THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORs:

THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PRoviNCE oF ST. JosEPH

Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.
VoL.

XIII

OCTOBER, 1950

No.4

FATIMA: THE ROSARY AND THE HEART OF
MARY

F

ATIMA is a name of light and hope for all those souls
who are striving for the kingdom of God. The Basilica
of Our Lady of the Rosary, with its tall, white tower
rising up over the hill, is as a lighthouse in this turbulent hour
of the world. The hours of history sometimes can be very long.
This present hour, so tremendous, is still the same which thirty
years ago obliged Our Lady, Mother of God and men, miraculously to appear in order to give us a message of salvation. The
evils of humanity not only persist but are increased. But she
also, invisibly present, persists in her eagerness to help us. Her
saving watch-words still retain their full vigor and are awaiting fulfillment.
We ourselves wish to help make known and accomplished
those things most insistently recommended by her, that. is, the
practice of the Rosary and the devotion to her Immaculate
Heart. This is the second time that we have attempted this,
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for as early as July, 1944, we presented a study concerning the
value and relationships of the two devotions in the HispanoPortuguese Assembly, celebrated in Fatima by the Spanish
Mariological Society.* In the same place where our heavenly
advocate appeared as Our Lady of the Rosary and besought
veneration and reparation for her maternal Heart, we attempted to explain, in the light of sacred science, the causes
of her requests. Why, we asked, are these devotions petitioned?
What titles of excellence, or of efficacy, make them so commendable? Why is it Our Lady of the Rosary who beseeches
devotion to her Heart? Is it perhaps because they constitute
one and the same devotion, since it would be unfitting to
separate them, or is there a great advantage in uniting them?
What natural connection exists between them?
Today, we again respond not only on account of the occasion
of Our Lady's message, but also because the message itself is
conformed to a value and to a permanent connection between
the Rosary and her Heart, which merit a more attentive study.
The Rosary is a means of perennial efficacy for transfusing into
our souls the evangelical spirit. For it is not only consubstantial
with the Gospel, but it is a gospel in action: a popular evangelical program of faith, morals, and Christian piety. It is,
at the same time, a constant revelation of the Heart of Christ
and of the Heart of His divine Mother. For the Rosary unceasingly proposes for the loving commemoration of souls the
great accomplishments of Their love, which are the mysteries
of the redemption. Without a doubt this is the divine reason
for Fatima, for Our Lady knows very well the theology of her
Rosary and of her Heart. Thus, by way of serving her maternal
intentions, we wish to reflect upon her the little that our
limitations will permit.
To this end we shall recall first the history of the Rosarian
and Cordimarian revelations of Fatima. Then we shall consider the value or efficacy of both devotions and their mutual
* This study was published in Estudios Marianos, IV, Madrid, 1945, pp. 341-410,
under the title: " La Devocion a! Immaculado Corazon de Maria y el Santisimo
Rosario." It has been especially adapted by the author for publication in English.

FATIMA:

THE ROSARY AND THE HEART OF MARY

455

connection or dependence, with the consequences which derive
from all this.

I.

THE RosARY AND THE HEART oF MARY IN THE
APPARITIONS

OF FATIMA

We shall begin our study by recalling the Rosarian-Cordimarian message of Fatima which was delivered during the
apparitions and was contained in the recommendations of the
heavenly visitor and in the conduct and testimony of the
children. The message itself, as understood by its best interpreters, will be the final proof of our doctrine concerning the
compenetration of the two devotions. Being desirous of historical authenticity we shall limit ourselves in this chapter to
its ordered presentation, reproducing to the letter the narration
which seems to us most exact.
I.

THE VISIONS THEMSELVES

The wonderful Lady who appeared to the children seems to
be between fifteen and eighteen years old. Her tunic, white as
snow and ringed at the neck with a cord of gold, descends to
her feet which hardly
the leaves of the oak tree. A
mantle, similarly white and bordered with gold, covers her head
and almost her whole person. From her hands which are
joined at her breast, as in prayer, there hangs a Rosary with
white pearl-like beads, terminating with a small crucifix of
buxnished silver. Her face, of most pure and extremely delicate
features, is surrounded by an aureola of sun, but it appears as
though shadowed with sorrow. 1 Thus she appeared six times. 2
In the first and third vision she promised the children: " In
1 L. G. DaFonseca, S. J., Our Lady of Light, p. !l. We quote preferably Father
Fonseca because his work is the best concerning Fatima with which we are
acquainted.
how the children testify to this in the questionings. Cf. Fonseca, op. cit.,
pp. 8, 4, 5, 6, 7. In the sixth and last vision she appeared in the same guise,
although later she assumed others signifying the three phases of the mysteries of
the Rosary: The joyful (vision of the Holy Family), sorrowful (vision of Our Lady
of Sorrows), and glorious (vision of Our Lady in majesty or Our Lady of Carmel)
cf. Fonseca, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

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October I shall tell you who I am." 3 In the sixth and last
apparition, which occured on the thirteenth of October, Lucia .
asked the vision: " Who are you, and what do you want of
me? " The vision responded: " I am the Lady of the Rosary." 4
Lucia asked if she were going to leave her alone, and the
vision answered," No, daughter. Do you suffer much? ... Do
not lose heart! I will never abandon you. My Immaculate
Heart will be your refuge and the road which will lead you to
God." While saying these words the Lady opened her hands,
and for the second time that intense light reverberated over
the children in which they saw themselves as though submerged
in God. It seemed as though Francisco and Jacinta were in a
ray of light which went up toward Heaven, where they were
soon to be taken. Lucia, however, seemed to be in a ray that
extended over the earth. In front of the right hand of the vision
they saw a heart surrounded with thorns which pierced it in
every part. They understood that it was the Immaculate Heart
of Mary, and that she was asking for penance and reparation. 5
Thus, for a moment during this apparition, in front of her
right hand which held the Rosary, the Blessed Virgin revealed a
symbolic heart illuminated by the light which was projected
from her hand. 6
II.

OUR LADY'S RECOMMENDATION

The Blessed Virgin recommended the holy Rosary in all
six apparitions. In the first apparition: After a few moments
the apparition recommends to the little children to recite the
Rosary with devotion every day as they had done a little
• Ibid., p. 8 and p. 5.
• Lucia again asked, ". Who are you, and what do you want. of me? " The vision
finally responded that she was the Lady of the Rosary ... Ibid., chap. Vlll, The
Sixth Apparition, p. 4.
5 Ibid., chap. III, The
Apparition, p. 4.
6 In conformity
with the indications of Lucia and with the approbation of the
Bishop of Leiria as of March W, 1948, this figure of Our Lady of the Rosary
showing us her Heart is being reproduced in images and holy cards. Cf. Jose de
Castro, 0. F. M. C., Apariciones de la Santisima Virgen en Fatima, Seville, 1948,
chap. XXV, pp.

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457

while- before, in order to obtain peace for the world.7 In the
second: " What do you want of me? " Lucia had asked anew.
The apparition responded that they should return there the
thirteenth of the next month and she recommended again the
recitation of the holy Rosary. 8 In the third: The beautiful lady,
after having reminded them not to fail to come the 13th of the
following month, insisted for the third time upon the daily
recitation of the holy Rosary in honor of the Blessed Virgin
with the intention of obtaining the anxiously desired end of
the war, for she alone could help them. 9 In the fourth: She
exhorted them again to recite the holy Rosary and to be
present in the Cova da Iria the following :months on the prefixed day and hour. 10 In the fifth: The Blessed Virgin told the
children to persevere in the recitation of the Rosary in order to
9btain the cessation of the war, and she promised to return in
October with St. Joseph and the Child Jesus. 11 In the sixth:
Lucia repeats again the question, " Who are you and what do
you want of me? " And finally the .vision responds that she is
Our Lady of the Rosary and that she desires in that place a
chapel in her honor. She recommended for the sixth time they
continue to recite the Rosary every day, adding that the war
was almost over and that the soldiers would not be long in returning to their homes.12
In the first, second, and third apparitions the Virgin of the
Rosary spoke to the little shepherds beseeching devotion,
reparation, and consecration to her Immaculate Heart. In the
first: " Do you wish to offer yourselves to Our Lord, disposed
to sacrifice yourselves and to accept with pleasure all the
sufferings which He may will to send you, in reparation for so
many sins by which the Divine Majesty is offended, in order to
obtain the conversion of sinners, and in reparation for the
Fonseca, op. cit., chap. ll, the 1st Apparition, p. 4.
Ibid., chap. S, The 2nd Apparition, p. 2-S.
9 Ibid., chap. IV, The Srd Appa1ition, p. 5.
10 Ibid., chap. V, The 4th Apparition, p. 10-11.
11 Ibid., chap. VI, The 5th Apparition, p. 5.
12 Ibid., chap. VIII, The 6th Apparition, p. 4.
7

8

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blasphemies and all the offenses against the Immaculate Heart
of Mary." 18 In the second: Lucia continued;" I would like to
ask you to take the three of us to Heaven." " Yes, I shall come
to t1lke Jacinta and Francisco very soon. But you must remain
longer here below. Jesus wishes to use you to make me known
and loved. He wishes to establish in the world the devotion to
my Immaculate Heart." " Then I must remain alone? ", she
asked sadly while she was thinking, no doubt, of the persecutions which were harassing her for almost three weeks. "No,
daughter. Do you suffer much? ... Do not lose heart! I will
never abandon you. My Immaculate Heart will be your refuge
and the road which will lead you to God." H
In the third: " Afterwards, in order to renew my cooled
fervor," Lucia humbly confessed, "She admonished us again:
'Sacrifice yourselves for sinners and say frequently, especially
when making some sacrifice: 0 Jesus! for your love, for the
conversion of sinners, and in reparation for the sins committed
against the Immaculate Heart of Mary. 15 You have seen hell
where the souls of poor sinners go. In order to save them Our
Lord wishes to establish in the world the devotion to my Immaculate Heart. If it is done what I shall tell you, many souls
shall be saved and peace shall come. The war will end soon.
But if they do not cease to offend Our Lord, it will not be long.
In the next pontificate (that of Pius XI) there will begin
another much worse. When you see a night illuminated by an
unknown light know that that is the great sign which God is
giving you that the punishment of the world for its many transgressions is near. It will be by means of a war, hunger, and
persecutions against the Church and against the Holy Father.
In order to prevent this I shall come to ask the consecration of
the world to my Immaculate Heart and the Communion of
reparation on the first Saturday of the month. If they are attentive to my supplication Russia will be converted and there
will be peace. Otherwise, an impious propaganda will diffuse its
'" Ibid., chap. II, The 1st Apparition, p. 3-4.
><Ibid., chap. III, The 2nd Apparition, p. 4.
'" Ibid., chap. IV, The 3rd Apparition, p. 6.

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459

errors throughout the world, raising up wars and persecutions
against the Church. Many good people will be martyred, and
the Holy Father will have much to suffer. Various nations will
be annihilated ... at the end my Immaculate Heart will
triumph.' " 16
III.

THE SHEPHERD CHILDREN

The shepherd children, as a consequence of the apparitions,
practiced with fervor their recitation o-f the Holy Rosary. They
earnestly counseled its practice proclaiming that it is what
the Blessed Virgin most recommended to them. They not only
practiced the devotion to the holy Rosary, but sometimes they
spent entire hours reciting it. 17 Finding themselves imprisoned
because of the apparitions they remembered that they had not
yet recited the Rosary. Jacinta, removing a medal which she ·
was wearing about her neck, asked a prisoner to hang it on the
wall. Then, kneeling before that improvised altar they began to
recite. The prisoners also knelt down and recited with them. 18
In the first apparition Lucia asked the Blessed Virgin if Francisco also would go to Heaven. She answered that he would,
but that first it would be necessary to recite many Rosaries.
"When they told him these words a little later, he became
radiant with joy because of the promise. Crossing his hands
on his breast he exclaimed,' Oh my Lady, I will recite as many
Rosaries as you wish! ' " From then on he did not let a day
pass without offering this homage to the Queen of Heaven.
Frequently he asked his sister or his cousin to recite it with
him. But perhaps more often he recited it alone.
Many times while the others were playing he used to retire
a little and walk in silence. " Francisco! What are doing?,"
they used to ask him. In response he merely used to raise his
arm showing his Rosary. " Come and play now. Afterwards the
Ibid., chap. IV, The 8rd Apparition, p. 8.
Ibid., chap. XI, p. 14. Also, cf. chap. XI, p. 5 and Albino Menendez-Reigada,
0. P., El Mensaje de Fatima, p. 88.
18 Fonseca, op. cit., chap. V, p. 8.
16

17

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three of us will :recite together." "Afterwards? Now and later!
Don't you remember that the Blessed Virgin said that I must
:recite many Rosaries?" Other times he used to hide himself,
and on being called he would answer from behind a wall or
some bushes where he would be found on his knees reciting.
" Why didn't you call us so that we could recite it with you? "
" I like it better to :recite alone in order to think and console
Our Lord Who is so affiicted by so many sins." 19
In the questionings the children unanimously confirmed the
recommendation of the Rosary which Our Lady made to them.
"What was she most insistent in :recommending to Lucia?"
they asked Jacinta. "The :recitation of the Rosary every day,''
she responded. 20 They in turn recommended it also: "Mother,
it is necessary to :recite the Rosary every day. The Blessed
Virgin wishes it," said Jacinta. 21 Lucia recommended the family
:recitation of the Rosary " because the Blessed Virgin wished
it." 22
Besides this fervent practice and recommendation of the
Rosary, they showed themselves to
devotion
to the Immaculate Heart. In this consideration the life of the
children is also an incomparable commentary of the apparitions.
From the time of the heavenly visits they began to be truly
ideal models in devotion to the Immaculate Heart. They loved
it ardently; they spoke of it with eloquence; they invoked it;
they multiplied their sacrifices in order to console it and to
make reparation for the blasphemies and offenses by which it is
o:ffended.23
When they were in jail Francisco consoled his sister by inviting her to offer her sacrifices for sinners: "Jacinta, crying,
with her hands joined, raised her eyes and added: ' And also
for the Holy Father and in reparation for the offenses commit'"Ibid., chap. Xll, pp. 3-4. "According to the testimony of his mother, he used
to recite the Rosary eight or more times in
hours." Castro, op. cit., p. 139.
2 ° Fonseca, op. cit., chap. VII, pp. 5, 7,
22 Ibid., chap. II, p. 6.
•• Ibid., chap. III, p. 5.
23 Ibid., Epilogue, p. 8.

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461

ted against the Immaculate Heart of Mary.' 24 And Lucia,
saddened by the sufferings which the apparitions were causing
her, was encouraged by Francisco saying: ' Don't worry! Didn't
Our Lady say that we shall have to suffer much in order to
make amends to Our Lord and to her Immaculate Heart for
the many sins by which they are offended? They are so sad!
. . . H with these sufferings we can console them we ought to
be content.' " 25
Jacinta, already wasted on account of her infirmity, made
this extraordinary request of Lucia: " It will be only a little
while now till I go to Paradise. You stay here below in order to
make it known that Our Lord wishes to establish in the world
the devotion to the
Heart of Mary. When you
ought to speak do not hide yourself! Tell everyone that God
grants us His graces through the mediation of the Immaculate
Heart of Mary. Tell them' to ask her. Tell them that the
Heart of Jesus wishes that the Immaculate Heart of Mary be
venerated together with His Heart. Tell them to beg for peace
from the Immaculate Heart of Mary, for Our Lord has confided
it to Her. If only I were able to instill in the hearts of all the
fire that I feel here within, which makes me so delighted in the
Hearts of Jesus and Mary." 26
" The Blessed Virgin has come to see us," she said, referring
again to her cousin, " and she says that soon she will return to
take Francisco to Heaven. She asked me if I wished to continue converting sinners. I answered ' Yes,' and she added
that I shall go soon to a hospital and that I shall suffer much;
but that I may bear it all for the conversion of sinners, in reparation for the offenses committed against the Immaculate
Heart of Mary, and for the love of Jesus.'' 27 The little victim
of expiating love suffered beyond measure: " Yes, I am suffering; but all for the conversion of sinners or to expiate for the
offenses which are made against the Immaculate Heart of
Mary.'' 28 And Lucia testifies: "I found her always equally
•• Ibid., chap. V, p. 7.
•• Ibid., chap. XI, p. 11.
•• Ibid., chap. XI, p. 19.

•• Ibid., chap. Xll, p. 6.
""Ibid., chap. Xill, p. I.

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joyful in suffering for the love of God and for the Immaculate
Heart of Mary, for sinners, and for the Holy Father. This was
her ideal, and she spoke of it always." 29 In her most recent
testimony, Lucia notes," The war or peace of the world depends
upon the practice of this devotion (The Rosary) and on the
consecration to the Immaculate Heart of Mary." 80

II.

VALUE OF THE RosARY AND oF THE DEvoTION
TO THE HEART OF MARY

For what divine reasons are the Rosary and the devotion to
the Heart of Mary so commendable that she recommends them
with such insistence? What secret virtue makes them so efficacious for re-Christianizing souls? In order to answer these
questions satisfactorily we shall study from a theological aspect
the value of both devotions, first establishing a notion of them
and determining a just criterion for valuing them.
I.

NOTION OF 1'HESE DEVOTIONS

Devotion, properly speaking, is the first act of the virtue of
religion, consisting in the will to give oneself to God and to
things divine. Because devotion is the first religious act which
subordinates the will to God, it necessarily informs all the other
religious acts, both interior and exterior, 31 for no act ordains us
to God without the previous subordination of our will to Him.
There is no religious act, therefore, that is not devout. 82 From
this proceeds the common identification between " devotion "
and religiousness or piety, and between " devotions " and
religious practices. Since devotion informs piety and religious
practices, they legitimately appropriate its name. A devotion,
therefore, is a manner of practicing devotion or piety. Or, in
other words, it is a religious or devout practice in its precise
meaning, by which man is directed to God, to the Blessed
29 Ibid., chap. XIII, p.
Also cf. chap. XI, p. H; chap. XII, p.
pp. 1, 6.
3 ° Castro, op. cit., p.
31 Cf. Summa Theol .., II-II, q.
a. 1, ad lum.
32 Ibid., II-II, q. 83, a. 15, c.

chap. XIII,

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468

Virgin, or to the saints, and by which he gives them due veneration. The devotions of the Rosary and of the Heart of Mary
are, therefore, special ways by which souls direct themselves
to the Blessed Virgin and pay her the veneration which they
owe her.
The devotion of the Marian Rosary consists in the consideration of the intimate lives of Jesus and Mary as portrayed in
the fifteen principal mysteries of their joy, sorrow, and glory.
This is accompanied by the recitation of one Our Father, ten
Hail Mary's, and one Glory for each mystery in reverence for
the most sublime dignity of Mary as Mother of God and of
men. 33 As may be seen from its definition, the Rosary is composed of a principal element-the mysteries of the intimate
lives of Jesus and Mary, and of a secondary element- the
•• The notion which we propose is based on those of the Roman and Dominican
Breviaries in the lessons of the second nocturn of the feast of the Rosary.
Similar also is that which St. Pius V gives in his Constitution Consueverunt Romani
Pontifices of September 17, 1569, and which Leo XIII proposes in his Encyclical
Supremi Apostolatus. This great pontiff not only merits to be considered as the
Pope of the Rosary, but also as its doctor and apostle. His principal Rosarian
Encyclicals ought to be remembered and studied. They are the following: Supremi
Apostolatus, September 1, 1888; Superiori Anno, August 80, 1884; Octobri Mense,
September 22, 1891; Magnae Dei MatTis, September 8, 1892; Laetitiae Sanctae,
September 8, 1898; lucunda Semper, September 8, 1894; Adjutricem Populi
Christiani, September 5, 1895; Fidentem Piumque, September 20, 1896; Augustissimae Virginia MariaB, September 12, 1897; Diuturni Temporis, September 5, 1898.
[Translator's note: The English translations of these Encyclicals together with
other Apostolic Letters and Constitutions of Leo XIII on the Rosary indulgences,
have been collected by William Raymond Lawler, 0. P., and they have been published by the St. Anthony Guild Press, Paterson, New Jersey, 1944, under the title

The Rosary of Mary.]
With reason Father Arthur Cayuela, S. J. writes: "The testimony of the Popes
concerning the excellence of the Rosary could not have been more unanimous.
. . . Concerning no other matter have the Popes ever published so many
Encyclicals; no other practice have they recommended with so much insistence."
El Rosario En Familia, pp. 18-14 ..
Already there must be more than five hundred Rosarian documents from the
Apostolic See. Cf. Acta Sanctae Sedis necnon Magistrorum et Capitulorum Genera-

lium Sacri Ordinis Praedicatorum pro Societate SS. Rosarii, Confraternitatibus SS.
Rosarii, sodalitatisque Rosarii-Viventis et Rosarii Perpetui. vol. I, Lyons, 1880, vol.
II, Lyons, 1891. Cf. also Paulino Alvarez, 0. P., Las Glorias del Rosario, pp. 180
and following.

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above mentioned prayers. Taken together these two elements
materially integrate the Rosary.
Consequently, the Rosary comprises two fundamental acts:
one principal, causal or quasi-formal, which is the recalling and
loving contemplation of the intimate lives of Jesus and Mary;
and the other secondary, consequent, and material, which is the
recitation of the vocal prayers. The meditation and recitation
united integrate the practice of the Rosary.
Of the meditation on the mysteries, it can be said: a)
It is the principal act, because it is more perfect, more important, and more beneficial than the recitation. Therefore the
recitation is secondary. b) It is causal, because from the
thought and affection of the mysteries ought to proceed the
recitation of the prayers, which are their expression. Therefore
the recitation is consequent. c) It is quasi-formal, because
just as the soul is the form of the body, because it gives it being,
life, and'perfection, so also the meditation ought to inform the
recitation, communicating to it its own thought and affection. 34
•• In the virtue of religion, which gives worship to God on account of His
excellence, and in the subordinate worship of dulia which gives veneration to the
saints and of hyperdulia which pays cult to the Blessed Virgin on account of that
which they participate of Him, one must distinguish: a) the acts by which the
worship is givelJ. (material object); b) the worship which they give (formal quod
object); c) the reason why it is given, which is the reverence due to the excellence
of the person,· or his excellence insofar as it is worthy of reverence (formal quo
object); d) to whom it is given (object eui or subject). Cf. Summa Tkeol., II-II,
q. 81, a. 2.
According to this: a) The material object of the Rosarian cult is the consideration of the mysteries and the recitation of tlfe vocal prayers. b) The formal object
by the aforesaid acts informed with the
quod of the Rosary is the cult
purpose of honoring Mary on account of her excellence as Mother of God and of
men, is paid to her, and in her and through her to Jesus, and in them and through
them io the Most Holy Trinity. c) The formal object quo of the Rosary is the
reverence due to the excellence. of the most holy Virgin in her intimate life with
Jesus as recalled in the mysteries. Or, in other words, it is reverence due to her
on account of her excellence as Mother of God and of men and as mediatrix and
coredemptrix of the human race. For thus the Rosary presents her in the mysteries
and in its supplications. d) The object cui or direct subject of the Rosar:y is
the most holy Virgin, Mother of God and our Mother, and in her and through her
Jesus, and in them and through them the Most Holy Trinity. In the above given
definition. of the Rosary all these diversities of object are contained.

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465

The Rosary contains all the conditions which integrate the
perfection of worship. a) It is veneration of the Blessed
Virgin in her most sublime position as Mother of God and of
men. b) It is love, union, and intimate communion through
the loving recollection of her most holy life. c) It is a petition
to the most holy Virgin, and to God through her mediation and
through the mediation of Jesus. d) It is imitation since it recalls good example and holy sentiments. Insofar as one loves,
unites himself with, and imitates the Rosary there is born in
him the spirit of reparation. e) It is a surrender of the mind,
will, and of one's works to the service of Mary. The Rosary
leads to a total consecration of the soul to the Blessed Virgin
as a recompense for her
and as
of her sovereignty. This it accomplishes inasmuch as it presents Mary as
our Mother, who lovingly communicates to us that life which
was gained with so much sorrow, and as our Queen and our
Lady upon whom we depend for everything. With regard to
the effects of the Rosary and its theological fundaments, later
we shall see that the Most Holy Rosary is not only a devotion
theologically solid, but that it is also a Mariology and even a
supplicating Theology.
Devotion to the Immaculate Heart is the veneration of the
most holy Virgin in her physical Heart, mirror and symbol of
her' love. In other words, it is the veneration of Our Lady on
account of the excellence of her love as reflected and symbolized
in her physical Heart. 85 The Cordimarian cult is founded on the
•• In the object of the Cordimarian devotion, we ought to distinguish: a) The
object cui or subject ultimately and properly such, which is the person of the
Blessed Virgin, and the proximate object cui, which is her Heart. In other words,
the object cui is Our Lady in or by means of her Heart; b) The material object,
which consists in the acts of Cordimarian veneration; c) The formal object quod,
which is the veneration offered by means of these acts to the Heart of Mary on
account of the reverence due to its excellence; d) The formal object quo, which
for Mary on
is reverence for the exeellence of the Heart of Mary, or
account of the excellence of her Heart. All this may be summarized by saying that
Cordimarian devotion
the Heart of Mary on account of the reverence
due to the sublimity of her love, or the Blessed Virgin on account of the excellence
of her Heart.

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excellence of Mary's love as participated and symbolized in her
physical Heart.
Thus, this fundament may be illustrated according to three
aspects:
1) Physico-Psychological aspect. The heart by its very
structure and function is intimately related with and reflects
love and the other affections of the soul, and therefore it participates in their excellence. For this reason it is a natural symbol
of love universally recognized. The heart is one of the most
important of the bodily organs. It causes and regulates the
circulation of the blood, and it is intimately connected with the
nervous system. By its natural structure and function it is the
organ principally affected by love and by the whole affective
life of the soul. Although it is not the organ of the affections, it is
as though it were. For so acting do they affect it, that although
it does not cause them, it is, nevertheless, intimately joined
with them and reflects them. Consequently, by right the heart
is the symbol of love and of all affections. With reason, then,
the physical Heart of the Virgin Mary is venerated. For it
participates, reflects, and symbolizes her love.
2) Moral aspect. Love, whose excellence in the Blessed
Virgin is the motive for the Cordimarian devotion, not only is
the first of the affections of the soul, both in the sensible and
in the rational order, but it is also the principle and root of all
the affections, and even of all actions. 36 The appetitive faculty,
especially the will, is the universal psychological motor. Therefore it actuates all the other faculties, informing with its acts
all other acts. 87 In the moral order the goodness and malice of
human acts are measured subjectively according to the desire or
•• Cf. Summa Theol., I-11, q.
a. 6.: Finis autem est bonum desideratum, et
amatum unicuique. Unde manifestum est quod omme agens, quodcumque sit, agit
quamcumque actionem ex aliquo amore.
Ex amore, causatur et desiderium, et tristitia, et delectatio, et per consequens
omnes aliae passiones; unde omnis actio quae procedit ex quacumque passione,
procedit etiam ex amore .sicut ex prima causa; unde non superfiuunt aliae passiones,
quae sunt causae proximae.
a. 4; 1-11, q. 9, a. 1; J-TI, q. 17, a. 1.
•• Ibid., I, q.

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consent which is present in them. Love, therefore, comprehends
our psychological and moral life.
8) Supernatural aspect. Charity, the divine form of our will,
is in our supernatural psychology. Charity is the virtue of
virtues. 38 The divine love of charity is the principle, motor,
form, perfection, and merit of all our supemahiral acts. 39 The
whole divine life of the soul is reduced to love, since love informs the actuation of all the supernatural energies. Thence it
follows that the heart comprehends the whole life of the soul
and all its perfection. "Charity," says St. Thomas," is the life
of the soul just as the soul is the life of the body." 40
The Heart of Mary signifies jointly her physical Heart and
her love which is called her " Spiritual Heart." It signifies her
physical Heart ina.smuch as it is a reflector and symbol of her
love. The content of the Heart of Mary is principally her
love in itself in all its fulness and perfection, and consequently,
her whole life in all its manifestations and mysteries, inasmuch
as it is actuated and informed by love. 41 Thus honor is given
to the Heart or love of the Blessed Virgin in itself and as the
fount of her life and of her mysteries.
Cordimarian devotion has as connatural acts: a) Veneration,
essential to all worship; b) Love, due in a singular way to the
•• Ibid., II-II, q. 28, aa. 7-8; I-II, q. 65, a. 2.
•• Ibid., II-II, q. 28, a. 8.
•• Ibid., q. 28, a. 2, ad 2. Formaliter charitas est vita animae, sicut et anima
vita corporis.
41 It was discussed repeatedly in our Assembly at Fatima whether the devotion
to the Heart of Mary comprehends also her intellectual life. We said then, and we
repeat now, that the devotion to the Heart of Mary is referred immediately to the
affective life of the Blessed Virgin, that is, to her love. Since love informs the
intellectual life of the Blessed Virgin, the Cordimarian devotion is referred to it
also, but consequently. In every just soul, and even more so in the Blessed
Virgin charity is the life of its life.
In order to understand the necessity, extension, and meaning of this information
of charity in the entire life of the soul the doctrine of St. Thomas should be
recalled: a) Concerning the will as universal mover of the potencies. (I, q. 82, a. 4;
I-II, q. 9, a. I; etc.) b) Concerning charity as form of all the virtues. (II-II, q. 28,
a. 7-8; I-II, q. 65, a. 2; etc.) c) Concerning the information of faith by charity.
(II-11, q. 4, per totum; I-II, q. 65, aa.. 4-5; etc.) d) Concerning the information of
the gifts by charity. (I-II, q. 68, a. 5 & 8; 11-II, q. 45, a. 2; etc.).

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maternal and most amiable Heart of the Blessed Virgin; c) Consecration or total self-surrender, in acknowledgment of our
dependence and as a necessary reciprocity to the Heart of our
Mother and Queen; d) Reparation, a spontaneous and necessary effect of love which, upon willing the good of the most
holy Heart of Our Lady, wishes to see it fittingly corresponded
to, and it attempts to avoid and to make amends for its
offenses. Reparation flows spontaneously from love; 42 e) Imitation, through the conformative virtue of love; f) Invocation,
since the Heart of Mary is maternal, it is most loving and
most powerfuU 3 From the object and connatural acts of the
Cordimarian devotion may be gathered its effects, which are
similar to those of the Rosary as we shall see later.
II.

CRITERIA

OF EVALUATION

The mere description of the two devotions suffices for making
a mature judgment concerning the respective solidity of each
and their pure theological physiognomy.
contrasting
them more deliberately with an identical criterion of appraisement of devotions, what they merit will be made more evident.
Just as it is impossible to have a science concerning individual
preferences and conveniences, so also it is impossible to fix a
subjective criterion to evaluate devotions. But devotion has its
theological reason of being and, therefore, devotions ought to
have this reason of being also. For, as we have said, they are
determined forms of practicing devotion or piety. From the
42 Father Lebrun in his work La devotion au Coeur de Marie (Paris, 1917), conceives reparation as secondary and less pertinent to the Cordimarian devotion .. He
himself confesses that he differs in this from Father Gallifet and the current practical
opinion. Day by day, J;eparation is coming to be considered more connatural to
the Cordimarian cult. In conformity with the reasoning and psychological observation of the Angelic Doctor, we judge it to be a spontaneous effect of love. Manifestum est quod quanto aliqua virtus intensius tendit in aliquid, fortius repellit
omne contrarium ... Amm autem amicitiae quaerit bonum amici: uncle quando est
intensus, facit hominem moveri contra omne illud quod repugnat bono amici. (I-II,
q. 28, a. 4, c.).
'"The well-known prayer Ave Cm· Sanctissimum of St. John Eudes expresses
the principal acts of the Cordimarian culL

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reason of being of religion, worship, or devotion, the objective
theological criterion for appraising devotions ought to be
deduced.
What, then, is the reason of being of religion? There may be
pointed out two correlative fundaments of the religious obligation or divine worship which religion fulfills. One is from the
point of view of God, and it is His infinite excellence or perfection and His position as the First Creating Principle, Ultimate
End, and Beatifier of man. 44 The other is from the point of view
of man, and it is his need and dependence in respect to
God.45 The acknowledgment of God's excellence and of our
dependence in respect to Him is the essential constituent of
religion. To practice it is to manifest to God this acknowledgment and this dependence. 46 To this are ordained the diverse
interior and exterior acts of religion: devotion, which is the
first act as we mentioned above, prayer, adoration, sacrifice,
etc. 47
The essential purpose of religion, then, is divine reverence
which man is obliged to give. But on the part of man, the
religious obligation lies in his need and dependence in respect to
God. Therefore, in the very motivation of the religious obliga.tion is included also the intent of making us :perfect. Religion
accomplishes this by subordinating and uniting us to God from
Whose goodness must come our goodness and in Whose union
our perfection consists. 48 These two ends mutually include
" Cf. 11-11, q. 81, aa. 1 and 4.
•• Ibid., q. 85, a. 1: Naturalis ratio dictat homini quod alicui superiori subdatur,
propter defectus quos in se ipso sentit, in quibus ab aliquo superiori eget adjuvari et
quidquid illud sit, hoc est quod apud omnes dicitur Deus.
•• Ibid., q. 81, a. 8 ad
•• By devotion our 'will is subordinated and offered to God. (Cf. 11-11, q.
a. 1.)
By prayer our mind is elevated, subordinated, and offered to God. (11-11, q. 88, a. 1
and a. 8, ad 1 and ad 8.) By adoration the reverence and subordination of the
spirit is united to that of the body. (11-11, q. 84, a.
By sacrifice man signifies
in the offering of something sensible the entire oblation of his soul to God as to
his First Principle and Creator and his Intimate and Beatific End. (11-11, q. 85, a.
•• Cf. 11-11, q. 81, a. 7, c: Deo reverentiam et honorem exhibemus, non propter
seipsum, quia ex se ipso est gloria plenus, cui nihil a creatura adjici potest, sed

2

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each other, for man is not able to worship God without benefiting himself, nor is he able to seek his good in God without
worshipping Him. 49
Thus religion or devotion has a two fold end and effect which
is the glory of God and the good of man. St. Thomas divides
the second purpose of worship into two, and consequently, he
assigns three ends: " Divine worship," he says, " is ordained
primarily to pay reverence to God .... Secondly, it is ordained to this that man be instructed by God Whom he worships .... Thirdly, divine worship is ordained to a certain
direction of human acts according to the laws of God Who is
worshipped." 50 All this may be summarized by saying that
religion or devotion has for its end the glory of God and the
divine perfection of man.
Moreover, devotions have this same reason of being and
this same purpose. Therefore this is the objective criterion for
evaluating them according to a theological standard. Theologically speaking, a form of devotion is more or less perfect
according to its aptitude for glorifying God and sanctifying
souls, that is, according as it brings together more or less
perfectly the conditions necessary for .this effect. Later, we
shall treat of these conditions more precisely.
Although this criterion is deduced from the exactions of the
virtue of religion which gives due worship to God, which worship is specifically distinct from that due to the Blessed Virgin
and to the saints, however, it is equally true in the worship of
hyperdulia and dulia. Their reason of being is analogous and
subordinated to that of the divine worship, and their acts
and ends ought to be informed by the acts and ends of
religion. This does not mean that the worship of dulia and
hyperdulia ought to be merely relative, for veneration is due
proter nos, quia videlicet per hoc quod Deum reveremur, et honoramus, meus
nostra ei subjicitur; et in hoc eius perfectio consistit.
•• Ibid., II-II, q. 88, a. 8, c.
50 Ibid., II-II, q. 92, a. 2, c: Ordinatur primo divinus cultus ad reverentiam Deo
exhibendam. . . . Secundo ordinatur ad hoc quod homo instruatur a Deo, quem
colit. . . . Tertio ordinatur divinus cultus ad quamdam directionem humanorum
actuum secundum instituta Dei, qui colitur.

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to excellence. Creatures divinely excellent are able to be
honored for the excellence which they possess, and so much
the more may they be honored inasmuch as they possess
greater excellence. The greater their excellence, the nearer
they approach to the divine excellence. For this reason the
Blessed Virgin, who most nearly approaches the divine excellence, merits a proper and superior worship of hyperdulia. 51
But the excellence of creatures is a participation of the divine.
Therefore, to its acknowledgment and veneration is united
connaturally the acknowledgment and worship of the excellence of God, Who is infinitely higher and more venerable. The
worship of dulia is subordinated, then, to the divine worship by
its own reason of being. Consequently, as St. Thomas teaches,
this virtue itself and its acts and ends are subordinated to the
virtue, acts, and ends of religion. 52
We say this is so by its very reason of being. If we consider
the essence of religion, we see that not only this virtue of
honoring divinely excelling creatures but also all the virtues can
and ought to be informed by religion which elevates them from
their particular and inferior ends to the highest end which
religion serves. All human acts ought to be religious acts, subordinating themselves to the virtue of religion whose proper
duty is to ordain the life of man to God. Subordinated thus to
:religion human life is supremely exalted. Man's actions, already noble and good by reason of the respective virtues from
which they proceed, become much more so due to the elevation
to the divine which religion confers upon them. 53 From this
general reason together with the particular reason proposed
61

Ibid., II-II, q. 103, a. 4, ad 2; III, q. 25, a. 5.

Dulia in its general meaning includes all the virtues which give due veneration
to superior rational creatures. Taken in this sense it includes piety and observance.
(Cf. II-II, q. 103, a. 4, c.), while in its proper sense (Cf. ibid., a. 3) it is part of
observance. In its ordinary use, by dulia is understood the virtue which gives due
veneration to supernaturally excelling creatures. Notice how St. Thomas declares
the subordination of the virtues which honor creatures to the virtue of religion:
II-II, q. 101, a. l; q. 102, a. 1.
63 Cf. ibid., II-II, q. 81, a. 1 ad l; II-II, q. 81, a. 4, ad 2; II-II, q. 81, a. 8;
II-II, q. 88, a. 6, c.
62

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before it is evident that the veneration of the saints will be so
much the better inasmuch as it more directly and more efficaciously leads to (}od.
The liturgical or official veneration of the Blessed Virgin
and of the saints is an irrefragable confirmation of this doctrine.
The virtue of religion fully informs this veneration with its
ends of divine glory and the sanctification of souls without, however, diminution of the honor which is given to the saints. The
purpose of religion or latria is clearly expressed in the prescribed
invitation with which the liturgical Office is always begun:
V enite exultemus Domino. . . . 5 "' Throughout the
Divine Office God is glorified in His saints whose examples are
evoked for the edification and example of the faithful. In the
proper prayer of the Office God is thanked for exalting His
saints, and He is besought that He may be attentive to the
supplications they make for us in consideration of Our Lord
Jesus Christ: Per Dominum nostrum J esum Christum. 55
This compenetration of the worship of dulia (and hyperdulia)
with the divine worship is the reason why it is practically considered as religious worship and as a connatural manifestation
of religious piety. From this proceeds the common use of the
same terms in both kinds of worship. The word " devotion,"
the principal act of religion, clearly indicates this. For the
same term is used for pious sentiments in respect to the Most
Holy Trinity as for those in respect to the Blessed Virgin and
the saints. However, strictly understood, it has a diverse extension in each case. In the present case it has joined with the
extension of worship due to the saints that of the supreme
reverence which is due to the Saint of Saints.
•• Notice how in the diverse lnvitatories latreutic worship proceeds from the
veneration of the saints: Common of a martyr: Regem aempiterum venite adoremua
plus Qui Martyrem suum . . • Common of a confessor: Confeaaorum Regem
adoremus plus Qui celestill regni. . . . . Common of a virgin: Agnum spon..oum
Virginum plus V enite adoremua Dominum. . . . Common of the Blessed Virgin:
Solemnitatem Virginill Marie celebremus plus Ckrilltum •.• eiua Filium adoremua
Dominum. Cf. Santiago Alameda, 0. S. B., El Oficio Divino (Salamanca, 1982),

m.
•• This is easily verified by consulting the collects in the missal or breviary.

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The cult of the Blessed Virgin is ordained not only to the
veneration of her but also to the veneration of the divinity and
to the sanctification of souk To these ends Marian devotions
ought to adapt themselves, and they will be so much the
more excellent, theologically speaking, insofar as they are more
apt and efficacious for obtaining these ends. This seems to us
to be the true objective criterion for the right estimation of
Marian devotions.
Consequently, in order to evaluate a certain Marian devotion one must examine: (1) its lat:reutic extension or its aptitude for glorifying God; (2) its hyperdulic extension or its
capability for glorifying Mary; (3) its saving or sanctifying
efficacy. And since sanctity is attained in the union with God
by means of the intimate union of the soul with Jesus and
Mary, and since it is accomplished by divine grace with the
exercise of the theological and moral virtues and particularly
by means of prayer, the sanctifying efficacy .of a Marian devotion may be proved by its aptitude: (1) for conforming souls
with Jesus
Mary; (2) for obtaining grace; (3)
increasing faith; (4) for strengthening hope; (5) for inciting
charity; (6) for the moral instruction of souls in the virtues or
evangelical life; (7) for leading us to pray perfectly" With these
criteria let us contrast the theological value of the Rosary devotion and the devotion to the Immaculate Heart of Mary. 56
HI.

DIVINE GLORIFICATION

The intent of glorifying God is so obvious in the Rosary even
as to make it appear to be a devotion primarily latreutic,
and often it is considered as such. 57 However, perhaps it is
56 We do not claim that these devotions have been formed according to and as
effects of theological canons, for they are daughters of the spirit of piety rather
than of the reasoning of theologians. But this spirit of piety is most wise, as it is
an instinct and derivation of the Holy Spirit Who is the Spirit of Truth. Afterwards,
the theologian examines with astonishment the wonderful wisdom of these divinely
ingenious institutions.
57 In the Secret of the privileged votive Mass of the Rosary is said:
Annue,
quaesnmus misericors Deus, precibus nostris: ut quicumque intra Rosarii Dei

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preferable to conceive of it as a devotion specifically Marian in
which Mary and the veneration of Mary appear wisely subordinated to God and to the divine worship. The Rosary is
hyperdulia informed with latria. The Rosary glorifies: (1)
The Most Holy Trinity; (2) Especially Jesus Christ. And the
Rosary accomplishes this glorification: (1) In the mysteries
and truths which it contains; (2) in its oral prayers.
It gives glory to the Most Holy Trinity in its mysteries. The
Rosary begins by calling to mind the sacred mystery of the
Holy Trinity upon reminding us that the Word of the Father
became incarnate in the most pure womb of the Blessed Virgin
through the operation and grace of the Holy Ghost. And
throughout the mysteries of His hidden life and His Passion
and death there appears the Son of God reconciling us with the
Father and meriting for us the communication of the Holy
Ghost, Whose mission is recalled expressly in one of the
mysteries. In its glorious mysteries the Rosary commemorates
the triumph of the work of Redemption in the glory of Jesus and
Mary enwrapped in the Blessed Life of the Trinity, the possession of which they merited for us also. Likewise, the Rosary
glorifies the august Trinity in Mary, who in it appears intimately related with the divine persons: The first born daughter
of the Father, the mother and associate of the Son, and the
spouse and tabernacle of the Holy Ghost. The Sacred Trinity
admirably manifests Itself in Mary, full of grace, the greatest
work of the divine love, perfected triumph of the Redemption,
prototype and mother of the sons of God.
The Most Holy Trinity is glorified in the Rosarian prayers.
genitricis Mariae, eius soli filio dicati, ambitum virtutis continemur, plena tibi atque
perfecta corporis et animae devotione placeamus. St. Pius V in his Constitution
Consueverunt Romani Pontifices of September 17, 1569 writes: Respiciens (Btus.
Dominicus) modum facilem et omnibus pervium et admodum pium, orandi et
precandi Deum; Rosarium, seu Psalterium eiusdem Beatae Mariae Virginis nuncupatum excogitavit. In the fifth lesson of the old Office of the Rosary (1590) was
read: Hoc autem Rosarium sive Psalterium est modus quo facile admodum et pie
Deum exoramus; quo ... Beatissima Virgo colitur et veneratur. (Acta S. S. SSmi.
Rosarii, vol. II, 4, p. 1225) . In the Office in the fifth lesson of Matins is read:
Est autem Rosarium, sive Psalterium, sacra quaedam formula precandi Deum in
honorem Beatae Mariae: ...

