THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EmToRs: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PRoVINCE OF ST. JosEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoL. XII OCTOBER, 1949 No.4 NO PLACE FOR RAIN HE western world has nearly come to the conclusion that hell is probably unpleasant. At least the previews of the last fifteen years have shaken us out of a smug dismissal of the possibilities of hell. No amount of evidence can move any man to an admittance of the certainties of hell, since hell, like heaven, is a supernatural thing that must be believed until the doors swing open for the investigator who demands first hand evidence. Still, the previews are as convincing as intrinsic evidence can be in such a matter. For in these past fifteen years whole nations have adopted the habits of hell as first principles of personal and national activities. Injustice, and its inevitable climax of hatred of God, have been paraded with pride and praised for their obvious and immediate successes. Until recently, we have taken injustice rather lightly, perhaps because we have thought of it in terms of disparate acts of burglary or business acumen. When it appeared on the stage of the world as a fixed habit, a vice, men found it hard to 397 398 WALTER FARRELL believe their eyes; surely, such stark evil could not walk nakedly through the lives of men shamelessly, without embarrassment, with no attempt at secrecy. It took the unmistakable evidence of concentration camps, murder kitchens, dying testimony of hulks of battered eyewitnesses who testified with their bodies as well as their words, to convince the men of the West that the foulness of this vice was poisoning the world that had been Christian. But this, as we learned in the slow way of incredulous men, was only a beginning; the kindergarten level of the science of evil was initiated in Nazi Germany. The graduate level was reached only after the world writhed in agony from its contacts with the tots who had learned so quickly and so eagerly. Now the western world is slowly coming to realize that the masters have taken over behind the Iron Curtain, with no intention of limiting their fundamental principles of injustice and hatred to the territory already besmirched by the soot from the fires of hell. We are shocked by flagrant injustice, superabundant even for vicious goals. Political slavery, police terrorism, mock trials cluttered with the harvest of torture, murder, imprisonment, flagrant and barefaced falsehood, nations disappearing under our very eyes and human beings by the thousands snatched into a mysteriously evil oblivion; these things have shaken us badly. Such extremes go beyond any assignable purpose except sheer malice. The hand we lift in protest is, we notice, trembling; for such loathsomeness does more than turn the stomach of a man. We are not yet looking through the open doors of but the preview is almost too much for us. It is a badly needed comfort to look about the part of the world still left to us and breathe its air deeply. Here, thank God, things are different. Every detail of the comparison of the two worlds is flattering, and we begin to think of ourselves as angels of light girding for battle with the powers of darkness. Almost, we thank God that we are not as the rest of men. Here is a battle of absolute fundamentals, a basic opposition of love and justice to hatred and injustice; and we are on the side of NO PLACE FOR RAIN 399 the angels. So we begin to muster our forces, particularly our moral forces since this is ultimately a moral battle. At this point our vigorous righteousness begins to ooze away. Not that we are any less revolted by the reign of the vice of injustice; but we are bewildered by the paradoxical condition of the world of the West. That flattering uprightness, so long considered a kind of inheritance, fares badly when we bring it out of the shadow of assumptions into the pitiless glare of close scrutiny. Perhaps our mustering of forces will have to be much more than a call to arms. Certainly our most superficial glance reveals a plethora of unjust acts. But, then, every age has had its share of individual, isolated, sporadic injustices. Even though our age may have a somewhat more abundant supply of these, this is reassuringly balanced by the lack of evidence of any wide-spread infiltration of the vice of justice. Perhaps we are guilty of some diabolical mistreatment of others, but at least we do not go about such things with a devilish malice; the very next day may find us crowding the hours with angelic ministrations of thoughtfulness and mercy. Well, then, where is the difficulty? On one side you have a world plague-ridden by the vice of injustice; on the other, an absence of that vice, as far as the evidence can show such freedom from vice. The difficulty lies in the fact that there is also practically no evidence of the presence of the virtue of justice! We are brought up short by the astounding suspicion that perhaps we are living in a society that subsists without either the vice of injustice or the virtue of justice, a kind of social vacuum which is in itself a contradiction in terms. The vice of injustice makes a desert of society; the virtue of justice is the green of the valleys. But here we have some anomalous thing that is neither life nor death, desert nor fertile land, a society peopled by neither the just nor the unjust. If the Lord makes His rain to fall on both the just and the unjust, then here is a land in which there is no place for rain! Perhaps this astounding suspicion will give way before a fuller mustering of facts. But it is unsettling enough to demand thorough investigation. If, as 400 WALTER FARRELL a result of such an investigation, the incredible social vacuum should prove not only worthy of credence but inescapably a fact, if the suspicion should be confirmed, or any part of the suspicion, then the logical consequences of it must be looked at squarely. That may be as unsettling as the ominous miasma of evil that slowly spreads from the East; but in no other way can the radical and immediate remedies be found. Without such remedies, it is futile to talk in terms of mustering forces against injustice from a land barren of justice. For our consolation, let us first attempt to establish our freedom, at least on a national scale, from the vice of injustice. Let it be admitted at once that this does not imply a denial of, or a blindness to, the unjust actions of the men of our time and our country. On the contrary, an open confrontation of the facts of injustice will facilitate our understanding of the gratifying fact that the vice of injustice has not as yet made its domicile among us. The men of the West are undoubtedly guilty of injustice. It may be argued, and to a considerable degree of probability proved, that injustice has had a flourishing time of it since the last war. That, however, is not particularly relevant to our problem. We are interested in seeing the fact of injustice and the bearing of that fact upon the existence or non-existence of the vice of injustice. There is among us, as there has always been among men, a steady output of the sweaty, vulgar type of injustice from the labors of men who roll up their sleeves and go at injustice as a means of livelihood. These men are the professed criminals; their unjust acts are the openly criminal offenses that keep prisons crowded: acts of murder, of theft, of assault, of rape, kidnaping, and so on. These are the open enemies of society, the outcasts; they are not, of course, ever admitted to the drawing rooms of the better families, let alone invited for a quiet week-end. Then there are the increasing injustices perpetrated by men with no desire to risk the prison exile of the criminal but with every desire to share the quick NO PLACE FOR RAIN 401 returns offered by unjust methods. They are sure they do not belong in society but are even more sure they do not want to be cast out of it. So they pull and tug to get their hulking dishonesty into the garments of respectability, never looking comfortable, but stubbornly insisting that they are within the law, or at least not as yet apprehended. Their dishonest products are such things as the flourishing trick of charging a man for his need as well as for what he purchases, the fake " bonus '' plague which demands totally unauthorized extra payment for railroad tickets, hotel rooms, apartments, houses, automobiles; and finally for food, clothes, cigarettes, in wide open blackmarketing. This class will include all the gougers who prey on the helplessness of men and the weakness of law whether the gouging be effected in sharp business deals, shady legal tricks, or the " honest grafting " through political, economic, or labor offices. It is, you see, a shade safer and somewhat less violent than the racketeers' high-priced "protection"; but not one whit less unjust. To complete the story of actual injustices we must face the perfumed brutalities which have become delicately respectable. These are now taken for granted in the most select circles; easily topics of general conversation, and frequently matters of boast or of congratulation. For the most part, these injustices have crashed the gate to social acceptance by changing their names and being patient enough to let us get used to their presence. Take, for example, respectable murder. Instead of hacking a child to pieces we perform a craniotomy; in place of abortion, read therapeutic abortion; rather than kill the ill or aged, practise euthanasia. The foreign words are so confusingly long and so pleasantly melodious; not nearly so shocking as the vulgarly clear words like stab, hack, kilL In this way, the marriage contract has been eliminated; monogamy has been replaced by polygamy and polyandry in the best families. Mutilation of women for reasons other than disease is routine in hospital practice where religion does not raise a protest, while mutilation of men has gone to the point of legal approval on a wide scale. But be su.re you call these things by 402 WALTER FARRELL names like hysterectomy and sterilization; we must have melody with our injustice. The list of respectable injustices grows year by year; the hardworking professional criminal may eventually find it necessary to appeal to the police for protection of his field of labor, but then by that time perhaps even the police will have gone respectably unjust. At any rate, there can be no challenge to the presence of unjust acts in our time. Yet, for the most part, these things do not add up to the vice of injustice in any one individual. The vice of injustice is not easily come at; and its characteristic mark is to be found in the pleasure it' gives to the perpetrator of the unjust act. The possessor of the vice of illjustice likes to do the unjust thing precisely because it is unjust; he tramples on the rights of others precisely because they are rights of others. 1 It is this characteristic of injustice that is at the root of our abhorrence of the crimes of the Nazi and Communistic regimes; only this explains their boundless cruelties. It is important that we grasp this fully if we are to understand to what degree we ourselves are free or tainted with this vice. It will be worthwhile, then, to give some close attention to the formal nature of injustice. This vice is a spearhead of chaos, for its work is to introduce disorder into our contacts with others. Intemperance and cowardice make a shambles of the rule of reason in the inner kingdom of a man's soul, turning his appetites into a rebellious . horde perpetually_ locked in violent civil war. Injustice steps outside a man himself to the same goal of disorder and contemptuous hostility, for injustice deals formally and principally with others. 2 What comes to the unjust man himself as a result of his injustice is in a very real sense secondary. In1 " It is not easy for any man to do an unjust thing from choice, as though it 1 were pleasing for its own sake and not for the sake of something else: this is proper to one who has the habit, as Philosopher declares." Summa Theol., IIII, q. 59, urn. • " The will, like the reason, extends to all moral matters; i. e., passions and those external operations that relate to another person. On the other hand justice perfects the will solely in the point of its extending to operations that relate to another: and the same applies to injustice." Ibid., q. 59, a. 1, ad 8 urn. NO, PLACE FOR RAIN justice looks primarily to the doing of evil, good is a secondary, accidental thing; and it is this that gives injustice a distinctively satanic flair for the complete disorder and chaos of hell. 3 It is, by its very nature, a bitter, relentless opponent of amicable relations between men and of that basic order which must be the foundation of all human social life. From no more than this passing glance at injustice, it is not hard to see something of the amount of perversion which must go into its formation; since a first condition for this vice is that a man, in some viciously twisted way, should see the evil of tramping on others as an attractive focus for his desires. There are three general types of injustice, contradicting the three types of justice. The first is a contempt for the common good and is not our immediate concern in this study. Indeed, the world-wide trend today to a greater statism, whether it be by increasing paternalism or an increasing tyranny in government, would seem to argue that the danger to the common good is not to be found in existing contempt for it but rather in a frenzied embrace of it to its destruction. For when the alleged concern for the common good goes to the lengths of overlooking the welfare of the individuals of the community, or sacrificing them ruthlessly to common goals, the alleged common good is no longer either common or good; it is spoiled, perverted, destroyed, as a child is by weakly coddlinglove that subjects the parents to childish whims. The second type of injustice concentrates on the disproportionate distribution of labors and rewards by those in authority. This too can be put aside for our purposes that we might concentrate fully on that injustice that exists to disturb the balance of justice between individuals. 