THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORs:

THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PRoviNCE OF ST. JosEPH

Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

VoL. XI

JANUARY, 1948

No.1

THE BASIS OF THE SUAREZIAN TEACHING
ON HUMAN FREEDOM

W

E propose in these pages to undertake a fresh analysis
of the teaching of Francisco Suarez on human freedom and God's causality of a free human act. Our
purpose is to point out just what the roots of that teaching
are. The suspicion arises almost at once that any such study is
useless, wasteful, and harmful: useless, because what ·is of
primary importance to man is to have God's grace rather than
to dispute its nature; wasteful, because far greater men have,
over a long period of time, disputed this very matter and failed
to reach a solution commonly accepted, so that we should be
content to accept the nature of grace as a mystery not to be
toyed with by our unskilled minds; harmful, because it might
possibly be provocative of further dispute.
Yet we are convinced the analysis ought to be undertaken,
first, and most important of all, because of the inherent importance of the question in itself. The questions of the nature
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THOMAS U. MULLANEY

of man's freedom, and of God's motion of that free will are
vital to every Christian, for upon the answers given them
depend the whole character of one's spirituality and, to a large
extent, of one's relationship to God Himself. The spirituality
of one who accepts the intrinsic efficacy of God's efficacious
helps is bound to be altogether God-centered; his attitude to
God is one of completely relaxed and limitless trust. The
spirituality, on the other hand, of the praCtical Congruist is
bound to have its egocentric side: for if, as Congruists-among
them Suarez-hold, the determination that grace shall be efficacious comes from the created will, so that, metaphysically
speaking, it is possible that there be some men whom the Allpowerful God cannot save, then, very clearly, our spirituality
must be in very important part self-centered. If the ultimate
and determining element in saving my soul is myself-and
Suarez teaches that it is-then in the effecting of my own
perfection it is I, and not God, who is of ultimate importance
and my whole spirituality must be shaped accordingly. Now
in practical Christian life a choice must be made of one or the
other outlook, and the choice is of very real importance in our
day-to-day living. According as one chooses one or the other
one puts ultimate trust either in God or himself.
It seems to us that Father Garrigou-Lagrange has expressed
this point extremely well when he wrote, " It has been said that
the Thomist must abandon his doctrine when he enters his
oratory. On the contrary it is during his moments of insubordination and pride that he forgets his doctrine of the subordination of causes. Freed from all illusion he must say that of
himself he is nothing. . . . It would be a great illusion to think
that what is better in us and of a salutary nature, the good use
of our liberty and of grace, our free determination is exclusively
our work and does not come from God. . . . In truth when the
Molinist prays (and the same can be applied to the Congruist)
he thinks like us that it is an old and absurd dream to believe
that we are or do something good of ourselves and independently of God . . . of ourselves we are nothing. If we deduct

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from ourselves what we have received from God and what He
unceasingly preserves in us, in strictness of terminology, without any metaphor, there is nothing left. . . . How can our
free determination be exclusively our act? How can it depend
solely upon ourselves that the grace of God is made efficacious
or sterile? Of ourselves we are less than nothing."
" Were St. Augustine and St. Thomas in their hours of prayer
and adoration ' humble Molinists' ? Humility does not consist
in diminishing God's glory or His supremacy, but in recognizing
our nothingness before Him .... The Molinist (and Congruist) in his hours of intense prayer, forgets his doctrine and
says with the Scripture: ' . . . Convert me, 0 Lord, to thee
and I shall be converted.' " 1
" A whole book could be written on the difference between
the spiritual direction based on the teaching of St. Augustine
and St. Thomas and that based on Molinism (and Congruism).
The former is more divine, more supernatural, simpler, and
also, ... more exacting. It recommends far more the need
of prayer, abandonment to divine Providence .... The latter
is more human, more complicated, more external; it inclines the
soul rather to examine itself than to see God's action in us; it
is consequently less exacting (probabilism) for one cannot ask
much of a man who cannot rely upon God in coming to a firm
resolution and keeping it . . . one would see that authors of
the spiritual life who had to receive their training in the
Molinist or Congruist school have been led ... to speak of
fidelity to grace and abandonment to divine Providence like
most convinced Thomists." 2
"The objection against Thomism is that it is a discouraging
doctrine. Instead of being opposed to the virtue of hope, it
induces us to place all our trust in God and not in ourselves.
On the other hand, what is there more discouraging than the
doctrine which would have to result in maintaining that God
1 Garrigou-Lagrange, 0. P., Rev., God: Hia Existence and Hia Nature, Herder,
St. Louis, 1987, Vol. II, pp. 878-879.
• Grace, S. J., Rev., Maximew Spirituelles; de Caussade, S. J., Rev .. L'Abandon
la Providence; Lallemont, S. J., Rev., La Doctrine Spirituelle.

a

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THOMAS U. MULLANEY

is powerless in certain circumstances to keep us from falling
into certain defects and cause us to will what is good? (Suarez,
as we shall see, had explicitly to admit this very proposition.)
How could we hope to reach heaven if God could give us only
an indifferent grace and if we had to make it efficacious by the
effort of our own poor and inconstant will: Is not our salvation incomparably more assured in God's hands than in our
own?" 3
Now in deciding which spirit we shall follow it is most help• Garrigou-Lagrange, op. cit., pp. 500-501. The difference between the two
spirits-the spirit of Congruism and that of Thomism--<!an be illustrated by considering the words of a " religious soul " quoted by Father Garrigou. " Formerly
I believed ... that God gave us more graces and predestined us, because He saw
in advance, in .His infinite foreknowledge, that we would correspond with His
graces; but after I have read St. Thomas, it seems to me that this way of thinking
... takes away something from God, so as to make us rely more on ourselves,
and that it is better to abandon ourselves to Him ... assured that He does not
wish to damn anyone. How good it is to profit by these questions, so agonizing and
troublesome, so that we may trust more in Him who can do all things, who loves us
and whom we wish to love! ... by the prayer that He will cause us to utter, He
will give us the grace that is efficacious, fidelity, love, perseverance.
" ... In order to grant me these graces of peace of mind and abandonment to
His will, He waited until I fully realized that everything, everything comes from
Him. Formerly I relied too much on myself ... now I rely on His divine strength.
He is my strength and my salvation." (cf. p. 50!l)
On the other hand, we can with Father Del Prado (cf. De Gratia et Libera
Arbitrio, Pats Ilia, p. 149) deduce what the attitude in prayer of a Congruist
should be if his doctrine were unaffected: " Lord, I give thee thanks, because without Thy premotion I determined and I chose to observe Thy precepts; I give Thee
thanks, Lord, because I moved my free will, which Thou canst not intrinsically move
or change, to do what is right and good. I give Thee thanks because when Thou
didst stand at the door of my heart, as at the door of the hearts of other men, I, in
the final decision, physically alone and without Thy help, did open the door of my
heart to Thee ... others did not. In the business of saving my soul, Lord, not
everything is from Thee---but for the part that is, I thank Thee. I thank Thee
for this that while other men, with no greater temptation than I had, fell, I have
persevered through my own determination (which Thou didst not physically
prepare) in using the help which Thou didst have ready if I wanted it. I thank
Thee, Lord, because Thou art doing Thy part to save me, and I, of course, am
doing my no less essential part, which Thou canst not do." Listen then to some
of the Collects of the Missal " That God may compel our rebellious wills," " That
He may give us a good will"; "We do not put our trust in anything that we do of
ourselves"; "Keep thy family ... it leans solely on the help of thy grace";
" Make them seek only that which is pleasing to thee."

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ful to have a very exact knowledge of the nature of grace; for
if that be misunderstood, then one's whole life is at least
maladjusted to the realities of Christian living. It is imperative
that the driver of a car know what the clutch is for, and the
gearshift, the brake, the gas; if he does not, he simply invites
disaster. So with the human soul. If man does not know his
own role in his life with God, and God's own role in that same
life he, too, may be headed for disaster. Only in knowing, as
accurately and as fully as is possible to each of us, the nature
and the workings of God's grace can we hope properly to adjust ourselves to it and to live by it, in the way that we
should. In general, therefore, sincere attempts to come to a
knowledge of the nature of God's grace are useful and in the
highest sense, practical.
Over and above that, however, this approach of ours in particular seems to have value. We intend quite simply to examine
Suarezian Congruism and to analyze it in terms of its fundamental propositions and all that they involve. Now the very
fact of the protracted disputes on this matter of human freedom and God's grace is proof that any attempt to reach agreement on the disputed positions as though they were isolated
teachings must fail. Centuries of discussion have brought the
disputants no closer together. Only an approach, then, which
seeks the ultimate roots of each system and makes possible the
evaluation of those hidden presuppositions can hope to contribute, perhaps, to eventual agreement. What is needed· is a
clear and reasoned affirmation and reaffirmation of what those
roots are, plus a realization that neither system can properly be
known or evaluated except in the light of its respective bases.
He who accepts and defends one or the . other system must
wholeheartedly accept its foundation. This proposed study of
ours aims, therefore, to lead to a better understanding of the
Suarezian position by following it, step by step, to its very
origins; once they are explicated, Suarezianism, as an integral
system, can be evaluated-for any teaching on freedom and
the divine motion can be understood only in light of its metaphysical principles.

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The suspicions, therefore, that such a study is useless, wasteful or harmful are easily put to rest. It cannot be useless for
while it is certainly more important to have grace than to know
intimately its nature, still such knowledge as we can acquire is
highly important, particularly in order that we be able to judge
our relationship with God. Nor is such an endeavor a waste of
time; the very fact that most learned men have, for a long time,
disputed this very matter indicates that better minds than ours
have considered it at least possible to reach agreement. There
is mystery, assuredly, in the workings of God's grace in the
lives of men, but not everything about the mysteries is beyond
our understanding, for mysteries of our faith are revealed by
God as great sources of enlightenment, not as occasions for
ceasing to reason. Nor, finally, is such an undertaking harmful even though similar undertakings have, in the past, sometimes provoked dispute, for in this matter it is only through
discussion that a resolution of the questions involved can be
hoped for. If we perpetually impose on ourselves a voluntary
silence in these matters concord in them can never be attained.
The very silence rather than honest and calm discussion would
bring a perpetuating of disagreement on a vital issue.
The reasonableness, therefore, of discussing these much-discussed questions is apparent. Our aim in this particular discussion is extremely simple. We are deeply convinced-and
the history of the long discussions between Congruists and
Thomists no less than our own study of the two positions bears
us out-that the Congruist and the Thomistic teachings on
human freedom and God's causality of a created free act cannot, as we have indicated, be considered in themselves alone
nor discussed as though they were independent or isolated
teachings. Men who, over a long period of time, disagree over
and discuss some problem commonly come at the end to reach
at least some points of mutual agreement-but today after
three hundred years of discussion Suarezian.s and Thomists are
no closer to agreement than they were at the beginning, for in
this matter there is hardly a single point-outside, of course,
those truths which are of faith-upon which the two groups

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agree. Evidently, then, it is imprudent to attempt to solve the
problem by considering only the points immediately under
discussion. Since there are no common points of agreement
(save always the truths of faith) lhe real heart of the disagreement must lie deeper-and our aim here is to uncover
those more hidden, but truly radical points of conflict. To
really understand even the conflict about man's freedom and
God's movement of human free acts we must know the roots
of that conflict in order to determine whether even in its roots
there is any basis for hoping to resolve the differences. What
we intend, therefore, in this paper is by an impartial and objective study of Suarez' own works to dig out the rock-bottom
bases of his teachings in this matter and, then, reflectively, to
show the discovered bases are, in fact, the supports which give
character and weight to each of the various doctrinal points
developed by Suarez. The answer to the further question-Is
agreement possible between Suarezians and Thomists with
respect to these bases?-will be amply evident perhaps from
their very enunciation, and certainly so from even a very brief
consideration of their implications.
The manner of procedure is immediately indicated by the
nature of our task. Since we are primarily interested in Suarez'
teaching on human freedom and God's motion we give first a
reasonably detailed exposition of that teaching, an exposition
which is not an interpretation but Suarez' own doctrine expressed as far as is possible in his own terms. In order to
make easy verification of the fidelity of our exposition we give
very frequent references to Suarez' works and, often enough,
quote the Latin text of Suarez. Yet any Thomist who, for
the first time, meets so full an explanation of the teachings
of Suarez is certain to finish with a sense of not having seen
a complete picture. He will know what Suarez taught about
the nature of human freedom and its relation to God's motion;
he will see, granted Suarez' premises, the logic of that teaching,
but ·he must still have the sense that something, about those
premises has escaped him. Even granted, that, in order to
save human liberty, Suarez, because of his peculiar system,

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had to teach that the human will needs no distinct premotion
by God because such promotion would destroy liberty as he
conceived it, the Thomist is still puzzled as to how Suarez
could teach that. He senses that Suarez is supposing something which the Thomist does not understand about the very
nature of free will, not only in so far as it is an appetite, but
also in so far as it is a potency. There is nothing to do then
but to seek to answer the question, " How did Suarez conceive this power which is the will? And how did he conceive
its relation to its own act? " To answer' we must know what
Suarez thought of potency and act in general, and so in the
second section of the exposition we shall review the Suarezian
teaching on potency and act. Since Suarez himself does not
set out to give his whole doctrine on this highly metaphysical
point in any one tract, one must collect from various parts
of his works (particularly from the Disputationes M
cae) his discussions of potency and act in several diverse
orders. We do not, therefore, arbitrarily reduce all of Suarez'
teaching to a few propositions expressed in our own terms, but
rather we expose that teaching in each of the major fields in
which the doctrine on potency and act is fundamental. Here
again as in the first part, our attempt is to allow Suarez to
speak for himself; so, without reading anything into his teaching, we give plentiful references to, and adequate quotations of,
Suarez' very words.
Given, then, in Part I the necessary knowledge of Suarez, we
proceed to the second major part, the criticism. Since we wish
to see what influence his teaching on potency and act has on
Suarez' notions of liberty, logic clearly demands that the former
teaching be analyzed and criticized first, and any fundamental
and unifying principle which may be in it, exposed; and the
working out of that principle indicated in each of the various
orders in which Suarez takes up the consideration of potency
and act. In the second section of the second part, enlightened
now by the knowledge we should have of Suarez' basic notion of
potency we show, first the working out of that notion in his
whole teaching about free acts, and secondly the factor which

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made the application of the metaphysical notion of potency
so easy and inevitable here-which factor is the Suarezian concept of the nature of man's free appetite, as appetite. Thus the
real bases of Suarezian Congruism are explicated and that by
appealing to the teachings of Suarez himself; at the same time
in our disposition of the matter, the order of discovery is, in
general at least, preserved, even though in particular (in the
second part especially) we frequently resort to the order of
discipline in order to bring home the basic unity in Suarez.
Even in the first part we have not hesitated to rearrange and
try to systematize some of the teachings which are found in
various parts of Suarez' works. The brief outline of our procedure therefore is this:
Part I: The Exposition (of Suarez' teaching):
Section I: The Suarezian teaching about human freedom
Section II: The Metaphysical Background (of this teaching)
Part II: The Criticism:
Section I: The criticism of the metaphysical background
Section II: Criticism of the Suarezian teaching on human
liberty.
A more detailed outline of each section to indicate the various
points to be studied will accompany the individual sections.
So much, then, for the justification, the purpose, and the
procedure of our undertaking. A brief resume in the beginning,
of the conclusions to which this undertaking has led us, and of
which it shall be the premises and the defense, will be helpful
in understanding the orientation of the whole work. The conclusion can be briefly stated thus: Through the centuries
Thomists and Suarezians have not agreed on questions relative
to man's free acts and God's causality of those free acts because
they lack, in the natural order, a common starting point in this
matter; their disagreement on these points is only a part and a
symptom of a far more fundamental disagreement, so that
their divergent teachings on created liberty and God's motion
of it shall not, except, of course, in the case of a final decision

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in the matter by the Church, be reconciled so long as the more
basic disagreement persists.
Note that we say that the two schools lack a common starting
point "in the natural order." Can differences in that order,
then, cause differences in the higher, supernatural order (for
differences about the nature of grace are clearly differences
. about a supernatural reality)? They can; for it is evident that
our knowledge of supernatural things is conditioned by our
knowledge of the order of nature, for the things we know first
and best are natural realities; in this life we know supernatural
things only by analogy with the natural. The things which God
so lovingly chose to reveal to us have come into our knowledge
through the medium of human words; and human words primarily and most properly signify the natural things which first ,
fall within human experience. When, therefore, those same
words are employed to signify realities of a higher order, they
can do so only analogously; the things of that higher order are
not, absolutely speaking, the same as the things primarily
signified by these words in question, but only according to a
certain proportion. What, then, if two men, or two· groups of
men, disagree on the nature of the things primarily signified by
certain human words? Will not disagreement about supernatural things which those same words are used to signify only
by analogy to the natural, most easily follow? Just as certainly
as an accurate human knowledge of nature (philosophy) is a
good basis for an accurate human science of supernature
(theology), so disagreement about the things known in the
natural order can be a firm basis for disagreement about supernatural things known through revelation. Such disagreements,
whenever found, are likely to be reconciled only by a searching
investigation which points the way to eventual agreement in the
natural order, as the condition for agreement on the more
divine plane.
Granted the fact, then, that disagreement in the lower order
can lead to disagreement in the higher order, are Thomists
and Suarezians in disagreement about natural realities? That
they are and have been is an accepted fact; it is our contention

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that that disagreement is so deep, so ultimate, that there are no
more radical points of human science, save the principle of contradition, agreed to by both sides in the light of which they can
come to mutual agreement on the issue now disputed. It is in
that sense that we say the twO schools lack, in the natural order,
a common starting point-that, therefore, the dispute cannot be
resolved by natural science now accepted by both sides. Fundamentally what is in dispute is not whether some grace be intrinsically efficacious, and whether such grace physically determines
the created will to act freely, but rather (I) the nature of man's
free faculty as free (i. e. the nature of created liberty itseH) and
(2) the nature of man's free faculty as faculty (i. e. the very
nature of potency.) The first question is ultimate in its order;
the second is ultimate in the whoie scientific metaphysical order,
(since there is nothing more basic in that order than the first
principles of which we have, not science, but the habit of intellectus. Suarezianism-and this is the whole burden of our
study-can be reduced to, and summarized in, two propositions,
each so basic that it can be resolved to no more ultimate proposition, and to the two propositions Thomists shall never agree.
The first bases of Suarezian Congruism we insist are these two
propositions: 1) reason does not enter in as a per se cause of a
free human act; the Scotistic divorce of intellect from will was
actually accepted by Suarez; 2) potency and act are not really
distinct principles of created being, for one reality which is
actual can also be, in its very actuality, its own intrinsic limitation of actuality; conversely one reality can be of itself potential, yet virtually and eminently contain its own actuality.
The first proposition, as we very well know, can be instantly
attacked by an appeal to Suarez' own words. We are quite
aware that he derives the existence of liberty in man precisely
from man's intellectual nature; we are aware that he verbally
rejected Scotus' divorce of will and intellect. None the less we
maintain, and shall show, that in his own thinking Suarez was
a convinced, if unconscious, voluntarist; that he never even
conceived the implications of the fact that the existence of
freedom in man must be derived from the existence of intellect

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in man; that he never understood the Thomists' teaching on
the interdependence of the two faculties, but explicitly asserted,
on the other hand, the unique and independent primacy of the
will in its own order. Suarez conceived himself as a Thomistic
intellectualist, but he conceived ntan's free power as a Scotistic
voluntarist would conceive it. He openly maintained that the
will of man can act without regulation by reason, that it can,
for no reason other than its very freedom, choose one of several
equally good objects, or even the lesser of several proposed
goods.
Along with Suarez' misconception of the human will as free
is a most interesting concept of it as potency, the concept that
as a potency it can virtually and eminently contain its own
act, its own determination, so that without premotion or predetermination by God it can reduce itself to act; as potency it
has within itself its own actuality. That proposition is like a
theme stated and restated in the works of Suarez. Necessarily
it rests upon a metaphysical judgment about potency and act
as such; that judgment is accurately stated in the second of the
two propositions we have already indicated as basic in Suarez'
doctrine. That Suarez was explicitly, and consciously, convinced of that proposition cannot be doubted; it is at the root of
his teachings on potency and act in practically every distinct
phase of the question he considered, as we shall show.
But what of these two judgments; are they acceptable or not?
With respect to the first there is no difficulty, for Suarez himself did not consciouly wish to embrace it, but wished rather to
stick by Thomistic intellectualism. Even in his eyes the Scotistic
voluntarism which he accepted unawares was a discredited
thing. But the second principle he consciously enunciated. Is
it philosophically (or theologically) tenable? Consider its
implications!
Act, of itself, admittedly names perfection, either perfection
in a certain order, or absolutely unlimited perfection. Wisdom,
for example, denotes the perfection of knowing things in their
cause. Limitation denotes a certain exclusion of perfection, for
it prohibits an act from including more perfection than that to

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which the limits restrict it. The limitations on the wisdom of
St. Thomas, for example, prevented his knowing things in their
causes as well as the Archangel Gabriel does. Suarez maintained that this act, wisdom, can also be its own intrinsic limitations. So it must follow that in St. Thomas the wisdom he
had is, in nature, identical with the element which limited his
wisdom and prevented its being identical with that of Gabriel
(and prevented, .of course, its being identical with any other
wisdom) . But if these limits are identical in reality with the
widsom, then wisdom is, by its very nature, this wisdom of St.
Thomas, and it is false to speak of another wisdom, of Gabriel
for example. H in nature wisdom is identified with certain
limits, then by definition wisdom is those limits, and what has
different limits has a different nature; therefore is not wisdom.
Thus by its very nature all wisdom would be St. Thomas'
wisdom. There would be no longer many diverse degrees of
wisdom, but only one wisdom. Thus the analogous concept of
wisdom would be destroyed to be replaced by an absolute univocal. The distinction between the Uncreated Wisdom of God,
the created wisdom of the Man Christ, the wisdom of each
angel, and the wisdom of men, all these vanish. But ought
these distinctions to vanish? Shall we say that the Wisdom
which is God is the weak and halting obscurity called human
wisdom? Clearly the teaching of Suarez destroys any possibility
of analogy.
Beyond this, even the very possibility of any universal predication whatsoever is taken away by Suarez, along with the real
foundation for such predication. A universal is predicated of
several singulars when a form (or act), while retaining the same
definition, is found to exist in nature in several things which
are yet somehow distinct one from another; the act which is
human nature, for example, retaining the same definitionrational animality-does exist in an uncounted number of men.
Now if an act be not really distinct from, but rather identical
with, that which limits it, it follows that that element in nature
which makes human nature in any individual-say in St.
Dominic-to be limited to that individual, i. e. makes it to be

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his human nature, that limiting element clearly is to be identified with human nature. Hence human nature, really, essentially, includes whatever it was that individualized St. Dominic
and made him distinct from all other men; the only human
nature there is, it would follow, is St. Dominic. Of him we
could say," He is all human nature"; and of no one else could
we say," He is a human"; for given the fact that as individual
St. Dominic differs from other individuals (if he did not so
differ they would not be other) , and then supposing, as Suarez
supposed, that in the real world that which limits an act to be
this individual is really identical with the act, it follows that
the act is this given individual and none other. Hence there are
not many men: for what we call the human nature in many men
has a differentiation in each and hence (on the supposition that
differentiation is the nature) a different definition. There is,
then, no such thing as a common nature found in many individuals; and to call Scotus, Suarez, Leibnitz, and James men is
to call by one name many· really different things. Accepting
Suarez' position and then concluding from it, one ought logically
to end up in purest Nominalism-and Nominalism is refuted by
every day experience. Lest we seem through some intellectual
chicanery to be twisting Suarez' position to conclusions unrelated to it, we must point out that traces of both these conclusions we have drawn are to be found in Suarez himself. The
first, the tending toward univocity in analogates is to be found
in his treatment of being in general in which he maintains that
the formal concept of being is one; and so sure was he of the
unity of being (though being among Scholastics has always
been considered a classic example of analogy) that he says that
"everything we have said of the unity of the concept of being
seems far more clear and certain than that being is analogous "
and " the unity of the concept is not rightly to be denied for
the sake of defending the analogy. If one must be denied rather
the analogy (which is uncertain) is to be denied than the unity
of the concept which seems to be demonstrated." 4 At the very
'Disputation88 Metapkyricae, disputatio ll, sectio I, n. S, 4..

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beginning of his metaphysical speculation, then, the direction
toward which his principles leaned is clear.
With regard to the second implication we have indicatednamely, removal of all universality-Suarez,
writing about
individual unity, maintained that an individual as such adds
nothing really distinct from the specific nature; but what it adds
to the common nature is only rationally distinct from that
common nature. 5 Since things which are not really distinct are
really the same, the implication seems hardly far-fetched.
What is fundamentally wrong with this principle which
destroys both analogy and all universality? The fact is that
these consequences are merely symptoms; what is basically
involved here is the very principle of contradiction, for the
Suarezian formula is opposed to that first principle of all human
thought. From the position of Suarez it follows that one and
the same reality is, at one time, and in one order, both limited
and unlimited, finite and infinite. Admittedly St. Dominic is
not the only man; there are and presumably shall be millions
of men other than St. Dominic. Suarez would admit, then,
that St. Dominic does not totally exhaust the totality of
human nature; rather his humanity is a limited human nature
other than which there are many human natures. But if it be
also true, as Suarez taught, that act can be identical with its
own limits (or more proximately for this example, that an individual adds nothing really distinct from a specific nature),
then there is nothing distinct from the act which is human
nature which can receive and multiply it, nothing in which it
can be pluralized, for if we try to imagine this reality which is
the combined act-limits as pluralized, we find it impossible; if
act is the same and its limits the same there is nothing in which
the attempted plural members can differ, but they are precisely
alike in every way; hence there is really no plurality at all, but
only unity. Thus multiplication of an act is impossible; any
act that actually is is the totality of that act which lacks nothing
that that act could have. It is, then, that act to an unlimited
\

• Ibid., disp. V, sect. 2, n. 9, 16.

16

THOMAS U. MULLANEY

degree; it is, if multiple, a limited infinity; it is multiplied
though not multiple; it is both totally this act and partially the
same act-and that follows inevitably from the Suarezian
position. Other arguments, too, can be urged against Suarez at
this point, but there shall be opportunity enough in subsequent
pages to examine them.
The metaphysical principle, in any case, upon which the
whole structure of Suarez' Congruism is constructed is both
opposed to the principle of contradiction and destructive of
all analogy and universality. We have yet to show, of course,
that that
and the Suarez-discredited divorce of will
from intellect are the two pillars of his Congruism.
Which of these two principles was, in historical fact, prior in
the mind of Suarez we are not in a position to know; but their
mutual causality upon each other in the generation of his system seems quite apparent. Suarez conceived human freedom
subjectively rather than objectively, as his very definition of
it indicates; he defined this quality of an operative faculty not
in light of the objects with respect to which the faculty operate
and from which, therefore, all its characteristics· (including
liberty) are derived, but rather he defined it in light of an indifference in the faculty itself, a subjective consideration which
ignored the genesis of that indifference. Considering liberty,
therefore, apart from its object and the faculty (namely, the
intellect) which presents that object, Suarez; faced with the
Thomistic doctrine on physical premotion and efficacious grace,
had to conclude that such efficacy would destroy freedom and
was, therefore, impossible. The Thomist can assert premotion
and safeguard liberty, for he sees that the free faculty premoved is of such a nature that it is metaphysically impossible
that it even be necessitated with respect to an object known
not to be a perfect good. Why? Because election, the proper
act of the free power, is for the Thomist substantially an act
of will but formally an act of reason, and through reason man
has a norm (the universal good). Man can always compare
any particular good, and even the human act itself bearing on
that good, with the universal norm, and seeing object and act

BASIS OF SUAREZIAN

TEACHING

ON HUMAN FREEDOM

17

as partial things inadequate to his appetite for universal good,
cannot be necessitated with regard to them, for only those
volitional acts of men are necessary which regard universal
good. From the very fact that the act of the liberum arbitrium
is formally an arbitrium, i. e. a judgment, it is metaphysically
impossible that that act even be necessary with regard to a
particular thing known to be such.
Suarez could not, after divorcing will from intellect, safeguard
its freedom from the intellectual side of the volitional act, since
it had none, entering in as a per se cause, in his analysis. Yet
the will is free, as both faith and reason indicate. Since Suarez
could no longer root that freedom in the will as will, i. e. as intellectual, he rooted it in the will as potency, for he had ready
to hand (or else elaborated-we confess we do not know which)
the doctrine that potency can be a self-actuating thing; the
volitional potency thus becomes free even of premotion, free
even to this extent that it brings about without God's predetermination its own self-determination. Necessarily, then, the
Thomistic doctrine about God's causality of our free acts was
thrown overboard. Thus, while Suarez' general concept of
potency made it possible for him to teach what he does about
God's causality of our free acts, his subjective conception and
definition of liberty made it necessary that he teach that in
order to safeguard freedom. Once he had cut off from himself
the safeguarding of freedom by an appeal to its intellectual side,
he was forced to safeguard it by an appeal to the self-actuating
character of the very potency-something which he could do in
light of his general doctrine on potency.
It remains, then, to make good the claims we have here made.
With a single hope that we may thereby be serving the God
of all science, we shall undertake to do so in subsequent sections
of this study.
THOMAS U. MuLLANEY, 0. P.
Dominican House of Studies,
Wa8hzngton, D. 0.

(To be continued)
2

JfYSTICI CORPORIS AND THE SOUL OF
THE CHURCH

T

HE niost
acquaintance with the history of theological discussions will justify taking the greatest care
in the precision and clarity of terminology. Hypostasis,
Filioque, hornoiousios leap immediately to mind. What was
perhaps at first only a material error, the choice of a word, was
fanned by injured pride into formal error, the sins of heresy
and schism, violence, and the spiritual ruin of many. "What's
in a name? " indeed-at times, more than one realizes at the
moment.
Relatively speaking, words are not, of course, as important
as the ideas they are intended to convey, but since we lack
angelic means of communication, we must continue to express
our ideas by means of words, and to express our ideas clearly
and precisely, we must choose our words for their clarity and
precision. In oral communication, when misunderstanding or
·obscurity arises, it can be immediately adjusted by the living
voice; but the printed word cannot interpret itself, it leaves its
writer at the mercy of his reader's intelligence and good will.
The complicated arrangement of molecules of ink which is the
printed word is designed to effect-the transfer of exactly the
same idea from the mind of the writer to the mind of the
reader; if the result is a different idea, then we must scrutinize
the writer who chose the word, the reader, and indeed, sometimes the word itself. And if a reader should disagree with a
writer, there is always the possibility that he disagrees, not with
the ideas of the writer, but with what he thinks are the ideas
of the writer; when a man's choice of words is censured, it is
always on the premise that the critic has penetrated the thought
to be conveyed in spite of the questionable language.
The Encyclical letter of Our Holy Father Pius XII on the
Church and the Mystical Body 1 would attract the most studi1

Myatici Corporis Christi; in AAS XXXV (1948), pp.

18

" MYSTIC! CORPORIS " AND THE SOUL OF THE CHURCH

19

ous attention of all Christians for either of the two reasons
which combine to make it one of the most important events of
lasting significance in our generation, its subject matter-Christ
living in His Church, and its author-the colossus who acts as
Christ's Vicar on earth. Small wonder that it has been studied
with care and diligence,. its admonitions received with loving
reverence, its instructions pondered. Only the most temerarious
could dare to controvert its express teachings; onli the grossest
could excuse flouting its wise and salutary
instructions.
But unfortunately the voice of even Peter must mute its
ravishing tones and reach the flock through printed wordsoften in another language-doubling the risk of losing in the
transfer the precious thought of Christ's own vicar. If then
discussion of the encyclical should arise, it would be to clarify
our understanding of it, to penetrate the meaning of the. words,
to compare our harvest with the fruits gathered by others from
it. If we should find something new, we might examine
whether it is really so, and to all, or only to us. If we should
find something that contradicts what is already widely accepted,
we might examine whether the contradiction is real or only
apparent due to our lack of perspicacity. If we should find
something that catalyzes a whole mass of material dear to our
heart into a scintillating chain of conclusions, we might pause a
moment lest in the fervor of our haste, we put our conclusion
into the mouth of Peter.
Something of the sort has been happening since the appearance of the Encyclical. Not only has it been hailed a. reorientation and reorganization of the whole of theology. 2 It is credited
with restricting the membership of the Mystical Body and discrediting at least one outstanding book on the subject. 8 And
what concerns us most closely here, it is supposed to have
abolished the distinction between the body and the soul of the
Church.'
• J. Bluett, S. J., "Theological Significance of the Encylical Mystici Corporis," in
Proceedings of Foundation Meeting, Catholic Theological Society, pp. 47, 60.
1 J. Bluett, S. J., Theological Studies, VIII
(194.7), p. 84.0; Francis Connell,
C. SS. R., American Ecclesiastical Review CXV (194.6), p. 6!t.
'J. C. Fenton, "The Use of the Terms Body and Soul with Reference to the

20

IGNATIUS

MCGUINESS

And although this efiect is not universal, rumors of such
speculation among the theologians are disturbing some of the
little ones of the flock who, more charitable perhaps, judge
these matters in the light of their infused wisdom instead of
the acquired wisdom of the theologians, and are concerned over
the salvation of the " other sheep." 5 So it is not without profit
and hope of more exact understanding to consider again what
Pope Pius XII teaches about the membership of the Church,
and the incorporation of its members into the Mystical Body.
It is only reasonable to defer our judgment of the novelty of
the Pope's teaching until we have established, as best we can,
what it really is.
With regard to the membership of the Mystical Body, it has
been stated that it "contradicts papal teaching" to assert,
"Neither can one say that the Mystical Body of Christ is
limited in an actual sense, to those who belong trisibly to the
Church " [italics mine.] The explicit papal declaration, which
it is said to contradict, reads, " Only those are really to be
included as members of the Church who have been baptized
and profess the true faith, and who have not unhappily withdrawn from Body-unity or for grave faults been excluded by
legitimate authority .... " 6 Since the contradiction is not
obvious, at least at first glance, we must assume that it lies between the implications or inferences of these statements. The
first says the Mystical Body is not limited to those who " belong
visibly to the Church." Incidentally, this is a much more exact
phrase than the commoner " belong to the visible Church,"
because the visibility of the Church is quite different from the
visibility of membership, and because one !night possibly belong
"invisibly" to a visible organization, e. g. the Communist
Party. The Pope writes that only the baptized belong to the
Church, and since, he quotes with approval the words of St.
Catholic Church," American Ecclesiastical Review CX (1944), p. 48; "Extra
Ecclesiam Nulla Salus," Ibid., p. 800.
"Cf. Homiletic and Pastoral Review XLVID (1947), p. 184.
8 In Ecclesiae autem membris reapse ii soli annumerandi sunt, qui regenerationis
lavacrum receperunt veramque fidem profitentur, neque a Corporis compage semet
ipsos [sic] misere separarunt vel ob gravissima admissa a legitima auctoritate
sejuncti sunt. Myatici Corporis Ckriati, p. 20!!.

