THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS:

THE DoML."'liCAN

FATHERS OF THE PRoviNCE oF

ST. JosEPH

Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.
VoL. X

APRIL, 1947

No.2

TWENTIETH CENTURY APOSTLE

T

HE task of the apostle of Christ remains essentially the
same in every age. Men are to be brought to God, and
God to men; heaven is to be sampled beforehand
through the establishment of the kingdom of God in the hearts
of men; that kingdom is to be eternally possessed in the courts
of heaven. Whatever the age, whatever the risks and difficulties, whatever his labors, the apostle comes to the end of
the road knowing himself an unworthy servant; the fruits of
his apostolate are always so evidently much more God's than
men's. The apostle's harvest field is the heart of a man; only
God can enter there to sow and till and reap.
Still, the Almighty, with divine graciousness, has given the
apostle a part in the accomplishment of the happiness of men.
In the ordinary Providence of God, there are things to be done
by the apostle, indispensable things, things for which he must
answer under penalty of his own eternal life with God. Consequently the apostle must use his human powers to the utmost

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for men, not because God needs him but because, through the
mercy of God, men need him. He must evaluate and develop
the gifts which God has given him; a matter which will be between himself and God, with help normally limited to his confessor, his directors, his superiors, and his friends. As he grows
in wisdom, he may even get much help in this line from his
enemies.
There is, too, the whole objective field of his labors to be
considered: the world he lives in, the men of his time, the
difficulties peculiar to, and opportunities for, his work offered
by the defects and perfections of his age. In estimating this
aspect of his labors, the sources of help to the apostle are
almost unlimited. From this angle, his work is a public affair,
any man of his time may contribute to it. The importance of
a reasonably correct objective estimate hardly needs argument:
knowing his time, his contemporaries, the instruments ready
to his hand, and the obstacles that will be raised against him,
the apostle is in a position to escape that dread which haunts
the truly apostolic heart-the waste of time and effort.
It is to this objective view of the apostolic field that this
study will be directed. An obvious guide, and constant corrective, to such a survey is a sharp contrast with the original
apostolic field into which the twelve chosen ones of Christ
stepped from the sheltering companionship of their Master and
ours. That will be the procedure in this paper. In the full
assurance of the extravagant gifts of divine grace to our times,
we shall concentrate on some of the human aspects of our age
that differentiate the apostle's labors, and on the apostle who
labors among the constantly increasing unbelievers of the
America of our day.

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*

The Apostles might have looked out over their world and
have wondered how to prevent the obliteration of the infant
Church by the crushing weight of paganism, as a modem
apostle might wonder how to avert the submergence of the
Church today under the growing waves of unchristian thought

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and practice. In actual fact, this was not the problem of the
Apostles. Their problem was how to convert a world; not
avert, then, but convert. It could not be otherwise, for the first
is a purely human point of view, edging fearfully towards
despair under the weight of the overwhelming probabilities of
defeat; the second is beyond the reach of a man unless he stand
on the shoulders of God, a prospect alive with hope, with challenge, and vibrant with courage.
The strategy of that original band of Apostles was never
purely defensive because it was never purely human; it was
definitely offensive. It was not negative but positive. They
were not fighting off something nearly so much as they were
bringing something home: happiness to unhappy men, joy to
sad pagans, strength and hope to beaten fighters, relief to men
so miserable they had forgotten there was anything but misery.
Their program was not so much one of reform as of relief, not
so much corrective as informing and inspiriting.
Granted the apostolic heart, it could not have been otherwise.
From the side of the Apostles themselves, they possessed, or
were possessed by, a happiness too big to be imprisoned by a
human heart, even by a divinely enlarged human heart. This is
not, of course, the whole story. While happiness is both openhanded and contagious, it is also sensitive to disapproval and
jealous in guarding its precious sources from misunderstanding
and mockery. Add to their happiness the possession by the
Apostles of a secret too good and too incredible to be kept,
then this thing had to break out of them. Its words could not
be other than would resound down the roads of the world, words
that would be a blending of discovery, long-sought relief,
challenge, and battle.
They were men aflame with a fire that was no less than a
conflagration. It would have been a waste of breath to urge
coolness, calm, prudent restraint lest the fire spread. The
Roman Empire risked its prestige and vast resources in the
attempt to extinguish or at least control the fire; Moses was
wiser to take off his shoes and pray before the burning bush.
For both fires were lighted by God.

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FARRELL

Still, happiness can shrink from too much contact with
despair, secrets can be smothered by scorn, and fires can die
down if fuel is not fed to them, even divine fires if they burri in
the hearts of men. Put all these together, however, and add
one last factor and it becomes clear that there can be no such
thing as a defensive apostle. That last element was the relentless pressure of the divine command: "Go teach all nations."
The Apostles were driven men, driven to a task too big for
the fleeting moments of a lifetime. It was no wonder Paul's
restless feet should pace off the lengths of the long roads of
Rome, that Dominic's impatient sleep should be taken grudgingly and before the altar, that Thomas should drive his mind
at a pace far too fast for his body, and for the minds and bodies
of later centuries. Men so prodigal oflife cannot live defensively.
On the other hand, the plight of the men of their time would
add no comfort to a moment's leisure. In bringing happiness to
men, they were coming to the relief of human misery. The
tired, hopeless, helpless men of their world were in desperate
straits from which only the Apostles could relieve them. This
rescue mission of the Galileans was not to be compared to
feeding the starving, staunching the flowing blood of the
wounded, or cooling the fever of the sick. This condition of
men could be stated only in terms of eternity; humanly speaking, the eternal loss or eternal gain of men rested on the
shoulders of the Apostles.
However breathlessly they drove themselves, their help would
be too late for some. Whatever approach they used, in every
failure they must reproach themselves for the things that
might have been done differently. Nothing purely human in
their own lives could be set up as a rival to this rush to the
relief of the needs of men. Their problem was one of communicating a divine message to the minds and hearts of men.
There is no more heart-breaking work; the message is so
weighty, time so pressing, and the distance so great as it is
between man and man.
Their procedure could not be defensive. The possibilities of

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offensive strategy, on the other hand, are obvious. The Apostles
could bring their message to· men by shouting it, by writing it,
or by living it. All three they did, exhausting the possibilities
for the spreading of truth, as the Church must always do. But
all three were not used with the same emphasis. And this, in
the light of the special difficulties of our time, may be of prime
importance for the consideration of the modem apostle.
The written word was used most sparingly by the Apostles.
There was, of course, the example of the Lord Himself still
vivid before their eyes. He, we are told, began to do and to
teach; but, as far as we know, He never wrote a line beyond the
mysterious scribbling for the benefit of the accusers of the
adulteress. And that was done on sand. Certainly the Apostles
were subject to the inexorable pressure of limited time. The
slow plodding labor of writing could be done by others whose
memory was not bulging with crowded images of the Son of
God made man. The Apostles had seen the Lord; their words
had to show Him to others. Words just do not come out of a
pen fast enough for so lively and pressing a story.
Undoubtedly the time and labor that must go into the writing
of a manuscript and its slow, faulty circulation by tedious copying were factors determining the limitation of the writing of the
Apostles to a few scattered letters and some of the Gospels.
The very low proportion of literacy among the men of their
time, together with the ineffable character of their message,
would obviously tend to put the written word among the lesser
of the apostolic instruments.
The spoken word was a much sharper sword and they used
it, one might almost say, mercilessly. They spoke to individuals, to small earnest groups, to cynical thousands; they spoke
from high hills, in the depths of cellars, in synagogues, and
before judgment seats. Given the slightest opening, they spoke;
often enough, no doubt, where no opening was offered, they
made their own openings. Men within reach of their voices
would not escape without the message of Christ ringing in their
ears.

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Even though the spoken word could not, of itself, boast of
such permanency as is proper to the written word, it was obviously valued much more highly by the Apostles. It has, even
work. There is so
today, virtues that set it apart for
much more of complete life in it that it is never merely the
unveiling of another man's intellectual treasures. In it the
whole man speaks, heart and hands, soul and eyes, face and
the whole vitally alive figure of a man desperately in earnest.
To _resist this word is to do much more than reject an idea; it is
to fight off all that the idea has done to this man.
The supreme power of the spoken word of the Apostles is
better' seen when we remember that that word was not an
apologetic defense but a display in word of temporal and
eternal peace to a worJd that had broken open the outer shell
of worldly peace and found it to be an empty husk. The naked
power of such _a word was supported by such confirmatory
material, from all sources, as was already familiar to the audience. It was driven home by the thundering expositions of
divine power in miracle after miracle worked to attest to the
truth of the word and to shock the minds and hearts of men
out of their complacent or despairing stagnation.
The apostolic speech, then, was a divinely confirmed exposition of the message of Christ at work in the liv:es of the speakers.
For there is nothing so close to life ·as the word that springs
from it; there is no moment of closer approach to the imaging
of the Godhead fro:tn which we sprang than when a word
proceeds from us; no act in our lives more closely approaches
the creative act of God than that by which we breathe the
spiritual life of meaning into the physical vessel of sound.
Our words are the closest image of ourselves, as we are the
physical universe's closest image of God; of all the fruits of
our genius, this word is the closest to being endowed by us
with the breath of the spirit.
The very basis of the nobility of the spoken word betrays its
limitations, as our imaging of God shows forth the infinite
perfection of the original of that image. The most powerful

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APOSTLE

expression of what has laid hold of the mind and heart of a
man is not what he writes or says,
what he does and is.
This, then, was the supreme apostolic weapon of the original
Apostles-their very lives and actions. Short of the grace of
God, it was their life-exposition of the message of Christ that
made the western world Christian. The only limit set to the
use of this instrument was dictated by the Master of life in
setting a time for death. If their words portrayed temporal and
eternal peace on a fascinating canvas, their lives and deeds put
the same message in three dimensions, in a form that men could
view and handle from all angles, a sculpture carved so harmoniously from the stubborn and diverse material of human
lives as to leave no doubt of the divine genius of the Sculptor.
Men read and doubted, they heard and argued, but when they
saw, they fell on their knees. What was true then has been
confirmed in every age; it is not literature, nor oratory, but
sanctity that can bring happiness to men. Sanctity can give
savor to literature, a graciousness and p1ercmg strength to
words, but it is seen only in men.

*

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*

The life to which God's generosity has destined men was not
meant as a substitute, a replacement, or a reversal for the life
for which man's natural powers fit him. It is designed as a
perfection of that natural life. That grace perfects rather than
destroys nature is a profound and absolutely accurate truth, all
of the corollaries of which must be taken in their full, literal
implications. The supernatural life of men on this earth presupposes the soundness of nature within men. In fact, if there
be decay or degradation of nature, that decay must be rooted
out, that degradation corrected before there is any possibility
of erecting supernatural life. No life, least of all a supernatural life, can be built upon rotting foundations; and nature
is the foundation of the supernatural life in men. On this
score, humanly speaking, the Apostles were rather well off.
To reduce the natural prerequisites of supernatural life (the
goal of apostolic labors) to the absolute minimum, we could

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say that they amounted to a wholesomely sound grasp of the
nature of God and of man. In Roman times, the chief defects
centered about the first of these. It must be remembered that
while those times were ' thoroughly pagan, they were not
atheistic. The universal underlying belief of that age did not
include the notion that God was unnecessary. Why this was
so is quite another question; it may have been because of the
experimental knowledge of man's insufficiency, or, more likely,
because the human race was simply not yet old enough in the
west to have reached that level of corruption. The fact is that
rather than eliminating the divine being, the age sinned by
multiplying divinities beyond all reason. But the germ of the
idea of a superior and spiritual being was universal in the
Roman world. The concept was corrupted often to the point
of absurdity (but then every corruption of the idea of divinity
results in absurdity); yet the truth was there, ready to be
uncovered, to be healed, given new life by the words of the
Apostles.
As to the nature of man, there was, it is true, that essential
humanity of man which is the institution
contradiction to
of slavery, accepted without serious question throughout the
Roman world. The contradiction had been seen by the Greek
philosophers long before and met by the simple, and completely
false, stratagem of denying full human nature to the men who
were slaves. They could not be men and be treated in this
fashion,so they were declared to be somehow less human than
their masters. The philosophical difficulties probably did not
seriously trouble the slave-owners of apostolic times; the important point, however, is that this thing of slavery was not
so much a corrupted notion of man's nature as a totally unjust denial to some men of the possession of human nature.
Those who were considered fully human (the ruling group,
owners of slaves, and, generally, all those who were not actually
enslaved) were estimated quite soundly. Thus, it was not
doubted that the mind of a man could attain to truth, grasp it
firmly by reasoning processes, and be sure that it would not

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somehow cease to be true tomorrow or next year. To these
men, there were absolute, unchanging truths which the mind
of man could learn and by which he could direct his life and
his world. It was seen that these absolute truths did not stop
short at the borders of the moral world; that there was an unchanging right and an unchanging wrong, a just and an unjust
thing, virtue and vice. Generally speaking, the free will of
roan-the immediate consequence of this kind of knowledgewas not called into serious question. Consequently the moral
responsibility of the individual was not scoffed at or rejected
but rather was one of the cornerstones of the justice on which
Roman judges prided themselves. That there was some sort of
life after death, with its implications of the spiritual nature of
the soul of man, was generally agreed upon. All of this pointed
plainly to finality for human life; to the fact that there was
some meaning to living, some goal to which a man attained or
short of which he fell and so failed in his living. Authority
might be rebelled against, be bitterly abused by tyrants,
soundly cursed by its victims; but the necessity of authority's
exercise in military and civil life was considered a fact beyond
serious question. In an empire as widely spread as was that of
Rome, there could hardly be any practical doubts on authority
as· a source of knowledge; other men's word had to be taken by
men far removed from the provinces if there were to be any
of these far-flung outposts at all.
All in all, the prerequisites from the side of nature were
fairly ready to hand for the Apostles: a notion of God and an
insistence on a superior and spiritual being; absolute truth,
moral as well as metaphysical; the mind and will of man; his
spiritual soul; life after death; personal responsibility; finality;
authority. These are no small things, as an apostle of our own
age can well testify. They are absolute essentials for the establishment of the supernatural life of men here on earth. Granted
there was much corruption in these ideas, granted that their
application suffered as much in this age as in any other, or
even more, the point is they were there to be built on. The

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Apostles could begin their incredible task with very little delay
in putting down the foundations, very little labor in· removing
the obstacles to the beginning of their building.
In the strictly moral order, there are some completely indispensable dispositions for the supernatural life; so essential, in
fact, that if the apostle does not find them present, he must
establish them before
work can really begin. Again staying
within the limits of the absolute minimum, we might name
these as: 1) courage, at least that spark of courage which is
willingnes&to face the fact of personal responsibility; 2) hope,
at least that shadow of hope that escapes both from completely
smug satisfaction with the present and from utterly despairing
abandonment of the future; 3) moral life, at least that ghostly
silhouette of it that consists of an admission of the desirability
of it for the happiness of men.
On this score, the field was by no means well prepared for
the Apostles. True, Rome had always boasted of courage as
it did of justice. In apostolic times, that courage had actually
degenerated into a purely physical thing as apt to be brutal
stolidity as anything else. On the moral side, personal responsibility was faced, not so much as a matter of couTage as a
matter of resignation in the face of the obvious and inescapable;
it had not occurred to most men to escape it by waving a
denial in its face, any more than they would have set out to
build a road, waving aside the mountains by denying their
existence. As for hope, certainly these tired pagans had little
illusion about the grandeur of their world and their lives. Their
weakness in this regard was not nearly so close to smug satisfaction with the present as to despairing abandonment of the
future and the effort it demanded of them. Weakest of all
would be the moral life of that time as far as apostolic efforts
were concerned; pagan corruption had made the most of centuries of unchallenged decay in the lives of men. Still, the
dream was not entirely dissipated, the ideal was not totally
discarded; however low men might sink, the stars were not
completely out of reach of their eyes though they might be
hopelessly beyond the reach of their hands.

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The Apostles faced the tremendous obstacles of unmitigated
sensuality and its inevitable offspring of cowardice; the victims
of such vices as these cannot but look on God as a threat to
all to which their lives have been dedicated. But, at least,
these men were not proudly self-sufficient, secure in their power
to achieve happiness and perfection of life without external
assistance. In that case, God would have seemed unnecessary.
As it was, they were tired, disillusioned, bitter, sure that they
were not capable of bringing fullness of life, the abundance of
joy, the success of living, to themselves; and not at all sure
that anything or anyone else could make life and its world less
drearily hopeless than it so obviously was to them. They were
weary, disillusioned pagans. Nothing less than infinite power
could come to their rescue. In a blurred, tired way, they
realized that this was so.

*

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Superficially, it would seem that the modem apostle starts
off with many of these apostolic difficulties erased through
the smooth organization of a well established and worldwide
Church. In actual fact, however, the power, organization, and
influence of a worldwide Church is as little comfort to the
modern apostle as the feeble impotency of the infant Church
was a discouragement to the original Apostles. For apostolic
eyes are on the harvest to be reaped, not on the crops already
threshed and safely under cover; the apostle looks now, as he
did in the first century, at the fields outside the present cultivation of the Church.
As the eyes of the twentieth century apostle scan these horizons, he cannot but find them much more humanly hopeless
than were the horizons that stretched before the eager, always
impatient eyes of Peter. The twentieth century apostle has a
road which is much longer than the length of all the roads of
Rome, he has much farther to go, because within his time men
have gone much farther afield and now it is such an intolerable
distance from man to man. Indeed, it is quite possible that his
apostolic life will be consumed in doing little more than estab-

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lishing a starting point. H apostles could be discouraged,
surely this would be grounds enough for refusing to start the
labors that will take the repose out of life: that heart and soul,
mind and body should be worn out only to give men a bare
foothold and, perhaps, to teach them to take the first or second
stumbling step on the long road home.
The audience of the modern apostle is almost totally lacking
in the natural prerequisites for supernatural life. Sound
notions of God and man are either already gone or moving
rapidly to the last stages of decay. These are large statements.
But look at them, conclusively if briefly, from the triple angle
of the modern difficulty, using "modern" here only in the
sense that these were not major hazards faced by the original
Apostles: the difficulty of the intellect, of the will, and of the
physical universe.
On the side of the intellect, there is the staggering denial of
the validity of the proper rational processes which is contained
in the modern axiom of the sole certitude of experimental
knowledge, or knowledge obtained by scientific observation.
Axiom is precisely the proper word, for this point of view is
so taken for granted that a challenge to it seems almost an
anachronistic insult to science. Since the whole purpose of the
perfection of scientific instruments is to lengthen the senses of
man, a limitation of man's knowledge to the fruits of his science
is necessarily a declaration that his knowledge cannot surpass
the sensible world. What is said, believed, maintained in any
way beyond that field of scientific observation, must, on the
face of it, be no more than an assumption, a hypothesis, or an
emotionally dictated point of view; it may be very necessary
for the living of human life, but nonetheless surely devoid of
certitude.
The full implications of this modern axiom become apparent
in the denial of, or agnostic indifference to, the spiritual in man.
The word has not yet escaped from our vocabularies. But it
has been debased to mean little more than the" not immediately
visible"; cats, dogs, and angle-worms are made to feel at home

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under the broad shadiness of its spreading branches. What has
been meant by the word " spiritual," i. e., the immaterial which
is beyond the reach of the senses, is in fact denied. Thus the
intellect itself, along with the whole world of its proper operations, is denied. There is, by way of confirmation, the explicit
insistence on the non-qualitative indifference of ma:p. from the
animals. It is true that this denial may sometimes look like a
benign extension of intellect to the animals; but, from the very
nature of intellect, if it is to be a property of brutes, man has
lost his claim to spirituality, he has lost his mind.
These fundamental attacks on the very nature of man are
left cheerfully in obscurity because they are much too shocking
to be faced boldly by the mind of man. Yet they are made
clear in the not at all obscure rejections of such things as
absolute, unchanging truths, with the consequent enthronement
of relativism.
Sense knowledge is indeed a limited thing. In its specialized,
detailed observations it is a relative thing constantly subject
to correction through the perfection of the instruments of
observation. If it were true that this is man's only source of
knowledge, then it would also be true that man has no absolute
knowledge; that his life must be built on shifting sands. Today's truths are only the material for tomorrow's correction.
If he must build, then he must build on sand; under such circumstances, the man is a fool indeed who insists upon the labor
of building.
Another such modem rejection lies in the field of finality.
Clearly, if there is no absolute truth, there can be no unchanging goal for a man's life; if there is no spiritual world, there is
nothing for a man to aim at above the flow of matter that is
the current carrying his daily life to its inevitable disaster of
death. There can be no end that gives personal meaning to the
individual's life; or if there can be, it lies outside of knowledge
that is limited to scientific observation. This, of course, would
mean that a man is faced with the chaotic spectacle of meaningless existence, that is, of life really gone mad. To escape such

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a thing (for indeed it cannot be faced) there is the sickly substitute of mass goals for personal ones. It was clear from the'
beginning of the modern madness that such sops as" living in
posterity," "living on in one's children," "enduring through
one's works," and so on, really said no more than "when you
are dead you are dead and that's the end of you." The mass
goals-of a race, a party, a class, or a nation-really do little
more for the individual. All of them insist on the tragic· emptiness of individual life, all of them admit that the individual's
life is personally meaningless because it has no personal goal.
The third most pertinent modern rejection from the side of
the intellect is the denial of the truth of man's life after death.
Such a life is possible, of course, only on the basis of the immaterial (i.e., the spiritual) in man. If that be rejected, then
man's life is rigidly fenced in within the bounds of conception
and death. What he can cram into that space is all that he will
get out of life; the loss or surrender of anything that might
have been fitted into that small space is a needless and irreparable loss on some quaintly quixotic grounds that will not
bear hard-headed inspection. Sacrifice is a word that should
pass out of the vocabulary and the practice of men. With the
assurance of complete oblivion at death, men have a guarantee
of frustration at the inception of every action, a precept against
hope in every effort, a foretaste of death in the very vigor of
life.
On the side of the will, the condition of the modern apostle's
audience is hardly less desperate; indeed, it could hardly be
other than equally desperate, since the picture of the will of
man is a consequence of the caliber of his intellect and the
knowledge of which it is capable. For the work of the will is
not to know, but to desire and reach out for the things that are
offered to it by means of knowledge.
It is not surprising, then, that there should be almost an
eagerness to deny freedom of will in men today; to emphasize
biological drives, subconscious influences, and animal parallels
in the examination of human behavior. If man's knowledge is

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limited to the sensible order, if his soul is not spiritual and
immortal, there is no point in talking about free will; there
cannot be such a thing. Hospitals and animal training centers
should take the place of courts of justice and of schools which
make a .pretense of moral training.
There is a rather paradoxical attitude in this matter of freedom that is the result of an inherent contradiction rather than
of any mysterious truth. For while there is a strong resistance
against freedom of will (i.e., against the denial of intrinsic
necessity), there is also a strong insistence on freedom from
external regulation. It is a kind of combination of insistence
on respect of rights and a conviction of helplessness in the
exercise of those rights. Men insist that they are not intrinsically free, and demand that they be extrinsically. free. Strictly
speaking, the idea of external regulation by law should be an
impossibility if there is no intrinsic freedom in man. Instead,
the idea of regulation by authority is seen as a kind of insult
to man; on the ground alleged, it is an absurdity. Man is
pictured as the victim of forces within himself rather than as
a master ruling the kingdom of his soul. The claim really is
that we cannot rule ourselves, since we are not free; we should
not be ruled by others. We are not amenable to rule from the
outside, yet we-are blind to the possibilities of rule from the
inside.
The consequences for morality, at least for the theory of
morality, are fairly obvious. Since there is no freedom, there can
be no personal responsibility. Since there is no personal goal,
there is nothing for which to be personally responsible; without
a personal goal there is nothing contributing to the attainment of
that goal or defeating its attainment, there is no right and
wrong. Morality becomes a shifting thing of social custom
whose violation is a matter of taste rather than of tragedy;
morality has ceased to be the measure of the· humanity of the
action of a man and has become the statement of its social
acceptability. The social goal has supplanted the personal goal,
to the obliteration of the person.

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All this, mind you, may be just theory. With the Romans,
the theory of morality remained fairly intact, though the
practice had sunk to the lowest levels of degradation; with us,
the theory is gone but we have a long way to go before we
catch up with the Roman practice. It would not be nearly so
strange were our theories an attempt to rationalize a degradation that had already set in. The strangeness of our situation is
that we have laboriously erected a framework to make complete corruption look like a rational and acceptable thing; but,
as yet, we have not been able to talk ourselves into utter corruption. A combination of natural goodness and the vestiges
of a Christian heritage has made us, thus far, see the conclusions of our wild reasoning as too foul to be introduced into
our actual living.
Another paradox in the modern moral field is the strange
marriage of a resentment of authority to a slavish eagerness
to have more and more of our lives taken over by authority.
In sharper terills, we have come to resent more and more
strongly the exercise of human authority (the moral authority
that operates through law on the supposition of the mature
responsibility of its subject); yet we are becoming more and
more enthusiastic about the ·extension of an irrational, and so
inhuman authority (the authority that is exercised through
force on the assumption of the incapacity of its subjects to take
care of themselves). This latter authority is tyrannical when
it is selfish; even when it is benign, it is paternal and under it
men cannot be men but must remain forever children.
Probably the modern apostle's audience will not have sunk
to the level of complete sensuality that was common in the
days of the original Apostles. The modern apostle will not, on
the whole, be faced with sensuality's offspring of cowardice, nor
with the frame of mind-the logical consequence of sensuality
and cowardice-that looks on God as a threat to all that life
holds. On the other hand, the audience of this modern apostle
is not made up of tired, disillusioned, nearly hopeless pagans
who have learned the hard way something of the insufficiency

TWENTIETH

CENTURY APOSTLE

149

of man. Rather, it is made up of men and women who, at least
in their younger, more vigorous years, are very sure of themselves indeed. They have a long list of scientific triumphs to
bolster their confidence; and each of those triumphs have
opened up horizons that, to young eyes, seem limitless.
The material progress, and the promise of material progress,
is enough to turn the heads of men standing on much more
solid ground than do our moderns. The millenium seems just
around the corner; the possibilities of progress infinite. In the
exciting maze of detailed progress, no one has time to ask
fundamental questions; there is so much for a man to do and
so little time for the doing, why should anyone stop to ask
reasons for the doing of the things that crowd a man's life
today? To such men-young, vigorous, sure of themselves,
riding a wave of triumph, stretching towards ever brighter and
farther horizons-God is not a threat, He is an unnecessary
encumbrance. It is pride, not fear, that will be the apostle's
great enemy.
With this intellectual and moral background, the audience
of the modern apostle will look out on the world with far
different eyes than did the men and women of the Roman
world. The idea of a superior and spiritual being will not be
universal among these men; rather, it will quite likely be totally
extraordinary. To a great extent, the idea of a Creator will
be a religious luxury and a scientific absurdity. The world, to
thousands of the modern apostle's contemporaries, will seem a
self-sufficient, self-explanatory world, though the explanation
still eludes the more violently curious who pester themselves
with such unscientific questions. Men will not be tempted to
look for the reasons of a. beginning of things that are so fascinatingly diverse in their present manifestations.
The vague
of the beginning is matched by the
vague but general disinterest in the goal. The fact of order in
the world men study is not likely to be denied; but attempt at
its explanation, its meaning, will be shrugged 9ff with considerable impatience. For this order is an order without intelligence;
2

150

WALTER FARRELL

an order extending to minutest details but not to the ends or
goals which would give meaning to the whole. It is order, then,
without meaning, without purpose; so it is the most chaotic
thing that has entered into the ken of man-an order that is
yet chaotic and utterly mad.
In completely brief summary, it should be evident that the
world facing the modern apostle is much less ready for his
message than the world of the original Apostles was 1for theirs,
that the natural prerequisites for supernatural life are almost
totally missing in the modern world. The wholesome grasp of
the notion of God and of man has been so wholly lost that a
proud, young, self-sufficient world feels it can do without God
and can still base its pride on a caricature of men.
This still does not tell the whole story of the unprepared state
of the audience of the modern apostle. There is yet another
factor that might easily have been expected, since it follows so
logically, but which is often overlooked in theoretical discussion; it is, however, immediately apparent in the concrete if
any justice is done to the mind of the audience.
This factor is the effect on the minds of men of a steady diet
of distorted notions of man and his powers. Thus, a completely
honest man with an exclusively scientific background will present an intellectual stone wall to the message of the apostle,
not because he will not listen but because he simply cannot
follow that message. He has developed a blind spot that
it next to impossible for him to follow the ordinary rational
processes employed in philosophical or theological discussion.
Even where the steps are made so small as to be almost mincing, and where he apparently follows each one, he is incapable
of taking the last step to a certain conclusion, convinced that,
since this is not a process of scientific observation, it must end
in a mere assumption.
Something of the same nature will be true of very many
others who have not such concentration on scientific methods
as a source of the one-sided development of their minds. Unchallenged misinformation will have built up such a complete

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151

CENTURY APOSTLE

wall against any other picture of man, or any means other
than the experimental of arriving at truth, that they, too, are
really incapable of following the apostle's message. Among the
less educated, these intellectual blind spots will probably not
exist. But the same result is effectively accomplished by a blind
faith in pseudo-scientific philosophies and their sweeping dogmas, along with a very natural resentment at the discipline involved and the renunciations demanded for the wholeness of
human life which the apostle is championing.

*

*

*

*

*

From the point of view of the audience to be addressed, then,
the twentieth century apostle in America faces a much more
difficult task than met the eyes of the original twelve when
they started out to conquer the world for Christ. What of the
human instruments this modern apostle, like his original predecessors, must use: the written word, the spoken word, and
the life-exposition of his message? The assumption of our times
has been that the triumphs of science· have so perfected these
instruments of apostolicity that they more than balance the
disadvantages that spring from the defects of the modern
audience. Has that assumption any basis in fact?
Beyond question, the apostolic instruments have been tremendously improved since the days of the l>riginal Apostles.
The written word can now be circulated cheaply, quickly,
accurately, and in almost limitless volume. Nothing has been
done, or can be done, to eliminate the slavish labor of writing;
but everything has been done to do away with the limitations
the age of the Apostles placed on the dispersal of the written
message.
By means of the radio, the apostle's voice can penetrate to
the farthest corners of the earth, into the deepest recesses of
the homes of men, and with speed that is almost angelic.
through recordings of the original broadcasts, the same wonder
can be repeated again and again with no further effort; the
apostle's voice can be made to ring out though he be thousands
and thousands of miles away from the broadcasting station;

WALTER FARRELL

indeed, even after he is dead, his living voice can be made to
resound throughout the limits of the world. All the limitations
of the spoken word under which the original Apostles labored
have been done away with except the obviously persistent
obstacle of the diversity of language.
Even the life-exposition of his sacred message can be caught
to some extent by the camera and exposed to the eyes of millions to whom the apostle could not possibly have come in
person. His earnestness, his sincerity, the ringing conviction of
his voice, the flash of his eyes, the power of his gestures can
now be known directly by men and women to whom it was
physically impossible for the apostle to come in person.
Yet, the actual condition of the audience to whom the modern
apostle must speak and write has very nearly nullified these
improvements in the instruments he will use. These apostolic
weapons have been, in effect, reduced to defensive rather than
apostolic, and so offensive, instruments. It is true that the
spoken word today can hardly be escaped by the men of our
time; but the completeness of the corruption of natural truths
has rendered men, to all practical purposes, invulnerable to that
spoken apostolic word. To the modern, it must seem that the
apostle is speaking a totally foreign language. There hardly
seems sufficient reason, in the modern's eyes, for the serious
effort necessary to understand; besides, he is young, eager,
hurried about a thousand details, and the future is so bright!
Undoubtedly this last war has opened the eyes of many a
Catholic to the wall that stands between his mind and that of
his educated contemporaries. Under the grim necessities of
war, the fundamental questions of human life were pushed again
and again before the minds of men; under those same grim
demands, the Catholic was uprooted from his parochial life,
his parish friends, and dropped into the midst of men to whom
he was a stranger indeed. He discovered in astonishment that
a simple, utterly logical, and essential truth cannot penetrate
the fog that has descended on the minds of men; that honest,
sincere, educated men surrender the terrific struggle to under-

CENTURY APOSTLE

158

stand a book that would be no more than slightly serious reading to freshmen in Catholic philosophy. It is not a matter of
of insincerity, of prejudice, but of positive inability which is the fruit of the modern distortion of the minds
of men.
The written word, despite the ease of its production and
circulation, obviously faces the same difficulty of positive incomprehension. Moreover, it is easily escaped. Surely, there is
nothing easier than turning one's back on a particular book
where one is surrounded by millions of books on almost as
many subjects; and books that are so much simpler to read
because they have so little of profundity to make plain. Indeed,
the proudly vigorous modern would almost have to be tied
down to be made to read the kind of book he so badly needs.
The apostle's written word is not read by the audience to whom
he addresses it; the apostle's spoken word, if listened to, cannot, for the most part, be understood by the audience to whom
he speaks.
The one apostolic instrument that has come down to us with
its effectiveness comparatively unimpaired, perhaps even increased, is that of the life-exposition of the message of Christ by
the apostle. It is still true that doubt and argument are difficult things to foster in the face of the factual evidence of this
man's life. In fact, there is in the heart of every man a champion of all the apostle is advocating; for the apostle's life is a
fulfillment of the desires that are at the root of all the efforts,
the hopes, the struggles of men. Men know what they want
when they see it before their very eyes in the life of another
man. There is no obscurity about the desirability of such
joy, such tranquillity, such invulnerable happiness, whatever
repugnance there may be to the effort of such achievement.
The shock of the contrast between the life of this man and
his contemporaries, between the orderly and eager pursuit of
a goal worthy of the powers of a man and the meaningless
round of routine days to no personal purpose, demands attention and inquiry. Even a deliberate effort to ignore this

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WALTER FARRELL

startling thing, to brush it out of the mind, will hardly be
successful for any length of time; it says too many things too
deeply, things too much in accord with all a man desires, to
be easily dodged. There is little or no escape from the drumming of its message. For an American, it has the supreme
appeal: it actually works, for the full happiness of man.
By the same token, never before has an unworthy Catholic
life done so much damage or faced such an accounting before
the Judge of men. The Catholic whose morals are no better
than those of the men of his time is, more than ever before, a
diabolic agent achieving the very opposite of the apostle's goals.
For the life-exposition of evil on the part of one who above all
people in the world has reason for being holy leaves a swath of
disillusionment, despair, or hopeless surrender behind it, a harvest of which the devil himself might well be jealous. His contemporaries might be excused on grounds of ignorance that
could easily be invincible; not so the Catholic. The fact that
he moves with the crowd of the men of his time will be small
comfort; he should be in that crowd, but, whether he likes it
or not, he is an apostle, an apostle of good or of evil.