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The Rosary directs its petition primarily to God according to
the perfect formula taught to us by Christ. And in the prayers
to the Blessed Virgin she is saluted as full of the grace of God
Who is with her; she is proclaimed blessed because of the
blessed Fruit which is her Son; and as Mother of God she is
besought to obtain of Him the gifts of His goodness-our wellbeing. Moreover, the Rosary crowns its glorification of the
Most Holy Trinity by terminating each decade with the
doxology: "Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the
Holy Ghost, as it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be,
world without end. Amen."
Jesus Christ is glorified in the mysteries of the Rosary. The
Rosary is an abridged Gospel which relives the mysteries of
true man, Saviour of the human race. By
Jesus, true God
means of the Rosary the most holy life of the Saviour is made
the constant object of the loving contemplation of souls. In the
Rosary Jesus is the blessed Fruit of Mary, who in giving Him
to us became at the same time His mother and ours and
blessed among all women. The Rosary, therefore, is a perennial
homage to our Redeemer. Jesus Christ is given glory in the
prayers of the Rosary. The Rosarian prayers make this homage
to Jesus Christ exterior, not only by adoring Him in the
Blessed Trinity and by seeking and asking as He taught us to
seek and to ask, but also by proclaiming His Divinity, blessing
and invoking His Name in each Hail Mary.
Latreutic extension is not so apparent in the devotion to the
Heart of Mary as it is in the Rosary, but he who does not see
Mary clothed with the Sun of the Divinity does not really see
her. The Lord is with her. It is not possible to enter into the
Heart of Mary without entering into God. The Heart of Mary
is a true Holy of Holies of the Most Blessed Trinity with Whom
she lives in vital and ineffable communion. Every soul through
grace is a little god. Mary is as divine as anyone can possibly be
without being God. The Virgin Mary relives in her spirit in a
most lofty and incomparable manner the adorable life of the
Trinity. Her Heart is a living mirror of the hidden mystery
of the Deity. Thus, in Mary the soul finds God. Upon pene-

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trating into her most holy Heart the soul adores the thrice holy
God. 58 But moreover, if the excellence of creatures of itself
leads to the veneration of the Creator, the divine excellence of
the most pure Heart of'Mary, supreme realization of the divine
Wisdom, Love, and Power, proclaims better than all other
creatures together the infinite perfection of God. She is the
true heaven which reveals the glory of the Creator. The soul
finds in the Heart of Mary, together with that of Christ, the
supreme benedicite of divine praise; 59 And to that benedicite
of the soul is joined the Magnificat, which the Heart of Mary
raises unceasingly to the merciful God Who has made her great
and blessed: " My soul doth magnify the Lord. And my spirit
hath rejoiced in God my Saviour. Because he hath regarded
the hu:n;tility of his handmaid, for behold from henceforth all
generations shall call me blessed. Because he that is mighty
hath done great things to me: and holy is his name."
•• The doxology of the Cordimarian hymns of St. John Eudes has this profound
thought: 0 sacrosancta Trinitas, Aeterna vita cordium, Cordis Mariae sanctitas,
In corde regnes omnium. Cf. Carlos Sauve, S. S., La intimidad de Maria (translated
into Spanish by Ruiz Amado, S. J., Barcelona,
59 Cf. Ibid., p. 55:
"We might consider the relations of Mary with the infinite
perfections of the Most Holy Trinity; we might dwell on the relations of intimacy,
familiarity, and union with which each Divine Person privileges her. How near
must she not be to the Divine Majesty to Whom her royal dignity must be as a
perpetual adoration! How near must she not be to the infinite simplicity, to which
her candor is probably paying continuous homage; to the infinite sanctity, which her
immaculate purity must be glorifying unceasingly; to the omnipotence, which might·
represent to us her authority over the Child God and over the world! How close
must she not be to charity, to tenderness, to the infinite mercy, which her goodness and love will sweetly reveal to us! . . . "
"Mary," says Father Faber, "is worth more than the whole creation. For she is
the most worthy of creatures, the most beautiful, the most powerful, and the one
most loved by God. And thus it is that before the eyes of the Eternal One she is the
canticle which is fitting for Him in Sion. Mary is all praise and thanksgiving.
Mary is the repose of the merciful complacence of the Creator. And thus the praise
of Mary is an almost infinite veneration which we may offer to the King of the
ages in humble adoration. In ancient times the servants of God composed their
benedicite, choosing for a theme of similar song the mountains and the seas,
the birds and the fish, the cold and the heat, the fountains and the meadows, men
and animals. All of these creatures were invited to bless, to praise, and to exalt
the glory of the Creator. But the benedicite of Christians is Mary." All For
]B8WI, chap. 8.

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Jesus is Mary's reason of being. Mary's reason for being
is to give us Jesus. Thus Marian devotion ought to lead us to
Jesus through Mary. We have seen how the Most Holy Rosary
does this. How is this accomplished in the Cordimarian devotion? St. John Eudes made the object of this devotion not only
the physical and spiritual Heart of Mary, hut also her" divine
Heart," that is, Jesus living in her, Who in being the Life of her
life is the Heart of her Heart. In this way, Cordimarian veneration has reverted into homage to Jesus, according to the saint's
formula appearing in the Invitatory of Matins of the liturgical
Office of the Heart of Mary: Jesum in Corde Mariae regnantem:
venite adoremus.
Although he may not express it so explicitly, the devout soul
always finds the gem in its setting: The Divine Son in the
Heart of the Virgin Mother. The Heart of the Blessed Virgin
has and gives Jesus always. Moreover, there is the union,
compemitration, and conformity between the Son and the
Mother, between the Heart of Christ and the Heart of Mary,
one intimate and indissoluble. Cordimarian veneration not
only respects that intimate identification of the Heart of Mary
with that of Christ, but it venerates it principally in respect to
her, since it is her divine formation in Christ which makes her
supremely venerable. And in this way, through the Immaculate Heart of Mary, souls penetrate into the Sacred Heart
of Jesus, and the veneration of Mary's love grows into adoration of the infinite love of Jesus.
IV.

GLORIFICATION

OF MARY

The Most Holy Rosary is a most perfect practice for glorifying Mary in the mysteries and excellences which it recalls and
in the praise which it directs to her.
The Most Holy Rosary glorifies Mary in its mysteries. By
means of them it gives a perfect explanation of her excellence
by presenting her as dependent upon and intimately united
with Jesus, that is, in her condition as Mother of God and of
men in her consequential office of Coredemptrix, Mediatrix,

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Dispensatrix of grace, and Queen of all created beings. 60 That
this is the greatest of Mary's sublimities is well known; that the
Rosary contains it is evident. In the Rosary Mary is the Mother
of Jesus, Whose motherhood she accepted, Whom she conceived of the Holy Ghost, Whom she brought forth while remaining a virgin, Whom she presented in the temple, Whom
she nourished, and with Whom she lived and to Whom she gave
her motherly care, not only during His hidden life, but during
His entire life. At the same time, she is the Mother of men
for whose divine regeneration she accepted and accomplished
the office as Mother of the Saviour, and she offered the life of
her Divine Son as the price of our Redemption. For that
reason she is the Mediatrix through whom God comes to us
and through whom we supplicate God, and she is the Coredemptrix, especially in the sorrowful mysteries. 61 Moreover, she
is our Mother, full of grace, through whom we beseech it and
through whom it comes to us from God; and she is the Queen
who co-reigns with her Divine Son. Thus, the Rosary is a
popular and unsurpassable Mario logy, a most wise means of
glorifying Mary.
At the same time the Rosary is a perennial commemoration
and a perpetual homage to the most memorable and glorious
accomplishments of Mary. The inspired prayers of the Rosary
which refer to Mary marvellously rhyme with the ideas con60 By means of the Holy Rosary we raise Mary to the place which she occupies in
the divine plan. In the Rosary we are conducted to God by Mary, we do all for
Mary and we hope for everything from Mary. This is, in effect, her role in the
Incarnation. Without any doubt, she is a cause of our salvation. (Father Hugon,
El Rosario y la Santidad, II, cap. I, page 79.)
61 According to Pope Leo XIII, perhaps no other manner of prayer expresses
better the Marian mediation and coredemption than the Rosary. "Quod Mariae
praesidum orando quaesumus, hoc sane, tamquam in fundamento, in munere
nititur conciliandae nobis divinae gratiae, quae ipsa continenter fungitur apud
Deum, dignitate et meritis acceptissima, longeque Caelestibus sanctis omnibus
potentia antecellens. Hoc vero munus in nullo fortasse orandi modo tam patet
expressum quam in Rosario; in quo partes quae fuerunt Virginis ad salutem hominum
procurandam sic recurrunt, quasi praesenti efl'ectu explicatae: id quod habet
eximium pietatis emolumentum, sine sacris mysteriis, ad contemplandum succedentibus, sine precibus ore pio interandis." (Jucunda Sumpcr.)

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tained in the mysteries, and they echo and reecho her loftiness,
proclaiming her full of grace, united with God, blessed among
women. Moreover, they beseech her as Mother of God and our
Mother to bestow upon us grace for our present needs and
the grace of final perseverance. The Rosary consists in mysteries
and prayers divinely harmonized: That magnificent hymn of
Mary, Mother of God and our Mother, which, repeated perpetually and universally by all Christian souls, is the perfect
fulfillment of the prophecy of the Magnificat: " For behold
from henceforth all generations shall call me blessed." 62
The Cordimarian devotion also is a most fitting way of glorifying Mary. In the perfection of her Heart is contained the
whole excellence of her life. To honor her Heart is to glorify
her in all her grandeur. The Cordimarian devotion glorifies
the sanctity of Mary at its very source, which is her most perfect love. This love is the virtue of virtues; the cause, perfection, and merit of all her actions; the explanation of all her
mysteries and titles; the substantial excellence of her most holy
life. To glorify her Heart is to glorify Mary completely. The
Cordimarian devotion by its universal extension is the devotion
of devotions. "The excellence of the soul of Mary, the manifestations of her love, her diverse titles, and the intervention of
her motherly solicitude in behalf of men . . . are all venerated
together under the most expressive symbol in the devotion to
her Immaculate Heart." 63 The acts connatural to this devotion which we mentioned above-love, consecration, reparation,
invocation, and imitation-prove its efficacy in glorifying Mary
in her most blessed Heart.
62 The Rosary
is also called the "Psalter of Mary," and the Church in the
liturgical Office for the feast of the Most Holy Rosary invites us to take this
mystical Psalter and sing the glory of the Blessed Virgin, our helper: " Sumite
Psalterium jucundum in insigni die solemnitatis vestrae, et exultate Virgini adjutrici
nostrae. Cantate ei canticum novum: annunciate inter gentes gloriam eius."
(Response at Vespers of the Feast of the Most Holy Rosary.) "Igitur cum sacra
haec precandi formula tantopere Virgini grate esse dignoscatur .... " (Leo XIII,
Supremi Apostolatus)
63 Narcisco
Garcia Garces, Catecismo de la devocion al Corazon de Maria,
number 97.

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V.

SANCTIFYING

LLAMERAS

EFFICACY

OF THE DEVOTIONS

1. Conformation of Souls to Jesus and Mary.

divine plan of reconciliation, sanctification, and glorification of souls· reduces itself to Christianizing them or conforming them to Christ, Conformes fieri imagini Filii sui. The
Christian life is begun with the incorporation in Christ by
baptism; it grows .with the growth of this incorporation; and
it is perfect when it reproduces faithfully the life of Christ, that
is, when it reaches a complete conformity and identification
with Him. The perfect Christian life is, therefore, that which
relives perfectly the life of Christ. Christianus alter Christus.
This incorporation is accomplished in Mary and through Mary,
Mother of Christians, the divine mould of the sons of God.
The Rosary is a most efficacious means of conforming the
soul to Mary and to Christ. It presents them as models in the
entire course of their lives, which have to be relived by the
soul. " The whole intimate, loving, and familiar intercourse
with God by means of prayer and contemplation is ordained to
this, to go on copying and imitating as well as possible, and to
let the Divine Spirit impress in us supernaturally, the adorable
perfections of the Celestial Father, conforming us to His Onlybegotten Son, splendor of His glory and our exemplar and
model.
"In order to know, then, the grades which this divine life
offers and the phenomena which it presents from the time we
receive it in baptism until it fully unfolds itself in glory one
must keep well in mind all the mysteries-the joyful, sorrowful, and glorious-of the life of Our Lord. For this reason it is
so helpful to meditate upon them at the side of Mary, Mother
of Divine Grace, in the holy Rosary. All of them, from the
Incarnation itself de Spiritu Sancto ex Maria V irgine and the
Nativity to the Passion, Death, Resurrection, and Ascension,
and even to the sending of the Divine Spirit, which is where
the wonders of the Christian life are consummated-have to

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reproduce themselves in their own way in many other Christs,
in all the perfect Christians." 64
Further, the Rosary subjects souls to the forming influence of
Jesus and Mary. "The Rosary becomes for him who recites
it well a pouring forth of the knowledge and love of God over
his soul and a sort of living and continual incarnation of the
spirit of Jesus and Mary in our hearts!' 65 The supernatural
efficacy of the Rosary stems from this that it is at the same time
a prayer directed to Mary and an assiduous meditation on the
Blessed Virgin and the humanity of Christ, the bond of reconciliation between God and man. The recitation of the Rosary
makes us intimately familiar with Jesus and Mary; it envelops
us in the rays of their sanctity and purity; it brings the soul
and its powers close to Heaven, and it leaves impressed in our
thoughts and affections the seal of God." 66 By the Rosary also
the soul appropriates the mysteries of Jesusand Mary making
them his own· through faith and love, and in a moral sense he
relives them sharing with them their affections and sentiments.
we will speak of the Rosary's efficacy for obtaining grace
and the virtues which reproduce the life of Jesus and Mary in
the souL
To show the sanctifying efficacy of devotion to the Heart of
Mary, it is sufficient to say that it is the fruit and the connatural effect of this devotion to conform our heart to that
of Mary, the divine mould of Christian hearts, in order to conform them to the Heart of Christ. In the perfect conformity
with the maternal Heart of Mary and that of her Son consists
the perfect compenetration of our life with theirs. 67 And to this
Arintero, Grados de Oracion, art. 1, pages 13-15.
Norberto del Prado, 0. P., Enseiianzas del Rosario, I, Introduction, page 35.
66 Ibid., HI, page 64. "Jesus and Mary," says Father Joret, 0. P., "are not just
beautiful dead models of Whom there remains only an edifying remembrance.
They live more and better than ever .... They contribute as instruments to the
divine action which alone is capable of penetrating to the most secret depths of the
soul, and with it they enlighten the spirit, animate the heart, and transform our
lives." (Leo XIII, Le Rosaire de Marie, II, chap. 3, art. !'.! & 3, p. 339.)
67 The prayer of the liturgical Office of the Heart of Mary by St. John Eudes
expresses it thus: " Deus, qui Unigenitum tuum in Corde Tuo ab aeterno viventem
64

"5

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conformation with the Heart of Mary and formation into it
with that of Christ we are efficaciously led by the connatural
acts of this Cordimarian devotion, that is, by love, consecration,
and imitation.
2. Means of Obtaining Grace.

The true cause of our being conformed with Christ is grace,
the participation of the divine life, which unites us to Christ
and connaturalizes us with God, associating us in a vital manner with the mystery of the Trinity. Since only God is able to
sanctify, grace proceeds from Him alone as from its Author.
However, it flows in its plenitude from God into Christ, the
Head or principal vivifier of souls, and from Christ it flows comshe is the Mother of souls and
pletely into Mary, inasmuch
universal co-principle of their lives. Grace, therefore, proceeds
from God and is communicated to us through Jesus and Mary,
as the fruit of the Redemption accomplished by their mysteries.
This communication is effected: (a) through the sacraments,
of themselves efficacious in virtue of the Passion of Christ;
(b) through a living faith in the Passion of Christ and in the
mysteries of the Redemption. It is very important to be aware
of this efficacy of faith informed by love in order to gain for
oneself the value of the redemptive mysteries, of Jesus and
Mary and draw from them the divine water of grace. By faith
and love we come into the possession of Jesus and Mary, and
from this spiritual contact with them we derive for ourselves
Their sanctifying virtue. This doctrine, taken from St.
Thomas, 68 illustrates in a marvellous manner the efficacy of the
Rosary and the devotion to the Heart of Mary in obtaining
grace.
The Rosary predisposes for the acquisition of grace inasmuch
as it leads us to abhor sins, which the redemptive life aims to
in Corde Virginis ·Matris vivere et regnare in at:ternum voluisti: da nobis, quaesumus,
hanc sanctissimum Jesu et Mariae in corde uno vitam jugiter celebrare, cor unum
inter nos et cum ipsis habere, tuamque in omnibus voluntatem corde magno et
animo volenti adimplere; ut secundum Cor tuum a te invenire mereamur."
68 Summa Theol., III, q. 49, a. 1, ad 5; a. 8, ad 1.

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abolish. Moreover, it makes manifest the infinite value of grace
which is recalled in the mysteries, andit incites us to reconcile
ourselves with God, Who demands that we pray. For this same
reason it is an efficacious means for conserving divine grace.
The Rosary is also very efficacious for obtaining growth of
sanctifying grace and the aid of actual grace, for it places the
soul in spiritual communion with Jesus and Mary, causes of
grace. Moreover, by means of loving union and moral contact with their mysteries it captures with faith and love their
divine influence. Meanwhile, this is repeated again and again
in the prayers, which beseech from God the coming of His
reign over us, and from the Blessed Virgin, full of grace, that
she may obtain grace for us, her sinful children. "The mysteries," says Father Hugon, " are not only examples of heroism.
They possess a special efficacy for making us practice what
they teach. . . . Our union with the soul of the Word disposes us to receive graces which will make us like unto Him,
and our pious contact with the heroism of the Saviour will merit
for us actual aids for being heroic as He was." 69
This sanctifying virtue of the Rosary makes it commendable
beyond measure. Moreover, it ought to be noted that the
connection between the Eucharist and the Rosary is extremely
intimate; they are two modes of :revivifying Christ and the
sanctifying efficacy of His mysteries, which wonderfully complete each other. The Rosary was inspired by Mary as an
69 Father Hugon, El Rosario y la santidad, III, chap. 4, p. Hil.
In another place
the same Father Hugon says: " The meditation of our beautiful prayer places us in
contact with the source from which Mary has obtained her spiritual riches. As we
have said speaking of the soul of Jesus, the Rosary makes us perceive in some
way the soul and the grace of the Blessed Virgin. Brilliant rays of light, eternal
fire, come forth from her soul to ours. When we recite the Hail Mary, when we
say to our Mother gratia plena, we not only renew the perfume of her first joys,
but also, and above all, we recall the role which she plays in the work of our
salvation, in the obtaining of grace, and the claims which she, being near to God,
makes efficacious in our favor. To meditate on the mysteries is to unite our soul to
her, our heart with hers. It is to join our voice with that of time and eternity when
we say: Maria Mater gratiae-Oh Mary, Mother Of Grace, be mindful of your
children! And Mary answers by showering upon us new favors saying: " He that
shall find me shall find life, and shall hav<" salvation from the Lord." (Ibid., II,
ehap. !l:, pages 96-97.)

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auxiliary of the Eucha:risto By means of the :revivification and
moral possession of the mysteries of Jesus and Mary through
the Rosary, she disposes souls so that they may perceive better
and benefit more from the sanctifying efficacy of the Eucharistic
gifts-the Mass and Holy Communiono
It is easy to discover this excellence also in the devotion to
the Heart of Mary, if we remember that all divine graces come
to us through the maternal Heart of Maryo We are children of
her Heart inasmuch as we are children of God. Mary received
grace in such abundance as to be able to communicate it to all
souk Her grace is maternal inasmuch as it prepared her to become Mother of God and because by communicating it to us
she becomes our Mothero This she does by an affective movement of her maternal Heart, for every outpouring of divine
grace is accompanied by a loving irradiation from the Heart
of Maryo That most holy Heart, intimately united to that of
Christ and inhabited by the Holy Ghost is, then, the throne
and source of graceo The devotion to the Heart of Mary leads
us to drink from the Fountain, enkindles us in the Fire, illuminates us in the Sun. The union which faith and love establish
between her Heart and ours bestows on ours the sanctifying
influence of her graceo
The conversion of sinners is a very natural effect of this devotion and is not extrinsic to it. For to lead the wayward
children to the Heart of the Mother of Mercy is to assure them
of pardon and to reenkindle in them the inextinguishable
desire of the maternal intimacy. But the best is always for the
besL And if the sinners recover lost grace in the maternal
Heart of Mary, surely then it is the secure
for faithful
souk The love of Mary is solicitous in admitting them, most
powerful in guarding them, and most efficacious :in introducing
them to the Heart of God.
"Through Mary," says Father Hugon, "there is
the
Church a supernatural current which alternately descends and
ascends; there is between Heaven and earth a sort of perpetual
flow and re:flowo It is as a wave of the sea that sends back a
wave, love that returns loveo The merits and treasures of

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Jesus are transmitted to.us by the Heart of Mary; our merits
and our love go to Jesus by the Heart of His Mother. Your
Immaculate Heart, 0 Holy Virgin, is the sweet rendezvous
where God and man meet, the mysterious river wherein come
together the rivulets of time and eternity." 70

3. Increase of Faith.
Through grace the soul has life from God, and through the
theological virtues derived from grace the soul lives to things
divine, participating in the divine activity. Those virtues are:
faith, which is a participation of divine knowledge, the light of
the Word of God in us; hope and charity, which are participations of the divine love, infusions of the Holy Ghost.
Faith is the divine virtue whereby man, moved by grace,
voluntarily assents to the truths which the all wise God reveals. It is, then, the light of the Christian life, and therefore,
its root and foundation, as the Apostle calls it. It discloses to
us in substance the secret things of God. It opens up for our
hope horizons of eternal glory by assuring us that God Himself through His infinite mercy will be our reward. Moreover,
it places the love of the soul in contact with the infinite divine
Good, with God Who is essentially good and infinitely lovable.
It elevates our happy dependence upon God by making us
certain that He is our Heavenly Father and we His children,
whom Christ, the Incarnate Word, leads to Him. Faith, in
giving a divine meaning to our lives, gives it also to all creatures.
By means of faith, God, the August Trinity, is the Sun of life.
The Rosary increases faith because it is a marvellous compendium of the revealed dogmas which it constantly proposes
for our devout consideration and firm adherence. Pope Leo
XIII teaches that the Rosary affords a practical and easy means
of introducing and fixing in our spirits the principal dogmas of
the Christian faith. 71 "The Marian Rosary," says Pius XI,
•• Op. cit., p. 95.
71 Encyclical Magnae Dei Matris.
" Eo quidem summa Evangelicae doctrinae
perapte continetur." (Pope Leo XIII, Apostolic Letter to the English, April 14,
1895.)

3

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" helps to excite, encourage, and make attractive the evangelical
virtues, Above all, it nourishes faith which flourishes with
timely meditation on the holy mysteries, and it elevates the
spirit to the world of revealed truths, all of which are certainly
wholesome, as it is obvious to all, especially now when there has
come upon many in this century, even upon those who call
themselves Christians a sort of dislike for spiritual things and
the Christian doctrine!' 72
Further, frequent meditation on the mysteries is efficacious in
obtaining from Jesus and Mary the grace to penetrate them,
Jesus and Mary in the Rosary are teachers and enlighteners of
the soul who believes in them, " And in this series of divine
lessons," says Father Del Prado, " which extend from the
Incarnation of the Word of God to the Coronation of His
most holy Mother, we never cease to hear the voice of Mary, a
soft and sweet voice which speaks to the heart and impresses
on it with
of fair and holy love the entire pattern of
the life of Jesus and her own, It is Mary who in the mysteries
of the Rosary enlightens our understanding in a wonderful
manner with the truths of faith, and who fills the soul with
consolation and holy hope. There is nothing more efficacious
nor more pleasant than the recitation of the Rosary for
firmly establishing and conserving the Catholic faith in the
heart of man." 73
The Rosary also benefits faith because the example of the
most firm faith of Mary as presented in the Rosary is an incitement for our own, and the practice of the Rosary is a perfect
exercise of faith.
From all this it may be inferred that the Rosary is a most
efficacious means for the :rechristianization of souls and for the
conservation and growth of Christian doctrine in them, The
Popes have recognized and repeatedly taught this. 74 The
Encyclical lngravescentibus Malis, Sept., 1937. Cf. Torras y Bages, El Rosario
Mistica Filosofia, Barcelona, 1935, chap. I.
73 Ensciianzas del Rosario, I, pp. l!40-9!41. Cf. Leo XIII, Encyclical Magnae Dei
Matris, where he explains that the Rosary is " an instrument well adapted to
preserve the Faith." Cf. also Joret, op. cit., II, chap. III, art. 9!, 3l!, no. 9!.
74 Cf. Leo XIII, Encyclical Adjutricem Populi.
72

y

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Rosary from its very beginning was as much a catechetical
method as a method of prayer, or even more so; or better, it
was a happy way of uniting the two so that the people might
pray and profess the Christian truths at the same time as they
learned them. First, a mystery was explained to them, and
afterwards, they converted it into a prayer, beseeching God
through the mediation of Mary and Jesus while they recalled
to mind the mystery. In this way the people benefited simultaneously in faith and piety.
The apostolic value of the Rosary is perennial. One must not
forget that where the Rosary enters there enter also Jesus and
Mary with all the consequential benefits. It has this result,
above all, that it supernaturalizes our life, which is always so
obstinate, and today more than ever, to the Christian interpretation of our existence. The Rosary is a tremendous force
in supernaturalizing our lives because it gives a divine meaning
to the unchangeable pattern of human life in its three invariable
phrases of ideals or hopes, struggles and bitternesses, attainment
or triumph, if not of final defeat. To humanity which hopes,
suffers, and conquers, the Rosary teaches how to make divine
its joys, to convert into merit its sorrows, to look to eternity
for true glory, preparing oneself for the fruit of the Redemption
which is precisely to make human life divine, uniting it in merits
and glory with that of Jesus and Mary. 75
75 In spite of the original apostolic purpose of the Rosary, little attention is given
to its extraordinary efficacy as an instrument in the apostolate. Leo XIll had
· this uppermost in mind in proposing the Rosary as an unexcelled means of
Christian restoration.
This great Pontiff disclosed in the Rosary a three-fold
Christianizing apostolate. Ergo Rosarium Mariae Virginis in quo apte utiliterque
habentur conjumcta: a) Eximia precandi formula:
(Apostolate of piety). b) Et
idoneum fidei conservandae instrumentum:
(Apostolate of faith or truth). c) Et
insigne specimen perfectae virtutis:
(Apostolate of morality or Christian virtue).
(Encyclical Magnae Dei Matris.)
To gain souls for the Rosary, as we wrote elsewhere, is to gain them for Jesus
and Mary, whose truth and faith, whose life and example, whose veneration and
supplication the Rosary contains. It is a magnificent three-fold apostolate: of faith,
morality, and piety. The apostolate of faith is to make known the mysteries of
Jesus and Mary; the apostolate of Christian morality is to remind souls of the
most holy life which these mysteries relive; and the apostolate of piety is to cause

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The entire intimate life of the Heart of Mary is illuminated
by faith. Love and faith mutually influence each other. Love
determines the intellect to believe/ 6 but faith discovers for love
the infinite goodness of the Infinite Truth. 77 Thus, love informs
faith, and faith guides love and illumines our life. Mary's faith
made her adhere to the divine truth with all the force of her
immense love. But, in its turn, Mary's love received its life
through the divine motives of faith. She lived for love, but the
pure and divine tmth was the flame of that fire, the light of
her life.
In the light of the Truth of God, not acquired by us but
revealed by Him, things are divinely illuminated and are then
seen as they are in the eyes of God. Thus, above that light
which creatures reflect of God, He is known in the pure revealed light of faith, and creatures themselves are seen in the
light of God. One's own feeble lights darken the soul, but the
light of God, even through the veil of faith, enlightens it from
above. Everything is seen in God, and God is seen in everything. In a parallel manner and for the same reason, the
motives of love are deified. One loves only for the sake of God.
God is loved in all and all in God. In the measure in which the
Holy Ghost, Who is the Spirit of Truth, makes the soul more
translucent by enlightening its faith, so much the more is its
knowledge and love supernaturalizedo It understands, loves,
and lives more to divine things.
The Blessed Virgin lived this life in pure faith. God was
her Light; God was her Love, The Reason of all reasons, the
Goodness of all goodnesses. Her Heart lived for God. The
Jesus and the Mary to be venerated in their mysteries and to make supplication
through their mediation.
Fathers Del Prado and Torras y Bages observe that Leo XIII discovered in
the doctrine of St. Thomas and in the devotion to the Rosary the two infallible
sources for the rechristianization of modern society. Rosarian organizations and
other associations of piety and of the apostolate, above all Catholic Action, will
find in the Rosary an easy and efficient instrument of the apostolate.
76 Cf. Saint Thomas Aq., op. cit., II-II, q. l, a. 4, c.; q. 2 a. l, ad 8; q. 2, a. 10,
c.; q. 4, aa. 1 and
77 Ibid., I-II, q. 62, a. 4; II-II, q. 4, a. 7.

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divine criterion was her motive in all things. Her own Divine
Son was the Great Mystery which dazzled her, enlightened her,
and divinely inflamed her. Enlightened by her faith, Mary's
heart was centered and submerged in the divinity of her Son.
Never for one moment did she cease to believe 'in Him, to
adore Him, to love Him with all the energy of her soul. The
eclipses to which the divinity of the Redeemer submitted itself
gave her occasion for greater heroism in her faith.
The soul which through the Cordimarian devotion arrives at
the Heart of Mary enters into the depths of divine light which
envelops it, in which it loves, in which it lives. And that pure
supernatural light of the Heart of Mary is not able to do less
than to enlighten in a wonderful manner the hearts which unite
themselves to hers .. At the sight of the wonders of faith in
this virginal Heart, the soul will proclaim Mary blessed for
having believed and. will find courage to live according to
faith.
4. Strengthening of Hope,

Faith assures the Christian soul of the possibility of obtaining
eternal happiness in the blessed vision of God. Hope, then, is
born of faith, and it is the divine virtue by which we are
confident of securing the possession of God with the help of
His omnipotence. Without this virtue the heart of man would
fail, lacking as he does the good which he anxiously desires and
afflicted with the thousand adversities of tlris sorrowful life.
But with it he glories in the midst of his tribulations, sure of
the infinite compensation of future glory. "We glory," says St.
Paul, " in the hope of the glory of the sons of God." Thus, hope
is an incentive for sacrifice, a consolation for misfortune, a
restraint for receptive illusions, a constant recourse for perseverance in good; it is, finally, as St. Paul says, as an anchor
securely fastened in eternity against the tempests of life.
The Rosary strengthens hope because it proposes, promises
and offers the soul the possession of God, the true happiness,
which is the object of hope. 78 To this is added the friendly and
78

Ibid., 11-11, q. 17, a. !l.

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eternal intimacy with Jesus and Mary which the Rosary also
presents. Further it guarantees hope with the intervention of
the divine omnipotence through His saving mercy, and this is
the true motive of hope. 79 The Rosary, too, promises the mediation of Jesus and Mary, Whose worth before God is infinite and
Whose earnest desire to save us moved Them to the supreme
sacrifice. 80 It forecasts the triumph already obtained by Jesus
and Mary in the mysteries of their glorification, 81 and ministers
to hope through the contempt for earthly things which is taught
in the Rosary. 82 It stimulates the practice of hope through the
exercise of this virtue in the mysteries and in the prayers which
ask what ought to be hoped for and in the order in which they
ought to be desired. 83
" In no less degree does the Rosary enliven hope in eternal
things by opening widely the Heavens when, while meditating
on the victories of Christ which are commemorated in its final
mysteries, it invites us to take possession of that imperishable
Fatherland. By this means, although we may breath in everywhere that anxious desire for earthly goods which has weakened
the hearts of mortals and which tends to infect us with that
fever for perishable riches and most vain delights which afflicts
so many, we shall feel impelled anew by a holy inspiration to
pursue that treasure of celestial and eternal goods which neither
thieves can steal nor moths consume." 84
The Blessed Virgin is the great model of a hopeful souL Both
on account of the object and the motive, as well as the intensity
of the virtue and its exercise, the Heart of Mary was ineffably
hopeful. She was ineffably hopeful on account of the object of
her hope because God was her possession more so than of any
other soul. Moreover, God was her hope as fruit of her divine
maternity. She was ineffably hopeful because of the motive of
79

Ibid., II-II, q. 17, aa. £ and 7, c.; q. 21, a. l, c.

so Ibid.,

III, qq. 46, 47, 48 and 49.

Ibid., III, qq. 53, 55, 56, and 57.
82 Ibid., III, q. I, a. 2, etc.
83 Ibid., II-II, q. 17, a. 2, ad 2; q. 83 aa. 5 & 6.
84 Pius XI, Encyclicaiingravescentibus
Malis.
81

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her hope, for'' the Lord was with her"; the God of glory Who
was to establish her glory was her Son. Moreover, no contrary
motive hindered her, for happily she was impeccable.
Mary was ineffably hopeful by the intensity of this virtue
since it was proportionate to her most firm faith and plentiful
grace. By its exercise she was ineffably hopeful since she did
not entertain desires of any good outside of God, and this
earnest desire of her Heart to possess God was incessant and
most vehement. The Cordimarian soul will learn from the
Heart of the Blessed Virgin contempt for earthly things and aspiration for things divine, the infallibility of the divine promises,
and the advantage of remaining hopeful in every trial, even
when all human hope fails. Above all, the soul will find in the
maternal Heart of Mary a most steadfast and loving help in
strengthening his hope, for she has been given to us as Mother
for our hope. Salve Spes nostra/

5. Incentive of Charity.
Charity, as we have said above, is a participation of divine
love by which we love God because He is Infinite Goodness, this
being the supreme motive of love. Because of the supreme excellence of its object, charity is the highest virtue. It is the
virtue of virtues and their higher form, for it elevates them
from the particular good of each to the sovereign divine Goodness, Who is the good of all good things. With this same virtue
we love men inasmuch as they are sons of God, which is to love
God in them and to love them for what they have of God. Since
it informs all the virtues, to perfect oneself in charity is to
perfect oneself in them all; and to be perfect love is to be
wholly perfect.
The incentives of charity in the Rosary are so many that it is
not easy to summarize them. But let us say that the Rosary
fosters divine love: first, for God and especially for Jesus
Christ; secondly, for the most Holy Virgin; thirdly, for men.
The Rosary incites love for God: (1) Because in the Rosary
God is shown to be infinitely perfect and blessed in Himself.
(2) Because in the Rosary God manifests His infinite goodness,

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LLAMERAS

by predestining man for His same blessed happiness and by
giving us His Only-begotten Son for our redemption, which is
the supreme proof and gift of His love. Moreover, it sends to
us the Holy Spirit, and gives us a Mother in the most holy
Virgin, Mother of Jesus.
The Rosary leads to the love of Jesus Christ: (1) Because
besides being God He is true man, full of grace and truth, and
thus the Rosary presents Him to us. (2) Because He unites us
with Himself in a brotherly union making us participants in
His divine life and in the eternal life of His glory, and this the
Rosary teaches. (3) Because He lives, dies, and rises again to
save us as the mysteries of the Rosary recall. Each one is a
manifestation of a new love on His part which moves us to
correspond to it with our own.
The Rosary inspires love for the Blessed Virgin: (1) Because she is the Mother of God, full of grace, most perfect and
most amiable. And thus she appears in the Rosary. (2) Because she is our Mother who gives us divine life in Jesus, and
who loves us with maternal affection. And thus the Rosary
:represents her. (3) Because she is united with Jesus, who
caused our redemption by offering the life of her Son and her
maternal Heart in order to bring us forth in God. And this the
Rosary considers. (4) Because from Heaven where she is
Queen and Mother she continues to communicate life to souls
and to fulfill toward them all the duties of a divine Mother.
And this the Rosary recalls.
The Rosary moves us to the love of our neighbor: (1)
cause it teaches us that all men are sons of God, united as
brothers in Jesus Christ and in Mary, and predestined to the
same blessed happiness. (2) By the example of heroic love
for mankind which Jesus and Mary give us in their mysteries.
(3) Because the prayers of the Rosary oblige us to recognize
ourselves as brothers in God Our Father Who is in Heaven and
to desire for all His Kingdom and to pardon our offenses so
that He may forgive us as we forgive others.
The excellence of love is the supreme excellence of the life of
Mary and the reason of being of the Cordimarian devotion.

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Sanctity has its adequate expression in love. Grace is the
essential form of the divine life of the soul; it is the super-soul
of the soul. Charity, in its own actuation and as the form of the
virtues comprehends the divine activity of grace. The sanctity
of Mary, then, is contained in her, and her love, therefore, comprises her life. That love was proportionate to her fulness of
grace, and like it, was full and immeasurable.
Intimate with the Trinity through ineffable relations, united
to the divine Word with a mother's intimacy, inhabited lovingly
by the Holy Ghost, the heart of Mary was so deeply immersed
in the infinite divine fire that she burned with the same ardor
and she was inflamed with the divine flames. She, better than
the blessed soul, could have exclaimed: " 0 living flame of love,
which wounds so tenderly my soul in its inmost depths! "
(Canticle of the soul in the intimate communication of union of
love of God by St. John of the Cross.) And the :first flames gave
rise to others. For, since the divine Goodness is infinite and
inconsumable, Mary's love was not consumed on being united
with It, but rather it was
with greater ardor. The
more she became united to It, the more she was inflamed, and
the more she was inflamed, the closer she became united.
This love, progressively more ardent, was continuous in
Mary, and thus her love continually increased. The interruption, even for an instant, of the divine love in Mary would be
more unintelligible than the duration of the universe without
the energy which sustains it. There was no sleep for her love,
nor settings for the Sun of her Heart. The Heart of Mary is a
Mother's Heart. From the love of her Heart all of us are born to
grace and to charity, to life and to love. Ego mater pulchrae
dilectionis. . . .
The veneration of the Immaculate Heart of Mary is, then, an
incentive of love in souls: (I) For God, Whose infinite goodness is the object and the true excellence of Our Lady's love.
In the Heart of Mary God alone is found. By approaching the
Heart of Mary the soul is inflamed with divine love; (2) For
Jesus Christ, Heart of the Heart of Mary; (8) For the Blessed

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Virgin herself, whose maternal love inflames our filial love; (4)
For men, sons, like ourselves, of the Immaculate Heart.
6. Moral Influence.

The theological virtues animate and govern human life, but
for complete Christianization man needs the moral virtues
which subject him according to the demands of his supernatural
end. Since the requirements of that supernatural end are
superior to those of a purely human life, the virtues naturally
acquirable are not sufficient to obtain it, even presupposing the
theological virtues. Infused moral virtues are required, whose
extension is much greater and more elevated than that of the
natural virtues. The Christian virtues of prudence, justice,
religion, obedience, fortitude, magnanimity, patience, temperance, sobriety, chastity, meekness, humility, etc. are very much
superior to the natural virtues of the same names. A man
humanly perfect would be a very imperfect Christian. 85
The Rosary has a strong moralizing power in the life of a
Christian. It points out with precision and reminds one with
lively insistence of the supernatural Christian end of man and
his responsibility in being able to obtain it or lose it according
to the way he lives. That end, whose fulfillment appears in
the glorious mysteries, presides in all the mysteries beginning
from the Incarnation itself, in which the Son of God comes from
Heaven to open anew its gates to man. The moralization of
man is the essential purpose of the Rosary, as it is also that of
the work of the Redemption.
The whole drama of the Redemption, which the Rosary
relives, has for its end to free man from sin and lift him from
the degradation of guilt to the sanctity of the evangelical life
which is proper to men redeemed and made sons of God. It
is Jesus and Mary Who accomplish this sublime undertaking of
regeneration and sanctification. Jesus immolates His life and
Mary accepts and makes her own this offering of her Son in
•• Cf. I-ll, q. 65, a. 2 and q. 68, a. 4. See also Garrigou-Lagrange, Lea Trois ages
de la vie interieure, part Ill, chap. 8. (Vol. ll, p. 101 and following.)

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order to put to death sin and make it possible for men to live
according to God.
The Rosary offers to souls a perfect program or moral
evangelical life which is contained in the virtues of Jesus,
Mary, and Joseph as manifested in the mysteries. 86 This program of life is the best guarantee of salvation. And I say
that these virtues are manifest in the mysteries because they
shine forth in them with divine splendor which makes them
perceptible to all souls who consider them. To enumerate the
virtues which each mystery contains and stimulates would be
as if to enumerate the rays of the sun. There is no state or
condition of life which does not find in the Rosary Christian
orientation and example of evangelical virtue. By means of
the Rosary, Jesus and Mary lead man in Their footsteps by
sharing with him his daily anxieties, the sacrifices which his
vocation entails, the glory of his triumph. 87 And just as there
is no virtue which it does not teach, neither is there any precept
which it does not contain, nor any vice which it does not correct. 88 The Rosary is, therefore, a wonderful synthesis of
Christian morals.
The Rosary justifies the requirements which the Christian
moral life imposes: (a) By means of the divine glory, the
supreme end of the Redemption, which it teaches us to desire,
ask, and seek to obtain; (b) By the incomparable compensation which it promises us in the possession of God, that is, in
the participation of His glory; (c) By the heroic example of
Jesus, Mary, and Joseph which it offers to us. They drank the
bitter chalice while scarcely a few drops fall to our lot; They
carried the Cross while only a sliver is placed upon us.
The Rosary makes the Christian life possible, easy, and even
delightful: (a) By means of the grace which it obtains; (b)
Through the influence and help of Jesus and Mary.
86 Pope Leo Xlll, says that the Rosary is " insigne specimen perfectae virtutis."
(Encyclical Magnae Dei Matris.)
87 Cf. Hugon, El Rosario y la Santidad, Part Ill, chap. IT.
• 88 "Est autem eadem materia circa quam et virtus recte operatur et vitia opposita
a rectitudine recedunt. Sic ergo, tota materia moralis ad considerationem virtutum
reducta .... " (Summa Tkeol., IT-IT, Prologue.)

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The propagation of the Rosary never fails to result in the
betterment of public, family, and individual morals. For that
reason the Popes in their efforts to rechristianize souls, apply
the moral lessons of the Rosary to the social necessities of the
times. 89
St. John Eudes delighted in calling the Heart of Mary" the
throne of all the virtues." The perfect love of the Absolute
Goodness imports a love for all true goods. Charity implies all
the virtues. All are enthroned where it reigns. To say that the
Heart of Mary was most virtuous is to say that it was most
perfect in love. At the service of her love the Blessed Virgin
possessed all the virtues in a grade proportional to this same
charity. Her Heart was not only,most loving, but also most
prudent, most just, most pious, most courageous, most humble,
most pure, most meek, most clement, in a word, most virtuous.
In the loftiness of Mary's love the Cordimarian devotion venerates the loftiness of all her virtues. Her most holy Heart is a
perfect model of them all, and she irradiates them with her love
to those souls who consecrate themselves to her Heart.
Cor sanctitatis formula,· Cordis fidelis regula.90
7. Efficacy As A Prayer.
By providential disposition prayer is the most powerful of recourses which man has at his disposal for cooperating in the
beneficient designs of God. By asking he obtains his own welfare and the welfare of others. The good which he needs above
all is salvation and for it, sanctification. Thus, he needs above,
•• Cf. Leo Xlli in his Encyclical Laetitiae Sanetae, where he proposes the
Rosary as the remedy for social evils. Also confer Pius XI, in his Encyclical lngTavesc&ntibus rnalis.
90 St. Eudes in the Liturgical Office of the Heart of Mary, hymn for Matins.
In the oration for the Litany of the Heart of Mary this same saint says: " Omnipotens Deus, qui Beatissimae Virginis Mariae cor amantissimum, sacrarium Divinitatis, thronum omnium virtutum, totiusque sanctitatis thesaurum esse voluisti: da
nobis, quaesumus, eiusdem sanctissimi Cordis meritis et precibus, ipsius imaginem in
corde nos jugiter portare; ut eius imitatione, quae tibi sunt placita semper facientes,
secundum Cor tuum in aeternum effici mereamur; per Christum Dominum nostrum.
Amen."

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all grace and glory. 91 Prayer in itself is an act of the virtue of
religion; but religion acts in it as informed by the theological
virtues, especially by charity, and with the concurrence of other
virtues. 92 Serving the theological virtues, ·prayer is a most
efficacious means of union with God. By means of prayer the
sons of God communicate with their Heavenly Father. "Our
Father Who are in Heaven "-that communicationis supremely
exalted when the Spirit of adoption, Who rules souls with His
gifts, supplies for our weakness and makes us love and pray
for divine things. The devotions whose purpose is
cation of God and the sanctification of the soul accomplish this
especially inasmuch as they are practices of prayer.
Pope Leo XIII calls the Rosary an excellent form of prayereximia precondi formula. 98 We shall indicate summarily the
excellences of the Rosarian prayer which make it so highly
efficacious.
1. The Rosary strengthens the theological virtues and the
other virtues which perfect prayer, as has been shown.
It is most apt for lifting up the soul to God and to divine
things,04 for it occupies the imagination with the Gospel scenes,
the intellect with the divine truths, and the will with the infinite
goodness and with the merciful love of God, of Jesus, and of
Mary. Moreover, it contributes to this interior
with
the vocal reiteration.
3. It comprehends all the acts of perfect worship, as has
been pointed out above.
4. It is directed to God in union with and through the
mediation of Jesus and Mary. 95
5. It offers the most efficacious claims for obtaining favor
which are the merits of Jesus and Mary. 96
91 Cf., II-IT, q. 83, a. 5.
•• Ibid., aa. 3 and 15.
•• Encyclical Magnae Dei Matris.