" MYSTIC! CORPORIS " AND THE SOUL OF THE CHURCH

21

Paul, the Church is the Mystical Body of Christ, the conclusion is drawn that the Pope teaches that only the baptized
belong to the Mystical Body, or, in slightly different words,
the Mystical Body is limited to those who belong to the
Church, i. e., the baptized. But this is fallacious.
In order to support this conclusion, " Church " in the minor
would have to be taken in the same sense as in the major where
it is obviously the " visible Church " for otherwise we might
have four terms, and besides, and this is the crux of the problem, " visible Church " and Mystical Body must be simply convertible, or, loosely speaking, equivalent. Hence the idea has
arisen that as a result of the encyclical the distinction between
belonging to the body of the Church and to the soul of the
Church, and belonging visibly and invisibly is abolished. Great
care, then, is indicated in determining in what sense the minor
is to be understood and applied.
If a schoolboy were to present such an argument as this:
" Only rational men are members of (belong to) the human
race. But, the human race are animals, therefore, only rational
men are animals," we would detect the flaw immediately. And
yet both premises are true.
In the same way, both premises are clearly papal teaching,
but the conclusion, the limitation of the mystical body to only
the baptized, i.e., t:he visible church, does not follow. At least
it does not follow from these alone. It is true that all the
members of the visible Church are members of the Mystical
Body, but what of the converse, are they the only members,
and does the Pope say anything about it? It is true that all
men are animals, but it is not equally true that all animals are
men. Can we say that the Pope teaches that all members of
the Mystical Body (and not merely some members, even the
greater part) are members of the visible Church, because he
teaches that the Church is the Mystical Body? The answer is
obvious even to one unacquainted with the elements of logic.
Nor would the result be any different if we inverted the
minor to read," the Mystical Body is the Church." We would
have to be certain, as before, that the Mystical Body is the
visible Church and that the two are coextensive, or what is

IGNATIUS

MCGUINESS

more to the point, that the Holy Father explicitly declares
them so.
Hence the case for the contradiction is somewhat weak.
What now of the actual teaching of the Encyclical? Most people are suspicious of logic and its subtleties anyway, and we
have agreed that the premises are true. But first, the whole
context:
Only those are really to be included as members of the Church
who have been baptized and profess the true faith and who have
not unhappily withdrawn from Body-unity or for grave faults been
excluded by legitimate authority. "For in one Spirit," says the
Apostle," were we all baptized in one Body, whether Jews or Gentiles, whether bond or free." (I Cor. 12, 18.) And therefore in the
true Christian community there is only one Body, one Spirit, one
Lord and one Baptism, so there can be only one faith. (Eph. 4, 5.)
And so if a man refuse to hear the Church, let him be consideredso the Lord commands-as a heathen and a publican. It follows
that those who are divided in faith or government cannot be living
in one Body such as this, and cannot be living the life of its one
divine Spirit.7
The Holy Father first enumerates certain qualifications that
must be filled by a member of the Church. He must be baptized, since it was declared for the Armenians, 8 among other
places, that by baptism we become members of Christ and of
the body of the Church; and a member must not be separated
by the crimes of heresy, schism, or apostasy, or by the ban of
excommunication. The Pope concludes that those who are
" divided in faith . or government " are not members of the
Mystical Body. There is nothing new or striking in this; it is
commonly held by theologians. 9
However, all theologians insist that this separation from the
Church must be voluntary, deliberate, intentional, culpable. If
the conclusion is traditional, may not the distinctions to be
made be adopted from tradition too? " So if a man refuse ... "
• Myatici Oopori8 Christi, p. 202 (translation by National Catholic Welfare Conference, Washington, 1948, par. 22).
B Denziger, Enchiridion Symbolorum, n. 696; cf. n. 895, also Oode:r; Iuria Oanonici, c. 87.
• Cf. M. J. Congar, 0. P., "The Idea of the Church," THE THoMIST I (1989),
p. 881.

" MYSTIC! CORPORIS " .AND THE SOUL OF THE CHURCH

28

seems to indicate a deliberate act; refusal is more intentional
than mere omission or failure. Hence there are grounds for
assuming that the Holy Father meant that those who are deliberately, or voluntarily, or culpably divided in faith or government are cut off by their own will from the life of the Mystical Body. What of those, however, who are actually divided
from the visible Church but through no fault of their own,
through no deliberate act of refusal, who because they have
not undergone the rite of baptism are not-in the words of
Eugene IV-of the body of the Church? 10 It is possible in
any way for them to live the life of the divine Spirit? Theologians have commonly held that it is, and they explain their
teaching by a metaphor that goes back to the time of
Non-Catholics who are in the state of grace are said to be
living in the soul of the Church. They are of the Church because they are sharers in the life of grace, they are not of its
body because they do not fulfill the conditions enumerated;
they are only ordained to membership in the body, " unsuspectingly ... in desire and resolution .... " 11
· There does not seem to be any indication in these words of
the Holy Father that such a usage is to be discontinued. It is
one thing to say that those who have deliberately cut themselves off from the Church are thereby cut off from the Mystical
Body; it is quite another to say that those who are outside the
Church through no fault of their own and whose souls are the
dwelling places of the Holy Ghost are cut off from the .Mystical .
Christ through Whose Sacred Humanity all graces come to all
men. The first is Papal teaching; the second would be worthy
of censure, because of the slight it would cast on the universality of the Redemption and the sanctifying activities of
the Holy Ghost.
When he says that all the members of the Church by baptism
are members of the Mystical Body, the Pope assumes that the
justification for such a simple statement will be clear to those
of his readers with a theological background. One of the
effects of sanctifying grace is incorporation into Christ, " . . .
10

Denziger, n. 696.

11

Mystici Corporis Christi, p. i4!! (N.C. W. C. translation, par. 100).

24

IGNATIUS

MCGUINESS

and because through grace, man is incorporated into Christ
and united to His members . . . "; 12 the ordinary channel of
grace is the worthy reception of the sacraments, and ,particularly the sacrament of baptism. On the other hand, one becomes a member of the Church, in a legal sense, through baptism.18 The conclusion is obvious.
But to justify the statement that only the baptized are
members of the Mystical Body, we would need different premises. And if a conclusion be properly and strictly drawn from
its premises, the negation of the conclusion involves the negation of the premises in which it is virtually contained. Now
in order to get the idea of exclusiveness, as contained in the
word " only " into the conclusion, we must begin: the only
way to receive grace, i. e., incorporation into Christ, is through
the sacrament of baptism. If this be not true, then the conclusion that only the baptized are incorporated into Christ,
does not follow. And, in view of the fact that Quesnel's proposition "No grace is granted outside the Church" (Extra ecclesiam nulla conceditur gratia) has been condemned/ 4 as well as
other propositions of similar tenor, it would be dangerous to try
· to defend such a restriction in the distribution of grace. " For
I tell you that God is able of these stones to raise up children
to Abraham." 15
Thus the teaching of Pius XII on the actual membership of
the Church and the Mystical Bod¥ and its restriction to those
in communion with the Holy See does not contradict the statement that the Mystical Body is not limited to those who belong visibly to the Church. Nor does a passage quoted apart
from its context abolish the traditional distinction between
belonging visibly to the Church's body, and invisibly to its
soul.
What of the declaration of Pius XI that such a distinction is
inappropriate and absurd? Again the context and the purpose
Denziger, n. 698.
Baptismate homo constituitur in Ecclesia Christi persona . • . nisi . . . obstet
obex ... , Codex Juris Canonici, c. 87.
u Constitutio· dogmatica, Unigenitua, Clement XI, in Denziger, n. 1879.
18 Matthew, iii, 9.
11 DeCTetum Pro Armenia,
13

" MYSTIC!

CORPORIS " AND THE SOUL OF THE CHURCH

25

of the Encyclical give us a clue to the sense. Pius XI condemned in strong and vigorous language the Panchristian movement which sought to unite all churches in a world federation.
And he concludes,
And so, Venerable Brethren, it is clear why this Apostolic See has
never allowed its representatives to attend gatherings of non-catholics, for the union of christians may be fostered in no other way
than by promoting the return of the dissidents to the one true
Church of Christ. . . . For since the mystical Body of Christ,
namely the Church, is one, " being compacted and fitly joined together " after the fashion of his physical body, you would foolishly
and stupidly say that a mystical body can consist of dispersed and
scattered members: whoever therefore is not joined with Him is
neither His member nor one with the head (Who Is) Christ. 16
The non-catholics who are the dispersed and scattered and
therefore unassimilable members are so deliberately and voluntarily. The Pope says nothing about those who are in good
faith and inculpably beyond the sound of his voice, or rather
he makes the incidental, but for us very significant, observation that whoever is not joined with Him is not His member.
Could that imply that whoever is joined with Him, of course
by sanctifying grace, or even by fides informis, is His member?
The tradition for such a position is venerable enough to be
respectable.
The most effective citation to support the contention of those
who deplore the expression "the soul of the Church" is this,
"We deplore and condemn the pernicious error of those who
conjure up from their fancies an imaginary Church, a kind of
Society that finds its origin and growth in charity, to which
they somewhat contemptuously oppose another, which they call
juridical. But this distinction which they introduce is base'"Itaque, Venerabiles Fratres, planum est cur haec Apostolica Sedes numquam
siverit suos acatholicorum interesse conventibus; christianorum. enim conjunctionem
haud aliter foveri licet, quam fovendo dissidentium ad unam veram Christi Ecclesiam reditu. . . . Cum enim corpus Christi mysticum, sc. Ecclesia, unum sit . . .
compactum et connexum ... corporis ejus instar, inepte sl:u!teque dixeris mysticum
corpus ex membris disjunctis dissipatisque constare posse: quisquis igitur cum eo
non copulatur, nee ejus est membrum nee cum capite Christo cohaeret. Encyclical,
Mortalium Animos, in AAS XX (1928), p. 15.

26

IGNATIUS

MCGUINESS

less." 17 This forthright condemnation is taken to apply to
the explanation found in nearly all treatises on the salvation of
infidels and those outside the Church, by which the axiom,
extra eoclesiam nulla salus is reconciled with the fact that some
are saved outside the Church. That they are saved shows that
they belonged to the Church, that they were infidels leaves
them outside the Church, hence they are said to belong to the
soul, and not to the body, of the Church.
It is quite possible that the Holy Father was condemning, not
a wide-spread Catholic notion, but a wide-spread Protestant
error, the invisible Church of Martin Luther and the Reformers,
the spiritual church of the Fraticelli, of Wycliffe and the Hussites. As we have mentioned before, the expression " invisible
Church" is·inexact and misleading and we gladly relinquish it
to those who by its use can conceal their rejection of the true
Church which Christ founded. The Church is one, not two- or
three-fold. It is, bythe very nature of its purpose, visible to
all men, and is ruled by a visible head as the Vicar of its
invisible head, Christ its founder. But as Billot pointed out/ 8
" the visibility of the ·Church belongs to the body in general;
not to each of its members taken singly .... " It is not, therefore, contrary to Catholic teaching, particularly that of the
Pre- Tridentine theologians whose thought had not been focused
on the subterfuges of the Reformers, to hold that men can be
of the Church, without partaking of her visible communion.
To put this idea concretely and to pay homage to the Holy
Spirit who by appropriation is the Sanctifier, the Principle of
all graces, the Breath of Divine Life, the. Soul of the Church,
theologians said that such, animated as they were by the Holy
Spirit, were of the soul of the Church. That doctrine remains
intact. It is the Spiritual Church, the Invisible Church, the
Soul of the Church in the Protestant sense that is condemnd
and deplored; but the Soul of the Church in the Catholic sense
as found in the Fathers, the Popes, the theologians is quite
untouched.
One last difficulty must be faced. What shall we call those
u Mystici Corporis Christi, p. !!24 (N.C. W. C. translation, par. 60).
18 Billot, De Eccle8ia Christi, I, p. !!79.

" MYSTIC!

CORPORIS " AND THE SOUL OF THE CHURCH

who are incorporated into Christ and therefore into His Church,
but not visibly? Strenuous objections have been raised to calling them " members " of the Church, or " members " of the
Mystical Body, because they are certainly not on a par with
those who belong visibly to the Church. This difficulty is far
from new. St. Robert Bellarmine suggested the distinction
between members of the Church and those who belong to the
Church, 19 reserving the first to those who belong visibily to the
visible communion of the Church and enjoy all the consequent
rights and privileges, and applying the second to those who are
described by the present Holy Father as " ordained unconsciously in desire and resolution" to the Church; The matter
is not of great importance provided one thing is clearly borne
in mind. Anyone in the state of grace, within or without the
Church, lives with the life of Christ, lives by reason of union
with Him. They must be joined to Him in some way and that
union we usually designate as member with Head, or branch
with Vine. A separated member does not live with the life of the
organism to which it was formerly attached. A.child does not
live with the life of its parents once its generation has taken
place. To designate that union with Christ we use the word
member.
Since, however, there is a real distinction between the metaphor and the dogma we can qualify the metaphor without
changing the doctrine. Of the two, the doctrine of incorporation into Christ is much more important and should not be lost
in squabbling over names. Hence, it is not contradictory to
papal teaching to say that the Mystical Body is not limited to
those who belong visibly to the Church; nor is it condemned to
speak of justified infidels belonging to the soul of the Church,
for if they are justified, they live in an inner vital union with
Christ, and as St. Ignatius of Antioch declared long ago,
"wherever Jesus Christ is, there is the Catholic Church." 20
IGNATIUS McGUINEss,

Dominican House of Studies,
W askington, D. C.
18
10

De Ecclesia Militante, III, iv, S.
Epiatola ad Smyrnaeos, ch. 8, in PG V, 714.

0. P.

THE EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT
ON PSYCHICAL CHARACTERISTICS
(Second Installment)

I

III. pARTICULAR

TYPES

OF TEMPERAMENT

N this section we will indicate some further points of
similarity between the endocrinal and the humoral theories
of temperament, particularly in regard to the division of
temperament into a various kinds or " types " and the description of the psychical characteristics. pertaining to each type.
In order to give some idea of how the endocrinologists arrive at
their notions as to type classification and the characteristics
associated with each type, we will give a brief description of
the anatomy and function of some of the major endocrine
glands, some data of medical science as to the physiological
and psychical phenomena found to accompany pathological
hyper- or hypofunction of these glands, and the descriptions
of "normal" temperaments which the endocrinologists have
evolved from these medical data supplemented by experimentation and clinical observation of endocrinopathic subjects during the pre- or postmorbid states and of non-pathological subjects during certain periods of life when the glands tend to
temporary under- or overfunction, such as at puberty, etc.
With each of the major types described by the endocrinologists
we w:ill compare a type described by the ancients and medievalists, with a view to showing the correspondence between them.
The lack of unanimity among the modern " type " psychologists in the matter of type classification and description is, of
course, notorious. Each author or at least each group of authors
appears to use an entirely different terminology in the classification of types. Outside the group of endocrinologists, perhaps
the most famous classification is Jung's division of" introverts"

28

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

29

and " extroverts," against which has been leveled the criticism
that it represents extremes actually seldom found among normal
individuals, the majority of whom de facto tum out to be
" ambiverts." This is a type of criticism quite generally made
of any attempt at type classification, i. e., that it results in the
posing of " ideal " categories into which hardly any individual
can actually be fitted. Such a criticism might be justified in
the case of some type classifications of the moderns, but for
the most part it seems to miss the viewpoint of the classifiers,
namely, that the types they depict are the pure, unmixed
" prototypes " to be used as norms in determining the predominant tendencies of individuals, without implying that
every individual, in every respect, can be perfectly fitted into
one or another of these ideal pigeon holes. If this could be done,
there would be no such thing as " individual psychical differences " but only " group differences," which is obviously
contrary to fact.
Even among the endocrinologists themselves there is a considerable difference of terminology in the matter of type classification, though actually the various types described by the
different authors are easily reducible one to another. Moreover, it must be remembered that for the endocrinologists temperament is the chief determinant of morphological as well as
psychical characteristics; hence some use one set of terms for
the morphological classification and another for the psychical
classification, while others use one set of terms for both kinds of
characteristics. Kretschmer, for instance, has classified the
various types morphologically as " pyknic," 134 " athletic," 135
and " asthenic " 136 (later reduced to " pyknic " and " leptosome ") 137 and psychically as " cyclothymes " (extroverts,
sociable, cheerful, emotional, etc.) and" schizothymes" (intro18 ' In Greek, " pyknos " which means " compact,"
that is, short, broad of
skeleton, well-rounded as to arms and legs, etc.
18 " In Greek, " athletikos," that is, large of chest, narrow hips, strong muscles,
well-balanced proportion between trunk and limbs, etc.
188 In Greek, "asthenikos," that is frail, long, slender of skeleton, slight muscular
development, etc.
187 In Greek, "leptos," that is, straight, narrow, thin; of slender physique.

30

LEO M. BOND

verts, retiring, timid, gloomy, etc.). The Italian school uses
the terms " brevilineal," " megalosplanchic " or " brachymorphic," 138 and " longilineal," " microsplanchic " or " dolichomorphic " 139 for the morphological classification, or for both
morphological and psychical classifications prefixes the particles
" hyper- " and " hypo- " to the names of the major endocrine
glands to represent types resulting from the characteristic overor underfunction of the particular gland dominant in an individual's make-up, e. g., the hyperthyroid temperament, the
hypopituitary, etc. As far as the things signified by these
various terms are concerned, in the morphological classifications, Kretschmer's "pyknic" type corresponds to the Italian
school's "brevilineal," "megtalosplanchic" or "brachymorphic," and his " athletic " and " asthenic," or simply " leptasome," to the " longilineal," " microsplanchic," or " dolichomorphic "; while of his psychical types, the "cyclothymes"
fall under any of the types designated by the Italian authors
as "hypothyroid," "hypopituitary," "hypersexual" (hypergonad) or "hypersurrenal" (hyperadrenal), and his "schizothymes " under any of the " hyperthyroid," " hyperpituitary,"
" hyposexual " (hypogonad) or " hyposurrenal " (hypoadrenal)
types.
Since a definite morphological build is supposed to accompany
a particular psychical make-up and since, according to the
endocrinal theory, both are based upon the over- or undersecretion of the dominant gland, it would seem that the "hyper-"
"hypo-" terminology is the more representative one; certainly,
it is the simpler one. Hence in this paper we will use this
terminology to indicate the classification of temperaments
according to the endocrinal theory, especially since we are here
concerned chiefly with the psychical aspects of temperament
and can disregard the exclusively morphological classifications.
The " hyper- " " hypo- " terminology is based on the assumption, or rather the fact, that no person exists who is so perfectly
That is, the thorax is large in proportion to the total height, etc.
In these, the total height is great in proportion to transverse measurements
of the thorax, etc.
138

139

31

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

constituted physiologically that every one of his endocrine
glands pours into the blood stream exactly the amount of
secretion demanded by the exigencies of the human body. If
such did exist we would have, say the endocrinologists, the
"perfect man," physically and psychically. In actual individuals there is always, in relation to this ideal state, some
excess or defect of endocrine secretions, at least in some of the
glands, and this characteristic dysfunction forms the basis of
"normal" temperaments. In medicine, the prefixes "hyper- "
and "hypo-" in connection with the endocrine glands, are used
for a somewhat different purpose, i.e. to indicate an abnormal,
pathological, often temporary hyper- or hypofunction of a gland,
resulting in a definite disease or disease symptoms. In temperamental type classification they are used to signify that nonpathological hyper- or hypofunction which determines the
normal, innate, more or less constant physiological and psychical make-up. As N accarati says: "When we speak of
hyperthyroids and hypothyroids, of hyperpituitaries and hypopituitaries, we do not mean the real pathological cases but we
refer only to those individuals having a constitutional or a
congenital hyperactivity or hypoactivity respectively speaking which is kept under physiological limits." 140 In between
"pathological" and "non-pathological," however, there might
be any number of " border-line " variations, which, nevertheless,
are usually classified as " normal." Especially in the psychical sphere the characteristics displayed by many so-called
" normal " individuals are frequently quite as pronounced as
those observed in pathological subjects, not excluding manifestations suggestive of quasi-psychopathic states.
The value of pathological data for the determining of normal
types of temperament lies in the fact that there is a certain
continuity in the degrees of physiological and psychical symptoms observed in various gland pathologies, a continuity proportionate to the degree of gland hyper- or hypofunction
involved. Hence the symptoms accompanying pathological
uo S. Naccarati, "The Morphological Aspect of Intelligence,"
Psychology, XL (1921), 3.

Archives

of

32

LEO M. BOND

hyper- or hypofunction serve as a clue to indicate what tendencies are to be looked for, and usually to be found, in normal individuals as a result of the normal endocrine hyper- or
hypofunction determinative of their innate, temperamental
constitution.
The numerous variations and combinations of temperamental
characteristics found in the majority of individuals are attributable, say the endocrinologists, to the various degrees of
endocrine dysfunction which are possible even within the range
of " normal," as well as to the great variety of physiological
and psychical dispositions made possible by the complex, synergistic-antagonistic interplay between the various glands. As to
observable psychical characteristics, another source of variety
is the at least apparent modifications that have been superimposed upon the native make-up by such influences as environment, convention, ideals, etc. Nobody knows better than the
individual himself, however, what a disparity often exists between his inner self and the self he displays to the world, nor,
we might add, the life-long struggle that often goes on, or
should go on, between the " urges " of his temperament and
the dictates of right reason. However, an experienced observer
can usually detect the dominant temperamental trend in most
individuals and can thus assign him more or less to a definite
"type" category.
There are, then, according to the endocrinal theory, four
principal hyper- and four principal hypo- endocrine temperaments; namely, the "hyperthyroid," the "hypersurrenal," the
"hypersexual" and the "hyperpituitary," the "hypothyroid,"
the " hyposurrenal," the " hyposexual " and the " hypopituitary." The traditional division of temperament is, of course,
the well known four-fold classification: "choleric," "phlegmatic," " sanguine," " melancholic," based upon the predominance of one or another of these humors in the blood stream.
This division is very old, having been suggested at least remotely by Anaxagoras (B. C. 500-428) and Democritus (B. C.
460-362), more definitely formulated by Hippocrates, and modified by Galen. This was, in general, the division of tempera-

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

33

ment used by Aristotle, though to Galen seems to be due the
credit for having clearly distinguished between the "melancholic " and " choleric " temperaments, which up to his time
were included more or less jointly under the denomination " billious." It is the division that was used during the Middle Ages
by such great masters as St. Albert and St. Thomas and which is
still widely used, although its basis, the humoral theory as such,
has, of course, been discarded. The terminology of this division
has been so canonized by an age-old use that it finds a place in
the best modern vocabularies. Today it is clearly understood
what is meant, for instance, by a " melancholic " or a " phlegmatic " person. In describing the characteristics of these four
temperaments, the modern authors to be quoted are those who
have simply given a more minute and amplified description of
the characteristics assigned to these temperaments by the
ancients and medievalists, an amplification made possible by
additional centuries of observation and application, though not
differing in basic features from the descriptions of the older
scholars.
The distinction between psychological " character " and
"temperament " must be born in mind if we are to avoid confusion in the understanding of the expression " psychical characteristics of temperament." Psychological character is, as we
have said, the sum-total of an individual's psychical traits,
considered in themselves, abstracting from their physiological
basis. Temperament is, properly speaking, this physiological
basis itself. Hence when we speak of the " psychical characteristics of temperament " we refer to the psychical traits, not
as they are in themselves and as they pertain to psychological
Temcharacter, but as they are the effects of temperament.
perament, from our definition, is the structural and functional
disposition of bodily organs from the viewpoint of the influence
which these dispositions exert upon the shape and development
of the body and upon the sensational, emotional, intellectual
and volitional activities of an individual.
3

84

LEO M. BOND

1. The Hyperthyroid-Choleric Temperament.
One of the most important of the endocrine glands is the

thyroid. Its anatomy is thus described by Dr. Loewenberg:
It consists of two symmetrical lobes which are connected by a
third lobe, the isthmus. It is situated in the lowermost portion of
the neck anteriorly, each lobe lying on either side of the trachea
and larynx. The isthmus connects the lower third of both lobes and
is on a level with the second, third and fourth rings of the trachea.
The entire gland is enclosed in a capsule whkh is connected with
the fascia of the neck and is adherent to the trachea. The tracheal
attachment of the thyroid is responsible for the up and down movement of this gland during deglutition. 141
In the physiological order, the thyroid exerts a notable influence upon metabolism, upon the circulatory, respiratory, digestive, and cerebrospinal nervous systems, whose functions are
speeded up by overactivity of the gland and slowed down by
its underactivity. In the psychical order, it has been observed
that overactivity of the gland is accompanied by an intensification of the mental and emotional processes; its underactivity,
by a corresponding remission in psychical functions.
The thyroid gland, because of its secretion and innervation, acts
as the metabolic stabilator of the body, exerting a catabolic influence upon metabolism, facilitating oxidation and generally regulating metabolism. It exerts a definite influence upon growth and
development and upon the circulatory system, the respiratory
system, and digestive system and the cerebrospinal nervous system.
In embryonic life and during childhood, the normal thyroid gland
favorably influences the physical and psychical development of the
individual. The hyperactive thyroid may cause prematurity and
evidence of excessive metabolic activity. This may be characterized
by leaness, excessive sweating, muscular and nervous hyperactivity
with mental acuteness. The hypoactive thyroid may cause cretinism
or lesser degrees of stunting of mental and physical development.
In the adult, a hyperactive thyroid will cause increased oxidation,
thereby speeding up the mental and physical processes, often to the
extent of upsetting the fine balance maintained in the normal individual. The sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system
141

S. Loewen berg, op. cit., p. 5.

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

85

becomes stimulated or irritated, thereby influencing to greater
activity all the glands and organs innervated by sympathetic fibers.
As an example of sympathetic stimulation in thyroid hyperactivity
may be mentioned the well defined train of symptoms in hyperthyroidism, namely tachycardia, hyperexcitability . . . etc.
Suppression of thyroid activity will, on the other hand, cause
decreased oxidation with symptoms attributable to sympathetic
depression or vagus stimulation. In the young, the result is a characteristic stunting of mental and physical development. In the adult,
there occurs a slowing of the mental processes, accompanied by
certain physical characteristics.
In addition to the stabilizing influence exerted by the thyroid
upon metabolism, there are other functions attributed to this gland:
(1) Dextofixer, i.e. it is noted that hypothyroid or athyroid individuals fall prey to infection more readily than do normal indithe heart rate and
viduals; (2) Cardiovascular stabilator, i.
vascular tension are increased in hyperthyroidism and decreased
in hypothyroidism; (3) Emotional and intellectual stabilator, i. e.
t.he emotions and intellect are speeded up in hyperthyroidism and
depressed in hypothyroidism. 142
The thyroid produces these effects upon the various bodily systems and organs through the medium of its hormone or hormones, which it secretes into the blood stream for distribution
to the various parts of the body.
The influence that the thyroid gland exerts upon the body is due
to its hormone or hormones elaborated from the iodine content of
the individual. At the present state of our knowledge only one
thyroid hormone is known, namely thyroxin. Whether this is one
of several hormones, a combination of hormones, or the only hormone that the thyroid elaborates is still a debatable question. 143
Speaking of symptoms noted in hyperfunction of the thyroid
in general, Dr. Loewenberg says: "Excessive nervousness and
hyperexcitability are usually present in those who have congenital hyperthyroid tendencies." 144 And Dr. Wolfe: "A hyperacuity of sense perceptions accompanies the general hypersensitiveness of thyroid overfunction." 145 " The increased re""Ibid., pp. 241-!M!t.
ua Ibid., p. 289.

lU Ibid., p. 18.
"" W. Wolfe, op. cit., p. 747.

86

LEO M. BOND

flex activity of hyperthyroidism reflects the exaggerated metabolism of the organism." 146
With regard to symptoms noted in particular pathologies due
to thyroid hyperfunction, in" physiological goiter," which is a
" generally symmetrical enlargement of the thyroid gland due
to simple hypertrophy of all its structures," the individual
" usually presents some signs of increased sympathetic nerve
activity, i.e., generally he seems high strung, is quite emotional
and easily upset." 147 In " simple hyperthyroidism " the patient
" appears to be hyperexcitable, is nervous, irritable, and emotional; his actions and mental reactions are very much exaggerated." 148 In " toxic adenoma," which is " an adnomatous
goiter that has so irritated the thyroid gland as to cause hyperthyroidism," the patient "complains that he has become 'highstrung,' is easily fatigued and upset or annoyed by trivial
things, and is almost constantly in a state of excitement. All
functions, physical or mental, are hyperactive." uo
In" exophthalmic goiter,'' known also as Graves disease and
Basedow's disease," a constitutional disease of endocrine origin
characterized by a peculiar type of thyroid hyperactivity," 150
" the extremely nervous, jumpy restlessness of the individual,
the tremor of the fingers . . . and the tachycardia are quite
characteristic." 151 " The usual complaints are nervousness and
restlessness, which are manifested at first by unusual excitement and by an increased expenditure of energy so that the
patient attempts to do and often accomplishes a great deal
more than he did before the onset of his illness." 152 " Speech
is usually hurried and, on the least excitement, the voice becomes high pitched. The heart is rapid . . . the pulse rate is
often as high as 120 per minute or higher and does not slow
down while resting, during sleep, or with digitalis medication." 153 " Mental symptoms may be associated with mental
exhaustion or with abnormal excitation. The mentality may
Ibid., p. 746.
Lowenberg, op. cit., p. 267.
us Ibid., p. 277.
uo Ibid., p. !!81.

1 '"

107

Ibid., p. 284.
Ibid., p. !!88.
1 .. Ibid., p. 290.
108 Ibid., p. 291.
150

161

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

87

be keen and alert and is often misdirected into unwonted
channels." lH "Occasionally patients may develop morbid fears
or be in a state of hyperstimulation alternating with depression.
Hallucinations of grandeur may alternate with hallucinations
of persecution. An inferiority complex may be so entwined
with a superiority complex as to create an impossible personality. Loss of memory, loss of sleep, loss of perspective and
loss of self control make the individual a decidedly unsocial
being." 155
More severe cases of hyperthyroidism may lead to psychoses.
During the early course of the disease, this acuity of mind and sense
perception is manifested by restlessness, nervousness, and insomnia,
but as time goes on, the patients become confused, apprehensive,
fearful and neurotic, disturbed in orientation and mental adjustment. They acquire abnormal conceptions which make them unfit
to cope with the ordinary vicissitudes of everyday life. If the disease remains untreated a true psychosis may develop, but with the
reduction of the thyroid toxicity the symptoms are generally relieved, at least to a certain degree. 156
The neurotic symptoms of hyperthyroidism, such as mental and
physical unrest, headaches and insomnia, may lead to more intensive psychotic states under pressure of severe and enduring toxic
influences. The irritability, general crankiness and emotional instability, together with the pronounced feeling of inferiority, emphasized by the general brilliance of mind, create incessant scenes of
jealousy, family feuds and friction. 157

With a knowledge of
physiology and symptomatology of
the hyperfunctioning thyroid, it is not difficult, according to
the endocrinologists, to predict what tendencies an individual
endowed with a "normal " hyperthyroid temperament will display. Physiologically, we have an "active" person, possessed
of a certain nervous energy, prone to quick nerve excitation
and quick muscular movements; a tense, alert person whose
whole bodily system tends to overactivity, rapid heart beat,
quick metabolic conversion of food into energy, etc. Psychically we see a" high-strung " individual, highly sensitive to sense
1 "'

m

Ibid., p. 295.
Ibid., p. 296.

168

157

Wolfe, op. cit., p. 747.
Ibid., p. 788.