*

*

*

*

*

If the evidence submitted in this study be valid and the
reasoning correct, the conclusions should be quite clear, and
of considerable importance to apostolic activity. Obviously,
the modern apostle should concentrate on the most intense and
widespread use of his most effective instrument, i. e., his lifeexposition of his apostolic message. That would mean that his
own life, made a vivid portrayal of that message by the utmost
in sanctity it is given him to achieve, should really be paraded
before men. He must go to men since men probably will not
come to him. Much more of his time should be spent in the
marketplace, in the union halls, in conference places, in the
outer world where men live their lives, than has been true in
the past. The rectory should be much more of a central office
and place of refuge (made necessary by human limitations\
than a fortress wherein the apostle lives securely. It is much

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CENTURY APOSTLE

155

too easy to go on the defensive, to hide his light under a bushel,
to do only what the express demands of men make necessary,
than it is for the apostle to go out among men, meet their constant rebuffs, amused tolerance, contemptuous misunderstanding, and even pity. Yet, it is precisely to men who will meet
him thus that the apostle is sent.
Next, he must, obviously, multiply that life-exposition as
far as lies in his power. He cannot be in two places at once, he
cannot multiply his own life; but he can multiply that lifeexposition of the divine message in the lives of the laity. He
must, then, urge, indeed demand, an apostolic life from the
Catholic laity. He must refuse to be content with, or condone,
a defensive, mediocre, lukewarm Catholic life; he must not be
apologetic in his wholehearted condemnation of the diabolic
disasters wrought on the lives of others by unworthy Catholic
lives. The very existence of such things is a graphic statement
of failure in the past, for its roots are not to be found in defects
of the laity so much as in their undernourishment by their
pastors. For, surely, if there is apostolic life among the laity,
it will be because, through the grace of God, some apostle
has built it there, moulded that
by ceaseless labor and the
intelligent modification of the very means which were used in
building his own.
The apostolic written word has not, in our time, been limited
in its genius, its persistence, or its volume. Rather, it has shown
clear results of the hard labor which the divine love inspiring
it dictated. Nevertheless the limitations of the written word in
our time must be honestly faced. The fact that these limitations are not the fault of the apostle, nor the direct limitations
flowing from this apostolic instrument of writing, do not in
any way lessen the seriousness of such limitations from the
apostle's point of view. They are the results of the defects of
our age. Granted. But the point is that the apostolic efficiency
of this instrument has been seriously lessened.
In the direction in which it has been used-the obvious
apostolic direction of the unbelieving-the written word has

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WALTER FARRELL

become steadily less effective, not by reason of intrinsic defects
but because of the extrinsic deficiencies of the twentieth century. For apostolic purposes, it is not the instrument it used to
be when men understood each other. Why not, then, admit
this fact and limit its use in relation to unbelievers to the
essential minimum of an apologetic which will be a kind of
holding action while the forces of the really effective offense are
steadily mounted? Why not throw its full force in the one
direction where men are prepared for its effectiveness, i. e., in
the direction of the faithful in order that through them men
might really be reached? By such a stratagem, all of the faithful, all of them, could have opened to them the full richness of
their Catholic heritage. They could thus have the full story
of the triumphs and failures of the long life of the Church, and
as a familiar, almost a homely, possession. They could know
more intimately of the gallant risk of Catholic life, the depth
and inviolability of the serene happiness of sanctity, the full
labor and delight of prayer. The essential character of meditation and spiritual reading for full Christian living could then
be given them as thoroughly as the Commandments are now.
College graduates could have the same scientific grasp of their
religion as they have of other co"
disciplines; they could,
in other words, be equipped with the intellectual habit, the
science, of theology and thus be prepared to think with the
principles of their faith, and to educate themselves in still more
intense and profound study of what is ultimately the principal interest of their lives. What is this, after all, but a
multiplication of the apostle's life in the life of the laity, the
multiplication of his most effective apostolic instrument?
The same thing should hold for the spoken word. We are
not facing the facts if we pretend that the full power of the
apostolic instruments has been turned in the direction of the
faithful. Why not let this be the immediate object of the
spoken and written word which serve it so well? Let the spoken
word be a brand to set the faithful on fire rather than a spark
to be snuffed out by the modern fog. Let it enflame the faithful

TVVENTIETH CENTURY APOSTLE

157

that in the light of their consuming love even the blind may
see.
This is by no means a demand that we abandon the spoken
and written word, nor that we in any way underestimate their
importance. It is a demand that we evaluate them from the
point of view of apostolic efficiency. It is a demand for a
change in their direction, for a stop to the tremendous waste
of apostolic effort and to the smug illusion of great things done
because great efforts have been put forth. For the great things
are not being done if, in our time and country, the nation
becomes materialistic in masses while we have a trickle of
converts.
It might be more truly objected that such a program as this
reduces two of the prime apostolic instruments to secondary,
even to indirect, roles. Let it be understood, however, that even
this involves no change in the prime object of apostolic labors,
no abandonment of the millions who have not heard of Christ,
no turning the eyes away from the fields that await the harvester. Quite the contrary. If these apostolic instruments of
the spoken and written word are in fact ineffectual as direct
apostolic instruments in our time precisely because of the defects of our age, why should they continue to be used as though
they were effective direct instruments? Is it more apostolic to
cherish means which no longer achieve the end so effectively?
Why not concentrate on an instrument which will better penetrate the armor of the twentieth century? There is a thrill of
power in the use of the spoken word, an aura of fame and glory
in the written word, even when these things are ineffective.
Perhaps that deceives us. On the other hand, in the lifeexposition there is enough of pain and divine joy to protect the
apostle from the false values of the world in which he must
live and labor; and this apostolic instrument is at its highest
effectiveness. The apostle is not dedicated to his instruments,
but to the men for whom he burns out his life, whatever the
instrument of the burning.
Recently, the written word has been singularly effective, not

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WALTER FARRELL

when it exposed a doctrine, but when it portrayed a life. These
apostolic instruments of the spoken and written word are of
inestimable value to the apostle where they are used immediately as a means to multiplying his own life-exposition of the
apostolic message in the lives of the faithful. Perhaps this conclusion could be stated more briefly, and no less adequately, by
saying that in our century the apostolic mantle has fallen on
the shoulders of the laity as well as of the clergy through the
nullification of the means of communication of truth. The clerical apostle labors as much through the faithful as through his
own life. It is his special duty in his twentieth century labors
to make that mantle fit the shoulders of the laity more perfectly that it may be worn proudly, even gaily.
WALTER FARRELL,

Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. 0.

0. P.

THE CASE FOR CONFIRMATION

T

HAT a sacrament should need defense is not a matter
for leisurely discussion but for immediate attention.
It was just such practical attention which the sacrament of Confirmation received from the Fathers at the Council
of Trent. There the first complete and definitive case for
Confirmation was written. Against the attacks of the reformers,
the Council defined Confirmation to be a sacrament of the New
Law, instituted by Christ, which confers grace upon the recipient who places no obstacle to grace; it likewise impresses a
character upon the souP All this was clear enough. It definitely
declared the doctrine of the Church. Yet it did leave room for
and, in time, even a demand for another kind of defense. This
case would be directed not against those outside the Church
but to those within. It would be directed not against denial
but rather against indifference. Its aim would not be retractation but rather appreciation. That is exactly the case presented
for Confirmation by the Church today.
Let us put it in another way. If-by an impossible hypothesis
-it were within the power of men to fix the number of the
sacraments, and i£, in such a case, it were thought necessary
to drop one of the seven sacraments, an overwhelming vote
would nominate Confirmation to bow out of the sacramental
system. It seems that this is the sacrament which men could do
most easily without. The absolute necessity of Baptism and
Penance, and the utility of Extreme Unction are borne in upon
Catholics in their daily lives. They are almost bound to appreciate the intrinsic beauty and value of the Eucharist, of
Matrimony and of Holy Orders. But Confirmation leaves them
more than a little nonplussed and unappreciative. The ordinary
Catholic can well appreciate the reception of Christ in the
1

Cf. Denziger, Enchiridion Symbolorum (Freiburg i. Br: 1932), 849, 852.

159

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JAMES R. GILLIS

Holy Eucharist but is more than a little vague about the
reception of the Holy Ghost in Confirmation.
This outlook is not due to the fact that Christ did not confer
Confirmation, but promised the Paraclete to His apostles and
disciples. It is not because this sacrament did not receive its
proper name until the fifth century, nor merely because the
matter and form of the sacrament are not to be discovered in
the pages of Sacred Scripture. It is rather because this sacrament is aimed at making apostles, that its very aim is the
apostolate; and there are so very few apostles. The reason
why the average Catholic is unappreciative of the grace of this
sacrament is because he has not found it necessary to call upon
it to come surging into his soul. The reason why he has not
found it necessary is that he had not found himself at odds
with the world and its spirit; because the enemies of Christ and
His Church have had no reason to look upon him as an
adversary. In other words, his way of life has not been Catholic
enough or Christlike enough for him to see the real opposition
between himself and the world, whereas Christ had practically
ordered him to find not only opposition, but even contradiction
and persecution.
There is something very special about this sacrament. It
was promised by Christ as a sort of spiritual culmination of the
gifts the apostles had already received. 2 It was a very solemn
promise, solemn in time, in manner, and in its absolute importance. Moreover the preparation demanded by Christ was much
more formal than for any other of His gifts to them. It certainly
was placed as a crisis in their lives, a sort of turning point in
their careers. Fear and cowardice were forgivable in them
during Christ's passion, but hardly after His Ascension. The
whole world hung in a balance while they huddled togf'ther in
the upper room waiting and praying. Would they go out of
their retreat willingly, even boldly, to do work they had been
given to do, or would the Jews have to track them down, haul
them out, and put them to death for being the friends of the
• Acts, iv, 8; John, xvi, 18.

THE CASE FOR CONFIRMATION

161

crucified Christ? The Holy Ghost settled that issue as He
settled many another for them. It was then and only then that
they began to merit their glorious title of " apostles." There is
no avoiding the issue that the descent of the Holy Ghost on
Pentecost was clearly and definitely tied up with the mission
of the whole Church-the apostolate.
Nor was this gift intended only for the Apostles. The effects
of the descent of the Holy Ghost were to be as common in the
Church as the sacrament of Confirmation. St. Thomas teaches
this explicitly and his doctrine is confirmed by the Church:
"Christ, by the power which He exercises in the sacraments,
bestowed on the apostles the reality of this sacrament, i. e., the
fullness of the Holy Ghost, without the sacrament itself, because
they had received the first fruits of the Spirit (Rom. viii, 23) .
. . . Again the Holy Ghost came down on the apostles in the
shape of a tongue. Which refers to the same signification as
balm: except in so far as the. tongue communicates with others
by speech, but balm, by its odor; because, to wit, the apostles
were filled with the Holy Ghost, as teachers of the Faith; but
the rest of the believers, as doing that which gives edification to
the faithful." 3 There were none of the faithful who escaped
the fiery tongues, none who escaped this power from on high,
none who avoided the obligation consequent upon this gift-the
apostolate. This was the birthday of the Church, and it was
marked by the moblization of the infant Church to battle.
From the early patristic ages, the exact function of this sacrament provided matter for speculation and controversy. Since
it was ordinarily conferred immediately after Baptism, this
question bothered the Fathers: "What effects should be attributed to each of the sacraments of the Christian initiation? " 4
If Baptism is completely efficacious in producing the new man,
what need is there for Confirmation? Even in the analogy of
• Summa Theol., III, q.
a.
ad 1um.
4 Tertullian,
De Baptismo, vii, in PL I,
Cyprian, Epistolae, in PL, III,
1115; Augustine, Sermo CCXXVII, in PL XXXVIII, llOO; De Baptismo iii, 16,
in PL XLIII, 149; Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech., xxi, 3, in PG XXXIII,

JAMES R. GILLIS

St. Thomas there seems to be a decided limp when he describes
the effects of Confirmation. "Now the life of the body is
perfected directly in three ways. First by generation whereby
a man begins to be and to live: and corresponding to this in
the spiritual life there is Baptism, which is a spiritual regeneration .... Secondly, by growth whereby a man is brought to
perfect size and strength: and corresponding to this in the spiritual life there is Confirmation, in which the Holy Ghost is given
to strengthen us." 15 In other words, it seems that there is an
element of extravagance here. For the child, once it has life,
will grow and become strong if given healthful food and the
proper care. All that this sacrament should confer is what
would be achieved just as well through frequent reception of
the Holy Eucharist. If this sacrament merely confirms and
strengthens the spiritual organism received in Baptism, it does
seem to be a bit of divine extravagance.
Yet we know that what appears to be extravagance on the
part of God is never really so; it is only our own inability to
grasp the wide horizons of God's providence and His aims for
His spouse, the Church. St. Thomas gives us the roots of a
solution. But they are just that, roots, solid, practical and
living. J:hey still require no little care and cultivation in order
to bring them to the full flower of their splendor. The maturing
of these roots has been provided by the many papal encyclicals
which demand that the faithful begin to recognize their duties. 6
• Summa Theol., III, q. 65, a. I.
8 Leo XIII, Encyclical Sapientiae Christianae, Jan. 10, 1890:
The ministry of
preaching, or teaching, belongs by divine right to the Masters ' whom the Holy
Spirit has constituted Bishops, to govern the Church of God'; but none the less
let no one think that it is forbidden to private persons to cooperate diligently with
this ministry .... When occasion demands it, these cannot indeed play the
• doctor ' but can communicate to others the truths that they have learned, and
become as it were the echo of the voice of their Masters. Cf. Summa Theol., 11IIae, q. 3, a. 2, ad 2um; Pius X, Encyclicalil Fermo Proposito; Pius XI, Encyclical
Ubi Arcana; Letter addressed to Cardinal Bertram, A. A. S. 1928, p. 384; Letter
addressed to Cardinal Segura, A. A. S. 1929, p. 664; Letter addressed to the Bishops
of Argentine, Bonne Press CoUection, p. 393; Letter addressed to the Patriarch of
Lisbon, A. A. S. 1934, p. 628; Pius XII, Encyclical Mystici Corporis.

THE CASE FOR CONFffiMATION

163

The key is found in the following passage of the Summa
Theologica:
The sacraments of the New Law are ordained unto special effects
of grace: and therefore where there is a special effect of grace, there
we find a special sacrament ordained for the purpose. But since
sensible and material things bear a likeness to things spiritual and
intelligible, from what occurs in the life of the body, we can perceive
that which is special to the spiritual life. Now it is evident that in
the life of the body a certain special perfection consists in man's
attaining to the perfect age, and being able _to perform actions of
a ruan; hence the Apostle says (I Cor. xiii, 11): When I became a
man, I put away the things of a child. And thence it is that besides
the movement of generation whereby man receives life of the body,
there is a movement of growth, whereby man is brought to the
perfect
So therefore does man receive spiritual life in Baptism
which is spiritual regeneration; while in Confirmation man arrives
at the perfect age, as it were, of the spiritual life/
In this transition from childhood to adulthood St. Thomas finds
two definite changes, the putting away of some things and the
acceptance of others. That the confirmed is more perfectly
likened to Christ is apparent from his comparison of the confirmed in a special way to Christ, the Head of the Mystical
Body. Since the Head is full of grace and truth, the confirmed
bear a special resemblance to Him, for their portion is a fullness
of grace. 8 But even this distinction between the baptized and
the confirmed is by no means clear. An increase in grace can be
received in the reception of the other sacraments, thus bringing
the member to a closer conformity to his Head. We have yet
to see what the baptized puts away when he becomes a spiritual
adult. What is there that is an essential part of the man but
has no place in the child? St. Thomas finds the answer in
breadth of outlook, responsibility, and action.
In this sacrament the fullness of the Holy Ghost is given for
the spiritual strength which belongs to the perfect age. Now when
Summa Theol., III, q. 72, a. 1.
Summa Theol., III, q. 72, a. 1, ad 4um: llli qui confinnationem accipiunt, quae
est sacramentum plenitudinis gratiae, Christo conformantur, in quanto ipse a primo
instanti suae conceptionis fuit plenus gratiae et veritatis.
7

8

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JAMES R. GILLIS

man comes to perfect age he begins at once to have intercourse
with others; whereas until then he lives an individual life, as it
were, confined to himself.s•
But it is evident, from a comparison with the life of the body,
that the action which is proper to man immediately after birth is
different from the action which is proper to him when he has come
to perfect age. And therefore by the sacrament of Confirmation
man is given a spiritual power in respect of sacred actions other
than those in respect of which he receives in Baptism. For in
Baptism he receives power to do those thing which pertain to his
own salvation, forasmuch as he lives to himself; whereas in Confirmation he receives vower to do those things which pertain to the
spiritual combat with the enemies of the Faith. 9

It is a mistake too often made, to attempt to describe the
actions proper to children and adults in the spiritual sense, apart
from the mystical body of Christ. It is only in the light of that
doctrine that we can begin to evaluate their respective spheres
of operation with any clarity. Otherwise we easily fall into the
false position of considering the confirmed as a special, elect
and select group in the Church. This is a mistake.
In describing the mystical body of Christ, St. Thomas has
this to say: " The difference of states and duties in the Church
regards three things. In the first place it regards the perfection
of the Church. For even as in the order of natural things, perfection, which in God is simple and uniform, is not to be found
in the created universe except in a multiform and manifold
manner, so too, the fullness of grace, which is centered in Christ
as head, flows forth to His members in various ways, for the
perfecting of the body of the Church." 10 Because the confirmed
have received a certain fullness of grace, they are most closely
likened to Christ, the Head of the Body. This fullness is not
possessed by the baptized and hence this basic difference, which
will always be present in the Church, manifests its beauty.
There will always be the men and the boys, the women and the
girls in the supernatural family, just as there are in the natural
sa Summa
9

Theol., III, q. 72, a. 2.
Summa Theol., III, q. 72, a. 5.

10

Summa Theol., II-II, q. 183, a. 2.

THE CASE FOR CONFIRMATION

165

family. And this very diversity contributes to the perfection
of the Church.
While these two states exist in the Church and will continue
as long as the Church, yet they are really not opposed, any more
than the man is opposed to the boy, or the woman to the girl.
They are different only in the way in which childhood and manhood, dependence and independence, weakness and strength
can be opposed in the same individual. 11 The confirmed do
not compose a small, select group in the Church, as do the
ordained clergy, but are rather the normal majority in that body.
As the child looks forward to growing up, so too the baptized
is on his way to becoming a man, for it is the intention of nature
to bring each one to its normal perfection in age and strength,
even though this intention is sometimes hindered by reason of
the corruptibility of the body. Yet, even more so, it must be
God's intention to perfect the body of the Church by bringing its members to that spiritual age which is perfect. 12 Confirmation is not intended for the few, but for all. The mystical
body must have a majority of mature members who have the
fullness of Christ, through the reception of this sacrament.
Even if the mystical body were completely made up of the
spiritually mature there would still be a diversity of operation
among its members, as St. Paul clearly says. 13
The essential difference between the confirmed and the hap11 Summa Theol., ill, q. 72, a. 8, ad lum; Hoc sacramentum datur ad quamdam
excellentiam, non quidem unius hominem ad alium, sicut sacramentum ordinis, sed
hominis ad seipsum, sicut idem perfectus vir existens habet excellentiam ad se
puerum.
19 Summa
Theol., III, q. 72, a. 8: Per hoc sacramentum promovetur homo
spiritualiter in aetatem perfectam. Hoc autem est de intentione naturae ut omnis
qui corporaliter nascitur, ad perfectam aetatem perveniat; sed hoc quandoque impeditur propter corruptibilitatem corporis, quod morte praevenitur. Multo autem
magis de intentione Dei est omnia ad perfectionem perducere ex cujus imitatione
hoc natura participat.
18 Summa Theol., 11-11, q.188, a. 2: Oportet autem ad diversas actiones diversos
homines deputari, ad hoc quod expeditius et sine confusione omnia peragantur.
Et hoc est quod Apostolus dicit (Rom. xii, 4, 5) " Sicut in uno corpore multa
membra habemus, omnia autem membra non eundem actum habent; ita multi unum
corpus sumus in Christo! "

3

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JAMES R. GILLIS

tized seems to be in the social character of the outlook, responsibility, and action of the confirmed and the individual character
of outlook, responsibility, and action in the baptized. Since the
baptized lives more for himself, his attention will hardly go far
beyond his individual needs. That is exactly what we expect
from children; they spend their childhood in receiving. But
what is expected in children, and what in no way impedes the
the perfection of the family, would be lethal if carried on
into adult years. The family and the state would be peopled
by grown-up babies, who either could not or would not accept
responsibility. If they should exist in a sufficient number, the
family and the state would come to the verge of collapse. There
would be no peace because no order; and there would be no
order because there would be no regard for others.
The drastic change in outlook that must come to the adult
derives from the fact that he becomes perceptive of others and
of their rights and above all of the common good of the community. He begins to see his own life and his own rights in
their almost constant contact with and influence on the lives of
others. He becomes in a very definite manner a public individual inasmuch as he begins to take an active interest in the
common good. In the supernatural community, this order and
peace is conserved by the Holy Spirit. "Just as in the natural
body the various members are held together in unity by the
power of the quickening spirit, and are dissociated from one
another as soon as the spirit departs, so too in the Church's
body the peace of the various members is preserved by the
power of the Holy Spirit, Who quickens the body of the
Church." 14
To conceive the body of the Church as made up of a predominance of spiritual children would leave us only one
conclusion-that the body would suffer. The Holy Ghost will
not allow this condition to become a reality for it is not the
normal condition of the body. If, as St. Thomas says, the
baptized live primarily for themselves, the multiplication of the
"Ibid., ad Sum.

THE CASE FOR CONFffiMATION

167

baptized would lead only to a schism of individualism in the
body of Christ. It would mean that, although bound to Christ
and to His body by the ties of faith and charity, the members
of the Church would live on in the Church as children. They
would definitely lack that mature and seasoned outlook that is
proper to the adult, the responsible citizen. The citizen must
not seek his own good apart from the common good but he
should love his individual good in subordinating it to the
common good. St. Thomas compares the mystical body to the
state in describing the effects of selfish action on the part of
the members. " A man departs from this unity of spirit when he
seeks his own; just as in an earthly kingdom peace ceases when
citizens seek each man his own. Besides, the peace both of mind
and of an earthly commonwealth is better preserved by a
distinction of duties and states, since thereby the greater
number have a share in public actions." 15 It is precisely to give
the members of the body a share in public actions that Confirmation was instituted, for this is one of the effects attributed
to it. The consecration of Confirmation is a certain deputation
to public acts. 16
It is one of the most strikin,g characteristics of lack of
maturity, expected in children but not in adults, that they are
incapable of or unwilling to accept responsibility. There is no
room for such in the mystical body of Christ; it is strictly a
community, a supernatural family, whose whole character is
militant. It has no desire nor intention of sending boys on the
errands of men. That is why the consecration of Confirmation
is perfective of the whole body of the Church. That is why
every reception of Confirmation is in a very true sense a renewal
of Pentecost, not only for the recipient but for the whole
Church; it should pull a man out of himself and dedicate him
to the common good, to the apostolate, not as a matter of oppor18

Ibid.
IV. Sent., d. 7, q.

q. 1, ad Sum: Potestas characteris hujus est potestas
activa, non ad conferendum spiritualia quod est ordinis, sed magis ad conferendum
publice; et ideo confirmatus non constituitur in gradu alicujus ordinis, quia nullus
ei subjicitur in receptione divinorum ab ipso.
18

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JAMES R. GILLIS

tunity or predilection, but rather as a matter of obligation. It
is, then, only in the terms of the whole mystical Christ, anQ.
the continuation of the aims of the Incarnation through that
body, that Confirmation becomes clearly intelligible, not as a
mark of Divine extravagance, but as a sacrament which produces mature members of the mystical body. Pope Pius XII
has summed all this up in a few words: "By the chrism of Confirmation, the faithful are given added strength to protect and
defend the Church, their Mother, and the faith she has given
them." 17
Faced with the wreckage of modern paganism, an almost
unbroken line of Popes have issued call after call to the laity
to enter into the battle for Christ. 17 " As Pope Pius XI himself
admitted, his definition of Catholic Action 18 was arrived at
not without divine inspiration. In this, a new order was
established; the course was set first, and then the theologians
began to consider the dogmatic foundations for this apostolic
activity on the part of the laity. Certainly, from the Council
of Trent until the time of Pope Leo XIII there was little real
interest evidenced by theologians in this sacrament. It was even
charged that Confirmation was playing a continually diminishing role in the sacramental hierarchy of the Catholic Church.
Today there is no room or occasion for making such an assertion. Today this sacrament is coming more into its own
because today the real spirit of the Church, the militant
spirit, is being reawakened. Today the confirmed are less
inclined to see their consecration merely in
terms of their
own private warfare against the world, the flesh, and the
devil, and are more inclined to recognize their responsibility to
the Church.
Pius XII, Encyclical Mystici Corporis (N.C. W. C. ed.), p. 14.
Cf. fn. 6 above.
:ts In a discourse to the Young Women's Section of the Catholic Action of Italy,
March 28, 1927, the Holy Father affirmed that his definition of Catholic Action as
" the participation of the laity in the apostolate of the Church's hierarchy " was
given "after due thought, deliberately, indeed, one may say, not without divine
inspiration." Cf. Civardi, Manual of Catholic Action, p. 6.
17

17 •

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169

That the sacrament of Confirmation has a double effect was
defined by the Council of Trent. These effects are intimately
connected with the office and obligation of the confirmed:
Through an analysis of these effects, sacramental grace and the
character, the precise value and importance of this sacrament
in the Christian life may be more lucidly demonstrated.
It is perhaps one of the most profound truths of Catholic
doctrine that the faithful are bound to Christ not merely by the
corruptible bonds of faith and charity, but also by a purely
objective and incorruptible bond, called the "character." This
effect, a certain indelible sign imprinted upon the soul, is
peculiar to those sacraments which constitute the recipient in
a certain and definite state. These sacraments are Baptism,
Confirmation, and Holy Orders. According to St. Thomas the
character is the sacramentum et res of these sacraments. These
are distinctive marks but, more than that, the character is a
certain spiritual power ordained unto things pertaining to divine
worship. 18 " The character of Baptism marks the recipient and
sets him apart from the non-baptized, and moreover it confers
upon him the power to receive the other sacraments of the
Church. This power is passive as is in keeping with the condition of the baptized-one but newly born to the divine life in
the mystical body of Christ. The character of Orders, on the
other hand, is active; it pertains to the sacramental agents.
This is the instrumental power by which priests are set apart as
"other Christs" with the power to confer the sacraments on
others. In this character, men most perfectly are conformed to
Christ, the Priest.
Secondly, each of the faithful is deputed to receive, or to bestow
on others, things pertaining to the worship of God. And this,
properly speaking, is the purpose of the sacramental character.
18 " Summa. Tkeol., III, q. 68,
Divinus cultus consistit vel in recipiendo
aliqua divina, vel in tradendo aliis. Ad utrumque autem horum requiritur quaedam
potentia; nam ad tradendum aliquid aliis requiritur quaedam potentia activa: ad
accipiendum autem requiritur potentia passiva. Et ideo character importat quamdam potentiam spiritualem ordinatam ad ea quae sunt divini cultus.

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JAMES R. GILLIS

Now the whole rite of the Christian religion is derived from Christ's
priesthood. Consequently, it is clear that the sacramental character
is specially the character of Christ, to Whose character the faithful
are likened by reason of the sacramental characters, which are
nothing else than certain participations of Christ's priesthood,
flowing from Christ Himself.1.9
Thus through this objective, almost cold-blooded order, of the
character, St. Thomas saw the effects of Christ's passion being
validly applied and validly received down the ages. As the
Great High Priest, Christ offered Himself as the perfect victim
on Calvary. It is by Baptism that men begin to be sharers in
the first fruits of Christ's passion and death but, more than that,
with Baptism they assumed certain obligations along with that
passive power. For if the character of Baptism renders them
capable of receiving the other sacraments, there is implied an
obligation to receive them. Since the priest has power over the
mystical body precisely because Orders gives him power over
the real body of Christ, it is evident that this power flows in a
particular way from the sacrificial death of Christ. The power
to consecrate the real body of Christ is the root of the priestly
powers, and in that act he continues the sacrifice of Calvary
in an unbloody manner. All this is clear enough. These two
spiritual powers, participations in the priesthood of Christ,
continue each in its own way the work of Redemption. For the
baptized the obligation is personal, for the priest it is public.
The baptized lives more for himself, to receive the other sacraments validly and fruitfully and thus to grow in the body of
Christ, but the priest does not possess the sacerdotal power or
sacerdotal obligation for himself alone. He is strictly a public
person, dedicated to public acts. He is a priest, not for himself,
but for others . The spiritual welfare of the body of Christ is
his obligation. 20 So the character of Baptism is a passive power;
that of Orders an active one.
Ibid., a. 8.
Summa Theol., III, q. 65, a. I; Perficitur autem homo in ordine ad totam
communitatem dupliciter:-uno modo per hoc quod accipit potestatem regendi
multitudinem, et exercendi actus publicos; et loco hujus in spirituali vita est
sacramentum ordinis.
19

"0

THE CASE FOR

171

This seems to be a complete order, sufficient for the needs
of the body of Christ. What power is .yet to be given, what
obligation resulting from that power is yet to be assumed?
In other words, is there any real reason for the existence of
still another character of Confirmation? That there is such
a character is a matter of faith, but where does it fit into this
scheme of things, into this broad plan of the economy·of salvation? Again we meet an apparent mark of divine extravagance.
I£ Baptism consecrates the layman and Orders consecrates the
priest, what other state is left in the mystical body which
demands a special, permanent power? What more is demanded
according to the rite of the Christian religion which had its
origin in the sacrifice of the Cross, which laymen can do with
the definite stamp of Christ-like legality about it?
The solution to this problem should be more or less obvious
from the foregoing analysis of the general effects of the sacrament. Baptism consecrates the child of God, not the man of
God. This latter is the particular. and special effect of the
consecration of Confirmation. This is the fullness of power
which the baptized is empowered and obligated to receive, if
he is to take his rightful place in the Church. This is the perfect
work, begun in Baptism and brought to consummation in
Confirmation. The character which it impresses is not active
in the sense that the character of Orders is active; nor is it
passive in the sense that the character of Baptism is passive.
The words of St. Thomas in different places indicate this. In
one place he relates the character of Confirmation to that of
Baptism: " While the sacrament of Baptism pertains to
recipients. . . . In a way Confirmation also is ordained for the
same purpose, as we shall see in its proper place." 21 In this way<'
n Summa Theol., III, q. 68, a. 6. Cajetan (Commentarium in Summam Sancti
Thomae, III, q. 7!!, a. 5), concludes that the character of Confirmation is the
perfection of the baptismal character and hence is as passive as that of Baptism.
However this doctrine is opposed by most of the other commentators. Cf. Salmanticenses, CurBUB TheologicuB, IX, "De Sacramentes tract.!!!!, disp. 5, dub.!!, no. 44;
John of St. Thomas, CurBUs Theologicus (Paris, 1886) IX, 158, 858; Gonet, J. B.,
ClypeUB Theologiae (Cologne, 1677), VI, disp. 4, 86.

