THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS:

THE DOMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JOSEPH

Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

VoL. XIV

OCTOBER, 1951

No. 4

KIERKEGAARD AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

K

IERKEGAARD gave a good deal of thought to the fate
of his own lifework and reputation at the hands of
posterity. He wanted to avoid scholarly embalmment
and to discourage the growth of a Kierkegaardian cult, but on
both counts his wishes were denied him. Minute scliolars
and enthusiasts have found him a fair subject for their attentions, and there is certainly room for both scholarship and
enthusiasm in any assessment of his mind and personality. But
if these qualities are divorced from critical independence of
outlook, they serve only to betray him and to give us a false
impression. Kierkegaard could never tolerate personal adulation or an indiscriminate reception of his message. Like Bergson
and Marx, he repudiated in advance any attempt to attach an
" ism " to his name: Kierkegaardianism seemed as ridiculous
to him as Socratism, since both thinkers located truth in the
personal relation of man to man. Similarly, his conception of

441

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JAMES COLLINS

truth as demanding an individual, responsible decision about
the meaning of one's life led him to warn against a merely disinterested analysis of his teaching. This does not rule out a
legitimate study of his mind in accord with the canons of historical research. But Kierkegaard requested the historian of
philosophy and religion to present his thoughts in such a way
that they would offer a constant challenge in regard to their
relevance for contemporary problems.
In avoiding these two abuses, Kierkegaard nevertheless
looked forward to the advent of both his poet and his critic.
The former personage would be one possessing sufficient insight
and sympathy to grasp the meaning of his life and convey to
others something of its original venturesomeness. To a man
whose own days were spent in the shadow of misunderstanding,
this hope of an eventual transparency before men as well as
God was a great support. He did not conceive his poet's function as one of vindicating all his moves but as one of securing
an honest hearing for all the evidence and perspectives upon
which he himself had acted. One consideration which conditioned all of Kierkegaard's actions· was the idea that, like
Luther, he was called upon to be a corrective of the peculiar
cultural and religious situation of his own day. Hence he
consistently refused to regard his position as an ultimate standard, but only as the standard which was most needed during
his lifetime. This does not mean that he denied permanent
norms of thought and conduct or that he tried to disregard
them. It is rather an acknowledgment of his own limitations,
his proclivity towards the onesided and paradoxical, and the
specially unbalanced condition of his own world. Thus he felt
the need for more than a poet. He expected that there would
be a critical sifting of his convictions and an integration of them
with a norm, a normal outlook.
It is unlikely that any single individual can successfully claim
to be the poet or the critic hailed from afar by Kierkegaard.
The work of understanding and evaluating him is a cooperative
one, one which may be carried out in several different ways.

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PHILOSOPHY

448

This is evident from a survey of his various critics. The great
majority of them can be classified among either the existentialist philosophers or the crisis theologians. In their different
ways, they have called attention to his general importance and
to many particular points of interest. Their estimates of his
mind, however, often stand in sharp mutual contrast, leaving
open the question of his basic contribution to the human search
after truth. A majority of the existentialists want a Kierkegaard from whom the sting of living one's life before God and
eternity has been removed. But the atheistic, temporalistic
interpretation is forced to discard or explain contrariwise all
the convictions which he considered most valuable and unambiguous. For their part, the crisis theologians have retained
most of his religious beliefs. But they have failed to deal with
his own objection against taking his Lutheran stand as a
rounded statement of faith. Consequently, they have remained
helpless before most of the philosophical and theological difficulties which he raised but could not solve on the basis of
his own premises.
The upshot of this conflict between schools of Kierkegaardian
interpretation is the widespread opinion that one must choose
between his detached philosophico-psychological insights and
his religious views. This is one either/ or which the master of
such dilemmas might challenge. It seems more sensible to
admit the coherence of these two areas of thought in his own
This
mind and to weigh the whole outlook in a critical
involves an implicit criticism of the approaches of both atheistic
existentialists and crisis theologians to Kierkegaard. Their
method has been one of picking and choosing, and it is only
to be expected that very little of the original subject remains
after such arbitrary dissection. When one set or another of
partial statements is advanced as the authentic Kierkegaard,
the result for most readers can only be scepticism about ever
making sense out of the man or reaching a settlement about his
intrinsic worth.
The surer course is to accept all that he has to offer and

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JAMES COLLINS

attempt replacement of his beliefs in a comprehensive setting
where they can be both honored and supplemented. The claim
that this or that body of doctrine is indeed capable of assimilating and evaluating the whole Kierkegaard can never be made
in an apriori way. It is a matter of proceeding on the hypothesis that such is the case, and then of abiding by the actual
results as sufficient' verification. This procedure can be followed in making comparison between Kierkegaard and the
Christian wisdom of Augustine and Aquinas, who in their turn
sought to rescue the best in Greek thought. No foolish claim
is made that the Danish thinker falls within the category of
an Augustinist or a Thomist philosophy. But the total view
of life which these thinkers expounded does further the task
of appreciating and weighing the many sides of Kierkegaard's
genius. Direct comparisons are rendered difficult by the fact
that he lacked first-hand acquaintance with many sources of
Christian wisdom. Through Luther, however, Kierkegaard was
led to read a good deal in Augustine. His thought displays
significant .points of contact with the Augustinist tradition as
it extends down into the modern world of Luther and Pascal.
The connection with Aquinas is much more indirect, although
no less real. It is to be found in their mutual respect for the
common sense criticism of Socrates and the realism of Aristotle. Despite the wide differences in their intellectual milieus,
Aquinas and Kierkegaard are united in this -appreciation of
the apogee of Greek thought. St. Thomas, however, retains
the interests of the professional theologian and philosopher, of
wisdom in its formal, scientific character. Hence it is inevitable
that, even on those questions where there is fundamental agreement, he, would be obliged to correct and extend the position of
Kierkegaard. The latter always remained an informal religious
thinker and poet, whose thought-processes shied away from
complete scientific formulation and comprehensiveness. It is a
definite test of Thomistic wisdom to evaluate such a resistant
and elusive attitude without transmogrifying it into that Systematic caricature so dreaded and detested by Kierkegaard.

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PHILOSOPHY

445

Five concrete instances are selected for brief illustration of
this comparative problem. An open and enterprising perennial philosophy cannot ignore the questions raised by Kierkegaard; still less can it afford to slight the sound discoveries he
has made.
1. THE STARTING POINT OF COGNITION

Kierkegaard voices the general dissatisfaction felt during the
eighteen-forties about Hegel's attempt to philosophize on the
basis of a purely undetermined notion of being. The human
mind is not so constructed that it can make a pres'uppositionless beginning. Although it may start a process of demonstration and exposition at some .definite point, this is a first step
only in the methodological sense. Actually, this starting point
has been prepared and determined by previous activity of an
intellectual sort. Moreover, understanding always conies after
the fact. " The fact " refers to the total matrix as it embraces
both the knower and the surrounding world in their status as
existents. Some transaction between these centers at the precognitive level is supposed before· knowledge becomes actual.
Cognition is one form of motion or becoming. As such, it requires an initial movement of actualization which is not itself
cognitive but which naturally leads to knowing. There is something irreducible and inexhaustible about that which we come
to know through this process of attentive fecundation by the
existent world. We draw upon its resources more than idealists
and pragmatjsts are ready to admit. We are existentially
affected by the thing as a condition for knowing it and for
using or transforming it to suit our practical purposes.
Kierkegaard's defense of the autonomous condition of knowledge is a reminder that religion is not forced to choose between
the pantheistic God of idealism and the finite, developing God
of pragmatism. The latter conception has been constructed as
a curative against the popular image of a remote, vengeful deity
as well as the more sophisticated Absolute Mind of the idealists.
But neither of these notions of the infinite God has any standing in the main body of the Christian philosophical tradition:

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JAMES COLLINS

they are poles removed from the Augustinist and Thomistic
doctrines on God and the world. Kierkegaard saw the need
for a realistic basis of religious belief; he also recognized that a
man can worship only a God Who retains infinite majesty and
goodness of being. There was no conflict in Kierkegaard's
mind between a realistic view of the individual and his cognition
and an affirmation of the transcendence and perfect actuality of
God. This suggests that the empiricist proponents of a finite
deity have been proceeding on a false alternative. Kierkegaard
sought to make return both to realism and to a worthy theistic
view of God.
That he did not complete the integral recovery of realism is
evident even in regard to the present question. He makes only
casual mention of whether knowledge should start with the
world about us or with man. A sound instinct told him that
there is no genuine disjunction here, even though his Augustinist
leanings led him to give factual preference to man. Yet he does
not begin with man in the manner of recent Cartesians: he
would not concur with the choice of the abstract, fugitive
pour soi of Sartre as the foundation for existential meditation.
It is rather man the exister who serves as the priming point
for Kierkegaard. What attracted him to this pole of existential act is the notable fact that in man existence and cognition
are inextricably bound together. Man is an interesse, a synthesis of being and knowing. Or rather, he exists in such fashion
that his highest act is one of knowing and modifying in a free
way his own existent condition. In the human mode of being,
Kierkegaard saw the most convincing proof and basis of realism.
Thought and reality are not confused in man, and neither are
they alienated from each other. Neither idealism nor phenomenalism translates the human situation in a faithful way.
Thought bears a reference to reality because the thinker first
exists and because it is characteristic of his cognitive acts
themselves to belong to the realm of existence. Their function
is to bring to the perfection of self-awareness and self-determination. This is man's calling and one basis of his claim to
dignity.

KIERKEGAARD AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

447

Existentialists have gone a step beyond this by systematically
excluding the non-human world as a basis for speculation. This
has led them to develop a man-centered metaphysics, in which
the modes of human being become the dominant modes of
being generally and the constructive laws of each man's projection of his own world. Kierkegaard himself would not agree
to this further inference. He was unable to explain how an
existential knowledge of the world can be acquired, but at least
he allowed that the essential determinations attained through
the sciences do belong to the public realm of intersubjective
knowledge and do describe the real universe. Furthermore, one
of his major contentions against Hegel implied a wider scope to
existential knowledge than he recognized. The only way to
show that the self-movement of the dialectical Idea is logical
rather than real movement is to appeal to sense perception of
the physical world. Kierkegaard accepts the Aristotelian
dictum that real change is first grasped through the senses; it
is a given factor which cannot be generated by pure thought
alone. He would agree with Feuerbach that the apprehension
of real change as such is the accomplishment of the understanding in cooperation with the senses. Only the negative aspect of
this thesis was exploited against Hegel. But it has as its posifunctioning in its
tive side the admission that
properly human mode along with sense perception, apprehends
an existential process independent of man. With the aid of
the senses, some knowledge can be gained about existential acts
other than that of the reflective, moral subject.
Kierkegaard's appeal to the senses admits of one further
inference. Since thought by itself cannot grasp change and
the existent, a certain primacy must be accorded to our sense
acquaintance with the world of natural things. It is indispensable for every existential cognition, including that of the
human self. Kierkegaard's inability to achieve a lasting synthesis between body and soul is due not only to psychological
reasons but also to a failure to work out this implication. The
empirical bias of Aristotle and Aquinas is a needed corrective
of this deficiency. These philosophers recognize that self-

448

knowledge is conditioned by knowledge
the physical world.
Our knowing powers, are awakened in an existential direction
through sensuous perception of natural things. There is no
independent, exhaustive understanding of the soul, although
we become aware of the fact of its existence cQncmnitantly with
the exercise of our knowing powers in respect to material things.
All of our subsequent reasoning must be br6ught back eventually to the criterion of sense perception, for it is here that the
intellect first meets existence. We need not follow Hume in
consigning all metaphysical inferences to the flames, but we
should cast off all such reasonings as have no warrant whatever
in the evidence provided by the sense .world. The quarrel of
the theists with naturalistic empiricists is not over the indispensable character of sense experience but over its implications.

2.

THE

Mom1s OF BEING

It is a commonplace among contemporary existentialists that
" existence " is derived from " ex-sistere," to stand out from.
They go on to explain that the existent is that which asserts
itself in the face of the nought. Remarkably enough, this
etymological prologue is often followed by a thoroughly idealistic dialectic of being and nothing. This transition could not.
have been made so easily, had these existentialists really respected the mind of Kierkegaard, who does not contrast the
existent primarily: with unqualified nothingness. This opposition does obtain, "''but it comes too close to Hegel's pairing of
" being" and" non-being" to serve as the basic contrast. Much
more pertinent is the fact that existential act stands out from
both pure thought and possibility. The opposition between
existence and pure Systematic thought enables Kierkegaard to
distinguish existence from every moment in the Systematic
dialectic, including the initial antithesis between " being " and
"non-being." He sets the existential order off from the pure
concept of " being " just as definitively as from the Speculative
explanation of the nought. To exist is to exercise a mode of
being totally distinct from the entire Speculative play upon

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AND CHRISTIAN

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449

the concepts of in-itself and for-itself, en soi and pour soi (to
employ Sartre's terms) .
Even within the realm of real being, however, there is a
contrast between existence and ·mere capacity for existence.
Kierkegaard appropriates for himself the Aristotelian distinction between potential and actual being, with the added precision that the ultimate act of a concrete nature is the act of
existing itself. Until it has received this ultimate and unique
perfection, the thing is still comprised within its causes; it cannot be said to be in a plenary way until it 'exists in its own
right and on its own foundation. In this sense, existence is a
mark that the thing has passed from potential to actual being
in a completed way as an individual entity. This involves a
standing forth from one's causal principle as well as from the
potential mode of being. For Kierkegaard, there is no contradiction between being an existent thing and a caused one. In
fact, his analysis of the historicity of existence reveals that
the only way in which any existent emerges is by means of a
passage from potential to actual being. Such a transition can
be made only under the active influence of a cause, which
confers the act of existing upon the thing in process. One of
the main objections levelled against monistic idealism is precisely its suppression of the efficient cause of change in favor of
the ground-consequent relation between concepts. Sartre slips
. back into this idealistic attitude when he construes the standing forth of the existent self as a form of self-interrogation
within brute existence.
An analysis of history revealed to Kierkegaard that the
existent is that which has come to be by way of passing from
potency to act through the operation of an efficient cause.
Gilson's historical research has established that the close association between existing and having an origin from a cause
was the characteristic Christian view of existence until the
modern period. Augustine and Aquinas would have understood
Kierkegaard's assertion that God does not exist, He is.1 Kirke1

Cf. St. Thomas' Commentary on the Liber De Causis, lect. 6.

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JAMES COLLINS

gaard liked to reflect upon the Biblical saying that in God
there is no shadow of alteration, and hence he denied to God
a mode of being which signifies change. To Augustine as well,
the divine immutability is a distinctive attribute setting off
the eternal way of being from that of temporal things. One
way of expressing the divine transcendence is to deny to God a
manner of being which involves change and causation. Aquinas
respects this meaning of existence and occasionally refers to
God as non-existens. On the other hand, he also observes that
change and causation are only associated with existence because of the finite way in which it is present in creatures, not
because of an intrinsic connection. In so far as they approach
to perfection, created things approach to a more perfect act' of
existing. Causation and change are not the a'.ct of existing
itself hut only the means whereby finite, historical beings gain
access to existential act. Although the created conditions and
limitations of existence do not apply to God, He does realize
in its full perfection the act of existing. He alone is a subsistent act of existing, unmixed with any shadow of change
and causation. He is esse super omne ens, the supreme act of
existing not subject to the conditions under which finite entities
share in the perfection of the existential order. What Kierkegaard and Augustine call God's eternal being is metaphysically
designated by Aquinas as His subsistent act of existing. In
this way, some knowledge can be acquired about the purely
actual being of God with the aid of that which exists by coming
to be in a caused, historical way.
This conception of existence also provides a solid theoretical
basis for Kierkegaard's belief in the hierarchy of beings. He
was not much concerned about determining all the aspects
whereby man differs from other beings in the material world.
All of his attention was concentrated upon the polar relation
between God and man, eternity and history. The great divisions of real being are into potential and actual, existential
and eternal. The presence of eternity to time illuminated all
of his meditations and trials, for the distinction between man
and God does not lead to God's banishment from the sphere of

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AND CHRISTIAN

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451

time. God's immanence to creation, indeed, is secured only by
His infinite perfection, since only a being of unlimited actuality
and power can be effectively present to others without tending
to displ;:ice or flatten them. The divine omnipresence is a
generous, creative one and, in the case of man, it is the very
condition of the use of created freedom. The fresh note sounded
in Kierkegaard's doctrine on the human individual is the refusal to found individual integrity upon a rhetorical claim to
self-sufficiency. Instead, man's freedom is proportioned to his
acknowledgment of the majesty of God and his own ordination
to a share in eternal life.
The naturalistic assumption that a theory of grades of being
is inevitably derogatory of man and sapping of his initiative
has seldom been subjected to critical examination by the
naturalists themselves. It was elevated into a truism in Kierkegaard's day by Feuerbach, and has continued to remain unquestioned in Marxian and Deweyan naturalism. But the
recognition of higher forms of being need not entail a devaluation of lower forms. Man's place in the cosmos must first be
determined on grounds of present fact, before we consider the
consequences. Some sort of hierarchy is present in a universe
which permits of wider sharings in value and more adequate
embodiments of the traits of experience. Because he admitted
that teinporal existence is ordained eternity,
did
not therefore counsel men to flee from their historical, mundane
responsibilities. Rather, he asked them to face these problems
with awareness of an added dimension provided by God's eternal power. If he did not develop this theme with strict consequence, the weakness lies not in his conviction about the
hierarchy of beings but in his ethical and theological conception
of man. The latter doctrines are not linked intrinsically with
his view of existence and eternal being; quite the contrary:
they tend to hamper the natural development of a doctrine of
participated freedom, social as well as personal.

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JAMES COLLINS

3.

SPECULATIVE

AND SYSTEMATIC

KNOWLEDGE

Kierkegaard's commitments concerning being and existence
also
in uneasy relation to his
and antiSystematic campaign. The temptation arises to consign his
own metaphysical notions to some non-philosophical limbo. He
resembled Marx both in proclaiming the downfall of philosophy
and in contributing a good deal toward its advancement.
Neither thinker could bring an era of philosophical speculations to an end without helping to generate a new phase in its
history. Kierkegaard's tragedy was that there was no philosophical movement on the horizon which could find a place for
his deliverances. After a shrewd appraisal of contemporary
tendencies, he concluded that at its worst philosophy degenerates into the Hegelian " pure thought " and at its best remains
an analysis of essential forms. He saw no way of incorporating
his existential insights into any of the systems of his day. This
forced him to give them an exclusively religious connotation
and to depreciate their metaphysical consequences, except for
polemical purposes.
Yet in his writings there is observable a definite strain of
sustained, theoretical reasoning. His actual practice belies his
words and compels us to distinguish between the historical
forms of philosophy with which he was acquainted and other ·
possibilities for philosophy. Kierkegaard did not leave entirely
unexplored the alternative routes to philosophical wisdom. For
instance, he reproached Hegel for introducing the readers of his
Philosophy of History straightway to particular trends of events
instead of giving a careful explanation of historical process and
knowledge as such.
Why at once become concrete, why at once begin to experiment
in concreto? Was it not possible to answer this question in the
dispassionate brevity of the language of abstraction, which has no
means of distraction or enchantment, this question of what it means
that the Idea becomes concrete, what is the nature of becoming,
what is one's relationship to that which has come into being, and
so forth? 2
1

Pkiloso-pkicalFragments (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 64, n. I.