88

LEO M. BOND

stimuli, prone to quick and strong emotional reaction, mentally
acute and in general psychically " irritable." Observation of
persons exhibiting normal, non-pathological hyperfunction of
the thyroid verifies these predictions. Pende, speaking qf the
hyperthyroid temperament rather than of any disease, says:
Thus, in the pure hyperthyroid .... I have encountered hypermotivity, very rapid nervous and mental reactions, an active volitive
nature, with lively hypercritical intelligence and often brilliancy. 158
There is a special dominance in the hyperthyroid temperament of
a marked irritability of the vegetative nervous system, especially
of the sympathetic subdivision, as there is also a tendency to great
psychical irritability, hypermotivity, cerebral unrest and quick and
unstable psychic processes in general. Intelligence develops early
and is often of high grade. 159
N accarati says:
Not less striking are the psychic characteristics of the hyperthyroids.
Being intelligent they possess live ideation, prompt perception, vast
imagination, strong memory, and shrewd critique. Endowed with
exquisite sensibility the hyperthyroid feels joys and griefs deeply,
offenses and wrongs do not pass without a long and profound
repercussion on his mood/ 60
And Berman, still speaking of the hyperthyroid
says:

temperament,

Noticeable emotivity, a rapidity of perception and volition, impulsiveness, and a tendency to explosive crises of expression are the
distinctive psychic traits. A restless, inexhaustible energy makes
them perpetual doers and workers who get up early in the morning,
flit about all day, retire late, and frequently suffer from insomnia,
planning in bed what they are to do next day.
Certain types of thyroid excess ... are peculiarly susceptible to
emotional instability. They are subject to brainstorms, outbreaks
of furious rage sometimes associated with a state of semiconsciousness.161
Now anyone familiar with the meaning assigned, even by
common usage, to the word " choleric," will immediately recog168

Pende, op. cit., p. 80.

180

160

Ibid., p.

1" 1

Naccarati, op. cit., p. 17.
Berman, op. cit., pp.

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

89

nize in the "hyperthyroid " temperament, the "choleric" temperament of the traditional four-fold division. A brief glance
at the description of the choleric temperament given by some
of the ancients and medievalists will serve to verify this identity.
When examining these older authors, we should bear in mind
the fact that they considered the quality of the blood to be
dependent upon the predominance in it of one or another of
the humors. Thin, clear, very warm blood, was due to the
cholera. Hippocrates, for instance, referring to the choleric
temperament, describes individuals " who are endowed by
nature with industry and alertness. And they are pertinacious,
prone to anger, and intractable, incline more to fierceness than
to mildness. And they are very keen and adept at the arts and
very proficient in warfare." 162 Aristotle notes that, " Some
animals have a keener mind than others because of the thinness
and purity [of their blood] for those whose humor is lighter and
clearer have a more mobile sensibility." 163 For Galen, says
Roback, " the choleric's irritability was attributed to the predominance of the yellow bile in the body." 164
St. Albert says:
We say that the choleric is easily moved to anger and fervor and
in this condition apprehends fiery representations, due to the fervor
and lightness of his blood.165
Of those animals which have blood, some are of light, foamy choleric
blood; they are light and quick of movement and very unstable;
as also can be seen in men of this temperament. 166
The animal endowed with a lighter and purer natural humor has a
better sensibility .16 7
But better than all are those which have a warm, thin and clean
blood; for such an animal is better disposed for wisdom and courage
and things of this sort. 168
Liber de A ere, Aquis, et Locis (Opera Omnia I), p. 89.
De Partibus Animalium, II, cap. 4 (ed.: Didot, pp. 235-236).
160 Roback,
op. cit., p. 11.
165 Albert the Great, op. cit., I, t. 2, cap. 2.
166 I"bid., XX, t.l, cap. 11.
187 Ibid., XII, t. 2, cap. 1.
16s Ibid.
162

163

Hippocrates,

40

LEO M. BOND

And St. Thomas says:
a disposition to anger is due to a bilious temperament (cholericam
complexionem); and of all the humours, the bile (chole-ra) moves
quickest. 169
Now the impulse of passion may arise ... from its quickness, as in
bilious persons (sicut in cholericis) .110
At this point we might recall the passages from St. Thomas
quoted in the first section, to the effect that a soft skin is indicative of a good sense of touch and a good sense of touch is a
sign of a good sensitive nature and a good intellect.
Hence from the fact that one has a better sense of touch, it follows
that he has in general a better sensitive nature, and consequently,
a better intellect. 171
. . . and among men, the better is one's sense of touch, the more
apt is his mind, as can be seen in those who have soft flesh.172
Among men we judge those that are bright and those that are dull
from their sense of touch. For those who have hard flesh, and in
consequence, poor touch,. are mentally dull; but those who possess
soft flesh and consequently good touch, are mentally keen.173
This correlation between a soft skin, a good sense of touch,
a good sensitive nature and a good intellect was a doctrine derived from Aristotle 174 and St. Albert. 175 But to St. Thomas
alone, says Fr. Barbado, is due the credit for having distinguished another criterion in this interrelationship, namely,
sensitivity to pain: " Saint Thomas indicates three criteria for
judging perfection of touch: that of the general temperament,
the softness of the skin and another which we have not found
in any of the other scholastics, before or after ... that, namely,
of B\ greater or less sensitivity to pain. 176
Summa Tkeol., 1-11, q. 46, a. 5.
Ibid., 11-11, q. 156, a. 1, ad !rum.
171 II De Anima, lect. xix.
171 De Sensu et Semato, lect. ix.
178 II De Anima, loc. cit.
, .. De Anima, lect. ii, cap. 9.
175 Albert the Great, Summa de Creaturia, q. SS, a. 4.
178 P. M. Barbado, 0. P., "Correlaciones Del Entendimiento con el Organismo,"
La Ciencia Tomilta, xx:xm (1926), 196.
180

· 170

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

41

Fr. Barbado then quotes the following from St. Thomas and
comments on it:
Among the other animals, man has the most certain touch. A
sign of this is that man is less able to endure excessive degrees of
cold and heat than are other animals. And among men, the better
is one's sense of touch, the more apt is his mind, as can be seen in
those who have soft flesh.177
This text is sufficiently clear for those who know that by the expression "hujus signum est," the saint generally indicates that he
is about to give an experimental proof. The Angelic Doctor says,
then, that the argument from experience, which shows that the
sense of touch is more perfect in man than in animals, must be
deduced from the fact that the former (men) are not able to stand
the rigors of cold to the same extent as the latter (animals), or
what is equivalent, that man is more sensitive than animals to the
pain produced by the cold. One does not have to extend this argument very far to conclude also that among men, he is to be judged
as having a more perfect touch who is more sensitive to pain, and,
consequently, in the sensitivity to cold, easy to measure today, we
have an efficacious means of judging the positive correlation between sensitivity to pain and the perfection of the intellect. Finally,
it seems to us that to the Angelic Doctor should be attributed the
merit of having suggested the idea that to determine the perfection
of touch, which is correlated with perfection of the intellect, one
must pay attention to the sensitivity to heat and cold.178
According to the endocrinologists, hyperfunction of the thyroid
produces, concomitantly with good mental ability, softness of
skin, a good sense of touch, and sensitivity to pain. As Berman
says:
The skin of the hyperthyroid ... is soft. 179 Sensitivity, the ability
to discriminate between grades of sensation or acuteness of perception is another thyroid quality. Just as the thyroid plus is more
energetic, so is he more sensitive. He feels things more, he feels
pain more readily, because he arrives more quickly at the stage
when the stimulus damages his nervous apparatus. The electrical
conductivity of his skin is greater, sometimes a hundred times
De Sensu et Senaato, lect. ix.
Barbado, loc. cit., pp. 196-197.
179 Berman, op. cit., p. 160.

177
178

LEO M. BOND

greater, than the average. Conversely, the thyroid deficient type
has a low discriminative faculty. Galton has recorded that idiots
hardly distinguish between heat and cold and that their sense of
pain is so obtuse that some of the more idiotic seem hardly to know
what it is.180

Once again St. Thomas can say " I told you so."
Some of the modern authors' amplified descriptions of the
choleric temperament, elaborated from the basic features
pointed out by the ancients and medievalists, are as follows:
The choleric person is quickly and vehemently excited by any impression mode; he tends to react immediately, and the impression
lasts a long time and easily induces new excitement. The choleric
is more or less always in a hurry, a man of enthusiasm, usually
endowed with considerable intelligence. The choleric is very passionate. Whenever the choleric is bent upon carrying out his plans
or finds opposition, he is filled with passionate excitement. He has
a sharp intellect and a keen vivacity which influences all his thoughts
and plans. He rushes for his goal with great haste and impetuosity.
The choleric is very stubborn and opinionated vehemently excited
by contradiction, resistance, and personal offences and may even
indulge in furious outbursts of anger. Being of an active temperament, he feels a continual inclination to activity and occupation.
He cannot be without work and he works quickly and diligently.
He can if he does not control the weak side of his temperament,
act as an explosive powder in private and public and cause great
disturbance. 181

Tanquerey says: " choleric persons are those in whom passion is not only violent . . . but also enduring. They are
energetic, etc. . .. " 182 And Merkel bach: " Cholerics are bold,
aggressive . . . but also precipitate, impatient, wrathful,
proud . . . " 183 The intensity of the volitional activity displayed by cholerics is described by some writers as " strength
of will," but it would seem, according to Ach, that in reality
this intensity is necessitated by a weak determinative disposiIbid., pp. 218-214.
C. Hock, Tke Four Temperamenta (Bruce: Milwaukee, 1985), pp. 18-81.
182 A. Tanquerey, Tke Spiritual Life (Reilly: Philadelphia, 1980), p. 11.
188 B. Merkelbach, 0. P., Quaestionea de Variis Poenitentium Categoriis (Liege,
1988)' p. 69.
180
181

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

48

tion of the will and that in reality the choleric's will is weak
rather than strong, according to the common acceptation of a
"strong will." Roback, summing up the doctrine of Ach (Uber
den WiUensakt und das Temperament) on this point, says:
The choleric is marked by increase of motivation with heightened
motor and sensory excitability, where only a slight determining
disposition is present. Owing to the slight determination, a stronger
will act is needed; but owing to the heightened excitability, failure
is often the result. An intensity of effort out of proportion to the
degree of success goes with a strong feeling reaction which leads to
renewed effort and finally success.184

It is evident, then, from all this, that the " hyperthyroid "
temperament ascribed by the endocrinologists to an excess of
thyroxin in the blood is nothing more than a modem, more
scientific version of the " choleric " temperament attributed
by the ancients and medievalists to a predominance of the
" cholera " or yellow bile in the blood, and that the characteristics of the one temperament correspond very closely to
those of the other.

2. The Hypothyroid-Phlegmatic

Temperament.

From what has been said above with regard to the function
and physiological effects of the thyroid gland, we can easily
imagine what symptoms its pathological hypofunction would
produce. According to Dr. Loewenberg, as already noted,
Suppression of thyroid activity will, on the other hand, cause a
general slowing of the physical and mental processes. In the young,
the result is a characteristic stunting of mental and physical development. In the adult, there occurs a slowing of the mental processes, accompanied by certain physical characteristics; the heart
rate and vascular tension are decreased and the emotions and
intellect are depressed in hypothyroidism. 185
In mild cases of pathological hypothyroidism:
On examination one may note a dull expression and some listlessness. The heart is slow; the blood pressure is usually low. Speech
18 '

Roback, op. cit., p. 107.

••• Loewenberg, op. cit., pp. UO-!MI.

LEO M. BOND

may be slow and halting and the voice may be thickened. The
basal metabolic rate will be found to be low. At times the only
complaint is tiredness, a disinclination to be active either physically
or mentally, and the development of obesity. 186 ·
Dr. Wolfe says:
The most marked mental deficiency is noted in hypothyroidism,
since the thyroid gland governs brain function. A low intelligence
quotient, decreased aptitude in school and lessened response to
stimuli accompany a general sluggishness of mind, body and emotions, and a lethargy and forgetfulness which cause the patient to
have little interest in the affairs of his life. His movements and
speech are as slow as his mental reactions. 187
Hypothyroidism is also characterized by a marked inclination to
sleep, due possibly to a reduction in the sensory reactivity. 188
With. regard to particular hypothyroid diseases, in " myxedema," which is " a condition that may occur in the adult as
a result of thyroid insufficiency," 189 the
symptoms and signs are the reverse of exophthalmic goiter. The
onset in non-surgical myxedema is gradual; it will be noticed that
the individual has become dull, listless, and mentally, physically
and sexually retarded. He moves and thinks slowly and is extremely
forgetful. He becomes somnole:at, tires easily, etc. The autonomic
nervous as well as all functions are depressed. 190

In the same disease, according to Dr. Myerson,
a patient who may have been a bright, capable and energetic person, full of the eager purposes and emotions of life, gradually becomes dull, stupid, apathetic, without fear, anger, love, joy or
sorrow, and without purpose or striving. 191

In " cretinism," which "may be defined as a state of continuous
infancy due to arrested

physical

and mental development

1ae Ibid., p. 888.

WoHe, op. cit., p. 789.
Ibid., p. 741.
188 Loewenberg, op. cit., p. SM.
180 Ibid., p. 886.
18 •

188

181 A. Myerson, The Fov:ndatiom of PeraOfllllity (Little, Brown: Boston, 1921),
pp. 12-18.

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

45

before or soon after birth results from congenital thyroid
insufficiency,'' 192 the common symptoms are,
marked general indolence, lassitude, and· inertia. Complete cretins,
ungainly and seriously inhibited in every action, devoid of response
to physical and mental stimuli, often lie about practically immobile
throughout life. Such gravely affected individuals as a rule are
unable to form the slightest critical conception of their condition,
or to· arrive at any notion of the occurrences of their daily life.
Sometimes they are aggressive, but usually they remain quiet and
care only for repose and sleep.193
As might be expected, then, the hypothyroid temperament
presents a picture just the reverse of that presented by the
hyperthyroid temperament. Physiologically, we see an" inactive" person, almost devoid of nervous energy, prone to slow
nerve excitation and slow muscular movements, a lethargic,
languid person whose whole bodily system tends to underactivity, slow heart beat, slow metabolic conversion of food
into energy, etc. Psychically, we have an apathetic person,
only dully reactive to sense stimuli, prone to slow and feeble
emotional excitation, mentally slow and in general psychically
" calm." Describing this temperament, Pende says:
We find in the hypothyroid an apathetic, slow character, hypoevolute intelligence, marked especially by a lack of critical faculty,
with predominance of concrete over logical thought. 194
In the psychic field we find apathy and slowness of all psychic pro.,.
cesses. The intelligence is hardly ever completely evolute, almost
never of high grade, more often below the average. 196
Berman says:
Thyroid deficients are quite conscious of the limited reserve of
energy at their command. Also that they need plenty of refreshing
sleep. Taciturn, inarticulate, lazy, slow, tired are the adjectives
applied to them by their friends as well as by their enemies.196
The memory of thyroid insufficients is wretched. 197
Loewenberg, op. cit., p. SIS.
Ibid., pp. S!la-8!!6.
1 "' Pende, op. cit., p. 80.

190
198

Ibid., p. 281.
Berman, op. cit., p. 218.
117 Ibid., p. 214.
195

190

46

LEO M. BOND

A child with a hypothyroid temperament is characterized by,
undergrowth, physical and mental, a persistent babyishness and a
retardation of self-control development. He needs an excess of
sleep, sleeps heavily, needs sleep during the day, when awakened
in the morning still feels tired and rather dull and restless, dresses
slowly, has to be coaxed or forced to dress, gets to school late nearly
every morning, does badly at the school, reaction time, learning
time and remembering time being prolonged as compared with the
average, and is lazy at home lessons.198
From a consideration of all these characteristics, it is not
difficult to discover in the " hypothyroid " temperament, the
" phlegmatic " temperament ascribed by the ancients and
medievalists to the " phlegma " in the blood. Hippocrates,
describing the phlegmatics, says they are " persons of a humid
temperament, and very sleepy. And they are dull at the arts,
not disposed to labor, and are for the most part weak by nature.
They are sluggish rather than keen and alert." 199 For Galen,
says Roback," the phlegmatic person's apparent slowness and
apathy were traced to the influence of the phlegm." 200 And he
quotes Maimonides, " For instance, a man whose natural constitution inclines towards dryness, whose brain matter is clear
and not overloaded with fluids, finds it much easier to learn,
remember, and understand things than the phlegmatic man,
whose brain is encumbered with a great deal of humidity." 201
St. Albert says: " But those whose blood contains much
phlegma are lazy and sleepy and soft with a feminine softness
and they have a very poor memory. They sleep a great deal and
their intellect is dull." 202 St. Thomas points out the phlegmatic's weakness of will: "a man fails to stand to that which is
counselled, because he holds to it in weakly fashion by reason of
the softness of his temperament. This is also the case with
phlegmatic temperaments." 203
1os Ibid., p. !MS.

Hippocrates, loc. cit.
••• Roback, op. cit., p. 11.
101 Ibid., p. 48.
••• Albert the Great, De AnimalibU8, XX, t. 1, cap. 11.
••• Summa Tkeol., 11-IT, q.166, a. I, ad !tum.
100

EFFECT OF BODn..Y TEMPERAMENT

47

Moreover, the "phlegma" was one of the "cold" humors,
which would, as we noted in the previous chapter, produce
only scanty " spirits " with a resulting retardation of all the
psychical functions, for as St. Thomas says, " when the spirits
are few nature constricts them and confines them to their
source," 204 whereas "when the spirits are many nature is able
to retain some in their source and still pour them out in abundance " 205 and " a spirit abundant in quantity abounds also
in power." 206
Hock's description of the phlegmatic temperament is as
follows:
The soul or mind of the phlegmatic person is only weakly or not
at all touched by impressions. The reaction is feeble or entirely
missing. Eventual impressions fade away very soon. He has little
interest in whatever goes on about him. He has little inclination
to work, but prefers repose and leisure. With him everything proceeds and develops slowly. He is not easily exasperated either by
offenses, or by failures or sufferings. He is very much inclined to
ease, to eating and drinking; is lazy and neglects his duties. He has
no energy, and does not aspire to lofty things. 207
And Merkelbach notes that " the phlegmatics are mild, peaceful, easily led, but they can also be petty, inconstant, lazy,
indifferent: with difficulty are they aroused to good, they lack
strong passions, are easily content with mediocrity, they love
peace and quiet." 208 Tanquerey says: "The phlegmatic are
slow and awkward in action and so indifferent as to hardly feel
the need of loving or of being loved. They have little taste for
active work, but when they must get down to it, they succeed
best in those undertakings which demand patience rather than
imagination and feeling." 209
From this comparison of the characteristics of the " phlegmatic " with those of the " hypothyroid " temperament, it is
clear that these are but two names for the same temperament.
While the ancients and medievalists attributed these charac""'IV Sent., d. xlix, q. 8, a. 2.
••• Ibid.
aoa Ibid.

••• Hock, op. cit., pp. 59-60.
Merkelbach, op. cit., p. 69.
••• Tanquerey, op. cit., p. 10*.
208

48

LEO M. BOND

teristics to the " phlegma " content of the blood stream, the
endocrinologists ascribe them to the deficient thyroxin content.

8. The Hypersurrenal-Sanguine Temperament.
Dr. Loewen berg thus summarizes the anatomicaf features of
the adrenal glands:
The adrenal glands are two in number and yellowish in color. They
are situated retroperitoneally, each imbedded in the perirenal fat
above its respective kidney. They are composed of a cortex and a
medulla which differ from each other in gross appearance, histologic
structure, embryologic origin, function and in the elaboration of
distinctive hormones. The right adrenal is somewhat triangular in
shape, being likened to a "cocked hat." It is smaller than the left,
measuring approximately 11f2 inches in length, ljz inch in breadth,
and lfz inch in thickness, and weighs between 30 and 40 grains.
The left adrenal is somewhat larger than its fellow and is more or
less diamond shaped. It measures approximately 1% inches in
length, % inch in breadth, and about % inch in thickness, and
weighs between 40 and 45 grains.
On gross section the adrenals generally show three layers. 1) A
peripheral layer, which is yellowish gray in color; 2) An intermediary zone, which is firm and yellowish in color, the cortex.
3) A large inner layer, which is soft and brownish red in color, the
medulla. 210
From the physiological standpoint, " it is necessary to consider separately the cortex and the, metlulla as each structure
elaborates individual hormones. Though these structures are
intimately fused in all mammals as an apparently single gland,
they nevertheless vary greatly in their physiologic action because of the dissimilarity of their hormones." 211
As to the function of the adrenal cortex, the same author
says:
1. It is essential to life. 2. It influences gonad development and
function. 3. It maintains a vital influence upon body function and
metabolism, as is noted by the phenomena occurring as a result of
cortical destruction and of cortical stimulation. Partial destruction
or total ablation of all cortical tissue will produce during the sur210

Loewenberg, op. cit., pp. 514-515.

" 11

Ibid., p. 519.

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

49

vival period: (a) loss of weight, (b) extreme weakness, (c) fall
in body temperature, (d) lowering of the basal metabolic rate,
(e) dehydration, (f) definite loss of blood chlorides, (g) rise in
the inorganic phosphates, (h) retention of potassium in the blood,
(j) decrease in urea clearance, (k) decreased phenosulphonphthalein
excretion, (1) increased excretion of sodium by the kidneys, therefore lowered concentration of sodium in the blood, (m) diminution
of blood volume, (n) lowering of blood pressure, (o) moderate hypoglycemia (blood sugar deficiency), (p) renal failure, (q) dyspnea
(exhaustion), (r) decrease of carbon dioxide capacity, (s) prostration, (t) convulsion, (u) coma, and (w) finally death. Stimulation of the adrenal cortex as a result of hypertrophy (hyperfunction), tumor, hyperemia, or other conditions will cause (a) increase
in weight, (b) virilism, (c) increased basal metabolism, (d) hyperemia, (increased blood volume) (e) hypergonadism in the male and
masculine perversion with hypertrichosis in the female, (f) increased blood pressure, (g) occasionally hyperglycemia (increase in
blood sugar), (h) pseudo-hermaphrodism in congenital tumor, and
(i) macrosomia precox in tumors acquired during childhood and
adolescence. 212
With regard to the hormone elaborated by the adrenal cortex
and upon which its above mentioned activities depend, Dr.
Loewenberg says:
It has been proven beyond any doubt that the adrenal cortex
elaborates at least one potent hormone which is essential to life.
Its administration in sufficient quantities will help to maintain life
and to restore vigor and other cortical functions in decorticated
subjects. The adrenocortical hormone (cortin, interrenalin, interrenin, etc.) irrespective of the method employed in its extraction,
when active, has a definite physiological action. 218
The function of the adrenal medulla is indicated
activity of its hormone:

by the

The adrenal medulla is not essential to life . . . The function of
the adrenal medulla depends largely upon its hormone variously
known as epiephrine, adrenalin, adrenin and suprarenalin, which,
while not essential to life, helps to preserve life by stimulating the
individual to greater activity for self-preservation when
is
threatened. The adrenal medulla is credited by Cannon as being
112

Loewenberg, op. cit., pp.

4

111

Ibid., pp.

50

LEO M. BOND

the "reserve or emergency gland," or the so· called "minute man"
of the body. It is supposed to assume secretory activity chiefly in
cases of mental and emotional stress. It prepares the organism
for either "fight" or "flight" by speeding up the circulation, raising arterial pressure, mobilizing glycogen so as to facilitate muscular
activity and stimulating the sympathetic nervous system. 214
Adrenalin (suprarenalin or adrenin, natural or synthetic) has a
powerful and immediate effect upon various stl"l.\cturesof the body.
Its effect is almost evanescent, being speedily worn off because of its
rapidly oxidizing properties. The action of this hormone may be
summarized as follows: 1. It stimulates the sympathetic division
of the autonomic nervous system, which is evidenced by dilation of
the pupils, acceleration of the pulse and inhibition of gastrointestinal peristalsis. 2. It mobilizes glycogen from the liver and muscles.
8. It raises arterial tension. 4. It raises the basal metabolic rate
and increases heat production. It affects the various organs of the
body as follows: (a) The Eye. It causes dilation of the pupil ...
(b) The Heart. It produces acceleration and increased force of
the beat .... 215
With regard to psychical manifestation noted in pathologies
due to adrenal hyperfunction, Dr. Loewenberg says: "The
individual is usually effusive and presents a picture of euphoria
(buoyancy, optimism). The mentality is as a rule above normal. 216 " Psychic disturbances and emotional inStability
characterized by fits of depression or by extreme ecstasy are
common." 217
Bearing in mind the functions oi the adrenal glands and the
symptoms accompanying pathological hyperfunction, what
type of temperament might we expect in an individual whose
adrenals tend to hyperfunction? It might be supposed, according to the endocrinal theory, that all these various functions of
the adrenal glands and the activities of their several hormones
would not be of equal importance as regards their effects upon
the temperamental disposition of the various organs affected
by them. Neither could they all be supposed to have a definite
influence upon the psychical characteristics. To determine experimentally precisely what effect each individual function of
"' Ibid., p. 528.
11 " Ibid., pp. 529-581.

018

Ibid., p. 554.

117

Ibid., p. 577.

EFFECT OF BODILY

51

the glands would have upon a person's psychical make-up,
would be, at the present state of knowledge, quite impossible.
However, empirical observation indicates that the more important influences of the glands upon the psychical characteristics
are those exercised through the medium of metabolism, blood
volume, blood pressure, nerve excitation, etc. Now it is precisely in their effects upon these functions that the activities of
the adrenal cortex and the adrenal medulla coincide more or
less. Another important function presented by the adrenals,
namely their effect upon the sugar content of the blood, is also
more or less common to both cortex and medulla. Therefore,
while from the physiological viewpoint it is necessary to consider the cortex and the medulla separately, from the viewpoint
of their effect upon psychical characteristics they can be considered jointly as determining one type of hyper-temperament,
or one type of hypo-temperament, referred to respectively by
the endocrinologists simply as " hypersurrenal " and "
surrenal" without any distinction as to the component parts
of the glands. There is, of course, the possibility that even
within the range of normal temperamental hyper- or hypoactivity, the two lobes of the adrenals may not synchronize in
their activity, i.e., the cortex might tend to hypersecretion and
the medulla to hyposecretion, and vice versa. It is not likely,
however, that the hyperfunction of one lobe would be in such
perfect counter-balance to the hypofunction of the other, that
the influence of one lobe would completely neutralize the influence of the other; either the hyper- or hypoactivity would predominate to some degree. The counter-influence exerted by
the other lobe would tend only to modify the influence of the
lobe whose hyper- or hypoactivity predominates. The net result of this would be, most likely, a less pronounced hyper- or
hyposurrenal temperament.
Besides the above mentioned functions common to both the
cortex and the medulla and exerting an important influence
upon temperament, a new element has been introduced by the
adrenal cortex, namely its influence upon male sex gland development and function, its hyperfunction having a masculizing

52

LEO M. BOND

effect on both men and women. The relation of the sex element
to temperament we will discuss later when speaking of the
" hypersexual " and " hyposexual " temperaments. For the
present it is sufficient to note that increased gonad activity is a
concomitant of adrenal hyperfunction.
It will be noted that some of the functions of the adrenals
having a more important influence upon temperamental characteristics, viz., regulation of metabolism, blood volume, blood
pressure, nerve excitation, energy mobilization, etc., are precisely those which are attributed also, though in a somewhat
different manner, to the thyroid. In connection with the hyperfunction of the adrenals, therefore, we would expect to find
somewhat the same psychical manifestations as those observed
to accompany hyperfunction of the thyroid, e. g., quick mental
and emotional reaction, excitability, energy, precipitousness,
etc. Observation has shown, say the endocrinologists, that
hypersurrenal individuals do display these characteristics to
some extent. Speaking of the normal hypersurrenal temperament, Pende says: " In the hyperadrenal variety we find . . .
a robust intelligence." 218 " The character is active, impulsive
... restless and strong-willed." 219 But observation also shows
that there is an important difference in these characteristics as
displayed by hypersurrenals and hyperthyroids, namely that
in the hypersurrenals the psychical reactions are much less
enduring than in the hyperthyroids, and impressions made
upon them tend to fade quickly, which is not the case with
the hyperthyroids.
A possible explanation of this difference in reaction might
be found in several peculiarities of the adrenals as to the
manner of releasing their hormones and the activities of the
hormones themselves, especially with regard to adrenalin. One
of these peculiarities is that the adrenal medulla, besides constantly supplying hormones to meet the normal requirements
of the body, has the ability of instantly increasing its adrenalin
output to meet extraordinary demands of various organs m
218

Pende, op. cit., p. 80.

210

Ibid., p. 98.

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

58

times of mental and emotional stress. As Jane Stafford says:
"The adrenal glands discharge relatively large amounts of
hormone under emotional stimuli, such as rage or fear. The
excess adrenalin discharged as a result of strong emotion causes
the heart to pump more quickly and forcefully; the liver to
release its store of sugar for additional fuel for the body; the
air passages to dilate, permitting freer breathing; and the blood
vessels of the skin and abdominal organs to contract, thus
increasing the amount of blood available to the muscles and
nerves which must meet the emergency." 220 And as Cannon
says: " Exceedingly delicate biological tests ... and an examination of the glands themselves, afford clear evidence that in
pain and deep emotion the glands do, in fact, pour our-an excess
of adrenin into the circulating blood." 221 One of the characteristic features of adrenalin is that it quickly disappears.
According to Dr. Loewenberg, as already noted: "Adrenalin
(suprarenalin or adrenin, natural or synthetic) has a powerful
and immediate effect upon various structures of the body. Its
effect is almost evanescent, being speedily worn off because of
its rapidly oxidizing properties." 222 And according to Cannon:
" The destruction of adrenin and the disappearance of the effect
which adrenin would produce are thus closely parallel." 228
These functional peculiarities of the adrenal medulla and its
hormone would furnish, according to the endocrinologists, a
plausible explanation of the strong but quickly transient psychical reactions of the hypersurrenal temperament and would
account for the vivacity, instability, and superficiality found
in this type. The hypersurrenal's constant supply of adrenalin
tends to excess, with a resulting tendency to overactivity on
the part of all the organs and systems affected, i.e., metabolism,
blood pressure, sympathetic nervous system, glycogen mobilization and distribution, etc. This physiological hyperactivity
would result in a constant inclination to mental and emotional
vivacity. When notable mental or emotional stimuli are presented to him, he would react quickly and strongly. The re••• J. Stafford, op. cit., p. 25!!.
121

W. B. Cannon, op. cit., p. 6S.

229 Loewenberg, op. cit., p. 5!!9.
••• Cannon, op. cit., p. 54.

54

LEO M. BOND

suiting psychical excitation would effect an immediate release
of additional adrenalin, the amount of increase being proportionally greater in him than in the person whose supply is
deficient. This would result in a further acceleration of all the
biological functions mentioned above and a still greater mental
and emotional activity, often accompanied by energetic physical motions as a result of the greatly increased energy produced
by the release of large quantities of sugar into the blood stream,
for, as Cannon says," in man, emotional excitement (e. g. fear,
pain, worry, mental anxiety, excitement such as at games,
during exams, etc.) produces temporary increase of blood
sugar" 224 as a result of the released adrenalin.
With the quick destruction of adrenalin, due, as noted above,
to its rapidly oxidizing properties, there would be a proportionally rapid subsidence of the biological and psychical overactivity. This would mean that mental and emotional impressions would not be very deep or lasting. A certain carelessness and optimism would result from the tendency to forget
past difficulties and unpleasant experiences. The result of this
would be a general tendency to superficiality. Thought would
be brilliant and energetic rather than profound and sustained.
There would be emotional instability, a rapid change of mood,
etc. The will, while strong and active during mental and emotional excitement, would tend to inconstancy when the impressions had faded. As Pende says, " This type has great
intellectual energy and presents the picture of euphoria." 225
And according to Berman: "chemical quantitative studies have
shown that by repeated stimulation the adrenal glands may be
exhausted of their reserve supply of secretions, which. returns
only insufficiently if not enough time is given for their recuperation. There results ... a loss of appetite and zest in life, and a
mental instability characterized by an indecision, a weepishness
upon the slightest provocation." 226 But with the restoration
of adrenalin, vivacity and optimism would return. All of which
would help to explain the changeableness and superficiality of
this temperament.
••• Ibid., p. 75.

•••.Pende, op. cit., p. 284.

••• Berman, op. cit., p. 81.

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

55

With this picture of the hypersurrenal temperament as
sketched by the endocrinologists, one immediately associates
the " sanguine " temperament attributed by the ancients and
medievalists to predominance in the blood stream of the humor
known as the sanguis or blood proper. Galen, as already noted,
gives "enthusiasm" as the predominant characteristic of this
temperament. St. Albert points out the sanguine's euphoria
and good mental qualities. Contrasting this temperament with
its opposite, the melancholic he says: " For we say that the
melancholies are sad and grave. But we see that the sanguine
have the opposite affections." 227 They are "of a very joyful
temperament and a cheerful aspect, always hopeful, not depressed by misfortunes and they have a good intellect and good
qualities." 228 Moreover, while the sanguis was one of the
" warm " humors, it was, as already noted, " warm and moist,"
and hence more temperate than the cholera, which was " warm
and dry." Consequently the" spirits" derived from the sanguis,
while possessing to some extent the heat and speed of the
choleric spirits, were, nevertheless, more temperate and more
" midway between thickness and thinness," to use St. Thomas'
expression. 229 Hence they would produce warm but less violent
passions than would the choleric spirits. In persons of sanguine
temperament, anger, for instance, would be less violent and
less enduring than in the cholerics or melancholies. They would
be optimistic because, as St. Thomas says, " heat in the heart
banishes fear and raises hope," 280 but perhaps not as bold and
daring as the cholerics. They would incline more to the gentle
passions like love and joy. "Sanguine temperaments," says
St. Thomas, " are more inclined to love." 231 They would be
those people who, he says " become joyful on slight provocation " because their blood, like wine, "generates an abundance
of clear, temperate spirits, midway between thickness and
thinness." 282
227 Albert the Great, op. cit., I, t. 2, cap. 2.
••• Ibid., XX, t.l, cap. 11.
231 Ibid., q. 48, a. 2 .
... IV Sent., d. xlix, q. S, a. 2.
232 IV Sent., loe. cit.
••• Summa Theol., I-ll, q. 45, a. 4.