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JAMES R. GILLIS

it is not difficult to see the passive character of Confirmation
operating in this manner. It empowers the confirmed not
merely to receive Penance, the Eucharist, Matrimony, but it
empowers them in a special way, which is in conformity with
the mature member of the body of Christ.
However it is the active aspect of this character which seems
to be the more important. Here St. Thomas relates this character to that of Orders inasmuch as both are conferred by the
Bishop: " By Order and Confirmation the faithful of Christ
are deputed to certain special duties;
.d this can be done by
the prince alone. Consequently the conferring of these sacraments belongs exclusively to a bishop, who is, as it were, a prince
of the Church. 22 The special duties to which the confirmed are
deputed and which are outside the province of the baptized are
summed up by St. Thomas in the rather terse words, " in
Confirmation a man receives the power to do those things which
are related to spiritual warfare against the enemies of the
faith." 23 So, Confirmation does more than merely prepare the
baptized to live more fully the sacramental life of the Church;
it turns his attention outside himself. He is now a mature
citizen; now he must begin to communicate with others in his
actions. He may no longer be concerned only with his own
spiritual welfare. A new and larger horizon has been opened.
Now he must seek his own good in subordination to the common
good of the whole community.
The consecration of the confirmed is really the consecration
of the soldier of Christ, but not in the sense that the soldiers
are a select group. The whole character and spirit of the
Church, the body of Christ, is militant. Every adult member
is by the fact of membership, called to be a soldier. And of
course, no soldier is a private citizen-he is a representative of
the whole community. He is made a soldier not to better
defend his own life, but rather to even invite destruction to
himself in order to protect the whole community. His defense
Summa Theol., III, q. 65, a. 3, ad 2um.
•• Ibid., q. 72, a. 5.

THE CASE FOR CONFIRMATION

173

of himself is ordered to the good of the community. This is the
office of the soldier, who has received his consecration in Confirmation. This is to be his life and his work, to which he is
dedicated irrevocably by the character of the sacrament. He
bears in his soul both the power and the obligation. His
military work bears an official stamp about it-the stamp of
the priesthood of Christ. " All the sacraments are protestations
of faith. Therefore just as he who is baptized receives the power
of testifying to his faith by receiving the other sacraments; so
he who is confirmed receives the power of publicly confessing
his faith by words, as it were ex officio." 24 Yet it is a common
mistake of limited vision to reduce this confession of faith solely
to that made under the threat of death. St. Thomas indicates
the breadth of its scope: " The confession of faith does not
consist only in protestation by word, but also in protestation
by deed." 25
It is a fact of the Christian life, that all members of the body
of Christ are obliged to wage spiritual warfare against the
invisible and personal enemies of faith and salvation. This is
an elemental test of membership in the body of Christ; this is
required even of the baptized. But if public profession of faith
is required of the baptized, it still lacks the official stamp. Even
here he acts as a child, even though as a thoroughly courageous
one. He must accept such a challenge even at the cost of his
life, for this external profession is a test of his loyalty to Christ.
He must judge that even death in union with Christ is preferable to life without that friendship. This would be primarily a
personal battle, forced upon the child, who must grab for the
best arms available. It is quite different from the studied and
planned program of attack in which the soldier participates.
St. Thomas sums all this up briefly: " All have to wage the
spiritual combat with our invisible enemies. But to fight against
visible foes, viz., against lhe persecutors of the faith, by confessing Christ's name, belongs to the confirmed, who have
already come spiritually to the age of virility .... And there•• Ibid., ad

•• Ibid., II-II, q. 14, a. 1, ad lum.

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JAMES R. GILLIS

fore the character of Confirmation is a distinctive sign. not
between unbelievers and believers, but between those who are
grown up spiritually and those of whom it is written: " As newborn babes (I Pet. ii, 2) ." 26 Thus the distinctive quality that
distinguishes the confirmed from the baptized is the official
character with which they carry out their duties. The confirmed
are public persons, whose primary obligation is the common
good; the baptized, when forced to perform actions which are
outside their normal competence act primarily for themselves.
Thus even· in the protestation of faith found in the reception
of each sacrament, the primary intent of the baptized is his
own spiritual welfare, and secondarily its effect on the common
good of the whole body.
If the character of Confirmation establishes the members of
the Church as official warriors in the defense of the faith, then
it must be the work of the sacramental grace of this sacrament
to make them competent spiritually to fulfill their obligations
to the body of Christ. There can be no doubt that this sacrament brings to the members of Christ a great increase in sanctifying grace. 27 Moreover it has, like all the sacraments, its own
specific grace, called sacramental; this is the
of grace
which is the heritage of all members. This particular grace has
a two-fold effect. It is aimed first of all at the removal of the
" occupational weakness " which is found in all the newly born
-the baptized. 28 But, further than this, like all sacramental
grace, it is ordained to the perfection of the soul in those things
which pertain to the worship of God in regard to the Christian
religion. 29 It is not difficult to see that since the character is a
•• Summa Theol., :II, q. 72, a. 5, ad lum.
•• Ibid., a. 7: Missio seu datio Spiritus Sancti non est nisi cum gratia gratum
faciente. Unde manifestum est quod gratia gratum faciens confertur in hoc
sacramento.
06 Ibid., q. 65, a. 1: Ex his eb1>111 patet sacramentorum numerus, secundum quod
ordinantur contra defectum peccati. ... Confirmatio contra infirmitatem animi,
quae in nuper natis invenitur.
•• Ibid., q. 62, a. 5: Gratia sacramentalis ad duo praecipue ordinari videtur;
videlicet ad tollendos defectus praeteritorum peccatorum . . . et iterum ad per-

THE CASE FOR CONFIRMATION

175

certain participation of the priesthood of Christ and since by
His Passion Christ inaugurated the Rite of the Christian
religion, this sacramental grace is directed toward the perfecting
of the soldier of Christ. This ensures him that strength and
courage necessary to confess his faith in the sign of his redemption. This is not merely a peripheral change but a radical transformation. This sacrament reaches deep into the soul to give
it a seasoning and hardening effect which transforms the youth
into the soldier. It makes fortitude and bravery in the Christian
life a general, a normal condition. This bravery takes on something of the divine courage manifested so splendidly by Christ
on the Cross. It is in the likeness of Christ crucified, that the
confirmed must carry on his apostolate. 30 In this it is not
difficult to see the cross as the touchstone of the confirmed.
By His victory on the cross Christ came into His Kingdom; 31
with that same sign of the cross made upon his forehead by the
bishop, the Catholic is conscripted as a true soldier of His
crucified King.
St. Thomas relates the sacrament of Confirmation to the
virtue of fortitude. Yet it seems that since the confirmed is
brought into such a warfare for the cross of Christ something
of that splendid divine courage must be a part of his supernatural equipment. This would be achieved through the gift of
fortitude. " The truth of the matter is that in conquering the
difficulties and in surmounting the dangers and perils which
ficiendam animam in his quae pertinent a cultum Dei secundum religionem vitae
christianae.
30 Ibid., q. 72, a. 4, ad Sum:
Sed hoc sacramentum non solum ordinatur ad hoc
quod sanctificetur in seipso, sed exponitur cuidam pugnae exteriori; et ideo non
solum fit mentio de interiori sanctificatione, cum dicitur: Confirmo te chrismate
salutis, sed etiam consignatur homo exterius quasi vexillo crucis ad pugnam spiritualem, quod significatur cum dicitur: Consigno te signo crucis; cf. Summa Contra
Gentes, IV, cap. 60: Et quia pugnantes sub aliquo principe ejus insignia deferunt,
hi qui confirmationis sacramentum suscipiunt, signo Christi insigniuntur, videlicet
signo crucis, quo pugnavit et vicit; Alexander of Hales, Summa Theologica, IV,
q. ix, m. 2, a. 2; Pius XII, Mystici Corporis, No. 77, p. 48.
31 Summa Theol., III, q. 42, a. 1:
Quia Christus per crucis victoriam meruit
potestatem et dominium super gentes.

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JAMES R. GILLIS

surround the pursuit of eternal life, virtues founded on human
standards would fail because of the weakness of the individual.
Accordingly, the gift of fortitude is necessary for acting in a
higher way and for using divine power as one's own." 32
Certainly St. Thomas teaches that the gifts of the Holy Ghost
are received in Baptism,S 3 and Pope Leo XIII taught this as
at least the more probable doctrine. 34 Yet, Confirmation is the
sacrament which confers the plentitude of the Holy Ghost.
It is, then, not at all rash to see in this fullness of grace a great
enlivening and enlightening through the activity of the Holy
Ghost, with a
a marvellous increase in the gifts themselves.
The effects of this sacrament have been very graphically
sketched in the Acts of the Apostles. How can one better
explain the effect of the divine fire from heaven upon the
Apostles and disciples on that first Pentecost, than through the
fact that they were using divine power in place of their own?
This too must be the gift which marks the reception of Confirmation as a renewal of Pentecost for the Church and for the
recipient. The most extraordinary effects accompanied the
reception of the Holy Ghost in apostolic times. These were
known as the "charisms." They were glaringly manifest as
effects of the descent of the Holy Ghost, on Pentecost; they were
evident when the Apostles imposed hands upon the new Christians. They seemed then to be standard equipment for the
apostolate. Thus these Christians bore upon their work a divine
32

John of St. Thomas, "The Gifts of the Holy Ghost," THE THOMIST, IX (1946),

p. 290.
33 Summa
Theol., I-II, q. 68, a. 5: Sicut virtutes morales connectuntur sibi
invicem in prudentia, ita dona Spiritus Sancti connectuntur sibi invicem in charitate:
ita scilicet quod qui charitatem habet, omnia dona Spiritus Sancti habeat, quoram
nullum sine charitate haberi potest.
3 • Pope Leo XIII, in encyclical Divinum
lllud: Certum quidem est, in ipsis
etiam hominibus justis qui ante Christum fuerunt, insedisse per gratiam Spiritum
Sanctum, quemad modum de prophetis ... quippe in Pentecoste non ita se Spiritus
Sanctus tribuit, ut tunc primum esse sanctorum inhabitator inciperet, sed ut
copiosus inundaret, cumulans sua dona, non inchoans, nee ideo novus opere, quia
ditior largitate!

THE CASE FOR CONFIRMATION

177

stamp of approval which all could witness. The charisms are
strictly public property in the sense that they were not given for
personal sanctification, nor as a reward for individual merit,
but only for the common good. St. Thomas lucidly explains the
purpose of these graces, and shows how each of them fulfilled
in a very special way its task of assisting in the apostolate. 35
Yet these gifts were extrinsic and accidental to the essential
effects of the sacrament. The confirmed do not leave the altar
rail these days speaking with tongues or prophesying. Yet
neither has the character of the Church, or its mission changed
in the least. The apostolic work is as much required now as it
was then. The Holy Father, Pius XII, writes that members
of the Church gifted with charismatic powers will never be
lacking in the Church. as• Yet the powers are certainly not as
profusely given now as they were in the apostolic times. Still
we have no guarantee that they could not be given more profusely than they are given at present. At least, there is one,
not very striking in its manifestation, which seems to be
exactly what the apostle of today needs and needs badly-the
grace of words and wisdom.
The aim of all the charisms, according to St. Thomas, is the
cooperation of the apostle in bringing others to God. Since
only God can move another interiorly, it is left to His instruments, his apostles, to move them exteriorly by teaching or
persuading. For this office of teaching three things are
necessary.
Now as regards the first, three things are necessary, as may be
seen in human teaching. For whoever would teach another in any
science must first be certain of the principles of the science, and
with regard to this there is faith, which is certitude of invisible
things, the principles of Catholic doctrine. Secondly, it behooves
a. 4: Gratia gratis ordinatur ad hoc quod homo
• 5 Summa Theol., I-II, q.ll1,
alteri cooperetur, ut reducatur ad Deum. Homo autem ad hoc operari non potest
interius movendo (hoc enim solius Dei est), sed solum exterius docendo vel
persuadendo. Et ideo gratia gratis data ilia sub se continet quibus homo indiget
ad hoc quod alterum instruat in rebus divinis, quae sunt supra rationem.
••• Pius VII, Corporis Mystici, No. 17, p. 12.

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JAMES R. GILLIS

the teacher to know the principal conclusions of the science, and
hence we have the word of wisdom, which is knowledge of divine
things. Thirdly, he ought to abound with examples and a knowledge 1
of effects, whereby at times he needs to manifest causes; and thus
we have the word of knowledge, which is knowledge of human
things .... 36
Whatever is necessary for the Church, the Holy Ghost supplies.
And so it is completely within the power and intent 9f the Holy
Ghost to supply those things which are necessary for its
mission-even a course in speech.
Now the knowledge a man receives from God cannot be turned to
another's profit, except by means of speech. And since the Holy
Ghost does not fail in anything that pertains to the profit of the
Church, He provides also the members of the Church with speech;
to the effect that a man not only speaks so as to be understood by
different people, which pertains to the gift of tongues, but also
speaks with effect, and this pertains to the grace of word. 37
This is the grace of the gracious word, the ability to attract
others, not by the clever, the startling, the shrewd, but by
supernaturally gracious words, words that merely clarify and
prove that the spirit of the Apostle is not of this world. This
is not merely the intellectual and apologetic apostolate. It is
rather the manifestation of hearts that have known the love of
God in contemplation and are poured forth in word and action
upon their fellow-men. The intellectual approach is insufficient
-only God-filled men and women can be true apostles of the
body of Christ. How will the Holy Ghost use them in defensive
and offensive action for the cause of Christ?
This happens in three ways. First, in order to instruct the intellect,
and this is the case when a man speaks so as to teach. . . . Secondly,
in order to move the affections, so that man wililngly hearkens to
the word of God. This is the case when a man speaks so as to please
his hearers, not indeed with a view to his own favor, but in order
to draw them to listen to God's word .... Thirdly, in order that
men may love that which is signified by the word, and desire to
•• Summa Theol., I-II, q. 111, a. 4.

37

Summa Theol., II-II, q. 177, a. 1.

THE CASE FOR CONFIRMATION

179

fulfill it, and this is the case when a man so speaks as to sway his
hearers. In order to this effect the Holy Ghost makes use of the
human tongue as an instrument; but He it is Who perfects the work
within. 38
There is no limitation of this gift to priests or bishops. This
may very well become the means of even the lay apostle, as it
was in the early Church. Even women may enjoy it in a
restricted field.
Speech may be employed in two ways: in one way privately, to
one or a few, in familiar conversation, and in this respect the grace
of the word may be becoming to women; in another way, publicly,
addressing oneself to the whole church, and this is not permitted
to women. First and chiefly on account of the condition attaching
to the female sex, whereby woman should be subject to man as
appears from Genesis (iii, 16). Now teaching and persuading
publicly in the church belong not. to subjects but to the prelates
(although men who are subjects may do these things if they be so
commissioned, because their subjection is not a result of their
natural sex, as it is with women, but of some thing supervening by
accident) .39
The confirmed has a right to the graces necessary for the
apostolate. Yet he has no claim on any or all of the charisms.
They are gifts beyond the hopes or merits of rqen. Of all the
gifts, that of the grace of word seems the closest to the apostolate; it is, moreover, the one which can best be prepared for by
the apostle. First of all, the fullness of the Holy Ghost must be
consciously appreciated. This is impossible without some earnest
effort at leading an interior life. This is the formation which Pius
XII demanded not as preparation for but rather as an essential part of Catholic Action. 4 ° For activity even in behalf of the
•• Ibid.
89 Ibid., a. 2. Cf. Cajetan's
commentary on this article in which he points out
the scope still allowed to those who are not prelates according to the mind of
St. Thomas.
•o Pius XII, Speech to the Directors of Catholic Action of Rome, April 19, 1931:
Catholic Action must consist of two things-it must fall into two parts not
necessarily successive ones; two divisions, ideal and moral. A work of formation,
in any case. Catholic Action must have as preliminary the individual sanctification

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JAMES R. GILLIS

Church is bound to be worth little more than the air it disturbs
unless that activity flows from the Head through the members
in the spirit of love. That is the activity which men and women
must carry into every aspect of their daily lives; we cannot
expect the charisms, but we can strive mightily to live by the
gifts of the Holy Ghost. It is possible to become a better
apostle, by study and prayer; the study of Theology is not out
of place in the apostle, but very much in place. John of St.
Thomas even hints that through it one may, in a human way,
make up for the absent charism of the gracious word:
For the charism of knowledge is ordered to the defense of the faith
and the instruction of others. It does not require that a person be
in the state of grace. Loving knowledge, experiencing, as it were,
the things of salvation, is not its end. Such knowledge is the
function of the gift. According to St. Thomas who follows St.
Augustine, it is evident that it is one thing to know how much a
man should believe to attain the blessed life which is eternal (this
is the knowledge of the gift). It is quite another to know how to
use this to aid the faithful and to defend the Faith against those
without it. This latter then seems to be what the Apostle means
by the term knowledge. This knowledge is either a charism or
theology. 41

There is no direct connection between the charism and the
gifts of the Holy Ghost. Yet they are the gifts of the same
Spirit, Who is the Soul of the Mystical body, that body which
is armed and aimed at conquest for Christ. The supernatural
life through the gifts must be the soul of the apostolate.
Whether the charisms, or at least one particular charism, will
of each one of its members: so that the supernatural life abounds and superabounds within them. But after this first and formative element, comes the second
-the distribution of this life, the action of apostolate, which means putting into
practice, in all its extension and in all its possibilities, the first apostolate of all,
that of the Twelve Apostles;
Letter to Cardinal Bertram: Catholic Action does non consist in attending exclusively to one's own perfection, though this must be its first and supreme intention,
but also in a true and genuine apostolate.
41 John of St. Thomas, " The Gifts of the Holy Ghost," THE THOMIST,
IX
(1946), p. 446.

THE CASE FOR CONFIRMATION

181

be given in profusion for the apostolate depends upon God's
will. Yet we are sure that " The Holy Ghost does not fail in
anything that pertains to the profit of the Church." 42
This is the case for Confirmation. Even in this crude and
imperfect exposition it should be obvious to the reader that
like all the sacraments, Confirmation is another stirring manifestation of divine wisdom and love. It is only because men
have failed to catch something of the marvellous aims of Christ
and His Church that they have failed to see the importance
of this sacrament. It has been due to the failure of Catholics
to see the Church continuing the mission of Christ. They have
not seen that by incorporation into that mystical body, they
have assumed rights and obligations in the mission of the
Church. In the twelfth century an old bishop bewailed the fact
that in spite of the marvellous graces accorded to the confirmed,
hardly any of their effects were to be seen in the lives of men. 43
It was almost as if St. Paul's question to the Ephesians was
being repeated, and the same answer was being given: " Paul
having passed through the upper coasts, came to Ephesus, and
found certain disciples. And he said to them: Have you received the Holy Ghost since ye believed? But they said to him:
We have not so much as heard whether there be a Holy Ghost." 44
It is almost as true in the twentieth century as it was in the
twelfth, that Catholics, who have both heard of and received
the Holy Ghost, still act as if they had not.
The lament of William of Auvergne might well have been
voiced today were it not for the fact of Catholic Action. This
was not merely a call for the laity to do what they were consecrated to do by Confirmation; they were called to share in the
apostolate of the hierarchy itself, to share as members in an
•• Summa Theol., II-ll, q.l77, a. I.
•• William of Auvergne, Summa Opi'JI'Um, I, fol. x: Nee mirum est si virtus ejus
et efficacia apud hujusmodi homines aut parva sit aut nulla. !nest quidem spectem
Christianae religionis et ipsum nomen et signa onmia sanctitatis non solum erubescant sed etiam formident. Rarissimi enim sunt qui non erubescant atque formident
facere bona aut loqui vera etiam in conspectu hominum Christianorum.
"Acts, xix, 6.

4

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JAMES R. GILLIS

organized, hierarchical and mandated apostolate. 45 This is an
organized apostolate. The members of Catholic Action share
in the mandate of the bishop, as organized groups. This is the
demand of our day. The clergy are insufficient and are incapable of winning the world to Christ.Ml The confirmed have been
consecrated for just such an opportunity. Pius XII insists upon
its necessity.
And so we desire that all, who claim the Church as their mother,
should seriously consider that not only the sacred ministers and
those who have consecrated themselves to God in religious life, but
other members as well of the mystical body of Jesus Christ have
the obligation of working hard and constantly for the upbuilding
and increase of this body. We wish this to be remembered especially
by members of Catholic action who assist the bishops and priests
in their apostolic labors-and to their praise be it said that they do
remember. 47
Yet the numbers who have heeded this call have been comparatively few. Catholics will not heed this call until they begin
to find it necessary to call upon that strengthening grace of
Confirmation frequently and fervently. They will not heed the
call as long as they see the Christian warfare as a defensive
fight against the pagan influences of the world. They will not
heed that call until they begin to understand that the Christian life is not a part time occupation or a hobby but a life,
complete and entire to be lived every hour of every day. They
will not heed that call until they begin to appreciate the truth
that has been given them through faith, that it is the spark for
a revolution which can remake the fabric of society into the
seamless robe of Christ, the King. And they will heed that call
only when they begin to recognize the voice of the Holy Spirit
calling them to do their duty.
•• Michael Moran, L'action Catholique, p. 52 seq.
•• Pius XI, Letter to Cardinal Segura: You see clearly the manner of times in
which we are living, and what they demand from the Catholic forces. On the one
hand, we deplore a society growing ever more pagan. . . . On the other hand, we
grieve because the clergy are quite insufficient to cope with the necessities and
needs of our times.
_. Mystici corporis, no. 96, p. 61.

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183

St. Thomas caught something of this vision when he described
this sacrament and its effects: "A good.name is manifested in
the balsam on account of its odor. This is a necessity for those
who converse with worldlings for the purpose of publicly confessing Christ, sprung into the very center of the battle from
the secret loins of the Church." 48 From the secret chambers
of the mystical body there are coming forth real apostles to go
forth into the camp of the enemy, into every stage and condition
of society. They do not meet hostility as much as indifference,
and yet they are prepared for both. The plan of battle, the
weapons of warfare are geared for a 20th century apostolate
but the consecration, the spirit are the same as on that very
first Pentecost. The Spirit is Love, and weapons, although
different in shape, are still the weapons of Love and Love alone.
It is necessary that the dedicated soldiers should know what
manner of warfare they are entering. They must know the plan
of campaign. They must be instructed in the ways of warfare.
That is the very reason St. Thomas found for sponsors.
This sacrament is given to man for strength in the spiritual combat.
Now, just as one newly born requires someone to teach him things
pertaining to ordinary conduct . . . so they who are chosen for the
fight need instructors by whom they are informed of things concerning the conduct of the battle, and hence in earthly wars,
generals and captains are appointed to the command of others.
For this reason he also who receives this sacrament, has someone
to stand for him, who, as it were, has to instruct him concerning
the fight. 40

It is of the utmost importance that the confirmed begin to
realize that there is a fight, and that they have been equipped
for that battle. They are mature members of amilitary community. They must put off the things of the child, and begin
to recognize their responsibility. They must stop acting like
children and begin to act like Christian men and women.
Because Confirmation brings to the soul nothing less than the
•• Summa Contra Gentes, iv, cap. 60.
•• Summa Theol., III, q. 72, a. 10.

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JAMES R. GILLIS

gift of Pentecost, the Holy Spirit, it will remain a complete
mystery except for those who live by that Spirit. That is their
obligation as apostles. Yet there will always remain much to
be clarified in this beautiful yet profound mystery. The whole
Church has been unmistakably impressed by the recognition of
its necessity-by granting pastors power to confer this sacrament upon the dying.&o It still remains a stupendous task
for theologians. The Holy Father appreciates this and has
invited theologians to the task: "We are well aware that many
a veil shrouds this profound truth of our union with the divine
Redeemer and in particular the Holy Spirit's dwelling within
our souls and impedes our power to understand and explain it.
This mystery is enveloped in a darkness, rising out of the
mental limitations of those who seek to grasp it. But we know
too that well-directed and earnest study of this doctrine and the
clash of diverse opinions and their discussion, provided love of
truth and due submission to the Church be the arbiter, will
open rich and bright vistas, whose light will help to progress in
kindred sacred sciences." 51 From such investigation will arise
clarity and appreciation. But the real case for Confirmation
will be written by a living apostolate made fresh by the breath

of the Holy Ghost.
JAMES

Dominican House of Studies,
River Fwest, IUinoia.

10
11

Acta Apoatolicae Seclis, vol. 88, pp. 849-858.
Pius XII, CorpCYTis Myatici, no. 78, p. 49.

R. GILLIS, 0. P.

THE BEAUTY OF GOD

T

HEOLOGICAL literature is not greatly concerned with
divine beauty. The familiar manuals of dogmatic
theology limit their treatment of this subject to a few
paragraphs in ·the tract on the divine attributes, and in some
texts even this casual treatment is omitted. The older works
in theology take no great pains to present a complete development of the subject.
Among the works of St. Thomas there is little in the nature
of an ex professo treatise on the beauty of God. His one effort
in this line is contained in a portion of one chapter of the
Exposition of the Divine Names of the Pseudo-Denis. Throughout the Opera Omnia there are other references to beauty which
contain the principles of the Thomistic esthetic, but these are
scattered passages which are not presented as an orderly
synthesis. In this article an: endeavor will be made to integrate
these various references and to present the teaching of St.
Thomas on the divine beauty.

I. SoURcEs
An obstacle to the synthesis of the true doctrine of St.
Thomas' esthetics has existed since 1869. In that year Uccelli,
an authority on the works of the Angelic Doctor, published a
portion of a Commentary on the Divine Names of the PseudoDenis under the title, De Pulchro et Bono, and ascribed it to
St. Thomas. The original text of this commentary was thought
to be a manuscript in the handwriting of St. Thomas, and the
discovery was hailed as a boon to the Thomistic esthetic. The
interesting history of this manuscript is given by Pere
Mandonnet:
At the time of the French occupation, the convent of St. Dominic
at Naples possessed a manuscript reputed to be the autograph of
185

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THOMAS C. DONLAN

St. Thomas Aquinas. It was kept in the cell of the saint and was
offered for veneration on his feast-day, mounted in a precious reliquary. When the Occupation laid the heavy hand on objects of
value, the reliquary was stolen, and the manuscript was thrown
among the books of the library which were sold. At the sale, the
Reverend P. Andres, a Jesuit, recognized its value,. bought it for
fifty sous and presented it to the king, Joachim Murat, who put it
in the National Library where it yet remains. The manuscript is
written on parchment in the hand, as they think, of the Angelic
Doctor in a barely legible cursive scripU

The opusculum De Pulchro et Bono is ascribed to St. Albert the
Great by Mandonnet and by Grabmann. H it is really the
autograph of St. Thomas, it only proves that St. Thomas
attended the school of St. Albert where he undertook to study
and copy the works of his master .2
Mandonnet and Grabmann cop.cur in placing the opusculum
De Pulchro et Bono among the spurious works wrongly ascribed
to St. Thomas. Their opinion is thus summed up by Grabmann:
The only explanation left is that St. Thomas transcribed in his own
hand the commentary of Albert the Great on the works of the
pseudo-Areopagite. William of Tocco reports that St. Thomas in
his student days had listened to lectures on the writings of the
pseudo-Areopagite at the feet of Albert the Great. 8

Futher on he states: ". . . the actuality of De Pulchro et Bono
as a statement of the Esthetic of St. Thomas must be firmly
rejected. Mandonnet has also rejected this Commentary as
being pseudo- Thomistic." 4 Earlier authors, such as Vallet,
1 P .. Mandonnet, 0. P., Des Ecrits Authentiques de S. Thomas D' Aquin (Fribourg: 1910), p. 154, nos. U7-180.
• Ibid. Si le manuscrit en question est reellement de saint Thomas, nous aurions
une preuve directe de !'etude que le disciple a faite des oeuvres de son
et il
aurait vraisemblablement copie ces ecrits pendent qu'il etait a son ecole.
• M. Grabmann, Die Echten Schriften Des Hl. Thomas Von Aquin. (Munster:
19!20), p. !281: Es bleibt dann nur die eine Erkalarung dass Thomas mit eigener
Hand die Kommentare Alberts d. Gr. zu den Werken des Pseudo-Areopagitica
abgeschreiben hat. Wilhelm von Thocco berichtet, dass Thomas in seinen Lemjahren
zu den Flissen Alberts d. Gr. gerade auch dessen Vorlesungen tiber die· Schriften des
Pseudo-Areopagiten angehort hat.
6 lbid . ... da die Verwertung des Kapitels De bono et pulchro fur die Darstel-

THE BEAUTY OF GOD

187

Lepore, Krug, and others who trusted the authenticity of
Uccelli's discovery, have included much of St. Albert's esthetic
in their works. They labored under the impression that they
were developing the doctrine of St. Thomas. Consequently,
some of the work in the field of Thomistic esthetics must be
carefully studied if the true doctrine of St. Thomas is sought
therein. The present study draws only from the authentic
Exposition of the Divine Names. No reference is made to the
opusculum De Pulchro et Bono.
Apart from his Exposition of the Divine Names, St. Thomas'
teaching on beauty is contained in fifteen references throughout
his works. This number may not be complete, but the chief
texts which furnish the principles used by most commentators
are included therein. Of the fifteen texts cited, two are from
the Commentary on the Psalms of David, and of the remaining thirteen, eight are in answers to objections. Thus, throughout the Opera Omnia there are only five references to beauty
in the corpora articulorum which ordinarily contain the more
important aspects of St. Thomas' doctrine. Apparently the
Angelic Doctor discussed beauty principally when urged to
do so by the remarks of others on the subject.
Because of the incompleteness of St. Thomas' tract on beauty,
it is difficult to understand the universality of the principles
of his Esthetics. A theory so well founded seems to. deserve a
more through treatment, and appears worthy of inclusion in
the consideration of the divine attributes in the First Part of
the Summa Theologica. An answer to this difficulty can be
sought in the metaphysical character of St. Thomas' esthetics
and in the close relationship of beauty to goodness and truth.
Given the definitions of beauty and the three objective elements
of beauty, together with the references to the psychology of
the esthetic experience, a complete and workable theory of
esthetic can be evolved from the general doctrine of St. Thomas'
metaphysics and psychology. The same answer may be given
lung der Asthetik des hl. Thomas mit Entschiedenheit abgelehnt werden muss. Es
hat Mandonnet diesen Konentar als pseudo-thomistisch abgelehnt.

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THOMAS C. DONLAN

when one wonders why St. Thomas did not treat extensively
of God's beauty in the Summa Theologica. The doctrine on
goodness and truth is there and so are the principles regarding
beauty; it has been left for others to draw the conclusions.