4 3 This is seen clearly if we remember that injustice is the direct contrary of justice. Thus, when St. Thomas describes the primary and secondary acts of justice, he is at the same time giving a direct insight into the opposing acts of injustice. " Doing good is the completive act of justice, and the principal part, so to speak, thereof. Declining from evil is a more imperfect act, and a secondary part of that virtue. Hence it is a material part, so to speak, thereof, and a necessary condition of the formal and completive part." Ibid., q. 79, a l, ad 3 urn. • The first and third types of injustice are stated explicitly: " Injustice is twofold. First there is illegal injustice which is opposed to legal justice: and this 404 WALTER FARRELL This injustice between individuals, particular injustice, works in the field of justice and is therefore concerned with an equality in external things, upsetting that equality. By it, a man reaches out to take more goods than belong to him or to bear less evils; which is to say, that he reaches out for someone else's goods and does his best to unload his evils on another. 5 The two points to be stressed here are the external, objective character of the injustice committed and the specifying formality of the habit. In the case of temperance, for example, if a man becomes drunk by accident or through ignorance, he is not only not intemperate, he has not placed an intemperate act, for the object of temperance is not an externally established thing; rather its object depends entirely on proportion to the man himself. On the contrary, in the case of injustice, dealing with externally established order, the taking of another man's property is still an unjust thing however ignorant or well-intentioned we may be in putting our hand into his pocket. In injustice, in other words, the act may be materially unjust even though it is not formally so, a thing impossible in the other moral virtues. 6 The second point to be stressed here is that "a habit (such as the vice of injustice) is specified by the object in its direct and formal acceptance, not in its material and indirect acceptance." 1 It is the primary goa], the end of the action intended is essentially a special vice, insofar as it regards a special object, namely the common good which it contemns; .... Secondly we speak of injustice in reference to an inequality between one person and another .... " Ibid., q. 59, a. l. For the second type of injustice, see Ibid., q. 61, a. 1; q. 63, a. l. 5 " We speak of injustice in reference to an inequality between one person and another, when one man wishes to have more goods, riches for example, or honors, and less evils, such as toil and losses, .... " (II-II, 59, l) Ibid., q. 59, aa. 1, 'i!. 6 Objectum non est aliquid exterius constitutum, sicut objectum justitiae; sed objectum temperantiae, id est, temperatum, accipitur solum in comparatione ad ipsum hominem. Et ideo quod est per accidens et praeter intentionem, non potest dici temperatum nee materialiter, nee formaliter; et similiter neque intemperatum; et quantum ad hoc est dissimile in justitia et in aliis virtutibus moralibus; sed quantum ad comparationem operationis ad habitum, in omnibus similiter se habet." Ibid., q. 59, a. 'i!, ad 3 urn. • Ibid., ad 1 urn. NO PLACE FOR RAIN 405 by its very nature that sets up a habit as different from all others, not the secondary effects, or the accidental by-products. Injustice always consists in injury to another; 8 for that injury to be a product of the vice of injustice, it must be the primary goal, the thing chosen, that attraction that draws a man into action. 9 Here is the core of the satanic repulsiveness of this vice of injustice, that it finds its complacency in injury inflicted on others; it actually makes a goal of that betrayal of our common nature; the crunch of bones under its iron heels is music to its ears. It follows from these two considerations that not all unjust actions are the fruit of the vice of injustice, though there is never any question of the objective injustice of an action whatever the driving forces that brought it into being. There can be unjust actions which are not from injustice. The unjust acts a man commits do not necessarily mark him out as an unjust man, in the proper sense of a man infected by the vice of injustice. This can, as a matter of fact, happen in two ways: either because the action is not aimed at an unjust goal, that is, there is no correspondence between the act and its proper (or unjust) object; or because the act as a matter of fact takes its rise from quite a different habit, that is, there is no correspondence between the act and the habit of injustice. To reduce this explanation to its simplest terms, we could say that unjust acts can be committed either from ignorance or from passion (such as anger, love of money, lust, and so on). In both cases, you 8 Ibid., a. 4. ••• sometimes from choice, for instance when the injustice itself is the direct object of one's complacency. In the latter case properly speaking it arises from a habit, because whenever a man has a habit, whatever befits that habit is, of itself, pleasant to him. Accordingly, to do what is unjust intentionally and by choice is proper to the unjust man, in which sense the unjust man is one who has the habit of injustice: ... " Ibid., a. 2. In Ethic., lib. V, iect. 13 (1045): " quando aliquis ex electione inducit alteri nocumentum, est injustus et malus. Et talis dicitur ex certa malitia peccare." Ibid., lect. 14 (1057): "scilicet quod simpliciter et per se injustum facere non est aliud quam quod aliquis volens noceat: et in hoc quod sit volens intelligitur, quod sciat et quod laedat, et quod nocumentum inferat, et ut, idest qualiter, et alias hujusmodi circumstantias." 9 " 406 WALTER FARRELL must absolve the man from the befoulment of the vice of injustice, though you are perfectly right to label him ignorant, hot-headed, greedy, or base. 10 The point is of major importance, which explains why St. Thomas devoted a whole article to it, and drove it home in great detail in his commentary on the Ethics of Aristotle. We appreciate this importance almost instinctively, and give it expression neatly in the difference of our response to the injustices perpetrated in the world of the West and the Iron Curtain countries: we are angry at the first, we loathe the second. As far as we can judge it, the white-slaver in this country is not primarily interested in debasing women but in using them for the accumulation of money. The dope peddler is not so furtively active because he likes the moral disembowlment of 10 " Accordingly it may happen in two ways that a man who does an unjust thing, is not unjust: first, on account of a lack of correspondence between the operation and its proper object. For the operation takes its species and name from its direct and not from its indirect object: and in things directed to an end the direct is that which is intended, and the indirect is what is beside the intention. Hence if a man do that which is unjust, without intending to do an unjust thing, for instance if he do it through ignorance, being unaware that it is unjust, properly speaking he does an unjust thing, not directly, but only indirectly, and, as it were, doing materially that which is unjust: hence such an act is not called an injustice. Secondly, this may happen on account of lack of proportion between the operation and the habit. For an injustice may sometimes arise from a passion, for instance, anger or desire, and sometimes from choice, for instance when the injustice itself is the direct object of one's complacency . . . a man may do what is unjust, unintentionally, or through passion, without havhig the habit of injustice." Summa Theol., q. 59, a. 2. In Ethic., lib. V, lect. 13 (1041): "Tripliciter contingit aliquod nocumentum inferri circa communicationes hominum adinvicem. Uno modo per ignorantiam et involuntarie. Alio modo voluntarie quidem, sed sine electione. Tertio modo voluntarie et cum electione." Ibid. (1044): "Quando aliquis sciens quidem nocumentum inferre sed non' praeconsilians, idest absque deliberatione, tunc est quaedam injustitia, sicut quaecumque aliquis co:mmittit per iram et alias passiones, si tamen non sunt naturales et necessariae hominibus. . .. Illi igitur qui propter praedictas passiones aliis nocent, peccant et f.aciunt quidem injustum, et actus eorum sunt injustificationes: non tamen propter hoc ipsi sunt injusti et mali, quia non inferunt nocumentum propter malitiam sed pr.<>Pter passionem. Et tales sunt qui dicuntur propter infirmitatem peccare." ' NO PLACE FOR RAIN 407 men; the racketeer, at least the executive racketeers, were not concerned chiefly about murder and destruction. So it is on down the line through the " almost legal " injustices, and the perfumed brutalities of the modern drawing room. The criscrossing parade of husbands and wives through the same home is not motivated primarily by pleasure in smashing the contract of marriage but by lust, boredom, cowardice or something of the kind. The crimes committed, approvingly, against unborn children, against the bodies of men and women, against the working man or his employer are, with practical universality, motivated by passion or by a fundamental ignorance that grows daily more fearful in its promise of social chaos. In view of this, it seems a solid conclusion that there is a gratifying absence of the vice of injustice in the men and women of the West. The conclusion is confirmed by lack of any public knowledge of the existence of the vice on a large scale; a fact attested to by the unfeigned horror that rolled in waves over our people at the authentic revelation of the work of this vice of injustice by the Nazi zealots. We called the beatings, tortures, mistreatment and starvation of millions of men senseless, irrational, because, in our loathing of these things, we were reluctant to believe they could come from men still in possession of their human faculties. These things were inhuman, bestial, diabolic; in reality, they were revelations of our capacity for sins, and of the revolting nature of this particular sin that does in fact make up a substantial part of the climate of hell. We had not time to recover from that first shock when the evidence of the continuation and aggravation of this vice on national scales began to roll in; for too long we remained disbelieving, perhaps because we are so reluctant to admit that human beings can be so abusive of men, and like it. Now the evidence can no longer be denied; there is a note of terror creeping into our revulsion from this slimy thing. All of this surely confirms the conclusion that there has not been evidence of the vice of injustice among ourselves. There have been, it is true, isolated cases of crime which would seem to indicate the vice of injustice as their source: 408 WALTER FARRELL murders apparently for murder's sake, brutal assaults for no assignable reason, sabotage that served no further purpose, and individual torturings. We have met these with the standard modern armor against moral facts, explaining that these people were undoubtedly sick, pathological cases; they were morons, or neurotics, obviously insane. Sin, particularly utterly repulsive sin, sin that hasn't as yet been perfumed into acceptance by the respectable, must always be waved out of existence or into the doctor's office. The things done were no less abominated, but we spared their perpetrators our abomination by a great pity which was not so much in their favor as in our own, that we might not be forced to see that rational men can sin from deliberate malice, that the air of hell can be mixed in the atmosphere we breathe. Though, of course, we still insist on taking full credit for anything of virtrte that crops up in our human world. Obviously we are fooling ourselves in this matter, for we did punish as criminals, in the war-criminals proceedings, men who had done just these same despicable things. The point here, however, is that the cases are sparse and scattered enough to allow us to engage in this self-deception. We have not been brought face to face with the vice of injustice here at home; which is a very good argument against its existence here. For injustice is not one to hide its face. Before we settle back to gloat at the absence of the vice of injustice among us while it is so prevalent in other parts of the world, it