THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS:

THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PRoviNCE oF ST. JosEPH

Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

VoL. X

JANUARY, 1947

No.1

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ACCORDING TO FRANCIS DE VITORIA *

T

HE subject-matter of this study is the International
Community in the light of the principles of Francisco
de Vitoria, the Father and Founder of International
Law. This topic has been selected of set purpose because we
are witnessing today the powerful nations frantically trying
to organize anew the world into a community but failing for
two reasons: a) because they lack unity of faith and therefore
of ideals; b) because of their conflicting aims and selfish
national ambitions. Their view is blurred with rancor and
vengeance towards the vanquished, envy and enmity towards
* Editors' Note: In July, 1946, The University of Santo Tomas in Manila began
the three hundred and twenty-seventh year of its academic life, with some ten
thousand students. The address delivered at the opening exercises is presented here
by the Editors of THE THOMIST as significant of the role this venerable University,
a bulwark of Thomism, will play in the formation of the new Philippine Republic
and, on a larger scale, in the reconstitution of society on a supranational level,
as envisioned by Francis de Vitoria.

1

HONORIO

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some neutral countries, engendering thus fresh injustice rather
than repairing it. Opus justitiae pax (the work of justice is
peace), the reign of peace cannot prosper in a world of injustice.,
There probably is no man in the realm of international
theory who more deservedly is entitled to human gratitude
than Francisco de Vitoria, a humble Dominican friar of the
University of Salamanca, greatest among the great who in the
sixteenth century honored that center of learning. It is only
recently that his unearthed writings have been the subject of
diligent study with the result that a new science has developed
covering the vast field of international politics.
The principles he enunciated regarding the relations of one
state to another both in time of peace and in time of war were
meant to protect the interests of justice in the defense of t;he
rights of the weaker against the stronger. They are principles
applicable to nations without discrimination as to color, creed
or degree of civilization. They are dictates of reason which
defy time or place, which cannot be styled old because truth
is ever young, which cannot be called modem because truth is
eternal; they are principles of a permanent character. the application of which may at times vary according to particular
conditions, but the .contents of which are ever unassailable.
Vitoria served no interests of king or country when those
interests were at variance with those of truth.
This explains why his works, buried in obscurity until
recently, are now acclaimed the world over, studied conscientiously, commented upon not only with respect but even with
veneration. His was the voice of justice on behalf of the discovered peoples of his times, and his teachings became embodied in the humane Laws of the Indies by which the people
discovered and christianized by Spain were governed. He stands
high above all party discussions; he states principles of truth,
justice,
charity, favor whom they may. To sketch out
roughly his concept of the International Community, its law,
its forms, its rights is the purpose of this study.

INTERNATIONAL

I.

COMMUNITY

THE INTERNATIONAL

ACCORDING TO VITORIA

CoMMUNITY

CoEXTENSIVE

8

WITH

HUMANITY

One of the leading principles embodied in the scheme of
Vitoria's Law of Nations is the idea of a League of Nations or
United Nations ·as distinct from the universal monarchy or
society of pagan times and of the Middle Ages. The men of
antiquity as well as the men of the Middle Ages had, no doubt,
some sort of idea of a universal society; but they never considered its members to be living units of an organized body.
They felt naturally inclined to connect the uNity of the then
known world with one man. 1 Such ideals gave way to certain
forms of internationality which, as Torres Lopez indicates,
should not be confused with the real forms of· interstate unity
or society of our days. It was Vitoria who rejected these
medieval concepts represented by the imperialism of Rome
and by the political temporal universalism of the' Pope. 2
The Romans had received the idea from the Persian empire
and it took plastic reality in the magnificent political creation
of the Roman Empire, an entity truly universal in the mind of
the contemporaries. This idea of the Roman reality appears in
the classics in unmistakable language. "I place on them no
limit· of time or possessions, I have given them an ei'npire
without end." "His ergo nee metas rerum nee tempora pono,
Imperium sine fine dedi," writes Virgil giving Rome a limitless
empire. Or in the words of Cicero agreeing with' the Stoics,
"They think the world is a community, a state, of gods and
men, and each of us a part of that world." 8
This universalist idea of the Romans was not destined to die
out with the coming of Christianity. It was, on the contrary,
maintained and supported valiantly by Christian writers and
1 Leur tendance naturelle les portrait volontiers a rattacher a une seule principe,
ou mieux encore, a un seul homme l'unite du monde alors commun (H. BeuveMery, La Theorie des pouvoirs public d'apres Francois de Vitoria, Paris, 1928.
p. 88).
'M. T. Lopez, Anuario de la Asociaci6n Francisco de Vitoria, II, 149.
8 De Fin., IT, 19.

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HONORIO

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statesmen, for it represents a unitarist affirmation of one rule,
one head, one supreme lord over all peoples not merely in the
order of faith, in the spiritual realm, but also in the political
order. The writings of Doctors and Fathers of the Church
contain statements and assertions reflecting the mentality of
the times in which they lived, and create a vigorous tradition
in support of the universalist supremacy of the Church both in
temporal and in spiritual affairs. In the full period of the
Middle Ages, however, disputes arose as to the direct universal
power of the Pope over temporal matters of the Christian
States. The field now became divided and the distinction was
clearly set, granting the Pope direct powers over Christians the
world over, and allowing him in temporal matters merely an
indirect power such as may be demanded by the exigencies of
a strictly spiritual nature.
Different attempts were made during the Renaissance to
theorize and establish the, groundwork for a ruler over the
universal world. 4 Dante in his De Monarchia, Arevalo in his
De M onarchia Orbis and many other authors in their endeavor
to unify the world under one ruler were merely interpreting the
mind of a war-torn Europe suffering the havoc caused by constant strife due often to petty rivalries between kings and lords.
The field is now clearly marked out: on the one side, the
fervent imperialist firmly upholds the Renaissance idea in
favor of the absolute power of the emperor over all kingdoms
and kings in temporal matters; on the other, the medieval concept of canonists defending the direct universal dominion of
the Pope in temporal affairs. 5 Both views were advanced in
the sixteenth century as titles for the conquest of the New
World and rejected with equal vigor by Vitoria.
Vitoria did not suggest a utopian world-state where citizens
'Pierre Dubois, De Recuperatione Terrae Sanc;tae; Dante, De Monarchia;
Augustinus Triumphus, Summa de Ecclesiastica Potestate; Marsilius of Padua,
Defensor Pacis. These are some illustrations of the fact that the old landmarks
were disappearing and a new world was coming into being. Cf. Figgis, From
Gerson to Grotius (Cambridge, 1907) Introd.
• Cf. Beuve-Mery, op. cit., p. 88.

INTERNATIONAL

COMMUNITY

ACCORDING

TO VITORIA

5

may live as in a dreamland and where the states lose their
juridical personality and sovereignty. He gave to his universal
society natural foundations, always keeping in view that organic, objective, institutional basis which forms the groundwork
of his conception of public authority within the state. In order
Lo achieve this purpose it was necessary to bring forth a vigorous conception of nationality and of national sovereignty.
In his scheme, the states, the nations politically organized
and enjoying sovereignty, are to be the cells of the great interstate organization. The principles that were to give origin to
the idea of the universal community of states had to be principles, not of juridical voluntarism, but of natural law, so that
such international society and its rights should thereby be
created, and were not merely to exist as a result. of a treaty
subject to frequent unwelcome ' changes. Vitoria based his
political conception of the nation organized into the state upon
an obvious sociological concept. 6 It is upon this conception too
that his theory of the international society and of international
law are founded. International law, says he, has not only the
force of a pact and agreement among men, but also the force of
law, for the world as a whole, being in a way one single state,
has the power to create laws that are just and fitting for all
persons, as are the rules of international law. Consequently it
is clear that they who violate these international rules, whether
in peace or in war, commit a mortal sin; moreover, in the
gravest matters, such as the inviolability of ambassadors, it is
not permissible for one country to refuse to be bound by international law, the latter having been established by the authority
of the whole world. 7
It is true that Vitoria does not develop a complete theory of
the universal society, leaving his listeners to infer the logical
conclusions ensuing from his basic tenets. He makes us under6 Les deux traits caractl!ristiques de la Politique de Vitoria nous semblent etre
d'une part le caractere institutionel de sa conception de l'Etat, d'autre part la
nature objective du Droit Public qui en deco\lle. (Delos, 0. P ., La Societe Interpp.
national et les Principes de Droit Public, Paris,
• De Vitoria, De Potestate Civili, Sect.

6

HONORIO

MUNOZ

stand, however, that by virtue of the interdependence of the
states the international society shall enjoy the rights of free
circulation, the right to trade, the right to preach the Gospel,
the right of colonization, the right of intervention, the right to
travel on the high seas, and the right of just war.
In the ideal universal society created by Vitoria, whether it
be narrowly called Christendom-a natural society of Christian
nations-or, more broadly speaking, a natural society of all
states having as its basis the natural sociability of all men,
both cases a society of the same nature, a unithere exists
versal society wherein the independent state fulfills the function
of an organ. The right of war, therefore, is not merely a subjective right linked to sovereignty. It is something founded
upon the purpose and the common good of the world (ex fine
et bono totius orbis) .8
Such is the international society, be it Christendom, or a
natural society of nations, a res-publica whose citizens are
the moral persons of states. This society has one potestas, or
power inherent in the social body. It also has an auctoritas,
an authority, which explains the character of law and the moral
obligatory force of this potestas. The principle then of this
international life is the purpose which affords an objective basis
for right, 9

II.

THE LAw oF THE INTERNATIONAL

CoMMUNITY

The basic tenet upon which the whole· doctrine of Vitoria on
international law is grounded is the
of natural society
and communication. No one may by natural law be excluded
from this natural society and communication. The duties of
justice and ties of friendship binding all peoples together in
one universal society being prior and superior to any civil
society are, therefore, unbreakable. Hence no human or artificial partition of territories into nations should ever threaten
the superior unity and wellbeing of the international comn:mnity. This society must then be governed by a law appli8

De Vitoria, De Jure Belli.

• Delos, 0. P., op. cit., p.

INTERNATIONAL

COMMUNITY

ACCORDING

TO VITORIA

7

cable to all, by a directive principle, called by Vitoria the law
of nations," which is either natural law or derived from natural
law," for no society can exist without a governing rule directing
the particular interests of the individuals and those of the
general body towards the welfare of human society.
The law of nations is necessary for the preservation of the
natural law, not absolutely necessary but quasi-necessary, for
it would be nigh impossible to conserve the natural law without
the law of nations. 10 It is always unlawful to violate the natural
law, since it is impressed by God on human nature. The law of
nations being derived from a principle of natural law and from
a universal fact "becomes a human statute based on reason," 11
and therefore binding in conscience, even though its violation
may not have juridical sanction until there be an organized
body empowered to impose it. 12 Such laws, then, springing
from reason and directed to the common good of the universal
supranational society, are binding not only in conscience but
also before society, having real juridical and ethical value.
It has been shown that humanity constitutes a universal
society and it must have a law by which it is governed. This
law is the Law of Nations. The Law of Nations, writes Vitoria,
has not only the force of a pact and agreement among men,
but also the force of law; for the world as a whole, being, in a
way, one single state, has the power to create laws that are just
and fitting for all persons, as are the rules of the law of nations.
The world can then agree to create an organ of authority
wielding this power for the welfare of the international community. Just as the majority of the members of a state may
set up ·a king over the whole state, although other members
10 Jus gentium est necessarium ad conservationem
juris naturalis et non est
omnino necessarium, quia male possit conservari jus naturale sine jure gentium.
Cum magna namque difficultate jus naturale servaretur sine jure gentium. Vitoria
as cited in: M. Reigada, 0. P., Anuario de la Asociasi6n Francisco de Vitoria,
IV, 45.
11 Ibid.
12 It should be noted that Vitoria establishes this human statute on reason, thus
rendering such basis objective and rational; Suarez deviated, making the basis
subjective and voluntary. Cf. Reigada, op. cit., p. 66.

8

HONORIO

MuNOZ

are unwilling, so the majority of Christians, even though there
be some who are opposed, may lawfully create a monarch whom
all princes and provinces are under obligation to obey. 13
Many will see in these words a hint towards the papacy
becoming the supra-state authority. Yet Vitoria merely points
out the feasibility of having an organ of authority, whether
this be a king, emperor, Pope, or a moral or juridical
The experiment of the League of Nations proved to be
immature and failed because:
a) it lacked the fundamental principle established by Vitoria,
viz., juridical equality of states; right was placed at the service
of might, not might at the service of right;
b) it did away with the Maker of all laws, the author of all
society, the ruler of the world, the governor of creation. Such
society was doomed to be buried in the ruins of its own helplessness; it carried within itself the germs of self-destruction.
It appears clearer every day that the United Nations is
doomed to the same fate; the same defects are equally inherent
in it. It shows, moreover, a certain repulsive persecutory mania
against those nations which, on the one hand, are not allowed
to be members and, o:ri the other, are criticized for not being
such. No godless institution can enjoy vitality or long existence.
It has been seen that the law of nations, being ethically
binding, must have a moral sanction. But is there a juridical
sanction? In the past the only juridical sanction for the violation of the law of nations was war, which in the concept of
Vitoria is merely a punishment for the violation of a right.u
Only the supreme authority acting as judge may take such
measures when all peaceful ones have failed.
Yet apart from whether coaction is of the essence of law or
merely something external to it, war is an imperfect penal
sanction not only because of the horrors that follow in its wake,_
18 Sicut major pars reipublicae regem supra totam rempublicam constituere potest
llliis invitis, ita pars major Christianorum reliquis etiam renitentibus, monarcham
suum creare jure potest cui omnes principes et provininciae parere teneantur.
Vitoria, De Potestate Civili, n. 14.
10 Vitoria, De Jure Belli, n. IS.

INTERNATIONAL

COMMUNITY

ACCORDING TO VITORIA

9

but also because victory does not always favor the innocent
party at war. Hence Vitoria, himself a great humanitarian,
puts certain limitations to the declaration of war as a means to
redress an injury "for inasmuch as wars ought to be waged for
the common good, if some one city cannot be recaptured without greater evils befalling the state, such as the devastation of
many cities, great slaughter of human beings, provocation of
princes, occasions for new wars to the destruction of the Church,
the prince is bound rather to give up his own rights and abstain
from war." 15
The same thought is expressed in unmistakable terms in
another passage on the civil power. No war is just, he states,
the conduct of which is manifestly more harmful to the state
than it is good and advantageous; and this is true regardless
of any other claims or reasons that may be advanced to make
it a just war. Nay more, since one nation is part of the whole
world, and since the Christian province is a part of the whole
Christian state, if any war should be advantageous to any
province or nation, but injurious to the world or to Christendom, it is his belief that for that very reason that war is
unjust. 16
Hence war as a sanction for the violation of a right is inadequate and highly inexpedient. There must be found some other
recourse, viz., appeal to a higher authority who should act as
judge to settle all disputes peaceably through arbitration or
through a just and fair compromise.
III.

FORMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL

COMMUNITY

1. Imperialism
The universal power of the emperor was a tenet held for
many centuries. It has never been an actual fact, but it was
a theory entertained both by pagan Rome and by Christian Europe. Roman lawyers asserted the right of Caesar to
declare war on all foreign nations, on the ground that he held
10

Ibid., n. 88.

18

De Potestate Civili, n. 18.

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HONORIO

MUNOZ

sway over the whole world. Christian writers on the other
hand based their belief that Caesar was universal. lord upon
certain passages of Sacred Scripture and upon some principles
o£ natural reason. Thus they interpreted . the passage of St.
Luke "there went out a decree .from Caesar Augustus that a
census should be taken of all the world" as applying to Christian emperors even more fittingly than to pagan, for why
should the former be in any worse condition than the latter?
Again they take Christ's words "render unto Caesar the
things that are Caesar's" as favoring their contention, for how
could Caesar have this right save as an emperor holding universal sway? Furthermore the writings of the Fathers and the
encyclicals of some Popes seem to imply the same doctrine
which at last became incorporated in the law of the Church.
Prompted by the implications of the text of the Popes, 11 the
commentators or glossators of the law expressed unequivocally
what they thought to be a sane doctrine and which was undoubtedly common in their times, namely "that the emperor
is the rightful lord of the whole world," as Bartholus testifies. 18
Again arguments were drawn from similitudes in the natural
order, for instance, that as bees have one queen so there should
be one world with one governor, viz., the emperor. Roman and
canon lawyers, though led by different motives, agreed as to
the convenience of the world-power of the emperor. The Roman
lawyers believed that the universal power of the emperor was
a prerogative of natural law. The canon lawyers asserted that
it was a prerogative of the emperor " by a concession of
Pope." The emperor was the one entrusted by the Pope with
the mission of carrying out his orders in temporal things for
the spiritual welfare of the Church. Some writers go so far as
to suggest that it would be a heresy to deny the universal
power of the emperor: " and if anyone should presume to say
the emperor is not the lord and ruler of the world, he would
17 When Charlemagne was crowned in 800, Pope Leo pronounced these words:
" Imperator est superior, est dominus omnium nationum; imperator coronabit omnes
reges."
18 Bartolus, Comment. in Extrav., "Ad Reprimendum."

INTERNATIONAL

COMMUNITY

ACCORDING TO VITORIA

11

seem to be a heretic." 19 This serves to indicate how far lawyers
had advanced this idea which exerted great influence throughout the Middle Ages and was far from being dead in the
sixteenth century.
Who was the first to initiate the anti-imperialistic theory is
difficult to say. It would seem that until the discovery of the
New World no one dared to denounce the universal power of
the emperor as a false theory. The question was much debated
in the first half of the sixteenth century. The two currents
were represented by Gines de SepUlveda, an imperialist, and
Francisco de Vitoria, his firm opponent. G. de Sepulveda
(1.490-1578) was a Spaniard who while travelling in Italy met
Emperor Charles V at Genoa and became his adviser. He went
to Rome where he wrote the famous book " DemoMates Secundus sive Dialogus de Justis Belli Causis," in which he exalted
imperialism and defended the justice of the wars carried on by
the Spaniards in America. The book was not allowed to be
introduced into Spain. A commission made up of professors
from Alcala and Salamanca decided to forbid its introduction
into Spain on account of some pernicious doctrines contained
therein.
SepUlveda was interpreting the opinion of a large portion of
the population who did not question the justice of the wars in
the New World; but the authority of his judges was too great
to be disregarded. 20 Thus the controversy grew more interesting. To put an end to it and in order to appease his conscience, the emperor convoked an assembly to be held at
Valladolid, in which Sepulveda and his staunch adversary Las
Casas were to discuss publicly their views. The Assembly presided over by Dominic de Soto, 0. P., met in the year 1550.
Bartolus, Cod. I, Hostes.
When the news reached him that his book had not been passed by the
co=ission, SepUlveda wrote a defense of his book, which he dedicated to the
Bishop of Segovia. He reasserts his opinion on the subject of the Indians, and
cites some formidable authorities on whom he claimed to rest his views: Augustine,
Ambrose, Gregory and Thomas; J. Scotus, N. Lyra, M. Roa, J. Major, A. Castro,
F. Guevara, Didacus Vitoria, O.P., P. Scotus O.P., A. Herrera O.P. Cf. SepUlveda,
Apologia De JUIItia Belli Caw (IVth Ed.; Madrid, 1780).
10

20

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HONORIO

MUNOZ

A resume of the discussion was made by the President of' the
Assembly and was published afterwards.
Four reasons were given by Sepulveda to justify the declaration of war on the Indians by the emperor: (a) the gravity of·
the sins of those peoples, especially idolatry and sins against
nature; (b) that as people of very rude intellect they must
serve those higher; (c) that their subjection is necessary before
preaching the faith to them; (d) that they sacrifice human
beings and are cannibalistic. These four reasons he supported
with arguments from Scripture, Canon Law, the Fathers and
Doctors of the Church.
To these four reasons of Sepulveda, Las Casas opposed
twelve points. At the same time he answers all the arguments
taken from Scripture and from other authorities. To the argument that the Spaniards could make wars on the Indians on
account of their horrible sins, Las Casas replies that as the
Indians are not of the forum of the Church no one has jurisdiction to punish them, except in the following cases which he
enumerates: 1) if the infidels have violently taken the land
from the Christians, as was the case with the Holy Land;
fl) if with the grave sins of idolatry they contaminate or cause
harm to the cause of the Faith, or the sacraments, temples, etc.;
3) if they consciously impede the preaching of the Faith;
4) if they make war on Christians, as the Turks do; 5) if innocent people, the care of whom has been entrusted to the Church,
have to be delivered or released from oppression, but even in
this case if a greater evil should follow from their release, the
Church should try to help them in some other way, for of two
necessary evils the lesser one is to be tolerated.
The argument used by Sepulveda that the Indians were of
very rude intellect was answered with ease by Las Casas who
had first-hand knowledge, as he had spent over twenty-five
years with them. He said that he knew those people well, that
they had their own villages, towns, laws, arts, lords and so forth.
And he added that sins against nature and some other sins
(he does not mention which) are punished by them with death.
He did not deny that some of their traditions and customs

INTERNATIONAL

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ACCORDING TO VITORIA

18

were repugnant, but he insisted that it could not be a reason
for declaring war against them.
The text of Christ so often adduced in these controversies,
namely, "teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of
the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost" was interpreted by Las Casas as meaning that it was the duty of Christians to preach the Faith, and nothing beyond that. They
could in no way compel the pagans to receive it or even to
hear it. Furthermore if a whole nation, that is, the subjects as
well as their rulers, do conjointly consent to refuse hearing the
Christian Faith, it would be wrong for Christians to· declare
war against them on that account. 21 Such were the arguments
on the question of the Indians. Sepulveda was severely defeated, and the principles of justice advanced by Las Casas
triumphed. The anti-imperialistic doctrine of Vitoria was now
officially victorious.
Vitoria enunciates his theory in two conclusions. 22 First. The
emperor is not the Lord of the whole earth. To prove his thesis
he gives the following reasoning. Dominion is based either on
natural or on divine or on ·human law. But the dominion of
the whole world is based upon none of these.
No one is by natural law Lord of the whole world, for by
natural law mankind is free, save from paternal and marital
dominion: it is only the father and the husband who by natural
law .have dominion over their children and wife respectively. 23
Dominion and preeminence were introduced by human law.
It is true that in the abstract it would not seem to be against
natural law that there should be some universal authority for
the wellbeing of man; but when dealing with a concrete case
there is no reason why by natural law this dominion should be
more proper for Germans than for Gauls. Any civil power,
•• For a resume of the discussion, cf. Dominic de Soto in Biblioteca de Autores
Espanoles (Madrid, 1878) LXV, 199.
•• Vitoria follows the system of the Middle Ages, first expressing the objections
which seem to militate against the thesis, followed by the establishment of the
thesis and the arguments in its favor.
•• Summa Theol., I, q. 92, a. 1, ad 2um; q. 96, a. 4..

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although it may take its rise in nature, is founded not on nature
but on
since man is a political animal.
By divine law the emperor is riot lord of the whole world,
for it has never been so either before Christ or after. In the
Old Testament we see that N ebuchadnezzar never counted the
Jews under his dominion, as they were forbidden by their law
to have any foreigner as their lord. 25 It is urged that Christ
was universal Lord and that Augustus acting as His deputy
held universal power which continued in his successors, but
Vitoria doubts .it. As regards Christ, it is probable that He was
not, on His human side, Lord of the world, except insofar as it
was required for the salvation of souls.26 But even granting
that, it -is entirely capricious to assert that He bequeathed the
power to the emperor, there being no mention of it in the whole
Bible. Consequently, it is a mere fiction to say that by express
grant of Christ there is an emperor and a lord of the world.
Moreover, if there had been any such institution by divine law
how could the empire be divided and how could nations and
states be free from that subjection through prescription?
It remains to be shown that the emperor is not lord of the
world by human law. And this is clear because there cannot
be such jurisdiction necessary to promulgate it. Again the emperor never enjoyed such position by lawful succession, or by
gift or by exchange or by purchase or by just war or by any
other legal right.
The second conclusion states that even if the emperor were
lord of the whole world he could not legally seize the countries
of the Indians, for it is only in jurisdiction' and not ownership
that the defenders of that opinion hold him to be such lord.
This shows, he adds, that the Spaniards cannot justify on these
grounds their seizure of the provinces' in question. 27
The straightforwardness of Vitoria's anti-imperialistic argumentation could not be very pleasing to the emperor or to the
•• Aristotle, Politics, Bk. I; St. Thomas, De Regimine Principum, I, xxvi.
•• Deut., xxvi.
•• St. Thomas, Commentary on St. Johna Gospel, ch. 18.
.., Vitoria, De India, .sect. II.

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15

aristocracy that was deriving no small benefit from the conquest. The study, De India, was delivered on June 19, 1588.
The news reached the emperor, who on the tenth of November
of the same year addressed an unpleasant letter to the Superior
of Salamanca in which he expressed regret that some Masters
of the Dominican Convent had dared to question in public the
emperor's right to the conquest of the Indies and had also denounced in public lectures and sermons the injustice of the wars
in the New World. He added that in the future no one was
allowed to treat or preach or dispute or print anything bearing
upon that question without the explicit leave of the emperor.
This letter was obviously directed against Vjtoria and those
who shared his views. What the immediate result was is unknown. We are certain that this tension between the emperor
and Vitoria did not last long. In March, 1541, the emperor
sent to him personally for solution of the consultations that
came from the Indies, which Vitoria solved not as the emperor
might have wished but according to the dictates of his conscience. Vitoria was a moralist whose vast learning was at the
service of truth, not at that of the emperor or any other earthly
interests.

The Papacy
On the fourth of May, 1498, Pope Alexander VI issued the
Bull Inter Coetera, concerning the islands lately discovered by
Columbus. Many references have been made to it as a document which entitled the Spanish kings to take possession of the
lands of the New World. And, indeed, from the very words
used by the Pope it would seem undeniable that he was using
his authority as universal lord. The text of the Bull gives the
impression that those lands were given to the Spanish crown
so that they might be brought to Christianity. lt is stated:
" By our own action, not at your request or the request of
another for you, but of our own liberality, our certain knowledge, and the fullness of apostolic power, We give, concede,
and assign to you, your heirs, and their successors, all the
islands and lands discovered or to be discovered, by the

16

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authority of the all-powerful God conceded to Us through St.
Peter, and by the authority of Jesus Christ, Whose Vicar We
are on earth; that you may enjoy full and free power, authority,
and jurisdiction over them." 28
From these words it would seem that the Pope entertained
no doubt as to his dominion over those lands, and the title he
adduced is "by the authority of the all-powerful God conceded
to Us through St. Peter and by the authority of Jesus Christ
Whose Vicar We are on earth." Therefore he disposes at will
of those countries and gives them to the kings of Spain of his
own accord and liberality and by the fullness of his apostolic
authority, "by our own action, not at your request or the
request of another for you, but of our own liberality, our certain knowledge, and the fullness of apostolic power." He, then,
attributes political sovereignty to the Catholic kings over those
lands. On that basis, the Bull was referred to as a justifying
title for the conquest by Spain, and contemporary evidence
shows that the Spanish kings and the politicians of the day
considered the Bull to be of that attributive character. For
that reason the kings drew up a manifesto for the conquerors
to be read to the Indians before entering a war, and it was said
therein that the kings of Spain, by gracious concession of the
Pope, Lord of the earth, were the right lords of those countries
the inhabitants of which were bound to submit, lest war should
be declared upon them. And this procedure of admonishing
the Indians beforehand was continued all through that period
of conquests. When Francisco Pizarro set out for the conquest
of Peru in 1533, he was given a document of Charles V, from
which we may extract a few clauses in support of our argument.
" The Pope, as Lord of the world, made donation of these
islands and countries with everything therein to the Catholic
Kings of Castile who were then Ferdinand and Isabella, of
glorious memory, and their successors. And so it is that His
Majesty is lord of these islands and countries in virtue of said
donation. Therefore I ask you to think this over and resolve
•• Solorzano Pereyra, De Indiarum Jure, bk. ii, cap ..

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to acknowledge the Church as mistress of the universal world,
and the Pontiff called Pope, in her name, and His Majesty in
his place as lord and superior, King of these islands and countries in virtue of the aforesaid donation. I£ you would dare to
act contrariwise, be sure that with the help of God I will begin
to fight against you, and will also endeavor by all possible
means to subject you to the obedience of the Church and of
His Majesty." 29
There can be little doubt that the opinion prevailing in Spain
up to the beginning of the sixteenth century favored the universal jurisdiction of the Pope and his power to give the new
lands to Spain. The adviser of the kings, Palacios Rubios, an
eminent jurist, together with Dominican theologian Matias de
Paz were both firm supporters of that opinion. In the same
way J. Sepulveda, Malferit, G. Lopez, Bobadilla, Zevallo,
Herrera, A. Guerreiro, and others, held the same view. The
same thesis was also maintained by Navarro Alpizcueta, Professor of Law at Salamanca and Coimbra, but he changed his
opinion, as we learn from a public lecture given by him in
1545.80 Indeed, so accepted was this opinion that Vazquez de
Me:nchaca did not hesitate to write: "not only did many
teachers of both branches of law teach it, but some asserted it
to be the more popular opinion." 81
It seems to have been the most widely accepted opinion
during the Middle Ages. The Pope was considered to be the
last authority to whom appeal could be made by Christian
princes; he was their judge. But was he really regarded as the
Lord of the world? Following
in the thirteenth
century, St. Antoninus held it in the fourteenth, Sylvester in
the fifteenth. In the sixteenth century the imperialists upheld
it, as it lent strength to their argument. Joannes Lupus (about
the end of the fifteenth century) in the division that he makes
of war describes the just war (bellum proprium) by saying
that it is "that which is approved by the authority of the law
•• Ibid.
•• Navarrus de Alpizcueta, Opera Omnia (Venice,
IV, 578 ff.
81 Vasquez de Menchaca, Controversiarum lllustrium
(Lyons, 1599), I, ch. ill.

