THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS:

THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PRoviNCE oF ST. JosEPH

Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.
VoL. XI

OCTOBER, 1948

No.4

THEOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF CONVERSION

T

HERE exists a rather curious discrepancy between the
very lively interest taken nowadays in apologetical,
oecumenical, and other works which by their very nature
tend to result in conversions to the Catholic Church, and the
almost complete lack of reflection among Catholics on the
problems connected with these conversions. This lively interest
hardly needs demonstration. It can be measured, for example,
by the numerous stories of converts which are being published
and read and which furnish the principal material for psychological studies of conversion (Starbuck, James, DeSanctis, Th.
Mainage, 0. P.) The lack of theological reflection is shown,
among other instances, from the fact that the Dictionnaire de
Theologie Catholique does not even mention the word conversion; the Dic·tionnaire Apologetique de la Foi Catholique and
the Lexicon Fur Theologie und Kirche have only very short
articles on the subject and they are more historical than theological. In this study, we intend only to examine some of the
theological problems related to conversion and indicate certain
solutions; all of these problems could not be studied in one
article.
409

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C. F. PAUWELS

It must be noted immediately that the word " conversion "
can have several different meanings, all of these meanings having
some connection between them. The different uses of the same
word have been the cause of much confusion in the psychological study of conversion as we understand it. Conversion can
mean (and it is in this sense that we write of it) a change
of religious conviction, and notably the acceptance of the
Catholic faith. It indicates a motion to something new from
something old; therefore it has a counterpart in apostasy, and
if we attend to the fact that as an old conviction is given up
a new one is acquired we note that every conversion can be
called an apostasy. Conversion in this first sense, however,
implies something more than a merely intellectual act, for whoever accepts the Catholic faith enters the Catholic Church and
intends to live a Catholic life.
In another sense, conversion may mean the justificatio impii,
the change from a bad life to a good one. In this sense, conversion has been the object of numerous theological studies, and
has been considered by St. Thomas 1 and the modem authors.
The latin term, conversus, has been used to designate a laybrother in the same sense. It should be noted that a conversion
to the Catholic faith always implies some change from a bad to
a good life, in this respect at least that the Catholic standards
of good and bad must be accepted with the faith; therefore,
almost every convert, even if he could be called a good Christian before his conversion, has to make some changes in his
manner of life. Still, one can be a bad Catholic and a sinner
at the same time, and such a one needs the justificatio impii
without needing any change of faith. On the other hand, many
non-Catholics are already in a state of grace before they are
converted to the Catholic faith. Hence a connection between
these two kinds of conversion is not only possible, but necessary.
In a third sense, conversion may mean a change in religious
life without any change of faith. This kind of conversion is
studied by ascetical and mystical theologians. 2 We call it a
Summa Theol., I-II, q. 113.
'Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, The Three Ways of the Spiritual Life, London,

1

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PROBLEMS

OF CONVERSION

411

conversion when a man changes from a humdrum religious life
to a more serious one, from carelessness about venial sin to a
systematical endeavor to reach perfection. Although this kind
of conversion implies no change in religious conviction and is
thus very different from the first kind, it should be noted that
the acceptance of the Catholic faith, which is the fullness of
revelation and grace, must bring about in the life of good
Christians who are in a state of grace before conversion a
growth in
intensity of religious life.
Finally, Protestants have a special notion of conversion which
can not be fully treated here. We can call it an offspring of
Luther's teaching on the fides salvifica; it means no change in
religious conviction but is the beginning of a more consciously
religious life. Professor Starbuck has studied these conversions
in his famous book The Psychology of Religion. He notes carefully that such conversions ". . . are true of a specialised class,
chiefly Protestant, American members of professedly Christian
communities. They are not necessarily true of savages or statesmen or Catholics or persons living in a different historical
epoch." Notwithstanding his caution, his conclusions on the
age of conversion and the influence of puberty are often applied
to conversions to the Catholic faith.

*

*

*

In this study, we are interested only in conversions to the
Catholic faith, and from the theological, not the psychological,
approach. The theologian has to look to the theological cause
of conversion, the grace of God. He is the only person who has
a right to speak of this grace. Further, he is the only person
who can define exactly what a conversion to the Catholic faith
is, for every motion is known from its goal and only the theologian can say what the faith truly is. Too, he alone can speak
of a right and a wrong way to come to the faith. The doctrine
on the nature of faith and especially the treatise on the genesis
of faith must be used in the study of conversions.
The historian can tell the story of conversions and, by comparison, he can find some general laws about the way in which

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C. F. PAUWELS

they usually happen. The psychologist can study conversions
as facts of conscious human life and he can look for the influence
of subconscious processes. Neither of these, however can claim
the right to judge extrapsychic, superhuman causes. On the
other hand, the theologian needs the help of both historian and
psychologist if he wishes to do more than give only abstract
speculations on faith and conversions. From revelation he can
deduce what faith is and the relation of faith to the grace of
God, but if he wishes to speak of different kinds of conversions,
the different ways by which God brings His children to the truth
and the Church, he must turn to actual facts. Working in a
priori fashion, he can only suggest possibilities.
Before discussing the use of these facts, we must point out
an important conclusion: the theologian alone can judge when
to speak of true and when to speak of false conversions; he must
therefore sort out the facts according to his own standards.
This conclusion may seem rather arrogant especially to psychologists. We do not mean to deny that psychologists too can
judge about true and false conversions, but they can judge
only according to a psychological pattern and this does not
coincide with the theological pattern. We have said that a
conversion always has its counterpart in an apostasy in that
when a man accepts the Catholic faith he, at the same time,
casts off his former convictions. To a psychologist when a
Protestant becomes a Catholic. abjuring his Protestantism, it
may seem the same thing as when a Catholic becomes a Protestant, abjuring his Catholicism. He may call both facts conversions, study them side by side, and speak of them being true
or false conversions in a psychological sense. To a theologian,
however, the first is a work of grace and the second the work
of sin; he will never call the second fact a conversion. Furthermore, the theologian must consider whether a man becomes a
true Catholic in the right manner, whether he has the real faith
and whether he came to it in the right way. For instance,
George Tyrell, the Modernist leader, is always called a convert
from Anglicanism to Catholicism. In view of his later life and
evolution, the theologian must consider two possibilities: Tyrell

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OF CONVERSION

418

may have been a true convert and afterwards gave up his faith,
or perhaps he never was a true convert and a good Catholic;
he may never have believed in the true Catholic manner, or
his motive in becoming a Catholic may have been false or unsound. In special cases, like Tyrell's, it may be impossible to
come to a certain conclusion, but it is the theologian's exclusive
right to judge.
When he has received the necessary facts from historians and
psychologists, it is the theologian's task to analyse them and
interpret them in the light of the workings of divine grace.
Grace, of course, can not be experienced. We can only believe
in it, but from theological analysis we can be sure that some
of our actions, as, e. g., to believe, to love our enemies, can
be done only with the help of grace. The theologian searches
the stories of converts for actions of this kind; he may find that
they have not been appreciated properly by the converts themselves and that they have been passed over by historians and
psychologists to whom they had no meaning. The converts,
even if they are making an effort to retail the entire truth, will
tell their stories as they remember them. It often happens that
facts which are of little importance to the theologian made
the strongest impression upon the convert. The event which,
to the theologian, marked the moment of the infusion of the
faith is often forgotten and passed over. All this is so because
grace is not experienced but is rather believed.
There are some conversions which are
conversions such as those of St. Paul and St. Augustine, and in
latter times of Alphonse Ratisbonne and Paul Claude!. In these
cases, the converts themselves, the historian, psychologist, and
theologian will consider the same moment decisive. But there
are many other conversions, long drawn-out affairs with, apparently, no decisive crisis; of these the conversion of Cardinal
Newman is outstanding. It can also be that a phase may appear
important in the eyes of the convert without being, in the theologian's eyes, the real turning point. Such might be the
moments in which a man realizes that his boyhood religion is
false or when he hears that his closest friend is to become a

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C. F. PAUWELS

Catholic. The Dutch convert, Pieter van der Meer de Walcheren, a friend and follower of Leon Bloy, confesses that he
can not tell the moment in which he first made the act of faith,
but he best remembers the moment when for the first time he
knelt down and made the sign of the cross. Father Bede Camm
tells of a moment in Maredsous chapel when he almost heard
the devil saying, "What kind of nonsense is this? Do not pray
to the Virgin; go back to your work! " 3 These moments claim
the attention, not only of the converts themselves, but of the
historian and psychologist as well, because they are of chief
importance to the conscious spiritual life. The theologian, while
acknowledging their relative importance, will look elsewhere for
the precise moment of conversion, the infusion of the faith.
St. Augustine's case furnishes another complication. His was
a double conversion; the Manichee turned Catholic, the sinner
became a saint. At the same time he had to face an intellectual
and a moral conflict; this is not uncommon. In such cases, the
moral conflict being more vivid and more emotional may often
claim more attention; hence it will be better remembered afterwards, while the theologian concentrates not upon the conflict
but upon the actual conversion.

*

*

*

When studying the beginning and growth of faith in converts, the theologian needs to keep in mind the possibility that
they may have had divine faith even before they had the
thought of becoming Catholics. Catholic doctrine admits the
possibility of being in a state of grace without belonging to the
visible Catholic Church, and since sanctifying grace is always
accompanied by the supernatural virtues one may have divine
faith while yet outside the church. The formal object of divine
faith, the reason why we believe is God's revelation; the proposition of this revelation by the Church is considered by theologians to be a necessary condition of faith, but it does not
belong to its formal object. Hence, real faith is possible to nonCatholics.
• "De l'Anglicisme au Monachisme," Collection Pax, 1930, p. 98.

THEOLOGICAL

PROBLEMS

OF CONVERSION

415

In such cases, conversion can not be called the acceptance
of the Catholic faith in the most obvious sense, that is, in the
sense that the convert had no divine faith at all before his
conversion. Conversion consists in believing that the Catholic
Church is God's work and has God's mandate to teach and
propose His revelation with authority. It means beginning to
believe through the Church. As it implies believing every
article of faith the Church proposes, the convert will have to
believe much more after his conversion than before; this, however is only a change in the material object of his faith and a
secondary effect of his conversion.
These changes in the material object of the faith can be very
different in different conversions. In the case of a liberal Protestant, it many mean that he, for the first time in his life, has to
believe in the divinity of Jesus Christ, His redemptive mission,
the Holy Eucharist; in the case of the Anglo-Catholic, it may
mean fewer additional articles of belief. Therefore, it is possible
that the question of the Church and of believing through the
ministry of the Church will appear more or less important to
the converts themselves. To find the real Jesus is more important than to find the real Church, but to find the true
Church is more important than to acknowledge the Pope. It
is, therefore, not only easily understood, but it is quite right
that some converts will insist on the material, and others on the
formal, change in their faith. But the theologian will always
consider the acceptance of the faith through the Church as the
essential feature of conversion.
Thus far, we have spoken of conversion chiefly as a fact of
the intellectual order; believing is an act of the intellect, moved
by the will. Conversion, however, entails more than this. A
convert acquires a new religion and becomes a member of the
Catholic Church. As a Catholic, he henceforth receives God's
grace through the ministry of the Church and chiefly through
the Sacraments. Previously he may have b('!en in a state of
grace and may have received abundant grace from God, but
henceforth he will receive this grace in an entirely different
manner. This, again, is something which is withdrawn from the

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C. F. PAUWELS

consciousness of the converts themselves; they will not note it
and it will never be studied by psychologists. It is, of course,
much more important that they receive God's grace than that
they should know about it, but the theologian has to insist on
this aspect of the convert's membership in the Church. A story
like Msgr. Benson's that he was received into the Church without feeling or experiencing any special emotion has, therefore,
very different meanings for psychologist or theologian.
For the same reason it is supremely important to the theologian whether or not the convert was validly baptized before
conversion. Psychologically, this may be negligible, something
of no consequence, and certainly less important for the conscious process of conversion than the actual beliefs one had
before conversion. Practically, of course, it has to be decided
whether the convert must be baptized conditionally. But to
the theologian it means that the convert, even before his conversion, may already have been able to receive the sacraments
and, through them, God's grace; radically, he may have already
been a member of the Church and conversion may only be a
claiming of native rights.
In Holland and elsewhere in Europe, there are some converts
who strongly object to the use of the term conversion. They
prefer not to be called converts; they say they are " reunited "
and not " converted." Some priests agree with them, and we
must concede that a term with four different meanings has its
difficulties and may imply less pleasant and somewhat humiliating associations. If we should consider the possibility of a
new and different term (which might prove hard to find) it
would have to be applied to those who were validly baptized
before conversion.

*

*

*

In every study on conversion which is historical or psychological, there is an attempt to classify conversions in several
species. It can be questioned whether the theologian can copy
these classifications or whether he should make his own. Some
distinctions are plainly psychological or historical. For example,

THEOLOGICAL

PROBLEMS

OF CONVERSION

417

if the question of subconscious influences is taken as a norm, it
is a purely psychological standard. If we ask whether a conversion concerned one individual soul or whether it entailed a
group, the question becomes historical. The theologian, however, must take his norms of classification from the Catholic
notion of faith and, more particularly, from the notion of faith
through and in the Catholic Church (fides divina et Catholica.)
We believe that special stress should be laid on the question
as to how the divinity of the Catholic Church becomes evident
to the convert.
Sudden converions make the story of one convert very different from other stories; they furnish one decisive, critical, often
dramatic, moment as the obvious climax. They mean everything to the historian who at the same time is a good storyteller; they may give precious indications to the psychologist
who wants to speak about the unconscious or the subconscious.
The theologian, however, must note that every conversion has
its own critical moment, even if it passes unobserved by the
convert. It is imposible to grow gradually into the Catholic
Church or to acquire the faith gradually; the influence of grace
is instantaneous, but the moment need not be dramatic.
Further, the theologian is certainly interested in whether a
conversion to the faith is accompanied by the justific;atio impii,
the conversion to a better life. This circumstance, too, makes a
great difference in the story and the study of it. Though it
makes conversion more difficult, inasmuch as the faith itself
then clearly implies moral demands, it has no direct influence
on the conversion to the faith itself; it only makes a man more
open to the aspect of the sanctity of the Church.
A conversion must be studied and classified from the terminus ad quem and not from the terminus a quo. Therefore,
it seems that the fact of one having been a heathen, or Mohametan, or a Communist, or an atheist before becoming a
Catholic can not in itself be a norm of classification to the
theologian. The terminus a quo has its influence on the story
of the convert; the ways to the Church can be very different
and principally by reason of their starting-points, but to the

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C. F. PAUWELS

fact of conversion itself the starting-point need not be of great
importance. However, we must admit the real possibility that
the terminus a quo may create a kind of predisposition to see
the divinity of the faith and the Church under one certain
aspect. For example, the fact that one has been a Communist
may mean that he is attracted to the Church in her social teaching and activity.
On the other hand, it is of paramount importance to the
theologian whether the convert actually had the faith before
conversion; this fact, we believe, will give the first really theological norm for classification. Here we do not mean faith in
any modern, vague sense; we mean faith in the true Catholic
sense, that is the acceptance of mysteries on the authority of
God. Obviously there is a great difference between the man
who for the first time in his life has to accept something he
does not understand, on God's authority, and the man who is
already accustomed to bow his head to God's authority. This
difference is psychological but is much more theological. The
divine authority of the Church as seen in its various aspects
can and must furnish the theological norm for further classification.
Here the theologian certainly does not mean that the divinity
of the Church can be demonstrated by various apologetical
arguments and that these arguments will be the norm of
classification. These arguments can give only a natural preparation for the faith, but the faith itself is infused. The divine
mystery of the Church, however, has many aspects which the
light of the faith can show, and so the converts by their very
faith will come to the Church in various ways. For instance,
Sigrid Undset, the great novelist, writes about her conversion:
" We want, above all, teachers who can teach us something;
we need leaders who have the real power to command and
prohibit;,and we desire to look up to One to Whom we can pour
out our confidence and admiration, and also our love." The
Dutch politician, Dr. Henry P. Marchant, gave to his story the
motto, V eritas liberabit nos, " The Truth will make us free."
While Cardinal Newman was a man of too many sides and of
too versatile an intellect to be easily classified, there is a signifi-

THEOLOGICAL

PROBLEMS

OF CONVERSION

419

cant fact with regard to his classification. During his illness in
Sicily he could protest, " I will not die because I have not
sinned against the truth," but he did not become a Catholic
before having solved for himself the intellectual difficulty as
to how the Catholic Church of his own day could be the same
as his beloved Church of the Fathers.
Most converts are, in some way, impressed by the sanctity
of the Church, but in different forms. Sheila Kaye-Smith, the
English novelist, was affected in her conversion by considering
the Catholic Saints in the centuries after the Reformation.
She was struck by the contrast between St. Francis de Sales,
St. John Vianney, St. Ignatius Loyola, the two Saints Theresa
and the foremost religious figures of her own Anglican Church
who were no more than " worthies " and a source of acrimonious
dispute in their own church. F. Vernon Johnson, England's
famous missionary preacher, was first repelled and then singularly attracted by the story of St. Theresa of Lisieux; this forced
him to ask himself about the value and truth of this Catholic
faith which gave to the young Carmelite such strength and
grace. Quite a different aspect of the sanctity of the Church
made G. K. Chesterton write that he became a Catholic, " to
get rid of my sins." 4 Again, very different are the many
stories of converts who received their first real impression of the
Catholic Church from nuns in hospitals.
The beauty and charm of the Catholic faith can also be
shown to be superhuman and divine. Here, however, we have
to be very careful; there are many things to be admired in
Catholic life which are human and accidental. We should be
very skeptical about conversions founded upon the splendor of
the ceremonies in St. Peter's or on the quiet and intimate
beauty of Christmas in a Benedictine monastery. But, on the
other hand, the poet, Alfred Noyes, has shown how the masterpieces of the greatest poets, when compared with Catholic
doctrine, receive a more abundant splendor. In this way we
see really divine beauty, but we must not
poets, painters,
and other artists to be brought to the Catholic Church mainly
'Autobiography,

London, 1987, p. 829.

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C. F. PAUWELS

in this way. The Dutch painter, Dom Willibrord Verkade, who
afterwards found peace and happiness in Beuron' s art and
beauty, found truth and faith in a poor village church in Brittany. Professor Gerard Brom has noted that the Dutch poet,
Joost van den Vondel, who loved splendor in the Renaissance
style, never saw the pomp of Mass in a Cathedral; he went to
Mass in little places.
Truth, sanctity, and beauty, then are three general aspects of
the faith and the Church; through these can appear to converts
the divinity of the Church. Next to these, we sometimes observe that a particular dogma or institution proves the decisive
factor. Some converts are first convinced that God has taught
or instituted one special thing; afterwards they find that one
thing existing only in the Catholic Church. In this way the
monks of Caldey can be said to have become Benedictine before
they were Catholics; they found that Benedictine life in accordance with the authentic traditions is possible only in the
Catholic Church.

*

*

*

More species of conversion could be found but we believe
those already described to be the principal varieties. There is,
however, an element in the Catholic doctrine on faith which
may give a different standard for classification. In Catholic
theology the act of faith is always called an act of the intellect.
To believe means to accept something as true, and an act of
faith, for a Catholic, is never a vague feeling but has some
proposition as its object. In Catholic theology there is another
element; faith is an act of the intellect, but the intellect moved
by the will. The proposition or truth accepted by faith is not
seen in itself and hence it can not move the intellect by its own
strength. The will must influence such an intellectual act; hence
we may further distinguish species of conversions in relation to
the motives of the will.
In the stories of some converts, we find that the sense of duty
toward God is more apparent, while in others there is more
consciousness of happiness accruing to the convert himself. We
do not intend to stress or exaggerate this opposition. Catholic

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PROBLEMS

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421

theology will never acknowledge a conversion as true, if the
sense of duty towards God is entirely lacking; on the other
hand, no convert expects to find only unhappiness, misery, or
disappoinment in the Church. Catholic morals have their principles in something between pure eudaimonism and the categorical imperative of duty, and we must have towards God a
love which at the same time is a love of friendship and a
utilitarian love in the highest sense. Therefore, to become a
Catholic is at the same time a sacred duty towards God and a
real happiness to the convert. Yet, in one's conscious thinking,
one of these two may dominate and become more apparent.
We have, then, two different, but not absolutely opposed, kinds
of conversion. St. Paul, who after seeing Christ's glory only
asked, " Lord, what do You want me to do? " can be called an
example of the first. The Duch convert, A. J.D. van Oosten,
who after his conversion wrote a brochure entitled "The Joys
of the Convert" may be called an example of the other.
This new classification intersects the other we have already
enumerated. Truth, sanctity, and beauty can be viewed as
something to which it is a man's duty to conform, but they are
at the same time something very good to a man. To someone
like St. Augustine, who was acutely unhappy in his sins and
who was really desiring sanctity, or to a man who is troubled
with questions on the meaning of life, Catholic sanctity by
grace and Catholic truth are a glorious answer to difficulties.
On the other hand, Cardinal Newman's sermon on" The Parting of Friends," his last sermon as an Anglican, clearly indicates
that the truth meant to him a very stem call of duty.
While we are speaking of the motives of the will, we must
mention the fact that often less idealistic and religious motives
can play a part in conversion. The thought of conversion can
cross one's mind for the first time in connection with love for
one who is already a Catholic. In certain circumstances, to
become a Catholic can mean better chances for one's career.
And there can be other motives. The theologian has to insist
that such motives can never bring about a conversion; they can
only furnish an occasion, an accidental inducement. So, motives

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like these, or motives of fear and compulsion can not be a
standard for classification of true conversions.

*

*

*

Every conversion is a story because it is something which
takes some time in a man's life. Even if the conversion itself
is sudden, the convert had a terminus a quo, a religious life
before his conversion, which can throw a light on his conversion
and must be told and studied, even when it is purely negative.
In most cases, however, a conversion is a fact with a long
preparation and it may be in process for several years. Conversions, too, have a sequel, less known to psychologists because
seldom told by converts who usually close their narration with
their entry into the Church .. This sequel is really part of the
story because it takes some time to realize all the consequences
implied in conversion and to feel truly at home in the Catholic
Church.
The theologian's first object of consideration is the grace of
faith and, particularly, its infusion. The first thing, then, that
he notes about conversion stories is that the sequel to a conversion presents a practical problem; it belongs to the confessor,
the religious guide, rather than to the student of theological
problems. The convert has received the grace of the faith, and
he must ·face the consequences. These must be worked out by
pastoral care; they do not present the theological problem
presented by the beginning and preparation of a conversion.
Such problems have a negative and a positive side. Msgr.
Kinsman, Episcopal Bishop of Delaware who became a Catholic, spoke afterwards of a " de-anglicanising " and a " romanising " process. This must be true of every convert; he has to
cease being a Protestant, or a Jew, or an atheist, or whatever
he was, and he has to become a Catholic. The second part must,
of course, always be a work of grace; the first part, however,
though meant by God's Providence to lead a person ultimately
to the Church, can be brought about by purely natural causes.
In this respect, a conversion can happen in two ways. One
can start doubting the truth of one's former religion because
one is attracted to the Catholic Church. Here the theologian

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428

judges if it be an immediate work of grace, provided one is
attracted to the Church in the right way. But the former
religion can be lost or, at least, doubts can be entertained about
it for quite other reasons. In such a case, a person being at a
loss might begin to look around and be attracted to Catholicism
On the other hand, a person might drift; losing confidence in
orthodox Protestantism, he might become skeptical and then
turn to atheism, finally coming to the true Church. Then the
grace of faith need not have a direct influence on the negative
part, the ceasing to be a Protestant. So a heathen might lose
his primitive religion by simple contact with civilisation. In
Cardinal Newman's case we see that his confidence in Anglicanism suffered a bad jolt from the affair of the Jerusalem
bishopric long before he began to think of becoming a Catholic.
In these cases it is the theologian's work to search for the
moment when the positive work of grace began, though he may
not be able to indicate it precisely. He can not trust the judgment of the converts themselves; to them it is one long story in
which they thankfully see the finger of God's Providence. Nor
can the historian or the psychologist help; this study is the
realm of the theologian. At the end of the story there awaits
a knotty problem of a special nature. A convert has to believe
and then he has to be baptised. These two belong together.
When he believes, he should be baptised in order to be a member of the Church in which he believes. Generally, before the
Sacrament of Baptism there will come the Baptism of desire.
A convert is not baptised immediately when he firmly and
supernaturally believes.
Theologically speaking, conversion is a wide subject with
many problems. Here we have only mentioned a few of them
and pointed to possible solutions, but it seems to us that it is
a very neglected field. Even the psychological study of conversion is done mostly by non-Catholics and with disastrous
results. It is our hope that more theological reflection will be
given to this important matter.
F. PAUWELS, O.P.

c.

Dominicanenkloo&tef',
ZwoUe, N etherlanth.

ON ANALOGY
The present paper is an attempt to clear
up some of the problems involved in the traditional theory of
analogy as presented by the Thomistic school. The two main
ideas behind the formal developments offered here are: (1)
analogy is an important discovery, worthy of a thorough
examination and further development, (2) contemporary
mathematical logic supplies excellent tools for such work.
This paper is, as far as the author knows, the first of its kind; 1
it deals with a difficult subject in a sketchy way; what it contains is, therefore, not meant to be definitive truths, but
rather proposals for discussion.
The approach to the problems of analogy used here is the
semantic one. This is not the only method, but it would seem
to be both the most convenient and the most traditional. As a
matter of fact, it is difficult to see how equivocity, which is
and must be treated as a relation of the same type as analogy,
can be considered except by the semantic method. Also, St.
Thomas Aquinas examined analogy in his question concerning
divine names and the title of Cajetan's classical work is "De
Nominum Analogia."
It will be taken for granted that the reader has a good
knowledge of classical texts of St. Thomas and Cajetan, and
of the content of the Principia M athematica; 2 no reference
1. INTRODUCTORY.

1 The author is, however, indebted to the late Fr. Jan Salamucha
and to J. Fr.
Drewnowski who were the first to apply recent Formal Logic to Thomistic problems.
The present paper may be considered as an attempt to formalize some of the
opinions expressed by them. Cf. Mysl katolicka wobec Logiki wsp6lczesnej (Polish
= The Catholic Thought and Contemporary Logic), Poznan 1937 (with French
abstracts) and J. Fr. Drewnowski, Zarys programu filozoficznego (Polish= A
sketch of a Philosophic Programme), Przeglad Filozoficzny, 37, 1943, 3-38, 150-181,
262-292, especially pp. 95-98. (There is a French account of this important work
in Studia Philosophica (Lwow) I, 1935, 4ii1-454.
• A. N. Whitehead and B. Russell, Principia Mathematica, e<1d ed., Cambridge
1925-1927.

424

ON ANALOGY

425

will be made to these works, except for some laws used in the
proofs. Other more recent topics of mathematical logic needed
for the theory, as, e. g., plural relations, 3 semantics,• etc., will
be explained.
The main results of our inquiry are: (1) an exact definition
of univocity, equivocity, and analogy of attribution; (2) proof
of the principles of contradiction and of excluded middle for
univocal and equivocal names; (8) a metalogical examination
and exact translation of the formula " analogy itself is analogical"; (4) proof that a syllogism in Barbara with analogical
middle terms, if analogy is defined according to the alternative
theory, is a correct formula; (5) criticism of the alternative
theory; (6) definition of analogy of proportionality by isomorphy; (7) proof that a syllogism in Barbara with analogical
middle terms, if analogy is explained according to the isomorphic theory, is a correct formula; (8) a suggestion that
contemporary Logic uses analogy.
Incidentally other results are reached, which may have a
more general relevance: (1) the foundations of a semantic
system, useful for Thomistic Logic, are sketched; (2) a generalised table of relevant semantic relations between two names
is given; (8) the formal validity of a syllogism in Barbara, as
opposed to its verbal correctness, is defined; (4) a rudimentary
analysis of causality, as understood by Thomists, is supplied.
The fundamental notion of our theory is
that of meaning, described by the following formula:· " the
name a means in the language l the content f of the thing x "
(symbolically: "S (a, l, f, x) .") The situation symbolized by
"S (a, l, f, x) " will be called a "semantic complex." In spite
of its simpilicity the semanitic complex merits a detailed
comment.
2.

MEANING.

(1) By " name " we understand here a written word or
other written symbol. It must be emphasized that a written
• Cf. R. Carnap, Abrias der Logistik, Wien 1929, pp. 48-45.
' Cf. A. Tarski, Der W ahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Studia
Philosophica (Lwow), I, 1985, 261-405.

426

I. M. BOCHENSKI

symbol is just a black mark (a spot of dry ink) on paper.
As such (materialiter sumptum) it is a physical object which
occupies a given position in space and time. It may happen,
therefore, that two names, e. g., a and b have the same
graphical form (symbolically I (a, b), where "I" suggests
" isomorphy ") but we cannot speak correctly of " the same "
name which occurs twice, e. g. as middle term in a syllogism.
In that case we have always two different names of the same
graphical form.
(2) Every relation of meaning implies a reference to a
language. This is obvious, for the same name may mean one
thing in one language and something quite different in another.
Moreover, it may have no meaning at all in another language.
If the mention of a language is omitted in classical definitions,
it is because the authors writing during the Middle Age and the
Renaissance thought of the only one language used at that
time, Latin.
(3) What we call "content" is what classical Thomists
called "ratio." This ratio is always conceived as something
determining the thing whose content it is; even in case of
substantial contents (as "substance" and similars) we conceive them as such and St. Thomas explicitly teaches that in
this case we always have to do with a quality in a broader
meaning (including "substantial quality").
(4) Finally, the " thing " means the same as the " res "
of the Thomists, namely the subject to which the content
connoted by the name belongs. This is, at least if the logical
analysis is pushed sufficiently far, an individual.
The relation S gives rise to several partial relations and
partial domains. We are not going to investigate them here,
as they are not relevant to our theory. We shall note, however,
that the relation S allows some elegant definitions of some
important semantic terms. Let Dn'R be the class of all Xn
such that there is at least one X1, one X2 · • • Xn-1, one Xn+1,
one Xn+2 · • • xm (m being the number of terms of R) such that
R (xl, X2, • •. 'Xn, • •• 'Xm). We shall call Dn'R "the n-th
domain of R." We put now:

ON ANALOGY
fJ.l.

nom= Dt.D/S = Dt.a{ (3l, f, x)S (a, l, f, x)}

fJ. 2.

lin= Dt.D/S = Dt.l{ (3 a, f, x) S (a, l, f, x)}

fJ. 3.

rat= Dt.Da'S = Dt.f< (3 a, l, x) S (a, l, f, x)}

fJ. 4.

res= Dt.D4'S = Dt.x{ (3 a, l, f) S (a, l, f, x) }.

427

The above definitions define the classes of names (2.1), languages (2. 2), contents (2. 3) and things (2. 4).
3. ANALOGY A RELATION INVOLVING TWO NAMES. We contend that analogy, as well as univocity and equivocity, is not
an absolute property of one name, but a relation involving
two names at least. If this seems contrary to tradition, it is
because of the use the classical authors made of the formula
"the same name": they meant two names of the same form,
but spoke, for the reason mentioned above (§ 2), of a single
name. If, however, our considerations about the names are
admitted, we are compelled to say that no single name is,
strictly speaking, univocal, equivocal, or analogical. A single
name may have a clear meaning or a confused meaning; but
it has always one meaning only, and it is not possible to speak
about identity or diversity of its meanings, which is required,
if we have to define univocity, equivocity, or analogy.

4. THE 16 RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO SEMANTIC COMPLEXES.
Now if our relations involve two meaning names, they must be
relations between two semantic complexes; and as the nature
of these relations depends on the relations holding between
the terms of both complexes, they will be octadic relations,
each complex being a tetradic relation. The general form of
such relations will be consequently the following:
R (a, b, l, m,f, g, x, y),
where a and b are names, l and m languages, f and g contents,
x and y things, while we have S (a, l, f, x) and S (b, m, g, y).
The question ·arises now, how many relevant relations are
there of the above type. This depends, evidently, on the
number of dyadic relations between the terms a-b, l-m, f-g
and x-y. Such dyadic relations are very numerous, indeed,

428

I. M. BOCHENSKI

infinite in number; but for each couple two relations only are
relevant, namely, I (a, b) and ,..._,I(a, b) for names; l = m and
l =I= m for languages; f = g and f =I= g for contents; x = y and
x =I= y for things. Thus there are 16 and only 16 relevant
relation between two semantic complexes. The following table
enumerates them:
No.
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.
6.

7.
8.

a,b
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

l,m

=I=
=I=
=I=
=I=

f,g

=I=
=I=
=I=
=I=

:z;,y

=I=
=I=
=I=
=
=I=

No.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

a,b
,.._,I
---I
---I
---I
---I
,_,I
---I
---I

l,m

=I=
=I=
=I=
=I=

f,g

:z:,y

=I=
=I=

=I=
=
=I=

=I=
=I=

=I=
=
=I=

This table should replace the traditional division of names
into univocal, equivocal, and synonyms .. As we are, however,
not interested in the establishment of a full semantic theory,
we shall not define all 16 relations, but only the first four
which are directly relevant to the theory of analogy.
5. DEFINITION OF UNIVOCITY AND EQUIVOCITY. These four
(octadic) relations, which we shall name "R1," "R2," "Ra,"
and " R4," are defined as follows:
5.1.

5. 2.

5. 3.
5. 4.

R 1 (a, b, l, m, f, g, :z:, y) ·
= Dt.S (a, l,f, :z:) • S (b, m, g, y) ·I(a, b) ·l=m· f=g·:z:= y
R2 (a, b, l, m, f, g, :z:, y) ·
-=Dt.S(a,l,f,:z:) ·S(b,m,g,y) ·I(a,b) ·l=-m·f=g·:z:=;by
R 8 (a, b, l, m, f, g, :z:, y) ·
=Df.S(a,l,f,:z:) ·S(b,m,g,y) ·l(a,b) ·l=m·f=;bg·:z:=y
R4(a, b, l, m, f, g, :z:, y) ·
= Dt.S (a, l, f, :z:) · S (b, m, g, y) ·I(a, b) ·l=m· f=Fg·:z:=;by

5.1. is the definition of names which are semantically identical in spite of being (physically) two names. We may call
them " isosemantic " names. 5. 2 is the definition of univocal
names: quorum (x andy) nomen est commune [i.e. I (a, b)],
-ratio autem significata (f and g) est simpliciter eadem (f =g).

ON ANALOGY

429

5. 3 is again the definition of names which have the same
denotation, but a different connotation; we may ·term them
"heterologic" from X6yos =ratio. Finally 5. 4 defines the
equivocal names: quorum (x and y) nomen est commune [i.e.
I (a, b)], ratio autem significata simpliciter diversa (f =F g).
In all cases l = in, i. e. both languages are identical. This being
so, we may drop " l = m " and put " l " for " m " in the above
definitions. The definitions of univocity and equivocity will
now run as follows:
5. 5.