KIERKEGAARD AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

458

Save for the name, this is asking why Hegel does not examine
more exactly the speculative problems underlying philosophy
of history. Most of the above-mentioned questions are treated
in a quite formal and technical way by Kierkegaard himself.
In turn, we can interrogate him as to whether his own stand
on the modes of being has only an abstract, essentialist significance. An admission that it does convey some knowledge
about the universe in its existential character paves the way
for a philosophical approach which will avoid the morass of
absolute idealism without remaining content with a phenomenological description of essential structures.
A few philosophies have addressed themselves primarily to
the problem of existence. One of these is that of Aquinas. It
is orientated to the study of existence precisely because it is a
philosophy. of being. As the science of being as such, metaphysics is directed primarily to the most radical principles of
being: essence and existence. The beings of our experience
are constituted not only by a determinate nature but also by
an ultimate act whereby this concrete subject is enabled to
be in the existential order. In virtue of the act of existing, the
individual takes its place among the actual entities of the world.
Since a thing is not a being in the full sense until it exercises
this existential act, a philosophy of being must have special
regard for the existential order. The intelligible structure of
the entity is secured by its essence, whereas its fruitful sharing
in the community of the actual universe requires a decisive
posing of this essence through the existential act. There is no
basis fol.i Sartre's charge that classical metaphysics favors
essence over existence. It is not a question of favoring one
over the other but of giving due recognition to the contribution of each to the concrete entity. This enables us to take
account of experience both as intelligible and as urgently
existential.
Two features of the Thomistic " existential communication "
are relevant here. In the first place, it is elaborated in a strictly
theoretical and systematic fashion; secondly, it entails a sharp
delimitation of the scope of speculative and systematic thinking

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JAMES COLLINS

in view of the existential nature of the real world. It avoids
Kierkegaard's justifiable strictures against the Hegelian conception of philosophical science, without surrendering the rights
of a scientific treatment of being as existent. Allowance is
made for a more practical and homiletic discussion of existence,
although the latter is not given exclusive competence. This is
the proper function of a metaphysical norm when confronted
with the Hegel-Kierkegaard debate.
The meaning attached by Hegel to speculation is peculiar to
his standpoint of absolute idealism. His method and his doctrine stand in circular relation to one another, so that if the
one is undermined, the other collapses. Apart from his conception of Absolute Mind, there is no reason for regarding the
speculative process as a self-enclosed, autonomous method. Unless one is already convinced that philosophizing is an expression of the dialectical growth of Absolute Mind itself, there is
no ground for robbing the finite individual of its proper significance, inalienable freedom and responsibility. By attacking
Kierkegaard was preparing the way
this absolutist
unwittingly for a renaissance of that kllid of speculation which
displays a truly humane character. The goods of human life
are not jeopardized by a speculative activity operating within
a realistic and theistic context. Here the speculative method
is not a:gtagonistic to subjective interests or practical understanding; rather, it underlies these other aspects of the human
spirit as a reliable foundation and guide.
To speculate means to engage in a quest for the truth for
its own sake, but without any implication that the relation of
the knowing subject to the truth is unimportant or that our
work as men is completed once we gain a knowledge of what
things are. Speculative truths are self-justified in the sense
that a knowledge of them satisfies a desire of our intelligence
simply to know the nature and existential act of things. But
these truths also have a paramount bearing upon our practical
outlook and upon praxis itself. Metaphysics tends to be a
wisdom not only as contemplation of the widest truths about
the traits of being but also as regulation of the whole order of
1

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455

goods and actions. The aim of the wise man is to realize the
most intimate synthesis between practical and theoretical
understanding and to order action in the light of this unified
insight. Speculative wisdom is at the service of the whole man.
A similar case is presented by the ideal of systematic construction. There is a minimal and neutral sense in which
every thinker of any calibre must be systematic. He must
try to furnish an explanation on the basis of reliable principles,
consistent inferences and ever more inclusive evaluations of
experience. It is supposed that the object of inquiry is to some
degree intelligible to us and patient of being expressed in a
unified body of knowledge or a system. But absolute idealism
adds considerably to this minimum. It interprets the systemic
enterprise in terms of an organismic theory of reality and the
mind's relations to things. Being is said to be not only intelligible in itself but, in principle, completely available to the
philosopher. The proportion between mind and thing is founded
on a view that the existent world is an " estranged " product
of Mind and is destined for complete return to the conceptual
state. The mind can totally comprehend nature because nature is the state of Mind-fa-estrangement from itself. Whatever resists assimilation to the philosophical concept is thereby
shown to be caught in illusion and standing in need of " sublation" to a higher level. The philosophical system in its conceptual interconnections is an adequate transcription of the
world as a dialectical organism. This was the common interpretation of absolute idealism which led Kierkegaard to rebel
despairingly against systematic thinking.
Most non-idealistic philosophers would agree with him in repudiating this latter idea of a system, but they would do so
·without prejudice to the more restrained statement. St. Thomas
adds a metaphysical reason why the extreme view is untenable.
In the speculative order, we cannot legislate about the human
condition but must accept it as we :find it. The human mind
is not divine and its concepts not creative. By means of our
concepts and empirical investigation, we can attain to some
understanding of the structure of being through its experienced
2

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JAMES COLLINS

traits. But .we are not equipped to gain an immediate and
exhaustive insight into essences, such that they might be completely assimilated to a system. The perfection of human
1..'llowledgeis achieved in the judgment about existence, since
this is the way in which the mind expresses to itself the perfect
act of being. The existential judgment affirms that the thing
exercises its own act of existing, that it stands forth from the
realm of concepts and possibles. By implication, this judgment also. affirms that the being of the thing remains other
than and inore than the judging act and its conceptual factors.
The human intellect acknowledges but does not ingest the
existing world. To understand the existent is to make a conquest w;hose gromid is a confession of humility before the given.
Not only at the beginning of the philosophical enterprise
but also at every subsequent phase, we are striving to grasp
that which can never be transferred in its entirely into the
order of concepts and judgments. The individual being remains other than philosophical thought in virtue of the act of
existing. Hence it ·furnishes the philosopher with constant
nourishment, mystery and incitell!ent to 'make further discoveries. Its otherness is not a self-deception on the part of
an Absolute Mind but the integrity which every individual
existent demands for itself. An existential philosophy must
be an open rather than a closed, circular discipline, a system
always in the making and always subject to revision and unexpected advance. In this way, it escapes the force of Kierkegaard's ironical comment that the System must already be
completed in principle on pain of not being a System at all.
4.

THE WHOLE

MAN

The Thomistic theory of man is a remarkable instance of the
application of existential principles to a specific domain of
being. In main part, Kierkegaard's ideas on man can be
incorporated into this Christian anthropology without detriment to the general structure. Among Kierkegaard's major
contentions are that man is finite, a body-soul complex whole,

KIERKEGAARD

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457

and a passional creature. These three points can serve as a
frame of reference in showing the relation between metaphysics
and existential meditation.
What makes a thing to be a. created, finite being? Aquinas
departs from some earlier traditions by explaining finiteness in
terms of essence and existence rather than matter and form.
There might be entities which would be free from matter and
yet be finite. What is distinctive about the finite mode of
being is the presence of really distinct and radically constitutive principles of being: essence and existence. These factors
compose with each other as a concrete subject and its ultimate
actuation. The perfection of existence is proportioned to the
determinate subject which is actuated, since this ·subject or
nature imposes its own specifying restrictions upon the act of
existing. The concrete essence is itself a limited capacity for
receiving the existential act. The actual being constituted by
the union of such an essence with its proportionate act in the
existential order is a finite existent. Not only its essential
nature and mode of existing but also its powers and mode of
operating partake of this limitation. It is thoroughly and
permanently a finite being, even though it can attain progressive contljol over its field of experience.
Men are finite beings in this sense. It may be true, as Hegel
states, that finitude as such is a category of the understanding,
but this does not apply to the individual finite acts of being
which are the real foundation for thecategory. They are not
mere modes of reason which feign to be independent of mind
and distinct from the Absolute. Finite beings are, Kierkegaard
observes, other than the categories whereby they can be classified and analyzed. Similarly, they affirm by all that is real
within them their decisive otherness from an infinite being,
in which no real distinction can be drawn between essence and
existence. The divine essence has no limits since it is nothing
other than the very act of existing in its unrestricted perfection.
Finite things are caused by the infinitely actual being: they
are not masked developments of this being. Each of them is a
unique and rich act, an integral whole rather ·than a moment

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JAMES COLLINS

in a dialectical process. This is most evident in the case of
human persons. The person is aware of himself as an inalienable center of existence and freedom. He cannot be assumed
into any higher state of being; that which could be so assumed
would never have been a person. The individual is terminated
in itself, and the human individual seals this termination with
an affirmation of his own selfhood and self-mastery. He is not
only made to exist: he deliberately asserts himself as an
existent and a moral character which cannot be attributed to
another entity,
In describing the nature of the human person, Kierkegaard
makes a deliberate return to the threefold division of bodysoul-spirit so dear to the Fathers of the Church and other
spiritual writers. Not only as a weapon against Hegel but also
as a means for describing the interior struggle that accompanies the birth of a mature personality, he found this conception of man a useful one. It is a division also recognized by
Aquinas, who usually tries to find a place for the empirical
data and spiritual tools of the Fathers. Hence he notes that
what is ordinarily referred to as the rational, human soul is at
once a soul and a spirit. 3 It is a soul in so far as it commi.micates life to matter, and this function it shares with all other
life principles in the material world. But what elevates it
above the others is its own spiritual character. The human
soul not only informs matter but has its own subsistent mode
of being, which is not intrinsically dependent upon matter. It
can receive and exercise the act of existing in its own right, so
that it does not perish in the extreme case when the body is
dissolved. This is the metaphysical aspect of its spirituality.
Nevertheless, this same spiritual principle is also the enlivening soul ofmatter. The existential act is not only received by
the human soul but is naturally communicated by it to its
proper matter in the formation of the body. The soul is a
part of human nature and has its complete natural perfection
only as united with its body. Soul and matter are joint principles specifying the structure of human nature: were they
8

Summa Tkeologiae, I, q. 97, a. S, c.

KIERKEGAARD .AND CHRISTIAN

PHILOSOPHY

459

not both present, we could not be the kind of beings we indeed
are. The genuine human individual, the person in the proper
sense, is the individual composite whole of soul and matter. In
their union is found the mode of being distinctive of man.
This is our only safeguard against assimilation to the angels
on the one side and mere things on the other. From the former
we are set off by the material factor in our being, and from the
latter by the immaterial nature of our soul or Jormal principle.
Metaphysically regarded, the human spirit is not a third something superadded to soul and body: it is the soul itself regarded
in its distinctively human status as an immaterial act of being.
Kierkegaard gave sho.rt shrift to theological speculations
about the " rectitude or state of integrity " of the human soul
before the Fall. Yet he might have profited by a reading of
the pages devoted by St. Thomas to this topic. 4 St. Thomas
inquires whether a perfect subjection of the body to the soul
and its government belongs to our natural equipment. He replies in the negative and adds that, since the Fall, the soul's
task of securing order and unity in the person has been made
mo!e difficult. lts aim OtJght not to be the suppression of the
bodily side of man but its proper ordering, so that the entire
man may share in material and spiritual goods in due proportion. The primacy of the spiritual principle in man is to be
established, not its exclusive rights. It is a question of subordination and synthesis, not of suppression and elimination. Here
is where the problem of man ceases to belong solely to the
speculative sciences. There are moral and religious difficulties
standing in the way of a harmonious development of personal
life. Kierkegaard's interpretation of spirit can be inserted at
this place in a discussion of humanism. For it concerns the
manner in which personal. existence is orientated to good or
evil in accord with a dominant ideal.
Both man's finite nature and his composite character as a
soul-body complexus have a bearing upon the problem of the
"passions." This term is taken here in the Kierkegaardian
sense of stressing the real distinction between the cognitive
•Summa Theol., I, q. 94,

c.; q. 95, a. I, c.

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J·AMES COLLINS

and the conative aspects of human nature. Hegel did not require Kierkegaard's tutelage to instruct him about the power
of the passions in determinillg human affairs. One of the leitmotifs in the Hegelian philosophy of history is the passional
aspect of man, his all-consuming concern for his proper, subjective interests. But Hegel regarded this moment of passion as
trick played upon
eventually upon itself-by Absolute Mind, as a ruse of providence for attaining its own ends
despite our egoism. Not the existence and importance of the
passions but their non-cognitive and non-absolutist character
is the point at issue.. Kierkegaard found no evidence which
would warrant reducing the passions to aspects of knowledge
and the march. of the Absolute Spirit through time.
In a realist philosophy of creaturely, participated being, it is
impossible to confuse the two orders. To know a thing does
not forthwith place us in full possession of it. The knowledge
must be followed through· with desire, decision and effort, if
the relation is to be made more intimate; This is due to something more than a defect in our knowledge. It cannot be said
that if we did have sufficient knowledge about the object, nothing more would be wanting in the order of aesire. That something over and above the cognitive possession of the thing is
demanded, foltows from our :finiteness. We still yearn for a
fuller grasp, because of the limits of our nature and its exigency
for other goods. Man is related to things not only as objects
to knoWn but als9 as goods or ends to be pursued. He would
be deluding himself to hope to maintain a purely theoretical
attitude in the face of the world of experienced goods, for he
needs to go out to them and obtain them .in their own actuality. No,,- can knowledge pass through the human mind in a
purely impersonal and disinterested fashion, as it does through
a complex calculating machine. In us, knowing is a personal
act which must be appropriated in a personal way and ordained
to the good of the individual man under the rule of prudence.
Since man is not pure mind and will, he also experiences
bodily desires or passions in the ordinary sense. Kierkegaard's
esthetic individual is entangled in the net of the passions and

a

KIERKEGAARD AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

461

yet is not sufficiently passionate to assume mastery over his
own life. The paradox is resolved by recalling that the will
is regarded by Kierkegaard as a major natural passfon. To be
lacking in passion is to fail to achieve the synthesis of psychophysical powers under the guiding discipline of interested reason and will. But little is said about the bodily passions in
reference to· moral and religious life. Kierkegaard is so preoccupied with a description of such spiritual passional states
as dread, despair and faith that he often loses sight of the total
person and the problem of integrating all the passional drives.
Neglect of this kind is dangerous, since it leaves the individual
exposed to sudden waves of bodily passion which cannot be
correlated with the spiritual aims of the person. Conflict and
disorder are the consequences, instead of a progressive unification of appetites.
Methodologically, the Thomistic approach to man stands
that of Kierkegaard and that of contemporary
midway
naturalists. It has in common with the latter a program of
studying man along with the other beings in the material universe for their common features. He is a changing, material,
striving existent to whom applies all that can be gathered
about the general traits of process, purpose, vital function and
value. · Kierkegaard would include all the evidence gathered
by this method under the headings of objective or essentialist
truth, but it would also have existential significance, if it be
seen that the theoretical judgments about existence are possible. Kierkegaard is justified; however, in insisting that man
represents a distinctive embodiment of the notes of existence
and that this requires a causal as well as a descriptive explanation. He helps one to strike a balance between ·interest in
widest generality of explanation and respect for the differences
between modes of existence and the causal implications of these
differences. Man exists in a distinctively personal way as a
reflective and free agent. His culture and moral personality
are the work of freedom and-Kierkegaard would add-of
divine government. Man's way of existing rests on a recognition of his placement in the existing world and his vocation
to participate in the source of existence.

462

JAMES COLLINS

5.

FAITH AND REASON

Being a hundred years removed from Kierkegaard, we sometimes make inferences from his stated position which he himself
would not admit. Because he preached the scandalous crucifixion of reason on the tree of faith, .we are ready to conclude
that he is anti-intellectual or, more subtly still, that he is
engaged in discrediting religious faith indirectly in the eyes of
intelligent men. His actual intent is much less forbiddng and
devious than is sometimes supposed. He was confronted with
a peculiar sort of rationalism, not one which oulawed faith as
nonsense but one which clasped it so vigorously to itself that
faith was suffocated in the embrace. Consequently, there was
no more effective temporary strategy than to proclaim the
utter irreconcilability between religious truth and an absolutist
brand of reason. Kierkegaard hesitated to say anything in
human tongue about Christian faith under these circumstances.
He had his pseudonym, Johannes Climacus, advance a distinction between a doctrine or philosophical exposition of faith and
an existential communication after the manner of a subjective
truth. 5 It seemed to him that the ordinary doctrinal treatment fails. to arouse individual response and that ordinary
apologetical methods betray a lack of confidence in faith.
St. Thomas kept his sermons and his theological treatises
separate, but he held that theology is the one science which is
doctrine should not be
both speculative and practical.
treated .in a purely speculative way, since it is formally concerned not only with God but also with the direction of human
actions to the vision of God. Hence it fulfills in the highest
degree the requirements of wisdom, which judges and orders
all matters in the light of man's final end. On the other hand,
Aquinas made the fullest use of reason in examining the content of faith. This he did without any implication that it is
due to the weakness of his belief or to a compromise between
natural and supernatural orders of assent. The theological use
• Concluding Unscientific Postscript (Princeton:
1941)' p. 889.

Princeton University Press,

KIERKEGAARD

AND CHRISTIAN

PHILOSOPHY

468

of ordinary human reason, unhampered by the pretensions of
absolute idealism, does not rest on such motives but on a realistic appraisal of man. Just as we cannot decree man into becoming a phase of ·Absolute Mind, so we cannot decree th::i.t
faith and reason will have no commerce in him.
Man is a being who knows in part and believes in part, but
both believing and knowing help to perfect his one personal
outlook.
has a native tendency to unify the truths to which
he assents, bringing the deliverances of faith to bear upon the
life of reason and, conversely, exploring the groundwork of faith
with the aid of reason. Augustine and Anselm set the pattern
for this view of the normal intercourse between faith and reason when they formulated the guiding axiom of Christian
wisdom: I believe so that I niay understand, and I understand so that I may believe. The purpose of a Christian wisdom is not to erase the distinction between understanding and
believing but to keep open the lines of communication and
mutual aid. 6 St. Augustine compares this polar activity to the
moral dialectic of coming into possession of finite goods so that
one may desire the supreme good all the more intensely. Truth
is ultimately one not only in its primary source, God, but also
in the final tendencies of believing and understanding. Reason
is strengthened in its operation by the direction it receives
from faith. The latter, in turn, draws upon the resources of
reason in order to make intelligible that which has been revealed. If faith seeks after direct insight into the grounds of
supernatural truth, it specifies as its goal not philosophical
cognition but the sheer vision of God face to face.
St. Thomas customarily distinguishes between two sorts of
truth in the content of revelation. Some truths are of a strictly
supernatural sort, which could in no way be discovered by
unaided reason. Other truths do not surpass the natural capacity of reason, but nevertheless have been revealed because of
their importance for our salvation and the weakness of our
mind in its actual condition. In this way, the mysteries of the
•Cf. the illuminating remarks in E. Gilson: L'Etre et l'ewsence (Paris: Vrin,
1948)' pp. 240-242.

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COLLINS

Trinity and the Incarnation are set off from revealed assurances about immortality and providence. Because he did not
make this distinction, Kierkegaa:rd took needless scandal at
any philosophical treatment of questions like immortality and
divine providence. It seemed to him that these matters could
not be handled philosophically without reducing the entire
content of faith to the level of natural reason and philosophical
fact that both faith and reason can
criteria. But from
deal with these truths it only follows that there are som,e revealed truth which can be believed at one time and known at
another, or believed by one individual and known by another.
In regard to the mysteries of faith which are above our natural
power of proof, however, Kierkegaard is justified in protesting against efforts to provide philosophical demonstration.
Revelation is not, as Fichte dreamed, a sort of V olksausgabe
or vulgar version of what reason will later establish philosophically. Neither is our saving adherence to revealed truth
an exclusively intellectual act, isolated from the affective side
of man's life. Kierkegaard's analysis tells also against the
rationalistic theologians who had forgotten the influence of
will upon intellect in the free and supernatural act of believing. There is a close resemblance between the dialectic which
Augustine found between love and understanding in the growth
of faith and Kirkegaard's appeal for renewed cooperation between passion, will and interested reason. Both these Christian thinkers are only recalling in their own generation the
Biblical conception of fides caritate f ormata, faith quickened
and warmed by love of God above all.
Crisis theologians like Emil Brunner have followed Kierkegaard in locating faith formally in the subjective act of believiµg and personal encounter with Christ. 7 It is a welcome reSee E. Brunner: Revelation and Reason (Philadelphia: Westminster Press,
1946), pp. 86, 156; chapter !l5 is a remarkable plea (against Barth) for a Reformed Christian philosophy along Kierkegaardian lines. For a critical disciission
of the attitude of neo-orthodoxy toward faith and reason, cf. L. H. DeWolf: The
Religious Revolt Against Reason (New York: Harper, 1949). The be5t account
of the theological aspects of existentialism is Dante Morando's Saggi au l'esistensialismo teologico (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1949); chapter 8 is on Barth.