•• Cf., IT-IT, q. 81, a. 7; q. 82, a. 3; q. 83, a. 1,

•• Ibid., ill, qq. 22 and 26;
""Ibid., q. 19, a. 4, and q. 48.

a. 3, ad 3; a. 17, c.

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6, It proposes the mysteries most apt for exciting devotion,
For, as St. Thomas teaches, although of itself the purely divine
has greater power in moving the affections and exciting devotion, however, because of our human makeup we must go to the
invisible by means of the visible, Thus the mysteries of the
humanity of the Word make a greater impression on us and
more easily enkindle in us the love of God. 97
7, It greatly facilitates the very necessary practice of meditation, arresting our attention with the variety and wealth of the
recalled Gospel events,
8, It is connatural to our mode of spiritual and corporal
being with its union of mental and vocal prayer. 98
9, The vocal prayer of the Rosary is at once sublime and
simple, and it is subordinated to the consideration of the
mysteries, the meaning of which it expresses. 99
10. It asks for that for which it ought to ask, and in the
order in which it ought to be desired and asked. 100
11. It petitions for whom it ought to petition, that is, for
ourselves and for our neighbor. 101
12, It is of itself a pious and persevering supplication. 102
13. It is, therefore, of universal utility. No one is able to
reject it as too difficult, for it is most simple, nor as too simple,
for it is exceedingly sublime. The unlettered know how to recite
•• Ibid., II-II, q. 8fl, a. 3, ad fl, "Ea quae sunt divinitatis, sunt secundum se
maxime excitantia dilectionem, et per consequens devotionem, quia Deus est super
omnia diligendus; sed ex debilitate mentis humanae est quod sicut indiget rnanuductione ad cognitionem divinorum, ita ad dilectionem per aliqua sensibilia nobis
nota; inter quae praecipuum est humanitas Christi, secundum quod in Praefatione
dicitur: ' Ut, dum visibiliter Deum cognoscimus, per hunc in invisibilium amorem
rapiamur.' Et ideo ea quae pertinent ad Christi humanitatem, per modum cuiusdam
manuductionis, maxime devotionem excitant; cum tamen devotio principaliter circa
ea quae sunt divinitatis consistat."
•• II-II, q. 83, a.
•• II-II, q. 83, aa. lfl and H.
100 II-II, q. 83, a. 9, and a. 14, ad 3.
101 II-II, q. 83, aa. 7 and 8.
'" 2 II-II, q. 83, a. 15, ad ft. Cf. also Del Prado, Enseiianzas del Rosario, II, chap.
11, 1ft, and 13.

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it, and the learned will never recite it with sufficient wisdom.
The sinner recites it as an entreaty for pardon, and the just
as a hymn of love.
In conclusion, as Torras y Bages affirms, " He who penetrates the substance of the Rosary and recites it properly never
needs another kind of prayer. He finds in it, to use the phrase
of the Venerable Father Louis of Granada, the two wings with
which the soul flies to Heaven, that is, mental and vocal prayer,
an admirable synthesis of the mysteries of the Catholic faith,
the most sublime prayers which God Himself deigned to teach
man, the powerful intercession of the Virgin Mary, in a word,
the entire rich essence of Christianity concentrated in a simple,
easy, and agreeable formula." 203
In order to understand the excellence of the Cordimarian
devotion as a practice of prayer it is sufficient to consider that
in it one prays to the Heart and by means of the most holy
Heart of Mary, Mother of God and our Mother. This may be
seen more clearly by considering:
L That the Cordimarian symbolism, so natural and expressive, aids the imagination, fixes the attention, and incites
meditation;
The loftiness of the Heart of Mary makes the spirit soar
to God and to divine things;
3. The veneration of the immense love of the Blessed Virgin
excites the love and devotion of the soul which are the substance of prayer;
4. The soul unites its aspirations and its petitions with
those of the Heart of Our Lady;
5. The Heart of Mary, whose mercy and favor are Implored, guarantees a favorable response to our petitions.
This is in brief arguments (almost in theological terms) the
value of the Rosary and of the devotion to the Heart of Mary.
They are fountains of evangelical life which they efficaciously
transfuse into our souls. And this is the reason of the Rosarian103

Op. cit., pages 13-14.

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LLAMERAS'

Cordimarian message of Fatima. The Blessed Virgin with
maternal solicitude calls souls to the love and reparation of her
Heart, and she exhorts them to persevere in the practice of the
Rosary in order to restrain them in their turning away from
God and to bring them back to Christ. They are not recourses
advantageous only under certain circumstances, but they are
perennially efficacious and so much the more urgent as the
conditions of souls are worse.
The explanation of the revelation of the Rosary which Fray
Louis of Granada gives is always valid. " Our Lady," he says,
"revealed it to the glorious Spanish Patriarch Saint Dominic
for the extirpation of heresy, the banishment of vices, the
amendment of men, the
of the faithful, in order to
enkindle in them 'the light of the knowledge of God and the
mysteries of Faith, the fervor of charity, and the exercise of the
Christian virtues. And these have been the admirable effects
which always have been recognized whenever this holy devotion has been preached as it ought to be preached." lM

III.

THEoLOGICAL

CoNNECTIONS

BETWEEN

THE

Two DEVOTIONS

Both of these devotions have the· common excellence of being
most apt practices, according to theological requirements, for
the ends which the Marian cult ought to accomplish, that is, for
the glorification of God, the veneration of·the Blessed Virgin,
and the sanctification of souls. Both, therefore, are heartily
recommended. However, we have attributed .to each that
common excellence because of particular reasons which are the
particular causes of their recommendation. Although each is
efficacious, nevertheless, since each is so in its own right, to
combine them is to double their efficacy. It is, then, very useful to unite them. And if one argues that by force of this
reason all Marian devotions ought to be united, since all are
good and in their own way recommendable, I answer that all
are recommendable for some reason, but the Rosary devotion
10 '

De la devoci6n del Santo Rosario, number 5.

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and that of the Heart of Mary are recommendable for every
reason, as has been demonstrated.
If the union must consist in adding the one to the other
while practicing them separately, then there is effected only a
union of their common ends, inasmuch as their respective
efficacy is combined to accomplish these ends. However,
this way they are not connected, nor do they mutually perfect
each other. Is there not a more intimate connection between
them? Is their common excellence the only reason the Blessed
Virgin had in uniting them in her recommendation of them? Is
it possible to discover a natural connection which permits the
practical integration of them into a single devotion which would
combine the efficacy of both? 105
105 Statement
of the problem. The relation of the two devotions may be considered in the theoretical order and in the practical order, and in both it ought to be
determined. As for the theoretical order we are not aware of any study of the
problem having been made. Each devotion is analyzed separately and its respective
excellence is recognized. Consequently, both are eamestly recommended without
bothering to show their relation to each other. Sometimes a passing remark is made
concerning the affinity and coherence which exists between them. Cf. Father
Hugon, 0. P., El Rosario y la Santidad, part I, chap. I, p. 86; Chap. II, p. 96,
etc.; Santiago Navarro, C. M. F., Fundamentos dogmatico-historicos de la devoci6n
al lmmaculado Corazon de Maria (in the official chronicle of the Sixth Diocesan
Marian Assembly of Seville, 1944), p. 25; Narciso Garcia Garces, C. M. F.,
Titulos y excelencias de Maria (Madrid, 1940), no. 222, and Catecismo de la
devoci6n al lmmaculado Corazon de Maria (Madrid, 1943), no. 101; Norbert Del
Prado, 0. P., Enseiianzas del Rosario (Vergara, 1913), Vol. II, chap. V.
In reviews and articles of an exhortatory or pious nature it is more common to
see them interwoven, especially in these last few years as an effect of the revelations
of Fatima and of the practice of the five first Saturdays. Cf., for example, Da
Fonseca, S. J., op. cit.; Magni, S. J., Mensaje de Fatima y nuestra respuesta (Bilbao,
1943), part II; Luis de Fatima Luque, 0. P., Los cinco prime:ros sabados (Vergara,
1944); Juan de Oliveiva, 0. P., 0 Rosario de Maria Cruzada Mundial do Rosario pela
Paz (Porto, 1944); Gonzalo Torres, C.M.F., El Milalgm de Fatima (Madrid, 1943),
chap. 6; Nazario Perez, S. J., Lecciones de Fatima (in the Vida Sobfenatural, no.
270, Dec. 1943.); M. Cuervo, 0. P., Fatima (in El Santisimo Rosario, no. 706, Oct.
1944; Barbado, 0. P., Exhortacion Pastoral sobre la Consagracion al lmAnaculado
Corazon de Maria (Salamanca, 1943); Justo Ferndandez Ruiz, El Santo Rosario '!J
el mensaje de Fatima (Soria, 1944); Luis Pujol, C. M. F., El Corozon de Maria en
los Misterios del Rosario (Madrid, 1945); Gregorio Martinez de Antofiana, C. M. F.,
El Mensaje de Fatima y el Corozon de Maria (Madrid, 1943).

4

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I.

LLAMERAS

NATURE OF THEIR CONNECTION

If the devotions were essentially cpnnected, the Rosary devotion would be of itself a Cordimarian devotion, and vice versa.
Therefore, to practice the one would be ipso facto to practice
the other. Does there exist an essential connection between
them? This has sometimes been insinuated. One might reason
thus, saying that the object of the devotion to the Heart of
Mary is to pay reverence to the excellence of the love of the
Blessed Virgin as venerated in her physical Heart, while the
object of the Rosary is to pay reverence to the excellence of Omr
Lady's love in its three phases of joy, sorrow, and glory, which
are manifested in the three series of mysteries. And it might
even be added, as does Father Garces, that" the three crowns
of joy, suffering, and glory or beatific love are beautifully symbolized in the fresh roses, piercing sword, and ardent flames of
the Immaculate Heart." 106
This contains some truth, for it is true that the Rosary also
honors the Blessed Virgin in this way. But its formal object is
to honor the excellence of Mary as she is united with Jesus,
concerned about Him, bringing Him forth, sharing with Him
His life, the redemptive work, and His glory. In other words,
it honors Mary in her excellence as Mother of God and hence
as Mother of men, with all its consequences. Therefore, they
are not identical, and to affirm this would be to denaturize
them. However, in spite of the difference of their proximate
formal objects, the wonderful conformity which is found between the two devotions is adequately preserved.
This marvellous conformity is preserved through their interdependence or causal connection which proceeds from the
connection of their formal objects themselves. But, since this
interdependence implies a coordination and a subordination
between the two devotions and determines their precedence or
respective excellence, in order to establish it precisely we must
distinguish in Mary: (a) Her supreme ontological excellence
which results from her state as Mother of God and from her
106

Titulos y Grande:oas de Maria, no. 22.

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consequent spiritual motherhood of men; (b) Her supreme
psychological and moral excellence which is established by her
charity, inasmuch as her charity is an adequate fruit of her
fulness of grace and includes in its perfection the perfection of
her every action. It is this excellence which is principally
symbolized by her Heart.
Mary's ontological excellence is the reason for her psychological excellence; for her two-fold motherhood motivates all
in Mary. However, her psychological excellence is a copy and
expression of her essential excellence. From this it may be
deduced that: (a) The formal object of the Rosary is the
cause of the formal object of the devotion to the Heart of
Mary. Moreover, the formal object of the Rosary is the end
for which honor is paid to the Heart of Mary. In this sense
the excellence of the Rosary is supreme, and the Cordlmarian
devotion is subordinated to it as a means for obtaining its
object. In a sense, the Heart of Mary was a cause of the divine
motherhood. But, absolutely speaking, the excellence of the
Heart of Mary depends on her motherhood,
not vice versa;
(b) The principal formal object of the Cordimarian devotion
is the reason for the objects of all other devotions which honor
the excellence of the perfection or sanctity of Mary in its diverse
manifestations, since the excellence of her love is the cause and
reason for the excellence of her life.
In this sense, the Cordimarian devotion is of itself the most
excellent, and all devotions inasmuch as they venerate the
virtues and excellences of the Blessed Virgin are subordinated to
it as to a formal cause and as to an end. Notwithstanding what
we have already said, the Rosary itself, inamuch as it venerates
the love and virtues of the most Blessed Virgin as manifested in
its mysteries, is subordinated to the object of the Cordimarian
devotion. Thus, it is subordinated to the excellence of the Heart
of Mary and ought to be a means of honoring it.
This subordination does not detract from the supreme excellence of the formal object of the Rosary. The Rosary venerates Mary in the full excellence of her position as Mother of
God and of men. But to do this, the Rosary recalls her whole

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life as Mother of Jesus and of us, and it ponders over the diverse
excellences which are contained in the mysteries. These excellences declare the excellence of her most excellent Heart and
must yield in paying homage to it. With the distinctive nature
of the Rosary thus preserved, we may formulate the following
propositions: (1) The most holy Heart of Mary ought to be
the center or end of the Marian devotions; (2) The devotion
to the Heart of Mary ought to inform all devotions to the
Blessed Virgin; (8) The Rosary ought to be a Cordimarian
devotion; (4) The Rosary is aLle to be the most excellent
Cordimarian devotion.
II.

THE HEART OF MARY AND MARIAN DEVOTIONS

We say that the Heart of Mary ought to be the center of
Marian devotions inasmuch as the others ought to converge
to it as to their common reason of being. We say that it ought
to be the end insofar as of itself it deserves to be the object of
the veneration of the other devotions to which they ought to
tend. The Heart of Mary is the reason of being and, therefore,
the center of Marian devotions because the excellence of each
one of them proceeds from the excellence of Mary's Heart.
Therefore, by means of the perfections which they venerate they
ought to converge in the veneration of her most holy Heart.
Moreover, this veneration ought to be intended, and thus the
Heart of Mary ought to be the end of the other devotions,
since it is in itself most excellent or most perfect, and a principle
of every excellence or perfection.
If we consider the sanctifying purpose of Marian devotions
we arrive at this same conclusion, since that sanctification is fulfilled in the intimate conformation of souls with the Blessed
Virgin. To accomplish this it is exceedingly efficacious, as was
demonstrated above, to unite them with her maternal Heart
and identify them with her sentiments. Love for the Blessed
Virgin, the soul of all Marian devotions, tends of itself to this
assimilation to her most holy Heart.
Devotion to the Heart of Mary ought to give form to the other
Marian devotions. This proposition is a consequence of the

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505

preceding but it makes its meaning more precise and dear.
The Cordimarian devotion accomplishes this formation by
directing and elevating the other devotions to the Heart of
Mary.
Moreover, this formation is proper to it, for the subordination
of objects and ends subordinates some devotions to others just
as it subordinates some potencies or virtues to others. Thus,
the universality of the end or good of the will subordinates to
the will and subjects to its formation all the potencies which the
will moves and utilizes. Likewise, the universality of the object of general justice subordinates to the virtue of justice and
subjects to its formation all the virtues which justice orders
or moves for the welfare of society, while the supremacy of the
good of charity subordinates and subjects them to a formation
even more perfect which elevates them toward the Supreme
Good. 107 Thus, the sublimity of the Cordimarian devotion by
means of its object subjects to its formation the other Marian
devotions, which through this formation become Cordimarian
devotions also; 108 that is, they are ordained and directed to the
veneration of the Heart of Mary.
If all Marian devotions ought to be Cordimarian devotions,
it might seem that there ought not to be a special devotion to
the Heart of Mary, for it would lack a proper object. But, a
devotion may be general and special from different points of
view. A devotion, just as a virtue, may be general in two ways:
inasmuch as its function is made the proper function of all the
others; inasmuch as by its information all the others participate
in its function. The virtue or devotion which is general in the
first sense would not be a special virtue or devotion, for it would
lack a proper act and object. But the devotion or virtue which is
general in the second sense is a special devotion or virtue, for
it has for its proper act that in which the others participate
when by its information of them it makes this proper act
107
108

Cf. II-II, q. 58, aa. 5 & 6; q. :!!3, a. 8.
Cf. II-II, q. 58, a. 6, c.

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general or common. 109 The devotion to the Heart of Mary is,
then, a special devotion since it has for its proper object the
veneration of the Heart of the Blessed Virgin on account of the
reverence which is due to its loftiness. Moreover, it is a general
devotion inasmuch as by its information it subordinates to its
object the other Marian devotions and makes them Cordimarian.

m:. -THE ROSARY, A CORDIMARIAN

DEVOTION

The statement that the Rosary ought to be a Cordimarian
devotion means that the Rosary ought to be a Cordimarian
devotion, not only because of the general reason that it is a
Marian devotion, but also for reasons derived from its very
nature, such as the following: (1) The Heart of Mary deserves
to be venerated in the mysteries of the Rosary for they are the
work and the glory of her Heart; (2) The Heart of Mary is
an explanation of the mysteries of the Rosary while, at the
same time, the mysteries reveal her Heart. To gaze upon them
in her Heart is to see them at a source. Love animates and informs the entire life of Mary; (3) Mary lived the mysteries in
her Heart. Her own physical Heart was the living mirror of
them reproducing all their impressions. If the vividness with
which some souls recall the sentiments of the redemptive mysteries conforms them in some cases even physically with Christ
Crucified, without a doubt then the Heart of Mary is a stereotype of the
which she shared with her Son.
In the Cordimarian liturgical Office St. John Eudes inspiringly wrote: "Your blessed Heart, 0 Mary, is a most luminous
mirror of the life of Christ and a perfect image of His Passion
and Death." 110 And repeating the same thought in the Tract
of the Mass he adds, " For she carried in her Heart the stigmata
of Christ." In the Postcommunion he beseeches, "Lord Jesus
Christ, Who wished that admirable mysteries of Your life,
Passion, and Resurrection be conserved and glorified in the
1o• Cf. II-II, q. 58, a. 6, ad 4.
110

The fourth antiphon of second vespers.

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most sacred Heart of Your admirable Mother. . . . " 111 It is,
then, very fitting to relive the mysteries of Mary in intimate
communion with her Heart, sharing her sentiments and those
of Jesus. To contemplate the Rosary in the Heart of Mary
is to admire and to enjoy the roses on the rosebush itself. For
the rosebush is her Immaculate Heart, and the roses are the
mysteries. The beauty and perfume of such divine roses dictate
to the heart and place on the lips that celestial acclaim: Ave
Maria gratia plena.
The distribution of the Rosarian mysteries into joyful,
sorrowful, and glorious, according to the sentiment which
is dominant in them, confirms the Cordimarian propensity of
the Rosary. The excellence of the maternal Heart of Mary,
which the Rosary discloses, reflects the supreme excellence of
Mary as Mother of Jesus and our Mother, which the Rosary
honors. The Rosary by its very make-up is a most apt means
of Cordimarian devotion, as we shall immediately demonstrate.
The Rosary can be the most excellent Cordimarian devotion.
The reasons given for the last proposition demonstrate that the
Rosary ought to be a Cordimarian devotion. The Rosary devotion itself gains in efficacy from it. However, the ultimate
reason alleged refers to a most special aptitude of the Rosary
for the practice of the devotion to the Heart of Mary. Is the
Rosary utilizable as a practice of Cordimarian devotion? Our
proposition affirms that it is of itself most apt for it. Its
Cordimarian extension will depend on the manner in which it
is practiced. Thus the transcendence of this proposition. becomes evident, for it solves satisfactorily the coordination and
integration of the two devotions, uniting their practice and
combining their efficacy without denaturizing them. That in11 1 The hymn for second vespers of the Office of the Rosary expresses the same
idea, and it is repeated in the hymn of lauds of the Office of the Heart of Mary:
In the hymn of the Heart of Mary:'
In the hymn of the Rosary:
0 COR dolore sancium
Ave dolens, et intimo
Dum nati agonem, verbera,
In CORDE agonem, verbera,
Spinas, crucem et lanceam,
Spinas crucemque Filii
Materna deflent lumina.
Perpessa, Princeps martyrum.

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LLAMERAS

tegration might be expressed in this simple formula: To
practice the Rosary with Cordimarian predilection.
The Rosary is a most excellent means of knowledge of the
Heart of Mary. Knowledge of the Heart of Mary is absolutely
necessary for the Cordimarian devotion. Every devotion is
founded on the knowledge of the excellence which makes the
subject of veneration capable of being honored. Without this
knowledge the devotion lacks a reasonable fundament and is
helplessly superficial. Hence, the devotions which are not
founded on reason usually lean upon unreasoning sentiments;
we have a choice, either doctrinal solidity, or pietism and sentimentalism. We have demonstrated that the devotion to the
Heart of Mary is theologically solid, but it is so because of
solid reasons. If these reasons were lacking, it would not be
solid in theory and if sufficient knowledge of them is lacking it
will not be solid in practice. "The permanent and substantial
fundament of the devotion to the Heart of Mary," as Father
Garcia Garces wisely says, "consists in recognizing its sublime
excellences and the duties which it performs with us. . . . " 112
That recognition is not possible without knowledge.
Knowledge of the Heart of Mary and of the excellence which
makes it worthy of veneration cannot be obtained a priori. I
mean that it is not given to us to know the Heart of the Blessed
Virgin in itself or to imitate its ineffable perfection. The personality and excellence of Mary is dependent in everything on·
that of Jesus, and it is in the light of Him that one must know
her, that is, in the mysteries which intimately unite her with her
Divine Son. Without the light of the Incarnation and Redemption it is impossible to perceive even faintly the ineffable perfection of the Heart of Mary, Mother of God and of men. It
may not be said that the Heart of Mary explains the mysteries
and not vice versa for, in the first place, some of the mysteries
are the cause of Mary's entire perfection. Secondly this may not
be said, because the mysteries in which her Heart is revealed
to us are more easily understood than her Heart in itself and,
112

Catecismo de la devoci6n at Corazon de Maria, no. 92.

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509

therefore, they penetrate better into its sublime intimacies.
Finally, if the perfection of Our Lady can well explain the
perfection of the mysteries, the mysteries in turn explain the
perfection of her Heart, since it was thus perfected to realize
them and to live them. The Heart of Mary was capable of being
perfected, and her life perfected it. ·works of love perfected her
love. Each mystery of Jesus imd Mary is a chapter of the
great epic of their love. They might have been able to :redeem
us by only loving us; but Their love dictated to Them the work
of the Redemption which is the supreme accomplishment of
Their Hearts. Through it Their Hearts must be made known
to souls.
The Cordimarian symbolism is insufficient to make known
the Heart of the Blessed Virgin. The symbolic Heart is an apt,
suggestive, and tender means to fix the attention and the
affections on the Heart of Mary, but of itself it does not :reveal
to us its contents. For a substantial and solid Cordimarian
devotion, then, its precious symbolism is not sufficient. There
is required a previous knowledge of the perfections
lences of the most holy Heart of Mary, Mother of Jesus and
of us.
The Rosary is a most excellent means of knowing the Heart
of Mary, for it is at once its history and its theology. As its
history, the Rosary :reveals Mary's Heart to us; and as its
theology, it explains it to us. History reveals hearts in the
measure in which hearts influence life. In reality history is
attributable to man only insofar as it proceeds from his will.
The history of the life of the Blessed Virgin is the history of her
Heart. The realizations of her life are the works of her Heart.
The Rosary, by recalling the great events or mysteries of Mary's
life, :relives the history of her most holy Heart and reveals it
to souls. " The Heart and the soul of Mary," says Father
Hugon, " are manifested in their entirety in the mysteries with
all their treasures and indescribable beauties." 113
" In order to know the excellences of the spiritual Heart or of
113

El Rosario· y la Santidad, part II, chap. I, p. 86.

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LLAMERAS

the love and interior life of Mary, it is necessary to study the
most principal part, which in the mysteries of the life of Mary
corresponds to her Heart, and the efficacy and influence which
it has had and still has in the salvation of men." 114 The Rosary
makes it easy for souls to acquire this knowledge.
Moreover, the Rosary, at the same time that it is the history
of the Heart of Mary, is also its theology. It does not limit itself merely to recalling the mysteries, but it also presents them
in the divine light of their setting according to the designs of
providence, that is, as shared and united with the Divine Son,
informed by those same ends as motivated the hypostatic union.
Thus the Rosary makes evident the divine excellence of the
Heart of Mary identified with that of Christ in the supreme
realization of divine love, which is the Redemption of man. "By
reason of the duties which it performs for man," says :Father
Garcia," we must think of the Heart of Mary as it is in reality,
that is, loving and compassionate as that of a Mother, sacrificing as that of a Coredemptrix, solicitous for our welfare as
that of a JVIediatrix and Advocate, generous and magnificent as
that of a Queen." 115 In this manner the Heart of the Blessed
Virgin appears in the mysteries of the Rosary. And, in thi.s way,
the Rosary, as Father Del Prado says, "manifests to us with
heavenly light in its three series of mysteries what the most
sweet heart of Mary is." 116
A complete demonstration of these affirmations could be
achieved by studying the Heart of Mary in each of its mysteries.
"What a lesson it would be," writes Father Peinador, C. M. F.,
" to examine one by one all the mysteries of the life of Jesus,
the intimacies and colloquies of the Mother and Son in N azareth, and to perceive the palpitations of love of the Heart of
Mary in unison with those of the Divine Heart of Jesus: joys
and sorrows, forebodings and solicitudes, tendernesses and
abnegations, grief and bitterness, diverse modalities of her love
for Jesus and for us, distinct throbbings of her maternal Heart
Garcia Garces, op. cit., no. 45.
Ibid., no. 76.
110 Enseiianzas del Rosario, Vol. ll, chap. XI, p. 100.

114

115

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511

all concurring to the very same end-human Redemption." 117
This is not an opportune time to make that pious study. However, the Rosary makes this easy for all, revealing the joys,
sorrows, and glories of the Immaculate Heart in the three
phases of the sacred mysteries.
" There is not in the Church," writes His Excellency Bishop
Barbado, 0. P., "a devotion more apt for penetrating the
secrets of Mary's Heart, for knowing her sentiments, and for
learning her virtues than the most Holy Rosary. The Christian
while he fingers his beads follows step by step the Virgin Mary
from the moment in which the Son of God becomes man in her
most pure womb, as she visits her cousin St. Elizabeth, when
in the stable of Bethlehem Jesus is born, when she carries Him
to the temple and offers Him to God, and when later she finds
Him there amidst the doctors.
" In all these steps, so outstanding in the life of the Blessed
Virgin, he who is devoted to the Rosary penetrates the Heart
of Mary, who, as St. Luke tells us, conserved in it all these
mysteries, and he contemplates her sentiments and admires her
virtues, joined with the sentiments and virtues of Jesus and
St. Joseph. And in the school of the Holy Family, Whose life it
lives spiritually during the recitation of the Holy Rosary, the
Christian family assimilates the way of thinking, feeling, and
working of the Holy Family, and it learns to imitate Them in
Their purity, and humility, in Their patience and obedience,
while at the same time it praises Them and beseeches Their
protection and aid.
" And while accompanying Mary he follows in the footsteps
of Jesus in His Passion; he contemplates also the sentiments of
the Immaculate Heart of the Blessed Mother, and with her he
compassionates Jesus in the Garden, when He is scourged and
crowned with thorns, when He carries His Cross, and finally,
when He expires nailed to the Cross. With Mary he learns to
abhor sin because it offends God, to offer satisfaction to Our
Lord for the sins of all men, to suffer with patience the trials
117 Consagmcion al Corazon de Maria
(In the Official Chronicle of the Sixth
Marian Assembly of the Diocese of Seville, 1943, p. 79).

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LLAMERAS

and labors of life, and to abandon himself with confidence to
the hands of divine providence.
"Finally, he who is devoted to the Rosary is intimately
united with the Heart of Mary in her joy at seeing Jesus Christ
risen and upon contemplating Him ascending into Heaven full
of glory and majesty. With her he prays that the Holy Ghost
may fill the hearts of the disciples of Jesus, and he prepares his
own heart to :receive Him, as did Mary and the Apostles in the
Cenacle. He ascends spiritually with her into Heaven and rejoices to see her crowned Queen of Heaven and Earth. With aU
the angels and saints he sings in her honor canticles of praise.
United with them and with the Heart of the glorious Mary he
renders worship and chants a hymn of thanksgiving to the Most
Holy Trinity for granting so great a glory to the Mother of
Heaven, near to whose Heart the Christian leaves his own with
the firm hope of ascending one day to reign with her.
" This pious consideration of the mysteries of the holy
Rosary, following the scenes of the Gospel, leads us by the hand
into the interior recesses
the Heart of the Most Holy Virgin,
there to contemplate the inexhaustible wealth of her love for
God and for men and the perfection of her virtues. It cannot
help but produce longings for sanctity and fruits of perfection." 118
The Rosary is a most excellent means of compenetration of
souls with the Heart of Mary. That compenetration is accompanied by the soul reliving the intimate life of the Blessed
Virgin, that is, the life of her Heart, letting the spirit of Mary
inform our own lives" The Rosary is a most efficacious means
for accomplishing this, since it brings to our mind and heart
the history of Our Lady, which is the life of her Heart. Moreover, it makes us share her sentiments which give meaning and
divine merit to those of our own lives by leading us to share
them with her and with Jesus. «To meditate the Rosary,"
118 Pastoral letter concerning the Consecration
to the Immaculate Heart of Mary,
Salamanca, l!l43, pages
Also cf. Del Prado, Ensefianzas del Rosario, Vol. II,
chap. 5.

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513

says Father Hugon, "is to unite our soul with her's, our heart
with her's." 119
" There is no doubt that by means of the Rosary there is
achieved a mutual approximation between our hearts and the
most sweet Heart of Mary. By reciting the Most Holy Rosary
and meditating its mysteries we speak with Mary; and Mary
speaks with us, and she speaks to our hearts and piaces them
in contact with her Heart. Moreover, she creates in us a right
and clean heart
which are portrayed as in a mirror the virtues
and holy affections of the Heart of our Mother." 120 Of itself
the loving and continuous commemoration of the mysteries of
the Blessed Virgin leads one to a most intimate compenetration. There is impressed deeply in the soul that which is the
habitual object of loving thought. And above all, by means of
thought love penetrates into the Heart of the person loved and
becomes identified with its feelings and shares its intimacies.
The Rosary has been and always will be most efficacious for
forming Christian hearts to those of Jesus and Mary.
The Rosary is a most excellent means for eliciting acts connatural to the Cordimarian devotion. We have pointed out
above as connatural acts of the devotion to the Heart of Mary
(besides veneration which is general) love, consecration, reparation, imitation, and invocation. For reasons deduced from its
very nature "we attributed similar acts to the Rosary. Its efficacy
for stirring up those acts toward the Heart of the Immaculate
Virgin is readily seen. All of these acts spring forth spontaneously before the excellence of the most holy Heart of· Mary
which the Rosary reveals. And this happens so much the more
when the Rosary is not merely a cold remembrance and a
lifeless representation of the realizations of Mary's love, but a
pious and loving reliving of them, which moves one· to understand and reciprocate them.
The Most Holy Rosary stimulates: (1) Love for the Heart

in

El Rosario y la Santidad, Part II, chap. II, p. 97.
Del Prado, Enseiianzas del Rosario, part II, p. 101.
121 Cf. I-II, q. 28, a. 2, "Rationis apprehensio praecedit affectum amoris; et ideo
sicut ratio disquirit, ita afl'ectus amoris subintrat in amatum."
119

120

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LLAMERAS

of Mary by presenting it in its mysteries as most loving and
most lovable; 122
Consecration, for it reveals Mary's Heart
to us as the Heart of a Mother and of a Queen; (3) Reparation, for in the Rosary Mary's Heart appears as a coredemptive
Heart which merits to be lived and imitated; (4) Imitation, for
the Rosary reflects the life of the Heart of the Blessed Virgin,
which ought to be reproduced in the soul. To accomplish this
the soul is impelled by love and love's ability to conform the
lover with the beloved; (5) Invocation, for in the Rosary the
Heart of the Virgin is shown to be maternal and powerful. "The
Holy Rosary is, therefore," as Bishop Barbado, 0. P. says," the
pious practice which brings us closest to the Heart of Mary. It
makes us know and love her more, and moves us more to imitate
her. It is the golden key which opens wide the Heart of our
Heavenly Mother." 128
JV;

ATTESTATIONS

TO THE CoNNECTION

OF THE DEVOTIONS

The bond between the Rosary and Cordimarian devotions is
intimate and inseparable, as intimate and inseparable as the
union between the Heart of the Blessed Virgin and the mysteries of our life. Our previous arguments merely point out
that natural and indissoluble bond.
The historical connection of the two devotions has its explanation in that natural theological connection which harmonizes and compenetrates them. If the apostles of the Cordimarian devotion, above all the saintly Father Claret, present it
as intimately bound to the Rosary devotion even to the point of
integrating them into a single devotion, if the most Blessed
Virgin herself unites and fuses them in her recommendations,
if the Vicar of Christ invokes her as Queen of the Rosary
122 " The Rosary infuses in our spirit a filial affection for Mary, inasmuch as it
reveals and discloses to us in the consideration of its mysteries the Heart of this
Lady just as it is, with all the sanctity with which the Heart of the Mother of
God is embellished and with all the tenderness which is possessed by the Heart of
the Mother of men." (Del Prado, op. cit., part II, chap. V, p. 96.)
'"" Op. cit., p. 25.

FATIMA:

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515

while consecrating humanity to her Immaculate Heart, it is
because neither her love can be separated from the mysteries,
nor the mysteries from her love. The Rosary takes one to the
Heart of Mary. Her Heart is revealed in the mysteries. In the
Rosary the soul is compenetrated with the Heart of the Virgin
Mother.
But if the arguments explain the facts, the facts attest to the
arguments. We shall cite, then, in confirmation of our conclusions and reasoning the eminent example of the great Spanish
apostle, Blessed Anthony M. Claret, and the most authentic
interpretations of the wonderful message of Fatima, confirmed
by the Blessed Virgin herself in her exhortation to practice the
five first Saturdays and by the Pope in his consecration to the
Immaculate Heart of Mary.
I.

THE TEACHING OF BLESSED ANTHONY

In the apostolate Blessed Anthony Claret was at the same
time a providential apostle of the Rosary and of the devotion to
the Heart of Mary, as it is well known. 124 "Father Claret always associated the recitation of the Rosary with the devotion
to the Heart of Mary. Moreover, according to him the image
of the Heart of Mary ought to be the image of Our Lady of
the Rosary with a Heart on her breast. Thus it was in that
124 Cf. Mariano Aguilar, Vida admirable del siervo de Dios P. Antonio M. Claret
(Madrid, 1894), part I, chap. XI. "Among the associations," says this writer,
"which, favored by his untiring zeal, began to flourish again or budded forth for
the first time with vigorous life, the Confraternity of the Most Holy Rosary and
the Archconfraternity of the Heart of Mary deserve special mention." (p. 288);
Jose Puigdesens, Espiritu del Beato Antonio M. Claret (Barcelona, 1928), part II,
chap. II, p. 247; Father N. Garcia Garces in his article "El Beato Antonio M.
Claret y el Santo Rosario" (in Ecdesia, 119, p. 427) summarizes thus his
Rosarian apostolate: " The Blessed Virgin herself willed to consecrate him an
. apostle of her favorite devotion, and he had no less than nine divine conversations and revelations concerning the Rosary devotion. " On December 6, 1862, at
6: 45 in the afternoon, the Blessed Virgin told me that I must propagate the
devotion of the Most Holy Rosary, as the Venerable Alan de Rupe had done.
Twice she told me this. Later Jesus Christ added, 'Yes, Anthony, do that which
my Mother tells you.' Even before that, December 9, 1857, the Blessed Virgin had
told him that he must be the Dominic of these times in the preaching of the
Rosary .... "

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memorable novena of Vich in August of 1847, during which, in
such a small city, H!,OOO persons were inscribed in the
confraternity of the Most Holy Rosary. The object of veneration was an image of Our Lady of the Rosary with a symbolic
Heart of silver on her breast. The same also happened in Cuba.
When his secretary Currius commissioned a fum in Paris to
make some images and holy cards, reflecting the tastes and the
criterion of His Excellency Archbishop Claret he said, " You
will notice that the Virgin of the Rosary has a heart with a
sword painted on her breast which you must not omit in any of
your engravings, for this is the model which our most esteemed
archbishop has designed for the altars of the Confraternity of
the Most Holy Rosary and for those whom he has enrolled in
the Archconfraternity of the Immaculate Heart of Mary."
" Please make as soon as possible," he wrote in another letter,
" two carved images of Our Lady of the Rosary with the Heart
and the Child Jesus, in conformity with the enclosed design
I am sending."
is
"
of the Rosary with the Child Jesus,
greatest glory and best adornment, is the image preferred by
Father Claret for the devotion to the Heart of Mary, the two
devotions thus being joined and completing each other. This
is exactly as the Heart of Mary of Fatima wishes it." 125
In practice the Rosary was always an essential practice of the
Cordimarian devotion as propagated and directed by Father
Claret. " The Rosary devotion has never been remote from
that of the Immaculate Heart." History tells us how the former
has been considered as " the most proper and essential practice
125 Iris de Paz (Official organ of the Archconfraternity
of the Immaculate Heart
of Mary) no.
(August 15, 1943), p.
"In 1853 Father Claret
asked the painter Vallejo to paint a picture of Our Lady from a sketch which he
himself had designed. In it she appears standing with her Heart visible on her
breast and holding in her left ann the Child Jesus. With His beautiful little hand
Christ presents the Rosary to St. Catherine, while Mary with her right hand gives
it to St. Dominic. He ordered it to be painted in order to place it on the altars
of the Confraternities of both the Most Holy Rosary and the Heart of Mary, which
he established in the parishes of his Archdiocese of Cuba." Gonzalo Torres, C. M. F.,
El Milagro de Fatima, chap. VI, p. 85.

FATIMA:

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517

of the latter. For it invites us to consider the joys and sorrows,
the happiness and glory of the maternal Heart of Mary in the
principal mysteries of her life and in the mysteries of Our Lord
Jesus Christ, just as she, during her life, meditated, pondered,
conserved, and lived in her Heart the memory of the mysteries
of the life of her Son, as the Holy Gospel tells us." 126
As the Most Blessed Virgin 'Was to do in Fatima, Father
Claret integrated the two devotions in the Cordimarian Rosary.
" Blessed Claret was an inspired prophet of the desires and
designs of the Blessed Virgin in regard to the veneration of her
Heart. For it is certain that Father Claret, seeing Our Lady,
whom he loved, honored and acclaimed, seeing the whole world,
cities and villages, consecrating themselves to her with holy
ostentation and pomp, smiling in the depths of his soul would
have exclaimed, 'Very fine! Our Lady merits all that. That
and much more is due to the goodness and grandeur of her
Immaculate Heart.'
"Nevertheless, with his smile darkened with sadness, as was
the smile of the •white Lady of Fatima, he would add, ' But
that is not the way. That is not the veneration whieh the
Blessed Virgin seeks for her Heart in the apparitions of Portugal, nor is it the veneration which traditionally the confraternities of the Heart of Mary' have been developing.' That is not
what Father Claret taught and practiced, entirely in accord
with that which decades later the Blessed Virgin deigned to
reveal to the favored little shepherds of Aljustrel. According
to the manifestations of the Blessed Virgin, the veneration
which she asks for her Immaculate Heart, in order to achieve
the peace of the world and to overcome the anger of God, is
the Communion of reparation, the recitation of the Rosary, and
the consecration. It is exactly the same as that which was
practiced, recommended, and spread more than a century ago
by Father Claret, inspired apostle of the Heart of Mary.'' 127

126

Gonzalo Torres, C. M. F., op. cit., pages 85-85.

197

Iris de Paz, no. 2-108 (August 15, 1948), p. 258.

5

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MARCELIANO
II.

LLAMERAS

THE TEACHING OF SPIRITUAL WRITERS

There have not been wanting poor and shortsighted writers
who have all but eliminated the Rosarian aspect from the
message of Fatima in order to make better known its Cordimarian purpose. For them, the devotion to the Heart of Mary
could come to supplant advantageously that of the Rosary; the
Heart would be substituted for the Blessed Virgin; the mysteries
of Jesus and Mary would pass to a second place in piety. However, one thing still confounds these resolute interpreters, and
that is the formal assurance of the apparition that she was
The Virgin of the Rosary. To please them she would have had
to say that she was the Heart of Mary. What a pity that
theological sense is not possessed by all! Those who have it
speak in a different manner, as it will appear in the following
testimonies.
The Most Reverend Francis Barbado, 0. P., Bishop of Salamanca: " This pious consideration of the mysteries of the holy
Rosary, following the scenes of the Gospel, leads us by the hand
into the interior recesses of the Heart of the Most Holy Virgin,
there to contemplate the inexhaustible wealth of her love for
God and for men and the perfection of her virtues. It can not
help but produce longings for sanctity and fruits of perfection.
It is not strange, then, that in Fatima these two devotions are
intimately united and that to them is bound Our Lady's
promises of protection." 128
Nazario Perez, S. · "The Rosary is also the devotion of
triumph over the enemies of the Church, and in this it is very
similar to the Immaculate Mary. On the other hand, it is that
which leads us to Jesus through Mary by means of the meditation on the mysteries of the life of Christ, which is done in
the service of Our Lady. Without a doubt, for that reason it is
preferred by the Mother of God, whose fondest desire for us is
that we be united with her Son. 'Make reparation by means
of the Rosary for the many offenses with which ungrateful sin128

Pastoral Sobre la Consagraci6n a1 lmmaculado Coraz6n de Maria, page ll4.

FATIMA:

THE ROSARY AND THE HEART OF MARY

519

ners affect my Heart,' Our Lord Jesus Christ said one day to a
Spanish Dominican nun. And she replied, ' But, my Jesus, the
Rosary is for honoring Your Most Blessed Mother! ' The Divine
Spouse, wishing to·. correct her misconception, said, ' You will
find My Heart in each mystery of the Rosary.' And in fact,
this holy nun from that day came to find Him, just as many
other fervent souls will find Him there. And no less will they
find there the Immaculate Heart of Mary. Mary, as St. Luke
tells us, meditated all these words and works of Christ, pondering them in her Heart, thus teaching us the most substantial
part of the Rosary.
" Thus it seems that all the ancient hopes of the Church in
the Heart of Jesus, in the Immaculate Virgin, and in the
Rosary are founded in the Heart of Mary, which the revelations
of Fatima point out to us as the last hope. Thus it has been given
us to understand by Pius XII, who made the consecration of
the world to the Heart of Mary, invoking Our Lady of the
Rosary on the last day of her month, and he repeated it more
solemnly in the Vatican on the feast of the Immaculate Conception." 129
Narciso Garcia Garces, C. M. F.: "The Rosary is a devotion
very closely related to the Cordimarian devotion. All who are
devoted to the Heart of Mary ought to recite it; for in the
fifteen mysteries we venerate all the love and virtues of Our
Lady in the different steps of her life. The roses of this most
popular Marian devotion remind us of the Heart which rejoices, the Heart which suffers, the Heart which triumphs;" 130
German Puerto, C. M. F.: "Intimate are the relationship
and union which exist between this popular Marian devotion
(the Most Holy Rosary) and that of the Heart of Mary. If
after examining their make-up we were to remain unconvinced
of this conclusion, nevertheless we would unhesitatingly declare
it, confronted as we are by the fact that the modern apostles
of the Heart of Mary have been also champions of the Most
'"" "Lecciones
10

de Fatima" in La Vida Sobrenatural, 279, page 459.

° Catecismo de la devoei6n al lmmaculado Coraz6n de Maria, number 101.

520

MARCELIANO

LLAMERAS

Holy Rosary. Among them is Father Claret, apostle and model
of missionaries. . . . The Blessed Virgin herself, when she
spoke of establishing in the world her maternal reign, joined it
with the fervent recitation of the Most Holy Rosary. It is
not necessary to insist upon these famous apparitions, especially
those of Fatima. . . . " 131
Fathers Magni, S. J., and Toni, S. J.: "The Blessed Virgin,
speaking with the three little shepherds, often insisted upon the
daily recitation of the Rosary: ' Recite the Rosary every day
with devotion in order to obtain world peace.' Moreover, on
October 13, 1917, she solemnly confirmed her invitation to
recite the Rosary by revealing her name: ' I am Our Lady of
the Rosary.' Often in the course of the history of the Church,
and particularly in these recent apparitions, as also at Lourdes,
Mary has manifested her predilection for this form of prayer
which is the true compendium of all her joys and sorrows. In
Fatima she added that the general intention in the reCitation of
the Rosary should be to make reparation for the offenses committed against her Heart. 132
"Mary knows that the modern world delights exceedingly
in probing the mysteries of nature, science, and history, but
that it does not bother itself with far more important mysteries,
such as those of God, grace, and eternity. Thus she invites
us to meditate the mysteries of the holy Rosary, which are
none other than those which the Gospel presents to us and
which must be fully known in order that we might attain
eternal salvation. In order to help us penetrate the full depth
and divine beauty of these holy mysteries Mary with maternal
solicitude, asks us to accompany her for a quarter of an hour,
meditating upon them as she meditated and lived them in her
life.
"Mary, in reality, associated herself with the mysteries of
joy, sorrow, and glory of her Son not only externally, but above
all, with an interior union, full and generous, of faith and
181 " Fundamentos dogmaticos de Ia devocion al Corazon de Maria " in Estudioa
Marianas ill, p. 884.)
182 Mensaje de Fatima y nueatra Oorreapondencia (Bilbao, 1948), pages 68-64.