Un(a, b, l, f, g, x, y) ·

5. 6.

nr.S (a, l,f, x) · S (b, l, g, y) ·l(a, b) · x=;i=y· f=g
Ae (a, b, l, f, g, x, y) ·
= nr.S (a, l, f, x) · S(b, l, g, y) · l(a, b) · x=;i=y· f=Fg
=

We have used "Un" to suggest "univoca" and "Ae" to
suggest "aequivoca
we also changed, for technical reasons,
the order of the two last factors.
The following laws, which are immediate consequences of
5. 5, will be needed in the latter parts of this paper:
5.7.
5.8.

Un (a, b, l, f, g, x, y) · :::::) · S (a, l, f, x)
Un (a, b, l, f, g, x, y) ·:::::) · S (b, l, f, x).

6. pARTIAL DOMAINS AND RELATA. Each of OUr relations
Un and Ae being heptadic, contains (A) = 7 hexadic, G) = 21
pentadic, ( l) = 85 tetradic, (J) = 85 triadic and (p = 21
dyadic partial relations, together 119 (120 with the full relation). We may denote them by" Un "resp. "Ae "followed by
two figures: one above, indicating the type of the partial
relation (e. g. "Un 5 " for a pentadic partial relation of Un),
another below, meaning the place which it occupies among
partial relations of the given type-the whole between paren"will mean the second among the pentheses. E. g."
tadic partial relations of Un.
Moreover, each of these partial relations gives rise, exactly
as the whole relation does, to many partial domains and relata.
The n-th domain of the relation R will be symbolized, as above
(par. 2), by "Dn'R" and the n-th class of relata of R by

430

I. M. BOCHENSKI

"ag ..'R." There are 120 such domains and 120 such classes
of relata. We shall not define them all; the scope of the above
remarks was only to show how ambiguous the common language
is when we use it to speak about univocity or equivocity and,
of course, about analogy.
We shall, however, use our notation in order to define the
traditional terms " univoca " and " aequivoca." We need here
first a definition of the following partial dyadic relations:
6.1.

=

Dt.XY{ (3 a, b, l, f, g) Un (a, b, l, f, g, x, y)}

6. fJ.

=

Df,xy{ (3 a, b, l, f, g) Ae (a, b, l, f, g, x, y) }.

We can no\V define the classes called " univoca " and " aequivoca" which we shall name "uni" or "aeq ":
6. 3.

uni = Dt.F' (Un

6. 4.

aeq = Dt.F'

If this would appear too generic, we may use triadic relations,
including the language as a term:
6.5.

(UnJ 1 ) = Dt.lx•Y{(3 a, b, f, g) Un (a, b, l, f, g, :ll, y)}

6.6.

(Aeal) = Dt.l:llY{(3 a, b, l, g)Ae (a, b, l, f, g, x, y)}

3

AA

A

and consequently:
6. 7.

unil = Dt.D't (Unft) U D'2

6.8.

aeql=Dt.D't(Aeft)

U D'2(AeJ1).

7. THE PRINCIPLES OF CONTRADICTION AND EXCLUDED MIDDLE.
Other important laws of our theory are two formulae which
will be called, respectively, "the law of contradiction" and
"the law of excluded middle for univocal and equivocal names."
We mean by the first that no two names can be univocal and
equivocal in respect to the same language, couples of contents
and of things. By the second we mean that if such names are
not univocal, they must be equivocal, and conversely. It should
be clearly understood that this is true only in respect of some
determined contents meant by the names, moreover that these

481

ON ANALOGY

names must be of the same form and the things they mean
must be not-identical. For nothing prevents two names from
being univocal in respect of f- g and, at the same time, equi
vocal in respect of h- j, if f =/= h or g =/= j; also, if the names
do not mean the contents involved, they are neither univocal
nor equivocal in respect of them. The last two conditions
follow from our table (in par. 4).
Consequently, we state our principles in the following
form:
7.1.

(a,b,l,f,g,x,y): S(a,l,f,x) ·S(b,l,g,y) ·l(a,b) ·x=;l=y·-::J
-::J · ,_ [Un (a, b, l, f, g, x, y) · Ae (a, b, l, f, g, x, y)]

7.2.

(a,b,l,f,g,x,y): S(a,l,f,x) ·S(b,l,g,y) ·l(a,b) ·x=;l=y·-::J
-::J · Un (a, b, l, f, g, x, y) v Ae (a, b, l, f, g, x, y).

Proofs: 5
(1)

p -::J ,-.J (pq · p ,_ q)

(axiom)

(2)

p -::J · pq v p ,-.J q

(axiom)

(3)

,-.J (f =g) · =

(4)

by (1
(5)

Df. • f =F g

(definition)

S(a,l,f,x) ·S(b,l,g,y) ·l(a,b) ·x=;l=y: -::J
-::J: ,_ (S(a,l,f,x) ·S(b,l,g,y) ·l(a,b) ·x=;l=y·f=g):
: S(a,l,f,x) ·S(b,l,g,y) ·l(a,b) ·x'=;l=y· ,-.J (f=g):
.
S(a,l,f,x) ·S(b,l,g,y) ·l(a,b) ·x=;l=y f=g
)
puttmg

p

'

--

q

=7.1

by (4), (3), 5. 5 and 5. 6 with the rule for adjunction of
quantifiers.
(6)

S(a,l,f,x) ·S(b,l,g,y) ·l(a,b) ·x=;l=y: -::J
-::J: S(a,l,f,x) ·S(b,l,g,y) ·l(a,b) ·x=;l=y· f=g·v
v · S(a,l,f,x) ·S(b,l,g,y) ·l(a,b) ·x=;l=y·,-.J (f=g)

by (2) with the same substitutions as for (4)
(7) =7.2
• The method used is that of the Principia M athematica; therefore what we call
"proof" is rather a sketch of a proof. Rigorous proof could be, however, easily
built along the lines given here. (This applies to all proofs contained in the present
paper.)

8

482

I. M. BOCHENSKI

by (6), (3), 5. 5 and 5. 6 with the rule for adjunction of
quantifiers.
The law of excluded middle shows that the classical
Thomists were right when they named their analoga " aequivoca a consilio," considering them as a subclass of the class of
aequivoca, and that some modern Thomists are wrong when
they put analogy as a third class coordinated to univocity and
equivocity. Incidentally it may be remarked that the authors
of the Principia M athematica used an exact translation of the
" aequivocatio a consilio " when they coined the expression
" systematic ambiguity." As a matter of fact, they were
treating of analogy.
Analogy will be,
according to the above analyses, a heptadic relation between
two names, a language, two contents and two things (at least).
The names will be of the same form; the things must be
different. How the contents are related we must still investigate. If we suppose that the answer to that question is
expressed by " F ," the generic definition of analogy will be
the following:
8.

8.1.

ON THE GENERIC NOTION OF ANALOGY.

An(a,b,l,f,g,x,y) ·=
=nr.·S(a,l,f,x) ·S(b,l,g,y) ·l(a,b) ·x=Fy·F.

Moreover, using 7. 2 we may say that analogy is either a kind
of univocity or a kind of equivocity. According to the Tradition
it is certainly not the first. Thus it must be the second. We
may put therefore:
8.1J.

An (a, b, l, f, g, x, y) · = nt. · Ae (a, b, l, f, g, x, y) ·F.

The question arises now, if there is a factor G such that F
would be identical with the product of G with another factor,
say H.., G being identical in all kinds of analogy, Hn different
for each; the definitions of the successive kinds of analogy
would be constructed by putting in 8. 2 for" F" first" G · H1,"
then "G · H2" and so on. If it be so, we could say that the
name " analogy " is univocal; if not, i. e. if there could be no
common factor G, it would be equivocal.

ON ANALOGY

433

As a matter of fact some well known Thomists asserted that
the name "analogy" is an analogical name, i.e. (according
to 8. 2) an equivocal one. We are not going to discuss this
assertion, but limit ourselves to a correct formulation of it.
This requires, however, some preliminary steps.
9. EXPANSION OF THE THEORY TO HIGHER LEVELS. We must
first note, that we are already dealing with a situation that is
far more complex than that which is met in classical Formal
Logic. As a matter of fact, all artificial symbols of any
system of contemporary Formal Logic belong to the same
semantic level, namely to the object language, i. e. each of
them means some object, but none of them means a symbol
of an object. But in the theory developed above we are using
symbols belonging to a higher level, namely our symbols " a "
and "b," which are names of names, i.e. symbols of symbols.
In order to supply the last sentence with a more definite
meaning, let us introduce the following recursive definition:
(1) the object language is the first level; (2) a language such
that at least one term of it is a symbol of a symbol belonging
to the n-th level, but none is a symbol of such term, is the
n + 1 level; (3) a relation holding between objects of which
at least one is of the n-th level, and none is of the n + 1 level,
is of the n-th level.
It will appear that our a, b and also S, Un, Ae etc. are of the
second level; consequently the names of these will belong to
the third level. Now when we say that " analogy " is an
analogical name, the word "analogy" is a name of An; thus
it belongs to the third level. We have to investigate if and
how are we allowed to extend our theory to that level, for
everything we said until now was clearly situated on the second
level.
Let us note first that the laws of the third level would be,
as far as structure is concerned, exactly similar to these met
on the second. For if we say that " analogy " is analogical,
we mean that two names, say A and B mean in our new
language (which is, by the way, the third level), the rela-

484

I. M. BOCHENSKI

tions Anl and An2 of the objects (al, bl, zl, fl, gl, Xl, yl) and
(a2, b2, l2, f2, g2, X2, y2). The last two may be considered as
classes; but there is nothing to prevent us from considering
them as objects, as the relations An1 and An2 are true contents
of them. Let us put " X " for the first and " Y " for the second.
We shall obtain the following exact formulation of the thesis
" analogy is analogical ":

AN (A, B, L, An1, An2,X, Y).
Here all symbols (except the parentheses and comas) are
different from those used in the former paragraphs; and yet
the structure is not only similar, but strictly identical with
the structure of
An (a, b, l, f, g, x, y).
It is also clear that the whole of our previous analyses might
have been repeated on the third level. We would reach a
theory, whose terms and meaning would be different from
the theory we developed above, but whose structure would
be completely identical.
This suggests an important remark. Analyses of such kind
involve the use of the idea of structural identity, or isomorphy.
Now, according to the theory we shall propose, this means
analogy of proportionality. It seems, consequently, that we
cannot treat adequately the problem of the generic notion
of analogy without a previous examination of analogy of
proportionality.
10. ANALOGY OF ONE-ONE ATTRIBUTION. Among the several
kinds of analogy there are only two that are really relevant:
analogy of attribution and analogy of proportionality. Two
names which are related by the first will be called " attributively analogous"; similarly, two names related by the latter
will be called " proportionally analogous."
We are starting with the first kind. Here again there is one
relation called " analogia unius ad alterum "-in our terminology " one-one analogy " (symbolically " At ") -and another

485

ON ANALOGY

called .. analogia plurium ad unum," here " many-one analogy "
(symbolically " A tm ") . Let us begin with the first, which
is the more fundamental.
We ha.ve two things, x and y and two contents, f and g;
the names a and b are equivocal in regard to them, but there
is still another characteristic: x is the cause of y or y the cause
of x. Writing "C (x, y)" for "x is the cause of y " we shall
have:
10.1.
At (a, b, l, f, g, x, y) ·
= Df. Ae (a, b, l, f, g, x, y) a (a;, y) v a (y, x)
0

0

0

This is, however, rather unsatisfactory, for the connection of

f and g is not shown, the relation of causality being not
analysed. We cannot, of course, give a complete analysis of
this highly complex notion here. We shall note only that the
relation of causality is a pentadic relation which holds between
two things, two contents and a peculiar dyadic relation between
the things; e. g. the food is the cause of the health of the
animal, if and only if there is a content f (health) present in
the food (x) such that, if a peculiar relation R (here: of being
eaten) is established between a; and the animal (y), another
content g (the health of the animal) appears in y. Writing
" C (f, x, R, g, y)" for this relation we shall have:
10. fJ.

At (a, b, l, f, g, x, y) ·
= Df. Ae (a, b, l, f, g, X, y)
v a (g, y, R, f, x).
0

0

(3R)

0

a (f, X, R, g, y) v

The alternative is necessary, according to the traditional doctrine, as there may be an analogy independently from the
direction of causality.
11. ANALOGY OF MANY-ONE ATTRffiUTION. The second kind
of analogy of attribution is clearly derived from the first. The
many-one analogy holds, namely, between two names a and b,
if and only if there is a third name c, such that both a and b
are attributively analogous (according to 10. 2) with c:
11.1.

Atm(a,b,l,f,g,x,y) ·
=»t. · (3 c,h,z) ·At(a,c,l,f,h,x,z)
·At (b, c, l, g, h, y, z).

·

486

l. M. BOCHENSKI

Let x be food, y-urine, z-animal, j, g, h-the contents called
"health" of, respectively, x, y, z, and a, b, c-the names of
these contents. There will be a many-one analogy of a in
respect of b.
We may still distinguish four further subclasses of this class
of analogical names, for in 11. 1 we may have either

(1)

C(f, x, R, h, z) · C(g, y, R, h, y)
C(f, x,R, h, z) · C(h, z, R, g, y)

(3)

C(h, z,R, f,x) · C(g, y, R, h, z)

(4)

C(h, z, R, f, x) · 0 (h, z, R, g, y).

-or
-or
-or

U. CONDITIONS OF ANALOGY OF PROPORTIONALITY. Th'ere
are, according to tradition, two conditions for this kind of
analogy: the contents must be non-identical, i.e. we must have
equivocity; still, the syllogism having as middle terms a couple
of proportionally analogous names must be a correct formula.
This is secured, according to classical writers, by the fact that
these middle terms mean something " proportionally common "
in both cases, or that there is an analogatum commune containing in confuso the contents meant by both names.
It seems at first, that these requirements are contradictory:
for, if the meanings of the two names are quite different, one
can hardly see how a syllogism with them as middle terms
may be a correct formula. As a matter of fact, not only is
there a logical theory capable of fulfilling both requirements
without contradiction, but it seems even that there are two
such theories. It seems, namely, that one theory is suggested
by the " proportionaliter commune," the other by the " confuse." We shall call the former "isomorphic," the latter
"alternative theory.' As far as is known to the writer, St.
Thomas used the isomorphic theory, while the alternative
seems to be originated by Cajetan.
18. THE ALTERNATIVE THEORY. The central idea of the
alternative theory may be explained as follows: we have to do
with three names; one of them means the content f, the other
the content g, f and g being the analogata particularia; the

ON ANALOGY

487

third name means the analogatum commune, namely, the alternative of f and g, symolically f U g. We shall give to that
expression a sufficiently clear meaning by putting
13.1.

[f U g]x· =Dt. · fxv gx.

A rather complex situation arises here because of admission
of three names: this makes an expansion of our previous
formulae to three complexes necessary, and the basic formula
for analogy of proportionality becomes a relation of 10 terms.
Once a definition of this form is established, the (heptadic)
relations analogous to Un and Ae will appear as partial
re!ations of the general one, and the verbal formulae as elliptic.
We shall not, however, define this general relation in that way,
as, for several reasons, to be explained later (par. 16), the
whole alternative -theory appears as inadequate. But we are
going to investigate the validity of a syllogism in Barbara with
proportionally analogous middle terms. For the use in that
inquiry we define the analogy of proportionality (Anp)
according to the alternative theory as a heptadic relation in
the following way:
13. Pl.

Anp (a, b, l, f, g, x, y) ·
= Dt. · Ae (a, b, l, f, g, x, y) · (3 h) · f = [g U h].

This is a partial relation contained in the full relation of
analogy described above.
14. ON FORMAL VALIDITY OF SYLLOGISM. If we wish to
investigate the validity of a syllogism with analogical middle
terms we meet a serious difficulty unknown in current Formal
Logic. For in current Formal Logic it is always supposed that
a formula which is verbally valid is also formally valid; the
reason of this supposition is that all terms used in current
Formal Logic are univocal symbols. Here, however, the situation is different, as we have to deal with analogical names. We
need, consequently, a distinction between the verbal and formal
validity of a formula; moreover we need to know when a
verbally valid formula is also formally valid. This is by no

488

I. M. BOCHENSKI

means a universal rule, as the case of the syllogism with equivocal and non-analogical middle terms shows. We are not
going to investigate the problem in its full generality, but we
will limit ourselves to a single case, the syllogism in Barbara.
We shall first construct two languages:
(1) A first-level univocal language. This will be the language of the theory of classes, interpreted as a Logic of contents.
In it the mode Barbara will run as follows:

f c g. h c f. ::J . h c g.
(2) A second-level analogical language. This will contain
all symbols used until now (small Latin letters being sometimes substituted by small Greek letters and indexes being
added to them) , with addition of the following: (i) " II "; a
formula composed of " II " followed by " a," followed by " b "
will be interpreted as meaning the formula "a C b "; (ii)
" + "; a formula such as " II + a + b " will be read: " a
formula composed of II followed by a, followed by b ";
(iii) " e T "; "Fe T " will be read: " F is a true theorem."
The proofs will be developed in a second-level language,
containing as subclasses the above two. We shall proceed as
follows. Given the (second-level) premises A and B such that
A e T ·BeT, we wish to prove that the (verbally correct)
conclusion C (of the same level) is a true theorem, i. e. that
C e T. We translate A and B into the first-level language,
apply to the result the laws of classical Formal Logic and
obtain a conclusion, which we re-translate into the second-level
language; if we are able to obtain C e T in that way, the
formula" if A e T ·BeT, thenCe T "is clearly a valid formula
and the formal validity of the mode, whose premises are A
and B, and the conclusion is C, is proved.
We put as a law of translation the intuitively evident:
1.1,..1.

S(a,l,f,x) ·S(b,l,g,y):

::J :II+a+beT·e==·fCg.

With the help of 14. 1 we can easily prove that a syllogism
in Barbara with univocal middle terms is a formally valid
formula; but we camiot prove it if the middle terms are either

ON ANALOGY

489

purely equivocal or attributively
analogical. Alongside of 14. 1
--.
we shall need still another law of translation for cases where
an existential quantifier is involved:
14. 2.

(3 h) · S (a, l, [f U h], x) · S (b, l, g, y):
: (3 h) . [f
h] c g.

u

This seems to be also intuitively evident.
15. THE VALIDITY OF THE SYLLOGISM IN BARBARA WITH
ANALOGICAL MIDDLE TERMS ACCORDING TO THE ALTERNATIVE
THEORY. In such a syllogism the middle term of the major
premise is analogical with regard to the middle term in the
minor premise, the situation being this, that the former means
alternatively
by the latter and some other
content. This syllogism,
is a valid formula. The
proof is rather cumbersome, because of the existential quantifier; we shall however give here a developed sketch of it.
In the first place we need two theorems analogous to 5. 7
and 5. 8. These may be proved as follows:
(1)

Anp (a, b, l, f, g, x, y) ·
== · Ae (a, b, l, f, g, x, y) · (3 h) · f = [g U h]
[by 13. 2]

(2)

=·S(a,l,f,x) ·S(b,l,g,y) ·l(a,b) ·x=Fy·
. f¥= g. (3 h) . f = [g
h]
[by (1) and 5. 6]

(3)

==· (3 h) ·S(a,l,f,x)

(4)

= · (3 h) · S (a, l, [g U h], x) · S (b, l, g, y) ·I (a, b) ·

u

·S(b,l,g,y) ·l(a,b) ·
·x¥=y·f=Fg·f=[g U h]
[by (2) and *10. 24 Principia Mathematica.]
·x=Fy·f=Fg
[by (3) and *13.12 Principia Mathematica.]

(5)

==· (3h)S(a,l,[gUh],x)

15.1.

Anp (a, b, l, f, g, x, y) ·
· (3 h) S (a, l, [g U h], x)
[by (5) and "p = qr · · p
q "]

· (3h)S(b,l,g,y) ·
· (3h) ·x=Fy·f=Fg
[by (4) and *10. 5 Principia Mathematica.]

440
15. !2.

I. M. BOCHENSKI

Anp (a, b, l, f, g, x, y) · => · S (b, l, g, y)
[by (5) and "p = qra · => · p =>. r," dropping
the quantifier].

We enumerate now the five hypotheses of the syllogism in
Barbara with analogical middle terms, explained according to
the alternative theory:
H1.

II+m1+a1eT

H2.

IT+ b1 +m2e T

H3.

Anp (m1, m2, l, P-1> p.2, x, y)

H4.

Un (al> a2, l, a 1 , a2, z, t)

H5.

Un (b1, b2, l, {31, f32, u, v).

The proof of " II + b2 + a2 e T " runs as follows:
(1)

(3 h) S (m1o l, [p.2 U h], x)

by H3 and 15. 1

(!2)

S (al> l, al> z)

by IJ4 and 5. 7

(3)

(3 h) · [P-2 U h] C a1

by (1), (!2), H1 and 14. 2

(4)
(5)

S (b 1, l, f11o u)

by H5 and 5. 7

S (m2, l, p.2, y)

by H3 and 15. 2

(6)

{31 c /J-2

by (4), (5), H2 and 14.1

(7)

{31 C P-2 · (3 h) · [P-2 U h] C a1

by (6) and (3)

(8)

(3 h) · {31 C P.2 · [P-2 U h] C a1

by (7) and *10. 35 PM

(9)

(3 h) · {31 C a1

(10)

{31 C a1

by (9)

(11)

S (b2, l, /31, u)

byH5 and 5.8

(12)

S (a 2 , l, a1o z)

by H4 and 5.8

(13)

II + b2 + a2 e T · = ·{31 C a1
II+ b2 + a2 e T

by (11), (12) and 14.1

(14)

u

by (8)' "f c g. [g
h] c j . => . f c j"
and *10. 28 PM

by (10) and (13)

Q.E.D.

16. CRITICISM OF THE ALTERNATIVE THEORY. Jt has been
shown that a syllogism in Barbara with analogical middle
terms, defined according to the alternative theory, is a formally

ON ANALOGY

441

valid formula. This is, however, the only advantage of this
theory. Not even all requirements of Theology and Metaphysics in regard to the syllogism can be met by means of it.
For a syllogism of these sciences has not only analogical middle
terms, but also analogical major terms; e. g. when we write
" if every being is good, and God is a being, then God is good,"
not only " being," but also "·good " must be analogical. 'But
this means, according to the alternative theory that HI,. in
par. 15 should be replaced by

If so, instead of (3) we would obtain only
(3 h) · U-t2 U h] C [cx2 U g]

which does not allow us to draw the conclusion (14). Neither
can we try to in vert the order of " f " and " g " in 15. 1 ; in
that case the syllogism would become valid, but the major
term in the conclusion would have an alternative meaning,
which can hardly be admitted.
Moreover, the theory has other inconveniences. First, the
very definition of analogy, as sketched in par. 13, is highly
unsatisfactory. By saying that two names are analogical if
and only if there is a third name meaning alternatively the
contents meant by both, we do not show any intrinsic connection between the contents involved; and every couple of names
would be analogical, according to that definition, for we can
always introduce into our system a new name, defined precisely as meaning the said alternative. Secondly, there are
serious gnoseological difficulties. The situation with which we
have to deal, is the following: two names are given, and while
we know the meaning of the first by direct experience, we do
not know in that way the meaning of the second. In order
to be able to use that second name correctly, we must supply
it with a meaning correlated in some way with the meaning of
the first. Now the alternative theory allows nothing of the
sort: it only says how we can deal with middle terms having
alternative meanings, when both meanings are already known.
3

442

I.

M. BOCHENSKI

These remarks do not lead to the complete rejection of the
alternative theory; but they seem to show that it is at least
incomplete and should be completed by another theory. The
present author believes that this was the position of Cajetan.
17. THE ISOMORPHIC THEORY. This theory is based on the
following considerations: the " proportionaliter eadem " suggests that there is an identity, not between the contents meant
by both analogical terms, but between some relations holding
between the first (f) and its thing (x) on one side, the second
(g) and its thing (y) on the other. The texts of St. Thomas
Aquinas are clear enough here. The said relations are, however.
not identical; this is also a traditional thesis, strongly emphasized by all classical Thomists. We may therefore admit, as
a first approximation, that, while being non-identical, they
are both contained in the same relation. The definition of
analogy of proportionality would run, in that case, as follows:
17.1.

Anp (a, b, l, f, g, x, y) · = Df. • Ae (a, b, l, f, g, x, y) ·
{3 P, Q, R) · fPx · gQy · P =;&= Q · P <: R · Q <: R.

This is, however, not satisfactory. For if 17.1 would be the
definition of analogy of proportionality, there would be a
material univocal element; analogy would allow us to transfer
to the other name some material relations found in the meaning
of the first. Now St. Thomas Aquinas and Tradition are quite
clear as to the negation of such univocity. But 17.1 can be
corrected by the affirmation that the common element in both
relations is formal, i. e. consists in the isomorphy of these
relations. The definitions becomes:
17.

An (a, b, l, f, g, x, y) · = nt. · Ae (a, b, l, f, g, x, y) ·
· 3 P, Q) · fPx · gQy · PsmorQ.

This is what we mean by "isomorphic theory." It is strongly
supported by the fact that St. Thomas Aquinas uses for illustration of his doctrine mathematical proportionality, the only
mathematical function he possessed and a function which
makes one immediately think of isomorphy.
One may think, perhaps, that if this be analogy of propor-

448

ON ANALOGY

tionality, the meaning of our sentences about spirit, God etc.,
would be extremely poor, indeed limited to some very few
formal relations enumerated in the Principia M athematica.
But this is not so. It is true that we cannot, as yet, give exact
formulations of many formal properties involved in relations
used by Metaphysics and Theology; the reason, however, is
not the lack of such formal properties, but the very undeveloped state of Biology and of other sciences, from which the
Metaphysician and the Theologian must draw his analogical
names (and contents). An immense progress in speculative
sciences would arise out of a formalization of these disciplines.
And yet, even in the actual state of knowledge, where only
Mathematics, i. e. the poorest of all sciences, is formalized,
we can show,
the difference between the Principle and
the Father by purely formal means--as, evidently, the first is
transitive, the second intransitive.
18. THE EXISTENTIAL INTERPRETATION

OF THE MODE Barbara.

H the isomorphic theory is admitted, a peculiar interpretation
must be given to the mode Barbara with analogical middle
terms. Let us consider the following substitution: " if all being
is good, and God is a being, then God is good." According to
the isomorphic theory the only common element meant by the
two" being "and the two" good" is a product of some formal
relations, say P in the first case and Q in the second. But if
it is so, the major must be interpreted as follows: " for all x:
if there is an f such that fPx, then there is a g such that gQy ";
the minor will be interpreted in the same manner by the
formula " for all x: if there is an h such that hRx, then there
is an f such that fPx." From this we draw the conclusion
" for all x: if there is an h such that hRx, then there is a g
such that gQx." This would mean: " if there is an x such that
h is the Divinity of x, then there is a g such that g is the
Goodness of x." The law used here is:
18.1.

(x) · (3 f)fPx :J (3 g) gQx : (x) · (3 h) hRx :J. (3 f) fPx :
:J : (x) · (3 h) hRx :J (3 g) gQx.

This is a correct formula of the Logic of predicates.

444

I. M. BOCHENSKI

The remarkable result of the existential interpretation is that
the Thomistic idea of analogy becomes sharply formulated in
a very anti-univocal sense. For, we do not know, as a result
of our reasoning according to 18. 1, anything except that there
is something (undetermined as to the content) which has to
God the set of quite formal relations Q. And yet, the talk
about God's goodness is clearly meaningful; moreover rigorous
demonstrations concerning it are possible.
19.

THE

VALIDITY

OF

THE

SYLLOGISM

WITH

ANALOGICAL

We
are going to show now how, in such theory, a syllogism in
Barbara is a formally valid formula. We meet here, however,
two formal difficulties.
First we note that isomorphy, being a relation between two
relations, cannot be, as such, treated as a relation in which
these relations are contained; now this seems to be necessary
if we wish to construct a correct syllogism with analogical
middle terms, interpreted according to the isomorphic theory.
This difficulty may be, however, obviated in the following
manner. Isomorphy implies the identity of a series of formal
properties of the relations involved. These formal properties
are different in each case of couples of isomorphic relations;
but for each of them in concreto a product of such properties
may be determined. E. g., in some cases both relations will be
included in diversity and will be transitive; in other cases they
will be intransitive and assymetric etc. Now each of these
properties may be conceived as a relation in which the given
isomorphic relations are contained. This can be done by introducing in the system the name of a new relation, which is
treated as a primitive term, but whose meaning is determined
by an axiom. E. g. for symmetry we will put a relationS and
determine the meaning of "S" by the axiom (x, y): xSy ·
xSy
xSy. The product of such relations would constitute
the relation in which both isomorphic relations are contained. 6
MIDDLE

TERMS

ACCORDING

TO THE ISOMORPHIC

THEORY.

=·

• The author is conscious that the proposed solution is highly un-orthodox; he

445

ON ANALOGY

The other difficulty is strictly operational. It will appear
that we shall need an expansion of our 17.2 in order that the
name of the common relation R, in which the relations P and
Q are contained, might be treated as an argument of "Anp."
If so, a new relation must be defined, namely an octadic
relation containing as terms, alongside of the seven stated in
17. 2, also R. We shall define it as follows:
19.1.

Anp (a, b, l, f, g, x, y, R) · = vr. · Ae (a, b, l,f, g, x, y) ·
· (3 P, Q, R) · fPx · gQy · P =I= Q ·P =I= R · Q =I= R ·
· P C: R · Q C: R · R e Form.

By " Form " we mean the class of all formal relations, as
described in par. 17.
There will be three laws of translation, analogous to 14.1:
19. 2. Anp (mto m 2 , l, p.1 , p.2 , x, y, P) · Anp (a 1 , a 2 , l, 0:1o o:2 , z, t, Q): =:)
=:):II+ m 1 +a, e T · ==· (x) · (3 f)fPx =:) (3 g)gQx.
19. 3. Anp (b 1 , b 2 , l, {3 1 , {32, u, v, R) · Anp ( m 1 , m 2 , l, p.1 , p.2 , x, y, P) : =:)
=:):II+ b, +m2e T·=· (x) · (3 h)hRx=:) (3f)fPx.
19. 4. Anp (b1o b2, l, {3,, f3z, u, v, R) · Anp (a,, az, l, o:,, 0:2, z, t, Q): =:)
=:) : II+ b 2 + a 2 e T · = · (x) · ( 3 h) hRx =:) ( 3 g) gQx.

Our hypotheses are
Hl.

II+ m 1 + a 1 e T

H2.

II+ b, + m 2 e T

H3.

Anp (mto mz, l, p.,, p.z, x, y, P)

H4.

Anp (a,, az, l, o:,, 0:2, z, t, Q)

H5.

Anp (b,, b2, l, {31, {32, u, v, R).

The proof of " II

+ bz + a2 e T " runs as follows:

(1)

(x) · (3f)fPx=:)(3g)gQx

by H3, H4, H1 and 19. 92

(2)

(x) · (3 h) hRx =:) (3 f) fPx

by H5, H3, H2 and 19. 3

(3)

(x) · (3 h) hRx =:) (3 g) gQx

by (1), (2) and 18.1

would be glad to find anything better. It must be remembered, however, that the
whole difficulty is purely operational; it seems intuitively evident that once there is
a common property, the syllogism is valid.

446

I. M. BOCHENSKI

(4)

IT+ b2 + a2 e T ·==· (x) (3 h)hRx
by H5, H4 and 19. 4

(5)

n + b2 + a2 e T

(3 g)gQx
by (4) and (3)

Q.E.D.

ON ANALOGY IN RECENT LOGIC. While the classical
Thomists used analogy in Ontology and Theology, but not in
Logic, recent writers seem to make a constant use of it in
Formal Logic. We noticed already that the authors of the
Principia M athematica re-invented the very name used for
analogy by the Thomists (par. 7) and that analogy appears
in the construction of Semantics (par. 9). The last phenomenon is connected with the theory of types. It is known
that, in order to avoid contradictions, we are bound to divide
all objects treated by Logic (or all logical expressions) into
classes called "types." The formulae used in each type have
quite a different meaning, but exactly the same structure as
the formulae used in another. This means that the formal
properties involved are identical i.e. that we have to do with
analogy, at least if the isomorphic theory is accepted.
The question arises as to why analogy has penetrated the
domain of Formal Logic. The answer seems to be given by
the theory of Prof. H. Scholz, who says that recent Formal
Logic is nothing else than a part of classic Ontology. 7 As a
matter of fact, recent Formal Logic generally deals, not with
rules, but with laws of the being in its whole generality; most
of the laws contained in the Principia M athematica, e. g., as
opposed to metalogical rules, are such laws. If this is so, it is
not to be wondered at that some consideration must have been
given to analogy, for "being" is an analogical term and so
are the names of all properties, relations, etc., belonging to
being as such.
One curious feature of these developments is that the highly
trained mathematical logicians who had to speak about
analogy, spoke about it in a very loose and inexact way.
7

H. Scholz, Metaphysik als strcnge Wissenschaft, Koln 1941.

ON ANALOGY

447

What, for example, the Principia M athematica contains on
the subject is far more rudimentary than the classic Thomistic
doctrine. Yet, recent Formal Logic, once applied to the language itself, supplies superior tools for the elaboration of that
notion. The present paper is believed to contain only a very
small sub-class of the class of theorems on analogy, which
may and should be elaborated by means of recent Formal Logic.

I. M. BocHENSKI, 0. P.
University of Fribourg,
Fribourg, Switzerland.

THE BASIS OF THE SUAREZIAN TEACHING
ON HUMAN FREED0.\1
[Third Installment]

I.