56

LEO M. BOND

Hock, elaborating upon the observations of the older writers,
points out the sanguine's tendency to quick but fleeting emotional reactions:
The sanguine person is quickly aroused and vehemently excited by
whatever influences him. The reaction follows immediately, but
the impression lasts but a short time. The passions of the sanguine
are quickly excited, but they do not make a deep and lasting impression; they may be compared to a straw fire which flares up
suddenly, but just as
dies down, while the passions of a
. choleric are to be compared to a raging, all devouring con:flagration.288
Regarding the sanguine's instability he says:
Because the impressions made upon a sanguine person do not last,
they are easily followed by others. The consequence is a great
instability. The sanguine is always changing in his moods; he can
quickly pass from tears to laughter and vice versa; he is fickle in
his views; today he may defend what he vehemently opposed a
week ago; he is unstable in his resolutions. He is also inconsistent
at his work or entertainment. 284
And as regards his mental superficiality:
The sanguine person does not penetrate the depth, to the essence
of things, he does not embrace the whole, but is satisfied with the
superficial and with a part of the whole. Before he. has mastered
one subject, his interest relaxes because new impressions have already captured his attention. He loves light work which attracts
attention, where there is no need of deep thought, or great effort.
The sanguine does not like to enter into himself, but directs his
attention to the external. In the sanguine the five senses are
especially active, while the choleric uses rather his reason and will.
The sanguine sees everything, hears everything, talks about everything. He is noted for his facility and vivacity of speech, his
inexhaustible variety of topics and flow of words. 235
And his optimism is shown:
The sanguine looks at everything from the bright side. He is optimistic, overlooks difficulties, and is always sure of success. If he
fails, he does not worry about it too long but consoles himself easily.
••• Hock, op. cit., pp. 85-87.

""' Ibid., pp. 85-86.

••• Loc. cit.

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

57

Even if the sanguine is occasionally exasperated and sad, he soon
finds his balance again. His sadness does not last long, but gives
way quickly to happiness. 236
Moreover,
A sanguine is quickly excited by an offense and may show his anger
violently, but as soon as he has given vent to his wrath, he is again
pleasant and bears no grudge . . . The sanguine person does not
like to be alone; he loves company and amusement; he wants to
enjoy life . . . is inclined to inordinate intimacy and flirtation ...
However his love is not deep and changes easily. 237
Speaking of the same temperament, Merkelbach says: " those
who are sanguine feel promptly and vividly but not intensely
and perseveringly, hence they are very unstable." 238 And
Tanquerey notes:
Sanguine or impulsive persons are the ready prey of the first vivid
impression that makes itself felt. They are expansive, volatile and
spasmodic, passing quickly from gaiety to sadness, from hope to
anxiety, from enthusiasm to discouragement ... " They are " quick
of movement, they have an engaging smile and a sprightly appearance. They are light-hearted and extremely changeable, giving
themselves over readily to the most contrary emotions and acting
on the spur of the moment. Gifted with a lively imagination and
an ardent heart, they attain success in literary work, speak with
great facility and charm to all with whom thy come in contact. 239
Again we conclude that the temperament denominated by
the endocrinologists as " hyper!Surrenal " and attributed by
them to hypersecretion of the adrenal glands is substantially
the same as the " sanguine " temperament, classified and
basically described hundreds of years ago by the ancients and
medievalists.

4. The Hyposurrenal-Melancholic Temperament.
We have already noted some of the physiological effects of
adrenal hypofunction. The most important in relation to psychical characteristics are probably the general weakening of
••• Ibid., pp. 85-42.
2117 Ibid., pp. 88-41.

••• Merkelbach, op. cit., p. 68.
••• Tanquerey, op. cit., p. 10*.

58

LEO M. BOND

the system, lowering of the basal metabolic rate, diminution of
blood volume, lowering' of blood pressure and blood sugar and
the production of fatigue and nervous disturbances.
With regard to pathological symptoms, speaking of Addison's
disease, for instance, which is "a definite entity resulting from
hypofunction of the adrenal cortex," 240 Dr. Loewenberg says:
The nervous and mental symptoms which occur in advanced cases
of Addison's disease may be due to a general asthenia associated
with anemia. The intellect may not be definitely affected, but the
mental languor may be such that the patient does not take the
trouble to think or invoke any mental processes. 241
The so-called " neuro " who has indefinite complaints, or rather a
multiplicity of complaints, and who has hypotension, a great variety
of psychic and nervous disturbances, and is definitely fatigued may,
in many instances, be suffering from hypofunction of the adrenal
cortex. 242
In " hypoglycemia," a condition " due to an insufficient quantity
of sugar being released into the blood stream," and which is marked
" in hypoadrenalism, in Addison's disease and in destructive tumors
of the adrenal medulla," among the common symptoms are "anxiety; nervous trembling." When the condition is chronic, it is
manifested by malaise lassitude, lack of physical and mental concentration often to a degree where it is impossible to do any physical
and mental work. Long standing or severe cases of hypoglycemia
because of their nervous phenomena are occasionally diagnosed as
psychoneurosis, or other nervous disorders. The more common
nervous phenomena are periodic attacks of mental confusion, often
associated with amnesia, so that the patient does not remember
what he said or did during such periods. 243
Berman, speaking of symptoms observed in nervous diseases
due to pathological hypofunction of the adrenals, says:
In some, mental and physical elasticity are totally lost, and even
the slightest exertion in either field often causes so much weariness
and exhaustion as to be prohibited. Depression and even melancholia are associated with the fear of not being able to accomplish
good work hitherto easy and enjoyed. Sometimes they are obsessed
.. 0

"' 1

Loewenberg, op. cit., p. 556.
Lowenberg, op. cit., p. 561.

••• Ibid., p. 571.
••• Ibid., pp. 466-478.

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

59

with the thought that they have lost their nerve completely, and
so dread to commit themselves in even the most trivial situations.
The vacillating frame of mind is so distressing at times as to arouse
thoughts of suicide. The brooding over themselves and their
troubles is one of the distinctive feasures of the whole complex.244

It will be noted that some of the physiological effects of
adrenal hypofunction are similar to those produced by hypofunction of the thyroid, as was the case in regard to hyperfunction of the adrenals and the thyroid. There should be,
therefore, according to the endocrinologists, a certain coincidence between the psychical characteristics of the hypothyroid
temperament and those of the hyposurrenal temperament.
Observation verifies this assumption. According. to Berman:
"The congenital adrenal inadequate is defined (limited) in
physical and mental energy." 245 "A fatigability that goes with
·a low blood pressure, lowered body temperature and a disturbed ability to utilize sugar for fuel purposes is another of
his chief complaints." 246 In children of this temperament:
"Lack of appetite, lack of energy, lack of response to stimuli
are its keynotes and the motifs of the later years of childhood." 247
But, again as in the case of the hyperthyroid and hypersurrenal temperaments, there are some important differences
in the corresponding hypo-temperaments. The hypothyroid is
a "nerveless" individual of blunt sensibility. His reaction to
mental and emotional stimuli is very slow and impressions
eventually made are light. The hyposurrenal, on the other
hand, is really of a nervous, sensitive constitution, but due to
a general lack of energy, his reactions are slow, though impressions eventually made may be very deep. He can work
himself up gradually to a state of great mental and emotional
excitement. This combination of sensitivity and inability to
react quickly and energetically has far-reaching psychical consequences. It tends to produce a lack of self-confidence, a proneness to discouragement, indecision, anxiety, pessimism, strong
Berman, op. cit., pp. 81-82.
s•• Berman, op. cit., p. 240.

24 '

••• Ibid., p. 289.
""Ibid.

60

LEO M. BOND

aversions, sensitivity to grief and a brooding introspection.
Berman says:

As

The adrenal insufficient is important because he is to be seen everywhere. Cold hands and cold feet plague him, cold feet psychically
as well as physically, for a chronic and obsessive indecision is one
of his most prominent complaints. 248 He cannot sleep when he
lies down, he cannot keep awake when he stands up. He cannot
concentrate, but still he is pitifully worried about his life. As he
works himself up into his hysterical state as a reaction to a disagreeable person or problem, irregular blotches may appear on his
face and neck.249 Dismissed sometimes contemptuously as weaklings, they are accused of laziness, craziness and haziness.250
And Pende, still speaking of the hyposurrenal temperament,
says: " From the psychic point of view there is a tendency to
depression, melancholia and pessimism, with affectivity and
sensitivity to grief often much exaggerated." 251
As to mental ability, the endocrinologists seem to have difficulty in classifying the hyposurrenal individual. Pende, for
instance, in his Constitutional Inadequacies (p. 80) , says,
"The intelligence is normal." Later in the same book (p. 248)
he says, " In the hypoadrenal variety there is an asthenic,
depressed, abulic character, with an intelligence which is in
some cases hypoevolute and in others, hyperevolute."
In all these tendencies of the hyposurrenal temperament, we
find a great similarity to the characteristics assigned by the
ancients and medievalists to the "melancholic" temperament,
which they ascribed to the predominance of the " atra-bile "
or " black bile " in the blood stream. Aristotle, perhaps in an
attempt to explain the slow but gradually intensifying reactions
noted in this temperament and the " laziness, craziness, and
haziness " spoken of by Berman, distinguished between the
" cold melancholic " and the " warm melancholic," assigning
different characteristics to each and attributing the difference
to low or high temperature of the atra-bile, which though by
nature cold, was capable of becoming heated to a high degree.
He says:
••• Ibid.
"" Ibid., p. 8!!.

••• Ibid., p. !!39.
••• Pende, op. cit., p. !!43.

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

61

The atra-bile becomes both very hot and very cold as water,
though it is cold, if it shall have been sufficiently heated to boil,
becomes hotter than the flame itself, and likewise stone and iron
when they have been heated, become hotter than the coals, although by nature they are cold. But the naturally cold atra-bile
if it exceeds the proper quantity in the body, causes stupefaction
or lethargy or depression of soul, or fears; but if it becomes very
much heated, it causes hilarity and singing, mental aberrations,
eruption of ulcers and other things of this kind.
Those in whose nature a temperament of this kind is rooted soon
acquire various characteristics, certain ones for the one temperament, others for the other, e. g., those in whom it (the atra-bile) is
abundant and cold, become dull and foolish; but those in whom it
is superabundant and warm become wrathful, ingenuous, prone to
love and are easily moved to anger and cupidity; some also become
very talkative. 252
In describing the " warm melancholic," Aristotle may be depicting what the endocrinologists call the " compensated adrenal
type," i. e., a modification of the hyposurrenal temperament
in which adrenal hypofunction is offset to some degree by adequate thyroid function.
St. Thomas thus comments on Aristotle's observation that
·melancholies seek compensation for their sadness:
And he says that the melancholies, according to their natural disposition need remedies for their sadness because their body suffers
a sort of corrosion because of the dryness of their temperament.
And hence they have a vehement appetite for pleasure, by which
sadness of this kind is repelled. And because the melancholies
strongly desire delectation, hence it is that they frequently become
intemperate and depraved. 258
We might point out here a parallel reaction noted by Berman
in hyposurrenals as a result of" war strain":
But such have been the psychologic reactions to the war that all
kinds of compensations in the way of dangerous mental states have
become frequent in these inadequate adrenal types. A trend to
violence and a resentful emotionalism are combined with desperate
••• Problematum, IV, sect. 80 (ed.: Didot, p. 267).
••• In IV Ethic, lect. 14.

62

LEO M. BOND

attempts to spur the jaded adrenals with artificial excitements. A
survey of drug addicts would probably show a definite percentage
of this type. The same applies to certain petty criminals and
la wbreakers. 254

· St. Albert also speaks of the sadness of the melancholic, his
exaggerated fears, the gravity and obscurity of his thoughts and
his
tendencies:
For we say that the melancholic are sad and grave,that they suffer
. from terroristic imaginations and that they are held in this condition by the heaviness, frigidity and fearfuhiess of the melancholic
mind disposed to fear, become
blood, for images received in
terroristic. 255
·
But those whose blood is cold, fetid, and thick. (melancholies) have
profound and as it were immovable thoughts; and their ideas are
obscure . . . they are timid by nature: and their fear does not
easily leave them nor do they accept consolation, but animals of
this sort become. desperate •and men suffer the loss of reason and
mental disorders .. And the men sometimes find no pleasure in
themselves and are suspicious of others, they killthemselves and
are not lovable; they prefer solitude and are. subject to many other
evils and are frequently thieves even when they do not need the
things they steal (kleptomaniacs), and often suffer from insomnia
·
because of their dry and cold temperament. 256

a

We have already noted how Aristotle, St. Albert and St.
Thomas attributed slow-rising but eventually intense and long
enduring anger to an abundance of " fibrin" or small particles
of melancholia in the blood, as well as the good mental qualities
resulting from a variety of melancholia, that, namely, which
has a sufficient mixture of moisture. St. Thomas also speaks of
the " melancholies who are greatly moved by their phantasms
because, due to their earthy nature, the phantasmal impressions
are more firm in them." 257 And those " in whom the spirits
are earthy and obscure are prone to sadness." 258
••• Berman, op. cit., p. U!!.
••• Albert the Great, op. cit., I, t. !!, cap. !!.
••• Ibid., XX, t. 1, cap. 9.
•n De Memoria et Reminiscentia, lect. 8.
••• IV Sent., d. xlix, q. 8, a.!!.

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

63

Hock gives a more detailed analysis of the traditional characteristics of the melancholic temperament. He speaks of his
slow but gradually deepening impressionability: " The melancholic person is but feebly excited by whatever acts upon him.
The reaction is feeble, often almost imperceptible. But this
feeble impression grows stronger and at last excites the mind
so vehemently that it is difficult to eradicate it." 259 0£ his
introspection and the gravity of his thoughts, he says:
The thinking of the melancholic easily turns into reflection. The
thoughts of the melancholic are far-reaching. He dwells upon the
past is preoccupied by occurrences of the long ago; he is penetrating;
is not satisfied with the superficial, searches for the cause and correlation of things; seeks the laws which affect human life, the principles according to which man should act. His thoughts are of a
wide range; he looks ahead into the future; ascends to the eternal.
His very thoughts arouse his own sympathy and are accompanied
by a mysterious longing. Often they stir him up profoundly ...
The untrained melancholjc is easily given to brooding and to daydreaming.260
The same author speaks of the melancholic's love of solitude, his
sadness, passivity and lack of courage in the face of difficulties:
The melancholic does not feel at home among a crowd for any
length of time; he loves silence and solitude. Being inclined to
introspection he secludes himself from the crowds, forgets his
environment, and makes poor use of his senses, eyes, ears, etc.
In company he is often distracted, because he is absorbed by his
own thoughts. The melancholic looks at life always from the serious
side. At the core of his heart there is always a certain sadness.
The melancholic is a passive temperament. The person possessing such a temperament, therefore, has not the vivacious, quick,
progressive, active propensity of the choleric or sanguine, but is
slow, pensive, reflective. It is difficult to move him to quick action,
since he has a marked inclination to passivity and inactivity. This
pensive propensity of the melancholic accounts for his fear of
suffering and diffculties as well as for his dread of interior exertion
and self-denial. He is pusillanimous and timid if he is called upon to
begin a new work, to execute a disagreeable task, to venture on a
new undertaking. He has talent and power, bJt no courage. 261
••• Hock, op. cit., p. 45.

••• Ibid., pp. 45-46.

""' Ibid., pp. 46-48.

64

LEO M. BOND

He has an inability to think fast under emotional stress, is characterised by suspiciousness, pessimism, hypocondria, and a
tendency to nervous disorders:
If he is called upon to answer quickly or to speak without prepara-

tion, or if he fears that too much depends on his answer, he becomes
restless and does not find the right word and consequently often
makes a false and unsatisfactory reply. He is very suspicious,
conjectures evil intentions and fears dangers which do not exist at
all. Offenses, mishaps, obstacles he always considers much worse
than they really are. The consequence is often excessive sadness,
unfounded vexation about others, brooding for weeks and weeks
on account of real or imaginary insults. Melancholic persons who
give way to this disposition to look at everything through a dark
glass, gradually become pessimistic, that is, persons who always
expect a bad result; hypochondriac, that is, persons who complain
continually of insignificant ailments and constantly fear grave
sickness misanthropes, that is, persons who suffer from fear and
hatred of men. Because melancholies take everything to heart
and are very sensitive, they are in great danger of weakening their
nerves. It is necessary, therefore, to watch nervous troubles of
those entrusted to one's care. Melancholies who suffer a nervous
breakdown are in a very bad state and cannot recover very easily. 262
We conclude, then, from all this, that the endocrinologists in
classifying the " hyposurrenal " temperament and attributing
it to hypofunction of the adrenals, have simply given a new
name and a more scientific explanation of the traditional
"melancholic " temperament, attributed by the ancients and
medievalists to an excess of " melancholia " in the blood.

5. The Hyper- and Hypopituitary

Temperaments.

The pituitary gland is considered by endocrinologists to be
perhaps the most important of all the endocrines because of
the dominant influence which it exercises over the other endocrine glands and hence over the organism as a whole. As Dr.
Loewenberg says:
While each of the endocrine glands is important and has a specific
function to perform, yet none equals in importance the pituitary
gland.
262

Ibid., pp. 48-57.

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

65

The pituitary gland may be considered the governing body of
the entire endocrine system: its influence is manifested during the
fetal stages and the various ages after birth. This influence is
wielded by its hormones, some of which act directly upon the
development and the functions of the body, while others activate
various other endocrine glands so that their specific hormones may
be elaborated in sufficient quantities to stabilize many of the
functions of the body. 268

The pituitary is also the most complicated of the endocrines as
to anatomy, function and the effects of its numerous hormones.
Without going into detail, we will simply indicate some of its
outstanding features. As to anatomy:
The pituitary gland is a composite of four distinct structures:
1. The anterior lobe of the pituitary body (pars anterior, pars
glandularis, anterior hypophysis). 2. The posterior lobe of the
pituitary body (pars posterior, pars nervosa, posterior hypophysis).
3. The pars intermedia (the intermediate lobe). 4. The pars
tuberalis.
Shape and size: The pituitary gland is a somewhat elliptoid,
reddish gray body situated in the sella turcica of the sphenoid
bone (at the base of the brain, a short distance behind the root of
the nose), usually weighing about 0.8 gm., and measuring approximately 6 by 8 by 14mm. Under certain circumstances and in
various people, the size and weight may fluctuate within narrow
limits ...
Physiology: The pituitary gland is considered as a unit only
because of its gross appearance. Its component parts differ in their
physiology as markedly as they do in their structures. Not only
do the various lobes secrete different hormones, but each type of
cell in the same lobe seems to be responsible for an individual
hormone. 264

To give some idea of the extent of the pituitary's influence
and the complexity of its effects on the organism, we will give
Dr. Loewenberg's summary:
The vital functions of the body that are either directly or indirectly
influenced by the pituitary gland may be listed as follows: I. Sex
Hormone Activity: (a) Maturation and fertilization of the ovum;
••• Loewenberg, op. cit., p. 68.

5

•••Ibid., pp. 74-75.

66

LEO M •. BOND

(b) Retention of the ovum and its intrauterine development; (c)
Aid in expulsion of the fetus from the uterus; (d) Development of
the primary and secondary sex organs; (e) Development of sex
function; (f) ·Control.of la.ctation. II. Growth Hormone Activity;
(a) Growth and development of the fetus; (b) Growth. and deadulthood; (c) Skeletal growth; III
velopment of the child
Aid in the Control of: (a) Vascular tension; (b) Diuresis and
antidiuresis (water metabolism); (c) Digestive system; {d) Gen,..
eral metabolism; (e) Carbohydrate metabolism; (f) Fat metabolism; (g) Protein metabolism, etc. IV Controlling Influence
Upon: (a) The Thyroid; (b) The Gonads (male and female);
(c) The Adrenals; (d) The Parathyroids; (e) The Islands of Langerhans; (f) The Pineal; (g) The Thymus; (h) The Nervous
System and most of the cells of the body. zs 5
Of the seventeen hormones thought to be elaborated- by the
pituitary, only five have been isolated, the most important of
which and the best known as to their effects, are a growth hormone and a sex hormone produced by the anterior lobe, to
which, however, no specific names have yet been given. Of the
thyrotropic hormone, whose specific function is the stimulation
of the thyroid glarid, Dr. Loewenberg says:
The existence of a thyroid stimulating substance in the anterior
pituitary lobe has been proven and has been isolated in a sufficiently purified form for clinical use. Whether this is a true, independent hormone or only a by-product of the other well known
pituitary hormones is still a question to be answered by further
experimentation. The action of the so-called thyrotropic hormone
can be elicted. only in the presence of a thyroid gland; it has no
effect after complete thyroidectomy or in the complete absence of
thyroid activity. 266
As to psychical effects of the pituitary, the impracticability
of attempting to attribute particular psychical characteristics
directly to this .one gland becomes manifest when we consider
the extensiveness and complexity of the physiological functions
attributed to it and the dominating influence which .it exerts
over other glands. Still less feasible would it be to attempt to
describe a distinct hyper- or hypopituitary temperament, at
""Ibid., pp. 76-77.

108

Ibid., p. 10!!.

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

67

least from the psychical aspect. Berman, referring to only one
source. of difficulty, i.e. the reciprocal antagonism thought to
exist between certain functions of the anterior and the posterior
lobes, says: " The presence of two antagonistic elements in the
one gland complicates any attempt at even the most abstract
analysis of a personality dominated by that gland." 267
. Hence a " type " of
based upon hyper- or hypofunction of the pituitary is hardly admissible, except, perhaps,
on a morphological basis, since the effects on somatic growth,
on configuration and on sex physiology are practically the only
temperamental effects attributable directly to this gland.· Other
effects, especially those important in the determination of psychical characteristics, it exercises through the medium of its
stimulating or inhibiting influence on other glands, especially
the thyroid, and the psychical characteristics resulting therefrom are reducible to and should be assigned to types based
upon hyper- or hypofunction of these individual glands themselves. In describing hyper- and hypopituitary types, the endocrinologists concern themselves chiefly with individual differences · in somatic· structure and. primary and secondary. sex
characteristics, which pertain more to the morphological aspect
of temperament. ·The. psychical characteristics they describe as
accompanying hyper- or hypopituitary morphological types are
almost identical with those attributed to hyper- or hypofunction
of the thyroid and evidently result from the stimulation or
inhibition of this gland by the thyrotropic hormone .of the
pituitary.
So intimately are these two glands. connected in their determining effect upon temperamental individuality, especially
on the psychical side, that some endocrinologists use the
terminology "hyperpituitary-hyperthyroid"
or "hypothyroidhypopituitary " temperaments. For example, Pende says: " In
our enumeration of constitutional endocrine types we have
placed side by side and almost identified the hyperthyroid and
hyperpituitary constitutions, since it is practically impossible
to separate the pure hyperpituitary constitution from a hyper•" Berman, op. cit., P• !MS.

68

LEO M. BOND

thyroid component." 268 In describing the psychical feature of
his " hyperpituitary-hyperthyroid
" type, he says: " There is a
tendency to psychic unrest due to mental excitement and hyperemotivity, but with dominion of logic over passions. The intelligence is usually well developed." 269 Berman, describing
the same type, says:
brains, the ability to learn, and the ability to control,
self-mastery in the sense of domination of the lower instincts and
the automatic reactions of the vegetative nervous system, the rule
by the individual of himself and his environment, are at their
maximum in him. Men of brains, practical and theoretical, philosophers, thinkers, creators of new thoughts and new goods, belong
to this group. 270
Describing the type based upon hypofunction
glands, Pende says:

of these two

We find in the hypothyroid (or hypothyroid-hypopituitary) variety
an apathetic, slow character, hypoevolute intelligence, marked
especially by a lack of critical faculty, with predominance of concrete over logical thought. 271
Hypopituitary-the intellectual development is slightly backward,
and the character is capricious. In both sexes we find muscular
asthenia low blood pressure and a slow pulse, psychic torpor,
apathy, mental puerilism, lack of concentration, occasionally impulsiveness and deficient moral sense.272
Berman notes of this type:
Among these types are included subjects of obsessions and compulsions who are dull and apathetic, cannot learn or maintain
inhibitions, and so, without initiative, evolve into moral and
intellectual degenerates. 273
Pituitary inferior subnormal temperature, blood pressure and pulse.
Mentally sluggish, dull, apathetic, backward. 274

It is evident from this that the hyperpituitary

and hypopituitary types are practically the same, at least from the psyPende, op. cit., p. 67.
••• Ibid., p. 282.
••• Berman, op. cit., p. 246.
271 Pende, op. cit., p. 80.
968

"" Op. cit., p. 288.
••• Berman, op. cit., p. 244.
""Ibid., p. 247.

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

69

chical aspect, as the hyperthyroid and hypothyroid types.
However, Berman, as we have noted before, would attribute
to the pituitary some sort of direct action upon the brain and
the mentality, although he fails to state which of the seventeen
pituitary hormones are supposed to produce these effects. In
the following statement, he practically admits that this is only
a supposition, not the proven data of empirical observation and
experimentation: " So while the thyroid raises the energy level
of the brain, the whole nervous system, as a by-product of its
general awakening effect upon all the cells of the body, the
pituitary probably stimulates the brain cells more directly,
perhaps in the manner of caffeine or cocaine." 275
With regard to the corresponding type classification of the
ancients and medievalists, the conclusion is evident. The hyperand hypopituitary temperaments of the endocrinologists, since
they are reducible, on the psychical side, to the hyper- and
hypothyroid temperaments, correspond in the older classification to the two temperaments which we have pointed out as
being synonymous with the hyper- and hypothyroid temperaments, namely, the "choleric" and the "phlegmatic."
6. The Hyper- and Hyposexual Temperaments.
The sexual organs or gonads, besides determining the primary
and secondary sex characteristics, i. e. the differentiation of
" male " and "female," and the accompanying morphological
features peculiar to each, such as bone structure, body configuration, fat distribution, voice qualities, etc., have, of course,
as their primary function, reproduction, with all its necessary
physiological concomitants. The gonads accomplish their functions by means of both external secretions (ova and spermatazooa), and certain internal secretions produced in what are
called the "interstitial cells " of the sexual organs. The internal
secretions are supposed to be responsible for the secondary sex
characteristics and to assist in various ways in the whole process of reproduction.
They are considered to be the chief
••• Ibid., p. 70.

70

LEO M. BOND

physiological factors in what the modems call "libido " o.r sex
urge, and "potentiality." Their pathological maHunction iS
responsible, say the endocrinologists, for certain sex anomalies
such -as eunuchoidism, pseudohermaphroditism, precocious or
retarded sex maturation, excessive or defective " libido " and
"potentiality," and possibly of some types of sex perversion.
Hyper- and hypofunction of the gonads is intimately connected with and, to a great extent,· determined by hyper- or
hypofunction of certain other endocrine glands, particularly
the pituitary and adrenals. Speaking of this interrelation, Dr.
Loewenberg says:
Gonad
and function are dependent upon the gonadtropic hormones of the anterior pituitary body. The anterior
pituitary body through its hormones, stimulates libido and potentiality, incites ovulation and menstruation. 216
Since the gonadtropic hormone influences the growth, development
and function of the gonads, any deviation from the normal will
secondarily affect these structures. 271
There appears to be a definite interrelationship between the suprarenal cortex and the gonads. Much of this relationship, judging
from the experimental data obtained by competent experimental
physiologists is mediated through the hypophesis (anterior pituitary
lobe) .278
As an example of glandular interrelationship we may cite that
existing among the adrenal cortex, the anterior pituitary body and
the gonads. The adrenal cortex in many ways owes its function to
the anterior pituitary body which possesses among its many hormones an adrenotropic principle. Most likely the anterior pituitary
body exerts its influence upon the gonads, both through the adrenal
cortex and directly by its gonadtropic hormone, because the
moval of either the anterior pituitary or the adrenal cortex causes
loss of libido and potency with atrophy of the gonads. 279

The designation of a type of temperament based upon hyperor hypofpnction of the gonads has reference principally to
morphological characteristics and even here is confined to a
••• Loewenberg, op. cit., p. 614.
277 Ibid., p. 91.

••• Ibid., p. 616.
Ibid., p. 535.

179

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

71

limited but very fundamental sphere, i. e. somatic features
resulting from sex differentiation and greater or less sexual and
reproductive capacity. Even from the morphological aspect it
would seem: that sex characteristics are qualities too fundamental to justify the. construction of a type of temperament
upon them-they are basic concomitants of all types. However
by the delineation of hyper- and hyposexual temperaments, the
endocrinologists apparently intend simply to point out the fact
that physiologically some men are more " male " than others
and some women more "female " than others.
In the psychical sphere, there
of course, some notable
differences between males and females in general, especially in
the affective zone, differences which undoubtedly have as their
foundation, at least to some degree, the basic physiology peculiar to each sex. But it would seem that the chief, though
perhaps less basic, cause of differences in psychical characteristics between the sexes would be due to the entirely different
psychological " environment" to which each sex is ordinarily
subjected, i.e. their education in and preoccupation with different phases of human activity, their different status and
function in society, etc. In other words, psychical differences
associated with sex differentiation would be classifiable, to a
large extent, as differences of "character" rather than of temperament, though of course the physiological and morphological
differences would be the basic cause of men and women being
subjected to different psychological environments. Common
observation shows that when women are subjected to "masculine,; types of activity, education, occupation, etc., they tend
to develop characteristics usually more predominant in men;
i. e. independence, aggressiveness, etc.
13ut within each sex, the greater .or less predominance in
different individuals of characteristics peculiar to that sex might
be a justifiable basis for the designation of certain types as
" hypersexual " or " hyposexual," especially in the morphologic!J.]. sphere. However, the psychical char;acteristics which
the
depict as accompanying hyper- and hyposexual temperaments are practically identical with those attri-

72

LEO M. BOND

buted to hyper- and hypofunction of other endocrine glands,
especially the adrenals. Thus Pende, who prefers the terms
" hypergenital " and " hypogenital " to " hypersexual " and
"hyposexual," says:
In the hypergenital variety we find an expansive, euphoric character, a lively imagination and mediocre intelligence of realistic
type.2so
In the hypogenital variety we find a depressed character, a
mind either of childish or of hetero-sexual type and hypoevolute
intelligence. 281

The explanation of why hyper- and hyposexual types display
psychical qualities characteristic of hyper- and hyposurrenal
types is not hard to find when we bear in mind the relationship
existing, as noted above, between the pituitary, adrenals and
gonads. Adrenals and gonads tend to hyper- or hypofunction
together, because of the peculiar interplay between the adrenotropic and gonadtropic hormones elaborated by the pituitary.
Hence hyper- or hypofunction of the gonads is accompanied by
psychical qualities characteristic of adrenal hyper- or hypofunction, not that the gonads themselves produce these effects
but that their hyper- or hypofunction is merely a concomitant
of that which does produce these effects, namely hyper- or
hypofunction of the adrenals. Hence hyper- and hypofunction
of the gonads should not be considered as a basis for the postulation of a particular hyper- or hypo- temperament but simply
as an accompaniment of hyper- or hyposurrenal temperaments. Thus from the viewpoint of psychical characteristics,
the types denominated by the endocrinologists as "hypersexual " and " hyposexual " are easily reducible to the hyperand hyposurrenal types and consequently to the corresponding " sanguine " and " melancholic " types in the traditional
classification.
The ancients and medievalists were well aware of the interrelationship between sex, temperament and psychical qualities.
St. Thomas, for instance, commenting on Aristotle, attributes
280

Pende, op. cit., p. 80.

••• Ibid.

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

73

the inconstancy of women to their temperament: " Accordingly,
since woman, as regards the body, has a weak temperament,
the result is that for the most part, whatever she holds to,
she holds to it weakly; although in rare cases the opposite
occurs." 282 Inconstancy, when found in men, was also due to
temperament: "A man fails to stand to that which is counselled
because he holds to it in weakly fashion by reason of the softness of his temperament, as we have stated with regard to
women." 283 Greater or less " libido " was also an effect of
temperament:
By temperament, some are more prone than others to desire
(concupiscentiae) .284 For some are disposed from their own bodily
temperament to chastity. 285 Now that which is on the part of the
body is merely an occasional cause of incontinence; since it is owing
to a bodily disposition that vehement passions can arise in the
sensitive appetite which is a power of the organic body. 286
Even sex perversions might be included in the following and
attributed to temperament:
Some pleasures are in conformity with nature, and some are against
nature. Some of those that are not in conformity with nature are
pleasurable on account of the vicious nature, as, for example, in
some men who have corrupted and perverted temperaments. On
account of this such persons develop perverse imaginations and
affections. For the sensitive functions need the cooperation of the
body, and the body acts in conformity with the nature of the
temperament. 287
Hence, while the older scholars did not designate a particular
type of temperament based upon the sex element, they nevertheless considered greater or less predominance of that element
as an accompaniment of certain other temperaments, which is
actually what the stand of the endocrinologists in the matter
can be reduced to.
••• Summa Theol., II-II, q.l56, a. I, ad I urn.
••• Ibid., ad 2um.
••• II Cont. Gent., 63.
••• Summa Theol., I-II, q. 51, a. 1.
••• Ibid., II-II, q. 156, a. 1.
••• In VII Ethic., lect. 1.

