compelled to abolish itself, since
negation applies to Him as little as affirmation. "And if we
affirm or deny anything of that which comes after Him, we
neither affirm or deny Him, because He is above all affirmation
as the perfect and unique cause of all things, and above all
negation as the supereminence of that which is simply absolute
(in the literal sense, sc., of " detached from everything ") and
above and beyond everything." 18 Positive and negative the17

P. G., III, 1047 f.

18

P. G., III, 1047 f.

WAYS TO KNOW GOD

887

ology thus give way to mystical theology when the ascent has
been achieved; this theology ends in complete silence and the
union with the ineffable. Positive and negative theology represent the steps leading upward to the summit of the mountain.
They appear, at first sight, as two different ways by which to
determine the Creator in starting from creation. Their opposition, however, proves to be not exclusive. They complement one
another on every one of the steps. Positive theology rests on the
analogy of being between Creator and creature, the analogia
entis, as St. Thomas says, following Aristotle. 19 Negative theology rests on the fact that there exists side by side with the
"similarity" a "greater dissimilarity," as St. Thomas never
ceases to point out. Both theologies coincide on the height of
" mystical theology," in which God Himself unveils His mysteries but at the same time makes us realize their impenetrability.
II. Symbolic Theology
I. The Areopagitica on "symbolic theology." Dionysius
lists " symbolic theology " as the lowest degree of positive theology. As has been remarked before there are many references
to a book dealing specifically with this topic; this book has not
been preserved. His notion of symbolic theology must be
gleaned, therefore, from pertinent remarks in the texts at our
disposal.
The most explicit statement is found in the ninth letter to
Titus. 20 The holy authors, he says, have presented the mysterious truth which is beyond the grasp of the uninitiated, by
means of images to be deciphered like puzzles. Likewise, Truth
Eternal, the very fount of life, shows Itself in the Divine
Mysteries, i.e., the Eucharist, concealed behind the veil of sensible shapes. Such a language of images demands an exegesis
18 Aristotle, Met. V, 1116 b !1; Aquinas, Q. D. de ver. q. 1, a. 10, ad 1m. In
the latter text there is also reference to the " greater dissimilarity."
•• P. G., lll, 1108 ff. The "letters" of Dionysius are to be considered, probably,
not as letters properly so called but as short treatises cast into this less rigid form
which allows for the presentation of remarks complementary to the longer works.

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SISTER THERESIA BENEDICTA A CRUCE

that crude misunderstandings be avoided; otherwise expressions
like "God's womb" from which proceeds the Son, or the
"breath of His mouth," or God's "wrath," or "ebriety," or
"sleep" might be taken in their literal sense. Holy Writ is full
of such images, apt to scandalize persons lacking proper understanding. But one able to envision the beauty hidden beneath
the image will find them full of God-revealing light. It is the
purpose of these metaphorical expressions to conceal the holy
from the desecrating eyes of the multitude and to reveal it to
those who, striving for holiness, have freed themselves of
childish habits of thought and have acquired the acuity of mind
necessary for the contemplation of simple truths. Thus all
teachers of the Old and the New Covenant have announced God
by means of suitable images; and the angels have manifested
the things divine in mysterious images. Jesus Himself has
spoken in parables and instituted the Blessed Sacrament in the
image of the Supper. It corresponds to human nature that the
light of divine knowledge be attained in such a manner. Our
life is, in fact, divided and undivided at the same time. That
part of the soul which is not under the necessity of receiving
sensible impressions could be destined for the simple and internal contemplation of divine images; it is, however, commensurate to that part of the soul which is subjected to impressions to
be lifted upwards to things divine by typical symbols. 21
According to the words of St. Paul, the whole visible creation
is placed before the invisible essence of God. 22 Therefore, the
holy authors considered some things only in regard to civil
relations and laws, others in full purity; some in a human manner, others supernaturally and in a perfect manner. One must
rise above the customary interpretation and endeavor to penetrate into the meaning of the holy signs and images in a manner
appropriate to holy things to understand, for example, the
image of" fire" which the Scriptures use not only for God Himself,Z3 but also for His word 24 and for the heavenly spirits,
21
22

P. G., III, 1103, § 1.
The reference is probably to Rom., I, 20.

23

24

Deuter., IV, 11 ff., and 24.
Ps., XVII, 31.

WAYS TO KNOW GOD

389

though not in the same sense in each case. A further explicitation and interpretation is given, not in this text but in the
Celestial Hierarchy." 5 When speaking of the angels the author
refers to wheels and living beings made of fire, men fulgurating
like fire, heaps of glowing coal, and streams of fire flowing with
powerful noise. The Thrones are called fiery, and the name of the
Seraphim is interpreted as meaning "the burning." This preferred image is used to express the likeness of the heavenly
spirits to God. That the same image is employed so frequently
for God Himself must have its reason in the fact that fire has
many properties making it suitable for rendering concrete the
Divine Essence: "The sensible fire is, if one may say so, within
all things, passes through all of them, staying pure in itself, and
it is received by all things; although it is wholly luminous, it is
at the same time also hidden and remains unknown, unless it
meets some substance in which it may manifest its power; it is
unmeasurable and invisible, dominates and leads all wherein it
is to achieve the proper work; it has the power to alter things
and allows everything coming close to it to participate in its
nature; it renews everything by vital warmth and illuminates
by the lightning shining forth openly . . . ; it has the force to
separate and is immutable; it mounts upwards and is penetrating ... ; always mobile, it moves itself and other things;
it has the power to comprise other things and is never comprised by them; it is not in need of any other thing; it reveals
the loftiness of its being in all things capable of receiving it
... ; however much it communicates itself by illuminating, it is
never diminished thereby." One cannot fail to recognize in this
description of fire traits reminiscent of the statements on
Divine Wisdom; 26 the modes of speech by means of images and
without them explain one another.
Another image too,
that of the mixing bowl, seems to
be taken from the Books of Wisdom; Dionysius coruments
thereon also in the ninth letter .27 The Scriptures say of the
2 ' Wisdom, VII, 22 ff.
P. G., III, 327; c. XV, § 2.
Prov., IX, 2 f, says that Wisdom mixes the wine; the mixing bowl itself is
not named.
25

27

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SISTER THERESIA BENEDICTA A CRUCE

generous Wisdom that it sets up a mysterious mixing bowl and
dispenses the salutary potion; but first it sets up solid food and,
raising its voice, kindly invites all who need it. Divine Wisdom
thus dispenses two kinds of food, one solid and durable and one
liquid and poured out, and in the mixing bowl it dispenses its
goodness which takes care of every being. The mixing bowl,
which is round and open, serves as a symbol of the all-comprising Providence which simultaneously penetrates and includes everything. It remains within Itself while proceeding
towards all things, stable in immovable sameness, and so stands
the mixing bowl constantly and firmly. But it is said that
Wisdom builds a house for Herself and there serves the solid
food and provides cups and the mixing bowl; by this it is made
clear to all who adequately consider things divine how Wisdom
is at all times and forever the perfect originator of being and of
well-being, how She goes forth to everything, unfolds in the
universe and surrounds all things; and the same (originator) is
also in an eminent sense within Himself and absolutely not and
in no wise whatsoever in any of the things, but separate from
all and the same in Himself in the same manner, eternally being
and persistent, always behaving in the same manner, never
proceeding out of Himself or leaving His proper seat or His
immovable abode and His domestic hearth; rather, staying
therein (or in Herself) she (Wisdom) achieves the whole and
perfect work of Providence, at the same time going forth to
everything and remaining within Herself, simultaneously standing and moved, and not standing and not moved, but, so to
speak, possessing the operation of Her providence in permanence
and the permanence of Her providence in a manner at the same
time commensurate to and transcending nature. 28
" But what is the solid and what the liquid food? It is said,
indeed, of the generous Wisdom that it dispenses and provides
both. The solid food signifies, I believe, the spiritual and lasting
perfection; by this the spiritual senses of those to whom divine
St. Paul, drawing from the well of Wisdom, attributes a share
•• P. G., III, 1109 f.; c. I, § S.

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in the truly solid food, are enabled to participate in the Divine
with a steady, powerful, unified, and undivided knowledge.
The liquid food, on the other hand, signifies, as I see it, the
doctrine which, spread out and flowing forth, tends to pass
beyond everything and lead its pupils through the manifold,
the diverse, and the divided to the simple and undivided
knowledge of God hy means adjusted to the pupils (that is,
to their ability to understand) . For that same reason the
spiritual and divine words are compared to dew and water or
to milk, wine, and honey, because they possess the power to
generate life like water, to further growth like milk, to revive
like wine, to cleanse and also to preserve like honey. This indeed
is the gift of Divine Wisdom to Her followers, that She provides
them with an abundance of plenty and indestructible joy. This
means truly to feed, and therefore She is praised as giving life
and feeding men and also as reviving and effecting perfection." 29
A similar mode of expression is apparent when reference is
made to the " ebriety " of God to indicate the inexpressible
abundant overflow of all goodness which is in God, in the sense
of its origin, before it is sent out. The senselessness, however,
which is characteristic of the state of drunkenness must be related to the eminence of God, to His transcending all senses, to
the fact that He is above all knowing and being known, even
above all being. Thus also, the feast of the Saints in the
heavenly kingdom signifies the singleminded community of the
Saints in the fruition of Divine goodness and the plenitude of
the goods they enjoy; their victory signifies that they rest from
all labors, the invulnerability of their life, their moving in the
light and the realm of the living, since Jesus gladdens them and
allots to each his place, serves them Himself and lavishes on
them the fullness of all goods. 30
Dionysius gives finally a brief explanation of God's "sleeping" or" awakening"; this is found in the concluding parts of
the letter. Divine sleep signifies in God that which is raised
18

lbid .• § 4.

ao Ibid., § 5.

SISTER THERESIA BENEDICTA A CRUCE

above everything and indirectly the things which are governed
by providence. 31 His awakening is interpreted as the attention
which God's providence gives to those who are in need of
education and salvation. 32
Dionysius devotes a passage in another work to an attempt
at clarification of the mode of expression characteristic of" symbolic theology." He proceeds to show that the human mind
endeavors to attain an understanding of the invisible by means
of the visible also on the level of creatures. One may conceive
of the soul after the manner of a corporeal shape and speak of
its parts, although it is strictly indivisible. In this manner of
speaking, the " parts " must be understood differently from
what we mean by the word when we refer to bodies. One may
call the power of intellectual cognition the head; opinion, because it stands between reason and unreason, may be called the
neck, and so forth. That is, one may employ the names of body
parts as symbols for the powers of the soul. It is possible to
speak in a similar manner of God's breadth, or length, or depth,
thus to indicate His going forth to all things, His power extending over everything, and His being hidden and unknowable to
any created being.••

The immediate and mediate significance of symbolic
names. An attempt will be made in the following paragraphs
to uncover the meaning of " symbolic theology " on the basis
of the fragments reported upon above. According to a brief
reference in the Mystical Theology, 34 the question is about the
application of names of sensible things to the divine. 35 We have
to examine what these sensible things are, to what their names
are applied, in what sense this "transference" of names has to
be understood, and finally what kind of relation between the
The manuscript shows in this passage a misprint which makes it difficult to
determine the exact meaning of Sister Theresia. However, the rendering given
above is presumably correct, because it is in accordance with the passage in
Dionysius to which the text refers. R. Allers.
•• De div. nom., IX, § 5, P. G., III, 918 f.
•• Ibid., § 6.
31

•• Theol. Myst., c. III, P. G., III, 1058.
•• -rlves a1TO TWV alaiJ'1)TWV f1TL TCt 8eia p.e-rwvop.la<.

WAYS TO KNOW GOD

898

things signified immediately and those signified mediately is
factually presupposed, on the part of the speaker as well as on
that of the listener.
The passage reported above lists a long series of such " transferences ": forms, shapes, parts, tools, places, adornments,
passion, grief and anger, drunkenness and titubation, oaths,
sleep and wakening. Some of them have appeared in the preceding examples. To one part they are objects of external
perception, things and properties of things, as the mixing bowl,
the shapes of bread and wine, extension through space, or fire;
to another part they are bodily and mental states and processes,
like sleep and waking, ebriety, anger, and the like, or social acts
such as oaths and curses, and events, as in the case of the
wedding feast and other instances mentioned in the Scriptural
parables.
Symbolic language, therefore, derives its expressions from the
fields of external and internal experience and also from what
may be called " experience of life " formed by the concurrence
of very diverse elements. The term " sensible things " must be
taken in a strict sense. It refers, obviously, to all that which
we are accustomed daily to experiencing directly or which
appears before our mental eyes whenever its name is mentioned.
The names are employed in symbolic language to signify something other than that with which we are acquainted by our
daily experience. That to which these names are transferred
is called by the Areopagite "the Divine." He uses this name in
a very wide sense so that it comprises various meanings. This
is evidenced by the use Dionysius makes of this term elsewhere. He not only applies it to God Himself and to everything
pertaining to God's being or to the Sacraments instituted by
God-the Divine Mysteries-but he also calls " divine " the
angels and some men, especially the bishops, 86 and he speaks
of " divine joy " in relation to the consecration of monks, 87 and
so forth. The term occurs almost on every page. It is one of
•• E. g. De Eccles. Hier. c. V, P. G., lll, 505.
•• Ibid., c. IV, 4, P. G., lll, 585.

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SISTER THERESIA BENEDICTA A CRUCE

the expressions for which he has a definite preference and which
characterize his style. The examples show furthermore that
fire is an image for God Himself, for God's Word, and for the
angels. The mixing bowl is a symbol of Divine Providence;
food and drink are images for various forms of instruction,
respectively of the participation resulting therefrom in Divine
Wisdom; they are also the shapes in which the God-Man offers
Himself in a hidden manner; in the latter instance the symbol
is no longer the spoken name but the visible shapes which are
actually present, and they signify not only an intelligible meaning but also a present reality. This last remark, however, deals
with the relation between the symbol and that indicated thereby. For the time being the question is about that to which
"symbolic theology" attempts to lead us through images
gleaned from the world of experience. This goal is in itself manifold and may perhaps be covered best by the name of the
" kingdom of God." It has its reason of being and its unifying
and dominating center in God Himself. It is the true and
ultimate goal with which symbolic theology is concerned. From
Him, however, there proceed and penetrate into the created
they are " Divine ") and thus render " divine " everything
world effects which preserve something of His essence (i. e.,
wherein they are received. All these " emanations " of Divine
essence, everything that is alive in creatures and possesses
likeness to God and that unites them with God into the unity
of the Kingdom of God, all this cannot be grasped by our hands
or seen with our bodily eyes any more than God Himself. These
"things Divine " must, therefore, be intimated, by means of
images taken from the world of natural experience, to humans
living in and bound to this world, the only one they know.
8. The Symbol as Image. How does such an image-language
become possible? Or in other words, what are the factual conditions rendering it possible that this language be spoken and
understood? To attain clarity on this point, it is necessary to
inquire into the particular sense in which the word "image"

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395

is used in the present context. All the preceding remarks
suggest that in this instance, too, no unequivocity is to be
expected. It seems best to begin once more with the expressions Dionysius himself uses. He concludes the list of" images "
reported above with the succinct summary: " and how many of
holily shaped forms of symbolic representations of God there
may be." 38
Concerning the word " image " one has to realize that the
relation of image is not necessarily implied in the original meaning. The notion of" throwing together" has assumed different
meanings in Greek parlance. Those which come closest to the
problems here considered may be comprised under the heading
of "mark by which something may be recognized"; in this
sense, as a means for recognizing one another, the creed was
called by the Christians the "symbol." The term connotes
furthermore" characteristic" and, finally," sign." Other expressions used in this context render us aware that the "symbol"
must be considered as an " image." In this regard we are told
that we have to do with something "formed," that is, formed
or shaped by someone after the manner in which an artist
shapes his work (this is implied in the expressions ro?To> and
also ?T..\onro>); that accordingly it is a "formation" suitable for
sensory apprehension (p.Opcfxl)cm), and that it refers to God as
an ideal to its realization, or an image to the original.39
The notion of " formation " or the " formed " and " shaped "
38 Theol. Myst. c. ill, P. G., ill, 1053 f., ... Kal lluat lf.}l.}l.a, rijs uvp.{JoA<Kiis
Elut Oeorv1rlas lep67rAauro< p.op<jJwuets. Neologisms like Oeorv1rla and lep61rXauros

belong to peculiarities of the Areopagitic style. Translation of such terms is always
difficult and runs the risk of missing the correct meaning. The terms chosen here,
however, are an inevitable necessity. Tv7ros means "prefiguration" in the sense
in which it is said that Christ is prefigured in the Old Testament, not as the
origitial, but in the manner of the nonessential by which or in which the essential
announces itself.
•• The German expressions here and elsewhere allow for certain implications
indicative of an inner kinship between terms and their significations, which are lost
in translation. Bilden (to form), Gebilde (what is formed, configuration), and
Bild (image) are linguistically related, as is furthermore einbilden (impressing or
imprinting a form, also incorporating) and Urbild, original. Thus, certain subtle
innuendos cannot be perfectly rendered. R. Allers.

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SISTER THERESIA BENEDICTA A CRUCE

also has a twofold signification: one has to think on one hand
of that which is presented to us by "theology," that is, the
words used by the Scriptures when they speak of God and of
things divine; on the other hand, of that which is immediately
expressed by these words, i.e., the things named thereby (as the
fire or the mixing bowl) or events reported (as in the parables),
or actions by means of which the Prophets presented in a sensible manner whatever they had to announce; Christ too revealed Divine Truth not only by His words but by His actions,
and the Church intimates knowledge by Her liturgical ceremomes.
4. The image-relation and its presuppositions on the part of
the speaking and of the understanding mind. It would be
interesting to inquire into the question of how words are formed
so that they place an image before our eyes sensibly and at
the same time, place it there so that it points beyond itself to
something expressed mediately by the words and which the
images are meant to represent.
This problem, however, is
outside the scope of the present article; rather, the attempt
must be made to understand the image-relation as it obtains
between that immediately and that mediately expressed by the
words. When Moses says: " The Lord thy God is a devouring
fire, a zealous God," 40 he is in a definite sense the one who forms
and shapes, as the " theologian." 41 Like a magician he conjures
up before our eyes the image of fire. It is " formed " by him
because it is apprehended in a definite manner, viewed under a
definite aspect, namely, as" devouring fire." The terms" forming" or "shaping" do not imply, in this context, any arbitrariness. One must rather think that he shaped the image in this
particular manner because it so shaped itself "in him." It
imposed itself on his mind as an image of God because he experienced God in a corresponding manner. There is some
similarity between the ineffable he encountered and the " de•• DeutiJT., IV, 24.
41 More correctly, though, the Divine Spirit may be called the former, because
He leads the theologian, permits him to find the words and images, or even tells
or shows them to him.