THE SuAREZIAN

TEACHING ABOUT HuMAN FREEDOM

IV. THE FREE ACTS
I. The Nature of" Free Use." 124 We have seen the Suarezian

teaching on the nature of liberty, its characteristics, its subject, its relation to divine movement and divine freedom, to
created intelligence, and to created necessary acts. We have
also seen that freedom to be real requires not only the free
faculty but the free use of that faculty as well. With that use
we shall now concern ourselves.
Suarez indicates that the very use of free will consists in
indifference. He appeals to the Council of Trent, 125 for the
Council, as we have seen, declares liberty is in the power of
indifference. The use, therefore, of liberty is the use of that
power. If a man is incapable of the use of this power then he
lacks the indifferent power. Man, then, is naturally capable
of the free use of the free faculty and in the exercise of human
actions he retains this use; otherwise all his acts are outside
his nature. 126 It is certain that there is in us liberty such that
in the very instant in which we freely operate, the potency
retains its indifference. 127 An act in which the power is determined is not free for, Suarez repeats, the act of the will does
Cf. Opus. Primum, Liber I, cap. 1-4.
Trent, Sess. 6, can. 5 (Denz., n. 815), cap. 5 (Denz., n. 797), and can. 4
(Denz., n. 814).
126 (Si)
homo ex natura sua incapax est usus libertatis a nobis expositae
. . . sequitur non solum carere hominem usu libero suorum actuum sed etiam
carere interna facultate (Opus. Primum, cap. I, nn. 6-7).
127 Sit ergo primum
hujus materiae fundamentum certissimum dari in nobis
talem libertatem quae in ipso usu humanorum actuum indifferentiam . . .
habeat ... quod ipse usus sit cum indifferentia quam retinet potentia etiam
in ipso instanti in quo libere operator (Ibid., n. 8).
12 '

125

448

BASIS OF SUAREZIAN

TEACHING

ON HUMAN FREEDOM

449

not haYe the note of freedom immediately, but from the faculty
which actually exercises freedom in the very act. If either
power (of acting or of not acting) is not proximately expedited
for act the act is not free. 128 The free act of willing can be
impeded (though the potency remains free) because: a) God's
concursus is not
or b) because the object is not proposed. In neither case is the consequent non-act free. 129 The
free act of not-willing, on the other hand, cannot be impeded
by the object (for the object can move the will only insofar as
the will is born to be moved by it), but it can be impeded by
God, ·whose infinite power can overcome the creature's finite
capacity for both willing and not-willing. 1 so
2. God's Causality With Regard to Free Acts. Every act
depends immediately on God, Who gives being not only to the
faculty, but to the operation as well. God acts in our acts,
even with immediacy of supposit as well as with immediacy of
power. The effect comes forth by one and the same act from
God and from the creature; the very act of will is one act flowing immediately and per se not only from us but also from God
and this, Suarez adds, is the teaching of St. Thomas. 131 God
causes this action immediately through His will or power, not
through some other action in the creature, for to act another
action is given. Through one and the same action God, together
with the will, influences the act or the term of action. 132
Ibid., cap. 2, n. 5.
Potest autem ilia facultas quoad potestatem volendi impediri vel ex parte
objecti per ignorantiam vel inconsiderationem
. . . vel ex parte potentiae si
fingamus privari omni concursu (Ibid., n. 10).
130 Quoad potestatem
nolendi vel non volendi non potest impediri usus libertatis
ex parte objecti ... potest tamen impediri ab aliqua exteriori causa ... quia in
voluntate Iibera duplex sit potestas ad volendum scilicet et non volendum neutra
eorum et infinitae virtu tis; ergo in utraque potest superari a Deo (Ibid., nn. 11-12) .
131 Suarez cites III cont. Gent., cap. 70 and Summa Theol., I, Q. 105, a. 5.
132 lnfluit
Deus immediate in opera Iibera voluntatis nostrae . . . tam divina
virtus quam substantia seu suppositum per seipsum proxime et immediate influit
... effectum una et eadem actione a Deo et creatura tanquam a causa prima et
secunda prodire . . . (Deus) non potest autem esse causa actionis per aliam
quae in creatura sit sed immediate per suam voluntatem vel potentiam;
qua ad actionem non est actio ... per eadem actionem influit Deum cum volunate
in actum sen terminum illius actionis (Opus. Primum, Zoe. cit., cap. 4, nn. 3-5).
128
120

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For Suarez, God's concursus is not previous to, or distinct
from, the human act, for it is the act of the second cause; it is
the act as of God acting and concurring with that cause-and
nothing can be previous to itself. Since concursus is the very
act, it is concerned not with the principle of the act but with its
effect, it gives the principle (in our case the will) nothing. In
the case of transient actions that is clear since they are not
received into the agent anyway, and confer nothing on the
agent. It is true also of immanent acts, such as those of the
will. Concursus regards the will not as it is a principle of such
an act but as it is a subject about which such an act is concerned. Hence concursus confers on the wiil nothing by which
it is aided, inclined, or strengthened to acting, because through
this action the will is not constituted in first act, but in second
act, and therefore it supposes in the will whatever is necessary
to acting .133
A classic objection is that this action is an effect of divine
action, and therefore through the divine action something previous is done to the will by which it is aided in eliciting its act.
The consequence is proved by this, that action cannot be the
immediate cause of action. 134 Suarez answers by a distinction.
The divine act can be two-fold: ad intra or ad extra. An act
ad intra, not properly an action, is an act immanent in God
which is not as a means to a term to be produced externally,
but rather is to that term as a principle of acting, or as applying
the divine omnipotence. An act ad extra is an action received
into a creature and is the proper means (via) to the effect and
term of the action of the created cause. It is the dependence
by which the effect depends on God as on its first cause.
Suarez, taking divine act as an act ad intra, says that the
action of the creature is an effect of divine action, but the
consequence is to be denied, for action taken in this sense
183 Generalem
concursum sic . . . non esse aliquid distinctum vel praevium
ad actionem causae secundae . . . quia ostensum est hunc concursum esse eamdem
actionem causae secundae . . . eadem actio non potest esse praevia ad seipsam.
. . . Concursus non versatur circa voluntatem ut est principium talis actions sed
ut est subjectum ... concursus nihil voluntati confert quoad agendum juvetur,
etc. (Ibid) ., n. 6) .
1 "' Ibid., n. 7.

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(immanent) can be a principle of action properly so called
(transient). Taking divine action as act ad extra the act of
the created will is not an effect of divine action; it is rather an
effect of the divine will and power. The created action depends
not on the action of God, but on God Himself and His power
immediately, just as it depends on the created will. God's act
ad extra is not prior to the action of the creature for it is the
very same thing as that act of the creature. However, it is
prior by nobility.i 35
Granted God's influxus in the effect, is there needed in addition some influx in the second cause itself? 138 Some answer in
the affimiative; some previous entity is required in the second
cause to move or determine it. Two schools advance this
answer: I) those who say God moves the will through a true
action in it by imprinting on it something by which it is forally determined to such an action; 2) those who maintain God
moves the will not by imprinting something intrinsic but rather
by an extrinsic quasi-effective motion based on the natural subordination and sympathetic response of the lower cause to God.
The first school teaches that the will cannot act without such
motion, but given it, the will acts necessarily, but by necessity
of consequence and of supposition. The will, this school maintains, cannot resist such determination; by it, it is formally
determined prior to operating to do one thing; the voluntary act
is from the will effectively but the determination is actively
from God alone. Yet this school argues that liberty is not
destroyed by such motion, for God moves strongly, but also
sweetly and proportionately. Suarez sees a difficulty in reconciling the "sweetly" with this school's notion of strongly, but
the followers of this school urge all to believe what cannot be
understood. 137
136 In illo (sensu, i. e. actus ad intra)
verum est antecedens sc. actionem
creaturae esse effectum divinae actionis . . . in hoc autem sensu negatur consequentia . • • hoc modo utcndo nomine actionis posset actio ab actione manare
. . . loquendo de actione ad extra, negandum est antecedens . . . nonpendet
actio creaturae ab actione Dei sed . . . ab ipso Deo ejusque voluntate et potentia
•.. in hoc sensu actio Dei non est prior actine creaturae . . . prioritate causalitatis
•.• in re sit omnino eadem actio (Ibid., nn. 7-8).
187 Ibid., cap. 6, nn. S-5.
180 Ibid., cap. 6-6.

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Suarez answers that the will in order to act freely, does not
need any special help of God (distinct from the will's act itself)
by which it is given something previous to its act in addition
to its permanent active power. 188 He states that this is the
teaching of all theologians except Thomists, and even of some
of them; he also says that it is according to
mind of St.
Thomas, who teaches that in all created agents only two things
are required for act, the agent's own power and God's motion. 139
By the latter, concursus in the Suarez' sense must be understood, else three things are required.
From reason, Suarez argues against a previous motion showing, as we have already seen, that the essential subordination
of second causes to the first cause is amply safeguarded by
simultaneous concursus. Why require another divine action?
It is required to attain the effect of the creature neither immediately nor mediately (as a previous condition), therefore, it is
not required at all. It cannot be required immediately, for
God immediately influences the effect through simultaneous
concursus. If required mediately it influences not the effect
but the second cause itself as an application, motion, compliment, or determination of this cause. 140 Now none of these is
necessary. An application to act surely is not necessary since
there is sufficient application through the proposition of the
object. Supposing all other requirements to act as given, just
how could pre-motion apply to the will, since on the supposition it has its object already presented through the judgment
of reason? The only thing left is that the act itself be the term
of the motion, but this application is imagined to be prior to
that act. 141
138 Voluntatem Iiberam ad suum actum liberum efficiendum non indigere speciali
influxu Dei distincto ab ips() actu . . . quo ei aliquid ad actionem praevium
conferatur, distinctum etiam ab ejus virtute activa permanente, naturali vel
infusa (Ibid., cap. 6, n. 1).
••• Ibid., n. 2. Suarez cites Summa Theol., 1-11, Q. 109, aa. 1-8.
uo llle (concursus i.e. simultaneous) etiam satis est ut causa secunda sit
subordinata primae non per accidens sed per se et essentialiter (Ibid., n. 8) .
141 Postquam
voluntas habens praesens objectum per judicium rationis .
inquiritur quid sit necessarium ex parte Dei. . . . Dices terminum (hujus
applicationis) esse actionem causae secundae . . . sed . . . applicatio dicitur
esse aliquid in causa secunda praevium ad actionem (Ibid.,
6-7) .

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Neither is a motion required by the will previous to its act.
:Motion requires a term, but this motion has none that Suarez
can determine. It cannot be the act of the second agent, for
if it were and the will passively receives this
then only
God would be active in producing the act. The only other
possibility is a fluid quality, produced in the agent, but a
quality, which, as we shall see, is purposeless. We should note,
however, that the Aristotelian maxim, " whatever is moved is
moved by something other than itself," adduced in proof of
this pre-motion means simply that created agents are moved
insofar as they receive from another their power of acting
(which is continually conserved in them), and application of
that power to the object. It does not mean that they receive
a motion of that power. 142
The created will needs, in the third place, no complement in
order to act. It is impossible for it to receive such a complement unless outside the ordinary course its act is intensified,
extended as to objects, etc. Every power by nature is surely
adequate to its own act. Fire is adequate to produce heat; no
fluid quality is needed to help it to do so. Again, supposing
such a quality as necessary and given it in the will, God's simultaneous concursus is still necessary. Given both motions, the
will either needs yet another pre-motion, or it does not. If it
does, then the process must proceed to infinity. If it does not,
then the first pre-motion is not needed, either, for: 1) on the
supposition some second cause (that, namely, to which the
quality is already added) does not need pre-motion, hence
second causes do not by nature require it; 2) if, from the form
of the agent plus this quality, the second agent's power is complete why could not God give creatures permanent powers equal
u• Eodem enim modo inquirendum est quem intrinsecum terminum habeat haec
motio ... non est .•. immediate ad actionem causae secundae ... (quia) fieret
actionem ipsius voluntatis . . . a solo Deo fieri et voluntatem solum passive ad
ipsam concnrrere .... Axioma illnd (omne qlod movetur ab alio movetur) in hoc
creatum non agit nisi virtutem agendi ab alio accipiat,
habere verum quod
etc. . . ." At vero post receptam et conservatam virtutem et factam applicationem
passi vel materiae sufficientem, sit necessaria nova motio in agente ut agat, neque
est verum neque ab Aristotele alicubi in hoc sensu traditum (Ibid., nn. 9-11).

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to this combination of power plus quality? Certainly that
would not be contrary to the efficacy of the divine power, and
would show God to be even more liberal in communicating His
power to creatures. One cannot argue that this quality is
incommunicable as something innate to the second cause, for
even now the second cause has, in a stable and permanent way,
its powers of acting, but has it from the actual influx of the
first cause which gives and conserves it. This complement
could likewise be given permanently and not merely transiently.
Since, whether permanent or transient, it comes from God, we
can hardly understand what a transient quality can accomplish
that a permanent quality cannot achieve. 143
In the fourth place, no excitation of second causes is necessary, at least not because of the subordination of second causes
to the first cause. In some agents excitation is required but for
other reasons; in those cases it is achieved by other second
causes (as an odoriferous body emits its odor only when
heated) . The proponents of this " exciting quality " cannot
explain its nature, or agree on its subject. 144
In general, Suarez summarizes, all arguments for a previous
perfecting quality are to be rejected. The argument that the
second cause always acts as an instrument of the first cause and
needs a transient motion or completing of its power
does not prove. In the first place, it is not universally true that
instruments need this motion. Heat can be an instrument of
fire or even of the soul in producing a new substantial form;
""Non solum superfiuum sed etiam impossible videtur aliquid sub ea ratione
compleri sub qua jam completum est; sed causa secunda (in ordine causae secundae)
supponitur completam virtutem habere (Ibid., n. 13) . . . . Quis (inquam) credat
virtutem solis ad illuminandum in ordine causae secundae incompletam esse? Aut
visum optime dispositum et perfecte informatum specie adhuc indigere alio extrinseco complemento? (Ibid., n. 14). Si (causa secunda cum complemento sub discussione) non indiget alio auxilio ... idem dici poterat de ipsa secunda causa ut
praecise constituta sua naturali virtute agendi . . . tum quia jam damus quamdam
causam secundam quae non requirit alium concursum . . . tum quia . . . au non
potuit Deus dare creaturae virtutem . . . ita perfectam ut haberet ex se totam
illam efficacitatem? (Ibid., n. 16) ... ergo ex hac parte nulla est major repugmmtia
in communicanda hac virtute permanente quam sit in virtute fluente (Ibid., n. 17) .
"' Haec excitatio a causa prima •.. etiam est sine fundamento adinventa (Ibid.,
n. 18).

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yet it does not act in virtue of pre-motion received into it as is
per se evident. The same is true of an image in the imagination acting as an instrument in the production of an intelligible species. The usual instances cited as exemplifying the
necessity of pre-motion in instruments are artistic instruments.
But in them a special motion is required not precisely because
they are instruments but because of
of place required
for their operation-but that is not true of all instruments.
Secondly, this argument from instrumental causes does not conclude simply because second causes, properly speaking, are not
instrumental but principal causes. They are said to be instrumental with respect to God by a certain comparison and to
emphasize their imperfection and dependence on God. 145
There remains finally the question of predetermination. 146
Here Suarez' purpose is to show: 1) that second causes in
general do not need to receive determination from the first
that the nature of some causes, as free,
cause to act; and
does not demand it either.
Second causes in general do not require predetermination.
Surely secondary natural agents by their very forms or natural
properties are determined to one thing, and have no intrinsic
indifferences; how could fire, for instance, need something in
addition to its nature to determine it to heat things rather
than to freeze them? If one objects that some natural agents,
the sun, for instance, are capable of many effects and must be
determined to this one rather than to that, the answer is that
the point under discussion is overlooked in the objection. Such
determination as that does not pertain to the subordination of
second causes to the first cause. Physically speaking, such
determination is always made by the assistance and concurrence of other second causes, efficient or material, with which or
us Dla generalis propositio de instrumentis assumpta . . . de motu recepto in
instrumento, non est in universum vera. . . . Neque argumentum quod in hac re
fieri solet de instrumenlis artis est efficax ... quia tota actio horum instrumentorum
fit, vel deferenda aliquod corpus per varia loca ... vel compellendo aliud a Guo
loco : .. Deinde ... causae secundae non sunt proprie ... instruments sed causae
principales in suo ordine (Ibid., n. 18).
ue Ibid., cap. 7.

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about which these "indetermined" second causes act. 147 One
can conceive a case (though it does not exist) in which determination through second causes would be impossible. Then
either no effect would follow or else God would determine the
cause, not because of its subjection to Him, but because of its
peculiar need for it pertains to the general providence of the
first cause that He assist those second causes which are in need.
In such cases the determination could be brought about by
some previous reality added to the cause, but it need not necessarily be brought about in that way. 148
The objection, " second causes need to be determined to produce this individual effect" is of no real weight. The determination to this individual effect comes either from the peculiar
dispositions of the subject, the conditions and circumstances
surrounding the operation, or from the will of God alone. This
latter implies no predetermination imprinted on the second
cause, for the determination of divine concursus is sufficient to
account for it. The determination to an individual effect, if it
is a special reality, must act either by impeding the power to
other individual effects, which is incredible, or by adding something to the power which efficiently draws the second cause.
Applied to free causes this would clearly destroy liberty. If one
applies it to natural causes it is a matter of small importance,
though it does seem to be an unnecessary multiplication of
realities since the same effect can be achieved by limiting simultaneous concursus to this individual. 149
147 (Causae naturaliter
agentes) ... ex vi suarum formarum sunt determinatae
ad unum ... ergo non indigent nova forma aut novo impulsu quo determinentur

(Ibid., n. 1) .
us Pertinet enim ad generalem providentiam causae primae ut secundis indigentibus subveniat. . . . In eo casu licet non repugnet determinationem fieri per aliquid
necessarius (Ibid.,
praevium superadditum causae . . . non tamen est hie
n. 2).
uo Negamus ... hanc determinationem fieri a causa prima per aliquam actionem
praeviam circa' causam secundam, aut ei aliquam rem imprimendo ... quia sola
determinatio divini concursus sufficit ad hanc determinationem . . . aliter igitur
potest haec praedeterminatio excogitari per modum additionis et augmenti virtutis
activae. . . . Necesse est quod talis determinatio tollat libertatem quoad specificationem. . . . De causis naturalibus si quis ita sentire voluerit parum nostra refert
(Ibid., nn. 4-6) .

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The nature of some second causes, as free, does not require
predetermination either. 150 The usual argument for this predetermination is simple enough: A definite effect cannot proceed from an indifferent and undetermined cause.
But the will, given everything necessary on the part of the
object, the intellect, and the will's own power, is indifferent to
this or that effect. Therefore, before it definitely elicits an act
it must be determined by God.
The determination cannot be from any other second cause,
since none has efficiency over the will. If the objection is raised:
" This proves that even God can do nothing unless He is first
determined by another," the proponents of predetermination
answer that God is so perfect He determines Himself without
being determined by anything above Him, and that is something which is true only of God. If the created will determines
itself in the same way it is not in that respect, subject to God. 151
Suarez' criticism is that this opinion supposes the indifference
of the human will to be passive and negative rather than active
and positive. It receives determination prior to its act and so
does not determine itself, but is passive; likewise it is indifferent in the sense that it is capable of either determination but
actually has neither, and so is negative. Suarez repeats that
this position leads to a denial not only of free acts, but even of
man's free faculty.m
The Suarezian position is that a faculty, which is positively
and actively indifferent, as the master of its act can, of its own
intrinsic power, determine itself to its act. The proposition:
" An indifferent power cannot of itself produce a determined
effect," would be true of a power which is indifferent by reason
of some imperfection in itself or of some defect in the conditions
necessary for its act, but hardly of a power indifferent from its
very perfection. 153
Ibid., cap. 8.
'"'Ibid., nn. 1-2.
'"" Supponunt qui ita argumentantur totam nostrae voluntatis indifl'erentiam passivam esse et non activam et negativam potius quam positivam . . . (In hac positione) indifl'erentia tantum passiva est ad recipiendum nimirum hanc vel illam
determinationem. . . . Non erit indifierens positive per actum eminentem seu
virtualem ... inde aperte sequitur voluntatem non esse liberam (Ibid., n. 4) .
ua Potentiae quae de se est positive et active indifl'erens tanquam dominum sui
100

4

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Self-determination is not repugnant, for to be indifferent in
first act and determined through second acts is not repugnant
as is clear from the examples of God's will. One act does not
necessarily involve the negation of the other as it is not repugnant for primary matter to indifferent in passive potency and
to be actuated or determined through one formal act. Neither
does it involve any infinite power, since this active power, the
will, can be participated from a superior power and in dependence on it. God's infinitely perfect liberty is distinguished
from ours in this: He is essentially free and no potentiality,
composition, or imperfection is involved in the use of His
freedom. 154
Arguing positively, Suarez says that determination of the
will not only need not be, but cannot be, from any agent
extrinsic to the will, or from any reality previous to the act of
the will, for the determination of the will is formally and
physically the very act of will. What else can it be? Certainly
it is something intrinsic to a man. It cannot be in the intellect, for that faculty can move the will only. objectively. Surely
it is not in the lower faculties. If the determination is anything
at all, then, it must be in the will. Since it is there it can only
be the act for it cannot be a habit or something in the order of
first act, since the will of itself is sufficiently constituted in
first act. There is no medium between first and second act, so
the determination can be only second act. Again, a thing is
voluntary only if it: a) is the voluntary act; or b) supposes a
voluntary act. Now determination of the will does not suppose a prior voluntary act; if it is to be voluntary at all it must
be the act of the will.m
actus potens est sua intrinseca virtute cum generali concursu primae causae sese
ad suum actum determinare (Ibid., n. 5) • . . illa propositio: Potentia indifferens
non potest ex se producere determinatum effectum ..• esset vera in causa indifferente ex imperfectione virtutis, vel ex defectu conditionis requisitae ad agendum,
non autem in causa indifferente ex perfecta et eminente virtute (Ibid., n. 6) .
1 "' Hujusmodi facult.Bs et modus agendi nee in sese involvit repugnantiam •.•
quia unus actus non includit necessaria negationem alterius sicut materiam primam.
• . . Nee est cur requirat infinitam perfectionem aut virtutem ... quia potest esse
participata a SUJMlriori virtute (Ibid., n. 7)" .
... Voluntatem •.. determinari nihil aliud est quam velle; ergo non potest esse

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Suarez explains that the will does not act because it is determined from outside (aliunde) but rather it wills because of
this that it determines itself, but in such wise that the causal
note indicates the formal not the efficient cause. In the line
of efficient causality, for the will to be determined is the same
thing as for it to effect its volition or nolition. In the line of
formal cause, however, it remains determined because it continues to be affected by this act of will rather than by another.
In this sense there is no repugnance in sa;}'-ing that the will is
determined because it wills, although it is not determined except
by willing, because there is here implied the formal cause, not
the efficient. Most properly, however and without any equivocation the will is said to determine itself by willing, and to
will by determining itself. From this it is clear how the will
can be both indifferent and determined. It is not determined
in first act, but can be formally determined by second act, and
when it is determined in second act it cannot, as to that state
be at the same time indifferent, though it retains its indifferent
faculty .158 Physical predetermination destroys indifference both
of specification and of exercise, and therefore is incompatible
with liberty.
Suarez considers first the freedom of specification.157 The
use of liberty implies a two-fold power: 1) the power to omit
the act while retaining the power to place it; and 2) the power
to place the act while retaining the power to omit it. Now,
then, if this predetermination is necessary for operation the
will cannot move without that influx. So long, therefore, as
ab extrinseco agente sine ipsa nee potest esse aliquid praevium ad ipsum velle,
quod sit causa efficiens ejus. . . . Si ergo determinatio est aliquid oportet ut sit
in ipsa voluntate . . . talis determiilatio nihil aliud esse potest praeter actum
secundum; neque cogitari potest medium inter actum primum et secundum (Ibid.,
n. 9).
11 " Quo fit ut .•• non ideo voluntas velit quia aliunde est determinata sed potius
ideo velit quia seipsam determinat 'ita tamen ut in ea caussli nota indicetur causa
formalis, non efficiens • • • in hoc sensu non est repugnantia in ilia locutione:
Yoluntas determinatur quia vult quamvis non determinetur nisi volendo ... sine
ulla aequivocatione dicitur voluntas sese determinare volendo et velle, sese determinando (Ibid., n. 10) •
107 Ibid., cap. 9.

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God does not give the determination to the will, it is not in
the power of the will to operate. The motion and determination are free with regard to God, but not with regard to man.
Moral responsibility for not acting is thus impossible when man
receives no determination, or when man is determined to volition the fact that he does not choose the object cannot be
attributed to him. 158
Some escape this conclusion by arguing that without this
determination the will can act, though it never shall. The
answer of Suarez is that, on the supposition, the will is in fact
insufficient to determine itself; therefore it cannot in any true
sense act without this determining factor. If the determination
is the ultimate complement of the will, the will's power without
it is remote and physical, not proximate and moral, such as
liberty requires. 159
Others try to defend determination by saying that it is in
man's power to get this determination. Hence if he lacks it,
the lack is imputable to him. Now if it is in
power it is
subject to his will; his will therefore can either do something
to get it, or it can do nothing. If the latter, it is not in his
power at all. If he can do something to get it how shall we
account for the act done to get it? Either he needs predetermination to that act or he does not. If he does, we go tripping
along ad infinitum, or else come at last to some determination
which is altogether from outside a man, and how the act proceeding under it could be in the will's power is inconceivable.
If a man does not need predetermination to the act by which
he wins predetermination, then the will does not (simply speaking) require predetermination by reasons of its subordination
to the first cause. To say the will does nothing positive but
'"" Si determinatio ilia est . . . necessaria . . . ergo sine illo influxu non potest
moveri voluntas . . . ergo nunquam ipsum velle est in potestate ejus nisi prius
Deus . . . determinationem tribuat quod solum est in ejus potestate et arbitrio.
Unde ipsi Deo Iibera esse poterit hominis motio et determinatio, non autem ipsi
homini (Ibid., n. !!) . Interrogo an in eo casu sit illi voluntati moraliter tribuendum
quod nihil voluerit. Certe id aflirmari non potest (Ibid., n. S) .
109 Si non habetur nee haberi potest omnis potestas quae voluntati
attribuitur
erit mere physica et remota non autem proxima et moralis quae ad usum liberum
et culpam necessaria est (Ibid., n. 4).

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merely allows itself to be determined settles nothing. By allowing itself, it can be doing nothing, for to do anything it already
needs (on the supposition) determination; or if the" allowing"
is something the will must already be determined to it and that
previous determination is in God's hands alone.160
In summary, if determination is in God's power alone the
will is passive as regards it; and a passive power cannot be a
free power. To introduce some kind of disposition and say
that through its mediation the will has power over its determination does not help for two reasons: 1) we must account
for that disposition; and 2) it is ridiculous to require a disposition in man for all the natural concursus of the first cause
and for all acts of will, even trifling ones.161
Suarez shows, secondly, that physical determination militates
against freedom of exercise/ 62 because determination implies a
form impressed on the will which with the will completes the
proximate principle of the voluntary act. It is: a) determimition because it not only inclines to one thing as to specification
but also altogether determines the will to the exercise of the
act (otherwise it is not real determination but only a modification, which, like charity, or any other habit, inclines us to
one thing); b) physical determination because: i) it is a physical cause of the act which is physically in the will; ii) to distinguish it from moral determination, such as persuasion. Now
such physical determination means the act cannot be free as to
100 Quomodo erit in potestate
illius hominis habere illam determinationem a
Deo . . . ? Aut enim aliquid. potest facere voluntas quo obtineat a Deo illam
determinationem, vel nihil agere potest. Si nihil facere potest, ergo non est in
potestate ejus habere illam. . . . Si autem aliquid potest libere facere, . . . si
requiritur determinatio (ad illud volendum) vel proceditur in infinitum vel sistendum erit in aliqua determinatione quae omnino ab extrinseco veniat. . . . Si non
requiritur ilia determinatio ad primum opus . . . concluditur voluntatem indifferentem et nondum determinatam ab e.xtrinseco agente posse se libere determinare
• . . (et) illam determinationm non esse per se necessariam ad operandum (Ibid.,
nn. 6-7).
181 Voluntas autem dicitur concurrere passive ... potentia 'passiva non satis
est ad liberam potestatem. Ridiculum est . . . ad actus omnes volendi etiam circa
res minimas dispositionem ex parte hominis requirere, praeter ipsammet cooperaticnem liberam (Ibid., n. 8).
'""Ibid., capp. 10-11.

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exercise (nor as to specification either, as a consequence) for
the will is not free with respect to this determining reality. It
is not free to receive it (for the will is passive as to receiving
it) nor, having received it, to use it or not, for given it, the
will can no longer not-operate. Always one part of the power
required for indifference and liberty is impeded; hence, freedom
is taken away. The common answers to this difficulty (that
the will can not-operate in the divided sense, or that it is of
itself indifferent even though with this determination it cannot
not-operate, and such indifference is enough to preserve freedom) are inadequate. The first answer diverts consideration
from the use of liberty, which is the question, to the free faculty.
Even there, those who use this answer are mistaken, for in fact
determination such as they suppose destroys even the freedom
of the power. The second answer implies liberty is a passive
power, which is simply to be denied/ 63
Suarez interprets the council of Trent 164 itself to teach that
God does not predetermine us, for the Council says of God's
motion that the will can cast it off (quippe qui illam alijicere
potest) and again that the will can dissent from that motion
(posse dissentire si velit) . The Council is certainly speaking
of prevenient motion and in the composed sense, for no one can
cast off what he does not have or which is not offered to him.
According to the Council, then, it is required for liberty that
in the composed sense the will under God's motion can
not-act. 165
163 Determinatio physica dicitur esse forma quaedam voluntati impressa quae cum
ilia complet principium proximum actus ... dicitur ... esse determinatio voluntatis ... quia omnino determinat illam ad exercitium actus (Ibid., cap. 10, n. 1).
Ex tali determinatione sequitur actum non esse liberum quoad exercitium . . .
neque ... quoad specificationem ... quia respectu illius determinationis voluntas
nostra non est Iibera; nam ad i!Iam recipiendam . . . mere passive se habet; post
receptam autem illam necessario prodit in opus ... semper ergo habet (voluntas)
impeditam alteram partem illius potestatis ... et ita tollitur usus libertatis (Ibid.,
n. 2) . Prima enim responsio ab usu ad facultatem liberam divertit . . . Secunda
... solum ponit libertatem in passiva indifferentia quod est illam funditus destruere
(Ibid., nn. 8-4).
16 ' Suarez quotes Trent,
sess. 6, cap. 5 (Denz., n. 797) and can. 4 (Denz.,
n. 814).
161 Est certum Concilium loqui de motione Dei praeveniente nostram voluntatem

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Some ·authors, faced with this argument, Suarez continues,
concede that given God's motion the will can resist and notoperate, but infallibly it never uses this power, and this is
sufficient, they say, for efficacious motion from God and also
for safeguarding freedom in man. This is in open contradiction to their origi"nal propositions, such as" given God's motion
the will can not not-operate," and " given motion it is necessary to operate," propositions which they confirm by appealing
to St. Thomas' dictum: " If God moves the will to something
it is impossible for the will not to act." 166 St. Thomas simply
cannot be understood to be speaking of the previous motion in
the place cited; he is speaking of God's cooperative motion
which, as we have seen, includes the very act. Since that
motion includes act, it is clearly impossible that under it there
be no acts. 167
If God efficiently moves us, we cannot resist; 168 therefore, we
are not free. Again, we can ask whether or not this predetermination is subject to man's will in its use. If it is, it is
not determination but inclination to act, something in the order
of first act which leaves the will indifferent. If its use is not
... certum est loqui Concilium in sensu composito ... quia nemo dicitur abjicere
nisi id quod habet aut quod ei offertur ... juxta Concilii doctrinam ... etiam in
sensu composito necesse est ut maneat in voluntate potestas resistendi (Ibid., n. 5).
166 Summa Theol., I-II, q. 10, a. 4, ad Sum.
Suarez both here (Opus. Primum,
loc. cit., n. 6) and in the Metaphysics (Disp. Meta., disp. 19, sect. 4, n. 1) quotes
St. Thomas as saying this though the words he quotes as St. Thomas' differ
slightly in the two places cited. The Leonine and Faucher editions of St. Thomas
read: "Si Deus movet voluntatem ad aliquid incompossibile est huic positioni quod
voluntas ad illud non movetur. Non tamen est impossible simpliciter. Unde non
sequitur quod a Deo ex necessitate moveatur." The Piana edition reads: "Si Deus
movet voluntatem ad aliquid impossibile est poni quod voluntas ad illud non
moveatur."
The Codex Vaticanus 733 reads similarly: "impossible eat hoc poni
quod, etc." The Vienna edition of 1478 and several codices (Palatinus 858; Vaticanus 782; Vaticanus 786) read not " incompossibile " but " impossibile." However, every edition we have seen adds "non tamen est impossibile simpliciter."
••• Locutus est (S. Thomas) de motione cooperativa quae, facta compositione,
includit actum ipsum. At praedicti auctores ilium interpretantur de hac motione
praevia (Opus., Primum, loc. cit., n. 6).
168 Ibid., n. 7.
Suarez cites Romans ix: "Voluntas ejus quis resistet?" and
Esther xiii: " Non est qui possit tuae resistere voluntati."

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subject to the will, then second act flows by natural necessity;
the will cannot not-operate. 169
Suppose that the created will by its very nature requires this
determination, then creatures have no free acts, and moreover
lack any free faculty. For the will without the extrinsic determination is not proximately apt to choose anything. Therefore the faculty does not by its nature demand the free use of
operating (for it cannot of its very nature demand two repugnant conditions for operation) . Therefore it is not free, for
free powers do demand free use. Moreover, the will can only
be passively indifferent if it needs determination; and a passively indifferent thing (like the hand) is not free. 170
Suarez begins then to expose his own opinion on how God's
concursus does, in fact, fall on our free acts, and in exposing
how, without resorting to predetermination, our wills' subordination to God can sufficiently and exactly be preserved he gives,
he says, the best possible argument against deterniination. 171
Now it is clear that whatever God operates He operates
through His will, for God's omnipotence is an attribute rationally distinct from His will. His omnipotence operates nothing unless the intellect precedes as directing, and the will as
applying. Now God can influence man's free act in two ways:
I) by willing absolutely that such an act be placed by such a
will at this time, and in this way. Such an act of will antecedes God's foreknowledge of the effect as future; it determines
the will;
God can will by an act which is conditional, not
absolute, that this act be placed by the created will. The
condition is "if the created will determines itself to eliciting
this act"; God, under the same condition wills to concur in the
act, expecting, so to speak, the influx of the created will, for
160 Si ergo primum (i.e. si illa determinatio subditur usui libero voluntatis)
...
illam non esse determinationem ad opus . . . sed esse ad modum cujusdam habitus
... qui de se ad unum actum inclinat (Ibid., n. 8). Si ... eligatur ... hanc
praemotionem esse inseparabilem ab actu secundo ex natura sua . . . dicendum
est actum secundum naturali necessitate ab ilia manare (Ibid., n. 10).
170 Dicunt hanc determinationem
esse necessariam ex intrinseca natura creatae
voluntatis; ergo sine ilia non est voluntas apta proxime ad aliquid volendum . . .
ergo neque ex natura sua est facultas Iibera (Ibid., n. 18).
tn Ibid., cap. 14.