II. PRELIMINARY

NoTIONS

Any valid conclusions about the divine beauty must be based
upon the principles of esthetics and upon knowledge of God.
Esthetics furnishes many conclusions about the nature of
beauty, but the logical application of these conclusions to the
divine nature must wait upon tht: presentation of the fundamental notions of God's nature and attributes and of the
manner in which men know these truths. Before taking up the
matter of divine beauty it will be necessary to consider St.
Thomas' teaching on beauty; on man's knowledge of God; on
the perfections and attributes of God; and, finally, the doctrine
on the nature of God.
1. ST. THOMAS'

THEORY OF ESTHETICS

1. The Notion and Perception of Beauty

Like truth or goodness, beauty may be studied under a
twofold aspect, either as a quality of a certain object which
gives rise to the esthetic experience, or as the esthetic experience
itself. A study of the quality of the beautiful object is a consideration of the metaphysical or objective aspect of esthetics;
a study of the esthetic experience itself is a consideration of
the psychological aspect of esthetics.
The psychological aspect of esthetics was considered by St.
Thomas when he defined beauty in terms of its effects in the
following passages: " Those things are called beautiful which
please when seen." ". . . that, the very apprehension of which
pleases is called beautiful." 5 Pleasure is posited as the first
effect of beauty. Further statements expand the original definitions beyond the realm of the senses into the domain of the
• Summa Theol., I, q. 5, a. 4, ad lum; I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad Sum.

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THE BEAUTY OF GOD

intellect where the esthetic experience finds its cause and
produces its principal effects. ". . . beauty adds to goodness
a certain ordination to the cognitive faculty, so that whatever
gratifies the appetite simpliciter is said to be good, only that
which causes pleasure in being apprehended is called beautiful." 6
This emphasis on the intellectual character of the esthetic
experience does not exclude the concomitant and less specific
sensory pleasure, but rather indicates that the principal effect
of perceiving beauty is to be sought in the intellectual order.
The cognitive nature of the perception of beauty admits of
varying degrees of knowledge which contribute to the esthetic
experience. The definition of beauty as " that which pleases
when seen " includes the Latin word videre which properly
refers to the function of the sense of sight, but the meaning
of this term may be extended in view of the following:
It is fitting to speak of any name in two ways: first, according to
the primary signification; secondly, according to the use of the
name. For example the name of sight which was first employed to
signify an act of the sense of sight, but because of the dignity and
certainty of this sense, its name was extended . . . to include all
the knowledge of the other senses. We say " See how it tastes, or
smells, or how hot it is." The name was further applied to intellectual knowledge, " Blessed are the clean of heart for they shall
see God." (Mt., v, 8) 7

In the definition of beauty, the word videre refers to all the
cognitive faculties of man, both sensitive and intellectual.
The senses are not equally cognitive and all do not minister
equally to the formation of the concept of beauty. In perceiving
beauty there is a definite hierarchy of importance among the
senses.
Those senses which are most cognitive are principally concerned
with beauty, especially sight and hearing which chiefly minister to
the reason. We speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds, but
in reference to the objects of the other senses we do not use the
term " beautiful," e. g., we do not speak of beautiful ordors or
flavors.8
• Ibid., 1-11, q.
a. 1, ad Sum.
• Ibid., I, q. 67, a. I.

8

Ibid., I-ll, q.

a. I, ad Sum.

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THOMAS C. DONLAN

Here again is emphasized the role of reason in appreciating
beauty. Sight and hearing are the principal esthetic sensefunctions, but their preeminence is due to their proximity to
reason. This same emphasis on the intellectual nature of
esthetic experience finds different expression in the tract on the
moral virtues.
Beauty consists in a certain clarity and due proportion. Now both
of these are found radically in the reason to which pertains both the
light manifesting beauty and the establishing of due proportion in
other (things). So beauty is found per se and essentially in the
contemplative life, which consists in an act of reason; whence the
Book of Wisdom (8/2) says of the contemplation of wisdom: "I
became a lover of her beauty." Now among the moral virtues,
beauty exists by participation inasmuch as they share in the order
of reason; and especially in temperance which represses those desires
which chiefly becloud the reason. So it is that the virtue of chastity
best prepares man for contemplation, because venereal pleasure
draws the mind most strongly to sensible things. 9

The teaching that " beauty consists in due proportion " places
the esthetic experience beyond the senses because, "sense knowledge does not extend sufficiently far that it can consider the
proportion of one thing to another. This pertains properly to
the reason." 10 However, this teaching does not exclude the
senses from their proper role in the genesis of the concept of
beauty, but they are not the chief factors in the esthetic experience. When it is said that " those senses which are most
cognitive are principally concerned with beauty," it must not
be inferred that the less cognitive senses are completely
excluded. In considering St. Thomas' treatment of the objective
conditions o£ beauty, it will become clear that all the cognitive
faculties must be employed for the full appreciation of beauty.
Formally, the perception of beauty consists in an act of
abstraction by which the intellect knows its proper object (i. e.
the form or quiddity of material things) from among the
particular data supplied by the senses. This knowledge itself
• Ibid., ll-II, q. 180, a. 2, ad Sum.

10

Ibid., ll-II, q. 58, a. 4.

THE BEAUTY OF GOD

191

delights the will, and thus the esthetic response is completed.
No exclusion of sense pleasure is implied, but this doctrine
places the formality of the esthetic experience in the reason/· 1
" Beauty is found essentially and per se in the contemplative
life, which consists in an act of reason." 12
Experience manifests that not every act of knowledge pertains to esthetic experience. There must be some quality in
esthetic knowledge which distinguishes it from ordinary cognition. The distinctive note of esthetic knowledge is facility or
suavity. Beauty pertains essentially to the contemplative life,
the chief act of which is ". . . a simple intellectual view of
truth, superior to reasoning and accompanied by admiration." 13
This quasi-intuitive and facile perception of the esthetic experience is quite different from the laborious procedure of discursive
knowledge which is the ". . . knowledge of a thing previously
unknown at which we arrive from something known beforehand." 14 Once this note of facility is lacking, there can be no
question of esthetic knowledge; beauty is recognized at once
and suavely, or not at all.15
fl. Delight in the Esthetic Experience

Although the perception of beauty pertains primarily to the
intellect, there is an element of delight in knowing the beautiful.
Pleasure or complacence is the proper effect of beauty in the
psychological order; beauty is that which pleases when seen.
There is some special relation of causality between the apprehension of beauty and this consequent delight. This relationship
is explained in the following texts: Since the good is what all
desire, it belongs to the nature of goodness that it allay the
11 Cf. J. L. Callahan, 0. P., A Theory of Esthetic
(Washington, D. C.: 1927),
pp. 89 fl.
1 '• Summa Theol., II-IT, q. 180, a. 2, ad Sum.
13 R. Garrigou-Lagrange, Christian Perfection and Contemplation
(St. Louis:
1989) p. 45. Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 180, aa. 1, 6.
10 Ibid., I, q. 58, a. 8, ad 1um.
15 Ad pulchrum enim non sufficit quaelibet
cognitio, sed requiritur quaedam
visio, seu intuitio qua objectum quasi comprehendatur (E. Hugon, 0. P., Curaua
Philosophiae Thomistae (Paris: 1907) V, 189.

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THOMAS C. DONLAN

desires of the appetitive faculty; but it is the nature of beauty
to allay desire merely by being seen or known." 16 "Beauty is
desirable only insofar as it shares the nature of goodness, and
truth is desirable in the same way .... " 17 Beauty must be
known as a good of the intellect if it is to be desired, and this
desire must find its fulfillment in the very knowledge of the
beautiful object.
There are certain kinds of knowledge which do not beget
pleasure/ 8 and there are certain intellectual pleasures which
have nothing to do with beauty. Esthetic delight is a special
pleasure which is chiefly intellectual because its cause is in the
intellect and its end is in knowledge. The delight concomitant
with the perception of beauty is both intellectual and emotional
but the intellectual delight is known by analogy with sense
pleasure. Any emotion is a modification of the sense appetite/ 9
and emotions are not found properly in the intellect. 20 Yet
there is a certain intellectual delight found in the esthetic
experience and this intellectual delight is accompanied by a
corresponding reaction in the sense appetite because both faculties are delighted in the attainment o£ their proper objects. 21
In view of the emphasis upon the intellectual nature of the
esthetic response, the pleasure which is posited as the effect of
the preception of beauty must be primarily the gaudium, or
delight, which follows intellectual knowledge. At the same time,
Summa Theol., I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad Sum.
I Sent., d. S1, q. 2, ad 4um.
18 Operationes
sunt delectabiles inquantum sunt proportionatae et connaturales
operanti. Cum autem virtus humana sit finita, secundum aliquam mensuram operatio
est ei proportionata. Unde si excedat illam mensuram jam non erit proportionata
nee delectabilis, sed magis laboriosa et attaedians. Et secundum hoc otium et ludus
et alia quae ad requiem pertinent, delectabilia sunt inquantum auferunt tristitiam
quae est ex lahore (Summa Theol., I-II, q. S2, a. 1, ad Sum).
19 Passio proprie invenitur ubi est transmutatio
corporalis, quae quidem invenitur
in actibus appetitus sensitivi (Ibid., I-II, q. 2S, a. S).
20 Ratio passionis magis proprie invenitur
in actu appetitus sensitivi quam intellectivi (Ibid., I-II, q. 22, a. S).
21 Delectamur
enim et in his quae naturaliter concupiscimus, ea adipiscentes, et
in his quae concupiscimus secundum rationem (Ibid., I-II, q. S1, a. S); cf. Ibid.,
I-II, q. S1, a. 4; Ibid., I-II, q. 26, a. S.
16
17

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198

the doctrine demands the presence of delectatio, or sense
pleasure, which is concomitant with its more noble companion.
The superiority of intellectual delight over emotional pleasure
is aptly summed llp in the statement that ". . . we experience
delight in the intellective appetite in which we are one with the
angels." 22
There are two causes for delight in the apprehension of
beauty. The first is love, i.e., love taken in its broader sense to
signify the inclination of a faculty towards its proper object. 23
This love or inclination causes both the senses and the intellectual faculties to unite with their proper objects. 24 The union
of faculty and object causes joy or delight, which is pleasure
in the possession of some good. A similarity or proportion
between the faculties which perceive beauty and their proper
objects begets the inclination of these faculties towards their
objects. 25 This similarity or proportion which inclines the
faculty towards its object ultimately produces delight. 26 Beautiful things are proportioned to the faculties which they delight;
beautiful things are easily apprehended because they are suited
to the powers of the cognitive faculties. 27 Likewise, when the
92 Ibid., 1-11, q. 81, a. 4, ad Sum .
.. In unoquoque autem horum appetituum amor dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum. In appetitu autem naturali principium

hujusmodi motus est connaturalitas appetentis ad id in quod tendit, quae dici
potest amor naturalis; sicut ipsa connaturalitas corporis gravis ad locum medium
est per gravitatem, et potest dici amor naturalis; et similiter coaptatio appetitus
sensitivi vel voluntatis ad aliquod bonum, id est, ipsa complacentia boni, dicitur
amor sensitivus vel intellectivus seu rationalis. · Amor igitur sensitivus est in
appetitu sensitivo, sicut amor intellectivus in intellectivo appetitu; et pertinet ad
concupiscibilem, quia dicitur per respectum ad,bonum absolute, non per respectum
ad arduum, quod est objectum irascibilis (Ibid., I-11, q. 26, a. 1).
2 ' Amoris autem proprium objectum est bonum quia ... amor importat quamdam
connaturalitatem vel complacentiam amantis ad amatum; unicuique autem est
bonum id quod est sibi connaturale et proportionatum (Ibid., I-11, q. 27, a. 1).
""Similitudo, proprie loquendo, est causa amoris (Ibid., 1-11, q. 27, a. I).
""Ibid., 1-11, q. 87, a. 7, sed contra.
•• Pulclu.11m autem respicit vim cognoscitivam; pulchra dicuntur quae visa placent;
unde pulchrum in debita proportione consistit, quia sensus delectantur in rebus
debite proportionatis, sicut in sibi similibus, nam sensus quaedam ratio est et

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THOMAS C. DONLAN

intellect attains its object, which is the quiddity of material
things, it apprehends the form of that object (\vhich is the
objective source of beauty,Z 8 and is delighted by the very act
of knowing. 29
The· activity of the faculties which apprehend beauty is the
second cause of the joy of the esthetic experience. Operation or
activity is at the root of all delight, and the most delightful
operations of both senses and intellect are those which are most
perfect, i. e. those operations of intellect and sense which are
perfectly disposed for the reception of their most perfect
objects. 3° Consequently, the delight of the esthetic experience
is the perfection of those faculties which apprehend beauty. 31
3. The Objective Aspect of Esthetics

Every effect must have a proportioned cause, and the esthetic
experience is no exception to the general rule. The psychological
explanation of the esthetic experience has its roots in the
operation of man's faculties, but this explanation shows only a
part of the picture. The explanation of esthetic delight finds
its completion in an analysis of the beautiful object which man
contemplates. Three elements are to be found in every beautiful
object;. integrity or perfection, proportion, and clarity or
resplendence. Each must be examined separately to determine
their nature and importance.
Integrity or perfection is the first of the objective elements
of beauty. Anything is said to be perfect when it lacks nothing
according to the measure of its perfection. 32 Everything created
is composed of parts which are either actual, virtual or potential.
omnis virtus cognoscitiva. Et quia cognitio fit per assimilationem, assimilatio autem
respicit formam; pulchrum proprie pertinet ad rationem causae formalis (Ibid., I,
q. 5, a. 4, ad 1um).
•• Cf. Ibid.
•• Cf. Ibid., I-II, q. 32, a. 1, ad Sum.
80 Omnis delectatio
aliquam operationem consequatur (Ibid., I-II, q. 32, a. 1).
81 Unumquodque
autem perfectum est inquantum est actu, nam potentia sine
actu imperfecta est (Ibid., I-II, q. 3, a. 2).
•·• Perfectum dicitur cui nihil deest secundum modum suae perfectionis (Ibid.,
l,q.4,a.1).

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Those parts which are required for the natural completeness
of anything .are its integral parts. Integrity is a species of perfection, and perfection is the form of the whole being which
results from the integrity of the parts. 33 ·
This note of completeness, integrity or perfection must grace
every beautiful object, but it must not be understood in a purely
negative or in an over-extended sense. While it is true that
deformed or imperfect things, as such, are ugly and displeasing 34 it must not be concluded that the mere presence of
integral parts fulfills what is demanded by the integrity of
beauty. The perfection characteristic of pulchritude is "a
positive fullness, completeness, a richness of perfection such as
can call forth the attention of the cognitive faculties and
provoke a lively pleasure." 35 A rose-bud, although having the
perfection of a rose-bud, evokes only passing attention even
from the flower-lover. Later, the same bud, having become a
flower with its myriad tints and rich hues coupled with its
fragrance, arrests the gaze of all, even of the uncouth and the
rude. The added life and vigor of the flower constitutes the
integrity or perfection necessary to furnish the esthetic stimulus.
The integrity of beauty must not be understood in an overextended manner. Perfection is twofold: primary, and secondary. The former consists in the form of the whole resulting from
the integrity of the parts; the latter consists in an end which is
either an operation or the result of an operation. Primary
perfection causes that which is secondary, because the form is
the principle of operation. 36 The integrity or perfection of
88 Quae quidem perfectio est forma totius quae ex integritate partium consurgit
(Ibid., I, q. 78, a. 1).
•• Quae enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt (Ibid., I, q. 89, a. 8).
8 " J. L. Callahan, 0. P., op. cit., p. 58).
86 Duplex est rei perfectio, prima et secunda. Prima quidem perfectio est secundum quod res in sua substantia est perfecta; quae quidem perfectio est forma
totius quae ex integritate partium consurgit. Perfectio autem secunda est finis;
finis autem vel est operatio, sicut finis citharistae est citharizare; vel est aliquid ad
quod per operationem pervenitur, sicut finis aedificatoris est domus, quam aedificando facit. Prima autem perfectio est causa secundae, quia forma est principium
operationis (Ibid., I, q. 78, a. I).

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beauty is teleological, and the requirements of a given object
establish the measure of its integrity. Thus, the Venus of Milo,
while only fragmentary in its present state, is considered to be
truly beautiful. The figure lacks much of the integrity required
in a woman, but retains perfection sufficient for a statue.
Perfection or integrity must be understood in a most formal
sense. In the realm of beauty, integrity has no absolute significance and must be understood in relation to the end of manifesting a form existing in matter.
The second of the objective elements of beauty is proportion,
and this quality is noted more than the others. 37 Proportion
consists in the due disposition of the parts of an action or object
among themselves, and of the individual parts to the whole.
Of all the elements of order, proportion is the most striking
because it signifies the perfection of order. This concept of order
includes other qualities of beauty. Variety or multiplicity of
diverse things is the material cause, unity the formal cause and
proportion the efficient cause of order. It is proportion which
unifies and coordinates diverse elements in a manner most perfectly suited to manifest the perfection of the whole.
The importance of proportion as an element in beauty and
in the esthetic experience can scarcely be exaggerated. There
must be a twofold proportion, the first in the components of the
beautiful object and another between the object and the
faculties which apprehend it. Beauty is appreciated precisely
because it is proportioned to the cognitive faculties. " Beauty
is related to the cognitive faculty and that which pleases when
seen is said to be beautiful. Wherefore, beauty consists in due
proportion, because the senses are delighted in duly proportioned objects as in things like unto themselves, for the senses
and every cognitive faculty is a kind of proportion." 38 Like
37 Ibid., I, q. 39, a. 8; I-II, q. 145,
II-II, q. 180,
ad Sum; In de Div.
Nom., c. 4, lect. 5; Summa Theol., I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1um.
38 St. Thomas'
last statement, " ... sensus quaedam ratio est et omnis virtus
cognitiva," is a citation from Aristotle, as is evident from the commentary on the
De Anima (lib. lect.
no. 598) where St. Thomas observes, "A sense is delighted
in proportioned objects as in things like unto itself because a sense is a kind of

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integrity, proportion is to be understood in a relative and
teleological sense; " Beauty consists in due proportion." 39 Only
that proportion which is best suited to manifest the form of the
object is true esthetic proportion.
Resplendence or clarity is the third objective element of
beauty. Practically all of the ancients reckoned clarity as a
quality of beauty, but with St. Thomas, this element assumes
a new importance and a new significance. The hiatus between
the percipient subject and the beautiful object is spanned by the
clarity of the object. Without clarity an object cannot provide
esthetic stimulus. The beauty of any object is in direct proportion to its clarity. The word clarity was first employed to
denote the light which renders objects visible to the sense of
sight. This primary signification was extended to include whatever quality manifested an object to any cognitive faculty. It
is consistent with usage to predicate clarity of intellectual
knowledge. This teaching is applied in the statement that
corporeal beauty consists in " due proportion of the members
with a suitable clarity or color," while the beauty of human
acts (which is something spiritual) results from " due proportion of words or deeds in which the light of reason shines
forth." 40
The lives of many saints are filled with painful and humiliating experiences, of which Our Lady's flight into Egypt and the
sufferings of St. Paul are apt illustrations. Viewed from a
natural standpoint such abasement may seem unreasonable
and even revolting, but the true beauty of these sufferings
proportion (sensus est proportio quaedam) ." And again (lect. 24, no. 556), " A
sense is a kind of reason, that is, proportion (Sensus est quaedam ratio, i.e., proportio.) . The improper interpretation of this one term, ratio, can be of grave
consequence. If this term is interpreted incorrectly, the foundation of one of the
basic principles of Thomist esthetic is weakened. This principle is that there is a
twofold proportion in beautiful things; one intrinsic, of the parts among themselves
and to the whole; the other extrinsic, of the objects to the faculties which perceive
it; cf. M. de Munnynck, 0. P., "L'Esthetique deS. Thomas d'Aquin," reviewed in
Bulletin Thomiste (Janvier, 1925) no. 178, by J. Webert, 0. P.
39 Pulchrum in debita proportione consistit (Summa Theol., I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1um).
40 In I Cor., lect. 2.

5

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THOMAS C. DONLAN

becomes apparent when one understands that they were motivated by Charity. Charity-the love of God and neighboris the form of the infused virtues, and its resplendence lends
beauty to the very depths of human misery. The clarity of
beauty is the resplendence or effulgence of the form of the
object. The form is the prime constituent of the essence of a
being; it is that by which a thing is and by which a thing is
known. Resplendence of the form is the splendor of the essence
and this splendor manifests the object to the cognitive faculties.
To return to the idea of light or clarity mentioned previously,
the form may be conceived as the light which makes the object
known. All the properties of an object enjoy a degree of clarity
proportionate to their participation in the essence from which
they flow.
The essence is the cause of the primary clarity of an object
and also causes its beauty fundamentally. Consequently, an
object will enjoy a place in the gradations of beauty proportionate to its position in the hierarchy of forms. In every being
there will be as many diverse kinds of beauty as there are
different radiations of the form or forms. St. Thomas touches
upon this point when he mentions the various gradations of
beauty, viz., (1) corporeal beauty: "We call those men beautiful who have well-proportioned members and a splendid color
or complexion." 41 (2) intellectual beauty: "Beauty is found
per se and essentially in the contemplative life which consists
in an act of reason." 42 and (3) supernatural beauty: "Inasmuch as He (Christ) is the perfect Word of the Father, He has
a clarity which shines forth upon all, and in which all things
are resplendent." 43 The clarity of even natural forms is derived
from the divine essence as a kind of analogus participation;
and it is for this reason that Aristotole considered the form as
something divine. 44 Thus, created beauty is a sensible manifestation of the divine splendor which causes all beauty as
"I Sent., d. SI, q. 2, a. I.
"Summa Theol., 11-11, q. 180, a. 2, ad Sum.

••I Sent., d. Sl, q. 2, a. I.
•• ln Lib. I Metaphysic.

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is a similitude of divine pulchritude. It follows, then, that all
things are beautiful with the beauty of God.
4. The Definition of Beauty

The only definition of beauty formulated by St. Thomas is
expressed in terms of the proper effect of beauty, "Beauty is
that which pleases when seen." Emphasis here is on the effect
of beauty on the apprehending subject, and the objective
reality is mentioned only by implication (Pulchrum est id
quod visum placet) . The qualities of this objective reality
are described in different places. First, three qualities are
mentioned:
" Three things are required for beauty; first,
integrity or perfection, for defective things are for this reason
ugly; secondly, due proportion or harmony; and, finally, clarity,
consequently, those things which are brilliantly colored are said
to be beautiful." 45 In other places, two qualities are noted:
"Clarity and due proportion concur in the nature of beauty." 46
" Beauty consists in a certain clarity and due proportion." 47
"And he (Pseudo-Denis) shows wherein the nature of beauty
consists by saying that God causes beauty inasmuch as He is
the 'cause of harmony and clarity' in all things." 48 Finally,
only a single element is given: ". . . beauty consists in due
proportion." 49
From the simple definition of beauty in terms of its effects
combined with the idea of the objective elements of beauty a
more comprehensive definition can be elaborated. This ultimate
definition will be expressed in terms of an improper genus and
species, because beauty is outside the genera and species. Moreover, this definition must reckon with the fact that beauty, like
truth or goodness, may be considered from three aspects, viz.,
subjective, formal and objective. Subjectively, beauty is the
complacence or delight in a rational subject consequent upon
the apprehension of an object which provides the proper
stimulus. Formally, beauty IS something rationally distinct
•• Summa Theol., I, q. 89, a. 8.
•• Ibid., II-II, q. 145, a. 2.
•• Ibid., II-II, q. 180, a. 2, ad Sum.

•• In de Div. Nom., cap. 4, lect. 5.
•• Summa Theol., I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1um.

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THOMAS C. DONLAN

from the beautiful object. It is a relation of conformity existing
between a perfect, duly proportioned and resplendent object
and the intellect which contemplates it. Objectively, beauty
is a being, perfect, proportioned and resplendent to a degree
that makes it a stimulus for the esthetic experience; it is the
resplendence of the form in a perfect and proportioned object.
When these various definitions are unified, it becomes clear that
beauty is the perfection, proportion and resplendence of a being
which will delight the beholder when it is seen. This definition
is well suited to represent the content of St. Thomas' thought
and can be harmonized with the definitions elaborated by his
commentators.

5. Beauty, Goodness, and Truth
Beauty has a relation to the cognitive faculties as well as to
the appetites. The term " good " expresses the relation of
being to the appetites, while the word " truth " expresses the
relation of being to the intellect. Because beauty is an attribute
of being, it follows logically that if there was a special faculty
for apprehending the beautiful, beauty would consist in being
precisely as related to that faculty. But beauty is the object
of the cognitive and appetitive faculties conjointly, and, consequently, there is a close relationship between beauty and the
objects of these faculties, viz., the good and the true. Beauty
and goodness are objectively identical yet rationally distinct;
they are two aspects of one reality. 50 Both are dependent upon
the form of the object, but in different ways. The form of an
object considered as good is that which can allay the appetite,
while the same form of the same object considered as beautiful
enjoys a certain splendor which makes the very knowledge of
the object a source of delight for the beholder. Beauty adds to
goodness a relationship to the cognitive faculties. Beauty must
share in the nature of the good in order to be desirable, because
the end and perfection of every other faculty are contained in
•• Pulchrum est idem bono, sola ratione differens (Ibid., 1-11, q. 27, a. I, ad Sum).

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201

the object of the appetitive faculty (i.e., the good) as that
which is proper is included in that which is common. 51
Beauty is likewise identified objectively with truth and is
ordained to the same subject, the intellect, although to different
operations thereof. When the cognitive faculties are applied
to certain objects, they apprehend the same object under a
twofold aspect; they perceive the adequation of the so-called
" naked entity " of the object with the intellect, and they apprehend the entity of the object as possessing the integrity of its
nature as well as the proper proportion of parts manifested
through the resplendence of the form. In the former case the
intellect attains truth; in the latter, beauty. Beauty demands
that the object enjoy a certain resplendence of the form, a
peculiar clarity which renders it desirable as the special good
of the cognitive faculties, which also renders the object suitable
for quasi-intuitive assimilation by the contemplating subject.
The good and the beautiful are materially identical and
formally diverse. The good is the end of the appetite; it pertains
to the final cause. The beautiful is a special good of the cognitive faculties, " and because cognition is by way of assimilation
which regards the formal cause, beauty properly pertains to the
nature of a formal cause." 52 In the possession of good there is
complacence but not contemplation; in the apprehension of
beauty there is both complacence and contemplation. The good
pleases when possessed; the beautiful pleases when seen. Beauty
does not beget the desire for dominion. "To consider (or,
contemplate) pulchritude is delightful in itself." 53 The love
of beauty is of its very nature disinterested. Every faculty
has a certain complacence in its proper object, and hence there
must be a special delight in the apprehension of the beautiful
to distinguish it from the complacence of the intellect in the
true. Truth is the good of the intellect, and the intellect finds
51 Ibid., I-II, q. 11, a.l, ad 2um.
•• ... et quia cognitio fit per assimilationem, assimilatio autem respicit formam;
pulchrum proprie pertinet ad rationem causae formalis (Ibid., I, q. 5, a. 4, ad lum).
58 • • • considerare pulchritudinem
est delectabile secundum seipsam (In I Polit.,
lect. 8).

THOMAS C. DONLAN

its perfection in attaining truth. Beauty, like truth, is apprehended by the intellect and not only perfects the intellect, but
adds a relation to the will which apprehends the knowledge of
the beautiful as a good and is delighted in this knowledge. The
normal operation of the intellect lacks this special reference to
the appetitive faculty.
2. GOD AND MAN'S KNOWLEDGE

OF HIM

1. Man's Knowledge of God

The foregoing synoptic view of the principles of esthetics
must be complemented by a consideration of the doctrine about
man's knowledge of God and about God Himself, before any
conclusions can be drawn regarding the divine beauty. Like all
of man's knowledge, his concepts of the divine nature have their
origins in sensible reality. Due to this dependence upon matter,
merely human knowledge never can attain the essence of God
directly, because the divine power infinitely surpasses created
effects. The knowledge of these created effects in the light of
the divine causality can lead to a knowledge of God's existence
and even to a knowledge of certain aspects of His nature. Man
can know the divine nature by analogy, that is by knowledge
based on the relation existing between two or more things.
Analogous knowledge is relative or comparative. The analogous term is predicated of different objects in a sense which is
neither the same, nor yet entirely different, but according to a
certain proportion or proportionality. Thus, when it is said that
a man has a healthy complexion, we have an example of the
analogy of proportion or attribution. Health is formally in the
man; it is in his complexion only by extrinsic denomination,
because his complexion is an effect of his health. When the
name " dog " is predicated of an animal and of a constellation,
we have an example of analogy of proportionality in the metaphorical sense. " Dog " is predicated formally only of the
animal; it is predicated of the stars metaphorically because of a
resemblance which is independent of causal relationship. On
the other hand. " cognition " can be predicated of both sensa-

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208

tion and intellection proportionately and properly, because
sensation is to the sensible what intellection is to the intelligible, and both are species of cognition a:ccording to a proportionate meaning of the term. It is this last species, the analogy
of proper proportionality, that gives us our knowledge of God,
for there is no determined proportion between the analogues.
Existence, goodness, truth, being, beauty, all of these can be
predicated both of God and of creatures because the realities
signified by the terms are found formally both in God and in
creatures, and because beauty, for example, exists in creatures
in a manner proportionate to that in which it exists in God.
Our ability to know God from His creatures is aptly expressed
by St. Paul: " For since the creation of the world His invisible
attributes are clearly seen . . . His everlasting power also and
divinity . . . being understood through the things that are
made." 54 Thus does man arrive at a knowledge of God. It must
be noted that there is more diversity than similarity in analogous knowledge. The natural knowledge of which we have
been speaking will embrace the existence of God and something
about His nature, but it never attains to a quidditative knowledge of God nor does it illumine the mysterious manner in which
the various perfections exist harmoniously in the divine essence.
Man in understanding the works of nature by his natural reason
attains to a knowledge of what God is not, rather than of what
He is. The knowledge of the inner life of God whicli has been
freely given to man comes to him through divine revelation and
the gift of faith. By these means man's natural knowledge of
God is vastly enlarged and greatly perfected. The knowledge
of Faith is the initiation into that beautific knowledge which is
the portion and the inheritance of the just throughout eternity.
2. The Perfections and Attributes of God

In the world of nature there exist two kinds of perfections;
the absolutely simple perfections, such as goodness, beauty, and
truth which contain no imperfection in their formal concepts;
•• Romans, i, !!0.

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THOMAS C. DONLAN

and the mixed perfections, such as sensation, or reasoning
which include some imperfection in their formal concepts.
These mixed perfections cannot exist formally in God because
no imperfection can be predicated formally of God and imperfection pertains to the formal concept of mixed perfections.
On the other hand, the absolutely simple perfections are those
which include no imperfection in their formal concept and which
it is better to possess than to lack. The absolutely simple prefections of God are what are known as the divine attributes;
they exist necessarily, formally and eminently. in Him and are
deducible from what we conceive as the divine essence.
3. The Essence of God

Man knows the perfections of creatures and he attributes
these perfections to God by the process of analogy. The cumulation of all perfections existing in their cause in an infinite
degree and with utmost simplicity constitutes what we call
the physical essence of God.
Among the many attributes of the divinity there is one which
is the source of all other perfections and which serves to distinguish God from all other beings. Such an attribute is what
constitutes the metaphysical essence of God. This radical perfection which is God's essence is self-subsisting being. God
named Himself in terms of self-subsisting being when He said
to Moses: "I am Who am"; 55 " Who Is" is God's proper name
in the strictest sense.
The essence of God is distinct "not really, but logically"
from the divine attributes and Persons. In the terminology of
later theologians, this doctrine is stated by saying that there
is a minor virtual distinction between the divine essence and
the attributes and Persons. A minor virtual distinction is a
plurality conceived by the mind and founded imperfectly in
reality. That is to say, while God's essence is absolutely simple,
His perfections are such that they escape the intellect of man
and must be conceived as multiple and distinct. The simplicity
55

Exodus, iii, 14.

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205

of the divine essence is sufficient foundation for the human mind
to conceive of one attribute explicitly while prescinding from
the others which enter the concept only implicitly.
4. General Conclusions about the Beauty of God

The foregoing doctrine about the nature of God and about
the human manner of kndwing the divinity forms the groundwork for drawing certain preliminary and general conclusions
about the divine beauty. It is a fact of experience that beauty
exists in the material creation. St. Thomas closely allies beauty
with perfection and allows for no admixture of imperfection in
the beautiful, as the beautiful. Beauty, therefore, is an absolutely simple perfection.
By way of the analogy of proper proportionality beauty is
predicated of God Who is the efficient cause of all created
perfection. Or, beauty may also be predicated of God inasmuch
as He is Self-Subsisting Being, to Whom nothing of the perfection of being can be lacking. The conclusion of both predications is the same: God is beautiful. In God, nature and
supposite are one. Hence it may be said that God is Beauty.
Further, the divine attributes exist in God both formally and
eminently, and because of this eminent perfection, the divine
beauty must be ineffably delightful and infinitely more perfect
than any created beauty which at best is but a feeble reflection
of that Beauty which is God.