KIERKEGAARD

AND CHRISTIAN

PHILOSOPHY

465

minder that all the roads of Christian existence lead to the
person of the Word of God made flesh. But it was difficult
for Kierkegaard to avoid correlating what older theologians
called the act of believing-fides qua creditur-with the truths
and the personal Truth revealed· for our assent and adhesionfides quae creditur. Taken, by itself, a theological science
which concentrates upon the latter is bound to issue in dead
formalism and insensitivity to the need for devotion to, and
personal sacrifice for the sake of, revealed truth. But the believing act, if cultivated in isolation, leads to
sentimentality and undisciplined enthusiasm, consequences which were
equally repugnant to Kierkegaard. Both aspects of faith belong
to the foundation of Christian life, since they .both lead men
to the person of Christ.
The difficulty of maintaining intimate contact and balance
between dogma and devotion, creed and cult, suggests that
the problem of faith cannot be resolved merely from the standpoint of the individual believer and an invisible company of
believers. It is also a matter of joint concern to a Church or
visible body of believers. Faith incorporates one into the wider
religious community in its incarnate form as a Church. It
makes the demand that we ·acknowledge God not only in the
privacy of our hearts but also in a public and corporate way
along with our fellow believers. The movement of existence
impels the man of faith toward visible and soeial confession
of that faith and a corresponding communal act of worship.
Kierkegaard hesitated to make this inference, however, lest it
commit him once again to the Hegelian organic whole. Having
criticized the latter as being destructive of the individual, he
remained forever wary of visible expressions of the social aspect
of religion. This is a final instance in which it would ,be fatal
for us to lend unconditional normative value to· his criticisms.
JAMES COLLINS

Saint Louis Unive;rsity,
Saint Louis, Mo.

THE PLATONIC THEORY OF INSPIRATION

T

HIS essay makes no attempt to locate, describe or
evaluate an aesthetic along Platonic lines. Many qualified men have done this adequately-in fact, exceedingly
well, considering that they have generally read an integrated
and extensive aesthetic where there were, at most, but indications from Plato himself.
The contributions made by Plato towards an aesthetic are
three-fold. He suggestively treated (1) the character or
make-up of art, (fl) its moral consequences and (3) the inspiration of art. It is well known that for Plato artistic production is but an imitation of an imitation, a product thriceremoved from reality. From this it is easy to see how and why
the censorship of Homer and all other poets came about in
the tenth book of the Republic. The core of this development,
the premise underlying the logic of Plato's dicta, is to be found
in the theory of inspiration.
This essay reports what Plato said about this last element
of a complete aesthetic: the nature of inspiration. Of the
three main topics of aesthetic importance in Plato, it has remained the least commented upon. There are two probable
reasons for past neglect of the theory 'Of inspiration. In the
first place, the theory had not been accorded a sufficient importance; and secondly, there is very little available material
from Plato himself with which to work.
The basic issues in this study are not what attitudes were
adopted by Plato, but why; not what are the superficial reasons given for his attitudes, but what valid and more satisfactory explanations may be found and what more pertinent
connections may be made with the more acceptable aspects
of Platonic philosophy. The answers lie in the theory of
inspiration.
My approach to the subject is from the primary sources,
466

THE PLATONIC

THEORY OF INSPIRATION

467

with some research in the Greek language to trace the literal
and metaphorical usages of certain key words. All the textual
references are to the Random House edition,1 following the
Stephanus pagination.
1.

FUNCTION OF INSPIRATION

The function of a thing is the criterion of its usefulness. The
function of the theory of inspiration should, in some adequate
way, explain Plato's statements about it. Prima facie, of course,
this theory serves to explain how artistic creation is possible.
If all human endeavor were philosophic, then there could be
no such question. If all human endeavor followed the logic
of the Sophist or the systematic process of inquiry illustrated
in the Theaetetus and the
then there would be
no artistic creation possible, nor any problem concerning its
method. But Plato fully realized that such was not the case;
that productions which did not follow the long and careful and
difficult path of intellectual inquiry and dialectic did come into
being. It became a matter of some importance for him to
account for their existence.
It would be the easy thing simply to say that Plato refutes
the validity of artistic creations: that one could successfully
document Sully's thesis:
In spite of his lofty theory of the origin and nature of beauty,
Plato seems to have imperfectly appreciated the worth of art as
an independent end in human life and culture. He found the end
of art in imitation ... , but estimated the creative activity of art
as a clever knack, a little higher in intellectual value than the
tricks of a juggler. He tended to regard the effects of art as devoid
of all serious value, and as promoting indolence and the supremacy
of the sensual elements of human nature. 2
In the sections that are to follow, Plato's own words on the
subject of inspiration are brought together. They are few and
1 The Dialogues of Plato.
Tr. Benjamin Jowett, 2 vols. (New York: Random
House, 1987.)
•James Sully. "Aesthetics," in the Encyclopaedia Brittanica. 9th ed. (Chicago:
R. S. Peale Co., 1892.)

468

ARTHUR E. VASSILION

not too specific; but they are very suggestive of things which
do not quite enter into the strict survey of the area of inspira·tion. It may be profitable, nevertheless, to correlate these
suggestions into the evaluation of the theory of inspiration.
Baldly speaking, the function of inspiration is to explain
how a particular individual is motivated to create in an artistic
medium, and why his product is what it is. It will become
obvious that Plato actually did not appreciate the process at
all, except in the most superficial and conventional sense. It
will also become obvious that his attitude toward some of the
products of artistic creation is a careful one. Nowhere in Plato
can a denial of the effectiveness of the artistic media be found.
On the contra1y, one of the principal charges that has been
brought against Plato has been that of full awareness of, _and
respect for, the efficacy of artistic productions on the nature
of man. What Plato questions is the responsibility of the
function of inspiration.
One of the aims of this study is to demonstrate a more valid
correlation between the theory of inspiration and the essential
and ultimate suppositions involved in Plato's theory of knowledge. It is in this area that the
of responsibility may
be clarified.
2. INSPIRATION versus ART
The theory of inspiration, which is to be traced in detail in
the following pages, supposedly includes all the creative arts.
In reality, although painting and music (that is, music distinguished by notes, not music in the more. comprehensive
usage of the Greeks) are occasionally mentioned and slightly
discussed, poetry is the major creative medium which Plato
uses in his discussion of inspiration, imitation and censorship.
Poetry of necessity is one of the major arts since, from
antiquity, it has been known as the language of religion. The
value· of the elements which go into what is here called the
theory of inspiration is not affected by the singular emphasis
upon poetry, rather than by a more equitable emphasis upon
all the creative media. Indeed, it is a most natural result since,

THE PLATONIC

THEORY OF INSPIRATION

469

for the early Greeks, only poetry was considered as that most
comprehensive art.
In the Ion we have the first indications of these elements
of inspiration. Ion, the rhi:tpsode, is troubled by Socrates who
good-naturedly berates his so-called special ability to interpret
Homer over and above all other men, while he is deficient fu
the interpretation of any other poet. 8 There is only one major
point in the whole dialogue: that the rhapsode possesses no
learned, conscious, rational interpretation of a poet, but is a
means, an instrument, through which the poetic inspiration is
transmitted.
Socrates tries to explain to Ion what the reason for his deficiency is: " The gift which you possess of speaking excellently
about Homer is not an art, but, as I was just saying, an inspiration; ... " 4 Here we have not only the first direct reference to
inspiration, but also the differentiation which Plato made between art. and inspiration. The Greek words for the various
forms of the verb to inspire throw a good deal of light on this
matter and will continue to do so for the rest of this essay.
Further, the original meanings of these words dispel any illusions concerning a possible " scientific " definition of inspiration and also do away with much that has been read into
Platonic aesthetics.
'Eµ1TvE<»,5 literally means to be filled with breath; e'1Tl,'1Tvoia,
means breathing upon or breathed upon and is the direct form
from which we derive the word " inspiration " borrowed from
the Latin. One who is inspired, or more literally, filled with
God, or possessed, is .one who is evOeot;. It is from this last
word that we derive our word " enthusiasm." This word will
come up again later in a discussion of related influences upon
Plato and will help to determine the differences between literal
and metaphorical usages.
In addition to the above key words, there are several others
"Ion 581 C.
'Ion 538 D.
•All derivations are based upon the Classic Greek Dictionary. (New York:,
Hinds, Noble & Eldredge, 1901.)

470

ARTHUR E. VASSILION

which are interesting to trace in the original and which come
up in the quotations to follow. The word for "art," the
inferior element as Socrates uses it, is TEXV'YJ. This has a variety
of meanings: a skill, a craft, a manner of doing something.
That which is artistic is TEXV£K6v. Two other words occur
several times: Oe'iov and 8aiµ6viov, both of which refer to the
"god-head"; and it is from them that we derive the word
Plato used so often in his classifications, a "divine (r) ."
This brief but illuminating tracing to the original language
shows us several things: that we cannot hope to find in Plato
a· definition of inspiration which is specific and concrete; that
the words for inspiration, inspired, divine and diviner rely for
their definitions upon a whole set of theological and mythological suppositions accepted by Plato at face value. With
such evidence there is no argument. Plato uses words which
cannot be taken out of their context, and their context is
such that there is no ultimate, concrete explanation given. In
other words, those who may like a point by point, step by step
description of the ritual, or process, which an " inspired " poet
may have to go through, should not look to Plato.
It seems obvious that the literal meaning of the words given
previously is the one most closely held in mind by Plato. Few,
I suppose, would deny the explicit accuracy of the classical
Greek language, a language which devised scores of forms to
specify each shade of difference in the meaning of particular
verbs. There was little ambiguity in the Greek language because of this and there is little reason, if any, to read into
the Platonic use of these words the complex ambiguities of
later developed aesthetics.
A man who is evOeoi; is a man full of God. A man full of
God is expressed metaphorically by
one breathed
upon and filled with God. Further than that we cannot accurately go. With these meanings we can certainly determine the
rest of the material upon inspiration which we find in Plato.
The ramifications of these words, in a literary sense, will be
discussed in the conclusions to this essay.

THE PLATONIC

THEORY OF INSPIRATION

471

To return to the Ion again, Socrates, by his example of the
magnetic rings, continues his explanation to the rhapsode that
he is possessed by inspiration, not art, when he speaks of
Homer:
. . . there is a divinity moving you, like that contained in the
stone which Euripedes calls a magnet, but which is commonly
known as the stone of Heraclea. This stone not only attracts iron
rings, but also imparts to them a similar power of attracting other
rings; and sometimes you may see a number of pieces-of iron and
rings suspended from one another so as to form quite a long chain:
and all of them derive their power of suspension from the original
stone. In like manner, the Muse first of all inspires men herself;
and from these inspired persons. a chain of other persons is suspended, who take the inspiration. For all good poets, epic as well
as lyric, compose their beautiful poems not by art, but because
they are inspired and possessed. 6

Plato, by this example, has established the perspective which
he will in future employ in his consideration of the imitative
arts. At the same time, he has come as close to " defining "
the process of inspiration as he ever will. The chain of succession is a passive one, after the original impulse is generated by
the Muse. From then on we have a descending process: GodPoet-Rhapsode.
One can see in this illustration the clear,
yet embryonic, theory of Forms or Ideas. God, who has
thought of the ideal poetry (which resided in the Muse of
poetry for the Greek mind) : the poet who most closely participated or shared in the ideal Form of Poem: the rhapsode
who, by favor of divine influence, most closely approached the
meaning and intent of the poet. It may be clearly seen from
such a perspective that reason is the greatest stumbling block
to true poetic ,creation. The point is intended to prove, as I
see it, that poetry (and, by inference, all the arts) is not actuin a divine
ally a human creation but a human
creation. In such clever ways does Plato set the stage first
for the acceptance of poetry as divine, then for the rejection
of the unthinking human: the poet.
0

Ion 588D.

3

472

ARTHUR E. VASSILION

The discussion continues between Socrates and Ion, and we
now have one of Plato's most sympathetic descriptions of the
artist and his inspiration:
For the poet iS a light and winged and holy thing, and there is no
invention in him until he has been inspired and is out of his senses,
and the mind is no longer in him: .· when he has not· attained to
this state, he is powerless and unable to utter his oracles. Many
are the noble words in which the poets speak concerning the actions
of men; but like yourself when speaking about Homer, they do not
speak of' them by any rules of art: they are simply inspired to
utter that to which the Muse impels them, and that only: ... 1
The poet cannot be rational while engaged in the poetic process: when ' God fills him with breath, there is no room for
human reason. At the same time, Plato acknowledges the
special attributes of the creative artist in his words "a light
and winged and holy thing " and affirms. the lifelong attitude
he kept toward the arts, even though he had to tum away
from their traditional products in his capacity as the philosopher-king of the Republic. 8
A little further down in the discussion, .Plato makes explicit
this direct, divine manipulation of the inspired creative artist:
, . . for not by art does the poet sing, but by power divine. Had
he learned by rules of art, he would have known how to speak
not of one theme only, but of all; and therefore God takes away
the minds of poets, and uses them as his ministers, as he also uses
diviners and holy prophets, in order that we who hear them may
know them to be speaking not of themselves who utter these priceless words .in a state of unconsciousness, but that God himself is
the speaker, and that through them he is conversing with us.9
Now the artist speaks in a "state of unconsciousness," a state
which must imply a metaphorical use to describe that absence
of conscious effort.
Socrates ends the discussion of the inspiration of poets and
of their magnetic influence upon their interp).'eters, the rhapsodes, by telling Ion that if Ion insists that he functions by
art, he is being dishonest by his display of inadequacy; but
'Ion 534BC.

8

Rep. X 607 A.

"Ion 534 C.

THE PLATONIC

THEORY OF INSPIRATION

478

that if he is willing to admit of inspiration by divineinfluence,
then he may be considered in a more noble light. 10
There is a brief but contributive passage in the Apology
which illuminates the growing unrest Plato felt with what he
considered the ineffectuality and decadence of the poetic art,.
Socrates has been informed by the oracle that there is no wiser
man in all the world, and he sets out to prove the oracle wrong
by interrogating all kinds of people considered wise.. Socrates
is now telling of one of his labours:
After the politicians, I went to the poets, tragic, dithyrambic, and
all sorts. And there, I said to myself, you will be instantly de.tected; now you will find out that you are more ignorant than they
are. ·Accordingly, ·I took them some of the most elaborate passages. iri their own writings, and asked what was the meaning of
them-thinking that they would teach me something. Will you
believe me? I am almost ashamed to confess the truth, but I
must say that there is hardly a person present who would not have
talked better about their poetry than they did themselves. Then
I knew that not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort
of genius and inspiration; they are like diviners or soothsayers who
also say many fine things, but
not understand the meaning of
them. The poets appeared to me to be much in the same case;
and I further observed that upon the strength of their poetry they
believed themselves ·to be the wisest of men. in other things in
which they were not wise.11
Here we have explicit the Platonic animus against the irrational, non-cognitive products of the creative media. It does
not matter that these poets, diviners and soothsayers occasionally reveal an insight into truth: from the intellectual point
of view their revel!J.tions are incidental.
There is an interesting correlation between Plato's description of the poet's productions and his attitude -towards them
and the trend of early Greek philosophy. Over many generations the movement was from chaos to order; from the ambiguous multiplicity of basic substances to the more integrated
conception of a Mind or Nous. With Plato we find an integration which resolved the primeval chaos of both nature and
10

Ion 542.

11

Apol. HA.

474

ARTHUR E. VASSILION

man's mind to a universe of order and logic: a gigantic discipline-machine along Socratic lines with proper cause and effect
relationships. With such a development of logic in philosophy,
it becomes understandable that the Socratic view, as expressed
by Plato, would not admit of irrationality and irresponsibility.
But these are the earmarks of artistic productions, at least on
the surface; and even though inspiration is admitted as the
explanation of the process of artistic development, and occasional insight into truth granted to the devotees of the Muse,
the whole problem becomes repugnant to minds such as those
of Socrates and Plato. We will be able to see more of this
duel between the rational and the irrational in the Phaedrus,
but for the moment there are one or two statements in the
Meno and the Laws which should be brought in to make this
compilation of references to inspiration as complete as possible.
In the Meno Plato inquires into the source of the knowledge
of virtue. Can it be acquired through sense experience or by
the manipulation of thoughts in the mind? Plato's conclusion
is that it is a gift of God; 12 but in arriving at this conclusion
he makes another reference to inspiration. In fact, inspiration
diviners, soothsayers,
is the common denominator of
prophets and statesmen:
But if not by knowledge, the only alternative which remains is
that statesmen must have guided states by right opinion, which
is in politics what divination is in religion; for diviners and also
prophets say ma,ny things truly, but they know not what they
say. . . . And may we not, Meno, truly call these men "divine"
who, having no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand deed
and word? . . . Then we shall also be right in calling divine those
whom we were just now speaking of as diviners and prophets,
including the whole tribe of poets. Yes, and statesmen· above all
may be said to be divine and illuminj!d, being inspired and possessed of God, in which condition they may say many grand things,
not knowing what they say. 13

This last quotation gives us another confirmation of the point
of irresponsibility which was brought up earlier. The oppo19

Memo 99 D-100.

1•

Meno 99 BC.

THE PLATONIC

THEORY OF INSPIRATION

475

sition between philosophic knowledge and artistic inspiration
now seems very strong and clear. Yet we must keep this in
mind, that, as in the case of virtue, there are other things than
inspiration that depend upon the " gift of God " or " divine
illumination " rather than upon logical inference.
In the Laws the Athenian stranger (Plato) speaking of
Homer says:
For indeed, in these verses, and in what he said of the Cyclopes,
he speaks the words of God and nature; for poets are a divine race
and often in their strains, by aid of the Muses and the Graces,
they attain truth. 14

The Athenian goes on to defend the poet's position, which
must be taken for a defense of all the creative media, although
Plato brushed over music and painting:
That the poet, according to the tradition which has ever prevailed
among us, and is accepted of all men, when he sits down on the
tripod of the muse, is not in his right mind; like a fountain, he
allows to flow out freely whatever comes in, and his art being
imitative, he is often compelled to represent men of opposite dispositions, and thus to contradict himself; neither can he tell whether
there is more truth in one thing that he has said than in another. 15

In this last quotation we have a metaphorical, but remarkably pertinent, account of the creative process. The poet's
inspiration is likened to the free-flowing water of a fountain, a
fountain without controls of its own. Whatever enters a poet's
being, while his mind is taken over by the Muse, or God, must
come out again unimpaired. The embarrassing problem may
be posed: if all that a creative artist produces is directly Godgiven, then how does Plato account for his objections? If the
poet is " compelled " to do and say certain things while gv(}Eo';,
and if " God is perfectly simple and true both in word and
deed; . . . he deceives not, either by sign or word, by dream
or waking vision,'' 16 then how can Plato so bluntly contradict
himself and reject the artistic production? I propose that, in
consideration of this point, Plato has little right to turn against
u LawB, Bk. ill 682 A.

10

Laws, Bk. IV 719 C.

1•

Rep., Bk. II 882 D.