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God wishes to accommodate Himself to us in such a way as
not to injure our free will. In virtue of this divine will, God's
omnipotence remains applied (applicata) to flow into the act
of the human will, without any new act on God's part. This
latter mode is the one Suarez accepts. 112
His arguments for it are: 1) it involves no repugnance. We
see from experience that the sun, for instance, concurs in a
general way with each of the secondary causes which depend
on it; 2) it is most apt. The power of the will is above that
of all other natural agents, and is not bound to any one thing.
It is necessary that God's concursus have the same eminent,
universal, and abstract character. Determination, says Suarez,
is too restrictive for the will. Any concursus other than this
would be repugnant to man's freedom, for it would imply that
man would be indifferent in first act and yet determined in first
act, a clear contradiction since determination and non-indifference are the same thing. 173
Appealing to Scripture in support of this kind of premotion,
Suarez sees in such passages as: " God left man in the hand
of his own counsel," 174 an indication that after God's concursus
there is yet room for man's deliberation, which would not be
true if concursus determined man. Scripture, it is to be noted,
is speaking of a proximate and moral power, and of God's indifferent concursus proposed and offered. Support of his position
is common among Scholastics, Suarez thinks. St. Thomas does
... Ibid., nn. 4-6. Duobus modis posse intelligi divinam voluntatem velle influere
in actum liberum humanae voluntatis: primus ... simpliciter et absolute volendo
ut talis actus a tali voluntate fiat . . . et hunc modum hactenus impugnavimus.
Alius . . . est Deum non ·absolute, sed quasi sub conditione velle ut hie actus fiat
a voluntate creata ... et sub eadem conditione velle influere ... expectando ...
influxum creatae voluntatis. . . . Ex vi autem hujus divinae voluntatis, ita manat
applicata divina omnipotentia..ad influendum in actum humanae voluntatis, ut hac
influente. . . . Deus etiam influat (Ibid., n. 5) .
173 Cum potestas liberae voluntatis
sit veluti superior et eminentior caeteris
naturalibus agentibus . . . necesse est ut hie concursus cum eadem eminentia,
abstractione et universalitate (ut sic dicam) tribuatur (Ibid., n. 7). In hoc
involvitur contradictio quod . . . eadem potentia . . . agat determinata et non
determinata ... indifferens et determinata ab alio in actu primo, i.e. non indifferens nam haec duo idem sunt (Ibid., n. 8) .
1 " Ecclu.
xv. Opw. Primum, loc. cit., n. 9.

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not expressly teach it, but on the other hand " he nowhere
affirms that God of Himself and by His efficacious will alone
determined to one act the concursus to be given the human will
by determining the will to it." 175 The Angelic Doctor says
without distinction that the knowledge of future things in their
causes is conjectural. 176 Were he of the opinion that God
efficaciously predeterinines our wills he would have held that
God knows our future acts in the predetermination of His will.
As it is, he derives the certitude of God's knowledge of such
things from their presence to eternity. Again he teaches that
God's general concursus does not consist in determining the
will to one thing, but that God of Himself confers concursus
which is indifferent and ordered to the general object of the
will, namely good. "Without this universal motion man can
will nothing," which clearly implies that God's motion as God's
is indifferent; with this general concursus the will is determined
through reason and liberty. 177 St. Thomas says explicitly that
by grace God sometimes moves certain people, but he does not
say that He ever, predetermines anyone. St. Thomas clearly
teaches that God so moves our wills that He " does not determine them necessarily to one thing." 178 Suarez cites other
places in St. Thomas, 179 but the three mentioned above contain
his strongest points. 180
"" Divus ergo Thomas . . . nullibi affirmat Deum ex se et sola sua efficaci voluntate ad unum actum determinasse eum concursum quem erat exhibiturus voluntati
humanae praedeterminando earn ad ilium (Ibid., n. 10).
178 Suarez cites Summa Theol., I, q. 14, a. 18;
Actually St. Thomas says there
that God knows contingent things as they are actual, i.e. He must know them in
some other way than they are· in their secondary causes, as contingent.
111 I-II, q. 9, a. 6, ad Sum.
The universal motion spoken of by St. Thomas is
given to the will as a nature, to move it as a nature. To subsequent free motions
man determines himself through reason as St. Thomas points out. The fact that
the will needs a universal motion with regard to a universal object does not militate against the fact that the liberum arbitrium needs a determining motion for
God provides for each thing according to its nature.
178 This is the very crux of the matter.
God moves us, not violently; God determines us, without necessitating us.
17 °For example he appeals to Q. D. de Verit., q. 5, a. 5, ad lum; Q. D. de Pot.,
q. 8, a. 7, ad 18um; III Cont. Gent., c. 78, etc.
180 Opus. Primum, loc. cit., nn. 10-11.

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The objections against such concursus Suarez reduces to four
capital difficulties: 181 1) It supposes that God applies His will
and power to concurring with the creature in a confused, general way, which is imperfect; 2) it implies that God influences
the created act in a blind, ignorant way unless He concurs
before hand and so knows what the creature will do under
concursus; 8) the creature determines God to operating this
act rather than that, which is absurd for the higher determines
the, lower and not vice versa; 4) God would cooperate as a
natural agent according to the need of the second cause, and
by a transient action which passes into the second cause, and
all of that would indicate very imperfect causation. 182
The general answer to these objections is simple; God knows
everything which second causes can do, with this or that concursus. Even more wonderfully, God foreknows not only what
they can do but even what they would do if they were procreated with this particular help or occasion to do such or such
a thing. This mediate knowledge is very properly attributed
to God, as the Fathers and the Holy Scriptures testify. The
fact that it is difficult for us to understand is no valid argument against it. Given this knowledge in God, then, His will
destines things to their ends and selects for them means suitable
to their natures. 183
From this Suarez proceeds to answer the objections in particular. To the first, there is no confusion in the way" in
which God applies His will and power to concurring, for God
foreseeing the results of His concursus offers His help for this
individual act. This is not predetermination, for God, by a
similar act, offers the will concursus sufficient for the other acts
of which the will is capable. Nor is the effective act of giving
181 Ibid., cap. 15.

Ibid., n. 1.
(Divina cognitio) reprn.esentat quidquid per causas secundas, et voluntates
creatas cum hoc vel illo auxilio et concursu fieri potest. . . . Sed quod mirabilius
est non solum cognoscit Deus anteriore scientia . . . quid omnes voluntates possint
facere sed etiam quid facient si cum hoc auxilio vel occasione ad hoc vel illud
volendum procreentur. . . . Hac ergo supposita scientia in Deo accedit divina
voluntas quae res singulares in suos fines destinat, et media eligit (Ibid., n. i).
181

181

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concursus absolute; an implicit condition is always included
" if the will consents." 184
To the second objection he answers that God is not ignorant
of the result of His concursus before giving it, for by mediate
science He already knows the will's act. 185 To the third
objection he notes the determination of the first cause can be
understood in a two-fold way: a) the application by which
God orders His omnipotence to helping the second cause, and
concurring with it; b) the determined created action proceeding from the divine will and power, cooperating with the human
will.
The first of these is from the free determination of the Divine
will; the human will is not its cause. However, some aspects
of this determination can be accounted for by the objects or
the human will, since by its very nature it demands this mode
of operating. 186 The second, the determined action, receives
its determination from the created cause; not that this creature
is the sole effective cause of its determination, but in that
cause is found the proper and proximate reason for the determination. It is the proximate cause which determines the
action to this species, this time, etc. All this argues not to
imperfection in God, but to very great perfection, since He has
devised such a way of safeguarding created free causality. In
the instant in which God, as first cause, actually influences,
is understood to have previously (by a priority of nature)
a determination by which His will is ready to concur in this
or that act. His will is indifferent only by a universal and
absolute indifference, and determined (conditionally) to co18 ' Deus enim distinctissime praevidens omnes hos actus ... distincte ac definitive
vult ad hunc vel ilium, et sic de caeteris, praebere concursum seu offerre quantum
in ipso est ... tamen quia Deus etiam praevidet quem actum ilia voluntas effectum
sit . . . Deus . . . concursum offerat, ideo Deus determinate . . . vult cum ilia
concurrere ad talem actum . . . nee ilium absolute velit sed cum dependentia
ejusdem actus a proxima causa ... et includendo in se implicitam conditionem: Si
ipsa consentire voluerit (Ibid., n. 3).
18 " lbi.d., n. 4.
186 Ex parte autem objecti vel humanae
voluntatis reddi potest nonnulla ratio
hujus determinationis nimirum quia ex natura sua postulat hunc operandi modum
(Ibid., n. 5).

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operating with the created cause, so that if the latter acts, God
necessarily acts by a necessity of supposition. Now the created
will in the instant in question is altogether undetermined. There
is absolutely no necessity about its infl.uxus; the act begins
solely from its indifference of liberty, when and as its wills. For
this reason, the determinateness is assigned to it as to its proximate root, though divine concursus is clearly necessary that
liberty effectively cause the determinateness.
According to
causality, neither first nor second cause has any priority of
nature, for neither acts on the other, but each acts on the effect;
neither applies the other or causes it to do something by reason
of this concursus. The first cause can be called prior in causiiJg, inasmuch as it gives and conserves the being of the second
cause, effects the conditions or motions preceding the action,
concurs in a more outstanding way, and so forth. 187
To the fourth objection Suarez teaches that God does act
necessarily, but the absolute necessity that His power act is
based on a supposition; viz., the previous determination of His
will to act. To say God's action is transient is of no great
importance; the cardinal point is that God causes that act
immediately and hence the created action is an act of God, for
action is a thing as it proceeds from its cause, or the dependence
of an effect on the agent, and the created action has this respect
to God. That God have transient action in His effects argues
no imperfection in Him but places in creatures perfection presupposed in God. 188
181 Verissimum
est actionem illam accipere determinationem suam a proxima
cauoa sen voluntate humana . . . quod humana voluntas sit propria et proxima
ratio illius determinationis. . . . Proxima vero causa . . . suo influxu determinat
actionem ad hance speciem, ad hoc tempus, etc. (Ibid., n. 5). Deus ... solum
est indifferens universali quadam et absoluta indifferentia; determinatus tamen quasi
sub conditione ad cooperandum creaturae ... creata voluntas in illo priori naturae
est omnino indeterminata et nullam habet necessitatem influendi . . . et ideo in
earn tanquam in radicem proximam haec determinatio revocatur (Ibid., n. 6) .
Si prioritas naturae sumatur proprie secundum causalitatem . . . neutra harum
causarurn priusquam alia influit; quia neutra influit in aliam ... et neutra applicat
aliam aut facit illam facere ex vi hujus concursus (Ibid., n. 7) .
18 ' Ibid., n. 8.

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There remains one really important difficulty. 189 From
Suarez' thesis it seems to follow that God does not have a
perfect providence with regard to our free acts, that He does
not predefine them by an absolute and efficacious decree of
His will before He sees that those acts should be placed by our
will with His concursus. The objection seems very strong, for
if one answers by saying that God does, by His absolute decree,
predefine our acts, it follows then He efficacio1:1slymoves us to
the defined acts and this seems to be the very same thing as
the predetermination Suarez has argued against at such
length. 190 Here then is a dilemma.
The answer requires some preliminary discussion. By predefinition Suarez means " a certain eternal decree of the divine
will by which it absolutely establishes that something be done
in time." This decree " precedes foreknowledge of the future
act " and by it God absolutely decrees the act, and therefore
ordains the means through which it shall be brought about. 191
This predefinition is not contrary to our liberty. It is incredible and unworthy of God that God could not predefine our
acts. To say that He cannot is to limit His power too greatly
and to suppose that all free acts are outside His efficacious
intention. We can distinguish a two-fold physical predefinition:
internal, which God establishes in His own will, not that
through it He immediately affects or predetermines the second
cause, but only that in Himself He has a defined and absolute
intention of some end and by reason of it He applies apt means
so that the thing is infallibly brought about as it has been predefined. The second is external, which reaches out to the
external effect with such efficiency that it physically determines
the human will to its act. The first of these we shall simply
call predefinition; the second predetermination. 192
190 Ibid., n. 1.
Quoddam aetemum decretum divinae voluntatis quo absolute statuit ut
aliquid fiat in tempore ... proprie dicit decretum antecedens praescientiam futuri
actus, quo Deus absolute decrevit ut (homo) haberet ilium (actum) et ideo
ordinavit media per quae fieret (Ibid., n. 2).
192 In hac divina praedefinitione
. . . distinguere nos possumus quamdam esse
praedifinitionem internam qqam Deus in sua voluntate statuit, non ut per earn
189

191

Ibid., cap. 16.

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This predefinition is reasonable, Suarez points out, since,
supposing God's determination that such and such an effect
take place, it is certainly to be brought about by God's power
in that one way which infallibly insures the result. God will
do neither more nor less than is necessary. Since a predetermination of the human will would take away the very freedom
through which, on the supposition, God has determined that
the effect should proceed, He does not give so efficacious a
motion as that. Neither does He just preordain a series of
causes with which He sees the decreed act will be placed by us.
With regard to our good acts, He can also preordain the very
act.
This predefinition does not destroy freedom of exercise, as
predetermination does. The latter is certainly unnecessary
since a moral motion plus science by which God sees that, given
these circumstances, the rational appetite will consent to this
act is sufficient. God predetermines us by an act which is like
an intention and of itself produces nothing external, since God's
will operates through His omnipotence and not, immediately,
of itself. Since it neither imperates nor uses the created will
it brings no physical predetermination to bear on it. The fact
that the means to the end are somehow contained in God's
intention of the end argues nothing against the case; predefining the act through such a means does not predetermine but
moves the will in a fitting and efficacious way, which God sees
is so accommodated to this will that it will infallibly be
attracted to consenting. 193
immutet causam secundam immediate, aut illam determinet . . . sed solum ut in
sese definitam et absolutam intentionem habeat alicujus finis ••• aliam vero esse
aut cogitare posse praedefinitionem . . . quae cum tali tantaque efficacia . . . exeat
ut voluntatem humanam physice determinet. . . . Priorem vocabimus praefinitionem
sen praedefinitionem; posteriorem vere, praedeterminationem (Ibid., nn. 5-6) .
198 Ex vi illius decreti solum
(Deus) applicat suam potentiam ut illo modo
efficiat . . . quia ad intentum finem obtinendum infallibiliter sufficiat. . . . Contingere potest ut . . . praedeterminatio physica repugnet cum illo decreto, ut in
actibus liberis praefinitis contingit; et tum . . . ex tali praedefinitione . . . repugnaLit sequi; quia impediret libertatem, quae simul cum actu praedefinita erat.
. . . Sufficit alia motio (i.e. alia a praernotione) moralis cum communi concursu
adjuncta conditionata scientia. . . . Praedefinitio non imperat illi (voluntati
humanae) nee utitur ilia (Ibid., nn. 8-9).

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The differences between such predefinition and Thomists'
predetermination are many: 1) predefinition is also a will of
this means which means move the free will contingently, though
infallibly from God's foreknowledge; predetermination requires
no means other than the efficacy of the very determination
which, determining the will, overpowers it; 194 2) predefinition
defines the act with regard to the mode in which the second
cause operates, so that its object is the act as it is to be done
by determination of the free will itself; the object of predetermination is not only the act but also its mode, i. e., the physical
determination through God's efficacious motion; 3) predefinition abstractly considered (prescinding from the application of
the accommodated means) is neither immediately active ad
extra nor applicative of divine power (though the predefinition
in reality is the same as the determining of the means, the mind
can make the precision) ; while predetermination is of itself
active; 4) by predefinition God's
concursus is not
changed, but the will so governed that it infallibly uses it;
predetermination so changes concursus that the latter uses the
will rather than the other way round. 195
That predefinition, on the other hand, leaves us free as to
exercise is clear; it merely applies a means by which the will
is infallibly attracte9, though it can still not-operate. Of course
the human consent is certain from divine foreknowledge. The
connection between predefinitioa_ and the execution of act is
founded precisely in this divine foreknowledge plus providence,
attracting by moral motion, and not in the physical efficacy of
a decree determining the will to one thing. Suarez notes that:
1) predefinition is not, simply speaking, antecedent to the use
of liberty; it supposes preknowledge of it as a future conditional
thing and falls on that free consent as it is to be induced through
1 "' (Praedeterminatio)
non requirit aliud medium quam suam effieaeitatem, qua
st'cum rapit voluntatem, determinando illam (Ibid., n. 10).
10 " Praedefinitio abstracte concepta . . . non sit immediate aetiva ad extra nee
applieativa potentiae divinae donee intelligatur determinata ad tale medium . . .
praedeterminans voluntas per seipsam est aetiva vel applieativa potentiae divinae
ad vim ... ex vi (praedeterminationis) necesse est variari eoneursum Dei talemque
praestari ut ille potius voluntate utatur quam voluntas illo (Ibid., n. 10}.

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the means which, as God foresees, will infallibly bring it about;
and 2) given it the will can, simply speaking, not-act. This
power is not a power to resist God's will, for: a) God's will
does not immediately move the human will; b) He sees the
act to be placed in such a way that it can be impeded. What
would be repugnant is not that God foreknow both that I shall
do this and also my power not to do it, but that this be predefined and not take place. There is no potency for the latter.
This repugnance, Suarez adds, comes not only from the causality and power of the supposition but from this that the
foreknowledge supposes this future use of freedom, grantedthe
conditions. The necessity, then, is only that when a thing is,
it be.' 96
Predefinition leaves freedom of specification unharmed.
Many of our acts are not predefined, yet we have ordinary
the definition,
concursus for them. The latter does not
nor is it given through predefinition, because such definition is
not required by reason of the subordination of second to first
cause. 197
We consider now the various kinds of human acts; they can
be either natural or supernatural.
Nat ural acts, again, are
either good or bad, a distinction which has no place with regard
to supernatural actions since all evil voluntary actions can be
placed by the natural power of the will. We shall now consider natural acts and evil acts, then good acts. 198
It is certain in the first place that God does predetermine the
will, or in any way incline it to this formal element of sin.
Suarez thinks it de fide, certain that God does not excite us,
196 Praedefinitio
. . . applicat medium quo ita moveatur liberum arbitrium ut
revera possit non operari . . . quamvis ex divina praescientia certus sit et infallibilis consensus liberi arbitrii ... in priori praedefinitione fundatur connexio (cum
actu) et necessaria consecutio in divina praescientia, adjuncta providentia, morali
modo attrahente ... praedefinitio haec non est simpliciter antecedens usum libertatis, quia supponit praescientia ejus ... sed supponens aliquo modo usum libertatis, cui sese accomodat (Ibid., nn. 11-18).
197 Esse plures actus humanos ad quos Deus, . . . concurrit, etsi eos non praedefiniat. . . . Concursus generalis non datur per hanc praedefinitionem neque ad
ilium est necessaria (Ibid., n. 14).
198 Ibid., Liber II, Introductio.

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or move us by moral motion to morally bad acts. St. James
implies this. 199 Again, the Council of Trent defined: "If anyone shall say that it is not in the power of man to make his
ways evil, but that God operates evil works just as He does
good works, not only permissively but also properly and per se;
so that Judas' betrayal is no less His work than the calling of
Paul, let him be anathema." 200 The Council speaks of " evil
works " making no fine distinction between the work formally
and materially regarded. It outlaws the opinion that God
operates such things and does not say, for example," save in a
material way." To argue that God causes sins materially but
not formally is therefore unjustified. He would not only give
His concursus, He would even determine it to this act; what
more could be required for Him to be its cause? To say God
is the cause of material sin and not of the formal sin is meaningless. If God so determines man to act in these circumstances
it is impossible that the act be anything but a sin, as, for
example, to determine Judas to betray Christ with his knowledge of, and attitude to, Christ, and his dispositions, would
have been precisely to determine him to sin. 201
It is even true that God never moves our wills by this moral
motion (exaltations, persuasions) to any act, even though it
be indifferent or good in itself, with the positive intention that
man take from it the occasion of doing evil, that is, of eliciting
another act which man could elicit only evilly. While this is
not so expressly of faith as the first proposition, it seems suffieiently certain that the contrary is erroneous. Such an intention is intrinsically evil and therefore is repugnant to the divine
199 "For God is not a tempter of evils and he tempteth no man" (James, i, IS).
Cfr. Opus. Primum, Liber II, cap.
nn. 5-6.
200 Sess. 6, cap. 6 (Denz., n. 816).
001 Neque hie (in verbis Concilii)
locus relinquitur distinctioni de materiali et
formali. . . . lmo cum posito materiali necessaria consequatur formale . . . nunquam
hoc est in potestate Iibera voluntatis (Opus. Primum, loc. cit., n.
(In suppositione praedeterminationis) Deus est directe et per se causa illius malae voluntatis . . . ex intentione sua praedeterminante influxum suum ad talem volitionem
... quid ergo amplius requiri potest ut vere ac proprie dicatur causa illius peccati
(Ibid., n. 10). Quid enim est Deum esse causam materialis peccati et non formalis?
(Ibid., n.

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goodness. Again, if God could directly intend an evil and He
could immediately move us (morally) to it for that would be
no worse than intending evil. Now we cannot conceive God
in His goodness soliciting us to sin, therefore neither does He
intend our sins. 202
God does not move us morally to sin; Suarez goes further and
says that even predefinition to evil acts is repugnant. He
argues from Scripture, for example, " Non Deus volens iniquitatem tu es." 20 z The Second Council of Orange declares: "Not
only do we not believe that some are predestined to evil by
the divine power but also, if there are those who wish to believe so great an evil, we, with all detestation, call them anathema." 204 Since predestination and predefinition differ only
in name, the teaching of the Church is clear. 205 He also argues
from reason: it is evident that God cannot intend eviJ.2°6 When
Scripture seems to speak of God exciting men to particular
sins it must be understood as either a negatibn of concursus
or as an excitation to sins through a
good operation
which will be the occasion of ruin, which ruin God foresees and
permits, though He does not intend it. 207
Even more certainly, Suarez concludes, predetermination to
sin by God is impossible. What God can do in using evil wills
is to have presented to them some object so that the will, of
itself actually determined to evil, tends to this object. Even
this, however, is regularly done, Suarez thinks, not by God
immediately but through the devils whom God orders to apply
certain objects rather than others. This, of course, is to order
a lesser evil, for it limits the diabolic powers. Even as to sin
which is punishment for a previous sin God gives only permission. The reason is that while punishment is good, evil cannot
be done that good may come of it; God is not even a true cause
of the hardening of sinners, certainly not through any positive
Ibid., cap. 8, nn. 1-2.
Psalm V.
20 ' III de Praedestinatione
202
203

(Denz.

# 200) .

Opus. Primum, loc. cit., cap. 4, nn. 1-3.
206 Ibid., nn. 9-12.
••• Ibid., cap. 5.
205

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action and direct intention of this effect. This hardening is
sinful for it is an inhering in evil, a voluntary impenitence and
resistance tlo God's call. Such things are attributable to God
permissively only. He hardens hearts, blinds minds, and
deserts men only insofar as He, as punishment for previous
sins, does not give the grace by which these things could be
avoided. The occasions by which such conditions are brought
about God permits or causes not as they are occasions of evil,
but as good things from which God foresees evil will result;
Lut that event is due only to human malice. 208
Yet God has providence of evil acts in particular. This does
not mean that God provides that sins be, in the sense that He
decrees, intends, or procures them. Yet sins fall under divine
providence, and providence is concerned about them in some
way. God gives the necessary concursus, not that they be but
that they can be, in order that freedom be safeguarded in all
respects. Knowing from all eternity that they will be, God
ordains them, providentially, to punishment or to some other
effect. 209
Of our good acts, God is, simply speaking, the author. He
not only concurs in them as he does in sins, He intends them
per se; for their sake He gives to the will a very powerful propensity to that which is right and reasonable. To good acts,
all laws and precepts, all rewards and punishments, are ordered.
God directly and per se influences as to the good; He provides
that such acts be, and procures their being placed. That God
by an absolute decree, previous (in nature) to His foreknowledge of future things, predefines these good actions is not a
matter of faith nor is it a theological conclusion. Theologians
hold various opinions on the matter. . More probably, Suarez
208 Constat voluntatem
hominis non praedeterminari physice ad actum malum a
voluntate Dei efficaci (Ibid., cap. 8, n. 5) . Potius dicendum est Deum applicare
voluntatem ad minus malum quam ad malum . . . atque hoc ipsum (ut ego
existimo, regulariter non fit a Deo immediate sed per angelos ... malos (Ibid., n. 7).
Deum obdurare . . . quia in poenam praecedentium delictorum nee dat gratiam
qua cor emolliat, nee lumen (Ibid., nn. 9-10).
209 Verissimum est Deum habere providentiam
malorum actuum in particulari.
. . . Nam Deus providet auxilium seu concursum necessarium ad actum malum
non quidem ut ille fiat sed ut fieri possit (Ibid., n. 10).

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thinks, some good acts are so defined and others are not,
depending on God's good pleasure and the things He intends. 210
The question of the predefinition of indifferent human acts
does not really arise, since divine providence is concerned with
individual acts. No individual act is ever indifferent; it is
good or bad-good from a good end and bad either from a bad
end, or no end at all, for an act specifically indifferent, ordered
to no end is by that fact sinful. God is, therefore, not its
author; He neither predefines it nor excites to it. He can however, move us to indifferent acts for a good end, and we can
place the act and never intend the end. In that case the act
is from God, though its indifference or uselessness is not from
Him. It does not seem repugnant to Suarez that God could
move us to a specifically indifferent act through which He
intends an end, yet not move us to will that end. In general,
however, he thinks. it better to say that God moves us only to
good acts; that any acts be indifferent He merely permits and
influences through His ordinary concursus. 211
'Ve come now to the question of supernatural acts and the
special help required for them. 212 It is clear that a gratuitous
and supernatural aid for such acts is required. 213 This aid
(actual grace) admits of many divisions; 214 for Suarez' purpose however, the most important is the distinction between
that named sufficient and that named efficacious.215
Sufficient grace he describes as that which prescinds from
any actual effecting and includes its negation. The efficacious
210 Horum
(actuum bonorum) simpliciter auctor est Deus . . . propter illos
dedit voluntati potissimam propensionem naturalem ad id quod honestum est ...
an vero Deus praefiniat absoluto decreto praescientiam futurorum antecedenter ut
hi actus boni . . . naturales fiant non est res ad fidem pertinens. . . . (Aliqui
dicunt) quosdam praefiniri, quosdam non item. . . . Quem dicendi modum ut
probabiliorem eligimus (Ibid., n. 11).
u 1 Individuo nullus est actus indifferens. . . . Potest autem interdum Deus
movere ad talem actum faciendum propter bonum finem et homo suo arbitrio eligere
actum et omittere finem a Deo intentum (Ibid., n. 12) .
212 Ibid., Liber III.
213 Ibid., cap.
"" Ibid., capp. 4-5.
ou Ibid., cap. 6.

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is always sufficient; but a sufficient cause need not be efficient;
e. g., if it is sufficient in one line of causality and the necessary
cause in some other line is wanting. For us, sufficient aid is
that which is enough (satis) for effecting (ad efjiciendum) a
supernatural act, but yet does not produce it, not because the
aid is insufficient, but because of the will's freedom. 216
That such sufficient grace is given to men is of faith. God
Himself testifies that He has done all that was sufficient for
the salvation and conversion of sinners. "What is there that
I ought to do more to my vineyard, that I have not done to
it?" 217 The Fathers and the Councils of the Church also
witness to this. 218
Just what sufficient grace is, is disputed. Some say it is
sufficient so that man can act, but not sufficient to this that
man act. 219 This is rejected by Suarez who argues that with
regard to a sufficient aid, two elements must be distinguished:
I) what is formally given;
the term or end of the aid given.
What is formally given to man through sufficient grace is the
power to act; but its end is the act. Sufficient grace is sufficient
for the power (ad posse) if the formula is understood of the
formal effect, not if understood as the term. Potency is not
given for the sake of power, but for the sake of operation.
Any sufficient grace is sufficient for operation. As man is commanded to do things and not merely to be able to do them, so
the help given him is sufficient that he accomplish them (if he
wills to) and not merely that he be able to do so. Any principle that is, simply speaking, sufficient must have all the power
necessary for the act. If something more is needed where is
the sufficiency? This is to be understood, of course, of aid
which is approximately sufficient for acts.
no Sufficiens gratia praescindit ab actuali effectione ejusque rtegationem includit
. . . quidquid est efficax esse etiam sufficiens; potest vero e converso causa esse
sufficiens et non efficax, i.e. actu efficiens . . . erit ergo auxilium sufficiens quod
satis est ad efficiendum supematuralem actum ilium tamen non facit, non ex
insufficientia auxilii sed ex libertate voluntatis (Ibid., n. 1) .
217 Isaias v, 4.
us Council of Orange, can. 25 (Denz. nn. 198-200); Trent, sess. 6, c. 5 (Denz.
n. 797) and c. IS (Denz. n. 805); cfr. Opus. Primum, Liber III, cap. 6, nn. 2-5.
110 Ibid., n. S.

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A man who does not actually have all the aids necessary as
principles is yet said, sometimes, to have sufficient grace. This
is meant in a remote and potential sense. That it be true even
in that sense, however, a man must be able to do something
to obtain that aid which is proximately necessary, by praying,
for example. and doing all he can. God will not be deaf to
such a man. A difficulty here arises in relation to infidels and
Christians who have fallen into serious sin. They seem altogether unable to arise from their condition, so how have they
sufficient grace for conversion, Suarez answers that as long
as the infidel remains untouched by gratia excitans he does
not actually have sufficient help, and his not placing supernatural acts is not imputable to him. In other ways, however,
he can be said to have sufficient grace in universal causes (the
preaching of the Church, Redemption of Christ) or because
God illuminates everyone, even him who does nothing worthy
of the illumination. As to the Christian sinner, he has sufficient
help for he has God ready to aid him as often as his will, excited
by faith, applies itself to his conversion. 2 " 0 It is clear, then,
that the nature of sufficient grace does not demand that man
actually receive it into himself as concursus. The latter is
given only in the very operation; and it is not the very ratio
220 Quod
formal iter datur per auxilium sufficiens est posse; terminus vero seu
finis propter quem datur est velle seu perficere. Cum ergo dicitur auxilium su£ficiens dari ad posse ... si intelligatur quasi de formali effectu auxilii, verissimum
est; ... si autem intelligatur de fine ... falsum est; nam potentia ... datur ...
proter operari; imo non potest dare primum sine secundo (Ibid., n. 3). Est igitur
de ratione auxilii sufficientis ut ad operandum sufficiens est . . . quodcumque
auxilium detur, si ultra illud est necessarium aliud per modum principii alterum
non poterit esse sufficicns simpliciter, sed ad summum in aliquo genere (Ibid.,
n. 4). . . . Contingit enim hominem non actu habere omnia haec auxilia necessaria ... et nihilominus dici habere auxilium sufficiens; sed illud intelligendum est
remote et in potentia. . . . Ut vero hoc etiam sensu habcat homo auxilium sufficiens
necesse est ut sit in potestate ejus aliquid facere ad obtinendum illud auxilium
quod proxime sufficit (Ibid., n. 5). (Respcctu infidclis) quamdiu hie motus (auxilii
excitantis) actu non fit in homine non habere hominem auxilium sufficiens in actu
... neque ... in potestate sua intrinseca ... fidelem peccatorem habere sufficiens
auxilium adjuvans ... quia habet Deum paratum ad jumndum ilium quotipscumque
liberum ejus arbitrium per fidem excitatum sese ad suam conversionem applicaverit
(Ibid., n. 6) .

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of sufficient help that it actually operate. It is in man's power
that sufficient help become concursus; for when man applies
himself to operation, God enters in. 221
The existence of efficacious help is certain; " No one can
come to me unless the Father Who sent me draw him." 222
What this efficacious aid is, is disputed. Heretics say it is a
divine motion which necessitates the will, without which the
will cannot act; they deny any merely sufficient aid. On the
other extreme, some Catholics say divine aid is called efficacious
from the effect; no grace is ex se efficacious, but all grace is
called either efficacious or sufficient depending on whether man
wills to cooperate or not. Since this opinion is difficult to reconcile with the words of Scripture and with those of St. Augustine, Suarez adopts the view that grace is called efficacious
because it offers to the will most efficacious powers. Concursus
cannot properly be called efficacious help for it is not so much
efficacious as the very effecting; in it, sufficiency and efficacy
cannot be distinguished, and it always has the very same conjunction with the effect. Only help which is a principle of
operation admits a division into sufficient and efficacious.
Suarez describes efficacious grace, then, as that principle of
grace which has peculiar force and efficacy to induce the human
will to consent. 223
Since efficacious aid is given in order that a man will one
thing deterrninately, its efficacy seems to consist in a certain
power to determine the will to this act. Some theologians
teach that the efficacy consists in this power to determine, in
a physical way, as we have seen earlier with regard to God's
221 Concluditur non esse quidem de ratione auxilii . . . sufficientis ut homo actu
et in se recipiat . . . concursus, quia non est de ratione sufficientis principii ut actu
operetur; illud autem auxilium non datur nisi in ipsa actuali operatione
voluntate nostra applicante se ad opus statim ac Deus infiuit (Ibid., n. 7) .
••• John vi.
••• Nunc u.t probabilius et verius statuimus auxilium non dici efficax quia facit,
sed etiam quia vires praebet efficacissimas voluntati ... hoc nomen . . . non proprie
attribuatur illi auxilio quod est per modum concursus. . . . Solum ergo datur ilia
divisio (sufficiens et efficax) de auxilio per modum principii. Est ergo auxilium
efficax illud gratiae principium quod peculiarem vim et efficaciam habet ad inducendam humanam voluntatem, ut consentiat (Opus. Primum, Liber lll, cap. 6, n. 8).

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motion in the natural order. This is rejected by Suarez for
two reasons: . a) it is opposed to the sufficiency of grace and
hence also to liberty of specification; b) it is opposed to liberty
of exercise. 224
It is opposed to the sufficiency of God's other help. Sufficient
grace is truly sufficient if the will chooses to cooperate; hence
physical determination is
On the other hand, if
physical determination is necessary for supernatural acts, it
follows that the unconverted do not have a grace even sufficient
for conversion. Even Protestants see this point and deny any
sufficient grace; it is all efficacious for them. 225
To answer that sufficient grace gives ability to act (posse
'velle) but determination is necessary only to the actual operation is no answer. By the teaching of the defenders of physical
determination the efficacious motion is the ultimate complement of the power in which it inheres; it is therefore necessary
to it that it have the ability to act. Any aid short of determination is, then, not sufficient, for the principle of the act would
remain incomplete. 226
Some of Suarez' opponents, he says, seeing the force of this
argument, say that it is in the power of a man who has
sufficient grace to have efficacious grace too, if he does not
resist; man never lacks efficacious grace except by his own free
sin. VVhile in itself it is true that whatever is necessary to
man's salvation is somehow in his power, the principle can
hardly be consistently enunciated by defenders of determination. This efficacious aid is said to be a supernatural entity
which God causes in us without us, for it is not our vital act
but a power previous to act. Since it is infused it does not
••• Ibid., capp. 8-9.
••• Auxilium quod dicitur sufficiens est vere et realiter ad hoc sufficiens si liberum
arbitrium . . . cooperari velit. Si hujusmodi auxilium hoc sensu efficax ut physice
. . . praedeterminans sit simpliciter necessarium, . . . sequitur eos, qui non convertuntur, non habere sufficiens auxilium ut convertantur (Ibid., cap. 8, n. 1).
••• ... dicti auctores docent auxilium hoc efficax esse ... veluti complementum
ultimum virtutis ·necessariae ad agendum; ergo non solum est necessarium . . . ut
voluntas velit, sed etiam ut velle possit . . . ergo . . . auxilium quod hoc non
includit non potest dici sufficiens etiam ad posse (Ibid., n. 2).