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LEO M. BOND

7. Other Endocrine Glands.
With regard to other glands which are generally considered
by most authorities as having some endocrine function, it is
hardly possible to consider these as forming a basis fo.r ·particular types of temperament, either because their known functions are too limited in scope or too trap.sient ·to exert any
appreciable influence upon the general temperamental disposition of the body and the psychical make-up, or betause, if they
do exert some influence, the psychical qualities resulting therefrom coincide with and are easily reducible to those of other
types. Their hyper- or hypofunction might be responsible for
certain variations or modifications found in other types, but
their effects are not characteristic enough to differentiate a
particular type of individual.
The parathyroids, for instance, control lime metabolism in
the body and exert some influence upon muscle and nerve
excitation. Their abnormal hypofunction is said to cause certain organic nervous diseases and bone malformations. Some
endocrinologists describe a " subparathyroid " type, characterized by irritability and emotional instability, which is practically identical with the hyperthyroid type. The ability of
some children, and occasionally of adults, to form unusually
vivid and detailed picture-images of things seen in· the past,
the " eidetic phenomenon" of Jaensch, may be, say some en do.,.
crinologists, an effect of lime deficiency brought about by parathyroid hypofunction, although it might also be attributable to
thyroid hyperfunction. As Berman says, " Both hyperthyroidism, excessive activity of the thyroid, or subparathyroidism,
insufficient activity of the parathyroid, may cause a loss of lime
salts from the body which is responsible for the peculiar nerve
condition that makes for the eidetic phenomenon." 288
The pancreas, beside its external secretion, the pancreatic
juice, so necessary to good digestion, elaborates in the " islets
of Langerhans," an internal secretion, " insulin," whose chief
function is the regulation of carbohydrate metabolism. An
••• Berman, op. cit., p. 266.

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

75

insufficiency of this hormone may produce diabetes, the condition resulting from an excess of sugar in the .blood. ·. Since
sugar produces a general energizing effect upon the organism,
any undue under- or oversupply of it has an important bearjng
upon the general psychical·tone, as we.noted·when considering
the hyper- and hyposurrenal temperaments .. But other glands
besides the pancreas. play an important part in ca;rbohydJ:ate
metabolism and in the mobilization and utilization of energy.
Hence any psychical characteristics. observed to accotnpany
hyper- or hypofunction of the islets of Langerhans " may not
,be attributable to that gland alone .and; .at. anY rate, from the
psychical viewpoint, any characteristics resulting from deficient or excessive sugar in the· blood are usually included as
particularly of the surrenal
phases of other .
temperaments.
As to the .thymus, located. just below the thyroid and described by some endocrinologists as a gland of· internal secre,..
tion, Dr. Loewenberg says:
Notwithstanding the intensive researches which have been made
and are still being .carried' on iii 'many quarters, its ability to
elaborate a specific hormone has not yet been definitely established.
As to the specific function of the thymus inrelation to growth, development and metabolism, there,exist many controversial opinions
based on similar experimental data. 289 Knowledge of its function,
notwithstanding extensive researches, it still vague even to the
moderns. 290

Hence any attempt. to. describe a " hyper- " or '' hyPothymic "
temperament would be obviously premature.
With regard to the pineal gland, a brain appendage regarded
by the ancient Hindus and later by Rene Descartes as the
" seat of the soul," while some evidence exists as to its elaboration of an internal secretion,
Loewenberg
"We must
confess our total lack of knowledge of the influence of this internal secretion in the body and, particularly, we must point
out that the hypothesis that the secretion plays a role in the
••• Loewenberg, op. cit., p. 899.

••• Ibid., p. 250.

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LEO M. BOND

development of puberty is, to date, completely without significant evidence." 291
This whole section might be summed up by saying that the
four types of temperament designated by the endocrinologists
as hyperthyroid, hypothyroid, hypersurrenal, and hyposurrenal,
to which correspond respectively the choleric, phlegmatic, sanguine, and melancholic temperaments of the ancients an"d
medievalists, are the only ones extensive enough and distinctive
enough to merit the name of " type," and that any psychical
characteristics that might be attributable to other endocrine
glands are easily assignable to these four types. Moreover it is
safe to say that any future " types " which may be evolved
from a better knowledge of the endocrine glands will also be
reducible, on the psychical side, to these four, since they run
the whole gamut of fundamental psychical qualities.
Hence it is evident that the endocrinologists have not added
and will not add anything substantially new to the observations
of the ancients and medievalists as to " type " classification
and the assigning of particular characteristics to each type.
We have, then, one more indication of the fundamental similarity between the hormonal and humoral theories of temperament and, incidentally, further evidence that the older scientists
did not always proceed in quite such an a pnon manner as
some moderns would like to think.

IV. THE ENDOCRINAL

THEORY OF TEMPERAMENT

ARisTOTELIAN-THoMISTIC

AND

PsYCHOLOGY

The endocrinologists, we recall, started out on their study
of individual personality with a notion that man must be, in
some way or other, a" whole," and that any attempt to explain
his personality must be made from a "whole making" point
of view. Their interest in this "personalistic" aspect of human
life was aroused by the unmistakable evidence which they encountered in their work as physicians, psychiatrists, and anthropologists, that man functions in a unified manner, that all his
091

Ibid., p. 48.

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

77

activities, physiological, emotional, intellectual or whatever
way one might classify them, are in some manner or other, so
interrelated that one type of activity cannot take place without
setting up repercussions in all the other types, moreover, that
the individual man is characterized by an individual, personal
way of reacting physiologically, emotionally, intellectually.
They then set out to determine, by means of empirical investigation, the basic cause of this remarkable unity and individuality in man's functioning. Having accumulated, by much
painstaking experimentation and observation, a great mass of
empirical data with regard to man's physiological,
and mental operations, they concluded that the unification so
apparent in his functioning is due to the fact that man himself
is simply the sum-total of his morphology, temperament and
character, three closely interrelated "sides" of man which,
taken all together, constitute the" whole" man. The next step
was to determine the basic cause of morphology, temperament,
and character, i.e., to discover the chief factor responsible for
the characteristic shape and size of an individual's body, the
peculiar structure and functional disposition of his organs and
the individuality of all his mental and emotional characteristics.
Because of the great influence which the secretions of the endocrine glands were observed to exert on these three "constituents " of the whole, it was decided that these chemical
compounds are the chief determinant of morphology, temperament, and character, inasmuch as they are the chief determinant of the individual structure and functional disposition of
all bodily organs, which structure and functional disposition
are, in turn, the cause of the individual morphological build
and psychical make-up. The "whole" man-the sum-total of
these three constituents-is, therefore, simply the total product
of the combined chemical activities of his hormones. He is a
homogeneous unit, composed entirely of matter. Not only his
body, but his thoughts and emotions as well, are the products
of material, chemical reactions instigated by his endocrine secretions. With such a concept of man as a starting point, it is not
surprising that Berman, for instance, should conclude, as noted

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LEO

BOND

before, that: " The soul was once a subtlety of metaphysics.
Now when mind appears soaked in matter, saturated with
chemicals like the hormones, therefore woven out of material
threads, the independent entity created out of intangible spirit
flilits like a ghost at dawn."
Now the question presents itself: how is it that from substantially the same empirical data as to the effect of organic
dispositions on psychical activities, men like Aristotle and St.
Thomas should have arrived at conclusions so totally different
from those of the endocrinologists. as to the nature of man and
his operations? How is it that the theory of the humors as the
chief determlliant of man's individual characteristics could have
led its proponents to the conclusion not only that man has a
spiritual soul, but that a spiritual soul is the very form of man,
while the theory of the hormones has led some of the endocrinologists to· the conclusion that man cannot possibly have a
spiritual soul since he is composed entirely of matter? The
answer is, of course, that Aristotle and St. Thomas realized that
man himself is .something quite different from the phenomena
which he exhibits and hence that empirical investigation alone
is not sufficient to arrive at a knowledge of man's nature, but
must be combined not only with a careful analysis of the
evidence offered by man's own consciousness but with a process of :accurate reasoning downward from self-evident first·
principles.
The chief reason, then, •why the empirical investigation of
the endocrinologists has failed to disclose the nature of man's'
"wholeness " ,and the nature of man himself, is the fact that
it is ·concerned .only with the accidental qualities inherent in
man, and not with man himself. The endocrinologists contend;
of course, that such. distinctions pertain to philosophy, not to
science; and that they are ·not concerned with a philosophical
explanation of man, but only with those things about. him
which can be accurately determined by empirical observation
and experimentation. Nevertheless, they profess the desire and
intention of .arriving at a knowledge of the " whole" man, and
they ..even attempt to explain the "whole" man in terms of

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79

empirical data. This is, of course, from our point of view, a
contradictory position. Either they must abandon all attempts'
to arrive at a knowledge and to give an explanation of the
" whole" man and confine themselves solely to an investigation
of. his phenomenal aspects, or else combine their scientific data.
with those philosophical principles by which alone the intrinsio
nature of man can be understood and accounted for. If they
choose the first alternative, they must refrain from all speculation, as to what intrinsically constitutes man, and particularly
they must refrain from denying things about him which can
neither be ,affirmed nor denied on the basis of 'empirical data
alone.
Yet to confine themselves to this purely empirical type of
investigation would be a great pity, because a knowledge of
the intrinsic nature of man would, as we have said before,
give direction and orientation to their empirical investigations.
It would supply them with some degree of foreknowledge, so
to speak, of what they might expeot to find in their observations and experiments, with a better appreciation of the interdependence among the various kinds of functions which the·
" whole" man performs and would serve as a check and a norm
by which to evaluate their experimental findings. Especially,
it would save them from that purely materialistic concept of
man from which flow so many grave and far-reaching errors ..
Moreover, an understanding of man's nature would be of
practical value to them in their work as physicians, psychiatrists, etc. True, a philosophical knowledge of man's constitution would not, of itself, enable them to cure this or that bodily
or mental disease; nevertheless, it would furnish them· with a
psychological insight irito their patient which would be a distinct advantage in the diagnosis and treatment of many types
of pathology. It would enable them, for instance, to appreciate
better the value of mental and emotional symptoms as indi:.
cators of particular types ·of organic and functional disorders.
A better appreciation of even the physiological unity of mail
would be a great aid to them in determining what· specific
remedy would· he here and now safest and most effective.

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LEO M. BOND

Thyroxin, for instance, might be a specific for this or that type
of thyroid malfunction, but the patient's constitution as a whole
must be taken into consideration before it can be safely administered. It might have very undesirable effects on other systems
and organs in the body, on the nerves, heart, blood pressure,
etc., because of the individual's peculiar physiological make-up
as a whole. It might induce, moreover, mental and emotional
states which would only aggravate the patient's condition, because of his constitution as a whole. Examples of this kind
might be multiplied indefinitely.
Another reason why it would be a pity for the endocrinologists to confine themselves to a mere empirical investigation
of man is the fact that, were they familiar with the doctrines
of true philosophical psychology and with some of its presuppositions, they would be in an excellent position, by reason
of their technical knowledge of the human organism and its
functioning, to render real service to this branch of philosophy
by contributing not a little to a better understanding and
appreciation of the body-soul relationship, which is, after all,
the key question in psychology. They have already a great
advantage over the majority of modern scientific psychologists
in that they have an appreciation of at least the fact of the
" wholeness " of man and the unity of his nature and are
convinced of the necessity of studying the whole man from a
"whole-making" point of view. The failure to grasp these
notions is one of the chief reasons why so much of modern
psychology has gone awry.
One of the chief difficulties which would confront these men
in the acceptance of that psychological doctrine which alone
has been able to give an adequate and complete account of
man's nature (i.e., Aristotelian-Thomistic psychology) would
be, as we have noted before, the conviction that since Aristotle
and St. Thomas and the other ancients and medievalists from
whom they borrowed much of their physiological doctrines,
were hopelessly inaccurate in their observations and interpretations of physiological phenomena and were, in fact, wrong in
many of their particular conclusions, they could not possibly

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

81

have arrived, even with the most impeccable reasoning, at a
true interpretation of man's nature. We have attempted to
furnish some evidence whereby such misconceptions might be
corrected, by showing not only that these men were substantially correct in basic notions of physiology, but, more specifically, that their humoral explanation of man's physiological and
psychical individuality bears a remarkable fundamental similarity to the endocrinal explanation and was, in fact, the embryo
from which the whole science of endocrinology developed.
We will now attempt to give, in a way which might be comprehensible to the endocrinologists, a summary idea of some of
the more basic notions upon which the Aristotelian- Thomistic
psychology is built, as well as an indication of some of the
presuppositions upon which it rests. We will also attempt to
indicate, at the same time, how this psychology and its presuppositions not only render the data of endocrinology intelligible, but furnish an ultimate and adequate explanation of man
himself, of his nature, and his individuality. Such an attempt
to present a thumb-nail sketch, so to speak, of AristotelianThomistic psychology, especially to men unfamiliar with its
terminology, labors, of course, under many difficulties, not the
least of which is the fact that the psychology of Aristotle and
St. Thomas is, to a great extent, based upon and presupposes
their cosmological and metaphysical doctrines, doctrines with
which, of course, the endocrinologists are, for the most part,
unfamiliar. However, it would seem that the only feasible way
to introduce these men to such ideas as matter and form, in the
technical sense, substance and accidents, etc., is by showing
them how these things are realized in man, and how man can
arrive at a knowledge of them by the use of his senses and his
reason. Moreover, it would seem better to omit, in such a presentation, some of the more detailed doctrines, until some of
the more general features of the doctrine as a whole have been
grasped.
To explain, at least in technical detail, such things as the
real distinction between the soul and its powers, that the soul
is not immediately operative, etc., would only cause confusion,
6

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LEO·M. BOND

as would insistence on the fact that when a Thomist speaks of
the soul as the form of the body, he really means the form of
the prime matter of the body. It would seem that the first and
most important thing to be impressed upon the endocrinologists
is 'the 'fact that man is one, complete, living, sensing, understanding, substance, composed of two incomplete, entirely different substances, a material body and a spiritmil. soul. This
fact inakes hlni·something unique in creation, something quite
different from the phenomena which he exhibits, and something
specifically distinct not only from plants and animals, but from
non-living matter as well, facts which not all endocrinologists
are willing to admit. On the other hand, a summary presentation of such matters runs ··the risk of becoming an inadequate
presentation and the avoidance, as much as is possible, of
technical expressions and technical explanations can easily give
.
to niisinterpretations, ·due to the· manifold meanings· and
connotations which have come to be attached to wol'ds used
.in common parlance. However, it would seem that attempts
in this direction .must be made if we are to present our philosophy to· those: unfamiliar· not only with ·philosophical terms
but with· philosophical ideas. The following paragraphs are,
therefore, merely a suggestion: of. how one might proceed in
famili:i!-rizingthe endocrinologists with the substance· of our
psjrchology and with· some of. its presuppositions.

. If the data of endocrinology manifests anything about man,
it is.that he operates as a unit. H the activities of his endocrine
giands.can exert a profound
not only upon his major
physiological processes such. as metabolism, nerV-e activity,
re&piration, and reproduction, but also upon all his mental and
emotionalprocesses as well, this could only be becauseall these
vari9us types of activity constitute phases of a total activity
flowing from man as a whole. Emotional states such as anger
and fear could not cause a
of adrenalin nor could a
release of adrenalin cause, a speeding up of blood pressure,
heart beat, and muscle activity, as well as an intensification

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

88

of mental processes, unless all these activities were so joined
together .in man as to form all together a unified operation.
If, then, as endocrine datJ;t so
indicates, no one type, of
activity takes place in man without influencing all the other
types, it is evident that man does operate as a unit.
Since, therefore, man operates as. a unit, he must be, in himself and by reason of his very nature, a unit, for universal
experience demonstrates the fact that a thing operates according to its nature, and the mode of its operation indicates the
mode of its being. It would be impossible for a thing to produce a type of activity contrary or in any way disproportionate
to its nature, for the nature of a thing is .the principle, the
source from which its operations flow. In other words, .a thing
acts as it does solely because it is what it is. The unification
so apparent in all the activities flowing from man's nature,
demands, there{ore, and presupposes unity in man's nature.
Moreover, even without a detailed knowledge of the unification
existing among his various operations, man, in the very exercise
of at least his conscious activities, has some awareness of the
fact that he is ali integer.
But to really understand the unity of man's nature, we must
know how
why he is a unit, and what kind of unit he is.
. By reflection upon himself and his activities, man can perceive
that, although he operates as a unit, he himself is something
quite distinct from his own operations, for these constantly
change, come and go, succeed one another in an endless procession, but he himself remains the same individual throughout
life. His operations produce many changes in him; they cause
him to grow and develop physically and mentally, yet he is
conscious of the fact that as a full grown man he is still the
same person that he was as a child: Nothing is more obvious
than the transitoriness of his emotional activities, for instance,
yet he is always the same person who is now angry, now calm,
now loving, now hating, now fearing, now hoping. Now he is
exercising one type of activity, now another, or now he ceases
to exercise some types of activity altogether. At one time he
is walking, at another resting, now thinking, now sleeping, yet

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LEO M. 'BOND

always it is the same individual who performs all these transient activities. If, therefore, he himself is something permanent, his operations something transient, he himself must be
something distinct from his operations.
Though he himself is distinct from his operations, nevertheless it is evident to him that his operations are so related
to himself that they cannot take place outside of himself, they
have no existence except in him. His thinking, for instance,
does not go on when he stops thinking, nor his walking when
he sits down. His operations, therefore, are accidents, things
which have no existence in themselves or of themselves, but
only in something else, only in some subject, upon which they
depend and in which they inhere. But man liimself, the subject
of these accidents, is a substance, that is, something that does
exist in itself and by itself and not in something else as in a
subject, something that "stands under" and supports the
accidents which inhere in it.
This same relationship that exists between man and his
operations, exists also between man and all his qualities,
whether of body or mind, for the qualities of man have no
existence outside the man himself. They have their being only
in him whose qualities they are; he is the subject upon which
they depend and in which they inhere. The shape and size of
his body, the disposition of his organs, his emotional and intellectual characteristics, are all things that have no existence
except in the man himself; they are accidents inhering ultimately in the substance man, and he is the subject which
underlies and supports all these qualities.
Man is, therefore, by his very nature, not only one thing but
one substance, one substantial thing, and his unity is the unity
of a substance, a substantial unity. Hence man himself cannot
consist of a mere aggregate of his operations, for his operations,
are accidents and no aggregate of accidents can ever constitute
a substance. Substance and accidents are two essentially different things. Neither can the substance, man, consist in the
sum-total of his physical and psychical qualities, for they too
are only accidents inhering in man and presupposing man as

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

85

their supporting subject. Hence morphology, temperament, and
character cannot be the constituents of man himself nor of
man's nature, for they are merely dispositions of his body and
his mind, accidents, therefore, inhering in man but incapable
of constituting him. They may be the constituents of his personality, if we mean by personality the sum-total of all his
accidental individual characteristics, but they cannot be the
constituents of the substance man himself.
To say that man is by nature one substance, does not of itself
tell us much about what particular kind of thing man is, or
what particular kind of nature he has. Any one thing that
exists in itself and not in another as in a subject, is one substance-a stone, for instance, or a tree, or a dog. We want to
know what kind of substance man is. When we have determined
this, we will know a good deal more about man himself and his
nature. Since the nature of a substance is manifested by its
operations, to learn more about the nature of man, we must
investigate more in detail the operations which he performs,
whether these be automatic, as his physiological operations, or
conscious and deliberate, as his sensory and rational operations.
To start, then, with man's physiological operations, the
most obvious thing about these is that they are vital operations,
i.e., the activities of a living thing. We recognize a thing as
living if it manifests self-motion, or motion from within, i. e., if
it grows and develops, preser-ves, perfects, and ultimately reproduces itself by means of a series of internal activities produced by parts or organs which act upon and move each other
in such a way that the joint activities of all together conduce to
the preservation and development of the whole thing. This is
why we call a living thing an organism, something composed of
parts or organs, each of which, by means of its operation, contributes something to the well-being of the whole.
Moreover, while in a living thing a certain amount of balance
or equilibrium must be maintained among the various phases
of the total activity, nevertheless this total activity is really
the result of a lack of rigid equilibrium among the various parts
or organs, a lack which induces a mutual interaction among the

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LEO M. BOND

organs, whereby one organ initiates, stimulates, or retards the
activities of other organs for the efficient production of the total
activity necessary for the welfare of the organism as a whole.
A living thing lacks a rigidly stable equilibrium among its
various !Jrgans because the preservation and well-being of the
organism as a whole demands a great amount of adaptability. on
the part of the organs in order to meet the ever changing requirements of the organism resulting from the various conditions and circumstances in which it finds itself .. This adaptability
to meet changing circumstances is one of the chief characteristics of a living thing. In the human organism, it is particularly
conspicuous in the function of the endocrine system, as we have
seen.
· Another characteristic of a living thing is that in it, nonliving matter, such as chemical elements and compounds, is
elevated to the performance of vital activities such as nutrition,
growth and reproduction, activities of which chemical elements
and· compounds are incapable as found in their natural state
outside of an organism. Here we have evidence of the existence
in' living things of some vital principle, some sources of life
which so dominates, directs, and elevates chemical and physical
forces as to render them capable of performing functions of a
higher order than they themselves are naturally capable of.
Without such an elevation, in the case of animals and men, the
ability of hormones, for instance, me_re chemical compounds, to
contribute essentially· to such vital operations as metabolism,
nerve activity, ovulation, spermatization, etc., would be entirely inexplicable. Metabolism, for example, that wonderful
process wherein a certain permanence in the shape and identity
of bodily organs and of the whole organism is maintained
despite a constant change of matter, is a type of activity which
has no counterpart in non-living things, and one which clearly
evidences the presence of a vital principle capable of elevating
non-living chemicals to the performance of vital activities. Of
the role played by this vital principle in the higher activities
of man, we will see more later.
These, then, are the essential characteristics of a living thing

EFFECT OF BODILY TEMPERAMENT

87

with self-movement, or movement from within, resulting from a
lack of rigid equilibrium of parts and productive of the total
activity necessary for the preservation, development, and reproduction of the thing itself, a self-movement directed by a
vital principle capable of elevating non-living matter to the
performance of vital activities. These characteristics constitute
the criteria by which living things can be distinguished from
non-living things. They are totally lacking in non-living things,
in atoms of non-living matter, for instance. The parts of an
atom, nucleus and electrons, when stimulated from without,
react on each other and move each other to produce an element
or a compound wit,h a more perfect activity than that of which
they themselves, considered as individual parts, are capable, but
this activity never passes beyond the limits of mere mechanical
force. It never becomes a vital activity productive of growth
and self-reproduction in the atom, nor is it capable of a great
adaptability to meet changing conditions. The equilibrium
between nucleus and electrons is a rigidly stable equilibrium
derived from the very structure of the atom itself. It is by reason of the very rigidity of equilibrium between its parts that the
atom is unable to move itself, or to alter the motion impressed
upon it from without. There is in the atom no constantly maintained lack of· equilibrium productive of a series of internal
activities which· result in the development and reproduction of
the atom itself nor is there any elevation of mechanical forces to
the performance of a type of activity higher than mere mechanical action. Hence the atom performs no vital activities
and is, therefore, a non-living thing.
The same is true of chemical elements, which by reason of a
stable equilibrium of their parts are incapable of moving themselves from within for their own self-development and self- reproduction. They merely react in a uniform, mechanical way,
according to their particular natures, to stimuli applied from
without. They have no organs nor are they capable of adapting
themselves by reason of a labile equilibrium of parts to changing
conditions. It is only when they have been incorporated into
a living thing that they become capable of vital activities.

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Man's physiological activities, then, are vital activities, since
they are the activities by which man nurtures himself, grows
and reproduces his kind. Since, therefore, man performs vital
activities, he must be not only one substance, but one living
substance, endowed with an intrinsic principle of life, hence
differing radically and essentially, both in his being and in his
operations, from all non-living things. Therefore neither he
himself nor his activities, not even his physiological activities,
can be the products of mere physical forces or chemical reactions. If chemical compounds such as the hormones can produce vital operations in man, it is only because they have
become parts of his organism and have thus come under the
domination, direction and elevating power of the principle of
life within him.
But man's operations are not confined to mere physiological
activity. He is conscious of the fact that he performs another
of activity which differs in many respects from physiological activity, viz., the activities of his senses. By a little
introspection, he can perceive that it is by the activity of his
external senses, sight, touch, hearing, etc., that he first becomes
aware of the existence of his own body, and of other material
objects. He acquires this knowledge by reason of the fact that
his senses apprehend sensible qualities of these extra-mental
objects, their color, their shape, their sound, etc. When he sees
an apple, for instance, he is aware of the existence of the apple
because sensible qualities of the apple have gotten into his
consciousness, although obviously the apple itself, together with
its qualities, remains as it was outside of himself. The very
same qualities that are in the apple and that remain in the
apple, have, therefore, acquired. in his sense consciousness, a
new kind of existence, a psychical existence, a unique type of
existence which is realized nowhere but in a knowing subject.
The new existence which the qualities of the apple have
acquired in the knower is to some degree an immaterial existence, for it involves a reproduction, so to speak, of the material
qualities of the apple, but without the matter in which those
qualities inhere as they are in the extramental apple. Yet it is

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89

not a purely immateral existence, because it is limited to the
material qualities of a particular concrete apple, and is brought
about, as we shall now see, by the activity of material organs.
The medium through which the eye is brought into contact
with the color of the apple is the image or representation of the
apple which is impressed upon the retina of the eye. Through
the medium of this retinal image, the eye, by means of its
sensory operation c.£ seeing, apprehends the color of the apple,
and man, the knower, h¥ acquired at least an incomplete sense
knowledge of that color. But before he can perceive the apple,
i. e. before his sense knowledge of the color of the apple is really
complete, the visual sensation beginning in his retina must be
relayed along the nerve tracts leading to the brain. More precisely, they go to that particular group of brain cells located
principally in the cortex of the brain, which constitute the
organ of what is called in Aristotelian-Thomistic psychology,
the " common or central sense," an internal sense by whose
function the knower becomes completely aware of the fact that
he is sensing something and is enabled to distinguish the sensation of one sense from that of the others.
Fundamentally the same process takes place when man apprehends the other sensible qualities of the apple, by means of
other external senses, its sweetness, for instance, by the sense
of taste, its smoothness, by the sense of touch, etc. When he
touches the apple, for instance, the peripheral nerve endings in
the " touch spots " of his fingers receive an impression of something soft and hard and this tactile sensation is relayed along
the nerve tracts to the organ of common sense, and he becomes
fully aware that he is touching something and that the thing
he is touching is hard or soft, as the case may be. This process
of sensation with regard to the external senses has, in general,
been amply verified by modern experimental data, although the
exact location within the brain of the particular cells which
constitute the organ of central or common sense has not been
definitely determined, nor, in fact, is the term" common sense"
generally used by the moderns.
Moreover, man is conscious of the fact that, besides the

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LEO M. BOND

activities of the external senses and the internal common sense,
he is capable of another type of sense cognition which does not
arise here and now from the operations of the external senses.
He can close his eyes, for instance, and imagine the color and
shape of an apple which he does not see, or he can recall an
image of an apple which he saw yesterday orlast week. This
is sense knowledge, to be sure, but obviously not a knowledge
which arises here and now from the activity of the external
senses, for he is not employing these in the present instance.
This type of sense cognition must take place, then, solely within
the brain organ, by means of an image formed in that group
of brain cells which constitute the organs of imagination or
of sensory memory as the case may be, for there can be no
other explanation of the presence of the sensible qualities of the
apple in his consciousness when he is not employing his external
senses. The formation of internal· images by the memory and
imagination can be easily verified by the simple experiment of
closing the eyes and remembering or imagining some object.
The presence .of an internal image of the object can be · detected. The data which the image produces was acquired
originally by external sense cognition, but here and now the
image is formed independently of the activities of the external
se:nses. Another · indication that the internal senses employ
organs located in the brain is had from the fact that lesions in
etc., result
certain sections of the brain, due to injury,
in a complete or partial inhibition of memory or in derangements of the imagination.
The cognitive operations of the external and internal senses
are, therefore, material operations, performed in and by means
of material organs and involving molecular changes in nerves,
brain cells,.etc. Nevertheless they are at the same time at least
quasi-spiritual operations because by means of them, the material qualities of extramental objects acquire a unique, quasiimmaterial, psychical existence in man's consciousness. Hence
the senses are capable of a type of activity definitely higher than
.purely physiological activity.
Yet sensory activities presuppose and depend upon physio-

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91

logical activity, since they are the operations of organs which
were formed by physiological activity and which depend upon
physiological activity for their nourishment, development, and
functional efficiency. Hence it is not surprising that the quality
of sensory cognitive operations should be determined to a great
extent by the structure and functional disposition, the temperament, in other words, of. the organs themselves. A better physiological disposition of the organ of imagination, for instance, is
conducive to the formation of clearer and more complete images
and hence to better imaginative qualities. This explains why
better or worse imagination and memory can result from better
or worse endocrine function, for endocrine function is, as we
have seen at length, the chief determinant of the structure and
functional disposition of organs. A hypersecretion of thyroxin
by the thyroid, for instance, means greater sensitivity and a
more energetic activity of nerve cells in the organ of imagination, which in turn conduces to clearer, more complete, more
rapidly formed images. This is not to say that the images are
the products of chemical reactions instigated in the brain cells
by thyroxin, but simply that the energizing and sensitizing of
the brain cells by thyroxin enables them to perform better the
work which they must do in the functioning of the imagination.
Besides seeing or imagining an apple, man is aware of the
fact that if he is hungry and likes apples, he desires to eat the
apple. In other words, he experiences a movement of his sensitive appetite toward the sensible good which he apprehends in
the apple, a good which consists in the ability of the apple to
satisfy his taste and his hunger. Moreover, when he tastes the
apple, he is conscious of a certain joy of satisfaction. Sense
appetition constitutes, therefore, a type of activity which is
superadded to and caused by sensory knowledge, an activity,
consequently, which also takes place in sense organs and is,
therefore, conditioned to a great extent by the structure and
functional disposition of those organs. This type of activity is
of all the senses, both external and internal. It
includes not only the movements of the appetite toward the
sensible good and a sense of joy when that good is possessed,

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LEO M. BOND

but also movements of recoil from what is apprehended as undesirable in the object as well as feelings of sadness which ensue
if the undesirable object cannot be avoided. It includes also
various other appetitive movements such as fear, the reaction
following upon the apprehension of an evil that is imminent
and apparently unavoidable, and anger, the vindictive reaction
against an evil that is actually present, etc. These appetitive
movements of the sensory appetite are accompanied by changes
in the physiological activities of the body, changes which vary
in proportion to the intensity of the movements themselves.
The whole appetitive reaction, including the physiological
changes, constitutes what are commonly called emotions.
Emotional activity is, therefore, an activity of physical organs. Consequently it is easily conditioned as to intensity,
frequency, etc., by the disposition of the organs themselves.
Moreover, special dispositions of the organs can cause in an
individual a greater or less susceptibility to one or another of
the emotions. This explains why an individual's emotional
tendencies can be determined to a great extent by the functional peculiarities of his endocrine system, since these latter
determine the peculiar condition of the organs involved in emotional activity. It explains, for instance, why hyperfunction of
an individual's adrenal glands can cause in him a proneness to
fear or anger, why hypofunction of his thyroid can deaden his
response to emotional stimuli, etc.
Sense cognition and sense appetition have, therefore, physiological activities as their substrate. Nevertheless, they constitute a much higher type of activity than that of which the
organs are, of themselves, capable. Hence they give further
evidence of the presence in man of some vital principle which
is capable not only of elevating non-living matter to the performance of vital physiological activities, but of elevating living
organs to the performance of a quasi-spiritual sensory activity
completely above their physiological powers. This principle
must be, therefore, at least to some degree, an immaterial or
spiritual principle, for otherwise it could not elevate material
organs to the performance of quasi-spiritual activities.