III. THE DocTRINE OF ST. THOMAs' ExPOSITION OF THE
DIVINE NAMES oF PsEUDo- DENIS

The first part of this paper presented a synthetic view of
esthetics, the principles of which were gathered from varied
places throughout the works of St. Thomas. This was followed
by a consideration of certain aspects of the teaching on the
divine nature. Both studies are prerequisite for the investigation of divine beauty which St. Thomas makes in his Commentary on the Divine Names. This commentary is the source
of much of what is presented today as the " esthetics of

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THOMAS C. DONLAN

Thomism," 56 and despite the fact that it is a great boon to the
study of esthetics, there are certain difficulties inherent in the
work which must be overcome. In the Prologue three of these
difficulties are indicated: (1) A Platonic mode of expression is
evident throughout the works of the Pseudo-Denis. Plato's
theory of exemplarism is not consonant with faith or truth when
applied to separated natural species, but this doctrine is true
and in harmony with faith when applied to God Who is the
first principle of things, and in Whose mind pre-exist the
archetypes of all creation. (2) Frequently, the Pseudo-Denis
adduces good reasons in support of his conclusions, but these
reasons are stated in too few words, or are implied by one
word, thus making for great difficulty of interpretation.
(8)
Certain parts of the text, while appearing verbose, contain much
profound doctrine which can be culled therefrom only at the
expenditure of much time and energy.
· These difficulties pertain to the text of the Pseudo-Denis.
We, who are chiefly concerned with St. Thomas' explanations
of the text, encounter further difficulties which find their
ultimate explanation in the work of the original author: (1)
The lucid order and presentation characteristic of the independent work of St. Thomas are not always present in this
commentary, because the explanation follows the order, and
sometimes the phraseology, of the original work. (2) It is
frequently difficult to ascertain how much of the commentary
is the independent thought of St. Thomas and how much is an
amplification of the opinions of the Pseudo-Denis. (8) A lack
of any authoritative commentary on that part of St. Thomas'
exposition which deals with beauty renders the beginner prone
to many errors, against which his only defense is a constant
and tedious comparison of the doctrine of the exposition with
the body of Thomistic thought. The following summary of the
doctrine of the Exposition of the Divine Names is taken entirely
•• Cf. G. Lepore, 0. S. A., Lectiones Aestheticae (Viterbo: 1905); J. Maritain,
Art and Scholasticism (New York: 1937); Gerald B. Phelan, "The Concept of
Beauty in St. Thomas Aquinas," Aspects of the Nf/W Scholastic Philosaphy (New
York: 193i).

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207

from that work and is presented in the order followed by St.
Thomas. It is not intended as a complete statement of his
teaching on all points treated; this is a synoptic view of the
doctrine presented in one of the lesser works of the Angelic
Doctor. The summary may be verified by referring to the
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eight and Ninth Lectures of the Fourth
Chapter. 57 No more explicit citation will be made, for the sake
of brevity in the notes.
God Who is Super-substantial Goodness is beautiful; in fact,
He is Beauty. Although the qbstract and concrete terms
"beauty" and "beautiful" are predicated of creatures in
different ways, both are united as one in the simplicity and perfection of God. The beauty of creatures is a similitude or reflection of God's beauty, and the abstract term "beauty," when
predicated of creatures, signifies a participation in the First
Cause Who renders all else beautiful. The term "beautiful,"
when predicated of creatures, signifies a thing which participates
in created beauty. Beauty, therefore, is an analogical concept.
God is Beauty because He is the efficient cause of the diverse
created beauty which is granted to creatures in a way proper to
each, that is, according to the peculiar nature of each. Here
the teleological nature of created beauty is stressed, for beauty
is caused in creatures in proportion to the needs or capacities
of their natures. God is the cause of pulchritude inasmuch as
He is the cause of consonance or proportion and clarity in all
things. The proper nature (ratio) of beauty consists in consonance and clarity. In the mention of these two elements the
existence of the third element, i. e., integrity or perfection, is
implied. An example taken from the order of material beauty
manifests the idea of St. Thomas that in beautiful objects the
form shines forth through properly disposed matter. This teaching is to be understood formally, for beauty exists whenever a
thing has duly proportioned parts and the clarity proper to its
own genus, whether that be spiritual or corporeal. God is the
cause of all beauty because the clarity of creatures is a participa•• S. Thomae Aquinatis, Opuscula Omnia (Paris: 1927), II.

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THOMAS C. DONLAN

tion by way of similitude of the clarity of God Who is the Font
of Light. In a somewhat metaphorical tone, St. Thomas speaks
of the participations of the luminous divine rays which are
causative of beauty in things.
God is Beauty inasmuch as He is the cause of harmony in
creation, for He orders all things to Himself as to a final end,
either immediately or through the mediation of creatures which
are ordained to each other and ultimately to God. God is
Beauty, but God may be called "beautiful," and this is by
excess. Excess is twofold: one type which is contained within
a genus-this is expressed by the comparative or superlative
degree of an adjective; another kind which is outside the genera
-this is expressed by an adjective to which has been prefixed
the adverb snper. This twofold excess cannot be predicated of
creatures, but we can truly say that God is most beautiful and
super-beautiful, not as though the Divinity were reduced to a
genus, but because all perfections of whatever genus are attributed to Him.
God is most beautiful. In this predication we indicate the
absence of all defect in concept of the divine beauty. Beauty
in creatures suffers a twofold defect: first, the beauty of creatures is variable; it can begin to be, or cease to exist; it can
increase or diminish; secondly, the beauty of creatures is li!llited
and particularized just as the natures of creatures are particularized. This twofold defect found in creatures is excluded
from God when He is said to be most beautiful. God is
unchangeably beautiful without any limitation whatsoever.
God is super-beautiful. Beauty exists eminently in His simple
nature which is the source of all beauty, and in which there
pre-exist uniformly all created beauty and, all things beautiful
after the manner in which multiple effects pre-exist in their
cause.
Next follows a consideration of the causality of divine beauty.
All being derives from divine beauty. This can be stated in the
form of a syllogism: Clarity pertains to the nature of beauty.
But every form by which a thing has its being is a participa-

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209

tion of divine clarity; (each thing is beautiful according to its
proper nature, i.e., according to its proper form) ; therefore, all
being is derived from Divine Beauty. Furthermore, all relations
among creatures, whatsoever-they may be, are reducible to the
causality of divine beauty, to which pertains harmony or consonance. God, Who is the perfect cause, works in a perfect
manner. Unlike creatures, who work to attain an end which
they do not possess, God acts for an end which He is, i.e., God
works for the sake of His beauty which He wishes to communicate to creatures by way of similitude. The divine beauty is
the efficient cause of everything inasmuch as all being and
motion and the conservation of both proceed from the divine
pulchritude. Divine beauty is the final. cause of all things, for
creation is made to imitate God's beauty. Finally, because all
things are distinguished according to God's beauty, the divine
pulchritude is the exemplary cause of things.
Next, the commentary reiterates the objective identity of
beauty and goodness while maintaining their rational distinction. The reasons for the objective indentity of goodness and
beauty are, first, that all desire beauty and goodness as a cause,
and, secondly, that all things share in goodness and beauty
because everything is good and beautiful according to its proper
form. A striking example is adduced to demonstrate the latter
reason. Because of its simplicity, even prime matter has a
similarity with the divine goodness and beauty because the
beauty and goodness of God are simple. However, the simplicity of prime matter is by way of defect, while the simplicity
of divine goodness and beauty is by way of excess inasmuch as
God exists super-substantially. The third reason for the objective identity of goodness and beauty is that clarity and
harmony, which pertain to the essence of beauty, are contained
in the notion of good. The formal distinction between goodness
and beauty consists in this, that to be what it is, i. e., to be constituted in its own proper nature, beauty adds over and above
the notion of good an order to the cognitive potency.
This marks the end of the general observations on beauty,

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THOMAS C. DONLAN

and, more especially, on the divine beauty, which are contained
in St. Thomas' Exposition of the Divine Names. The following
four lectures of the Fourth Chapter deal with particular applications of the above doctrine and add nothing new to the
principles already seen. For the sake of completeness, it may
be remarked that the next four lectures show examples of the
universal causality of the divine beauty which causes all substance, relations, rest and motion which exist in I creation.
Further, the divine pulchritude is manifestly the final cause of
all things because it is most lovable, not only by creatures, but
also by God Himself.

IV. A SUMMARY OF ST. THOMAS' TEACHING ON BEAUTY
In the first part of this paper, the basic principles of the
Thomistic esthetic were discussed. There followed a consideration of St. Thomas' teaching on the divine nature and of man's
knowledge of the divinity which served as an introduction to
the presentation of his doctrine on the beauty of God as treated
in the Exposition of the Divine Names. Now, before taking up
the applications of this doctrine in the realm of created things,
it will be useful to present a brief summation of the basic
tenets of St. Thomas' esthetics and of their applications in the
Exposition of the Divine Names.
1. St. Thomas' concept of beauty is moderately realistic,
taking its stand between gross materialism on the one hand,
and esoteric idealism on the other. Beauty is fundamentally
in things and formally in the mind.
2. Beauty is commensurate with being; and ugliness, like evil
and error, is reducible to non-being. Hence, the absolute perfection of that beauty which is God rests on the infinite plenitude
of self-subsisting Being. The imperfect beauty of creatures is
explained in terms of their corruptible and particularized
natures, that is, in terms of their deficiencies in the order of
being. 58
•• ... pulchrum et bonum sunt idem subjecto (In de Div. Nom., cap. 4, lect.
i) • ... bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem (Summa Theol., I, q. 5, a. I); ... ad

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211

3. Beauty has a necessary relation to a percipient subject
and is defined in the light of this relation. 59 The mind is made
to delight in beauty as much as it is made to love goodness and
to know truth. The part played by the senses in the appreciation of beauty is ministerial to the act of the intellect 60 wherein
the esthetic experience is formally completed. 61

4. The metaphysical relation of truth and the metaphysical
relation of beauty are intimately connected; both pertain to the
order of formal causality. 62 Despite this fundamental likeness,
truth and beauty are formally diverse. Truth is that by which
things are known; beauty is that by which a known thing
delights the contemplating subject. Truth is an adequation;
beauty renders this adequation delightful. Truth is known;
beauty is both known and loved. 63
5. Beauty and goodness are identical in the subject of which
they are predicated. Beauty and goodness delight those who
apprehend them, but they are enjoyed in diverse ways, by
possession in the case of the good, by contemplation in the case
of the beautiful. Beauty and goodness are logically distinct. 64
The good pertains to the order of final causality inasmuch as it
is the proper object of the will and is desirable in every realm
pulchritudinem tria requiruntur.-Primo
quidem integritas, sive perfectio; quae
enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt (Ibid., I, q. 89, a. 8): cf. Ibid., I, q. 49,
a. I.
•• ... pulchrum autem dicatur id cujus ipsa apprehensio placet (Ibid., 1-11, q. 27,
a. 1, ad Sum).
60 ••• unde et illi sensus praecipue respiciunt pulchrum qui maxime cognoscitivi
sunt, scilicet visus et auditus rationi deservientes (Ibid.) .
61 Et ideo in vita contemplativa,
quae consistit in actu rationis, per se et essentialiter invenitur pulchritudo (Ibid., 11-11, q. 180,
ad Sum).
62 ••• pulchrum
proprie pertinet ad rationem causae formalis (Ibid., I, q. 5,
a. 4, ad 1um); Q. D. de Ver., q.1,
63 Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 5, a. 4, ad lum; Q. D. de V er., q. 1, a. 2.
6 ' ••• pulchrum
et bonum in subjecto quidem sunt idem ... sed ratione
differunt; nam bonum proprie respicit appetitum, est enim bonum quod omnia
appetunt; et ideo habet rationem finis, nam appetitus est quasi quidam motus ad
rem. Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam: pulchra enim dicuntur quae
visa placent (Summa Theol., I, q. 5, a. 4; ad 1um).

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THOMAS C. DONLAN

of being. Beauty is properly the object of the intellect and is
the cause of delight
the order of apprehension and contemplation. The good delights when possessed; the beautiful pleases
when seen or known. 65 Beauty has a goodness all its own, a
goodness realized in the contemplation of a beautiful object.
If the beautiful is desired as an end to be possessed, it must
conform to the nature of the good. Properly, the desire for
the good can include the desire for beauty, but the beautiful is
desirable in itself as the delight of the contemplating subject
whose desire is to know and to be delighted, exclusive of a
desire to possess.66

in

6. St. Thomas gives three essential constituents of beauty:
integrity or perfection; due proportion or consonance; and
clarity. 67 These three elements are intimately connected with
being, and are conclusive proof of the metaphysical nature of
the Thomist esthetic. Integrity or perfection, in its primary
meaning, signifies being itself. 68 Proportion concerns order to
an end; 69 clarity pertains to intelligibility and truth. Christ
the Word, the Truth of the Father, is said to possess clarity/ 0
The following schema represents these conclusions graphically. 71
Quae
Visa
Placent

I

Id cujus
llntegritas sive perfectio
Apprehensio Claritas
Placet
Proportio sive consonantia

IEns
}
Verum
Pulchrum
Bonum

•• ... de ratione boni est quod in eo quietatur appetitus. Sed ad rationem
pulchri pertinet quod in ejus aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus (Ibid.,
1-11, q. 27, a. 1, ad Sum).
•• Appetitum terminari ad bonum et pacem et pulchrum non est terminari in
diversa (Q. D. de Ver., q. 22, a. 2, ad 12um); ... pulchrum autem dicatur id
cujus ipsa apprehensio placet (Summa Theol., I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad Sum).
87 Ad pulchritudinem
tria requiruntur. Primo quidem integritas sive perfectio
... et debita proportio sive consonantia ... et iterum claritas (Ibid., I, q. S9,
a. 8).
•• Duplex est integritas; una quae attenditur secundum perfectionem primam quae
consistit in ipso esse rei ... (IV Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a. 4).
•• Et ex hoc quod omnia in omnibus inveniuntur ordine quodam, sequitur quod
omnia ad idem ultimum ordinentur (In de Div. Nom., cap. 4, lect. 5).
70 Et inquantum
est verbum perfectum Patris, habet claritatem quae irradiat
super omnia et in quo omnia resplendent (I Sent., d. S1, q. 2, a. 1).
71 Gerald B. Phelan, op. cit., p. 14S; lntellectus
autem per prius apprehendit
ipsum ens, et secundario apprehendit se intelligere ens, et tertio apprehendit se

THE BEAUTY OF GOD

218

7. Beauty is an absolutely simple perfection caused in creatures by God, 72 and predicated of the divine essence by analogy
of proper proportionality. Beauty exists in God formally and
eminently, as multiple effects pre-exist in a simple cause. 78
8. God is beauty, and He causes all beauty inasmuch as He
causes all clarity and proportion in nature. He does this out of
love for His own beauty which He desires to see reflected in
His creatures. 74 Further, divine beauty is the efficient, final, and
exemplary cause of all things. 75
9. The universal causality of divine pulchritude extends to
the being, relations, motion and rest, and distinctions of whatever kind that exist in creation. 76
10. Divine goodness and beauty are the final cause of all
being and action. 77

v. THE DIVINE BEAUTY IN ITSELF
Certain applications of the doctrine already seen will now be
made in order to manifest the full import of the principles of St.
Thomas' esthetics. We will first consider the conditions for
beauty in relation to the divine essence; and, secondly, the
divine beauty in the Most Blessed Trinity.
appetere ens. Unde primo est ratio en tis, secunda ratio veri, tertio ratio boni (Summa
Theol., I, q. 16, a. 4, ad 2um).
70 Pulchritudo
enim creaturae nihil est aliud quam similitudo divinae pulchritudinis in rebus participata (In de Div. Nirm., cap. 4, lect. 5).
73 In ipsa enim natura
simplici et supematurali omnium pulchrorum ab ea
derivatorum, praeexistunt omnis pulchritudo et omne pulchrum, non quidem
divisim, sed uniformiter, per modum quo multiplices effectus in causa praeexistunt

(Ibid.).
" Omnia enim facta sunt ut divinam pulchritudinem qualitercumque imitentur
(Ibid.).
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., cap. 4, lect. 6, 8.
The proper interpretation of this teaching requires
certain distinctions made in the light of the whole synthesis.
77 ... omnia ex desiderio pulchri et boni "faciunt et volunt quaecumque faciunt
et volunt" (In de Div. Nom., cap. 4, lect. 9).

6

THOMAS C. DONLAN

1. THE CONDITIONS FOR BEAUTY VERIFIED

OF THE DIVINE

ESSENCE AND ATTRIBUTES

Integrity or perfection is the first essential constituent of
beauty noted by St. Thomas. 78 A thing is perfect when it lacks
nothing that is required for its perfection. Now God is most
perfect because He has all things required for His infinite perfection.79 Further, God, Who is Pure Act, is absolutely perfect,
because a thing is said to be perfect inasmuch as it is in act. 80
Proportion or harmony is the second constituent of beauty. 81
Proportion is a species of order, and order requires some kind of
distinction, either real or logical. Order further requires a
certain compatibility on the part of those things which are to
be ordered, because insociable parts cannot partake of a mutual
order. 82 In the perfect unity and simplicity of the divine essence
there is no real distinction, no actual division into parts. However, the created intellect can conceive of distinction in God,
and it is because of this virtual distinction that we can speak
of the order in the divine nature. Thus we speak of the distinction of the divine essence from the divine intellect and will,
when, in the reality of God's nature, these three are really one
in the perfect unity of identity. When we conceive of God as
existing and as knowing and willing things other than Himself
we are face to face with the mystery of great diversity existing
in perfect unity, and we catch a glimpse of that perfection of
order which is harmony in God.
Clarity, the last element of beauty ,83 is a kind of light which
may be either spiritual or corporeal. The clarity of God is most
strikingly evident in His knowledge of Himself and of things
other than Himself. God's knowledge is identical with His sub78 Summa Tkeol., I, q. 39, a. 8.
•• Perfectum autem dicitur cui nihil deest secundum modum suae perfectionis
(Ibid., I, q. 5, a. 5).
80 In tantum est autem perfectum unumquodque, in quantum est in actu (Ibid.,
I, q. 5, a. 1).
81 Ibid., I, q. 39, a. 8.
82 E. Dubois, De Exemplarismo Divino (Rome: 1899) IV, 235.
83 Summa Tkeol., I, CJ,· 39, a. 8.

THE BEAUTY OF GOD

stance, 84 and the "knowledge of approbation" in God is the
cause of creatures. 85 As St. John rightly .says: "God is Light,
and in Him there is no darkness." 86 The Church, too, calls God
" Light " when she chants in the Nicene Creed, " Light of the
Light," and applies this name to the Word Who proceeds from
the Father by intellectual generation. 87 The light of divine
knowledge and the Light which is the Son give us some idea of
the clarity of God which is the source of all light and clarity
in creation.
Having verified the three conditions for beauty of the divine
essence in itself, we now consider the beauty of the divine
attributes. All of the attributes are reducible either to the
divine being (the source of the entitative attributes) or to the
divine intelligence or will (the sources of the operative attributes). Thus, for example, unity, simplicity, and eternity pertain to the being or essence of God; knowledge, life and truth
pertain to the divine intelligence; holiness, justice, and love to
the divine will; beauty, providence, and predestination pertain
to the divine intellect and will conjointly. 88 In the ordination of
the divine attributes all the conditions for beauty can be
verified. In the divine attributes we find infinite perfection
commensurate with the infinite perfections of God which are
free of all imperfection. The attributes exist formally in God,
but they are not formally distinct. So great is the harmony and
unity of the divine attributes that they mutually include one
another actually and implicitly. The harmony or proportion of
God's attributes is so perfect that it is founded on the real
identity of them all as they are conceived as virtually distinct.
The clarity of the divine essence is seen throughout the divine
Necesse est dicere quod intelligere Dei est ejus substantia (Ibid., I, q.14, a. 4).
Deus per intellectum suum causat res, cum suum esse sit suum intelligere.
Unde scientia Dei secundum quod est causa rerum, consuevit nominari scientia
approbationis (Ibid., I, q. 14, a. 8.).
86 I John, i, v.
87 Processio Verbi in divinis habet
rationem generationis; procedit enim per
modum intelligibilis actionis (Summa Theol., I, q. !i!7, a. !i!).
88 R. Garrigou-Lagrange, 0. P ., op. cit., p. 165; Summa Theol., I, qq. 3, 14, !i!5.
8'

85

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THOMAS C. DONLAN

attributes, and is the light in which God comprehends Himself
and by which He sees all things in His essence. The spiritual
clarity of the divine attributes is most perfect. 89
2. THE BEAUTY OF THE MOST BLESSED TRINITY

The three persons of the Trinity are really distinct from each
other. Unlike the divine attributes which are only virtually
distinct, the persons in God are really distinct from each other
although they are one in nature. 90 This distinction of the
persons is founded on the opposition of real and mutual
relations which obtain among the persons. Because of the
opposition of paternity to filiation, and of active to passive
spiration, there are three really distinct persons in the Blessed
Trinity; the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The two processions
in God i. e., that by which the Son proceeds from the Father
and that by which the Holy Spirit proceeds from both Father
and Son, are virtually distinct from the divine nature which is
the remote principle of both processions. 91 The proximate
principle of the first procession is the divine intellect, connoting the relation of paternity; the proximate principle of the
second procession is the divine will, connoting the active spiration common to the Father and the Son. 92
E. Dubois, op. cit., IV no. 241.
oportet quod in Deo sit realis distinctio, non quidem secundum rem
absolutam, quae est essentia, in qua est summa unitas et simplicitas, sed secundum
rem relativam (Summa Theol., I, q. 28, a. 3); Sicut igitur ponitur pluralitas personarum in divinis, ita utendum est nomine trinitatis; quia hoc idem quod significat
(Ibid., I,
pluralitas indeterminate, significat hoc nomen, trinitas, determinate
q. 31, a. 1).
91 • • • in
divinis sunt duae processiones ... processio Verbi . . . et praeter
processionem Verbi ... processio amoris (Ibid., I, q. 27, a. 3); ... relatio realiter
existens in Deo est idem essentiae secundum rem, et non differt nisi secundum
intelligentiae rationem ... Patet ergo quod in Deo non est aliud esse relationis et
essentiae, sed unum et idem (Ibid., I, q. 28, a. 2).
92 ••• processio
Verbi in divinis . . . procedit enim per modum intelligibilis
actionis . . . et a principio conjuncto . . . et secundum rationem similitudinis, quia
conceptio intellectus est similitudo rei intellectae . . . unde processio Verbi in
divinis dicitur generatio et ipsum Verbum procedens dicitur Filius (Ibid., I, q. 27,
a. 2); ... cum in hoc quod est esse principium Spiritus Sancti, non opponuntur ·
relative, sequitur quod Pater et Filius sunt unum principium Spiritus Sancti (Ibid.,
I, q. 34, a. 4).
89

90 • • •

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217

In this procession of the divine persons we find infinite
beauty. The Father, Who is the principle of the Trinity, contains within Himself the infinite perfection of the divine nature
with which He is identified.us In the Son, Who is the perfect
image of the Father, 94 the Father understands all perfection,
both created and uncreated. It is in the intellectual generation
of the Word that the divine clarity shines forth. Harmony is
evident in the Trinity from the manner in which the persons
proceed from each other according to the order of nature and
without priority. 95 Moreover, only the three persons comprehend and adequately love the infinite perfection of their own
sublime nature. "There are three Who give testimony in
heaven, the Father, the Word and the Holy Ghost. And these
three are one." 96 In the innermost life of the Blessed Trinity,
in the ineffable acts of knowledge and love which constitute this
life, there is the contemplation of the divine beauty, the delightful comprehension of the effulgent and harmonious perfection
which is the Triune God.
It should be noted here that St. Thomas takes pains to show
how fitting is the appropriation of beauty to the Son. In the
very nature of Christ and in the hypostatic union we find the
thre·e conditions of beauty verified in a most sublime manner. 97
The most perfect integrity is found in the hypostatic union
because, as the Son, Christ has all the ineffable perfection of the
divine nature of the Father together with a most perfect human
nature which is, so to speak, a compendium of all created perfection inasmuch as it contains both spiritual and corporeal
93 Cum Pater sit a quo procedit alius, sequitur quod Pater est principium
(Ibid.,
I, q. 33, a.l); cf. Ibid., I, q. 29, a. 2.
94 Qui est imago Dei invisibilis (Coloss., i, xv).
95 In
divinis dicitur principium secundum originem absque prioritate. Unde
oportet ibi esse ordinem secundum originem absque prioritate. Et his vocatur ordo ·
naturae, non quo alter sit prius altero, sed quo alter est ex altero (Summa Theol.,
I, q. 42, a. 3).
96 I John, v, vii.
This is a citation of the Joannine Comma, concerning the
authorship of which there has been much controversy. The inspiration and veracity
of the pericope are beyond cavil, because this passage comprises part of the text
as received into the canon.
97 Summa Theol., I, q. 39, a. 8.

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THOMAS C. DONLAN

perfection. In Christ are the highest possible degrees of the
perfection of nature, grace, and glory. In Christ is also to be
found the greatest clarity. The Word is the light or clarity of
God substantially, and in Him is the most perfect created light,
both natural and supernatural, which He has as man," ... in
Whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and of knowledge." 98 In the hypostatic union is to be found the most
sublime harmony, for as the perfect image of the Father, there
is in Christ the perfect proportion of equality with the divine
nature. Christ contains all the perfections of both divine and
human natures and unites them substantially in His person.
This union in the person is the greatest of all created unions.
VI.

THE DIVINE

BEAUTY IN RELATION

To CREATURES

Beauty finds its ineffable perfection in the Blessed Trinity
and its most perfect expression in the person of Christ. This
beauty is appreciated perfectly only by the Trinity itself, for no
created intellect can compass the divinity. However, we must
not conclude that the esthetic of Thomism denies beauty to
creatures. This ineffable beauty of God is reflected throughout
creation. 99 We will consider certain examples of the reflection
of the divine beauty in the orders of nature, created grace and
glory. No attempt is made to exhaust the possibilities of applying the doctrine; our purpose is to demonstrate the application
of universal principles in a few representative instances.
1. THE DIVINE

BEAUTY

REFLECTED

IN NATURE AND ART

The world about us abounds with the beauties of nature and
of art. Anyone who is properly disposed can find many works
of human art to allay his thirst for beauty, and the beauties of
nature are thrust, so to speak, upon the faculties of even those
who would ignore them. The beauties of the universe wait to
enlighten the mind arid delight the heart of the beholder and,
Coloss., ii, iii.
•• Quia enim propriam pulchritudinem habet, vult earn multiplicare sicut possible
est, silicet per communicationem suae similitudinis (In de Div. Nom., cap. 4, lect. 5).
98

THE BEAUTY OF GOD

219

eventually, to lead him to that beauty which is God. The
beauty of the harmonious operations of the intellectual virtues,
the beauty of the great intellectual monuments which are the
products of reason and these virtues, the beauty discovered
in the truth after long study-all these are reflections of the
supreme beauty we call God.
Beauty is found also in the moral order. Inasmuch as the
moral virtues share in the ordination of reason they share also
in beauty. 100 By contrast, the beauty of the moral order can
be appreciated in terms of moral evil which is manifest when
human actions are devoid of the governance of reason.
2. THE DIVINE BEAUTY REFLECTED

IN THE ORDER OF GRACE

The three theological virtues of Faith, Hope and Charity
contain all the elements of spiritual beauty. Everything
required for union with God in this life comes with the theological virtues, and in this consists their integrity or perfection.
Theirs is the light of grace which, although dim in comparison
with the light of glory, is, nevertheless, far superior to the
clarity of unaided reason. The condition of proportion or
harmony is admirably fulfilled in the twofold order of origin
and of dignity which obtains among these three virtues. 101
The infused moral virtues presuppose the theological virtues
and enable man to discharge the duties incumbent upon him
from the divine. law and from his supernatural end. These
virtues are had together or not at all, for their roots are in
charity 102 ; and their perfection consists in this, that they
dispose and enable man to fulfill the duties of his supernatural
moral life. The clarity of these virtues is the light of infused
100 In virtutibus autem moralibus invenitur pulchritudo participative, inquantum
scilicet participant ordinem rationis (Summa Theol., 11-11, q. 180,
ad Sum).
101 Ordine quidem generationis . . . in uno et eodem fides praecedit spem et spes
charitatem secundum actus; nam habitus simul infunduntur .... ordine vero perfectionis charitas praecedit fidem et spem eo quod tam fides quam spes per charitatenl formatur et perfectionem virtutis acquirit (Ibid., 1-11, q. 62, a. 4).
102 ••• hujusmodi virtutes
morales (infusae) sine charitate esse non possunt
{(bid., 1-11, q. 65,

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THOMAS C. DONLAN

prudence perfecting the practical intellect supernaturally, and
effecting the supernatural direction of the three appetitive
potencies through the three virtues of temperance, justice, and
fortitude. 103 The harmony of the infused moral virtues is seen
in their mutual ordination to each other/ 04 and in the perfect
moderation and harmony of the human acts which they direct
to their supernatural end. Thus the infused moral virtues, in
their fulfillment of the conditions of beauty, are beautiful by
participation in the beauty of God.
The gifts of the Holy Ghost which render men docile to the
inspirations of the Spirit 105 are also an object of beauty in the
order of grace. The perfection of these gifts lies in this, that
they render man docile, not to the lesser motion of reason
which operates through the virtues, but rather to that perfect
motion which is from God. 106 The perfection of the gifts which
dispose man to be moved by the Holy Spirit is greater than the
perfection of the moral and intellectual virtues which perfect
either the reason or other faculties in their relation to reason.
Yet the gifts are less perfect than the theological virtues by
which man is joined to God. 107 The clarity found in the gifts
is the clarity of faith joined with the light of those gifts which
perfect the intellect. 108 The harmony among the gifts has been
aptly stated thus: " The seven Gifts make the soul resemble a
seven-stringed lyre upon which the Spirit plays wonderful
harmonies. The seven Gifts are ordained to the seven operaIbid., II-II, q. 180, a. 2, ad 3um.
Ibid., I-II, q. 66, a. 4.
105 Dona Spiritus Sancti sunt quidam habitus quibus homo perficitur ad prompte
obediendum Spiritui Sancto (Ibid., I-II, q. 68, a. 3).
106 Sed in ordine
ad finem ultimum supernaturalem, ad quem ratio movet,
secundum quod est aliqualiter et imperfecte informata per virtutes theologicas, non
sufficit ipsa motio rationis, nisi desuper adsit instinctus et motio Spiritus Sancti
. ... Et ideo ad illam finem consequendam necessarium est homini habere donum
Spiritus Sancti (Ibid., I-II, q. 68, a. 2).
107 Cf. Ibid., I-II, q. 68, a. 8.
108 Omnia enim haec quattuor
(sc. sapientia, intellectus, scientia et consilium)
ordinantur ad supernaturalem cognitionem, quae in nobis per fidem fundatur
(Ibid., II-II, q. 8, a. 6); Prima autem unio hominis (cum Spiritu Sancto) est per
fidem, spem et caritatem (Ibid., I-II, q. 68, a. 4, ad 3um).
103

104

THE BEAUTY OF GOD

221

tions of the soul which they sanctify; to the seven principal
virtues which they strengthen; to the seven Beatitudes which
they cause in this life; to the seven capital vices which they
extirpate; to the seven Sacraments by which they are communicated; to the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer by which they
are besought; and to the seven gifts · of glory which they
merit." 1.o9
3. THE DIVINE BEAUTY IN THE ORDER OF GLORY

St. Thomas' treatment of beatitude begins in a negative way.
He first discusses those things which do not pertain to man's
beatitude. Then he begins to set forth his doctrine positively.
Man's beatitude consists formally in the vision of the divine
essence.uo The actual possession of beatitude consists in that
operation which is the most perfect operation of man's most
perfect faculty directed to the most perfect object which that
faculty can attain. 111 The operation by which man attains his
beatitude is an act of the speculative intellect by which he
contemplates the divine essence. A cold, speculative vision of
the divine essence would be insufficient for beatitude, because
it would leave the appetitive side of man's nature without joy.
Upon the act of the intellect seeing God's essence follows an act
of the will delighting in the vision.
The relation of the intellect and the will in the possession and
enjoyment of beatitude is thus described by St. Thomas:
It is fitting that the operation of the intellect, which is vision, should
enjoy a preeminence over delectation. For delectation consists in
a ertain repose of the will; but that the will should rest in anything
E. Dubois, op. cit., IV !l58; cf. Summa Theol., 1-11, q. 68, aa. 4 & 7.
IDtimus hominis finis est bonum increatum, scilicet Deus, qui solus sua infinita
bonitate potest voluntatem hominis perfecte implere (Ibid., 1-11, q. S, a. 1).
111 • • • si beatitudo
hominis est operatio, oportet quod sit optima operatio
hominis. Optima operatio hominis est quae est optimae potentiae respectu optimi
objecti (Ibid., 1-11, q. S, a. 5); Est enim beatitudo ultima hominis perfectio.
Unumquodque autem in tantum perfectum est, inquantum est actu; nam potentia
sine actu imperfecta est. Oportet ergo beatitudinem in ultimo actu hominis consistere. Manifestum est autem quod operatio est ultimus actus operantis; . . .
Necesse est ergo beatitudinem hominis operationem esse (Ibid., 1-11, q. S, a. !l).
109

110

THOMAS C. DONLAN

is only by reason of the goodness inherent in the object in which it
rests. If, therefore, the will should find repose in any operation,
the repose of the will proceeds from the goodness of that operation.
Nor does the will seek the good because of therepose; for thus the
very act of the will would become its end which contradicts what
has been said above. . . and thus it seeks its rest in an operation
because that operation is its good. Whence it is manifest that the
very operation in which the will finds its rest is more principally a
good for the will than the repose of the will therein. 112

Not only are the intellect and the will occupied in the fruition
of beatitude, but the lower faculties are also employed. " The
entire man is perfected in perfect beatitude, but in the lower
faculties by redundance from his higher faculties." 113 Man will
be perfectly happy with the vision of God, for" the very sight
of God causes delight and he who sees God can never be unhappy." 114 The ultimate perfection which is the object of man's
desire will consist principally of contemplation in the future
life. 115 St. Thomas previously remarked that beauty is found
" per se and essentially in the contemplative life," and so beauty
must have some part in man's ultimate beatitude. 116
When St. Thomas says that in beatitude " the very sight of
God causes delight," 117 we hear echoes of his definition) " That
whose very apprehension (or sight) pleases us is called beautiful." 118 The entirety of St. Thomas' tract on man's beatitude
clearly indicates an unending contemplation of the divine
beauty. The delight consequent upon the apprehension of
formal beatitude is analogous to the esthetic experience, for
only the divine beauty can simultaneously illumine the intellect
and enrapture the will. In what other act of the intellect except
that by which we see the essence of God could the will find its
eternal complacence? Only in the contemplation of subsisting
beauty can man find the fullness of his eternal happiness.
Ibid., q. 4, a. fl.
1 " Ibid., I-II, q. 4, a. 1, ad 2um.
Ibid.; q. S, a. S, ad Sum.
115 • • • in contemplatione
divinorum maxime consistit beatitudo (Ibid., I-II,
112

118

q. S, a. 5).
116

117

Ibid., II-II, q. 180, a. 2, ad Sum.
Ibid., I-II, q. 4, a. 1, ad 2um.