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depend on us. It can be said to depend on our wills only by
reason of some disposition in us, given which, God grants that
aid, and only then. Yet that there be such a disposition Suarez
thinks impossible. 2.27
The supposed disposition could be imagined to be either
positive or negative; there are no further possibilities. Both
are repugnant. The positive could only be a good act and
indeed a supernatural one (since a natural act is not a sufficient
disposition and especially not an ultimate and necessitating
disposition to grace), yet it is unheard of that to contrition,
say, or to the first will to believe, such an ultimate disposition
is necessary Again, for this preparatory good and supernatural
act divine determination is necessary, therefore another earlier
disposition must have been in man to receive that predetermination and so ad infinitum If one wishes to defend predetermination one cannot maintain that free consent making it
efficacious is in man's power, for the possibility of a negative
disposition is advanced by practically no one. 228
Predetermining grace is opposed to the exercise of freedom.
Suarez speaks of gratia excitans here, reasoning that if it is
true that this grace, which more than other precedes our wills,
does not predetermine us, it is certainly true of other graces.
His argument from reason is simple Gratia excitans moves man
to consent only by illuminating him (objectively) or by touching his affections through certain imperfect and indeliberate
motions of fear, affection, or joy. Neither of these ways of
moving the will is sufficient to determine it physically. There227 • • • hoc ipsum principium quod in hac responsione confitetur non potest cum
ipsa sua assertione consistere . . . hoc auxilium efficax dicitur esse qualitas seu
entitas quaedam supernaturalis quam Deus efficit in nobis sine nobis; ergo quod
nobis infundatur talis qualitas non pendet a nobis . . . ut a cooperante illam
entitatem (Ibid., n. 6).
••• Positiva dispositio esse tantum potest per actum . . . qui debet esse bonus
(non naturalis) . . . hoc est inauditum scilicet, quod ad contritionem v. g. sit
necessaria alia ultima dispositio; et multo minus verisimile erit id dicere de attritione, vel de prima voluntate credendi ... addo ... ad priorem actum ... necessarium esse divinam praedeterminationem . . . Praedetenninatio ergo ad ilium
actum non erit in potestate hominis; alioquin . . . infinite proceditur (Ibid., nn.
7-8).

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fore gratia excitans does not predetermine us. The minor premise will bear some comment. The first part is clear: outside
the beatific vision no particular object determines the will,
especially not as to exercise of the act. Besides, an intellectual
judgment can physically determine the will only by reason of
a prior free act from which the determining act necessarily follows. By the second part of the minor premise (that the touching the appetitive part of man through imperfect motions of
fear, joy, etc., does not determine the will physically) Suarez
shows that these motions are imperfect, certain velleities only
which cannot of their own force determine the will to give
absolute consent. The will is never determined by one act to
place another unless there is a necessary connection between
them.229
The next appeal is to the Council of Trent which says that
man can assent or dissent when God touches his heart through
the illumination of the Holy Ghost; in other words, he is not
determined by it. But the Council previously calls this same
illumination gratia excitans. Therefore, gratia excitans does
not determine us. 230 Note that the Council speaks in a general
way of gratia excitans. To say the declaration means that
exciting grace gives power to act, though with that grace alone
such an act will never be placed, is unjustified, among other
reasons because the Council is speaking of a true potency which
often is reduced to act. Therefore, it speaks rather of act than
of potency when it says man can
if he wills to do so;
it speaks of an excitation by which man is converted. Such a
movement is always called efficacious. Some answer, "Well,
the Council says man can resist. But even where the will is
determined, it can resist though it does not, of course." To
this Suarez replies that in the composed sense (that is, given
••• ... extra visionem beatificam nullum particulare objectum determinat voluntatem, praesertim quoad exercitium actus ... illi motus . . . in suo ordine sunt
imperfecti ... ergo ex intrinseca illorum vi non potest voluntas physice determinari
ad plenum et absolutum consensum praestandum (Ibid., cap. 9, n. 8) .
280 (Concilium) definit, tangente Deo cor hominis per Spiritus Sancti illuminationem, quod paulo antea excitantem gratiam vocaverat, posse hominem . . .
dissentire (Ibid., n. 2).

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the determining grace), the will can not simultaneously dissent
(on the supposition that grace determines) for what determines a thing does not leave it undetermined.
If the opposition admits that in the composed sense the will
can not-consent, well and good; all Suarez intends is that grace
. of itself by its own power does not necessarily induce consent.
But if one says: "man can dissent but never will," he is mistaken. Man not only does not do contradictory things, he
can not do them. If, then, he necessarily consents by reason of
this grace he cannot join dissent with that grace. The lesser
cannot overcome nor impede the greater. But efficacious grace
(on the hypothesis) is greater than the will since it necessarily
induces its act. Therefore, the will does not and can not impede it. One might say: " As the Council declares, given
grace one can dissent, but only in the divided sense, i. e., without that grace it could dissent." But the point is, Suarez rerefuses it) is
plies, the Council says he who has the call
the one who dissents, not he who lacks the divine call. It is,
therefore, speaking ofthe composed, not of the divided, sense.
Again, without the grace one does not dissent; rather one does
not consent, i. e., there is a negation of any act, not the placing
of a negative act. Liberty in this divided sense is common to
all agents; to place human freedom in such liberty is to deny
the specific reality of human liberty. 231
In order to operate supernaturally it is not required that
gratia excitans bring even a moral predetermination, i. e., a
certain vehement propensity which, leaving in the faculty a
881 ••• Concilium loquitur de vera ... potentia quae in actum saepe reducitur,
... imo potius de actu quain de potentia agendi loquitur . . . potentiam ad consentiendum determinatam posse dissentire (sensu composito) ... est aperta repugnantia et contradictio; nam forma physice determinare potentiam . . . nihil aliud
est quam ex vi sua . . . necessario secum afferre seu conjunctum habere consensum
. . . quod simul sit consensus et dissensus . . . est impossibile . . . homo non solum
nunquam efficit contradictoria, sed nee facere potest. . . . Item vis inferior non
solum nunquam vincit superiorem sed neque vincere potest ... sed ilia gratia efficax
dicitur ... tam potens ut necessario inducat suum actum; ergo voluntas creata ...
illam ... neque impedire potest ... non dicitur (a Concilio) dissentire qui caret
vocatione, sed qui illam habet et respuit . . . plane facit sensum compositum
(Ibid., nn. S-4) .

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real power to resist, yet usually or even always leads to the
effect. The reason this is not required Suarez thinks is clear;
if it were necessary for the effect, then it alone is sufficient
grace, and ordinary grace lacks something required to produce
the effect. Hence those who do not believe all the articles of
faith when they are called to faith are not sufficiently called,
a proposition Catholics dare not concede. If moral determination is in any way required physically or morally then most
men in sinning are not fully free or fully culpable; for most
men are not so determined (since determination works its
effect practically always). Since man needs no determination
to act naturally neither does he need it to act
This is not to deny the possibility of moral determination.
When man acts with a very evident judgment that this act is
expedient and its contrary unfitting he is so determined. Thf'
devil can so vehemently induce men to evil acts that, morallj
speaking, they cannot refrain from consent without God's grace;
even more surely, then, God can predetermine us morally to
good. Just what predetermination of this kind is, in each case,
is hard to decide. There is a certain minimum divine call which
is, simply speaking, necessary that man be converted if he
minimum by communiwish it. God can give more than
cating a greater light, exciting a more intense act or drawing
the will more strongly in other ways. Yet the will sometimes
remains equally indifferent and the effect equally contingent
to both possibilities; sometimes, again, the man's conversion
is more difficult, but often the will, because of the efficacy of
the call, or the abundance of the grace, is rendered (as if in
first act) more inclined to consent. Then we say the will is
morally determined; it can be so determined more or less. 233
282 Necessaria non sit (praedeterminatio
moralis) ad ... supernaturalem actum
humanum . . . quia alias nulla gratia excitans quae non efficeret in homine hanc
moralem determinationem esset in suo ordine auxilium sufficiens. . . . Voluntas
moraliter praedeterminata ... aut nunquam ... aut vix et raro dissentit (Ibid.,
cap. 10, n. 1).
288 Ad actus malos potest
daemon tam vehementer inducere hominem . . . ut
nisi gratia Dei juvetur moraliter non possit sese continere quin consentiat; ergo
multo magis potest Deus ... ita illuminare hominem et affectum ejus inclinare ut

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This determination admits even of a grade, Suarez thinks, in
which the connection between grace and free consent is a moral
infallibility which can, simply speaking, be said never to fail.
God so comprehends the will that He can infallibly make it
consent. Even the devil and other men can do this, so why
not God? Yet the infallibility is not absolute, since liberty still
remains and so it is not impossible that the effect be not
produced. 234
What then is efficacious grace? Besides gratia excitans the
will needs gratia adjuvans. The latter affects the act in a
physical way more than gratia excitans does. This assisting
grace is called cooperating insofar as, together with the will,
it is a principle of eliciting the act; insofar as it precedes the act
by priority of nature it is called prevenient grace; insofar as it
is infused by God alone it is called operating grace. 235
Suarez' first point is that there is inhering in us no kind of
assisting grace, operating or cooperating, i e., something which
is neither a habit nor an act, though for the first supernatural
acts which precede the habits he admits as probable a kind of
fluid first act, though it does not determine us. 236 The opinion
that there is in us a determining aid which is neither habit, nor
act, he sees as without foundation in the Fathers, the Councils,
or St. Thomas. 237 Neither the subordination of second cause
to first, nor the indifference of the will requires extrinsic determoraliter eum ... determinat ... potest autem Deus uberiorem et majorem (vocationem) conferre ... quibus voluntas magis alliciatur (Ibid., nn . .5-6) .
••• . . . censeo posse perveniri in hac determinatione ad moralem infallibilitatem
quae simpliciter dici possit nunquam deficere . . . quia Deus comprehendit capacitatem et inclinationem humanae voluntatis ... daemon sua tentatione potest ita
hominem opprimere ut infallibiliter sequatur consensus nisi gratia Dei subveniat ...
unus homo potest efficacissime ilium (alterum) pertrahere . . . quid ergo non
poterit facere Deus? (Ibid., n. 7).
••• Ibid., cap. l!i!, n. 1.
••• Opinio quae ad eliciendos primos actus supernaturales qui non eliciuntur ab
habitibus ponit aliquam gratiam adjuvantem et inhaerentem voluntati per modum
actus primi 'fluentis probabilis est, dummodo talis actus . . . in auxilio sufficiente
includatur et absque physica praedeterminatione ponatur (Ibid., n. !i!) .
••• Suarez cites Summa Theol. I-ll, q. 8, a. !i! as supporting the teaching "nullam
esse gratiam per modum actus primi nisi habitum." Cf. Opus. Primum, loc. cit.,
n. 8.

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mination; the Councils and the Fathers have never founded
the necessity of grace on the indifference of the will, but rather
on the weakness of fallen man, or on th,e deficiency of his
powers. Granted, for example, a will informed by charity and
granted the object sufficiently proposed, man has a sufficient
principle of loving God, given concursus proportioned to the
grace. Such expressions as: "God makes us will (Deus facit
ut velirnus) ," "God operates the act of will in us (operatur in
nobis velle) ," and others of like import Suarez interprets to
mean that grace excites, morally rules, and directs our steps.
Our cooperation and free consent are required for such works,
though God is the principal cooperator. 238
His second point is that, even admitting this kind of grace,
one can not hold that it physically predetermines the will prior
to the second act of the will: the efficiency of grace cannot
be found in any such characteristic as that. And why not?
Because such determination would destroy the freedom through
actual indifference; Suarez appeals here to reasons given earlier
and adds that this predetermination to one thing is in a proximate cause inasmuch as this cause is constituted in first act.
But necessity in acting is precisely determination to one thing
in the cause, inasmuch as the cause is constituted in first act.
Man, therefore, by such determination would be constituted
a necessary and not as a free agent. The major premise is
clear: the determination is something prior to second act, its
cause, which constitutes the will as completely ready to act.
It is, then, first act. The minor is evident from the very
terms. 239 One cannot argue that, granted this determined entity
238 Ex subordinatione
causae secundae ad primam non esse necessariam talem
virtutem fluentem. . . . Haec omnia (locutiones Sacrae Scripturae) dicta sunt
ratione gratiae excitantis et moraliter regentis; ... quatenus vero nostra cooperatio
et liber consensus requiritur, tribuuntur Deo ut principali cooperatori (Ibid.,
nn. 4-5).
'
239 Dla deductio eodem modo in his actibus supernaturalibus
facienda est, qua
earn supra ... in communi fecimus de actibus liberis voluntatis ... praedeterminationem ad unum (si est) esse in causa proxima quatenus constituta in actu primo
ad efficiendum; nihil autem est aliud necessitas in agendo nisi determinatio ad
unum in causa, quatenus est in actu primo constituta; ergo per illam determinationem constituitur homo in ratione agentis necessarii et non liberi (Ibid., n. 6).

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in the will, the will is yet free, because of its greater power;
this determination, on.the supposition, is superior to, and overcomes, the indeternpnateness of the will. God's infinite power
can quasi-force the will but a created being, such as this grace
is said to be cannot do so.240
Suarez argues that the Council of Trent was clearly opposed
to this doctrine of determination; the answer that Trent speaks
only of gratia excitans and not of assisting grace (gratia adjuvans) he rejects. He maintains that the Council felt and
taught implicitly that: 1) the power to resist any motion
prior to act is of the very nature of liberty; 2) no antecedent
motion can so determine the free will as not to leave in it the
power to resist the motion. The Council says: " Nor does
man do nothing at all reC'eiving that inspiration; indeed, he
can refuse it." Now the word "do" here means to do something which proceeds from one's own will and reason, i.e.,
freely. The will, then, in assenting to grace is not merely passively determined to one thing. The Council says: "The free
will moved and excited by God," etc.; since " motion " is used
broadly it comprehends any divine motion which precedes
man's consent, even gratia adjuvans. Implicitly, then, the
Council taught that any motion which does not destroy liberty
leaves the power of resistance in the will, a power, Suarez adds,
which premotion denies (in the composed sense, of course, and
as the will is proximately disposed for act) .241
To Suarez it is clear that no supernatural aid given to man
as a principle of consent to an act physically predetermines
him to that consent. But what of concursus itself he asks. It
is quite evident that it does not predetermine the will, either;
for while concursus in itself can determine the will formally, it
.. 0 Omitto vix posse intelligi qualis est ilia entitas quae inhaerens voluntati
ita
sit illi superior ... ut vincat et superet indifferentism ejus ... ut ipsum (objectum)
non possit non efficaciter . . . determinare voluntatem . . . non ergo facile intelligitur quomodo possit earn quasi agere. . . . Deus enim propter infinitam vim
activam ... habet hanc vim (Ibid., n. 8) .
"" Ergo implicite docet (Concilium) hanc potestatem (resistendi) semper relinqui in omni motione antecedente, quae libertatem non tollit; ergo e contrario
praemotio, quae hanc potestatem aufert impedit libertatem (Ibid., nn. 9-U).

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cannot do so without the will. This concursus is the voluntary
act itself; it cannot be, therefore, unless the will is operating.
Action surely does not predetermine the agent to acting, but
formally constitutes him as acting in second act. 242
Even considering concursus in its root, i. e., in the divine
will, Suarez continues, it is true that it does not predetermine
the. will. Concursus so considered is conceived as an act of
God ad intra, which supposes no preknowledge of man's cooperation, an act which proceeds from God's absolute and
efficacious will by which He efficaciously determines the created
will to consent to a determined supernatural act, not by impressing on the human will any reality prior to act, but only
by drawing it. Suarez applies here what he has already said
of the impossibility of such determination in the natural order.
What was said there applies here; this position denies the
reality of free acts. 243 He adds, however, the following considerations.
If such an act of God's will is necessary in order that man
can act then man can not act in a supernatural way when he
does not so act. When he does not act he is not determined
by God's will to act; therefore, power to act is
It
solves nothing to say that man has it in his power infallibly to
receive this determination by negatively allowing himself to
be moved by God. This negative disposition is a negation of
something positive, i. e., of a voluntary act which is in the
will's power, for as a free disposition, it supposes that its opposite is possible to the will. That act would be either good or
bad. If bad, it would follow that when a man sufficiently
excited (by gratia excitans) to make an act of faith, does not
commit some other sin infallibly he will be determined by God
"'" Auxilium igitur hoc prout in homine recipitur potest quidem formaliter determinare voluntatem, non tamen sine ilia; . . . nee determinare illam potest prout
nunc loquimur ... quia auxilium non est nisi ipsamet actio voluntatis quae principalius a Deo est (Ibid., cap. 13, nn. 1-2).
••• Ibid., nn. 3-4.
•u Aperte sequitur (ex hac opinione) non esse in potestate hominis supernaturaliter operari, quando actu non operatur. Probatur, quia cum homo non operatur
non determinatur per voluntatem Dei praedeterminantem; ergo . . . neque est in
potestate hominis facere (Ibid., n. 5).

6

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to believe. This conclusion is contrary to our faith, for one
to whom the faith is sufficiently proposed can, in fact, will not
to believe. If the act were good it follows that God would
determine this man to believe for the precise reason that the
man does not place a good act, which is ridiculous. Again, as
any act of man's is because God premoves him, so the negative disposition is because God does not premove him. Thus
the very negation is not free but necessary. In the third place
it is absurd that the ultimate disposition to God's most efficacious supernatural help should be the lack of some natural act,
even more absurd than supposing the disposition to be a positive, though only natural, act. 245
The truth, according to Suarez, is that God wills the acts
of men's wills as conditional; i.e., He does influence on the
condition that the human will cooperate. But what is efficacious grace if it is not physical predetermination? The word
" efficacious " can be taken in three different ways, as naming:
1) any power or faculty of acting, especially one having some
special energy, even though the power is not acting; in this
sense, sufficient grace .is truly efficacious; 2) a power of acting
as actually conjoined to its action; in this signification grace
can .not be said to be efficacious without the consent and free
determination of our will; 3) a grace which not only can effect
and does effect, but is effective in such a way that it always
infallibly has the actual effecting joined to it. 246
Efficacious grace in this third and proper sense does not
formally include concursus; if it did it would in no wise differ
from efficacious grace taken in the second sense of actual conjunction with the effect. Formally this aid is a principle of
"' 5 Erit ergo alicujus actus .... Vel ergo ille actus est bonus vel malus: si bonus
sequitur determinare Deum voluntatem . . . hominis . . . quia non operatur alium
actum bonum, quod ridiculum est; si vero sit actus malus, ergo, quoties ille homo
. . . sufficienter excitatur . . . non committit aliud peccatum infallibiliter determinabitur a Deo ut velit; consequens autem est falsum et contra doctrinam fidei
(Ibid., nn. 6-8).
••• Tertio modo potest gratia appellari efficax non solum quia effectiva est, neque
solum quia actu efficit; sed quia ita est effectiva ut semper habeat infallibiliter conjunctam actualem effectionem (Ibid., cap. 14, n. 4} .

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operation, not an operation. Infallibly it brings on the act
and consequently (not formally) it has the conjoined actual
help which is concursus and even the cooperation of the will.
As St. Augustine saw, it consists in a certain calling, which pertains to operative grace. Its efficacy, for St. Augustine, consists in two things: 1) that God gives it from the firm intention of converting or saving men, an efficacious election; 2) that
God calls man at such a time and in such a way as is accommodated to the effect intended by God, viz., man's conversion.
Hence, St. Augustine names this call " congruous." 241
In what does this congruity consist? Some have thought
" it consists in a certain proportion which exists between such
an illumination or inspiration effected in such a way by God
in a man of such complexion, nature and condition; for God
most accurately comprehending all these things in any man if
his heart is touched in this way he is softened and consents." 248
While it is true that God's efficacious call sometimes consists
in something specially accommodated to the man which God
operates in the man (as the call of St. Paul), yet that is not
required for a call to be efficacious; otherwise, those not called
\vith this special call, would not have a sufficient call. Again,
mere congruity is not sufficient for efficacy, for it induces of
itself only moral certitude that the act will follow, whereas
truly efficacious help must be so infallible that the non-position
of the act is repugnant and contradictory. 249
... In gratia efficaci non debeat formaliter includi auxilium illud quod est per
modum concursus. . . . Igitur gratia efficax formaliter constituenda est in aliquo
auxilio quod sit per modum principii ... et consequenter etiam habet conjunctum
actuale auxilium quod est ... concursus (Ibid., n. 4). Consistit efficacia hujus ...
gratiae (ex doctrina S. Augustini) in duobus. Primum est quod a Deo datur ex
proposito ... convertendi vel salvandi hominem ... secundo necessarium est ...
ut Deus tali tempore et modo hominem vocet qui
sit ad efiectum . . •
atque hinc Augustinus ... hanc vocationem congruam appellat (Ibid., nn. 6-7) .
••• Ibid., n. 7.
••• Licet verum sit saepe vocationem efficacem fieri hoc singulari modo . .
tamen neque id requiri potest ut necessarium ad vocationis efficaciam . . . ; quia
alias qui non ita vocaretur non haberet vocationem sufficientem neque etiam ilia
congruitas satis est ad illam efficaciam (quae) tanta esse debet ut implicet contradictionem aliquando deficere (Ibid., n. 8).

THOMAS U. MULLANEY

The efficacy of God's call consists in this that "God, in His
infinite wisdom seeing what each cause or will shall do in
every event and occasion, if placed in it, also knows when and
to which vocation each will shall give assent if it (the call)
is given (to the will). Whence, when He wills to convert a
man He wills also to call him at that time and in that way in
which He knows he will consent, and such a vocation is called
efficacious because although of itself it does not have an infallible effect, yet inasmuch as it is subject to such divine knowledge infallibly it shall have it" (the effect). The efficacious
grace can be with or without the special congruity; its efficacy
is moral, not physical, and is to be sought not in the vocation
itself but rather as if proceeds from God and is under His direction. It implies not necessity (which regards the cause), but
certitude and infallibility, which look to foreknowledge. The
will shall never resist it, though it can, since foreknowledge
does not remove the power of doing the opposite of what is
foreknown. 260
Suarez' arguments from reason for the convenience of this
doctrine, are: I) the efficacy of grace can be explained in no
other convenient way; 2) this doctrine is most apt in conciliating freedom with grace. We have already seen that. He adds,
however, that the efficacy ought to be proportioned to the causthe efficacy should be
ality of the call, which is
understood in a.moral sense, too. To liberty moral persuasion
is by no means repugnant; nor is infallibility, since that quality
is not from a cause but from the supposition of a future thing
as a true and knowable object.
Nor does this explanation of the efficacy of grace deny the
••• Efficaciam bujus vocationis in hoc consistere quod Deus, infinita sua sapientia,
praevidens quid unaquaeque causa seu voluntas in omni eventu et occasione operatura sit, si in ea constituatur, etiam cognoscit quando et cui vocationi sit unaquaeque
voluntas assensum praebitura si ei detur. Unde quando vult hominem convertere
vult etiam ilium vocare illo tempore et modo quo novit ilium consensurum, et talis
vocatio appellatur efficax quia licet ex se non habeat infallibilem effectum tamen
ut subest tali scientiae divinae infallibiliter est illam habitura. Unde bane efficaciam
... neque esse spectandam in ipsa vocatione secundum se ... sed prout progreditur
a Deo et est sub intentione ac scientia ... ejus (Ibid., n. 9).

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sufficiency the grace in those who are not converted, for the
non-conversion can come from their will alone. It is to be
noted that efficacious and sufficient grace do not differ in this
that the former has any reality, or motion, or quality which a
non-efficacious call has not. 251 There is a difference on God's
part in that He foresees the .effect in one and not in the
other; but man has the power " to make God foresee that he
will consent to the call"; so it is in his power to have an
efficacious call. What determines that this man be called by
God at a time when God foresees that the call will be respected?
The will of God is the only answer. Nor can one say," But on
this theory there might be some one whom God foresees will
never cooperate with grace; such a man could never be called
efficaciously by God." God's infinite power and wisdom can
find a way to reach every one, by extraordinary means at least.
If one insists that it could happen that man resist every call
(though, morally speaking, it never happens), we must admit
it; metaphysically or logically speaking there is no inconvenience in this proposition. 252 Divine omnipotence is safeguarded
by this fact that God could efficaciously convert such a man by
impeding the use of his freedom.
001 Neque etiam (repugnat libertati) infallibilitas quae oritur ex praescientia, quia
ilia ut sic non est ex causa, seu ex suppositione antecedente, sed ex suppositione
ipsius rei futurae in ratione objecti veri et cognoscibilis (Ibid., n. U). Gratia
efficax praeveniens usum liberi arbitrii prout a nobis explicata est nullam rem, qualitatem aut motionem necessario requirit, quae non possit includere vocatio non efficax
(Ibid., n. 14).
••• Ex parte autem Dei antecedit praescientia effectus in uno et non in alio;
tamen haec ipsa differentia non est ex solo Deo sed etiam ex libero arbitrio; nam
in potestate hominis . . . est facere ut Deus praesciverit ipsum consensurum vocationi ... atque ita est in potestate ejus habere efficacem vocationem (Ibid., n. 14).
Cum infinita sit Dei potentia et sapientia, qua novit omnia auxilia et omnes modos
quibus potest voluntatem hominis ad aliquid inclinare, impossible est quin aliquem
praevidea'.t, quo tandem homo consenturus est si ei applicetur. . . . Quod si quis
• . . contendat totam hanc impossibilitatem solum esse moralem, atque adeo non
implicare contradictionem quod oppositum accidat . . . ideoque simpliciter admittendum esse posse ita accidere, metaphysice seu logice loquendo respondetur totum
hoc verum esse ... inde nihil sequitur contra divinam omnipotentiam sed solum
sequitur voluntatem vere ac proprie manere liberam . . . (Deus) posset illam
(voluntatem creatam) convertere quo vellet, impediendo libertatis usum (Ibid.,
u. 16).

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Let us now summarize. The doctrine which maintains that
efficacious grace is efficacious by reason of a reality which physically determines the created will to act denies, Suarez repeats,
the sufficiency of grace in those who de facto are not converted. Such efficacious grace is necessary in order to act;
therefore, if one does not receive it he lacks something which is
altogether necessary in order to operate. It follows that God
expects the impossible (since He fails to give some men the
help necessary to meet His demands) and that either omission
of these good acts is not imputable to men, or else that God
blames men for not doing the impossible. 253
The answer " without efficacious grace man has grace which
is sufficient, sufficient to be able to act, though not sufficient to
act " Suarez refutes for 1) God orders us to do things, not to
be able to do them; hence He ought to give grace sufficient not
for " ability to do" but for the doing; 2) He wills not only that
man can be saved but that he be actually saved, as St. Paul
says; hence He gives men grace sufficient actually to save them;
8) the Thomists' idea of sufficient grace is not even sufficient
for "power to act"; it leaves the faculty not proximately expedited for act but only remotely and physically empowered.
The distinction is, moreover, without basis in any of the Fathers
or older theologianS. 254
To answer, on the other hand," It is in a man's own power
to have efficacious grace such as we describe, and if a man does
not have it, it is his own fault," simply opens up further difficulties. The grace can be in man's power only by reason of some
prior act or disposition. What of that act or disposition? It
cannot be natural; that is Pelagianism. Suppose, then, it is
supernatural; is efficacious grace needed to have it? If it is we
••• Doctrinam hanc (de efficacia praedeterminante) prout in illa sententia explicata est non posse in concordiam redigi cum hoc principio . . . dari hominibus qui
nolunt ... auxilium sufficiens ... ad agendum. Itemque sequitur Deum praecipere
homini impossibilia {Opua. Tertium, nn. 15-17).
••• Deus non praecipit homini ut possit operari sed ut operetur. . . . Deus non
tantum vult ut homo possit salvari sed ut salvus fiat ... ergo ad hoc dat auxilium
sufficiens . . . qui nee habet nee habere potest quae necessaria sunt ad operandum
non solum non habet auxilium ut faciat sed nee etiam ut possit moraliter et
proxime loquendo (Ibid., n. !U) •

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can go on to infinity; if it is not, then why is such determining
grace needed for any other act? 255
Secondly, predetermining grace is opposed to liberty. Under
such grace the non-position of the act is impossible; the placing
of the act then is not free since, as Trent says, the use of freedom requires the power of dissenting from the divine motion.
And the words are meant in the composed sense, since one cannot throw off something he does not have. Moreover, the will
is merely passive in receiving the motion, and the passive is
not free. Yet this does not imply that God cannot predefine
our supernatural acts and induce the will in a moral way. The
will by the mere fact of being subordinated to the First Cause
does not need grace. Even for the Fathers the necessity of
grace arises from other fonts, e. g., the repugnance of the appetite, the deficiency of our powers, and their lack of proportion
to the true end of man and the means to it. 256
From predetermination follows the absurd conclusion that
God premoves and predetermines the will to evil, for the will is
quite as indifferent to evil acts as to good, and just as subordinated to the First Cause in effecting evil as in effecting good.
Thomists, according to Suarez, should conclude that God
efficaciously determines and moves us to evil, that without
this determination one cannot consent to evil, but given it one
can not not-consent. If God's efficacious motion to good depends as to its distribution on God's will, so does His motion to
bad objects. 257
255 Naturaiis
esse non potest . . . si autem est supernaturalis interrogo an ad
ilium sit necessarium auxiiium efficax praedeterminans necne; nam si necessarium
est ... ad alteram dispositionem procedendum erit ... etiamsi in infinitum procedatur . . . si . . . non est necessarium . . . idem dicendum erit de quoiibet alio
actu (Ibid.)
256 Dicitur ... voiuntatemque
nostram ... ab eo (auxiiio) ita determinari ad
unum actum, et ad exercitium illius ... ut impossibile sit voluntatem ... non
operari ac consentire; ex quo manifeste fit ilium consensum non esse liberum (Ibid.,
n. 25). Nunquam reperitur in sanctis Patribus quod fundent necessitatem gratiae
... neque in sola subordinatione causae secundae ad primam (Ibid., n. 29).
257 Videtur ... sequi Deum esse auctorem mali actus vere ac proprie non permitten do soium sed etiam praemovendo ... quia voluntas ex se tam est indifferens ad maios actus efficiendos sicut ad bonos, et in eorum effectione tam subordinate primae causae ... ex duobus hominibus hunc facit (Deus) consentire
(in actum malum), ilium dissentire, soium quia vult (Ibid., n. 24).

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THOMAS U. MULLANEY

To say to all this, " Yes, God moves us to evil, but to evil
materially taken, not formally," is not acceptable to Suarez.
The two elements are inseparable; the intention of the agent
tends to this human act from which the deformity of the act
cannot be separated, and God's will must bear on such an act
absolutely (on the supposition), and not merely conditionally.
Those who argue from Our Lord's words: "No one can come
to me unless the Father draws him," to physical determination
should conclude that Judas could not have betrayed Christ
unless the Father had drawn him to will it. If this and similar
passages mean that our wills can do nothing without God's
general motion, then nothing can be drawn from them about
the excellence of supernatural acts and grace itsel£.258
On the conciliation of this notion of grace with God's efficacy,
Suarez first lays down certain propositions; then he shows their
conformity with man's freedom. The propositions are: 1) Man
by the unaided power of his free.will and without the assistance
of divine grace can work no supernatural good, no pious deed
conducive to attaining eternal life, nor can man even keep the
natural law over a long period of time without grace. 2) Grace
not only assists man, but excites him; it precedes man's operation and excites him to act well. This beginning of our salvation is worked in us, without any merit of ours and without
our free cooperation, or any disposition. This " calling " is
gratia operana, through which Go<I alone operates in us that
we should will, ·but to the willing itself we do cooperate. 259
3) Though God's call does not have its effect in all who are
called, yet, even for those who do not answer, the call is sufficient in such a way that it is truly in their power to answer.
We have seen the reasons for this already, and at some length.
We should bear in mind that, since we are speaking of moral
••• Nonnulli auctores ... se ... exponere vel potius eludere Scripturas et Conciliorum definitiones adhibita distinctione de actu malo pro formali vel pro materiali . • . ac si separabile sit, moraliter loquendo formale a materiali quando
intentio agentis definite . . . tendit ad ipsum actum humanum, a quo inseparabilis
est deformitas . . . et ita ilium (Deus) vult ut non velit quasi conditionate et
dependenter a voluntate creata sed absolute nolendo (Ibid., nn. 85-86) .
111 Ibid., nn. S7-S8.

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acts, which require man's activity, an exterior call (the proposition of truths, let us say) is not truly sufficient; the Holy Ghost
must interiorly inspire and excite a man. That assisting grace
be sufficient it is necessary that it include whatever assisting
grace is. If one maintains that it is first act, or a principle of
act, one must maintain that sufficient gratia adjuvans includes
that total reality, for it is truly necessary in order that a man
can will and do what he is called upon to will and do. If he
does not have the totality of assisting grace, the lack of his
consent is not to be attributed to him. Since the actual concursus of grace is in a man only when he is, in fact, acting, it
can not be included, in the same way, in the sufficient call given
a man who is not acting. Yet for the sufficiency of that call
the concursus must be so offered by God that it is in man's
power to have it if he wishes.260
Besides the sufficient call nothing further, simply speaking,
is necessary to actual operation except the actual concursus of
grace which God infuses in the very act. The call constitutes
man in a first act sufficient to give consent; he needs only a
proportionate concursus which must be in his own power. If
something further were necessary it would be a principle of, or
necessary condition for, the act: one lacking it would not be
sufficiently disposed. 261 5) Aid which is efficacious in that it
260 ••• ut vocatio sit sufficiens non satis est exterior doctrina sed oportet ut ....
Spiritus Sanctus interius operetur et hominem excitet ... hoc modo dicimus vocationem sufficientem includere omnem gratiam excitantem interiorem simpliciter
necessariam ad volendum (Ibid., n. 40). Rursus ex parte gratiae adjuvantis intelligi
potest necessarium vel aliquod auxilium quod sit per modum principii . . . seu per
modum actus primi . . . vel . . . ipsemet concursus actualis Dei . . . ut vocatio
sit sufficiens necesse est ut includat omnem adjuvantem gratiam quae per modum
principii necessaria est ad ilium actum (Ibid., n. 41). Si vero de concursu gratiae
sermo sit ... non potest hoc modo includi in vocatione sufficiente quam habet is
qui non operatur: necessarium vero est ut hie concursus cum ipsa vocatione
sufficiente ita offeratur . . . ut sit in hominis potestate ilium habere si voluerit
(Ibid., n. 42) .
2 " 1 ••• ultra vocationem sufficientem . . . nihil esse simpliciter necessarium ad
actualiter operandurn praeter actualem gratiae concursum quo Deus ... influit in
actum ipsurn . . . nobis constat post vocationem expectare Deum ut homo aperiat
et consentiat; supponitur ergo . . . hominem esse jam constitutum in actu primo
sufficientem ad consensum . . . et solum indigere concursu proportionato (Ibid.,

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THOMAS U. MULLANEY

actually operates consent in a man does not necessarly require
(besides sufficient exciting and assisting grace) anything else
except that aid of grace which consists in actual proportionate
concursus. In other words, over and above sufficient grace,
efficacious aid does not necessarily add anything except concursus and the operation itself, though, from God's bounty, it
can include more copious exciting helps. 262
6) Though efficacious grace, physically speaking, does not
necessarily place anything in man over and above sufficient
grace, yet on God's part it does add a special benefit and a certain moral ratio which consists in this that God from His special
and efficacious proposition offers this call to man at that time
and in that mode which He knows is accommodated to man so
that he shall consent, though he is able not to consent. The
fundament of this moral congruity is God's wisdom and knowledge. He knows beforehand what each of us should do under
any set of circumstances. Any efficacy which is more than
moral would make grace an affecting grace (gratia efficiens)
rather than efficacious (efficax) . The certitude and infallibility
of this moral efficacy is from God's science.263
Last of all, Suarez shows the conciliation of this efficacious
grace with men's freedom. Since there is no doubt that the
explanation given safeguards liberty it will suffice to show that
it also safeguards the necessity and efficacious working of divine
grace.
This opinion .attributes the beginning of faith and salvation
n. 48) . Si aliquid aliud esset necessarium illud deberet esse praevium ad actum.
. . . Unde fit ut homo ilia re carens, . . . adhuc sit impotens, et consequenter
nondum habeat auxilium simpliciter sufficiens (Ibid., n. 44).
••• . . . concludimus auxilium efficax ut actu operetur consensum liberum . • •
ultra sufficiens excitans et adjuvans et actualem ejus cooperationem cum voluntate
nihil necessaria requirere . . . praeter illud auxilium gratiae quod in actuali concursu proportionato consistit (Ibid., n. 46).
••• Quamvis gratia efficax physice et re ipsa nihil ex necessitate ponat in homine
ultra sufficientem tamen ex parte Dei auxilium efficax ... addere speciale beneficium
. . . et motionem . • . quae in hoc consistit quod Deus ei (homini) praebet illam
vocationem et in illo tempore et modo prout novit accomodatam ut cum ilia homo
. . . cum efiectu consentiat. . . . Constituenda igitur est in ilia congruitate morali
quam Deus infinita sua sapientia praenovit et benigna misericordia (Ibid., n. 48).