would be well to note some of the cautions imposed on our congratulations of ourselves by the very evidence used to prove our freedom from the odious vice. Of the dangers to be particularly noted, two demand serious consideration: the serious risk of getting used to the sight of unjust acts, and the even more serious increase of moral ignorance that makes men blind to the injustice of the things they are doing or seeing done. We can get so accustomed to sights, smells, sounds, as to be completely undisturbed by them; anything unaccustomed in these lines will bring us to sharp attention, while the usual NO PLACE FOR RAIN 409 things go unnoticed. A man can sleep through the roar of an elevated train speeding past his window, yet hear the tinkle of an alarm clock. Much the same thing is true in the moral order. What shocks us at first sight can, little by little, become so much a part of our daily experience as to seem almost normal; if the shocking things are injustices, this means that we !'I-re getting ourselves thoroughly disposed to accept injustice, prepared, indeed, to cultivate the satanic habit since it seems so widespread. Every age has faced this danger, for every age has had its injustices. Perhaps the least degree of this danger comes from the openly criminal injustices against which society ceaselessly wages war; though people did once get used to having brigands on the roads and pirates on the. seas, and we ourselves are almost resigned to graft. A greater danger comes from the " almost legal " injustices, perhaps because the helplessness of the protective forces of society gives theni wider scope. But surely the gravest danger of habituation comes from the perfumed brutalities that are accepted as routine in any level of society; perhaps it would be better to see these things not as dangers but as disastrously accomplished facts. We have become accustomed to these things; and to this degree we are prepared to accept injustice as a normal procedure in social life. Yet, regardless of the ignorance, the passion, or the good intention that lies behind a particular injustice, the damage done to men and to society is not lessened in the least. For material injustice is no less an overthrow of the balance of justice, of the order necessary to society than the injustice that flows from the formal vice of injustice. Just as much damage is done; for the norm of the just and unjust is an external thing which the inner dispositions of men do nothing to change. With this in mind, it is frightening to look at the injustices to which we have, in fact, become accustomed. Irreligion is so taken for granted that we rarely think of it in terms of injustice, though it is, of its very nature, the basic injustice of the creature against the source of all that he is and has. We do not even hear the marriage contract shattering against the walls of passionate selfishness any longer; it has happened too often 410 WALTER FARRELL to attract attention. Injustice has been so obscured in the practices of contraception that the organ of propaganda for this sort of thing can now call itself "Human Fertility," completely missing the humor of the absurdity. There is serious effort now being expended to have us take impurity in the young as normal and universal, and with considerable success. Fundamental mutilations of men and women, murders done in certain .modes, thievery on a grand scale, all these we are habituated to, so much so that we are surprised and hurt when their respectability is challenged. This moral blindness could not have come about through mere frequency of our contact with these things. The people who perpetrate these things with such undisturbed serenity of soul are not men and women who have simply become hardened to savagery; rather they are blind because they labor under a blanketing ignorance that makes it very nearly a psychological impossibility for them to see the injustice of their acts. But the injustice, you will remember, is no less damaging to men and to society despite their complete ignorance. It is this ignorance, the authors of it, and the means by which it has been accomplished that present the most serious threat to a defense against the vice of injustice both in its inner corrosion of ourselves and the violence of its acts from those who are already victims of it on the other side of the world. 11 With this established absence of the vice of injustice, it would be heartening to find that we were also just with all the vigor and promptness proper to the habit, or virtue, of justice. For then we would indeed be in a position to spearhead the opposition to the dark evils of injustice. In the beginning of this study, we voiced the strong suspicion that both the vice of injustice and the virtue of justice were absent from our national life. In investigating the latter part of that suspicion, we must tread carefully. It is never so true that virtue is better 11 We shall touch on this ignorance and its causes in some detail later on in this study when we attempt to analyze some of the reasons for the decay of the virtue of justice. NO PLACE FOR RAIN 411 hidden than vice as in the case of injustice and justice. It is not the smooth functioning of social life which draws our attention, but the upheavals of fights, riots, civil wars; we can take the first for granted as we usually do with. beneficient things. Under these circumstances, it would be absurd to attempt to demonstrate the absence of justice from the whole body politic. Yet, the lack of social upheavals at the moment does not argue so much to the presence of justice as it does to the lack of injustice; we may possibly be coasting along on the momentum of the virtue of another age. To keep within the bounds of the evidence, let us state our suspicion in these terms: there seems to be little public evidence of the virtue of justice in our western world; and on a priori grounds with considerable confirmation from the facts, it is difficult to understand the continued existence of the virtue of justice except within the relatively small group of those who hold to vitally strong religious beliefs. Even stated as cautiously as that, the suspicion of the defect our time nms into a mass of evidence of the virtue of justice that seems to smother it at once. Look at the apparent contradictions of this suspicion. In the disputes between labor and management, both sides proceed in the name of justice; both sides make accusations o£ injustice; both appeal to government and to public opinion in vindication o£ justice, the protection of their rights. Surely, standing thus on their rights, both sides would seem to be consumed with a hunger and thirst after justice. Then there is the matter arbitration which has come so far to the fore recently; surely the arbiter holds that position of impersonal fairness that we attribute to justice, and he acts in that objective fashion in declaring the just or right thing. er, Colorado. BOOK REVIEWS La double experience de Catherine Benincasa (Sainte-Catherine de Sienne). By RoBERT FAWTIER and Loms CANET. Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1948. Pp. 368. Fr. 550. This is an important book-not important for what it is in itself, but for what it connotes. The authors are Catholic laymen of the most erudite attainments in their respective fields: M. Fawtier in history; M. Canet in the history of Christian thought. It is not a joint work, for the former treats of Catherine's human experience, the latter of the spiritual aspects of her life. While their views are sometimes at variance, there is, nevertheless, a striking note of unity. A brief evaluation of the work of M. Fawtier appears in a recent issue of The Catholic Historical Review. A few observations there made should receive more extended notice here. l\1. Fawtier is no stranger to St. Catherine, and he professes the utmost admiration and veneration for her. In his Essai de critique des sources (2 vols. Paris, 1921-30), however, he provoked sharp criticism by the animus and violence of his attack upon the early biographers of the saint. He also touched off a scholarly restudy of the sources, many of which have since been published for the first time, and others may follow. From what have appeared up to now, it is apparent that he has won this battle against certain somewhat exaggerated (and, incidentally, undefended) estimates of the political role the saint played in the life of her times. But the role was not inconsiderable; Catherine cannot be eliminated therefrom (cf. M. Denis-Boulet, La carriere politique de Sainte Catherine de Sienne, Paris, 1939, which M. Fawtier cites with approval, and Arrigo Levasti, S. Caterina da Siena, Rome, 1947). In his attack upon the reliability of the hagiographical sources, however, M. Fawtier failed completely (cf. DenisBoulet, op. cit., 33, and M. H. Laurent, Il processo Castellano fasc. IX in Fontes vitae S. Catherinae historici, Rome, 1942). Nevertheless, M. Fawtier returns to the attack, chastened by the events of 1940-45, more mellow, but still aggressive and at times petulant if not violent. On April 29, 1942, the anniversary of St. Catherine's death, the Gestapo came to his home in the middle of the night. Three years later, almost to the very day, he sought hospitality in Switzerland, after a harrowing experience in Nazi concentration camps. Three years of meditation on the strange coincidence that deprived him of his liberty on that particular day determined him to stand like Catherine, firm in his convictions, and write a life of the saint, whether is was worthy of her or not. We may admire his courage, but not his tenacity. Scholarship and erudition should recognize that history deals with facts. A Catholic scholar, 500 BOOK REVIEWS 501 however critical, must take note of facts that the philosophy of the materialist and the Deist and the Protestant may refuse or fail to recognize. The supernatural life, the mystical life cannot be ignored. And this is not merely a question of miracles and the medieval attitude toward them. Saints are not ordinary folk. There are extraordinary men and women whom God has raised up for a definite work in the world under His provident care of mankind, and especially of His Church. The saints, above all mystics, are men and women in whom the supernatural life is in full operation, for it is dominant and it governs in diverse ways their natural and ordinary activities. To repeat, it is not merely a question of supernatural phenomena-whether this or that was a miracle, whether it really happened, or whether the credulity of the witness was excessive. It is a question of whether or not the spirit of God is at work, and of this exceedingly few are competent to judge. Now .. the supreme authority in the Dominican Order, the General Chapter, after investigating Catherine, recognized the spirit of God at work. The Master General of the Order committed her to the direction and guidance of one whose competency was beyond cavil. Later, the Holy Father confirmed the action and choice of the Dominican Gt:neral. Later still, the Church officially raised Catherine to the altars for public veneration and has, since M. Fawtier launched his initial attack on the story of her life, made her Patroness of Rome, second only to the Blessed Apostles Peter and Paul. The Church has also raised to the altars the director of Catherine. A passing reference to these facts is not sufficient. The implication of the facts in the life of the saint and in the course of events must also be acknowledged. For a Catholic historian, therefore, to limit his study to the human experience in the life of the Sienese mystic precludes the very possibility of presenting an accurate historical picture of her. And then, the attempt to split her in half-M. Fawtier painting one side, the other to be painted by a colleague--is to assure a caricature. The English speaking world was recently subjected to something of the sort in a book inspired by the earlier labors of this self-same M. Fawtier (cf. The Greategt Catherine, by Michael de la Bedoyere). The author tried to finish the picture and gloss over its defects with common, not Catholic, sense. A personality cannot be spilt: one side natural, the other supernatural. The natural is elevated, perfected, transformed by the supernattral. A Catholic historian must understand this in all its implications and ramifications, and if he turns hagiographer it is a condition sine q1ta non. M. Fawtier has failed miserably, and it appears that he knows it. Consequently, the whole human aspect of the life of Catherine is here presented in false light. For instance, although M. Fawtier restates his position more positively, more calmly, more objectively here than in his 502 BOOK REVIEWS critique, he is shocked because Catherine lived in the ideal, not the real world: she·is <'oncerned solely with moral evil and not with the physical miseries of the masses. She is a sainte pour signori, so conveniently can he forget her heroic ministrations to the sick. And he is scandalized when Catherine, burying with her own hands a little nephew who had succumbed to the plague despite her personal devotion, said joyously: " This one will not escape me." Moreover, M. Fawtier makes his judgments and solves controverted points according to human standards alone. A few examples will