2

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or the ruler, as for example the Emperor and especially the
Pope." 32 Lupus supports his views with a quotation from'
Hostiensis who was perhaps second to none in defending the
universal temporal jurisdiction of the Pope. Hostiensis exerted
enormous influence upon all canonists for he was the most
celebrated jurist of his time, and in defense of this particular
theory the authority of his name overpowered any other
argument.
Nevertheless we find that in the dispute between PhilippeAuguste of France and Richard Coeur de Lion, Pope Innocent
III interfered and drew a distinction between the king as
Christian and as chief of the state; and it was in his character
of Christian that he was subject to the Pope. The Pope did
not deny his own superiority, but merely expressed his mind
as mediator of both Christian princes. It is certain that the
Pope has ever been considered the supreme judge on earth,
upon whom there lies the duty of solving any disputes between
Christian princes. In fact, the· medieval theory recognizes as
one of the essential conditions jor· a just war that the Pope
should be consulted before entering it. He was the highest
authority in Christendom, and he was also entrusted with the
furtherance of the Christian faith in the whole world (mundum
universum). Towards that end all Christian princes. should
cooperate and, therefore, they had to serve the spiritual good
of the Church and be subject to the orders emanating from
the Pope. That was the condition of their officej if they should
act against the good of the Church they could be excommunicated and be deprived of their rights by the Pope, from whom
-it was believed-they derived their authority. The emperor
and the kings were entrusted with carrying out the temporal
affairs of their kingdoms in a way favorable to the cause of the
faith. The emperor was the temporal vice-gerent of the Pope.
This medieval opinion was still upheld at the beginning of
the sixteenth century by two influential Spaniards, a theologian,
Matias de Paz, and a jurist, Palacios Rubios, both Professors
80

J. Lupus Segobiensis, De Bello et Bellatoribus (Venice, 1567).

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at Salamanca and members of the commission for the government of the Indies, which met at Burgos first in 1512. Palacios
Rubios held fast to this theory in a book-unpublished as yetentitled The Oceanic Islands. He writes:
We conclude, therefore, from all that we have said, that jurisdiction proceeds from God, is discovered by the law of nations,
and ordered by civil law. At the time of Christ's birth, all power
and jurisdiction was divided into four monarchies and kingdoms,
and all power and jurisdiction over them was transferred to Christ
Himself, as is taught by Hostiensis and others who follow him.
Christ, therefore, had power over all men, even unbelievers, since
at His name every knee must bend, of those in heaven, on earth,
and under the earth. Hence, He has power, not only in spiritual
affairs, but in temporal affairs as well, for Christ received both
powers from His Father. From this it is evident that all power of
authority, whether spiritual or temporal, takes its origin from God
whence it is bestowed on the people, in their judges, kings, and
priests. All power, then, is translated to Christ Who has obtained
dominion over the entire world. He, in turn, has passed it on to
Peter, His Vicar, and to Peter's successors, the Roman Pontiffs,
by whom power is conceded and granted to others. Spiritual power
is conceded by them to prelates of the Church; temporal power is
given by them to rulers, princes, and other temporal lords. Power
is permitted to unbelievers by a tacit permission of the Church;
this is only a use of jurisdiction because the Church is unable to
exercise it, either directly or through her delegates.••
Matias de Paz, another adviser of the crown, was of a similar
opinion." 4 Both agreed that the only justifying title that the
kings could advance for the conquest of America was that the
conquest had been made " by the authority of the Sovereign
Pontiff, and by no other." 35
Such was the opinion prevailing in the universities and taught
by most
For that reason, no doubt occurred as to
88 Palacios
Rubios, Libellus de lnsulis Oceania quas vulgus Indian appelat
(Unpublished ms. Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid).
•• Cf. Matias de Paz, 0. P., "De Dominio Regum Hispaniae Super Indos," in
Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum (Rome, 1933).

85Jbid.

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the power of Pope Alexander VI to bestow those newly discovered lands on the Spanish crown. So it is that the universality of the temporal power of the Pope was one of the
titles alleged to justify the conquest of America, which Vitoria
refused to recognize as legitimate.
In Spain, Vitoria was, apparently, the first to denounce this
title as valueless. In Italy, Cajetan and Torquemada had
drawn the distinction between the direct and indirect power
of the Pope in temporal affairs. This indirect power was only
allowed when it was deemed to be required for the cause of the
faith. But in Spain there is no evidence of any writer previous
to Vitoria denying this title as legitimate.
Vitoria considers first the opinion of the canon-lawyers and
rejects their arguments in four propositions:
1) The Pope is not civil or temporal lord of the whole world
in the proper sense of temporal power. He cannot claim such
dominion either by natural, human, or divine law. In the
supposition that Christ had that power, He could not give it to
the Pope, who has no jurisdiction over infidels. Again Christ's
words to Peter " feed my sheep " clearly speak of power in
spiritual and not in temporal matters.
fl) Even assuming that the Supreme Pontiff had this secular
power over the whole world, he could not give it to the secular
princes. This is clear because that power would be annexed to
the Papacy and not to the particular Popes; and all the Popes
being equal in juridical power, none of them could deprive the
others of the prerogatives of the papal office.
3) The Pope has temporal power only insofar as it is in subservience to matters spiritual, that is, as far as is necessary for
the administration of spiritual affairs. The end pursued by the
civil power is temporal felicity, which has to be subjected to
the spiritual, eternal happiness. The Pope has dominion over
tempo;.-al things insofar as these impede man from attaining
his ultimate end. Laws, therefore, that impede the attainment
of temporal happiness can be rescinded by the Pope for the
good of the faithful. On this principle, when princes are at

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variance in disputes and are rushing into war, the Pope can act
as judge and inquire into the claims of the contending parties
and pass judgment, which Christian princes are bound to respect, lest greater spiritual evils should befall. Again, on the
same principle, the Pope can unseat kings and even set up
other kings, as at times he has done. It is in this sense that
those numerous rules are to be interpreted which say that the
Pope has both swords. Moreover, if the Pope were temporal
lord of the world the bishops would also be temporal lords of
their respective bishoprics, which is not admitted.
4) The Pope has no temporal power over the Indian aborigines or over other unbelievers. This is manifest from the
first and third propositions, for he has no temporal power save
such as subserves spiritual matters. But he has no spiritual
power over them, therefore neither has he temporal power. If
the barbarians refuse to recognize any lordship of the Pope,
that furnishes no ground for making war on them and seizing
their property. Even if they refuse to accept Christ as their
Lord this does not justify making war on them or doing them
any hurt. The infidels cannot be compelled by arms to recognize the lordship of the Pope; therefore it is unlawful to declare
war on them.
This shows that the title under discussion cannot be set up
against the barbarians, and that Christians have no just cause
of war against them either on the ground that the Pope has
made a gift of their lands or on the grounds of the absolute
lordship of the Pope. Therefore, at the time of the Spaniards'
first voyages to America they had no right to occupy the lands
of the indigenous population.
Such were the cogent arguments of Vitoria on this point.
He firmly denied the universal jurisdiction of the Pope over
the infidels and, therefore, could not admit
just a title based
on a false principle. He by no means disregarded the Bull, but
he interpreted it as meaning that the Sovereign Pontiff assigned
those newly discovered countries to be evangelized exclusively
by the Spaniards and Portuguese, thereby forbidding under

HONORIO MuNOZ

excommunication to any other Christian prince approach to
those lands. According to Vitoria, the Pope merely monopolized the evangelization of the Indies on behalf of the Spanish
and Portuguese kings; and this the Pope could do. The motives
which led the Pope to take this step might have been of a different character, for Spain had been the first country to discover those lands, her geographical position was most favorable,
and her opportunities were many. Her moral unity as a nation
had just been accomplished with. the surrender of Granada,
until then in possession of the Moors. And another fact not to
be overlooked is the nationality of Pope Alexander VI.
Vitoria's doctrine was accepted by prominent lawyers and
theologians alike. Thus Bafiez, professor of theology at Salamanca, echoed the opinion of the master in these words: "The
Pope wished the kings of Spain and Portugal to be the leaders
of the Indians in order that they be converted to the ·faith.
Therefore he wished them to have over the natives a power
such as the Emperor has over certain kings and princes." 86 The
same opinion was shared by Las Casas, De Soto, Cordoba,
Acosta, Navarro, Freitas, Menchaca, Covarrubias, to mention
only a few.87 After Vitoria few authors in Spain maintained
the opinion of Hostiensis.
On the other hand, the Reformation was a powerful argument against the authority of the Pope and, to many, the fact
that half Europe was refusing to acknowledge the Pope as the
rightful authority of Christendom was a definite proof of his
lack of jurisdiction, spiritual and temporal, over infidels. Meanwhile, on both sides there were extreme opinions. Bartholus
condemned as heretical anyone bold enough to deny the Pope's
universal lordship over the world.38 Antonius de Rosellis likewise condemned as heretics those who dared assert that the
Pope was lord of the whole world.811 Referring to them Covar88 D. Covarrubias a Leiva, Opera, I, 9:
De Potestate Temporali et Spirituali
(Frankfort, 159!t).
81 De Jure Belli, Ll, ch. 14.
88 M. J. Barthelemy, Les Fondateura du Droit International, p. 7.
•• James Brown Scott, The Spaniah Conception of International Law and of
Sanctions (Washington, 1984), p. 1.

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rubias writes: " Bartholus quite evidently acts too boldly in
saying the contrary opinion is heretical. This is untrue, and
Bartholus does not seem to understand what heresy is. The
same can be said of Antonius de Rosellis. · These Doctors would
have acted more modestly if they had left the declaration of
heresy to the Church." 86
IV.

RIGHTS oF THE INTERNATIONAL

CoMMUNITY

1. Independence 0'1' Interdependence of States
The theory of equilibrium finds its satisfactory fulfilment in
Vitoria's idea of the international community. In the past, it
appears to have been the union of the weak and feeble against
the strong, and has also manifested itself as equality of powers.
In the early writers on international law this question is expressed in the form of resistance to a state which is ever
growing. It seems that Gentilis maintains the lawfulness of
attacking the neighbor who grows too powerful. 37 M. Wycliffe
in England reechoes, the same opinion in 1593; and Francis
Bacon holds the same on the legitimacy of England's war with
Spain in 1624. Grotius seems to reject the equilibrium and,
following Vitoria, denies the right of nations to declare war
without having been actually interfered with.
That the states of this international community possess and
enjoy equal rights is a fundamental tenet of Victoria's conception upon which his law of nations is based. While on the
one hand the practice of the states in the past and the majority
of the authors set as a basis of their systems the principle of
the isolated and unrelated independence of states, Vitoria on
the contrary firmly insists upon their equality and interdependence.88 International law has not only the force of a
pact and agreement among men, but also the force of law; for
the world as a whole being in a way one single state has the
power to create laws that are just and fitting for all persons,
as are the rules of international law.
Interpreting this passage, J. Brown Scott draws the conclusion "that every rule of international law has a municipal

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sanction in esse or in posse and that a failure to enact a municipal statute for that purpose or to apply it if enacted, renders
the state in default liable in.damages." 39 Each sovereign state
has equal attributes with other similar states, and should
therefore enjoy the same rights in relation to the international
community. These rights are not based on the preponderance
issuing from the material possession or the strength of armies
or armaments but upon the fact of the existence of a state as a
juridical person. The mutual respect and cooperation of these
juridical persons having eql).al standing in the international
community are deemed by Vitoria to be essential for the peace
of the world. The states must enjoy independence, sovereignty,
but never with a subjective absolutism. The application of the
principles of Vitoria exacts a subservience of this attribute of
the states to the common good of the world. States are to be
independent in the attainmen't of their sufficiency, since no
state in the world today is self-sufficient. The mutual relations
between one state and another are governed by the law of
nations, which, as a derivation of natural law, must aim at the
welfare of individual units within the international framework
and must never be detrimental to the universal community.
So much emphasis is laid by Vitoria upon this point that a war
otherwise legitimate between two states would be unlawful,
if its results would be harmful to the moral values of the
community of nations.
2. Right to Trade

"The law of fundamental duties as well as rights, is that of
natural society and fellowship, which it is the glory of Vitoria
to have proclaimed." 40 The first right emanating from this
principle of the natural society and communication is the right
to trade, understood of course in its broader sense. This implies
the power to travel from one part of the world to another.
Thus, he establishes his doctrines in several propositions which
are in themselves tenets of law. The occasion was the question
•• James Brown Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law; Francisco de
Vitoria and His Law of Nations (Oxford, 1934), p. 138.

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of communication with natives of the New World. The Spaniards, he states, have a right to travel into the lands in question
and to sojourn there, provided they do no harm to the natives,
and the natives may not prevent them. In support of this
assertion, he advances fourteen proofs of which a few alone
will suffice for our purpose here. It was permissible from the
beginning of the world (when everything was in common) for
anyone to set forth and travel wheresoever he would. This was
not taken away by the division of property for it was never the
intention of peoples to destroy by that division the reciprocity
and common use which prevailed among men. Again, coming
to an example nearer home and with a more immediate import,
it would not be lawful for the French, he says, to prevent the
Spanish from travelling or even from living in France, or vice
versa, provided this in no way contributed to their hurt and
the visitors did no injury. He even considers it an act of war
to banish strangers who have committed no fault or to keep
certain people out of the city or province as being enemies,
or to expel them when already there. Such are the rules
governing immigration, as enunciated by Vitoria.
In the third section of his De Indis, Vitoria embarks upon
the examination of the legitimate titles whereby the Indians
might have come under the sway of the Spaniards. In its ·discussion, he employs the same virile language that he used when
discussing the negative titles, and his arguments here are not
less convincing than in the previous section. His conclusions,
drawn from the sound principles which he establishes, cannot
but convince unprejudiced minds. And although he himself
sternly denied the ambitious claims of many a Spanish trader
of his time, yet he is not less firm in the assertion of the rights
which rendered lawful the action of the Spanish kings in
America. So nobly did he deal with these problems that he
manifestly showed no other concern in the matter than those
of truth and justice. Whether his opinions favored his countrymen was of no concern to him. Above narrow nationalism stood
his idea of the universal brotherhood of all peoples of the earth.
If the private interests of one country would harm the general

26

HONORIO MUNOZ

welfare of the others, then those interests should not be cared
for; they are wrong in the light of the law of nations. The
community of nations is an expression of human solidarity,
and is meant to be for the common benefit of all the peoples
grouped into geographical and ethnological entities. Nations
are independent units in certain matters, but always interdependent on each other insofar as some of them need to be
helped by others and therefore depend upon them. This fact
of interdependence affects all the nations and
one can live
without the neighbor's help, for as it is with men, so it seems
to be with nations.
In Vitoria's theory, the world is a compound of many units.
Each one of them needs the concourse of the· other for the
perfect wellbeing of the whole. Just as the human body needs
the cooperation of each member !or its harmonious functioning,
so it is with the community of nations. Mankind is one. Men
are essentially equal, no matter where they happen to dwell.
Mere geographical surroundings cannot alter the essential
natural qualities with· which man has been endowed. Man is
made to live in society, so that by living with others his natural
needs may be supplied. Hence, from his natural Tight of society
and fellowship flows the right of communication 'for the various
purposes of life.41 From this general principle, conclusions may
be drawn to show the right of every man in every state to
communicate with others freely, provided that no harm results
from it. States can establish communication with each other
without being molested by other states.
From the principle of natural society and fellowship Vitoria
derives the right of communication and he proceeds to explain
this right by establishing a few conclusions each of which is
supported by .various arguments.
In the first of his .conclusions, he shows that the Spaniards
have a right to travel into the lands of the New World and to
sojourn there, provided they do no harm to the natives, and
the natives may not prevent them. In support of t"bis proposition he gives fourteen arguments the first of which is derived
from the law of nations. This law he defines as "that which

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natural reason has set up among all nations" (jus gentium est
quod naturalis ratio inter omnes gentes constituit). Jle substitutes. for the word homines of the Justinian definition gentes,
obviously taking this word in the meaning of nations, as is
apparent from the words which follow: "for among all nations
(omnes nationes) it is considered inhuman to receive badly
visitors and strangers, if this be without a special cause." 42
Therefore, by the law of nations, which he says, is natural law
or derived from it, the right of communication belongs to every
country, in such wise that it cannot be impeded at will. By
this law it is incumbent upon the states to allow the exercise
of this right to their subjects. Consequently, it is reckoned
inhuman among all nations to treat visitors and foreigners
badly without some special cause. On the other hand it is
humane and correct to treat visitors well. The only condition
is that no harm should ensue from such communication. If the
use of this right would result in direct harm to the countries
concerned the right of communication of dangerous visitors
might be lawfully suspended (as, for example, in the case of
Communists who, as all agree, plot against the state).
He states further that it would not be lawful for the French
to prevent the Spaniards from tr!lvelling or even from living
in France, or vice versa, provided that this in no way injured
them. Here again the principle underlying this conclusion is
that men are equal by nature. There is no superiority of races.
Barbarians are as much men as civilized people are; pagans are
men as Christians are. Therefore, they can enjoy in the same
way those rights which by derivation of the law of nature pertain to all in equal degree. He strengthens these arguments by
saying that friendship among men exists by natural law, and
it is against nature to shun the society of harmless folk. Conse"De Potestate Civili.
•• This substitution of Vitoria is of importance, because in Roman Law the
individual person seems to have been considered the subject of the law of nations.
Vitoria, on the other hand, indicates that the subject of the law of nations is not
the individual but the moral person, that is, peoples, nations, states. Of., Le
Droit des Gens et lea Anciens Jurisconsults Espagnols (Le Haye, 1914), p. 84-85.

28

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MuNOZ

quently, it is unlawful to impede the exercise of this right.
Hence, for Vitoria it was as lawful that the Indians should
emigrate into Europe as that Europeans should into the New
World. Men have equal rights by the law of nature, and the
right of emigration is common to all; it cannot, indeed, be
impeded, except as a punishment, or in case of war.
If it were not lawful for the Spaniards to travel among the
Indians, this would be either by natural law, or by divine, or
by human law. It is certainly lawful by natural and by divine
law. If there were any human law which without any cause
took away rights conferred by natural and divine law, it would
be inhuman and unreasonable and, consequently, would not
have the force of law. According to this, it would seem that
those human laws are not in accord with natural law which
tend to restrict or impede altogether this right of communication and, therefore, they lack the moral binding force which
every human law possesses insofar as it does not contradict
divine or natural law.
Hence the second proposition of Vitoria, that the Spaniards
may lawfully carry on trade among the native Indians so long
as they do no harm to their country as, for instance, by importing thither wares which the natives lack and by exporting
thence either gold or silver or other wares of which the natives
have abundance. Neither may the native princes hinder their
subjects from carrying on trade with the Spaniards nor, on the
other hand, may the princes of Spain prevent commerce with
the natives. This is proved by the same arguments adduced
previously in favor of the first proposition and, in sum, it is
certain that the aborigines have no right to keep off Christians.
It is clear that if Spaniards forbade the French to trade
with the Spaniards and this not for the good of Spain, but in
order to prevent the French from sharing in some advantage,
that practice would offend against righteousness and charity.
If then, there can be no just legal ordinance to this effect,
it also cannot be accomplished in actual fact, for nature has
established a bond of relationship between all men, and so it

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is contrary to natural law for one man to disassociate himself
from another without good reason.
In the third proposition he states that if there are among
the Indians objects which are treated as common both to citizens and to strangers, the Indians may not prevent the Spaniards from communication and participation in them. This
follows from the previous conclusions, for if the Spaniards may
travel and trade among them, they may, consequently, make
use of the laws and advantages enjoyed by all foreigners. The
implications of these propositions are worth considering.
The doctrine of Vitoria is that the right of commerce is
mutual. The Spaniards can carry goods to the Indians and
exchange them for gold or treasures which are in abundance
amongst the Indians. There is no distinction of races; for these
purposes all are equal. Vitoria speaks here generically of men.
Whatever religion they may belong to or whatever country
they may come from, all have the same rights, all are of the
same brotherhood and, therefore, all have those same natural
rights which are common to all. To seek to limit those rights
to some peoples, excluding others, without serious reason, is
against justice and also against the law of nations. Because it
comes from natural law, the right of commerce cannot be impeded by the princes without violating natural law. The only
case in which the exercise of this right can be suspended by the
authorities is when harm would ensue from its use.
The idea that the right of commerce attains legality only
when a pact or a contract has been signed was unknown to
Vitoria, for whom there are certain basic principles which have
been consented to by the generality of mankind through the
centuries as, for instance, the community of the seas, hospitality
to foreigners, the right of commerce, and so forth. The traditional acceptance and practice of those principles wield as much
binding force in international relations as explicit contracts.
Inasmuch as things which belong to nobody are acquired by
the first occupant according to the law of nations, it follows
that if there be in the earth gold or in the sea pearls or in a
river anything else which is not appropriated by the law of

30

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MUNOZ

nations, those will belong to the first occupant just as the fish
in the sea do. Indeed there are many things in this connection
issuing from the law of nations which, because they have sufficient derivation from natural law, are clearly capable of conferring rights and creating obligations.
What stand should the Spaniards take if these principles were
denied to them which by the law of nations were bequeathed
and have always ranked as legal in the common usages of men?
If the Indian natives would wish to prevent them from enjoying any of their above-mentioned rights under the law of nations,
for instance, trade, the Spaniards ought in the first place to use
reason and persuasion in order to remove scandal, and ought
to show by all possible methods that they do not come to harm
the natives, but wish to sojourn as peaceful guests and to travel
without doing the natives any harm, and they ought to show
this not only by words but also with reasons. If, after this
recourse to reason, the barbarians decline to agree and propose
to use force, the Spaniards can defend themselves and do all
that is consistent with their own safety, it being lawful to repel
force by force. If safety cannot be assured in any other way,
they may build fortresses and defensive works and, if they
have sustained a wrong, they may follow it up with war on
the authorization of their sovereign and may avail themselves
of the right of war. If the Indians deny the Spaniards their
rights under the law of nations, the former do wrong to the
latter; therefore, if it be necessary in order to preserve their
right that the Spaniards should go to war, they may lawfully
do so.

3. The Freedom of the Seas
Another point of no slight importance which Vitoria deduces
from the right of natural society and from the right of communication is the freedom of the seas. He accepts it as a
matter of course. He advances it as an argument to prove his
first title. By natural law (he points out) , running water and
the sea are common to all, so are rivers and harbors, and by
the law of nations ships from all parts may be moored there;

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on the same principle they are public things. Therefore it is
not lawful to keep any one from them. Hence it follows that
the aborigines would be doing a wrong to the Spaniards if they
were to keep them from their territories.
In this Vitoria merely followed the Roman theory of the
community of the seas and of the rivers. But it is worthy of
notice that he in this as in the previous section dares to pronounce as right what his mind as a moralist avows, not heeding whether his pronouncement displeases the public or not.
Vitoria wrote in a period when the Spanish navy had no rival
upon the seas. Yet, he maintained the freedom of the seas and
denied that they could be monopolized by any nation to the
exclusion of others.
He was also a partisan of the free-trade theory, for the law
of nations applies to all states in the same fundamental way.
The enunciation of these and other similar principles did not
favor Spanish interests in the New World. The policy of the
traders and merchants tended towards monopolizing the trade
of America for the Spaniards. But Vitoria's mind was not
narrowed to territorial demarcations of nationality. He was a
citizen of the world, of which Spain was merely a part; the
spirit of Vitoria was entirely international.
A little after Vitoria, but earlier than Grotius, another Spanish jurist, de Menchaca, strongly upheld the freedom of the
seas in his Controversiwrum Illustrium. "Although we have
many times heard," he writes, "that a great majority of the
Portuguese believe that their King has acquired dominion over
the West Indian Ocean, and that it is unlawful for the other
nations to sail those seas; even though the people of our own
Spain seem to hold the same belief, viz., that only the Spaniards have a right to navigate the endless sea towards the lands
of the Indians, yet the seas cannot become the property of
any one prince against the common use by all nations." He
denies, supporting his denials with lengthy arguments, the
titles advanced by the republics of Genoa and Venice, titles of
occupation, prescription, custom.
Nearly a century later, 1609, Grotius published a chapter on

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the freedom of the seas. In this work he advocates the freedom
of the seas invoking Vitoria's authority, but in defending
Vitoria's theory, he meant to do service to the interests of his
country or, rather, to the company for which he wrote. The
motive which led Grotius to this conclusion was very different
from the motive of Vitoria.
In 1613, Welwood in his Abridgment of All Sea Laws protested against Grotius and distinguished between freedom of
navigation and freedom of fishing. In the same way Selden,
in 1635, published his Mare Clausum denying Grotius' arguments. He did not, however, disregard Vitoria's authority; but
here again is an Englishman defending the interests of his king
and country, despite the law of the nations. A little later,
a Portuguese, Freitas, refuted Grotius' arguments, and maintained in his book De Justo Imperio Lusitanorum Asiatioo.the
legitimacy of monopolizing the seas. It favored, of course, the
claims of the Portuguese.
It seems natural that every writer should endeavor to defend
the interests of his own country, but it is not very admirable.
It is very unusual to find writers who place the interests of the
commonweal of humanity above those of their native land,
even when justice would demand it. The writer who can do
this has a clear idea of the community of nations and of their
interdependence, of the equality of all before the law, and of
the prevalence of common over private interests. Vitoria was
one who sought for truth and justice in international dealings
on behalf of the community of nations.
4. Right of Immigration or Naturalization

From the title of natural society and fellowship Vitoria derives his theory relative to the acquiring of nationality. He
accepts the theory that he is to be called, and is, a citizen who
is born within the state. Thus if children of any Spaniards be
born in the Indies, and they wish to acquire citizenship, it seems
they cannot be barred either from citizenship or from the advantages enjoyed by other citizens. He refers to the case in

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which the parents had their domicile in the Indies. Man is a
civil animal. Whoever is born in one state is not a citizen of
another state. It is clear, then, that Vitoria follows the theory
that territory rather than descent gives origin to nationality,
jus soli rather than jus sanguinis.
From the right of communication follows the right of everybody to establish his domicile in any land that pleases him,
provided always that no harm comes thereby to the natives.
And if there be any person who wishes to acquire a domicile
in some state of the Indians, as by marriage or in virtue of any
other fact whereby any foreigners were wont to become citizens,
they cannot be impeded any more than others. Consequently,
they enjoy the privileges of citizens just as others do, provided
that they also submit to the burdens to which others submit.
Hence, refusal to receive strangers and foreigners is wrong in
itself.

5. Right to Preach the Gospel
The right to commerce in the realm of ideas is based not only
upon natural law but also upon divine law. Vitoria insists upon
the right and duty which missionaries have to preach the gospel
of Christ, and this right he considers as a strong possible title
which might be advocated to justify a war of defense an<:l the
conquest of new lands with all the consequences pertaining
thereto, such as the preservation of the faith of converts and
the appointing of Christian princes over them.
The view of medieval writers that the doctrinal rights of the
Church are always over and above those of the state was not
obsolete in the time of Vitoria. The spiritual interests of man
were generally preferred to the temporal ones. Not only that,
but the latter had to be sacrificed for the sake of the former
whenever it was required. Thus temporal rulers could not put
obstacles to the spreading of Catholic ideals in their countries.
The Church then was absolutely free to preach the truth of
Christianity the world over. More, it was the Church's right,
her duty and obligation, to make known the gospel of Christ.
l!'or that purpose she could send missionaries out into all coun3

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tries, civilized and uncivilized alike. Besides the natural right
to free passage and journeying to all countries, common to all
men, the missionaries should enjoy freedom for announcing the
Christian faith to all men. Charity and fraternal correction are
not merely a precept of Christ, but also a precept of natural
law binding in a general way all men and, in a special manner,
all Christians. Such is the Catholic view. It is based both
upon the precepts of Christ and upon the nature of the Church
which, as a perfect society, enjoys all the rights and privileges
which other societies or states enjoy.
The second possible title which the Spaniards might have
for taking possession of the New World is derived from the
right to propagate the faith of Christ. Jesus was the Lord of
Heaven and earth. He came to this world to redeem mankind.
The doctrine which He came to teach is necessary for man to
know and to follow in order to attain salvation. Everyone is
bound, as far as possible, to know it and to follow it. In order,
therefore, that it should be brought to the knowledge of everyone, Christ entrusted His Church with the mission of propagating it in all parts of the world and of bringing it to the notice
of all human creatures. Such was Christ's precept: "Preach
the gospel to every creature." The Church, then, possesses the
right to teach all nations, to spread the Christian faith throughout the whole world. She is under the obligation of making
known the gospel to every human being, and no. one may oppose her in this aim. Neither prince nor nation can legitimately
forbid the Church to teach her doctrine to all men. Prohibition
to do this involves grave injustice towards her. The gospel or
law of Christ is to be the portion of all; it embraces all nations,
all tongues, and no one is exempt from the duty of knowing it.
This divine right of the Church cannot be opposed by secular
.a11thority, and if the Church is prevented from exercising this
right grave injury is done to her which may be a sufficient reason
for lawful declaration of war. Being a perfect society, the Church
is justly entitled to avenge any injury she is made to suffer,
whether in the person of her Sovereign Pontiff or in any member

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of her fold. In the last resort, this act of vindication may be
entrusted to arms.
A grave injury would be done to the Church if her members
were not allowed to go freely to all nations with the mission of
announcing the gospel of Christ. This was not merely the view
of one or a few writers; there were many who maintained it
and declared war to be legal against those who impeded the
spreading of the faith.
Vitoria explains this title in several propositions, as is his
usual manner of doing. In this first he states that Christians
have a right to preach and declare the Gospel in barbarian
lands. To support this proposition he adduces five arguments.
In the first place, he quotes the divine injunction of Christ,
"Preach the Gospel to every creature"; and 'also the text of
St. Paul to Timothy, " The word of the Lord is not bound."
Secondly, the proposition is clear from what has already been
said, for if the Spaniards have a right to travel and trade among
the Indians, they can teach the truth to those willing to hear it,
especially as regards matters pertaining to any human subject
of instruction. Thirdly, because the natives would otherwise
be outside the pale of salvation, if Christians were not allowed
to go to them carrying the Gospel message. Fourthly, because
brotherly correction is required by the law of nature just as
brotherly love is. Since, then, the Indians are not only in sin,
but outside the pale of salvation, it concerns Christians to correct and direct them; nay, it seems that they are bound to do so.
Lastly, because they are our neighbors, as said above: "Now
the Lord has laid a command on everyone concerning his neighbor." Therefore it concerns Christians to instruct those who
are ignorant of these supremely vital matters.
Here Vitoria speaks as a moralist and not as a lawyer. To
the argument of freedom of passage, which he adduced in support of the previous title as being part of the law of nations,
he adds here a religious argument which, however, would be
admitted only by those of his creed. His arguments would lack
the power to convince those for whom morals never have legal
value.