118

Ibid., I-II, q. !'l7, a. 1, ad 3um.

THE BEAUTY OF GOD

And what of man in possession of this ineffable beauty?
What happens to that creature who is so affected by the
ecstasy resulting from contemplating lesser beauty? He is
transformed. Were it not for the infused light of glory man
would be purblind and unseeing in the face of divine beauty.
Man must be elevated and strengthened to see God; 119 and,
once elevated, must be sustained lest he lose the sight of that
Beauty which ravishes his being. Without the constant presence
of the infused habit of the light of glory, man could not continue
to contemplate the vision which is his beatitude. In the face
of the clarity of divine beauty, man's soul will glow and his
body will become effulgent with the resplendence of his soul/ 20
according to the promise of Christ, " Then shall the just shine
as the sun in the kingdom of their Father." 121 From the
infused habit of the light of glory, man's intellect will become
proportioned to the object of his beatitude, and in the perfect
operations of all his faculties he will be eternally happy in the
contemplation of that beauty which is God.

VII. CoNcLUSION
Perhaps there never will be a completely satisfying explanation of the fact that St. Thomas did not develop scientifically
the concept of divine beauty in the Summa Theologica. This
apparent neglect undoubtedly strikes the modern mind much
more forcibly than it affected the contemporaries of the Angelic
Doctor. He lived in an age of faith and reason when men were
devoted to a love of the good and the pursuit of truth. The
blindness resulting from materialistic pursuits and the bligh\ of
uncreative activity was not then, as now, the lot of the
people. The spiritual foundations of society were preserved and
119 • • • lumen creatum est necessarium ad videndum Dei essentiam, non quod per
hoc lumen Dei essentia intelligibilis fiat, quae secundum se intelligibilis est, sed
ad hoc quod intellectus fiat potens ad intelligendum, per modum quo potentia fit
potentior ad operandum per habitum (Ibid., I, q. 12, a. 5, ad 1um).
120 ••• claritas ilia causabitur
ex redundantia gloriae animae in corpus (Ibid.,
Suppl., q. 85, a. 1).
u• Matt., xiii, 43.

224

THOMAS C. DONLAN

strengthened by faith and reason, men cared for truth and goodness, and as Eric Gill once said, " beauty looked after herself."
Beauty was accepted as something familiar, it was everywhere
-in the churches, the public buildings, the ordinary articles of
everyday life produced by the guilds. The concept of the beauty
of God would be less of a puzzle in such an age than it is today
when beauty is never sought on the production-line but is rather
relegated to art-galleries and museums. The fine arts today are
not the inheritance of the people, they are rather the playthings of an esoteric clique, which, when judged by its products,
is so spiritually impoverished that its members cannot conceive, let alone express, the idea of divine beauty.
The esthetic of St. Thomas is essentially metaphysical. Its
principles are as universally applicable today as when they
were first enunciated. In the Summa, the sharp analysis of
truth and goodness, coupled with the principles of esthetics
furnish adequate equipment for developing the concept of
divine beauty. In his Exposition of the Divine Names, he does
no more than apply these principles to the teachings of PseudoDenis. Conclusions are always contained in principles, and it
may well be that St. Thomas deliberately left the principles of
esthetics to be applied by others while he busied himself about
matters which were less familiar and more necessary to his age.
Theology, as has been said, offers little in the way of a
complete treatment of divine beauty. Scholastic philosophy has
not made itself felt in the field of esthetics. Yet both of these
developments are necessary for the present day. Modem art
is in a sorry state; it is highly materialistic and consequently
devitalized. Much of it is an admission that people are "gutted
of inspiration and robbed of belief." Consequently, much
modern art vitiates the spirit because it is divorced from goodness and truth. The restoration of art is definitely in order, but
there is an insufficient theological and philosophical development available to guide those who would undertake the task.
Art should be enlisted on the side of the spirit, it should be an
aid and not a hindrance to those who would enter the temple
of God through " the gate called beautiful."

THE BEAUTY OF GOD

The restoration of art depends on the restoration of wisdom,
which is to say, a restoration of Theology. It is only when men
begin to think, judge, and act in accordance with divine truth
that the integration of art and life and their ultimate direction
to the final common good will be possible. The Theologian must
labor unremittingly for the development and diffusion of his
science.
In the moral order there is a need for the presentation of the
divine beauty. Materialism and hedonism are the plague of
the soul, and they are expressed negatively by a lack of temperance. Of all the moral virtues, temperance shares most fully in
the nature of beauty, because temperance best prepares man for
contemplation wherein beauty itself is to be found. The love
of beauty is not possessive, and if men were led to a love of
moral beauty there would be unfolded to them a way of life
more in conformity with their spiritual nature, precisely because
a true love of beauty frees man from the debasing results of
materialistic and hedonistic pursuits. This, of course', demands
that greater effort be made to develop the science of esthetics
and to perfect our knowledge of the divine beauty.
St. Thomas' teaching about beauty, and about the divine
beauty in particular, is only a beginning. Much remains to be
done in the way of co-ordination and application of principles
which are universal and timeless because they are metaphysical.
To say that the Thomist esthetics is metaphysical ". . . is not
to suggest that with St. Thomas everything has been said and
there is nothing further to be done; on the contrary, the Thomist
world view is not an end but a beginning: it means not that
there is no further need of thought but that thought can be
begun without fear of sterility." 122
THoMAS

C. DoNLAN, 0. P.

St. Dominic's Priory,
Fenwick High School,
Oak Park, Illinois
122

Gerald Vann, 0. P., Saint Thomas Aquinas (New York: 1940), p. 34.

THE CERTITUDE OF HOPE
(Second Installment)

II. THOMISTIC DOCTRINE

I

I.

ExisTENCE

OF THE CERTITUDE

oF HoPE

N a consideration concerning the certitude of theological
hope, just as in a consideration of anything, two fundamental problems immediately present themselves. The first
concerns the very existence of this certitude of hope (an sit),
while the second inquiries still further into its very nature (quid
sit) . These two considerations, in fact, form an adequate division of this subject in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. For
that reason we will employ the same division in this exposition
of the Thomistic doctrine on the subject.
It should be borne in mind from the beginning that the existence of this certitude offered no great difficulty to the mind
of St. Thomas, nor indeed, to most of the great theologians.
Consequently the main part of most treatments of the subject
deals rather with the problem of the nature of hope. However,
three distinct arguments are apparent even in the discussion of
its existence. The probative force of the first is founded upon
the authority of Sacred Scripture, while in the second the
authority of Aristotle is cited arguing from reason concerning
the nature of virtue. The third is an argument of comparison
between the primary principles of hope and faith in man.
From the third quarter of the twelfth century, the accepted
definition of theological hope has been, " a sure expectation of
future beatitude." 51 Nor was the concept of certainty added
to the idea of expectation without reason. There is firm founda51 Summa
Theol., II-II, q. 18, a. 4, Sed Contra, ... certa expectatio futurae
beatitudinis; Petrus Lombardus, Ill Sent., d. XXVI.

QQ6

THE CERTITUDE OF HOPE

tion for this in Sacred Scripture: " For I know whom I have
believed, and I am certain that he is able to keep that which I
have committed to him, against that. day." 52 St. Paul thus
expressed his firm conviction that he would not be confounded
in his hope which emanated from the magnitude of God promising it, for God is able to preserve his Apostle until death.
Not only did the Apostle's hope contain certainty, for this is
proper to the virtue itself regardless of him who possesses it:
" And hope confoundeth not: because the charity of God is
poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, who is given
to us." 53 Hope itself does not confound, that is, that by which
we hope is not found wanting unless we separate ourselves from
that principle of hope. Only he is said to be confounded by
hope who separates himself from the omnipotent helping God
in whom his hope rests. Thus " no one hath hope in the Lord,
and hath been confounded." 54
And the reason why the virtue of hope does not confound is
" because the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by
the Holy Ghost who is given to us." 55 It makes no difference
whether we consider here the charity by which God loves us,
or that by which we love God; both are poured forth in our
hearts by the Holy Ghost. Moreover, charity is understood in
both ways when it is said that hope does not confound. If we
consider that charity by which God loves us it is manifest that
He will not deny Himself to those whom He loves; "He hath
loved the people and all the saints are in His hand." 56 Likewise, if we consider that charity by which we love God, it is
manifest that He has prepared eternal goods for those who love
Him: " He that loveth me, shall be loved of my Father: And
I will love him and will manifest myself to him." 57 Because of
this charity, then, hope does not confound, that is, hope is
certain.
If this is not true, then, " why did Christ, when as yet we
were weak, according to the time, die for the ungodly? " 58
II Timothy, i, 12.
Romans, v, 5.
•• Eccl., ii, 11.

52

53

•• Rom., v, 5.
56 Deut., xxxiii, 3.

57
58 ·

John, xiv, 21.
Rom., v, 6.

WALTER M. CONLON

Thus St. Paul supported this reason by the death of Christ, and
gives us further proof for the existence of this certitude. Christ
died for the ungodly. This is surely a great thing if we consider
both. the person who died, Christ, and those for whom He died,
the ungodly. Furthermore, such a great event could not happen
unless it is brought about for some sure and certain end, for
" what profit is there in my blood, whilst I go down to corruption? " 59 This is like saying, there is no profit, if the salvation
of mankind does not follow. St. Paul's whole argument may be
paraphrased in this way: Theological hope has certitude because the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the
Holy Ghost, since that is why Christ died for us.
The second argument for the existence of this certitude may
be stated briefly as follows: 59 • What is true of all virtues inasmuch as they are virtues is true of theological hope, because
whatever is true of all is true of each one. But every virtue,
inasmuch as it is a virtue, has certainty in its determination
towards its end. Therefore theological hope, being a virtue, has
certainty. 60 This argument is founded upon the philosophical
doctrine of Aristotle that virtue is more certain than art. As
can be seen at a glance, the burden of this proof rests upon the
certainty here predicated of virtue by its very nature. Since
this will be treated at length later it is sufficient here merely to
indicate the general outline of the argumentation. Every virtue
is essentially a perfect operative habit. But habits, since they
are similar to a second nature, act after the manner of nature,
that is, towards a sure and determined end, by means of sure
and determined ways, and from a sure and determined inclination, which is the natural inclination of the natural agent
towards its proper end. Natural agents thus determined are
therefore said to have a threefold certitude, that is, of end,
inclination and operation. Likewise this certitude is found in
operative habits or virtues, and consequently in hope. 61 Thus,
59 Psalms, xxix, 10.
••• St. Thomas, Comm. in Ill Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a. 4.
60 Ill Sent., d.
q.
a. 4.
81 Fr. Ramirez, "De certitudine Spei," La Cientia Tkomista (Sept. 1988), p. 195.

THE CERTITUDE

OF HOPE

certitude not only exists in hope, but is an essential attribute
of that virtue. Moreover, this certitude is predicated of hope in
an even greater proportion since, according to St. Paul, 62 hope
is an anchor of the soul, and consequently of the powers and
virtues of the soul.
The final argument for the existence of the certitude of hope
may be stated in the following manner: Just as faith adheres
to first truth, so also hope adheres to supreme bounty, because
it proceeds from grace. But just as first truth cannot deceive,
so also bounty cannot fail. Therefore, just as there is certitude
in faith so also there is certitude in hope. 63
This supreme bounty is the omnipotent helping hand of God
(omnipotentia auxilians) , the moving principle of hope, and
upon this omnipotent help rest not only our hope but also the
certitude of that hope. Certainly there is no power strong
enough to negate the omnipotent power of God. If then the will
of God has determined to exercise this omnipotent help towards
us nothing can be more certain and sure than our hope of
eternal beatitude through this help. But the very life and
works of the Son of God, and particularly His passion and death,
demonstrate the bounty of God towards men. Consequently,
hope of eternal beatitude through the omnipotent help of God,
the supreme bounty, cannot be uncertain, but must be of the
most certain order.

II.

THE NATURE OF THE CERTITUDE

OF HoPE

In order to understand the complete doctrine of St. Thomas
concerning the certitude of hope it is necessary to compare the
two treatments of the subject in the Commentary on the Sentences and in the Summa Theologica. In the former work he
lays down all the fundamental principles, while in the Summa
he proceeds to further speculation. Consequently we will view
these two works separately and attempt to point out the
advancement made in the later work.
62

Hebrews, vi, 19.

68

Fr. Ramirez, op. cit.

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WALTER M. CONLON

1. Commentarium in SententimJ

The influence of St. Albert on the thought of St. Thomas in
this treatment of the certitude of hope is very marked. In fact,
the fundamental notions contained in this treatment have been
seen before in the writings of St. Albert. However, over and
above what is contained in the works of St. Albert, St. Thomas
adds the certitude of divine ordination. Moreover, this work is
a refutation of other preceding scholars, and is strongly opposed
to all those who taught that the certitude of hope is conditional.
Thus in the first place we have a refutation of the theory of
conditional certitude.
Without a profound understanding of the two concepts of
certitude and of hope, the very idea of the certitude of hope
might seem to be a contradiction in terms. Indeed, certitude
properly speaking is predicated of the intellectual faculty, while
hope as a virtue resides in the appetite. This is surely a major
difficulty. Moreover, it has been pointed out that some who
have hope of eternal life will never attain it. This too would
seem to destroy the certitude of hope. Likewise, it is argued
that no one will attain eternal life unless he possesses charity
and grace. But since one does not know with absolute certainty
whether he possesses these now or will have them at the end,
there can be no certitude in our hope of eternal life.64 These
are the principal difficulties and all of them are the result of a
misunderstanding of the true nature of the certitude of hope.
St. Thomas was thoroughly conscious of these difficulties
when he undertook to propose a solution to this problem.
Nevertheless, however insuperable these objections may seem
to be, there must be an explanation since the Sacred Scriptures
themselves attest the existence of the certitude of hope. Proceeding quite logically, the Angelic Doctor first examined the
existing explanations and determined wherein they erred as well
as their effectiveness to explain the difficulties in an adequate
manner. Thus, in view of the apparently insuperable nature of
•• Ill Sent. d. 26, q. 2, a. 4, obj. I, 2, 5.

THE CERTITUDE OF HOPE

the first objection, some had held that hope has no certitude
unless from faith, which is in the intellect. The difference
between them, moreover, consisted in this, that the certitude of
faith concerns the universal while that of hope concerns the
particular. For that reason we are sure, by faith, that every
good person will attain eternal life; but by hope we are sure
that this particular individual will have eternal life if he perseveres.· Therefore the certitude of faith is universal and absolute, but the certitude of hope is particular and conditional. 65
St. Thomas could not agree with this explanation. In fact he
stated explicitly that it could not stand, and therefore we must
seek another. According to the above explanation, we must conclude that faith and hope are neither diverse habits nor do
they exist in different faculties of the soul, since the universal
and particular do not diversify essences or habits. It was this
apparent falsity which led St. Thomas to formulate his own
more profound solution. For its negative influence upon the
thought of St. Thomas this theory of the school of Abelard is
important.
It became necessary to re-examine the concept of certitude.
In a broad sense, certitude is nothing other than the determination of the intellect to one thing. Properly speaking, however, it
connotes the firmness of the adherence of the intellective power
to its intelligible object. 66 Moreover, certitude is twofold, the
certitude of judgment (certitudo cognitionis) and the certitude
of inclination (certitudo ordinis) .67 From the point of view in
which certitude is found in a subject it is either essential or
participated. 68 Thus, essentially, it is found in the intellective
•• Ill Sent., d.
q. a. 4: Quidem di..'"terunt quod spes non habet aliam certitudinem nisi a fide; sed in hoc differunt quod certitudo fidei est in universali, sicut
quod quilibet bonus habebit vitam aetemam; certitudo autem spei est in particulari, sicut quod iste, si bene facit, habebit vitam aetemam. Et ideo certitudo
fidei est universalis et absoluta, certitudo autem spei particularis est et conditionata.
(We have seen this doctrine proposed by the theologians of the school of
Abelard.)
•• Ill Sent., d.
q.
8; d.
q.
a. 4.
•• Q. D. De V er., q. 6, a. 8: Duplex est certitudo: scilicet cognitionis, et ordinis.
88 ll-ll, q.IS, a. 4:
Certitudo invenitur in aliquo dupliciter, scilicet essentialiter
et participative.

WALTER M. CONLON

power, while in a participated manner it is found in everything
that is moved in an infallible manner toward its end by the
intellective power. The certitude of judgment, therefore, is had
when the judgment coincides perfectly with reality as found in
the thing judged. This estimation or judgment is drawn chiefly
from the causes of the object, and for that reason the name of
certitude is applied to the order of cause to effect. Thus we say
that the order of cause to effect is certain when the cause infallibly produces the effect.69 Accordingly, nature itself can be
said to act in a certain manner, moved, so to speak, by the
divine intellect which moves everything with certainty towards
its end. The influence of St. Albert is clearly evident in this
reasonmg.
It was precisely the predication of intellectual or judicial certitude to hope which led to this solution. Since it is impossible
to find this type of certitude in the appetite, it was necessary to
apply to that faculty the certitude of inclination. All order
between any act or motion and its end, however, is from the
intellect directing the action, whether that intellect be conjoined, as in agents acting through the will, or remote, as in
agents operating through nature (per naturam) .10 However,
every tendency to an end is determined by some preceding
intellect. Thus it is that nature acts with certainty, as it were,
moved by the divine intellect which moves everything in a certain manner (certitudinaliter) towards its end. 71 Accordingly
we can rightly attribute certitude to the operation of nature
and, in fact, to the operation of anything that acts after the
manner of nature. In this way, therefore, since virtues are
habits and operate like a second nature they also participate
""Q. D. De VeT., q.6, a.8.
70 III Sent., d.
q. a. 4: Omnis operatio et motus cujuscumque tendentis in
finem est ex cognitione dirigente, vel conjuncta, sicut in agentibus per voluntatem, vel remota, sicut in agentibus per naturam.
71 Summa Theol., q.
a. I: Bonum ordinis in rebus creatis existens a Deo
creatum est. Cum autem Deus sit causa rerum per suum intellectum, et sic
cujuslibet sui effectus oportet rationem in ipso praeexistere; necesse est quod ratio
ordinis rerum in finem in mente divina praeexistat.

THE CERTITUDE

OF HOPE

this certitude. 72 This flows from the determination of divine
Wisdom instituting nature. Therefore, the certitude of hope
and the other virtues must not be looked for in a knowledge of
the object, or of proper principles, but rather in the infallible
inclination in the act_73 And so the determination of the act of
a virtue towards the end of that virtue constitutes the certitude
known as the certitude of virtue. It is truly a determination to
one thing, not however an intellectual or judicial determination,
although it is derived in some way from that. In this way we
attribute to hope the certitude of nature, 74 since every habit
implies a disposition in relation to a thing's nature, and to its
operation and end. 75 It should be noted here that this determination of act to end does not imply the act of attaining the
end itself. Thus, it could happen that, although the determination existed, the end would not be attained. It might be impeded accidentally by an extrinsic force. 76 In this way St.
Thomas has definitely destroyed the force of the objection which
denies the certitude of hope because some fail to attain the end.
This attainment of the end, in fact, is in no way included in the
order to act to end. That is the certitude of event while this is
the certitude of order. The certitude of hope, then, refers to the
determination towards the end. 71
However, it does not seem fitting that hope, which, alone
among all the virtues, claims certitude as an integral part of its
definition, should have no certitude other than this which is
common to all virtues. Thus, the Angelic Doctor pushed his
inquiry further. Searching into the specific reasons for hope,
72
73

III Soot., d. 26, q. 2, a. 4, ad 1um.
Q. D. De Spe, a. 1, ad 10um: Et ideo certitudo spei et aliarum virtutum non

est referenda ad cognitionem objecti vel principiorum proprium sed ad infallibilem
inclinationem in actu.
74 III Soot., d. 26, q. 2, a. 4:
Unde etiarn ipsa certitudo inclinationis naturae spes
dicitur.
75 Summa Theol., I-II:
Habitus importat dispositionem quamdam in ordine ad
naturam rei, et operationem vel finem ejus.
76 Ill Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a. 4, ad 4um.
77 III Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a. 1:
Unde cum certitudo spei sit de bono expectato,
!IDportat determinationem in bonem.

Q34

WALTER M. CONLON

he concluded that the certitude of hope is caused by divine
bounty ordering us towards the end, and also by the inclination
of all the other virtues, and even by the inclination of the habit
itself. 78 Therefore the certitude of hope includes the certitude
of all the other infused virtues. Since all of the virtues operate
after the manner of nature, each one possesses the certitude of
virtue. Now these particular virtues are particular determinations towards a particular end, and so they reinforce the determination towards the general end, eternal life, by keeping the
creature properly inclined towards each particular end. 79 Thus
there is less probability of sin which would destroy charity
(which gives hope its extrinsic form) and consequently weaken
that virtue together with its determination or certitude. In
this way it is possible to see clearly the connection between the
certitude of the other infused virtues and that of hope.
Q.

Summa Theologica

Finally, the certitude of hope includes the certitude of divine
ordination. This is that certitude which is peculiar to hope,
and by which it differs from the certitude of other infused
virtues. It is of importance to note here that this certitude of
divine ordination was enunciated by St. Thomas at the end
of his treatment of the subject in the Commentary on the Sentences. In the beginning of that treatment, he states that some
theologians maintained that all certitude in hope is derived
from faith. Then he proclaimed that this could not be true, and
accordingly went on to explain the certitude of the order of
nature in hope. Now, however, he adds this other, the certitude
of divine ordination. What did he wish to signify by this? Certainly he did not intend to signify the certitude of virtue which
is derived from divine wisdom through the certitude of nature.
There remains only the divine ordination to supernatural life
78 Ibid., ·a. 4:
Ideo certitudo spei causatur ex liberalitate divina ordiuante nos in
finem et etiam ex inclinatione omnium aliarum virtutum et etiam ex inclinatione
ipsius habitus.
79 Q. D. De. Virt., a. 10, ad 14um:
Virtus enim infusa facit quod nullo modo
obediatur concupiscentiis peccati; et facit hoc infallibiliter ipsa manente.

THE CERTITUDE

OF HOPE

through faith, hope and charity, by means of grace and merit.
However, since charity follows hope in the order of generation,
we can dismiss it from this consideration. Thus we are confronted with the ordination of hope through faith by means
of grace and merit. This would seem to be a return to the old
theory which St. Thomas explicitly abrogated, namely that of
a participation of the certitude of faith. But this is not true.
The certitude of divine ordination is a clear statement of that
certitude proper to hope. Certainly hope depends upon faith
since nothing is desired or hoped for unless it is first known. It
should be noted, however, that the Angelic Doctor first clarified the nature of the certitude of hope before stating this
theory. The certitude of hope pertains to the act of the appetite
and is in no way confused with the certitude of the intellect.
Thus the certitudes of faith and hope are not univocal but
analogous. However, the intellectual virtue of faith not only
believes. truth but also directs the other faculties according to
that truth. Thus, it can truly be said that the certitude of hope
is derived from the certitude of faith inasmuch as a movement
of a virtue in the appetite is directed by an intellectual virtue
it participates something of its certitude. 80
By faith we learn that we are ordained to eternal life, in fact
our faith has certitude concerning this ordination. However,
this certitude is still in the intellectual sphere. In hope it is
reduced to the practical order by which the act of hope tends
in an infallible and determined manner towards the end. This
determination of the act of hope depends upon faith insofar as
it is through faith that the knowledge of this ordination was
communicated to us, and further inasmuch as faith directs
our actions in a practical way. It should be emphasized again
that there is no intention here of introducing into the sphere of
It is plainly the cerhope the determination peculiar to
titude of order and so depends immediately upon the formal
80 Q. D. De Spe, a. 2, ad 4um:
Certitudo spei derivatur a certitudine fidei; in
quantum enim motus appetitivae virtutis dirigitur a virtute cognoscitiva, participat
aliquid de ejus certitudine.

WALTER M. CONLON

object of hope or the omnipotence and mercy of God. 81 Therefore, when we presuppose the existence of faith our hope adheres principally to the omnipotence and mercy of God by
which alone we can come to eternal life. It is precisely this
divine help which places our hope in the realm of possibility and
further into the realm of certitude. Since it is the principal
cause by which we hope, it therefore places in the act of hope
the determination towards the end. This determination is of an
infallible nature and for that reason is termed certitude, just
as the determination of nature itself or the acquired virtues is
so named. Therefore in this determination of the formal motive
object (omnipotence of God) to the formal terminative object
(eternal life) of hope we find that certitude peculiar to theological hope, which St. Thomas has very aptly termed the
certitude of divine ordination. In giving a very brief explanation of this in the Summa Theologica he wished both to recognize the dependence upon faith and at the
time to
distinguish his new theory from the old theory of unqualified
participation of the certitude of faith. For that reason he said
that " hope tends with certainty towards its end, as if participating certitude from faith, which is in the cognitive power." 82
It is no longer a whole-hearted and complete participation, an
illicit transposition from the order of understanding and judgment to the order of the appetite. There is a relationship between these certitudes, but they are as different as the virtues
of faith and hope themselves.
In the light of this solution it becomes possible to answer the
formidable objections without recourse to the old theory of
conditional certitude. Certitude is principally found in the
reason, but it is found also in the operations of nature and
virtues in a participated manner. 83 It was the confusion of
these two orders of certitude which produced the idea of conn Summa Theol., 11-11, q. 18, a. 4, ad 2um: De omnipotentia autem Dei et misericordia eius certus est quicumque fidem habit.
•• Summa Theol., 11-11, q.IS, a. 4: Spes certitudinaliter tendit in suum finem,
quasi participans certitudinem a fide, quae est in vi cognoscitiva.
•• Ill Sent., XXVI, q. 2, a. 4, ad lum.

THE CERTITUDE OF HOPE

237

ditional certitude. Therefore it should be seen that the certitude
of hope is not conditional, but absolute in its order. This order
of hope to attain eternal beatitude is from the formal motive
object of the virtue, that is, the omnipotent help of God (omnipotentia auxilians), and therefore the certitude of the order of
hope towards eternal beatitude is proportionate to the certitude of the divine omnipotent help. This, of course, is absolute,
and accordingly renders the certitude of hope absolute. Consequently, it must be said that a theory which reduces the certitude of hope to the conditional order should be immediately
rejected. Moreover this theory is in no way necessary in order
to answer the objection that certitude properly speaking is in
the reason while hope is in the appetite. Both of these statements can be admitted without question. Certitude is found
essentially in the intellective power, but the determination of
the act of hope under the omnipotent help of God is also of a
certain and infallible nature. It is the certitude of an act
infallibly determined towards its end, a certitude of order or
inclination.
The theory of conditional certitude which has had such a
long life both before the time of St. Thomas and after him,
especially among theological writers since the Council of Trent,
was necessarily linked with the proposition that the certitude of
faith is universal and that of hope is particular. The former is
universal and absolute since by faith we believe that every good
person will obtain eternal life; the latter is particular and conditional because it produces a proposition of this nature: this
man will have eternal life, if he does good. In the light of the
Thomistic solution, such a theory becomes untenable because
the certitude of hope neither deals with the knowledge of any
proposition nor with the acquisition of any end. In other words
it is neither a certitude of judgment nor a certitude of event.
This certitude of event differs from the certitude of inclination
for the former concerns the power of attaining beatitude while
the latter concerns the very act itself of attaining beatitude.
Theological hope is defined as a certain expectation of future

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WALTER M. CONLON

beatitude coming from grace and merits. 84 What relation,
therefore, have grace and merit to the certitude of hope?
In the present order of providence it would be vain to expect
beatitude to be awarded without merits. However it is not
necessary that the merits actually precede the act of expectation, for even he who is not in the meritorious state of charity
can quite laudably hope for eternal life on account of the merits
which he expects to have in the future. Certainly our eternal
beatitude must be merited. Accordingly, some would say that
because merits are from free will, which is a contingent cause,
therefore hope of eternal life cannot be certain since whatever
depends upon something contingent can have certitude only
when actually possessed. To this it must be answered that the
certitude of inclination does not guarantee the actual attainment of the end against accidental and extrinsic impediments.
Therefore as long as we are in this life there remains the possibility of an accidental impediment so that the object of hope,
which itself is certain, may never be attained. 85 For that reason
the gift of fear of separation is joined to hope, but in the future,
when no accidental impediment can intervene, there will be no
fear of separation and indeed no hope, for that which was hoped
for will be possessed. Thus the fact that merit depends upon
the contingency of the free will does not destroy the certitude
of hope, which depends upon the nature of merit but not upon
the freedom of the will.86
The office of supernatural grace seems to place another difficultY, in the way of the certitude of hope. Assuredly no one will
have eternal life unless he possess charity and sanctifying grace,
but we do not know whether we possess these now,. or will have
Peter Lombard, III Sent., d. 26.
III Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a. 4, ad 4um: Quamdiu in hac vita sumus potest esse
accidentale impedimentum ne spes quae de se certitudinem habet, finem suum
consequatur.
86 Summa Theol., ll-II, q.IS, a. 4, ad Sum:
Dicendum quod hoc quod aliqui
habentes spem, deficiant a consecutione beatitudinis, contingit ex defectu liberi
arbitrii ponentis obstaculum peccati, non autem ex defectu divinae · potentiae vel
misericordiae, cui spes innititur. Unde hoc non praejudicat certitudini spei.
8'

85

THE CERTITUDE

OF HOPE

289

them at the end. Hence there arises a doubt, but it is a doubt
concerning a fact, that is, whether we will· or will not have
grace and charity at death. Nevertheless we do know that
charity, grace and merit which we expect to have will lead to
eternal life in a most certain manner. 87 For that reason it is not
a case of the existence of grace in the soul at any given time,
but rather the intrinsic force of grace itself that enters into a
consideration of the certitude of hope.
Another problem which confronts a consideration of this
subject is the difficulty raised concerning hope that is formed by
charity in comparison to that which exists in an imperfect state
without charity. Does the loss of charity destroy the certitude
of hope and, if it does not, does it diminish it? In order to
answer this it is necessary to consider two things, the effect of
the loss of charity upon hope, and the various certitudes included in hope. In the first place, (the differences between
formed and unformed hope is the difference between virtue in
a perfect and an imperfect state because of an extrinsic defect.
Thus hope without charity is a weakened virtue precisely in
regard to its determination as a habit. If its determination is
weakened, the certitude of that determination is proportionately weakened. Accordingly, that certitude of hope which
pertains to the virtue in its nature of a habit is greater in one
who possesses charity than in one who is without charity. This
is dependent merely upon the relatively perfect or imperfect·
state of the virtue. Moreover, insofar as the inclination of the
habit is concerned, the certitude of hope is greater in one who
possesses formed hope than in a predestined who is in the state
of unformed hope. 88 However, this is considering that certitude
which proceeds from the inclination of the habit. Insofar as the
•• III Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a. 4, ad 5um: Dicendum quod licet nesciam utrum finaliter
habiturus sim caritatem, tamen scio quod caritas et merita quae in proposito habeo
ad vitam aetemam certitudinaliter perducunt.
88 III Se:nt., d. 26, q. 2, a. 4um: Ideo sciendum est quod certitudo spei, quantum
ad inclinationem habitus, est major in habente spem formatam, etiam praescito ad
mortem, quam in praedestinato habente spem informem; sed in quantum includit
certitudinem quae est ex Dei ordinatione et ex meritis quae sunt in proposito, est
aequalis in utroque.