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to grace, i. e., to a divine call which is the work of God alone,
not due to nature in any way and given to men without any
merit of theirs. 264 Besides the call there is required an assisting
or cooperating grace by reason of which man's free consent is
principally from grace, not only as operating, but also as cooperating grace. To cooperating grace man's free consent must
be added, for it is in man's power to impede the effect of grace
or to bring about that effect. The will of itself alone can do
the impeding since that consists only in defect, but to bring
about the effect it needs grace. Because of this, if the will
resists grace it deserves punishment; if it cooperates, it deserves praise and glory. 265 God is said to give not only the
power of operating but also the will, by reason of the efficacious
call. He is said to operate in us in this sense, that we will
because, in the order of moral cause, He alone draws us by preventing" (pralienientis) and inducing us, though in giving consent man has integral freedom. Thus though God alone operates this in us that we will God alone does not operate the
willing but He, with us, operates it (ipsum velle). He is a
principal, but not the total, cause. By reason of His more principal influxus He is said to bring about the willing and the doing
(dicitur operari velle et perficere) .266
This explanation enables one clearly to understand in what
the high and profound mystery o£ divine election consists,
according to Suarez. God gives a fitting, a congruous call to
whom He will; at times He gives to one a call which shall not
he congruous to him, and denies the one which would be congruous, as Christ's famous words about Tyre and Sidon show.
A call which would have been efficacious to Tyre and Sidon
••• Ibid., n. 58.
••• Ultra vocationem hanc reqummus adjuvantem seu cooperantem gratiam
ratione cujus ipsa conversio ... principaliter etiam est a gratia ... in (voluntatis
nostrae) potestate est impedire effectum gratiae, et ilium efficere; sed illud prius per
se solo potest praestare, quia in defectu tan tum consistit (Ibid., nn. 54-55) .
••• Deus dicitur dare ... etiam voluntatem ... quia nimirum in eo genere causae
moralis, praevenientis suadentis et inducentis solus Deus est qui docet interius et
trahit hominem ... licet Deus solus operetur ut velimus, non tamen Deus solus
operatur ipsum velle sed nobiscum illud operatur et est principalis non tamen
totalis causa ejus (Ibid., n. 56) .

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THOMAS U. MULLANEY

was denied them and given to the Jews to whom it was not
efficacious.267 Though the efficiency of the grace as to its effect
(man's consent) does not exist without man, yet the very distribution of the call (i. e., that an accommodated call is given
to one and not to another) is from God's will alone. So to the
question, " Can it be that with equal divine assistance one man
is converted and another is not?" The answer is clear. If we
are speaking of prevenient aids which are principles of free
supernatural consent, the answer is yes, for one man can resist
aid which is even greater than that which touches the other
who is converted. Yet he who actually is converted exceeds
in the actual concursus and influx of grace. 208
It can be objected that merit seems to precede the distribution for the vocation is efficacious in one man because it is
foreseen that it will operate in him; it is not efficacious in
another because it will not operate in him. But it will not
operate in the first man unless he freely consents; it will not
operate in the second because he will oppose it. In this, then,
is some merit or some ratio on the part of the free will. The
objection is confirmed by this that unless this is maintained
then it is not in our power to have a congruous and efficacious
call; a difficulty which Suarez advanced, himself, against the
Thomistic position. 269
Suarez answers that God elects one whom He foresees will
consent not because he will consent (which would imply merit,
and would therefore be repugnant to grace) but in order that
he consent (which implies an end intrinsically included in the
grace). The very purpose of God's preparing help for His elect
is efficaciously to induce them to certain works. There is nothing which merits reward until God calls a man to consent;
there is no reason for such a call on man's part. The conclusion: "It is not in man's power to have an efficacious call,"
••• Mt. xi.
••• . . . interdum dat uni vocationem quae illi congrua futura non est negat
autem illi cui futura esset accomodata, si ei data fuisset; sicut Christus de Tyro et
Sidone dixit . . . ipsa distributio vocationis, quod huic detur accomodata potius
quam illi solius est voluntatis divinae (OpUII. Tertium, n. 57).
••• Ibid., nn. 62-68.

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501

does not follow. Man can operate with the call he has; if he
does, it will be efficacious in him. Since, absolutely speaking,
the will by divine grace can bring about that no call be invalid
and without effect, even the help which, in fact, is inefficacious
is still sufficient. 270

*

*

*

So much then for the doctrine of Suarez about· human freedom and its movement under God. Even from a cursory reading of that doctrine one is aware of vast differences between it
and the Thomistic account of the same reality, and aware,
most of all, of very great differences between Suarez' teaching
about God's part in a free human act and the Thomists' teaching on the same point. One suspects that what is involved
here is different notions about the very nature of the will as a
potency. Thomists say that man's will must be pre-moved
and pre-determined by God; Suarez says that no such premotion or predetermination is necessary. How then did Suarez
conceive this potency which is the will, and how did he conceive its relation to its own act? To know that, we must know
in the first place what Suarez though of potency and act in
general, just as to know what St. Thomas meant by his teaching on temperance we must know what he taught about virtues
and habits in general. Really to penetrate what Suarez understands by this free faculty and its act we must know what he
or potencies, and their acts in general.
understood by
It is impossible to find in one place in Suarez a complete and
adequate exposition of his teaching about potency and act,
but we can find a full exposition of his notions of potency and
act in several diverse orders, and of course, many indications
of those notions throughout his works. We therefore shall not
arbitrarily reduce all of Suarez' teaching to a few propositions
••• Non sequitur Deum elegisse eum quem praevidit consensurum, si eum sic:
vocaret, quia consensurus erat, sed ut consentiret ... illud prius dicit habitudinem
et rationem causae meritoriae quae gratiae repugnat, posterius vero dicit solum
habitudinem finis quae in ipsa gratia intrinsece includitur nee vero hinc fit non
esse in potestate hominis vocationem efficacem, quia in potestate ejus est facere
et operari cum ea vocatione quam habet quod si faciat et velit, ilia erit in eo
efficax (Ibid., nn. 64-65) .

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THOMAS U. MULLANEY

expressed in our own terms but rather shall expose Suarez'
teaching in each of the major fields in which the doctrine of
potency and act is fundamental.
Only then, after we have
really seen Suarez' own teaching, shall we look for a proper way
of expressing any basic unity of concept that may be found in
it, and that may throw light on his more particular teaching
on human freedom and its acts. We shall, so to say, let Suarez
speak for himself and shall simply indicate his teaching in this
order.
THoMAS U. MuLLANEY, 0. P.
Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

(To be continued)

BOOK REVIEWS
Apologia Pro Vita Sua. By JoHN HENRY CARDINAL NEWMAN, edited by
Charles l<'rederick Harrold. New York: Longmans, Green and Co.,
1947. Pp. 421, with index. $3.50.
A Grammar of Assent. By JoHN HENRY CARDINAL NEWMAN, edited with
a preface and introduction by Charles Frederick Harrold. New York:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1947. Pp. 416, with index. $3.50.
The Idea of a University. By JoHN HENRY CARDINAL NEWMAN, edited
with a preface and introduction by Charles Frederick Harrold. New
York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1947. Pp. 451, with index. $3.50.

I
The works of John Henry Cardinal Newman were published during his
lifetime, and since that time have never been out of print. The 1940-41
bombings of London and the resultant fire in Paternoster Row, however,
destroyed the entire existing stock. Longmans Company has projected a
new edition, and entrusted it to Dr. Charles Frederick Harrold, Professor
of English at the Ohio State University. Professor Harrold is a well known
Newman scholar who has published an expository and critical study of
the mind, thought and art of Newman. His name appears under Newman's
quite frequently in the current bibliographies of Modern Philology and
the Publications of the Modern Language Association. The function of
an editor is the preparation of the most reliable text with such additions
and changes as render it most useful to the modern reader. In this
capacity Dr. Harrold has been an eminent success with only one or two
minor exceptions.
In this edition of the Idea of a University, the editor has done the
Newman public a great service in the publication of Discourse V, "General Knowledge Viewed as one Philosophy," which Newman himself, once
released from the Irish University project, omitted from subsequent editions of the Idea. In view of the difficulty of synthesizing Newman's educational thought, this discourse, marking a stage in the evolution of that
thought, may be an aid towards a more definitive evaluation than has so
far been had.
" To make a place for the Discourse," the editor explains, " two chapters
of 'University Subjects' have been omitted from this edition. They are
'Elementary Studies, 1854-56 ' and ' University Preaching, 1855.' Their
lack of relevancy for our time, at least from a comparative standpoint,
would seem to justify their omission." This is of a piece with the editorship of other English scholars of Anglo-Saxon texts who omit dogmatic and

503

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homiletic passages on the grounds that their interest is null for the modern
reader. The lecture on university preaching is not only a gem of advice
but is the theory behind the sermons of a great preacher. The discourse
on elementary studies in its fourth part includes a discussion of exactly
what theological studies Newman as Rector would put in the curriculum
of his University, certainly a salient point in a book which has for one
of its main topics the relation of theology to University teaching.
But these are small matters. Besides the text and the preface concerning the text, Dr. Harrold has exceeded his editorship by writing a formal
introduction for each volume. Now an Introduction for a definitive edition should be written by a competent scholar with some sympathy for his
subject and with all the qualifications necessary for an evaluation of his
subject. Professor Harrold manifests sympathy, and of his scholarship
there can be no cavil. But what competency does a Professor of English
bring to an evaluation of the thought of Newman? Although Newman's
prose doubtlessly has a claim to a place in English literature, he himself
would hardly have considered himself primarily a literary artist. Dr.
Harrold himself once wrote that any consideration of Newman as a literary
artist must be preceeded by an expository study of his thought. The
genius of Newman is many faceted, but the light which pours into the
spectrum of his genius to be diffused in many colors is the white light of
theology. Not a professional theologian, Newman centered his whole
literary labor on questions of theology. The best evaluation of his thought
then, since it is religious thought, would come from a theologian. But Dr.
Harrold is a Professor of Literature, and indeed not a Catholic, but, as
he says in another place: "to use a word Newman disliked, an 'Episcopalian.' " Harrold realized his own inadequacy in this regard, and feared
that his " objective " approach might be construed as secr4!t sympathy or
The disadvantages of such an
antipathy, or-worst of all-indifference.
" objective " approach are evident in these Introductions on several points
on which the hypothetical theologian with a sympathy for Newman and
a scholarship equal to Dr. Harrold's might have fared better.
The Apologia for instance is Newman's testimony to the faith that was
within him. It is almost inevitable that those who do not share that faith
should question the value of the testimony. Of course Newman is not
called a liar; Kingsley's mistake is not repeated. But Frank Leslie Cross
has charged that Newman's trend to Catholicism is falsely stated. Therefore Dr. Harrold discusses Newman's truthfulness and his success at selfanalysis in which discussion he is obviously, influenced by Houghton's Art
of Newman' a Apologia. Cross's words are "exaggerative.'' Of course the
very word apologia suggests " distortion," and the picture, while substantially true, is "shaded a little." Newman has a "sinuous" mind which is
more concerned with " how he felt at a particular time than why he so felt

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505

or thought." "Emotional factors as much as intellectual ones" brought
about the conversion of "a most subtle and paradoxical character." The
main emotional factor is supposed to be the rejection of Tract XC by the
Anglicans. although it does not seem to have occurred to such critics that
such a rejection showed Newman intellectually that Anglicanism was not
what he had thought it to be. These remarks (pp. xix-xxi) are similar to
the Anglican rebuttal that Newman's literary powers declined after his
conversion, or the vividly painted contrast between the powerful preacher
of Littlemore and the broken down old man of Birmingham. They do
not obscure the luminousness of Newman's testimony, but,. proceeding as
they do from a principle Newman fought against: "that a sufficient account
is given of an opinion, and a sufficient ground for making light of it, as
soon as it is historically referred to some human origin," it is regrettable
that such remarks found their way into an edition of the Apologia.
The Introduction to the Grammar of Assent, on the other hand, is not
unfavorable at all, but only inconclusive. The Introduction, Dr. Harrold
decides, is " not the place to enter fully into Newman's complex and subtle
argument " (p. xviii) . He suggests that this may be the way of the
scholar or special student, but recommends to the general, reader just skimming through the various chapters " catching a general (view of his argument, but lingering over certain passages, which, by their imaginative anrl
literary quality, lift the book above the level of the usual treatise of its
kind " (p. xix) .
It is true that the Grammar is a difficult book, even for the theologian,
because of the unusual sense Newman puts on his words. Still, a theologian could have dealt more adequately with the reality underlying the
words, that is, the motives of credibility which have involved Theology,
Psychology, Ethics and Criteriology. Dr. Harrold could have written a
more definitive introduction had he relied more heavily on Father Juergen's
Newman on the Psychology of Faith in the Individual which he mentions
in the Bibliography. The omission of Father Benard's Introduction to
Newman's Theology in the same bibliography is a serious one, not only
because Father Benard's book is a helpful aid in understanding Newman's
argument in the Grammar, but because it is a good refutation of the
imputation of Modernism.
Last of all, Dr. Harrold finds that the Idea of a University "betrays a
temporal provincialism" (p. xx) for Newman will not admit research,
except on a very limited scale, into his ideal university. "He has no
premonition," says the Professor from Ohio State, " of what the world's
great universities are to become, centers not only of the humanities but also
of the vast scientific learning and investigation ministering to human
enlightenment and welfare" (p. xx). That Newman might have modified
his views is of course possible; that he would have changed them is highly

7

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doubtful. Newman is hardly the man to bow before the fait accompli, no
matter how formidable. Whatever may be said for Dr. Harrold's argument
that" an instructor's research may enrich and vitalize his role as a teacher"
(ibid), the Idea maintains the contrary, and the introduction to a definitive
edition is hardly the place to argue with the work itself.
It may seem a concentration on negation to point out incidental flaws
in the great work Dr. Harrold has done. It may seem all the more
ungracious since, on July lOth of this year, after bringing out three volumes
of the Essays and Sketches, the editor died. Neverthless, while the reviewer rejoices that the name of this great Newman Scholar will always
be associated with this truly monumental edition, he believed that a
critical appreciation involved not lavish praise, which the edition does
deserve, but the separation of a little chaff from a great harvest of wheat.

n
The Apologia pro Vita Sua without doubt is the best introduction to
the life and work of the great English Cardinal. The very title is singularly appropriate for his whole career was in the highest sense of that
abused word, apologetic. Well might Cardinal Manning preach the funeral
panegyric: " We have lost our greatest witness to the Faith." In its own
day the Apologia was a witness to the veracity of Newman, a veracity the
bigoted Kingsley had called into question in a larger attack on the Catholic
priesthood. Newman challenged the statement, and in the controversy
that ensued it became evident that Kingsley, as an exponent of muscular
Christianity, was no match for the intellectual refinement of his opponent,
a refinement which Kingsley regarded as guile and effeminacy. Kingsley's
bludgeon was totally ineffective against the rapier satire of Newman. That
phase of the controversy long over and relegated to an appendix, its only
importance now is that it was the occasion for the history of Newman's
religious opinions. The Apologia has long been read as a history of a conversion from Anglicanism; a more profound view might see in it a record
of a great apologete's lifelong struggle with an enemy of Dogmatic Christianity, namely, Liberalism.
Today Liberalism has become a shibboleth; at the very most it has
but a relative meaning. Newman was never a Conservative in the sense
in which he defined a Conservative: " a man who upholds government and
society and the existing state of things,-not because it exists,-not because it is good and desirable, because it is established, because it is a
benefit to the population, because it is full of promise for the future,-but
rather because he himself is well off in consequence of it, and because to
take care of number one is his main political principle " (Essays and
Sketches, II, p. 340). Newman was ever a Liberal in the sense of progressivism. He always admired Pere Lacordaire who had said: " I die a
repentant Catholic but an unrepentant Liberal."

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507

The Liberalism that Newman opposed was of quite a different nature.
Religion for him was revealed, objective and dogmatic; Liberalism was
fundamentally anti-dogmatism and a subjective religion. "Now by Liberalism I mean false liberty of thought, or the exercise of thought upon
matters, in which, from the constitution of the human mind, thought
cannot be brought to any successful issue, and therefore is out of place.
Among such are first principles of whatever kind; and of these the most
sacred and momentous are especially to be reckoned the truths of Revelation. Liberalism then is the mistake of subjecting to human judgment
those revealed doctrines which are in their nature beyond and independent
of it, and of claiming on intrinsic grounds the truth and value of propositions which rest for their reception simply on the external authority of
the Divine Word" (Apologia, p. 261). Liberalism is more a spirit than a
coherent philosophy; today it is called Secularism which is the reliance on
reason, science, education, the state, or any agent but the supernatural
to save man from ignorance and chaos. In Newman's day, Liberalism was
in a period of transition from an earlier Deism to the present Modernism
which holds that religion should be reformed in the light of modetn thought.
The Philosophy of Locke, the Economics of John Stuart Mill, the Higher
Criticism of the German theological schools, the Scientism of the British
Associationists-all were motivated by the Liberal spirit that made Swinburne cry out: " Glory to man in the highest for man is the measure of
things." In the face of such a spirit, Newman feared that his wrestling
was not with flesh and blood. " Are you aware that the more serious
thinkers among us are used, as far as they dare form an opinion, to regard
the spirit of Liberalism as the characteristic of the destined Antichrist?
as exalting himself above the
. . . Antichrist is described as the
yoke of religion and law. The spirit of lawlessness came in with the
Reformation, and Liberalism is its offspring" (Apologia, p. 178) .
Newman's own early life was not without Liberal influence. He was
brought up in Evangelicism, which, though its fundamentalist character
may seem to us poles apart from Liberalism, Newman thought "played
into the hands of the Liberals " by its basic assumption of a subjective
religion. Although ·the future champion of orthodoxy at an early age
"received impressions of dogma, which, through God's mercy, have never
been effaced or obscured," he likewise read Paine's Tracts against the Old
Testament, Burne's Essay on Miracles and some verses of Voltaire in
denial of the immortality of the soul. At Oxford he was active in the
Latitudinarian party as represented by Whately and his Noetics. For
five years he worked with these " liberal Christians " in their efforts to
banish the mysterious from religion. At last he came to fear that he was
preferring intellectual to moral excellence. " In proportion as I moved
out of the shadow of that Liberalism which had hung over my
my early devotion towards the Fathers returned " (p. 28) .

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The change in Newman's course amazed his former friends. Whately
and Blanco White viewed his "bigotry" with alarm. Newman's brother
Francis remonstrated. His course was directly opposite, ending in a rejection of all supernatural religion and retaining only a vague belief in a
shadowy Divinity. The Scotch Utilitarian school motivated an attack on
Newman's own clerical, humanistic Oriel. The times were against Newman;
Mrs. Browning sniffed that the Tracts for the Times, which began at this
period, should be called the Tracts against the Times. But the Oxford
movement went doggedly on, and Newman formulated his theory of the
Via Media, still, Christopher Dawson maintains, the best intellectual justification for Anglicanism.
The Via Media however was but a paper theory, and it soon began to
crumble under the attacks of the church it had set out to defend. Tract
XC was rejected; the Thirty Nine Articles would not bear an interpretation that was not hostile to Catholicism. There was the affair of the
Jersusalem Bishopric; Anglican prelates in effect recognized Lutheran orders.
The Via Media had been seen as a ground between Rationalism and Catholicism; now there was the progressive and painful realization that there
could be no such ground. If Anglicans were part of the Church Universal,
their severance could not be justified " without using arguments prejudicial to those great doctrines concerning Our Lord which are the very
foundation of the Christian religion " (p. 185) . England then was wrong,
but how could Rome be right?
Newman felt that his Liberal enemies were rushing him over the brink
of a terrible precipice. " The object of the Movement was to withstand
the Liberalism of the day" (p. 95). Now "the most oppressive thought
... was the clear anticipation ... that it would issue in the triumph of
Liberalism. Against the anti-dogmatic principle I had thrown my whole
mind. . . . The men who had driven me from Oxford were distinctly the
Liberals; it was they who had opened the attack on Tract 90, and it was
they who would gain a second benefit, if I went on to abandon the
Anglican Church" (p. 184). But it could not be helped. He had already
come " to the conclusion that there was no medium, in true philosophy,
between Atheism and Catholicity, and that a perfectly consistent mind
... must embrace either the one or the other" (p. 179) . Liberalism was
but the halfway house on one side, as Anglicanism was on the other
(p. 184). But one perfectly consistent and of good will cannot live in a
halfway house. In 1845, as Renan, who was a prophet of Liberalism, was
leaving the Church, Newman, the arch-foe of Liberalism, was making his
profession of faith at the feet of Father Dominic.
In the light of such a view of Newman, it is strange that he of all
people should have been taken as a prophet of Modernism or any other
weakening of the objective Christian tradition which was his doctrine and

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life. For one thing, the Modernists were using his name as a screen for
their doctrines. An extant letter of Pius X to an Irish Bishop however
absolves Newman from any implication in the condemnations of Modernism. If Newman has suffered much from those who unjustly used
his name, and from over hasty critics, he likewise suffers from undiscerning admirers of the Credo in N ewmannum school. The Apologia pleads
for understanding. The misinterpretations, now on different grounds, continue. A careful reading against the proper background should show that
Newman, despite the subjective note in his literary style, his uncongeniality
to Metaphysics, and his willingness to conduct an argument on the enemy's
ground, is ever in the vanguard of the forces of transcendency against vital
immanence.

m
The Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent is Newman's apologetic against
a particular form of Liberalism, the Rationalism of John Locke. Locke
had enuntiated the principle of certitude that " doctrines are only so far
to be considered as they are logically demonstrated." The natural corollary was: " It is dishonest in a man to make an act of faith in what he
has not had brought home to him by actual proof." Newman saw the
danger in the application of these principles to the faith of the average
Catholic, who would not have a scientific demonstration of his motives of
credibility.
The Grammar of Assent is his rejoinder. A forbidding book to many,
the fundamental principle for its understanding is Newman's enigmatic
remark that "it is what it is and not what it is not." It is not a treatise
on the theological genesis of faith. It is not an attempt to discredit the
traditional, scientific apologetic of the schools. It is not an easy book for
the believer himself, but a· book to show the rationalist philosopher that
the average believer can have a faith that is rational. It is an argument
formulated by Newman himself that the harmony between the religion of
conscience (or Natural Religion) and the religion of revelation constitutes
a sufficient accumulation of probabilities to justify an assent to the credibility of revelation.
Newman chooses a long and somewhat involved approach to his subject. In the first part of the book, he discusses the various modes of
apprehending and assenting to propositions, making his famous distinction between the notional and real assents, and finally applying the abstract
discussion to belief in the one God, the Trinity and dogmatic Theology.
In the second part, he discusses unconditional assent (i. e. for him, an
assent which does not depend, and is not conditioned by previous syllogistic reasoning) , certitude, the nature of inference, the famous illative
sense, and finally the application to religion. All this is more like the

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Newman who composed a logic with Whately than the familiar rhetorician
who shines through in the concluding chapters of each part.
The Grammar is not easy to grasp. The theological censors had an
unhappy time of it, Father Harper published an attack from the scholastic
point of view, and Father Perrone threw up his hands in horror: "Newman miscet et confudet omnia." But Newman insisted that the best
approach to the problem, was the one that was most personal, thus giving
ground to the German sneer: Newman subjectificaiit.
The language provides a great deal of the hazard. Some have maintained that English is not adaptable to philosophical purposes. Alfred had
difficulty with the abstract thought of Boethius in the very beginning,
and some have thought that the progressive refinement of the language
made it more poetic but even less scientific. Whatever the case may be,
English is a living language. Newman's book was written in archaic English when it appeared, for he wrote in the language of the problems he
was facing, the language of Lockean philosophy, the language of the
common rooms of the Oxford of thirty years before. Newman therefore
is cut off from the precise terminology of the philosophia perennis by the
insularity of British thought, and from us by changes in a living language. But surely this difficulty would vanish were we to accept Newman's
terms in the sense he intended. That is precisely where the difficulty lies.
Newman most frequently does not define but describes with a richness
that is bewildering. For instance, it is hard to see whether the distinction between notional and real assent is that between the speculative and
practical, or the universal and particular.
It is with some trepidation then that one ventures to criticize work
he is not sure he has fully grasped. Scientific demonstration of the credibility of revelation Newman does not deny, but simply passes by. He
would argue from conscience, which he accepts in the sense of Aristotle's
cppovtpt<;;. The illative sense is the heart of the argument. When the
mind is confronted with the convergence of a sufficient number of probabilities (for Newman facts not capable of demonstration) the illative
sense is able to conclude. It is the process of induction which Newman
saw was not strictly a demonstration.
In his whole approach, Newman seems impatient with the metaphysical
sphere, and almost Kant-like is eager to be on more familiar ethical
grounds. He is motivated by a spirit not unlike that which makes St.
Thomas say in the introduction to the Secunda-Secundae of the Summa:
" ... there is little use in speaking about moral matters in general, since
actions are about particular things." But Newman allowed his impatience to carry him too far. Of course, it was really impatience with the
excessive rationalism of Locke. And his own English character was notoriously not given to speculation, as he once confessed to his Irish students.

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But that impatience made him reduce universals to
generalities
and bypass metaphysical argument with what amounts to vituperation.
Thomists might agree that universalia non movent, but they would not
imperil all speculation by denying universals. Newman's distrust of
paper logic led him to commit the most arrant sophisms about reasoning
and laughing animals instead of rational, risible animals.
But these things are incidental to the main argument, which can be
seen in all clarity in the summation which is the old Newman. At the
beginning of his work Newman put the words of St. Ambrose: "Non in
dialectica complacuit Deo salvum facere populum suum. It was probably
a warning against the Liberalism which he was writing to confute, but
also an act of humility for his own dialectic. Quite fittingly one might
write below the words of St. Ambrose the words of St. Paul: " It has
pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe."

IV
The Idea of a University has a similar place in Newman's struggle with
the Liberal spirit. These lectures were occasioned by the foundation of a
Catholic University of Ireland, of which Newman was the first Rector.
The scheme to counteract an educational system invincibly secular by a
university that was both theological and humane eventually failed, but
not before Newman had put in seven of the best years of his life in the
work, and had delivered a series of lectures on the nature and extent of
university education and related topics. These discourses, for the most
part published in this volume, constitute a genuine classic. The language
is unsurpassed; the balance and harmony of the English prose can be
compared only to a magnificent symphony.
They can best be seen in relation to the milieu against which they were
written. In general, these lectures form part of Newman's strategy against
what he called in these very lectures a form of infidelity of the day. In his
own days at Oxford, Newman had seen an educational reform launched by
his own Oriel bitterly opposed by the Scotch utilitarian school, and the
Liberals whose gospel was Locke's Some Thoughts Concerning Education.
Newman now reiterated his insistence on the non-utilitarian character of
liberal education. Scientism too was in the ascendant. The newly founded
University of London had excluded theology from the curriculum; several
government commissions were busy preparing clerical, humanistic Oxford
for the days when the philosophy of John Stuart Mill would reign. The
Liberal policy, conscious or unconscious, was not to fight theology, but
to ignore it. By concentration on research in the positive sciences, the
interest and imagination of students would be so captivated that theology
would soon be forgotten. Newman countered that a university was a
place for teaching; research was to be left to the Academies, Societies and

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similar foundations. He maintained vigorously that a university by its
very name professes to teach universal knowledge; therefbre, the exclusion of the science of theology would destroy the universality of the
university.
Modem interest in the Idea is not that of curiosity in a literary antique,
but that of inquiry from a master in the philosophy of education. In
this respect, the first nine (or ten, counting Discourse V which Newman
omitted from later editions, but which Dr. Harrold gives in appendix)
discourses that make up the first section are of greater interest than the
lectures of the second section on university subjects. The lectures on
University Subjects are for the most part separate and each a perfect
unit. The lectures on University Teaching are supposed to constitute one
perfect argument. The main doctrines as outlined in the previous paragraph are clear enough, but many have found the synthesis of the nine
(or ten) lectures difficult in view of seeming contradictions, and withal an
uneasy and hesitant manner that almost amounts to diffidence.
The main argument is that a university is a place for teaching universal knowledge. The first four (or five) discourses are concerned with
the "universal," that is, the integrity of the university. For that integrity,
theology is necessary. But what Theology? The fact has been grasped;
the nature of the fact eludes many. Newman, who is arguing on human
grounds, and, he says, on grounds common with Protestants and other
monotheists, seems to be holding for a mere Natural Theology or Theodicy.
His definition and description of Theology points to that. Yet, the conclusion goes beyond that. If the Incarnation be a fact, he says in effect,
it is a part of knowledge, has an influence on other knowledge, and must
be considered in any complete education. Therefore, the Theology for
which Newman is holding is not simply Theodicy but "that system of
revealed facts and principles which constitute the Catholic faith."
In another lecture (" Elementary Studies " not printed in this edition)
Newman is more particular on the theology to be taught in his ideal university. He respectfully opposes those who would teach Theology proper,
or even replace the Classics with Scripture and the Fathers, and prefers
to follow the English tradition. In this he is motivated by the object of
University education as he sees it, the lay gentleman. This question will
be discussed shortly. Theology proper, he thinks, would be taught super·
ficially by lay professors, be received superficially by young minds, and
might even be the occasion for intellectual pride. He urges instead a broad
. knowledge of doctrinal subjects, and that part of Scripture and Church
History which is considered sufficient in the general culture of a layman.
The only theological works he would admit are those like Bellarmine's
Controversies, Suarez' On Laws, and Cano's treatise on the Loci Tkeologici.
The relation of Theology to the rest of the curriculum brings up another

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interesting question. In both Discourse ill and IV, Newman seems to
hold only that the other sciences have a negative subordination to Theology. In this as in other matters, he held that his ideal university was
Louvain, though Oxford is much more in evidence. In the hitherto
omitted discourse on " (Universal) Knowledge viewed as one Philosophy "
Newman speculates on the possibility of Theology being in a more vital
sense the unifying wisdom. In a footnote (p. 899} he supposes it plausible
that Theology is the form of the other subjects, i. e. the external form
as charity is of fides formata. This he rejects on the grounds that theology then would not be one subject among the others. But perhaps
this objection could be met by a distinction not precise but descriptive.
Theology is both a science and a wisdom. As a science, it might be with
the others and be in fieri towards the wisdom which would be in facto
ease. Such a tentative proposal might more nearly approximate the ideal
of Pius XI who insisted that " Religion . . . be in very truth the foundation and crown of youth's entire training" (Divini Illiua Magiatri).
It is this same encyclical of Pius XI that causes difficulty with the next
five lectures on the essence of a university. These lectures maintain that
the object of the University is intellectual, not moral. Knowledge is to
be its own end in such wise that the product of university education is
"not the
not the Catholic, but the gentleman." Newman concludes that his mission in the University was that of St. Philip Neri
whom he sees, in a brilliant peroration, as preferring " to yield to the
stream, and direct the current, which he would not stop, of science, literature, art, and fashion, and to sweeten and sanctify what God had made
very good and man had spoilt " (p. 208) . Yet it is the same St. Philip
the Holy Father quotes against such a philosophy of severance. The
encyclical maintains that " the proper and immediate end of Christian
education is to cooperate with divine grace in forming the true and perfect
Christian. . . . Hence the true Christian, product of Christian education, is the supernatural man who thinks, judges and acts constantly and
consistently in accordance with right reason illumined by the supernatural
light of the example and teaching of Christ." These views, however, may
not be so opposed as they appear; in fact, they may well be complementary, though it would be difficult to reconcile them in every particular.
Newman is reasoning from different principles; he reaches a conclusion not
too far from the Holy Father's.
Knowledge as Newman said, is of course its own end. Learning is the
good of the intellect, as health is the good of the body. But these ends
are only intermediate. Knowledge is an end in itself, but not man's end.
From'the aspect of the intellect, the good which is knowledge is a bonum
honeatum; from the higher aspect of the whole man it is a bonum utile.
The object of education, as Newman himself admits, in the added connota-

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tions he gives both " education " and " wisdom," is not simply the intellect, but the body, soul, intellect and will which make up the whole man.
Newman was not wrong in what he affirmed; if anything he was wrong
only in what he did not affirm. Abstrahentium non est mendacium. If
the reader does not think Newman returned clearly enough to the totality
from which he abstracted, he might read the Tamworth Reading Room
articles for Newman's views on the other side of the paradox. Newman
was the last man in the world to be an intellectualist; at Oxford he had
been in trouble with Provost Hawkins because the young Newman maintained that the work of the tutor was not only intellectual, but " quasipastoral." In the spade work of viewing the university as a bare idea
before seeing it, like the Pope, as an instrument of the Church, Newman
has done valiantly. That his work should be passed over so lightly in the
current discussions on the theology and philosophy of education is a grave
misfortune. One may not agree with a theory of the Idea; to have passed
it over is to push back the starting place of the investigation, and to lose
much needed time.

v
Newman was not a Thomist. The stock remark that he was an eclectic,
while in the main correct, hardly puts the matter in the proper perspective. Not a "professional" theologian, he more than once candidly
admitted his limitations in that respect. His entire training had been
Anglican; in many ways his mind was already formed when he entered the
Church. He spent but one year at the Propaganda in Rome before Ordination. And those were the days before Leo XIII when the sacred sciences
were hardly in a flourishing condition. Newman wrote from Rome to his
friend J. D. Dalgairns, who had favored a Dominican apostolate for the
group of Oxford converts: " Aristotle is no favour here ... nor St. Thomas.
. . . St. Thomas is a great saint ... people ... reverence him, but put
him aside." Philosophy, Newman said from the reports he received, was
" odds and ends, whatever seemed best-like St Clement's Stromata. They
have no philosophy. Facts are the great things, and nothing else. Exegesis,
but not doctrine" (Ward's Life, I, 166 f.).
Newman called Aristotle his master (Grammar, p. 327) and pays high
tribute to the Stagirite: " While the world lasts, will Aristotle's doctrine
on these matters last, for he is the oracle of nature and of truth. While
we are men, we cannot help, to a great extent, being Aristotelians, for the
great Master does but analyze the thoughts, feelings, views, and opinions
of human kind. He has told us the meaning of our own words and ideas,
before we were born. In many subject-matters, to think correctly, is to
think like Aristotle; and we are his disciples whether we will or no, though
we may not know it" (Idea, p. 97). But the Aristotle he knew was the

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Aristotle of the Nicomachean Ethica and the Rhetoric and not of the
Physics and Metaphysics. In fact, he once wrote a Platonic interpretation
of the Poetica with no reference to the catharsis, and maintained in the
face of the Organon that Logic was not an instrumental art.
Newman always reverenced St. Thomas and spoke of him with genuine
admiration. He had in his library the Summa Contra Gentes, but in the
half dozen times or so he cites St. Thomas, he may very likely be using
current scholastic manuals.
It would be impossible to cite his divergences from the Common Doctor.
Over and above the matters already mentioned, there are several small
things in the appendices of the volumes under review. In Note III of
the Grammar after a careful consideration of what had been written by
St. Thomas and others on the punishment of the damned having no termination, he ventures the opinion that " a refrigerium was conceivable, which
was not strictly a cessation of punishment though it acted as such: I
mean the temporary absence in the lost soul of the consciousness of its
continuity or duration." Then almost at the end of his remarks, he notes:
" In what I have been saying, I have considered eternity as infinite time,
which is the received assumption (p. 887) . It may be the received assumption, but it is not correct, nor is it received in theology which was precisely where the author was arguing until he vitiated the discussion by the
use of a word in a sense other than theological. Note G of the Apologia
makes a rather good analysis of the problems concerning lying and equivocation, but closes with this: " . . . as to playing upon words, or equivocation, I suppose it is from the English habit, but . . . for myself I can
fancy myself thinking it was allowable in extreme cases for me to lie, but
never to equivocate " (p. 828) . Which gives a rather disappointing picture
of one who, despite careful study, remains prejudiced by an earlier impression rather than by solid reasoning.
But these minutiae are lost in the large picture of a great Catholic
thinker with his roots deep in antiquity, yet ever progressive. To mention but one thing, his Development of Dogma, a pioneer work in an
important matter, has provided hints for the more thorough studies of
Father Marin-Sola and other theologians. Perhaps it is no coincidence
that this great progressive Traditionalist was created Cardinal by the
same Leo Xill who gave St. Thomas back to the schools. As a matter
of fact, the new Cardinal addressed a warm letter of congratulation to
the Pontiff on the publication of the Aetemi Patris. In 1880 one of the
Oratorians jokingly asked the Cardinal what he should do were he elected
Pope. His Eminence responded seriously that he would as his first act
organize commissions on Biblical criticism and the early history of the
Church. Which was what Pope Leo later did, a step that foreshadowed
the work of Pere Lagrange.