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Again, the general way in which he speaks applies not only
to the Spaniards but to all Christians. The argument is meant
to be a premise of the entire syllogism, and nothing more. It
merely proves that by Christian ordinance Christians have a
right to propagate Christianity the world over, to make the
Gospel known to every human being in every part of the world.
In the second proposition he sets out to make evident that
the Spaniards might be the evangelizers of America by special
appointment of the Sovereign Pontiff. He says that although
this is a task common and permitted to all, yet the Pope might
entrust it to the Spaniards and forbid it to all others. The
reason is that the Pope has power in matters temporal when
these subserve matters spiritual. Therefore, as it is the Pope's
concern to bestow special care on the propagation of the Gospel
over the whole world, he can entrust it to the Spaniards to the
exclusion of all others, if the sovereigns of Spain could render
more effective help in the spread of the Gospel in those parts.
Not only could the Pope forbid others to preach but also to
trade there, if this prohibition would further the propagation
or Christianity, for he can order temporal matters in the manner which is most helpful to spiritual matters. If in this case
that is how spiritual matters would be best helped, it consequently falls within the authority and power of the Supreme
Pontiff. It seems that in this case this is the course most conducive to spiritual welfare because, if there should be an indiscriminate inrush of Christians from other parts to the part in
question, they might easily hinder one another and develop
quarrels to the banishment of tranquility and the disturbance
of the concerns of the faith and of the conversion of the natives.
Further, inasmuch as it was the sovereigns of Spain who
were the first to patronize and pay for the navigation of the
intermediate ocean, and as they then had the good fortune to
discover the New World, it is just that this travel should be
forbidden to others and that the Spaniards should enjoy alone
the fruits of their discovery. For just as in the interests of the
preservation of peace among princes and of the spread of religion the Pope could make such a distribution of the land of

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the Saracens among Christian princes as would prevent one
prince from crossing the lands of another, so also for the good
of religion he could appoint princes especially where there were
no Christians there before. This proposition and the arguments
advanced in its defense rest upon the assumption that the Pope
is spiritual lord over all Christian princes and nations, and
anything that he would command which would tum in the
interests of religion was to be obeyed for the sake of faith.
In the time of Vitoria the leading states in Europe were
Catholic, that is, under the spiritual sovereignty of the Pope,
and therefore he could order things to be done in the New
World as he thought convenient to religion. He was, then,
acting as a superior with his subjects, and as a sovereign with
other sovereigns. All that the Pope could do was as head of
the Church and in that quality he was superior and the rulers
of the Catholic countries were his subjects. In the interests of
faith he could, therefore, according to Vitoria, take the practical
measure of limiting to one nation the task of evangelizing those
countries. Even more, he could, as superior, forbid his subjects
to trade with or approach to those countries if such relations
would likely harm the cause of the faith. Vitoria is not here
denying the right of commerce with all nations. He is merely
asserting the powers that the Pope could have, with the
evangelization of those lands, and stating the corresponding
obligations of his subjects to obey.
Some writers seem to interpret this as a weakness of Vitoria,
a kind of surrender, as if he intended with this to gain papal
favors. Such a view clearly shows a lack of understanding of
Vitoria's thesis and argumentation; it is unfair. Vitoria does
deduce a logical conclusion from the premises already laid
down. The Pope as the spiritual head of the world has authority
over his subjects who are bound to obey him in all that affects
the interests of the faith. The material things, as inferior to
the spiritual, should be made to serve them. It is only indirectly that the Pope could interfere with material businessapart from his temporal sovereignty over his Papal States-

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for the sake of the spiritual. Vitoria, as a good .Schoolman,
merely draws a logical conclusion from the established premises.
That the Spaniards should be preferred by the Pope for the
evangelization of the New World is a point upon which all
Spanish writers of that period, and some foreigners too, coincide.
The reasons which they advance, although not altogether convincing, are nevertheless legitimate. It is obvious, as noted
before, that the Pope, not being lord over those countries,
could not make a distribution, but could make a demarcation
of the field to be evangelized by the Spaniards and by the
Portuguese. The Pope could entrust the Christianization of
pagan countries to those whom he chose. Such practice has
been carried on since, and is even now in full sway. The exclusiveness of the evangelization by Spaniards and Portuguese
is to be attributed originally to the fact that they were the
first to discover those lands and could, therefore, claim a primary right. Such claim was sanctioned when Alexander VI
made the demarcation of the lands discovered. The Pope, as
spiritual head of Christendom, could expect to be obeyed only
by those who recognized his authority. Hence the indirect
power over those countries-it being a precautionary measure
in the interest of the faith-only affected those Christians who
acknowledged his authority. Spain was then the first power in
Europe. No other nation was as able to undertake the colonization of America as Spain at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Moreover, the geographical position of the New World
favored Spain more than other countries. All of which seemed
to indicate that the Spaniards were best prepared to Christianize
America.
In the third proposition Vitoria opposes those who maintained that if the Indians did not become Christians after
the faith had been preached to them, war could be declared
upon them. All that Vitoria expects of the Indians is that they
should put no obstacle to the preaching of the Gospel. It is
wrong to exercise coercion on them in order that they be converted. This is the generally accepted teaching of theologians
of that time. If the Indians allow the Spaniards freely and

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without hindrance to preach the Gospel, then whether they do
or do not receive the faith furnishes no lawful ground for
making war on them and for seizing in any other way their
lands. This is clear from what has been said above and also
from the fact that there cannot be a just war where no wrong
has previously been done.
Is it wrong for the Spaniards to compel the Indians to hear
the Gospel? Here discrepancies occur. Antonius de Cordoba
considers it wrong because that would be to compel them to
accept the faith/ 3 On the other hand, another theologian,
Thomas a Jesu, states that although it would be wrong to compel them to accept the faith, yet according to the opinion of
the doctors the Indians could be forced to give ear to the
preaching of the Gospel. 44 Whom those doctors alluded to he
does not specify. We, on the contrary, are aware of several
who, with Vitoria, maintained it to be wrong to compel the
Indians or other infidels to hear the Gospel. Thus De Soto,
Baiiez, Suarez, Valencia, Freitas, Torres, Acosta, and others
were partisans of this opinion. 45 It is an easy way of giving
value to opinions to back them with the authority of "the
doctors." But in the end this proves nothing as it aims at
proving too much. Presumably the author refers to some imperialists, but it definitely seems far too wide to involve the
whole body of theologians in favor of an opinion when they,
in fact, are generally against it.
The situation would change, however, if the Indians should
engage themselves in putting obstacles to the propagation of
•• lllos autem qui nos audire nollent non possemus cogere ut nos audirent; quia
jam esset illos ad fidem aliquo modo cogere. A. Cordoba, Quautionarum, I, q. 47.
dub. 4.
.. Quamvis Ecclesia non sit faculta vi et armis compellendi infideles ut ad
evangelii receptionem fideique nostrae veritatem convertuntur; saltern secundum
doctorum sententiam possunt compelli ut auditum praestant evangelio. Thomas a
Jesu, De Procuranda Omnium Gentium Salute, IV, part 1.
•• De Soto, In IV Sent., IV, d. 5, q. 1; Banez, Summa Tkeol., II-II, q. 10, a. 10;
Suarez, De Fide, disp. XVIII, s. 2, n. 8; Freitas, De Just. Imper. Lisit., cap. IX,
n. 6; Torres, De Fide, a. VIII, disp. 51, dub. 2; Acosta, De Proc. Indor. Sal., lib.
II, cap. 18.

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the faitli. Then, Vitoria states, the Spaniards after first reasoning with them in order to remove scandal, may preach it despite
their unwillingness and devote themselves to the conversion of
the people in question, and if need be they may then accept or
even make war until they succeed in obtaining facilities and
safety for preaching the Gospel. The same pronouncement
must be made in the case where they allow preaching but
hinder conversion either by killing or otherwise punishing those
who have been converted to Christ or by deterring others with
threats and fears. This is clear because herein the Indians
would be doing an injury to the Spaniards as appears from
what has already been said. Therefore in favor of those who
are oppressed and suffer wrong the Spaniards can make war,
especially as such vitally important interests are at stake.
This proposition demonstrates that if there is no other way
to carry on the work of religion, this furnishes the Spaniards
with another justification for seizing the lands and territory of
the natives and for setting up new lords there, putting down
by virtue of the right of war everything which is permitted in
other just wars, but always with a regard for moderation and
proportion, so as to go no further than necessity demands,
preferring to abstain from what they lawfully might do rather
than transgress due limits, and always with an intent on the
welfare of the aborigines.
Vitoria has now reached the last stage of the argument to
prove the possibility of a lawful title to take possession of the
Indies in virtue of the propagation of Christianity. In this he
is merely setting up a possible title. He is theorizing; he is only
showing how on account of the propagation of the Gospel the
Spaniards in the case might acquire a legal title. He, moreover,
indicates the process and the measures which might be taken.
His humanism reaches sublimity. This opinion of Vitoria was
not only followed by subsequent theologians but it became
incorporated in the Laws of the Indies. 46
The right of the Spaniards to preach the Gospel could not
' 8

OrdenanzasReales, Lib. II, cap. xx, n.l-18.

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be exercised without causing them injury, which might be
repelled by war of self-defense. Thus they could build up
fortresses and have therein soldiers and supply themselves
with other defensive weapons, according to T. a Jesu. 47 That
it would be a grave injustice if the Indians impeded the preaching of the Gospel is not questioned by theologians. This grave
injury could be a just cause of war. Vitoria, however, adds
that it would be very imprudent to take up arms immediately
against the Indians. Other means should first be tried, for
religion is not to be forced with guns and bombs.
What we have been showing, Vitoria goes on, is what is
lawful in itself. I personally have no doubt that the Spaniards
\vere bound to employ force and arms in order to continue their
work there. But I fear measures were adopted in excess of what
is allowed by human and divine law. The title under consideration might, then, be a second lawful title whereby the
Indians might fall under the power of Spain. But regard must
ever be had to what has just been said, lest what in itself is
lawful be made, in the circumstances, wrong.
6. Right of Intervention

An argument which the imperialist adduced to justify the
occupation of America was the allegation based upon the fact
that the Indians committed horrible crimes. They were given
to idolatry, they perpetrated the most heinous crimes against
nature, they practiced the custom of human sacrifices, they
were cannibalistic, and they suffered unjustly under abusive
tyrannies. All the practices of savage peoples were common
among them, and they appeared to be too atrocious not to
justify any action, however harsh, against them. " Many affirm
it to be not only pious but proper to inflict war on these infidels
and to deprive them of their property and possessions." 48
A prominent lawyer of the sixteenth century maintains it to
be the generally accepted opinion of canonists and lawyers, and
Thomas a Jesu, op. cit., IV, part 1.
'" S. Pereyra, De Ind. Jur., Lib. II, cap. XIII.

' 1

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that it is followed by many theologians, since it is not disproved
in any passage of Holy Scripture. Indeed it would have seemed
to be the duty of Christian princes to interfere by any means
in order to avoid as far as possible the practice of human sacrifices and other horrors from taking place. Thus, Vargas and
Guerrero not only endeavored to excuse the Catholic kings
from any responsibilities in America, but they bestowed praise
upon them for due to their action those savage peoples were
giving up inhuman practices and were fast turning from
barbarism to a better life and to the true religion. 49
The kings were also to be held less responsible since they had
been granted leave by the Pope. But even lacking this special
dispensation from the Pope, any prince is bound to exercise
this authority in order to bring the pagans to the Christian
faith. Nay, pure humanitarianism should lead men to direct
those peoples towards good, to vindicate their heinous crimes
and to prevent as far as possible that their subjects be oppressed
by the tyrants.
These reasons advanced by some theologians and jurists
alike did not fail to bring home the conviction of the justice
of Spanish action in the New World. It will be easy to understand when it is realized that such theory was based upon a
doctrine which was not uncommon, that if a prince or a lord
imposed upon his subjects an unbearable burden any other
prince wielding more power and enjoying a greater authority
could, nay, should, try to set those vassals free from the cruel
jurisdiction of that tyrant, even had the vassals not requested
any help from outside. 50
It is interesting to observe what a variety of opinions were
set forth when trying to justify the occupation of America.
Sometimes it is tyranny alone which is given as a sufficient
motive; other times it is cannibalism. An author maintains
that idolatry justifies it; another holds that human sacrifice is
a reasonable cause. Finally, when severally taken these motives
•• A. Guerrero, Thesaurua Chriatianae Religionis, cap. 81; F. Vargas, De Episc.
Jurisdic., 10.
•• Solorzano, op. cit., 11, 18.

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failed to justify the occupation of that land, they were put
forward conjointly as an insurmountable argument. These were
often adduced as legitimate causes for war, and therefore, it is
when dealing with that point that writers speak of them in
detail. Vitoria, however, treats them here also, because they
were urged under this title to justify the Spanish occupation
of America. He took the lead in denying their legitimacy, and
his opinion was afterwards maintained by a host of writers,
theologians as well as lawyers.
Vitoria sets the question in this fashion. The upholders of
the thesis that the sins of the Indians furnished a just title for
occupying their lands based their tenets upon the assumption
that by those sins.these peoples were breaking the law of nature.
In order to make it clear they established a distinction according to which some sins of the Indians were only directly against
against positive divine law, and for these the aborigines could
not be attacked with war, because it could not be shown to
them that they were doing wrong .. But there were other sins
against nature, such as cannibalism, human sacrifices and
others, and for these they could be declared war upon and in
that way be compelled to desist from them, for it could be
shown to them that they were offending God and consequently,
they could be forced to cease doing wrong. They could, moreover, be compelled to keep the law which they themselves
professed, and be punished by Christian princes under the
authority of the Pope, if that law was broken.
To this argument Vitoria answers in a manner which is both
clear and consistent with the principles previously stated by
him. He does not venture to deny the fact of the repugnant
practices of the aborigines; he limits himself to question the
right of either the Pope or the Christian princes to interfere in
a vindictive way, for this presupposes such jurisdiction over
them as they lack. Christian princes, he says, cannot even by
authorization of the Pope restrain the Indians from sins against
the law of nature or punish them because of those sins. This
assertion is founded on the argument that the Pope has no
jurisdiction over the aborigines and consequently, he cannot

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delegate it to others. Again the Pope cannot make war on
Christians on account of their being fornicators or thieves or,
indeed, because they are sodomites. Nor can he on that ground
confiscate their lands and give it to other princes. This is confirmed by the considerations that these sins are more heinous
in Christians who are aware that they are sins, than in barbarians who lack that knowledge. Further it would be a strange
thing that the Pope who cannot make laws for unbelievers,
could yet sit in judgment and visit punishment upon them.
Moreover, the aborigines in question are either bound to
submit to the punishment awarded for the sins in question or
they are not. If they are not bound, then the Pope cannot
award such punishment. If they are bound, then they are
equally obliged to recognize the Pope as lord and lawgiver,
and if they refuse such recognition, that in itself furnishes a
good ground for making war on them, which is denied by the
upholders of that view.
Furthermore, what is it that the writers in question call a
profession of the law of nature? If it is mere knowledge, the
natives do not know it all; if it is mere willingness to observe
the law of nature, then the resort is that they are also willing
to observe the whole divine law; for if they knew that the law
of Christ was divine, they would be willing to observe it.
Therefore, they no more make a profession of the law of nature
than they make of the law of Christ. Again, there are clearer
proofs whereby it is shown that the law of Christ is from God
and is true, than to demonstrate that fornication is wrong or
that other things which are also forbidden by natural law are
to be shunned. Therefore, if the Indians can be compelled to
observe the law of nature because it admits of proof, they can
be compelled to observe the law of the Gospel; and this is true.
Such is the argumentation of Vitoria, which tends to prove his
assertion by arguing ab inconvenienti and ad hominem rather
than by proving directly his thesis. However, although it needs
no additional proofs, it will not be out of place to make a
remark in order to emphasize the point under discussion.
The crimes against natural law committed by the Indians

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were not a legitimate motive which could justify the occupying
their lands and depriving them of jurisdiction; both because
t.he Spaniards held no jurisdiction over them, and because even
if they had, their authority could not extend so far as to deprive
them of rights inalienable which correspond to the human personality by virtue of their nature and not by virtue of divine
grace, as it has previously been demonstrated.
It should be equally noticed that Vitoria speaks here of the
first coming of the Spaniards to America, that is, before the
aborigines could have inflicted any injury or perpetrated any
injustice against the Spaniards which might have justified
claims of the latter to proceed against the former with coercive
action. Moreover, the argument merely denies that the crimes
of the Indians afforded the Spaniards a right to take their
property and occupy their land. It does not in any way question the rights of the Spaniards to preach the moral law
amongst the natives, thus contributing to their regeneration;
on the -contrary this is one of the legitimate claims which
justify the occupation. Vitoria examines it in the third section
of this lecture.
It is clear, then, that Vitoria does not approve of the dictatorial intervention of a country in the internal or external
affairs of another. He is willing to admit that if help is asked
for justly it should be given as, for instance, when the majority
of the peoplein a country are ruled by the oppressive law of a
tyrant. In other circumstances when no help is demanded,
coercive intervention does not meet with the approval of
Vitoria, except in extremely difficult circumstances when the
common interest of religion or humanity were in grave danger
and even then it would have to be as the last resort of the
community of nations.
The defense of innocent people who are made to endure
unjustly inhuman sufferings seems to be demanded by the
principles of natural law. When a country is so unfortunate
as to fall under the sway of a tyrant the position both of ruler
and subjects becomes very critical indeed. In. such contingency
the ruler reverses the social order making the subjects serve

46

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MuNOZ

him instead of putting himself entirely at the service of his
people. The laws that he promulgates are not for the benefit
of the subjects but for his own interests. The subjects are
considered as slaves and are not treated in a better way than
slaves. Their rights are entirely ignored, and their interests
are not worthy to deserve the attention of the ruler. Furthermore, there have been frequent cases in history when innocent
people were so badly treated that they were sacrificed and
their bodies were made to serve cannibalistic purposes. Examples of this .are by no means scarce in the records of barbarian
countries. Such was the situation in the New World when the
Spaniards first came, as is testified in numerous contemporary
histories.
Was, then, this a lawful title for the newcomers to intervene
on behelf of the innocent? Had the Spaniards any right to put
an end to those inhuman sacrifices among the Indians? Would
those tyrannical laws and sacrifices and cannibalism afford a
sufficiently strong argument to urge the action of the Spaniards
for the sake of the innocent?
Vitoria holds the affirmative, and bases his fifth legitimate
title by which the Spaniards could take possession of the Indies
upon either the tyrannical laws which work wrong to innocent
folk, such as that which allows the sacrifice of innocent people,
or the killing in other ways of uncondemned people for cannibalistic purposes, or upon the tyranny of those who bear rule
among the aborigines. Vitoria advances two reasons taken
from Holy Scripture. He asserts also that without the Pope's
authority the Spaniards can stop all such nefarious usage and
ritual aniong the aborigines, being entitled to rescue innocent
people from an unjust death. This is proved by the fact that
God has laid a charge on every individual concerning his
neighbors. Therefore anyone may defend them from such
tyrannical and oppressive acts, and it is especially the business
of princes to do so. A further proof is given, " Deliver them
that are drawn unto death and forbear not to free those that
are being dragged to destruction." 51 The passage
not to be
51

Proverbs, xvi.

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taken as applying only to victims when they are actually being
dragged to death, but the natives can also be compelled to
abstain from such ritual. I£ they refuse, it is a good ground for
making war on them under the law of war, if such sacrilegious
rites cannot otherwise be stopped, for changing their rulers
and creating a new sovereignty over them. It does not matter
that all the Indians assent to rules and sacrifices of this kind
and do not wish the Spaniards to champion them, for herein
they are not of such legal independence as to be able to consign
themselves or their children to death.
This opinion of Vitoria revives an old doctrine which maintained that if a lord would burden the subjects out of measure,
any other prince could and should render the vassal exempt
from the authority and jurisdiction of the cruel lord even
though the subjects did not ask for help.
The defense of the innocent against the tyrant is the task
which Vitoria seeks to discharge. The Spaniards could set free
the subjects of the tyrant Indian princes by means of war if
that was required. It would be a legitimate war and the
Spaniards could also put new rulers, abrogate the vexatious
laws and enjoy the rights of war keeping their authority over
the conquered areas, not precisely by right of conquest but by
virtue of a concession granted by the Indians for their help.
It is presupposed here that the majority of a country is really
suffering unjustly, and moreover that such majority would
request the help of other princes if it were possible. Thus
Vitoria ends up by saying that we may find a fifth lawful
title here.
This doctrine of Vitoria was practically sanctioned by the
League of Nations, when, a few years ago, it sent a commission
to inquire into the laws in force in the Republic of Liberia,
and the social conditions of the inhabitants. As a result of the
investigation, slavery was abolished, cannibalism was outlawed,
and other practices were entirely condemned especially those
concerning slave-trade, work of women in mines, etc., and also
laws were promulgated for the good treatment of girls, women
and children.

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Alliance and friendship form another title which Vitoria
considers as a separate one, though it would seem to be included
in a previous one, of intervention. This seventh title holds in
the case when, two countries being at war, one requests the help
of a third with which it maintains friendly relations. This third
power may at the time of victory claim a part of the possessions
conquered, as a retribution for the aid given. In this way the
territories of a country could very legitimately be engaged.
But it is essential that the party that asks for help should be
in a just war. Otherwise, it would be wrong for the friend-state
to take part in it and could not, consequently, increase its
possession in a just manner.
Applying the case to the Indians and Spaniards, Vitoria puts
it in this wise. As the Indians themselves sometimes wage
wars with one another and the side which has suffered a wrong
has the right to make war, they may also summon the Spaniards to their help and share the rewards of victory with them.
There is no doubt that the cause of the allies and friends is a
just cause of war, a state being quite properly able, as against
foreign wrong-doers, to summon foreigners to punish its enemies.
There does not seem to be any other juridical title whereby
the Romans came into possession of the world, save by right
of war, and the most special cause of their wars was the defense
and protection of their friends. This is the seventh and the last
title whereby the Indians and their lands could have come or
might come under the possession and lordship of Spain.
Vitoria here seems to take for granted the righteousness of
the Roman conquests. He, out of reverence for the Fathers,
particularly for St. Augustine, who admits the legitimacy of the
Roman Empire, does not question it and takes it as a consummated fact, merely establishing a similarity with the Empire.
Such expansion is legitimate, Vitoria admits, provided that the
friend-state with which alliance is entered into, has been
\\Tonged and is, therefore, in a just war, defending a just cause.
In other cases it would not be legitimate to intervene.

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7. Right of Colonization
The third title adduced by the imperialists to justify the
conquest of America by the Spaniards was the right of discovery (Jus inventionis). The Spaniards were considered to
be the first discoverers of the Indies and also the first to take
possession of them. This, and no other title, says Vitoria, was
originally set up, and it was in virtue of this title alone that
Columbus first set sail. 52
From ancient times, the fact of occupation has been looked
upon as one of the original titles for the acquisition of ownership. In the Roman law as well as in the canon law, this title
had been recognized with absolute legitimacy, though discovery
alone was deemed to be only a prerequisite towards the acquisition of the lands discovered. Of itself it was not claimed to be
a title. It had to be followed by actual occupation carried out
with the intention of permanently possessing those lands.
There was a rule in law (regula juris) which asserted" dominion
over things begins with natural possession" (rerum dominia a
naturali possessione coepisse). Such rule was but the abstract
enunciation of concrete facts of history. In the case of America
such possession was attributed by natural law and also by the
law of nations to those who first discovered and occupied those
islands and countries. But in order that occupation may have
juridical sanction it is necessary that the lands occupied should
be previously unoccupied (res nullius) . 58 Was this the case in
America?
First of all it may be asked whether the Spaniards were the
first to discover America. Taking discovery in the modern
sense of the word, the commonest opinion stands in favor of
the affirmative, although there have been suggestions for the
negative which, however, do not seem to be furnished with
valuable arguments. Up to the sixteenth century Spain had
•• Vitoria, De lndis, sect. II.
•• Solorzano writes, " Ideo dicimues, invenerint et occupaverint quia sola inventio
non sufficeret ad hunc naturalem quaerenci modum nisi occupatio accedat." Cf.
De lndiarum Jure, lib. II, cap. 6.

4

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been known to all antiquity as the end of the earth. The
columns of Hercules at Cadiz were believed to mark one of the
four corners of the earth, and the cape Finis Terrae in the
northwest of Spain testified to this opinion. Similarly, it can
be further confirmed that this was an old belief, from the
numerous epitaphs found in Portugal and Spain, where in order
to show the bravery of the captains it was written that they
came to the ends of the earth (ad extremum orbis) .54 Beyond
the borders of Spain there was nothing but water, mystery,
and chaos.
However, even if there had been people who actually sailed
for and arrived in America, they never acknowledged it to be
a new world, for they thought it was the East Indies. We are
aware that Columbus himself held that those countries to which
he had sailed in a direction different from the customary one
were the Indies. Thence their first name the Indies. In conclusion it can be safely stated, without intending to disregard
the opinion of many inclined to believe that the Nor semen
were the first to sail to America, that the Spaniards were the
first to discover the New World.
In this connection, some writers maintained that the occupation and settlement which followed the discovery of America
was right and legal, because an immense part of the lands discovered were not in any sense occupied, nor seemed to belong
to any lord. 55 Moreover, there were many lands which were
held to be abandoned and which were common to those who
wished to occupy them.
If it were true that the Spaniards occupied lands hitherto
belonging to no one, no doubt would have arisen as to the
justice of it, because "what belonged to no one before is conceded to the discoverer by natural reason" (quod ante nullius
est id naturali ratione occupanti conceditur), as the regula
states. This was not so in the opinion of Vitoria; he speaks
very emphatically on this point: "It can not be said that the
•• Morales, De
•• Solorzano, loc. cit.

Hispaniae, lib. VIII, cap. !W.

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islands of the New World were uninhabited. For the most part,
they were filled with the barbarians who occupied, possessed
and cultivated them before our arrival. They who, in the
Providence of God, possessed these islands from the beginning
must be considered to have the true and proper dominion over
them. We can no more speak of these islands as belonging to
no one and so becoming the property of our country than we
would speak of our land as belonging to the Indians if they
had happened upon it." 56 Vitoria rejects the allegation that
those new lands were res nullius, on the basis that so far as he
had been informed they were already occupied at the arrival
of the Spaniards.
Failing this argument, therefore, another was brought forward by the imperialists to make the action of the Emperor
appear legitimate. It was urged that the inhabitants of the
Indies were slaves by nature and therefore, were incapable of
dominion or jurisdiction because the slave is not his own
director (dominus sui), but is born to serve somebody else.
In consequence the lands were res nullius and could juridically
be occupied and taken possession of by the new discoverers.
Such an opinion had its background. It would seem to be
an application of the medieval theory that non-Christians were
deprived of any right to hold or to enjoy jurisdiction over
others. Christians were considered to be superior to others
foreign to that confession and were equally supposed to wield
a certain supremacy in the world. Alfonso de Ojeda was one
of the first writers to apply this view to the Indians upholding
their natural slavery. It has been shown that J. Gines de
Sepulveda was a strong upholder of this opinion. 57 Vitoria
does not dwell long upon this title, as he has already proved
that the Indians were true owners, and that they had their
l"ightful superiors over them. 58
The slow progress of some countries has given rise to the
•• Ibid.
57 Aubrey F. G. Bell, "Juan Gines de SepUlveda," Hispanic Notes and Monographs, IX (19fl5).
58

De lndis, sect. II, tit. S.