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397

vouring fire," some factually common trait. In this instance
one has to do with an image-relation in the proper sense: something sensible, encountered in sensible perception, represents
something other in virtue of factually common traits which
allow recognition of the latter in the former. The particular
fact that the thing represented can never become an object of
sensory vision, by principle, does not pertain to the image-relation as such, but to the peculiarities of an image of God. The
possibility that one can become cognizant of the thing represented by looking at the image, however, pertains to the image
as such and therefore also to the image of God.
To shape something into an image one must know the original. The theologian (taking this name as always in the
Areopagitic sense of one speaking of or announcing God)
must know God to shape his images of God. What, then, is the
foundation of this presupposed knowledge of God? There are
several sources from which a knowledge of God may be drawn:
natural knowledge of God, faith as the " ordinary " way of
supernatural knowledge of God, and finally a supernatural experience of God 42 as the " extraordinary " way of a supernatural knowledge of God.
(a) Natural Knowledge of God. The study. of the Areopagitica does not give the impression that the author considered
natural knowledge a possible source of his theology. 43 This
•• Under this name is comprised a diversity of facts.
•• The question whether or not Dionysius held that a natural knowledge of God
is at all possible is very difficult to answer on the basis of this writer's statements.
His actual way of .proceeding, however, is another thing. Most passages read as
if he wanted to exclude natural knowledge as dangerous, to say the least, although
he does not seem to consider it altogether impossible. Cf. Theol. Myst. I, 2, P. G.,
III, 999 f.; De divin. nom. I, I, ibid., 585 ff. He distinguishes, in fact, in the ninth
letter to Titus (Ibid., II06 ff.), the "secret and hidden" theology from one he
characterizes as " manifest and easy to understand," which latter proceeds by
" philosophical demonstration "; but this corresponds to the different procedure
adopted in the " Symbolic Theology " on one hand and his treatment of the
spiritual names of God on the other. Contemporary theology comprises both ways
under the heading of "natural theology" (cf. Scheeben, Dogmatik vol. I, p. 482).
This is in accordance with the doctrine of St. Thomas. It is questionable whether
an interpretation in this sense of Dionysius is permissible.

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SISTER THERESIA BENEDICTA A CRUCE

kind of knowledge will be, however, mentioned here as one of
the factual possibilities. Natural theology, as the name is used
today, refers to a doctrine on God developed from natural
experience by natural reason. The nucleus of this doctrine is
the proofs for the existence of God and the doctrine of God's
nature and properties deduced from our knowledge of the
created world. In this, one proceeds by conceptual thought,
discursive reasoning based on sensible data, as all such reasoning is. The qualification " sensible " must be taken in a broad
sense, as opposed to conceptual thinking which presupposes
certain given data. In this sense, the term covers all sensible
and spiritual vision, and within the former the vision of things
actually present and of things represented.
There must he a primary intuition furnished by the external
senses to make scientific thought possible. By this intuitive
evidence the external world is presented to the human eye, and
hence much more than that which strictly "falls into the senses."
Perception always goes, in more than one respect, beyond that
which falls then and there into the sense. There is given together with the apprehended material, in a " co-givenness," all
that which does not actually fall into the senses presently, but
which fundamentally might do so, and the apprehension of
which may be attained in the progress of perception; this mode
of giyenness may be characterized as an " empty intuition " or
an intuition of emptiness (leer-anschaulich). But many features are given simultaneously which never can fall into the
senses or be attained by sensory perception.
In this regard one has to mention first the " inner " structure
of and the laws governing the spatia-corporeal nature as such;
these aspects mathematical science tries to apprehend by means
of its peculiar concepts. To mention just one example: we
perceive " causation," although it can never become an object
of sensory awareness as such. This view of the world as effectively-real 44 is contained in sense perception; it is the presup•• The German text has here wirldicku, a term which cannot be translated with
exactness. It means, of course, " real," but with an emphasis on the note of bring-

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899

position for all inquiry into causal laws. The scientist follows
the lines of inquiry pointed out by such implications and disregards others, equally present. This disregard is fundamental
for the scientist's conception of "nature," which is abstract
compared with the fullness of the world apprehended by the
senses.
In this fullness, the world presents still another "inside"
beyond that studied by science. Among the impressions our
senses convey one encounters the difference between "animated" and" unanimated" beings. 45 Life and soul are" seen"
simultaneously (together with the other sensa) in external perception, but they are never envisioned from without in the
strict sense. They are, however, truly experienced "from
within." And that which is apprehended together with and as
implied in the external world can be brought to cover, as it
were, that which we experience within ourselves.
But besides the particular features characteristic of beings
endowed with life or soul, more is contained in the plenitude of
the sensibly perceived world than can be grasped by the methods
of science. This world is " our world," in which we experience
love and joy, which we face enthralled or admiring, awed or
horrified; it is a meaningful whole which " speaks " to us in a
thousand voices, revealing its being as a whole and in every one
of its parts, and nonetheless remaining a mystery forever. It
is this same world which by all it manifests and conceals points
beyond itself to Him Who through it " reveals Himself mysteriously." It is this world and its implied indications which point
ing about, causing, etc. as in the verb wirken. One might say that the German
language expresses a more dynamic view of "reality," which word seems to stress
the static aspect. R. Allers.
•• Biology and psychology when adopting " exact " procedures, i. e., those of
mathematical science, apprehend life and soul through their corporeal conditions
or manifestations. This is not to the point in the present context. The approach
is furnished indeed, in the situation under consideration here, by the body; but
this body is not viewed as a " material body " but as " corporeal," in which the
presence of life and soul are " visible." The German has the useful distinction
between Korper, rendered here by " material body," and Leib which refers to the
body of a living being, primarily of man. R. Allers.

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SISTER THERESIA BENEDICTA A CRUCE

beyond itself that fonn the intuitable basis for the demonstrations of natural theology. It is also the potentially intuitable
basis for the language of images, the recognition of values, and
at the same time, the understanding of "symbolic theology."
The Psalmist hears the voice of God in nature. He does not,
however, know God from this source only. Rather, he finds
God in all things because he possesses the faith and because
God's voice speaks in his interior. It cannot be gainsaid, however, that some images may be derived immediately from the
intuition of nature. "The Lord's voice soundeth over the
waters." 46 It is natural to man that he interpret the growling
of .thunder as a manifestation of some higher power. The
image of" God's voice" accordingly suggests itself and may be
safely considered as generally intelligible. The symbolic language is, in this instance, an expression of real or assumed knowledge. When such knowledge exists the image achieves more
than simply representing something previously know but not
actually present and thus bringing about recognition of the
thing in its image. The image is conducive towards a knowledge of a thing yet unknown. The " theologian " becomes
acquainted with God by means of the image. Then, the image
is not the work of the theologian but of God. God has manifested or mirrored Himself in His work and thereby lets Himself
be known. The fact that He is not known before and, therefore,
cannot be · " recognized " does not render meaningless the
notion of image as " reproduction." It is indeed possible not
only that one recognize the portrait of an acquaintance, but
also that one may become acquainted with an unknown person
through a good portrait. Also, when looking at the portrait
one knows that it is a portrait and that it is a good portrait.
This is an actual possibility, although it is realized only in the
case of a spectator who possesses the " sense " for it and also
the necessary training of the eye. What we call today a
" symbol " is, it would seem, most completely realized when an
intuitable form is apprehended as " meaningful image " (SinnBild) and the image reveals to us a hitherto unknown meaning.
"Pa., xxvm (XXIX), s.

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401

Consequently, it is God Who is the first and original theologian. His " symbolic theology " is coextensive with the
whole creation. The theologians of whom Dionysius speaks,
the holy authors, are the men who have an original understanding of this "natural" revelation; they have the gift of understanding the image-language of God and of translating it into
human language so as to lead others to God by way of symbolic
theology. One may safely assume that they are by nature
"chosen vessels," that is, that they possess to an unusual degree
the capacity which we call " religious sense." The development
of this sense and of such a man's capacity may also be furthered
by particularly favorable conditions of natural environment.
This, however, must not be taken as tantamount to saying that
natural revelation is accessible only to these elect persons. Quite
to the contrary, the whole significance of their mission rests on
the possibility that others too may find God in this way. This
is a necessary condition for the intelligibility of their imagelanguage. Their task consists only in teaching others, so that
these may learn how to look through nature when listening to
the words of their teachers. (It is well to remember that even
sensory perception has to be learned and that it is not learned
equally well by everyone.)
Natural knowledge is only one possible basis for the images
created by and the understanding of symbolic theology. The
natural basis, however, is much broader than the reference to
the one example cited suggests. It has been remarked before that
images are borrowed not only from external but from internal
experience as well. When Moses says, " The Lord is a devouring
fire," he elucidates the "external" by an "internal" image.
The experience of Divine governance in personal fate as well
as in historical events on a large scale is obviously of great
importance in the shaping of language used by the Psalmist.
Here, and also in the parables, the field of sensory perception is
definitely abandoned. The " image " takes on an ideal character
which presupposes a spiritual penetration of original experiential
data pertaining to a higher spiritual level. A further discussion
of these problems must be reserved for a future occasion. It is
5

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SISTER THERESIA BENEDICTA A CRUCE

indeed impossible to point out, within the narrow frame of an
article, the diverse possible ways of natural knowledge of God,
to explain their importance for symbolic theology, or to consider
their peculiarities and differences. For the present, the indication must suffice that natural knowledge of God appears as an
abundant source from which symbolic theology may draw.
(b) Faith. One can hardly determine accurately how far the
influence of natural knowledge goes and whether it is ever
factually the only source. Every one of the " theologians," after
all, stands firmly on the ground of faith. To the authors of the
Old Testament, God is first of all the God of Abraham, Isaac,
and Jacob, the God of their forefathers, Whose feats they have
heard recited since their early youth, in the service of Whom
they have been educated. "Faith" then assumes in this context
the proper meaning of fides, of the acceptance and retention of
supernatural revelation, and is not synonymous with the looser
meaning of "belief." By the expression "supernatural revelation" reference is made to the Self-revelation of God through
His very words, particularly the revealing of the mysteries of
God, hidden in Him and inaccessible to natural knowledge.
(What there is in the way of naturally knowable facts in Revelation may be disregarded in the present context.) God's Word
is Revelation of supernatural truth and addressed, at the same
time, to man, demanding faith as the acceptance and retention
of revealed truth. Faith is rightly called knowledge insofar as it
confers the possession of truth; but it is dark knowledge in that
the conviction it entails is not founded on insight into the faithfully accepted truth. Using the terms "God's Word" and
"address" is not tantamount to saying that supernatural revelation consists always in a definite and immediate speaking of
God after the fashion of man. The words of God's messengers,
His Prophets and Apostles directed in His name at those who
are called to the faith, are also Divine Word and address; this is
true, first of all, of the Scriptures. By referring to the holy
authors as "faithful " we mean that they led a life of faith before
and continued to do so after they had been called. The higher

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403

light they received does not flow steadily, but is a sudden and
momentary elevation above the ordinary state, though it leaves
behind certain lasting after-effects. We are concerned here only
with the fact that faith is in itself, independently of all extraordinary illumination, a possible source of the image-language of
symbolic theology. When the poet of the Psalms contemplated
the fate of the chosen people, as he knew it from sacred history
-the miraculous promises and the leadership of Divine Grace,
the ever recurring apostasy of the people and thereafter the
terrible judgments and punishments-certain images of God may
have suggested themselves so to speak spontaneously, as of God
as "Father of orphans," 47 and faithfully caring shepherd/ 8 or on
the other hand as the angry judge who " delivers His people up
to the killing like sheep" 49 and "arises in glowing wrath." 50
This language could be understood through the intermediary
of faith, since the people listening to the Psalms and singing
them themselves lived in the same tradition as the holy singer.
He but lent words to things alive in the hearts of his audience
or aroused others which slept there.
(c) Supernatural Experience of God. (1) Revelation and
Inspiration. Faith, the acceptance of the revealed Word of God,
refers back ultimately to something other. God speaks through
His messengers; His words to be received as His must be somehow distinct from ordinary human words and those speaking
the words must be legitimated as God's messengers. The simple
faithful man is satisfied with the legitimation supplied by the
Scriptures; it is part of his faith, based on the doctrine of the
Church, to feel sure that the Scriptures are God's \Vord and
that the authors of the various books are "inspired," that is,
governed by God's Spirit. It is not up to him to examine this
inspiration or to ask how this or that word " came to occur
in the Scriptures." But there must be some way to ascertain
both. The second question concerning the criticism of the Bible
may be neglected. We may assume that any definite passage
"Pa., LXVII (LXVID), 6.
'" Pa., XXII (XXID).

'" Pa., XLIII (XLIV), 1!!.
50 Ps., LXXVII (LXXVIII), 21, !!2.

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SISTER THERESIA BENEDICTA A CRUCE

is genuinely Scriptural. Such a passage is considered as inspired
not only hy the simple faithful but also by the theologian-in
the modern, not in the Dionysian sense. Revelation means
that God wants to make known something in the particular
text. "Inspired" means that God moved the author to write
down this text or, eventually, moved a person to speak the words
reported in the text. Is it necessary that the inspired person
who becomes the instrument of Divine Revelation know of
this fact? Must he be aware of having been accorded an illumination, must he himself have received a revelation? Cases are
conceivable in which nothing of this sort occurs; it is not impossible that someone speak words of Revelation without
realizing it, without having received a revelation from God,
and without himself being carried by God's Spirit in the words
he speaks and the way he speaks them; he may believe he expresses nothing but his own opinion in words of his own choosing. Thus Caiphas spoke in the High Council: "Ye do not know
any thing and do not consider that it be better for you that one
man die for the people and not the whole people perish." 51
And St. John adds: "But he spoke so not of himself but hecause he was the High Priest of this year, he prophesied that
Jesus was to die for the people .... " Caiphas, therefore,
spoke in the name of God and by Divine ordinance, without
knowing or willing it as such. St. John, however, knows that
Caiphas spoke God's word. Does he know of the prophetic
significance of Caiphas' words by a revelation accorded to him
on this particular point? This is quite possible. But it might be
also that the fulfillment of these words by the death of Jesus
and the contemplation of the whole work of Redemp,tion made
St. John realize the prophetic character of this utterance.
Ordinarily, it is surely not the case that a man becomes the
instrument of Divine Revelation without his knowing and
willing it. It will be helpful to compare the preceding report
with the great vision of Isaias. 52 The Prophet sees the Lord
sitting on the throne of glory; he speaks to Him from mouth to
51

John, XI, 49 fl'.

••Is., VI.

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405

mouth and receives words he shall pass on to the people. Seeing
and hearing must be taken here, it would seem, in a strictly
literal sense. The description given by the Prophet is not to
be considered as the symbolic rendering of something envisioned
in a purely spiritual manner. Thus, here too it is God Who is
the " symbolic theologian," Who reveals Himself, the Incomprehensible, in a visible image and by human words. He reveals
Himself to the man who stands before Him and charges him
with His mission. Isaias is conscious of both Revelation and
mission. When he, then, stands before the people, he knows
that his message is God's Word in the strict sense of the term.
Revelation and inspiration and the consciousness of both appear
in this case simultaneously.
The question then arises: what gives to the Prophet the
certitude that he is standing before God? Looking with the eyes
or the imagination is not an indispensable condition. These
traits may be absent, and the inner certitude nonetheless be
there that it is God Who speaks. This certitude may be based
on the " feeling " that God is present; one feels oneself touched
by the Divine Presence in one's innermost being. This is what is
called "experience of God" in the strictest sense. It is the
nucleus of all mystical experience, encountering of God as of
one person by another. A sensible vision may be added to this,
as an unessential accompanying phenomenon, as it was in the
case of Isaias.
Can one, on the other hand, conceive of such a vision without
a true experience of God? It is not impossible that the Prophet
see the Lord before him or hear His words without being
touched internally by God in a mystical manner. This was obviously the case with the boy Samuel who heard God calling
him without realizing that God was calling. 53 He did not recognize God. With Isaias it might have been so that the miraculous character of the vision and the accordance with his
knowledge of God by faith of the things seen and heard
brought about the conviction of God's presence without an
•• I Sam., III, 1 f.

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SISTER THERESIA BENEDICTA A CRUCE

inner contact. This interpretation cannot be rejected absolutely as an impossible one; it appears, however, as a rather
artificial construction. Of young Samuel we read that he did
not yet know the Lord; this seems to suggest that Eli knew the
Lord and that Samuel was going to learn to know Him. One
gets the strong impression that Samuel knew the Lord after the
revelation which was accorded to him; this knowledge came not
from discursive reasoning and intellectual consideration but
from personal encounter, from having been touched in his innermost, from the experience by which the child awoke to be a
Prophet. 64 In such a true experience of receiving a mission,
then, inspiration, revelation, and the consciousness thereof are
combined with the direct experience of God. Between this fullness of experience and the other extreme of a revelation without
the person knowing about it or. willing it as a revelation, there
exist many intermediary degrees.
To start again from below: inspiration may be present and
the person conscious thereof without any revelation being conceded to the inspired mind; the holy author knows that he is
moved by the Divine Spirit to say or to write something, also
how to express it; he may experience inspiration as such, but
what he has to say has no relation to his person; it may be an
event of which he knows by experience, or a moral truth into
which he has a natural insight. (Such must have been the
origin of parts of the books on history or wisdom in the Scriptures.) The opposite, however, that is, revelation without some
type of inspiration, is obviously impossible. Whenever God unveils Himself or a hidden truth,. it is done through His Spirit,
and whenever a man is chosen to transmit to others such a
truth, he must be led by God's Spirit. Divine truth may enlighten a mind which neither hears nor sees anything. The choice
of the words in which to cast his message may be left to the
person. If he receives a revelation by means of audible words
•• The interpretation submitted here is not claimed to be the only possible one,
but to be a possible one. Viewed in this manner, the event reported affords a
useful intuitable basis for the thesis to be demonstrated.

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or an image is presented to him, it may be that he has only to
pass on the image or the words without understanding them
himself. But it is also possible that the spiritual meaning is
made intelligible to him, be it by an inner illumination or by
additional explanatory words.
(2) Personal and Mediate Experience of God. In all such
cases, as referred to above, there is more than mere natural
knowledge of God and also something surpassing faith, but it
is not necessary that there be always a personal and experiential
knowledge of God. It may be questionable whether one is entitled to speak of all such cases as of a knowledge of God. It
seems correct to say that any experience is apprehended as
coming from God which is experienced as having the character
of the supernatural. When Divine Truth appears in the splendor
of a " supernatural light," that is, appears as clearly distinct
from natural knowledge and as breaking into the latter's context, then the light is understood as " Divine Light." When
words are heard or a figure seen, and the one speaking or appearing does not claim to be God Himself but an angel or a
saint, he nevertheless comes from God as His messenger. The
person receiving the revelation knows that he is subjected to
Divine influence, through this messenger or through an" intellectual vision." (This may be asserted also of inspiration, unless
it be, perhaps, experienced as of demoniacal origin.) But under
the conditions mentioned, man does not stay in face of the
Lord, God does not cease to be the hidden God. Isaias, however, envisioned God Himself and heard His words; and if the
interpretation given above of the tale is correct, he was sure in
his innermost being that God Himself was present. Only when
this happens is one entitled to speak of a personal experiential
knowledge of God. This "feeling of God's presence" has been
called above the nucleus of all mystical experience. It is, however, only the beginning, the lowest degree of the life of mystical
prayer. There are many steps and transitions between this
stage and the apex of " infused contemplation," the permanent
union with God. Each higher stage is a richer and deeper self-

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SISTER THERESIA BENEDICTA A CRUCE

revelation and self-surrender to the soul on the part of. God; on
the part of the soul, it is a more and more comprehensive penetrating into, and becoming acquainted with God, which demands of the soul an ever more complete surrender. Personal
experiential knowledge is characterized by the note of immediacy which is lacking in those revelations in which God does
not disclose Himself, but only a single truth or event is revealed
which is unattainable by natural knowledge. The difference is
about that which obtains between the immediate experience of
a thing self-present on one hand and one apprehended only by
its effects or rendered present through a messenger on the other.
But God is never " immediately intuited " in the same manner
as is that which falls into our senses or that which we recognize
as true in spiritual insight.
The name of an experience of God applies in the strictest
sense only to personal encounter. But the kinds of mediate
knowledge referred to before must be counted among the supernatural experiences and therefore be distinguished from faith.
All kinds of supernatural experience, but particularly personal
acquaintance, stand to faith in the same relation as, on the
natural level, one's own experience stands to knowledge by report. All kinds of experience are a fulfilling of something known
hitherto only in thought without proper original apprehension.
Personal encounter differs from mediate experiential knowledge
by being fulfillment, since the object recognized as self-present
provides fulfillment to that which hitherto was known only by
mediation or representation. Personal encounter does not yet
provide complete fulfillment, but it points beyond itself to a
truer fulfillment in mystical experience of a higher degree and,
finally, in beatific vision. (The question will not be 'raised here
whether beatific vision still carries some note of non-fulfillment,
dependent on the fact that it is not the vision by which God
envisions Himself.)
(3) Supernatural Experience of God, Faith, and Natural

Knowledge of God. Compared with the natural knowledge of
God, faith possesses the characteristic of fulfillment, though not

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in the way personal experience fulfills what is merely known;
the relation is rather like that obtaining between what is clearly
known as set over against something only " guessed " darkly
(that is, if we understand by natural knowledge of God His
appearing together with or in simple natural experience, so to
speak His co-appearance, as of a higher power, and not yet
natural theology) . One may also speak of a material enrichment of knowledge, insofar as faith furnishes us with new information above that gathered from natural experience and
natural theology; finally one may refer to the confirmation by
a higher authority of things known previously. The transition
from natural to supernatural knowledge of God can be compared, on the other hand, to making the personal acquaintance
of a man whose existence was realized before only by means of
certain effects ::tnd, eventually, concluded on the basis thereof.
Faith may furnish a bridge for this transition. We may also
think of this transition from natural to supernatural knowledge
of God as happening without the mediation by faith, that is,
as a gift of Grace bestowed on a person previously void of faith;
if this experience is " accepted," then the diverse kinds of fulfillment will coexist in this experience so that the whole event will
present to a much higher degree the character of an inner revolution and transformation.
All kinds of knowledge of God are coordinated with one
another by the intentions in virtue of which they point beyond
themselves, and they are lastly ordained towards the experience
of God. This is not tantamount to saying that natural knowledge of God and faith presuppose supernatural experience as a
precedent in time; nor that they actually find their legitimation
therein; but that there is implied in their proper nature an aiming at this experience and the possibility that they may be rediscovered in a transformed state within this new mode of
knowledge.