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98

Man, by the aid of introspection and accurate analysis of his
own thoughts and the process by which he forms them, is able
to perceive that he performs, over and above physiological and
sensory activities, other cognitive activities which terminate in
a type of knowledge far superior to mere sense knowledge. By
his senses he apprehends sensible qualities of particular material
objects, their color, shape, smell, taste, etc. But his senses .
never penetrate to the essence of the objects whose sensible
qualities they apprehend; nor do they perceive such things as
the substantiality of objects. His senses do not tell him what
a thing is, but only how it looks, how it feels, how it tastes, etc.
Essence and substantiality cannot be seen or heard or touched,
yet man is aware of the fact that somehow or other they have
gotten into his consciousness because he knows at least something about the essences of things and can distinguish the substantiality of a thing from its accidents. By this type of
knowledge, then, he has apprehended things that are not
sensible but only intelligible; hence he has not apprehended
them by his senses but by his intellect.
The only possible way in which he could have arrived at a
knowledge of such things as the essence and substantiality of
objects, is by a process of mental abstraction whereby his
intellect separates, so to speak, that which is intelligible in
material objects from the objects themselves, whose existence
was first made known to him by the activity of his senses
apprehending their sensible, material qualities. When he knows
the essence of a thing, he has in his intellect that which is
required to constitute the thing, that which makes the thing
what it is. Hence he has the thing itself in his intellect, according to its psychical mode of existence and in a purely immaterial way, i. e., without the matter which the thing possesses
in its extramental reality and even without the material, sensible qualities as they are in this or that particular object. Hence
by the activity of his intellect, he has completely de-materialized
the object, so to speak, by giving it a purely spiritual existence
in his mind, whereas by the activity of his senses he gave a
merely quasi-spiritual existence to the material qualities inher-

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LEO M. BOND

ing in this or that individual object. Moreover when he knows
the essence of things or their substantiality, he can perform
further intellectual activities by forming judgments about
these things and by reasoning about them, activities which are
completely above the power of his senses.
Man's intellectual activities are, therefore, purely spiritual
activities, for by them he completely spiritualizes material
things. His intellect itself, then, must be a purely spiritual
thing, for only purely spiritual things can perform purely
spiritual activities. Intellectual activities, therefore, since they
are purely spiritual activities, cannot be the functions of material organs, nor does the intellect depend intrinsically, in either
its being or its operations, upon bodily organs. However, the
human intellect, as it is in this life, depends extrinsically upon
bodily organs, in its operations, for it is by the images formed
in the external and internal senses that the intellect first comes
in contact with reality and is supplied with the data from which
it elaborates its ideas, and these images are, as we have seen,
activity of bodily organs. Hence
the products of the
intellectual activities can be conditioned in an indirect way by
the temperament of sensory organs, for the better the structure
and functional dispositions of the nerves, brain cells, etc., employed in the formation and transmission of the sensible images,
the clearer and more complete will be the images themselves
and the more rapidly will they be produced and presented to
the intellect for de-materialization, which will greatly increase
the clarity and speed with which the intellect forms its ideas
and judges and reasons by means of these ideas. This extrinsic
dependence of the intellect, in its activities, upon the senses,
explains how brain chemistry can determine to a great extent
the speed and quality of intellectual reactions. This is not to
say that thinking itself is a product of chemical activity or the
physiological function of the brain cells themselves, but simply
that better disposed brain cells mean better imagery, which in
turn conduces to better intellectual activity. This is why more
thyroxin in the blood stream, for instance, means better intellectual reactions, because thyroxin sensitizes and energizes all

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95

the nerves, tissues and cells involved in the activity of the
sensory organs, particularly the brain cells, of which the internal
sense organs are composed.
Here we have further evidence of the elevation in man of an
inferior type of activity, namely, sensory activity, to form the
basis of a much higher type of activity, purely spiritual, intellectual activity, the elevation of bodily organs, not to the performance of purely spiritual activities, but to subserve the
intellect in its purely spiritual activities. Such an elevation
again presupposes in man a highest principle which dominates
and elevates all his physiological and sensory activities and
directs them to the highest type of activity of which man is
capable, i.e. purely spiritual, intellectual activity. This principle must be, therefore, a purely spiritual principle, for nothing
less than a purely spiritual principle could be the source of
purely spiritual activities. It must be, moreover, a principle
endowed not only with vegetative and sensory powers but with
purely spiritual, intellectual powers. In the exercise of its vegetative and sensitive powers it depends upon and directly employs bodily organs, whereas in the exercise of its intellectual
powers it is intrinsically independent of matter though it depends extrinsically upon material organs for the data from
which it abstracts to form its ideas.
Man is conscious of the fact that besides physiological, sensory and intellectual activities, he also performs another type
of activity, the activity of his will, or volitional activity, by
which he desires and enjoys not only material, sensible goads,
but also immaterial, spiritual goods such as happiness, peace,
virtue, etc. Will is simply that quality by which man tends
toward the good which he recognizes in the things that he
knows. Hence the appetition of the will is a much higher type
of activity than is sense appetition, for by sense appetition man
desires and enjoys particular, material, sensible goods which he
apprehends by sense knowledge as being capable of satisfying
his senses, whereas by volitional appetition he 'Can desire and
enjoy abstract, immaterial goods apprehended by intellectual
knowledge. In choosing particular forms of goods, particular

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LEO M. BOND

kinds of happiness, etc., the will follows the judgments of the
intellect as to the desirability of this or that particular type of
good. However, the will is intrinsically free in its choices because, although it follows the judgments of the intellect, the
intellect itself is in no way necessitated to judge that some
particular good is better than another since all particular goods
are deficient in one respect or another. Moreover, the will exercises a certain dominion over the operations of the intellect and
hence can restrain the intellect from making judgments as to
the desirability or undesirability of this or that good.
Since, therefore, volition is simply the appetitive phase of
intellectual activity, it is, like intellection, a spiritual activity.
Hence it does not intrinscally depend upon material organs nor
take place in material organs, as do the movements of the
sensitive appetite. The will is, therefore, both in itself and in
its operations, independent of matter and cannot be forced in
its choices by the disposition of physical organs, by intra visceral
pressures or bodily conditions. However, since the object of
the will, the good, must first be presented to it by the intellect
and since, moreover, the choice of the will follows upon the
judgment of the intellect, the will in its operations is indirectly
and extrinsically dependent upon sensory activity and bodily
organs inasmuch as the intellect itself is extrinsically dependent
upon them in its activities. Better sensory activity means better
intellectual activity and the clearer and more complete is the
intellect's knowledge of a thing, the stronger can be the movement of the will toward the good apprehended in the thing and
the more rapidly and energetically can the will react to the
judgments of the intellect. Hence the will can be indirectly
influenced in its desires and choices, but can never be forced,
by the quality of sensory activities and the structure and
functional dispositions of physical organs.
Hence the will can be influenced by the emotior:s, since these
are movements of the sensitive appetite. Anger, fear, hope,
sensual love can indirectly greatly impede or intensify the
desires and choices of will since they can impede or intensify
the intellectual activities upon which the will depends. But

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97

they can never force the will, unless they become so intense as
to completely destroy the reason. Hence volitional activities
can be conditioned to some extent by the temperament of
physical organs and the will greatly influenced, though never
forced, in its desires and choices by bodily dispositions. This
explains why volitional reactions can be influenced by the condition of the endocrine glands, inasmuch as the endocrine glands
can greatly influence emotional and intellectual reactions.
These, then, are the kinds of activity which man, the substance, performs: physiological, sensory, intellectual, and volitional. And since the activities of a thing manifest its nature,
we must conclude that man is by nature not only one complete
substance, but one complete living, sensing, thinking, willing
substance, a substance which contains in its totality not only
a purely material element but a purely spiritual element, the
vital, spiritual principle which dominates and directs all the
activities of man and elevates his physiological and sensitive
activities to subserve his intellectual activities.
If man is only one substance, how can he contain in himself
two such contrary elements as pure matter and pure spirit?
In the first place, the material element and spiritual element
in man must be substances, for they are the constituents of
man, and man is a substance. A substance cannot be constituted of anything less than substance. But the material and
the spiritual elements in man cannot be two complete substances because two complete substances must ever remain two
complete substances and cannot together constitute one substance. The material element and the spiritual element in man
must be, therefore, two incomplete substances which complete
each other in such a way as to form together one complete
substance. The incomplete material substance in man we call
body; the incomplete spiritual substance we call soul. Man,
t.herefore, is not all matter; he is not all spirit. He is matterspirit. He is not a body; he is not a soul. He is a body-soul,
one complete substance composed of two incomplete substances.
Now if, of two incomplete substances which unite to form
one complete substance, one of the incomplete substances sup7

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LEO M. BOND

plies to the· composite that which distinguishes the composite
from every other kind of being, then that incomplete substance
specifies the composite, i. e., constitutes it in a definite species,
makes the composite specifically what it is, and at the same
time completes the other incomplete substance in such a way
as to make it specifically what it is in the composite. This is
what the soul does in the body-soul composite, because it is the
soul-the spiritual element-which supplies the intellect in man
and it is by reason of his intellect that man is distinct from
every other kind of living being in the world, from plants,
whose vegetative life he shares, from animals, whose sensory
life he shares. It is by reason of his intellect that man is man,
a human being, a rational animal, constituting a unique species.
It is the soul, then, that determines man
be what he is and
it is the soul that makes the body what it is ;in the human composite, i.e., a living, human, body, specifically distinct from all
other living bodies. This is why we say that the' soul is the
form of the body, i.e., that which causes the material element
in man to be a living, human body and to act as a living, human
body. It is because the soul is the form of the body that the
soul dominates and directs all the activities of the body in such
a way as to ordain them all ultimately to the production of that
activity. which is highest and most characteristic of manintellectual activity. It is the soul, therefore, that elevates the
chemical and physical forces in the human body above their
natural capacities in such a way as to render them capable of
performing vital physiological activities, i. e., nutrition, growth
and reproduction. It is the soul also that elevates the bodily
organs, composed of chemical elements, to the performance of
a type of activity above their physiological powers, namely,
sensory activities. It is the soul also that elevates the sensory
organs of man in such a way as to render them capable not of
performing by themselves purely spiritual activities, but of
subservirig and ministering to the intellect and will in their
purely spiritual activities. In both the entitative and operational aspects of man, therefore, the soul plays the formal role
since it is that which formally causes man to be what he is and

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99

that by which he lives, senses, thinks, and wills, the body acting, however, as a co-principle with the soul in the vegetative
and sensory activities and as an instrument of the soul in its
intellectual and volitional activities.
Here we have the ultimate explanation of the unity of man
and of the unity of his operations. Man is a unit because he
is composed of two incomplete substances, body and soul,
which joined together form one complete substantial whole.
And it is because body and soul together form a unit that man
operates in a unified manner, that all his activities are so interrelated that one cannot come into play without setting up
repercussions in all the others. It is by reason of the substantial
unity of body and soul that material, physiological activities
can influence spiritual, intellectual, and volitional activities and
spiritual activities can influence physiological activities, and
both physiological and spiritual activities can combine to produce semi-spiritual sensory activities. It is by reason of this
substantial unity of body and soul that endocrine glands can
influence not only physiological activities but sensory, intellectual, and volitional activities as well, and can in turn be
influenced by all of these.
Moreover, since the soul is the source of purely spiritual
activities of intellection and volition, it must itself be a purely
spiritual substance endowed with purely spiritual powers. Yet
since the soul dominates the body, directs and elevates the
physiological and sensory activities of man, it must, as we have
said before, be endowed with vegetative and sensory powers,
without having to contain in itself the material element necessary for the exercise of these powers. It is only in the exercise
of its vegetative and sensitive powers that the soul is intrinsically dependent upon matter.
In itself, therefore, in its own being and in at least its purely
spiritual activities of intellection and volition, the soul is intrinsically independent of matter. Hence it can exist in a state
of separation from the body and still continue to perform at
least its purely spiritual activities of intellection and volition.
When the soul is separated from the body, the body dies be-

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LEO M. BOND

cause the principle of life has gone out of it and it is now no
longer a living, human body, informed with a human soul, but
a mere mass of non-living matter. Yet because body and soul
together form one complete substance, they have, so to speak,
a natural affinity for each other, an inclination rooted in their
very nature to be united with each other. Hence it is fitting
that after separation by death they should again at some future
time be reunited with each other to form again one complete
substance. Death is, in a sense, unnatural, since it is the separation of two incomplete substances which are destined by their
very nature for union with each other. This is why the soul so
strenuously resists separation from the body, why it fights so
tenaciously to maintain its union, a fact with which the medical
profession is well acquainted. It also explains the natural instinct in man to defend himself against anything that threatens
to separate body and soul, the instinct of self-preservation.
The union of body and soul to form one complete substance,
man, is, of course, characteristic of every human being since it
is that by which human nature itself is constituted. But man
is conscious o£ the £act that although he has the same specific
nature as all other men, yet as an individual he differs in many
respects from all other men. There must be, therefore, something in the human nature as possessed by him which makes
it an individualized nature peculiar to himself. True, the differences he can observe between himself and other men are
differences in accidents only, differences of morphology, temperament, and character, which, as we have seen, are only
accidental qualities of man. Nevertheless, they indicate that
his particular body and his particular soul are different from
those of other men. And if his body and his soul differ from
those of other men, the composite resulting from the union of
his body and his soul must also be different from that of other
men. In other words, his body-soul substance must be an
individual substance peculiar to himself.
What is it, then, that makes his individual substance differ
from that of other human beings? To ask this question is to
ask what differentiates his particular soul and his particular

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101

body. If the soul is the form of the body, in order to inform
his particular body it must be a soul adapted to his particular
body, and because it is a soul adapted to his particular body,
it is by that very fact a particular, individual soul, differing
from all other souls which inform other particular bodies. His
soul is his individual soul precisely because it informs his particular body. On the other hand, since a human body is a
human body precisely because it is informed by a human soul,
a human body is also a particular human body precisely because
it is informed by a particular human soul. Body is the matter,
the material cause, of the human composite; soul is the form,
the formal cause of the composite. In the line of material
causality, therefore, the body individuates the soul. In the line
of formal causality, the soul individuates the body. We might
say, then, that man's substantial individuality results from his
unity, since it results from the union of his body and his soul
to form his complete individual substance. We might also say
that his accidental individuality, the individuality of his morphology, temperament, and character, also results from his
unity, because it results from his substantial individuality
which in turn results from his unity.
It is easy to see, then, why psychical individuality, in the
sense in which we have been using the term, should correspond
to physiological individuality, for since body and soul are individuated in their union to form one complete substance, characteristics of soul, psychical characteristics, such as peculiar
ways of reacting to emotional and intellectual stimuli, will
correspond to bodily characteristics such as the peculiar structure and functional disposition of physical organs. Physiological and psychical characteristics are, to be sure, only accidents inhering in the incomplete substances body and soul and
ultimately in the complete body-soul substance, man. Nevertheless they derive their individuality from the individuality
of the substances in which they inhere and hence their individuality is determined by the individuality of those substances.
Moreover, since body and soul correspond in individuality,
they must also correspond in perfection. Hence their charac-

LEO M, BOND

teristics also correspond in perfection. A better disposed body
will be informed by a better soul and a better soul will have
better characteristics. And a better body-soul will produce a
more_ perfect individual, endowed ·with more perfect physiological and psychical characteristics.
This union of a more perfect body and a more perfect soul
to form a more perfect individual is the ultimate basis of the
" individual differences " so evident in men, for these differences
are simply the physiological and psychical characteristics peculiar to an individual and resulting ultimately from the individuality of his body-soul composite. We might say also that
this union is the ultimate foundation of " types " of men, for
type classification is based upon the general resemblances
among individuals as to physiological and psychical characteristics, and individuals resemble each other in physiological
and psychical characteristics because their individual bodysoul composites, their individual natures, resemble each other.
Hyperthyroid bodies, for instance, will be informed by " hyperthyroid" souls, so to speak, and the resulting body-soul composites will also resemble each other and will display similar
hyperthyroid characteristics.

*

*

*

To return, in conclusion, to a comparison between the doctrines of the endocrinologists and those of St. Thomas and
Aristotle in the matter of temperament, it might be argued at
this point that to give a philosophical explanation of man's
nature and individuality is all well and good, but that this does
not necessarily fall within the scope of a theory of temperament.
It might be maintained that the discussion should confine itself
to a determination of the basic material cause of morphological
and psychical individuality and should abstract from the question of formal causality. On such grounds it might appear that
the endocrine theory of temperament has fully vindicated itself
when it has traced morphological and psychical individuality
to the characteristic structure and functional disposition of
bodily organs, and this, in turn, to the individual endocrine

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108

make-up as the basic material cause of psychological personality. But a theory of temperament must embrace more than
the material cause of individuality in order to be a theory of
temperament at all. Temperament is a question of the relationship between bodily dispositions and psychical qualities.
Hence it cannot give, as it must, an adequate reason for the
influence of such purely material things as organic dispositions
and chemical hormones on such purely immaterial things as
thoughts and desires, unless it includes, or at least presupposes,
an adequate explanation of the relationship between the material and spiritual elements in man from both the operative and
entitative points of view.
The argument with the endocrinologists is not that they have
established merely the material cause of man's individuality,
but rather that they claim this merely material cause to be the
total, adequate, and only cause of everything in man's nature.
Aristotle and St. Thomas, on the contrary, never claimed more
than material causality for their humors as the determinants
of man's psychological individuality. They readily admitted
that the doctrine of the humors comprised only the material
aspect of their theory of temperament, which, to be complete,
would have to be understood in conjunction with their doctrines on the intrinsic interrelation between body and soul and
hence the intrinsic constitution of man himself.
By way of final comparison, then, we might sum up this
whole paper by saying that the endocrinal theory of temperament is, in reality, only a half-theory, claiming to be a whole
theory, whereas the humoral theory was a whole theory, the
formal part of which was presupposed to the material part.
However, it must be admitted that the material part established
by the endocrinologists is far more satisfactory and more scientifically correct, at least as to details, than was the corresponding part of the humoral theory. On the other hand, the
formal part of the humoral theory was far more perfect than
is the formal part of the endocrinal theory, which is, as a matter
of fact, identical with the material part. We might say, therefore, that for the establishing of a theory of temperament, the

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LEO M. BOND

endocrinal theory can offer more perfect matter, the humoral
theory more perfect form. For a really satisfactory and complete theory of temperament, then, the solution is a " hylomorphic " combination of the two.
The endocrinologists have nothing to fear from the Thomists,
for Thomistic psychology will always accept and sanction whatever truly verified data the endocrinologists can present. Nor
have the Thomists anything to fear from the endocrinologists.
On the contrary, both Thomists and endocrinologists can be
of real assistance to each other in advancing their respective
phases of psychology. And there is great need for such cooperation and mutual assistance, for much work is yet to be done
by both philosophers and scientists before the really " whole "
man is even half known.
LEo M. BoNn, O.P.
College of Mt. Saint Joseph,
Mt. Saint Joseph, Ohio.

BOOK REVIEWS
Politica de Vitoria. Por ANTONIO GoMEz RoBLEDO. Mexico City: Ediciones
de Ia Universidad Nacional, 1940. Pp. 165.
La Filosofia de la Ley segun Domingo de Soto. Por ALFoNso ZAHAR
VERGARA. Mexico City: Editorial Jus, 1946. Pp. 173, with index.
The Main Problems of Philosophy. By Dr. OswALDO RoBLEs. (Translated
by K. F. Reinhardt) Milwaukee: Bruce, 1946. Pp. 210, with index.
$3.00.
Philosophic thought in the United States has ever shown interest in the
teaching ·of European thinkers and, in recent years, in the doctrines
emanating from the Far East. Rarely has attention been paid the
development of philosophic issues by the thinkers of the New World
" south of the bordet ." To assign all the reasons for this neglect, and, at
times, contempt, would be difficult, not to say temerarious, for one who
has not plumbed the complexities of Latin American relations. Yet, one
explanation inevitably suggests itself. The tradition of the Catholic
Church and its schools and scholars has been foreign to the ways of thinking
of the philosophers of the United States and, for the most part, of historical
moment; to the cultures of Latin America it has been and is vital. The
three works under consideration are evidence of that vitality.
Senor Gomez Robledo presents us with more than a mere essay on the
politics of Vitoria; it is a commemoration of the fourth centenary of the
Relectionea De India, it is the homage of a nation to the creator of international law, it is a sketch of the man, his times, his ideals, his theories
on the state, and on war. To his own enthusiasm, Senor Gomez adds the
critical observations and encomiums of such scholars as Barcia Trelles,
Brown Scott, Recasens Siches, and Thomas Delos, 0. P. He :fin,ds little
to blame and ·much to praise in the great scholastic, pointing out among
other things that Vitoria anticipated the juridical concepts of Kelsen
and the Austrian school. He has, however, at times been deceived, partly
by his own evident and rather hysterical dislike for Black and Brown
Fascism-but never Red!:_and partly by verbal similarities into claiming
Vitoria as a supporter without further qualification of democracy in whatsoever milieu that much abused word be applied. No doubt further study
and fuller penetration into their terminology will reveal to him how
Thomists, by virtue of the distinction between the ultimate object of
authority and its actual exercise, can upon occasion demand a single strong
ruler, without becoming Fascists.
Senor Zahar Vergara has dedicated his nascent talents to a study of

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Vitoria's great disciple and first conquest, Dominic Soto, 0. P., the Lion
of Trent, whose treatise De lure et Justitia lay side by side with Vitoria's
Relectiones in the library of every jurist of consequence in Europe for
centuries.
There is a suggestion of Jaspers (Psych. d. Weltan.) in the way he
begins his study with rather more than a glance at the intellectual ferment
of the time in which Soto moved, as evidenced in the ideas of three of
Soto's contemporaries: in Vitoria, the denial of arbitrary power to the
prince and the exaltation of individual conscience as the basis of justice
and right; in Melchior Cano, the denial of special privileges to the
temporal power of the Pope and his consequent exposure to the hazards of
power politics; and, in Mariana, the denial of absolute power and the
justification of regicide as a threat to ambitious and immoral rulers. Soto
then is conceived as a product of his times; the doctrines of the Fathers
and Doctors of the Church, ordered and co-ordinated by St. Thomas,
under the impact of the religious, social, and political upheavals, guided
by Vitoria, resulted in a treatise on juridical metaphysics which is
fundamental to all juridical knowledge. Then after a brief biographical
sketch, Soto's doctrine is summarized under three headings: the general
concept of law, the eternal and the natural law, and the human or civil
law. Soto is Thomistic throughout. In presenting Soto's thought, Zahar
constantly compares him with St. Thomas and not infrequently finds St.
Thomas clearer and more definite. Hence Soto seems to stand in relation
to St. Thomas as human to eternal law, as application of the principles
to actual circumstances. Unfortunately, this little book will be unintelligible
outside the tradition of the Schools, since what is here assumed as
evident has been denied and now forgotten; eternal law, objective norms
of right and wrong, common good, are but musty relics, archaic curiosities
of a darker age in the enlightened legal philosophy of Wendell Holmes and
Roscoe Pound. Senor Zahar has dedicated his work to his former professor
at the National University who guided him safely through the tempest of
modern writers into the haven of Thomism, Dr. Oswaldo Robles.
Dr. Robles' work The Main Problems of Philosophy, first appeared
in Mexico City in 1943 under the title Propedeutica Filosofica, Un Curso
de Introducci6n general a la Filosofia. Impressed with the unusual qualities of this introduction, Dr. Reinhardt, with the assistance of his colleagues at Stanford University, translated it into English, and finding
himself unable to render Prppedeutica into English, changed the title to
the possibly misleading one of Main Problems. The book is divided into
nine chapters of unequal length. The first, and perhaps most important, is
on the nature and definition of philosophy and its place among the
sciences, followed by chapters on the division, methods, and six parts of
philosophy. In other words, we have a general survey of the aim, method,
and content of philosophy.

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Even without Dr. Reinhardt's introduction, one will not read far before
realizing that here is a remarkable book. The omission of any adjective
in the title becomes doubly significant, for philosophy is soon revealed
as pure Thomism. Here we have a layman, not a cleric and therefore
not swayed by theological or authoritarian preoccupations, not, so to
speak, a professional Thomist, who has evidently tried many of the
modern philosophies and found them all wanting and who by preference
adopts Thomism, and indeed fully and whole-heartedly. His chair is not
in a Catholic school, but in a State-supported and otherwise antagonistic
one, and yet so filled is he with a sense of his responsibility to 'Truth,
that he proposes the system of St. Thomas without qualification, apology
or reserve as its source and safeguard.
If it be agreed that a good introduction to any discipline requires a
nice discrimination as to what to include and what to leave for furtl.er
study, as well as a certain dexterity in stating problems so that the
student's interest is aroused and sustained without stultifying him, combined with a not too common ability to bring out certain aspects of
truth common to several schools or systems of thought without generating
confusion or lapsing into a despondent eclecticism, and to organize various
conflicting theories under the problem to which they are relevant, then
Dr. Robles has written a good introduction.
The first problem is to explain what is meant by philosophy. Dr.
Robles, proceding inductively by the use of common notions of knowledge,
shows that we distinguish various types or levels of knowledge. Realizing
that the common but preverted notion of " science " may cause confusion,
he shows how that word can have various meanings, and just what mean·
ing is applicable to philosophy. He starts with Aristotle's famous observation that all men desire to know, and before he concludes the chapter,
Heidegger, Meyerson, Comte, Poincare, Schlick and the School of Vienna,
Hostelet, Driesch, Max Scheler, Husserl, St. Thomas, St. Augustine have
been questioned and their answers weighed; he ends with a quotation from
Plato's Phaedrus. A fine meditation on the dignity of philosophy as the
most noble and most worthy discipline includes ideas from Plato and
Pascal, Aristotle and St. Thomas.
Dr. Robles begins his second chapter, on the major divisions of
philosophy: "the philosopher who faces reality is not unlike a clear idea
confronted with chaos "; the philosophical ideal of St. Thomas is described
in the words of Mallarme, to express " the hymnic melody of the relations
of all things." He adopts and explains the division given by St. Thomas in
his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, and in its light criticizes the
Wolffian melange which Neo-Scholastics support and also a neo-Kantian
division proposed by the Mexican thinker, Dr. Antonio Caso.
His third chapter, one of his best, begins with an encomium for the

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phenomenological method of Husser! as one of the most significant discoveries in the entire history of philosophic thinking. Yet, Dr. Robles
finds its antecedents in the philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas.
He rejects it as a philosophical position, a sort of sterile idealism; but
accepts its method, which he finds really incompatible with idealism, for
its reliance on the absolute and apodictic evidence of direct intuition
which is akin to the intellectualism of St. Thomas. He avoids, however,
the intuitional method of Bergson SSvdestroying the ontological value of
the intellect. Finally, he exposes the Scholastic method by first clearing
away some misconceptions and then distinguishing two aspects which are
often confused, the didactic and the investigative.
We believe that this method is the most efficient for the teaching of philosophy,
provided that it is not carried to such extremes as to make it sterile and to
deprive it of its originality, a censure which must be leveled at the philosophers
of the scholastic decadence. For those who would profitably make use of this
method we therefore recommend that they familiarize themselves first of all with
the writings of the great masters of scholasticism, and that they avoid the reading of those bloodless and mechanized " manuals " which some mediocre writers
mistakenly confound with the rich and fertile tradition of genuine scholastic
philosophy.
As a method of scholastic investigstion, scholasticism adheres to the evidence
of the first principle of knowledge. It makes use of both deduction and induction,
but it bases the validity of both on the a priori intuition of first principles. It
is not a narrow or exclusive method; it does not pass judgment on any doctrine
without having first examined it in the light of basic rational evidence, and it
disregards the argument from (human) authority as more or less unsafe. The
argument from authority is proper to theology, but not to philosophy, which takes
retz8on (ratio) and rational evidence as its guides. Those who believe that scholasticism is a dogmatic system of philosophy demonstrate in holding this opinion that
they have never penetrated to· the
sources of the scholastic tradition.
(p. 41.)

Nor, it is feared, will they read the pages of Dr. Robles.
The fourth chapter on the " Theory of Knowledge " betrays the real
interests of Dr. Robles. Phenomenology in the person of Nicolai Hartmann
receives a careful and a sympathetic study, and is commended for placing
the problem of knowledge not in psychology or in logic, but where St.
Thomas and the Spanish Scholastics of the siglo de oro placed it, in
ontology. "St. Thomas, the thirteenth century philosopher, and Hartmann,
the contemporary German philosopher, have the same clear and penetrating
vision ... however, though in agreement as far as their high esteem for
the data of "direct intuition" is concerned, (they) differ profoundly in
their interpretation of these data." (p. 59.) Dr. Robles conceives of the
theory of knowledge as " a basic philosophic discipline of speculative character, whose formal object is the elucidation of the aggregate problems

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generated by the subject-object relationship." After surveying the problem,
which is innate to the tension between being and becoming, although the
simplifications of the manuals obscure the fact, in thinkers from Heraclitus
to the latest Neo-Realists and Neo-Thomists, he outlines a solution which
is basically intellectualistic and Thomist but arrived at through phenomenological analysis. From this position he then considers the Formalism of
Kant and all the forms of Idealism, which are rejected because "the
idealist does violence to the act of intuition and rejects the evidence of
being; he takes the data of direct intuition, empties them of their ontological content, and puts in its place a preconceived concept of abstract
metaphysics." (p. 85.) This whole chapter compresses a wide field of
reading and discussion into a well-ordered treatise, offering suggestions
for further study and managing to convey a welcome amount of historical
background without appearing to do so.
Since Dr. Robles considers the theory of knowledge as a general preface
to metaphysics, his next chapter is on metaphysics itself. Here he inserts
some ten pages on Aristotle and the vicissitudes his writings underwent,
the commentaries and critical editions of the Metaphysics. Then he exposes
and criticizes four concepts of metaphysics, the scholastic, the Hegelian, the
Bergsonian, and the existentialist as proposed by Heidegger. Here his
critical sense fails him somewhat, for Hegel is dismissed as sophistical,
Bergson as evasive, and Heidegger as deficient and " nihilistic," a cavalier
treatment that is partly compensated for in the next chapter. In the
next section the concept of being, its division into rational, real, ontological,
intentional, its modes of potency and act, essence and existence, substance
and accidents are sketched. On the question of the real distinction he is
somewhat reticent, only implying that all scholastic authors do not follow
St. Thomas. As for himself, "the denial of the real distinction ... in creahis delicacy in not naming
tures ... comes very close to pantheism."
those Catholics who deny it. His exposition of the principal points of metaphysics is a little too pat, even for an introduction, and one trained in the
school of St. Thomas can only marvel at a discussion of being which does
not even once mention analogy. Nor does the problem of causality receive
any mention until the Kantian antinomies are treated in the next chapter on
Natural Theology. But the most intetesting section of this chapter is
entitled "AXiology," the theory of value, in which Dr. Robles deftly
integrates the modern discussion of value-which he dates from Brentano
(1889) --'into the Thomistic theories on relations and on the "adequate
good." Far from being the totality of philosophical investigation or even
an autonomous discipline, axiology is presented as a part of metaphysics.
Thus we should speak of an axiological metaphysics: the being of values,
axiological epistemology: the knowledge of values, and the philosophy of
civilization, which studies the problem of the realization of values.

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Compared to what has gone before, the chapter on Natural Theology
is brief, and as commonly understood, extremely incomplete. In fact, all
that it contains is a commentary on Question Two of St. Thomas, the
problem of the existence of God; nothing at all is said of the nature of
God as attainable by reason. By a criticism of Ockham and the Fideists,
the Traditionalists, Ontologism, and Bergsonian Intuition, he shows the
necessity for a demonstration. By criticizing the agnosticism of Spencer
and Kant, he shows the possibility. By rejecting the arguments a simultaneo like the Ontological argument of St. Anselm, and the arguments a
priori, he prepares the way for his exposition of the a posteriori arguments
which are the Quinque Viae. But this rather jejune chapter ends with a
priceless little essay on the futility of existentialism, entitled the " Metaphysics of Human Existence," inspired perhaps by the God-hungry cry of
St. Augustine, for it concludes thus:
And why does Heidegger's existential metaphysics lead us into a blind alley?
Because his existential analysis exhausts itself in negation and terminates in
nothingness. St. Augustine, on the other hand, arrives at the plenitude of Being;
he finds shelter and safety in the boundless heart of the Eternal God.