FATIMA:

THE ROSARY AND THE HEART OF MARY

521

charity. Let us study her life. The words, examples, and
works of Jesus form the object of her continuous meditation, the
never failing fountain of her affections and desires, the model Qf
her supernatural life, which elevate her to the most sublime
summits of sanctity. She lives the mysteries which unfold themselves before her eyes, and she lives them so closely united with
the mission of Jesus the Redeemer that she may justly be
proclaimed the Coredemptrix of the human race. She asks us
to contemplate them together with her, and to live them, so
that the joys, sorrows, and glory of the most holy Hearts of
Jesus and Mary may be ours." 133
Gonzalo Torres, C. M. F.: "Although this Lady of Light,
whose homeland is Heaven, has told us in definite and categorical terms, ' I am Our Lady of the Rosary,' nevertheless, her
message cannot be understood if it be separated from her
Heart." 134 " The well-:aimed character of the sacred message
of the Cove of Iria is its alliance of two extraordinarily popular
devotions, the Rosary devotion and the devotion to the Hearts
of Jesus and Mary." 135 "I bring this chapter to a close by
inviting you, dear reader, to give yourself completely and
devoutly to the love of these three great devotions: the devotions to the Heart of Jesus, to the Heart of Mary, and to the
holy Rosary, all of which are so ingeniously united in the revelations of Fatima." 136
Emmanuel Cuervo, 0. P.: "The Blessed Virgin also manifests
to the little shepherds her desire that the world be consecrated
to her
Heart, a request which happily has already been fulfilled by the reigning Pontiff, Pope Pius XII.
But this desire of the Blessed Virgin in no way contradicts her
previous declarations that she is the Virgin of the Rosary, nor
does she substitute the devotion to her Immaculate Heart in
place of the Rosary, nor does she give preponderance to the
devotion of her Immaculate Heart over the recitation of the
Rosary. It would be a lamentable error to understand the
••• Ibid., pages 72-74.
••• El Milagro de Fatima, chap. VI, pages 75-76.

••• Ibid., page 81.
Ibid., page 85.

136

522

MARCELIANO

LLAMERAS

apparitions of Fatima in this sense, which would debilitate in
part its very purpose. When one studies the apparitions of
Fatima he must consider them in all their original purity without any mixture of prejudices alien to the intentions of the
Blessed Virgin.
" The Virgin of the Rosary is the integral Virgin of the
Gospel, the Virgin of its mysteries and of those of Jesus Christ
in which she cooperated. She is the Virigin who lived in indissoluble union with her most holy Son in this world and
accomplished with Him, and dependant upon Him, our Redemption. The Virgin of the Rosary is the Mother of God and the
spiritual Mother of men. The whole life of the Most Blessed
Virgin in its double aspect of cooperation in the mysteries of
Christ and in the mysteries of our Redemption was motivated
by her most ardent love for the real Christ and for the
mystical or total Christ, of which her Heart is a symbol. Thence
it is that the Mother of God, manifested herself in Fatima as
Our Lady of the Rosary, that is, as the Virgin. Cooperatrix in
the mysteries of Christ and of our own, she asks the consecration of the world to her love, by means of which she cooperated
in these mysteries, and by means of which she is with Christ
and through Christ our Mediatrix and Coredemptrix. It is impossible to find in this a contradiction, or a substitution of one
thing for another, or preponderance of one over the other but
only the explanation of one and the same reality of the mysteries of the Rosary, that is, the reality of the mysteries of the
Rosary which are the mysteries of Mary and Jesus Christ,
and in a certain way ours also." 137
John De Oliveira, 0. P.: "The Immaculate Heart appears
in the message of Fatima to show men the love of their Mother
who has deigned to appear to them from the crown of an
azinheiva tree. It is the Heart of Our Lady of the Rosary,
giving us to understand what great power the Rosary has over
her." "- 38
Fatima" in El Santisimo Rosario 706, pages 278-279.
0 Rosario de Maria (Cruzada Mundial do Rosario pela Paz, Oporto, 1944),
page 12.
137 "

138

FATIMA:

THE ROSARY AND THE HEART OF MARY

523

" The devotion to the Immaculate Heart would terminate in
an exterior and sentimental cult before plastic images more or
less piouso If at the base of this devotion there ever begins to be
lacking penance and the Rosary, then it will be evident that
we are very far from realizing the message of Fatima, and
therefore, from obtaining the graces promised in :recompense
for the practice of the true devotion to the Immaculate Hearto
However, this error will never produce two separate devotions.
For the great devotion to her Immaculate Heart which Our.
Lady of the Rosary of Fatima asks of us is the Rosary entirely
bathed in penance. The first to give us the example of this
correct understanding of the message of Fatima was the Pope.
This he did by consecrating the world to Our Lady of the
Rosary and to her Immaculate Heart." 139 " It would be a
lamentable mistake if the recent and so sensational publication
of this revelation would come. to avert the attention from
its two fundamental and evangelical parts: penance and
prayer o" 140
G. Martinez De Antofiana, CoMo Fo: "The revelations
Fatima, just as the apparitions of Lourdes, and perhaps even
more so than they, are an exaltation of the devotion of the
holy Rosary and a most earnest recommendation to :recite it
daily ...
For that reason, Pope Pius XII, in alluding to the
events of Fatima in his Encyclical of ,June 13, 1940, speaks especially of 'The recitation of the holy Rosary, which was so
earnestly :recommended by Our Lady of Fatima.'
"But it ought to be noted what an intimate connection the
apparitions themselves place between the devotion (or practice
of the devotion) of the holy Rosary and the devotion to the
Immaculate Heart of Maryo This is seen especially in the
practice of :reparation to her most pure Heart, one of the principal points of the message, which ought to be practiced by
means of meditation or consideration of the mysteries of the
Rosary together with its recitation. Indeed, the history of the
devotion to the Heart of Mary shows us how the holy Rosary
0

130

Ibid.

140

Ibid., page 18o

MARCELIANO

LLAMERAS

has been considered as its most proper and essential practice,
since it invites us to consider and venerate the joys, sorrows,
gladness, and glory of the maternal Heart ofMary in the principal mysteries of her life and in the mysteries ·of Our Lord
Jesus Christ in the same way as she (as the Gospel tells us)
during her life meditated, pondered, and preserved in her
Heart the memory of the mysteries of the life of her Son." 141
lli.

FURTHER ATTESTATIONS

In the third apparition, the Blessed Virgin announced to the
little shepherds, " I come to ask the consecration of the world to
my Heart and the Communion of reparation on the first SaturOur Blessed Lady with
days of the month." On Dec. 10,
the Child Jesus appeared to Lucia and showed her her Heart
surrounded with thorns. The Child Jesus, while pointing to
Mary's Heart, said to Lucia," Have compassion on this most
sweet Heart which suffers continual martyrdom because of
human ingratitude."
To this the Blessed Virgin added," Look, my daughter, at my
Heart surrounded with thorns with which ungrateful men
wound it at every moment with their blasphemies and ingratitude. You at least attempt to console me and announce forme
that I promise to assist at the hour of death with the graces
necessary for salvation all those who on the first Saturday of
five consecutive months confess, receive Holy Communion,
recite a third part of the Rosary, and accompany me for fifteen
minutes, meditating on the mysteries of the Rosary, with the
intention of offering me reparation." 142
The apparitions and message of Fatima have had their
supreme certification in the allocation addressed to Portugal
and to the world by Pope Pius XII on October 31, 1942, the
twenty-fifth anniversary of the miraculous events. In his
message the Pope recalls Our Lady's special recommenda141 El
de Fatima y el Culto al Curaz6n de Maria (Madrid, 1948),
pages 40-4!l.
us Da Fonseca, op. cit., Epilogue.

FATIMA:

THE ROSARY AND THE HEART OF MARY

tion of the Rosary, and he fulfills her request that the world
be consecrated to her Immaculate Heart.
In his consecration the Pope does not forget that it was Our
Lady of the Rosary who besought it. To her, to the Queen of
the Most Holy Rosary, to her Immaculate Heart, the Vicar of
Christ consecrates the whole human race: " Queen of the Most
Holy Rosary! ... To you, to your Immaculate Heart, We, as
the common Father of the great Christian family, as Vicar of
Him to Whom was given all power in Heaven and on earth, and
from Whom we have received the care of so many souls,
redeemed with His Blood, who inhabit the whole world, to you,
to your Immaculate Heart, in this tragic hour of human history, we confide, we deliver, we consecrate, not only the Holy
Church, the Mystical Body of your Jesus, which suffers and
bleeds in so many places and is affiicted in so many ways, but
also the whole world, torn by deadly strife, inflamed with fires
of hate, victim of its own iniquities." 148 The august voice of
the Pope seals the indissoluable alliance between the Most
Holy Rosary and the devotion :to the Heart of Mary.
The Apostleship of Prayer adopting the watchwords of
Fatima, informed its propagandists and members in its Circular
of September 12,
" All our members in whatsoever part
of the world are urged to have recourse to the divine mercy by
means of the Most Pure Heart of Mary." " In our propaganda
let the Christian doctrine concerning the veneration of the
Most Pure Heart of Mary be clearly and repeatedly expounded
and inculcated."
" Let the daily recitation of the Rosary be recommended to
the faithful, along with pious meditation on the mysteries."
" Let the Communion of reparation on the first Saturdays of
the month in honor of the Most Pure Heart of Mary be promoted in order to beseech the conversion of sinners and the
divine mercy for the whole human race."
us Pope Leo XIII saw in the Rosary this great supplication to the Most Pure
Heart of Mary: " Ad perpetuam recordationem implorati ubique gentium per
mensem octobrem A PURISSIMO EIUS CORDE PRAESIDII ADDATUR
PRAECONIUM: REGINA SACRATISSIMI ROSARII, ora. pro nobis. (Salutaris IUe, December 24, 1888.)

526

MARCELIANO

V.

LLAMERAS

CoNSEQUENCEs

AND NoRMS

The Most Holy Rosary and the devotion to the Immaculate
Heart of Mary are recommendable beyond measure as most
apt practices, according to theological exactions, for accomplishing the ends which Marian devotion ought to accomplish;
namely, the glorification of God, the veneration of the Blessed
Virgin, and the sanctification of souk The Rosary venerates
more directly the ontological excellence of the Blessed Virgin;
that is, her position and realization of the Motherhood of God
which are invoked in the mysteries. The Cordimarian devotion
honors more directly her psychological excellence, which is
summed up and symbolized in her Heart. However, the close
relation of these two excellences intimately connect the two
devotions. It is possible to practice the one without the other.
However, it is connatural and very useful to unite them; connatural, because of their interdependence; very useful, because
thereby their efficacy is doubled.
The Rosary ought to be Cordima:rian, because the mysteries
are Cordimarian. The Cordimarian devotion communicates to
the Rosary a greater penetration and intimacy. The Rosary
can be a most excellent Cordimarian devotion, because it is the
history and theology of the Heart of Mary and completely fuses
souls with it, and it incites acts of Cordimarian veneration.
Since the true Cordimarian devotion requires a knowledge of
the Heart of Mary and an intimate _union with her sentiments,
it would be difficult to separate it from the Rosary without
weakening its solidity. The history of the Cordimarian devotion confirms. the compenetration of the two devotions. The
Message of Fatima is essentially Rosarian-Cordimarian.
Of
itself, the propagation of one of them aids the other. In conformity with theology and history and with the explicit desires
of the Blessed Virgin they ought to be propagated together.
Both devotions ought to be spread so universally that they
will be practiced assiduously by all souls. Their universal utility
and the earnest recommendation which they have received
from the Blessed Virgin and the Church demand it. The con-

FATIMA:

THE ROSARY AND THE HEART OF MARY

527

nection or union of the two devotions is most fitting and
proper, and it is easily accomplished by practicing the Rosary
devotions with Cordimarian predilection. The formula of integration may be expressed thus: Cordimarian Rosary, that is,
veneration of the Heart of Mary in the mysteries of the Rosary.
In harmony with their nature and with the will of Our Lady
they must be practiced in such a way that they may completely
fuse souls with Jesus and Mary, that they may serve as reparation to Their most Sacred Hearts, that they may obtain the
pardon of sinners and peace for the world. 144 Their practice will
be efficacious for these intentions of Our Lady if it is performed
by manifesting veneration, love, union, intimate communion,
invocation, imitation, reparation, and consecration, all of which
are connatural to it.
MARCELIANO

LLAMERAS,

0. P.

Convent uf St. Vincent Ferrer,
Valencia, Spain.

, .. In the Watchwords of the Blessed Virgin and the Angel spoken to the little
shepherds at Fatima these ends are evident. Consider those of the Blessed
Virgin: " Sacrifice yourselves for sinners and say frequently especially when making
some sacrifice: OH JESUS, IT IS FOR YOUR LOVE, FOR THE CONVERSION
OF SINNERS, AND IN REPARATION FOR THE INJURIES COMMITTED
AGAINST THE IMMACULATE HEART OF MARY." (Cf. Fonseca, op, cit.)
Consider those of the Angel: 1. " Recite with me: MY GOD, I BELIEVE, I
ADORE, I HOPE, AND I LOVE YOU. I ASK YOUR PARDON FOR THOSE
WHO DO NOT BELIEVE, DO NOT ADORE, DO NOT HOPE, AND DO NOT
LOVE YOU." (Cf. ibid.) 2. "Recite, recite often. The most holy Hearts of
Jesus and Mary have designs of mercy on us . . . ! Offer continually to Our Lord
prayers and sacrifices in order to make reparation for the many sins with which
He is offended and in order to obtain the conversion of sinners. Do this to bring
peace to you," 8. "MOST HOLY TRINITY, FATHER, SON, AND HOLY
GHOST, I ADORE YOU PROFOUNDLY, AND I OFFER YOU THE MOST
PRECIOUS BODY AND BLOOD, SOUL AND DIVINITY OF OUR LORD
JESUS CHRIST, PRESENT IN ALL THE TABERNACLES OF THE WORLD
IN REPARATION FOR THE OFFENSES WITH WHICH HE IS OFFENDED,
AND BY THE INFINITE MERITS OF IDS MOST HOLY HEART AND
THROUGH THE INTERCESSION OF THE IMMACULATE HEART OF
MARY, I ASK YOU FOR THE CONVERSION OF SINNERS." (Cf. ibid.)

THE DIALECTICS OF WAR AND PEACE
(CoNCLUSION]

HI,

THE DIALECTICS

OF WAR UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS'
REGIME

The Pact of 1919 united to traditional principles certain
new ideas inspired by a better understanding of the solidarity
of states. The .states implicitly recognize the indivisibility of
peace, as seen in art. II: "All wars and all threats of war,
whether they affect directly or not one of the members of the
society, interest the entire society, which must take all measures
proper to the safeguarding of the peace of nation!L" Peace,
therefore, forms an indivisible whole; and society assumes in
its regard responsibilities distinct from those of the particular
states. The latter again manifest their solidarity in presenting
a united front against whoever would undertake a war of
aggression; they engage themselves" to respect and to maintain
against all exterior aggression the present territorial integrity
and political independence of all the members of the society "
(art. 10), Moreover, they bind themselves not to have recourse
to war without first having submitted their differences either
to arbitration and judicial ruling, or to the mediation of the
CounciL They bind themselves, finally, to take certain measures
of sanction against any state having recourse to war, in violation
of the obligations of the Pact. By thus accepting "certain
obligations not to have recourse to war," the states were
introducing in modern international law, not so much the
distinction between just wars and unjust wars as is sometimes
claimed-this being a moral distinction-but at least its juridical projection, the distinction between legal and illegal wars,
that is to say, wars in violation of the Pact. This was already
an important innovation and filled with consequences.
But-and this is a characteristic trait of this transitory

528

THE DIALECTICS

OF WAR AND PEACE

529

regime-the new principles did not eliminate the old ones which
they contradicted. Notably, far from repudiating the sovereignty
of the states, the Covenant consecrated it, in its fashion. It
left the Assembly and the Council of the League the character
of diplomatic conferences, subject as they were to the ruling of
unanimity which paralyzed their action, but safeguarded the
sovereignty of its members. It introduced in art. 15 the famous
"reserve of sovereignty," which confirms the existence of "a
domain reserved to the exclusive competency of the state " and
excludes all control by the international community in this
domain. Neither did it institute a true collective action against
the state which had recourse to war in violation of the obligations of the Pact. In effect, if this covenant-breaking state
was supposed to be committing an act of war against all the
other members of the society, each member state decided for
itself the measures by which it would acquit itself of the obligations of international solidarity which flowed from art. 16.
The sanctions resulted less from an action of the society than
from a conglomeration of individual measures. Again, it is
in the meaning most favorable to the sovereignty of the states
that art. 10 was interpreted: the states bound themselves to
respect and defend against all exterior aggression the territorial
integrity and political independence of other members, but
these dispositions were the object of an interpretive resolution
leaving each member the care of " judging . . . in which
measure (it) is held to assure the execution of (its) obligation
by the use of its military forces." Mutual assistance, promised
in case of aggression, left intact the sovereignty of the states,
and this, as always, entailed the" divisibility" of war.
The Pact, in effect-and this is what we wish to notepreserved and consecrated in its fashion the classical notion of
war. The authors of the Pact place themselves in the traditional
dialectical framework of war and peace. Their aim being " to
assure international peace and security," the means to which
they have recourse is "the acceptance of certain obligations
not to have recourse to war." The method is clear: the states'
right to war is not more contested, at bottom, than their

580

J. T. DELOS

sovereignty. To assure peace, the problem is to make the states
voluntarily accept certain renunciations of the use of their
right, with the hope of progressively expanding their commitments, until they cover all possible cases, and to surround the
execution of these commitments with all the guarantees that
treaties and international law can procure.
Thus the states bind themselves (art. 12 to art. 15) to
avoid war without first having submitted their dispute to
arbitration, to judicial settlement, or to consideration by the
Council of the League of Nations. They bind themselves
also to avoid taking action against a state carrying out a
unanimous recommendation of the Council, or a judicial
sentence. In promising to respect the territorial integrity and
the political independence of other states, they bind themselves
to avoid aggressive war. Thus, all the doors through which
war could enter are bolted; the bolts are the obligations which
the states have assumed to refrain from using these doors.
During three periods, the application of this method was
pursued with perseverance, and it was the cause of a real
progress in international law. The efforts were oriented in
three principal directions. Firstly, toward the organization
of mutual assistance to the states that are the victims of
aggression, and in a .subsidiary way, toward a definition of
aggression. Secondly, toward the prevention of war, thanks
to the re-enforcing of the powers granted the Council to safeguard peace when it is threatened. 12 Finally toward the
development of peaceful means of solving conflicts-inquestmediation, arbitration, judicial settlement-so that in all cases
this procedure should lead to an obligatory solution. In this
way, recourse to war lost its justification or its excuse.
As for what concerns war itself, a unanimous resolution
12 It led notably to the Convention
of October
1930, to bring financial
assistance to those states that are the victims of aggression. (0. J. of the L. of N.
special supp. No. 83, Oct. 1930, p.
and to the General Convention held to
develop the means to prevent war (0. J. special supp. No. 93, Oct. 1931, p.
which convention never realized any effectiveness due to the decline of international institutions.

THE DIALECTICS

OF WAR AND PEACE

581

adopted by the Assembly on September 26, 1927, outlawed
wars of aggression and qualified them as international crimes.
The sixth Pan-American Conference, meeting at Havana,
February 18, 1928, also declared such-wars to be international
crimes, and considered as illicit and prohibited all aggression
between American states. Finally, the Pact of Paris (August
27, 1928), or the Briand-Kellogg Pact, which united the signatures of nearly all of the states, stipulated that these
states " condemn recourse to war for the solution of international differences and renounce its use as an instrument of
national politics."
What lessons can we draw from this experience and from
the progress of law accomplished during this period? The
fact that the states, in joining the League, accepted certain
obligations to avoid recourse to war, has been hailed as a
progress toward peace. But one may ask if in banning recourse
to war "in certain cases," the Pact did not consecrate the
principle of war. To regulate the conditions of usage of a
is this not recognizing and
right, even in a restrictive
fortifying this right?
With this question, that of the value of the method employed
by the Pact is also brought up. To lock the doors through
which war is introduced, by the voluntary renunciation of the
use of this right, may be the only possible method in an international regime founded on the idea of state-sovereignty. Since
the right of war is an attribute of sovereignty, what other
course is there than to get each power to voluntarily renounce
the exercise of its right and, by multiplying these renunciations,
practically eliminate recourse to war? But it is certainly an
inefficacious method. Not only because the possible cases of
war are unlimited and unforeseeable and that it is impossible
to obtain beforehand a renunciation which contains them all
in their individual circumstances, but also because the principle
upon which the method is based is false. In reality, it tolerates
a contradiction which ruins the system of preventing war all the
while it believes to be building it up. An international community which considers the right of war as an attribute of the

582

J. T. DELOS

sovereignty of the state, admits by this very fact that an
institution doubly asocial (because it flows from the sovereignty
of the state on the one hand, and because it substitutes violence
for the rational elaboration of law on the other) is nevertheless
a social procedure fit to
a societal result.
One may also say without paradox that the problem of the
prevention of war, which since 1919 has been the occasion of
so many efforts and so many negotiations, notably on the base
of Article II of the Pact of 1919, presented itself under the
regime of the League of Nations as a problem at once necessary
and false. Necessary because in the face of it, humanity can
not remain disinterested, and because it can effectively, through
appropriate measures, prevent one, two, three, or an indeterminate number of wars. False because one cannot prevent
war-all wars-in a society whose structure is such that it
gives birth to the right of war for the benefit of the individual
state. All of the renunciations to the use of the right are
accidental relative to the right itself, and the barriers opposed
to the exercise of the right will fall some day before the
necessity of using this right, or before the interest one may
have in using the right. As for abolishing the right itself by
voluntarily renouncing its existence, this is a Utopia, a sort of
metaphysical impossibility, when this right results from the
very structure of society.
Those who worked that law might progress during the
regime of the League of Nations, had to struggle amidst
contradictions rendered all the more irritating for the mind as
they became more difficult to perceive. The prohibition of the
" war of aggression " is an example. The first task of a society
organizing itself is to eliminate aggression, that is, recourse to
physical violence contrary to law. But, it is not so much with
aggression as with the "war of aggression" that international
law concerned itself during the process of its historical development. It is the latter that the Assembly prohibited in 1927; it is
the " aggressor state " that the 1924 Protocol of Geneva has in
mind when it qualifies by this name " whosoever has recourse to
war in violation of the agreements covered in the Pact or in the

THE DIALECTICS

OF WAR AND PEACE

533

present Protocol" (art. 10). Thus, it is not war that is prohibited, but a certain war-the war of aggression. Aggression
is a circumstance which qualifies war and makes it criminal,
without in any way taking away from it its character of a
legitimate institution, and without abolishing the right of war
of the state.
One need but reflect on this expression-war of
to note the contradiction which we denounce. A state becomes
an aggressor when it has recourse to war in violation of pledges
taken in an international convention.
In other words, that
state is an aggressor when, by having recourse to war, it
crosses a" juridical frontier" traced by the international agreements to which it is a party.
There is a hierarchy in obligations, and this hierarchy forms
part of the very structure of the juridical order. Anterior
to the conventional obligations, such as those which trace the
"juridical frontiers" opposed to war, there is the very power of
contracting these obligations, a power founded on the nature of
the state, which nature, it is contended, makes it a sovereign.
The conventional restrictions of its sovereignty are logically
posterior to this sovereignty itself; they presuppose it. If some
day the state breaks its conventional pledges not to have
recourse to war, it will justify its decision by an appeal to the
right which permitted it to contract the pledges themselves.
It will place itself on a superior plane, that of its sovereignty,
from which flows the right of war even before the right to
limit this right voluntarily.
The conventional obligations
which limit the usage of its right to war are the contingent determinations of an anterior right which manifests anew its
superiority when new circumstances, political or historical,
supercede those which led to the acceptance for a time of
certain conventional restrictions.
Thus, there is in the very
heart of the notion of " war of aggression " an irreconciliable
opposition. The notion of war evokes the sovereign right of
the state, the notion of aggression appeals to a juridical order
unquestionably respected by aU the members of the social
6

584

J. T. DELOS

group. The two notions may be coupled, but their opposition
cannot be suppressed.
Moreover, this becomes more obvious if we consider the
consequences. To say that war becomes " aggression " in
certain cases-when it is waged in violation of the law which
forbids having recourse to it-is to admit that a social control
can be exercised on the act by which the state has decided to
have recourse to war; One must, in fact, verify its conformity
or non-conformity with law. But it is evident that this control
will operate only if the state upon which it is exercised remains
on the terrain of its conventional obligations, if it refuses to
place itself, as it can, on the superior level of its sovereignty,
which sovereignty is left intact by its conventional obligations.
In other words, if it freely accepts controls and sanctions at the
very moment when these apply to itself. If, in short, it is more to
its interest to submit to them than to challenge them, as it
could.
In reality, if a control can be exercised on a state to judge
if it is engaging in a war of aggression, it is because there
exists a social power superior to that of the state. But a war
whose legitimacy is verified by a social control is no longer
an act which emanates from sovereignty. Is it not equivocal
to still call it war, if one keeps in mind the meaning this word
has had in the modern period?
IV.

THE DIALECTICS

OF WAR AND THE UNITED NATIONS.

Is the dialectic of war and peace affected by the new regime
of the United Nations? Perhaps the moment to answer that
question has not yet come. Only experience will show the
respective importance of the various provisions of the Charter.
One can not forget the precedent of the League. Just as
fundamental articles of the Covenant were promptly deprived
of their original force by a timid interpretation, so today no
one can say which stipulations of the new Charter will be
weakened or reinforced by the usage the states will make of
them. The future alone will reveal the efficaciousness of the
new organs, such as the Security Council and the Social and

THE DIALECTICS

OF WAR AND PEACE

535

Economic Committee, to which the Charter attributes powers
that are extensive, but formulated in very general terms.
Judging from the text of the Charter, it is clear that the
new society betrays an organic character which was lacking
in the old League and, therefore, the problem of war and
peace is put in a different context. Of course, one cannot say
that, from the League to the United Nations, there has been an
abrupt jump.
Certain functions which devolved to the
Assembly or the Council through the Pact of 1919 already
manifested the organic character of the international community. But we know that they were eclipsed by the other
provisions: such as the maintenance of the principle of the
sovereignty of states and of the rule of unanimity, the equality
of the powers of the Assembly and the Council, the fact that
concerted action by the states with a view to the maintenance
of peace (on the basis of articles 10, 11, or even 16, for
example), was not true societal action, but a concentration of
simultaneous individual enterprises. AU this took away from
the society created by the Pact its truly organic character.
Does the new Charter have the same :respect for the
sovereignty of the states? It strives assuredly not to alarm
their susceptibilities, sensitive as they are always on this
point, but neither does it say anything in favor of a principle
which from all evidence is not in accord with its essential
Thus art.
par. 1, speaks of the "sovereign
institutions.
equality of states," where it was expected that their sovereignty
would be mentioned. The new expression, while it may not be
too clear, can only signify the equality of the states before law.
The same article (par. 7) recognizes that there are "matters
which essentially pertain to the national competence of a state."
The Pact of 1919, on the other hand, considered that certain
questions were "left to the exclusive competence" of the state.
Can one infer, without reading too much into the texts, that in
attributing to the states an essential competence in certain
matters, the actual Charter admits that secondary competences
may at the same time be exercised on these same matters, and
that therefore, these matters pertain to the simultaneous

536

J. T. DELOS

petence of the national state and of the international society?
Under the regime of the League, on the contrary, the" :reservation of sovereignty " totally removed the acts of the state from
international control and permitted it to commit certain " asocial" acts in conformity with law. 13 But, regardless of these
considerations-and the study of the Charter would furnish
many more-they remain accessory, if we compare them
to the three essential innovations of the Charter:
the
attachment of the International Court of Justice to the
U. N., for whom it becomes the "principal" judi,cial
organ (art. 92); the creation of the Security Council, which
has the principal responsibility for the maintenance of the peace
and of international security (art. 34); finally, the creation of
the Economic and Social Committee, whose creation marks a
probably decisive stage-in any case a very important onein the development of an international society. The text of the
Charter has a perfect clarity about it when it underlines the
organic character of these institutions.
Read, for example,
the articles 62 to 67 which define the functions and the powers
of the Social and Economic Council, or art. 24 which specifies
those of the Security Council. " To assure the rapid and
efficient action of the organization," reads art. 24, " its members
confer on the Security Council the principal responsibility for
13 We could also note that the Pact of the League of Nations presented as an
end to attain and as a source of obligation certain rules in which the new Charter
sees rather certain fundamental elements of the initial social pact-" principles to
which the members of the U. N. conform their conduct," because without them
there can be no common life. This is the case with the territorial integrity or
the political independence of all the states. The members of the League of Nations
promised to respect them and to maintain them against all exterior aggression;
and the mutual guarantee contained in article 10 was in its origin meant to be a
" construed right," which however, was never completed. The Charter of 1945
declares that the members of the U. N. "refrain in their international relations
from the recourse to the menace or use of force against the territorial integrity
or the political independence of all states" (art. £, par. iv), and this is less a
conventional obligation which new agreements will determine, than it is one of
the bases of the social life of the states and of the Pact upon which rests their
community. The respect for the integrity and the political independence of states
passes from the plane of conventional obligations to that of principles or of facts
presupposed by judicial obligations.

THE DIALECTICS

OF WAR AND PEACE

537

the maintenance of peace and of international security, and
recognize that in discharging the duties imposed hy this
responsibility, the Security Council acts in their name." "In
accomplishing its duties, the Security Comicil acts in conformity with the aims and principles of the United Nations.
The specific powers granted the Security Council to permit it
to accomplish the said duties are defined in Chapters VI, VII,
VIII, and IX" (art. 24) . Thus, the role of the Security
Council is very much that of an organ; it exercises the will of
the social body, it acts in virtue of the responsibilities which
weigh upon the collectivity itself, said collectivity acquitting
itself of them through the instrumentality of the Council.
In this new context, how is the dialectic of war and peace
manifested? We are not in the least surprised to find that the
Charter does not speak of war. The very name of war does
not appear, except in the preamble, where it is cited as one of
the " scourges " from which future generations must be spared,
and in article 53 where it designates a past historical fact, the
second World War.
Nothing better illustrates the difference between the two
charters and the two societies, that of 1919 and that of 1945.
The end is the same: "guarantee peace and safety," says the
Covenant; " maintain peace and international security," says the
Charter of 1945. But this end the Pact of 1919 seeks to attain
by imposing" certain obligations not to have recourse to war,"
that is, certain renunciations of the use of a right whose
existence it acknowledges by the very fact that it forbids its
exercise in certain cases; and we have shown that it could
not suppress the right of war, because the very structure of
society created it to the profit of the state, supreme warrantor
of order and justice. This structure changes with the new
Charter, and the problem of war is thereby profoundly affected.
It begins to appear in its true light; it is neither an independent
problem, nor a particular problem, but the historical aspect of
a more general question, that of the use of force in political
societies.
The main characteristic of these societies-so essential that

538

J. T. DELOS

this characteristic alone could define the societies-is that a
social power, which is a juridical power, assumes a monoply
over the use of force. Or again, it is that law has the right
and the power to make itself served by force, by making
exclusive use of the organs of the collectivity to realize this
end. A society which recognizes in its members a right to war
is a society where the use of force and the application of law are
not socialized, . but remain asocial. These functions are not
assumed by public organs; they are, rather, in the hands of
particulars. That is why it is contradictory in such a society
to seek to prevent war. In truth, the task to accomplish does
not consist in preventing war, but in changing the structure of
the community and organizing it according to the nature of
political societies. The progress being made in this direction
implies the socialization of the use of force. This use then
passes into the hands of societal organs, and with this transformation the name of war automatically disappears, henceforth deprived of its true significance. This is what is happening
today in the Charter of the United Nations.
The notion of " private war " corresponded to the structure
of feudal society. It was the characteristic sign, as it were,
of a situation where, public power having dissolved, its rights
devolved to the private domain. The network of the bonds
through which the state manifested its authority and exercised
its functions came apart, and gave way to a network of feudal
pacts, to a regime of free association in which individuals,
bound by their oath, promised mutual aid and service. Since
societal organization falters on the superior plane, which is
that of the state, war appears on the inferior plane, that is,
in the hands of lords and their vassals. It is a war because
it partakes, even in the feudal regime, of the nature of an
institution of public law; the feudal system is not pure anarchy,
it also sets up a public order which gives to Europe a solid
frame, and announces in her the future mistress of the world.
But war here is private war, because it is no longer exclusively
in the hands of the public power; it is decided and pursued
by the associates of the feudal pact, involved as they are by

THE DIALECTICS

OF WAR AND PEACE

589

their contract in a network of reciprocal obligations, of a
personal and a patrimonial order.
If we apply, analogically, to the medieval period notions
elaborated for a
period, we would say that in this time
of private wars " the unjust private war " would generally
be plain brigandage accomplished in force. Conversely, the
" just war " is for the feudal barons, and for their subjects,
a real and supreme guarantee of respect for their rights and for
the reign of justice. Such a war, the medieval institutions
(like those of the modern period) strive to humanize and to
prevent: the " peace of God " is designed to protect noncombatants, clerics, peasants and their goods; the " truce of
God " forbids hostilities on certain days or during certain
periods.-These are necessary and benevolent measures, as
are all those measures which have as their end the prevention
of war, but, like the others, they were impotent, for they did
not modify the structure of feudal society but accomodated
themselves to it. It was the modem state which suppressed
private war, by rendering useless the function which it fulfilled.
It established a superior social order, which did not perfect the
feudal system, but destroyed it while replacing it and while
introducing new ideas, such as that of the sovereignty of the
state or of public order, upon which rests the modem organization of society.
Acts which would have furnished" just cause" for a private
war between barons undergo a change. They become misdemeanors or crimes against particulars or against public order
and against the state. They give rise to judicial trials and
prosecutions. They no longer engender war, but rather set off
social procedures. Thus, one of the first forms of the dialectics
of war and peace disappears, that which opposed private war
to peace. But this dialectic disappears on one plane, only to
reappear on a higher one, in the relationships between the
states. It passed from the level of the society of feudal princes
to that of the modern society of sovereign states. The peace
which the law, the judge, and the executive power establish
in the interior of the state, war is supposed to establish and

540

J. T. DELOS

defend in the community of states. Today, the dialectics of
war and peace established by the modern regime of the
sovereign state is disappearing in its turn with the socialization
of the use of force on the international level.
Where in fact has the Charter of the United Nations made
use of the term " war "? It wishes to oppose every " menace to
the peace," " every rupture of the peace," " every act of
aggression"; but in the present state of international society,
war and peace are no longer considered as two contraries.
Their dialectical opposition is passed by; there is no longer an
exact correspondence between " rupture of the peace " and
" entrance into war." The acts which bring about this rupture
are henceforth of another kind; they are differently qualified
and are expressed by a new name-international
crime(criminal aggression against the peace or against humanity);
they are even, if one so desires, a revolution or an unnamed
catastrophe, but no longer war. If some day, in executing the
decisions of the Security Council and applying the plans of
its Committee of Major Powers, atomic bombs destroy cities
or an entire country, this will be a work of justice or of social
injustice, a police measure or a governmental measure, or on
the contrary, an act of international tyranny, but it will not be
war. This is a widespread error, but one which undoubtedly
evidences an imagination far removed from reality, that of
believing that the suppression of .wars between states will
permit the realization of the old dream of humanity and of
transforming into ploughshares the swords and shields, and
tanks into tractors, for if this suppression entails individual
disarmament of the states, it demands collective armament
constantly maintained on a level with the progress of science
and technique. It must be even more efficacious since the
mass of the civilized community in which order is to be maintained will be more considerable. The evolution which we are
now undergoing does not tend to eliminate the use of force
from international society. This it can not do; this it must
not do. But it does tend to socialize the use of force, to elevate
it into the anarchical hands of the sovereign states in order to

THE DIALECTICS

OF WAR AND PEACE

541

make of it the monopoly of the international society and the
auxiliary of the public order.
Does this mean that the present stage must be passed over
and that we must leave the intermediary period in which we
have found ourselves during the past 25 years? War, being
an all-useful procedure which is exercised in the three branches,
legislative, judicial, and executive, will be radically destroyed
only if these three functions are assumed by a super state.
The power of asocial, anarchical, or arbitrary action, which is
called the state's right of war, will be automatically destroyed.
But this state of international organization is far from being
attained, and in this regard the Charter of the U.N. is
deceptive.
Clearly, in the judiciary order, we must not underestimate
the progress realized. Article ninety-two declares that the
International Court of Justice constitutes "the principal judiciary organ of the U.N.," although the pact of 1919 was
content to charge the Council of the League of Nations to
prepare a project and to submit it to the member states. The
Security Council could find in the arsenal of its powers the
means of making the decisions of the Court respected. These
are important manifestations of the organic character of the
international community and of the progress of its institutions.
The creation of an international tribunal charged with judging
war crimes, crimes against the peace and against humanity,
and the crime of aggression, shows that the time has passed
when recourse to war was a sovereign act socially uncontrolled
and uncontrollable; it marks even more clearly the rejection
of the conception according to which the will of the states
would be the only foundation of international law. These
notions indicate a progress of considerable importance, but
at the same time the San Francisco charter does not propose
new means of regulating differences, and those which already
existed did not receive any notable development. Undoubtedly
the movement towards the organization of conciliatory arbitration and judiciary ruling, whose results the general act of
Geneva codified in
received a new force after the

J. T. DELOS

lishment of the U.N. and the signing of the peace treaties, but
the charter by itself does not give it any further power.
Moreover, if it does favour the progress of legislative order,
it does so only in an indirect fashion. The Security Council, for
example, could elaborate a system of regulations and control of
armaments (art.
47). The activity of the Economics and
Social council (art. 61, ss,) aided by the specialized institutions
whose creation the charter foresaw and which have competence
in the economic and social domains, in intellectual culture and
education, of public health and its allied fields, probably will
be the occasion for a large number of laws. Finally the method
adopted for the elaboration of peace treaties, in the complexity
of its operational procedures, undoubtedly constitutes an
instructive precedent, but, at the same time, in the charter we
shall seek in vain for institutional progress endowing the
community with true legislative organs. The Charter does
not even make an allusion to the procedure of revision of no
longer applicable treaties, as did article 19 of the pact of 1919.
In the same way as in the former system which was based on
the sovereignty of states, the present system slothfully entrusts
the manifestation of social needs, and the maturing of new laws
for the international order to conflict.
There is a difference, however, and it is a great one: formerly,
international conflict-since
its solution arose from the
judicial or the legislative function- could be legitimately
solved by war, and a new juridic order arose therefrom; war
was an element of this procedure whose results the treaty of
peace declared. Henceforth, recourse to this later ratio is
impossible, and if any state presumes to break the peace,
all society by the organ of the Security Council must prevent
it and chastise its anti-social action. Herein is the most characteristic trait of a regime instituted by the charter. Peace results from the functioning of international institutions capable
of assuring the three essential social functions, legislative, judicial, executive. War is a polyvalent procedure which supplies
for their insufficiencies. But it must be noted that if, today,
the lacunae of the international organization still call war

THE DIALECTICS

OF WAR AND PEACE

548

a replacement procedure, as the final means of making law
or applying it, this social inclination towards war must henceforth strike against a bulwark. This bulwark is the Security
Council in which the collectivity has placed its hope of preventing future wars and which the social state still demands
as the supreme means of law.
It is the column of peace of whose solidity we can boast,
for juridically the council is provided with all the powers
necessary for its task. And in fact, who would dare to risk
a war if the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France,
China, or other member powers of the Council forbade it
and bent all their strength to prevent it.
It is a column however whose resistance
to us
very precarious for two principal reasons. Perhaps a capable
doctor or surgeon could make another organ take over the
function of an atrophied organ and thus restore health to the
entire organism. Perhaps a clever architect could shift to another
column the stresses which should have been supported by
a support which he wishes to remove. But in the life of a society,
functions of some importance are not capable of being
channelled to an organ which is not made to replace them.
A society in which the judge would be charged with making
the law would be a society in which there would be neither
good judge nor good legislator. And it is probable that the
society in which the policeman supplied at the same time for
the judge and the lawmaker would no longer have a good
police force. In the present International Society, the Security
Council receives a universal pacifying task. It must, even by
force, stop menaces against the peace. It must prohibit
the rupture of the peace and outlaw aggression. Perhaps it
would succeed, if all the menaces against the peace sprang
from disturbers of order or from ambitious men thirsty for
conquest and power, in a word, if the prevention of war
were only the concern of an international police. But reality
is more complex. There are aspirations towards justice
which incite nations to prefer war to peace. They must be
satisfied if an individual course to force is to be prevented,

544

J. T. DELOS

and they can be satisfied only if the
society
possesses organs specialized to this end and adapted to their
task.
The Security Council is not instituted to fulfill these
functions and the tendency of society toward law will nullify
it, leaving a negative resistance which it will oppose to a
desire for war nourished by a revindication of justice. With
far stronger reason it would be incapable if one of its members
should attempt to utilize for its own profit this aspiration of
other peoples towards justice o:r the reform of law. The task
of pacification entrusted to the Security Council is too general
to be always efficacious. It begets the· idea of an omniscient,
omnipotent paternalism that the eleven united patriarchs wise
and strong must exercise in favor of peace, but which in
international society as in every other society, only masks the
poverty of the social organization.
The second weakness is too well know for us to insist on and
is set down in the constitution itself. Article twenty-seven
determines that the decisions of the Security Council on all
questions other than those of procedure will be taken by the
affirmative vote of seven of its members in which are comprised
the voices of all its permanent members. 14 From this it follows
that each one of the five Great Powers, permanent members
of the council, can raise obstacles to the decision, even if that
decision has attained seven or more votes. Each power can
at any moment prevent the council from acting; the announcement of its intention to vote negatively suffices to paralyze
the council. This power is known as the " right of veto."
This is not the place to discuss the above mentioned
" " Being understood "-adds the text-" only in the decisions taken at the
conclusion of chapter the sixth (specific regulation of disputes) and of paragraph 3 of article
(specific regulation of disputes by means of accords or
regional organisms), one party to the dispute abstains from voting."
The veto thus can not interrupt the procedures which the Council undertakes
in view of the pacific regulations of conflicts but these procedures are limited only
to inquiries, mediations, recommendations.
The conciliatory function is never
but only the executive function, the power of action
paralyzed by article
properly so called, which, however, is the most important and the newest of those
which are confided to the council, the keystone of the system.

THE DIALECTICS

OF WAR AND PEACE

545

disposition of the Charter. The dangers are foreseen; they
are evident. It has been noticed also that in establishing
the veto for the exclusive benefit of the five Great Powers,
the Charter is dearly anti-democratic because it does not
give representation to the middle-sized or small powers. It
is possible to reply to the critics of this procedure
pointing
out that the right of veto does not exist because it is written
into the charter, but that it is written into it because it exists
in fact, whether one like it or not. It is impossible to conceive
the organization of the U.N. would institute an action if
one of the super Powers, the United States or
U. S. S. R.
example, were opposed to it or would not
it. It
xs
they add, that the « Great Powers who actually
to support wholeheartedly the decisions of the Security
"-'U"-'H'-'H, should have more to say than the others and
be able to refuse to engage in, for example, an action against
such or such, since it is they who, eventually, must furnish
the majority of the troops, the material, and
necessary
for
The
effect
is
in the case
of the Great Powers would be obliged
collectively to accept a decision because
the vote
one Great
a majority in the council, formed
Power and six middle sized or small nations,
have
decided it thus.
For ourselves, who are neither criticizing nor defending
the dispositions of the Charter, but are simply attempting to
determine the present stage of an historical evolution, it is
clear that the right of veto permits a state, accepted by the
international community as its permanent member, to substitute self-interest for a tendency to common interest
very exercise of its activity as a member.
the same way
the soldier or functionary in time of action, would be authorized
to direct himself according to his private interest, to substitute
it for the common interest, yet without losing the rights and
advantages which their function confers upon these individuals.
Moreover, the right of veto equally permits a Great Power
15

Jacques Gascuel, Ce qui est La Charte des Nations Unies, Paris, Fazard, p.