(4) Signification of Supernatural Experience for Symbolic
Theology. The notion of a supernatural knowledge of God has
to be clarified to ascertain what it may achieve for " symbolic

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SISTER THERESIA BENEDICTA A CRUCE

theology" (i.e., in the Areopagitic sense, as image-language
about God) . Inspiration, " non-personal " revelation, and
visions may, in comparison with the natural knowledge of God
and faith, point out new images and, at the same time, give the
certainty that these images are "adequate." 55 The things the
prophet sees and hears form, as it .were, the higher teaching of
symbolic theology; images and words are put at the disposal of
the holy author and enable him to speak the ineffable and to
make visible the invisible. But still more important is the inner
contact of God without word. or image. In this personal encounter the mind becomes intimately acquainted with God and
thus is rendered able to " shape the image according to the
original." On the basis of this experience, images and words
may suggest themselves which are apt to represent God as one
came to know Him. This intimate knowledge also furnishes to
the theologian a standard of appraisal or a correct " feeling "
when he consciously elaborates this presentation and searches
for suitable words and images.
The question must be raised once more of what the conditions are for the understanding of such an image-language which
is drawn from ultimate sources. The answer is that he will have
the most praper understanding who already possesses such an
experiential knowledge of God. He alone has the possibility of
recognizing in the " portraits " God, with Whom he is personally acquainted. But faith too, and even natural knowledge,
supply a basis for a certain understanding. One who knows and
loves God by and in living faith will be anxious to know Him
from ever new sides and in ever new "traits"; he will, therefore, turn always to the Scriptures for information. Here too
some kind of recognition takes place. The faithful mind has
already an "image of God" and integrates it with the new
images by which he finds that God is presented. This ena:bles
him to add new traits to his image; he discovers these traits in
the old images. (In these statements the term" image" is used
•• "Adequate " is an imperfect rendering of the German treffend which is, in fact,
covered by the colloquialism " hit the mark." R. Allers.

WAYS TO KNOW GOD

411

in diverse senses. By "my image of God" no duality is introduced of image and that represented thereby, but the image
means God as I know and understand Him.) The terrain of faith
is not abandoned in this process; there is a progress within faith,
clearly distinguishable from a purely natural and rational apprehension of the literal sense, but different also from the experiential knowledge of God. An unbeliever does not become
acquainted with God by reading the Scriptures, say in the attitude of a student of linguistics or religious history; he only
comes to know the way the Scriptures and those who believe
in them think of God, 56 unless it be that by such reading faith is
awakened in him; but in this case a transition occurs from the
one to the other attitude. There are different modes of understanding and of becoming acquainted within faith itself. A believing reader of the Scriptures accepts all he reads " in faith,"
that is as revealed truth, but this does not necessarily entail that
his soul apprehends everything in a living manner. The apprehension may be to a large extent empty and void of influence on
experience and remain limited to a merely literal understanding. 57
One becomes sharply aware of this difference when one sees suddenly a Scriptural text in a " new light " by which one is shown
either something in God hitherto unknown to one or one's own
soul; it may happen also that a reader is struck in a personal manner by a Divine demand he did not realize before, or a doctrinal
truth which had been known as separated from another may
appear as closely interrelated. All this is possible " in the light
of faith." Our knowledge of God is thereby enriched, our
relation to God deepened or ordered in a better way, but we
do not stand, nonetheless, before God's face. This too may happen; a word in the Scriptures may strike a person in his innermost being so as to make him feel that God Himself addresses
him and he may thus become aware of God's presence. The book
or the holy author or the preacher to whom I happen to listen
•• This applies to those who deny the existence of God and also to those who
believe in God but not in a revealed "Word of God."
67 This difference is not the same as the theological distinction between " living "
and " dead " faith, which refers to the possession or the loss of the state of grace.

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SISTER THERESIA BENEDICTA A CRUCE

disappears-God Himself speaks, and He speaks to me. The
terrain of faith is not properly abandoned, but I am raised for
one moment above it to an experiential knowledge of God.
All theology has, ultimately, but one task: to make the way
free to God Himself. The Areopagite has stated this explicitly
as the goal of his " symbolic theology." It addresses itself to a
chosen circle and aims to achieve more than mere instruction
on the content of faith; it addresses those who have already
experienced a certain illumination and therefore strive for
sanctity. Symbolic theology tries to lead such persons by unveiling to them a suprasensible world in the images; it tries to
detach them more and more from the sensible world and desires
to lead them to a point where they will have no need any longer
of such images. " Symbolic theology " attempts to " lead them
by the hand," 58 first away from the sensible to the spiritual
and suprasensible, and finally to the highest apex, the union
with the One. It is not for theology to bring about this last
step; this is God's own doing. Theology can only lead in this
direction.
Experiential knowledge has been called before the " fulfillment of faith." Thereby it is indicated that faith aims at the
same state which is actually given in experiential knowledge.
This is a general character of "intention" and "fulfillment."
When I see with my own eyes something of which I knew only
by hearsay-e. g., a famous work of art or a beautiful old townthen that which I actually behold as existent belonged already
to my mental world. Through reports heard or read the thing
had reached me in a certain manner and I was touched by it
internally. In such a happening, fulfillment receives its significance. This is true in an even higher degree of faith. We look
at the Scriptures as "God's Word," because He there approaches us, reveals Himself and makes known His demands.
As long as I look at the Scriptures in mere faith only, they are
but the word spoken "in His name." But even this mediated
word can bring me into a connection with Him and make me feel
••

Gael., c. I; § 2, P. G., III, 121.

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413

internally touched. This feature of faith by which it transcends
itself-St. Thomas calls it " the beginning of life everlasting in
us " 59-brings it about that we may " recognize God " when
He suddenly makes us feel His presence, or even shows Himself in a visible manner, and also renders us able to understand
what others have said regarding their own experiences of God,
though we have no such experience ourselves.
The same considerations apply, to a certain extent, also to
the natural knowledge of God. If a man grew up without instruction in the faith, but is receptive for God's traces in nature,
in his own interior, and in human life, he may feel his faults as
" sins " and a loss he suffers as a " Divine punishment." He can
understand easily when it is said of God that He breaks out in
wrath and that He is a devouring fire. However imperfect and
indefinite natural knowledge of God may be, however much it
may be in need of correction and enrichment through faith,
there is nevertheless implied in it a direction towards and an
aiming at that which becomes real in experiential knowledge of
God. Some kind of encountering God takes place even on the
level of natural knowledge, and this then makes possible " recognition" when it happens that He stands before such a man.
Thus, it seems as if there were a great number of people
capable, at least fundamentally, of understanding the imagelanguage of symbolic theology. What then is the meaning of the
statement that this theology " hides the holy before the desecrating eyes of the multitude"? 60 Are there any persons left to
whom symbolic theology is unintelligible? Such people exist,
indubitably; the Scriptures are exposed today not less than in
the time of Dionysius to the crude misunderstanding of the
images to which he refers. And even if there is no false interpretation there may still prevail a total lack of understanding.
There are several reasons for this fact.
As has been remarked above, " our world points beyond itself " in many ways, and thus leads the mind to transcend the
boundaries of this world; but these " hints " are not such that
•• Q. disp. de ver. q. 13, a. 2, c.

60

V. sup. p. 388.

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SISTER THERESIA BENEDICTA A CRUCE

they might not be overlooked, nor are they so unequivocal that
they would lead unfailingly to the goal. Nat ural disposition
and teaching on the part of the environment play here a decisive
role, as they do in many similar situations. A man lacking
" practical sense " is unable to see " what a thing is good for "
and how to handle it. If he is not well trained he will forever
walk through this world in a somewhat hazy and helpless state
of mind. There is also sometimes a defect of " religious sense,"
and it is quite possible that a man remain blind to the" hints"
by which the world points to God, unless this defect is remedied
by a good education. 61 To some the Scriptures remain a sealed
book as long as the reader is not assisted by some special grace.
He stops at the immediate and literal sense and is unable to
look through the images. He does not know how to account
for the maior dissimilitudo and develops a poor or undignified
idea of God, or even becomes an atheist if he feels that such
an idea is repulsive. He may also, eventually, reject not God
but the Scriptural testimonies.
It is questionable whether one can claim that lack of faith, a
total ignorance of God, can exist without personal guilt and,
therefore, that some may be inaccessible to the image-language
of the Scriptures. If such a case could exist, one cannot deny all
human guilt. We may disregard here original sin and the
opacity of the mind caused by it. But no man grows up in
absolute separation from others; and then it is " society " which
is responsble when it fails to furnish the testimony which might
have opened the eyes of this person. In most cases, however,
the " unbeliever " is responsible himself too for his blindness.
61 The doctrine of the Church is that the human mind is able to attain a. knowledge of God by its natural powers. But it is not said that everyone wiU arrive
at such a knowledge under all conditions. If St. Paul declares (Rom., I, 20) that
there is no excuse for the pagans since God may be known from creation, one has
to think of the total pagan world in which helpful factors assuredly never were
missing, not however of the individuals taken singly. The Apostle, furthermore,
considered them guilty because they did not proceed to the right veneration of
God, in spite of an actually existing knowledge of Him (Rom., I, 21). However,
the blindness of an individual man may also stem from personal guilt. (On this
point v. in£.)

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415

Nobody can live under such conditions that no testimony whatsoever of God would reach him. If he refuses it entrance into
his mind and does not, at least, take some pains infollowing up
the views he comes to know, it is his own guilt; if at a later
time there results a total incapacity of knowledge, if a factual
non-recognition is superseded by an inability to recognize, all
these effects are ultimately his own doing. This is, obviously,
even more the case when there is not only actual lack of faith
but definite atheism by principle, or hostility against God. It is
not within the scope of this article to inquire into the causes of
such an attitude. But an understanding must be reached of the
fact that "symbolic theology" may, eventually, succeed in
hiding God rather than in revealing Him. It is easy to see that
the eyes of guileless unbelievers are unable to pierce the veil.
Such a man, however, is not one of those who ought not to see.
It seems rather in accordance with the meaning of "theology"
that he should be taught how to see. Some people fail to obtain
a knowledge of God because of laziness and dullness of mind;
in such instances the inability to see may be considered as a
state of punishment. It is even more easy to understand that
those malignant minds be struck with blindness which 1·ejuse
to believe but read the Scriptures with the intention of using
their very words as weapons against revealed truth. 62
The attempt has been made to show that in all true knowledge of God, it is God Himself Who accedes to man, although
His presence is not actually felt in all cases; this happens only in
experiential knowledge. In natural knowledge, God approaches
man through images, words, and manifold effects; in faith, by
way of self-manifestation in the Word. Whenever there is a
62 There is a passage indicating that Dionysius may actually have thought
on
such lines. In the seventh letter, addressed to Polycarpus (§ 2, P. G., III, 1079 f.)
he answers the sophist Apollophanes who had criticized him for using against Greek
philosophy its very doctrines. Dionysius reproaches the Greek for trying to use
Divine wisdom against God. The particular instance, however, to which Dionysius
refers can hardly be interpreted as a misuse of the Scriptures. The remark has in
any case a wider significance. It throws some light on the fights about God
raging in this age, when pagan and Christian writers alternatively grasped the
weapons of their respective antagonists.

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SISTER THERESIA BENEDICTA A CRUCE

question of knowing a person, there is not only the possibility of
self-manifestation but also its opposite, the possibility of barring the approach to knowledge, furthermore the possibility of
withdrawing behind one's work. This work, then, still has significance, has a real meaning, but it no longer gives free approach
to the person, no longer mediates the contact of one spirit with
another. God will let Himself he found by those who seek Him.
Therefore, He first wants to be sought. Thus it becomes understandable that natural revelation is not inescapably clear and
unequivocal, but an instigation towards further search; supernatural revelation gives the answers to questions aroused by
natural revelation. Faith is already finding God and means that
He lets Himself be found to a certain extent. And this not only
in the sense that God allows us to he told something about Him
through His Word, but also that He lets Himself be found
through it. Faith is a gift that should be accepted. In faith
Divine and human freedom meet. But faith is a gift of such
a nature that it calls for asking for more. As a dark knowledge
lacking true insight faith awakens the longing for unveiled
clarity; as a mediated encounter it arouses the desire for immediately encountering God; the very content of faith arouses
this desire by the promise of beatific vision. One may also
understand, on the other hand, that God withdraws from those
who do not comply with the call for further search, who remain
unmoved and in dullness of spirit in face of His self-manifestations or do not seek therein Him but means to serve their own
ends, eventually even against Him. To him who does not
accept God's word as the word of God it turns into a dead word.
No longer does it point beyond itself, in a live manner, at the
context wherefrom it stems, that is, the realm of the Divine
Spirit. The heathens may find a confirmation of their idolatry
in some of the images, the dialecticians discover contradictions
between different passages; the educators and moralists be
scandalized by many things, because their minds remain
obtusely ignorant of the hidden meaning.
(5) Degrees of V eiledness and of Unveiling. The "hidden
sense " may be more or less hidden. As has been pointed out

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before, Dionysius comprises very diverse things under the name
"symbol": visible images of the invisible which, however,
stand to the latter in a true image-relation (as the" devouring
fire ") ; other images in which the relation is not directly intuitable but may be established by thoughtful comparison and
discovered by reasoned reflection (such a relation is, e. g., that
of the mixing bowl to Divine Providence). To the last named
class one would apply today the name of allegory rather than
that of symbol. Other examples have been mentioned in which
the symbols had no longer any sensible character. This is the
case with the parables. Jesus Himself adds to the parable of
the sower the explanation because His disciples asked for it. 63
Before He had closed his tale with the words: " Who hath ears
to hear shall hear." These words indicate that the true meaning does not lie on the surface, and it is not given to everyone
to find it. When hearing this parable the listener has first to
realize clearly the meaning of the tale. This demands an intense
comprehending activity of the mind. But he must recognize
moreover that this whole configuration of intellectual content
points beyond itself in a definite direction; he must disengage
from the tale a " typus "-in the sense of a general form-which
then has to serve as a directing rule so that the mind may be
rendered capable of shaping behind the first a new intellectual
configuration in which the same form occurs again, but loaded
now with the meaning-content tl).e teller originally intended to
convey. Not many are capable of such discovery and re-creation when they have to do with comparisons and parables made
up by men. How much less, however good the intention, when
it is God Who speaks. Not even the disciples were able to do
so, although " it was given to them to understand the mysteries
of the heavens." 64 The Lord had to open up to them the
secret meaning. In a similar manner He taught, at a later time,
the two disciples on the way to Emmaus 65 how to understand
the messianic predictions of the Prophets and their bearing
upon His Passion and Glorification. Mter the sending of the
•• Matt., XIII, 8 ff.
•• Matt., XIII, 11.

6

•• Luke, XXIV, !i!5 ff.

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SISTER THERESIA BENEDICTA A CRUCE

Holy Ghost the Apostles became able themselves to achieve the
work of exegesis.
The diversity of symbolic relations is mentioned here, though
but briefly, to indicate that there are different degrees and
modes of hiddenness. To these correspond different degrees
and modes of symbolic knowledge. The most general approach
is furnished in the image-relation proper. The parables submit
the Divine truth as in a closed casket. In many instances it
falls to man to seek the key. Sometimes the key is supplied
in the form of an additional explanation or of an inner illumination. It may also happen that a sort of" office of the key" is
conferred on individuals or groups which have received the
gift of Scriptural exegesis. This viewpoint makes possible an
understanding of the Areopagitic " hierarchies." God reveals
Himself first of all to the pure spirits whose natural capacity of
understanding is greater than ours and in whom the Divine
Light does not encounter any inner obstacles. It is the office
given to these Spirits to transmit the light they receive, and
their office is taken over and continued by the " Ecclesiastical
Hierarchy" in the degrees of the human order, the members
of this hierarchy being called to an angel-like life and service. 66
It is their duty to receive with a purified mind the Divine
mysteries and to take charge of them. This also entails preaching and interpreting the Divine Word. Corresponding to the
different modes and degrees of hiddenness there are different
modes and degrees of unveiling, degrees of office and of difference
in the extent to which a person is forbidden or allowed approach.
06 Dionysius emphasizes on one hand that revelation is accorded to us through the
angels (Hier. Cael. IV, 4, -P. G., III, 181 fi.), on the other hand that Christ is the
head of both hierarchies and gives to both to share in the Divine life according to
their natures. The angels participate therein in a purely spiritual manner, men
by way of the sacerdotal office and the symbols of liturgy (Eccles. Hier. c. I, 1 fi.,
P. G., III, 869 fi.). The office of the angels as mediators recedes therewith into
the background. The highest degrees of the hierarchy are said to receive the
"holy gift " from God Himself, and no mention is made of the angels as mediators
(Ibid., 5, P. G., III, 875 f.).