476

ARTHUR E. VASSILION

what he calls the imitative arts. Further, if this point is valid,
Plato must be deficient in his understanding of that part of
aesthetics which has to do with direct creative production.
Finally, remembering the theological and mythological assumptions that Plato did make, it seems evident that the best that
can be said about Plato's attitude on this problem is that he
was far more concerned with establishing order and security
in the world than he was with keeping free from aesthetic
contradictions.
In the Phaedrus we find three concluding contributions to
the question of inspiration. Towards the beginning, as Socrates
and Phaedrus are walking in the country, Socrates tells his
young friend that he is becoming affected by the surroundings:
" ... for surely the place is holy; so that you must not wonder
if, as I proceed, I appear to be in a divine fury, for already I
am getting into dithyrambics." 17
When Socrates prepares to recant his first speech and admit
that love is a madness of a nobler sort, he throws some additional light on this "madness" which possesses certain men:
"It might be so if madness were simply an evil; but there is
also a madness which is a divine gift, and the source of the
chiefest blessings granted to men." 18 Now we have this madnes.s of divine origin postulated as the "source of the chiefest
blessings granted to men," a far cry from his previous contentions. But he goes on to explain:
. . . and in proportion as prophecy ... is more perfect and august
than augury, both in name and fact, in the same proportion, as
the ancients testify, is madness superior to a sane mind ... , for
the one is only of human, but the other of divine origin.19

and a little further on:
The third kind is the madness of those who are possessed by the
Muses; which taking hold of a delicate and virgin soul, and there
inspiring frenzy, awakens lyrical and all other numbers; with these
adorning the myriad actions of ancient heroes for the instruction
17

Phaed. 288 D.

18

Phaed. 244 A.

1•

Phaed. 244 D.

THE PLATONIC

THEORY OF INSPIRATION

477

of posterity. But he who, having no touch of the Muses' madness
in his soul, comes to the door and thinks that he will get into the
temple by the help of art-he, I say, and his poetry are not
admitted; the sane man disappears and is nowhere when he enters
into rivalry with the madman.20
There are no points in the
which have not been touched
upon, at least, in the preceding, or which will not assume a
greater clarity in the following section.
8. THE- RATIONAL-IRRATIONAL

PROBLEM

Throughout the whole discussion, up to this point, one factor
contributing heavily to any attempt to determine the theory
of inspiration has come up again and again. This factor is
involved in Plato's attack on the creative media, in fact it
proves his most formidable weapon. For the sake of convenience in this discussion this factor may be termed the
rational-irrational problem.
Throughout most of the references cited we find such key
phrases recurring many times: inspired hy divine impulse; attaining some truth but having no knowledge of the degree or
exactness of it; compelled to; not of sane mind but_ freely allowing that which comes in, by divine inspfration, to go out,
unchanged. These and many others contribute to the feeling
that Plato is putting a great emphasis upon the passive, noncognitive aspects which he considers to be paramount in the
arts.
The underlying motive for this emphasis upon such negative qualities may be found in the discussion of the soul in the
Phaedrus. In the great figure of the soul as composed of a
charioteer and two horses, Plato states his basic reasons for
classifying the creative media as imitative, as arts of the passions, arts of distractive illusions.
Soul, whether divine or human, is characterized by the figure
of a charioteer driving his chariot across the skies, continually
keeping his horses in rein. The difference between the divine
90

Phaed,. 245 A.

478

ARTHUR E. VASSILION

and human characterizations is that the souls of the gods are
balanced, the control by the intellect of the charioteer and the
upward pull of the will or noble desires over the downward
pull of the passions or ignoble desires, is stable and eternally
maintained. The human soul, on the other hand, is in a constant state of turbulence: the downward pull of the ignoble
steed is continually threatening to ground the flight.
There is no ambiguity in the use which Plato made of this
metaphor. The intellect, in the form of the charioteer, and
with the help of the will, the noble desires, must be the ultimate and supreme governing factor of the human soul and
thus of human life. All the attributes of the imitative arts,
and principally poetry, belong to the realm of the ignoble steed;
he of the passions, the sensual dependencies. Socrates goes on
to explain in what the two steeds differ and what makes them
good or bad:
. . . but I have not yet explained in what the goodness or badness of either consists, and to that I will proceed. The right-hand
horse is upright and cleanly made; he has a lofty neck and an
aquiline nose; his colour is white, and his eyes dark; he is a lover
of honour and modesty and temperance, and the follower of true
glory; he needs no touch of the whip, but is guided by word and
admonition only. The other is a crooked lumbering animal, put
together anyhow; he has a short thick neck; he is flat-faced and of
a dark colour, with grey eyes and blood-red complexion; the mate
of insolence and pride, shag-eared and deaf' hardly yielding to whip
and spur. 21

This is a most significant passage since it displays the most
intimate attitudes of Plato. We can easily recognize the expression of the puristic elements in Plato. 22 . The noble steed
is white with dark eyes, color opposites of a determinate nature.
The ignoble steed is dark with grey eyes and a revolting complexion. In using such descriptive elements Plato is subscribing to the theory that a beautiful soul is best, and most often,
Phaed. 258 D.
•• Plato chose the pure white light, the clear full note, the simple elements in
each case as being those which most closely approximated perfection.
21

THE PLATONIC

THEORY OF INSPIRATION

479

expressed by a beautiful body; a wicked or repulsive soul is
expressed by a repulsive form. Further, the noble steed is,
actually, part of a working team with the charioteer. The
ignoble steed represents the rebellious elements of the soul.
The will loves honor, temperance, order and duty; the passions
love excess, disorder, insolence and pride. We may now begin
to draw the comparisons which are offered between this figure
of the soul and the bearing it has upon the theory of inspiration.
The ignoble steed is deaf, pays no attention to the guidance
of the charioteer, plunges after the immediate sensual enjoyment of every object which attracts it. Out of this we certainly
derive the impression of irrational behavior. This type of conduct, in the human being, results in irresponsibility which is
no part of the pattern of the philosophic mind. Plato, attributing to the artists passivity, non-cognition and irresponsibility, based his views of a decadent, effeminate art upon
these elements. In no way does he allow what we should actually call" creative" activity to the artists. They are base and
passion-motivated instruments. Yet it is in just this that Plato
contradicts himself, as previously illustrated. Where is the
poet who is a " light and winged and holy thing " in this picture of disorder, arrogance and blindness? And how can he
justify the fact that at one time the artist, through inspiration,
is merely the instrument of God speaking, and at another time
he is evidently the conscious seeker after sensual enjoyment,
degrading expression and false ideas?
Plato forgets a great deal when he so cleanly divides the areas
between the philosopher and the artist. He says explicitly:
But of the heaven which is above the heavens, what earthly poet
ever did or ever will sing worthily? It is such as I describe; for I
must dare to speak the truth, when truth is my theme. There
abides the very being with which true knowledge is concerned; the
colorless, formless, intangible essence, visible only to mind, the
pilot of the soul. 23

Here is the answer from Plato's point of view: the artist is
'" Phaed,. !M7 B.

480

ARTHUR E. VASSILION

concerned with the appearance of reality, the structure of surface beauty; while the philosopher is concerned with reality,
the structure of truth. Put differently, the philosopher, the
supreme artist in Plato's opinion, 24 deals with the world of
light and eternal ideas, not with the world of half-shadows
which must, by Plato's view of things, be the lot of the imitative artist. Surely then, it cannot be too exaggerated a thing
to say, if we· remember the previous references, that Plato's
God must not be as reliable, pure, and undeceiving as Plato
presents him to us. If the philosopher attains that vision of
the essence given to mind only by the process of human
thought, and this is the supreme pinnacle of the thinking man,
then how do we eliminate the inspired, the divinely influenced
man who is not speaking of and for himself, but is acting as
the instrument of the voice of God, or, indirectly, the Muse?
There must have been an overpowering drive in Plato to cancel
out any such manifestation and clear .the way for the long,
arduous task of hard thinking and human logic which would,
eventually, lead to the innermost secrets of the world.
The very figure of the charioteer and the two horses, in all
its minute details, leads to the question: how can we account
for the presence of so much metaphorical artjstry in Plato,
here and elsewhere in his dialogues? The answer, as I understand the Platonic position, lies in rational, responsible, cognitive consciousness. The poet would have stumbled upon such
a poetic figure through irrational inspiration, as Plato defines it,
and would have used it for what it was worth in its combination
of sensuous qualities to the eye, the ear. The impact of truth
in the metaphor would have been incidental, regardless of how
true it may have been. The conscious thinker, the trained
person, the philosopher, Plato, in short, both leads to and draws
from this figure of the soul as a rational illustration of part of
his structure of truth. Here is no babbling sitter upon a fount
of daemonic inspiration with an irrational, even though useful,
poetic figure, but a thinker fully cognizant of the intellectual
••Laws, Bk. VIl 817 A.

THE PLATONIC

THEORY OF INSPIRATION

481

validity of its use. To such a thinker, the beauty of the poetic
figure becomes infinitely more valuable since it is perceived by
the " eye of the mind, the pilot of the soul."
Again, we can return to Plato's own words to substantiate
this qualification of responsible, rational knowledge of truth.
The last pertinent statement to this theme in the Phaedrus
reveals the ultimate Platonic challenge to the imitative arts;
one which is to be repeated several more times, ending with
the last work, the Laws. Socrates is saying:
. . . to Homer and other writers of poems, whether set to music
or not; ... to all of them we are to say that if their compositions
are based on knowledge of the truth, and they can defend or prove
them, when they are put to the test, by spoken arguments, which
leave their writings poor in comparison of them, then they are to
be called, not only poets, ... but are worthy of a higher name,
befitting the serious pursuit of their life.25
This higher name is, of course, philosophers; for in that union
of poetic language and conscious knowledge of truth we have
Plato's supreme artist, the philosopher, the philosopher-king of
the Republic, the legislator of the Laws.
4.

CONCLUSION

We have now examined every major reference to inspiration
in Plato's own writings, and nearly all the minor references
except those short phrases here and there which have nothing
different to say. It is my aim in this concluding section to
offer both a resume of the essential points involved in the
theory of inspiration and an evaluative integration of what
seems to be related and suggestive.
I think it may be legitimately concluded that we need to
approach Plato's position on inspiration by imaginative ways.
Specific words were found in the description of the theory; but
these words, when traced in the original Greek, proved to have
meanings that simply confirm the imaginative approach. Plato
evidently could not find, and did not want to find, what we
•• Phaed. 278 B

489l

ARTHUR E. VASSILION

would now consider more " scientific " words to describe the
process of inspiration. Consequently, he accepted at face value
words which were used in the Homeric period. When we find in
use words which have for a literal meaning expressions such as:
breathed upon, filled with God, and the like, we are dealing
with a theological and mythological context. This explanation
is not given critically. As far as I am concerned, that is as it
should be. Until we can measure the total processes of the
human mind, and evaluate them without any question, there
certainly are no other words to describe the creative process.
The explanation is given merely to clarify, if possible, my
understanding of the use of these words by Plato. In addition,
since these words, now that they are established beyond question, both from their literal meanings, and their metaphorical
usages, enter so prominently into the discussion of the theory
of inspiration, a position has to be taken concerning them.
There is still another way that these words are valuable to
this problem, now that they have been specified in all their
unspecificity: I believe that they make even more apparent
the evidence of contradiction and uncertainty in Plato's attitude toward the artistic media.
The function of the theory of inspiration is to explain how
artistic production comes about and why. The how of artistic
production has been fairly well explained in Platonic terms:
sensitive souls are entered into by God, indirectly by the Muse,
and are compelled to release what is given them without conscious knowledge on their part. The human mind is displaced
for the period of inspiration, and the divine influences are in
full control. Naturally, Plato would not concern himself with
the why of creation. He held it in low esteem as compared
with his view of philosophical knowledge. Lindsay characterizes Plato's attitude in this way:
Plato denounced art because he so intensely felt its power. He
was himself both poet and philosopher, and the quarrel between
poetry and philosophy was waged in his own breast .... he could
not regard it as a necessary stage on the way to that full enlighten-

THE PLATONIC

THEORY OF INSPIRATION

488

ment which is philosophy. He knew that the claims of art were
too imperious for it to submit to be consigned to a position of decent
respectability. He felt that it claimed all or nothing. He would
not give it all: for he could not be unfaithful to philosophy: so
he must needs fiercely give it nothing. 26

Nowhere in Plato can I find anything specific to explain why
he thought artistic creation went on. I do not doubt that he
must have thought of the question; in fact, I do not doubt that
he must have had an answer. When you have an answer, however, that embarrasses, or puts in questionable light, the rest of
your doctrine, you may very well ignore it.
Irwin Edman has something to say on this subject:
The philosopher, like the artist, is at once selective and constructive. Out of all the manifold data of human experience, he selects
· certain salient and crucial facts, and, out of all the principles by
which facts may be classified, he selects certain principles, and, by
virtue of these, contrives a system of metaphysics, an ultimate code
of morals, a fundamental vision of nature, life and destiny. 27

The contention supported in this quotation confirms the contention that I brought into my study and that dominates the
whole of this concluding section: that Plato failed, consciously,
for reasons to be given later, to view all the possible aspects of
artistic creation.
The surface reasons usually given for Plato's attitudes towards art are those such as: his objection to the licentiousness
of the artists; the decadence and effeminacy to which art contributes; and the emphasis upon the base and sensual which
corrupted the youth. Of course, all these have an element of
truth in them. No one explanation is possible for a complex
such as an aesthetic attitude represents. Needless to say, the
contention supported in my argument cannot be the whole
explanation for the same reasons. The fact remains, however,
that if we are to reach any degree of truth we should incor••Five Dialogues of Plato Bearing vn Poetic Inspiration. Intro. by A. D. Lindsay.
(London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1913.)
"Irwin Edman. Arts and the Man. (New York: New American Library,
1949)' p. 141.

484

ARTHUR E. VASSILION

porate all the possible explanations of a problem. Therefore, I
contend that those elements which I am supporting are so
obvious in Plato's own writings, that only a high degree of
wilful intellectual bias could 'continue the exclusion of this
aspect which relates the theory of inspiration with elements of
Plato's theory of knowledge ..
Of the problem which has faced every interpreter of Plato:
why did Plato consider the arts decadent, effeminate, licentious,
corruptive, two statements may be brought to bear at this
point. Edman says:
But the quarrel is something more, and something different from
that between flesh and spirit. Why, at the close of the Republic,
does Socrates, who had previously merely censored, now exclude,
albeit reluctantly, the artist from the Perfect State? Plato does
not so much think the artist incites flesh as that he diverts and
distracts the ·mind, keeps the attention exquisitely enamored by
the sensuous simulacra of things, which are, for their part, the
imperfect shadows of ideas.28
In the same vein Lindsay picks up the same point:
Plato quarrels with art because in his view it emphasizes and
attaches importance to just that sensible side of things, which
thought must transcend, and so hinders the mind's progress from
sensible to intelligible reality, and also because the processes by
which it reaches immediacy are not trustworthy and are as far
as possible removed from those logical processes by which truth is
attained. 29
We are now approaching the point where valid correlations
may be made. Both Lindsay and Edman, to choose just these
two among a host of others, approach the element of connection which I will make; but both neatly stop around the point,
never quite getting to it. The quarrel Plato has with art is
something more than that between
and spirit. The points
presented which explain Plato's attitude toward the distractive
and obstructive capacities of art are certainly valid and satisfactory to a point. Of the two writers, Lindsay closer ap••Edman, op. cit., pp. 115-116.

••Lindsay, op. cit., p. xv.

THE PLATONIC

THEORY OF INSPIRATION

485

proaches the added explanation I wish to present. When
Lindsay says, " because the processes by which it reaches
immediacy are not trustworthy," he is stating the core of
my argument.
Exactly, this correlation is that Plato had the same basic
premise for his theory of inspiration as he had for his theory
of knowledge. That premise is to be found in the doctrines of
immediacy and of reminiscence. Let me bring my two witnesses to bear me out, as much as they can. Edman, in discussing the
to the theories of truth used by various
philosophers, has this to say:
But the " fact " by which truth is supposed to be verified, with
which truth· is supposed to correspond, or of which it is said to be
a description, is curiously recalcitrant to all formulations of it.
The fact remains elusive of all descriptions. It is unique, immediate, absolute.80
and :finally:
Ultimately, when. the argument has simmered down in a philosophy, it, or what it simmers down to, is an integral act of insight, an
intuition. 31
This is no coincidence from the pen of a well-known writer on
philosophy and the arts, but an attitude common to most
thinking men when they come to set down their viewpoints
on philosophy. That Plato not only agreed but went even
further than this is well known and will be more fully illustrated in the quotations to follow from Lindsay.
Lindsay discusses the possible aspects which may enter into
any consideration of Plato's attitude towards art, specifically,
inspiration, and he develops the point by the following quotations. The only difference between Lindsay's views and mine
is that of distance. I am going to try to go a little further than
he did. Specifically, Lindsay has this to say about Plato's
considerations of art and knowledge:
••Edman, op. cit., p. 180.

81

Ibid., p. 148.

486

.ARTHUR E. VASSILION

The truth is that if Plato is poetic, it is not because he ever subordinates philosophy to poetry, but because he takes what may be
called a poetic view of knowledge. He emphasizes and asserts the
importance in knowledge and in logic of the element of the immediate and the intuitive. While always insisting on exact argument
and careful logical reasoning, he makes all reasoning depend finally
on intellectual insight and vision which is immediate. 82

It is Plato's position in the Meno that the soul has learned
all things in its many rebirths and that therefore man only
recollects. Truth is part of the soul, as are all other virtues. 88
The process of realizing, or recollecting, knowledge is that of
contemplation-along logical lines, of course. The way is hard,
for some, overpowering; but that is the only legitimate way of
attaining truth in Plato's estimation.
After contemplating beautiflil objects gradually and in order, "on
a sudden he beholds a beauty wonderful in its nature." u
Lindsay concludes his presentation by a very apt statement
within which he gives a quotation from Plato, which should
leave no question of Plato's views on this subject:
Though the apprehension is immediate and its own evidence, it is
reached in a definite way, which Plato is prepared to describe ....
Perhaps the clearest account of the matter is given in a passage in
the seventh letter. Plato is explaining . . . why his philosophy
cannot be properly stated in words. He shows the defects of all
our ways of representing reality ... we must test and examine all
our thought by dialectic. If we do that, he says, after a long and
difficult process of " rubbing our conceptions and perceptions together," suddenly insight and reason flash out, and we know reality
as it is. The reality cannot be described, simply because our
apprehension of it is immediate, but we can explain the necessary
means toward that apprehension. 85
The testimony is now complete, I believe. Plato has testified
in his own words and ideas, and Lindsay and Edman have given
witness, in their own interpretations, to the poetic character of
Plato's logical process. Or rather, more accurately, the poetic
character of the result ,of Plato's logical process.
.. Lindsay, op. cit., p. ix.
88 Meno, 81 CD.

8'

35

Lindsay, op. cit., p. xi .
Ibid., pp. xiv-xv.