Dr. Robles does not do himself justice in the next chapter on the
philosophy of nature for, since it " aims at an integrated and unitary
explanation of the diversity of substances as they exist in nature " it is
far too short to even enumerate all the problems of cosmology and
psychology. Perhaps he felt that psychology would be sufficiently dealt
with in the exposition of phenomenology in the Theory of Knowledge.
Further he tantalizingly proposes a third discipline, midway between
cosmology and psychology, which he calls rational biology, the formal
object of which appears to be those operations of the psyche that are
intrinsically linked with organic corporality. Perhaps at some future time,
he will expatiate on the objectives and method of this new science. The
fundamental problem in this chapter is the nature of bodies, and from a
review of the three solutions, Atomism, Dynamism, both physical and
metaphysical, and Hylemorphism, he turns to the form which gives life,
namely the soul, and there he rests.
In his chapter on Logic, he discusses three types, the Psychologism of
John Stuart Mill. the Logical Formalism of Kant, and the Metaphysical
Logic of Hegel. He shows that Thomistic logic, if there be such a monster,
is diametrically opposed to Kantian Formalism, and appr()aches Hegel
because it presupposes the ontological validity of knowledge. The central
problem of logic is the famous dispute on the Universals, in which St.
Thomas took a position between the two extremes, called Moderate
Realism.
In his last chapter on Moral Philosophy, Dr. Robles attacks the

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problem of distinguishing speculative from practical knowledge without
divorcing morality from reason as Kant was forced to do. He accepts the
four-fold division of science given by Maritain in the Degrees of Knowledge,
and defines moral philosophy as that " speculatively practical knowledge
which establishes the ideal norms for the realization of human acts and
which ordains man to his ultimate end." He reduces all ethical systems to
four, Hedonism, Eudemonism, the Ethical Formalism of Kant, and the
" material ethics of Value " which latter he describes as an attempt by
Scheler, applying Husserl's method to the practical order, to overcome the
formalism and unreality of Kant. This attempt is unsuccessful because
still 'based on something subjective, " the aboriginal exercise of emotional
intuition "; the objectivity so necessary in a regulative norm still escapes
Scheler's grasp.
In a few closing pages, Dr. Robles seeks to anticipate criticism of his
copious extracts from the history of philosophy, and his extensive use of
technical terminology. The first he answers by citing the example of St.
Thomas who, while no " historicist " in the modern sense, learned from
the ancients to accept what was true and to avoid what was false. The
second is so obviously true, that one wonders whether this is not rather a
work of orientation, rather than initiation. For this is not a simple book,
couched in semi-popular language. Take for example, the observation (p.
177) that the " practical " character of knowledge, as distinct from
" speculative," springs from a combination of formal and final causality.
It is hardly our idea of an introduction at all, unless Mexican undergraduates are of higher mental capacity and further advanced than ours.
This, of course, is quite possible if Mexico retains the Thomistic idea of
education as a discipline, a training in thinking, instead of the dismal
doctrinaire Deweyisrn we enjoy. But the competent order and insight of
Dr. Robles' book will repay time and hard work much more richly than
the Hocking-Blanschard-Hendel-Randall prefaces to philosophy or Mead's
Types and Problems of Philosophy. One is aware that Dr. Robles not only
knows, but knows that he knows, and so too will his student if he exert
himself.
The gravest criticism that can be leveled against Dr. Robles is that he
does not always heed his own prescriptions. His pages are comparatively
innocent of references to the great Scholastics or Commentators; his sources
are all too often second and third hand, and not always the best. Maritain
is cited fourteen times; John of St. Thomas, three; Cajetan, three; Banez
and Capreolus, once. Particularly, the bibliographies appended to each
chapter could be greatly enhanced in value were the " genuine sources of
the scholastic tradition " appealed to rather than manuals and expositions
of questionable pertinence and dubious Thomistic purity. In this way
advantage could be taken, for instance, of the Cursus of John of St. Thomas,

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made available in recent years. The writings of Santiago Ramirez, 0. P.,
especially his De Ipsa Philosophia in "Ciencia Tomista" would be extremely helpful in a survey of this sort. Dr. Robles appears more at home
with the nineteenth century Germans than with the sixteenth century
Spaniards and Italians, at least, he refers to them more frequently. Nor is
this a contradiction of what was stated at the beginning of this review
about the cultural heritage of Latin America; it but emphasizes how
naturally correct values and ideas come to him, for we only take pains
with that of which we are uncertain or with which we are unfamiliar.
The value of Dr. Robles' work founds a debt of gratitude to Dr. Reinhardt and his associates for putting the book within the reach of English
speaking readers. The scond edition will undoubtely correct such defects
as mistaking Cajetan for Cardinal de Vio's first name, or the confusing
references to Zeferino Gonzales. It is to be hoped that revision will also
include improvement of the bibliographies mentioned above as well as some
material on the use of sources and standard bibiographies like the Bulletin
Thomiste and Vernon Bourke's excellent work. A second edition should be
called for since The Main Problems of Philosophy should prove more than
useful to those engaged in the pursuit of Wisdom, whether sacred or
profnne.
J. I. McGUINEss, 0. P.
Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

Religion In Economics. By JoHN R. EVERETT. New York: King's Crown
Press, 1946.
In his recently published study," Religion In Economics," John Rutherford Everett investigates the relationship between religion and economics
in the work of three American economists. The objective of the study
seems to be to delineate the influence of religious thought in the economic
theorizing of the men involved-John Bates Clark, Richard T. Ely, and
Simon N. Patten. To the execution of this worthwhile project Mr. Rutherford brings a comprehensive knowledge of the economists with whom he is
concerned and a consistent objectivity in the presentation of their ideas.
The author makes it clear however that his treatment of the subject matter
is biographical and not critical.
It would seem that the first quite obvious limitation of this study is its
ambitious title. Very simply, Mr. Rutherford is unwittingly guilty of
proposing a thesis which in its phrasing promises so much but which in
its actual development fulfils so little of its intriguing possibilities. Had
the author presented his study as " The Influence of Protestantism on Three
American Economists " its title would have been admittedly more un-

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wieldy but immeasurably more accurate. The fact of the matter is that
great, good, and sincere as these three gentlemen were in their personal
Christianity they certainly shared an irritating intellectual blindspot where
Catholicism was and is concerned. Consequently, the term "religion" in
the title must be understood necessarily in a restricted sense.
It could be that John Bates Clark, Richard Theodore Ely and Simon
Nelson Patten felt no compulsion to investigate the monumental contributions of the Church to social philosophy, but that is hardly credible. It
might be that, knowing of the majestic synthesis of Thomas Aquinas, they
nevertheless dispensed with it as the dated summation of medieval superstition and casuistry. This, of course, would be a serious indictment of
their scholarship, if true. Conceivably the Encyclical "Rerum Novarum,"
issued in 1891, failed to impress the generality of American social philosophers. But this seems contrary to established fact. At any rate, Mr.
Rutherford's study reveals no substantial and pertinent references to the
vast treasury of Catholic ethical doctrine, identified as such, in any of the
works of Clark, Ely, and Patten. This glaring omission is the fundamental
weakness in an otherwise laudable effort to return economics to •its rightful place in the hierarchy of morally informed social sciences.
To understand what Clark, Ely, and Patten were attempting in the
formulation of their theories one must be given a quick preview of the age
in which they lived and labored. The period 1870 to 1900 was crucial in our
economic history. American capitalism had very literally come of age by
the end of the eighties and in the subsequent decade its lusty acquisitiveness had crystallized in that economic system which has made the United
States materially great. In the process of phenomenal growth, however,
the social cost had been tragic. The divorce of economics from ethicsimplicitly contained in the works of Ricardo, Nassau Senior, and John
Stuart Mill, and actually effected by the Manchester School-provided a
convenient rationalization for the ruthlessness of the " roaring nineties."
The result was an economy in which bigness became the sole criterion of
success and in which those who were successfully " big " indulged their
fabulous wealth in the vulgar display of what Thorstein Veblen so aptly
described as "conspicuous consumption." This was a gilded, glamorous
decade in which, beneath the glittering surface of things, the inherent
greatness of a relatively young nation was compromised by the manifold
injustices of a capitalism the essential goodness of which was obscured by
the immorality of those who employed it for their own self-aggrandizement.
From the very inception of the Industrial Revolution earnest men
recognized in nascent financial capitalism ominous possibilities for great
injustice. As the Revolution ramified throughout the western world these
potencies were actualized in the great discrepancy between the concentrated wealth of the few and the cumulative pauperization of the dispos-

8

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sessed many, in the chronic cyclical maladjustments and their consequent
mass unemployment crises, in the monotony and dehumanization of
industrial mechanization. All this impelled a small but significant coterie
of· humanitarians to urge the Christianization of economics. In the United
States, prior to the Civil War, Theodore Parker and William Ellery
Channing inveighed against the inequities of the age in which they lived.
The latter half of the Nineteenth Century found George Herron and
Washington Gladden advOcating that "the church (Protestant) change
from a means of grace for the individual soul to an agency for constructive
social action."
However, it remained for John Bates Clark, internationally recognized
at the turn of the century as America's outstanding economist, to oppose
a voluntaristic and moral social philosophy to the predominant determinism and materialism of the schools. Both Patten and Ely differed with
Clark on strictly economic grounds. But both shared with him the attempt
at introducing to a greater or lesser degree contemporary economic social
philosophy to Christianity. The anomaly of their position is the fact that,
deliberately or unknowingly, they failed to avail themselves of the one
completely integrated social philosophy, the departure from which had
made possible the immorality of the situation against which they crusaded.
The formulation of the social philosophy of John Bates Clark can be
ascribed rightly to three powerful influences in his life. The son of Godfearing New England parents he grew to young mandhood in an atmosphere
of Evangelical Protestantism that left an irradicable impress on both his
character and mentality. As a student at Amherst College he later attracted the attention of its famous President, Julius Seelye, who taught
economics as a branch of Moral and Mental Philosophy. It was Seelye who
prevailed upon Clark to forsake contemplated studies for the ministry and
devote his talents to the field of academic economics. Upon graduation
from Amherst young Clark departed for Germany where at Heidelberg he
became a devotee of the theories of Professor Karl Kneis, the most outstanding representative of the Historical School of economics. These three
factors-his childhood formation in the deeply religious environment of a
Christian home, his introduction to economics as a specialized phase of
moral philosophy at Amherst, and the organismic analysis of society
proposed by the German economists of the Historical School-contributed
substantially to the new orientation given economics by Clark on his return
to the United States.
The genesis of Clark's social philosophy emerges in a series of articles
appearing in the magazine "The New Englander." The first of these
significant essays was published in January 1877, and for nine subsequent
years Clark developed his theories in the pages of the magazine until in
1896 he gathered the eXJl.anded articles into his classic book " The Phi-

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losophy of Wealth." The thesis proposed in this work marks a departure
from the then current economic theorizing of almost universal Classicism.
The trouble with classical· economics, Clark maintained, was that it
adhered to "a degraded conception of human nature (which) vitiated the
theory of the distribution of wealth." It was imperative then that a new
theory be presented which considered man as a whole. The beginning of
all economic theorizing presupposes a true knowledge of man, not only
in his individual state but man as an atom in the social organism. It is
only when the scientist constructs an image for his discussion that is the
man whom God created that any advance in the analytical work of the
economist will be made. The significance of this plea for an approach to
economics that would regard man as the creature of God rather than an
isolated mechanism determined by immutable economic laws, can hardly be
understated.
Today, John Bates Clark is recognized among economists as the author
of the one generally accepted academic theory of cost detem1ination in a
competitive economy. This device, widely developed in all classical texts,
is known as the theory of marginal productivity. In its practical application, particularly with reference to the regulation of wage rates, the
marginal technique can be thoroughly unethical. It is the irony of history
that Clark should be placed among the world's foremost economists
largely by virtue of his perfecting a theory which in his earlier career he
would have vigorou11ly opposed and with which, in its contemporary
unqualified version, he would certainly not concur. At any rate Clark once
wrote that " the competitive principle instead of being supreme and
resistless exists at best by sufferance. It is subject to constantly narrowing restrictions and is liable in particular forms to be totally suppressed
by the action of that moral force which is in reality ll'Upreme."
From the standpoint of Clark's contributions to an ethical social philosophy, his earlier rather than his later theorizing offers more abundant
evidence of a conscious effort to rationalize economics on a thoroughly
moral basis. This, of course, is not to imply that even in his more mature
works he did not continue the attempt to integrate the technicalities of
economics with moral imperatives. But, certainly, in his Philosophy of
Wealth he defends unequivOcal propositions which at a later date he would
find inconsistent with his then accepted general thesis. Among these propositions is the idea that arbitration and cooperation rather than competition
will determine social rewards. Applying this concept to the area of industrial relations Clark laid down a principle whose essential validity
become increasingly more evident in our generation. Maintaining that
the division of wealth in a capitalistic society is both unequal and unjust,
he urged two correctives. " First labor must organize to the same point as
capital, then there must be an increase in the effectiveness of moral

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agencies so that the transition can be more easily effected. The principle
of cooperation must be instilled in all so that the divisions of the product
made by arbitration will be honest, just, and equitable. Upon arbitration,
profit sharing, and full cooperation must be our dependence for the solution
of the labor problem."
If a correlation of Clark's theories were attempted it would be extremely
difficult to reconcile his advocacy of what would be, in modern terminology, a labor monopoly with his later defense of technically unrestricted
competition. However, in urging that the organizational strength of labor
parallel that of capital and that arbitration, profit sharing and cooperation
be widely employed in the resolution of capitalistic inequities Clark was
not only more faithful to his Christian consciousness but also vastly more
realistic ·than in his later writings.
The acknowledged standard bearer for the American School of " ethical
economists" is Richard T. Ely. Like John Bates Clark he had the initial
and indispensable blessing of a sturdy Christian home. Ely's parents took
their Presbyterianism seriously. However the sanguine disposition of their
offspring militated against his acceptance of Calvinistic predestination and
in his early young manhood he sought a more optimistic solution for the
mystery of life and death in Universalism. After attending both Dartmouth
and Columbia Colleges Ely won a travelling scholarship permitting him to
do graduate work abroad. Eventually he gravitated toward Heidelberg
and its great Professor Karl Kneis and there his reactions to the Historical
School were as enthusiastic as those of his countryman, Clark. Arriving
back in the United States in· 1880, Ely shortly published The Labor
Movement in America.
No radical, Ely sought a solution to the problem of industrial relations
that would provide equity for both capital and labor. The Christian
religion, he maintained, " has within it all that is necessary for the
solution of society's problems. The sciences of theology and sociology
come from two parts of the one statement made by Christ: Love the
Lord thy God with thy whole heart and thy neighbor as thyself. . . .
Theology is the science of God and His relations to His creatures. But
the whole science is simply an elaboration of the first two great commandments on which hang the whole law and prophets. . . . The second part
of this commandment . . . and thy neighbor as thyself . . . is in its
elaboration, social science or sociology.... If men could see the real truth
involved in this simple Gospel of Christ all questions would be solved."
Ely argued that the British writers of the Classical School had removed
man from the center of economics and had replaced him with wealth as the
material cause of the science. The influence of the German school of
economists enabled Ely to blend his own deeply religious convictions with
his zeal for humanitarian reform in the area of the social sciences. The

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laissez-faire economists who reduced economics to an elaboration of the
law of demand and supply were, for Ely, proposing a doctrine that was
not only fatal to public policy but contrary to the social Christianity in
which he ardently believed. Paradoxically, however, Ely favored competition as " the chief selective process . . . in economic society and through
it we have the survival of the fittest." He resolved this apparent contradiction in his theorizing by placing a new interpretation on the word
" fit," at least in its economic connotation. For Ely those who were
rendered " fit " by the competitive process were necessarily a " brave,
strong race of men, and the brave and strong are merciful." Certainly this
reveals naivete in Ely but is typical of his vast optimism and faith in man's
perfectibility.
Richard T. Ely's greatest distinction lies not in his economic theorizing.
Actually he was much more the sociologist than the economist. Rather,
it was Ely's insistence upon the ethical in his approach to the social
sciences that sets him apart, with John Bates Clark, as a recognized scholar
who believed that the perfection of that scholarship presupposed its
integration with the Gospel of Jesus Christ.
In introducing the biographical treatment of Simon Nelson Patten's
intellectual development the author says of Patten, " if Ely can be called
the prophet of religion in economics Patten can claim the title of theologian." Frankly, we disagree sharply. Patten is neither a theologian nor
for that matter an effective economist. He is not a theologian for the simple
reason that his conception of religion is nothing more than an irritating
eclecticism of isolated biological, philosophical, and sociological half truths
with a dash of very unique " theology " added for good measure. And
despite the fact that Rexford Tugwell believed him to be " the most
original and suggestive economist that America has yet produced," Patten's
pragmatism, so widely applied in the Welfare Economics of the New Deal,
proved an exceedingly uneconomical and expensive experiment for the
people of the United States.
Both Clark and Ely consistently maintained in their writings the traditional and supernatural interpretation of religion. Fundamental to their
thesis is the truth of the brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God.
The society envisioned by both was no friendly nebulous association of
men but a truly religious fraternity of mankind. For Patten, however,
" God is the sum total of all man's ideals, aspirations, and hopes projected into personalized form and dealt with in terms of a picture language.
God's Kingdom is the goal toward which man moves; it is the type of
society within which all ideals and hopes are finally realized."
Patten, like Clark and Ely, knew a home in which sincerely religious
parents created a strong moral environment. After a boyhood and early
youth in which he failed to reconcile the inflexible Calvinism of his father,

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particularly, with his own religious gropings he left Northwestern University, where he was entered as a law student, and embarked for Germany
in pursuit of greater philosophical knowledge. Unlike his contemporaries,
Clark and Ely, he preferred the university of Halle to Heidelberg. Arriving
back in the United States he worked for a time on his father's farm and
then resumed his legal studies at Northwestern. During these years Patten
underwent both severe physical suffering as his eyesight threatened to fail
him permanently and intellectual frustration as his novel theories received
little recognition.
In 1911, his eyesight restored and his ideas given hearing in certain
academic quarters, Patten published his first really important work, The
Social Basis of Religion. Here, in this book, he presented his novel interpretation of religion. Briefly, the thesis developed by Patten is presented
by Mr. Everett as follows: Knowledge is divided into three classifications.
In the first instance there is the knowledge gained in the acceptance of social
tradition; then the knowledge of fact which is gained from sensory experience; and
finally knowledge of value that depends upon motor data. Each one of these
areas has its own test for validity; yet they are all closely related. A true judgement on the accumulated knowledge of civilization is made on the basis of its
utility. If it in no way elicits an active motor response, it can be discarded as
false. In other words an idea is true only when it has a specific value placed upon
it and when that value is sufficiently strong to caU forth definite action.
It is most important to know how values can be tested. " Values are judgements about means to an end." If a particular means is chosen to gain a
specific end, the only teat of its validity is to try it. If it works, that is, if the
end is achieved with the greatest economy of effort, we then can judge the value to
be true. When values are expressed· as judgments they are called beliefs. True
beliefs are those that work out in practice, and are consequently never completely
false or true, but rather becoming either true or false. " Belief, truth, and
action are thus bound together and all of them are tested by the consequences
they bring." Religious beliefs are true when they perform a function in society.
If they elicit an activity that is detrimental to the accepted social end they are
pronounced false; if however they contribute to social well being and the establishment of Utopia they are true . . . Patten . . . considers the older historical
interpretation of religion to be false because it produces an emphasis on personal
salvation rather than social redemption.

Certainly Mr. Everett is aware of the frustrating utilitarianism of so
much of the recent practice the philosophy of which is adequately
contained in the above synthesis. Since the author protests that he offers
here no critical study his failure to stigmatize on purely theoretical grounds,
Patten's pragmatism is understandable. But why he should inconsistently
confer the accolade of " theologian of religion in economics " upon a man
whose theological illiteracy is so appalling is academically inexcusable. It
would have been considered more objective and immeasurably more discreet

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119

if Mr. Everett had permitted his readers to form their own judgments about
Patten and his theories.
In summation we believe that Mr. Everett has succeeded rather well in
delineating the religious ethos in the theorizing of John Bates Clark and
Richard T. Ely. However, we cannot insist too strongly that the contributions of these gentlemen have the character of restatement rather than
originality. If in the nineteenth century Clark and Ely defended so ably
the thesis that economics should not be divorced from ethics it must be
remembered that they were merely reiterating the position of seven
centuries old Thomism. And if these two Christian gentlemen had
recognized the Calvinism against which they rebelled in their youth as the
theological root of the separation of economics from the area of morals
and, having recognized this fact, delved deeply into the Summa of St.
Thomas, they would have found there the indispensable dogmatic validation of the ethical doctrines they preached.
In our opinion Simon Nelson Patten should not have been included
as an exponent of religion in economics. It is true that Patten believed in
a social Christianity which for him at least assumed the proportions of a
faith. But any dispassionate analysis of his doctrines reveals that his
unorthodoxy was so marked, the departure in his philosophizing from
traditional Christianity so obvious, that to classify him with Clark and
Ely is very nearly tantamount to misrepresentation. Patten's intentions
may have been admirable but the implications of his teachings, when
actualized in practice, could be, as they have very nearly been, nothing
short of disastrous.
CHARLES B. QUIRK, O.P.
Providence CoUege,
Providence, R. I.

The Three Ages of the Interior Life. (Volume I.) By REGINALD GARRioouLAGRANGE 0. P. (Translated by Sister M. Timothea Doyle, 0. P .) St.
Louis, Mo.: B. Herder Book Co., 1947. Pp. 517, with bibliography
and index. $5.00.
Common Mystic Prayer. By GABRIEL DIEFENBACH, 0. F. M. Cap. Paterson, N.J.: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1947. Pp. 136, with bibliography.
$1.50.

Father Garrigou-Lagrange is one of the acknowledged contemporary
masters of Dominican spirituality. For all the years of his long career as a
teacher and writer, he has fought a continuous battle to reestablish tradiprinciples of the spiritual life and to bring out the Dominican contributions to the tradition. There are still many theologians who do not

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agree with the great Dominican authority, but they no longer hold as
tenaciously as they did once to the views of the spiritual life that were
current during the 19th and early !lOth centuries. In an attempt to avoid
the errors of quietism theologians began to split up the unity of the
spiritual life by overemphasizing the differences between the ascetical and
mystical states of soul. The peak of this trend can be found in the article
on Mysticiame in the Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, which practically identifies mysticism with the miraculous.
While admitting that there are many extraordinary phenomena in the
lives of some mystics, Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange has insisted that the substance of the mystical life needs no extraordinary principles, such as infused
ideas, but is a normal, though unfortunately rare, development of the
supernatural principles that are present in the soul from baptism, viz.
sanctifying grace, the infused theological and moral virtues, and the gifts
of the Holy Ghost. Especially in the last he finds an adequate explanation for the essentials of the mystical life; the growing predominance of the
activity of the Holy Ghost through His gifts, the corresponding perfection
of the theological virtues, establishes the soul in a state of perfection that
is just short of the perfection of heaven by the absence of the Beatific
Vision. Such perfection cannot be attained by an active spirituality, for it
requires a purification of soul that can come only from the initiative of
the Holy Ghost working in the soul in what S. Teresa always refers to as a
"supernatural" way. During such times of purification the soul is no longer
the initiator of its own activity, but it is being moved by a higher principle.
Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange has written many works on the spiritual life.
Some have been translated into English, but their value to the ordinary
reader is somewhat lessened by their controversial preoccupations. The
present volume (the first of two) is much more satisfying reading, although
the author is still defending 'his favorite theses. Yet the chief aim of the
work is to present a complete account of the spiritual life from its beginnings in the desire of the soul to lead an interior life to its culmination in
the transforming union. The first volume is concerned with the fundamental principles of the spiritual life, which are taken from dogmatic and
moral theology. Then, utilizing the traditional division of the spiritual
life into that of beginners (the purgative way}, of proficients (the illuminative way}, and the perfect (the unitive way), Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange turns
his attention to the state of beginners.
It might be well for the general reader on opening Fr. GarrigiouLagrange's book to start with the last chapter on "Retarded Souls." A
careful reading of what he has to say on this subject will arouse in the
soul a more receptive disposition for the other sections of the book; as he
says: " Some souls, because of their negligence or spiritual sloth, do not
pass from the age of beginners to that of proficients. These are retarded
souls; in the spiritual life they are like abnormal children, who do not

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l!U

happily pass through the crisis of adolescence and who, though they do not
remain children, never reach the full development of maturity. Thus these
retarded souls belong neither among the beginners nor among the proficients." (p. 461) Such spiritual tragedies occur too frequently in the
spiritual life. Even some religious, who after years of training are subjected by God to a severe trial have not the courage to accept it generously.
Yet such acceptance might mark the turning-point in their religious lives.
The spiritual life from beginning to end is marked by two distinct but
complementary processes-purification and illumination. The purifying
process is necessary to root out all obstacles to union with the all-Holy
God. The illuminative process consists in the increasing perfection of the
life of contemplative prayer and the growth of all the virtues or the progressive union of the soul with God through knowledge and love.
In the life of beginners these two phases are manifested by increasing
generosity in the practice of mortification and the gradual development
of a habit of meditation. Father Garrigou-Lagrange gives all the practical
help needed to make progress in both of these activities. His consideration
of the obstacles to progress and the method of their removal is especially
worthy of praise. This is not the place to discuss what constitutes Dominican spirituality. Yet it is important to point out how Fr. GarrigouLagrange manifests that spirit in his writings. If anything characterizes
Dominican spirituality, it is a regard for the intellectual, and insistence
on the necessity for true understanding. It is not merely a demand for
speculative understanding, for correct knowledge of theoretical principles;
there is a special value placed on practical understanding. This is specially
evident in the question of self-knowledge. It is not enough for the soul
to have the certitude of faith that God is provident; often there is a practical denial of this truth in the lives of even good men. They need to be
brought to a concrete realization that their actions are in many ways
opposed to their theoretical certitudes. Such practical understanding is
known as self-knowledge; it has been stressed by all the Saints. There is a
wealth of information about it in the great treatises of St. Thomas on the
virtues in particular and in his tract on the capital sins. Fr. GarrigouLagrange has made excellent use of this material.
The second volume, which we hope will soon appear, will bring to the
reader a real insight into the mystical life. One of its most important
sections deals with the transition from the ascetical to the mystical life,
which is especially marked by the passage from habitual meditation to
infused contemplation. This is also the theme of Fr. Diefenbach's little
book, Common Mystic Prayer, which follows closely Fr. GarrigouLagrange's line of thought. The author presents this important state of
soul in simple, clear language. He has followed its development step by
step and offers much practical advice. He makes a clear distinction between the essential aspects of mystical prayer and the extraordinary phe-

BOOK REVIEWS

nomena. His book can also serve as an excellent introduction to the subject of mysticism, which is still a terrifying one for many readers.
JAMES

M. EGAN, 0. P.

Sparkill, N.Y.

Revelation and Response in the Old Testament. By CUTHBERT A. SIMPsoN.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1947. Pp. 205, with index.
$2.50

The author proposes (1) to trace the development of the religion of Israel
from its beginnings and to show how the divine revelation-to which this
development was the response-was mediated through historical event; (2)
to show how the gradual unfolding of Israel's monotheism had as its concomitant a growing awareness of the essential unity of life; (8) to show how
the creative minority in Israel were gradually brought to the realization that
the community of which they were a part had a supranational significance.
He carries his argument only to the exile, but considers it to be the foundation for any succeeding history of revelation in Israel.
This study comprises seven chapters. The first, entitled " Primitive
Jahvism," assumes that Israel's religion began as a form of animism con-'
cerned with maintaining good relations with the good and bad spirits which
.filled the desert spaces. Jahveh, as god of the volcano of Sinai and god of
the thunderstorm, was of the second category.
Here the autho;r assumes (" we must ") that Israel passed from a natural
response of self-regarding fear to the response of self-surrendering acceptance, a transition of crucial import in the development of Jahvism. Coming
through to the other side of fear, Israel found" at the heart of the destructive forces of nature that which enriched and ennobled life." (p. 6)
Reflecting upon this repeated experience, Israel came to believe that it had
been chosen by Jahveh to be his people. The author attempts to trace the
development of this faith in these pages.
To the obvious objection that such an explanation is inadequate, pernicious and nothing but emotionalism, the author proceeds to clarify his
terms. It is equally absurd, he states, to suggest that man can reason his
way to a real awareness of God. The Wholly Other is beyond that. Hence
the primitive experience of Israel, though partial, is valid. Can it be said
to be a " response to revelation? " By revelation he means " that divine
activity which has as its purpose the freeing of man from those interior
tendencies which, if yielded to, will drive him to inevitable frustration ...
it is much more than a simple disclosure of objective truth by God . . .
it involves also an empowering of the will to conform itself to the truth

BOOK REVIEWS

which has thus been made known; and this in such a way as not to destroy
the freedom which it is the purpose of revelation to bring to fruition, or to
weaken the personality which it is intended to mature." (p. 10)
It follows that God teaches the fact of " human conditionedness with a
strange and terrible respect for man's freedom." (p. 12) Compelling though
this inner compulsion may be (especially in the case of the prophets), it is
always man's responsibility whether he accepts or rejects it. Israel accepted,
or responded to this revelation, and in so doing, developed its theology.
In the fulness of time, when civilization had developed to a point where
the salvation of mankind from the frustration of self-centered power called
for the creation of a people aware of the transcendence and centrality of
God, Israel was singled out from among all the nations to act as the agent
of redemption. It took Israel a long time to realize that Jahveh was a God
not only of nature but of history. (p. 17) Recognizing God as the god of
war (and on their side) was an experience which, while it lasted, unified
life in a momentary emotional monotheism. Primitive Jahvism therefore
contained in itself the germ of the later reasoned ethical montheism. (p. 20)
More than a momentary unification of life, or emotional surrender of self,
was required. All life had to be related to Jahveh. The slow recognition of
this demand and the painful endeavor to meet it is another of the lines in
the complex pattern of the Old Testament.
From the many tales woven around the god of Kadesh, Jahveh of Sinai
took over the new qualities of justice, creativity, and responsiveness to
human need. The assimilative process began at Kadesh, whose priesthood
and sanctuary Israel took over, and whose god was identified with Jahveh.
Nor was this any ordinary syncretism, because of Israel's extraordinary
drive towards monotheism. (p. 28)
Chapter IT deals with Moses. He was never in Egypt, says the author.
(p. 38 f.) He occupied too influential a post at Kadesh to be a newcomer
there. But he was the representative and leader of the creative minority
in the community which had been brought into being by the fusion of
primitive Jahvism with the religion of Kadesh, and he was the agent
through whom the clans were brought to make the response which gave
to the events of the exodus.
enduring
In Chapter ill Israel is observed in its contact with and adaptation of
Canaanite baalism as the source of creative power manifested in nature.
The local gods came to be identified with Jahveh.
The next chapter treats of the institutionalization of·Jahvism with the
coming of the monarchy. From the evils to which this step led Jahvism
was saved by the prophets who revolted against power politics.
Chapter V states that J 1 and J 2 are the editors or revisors of Israelitic
traditions. It was J 1 who organized the traditions of the southern kingdom.
J 2 painted on a wider canvas, molding and adapting the Sinai tradition

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against a world background, where necessary adding and manipulating the
history of the patriarchs; by joining the Sinai tradition to that of Kadesh,
he enriched Jahvism with the covenant idea. At any rate, when he drew
back from his task, he had effected a delicate balance between the North
and the South, and Jahvism was ready for the next step, which however
it is not the author's purpose to pursue.
Thus far we have allowed the author to speak for himself, using his terms
whenever possible, in order to grasp his meaning and thesis. The reading
of this volume will provide an opportunity to reconsider our own position
in regard to the problems it raises. It will at least serve to focus attention
anew on the complexity of the literary as well as the historical problems of
the Old Testament. However, it is now our intention to cast a critical eye
upon the result of the author's own thinking.
To begin, the author states that "It is 'now generally recognized [sicn
that Sinai was in Midian in Arabia, at Kadesh (pp. 24, 27, 37, 99 f.); Mt.
Horeb in the Sinai peninsula was the mountain of Jahveh according to the
northern tradition." (p. 157, n. 2) As his authority he quotes Wellhausen
(English edition of 1885) , who is notorious for his contemptuous attitude
towards topography and who once dismussed all such discussions as both
a waste of time and an occupation for dabblers. It is true that there are
some now extinct volcanoes in Midian, but to locate Sinai in this region is
most arbitrary, for, whatever the theory, the stages of the exodus described
in the Bible hardly fit this route, and the fifteen hundred-year old tradition
which places Sinai in the southern portion of the Sinai peninsula could
hardly have arisen if it had not historical basis in fact.
The historicity and trustworthiness of the writers of the various books
(or documents) is frequently questioned. The author's theory has colored
his interpretation of the facts. He holds, for example, that it was a later
literary tradition which transformed the local official who persecuted the
(few!) tribesmen in Egypt into the imposing figure of the pharao. (p. 30 f.)
Miriam is looked upon, not as Moses' sister, but rather as a prominent
member of the Kadesh community ,and her story is said to reflect the
resentment against Israel felt by devotees of Kadesh's old god. (p. 47)
Abraham was adopted into Jahvism from the southern (Hebron) tradition,
and post factum was claimed as a father. Isaac and Jacob are looked upon
as legendary figures. (p. 56 f.) Leah and Rachel were figures used to link
together into one tradition the tribes of the north and the south. Also
legendary to a great degree are the exodus and desert tradition and the
Elijah tales.
Little if anything constructive and of lasting value can be obtained by
such an exegesis of the texts. It is arbitrary to an extreme. On one occasion
(p. 59) the author himself senses the frailty of his intepretation (in re
Rachel and Leah at least), for he is obliged to write: "It is scarcely

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125

necessary again to call attention to the extraordinary skill with which this
mass of material ... was organized into a unity and related to the Jahvist
tradition of the desert." Indeed, it should scarcely be necessary to dissect
such a skillfully constructed tale, when all the evidence points to its
genuineness. As a matter of fact, it may be said that the author has raised
some outmoded ghosts that sound scientific scholars thankfully-but, it
appears, too optimistically-had thought to have been laid definitely to rest.
Briefly to mention other questionable positions taken by the author: he
speaks of the H exateuch, merely in passing to be sure, but this is hardly
to be described as scientific. He holds (shall we say boldly?) to the
southern entry of some of the tribes into Canaan (p. 48; .P· 164, n. 3) , a
position hardly justifiable by the texts. Isaias 7, 14 is completely passed
over in his treatment of the incident of which it plays the most important
part. And to cap the climax, the hoary old tale proposed by Philo, the
Manichaeans, and John Milton (but by no serious scholar) that the story
of the fall of man was basically the attainment of sex consciousness (p.
126 f.) is again raised from the oblivion into which it had been enterred
by sound criticism.
For many of these positions, however, the ground or framework was laid
in the opening chapter of the book. It bears the title "Primitive Jahvism."
The adjective "primitive " is, in its implications, pejorative. It implies here
an evolution from animism to monotheism, from the less perfect to the
more perfect, somewhat in the hegelian manner of thesis, antithesis, and
synthesis. The position cannot be justified. Dr. Albright of Johns Hopkins,
America's outstanding orientalist, utters these words which Mr. Simpson
might read and ponder: " I fail absolutely to see that they [the assured
results of modern Biblical criticism] carry the implications for the religious
evolution of Israel with which they are generally credihd . . . Only the
most extreme criticism can see any appreciable difference between the God
of Moses in JE and the God of Jeremiah, or between the God of Elijah and
the God of Deutero-lsaiah. The rebellion against historicism .. is justified,
yet it should ... be ... rather against the unilateral theory of historical
evolution which makes such an unjustified cleft between the official religion
of earlier and/or later Israel." (Journal of Bibl. Lit., 1940, pp. 110-111
passim)
There is certainly room for a middle position between that of extreme
criticism, which hold for an essential evolution of religion, and that somewhat rabbinical theory according to which the Bible and its content has
been given to us all at once and completely, like something dropped from
Heaven (or Sinai), or like Minerva stepping forth from Zeus' brain. The
middle position would hold for an evolution or religious thought in the
sense of an increase in the light, whereby men were led to a deeper understanding of a religious truth previously revealed. Hence Israel did, over the

BOOK REVIEWS

centuries, come to a clearer idea of God, of the divine nature and of the
divine attributes. But what is perfectly clear is that there was no " drive
towards monotheism "; monotheism was the primitive notion of God, and is
still the primitive notion of God in the sense that it is fundamental to an
understanding of Israel's religion.
The miracle of Israel consists precisely in the fact that it possessed from
the beginning something absolutely unique among the religions of the
time-an idea of God who was one, without consort, creator and ruler of
the world. And it is utterly improbable and from a human point of view
impossible that Israel, living as it did in the midst of peoples whose notions
of the deity were crude and polytheistic, would ever have arrived at its
transcendent notion of God without a divine intervention or revelation.
Pages 10-15, which treat of revelation and the response to it, lack precision. Revelation is said to be " an empowering of the will to conform
itself to the truth which has thus been made known" (p. 10) , but revelation is distinct from the actual grace whereby man's will is moved to act.
In revelation the recipient is completely passive while God lifts a corner of
the veil which hides the divine life. There is no question of a man's active
participation in the act of revealing. At the same time, however, his liberty
remains inviolate, for God is so powerful that He can move free men
according to their natures, i. e., freely but with infallible certitude of the
result. If this is what the author intended to communicate by his " inner
compulsion," all well and good, but the impression left on this reader was
that the inner compulsion was rather ineffective, that God could only go
so far, and that He was in some measure dependent upon the reaction of the
human being to whom His revelation was made.
Viewing this work as a whole, it is difficult to be impressed or convinced.
There is always· something suspicious about the orderly and neat division
of thought, especially religious thought, into periods and epochs, following a
pattern so enticingly simple as evolution. The work of reconstruction is
always fraught with danger, and the danger should be faced with great
circumspection, great objectivity, and great scholarship. The present work
does not seem to reflect these saving virtues.