WAYS

KNOW GOD

419

Concluding Remarks: Symbolic Theology and Other
Theologies
The diversity of symbols constitutes a series of degrees already within symbolic theology. This is repeated in the other
" theologies " which Dionysius distinguishes from the former.
The" spiritual names of God" (the Good, the Being, the One,
etc.) are not open to understanding even in their immediate
significance. They appeal therefore only to a circle of chosen
minds. Further inquiry is needed to find out in what relation
these names stand to God and how He may be known by means
of them. It seems possible to show that one no longer has to
do here with the mere relation of sign or reproduction, but
still with a " mysterious revelation." 67 This " positive theology " therefore needs to be complemented and corrected by a
"negative theology." In both something will be found of that
by which all knowledge about God becomes precisely knowledge of God, namely the personal encounter with God. When
this encounter finally becomes a person's proper experience, no
longer mediated by images and parables, nor by ideas, nor by
anything which may be given a name, then only is reached the
level of "mysterious revelation" in the strict sense, the "mystical theology," the self-revelation of God in silence. This is the
summit, the height of which is approached hy the degrees of the
knowledge of God.
Thus it may be stated once more: God Himself is the First
Theologian. All speaking about God presupposes God's speaking. His most real speaking is that in the face of which human
speech is silenced, that which no human words can comprehend
nor the language of image express. It amounts to a seizure of
him to whom this speaking of God is addressed and it demands
personal surrender as the condition of hearing it. Such a
seizure is usually associated with the vocation as a "theologian."
God wants to speak to the people who stay in the plains through
61 This seems to agree with the opinion of Dionysius, though he distinguishes this
theology as the .. manifest" from symbolic theology as the" secret." P. G., lll, 1106.

420

SISTER THERESIA BENEDICTA A CRUCE

those to whom He speaks on the summit of the mountain.
Therefore He condescends to speak to them and through them,
but also without their mediation, in human words and in images
man can understand. He gives to His theologians the words
and the images by which they are enabled to speak of Him to
others. To these others He Himself speaks as a " symbolic
theologian," through nature, through man's inner experiences,
and through His vestiges in human life and in the history of
the world, by this means rendering the people capable of understanding the language of the theologians.

*

*

*

*

*

*

The foregoing discussion presents a set of problems in a first
survey as it results when one tries to proceed with a minimum
of theological presuppositions. A further elucidation of the
notion of" God as the First Theologian," in terms of theology,
would have to start from the truest instance of God's speaking, that is, the speaking of the Divine Word. The Word
Made Flesh would then have to be considered as the first
symbol.
SISTER THERESIA BENEDICTA A CRUCE, 0. c. D.
Convent of the Discalced Carmelite Sisters,
Echt, Limburg, Holland
RuDOLF ALLERS,

Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. C.

Translator.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST
BY JOHN OF ST. THOMAS
JAMES

Translated from the Latin by
M. EGAN, O.P. and WALTER D. HuGHES, O.P.

CHAPTER VII*
The Number of the Gifts
I. There is no doubt that there are seven Gifts except perhaps
for those who, denying any formal distinction, number the Gifts
among the virtues.

*

OUTLINE

OF CHAPTER

VII

The Number of the Gifts

I.

THE SEVEN GIFTS OF THE HoLY GHosT

A. In the opinion of some theologians
B. In Tradition

II.

THE ExPLANATION

(1)

(2)
OF THE NuMBER oF THE GIFTS

(3)

A. The sufficiency of that number (4)

B. St. Thomas' appropriation of each Gift to its corresponding virtue
1. The. Gifts and the Cardinal Virtues (5)
2. The Gifts and the Theological Virtues (6)
3. A difficulty arising from St. Thomas' doctrine
Understanding (7)
4. Reply to this difficulty (8, 9 and 10)

III.

OBJECTIONS

AGAINST

THE ENUMERATION

OF SEVEN GIFTS

on the Gift of

(11)

A. Thll opinion that there are fewer, expressed in three objections
B. The opinion that there are more, expressed in six objections

IV.

THE REASONS WHY THERE ARE NoT FEwER THAN SEVEN GIFTS

A. Reply to the first objection

(14)

B. Reply to the second objection
C. Reply to the third objection

V.

(15, 16 and 17)

(18)

THE REASONS WHY THERE ARE NoT MoRE THAN SEVEN GIFTS

A. Solution of the first objection (19)
1) Confirmation from Scripture and Tradition
2) Confirmation from reason (21)

421

(20)

(12)

(13)

422

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

These same authors are not disconcerted by the fact that Isaias
enumerates seven Gifts, because they maintain that later he adds
faith and justice-And justice shall be the girdle of his loins and
faith the girdle of his reins. 1 For them, then, Isaias has enumerated
more than seven Gifts.
This opinion is not completely repudiated by Lorca, 2 since he
thinks that it can be defended. However, he admits that the opposite opinion is more common and should be held because of the
authority of the Fathers and theologians, among whom seven Gifts
are commonly enumerated.
2. The enumeration of seven Gifts is so well established in the
tradition of the Church that no probability is left to the opposite
opinion. For what probability can there be in an opinion which is
opposed to the unanimous agreement of the holy Fathers, the
common acceptation of theologians, and the practice of the Church?
For the Church seems to have approved this doctrine by chanting
in praise of the Holy Ghost: "Thou art sevenfold in gifts," 3 and
again, " Give to your faithful confiding in you the sacred sevenfold." 4 The Fathers considered this as a determined and certain
number, and not a figure or universal number. They agree on this
because Sacred Scripture specifically mentions the Gifts by name,
which is a sign that it is treating of them as determined and certain. For Isaias enumerates these seven Gifts by their proper
names. He notes first And the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon
him 5 - the spirit in general. Then he divides the spirit specifically
and calls each by its name: the spirit of wisdom and of undera) Resumption of objection from this solution (22)
b) Answer to resumption (g3)

B. Solution of the second objection (24)
C. Solution of the third objection (25)
D. Solution of the fourth objection

(26 and 27)

E. Solution of the fifth objection (28)
F. Solution of the sixth objection

(29)

Isaias, xi, 5.
Commentaria in I-ll, q. 68, d. 25, n. 4. Alcala, 1609.
3 V eni Creator from Terce on Pentecost.
Cf. Hymns of the Dominican Missal
and Breviary, Aquinas Byrnes, 0. P. Herder, 1943. Pp. 138, 144.
• Sequence of the }.;!ass of Pentecost.
5 Isaias, xi, 2.
1

2

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

423

standing, the spirit of knowledge and counsel. 6 Hence Tertullian 7
in his explanation of this passage teaches that, "The spirit of the
Lord will rest upon Him, and next he enumerates its species, the
spirit of wisdom and of understanding, etc." Whenever Scripture
uses a number and names the species enumerated, that number is
generally taken as determined and definite. Such is the common
testimony of the Fathers, among whom are: Jerome, 8 Gregory, 9
Augustine/ 0 Ambrose, 11 Cyprian, 12 Bernard/ 3 Tertullian/ 4 Origen. 15
All the theologians and the common opinion of the faithful follow
this tradition. Hence this opinion is more than probable while its
opposite is more than improbable.
No merely natural reason can be given for this number, since it
is derived from revelation alone. It must be explained and defended
by Scripture and the Tradition of the Church; it cannot be
demonstrated.

3. Two things must be considered in explaining the number of
the Gifts. First, in examining the argument of St. Thomas, some
reason must be given why this number seven is sufficient at least
according to some proportion and analogy. Secondly, an inquiry
must be made as to whether these seven Gifts are indivisible species
or merely subordinate genera which can contain further species
and hence, in an absolute sense, would constitute more than seven
Gifts.
4. St. Thomas has proved 16 that seven Gifts are sufficient.
These Gifts can perfect all the powers of the soul which are ordained to obey and to be moved by the divine impulse, namely,
reason and the appetitive faculty.
• Ibid., xi, 8.
• Contra Marcionem, c. VIII. PL, ii, 489.
8 In Isaias XI.
PL, xxiv, 144.
PL, lxxv, 544. Homilia XIX in Ezechiel, PL,
• I Moralium, c. 12 (alias
lxxi, 1158.
10 Sermo XV11 de Sanctis, PL, xxxix,
11 De Doctrina Christiana, c. 7,
PL, xxxiv, 89. I De Sermone Do1nini, c. 4, PL, xxxiv,
c. 9, PL, xxxiv,
11 I De Spiritu Sancto, c.
PL, xvi, 740. In Psalmum 118, PL, xv,
"I ad Quirinum, c. 11, PL, iv, 685.
13 Sermo Lin Cantieum Canticorum, PL, clxxxiii,
Sermo 11 de AnnuntiaPL, clxxxiii, 590.
u Contra Judaeos, c. 1, PL, ii,
16 Homilia VI in Numeros, PG, xii, 6680:. Homilia 11 in Isaias, PG, xiii,
10 I-II, q. 68, a. 4.

424

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

Reason is speculative and practical, and both parts are perfected
by two Gifts. No more are necessary. For both parts have a twofold operation, to apprehend or to find truth and to judge analytically about that truth. The speculative part is perfected in the
discovery of truth through the Gift of Understanding. Its judgment is perfected through the Gift of Wisdom. The practical
intellect is perfected in the discovery of truth through the Gift of
Counsel, and in judgment through the Gift of Knowledge.
The appetitive faculty is perfected in three respects. First,
through the Gift of Piety it is perfected in its relationships with
others-proper to justice in the will. Moreover, the double personal relationship of the sensitive appetite is ennobled. First,
Fortitude perfects a person in matters related to the irascible
appetite. Secondly, fulfilling a need for a new element to perfect
the habits in the concupiscible appetite, the Gift of Fear restrains
the soul from all delight in harmful pleasure-pierce my flesh with
your fear. 11
5. This excellent compilation of St. Thomas, embracing all the
rational powers perfectible by the divine impulse, indicates the
acts of all the intellectual and cardinal moral virtues with their
corresponding Gifts. For example, there are four cardinal virtues:
prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, to which correspond
the four Gifts: counsel, piety, fortitude and fear, inasmuch as it
has a secondary act of repressing delights. The intellectual virtues
are the habit of principles - called understanding, wisdom, and
knowledge. To these correspond the Gifts of Understanding,
Wisdom, and Knowledge.
Two virtues perfect the practical part of the intellect. In moral
matters there is prudence, which is perfected through the Gift of
Counsel. In artistic matters (external works) there is art, for
which, according to St. Thomas/ 8 there is no corresponding Gift
of the Holy Ghost. For the Gifts perfect a man so that he may be
docile to the Holy Ghost in matters which pertain to right living
and the preparation of his soul for the attainment of eternal life.
External works of art do not belong to the motion of the Holy
Ghost, since the Holy Ghost does not move men with a supernatural gift and special impulse to such things as making clothes
or building houses. He moves them only to tend towards eternal
17 Psalm

cxviii, 120.

18

I-II, q. 68, a. 4, ad I.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

425

life. In a word, the arts are concerned with works of the natural
order and there is no such thing as a supernatural work of art.
Consequently, there is no supernatural virtue of art. Since the
Gifts of the Holy Ghost are supernatural, no Gift corresponds to
art, nor is the action of art an action of the Holy Ghost.
6. The Gifts presuppose all three of the theological virtues as
their root and foundation, since it is through them that the soul is
united to God and able to be moved by His Spirit. But in a special
way the Gifts of Understanding and Knowledge correspond to
Faith so that revealed mysteries can be rightly apprehended and
judged. Fear-in so far as it restrains presumption-is conjoined
to Hope, while Wisdom is linked with Charity, since from the
savor and taste of love the soul experiences and enjoys loving
knowledge. Therefore, from every point of view these seven Gifts
are sufficient.
7. Objection: The only difficulty with this collation of Virtues
and Gifts arises from the fact that St. Thomas asserts that the
Gifts of Understanding and Wisdom perfect the speculative part
of the intellect, while Counsel and Knowledge perfect the practical
part. But Understanding and Wisdom are also practical, just as
is Faith, to which they correspond. For Faith is at the same time
speculative and practical because it works through Charity.
Furthermore, the Gift of Knowledge is concerned with both speculation and action, since it judges of things to be done and even the
scientific analysis of truths in themselves. St. Thomas recognized
this 19 and he retracted his earlier opinion that Understanding was
not practicaJ.2° He did the same 21 about the Gift of Knowledge.
Since, therefore, St. Thomas has retracted this present teaching
upon which is founded his proof for the conclusion about the
number of Gifts, the whole compilation topples and has been
fabricated in vain.
8. Response: It is true that St. Thomas does modify his former
statement and he admits that the Gifts of Understanding, Knowledge, and Wisdom are found in both the speculative and practical
intellect. A defense might be instituted upon the grounds that in
the collation of St. Thomas just given Understanding and Wisdom,
19 II-II, q. 8, a. 3 and 6.
•• I-II, q. 68, a. 4.

21

II-II, q. 9, a. 3.

426

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

although both speculative and practical, are more eminently attributable to the speculative part. The Gift of Knowledge, which proceeds through lesser causes than those of Wisdom, and the Gift of
Counsel are more eminently practical, although they too are speculative. Although this defense is not without foundation, it is not
necessary. St. Thomas 22 has clearly shown that "To some it seems
that the Gift of Understanding differs from the Gifts of Knowledge
and Counsel by the fact that these latter belong to practical
knowledge, while the Gift of Understanding belongs to speculative
knowledge. It differs from the Gift of Wisdom, which also belongs
to speculative knowledge, because Wisdom is concerned with judgment, while Understanding renders the mind apt to grasp the
things that are proposed, and to penetrate into their very core.
In this sense we have assigned the number of the Gifts. 23 But if
we consider the matter carefully, the Gift of Understanding is
concerned not only with speculative but also with practical matters,
as stated above. 24 Moreover, the Gift of Knowledge is concerned
w·ith both matters, as we shall show further on, 25 and consequently
we must make our distinction in some other way." When St.
Thomas mentions that some think this way, he implies that in his
enumeration of the Gifts 26 he wrote according to a common opinion,
not according to his own. He wished to reserve his own for further
discussion in a more suitable place.
9. The definitive doctrine of St. Thomas, then, affirms that
three Gifts belong to the appetitive power: Piety, Fortitude, and
Fear. It is likewise quite clear that because of its concern with
action the Gift of Counsel belongs to the practical intellect and
that it corresponds to the virtue of Prudence. On the other hand,
the Gifts of Understanding, Wisdom, and Knowledge, which embrace both the speculative and the practical, should not find their
total adequation in their correspondence with the virtues. Some
of these virtues perfect the speculative part and others the practical, since their limited formalities can include only one or the other
function of the intellect. No one acquired virtue can, at the same
time, perfect the intellectual potency under both aspects. Supernatural virtues, however, are so elevated that they can embrace
22 II-II, q. 8, a. 6.
•• I-II, q. 68, a. 4.
•• Ibid., a. 3.

25
26

II-II, q. 9, a. 4.
I-ll, q. 8, a. 4.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

427

both. For example, Faith, like the Beatific Vision, is at once
speculative and practical. In it there is not so much a question of
its limitation to a subject which it perfects as of the participation
in the Divine Science which it represents and whose place it takes.
Thus Faith includes both functions of the intellect.
For this reason, the truer and more formal reason for the distinction of the Gifts is to be sought, not in their relation to the
intellectual virtues and their limitations in the speculative or
practical intellect, but in the correspondence between the Gifts
and Faith and their imitation of it.
10. It is in this way, therefore, that St. Thomas proves the
sufficiency of the intellectual Gifts, 27 since these Gifts are ordered
to supernatural knowledge which is had through Faith. Faith is
primarily concerned with the First Truth, the Divine Truth.
Secondarily, it considers certain things related to creatures. Finally,
it directs human actions to which it extends, since it works
through Charity. For a man must be properly disposed in order
to have a correct attitude toward the things which are proposed
to him for belief. He should be able to grasp and apprehend correctly the things that are proposed. Moreover, he should be able
to judge well, knowing what to take and what to cast aside. The
Gift of Understanding renders him capable of apprehending these
truths. The judgment of them belongs either to Wisdom, if it is a
matter of judging through the highest causes, or to Knowledge,
if lesser causes are concerned. Action and the direction of human
life is the peculiar function of the Gift of Counsel.

11. Many difficulties arise from this discussion and correlation
of the intellectual and the appetitive Gifts. They will have as their
object to prove that fewer Gifts would be sufficient, or that there
are actually more Gifts than those mentioned.
12. The first difficulty seeks to prove that there are fewer Gifts
by the statement that all the functions of judgment concerning
supernatural objects can be fulfilled by one and the same habit or
principle. There is no reason, then, why all supernatural things
cannot belong to the one habit, especially one so elevated and
perfect as a Gift.
The second difficulty is somewhat similar. Faith by itself includes
••JI-ll, q. 8, a. 6.

428

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

all supernatural objects. It can extend to both the speculative and
the practical functions of the intellect, just as can the Gifts. Therefore, according to its superior and eminent motive principle, one
and the same Gift can extend to the judgment of all supernatural
things.
Finally, there is no reason why the same habit cannot, at the
same time, both apprehend and judge truth, since one act ordered
to another can be included under the same formality.
13. Other objections try to show that there are more than
seven Gifts. The first urges that although only seven Gifts are
epumerated, it is nowhere asserted that these seven are ultimate
species. They might be subalternate genera. For example, there
are said to be four cardinal virtues. Yet under these there are
subjective parts or species. Under justice there are the species,
called "commutative," "distributive," and " legal." Under this
same virtue there are the potential parts: religion, piety, dutifulness, appreciativeness, and the like. Prudence contains the
species called regnative, domestic, and military, while the potential
virtues annexed to it are eubulia, synesis, and gnome. 28 Why can
not there be contained under the Gifts many species of Piety,
Counsel, and so forth? Or else why do the Gifts contain all these
functions under one specification rather than under diverse
specifications?
Second, there are many intellectual virtues under wisdom and
knowledge. Why cannot there be many intellectual Gifts under
Wisdom and Knowledge? Why is there no Gift corresponding to
art?
Third, there are Gifts corresponding to the intellectual and moral
virtues. Why are there no Gifts corresponding to the theological
virtues?
Fourth, the Gifts are enumerated and ordered in pairs. The one
regulated is placed with the one regulating, as wisdom and understanding, since wisdom regulates understanding. Science and piety
are together, counsel and fortitude. Why is there no Gift regulative
of fear?
Fifth, even if Isaias enumerates seven Gifts he adds two others
a little later: and justice shall be the girdle of his loins and faith
the girdle of his reins. 29 Finally, St. Paul enumerates several other
•• Cf. I-II, q. 57, a. 6.

•• Isaias, xi, 5.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

429

Gifts: Now there are varieties of gifts but the same Spirit, 30 and
To one through the Spirit is given the utterance of wisdom; and to
another the utterance of knowledge, according to the same Spirit;
to another faith, in the same Spirit, to another the gift of healing,
in the same Spirit; to another the working of miracles; to another
prophecy, etc. 31 Why are not all these listed among the Gifts of
the Holy Ghost?

Why There Are Not Fewer Than Seven Gifts
14. Passing over the possibility of all the offices of judgment
being accomplished by one habit which would be of an order and
essence different from that of the Gifts, it must be unequivocally
denied that there is any one habit of the same order as the Gifts
which can do it. Whatever the possibilities may be about there
being a habit so elevated that it can fulfill all these functions, there
is actually no one habit that can do it all. Scripture assigns the
task to a plurality of Gifts and not to one. Since Scripture asserts
that the Gifts are actually more than one, no further proof is
needed. Only the convenience of this fact is subject to inquiry.
For through Faith the very existence of these Gifts is made known,
even though a plurality of Gifts is more reasonable because of
human capacity and limitation, to which grace adapts itself as far
as possible. Consequently St. Thomas need not prove this plurality.
Presupposing then the number of Gifts as establishe"d in the Scriptures, St. Thomas inquires into the convenience and the proportion
of that number. His discussion and his reasons intend to prove no
more than that.
15. In reply to the second objection it must be noted that there
is a proportion between the relationship the Gifts bear to their
objects and the relationship of Faith to its object. One may be of
greater material extension than another, for Faith attains to very
many things, and the Gift of Wisdom is related to far more than
the Gift of Counsel, which is limited to human actions. Yet in their
essence or in their manner of operation they are distinct. Faith
ean no more perform the functions of the Gifts of Wisdom and
Understanding than they could accomplish those of Faith. Each
operates within its own sphere. Faith believes in God revealing
80

I Corinthians, xii, 4.