suffice to illustrate the point. The date of Catherine's birth can only be approximated.. Strangely enough, it is all important, for it is the crucial point of M. Fawtier's attack upon the reliability of Catherine's first biographer. All the evidence points definitely and uniformly to about 1847. M. Fawtier insists that she is ten years older. Why? Ultimately because he thinks the remorse of conscience the saint experienced throughout her life is proof that there was a serious breach of fidelity in once making herself attractive to please her sister. He thinks she was at that time already a member of the Third Order (which is contrary to the evidence). Her breach of fidelity, therefore, consisted in laying aside the habit of her Order, and that was a violation of the oath secular tertiaries were in those days required to take. Now, of course, there is no such thing as the delicate conscience of a saint. Saints, knowing so well the gravity of sin, see in their own personal faults almost unpardonable crimes. And Catherine was a mystic, and she is judged by the standards of the man in the street. Anyhow, M. Fawtier contends, Catherine must have been older: she would not have been able to direct and dominate her famiglia unless she were more mature than her biographers assert. Among her disciples were men of varied and exceptional cultural, intellectual, and spiritual attainments-they would not have followed a young slip of a girl nor have called her dilettissima Mamma. Then again, in M. Fawtier's eyes, Catherine was just a good girl who stayed at home and said her prayers, who .in her early years lived like other people with all their interests and curiosity. Why? Because, despite the evidence, the Rule of the Third Order called for no rigorous or violent asceticism; in fact, it discouraged excess. M. Fawtier sees no need of generosity for progress in the spiritual life, and Catherine scaled the heights of the mystical life. He does not deny the evidence of her union with God. On tite contrary, he sees in this very fact further proof of a normal attitude towards ascetical practices. Catherine could have been no emaciated, ragged, macerated, hair-shirted person. Even a silly friar does not fall in love with such a girl; and 'one, having been spurned and having been foiled in his design to assassinate her, cut his throat when he discovered that he had a Rival to Wltbm she was espoused. Now when this sort of hagiographical writing is applied to the important BOOK REVIEWS 503 events of Catherine's life, when she is enmeshed in the toils of what we today call world affairs, M. Fawtier thinks she has no knowledge of complicated political situations. She becomes a pitiful plaything in the hands of papal and civil politicians, and she has but one solution (a moral one) to all problems. She is duped and deceived by all, even by two popes. She is a complete and abject failure, for she had nothing to offer but her unwanted counsel and her prayers. If she accomplished anything, it was in some other sphere than in the human. In appealing his case-a case that has been all but definitely settled and which will certainly be definitively adverse once the remainder of the sources Fawtier has submitted no new evidence. becomes readily Considered as a rebuttal, his case is lame. He turns for support to a colleague, realizing his inability to give expression to his concept of the spirituality in Catherine's personality. The historian seeks the aid of a theologian, and gives him, as will be seen, some clues upon which to work. What is the significance of this? Let this simple fact be noted here: M. Fawtier has throughout his several works on Catherine, consciously or unconsciously, sought to isolate her from her Dominican connections. He discovered that many Dominicans were suspicious of her, that very few followed her with interest. Still fewer were numbered among her disciples; and these, he contends, by their tales and inventions created a personality that is unreal. She had no influence upon her Order in life, and after death the Order only came to be interested in her when, by the labors and propaganda of the creators of the unreal Catherine, the unhistorical came to be accepted as authentic because useful: as a support for the Roman party in the Great Schism; as a means of securing approval of the Third Order; and as a mystic rival of St. Francis of Assisi. Now Catherine was a reformer. She was but a babe in arms when the Black Death swept over the Italian peninsula. By the time she was twenty, its appalling effects upon clerical and religious life had come to harvest, for to meet the need of administering to souls a full generation of candidates hurriedly and unwisely chosen had had time to sow their tares. Catherine's mission was clear. What sort of a reformer was she? Since her historians have not given us the real picture, and since history will not or can not unmask the fraud, something more than probability may be found in theology. The tactics are reminiscent of what took place in the early part of the sixteenth century-but in reverse .. Then, the reformers of the Church turned from doctrine, after their defeat, to the early Church and to scandalous history in an attempt to sustain their contention that the Church had strayed in doctrine and in morals during the course of the centuries. Now, an historian, an admirer of a reformer, turns to a theologian for support in sustaining an historical thesis that is untenable. Why did he choose M. Canet? 504 BOOK REVIEWS In the second part of the book, M. Canet paints a picture of the natural disposition and personality as he sees Catherine in her writings. He then treats of the sources of her doctrine, and finally systematizes and expounds it. The picture is not attractive. It looks like what M. Fawtier saw more than twenty-five years ago. But M. Fawtier has now touched up his half of the picture, but not so M. Canet. For him, to sketch briefly what he saw, Catherine preached, she reproached, she would suffer no contradiction. The General of the Dominicans placed her under the direction of Raymond of Capua, but within less than two years Catherine was in the saddle, directing her director, commanding him as well as her disciples. In the last year of her life, she hurled bitter invectives at Raymond. Within a few months of her death, on behalf of God, she complains of and reproaches all mankind. She was ever anxious to come to blows with the devil, but she was generally more adroit in dealing with the weaknesses of human nature, although she could not restrain her impatience with Stefano Maconi, one of her secretaries. Despite whatever good will she manifested, she remained sharp and strained, solemn and monotonous, sententious and counseling, imperious and sarcastic. Her insupportable " I will," instead of inclining to obedience, incited rather to rebellion. And her letters, written, perhaps between the ages of fifteen [?] and thirty-three, manifest, to say the least, a certain self-assurance. Her writings, filled with allegories that are fatiguing and antiquated, are sometimes shocking to our sense of delicacy. And yet, in spite of her awkward and faulty style, " it is impossible to read her works, when one has had the will to force himself to do so, without recognizing in them one of the highest, the most original, and the most powerful expressions that has been given to Christianity" (p. 246). As to the sources of Catherine's doctrines: M. Canet rejects the scholastic, Aristotelico-Thomistic invention of "infused knowledge." Her doctrine, he says, is drawn from St. Augustine. Three words suffice to define it: An Augustinianism without predestination, in which the reign of divine grace is affirmed without impairing the sovereignty of the human will; in which nothing is produced except by God, .but by a God Who in all things makes Himself voluntarily the servant of man; in which, consequently, the Church is invited to renounce the pomps of this world to conform herself to the example of the Son of God-Who had not whereupon to lay His head-since, being scarcely nothing, she must after His example be love, for " she is founded in love, and is love." Here is no trace of the new doctrines in which Aristotelianism borrowed from the Arabs combined with the neo-Piatonism of the pseudo-Denis to represent the charity of God as a transcendental egoism. There is not in St. Catherine one word, I say one single word, that betrays a specific Thomistic influence, still less an influence of Eckard. The charity of which she sings is free from all contamination with it is pure ava'IM], drawn directly from Christ through the Pauline epistles and the writings of St. John, through . St. Augustine and the lone line of his BOOK REVIEWS 505 spiritual sons, among whom are reckoned St. Dominic and the first Friars Preachers (pp. 248-9). There are three currents by which this " pure Christianity " in the Augustinian tradition was carried to Catherine: 1) the Franciscan, brought to her by Giovanni Columbini (who founded the Jesuati and renewed the Franciscan ideal) and transmitted by means of the family connections of the Columbini and Benincasa; 2) the Cistercian current, under the original form given to it by St. Bridget of Sweden, and which reached Catherine through Alfonso de Valdeterra (who was confessor to Bridget and in contact with Catherine) and Christofano di Gano (a disciple of Catherine and the translator or transcriber of Bridget's Revelations); 3) the current transmitted: a) by the primitive and persistent Dominican tradition; b) by the Hermits of St. Augustine of Lecceto; c) by the Carthusians of Maggiano and Gorgona; d) by the liturgy of the Church (pp. fl52-71). In her communion with the Interior Master, Catherine came, in the light of the teachings she had receivlld, to experience and to taste divine realities. She was not interested in philosopl).y and theology; she professed no theory of knowledge: "She was a simple child, who saw in Christianity, not a system of concepts, a combination of formulas, a solemn uproar of words, but a discipline of life in which she found, so fully that it would have been useless to seek any substitute for it elsewhere, the solution of the problem that faces every man coming into this world when ... he commences to take cognizance of himself" (pp: 276-7) . M. Canet then proceeds to an exposition of Catherine's doctrine. To present it here in outline would do justice neither to the author of the book nor to the reader of this review, for it is a work of the most profound erudition and scholarly research in the field of medieval, in fact of all, mysticism. But excessive, almost exclusive, concern with the symbolic, the metaphorical, the poetic, colors the content and blinds the author to the grandeur and depth and orthodoxy of Catherine's thought. Contempt for theological speculation inclines him to consider mystical theology as the only valid means of obtaining a knowledge of God. The difference in terminology between speculative theologians and spiritual writers is mistaken for radical opposition in doctrine. These postulates involve M. Canet to understand some of in serious difficulties and make it impossible for the most fundamental theological concepts, to say nothing of Catholic And be it noted well, and kept ever in mind, there is not in this book one single reference to the defined doctrine of the Church. Catherine had a profoundly orthodox and theological mind endowed with virile power and feminine intuition. Can M. Canet, then, have given an authentic interpretation of Catherine's teaching? The admitted reluctance, moreover, with which M. Canet assumed his task can hardly inspire confidence in view of what M. Fawtier wrote: 506 BOOK REVIEWS n est a souhaiter que quelqu'un au courant de la mystique fasse une etude comparee de celle de Catherine et de celle de la princesse [Brigitte] suedoise (Critique: Sources hagiographiques, 188 n. 4, 184). ll serait a souhaiter qu'un theologien de metier etudiat la doctrine de Catherine et nous dise si celle-ci est purement et exclusivement dominicaine ou si, au contraire, on y discerne des elements etranger dont il faudrait alors determiner l'origine (Critique: Vherefore I gave My Word, My Only-begotten Son, because the whole mass of the human race was corrupted through the sin [peccato] of the first man Adam. Wherefore, all of you, vessels made of this mass, were corrupted and not disposed to have eternal life. For this reason, therefore, I, with My dignity, joined Myself to the baseness of your humanity, in order to remedy the corruption and death of the human race and to restore it to grace which was lost by sin [peccato]; for I was incapable of suffering, and yet, on account of the fault [colpa], My divine justice demanded satisfaction. But man was not sufficient to satisfy it, for even if he had been able to satisfy in some things, he could only have satisfied for 514 BOOK REVIEWS himself and not for other rational creatures. Besides, for this fault [colpa], man could satisfy neither for himself nor for others, because his fault [colpa] was committed ,against Me, Who am the Infinite Good. Wishing, however, to restore man who was enfeebled and could not satisfy for the above reason, and because he was enfeebled, I sent My Word, My own Son, clothed in your own very nature, the corrupted clay