546

:T. T. DELOS

to withdraw from international control the actions of a friendly
or allied power. It is sufficient for the Great Power to shield
its ally before the council and thus paralyze any action which
the council would like to take against it. A power placed in
the top level of the international organization and entrusted
with the most important member functions, thus receives the
license to commit an asocial act, since it evades all international
recourse, and to make asocial every act of a friendly or allied
power which it chooses. The rights which classical sovereignty
conferred on each state become thus the peculiar property of
only five of them, but with this aggravating circumstance,
that these states are the five pillars of society. The present
edifice of peace has a keystone, the Security Council. But
is it truly a keystone or simply a void left at the top of the
edifice by the survival of absolute sovereignty for the benefit
of the five powers?
Yet it is not a taste for paradox which forces us to add
that if by this overt breach at the peak of the edifice of
peace, the same calamity as in 1914 and in 1939 falls once
more upon humanity it will only have the appearance of war.
A conflict will be above all the bloody manifestation of a
need for political unity towards which the international community is in irresistable travail. Formerly the aspiration
toward unity and toward political order caused the feudal
stage to disappear and grouped men into the framework of the
state and under the aegis of its sovereign power. As a result
sixty to eighty independent and sovereign societies exist side by
side in the world. At the present time only five truly sovereign
rulers remain within the framework of the Charter. And
if a struggle arises which throws them into opposition to one
another it would no longer simply be a case of decrying their
imperialism or their hegemonic ambitions, whatever may be
the part that these sentiments might play in setting the scene
for the catastrophe. It would be necessary to understand that
beside these passions, and at times even stronger than them,
there was being manifested the aspiration of the international

THE DIALECTICS

OF WAR AND PEACE

547

community towards unity and towards a certain form of
political government.
Would this movement be in the hands of one single power?
If that should be the case, the days of this new order would
be numbered, for it does not appear that any power today
is able by itself, to administer the interests of civilized society.
Will this new order be pluralist and organic, and in this case
what forms will it take? The future alone can tell.
V.

THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PACIFIC ORDER

We have arrived at the conclusion that the dialectics of war
and peace corresponds to no fundamental or. natural law of
political life. It is tied in with the structure of the international
community and its origin is at once sociological and historical.
War, however, is accompanied by a series of moral problems.
The idea of justice especially is one of the principal focal points
of its dialectic, for justice has fixed in the conscience of states
the attitude of counting war among the number of their rights.
As a consequence the speculations of the moralists are concerned with the subject of war. Hence we will attempt to
examine rapidly the changes which war undergoes in the minds
of men in the measure in which the structure of international
society is modified.
1. The Idea ofJustice and its Shortcomings in the Theory of

a Just War.
" Is it permitted to wage a war? " " Yes, provided that the
war is just." From this brief dialogue of theologians with their
consciences, from the time of St. Augustine to our own days, the
theories of war have issued. But· of what justice are they
speaking? Tradition is constant on this point; they speak of
that justice which the public power has the responsibility of
maintaining on earth. For this reason the moralists place two
conditions essential for war. The first is a formal condition; 16
16 From the point of view of the philosophy of law, as from that of juridical
sociology, we understand by form the element which gives to an act or a norm, etc.,

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the war must be decided by public authority. The other
visions the object or matter of war: 17 an injustice must have
been committed for which war alone can make reparation.
Here is the point of departure for their speculation, an
initial position which could be called both static and subjective.
On the one hand we have noted, in accord with Regout/ 8 that
the traditional doctrine considers the conduct of only one of
the antagonists and inquires about the justice of his undertaking. On the other hand it is concerned with the state; it
social determination, which manifests it as known, agreed upon, considered, desired,
executed by society. The matter is, in this same act, the element which receives
such determination. This matter is raised to the order moral economics, to the
physical order, etc. For example, the moral rule: " Thou shalt not steal," is a matter
which society accepts and, by considering it and expressing it according to its own
fashion, gives to it the form of law. Starting from this moment, the rule no
longer exists only as a moral or national precept which speaks to the conscience,
but also as a social rule or juridic precept which has application under this new
form to the citizens and to the jurists, etc.
17 The Moralists, regardless of what development each one of theni gives to the
doctrine, all take for their basis the common principles which are found already
posed in a concise but definitive manner by St. Thomas. J[n citing this author we
shall reproduce these principles in order to clarify the pages which follow. "For
a war to be just," he says, "three conditions must be present: (l) the authority of
the prince on whose command the war is waged; (2) a jnst cause, that is, those
against whom one fights merit to be fought by reason of a fault; (3) the :right
intention of the belligerents to favor good and to put down evil:' (Summa Theol.,
II-H, q. 40, a. 1) Leaving aside this third condition which is entirely foreign to war
and concerns only the belligerents and their psychological attitude, if we consider
war in itself we see that it is constituted by two elements even in the doctrine
which morals inspire and not that which sociology does: the formal element of the
authority .of the prince and the just cause.
This latter is an objective element, one distinct from the intention of the belliger·
ents, extrinsic to the authority of the prince and independent of it. It is an element
of fact; an injustice, a fault has been committed, the order has been troubled; a
casus belli exists. In the social phenomenon of war it is the material element, the
state of fact whose restoration is desired. On the contrary, the intervention of the
prince, of the social authority, is the formal element. The problem thus caused is
that of authority, of competence, of the titles which the power can claim in
order to act as a rightful power.
The first condition never needed much explanation in the eyes of the Medieval
authors. It is evident for them that the prince has the task of protecting his
subjects against disorder and injustice, against the danger arising from within and
from without the state.
18 Regout, op. cit., p. 18.

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considers it in its relations with its subjects their happiness and
their security, in its rights and duties in their regard. War is
not at all a solution, an outlet for an international problem. It
is imposed upon the state by the fulfillment of its duties towards its nationals in seeking to become a guarantee of the
rights of the state. If it is alleged that the state alone candecide upon recourse to arms; this is done by denying this right
to the private individuals who are its subjects, rather than by
attempting to justify the right of the state or to examine
thoroughly the foundations of this right. With regard to war,
the state is in a sort of formal " original justice." But it seems
that the Scholastic authors did not pay as much attention as
would have been expected to the fact that their conception of
authority and public power exceeded the exclusively static and
subjective point of view. They did not realize, apparently, that
the formal condition which they set down for the justice of a
war was open to a far wider interpretation.
According to them the authority of the state is founded on
the necessity of the common good,
they do not hesitate to
invoke this necessity in the case of war; it is the modem view
of the common safety, and instigated by the one in charge of the
common good. For them, however, the common good has a
universal scope. It is not circumscribed by the territorial limits
of a state. The area of application of the authority charged
with procuring the common good extends as far as the social
needs of man, his economic relationship and the ties which they
create. Hence if this authority is exercised by a determined
state within the limits of its territorial frontiers, the political
power, of itself overflows this framework. The state is called
upon by its very nature to regulate the relations born of the
most extensive human sociability. It can thus be said, without paradox, that once the premise of· the common good is
admitted, it is no longer a question of justifying a world-wide or
supra-national and superstate authority; it flows from the
premise. This individual state is the one which must render
account of the appropriation of authority by its hands and of
the historical or local determinations which that authority

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receives. If it has been long dispensed from the need to furnish
this justification, it is because the common good has for a long
time remained practically enclosed within the limits of the
state; the system of juridic protection which it instituted
sufficed for the individuaL
But, by the very force of logic, the universalism included in
the doctrine was perfectly clear to the theoreticians of a just
war in spite of the fact that they never drew an argument from
it. It is not absent from the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas;
it was present in his incomplete and overly concise theory of
the universal common good as the ultimate norm of a just
war. 19 In the H:lth century, Vitoria made it perfectly clear: the
ultimate norm for him is the common good of the universe, both
from the formal and from the objective or material point of
view. We must rise to the authority of the orbis to find there
the formal foundation of the state's power to declare war.
The universe (orbis) has the fundamental authority in view
of assuring its own common good, an authority which can be
exercised only by the .princes for the act of coercion, which
is war. 66 If the state," he adds, "has over its nationals this
power (of inflicting death upon them or of punishing them,
when they have injured the community) we can not doubt but
that the universe possesses it over every pernicious and evil
man; but this power can be exercised only by the princes." 20
Hence the state which makes war does not act in virtue of a
peculiar power which it possesses, as an attribute of sovereignty or by reason of being a state, but as an organ which
must have in view the good of one greater community of which
it is a part. " Since a state is a part of the ensemble, and even
19 Undoubtedly,
in the first place, St. Thomas has in view the necessity of defending and developing the national well-being, but this immediate goal of its very
nature is extended to include the obligation of causing justice and prosperity to
rule in the whole human community. St. Thomas insists that the justification of
war for him rests in: "the defence and safeguarding of the common good," " of
the common good" such as St. Thomas understands it, encompassing the order, the
true peace, the good, the " virtuous " life of the citizens. This bonum commune is
the goal of the state; to protect it and increase it is the task of authority.
•• Cf. de Solages, La Theologie de la gue:rre juste, Desclee de Brouwer 1947, p. 65.

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more profoundly a Christian province, a part of the whole of
Christendom, if a war is useful to a province or to a state but
to the detriment of one universe or of Christendom, I believe
that by this act the war is unjust." 21
Thus Vitoria, in studying the problem of public authority and
the foundation of public power, realized that he must look toward the orbis, toward one human community superior to the
state. But this conception, after the time of Vitoria, will escape,
almost entirely, the thought of the moralists. The formal justice
of war will have its principle in sovereignty or rather in the
character of a perfect society which the theologians recognized
in the state.
Actually this orientation is already manifest in the contemporaries of Vitoria, and notably his Italian confrere,
Thomas de Vio, Cardinal Cajetan. Cajetan was usually absorbed in his work as a commentator, to which he brought a
supple intelligence and an indefatigable logic. For him, except
in the case of defensive war, which :raises no problem, war is
essentially an act of vindictive justice. In his mind, that is why
it falls within the province of the state; it is the state's right to
restrain and to chastise. He did not teach, as Vitoria did, that
the state exercises, as an organ, a power which belongs to the
universe, to human society, and for this reason can influence
and punish, in addition to its own subjects, all the members of
a world-wide community; rather he saw the power of the state
rise from the fact that it is a perfect society and should be selfsufficient. Therefore, he reasoned, it must be able, of itself and
by its own means, to deal with those who disturb the peace of
its subjects. Without the right of punishing its own people and
foreign princes, the state would be very imperfect and would
lack what is essential to its natu:re: valde esset imperfecta et
deficeret. 22
The state's right, Regout justly notes, is conferred on it " by
its own authority in view of the number of rights and duties
that a 'perfect state' enjoys in order to protect its own well"'De; Potestate Civili, no. 13.

•• In II-II, q. 40, a. l.

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being and to maintain public order-which would be wrecked
if crime were not punished." 28 The right to punish, he observes
again, " is not conferred on the prince by a common temporal
authoijty, but it comes to him from his own power, from the
very nature of the ' perfect stale.' " 24 Doubtless the sovereign
state must obey a superior law; it acknowledges the moral and
rational order decreed by natural law, but it. is not caught up
in the network of obligations associated with that community
on which it would naturally be dependent.
Cajetan died in 1534 and so he never knew the works of
Vitoria; the De Potestate Civili dates from 1534-35, the Relectiones from 1539. What would the tireless commentator on
the text of the Summa have thought of an orientation so
different from his own, yet proceeding with· more fidelity to the
principles of the common Master?
Suarez did know the thought of Vitoria, and takes a place
with him among the founders of international law. But it is
undeniable that the international community which he conceived has lost its organic character; the world (orbis) no
longer possesses any proper authority, as in the time of the
Master of Salomanca. International law, which for Vitoria was
a law decreed by the international community, for Suarez partakes of the nature of a contract, and there is room left for
theory of the sovereign state, for the terrible tete-a-tete of
aggressor and victim, offender and offended, which, is the
doctrine of sovereignty, is a" right" for the aggressor. Let one
apply to the relations of states a text like this one and it will be
found to be very close to some of the terrible applications of
the theory of sovereignty. "A wrong done to someone else does
not give me the right to avenge the victim unless he himself can
defend himself justly and in point of fact does so, for then my
help is a collaboration in a good and a just act. But outside of
this disposition of the victim, it does not matter who can not
interest himself in the victini.'s affairs. For the offender is
accountable to no one, except the one offended. As a result,
•• Regout, op. cit., p.

•• Op. cit., p.

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the opinion of certain men that sovereigns have the power of
redressing injustice all over the world, is absolutely false; it
confuses all order and every distinction of jurisdiction. Such
a power has never been bestowed by God, and reason can not
demonstrate it." 25
It is evident how the field of research in the formal justice
of war has progressively narrowed. It is just that war be
decided by the public authority, but this authority is that of a
particular state. Its power is not at all a derivation or determination of that of the human community; rather it flows from
the character of perfect society that the state recognizes; it is a
form of its jurisdictional power. Only the state that is a victim
of aggression possesses this jurisdiction over the aggressor.
Surely, this chain of deductions should not obliterate from
notice that beautiful page of the De Legibus where Suarez
speaks of the universal society of men. Nevertheless, if the
logic of his system is understood it leads to a remarkable
divisibility of peace and war. It would make ineluctable the
conclusion that the day after the invasion of Belgium and
Holland by Germany, the latter was accountable only to these
two countries, that she had to answer only to them, that she
fell under the direct jurisdiction of the two victims only, so that
to intervene in their business, even now compromised, in the
name of universal justice, would have been to disrupt every
order of jurisdiction. Even Suarez himself doubtless would
never have conceded this; he would have found in his consciousness of universal solidarity reason to proclaim, this tinie, the
utter indivisibility of justice, peace, and war. But it must be
noted that his doctrine, so logical in appearance, is strangely
divided against itself on this point. Of the two voices with
which it invites thought, one leading to absolute sovereignty of
the state, the other heading towards solidarity, the stronger is
the former. It leads to the admission-and here the greatest
moral theologians leave his company-that all war is formally
just when it is declared by the sovereign state, and the consa De Caritate, Disp. XIII, sec. IV. No. S.

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science of the subject who obeys it can find apeasement in this
formal argument.
To return to Suarez, it is clear, as he said, that no one is
bound to correct injustices all over the world. The king of
England has nothing to do with French territory: the king of
France is supreme there. There has been a division of responsibility among the states, and they are bound by it in their
mutual dealings. This does not preclude a general order in the
community of nations; such a community has its own proper
authority, intended to establish order and have it respected,
whether it acts through its proper organs, or whether the states
assume a more or less conscious support of it. This much, and
the indivisible order of peace and war, reason can demonstrate.
Once having adopted the point of view which, for lack of a
better term, we have called the" state pomt of view," and the
subjective point of view of the belligerent, Cajetan and Suarez
were led on to complete their theory of the justice of war by a
paradoxical fiction. None of the medieval or modern writersnot even Vitoria-avoided the temptation to connect war with
the judiciary function. War, in their writings, seems always to
be the result of a litigation which could have been determined
through the application of law and through the offices of a
judge. This is because they had too static a conception of international relations; and how could it have been otherwise since
they took the state and not international society for the point of
departure of their speculation? The state screened their view
and prevented them from seeing the whole juridical order.
The state is an arrested formation; it is conscious of its personality and of its rights. Its relations with others are defined
juridical relations. The judge will be the supreme regulator.
But who will be judge? The state itself, judge and party in its
own case, since there is actually no superior authority who can
decide the quarrel. We know that in the last analysis Vitoria
gives this power to the " authority of the whole of the universe." 26 But with Cajetan and Suarez the idea of the perfect
•• De Solages, op. cit., p. 58.

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state society has progressed too far for them to refer to the
universe, and so they encounter the difficulty which every
doctrine based on the organic idea of the universe avoids.
For them, the authority of the state which becomes the
judge of others, has its formal source in the character of the
perfect society that they themselves recognize, but the same
principle that establishes its right likewise establishes the independence of the others. Sovereign and " perfect " states are all
equal; how can it be arranged that one should submit to another
as to his judge? (Let us note in passing that this question provides the transition from the formal point of view of authority
and sovereignty to the objective or material point of view of
an international community.) By what right have the other
members of the society of states been made to submit to the
authority of one of their equals, momentarily superior? Ratione
delicti is the answer. Cajetan had already calculated that if
" before war two nations were on an equal footing, by the very
fact that an injury has been inflicted, and because vengeance
is demanded, the independent prince becomes the superior of
his adversary." 27 Suarez elaborated on and refined this theory,
which for long remained the classic theory. And so, for having
refused to recognize the existence of an organic community of
nations, one is forced to admit the existence of some fictional
community, whose band is morality, and whose existence the
misdemeanor reveals. In brief, where one would see neither
society nor law, but instead the individual and the contract,
one is forced to appeal to morality to replace the organic public
law that is no longer possible. This can be done only by
reverting to a fiction.
Ingenious as it may have been, the theory was otherwise useless, particularly since another explanation, in conformity with
sociological and juridical reality, was ready at hand. If there
were disorder and injustice present in international society, it
was up to international society to punish and remedy it. But
it is a standing phenomenon of the life of societies, that if the
•• Regout, op. cit., p. 127,

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organs necessary to the accomplishment of some function are
defective, those members most affected by the· defect are impelled to make up for it. They dilute themselves, one might
say; under the spur of necessity they substitute for the weak
organ, which would have acted in their favor. Society, implicitly or explicitly, recognizes this substitution, showing thereby that in its eyes there has been no usurpation of power, but a
functional :replacement. When Vitoria wrote that the universe
possesses the right to punish those who disturb international
order but that it makes use of particlar states for this end, he
recognized the· organic character of the international community and also.established the basis of functional substitution:
the belligerent state acts by substitution, and the foundation of
the power it uses is not to be sought :in its own sovereignty or
in the nature of perfect society, but
the organic function it
is filling and, in the last analysis, in the principle of international authority.
To the formal justice of war there corresponds a material
justice; once the one who has had recourse to force has shm,,vn
his title to do so, it remains to consider the objects on which
he will use his power. Under the fust aspect, war is deemed
just if the power that sanctions it is one of law; under the
second, war is considered just if it pursues a legitimate end.
The first question establishes the right to war, the latter limits
the range of application of such a right. This is what is called
in the terminology of the traditional doctrine, the just cause:
war must have for its end the reparation of wrong or the
protection of right; justice is the only object permitted to belligerents. The question comes up again: what is justice? We
have no wish to undertake here a textual study that would be
irksome because so often attempted. Let us merely note the
two divergent positions that are found in the moral tradition,
one determined by the role given to the notion of the common
good, and to the organic conception that flows from it, the other
by the accentuation givento state sovereignty.
We know already the role of the idea of the comomn good in
St. Thomas' doctrine on war. The necessities of the common

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good confer on the prince the right of making war, and the
common good is equally the end he has in view; the formal and
material justice of war both have their principle in the common
good.28 The same is true of Vitoria; the end of war, in his
system, overrides the precise reparation which unleashes it. Behind one injustice, he sees the order of all justice that has been
violated; the end of war is " the peace and security " of the
commonwealth, the " defense of the public welfare," not only
of the state injured, but of the whole universe. 29 To the degree
that an improper interpretation of state sovereignty has obtained, justice and law are restrained. Since it is by reason of
an injustice suffered that one state becomes the judge of its
adversary, it follows that only the individual laws of the state
in question provide it with reason for a just war and only they
are protected by this international institution.
Since its character of " the perfect society " establishes the
sphere of authority of the state which has become the judge of
its attacker, that authority does not extend, materially, beyond
the circle of its oWii laws. Here again, the international· community is despoiled to the benefit of the sovereign state. Just
as the authority required to place force at the service of order
by means of a just war passes from the universal community to
the individual state and ends by becoming confused with
sovereignty of the latter, so the matter of just war becomes
restricted to the defense of the right of the particular state.
What place will social justice, which is concerned with the
common good of the society of peoples and states, have in this
conception of justice? What will be the place of,distributive
justice, which the community in its decrees, its political, economic, social, and cultural systems will assure to the state some
participation in civilized life, in proportion to its needs, services,
Regout, op. cit., p. 84.
Very explicitly and in a manner that agrees with his conception of the whole
social order of the world, he concludes that a war, which would be 'just if only the
injustice that occasions it be considered, may be actually injust when the grievous
repercussions that it will have on the common good of the sbtte, or of Christianity
in general, or of the world in general are considered." " All these terms he
explicitly distinguishes: De Potestate Oivili, q. IS, p. lU," de Solages, op. cit., p. 60.
28

29 "

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J. T. DELOS

and the possibilities presented by international society? Actually, the idea of justice seems to be destroyed.
Moreover it even becomes impossible to define the rights of
the states. Consequently, the application of justice in the relations of the individual states, the narrow base on which it was
hoped to at least establish peace, is compromised; peace, already crippled by the absence of the two complementary forms
of justice, loses even the prop that has been left it. If peace
rests on the respect of the rights of sovereign states, it is
necessary that these rights admit of definition. But they can
only be defined as the function of the human community because its rights pertain to jurisdiction over powers bound up
with its own functions, and those of the state refer to a juridical
order which exceeds the state. To make of the right of a state
an absolute, as the doctrine of sovereignty tries to, is to transform into absolute rights which are relative and which, united
to the functions of the state, are conferred on it.
This is the paradox illustrated by so many examples from
political and diplomatic history; that within the framework of
public law based on the sovereignty of state, the rigorous search
for justice leads to war, but peace results from compromise on
the law. It may be useful to take an example. Suppose two
states are disputing about a certain territory. On one hand, the
sovereignty of one is equal to that of the other, the right of
each, if recognized, is absolute, and one State must expel the
other. On the other hand, the theory of sovereignty furnishes
no criterion by which to settle the assignment of the disputed
land. A less general argument, foreign to the nature of the
state, must be invoked, borrowed either from some historic circumstance or from some expedient of the moment. Today the
ethnic criterion is invoked, or a criterion of economic need, or
military security, or historic right, criteria altogether contingent, lacking all character of necessity. In times past there
was a state of rights resulting from succession, or from marriage,
or from a free gift, or from a promise of exchange; borrowed
from private right, these arguments owe their apparent precision to private right. Assuredly, discussion between the sover-

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eign states affords no principle that affects both parties equally,
none that brings about their reconciliation under a common
obedience to its law.
In point of fact, the controversy is distorted beginning from
its point of departure. Not the rights of the state, but rather its
functions should be the first consideration. What is first is not
the right of the state to possess a territory in which its language
is spoken, nor even the right of populations of the same ethnic
character to form a political unity; what is first is the human
right, superseding any state, to live as men and to insist that
their government, whatever it may be, give them leave to do so.
The rights that the state exercises over any determined
territory are not for the support of the state and its attributes,
but for the good of men. Not only those who happen to live
in the territory are involved, but also all those who, thanks to
international exchange, can claim to benefit from the contribution made to international life by this particular population.
To award a territory to a certain state is not essentially a question of deciding between the rights of two states. It is a matter
of effecting a distribution of state authority within the international community, of assigning a local seat for the exercise
of power. This power has its principle not in the territorial
state but in a superior social being wherein must be sought the
source for the justice of this distribution of power.

Justice and the New International Order.
In order to fulfill the demands of justice and of peace, today
we must look outside the states themselves for the ultimate
foundations of the juridical order. It is this necessity that,
consciously or unconsciously, contemporary international organization obeys.
The change manifests itself in war before it is imposed in
peace. We have heard it repeated, as a commonplace, that the
last world conflict was a revolution more than a war. This
seems to be so but, in speaking thus, we are thinking not only
of the social disturbances which it brought about within each

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state, nor of the changes it provoked in the relations between
classes, ruining some, favoring the advance of others to positions of control. There is another and perhaps more important
phenomenon; in many countries, certain social groups participated in the war, less out of obedience to their governments
than to follow the currents in which their states were moving, in
order to favor the social and ideological interests which were
properly international. From this point of view, one can say
that the forces necessary to states to carry on war, were not
in their hands, and this because they were essentially
revolutionary, even though the state knew how to seize and
utilize them for victory. War has ceased also to be a political
and military conflict between states and has become a specific
phenomenon of human society, which has served the states,
inasmuch as the latter have made use of it.
It goes without saying that this state of affairs is accentuated
in peace. Will anyone say that in the international organization
which is operating today the state loses its power, that its
force disappears? One would think quite the contrary; the
more social human life becomes, the more necessary it will be to
confine the social mass within the boundaries set by some coordinating power. Thus it is not the power of the state which
is being diminished, but the independence which made it
believe in its sovereignty.
In the measure in which its functions increase, its organic
character reveals itself at the heart of the international commonwealth. The workings of' federalism, which are multiplying
today, do not dismantle the state, but they do dull the pomt of
its sovereignty. More even than the League of Nations, the
United Nations encompass as states in a network of juridical
relations and constitutes a system of departments entrusted
to appropriate bodies. Also, the General Assembly, the Security
Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Council of
Safety look after the united interests of the member states and
exercise the social functions of the new political collectivity;
At the same time, in increasing solidarity of the states forces
them to accept a hierarchy which not only corresponds to their

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degree of power, but also to the inequality of their responsibilities and the diversity of their functions.
Besides, another effect of the phenomenon of socialization is
·becoming apparent; the greatest mass of international relations is not constituted by the mutual relations of states, but
by those which multiply themselves between their members.
They spin the political, economic, social, and cultural web of
an international society which is developed without the intervention of states, or at least without their exclusive initiative or
complete benefit. They seem on the contrary pressed down,
overpowered, commanded by the" necessities," the" interests,"
the economic or ideological " currents," the source of which is
not in themselves, which surpass them in extension, which
maneuver them from within as well as orientiate their free
decisions. They submit to the sociological law which applies
to every organic body; members of a common civilization, they
do not lose their power of decision and their moral personality,
but like every organ, they live the life of the whole at the same
time as they live their own life.
The international law and th'e charter of the United Nations
reflect these changes. That their relations may be peaceful the
states undertake to found them on the rights of the peoples, and
to this effect they propose to favor universal and " effective
respect for the rights of man and basic freedoms for all, without
distinction of race, sex, language, or religion,'' as well as '' the
raising of the standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress." Like the " Special
Institutes" (art. 57), they are called upon to represent the
common interests which make their way into the economic and
social domain, into that of public health, of intellectual culture,
and education; they will embody them· and will speak for them;
they will insert them into the juridical order, referring them in
particular to the Economic and Social Council and to the
General Assembly of the United Nations. These rights and
these interests do not have their source in the state,
man and in civilization; they are not realized merely within the

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framework of the state, but in that of a properly human
society.
It is in order to protect these rights that the states set themselves to co-operate, both conjointly and separately, with the
organization (art. 56), and that those which are not members
of the United Nations accept, e. g., the Treaties of Peace signed
in 1947 in which the signatories assumed the obligation of
" taking all the necessary measures to assure to all persons
:under their jurisdiction, without distinction of race, sex,
nationality, or religion, the enjoyment of the rights of man and
the basic liberties, which include freedom of expression of
thought, freedom of the press and of publication, freedom of
worship, freedom of opinion and of reunion." In a similar vein,
the Commission on the Rights of Man, in its opening session,
was assigned as its field of labor the elaboration of recommendations concerning an international declaration on rights, of international declarations or covenants relative to civic liberties, to
the condition of woman, to free information, to the protection of
minorities, and to the prevention of distinctions based on race,
sex, nationality, or creed.
And so, it is in the human commonwealth, and no longer
merely in the states that international juridical order seeks to
lay its foundations. It is on man and on the institutions of
civilization, and no longer on the states alone; that peace is attempting to build its edifice. Certain states continue to play an
important role in this construction, that of organs and agents.
We mean those, for example, which give juridical form to the
institutions of which we have just spoken, and which guarantee
their functioning; these are the agents which execute all the
international obligations, which remain a dead-letter without
their good-will. But in all this, they are the organs and the
interpreters of the human commonwealth in the course of
organization; they are the functionaries of peace and this peace
is no longer realized only in their limited sphere.
We must take account of this evolution in order to define the
task of justice. It is easy to envisage it on an abstract and
theoretical plane and to say, as we have already said, that the

THE DIALECTICS

OF WAR AND PEACE

563

whole juridical order rests on the foundation of a tripartite
justice: that which subordinates the members of the international community to the demands of the common good, that
which assures to each of these members in the ranks of the
community a written law and the possibilities of life proportioned to its particular condition and the conditions of the
group, and finally that form of justice that we readily call
inter-individual (reserving for the first two the name of societal) because it assures respect for those rights which the
state, in its relations with its equals, derives from its own
nature. However this view, while it is fundamental, is still
theoretical. The difficulty in the practical order comes from
the necessity one finds of defining these rights so as to make
them claimable and to give society its concrete juridical order.
The spirit of justice is a spirit of rigor. At one time, with
the moral personification of the state and with the theory
of sovereignty-or with that of the state as a perfect societypolitical thought and juridical doctrine could believe that it
was in the presence of a subject whose rights could be deduced
logically from an invariable and unquestionable premiss, the
very nature of the sovereign state. We know today what was
the part of illusion in this belief; states exercise functions and
functions flow from rights, but the functions themselves vary
with the development of international society. Furthermore,
the total juridical order, necessary for peace, also has for a
fundament the rights of individuals, and of groups and communities which are not states, but belong more to the economic,
social, or cultural order than to the political. These are the
fruits of the development of international solidarities; they
reflect the historical and contingent conditions of civilization.
If one speaks of rights in regard to these-and the organization of international society demands it-one must, in order to
define them, rise to some more general principle, for example,
to that of human sociability and the common good.
There will be no difficulty, in these conditions, in recognizing
that, while peace is, today as always, the fruit of a triple justice
at a time when the frames of the modern world are cracking

564

J. T. DELOS

under the pressure of a more universal social life, the first
and principal fundament of peace is social justice. This, moreover, is the will to submit to the demands of the common good
and to recognize the hierarchy of social aims, subordinating the
inferior collectivities-and here we mean the states-to the
more general and more universal. The particular aspirations of
individuals, groups, nations, and peoples must be conformed to
the necessities of the common good, and not only because altruism invites us to this course, but because social justice imposes
it upon us. This justice develops the significance of international
solidarities, and binds their constraints, which are sometimes
heavy, to the most lofty ideal, that of the general welfare of a
humanity living in peace. The unification towards which
humanity visibly tends is not only a material fact, the result of
the multiplication of the bonds of interdependence among
people, but it also shows itself in the domain of conscience.
This unity is taking shape under our eyes, in spite of the appearances afforded by a world torn to pieces. But it must
have a moral element, and this is furnished by the idea of the
common good, which unites men and groups in the pursuit of a
single goal that is more and more lofty and finally embraces the
whole of humanity organized in society.
Social justice is not alone in unifying the world conscience.
Love or charity works with it. But of these two it is justice
that fills the more specific role. For love attaches itself to
persons, and under that aspect is not formally the cause of international peace. This is the tranquillity of social order, and
social order is a state of justice objectively realized in the
ranks of the community. It is again through the intermediary
of the common good that love contributes most directly to
peace. In order to love all men at one time one need only love
them in the well-being of a civilization which conditions the
life, happiness, and spiritual progress of each of them. Peaceful
nations are those that find in themselves the will to submit to
the demands of social justice and enough generosity to practice
love for humanity.
It is thanks to social justice and the love of the common good

THE DIALECTICS

OF WAR AND PEACE

565

that the individual conscience reaffirms its supremacy, ,and
·the worth of the single individual definitively prevails over that
of the collectivity, in which
might have believed it drowned.
To the degree that civilization extends the dimensions of the
collectivity in which man is placed, it seems that he must
stifle under the weights of impersonal social interests. To tell
the truth, the danger of suffocation and ruin is inseparable
from civilization and the social and juridical order. This last is
a work of technicalities; it uses a ponderous apparatus, whose
inner workings function slowly and with many imperfections.
On the other hand, the zone in which the human person can
effectively defend his liberty is confined, it seems, in a closed
shop, a municipality, a province, a state, but the individual
today is not only in conflict with a local society, on frontiers
close to home and well-defined, nor merely with the state, the
Leviathan which he became accustomed to resent and to
vanquish in the course of the 19th century. He is come to
grips with a world, the organization of which is all the more
unwieldly as it contains more elements still undecided and
shrouded in mist. The individual feels himself powerless, when
he is being pressed down by international forces or interests,
and he is ready to believe himself carried away by a social
determinism which does not exist, but to which his avowal of
statism has given birth.
Meanwhile, the individual retains his supremacy. He does
not manifest it by opposing himself successfully to this world
society but, if one may so put it, by going beyond it because
he understands and appreciates the justice of it. It would serve
no purpose to take up again here a liberal theme, and equate the
individual with society, that is, with universal society; the
pretention of establishing such an equilibrium is vain and false
in principle. But each of us can understand and love the welfare
of humanity, and for this reason, one who ventures to overrun
it lifts himself above the historical collectivity. He oversteps
it, but without separating himself from it nor failing to understand it; he remains present to it by his knowledge of its laws
and by the personal approbation which he gives to the justice
8

566

J. T. DELOS

which underlies its demands. He surpasses it because he knows
and understands it, refers it to an ideal on which he judges it,
not as one revolting against it, but as a good artisan who
renders his services according to the plan of the architect, even
though he himself did not conceive this plan.
The unity of the world conscience is veritably manifest
simultaneously on two planes: outside of ourselves, in civilized
society, thanks to the social standing which justice and love of
the common good give to the international collectivity; in each
one of us, because the understanding of the total common good
and the love which we bear it carries over into our own beings
the order and the peace of the universe.

J. T. DELos, 0. P.
Ambassade de France, pres le Saint Siege,
Rome, Italy.

THOMISM AND THE NEW THEOLOGY*

T

HAT World War IT would bring with it, not merely
great changes in the material fortunes of many nations,
but also radical changes in the world of thought, was
something which could have been forseen by a glance at the
history of human thought throughout the ages. Even before
the outbreak of hostilities it was evident that the great civil
universities of Europe were in the grip of philosophies which
were anti-christian in character, derived as they were from
Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Engels. Once the frontiers of Europe
were opened for inspection after the liberation it soon became
clear that a new factor had arrived on the scene. This was a
new philosophy, difficult to define, even by those who taught
it, but nevertheless of great influence, especially in France.
This new philosophy was given the name of Existentialism.
Now, it is also a fact of history that few philosophies come into
being without having an influence, sooner or later, on the
science of Theology, and so it was natural that the theologian
should wait, with a certain degree of apprehension, the result
of the impact of these philosophies, especially Existentialism,
on Catholic thought. This was even more important in the
present case, since a flourishing school of Catholic existentialists
already existed in France and in some other countries.
By the year 1946 controversies in several ecclesiastical reviews
made it quite clear that the apprehensions were more than
justified. 1 In that same year, in the course of two Allocutions,
one to the General Chapter of the Friars Preachers and the
other to the Jesuits, the Pope himself made some references to
* This article was written and accepted for publication prior to the appearence
of the recent papal encyclical, Humani Generia. Hence, the author makes no reference to that important document but his article gains significance in the light of
the Holy Father's words.-En.
1 Cf. M. Labourdette,
0. P. "La Theologie et ses sources," Revue Tkomiste, 56
(1946), 858-871, and J. Danielou, "Les orientations presentes de Ia pensee religieuse," Etudea, !l49 (April, 1946).

567

568

DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

what he called a" new theology." 2 He pointed out that, while
questions hitherto in dispute among Catholic theologians were
still important and by no means to be neglected, nevertheless,
the modern problem which confronts all theologians, no matter
to what " school " they belong, is the defense of the very foundations of the perennial philosophy and theology, foundations
which every intellect calling itself Catholic both recognizes and
venerates. The very centre of the problem touches upon the
intimate relations between the human intellect and that faith
which has been revealed to man by God. How far is the intellect capable of penetrating into those truths in order to deduce
from them, by a process of reasoning, other truths which are
connected with them? Above all, what is the value of such
conclusion? In his Allocution to the Jesuits the Pope mentioned the new theology by name: " There is a good deal of
talk (but without the necessary clarity of concept), about a
'new theology,' which must be in constant transformation,
following the example of all other things in the world, which
a:re in a constant state of flux .and movement, without ever
:reaching their term. If we were to accept such an opinion what
would become of the unchangeable dogmas of the Catholic
Faith; and what would become of the unity and stability of
that Faith? "
In spite of these words of warning so solemnly delivered by
the Vicar of Christ, discussion and controversy still continued,
and on the twenty-third of November, 1949, the spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset, speaking to a packed audience in the
Barcelo cinema, Madrid, declared that European Idealism as a
philosophical system had been overcome and superseded by
another and a more modern system, so too had Aristotelianism.
He then continued: " I am able to announce to you that the
Roman, Catholic, Apostolic Church is about to :relinquish both
Aristotelianism and Thomism; and that a new theology is being
forged which is in close relationship with that of the Greek
Fathers." 3
2 Cf. Act. A post. Sed., 38 (1946), 384-888.
"Reported in YA, 24th Nov. 1949.

THOMISM

AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

569

In spite of all that has been said and written about this new
theology there is still no very clear idea of its basic doctrines,
even though several of its chief proponents are now well known
to us alJ.4 The historical centre of the movement is in France,
with some repercussions in other countries, such as England
and Spain, where the movement has been hailed as the contribution of this century to modern thought. However, the partisans of this new theology make it very difficult for us to detect
their basic doctrines, for the simple reason that they do not
seem to be very interested in constructing a definite system or
method of theology. Rather they spend most of their time and
energies
attacking the old traditional system, their basic
argument being that it is to the advantage of the Church in
modern times to adopt more modern methods of approach, and
especially modern philosophies, in order to present the truths
of the faith in a way which will appeal to ordinary people.
In order to make their position clearer we shall endeavour, in
the course of this article, to study some at least of the main
these new theologians, especially
doctrines put forward
those which seem to have some connection with the warning
given by the Holy Father in his two Allocutions already
mentioned.
The term "new theology" has, as we shall see, no very fixed
content. The phrase can mean something which all Catholic
theologians worthy of the name must reject, or it can be applied
to certain tendencies which, although they may be dangerous
if carried too far, may occupy a legitimate place in Catholic
theology. One thing however is quite certain, namely that this
new movement can not be separated from what M. Maritain
has called the" New Christianity," 5 which according to him is
bound to make itself felt in the present age, and which will be
characterized by an attempt to bring the doctrines of the
Church into line with the times in which we live. We might
4 Cf. Br. de Solages, "Pour l'honneur de la Theologie," in Bulletin de Litterature
Ecclesiatique, 48 (1947), 65-84, in which the names of the principal supporters of
the new theology are given.
5 Cf. J. Maritain,
Humanisme Integral, pp. 139 and 146.

570

DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

say of the new theology that it attempts to form one of the
integral elements in the new christianity. The partisans of this
movement are preoccupied with the "man in the street" as we
know him today. He has to be won over to Christ and to the
true Church, and yet he has been brought up on the basis of a.
rationalistic and idealistic philosophy which has effectively
sealed his mind against any approach along the old traditional
lines. Scholastic philosophy will never make any impression
upon him for the simple reason that he does not understand
the terms and the concepts which it uses. The same must therefore be said of a theology which makes use of the traditional
Scholasticism for its presentation or development. That is the
real problem which confronts the theologian of today, and
the whole question at issue between the new theologians and
the traditional Thomist is how it can best be solved. Confronted with this problem the partisans of the new theology
have attempted a solution, but that solution is proposed in
two very different ways which can not, by any means, receive
the same criticism, as we shall see.
Both solutions imply, even if they do not state it in so many
words, the rejection of the Aristotelio- Thomistic philosophy as
a fitting instrument for use in theology and its substitution by
other more modern forms of philosophical thought. One solution has, however, gone too far, and has denied the scientific
value of those deductions made from the revealed principles of
the faith with the aid of reason as an instrument. The earlier
writings of Fr. Chenu and Fr. Charlier contain a summary of
this extreme solution. According to Chenu, the source of all
theology is the vital life of the Church in its members, which
can not be separated from history, the deciding factor in all
theology. Thus, strictly speaking, theology is the life of the
members of the Church, rather than a series of conclusions
drawn from revealed data with the aid of reason. Charlier
added to this statement the conclusion that the strict theological deduction as the result of a scientific use of human
reason is therefore impossible, since it would suppose that
reason could attain to a true understanding of the truths of

THOMISM AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

571

faith. Theology, as such, is therefore reduced to a simple explanation of revealed truth in terms which need not necessarily
have a permanent value, but which can, and indeed should,
change with time and according to the demands of circumstances. This doctrine was far too dangerous to pass unchecked,
and in 1942 the Holy Office banned the writings in which it
appeared. 6
In spite of this condemnation and the strong warning of the
Holy Father in the Allocutions already mentioned, the same
type of solution was proposed in a slightly more benign form
in articles in Reviews and especially in some of the publications
in the series, Sources Chretiennes as well as in the Collection
Thlologie and Unam Sanctam. Once again the subtle attack
on Scholasticism was evident, and it would be as well to point
out at once that the focal point of this attack was not merely
Thomism as such. There are different theories on certain matters pertaining to theology inside the Church and many things
are open to free discussion, but up to the present all systems
have attempted to base their solutions and conclusions on the
solid rock of the perennial truth. It is that very foundation,
wherever it may be found, which is under attack from the new
theology. At the same time, the main enemy is, as always,
Thomism, partly because it is the one system which has a completely coherent philosophical basis, and also because many
other systems existing in the Church today are not entirely
free from the taint of humanism and even of nominalism. This
fact becomes very clear if we compare two articles written on
the subject of the new theology, one by Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange
in Angelicum and the other by Fr. Perego in Ciencia y Fe.1
The former sees the new theology as a dangerous
which strikes at the very roots of the faith itself, and which is,
therefore, to be condemned. The latter, while by no means
agreeing entirely with this new system, tries to lay much more
emphasis on the reasons for its appearance at this point in the
• M. D. Chenu, Une Ecole de Theologie, Le Saulchoir, 1937; L. Charlier, Essai
mr le probleme tk6ologique, 1988.
1

Angelicum, 1946, pp. 1ft6-145, and Ciencia y Fe, 1949, pp. 7-30.

572

DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

history of civilization. The aim of the new theologians is primarily apologetic, i. e., an attempt to approach the modern
mind by a direct use of modern methods, adapting for that
purpose philosophical terms and concepts which are in more
common use among present-day philosophers in an endeavour
to break down the prejudice against Scholasticism and all that
it implies. This divergence in the criticism of the new theology
shows us more plainly than anything else the difficulty of
obtaining any clear notion of what is really implied by this
movement, a difficulty which is increased by the fact that many
of those theologians who do attempt to criticise this new movement are themselves followers of systems which have departed
from the clear lines of true Thomistic thought.
Thus it is clear that the main contention of the partisans of
this new movement is that theology, to . remain alive, must
move with the times. At the same time, they are very careful
to repeat all the fundamental propositions of traditional theology almost as if there was no intention of making any attack
against it. This is very true of such writers as Frs. de Lubac,
Danielou, Rahner and Br. de Solages, all of whom are undoubtedly at the very centre of this movement.
Their main accusation seems to be that traditional theology
is out of touch with reality because it takes little or no account
of modern methods and philosophical systems, and thus fails
in its main object, i. e., to present to the modern world a reasonable explanation of the doctrine of Christ. This is especially
true, in their opinion, of neo-Thomism, which is a sterile movement, destined to have little or no effect on the modern world.
As one of these theologians expresses it, " Quand l'esprit evolue,
une verite immuable ne se maintient que grace a une evolution
simultanee et correlative de toutes les notions, maintenant
rapp01·t. Une theologie qui ne serait pas
entre elles un
actuelle serait une theologie fausse." 8 According to such teachers traditional theology, with its foundations in Aristotelianism,
has lost during the centuries which followed St. Thomas, a mass
of notions, ideas, and even methods of expounding the faith
8

H. Bouillard, Conversion et Grace chez S. Thomas D'Aqum, pp. 219, sq.

THOMISM

AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

573

which were well known to the Fathers of the Church, some of
which have been taken over by the leaders of contemporary
non-Catholic thought. Such ideas and methods must be recovered if any approach is to be made to the modern world,
and they must be incorporated into theology, even if that
means rejecting Aristotelianism or even Thomism as we understand it today.
The partisans of the new theology accuse the defenders of
the traditional methods of being ignorant of that dramatic
world, the human individual with all his anxieties and experiences, while they wander about in a world of the abstract and
the speculative. St. Thomas himself-so they assert-were he
alive today, would be the first to recognize the importance of
a new method of approach, and so would do all that he could
to find one which would bring Catholic teaching into the foreground once more. Small wonder then that the traditional
theologians have made a counter-accusation against the new
theology that it has its philosophical basis in idealism and in
voluntarism, being descended in a direct line through Plotinus,
Bruno, Kant, Schelling, and Hegel in the remote past, and from
Von Humbolt, Nietzsche, Weber and Heidegger in more recent
years. Perhaps such a statement takes the criticism of the
philosophical angle of the new theology a little too far, but
certainly it would be quite true to say that the partisans of the
new movement are seeking their metaphysics outside Thomism,
and with bad results up to the present.
It is perfectly true to say that St. Thomas himself was the
author of a "new theology"; one glance at the history of
Thomism from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries is enough
to justify this remark. It is also true that Thomism, far from
being a dead thing, is necessarily vital, in the sense that much
progress is made and new light is continually being thrown on
the mysteries of the faith by means of the theological conclusion strictly so called, that is to say, from one premise
containing a revealed truth and another which contains a truth
known for certain by human reason. St. Thomas would have
been the last to assert that Thomism had reached its term with

574

DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

the last of his writings. On the contrary, he himself was always
on the lookout for new angles of approach to the many questions which needed solution in his own day. However, the
position taken up by the adherents of this new theology is far
different from that which St. Thomas adopted. Perhaps we
. shall be able to see this a little more clearly if we consider for
a moment the position they adopt with regard to revelation.
When God speaks to man and communicates to him divine
mysteries it is the fact which is revealed, and not the ·logical
proposition in which that fact is presented to us. Consequently,
very different philosophical systems can and indeed should be
used to express that divine revelation and to explain it to the
people for whom it is intended, who are not all theologians by
any means. The supernatural virtue of faith which is given to
us by God in order that we may believe the truths which He
has revealed is essentially a vital thing, part, that is to say, of
our lives, and as such it can not be separated from the age in
which we live. Only in a very secondary way is it concerned
with those formal propositions under whose form the faith is
presented to us. Faith. will thus give birth to theology, because
the truths of faith are expressed in words and concepts taken
from philosophical systems, but since those philosophies will
naturally tend to evolve according to the needs of the times it
follows that theology too will be in a state of constant evolu'
ofrevealed
tion. However, the real progress in the developp:tent
truth is to be found, not in the use of philosophical terms or
logical propositions and reasonings, but in an ever growing
penetration into the truths of faith by a deeper and more vital
Christian life.9 Since the life of the individual as a Christian
and a member of the Mystical Body can not be separated from
the age in which he lives, it will be natural and even necessary
to adopt the terms and the concepts familiar to modern thought
in order to express the truths of faith in such a way that they
will be intelligible and attractive to those outside the true
Church who are groping their way towards the knowledge and
the love of God.
• Clearly, this is very closely allied to Blondel's definition of truth as adaequatio
realis mentis et vitae.