THE PLATONIC

THEORY OF INSPIRATION

487

It now seems reasonable to state my major point: that,
ultimately, Plato equated both his theory of knowledge and
his theory of inspiration to the same elements of immediacy,
insight, intuition or
True, in his fervent desire
to establish and perpetuate reason, order, consciousness and
mental stability both to the world and to the mind of man
thinking, Plato did establish the logical process of dialectic.
The point here being argued is not that the process which Plato
emphasized is not legitimate, or that it may not be the best
one to follow, in the long run; but that in doing so Plato consciously disregarded the fact that he based both theories upon
the same elements.
If, at the end :of a long, arduous and highly complex process
of reasoning in an endeavor to find truth, we ultimately resort
to intuition for the final answer, we are certainly assuming the
same elements with which the creative artist is credited. Plato
did just that, as far as I can see. The difference is in the
process. The important point, as far as the purpose of this
essay is concerned, is that Plato faced an embarrassing problem.
Not being able to deny that the inspired person did reach
heights of truth and beauty by means of divine influence and
control, and not resting his view of knowledge on anything
else but reminiscence, which is derived from that part of us
that is the divine element of soul, Plato saw the dangers which
were inherent in this situation. If he had discredited the divine
influence of the creative artist, the inspiration from God, then
Plato would have arranged things very conveniently for his
dialectical process. He did not do this, though, since he, too,
had been so strongly influenced by the poetic element. On the
.other hand, had he arrived at any other apex in his process of
dialectic than the one of immediacy and intuition: had Plato,
in other words, been able to say this is the process, this the
result, completely dependent upon the' elements·of the process,
he would not have had the problem.
The result is that Plato could not allow the creative arts,
the inspired media, the dignity of their function. To do so
4

488

ARTHUR E. VASSILION

would be to belie his large effort to promote the thinking man,
since the creative artist does not consd.ously think. Plato holds
that the creative person does not think at all. Yet, I would
suggest, had Plato more honestly investigated the reasons for
inspiration, had he more intensively tried to understand that
the same processes of "rubbing our conceptions and perceptions together" apply to all persons-not just the philosopher,
he might have realized what has now become more widely
accepted: that the creative mind may be poetic, or philosophic,
or scientific, or all of these.
Plato, like Bergson, exaggerated the differences between reason and intuition to the point of almost• complete compartmentalization. Bergson insisted that, for the immediacy of
intuition to function, one must separate himself, as far as
possible, from any logical analysis. This onesidedness was the
result of Bergson's effort to support his thesis that reality is
never gained from intellectual concepts. Only the perception
of the flow of direct awareness, by intuition, gives this reality;
and any part of this. flow that is communicable must be expressed in fluid concepts or metaphors. 36 In the same way,
but at the other extreme, Plato felt bound to emphasize the
differences between reason and intuition. Plato accepted the
logical process with the ultimate immediacy of intuition and
rejected the. intuitive-rational association which at times subordinates first the one and then the other, but which, at all
times, employs reason and intuition as supplementary, not
antagonistic, to each other.
The artist does not create in a vacuum. He, too, rubs his
conceptions and perceptions together until a truth, or an aspect
of beauty, appears fully alive. Plato knew all this. That is
why he used metaphor and simile; why he reverted to myth
and allegory so extensively; why he used beautiful and indestructible poetic figures to objectify his concepts. Plato's
failure, from my point of view, and with the material with
••Henri Bergson. Introduction to Metophysics.
York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1949.)

Transl. T. E. Hulme.

(New

THE PLATONIC

THEORY OF INSPIRATION

489

which I have tried to substantiate it, has been one of a human
being trying to do good. He chose the process which he consid,ered superior and forgot that the rejected child was spawned
from the same womb.
Perhaps with Nietzsche, in his Birth of Tragedy, we can
project a supposed dramatization of what some of Socrates'
thoughts might have been, near the hour of his death, as he
once again listened to his inner voice telling him to practice
music. Nietzsche wrote:
It was something akin to the daemonic warning voice which urged
him to these practices; it was due to his Apollonian insight that,
like a barbaric king, he did not understand the noble image of a
God and was in danger of sinning against a deity-through his lack
of understanding. The voice of the Socratic dream-vision is the
only sign of doubt as to the limits of logic. " Perhaps "-thus he
must have asked himself-" what is not intelligible to me is not
therefore unintelligible? Perhaps there is a realm of wisdom from
which the logician iS shut out? Perhaps art is even a necessary
correlative of, and supplement to, science? " 87
ARTHUR E.

vASSILION

Syracuse, N. Y.

87 Friedrich Nietzsche.
Random House.)

TheJ Philosophy of Nietzsche, p. 1026. (New York:

NATURAL NECESSITATION OF THE HUMAN
WILL
(Conclusion)

III.

O

THE NATURE OF THE NATURAL APPETITE OF THE
HUMAN WILL

UR examination of the natural willing of life, knowledge, virtue, etc. has revealed that cognition, indeed
actual consideration of their necessary connection with
happiness, is pre-requisite for the necessitation of the human
will by these objects. Knowledge must also obviously precede
the natural willing of God, clearly seen in the Beatific Vision.
Does the same thing hold true for all natural necessitation? Is
it a general° principle that all natural appetite on the part of
the human will presupposes cognition on the part of the human
intellect?
THE OPINIONS OF THE COMMENTATORS

The commentators whom we have been
Sylvester, arid John of St. Thomas--clearly teach that natural
appetite in the will presupposes cognition in the intellect, as
far as actual willing is concerned. Along with this, however,
they teach the existence of a natural appetite which does not
presuppose cognition on the part of the hunian intellect (although it does on the part of God) and which precedes actual
willing. This kind of natural appetite, in the case of the will,
is not really distinct from the will itself, but is the will considered as it is ordered or transcendentally related to its proper
object by its Maker.
This division into a twofold natural appetite is apparent in
the following passages from Cajetan:

490

NATURAL NECESSITATION

OF THE HUMAN WILL

491

Natural appetite is wont to be taken in two ways: In the first
way, for an inclination implanted by nature. And in this way it is
not any elicited act, but is as first act, having a natural relationship
to such a thing. And such appetite is found in all powers, both
active and passive, as is said in the text. In the second way, it is
taken for a second act, whereby one tends towards something foreknown in such a way that one cannot tend towards its opposite.
And this is an operation of animal appetite, whether intellectual
or sensitive.1
Since natural appetite taken in the second way is an act of
animal appetite, i. e. of the will or of the concupiscible or of
the irascible appetite, Cajetan sometimes prefers to refer to it
as animal appetite and reserve the name natural appetite for
the first or potential natural appetite, if we may so term it.
Since potential natural appetite is common to all. powers, and
not proper to the will, he can thus distinguish it 2 from the
elicited or actual natural appetite of the will. Again taking
natural appetite to mean potential or innate natural appetite
as opposed to the elicited or actual variety, he distinguishes it
from animal appetite as the latter ·includes not only elicited
natural appetite, but also free, elicited acts of appetite:
For the evidence of these things, there must first of all be noted
the difference between natural appetite and animal appetite, as
the latter is divided into rational and sensitive, etc. For they
differ first of all, because animal appetite is a special genus of powers
of the soul ... but natural appetite is common to all powers.
Secondly, because natural appetite follows the formal notion of a
1 Cajetan, Comment., I, q. 78, a. I, n. 5.
Cf. ibid., 1-Il, q. 18, a. 2, n. 2: "Any
power is found to be determined to its object in two ways; first, according to itself;
secondly, according to its exercised act. And the ,determination of the power as
to itself, indeed, is noted according to the relation of the power to its adequate
formal object; for every power is thus determined to some object. But the determination as to the exercised act is noted according to the relation of the act, as
placed in reality, to its object."
•Cf. ibid., I, q. 80, a. I, n. 5: " .•. natural appetite, which is nothing other
than the natural potency itself of anything towards its perfection; and animal
appetite, which is not brought to bear except upon a known act. And therefore
we desire to see, to hear, and even to desire, in two ways: naturally, according to
a part, i.e. according to that power whose perfection it is; and animally, when we
desire and strive to conserve the apprehended good of vision or of volition."

492

ROBERT P. SULLIVAN

thing absolutely; but animal appetite follows the nature inasmuch
as it apprehends. Thirdly, because natural appetite is in act from
the nature alone; but animal appetite cannot go into act except
from apprehension. Fourthly, because to desire naturally is not an
elicited act, but is the very inclination of this thing to this object;
but to desire animally is an operation, which is second act. Fifthly,
because natural appetite is towards one thing; but animal appetite
is towards many things, according to the multitude of apprehended
goods. Sixthly, because natural appetite is towards a thing because it is suitable to this particular power which desires it; but
animal appetite is towards a thing because it is suitable to the
whole or supposit. Seventhly, because natural appetite is in act
in a thing from Someone else; but animal appetite from oneself,
because good moves inasmuch as it is apprehended by the desirer
himself, and not by someone else.3

But Cajetan takes natural appetite in a broad enough sense
to include both kinds when he distinguishes it from free appetite 4 (not that the potential natural appetite is a really distinct thing from free will, for both are identified with the will
itself, but they are two distinct modes of causality of the selfsame will) ; 5 but natural appetite and free will are compatible:
When it is said that natural necessity does not take away freedom, this can be understood rightly and wrongly. Wrongly, indeed,
if it be understood to mean that necessity which is natural both
objectively and elicitively is consistent with the freedom of that
act; for this is not intelligible. But rightly, by understanding that
the natural necessity of an act as to specification, or objectively,
does not take away its freedom; because it is consistent that it be
freely elicited.•

There is mention in this passage of a natural necessity which
is natural both objectively and elicitively, for Cajetan holds
8

4

Ibid., q. 19, a. 1, n. 5. Note mention of act; i.e. first act.
Cf. ibid., q. 88, a. 2, n. 4: "Nature is here taken as it is distinguished against

free; so that we call natural what is determined to one thing; the opposite of this
belongs to the free . . . not all congenital things are natural, but one thing is
natural and another is free; because something is determined to one thing; something else is indifferent to this and its opposite. And thus naturalness is repugnant
to free will."
•Cf. ibid., 1-Il, q. 10, a. 1, n. 5.
"Ibid., I, q. 82, a. 1, n. 17.

NATURAL NECESSITATION

OF THE HUMAN WILL

498

that in the case of God clearly seen the will is necessitated both
as to specification and exercise.7 Sylvester teaches the same
thing. 8 But our teaching that natural appetite necessitates
only as to specification is not· thereby overthroWn., for both
Cajetan and Sylvester can be interpreted in the light of the
following passage from John of St. Thomas:
Although there can be given an object about which the will is
necessitated as to exercise, as in the clear vision of God, yet this
necessity does not come formally from the object itself as it is an
object, but from the very disposition of the subject about such an
object. . . . The reason is that formally the object is only the
principle of specifying, and so from it as such does not come formally the necessity of exercise, but the exercise or eliciting comes
formally from the operating subject, and its necessity from the very
disposition and state of the subject. For the will is of such a nature
that if it be brought to bear with all its weight upon an object, it
is brought to bear necessarily, because nothing remains which can
detain and suspend the eliciting. But it is then brought to bear
with all its weight, when the object is totally adequated to its
universality, and with full advertence; for since the will by reason
of its nature and formal notion is determined to the good as such,
when there is proposed something in every way and totally good,
in all its universality and goodness, there is then no indifference in
the will, but total determination to such a good. 9
T Cf. ibid., n. 7: "To desire naturally happens in two ways: In one way, as to
the specification of the act; in the other way, as to its exercise. For since nature
is determined to one thing, to desire has only as much of naturalness as it has of
determination to one thing. Hence if the act of some power is determined to one
object so that it cannot be towards the opposite, it is natural as to the specification of the act; because it is necessarily specified_by such an object, from which it
cannot tend towards the opposite, as is clear about desiring with respect of the
good. But if the very power is determined to elicit such an act, so that it is not
in its power to suspend it, that act is natural as to the exercise of the act; because
it is necessarily exercised. . . . But if we speak of the will of one seeing the divine
essence, then the act of love and fruition with respect of the divine essence is
natural in both ways."
•Cf. Sylvester, Comment., ni, cap. 51, n. IV, 2: "Natural appetite can be
taken in two ways: in one way, for the appetite following a natural form; in the
other way, for an elicited act of the will which follows upon some apprehension
necessarily, either as to the exercise of the act, or only as to the specification of
the act."
•John of St. Thomas, op. cit., Ill, 400bl7-40lal8.

494

ROBERT P. SULLIVAN

As John of St. Thomas continues his explanation, he, too,
makes use of the twofold division of natural appetite. Like
Cajetan, he implies that the name natural belongs primarily to
the innate or potential appetite:
Nevertheless when we say the will is naturally and necessarily
brought to bear upon such an object, it is not brought to bear
after the manner of an innate appetite, but of an elicited one,
although necessarily; and so that appetite is called natural because
it is necessary, not because it is innate; for it proceeds from knowledge, indeed from full advertence, and hence it is especially voluntary, because it is from a special and full knowledge, namely from
the vision of God, and from an internal principle, namely from the
very weight of the will.10

Sylvester makes use of the same division of natural appetite
in passages in which he omits any necessitation as to exercise:
Natural appetite ... can be taken in two ways: in one way, as
it is distinguished from the appetite following knowledge; in the
other way, as it is distinguished from free appetite. The first way
designates only the order of a nature towards something, and implies nothing else than the fo:rm of a thing with a natural relationship towards something, just as the appetite of, a heavy body
for a downward place is nothing else than the form of heaviness
with a relationship to a downward place; and it is as first act. In
this way every power naturally desires what is suitable to it ....
In the second way, it designates an elicited act following knowledge, but determined to one of opposites in such a way that it cannot be bent towards the other, just as all naturally desire beati10 Ibid., 40la4-15.
Cf. ibid., II, 78a 11-80: "We must presuppose the customary
distinction between innate and elicited appetite. The former is the appetite arising from the nature itself without the mediation of any knowledge, just as the
gravitation in a stone for the middle of the earth. Elicited appetite is that which
proceeds from the mediation of some knowledge, as when an animal· desires food
or drink. And if this appetite arises from intellective knowledge, it is called the
rational appetite or will; and if furthermore it follows upon a knowledge proposing
the object with indifference not binding or limiting it to one thing alone, it will be
free appetite. Hence innate appetite, which is without knowledge and which is
opposed to elicited appetite, is one thing; natural or necessary appetite, which is
opposed to free appetite and can be elicited, is something else." ·Cf. also ibid.,
78bl8-!il!il: "Natural appetite need not be any act or active impetus, but only a
relationship and order to what is suitable to something."

NATURAL NECESSITATION

OF THE HUMAN WILL

495

tude by an act elicited by the will following the apprehension of
beatitude. 11
But St. Thomas understands by natural desire, not the inclination of nature opposed to the indination which follows knowledge,
but an act, elicited by the will, which is natural and determined as
to the specification of the act, but not as to the exercise." 12

Our commentators, therefore, are united in teaching the
existence of a twofold natural appetite of the will. One is
the power of the will, considered as having, prior to human
cognition and to its elicited act, a natural order or transcendental relationship to its proper object. The other is an elicited
act of the will, free as to exercise but naturally determined to
one thing as to specification, and following upon human cognition. Since the willing of God, clearly seen, and of life, knowledge, etc. always follows upon knowledge, and since the proper
object of the will is only the end, the good, and beatitude,1 8
we can expect to find the innate or potential kind of natural
appetite only in the cases of the last end, beatitude, and good
in general; yet this does not prevent these same objects from
also being willed by elicited or actual natural appetite, following
upon knowledge.
2.

THE OPINION OF FATHER O'CONNOR

As we have noted in our introductory remarks, this position
of the commentators has recently been attacked by Father
O'Connor, who is unwilling to admit a potential natural appetite prior to cognition, in either the will or the sense appetites.
His opinion is set forth in two books and an article in a philosophical quarterly. 14
We are not here concerned with Father O'Connor's main
Sylvester, Comment., I, cap. 4, n. II.
Ibid., cap. 5, n. V, 3.
13 Cf. In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 1, ad 2:
"Beatitude, as such, implies
per se the object of the will."
"William R. O'Connor, The Eternal Quest (New York: Longmans, Green, and
Company, 1947); The Natural Desire for God (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1948); "The Natural Desire for Happiness," The Modern Schoolman,
11

10

XXVI (January, 1949), 91-120.

496

ROBERT P. SULLIVAN

problem, the nature of the natural desire for the vision of the
divine essence. We are deeply concerned, however, with his
teaching on the nature of natural appetite in general, and particularly that of the human will.
Since we shall have occasion in the next part of this section
to enter into a somewhat detailed analysis of Father O'Connor's
teaching on these points, it will not be necessary to cite chapter
and verse in the brief summary of ,his position which we shall
now give here.
·
However much the commentators may differ on what a
natural desire for the vision of God may be, they agree, as we
have seen, on what natural desire in general is, and on its twofold division. 15 Father O'Connor parts company with them.
He denies that the act of natural appetite can ever be freely
elicited; it comes forth from the will with a necessity which
differs from that of coercion only in that it is from an intrinsic
principle. It cannot truly be said to be exercised, for exercise
refers only to a free act.
The twofold division of the commentators is rejected. The
possibility of an innate or potential natural appetite, prior to
human cognition and consisting merely in the order or transcendental relation of the will to its proper object, is eliminated
by Father O'Connor. He sees in such a doctrine only the pollution of the pure stream of Thomism by the muddy currents
of Scotistic teaching. There is, for St. Thomas, no natural
appetite of the· will which does not follow the cognition of the
object by the human willer him'self.
In place of the teaching of the commentators, F-ather O'Connor finds in St. Thomas not two kinds of natural appetite in
the human will, but only one. It always follows human cogni16 Besides Cajetan, Sylvester, and John of St. Thomas, Father O'Connor cites
the opinions of Dominic Soto and Bafiez. We have not examined the teachings of
the latter two, but from the passages cited by Father O'Connor it is clear both
hold for a potential natural appetite. Soto admits no elicited natural appetite for
the vision of God, but seems to hold it in other cases, according to Bafiez's
explanation of Soto's view, given by Father O'Connor (The Eternal Quest, p. 59).
Whether Bafiez himself does so is not clear, as his general teaching is not given by
Father O'Connor.

NATURAL NECESSITATION

OF THE HUMAN WILL

497

tion, for the will of its very nature depends upon and follows
the human intellect. This natural appetite is always actual,
too; it is not the mere power of the will considered as related
to its object. But it is actual only in an imperfect sense, and
thus it is not to be confused with a freely elicited act of the
will. For the natural appetite of the human will, Father O'Connor insists, is nothing else than that imperfect act, partly in
potency and partly in act, which is movement in the proper
sense of the word movement. This latter teaching is fundamental and oft-repeated in Father O'Connor's treatment of the
questio:n in The Eternal Quest.
S.

REJECTION

OF FATHER O'CoNNon's

Vrnw

At the outset of our evaluation of Father O'Connor's theory
of natural appetite, it is well to note that he is to be commended for his staunch defense of a natural desire in the human
which follows the cognition of the human intellect. This,
however, is something in which the commentators heartily concur; the important question is whether this is the only kind of
natural appetite in the human will? Highly commendable, too,
is the yeoman service Father O'Connor has done in the collection of relevant texts. His interpretation of them, however,
is debatable. To treat adequately the wealth of passages from
St. Thomas which he adduces would require far greater space
than is at our disposal; yet we believe that a valid analysis
and evaluation of his teaching can be made in the light of a
relatively few key texts.
We can begin, then, with an examination of his own theory
that the natural appetite of the human will is movement in the
proper sense of that word. 15 " In defense of it, he cites few
1 •• O'Connor, The Eternal Quest, p. 113:
"Natural appetite is never the complete and perfect act, which is the operation or activity that is exercised by a
power. It is always the incomplete and imperfect act of motus; a movement that
the agent suffers rather than activity causes. . . . Not every motus is the imperfect
act of movement, which alone is the proper sense of the term motus. In a wide
sense (large) any
which is a complete or perfect act, may be called

498

ROBERT P. SULLIVAN

texts from St. Thomas, and those that he does have an unfortunate tendency to backfire to the detriment of Father O'Connor's theory. Thus he cites the remark of St. Thomas that
" appetitus est quasi quidam motus ad rem." 16 To this it may
be briefly replied that St. Thomas doubtless inserted the qualifying quasi precisely because it is not movement in the proper
sense. Moreover, appetitus either refers to the power, and then
Father O'Connor is wrong in distinguishing natural appetite
from the power itself, as he does; or else it refers to the act of
the power, and then it refers equally to all acts of the will, even
free ones, for Father O'Connor admits that the text refers to
appetite in general.
Again, Father O'Connor says that St. Thomas expressly
denies that natural appetite is an action or operation. 17 The
text he quotes in proof of it is this: " The appetite for form is
not any action of the matter, but a certain relationship of the
matter to the form, according as it is in potency to it." 18 This
natural appetite of prime matter for substantial form is hardly
pertinent to a discussion of the natural appetite of the will.
The same text equally denies that natural appetite is motus, for
motus is an act, even if an imperfect one, and matter has no
act prior to its substantial form. Thus he relies on the one
case where natural appetite is clearly not any act, perfect or
imperfect, but potency related to its proper act.
Since movement is partly in potency and partly in act, the
fact that natural appetite is really movement explains for
Father O'Connor why St. Thomas can speak of natural appetite in terms of both potency and act:
Looking forward to the complete or perfect act, which in the
case of the powers of the soul is the operation they perform, appemotua. Natural desire, however, is motus not in the wide but in the proper sense,
since it is a tendency; or inclination towards an operation, but not the operation
itself."
16 Ibid., p. 114. The quotation is from Summa Theol., I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1.
17 Ibid,., p. !l50, note 85.
18 De Pot., q. 4, a. I, ad !l in contrarium.