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idea that other more civilized peoples had a right to impose
their dominion for the furtherance of civilization. This claim
which was so much debated in Spain during the expansion
of her dominion has crystallized during the succeeding centuries, though more often than not in the wrong way. Might
has prevailed over right, in many cases, and ambition, shielded
with the name of progress and enlightenment, has led nations
to disregard the rights of countries called backward or less
civilized. The case of Liberia in Mrica in our own day would
afford an interesting discussion of this subject on which Vitoria
stands unshaken against the sweeping currents of ambition and
tyranny. Natural law and the law of nations are equal to all
men and must be observed the world over. 59
Finally, the following is considered by Vitoria, not as a real
and legitimate, but as a doubtful, title. This opinion he does
not wholly approve nor condemn. Although the aborigines in
question are not wholly unintelligent, yet they are little short
of that condition, and so are unfit to found or administer a
lawful state according to the standard required by human and
civil claims. Accordingly they have no proper laws or magistrates and are not even capable of controlling their family
affairs. They are without any literature or arts, not only the
liberal arts, but the mechanical arts also; they have no careful
agriculture and no artisans of human life. It might, therefore,
be maintained that in their own interests the sovereigns of
Spain might undertake the administration of their country,
providing them with prefects and governors for their towns
and might even give them new lords so long as this was clearly
for their benefit.
He notes that there could be some force in this contention,
for if they were all wanting in intelligence there is no doubt
that this would not only be permissible but also a highly proper
course to take; nay, our sovereigns would be bound to take it,
just as if the natives wex:e infants. There is clear confirmation
oi this, for if by some accident of fortune all their adults were
•• Solorzano, De Ind. lur., Lib. II, cap. VI.

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to perish and there were to be left boys and youths in enjoyment indeed of a certain amount of reason, but of tender years
and under the age of puberty, our sovereigns could certainly
be justified in taking charge of them so long as they were in
that condition.
Once that is admitted, it appears undeniable that the same
could be done in the case of their barbarian parents, if they
are of that dullness of mind which is attributed to them by
those who have been among them and which is reported to be
more marked among them than even among the boys and
youths of other nations. Indeed, this might be founded on the
precept of charity, they being our neighbors and we being
bound to look after their welfare. Assuming that the title was
an established fact, Vitoria puts two limitations to its application. It should be temporary until the Indians were capable
of governing themselves, and also, it should not be merely for
the profit of the Spaniards but for the welfare and interests of
the Indians. Both conditions would rule out all illegitimate
ambitions of the Spaniards and would render the civilization
of those countries effective.
Internationalists of today would call these mandates, namely,
when a state undertakes to govern other states of a lower
civilization. But too often it is found that the interests of the
uncivilized states are not first and primary in the mind and
care of the civilizer. Vitoria based his two limitations upon the
precept of charity; they were founded on moral reasons. Today
it is not as a rule the moral side of the question that is foremost;
it is the useful side of it, and this utility is at times claimed to
be founded on legal reasons.
Modern mandates seem to have for their aim-in realityutilitarian ambitions. Those which Vitoria speaks of were based
upon Christian principles and on human solidarity, working for
the benefit of our fellow human beings and not precisely for
the advantage of the higher states. He was theorizing and his
immortal principles are applicable to all ages and to all countries; they are based on justice and truth, both of which are
everlasting. The sense of human solidarity in Vitoria is both

HONORIO MuNOZ

more real and more sincere than in modern philanthropists for
whom philanthropy seems to have become an excuse for furthering their own interests. Vitoria is not merely a precursor of the
mandate system. He was the founder of a system which has
not yet been realized. Modern mandates are a near approach
to it, but they lack the two essential limitations which Vitoria
established, namely, that they should be temporary and for the
benefit of the natives. Vitoria's principles of international relations are not many, but they affect the whole international
field and they possess the quality of an eternal value applicable
to all times and to all countries of whatever civilization.
Having discussed these eight titles, Vitoria sets an objection
of importance against himself; it deals with the jus retentionis.
If there be no force in any of the titles which have been put
forward so that the native Indians neither gave cause for just
war nor wished for Spanish rulers, etc., all the travel to and
trade with those parts should be stopped to the great loss of
the Spaniards and also to the grave hurt of the royal treasury.
Are the Spaniards right in keeping hold of the conquered
countries or should they rather leave the Indians alone?
The sixteenth-century Spanish theologians and jurists are
unanimous for the retention of the conquered countries. They
hold this because the nature of the Indians and their proclivity
to fall out would not admit of leaving them to themselves,
especially after they have given their name to the faith. Also,
if the old native rulers should return, there would be grave
danger that the faith would die out. Consequently, whether
the Spaniards dominate legitimately or not, it is not expedient
that the administration of the Indies should be abandoned by
Christian princes. 60
Even apart from the argument that such abandonment would
turn against their own religious wellbeing, economical reasons
could be urged. Thus Vitoria answers to the objection, saying
that there would be no obligation to stop the trade, because
there are many commodities of which natives have a superfluity
•• J. Acosta, De Proc. Ind. Sal., Lib. n, cap. XI.

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and which the Spaniards could acquire by barter. Again there
are many commodities which the natives treat as ownerless or
as common to all those who like to take them. Secondly, there
would probably be no diminution in the amount of the royalties,
for a tax might quite fairly be placed on the gold or silver which
would be brought away from the Indians, and it would be well
earned, inasmuch as the maritime discovery was made by our
sovereign and it is under his authority that trade is carried on
in safety. It is evident, now that there are so many native
converts, that it would neither be expedient nor lawful for our
own sovereign to wash his hands entirely of the administration
of the lands in question.
In this way Vitoria closes his De India, in which he examined
the illegitimate and the legitimate titles which the Spaniards
might have for dominating over the Indians. The nationalism
of Vitoria is never so strong as to permit him to overlook the
rights of the discovered race. For him there is one big family
of which all human beings are members. The internationalism
of Vitoria is based not on utilitarian or economic reasons, but
on the religious belief that the human race is one and all its
members are fundamentally equal, having the same fundamental rights and duties. It matters little whether the peoples
of one country do not progress at the same pace as those of a
higher and nobler civilization. The personal rights of individuals and the fundamental rights of the states must be based
on justice and truth. It is only when this is not so that international order is bound to go wrong. The only remedy for
international troubles is to realize that justice demands the
rendering to each what is due him. When justice reigns then
peace prevails among the nations of the world.
HoNORIO MuNoz,

CoUege of San Juan de Letran,
Manila, Philippine Islands

O.P.

LANGUAGE AND SENSE PERCEPTION

M

I

OST of the controversies in philosophy since Aristotle
-as before him-have centered around the relation
of sense perception to knowledge; for though the
Father of Logic made the relationship incontrovertibly clear
just through his shoWing of the relation of knowledge to
language in its everyday use, yet his doctrine has been all too
often ignored or overridden. From the nominalism of the
Middle Ages (a notorious instance of misunderstanding of
Aristotle's appreciation of verbal reference) through Cartesian
subjectivism, we come to Kant's analysis of man's reason
which represents as grave a failure as that of nominalism to
take an adequate account of the way the mind acts, as shown
in the way verbal symbols function in expressing and communicating ideas. But more than five hundred years before
the writing of Kant's Critiques St. Thomas had defended a
philosophy of mind that steers on an even and tranquil keel
between the two perils which Kant strikes alternately: the
Charybdis of the mind as prime lawgiver to perceptive facts,
and the Scylla of the mind as powerless to report on the thingsin-themselves-the twin dangers of a priorism and solipsism,
respectively.
For St. Thomas' theory of knowledge accepts the limits of
man's knowing faculty, limits recognized by St. Thomas after
Aristotle as being evident in word-behavior when the latter is
properly evaluated, and thus saves the appearances of truth
in all realms, including the semantic. The subjectivism vitiating
modern philosophy from Descartes onward represents in each
instance a failure to appreciate language's plain witness to
objectivity.
More than any other philosopher who has ever lived, the
56

LANGUAGE AND SENSE PERCEPTION

57

philosopher-saint who has been called Aristotle Christianized
deserves the title of " Defender of the Mind." The importance
of his work should be, it would seem, written in letters of fire
against the sky in this chaotic century, when blind leaders of
the blind, following the revolt from the philosophia prima, have
led us into foxholes. Our present confusion is not the result
either of an extreme abundance of data or of the fact that
attention has been paid to the truths of science rather than of
metaphysics. Philosophy, too, is based on facts; and the natural
scientist who refuses to acknowledge what transcends the limits
of his sphere cannot be said to have a scientific mind. The
confusion of our era now culminating in this Age of the Atom
Bomb is rooted in the false philosophy of science with which
modern philosophy began over three centuries ago and in
which it continues.
From Stuart Chase's inveighing against the "tyranny of
words " to Harold Larrabee's scorn of the logic of Aristotle as
one of deductive consistency in the use of language as opposed
to the logic of things, the modern scene is littered with puerilities. The philosopher must ask, paraphrasing Emerson: " How
can I hear what you say about language when what you admit
in using language keeps dinning in upon me?" The current
subjectivist nominalism of Bertrand Russell, the behavioristic
pragmatism of John Dewey, and the inverted idealism of George
Santayana are, one and all, based on false language theories,
and each is as vulnerable on the semantic side as that of the
most naive writer on the subject of words and things who
assumes a one-to-one correspondence between them.
Where is there anything in the elaboration and complexity
of symbolization techniques in modern science to justify the
supercilious attitude toward verbal stability and consistency that
has developed? Increased sense reports through the use of index
needles, revolving drums, sensitive plates, and so on have
hardly obviated the need for their interpretation through verbal symbols. The fact is that there is no scientist who works
on the assumption of " ever more reliable knowledge as the

58

]d.

HESS

enterprise of critical exploration proceeds" in any special
research who does not owe his assurance of truth's discoverability to Aristotle's substantiation of knowledge-findings by
his evidence that language witnesses the universally valid
character of knowledge. Aristotle's work with words was on
the methodological side of language as it functions in behavior,
and his treatise on this aspect of semantics was a propaedeutic
study to his philosophy of science, that knockout blow to the
Heracliteans who seriously taught that real knowledge is impossible.
Socrates saw that our use of language carries us as observers
beyond the tight organic-environmental realm of the behaviorist of his day. The limiting of the observer to his post on the
globe (which modern behaviorism demands and which the old
is countermanded by that
atomic theory of perception
observer's use of language which is applied universally to
things. Words represent common agreements on factual situations, and they express in transparent media the proof of
things by definition. Thus through the behavioral word an
Aristotle or a St. Thomas can posit that larger realm of proof
in which the relation of the organism to its environment is far
more significantly transactional than either ancient or modern
behaviorism has dreamt of in its philosophy. And through the
philosophy of language we must come again to the philosophy
needed to combat modern sophists who are no less strong and
perversive of truth than those the great Greeks combatted.
The present semantic fog, in which books on the use of words
are reducible either to a series of learned puns or to arraignments of word-forms as meaningless by the use of other wordforms, must be cleared first of all; in other words,
is high
time to take the speech-implementation situation seriously.
The way to understanding of the bearing of language reference
on the philosophy of science remains in St. Thomas' gloss on
Aristotle's conception of matter, which clarifies the relation of
intelligible to sensible objects, as that relation is sustained in
language methodology, showing reason to be " the impression

LANGUAGE ANI) SENSE PERCEPTION

59

of the divine light in us," the mark of our creaturehood and the
gift of the Creator.
Aristotle's great advance over earlier notions of the relation
between sense-perception and reason lay in his conviction that
thought and perception are aspects of one process. (This is the
key fact to which we will revert more than once in this paper.)
Protagoras had already suggested that truth but, under Heraclitus' influence, had vitiated its force by holding with Democritus that knowledge is a matter of material contacts and that
changes occur in both percipient and object at the moment of
contact, which changes make knowledge in any real sense
impossible. The Pythagoreans, on the contrary, as shown particularly in the work of Parmenides, exalted reason's objects as
timeless at the same time that they
to degrade the
objects of sense-perception as subject to change and decay.
But the great Greeks refuted both Heraclitus and Parmenides;
Aristotle, moreover, completed the work carried on so far by
Socrates and Plato, the work of combining reflection with sensepercepts and attributing the illusory appearances of things not
to any possible deceit of the senses but only to incomplete sense
reports. For example, insight into the twin character of awareness in discriininate perceiving, involving recognition of the
fact that perception under one set of circumstances must always
be thus given, provided the exact setup recurs, was shown early
in arguments over why a stick appears bent under water. For
it was seen even by those who held the stick's appearance due
to deceptive perception that the water-medium must also be
considered; and, if what was to be known later as a law of light
refraction vindicates the stick's bent appearance, the senses not
only report accurately on things but also report on them (witnessing that accuracy) as conforming to universal standards.

n
Now language as the method by which perceptual experience
may be expressed and communicated exhibits the character of
sense perception both as what is functionally dependent on the

60

M. WHITCOMB

HESS

conceptual principle and as what is immanent in objects. Aristotle, then, might show through the common word of the
syllogism that scientific investigation, cognition, and proofinvolving not only the universal and the particular (the major
and minor premises) but also the relation between them (the
middle term) -are as dependable as they are communicable.
As Plotinus says, the unit lives as a universal; but likewise the
universal lives as a unit. For sense objects are not complements of reason; they are the reals of reason. The world, as
common sense accepts it, is there to be known. Thus a true
theory of language leads inevitably to a refutation of all forms
of subjective idealism. The external world is neither complementary to knowers nor a construct of knowers. Above all, the
material universe is neither " nothing " nor representative of
an evil principle.
In their teaching that physical matter is a "second" principle whose essence is the negation of all true being, both Philo
and Plotinus were following pre-Aristotelian notions. And
instead of dethroning materialism, as subjective idealism (from
the Pythagoreans down to Christian Scientists) intends, the
result is always to enthrone matter as the Unknown God or,
to speak more precisely, as the Unknown Devil. The doctrine
of matter before Aristotle refutes the idea that the " body
beautiful " was properly appreciated just in paganism. On the
contrary, it was the " muddy vesture of decay ,; as Shakespeare's Lorenzo tells Jessica when, voicing to perfection the
Pythagorean teaching on the harmony of the spheres, he calls
her attention to the starlit Venice sky:
There's not the smallest orb which thou behold'st
But in his motion like an angel sings,
Still quiring to the young-eyed cherubins;
Such harmony is in immortal souls;
But whilst this muddy vesture of decay
Doth grossly close it in we cannot hear it. (My italics)

Though only in Christian teaching has the material world
been recognized for what it is without quibbling or vagueness-

LANGUAGE AND SENSE PERCEPTION

61

God's creation which was signed" Good" by Him-the Christian concept is implicit in Aristotle's theory of matter, which
reversed earlier theories that it is evil. As his universal metaphysical theory maintains the idea, and shows that only what
is out of line with the Divine Reason can be called evil, Aristotle taught that " the world and all that happens in it is the
longing of matter after God." St. Augustine's famous analysis
of carnal temptation in the garden of Alypius shows that the
battle between the mind and body is falsely named; it is really
between will and will. "Mind commands body; and there is
instant obedience; mind commands mind and there is rebellion." For the corporeal creation, far from being identifiable
with error or partial error, actually "means intensely and
means good," as Browning's Christian artist says. Art's testimony, referred to farther on, is, in its own special way of communication, identical with that of language in proclaiming the
unity of thought and perception, and in proclaiming also the
reality of the external world.
As St. Thomas shows, Aristotle's doctrine of knowledge and
of matter is in harmony with that of Christianity because it is
truly logical. For the pre-Christian thinker dealt justly with
the logic of language as it spans the abyss, on the one hand,
between sense perception and the universals of reason, and, on
the other hand, between knowledge and the external world.
His original logical analyses exhibit the fact that by the identifying of principles in ideas and phenomena an epistemological
witness is given both to the relation of knowledge and reality
and the relation of human knowers to the Divine Source of all
knowledge. The relation of perception to reason, the allengrossing problem of ancient philosophy, appears in Aristotle's
showing that the word-in-use is the idea and the idea is of
the object, physical or otherwise; for sense phenomena and
ideas are not two, as Plato seemed to teach, but only one, and
they are to each other as matter to form.
Thus the Actus Purus conception culminates Socrates' and
Plato's pioneer spadework on the truth of the relation of the

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sense world to reason. In all our direct perceiving, shown implicitly in language as the intimate instrument of thought's
expression, the sensible is revealed as the determinate in act,
the intelligible in potency, communicating its determinateness
to the intellect, which in its turn is intelligible in act and
determinate in potency. Verbal symbols act on the principle
that the intellect, made to extract the intelligible from the
sensible, cannot disentangle the universal from its individuating
matter yet can and must distinguish, sans differentiating, the
universal idea from the particular phenomenon. Scientific
activity consists in such distinction; and it is possible because
language, expressing, connotatively, the potentially determinate
and, denotatively, the actually determinate intelligible object,
exhibits at one and the same time an identity of principle between the essence and the existence of each created thing and a
fundamental distinction between them. Henry Adams observes
in his famous autobiography that the highly inflected languages
of antiquity show that man must have reached his highest
metaphysical powers early in his history; for, he says, man's
education was lifted from the start to a very high plane by
language which afforded him " the finest, subtlest and broadest
training both in analysis and synthesis." But it was Aristotle
who, taking the complex of relations between words-as-symbols
and words-as-ideas in his comprehensive logical stride, pointed
out the laws in evidertce in the language we use to hold ideas
before our minds and the minds of others.
Epistemological matter remains distinct from physical matter yet involves it, for all that the intellect grasps is formed
matter. Aristotle illustrated the process with analogies from
nature (acorn-into-oak) and from art (marble-into-statue),
showing the form-matter relation as that which reveals epistemological matter progressing from no thing at all to what
grows more and more significantly some thing, by virtue of the
actuating form. In all those illustrations and analogies we are
told that the intellect takes nothing to objects that is not
already in them and that the sense-fact, momentary and sub-

LANGUAGE AND SENSE PERCEPTION

68

jective as it is, must represent the ever-valid in order to be
genuine. The denotation and the connotation aspects of words
referred to above are implementary for expression of the dual
knowledge situation. Their separation is an impossibility in
words-in-use. Verbal intelligibility rests on maintaining the
right relation between the denotation (extension) and the connotation (intension) aspects of language terms. When a word
functions in behavior it expresses both relationships as a
window for thought. As Chesterton said of windows in general,
there are just two things to do with them: wash them and then
forget them. Words in use are to be kept clean and their
instru:tnentality forgotten; yet when interest is taken in that
instrumentality it is seen that denotation and· connotation at
once is a power possessed by language alone. Both music and
mathematics lack that double reference which is involved in
the relation of language meaning to the meant. One stumbling
block in mathematical logic is, among others, the fact that the
denotative and the connotative are not equally present in
mathematical symbols.

m
Greek thought, then, at its best showed both that conceptual
knowledge cannot explain perceptual without identifying itself
with it and that (by the proof of language itself) the material
world exists in its own right even as the knower exists. In the
first place, to be logical, the concept and percept must always
go together as functionally complementary aspects of the same
situation, as knowledge is related to its objects, revealing the
fact that the principle of knowledge of a thing and the principle
of that thing are one and the same. What things can be known
as having no being-principle (ills, negations, privations) are
known by opposing ideas. (A principle of being is always a
principle of knowledge but a principle of knowledge is not
always a principle of being.) And, in the second place, if the
material world represents what our intellects can grasp at first
hand, and only what these knowing faculties can apprehend

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directly, the fact is a key to man's place in the cosmos.
"Poems," wrote Kilmer," are made by fools like me, But only
God can make a tree." But Aristotle's epistemological monism
shows, in effect, not only that God alone can make the tree, but
also that God alone can make the idea of the tree in the sense
of formative concept} yet-and this truth is at the heart of
Aristotle's finding that the relation of the particular to the
universal (as shown in the logical picture of the middle term to
which the particular rises and from which it stems) is one of
stable epistemological reality-man can know the material
creation for exactly what it is, which fact points to man's possession of a divinely given intellect, one that thinks God's
thoughts after Him.
If a study of the intellectual processes used in arriving at
truth is at once a study of syntactical relations, the reason
appears in the methodological side of language as involving
the actual meaning content. The act of naming, as Socrates
first pointed out, is one of trust in the absoluteness of truth
and the validity of universal law. Determinateness of meaning,
appearing with the same exactness in the word as in the idea
and object, can be based only on the pervasive character of
truth as shown in verbal reference, which to be valid must
be triune: to the Idea which is God's, to the idea in the object,
to the idea in the perceiving mind.
Semantic relationships reveal (on the one hand, the relation
of the word to the idea, and, on the other, the relation of the
idea to the object) what is a basic sameness of meaning in the
idea, the object, and the word. The present failure to appreciate the logical relations in verbal implementation (the relation
between language as symbolism and· behavior) and verbal intention (involving the relation between the idea and the object)
is the result of a fundamentally unsound philosophy of science
no less than of language. When St. Thomas set out to refute
the Manicheans-and Cardinal Newman said of that refutation: " With the jawbone of an ass, with the skeleton of ancient
Greece, St. Thomas, the Samson of the schools, put to flight

LANGUAGE AND SENSE PERCEPTION

65

his thousand Philistines "-he employed the logic of Aristotle
to show that the notion that matter is bad is erroneous. Actually it is the same error as that of nominalism in reverse.
(That the sense presentation and the physical object are, from
the standpoint of knowledge behavior, as absolute in identity
as a thought with a word in language behavior, has been a
prolific source of confusion both in epistemology and semasiology.) Nominalism rejected as unreal all knowledge but the
perceptual, attributing to the particular the sole reality; Manicheism, on the other hand, despised the world of sense, attributing to matter a creative principle distinct from God. No
wonder that St. Augustine in his fight for truth against the
Manicheans spoke of the great difficulty he had in untangling
reality from the trickery of words! The trickery is in the theory
of knowledge as it relates to sense perception and as both relate
to language. Look in our own times at some of the " odd, low
and pitiful ideas " that are rife-ideas not only about God but
about matter! The attempt in medieval nominalism to reduce
Aristotelian universals to mere linguistic symbols is being repeated today, though more subtly, by Bertrand Russell and the
logical empiricists 1 in their search for a metalanguage; John
Dewey, on the contrary,
for" firm names" for behavioral
v
the
implementation side of language
events, discounting entire!
and referring symbolism to "the regions of mathematics and
syntactical consistency." And George Santayana, washing his
hands of Aristotle's logic altogether, boldly champions the preSocratics in his theory of language, though he is not so consistent as Cratylus, who gave up speech altogether.
The almost insuperable difficulty of discussing verbal relationships in their dual referential character is obvious: even
in the first relationship, that of the symbol to the idea, there
is the problem of the word-as-symbol (where words and ideas
are separable) and that of the word-as-idea (where the word
1 See my articles," Mathematical Logic in Modern Positivism," Journal of Philosophy, April, 1933, XXX, pp.
and "Epistemology and Symbolism," Ibid.,
XXIX, pp.
May,

5

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functions in behavior inseparably from the idea). The latter use
involves the second relationship, that of the idea to the object
which shows the synthesizing of the aspects of method and definition with the meaning and the meant at the moment of communication. (For the sake of convenience we have named the
first relationship that of" implementation," the second that of
"intention.") Aristotle showed the first through the behavioral
word even as he showed the dual relationship by means of
concrete examples. While the use of the word-as-symbol is
not stressed in Aristotle's acceptance of context-content, its
behavioral use in his hands is discriminate and does no violence
to the symbol side. Behaviorally the names are the meaningsotherwise communication would be impossible; but symbologically they only refer to the meanings. Russell and his school
have been as guilty of overstress of symbolism in language as
Dewey and his followers have been guilty of understress of that
language aspect. But the fact that language has two sets of
referents makes it truth's expression-tool par excellence.
there, then, some mysterious interconnection between the
relation of language and knowledge and that of sense-perception and reason? Mysterious or not, each relation can be clarified by clarifying the limits of the analogy between languageand-knowledge relationships and sense-and-reason relationships.
The analogy may be expressed as follows: Just as language
behavior may be taken as a behavioral event among other
behavioral events and in such a category belongs to a different
existential order from language as a set of symbols, so does the
world of nature belong to another order from sense-percepts;
and just as the verbal symbol and the thought it carries are
identical in essential meaning, so is the material world identical
with our perceptions of it in essential meaning. But this
analogy cannot be pressed. The material world is not any more
like language on the strictly referential or methodological side
(that of speech-implementation) than it is like Philo's prisonhouse of matter, itself an epistemological misunderstanding as
the end-result of a false attitude toward language. For the

LANGUAGE AND SENSE PERCEPTION

67

notion that matter is vile, a wall between man and his Creator
(whether that notion occurs in the work of a Graeco-Hebraic
philosopher like Philo, a great pagan·
like Plotinus, or
a Chestertonian character who espouses the latest new-thought
fad) , is arrived at by the holding of the perceptive
functionally complementary to reason apart from the percipient, as though the sense-world-like a word divided between
thought and symbolism-were only a realm of half-truth.

IV
Elsewhere I have written on poetry as a guide to semantic
understanding. 2 In poetry the methodological symbolic element
is not pushed into the background. Instead it is significantly
in the foreground. The office of poetic language is not to conceal the symbol but to reveal it, and to reveal it for exactly
what is is in prose usage-a completely transparent carrier of
meaning. The conceptual and the existential contexts as portrayed in terms of one another through the verbal symbol of
poetry" imitate" prose language behavior, and the poet above
all artists shows that a sincere portrayal of truth-situations
neither takes from nor adds to what is already in nature. In
what follows I shall quote from my arguments previously expressed in the Philosophical Review, shoWing why the poet's
unique and independent vision has truth and objective validity
which is self-proclaimed as being as sharable as any other
knowledge. For within poetic language the words are symbols
both as materials for the art and as attached by the world at
large to objects. We may not limit or obscure their meaning
subjectively but must rest both their surety and clarity on the
inviolateness of definitions. But before quoting the paragraphs
from my article I wish to remind the reader that in all art is
shown what happens in our sensuous and intellectual syntheses
alike: the indissociability of the universal and particular
aspects. In art the enjoyer thinks not on one level but on
three different levels: first, the art stuff on which, second, the
• PhilosophicalReview, Vol. Lill (1944), pp. 484-49!!.

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particularity, and third, the universality, of the representation
in question rest; for the medium unites the two in one presentation. It is a condition of beauty that the ideal fusion of the
three levels be complete. If, as Browning's Brother Lippo (who
was also quoted earlier in this paper) finds,
"We're made so that we love
First when we see them painted, things we have passed
Perhaps a hundred times nor cared to see,"
the reason is that by the use of another sense-material than
that of nature, the indissociability of the twin aspects of cognition, already implicit in the situation, is made explicit and
truth's transcendent character appears. The artist, in other
words, has painted two " things " as one: the universal idea
and the thing itself. In poetry, the language art, the universal
and particular elements must be identical yet distinguishable
in the same verbal symboling. My argument for poetry reads,
in part:
The first cognitive level in poetry may be called the sub-structural
since it is the relatively neutral sense stuff on which the structure
or existential context appears; and on the structural basis in turn
the superstructure or conceptual context rests. The three levels
are, of course, analytically indissociable and yet represent degrees
of meaning in the artistic creation. To take a single example from
sculpture, let us look at Saint-Gaudens' memorial statue which
Henry Adams commissioned him to make for him after his wife's
death. The figure has bronze for its sub-structure, a person for its
structural level, and brooding loneliness (or whatever else was its
purpose which Adams had outlined carefully beforehand to the
artist) for its superstructure. These levels are coalesced in the
statue; and the same kind of union takes place in all art forms
through three general stages. But poetry, having an ideated substratum for the superimposition of the particular and universal
levels, presents a different situation from sculpture.
At the art-materi<tl level, poetry has its sub-structure already
charged with meaning. This meaning partakes further as much
of the existential as of the conceptual aspects as expressed in the
completed art work. What the poet does is to throw these levels
intu sharp relief and yet keep them at the same time in complete

LANGUAGE AND SENSE PERCEPTION

69

umon. He does this by means of his musical arrangements. The
verbal symbol in poetry, exactly like the bronze of Adams'
memorial statue, expresses three degrees of meaning: First, the
art-material or the verbal symbol as such; second, the emotive or
musical structure; and third, the interpretive or meaningful superstructure. For where word-music is distinguishable yet not separable from its conceptual content, and where the verbal symbol
supports two non-dissociable degrees of meaning by drawing a
distinction between them at the same moment that it unites them,
we have poetry; but we have also a representation of what occurs
in all language usage. Poetry, being an art, exploits verbal signs,
exhibiting symbols as equally melodic and meaningful, and makes
of language itself a mirror of communication. The poetic word, in
short, re-presents or mirrors prose speech; and through this act of
mirroring (which is art) beauty seizes the observer, such beauty
as reveals that the least judgment in the life of the individual mind
must exceed in value the poet's finest product
Now, when the poet telescopes word, idea, and thing into the
immediacy of relation they have in poetry he does only what is
done in our usual word behavior. That is, he represents respectively
the universal and the particular relational elements in the truthsituation as the relation of ideas to things; also, he shows that the
relation of words to ideas and ideas to things is a transcendent one.
Such portrayal, however, is no more the poet's real purpose than
the sculptor's is to show Aristotle's purposive intelligence at work
in the world. If the poet presents artist-wise the conceptual and
the existential contexts as distinguishable only in terms of one
another in the same verbal art-stuff, this is just his modus operandi
for ensnaring beauty. In "reflecting" the existence of a triune
transcendence in word-idea-thing, he is certainly proving neither
Bishop Berkeley's eighteenth-century
nominalistic "discovery,"
esse est percipi, nor Hegel's nor any subsequent subjective idealism
which tries always so mightily to be factual. However, he proves,
if anything, just the opposite of the Berkeleyan thesis; for, like any
other artist, the poet takes the corporeal world as he finds it,
exercising at once his artistic and critical faculties in making
selections for his own creations. 3

Thus far the reasons for holding that the philosophy of
poetry reveals a propaedeutic relation to the philosophy of
language; and thus far too the reason that Dr. Samuel John8 "

The Language of Poetry," pp. 491-492, ibid.