THOMISM AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

575

Such, very briefly, is the position taken up by the new
theologians with regard to the relation between revelation and
theology as a science; and to our way of thinking it outlines a
problem which will have to be faced by all theologians, and
especially by Thomists. Needless to say, such a position, like
most errors, contains a germ of truth, which makes it all the
more dangerous. That divine revelation is, above all, a communication of certain divine facts can have a perfectly legitimate meaning for the orthodox theologian, and above all. for
the Thomist, but to make such a statement the basis of a
theological system which derides (there is no other word) the
theological conclusion, is a very great mistake. However, it is
not, by any means the only mistake made by the partisans of
the new theology, because their root error goes ever so much
deeper, consisting as it does in a false interpretation of the
relationship between faith and reason. To go too deeply into
this question would lead us further afield than the purpose of
this article warrants, but at the same time a brief statement
of the Thomist position in this matter will help to bring out
even more clearly the implications and the dangers of these
new theories.
St. Thomas' view of this problem of the relation between
faith and reason which gives rise to the science of theology was
both deep and clear and is admirably set out and defended by
John of St. Thomas.l{) Theology is a true science, indeed it is
the most noble of the sciences, worthy in every way of the
name of sapientia. The principles upon which it relies in its
evolution and in its investigations are those divine facts which
have been revealed by God. However, as a science, those
divinely revealed principles do not form its proper object, that
is the role of the conclusions which are drawn from them with
the help of humari reason. Such a statement, which seems so
clear to us now, was a real revolution when it was first made .
. The object of the science of theology is the theological conclusion strictly so called. Now, in order to deduce these conclusions
10

Summa Theol., I, q. 1; cf. John of St. Thomas, CurouB Theologicus, in loco.

576

DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

from revealed truth there is need of a :fitting instrument with
which to work. Sometimes this instrument takes the form of
another revealed truth, while at other times it is a
which
is known to human reason by its own unaided efforts. Now,
obviously, the minor premise which contains another revealed
truth will have far greater influence on the conclusion than one
which contains a. truth known to human reason alone. But,
and here is the crux of the whole question, even though the
human truth occupies an inferior position, that of a mere instrument, the revealed truth in the major premise does exercise a
great influence on that human instrument. That is why St.
Thomas speaks of these natural truths which are so used in
theology as the "handmaidens " of that science, in the sense
that theology, as a true science, makes use of these human
truths for its major purpose, which is to explain revealed truth
in human language, so far as that is possible.
The position of the new theologians is very different from
that of Aquinas. Their idea is that the theological reasoning
consists in using the revealed truth in order to draw out the
full latent content contained in the human truths, the contrary,
in fact, of the Thomist position. This is a logical conclusion
which follows from their vitalistic attitude towards truth and
especially from their statements that the theological conclusion
strictly so called has little or no value. 11 It also follows from
their teaching with regard to the evolution, necessarily connected with contemporary history, through which theology
must pass if it is to remain alive and to play an effective part
in the modem world. As one of the .Partisans of the new
theology expresses it, "L'histoire manifeste done a la fois la
relativite des notions, des schernes ou la theologie prends corps,
et l'affirmation permanente qui lea domine. Elle fait connaUre
la condition temporelle de la theologie et, en meme temps, offre
aux regards de la foi l'affirmation absolue, la Parole divine qui
s'y est incarnee." 12 Thus the human reasoning which changes
according to the dictates of its historical evolution and the
11
12

Cf. the two works by M. Chenu and L. Charlier already quoted in note 6.
Conversion et grace chez S. Thomas D'Aquin, by Henri· Bouillard, p. fl!U.

THOMISM

AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

577

necessities of the times, uses the permanent element, which is
the divine truth, as an instrument to develop and present its
latent content.
Thus the central problem which confronts us here is quite
simply one of two contrary ways of considering the relation
between revelation and reason. Either reason is the instrument
in the development of revealed truth or the revealed truth is
the instrument of reason. It is our opinion that, unless the fact
which we have mentioned before of the great influence of the
revealed truths on the natural truth which is used as an instrument in their full development is understood and clearly brought
to light, then this fundamental error in the new theology will
never be completely overcome. For that reason it is useful to
notice that the same conclusion could have been reached by a
consideration of the :role of the middle term in the theological
syllogism, which in one case-that of the major premise-is a
revealed truth, and in the other minor premise, a truth of
human reason. In order that this middle term in the minor
premise may have exactly the same sense as that which it has
in the major premise, thus avoiding four terms in the syllogism,
it must of necessity have the "approval," as it were, of the
revealed truth. If we examine it carefully we shall see that it
is just this approval which gives to the theological conclusion
its full force as an element in the expression of divine revelation
and which also brings to light the role of human truth as an
instrument in theology.
We know that, according to SL Thomas, the instrument
a double activity, i.e., its own, which is attributed to its personal activity in the forming of the effect, and also another
power which it receives from that cause which uses it as an
instrument.
Thus, in the theological conclusion we are not
dealing with a series of probabilities, but with strict conclusions
in the form of judgments which correspond to the ontological
truth virtually contained in the revealed principles. This doctrine has been very clearly expressed by John of St. Thomas,
when he said: "Pmemissa naturalis consideratur dupliciter.
Primo secundum quod praecise naturalis est, et sic ex hac parte

578

DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

non concurrit nisi ministerialiter . ... Alio modo consideratur
praemissa naturalis ut conjuncta praemissae supernaturali de
fide, scilicet ut ab ea elevatur quia approbatur et corrigitur ab
ipsa, et eius certitudinem participat: et hoc modo etiam praemissa naturalis concurrit non principaliter, et per se, sed sub
altiori lumine." 13
From aU these various angles we reach one and the same
conclusion, namely that it is the truth of faith which plays the
active part in the theological process of reasoning, using the
natural truth to develop the latent content in revelation, and
using it as a strict instrument in the Thomist sense of that
word. For this reason those theological conclusions are more
certain than any merely natural truth could ever be, because
they are reduced, in their final analysis, to a higher principle
than naturi!-l reason, one which is supernatural and divine,
which colours all that is human in the theological process,
giving it a new and a supernatural value. It is this divine element in theology which unifies everything, even the speculative
and the practical aspects of it. 14 Because the new theology has
failed to appreciate this truth with regard to the theological
conclusion it has also failed to realize the role of the merely
human truth as an instrument of faith.
Clearly, these principles have a very great importance when
we come to consider the attacks delivered against Thomism by
the partisans of the new theology. Far from being a mere
development of rationalism, as they assert, Thomism is, at one
and the same time, realistic and objective in its outlook. For
this reason the present Holy Father, in an address to the
assembled students of the seminaries, institutes, and colleges
of Rome, both seculars and regulars, stressed once again the
teaching of the Deus Scientiarum Dominus, as well as that of
the Code of Canon Law, and then added: "Be full of devotion,
therefore, blessed sons, and of enthusiasm for St. Thomas:
bend all your efforts to grasp his lucid doctrine, embrace wholeheartedly whatever clearly belongs to it and is safely regarded
13

14

John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus, I, q. l, a. 6.
Cf. John of St. Thomas, in I, Disp. 2, a. lO.

THOMISM

AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

579

as essential to it,'' 15 In the light of such clear direction from
the Holy See what are we to think of the action of these new
theologians who wish to substitute for Thomism the terms,
concepts, and principles of a new and fluid philosophy which,
as they themselves confess, will pass in the course of time as
others have done before it? To quote once more the words of
one of the new theologians, " Quand l' esprit evolue, une verite
immuable ne se maintient que gnice aune evolution simultanee
et correlative de toutes les notions, maintenant entres elles un
mere rapport. Une theologie qui ne serait actuelle serait une
theologie fausse." 16
Does it not also follow from what we have said above about
the theological conclusion and the place in it of the human element that, when the Church uses certain philosophical terms
in her dogmatic definitions, she is really exercising her infallible
judgment with regard to the value of such terms to express the
inner meaning of divinely :revealed truth? She is in no way
subordinating herself to those terms, as some seem inclined to
think; on the contrary, she is using them to express her meaning, and so they no longer belong to the purely human or
natural order, but receive a supernatural approval from those
very same divine truths which they serve to express. That is
the main reason why we, as Thomists, insist on the perennial
aspect of the philosophy of Aquinas, something which will
:remain and be a vital element in the world long after other
systems have faded into history. Speaking of this aspect of
Thomism, lVI. Maritain says: "It can, therefore, claim to be
abiding and permanent in the sense that, before Aristotle and
St. Thomas had given it scientific formulation as a systematic
philosophy, it existed from the dawn of history in germ, and
in the pre-philosophic state, as an instinct of the understanding
and a natural knowledge of the first principles of reason, and
ever since its foundation as a system has remained firm and
progressive, a powerful and living tradition, while all other
philosophies have been born and have died in their turn." 17
Act. Apost. Sed., 31-245.
Henri Bouillard, Conversion et grace chez S. Thomas D'Aquin, p. 219.
'"Introduction to Philosophy, p. 100.

16

580

DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

We are now asked to accept, in exchange for this solid foundation, the fluid concepts of a new philosophy, destined to change
with time-we are told-like everything else in this fluid world.
This, to our way of thinking, is not merely unreasonable but
also very dangerous.
There are certai1;1 basic philosophical concepts which cannot
be abandoned without danger to our faith. St. Thomas saw
this very clearly in connection with certain notions such as
that of subsistence as included in Conciliar decrees and definitions, in particular those of the Second Council of Constantinople. It is absolutely necessary to retain this metaphysical
concept in exactly the same sense in which it is understood by
the Thomist, as the foundation of the psychological and moral
personality if we are to hope to avoid falling into the heresies
of Nestorius and Eutyches. We are not told what is to happen
to these ontological notions and concepts were Thomism to be
abandoned in favour of a new theology and philosophy, but we
can guess! For that reason we can not accept the statement of
the new theology that such metaphysical notions included in
Conciliar decrees have no permanent value, and can be substituted by
without any danger to the abiding principles
of the faith itself. Thus, speaking of the notion of formal cause
as introduced into the decrees on Justification in the Council
of Trent, Bouillard says: "On se demandera peut-etre s'il est
encore possible de considerer comme contingentes ·lea notions
impliquees dans lea definitions conciliaires? N e serait-ce pas
compromettre le caractere irreformable de ces definitions? Le
Concile de Trente, par example, a employe, dans son enseignement sur la justification, la notion de cause formelle. N'a-t-il
pas, par le fait meme, consacre cet emploi et conjere ala notion
de grace-forme un caractere definitif?-Nullement.
Il n'etait
certainment pas dans l'intention du Concile de- canoniser une
notion aristotelicienne, ni meme une notion theologique con9ue
sousl'influence d'Aristote .... Il a utilise acette fin des notions
communes dansla theologie du temps. Maison peut leur substituer d' autres sans modifier le sens de son enseignement." 18
18

H. Bouillard, Conversion et grace ckez B. Thomas D'Aquin, pp.

THOMISM

AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

581

This doctrine alone would be sufficient to justify scepticism
with regard to the new theology and its fundamental tenets,
because we should not forget that we are being asked to substitute for the clear metaphysical notions of Aquinas the fluid
concepts of modern philosophies, and it is very difficult indeed
for us to see how that can be done without harm to the
unchangeable doctrines of the faith. A simple application of
what has been quoted above about the notion of the formal
cause to other concepts such as those of relation, person, nature,
and substance as they are to be found in the writings of modern
philosophers only serves to increase our sense of apprehension.
However, we
this point for more detailed and positive criticism on another occasion, but before doing so a word
must be said about the connection between the revealed truth
as such and the formal proposition of that truth, i.e. the dogma
of faith.
That there is an intimate relation between the revealed truth
and the dogma as proposed by the Church for our belief is
something which is perfectly clear to everyone. However, it is
evident that the new theologians have misunderstood that relationship, or at least have fixed their attention on one aspect of
it to the neglect of others. The logical proposition is related to
the mystery of faith which it expresses just as the logical assertion is related to the thing which is stated in it. In other words,
so far as the Church is concerned the dogma is only the external
expression in words of her intimate judgment of revealed truth.
It is a proposition expressing a truth and formulated by a
Teacher who is infallible in things which pertain to faith or
morals. Therefore the logical expression in words of any truth
of faith is something more than a mere external expression of
Christian experience (that is the modernist view); it is the act
of the official teaching Church. It is very important not to
·
forget this fact.
Insofar, then, as the dogma is contained in a logical proposition, it is something complex; whereas the mystery itself
which is proposed for our belief is something simple. This
means, in actual practice, that we do, in fact, believe the
9

582

DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

mystery which is proposed to us, not the logical proposition,
but at the same time, that proposition is the medium through
which we believe the mystery, and therefore it must express
that mystery adequately, especially when it is proposed to us
by the infallible Church. This doctrine is nothing more than
an application, not of logical formulae which have no real
meaning, but of common sense. The formal, logical proposition
has no value except as an expression of the inward thought.
Simple examples of this fact could be given in abundance, but
one will suffice. The phrase, "man is a rational animal" is a
logical proposition which is expected to express in words the
nature of man. If one agrees with that proposition he can do
so from various aspects. To any Christian that phrase should
imply that man is a composite being, made up of two parts,
the body and the soul. But the proposition could also be subscribed to by a rationalist who does not believe in the soul at all,
as a spiritual entity. Are we, therefore, to say that both the
Christian and the rationalist believe in the same basic reality
behind the words of this logical proposition? By no means.
In other words, the phrase" rational animal" must have a very
definite philosophical content which in one case is agreed to
and in the other is denied. It is our contention that the same
thing is true with regard to those basic philosophical concepts
which are connected with certain Conciliar decrees and definitions, and which must be retained in their full metaphysical
meaning if thefaith is not to have, as its basis, shifting sand
instead of firm rock!
We have already observed that it is very difficult to give a
systematic outline of the doctrines of the new theology, and
that for several reasons. In the first place, the partisans of
this movement are far too occupied with their revolt against
traditional Thomism to spend much time in the building up of
a system. Moreover, they are very shy and elusive, so much
so that it is often difficult to diagnose this tendency in any
particular author. Anyone who has read the works of Fr. Ives
de Montcheuil, especially chapters nine and ten of his Legons
sur le Christ, will be able to appreciate something at least of

THOMISM

AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

588

this difficulty. For that reason it is neither possible nor indeed
quite fair to attempt to give a complete list of authors who
may be regarded as partisans of this new movement. Rather
we have to be on the watch for tendencies, hints, obscurities,
many of which are admirably hidden behind a smoke-screen of
statements which seem, at first sight, to reflect the pure traditional theology, but which in fact do nothing of the kind. This
is very noticeable in such writers as Frs. de Lubac and Danielou.
From even a brief glance at their principal works it is at once
clear that they are at pains to hide anything which might be
regarded as new or startling in their expositions under the
outward appearance of complete agreement with all the traditional formulae of theology. They claim to be among the most
faithful disciples of St. Thomas whose main task is to set his
doctrines in the framework of history. Their works abound in
quotations from the writings of Aquinas, although some of his
principal commentators are conspicuous by their absence! They
recognize, without exception, the full Catholic doctrine with
regard to the supernatural nature of such elements in the
spiritual life as grace, the beatific vision, the gifts of the Holy
Ghost, and the infused virtues, but they differ very much from
the Thomist position in their exposition of the whole relationship between the natural and the supernatural. This difference
can be clearly seen in their treatment of that very difficult
question of the natural desire for supernatural beatitude,
especially as it is outlined in Fr. de Lubac's now-famous book
Surnaturel. We are not concerned here with a complete criticism of that work because that has already been done by
authors far more competent to judge of its merits and de-merits
than we are. 19 Our task is somewhat simpler in its scope,
because it is concerned with the foundation which lies behind
the doctrine expressed in that book.
As a preliminary observation it should be noted that it is
not correct to say that St. Thomas makes only rare use of the
word" supernatural," a statement, by the way, which is by no
1 ° Cf. the admirable article by C. Boyer, S. J., "Nature pure et Suruaturel dans
le Surnaturel de P. de Lubac," Gregorianum, 18 (1947), pp. 879, sq.

584

DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

means exclusive to Fr. de Lubac. The truth of the matter is
that both the word itself in its full meaning and also the
synonyms for it occur frequently in the writings of Aquinas,
especially in the Summa, the Quaestiones Disputatae and in
the single question De virtutibus in Communi. 20
Far more dangerous and false, however, is the interpretation
which de Lub,ac gives to this term "supernatural" and which
he attributes to St. Thomas, L e., that it is not used in direct
contrast to "natural," but rather to signify anything which
lies over and beyond the merely natural powers of any creature.
This definition, apart from the fact that it is not even etymologically correct, lies at the root of all the teaching contained
in this book. Obviously, with the aid of such a definition, in
which "supernatural" really means "superhuman," the author
is able to find in St. Thomas' teaching justification for his
theory that there is, in the natural order, an inefficacious but
absolute desire for the beatific vision of God face to face and
as He is in Himself, since man has no other ultimate end but
this vision,
the present order. Since this desire is natural,
and therefore something which is placed by God Himself in
man's human nature, it does not have the effect of making
God depend on man (for it is His free gift), nor can it produce
in us any right to the beatific vision, to grace, or the infused
virtues. Thus the gratuitous nature of these gifts is saved, but
at the cost of not a little effort on the part of the author.
There can be little doubt that a theory such as this, especially if it is carried to its logical conclusions, does tend to
destroy the complete distinction between the natural and the
supernatural, in spite of all the author may say to the contrary.
It also seems clear that, even if this explanation of the meaning
of the terms "natural" and "supernatural" preserves what
we may call, for want of a better term, the "juridical" gratuitousness of grace, the infused virtues, and the beatific vision,
it is very difficult to see how it can preserve at the same time
their theological and ontological gratuitousness. In order to
2 ° Cf. for example, Art. lO of this Question, also the articles by R. W. Meagher
in the Clergy Review, Jan. 1948.

THOMISM

AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

585

appreciate this point, which is all-important in this controversy
about the nature of the new theology, it is necessary to see
clearly what is implied in the absolute desire of which de Lubac
speaks.
Since he has given us the usual traditional meaning for the
inefficacious desire, i. e., one in which the means to attain it
are lacking in nature, we may presume that, when he speaks
of such a desire as being absolute, as opposed to conditional,
he is also using that term in its traditional sense. An absolute
desire, then, is one which is concerned with some good which
is in proportion to the nature, such as the desire which the soul
has after death for reunion with the body, or the desire which
a blind man can have for the sense of sight. Even though per
accidens such a desire may be incapable of realization in fact,
it is not therefore a vain desire, nor does it cease to be natural.
Banez, with his usual penetration and clarity of thought, explains this, and defends the doctrine that such a desire is natural
in spite of the fact that it either can not be, or may never be,
realized at all. 21 The reason he gives is both simple and conclusive. Since such desires have been realized de facto in certain individuals of the species, they can be lawfully desired by
others of the same species. Some persons have, in fact, the gift
of sight, and so it is natural fo:r a man born blind to desire that
gift, even though there may be no power in nature which is
capable of giving him that gift. Such is the usual explanation
given to this term "absolute desire," and it is the one which
Fr. de Lubac seems to accept. In that case, there is only one
conclusion which can be drawn from his opinion, namely, that,
although juridically the supernatural under all its aspects is a
free gift of God, nevertheless, man can still have a desire for
the face to face vision of God which although inefficacious, is
·
still in proportion to his nature.
Now;it should be kept in mind that Fr. de Lubac in thinking about a desire which has for its object not God, as the
Author of Nature, but as He is jn Himself, something which
is of its nature supernatural. Nor are we able to defend this
"'Cf. Bafiez, in I, q. 76, a. 1.

586

DAVID L. GID.1ENSTOCK

opm10n on the grounds that he is speaking of the natural
·power which is in all creatures to correspond with the activity
of the First Cause, either in the natural or in the .supernatural
order, because such a potentia obedientialis is entirely passive,
and thus on the part of the nature of the creature there does
not and can not correspond to it any intention, tendency, inclination, or natural desire; it is a mere passivity under the
Almighty Hand of God. H then this natural desire is to mean
anything at all in the sense in which it is proposed by the
author of Surnaturel it must surely imply that the end in viewthe beatific vision-is, in some way or other, in proportion to
human nature. It would appear that such an opinion does not,
and .can not, preserve effectively the complete distinction between the natural and the supernatural orders, and that consequently, it can not preserve intact the gratuitousness of grace,
at least metaphysically. We can see Fr. de Lubac's point
when he insists that, since this natural desire is in itself something which God has implanted in man's nature, it is a free
gift and so does not force God to give man grace, at least
juridically. But surely that is not enough to justify an absolute desire which may never be fulfilled? Also what are we to
think of the state of pure nature? Are we to deny all possibility
to such a state-a solution which would seem the only logical
conclusion to be drawn from Fr. de Lubac's views? If so then
we shall have to condemn not only such theologians as Banez,
John of St. Thomas, and Cajetan, but also Aquinas himself.
This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the true
meaning which must be given to this natural desire for beatitude as expressed in the writings of St. Thomas. There is an
admirable study of this question by Fr. Manuel Cuervo, 0. P.
which, to our way of thinking, expounds the only explanation
of it which will answer all difficulties and objections. Our purpose is somewhat easier to accomplish than that, because we
are only concerned with this matter insofar as it provides a
medium for some of the basic teachings of the new theologians.
The more one reads of their writings the more clear it becomes
that they have little positive to offer, and that their main

THOMISM AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

587

objects are to discredit the Scholastic tradition and to replace
it with modern systems. For that reason their writings are
directed towards demonstrating that, even in Aquinas, we can
find the same basic evolution in doctrine, together with the
fact that he, too, is tied hand and foot to the problems, methods,
and lines of thought of his time. For that reason, their main
points of attack against Thomism deal with such things as the
exact nature of Theology as a science, with special emphasis
on its practical aspect in relation to modern philosophical systems, especially the existential philosophy of Heidegger, Jaspers,
and Gabriel Marcel, nature and super-nature in all its aspects,
and finally-perhaps the most discussed question of all, and
one which is full of traps for the unwary - the evolution of
theology in the light of history. Thus, for example, in his book
on The Drama of Atheistic Humanism, Fr. de Lubac seems
to imply that, as against the attacks of Feuerbach, Marx,
Nietzsche, and Compte, the true prophets of a geniune return
to Christianity are to be found among such writers as Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, who alone are capable of understanding
the contemporary world in which they lived. I suppose that,
in our own day, he would claim that role for a Barth or a
Berdyaev rather than for any Catholic philosopher, tinged
with the Scholastic tradition! Speaking of Peguy's writings
and influence he says: "May that be primarily the endeavour
of those among us who are believers; may they show themselves more at pains to live by the mystery than eager to defend
its formulas or impose the hard outer crust of it; and the world,
impelled by its instinct to live, will follow in their footsteps." 22
However, it much not be supposed that the only ones the
new theologians have any respect for are the modern philosophers; they are also very fond of the Greek Fathers, and in this
they have done a great service by making simple translations
of their main works available in French. However, the purpose
behind that action was not quite as innocent as it may seem at
first sight, as we can see from the introduction to the Collection
written by Fr. Danielou. There it is plain that the idea first
•• The Drama of Atheistic Humwnism, by Henri de Lubac.

588

DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

mooted a century ago is still active, i; e., that there are two
different currents in tradition, that of the Latins and that of
the Greeks. The view of the new theologians is that the Church
will have to get back to the methods of the Greek Fathers,
especially to those notions which have been taken over by the
modern non-Catholic philosophers, notions and terms which,
so they maintain, the Church has lost through being tied
excessively to Thomism in all its forms.
First of a1l, the doctrine of the "two currents " in tradition
is gradually losing favour, owing to the serious criticism directed
against it by Froget and Galtier. Also it is not very obvious
that the modern world really has adopted anything from the
Greeks with the possible exception of the " eclecticism " of
Clement of Alexandria. Nor is it at aU-certain that the Church
would gain by a return to either the methods or the terminology
of the Greeks at the expense of Thomism. In some cases, the
method of approach adopted by the Greek Fathers led them
into difficulties which were not solved satisfactorily until the
time of Aquinas. We have a typical example of this in their
approach to the whole question- of the Blessed Trinity. Their
method was that of the earlier Symbola Fide:i, the order of
which they followed exactly in their catechetical instructions,
being more concerned with proving the divinity of each Person
rather than with questi9ns affecting the unity of Nature. _This
naturally led to the difficulty of explaining in any satisfactory
way how it is that, while the Father is called the Creator in
the Creeds, still the Gospel of St. John, speaking of the Son,
says,. Omnia per lpsum facta sunt.
Also, since the doctrine of appropriation was little known to
them, it followed naturally that they had great difficulty in
explaining the common action of the three divine Persons in
all the ad extra operations. It is interesting to notice that some
of these very same difficulties have already reappeared in the
writings of the new theologians, especially in certain questions
related to the indwelling of the Blessed Trinity in the soul.
Really desperate attempts are being made to establish some
personal relationship of each divine Person to the_ individual

THOMISM AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

589

soul in the state. of grace; based on some peculiar operation of
each Person. Some have not hesitated to speak of a "hypostatic union" between the Holy Ghost and the soul in grace,
a statement which, apart from its theological absurdity, has
already been refuted by Aquinas and by John of St. Thomas!
Who dares to suggest that a general return to these methods
would be to the advantage of the Church in modern times?
Everything points to the fact that the most desperate battles
between the new theology and traditional Thomism will be
waged in the fields of apologetics and mystical theology. Our
generation has already witnessed great changes of method in
the field of apologetics. Where before it was necessary to engage in active controversy on different points of Catholic
dogma, nowadays the essential need is to bring home to the
man in the street those fundamental truths which theologians
call the preambula fidei, as well as the social teaching of the
Church. This is particularly true in France at the present time,
and undoubtedly accounts for the preoccupation of the ecclesiastical authorities 'there with new methods of approach to all
those souls under their care, many of whom have no active
religion, even though they may have been baptized in the
Catholic faith. In England the same basic problem exists, but
viewed from a slightly different aspect, namely, that of the
possibility of some kind of cooperation between the various
protestant sects and the Catholic body. A glance at the recent
correspondence in the Times on the subject of " Catholicism
Today " shows that there is a growing realization of the power
of the Catholic Church, together with a vague feeling that
something should be done about it. As one leader-writer in the
Times puts it, " There is a widespread demand from Protestants
and from some Catholics for a renewal of exploratory discussions on dogma and worship, though there certainly does
not seem to be sufficient agreement between the Churches' views
on their rights and jurisdiction to justify formal negotiation." 28
The Holy See has recently issued a directive on this matter
•• Cf. Catholicism Today, a colleetion of the correspondence mentioned above
(Times Pub. Co., London, 1949).

590

DAVID Lo GREENSTOCK

which serves to make certain essential points quite dear" We
shall have to wait some time before we see any definite results"
However, all these problems have brought to the front rank of
controversy the arguments put forward by the new theologians
for a change in the apologetic method which will serve to bring
it into line with the needs of the momenL Some theologians
have sought to use this argument as a justification for the
adoption of terms and concepts taken from contemporary philosophies, not all of them existential in character. Others have
shown their sympathy for the movement by a reaction against
what they term "too much Scholasticism" in the normal
method of approach, not seeming to understand that any
attempt to find a common basis for discussion between Catholics and their opponents must have, as its starting point, certain
clear-cut notions and definitions" Any other method is bound
to lead to confusion sooner or later, and will thus only serve to
widen the gap between us instead of bridging it. The notions
of modem philosophies other than the Neo-scholastic are anything but dear and well-defined; it is
that very reason that
they have found their way into the modem systems, being left
vague deliberately" The real difficulty behind all this lies in
the fact that most people outside the Church suffer from an
almost complete incapacity for logical thought. Their basis
for argument is sentiment rather than reason. What is not so
generally recognized, however, is the fact that this incapacity
is a direct result of those modern philosophies which we are
now asked to adopt and to baptize-an impossible task How
can we ever expect to reconcile a materialistic philosophy, with
its theories of the dependence of the spiritual on the material
with Catholic thought in all its branches? Or, to take a more
modern example still, how are we to bring together the extreme
voluntarism of the existential theories and that basic intellectualism which is part of our Catholic spiritual formation
and our Thomist tradition?
We are perfectly willing to grant that new methods must be
which will meet the needs of our time, but we are
not prepared to admit that there is any need to go outside the

THOMISM

AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

591

traditional Thomism to discover those methods. Just as the
true Scholastic tradition is much more easily understood if it
is related to the general history of thought, so modem philosophies must be studied in relation to modem history.
Although metaphysical thought and truth is, as such, independent of time, the accidents of thought, such as methods of
presentation and the particular difficulties which have to be
solved, are certainly affected by history. The Catholic philosopher and theologian must be conversant with this "personal
coefficient" of modern thought. He must be ready to prove
that Thomism is fully capable of dealing with such modern
questions, and also he must be able to combat the idea that
Thomism is just an ingenious dialectic, manufactured in order
to bolster up a particular brand of truth or an individual faith.
If that were all that the new theology demanded then we would
have no difficulty in agreeing with it. But that is not the question at issue as they who support this new movement see it.
They wish to adapt modern philosophies in order to make them
an instrument of theology for the expression of Christian
thought, and it is this idea which has led them into a very dangerous position so far as the traditional theologian is concerned.
The Thomist position is simple. There are certain basic lines
within which we must work, and those lines will be found in
the traditional doctrines of Thomism, which is no mere speculative theology and philosophy, but one which is deeply rooted
in all that is best and most lasting in human experience" One
excellent result of the new theology has been an increase in the
study of traditional Thomism from the historical as well as
the theological point of view, with rather startling results as
far as the new theologians are concerned, because they have
occasionally found themselves defeated, and indeed at times
utterly routed, on this, their chosen battle ground.
In the realm of mystical theology and spirituality there are
vast possibilities for the development of the doctrines of the
new theology and its method, and we can only conclude that
such opportunities have not been grasped fully up to now
because the attention of its partisans has been directed else-

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DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

where. 24 Mysticism tends to regard itself as essentially an experimental and a posteriori science, rather than an a priori one,
and thus separates itself as much as possible from the supervision of dogmatic theology as such. We can expect to see this
tendency increase rather than decrease, and there lies a very
real danger which the traditional theologian must be fully
prepared to meet.
Once spirituality is effectively separated from dogma, then
any aberration is possible, as we know only too well from bitter
experience. Every attempt must be made to bring to the fore
those great mystical principles of Aquinas, fully in harmony
wi'ljl dogmatic theology and a logical consequence of it, in such
a way that any attack along the lines we have just mentioned
will be defeated before it has time to develop. Mysticism has
always proved to be a fertile breeding ground for new ideas
and modes of expression, simply because the mystic finds great
difficulty in confining his experiences .within the bounds of
human language, especially the cold, hard terminology of dogmatic theology. Sometimes, indeed, these human expressions
of mystical experience do not seem to fit into the framework
of Scholastic theology, and when the theologian objects to them
on those grounds he is told that the mystic lives these vital
experiences, and consequently, is the person best qualified to
exilress their theological content, a statement which is often
far from the truth.
Sooner or later, then, we may expect repercussions of the
new theology in mysticism and in writings on spirituality in
general. Just as there have been new definitions of truth proposed from the vitalistic point of view, so we shall see new
descriptions of grace, the infused virtues, and the gifts of the
Holy Ghost. This applies especially to the virtue of faith and.
to its act, because of the intimate connection between them
and the whole question of conversion to the true faith and with
revealed truth as such. The traditional view which describes
•• This does not mean to say that no attempt has been made to introduce these
new theories into spirituality. Cf. for example, J. Danielou, Platonis-me et Theologie
Mystique, also H. de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum .(F. Aubier, Paris).

THOMISM

AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

593

grace as a spiritual accident operating like a new nature which
not only lifts man up to a supernatural level but which also
forms the 'remote principle of an. his supernatural activity is
already being decried as too rationalistic, anthropomorphic,
and unintelligible. Such attacks will continue, unless we, as
Thomists, are prepared to bring out the real value of such
concepts as applied to theology and show the permanent truth
which lies behind them.
From the point of view of the Thomist, then, there can be
only one valid method of defence against the inroads of the
new theology, and that will have to come through a revival of
all that is best in the Thomist tradition. If this new movement
serves as a stimulus to bring about that renaissance-and there
are already obvious signs of this-then we shall have no cause
to lament its appearance at this period in the history of the
Church.
Undoubtedly, this movement contains an element of truth,
since nulla porro falsa doctrina est quae non aliqua vera
misceat, and in that sense we must be prepared to learn
In the first place, every effort should be made to bring even
the most sublime doctrines of the faith down to the intellectual
level of all men, no matter of what creed, race, or state of
This has been the great preoccupation of theologians
out the ages, as witness the efforts of Justin, the Alexandrian
school, Augustine, and Aquinas. Secondly, we have something
to learn from contemporary philosophies, because all that they
contain of truth is but a reflection of the one, supreme divine
truth, and so can help us to penetrate more deeply into the
secrets of revelation. They can also help us, especially if
studied in relation to contemporary history, to understand the
wounds from which the modern mind is suffering, and so
vide the :remedies more quickly and more easily. We must, as
the Holy, Father has told us, hold up a friendly hand to all,
which does not mean that we must accept blindly all that these
mode:rn philosophies teach us, even less that we should reject
in their favour the traditional Thomism; quite the reverse.
We must learn to judge the findings and the postulates of the

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DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

moderns in the light of those perennial principles which come
down to us as our greatest inheritance from the days of Aquinas.
Obviously, the problem is one which needs a prompt solution
if Thomism is to regain its place in the world of thought.
Both as a philosophy and as a theology Thomism is essentially
a vital system which develops within certain well-defined lines.
St. Thomas would be the first to support any such development,
but not at the cost of the fundamentals on which the whole
system rests. New methods of approach and new applications
of the perennial principles can certainly be found within the
framework of Thomism which, because of their basis in eternal
truth, will stand the test of time. Thus, for example, it could
be stated and proved that St. Thomas is the greatest of the
existentialists, a fact which cannot be denied and which becomes
all the more clear once we destroy for ever the false notion
that all he achieved was the" baptism" of Aristotle. He transformed the whole system of Aristotelian philosophy by giving
to it the one unifying principle which alone could bring it to
its full perfection as the instrument of theology. This. unifying
principle was that of existence, having its source in revelation,
which shows us a God who is the transcendent, self-existing
Being, who gives to all creatures everything that they have
and are. Thus, there is no need to go outside Thomism to find
a truly existential philosophy; on the contrary, the intellectual
realism of Aquinas is the best antidote for the excessive voluntarism of the non-Catholic existentialists such as Kierkegaard
·and Sartre. Above all we need to bring to the fore the great
principles of Thomistic metaphysics, with special attention to
the question of the metaphysical method as opposed to the
methods and the limitations of the natural sciences. In this
way we shall be in a position to make it clear that Thomism is
always in intimate contact with experience, since its principles
are based on a rational interpretation of that experience, which
means that it is tied to facts just as much as the natural sciences,
but on a different level.
The picture of natural science as an exact demonstration
based on observation, and of metaphysics as an affair of mere

THOMISM AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

595

words and abstractions, with little or no real meaning, a picture
which has influenced the new theologians not a little, is altogether false. A glance at the proofs which St. Thomas offers
for the existence of God is sufficient to show us how closely
metaphysics is connected with the every-day facts of experience.
Natural science, which is also concerned with these same facts,
deals with them insofar as they are governed by certain stable
laws, while metaphysics seeks to attain to some knowledge of
their ultimate causes. Consequently, there will always be a
constant element in the findings of metaphysics which will be
true in all ages of the world's history. To state, as the new
theologians do, that metaphysical systems must, of necessity,
change with the times is to assert that this constant element
in all human experience is really in a state of flux, a statement
which is not only self-contradictory but also contrary to the
facts as we know them.
We can all agree, I think, that the major problem of our day
is not one of mere politics, or even of sociology. It lies in the
field of the metaphysical, and ultimately in theology. However,
we can not agree with the new theologians when they state
that the only solution to this
is the adaptation of the
modern philosophies te a theological end, even though that
might mean the rejection of Thomism. The vast majority of
these modern systems seek a foundation in an exaggerated view
of the importance of the individual and of the scope of natural
science, together with a vain attempt to by-pass philosophical
thought by the use of methods which, however useful they
might be in natural science, are quite useless in the realms of
the metaphysical. The struggle at the present time is one of
there-assertion of the rights of man in relation to the family,
to society, and to God, and that struggle will only be won by
a return to the clear synthesis of all that is best in man's
thought which we call Thomism. It will certainly not be
achieved by any hotch-potch adaptation of those modern systems which are the real cause of the whole crisis.
Our duty, vis-a-vis the new theology, is then quite clear.
Not only have we to defend the basic principles of Thomism

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DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

wherever and whenever they are attacked, but also we have to
present those principles in such a way that we re-educate our
generation in the art of metaphysical and theological reasoning
along those lines. These principles must not be allowed to
stagnate, but should be brought up to date in their modern
applications. If, to a certain degree, we have been careless
about this in the past, there is still time for us to remedy the
error, and if this task is faced with courage and determination,
then we shall see Thomism make its full contribution both to
the modern needs and also to those of God's Church.
DAVID

Colegio de lngleses,
V alladolid, Spain.

L. GREENSTOCK, T.O.P.

BOOK REVIEWS
An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy. By A. H. ARMsTRONG.
minster: Newman, 1949. Pp. 222, with index. $8.25.

West-

With an easy style, indicative of the origin of the book in a series of
lectures at the London Headquarters of the Newman Association, Mr.
Armstrong writes a competent introduction to the ancient Western philosophies from Ionian Thales, traditionally the first, to St. Augustine on
the threshold of the Middle Ages. It is well to note at the beginning that
he is dealing primarily with philosophies, with philosophers only subordinately and to the degree that their personalities reflect some light on their
thought; this is not a series of anecdotes but a preface to the history of
early thinking. The development measures up to its expressed purpose,
which is to trace out the core of philosophical evolution in European culture;
philosophical and not theological, European and not Asiatic. Since these
distinctions are sometimes non-existent in fact, especially after the proclamation of the New Law, a rational division must be imposed on the matter
at certain stages. This is, however, indicated in the text and causes no
difficulties. Within its boundaries the account is clear, complete and well
unified.
To span the births and growths and decays of more than one thousand
years in a subject as diverse in content and as diversely elaborated as philosophy immediately forces a major problem on the author who seeks a
unified effect without misrepresentation. This author resolves the problem
by a fine articulation of progressive influence and historical context, introducing each stage of the evolution with a brief, instructive analysis of the .
cultural milieu, the particular limitations and advantages of the period,
the direction of practical and speculative activity at the time, and the
peculiar aptitude or approach of the philosopher in question, wherever
these factors make a suggestive frame for the thought itself. He concludes
his stages by drawing off, as interpretive summary, the significant influences, the growth in concept, method and approach that will shape the
subsequent extensions of intellectual progress, to make a well-woven texture
of remote and proximate, direct and indirect causality. He supplements
this emphasis on internal cohesion with one external point of reference,
the conclusions of the Catholic Faith and the Philosophia Petennis, which
are the common possession of the group he is addressing. This single,
widely understood standard provides a convenient principle for a number
of simple and illuminating comparisons.
The intent of the book is to give more than a sketch of the basic principles and conclusions comprising ancient philosophies. The book is an intro-

597
10

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BOOK REVIEWS

duction, and consequently designed to attract the reader to more intimate
knowledge of the thought introduced. With Plato and St. Augustine, the
author persuades the reader in the warmth of his own enthusiasm to turn
to the great, classic, stirring texts. Aristotle he introduces less winningly,
as necessary, indeed essential, but as though he does not expect cordial
relations to develop. It is probably true that men are by nature either
Platonic or Aristotelian and no strength or subtlety of argument or persuasion can alter these basic configurations. Yet since the genius of one
flowers as the complement of the other, as the author notes, the interaction
should achieve an enriching and mellowing of human thought more than
sterile opposition.
It is historically interesting to wonder whether Aristotle himself succeeded in grasping the force of Plato's teaching. The negative conclusion
is common enough, but not the easier to justify. For, if Aristotle did not
bring to the Academy a mind superlatively penetrating and comprehending
and if he shrank from twenty years' devotion to the living thought of his
Master, if he lacked the 'pietas' that disposes the well-ordered disciple,
our persuasions might well be bent by the textual criticisms. (True enough,
in his later writings he fustigates some more gullish predecessors, but he
does not fail in honor and reverence to those whose work paved the way
for his own, least of all, to Plato.) Rather he followed the Master as long
as he lived and taught, and held his friendship to the end. When, therefore,
in the elaboration of his own thought, he departs from fundamental Platonic
conceptions, does he reject them too harshly and to his own hurt, missing
some vital connection, or is he only making the necessary intellectual
incisions, painful by their nature, but required by honesty and for the good
of the thought itself? At least, all the circumstances argue for the latter.
Then, let the difficulties be solved another way. If we do not always see
the force of his criticism, neither do we see the bent of the minds to which
it was directed. If later writers have judged it too hard, perhaps they are
assigning to Plato's words, from the vantage point of the development of
centuries, a content he himself never knew.
On two lesser points, Mr. Armstrong's treatment of Aristotle's system is
at least arguable. He accounts the principle of individuation, which Aristotle
put in matter, for material individuals, as certainly inadequate and even
contradictory, and goes on to say that St. Thomas had to make heroic
efforts to present it in a reasonable and Christian sense, which puts the
Common Doctor in the position of trying to save a bad thing. But matter,
for all that it is purely negative, does not lack characteristics, which are,
naturally, negative characteristics.
One of these is that it renders form
incommunicable, from which follows that indivision in itself which is the
prime note of unity. Aristotle did not develop this principle to its perfection, as far as we know, but he seems to have hit the basic issue, and

BOOK REVIEWS

599

certainly transcendent forms of individuals are of little help. As for difficulties in applying this principle to immaterial substances, there are none.
Angels are unities by the same principles by which they are being, by themselves, without the need for introducing material principles into their order.
The second point in question is Aristotle's doctrine of the will. Mr.
Armstrong indicates that he unnecessarily limits the object of deliberate
choice to means and not ends in the VIth Book of the Ethics, while in
other places he speaks clearly about deliberation in regard to ends, an
apparent contradiction in texts. But Aristotle in the VIth Ethics is examining only one act of the will, that of election, which presupposes the end
and regards the means alone, so that an equivocation in the word ' choice '
has to be avoided.
There is a word to say about Plotinus. There is a slippery adjustment
involved in describing his thought, a deceptive prejudice to be skirted at
the penalty of embracing a great misconception, or, more likely and equally
unfortunate, of relegating him to the pigeon-hole of fuzzy, fantastic
dreamers. It has a double fundament, neither part entirely avoidable. First
of all, the philosophers generally conceived their cosmic principles in an
outward-looking way, grasping phenomena as external effects of external
causes, and, most important, perceiving the causality as external. Then,
the whole validation of their systems depends on recourse to objective data.
But Plotinus looked into his own soul and there saw his principles of the
universe. If we conceive of his thought as taking its origin from the external
phenomena around him, we lose all its force and peculiar character.
Plotinus went inward in his search for truth, and it is this direction of his
mind that is the key to his work. Without constant recurrence to his introspective approach, his words tend to lose the sense of reality. His concepts
cannot be divorced from their genesis and sustain their force. Although
it is true that Plotinus accepted into his own thought the inheritance from
the Greeks, the whole vitality and originality and therefore peculiar power
and sovereign value of his system is that he transmuted them in the fire of
his own inward-turning genius. The One and the Nous and the All-Soul
contain only sparse meaning if we do not know them in terms of the almost
unmeasurable living power and movement of the soul.
The second source of bias is the absence of proper terminology for spiritual
being, forcing a dependence on expression by metaphor. Unfortunately the
Plotinian metaphors are couched in the language of place and local motion,
and so the unwary reader is confirmed in his first misapprehension.
The author sees this problem and introduces Plotinus' thought with an
analysis of his character and temperament and an emphasis on the genuineness of his mysticism. Yet, the description of his system would be more
compelling with more persistent reference to the quality of its genesis.
In mentioning the mysticism of Plotinus, the author skirts a confusion

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BOOK REVIEWS

of the natural and supernatural orders, leaving open a question that ought
to be closed. It is no more than one sentence, but in it he grants the possibility of true supernatural contemplation on the part of one who lacks the
first elements of the supernatural life. Later on, in the chapter on St.
Augustine, he again steps over the impassable gap, repeating the thesis that
St. Augustine mistook the Divine Mind of Plotinus for the Logos of St.
John, and, moreover, never corrected his mistake. Granting that the first
part of the text in the Seventh Book of the Confessions lends itself to this
interpretation, certainly the whole of the text does not. First of all, it is
inconceivable that St. Augustine would think of the Son Himself, equally
God with the Father, as identical with the subordinated and depen&ent
second hypostasis of Plotinus. And when we come to the words: "Again
I read in these books that they had changed. the glory of Thy incorruption
into idols and divers images," where the saint is recalling the inferiority of
the Plotinian teaching, we can see the Christian writer perceiving under the
light of faith the deficiencies of merely natural insight. Because he accepted
from the philosopher what he saw was good, and praised him and marvelled
at him for having it, we cannot conclude that he put him among the inspired.
Even his early enthusiasm would not explain this. He always saw too distinctly the. difference between the naked mind darkened by the Fall and
the enlighted mind purified by faith.
While the work aims at an overall coverage of the philosophies of the
ancient times, it has to assume a certain natural proportion of parts, so
that Plato with Socrates, Aristotle, Plotinus and St. Augustine occupy
better than half the book in their own rights, and infiltrate the rest as their
thought influenced the thought that followed them. Nevertheless, the
accounts of the other philosophies are not slighted, and deserve special
mention for the clarity and vigor in which they are cast, and for the able
digestion of the often fragmentary and obscure works which they represent.
The Pre-Socratics and the Stoics are especially well done, and it is here
that Mr. Armstrong's ability to draw up an effective interpretation is of
notable yalue.
Mr. Armstrong has produced an able and useful book. It achieves its
purposes in a readable and scholarly manner, and, in the end, leaves the
reader well disposed towards more works from the same source.
MICHAEL STOCK,

Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. 0.