of Adam, in order that He might endure suffering in that selfsame nature that had offended, and, by suffering in His Body even to the opprobrious death of the cross, He placated My wrath. And thus I satisfied My justice and fulfilled My divine mercy, which mercy willed to satisfy for the fault [colpa] of man and dispose him for the good for which I had created him. This human nature, joined with the divine nature, was sufficient to satisfy for the whole human race, not only on account of the pain which it sustained in its finite nature, that is, in the mass of Adam, but by virtue of the Eternal Deity, a nature, divine, infinite ... Thus human nature was sufficient to satisfy for the fault [colpa], but only by virtue of the divine nature. In this way was destroyed the stain [marcia] of the sin [peccato] of Adam, and only the mark [segno] remained, that is, the inclination to sin [peccato] and all corporal defects, like the cicatrice [margine] which remains when a man is healed of a wound. The coming of the great Physician, My Only-begotten Son, cured this infirmitythe fault [colpa] of Adam which caused mortal stain [marcia]-by drinking the bitter medicine which man was not able to drink because he was much enfeebled. He did this as the nurse who drinks the medicine in place of the little one, because she is large and strong and the little one is not able to endure the bitterness. He was the nurse, enduring with the greatness and strength of the Deity united with your nature the bitter medicine of the painful death of the cross, to .heal and to give life to you, little ones enfeebled by the fault [colpa]. Only the mark [segno] remained of original sin [pecatto originale], which [pecatto] was contracted from your father and mother when you, were conceived by them. This mark [segno] is removed from the soul, "but not altogether," in holy Baptism, which Baptism has the power and gives the life of grace in virtue of the glorious and precious Blood. As soon as the soul has received holy Baptism, original sin [peccato originale] is taken away from it and grace is infused. And the inclination to sin [peccato], which is the cicatrice [margine] that remains from original sin [peccato originale], as said above, grows weaker and the soul can restrain it if she wishes. Thus the vessel of the soul is disposed to receive and increase grace in herself, more or less, according as it pleases her to dispose herself willingly, ... (D 14, DA 67-9). Scholarship should be tolerant. of opposing views in the interest of truth, and scholars who are seeking after truth should be patient in dealing with opponents. ,But there is such a thing as righteous indignation. And when methods of this sort are employed, under the influence of an antiintellectualism that permits voluntarism to run riot, it is time to cry out and to protest in the name of scholarship. Here we have in this book the profound erudition of an historian who sees in sanctity but a human thing. BOO:K REVIEWS 515 He is intent on driving a wedge between Catherine and the Dominican family to which she belonged. Failing in his efforts over the years and wishing to renew the attack, but being unable to find reinforcements in his own realm, he turns to an ally for aid and comfort. An attack is made in a new sector, but the tactics are the same: drive a wedge between Catherine and her Dominican brethren, isolate her from the Thomistic tradition. For what purpose? To destroy her? Not at all. It is far more subtle than that. The point to be noted here, however, is rather simple. M. Canet has failed to storm what he believes to be the central citadel of Catherine's position and upon which so much depends, i. e., " sovereign liberty " and freedom in its exercise quite independent of God but for the fact that it was given to man. In the process of feelmg out the strength of the attack, it has developed that there are certain specific, distinctive, and universally recognized characteristics of Thomism in Catherine's armory: primacy of the intellect over will; vision of God as the principal happiness of the blessed; predetermination or premotion of the will in every least thing; and a moving of the will by God that can be and is resisted by man, and also a motion that can be but is not in fact resisted-a distinction that came later to be called, respectively, sufficient grace and efficacious grace. This" simple child," therefore, according toM. Fawtier, learned what she knew " by word of mouth, and not by reading " (p. 64) . She was a complete failure in the human sphere (p. 9l86) -a pitiful tool of scheming politicians, papal and civil-she had nothing to offer a world in chaos save her prayers, her moral exhortation, and the example of her life. So be it! And no one can deny the frightful consequences to the Church and to the world because neither gave heed to " the foolish things of the world " that God had " chosen to put to shame the wise, and the weak things of the world" that God had "chosen to put to shame the strong." This " simple child," according to M. Canet, had in her no such thing as the Thomistic invention of" infused knowledge." She directed her director and commanded him as well as her disciples; but she was influenced by family connections and by two of her secretaries for the " pure Christianity " she taught. And yet, " there is not " in her " one word, I say one single word, that betrays a specific Thomisticjnfluence" (cf. supra, p. 'i'). Nevertheless, she gives evidence in her writings of four distinctive doctrines that characterize the school of St. Thomas. It would appear, therefore, that this " simple child " stands as a rather substantial witness to the authentic doctrine of St. Thomas. She died one hundred years after the Angelic Doctor and two hundred years before the great controversies on grace. She is a vital link in the chain that bi11ds the Commentators of St. Thomas to their great master. The attack on Catherine, therefore-that is the significance of this book for all Thomists in general and for Dominicans in particular. And it appears to have even wider significance in view of certain 516 BOOK REVIEWS trends in theology. But that must await a fuller examination of the whole view of Catherine's doctrine as propounded by M. Canet. It should be remarked here, however; that, in spite of the severe criticism to which the fruits of M. Canet's labors have been subjected, his labors are not without merit or value. The author may have been too busily engaged with the symbolic and the metaphorical to see the essential design and structure of Catherine's edifice--too busy gathering posies-but after all flowers do add to the beauty of a creation, if a creation it proves to be. And M. Canet has thoroughly explored and exhausted the field-ancient, medieval, and modern; pagan as well as Christian. But it still remains for a theologien de metier to determine what use Catherine made of the flowers in ornamenting her edifice. The book is superbly printed, and on good paper. Of course, it bears no imprimatur. JAMES B. WALKER, 0. P. Dominican House of Studies, River Forest, lUinoia. An Introduction to the History of Sociology. Edited by HARRY ELMER BARNES. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. Pp. 960, with index. $10.00. Historical Sociology: Its· Origins and Development; Theories of Social Evolution from Cave Life to Atomic Bombing. By HARRY ELMER BARNEs. New York: Philosophical Library, 1948. Pp. 186, with index. $3.00. After some years of undeniable prolificacy in the fields of history and sociology, Harry Elmer Barnes announces in these volumes that his labors in the history of social theory are at an end. In this branch alone he has authored or edited a dozen works, including these last, which are related closely to two done in collaboration with Professor Howard Becker, Social Thought from Lore to Science (1938) and Contemporary Social Theory (1940). Apparently this fertile ground is being relinquished in order that Barnes may concentrate his efforts upon the preparation of " a systematic work on the actual history of human society." He may well view this in anticipation as the proper crown for his ambitions. These have never been slight. The positive, oracular tone. characteristic of Barnes' previous writing is in these works as well. No blush in the preface to the History of Sociology accompanies the assertion that this is the " definitive summation and appraisal " of systematic sociology (p. x) ; no hesitancy is evident in the pronouncements with which, on allegedly scientific grounds, Barnes disposes of the whole trend of human history. The device which analysts of 517 BOOK REVIEWS propaganda call "the impression of universality" is used, consciously or unconsciously, to support what are obviously only the personal opinions of the author; this may be a trap for the unwary, and experienced scholars in the relevant fields will surely find it annoying, to say the least. This is particularly so when the character of the opinions is taken into account. Barnes is sure that all who know the facts believe with him in the omnipotence of science-his model is " the resolute courage of men like the late H. G. Wells who saw that scientific and mechanical marvels can bring untold benefits to mankind if we will but learn how to use them for the advantage of the race and to face social problems with the clarity and directness of science" (Historical Sociology, p. 169) -yet the conviction grows with reading that his notions really belong to a past age, a period in which it was somehow possible to accept uncritically theories of social evolution, progress, and cultural lag. A charge of anachronism cannot be leveled lightly against one so determined to resist what has been castigated as the contemporary "failure of nerve." The burden of this review, therefore, must be to show the basic defects in the concept of scientific sociology which Barnes has utilized in preparing the volumes under consideration. To the reviewer, this concept seems more akin to the ideas of Auguste Comte-who coined the word and is usually credited with founding the discipline of " sociology " a little more than a century ago-than to the definitions of the field advanced by leading theorists of the present generation of American sociologists. The latter are varied enough, as sociologists themselves know and others are fond of reminding them, but there has been at least a tendency toward convergence upon several principles of method which Barnes seems not to have noticed. These principles and their implications for further theoretical development may be dealt with below, in so far as they are within the range of interests of readers of a philosophical journal. * * * * * * First it is in place to note briefly the plan of these books and to estimate their usefulness. An Introduction to the History of Sociology is a collaborative work " presented as a comprehensive summary and critical appraisal of the growth of sociological thought from the ancient Near East to our own day, with the main emphasis on the systematic sociologists from Comte to Sorokin " (p. vii) . All but the first two of the forty-seven chapters treat individual theorists. Part I summarizes the pre-Comtian development; Part II treats as " pioneers of sociology " Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Lewis Henry Morgan, William Graham Sumner, Lester Frank Ward, and Ludwig Gumplowicz; other divisions of the book group the theorists regionally as Germanic, non-Germanic continental European, English, and American. Twenty chapters, including all in Parts I and II 518 ·BOOK REVIEWS except the one on Morgan, are the work of the editor; the others were written by twenty-five collaborators. It is manifestly impossible for a single reviewer to evaluate satisfactorily such a wide range of individual contributions. In general, the chapters are expository in character with critical content varying considerably from one to another. Among those which are most competently done, in the opinion of the reviewer, are those by Rudolf Heberle on Georg Simmel and Ferdinand Tonnies, J. Milton Yinger on Leopold von Wiese, N. S. Timasheff on Maksim Kovalevsky, and Emile Benoit-Smullyan on Emile Durkheim. In these and other chapters students may obtain relatively concise outlines of the life, works, method, theory, and sometimes the political orientation of each of the sociologists included. That the editor's announced objective has not been attained is due, on the one hand, to his own historical stereotypes and blind spots, and, on the other, to his plan of procedure. The first deficiency is glaring in the chapters written by Barnes himself, especially in the first two where he purports to· summarize all social thought before Comte. There Plato and Aristotle are confidently consigned to virtual irrelevance since their analyses of social phenomena have been "surpassed" by Comte, Quetelet, Spencer, and Ward (p. 6}; the Christian Fathers are alleged to have equated Seneca's "golden age" with the Garden of Eden, thus reinforcing " the already extremely retrospective character of Christian social philosophy, which rendered impossible any dynamic conception of human progress " (p. 13} ; Machiavelli is held to have " advanced beyond Plato and Aristotle in separating ethics from politics " and il[J. making " one of the most acute " early modem analyses of human nature based frankly upon "the premise of man's self-interest and the insatiability of human desire" (pp. 22-23} . No purpose would be served in continuing what could become an extended catalogue of similar personal valuations. Perhaps the most obvious fault in editorial planning is the vagueness of the principle on which theorists were selected for inclusion. The scope of the work was not limited to sociologists who treated the field as an empirical science, and indeed this would have been an impossible limitation, of much sociological writings. But once social phigiven the losophers are admitted for inclusion in a work of this kind, the problem of selectivity becomes very difficult. Hence, to select only a few examples, there are chapters on Benjamin Kidd and J. H. W. Stuckenberg but not on Frederic Lp Play or Karl Marx. It would be possible, too, to question inclusions and omissions among contemporary sociologists. More important, from the point of view of the over-all purpose of the book, is the failure to show any genuine development of sociology as a social science. Properly, this is not a history of sociology at all but a collection of essays on men who in the course of that history undertook to BOOK REVIEWS 519 develop more or less elaborate theoretical systems dealing with social phenomena. One who had to rely upon this book for his knowledge would conclude that sociologists had gone their own individual ways, putting all sorts of queer notions into circulati9n, but failing to develop a common · body of knowledge. To some extent, it must be admitted, such a conclusion would be justified. Unlike most comparable figures in other scientific fields, the leading sociologists of the first few generations remained in relative isolation from one another. While each had his followers or students, relatively little theoretical continuity can be discerned from one generation to the next. It is a fair guess that most present-day sociologists do not read Comte; if they do read his works, or those of Spencer or Ward, the fact is not evident from their writings. This is not a great loss, since the theoretical structures of these pioneers were in a large part built upon erroneous philosophical foundations. Indeed, the reader of these accounts of individual system-builders will gain, in a sense not intended by Barnes, " a far wider and more penetrating understanding of the problems of the last century " (p. x) by observing the confusion of minds of those who aspired to be the new social guides. It is apparent, too, that a large proportion of these systems were in one sense or another designs for soci3l reform rather than truly speculative scientific constructions at either empirical or philosophical levels. Comte himself thought of sociology as the governing science of the future, " positive " society which he had- postulated in his famous " law of the three stages"; for Spencer, llOciology formulated the applications of the evolutionary principle which dictated laissez-faire in the social sphere; Ward's well-known concept of "telesis," foreshadowing some recent ideas of social planning, indicated the bent of his systematic effort. The matter incorporated into the works of the various sociologists treated in this volume is extraordinarily varied and brings to mind Giddings description of the field as " the science of organized smatters." " It is not likely that there will be many more attempts to create systems of sociology " (p. x) , Barnes predicts, and he may well be right in so far as systems of the type he describes are concerned. It is more than a suspicion, however, that whether he realizes it or not, Barnes' own sympathies reflect the outdated grandiose conceptions of sociology which he relegates to the past; his declaration that " the chief justification of sociology is the guidance it can furnish to public officials and private citizens relative to building a better social order " (p. xi) reveals a normatively-oriented definition of the field; and this approach is exemplified in the readiness with which personal opinions on recent issues, such-as American participation in the First and Second World Wars, are injected into the historical matter without apology or qualification. 520 BOOK REVIEWS In evaluating the significance of theoretical contributions, Barnes is simply uncritical and unreliable, as a few examples will show. Sumner's Folkways, for instance, is praised unreservedly: "Of this work it is not inaccurate to say that it is unsurpassed as a sociological achievement by any single volume in any language and that ·it has made the sociological treatment of usages, manners, customs, mores, and morals essentially a completed task " (p. 157) . In view of the general agreement upon the illustrative (as opposed to demonstrative) character of the work, and the criticisms of the theory of mores by other sociologists as well as moralistsnone of which are mentioned in the text-this statement is nothing short of naive. Similarly, Ward's significance is attributed mainly to his statement of the " doctrine of the superiority of the conscious to the unconscious control of the social process " (p. 176) , which doctrine is alleged to be " perhaps the most important single contribution of sociology to human thought " (p. 177) . Gumplowicz is handled much more diffidently, but the theory that political origins may be reduced to force is said to have " gained such general acceptance among sociologists that it may almost be considered as the sociological theory of the origin of the state " (p. 195) . The word " almost " presumably excepts such an outstanding political sociologist as Professor Maciver, who has but recently described this Hobbesian view as having "completely lost hold" (The Web of Government, p. 19). Barnes' notions would be inexplicable were he not so clearly an adherent of a nineteenth-century brand of evolutionism. He is apparently sympathetic with Leslie A. White's attempt to rehabilitate the ideas of Lewis Henry Morgan; according to White, Morgan's " thesis of an evolutionary development of culture, repudiated or ignored by so many today, is the most basic concept of social science" (p. 151). The trends in sociological scholarship which Barnes does not reveal have been towards a much more modest definition of sociology as a positive science and toward a recognition of its limitations in respect to other fields which supply the basis for social policy, especially social philosophy. In part, these trends have been both the product and the cause of the high degree of specialization which now characterizes sociology as well as other academic fields, a specialization which is sometimes carried to exaggerated lengths. Barnes recognizes this phenomenon in a surmise that " sociological writing from this time onward promises to be mainly specialized forms of social theory " (p. x) , but he seems not to appreciate its implications for the problems of definition and theoretical development. Is it possible to have " specialized forms of social theory " without some basic conceptual system for the science of sociology as a _whole? Can scientific research even be attempted without an adequately defined frame of reference, which in turn implies the main outline of a theoretical system? The sociological systems of the past were undoubtedly far too preten- BOOK REVIEWS tious, as this History of Sociology reveals, but the discovery of these pretensions should not lead to the conclusion that systems as such are unnecessary or impossible. Outstanding theorists in contemporary sociological circles-such as Talcott Parsons, R. M. Maciver, Florian Znaniecki, or others-have circumscribed the field more carefully and constructed their theoretical systems accordingly. Their kind of "system" is underrepresented in this volume, and the arrangement of the materials prevents a grasp of the reasons for its appearance and its significance. * * * * * * Historical Sociology illustrates in a more specific way the same limitations of the author. The literature of the field has been sampled extensively, but the historical presentation is largely a compilation of materials within a framework of personal opinion. Begun as a chapter-length survey, the account was expanded to become " a comprehensive introduction " (p. ix) . As such, it is still sketchy in character and provides at best a kind of skeleton outline from which a student may obtain the names of thinkers and movements whom he may wish to investigate on his own. Little agreement upon the meaning of " historical sociology " would be found among sociologists. As the sub-title indicates, Barnes uses the term to signify the study of " social evolution." His definition of the field is so broad as to appear academically imperialistic: Historical sociology seeks, in the first place, to account for the origins of associated life among human beings, here relying mainly upon data from anthropogeography, biology, and psychology. It endeavors to trace the origins and development of all forms of social organization and structures. It deals with the rise and evolution of all social institutions. It treats of the beginnings, domination and decline of those social attitudes and philosophies which have affected social activities in various stages of history. It examines the question of the stages in the evolution of social types and structures. It tries to discover and formulate the. laws of social development, both with respect to broad stages of social evolution and with regard to particular periods and institutions. When it cannot discover laws of social evolution, it states the trends which are evident therein. It points out the historical basis of social maladjustments and social problems, laying special stress upon cultural lag or institutional maladjustment in our age. It takes up the problem of the elucidation and evaluation of the theory of social progress. (pp. S-4) Passing oyer the problem of finding in this statement a precise specification of the formal object of historical sociology, some other conspicuous shortcomings of this brief work deserve mention. Among the precursors of this study, which is traced back to primitive myth-makers and to the Greek Sophists, one notes especially the omission of St. Augustine and the French traditionalists of the nineteenth century; the German romanticists also appear somewhat neglected. The treatment of Christianity is almost wholly objectionable, since Barnes is not content to prescind from super- BOOK REVIEWS natural considerations but seems constrained, in the name of " realism," to deny their possibility (pp. 8, 33, 39, 54, 112, 142, 155-56, 162, 169) . One of the complaints brought against Christianity is the fact that it is nearly two thousand years old (p. 147); perhaps this serves as well as any com• ment to indicate the quality of the author's thinking on the problem of . social change. Cultural lag-" the gulf between machines and institutions" (p: 161)is posited as the basic cause of modern social problems disclosed by the study of historical sociology. This is a facile phrase which has been employed by sociologists for about twenty-five years. Used in a limited, purely descriptive sense, to indicate the evident disparity between high material achievement and prevalent social disorganization, it is legitimate enough. Causal implications have frequently been intended, however, and these are found in Barnes' use of the concept. It is assumed that technical ideas and social norms have essentially the same attributes, though they refer to different·objects. Throughout history, it has been easier to change technical ideas than social norms. The " lag " in the rate of change of the latter, it is held, explains the existence of social problems. It is apparent that such an explanation assumes, not only the identical conceptual character of technical and social norms, but also a relativistic and evolutionary conception of morality. Change, moreover, appears to be valued as an end in itself. That social change does not occur fast enough is explained by Barnes on the grounds of the crystallization of the bourgeois order and its defense by vested interests, the slow pace of secularization in the social realm, and " the disinclination of simians to indulge in abstractions" (p. 160). This last-" that, as simians, men are interested in, and adept at material things and the alterations thereof, while they are notoriously indifferent to, and incompetent at, social thought and social planning " (pp. 160-61)-comes from: a man who scoffs at the doctrine of original sin! * * * * * * This review has been devoted mainly to what is sometimes called " destructive criticism." The necessity for this approach is regrettable; the task it imposes can by no means be considered completed. It is unfortunate that so prolific an historian of the social sciences as Barnes should be so obstinately biased and so lacking in critical perspective and interpretive ability. Lest his work represent the plight of sociology as much worsf;) than it is, however, it seems desirable to append one or two comments on current trends in the field. The first of these concerns the tendency, already noted, toward a more precise delimitation of. the field as a positive science. This has come about partly as a result of specialization, partly as