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Newman's sympathy for Catholic tradition with his awareness of modem
problems, his subtle mind coupled with a genius for clear expression would
have made him a magnificent Thomist. But it is hardly good Thomism
to waste time in vain speculations on "might have been." Newman is
what he is, and he is great. Writer, preacher and thinker he is preeminently an apologete. And presupposing truth, the ultimate criterion
of any apologetic is determined by its effectiveness. Newman's apologetic
has been effective in his day, and it is still effective in ours. More than
one modem problem is an outgrowth of the Liberalism Newman fought.
History ·is not disparate, but continuous and causally connected. The
Atomic Age is not cut off from Victorianism by an iron curtain.
It is true that our times have their peculiar problems, and therefore have
need of special apologetics. One great apologete of our day proposes an
apologetic of the passions for the Freudians. Several converts have found
their way through Aristotle and St. Thomas. And there is no doubt that
many, led astray by a secularist philosophy, reading Newman would be led
to question the validity of principles they had regarded as self evident.
Should they pursue the question long enough and sincerely enough they
might join that number of souls, who under God owe their faith to the
work of John Henry Cardinal Newman.
URBAN VoLL, O.P.
Dominican Ho'U8e of Studies,
W aahington,D. C.

An Historical Introduction to Modern Philosophy. By HuGH MILLER.
New York: Macmillan, 1947. Pp. 615, with index.
I could scarcely believe my eyes when I read the following statement
from the pen of this responsible author, professor of philosophy at U. C.
L. A., that Saint Thomas was a Benedictine monk, who therefore was
interested in upholding authority! Not a major point, but if anybody
said Aristotle was a Spartan or Descartes a Dutchman, he would be dubbed
an ignoramus; we would drop his book and go to a reliable source. How
long are stupid blunders about even the greatest figures of the Middle
Ages to be tolerated?
Should we drop the book, or proceed? Let us be doubly fair and see
what the author has to say. In fact, as it turns out, what he has to say
is instructwe in more ways than one. He is endeavoring to provide a
synoptic view, not so much of the history of philosophy, as of philosophy
itself in terms of history. This is necessary, he thinks, to grasp the historical, and hence the philosophical, significance of two tendencies-the
rationalist and the empiricist-those well-known pivots around which the

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history of philosophy turns. Deeply empiricist, Miller feels, nonetheless,
that the empirical tradition cannot be really fruitful unless it assimilates
the insights of the rationalist tradition, particularly through its representatives in ancient times. When this assimilation is accomplished, the philosopher should be able to integrate philosophy in terms of political faith
and the passion for justice, and in terms of an evolutionary doctrine which
does not spurn rational necessities.
Professor Miller admires the Greeks, especially for their scientific attitude and their thorough-going intellectual honesty. Because ,Plato and
Aristotle are deeply intellectualistic, and inclined too much to " absolute
verities," the emPiricist cannot accept their doctrines today, but at least
these thinkers
not narrowly rationalistic, like the " clear and distinct "
rationalists of the Cartesian era, and we desperately need to recapture
their insights. Miller, one suspects, admires Plato the most of all the
Greeks, and admires him not least because of his passion for justice.
The contemporary historian, as evidenced by every book of this sort
published in the past few years, including Mr. Russell's History of Western
Philosophy, can hardly avoid devoting some space to the fifteen hundred
years between the Hellenistic Schools and Rene Descartes. What proportion of space does Hugh Miller, in his tum, give to this period? He devotes
eight chapters to the Greeks, in the section entitled " The Great Beginning." Twelve chapters are given over to the modems from Descartes to
Marx, while chapters nine and ten of the same section, " The Antecedents
of Modem Philosophy," are devoted to "A New Heaven and a New
Earth " and " The Long Middle Age." Much might be said about the
author's statements concerning Jesus, Saint Paul, and the early Fathers.
He is, obviously, trying hard to be fair in treating of religious matters.
It is scarcely debatable, he says, that Jesus existed historically, but he
evidently does not think Jesus was truly sent by God. He admires Augustine, the great psychologist, the " modem ,, man with his emphasis upon
the mind and heart of the individual. He pays grudging tribute to Aquinas,
whose architectonic ani hierarchic Summa reflects the hierarchical and
authoritarian organization of the mediaeval society in which he moved.
He praises the Franciscans most of all-Francis, Bonaventure, and Ockham
are singled out-for these men, he holds, in their various ways, express
the passion for justice, which in them is deepened by the religious impulse
of love. They mark an advance in human development by returning, in a
more authentic fashion than their contemporaries, who stress authority
and order, like the "Benedictine" Thomas, to the spirit of liberty and
love of the Founder of Christianity.
Hugh Miller acknowledges that one should study the Middle Ages more
deeply and should learn the lessons it provides in such abundance, but he
disagrees with, those contemporary publicists who claim that we should

are

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return to the Middle Ages and Medieval Order. If he has read them, does
he really think that Chesterton, Belloc, Dawson, Maritain, and the rest
advocate what would be tantamount to a literal return to the Middle Ages?
Even if he does not think this, he disagrees with the principles of order
upon which the mediaeval order was based, and here the divergence between our philosophies lies. In fact, Miller's opinion is that, for all of
their neglected worth, the Middle Ages were too hierarchical, authoritarian
and confining to the spirit.
There is little we need say of Professor Miller's discussion of the rationalistic and empirical schools of modern times. One must admire, he says,
the ingenuity of the system-makers, Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, but the
empiricists, he feels, are more solidly grounded in reality. We cannot
accept the particular terms of Kant's critical reconciliation of Empiricism
and Rationalism, but no such reconciliation can be effected without the
Sage of Konigsberg.
In the latter half of the book, comprising sections on " Contemporary
Philosophy," and "The Future," the author finally comes to his personal
synthesis of the two traditions he has been pursuing throughout their
checkered history. Contemporary movements of importance are realism,
pragmatism and positivism. These he treats ably and informatively. The
achievement of Bertrand Russell, he thinks, in deepening the understanding of the logical function fulfilled by mathematical theory in piodern
science, marks the greatest advance in philosophic insight since the Greeks
twenty-five hundred years ago. He recognizes the weakness of pragmatism, that " rich and many-sided movement." It is still unconsciously
idealist in its preconceptions; in this country it draws much of its strength
from the American traditions of liberty and the search for progress,
whereas elsewhere its insufficiency is more exposed; " American pragmatism
is today the moral resource of people still informed by religious faith, but
unable to find religious expression in creeds and institutions which have
become obsolete ... (Pragmatism is) the child of religious faith, seeking
to apply faith. The son of the preacher teaches pragmatism in the college. What will his son teach? " That is the question.
In this discussion of contemporary movements, the ubiquitous existentialism, oddly enough, is not treated or listed in the index; Thomism is
mentioned briefly in the section on Saint Thomas, while Gilson's works,
among others, are listed in the bibliography.
The author now proceeds to report "the significance of this history."
We are challenged today to recapture the Greek spirit of science and the
Greek spirit of political liberty and constitutionalism. Obfuscated even in
the ancient period, these philosophic insights, chiefly: of the moral and
political order, were cramped by rationalistic metaphysics, which, in such
men as Plotinus and Spinoza, reduce the rich diversity of the many to the

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One, and by feudal ecclesiasticism, which is ultimately antithetical to the
spirit of science and liberty. The empiricists freed us from rationalistic
metaphysics, yet were often political absolutists. The pioneering spirits
behind the rise of political freedom and religious congregationalism liberated us from absolutism, but did not have a solid philosophic foundation. All of these strands must be woven together-the rationalist's insights
into science and logic, the concern of the empiricist for concrete individual
things, the passion for justice and the love of " God " of the political and
religious liberators. Hugh Miller would not, doubtless, say bluntly that
God does not exist. After all, he might say, why should he be stigmatized
as an atheist and lose the attention of people? Are not, he asks, your rigid
anthropomorphic religionists the true materialists?
What is " universal
Being," mind or spirit of God? " Does not everything we know assure
us that if there be such universal Being, its character must be that defined
by the largest principles of physics, so that Reality is physical matter? "
The truly religious man, Professor Miller assures us, will experience exaltation in the contemplation of all of nature, and in the recognition that the
evolutionary process is not unintelligible but reveals deep logic and direction. (One cannot help asking, " To what ultimate end? ") Included in
the process, which true science discovers, is the age-long struggle for freedom and justice. This is the " spirit-side " of the complex evolutionary
progress. This, which Plato envisioned and fought for, is true philosophy,
truer by far than any " metaphysics."
These are the views, expounded by Professor Miller in his introduction to the philosophy he regards as primarily a moral enterprise. We
have considered them at some length because they are fairly representative
of the intellectual journey travelled by many contemporaries reared within
the empirical tradition. Such men are, in many instances, unwilling to go
all the way with Dewey and adopt his instrumentalism, as devoid of metaphysics perhaps as any metaphysics could be; they have become sensible
of the radical insufficiencies of empiricism; they feel they could never
return to the discredited clear-and-distinct rationalism of the early modern
era; they are impelled to turn to the ancient and mediaeval tradition.
They are dazzled by the splendor of the ancient vision of the universe,
though they are prevented from seeing its fulness of meaning by deep
inveterate empirical habits of mind, and yes, by unrecognized prejudices,
stemming from the rationalism they detest. They fail to do justice to
the mediaeval tradition, though they acknowledge its majesty and achievements, because they do not see it from proper perspective. In somewhat
eclectic fashion, finally, they construct their own personal philosophies. It
is not from such men that the great philosophies
significant for our
age will come, yet in their own way they are characteristic of what we
call the " contemporary mind."

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Of this company is Professor Miller. It would be easy, doubtless, to
score him on many counts for his treatment of mediaeval philosophers, and
to criticize his own personal philosophy for shallowness due to the lack of
any real metaphysics. (Is his distrust of metaphysics due to the fact
that he- can only think of metaphysics in terms of the rationalism he
rejects?) It would doubtless be easy so to criticize, but perhaps we should
at the same time ask ourselves whether we are not to blame for his not having a more complete and sympathetic view of our philosophy. Why is it that
Miller, like Professor Wild of Harvard, feels that Thomism (despite the
work of Maritain and others), is not really interested in the contemporary
problems of justice and liberty and has little really contemporary to say?
Miller's philosophy, based so largely on the spirit of political liberty and
the passion for justice, is insufficiently metaphysical, but have we shown
the passion for justice and freedom that would lead such men to examine
more dispassionately the foundations of our philosophy? Such, in the
hearts of men, is the curious link between the speculative and the practical
orders.
DoNALD A. GALLAGHER
Marquette University,
Milwaukee, Wiaconsin

The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns
Scotus. By A. B. WoLTER, 0. F. M. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1946. $2.75.
This is a.doctoral dissertation submitted to the School of Philosophy of
the Catholic Universi:ty of America.
The purpose of the dissertation is to expound Scotus' theory of transcendentality, and the function of each of the main classes of transcendentals, emphasizing particularly their theological implications. The author
remarks that such a study has been neglected up to now-an inexplicable
neglect, for the theory of transcendentality is indispensable in understanding Scotus' ideal of a systematic and scientific metaphysics, which the
Subtle Doctor defines as " the science of the transcendentals."
Doctor Wolter has refrained from attempting any critical or comparative study, and has limited himself to the interpretation of Scotus' teaching. This limitation of field was undoubtedly legitimate and even necessary. We hppe, however, that he will some day attempt to give us a
critical appreciation of Scotus' theory as well as its relation with St.
Thomas' teaching. The incidental remarks which he makes in this connection increase the interest of such ail undertaking. He affirms that
Scotus' theory can be justly critisized on several counts. This statement

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521

will make many a reader wonder whether the points susceptible of just
criticism are the basic ones, and whether consequently the whole Scotistic
metaphysics is built upon sand. Regarding the relation between Scotus'
and Thomas' teaching Dr. Wolter remarks over and over again that "the
chasm between both is not so unbridgeable as his commonly believed,"
that the doctrine of the two Scholastics is, in the majority of instances,
complementary rather than contradictory. This affirmation deserves to
be proved and substantiated for several reasons-not the least important
being to eradicate from the earth the tribe of those who call themselves
either Scotists or Thomists and deliberately ignore the teaching of St.
Thomas or Scotus respectively.
Dr. Wolter bases all his treatise on a text taken from the Opus Oxoniense,
b. 1, d. 8, q. 3, nn. 18-19 (Vives Ed., IX, 597b-598b). This key text gives
him even the plan and the main divisions of the whole work, which is
divided into two parts. The first deals with the idea of transcendentality
in general and its basic presuppositions, namely, the nature of a real
concept and univocation; the second discusses the various classes of transcendentals, namely, being, the properties or attributes coextensive with
being as such, the disjunctive attributes, such as " infinite-or-finite," " substance-or-accident," etc., and finally the " pure perfections," which are of
two kinds: those predicable of God alone and those predicable of God
as well as of certain creatures. A separate chapter is appended by way of
conclusion, showing how Scotus integrated into an organic whole the heterogeneous elements of Aristotle's metaphysics.
Transcendental, according to Scotus, is whatever rises above all general
and transcends all categories. Scotus therefore does not limit the term
"transcendental" to concepts which are convertible with being. The
disjunctive attributes as well as pure perfections are also transcendentals.
The transcendentals proper to metaphysics-there are also logical transcendentals-are real concepts or primae intentiones, which stand for realities, as opposed to logical concepts or secundae intentiones, which stand
for other concepts. Hence the first basic presupposition of the theory of
metaphysical transcendentality is the notion of a real concept.
A concept is real if it stands for some reality. The realities corresponding to different real concepts must be somehow distinct a parte rei. In
this connection the author discusses Scotus' theories of formal distinction
and natura communis, pointing out that the Subtle Doctor adopted the
doctrine of formal distinction to guarantee the metaphysical character of
our concepts and our knowledge. The reader is surprised by the fact that
the question whether the formal modal distinction-a distinction between
a formality and its mode-is or is not a parte rei is left rather in doubt.
Later on we will note the implications of such a doubt.
The second basic presupposition of Scotus' theory of transcendentality

8

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is his doctrine of univocation. Although regarding the notion itself of
univocation there is nothing given here which cannot be found in other
commentators, ancient or modern, of Scotus, Dr. Wolter's interpretation of
Metaph., 4, q. 1, n. 12; VII, 153a, where Scotus seems to deny the univocation of being, is original and acute. In this passage, Dr. Wolter says,
Scotus is not speaking of the concept of being at all, but of the term
"being." The main interest of this chapter, however, resides in pointing
out 1) the relation existing between univocation and the whole theory
of transcendentals, and 2) the absolute necessity of univocation in Scotus'
view as the only valid basis to justify in Aristotelian terms our knowledge
of God and substance. The contention of the author, which is not original
with him, that the theory of analogy is ultimately based on some sort of
illumination is highly interesting, although it will not convince many.
The second part of the dissertation deals with the transcendentals in
particular. A separate chapter is devoted to the discussion of each class.
The first chapter dealing with transcendental being is by far the most
important. It includes the following questions: the first object of the
intellect by way of origin; the concept of being; the primary or adequate
object of the intellect, and the twofold primacy of being, namely, the
primacy of commonness and the primacy of virtuality. Though his interpretation of the primacy of virtuality, and of the denominative predication
of being as regards ultimate differences and proper attributes is far from
being completely satisfactory, it is in this chapter especially that the
author displays his acumen.
In the last chapter, appended as a conclusion and entitled" Metaphysics
as a Theologic," Dr. Wolter attempts to show how Scotus constituted an
organic whole with the diverse and loose elements of Aristotle's metaphysics. As is well known, Aristotle in one place defines metaphysics as the
science of first principles, that is, God and the " Intelligences," and in
another place as the science of being as such. This dualism became acentuated in the two main currents of Arabian Aristotelianism, represented by
Averroes and Avicena. According to Dr. Wolter, the merit of Scotus would
have consisted in harmonizing these heterogeneous elements. Beginning
with the simple and univocal notion of being, the science of metaphysics,
as conceived by Scotus, continues with the analysis of the actual conditions of being, such as its contingency, etc.; by the study of the disjunctive transcendentals it rises to the knowledge of the more perfect members of the, disjunction; and finally through the study of pure perfections
" it is possible to bring out the highlights of this being we call God, until
He is revealed to be the ultimate solution to the fundamental question
of the metaphysician: Why does being exist?
As this incomplete summary indicates, the contents of the dissertation
could hardly be more appealing. If we add that, as a general rule, the

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528

author displays an unusual penetration from both the analytical and synthetic points of view, we can say, not as a mere formality but in truth,
that the work should find its place in the library of every metaphysician.
This is not to say that the discussion of the different questions touched
upon is equally solid. There are some vulnerable points. We will point
out a few of them, those which in our opinion are more fundamental.
Possibly the weakest point of the entire work is that Dr. Wolter, as
pointed out above, leaves undecided the question whether the formal modal
distinction is or is not a parte rei, although he himself is inclined to believe
that it is a parte rei. He writes (the italics are ours):
Scotists dispute whether this so-called diatinctio formalia modalis is really a distinction a parte rei or merely a virtual or mental distinction. While reasons for
both interyretations may be found, the author is inclined to believe that Scotus
regarded it as a distinction a parte rei.

But to leave undecided this fundamental question is to leave in doubt
the metaphysical character of the whole dissertation, which, deals, we are
told categorically, with the transcendentals in so far as they are metaphysical or real concepts. The reason is manifest. The formal modal
distinction is the basis of metaphysical univocation. The concepts of
being, wisdom, etc., are univocal if they can prescind from their modality.
On the other hand, according to Scotus a concept is not real unless there
be some distinction a parte rei between the realities for which it stands
and the realities signified by other real concepts. That the univocal concept of being and other univocal concepts are, according to Scotus, real
concepts cannot be affirmed categorically unless it is established without
any shadow of doubt that Scotus posits some distinction a parte rei between
the realities corresponding to these concepts and their modality. And
since univocation, as Dr. Wolter tells us, is not an incidental factor, but
the very foundation of Scotus' theory of transcendentals, any doubt concerning the nature of the modal distinction casts doubt upon the metaphysical character of the whole theory.
In discussing univocation the author devotes a few lines to the notion
of analogical concept and the so-called " unity of analogical concept." He
rightly points out the obscurity of this phrase as well as the seeming disagreement of nco-scholastics upon its meaning. He himself, however,
seems to be perfectly satisfied with such a state of affairs. He does not
make any great effort to reach some clarity or at least to prove that such
a clarity is unattainable. To show the lack of agreement between ncoscholastic writers he quotes the notions of analogical concept given by
Descocqs and Gredt. It is obvious that no agreerqent can be expected
between these two authors. While Descocqs considers the analogy of
attribution as the fundamental analogy, in the view of Gredt and others
the only valid analogy is that of proper proportionality, which alone would

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imply the unity of meaning required in a valid reasoning, namely, one
intrinsic proportion. To be effective, Dr. Wolter's criticism should have
been directed towards proving that an analogical concept has not and
cannot have one meaning. Instead his criticism is based upon the impossibility of one and the same concept having two meanings-a point on
which Gredt, for example, would perfectly agree with him. Incidentally
the author does not quote Gredt's definition of analogy of proper proportionality but his generic definition of analogy, applicable to both the
analogy of proper proportionality and the analogy of attribution, which
according to Gredt implies two meanings and consequently two concepts.
The explanation of the" virtual primacy of being" given by the author,
though in perfect agreement with the words of Scotus himself, does not
appear explanatory at all. This point is discussed in dealing with the
adequate object of the intellect. According to Scotus, being is the adequate
object of the intellect because everything intelligible either contains being
essentially or is contained essentially or virtually in something which includes being essentially. Being consequently has a primacy of commonness
as regards those intelligibles which contain the concept of being in quid or
essentially-genera, species, individuals and their essential parts-, and a
primacy of virtuality regarding those intelligibles which neither contain
being essentially nor are contained essentially in something which contains
being essentially. Such are the attributes of being, namely, "true," "one,"
etc. According to the author this " something " in which the attributes are
virtually contained is the concrete object, the thing. In other words,
the so-called " virtual primacy of being " does not mean virtual primacy
of being at all, but virtual primacy of the thing.
The common objection against univocation, namely, that the modalities
or ultimate differences and attributes are also being, is answered by Scotus
by saying that they are being denominative. According to the author
this does not mean that being belongs to these differences and attributes,
as one could expect from the rather lengthy explanation of denominative
predication and the examples he gives. On the contrary, it means that
these differences and attributes are " of being," " pertaining to being." In
other words, the legitimate conclusion which from this explanation follows
is that they are not being. No one would affirm that the coat is Peter
because it belongs to Peter. It seems therefore that between being and
nothing there is something. Dr. Wolter, however, does not admit such a
conclusion and thinks that the difficulty is obviated by simply stating that
the attributes, etc., are being denominative.
It would have been desirable for the benefit of those who are victims of
the neo-scholastic terminological confusion that Dr. Wolter had given
Scotus' doctrine on the notion of concept, its division, its relation to
reality, etc.

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525

It is apparent that these and the few other critical remarks which could
be added are traceable to Scotus himself or the actual condition of his
works rather than to the interpreter. Xk Wolter is perfectly aware of the
weakness of certain points and the tentative character of some of his
interpretations (p. xi) . They do not detract from the merits of the
work. Truly the Subtle Doctor has met in Dr. Wolter a subtle interpreter.
We heartily recommend this book to every true metaphysician.

FELIX ALLUNTIS, 0. F. M.
The Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. C.

The Theology of Catholic Action. By THEODORE M. HEsBURGH. Notre
Dame, Ind.: Ave Marie Press, 1946. Pp.
De Fundamentis Actionis Catholicae ad mentem Sancti Gregorii Magni.
By JAMES Voss. Mundelein, Ill.: Our Lady of the Lake Seminary
Press. 1943. Pp. 119.
These are two dissertations which aim to establish the dogmatic basis of
the lay apostolate.
Father Voss, following the teaching of St. Gregory the Great, propounds
the twofold thesis that 1) the ultimate theological basis of the lay apostolate is the nature of the Church considered as the Mystical Body, and
the proximate basis of the lay apostolate is lay participation in each
of the threefold offices of Christ, that of prophet, king, and priest. After
synthesizing Gregory's teaching on the Mystical Body, Father Voss treats
each of the three powers of Christ; he shows that each is continued in the
ecclesiastical hierarchy and that the layman participates in each of them.
The book is a historical rather than theological study. It merely .arranges
Gregory's teaching without much attempt at analyzing it. The chief value
share in all three
of the book is that it establishes that the layman
offices of Christ, thus it thwarts the attempts of those who would " keep
the laity in their place " by crediting them merely with a share in the
power to teach and thereby limiting their activity as lay apostles to one of
catechetics or other kinds of religious instructions.
Gregory the Great harl a keen realization of the dignity and duties of
the Christian layman. He expressed his convictions on this point with his
characteristic simplicity and force. His message has a meaning today,
when the need for lay apostles is so evident and there is an attempt to
recapture the total view of the Church, of which the laity is an integral
part. As Pere Congar, 0. P., has dryly observed, our ecclesiology should

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BOOK ruwiEWS

rather be called hierarchology since it is concerned chiefly with the hierarchy: the primacy of the Pope, the monarchical organization of the
Church, etc. It usually omits the other two essential elements of the
Church-the Holy Spirit, who is its soul, and the laity, who make up
most of its body.
It is a pity that this little book by Father Voss is written in Latin. It
is a simple and non-technical mosaic of Gregory's doctrine and would have
made excellent reading for apostolic laymen who are trying to fulfill their
Christian responsibilities.
Father Hesburgh's study first appeared as a doctoral dissertation of the
School of Theology, Catholic University, under the title: "The Relation
of the Sacramental Characters of Baptism and Confirmation to the Lay
Apostolate." It aims " to determine the place and function of the layman
in the Church, by a theological consideration of the basic structural sacraments of baptism and confirmation."
To give a frame of reference· for his theological treatment, Father
Hesburgh devotes the first part of his study to the lay apostolate in
recent papal documents, showing that it has come into prominence as
the papal solution to secularism and that the Popes have sketched its
nature and theological foundations. In part two, he treats the redemptive priesthood of Christ, the term of participation through the sacramental character; he emphasizes the mediatorial aspects of the Incarnation and Redemption, which is synthesized in the Church's teaching on
the grace of headship, the point of contact between Christ's objective
work of mediation and man's participation in it. In part three, the core
of the study, Father Hesburgh gives a complete exposition of the Christian's participation in Christ's priestly mediation through the sacramental
characters of baptism and confirmation. He presents the evidence for
the existence of the sacramental character, gives the Thomistic analysis
of its nature, and shows its relation to the lay apostolate.
Father Hesburgh has made an excellent study in sacramental theology.
He has shown clearly the fact and nature of lay participation in the Priesthood of· Christ. He has demonstrated the solidity of the priesthood of
Christ. He has demonstrated the solidity of the dogmatic truths underlying the lay apostolate and has established that lay participation in
Christ's priesthood can not be confined solely to a share in liturgical
worship but extends also to a share in the Christian apostolate. Research
of this kind is necessary to give sureness to the theory of the lay apostolate and' to allay the fears of those who view it as untraditional and
lacking a theological basis; it should also help prepare the minds of
Catholics for the apostolic work that modern conditions demand.
The Theology of Catholic Action is the same book as The Relation of
the Sacramental Characters of Baptism and Confirmation to the Lay Apos-

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.?27

tolate. Only the title is different. The change in the title has undoubtedly increased the appeal of the book and has given wider distribution to
its contents. From this point of view, it was a happy inspiration to
change the title: the material in the book is important and should be
more widely understood. It will, however, be unfortunate should the title
of the book lead people to accept it as the complete and definitive theology
of Catholic Action. The author had Catholic Action in mind when he
wrote the book, and he wrote it to contribute to the understanding and
solidification of Catholic Action theory. Nevertheless, the study was
done on ·a subject (the lay apostolate) broader than Catholic Action and
on a dogmatic basis (the sacramental character) narrower than the dogmatic basis of Catholic Action. Therefore, it is a misnomer to call the
book The Theology of Catholic Action.
The problem of " the theology of Catholic Action " is an interesting
one, and the title of Father Hesburgh's book gives an opportunity to
discuss it briefly. Is the theology of Catholic Action co-extensive with
the study of the sacramental characters of baptism and confirmation? The
sacramental characters seem rather to be only a part of the dogmatic basis
of Catholic
Dogmatic theology should make further contributions to the theology of Catholic Action, notably pertinent material from
the tract on the Church. Two recent works with useful material of this
kind are Canon Jacques Leclercq's La Vie du Christ dans son Eglise and
Abbe Hassyeld's Dans Christ et dans l'Eglise, which are the class notes
used in his course on the Church given at the Grand Seminaire of Lille.
Catholicisme by Henri DeLubac, S. J., is also of interest on this matter.
Furthermore, dogma should also furnish a treatment of the social aspects
of grace, such as Father Fournier has developed in La theologie d' Action
catholique. It must also investigate the effects of the Incarnation on
material reality, possibly along the lines suggested by Gustave Thils in his
Theologie des Realites terrestres. The theology of Catholic Action will
also have to explore further the relation between the spiritual and temporal orders to delineate more clearly the layman's area of competence.
Even these dogmatic considerations would not round out the theology of
Catholic Action. Moral theology would have a contribution to make, too;
this would consist in at least an analysis of social justice and the other
social virtues, a trend begun by Rev. William Ferree, S.M. in his Act of
Social Justice and Limits of Individual Responsibility for Social Reconstruction. Finally, the theology of Catholic Action must contain an
analysis of that which, according to most authorities, foL·mal!y constitutes
Catholic Action, the mandate. Certainly, the theology of Cat!1olic Actionand ·even its dogmatic basis-is broader than a treatment of hy par.ticipation in Christ's priesthood through the sacramental characters.
While on the one hand, the two dissertations under consideration narrow

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down too much the theological basis of Catholic Action, on the other
hand they deal with a subject broader than Catholic Action. They deal
with the lay apostolate rather than with Catholic Action. Unfortunately,
both of the studies seem to confuse or identify Catholic Action with the
lay apostolate. Father Voss says that Catholic Action is just the modern
name for the auxiliary lay apostolate (p. 109) and that it differs from
the traditional lay apostolate only in its form of organization (p. ll1).
Father Hesburgh uses the terms interchangeably, e. g. (p. 22), "What
then is the nature of this lay apostolate according to Pius XI? It is well
to begin with a definition since Pius XI has formulated and canonized
one. His classical definition of Catholic Action is: The participation ...
etc." Father Hesburgh does mention in passing the relationship between
the " official Catholic Action organization with other organized apostolates
of a less universal nature" (p. 21), but there is nothing in the study that
gives a basis for making such a distinction. It would seem from these
studies that there is no basis theologically for distinguishing Catholic
Action from other forms of the lay apostolate, although-in practice, at
least-the Popes insist upon distinguishing between them.
It is a fact that Pius XI and the other Popes have at times used the
term Catholic Action broadly so as to be practically equivalent to the lay
apostolate. Simultaneously, however, they insist upon a distinction between Catholic Action in the strict sense and other activities of the lay
apostolate. Father Hesburgh explains this apparent papal contradiction
by saying that the distinction refers to Catholic Action taken either in the
dynamic sense (an apostolic activity following upon supernatural being)
or in the static sense of an officially mandated organization of the lay
apostolate. Theologically speaking, Catholic Action from the dynamic
point of view is the same as the lay apostolate; they differ only in the
form of organization and canonical status. This is an assumption that
cannot be accepted without proof. Neither author gives proof.
This gratuitous identification of Catholic Action and the lay apostolate
seems to be based upon the failure to distinguish a deputation to participate in the apostolate of the hierarchy, which is given by the hierarchy to
some from a deputation to defend the faith of Christ publicly and firmly,
which is given by Christ to all, as a secondary deputation of the Confirmation character. The definition of Catholic Action is the participation of the laity in the apostolate of the hierarchy, while the dogmatic
basis for the lay apostolate is the secondary deputation of the character.
The two, therefore, are not identical, and differ not only in their comprehension but in their proper causes as well. It follows also that Catholic
Action differs from the lay apostolate not only statically (in its organizational form) but also dynamically (in its intrinsic nature). Failure to
distinguish between Catholic Action and the lay apostolate because of

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529

this confusion of principle can result also in a germane error held by some
that Catholic Action is the visible organization of the lay priesthood, the
entire " lower half of the church formed into a single organization," that
would parallel the organized hierarchy," the upper half of the Church."
Obviously, the laymen in Catholic Action share in the deputation of
the character, since they are baptised and confirmed as are other Catholics.
Also, their apostolic activity performed in Catholic Action will be at the
same time an exercise, of their deputation. The converse is not true. One
can do apostolic work for which one is fitted by the exercise of one's
deputation and need not at the same time be engaged in Catholic Action.
Wherein lies the difference?
The difference apparently lies in whether the activity is an exercise of
the secondary deputation of Confirmation only or of this deputation and
also of a participation in the apostolate of the hierarchy. This raises the
question as to what the apostolate of the hierarchy is and how the laity
share in it. Most writers on Catholic Action hesitate to attribute to the
laity a share in either the power of orders or the power of jurisdiction.
Certainly not in orders. And neither in jurisdiction, since the explicit
authority of canon law and Church tradition is against this. Probably
the most satisfying answer to the problem of what the apostolate of the
hierarchy is and how the laymen share in it is that given by Canon
Glorieux in his booklet Catholic Action: the Mandated Apostolate (Berliner & Lanigan, Nevada City, Calif.). Glorieux says that Catholic Action
is a participation in the apostolate which is proper to the hierarchy, viz.,
" the assuming of the responsibilities for the whole church, the taking of
measures for and the constant care of the whole " (p. 6) . Thus, in Catholic
Action, the laity share in the pastoral responsibilities of the Bishop. The
Bishop usually confers this share in his pastoral responsibilities by explicit
delegation, by a mandate. The mandate given to an organized group of
laymen dedicates the group to an apostolate for the common good of a
definite area or milieu of which they are representative. Since the common
good consists for the most part of sound institutions, much of the activity
of the people in Catholic Action will be devoted to the Christianization of
institutions, or social habits. For efficient action, this usually requires
specialization in Catholic A.ction.
The question of what the mandate is and what it adds to specify the lay
apostolate is far from settled. Despite uncertainties as to the nature and
necessity of the mandate, there is not much doubt about the distinction
between Catholic Action and the lay apostolate, whether it is the mandate
that makes all the difference or not. Most authorities on Catholic Action
lay great stress on the mandate, though papal documents hardly refer to
it all, and then only in vague terms. If it is the mandate which formally
constitutes Catholic Action, it is difficult to see how there can be a