O.P.

BOOK REVIEWS

601

Barbara Celarent. By THOMAS GILBY, 0. P. New York: Longmans Green.
Pp. 319 with index. $4.00.

In his introduction, Fr. Gilby points out that he is not writing a manual
on logic but rather he is explaining a habit of mind and method. This is
his purpose and the author adheres to it throughout. For Fr. Gilby, clear
thinking becomes a virtue attached to friendliness. Man owes it to his
fellowmen to reason accurately and express himself correctly. " Logic is
part cif the courtesy of conversation " (p. 8) writes the English Dominican.
The central theme of the book is to show how logic is related to dialectics
and dialectics to philosophy and theology. In the first part of the work,
the author delineates the limits of logic. No false claims are made for his
subject and any relationship to the exaggerated positions of the later
scholastics on the power of logic are discredited. The Organon of Aristotle
is briefly explained and the objects of logic are given. In a footnote (p. 81)
the author gives the formal and material division of logic but it is simply
a nominal one wherein the first three books of the Organon are placed
under formal logic and the last three under material logic. Thus there is
avoided the hopeless confusion created by some of the manualists who have
practically limited logic to the Prior Analytics at the cost of demonstrative
logic.
Parts two, three,
four get at the very heart of the subject. Part five
considers fallacies and part six, which concludes the book, gives the outline
and arguments of an actual scholastic disputation. Fr. Gilby covers the
entire field of logic and brings in besides many useful and necessary notions
for understanding scholastic philosophy, particularly analogy. For completeness in coverage the book matches any textbook in logic and it surpasses
all in its reader appeal.
The title of this work, Barbara Celarent, is an indication of the spirit in
which it was written. Such a title seems to imply that the book is a novel.
Certainly Fr. Gilby's approach to his subject is novel but there _any resemblance to fiction ends. The subheading of the opus is: " A Description of
Scholastic Dialectic." No description has been written that has such
fluency of style and engaging presentation of material as has Barbara
Celarent. Fr. Gilby has done for St. Thomas the philosopher what Fr.
Walter Farrell did for St. Thomas the theologian. He has written a companion to the philosophic thought of the Angelic Doctor.
Barbara Celarent is no mere restatement of what has been said innumerable times before by admirers of scholasticism. On the contrary, the brilliant
use of examples and the consistent and successful application of logic and
dialectics to every day life, makes Fr. Gilby's book one of significance.
Only a few examples need be cited to indicate the wit and wisdom of this
volume. Writing of modern trends in logic, the author notes: "Mathe-

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BOOK REVIEWS

matical logic cannot operate without some of the philosophical assumptions
that traditional logic alone is able to match; while the traditional logic on
its side should respect the convenience of this special symbolism for the
exhibition of pure logical form and relations and for working with the concepts of mathematical physics. It is a legitimate extension of the methods
employed by Aristotle and an instrument of the liaison between the special
sciences. A precious rule of criticism should be respected; let data be
explained in their own proper terms. Criticism should proceed from within
a subject. Music should not be defined by colour, nor life by non-biological
concepts, nor identities by equations, nor quantities by qualities, nor literature by history, nor scholastic theology slighted for not providing the
loving recognition of the divine presence." (p. 128)
Fr. Gilby is realistic about his subject. He points out that St. Thomas,
towards the end of his life, regarded his theological writings like chaff.
And adds Fr. Gilby: " ... logic is even dustier." But he immediately notes
that " . . . both are necessary if ultimately we are to be caught up into
the vision where nothing is wanting. In the meantime logic should go into
dialectics as theology goes into liturgy and mathematics into music."
(p. 17) In praise of the system which he is expounding, he writes: " One
recommendation of the thomist philosophy is that nothing is too far-flung
to engage its interest; there is a place for all the sciences; it offers an organization without friction under a law that is polite and not despotic, in a
society rather than a community." (p. 22) Neat little comparisons are
characteristic of the work, such as: " ... logic is like soda-water, made to
a formula; but dialectic is like champagne, and cannot be resolved into its
elements." (p. 33) Speaking of the syllogism, Fr. Gilby says: "At first
sight the method may appear clumsy and full of repetition, yet we recall
again the distinction between the mechanics of a thing and its spirit, and
in effect it is an economical form of argument, the very repetitions, as with
saying the rosary, being expected to quiet and fix the attention." (p. 204)
On almost any line in the book, the reader will run across a sudden and
unexpected witticism. These are either original with the author or else he
quotes from his vast knowledge of literature. Thus in such a sedate chapter
as that on analogy: "Happy convents, bosomed deep in vines, Where
slumber abbots, purple as their wines." (p. 81) Or again there is the sly
remark: " ... the concepts of canon law can be transferred only by analogy
the science of moral theology." (p. 257)
From what has been quoted, no one should conclude that Fr. Gilby has
merely written a humorous treatment of scholasticism. There is so much
serious matter that the average reader will be amazed at how much more
there is to the Aristotelian- Thomistic way than he had imagined possible.
A system of philosophy that rests on a great tradition has the inevitable
danger of lapsing into complacency. The author points out that the very

BOOK REVIEWS

608

greatness of Aristotle made philosophy stand still for centuries. (p.
To restate Aristotle and St. Thomas is not to advance their thought beyond
the stage of communicating it to pupils. New problems will be solved not
by quoting the two masters as one might cite the Bible; their principles
must be applied and developed. Anything less than that only proves that
the student of this system of philosophy has missed its central point of
universality. This, in substance, is the secondary theme of Barbara Celarent.
Special chapters deserve special mention. The one entitled "Necessity
and Fact " brings out clearly the difference between necessary and contingent propositions. Here are shown the roots of the Thomistic metaphysics and its distinction from idealism. Continuing somewhat in the
same vein is the chapter called "Sense and Sensibility." In a short but
brilliant paragraph, Fr. Gilby explains what he understands by the intellectualism of St. Thomas. At no time does the author discredit science's
method but the intellect always remains superior to the sense. The chapters
on induction and deduction should prove this to any reader.
Everything about Barbara Celarent is delightful and instructive. It is a
book that all students of philosophy should read regardless of what system
or systems of thought they prefer. Those who never could visualize
selves as profound thinkers will be pleased at how much they can learn
from the superb prose of Fr. Gilby and his lucid examples to cover all
subtle points.
There is no book in English that covers in such excellent style and with
such broad and incomparable strokes the entire system of Aristotle and
St. Thomas. Although not a long work, for those who have read the
Stagirite and the Doctor of the Schools, there can be no doubt that every
bit of the Aristotelean- Thomistic system has been touched at least by
inference when not explored to the full. This is one book on philosophy
that everyone· should enjoy.
RAYMOND SMITH, O.P.
The Angelicum,
Rome, Italy.

The Wisdom of Catholicism. Edited by ANTON C. PEGIS. New York:
Random House, 1949. Pp. 1017. $6.00.
This anthology contains the following thirty-five titles in English: St.
Ignatius of Antioch, To The Romans; St. Basil the Great, On Reading
Greek Literature; St. John Chrysostom, On Charity To The Poor; St.
Augustine, The Confessions (end of Dook 8 to Book 10) and The City of
God (Book 19); Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy (Books 4 and 5);
St. Anselm, The Proslogion; St. Bernard, On The Necessity of Loving God;
Anonymous, Jesu Dulcis Memoria; St. Bonaventure, The Ascent of the

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BOOK REVIEWS

Mind to God (Prologue and Chapters 5-7) ; St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Contra Gentiles (I, 2-8; III, 25, 37, 48; IV, 54); Dante, Divine Comedy
(Paradiso); Petrarch, Letter to Denis of Borgo-San Sepolcro; Villon, The
Ballade 'fo Our Lady; Chaucer, Canterbury Tales (The Parson's Tale,
Part I); Thomas a Kempis, The Imitation of Christ (Book 2); St. Thomas
More, The Four Last Things: Death; Erasmus, The Paracelsis; St. Teresa
of Avila, The Interior Castle (Seventh Mansion); St. John of the Cross,
The Ascent of Mount Carmel (Book 1, Chapters 1-13); St. Robert Bellarmine, On The Ascent of The Mind To God; Pascal, Pensees (Selections);
Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua (Part 7); Peguy, A Vision of Prayer;
Leo Xill, Christian Philosophy; Pius XI, On Reconstructing The Social
Order; Pius XII, On The Mystical Body of Christ; Claudel, The Satin
Slipper (First Day, Scenes 1 and 5, Third Day, Scene 8); Belloc, The
Restoration of Property (pp. 7-21); Chesterton, The Catholic Church And
Conversion (pp. 57-72); Undset, Kristin Lavransdatter (III, The Cross,
Chapters 5-7); Gilson, St. Thomas Aquinas (Master Mind Lecture) and
Medieval Universalism (Harvard Lecture); Maritain, Ransoming The Time
(pp. 115-140) .
The book also contains a brief " Preface " and an " Introduction " which
essays to define the theme of Catholic wisdom; a ten to twenty line introduction to each author; footnotes which are almost exclusively references
to Scripture and other sources; and a " Bibliography " indicating the Sources
of the selections published in this volume. For the most part the best
available English translations were used. There are a few exceptions. For
example, the Sheed Translation of the Confessions is preferable to the Pusey
used here; and while the Peers translations of St. Teresa were chosen, Peers
was rejected in favor of Lewis in the case of St. John of the Cross. In six
instances the translations here published are new, three of them having
been made by the editor.
In his " Introduction " the editor states his view of the theme of Catholic
wisdom:
" ... The eternalizing of man's life, the salvation of the world of time in and by
eternity, has been the great theme and occupation of Catholic writers over the
centuries . . . Because man is such a veritable wayfarer and pilgrim, living by
faith and hope and love in the world of time, he has probed within the recesses of
his own being in order to understand even a little of the mystery of the ways of
God to him. There is, in truth, nothing else for man to do. For his very existence
as a spiritual being is in itself an invitation-an invitation from God his Creatorto discover his deepest center, and to weigh the meaning of the hunger of his head
and of his heart. And though Catholic thinkers have meditated on the mysteries
of human existence in many ways, they have unfolded in their several ways the
outlines of a common spiritual ideal, an ideal and odyssey" (pp. xxiv-xxv).

The name of that. odyssey, probably, is transformation into Christ-the

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destruction of the tough shell of the merely natural man that the seed of
the supernatural may, by the Divine goodness, grow. If such is the theme
of Christian wisdom, it is not difficult to understand almost all of Dr. Pegis'
inclusions. Two present a problem. What Belloc has to say about economics
is both true and splendid; it is also characteristically Belloc; but it is economics, not sapiential literature, and it is not specifically Catholic. Gilson's
address at the Harvard Tercentenary is a noble thing-an entirely natural
plea for the acknowledgement of truth. It is difficult to see anything
Catholic in it.
what we have here in less than a thousand
Leaving aside these two
pages is an anthology of Catholic wisdom from the middle of the second to
the middle of the twentieth centuries-almost two thousand years in one
thousand pages. No one will deny that the editor has an admirable degree
of courage.
Any anthology is a mutilation. A great work is an organic whole, and to
" lift " a section of it is like embalming an arm. But there are two kinds
of " selections " and so two kinds of anthologies. The first has some objective justification due either to the nature of the subject matter or to the
verdict of history. If, for example it is imperative to" cut" the Confessions,
it does make sense to omit the last three books, for the subject matter permits such a break. Again, if one is to edit a lengthy anthology of Greek
literature, it is not impossible, however difficult, to determine what has
been historically more significant, and what less. The second type of
anthology, excellently illustrated by Maurice Baring's Have You Anything
To Declare, is based exclusively on the taste of the anthologist. There is
no possibility of praising or blaming this second type of anthology. One
can only say "Such is the anthologist's taste" and then judge that it is
or is not in accord with one's own taste.
In the nature of the case, the editor of this volume has to produce an
anthology of the second type, based on his taste alone. The vast living
literature of Catholicism for the past two thousand years cannot, according
to any rational principle, be imprisoned in any one thousand pages. An indefinite number of equally valid, entirely different thousand page anthologies
of the same subject matter could be published.
These reflections are not a criticism of the present volume, but a suggestion of the limitations of this type of anthology. A definitive short
anthology of Christian wisdom is an intrinsic impossibility. Still, one is
grateful to know where Dr. Pegis' preferences lie, especially because of his
admirable taste. Perhaps, the permanent value of his work is that it constitutes an implicit invitation to each reader to draw up his own anthology.
JAMES

Manhattan CoUege,
New York,N. Y.

v. MULLANEY

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La Mere du Sauveur et Notre Vie lntbieure. By REGINALD GARRIGOULAGRANGE, 0. P. Paris: Editions du Cerf. Pp. 889.
La Mere du Sauveur et Notre Vie lnteneure is a speculative and devotional analysis of the important theses of Mariology.
In the first chapter the famous Dominican treats of Mary's Divine
Maternity as the source of all her glory and of all her privileges. The following order can be established in the divine plan of Redemption. First of
all God wished to manifest his infinite mercy by determining to redeem
man from sin; at the same moment He decreed that the Word should be
made Flesh. He then chose Mary to be the Mother of the Redeemer and
to be crowned with glory. As a consequence, He decided to give Mary all
the graces and merits by which she would be able to deserve her special
glory. Thus her fulness of grace is a consequence of her Divine Maternity
rather. than the reason for her choice to this high position.
The Incarnation is beyond doubt the source of all human merit after
original shi. And since God wished Christ to be born of a Mother, the
Divine Maternity is a necessary condition of the Incarnation with which,
in the mind of God, it is associated. Among the merits of the Incarnation
are all the graces bestowed on Mary, which are a consequence not only of
the Incarnation but also of her own Maternity. It is right, therefore, to
conclude that the primary dignity of Mary is to be Mother of God, and that
her grace and glory depend upon it. It is not because she is the greatest
Saint, but because she is Mother of God that we honor her with the special
cult of hyperdulia. The honor of being Mother of God is greater than the
glory of all the saints in heaven.
·
.
Mary's initial grace begins with the moment ot her Immaculate Conby which she was preserved from original sin and from its consequences. It is sometimes believed that St. Thomas denied this great
privilege of Mary; The author examines St. Thomas' teaching most accurately and shows how he did not actually deny the Immaculate Conception.
On the contrary, both in the early and the last stages of his theological
teaching he expressly says that she did not incur original sin. If in the
Summa and in some other texts he would seem to deny it, these passages
must be interpreted as meaning only that Mary " ought " to have incurred
original sin, no mention being made as to whether she actually did incur
it or not. Attention is also drawn to the fact that St. Thomas distinguishes
between conception and animation and that he explicitly says that she was
purified after her animation; this can be interpreted with reference to a
posteriority of nature and not to one of time, a distinction frequently met
with in his writings, meaning that her preservation followed not in time,
but as a consequence of, her animation. This would not be at all contrary
to the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, since the preservation of
Mary from original sin must have taken place when her soul was created

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607

and could not have occurred at the simple conception of her body which,
in the mind of St. Thomas, preceded animation.
The author then examines the consequences of her Divine Maternity,
namely the fulness of her grace, her right to be our Mother, and her
mediation of grace.
There are three phases in the bestowal of grace to Mary, the moment of
her Immaculate Conception, that of the Incarnation, and that of her death.
All theologians agree that at the end of her life her degree of grace was
greater than that of all the saints and angels taken together. Some, however, do not think that this can be said of the first phase, others not even
of the second. The author, with the great majority, shows why it must also
be true at the very begin:hing of her existence. This opinion seems to be the
most reasonable, and the most worthy of the great holiness of Mary.
As a result of this immense initial grace, Mary possessed in the highest
degree all theological and moral virtues and the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
This presupposes the use of reason and free-will from the very first moment
of her existence. The author shows how a great number of theologians
a,dmit this to be quite possible at least in a transitory fashion (p. 77) .
He goes on to demonstrate with S. Francis of Sales, St. Alphonsus, Terrier,
Hugon and others that it is difficult to conceive that Mary should have
afterwards been deprived of their use; such deprivation would have interrupted her progress in grace, charity and merit (p. 81).
However this may be, it is certain that from a very young age Mary
never ceased to increase in grace. All men are obliged to strive towards an
ever higher degree of love for God. Mary was no exception. Each act of
virtue of Mary was more perfect than the preceding one, and the more she
approached to God, the more fervent and generous was the intensity by
which she was drawn towards him.
Her charity increased by means of her merits and of her prayers. There
is no such thing as an indifferent act; that is to say, every single act of a
soul in the state of grace must be either good or bad. Now all the actions
of Mary were good, each being better than the preceding one, and thus she
was continually obtaining new merits and a new increase. in grace. Her
grace also increased by prayer. Through the mercy ·of God, we can often
obtain by prayer an increase in grace which we have not actually merited,
if our prayer is fervent and humble. Mary's prayer was the best that
could be offered to God, and no one can tell how much love of God and
graces she obtained by it (p. 96}.
There is a most interesting note (p. 98) on the increase of grace in the
Christian soul. Every act of virtue merits an increase of grace, but to
obtain it this act must be at least as fervent as the preceding one. A tepid
act, namely a less fervent one, merits the increase but does not obtain it
at once. The author examines the question as to when the increase takes
place in such a case. The obvious solution would be that it takes place the

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next time a really fervent act is accomplished; but the author remarks that
this is not at all certain because, although a fervent act obtains at once the
increase due to that act, we cannot be sure that it also obtains what is due
for less fervent acts of the past. Only very fervent acts of charity and very
fervent prayers, such as those we make at Holy Communion, can settle this
account, and the author adds that such acts can be probably made also by
the souls in purgatory. These souls cannot merit any new increase of grace
or glory, but as they gradually become purified by their sufferings, they also
become more holy and dear to God and thus their acts of love of God would
seem able to obtain what is already due to them through their past merits
but which they had not yet received on account of their tepidity.
Father Garrigou-Lagrange then passes in review the principal events of
the life of Mary, emphasizing how each one in its own way was the cause
of a great increase in grace and merit: the Visitation, the Virginal Birth of
Christ, the Presentation, the flight into Egypt, the hidden life, the sorrowful
life, the Descent of the Holy Ghost.
Communion and Mass were particular moments of grace for Our Lady.
She was not a priest although her dignity of Mother of God was greater
than that of a priest, so she assisted at Mass said by St. John and received
from him Holy Communion (p. 126). Better than anyone else she was
able to believe that the Holy Sacrifice is the immolation of the same Victim
Who shed His Precious Blood for us on Calvary, and that it is the source
of all grace and merit.
To this sacrifice of her Son she united her own self as Mediatrix and
Co-redemptrix of mankind, and received Communion with more fervor and
love than is possible to anyone else. There was no obstacle in Mary to the
great graces Communion is meant to produce in the soul. Each Communion
was more fervent than the preceding one and thus she gave us the most
beautiful example of Eucharistic devotion.
Finally, the author examines Mary's principal virtues, to show how each
of them attained a very high degree of perfection: faith, hope and charity,
the cardinal and moral virtues, together with the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Regarding faith, he asks if the Blessed Virgin ever had on this earth an
immediate vision of God like that of the saints in heaven. The common
opinion is that she did have it in a permanent way as Christ did, otherwise
she would not have had the virtue of faith. But if St. Augustine and St.
Thomas believe that St. Paul enjoyed for a few instants the beatific vision,
it would seem difficult to deny such a privilege to the Mother of God.
The last chapter on the grace of Our Lady concerns her death and her
Assumption. By this time her grace had increased beyond all imagination,
and thus her glory in heaven must exceed that of all the other saints
together.
The rest of the book is devoted to the mediation and power of Mary

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609

(pp. 174-298), to which a chapter is added on the devotion to Our Lady
and another on St. Joseph.
In this section Father Garrigou-Lagrange examines the doctrine concerning Our Lady's association in the work of Redemption as a secondary
and subordinate cause. By the part she took in our redemption she merited
to become our Mother, transmitting to us the life of grace which Christ
obtained for us through His sacrifice. She was made Mother of all men at
the foot of the Cross.
The universal mediation of Mary is a consequence of the part she played
in our redemption. There is only one perfect Redemptor and Mediator,
Christ. But Christ makes use of others to help Him to dispose men to
receive the benefits of Redemption: they become secondary mediators
between God and their fellow-men. This is true of all priests but in a special
manner of Our Lady. She exercises this mediation by meriting, satisfying
and praying for us.
Strictly speaking only Christ can merit for us; His infinite merits are
based on the justice of God Who is obliged to accept them. Mary's merits
are based on the mercy and kindness of God Who, out of love for the
Mother of His Son, accepts her good works for those for whom she offers
them, namely her children. Theologians say that she merits for us " de
congruo " not " de condigno " as Christ. In this manner Mary merited for
us all that Christ merited out of strict justice. Such is the common opinion
of the Church. The same is to be said of the satisfaction she offered for
our sins by suffering the greatest of all martyrdoms. It is in this sense that
Mary is called the Co-redemptrix.
With regard to her prayers which she continues in heaven for us, it would
be temerarious to deny the power of her intercession. She is the universal
Mediatrix of men, and no grace is ever given to man without her intervention. To be heard by God, our prayers must be made at least implicitly
through her intercession.
There follows an interesting chapter (p. 240) on the manner in which
Mary distributes grace to our soul, and the author thinks it highly probable
that she is not only a moral cause, but an instrumental physical cause of
our sanctification.
The universal royalty of Mary forms the subject of one of the last
chapters. Mary is really and truly Queen of the whole universe, endowed
with all the authority and power of a Queen. Whereas Christ is King
because He is God and because He deserves to reign over those He redeemed
from the bondage of Satan, Mary is Queen because she partakes of this
dignity of her Son as His Mother and as Co-redemptrix of men. Her kingdom is one of mercy; she does not make laws or judge ma.nkind as does
her Son, but she has the power to distribute all the wealth of heaven and
to issue orders to those over whom she reigns. She is Queen of the Angels

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who obey her in all that concerns the reign of Christ; Queen of all Saints
who owe their glory to her intercession; Queen of the souls in purgatory to
whom she applies her own satisfactions in order to bring their sufferings
to an end; she even reigns over Satan whose head she crushed and who
:fears and obeys her. St. Thomas adds that her kingdom of mercy is also
felt by the poor souls in hell who are punished less severely than they
deserve on account of her intercession and merits, and who on certain days,
like perhaps that of the Assumption, do not find their sufferings so hard
to bear (p. 285) .
She is especially Queen of priests by protecting and sanctifying them and
helping them to celebrate Mass with more fervor.
The author then deals with devotion to Our Lady. He first of all establishes the nature and reasons of the cult of hyperdulia due to her and
answers those who pretend that this cult cannot be traced to the origin of
the Church or that it is injurious to the honor due to God alone.
He then examines the advantages of the most popular devotion to Our
Lady, namely the Rosary, and those of a total consecration to her in
accordance with the teaching of Saint Grignion Maria de Montfort. The
result of this consecration is a "mystical union" to Mary, which makes
us partake of her humility, her faith, and of her great love of God.
The chapter on S. Joseph is meant to show that he is the greatest of aU
Saints, greater than St. JQhn the Baptist, the Apostles and all the others,
because of his intimate union with the Mother of God and the mystery of
the Incarnation.
To close this marvelous treatise on Our Lady the author passes in review
the manifestations of the great devotion of France to Mary. From Clovis
and St. Remi to St. Jeanne of Arc, from then to the French Revolution
and finally to our own days, France has ever loved and honored Mary.
Many times Our Lady has saved this great country, but she did so especially when she sent Jeanne of Arc, and when later on she saved France
from the Huguenots and from their heretical domination.

HILARY MoRRis, 0. S.M.
4 Piazza Salerno,
Rome, Italy

Man and His Works. The Science of Cultural Anthropology. By M. J.
HERSKOVITS. New York: Knopf, 1948. Pp. 678, with index.
The author, who teaches anthropology at Northwestern University, is
widely known for his studies on the culture of the Negro and on other
subjects pertaining to the analysis and description of civilizations. The
present work covers the whole field of cultural anthropology. Primarily

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611

intended as a textbook for students, it is a modern and highly readable
summary of the facts and theories which make up this particular science.
Anthropology means literally: science of man; here, however, as with many
other writers on allied subjects, it means chiefly man as living with others
in a society, creating a civilization, and undergoing all the changes the
historical view shows as having occurred since man arose from his most
primitive state. Years ago the psychologist Karl Buehler remarked that
psychology has to make use of three approaches, none of which is sufficient
in itself, but may, when combined with the other two, enable us to understand better the nature and the working of the human mind. Man knows
about his mind, can study its manifestations in others, and its products in
the achievements of the individual as of the group. Cultural anthropology
is concerned with the material furnished mainly by " man's works."
Besides the brief introduction explaining the nature of anthropology,
there are six chapters: The Nature of Culture; The Materials of Culture;
The Structure of Culture; the Aspects of Culture; Cultural Dynamics;
Cultural Variation. A summary of 36 pages submits a " theory of culture "
and a discussion of" anthropology in a world society." A bibliography of
19 pages and a detailed index are added. There are 66 figures in the text
and 18 plates.
Prof. Herskovits places before the reader an enormous amount of factual
information which renders the book a valuable help in all studies concerned
with man. He does, however, more, and by this his work becomes important in two respects. He presents not only his science and its achievements,
but also an analysis of its methodology and its relations to other disciplines,
and to the system of knowledge in general. Thus, his ideas become relevant
for philosophy. He also considers the question of practical application; his
views accordingly assume importance for world politics as well as for the
understanding and solving of problems of lesser scope but hardly lesser
weight.
The appraisal of the factual evidence demands specialistic knowledge
and training. It is not a task for which this reviewer is competent nor a
matter to be discussed in a periodical of philosophical intent. The general
principles, however, underlying the interpretations and the outlook of the
author deserve consideration.
Dr. Herskovits defines his standpoint as that of "cultural relativism"
which he opposes to " absolutism " and the " ethnocentric " approach. He
distinguishes between " universals " and " absolutes." By the former term
he refers to certain features common to many civilizations and possessing
definite values; whereas none can claim, as he sees it, absolute validity.
Relativism, then, means that every culture must be envisaged and appreciated on its own merits, within the particular setting of place and time.
Ethnocentricism is the prejudice · which evaluates all foreign civilizations

BOOK REVIEWS

from the angle of that which happens to be the student's own. To claim
an absolute superiority for the " Euroamerican " culture is such a prejudice
which tends to falsify our interpretation of other cultural groups.
It must be recognized that there is such an ethnocentricism and that it
sometimes amounts even to a clear-cut parochialism, so much so that a true
understanding of another people's culture, mode of thinking, customs and
so forth is seriously impeded. This happens, indeed, not only in regard to
civilizations which are widely different from our own, but even in regard
to some which are rather close and belong to the same great cultural group.
There is no doubt that many misunderstandings and, consequently, blunders
in practical management of affairs, arise because of such ethnocentric
prejudices.
But this question should be distinguished carefully from the other one
concerning the objective value of this or that state of culture. It may
happen that the ethnocentric attitude is based on false presumptions, that
is, on the preference for the known and customary, and nonetheless is
objectively right, because the subjectively motivated preference may have
as its object a positive value. Just as a man may do what is objectively
right although his reasons may be wrong. It is, therefore, a methodological
fault to confuse the attitude of ethnocentricism with the objective evaluation of cultural phenomena. The anthropologist is entitled to say that such
evaluation is not a
pertaining to his discipline. This is indubitably
a permissible view. But if he refuses to consider questions of objective
evaluation, he cannot defend his relativistic approach as a general principle;
he can only claimthat it is a methodological principle within his discipline.
The two problems, of subjective preference and of objective preferability,
are obviously of a markedly different nature. They are confused, one feels,
because of the distrust the modem mind has developed for everything
which can not be ascertained by the means called scientific or approximating
the ideal of science. The cultural relativism as advocated by the author is
a partial manifestation of the generally relativistic attitude which denies all
possibility of objective evaluation. The question whether or not the Euroamerican culture, at least in some of its aspects, is objectively superior t9
that of other peoples cannot be answered by the comparative study of
cultures; this study furnishes only the raw material for such an answer.
On the other hand, it is clear that ethnocentricism has been the cause of
many misconceptions. Thus, the notion of the " primitive " mentality and
civilization has been largely a product of the unconsciously assumed position that one's own culture is absolutely superior. It has also created the
idea of progress as moving towards one's own preferred way of life as the
objective ideal. The advances achieved by cultural anthropology since
the beginning of this century have contributed in a noteworthy manner to
the weakening of a false ethnocentricism.

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618

It is equally true that every culture must be viewed, as it were, from
within and in its totality. Any particular phenomenon within a given culture can be understood only when we are able to realize what its significance
and function is within the culture to which it belongs; what it means to us,
or would mean were it encountered within our own civilization, is not to
the point.
Like most of the cultural anthropologists, the author takes his examples
mainly from cultures which are widely different from ours. There are, of
course, good reasons for this procedure. In our practical experience, however, we have to do not with the understanding of Melanesians or African
Bushmen; we deal mostly with people belonging to the same civilization
and nonetheless different, because of different histories, social standards,
language, and so forth. One may learn much from such a work, once one
realizes that the problems are basically the same in regard to far off and to
closer cultures.
The author is, indeed, anxious to make the reader realize the general
importance of cultural anthropology. He points out, justly, that this science
may render great service not only in regard to the policies adopted by
peoples of higher civilization in regard to those they consider inferior (as,
e. g., on the part of the United States in regard to the Indians), but also
in view of international relations in every sense.
One can perfectly agree with the author on this point as well as on his
general condemnation of " ethnocentricism " of which nationalism is an
extreme form. It is difficult, however, to follow him in his total exclusion
of all kind of evaluation of cultures, as a whole or in their individual traits.
It is quite true that science as such has nothing to say about values; it is
preoccupied exclusively with things that are and not with those that ought
to be. But as soon as a scientist sees sufficient reason for making practical
suggestions, he either must limit these to mere technicalities, or cease to be
a mere scientist and take a definite evaluative position. If he limits his
assistance to the statesman to technical advice, he can only state by what
means this or that end can be attained; he is not capable of making any
responsible statement on the ends themselves. If he does make such statements, he has inevitably based them on evaluation. If, e. g., the anthropologist suggests to the Bureau of Indian Affairs that the culture of some
Indian tribe should be preserved rather than destroyed and that the Indians
should be encouraged in: keeping alive certain forms of -life rather than be
lured or compelled into adopting the American way of life,- the anthropologist bases this advice on an evaluation of
own. In a certain sense,
his viewpoint is also ethnocentric, insofar as he shows a definite esteem for
the particular sample of culture he wishes to see preserved.
It is impossible to refrain from all evaluation as soon as one has to deal
with human affairs. If the scientist, in this case the anthropologist, believes

11

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that he can keep aloof and avoid all evaluation whatsoever, he falls prey
to a not uncommon self-deception.
But then, of course, the question returns and to the anthropologist it
seems. to be devoid of meaning: namely, that of the objective truth and
goodness contained in the various cultures he studies. To repeat what has
been said above: the mere fact that someone shows a preference for his
own culture does not prove that he is wrong. He may quite well have
right idea, though his motivations may be insufficient or false or even
immoral.
Culture appears to the author as something essentially subjective, that is,
as existing in the minds of the members sharing a definite cultural atmosphere. He rejects the idea of culture having any kind of existence outside
of these participating minds. Here too, one will agree with him; to conceive
of culture as an existing entity amounts to something like a relapse into
exaggerated Mediaeval realism. Nor can culture be credited with that sort
of reality which Hegel had in mind when he spoke of the "objective spirit."'
But, as there is a right middle between exaggerated realism and strict
nominalism, in what concerns the nature of " universals," so it seems that
there is an intermediary position in regard to culture.
The basic error, which leads to the untenable sort of relativism advocated
by the author is, one suspects, an offspring of a general trait of modern
mentality, a trait which one may characterize as onesided subjectivism.
This attitude, which depends to a higher degree on Idealism or on the
developments of the Cartesian doctrine than is usually realized, tends to
stress the mental act and to give little consideration to the contents with
which this act is related. Though such contents may be called, in one
sense," subjective" and hence a matter for psychology to study, in another
sense they are " objective," that is, they refer to something which is the
intentional object of the mental state. That which is known is not a mental
phenomenon, nor is that which is taken over by the individual through the
influence of the social group, a process the author calls "enculturation,"
a mental state. Customs, beliefs, forms of life, all these things are to the
individual mind "things." They are viewed, wrongly or rightly, as being
as objective as truths are.
One gratefully acknowledges, when reading this book, the enormous
amount of knowledge cultural anthropologists have collected. One also
notes as a definite advance the clarification of many theoretical conceptions
and the methodological progress which has been achieved in an amazingly
short time. Modern cultural anthropology, to comment on this in passing,
does not lend support to the extravagant theories on early stages of civilization which make up an important part in Freudian psychoanalysis. The
psychoanalysts will be forced to revise thoroughly their doctrines on such
matters. As an able presentation of facts and scientific procedures, this

a

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615

book is probably one of the best. The philosophy back of it, however,
is vitiated by the same prejudices which dominate modern thinking in so
many fields.
The desire, on the part of this author and of many of others, to see the
dignity of human nature recognized everywhere, in all forms of culture and
in all peoples, is praiseworthy. Such an universal humanitarianism should
not make, however, the student of eultural anthropology blind to the differences of value which are as real as those of technology or any other side of
human activity.
RUDOLF ALLERS

Georgetown University,
Washington, D. C.

Chaptets in Western Civilization. Selected and edited by the Contemporary Civilization Staff of Columbia College. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1948. fl volumes.
Challenges to Columbia University's various schools and departments have
not been infrequent, although most of them have been directed in recent
years at its Teachers' College. The undergraduate liberal arts college, however, has lately received more and more critical attention, particularly since
the publication of A College Program in Action and the appearance of some
published censures of the College penned by former members of its staff.
These critical comments will undoubtedly he augmented by the appearance
of Chapters in Western Civilization, which is a sort of textbook for the
Contemporary Civilization course at Columbia College.
This course, in which students are divided into groups of about thirty-five
and placed under the care of a young instructor in the College, is expected
to familiarize the student with the historical antecedents of the problems
which surround him. In existence for thirty years or more, the validity of
its approach to the problem of transmitting historical knowledge has been
frequently questioned. The latest questionings have come from widelyone might almost say wildly-dissimilar quarters: Thomas Merton's Seven
St&rey Mountain makes a number of caustic remarks on how little the
student learns from this course- Merton was a Columbia man; teachers
and writers of history at the last American Historical Society convention
were practically unanimous in their disapproval of the method of the course,
in the special section which was concerned with the Jllethods of presenting
broad survey courses. If the students feel they do not learn, and the teachers
feel they cannot teach- Barzun, for instance, was sceptical while at
Columbia - according to this celebrated and tested plan, then, perhaps,
something in these texts will reveal at least one of the reasons for the
difficulty.

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Volume I begins with a two-chapter survey of the mediaeval period, and
concludes with the French Revolution. Each chapter in this volume, as in
the other, is a separate piece of work by an expert, although some men have
written more than one chapter or part of a chapter. Volume IT begins with
the nineteenth-century Romantic movement and takes the narrative to the
period between World Wars I and IT. As is to be expected, the chapters
are of varying degrees of worth and are presented with different degrees of
skill. Oddly enough, the second volume seems to suffer much less from
these difficulties than does the first, rather a reversal of the usual case in
two-volume works;
Undoubtedly, unevenness in presentation could be a major difficulty to
teacher or student, particularly where the chapter of one very well known
figure is placed next to that of someone relatively obscure. The intrinsic
difficulty, however, seems really to be that some of these experts are more
than a Iitle inept or badly-informed in their particular fields. A natural
result would be the appearance of considerable insecurity or doubt in the
minds of the readers. When this insecurity is augmented, as it is certain
to be, by the diversity of group instructors, many of whom are not trained
in history at all, it should be. comparatively easy to see why students and
teachers at Columbia are dissatisfied. As for readers outside Columbia,
a few examples of the type of careless, inaccurate, and - in some cases downright vicious writing· these volumes contain should suffice to explain
the situation to them.
In Chapter I, Marshall Clagett declares that the Christian Fathers held
that ownership of private property was a man-made convention, having no
basis in natural law. On the next page, he declares that the principle of
separation of Church and State was ·a "living force in the West." In
Chapter II, the same writer declares that " a system of sacraments began
to grow " after 818 A. D. Following this remarkable historical observation
comes a whole page concerning the hierarchical organization of the Church,
in which Clagett indicates quite clearly that he does not even know that
a diocese was originally an imperial administrative unit. He refers glibly to
the natures of God, to Augustine's emphasis on love as though no other
Christian writer had ever mentioned that virtue, to the monastic vows of
"humility, chastity, and poverty,"'to Simon Magus's attempt to buy" the
gift of the Holy Ghost," to a " virulent monastic movement " in Ireland
which spilled over on to the Continent, to extreme unction as assuring the
dying person of salvation, and to the determination by the High Middle
Ages that " seven sacraments tended to be essential." These errors or
misconceptions-which are a typical, not an exhaustive, list-are sprinkled
throughout the first ninety pages of volume I.
Clagett is not even above the commission of such grammatical errors as
" results ... was," or " remainder ... were," or of such scientific guessing

BOOK REVIEWS

617

as his tour de force of identifying Jordanus de Nemore with Jordanus Saxo,
on the sole ground that they had the same given name. After reading these
first chapters, anyone might be pardoned for experiencing some slight
bewilderment.
Harry Elmer Barnes takes up the discussion next, and adds an entirely
new notion to the matter of the controversy between Boniface VIII and
Philip IV. If it had not been for Guillaume de N ogaret, Barnes assures us,
the other members of the French expedition would have killed the Pope!
This new light on the character of Nogaret is matched by John Herman·
Randall's observation, in the chapter called "The Natural Man of the
Renaissance," that St. Thomas " has hardly a trace of asceticism." Randall
is also convinced that it was the printing-press which had " made it impossible ever to extirpate a living ideaJ' One wonders how the living ideas
he had been discussing as having been formulated before 1447 managed to
survive.
When Barnes joins forces with Mitchell Garrett to discuss the Reformation, the results are hardly more satisfactory, although the writers do
emphasize the fact that many abuses in the Church were not the cause of
revolt but a means of excusing it. Nevertheless, allusions to the "larger
magic of the Church and its sacramental system," to a ridiculous list of
relics, and to a credulous acceptance of mediaeval legends as having been
given credulity in the Middle Ages, cannot but be offensive. There is a
serious error of fact in the statement that Henry VIII fell in love with
Anne Boleyn after beginning suit for divorce from Catherine. A far more
serious error of distortion and calumny is contained in the statement that
" fierce theological intolerance once more became a major intellectual virtue
in the Catholic Church." Listing, all the errors in this chapter, as in the
ones mentioned above, would be impossible and almost certainly useless.
One may certainly hope, however, that the poor bewildered students at
Columbia do not take too seriously Barnes's assurance that following the
Ignatian Exercises will enable them to " reproduce when wanted " some
"moments of exaltation and ecstasy."
One may hope, too, that the student will not be so completely dazed
that he can derive no benefit from the remainder of this volume, which is
. relatively free from error, or from volume II, which contains chapters by
William O'Shanahan on "Political Liberalism and Nationalism," and by
Richard Hofstadter on " The Impact of Darwinism," which are masterpieces
of their kind. It is even possible, in reading these chapters, to catch some
glimpse of the ideal once held by the men charged with constructing the
Contemporary Civilization course. These volumes show, however, that no
amount of excellent binding or typography, no planning of chapters to cover
certain great events or movements, no aspiring to form mature and truly
liberal mentalities, can substitute for sound, unbiased scholarship, or for an

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BOOK REVIEWS

undetstanding of the limitations necessarily placed upon the teaching of
any subject. Perhaps a great amount of puzzlement on the part of students,
and of strenuous opposition on the part of teachers, might be avoided if
the Columbia College plan could be radically altered and if the volumes
under review could be subjected to a similar process. Only then can the
valuable portions-about one-half-of these books do their best work.
SISTER MARIE CAROJ.YN,

Catholic University,
WMhington, D. C.

O.P.

BRIEF NOTICES
An Index to Aristotle. By TRoY WILsON ORGAN. Princeton: University
Press, 1949. Pp. 181. $5.00.
One abuse of St. Thomas has been made by those pseudo-students who
think that the Summa can be used as an index. Without reference to the
integral work, strange and unsound doctrines have not infrequently been
advanced by these dabblers in knowledge from St. Thomas. Fortunately,
Troy Wilson Organ does not make a similar mistake. He does not intend
his Index to Aristotle to be a substitute for the reading of the whole of the
Stagirite but rather he hopes it to be what an index is meant to be, simply
a guide to an author's works. Just as one section of St. Thomas throws
light on another section of the Angelic Doctor, so too is this the case of
the closely knit and logical system of the Greek philosopher. It is to be
hoped that this new guidebook to Aristotle will not result in distorting his
teachings but rather in facilitating the student's depth of knowledge of this
great thinker.
An Index to Aristotle is a thoroughly competent piece of scholarship.
The compiler has used the eleven volume English translation of Ross and
Smith, published by the Oxford University Press as his basis. Hence, the
danger of conflicting translations of some technical words is removed.
Nevertheless, the author does in many instances give the Greek equivalent
of the word in parenthesis after the English translation in the index. The
references are quite exhaustive and shoulq be extremely valuable to any
student. For the philosopher this handy reference book would seem
indispensable.

The Soul. By ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. Translated by JoHN PATRICK RowAN.
St. Louis: Herder, 1949. Pp.

with index .. $4.00.