a result of verbal wars of attrition between theoretical schools which have left a certain residue of fact. Philosophical training might have hastened the development, BOOK REVIEWS .523 but few sociologists have had anything like adequate preparation in this respect, and few philosophers have taken the trouble to investigate the contributions of sociology. The scientific status of the field is still debated, although, naturally, much of the debate is centered upon the proper definition of science. The relations between this narrow specialty and social philosophy or social policy are variously formulated, but distinctions are at least being made, and this is a definite gain. A second trend is toward the elimination of the numerous "determinisms" with which sociology has been affiicted. Were there space, it might be interesting to cite recent critical appraisals of the so-called " ecological " approach which illustrate how, after a period of relatively unchallenged popylarity in which it stimulates a great deal of research, a theoretical formulation not too well thought out in the beginning is subjected· to examination and refinement. In this particular case, the significance of the cultural context of social organization for community structure has been re-asserted and the physical and economic factors properly subordinated. " Biological," " physical," " geographic," " psychological," and all sorts of other approaches may still be found, but they have probably diminished in influence as the relational character of social reality has become more clearly apparent and as the influence of behaviorism has waned. Such methodological works as Znaniecki's The Method of Sociology {1934), Parson's The Structure of Social Action {1937) , Maciver's Social Causation (1942), and Sorokin's Sociocultural Causality, Space, Time {1943), have helped to clear the ground and to provide more satisfactory conceptual schemes. These have focused attention, on the one hand, upon the analysis of the social act as the most elementary datum for the sociologist, thus removing the discussion over determinism out of sociology to other realms where it properly belongs; and, on the other, upon the patterning of social actions in complexes and institutions which constitute social structures and provide the framework for functional analysis. This " structural-functional " conception of social systems, as Parsons calls it, is replacing the once-popular conception of society as " process " with its deterministic connotations. On the whole, these trends appear to be in a direction which will lead to fruitful investigations and which will avoid the philosophical biases so evident in system-building of the past. This review cannot be concluded without the expression of a ·hope that more Catholics with adequate philosophical preparation will enter sociology. They are urgently needed, not only as teachers in Catholic institutiens, but as scholars who will both assist in the orderly theoretical development of the science and work with philosophers and theologians to advance the integration of social theory as a whole. c. J. NUESSE Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C. . BRIEF NOTICES Der Begri!J der Geschichte als Wissenschaft. By RENE Fribourg, Switzerland: Paulusverlag, 1948. Pp. 130. VoGGENSPERGER. In many respects, the modern mind is tilted toward Plato more than toward Aristotle. Though it is dangerous to press this point into its details, lest similarities become strained and history over-simplified, there is a way in which Plato represents that interest in the past which has caught fire in modern scholarship. It is a belief that, by probing back through the past, the present can be explained, the laws of things can be understood, and the secrets can be wrenched from the universe about its origins. Much more than Aristotle, Plato had a genetic approach to cosmology, and when the Renaissance ushered in the distinctively modern era it returned to Plato rather than to Aristotle. From this point, Voggensperger briefly traces out the modern ardor in regard to history, showing how Comte, Hegel, German historicism, and also the pragmatic view of history as magister vitae make the project, described in his title, a very timely enterprise. Though Dilthey is treated, the author might have given an even more pertinent aspect to his study had he mentioned the problems of history in Jaspers and Heidegger. Communism likewise leans heavily upon history for support of its dialectical philosophy, and American naturalism, Voggensperger might have said, is at pains to appeal to the past in order to define philosophy and to locate its present opportunities. But the author has done more than time his topic, the concept of history as a science. He has said a great number of interesting and important things about the subject and has shown a commendable interest in uniting what is good in Aristotle with whatever truth an Aristotelian spirit can discover in modern philosophies. It is well known that Aristotle did not value history very highly in the world of knowledge, even ranking it below poetry which he felt rose above historical singularities to a kind of universal insight. It is a bold project then to ask where history fits into to the realistic Aristotelian definition of science. The author, appealing to authority and using his own arguments, concludes to the following definition of history: "History is a science which studies, in their many-sided individuality and according to their causal and teleological coordination, socially relevant events and circumstances produced by human wins " (p. 50) . At first sight, this definition of what a science is taken to be today does not square at all with Aristotle's idea of what a science ought, to be. A certain knowledge in terms of causes, which is the Aristotelian account of 524 525 BRIEF NOTICES genuine science, must be evident in character, causal in method, necessary and universal. But history is a study of individuals. It involves acts not necessary but flowing from human freedom. Historical knowledge does not attain the essences of things. This, then, is the central problem of the author: To fit in the modern definition of science as a fait accompli with the rigor of Aristotle's definition. Voggensperger is impressed with Maritain's attempt to show the empirical sciences in terms of so-called perinoetic intellection. It will be remembered that Maritain argues that such empirical disciplines gravitate to areas like mathematics or philosophy which are more truly scientific. There is something of this same thought which remains in Voggensperger's approach to history, for his final solution of the problem is that Aristotle's account of science, which is after all what realism commands, must be retained at all costs. But Voggensperger argues that the modern idea of science is not altogether alien to Aristotle's. History, he concludes, is a scientia in fieri. It is condemned forever to aim at a truly scientific character and can be scientific only to the extent that it participates in what Aristotle required of episteme. But this actual elevation into a truly scienific status history as knowledge can never claim. Its actual achievement will always fall short of its ambition. As a science, it will always be in fieri. This is a challenging idea, capable of extension, if it is true, to much wider horizons in the modem world. But Aristotle also said that what is impossible to be is also impossible to become. It may be wondered whether this metaphysical maxim of Aristotle does not rule out Voggensperger's laudable attempt to extend his doctrine of the nature of science. Taken literally, the principle would mean that since the science of history is impossible to be, it could never even enjoy the humbler estate of a scientia in fieri. Reconstruction in Philosophy. By JoHN DEWEY. Press, 1948. Pp. fl7l, with index. $2.75. Boston: The Beacon This is one of Dewey's well known books and summarizes fairly well everything of importance that he has written. The present edition contains a thirty-seven page Introduction entitled " Reconstruction as Seen Twentyfive Years Later." Here Dewey renews his plea that social and cultural has lagged behind the empirical sciences and ought to be brought up to date under the high-octane power of scientific method. This of course is the me_aning which Dewey attaches to " reconstruction." A detailed doctrinal criticism of Dewey would only arouse the curious name-calling by which he and his fellow naturalists choose to dismiss the more traditional philosophies which attack them. Twenty-five years of such criticism have not softened this panoply of their dogma, but twenty-five 9 526 BRIEF NOTICES more years, even without criticism, are likely to do so. History is sitting in judgment upon them, and much more than their speculative critics, history is stern in its verdicts. Though Dewey states in his Introduction that the most important discovery of modern science is that all is process, twenty-five years between the first and second editions of this book have not altered his thought. The world which, with blessing or without it, has extended the scientific method as he advocates, does not find itself on the turnpike of cultural and social advancement. Indeed, the generation of Americans whose schooling Dewey has either directly influenced by his words or seconded by his spirit is farther than its predecessors from the ideal that Dewey envisions. For instance, during the recent war the Army found it necessary to institute an orientation program because the truly secular character of secular education had failed to give motives to its graduates which would prompt them to serve their. country, work for it, live for it, die for it. The emphasis on the practical in education was noted in the Steelman report to the President which bemoaned the fact that America was failing to produce good theorists in the sciences, men with speculative backgrounds and nurtured imaginations who could compensate for the closure of the European intellectual markets. Dr. 0. A. Baker, world famous population expert, has predicted that with present tendencies, our population will drop to 100,000,000 within a century. This serious threat to our national security and to the freshness, originality, and other youthful virtues which would wane in a nation top-heavy with old people is a natural result of an amoral outlook upon life which views birth prevention with indifference. Indeed, history is passing judgment on the secular spirit which scientism abets. What are some of the consequences of applying the scientific method to social and cultural problems? For one thing, the way to discover what Russia would do with the secrets of atomic energy is to give her the bomb and submit the outcome to the pragmatic test. The way to decide whether a Communism would be good or bad in this country would be to Communist regime in Washington. Both of these measures would resist experiment since they could happen once and could never be corrected in their consequences. This brings out the inherent fallacy of extending the scientific method to all knowledge and of judging value only in terms of consequences. Such a procedure cannot handle the things that happen only once, which are the most important things in human affairs. Every man, for instance, has only one life. He cannot judge its significance by its consequences, because the consequences are beyond his power to rectify when life is finished. Every act of man has something irrevocable in it, making a man better or worse after it is over but never leaving him the same. The scientific method works well in proportion as its matter becoll,leS morally indifferent and in proportion as BRIEF NOTICES 527 plurality· prevails so that if one guinea pig is killed by experimental medicines another guinea pig can brought in and the error corrected. In the really important decisions like the meaning of life, the choice of a marriage partner, an oath of office, to mention only a few examples, the pragmatic and instrumental test is of no appreciable use at all. The mind must analyze the situation confronting it as it exists, not comparing it with a preconceived theory or a practical consequence but taking it in itself and as it is. This means that human life is impossible unless we admit that things are intelligible in themselves in greater or less degrees and unless we reject the Dewey myth that things are intelligible only in terms outside of them, namely, their consequences. The Philosophy of Man. By HENRI RENARD, S.J. Milwaukee: 1948. Pp. 248, with indexes. $2.75. Bruce, " The Philosophy of Man is a college textbook in rational psychology ... Its aim is to present a complete synthesis of St. Thomas' philosophical reflections on man" (p. V). The order of topics follows, approximately, that of St. Thomas' "De Romine": the preliminary discussion of life is followed immediately by an analysis of the nature of man's soul and of its union with the body. Next the. powers of the soul are treated in general followed by a brief discussion of the vegetative powers. A chapter on " The Problem of Knowledge In' General " prefaces the study of the sense and intellectual cognitive powers. The concluding chapter deals with the sense appetites, the will, the habits; to this is appended an " Epilogue: The End of Man Is Happiness in God." This division is convincingly defended (pp. 8-4). The book is prefaced by an analytical table of contents and has both a subject and an author index. The rich Thomism of this little work is evident in three ways. First, there is the doctrinal fidelity to the teaching of St. Thomas. On every controverted point Father Renard is unequivocally Thomistic: the intellectual soul is the only substantial form of man (pp. 47-49); the powers of the soul are really distinct from its essence (pp. 54-57) ; the divine motion of the human will (pp. 192-198), etc. Second, the diversity of the works by Thomas here cited is indicative of the breadth of the author's familiarity with Aquinas: fifteen different works by Thomas are referred to. Third, Father Renard's text is generously interlarded with quotations, translated by himself, from these fifteen works. On a rough average I would estimate about two quotations per page. A few imperfections mar this splendid work. The book is as stylistically uninviting to student, teacher, or general reader as was the author's Philosophy of Being. No recognizable genre of philosophical writing is 528 BRIEF NOTICES found here: neither current chapters, the article structure of Aquinas, nor the thesis form. It is a blur of all three with scholia, corollaries and unnecessary summaries (a writer's unconscious recognition of lack of structural clarity) adding to the confusion. There are two un-Thomistic notes, viz. the Wol:ffian phrase" rational psychology" (p. V, and p. 4) and the insistence that metaphysics must precede psychology (p. V) because the latter is" the metaphysics of man" (p. 1). Certain conclusions in psychology do pertain to metaphysics. But the science as a whole belongs to the philosophy of nature, since man is a mobile being: therefore it precedes metaphysics. In holding (p. 29) that the soul of an irrational animal is intrinsically dependent upon matter in the order of existence but only extrinsically dependent on matter in the order of operation the basic Thomistic principle operatio sequitur esse is forfeited. This surprising position is attributable to initially false definitions of these two kinds of dependence (pp. 28-29) . Any need for expressed species in external sense perception is denied, of course; but an unduly abstruse quarrel with Frs. GarrigouLagrange, Remer, and Gredt on why they are unnecessary is introduced. On the question whether proper sensibles exist formally in natural things, the author adopts three positions in one paragraph: (1) this is a physical, not a philosophical question; (2) there is considerable evidence for holding that proper sensibles do not exist formally in natural things, and all of this evidence must be granted; (3) it is obvious that proper sensibles do exist formally in natural things, and any other position is counter to realism (p. 104). I presume one takes the last position seriously and lets the others go, or admits the possibility that he has misunderstood the author. " The Philosophy of Man should prepare students to read the works of St. Thpmas directly, for it is believed that through a constant and intimate contact with one of the greatest thinkers of all time, many young minds may be brought to contemplate and to love Truth " (p. V) . The proximate aim of this book, then, is " to prepare students to read the works of Thomas directly." It succeeds admirably. BOOKS RECEIVED Aquinas, St. Thomas, Quaestiones Disputatae. Turin: Marietti, 1949. Tom. I: pp. 616, with index; Tom. II: pp. 900, with index. 4500 lira. Aquinas, St. Thomas, Quaestiones Quodlibetales. Turin: Marietti, 1949. Pp. 269, with index. 900 lira. Arintero, J. G., The Mystical Evolution. St. Louis: Herder, 1949. Pp. 377. (Vol. I) $4.50. Armstrong, A. H., The Real Meaning of Plotinus's Intelligi@le World. Oxford: Blackfriars, 1949. Pp. 11. 1j-. Barr, S., The Pilgrimage of Western Man. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1949. Pp. 382, with index. $4.00. Bochenski, I., ed., Bibliographische Einfilhrungen in das Studium der Philosophie. Bern: Francke, 1948. 2. Amerikanische Philosophie by R. B. Winn; pp. 32. 3. Symbolische Logik und Grundlegung der exakten Wissenschaften by E. W. Beth; pp. 28. 7. Italienische Philosophie der Gegenwart by M. F. Sciacca; pp. 36. 9. Franziisische Existenzphilosophie by R. Jolivet; pp. 36. 10. Augustinus by M. F. Sciacca; pp. 32. Each 2.80 fr. Coburn, K., The Philosophical Lectures of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949. Pp. 480, with index. $7.50. Deferrari, R. J., A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas. Washington: Catholic University Press, 1949. Fasc. II: pp. 233. $12.50. De Marquette, J., Introduction to Comparative Mysticism. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949. Pp. 229, with index. $3.75. Dubarle, D., Optimisme devant de monde. Paris: Editions de la Revue des Jeunes, 1949. Pp. 166. 225 fr. Eberle, J., Die Bibel-Das Alte Testament. Vienna: Herder, 1949. Pp. 321, with index. S 37. 20. Fabian, B., Cardinal Mindszenty. New York: Scribner's, 1949. Pp. 203, with index. $2.75. Fitzpatrick, M. and Wellmuth, J., St. Thomas Aquinas On Spiritual Creatures. Milwaukee:, Marquette University Press, 1949. Pp. 135, with index. $2.00. Gardner, W. H., Gerard Manley Hopkins. (Vol. II) New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949. Pp. 429, with index. $6.00. -Grenet, P., Les Origines de l'Analogie Philosophique dans les dialogues de Platon. Paris: Bovin, 1948. Pp. 300, with index. Hamer, J., Karl Barth. Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1949. Pp. with index. 529 580 BOOKS RECEIVED Herve, J. M., Manuale Theologiae Dogmaticae. Paris: Berche and Pagis, 1949. Tom. I: De. revelatione, de ecclesia, de fontibus revelationis. Pp. 652, with index. Hillenbrand, M. J., Power and Morals. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949. Pp. 281, with index. $3.25. Jaspers, K., Von der Wahrheit. Miinchen: Piper, 1947. Pp. 1126, with index. Lanza, A., Tkeologia Moralis. Turin: Marietti, 1949. Pp. 570, with index (Tom. I) . 1500 lira. Lewis, C. S., The Weight of Glory and Other Addresses. New York: Macmillan, 1949. Pp. 66. $U5. · Mouroux, J., Je Crois en Toi. Paris: Editions de la Revue des Jeunes, 1948. Pp. 126. 180 fr. O'Connell, J.P., The Eschatology of St• Jerome. Seminary of St. Mary of the Lake, 1948. Pp. 209, with index. Pegis, A., ed., The Wis4om of Catholicism. New York: Random House, 1949. Pp. 988. $6.00. Rooney, G., Preface to the Bible. Milwaukee: :Bruce, 1949. Pp. 182, with index. $2.00. Saunders, D. J., Reason to Revelation . .St. Louis:· Herder, 1949. Pp. 241, with index. $8.50. Walsh, C., C. S. Lewis, Apostle to the Skeptics. New York: Macmillan, 1949. Pp. 176. $2.50. INDICES OF VOLUME XII {1949) INDEX OF AUTHORS PAGE ALLERS, R. Review of Selbstkritik der Philosophie und vergleickende 11!! Philosophiesgeschichte im Umriss, by A. Dempf . --. Review of Cybernetics, Control and Communication in tke Animal and tke Machine, by N. Weiner . !!29 --. Review of Thomas Heute. Zehn Vortri.ige zum Aufbau einer neuen existentiellen Ordnungs-Metaphysik nach Thomas von Aquin, by A. Silva-Tarouca . 240 CARDozo, M. Review of Tke Fall of the Spanish American Empire, by S. de Madiariaga . 117 CAROLYN, SR. M. Review of Liberty against Government: tke Rise, Flowering and Decline of a Famous Juridical Concept, by E. S. Corwin . !!14 CoLLINS, J. Contemporary Theories of Man . 17 --. Review of Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion, by R. Thomte 880 CoNWAY, P. H. Review of An Introduction to tke Philosophy of 227 Nature, by R. A. Kocourek DoNLAN, T. Review of Tke College Seeks Religion, by M. Cuninggim 95 --. Review of Religion in tke Twentieth Century, by V. Ferm. 95 Review of Tke Administration of the Catholic Secondary 872 School, ed. by M. J. McKeough . --. Review of The Philosophy of Catholic Higher Education, ed. 87!!. by R. J. Deferrari" EGAN, J. M. Review of Principes de Morale: Tome 1-Expose Systematique; Tomf3 Il-:-Complements de Doctrine et d'Histoire, by Dom. 0. Lottip . 868 FEARON, J. States of Life . 1 FARRELL, W. No Place for Rain 897 KocoUREK, R. A. Review of Tke Philosophy of Anaxagoras, by F. M. Cleve · 88!! KoLNAI, A. The Meaning of the " Common Man " . !!7!! KuNKEL, F. L. Beauty in Aquinas and Joyce . !!61 LUMBRERAS, P. Review of The Eternal Quest, by W. R. O'Connor !!07 MADELEVA, SR. M. Review .of Figures for an Apocalypse . 101 MULLANEY, T. The Basis of the Suarezian Teaching on Human Freedom 48, 155 581 INDICES OF THE VOLUME XII (1949) PAGE MURRAY, J. C. Review of Separation of Church and State in the United States, by A. W. Johnson and F. H. Yost McALLISTER, J. B. Review of Between Man and Man, by M. Buber Dr. Northrop, Technology and Religion . MeN ICHOLL, A. J. Physical Metaphysics NUEssE, C. J. Review of An Introduction to the History of Sociology, ed. by H. E. Barnes, and Historical Sociology, by H. E. Barnes . OESTERLE, J. Review of Meaning and Necessity, by R. Carnap. PEPLER, C. Man in Medieval Thought . Ross, E. Review of Society as the Patient, by L. E. Frank RYAN, J. K. Review of Philosophical Commentaries; Essay towards a New Theory of Vision; Theory of Vision Vindicated, by G. Berkeley · SMITH, R. Review of A Philosophy of Submission, by H. V. Sattler. SMITH, V. E. Cognitive Aspects of the Heisenberg Principle . ---. Review of The Protestant Era, by P. Tillich --. Review of The Religion of Philosophers, by J. H. Dunham WALKER, J. B. Review of La double experience de Catherine Benincasa (Sainte-Catherine de Sienne), by R. Fawtier and L. Canet 3S4 H!l 336 425 516 106 136 119 289 286 474 220 220 500 INDEX OF ARTICLES Aquinas, Beauty in--and Joyce. F. L. KuNKEL 261 Aspects, Cognitive-- of the Heisenberg Principle. V. E. SMITH 474 Basis, the-.- of the Suarezian Teaching on Human Freedom. T. U. MuLLANEY . 48, · 155 261 Beauty in Aquinas and Joyce. F. L. KuNKEL Cognitive Aspects of the Heisenberg Principle. V. E. SMITH 474 " Common Man," The Meaning of the --. A. KoLNAI 272 Contemporary Theories of Man .. J. CoLLINs 17 Freedom, The Basis of the Suarezian Teaching on Human--. T. U. MuLLANEY . 48, 155 Heisenberg Principle, Cognitive Aspects of the --. V. E. SMITH 474 261 Joyce, Beauty in Aquinas and --. F. L. KuNKEL Life, States of --. J. FEARON 1 Man, Contemporary Theories of --. J. CoLLINS 17 Man in Medieval Thought. C. PEPLER 136 Meaning, The -- of the " Common Man." A. KoLNAI 272 186 Medieval, Man in-- Thought. C. PEPLER Metaphysics, Physical. A. McNICHOLL . 425 Northrop, Dr. --. Technology and Religion. J. B. McALLisTER 886 Il'."DICES. OF THE VOLUME XII (1949) 588 PAGE Physical Metaphysics. A. J. McNICHOLL 425 397 Place, No -- for Rain. W. FARRELL . 397 Rain, No Place for--. W. :FARRELL Religion, Dr. Northrop, Technology and--. J. B. McALLISTER 386 States of Life. J. FEARON 1 Suarezian Teaching, The Basis of the--on Human Freedom. T. U. MULLANEY . 48, 155 Technology, Dr. Northrop, -- and Religion. J. B. McALLISTER 336 17 Theories of Man, Contemporary--. J. CoLLINS INDEX OF BOOK REVIEWS BARNES, H. E., ed. An Introduction to the History of Sociology. (C. J. Nuesse) ---. Historical Sociology: Its Origins and Development; Theories of Social Evolution from Cave Life to Atomic Bombing. (C. J. Nuesse) BERKELEY, G. Philosophical Commentaries: Essay towards a New Theory of Vision; Theory of Vision Vindicated. (J. K. Ryan) BuBER, M. Between Man and Ma11- (J. McAllister) CARNAP, R. Meaning and Necessity (J. Oesterle) CLEVE, F. M. The Philosophy of Anaxagoras (R. A. Kocourek) CoRWIN, E. Liberty against Government; the Rise, Flowering and Decline of a Famous Juridical Concept (Sr. M. Carolyn) CuNINGGIM, M. The College Seeks Religion (T. C. Donlan) . DEFERRARI, R. J. ed. The Philosophy of Catholic Higher Education (T. C. Donlan) DE.\fPl!', A. Selbstkritik der Philosophic und Philosophiesgeschichte im Urnriss (R. Allers) DuNHAM, J. H. The Religion of Philosophers (V. E. Smith) FAWTIER, R. and CANET, L. La double experience de Catherine Benincasa (Sainte-Catherine de Sienne) (J. B. Walker) FEn.M, V. Religion in the Twentieth Century (T. C. Donlan) :FRANK, L. Society as the Patient (E. Ross) JoHNSON, A. W. and YosT, F. H. Separation of Church and State in the United States (J; C. Murray) KocouREK, R. A. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature (P. H. Conway) LoTTIN, DoM. 0. Principes de Morale: Tome !-Expose Systematique; Tome Il-Complernents de Doctrine et d'Histoire (J. M. Egan) 516 516 239 121 106 882 214 95 372 112 220 500 95 119 384 227 868 534 INDICES OF THE VOLUME XU (1949) PAGE M. J., ed. The Administration of the Catholic Secondary School (T. C. Donlan) MADARIAGA, S. de. The Fall of the Spanish Arnerican Empire (M. Cardozo) MERTON, T. Figures for an Apocalypse (Sr. M. Madeleva) O'CoNNOR, W. The Eternal Quest (P. Lumbreras) SATTLER, H. V. A Philosophy of Submission (R. Smith) SILVA-TAROUCA, A. Thomas Heute. 'lehn Vortriige zum Aufba'U einer neuen existentiellen Ordnungs-Metaphysik nach Thomas von Aquin (R. Allers) TnoMTE, R. Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion (J. Collins) TILLICH, P. The Protestant Era (V. E. Smith) VoLKEN, L. Der Glaube bei Emil Brunner (V. E. Smith) WIENER, N. Cybernetics. Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (R. Allers) McKEoUGH, END OF VoLUME xn 3752 117 101 207 236 240 380 220 220 229