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WALTER M. CONLON

certitude of divine ordination is concerned certitude is equal in
all, whether or not their hope is formed by charity, because we
do not hope for eternal life in the strength of merits now possessed but rather upon the strength of those which we expect to
have at the end of life.89
In view of these considerations we are now in a position to
see more clearly the precise difference between the certitudes of
faith and hope. The fundamental difference, of course, springs
from the diverse natures of the faculties in which they are
subjected, for the certitude of faith is a determination of the
intellect to truth, while the certitude of hope is a determination
of the appetite to good. This must always remain a primary
guiding principle in any theological consideration of this subject. But further consideration brings to light another difference, i.e., that the certitude of faith cannot be found wanting,
while that of hope can accidentally (per accidens) be found
wanting. Moreover, the certitude of faith concerns a complexity
of things, but the certitude of hope concerns a singular thing
which is the object of the will. A fourth difference reveals
itself in the opposites of these two, for doubt is opposed to the
certitude of faith while diffidence or hesitation is opposed to the
certitude of hope. 90 This difference springs immediately from
the first mentioned, that of the diverse subjects of inherence.
Thus the certitude of faith, which is fundamentally a judical
certitude, is quite naturally opposed by the state of doubt; the
certitude of hope, on the other hand, is a certitude of inclination
and consists in the infallible determination between the act and
the end, or between the formal motive object (formale quo)
and the formal terminative object (formale quod) , and consequently is opposed by hesitation which militates against
determination.
•• Ibid.
III Sent., d.

q.
a. 4: Ex praedictis patet quod certitudo fidei et spei in
quatuor differunt. Primo, in hoc quod certitudo fidei est intellectus, certitudo
autem spei est affectus. Secundo, quia certitudo fidei non potest dificere, sed
certitudo spei per accidens deficit. Tertio, quia certitudo fidei est de complexo,
certitudo spei de incomplexo quod est objectum appetitus. Quarto, quia certitudini
fidei opponitur dubitatio, spei autem certitudini opponitur diffidentia vel haesitatio.
90

THE CERTITUDE

OF HOPE

241

Finally we will consider the relation between the gift of fear
and the certitude of hope in the theology of St. Thomas. Filial
fear and hope are closely connected and, in fact, perfect one
another. 91 Moreover, it is precisely in regard to the certitude
of hope that fear seems to perfect the virtue since that certitude is caused by the omnipotent help of God, and through
filial fear we fear that this help will be withdrawn from us. 92
Therefore, while hope increases, fear also increases because
inasmuch as one expects with greater certainty to obtain some
good through the help of another, so much the more does he
fear to offend him or to separate from him. 93 Thus the possibility of an accidental extrinsic impediment causes us to fear
separation from the divine help, through which alone hope is
certain. Hence the certitude of hope is strengthened, at least in
a negative way, by the gift of fear. This close relationship, then,
might well be the reason why, in the Summa Theologica, the
tract on the gift of fear follows immediately after the article
dealing with the certitude of hope. The article serves quite
logically as an introduction to the theological consideration of
the gift of fear, and the tract on fear completes the doctrine on
the certitude of hope.

liT.

CERTITUDE

oF HoPE AccoRDING

TO THE CoMMENTATORS

In the final analysis, it has been seen that St. Thomas attri.buted a threefold certitude to theological hope. It includes the
certitude proceeding from the virtue itself in its nature of
habit, the certitude of all the other infused virtues, and the
certitude of divine ordination. The first two are derived from
the certitude of the order of the virtue, while the latter depends
upon the order of faith in the intellect. Thus, fundamentally,
there are two distinct certitudes of inclination in hope, namely,
91 Summa Tkeol., II-II, q. 9, ad lum: Timor filialis et spes sibi invicem cohaerent,
et se invicem perficiunt.
•• Ibid.: Per timorem filialem timemus ad hoc auxilio nos subtrahere.
•• Summa Tkeol., II-II, q.l9, a.IO, ad
Ea crescente crescit timor filialis,
quia quanto aliquis certius expectat alicujus boni consecutionem per auxilium
alterius, tanto magis vertatur eum offendere, vel ab eo separari.

WALTER M. CONLON

that participated from divine Wisdom through the certitude of
virtue, and that participated from the human intellect elevated
to the supernatural order by theological faith.
The first of these is admitted without question by the commentators, many of whom, in fact, satisfy themselves with a
re-statement of the precise words of St. Thomas. 94 Likewise all
held tenaciously to the idea of participation through faith. 95
However, the differences and the difficulties arose 'When they
attempted to explain this participation. Some, indeed, returned
finally to the old pre-Thomistic theory of conditional certitude. 96
St. Thomas successfully isolated the. certitude of hope from
the web of conflicting theories, but after his death many theologians returned again to the confusion of the centuries which
preceded the Angelic Doctor. They resumed again the old
objection that faith and hope differ only as the universal and
the particular, and consequently denied not only the distinct
certitude of hope, but the very existence of the habit itself as
an entity distinct from faith and charity. 97 The chaos which
resulted occasioned the magnificent defense of Thomistic doctrine by John Capreolus (Princeps Thomistarum). A little
later, Francisco de Vitoria led a Thomistic revival in the Dominican convent of San Esteban in Salamanca, and returned
to the Thomistic theory concerning the certitude of hope. The
next important influence in this subject was the Council of
Trent. Since then modern theologians generally, and even some
commentators on St. Thomas, have returned either to the old
•• Dionysius Carthusianus, III Sent., d. 26, q. 1: Quumque virtus operetur instar
naturae, inclinando in finem determinatum, ideo dicitur certior arte, quemadmodum
et natura, inclinat infallibiliter ex impressione primae naturae: sicque certitudo
convenit spei. Sylvius and Gotti describe this as natural instinct; thus Gotti, in
ll-11, q. 18, a. 4: Tertiam, qua id certum dicitur, quod vel naturae instinctu, vel
ex animi inclinatione fere semper uno modo fit.
•• Sylvius in II-IT, q. 18, a. 4: Spes nostra habeat certitudinem ex fide participatam; Salmanticenses, Trac. XVITI, Dub. Ill: Certitudo spei debet· esse participium fidei. De Vitoria, in II-II, q.l8, a. 4: Spes participat certitudinem a fide.
•• Ibid.: Certitudinem absolutam excludere dubitationem, non autem conditionatam, cujusmodi est certitudo spei; Billuart, Trac. De Spe, art. 3: Certitudo spei
in viatoribus non est absoluta, sed conditionata.
""Scotus, III Sent., .d. 26, q. 1.

THE CERTITUDE OF HOPE

9l43

conditional certitude or to the distinction that hope is uncertain
considered from the point of view of the subject hoping. 98
This return of modern scholars to the old theories arises in part
from a misunderstanding of the words of the Council of Trent. 99
Paradoxically enough, however, the most profound
tions of the Thomistic solution were written after the Council
of Trent by Dominic Banez, the Salmanticenses, and John of
St. Thomas.
I. John Capreolus

The confusion of the theologians immediately following St.
Thomas occasioned the Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomae
Aquinatis. In this work, Capreolus laid the ground work for
further correct Thomistic study of the certitude of hope. Scotus
had denied that faith and hope were formally distinct habits,
and consequently placed despair in opposition to faith. This
was very fundamental. Capreolus, however, pointed out the
difference between infidelity and despair, by showing that the
former pertains to the intellect while the latter pertains to the
will. Moreover, the intellect is concerned with universals, while
the appetite moves towards particular things. 100 Thus it could
happen that one who has a true estimation of the universal
truth of faith might lack a proper estimation ·in a particular
application. In other words, one could have faith, but lack
hope, or one could be in despair, which is opposed to hope,
without being in a state of infidelity, which is opposed to faith.
Hence the true Thomistic doctrine concerning the relation of
faith and hope was enunciated, and upon this rests the
tion of the certitude of hope which is derived in some way
through faith. By faith we believe universal truths. However,
these universal truths contain particulars; thus by another act
98 Gotti, in II-II, q. 18, a. 4: Quod si interdum a certitudine deficit ... , hoc est
ex parte subjecti.
•• Cone. Trid. Sess. VI, Cap. 13, Denz. 806: Nemo sibi certi aliquid absoluta
certitudine polliciatur, tametsi in Dei auxilio firmissimam spem collocare et reponere
omnes debent.
100 Summa Theol., II-II, q. 20, a. 2.

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WALTER M. CONLON

of the reason the universal principle is applied to the particular.
This last act, according to Capreolus, is not an act of theological
faith. 101 Hence for hope there are required two preceding acts
of the intellect, one the act of theological faith, and another
which applies this universal belief to a particular person. Capreolus does not say to which virtue this latter act pertains, but
he definitely gave the impetus for the further explanations of
later scholars. 102
2. Francis de Vitoria
With this foundation laid by Capreolus, the doctrine was
further elucidated by the great Spanish Thomist, Francis de
Vitoria. After explaining the notion of that certitude in the will
which is by way of participation, he asserted that hope is
certain because of the infallible judgments of hope. 103 This is
not an attempt to place an act of judgment in the appetite. By
the " judgments of hope " was meant those judgments upon
which the virtue of hope is founded. In the first place, there
must be a certain judgment to the effect that what is hoped for
can actually be obtained (debeo judicare certo quod id quod
spero, consequi possum). Vitoria considered two judgments.
The one is necessary and of faith. 104 This is the judgment that
beatitude is possible through grace and merit. Moreover, this
is that judgment upon which rests the certitude participated
through faith. However, he offers no further explanation of
the precise manner of this participation. The other judgment
which he considered is, "I shall be saved" (ego salvabor).
Concerning this he expressly states that it is not the foundation
Capreolus, In Ill Sent.: Ista particularis credulitas non est actus fidei theologicae, sed aestimatio quaedam aliunde procedens.
102 Ibid.: Ex quo patet quod spes non est habitus creditus sed appetitivus,
cuius
actus ex duplici credulitate vel aestimatione procedit, una universali, quae est
actus fidei, et alia particulari, quae non est actus fidei, sed solius intellectus, vel
virtutis cognoscitivae.
103 De Vitoria, In II-II, q. 18, a. 4:
Spes est certa, quia certitudinaliter movetur
appetitus in beatitudinem per spem, per judicia infallibilia spei.
101

'"'Ibid.

THE CERTITUDE OF HJPE

for the certitude of hope. 105 However he maintains that it is
lawful and even meritorious to maintain this judgment provided one propose to live a good life; but it would be presumptuous if one persevered in sin.
Vitoria most certainly did not maintain that the certitude of
hope is conditional, but his explanation of the judgment upon
which it rests might have given rise to the rebirth of that theory
in the minds of succeeding scholars who failed to distinguish
between the certitude itself and Vitoria's explanation of the
fundamental judgment. 106
Cardinal Cajetan who lived at the same time as Vitoria did
not expressly consider our problem. One year before the death
of Vitoria the Council of Trent convened, and the particular
heresies of the Protestant reformers had made it imperative for
the fathers of the council to discuss the certitude of hope. With
a view to forestalling further error they chose to use the term
" most firm " in place of " certain " when speaking of hope.
Hence, the thirteenth chapter of the sixth session has been
subject to much misinterpretation, especially in regard to the
certitude of hope. However, some scholars understood the pronouncements correctly, and these were greatly aided in their
explanation of the certitude of hope by the words of the
Council, which once again brought into prominence the relation
of merit to this certitude.
3. Dominic Banez
One of the first to see and explain the complete agreement
between the words of the Council and the Thomistic solution
was Dominic Banez of the Salamanca school founded by
Vitoria. Banez, it is true, did not continue the development of
the idea expounded by Capreolus and Vitoria. On the contrary,
he concerned himself mainly with the conclusions of the Council
and a clarification of the relation of merits to the certitude. In
De Vitoria, In II-II, q.IS, a. 4: Spes non est certa ab illo judicio, ego salvabo.
lbid.s Spes habet illud fundamentum certum, quod iste est possibilis beatitudo
ex meritis et gratia, et quod si est bonus, consequeter vitam aeternam.
105

106

8

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WALTER M. CONLON

this respect, his work is of great value since it enabled other
scholars to proceed with the development of the explanation
in the true light of the pronouncement of the Council. There
are three fundamental conclusions. First, it must be held by
faith that, hope not only concerns divine grace, and mercy, but
also the effects produced in us by it through which we merit
glory. Secondly, it must also be held by faith that one, even
though in the justifying state of charity, can fail through sin
to obtain beatitude, unless he is the recipient of a very special
privilege from God. Lastly, our hope is wholly (simpliciter)
infallible, firm, and safe, and it is so described in the holy writings and in the doctrine of the church.
In support of this conclusion he points out that because hope
rests upon the divine promise and the power and the mercy of
God, it cannot fail us any more than faith, on the testimony of
which it is founded. Moreover, hope cannot fail from the point
of view of merits upon which it also rests. But since merits can
be considered either as proceeding from the grace of God or
from the free will, this statement must be correctly understood.
Hope, indeed, does not rest upon merits inasmuch as these depend upon us, but rather inasmuch as they are gifts of God and
depend upon His grace. Thus we place hope in merits insofar
as they are instruments of divine mercy, because the principal
cause of our hope is God alone. Therefore, the cause of salvation for which we hope will be the grace of God and merits,
insofar as they are from grace. So, from Banez we have a clear
statement of the fundamental verities that hope is founded upon
the testimony of faith and proceeds from the grace of God and
merits. 107
Speaking of the possibility of merits failing from the 'point of
view of the subject (ex parte subjecti), he shows that this does
not prejudice the certitude of hope. No one will deny that.our
faith is most certain, nevertheless it can be lost. 108 The same
107 Banez, In II-II, 2a 2ae, q. 18, a. 4:
Hinc ergo est, quod perditio nostra nobis
imputetur solis: salus autem gratia Dei, et meritis prout sunt ex gratia.
'" 8 Ibid.:
Fides est certissima, tamen amittitur ab hominibus.

THE CERTITUDE

OF HOPE

247

can be said of hope. In order to confirm this point he uses the
example of one who receives legitimate money from a king,
for which in return the king promises to give him a city, but
the man loses the money. He was not deceived in his hope in
the word of the king, nor was it the money given which caused
his failure to acquire the city. He himself destroyed his hope
by negligently losing the money. The comparison, of course, is
made with the promise of God to be obtained through grace
and merit. The .example is defective since we are never certain
of the possession of grace, as the man was of the money. However, it does show clearly that its author was in complete accord
with the traditional Thomistic doctrine.
4. Salmanticenses

In their commentary entitled Cursus Salmanticencis in
Summa S. Thomae, the Carmelite Fathers of the reform of St.
Teresa made a genuine contribution to the explanation of the
Thomistic solution. In the light of the declarations of the
Council of Trent, they returned to the consideration of the
dependence upon faith, which we have seen before in the writings of Capreolus and Vitoria. Affirming, in the first place,
that the certitude of hope and that of faith were not univocal
but analogical, they went on to show, as did Vitoria, that the
certitude of hope does not depend upon the judgment, " I shall
pursue beatitude" (consequar beatitudinem), but upon one of
this nature, " I propose to obtain salvation with the grace of
God" (praetendo cum Dei gratia consequi salutem). That
such a judgment is correct can easily be shown since it takes
into consideration both the terminative object (formale quod)
and the motive object (formale quo) of hope. 109 The final conclusion, that the certitude of hope is absolute in its order, is
even more important since it at once shows a thorough understanding of the doctrine of St. Thomas and the Council of
Trent, and is a conclusive repudiation of the errors into which
109 Salmanticenses, Trac. Vill, dub. ill:
tivum, et motivum hujus virtutis.

Siquidem afferunt objectum termina-

WALTER M. CONLON

modern theologians have fallen with regard to the certitude
of hope. 110 Thus, the theory of those who maintain the necessity of an absolute or conditional judgment concerning the
attainment or fruition of beatitude was definitely rejected.
In order to explain the dependence of the certitude of hope
on faith these scholars distinguished three acts of the intellect:
two speculative acts, one general and the other particular, and
one .practical act. The general speculative act (speculativum in
communi) is that by which we believe, for
that God
prepares and offers aid to salvation to all. This act of faith is
without doubt presupposed to the movement of hope, and the
certitude of hope rests upon it, although in an inadequate
manner. The particular speculative act (speculativum in particulari) is that which determines, for example, that "I will
obtain salvation." It is immedi::Jtely evident, since this can be
false, that it neither pertains to faith nor is required for hope.
The third, or practical, act of the intellect, is one whose truth is
not concerned immediately with the object, but rather with
the conformity to the rule of right reason. It can be explained
thus: presupposing the divine promises, one hopes, through the
help of God, to pursue salvation. This act, which proceeds
from faith inasmuch as it is a practical virtue, directs and immediately occasions the act of hope. Moreover, this act, like
any dictate of prudence, is of infallible practical truth, and is in
every way certain, since faith contains truth even in a greater
way than prudence. Therefore the movement of hope which
follows it, participates from it a firm and determined inclination
to beatitude. 111 This determined inclination is the certitude of
hope. Thus the virtue of hope, and consequently its certitude,
depends upon two acts of the intellect, one a speculative act
and the other a practical act. The practical act immediately
110 Ibid.: Certitude spei esse absolutam; quoniam praedicta certitudo, ut pertinet
ad voluntatem, nihil aliud est quam firmitas, et determinatio affectus ad beatitudinem.
111 Salmanticenses,
Tract. VIII, Dub. III: Qui actus est infallibilis veritatis
practicae, et omnio certus, sicut quodlibet dictamen prudentiae, quam alitiori modo
continet fides. Unde motus spei, qui immediate ilium consequitur, participat ab eo
certitudinem in firma et determinata habitudine inclinationis ad beatitudinem.

THE CERTITUDE OF HOPE

249

occasions the act of hope, while the speculative act is presupposed just as a general statement from which a particular is
drawn is presupposed to that particular.
5. John of Saint Thomas

Probably the most profound explanation of this Thomistic
doctrine is to be found in the writing of the great Portuguese
scholar, John of St. Thomas. In his treatment of the subject,
we see all the various elements and aspects of the problem
brought together and given their proper relationship to one
another. Thus, the importance of the consideration of grace
and merit, which was stressed in the work of Banez, is brought
into relationship with the concept of participation through faith,
which was considered by Capreolus, Vitoria, and the Salmanticenses. This synthesis of the Thomistic doctrine is especially
important since it was made after, and in the light of, the
declarations of the Council of Trent, which almost all modern
writers of theological manuals misinterpret, to the detriment
of the doctrine of St. Thomas.
John of St. Thomas distinguished certitude in a threefold
manner: objectively, formally, and by way of participation.
Objectively, it is found in things themselves inasmuch as there
is an infallible connection of one with the other. This objective
certitude is found in hope considered from the part of God, by
whose infallible help hope moves. Formally speaking, certitude
is in the intellect, but this cannot be predicated of hope. Certitude by way of participation is in the will, inasmuch as this
faculty is moved to its end by infallible means and motive. 112
This is a most profound statement because the word " means "
includes both the grace of God and merit, while the word
" motive " refers to the influence of faith upon hope. Therefore,
an explanation of that statement will be an explanation of the
entire problem.
112 John of St. Thomas, In II-II, d. V, a. 3: Certitudo cum sit firmitas quaedam,
et infallibilis securitas, potest sumi tripliciter, vel objective ... formaliter ...
vel participative in voluntate, quatenus infallibili medio, et motivo movetur ad
finem.

250

WALTER M. CONLON

It should be understood that this certitude by way of participation is a practical and not a speculative certitude. Moreover, it consists in this, that it has a certain and sure rule,
which is to say that the will had sufficient motive so that it
should not hesitate, but should tend towards the end efficaciousiy and correctly. For just as there is in the intellect a
determination towards assent, when that faculty is perfectly
convinced, so also there is a determination in the appetite when
there exists sufficient motive for tending toward$ the end. However, all the sufficiency and certainty of this motive depends
upon the certitude of the means sufficient to acquire the end,
because the difficulties must be conquered through the certitude
of the means. Thus, it depends upon the means whether or not
the object of hope appears as a possible good: Moreover, faith
teaches that this certitude in tpeological hope concerning the
means will not be found wanting on the part of God. However,
considered from the part of the subject, faith does not teach
that any particular.person will not be found wanting, but nevertheless rightly rules so that the peccable subject will not
despair and thus impede the means, which are sufficient in
themselves to conquer the difficulties. Therefore, from the
point of view of the means, hope always has certitude sufficient
to tend efficaciously towards the end. It is true that one can
discard these means by sin, but the certitude of hope does not
depend upon the subject but upon the means. 113 For that
reason, hope is most certain because grace and merit, which arc
the means, are infallibly determined towards the end of the
virtue.
In the first place, then, faith is a speculative habit, and upon
its certitude all other certitude in the Christian life must ultimately depend. But faith, by extension, is also a practical
virtue, and it is in this repect that faith immediately influences
hope. The certitude of faith, considered as a practical virtue,
is ·a practical certitude, not a speculative certitude. 114 Thus
118 John of St. Thomas, In II-II, d. V, a. 8:
Finnitas spei, et ejus dictam non
fundatur in eo, quod tenet se ex parte subjecti, sed ex parte mediorum.
110 John of St. Thomas, In II-II, d. V, a. 8:
Secunda certitudo (quae datur a

THE CERTITUDE OF HOPE

251

although hope is ultimately founded upon the speculative certitude of faith, nevertheless it participates certitude from that
virtue principally inasmuch as faith is a practical virtue. So,
the certitude of hope, even from this point of view, is a practical
certitude, a certitude of order or inclination, and not a participated speculative certitude.
This explanation likewise answers forever the difficulty in
regard to despair and infidelity. Some argued that despair
would not only destroy hope, to which it is opposed, but would
also destroy faith. Accordingly, faith and hope are not distinct
virtues. The response to this is clear from the above explanation. Despair is opposed to faith insofar as that virtue is_ a
practical rule of action, but it does not destroy that universal
belief which is fundamental and essential to faith. The latter is
destroyed by infidelity. Thus, infidelity is opposed to the fundamental cause of the certitude of hope, while despair is opposed
to the immediate cause. 115
Thus, from the works of the commentators, culminating in
the work of John of St. Thomas, we have a clear and full explanation of St. Thomas' profound solution, which moreover
was confirmed rather than denied by the Council of Trent.
Nevertheless, by misinterpreting the words of the Council, and
by misunderstanding the explanations of the earlier commentators, many later commentators as well as most of the modern
authors have lost sight of the true Thomistic solution and have
returned to the old theory of conditional certitude. 116
The doctrine of these modern commentators differs from the
pre-Thomistic theory in this, that they concede to hope that
fide) est quasi practica, quasi fides judicat prudenter, et recte procedere ad
sperandum.
116 Summa Tkeol., IT-II, q. 20, a. 2, ad lum:
Unde motus spei aufferi potest, non
solum sublata universali aestimatione fidei (i.e. by infidelity), quae est sicut causa
prima certitudinis spei, sed etiam sublata aestimatione particulari (i.e. by despair),
quae est sicut secunda causa.
116 Gotti, In II-II, q. 18, a. 4: certitudinem triplicem esse posse: nempe condi
tionatam ... absolutam ... tertiam, qua id certam dicitur, quod vel natura
instinctu, vel ex animi inclinationi fere semper uno modo fit. . . . Primam igitur
certitudinis speciem convenire spei, certum est.

WALTER M. CONLON

certitude which it has by its very nature as a habit. However,
when they come to consider the participation through faith
they relapse into confusion. Failing to distinguish between
faith as a speculative virtue and faith as a practical virtue, they
confuse the certitude of inclination in hope with the certitude
of judgment and that of event. Thus, instead of an absolute
certitude of inclination they attribute to hope a conditional
certitude of event. But there is really no question of the certitude of event in hope. No one (except through special revelation) is absolutely certain of obtaining salvation. That point
is clear. However, we are absolutely certain through faith
that the means by which we hope to obtain salvation are
ordained to that end. It is this absolute and infallible ordination which precisely constitutes the absolute and infallible
certitude of hope, which St. Thomas very aptly termed the
" certitude of divine ordination."
WALTER

Dominican House of Studiu
WtUhington, D. C.

M. CONLON, O.P.

BOOK H.EVIE\VS
The Meeting of East and West. By F. S. C. NoRTHROP. Macmillan Company, New York, 1946. Pp. 531.

I
The modern age is top-heavily interested in technique. Explicitly, there
are contemporary formulae like Bridgman's Operationalism in the order
of knowing, Instrumentalism in the order of doing, and the Labor valuetheory in the order of making. In more general coordinates, ever since
Descartes and even before, in spirits like Occam's, man has been in search
of method. The extreme forms which this trend has reached in our own
day can be measured, if additional sampling is really needed, by the current
view of philosophy as logic.
In a deep sense, the whole history of philosophy is a story of method.
But in pre-modern times, men were wise enough to see that method and
matter must be taken together and that to take method out of this context
would be to study a sheer vacuum. All available physico-mathematical
measurement, when applied to a violin, could never tell us what music is;
we must make the instrument play. The Greeks, like Pythagoras and
Plato, when they used mathematical procedures, believed that numbers
were more than abstractions and hence that methodology involved more
than the merely logical order. The problem of the universals in the middle
ages was both a logical and an ontological problem. When this debate was
ended, method and matter were united but not identified in the hierarchy
of the real. Being, as Aquinas so vigorously insisted, is intrinsically intelligible; ens et verum convertuntur.
Today, being is viewed as intelligible in terms of outside relations, and
method has become detached as a machine with a crankshaft to make
being intelligible. No longer do we
being as self-evident, as coequal with truth. Man is on a treadmill; we need a method to study the
bridge between method, when re-applied to matter, and the matter itself.
Our machine is in constant breakdowns, always needing an (n + 1) th
method to study the nth. Once we deny the self-evidence that being is
intrinsically intelligible, we can never get back to the inner, ultimate
natures of things, no matter how refined our method may be. Ultimately
and basically the universe thus becomes an indifferent tabula rasa for man.
Sanities like truth and certitude, meaning and value, which alone can
rescue modern man from his intellectual anarchy and save our culture,
are entombed.

253

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BOOK REVIEWS

Prof. Northrop, in his brilliantly written book, makes the proposal of
a mere matterless method as a philosophy of the real and as the basis for
the meeting between East and West. Nowhere conceding the relation between self-evidence and intelligibility, he is willing to admit that the content
of thought may undergo radical, continuous change like the universe of
Heraclitus. The constant in s·uch change is mere method. The so-called
scientific procedure is elevated to a philosophical principle into which, it
would seem, the theoretical component of knowledge, emphasized by
Western thought, and the intuitive component, of the East, can be compatibly distributed. In the broad bosom of the scientific method, it appears,
the intellectual problems of man and his cultures are to be resolved.
But how can mere method establish agreement among men and how can
it ever enter into communion with the content that men live by, in, and
for? How, moreover, can method ever enter into contact with anything
outside its own self?