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son's first requirement for poetry-a requirement more or less
ignored in this era-was that each piece should contain within
itself whatever is needed to make it intelligible. That is,
poetry's ideal content no less than its art form is to be judged
by universal canons. The poet, intensifying and highlighting
verbal meanings, submits to a candid world his languagesymbols both as meanings of objects and materials of the wordart. The point here is that he submits those symbols-in which
he has amalgamated into a single meaning presentation interplaying words, ideas, and things-with the definite understanding that both the beauty of the verbal form and its
meaning are not only his own but everyone's. And, since the
poet, like all artists, reveals what is hidden but is nonetheless
to be recognized as true, he shows, in passing, what happens to
the symbol in language behavior. When Dionysius Thrax
defined grammar as " knowledge of what the poets said," he
was stating a more profound fact than was immediately apparent. For the key to the poet's power is also the secret of
his reign over the grammarian, and in like manner over the
semanticist; that is, the poet mirrors language as it is used
both on the implementation and the intention side.

v
Surely, the complex of relationships between words and
things, including the two primary aspects of verbal reference,
implementation and intention, or the use of symbols for transcribing ideas, and for identification of the meaning with the
meant, shows that the laws of language are subservient to the
laws of logic and not vice versa. That we use symbols for ideas
but that these symbols behave as ideas in the expression of
knowledge is obvious; and that the ideas are the principles of
the objects specified should be, it would seem, after Aristotle and
St. Thomas, no less obvious. But Kant's noumena-versusphenomena conception (as the developed form of Cartesian
dualism) represents an abortive attempt to hold that in the
perceiving of objects the mind, as the center of the knowledge

LANGUAGE AND SENSE PERCEPTION

71

system, makes objects conform to perceptions; for, in his selfstyled Copernican Revolution in philosophy, Kant taught just
that. The Kantian teaching, of course, resembles Plotinus'
earlier misunderstanding of Aristotle's cosmology: the noumena
are of an entirely different order from the phenomena, as much
different indeed as the Neo-Platonist's world of spirit from the
world of phenomena. For Kant also created an arbitrary
division between our knowledge of objects and things-in-themselves, the world-as-known and the real world. But the work
of language is, as we have seen, to bridge the two.
Russell's nominalism rephrased Kantian subjectivist concepts, themselves errors along nominalist lines, according to
mathematical concepts. The modern form of nominalism is,
incidentally, one that medieval nominalism would not recognize. In addition to revealing the old lack of understanding
of verbal implementation, it betrays verbal intention. Like
Gradgrind's, Russell's demand has been for "hard facts,"
which he also takes, or took, as being the mathematical. The
truth is, of course, that the equations of mathematical logic
take the investigator too far from real meanings to be useful
either in logic or semasiology. The doubling of symbolizations,
where mathematical notations are made to stand for logical
operations, involves a new reference complex in which syntax
becomes a matter of space-time relationships. But the translation of propositions into quantitative tautologies proved both
hard and unrewarding. In his own statement we learn that
Russell gave up the task and that it has been about twenty
years since he last worked on mathematical logic.4
If Dewey's dependence on the concepts of biology rather
than those of mathematics has attracted Russell and some of
his followers in more recent years, the reason is that his theories
stress something besides the logical framework of knowledge,
which, in Russell's identification of it with mathematics, left
little for the mind to work on in the way of experiential content. Dewey, in keeping with his cavalier choice of one set of
• The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, Northwestern University, 1944, p. 741.

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biological hypotheses-the evolutionist as opposed to the Mendelian-has tried to classify knowledge and language together
and simultaneously as mere forms of organismic responses to
environment. That the instrumentalist has, without being
aware of it, chosen a theory of knowledge that is also a theory
of reality in holding that all " knowings " and " namings " are
"organic-enviromental behavings," and that such a choice is in
open contradiction to his doctrine that all general theories
about the world and the nature of experience are essentially
worthless, are facts that reveal a fundamentally a-logical mind.
Any general hypothesis of knowledge and reality that rejects
all but immediate behavioral relations contradicts itself, of
course, at the start. In addition to that contradiction in his
presuppositions, Dewey's new vocabulary of "namings," "knowings," " behavings," and the rest of it falsifies the nature of
language, since those names are held segregable for investigation without change in themselves of any kind. But it is impossible to segregate a term without changing its behavioral
reference to the symbological. Whenever a word's implementation side is considered we have entered the strict realm of the
methodological as opposed to that of actual content where
word, idea, and object coalesce into a single meaning presentation. In other words, we have gone backward from the meant
to the meaning, and to the word as symbolizing the meaning.
Opposed though they have been in their respective semantic
errors, howe -er, Russell and Dewey are alike in being sub(The two positions in modern
jectivistic and materialistic.
philosophy, just as in the teaching of the pre-Socratics, go
together.) And Santayana likewise is caught in the same trap
of solipsism that logic baits for those who bridle from the way
of wisdom. The latter's doctrine that there is an infinity of
essences, none permanent and none alike, in the " realm of
essence" (the colors, forms, tastes, odors, pressures, and temperatures of sensation, and the ideas, words, images, and other
interpretive portrayals of thought) reads like a modern version
of the old atomist theory of knowledge of Democritus and

LANGUAGE AND SENSE PERCEPTION

78

Protagoras-fine atoms for thoughts, coarse atoms for sensations, with the material changes at the moment of contact between percipient and perceptual object making permanency of
truth impossible. Hear what Santayana says in his last work
in which he tries to explain away both the supernatural soul
and natural laws in the physical universe (for, unmindful of
Joubert's warning, he is evidently no more fearful of being
wrong in philosophy when he thinks differently from the philosophers than in religion when he thinks differently from the
saints):
It was a sad misfortune for Christian theory that it drew its
philosophy from the disciples of Socrates rather than from his
predecessors who had faced the world bravely and without prejudice; for Socrates and his followers, in the interests of morals and
politics, which in their time were in a parlous state, had thought to
save ancient society by attributing to the universe, quite falsely,
a political and moral constitution. This unhappy method not only
verbalized natural science but represented morality and holiness as
hanging on imaginary physical sanctions, and not on the inherent
vocation of human life and mind.5
The prejudicial implications in this statement apart-even
the extraordinary implication that the morals and politics of
this era are not "in a parlous state "-what p.an be said for
that " vocation of human life and mind " resolving itself into a
vertiginous whirl that Santayana names "perpetual self-transcendence into existing things " ? A euphemism for the old
Heraclitean fire, which remains as powerless today to provide a
stable foundation for either science or morals as it was twentyfive hundred years ago, hardly shows philosophical progress
or acumen, no matter how brilliantly it is expressed.
Finally, let Aristotle's logic be called a verbalizing of natural
science only by those who realize what the verbalizing signifies.
Verbal stability is no less the goal of philosophy than it is of
science-the consistent relativist must, like Cratylus, literally
either put up or shut up. The search begun by Socrates for
8

The Idea of Christ in the Gospels, Scribners, 1946, p. 287.

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M. WHITCOMB HESS

dependability in knowledge-findings against the Sophist deniers
of its possibility was culminated in the Father of Logic's showing of metaphysical truth underlying word-behavior. Aristotle's
original systematized report on the logical road to dependability
in knowledge shows that it is no royal road, perhaps, but it
is the only one there is. H modem philosophy has found it too
strenuous, and, from Descartes (for whose subjectivism the
Protestant movement of the preceding century had prepared)
until the present time, has tried other ways, all of them have
proved but the "ways of dream" to today's world-chaos in
philosophy and civilization in general.

M. WHITCOMB HESS
4.5 GroBVenor Street
Athena, Okio

THE CERTITUDE OF HOPE

T

HE OBJECT of theological hope is eternal beatitude.
If, then, certitude can be ascribed to this virtue it would
seem that this certitude must pertain in some way to
that object of hope. As a matter of fact, in the works of most
modern theological writers there is always the assumption that
the certitude of hope pertains to the actual attainment of eternal life. Of course, it is a matter of Catholic faith that no one
can be absolutely certain of attaining eternal life unless he
receives a special revelation to that effect from God. Consequently, the common doctrine among the theological writers is
that the certitude of hope is conditional, that is, this person will
be saved if he perseveres.· Likewise many apply a distinction
to the effect that hope is certain from the point of view of the
help of God, but it is not certain considered from the part of
the peccable subject hoping.
If the certitude of hope was a matter to be dealt with by
natural .and experimental sciences we should conclude that this
modern theory is the point of farthest advance in the problem
of hope's certitude. In those sciences, because of their experimental character, it is generally true that the latest pronouncement of the reputable scholars in the field are
farthest points
of advancement along a particular line. However, in the speculative sciences, especially in sacred theology, the same principle
may not be applied with equal freedom. Indeed, progress is
most surely made in theology. Nevertheless, in this science it
is often true that the advancement is not by way of finding
something new, but rather by way of a return to something old.
Thus, in differing with modern theologians relative to the certitude of hope, ours is not an advancement in the sense of finding something new, but rather it is a
and a plea
for the restoration of something old, which; nevertheless, has
been lost to modern thinkers.
75

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WALTER M. CONLON

When we contrast the position of the moderns to that of St.
Thomas Aquinas on this question we are not confronted with
the antagonism between the new and the old. In truth the
theory of conditional certitude antedates St. Thomas. Its
reassertion by so many modern scholars merely emphasizes two
things: 1) that St. Thomas is inadequately known by them, and
2) that the surgence and resurgence of such theories run in
cycles. In his time, St. Thomas combatted the theory of conditional certitude, and gained a victory which l.asted as long as
true Thomism sat in the chairs of theology. However when the
clear sky of his precise theologcal thought became more and
more obscured by the ever darkening clouds of humanism,
nominalism, and the so-called reformation, the foundation was
laid for a less scientific approach to theological problems, and
among them the certitude of theological hope. Hence, from this
point of view, the resurgence in modern times of the theory of
conditional certitude is not surprising, and only serves to illustrate the manner in which theories rise and fall in cycles. Given
the background just described, the pronouncement of the
Council of Trent to the effect that no one can be absolutely
certain of attaining eternal life, was itself an occasion for the
return to the theory of conditional certitude. However, St.
Thomas was well aware of the truth later defined by the Council
and neither ignored nor jeopardized it in the elaboration of his
theory of the certitude of order and of divine ordination.
Nevertheless, the almost universal acceptance of the "conditional " theory in our times is most astonishing in view of the
really Thomistic thought on this matter to be found in the
works of the great commentators on the Summa Theologica.
In their writings we find no trace of this theory of conditional
certitude.
In the Summa Theologica itself St. Thomas gives but little
space to the discussion of this subject. However, his study of
it in the Commentary on the Sentences is more extensive, and
here we find a satisfactory refutation of the theory of conditional certitude prevalent among so many modern theologians.

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The certitude of hope, he affirms, is not a certitude of knowledge
concerning a future event, namely the attainment of eternal life.
Rather it is a certitude of order towards that end, an infallible
inclination or ordination in the act of hope without any reference to the actual attainment of the end. Accordingly, it is not
the end which is in question here, but the actual character of
theological hope. It is very interesting to find the Angelic
Doctor himself refuting the theory of theologians who maintained that hope only participates certitude from faith and
who consequently attribute to hope certitude of a conditional
nature.
In this study we aim, not only to propose the theory of St.
Thomas on this question, but also, as far as possible, to indicate
the sources of his theological reasoning in this matter. Since,
however, the edited writings concerning this problem are very
limited we have endeavored to uncover the doctrine contained
in the unedited manusc_ripts of that period immediately preceding St. Thomas. Even there the field is not very extensive
but we feel that a study of this subject has been aided greatly
by the reading of the manuscripts which are herein cited. Indeed, a study of the problem in the period immediately preceding St. l'homas would be incomplete without a knowledge of
the contents of these unedited works.
I. PRE-THOMISTIC

I. THE DEFINITION

DOCTRINE

OF PETER LoMBARD

Although the doctrine regarding the certitude of theological
hope is rooted in the Sacred Scriptures themselves, nevertheless
the discussion concerning the nature of this certitude did not
arise until the middle of the twelfth century. The existence of
the certitude of hope is clearly admitted by the Fathers, but
they do not enter into a discussion of its nature. As a typical
example of the transitory treatment of this subject in their
writings we might cite a passage of Gregory the Great in his

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WALTER M. CONLON

Commentary on Job: "Through the certitude of his hope he
was already sitting in the heavens." 1
Indeed this particular theological point did not receive extensive treatment until the beginning of the thirteenth century.
However, for a clear understanding of the writers it is important to start from the definition of Peter Lombard for this was,
so to speak, the springboard from which all discussion started.
This was the age of the Commentaries on the Sententiarum
Libri Quattuor, and later the age of the Summae Theologicae
which produced the highest speculation regarding the certitude
of hope. The Lombard's study of the virtue of hope is very
brief, but his definition of theological hope is, from one point of
view, the most important single contribution to the speculative
study of the virtue. It definitely assigned to hope qualities and
causes the discussion of which by later scholars was to produce
the more extensive scientific
of the virtue familiar to
the thirteenth and succeeding centuries.
Peter Lombard defined hope as " certain expectation of future
beatitude coming from the grace of God and merits which
precede either the hope itself, which is preceded in nature by
charity, or the thing hoped for, that is, eternal beatitude. For
to hope for anything without merits cannot be called hope, but
presumption." 2 This is the definition which provoked the discussions of the thirteenth-century theologians. If the definition
did not actually exist before its promulgation by the Master of
the Sentences, it was not without foundation both in Sacred
Scripture and in the writings of earlier theologians.
Hope, he said, is certain 3 expectation. This note of certainty
or certitude is ultimately founded upon the fifth chapter of St.
St. Gregory the Great, Comm. in Job, 16, in PL LXXV, 742.
enim spes certa expectatio futurae beatitudinis, veniens ex Dei gratia et
meritis praecedentibus, vel ipsam spem, quam natura praeit caritas, vel rem
speratam, id est, beatitudinem aetemam. Sine meritis enim aliquid sperare, non
spes sed praesumptio dici potest (Sententiarum Libri Quattuor, III, d. 26, in PL
CXCII, 811).
• In this work the word " certain " will be understood in its primary sense i. e.,
signifying determination.
1

2 Est

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Paul's Epistle to the Romans. The precise passage is as follows:
" we glory also in tribulation, knowing that tribulation worketh
patience; and patience trial; trial hope; and hope confoundeth
not"; 4 after the words "trial hope" the Glossa Ordinaria
added, ". . . . that is, the certitude of hope."
The words " from the grace of God and preceding merits "
are also founded in the writings of previous scholars. For example, Anselm of Laon has this: " Faith and hope differ because hope is trust concerning future goods in the grace of God
and some preceding merits." 5 While it is true that Peter
Lombard qualified this statement, it is nevertheless evident
that at least the individual parts of the de:6nition were not
entirely new concepts. The importance of the definition itself
consists rather in the correlation and the clarification of these
ideas, and further in the clear statement of the nature of the
act of hope. It was this clarification and clearness which enabled
others to proceed with the more profouJ;J.dspeculations.
Hugh of St. Victor, however, who actually died twenty years
before the Master of the Sentences, also has some interesting
notes on this matter. While it is true that he did not delve
deeply into the problem, nevertheless he is of importance here
he was definitely an authority whom St. Thomas used
extensively. However, St. Thomas applies necessary distinctions which were omitted by the earlier theologian. The expression "from preceding merits" (ex meritis praecedentibus)
which pr9vokes so much comment and which is of prime importance to this discussion, does not seem to have been clearly
understood by Hugh of St. Victor in the sense which we now
call Thomistic. The Lombard asserted that the merits precede
either hope or the thing hoped for. Hugh of St. Victor had
said that they must only precede the thing hoped for because
no merit precedes hope itself. 6 Of course with the proper dis'Romana, v, 8-5.
• Anselm of Laon, Sententiae, ed. Bliemetzrieder, p. 80, as quoted by P. Ramirez
in La Cientia Thomiata, Sept. 1988, p. 198: Difl'erunt autem fides et spes, quia
spes est fiducia de futuris bonis in gratia Dei et meritis aliquibus praecedentibus.
• Hugh of St. Victor, Summa Sententiarom, Tract. 1, cap. i, in PL CLXXVI,

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WALTER M. CONLON

ti:t;:tctionswhich we later find in St. Thomas both of these writers
have foundation for their statements and are, in a sense, quite
correct. To distinguish here between hope and the act of hope,
and again between merits which one actually has and those
which one proposes to have before death, is quite essential to
the proper understanding of the classical definition of theological
hope.
In another work Hugh gives evidence of deep insight into the
difficulty. He describes hope as an " immovable motion based
upon certain or sure reason." 7 Although he did not go on to
elaborate the idea, nevertheless this brief statement would seem
to indicate that he has a clear understanding of the difference
between faith and hope as well as the dependence of hope upon
faith. It was the confusing of these which led other scholars
into confusion, as we will see later.
Almost immediately errors began to creep into theological
writings, and hope was confounded with faith and consequently
their respective certitudes were misunderstood. In fact, the
certitude of hope was the certitude of faith. Gundulphe of
Bologna renewed the discussion of the Lombard's expression
(ex meritis praecedentibus), "from preceding merits." He defined hope as a " trust of future good coming from preceding
merits." 8 Against this definition he offers two difficulties. In
the first place, hope without charity (which, in point of fact, is
never realized) should not be called hope, since it is rather error
than hope. Likewise, hope existing with charity in one who will
not actually be saved is rather error than hope. These objections are supposedly opposed to the " preceding merits." He
solves them by distinguishing a twofold hope, which in effect is
44. Spes est certitudo ex praecedentibus meritis: non debet intelligi ex meritis
praecedentibus ipsam spem, quia nullum meritum praecedit ipsam spem; sed
praecedentibus illud quod speratur.
• Hugh of St. Victor, De Fructibus Camis et Spiritus, cap. XVII, in PL CLXXVI,
1004. Spes est animi motus immobiliter ad ea quae certa ratione expetit accipienda
suspensus.
8 Gundulphe of Bologna, Sententiarum Libri Quattuor, Ill, n. 148, as quoted by
P. Ramirez in La Cientia Thomista, Dec. 1938, p. 353, Fiducia futurorum bonorum
proveniens ex praecedentibus meritis.

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81

reducible to the distinction to which we are accustomed, namely
formed and unformed hope. In the case of the formed hope he
interprets " the preceding merits" to be the virtues of faith and
charity which he says precede hope causally, or which precede
the beatitude for which we hope. The second species of hope
exists in the wicked (malis), by which he evidently means those
without charity. This is a trust of obtaining eternal life if one
dies in a good state. 9 He also applied this same conditional
clause to the first species. This conditional note is most important in this study because in it we see the beginning of the
doctrine of the conditional certitude of hope against which St.
Thomas directed his treatment of the subject in the Commentary on the Sentences, and which in spite of his protests has
endured down to our own day.
About the same time as Gundulphe of Bologna wrote, we find
the same theory in the writings of Peter of Poitiers (Petrus
Pictaviensis). He wrote explicitly that no one is so perfect that
he should hope without restriction that he should be saved,
unless in this way: if he dies in charity; and no one is so
obstinate who should not hope that he should be saved if he
dies in charity. 1° For no one is so perfect that he cannot fall;
or so evil that he cannot rise again while he is in this life. These
citations show the beginnings of the famous theory of conditional certitude with which even some of the commentators on
St. Thomas were later to be tainted. It is based fundamentally
upon a misconception of the true natures of the virtues of faith
and hope, which probably had its beginnings in the writings of
Peter Abelard. While Abelard was undoubtedly one of the
• Gundulphe of Bologna, loc. cit., Spes dupliciter dicitur. Spes enim dicitur
fiducia futurorum bonorum, idest beatitudinis aeternae, si in bono vitam finiverunt,
proveniens ex praecedentibus meritis, idest ex fide et caritate quae praecedunt
causaliter ipsam spem, vel praecedunt ipsam beatitudinem; et haec in solis bonis est.
Dicitur et aliter spes quae etiam est in malis, scilicet fiducia qua quis sperat quod
vitam consequatur aeternitm, si in bono vitam finiverunt.
10 Peter of Poitiers, Sententiarum Libri Quinque, ill, cap. 21, in PL CCXI, 1904
Nemo est adeo perfectus ut debeat sperare simpliciter se esse salvandum, nisi sic:
si in caritate decesserit; et nemo adeo obstinatus qui non debeat sperare se esse
salvandum, si in caritate decesserit.

6

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WALTER M• CONLON

greatest philosophers of the twelfth, century, his teaching on the
theological virtues is subject to much argumentation. He considered the relationship between faith and hope to be that of
genus and species.11 Thus it was easy to conclude that faith is
concerned with the universal and hope with the particular.
Subsequently, the certitude of faith is universal and absolute,
while that of hope is concerned with a particular and is conditional. Moreover, since. faith and hope are not essentially
distinct from one another, it was quite logical to apply to hope
the certitude of judgment which is proper to the intellective
faculty.
Following upon this line of reasoning the theologians then
proceeded to apply this certitude to the object of hope, or
eternal beatitude. Of course, it was at once evident to them
that no one can be sure of eternal life and, consequently, they
immediately excluded absolute certitude from the realm of hope.
Moreover, eternal life will be obtained only under the condition
that one dies in the state of grace, and therefore they immediately applied conditional certitude to hope. Their error consisted in this that the conditional clause referred to pertains to
faith rather than to hope. In other words, we believe that we
will obtain eternal life if w-e die in charity. Moreover, we believe
it absolutely and, consequently, not even in faith does this
establish a conditional certitude. Certainly, Abelard did not
draw all these conclusions from his principles, but they follow
from his confounding of the two virtues. Later theologians of
the school of Abelard were more explicit, as we have seen in
the writings of Peter of Poitiers, and as can also be seen in the
works of Hermannus. 12 Isagoge was even more explicit. Thus
" Hope is an expectation of future good coming from merits;
wherefore hope seems to be included in faith as a part in a
whole, for hope .is concerned only with good and fliture
things." 18
Abelard, lntroductio ad Tkeologiam, I, n. 1, in PL CLXX:VIll, 1695.
Hermannus, in PL CLXXVIII, 1695.
18 1sagoge, De Spe, I, p. 84, Spes autem est de meritis veniens futuri boni expectatio; unde spes in fide ut pars in toto claudi videtur, spes enim est in solis bonis
et solis futuris.
11
10

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Further evidence of the confusion concerning the certitude of
hope among the theologians of the latter half of the twelfth
century is the fact that some of them called it an enigmatical
certitude. Thus Radulphus Ardens wrote that hope is said to
be a certain expectation by an enigmatical certitude which is
greater ·than opinion and less than science.14 The theological
virtue of hope, then, does not seem tO have been clearly understood in the manner to which we are accustomed today. It is
quite understandable, therefore, that the notions of the certitude of hope among these theologians should likewise be con-.
fused and enigmatical. Moreover it was this confusion which
led St. Thomas to begin his treatment of. the subject by first
clarifying the fundamental notions of the virtue and its nature,
for upon them rest any true assertions concerning the certitude
·of theological hope. Thus, we will see that while St. Thomas's
doctrine on this point, like that of all the theologians from the
latter part of the twelfth century on,< was provoked by the
classical definition promulgated by the Master of the Sentences,
nevertheless the other scholars of that century can be said to
have aided in the explanation of St. Thomas only in a negative
way. In other words, his refutation of their errors served to
clarify his own position.

IT. THE BEGINNING

OF. THE CONTROVERSY

1. Peter of Capua

In the thirteenth century, which witnessed the rise of the
great universities and the M;endicant Orders, speculation concerning theological hope and its certitude took on much more
extensive proportions. Almost immediately after the turn of
the century, Peter of Capua, one of the early Dominican
scholars, undertook to explain more fully and more correctly the
definition of the Master of the Sentences. 15 He did not agree
" Radulphus Ardens, Lateran Section of the Vatican Library, 1175, Tom. I,
f !l5S va.
15 Petrus
Capuanus, Summa (Lateran Section of the Vatican Library, 4296
f4 1 aecto-b).

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WALTER M. CONLON

with the explanations of earlier scholars and consequently initiated the discussion which contemporary and succeeding scholars
were not slow to pick up and continue.
Beginning from the definition of the Lombard, as did most
of the theological writers, he pointed out some possible erroneous conclusions that might be drawn from the words of the
definition itself. Hope is a certain expectation of future happiness coming from the grace of God and preceding merits. Consequently, he concluded immediately, that since hope comes
from preceding merits, therefore it is had from preceding merits,
and consequently one can merit hope. This would appear to
follow logically from the above-mentioned definition. However
it is p,recisely against such a conclusion that Peter of Capua
interids to inveigh. Thus we find for the first time a new explanation for the causes of hope which are grace and merits.
The definition would be better understood if the word " coming " was understood to modify the word " happiness " and not
" hope." Therefore, in the Latin it was a matter of placing the
nominative case for the genitive. Thus the word veniens would
be changed to venientis. Consequently, the future happiness,
and not the hope itself, would be said to spring from merits.
Or, to put it another way, merits are said to precede, not hope
itself, but rather the thing hoped for. If one should insist that
merits precede hope then it must be understood not as the
theological virtue itself but rather the increase of that virtue.
Wherefore, although we cannot merit hope, nevertheless we
can merit the increase of hope. This was a clearer explanation
of the causes of hope than had yet been given in any explanation of the famous definition, and its influence upon later
scholars will be seen.
Among the theologians of the twelfth century, 'a further
question arose with regard to the conditional nature of the
certitude of hope. Thus.we find this early Dominican proposing
the question as to whether one should hope for eternal happiness
without any restriction in regard to that hope (i. e., simpliciter) .
Scholars had denied this explicitly, and they maintained the

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necessity of adding the restricting and conditional clause," if
one should persevere." Thus, the certitude of hope ·would not
be absolute but conditional, since this certitude depends first
and foremost upon the movement of hope itself. However, this
explanation did not seem fitting to Peter of Capua, with the
result that he was one of the first to raise his voice in protest
against it. The certitude of hope, like hope itself, is without any
condition whatsoever. In support of this conclusion he cites
St. Paul: "According to my expectation and hope; that nothing shall be confounded." 16 Aimo had remarked that this referred to eternal life which will be certain in proportion to the
expectation. Therefore, concludes Peter, the Apostle hoped for
salvation without any restriction or condition. Here he added
further argumentation against the theory of conditional certitude. The clause " if one perseveres " should not condition
theological hope for another reason. A person is bound to observe his baptismal vow in which he promised solemnly to
renounce the pomps of the devil not only now but always;
hence he is bound to persevere. Therefore one should hope for
salvation without any condition whatsoever.
Thus we see the beginning of the reaction to the theory of
the latter part of the twelfth century, which theory however
is adhered to even today by many and, possibly, by the majority
of theologians. It is interesting to find this reaction in the
writings of Peter of Capua whose Summa was influenced, at
least in part, by the works of Peter of Poitiers who, we have
seen, was very explicit regarding the conditional nature of our
hope.
2. Stephen Langton.
About the same time, possibly a few years later, this problem
was even more fully treated in the Quaestio de Spe of Stephen
Langton, the Cardinal Archbishop of Canterbury, who died in
1228. This work still exists in manuscript form. 16 •
i, XX.
Stephanus Langton, Questio de Spe (St. Johns College, Cambridge, ms. 57,
verso,
recto).

16 Philipp.
16 •

fo.

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WALTER M. CONLON

This work is also noteworthy because it protests, as did r
Peter of Capua, against preceding explanations. In this these
two have much in common. However the English scholar went
into more detailed explanations of the whole definition and
bases his conclusions upon these explanations. In the beginning
we find him also using the Lombard's definition as the basis for
his discussions. Consequently the explanation starts with the
causes of hope, which are grace and merits. Concerning grace
as a source of hope he merely indicates that the term must be
understood in the sense of a grace giving freely (gratia gratis
dante) and not a grace given freely (gratia gratis data).
However, a difficulty arises in his mind with regard to merit
as a cause of hope. If hope proceeds from merit then one can
merit hope, and therefore also first grace which is to be judged
in a similar manner. For example, Christ in the first instant of
his life merited comprehension just as the Angels merited confirmation, and thus the merit and the reward existed at the same
time. In like manner, therefore, why cannot it be said that one
virtue merits another even though they do not exist at the same
time? To this he replied that all virtue naturally precedes
merit, and reward naturally succeeds merit. If, therefore, one
virtue was the reward of another,. then the latter would be
merited which is impossible since all· virtue precedes merit.
must be understood not as the
Therefore, in the definition,
virtue itself but rather as the practice or act of that virtue.
Thus, hope is an expectation, that is, the act of hope is an
expectation, and might well proceed from merit.
Some concluded from this that one could be justified by
hope, while others maintained that only by faith could one be
justified. The solution to this difficulty depended upon a further explanation of the manner in which the words "from
merit and grace " are to be understood. Thus hope is said to
be a certain expectation of beatitude coming from grace and
merit. A more correct reading, however, is that it is a certain
expectation of beatitude through grace and merit. But there
is still some obscurity, and thus he emphasized that it is not

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the expectation of beatitude. Thus it is more correctly formulated thus: hope is an expectation of having beatitude through
merit.
With these definite concepts of the notions of expectation,
grace, and merits in regard to hope it was then possible to
analyze the notion of certitude therein contained. In the first
place it would seem that when we speak of hope as a " certain
expectation " we should understand it to mean either the certitude of science (certitudo scientiae) or the certitude of hope.
However, the author immediately excludes the certitude of
science since, as he says, no one in this life has that species of
certitude with regard to future beatitude. Hence we are speaking here of a kind of certitude entitled the certitude of hope.
But this seems to be a contradiction because then hope would
be a certain expectation through hope, and consequently the
notion would be no clearer than before.
This he endeavors to explain. There are, he says, two kinds
of certitude, namely, that certitude which excludes fear and
that which excludes ambiguity. In the definition of hope the
latter, or the certitude which excludes ambiguity, should be
understood. But, he says, this certitude is not in hope but
rather with hope. Moreover the name " certain " here designates the mode of expectation just as the term "enigmatical"
designates the mode of vision when one speaks of enigmatical
vision. Moreover this certitude of hope is more certain than
the certitude of sensitive science. He seems to disengage the
certitude of hope completely from the certitude of faith, and
thus adds to the gradual clarification of the notion of this
certitude,
A difficulty, however, arose from the words of the Master of
Sentences. He said that hope which does not proceed from
merits is presumption and not hope. It would seem to follow
that it is temerity, and therefore evil. Hence if one in mortal
sin should hope for eternal life he would siri because he would
be moved by a temerarious motion. Against such reasoning
stands the fact that it is good to have even unformed faith.