This translation of the Questio Disputata : De Anima of St. Thomas is a
happy addition to the growing library of English translations of his works.
The text of St. Thomas, in one question of twenty-one articles, treats of
the human soul, its nature, its union with the body, of potencies in general,
of immortality and of the cognition of the separated soul. The treatment,
however, is in greater length and detail than that of the corresponding
parts of the Summa Theologica (1, qq. 75-77; 88, 89). Written within a
few years of the First Part of the Summa, this Question contains the mature
teaching of St. Thomas.

619

BRIEF NOTICES

Doctor Rowan's translation is faithful and readable. The explanatory
notes are brief but useful; the references to citations in the text are accurate;
and the citations to parallel places are complete. The translator has added
an index of nine pages which includes proper names and topics, an excellent
contribution to the text.
All in all, here is the psychological doctrine of St. Thomas on the cardinal
topics of the science presented faithfully, dearly, with generous aids for
the student. It is a good book for reference, for courses, and for use in
t.he seminar.

Epistemology.
J. Flynn.

By FERNAND VAN STEENBERGHEN. Translated by Martin
New York: Wagner, 1949. Pp. 324 with index. $4.00.

Aristotelians and Thomists have long stood in need of a good English
manual in epistemology for use in teaching undergraduates. This present
translation, though perhaps somewhat advanced and difficult, is probably
the best book on the problem of knowledge that has appeared in English.
The author presents epistemology in four sections: a preliminary and
historical introduction; analytical or descriptive epistemology; critical epistemology; and conclusions concerning realism, error, and the divisions of the
sciences.
The heart of the book is in the middle two sections where the author
gives first a kind of phenomenology of human knowledge, describing what
appears to consciousness, and then moves on to justify human knowledge
by appealing chiefly to the affirmation of being. The exteriority of the
world is established by reflecting on our conscious life and discovering that
the felt objectivity of the corporeal world must be real and unadulterated
by the sense organ since the organ is what the world is to the extent that
it is spatial, extended, physical. " In this instance, the modus recipientis
coincides with the modus recepti" (p. 216) . Besides, several organs like
the eye and tactile receptors can cross-check each other in determining the
objective and extended character of matter.
The translation reads very smoothly, and there are copious subdivisions,
footnotes that are complete without being overburdening, a bibliography,
and indexes of both topics and names. All of this should recommend this
work for the college classroom.
However, despite its many positive features, there are certain doctrinal
difficulties about Van Steenberghen's approach which show that the final
textbook on epistemology has not appeared, at least in English,
First, the author seems to view his subject not as a part of metaphysics
to be studied near the end of the philosophical enterprise, but as a prolegomenon that must be hurtled at the beginning. Kant did enough damage
to show the futility of this program. As a result of this inversion of episte-

BRIEF NOTICES

mology's place, Van Steenberghen has to go through much of the philosophy
of nature and of metaphysics in the analytical section of his book. This is
a proof that the critical problem is not at the threshold of philosophy.
Secondly, the author pivots his solution of the knowledge problem on
consciousness. Descartes' problems, then, must be faced anew. Such a beginning, as Gilson argues, prejudices the discussion of knowledge in favor
of idealism. Van Steenberghen hardly answers this challenge in his treatment of it (pp. 97-98).
Thirdly, the author does not believe that the validity of first principles
should be discussed in epistemology. They are defended, he thinks, in
metaphysics. But has he not invoked these laws in connection with the
" affirmation of being "?.
Fourthly, the author is inclined to the Galileo-Lockean view of secondary
qualities. Had he put epistemology in its proper metaphysical perspective,
he could have availed himself of the conclusions · by the philosopher of
nature that secondary qualities are formal and not just the mechanisms
disclosed by physics.
In spite of such difficUlties, this book is worth the consideration of any
teacher searching for a satisfactory textbook in epistemology.

Introduzione alla Psicologia. By A. GEMELLI and G. ZuNINI. Milan:
University of the Sacred Heart, 1949. Second Edition. Pp. 505.
The first edition, of 1947, was out of print within one year. This is the
more remarkable, since this volume is not an " introduction " in the usual
sense of the term. A good deal of factual knowledge, going beyond the mere
fundamentals, is presupposed. The book introduces one not so much to
psychology as to an understanding of this science, its ·different schools, and
problems. It gives a survey of various approaches with the intention of
integrating the historical development of the studies on the manifold questions of psychology with the actual state of knowledge. Although P. Gemelli
has his own, very definite conceptions, the views of other scholars are stated
in admirable objectivity. Not only the student who, after having acquired
some elementary knowledge of this science, wishes to become acquainted
with its general viewpoints and principles, but also the scholar, the specialist,
and the philosopher will derive much profit from a reading of this work.
Its nineteen chapters, each accompanied by extensive bibliographies, comprise the whole field of psychology..
Psychology means here: empirical study of mental phenomena and of
human nature. Problems of a strictly philosophical kind are not discussed.
This does, of course, not preclude that the whole treatise is pervaded by a
philosophical spirit nor that its study might not be useful to the philosopher.

BRIEF NOTICES

Quite to the contrary: the objective and complete survey of problems and
viewpoints might to be welcome to anyone concerned with the problems of
human existence, be they envisaged from a speculative or an empirical
angle. To-day's speculative psychology often suffers from an insufficient
understanding of the ideas current in contemporary psychologies and, therefore, misses the point in criticism and fails to consider facts of which it has
to render account.
The authors maintain a perfect balance in their appreciation of the
various psychological methods. They neither side with the pure experimentalists or behaviorists nor with those who stress exclusively introspection; rather they conceive of the methodology in psychological inquiry as
" dualistic," that is, as needing the data of self-observation together with
those to be obtained by objective studies.
Having justified this viewpopint in the second chapter, they proceed to
expose their views on the relations of psychology and biology. The unity
of the human being renders necessary the use of biological studies in psychology, although no complete understanding can be attained by such
studies alone. The recognition of the unity of the person by Aristotle is
pointed out and so also the same idea as presented by many later writers.
There is no mention of modem " psychosomatics "; but one can easily
gather how little new there is in this approach, however much it be acclaimed
as an innovation to-day.
The following chapter on " The data of psychological experience and
their characteristics " is of particular interest, the more since it contains a
searching criticism of certain modern notions, as proposed by Boring and
by the " operationalistic " school. Here as in other parts of the work, the
contributions of psychologists of all countries are considered, and American
psychology is often referred to and quoted. The authors
with perfect justice, that most of the controversies of to-day are but repetitions of
those of older times. The main problem of psychology is to render account
of the one fundamental fact: that mental life manages to unify the multiplicity of data mental activity produces. This aspect is ignored by those
who are satisfied with enumerating and describing factual data. Other
schools have claimed to deal with this basic trait, but have only either
coined soine formulae, as the configurationalists, or limited their explanations to relations of some mental functions, as did the structuralists. The
critics of these theories, like McDougall and the psychoanalytic schools,
have in tum been guilty of a far going disregard of the facts of consciousness.
A new synthesis is needed. In a last paragraph the authors state, without
elaborating, that the existing confusion may be traced back to the kind of
dualism Descartes had introduced.
This review must be satisfied with listing the topics treated in the subsequent chapters. They are: conscious and unconscious mental activities;

BRIEF NOTICES

628

perception ("simple sensations" are justly viewed as mere abstractions);
memory; emotional life; reason and will; language (to the study of which,
as one knows, Gemelli himself has notably contributed) ; instincts; intelligent animal behavior; human conduct; social conduct; personality; problems
of character.
There is not one chapter from which the reader might not gain new
insights and a better understanding of the subject-matters under discussion.
The philosopher, in particular, who is sometimes a little too contemptuous
of the empirical data the psychologists collect and of their theories, may
come to appreciate the work done more than he did before. He also may
discover that there are tasks for him to do besides repeating the old hallowed formulae. The topics listed in the index alone may indicate to him
how much worth his while the study of this work may be. To do this is
not only profitable but rewarding in other respects, for there is hardly any
other such book which would " introduce " the reader in so clear and
pleasant and stimulating a manner into a field as wide and as important
than that covered by this book. It shows the mastership of a great scholar
who also is a great teacher and a brilliant stylist.

Reason to Revelation. By DANIEL J. SAUNDERs, S. J. St. Louis: Herder,
1949. Pp. 224, with bibliography and index. $3.50.
Today, for the fust time in many centuries, the Catholic Church is
assuming an ascendancy in the attention of thinking men. Non-Catholics
are looking at it from two points of view: the one a hopeful view, tinged
with a bit of sentimentalism, a bit of envy of Catholics, and a half understood desire "to be one myself someday"; the other, one of suspicion and
distrust for the power it wields, together with a constantly more articulate
wish to curb its growth and influence.
The holders of neither of these views, however, understand the Church.
They are impressed, perhaps in spite of themselves, by its continued existence, its tranquillity in the face of universal intellectual unrest, its solidarity
of outlook, its conservativeness, its unflinching support of Christian beliefs
even in the face of bitter persecutions. For these reasons, both those
favorable and unfavorable to the Church give it the favor of their sincere,
if grudging, admiration.
To present Catholics with the means of explaining the foundations of
that Church is the aim of this book. Foundations are fundamentals, and
every discussion must come to fundamentals if it is to be fruitful. In
orderly fashion, the author sketches these fundamentals, beginning with
the basic notion of the very existence of the supernatural, that is, the
possibility of God's communication to man of truths beyond his natural

BRIEF NOTICES

ken, the content of that communication, the Mysteries of Faith, and the
existence and function of miracles. Next, he studies the medium of that
communication, the Gospels, their authenticity, the credibility of the facts
they narrate about our Blessed Lord, His Divinity, miracles, prophecies,
and the truth of His Resurrection.
All this is done thoroughly but briefly. The scientific presentation of
the subject does not suffer from the easy style of the author. Particularly
well done are the chapters on the Gospels where considerable effort has
been made to present the objections as forcefully as possible, and to refute
them carefully and clearly. Lay readers may find these chapters a bit
difficult, for they appear to presuppose some knowledge of formal exegesis.
Because of its appreciafion of difficulties, and its clear presentation of
the truth, Reason to Revelation should find a receptive audience among
priests, clerical students, and the educated laity.

Elternschaft und Gattenschaft (Parenthood and Marriage).
MITTERER. Vienna, 1949. Herder. Pp. 160.

By ALBERT

This is one more treatise by Professor Mitterer, formerly of the Seminary of Brixen (Bressanone), now of the School of Theology at Vienna,
in which ·the empirical knowledge and the scientific or biological ideas of
St. Thomas are set over against those resUlting from modern research.
Prof. Mitterer has devoted to these problems a large number of books and
articles which he lists on two pages in the introduction of this volume.
Particularly, he refers to a preceding work, The
of Organisms,
particularly of Man, according to the Conception of the World in St. Thomas
and in Present Times (Vienna 1947) as necessary prolegomena to this book;
since the first book is not available, it is doubtful whether full justice can
be done to the present treatise.
The general tendency of the author's works is to show that the changes
brought about by the development of science, physics or biology, forces us
to abandon many of the ideas of Aquinas, ideas which are viewed as so
fundamental that the edifice of Thomistic philosophy seems to crumble.
But Prof. Mitterer goes even farther; he apparently believes that many of
the notions presupposed by or implied in moral theology and Canon Law
Law must be modified to be in accordance with modern scientific discoveries. On this aspect of the author's work this reviewer is not competent
to pass judgment.
It is, of course, obvious that in our times many things are viewed differently than they were in the Middle Ages. It is, however, questionable
whether the changes and advances in empirical knowledge have so fundamental an importance for philosophy that they would force us to abandon

BRIEF NOTICES

625

a large part of traditional doctrine. The question will be answered differently by those who-as many moderns do-believe that philosophy has to
follow conscientiously and even slavishly the march of empirical knowledge,
and by those others who believe that the foundations of philosophy are
broad and strong enough to allow for taking acoount of any ascertained
fact whatsoever. The latter conviction is not peculiar to Scholastic philosophers. It suffices to read the late Ernest Cassirer's study on the theory
of relativity to realize that according to this thinker the validity of
Kantianism is not at all endangered by the recent developments in physics,
although Kant taught that Euclidean geometry is endowed with a-priori
certitude and thought in the same manner of Newtonian physics. One may
ask, likewise, whether and how far the differences in the ideas concerning
the facts of parenthood, generation, and so forth, affect philosophical views
and moral conceptions.
This reviewer, in fact, cannot see that the new ideas and facts do force
us to abandon to the same extent, as the author apparently· assumes, the
tenets of Thomism. Nobody, indeed, will affirm that the views of St.
Thomas on facts are to be maintained at any cost; after all, Scholastic
philosophy· fought a losing battle against the new physics which superseded
that of Aristotle; there was a loss of prestige for quite some time, but
Scholasticism tecuperated and was able to incorporate· the modern ideas
without abandoning any of its basic principles. It may well be that the
same obtains in regard to Thomistic and modern biology.
Moreover, one gets the impression that the author, however much he is
master of the scientific aspect of his problems, is less capable of dealing with
their strictly philosophical side. This is visible, particularly, where he discusses the relation of parent and child. He writes (p. 52): "To which kind
of relationship belongs (biological) parenthood? The great change which
has to be reported here is that this relation is no longer an accidental one,
but substantial and, therefore, belongs no longer into the category relation,
but by 'way of reduction to the category of substance." This statement is
based on the declaration that " the parents are the substantial whole out
of a part of which the child is brought into existence by way of development." It seems hardly necessary to subject this statement to a further
examination; it obviously confuses several things which ought to be kept
apart. It may suffice to point out that the development, say, of the oak
tree out of the acorn is a substantial change but the relation which the
acorn has to the tree or the tree to the acorn remains nevertheless an accident of either of these things. Parenthood or sonship, likewise, are accidents
of father and son respectively, quite independently of the kind of physical
process which brought the son into existence. Thus, it is rather unintelligible what precisely the author means with his statement, or with one
following as a sort of corollary, that the "logical relation of likeness

626

BRIEF NOTICES

(similitudo) existing between parents and child is already with St. Thomas
not an accidental likeness, but a substantial likeness (similitudo naturae).
To-day their causal relation, too, is substantiaL" The author refers to
S. Th. I. q. '1,7, a. '1,. c.; but this text defines generatio as distinguished from
other modes of becoming and has not the meaning the author attributes
to it.
Similar criticism could be raised against other passages. The one discussed here, however, may serve as an illustration. This does not amount
to a thorough rejection of the author's work. He is indubitably right when
he demands that full account be taken of the data modern science has
accumulated and that these must be incorporated in any system of philosophy of nature, including of course human nature. There are many valuable discussions of what the author calls Treuelternschaft, a word coined
by him, and best translated by parental trusteeship; under this heading he
comprises aU moral obligations resulting from the biological fact of parenthood. This trusteeship corresponds to the fovere in St. Thomas or to the
nutrimentum, instructio, disciplina, supplied by the parents. Prof. Mitterer
is convinced that in this regard, too, one has to go beyond St. Thomas
whose conception appears to him insufficient and vitiated by his defective
knowledge of biology.
There is a lengthy discussion of ethical questions related to sexuality.
Again, St. Thomas is severely criticized. Among other things, he is said to
have viewed the act of copulation only as an extrinsic act and to have overlooked the relevance of this act for the individual himself. This is deduced
from the statement that the sexual urge is viewed by St. Thomas only as one
towards delectatio, whereas he should have considered the fact of "instinctuaL satisfaction" (Triebbefriedigung); one senses here a definite influence
of certain theories, especially of the psychoanalytic doctrine. It seems to this
reviewer that the contradiction the author believes to find between the
doctrine of St. Thomas and Casti connubii is non-existent. His argument
is this: St. Thomas recognized in the matrimonial act only a means for the
generatio prolis and denies to this act legitimacy if this intention is not
present. In Casti connubii, however, it is stated that cohabitation is " not
against nature . . . even though no new life can arise, be it because of
natural conditions, certain times, or some defects." What the author, however, overlooks is that the latter statement presupposes, of course, the
intention, that is, the inner attitude of the cohabitants in consequence of
which they would intend to procreate if the circumstances did permit this.
Nor can this reviewer convince himself that the critique of St. Thomas'
views on trusteeship are as defective as the author believes. But to enter
into any further analysis would lead too far.
All the objections against the standpoint of Prof. Mitterer notwithstanding, it must be gratefully acknowledged that he has at least the

BRIEF NOTICES

merit to have started a discussion which may lead to a fuller clarification
of many points in the ethics of married life and the parent-child relations.
One may disagree, and probably will disagree, with many of the author's
assertions; but one will still profit by his provocative treatment of all these
questions.

The Catlwlic Ckurck in the United States. By THEODORE
0. F. M. Cap. St. Louis: Herder, 1950. Pp. 444. $5.00.

RoEMER,

A good history of the Catholic Church in the United States has for long
been a necessity. Not only scholars but the Catholic (and non-Catholic}
reading public would appreciate a good history of an institution which has
existed in the United States as an organization since the founding of the
Republic itself. As things now stand there is only one history of the
Catholic Church in our country and that is the four volume work by John
Gilmary Shea, the last volume of which was published in the nineties.
Shea's work was a good one for its time but a great deal has happened to
the country and the Church since 1892. Furthermore, historical research
has gone forward considerably since Shea's time, and, in the light of its
findings, Shea's errors could be corrected.
Of the Catholic scholars who longed to see the work of Shea replaced by
a more modern treatment none desired it more than Monsignor Peter
Guilday of the Catholic University of America. It was to that end that
the series of doctoral dissertations called Studies in American Ckurck
History was begun by students under Dr. Guilday's direction, and the
beloved scholar himself cleared a great deal of difficult ground by his own
works on Carroll and England, to mention only two titles. In Dr. Guilday's
early years, however, the time was not ripe for a history of the entire
American Church, and, in his, later years, pressure of work and ill health
prevented his undertaking the task. However, it would seem that he thought
that the time had come when it could be done, for in his declining years,
he urged others to undertake the task. The first man to follow Dr.
Guilday's suggestion, Theodore Maynard, fell far short of the mark. He
was not a trained historian, and although he has written considerably upon
historical subjects, he has never acquired an historical sense. His Story of
American Catlwlicism certainly was not what Dr. Guilday had in mind.
The present work was also written upon the suggestion of Dr. Guilday.
It is better than Maynard's eccentric attempt but it is still far short of
the mark.
Father Roemer attempts to tell in one volume the story of the Catholic
Church in the United States. This seems to be the wrong approach. It is
improbable that a good compendium can be produced before a major work
is written, and this study owes its principal defect to the lack of a major

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BRIEF NOTICES

work in· the field - it is notably lacking in proportion and perspective.
Events and personalities of major importance are frequently treated very
briefly. For example: the fine work done by Archbishop John Hughes in
breaking the back of trusteeism (which the author ineptly dubs "Trusteemania") in New York and dealing to it its death-blow in the American
Church, is covered in one sentence. Father Samuel Mazzuchelli, the great
Dominican missionary of the Northwest, is mentioned only indirectly and
his entire life work summarized in five words. Another great Dominican,
Archbishop Langdon Thomas Grace, the second bishop of St. Paul and one
of the leaders of the hierarchy in his day is not even mentioned .. There are
others in a long list of great men
lives had a definite influence upon
the history of the American Church, whom Father Roemer barely mentions
or doesn't mention at all.
On the other hand, he goes into considerable detail upon some men and
events. He devotes a whole chapter, entitled Charity, to a history of the
Society for the Propagation of the Faith and the Leopoldinen-Stiftung,
important movements, indeed, but not that important. While passing up
more important men, he gives considerable space to men of lesser stature.
Fathers Stephen Badin, Charles Nerinckx, and Gabriel Richard, for example, were great missionaries but they certainly were not greater than many
a missionary who receives no mention whatsoever.
This lack of proportion in the work is not due to any bias upon the
author's part. Indeed, one of the great virtues of the book is its moderation and prudence. One of Shea's outstanding characteristics was his bias;
he was a man of strong likes and dislikes. Father Roemer shows no such
quirks in his writing. He avoids unearthing buried hatchets. He does not
use the muck-rake that is so dear to the " everythingcmust-be-told " school.
He .seems to appreciate the fact charity should be practiced even by the
historian.
The writing is at times heavy and the sentence structure at times so
involved as to be incomprehensible. There are other evidences of poor
proof reading such as misspelling and typographical error that should
prompt a careful re-reading of the text before it goes into a second printing.
The index, too, is in need of more work.

The Mystical Evolution in the Development ood Vitality of the Church.
Vol. I. By Jo:aN G. ARINTERO, O.P. Trans. by Jordan Aumann, O.P.
St. Louis: Herder, 1949. Pp. 377. $4.50.
Although this work in the original is almost 40 years old, it sounds a
theme that many American Catholics are fast becoming attuned to-the
wonders of the life of grace and holiness. So it is good to hear the theme

BRIEF NOTICES

629

again with variations peculiar to the man who has done as much as anyone
else to make it resound once again in the Church.
In 1908 Fr. Arintero projected a four volume work on the development
and vitality of the Church. The first volume, Organic Evolution, treated
the constitution of the Church and its visible progress; the second Doctrinal
Evolution, is concerned with the great question of the evolution of· the
dogmas of the faith; the third, Mystical Evolution, treats of the nature
and growth of the spiritual life of the Church; the last
Divine
Mechanism, sets forth the laws which govern the evolutionary develop.ment
of the Church.
Only the first half of the third volume, Mystical Evolution, is translated
here: a second volume will present us with the complete exposition of the
mystical life of the Church. (Perhaps by the time it appears we will be
calling for a translation of the other three volumes of Fr. Arintero's work.)
Fr. Arintero sets about his task systematically: he
us with the
traditional doctrine on the divine life of grace in the sc)ul, manifesting i1;
in all its glory as a participation in the intimate life of God Himself.
Especially. illuminating and delightful is the section on the familiar relations which the soul contracts with the Persons of the Most Holy Trinity
through grace and the infused virtues and gifts.
We know that life is never a static thing, but a dynamic flow of activities.
The supernatural activities of the Christian soul are shown to be sharings
in God's own activities. Life also means growth, yet, unlike natural life,
the life of grace grows without subsequent decline. To those who have read
the mystical writings of other modern masters of spirituality, this may
sound a bit hackneyed. They will be amazed to find how new it all sounds
tinder the pen of Fr. Arintero. As he himself explains: "We prefer, then,
to imitate as much as possible the method of the Fathers in not abstracting,
much less separating, one concept from the others. Like the Fathers, we
shall always observe the reality itself, but from different points of view,
multiplying the aspects and the images for the sole purpose of seeing better
that inexpressible and integral whole which no number of terms or ooncepts
·
can exhaust." (p. 66}
In pursuance of this method, Fr. Arintero has studied and meditated
profoundly the innumerable symbols and images that tradition has employed
to express the awesome reality of the life of grace in the soul. As a result,
the writing is suffused with an unction that enables the reader to pass easily
from the text to prayer.
The translation is excellent; one never adverts to its being a translation.
The publishers have presented the work in a pleasant format.

19

630

BRIEF NOTICES

Geschichte der Philosophie, I . .Altertum und Mittelalter.
HmscHBERGER. Freiburg, i. B., 1949. Pp. 490.

By JoHANNES

The author, professor at the seminary in Eichstiit, wrote this book, of
which the second volume will deal with modem and contemporary philosophy, "because no suitable textbook existed." He was faced with the
problem of presenting his subject in a limited space and, therefore, with
that of selection. He justly remarks that no one is more aware of the things
left out than the writer himself and that to criticize him for this reason is
hardly helpful. Every student of the history of philosophy has, of course,
his idiosyncrasies and would like to see this philosopher considered to a
greater extent, or that point brought out more clearly. Such preference
being mostly dependent on personal interests, it is not fair to urge them;
the one criticism which, perhaps, is objectively justified refers to the scant
space given to Neo-Platonism. This philosophy deserves to be pointed out
more forcibly to the student because of its being the first great synthesis
of divergent ideas and because of its influence on medieval and modem
speculation.
The two parts, Antiquity and MiddleAges, are nearly of equal length.
In the first more than 50 pages are devoted to Plato, more than 70 to
Aristotle which is as it should be. One gratefully notices that the philosophy
of the Hellenistic period is treated
extensively than it is usual in such
textbooks. The longest chapters of the second part are those on St.
Augustine and on St. Thomas.
There are no footnotes, but there are ample references in the text and
brief bibliographies for each chapter. Neither is there an index which presumably will be found in the second volume.
So far as this reviewer knows, this is the best textbook of its kind and
might be useful, when translated, in colleges and even in graduate schools.

An American Utilitarian: Richard Hildreth as a Philosopher. By MARTHA
M. PINGEL. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948. Pp. 225.
$3.00.
Part I of this book presents a short bi9graphy of Hildreth and an expository analysis of his Theory of Morals and Theory of Politics. Part II
publishes for the first time the Theory of Wealth and the Theory of Taste
neither of which Hildreth completed. Part III reprints " some brief polemics
which though relatively unknown and not readily available, are representative of both his style and his philosophy." (p. 123) The book also contains
a " Preface," a " Bibliography " adding thirty minor works to the only
other published bibliography and a splendid " Index."

BRIEF NOTICES

631

Hildreth's name is not unknown as an historian or a novelist and journalist,
but Miss Pingel's work is the first attempt to present him as a philosopher.
In this role he appears as a " follower of utilitarian principles first ·laid'
down by Hume and expanded by Bentham " (p. ix) , who " chose to treat
man in naturalistic terms" (loc. cit.). Sired by Hume and Bentham he
may in tum, at least indirectly, have sired Peirce and James as Miss Pingel
suggests (p. x) .
Secularism is evident in his conviction that " a religion cannot and should
not attempt to regulate morals, politics, or any of the practical businesses
of life. Religion should deal with the supernatural and intangible; practical
affairs being practical and mundane, belong to the realm of reason. In other
words, religion can lead but does not teach; it is by its very nature despotic,
not rational" (pp. 6-7). His pragmatism extends to morals: " ... an act
in itself could seldom, if ever, be considered either moral or immoral, but
rather the terms were applicable to the actor who produced the action.
If a ' selfish ' or a ' bad ' motive happened to lead to a ' good ' act-that is,
an act with good results, foreseen or riot-that act would nonetheless remain good" (p. 14). There is an implicit totalitarianism in his denial of
inalienable human rights: ... " Laying aside as untenable the idea of indefensible rights, whether natural or divine, either on the part of the governors
or the governed ... " (p. 36) . His theory of art is superficial and is based
in part on a materialization of the principle that art follows nature.
Normally tolerant, he can in the heat of controversy, descend to abusiveness in the most wretched taste. The Church is referred to as " that filthy
old hag " and as " the old battered Roman harlot, with all her wrinkles,
rouge and rheumatism " (p. 169) . It is only just to recall that a century
ago such cheap rhetoric was rather common. The epithets just noted
indicate Hildreth's style in controversy. In philosophy his pedestrian
verbosity is reminiscent of Locke.
This book is a model of the art of resurrecting the second-rate. It depresses one to realize that secularism, pragmatism, statism and that intellectual superficiality from which, in part, these " isms " spring, were really
so explicit in America a century ago.

The Philosophy of Existence. By GABRIEL MARcEL. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949. Pp. 90. $2.75.
One of the minor tragedies . in post-war Europe has been the gradual
eclipse of the Lavelle-Le Senne series Philosophie de l'Esprit which had
produced an impressive number of books during the late thirties. Perhaps
the reasons for throttling this important collection are more economic than
intellectual; the conquest of the paper problem had to be turned first to
the acute textbook shortage which confronted French university life at the

632

BRIEF NOTICES

war's end. At any rate, the reason for the decline of spiritualistes books is
certainly not the rise of Sartre who would not get much of a hearing among
the type of reader that had been patronizing the collection, Philosophie de
l'Esprit.
The one man who has held his o"'-n and even grown in stature is Gabrie1,
Marcel, sometimes referred to as a " Christian existentialist." His timely
articles and conferences have been important events for the traditional
French mind that has kept its faith in these times of peril, and it is significant that he was nominated to be the present Gifford Lecturer,
should
have as its happy issue his first systematic book in philosophy.
This present book, his first that has been translated into English, is
typically Marcelian and non-systematic. It is in fact a series of four essays,
very discreetly chosen and equally as well translated by Manya Harari.
The most notable chapter is the first, a translation of his " Positions et
Approches Concretes du Mystere Ontologique," a piece that Gilson brackets
with Bergson's Introduction to Metaphysics as one of the truly inspirational
documents of contemporary philosophy. It comes as close as any of Marcel's
writings to summarizing his philosophy as a whole. In it, he inveighs
against the " functional man " of the present, whose " ontological need "
has not been taken into account by the typical positivist or pragmatist of
the present. It is toward filling this need that Marcel consecrates his
Though a Thomist would reject the over-all dimensions of Marcel's
thought, it is a fact that his existentialism brings him into the same arena
with Sartre and enables him to begin at roughly the same point as atheistic
existentialism. That Marcel's conclusions are the exact antithesis of Sartre's
atheism, a-moralism, and nihilism cannot be overlooked by Thomists or
any truly rational philosopher. For Marcel, as for Sartre, man is engaged,
but the full ontological force of that engagement leads to the sanities that
alone can ground it. In Marcel's case, these grounding facts are explained
in the light of such experiences as that of fidelity or hope or love, or, as he
says in the third of the present essays, testiinony. American thinkers will
be interested in the suggestions of Roycean morality in Marcel, where
loyalty becomes fidelity and is raised into an argument for a personal God.
In fact, Marcel has written a book on Royce.
The second chapter, "Existence and Human Freedom," deals with Sartre
and supplements, in effect, an essay that appeared in. Homo Viator. It is
even more incisive than his earlier study and marks ag'ain the typical Marcelian trait of trying, wherever he can, to find first what is good in philosophers that he is later forced to criticize.
The third chapter is " Testimony and Existentialism." The final " Essay
in Autobiography" is taken from the book Existentialisme Chretien (ed.
E. Gilson, Paris: Pion, 1947) , which unfortunately received scant mention
in this country.

BRIEF NOTICES

688

This book is recommended reading for modem philosophers. By naturalists, of course, it will be dismissed as " supernatural," for they are apparently undisturbed by the challenge that there may be other and deeper
approaches to the real. besides their scientism. For Thomists and scholastics
in general, this book, as a study in metaphysics and natural theology, will
be provocative, fascinating to read and elusive to appraise.

Existentialism. By RALPH HARPER. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1948. Pp. 175 with notes. $3.00.
The title of this work is misleading. Existentialism, by convention, is
associated with Heidegger and Sartre, and must be qualified in other uses.
Harper, though influenced by Heidegger and Sartre, is more of a Christian
existentialist but unlike Gabriel Marcel and rather like Fr. Guthrie and
Fr. D'Arcy.
Harper feels that philosophy, as a whole, has neglected an important hint
in the Judaeo-Christian tradition on the mystery and interiority of the
person. Even Socrates was more of an intellectual than an existentialminded philosopher. But the intellect, by its universals and its abstractions,
overshoots the concrete mystery that is the self and that can only be known
by an " intuition." So, at any rate, Harper argues.
Harper finds that Kierkegaard had deep insight into the nature of man,
the flesh-and-bone man of experience. Kierkegaard had a " dialectic," with
man presented as a creature of paradoxes, where freedom meets with necessity and the finite mingles with the infinite. In such ambiguities, reason is
unable to light man's path and leads him instead to despair, but the antimonies can be surmounted by the intuitive " leap," compensating for the
failure of intelligence and really moving beyond it.
Heidegger and Sartre are also discussed. Though Harper rejects their
nihilism, he sympathizes with the general direction of their efforts toward
the concrete and non-ration!ll factors in human existence. This direction
Harper would retain without committing himself to its final. destination
when taken alone.
Such a project, taking the broad method of a system without the conclusions to which it leads, is a stiff challenge. Harper meets it with what
he calls the "interiorized scholasticism" of Pierre Rousselot and Fr.
Guthrie. Both men exalt the element of love and in many ways elevate it
beyond intelligence in power and dignity. In addition to Harper, they both
influenced Fr. D'Arcy in his Mind and Heart of Love, and the conclusions
of this "interiorized scholasticism" can be stated in Fr. D'Arcy's terms:
Man is a composite of essence and existence; essence is the aim of action
qirected toward the self, and existence is the testament of what is God-like

634

BRIEF NOTICES

about man. In the respect for existence and its laws, there is a thrust,
toward God, but because essence and existence are united in man, there is
no conflict between Eros and Agape in a truly realistic psychology.
Harper's work is a stimulating one, carefully thought out, well written,
and showing an acquaintance with the history of his subject, though chapters on Jaspers and on Marcel would have been in order. But what has he
said that can appeal to a truly intellectual philosophy since the intellect
must certainly be the final judge of whether Harper's ideas are right or
wrong? Even at first sight, the juxtaposition of Kierkegaard, Heidegger,
and Sartre along with scholasticism appears eclectic, and this is further
reflected by a consideration of his " interiorized " version of essence and
existence. Is it not true that essence is likewise a participation in God,
especially in its formal element? In Fr. Guthrie's and Fr. D'Arcy's thought,
there is likewise not enough respect for the relations of matter, form, and
subsistence in man which all precede the existential act.
Harper would seem to accord too much weight to the personality of man
and not enough to his nature. Rousselot, in his Intellectualism of St.
Thomas, felt that Aquinas had neglected the individual. But Aquinas, in
accepting Plato's argument that scientia est de universalibus, gave reasons
for the impossibility of a philosophy of individuals while insisting that
philosophy must be from individuals - the sense data where knowledge
begins. Man is tortured, because he cannot push further into the concrete
of individual existence, as Harper points out in his concluding remarks.
But love and existentialism cannot solve his dilemma-love, that is, when
taken alone. It is not the good that makes man free. It is the truth that
does so. This means that even will can prosper most in an atmosphere
of " interiorized scholasticism " or "' Christian existentialism " but under
the light and law of intelligence.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Bergstraesser, A., ed., Goethe and the Modern Age. Chicago: Regnery,
1950. Pp. 414. $5.00.
Bittle, C., Man and Morals. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1950. Pp.
with index.
$4.00.
Bochenski, I. M., Der Sowjetrussische Dialektische Materialismus. Bern:
A. Francke, 1950. Pp.
with index. S. Fr. 8.40.
Brinton, C., Ideas and Men. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950. Pp. 596,
with index. $6.00.
Caldin, E. F., The Power and Limits of Science. London: Chapman and
Hall, 1!:150. Pp.
with index.
Carnap, R., Logical Foundations of Probability. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1950. Pp.
with index and glossary.
Copleston, F., History of Philosophy. Vol. II. Westminster: Newman
with index. $4.50.
Press, 1950. Pp.
Cornford, F. M., The Unwritten Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1950. Pp. 159. $2.75.
Cronin, J. F., Catholic Social Principles. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1950. Pp. 831,
with index. $6.00.
De Chardin, T., L'Evolution Redemptrice. Paris: Les Editions du Cedre,
1950. Pp. 174.
De la Taille, M., The Mystery of Faith. Book H. New York: Sheed and
Ward, 1950. Pp. 485. $5.50.
Guthrie, W. K., The Greek Philosophers from Thales and Aristotle. New
York: Philosophical Library, 1950. Pp. 169, with index. $2.75.
Heris, C. V. (Trans. D. Fahey), The Mystery of Christ. Westminster:
Newman Press, 1950. Pp.
$3.50.
Hill, T. E., Contemporary Ethical Theories. New York: Macmillan, 1950.
Pp. 380, with index. $8.90.
Jugnet, L., Rudolf Allers on L'Anti-Freud. Paris: Les Editions du Cedre,
1950. Pp. 173. 210 fr.
Kirchgiissner, A., Erlosung und Sunde im Neuen Testament. Freiburg:
Herder, 1950. Pp. 836. Dm. 14.
Lethaby, W. R. (Revised by D. T. Rice), Medieval Art-312 to 1350.
New York: Philosophical Library, 1950. Pp. 238, with index. $7.50.
lVIarmion, Dom (Trans. Earl of Wicklow), More About Marmion. St.
Louis: Herder, 1950. Pp.
$1.75.
Maziarz, E. A., The Philosophy of Mathematics. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1950. Pp.
with index. $4.00.
lVIesser, M. B., East and West. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950.
Pp. 66, with index. $8.00.

635

636

BOOKS RECEIVED

MontagUe, W. P., Great Vi8iom of Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1950. Pp. 501, with index. $4.50.
Moore, B., Soviet Politics-The Dilemma of Power. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1950. Pp.
with index. $6.00.
Morgan, W. S., Pkilosophy of Religion. New York: Philosophical Library,
1950. Pp.
with index. $6.00.
J. J., Saint Tkomas Aquinas-De Principiis Naturae. Fribourg:
Societe Philosophique, 1950. Pp. 111, with index.
Rosmarin, T. W., Jerusalem. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950.
Pp. 51. $2.75.
Sellery, G. C., Tke Renaissance: Its Nature and Origins. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1950. $8.75.
Shahan, E. P., Whitehead's Tkeory of Experience. New York: Columbia
University Pre$8, 1950. Pp. 150, with index.
Sheen, F. J., Lift Up Your Hearts. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950.
Pp. 808. $8.00.
Silva-Tarouca, A., Praxis und Theorie des Gottbeweisens. Wien: Herder,
1950. Pp. no, with index.
Spedalieri, F., De Ecclesiae lnfallibilitate in canonizatione Sanctorum.
Rome: Catholic Book Agency, 1950. Pp. 68.
Spedalieri, F., Selectae et Breviores Philosophiae ac Tkeologiae Controversiae. Rome: Catholic Book Agency, 1950. Pp.
Summers, M., Physical Phenomena of Mysticism. New York: Barnes &
with index. $4.50.
Noble, 1950. Pp.
Toynbee, A .. J., War and Civilization. New York: Oxford University Press,
1950. Pp. 177.

INDICES OF VOLUME XIII (1950)
INDEX OF AUTHORS
PAGE
ALLERs, R. Review of Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture,
by H. Murray
--. Review of Power and Mo'f(ila, by M. Hillenbrand .
ARNoT, R. Review of The CommonaenaePsychiatry of Adolph Meyer,
by A. Lief .
CAROLYN, Sr. M. Review of Ckapters in WBBtern Civilization .
CURRAN, C. Review of Psychologie et Morale a'®: XIIe et XIIIe
SiBcles, by 0. Lottin
DELETTER, P. Hope and Charity in St. Thomas .
. 204,
DELOS, J. The Dialectics of War and Peaee .
. 805,
EGAN, J. Review of TheologiBB des Realites TerreatrBB, by G. Thils
GERHARD, W. Idealism: The Primacy of the Good .
GRACE, W. Review of Citizen Thomas More and His Utopia, by R.
Ames
GREENSTOCK, D. St. Thomas and Christian Perfection
--. Thomism and the New TheQlogy .
GREENWOOD, T. International Casuistics
iV:NNESsY, A. Review of The Love of God and the Cross of Jeaus, by
R. Garrigou-Lagrange
--. Review of The Three Ages of the Interior Life, by R. Garrigou-Lagrange .
LINTZ, E. Review of Whitehead's Philosophy of Time, by W. Hammerschmidt
LLAMERAS, M. Fatima: The Rosary and the Heart of Mary .
MARTIN, Sr. M. Review of Religioua Trends in English Poetry, Vol.
III, by H. Neale
MoRRIS, H. Review of La Mere du Sauveur et Notre Vie Inteneure,
by R. Garrigou-Lagrange .
MouRANT, J. Plato and the Poets .
MuLLANEY, J. Review of The Wisdom of Catliolicism, by A. Pegis
McNicHOLL, A. Review of The Categorical Imperative, by H. Paton
NADEAU, L. Review of The Life of Science, by George Sarton .
NEIL, T. Review of Le Sens de l'Histoire, by Nicholas Berdaefi .
--.-. Review of Meaning in History, by Karl LOwith .
OEsTERLE, J. Review of Art and Faith, by Jacques Maritain and Jean
Cocteau

687

115
482
410
615
424
825
528
401
16
417
1
567
858
280
280
299
458
108
606
9!49
608
271
118
296
296
97

638

INDICES

(1950)

OF VOLUME XIII

PAGE

OsTERREICHER,J. Max Scheler and the Faith
PicK, J. Review of Immortal Diamond; Studies in Gerard Manley
Hopkins, by N. Weyand
---. Review of A Study of Poetic Idiosyncracy in Relation to
Poetic Tradition, by W. H. Gardner
---. Review of Gerard Manley Hopkins: A Critical Essay Towards
the Understanding of His Poetry, by W. Peters
Ross, E. Review of Family and Civilization, by C. Zimmerman
SMITH, V. E. Review of L'Etre et L'Essence, by E. Gilson
SMITH, R. Review of You Can Change the World, by J. Keller
---. Review of Catholic Social Action, by J. Cronin
---. Review of Barbara Celarent, by T. Gilby
STocK, M. Review of An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy, by A.
Armstrong
VEATCH, H. Aristotelian and Mathematical Logic
0

0

0

0

185
289
289
289
286
104
111
111
601
597
50

INDEX OF ARTICLES
Aristotelian and Mathematical Logic. H. VEATCH
50
Casuistics, International--. T. GREENWOOD
353
Charity, Hope and-- in St. Thomas. P. DELETTER
204, 325
Christian Perfection, St. Thomas and--. D. GREENSTOCK
1
Dialectics, The--of War and Peace. J. DELos
305, 528
Faith, Max Scheler and the--. J. OsTERREICHER .
135
Fatima: The Rosary and the Heart of Mary. M. LLAMERAS
'453
Good, Idealism: The Primary of the--. W. GERHARD
. 16
Heart of Mary, Fatima: The Rosary and the--. M. LLAMERAS
453
Hope and Charity in St. Thomas. P. DELETTER
204, 325
16
Idealism: The Primacy of the Good. W. GERHARD
International Casuistics. T. GREENWOOD
353
51)
Logic, Aristotelian and Mathematical--. H. VEATCH
Max Scheler and the Faith. J. OsTERREICHER
135
New Theology, Thomism and the--. D. GREEiNSTOCK
567
Peace, The Dialectics of War and--. J. DELOS
305, 528
Perfection, Christian, St, Thomas and--. D. GREENSTOCK
1
Plato and the Poets. J. MoURANT
249
Primacy, Idealism: The-- of the Good. W. GERHARD
16
Rosary, Fatima: The-- and the Heart of Mary. M. LLAMERAS
453
Scheler, Max-- and the Faith. J. OsTERREICHER
185
Theology, Thomism and the New--. D. GREENSTOCK
567
Thomas, St.-- and Christian Perfection. D. GREENSTOCK
1
Thomas, St., Hope and Charity in--. P. DELETTER
204, 325
0

0

(1950)

INDICES OF VOLUME XIII

689
PAGE
567

Thomism and the New Theology. D. GREENSTOCit
War, The Dialectics of-- and Peace. J. DELOS .

805,

INDEX OF BOOK REVIEWS
AMEs, R. Citizen Thomas More and His Utopia (W. Grace)
ARMSTRONG, A. An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy (M. Stock)
BERDIAEFF, N . Le Sens de l'Histoire (T. Neil)
CRONIN, J. Catholic Social Action (R. Smith)
GARDNER, W. Gerard Manley Hopkins: A Study of Poetic Idiosyncrasy in Relation to Poetic Tra.dition (J. Pick)
GARRIGou-LAGRANGE,R. The Love of God and the Cross of Jesus
(A. Hennessy)
--. The Three Ages of the Interior Life (A. Hennessy)
--. La Mere du Sauveur et Notre Vie Interieure (H. Morris)
GILBY, T. Barbara Celarent (R. Smith)
GILSON, E. L'Etre et l'Essence (V. E. Smith)
HAMMERSCHMIDT,W. Whitehead's Philosophy of Time (E. Lintz)
HILLENBRAND,Mo Power and Morals (R. Allers)
KELLER, J. You Can Change the World (R. Smith)
LIEF, A. The Commonsense Psychiatry of Adolph Meyer (R. Arnot)
LowiTH, K. Meaning in History (T. Neil)
I,oTTIN, 0. Psychologie et Morale aux Xlle et XIIIe Siecles (C.
Curran)
-MARITAIN, J . .Art and Faith (J. Oesterle)
MuRRAY, H. Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture (R. Allers)
NEALE, H. Religious Truth in English Poetry (Sr. M. Martin)
PATON, H. The Categorical Imperative (A. McNicholl)
PEGIS, A. The Wisdom of Catholicism (J. MULLANEY)
PETERS, W. Gerard Manley Hopkins: A Critical Essay Towards the
Understanding of His Poetry (J. Pick)
SARTON, G. The Life of Science (L. Nadeau)
TmLs, G. Theologies des Realites Terrestres (J. Egan)
WEYAND, N. Immortal Diamond: Studies in Gerard Manley Hopkins
(J. Pick)
ZIMMERMAN,C. The Family and Civilization (E. Ross)
--. The Family of Tomorrow (E. Ross)

417
597
111

0

0

0

0

•

0

0

0

0

0

EN» oF VoLUME XITI

0

•

0

606
601
104

111
410

424
97
115
108
608

118
401