R. T. MURPHY, 0. P.
Dominican House of Studiea,
River Foreat, IU.

BRIEF NOTICES
Ta'lim al-Muta'allim-Tariq at-Ta'allum. By Az-ZARNUJI. (Instruction of
the Student: The Method of Learning. Trans. by G. E. VON GRUNEBAUM and T. M. ABEL.) New York: King's Crown Press, 1947. Pp.
78, with index. $2.00.
Heirs of the Prophets. By SAMUEL M. ZWEMER. Chicago: The Moody
Press, 1946. Pp. 137. $2.00.
From the aspects of missionary work, of our present " one-world "
political ambitions, and also with a view to philosophical stimulation,
the western world can do well to become more intimately acquainted with
the thought and traditions of the orient.
The first of these two books, a translation from a medieval Mohammedan
author, is an essay in the philosophy and psychology of Moslem education
which includes interesting comments on such topics as the nature, purpose,
time, and methods of study as well as the moral and intellectual habits
of the good student. The difficulty with Mohammedan education, as the
westerner reading this book will discover, is too much emphasis on static
traditions, studied by mechanical memorizing, and not enough stress on
progressive thinking. Until this frozen formalism is melted, the Moslem
world is not likely to return, in a sort of Oxford movement, to a rational
probing of its roots that would be so salutary in turning the orient, on a
large scale, to genuine truth.
The second book, written from a practical viewpoint by a man who
has spent forty years in missionary work, describes the hierarchy of the
Moslem clergy with the thought that, in the Mohammedan world, " the
key to understanding of the masses lies in personal friendship with their
clergy, the so-called imams, mullahs, and sheikhs." (p. 8) This little book
not only describes the status of official personnel in Mohammedanism but
includes descriptions of Moslem functions and ceremonies that will be of
interest to the philosopher of religion.

The Red Prussian. By LEOPOLD ScHWARZSCHILD. New York: Scribners,
1947. Pp. 432, with index. $4.00.
An ad hominem argument by itself is invalid. But philosophers of action
cannot help hut he at least suspected when their own lives exemplify the
very negation of the principles which they preach. Such' a philosopher was
Karl Marx. Heroized by leftist thinkers, he was in reality a compromiser

127

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preaching justice, a pamphleteer posing as an economist, an intriguer
condemning intrigue, a parasite declaring for independent action, and an
egoist advocating fraternity and equality among men. Such are conclusions
that can be drawn from this book, based largely on the famous Marx-Engels
correspondence and revealing personal insights into Marx, the man.
A Hegelian without Hegel's speculative power, Marx was obsessed by
prejudices for which he sought philosophical reasons. His economic theory
of history was, for instance, not the fruit of detached meditation but an
after-thought which seemed to justify the personal bias, the convenient
dream, of an agitator that the present economic system was doomed. In
the face of evidence contrary to his theory of history, Marx blithely closed
his eyes.
This easy-reading translation from the German presents some sporadic
insights into Marxian philosophy in addition to the biographical data which
ru-e indeed too local in character by reason of the almost complete reliance
on the Marx-Engels letters. Had the author ranged desirably beyond this
correspondence, he might have provided more material on the relation of
Hegelianism and Marx and also on the influences exerted in the final
Marxian synthesis by the French and English schools of economics.

The New Dictionary of l'sychology.
New York; The Philosophical

By PHILIP

Library,

LAWRENCE

HARRIMAN.

1947. Pp. 364. $5.00.

The Philosophical Library in its dictionary of philosophy was not always
happy in its choice of editorial material. Like its predecessor, the present
work is not likely to be of great assistance to the specialist, philosopher
and psychologist alike.
Psychology is, of course, by etymology and by the philosophy of a
considerable number of contemporary psychologists, the study of the soul
or mind. But " soul," in the present work, is not defined at all, and mind,
without being defined, is simply mentioned in a definition of "mind-body
problem." Such a glaring deficiency will not appeal to sound philosophical
psychology nor to the scientific psychologists who have seen the need for
an approach to their subject beyond the mere analytic method.
Many of the definitions are too brief and cryptic; terms of scholastic
origin such as " idea," " intelligence," " abstraction," and " will " have
been incorrectly or incompletely defined; important terms have also been
omitted, not only in the case of scholastic psychology but also in the case
of modern systems such as "holism" and Sartre's "existential psychoanalysis " which could at least have merited mention.
Dictionaries of this sort are of value if they provide fuller discussions
than those available in the general unabridged dictionaries which specialists

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129

usually have available. The present work does not stand out as an
addition to knowledge easily accessible elsewhere. In general, not enough
space has been allotted to the concepts defined, as an apparent attempt
to keep the book within its present size. Finally, the present dictionary
is the work of one man. Psychology is too vast to expect a single individual
to produce an accurate, adequate account of all its concepts. A good
dictionary of psychology, with handy qjv references, would be welcomed
by contemporary scholarship.

The Domain of Reality. By WILLIAM GERBER. New York: King's Crown
Press, 1946. Pp. 81, -with index. $1.50.
This book is an attempt to define the term " reality " in such a way
as a) to provide by the scientific method a rule for classifying an entity
as real; b) to confonn to common usage of terms; and c) to avoid disagreements between various schools and thinkers. The general definition turns
out to be: "A thing is real in a particular context as far as it functions
in that context." {p. 13)
A context is defined in terms of another context. Do we not then have
the case of the infinite regress? No, the author declares, for there is
"an inter-functioning of contexts rather than an infinite regress." {p. 23)
But such a solution to the problem is merely verbal. A vicious circle is
but an infinite regress re-worded.
The difficulty with consistency and functional theories of truth, both
of which would seem included in Gerber's definition of the real, is that
coherence by itself is meaningless. If consistency is the norm of universal
truth, as it is in the canons of pure science, then anyone who is consistently wrong could still be called right. Hegel, after his initial premise,
the mingling of contradictories, elaborated a coherent system. Marxians
are as consistent as philosophers who accept only science and its method.
One could begin with any random postulate, as science does, and by
judging everything as meaningless which does not fit this postulate, he
could work out a consistent system. Obviously, to define the real realistically there must be at least one pivotal point where self-evidence is
acknowledged, where a thing is seen to be what it is. Any other definition
of the real is a verbalism.
The thesis of this book, as in the case of so much other modem literature
that passes for philosophy, is that it enshrines the arbitrary and anthropomorphic postulate that the scientific method is a "disinterested analytical
scrutiny" (p. 2) which can solve philosophical problems. Unless one plants
his feet firmly in the proven grounds of a metaphysic, to seek meaning
through the scientific method itself is a meaningless quest and question.

9

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The Evolution of Physic8. By CARL TRUEBLOOD CHASE. New York: Van
Nostrand, 1947. Pp. 208, with index. $2.50.
This book is a summary of physics from the days of the Greeks to the
relea.Se of atomic energy. It is unfortunately sketchy in many parts. The
middle ages, as usual in so many modem discussions of the history of
science, are elided, despite the fact that Buridan and others really
anticipated the universal mechanics which Newton later formulated. The
astronomy of the Greeks, who managed to compute the approximate circumference of the earth despite the lack of scientific techniques as they
are now refined, is likewise slighted. No one can write a history of physics
without, if not an explanation of, at least a respect for, the forces that
brought the sun up to the horizon at the dawn of modem science. In
the field of post-Newtonian physics itself, there are also lacunae. The
general theory of relativity is given only scant treatment. The depth of its
conflict with the quantum system is not discussed. This suggests that the
book is too much of a recital without an attempt to appraise the presentday concepts of physics so that its main direction can be discerned.
Nevertheless, this book can be profitable reading to a philosopher as
an introduction to the physical picture of matter in the atomic age. It
is, of course, a fallacy to insist that philosophers must be physicists in
order to assess physics. But the temper of the modem mind is such that
a philosopher is greatly aided in his work of making his timeless truth
timely if he can appreciate the direction in which physics is moving so
that, pressing this movement to its conclusion, he may the more effectively
disclose its shortcomings as a science of the ultimate.
The genuine philosopher would be inclined to smile at such naivete as
this: " An acceptance of the Copernican idea in which the earth lost its
commanding position at the center of the universe might well be the
beginning of the end for dogmatic religion." (p. 18) Certainly a sounder
thinking in philosophy would also reject the thesis of the final paragraph,
implying that the scientist, as such, is qualified to discuss the ethical
problems in the use of atomic energy.

Thomaa Edward Shields. By JusTINE WARD. New York: Scribners, 1947.
Pp. 809, with index. $8.50.
Edward Shields is, in the words of Monsignor Patrick J. McCormick's preface to this book, " the outstanding Catholic ·educational
leader of his time." Important as he was in the :field of administration
where he waged and won important battles, Shields, the philosopher of
education, has left a corpus of ideas that can still prove fertile for speculation in this twenty-fifth year after his death. His own boyhood experi-

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181

ences, together with his experiences of student days with Dewey and Hall,
urged him to his methodological principle that truth must be made
functional. He attempted to marshal his scientific training from biology
and psychology into techniques of teaching religion that de-emphasized
mere memory and aimed at doing and acting.
In the eventual appraisal of James and especially of Dewey, Shields'
ideas must be taken into account. For such a project, this present work
will provide interesting background. Written by one of Shields' associates,
the book is a delightful blend of fact, philosophy, and humor which
cannot help but be of interest to a philosopher for both technical and
pastime reading.

Modern Christian Revolutionariea. Edited by DoNALD ATTWATER. New
York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1947. Pp. 890. $4.00.
The Christian revolutionaries treated in this book are Soren Kierkegaard,
G. K. Chesterton, Eric Gill, Charles Freer Andrews, and Nicolas Berdyaev.
The authors of the essays on these men are, with the exception of Attwater,
not particularly well known in this country. A brief biographical paragraph on each is supplied.
The essays, apparently intended for the layman, are estimates of the
various revolutionaries. Biographical data are blended in with the critical
material. In the case of the revolutionaries mentioned, their lives were so
surprisingly parallel, or at least revealing, with respect to their thoughts
that the biographical devices employed are particularly effective. Attwater
informs us in his introduction that: " The contents of this volume are the
first instalment of a series being published in England. . . . The series was
conceived in midwar, in the black summer of 1941, and the first separate
little books were not born till the fall of 1945." Such a practical way of
presenting philosophy and theology as the style of this book reflects is a
commendable thing that is certainly worthy of consideration by those
scholars in this country who have long bemoaned the gulf which separates
their world and that of the masses.
Admirers of G. K. Chesterton could hardly measure the fury which their
hero would muster against the estimates of his critic, F. A. Lea. G. K.'s
conversion was, we are told, "his first great error." (p. 99} Lea believes
that Chesterton's mind was inclined by nature to submit itself to authority.
But such, it can be replied, is the inclination of man himself. It is realistic,
human, natural to acknowledge dependence, to follow first principles, to
believe in God. In more pointed reference to Lea's opinion, Chesterton
might easily have said that all men are faced with the alternative of
choosing either a true authority or a false one. There is no middle course
of" authority-lessness." Finally, and ad hominem, this note of submissive-

BRIEF NOTICES

ness played into the symphony that is Chesterton's life does not square
with the notion of Christian revolutionary.
The author believes that Chesterton missed in life what is universal and
catholic by joining the Roman Catholic Church. Thus did Chesterton fall,
it is said, " below the level of the highest life-conception of his time and
country." (p. 154) But time and country are localizing and particularizing
things. Chesterton joined a universal and apostolic Church. Asking a
man to take his moral pattern from the life-conception of a particular time
and a particular place is one of those relativisms which Chesterton so vigorously condemned. On such a score, a Nazi could be complimented because
he realized the pattern which his environment held up.
In explaining the paradox, Lea says that reality itself is illogical since it
is in development and is thus constantly uniting what is not to what is.
But this reference to the changing world does not explain Chesterton's use
of the paradox in the world of philosophy and theology.
Lea uses the expression "democratic emotion" (p. 129 and p. 181), as
though it were the foundation of democracy. If he were familiar with
Chesterton's basic meanings, he would know how much the great controversialist rebelled against mere sentimentality. Fraternal love is not an
emotion. It is an act of will.
The essay on Kierkegaard is a good introduction to the thought of this
enigmatic thinker who is having his peak of popularity a hundred years
after his death. The account, however, is inaccurate on several points. It
is also to be charged with inconsistency. The opinion is rejected that
Kierkegaard's thought" implies' no external standard of truth and morality
above the individual decision.'" (p. 28) Later on, (p. 81) it is said that
there is a " fathomless abyss," " a leap in the dark." What is lacking in
this essay is a proper distinction between the Kierkegaard of intention and
the Kierkegaard who was led to the contemporary extremisms
this
reviewer believes to be Kierkegaard's logical conclusion. Kierkegaard never
really reached God in his dialectic. He intended to do so, but he is a Christian theologian much more by intention than by the actual logic of his
arguments. His logic, it would seem, leaves him engulfed in the abyss of
dread and despair.
Attwater's essay on Gill is perhaps the most satisfactory study in the
collection. It explains Gill's theories on work and art, making Gill seem
much less the eccentric which he is sometimes pictured as being. C. F.
Andrews, the British missionary to India, is described as a Christian revolutionary because of his apostolic work among the downtrodden. His
philosophy, and one dare say, his politics as stated in twenty-nine published
works, are presented.
Berdyaev's philosophy, rejoining that of Kierkegaard on some profound
points, is well explained except perhaps for the failure to focus his notion of
wisdom as participated by the historical process. Berdyaev, as an existen-

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133

tialist, joins hands with Kierkegaard. As a critic of the machine age, he
ties in with Gill and Chesterton. The views of Andrews likewise had economic implications. Thus there is perhaps unwittingly brought out the
true meaning of Christianity which, because it works at a deeper layer of
reality than mere matter, is much more radical and revolutionary than
even its devotees are sometimes aware. The Christian revolution works
out from the depths of man where we find that principle of simplicity
which alone can solve the complex problems of our age.

The Goodness of Being in Thomistic Philosophy and its Contemporary
Significance. By SISTER ENID SMITH, 0. S. B. Washington, D. C.: The
Catholic University of America Press, 1947. Pp. 155, with index.
$2.50.
This is a doctoral dissertation of the School of Philosophy at the Catholic University of America. Its title is misleading. The " contemporary "
aspect of goodness is treated in the form of a sixteen-page chapter on
Ralph Barton Perry. Whether Perry's notions are typical of the contemporary attitude in axiology will be questioned by the
reader.
C. I. Lewis' latest works serves to indicate that Perry's value-theory is not
even typical of his own Harvard University.
Of heavier weight in evaluating this book is the author's method. The
comparison of Perry and St. Thomas is made only in general terms. The
author seems much more concerned with showing the differences between
these two men rather than their agreements. Outside of the initial chapter,
Perry's ideas are hardly mentioned. The latter part of the book thus
becomes an exposition of the philosophy of goodness in Thomism. Such a
treatment is not without its merit. If nothing else, the study offers a compendium of Thomistic views which should make handy reference material
for the specialist in philosophy. However, if it has in mind a rapprochement
between St. Thomas and contemporary thought, relating perhaps the truths
of both as universal to particular rather than as two parallel lines, then
this study is not really adequate.
Aquinas, following Augustine, stated that no philosophy could be completely wrong. At a time when Thomism must face a world that does
not understand its language or respect its traditions, its vitalizing influence
might be profitably, certainly more effortlessly, extended to the various
philosophies and philosophers if points of agreement could be searched out
and probed through whenever possible. Thomists in many cases have
forgotten their ability to distinguish.
The' readers of this book will want to know whether the value discussed
by Perry has the same meaning as bonum in the vocabulary of Aquinas.
Is this study a lumping of all value, both that apprehended intellectually

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and that grasped by the cogitative power? Or would not a distinction
here enable us to accept a measure of Perry's dialectic? Further, if we
substituted the notion of man as man for that of the individual man,
viewing the value problem by its relation to a kind of Platonic archetype,
value could be defined in terms of interest. Value would thus become that
which interests man as man, hence being conformable to his nature as his
good.
In approaching the problem of being as St. Thomas solves it, the author
begins from the outset with strict metaphysics and keeps the discussion
from thence onward in the third degree of abstraction. In defining truth
and goodness, it would have been helpful to insist rather strongly on the
way in which truth and goodness are related. In the De V eritate, Aquinas
accepted Anselm's definition of a thing as ontologically true when it has
what it ought to have, fulfills what it ought to fulfill. In the Summa
Tkeologica (I, q. 21, a. 2), Aquinas in one sense· identifies justice and
truth. All this brings the metaphysics of knowledge and the metaphysics
of being, especially in its value aspect, strikingly close together. From
such an angle, Perry's avowed realism in epistemology, his description
of evaluating in psychology, both in fact would lead toward either a
kindred realism in regard to value or the solipsism which Perry and his
cohorts so strongly oppose.
The author has a chapter on the three ways in which a thing is said to
be good: in its essential being; in its added perfections; and in its order
to an end. There is likewise a chapter on the so-called axioms of goodness: bonum eat diffuaivum sui ease and bonum eat communicativum sui.
There is likewise a chapter on the kinds of goodness. This juncture, it
would seem, might have been another apt locus for the direct confronting
of Perry and Thomism. Bonum utile and bonum delectabile are not without reference to the interest theory; both, however, lead to the bonum
honeatum at the risk of an infinite series which would make even useful
and delectable goods indeterminate.
The final chapter, the best, concerns the problem of evil and the solution brought to bear by Thomism on this point. Value-theories, unless
they solve this most intimate of problems, must be judged inadequate
and gratuitous. The modern algebraic mind considers evil as error rather
than as the evil it is. Such an explanation cannot long satisfy the inquiring mind. What indeed is the opposite of value? Certainly it is not the
non-value or the indifferent. On the other hand, to speak of bad value is
like speaking of bad goodness. St. Thomas' thought can answer the real
problem of evil. Nowhere does the psychological approach of Perry and
his master James more thunderously break down.

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History is on Our Side. By JosEPH NEEDHAM. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947. Pp. 226, with index.

$2.75.

The author of this book is a distinguished biochemist of the University
of Cambridge, who has made some original contributions in the study of
differentiation in the developing embryo. A man of rare culture, he" reads
Chinese classics in the original," according to the jacket, "translates Polish
literature in his spare time, and studies Aztec philology as a relaxation."
His style, unusually alive for a man of technical achievement, is in delightful contrast to so much of the heavy scholarship in our age.
This array of fine talent, Needham sets to the rhythm of dialectical
materialism. Evolution, so often taken as a dogma today instead of the
scientific theory which it still remains, leads Needham to the Marx-Engels
philosophy of history. But as with the Marxians, the classless society to
emerge from the historical processes is not only unavoidable but desirable
for its own sake. Thus science which, in Bergson's classic simile came
down from heaven to earth on the inclined plane of Galileo is envisioned by
Marxian scientists like Needham and his fellow-countryman, J. B. S. Haldane, as bringing heaven down to earth along with it. History is on the
side of man's friends, Needham holds, because it will inevitably bring
about what they are trying to procure for him.
'
This book comprises a series of essays written over the period from 1936
to 1941. Almost anyone of these compositions could serve as a point of
departure to display the inadequacy of Needham's whole idea. If evolution were conceived according to the laws of thermodynamics, particularly
the law of entropy, the result would not come out to be the perfection of
man and his society. Entropy is a kind of dying rather than progression, a
dedifferentiation rather than the differentiation which marks organism and
civilization in their growth. This thermodynamical approach is regarded
by many competent scientists as being the fundamental empirical approach to reality. A related idea from Needham's professional vocabulary
can be introduced here, that of the biochemical organizer which apparently
"directs" embryonic differentiation. How can the specialization achieved
by these organizers be explained if the net result of evolutionary developments is to be the levelling dedifferentiation of men into a classless, }egalitarian status. In brief, if history is on the march toward a classless society,
then the following anomalies must be explained: if the movement takes
place according to thermodynamical laws only it is not progress, and if
it takes place according to biological laws, then it is directed toward
specialization rather than classlessness. In the first case, communism would
not be desirable; and in the second case, it would not be inevitable.
The first essay, entitled "The Two Faces of Christianity," purports to
show that the traditional western religion has always attempted a synthesis
of two incompatible predecessors, the materialism of " Hebrew Apo-

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calypticism" and the intense spiritualism of Greek Neo-Platonism. Needham would accept
former system only. " The christian religion, i'n
fact, has always contained communist elements implicit within it, but
this life of active apocalptic has always been smothered by the dead weight
of mystical Neo-Platonism so convenient to the possessing class." Needham's condemnation of mysticism stands in sharp contrast to his earlier
philosophy as stated in The Sceptical Biologist. There, he argued that the
problem of life could be approached either from the viewpoint of mechanism
or of teleology. These two conflicting views could be united, he maintained,
by a mystical intuition. In his present context, Needham must logically
drag his own former self into his courtroom. What assurance can he provide his readers that he will not some day reject these present views just as
he now parts company with his earlier philosophy?
Needham's wish to brand communism as Christianity in practice shows a
complete lack of appreciation of what Christianity is. Such a statement
uses matter as a frame of reference for evaluating Christianity rather
than takes root in the primacy of spirit. As Christopher Dawson says,
be more fatal to the nature of the Church, Her spirit and
nothing
Her efficacy, than a return to Her for purely economic reasons. The
Church has the power to effect economic justice only because She insists
that justice as such is not defined through economics.
The chapter on hylomorphism displays the typical misunderstanding of
matter and form. Form is presented in terms of the accidental form of a
vase. Rejected as unobservable to the techniques of empirical science,
hylomorphism is today supplanted, Needham finds, by an account of matter
in terms of energy and organization. This is strangely like the way in
which hylosystemists define the atom. Needham's solution, like that of
hylosystemism, is purely verbal. Where did the organization arise if not
in terms of a matrix or ground realized from within?
This book is based on a number of presuppositions, materialism, the
exclusive validity of the scientific method, and the dialectical meaning of
development. Such postulates will not be admitted by realists. All of
them, when mistaken for philosophy, are dogmas. They are the prelude
to observations rather than their result.

St. Thomas and Epistemology. By Louis-MARIEREGIS, 0. P. Milwaukee:
The Marquette University Press, 1946. Pp. 95. $1.50.
This is th'e printed version of the tenth in the series of Aquinas lectures
which the Aristotelian Society of Marquette University is laudably providing to American philosophy. The present volume, by the director of
the Albert the Great Institute of Medieval Studies at the University of
Montreal, continues the high level set by its predecessors. Presenting the

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187

subject in a chatty style that at times almost conceals a profundity of
thought, Pere Regis makes out the case against the critical philosophy
which fails in its content because it misconceives its own nature and place
in intellectual enterprises.
Included in his adversaries are Descartes and Kant and also the would-be
neothomistic approaches of Msgr. Noel and Pere Roland-Gosselin. Descartes, it is shown, attempted to provide philosophy with a method that
would unify it, but since Descartes there has been nothing but a precession
of disagreement among philosophers. Kant attempted to provide philosophy with the same kind of certitude as found in the Newtonian physics
of his day. But with the atom-smashing of Newton's world by twentiethcentury physics, Newton has· been abandoned. Noel and Roland-Gosselin
would assemble a critique of knowledge from what is implicit in the
Thomistic tradition and thus provide a Thomistic criteriology as the prolegomenon to St. Thomas' sciences of real being.
In criticism of these doctrines, Pere Regis points up that St. Thomas'
philosophy is not the equivalent of common sense and that when Descartes
and Kant emphasize the errors into which common sense, unregimented by
their formalism, is likely to fall, they must exempt genuine philosophy from
the scope of their indictment. The reader may feel need here for a clarification of the relation between common sense and true philosophy, between
the plain man's notion of being and the ens ut ens of the metaphysician.
This would seem more of a problem that the author's treatment indicates.
As the author says, the being conceived by the plain man and the notion
of the metaphysician are not the same, but he fails to clarify the subject
further. Certainly there is a relationship that must also be admitted between common sense and metaphysics, not only in the matter of content
but also in the matter of an organon, logical. and even linguistic. Whatever be their differences, the world studied by the metaphysician is the
same world as that apprehended by the ordinary man.
From a positive viewpoint, the author, describing knowledge in terms
of its various sources, in sensation and intellection, defines the science of
epistemology in terms of the following questions: "(I) are the knowledges
that present themselves as true really true?
if they are true, how is
this multitude of truths to be explained? (3) if they are multiple, how is
their multiplicity to be reduced to unity?" (p 43) Viewed in this way,
epistemology becomes what its name indicates-the science of knowledges.
The author solves the critical question by showing that idealism is a
monistic solution which, by its very lack of material to organize, would
make impossible the science of order that is philosophy. The author's
approach, he admits, implies that epistemology derives from metaphysics
and that metaphysics has the last word to say on what reality is. " The
plurality of truth, point of departure of all philosophic epistemology, is
made possible and understandable, then, only when metaphysics has defined

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being as multiform and men as possessing a diversity of cognitive principles." (pp. 52-58)
The author closes with a striking presentation of knowledge in terms of
the four-fold causality: the material cause of knowledge is
the
formal cause is being, the efficient cause is man, and the final cause is •• a
divine mimicry, a kind of sharing in the infinite perfection of God by
adding to our own being all the excellences that we :find in beings outside
of ourselves." (p. 56)
This book, were it read by a modem man persuaded to lay aside his
prejudices for a moment, would give pause as an approach to philosophy.
Idealism, sensism, skepticism ·are not only false from a speculative point
of view. They are empirically impossible. In an age which leans so
heavily toward empiricism, if such a leaning were impartially followed
through, the principles so ably defined and defended by Pere Regis should
be nothing less than conclusive.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Bea, A. Le NotJ,veau Psautier Latin. Paris: Desclee, de Brouwer, 1947.
Pp. 206, with bibliography. Fr. 64.
Belgodere, F. J. A. Retorno ala Logica Claaica. Mexico, D. F.: Editorial
Jus, 1947. Pp. 880. $12.00.
Benignus, Bro. Nature, Knowledge, and God. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1947.
Pp. 674, with index. $4.50.
Bernard, T. Hindu Philosophy. New York: Philosophical Library, 1947.
Pp. 218, with glossary. $8.75.
Brooks, V. W. The Times of Melville and Whitman. New York: Dutton,
1947. Pp. 495, with index. $5.00.
·
Bryson, L., Finkelstein, L., Maciver, R. editors. Con:flicta of Power in
Modern Culture. New York: Harper, 1947. Pp. 728, with index.
$6.50.
Crane, M., ed. The Roosevelt Era. New York: Boni & Gaer, 1947. Pp.
640. $4.75.
Ebenstein, W., ed. Man and the State. New York: Rinehart, 1947. Pp.
797, with index and bibliographical notes. $6.50.
Eudes, St. John. The Priest. New York: Kenedy, 1947. Pp. 824, with
index. $8.00.
Fine, B. Our Children are Cheated. New York: Holt, 1947. Pp. 255, with
index. $8.00.
Fletcher, J., Christianity and Property. Philadelphia: The Westminster
Press, 1947. Pp. 221, with index. $2.50.
Fromm, E. Man for Him8elf. New York: Rinehart, 1947. Pp. i65, with
index. $8.00.
Giordani, I. Mary of Nazareth. New York: Macrinan, 1947. Pp. 205.
$2.75.
Hardman, 0. The Christian Doctrine of Grace. New York: Macmillan,
1947. Pp. 128, with index. $2.00.
Hewes, T. Decentralize for Liberty. New York: Dutton, 1947. Pp. 288.
$8.00.
'"Juxley, T. H., Huxley, J. Touchstone fiw Ethics. New York: Harper,
1947. Pp. 265. $8.00.
Graham, A. The Christ of Catholicism. New York: Longmans, 1947. Pp.
891, with index. $4.00.
Joad, C. E. M. How Our Minda Work. New York: Philosophical Library,
1947. Pp. 116, with index. $2.75.
Joy, C. R., ed. Albert Schweitaer. :New York: Harper, 1947. Pp. 851, with
index. $8.75.

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140

BOOKS RECEIVED

Keeping Christmas and Building World Peace. New York: The Church
Peace Union, 1947. Pp. 20.
Marcus, J. R. Communal Sick-care in the German Ghetto. Cincinnati:
Union of American Hebrew Congregations, 1947. Pp. 848, with index.
$4.00.
Maritain, J. The Person and the Common Good. New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1947. Pp. 98, with index. $2.00.
Martin, H. The Inquiring Mind. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1947. Pp.
287, with index. $2.75.
McKenzie, J. G. Nervous Disorders and Character. New York: Harper,
1947. Pp. 126, with index. $1.50.
McMahon, J. J. De Christo Mediatore Doctrina S. Hilarii Pictavensis.
Mundelein, TIL: St. Mary of the Lake Seminary, 1947. Pp. 184.
Newman, J. H. Apologia Pro Vita Sua. New York: Longmans, 1947. Pp.
424, with index. $8.50.
-. The Idea of a University. New York: Longmans, 1947. Pp. 451,
with index. $8.50.
---. A Grammar of Assent. New York: Longmans, 1947. Pp. 416, with
index. $8.50.
O'Connor, W. R. The Eternal Quest. New York: Longmans, 1947. Pp.
290, with index. $4.00.
Ottaviano, C. Critica dell'Idealismo. Padua: Casa Editrice Cedam, 1947.
Pp. 215, with index. L. 700.
Pontifex, M. The Ezistence of God. New York: Longmans, 1947. Pp.
196. $2.25.
Roubiczek, P. The Misinterpretation of Man. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947. Pp. 818, with index. $2.75.
Silva-Tarouca, A. Thomas Heute. Vienna: Verlag Herder, 1947. Pp. 212.
S. 28; sfr. 14.
Slaughter, F. G. Medicine for Moderns. New York: Julian Messner, 1947.
Pp. 254, with index. $8.50.
Therese, Sr. M. I Sing of a Maiden. New York: Macmillan, 1947. Pp.
496, with index. $4.50.
Vergne, Y. de Ia. Madame Elizabeth of France. St. Louis: Herder, 1947.
· Pp. 480, with index. $4.00.
Walpole, E. W. Tell Me. New York: Hinds, Hayden & Eldredge (Barnes
& Noble), 1947. Pp. 168. $2.75.
Walsh, G. G. Catholicism. New York: Declan X. McMullen, 1947. Pp. 94.
$1.25.
Wise, J. E. The Nature of the Liberal Arts. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1947. Pp.
282, with index. $8.50.
Wolfson, H. A.
of Religious Philosophy. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1947. Vol. I, pp. 478; vol. IT, pp. 545, with
index. $10.00.