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WALTER M. CONLON

Therefore why is it not good to have unformed hope? It is good
to expect and hope for pardon even though one does not thereby
merit, and it would seem that such hope is not presumption.
In response to this difficulty, it is only necessary to apply
the proper distinctions in the proper places. Certainly one can
hope for eternal life and pardon even though in mortal sin, but
he should hope that God will infuse grace and thus he will be
able to merit eternal life. But if one should hope for eternal
life without merits on his part then certainly this would be presumption. It is thus that the words of the Master of the
Sentences must be understood. The expression " if hope is not
from merits " must be understood " if it is not through merits."
Consequently, the meaning would be that if one should hope to
have eternal life and not through merits, this would be presumption. Moreover when thus understood this statement does not
prejudice either hope or its certitude as it exists in an unformed
state in one in mortal sin. The words " grace and merits " were
placed in the definition of hope to distinguish this virtue not
from other virtues, but rather to distinguish it from presumption. Accordingly, if one hopes to obtain the reward otherwise
than through grace and merits, he is guilty of presumption.
Against this it can be proposed that it seems that even a
movement of hope itself can be presumption since it is a certain
expectation of future beatitude. Moreover since such certitude
is good it becomes better as it increases. Therefore it would seem
that we can have certitude of hope to such a degree that it would
become presumption. In this way hope could be presumption
and the movement of hope could be a movement of presumption.
Stephen Langton's whole solution of this problem consists in
an
of the afore-mentioned distinctions, namely, the
certitude which excludes fear and the certitude which excludes
ambiguity. If the former is understood, the above argumentation is correct and hope can well be presumption. However the
certitude here applied to hope is that which excludes ambiguity,
and this species of certitude never leads to presumption. Moreover insofar as it increases so much the better it is.

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The confusion of preceding scholars, as we have said, seems
to have arisen from the confusion of hope -with other virtues and
especially with faith. In this unedited manuscript we find some
clarifications along this line of thought. St. Paul had said that
hope does not confound. Why should this be said of hope
more than of any other virtue for indeed it seems that no virtue
confounds. The author responds to this by pointing out that
hope is an expectation and not a comprehension of a future
good, and this in some way suggests confusion for the person
hoping. Therefore the Apostle found it necessary to emphasize
that our hope does not confound.
Finally, this English scholar pointed out some fundamental
differences between the virtue of hope and the gift of fear, and
between the two virtues of faith and hope. However these distinctions will be found more fully in other authors.
3. William of Auxerre
About the year 1215, William of Auxerre wrote his Summa
Aurea in four volumes. This .work is of fundamental importance
to his discussion. It marks the first great advance towards the
solution of St. Thomas, and exercised great influence upon the
tho:ught of St. Albert, St. Thomas, and the whole of the early
Dominican school.
The Summa Aurea shows a clear comprehension of the difficulties of earlier scholars and their confusion when speaking of
faith and hope. Thus it would seem that faith and hope do not
differ since hope is a certain expectation and all certitude is
either in faith or in science. Therefore, this certain expectation
would seem to pertain to faith rather than to hope. Consequently, faith and hope would be identical.
This is the line of reasoning pursued by some scholars, but
this Parisian master shows its fallacy. He expressly declares that
it is false to assert that all certitude is either in faith or in
science. Accordingly, it is necessary to distinguish between the
certitude which is had in this life (certitudo viae) and that
which is had in Heaven (certitudo patriae). The former can

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WALTER M. CONLON

be further distinguished according to the certitude of faith and
that of hope. The certitude of faith is opposed to doubt, while
the certitude. of hope is opposed to and excludes despair and
diffidence. The certitude which is had by those in Heaven further excludes even fear of separation. 17 Thus we have a clearcut distinction drawn between the certitudes of faith and hope.
We see here also a complete understanding of the intellectual
nature of faith as well as an unwillingness to attempt to transpose that intellectual character into the order of hope. It is
true that we do not find here the more precise explanation of
the affective nature of hope, but nevertheless the certitude of
hope is definitely disengaged from that of faith and thus the
foundation was laid for further speculation along this line.
These distinctions were reached by means of a proper understanding of the three theological virtues and their differences.
These virtues seem to be identical since they all have God for
their object or end. But it is necessary to distinguish between
the end in which (finis in quo) happiness is found and the end
by which (finis quo sive ad quem) or through which it is found.
Thus, in regard to the theological virtues the first end is God
Himself or uncreated beatitude. By this end or object the
virtues are not distinguished one from the other, but the finis
quo of the theological virtues is created beatitude and according
to this end are they distinguished. Faith in the reason, hope
in the irascible appetite, and charity in the concupiscible appetite all have their proper finis quo or created beatitude/ 8 This
17 William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea, II, Tract 5, q. '2.
Duplex est certitudo,
scilicet viae et patriae. Certitudo viae duplex est,' scilicet fidei et spei. Certitudo
fidei est intentio cum privatione dubitationis. Certitude spei est intentio cum
privatione desperationis vel diffidentiae. Certitudo igitur fidei et certitudo spei
non expellunt timorem separationis a suo subjecto. Certitudo patriae expellit
omnem dubitationem, omnem diffidentiam, omnem timorem separationis. Patet
igitur quod haec est falsa: omnis certitudo est in fide vel scientia.
18 Summa A urea, III, tract, 5. Duplex est finis, scillicet finis in quo quiescitur et
finis quo sive ad quem. Finis is quo quiescitur est ipse deus sive beatitudo increata
et secundum ilium finem non est distinctio. Finis autem per quem quiescitur est
beatitudo creata et secundum ilium finem different virtutes. Quaelibet enim
virium motivarum in quibus sunt theologicae virtutes, ut fides in rationali, spes in

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distinction is very fundamental. It at once throws light upon
the difficulties which seemed insuperable to other scholars, and
it lays the firm foundation for the higher speculations of St.
Albert and St. Thomas. When St. Thomas wished to distinguish
the certitude proper to hope he began by showing the interrelationship of faith and hope. We find almost the exact distinction here in the work of William of Auxerre. Faith, he says,
is in the speculative intellect but it does not consist solely in
speculation; its end is not only truth, but also good. Thus faith
consists in speculation concerning first truth and in the estimation of good. 19 This estimation of faith formed the basis of
St. Thomas' theory. It is the basis for admitting the dependence
of hope upon faith, while yet denying the absolute participation
of the certitude of faith by the virtue of hope.
Speaking of the definition of hope, which he ascribes to St.
Augustine rather than to the Master of the Sentences, William
of Auxerre proceeds to explain its parts. In the first place he
affirms that this definition is concerned with hope as an act and
is not a definition of the virtue of hope. When it is said that
hope is a certain expectation of future beatitude coming from
grace and merits, it must be understood thus: coming by reason
of the grace of God, that is, His-liberality, and by reason of
preceding merits which merits precede either the act of hope or
the thing hoped for. This is a contradiction of earlier writers
who claimed that the word " grace " here meant the virtue of
hope. Thus the act of hope would come from grace, that is,
the virtue of hope. The Parisian master asserts that the word
" grace " must not be understood in that sense here, but rather
with relation to the bounty and goodness of God. St. Thomas
was later to assert the same opinion. Moreover the word
" merits " in the definition presupposes the notion of good
irascibili, caritas in concupiscibili, suam propriam habebit beatitudinem creatam per
quam quiescit in Deo qui est finis finium. Per finen ergo quo quiescitur fit
distinctio.
19 Ibid., Tract S, q. 2. Dicimus quod fides est in speculativo intellectu:
non
tamen consistit pure in speculatione, nee ejus finis tantum est veritas: immo etiam
bonum. Consistit enim in speculatione primae veritatis et in estimatione boni.

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works. Thus we must understand the merits of good works.
This was a contradiction of the opinion that the merits here
referred to were those proceeding from and by reason of the
movement of the virtue of faith.
The virtue of hope is defined as a courage of the mind concerning the attainment of eternal life through merits, by reason
of the bounty of God. 20 This courage, he points out, is a virtue
midway between presumption and despair. Despair is placed
in opposition to hope in contradistinction to the opinion of those
who would say that it seems to be in opposition to faith rather
than hope, thus adding to the confusion concerning the distinct natures of these two virtues. Some, as has been seen, even
went so far as to conclude that faith and hope were essentially
the same. Consequently the certitude of hope would not be
distinct from that of faith. However the fallacy of this reasoning was .Pointed out by William of Auxerre.
4. William of Auvergne
St. Thomas ascribed a twofold certitude to hope, the certitude
of virtue and the certitude proper to hope. Although the latter
was not clearly demonstrative or defined by William of Auxerre, he did initiate the line of reasoning which was ultimately
to terminate in the theory of St. Thomas. Another Parisian
master, William of Auvergne, asserted the certitude of virtue.
Thus every virtue by reason of its nature as a habit, and consequently hope, is said to have a firmness or certitude. 21
In his elaborate work De Virtutibus et M oribus William of
Auvergne enumerates seven daughters of hope. The first two
of these, trust and security, are worthy of attention here. In
the first place, trust is a spiritual supporting of oneself upon
that in which hope is placed. Thus, trust is like a great column
10 Ibid., Tract. 5, q. 2. Spes est audacia mentis perveniendi ad vitam aetemam
per merita concepta intuitu largitatis Dei. Talis autem audacia est virtus media
inter praesumptionem et desperationem.
21 William of Auvergne, De Virtutibus, in Summa Operum (ed. Regnault), f 70vb,
Sine firmitate nee est etiam habitus: quare nee virtus: cum omnis virtus sit
habitudo. In ratione ipsius virtutis cadit fortitudo seu firmitas.

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which sustains the human mind and the whole edifice of virtues.
The column in turn rests upon a twofold base namely the mercy
and justice of God. Hence, one who trusts in God not only
trusts or hopes in his mercy, but also in his justice and truth
by which He promised that He would not deny Himself to those
who trust or hope in Him. 22 This is a completely new approach
to the problem of grace and merit which other theologians discuss in regard to the definition of Peter Lombard. Moreover
this explanation goes further back to the foundations upon
which grace and merits rest, namely the mercy and justice of
God. In His mercy He gives us grace and in his justice He
rewards our merits.
The second daughter of hope is a sense of security in divine
protection. This security is twofold. The first concerns the
attainment of eternal happiness; the second is a security against
the fears and errors of this present life. William of Auvergne
does not mention the certitude of hope explicitly here, but it
is only a difference of terminology since his concept of the
security of hope and the concept of the certitude of hope are
one and the same. The first species of security which pertains
to the attainment of eternal life is fundamentally based upon
the death of Christ for by the merits of His death we hope to
come to life eternal. 28 St. Thomas later developed this idea
much more fully in his commentary on the fifth chapter of
St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans. The second species of security
here predicated of hope, that against the fears and errors of
this present life, is based upon the omnipotence of God and
on His good will towards us. Thus nothing harmful can happen
to us unless He wills or permits it. Accordingly, our hope is
secure and certain from this twofold point of view.
•• William of Auvergne, De Moribua, ibid., f. lOOra-b, lllarum ergo prima est
fiducia sive fidentia quae est spiritualis innixio in illud in quo sperat . . • et fidentia
quaedam est velut comuna mentem humanam et totum edificium virtutum sustinens,
et ipsa velut super duas basas divinae misericordia atque justitiae erecta: et
eiidem suggulta. Qui enim confidunt in Domino: non solum in misericordia confident seu sperant: sed etiam in justitia et veritate qua promisit se non deesse
sperantibus in se.
•• Ibid., f

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The objection to the certitude of hope from the fact of the
coexistence of fear along with the virtue offered no difficulty to
this Parisian Master. In fact he asserts that fear is the strongest help to hope. More than that, it is quite necessary, for
unless one fears the justice of God and turns from evil he will
not be able to attain the promise. Thus fear and hope instead
of being contrary one to another are thoroughly compatible.
5. Philip the Chancellor.

The Summa de Bono 24 of Philip the Chancellor, which in
many respects is a more important work than the Summa Aurea
of William of Auxerre, considers all theology from the viewpoint
of good. This work, which has never been edited, was composed
before 1230 and exercised a great influence upon the early
Franciscan and Dominican schools.
Concerning the problem of the certitude of hope this work
has some striking similarities to the doctrine of William of
Auxerre. However, Philip's treatment of the subject is much
fuller and certainly more complex. He quotes many texts of
Sacred Scripture together with the comment of the author of
the Glossa, in support of the fact of this certitude. From these
texts and their commentaries he concludes that whenever the
certitude of hope is spoken of the act of hope, and not the
virtue, is to be understood. Thus from the beginning he is
speaking of the certitude of hope in its act, or movement.
Philip notes here the apparent objection to the very idea of
certitude being applied to hope since certitude properly pertains
to the intellect. Consequently some had said that by its very
name it is clear that all certitude pertains to knowledge. Philip
responds to this by laying down a distinction similar to that of
William of Auxerre. Knowledge, he says, may be considered in
two ways: We can consider the knowledge of one in a good
state at the end, the knowledge that he will have eternal life, or
we can consider it in regard to a particular individual, that is,
•• Philippus. Cancellarius, Summa de Bono (Manuscript in the Vatican Library,
7.669, f. 89 recto et verso).

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the knowledge that he will have eternal life if he is in a good
state finally. The first of these pertains to faith and to the
certitude of faith, for so to believe pertains to faith. The second
does not pertain to faith, but rather to hope. Hope has this
from faith, but this is totally distinct from the certitude of faith
because faith does not touch singulars such as: this particular
person will have eternal life. Nevertheless it is ruled by faith
and is thus considered to be from faith (ex collatione fidei). It
seems here that the author adheres to the theory of. the conditional nature of the certitude of hope. He did place a conditional
clause when speaking of the certitude of hope, but the condition
pertains rather to faith than to hope, since hope has it from
faith. Besides the certitudes of faith and hope there is still a
third species which pertains to eternal life already possessed.
This kind is a certitude of knowledge or judgment and is had
only in Heaven.
But the question arises whether hope has a proper certitude
besides that which it has from faith. Philip answers this in the
affirmative and in support of his conclusion. he adduces several
arguments and distinctions which are very noteworthy since
they. occur again in the writings of the great scholars who followed him. Many of these· arguments and assertions will be
seen in the work of St. Thomas Aquinas.
In the first place, there is the comment of the Glossa on the
Epistles of St. Paul. To the words of Romans, " knowing that
tribulation worketh patience; and patience trial; and trial hope "
the Glossa adds," that is, the certitude of future glory." Again
to· the words of St. Paul to Timothy, " expecting the blessed
hope·" the Glossa adds" expecting, hence certain and solicitous."
The second argument is very short but of monumental importance because it clearly distinguishes between certitude in
the intellect and certitude in the appetite or affection. We see
that just as the sense of sight has certitude concerning its proper
object, and the sense of taste concerning its object, so also there
is a proper certitude in the intellect and in the appetite, concerning their respective objects. Since hope is in the appetite,

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it possesses a certitude proper to itself and independent of faith
which is in the intellect. The distinction between the certitude
in the intellect (in intellectu) and the certitude in the appetite
(in affectu) was latent in the work of William of Auxerre but
we have not seen it expressly stated before the time of Philip
the Chancellor. As a consequence of this he states that the
certitude of faith is opposed to doubt, while
certitude of
hope is opposed to despair or hesitation. The certitude of hope
seems to be a certitude of experience which is in the appetite,
while the certitude of faith is a certitude of knowledge of judgment which is in the intellect. Accordingly, concludes Philip,
there will be certitude in Heaven as regards the intellect but in
a more noble manner in the appetite through the presence of the
thing because the adherence and conjunction through the affection is stronger than that of the intellectual order. According to
our author, the same can be said of this life also. As a further
evidence that hope has a proper certitude besides that from
faith, he points out that the certitude of faith is concerned with
truth and that of hope is concerned with good. This follows
more or less as a corollary from the preceding argument.
As a last argument in support of his conclusion that hope has
a proper certitude of its own, the Chancellor cites that passage
of Aristotle in the book of Ethics where the philosopher says
that virtue is more certain than art. Consequently, since hope
is virtue it has greater certitude than all art. In support of this
argument, the author cites the distincions of certitude which we
have already noted in other theological writings. Firstly, there
is the certitude of judgment which is opposed to doubt, and
this pertains to faith. Secondly, there is that certitude which is
opposed to the fear of not obtaining beatitude, and this pertains to hope. Thirdly, there is the certitude which is opposed
to the fear of separation from beatitude already possessed, and
this pertains to those in Heaven.
Mter establishing the fact that hope has a proper certitude he
then proceeds to discuss the relative strength of the certitude
of hope informed by charity in comparison to the certitude in

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hope not informed by charity. At the outset, it would seem that
the certitudes of formed and unformed hope are equal since the
certitudes of formed and unformed faith are equal. On the
other hand, it would seem that formed hope enjoys a foretaste
of the certitude of those already possessing eternal life, and
consequently its certitude would be greater than that enjoyed
by one with unformed hope. In view of those conflicting probabilities Philip the Chancellor lays down a distinction which we
later find in St. Thomas' Commentary on the Sentences. In the
first place it is necessary to distinguish between that certitude
which hope has through faith and the certitude proper to hope
as to every virtue. In regard to the certitude of hope which
comes through faith, it is necessary to point out that in faith
itself the certitudes are equal in formed and unformed faith,
insofar as the certitude of judgment, the principal element, is
concerned. Consequently, the certitude of hope which comes
through faith would be equal in persons with formed or unformed hope. But still there seems to be more or greater certitude in hope united to charity than hope without charity.
Therefore it is necessary to look for that greater certitude in the
certitude of hope independent of faith. The author concludes
that the certitude of formed and unformed hope are equal in
regard to the certitude which is dependent upon faith, but they
are unequal in regard to the certitude of habit or virtue in hope.
From the foregoing problem arises the question of the relation of the certitude of hope in a predestined individual to the
certitude of hope in a praescitus, or one who will not attain
eternal life. St. Thomas answered this question very briefly but
with the same conclusion as Philip who discussed it more extensively. The whole problem revolves around the difficulty
when the praescitus is actually in the state of charity and the
predestined is not in charity. Since, however, hope is a certain
expectation of future beatitude, and since as a matter of fact
the praescitus will never actually attain this beatitude, it would
seem that such a person has not hope or certitude of hope. But
if he is in the state of charity at present then he possesses

"'

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present justice and consequently the virtues of faith, hope, and
charity. Philip concluded that the hope of a praescitus in
charity has greater certitude than the hope of a predestined
not in charity. This is quite intelligible in view of the abovementioned distinctions relative to the certitude of formed and
unformed hope. But in order to further elucidate his conclusion
the author demonstrates the types of certitudes which he
ascribes to both these individuals. There is a certitude of the
person expecting and a certitude of a thing. The certitude of
the person expecting is that predicated of the praescitus. The
certitude of the thing (certitudo rei) is predicated of the predestined and must be considered according to the purpose of
divine predestination and also according to divine ordination.
Thus the praescitus does not possess the certitude of the thing
itself, and the predestined does not possess the certitude of a
person expecting. There is still a third type of certitude, the
certitude of revelation, which was had by some of the saints.
These distinctions did not pass into the work of St. Thomas, but
they do appear in the writings of others.
Philip the Chancellor also discussed the difference between
the acts of expectation and hope. He lays down two differences
of his own and cites a third difference which he attributes to
others. The first and most important difference is that the act
of expectation does not connote the idea of certitude, but that
idea is contained in the very concept of hope. Thus the act of
hope is defined not as any expectation, but rather as a certain
expectation. Moreover the act of expectation can be aroused by
opinion alone while more than opinion is required to produce
an act of hope. The second difference consists in this that the
act of expectation can be exercised towards something we already have in order that we might have it in a more perfect
manner; the act of hope on the contrary is concerned with something not yet possessed. The third difference consists, according to some, in the fact that hope is only directed towards glory.
Thus hope is an expectation of future glory, or beatitude. Philip
does not endorse this as his own opinion, but merely cites it as

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OF HOPE

the opinion of others. This author has contributed much to the
clarification of the nature of the certitude of hope, and is without doubt an important link in the chain of speculative thought
which terminated in the work of St. Thomas.

Ill.

THE EARLY FRANciSCAN

ScHOOL

The doctrine of the Early Franciscan School may be found
in the Summa Theologica attributed to Alexander of Hales, the
founder of the school, and in the writings of this school's greatest
doctor, St. Bonaventure. Both of these scholars follow the line
of reason on this point which was begun by Philip the Chancellor. The problem is discussed much more extensively by St.
Bonaventure than by Alexander; nevertheless the latter left no
doubt as to his position in regard to the certitude of hope.
I. Alexander of Hales
Following the tradition of the Chancellor on this point, Alexander asserts that there is a twofold certitude, the certitude of
knowledge and the certitude of affection. 25 He then proceeds to
apply these species of certitude to the certitude of faith and, by
way of comparison, to the certitude of hope. Thus the certitude
of knowledge is the same in formed and unformed faith. However, according to Alexander, the certitude of affection is not
the same. Hence in unformed faith the certitude of affection
is from a sense of assent, that is, from this that a man senses
that he assents to first truth for its own sake, although he does
not tend towards it. But in formed faith the certitude of affection pertains to consent and love, that is it proceeds from this
that a man senses that he consents and loves truth in as much
as it is truth.
In hope, on the contrary, there is but one genus of certitude,
that is, the certitude of proper affection. Thus like Philip he
distinguishes between the intellectual and affective certitudes
OS Alexander of Hales, Summa
(Venice, 1575-76, ed. Francisius) m,
9.45, S. Respondeo dicendum quod in fide duplex est certitudo: certitudo cognitionis, et affectionis.

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WALTER M. CONLON

and refuses to predicate the former of hope. However he still
predicates a double certitude to hope. One is the certitude which
hope receives from faith and the other is that certitude proper
to hope. 26 Moreover he definitely asserts that the certitude
which hopes receives from faith is a conditional certitude, and
that it is the same in formed and unformed hope. On the other
hand, the certitude proper to hope is not the same in each
because this certitude proceeds from merits. Formed hope
trusts in merits actually or habitually possessed, while unformed
hope trusts in merits not actually possessed but which are
possible of possession.27 Comparing this to the Thomistic solution we will find that St. Thomas explicitly denied the conditional nature of the certitude of hope, but nevertheless agreed
that from the viewpoint of the certitude of virtue the certitudes
in formed and unformed hope are unequal.
Without further treatment of the fundamental notions, Alexander then takes up the difficulties presented by the condition
of the predestined, the praescitus, and the person in despair.
Here also the influence of Philip is plainly visible. Thus he
concludes that the hope of the praescitus who is in charity has
greater certitude than the hope of the predestined without
charity. The reason given for this conclusion is that the hope
of the praescitus is rooted in merits and its certitude comes from
merits. However, it is conditional, that is, it depends upon his
perseverance in merits to the end. But the hope of the predestined not in charity is not rooted in merits and thus it is
related to merits only insofar as they are possible of attainment.
Thus we see that this theory of conditional certitude is used
to explain the difficulty presented by the fact that one who will
•• Ibid., In spe vero non est nisi unum genus certitudinis, scilicet affectionis
propriae. Est tamen in ea certitudo quam accipit a fide: ex fide enim accipit
certitudinem spes: ut si perseveraverit, salvus erit: et haec est certitudo conditionalia. Haec igitur certitudo eadem ·est et ejusdem rationis in spe formata et
informis.
•• Ibid., Certitudo vero propria non omnino eadem est, nee ejusdem rationis:
quia propria certitudo spei ex meritis: sed spes formata confidit ex meritis actu
vel habitu: spes autem informis confidit ex meritis non habitus, sed possibilibus
haberi.

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actually not obtain eternal life (the praescitus) has greater
certitude of hope at present than the predestined man who at
present is not in charity.
Here the author of this Summa quotes the explanation of
others, which is, in fact, the one we have seen in the work of
Philip the Chancellor. 28 Thus, there is the certitude of the
person expecting and the certitude of the thing expected. The
certitude of the person expecting depends upon merits while
that of the thing expected depends upon divine preordination.
Thirdly, the certitude considered from the point of view of one
through whom something is expected depends upon the grace
of divine revelation. Thus the first species exists in the praescitus; the second in the predestined in mortal sin; and the third
exists in the perfect man.
Finally, we find treated in this work the difficulty concerning
despair. Some would make despair opposed equally to faith and
hope and thus confuse the two virtues. Alexander offers the
following explanation. The problem is concerned with that
hope which is not formed by charity. Unformed hope, he
asserts, in as much as it is from unformed faith is concerned
with the remission of sins and with eternal life. Consequently
since unformed faith is concerned with all the articles of faith,
despair, which destroys the unformed hope, also destroys the
unformed faith insofar as that faith is generative of hope, but
it does not destroy it completely. 29 Unformed faith may still
remain with despair, insofar as it is generative of servile fear.
In another place he points out that one can despair of the
mercy of God without despairing of His power. Thus he did not
hold as some have held that despair was equally opposed to
hope and faith, and consequently for him this objection to the
certitude of hope was not valid.
28 Ibid., Aliter respondent quidam:
quod est certitudo expectantis, et certitudo
rei, quae expectatur: et certitudo ex parte illius, per quem expectatur.
29 Ibid., II-II,
Tract. V, Sec.
q. IV, cap. 3, Secundum hoc ergo quod fides
informis ponit cum integritate omnes articulos, desperatio, quae privat spem
infirmem, privat fidem informem in quantum ipsa est generativa spei informis, non
tamen privat fidam informem simpliciter.

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2. Saint Bonaventure
St. Bonaventure was, indeed, a contemporary of St. Thomas;
accordingly we give his opinions because of his historical position. In general, he followed the tradition of Philip the Chancellor and Alexander of Hales.
In his commentary on the Sentences, St. Bonaventure's
approach to the question is exactly the same as that of St.
Thomas in his commentary on the Sentences. In the first place
he sums up briefly the doctrine which we have seen among the
theologians in the latter part of the twelfth century under the
influence of the school of Abelard. According to that school of
thought the certitude of hope was not proper to that virtue
nor was it different from the certitude of faith. 30 Moreover,
these theologians maintained that hope drew its certitude from
faith just as a particular science draws certitude from a universal science. Hence the certitude of faith differs from the certitude of hope only insofar as the former is universal while the
latter is singular. Moreover the certitude of hope is conditional,
while the certitude of faith is a certitude of fidelity (certitudo
fidelitatis) and the certitude of hope is a certitude of confidence
(certitudo confidentiae) since we have confidence of obtaining
that which we believe we will obtain.
At this point, St. Bonaventure interjects his personal opinion
of this theory and precisely here does his doctrine part company from that of St. Thomas. The Angelic Doctor stated
explicitly that this theory could not stand. The Seraphic Doctor, on the other hand, stated that it did not suffice, but
admitted that it seemed probable. 31 His reason for its insufficiency, however, is identical with that of St. Albert and St.
80 St. Bonaventure,
III Sent., d. XXVI, q. 1, a. 5, Quidam namque dicere
voluerunt, quod certitudo spei non est sibi propria neque diversa a certitudine
fidei, immo spes omnem certitudinem suam trahit a fide, sicut scientia in particulari trahit certitudinem a scientia in universali. ... Et sicut dicunt se habere
spem ad fidem, sicut se habet scientia in particulari ad scientia in universali. ...
Dicunt igitur quod certitudo fidei non differt a certitudine spei, nisi quia ilia est
in universali, ista in particulari; ilia autem absoluta, et ista conditionata.
81 Ibid., Sed iste modus dicendi licet videtur probabilis, non sufficit.

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Thomas, namely, that if the certitude of faith and hope differ
only as a universal and particular, then faith and hope are not
distinct habits.
Consequently, St. Bonaventure proceeds with his own solution. In the first place, he says, hope has not only that certitude
which it derives through faith, but also a certitude proper to
itself. 32 Thus he admits in the beginning the theory of the participation of certitude from faith. In this he differs from St.
Thomas, and follows the tradition of Philip and Alexander.
Again, he is not clear about the precise nature of this certitude
which he says is proper to hope. If it has no relation whatsoever
to faith, then it must be the certitude of virtue. This, however,
is common in all the virtues. In speaking of the certitude proper
to hope it seems that the Franciscan school refers to what is
considered common certitude by St. Thomas, that is, it is common to all the virtues. On the other hand, for St. Thomas the
certitude proper to hope is that which is related to faith but
which is not an outright participation of the intellectual certitude of faith. St. Bonaventure, on the contrary, admits this
participation and proceeds then to explain the certitude of hope
without making it clear whether he is speaking of this participated certitude or of that certitude proper to hope. In order
to clarify the certitude of hope he draws a threefold distinction
between it and the certitude of faith. They differ by reason of
their objects, by reason of their opposites, and by reason of their
subjects. 38 By reason of their objects they differ since faith and
its certitude is concerned with a complexity by reason of the
whole composite, but hope and its certitude are not concerned
with a complexity by reason of the whole, but by reason of
the thing attributed. Thus in the sentence " I hope that I will
•• Ibid., Et praeterea est alius modus dicendi, quod ipsa spes certitudinem habet,
non solum earn, quam mendicat a fide, sed etiam propriam, quae distinguitur a
certitudine fidei.
•• Ibid., Et ilia distinctio cognosci potest per duplicem differentiam, videlicet
ratione objecti, circa quod habet ilia certitudo versari, et ratione oppositi, qui
habet contrariari. ... Et ex hoc colligitur tertia diversitas, qua differt certitudo
fidei a certitudine spei, quia non solum differt ratione objecti et ratione oppositi,
sed etiam ratione subjecti.