81

Ibid., xii, 8.

480

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

without involving itself in inquiry or judgment concerning matters
of Faith. It performs no operation other than that of believing,
although it may be concerned with more objects than some of the
Gifts and fewer than others. The Gift of Wisdom judges these
same matters, but it does not exercise any function of believing.
The Gift of Understanding grasps and penetrates the things of
Faith, but it is not directly concerned with belief. Each of the
Gifts taken separately extends to many objects but not to the
exercise of the function of any other Gift, or at least not in the
same way as another Gift.
16. For the moment any consideration of the sufficiency the act
of Faith has for all its objects, according to its own manner of
acting and not according to the judgment and intimate penetration
of the terms by the Gifts, must be omitted. But without hesitation
it can be denied that Faith is sufficient for all objects according to
its own mode as well as the mode of the Gifts. It is the same with
the Gifts: each is sufficient for its object according to its own
manner of acting but not according to the formality of any other
'S · •t or Virtue. The distinction of the Gifts, however, is not based
solely upon the material objects to which they extend. Rather it
is founded upon the formality and manner of acting of the Gift in
relation to these objects. Moreover, Faith does not extend to all
the objects of the Gifts, nor does it perform all their acts. Each
performs its own function. Therefore, the argument that, like one
Faith, one Gift should be sufficient, is without foundation. Faith
does not suffice for all these operations but only for believing.
Other virtues are required for judging and apprehending.
17. Why should not one Faith or one Gift suffice for all these
functions? The answer lies in the specific limitation of each virtue.
For example, one science is not sufficient to perform the operations
of all the sciences, nor is one sensitive potency sufficient to fulfill
the duties of all the senses, since each has its specific limitation.
Could there possibly be one habit, whether a virtue or a Gift,
which, absolutely considered, could exercise all these functions
under a more elevated formality? This is possible, but it is not in
conformity with human limitation and capacity, to which it is convenient to operate through more limited forms. Moreover, as a
matter of fact, no such Gift is to be found. Upon what ground
may it be asserted that there is no such Gift? Scripture gives the

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

481

answer-by revealing that these Gifts are distinct, just as it reveals
that the three theological virtues are distinct: There remain these
three Faith, Hope, and Charity. 82
18. In solving the third difficulty it must be noted that one
habit or one virtue concerned with a hierarchy of things does suffice
for apprehending and judging all under the same formality of judgment. Yet for apprehensions and judgments under diverse formalities one habit or virtue does not suffice. The Gift of Wisdom
is ordained to judging under a formality different from that of
Understanding. The former judges in an analytic fashion, since it
proceeds from the highest causes. The latter employs merely a
simple, apprehensive judgment, just as does the habit of principles.
This does not mean, however, that the Gift of Understanding
merely apprehends and does not judge. It implies only that it does
not judge in the analytic manner of Wisdom and Knowledge.
Why There Are Not More Than Seven Gifts
An Inquiry Into the Question of Whether the Gifts Are
Ulti·mate Species
19. Solution of the first difficulty: There can be no doubt that
the Gifts are ultimate species, although they are of a higher essence
the moral virtues. Even though one ultimate species of such
Gifts is the equivalent of many virtues, formally there are but
seven of these species, ultimate and indivisible.
St. Thomas makes this point in writing of the Gift of Piety, 83
but the doctrine may be applied to the other Gifts. " Piety in one
and the same way directs all intercourse with others, receiving,
however, a norm other than that of the virtues. Because that norm
is simple and one, Piety is one spiritual habit. And by comparison
with this norm all its acts are specified." If Piety had only the
unity of a subalternate genus, it could not direct all social intercourse in one and the same way. For example, the virtue of justice
does not direct all relationships with others in one and the same
way. It directs in one way by commutative justice, in another by
distributive, and in still another by religion and respectfulness.
Absolutely considered, then, justice directs in different ways. All
these things, therefore, indicate that the Gifts are ultimate species.
•• I Corinthians, xiii, IS.

•• III Sent., d. 84, q. S, a. 2, quaestiunc. 2.

432

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

20. This doctrine is more in conformity with Scripture and the
Tradition of the Church, which enumerates seven Gifts and no
more. If under each Gift there were other gifts as ultimate species,
absolutely speaking, there would be more than seven Gifts. For
example, absolutely speaking, it cannot be said that there are only
four moral virtues, but that there are four cardinal virtues. Hence,
if there were more than seven Gifts, the number seven could not
be used in an absolute sense. Furthermore, if there are other lesser
species of Gifts, some .mention should be made of what they are
and how- many there are. For nothing should be asserted concerning these Gifts other than what is given through revelation.
But no more than seven Gifts are ever mentioned. Therefore, it is
not legitimate to make assertions concerning the Gifts which Faith
does not explain or which the Tradition of the Church does not
imply.
21. Reason confirms this doctrine. In each Gift the formal
motives and causes are those of one ultimate species. Therefore,
the Gifts themselves are ultimate species, being specified by such
motives. The inference is evident, since things specified cannot
exceed whatever specifies them. Consequently, if their formal causes
are not subalternate genera but ultimate species, the Gifts themselves must be ultimate and indivisible species. Since the Gifts act
with a higher motive within either of the intellectual or moral
genera of virtues they can embrace and unite in an eminent fashion
what is divided among the various motives of the virtues. Therefore, the motives and formal causes of the Gifts are less divisible
than those of the virtues. For a motive which proceeds in a higher
way and embraces many inferior causes is not divided into as many
species as the lesser causes, otherwise it would not proceed in so
unified a fashion. For example, the power of the sun, being more
eminent, is divided into fewer species than the powers of the
elements; the knowledge of higher Angels is contained in fewer
representative species than that of lesser Angels. Likewise, the
architectonic arts and sciences are not divided as much as the
ministerial and lesser arts and sciences are. Moreover, that a. higher
principle embraces more in jts unity and is divided less than an
inferior motive is proved from the fact that in one genus, temperance or justice for example, the virtues are divided into several
species. For in. a different way or according to a different rule,

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

433

reason measures what is related to commutative justice and what
is related to distributive justice, or the things related to God or
to one's neighbor. On the other hand, the Gift of Piety, which
measures according to a divine rule and the impulse of the Holy
Ghost, can embrace all in one architectonic rule of action, since it
is concerned with Gpd as a Father and all men as brothers in grace.
It pays all debts under the communication of that supernatural
notion of grace, which is one. It subordinates to itself all social
intercourse of the natural order. Fear, likewise, under the formality
of restraining the soul and fleeing from the evil of sin, restricts all
illicit delectation and subdues the excess of harmful elation. Yet
this is the function of the virtue of Temperance under the many
diverse measurings of reason and its own intrinsic goodness.
22. It may be alleged that this same situation obtains in the
infused moral virtues. Their motive in the supernatural order is
higher than that of the correlative virtues in the natural order.
Yet there are as many of them as there are acquired virtues.
Hence, it does not follow that because the motive of the Gifts is
higher there are fewer of them than there are virtues.
23. The answer to this difficulty is based upon the fact that the
case of the infused virtues is essentially different from that of the
Gifts. The infused virtues are elevated above the acquired virtues
by reason of their object and the substance of their acts, not because of a special mode of being regulated or moved. The infused
virtues and the acquired virtues are proportionately the same. The
infused virtues are concerned with a supernatural end and because
of this they are more elevated than the acquired virtues. But even
in the infused virtues the rule of action and manner of measuring
actions in relation to its proper objects and end is according to
infused prudence, which regulates according to the ordinary rules
and manner of understanding, inferred by the human process of
reasoning. From this knowledge of these objects through Faith,
Prudence elicits acts according to its proper limitation. This is evident in theological conclusions and practical and prudential rules.
Even in supernatural matters, Prudence acts according to limits
and capacity of reason. Hence, it is not extraordinary that such
virtues, even though supernatural and infused, should not be fewer
in number than the acquired virtues. Although they are elevated
above the virtues of the natural order in the matter and objects
7

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JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

with which they deal, in their manner of regulating and measuring
and knowing they are not so elevated that they operate more
unifiedly, more indivisibly, and more eminently than the acquired
virtues.
On the other hand, the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are concerned
with a knowledge and regulative principle higher than human
powers can attain even with infused virtues. The Gifts have as
their norm the impulse and motion of the Holy Ghost. Consequently, they function in a more unified and eminent way than
the infused virtues, since they are measured by a higher rule.
Therefore, they should not be divided and multiplied like the
virtues. Rather they should be contained in a lesser number of
habits and should unite each genus of virtue in an· indivisible way.
Their motive is higher, their formal cause is more elevated, and
they even proceed in a higher way.
!l4. The reply to the second difficulty is based upon the foregoing. The Gifts are not multiplied in the same way as natural
science because they function according to a higher and more
simple cause. They are, then, more unified and less divisible than
the natural sciences.
The difficulty concerning art is dispatched by noting that there
is no Gift of art because there are no supernatural works of art.
All supernatural things belong to right living as ordained to eternal
life. This is beyond the function of art.
!l5. Reply to the third objection: As has been noted above, 84
some Gifts correspond to the theological virtues. They are not
superior to them but serve them and prepare the object matter for
the virtue. The theological virtues unite the soul to the ultimate
end, and are the foundation and root of the Gifts by which the
Holy Ghost moves the soul to tend toward that end. Consequently,
the Gifts presuppose Faith, Hope, and Charity, uniting the soul to
its end. Thus all the Gifts are related to these virtues as to a root. 3 a
Moreover, in a special way, the Gifts of Understanding and Knowledge are related to Faith, Fear to Hope, and Wisdom to Charity. 36
In all, however, the Gifts are not superior to these virtues but their
servants.
•• Cf. Chapter 8, no. 55.
•• Cf. 1-11, q. 68, a. 4, ad. S.
•• Cf. respectively 1-11, q. 8, 9, 19, and 45.

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435

26. The reply to the fourth objection is based upon the twofold
principle of St. Thomas. First, 37 Fear implies a retreat from evil.
Yet the same habit directs a motion toward its term and away
from its beginning. The same Gifts, then, which direct the soul in
its approach toward God through Hope, Charity, Piety, etc., direct
the soul in the retreat from evil by the Gift of Fear. Hence, Fear
needs no other directive principle. Secondly, 38 Fear is directed by
Wisdom because the Divine Excellence, the principle subject of
Wisdom, is the special reason for fearing God. Fear itself prepares
for Wisdom, since the beginning of wisdom is the fear of the Lord. 89
Consequently, Fear is a disposition to Wisdom, by which it is
regulated and measured.
27. It is not inconvenient for the Gift of Understanding to be
directed and regulated through Wisdom, because the latter perfects man's intellect and directs his love. It reflects upon the
principles which are known by the habit of understanding.
28. Reply to the fifth objection: The two habits enumerated
by Isaias after the seven spirits are not called spirits. Consequently,
they cannot be included among the spirits which make the soul
readily movable by the Holy Ghost. Isaias does not assert that
the spirit of justice and the spirit of Faith will be the girdle of his
loins. He merely notes that justice and Faith will be the girdle of
his loins. This is a sign that they do not belong to the group ofSt'Ven; but that they are virtues which pertain to the administration of the reign of the Messias. For He was to rule in justice and
fidelity (faith here means fidelity, not the theological virtue of
Faith) . According to the Hebrew 40 this passage refers not to virtues but to faithful men who will approach and gird the Messias.
29. Reply to the sixth difficulty: St. Paul, according to the
common opinion, was enumerating the charisms. These are not
common to all men, nor need they be found -in all who are in the
state of grace. They may even be found in sinners, since they are
given for the edification of others and not for the salvation of the
one possessing them. To one through the Spirit is given the utter87 Cf. Ill Sent., d. S4, q. 1, a. 2, ad 8.
•• Cf. I-II, q. 68, a. 4, ad 5.
•• Cf. Psalm ex, 10 and Eccll!8iaticua ii, 16.
•• Cf. Oleaster: Commentarium in Pentateuckum Moyai, in loco.

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JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

ance of wisdom, to another knowledge, etc. 41 They are not given
to all, but some to one, others to another.
The Gifts of the Holy Ghost, however, are found in all the just,
since they have as their end the preparation of the soul to be
easily moved by the Holy Ghost toward eternal life. Thy spirit
lead me into the right land. 42 Yet the sevenfold Spirit found in
Christ-The spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him: the spirit of
wisdom and of understanding, etc. 43 - would remain not with sinners but with the just: The Holy Spirit of discipline will flee from
the deceitful ... and shall not abide when iniquity comes in. 44

"I Corinthians, xii, 8.
42 Psalm c!xii, 10.

•• Isaias, xi,
" Wisdom, 1: 5

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437

CHAPTER VIII *
The Properties of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost
1. There are three properties of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost.
The first is the connection of the Gifts among themselves and their

*

OUTLINE OF CHAPTER VIII

The Properties of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost (1)
I.

THE FIRsT PROPERTY:

THE INTERRELATION

OF THE GIFTs AND THEIR CoRRE-

LATION WITH CHARITY

A. The mutual relation of the Gifts like that of the moral virtues (!l)
1) The correspondence between the habits themselves not their acts (3)
2) The relation of the Gifts to Charity as analogous to that of the
moral virtues and Prudence (4)
B. The difficulties involved in the Thomistic doctrine
1) The first difficulty (5)
a) The first confirmation (6)
b) The second confirmation (7)
2) The second difficulty (8)
3) The opinion of Father Lorca (9)
C. The solution of these difficulties
1) The Thomistic doctrine involved in the first difficulty
a) From the authority of Scripture (10)
b) From the authority of the Fathers (11)
c) From the authority and reasons of St. Thomas (12 and 13)
2) The solution of the first difficulty (14)
a) The refutation of the first confirmation (15)
b) The refutation of the second confirmation (16 and 17)
c) The appraisal of the opinion of Father Lorca
d) The clarification of the notion of keenness in the Gift of Understanding (19)
8) The answer to the second difficulty
a) The Gifts and Faith (20 and 21)
b) The Gifts and Charity (22)
II.

THE SECOND PROPERTY:

THE PERMANENCE

OF THE GIFTS

A. The formal aspect (28)
B. The material aspect (24)
I) Objections against the Thomistic doctrine
a) The first objection (25)
b) The second and third objections (26)
2) The answers to these objections
a) The answer to the first objection (27)

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JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

association with Charity and grace, which is so intimate that the
Gifts never exist apart from grace. The second property is their
duration throughout this life and eternity. The third property is
their equality and inequality among themselves and in relation to
the virtues. These properties are common to the Gifts and the
virtues. The moral virtues have in addition the property called
moderation, since either their excess or deficiency is measurable by
reason. On the other hand, the Gifts of the Holy Ghost do not
involve any determined rule of moderation. They are united
immediately to God Himself and follow His impulse.

The Connection of the Gifts Among Themselves and With Charity
2. St. Thomas 1 proves the mutual relation of the Gifts in the
same manner in which he establishes the connection among the
moral virtues. All the moral virtues are correlated by the single
virtue of Prudence regulating them. Moreover, Prudence itself
cannot be had without an intention of the end rectified by the
other virtues. In this same way, the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are
connected through Charity which is had only by the indwelling of
the Holy Ghost. Yet the Holy Ghost cannot dwell in the soul
unless it is first made docile to Him and obedient in all th.ngs.
For whoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. 2
8. This interrelation of habits does not refer to their acts but
to the habits themselves. For it is not necessary for anyone who
exercises one virtue to perform acts of the other virtues at the
same time. However, he must be prepared to perform the acts of
b) The answer to the second objection (!l8)
c) The answer to the third objection (29)
III.

THE THIRD PaoPERTY:

THE RELATIVE SuPERIORITY

AND INFERIORITY

oF THE

GIFTs (SO)
A. The Gifts and the theological virtues (81)
B. The Gifts and the intellectual and moral virtues (3!l)
C. The hierarchy within the Gifts (33)
1) The Gifts in the intellect (34)
2) The Gifts in the appetites (35)
S) The position of the Gifts according to their material aspect (86)
4) A difficulty on the place of the Gift of Fear (87)
a) The Thomistic solution (38)
1

1-11, q. 68, a. 4.

• Romans, viii, 14.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

489

the other virtues should the occasion arise. For example, a person
may feel the obligation of performing an act of justice or religion
and at the same time he may be lax in the matter of chastity and
unprepared to preserve it in temptation. Evidently if he were faced
with the absolute necessity of preserving chastity to preserve the
virtue of justice, he would prefer to violate justice rather than
preserve chastity. Obviously, then, his attitude toward the
observance of justice is neither firm nor virtuous.
This same principle applies to the Gifts. Their mutual relationship is not necessarily found in their acts but rather in the habits
themselves. For example, a man prepared by union with God
through the theological virtues to follow His impulse and motion
toward his ultimate end, should be prepared to follow the divine
motion in all things that are conducive to the attainment of that
end. Likewise, anyone prepared by Understanding to follow the
Holy Ghost in matters related to Faith and not prepared to follow
Him in matters of Piety, Fortitude, or Fear, is not sufficiently
disposed to follow the Holy Ghost toward eternal life. He cannot
say with the prophet: I am prepared to follow your commandments
and I am not disturbed. 8
4. Once it is admitted that the Gifts are rooted in Charity and
connected through it -just as the moral virtues are connected
through Prudence - no difficulties arise, except those similar to
the objections concerning the moral virtues. For without Prudence
there is no true moral virtue, since the regulative principle of
morality is absent. And when Prudence is present none of the
others is lacking, since they establish the right intention necessary
for the judgment and command of Prudence. In the absence of
Charity no Gift can be found to move the soul towards eternal life.
When Charity is present none of the Gifts is lacking. For Charity
cannot remain without the movement of the soul toward eternal
life through the motion of the Holy Ghost.
5. Objection: The primary difficulty is in the presupposition
that the Gifts are united in Charity, and that Charity is united
with them in such a way that one cannot be had without the other.
The basis of this difficulty lies in the difference between the virtues
and the Gifts, which are necessary for operations surpassing the
• Psalm cxviii, 60.

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JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

common and ordinary actions of the virtues, extraordinary acts
which need a special motion and impulse of the Holy Ghost. Such
actions, however, are not necessary for Charity or for the attainment of eternal glory, since anyone can be saved through a simple
observance of the commandments. Even martyrdom, detachment
from the things of the world and other works not of precept but
of counsel are not required for the possession of Charity. Much
less necessary, then, are the extraordinary actions found in only a
few, like the fortitude of Samson or other martyrs who by an impulse of the Holy Ghost surrendered to death. Therefore, since the
Gifts are for extraordinary actions, while the virtues without the
Gifts suffice for common actions under Charity, there seems to be
no necessary connection between the Gifts and Charity.
6. The objection is confirmed by the fact that in many who are
not in the state of grace, and even among those who have not the
Faith, there are to be found many extraordinary actions. They
perform great feats of fortitude and piety. They are proficient in
counsel and in many other admirable and extraordinary works of
virtue. And all of these they perform without the Gifts. Hence
these extraordinary acts do not postulate Gifts rooted in Charity.
7. Further confirmation is provided by the possibility of salvation for those who have Charity but lack some of these Gifts.
Hence, the Gifts are not connected among themselves nor with
Charity; nor are they necessary for salvation. The argument seems
forceful enough, since there cannot be a necessary connection between things which can be separated. For example, many men who
are in the state of grace are simple and unlettered. They lack the
Gifts of Understanding, Wisdom and Knowledge. In fact, they are
filled with the opposed vices of dullness, roughness and puerility.
Hence, St. Augustine admits: 4 "Many of the faithful lack knowledge though they have faith." Likewise, without these Gifts in
their perfection many of the faithful are saved. According to St.
Augustine, 5 "There are those whom not the vigor of understanding
but the simplicity of believing makes most safe." Hence, without
the vigor of understanding proper to the Gift of Understanding
many of the faithful are saved. Faith, with Prudence and the other
virtues, is sufficient.
• XIV de Trinitate, c. 1, PL, xlii, 1037; cf. 11-II, q. 9, a. 1.
Contra Epistolam Fundamenti, c. 4, PL, xlii, 175.