NATURAL

NECESSITATION

OF THE HUMAN WILL

499

titus bears to it the relation of potentia. Looking back upon the
form or nature from which this tendency proceeds, it is act. 19

This is far from proving that natural appetite is more than
the bare power, for we could substitute the word power for
appetitus and tendency in this passage of Father O'Connor's
and express the exact truth. The same doctrine of natural
appetite as motus, however, affords him a convenient way of
getting around such passages of St. Thomas as these:
Even in the damned the natural inclination remains whereby
man naturally wills good. This inclination does not imply any act,
but only the order of nature to an act. 20
Even in the damned there remains the natural inclination towards virtue, otherwise there would not be remorse of conscience
in them; but that it is not reduced to act happens because, according to divine justice, grace is lacking; just as also there remains
in a blind man, in the very root of his nature, the aptitude for
seeing, inasmuch as he is an animal naturally having sight; but it
is not reduced to act, because there is lacking the cause which
could reduce it to act, by forming the organ which is required for
seeing.21

It is difficult indeed to understand how an aptitude in the
very root of his nature can be considered as a movement in the
proper sense. Shall we say a man has a movement towards
seeing, when he even lacks ·eyes? In spite of the statement
that this inclination does not denote any act, Father O'Connor
comments: "Obviously, the natural inclination whereby man
naturally wills or desires the good is the imperfect act of movement towards the good as the end of the will." 22 Distinguishing this inclination from the elicited act of choosing the means
to the end, which choice is, for Father O'Connor, perfect act or
operation (although no reason is given why choice should be
more perfect or actual than the willing of the end which is its
source) , he continues and explains that this text of St. Thomas
O'Connor, o-p. cit., p. 114.
••In II Sent., d. 89, q. 8, a. 1, ad 5.

19

91

99

Summa Theol., I-II, q. 85, a.
O'Connor, op. cit., p. 115.

ad 8,

500

ROBERT P. SULLIVAN

does not deny that this inclination " is an act in the imperfect
sense of motus." 23
It is noteworthy that if Father O'Connor's explanation is
wrong, we have in these passages the clear teaching of St.
Thomas that there is a natural appetite identified with the will
as a power. We shall soon see how these passages boomerang
for Father O'Connor when it is proved that natural appetite is
not movement in the proper sense. Before doing so, however,
let us consider a further argument of his. He finds confirmation for his view of natural appetite as imperfect act or movement in the statement by the Angelic Doctor that " the term
appetite implies imperfection." 24 Of course it does. Desire is
always of an absent good. The statement of St. Thomas applies to elicited desires, too; indeed, to any act of appetite, for
appetite always goes out to an object never possessed by the
appetite itself. On this fact St. Thomas bases his famous argument that beatitude is an act of the intellect, because the will
never obtains its object. Father O'Connor relies, too, on the
fact that St. Thomas usually gives only understanding or sensing as examples of perfect act or operation which is motus only
in the broad sense.25 But the reason for this is precisely that
cognition brings the object known into the knowing power,
whereas the object of the will is always outside the will, in any
of its acts. Hence neither does St. Thomas cite the freely
elicited act of choice as an example of perfect act. But Father
O'Connor sees only in the imperfection of appetite a confirmation of the theory that natural appetite is motus in the proper
sense:
We now see what this imperfection is. As a tendency appetitus
must have the imperfection of motus, which partakes of both
potency and act. While it is true that the term motus is commonly
used to designate operation (a use that St. Thomas himself resorts
to often enough), yet in the proper sense motus does· not mean
•• Ibid., loc. cit.
••De Ver., q. 22, a. 2, ad 4.
••Cf. O'Connor, op. cit., p. 250, note 85 and p. 252, note 44.

NA.TUBAL NECESSITATION

OF THE HUMAN WILL

501

operation but a preceding inclination to it. This is where natural
appetite belongs.26
But St. Thomas is speaking of appetite in general (and primarily of the power) and not just of natural appetite when he
attributes this imperfection to appetite. Hence freely elicited
choice is just as much a motus as natural appetite is, and the
case against the freely elicited natural appetite of the commentators collapses. Nor is it clear why choice should be regarded as perfect act or operation. How, too, is natural appetite in the will an inclination towards the operation of choice?
It is
inclination towards the end, not towards choice. Father
O'Connor speaks of it, however, in both ways. 27
Another
of the belief that natural appetite is
motus is found in the fact that" its act is tendere and its nature
is inclinari." 28 St. Thomas, however, uses the term inclination.
not only of natural appetite, but also the will 2 9 and its act. 80
Father O'Connor is aware that the will itself is called an inclination by St. Thomas, but attributes this to the fact that the
term appetitus is somewhat ambiguous, since it can refer to an
act of a power or to the power. 31 True enough; and we shall
see later how this fact justifies the commentators' use of the
term elicited appetite, to which Father O'Connor objects. For
the present, it suffices to remark that the fact remains that it
is the will as a power that St. Thomas calls an inclination and
an appetite in the passages just cited, as their contexts show;
especially the passage from the Summa, wherein the Angelic
Doctor is proving that there is such a power as the will in
angels. The next passage from the Summa we have quoted

an

•• Ibid., p. 116.
••Ibid., pp. 118, 115, 116.
•• Ibid., p. 116.
••Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 59, a. I: "This incliriation is called will." Cf. De Ver.,
q. 22, a. 5: "But since the will itself is a certain inclination, because it is a certain
appetite."
.
••Cf. Compendium Theologiae, I, cap. 129: "The act of the will is a certain
inclination . . . and is compared to natural inclinations." Cf. Summa Theol., I,
q. 106, a. 2: "For the operation is a certain inclination of the one who wills."
81 Cf. O'Connor,. op. cit., p. 255, note 54.

ROBERT P. SULLIVAN

clearly calls the operation of the will an inclination. Hence
tendere and inclinari are not proper to natural appetite nor to
motus.
Having stated that natural appetite is not an operation but
is rather a movement to be placed on the side of nature of
potency, Father O'Connor next asks whether it is necessary to
identify it with the particular nature in which it is found. 32
Of course, the elicited natural appetite is distinct from the
power which elicits it, but he recognizes no such elicited natural
appetite; what he means is: must this motus or inclination of
nature be identified with the nature? No, he answers; for St.
Thomas expressly distinguishes them in this passage:
And therefore, just as in natural things the nature itself is something else from the inclination of the nature, and its movement and
operation, so, too, in the order of grace, grace is something else
from charity and from the other virtues. 33
Father O'Connor finds here a real distinction of nature from
the inclination of nature, in the way that grace is really distinct
from charity. But what are the two things distinguished, we
may ask? For St. Thomas, sanctifying grace holds in the
supernatural order a role similar to that of the substantial
nature in the order of nature, for the nature is the subject of
its accidents, and is really distinct from them. That is the
distinction we have here. Whether natural appetite be an act
of will or the power itself which is the will, it is really distinct
from the substantial nature. Since the passage also distinguishes this nature from its motus, the implication is that he is
taking the inclination of nature to mean the power as distinct
from motus; motus is not taken here in the broad sense of
operation, as the adversative vel is used rather than seu; only
if the latter were used would it be implied that motus and
operation are synonyms.
Father O'Connor then cites this passage:
From every form follows an inclination, and from the inclination
an operation; just as from the natural form of fire there follows an
••Cf. ibid., p. 116.

••De Ver., q.

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inclination towards an upward place, according as fire is said to be
light; and from this inclination an operation follows, namely movement which .is upwards. There follows upon. a sensible form as
well as upon an intelligible form, therefore, a certain inclination
which is called sensible or intellectual appetite; just as the inclination following the natural form is called natural appetite. But
from the appetite follows the operation, which is local movement.34
Here we have St. Thomas not only again calling the appetite an inclination, but calling local movement an operation.
Now if there is ever movement in the proper sense, local movement is it. And this local movement is distinct from the appetite or inclination! Moreover, the nature referred to is again
the substantial nature, as is clear from the example given;· the
appetite is the power, distinct from the natural or substantial
form in the case of natural forms, and distinct, in the case of
the sensible and intellectual appetites, from the cognitive forms,
as the latter are in the cognitive powers. The substantial
nature and form are also meant in the other two texts cited
by Father O'Connor. 35
What shall we say, then, about this concept of natural appetite as motus in the proper sense of motus? We might embark
upon a disquisition proving that motus in the proper sense is
physical motus, and that this concept contradicts what Father
O'Connor has said earlier. 86 But we believe the arguments he
•• De Anima, lib. 2, lect. 5, n. 286.

••Of. op. cit., p. 254, note 49. The texts are: De Ver., q. 27, a. 2: "In natural
things, three things are pre-requisite for the obtaining of some end; namely, a
nature proportioned to that end, and an inclination to that end, which is the
natural appetite of that end, and movement 'towards the end; just as it is clear
that in earth there is a certain nature whereby it belongs to it to be in a central
place, and an inclination towards a central place follows this nature, according as
it naturally desires such a place when it is detained outside it by violence, and
therefore, when nothing hinders it, it always moves downward. But man, according to his nature, is proportioned to a certain end for which he has natural appetite,
and by his natural powers he can work to obtain that end." De Malo, q. 6: "In
natural things are found the form, which is the principle of action, and an inclination following the form, which is called natural appetite; action follows from these."
•• lbUl., op. cit., p. 106: "Neither Aristotle no:r St. Thomas eve:r :regarded the
tendency called natural appetite as anything less than a real and positive movement. . . . This movement is :real and not metaphorical, but in its own order,

5

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ROBERT P. SULLIVAN

invokes in favor of this theory have been sufficiently exploded
by now. We shall let St. Thomas deliver the coup de grace in a
passage which Father O'Connor himself cites in explaining the
two senses of motus:
To be moved is said in two ways. In one way properly, as the
Philosopher defines movement in the Third Book of Physics, saying
that movement is the act of a being existing in potency, according
as it is such. . . . In another way, any operation is broadly called
movement, as to understand or to sense; and taking movement in
this sense the Philosopher says in 3 De Anima that, movement is
the act of a perfect being; because each thing operates according
as it is in act. 8 1

Thus far quotes Father O'Connor. Had he read just a few
lines farther, he would have foun,d St. Thomas saying; "Now
rational minds are said to be mobile not in the first sense of
movement, because such movement belongs only to bodies, but
in the second sense." 88
Has Father O'Connor since come to realize the inadequacy
of the theory that natural appetite is movement in the proper
sense of the word? Probably not; but it is singularly absent
from his article in The Modem Schoolman, with the possible
exception of a passage in which he rejects the elicited appetite
of the commentators because " it is not the tendency which
flows from the natural form, but an act which is elicited by the
will or the sensitive appetite in the wake of prior cognition." 39
He does not, however, say that he has retracted this theory.
If he has done so, he should further modify his opinion to
accommodate the fact that every reference in St. Thomas to the
effect that the movement of the natural appetite of the will
follows the cognition of the intellect is a reference to actual or
elicited natural appetite only.
which is the metaphysical order. It is not ... to be measured and judged by the
standards that are applied to physical motion."
••De Ver., q. 24, a. 1, ad 14.
88 Ibid., loc. cit. Italics mine.
••O'Connor, "The Natural Desire for Happiness," The Modern Schoolman,
XX:VI (January, 1949), p. 117.

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The chief contention of this article is that the natural appetite of the will follows knowledge in the intellect. On this point
Father O'Connor does nobly. There is indeed a natural appetite in the will following human cognition. 40 The commentators
agree with him here. But he goes farther and claims that
natural appetite in the will always follows cognition in the
human intellect. There is no such thing as an innate natural
appetite prior to this cognition and consisting in a transcendental relation of the will itself to its proper object.
In support of his thesis, Father O'Connor lays down three
general principles concerning St. Thomas's doctrine. We may
at once admit the truth of the third one:
The third general consideration is this: because natural appetite
as such flows from the natural form, and animal appetite from the
cognitional form, St. Thomas very often speaks of natural appetite
solely as it exists below the level of sense, where obviously it is
always sine cognitione in its subject. Because natural appetite on
these lower levels is without cognition, it does not follow that it is
also without cognition on the two higher levels of the sensitive
appetite and the will.41
Father O'Connor ably demonstrates this conclusion with
appropriate texts from St.
which show that he often
confines natural appetite to natures or powers lacking cognition. This is usually done, however, when St. Thomas is contrasting natural appetite with animal appetite following cognition, and its purpose is probably to give a sharper contrast. 42
Father O'Connor's first general principle is that "when St.
•• Cf. Cont. Gent., II, cap. 55: " For natural appetite is in some beings as a
result of apprehension, just as the wolf naturally desires the killing of the animals
on which it feeds, and man naturally desires happiness." Cf. In IV Se:nt., d. 88,
q. 1, a. 2, a. 1, ad 9: "A natural inclination in the appetitive power follows natural
conception in cognition." Cf. In II Sent., d. 89, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2: "That which is
the end of man is naturally known in the reason to be good and to be sought, and
will following that knowledge is called will as nature."
• 1 O'Connor, op. cit., p. 100.
49 Cf. Quod., I, q. 4, a. 8:
"For natural inclinations can especially be known in
those things which are done naturally without the deliberation of reason, for thus
each thing acts in nature in such a way as it is naturally apt to be done." Italics
mine.
0

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ROBERT P. SULLIVAN

Thomas discusses the origin of the will, he roots it by nature
in the intellect or intelligence." 48 This is also true, but it
must be understood rightly in order to see its consequences
for natural appetite. When St. Thomas says that the will
proceeds " from the essence of the soul, presupposing intelligence," 44 he does not mean to deny that will is a property of
intelligent creatures and hence is always in them, or to imply
that we have no will before our intellect begiri.s to function.
Nor do we suppose that Father O'Connor believes this to be
his meaning; we want only to pave the way for· showing that
St. Thomas's words refer to a priority of nature, not of time.
The intellect is prior to the will in the sense that it presents
. the will with its object. This object and its presentation are
by way of final causality, so that the understood good is prior
to the act of the will as a final cause is to its effect. It is not
prior as a conditio sine qua non, which always implies a temporal priority or at least simultaneity. Moreover, the purpose
of having the will itself is so that men can desire the objects
presented by the intellect, so that it would be idle, therefore,
for God to put a will in a creature who lacked an intellect.
Thus the intellect is, as it were, a cause and principle of the
will and is prior to it by nature. Hence the will naturally
tends towards the understood good as to an end. Doubtless
this end must be understood before there can be any actual
tendency towards it, especially by those actions whereby man
directs himself to the end. But the good need not be understood with a temporal priority or simultaneity before the will,
considered as a power, can have an order to it. For a power
to tend towards an object is for it to be inclined towards something distant and future, as it were, to it. Otherwise we are
back in the position of not possessing a will until our intellect
has begun to function. Hence it no more follows that good in
general must be understood by the intellect of man before his
will can have an order to it, than it does that food must exist
before the digestive powers can have an order to it. No doubt
•• O'Connor, op. cit., p. ··95.

•• De Ver., q. 22, a. 11, ad 6.

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the objects of the powers are prior to the powers insofar as
these objects are, through intention, the final causes of the
powers, but the intention of the Author of Nature suffices
for this"
Intellectual cognition certainly precedes any actual tendency,
natural or free, in the human wilL To prove this is so, however, is not to eliminate an innate natural appetite identified
with the will itself as a power" It would be fruitless to consider
in detail all the texts adduced by Father O'Connor to show
that natural appetite in the will follows knowledge in the intellect (although the relevancy of some of them is not clear) ,
for it can simply be answered that they refer to the actual
natural appetite" Lest their cumulative effect might seem to
preclude any natural appetite of the will which does not follow
actual knowledge in the human intellect, however, it is well to
note that some of them refer to the movement of the will, and
that movement is, as we have seen, movement in the broad
sense, so that every reference to movement of the will as following apprehension is not to be taken as meaning the
appetite does follow knowledge" Other texts brought forward
to imply that the will, even as a power, is rooted in the intellect make use of the teaching of St. Thomas that the win is in
the reason; a teaching which St" Thomas himself explains, in
the very texts cited by Father O'Connor, 45 as employing the
word reason to denote not the faculty of intellect, but the
spiritual part of the soul which is the subject of both intellect
and wilL46
In brief, there is none of these texts which cannot be taken
as referring to actual natural appetite" Moreover, these texts
1

45

Cf. O'Connor, op. cit., p. 96.

De Ver., q. 22, a. 10, ad 2: "But if the will be considered as to that in which
it is rooted, then, since the .will does not have a corporeal organ, just as the intel46

lect does not, will and intellect will be reduced to tb'e same part of the soul. And
thus sometimes intellect or reason is taken as including both in itself; and thus
it is said that the will is in the reason." In Ill Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 3, ad 1:
"The essentially rational part is not said to be merely reason itself, but also the
appetite annexed to the reason, namely the will, hence the Philosopher says in 3 De
Anima that the will is in the reason."

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ROBERT P. SULLIVAN

for the most part consider will according to what is proper to
it. But to be an appetite is not proper to the will.47 Much
less is it proper to the will to have a natural
Thus
we should not look for the natural appetite of the will to conform to what is proper to the will, but for the will to conform
to what is proper to nature, as St. Thomas pointed out in his
proof for the· existence of natural appetite in the will.48
Yet Father O'Connor adopts the view that the natural appetite of the will must conform to what is proper to the will. First
of all he lays down his second general consideration:
St. Thomas has not a univocal notion of natural appetite, but
views it according to the analogy of being and of nature. Where
cognition does not enter as a factor in a nature, natural appetite
will be completely independent of cognition in the subject. Where,
however, cognition is a factor in the nature of a power, as it is in
the case of the sensitive appetite and the will, natural desire will
not be independent of knowledge. 49

Father O'Connor then goes on to prove the analogy of
natural appetite. One text he uses seems to indicate that
natural appetite is predicated univocally of the will rather than
analogically, 50 just as animal is predicated univocally of man
and is, moreover, prior to the rationality which is proper to
man. This raises the question whether natural appetite is really
analogical as applied to various powers. Certainly there is
47 Cf. Cont. Gent., III, cap. 26: " The will as an appetite is not proper to an
intellectual nature, but only as it depends upon the intellect."
48 Cf. De Ver., q. 22, a. 5:
"In ordered things the mode of the first thing must
be included in the second, and there must be found in the second not only what
belongs to it according to its own proper notion, but also what belongs to it
according to the notion of the first mode. . . . Now nature and the will are
ordered in this way, that the will itself is a certain nature, ... and therefore one
must find in the will not only what is of the will, but also what. is of nature, ...
and therefore one must find in the will not only what is of the will, but also
what is of nature."
49 O'Connor, op. cit., p. 97.
••De Ver., q. 22, a. 5, ad 6 in contrarium: "Will is divided against that which
is natural only, just as man is divided against that which is animal only; but it is
not divided against natural appetite absolutely, but includes it, just as man includes
animal."