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have eternal life." A whole is not hoped for, but eternal life,
or the thing attributed (rei attributae) is hoped for. Again,
the certitude of faith and hope differ by reason of their opposites because the certitude of faith is opposed to error and
doubt, while the certitude of hope is opposed to diffidence or
hesitation. Here St. Bonaventure points out that although the
certitudes of faith and hope are diverse, nevertheless they have
it in common that each is a firmness (firmitas quaedam). The
certitude of faith makes the intellect firm so that it will not disbelieve; and the certitude of hope makes the affection firm so
that it will not distrust or despair. 84 From this follows the third
difference: the certitude of faith is concerned with the intellect,
and the certitude of hope is concerned with the affection.
Furthermore, just as the certitude of the intellect can be considered in two ways, so also the certitude of affection can be
considered in tW'o ways. Thus, the certitude of affection either
strengthens the affection so that it can overcome distrust or
diffidence, or it so strengthens it that it can in no way be moved
or hesitate. The first, says St. Bonaventure, pertains to hope in
this life; the second pertains to Heaven (patria).
From these differences he then concludes that the virtue of
hope has certitude in its ,!lCt. Moreover this certitude of hope
is different from the certitude of faith; it is less than the certitude of glory; and it is not the certitude of perpetual confirmation, but of some virile adherence. 85 This is the summation of
his doctrine on the matter, but it seems to leave much obscurity
since every certitude can be considered as some kind of a virile
adherence. However, St. Bonaventure further elucidated his
opinion in his response to the objections concerning the certitude of hope. Thus, to that objection which denies the certitude
84 Ibid., Licet autem istae duae certitudines sint diversae, tamen in hoc communicant, quod utraque est firmitas quaedam. Fides enim firmat intellectum, ne
discredat; spes autem firmat affectum, ne diffidat.
•• Ibid., Sic igitur patet, quod virtus spei habet certitudinem in actu suo; patet
etiam quae et qualis est ilia certitudo; quoniam est differens a certitudine fidei et
minor est quam certitudo gloriae; non enim est certitudo perpetuae confirmationis,
sed cujusdam virilis adhaesionis.

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of hope on the grounds that one cannot be certain of something
that he will never obtain, the Seraphic Doctor replied by distinguishing between the certitude of order and the certitude of
event. The objection, he points out is opposed to the certitude
of event which does not pertain to hope. The certitude of hope,
on the contrary, is a certitude of order because hope efficaciously and infallibly ordains to salvation. 86 St. Bonaventure did
not explain his notion of the certitude of order in relation to
hope as did St. Thomas in the very beginning of his treatment.
Thus, St. Thomas seems to have begun his speculation where
St. Bonaventure left off.
In his answer to the first objection St. Bonaventure approaches the question of grace and merits from the viewpoint of
the objection which denies the certitude of hope because no
certitude is to be had from grace and merits, from which hope
springs. To this objection he responds that although from
merits we do not have certitude as through necessary scientific
knowledge, nevertheless we can have a certitude through a
probable conjecture and through some confidence of the good
will itself. 87 In another place he explains more fully his opinion
concerning the relation of merits to hope. In the first place,
hope as a virtue does not arise from merits. Secondly considered as an act hope does spring from merits. Considered as
a state it arises from preceding and concomitant merits. Considered from the point of view of the thing hoped for hope
arises from preceding merits. 88
88

Ibid., a.!!, q. 8.

Finally to the objection which contradicts the certitude of
hope because our salvation depends to some extent upon the
human will, St. Bonaventure responds with a distinction which
St. Thomas also used in answering this same objection. The
objection would be valid, he asserts, if he were to consider the
will merely in itself, but here we consider it in as much as it
•• Ibid., ad Sum, Cum igitur dicitur, quod spes habet certitudinem in suo actu;
dicendum quod hoc est verum de certitudine ordinis, quia efficaciter et infallibiliter
vera spes ordinat ad salutem.
87 Ibid., ad lum.

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WALTER M. CONLON

adheres to God who is our strength. Thus the certitude of hope
depends upon God rather than upon the human will.

IV.

EARLY DoMINICAN

ScHOOL

1. Richard Fishacre

Among the Dominicans in England we find this subject discussed by Richard Fishacre in his unedited commentary on the
Sentences. 89 The doctrine is not very extensively developed in
this work. Beginning with the definition of the Master of the
Sentences, he first points out that hope may be considered from
the point of view of the virtue itself, or of the thing hoped for,
or of the act of hope. Then he proceeds to compare the two
classical definitions, namely that of the act and that of the
virtue. The virtue of hope had been defined as a courage of the
mind conceived in regard to the bounty of God of having
eternal life through good merits. In the definition of the act of
hope grace and merits had been placed as the causes of hope.
Consequently, by comparing the two definitions this English
scholar concluded that by the grace of God in this case was
meant His bounty. Hence, hope is generated by the consideration of divine liberality, or bounty, and by the consideration of
our merits. St. Thomas also used this interpretation of the word
" grace " in the definition of hope.
Richard Fishacre then contributes an explanation of the
words of the definition of hope as an act. Hope is a certain
expectation of future beatitude coming from grace and preceding merits. Thus, it is an "expectation" to distinguish hope
from " apprehension " in Heaven; it is " certain " in opposition
to "hesitation "; it is directed towards "future beatitude " as
opposed to natural hope, which is not a virtue; it is concerned
with " beatitude " in opposition to servile fear which is an
expectation of future mercy; it springs from grace," that is,
the goodness of God, and is thus opposed to despair which con89 Ricardus
Fishacre, Sententiarum Libri Quattuor (Lateran
Vatican Library, Ms. !t94. ft. !t88 and !t84).

Section of the

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siders only severity; it also springs from " merits " and consequently is opposed to presumption which considers only the
benignity of God. The author then pursues a long discussion
on the notion of the priority of merits to hope. Further on he
gives an explanation of the manner in which merits are a cause
of hope and its certitude. It might be thought that a consideration of our merits would excite pride rather than hope, and
would weaken our hope instead of causing it to be more certain.
Consequently, it was necessary to distinguish. Thus, he says,
merits can be considered in two ways. They can be considered
as being in us and from us, but principally from God. Considered in this manner they excite hope. But if merits are
considered from the point of view that they are in us and not in
others, then certainly they excite pride, as was the case with the
Pharisee in the gospel who said" I give thee thanks that I am
not like the rest of me." Hence, considered in the first sense,
merits are truly a cause of hope which has been described as a
certain expectation coming from merits, that is, it is a virtue
by which future beatitude is expected, which expectation, as an
act. comes from the consideration of merits.
Finally, he gives a brief indication of the nature of this certitude caused by grace and merits. He does not distinguish, as do
most of his contemporaries, between the certitude of the intellect and that of the affection. He distinguishes a twofold certitude. One is the certitude of science or vision; the other is
the certitude of opinion. Opinion is the acceptance of one side
of a contradiction with fear of the other; the certitude of opinion is greater than doubt or hesitation, but less than science or
vision. Consequently, the certitude spoken of in the definition
of hope excludes hesitation and doubt and likewise vision.
Hence, fear always exists with hope. Thus the certitude of
hope, according to Fishacre, is a certitude of opinion, greater
than doubt but less than science or vision. This is a somewhat
different explanation from those we have already seen. It is
not, however, a profound treatment of the subject, and consequently adds little to the progressive development of the doc-

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trine which we have noted in other authors. A little later
another English Dominican, Robert Kilwardby 40 went further
in the explanation and definitely stated that the certitude of
hope was a certitude of order. However his writings most probably had no influence upon St. Thomas.
2. Disciple of Philip the Chancellor
The author of the marginal notes in the Vatican Manuscript
no. 691 41 was greatly influenced by the work of Philip the
Chancellor on this subject. His distinctions and reasons, indeed,
are those of the Chancellor. In the beginning, he clearly distinguishes between faith and hope and places each in its proper
subject. Even before treating the problem of the certitude of
hope he had done away with the difficulty which arose from
confounding these two virtues.
Like Philip, he points out that it seems to be a mistake to
apply certitude to hope since certitude is in the intellect. In
order, then, to explain this certitude he distinguishes a threefold certitude. The first is the certitude of separation, which is
opposed to fear, and is had in Heaven; the second is an affective
certitude opposed to despair, and this pertains to hope; finally,
there is the certitude of faith which is opposed to doubt. Thus
the certitude of hope is an affective certitude. It may however,
be explained in another way. There is that certitude which
concerns the fact that the man who is good finally will obtain
eternal life; this is the certitude of faith. There is the certitude
concerning this proposition that if a man is good finally he will
obtain eternal life; this is the certitude of, faith in as much as it
is generative of hope, and hence is called the certitude of hope.
Lastly, there is the certitude of eternal life already possessed.
Thus, according to the author of the marginal notes on the
manuscript, the certitude of hope is the mean between the certitude of faith and the certitude of eternal life already possessed.
' 0 Robertus Kilwardby, Commentarium in Sententias (Merton College, Oxford,
Ms. L. I, 8. Folio 186).
41 Lateran Section, Vatican Library, Ms. 691.

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At this point a doubt is proposed concerning the possibility
of expectation being certain since even the person in charity
can fall, and since no one is certain that he will persevere. If it
is objected that the certitude of hope is conditional, that is,
depends upon the condition " if one should persevere," then it
should be noted that hope cannot place a condition since hope
is in the appetitive power and it pertains to the intellective
power to place a condition. In the face of these conflicting
objections, the author responds unhesitatingly that the certitude of hope is conditional. Nevertheless, this condition is not
placed by hope, but by faith and hope has it from faith. This
condition seemed necessary to him since, as he says, no one is
certain of having eternal life unless through revelation, and also
since fear always exists with hope. It is the old theory of con..,
ditional certitude. In spite of his clear distinction between faith
and hope this author is still confounding the real nature of the
certitude of hope. Although he does not mention the term, this
treatment as a whole indicates that the author is confusing the
certitude of order with the certitude of event. If indeed the
certitude of hope was a certitude of event then he would be
quite right in stating that it is conditional and not absolute.
The mistake, therefore, concerns the nature of the certitude.
Since for him the certitude of hope is conditional, he easily
dismisses the difficult objection concerning the praescitus who
has hope at present but will not attain salvation. If the certitude of hope were absolute, this objection would seem to negate
it entirely, if this certitude had for its object a future event.
Consequently the author quite logically dismisses the objection
by stating that the certitude of hope is conditional, that is,
eternal life will be had if one perseveres.
This theory, however, would not seem sufficient to cope with
the question of the relative greatness of the certitude of a predestined person not in charity and the certitude of hope is a
praescitus who possesses charity. It would seem that if the
certitude of hope were conditional then each would have an
equal amount of certitude. But the author asserts that the

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expectation of formed hope is more certain than that of unformed hope. Therefore it would appear that in
case the
praescitus possessed greater certitude of hope. He distinguishes, however, a double certitude in the expectation of hope.
In the first place there is that certitude which springs from
merits actually possessed, and from this point of view the
praescitus has greater certitude. However there is another certitude regarding the thing for which we hope and this certitude
exists in the eternal deliberations. Considered in this way the
certitude of hope is greater in a predestined not in charity than
in a praescitus with charity. St. Thomas likewise answers this
difficulty by means of a distinction, as we will see, but it is a
different distinction, and is founded upon a different notion of
the nature of the certitude of hope.
This manuscript contains
same distinctions concerning
the notions of hope, expectation, and desire, and the same distinction between the expectation in longanimity and that in
hope which we have already seen in the Summa de Bono of
Philip the Chancellor. Concerning the definition of hope his
explanation does not differ greatly from those we have seen.
He merely reasserts what many have said, namely that the
definition of Peter Lombard is a definition of the act of hope
rather than the virtue. Consequently, the definition of hope
does not say what hope is, but what hope does. Hence the
words " coming from grace and merits " do not refer to hope
itself but to the act of hope. The merits referred to do not precede the hope, but rather the expectation, or the act of hope.
When it is said that hope is an expectation coming from grace,
the term " grace " may be understood either as hope itself
which is grace of God, or as faith by which the movement of
faith and consequently of hope is elicited, or as a consideration
of the grace of God by which is meant His bounty and liberality.
Again, when it is said that hope is an expectation coming from
merits, the term" merits" may be understood as a consideration either of the merits which one actually possesses now or
those which he proposes to have in the future. Hence the act

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or movement of hope arises from the consideration of the
bounty of God and of our proper merits.
Since, however, hope is a certain expectation coming from
grace and merits there would seem to be a difficulty concerning
unformed hope. It appears that unformed hope does not proceed from merits and, consequently, it would lack certitude.
This author replies to this by distinguishing the consideration
of merits. Merits, he says, may be considered in two ways. In
the first place we can consider merits as they actually exist in
works, and it is in this sense that they are understood when we
say that formed hope is a certain expectation. We can consider
merits as they exist habitually in habits,· or materially in free
will which is capable of being informed by grace and of being
moved meritoriously. In this sense unformed hope proceeds
from merits.
3. Hugh of Saint Cher
In the unedited Commentary on the Sentences written by the
Dominican Cardinal, Hugh of St. Cher, 41 " there is a striking
similarity to the works of some of the authors already treated.
His explanation of the definition and of the fundamental
notions of grace and merit, for example, is couched in almost
the exact words as the explanation of the aut}10r of the Marginal Notes on the Vatican manuscript no. 691. There are,
similarities to the works of Philip the Chancellor and Richard
Fishacre. However, the work of Hugh of St. Cher is not just a
repetition of the conclusions of preceding scholars.
In the first place, he clearly distinguished between faith and
hope and between hope and charity. While all the theological
virtues have the same finis in quo, they are distinguished by
their different fines quo. (This explanation has been noted
before in the Summa Aurea of William of Auxerre.) Hence
there is a threefold difference. They differ according to their
proper acts because the act of faith is assent, that of hope is
""Hugo a S. Caro, Commentanum in Quattuor Libros Sententiarum (Manuscript in Lateran Section of the Vatican Library, Ms. 1098, f. 108).

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trust, and that of charity is love. They also differ according to
their subjects for faith is in the reason, hope in the irascible
appetite, charity in the concupiscible appetite. Again they differ
according to their objects for faith is concerned with truth, hope
with the arduous, charity with good.
St. Augustine had said that hope differs from faith in this
that faith is directed towards our own good and also the good
of others, but hope is concerned only with the good of the one
hoping. This point of discussion is not of importance here, but
the response of Hugh of St. Cher is important. Since the statement of St. Augustine seems to have met with some opposition
this author undertook to explain his meaning. In doing so he
cites the opinion of those who distinguish a twofold hope,
namely the hope of a thing (spes rei) and the hope of an event
(spes eventus). By the first kind of hope we hope for God or
for eternal life. By the hope of event we hope to be always
with God or to have eternal life. Although it is quite possible
that his famous Summa de Virtutibus et Vitiis was written after
the Commentary on the Sentences of St. Thomas, nevertheless
his exposition of the subject follows the reasoning of William of
Auxerre rather than St. Thomas. His approach to the question
is the approach of the earlier commentaries on the Sentences.
Thus he begins by quoting the definition of the Master, then
proceeds to explain it, and ends by asserting that the definition
is a definition of the act of hope and not of the
Regarding the notion of expectation he points out that just
as in a corporal expectation two things must be considered, so
also in the expectation of hope. First there is the exertion of the
soul towards future beatitude, which exertion depends partially
upon faith. Then there is the permanence in a spiritual place
(loco spirituali) which is God. This explanation of the nature
of expectation is very similar to the one in the manuscript of
Philip the Chancellor. Consequently, one might well expect to
find here an explanation of the certitude of hope equally similar
to that of the Chancellor. However, the resemblance is only
in the broad outline of the notions of certitude. In fact, like

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Hugh of St. Cher, this author contents himself with a mere hope
of a thing while the objection to his statement refers to the
hope of event. Hugh of St. Cher, however, dismisses this explanation because, he says there is no difference between the
hope of a thing and the hope of event. The interesting note is
this reference to the hope of event. As a consequence of it we
would expect to hear Hugh of St. Cher speak of the certitude
of event with reference to hope. However, in his brief references
to the certitude of hope he does not seem to consider this
notion. Instead he offers us an explanation of the certitude of
hope very similar to that of William of Auxerre. He says there
is a twofold certitude, namely the certitude of this life and the
certitude of Heaven. The certitude of heaven is a certitude
of science or of apprehension. The certitude of this life is twofold. One is opposed to ambiguity or doubt. This is the certitude of faith. The other is opposed to despair or diffidence,
and this is that certitude which pertains to hope. Hugh of St.
Cher does not discuss, as do others, the relation of the virtue of
faith to the certitude of hope. He makes no mention of the
nature of this certitude, that is, whether it is conditional or
absolute. Instead he contents himself with the above mentioned
distinctions.
4. William Peraldus
William Peraldus, a theologian of the thirteenth century offers
distinctions which differ very little from those we have seen
before. There is a certitude of knowledge which is opposed
to doubt, and this pertains to faith; there is a certitude oi
trust, which is opposed to mistrust, and this pertains to hope;
finally, there is a certitude of security, which is opposed to the
fear of separation, and this pertains to Heaven. 42 William
Peraldus does not proceed any further with this discussion of
•• William Peraldus, Summa de Virtutibus et Vitiis (Venice, 1497) Tract. II,
num. 1, Item notandum quod est certitudo cognitionis: quae opponitur dubitationi: et haec pertinet ad fidem. Et est certitudo fiduciae: quae opponitur titubationi: et haec pertinet ad spem. Et est certitudo securitatis: quae opponitur
timori desperationis: et haec erit in patria.

8

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WALTER M, CONLON

certitude; his work adds nothing from this point of view. How- r.
ever, in his explanation of the causes of hope we do find something which was not contained in previous works we have seen.
The Master of the Sentences places grace and merits as the
causes of hope. We have seen that the notion of grace was
interpreted to mean the liberality or bounty of God. This
author accepts that interpretation. However, concerning the
other cause, namely .merits, which previous authors have been
satisfied to leave unqualified from this point of view, William
Peraldus proceeds further by reducing it to the justice of God.
Thus while others have reduced the causes of hope to the
bounty of God and merits, this author reduces them further to
the bounty of God and His justice, since the reward depends
upon the promise of God.

v. SAINT ALBERT THE GREAT
Among the afore-mentioned scholars we have seen a predominance of the opinion that hope possessed a twofold certitude, namely that received from faith, and a second which is
proper to itself. Moreover the precise nature of this certitude
which they termed ' proper ' was not clearly defined.
The writings of St. Albert the Great strike an entirely new and
different note in the discussions of the certitude of hope. In the
first place, St. Albert is very hostile to the possibility of hope
receiving certitude from faith; in the second place he explicitly
and vehemently denies that the certitude of hope is conditionaJ.43 In this way, St. Albert cuts himself off completely
from the weight of tradition among his theological predecessors.
Consequently, we find him returning to the fundamental notions
and thence building a new explanation from the beginning.
In the fifth book of his Compendium Theologicae Veritatis,
St. Albert approaches the problem in the way common to the
theologians, that is by starting from the definition of the Master
•• St.
the Great, Ill Sent., d. XXVI, a. 3, Quidam male dicunt, quod accipit
certitudinem a fide; a. 4, Spes nullam apponit conditionem: quia ordo ad finem per
actum semper certus 'est quantum est de se.

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of the Sentences. In this definition, he says, the word " certain " does not signify the certitude of reason (certitudo
rationis) but the certitude of opinion (certitudo opinionis).
While the certitude of reason is a full assent to one side of a
contradiction, the c11rtitude of opinion is an assent to one side,
which is approved by the reason, not approved absolutely but
with some fear or hesitancy regarding the opposite. The principal cause of this particular expectation is the grace of God,
and not our merits, because our works are not meritorious unless
through the grace of God. 44 We have seen the assertion of this
certitude of opinion before in the work of Richard Fishacre. He,
however, did not distinguish so clearly between the principal
and secondary causes of hope, and in this respect even this
work of St. Albert marks progress towards a more satisfactory
solution of the certitude of hope. However, St. Albert's real
contributions are to be found in his Commentary on the Sentences and confirmed in the unedited Summa de Bono.
In the Commentary on the Sentences, St. Albert first determines the precise nature of the certitude of
in general
and then determines the nature and causes of the certitude
proper to hope. He distinguishes a twofold certitude. One is
certitude after the manner of argument in knowledge. This type
pertains to faith and, as we have seen, St. Albert excludes it
from the realm of hope. The other is certitude after the manner
of nature (per modum naturae) and this pertains to every
virtue. Nature, he asserts, is surely more certain in its works
and end than is art. Accordingly, since virtue consents to the
reason after the manner of nature, virtue is also more certain
than art. But in attempting to apply this certitude of nature to
the theological virtue of hope in such a way that it would have
•• St. Albert, Compendium Theologicae Veritatis, Lib. V, cap. XXII, Spes est
certa expectatio futurae beatitudinis ex Dei gratia et meritis proveniens. In hac
diffinitione non sumitur certitudo rationis in qua plene ·uni parti consentitur, sed
certitudo opinionis qua uni parti consentitur, qua ratione probari videtur, nee
tamen omnino, sed cum formidine. Hujus autem expectationis causa principalis est
gratia Dei, et non merita nostra: quia opera nostra non sunt meritoria nisi ex
Dei gratia.

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a certitude proper to itself St. Albert found it necessary to
distinguish the notion of the certitude of nature still further.
First, there is the certitude or efficacy of the habit becoming
more easily moved directly to its act and towards its end.
This is the certitude of virtue, and pertains to each and every
virtue precisely as it is a virtue. Therefore this would not
distinguish a certitude proper to hope. Hence there is another
certitude of nature which St. Albert says is from the efficacy of
the inclination of the habit, and of the cause joined to the
habit. 45
This is surely a new note in this discussion, and to explain it
our author uses the example of fire. H fire is joined to the
cause which generated it and which gives the motion or movement which follows the form, it will rise in a more certain
manner, because then its motion. or movement would follow its
proper form and also the impulse of that which generated the
fire. This, he says, is the certitude which pertains to hope.
It is a certitude proceeding from the nature of the habit and
from its proper cause. Hence this certitude is proper to hope
which proceeds from grace and merits which are the causes of
the certitude. 46 For this reason, hope among all the virtues is,
in a special manner, defined by means of certitude. Thus it can
be seen how St. Albert unraveled the web of conflicting opinions
by adhering closely to the nature of hope and its proper causes.
In this place he does not go into a further discussion of the
causes of hope, but merely states them as grace and merits.
•• St. Albert, Ill Sent., d. XXVI, a. 8, ad !i!um, Duplex est certitudo: una quae
est in modum argumenti in cognitione, et haec competit fidei. Alia quae est per
modum naturae, et haec competit cuilibet virtuti: est enim natura certior arte in
operibus et fine, ut superius diximus: et quia virtus consentit rationi in modum
naturae, ut dicit Tullius, ideo virtus etiam certior est arte. Sed haec certitudo
quae est in modum naturae, est duplex: scilicet certitudo et efficacia habitus
meliorantis ad opus directe et ad finem, et haec est omnis virtutis secundum quod
virtus est. Alia est ex efficacia inclinationis habitus et causae adjunctae ad habitum,
et haec est major: ... et talem certitudinem habet spes."
•• Ibid., Et talem certitudinem habet spes, scilicet ex habitus natura et causa,
quia ex meritis et gratia proveniens quae sunt causa certitudinis: et ideo etiam inter
virtutes specialiter per certitudinem diffinitur.

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However, in another work he states that hope arises from the
divine bounty, from the abundance of merits, and from the
foretaste (praegustatione) of eternal things. 47 Further, he explains that the word" grace" must not be understood as something existing in the person hoping, but rather as a property
to which hope adheres. Hence, grace here does not signify some
created help received into the one hoping, but an uncreated
help which is divine omnipotence and mercy. Moreover, by
means of this help, even he who has not sanctifying grace can
obtain it and so come to eternal life.48 Thus explained, the
principal cause of hope becomes more intelligible and the difficulty concerning unformed hope really disappears.
We have seen that St. Albert excluded the certitude of
judgment or knowledge from hope. The certitude of hope is a
certitude of act and order towards the end. This does not
imply a certitude of attaining the end because, he says, no
virtue possesses such certitude in this life. Therefore St. Albert
likewise excludes the certitude of event from the realm of hope.
This is a very important step forward because the attribution
of the certitude of event to hope caused much complication.
It was this which caused other theologians to assert that the
certitude of hope was conditional. Their assertion of the conditional nature of the certitude of hope was founded upon this
statement which is undoubtedly true in itself, " that no one
knows with certainty whether or not he will attain eternal life
unless he is informed of it through revelation." This statement
is true, but the error was in applying it to the certitude of hope.
In the first place, it refers to the certitude of knowledge by the
words " no one knows," but this type of certitude does not pertain to hope. Secondly, it refers to a future event, the attainment of eternal life, but this likewise is excluded from the realm
of the certitude of hope by St. Albert. St. Albert describes the
•• Compendium Theologicae V eritatia, Lib. V, cap. XXIT, Certitudo spei ex
tribus oritur, scilicet ex divina largitate, ex abundantia meritorum, et ex praegustatione aetemorum.
•• III Sent., d. XXVI, a. S, Non dicit hie gratia habitus in sperant... ""-i potius
proprietatem cui innitur spes ex parte dantis res speratas.

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WALTER M. CONLON

certitude of hope as an (absolute) certitude of order or inclination towards that end founded upon the causes of that in- ,.
clination, and not as a conditional certitude of knowledge
concerning a future event .
. St. Albert's response to the apparent incompatibility of un_formed hope and the idea of merits being a cause of hope is
very complete. It would seem that this hope since it is without
charity could not spring from merits. Against that St. Albert
asserts, that unformed hope, is not without merits; it has them
only in purpose, that is, it proposes to have them. In this
respect, unformed hope differs from presumption which is in
every way without merits. St. Thomas later used this concept
of proposed merits (merita in proposito) to explain the same
objection. St. Albert, however, gives us a fuller explanation
of the concept.
The act of hope may proceed from merits " in proposito " in
five ways. First, merits may precede the act of hope in cause
only, that is, they exist in their cause which is grace. Secondly,
the act of hope can proceed from merits which precede both in
cause and in effect. Thirdly, merits may precede in their cause
and in a purpose of meriting. Fourthly, merits may precede in
their cause together with the merit of another, as, e. g., of
Christ or the Saints. Fifthly, merits can precede neither in
cause not in effect, but in the purpose of merits only. 49 These
five ways apply to the various degrees of hope. The fifth way
pertains to the act of unformed hope, and in this way, he
assures us, even this hope can come from preceding merits.
St. Albert's contribution to the Thomistic solution to the
problem of the certitude of hope was great. It consists, briefly,
in the refutation of previous adverse opinions and, still further,
in establishing the lines of speculation which led to the true
nature of the virtue of hope and the causes of its certitude.· He
dislodged the theory that hope has certitude from faith. Again,
he uprooted the theories which spoke of a certitude of judgment
or certitude of event with regard to hope. As a consequence

a

'"St. Albert, III Simt., d. XXVI, a. 4, q. 2, ad Sum.

THE CERTITUDE

OF HOPE

119

of this he categorically denied the proposed conditional nature
of the certitude of hope. All these were indeed great contributions, but his greatest contribution was the firm insistence
upon the fact that the certitude of hope is a certitude of order
or inclination proceeding through the causes of the virtue. St.
Thomas after him bases his treatment of the subject upon the
same solid grounds. It is true that St. Thomas went even still
further than St. Albert, by explaining the relation of faith to
the certitude of hope, and in giving to the certitude proper to
hope the name, certitude of divine ordination. However, it
would be difficult to say that even St. Albert himself did not
understand the relation of faith and the certitude of hope as
pointed out by St. Thomas. In fact, he clearly asserts that
hope is founded upon faith. 50
WALTER

M. CoNLON, O.P.

Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

(To be Continued.)

10 St. Albert, III Sent., d. XXVI, a. 4, ad lum, Sperans enim habet conjuncta.s
sicut omnis virtus: et hoc non facit ad esse, sed ad bene esse; a. 81, Spes fundatur
virtutes, et secundum quod in ipso spes fundatur super fidem, aliquid recepit a fide.
in cognitione aenigmatica, quae ostendit rem speratam in speculo et aenigmate.
The position of Peter of Tarantasia (Pope Innocent V) on this question is
difficult to understand. His explanation is in many ways similar to that of St.
Thomas, and yet we find him asserting that the certitude of hope is conditional.
However the work of this author as a whole follows the line of the traditional
Augustine rather than the new Aristotle. Cf. Commentarium in Sententias, d.
XXVI,
also Grabmann, Storia della Teologia Cattolica, p. 88-84.