II
The method employed by Prof. Northrop himself, in developing his
central thesis, is an historical one. He discusses the chief components of
various nationalities and cultures, drawing in the end inductive generalizations to exemplify. his general theme. He then proposes a method for
harmonizing the diverging national and cultural aspects of the knowledge
problem.
Mexico is examined and depicted as a mixture of various world views. On
the one hand, there is a genus of art, philosophy, and institution which
reflects " the Spanish and Mexican soul whose essence is passion . . ."
(p. 55) In this view is seen the intuitive, aesthetic component of thought.
Expressive of this spirit is the painting of Jose Orozco whose " most striking,
important, and universal symbol is fire." (p. 53) Phenomenology has been
able to take root in South America, and a peculiar aversion has been shown
to the Kantian formalisin, the businessman's culture and the " life under
the elms " which appeal in the United States. But running through Mexico,
on the other hand, is a positivist current deriving from the intellectual
influences of the French encyclopedists and from the political power of
the Diaz government. From this stream of thought comes the force of
the anti-clericalism and the communism which run counter to the traditional
passionate, intuitive outlook of the Mexican. Mexico thus suggests at the
very outset the two components of thought, the theoretical and the
aesthetic, that will later break more and more into the clear.
In the United States, the theoretical component of thought has been
exaggerated. No philosopher has influenced America's thinking more than
John Locke. According to his well-known doctrine, material substances exist
but they are not attained in knowledge. On the surging tide of physics, as

BOOK REVIEWS

255

developed by Galilei and Newton, Locke had to affirm that the world was a
colorless, odorless mechanism of atoms and that the so-called secondary
qualities were in the mind. He argued toward what Prof. Northrop presents
as a three-termed relation: unqualified physical objects in public, mathematical space; the individual observer; and appearances (secondary qualities), dependent partially on the observer and partially on the object world.
Mental substance thus came to be viewed as that which, when acted upon
by this public world, is conscious of pains, smells, sounds, and the like.
Such was Locke's system, cascading down the course of modern times
from the physics of his friend Newton and from Galilei who had written
that " if the animate and sensitive body were removed, heat would remain
nothing more than a simple word."
The consequences of this new view were epoch-making in the practical
order. If the public character of the world remains ultimately unknowable
in itself, as Locke said of material substances, then each individual with his
" sensed particulars " becomes a little world of his own. There is a basis
for toleration (as opposed to the divine right of kings) and a basis for
popular democracy (as opposed to Calvinistic theocracy). It was these
political consequences of Locke's doctrine which provided the pattern for
American democracy. It is a political atomism, based on "scientifically
grounded principles." Religion, in the Lockean universe, becomes an introspective, private thing. A person is a mental substance. Since there are no
prescribed social, public duties, law is a mere convention. And this view,
in the opinion of Prof. Northrop, has been the dominant legal philosophy
in the United States.
But the contradiction in Locke's doctrine came inevitably to the fore.
Our only source of knowledge is sense data, Locke said, but if these data
are subjective, how can we even know that there is a public world? Berkeley forthwith denied such a world in his notion of esse est percipi. Hume
argued that even the person, the agent of the percipi, is but an association
of sense data. Thus the stage is set for modern materialism, positivism,
psychophysics, and atheism. " Certainly if nothing exists but sense· data
and their associations, all this follows." (p. 116)
The American outlook has always been tinged by Kantian formalism and
by the economic theories of Adam Smith and W. S. Jevons. All of these
translate Locke's thought or its consequences. Like Locke, these philosophies instance the speculative, theoretical component of knowledge which
Prof. Northrop discovers in American culture.
A similar trend toward theory but with a different background is found
in British culture. Its political philosophy was formulated by the Aristotelian, Richard Hooker, and also, to some extent, by Locke and Bentham.
The British view has thus attempted to reconcile Aristotle with Locke,
social consciousness and respect for law with the subjectivism of Lockean

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BOOK REVIEWS

democracy. But the elections of July 1945 indicate that the British have
decided this rapprochment to be impossible and hence that Locke and
Aristotle must be " transcended." British culture has, because of its Aristotelian and Lockean character, obviously been steeped in a theoretic factor
of knowledge.
German culture has been expressed in modern times by Kant, Fichte, and
Hegel. Fichte attempted to.bridge the breach between Kant's moral dogmatism and the skepticism of his critical philosophy. This attempt ended
with the whole structure of knowledge and belief resting on moral rather
than on critical grounds. The voluntarism was so extreme that culture
acquired a primacy over nature in Fichte's system and the whole universe,
in Hegel's thought, became one of dynamic tension. In German culture
is thus found both the theoretic and the non-rational, aesthetic component
of knowledge, but the theoretic is still in the ascendancy.
In Marxian Communism, we likewise find the theoretical component in
the foreground. But it was the merit of Marx to emphasize that no
Lebensanchauung can be correct until it pays satisfactory attention to
man's material, bodily side. It was the error of Marx to go beyond the
scientific and to hold that the universe is in dialectical, autodynamic--one
might even say-vitalistic development.
In discussing Roman Catholic culture and Greek science, Prof. Northrop
argues that Aristotle and the medieval Aristotelians employed a theoretic
approach in their search for the scientific grounds of theology. Prof.
Northrop's treatment of Thomism will be discussed in another section.
All evidence, provided by Prof. Northrop, depicts Western culture as a
whole to be characterized by emphasis on the theoretical approach to reality
and neglect of the immediately felt, intuitive, aesthetic factors of knowledge.
In Oriental thought, this relationship is reversed. Content must be
experienced to be known. Chinese language, for instance, is a picturesystem, directly representing thought. In the writings of the great sage,
Confucius, there is no order in presentation, merely a series of disconnected,
intuitive statements. Oriental art, by and large, grasps the immediately
apprehended.
Self and object in Oriental thought are really parts of a single aesthetic
continuum in which "the blueness of the sky is sensed with the same
immediacy and simultaneity as the introspected pain of the observer."
(p. 332) Language brings out the differentiations rather than the indeterminate character of this continuum which obtains. For the Oriental, this
indeterminate character constitutes the loftiest form of reality. Buddhism
in fact is a philosophy of negations. Nirvana is " the undifferentiated or
indeterminate aesthetic continuum." (p. 350) The aim of life is to become
self-less. " The Oriental asserts the primary factor in human nature and
the nature of all things to be something which neither the formal methods

BOOK REVIEWS

of science and philosophy nor the determinate qualities can convey; and
uses logically formulated doctrines, without contradiction, either positively
to lead one toward the primary indescribable factor or else negatively to
designate what the primary factor in the nature of things is not." (p. 365)
The notion of the indeterminate will help to understand why the Oriental
will compromise; why he will not commit himself to explicit promises and
policies; and why he has such a strong sense of the nation and the family.
There is a continuum which engulfs the individual and makes it desirable
to seek indeterminacy and solidarity.

III
Against the backdrop of this contrast between the immediately felt,
aesthetic factor of knowledge which obtains in the East and the theoretic,
speculative component of Western knowledge, Prof. Northrop projects a
solution: " The aesthetic, intuitive, purely empirically given component in
rnan and nature is related to the theoretically designated and indirectly
verified component, not as traditional Western science and philosophy
suppose by a three-termed relation of appearance but instead by the twotermed relation of epistemic correlation." (p. 443) By substituting the
"two-termed relation" for the "three-termed relation," Prof. Northrop
believes himself to escape from the difficulties occasioned by Locke's
system. His two-termed relation is that of attempting to bring the immediately felt data of experience into conformity with a logical framework,
antedating the experience which confirms it and hence only indirectly
verified by the experience itself.
This is, in fact, the method of contemporary physics, which no longer
frets over the distinction between appearance and reality but dismisses
any mention of quality as a meaningless question, or, in the words of Prof.
Bridgman, a verbalism. It is a method which puts observer and object
on the same level, each containing both immediate and theoretic components. Thus, " the event which is knowledge is the purely naturalistic
interaction between one factor in the aesthetically immediate-theoretically
designated complex of things and other such factors." (p. 454) In such a
framework, the problem of quality and the reality of substance are never
posed.
There is no hierarchy in Prof. Northrop's universe. It is equipotential.
Knowing involves no vital becoming of another object but a purely inertial.
continuously-modulated relation, " a purely naturalistic interaction,"-contemplated apparently by a third observer who is contemplated by a fourth
and so on. " In fact, any complete thing whatever must be regarded as
made up of (a) the ineffable, emotional aesthetic materials of the equally
ineffable and emotional aesthetic continuum common to oneself and all

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things, and (b) the unseen theoretic component which can be adequately
designated only by thought and postulationally prescribed theory checked
through its deductive consequences. Thus to be any complete concrete
thing is to be not merely an immediately experienced, aesthetically and
emotionally felt thing, but also to be what hypothetically conceived and
experimentally verified theory designates. It is to be recalled that not
merely in mathematical physics but in the unseen immortal soul and the
unseen God the Father of the theistic religions, but even in the ordinarily
common-sense beliefs in external tables and chairs and persons as existing
independently of one's awareness and sense impressions of them, the inferred
postulated and indirectly verified theoretic component is present."
(pp.
450-451)
Prof. Northrop believes that he has lowered the barrier between ·East
and West. In the Occidental world, the theoretic component has been
unduly stressed; in the East, the immediate, intuitive, aesthetic has been
exaggerated. The solution accords to each factor its proper place. " That
conception of good conduct and the good state is the correct one, valid
for everybody, which rests upon the conception of man and nature as
determined by immediate apprehension with respect to the aesthetic component and by the methods of natural science with respect to the theoretic
component; procedures which, when correctly applied, give the same results
for one person that they give for another." (p. 470)

IV
Prof. Northrop, a widely read and apparently careful scholar, has made
some seriqus misinterpretations of Thomas Aquinas, whose thought must
be weighted against the inductive conclusion that the West has exaggerated
the theoretic component of knowledge and whose philosophy must be
considered in the light of Prof. Northrop's basic solution of the East-West
problem. Thomistic metaphysics, it is stated, rests on the empirical physics
of Aristotle which, when exploded, brought with it the blow-up of the whole
Scholastic ontology. (p. Q65) Aristotle's empirical physics is simply no
longer scientifically accurate, it is said. However, this attitude is in accord
with neither the letter nor the spirit of Aquinas. The empirical physics of
Aristotle and of Thomas was neither cosmology nor metaphysics, as a
careful reading in either of these two authors will attest. Aquinas may
have used what we now consider to be empirical physics by way of illustration but he did not use it by way of proot In fact, when dealing with
the Aristotelian astronomy of eccentrics and epicycles which Duhem depicts
as an example of what we now call the scientific method, Aquinas was
quick to point out that by some other hypothesis, yet unprojected, the
facts in question might be explained. The Aristotelian hypothesis could

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fl59

thus be only provisionally entertained. Far different is the Thomistic (and
realistic) attitude toward truly philosophical truths. The principle of
finality, the immortality of the human soul, Qod's existence and nature as
known to reason, these and other such questions were not mere provisional
theories. Aquinas insisted that in necessary proof the conclusion could not
be otherwise than it is. His (and Aristotle's) empirical physics can well
be rejected; but the philosophical physics or cosmology and the metaphysics
remain. In this light, and in the light of additional evidence readily discernible to any genuine student of Aquinas, Prof. Northrop has misunderstood the relation of science and philosophy in traditional thought. What
Prof. Northrop wishes is a so-called ... scientifically grounded philosophy.'
He is willing to concede that his proposed system must be continually
revamped as scientific theories come and go.
It is also incorrect to state that, for Aquinas and Aristotle, mathematics
was an empirical natural science concerned with prime matter, "an
empirical natural science just like physics, astronomy, and biology.'' (p.
267) Aquinas expressly states that mathematics abstracts from the domain
of empirical reality, viz.," sensible nature and motion." (de Coelo et Mundo,
III, 3) . In the same discussion, he clearly differentiates between what
he calls " natural " and mathematical science. Thomistically, it is a misunderstanding to speak of a being as having a potentiality only "logically,"
(p. 269) and it is even worse to say that for Aristotle and Aquinas "God
is identified with the rational form of the universe." (p. 270) Prof.
Northrop states that" what St. Thomas did was to take the conception of
man and nature precisely in the form which Greek science, as made philosophically articulate by Aristotle, indicated it to possess, and to identify
the traditional words of Christian doctrine such as ' soul,' ' God,' • perfection,' ' grace,' and ' revelation ' with certain factors in this generally
accepted and, for its time, scientifically verified theory." (p. 279) There
are at least five misconceptions, in this statement, as any Thomist would
recognize. Again, one might ask where Aquinas ever spoke of "reality,
composed of both prime matter and the rational principle, which is the
Unmoved Mover ... " ? (p. 279) It is no wonder that Prof. Northrop
concludes that Thomism is outmoded. If " Einstein's theory of relativity
is simple in comparison with the abstractness, the technicalities, the distinctions, and the ramifications of the theology of St. Thomas " (p. 286) ,
it can only be replied that in comparison to the " five men " who are able
to understand Einstein, thousands on thousands of seminarians are able
to understand the thought of Aquinas.
Apparently Prof. Northrop has crossed a bridge too quickly. Since he
draws his judgment of the Western world from analysis of historical systems,
mistakes in fact, like those above indicated, can be (and as the following
will show actually are) very crucial against the whole thesis of this book.

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v
Prof. Northrop's solution is that of "scientific method itself, when
this method is analyzed . . ." (p. 443) The two-termed epistemic correlation is the purified procedure of Galilei and Newton. Prof. Northrop
persistently proposes a" scientifically grounded philosophy." The dominant
need of our time, he states, is a philosophy of man and nature in the light
of contemporary empirical knowledge, as though this knowledge can validate
It is in the constant confusion of science and
philosophy. (pp.
philosophy that Prof. Northrop's thesis is inadequate. Not only is this
confusion based on gratuitous assumptions which have been repeatedly
refuted by sound reason. History, from which Prof. Northrop so abundantly
draws, might well make us question the whole underlying principle of
science's autonomy rather than make us take it for granted. For not since
Rome's fall has the West been threatened from the inside as it has in an
epoch where the scientific method has had so much to say.
More appropriate criticism of Prof. Northrop's solution can be found in
the explosive force of its inorganic, eclectic character. The intuitive tendencies of Oriental thought are toto coelo different from the abstract
theorizing of Western empirical science. How then are the twain to meet?
If we apply the method of modern physics to immediate experience, we
lose the character of immediacy. Physics can never deal with the immediacies of experience. Unable to appreciate the way in which (by abstraction) man's mind identifies itself with the directly given, thinkers like
Russell, Carnap, and Eddington have proposed that even " common-sense
objects," like tables, are logical constructs. We experience, if we apply
the method of physics, our own experiences, and we experience the experience of experience. Stebbing has shown that Carnap's logically constructed world ends in solipsism. If Bridgman's system is universally
applied, we wind up by operating on operations, or, in Joad's words applied
to British " scientism," describing descriptions. If scientific method alone is
true, then we have the subjectivism which not only divides East from West
but divides all men from one another.
Prof. Northrop's system attempts to evade the subjectivity of traditional
Western science by the so-called" two-termed epistemic correlation" in lieu
of the triad suggested by Lockean theory. Before assessing the notion of
Prof. Northrop on this point, the concepts of immediate and theoretical
need further exploring.
The immediate component of man and nature is empirically and directly
given. The theoretic component, however, is not a mere theory in the
traditional scientific sense. It is not a mere idea but exists in the nature
of things, being "ultimate, real, and irreducible." (p. 484) On the other
hand, the immediate component of things is likewise ultimate. It is in-

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261

effable, emotionally moving, aesthetically vivid. (p. 462) The two components in nature and in man are united by the two-termed relation of
epistemic correlation. But if the immediate is ineffable, how can such a
component ever relate to a theoretic component? If the theoretic component does not deal with the immediate, then it would bear on a vacuum
as opposed to
and experienced things. Thus either we have an
eclecticism based on the ipse dixit of Prof. Northrop or we still have the
two worlds which he set out to bring to understanding and .unity.
Knowledge for Prof. Northrop becomes a purely extra-mental interaction
between two realities which are not distinct in the hierarchy of being and
knowing but are on the same level as bodies that obey inertia. Despite
his preference for the scientific method which deals with inertial realities
and must necessarily regard man as completely determined from without,
Prof. Northrop is not willing to admit that the mind is a blank tablet. It is
difficult to reconcile this view of man with the necessity in Prof. Northrop's
system, for a two-termed epistemic correlation in which man, if this is
truly the expurgated edition of the Galilei-Newtonian method, becomes an
observer, merely passive.
Prof. Northrop's deus ex machina does not escape the solipsism of Russell
and Carnap; or else it makes the immediate something truly ineffable, incapable of being represented within the frame of the two-termed correlation
and having the practical consequence that the problem of world unity
remains, in Kipling's famous phrasing, exactly where it was before this
enquiry. We do not integrate by eclecticism nor by proposing that the
immediate be made mediate, that is, capable of representation within the
system of epistemic correlations.

VI
Prof. Northrop has written a long and, on the whole, admirable, interesting,
scholarly, and-for most men-a life-time's work. Indeed, the beauty in the
coherence of thought and the felicity of phrase tends to lull the reader's
critical attitude. In discussing Aquinas, Prof. Northrop made two misconceptions which are truly focal for his thesis. First, he badly confused
the !,"elation of science and philosophy in the spirit and letter of Aquinas.
Secondly, he erred in his conclusion that Thomism exaggerates the theoretic
component of man and nature. In reality, Aquinas made distinctions which
immunize him to Prof. Northrop's charges.
Gilson has recently shown how the real importance of Aquinas in the
medieval schools was his assertion of the reality and relations of existential
being, being with reference to existence. Existence is the integrating force
of concrete reality. In the stimulating thesis of Gabriel Marcel who has
reaffirmed many traditional notions from the general contour of modern
becomes incarnate in existence. Essence suggests
existentialism,

9

BOOK REVIEWS

the ideational, logical, and-one might say-theoretic component of things.
It is by existence that essence acquires fullness and actuality.
In the ens ut ens which Aquinas recognized in reality, there is room for
the two-fold philosophy that must be affirmed when East meets West in
world understanding. There is the . immediate component of existential
character and the theoretic component of the essence which has such a
character, theoretic not in the sense of a so-called scientific theory, only
indirectly and provisionally verified, but in the sense of directly leading
man to the inescapable certitudes of metaphysics and morality.
This book has been hailed as a monumental work. If we accept its
central thesis and its accent on science, it may well be a monument in the
graveyard of Western culture. But on the other hand, there is a faint
interlinear glimmer at times of that dualism which perennial philosophy
finds figured in the relation of essence and existence-a dualism which
alone accounts for the immediate-theoretic contrast and union, a dualism
which alone guarantees that diversity and unity that make cultures organic,
progressive, and generally open to outside influences.
VINCENT EDWARD SMITH.
Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. C.

Prevoir et Savoir. By YVEs SIMON. Editions de l'Arbre. Montreal, 1944.
Pp. 205.
The subtitle describes this little and highly interesting volume as " Studies
of the Idea of Necessity in Scientific Thought and in Philosophy." These
studies comprise a main part on the Theory of Determinism (106 pp.)
and several shorter essays on Science and Systematics, The School of
Vienna, Epistemological Pluralism, the Object of Physical Knowledge, and
the Knowledge of the Soul. These latter essays, although deserving consideration, are, however, of minor importance compared with the main
part; they are also partly of a more critical nature and must be passed
over in this report.
The study on determinism starts with an analysis of the notion of
chance. Common-sense views as a chance-event any which is contrary to
expectation, as that which could not have been foreseen. There are, however, events which may be foreseen and none the less must be labelled
accidental or fortuitous. An observer at a street corner may forsee that
two cars moving towards each other at a right angle must collide; the
accident is nevertheless due to chance. Chance is not defined in terms of
the unforeseen or the unpredictable, but by the non-unified plurality of the

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263

causal lines of which the event is the result. The author quotes approvingly
Cournot: " Events resulting from the combination or the coincidence of
other events which belong to series independent of one another are those
one calls fortuitous or products of chance." The common-sense notion is
dominated by practical considerations. The predictability of an event does
not influence its relations with its real causes, but it modifies profoundly
its human significance. Predictable events become objects of human prudence; unpredictable events cannot be controlled. The common-sense
opinion is in need of philosophical correction.
Any theory of indetermination, says the author in the chapter on the
" Philosophical Equivocations Concerning Determinism," must presuppose
determinism, because it would otherwise deny ultimately the rationality
of the universe and therefore its intelligibility. The chance-event must
be viewed as inevitable as soon as the causal lines are given, the meeting
of which constitutes the chance-event. This necessity, however, is not
" essential " but " historical," not one of right, but solely of fact. It is
correct to say that a chance-event has no cause; it has several causes and
the plurality of causes is irreducible. Such a plurality has unity only in
our mind, not in reality. The chance-event is inexplicable, irrational, unintelligible; it is because of this that rationalism denies emphatically the
reality of chance. Explication rests on identity, but the chance-event is not
identical with any of its causes in virtue of the latter's plurality. The
plurality of causes is unified only on the level of the First Cause which
" organizes chance." The argument is continued in the chapter " Causality
and Identity ": it is impossible to reduce the world totally to a unity
because it is only partially and relatively one, hence only partially and
relatively intelligible; there being no real distinction between the unity
and intelligibility of being. It is here where the fundamental importance
of the notion of potentiality, active and passive, becomes evident. Becoming
is effected by an agent different from that which becomes: whatever is
moved is moved by another, the emphasis being on other. What there is of
identity between the cause and the caused can be recognized only insofar
the diversity or " alterity " is recognized first. The principle of change must
be complemented by the two others, the one which affirms that omne
agens agit sibi simile, and the other that omne agens agit propter finem.
The aspects of diversity and identity which coexist in the causal relation
can be safeguarded only if these three principles are taken in consideration.
Hence, it is clear that the notion of cause is fundamentally an ontological
notion; in non-ontological knowledge, when one passes to the level of
positive science, this notion suffers divers " recastings," according to the
plurality of the procedures employed. On the level of science, the notion
remains, so to speak, only in a weakened form.
The confrontation of " the Ideal of Science and the Real World " makes

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BOOK REVIEWS

ample use of statements made by eminent scientists and culminates in a
penetrating analysis of the classical illustration of chance, namely the
throwing of dice. For there to be an equiprobability for each possible event,
that is, for each of the six faces of the die, it is necessary not only that the
die be regular but also that the throwing be irregular. "A badly assured
cause is needed to give to all possible eventualities an equal physical
assurance." This analysis leads to that of the " Indeterminist Crisis "
arising from the recent developments in " microphysics." The transition
from the simple to the very great number renders necessary the substitution
of the statistical for the causal law.
The closing paragraph of this study deserves particular attention because here the author points out a mistake all too frequently made not
only by the general public, but also by the philosopher analysing and
criticizing the notions of science. Science rests on the one hand on its
positive data, on the other on a certain ontology it implies. But, there
is a third factor which the author aptly calls the " cosmic image." Every
age is characterized, and this is particularly true of the great epochs of
science, by the predominance of a certain cosmic image. Linnean biology
is characterized by the image of a system of perduring models, whereas the
age of evolution is dominated by the idea of models in an insensible movement. It is an error to confuse with the philosophy immanent in science
this cosmic image which accompanies science in the subjectivity of the
scientist. The two things must be sharply distinguished.
(This reviewer would like to add that the study of the " cosmic images "
governing the mentality of the scientist at a definite historical age is one
of the most. important and one of the most neglected tasks of a comprehensive history of ideas. Professor Simon will surely agree that his characterization of the two examples he mentions is incomplete and that even
" cosmic image " of Linnaeus' or Lamarck's age, there enter
in the
other elements besides those he points out.)
This book is not easy to read. Yet, it ought to be studied by anyone
concerned with the philosophy of science and of nature. Unfortunately,
the number of misprints is rather great, and there is one page which is
thus rendered most difficult to understand. Professor Simon's book ought
to be made accessible in English, at least that first part of it which this
reviewer has tried to summarize.
RuDOLF

Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. C.

ALLERS

BOOK REVIEWS

fl65

Signs, Language and Behavior. By CHARLES MoRRIS. Prentice-Hall, Inc.
New York. 1946.
This work on semantics in terms of behavioristic pragmatism, by a professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago and one of the moving
spirits in the recent " Unified Science " movement, is an expansion of the
author's earlier publication, l!'oundations of the Theory of Signs.
The thirty-two page bibliography lists works of a very late date showing
the general semantic trend of the mid-twentieth century to be in accord
with Mr. Morris' instrumentalist theory. Extensive chapter-notes, appendix,
and glossary help the reader to translate that theory, presented as it is in a
kind of esoteric Esperanto, into readable English.
The new Morris code, like that of Dewey and others now in process of
·manufacture, has been created to defend the instrumentalist notion that
the Darwinian biology is of paramount significance for psychology. Any
page turned to is decipherable into that idee fixe of Dewey and his school
that language is refined animal sign-behavior. The key hypothesis-which
Mr. Morris uses as a modern philosopher's stone for testing his various
statements about language-that the dog-buzzer-food conditioned reflex
situation is the embryonic cell from which language came, is developed by
such cipher and jargon as seems to this Chicago professor to bring about
a connection in semantic terms between sub-human and human signbehavior. But since the manufactured descriptive, from "ascriptor"
through "denotatum," "formator," "iconic sign," "lansign-system," and
the rest down to " valuatum," can be decoded only through the old familiar
common word of current usage (which is as little like animal sign-behavior
of· Mr. Morris' pre-human sign-language as possible), this reviewer must
wonder how long the language-behaviorist will continue to fool himself and
others. Furthermore, his argument is a special form of the logical fallacy
petitio principii, where two equally unproved assumptions are used circularly to prove each other. The language behavorist's vicious circle-with
the revolving ideas that animal sign-behavior is pre-linguistic and that
language is a development of the former-is widened by appealing to the
extremely complex relationships in the semantic situation itself.
What has happened, of course, is that the behaviorist has semanticised
animal responses to stimuli, and in this way believes he has linked the
latter to language behavior, which is interpreted in turri as mere organic
response. For instance, when he states that the "T-Ascriptor" (" T" is
for " true " but the behaviorist shies at the overt word) can be both
" true " and " unreliable " (since the buzzer by which a dog has been
conditioned to expect food may sound ':When there is no food and thus be
true for the conditioning but not reliable for the food-presence), we see
that his forced semantic intlll'pretation of the buzzer-signal is read back

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BOOK REVIEWS

into our language behavior in an attempt to destroy its human and spiritual
qualities. Without commenting on his use of a conditioned animal reflex
effected by a human agent to show what he holds a pre-language type of
signaling, it is enough to say that though the human agent has a notion
of the signal factor as a separate and independent entity the dog has no
such notion.
The dog's failure to differentiate the two factors in the reflex-arc situation, a failure on which the whole logical fabric of the language behaviorist
depends, tells us something about the dog, perhaps. It certainly tells us
nothing at all about language, which-as segregated . for study--consists
precisely as a set of verbal symbols in isolation from their denotations, but
whose connotations retain the ideas of those denoted objects. The buzzer
can be, to us examining this special experiment, used analogically with
language (though its "connotation" is as forced as its "denotion ") because we can separate the two language aspects in actual language reference; but all forms of human signaling outside the language system-from
traffic lights or shaking one's fist to Haydn's Hundredth Symphony or the
equations of higher mathematics-are called " language " only analogically
or metaphorically. Mr. Morris, however, in the half-human, half-animal
example upon which he rests so. heavily, having semanticized the buzzer
declares (page fl9) that the challenge to the "mentalist" (his term) is to
show that the dog has an idea distinct from· the food. The challenge is,
on the contrary, for the behaviorist to show that the buzzer has any marks
of a pre-language at all. The contention that it has such a status, as here
developed, is as unwarranted psychologically as it is logically.
The instrumentalists' psychology which holds that mind is always particular reactions in a particular organism cannot make a case for language
compatible with its general theory to the extent even that it made a case
for human wills and rurposes as expressed in social institutions, after
William James. A generous critic of instrumentalism (E. H. Hollands) said
in the early days of the movement that, though it made so much of the
social, instrumentalism was really incapable of recognizing it. Taking the
school system as an example he said that, while it made use of physical
things and human acts, it was maintained and kept going just by the
common recognition of an end as valuable, of which recognition the
instrumentalist took no account. Developed social control, the critic went
on, involves a factor at once independent of the particular case of control,
which cannot be described as fact, event, or thing in the physical world,
and which shows incontrovertibly that nature is much more than its first
appearance as physical. Instrumentalism in its current and desperate
attempt to account for language, which is a form of developed social
control far more elementary and basic than that of educational or other
cultural institutions, is using, as we see in this book, ciphers instead of

BOOK REVIEWS

words of jargon instead of idiom; and the fact is eloquent of the behaviorist's well-grounded suspicion that in an honest semantic theory he will
meet his Waterloo. But he is going strong in. America as of •today; the
first thing that strikes the eye in the present ·work is the notice on the
cover, which is repeated in the author's Preface, that Mr. Morris received
Fellowships from both the Gruggenheim and the Rockefeller Foundations,
enabling him to write this book amplifying his theory of signs; and he was
given an additional money grant for aid in preparing the manuscript for
the printer by that effete organization of organizations, the American
Council of Learned Societies. All of which is " sign " enough of the poverty
of our modem culture, in which the philosopher is classified by the Morris
But this is
system as "an engine of symbolic synthesis." (p.
apparently the ideal of the Age of Technocracy.
M. WHITCOMB HESS
Ohio University,
Athena, Ohio.

Religion of A Scientist. Selections from Gustav Th. Fechner, ed. and
trans!. by WALTER LoWRIE. Pantheon Books, New York, 1946. Pp.
Gustav T. Fechner, 1801-1887, is known today mainly as the originator
of quantifying psychology, the science he himself named " psychophysics."
Even though Fechner's ideas and his approach have been partly abandoned,
partly thoroughly transformed, he is nevertheless recognized as the father
of experimental psychology. His mind, however, was a very broad one
and his interests were manifold. He started as a physicist, but was always,
in the depths of his soul, a speculative thinker, endeavoring to make clear
to himself and to exhibit to others the structure of the universe, the meaning of existence, the nature of ultimate problems as he conceived them. He
was not a man to build a system; perhaps there is no such thing as a
system of Fechner's philosophy. He was, in a way, deeply religious and
fundamentally an optimist.
The editor of the present volume, known for his many translations of
and writings on Kierkegaard, believes that Fechner's ideas might be of
interest and become helpful also today. The selected passages he has
included in his book are chosen exclusively from the viewpoil).t of religious
significance. He views Fechner as basically Christian, although it is
generally assumed that Fechner's religious principles were of a pantheistic
nature.
To make the reader acquainted with his hero, Mr. Lowrie has supplied
a preface and an introduction. He believes that Fechner's ideas may be
presented without taking account of his scientific, especially his psycho-

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BOOK REVIEWS

logical work. It might, however, have been advisable to consider these
latter investigations to some extent, since the views underlying tn'em are
linked very closely to Fechner's philosophy, particularly as concerns the
mind-body problem. The introduction surveys Fechner's life and philosophical evolution. There is one amazing mistake; the author speaks of
Feuchtersleben's little treatise which was in fact the first to deal systematically with "mental hygiene." It was published in 1838. Dr. Lowrie remarks
that this book had a definite influence on Kant's views; but, Kant died in
1801.
Selections and anthologies are always of dubious value in presenting an
author's ideas. There is, further, the danger that the editor, unconsciously,
limits his choice to such passages as serve to confirm his personal interpretation of the man he presents, and that he omits other parts that would
expose even those chosen in a quite different light. Moreover, to select
passages from an author whose scope was rather wide so that only parts,
are reproduced dealing with one particular, albeit important, aspect is
equally a source of possible misunderstanding.
Apart from these general objections, little can be said against the procedure of the editor. If one wishes to look at Fechner mainly as a religious
thinker, the passages here reproduced are rather representative.
It is another question whether Fechner deserves to be represented to the
reader. It is, indeed, interesting to see a man living in the age of triumphant
and promising scientific development, himself a scientist and surrounded
by an atmosphere of predominant materi<tlism, maintain and even intensify
his metaphysical and religious outlook. To that extent this book may have
some message for our own times. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether
the particular approach will appeal to the modern mind. In any case, the
editor has made accessible to the average reader the knowledge of a man
who managed to preserve his optimistic outlook, notwithstanding serious
difficulties and sufferings, and who never ceased to search for a deeper
and higher meaning beneath and beyond the world as common-sense and
science views it.
RuDOLF

Catholic
of America,
Washington, D. C.

ALLERS

BOOKS RECEIVED
Brogan, D. W. French Personalities and Problems. New Yerk: Knopf,
1947. Pp. 241. $3.00.
Bryson, L. Science and Freedom. New York: Columbia University Press,
1947. Pp. 202, with index. $2.75.
Callus, D. A. The Condemnation of St. Thomas at Oxford. Westminster,
Md.: Newman, 1946. Pp. 38. $.40.
Case, S. J. The Origins of Christian Supernaturalism. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1946. Pp. 248, with index. $3.00.
Cloete, S. The Third Way. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1947. Pp. 456, with
index. $3.00.
Copleston, F. A History of Philosophy. (Vol. I, Greece and Rome) Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1946. Pp. 531, with index. $4.00.
D'Arcy, M. C. The Mind and Heart of Love. New York: Holt, 1947.
Pp. 333, with index. $3.50.
Du Noiiy, L. Human Destiny. New York: Longmans, Green, 1947. Pp.
311, with index. $3.50.
Everett, J. R. Religion In Economics. New York: King's Crown Press,
1946. Pp. 174, with bibliography and notes. $2.50.
Feibleman, J. The Theory of Human Culture. New York: Duell, Sloan
& Pearce, 1946. Pp. 375, with index. $5.00.
Flores, A. ed. The Kafka Problem. New York: New Directions Press,
1946. Pp. 480, with bibliography and notes. $5.00.
Hesburgh, T. M. The Theology of Catholic Action. Notre Dame, Ind.:
Ave Maria Press, 1946. Pp. 211, with index. $2.00.
Laurent, M. H. Fablio Vigili et les Bibliotheques De Bologne. Vatican
City: Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, 1943. Pp. 464, with index.
Miriam, Sister Woven of the Sky. Boston: Mosher Press, 1946. Pp. 69.
$2.50.
Robles, Oswaldo Main Problems of Philosophy. {trans.-by K. F. Reinhardt)
Milwaukee: Bruce, 1946. Pp.
with index. $3.00.
Rutenber, C. G. The Doctrine of the Imitation of God in Plato. New
York: King's Crown Press, 1946. Pp. 115, with index. $1.50.
Thelen, M. F. Man As Sinner. New York: King's Crown Press, 1946.
Pp. 235, with index. $2.75.
Vergara, A. Z. La Filosofia de la Ley segun Domingo deSoto. Mexico City:
Editorial Jus, 1946. Pp. 173, with Index.

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Von Grunebaum, G. Medieval Islam. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1946. Pp. 873, with index. $4.00.
Wolter, A. B. The Tranacendentala and their Function in the Metaphysics
of Duns Scotua. (Franciscan Institute Publications, Philosophy Series,
No. 3) St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1946. Pp.
with index.
Wylie, P. An Essay On Morals. New York: Reinhart, 1947. Pp.
$2.50.