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" theology of Catholic Action " without a consideration of that which
formally constitutes Catholic Action. The theology of Catholic Action is
not completed merely with a proof that there is such a thing as a lay
apostolate, nor can it be assumed that because the laity enjoy a deputatation from Confirmation they also participate in the apostolate of the
hierarchy. A theology of Catholic Action must consider the apostolate of
the hierarchy and how the laity share in it.
Neither Father Hesburh nor Father Voss treats the question of what
the mandate adds over and above the lay apostolate. In his conclusion,
Father Hesburgh writes: " Since the Church Militant is a visible society,
organized under the sacred power and authority of the hierarchy, the lay
apostolate requires an external mandate, over and above the inner consecration to the apostolate by the sacramental characters" (p. 187). This
statement appears only in the conclusion. It is not discussed or proved in
the body of the book. It is difficult to see the basis for it, and it seems to
be contrary to facts. The lay apostolate has always existed in the Church,
whereas the external mandate is a modern device. Merely because the
Church is a visible society with an authoritive hierarchy is no proof that
the lay apostolate requires
external mandate. Genuine lay apostolates
can and have existed in the Church with the permission or even the mere
toleration of the hierarchy. A mandate is more than this.
On the other hand, it is possible to over-emphasize the mandate. Some
writers make everything depend upon it. But it can be questioned whether
a mandate alone can make any organization to which it is given, Catholic
Action. Those who hold that it can do so seem to be taking an extremely
voluntaristic position and espousing a type of nominalism by identifying a
being with its name. Merely calling an organization Catholic Action, or
even giving it a mandate, will not make it Catholic Action unless it has
the internal characteristics necessary for the essence of Catholic Action.
Catholic Action is not purely a juridic creation. It requires certain internal
qualifications. Furthermore, besides having the external mandate, it seems
that an organization to be Catholic Action must have the social qualities
which make it a realistic and functional answer to the problem of secularism. As Father Hesburgh points out, Catholic Action is devised as an
answer to the problem of secularism. If this is so, it 'Yould seem that
nothing is Catholic Action if it cannot meet the problem iwith reasonable
efficiency, and it is Catholic Action insofar as it can. This does not mean
that an organization in order to qualify as Catholic Action must be successful in meeting the problem of secularism. But it does mean that it per se
has the internal qualifications and adequate social means. Per accidens, it
may fail because of the enormity of the task or for other reasons; but it
is the right answer in itself.
This fact of the requirements of Catholic Action from a social point of
view (as the solution of the problem of secularism) should have some

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bearing on the theology of Catholic Action, dogmatic and moral. It is
unlikely that the theology of Catholic Action can be completely worked
out; except in function of the problem that Catholic Action is devised to
meet. It seems, too, that the theology of Catholic Action will progress
as Catholic Action itself develops. Father Hesburgh introduces his dissertation with a consideration of the problem of secularism and shows that
it occasioned the papal teaching on Catholic Action. He justifies his
treatment by pointing out that the papal documents are one of the loci
theologici and so a legitimate source for a dogmatic study. It is unfortunate that he does not continue this method of treatment, but breaks
off from it completely, proceeds to give a treatment of the sacramental
characters, and never returns to his point of departure. The reader is left
to wonder how all the development of the sacramental characters applies
to the problem of secularism. Naturally, one would not expect a treatment
of the technical and sociological aspects of Catholic Action in a theological
study, but one could expect an indication of how the dogmatic truths under
consideration are related to the problem which occasioned their study.
Perhaps it is still too soon to write the complete theology of Catholic
Action. Theologians are just becoming aware of its vast implications.
Significantly, there have been no serious attempts in recent years to make
a complete synthesis of Catholic Action theory, even in Europe where
thought on the subject is far advanced. This fact does not reflect a lack
of interest, because there have been numerous excellent articles and monographs on various aspects of Catholic Action. But it does signify an
increased realization of the profundity of the subject. The present attitude towards the theology of Catholic Action is illustrated by the action
of a prominent theologian at Rome, author of a very scholarly book on
Catholic Action which appeared some ten years ago. Recently, when
asked to bring his book up to date for re-publication, he declined, saying
that he now realizes the inadequacy of his first book and his inability to
write the theology of Catholic Action at this stage of its development. He
added that the theology of Catholic Action would not be merely deduced
in an abstract way but that it would evolve and clarify with the progress
of the living movements of Catholic Action.
Considerable work on various aspects of the theory of Catholic Action
is now being done. Much more remains to be done before a synthesis will
be possible. Research such as that done by Father Hesburgh on the sacramental characters is important and necessary. There should be similar
studies on other topics connected with the theological basis of Catholic
Action. Work of this kind will pave the way to the formulation of the
complete theology of Catholic Action.
THOMAS

The Catholic University of America,
Wa.Yhington, D. C.

J. REESE

BRIEF NOTICES
Der Italienische Humanismus. By EuGENIO GARIN. Berne: A. Francke,
1947. Pp. 295, with index. S. fr. 13.80.
The period of thought from the thirteenth century peaks of Scholastic
thought to the time of Bacon and Descartes is not always carefully studied
by philosophers. The Renaissance which tlus period includes is left largely
to students of history, art, and literature; and except for the names of
Scotus and 0<'.kham, the transition from medieval to modern philosophy is
often viewed as an abrupt break rather than the gradual sequence of ideas
wluch it actually embodied. Philosophers of history, it is true, point to the
Renaissance as a movement toward subjectivity and toward man's fellow
creatures in this world. They signalize the aestheticism of the Renaissance
and the effect of a few important people like Leonardo, Galileo, and perhaps
Giordano Bruno. But despite the efforts of a few enterprising scholars, the
full itinerary from medieval to modern times, at least in its philosophical
aspects, remains to be mapped.
Der ltalieni.sche Httmanismus is the study of various schools and various
thinkers from the end of the fourteenth century .to the beginning of the
seventeenth. It is of a statistical character, attempting to draw no philosophical conclusions in the light of the subsequent systems that humanism
helped to prompt but aiming more to present the thoughts of the vast
number of Italian humanists from Petrarch to Campanella. In view of the
surprisingly long parade of philosophers studied here, most of them obscure
thinkers and not previously studied by modern scholarship, at least together, this work reflects a patient and arduous degree of research and
provokes many more degrees of stimulation. It contains copious footnotes
and an annotated bibliography for each
There is also an index
of names and dates of the men treated in the body.
The author has organized his book for the most part chronologically.
To a great extent, as if to emphasize a certain logical movement that can
be inductively discerned in history, this arrangement enables a broad
division according to topics. Thus there are chapters on the origins of
humanism; on the social and civil life which the early humanists preached
in opposition to celibacy; on Platonism with its doctrines of aesthetic
intuition and of voluntarism; on Aristotle and the problem of man's unity;
on logic, rhetoric, and poetry which the humanists adopted as their organon;
on morality which they adopted to a great extent as their end, even though
confm,ing the good with the beautiful; and on experiment which came to be
adopted as the means of studying nature naturally. There is a final chapter
on the period from Bruno to Campanella which includes a study of the
Renaissance and the Reformation.

58!t

BRIEF NOTICES

533

Among the more prominent humanists studied are Marsilio Ficino and
Pico della Mirandola. A host of others treated in this book are less well
known. In the whole of the work, it is curious to note how much that now
seems post-Cartesian and even twentieth-century was said and said explicitly by these Italian humanists. Some of the passages would make
parts of Jeans, Dewey, Santayana, James, the existentialists, Einstein,
Russell, Morris, Marx, Alexander, and Whitehead seem like plagiarisms.
The naturalists would acknowledge the men of the Renaissance as their
intellectual ancestors. What could be more Marxian than " man is born
in order to be useful to men" (p. 64)? What could be more Jamesian or
Blondellian than " agere est intelligere " (p.
?
From its origins, the Renaissance tended to lower men's sights from the
search after eternal verities and to fix their attention on the here and now.
The emphasis on social and political life, on patriotism, on aesthetic contemplation, on experiment, and on the. logic of discovery-all consort in this
humanistic aim, so that Descartes when he turned man inward upon himself plowed up a soil that was already prepared to receive and nurture his
ideas. Even earlier and in Italy itself, Galileo with his empiricism in
science and his nominalism in philosophy simply swept forward rather than
created the idea that nature could only be interpreted by nature itself.
Empirical science thus solved a problem that beset the humanists. There
was a danger which some of them saw and some of them felt, as its actual
victims, that a vicious circle results when nature .is studied in and for
itself and that the only solution is a Plotinian
quite like the
purely aesthetic contemplation which Santayana urges upon men. From,
this circle, tmpirical science seemed to rescue the later humananism. By
the life-saving role that it thus seemed to play, it came to be regarded as
the only approach to the real. The popularity of scientism was thus prepared before Leonardo and Galileo started their experiments. That preparation, philosophically sketched, was accomplished to a great extent by
the men studied in this highly commendable book.

St. Thornas and the Greek Moralists. By VERNON J. BoURKE. Milwaukee:
Marquette University Press, 1947. Pp. 53, with index. $1.50.
History of Philosophy and Philosophical Education. By ETIENNE GILSON.
Marquette University Press, 1948. Pp. 49. $1.50.
Two of the traditionally annual Aquinas lectures were sponsored during
1947 by the Aristotelian Society of Marquette University. These two little
books are the respective texts.
Professor Bourke makes out a case that St. Thomas, though obviously
dominating his matter by his own superior insights, drew upon the ethics
of Hellenic thought, especially upon Aristotle and the Stoics. He elucidates

584

BRIEF NOTICES

how the genius of Aquinas elaborated on the Aristotelian notion of goodness in the light of man's ultimate end which revelation clarified. He shows
further how the Thomistic notion of reason, while admitting in a broad
sense the Stoic account of it, broadens the concept in a way that relates
good acts to norms speculatively known and ultimately theocentric.
Thomistic moral philosophy is divided into three considerations: the
inner structure of the moral act, psychologically analyzed into the parts
played by intellect and will; the meaning of right reason; and the organization of mo1·al philosophy in terms of the various virtues. Professor
Bourke shows that the structure of human acts is analyzed according to a
pattern from St. John Damascene who developed his thought from the
ethics and psychology of Aristotle. With regard to the meaning of right
reason, it is found that the intellectualism of Aristotle and the naturalism
of the Stoics come together in the sublimating synthesis of St. Thomas.
The pattern of orga11izingmoral philosophy according to virtues and their
" parts " is suggested in the Nichomachean Ethics, and is followed more or
less by Andronicus, Macrobius, Seneca, Cicero, and Plotinus.
The material in this book is skillfully organized, and despite its brevity,
it exhibits familiarity with a wide variety of sources. There is a section of
footnotes at the end. As a matter of detail, it may be wondered whether
Plato and the so-called Platonici so often cited by Aquinas did not play at
least a mentionable part in his moral philosophy. Aquinas admits their
thesis on the primacy of good in the order of intention. Also, and as a
matter of even smaller detail, the contention that St. Thomas had no
fluency in reading Greek, as Professor Bourke declares, is not universally
admitted.
Professor Gilson's !ccture is likewise an excellent and thought-provoking
contribution. He distinguishes between studying philosophy by way of
manuals which have a tende11cy to make the subject a matter of rote and
a vital penetration in which one not merely studies philosophy but becomes
a philosopher. He develops the Augustinian and Thomistic philosophy of
teaching and learning and, in his usually clear way, he make a strong plea
for greater emphasis in education on the history of philosophy as a study
of living ideas. In these days of educational ferment when so many
institutions are revamping their curricula to achieve a broader and better
integration, Gilson's discussion of where philosophy actually exists and how
it is related to individual philosophers cannot help being a timely contribution to American philosophy. He is apparently not satisfied with the
idea that we should study what others have thought to know what to
think ourselves. However, he does not state exactly how his principles
differ from this opinion.
This essay can be read with profit by every philosopher. There is much
in it for the teacher not only in directing his own personal thought but in
transforming courses in the history of philosophy into a much livelier

BRmF NOTICES

535

status than many of them now oc<'upy in the student's mind. The thesis
which Gilson advocates does not fully develop the fact that the study of
philosophy is a three- rather than two-termed relation, involving not only
the present philosopher and past philosophies but the experience which both
seek to interpret and to which both must conform. It is true that he
adverts to the fact that philosophy lives only in the present. But philosophy, it would seem, evolves from that present as much as it does from
the answers given in the past. Indeed, it is from the dynamism of our own
experience with the answers that other philosophers would give to it that
the personal philosophy which Gilson lauds is developed and enriched.
These two lectures are stimulating steps toward the type of philosophizing which Gilson envisions. They are entirely worthy of the high standards
which the previous ten Aquinas lectures have set.

How Our Minds Work. By C. E. M. JoAD. New York: The Philosophical
Library, 1947. Pp. 116, with index. $!2.75.
Contemporary psychology, through the influences of Behaviorism and
Freudianism, has descended into a cellar that is mostly physiological,
evolutionary, and materialist in character. In such a view, mind is simply
matter peculiarly combined and pressured ever forward by its inward
tensions. Basically mind thus becomes the sport of its material parts which
are traced backward to their origins along roads that Watson called reflexes
and that Freud termed evolutionary drives.
Against this philosophy of mind, Professor Joad takes forceful issue,
combining his gifts for apt examples with his remarkable insights as a
thinker and controversialist. The result is a h1ghly effective statement of
some of modern psychology's ignored and unsolved questions. There is,
however, a great deal of mystery wrapped about Professor Joad's own
solution to the problem of mind. This inadequacy is indicated on the
opening page where mind is pictured as an hypothesis, and psychology as
a system of theories rather than, like biology, physics, and chemistry, a
statement of given and predictable facts. But the larger view of this work
must advert to the wholesomeness of its attack on materialism and the
wealth of exampleE which it provides for all those who accept the immanent
view of life and the spiritual nature of man.
It is difficult to decide exactly how Dr. Joad solves the mind-body
problem. He discusses it largely in Cartesian rather than hylomorphic
strains, but near the end of his work he takes a much more holistic
view than the Cartesian tradition would approve. In this climactic section
of his work, faculty psychology is rejected in the interest of saving the
psychophysical unity, and "reason" and "instinct" are related as a
curving mirror which, on one side, looks convex and, on the other, concave.
This is neither Descartes nor Leihniz speaking, but neither is it hylo-

586

BRIEF NOTICES

morphism which insists that actions are through the faculties but of the
supposa.
In the opening chapter, mind is portrayed as apparently an immaterial
interpreter presiding over the chain of neurological reflexes in the body.
Against the background of Darwinism, the typical modern view of mind is
expounded-an epiphenomenon created by the material forces of a purely
phenomenal universe. In the third chapter, the obvious difficulties of
sensism and various forms of behaviorism are effectively lined up to bear
their powerful testimony in favor of the immaterial in man. •· .Mind so
conceived is an active, dynamic, synthesizing force; it goes out beyond the
sensations provided by external stimuli and arranges them into patterns,
and it seems to be capable on occasion of acting without the provocation
of bodily stimuli to set it in motion." (p. 74.)
With this evidence
his self-styled " hypothesis " that mind exists,
Professor Joad sets out to picture mind more as an activity than as a
thing. He rejects McDougalls' view of man in terms of instincts and
emotions, citing and defending .Aristotle's thesis that desire has to do with
the ends of action but that reason maps out the way to the willed
destinations.
Mustering his forces against what Allers calls elementarism in psychology,
Professor Joad makes his case for an apparently holistic rather than hylomorphic solution to his problem. He holds " that there are no purely
cognitive, affective, or conative experiences." (p. 104.) Certainly an
Aristotelian could retain his faculty psychology and agree with this analysis.
Man is a unity, and all of his actions resonate throughout that unity.
Yet there must be a difference somewhere between the cognitive, affective,
and conative aspects of an experience, or the consciousness of their distinction would remain unexplained. So conceived, man is a unit operating
through powers. The object is also a illiit. seen according to its various
aspects by the powers which the aspects specify.
There is a brief concluding chapter in criticism of the theory of the
unconscious, the argument being that the distinction between the unconscious and the conscious is not in accordance with the unity of the human
mind. Repressions, Professor Joad adds, can be better described in terms
of neural patterns acquired through experience and poised for immediate
action whenever the proper stimulus sets them off.
Strangely enough, Professor Joad's main difficulty seems to be not so
much mind as body. Though insisting on the unity of mind, he constantly refers to the body as though it were the locus of separate neural
phenomena that somehow interact with mind and follow it like the ship
of the Platonic pilot. The real problem is not mind-body but soul and
prime matter. In the final analysis, Professor Joad has stressed, he thinks,
the unity of mind. But he does not account for mind's union, not as
efficient but as formal cause, with the corporal part of man. The human

BRIEF NOTICES

537

body is not a human body until it is suffused with an informing soul. As
long as this fact is not taken into account, psychology will continue its
mad and convulsive shifting from one theory to another without expiaining
the real compenetration of soul and matter as vegetative, animal, and even
intellectual operations, in their origins, bring it forcefully to light.

Elements of Symbolic Logic. By HANS REICHENBACH.
millan, 1947. Pp. 444, with index. $5.00.

New York: Mac-

Dr. Reichenbach, now professor of philosophy at the University of California at Los Angeles, presents this book on symbolic logic as the fruit of
years of reflection on the subject, together with wide experience of teaching
it in various countries and thus to various linguistic groups. He acknowledges his debt to Russell, Hilbert, and Carnap, reaffirming his allegiance
to the so-called logical empiricist school which more or less accepts Russell's
verdict that philosophy is logic and logic alone.
Dr. Reichenbach begins his treatment of the subject with the calculus of
propositions and comes to the calculus of classes only after a treatment of
propositional functions. This is more or less the order of Russell, but its
validity is not universally admitted. Traditional logic, it is well known,
begins with the term or class and studies the judgment or proposition in
the second of its three sections. The reasoning behind this order is that
classification must precede the combination of classes, just as matter has
a natural (though not a temporal) priority over form. In their ordering
of the subject, the mathematical logicians like Reichenbach and Russell
are thus not faithful to their analytic method. In this respect, Lewis and
Langford are more logical. Aiming to solve the problem, Russell is impelled
to his theory of types in order to achieve a consistent presentation of his
subject in terms of the priority of the propositional function. But the
validity of this type theory, which is really earlier than Russell and is
suggested by Frege, is now seriously questioned, and Professor Reichenbach,
as will be seen below, does not deal with or even mention its principal
adversary.
Logic in this ;book becomes the " analysis of language," and the instrument employed is the metalanguage. Analytically, this resort to n-metalanguages and even an infinity of them is satisfactory for the purposes of
symbolic logic and in the domain of production rather than speculation
where it truly and fruitfully applies. But mathematical logicians have the
habit of avoiding the Knotenpunkt where the object language and the
metalanguage come together as closely as matter and form. In speaking
of the continuum, Aristotle said that it was infinitely divisible but never
infinitely divided. A similar statement could be made of the continuum in
logical dassification. It is infinitely formalizable but never infinitely
formaJized. A decision between the ordinary two-valued logic and the three-

9

538

BRIEF NOTICES

valued logic of Lucasiewicz and Tarski cannot be fully handled by either.
One may well surmise that an n-valued or infinity-valued logic could also
be hypothecated depending on ratios of probability.
Mathematical logic is a tool for thinking through problems of an empirical
and productive character where the hylomorphic union must necessarily be
ignored, given the so-called scientific method. But there is no such thing
thing as pure logic any more than there is pure art. The mathematical
logicians are in general.not sufficiently aware of what classification realistically entails and of the dialectical rather than demonstrative instruments
which defend its conclusions and communicate them. No treatment of
correct thinking, and this book purports to be of such a type, can be
adequate and fully useful unless it emphasises thinking as well as correctness. It must therefore include a discussion of abstraction as the basis of
all human thought and the types of necessity which abstraction discloses to
exist among things and among thoughts.
The original contributions of this book are chiefly in the analysis of
conversational language. (Chapter VII.) Symbolic logic is highly useful
for the understanding and improvement of grammar, though it is again
limited by the fact that grammar is an art and not infinitely formalizable.
On the score of completion, mention should also have been made, in this
work, of rhetoric. The book is intended as a text, and if its readers are to
be realistically educated by it, they should be aware of its limitations as
well as of its value. They should be apprized as fully as possible of the way
in which it fits in with the other activities of thought, speech, and communication.
Intuitionism, as advocated for example by Brouwer, gives a different
version of mathematical thinking from that of the formalists like Hilbert
and the logicists like Russell and Carnap. Russell, in the second edition
(1938) of his Principles of Mathematics acknowledges without refutation
that the intuitionists are a redoubtable opponent of his type theory. Intuitionism would challenge the validity of the structure such as Reichenbach
has worked out, and for that reason, its arguments and method might well
have been discussed and evaluated in a book like this.
This book is probably not suited for use on an elementary classroom level
since it does not explain and develop the manipulation of symbolisms with
sufficient example to enable the student to proceed on his own. For more
advanced readers, it is a clear presentation of the subject, especially of the
general directions behind it, and it is certainly recommended reading for
scientists, grammarians, educators, psychologists, and all others interested
in gaining empirical control over their subject matter. For a more philosophical viewpoint, however, recommendation must be tempered by the
consideration that in all thinking the subject and the object have something
from within that scholastics call natures and that abstraction alone can
apprehend.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Anderson, F. H. The Philosophy of Francis Bacon. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1948. Pp. 812, with index. $4.00.
Berenson, B. Aesthetics and History in the Visual Arts. New York: Pantheon Books, 1948. Pp. 260, with index. $4.00.
BruggeJ;", W. Philosophisces Worterbuch. Vienna: Verlag Herder, 1948.
(Thomas Morus Presse) Pp. 582, with index. S 88; s frs. 16.50.
Bryson, L., ed. The Communication of Ideas. (Religion and Civilization
Series) New York: Harper, 1948. Pp. 296, with index. $5.50.
Cummins, P. Dante Theologian. St. Louis: Herder, 1948. Pp. 604, with a
dictionary of proper names. $6.00.
Dooyeweerd, H. Transcendental Problems of Philosophic Thought. Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1948. Pp. 80. $1.50.
Gardner, W. H. Gerard Manley Hopkins. (Vol. I) New Haven: Yale
University Press, 19·18. Pp. 804, with index. $4.00.
Gasset, J. The Dehumanization of Art and Notes on the Novel. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1948. Pp. 108. $2.00.
Halbach, A. A. The Definition of Meaning in American Education. Washington: Catholic University Press, 1948. Pp. 160, with index of names.
Hartschome, C. The Divine Relativity. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1948. Pp. 164, with index. $2.75.
Kaftal, G. St. Dominic in Early Tuscan Painting. Oxford: Blackfriars,
1948. Pp. 95. 7s 6d.
McCarthy, J. W. The Naturalism of Samuel Alexander. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1948. Pp. 111, with index. $!l.50.
McNabb, V. The Akathistos Hymn. Hassocks, Sussex: The Ditchling
Press, 1948. Pp. 12, with notes. 8s 6d.
McSorley, J. Meditations for Everyman. (Vol. II) St. Louis: Herser, 1948.
Pp. 211, with index. $2.75.
Mueller, G. E. Philosophy of Literature. New York: Philosophical Library,
1948. Pp. 226, with index. $8.50.
Newman, J. H. Essays ana Sketches. (8 vol.) New York: Longmans,
Green, 1948. Vol. I: Pp. 410, with index; Vol. II: Pp. 884, with index;
Vol. III: Pp. 897, with index. $8.50 each.
Pauwels, C. F. Apologetiek. Roermond-Maaseik: J. J. Romen & Zonen,
1948. Pp. 778, with index.
Rossiter, C. L. Constitutional Dictatorship. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948. Pp. 822, with index. $5.00.
Sartre, J. P. The Psychology of Imagination. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1948. Pp. 285, with index. $8.75.

589

540

BOOKS RECEIVED

Sattler, H. V. A Philosophy of Submission. Washington: Catholic University Press, 1948. Pp. !21!2, with index.
Scherer, P. The Plight of Freedom. New York: Harper, 1948. Pp. !2!27,
with index. $!2.50.
Sheen, F. J. Philosophy of Religion. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
1948. Pp. 4!24, with index. $5.00.
Sorokin, P. A. The Reconstruction of Humanity. Boston: Beacon Press.
1948. Pp. !247, with index. $3.00.
Spitzig, J. A. Sacramental Penance in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries. Washington: Catholic University Press, 1948. Pp. 196.
Thonnard, F. J. Extraits des Grands Philosophes. Tournai, Belgium:
Desclee & Cie, 1948. Pp. 845, with index.
Tillich, P. The Protestant Era. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1948. Pp. 355, with index. $4.00.
Toohey, J. J. An Elementary Handbook of Logic. New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts, Inc., 1948. Pp. 194, with appendix and index. $!2.00.
Toynbee, A. J. Civilization on Trial. New York: Oxford, 1948. Pp. !271.
$3.50.

Valery, P. Reflections on the World Today. New York: Pantheon Books,
1948. Pp. 1200. $3.50.
Voggensperger, R. Der Begrifj der Geschichte als Wissenschaft. Freiburg,
Switzerland: Paulusverlag, 1948. Pp. 130.
Von Wiese, L. Ethik (in der schauweise der wissenschaften von mens chen
und von der gesellschaft). Berne, Switzerland: A. Francke, 1948.
Pp. 443. S. Fr. 35.00; 39.00 cloth bound.
Tyrrell, F. M. The Role of Assent in Judgment. Washington: Catholic
University Press, 1948. Pp. 184, with index.
Wahl, J. The Philosopher's Way. New York: Oxford University Press,
1948. Pp. 334, with index. $5.00.
White, L. G. (trans.), Dante's The Divine Comedy. New York: Pantheon
Books, 1948. Pp. !204, with 69 full page illustrations. $6.50.
Wyser, P. Thomas von Aquin: In Librrm Boethii De Trinitate, Q. 5 et 6.
Fribourg: Ed. St. Paul, 1948. Pp. 80.

INDICES OF VOLUME XI (1948,1
INDEX OF AUTHORS

PAGE

ALLERS, R. Review of The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities,
by F. C. S. Northrop .
241
--. Review of M etafisica dell' essere parziale, by Carmelo
Ottaviano .
874
--. Review of Nervous Disorders and Character, by J. G. Mc892
Kenzie .
--. Review of Medicine for Moderns, by F. G. Slaughter .
892
ALLUNTIS, F. R. Review of The Tran,,cendentals and Their Function.
520
in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus, by A. B. Wolter .
BocHENSKI, I. On Analogy .
424
BoND, L. M. The Effect of Bodily Temperament on Psychical Characteristics (Part II) .
28
CoNSIDINE, J. S. Review of The Apocalypse of Saint John, by R. J.
Leonertz
870
CoNWAY, J. What the Modern Man Should Not Believe .
277
EGAN, J. M. Review of The Three Ages of the Interior Life, by R.
ll9
Garrigou-Lagrange
--. Review of Common Mystic Prayer, by G. Diefenbach .
ll9
FoLEY, L. Review of On Understanding Science, by J. B. Conant .
265
FoRMICA, I. Review of Evil and the Christian Faith, by N. F. S.
Ferre
258
GALLAGHER, D. Review of Leon Bloy, Pilgrim of the Absolute, by R.
Maritain
259
--. Review of An Historical Introduction to Modern Philosophy,
by H. Miller .
516
HAcKETT, J. W. Review of A Scientist's Approach to Religion, by C.
W. Miller .
26'!
HuGHES, J. N. Review of Fearful Symmetry, by N. Frye .
257
KENNY, J. P. The Bases of the International Military Tribunal's
197
Authority .
LINTZ, E. J. Review of Essays in Science and Philosophy, by A. N.
889
Whitehead .
LuMBRERAS, P. Notes on the Connection of the Virtues .
218
McGuiNESS, I. Mystici Corporis and the Soul of the Church
18
--. Review of Politica de Vitoria, by A. G. Robledo .
105
--. Review of La Filosofia de Ley segun Domingo de Soto, by
A. Z. Vergara .
105
--. Review of 1'he Main Problems of Philosophy, by 0. Robles 105

541

642

INDICES

OF VOLUME XI

(1948)
PAGE

McSWEENEY, A. Review of Ethics, by R. A. Tsanoff .
894
MARIE CAROLYN, SISTER, 0. P. Review of The Shaping of the
American Tradition, by L. M. Hacker .
880
MuLLANEY, T. The Basis of the Suarezian Teaching on Human
Freedom .
. 1, 448
MURPHY, R. T. Review of Revelation and Response in the Old Testa122
ment, by C. Simpson .
MuRRAY, R. Review of De Gratia, by P. Lumbreras .
261
NuEssE, C. J. Review of Unity and Difference in American Life, by
R. Maciver .
247
---. Review of Foundations of Democracy, by F. E. Johnson
247
PAUWELS, C. F. Theological Problems of Conversion .
409
QUIRK, C. B. Review of Religion in Economics, by J. R. Everett .
112
REEsE, T. J. Review of The Theology of Catholic Action, by T. M.
Hesburgh .
525
---. Review of De Fundamentis Actionis Catholicae ad Mentem
S. Gregorii Magni, by J. Voss .
525
SMITH, V. Existentialism and Existence .
. 141,297
---. Review of La Synthese Thomiste, by R. Garrigou-Lagrange,
QP.
VoLL, U. Review of Apologia Pro Vita Sua, by J. H. Newman
508
508
Review of A Grammar of Assent, by J. H. Newman .
---. Review of The Idea of a University, by J. H. Newman
508

INDEX OF ARTICLES
424
Analogy, On--. I. BocHENSKI .
Basis, The-- of the Suarezian Teaching on Human Freedom. T. U.
MuLLANEY
1,880,448
Believe, What the Modern Man Should Not--. P. CoNWAY .
277
Bodily Temperament, The Effect of-- on Psychical Characteristics.
L. M. BOND .
28
Church, M ystici Corporis and the Soul of the--. I. McGuiNESS
18
218
Connection of the Virtues, Notes on the --. P. LuMBRERAS
409
Conversion, Theological Problems of--. C. F. PAUWELS .
141,297
Existentialism and Existence. V. E. SMITH .
Freedom, The Basis of the Suarezian Teaching on Human--. T. U.
1,880,448

International Military Tribunal's Authority, The Bases of the--.
J. P. KENNY .

197

INDICES

OF VOLUME XI

(1948)

548

PAGE
Modern Man, What the--Should Not Believe. P. CoNWAY
227
Mystici Corporis and the Soul of the Church. I. McGUINESS .
18
Notes on the Connection of the Virtues. P. LuMBRERAS .
218
On Analogy. I. BocHENSKI .
424
409
Problems, Theological--of Conversion. C. F. PAUWELS
Psychical Characteristics, The Effect of Bodily Temperament on--.
L. M. BoND .
28
Soul of the Church, Mystici Corporis and the--. I. McGuiNESS .
18
Suarezian Teaching on Human Freedom, The Basis of the--. T. U.
MuLLANEY .
. 1, 830, 448
Theologieal Problems of Conversion. C. F. PAUWELS .
409
Tribunal's, The Bases of the International Military-- Authority.
J. P. KENNY .
197
218
Virtues, Notes on the Connection of the--. P. LuMBERAS
What the Modern Man Should Not Believe. P. CoNWAY .
277

INDEX OF BOOK REVIEWS
CoNANT, J. B. On Understanding Science (L. C. Foley)
DIEFENBACH, G. Common Mystic Prayer (J. M. Egan)
EvERETT, J. R. Religion in Economics (C. B. Quirk) .
FERRE N. F. S. Evil and the Chri.9tian Faith (I. Formica)
FRYE, N. Fearful Symmetry (J. N. Hughes) .
GARRIGou-LAGRANGE, R. The Three Ages of the Spiritual Life
(.J. M. Egan)
---. La Synthese Thomiste (V. E. Smith) .
HAcKER, L. M. The Shaping of the American Tradition (Sister M.
Carolyn, 0. P.)
HEsBURGH, T. M. The Theology of Catholic Action (T. J. Reese)
JoHNSON, F. E. Foundations of Democracy (C. J. Nuesse)
LEONERTZ, R. J. The Apocalypse of St. John (J. S. Considine)
LuMBRERAS, P. De Gratia (R. Murray)
McKENZIE, J. G. Nervous Disorders and Character (R. Allers)
MAcivER, R. Unity and Difference in A.merican Life (C. J. Nuesse)
MARITAIN, R. Leon Bloy, Piligrim of the Absolute (D. A. Gallagher)
MILLER, C. A Scientist's Approach to Religion (J. W. Hackett) .
MILLER, H. An Historical Introduction to Modern Philosophy
(D. A. Gallagher)
NEWMAN, J. H. Apologia Pro Vita Sua (U. Voll)
A Grammar of Assent (U. Voll) .
--. The Idea of a University (U. Voll)

265

119
112
258
257

119
385

880
525
247

870
261
892
247

259
262

516
503
508
508

544

INDICES

OF VOLUME XI

(1948)
PAGE

NoRTHROP,

F. C. S. The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities

(R. Allers)
C. Metafisica dell' essere parziale (R. Allers) .
RoBLEDO, A. G. Politica de Vitoria (1. McGuiness) .
RoBLES, 0. The Main Problems of Philosophy (1. McGuiness}
OTTAVIANO,

SIMPSON,

874
105
105

C. A. Revelation and Response in the Old Testament

(R. T. Murphy)
SLAUGHTER, F. G. Medicine for Moderns (R. Allers) .
TSANOFF, R. A. Ethics (A. McSweeney) .
394
VERGARA, A. Z. La Filosofia de la Ley segun Domingo Soto (1.
McGuiness)
105

Voss, J. De Fundamentis Actionis Catholicae Ad Mentem S. Gregorii
Magni (T. J. Reese) .
WHITEHEAD, A. N. Essays in Science and Philosophy (E. Lintz) . 389
WoLTER, A. B. The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (F. Alluntis) .

END OF VoLUME XI