BOOK REVIEWS
Cicero in the Courtroom of St. Thomas Aquinas. (Aquinas Lecture 1945.)
By E. K. RAND, Pope Professor of Latin, Emeritus, Harvard University. Milwaukee, Marquette Univ. Press, 1946. Pp. 114.
The justly eminent Latin scholar, Professor Rand, author of Foundera
of the Middle Agea and many critical studies on classical and late Latin
authors, presented a purely personal commentary on certain aspects of the
Summa Theologica as the Aquinas Lecture at Marquette University in 1945.
It is based on a study, apparently not of the text, but of citations and
passages supplied from the Concordance which Dr. Deferrari and Sr. Inviolata, C. D.P., are working on at the Catholic University. He anticipates
adverse criticism and possible disaster, "partly from my ignorance of the
Summa Theologica in its whole extent,. partly because I purposely neglected
to examine . . . what the authorities of our day have said about St.
Thomas." (p. 3.)
Professor Rand sought to enliven what might have been a very dull
and pedantic piece of work by the extended use of a rather striking figure.
The Summa Theologica is a courtroom; St. Thomas, or rather Veritaa, Truth,
is the judge; and the host of authorities, sacred and profane, that St.
Thomas cites in the course of his work are witnesses to Truth. Thus Cicero
appears not as a culprit to be convicted or acquitted of the intellectual
crime of error, but only as a witness. The burden of the lecture is not a
critical study of the philosophical thought of Cicero in the light of St.
Thomas, but rather the urbane comments of a true gentleman educated in
the liberal arts in the Nineteenth Century on the liberal education of a
Christian gentleman of the Thirteenth Century as revealed in his wide
acquaintance with and discriminating use of the liberal arts as cultivated by
a gentleman of the first century before Christ. In his far from unsympathetic approach to St. Thomas and his genial observations, Professor Rand
reveals himself not only as a scholar but also as a person of cultivation
and education in the best sense of the term. Within the field of his own
competence, and he is the first to disclaim pretensions in any other, his
lecture abounds in remarks of a sort seldom heard in intellectual circles
outside the School.
On the use of authorities, he pays tribute to St. Thomas' phenomenal
memory and his ability to draw from the " deep well " whatever suited his
purpose. " For the moment St. Thomas is interested not in the source, but
in the element of truth that it may contain. He follows Ovid's maxim:

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121

Faa est et ab hoste doceri." (p. 68.) This is a handsome admission when
we remember how many of Professor Rand's colleagues and contemporaries
dismiss the Schoolmen as mere parrots, " apes of Aristotle," addicted to
ipsedixitism. Nor has he the myopic regard for footnotes characteristic of
German scholarship, for he remarks of St. Thomas, " He often will quote
like a gentleman, that is, inexactly, nor was he obliged-oh happy age!to verify his references, or to give them nicely." (p. 7.)
He finds St. Thomas a liberal gentleman, widely read in the Latin classics,
with a sense of humor (p. 20) for whom the liberal arts are" obviously, a
fixed part of his thought." (p. 16.) "St. Thomas is a Christian humanist,
like that good householder of whom Our Lord speaks, who drew from his
treasury things old and new. The treasury from which St. Thomas drew
was his well-stocked and retentive and harmonizing mind." (p. 85.)
On the Latinity of the Summa, in place of the condescending or critical
remarks we might expect from a man of his classical background, Professor
Rand finds that the Latin style of St. Thomas while not Ciceronian-" why
should it be "-has a "clarity, simplicity, and nobility" of its own. "His
style has the dignity, and sometimes the technical exactness, of Cicero's
periods." (p. 24.)
He gently derides the misconception that the Schoolmen were mere
syllogizers, juggling " therefores " and " whereases " into a childishly imposing pile they called science, the misconception found, among others,
in Thatcher and Schevill's Europe in the Middle Age. He finds St. Thomas
more interested in uncovering the truth by distinguishing the senses of
words and definitions.
He is quite taken with the nicety and precision of the terms St. Thomas
chooses for various things: the word annexae to designate the semiautonomous character of the virtues " allied or affiliated " to justice; the
word pietaa, loyalty, for the virtue by which we reverence both parents
and country, thereby paying the debt we owe them for benefits received;
the term " magnanimity " in place of the Ciceronian fiducia, trust;
" gratitude " in place of the ambiguous grace.
We find that St. Thomas did not view rhetorical skill with contempt, but
labored with loving care and pleasure over the elaboration of his arguments.
He took pleasure in his work and found the highest kind of delight hi the
contemplation of wisdom, both human and divine. He depended heavily on
the De Inventione in his discussion of the ancient virtues, citing it over
seventy times, with more than ordinary approval on occasion. The reason
may be that he " felt a certain Aristotelian strength beneath the elegant
and conveniently quotable phrases of Cicero." (p. 47.)
St. Thomas by his use of Cicero does not bestow on him unqualified
approval. His concept of the passions is refuted along with the other ideas
of the Stoics and his metaphysics in the Tusculan Disputations is passed

BOOK REVIEWS

over with the silence of charity. It is chiefly in the fields of ethics and
rhetoric that Cicero is brought forward as a truthworthy witness.
Of the Summa itself, Professor Rand finds that it is not an outline, a
summary or a collection of what other people had to say, as was the
Sentences of Peter Lombard. St. Thomas was "a humble seeker for the
truth wherever it may be found, hospitable to physical science as well as
heavenly, ever sharpening his mind and acquiring the calm of wisdom.
Behind it all is the peace of God that passeth understanding."
(p. 65.)
An observation like that on St. Thomas could come only from a heart naturally good which benevolent love had rendered sensitive and sympathetic.
Finally, Professor Rand in describing the pedagogical perfection of St.
Thomas desctibes him as a teacher "who to awaken young minds to the
truth of God, besought God's help in setting forth his subject clearly. God
granted the fulfillment of his design." (p. 68.)
There is one gem which the temper of the age makes particularly appropriate. Speaking of the Rhetorica of Cicero, Professor Rand writes, " The
work begins with a famous encomium of rhetoric in which the author
declares that philosophy without eloquence is of little profit to the statenaturally when the philosopher cannot utter his thoughts intelligibly-and
correspondingly, that eloquence without philosophy is often of positive harm
and never of any profit .... " (Inst. Orat. III l. 20.)
The metaphor with which Professor Rand clothed his remarks is an
intriguing one, for in introducing Cicero into the court of St. Thomas he
has arraigned St. Thomas before a higher court of scholars and learned
Humanists, and has arraigned himself in judging St. Thomas before a board
of Thomists, who in their turn can be tried. And so the figure spirals
upward out of sight. Professor Rand's verdict is one that does honor to
St. Thomas and himself, for he finds much to praise and little to blame in
St. Thomas. Would that the verdict of this court were the same. However,
in view of the many extenuating circumstances and the obvious good-will
of the defendant, there has been entered a strong plea for clemency.
Professor Rand has been betrayed by his own rhetorical device into
expressions that give a wholly inadequate, and therefore misunderstandable,
impression of the tremendous vitality of the assimilative and synthetic,
not eclectic, power of St. Thomas' mind. He says, indeed, in so many
words, that St. Thomas did not merely collect the opinions of ·other people;
but against that, he depicts St. Thomas as a mere arbiter between opposing
thinkers, and what is far worse, their verbalisms. Does St. Thomas'
ar.gument depend on their authority, so that it becomes true to say," ....
despite St. James' famous declaration . . . . and despite two utterances of
St. Augustine, St. Thomas' only evidence in support of his thesis is
Cicero's definition of religion in the De lnventione? " (p. 31.) · St. Thomas'
decision does not rest upon this or that author, but his use of this or that

BOOK REVIEWS

author, in the sed contra particularly, depends upon two factors, or rather
upon two aspects of one all-important norm, the Truth. He not only knows
what the conclusion will be according to the truth before he sets pen to
parchment or begins dictating; but he is also a skillful teacher and must
manifest the truth of his conclusion to other lesser minds. Thus to integrate and correlate the doctrine he may be propounding at this particular
moment, he introduces what is most appropriate from the store of words,
phrases, axioms, authors, definitions, examples, and the like that his students
should have gathered in the preparatory course in the arts, grammar, logic,
and rhetoric, and which were the common intellectual equipment of his
time. Thus his authorities and their dicta are manipulated with all the
skill of an impresario in order to make truth as striking, as attractive, as
unforgettable as possible. There is drama in the Summa Theologica but not
the casual sort one finds in a courtroom. "St. Thomas' decisions ....
rest upon a search for the meanings of words. . . ." (p. 66) is another unhappy phrase which might deliver St. Thomas into the hands of his bitterest
enemies, the Nominalists, and the bitterest enemies of all truth and reality,
the semasiologists. Nor can we roundly assent to the statement, "He is
philosophos at the last because he was philologos at first." (p. 67.) His love
of words is always the effect, not the cause, of his love of wisdom, and his
only interest in words is to adorn his only love as appropriately as possible.
The ignorance of the whole of the Summa Theologica and its objectives
that Prof. Rand has ingenuously confessed-all the more lamentable because he has shown himself so well-disposed and worthy of a happier fateis borne out again and again. We read," the theological part of the Summa .
. . ." (p. 32) ; " .... one will find what many had to say and what true
doctrine is in the S. T. But the flavor of the work is philosophical rather
than theological . . ." (p. 65) ; ". . . Moreover . . . his philosophical structure reposes on a foundation of law. Feeding on Justinian and many other
books of law, he tries cases and makes decisions : .. " (p. 66.) Anything of
law in St. Thomas' diet was by way of dessert, his staples were the Sacred
Scriptures, the Fathers, and Aristotle. The surprise he professes (p. 36) on
discovering that religion is not a theological virtue, unless assumed for the
purpose of the lecture, must derive from a rather naive concept of " theological " drawn from an incautious and too restricted dependence on the primary
meaning and derivation of words. The same trust in obvious meanings
leads him to confuse the elevated delight which the intellectual faculties
derive from their proper operations with the sensible joy and pleasure that
the body derives from recreation and games. " Metaphysical speculation
itself did not always, for him (St. Thomas) mean strenuous intellectual
exercise; it was also a joyous pastime." (p. 59.) There is no reason why
intellectual exercise, even strenuous, cannot be delightful; the more strenuous up to a certain limit, the more joy, just as in physical exercise. How-

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BOOK REVIEWS

ever, it was never a pastime for St. Thomas; life was all too short to waste
even a single moment, as witness the incident of the supper with Louis IX.
Except that they are distortions of the perfection of St. Thomas, these
are trifling matters since Dr. Rand enjoys no particular authority in these
fields. But there are graver charges drawn from those spheres of learning
in which he enjoys the greatest renown. A Thomist would hardly translate
utile as distinguished from honestum as " expedient " (p. 25) ; this peculiar
phrase " motions of the will which reside in the intellect. . . ." comes from
• . . . passiones animae aunt in appetito sensitivo, simplices autem motua
voluntatis sunt in intellectivo. . . . ; the recent war fervor led him to
render, Latrocinia nullam habent infamiam, quae extra fines civitatis cuiusque civitatis fiunt as "those high-way robberies that are committed
beyond the borders of the state." (!) These are schoolboy errors "which
would be stigmatized with our red pencils in students' exercises." The confusion that results from his discussion of the cardinal virtues in Cicero, St.
Thomas, and Aristotle is inexplicable coming from so learned a scholar
as Dr. Rand. To put it as succinctly as possible, he takes Aristotle's sophia
as Cicero's prudentia and as St. Thomas' prudentia, and he calls it wisdom,
the first of the moral .virtues. St. Thomas' wisdom as a Christian virtue
disappears as one of the gifts of the Holy Spirit; Aristotle's phronesis also
disappears. One would hesitate to contradict Dr. Rand were the distinctions
not so clear in both Aristotle and St. Thomas. Thus Aristotle enumerates
and describes the five intellectual virtues, speculative wisdom, sophia, knowledge, episteme, intuition of first principles, nous, art, techne, and practical
wisdom or prudence, phroneais. It is the last that is the cardinal or moral
virtue. St. Thomas admits that prudence can be taken in a wide enough
sense to include any human knowledge, speculative or practical (II-II,
q. 47, a. 2, ad 2) and thereby include rhetoric, dialectic, and physics, but he
does not approve of so stretching it, ". . . . as to its use the act of speculative reason . . . . falls under the direction of prudence; but as to its
specific nature, according as it is compared to its object, necessary truth, it
does not fall .... under prudence." And St. Thomas prefers to speak of
things according to their specific natures. Thus St. Thomas' tract on prudence is the parallel of Aristotle's on phronesis. Nor does he make Aristotle's sophia as a Christian virtue, " arguing that wisdom is one of the
gifts of the Holy Spirit." (p. 26.) He most emphatically distinguishes the
virtue of wisdom-sophia from the gift by showing that each is supreme in
its own order, one in the natural, the other in the supernatural. (II-II,
45, 1.)
Finally, Professor Rand implies that St. Thomas follows Cicero's opinion
that the cardinal virtues will not persevere after death, and was led thereby
to minimize the value of the Summa in the light of eternity, leaving it
unfinished. We have this infelicitous passage, "Where then are those neat

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125

definitions in the De Inventione on which St. Thomas had built so many of
his arguments? Viewed in the light of Cicero's own words . . . . the careful
structure of the sum of all rhetoric and of all theology crumbles. Perhaps
St. Thomas felt that if he made his masterpiece a perfect all-inclusive
whole, he would have imprisoned God, not worshipped Him." (p. 70.) ·
Far from crumbling in the light of eternity, the habits of knowledge and love
acquired in this life are the foundation on which the glory of the next
is built, for not only will we use the ideas stored in our intellect but their
quality and quantity will be an accidental and extrinsic glory. One of the
prized distinctions even in Heaven will be the aureole of a teacher, a
Doctor. And in Heaven too the moral virtues will fulfill their purpose most
completely and consequently most perfectly.
But, of course, Professor Rand knows all this already. He died in October,
1945. It is with genuine regret therefore that we make him the target of our
strictures; yet, these may serve to assist fellow scholars to approach St.
Thomas with care and preparation. Like Apelles of old, Sutor, ne supra
crepidaml
IGNATIUs McGuiNEss, 0. P.

Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

Marxism and the Democratic Tradition. By A. LANDY. International Publishers, New York, 1946. Pp. flflO; suggested readings.
This is a volume of which a reviewer might well say that it is consistent,
logical, clear, and faithful to historical facts, of which a great number are
cited. To do this would be to do no more than the author has done in his
presentation of his thesis; that is to say, it· would give an utterly false
picture of the book, just as the book gives an utterly false picture of history.
If any more proof were needed for the thesis that it is interpretation, and
not factual presentation, which makes convincing and readable history, this
book might well serve to give that proof.
From the foregoing remarks, it will be noticed that a review of this book
from the aspect of accuracy would be impossible; a review must be written,
therefore, which will examine the writer's approach to his subject, and his
handling of what are admitted to be, in almost every case, historical facts
of proven accuracy. It would be satisfying, perhaps, but somewhat childishly
so, to point out that Blackstone's Commentaries were first published in
1767, and could not, therefore, have been used by that gentleman, as Mr.
Landy would seem to indicate on page 84, as a means of inspiring against
the sentiments of the French Revolution. Such lapses are rare, and do not

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BOOK REVIEWS

substantially affect his argument. It is the argument itself which deserves
serious consideration.
Mr. Landy's theory, an unfairly simple theory, is that the roots of the
modern democratic notion are to be found in the British Revolution of
-1648. By observing similar or identical elements in later revolutions, he
arrives at a consideration of present-day Marxism, which he declares was
present in all these revolutions, at least in embryo. The obvious answer to
this contention-that Marxism certainly was two centuries younger than
the Revolution of 1648-is not the best answer, for it fails to consider
seriously Mr. Landy's main assumption. Since it is upon this assumption
that the whole work is based, a consideration of any such apparent inconsistencies should be subordinated to a consideration of the assumption. It
might be remarked, parenthetically, that Landy seems to attach a mystical
significance to 1648, perhaps because that is a period ·of revolution exactly
two hundred years earlier than the appearance of the Communist Manifesto.
The year 1649 or 1689 would have served his thesis equally well, even
though he produces numerous reasons for the earlier year.
Mr. Landy's assumption, made prior to writing his book, and apparent in
its pages by implication only, is that communism and democracy are
historically synonymous. This assumption gives him a remarkable advantage in viewing history; wherever he finds elements which are clearly
communistic--by which he means elements which show a conformity to
Marxian Communism-he labels them democratic. Wherever he finds democratic elements which are clearly not related to any Marxist notions, he
labels them bourgeois corruptions. This historical method has one enormous
advantage: it is the essence of simplicity. That it leads to all sorts of
eel-like wriggling to avoid obvious conclusions is beside the point. It might
be equally clear, and it would certainly be equally true, to say that Mr.
Landy is a
writing a history of democratic movements in the
Communist fashion, for the purpose of giving Marxian Communism a
respectable genealogy so .that it may be better qualified to convince nonCommunists 6f its essentially benevolent and venerable qualities.
In support of his thesis, Mr. Landy must describe Jefferson as a true
democrat-or communist-who fell away from the communist faith late
in his life; more specifically, when he became President of the United States.
Oddly enough, the same defection is noticed in Napoleon. On the other
hand, those convinced and loyal communists, Paine and Babeuf, were badly
treated, one being practically exiled and the other. beheaded. Is one to
assume that success in politics is always followed by an abandonment of
communistic ideals, and that adherence to those ideals invariably brings
exile or death? Surely this is not the moral intended by Landy, but it is
inescapable on the basis of his presentation.
This volume, then, marred only occasionally by errors of fact (one, that

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Cromwell stood for religious tolerance, could hardly be omitted from any
commentary), is scarcely to be considered histocy. Whenever the facts
threaten to become uncomfortable, they are abandoned. Landy is not the
first, of course, nor is he even close to being· the best, who has chosen to
write history-dominated-by-a-thesis. But this is such an all-excluding thesis
that its value is diminished to the vanishing point. Any person, any
movement, any political event which shows elements approved by the writer
is automatically communistic. As soon as these elements disappear or
combine into different patterns, they are dismissed. Explanations of the
extremely complex and delicate phenomena of history cannot be undertaken
from such an oversimplified intellectual vantage-point. Certainly economics
must be assigned an important place in considering history, but so must
moral, intellectual, and social forces, and they are stubbornly irreducible to
economic bases in a majority of cases. It is in his failure to consider anything but the economic basis of history that Mr. Landy exhibits his decided
limitations as an historian.
In spite of the remarks of the publishers, as carried on the dust-jacket,
however, perhaps Landy did not expect this book to be taken as history
except in the text-book sense. He has appended a two-page list of suggested
readings for those who would like further initiation into Marxist thought.
He has also wisely placed his notes at the end of the book, the proper place
for them since they are not properly notes, but only citations, and would
seriously have impeded the flow of his argument. It is perhaps unfortunate,
then, although certainly enlightening, that the notes are immediately seen to
include a disproportionately large number of books issued by Mr. Landy's
own publishers.
SISTER

The Catholic Univeraity of America,
Washington, D. 0.

MAim: CARoLYN,

o.·P.

BRIEF NOTICES
Neo-Platonism and the Ethics of St. Augustine. By REv. BRUNO SWITALSKI, C. SS. R.,
T. D. Krol Brothers. Chicago, Til., 1946. Vol. 1:
Plotinus and the Ethics of St. Augustine. Pp. 142.
Fr. Switalski presents us with an English translation of his dissertation
presented at the .University of Warsaw in 1938 which incorporates subsequent research on Plotinus. He promises to supplement this work with a
second volume on the influence of Porphyry, the greatest disciple of Plotinus,
on Augustine's moral viewpoints, and thus make a significant and valuable
contribution to the important and complicated problem of the relationship
of Christianity to the contemporary Hellenistic culture.
He neatly delimits the problem by comparing the contributions of the
most prominent representatives of the two cultures, Augustine and Plotinus,
in respect to the norms of morality, eudemonology, aseetical and mystical
life; and, finally, in their treatment of the problems of virtue and of evil,
aretaics and ponerology.
In the first part of his work, he sketches with broad but competent strokes
the main features and the sources, pagan and Christian, of Plotinus' ethics;
and he attempts to sift out the ethical teachings of St. Augustine from their
religious and dogmatic matrix and present them as an ethical system. With
regard to Plotinus and his sources, Fr. Switalski shows a wide acquaintance
with the voluminous literature, and treads his way with calm assurance
through the maze of conflicting interpretations of Plotinus. By proceeding
from an ontological foundation, the Plotinian discussion of happiness makes
the sublimity of the " way of purification " and the degrees of virtue intelligible to us. However, by introducing a new element-that which is beyond
the intellect and inaccessible to reason-Plotinus broke with the rationalistic
and utilitarian ethics of his Hellenistic forebears, and placed a strain on
the imagination which was too great for it, leading in his disciples to
mythology, superstition, and other excesses. For his exposition of the
thought of St. Augustine, Fr. Switalski does well to depend on Portalie in
the Dictionnaire Theol. Catholique, and concludes to the strongly theological
character of St. Augustine's ethics.
In the second part of his work, Fr. Switalski surveys St. Augustine to
find the places where he implicitly or explicitly depends on Plotinus. But
first he shows the influence of the Enneads on the conversion of Augustine
from Manichean materialism, in that they prepared his mind for the acceptance of the sublime doctrines of the Incarnation and Redemption. St.

us

BRIEF NOTICES

129

Augustine exalts and praises the Platonists above all other philosophers, and
regards Plotinus as the greatest of all Platonists. However, Fr. Switalski
qualifies the conclusion of Portalie that no other philosophy gave any real
impulse to Augustine's thought. He admits other influences although none
so predominant as that of Plotinus, whom he equates, at least in the early
period before 400, with the " Platonici " and the " Libri Platonicorum." He
finds literal citations from Plotinus in the City of God and in the Confessions; similarity of ideas in C. Academicos, De Beata Vita, De Ordine,
Soliloquia, De Musica, and in the works against the Manichees. Fr. Switalski, nevertheless, very prudently looks on the argument from similarity
of ideas with reserve, since truth is accessible to the human mind without
external influence, and St. Augustine was gifted with a brilliant intellect.
He concludes his scholarly and balanced study," .... Augustine does not
blindly follow the Neoplatonic philosopher but judges his doctrine in
the light of the authority of the Church . . . . he selected only those
ideas from the writings of Plotinus which were not opposed to Christian
revelation."

Some Illustrations of St. Thomas' Development of the Wisdom of St.
Augustine. The Mu Nu Sigma Lecture 1946. By VERY REv. GERALD
B. PHELAN, Ph.D., LL.D., F.R.S. C. The Argus Press, Chicago, ill.,
1946. Pp. 56.

This slender volume is a lecture delivered at Mundelein College, in which
Dr Phelan proposes to show without in any way detracting from his glory,
how much St. Thomas owes to St. Augustine. The core of the lecture is
the highly unconventional notion of wisdom which is applied to the
teaching of St. Augustine. " St. Augustine's wisdom is not of the order of
philosophical inquiry, nor even of the order of theological science. There
is no surer way of misunderstanding his teaching than by judging it in the
light of purely rational principles or a scientific exposition of revealed
truth. To deal so with the teaching of St. Augustine would be to distort his
thought and to degrade the essentially religious and supernatural character
of his lofty wisdom. Properly speaking, St. Augustine was neither a philosopher nor a theologian. He was a Christian sage .... No! the wisdom
of St. Augustine was not a wisdom of pure speculation or theoretical contemplation of truth. His was a wisdom born of charity, a wisdom of the
sort King Solomon extolled and which made St. Paul so wise. . . ."
This was, in other words, the infused wisdom of the Holy Ghost. There is
then no little inconsistency in the speaker's declaration that St. Thomas
borrowed the substance of this wisdom from St. Augustine, when he could,
and undoubtedly did, imbibe it directly from the same source as St. Augus-

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BRIEF NOTICES

tine, the Holy Spirit. Moreover, it is commonly thought, and Dr. Phelan has
not shown us otherwise, that St. Thomas used St. Augustine precisely in
" the scientific exposition of revealed truth." If there is consequent misunderstanding or " distortion " of St. Augustine, it is hardly on the part of
St. Thomas.
The body of the lecture aims to show how St. Thomas furnished the
wisdom of St. Augustine with a firmer basis in the nature of things than
the philosophy of Plato or Plotinus could provide with particular reference
to two problems, the existence and nature of God, and illumination and
abstraction in the theory of knowledge. Dr. Phelan uncovers the dangers
to which Christian thought was exposed by the concept of the esse of God
as essence, to which St. Augustine was led by his dependence on Platonic
dialectic and terminology as the wings on which to soar aloft to the heights
of ineffable Being. St. Thomas averted these perils by his recognition of
the dynamism of being, and God's esse as the pure act of existing. Similarly
in the realm of knowledge, the inadequacy, and indeed the invalidity, of the
Platonic form and essence and illuminism, which St. Augustine himself
seems to have sensed, is compensated and corrected by St. Thomas' philosophy of being. For St. Augustine, knowledge is vision; for St. Thomas,
it is more, it is a mode of being, of living, a vital activity wherein the
knower becomes the known. Thus purged of the dangers inherent in the
language and method of the Platonist, the substance of the wisdom of St.
Augustine is handed on to future generations to aid them in their quest for
truth.
Dr. Phelan, in extolling St. Augustine and the haunting, heavenly beauty
of his thought and language, has but gracefully woven, not unwittingly
we hope, another garland for the brow of him whom St. Augustine in vision
hailed as his equal, and whom the lecture shows to be his superior, St.
Thomas Aquinas.
Keystones and Theories of Philosophy. By REv. WILLIAM D. BRUCKMANN,
S. T. L. Benziger Brothers, New York, 1946. Pp. fl30.
In his preface, Fr. Bruckmann describes the need of the average student
for a handbook of philosophy which is real and undeniable. But the qualifications of one who would write such a book are also very real and undeniable, and lacking these, the need will remain unappeased. Fr. Bruckmann has rushed in where angels might fear to tread. Designed for students
of Scholastic philosophy, a book like this demands first of all a thorough and
penetrating grasp of the fundamentals of such a philosophy, and precision
in exposing them. Fr. Bruckmann seems unaware that the Holy See has
established such fundamentals, or keystones, in compiling and publishing
the Twenty-four Theses of St. Thomas Aquinas; and if he is aware of them,
his explanations of the doctrine of analogy-fundamental to all philosophy-

BRIEF NOTICES

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and the real distinction is so confused as to be unrecognizable as Thomistic.
Precision and clarity are always desirable in a work on philosophy but
especially in one which undertakes to offer definitions. There are conditions
hardly fulfilled by such statements as that philosophy is " the supreme
natural science" and that it" begins with the science of being or ontology."
The book contains a section entitled " Some Theories of Philosophy "
which attempts to summarize various philosophical aberrations under labels
such as Absolutism, Monadism, Scholasticism, down to Voluntarism. Oversimplification, unless done with the greatest care, almost inevitably leads
to distortion and inaccuracy. Fr. Bruckmann has injudiciously omitted the
restrictive clauses which alone made even the manualists on which he
obviously depends remotely intelligible. Thus without qualification are
grouped together under the heading of Voluntarism: Scotus, Schopenhauer,
Nietzche, Royce, and Pantheism.
Finally in a section entitled "Biographical Landmarks in Philosophy,"
we have a list of thinkers arranged according to the date of their death.
The unwary might infer, among other things, that St. Albert was a disciple
of St. Thomas. Further, each philosopher is tagged with a theory for
purposes of identification. That Charles S. Peirce be impaled on the spike
of Pragmatism is excusable; it is a problem of current discussion. To say
of Grotius that " he laid the foundations of international law " is inexplicable in the very year of world-wide centenary celebrations of the teaching
of Francis de Vitoria. The purposes of Fr. Bruckmann's work demand the
most painstaking of scholarship; they are utterly defeated when truth itself
is contravened.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Aquino, S. Thomas de. Summa Theologica. Ottawa: Studium Generale 0.
Pr., 1945. Vol. V (Supplementum Tertiae Partis). Pp. 587, with index
and Bibliographical Table. $2.50.
Bekessy, E. Barabbas. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1946. Pp. 324. $2.75.
Blau, J. L., ed. American Philosophic Addresses 1700-1900. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1946. Pp. 774, with index. $6.75.
Browne, W. R. Leviathan In Crisis. New York: Viking Press, 1946. Pp.
446, with Biographical Notes. $3.75.
Cassirer, E. The Myth of The State. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1946. Pp. 315, with index. $3.75.
Coerver, R. F. The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues. (The Catholic
University of America Studies in Sacred Theology, No. 92) Washington, D. C.: Catholic Univ. Press, 1946. Pp. 150, with index.
Gonzalez, J. M., 0. P. Biografia del Primer Obispo Chino Excmo. Sr. D. Fr.
Gregorio Lo 0 Lopez, 0. P. Manila: U.S. T. Press, 1946. Pp. 57,
with bibliography.
Gray, J. On Second Thought. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1946. Pp. 264, with index. $3.00.
lngrim, R. After Hitler Stalin. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1946. Pp. 270, with
index. $3.00.
Jones, H. M. Education and World Tragedy. (The Rushton Leatures)
Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1946. Pp. 178. $2.50.
Kayser, R. Spinoza. New York: Philosophical Library, 1946. Pp. 345,
with bibliography. $3.75.
Lowrie, W. ed. Religion of a Scientist. New York: Pantheon Books, 1946.
Pp. 281, with index. $3.50.
Scarlett, W. Christianity Takes A Stand. New York: Penguin Books, 1946.
Pp. 144.
Schneider, H. W. A History of American Philosophy. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1946. Pp. 660, with index. $4.50.
Somerville, J. Soviet Philosophy. New York: Philosophical Library, 1946.
Pp. 280, with index. $3.75.
Stecker, E. A. Their Mothers' Sons. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1946. Pp.
220. $2.75.

Sullivan, F. and Sullivan, M.P. Moreana 1478-1945. Kansas City, Mo.:
Rockhurst College, 1946.
Walsh, G. G. Dante Alighieri. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1946. Pp. 191. $3.00.
Williams, R. J. The Human Frontier. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946.
Pp. 324, with index. $3.00.
Zwemer, S. M. Heirs of the Prophets. Chicago: Moody Bible Institute,
1946. Pp. 137. $2.00.

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