5

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

441

8. The second difficulty: Since Faith can exist in sinners, the
Gifts which serve Faith can also exist there. For anything serving
a virtue can remain as long as the virtue remains. This is especia.lly
true of Gifts perfecting the intellect: Understanding in the perception oftruth, Wisdom and Knowledge in its judgment. Of their
very nature antecedent to Charity in the will, just as Faith, these
Gifts which perfect the intellect and serve Faith can precede
Charity and can be found without it.
It does not suffice to reply that the Gifts are ordained to Absolute
Good and unite the soul to God and hence cannot be had in a
sinner. For even Faith is ordered to the Absolute Good. It is the
directive principle of Charity and good works, for Faith works
through love. Yet Faith is found in sinners. Therefore, Gifts too
can be found in sinners, although of their very nature they are
directive of good works and tend to eternal life. However, they
may fail to attain that end because of defects on the part of the
one operating through them.
Finally, there is the argument that many sinners without grace
can understand, dispute, and judge in mystical and affective theology. They can know and teach truths of Faith as if they were
in the state of grace. Consequently, if while in Charity they
understood these things through the Gift of Understanding and
Wisdom, then in acting in the same way even after the loss of
grace, they must still understand through the Gifts.
9. On the basis of these objections, Father Lorca 6 denies both
assertions of St. Thomas. He denies that the Gifts are connected
with Charity in such a way that they are not found in sinners,
and he denies that the Gifts are necessary for salvation.
10. Yet, just the opposite of all these conclusions must be held
on the authority of Scripture and the Saints, whose testimony
easily overcomes and solves these difficulties.
It is certain from Scripture that a particular kind of understanding, wisdom, knowledge, counsel, as well as other Gifts, can
be found only in those in the state of grace. For of Understanding
it is said, a good understanding to all who do it, 1 give me understanding and I shalllive, 8 give me understanding and I will learn
6 Commentaria in q. 68, d. 25, no. 4.
• Psalm ex, 10.

8

Psalm cxviii, 144.

442

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

thy commandments 9 Moreover, Wisdom will not enter into a
m,alicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins. 10 This refers
to created wisdom, not to uncreated wisdom, since (the Holy
Ghost) will withdraw himself from thoughts that are without
understanding, and he shall not abide when iniquity comes in ... , 11
And because they had not wisdom, they perished through their
folly. 12 When that wisdom fails, a man is no longer in grace. For
God loves none but him that dwells with wisdom, 13 and no one
dwells with the uncreated wisdom unless he has wisdom within
himself making him wise and beloved of God. That Wisdom gave
him knowledge of the holy things. 14 There is, then, a knowledge
found only in the saints, which is called a Gift. Moreover, Thy
justifications are my counselsY Therefore, the Gift of Counsel is
never separated from justification.
Piety is profitable in all respects, since it has the promise of the
present life as well as of that which is to come. 16 This can be had
only through grace.
Fortitude is mentioned in the words of the Psalmist, Act manfully and let your heart be strengthened, you who hope in the
Lord; 11 and elsewhere, Strength and beauty are her clothing and
she shall laugh in the latter day/ 8 and if we endure, we shall also
reign with him. 19
Finally, Fear of the Lord drives out sin, for he that is without
fear cannot be justified/ 0 and The fear of the Lord is holy, enduring
for ever and ever. 21
ll. From these citations and others like them, it is certai_nly
safe to conclude that there are gifts which are found only in those
having grace. Moreover, these words of Sacred Scripture refer to
the seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost. For Isaias, in mentioning the
Gifts all together, attributes them to the indwelling of the Holy
Ghost, Who is found only in the just: And the Spirit of the Lord
shall rest upon Him. The Spirit of wisdom and of understanding,
Psalm cxviii, 78.
Wisdom, i, 4.
11 Ibid., i, 5.
12 Baruch, iii, 28.
13 Wisdom, viii, 28.
u Wisdom, x, 10.
15 Psalm cxviii, 24.
1

10

I Timothy, iv, 8.
Psalm xxx, 25.
18 Proverbs, xxxi, 25.
19 II Timothy, ii, 12.
20 Ecclesiasticus, i, 27.
21 Psalm xviii, 10.
16

17

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

448

etc. 22 Therefore, wherever the Spirit does not rest, there is no
spirit of wisdom or of understanding, For the Holy Spirit of discipline will flee from the deceitful . . . and he shall not abide when
iniquity comes in. 28 Therefore, the Gifts are coeyal with grace, for
they are possessed only through the indwelling of the Spirit. The
Fathers of the Church concur in this doctrine, especially St.
He teaches, 25 "We have heard that the heavenly kingdom will be opened to us through the sevenfold grace which Isaias
enumerated. . . . " Moreover, according to St. J erome,26 " We
understand that these Gifts were in Christ, because without Christ
no one can be wise or understand, nor can he give good counsel,
nor be strong, nor pious, nor filled with the fear of the Lord."
The same notion is found in St. Cyril's commentary on this part
of lsaiasP Writing of the anointing of the Holy Ghost, the author
of the work on the Cardinal Works of Christ 28 affirms that the Gifts
are had through grace: "through this anointing, wisdom and
understanding are given us by God, counsel and fortitude come
down from heaven, knowledge, piety and fear are poured forth by
inspirations from above." Extensive confirmation of this doctrine
can also be found among the other Fathers.
12.29 St. Thomas 80 gives the reason underlying this doctrine.
Just as the moral virtues are related to the rule of reason, so the
Gifts are related to the Holy Ghost moving the soul. Since the
Holy Ghost dwells in the soul through Charity, the Gifts are
connected through Charity.
However, to some this would seem to be a faulty reasoning
process, since it wanders from the notion of the Spirit moving to
that of the indwelling of the Holy Ghost. For although the Holy
Ghost dwells in the soul only through Charity, He moves it even
before Charity is present. This is evident from the fact that, ac•• Isaicu, xi, 1.
•• Wiadom, i, 5.
"'I Moralium, c. U, PL, lxxv, 544, and c. 82, PL, lxxv, 547.
•• Homily XIX on Ezechiel, PL, lxxvi, 1158.
•• Commentary on Iaaicu, c. 11, PL, xxiv, 144.
21 Lib. II on Iaaia.t, PL, lxx, 810.
•• Emaldus, De Cardinalibua Christi Operibua, PL, clxxxix, 1658.
•• At this point the Vives Edition is in error on the numbering of paragraphs.
The proper numbering is here preserved.
•• I-ll, q. 68, a. 5.

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JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

cording to the Council of Trent, 31 a sinner has attrition before he
is justified. How, then, can St. Thomas conclude that the Holy
Ghost should be dwelling in the soul from the relation of the Gifts
to the Holy Ghost moving the soul?
The answer to this difficulty lies in the fact that the Holy Doctor
is not referring to the Holy Ghost as moving merely in the efficient
order. In that order it is not necessary that the Holy Ghost dwell
in the soul, since He is moving toward justification and preparing
for His own indwelling. St. Thomas refers rather to the regulative
and directive moving of the Holy Ghost, analogous to the movement and regulation of the moral virtues by Prudence. St. Thomas
himself makes the comparison: 32 "Just as the virtues are related
to the rule of reason, so the Gifts are related to the moving of the
Holy Ghost." It is evident that if Prudence moves the soul by
directing and governing it, it dwells within the heart and mind.
Therefore, if the Holy Ghost directs and regulates in the same
manner, He must dwell within the soul and rectify the man, for
neither the command of the Holy Ghost nor the actions flowing
from it can be defective. Therefore, the similarity of the directive
and regulative motion of the Holy Ghost and the motion of Prudence is the irrefragible basis for St. Thomas' conclusion on the
indwelling of the Holy Ghost.
13. The efficacy of St. Thomas' conclusion on the necessity of
the Gifts for salvation 33 is now more evident. The formation of
the virtues according to the human manner of reasoning is not
sufficient. There must be superadded a motion and impulse of the
Holy Ghost leading the soul to eternal life. Consequently, a Gift
of the Holy Ghost is necessary to attain the supernatural end.
Father Lorca thinks he weakens this conclusion by stating that
according to this all the Gifts are not needed, just as it is not
necessary that the soul be moved by the Holy Ghost in every way
possible. Hence, all the Gifts are not necessary for salvation. This
seems to him especially evident, since, if a man is moved to judge
of divine things by the Gift of Wisdom, why should he be moved
by the Gift of Knowledge to judge of the same things.
St. Thomas, it may be noted in reply, at first draws an indefinite
conclusion, namely, that a Gift of the Holy Ghost is necessary to
31
12

Council of Trent, session 14, c.
I-II, q. 68, a. 5..

Cf. Denzinger, 898.
33 Ibid., a.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

445

attain the end. There must be some Gift directing and regulating
in a way superior to that of the virtues. It must remove the defects
which the virtues are powerless to overcome. St. Thomas need not
specify that all the Gifts are necessary. He leaves that virtually
manifest. In relation to a supernatural end a man cannot be sufficiently perfected through the virtues and motions of reason. He
must have a superior motion and impulse of the Holy Ghost. 34
But the theological and moral virtues cannot be perfected by only
one Gift. All seven of the Gifts which correspond to the virtues
and serve them are necessary. Since, then, all the virtues necessary
for salvation cannot be perfected without these Gifts, all the Gifts
are necessary for salvation.
14. Reply to the first objection: St. Thomas teaches 35 that the
Gifts are not required merely for works which of their very nature
exceed the common perfection of the virtues, as the counsels surpass
the precepts. Rather, they are required for a manner of action
which is according to a superior principle. This has been noted
above in the distinction made between the actions which are special
and extraordinary by reason of their object and those which are
extraordinary by reason of their subject. 36 Those objectively extraordinary treat of matters not of precept but of counsel, not commonly required for salvation. Subjeetively extraordinary actions
are such either because of the imperfection of the person or because it is impossible for him to conquer all the difficulties he
meets in the attainment of his end.
The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are not given merely to move a
man in works which are difficult of themselves, but also those
which are difficult in the second way as well. Since the Gifts
embrace both aspects of action, they are said to be necessary for
salvation, not merely for extraordinary works but for a special
manner of acting. Otherwise, because of man's weakness reason
would fail to lead him to his ultimate end. But the Spirit is good,
and will lead men to the right land.
15. It may be admitted, in reply to the first confirmation, that
those who lack grace perform unusual and marvelous actions which
are ordained to particular ends. That these actions be ordered to
•• Ibid., a. !2, ad !2.
35 Ibid., ad 1.

36

Chapter II, no. 37.

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JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

the full and perfect attainment of the ultimate supernatural end
is impossible, unless the Holy Ghost should lift the soul from its
infirmity. For not those who do wonderful works but those who
are led by the Spirit of God are the sons of God. Furthermore,
men do not even know how to pray as they ought, but the Spirit
Himself must pray for men with ineffable groaning.
16. The basic principle of the second confirmation can be denied
without hesitation. The proof fails because many simple and
uneducated persons in the state of grace, who know nothing of
worldly knowledge, know all that is necessary for salvation, for
His anointing teaches you concerning all things, 81 and the Holy
Spirit will teach you all truth. 88 Furthermore, the teaching of many
matters of acquired knowledge also pertains to the direction of the
Spirit: The foolish things of the world has God chosen to put to
shame the wise, and the weak things of the world has God chosen
to shame the strong . ... 39 Acquired knowledge puffs up, but
Charity builds well. The removal of that knowledge belongs to
the Holy Ghost, who also gives to souls the knowledge of the
saints, leading them through the right ways. This is the Gift of
Knowledge which is lacking to none of the saints.
17. Moreover, St. Augustine 40 is referring to the charisms
which may be common to sinners and the just. For the charism
of knowledge is ordered to the defense of the Faith and the instruction of others. It does not require that a person be in the state of
grace. Loving knowledge, experiencing, as it were, the things of
salvation, is not its end. Such knowledge is the function of the
Gift. According to St. Thomas,n who follows St. Augustine, it is
evident that "it is one thing to know how much a man should
believe to attain the blessed life which is eternal (this is the knowledge in the Gift). It is quite another to know how to use this to
aid the faithful and to defend the Faith against those without it.
This latter, then, seems to be what the Apostle means by the term
Knowledge." This knowledge is either a charism or theology.
18. Father Lorca objects that St. Thomas understood this passage from St. Augustine to apply not to a charism but to the Gift
I John, ii, 27.
John, xvi, 13.
•• I Corinthians, i, 27.

37
38

•• XIV de Trinitate, c. 1. PL, xlii, 1037.
"Cf. II-II, q. 9, a. I, ad 2.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

447

of Knowledge. 42 But Lorca has not pondered the words that St.
Thomas has cited from St. Augustine. In the first argument St.
Thomas 48 affirms that "through knowledge salutary faith is born,
nourished, and strengthened. But Faith is of divine things, so too,
then, is knowledge." St. Thomas bows to the authority of St.
Augustine and asserts that the Gift of Knowledge is concerned
with the temporal element in Faith, not with the eternal. St.
Thomas, therefore, admits only that St. Augustine is referring to
the Gift of Knowledge as it generates, nourishes, and strengthens
faith in the soul. This is not related to the instruction of others
but to one's own perfection, which is within the scope of the Gift
of Knowledge. For this reason he can infer that the Gift is one
thing and that " it is another thing to know how to aid the faithful
and defend the Faith against those who do not have it." Yet even
here St. Augustine is referring to the Gift of Knowledge rather
than to the charism which the Apostle mentions, just as he himself
makes clear.
19. But one part of that first objection remains to be answered.
It has been alleged that Understanding-necessary for salvationis given to sharpen the mind, and yet even without this keenness
many are safe in the simplicity of their belief. It must be admitted,
of course, that many are safe without alacrity of understanding in
argumentation and explanation. Yet without the loving and experimental alacrity of the motion of the Holy Ghost, which is
derived from the simplicity of Faith either actual or habitual, no
one can be safe in the simplicity of his soul nor in unfeigned charity.
This latter alacrity is the Gift of Knowledge, the science of the
saints, without which they have neither known nor understood:
they walk on in darkness. 44
20. Moreover, the Gifts of Understanding, Knowledge and
Wisdom are ordained to perfect, consummate, and formed Faith.
They are not ordered to unformed or imperfect Faith. Of course,
to apprehend truth imperfectly, to judge it and discern it from
error precedes Faith and is required for it. However, the spirit of
judgment and Understanding or Knowledge and the loving experimental judgment arising from the spirit is not required to introduce Faith. It can only vivify, form, and perfect it. While Faith
•• Ibid.

.. Ibid., a. 1.

.. Paalm lxxxi, 5 .

448

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

belongs to the intellect and precedes Charity, its formation and
its life are brought about through Charity. Consequently the Gifts,
which serve and prepare for a formed and living Faith, belong only
to a man who has Charity. It is very important to keep in mind,
then, that the Gifts of Knowledge, Wisdom and Understanding are
not just any sort of knowledge or understanding, even in the supernatural order. They are the spirit of knowing and of understanding,
etc. The spirit of understanding is more than just a supernatural
understanding coming from the spirit. It is born of love, and from
a sort. of experimental knowledge and contact with the spirit. This
Gift serves Faith, not in its unformed stages, but only when it is
formed.
21. Although Faith may be ordered to perfect action tending
to a supernatural end, some distinction must be made concerning
the essential perfection of the act of Faith. It may be conceded
that it is the foundation and root of supernatural acts, such as
justification, but it is not the proximate and formal principle of
such acts. This formal principle is had through Charity which is
the bond of perfection, forming and perfecting Faith. In the same
way, the Gifts of the Holy Ghost make their contribution, following
upon Charity.
22. Sinners living without grace can acutely discern, dispute,
and even treat of divine things and of mystical or loving Understanding as an object and matter of disputation. But they cannot
use such an Understanding as the principle and motive of their
knowledge. For example, I can treat of the intuitive vision of God
and of the experimental knowledge of sensible things as the object
or matter of a discussion. Yet I do not have the experimental contact with these sensible things nor the intuitive knowledge of God,
because I do not use experience and intuition as the principle and
formal reason of my knowing. In the same way, the sinner cannot
use loving and experimental knowledge as a formal principle. From
the very fact that he has not grace, he cannot have a connaturality
to the Spirit, nor union with God and experience of Him proper to
the Gift. No one knows except him who has received. 45 He may
use it as an object and treat of it as he remembers it. And in this
respect the great change from the state of grace to the condition
•• Apocalypse, ii, 17.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

449

of a sinner is in no way felt. However, it is in the experimental
and loving knowledge, the internal touch of the Spirit, that a great
change and loss is felt. For the Holy Spirit of discipline will flee
from the deceitful, and will draw himself away from thoughts without understanding, and he shall not abide when iniquity comes in. 46
The Gifts of the Holy Ghost, then, are taken away from sinners.
On the other hand, those whose hearts are turned to God immediately feel a serenity and tranquillity, and they are relieved of
the great burden of sin. This is a sign of the indwelling of the Holy
Ghost, Who is the inhabitant of rest. 41 This peace and serenity is
an effect of confession, as the Council of Trent teaches. 48

The Permanence of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost in Eternity
23. Presupposing that the Gifts are founded upon Charity,
upon loving experiential knowledge, and upon connaturality to the
Spirit, it is not difficult to realize that they will continue to exist
in heaven. Although regulated in a higher way in heaven, the Gifts
will be present just as will the Charity in which they are founded,
for the Vision of God will govern both Charity and the Gifts.
Moreover, if the intellectual and moral virtues remain in heaven 49
the Gifts corresponding to them should perdure, especially since
the latter are governed by a more elevated principle- the Holy
Ghost. St. Thomas proves this 50 by affirming that the Gifts are
given to men to make them docile to the Holy Ghost, not only
impelling and activating, but regulating and measuring as well.
In heaven, where God is all in all, the soul will be much more
happily and perfectly subjected to the Holy Ghost. Therefore,
most assuredly the Gifts will remain in heaven.
24. This line of argument proves the permanence of the Gifts
in heaven precisely as far as their formal aspect is concerned, the
regulation and motion of the Holy Ghost. 51 There remains, however, a difficulty concerning the matter of the Gifts and the conditions of their operation. Both imply some sort of imperfection
which cannot be present in heaven.
Wisdom, i, 5.
Isaias, xxxviii, 11.
48 Council of Trent, session 14, c. 3.
4 ° Cf. John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus, q.
d. 17, a. 4.
51 Cf. Chapter 3, no. 34.
r.o I-II. q. 68, a. 6.

40
47

8

450

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

25. First objection: As St. Thomas admits, 52 the matter of
some of the Gifts will not be present in heaven. There will be no
active life, to which Piety and Fortitude are ordered. Nor will
there be Understanding and the penetration of matters of Faith to
which the Gifts of Understanding and Knowledge are ordained.
No longer will the temptations against which the Gifts are arrayed 58
have to be conquered. Therefore, just as when a virtue ceases to
exist when its object is permanently absent--quite as truly as if its
essence were destroyed, so too the Gifts will not remain in eternity
as they are in this life.