NATURAL NECESSITATION

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509

analogy of natural desire, inasmuch as St. Thomas teaches that
natural love or natural appetite " is not only in the powers of
the vegetative soul, but in all the powers of the soul, and even
in all the parts of the body, and universally in all things." 51
Hence natural appetite, as now in the body, now in the soul,
now a substantial nature, now an accidental one, will be analogical, as being itself is in these cases. But is it analogical
as applied to various powers? The different powers of the soul
agree in the genera of quality and power, which are predicated
univocally of them, and hence it does not seem that natural
appetite in the will must conform to what is proper to the
will, namely to follow cognition, any more than it follows cognition in the case of the natural appetite of the intellect itself
for its object, the understood essence or truth; to say the latter
desire followed cognition would be to invoke an infinite regress.
At any
St. Thomas makes the natural appetite conform
to the mode of the substantial nature, and not to the mode of
the will, in the important text we are now about to consider.
Father O'Connor mistranslates it in The ·Eternal Quest,52 although not in this article, to read as if the natural inclination
of the will followed the mode of the will rather than that of
the substantial nature. The text of the passage, however,
clearly refers to the mode of the substantial nature. The passage reads:
But it is common to every nature to have some inclination,
which is natural appetite or love. This inclination, how.ever, is
found differently in different natures, in each according to its mode.
Hence in an intellectual nature there is found natural inclination
according to will, and in a sensi.tive nature according to sensitive
appetite, but in a nature lacking cognition, according to the mere
order of the nature to something. 53

In the words that immediately precede this passage, St.
Thomas again stresses the fact that nature is first in anything:
61

Summa Theol., I-II, q. 26, a. 1, ad 8.

""Pages 129, 209.

••Summa Theol., I, q. 60, a.].

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ROBERT P. SULLIVAN
I

It must be considered that the prior is always preserved in the
posterior. But nature is prior to the intellect, because the nature
of anything is its essence. Hence that which is of nature must be
preserved also in those beings having an intellect. 54

In the light of these words it is difficult to see how it can be
maintained that the natural appetite of the will must always
conform to what is proper to the will as will, namely, that it
follow the cognition of the intellect. That seems similar to
defining animal as a living being which is rational, because man
is rational. Man is subsequent to animal as regards what is
proper to him, namely rationality. So, too, both will and intellect are subsequent to the substantial nature.
What, then, is the mode of a substantial nature in the realm
of intelligent beings? At least two other interpretations of this
passage suggest themselves; they seem more conformable .to
the premise St. Thomas laid down, since they proceed from the
part of the substantial nature, not from what is proper to the
will. First, it is proper to an intellectual nature to have a will
and to a sentient nature to have a sense appetite. Hence St.
Thomas may be merely assigning the subject of the natural
appetite. According to this interpretation, the words secundu,m
voluntatem and secundum appetitum sensitivum can be translated as merely as to the will and as to the sensitive appetite.
Of course it is proper to the intellectual nature to have an
intellect, too, but St. Thomas mentions only the will because
the conclusion he wants to reach in this article is that " since
the angel is an intellectual nature, there must be natural love
in its will." 55 The second interpretation proceeds from the fact
that it is proper to an intellectual nature precisely as intellectual to know universals or to generalize. Hence it interprets
this passage to mean that, while nature is determined to one
thing, in an intellectual nature the natural appetite of the will
is determined to a general or common unity. We have already
seen that this is what St. Thomas teaches. Similarly, it is
•• Ibid., loc. cit.
55 Ibid., loc. cit.
The replies to the second and third objections of this article
are noteworthy as implying that this natural love is not always actual,

NATURAL NECESSITATION

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1511

proper to a sentient nature to know, by its senses, particular
classes of goods, and hence the natural appetite of its sense
appetites will be determined to a particular class of goods,
namely things suitable to the senses.
In the light of all that has been said, therefore, it does not
seem that in proving there is analogy of natural appetite, and
that there is an actual natural appetite following cognition,
Father O'Connor has succeeded in eliminating an innate natural
appetite which is identified with the will as a power. Since he
seems to want to eliminate it in order to substitute for it his
own theory that natural appetite is motus in the proper sense
of the word-a theory we believe we have shown to be untensince, in attempting to prove that the natural appetite of the will is one only and always follows cognition in the
human intellect, he must attribute inconsistency to St. Thomas
in the latter's doctrine on natural appetite, 56 we do not see any
necessity for discarding the traditional teaching of the commentators.
4.

VINDICATION

OF THE COMMENTATORS

The questions which must be settled in order fully to vindicate the teaching of the commentators are: whether the actual
natural appetite is freely elicited and can be called elicited
56 Cf. O'Connor, op. cit., pp. ll8, 115, 116.
The one consistency he attributes
(p. 119) to St. Thomas, namely that for him natural appetite is always the inclination that flows from the natural form and that in this respect it differs from sense
appetite arid will, which are inclinations flowing from apprehended forms, does not
fit in well with Father O'Connor's theory. For if the natural appetite of the will
always follows human cognition, it follows an apprehended form. Father O'Connor
anticipates this objection in The Eternal Quest (p.
and replies that the natural
appetite follows apprehension only as a conditio sine qua non; it follows the
natural form as its cause. But the same thing holds true for free choice: it is the
good that is final cause of the act of choice; its apprehension is only a necessary condition for it to exercise its final causality. And if the natural form is efficient cause
of the act of
appetite, so does it also efficiently cause the act of choice.
Hence natural appetite and free choice do not differ in this respect. They differ
in that it is the freely elicited act which follows cognition as a conditio sine qua
non, whereas innate, potential natural appetite does not. They also differ on the
point of necessity of specification.

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ROBERT P. SULLIVAN

app_etite, and whether there is a doctrine of innate, potential
natural appetite in St. Thomas.
The term elicited appetite need not detain us long. It is
true, as Father O'Connor points out, 57 that St. Thomas does
not use this terminology. John of St. Thomas calls it a customary expression: "We must presuppose the customary distinction between innate and elicited appetite." 58 To use the
term elicited appetite of the power may be a little inaccurate;
appetitus elicitivus is more accurate. But the term is used of
the act as well as of the power. Thus John of St. Thomas
says: " Elicited appetite is founded on cognition, and is called
elicited because it is had by the eliciting of an act and the
production of an operation." 59 There is foundation in St.
Thomas for the latter usage, since he admits that the word
appetite can be used both of the power and of the act, 00 In
the case we are discussing, the commentators make it plain
that their elicited natural appetite is appetite in the sense of
act. 61
Is this elicited act of natural appetite freely elicited? Neither
does this question need to detain us long, in view of all we have
•• Tke Eternal Quest, p. 112.
••John of St. Thomas, op. cit., II, 78all.
69 Ibid., Ou'f/ms Tkeologicus, q. 12, disp. 12, a. 8.
6 ° Cf. In 11 Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 1, ad 5:
"Appetite is the name of a power and
the name of an act; hence it is not unfitting that from the appetite of power there
proceed the appetite of act." Cf. also Summa Tkeol., I, q. 81, a. 1: "Now the
sensual movement is an appetite following sensible apprehension. For the act of an
apprehensive power is not so properly called a movement as is the action of an
appetite. For the operation of an apprehensive power is perfected in the very
fact that the things apprehended are in the one who apprehends; whereas the
operation of an appetitive power is perfected in this, that the desirer is borne
towards the desirable thing. And hence the operation of an apprehensive power
is likened to rest, but the operation of an appetitive power is rather likened to
movement; therefore, by sensual movement is understood the operation of an
appetitive power." Italics mine; note incidentally the bearing of this passage on
Father O'Connor's motus theory. For a similar twofold use of the word will, cf.
Summa Tkeol., I-II, q. 8, a. 1, ad 2; and a. 2. Also De Ver., q. 28, a. 8. The
word understanding is.used of power, act and habit; cf. In 11 Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 1,
solutio; and a. 8, ad 1.
61 Cf. Sylvester, Comment., I, cap. 4.
Cf. also Cajetan, Oommt.mt., I, q. 78, a. 1,
n. 5.

NATURAL NECESSITATION

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said above, when. discussing the sphere of necessitation of the
will. It cannot be emphasized too much that by free will we
are masters of our own acts, as St. Thomas so constantly
teaches. We do not directly choose objects, but our own acts;
these are the things that are in our power or possible to us.62
Each of our own acts is a particular good, and hence is freely
eligible, since we are necessitated only to the good in general.
If these acts, including that of willing good or beatitude, are
freely chosen, then they are freely elicited or exercised. Father
O'Connor objects to the use of the latter word, as it is applied
to the act of natural appetite of the will. But to exercise is to
use, 63 and by its reflex activity the will uses itself in every act
of choice.64 Thus we find St. Thomas clearly teaching that the
actual natural appetite for "beatitude is freely exercised, because this act is a particular good.65 We cannot choose the
last end, but we can choose whether or not we shall exercise
this act about the last end. The act is not choice, but it can
be chosen. If it is exercised, it will, of course, be necessary
as to specification.
Father O'Connor has difficulty in understanding what such
an act can mean. Having given Sylvester's position, he speaks
as if Sylvester had said the act of natural desire to see God
were necessarily elicited, and asks why it is not necessary as to
exercise, too, since we are not free to withhold it. 66 Sylvester,
of course, never said it is necessarily elicited and freely exercised. That would be a contradiction in terms,
both
Cf. Summa Theol., I-II, q. 18, aa. 4, 5.
Cf. Summa Theol., I-II, q. 9, a. 1.
"'Cf. ibid., q. 16, a. 4, ad 8; and Cajetan's commentary thereon, n. 3. Cf. also
In II Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 8, ad 5.
65 Cf. De Malo, q. 6:
"Man of necessity wills beatitude. . . . Now I say of
necessity as to the determination of the act, because he cannot will the opposite,
but not as to the exercise of the act, because one is able then not to will to think
of beatitude, because even the very acts of the will and intellect are particular ....
Thus, therefore, as to some things the will is necessarily moved on the part of the
object, but not to all things; but on the part of the exercise of the act it is not
moved of necessity."
68 Cf. O'Connor, The Eternal Quest, pp. 161, 162.
69
68

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ROBERT P. SULLIVAN

exercise and eliciting refer to the efficient bringing forth of the
act. What Sylvester says is that this act is freely exercised
or elicited, but necessary as to specification. We are free to
withhold this act for two fundamental reasons: first, because
such exercise or eliciting is by way of efficient causality and
no object efficiently moves the will, but only finally; secondly,
because even as a :fin·al cause such an act is a particular good,
and so is its exercise, and hence we need not choose to exercise it. 67
Father O'Connor's confusion here probably arises from the
fact that he himself regards the act of natural desire as necessarily elicited; the only freedom it enjoys is freedom from external violence.68 We have just seen that St. Thomas teaches
the opposite. That this act is freely elicited also seems to be
implied in St. Thomas's teaching on the conjunction of appetites:
Good, which is the object of the will, is in things . . . and hence
the movement of the will must terminate at a thing existing outside the mind. Now although a thing, as it is in the mind, can be
considered according to a common notion, omitting its particular
notion, nevertheless the thing cannot exist outside the mind according to the common notion without the addition of its proper notion;
and hence it is necessary that whenever the will be brought to
bear upon good, it be brought to bear upon some determined good;
and similarly, that whenever it be brought to bear upon the highest
good, it be brought to bear upon a highest good of this or that sort.
Now although the will has it from natural inclination that it be
brought to bear upon beatitude according to the common notion,
yet that it be brought to bear upon such or such a beatitude is not
from the inclination of nature, but from the judgment of reason,
which discovers that the highest good of man consists in this or
that thing; and hence whenever one desires beatitude, natural appetite and rational appetite are actually joined there; and on the
67 Cf. De Ver., q. 22, a. 6: "Secondly, the will is undetermined with respect of
act, because it can use or not use its own act about a determined object as it shall
have pleased; for it is able to go or not to go into the act of willing with respect of
anything whatsoever." Italics mine.
68 Cf. O'Connor, op. cit., pp. 124, 125.
On p. 122 he is reduced by his theory
to saying that we can choose happiness, although he has just admitted with St.
Thomas that we cannot choose the end.

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part of the natural appetite there is always rectitude there, but on
the part of the rational appetite there is sometimes rectitude, when
happiness is sought there where it truly is, but sometimes perversity, when it is sought where it truly is not. 69

In the light of this passage, how can Father O'Connor say
that "when a person freely elicits a desire to be happy, without associating or identifying this general state of happiness
with any particular object," 70 there is actual conjunction of
the natural appetite and the rational appetite? St. Thomas
makes it clear here that it is precisely when we do identify
beatitude with some definite object that we have such conjunction. By such conjunction the rational appetite tends
towards the object according to its particular notion, and tends
with freedom of specification because this object is a particular
good. The natural appetite tends towards the same object
according to its common notion, i. e. according to its aspect
of goodness, and it tends with necessity of specification because
it can will only goodness and can will this particular object
only insofar as it is a real or apparent good. Thus in willing a
steak dinner a man can freely choose the steak insofar as it is
steak, but necessarily wills it under the aspect of good, for his
natural appetite tends necessarily towards good insofar as it is
the reason for the desirability of the steak. 71
In view of St. Thomas teaching that appetite always goes
out to something particular and really existing, it seems prob69 In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 8, sol. 8.
••O'Connor, op. cit., p. 178.
11 Father O'Connor, op. cit., p. 212, errs, we believe, in saying that natural appetite as such has nothing to do with the ratio appetibilitatis, even in the case of
the natural appetite of the will. The natural appetite St. Thomas is discussing in
the passage he cites is only that of non-cognoscitive beings, as the context shows.
The actual natural appetite of the will tends directly towards the ratio appetibilitatis as the passage shows: " :flut the higher appetite, which is the will, tends
directly towards the· reason of desirability absolutely; just as the will desires good·ness itself primarily and principally, or utility, or something of this sort." De Ver.,
q. 22, a. 5). If, however, Father O'Connor's interpretation is the correct one, it
shows that the natural appl)tite of the will for good does not follow the apprehension of goodness, as he maintains it does! The passage must then refer to potential natural appetite.

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able that we never have an act of will merely towards goodness or happiness in general, but always with conjunction of
the rational appetite towards some particular good. In view
of the fi!ame statement, and of the way St. Thomas speaks
elsewhere,72 it seems that this conjunction is in a numerically
one act or movement, for if there are two acts of will involved,
one of which only tends towards goodness in general, that act
does not terminate at a really existing thing. If there is only
one act, it is clearly a freely elicited one, since it tends towards
a freely eligible, particular good. It is not certain, however,
that only one act of will is mvolved. 78 If there are two acts,
we must discard the foregoing proof from conjunction of appetites; we can afford to do so, since we have already seen that
St. Thomas expressly teaches that the act of natural appetite
is freely elicited.
Finally, we must answer the question whether, as the commentators hold, there is in the teaching of St. Thomas an
innate natural appetite, identified with the will as a power
transcendentally related to its proper object. Father O'Connor
regards this doctrine as characteristically Scotistic, and believes
the commentators borrowed it from Scotus. But Cajetan, at
least, explicitly rejects the Scotistic position.a If, however,
this doctrine is Scotistic, then Scotus is in agreement here with
St. Thomas, for we can find the notion of an innate natural
appetite in the teachings of the latter.
It is true that we have no passage in which St. Thomas
'r2 Cf. De Ver., q. 22, a. 4, ad 2; and q. 28, a. 7. Cf. also Summa Tkeol., I, q. 80,
a. 2, ad 2; and 1-11, q. 5, a. 8, ad 2. Cf. also In II Sent., d. 88,.q. I, a. 4, ad I.
'"Cf. Summa Tkeol., 1-11, q. 8, a. 8. If St. Thomas is there speaking about the
last end in general, it can be willed by itself, apart from conjunction of appetites;
yet even then not abstractly, but in such a way, it seems, that the will goes out to
that particular thing, as yet unknown in its paricularity, in which the notion of
last end shall be found to be fully realized. But if, as is less probable, he is speaking about a particular last end, it is only of a particular last end that he ewplicitly
declares that " it is one and the same movement of the will whereby it is brought
to bear upon the end . . . and those things which are towards the end." And this
would not preclude willing the end separately, without conjunction of appetites.
" Cf. Cajetan, Comment., 1-11, q. 10, a. I, n. 5.

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explicitly distinguishes the two kinds of natural appetite of the
human will. But in addition to the freely elicited natural
appetite following cognition, we find him de facto teaching and
using an innate natural appetite which is prior to human cognition and is identified with the power itself which is the will.
The existence of this potential and innate natural appetite
is implied in the very fact of the actual natural appetite which
we have been discussing. For if the act of natural appetite is
freely elicited, this can only be insofar as that act is a particular good or a means to the end. This implies that the will
is already determined as to the end and good in general by
potential natural appetite. Here is where imperfect or first act
comes in. Actions belong to supposits. In relation to the supposit or its substantial nature, the power itself, as an accident
thereof, is as act. But it is still in potency as regards its own
act and its object. Thus we can say that by the very fact a
man has the power which is the will, determined of its very
·nature to the end in general, he is in motion (using the term in
the broad sense) to the end, and can thus freely elicit the act
of natural appetite as a means or particular good.
This potential natural appetite. does not follow human cognition. In general, there is no necessary connection: between
natural desire or love and created cognition:
For appetite does not necessarily regard esse spirituale, as cognition does. Hence there can be natural appetite, but not cognition.
Nor is this prevented by the fact that in all things appetite follows
cognition; because in natural things it does follow apprehension or
cognition, but not that of the desirers, but of Him Who orders
them to the end.75
. This holds true even for the potential natural appetite of
the will. There are passages from the Angelic Doctor plainly
teaching an innate natural appetite in the will independent of
human knowledge:
••De Ver., q. 22, a. 1, ad 2. Cf. In III Sent., d. 27, q. I, a. 4, ad 18: "Love,
properly speaking, is only in those beings in whom there is knowledge, but the
name love is transferred to those things to which the name knowledge cannot be
extended, because love is said according as the lover is ordered to some other thing,
but a thing can be ordered to another even by an external orderer."

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Natural appetite is the inclination of anything whatsoever, of its
nature, towards something; hence by natural appetite any power
whatsoever desires what is suitable to it; but animal appetite follows
an apprehended form. 76
It belongs to each and every power of the soul to desire its proper
good by natural appetite, which does not follow apprehension; but
to desire good by animal appetite, which follows apprehension,
belongs only to the appetitive power. 77
Just as natural appetite follows a natural form, so, too, sensitive
or rational or intellective appetite follows an apprehended form. 78
Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a natural
inclination to something. Hence each power desires by natural
appetite that object which is suitable to itself. Above this natural
appetite is the animal appetite, which follows apprehension, and by
which something is desired not as suitable to the act of this or that
76 Summa Theol., I, q. 78, a. I, ad 8.
Italics mine. Cf. ibid., I-II, q. 85, a. 1:
" For the inclination of natural appetite does not follow the apprehension of the
desirer himself, but of Another."
77 Ibid., I-II, q. 80, a. 1, ad 8.
Cf. ibid., q. 6, a. 4: "The act of the will is nothing else than a certain inclination proceeding from an interior knowing principle,
just as natural appetite is a certain inclination proceeding from an interior principle,
and without knowledge." All italics mine.
78 De Malo, q. 16, a. 2.
Cf. Summa Theol., I-II, q. 41, a. 8: "A movement is
called natural because nature inclines towards ·it. But this happens in two ways:
In one way, because it is wholly perfected by nature, without any operation of the
apprehensive power, just as to be moved upwards is the natural movement of fire,
and to grow is a natural movement of plants and animals. In another way, a
movement towards which nature inclines is called
although it is not
perfected except through apprehension . . . and in this latter way even the very
acts of an apprehensive power, as to understand, to sense, and to remember, and
even the movements of the animal appetite are sometimes called natural. . . .
But according to the first acceptation of natural, it must be known that certain
of the passions of the soul are sometimes called natural, as love, desire, and. hope;
but the others cannot be called natural, and this because love and hate, desire and
flight imply a certain inclination to pursue good and flee evil, which inclination,
indeed, pertains to natural appetite, and hence there is a· certain natural love;
and desire and hope can in a way be said to be even in things lacking cognition.
But the other passions of the soul imply certain movements for which the natural
inclination in no way suffices." Here, contrary to Father O'Connor, is the natural
desire of the sensitive appetite (even actual) wholly perfected without sense apprehension! Apply the above principles to the will, we have both kinds of natural
appetite: the actuOl movement perfected only through apprehension, and the inclination preceding it. Italics mine.