26. Second objection: The intellectual Gifts, at least, cannot
be the same in this life and in heaven. Therefore, not all the Gifts
remain. For the Gifts of Understanding, Knowledge, and Wisdom
proceed with a certain obscurity in this life, since they are regulated by Faith and are compatible with it. However, a habit which
has obscurity as an intrinsic element cannot remain in heaven
where there will be no obscurity in the intellect, since darkness is
an imperfection and defect, which is incompatible with the highest
perfection of glory. Therefore, when the obscurity which is intrinsic
to the habit is destroyed the whole entity is changed. For example,
obscurity cannot be taken out of Faith without destroying its very
nature. Therefore, the Gifts involving obscurity in this life, like
that of Faith, cannot remain in heaven. Other Gifts, which are not
obscure, will take their place.
The third objection: ... prophecies will disappear, and tongues
will cease, and knowledge will be destroyed. 54 The knowledge referred to must be the Gift of Knowledge, for the Apostle mentions
other supernatural gifts such as prophecy and the gift of tongues.
27. Reply to the first objection: The primary and essential
matter of the Gifts is not destroyed in the next life, although
secondary and accessory matter or a certain state or condition of
the matter may change. The total object of the Gifts is not completely taken away as it is in the case of the cardinal virtues, which
remain in spite of this fact. 55 But in heaven the objects of the
virtues will not have the same imperfection as they have in this
" 2 I-II, q. 68, a.6.
•• Cf. St. Gregory, II Moralium, c. 52, PL, lxxv, 592.
•• I Corinthians, xiii, B.
"" Cf. John of St. Thomas, Curs'ltB Theologicus, q. 62, d. 17, a. 4.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

451

life. There will not be the struggle with passions; there will only
be the enjoyment of a great tranquillity. Both states of the virtues,
then, have the same object but a diverse manner of acting under
varied conditions. St. Thomas does not claim 56 that the Gifts
change their whole object but that some of their present matter
will not be their concern in heaven. He goes on to explain 57 how
some of the matter of the Gifts passes away with this life, while
some of it remains. Thus, not the total and adequate object of the
Gifts is changed but only that part connected with the imperfection of the present state. The primary and adequate object of each
Gift is the particular object to which a man can be moved by the
impulse of the Holy Ghost. This object may be present now and
in eternity, in battle or in triumph, amidst the labors of this life
or in the contemplation and enjoyment of the next. Of course, the
active life and its labors will cease. However, action under the
impulse of the Holy Ghost will not cease even in heaven. And it
is to just this action that the Gifts of the Holy Ghost extend.
28. Reply to the second objection: The fundamental proposition of this objection must be denied. The Gifts seek evidence
arising from affective and experimental knowledge and from contact with the divine Spirit. They do not, of course, have that evidence in all matters, for the capacity of the knowing subject is not
as great as the knowability of the object. 58 For example, a subalternate science by its very nature always strives for evidence.
Yet a person knowing that science can lack the exercise of that
evidence by not knowing the higher science which provides the
evidence of principles. 5 9 Consequently, even when Faith is removed,
the Gifts remain substantially the same as in this life. However,
they will be perfect, purified of the imperfection that they had
when the soul walked by Faith; on earth for blinded eyes there can
be no intrinsic clarity of the truths believed. The Gifts are, as it
were, subalternate to the Beatific Vision, and like Charity in which
they are founded, they are subordinated to it. In the absence of
the Vision, that subordination is supplied by Faith, and for this
reason there is no actual evidence concerning these truths. Yet
•• I-II, q. 68, a. 6.
•• Ibid., a. 2.
•• Cf. Chapter III, no. 87.
•• John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus, Tom. I, disp. 2, and Cursus Philosophicus, Tom. I, disp. 25.

452

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

even in this life the Gifts have a relationship to evident knowledge.
They can have evidence at least of the things which surround
Faith, like credibility, for they can know evidently that the things
of Faith should be believed. Likewise, although the Gifts without
the Beatific Vision cannot penetrate truths of Faith by a positive
knowledge, by negative and extrinsic evidence they can know what
those truths are not. They can separate the certitude of these
truths from opposing errors, and they can discern the things of
the Spirit from those of sense and imagination. Not by believing,
like Faith, but by understanding, penetrating, and judging with at
least extrinsic and negative evidence, the Gifts of the Holy Ghost
know scientifically of divine things-at least what they are not.
Therefore, the Gifts do not have obscurity as an. essential property.
In this life, theirs is a clarity negative in its evidence of things to
be believed but positive concerning their credibility. For nothing
shows more evidently or assures more strongly that the testimony
of Faith is good, than the impulse and internal motion by which
the Spirit gives evidence to our spirit that we are the sons of God. 60
In heaven the soul will have perfect evidence of the things seen.
Without being changed essentially by the passage from this life to
the next, the Gifts will remain in time of Vision. Only their application and regulative principle will be changed. For then the
Beatific Vision will govern the Gifts now ruled by Faith. Likewise,
Charity does not change essentially because its object is first believed and then seen. Only its manner of application and the perfection of its regulative principle is changed. Or again, sight, which
is a potency of its very nature endowed with evidence and clear
knowledge, may see only obscurely because the object is poorly
applied, being far away. If the object were brought closer, it would
become clear and evident, not through an intrinsic change in the
potency but by the extrinsic application of the matter.
29. Reply to the third objection: It is by no means certain
that the Apostle is referring to the Gift of the Holy Ghost. He
uses the common name of knowledge, not the spirit of knowledge
and the knowledge of the saints. These ·latter terms are customarily used to designate the Gift of Knowledge. Secondly, according to St. Thomas, 61 the Apostle does not affirm that knowl60

Romans, viii, 16.

61

Commentaria in I Corinthians, xiii, 8.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

453

edge is completely destroyed. He merely mentions that the state
and the imperfect manner of knowledge which in this life involves
a dependence upon images will be done away with.
The Superiority or Inferiority

of the Gifts

30. The Gifts may be compared both with the virtues and
among themselves to determine which is the most perfect. The
virtues are either theological, intellectual, or moral. Of the Gifts
thus compared, some are in the intellectual part of the soul, others
are in the appetitive part.
31. According to St. Thomas, 62 if the Gifts are compared to the
theological virtues, the virtues will be found superior. For the
theological virtues unite the soul to God as its ultimate end. On
the other hand, by the Gifts the soul already united to God is
further subjected to Him as moving and regulating it in the attainment of the ultimate end. It is more perfect to be united to God
than to be subject to Him as He moves the soul. For union is a
closer approach to God than motion and subjection to Him as a
Mover.
32. If the Gifts are compared to the intellectual and moral
virtues, it is clear that the Gifts are more perfect than the virtues.
:For where the virtues fail, the Gifts perfect the soul. The very
essence of the Gifts evidences this, since the Gifts perfect the soul
to obey a higher mover than do these virtues. The intellectual
virtues perfect the intellect according to the light of the reason;
the moral virtue5, natural or supernatural, perfect the will in its
obedience to reason. The Gifts, however, perfect the soul in its
obedience to the guidance of the Holy Ghost and His immediate
rule, according to the manner and measure of His distribution of
graces. From this higher regulative principle there follows a more
perfect standard and a disposition to follow a higher mover.
33. If the Gifts are evaluated in relation to one another, the
intellectual Gifts are found to be more perfect than those in the
appetitive part. Wisdom is greater than Understanding; Understanding is greater than Knowledge; and Knowledge greater than
Counsel. Among the Gifts of the appetitive part, Piety holds first
•• I-II, q. 68, a. 8.

454

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

place, then comes Fortitude, and, last of all, Fear. This hierarchy
refers to the absolute excellence of the Gifts according to their acts
in the proper faculties. In a particular order, and in relation to the
matter that they regulate, Counsel is preferred to Knowledge, and
Fortitude is superior to Piety. All this is the doctrine of St.
Thomas. 63
84. The reason for the first part-that the intellectual Gifts are
higher than the others-is found in the fact that the former direct
and regulate the latter, and judge concerning them. Prudence
directs the moral virtues of the appetitive part and gives them
their particular moderation. Consequently, Prudence is the most
excellent of the moral virtues. Likewise, therefore, Counsel, which
corresponds to Prudence, will be more excellent than Piety,
Fortitude, and Fear.
Furthermore, Knowledge proceeds, forms, and judges Prudence.
For Knowledge is not purely practical but speculative as well,
inquiring and analyzing through causes. The speculative naturally
precedes and is more excellent than the practical, because it is
more abstract and immaterial. The foundation and reason for the
practical, the speculative defends the practical through an analysis
of its nature and causes.
Moreover, the Gifts of Understanding and Wisdom precede the
Gift of Knowledge. Knowledge is concerned with inferior and
created causes. It receives its rule of action from Understanding,
apprehending and penetrating divine things through a simple
judgment much like the habit of principles. Understanding, therefore, is more perfect than Knowledge, which is concerned with
conclusions.
However, Wisdom judges and defends both Knowledge and the
principles upon which it reflects. Hence, absolutely speaking,
Wisdom exceeds the other Gifts in nobility and perfection, just as
the virtue of wisdom is superior to the understanding of principles
and knowledge.
35. The reason for the hierarchy of Gifts in the appetitive part
is taken from the fact that Piety corresponds to Justice, Fortitude
to the virtue of Fortitude, and Fear. to Temperance. Since, at least
as far as object matter is concerned, Justice is greater than Forti•• Ibid.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

455

tude and Fortitude greater than Temperance, the corresponding
Gifts should maintain the same order. For the more excellent the
virtue, the more excellent the corresponding Gift.
36. The last part of the conclusion, concerning the relative
excellence of particular Gifts, is explained on the grounds that in
the enumeration of Isaias Counsel is placed before Knowledge and
preferred to it. So, too, Fortitude is placed before Piety. Obviously,
the matter upon which Fortitude and Counsel act is more difficult
and arduous, for which special counsel and strength may be expected from God. These more formidable objects exceed the
scope of Piety and Knowledge, which can be exercised in things
not especially difficult. For Piety and Knowledge, without essentially involving any notion of arduousness in their object, can be
found either with or without it. Absolutely considered, however,
Knowledge and Piety are essentially more excellent.

37. An objection concerning the Gift of Fear: St. Thomas 64
puts Fear in the last place because it corresponds to the virtue of
Temperance. Yet, according to St. Thomas in another place, 05 this
aspect of Fear is secondary; primarily it corresponds to Hope.
But, absolutely considered, the perfection and excellence of a Gift,
just as of a virtue, should be determined by its primary aspect,
not its secondary.
38. Reply: Fear corresponds to both virtues, but as a flight
from evil, not a pursuit of good. Through Fear the soul considers
sin and flees from it. Looking upon God the soul withdraws into
its own nothingness out of reverence for Him Who can inflict
punishment. Related to Hope, in this less exalted way, Fear holds
the lowest place among the Gifts. For to withdraw from evil is not
as noble as to approach to good, although in the order of generation
it is first, since departure from one point is previous to the approach
to another in the order of generation. Fear is the beginning of
wisdom, 66 and by the fear of the Lord men depart from evil. 61
Fear, then, is the primary and initial Gift in the progress towards
perfection. Although it corresponds to the higher virtue of Hope,
it does so in a dispositive and preliminary way, as a flight from
evil and not in the perfect manner of an approach to good.
•• I-II, q. 68, a. 4.
05 Il-11, q. 141, a. 1, ad !l.

•• Psalm ex, 10.
87 Proverbs, xvi, 6.

456

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

In its full perfection Fear corresponds to Temperance by withdrawing men from superfluous delights and piercing the flesh.
Although it still does this by restraining men from evil, the perfect
victory in matters of Temperance consists in fleeing harmful delights; according to the Apostle, Flee fornication. 68 Hence Fear is
higher than Temperance in this matter because it flees and abhors
evil more perfectly.
Since he is considering the Gifts in the order of their perfection,
St. Thomas 69 treats only of the relationship of the Gift of Fear to
Temperance. Yet he recognizes that in relation to justification
and the theological virtues, to Hope for example, it is only the
beginning, and a disposition to further perfection. 70

•• I Corinthians, vi, !!.
•• 1-11, q. 68, a. 7.

'" Ibid., ad 1.

457

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

CHAPTER IX*
The

and Fruits: The Acts and Effects of the Gifts

1. Made docile to the Holy Ghost by the Gifts, the soul is led
to eternal life by conquering difficulties which exceed the power
of human reason and the virtues. The more the soul approaches
eternal life through acts of the Gifts, the more it casts off the
comforts and blandishments of this life. Its separation from the
things of the world, from its delight and riches, gives it an approach
to true happiness which is eternal life. Moreover, in obviating
difficulties and hindrances, these acts free the soul from falsehood.
F'or many err in seeking happiness in sensible things, whose opposition to spiritual goods makes them impediments to progress. Detachment from the goods of this life and the proper disposition to
approach true happiness could never be accomplished through the
rule of reason and the virtues in their human and limited way.
Their essential limitations and weakness prevent their overcoming
all the difficulties involved in attaining heaven. Only acts proceeding from the Gifts through the motion and impulse of the
Holy Ghost are equal to the task. According to St. Matthew, 1
Our Lord enumerated eight of these special acts called Beatitudes
Lhrough which the Spirit separates the soul from this world and
leads it to eternal happiness: Thy spirit will lead me into the right
land. 2
OUTLINE OF CHAPTER IX

*
I.

THE BEATITUDES

A. The nature of the Beatitudes (I)
B. The answers to three questions about the Beatitudes
I) The description of the Beatitudes and their effects
a) In general (2)
b) In particular (8, 4 and 5)
2) The correlation of eight Beatitudes and seven Gifts (6)
8) The scope of the Beatitudes (7)

II.

THE FRUITS

III.

THE RELATIONSHIP

(8)

1 Matthew, v, 8-IO.
• Psalm cxlii, IO.

BETWEEN THE BEATITUDES

AND THE FRUITS

(9)

458

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

fl. The first of three questions which naturally arise at this
juncture is: How are these Beatitudes described and what effect
do they have in the soul? St. Thomas gives a description and an
explanation. 3 There are four Beatitudes which exclude false happiness. There are four more which tend to the attainment of true
happiness. Two of these are for the active life, and two are for
the contemplative. These eight Beatitudes include everything that
can lead to eternal life.

3. The first three Beatitudes and the last one are related to the
eliminating of false happiness. The last Beatitude is, as it were,
a confirmation and manifestation of the other seven. 4 The first
Beatitude, poverty of spirit, removes the inordinate love of riches,
so that man will not place his heart or his happiness in them. The
second, blessed are the meek, 5 removes the inordinate passions of
the irascible part of the soul, so that men will not place their end
in winning victory and taking vengeance on their enemies. The
third, blessed are those who rrwurn, 6 removes the inordinate passions of delight and joy in which many, whose god is their stomach/
place their last end. The eighth Beatitude, blessed are those who
suffer persecutions, 8 removes desires of human favor and applause.
According to St. Thomas, 9 in virtue of this Beatitude a man would
rather suffer persecution than deviate from the way of justice.
4. The fourth and fifth Beatitudes are ordained to the attainment of true beatitude through the works of the active life. The
fourth Beatitude is a thirst and hunger after justice-a giving to
each his due with a burning heart. The fifth Beatitude, blessed
ore the merciful,' 0 gives justice and mercy and alms to friends,
neighbors, foreigners and enemies.

5. The sixth and seventh Beatitudes are ordered to the attainment of beatitude through the contemplative life. The sixth
Beatitude is the cleansing of the heart through purity. Without it
contemplation is impossible. Blessed are the pure of heartY The
peace which surpasses all sense and inebriates the spirit is a work
of justice-Blessed are the peacemakers. 12
3

I-11, q. 68, a. 2.

• Cf. ibid., ad 2.
0 Matthew, v, 4.
6 Ibid., v, 5.
7 Phillipians, iii, 19.

Matthew, v, 10.
• I-11, q. 68, a. 3, ad 6.
10 Mattherw, v, 7.
11 Ibid., v, 8.
12 Ibid., v, 9.

8

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

459

6. The second question which comes to mind is: How can seven
Gifts be related to eight Beatitudes, and how is it that St. Luke
mentions only four Beatitudes while St. Matthew mentions eight?
First of all, according to St. Thomas, 13 the eighth Beatitude is a
sort of confirmation and cladfication of the others. It implies a
firmness of soul in the face of human persecution, preventing it
from failing to fulfill the other seven Beatitudes and Gifts. It
makes a man spurn human favor and prefer to withstand persecution. Consequently, the seven Beatitudes are related to the seven
Gifts, the eighth Beatitude implies a firmness in matters belonging
to all the Gifts.
The Beatitudes enumerated by St. Luke were given by the Lord
in another sermon to the multitudes after He came down from the
mountain, as St. Luke expressly states. 14 Because Our Lord was
speaking to the multitude, He mentioned only those Beatitudes
which are inte"ded to remove false happiness, for many of the
crowd were inclined to seek their happiness in this world. Therefore, He mentioned poverty, hunger or labor, weeping in opposition
to delight, hate or persecution of men, which is contrary to human
favor and applause. In His sermon to His disciples, who were more
perfect, He added the other four Beatitudes which belong to the
attainment of true beatitude. From this it may be concluded that
it is not necessary that all the Gifts be exercised by all at all times,
although all are necessary for salvation should the time and occasion arise. Similarly, all the positive precepts, like the virtues,
need be practiced only in their proper place and time.
7. The third question is: Do the Gifts contain only works of
supererogation and counsel or also those of precept? They embrace
all things ordered to eternal happiness through a special impulse of
the Holy Ghost. There are many works which are objectively great
and extraordinary, for example, the complete detachment from
riches through poverty of spirit, the calming of all passion, and the
suffering of all the persecutions of this life. There are other works
which, although they are not great in themselves, assume magnitude because of attendant circumstances and weakness of the
person. These latter require a special Gift and motion of the Holy
Ghost to overcome obstacles. For example, to use riches moderately
even without giving them up completely, belongs to poverty of
18

I-II, q. 68, a. 8, ad 5.

u Cf. Luke, vi, 17 ff.

460

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

spmt. Not being overcome by persecutions and withstanding
ordinary temptations for any length of time frequently require a
Beatitude.
8. St. Thomas 15 treats the fruits of the Holy Ghost quite
thoroughly. The fruits are not distinguished from the works of
the Gifts and the virtues. They merely connote a certain delight
and taste in their execution. 16 Hence there is nothing to prevent
one thing being a virtue, a beatitude, and a fruit.
The fruit produced last by the tree is received with the fullest
enjoyment. The last things produced by the tree watered by the
Holy Ghost are acts and effects commanded by the Gifts and
virtues. When these are received with a delight of the spirit, they
are called fruits of the Holy Ghost. This is especially evident in
the twelve enumerated by St. Paul 17 and explained by St. Thomas. 18
A Beatitude is itself a fruit, for it is the act of a Gift. However,
according to St. Thomas,1 9 it adds a certain excellence among the
works which lead to eternal life.
9. The relation of each Beatitude and each of thP twelve fruits
to its respective Gift is treated by St. Thomas in various places
\vhere he considers each particular Gift. 20 There is no special
difficulty involved in these matters.
To the honor of Our Crucified Lord, Jesus Christ,
to the Most Blessed Virgin, St. Dominic and St.
Thomas, April 21, 1674 at Saragossa during the
expedition in Catalonia.
Thus far the author has left copies corrected with his own hand.
THE END

16
1

I-II, q. 70.

° Cf. II-II, q. 157, a. !2, ad 3.

Galatians, v, !22.
I-II, q. 70, a. 3.
19 Ibid., a. 2.
20 II-II, q. 8, a. 7 and 8; q. 9, a. 4; q. 19, a. 12; q. 45, a. 6; q. 52, a. 5; q. 121,
a. !2 and q. 129, a. 2.
17

18

BOOK REVIEWS
Presence et Union: Les Missions des Personnes de la Sainte-Trinite selon
S. Thomas d'Aquin. By Dom LuciEN CHAMBAT, 0. S. B. Abbaye S.
Wandrille: Editions de Fontenelle, 19M3. Pp. 205.
As the title manifests, the intention of the author is to expose the teaching of St. Thomas on the missions of the Divine Persons of the Trinity and
their indwelling in the soul. To accomplish this end Dom Lucien first seeks
the sources of St. Thomas' doctrine in Sacred Scripture, St. Augustine,
St. Albert. The main portion of the book is taken up with a minute
analysis of the following capital texts from St. Thomas' major works:
I Sent., d. 14-18; I Sent., d. 87; IV Contra Gentiles, c. 21; Summa Theologica, I, q. 48.
The author's conclusions are conveniently summarized in the preface;
they touch only the invisible missions, with which the work is mainly
concerned:
1) The mission of the divine Persons terminates at an indwelling of
these Persons in the soul of the just.
2) This indwelling is simply the presence of the divine Persons as exemplary and efficient cause of sanctifying grace.
8) This presence manifests in some way the divine Persons, who thus
become an object of knowledge and love: this manifestation or knowledge
·does not constitute the presence; the Persons are present" before any knowledge or love, present or represented in sanctifying grace and are by this
fact apt to be known and loved.

In the preface Dom Lucien also manifests his secondary purpose--a criticism and rejection of the explanations given by Pere Gardeil, 0. P. in his
work La Structure de l'Ame et l'experience mystique. This great theologian,
rejecting the opinion of Vasquez, which many Thomists were following,
revived the teaching of John of St. Thomas on the subject of God's
Presence in the soul and the missions of the divine Persons. Before giving
the explanation of Pere Gardeil, it may help the discussion to quote the
text of St. Thomas which is the source of difficulty.
I answer that, A divine person is fittingly sent in the sense that He exists newly
in anyone, and He is fittingly given as possessed by anyone; but neither of these is
otherwise than by sanctifying grace.
For God is in all things in a universal way by His. essence, power, and presence,
as the cause existing in the effects which participate in His goodness. Above and
beyond this universal way, however, there is one special way belonging to the

461

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BOOK REVIEWS

rational nature wherein God is said to be present as the object known is in the
knower, and the beloved in the lover. And since the rational creature by its operation of knowledge and love attains to God Himself, according to this special way
God is said not only to exist in the rational creature, but also to dwell therein as
in His own temple. So no other effect can be put down as the reason why the
divine person is in the rational creature in a new way, except sanctifying grace ....
Summa Theologica, I, q. 48, a. 8.

to his
According to Pere Gardeil, in this text, St. Thomas,
doctrine elsewhere, is distinguishing the two principal modes of God's
presence to creatures (the special mode of the Incarnation is not considered). These two modes are based on the two types of relation that can
exist between God and His creatures. One relation is universal- that of
cause to effects; this relation pervades all of created reality, natural and
supernatural; it is the presence of immensity. St. Thomas also speaks of a
new mode of God's presence; this is an objective presence, the presence of
an object known and loved. This presence is distinct, though not separable,
from the presence of immensity, for it is based on a new relation of the
rational creature to God. It is true that an object can be known and loved
without being physically and intimately present tu the knower and lover;
it is, nevertheless present in a new way, objectively. The perfection of this
way demands an intimate, physical union of the beloved and the lover,
which is not caused by love itself. Two people may know and love each
other deeply, without being physically present to each other. Physical
presence depends upon something else. Now any one acquainted with St.
Thomas' doctrine on grace, faith and charity, knows that these gifts make
God present objectively in the soul, but they do not bring about His real
presence; this is presupposed, because of His causality. That God can be
intimately attained by the operation of knowing and loving is due to the
fact that qod is physically present in the soul by way of causality.
Dom Lucien rejects this interpretation of Pere Gardeil for several reasons.
One, an extrinsic reason, seems to have great weight with him since he
refers to it several times; it is Pere Gardeil's lack of erudition-his work is
lacking " in that positive investigation and objective examination of texts,
which is the indispensable foundation for the discernment of Thomistic
thought" (p. 186). We should not be surprised at the attitude of the
author toward Pere Gardeil; we shall see later that he manifests the same
attitude toward St. Thomas. Another reason comes from the fact that this
theory has recourse ultimately to an experimental and joyous possession of
God. The fact that St. Thomas himself refers to an experimental knowledge is considered of slight importance. Dom Lucien also is astonished
that St. Thomas might use the word " presence " in an analogical sense.
He insists that if St. Thomas says there are two modes of God's presence,

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463

both have to be real presences, based on the presence of the cause to the
effect. On the contrary, the whole doctrine of St. Thomas gives evidence
that he considers the object of knowledge and love as present in a special
way, intentionally, to the one who knows and loves. It is true that this
intentiqnal presence abstracts from the physical presence; but when the
physical presence is wanting one cannot be said to dwell with the object
known and loved, or to possess ·and enjoy it. St. Thomas is attempting to
explain the scriptural data; this he does by linking the physical presence
of immensity with the intentional presence of knowledge and love. Dom
Lucien seems to be unacquainted with St. Thomas' teachings on Faith and
Charity, which are specified by God Himself as their immediate objects.
Fr. Gardeil, acquainted with the whole theology of St. Thomas, sees immediately the significance of the phrase- sicut cognitum in cognoscente et
amatum in amante.
Dom Lucien prefers to see the two modes of God's preesnce explained in
terms of causality. The first mode is efficient causality simpliciter; this is
not universal, but confined to the gifts of nature. Now it is true that both
St. Albert and St. Thomas frequently refer this mode to the natural gifts;
however, there is sufficient evidence that they do not confine it to the
natural gifts. Thus, for instance, St. Albert says explicitly: "While in us
there is a distinction between the gifts of grace and nature, there is none
in God who gives them: for He gives all in one gratuitous gift which is the
Holy Ghost, as He makes all in one word, which is the Son" (I Sent.,
d. 18, a. 2, ad 8) . The teaching of St. Thomas on the temporal processions
of .the divine persons is also significant: all gifts are attributed to the first
Gift, which is the Holy Spirit; the gifts of the Holy Ghost are so called
because they most perfectly manifest the gratuitousness of God's love
for us. It is significant that Dom Lucien has difficulty with St. Thomas'
answer to the question: Can the Holy Ghost be said to send Himself?
St. Thomas answers with a distinction; Dom Lucien says he is only trying
to explain the traditional phrase. St. Thomas, however, says that insofar
as the effects according to which the missions of the persons take place are
caused by the whole Trinity, the Holy Ghost can be said to send Himself.
Now these effects are of the supernatural order, not merely of the natural
order. There is no reason then to deny that the divine presence, which is
based on the relation of cause to effect, is universal, and extends to every
effect of the natural and supernatural order.
Dom Lucien admits the Catholic doctrine that all the effects of God
ad extra are to be attributed to the whole Trinity. However, he tries to
introduce a distinction which, if valid, would destroy this truth. Thus, for
example, he says: "A new causality, specified by its term which is sanctifying grace, enters into play here, and, by reason of this causality, a new
order of things begins to unroll" (pp. 184-5). What is this new causality?

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BOOK REVIEWS

It is, the author explains, not in the order of efficient causality, but in that
of exemplary causality. " ... it suffices to make precise, as does St.
Thomas, in what sense the action of the persons is common to the three
persons, and in what sense it can be called special to each. Looked at as
efficient causality, this action is one and identical, as the essence itself
with which it is identified; but one can consider it also as exemplary
causality ... ; under this aspect and by reason of this aspect, it can
belong by a special title to one or another person" (p. 179). On the basis
of this principle, then, Dom Lucien speaks of " l' activite particuliere " of
the Holy Ghost in charity (p. 136). He also says: "For St. Thomas,
as for St. Albert, the first procession is productive of the natural gifts, the
second of the gifts of grace, and each terminates at a particular mode of
presence, implied in the exercise of one or another causality" (p. 181).
Dom Lucien's fundamental error in this matter should be clear: he looks
upon exemplary causality as an action, a sort of efficient causality. Action
is according to the exemplary cause; but the action flows from the efficient
cause. And in God all action ad extra must be attributed to the whole
Trinity.
The most fundamental objection against Dom Lucien's explanation of
St. Thomas' doctrine, is that it deprives the doctrine of its most perfect
fruit. Time and time again, St. Thomas points out that the temporal processions of the divine persons terminate at the gifts produced in the creature, whereas the missions terminate not at the gifts but with the Persons
themselves. It is the Person who dwells in the soul, manifests Himself,
is possessed and enjoyed. True, none of this can take place without the
gifts of grace, i.e., sanctifying grace, wisdom and charity. A spiritual being
can be possessed only through knowledge and love; wisdom and charity
give us the power to possess the divine Persons. On the contrary, Dom
Lucien continually minimizes this doctrine and states explicitly that the
Persons are present in their gifts and are possessed in their gifts. " In the
first mode, these Persons were present by way of cause alone, i. e., letting
appear only their common causality; in the second mode, they are present
by way of objects, of objects situated in the one operating himself" (p.
163). "If one considers them (the Persons) as the principle of the return
of the rational creature to its end (inquantum ratio redeundi in finem),
one will have the temporal procession according to grace, which terminates
at the production of the gifts that unite immediately to the ultimate end,
namely, sanctifying grace and glory" (p. 181). The Persons can be said to
be present in a new way, because of the exercise of their exemplary
causality.
As we mentioned previously, the author frequently goes out of his way
to criticize St. Thomas. Thus, for instance, he says, in regard to a certain
passage in IV Contra Gentiles, c. fl1, which states the principle: Every

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465

object loved is found in the one loving: " St. Thomas would have rendered
us an appreciable service if he had taken the trouble to give us the precise
meaning he attached to this embarrasing principle. He did not judge it
good to do so. But perhaps this omission can be explained by the fact
that the holy Doctor in c. 19 had made extended remarks on this point
and gave many applications and developments, which the attentive reader
has not forgotten ... " (p. 141). Such statements as these seem to be
habitual with writers on St. Thomas who pride themselves on over-minute
textual study of the Angelic Doctor.
Dom Lucien set out to establish a thesis. It has seemed to this writer
that he failed, not because of his careful study of the texts involved, but
because of his failure to interpret them in terms of St. Thomas' whole
doctrine. His work has brought out the emphasis that St. Thomas places
on exemplary causality and the assimilation of the rational creature to God.
However, St. Thomas is too explicit, both in regard to the unity of the
divine action in the order of efficient causality, and in regard to the
special mode of presence through knowledge and love, to admit the interpretation of Dom Lucien as valid. St. Thomas is always his own best
interpreter; and it was St. Thomas that Perc Gardeil used in giving his
interpretation of the doctrine on the missions of the Persons of the Trinity.
JAMES M. EGAN, 0. P.
Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

Cursus Philosophiae. By
GRENIER, Ph. D., S. T. D., J. C. D. Quebec:
Le Seminaire de Quebec, Editio altera, 1944. Vol. I, lntroductio generalis, Logica, Philosophia N aturalis, pp. 490; Vol. II, Metaphysica, pp.
Vol. 1!1, Philosophia Moralis, pp. 431.
The fact that this course of philosophy comes to us from the University
of Laval in Quebec as well as its typography and format reminds one
immediately of Lortie's Elementa. The same font is used, and the same
general arrangement of matter into books, chapters and articles with an
outline at the head of each chapter is followed. The general appearance is
that of an attractive, easily read book.
But here the resemblance to Lortie ends. Abbe Grenier, while he follows
the major divisions of philosophy now canonized by usage, includes and
arranges matter according to a plan which, however .fresh and novel it may
appear, has the sanction of Aristotle and St. Thomas. The general tenor of
the whole course is struck in the first volume where more than half of the
brief introduction to philosophy is devoted to St. Thomas Aquinas, his
relation to Aristotle, his works, how they are cited, and the approval of his

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BOOK REVIEWS

works by the Church. Hence the mind and teaching of St. Thomas and
Aristotle are faithfully adhered to, and, whenever possible, any of the
Twenty-Four Theses pertinent to the discussion is quoted. The whole
course then has a strongly theological slant, and attempts to present not
merely a philosophical background to seminarians, but an ambitious and
Catholic outlook on life to college students in general. Thus for example,
we find on the question of the origin of the world," Statuitur thesis. Thesis
eat ex fide (sic) ex Cone. Vaticani, Can. V, Cap. I, Seas. III" (vol. IT,
p. 304), and a discussion of the knowability of miracles closing the volume
on metaphysics.
The third volume is the most noteworthy due to its uncommon adherence
to the terminology of Aristotle and St. Thomas. For Abbe Grenier, moral
philosophy is neither a speculative nor a hyphenated science, but essentially and formally practical both from the matter and from the viewpoint.
It is subordinate but not subalternated to any speculative science, since it
has its own self-evident principles. While he appears to differ from the
stand taken by Fr. Ramirez, 0. P., on the relation of moral philosophy to
theology, actually he concludes that moral philosophy is not a sufficient
guide for human acts, because of the ·fact of man's elevation to a supernatural end, the attainment of which requires the principles of faith and
supernatural means. He divides moral philosophy into three essentially distinct sciences according as the ends of human activity differ: Monastics,
or Ethics, on the individual; Economics, on domestic society; and Politics,
on civil society. Very properly, at least on Thomistic grounds, he gives the
primacy to Politics among the practical sciences. Under each of these,
a wealth of matter is treated.
Monastics embraces the end of. human acts, natural happiness and a
treatment of perfect happiness, which is formally the intellectual vision of
God; human acts considered psychologically and morally, and the principles of human acts which are laws and virtues, under which prudence,
justice and right, fortitude, temperance, and friendship are considered with
all their parts and opposed vices. Economics treats of society and authority
in general, and then of domestic society, under which marriage and its
properties, parental authority and duties are discussed, and ends with an
appendix on slavery and the status of domestic servants and familiars.
Politics starts with the quotation of St. Thomas' prologue to his commentary on the Politics of Aristotle; it is divided into two books, the causes
of civil society and the restoration of civil society (a phrase borrowed from
the Encyclicals), and concludes with the relations of societies among themselves, and with the Church. The Papal pronouncements of recent years
are frequently cited, and the teachings of the authors of the modern social
errors are pithily but sufficiently quoted in footnotes, Marx, Engels,
Rousseau, Lenin, Stalin, etc. As one might expect from the place of
publication, nearly all such citations are in French.

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467

The footnotes are another indication of the apologetical trend of the
work, which amounts to almost a Catholic bias. Abbe Grenier saves his
energy to dispute with those outside the School; domestic controversies are
handled delicately and quietly. Thus no great effort is made to expose the
background, presuppositions and arguments of Scotus or Suarez, nor are
their works either cited or quoted. This is not to say that they are ignored;
but their dissenting opinion is simply stated. St. Thomas, too, is sometimes
simplified. Thus, for example, in the thorny problem of premotion, Abbe
Grenier sedulously avoids using the word praemotio, and refuses even to
attempt reconciling premotion and human liberty.
To solve the problem we should perfectly know the divine operation itself, while
we know it only imperfectly through analogy with created operation. Hence here
lies a mystery which we cannot solve.
Hence we lay aside the controversies which have arisen on this problem, and we
show, as far as natural reason can, only that the divine motion does not destroy
rreated liberty. II, p. SIS.

And then he gives the doctrine of I-II, q. 10, a. 4.
The overall picture is, however, a fairly complete course of philosophy
along rigorous Aristotelian and Thomistic lines. It is a textbook, pure and
simple, and thus leaves a good deal to the instructor. About the only
pedagogical device used besides the traditional scholastic form of prenotes
and thesis is the listing of a few questions at the foot of each article to
point up and emphasize the more important points. Since his theological
preoccupations are so evident, it might be suggested that the author go a
little further and cite the places where the doctrines of St. Thomas' adversaries, past and present, are to be found, and that he show the applicability and influence of the various conclusions established in philosophy on
theology. Even the briefest indications of this sort would add to the value
of the book and arouse the interest of students. A richer bibliography is
also to be desired.
An edition in English of these volumes is being prepared. When it appears, unless too badly marred by the errors that beset books in English
published abroad and by the involved Latinisms that obscure vernacular
philosophy, it is to be recommended to those schools in this country that
sincerely desire to comply with ecclesiastical legislation on following St.
Thomas-a desire too frequently hampered by the lack of English manuals
other than those whose Thomism is merely nominal or completely and
deliberately absent. A work of philosophy or theology that bears the magic
name, St. Thomas, on its title page or in footnotes does not thereby become
Thomistic; but this book is definitely Thomistic, for it breathes the spirit
of St. Thomas on nearly every page.
IGNATIUS McGuiNEss, 0. P.
Dominican HotUie of Studies,
Wcurhington,D. C.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Dewey, J. Problems of Men. New York: Philosophical Library, 1946.
Pp. 424, with index. $5.00.
'Eudes, St. John. Tke Sacred Heart of Jeaua. New York: Kenedy & Sons,
1946. Pp. 184, with index. $2.00.
Eudes, St. John. The Kingdom of Jeaua. New York: Kenedy & Sons, 1946.
Pp. 848. $8.00.
Fisher, M. S. Robert Boyle. Phila.: Oshiver Studio Press, 1945. Pp. 184,
with index.
Langraf, A. Commentariua Cantabrigienaia in Epiatolaa Pauli e Schola
Petri Abaelardi: In Epiatolam ad Hebraeoa. (Publications in Mediaeval
Studies: II.) Notre Dame: The University of Notre Dame Press,
1944.
Maura, Sister M. Initiate the Heart. New York: Macmillan Co., 1946.
Pp. 46. $1.75.
Morris, C. Signa, Language and Behavior. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1946. Pp. 865, with index. $5.00.
Mullally, J. P. The Summulae Logicalea of Peter of Spain. (Publications
in Mediaeval Studies: VIII.) Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1945. Pp. 172, with index.
Pap, A. The A Priori in Phyaical Theory. New York: King's Crown Press,
1946. Pp. 102. $2.00.
Paschini, P. Tre Ricercke aulla Storia della Chieaa nel Cinquecento. Roma:
Edizioni Litugiche. Pp. 289, with index.
Peers, E. A. Mother of Carmel. New York: Morehouse-Gorham Co., 1946.
Pp. 220, with index.
Rand, E. K. Cicero in the Courtroom of St. Thomaa Aquinaa. (The Aquinas
Lecture, 1945.) Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1946. Pp.
115. $1.50.
Runes, D. D. A Bible for the Liberal. New York: Philosophical Library,
1946. Pp. 868. $8.50.
Shaw, P. E. The Catholic Apostolic Church, Sometimes Called Irvingite.
New York: King's Crown Press, 1946. · Pp. 264, with index. $8.25.
Spring, H. And Another Thing. New York: Harper & Bros., 1946. Pp.
265. $2.50.
Walz, A. San Tommaao d'Aquino. Roma: Edizioni Litugiche. Pp. 248.
Yelle, G. De Eccleaia et de Locia Theologicia. Montreal: Grand Seminaire,
1945. Pp. 178, with index.

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