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power, such as a sight for seeing or a sound for hearing, but as suitable absolutely to the animal.79
Since natural appetite is derived from some apprehension, although not conjoined, the case seems to be the same concerning
the inclination of natural appetite and animal appetite, which follows conjoined apprehension. . . . Now in natural appetite this is
manifestly apparent, that just as every thing has a natural consonance of aptitude tow.ards that which is suitable to it, which is
natural love, so too it has a natural dissonance, which is natural
hatred, towards that which is repugnant and corruptive.. So too
then, in the animal or intellective appetite, love is a certain consonance of the appetite towards that which is apprehended as
suitable. 80
Natural appetite does not follow from an apprehension, as do the
animal and the intellective appetites. But the reason commands
as an apprehensive power. Therefore, those acts which proceed
from the animal or intellective appetite can be commanded by the
reason, but not those acts which proceed from natural appetite;
but the acts of the vegetable soul are of this soTt.81

The natural inclination of the will is not only towards the last
end, but also towards that good which is shown to it by the reason. 82
••Summa Theol., I, q. 80, a. I, ad 8. Cf. De Ver., q. 15, a. 8: "There is in the
lower appetite a certain natural inclination whereby the appetite is in a way
naturally forced to tend towards the
object. But the higher appetite is
not determined to either of opposites, because the higher appetite is free, but not
the lower. And hence it is that the movement of the lower appetite is not found
to be attributed to an apprehensive power, because the cause of that movement is
not from apprehension but from the inclination of the appetite; but the movement
of the higher appetite is attributed to its apprehensive power, namely to th_e reason,
because the inclination of the higher appetite to this or to that good is caused
from the judgment of reason."
80 Ibid., I-II, q. 29, a. I.
Italics mine.
81 Ibid., q. 17, a. 8.
Italics mine, because Father O'Connor, evidently following
·the Parma edition, translates this clause " for acts of this sort belong to the
vegetable soul." This is false, as this clause is the minor premise leading to the
desired conclusion that tlie acts of the vegetable soul are not subject to the
command of reason, and is hence introduced by but. Again,· this reading would
eliminate natural appetite from everything below the vegetable powers. The
Leonine edition reveals that this reading is found only in the Parma edition. Hence
there is no implication that it is only the natural appetite of the vegetable soul that
does not follow cognition.
89 De Vir. in Com., a. 5, ad 2.
Note that this reply implies that the last end

6

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ROBERT P. SULLIVAN

The appetite for food is twofold. One, indeed, is natural appetite, according as the appetitive, retentive, digestive, and expulsive
powers serve the nutritive power, which is a power of. the vegetable soul; and such ·an appetite is hunger, which does not follow
any apprehensive power, but follows natural need. . . . The other
appetite is the sensitive appetite following apprehension, in which
are the passions of the soul.83
Each and every power desires its object by natural appetite ....
And because· natural appetite is determined to one thing, whereas
animal appetite follows apprehensiOn, hence it is that the individual powers desire a determined good, but the appetitive power
desires whatsoever good is apprehended. 84

Since every inclination results from a form, natural appetite results from a form existing in the nature of things, while the sensitive appetite, as also the intellectual or rational appetite called the
will, results from an apprehended form. 85

Passages such as the above are so clear that Father O'Connor does not attempt tO deny the import of some of. them. His
answer to them consists first in the claim that the good causes
such n,atural appetite, and hence, presumably, the good must
have been understood in order to do so. But this is true only
of the movement of actual natural appetite, as the text he himself cites plainly states. 86 Then he admits that there are two
accounts of natural appetite in St. Thomas. Of course there
are, for he believes in two kinds of natural appetite. Father
O'Connor begs the question by assuming that there can be
only one kind of natural appetite in the will. The twofold
is· not 'due to self-contradiction on the part of St.
is not proposed to the will by the intellect, especially when it is read in conjunc-

tion with the objection which it. answers.
88 De Malo, q. 14, a. 1, ad 4.
We italicize the word appetitive because Father
O'Connor claims that hunger belongs only to the powers of the vegetable soul. No
doubt actual hunger follows an apprehension.
••De Ver., q. 22, a. 8, ad 5. Italics mine.
••Summa Theol., I-II, q. 8, a. 1.
••Cf. Ibid., q. 2s; a. 4: "In the movements of the appetitive part, however, the
good has a sort of attractive power. . . . The good, therefore, first causes in the
appetitive power a certain inclination, or aptitude, or connaturality to the good,
and this pertains to the passion of love." Italics mine.

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Thomas; ilor is it only when he forgets to consider the analogy
of natural appetite that the Angelic Doctor attributes noncognitional natural appetite to the human will. Since the whole
basis of his distinction between natural and animal appetite is
that the latter follows apprehension whereas the former does
not, it would be stupidly short-sighted of St. Thomas to forget
the fact that the natural appetite of the will and sensitive appetites follows cognition, if that were the case. Moreover, let
us consider one place where he makes this distinction on the
basis of preceding cognition. It is immediately objected that if
natural love does not follow apprehension, then it seems to
pertain only to the powers of the vegetable soul, as Dionysius
implies. St. Thomas answers:
Natural love is not only in the powers of the vegetative soul, but
in all the powers of the soul, and even in all the parts of the body,
and universally in all things ... since each thing has a connaturalness for what is suitable to it according to its nature. 87
This reply occurs right after St. Thomas has just asserted in
the body of the article that " There is a certain appetite following the apprehension, not of the one desiring, but of Another, and an appetite of this sort is called natural." There,
too; he has described this appetite as if it were the power itself,
since it is the principle of act or movement:
But in natural appetite the principle of this movement is the
connaturality of the appetite for that towards which it tends, which
can be called natural love; just as the very connaturalness of a
heavy body for the central place is through gravity, and can be
called natural love; and in a similar way the aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will for some good, i. e. the very complacency
in the good, is called sensitive love, or intellective or rational love.88
Here, on Father O'Connor's assumption, we have St. Thomas
considering and not .considering the analogy of natural appetite
in the very same article. Unfortunately, we lack St. Thomas's
own explanation of this analogy; but we have seen that Father
O'Connor's interpretation is contrary to St. Thomas's oft-re87

Ibid., q.

·a. I, ad S.

88

Ibid., COrpu8.

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peated principle that nature is prior to what is proper to the
will as will.89 But we have the Angelic Doctor's own explanation of the analogy of appetite in general. Presumably, it fits
natural appetite, too, since the latter falls under the genus of
appetite. This explanation confirms our supposition that this
analogy designates the subjects of the
appetites:
The act of the will is nothing but a certain inclination following
an understood form, just as natural appetite is an inclination following the natural form. Now the inclination of any thing is in
that thing after its own fashion. Hence natural inclination is in
the natural thing naturally, and the inclination which is sensible
appetite is in the sentient being sensibly, and likewise the intelligible inclination which is the act of the will is intelligibly in the
intelligent being as in its principle and proper subject. . . . Now
when something is intelligibly in some intelligent being, the consequence is that it is understood by the intellect, both inasmuch as
one perceives himself to will, and inasmuch as one knows the nature
of this act, and consequently the nature of its principle, which is
the habit or the power. 00

St. Thomas here explains the analogy of appetite in terms
of intelligibility as well as of subject. Although this explanation speaks of the act of the will, and of appetite in general, we
seem justified in applying its principles to natural appetite, too.
If so, we can find confirmation in many passages of St. Thomas
of the fact that natural appetite seems to precede cognition,
rather than the reverse:
For the good is a certain truth, insofar as it is apprehended by
the intellect; inasmuch, namely, as the intellect understands the will
to will good.91
For the object of sense appetite is the good apprehended by
sense; but the object of the intellective appetite or will is good
under the universal notion of good, insofar as it is apprehensible
by the intellect. 9 2
Cf. ibid., q. 10, a. 1, ad 1.
Ibid., I, q. 87, a. 4. Italics mine.
91 De Vir. in Com., a. 6 ad 5. Whenever, in the body of this article, St. Thomas
mentions natural appetite and natural cognition, he puts the former first.
92 Summa Theol., 11-11, q. !'l4, a. 1.
Italics mine.
89
90

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For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man is naturally known by him. 98
Now it pertains to natural knowledge that the soul know it was
created for beatitude, and that beatitude consists in the attainment
of the perfect good.94
·

It is not disputed that natural appetite is an impression or
inclination from God. 95 If so, why should human knowledge
have to precede it? 96 We believe that the passages we have
adduced show that there is a natural appetite in the human
will prior to human cognition.
Is this non-cognitional natural appetite of the will the same
thing as the will itself, .considered as a power? If it precedes
human knowledge, it would seem that it is. The only other
possibility is that it could be an act, not following human
cognition, and elicited from the wili by the impulsion of. God.
Yet even such an act would presuppose the order of the power
to its object, for " all the .actions which proceed from a power
are caused by it according .to the notion of its object; but the
object of the will is the end, and good." 97 Moreover, such an
·es Ibid., I, q 2, a. 1, ad 1.
••De Mal.o, q. 5, a. 8. This text refers directly to the natural knowledge of a
separated soul, but experience and the preceding quotation show that it holds
true for this life, too.
••Of. In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1,
8, sol. 2, ad I: "The will cannot extend to
the opposite of that to which it is determined by the divine ·impression, namely,
towards the opposite of the last end." Of. also Quod. I, q. 4, a. 8: "For
natural love is a certain· natural inclination implanted in a nature by God." Cf.
also Summa Theol., I, q. 108, a. 1, ad 8: "The natural necessity inherent in things
which are determined to one is a certain impression of God directing to the end,
just as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to tend towards a certain
target is an impression of the archer and not of the arrow." Of. also ibid., I-II, q. 9,
a. 6, ad 8: "God, as the universal mover, moves man's will to the universal object
of the will, which is the good."
••Of. Summa Theol., I-II, q. I, a. 2, ad I: "When man acts by himself for
an end, he knows the end; but when he is actuated or led by another, e.g. when
he acts at the command of another, 01 is moved by the impulsion of another, he
need not know the end." Italics mine. Of. also ibid., q. 27, a. 2, ad 8: "Even
natural love, which is in al.l things, is caused by some cognition, not indeed existing
in the natural things themselves, but in Him Who instituted the nature." Italics
mine.
87 Ibid., q. I, a. 1.

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act would always be actual in the will, whereas natural appetite is not. 98 Again, St. Thomas identifies the natural appetite
of the will with the will itself:
God changes the will in two ways, however; in one way, only
by moving it, namely when He moves the will to will something,
without impressing any form on the will. . . . In the other way,
however, by impressing some form on the will itself, just as from
the very nature which God gave to the will, the will is inclined to
will something. 99

Many of the words which St. Thomas uses to describe the
natural appetite of the will imply that it is the will itself. Thus
he calls it an aptitude and a connaturalness. 100 If at times he
uses these words of an act, 101 this is not his usual custom. 102
Other words he uses do not imply act; for instance he calls
natural appetite a relation,1°3 and an order,1°4 and a propor••Cf. De Ver., q. 22, a. 6, ad 11.

•• Ibid., a. 8. Italics mine.
10 ° Cf. De Vir. in Com., a. 8, ad 8: "Virtue is said to be partly from nature ...
namely, according to power and aptitude."
Cf. also Summa Theol., I-II, q. 26,
a. 1, ad S: "Each thing has a connaturalness for what is suitable for it according
to its nature."
101 Cf. Summa Theol., I-II, q. 28, a. 4.
10 • Cf. ibid., I, q. 98, a; 4: "Hence the image of God in man can be considered
in three ways: in one way, indeed, according as man has a natural aptitude to
understand and love God, and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the
mind, which is common to all men." Cf. also ibid., I-II, q. 86, a. 2 ad 8; and In II
Sent., d. 89, q. 8, a. 1, ad 6.
108 Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 19, a. 8: "Even as we will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other power has a necessary relation to its proper and prinCipal
object, for instance the sight to color, since it is of its nature to tend to it." Cf.
also De Ver., q. 26, a. 1: "But the will has necessity with respect of goodness or
utility; for man necessarily wills good, but he does not have necessity with regard
to this or that thing, howsoever it may be apprehended as good or useful; this is
because each and every power has a necessary relationship to its proper object."
10 • Cf. Summa Theol., I, (.' 80, a. 2:
" For the appetitive power is a passive
power which is naturally apt to be moved by the apprehended object . . . and
the passive power itself has its own nature from the order to its active principle."
Cf. De Ver., q. 28, a. 4: "The principal willed, object, indeed, is that upon which
the will is brought to bear according to its nature, because the will itself is a
certain nature and has a natural order to something but this is what the will
naturally Wms, just as the human will naturally desires happiness." Cf. In III
Sent., d. 27, q. I, a. 2, responsio: "But everything which is from ·.God receives

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tion. 105 These words denote a transcendental relation, not an
act. After all, natural appetite is no more analogical than
potency is. In the case of prime matter, the natural appetite
for form is merely a transcendental relation. Il the word
potency can be applied to both prime matter and the power
which is the will, with the difference that in the latter case the
object of this relation is different, and the power is as an act
in relation 'to its substantial subject, so can the term natural
appetite be applied to both prime Jllatter and the will, retaining the same aspect of transcendental relation, and differing
only insofar as the objects of these natural appetites differ,
and insofar as one of them is as first act in relation to its
substantial subject.
This transcendental relation of the will to its proper object
is, of course, real. This does not mean, however, that it is a
predicamerital relation, a really distinct accident added to the
nature of man; The transcendental relation is real precisely
because it is identified with the will, and the will itself is something real. If at times St. Thomas speaks of a power having
rather than being a' ii'atural inclination,1°6 we must remember
that he also speaks of the will having freedom, and yet explains
that free will is not really distinct from the will itself. 107 Moreover, we have his clear identification of the natural appetite
some nature whereby it is ordered to its ultimate end. Hence it is necessary that in
all creatures having an 'end there'be found natural appetite, even in the will itself
with the :reSpect of the last end." ·
10 • Cf. Summa Tkeol., I-II, q. 18, a. 14: "The will has a twofold relation to the
thing willed: one, indeed, according as it is somehow in the willer through a certain
proportion or order to the thing willed." Father O'Connor says that this text may
imply that knowledge preceded natural appetite, since the thing willed is in the
willer through its representation in the intellect; St. Thomas, however, plainly says
it is in him through an order and proportion.
10 • Cf. ibid., I, q. 80, a. 1, ad 8.
m Cf. De Ver., q. 24, a. 4, ad 11: " The facility which is through the inclination of a habit adds over and above . the power something which is of another
nature, namely the habit, but the facility which is through the removal of coercion
adds a determined nature to the power, which nevertheless pertains to the very
nature of the power, just as the difference which is added to a genus pertaius to
the nature of the species."

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The very nature of each thing is a certain
with the nature:
inclination.,im.planted in it by the First Mover and ordering it
to
due end." 108
it is a natural appetite that St. Thomas uses
as an example
transcendental relation:
But those things which are said relatively signify, according to
their proper nature, only a reference to another. This relation,
indeed, is sometimes in the very nature of things, for instance when
some things. are ordered to one another by their very nature and
have an inclination to one another; and relations of this sort are
necessarily 'real; just as in a heavy body there· is an inclination
and order towards ·the central place: hence there is a certain relationship in the heavy Jl9dy itself towards the central place. And
the same applies to other things of this sort. 109

That· each power has such· a transcendental relation to· its
proper· object is apparent from. the fact that the power is
defined in terms of its object: ." Each power is defined from
that which is essentially and formapy its object. Now since
the object of the will is the good, for· this reason it is principally described from the ep.d." 110 We cannot define the will
without bringing in its natural inclination and the object
thereof, any more than we can define sight except in terins of
seeing and the -colored.111
From what has been said, therefore, it should be clear that
St. Thomas teaches the· existence of an innate ,or potential
natural appetite, not following human cognition. So do the
commentators. We can even see why they tend to give the
. name natural
chiefly to this innate inclination of the
will, since elicited natural appetite, as following human knowledge and as freely elicited, is an act ol. animal appetite in all
respects save its necessary specification. Since St. Thomas
teaches that there is such an elicited natural appetite, too, we
In Metaphya., lib. Xp:, lect. 2, n. 2684. Italics mine.
Summa Theol., I, q. ,28, a. I.
110 In 11 Sent., d. 24, q. l, a. S, ad 8.
111 Of. Richard R. Baker, The Thomistic Theory of the Passions and their Influence upon the Will (Notre Daine University: 1941), pp. IS, 14.
1 ••
10 •

NATURAL NECESSITATION

OF THE HUMAN WILL

527

find the twofold division of natural appetite given by the commentators to be fully vindicated in the doctrine of their master.
CONCLUSION

We hope that we have succeeded in fulfilling the aims set
forth in our introductory remarks. We have, indeed, assembled many passages from the teachings of the Angelic Doctor,
and have striven to co-ordinate them, rebuilding, as it were,
the concept of natural appetite which he had in his own mind.
We have seen that St. Thomas roots natural necessitation in
the fact that each thing exists for its own operation, so that a
being is not a static thing, but dynamic, insofar as it is a principle of operation. Hence any being can be called a nature or
intrinsic principle of operation, and has the immobility and
determination to one thing characteristic of nature.
We have examined the objects which necessitate the will,
whether by way of natural desire or by way of natural love,
and have found them to be happiness or the last end, good,
God clearly seen in the Beatific Vision, and goods of the class
of life, knowledge, and virtue. It has been noted that these
objects necessitate the will only insofar as they are considered
in general.
The natural appetite of the human will has been found to
'
be twofold, according
to the commentators. We have examined
the praiseworthy attempt of a modern scholar to throw light
on a doctrine which is obscure, to the extent that it is not
explicit in St. Thomas; yet we have found his solution-that
there is only one natural appetite in the human will, and it
is a movement, in the proper sense of the world, which follows human knowledge-to be erroneous. We believe that we
have shown his basic errors, and have vindicated the teachings of the commentators by showing that their doctrine may
definitely, even if not explicitly, be found in the works of St.
Thomas.
With regard to determinism and free will, our study has
shown that the will is determined to few objects, and these

528

ROBERT P. SULLIVAN

general ones, so that free choice of particular goods is not
hindered; indeed, there could be no free choice of means unless
there were first a determination as to the end, in general. This
same fact that the object of the will is a general one would seem
to eliminate any proof for the existence of God based on the
natural appetite of the human will, other than as a particular
exemplification of the proof from design and order in the universe. For the will could conceivably have been given its
general object in order to will a succession of particular goods,
and in such a case its natural desire would not be in vain. 112
Finally, the same fact that the natural appetite of the human
will is for a general object would seem to eliminate any explicit
desire for the vision of God, as a particular object; 113 so that
the desire for the vision of God must be regarded as an implicit
one, insofar as such a desire is contained in the desire for knowledge in general, or else insofar as it is contained in the desire
for beatitude and good, since He is, de facto, the object in which
these notions are perfectly realized.
ROBERT

P. SULLIVAN, o. P.

Providence College,
Providence, R. l.

112 Cf. Summa Theol., III, q. 11, a. 5, ad 2:
"But the will has itself indeterminately towards an infinitude of things. Nevertheless, this is not in vain, even if
it does not tend actually to all things, provided it tend actually to what is suitable
to the time and place."
113 Cf. ln l Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 5, solutio: "The soul always understands itself and
God indeterminately, and a certain undetermined love follows."

BOOK REVIEWS
Soviet Politics - The Dilemma of Power.
Cambridge:
$6.00.

By BARRINGTON

MooRE, JR.

Harvard University Press, · 1950. Pp. 523 with index.

This book by Dr. Barrington Moore, Jr. is a good book. It is marked
by extensive research, penetrating scholarship and objective construction.
It comes as a refreshing work in contrast to so much superficial literature
flooding the country today on the subject of Soviet Russia and MarxismLeninism. 'Harvard University is to be commended for the part it played
in making this book available.
The author is interested ·primarily in "the interaction between Communist ideology and certain Soviet political practices." (p. I) His secondary interest relates to tlie opportunity which this study provides " to test
prevailing general theories concerning the role of ideas in organized human
behavior." (p. 2) Therefore, the two central questions which his book
seeks to answer are: " Which of the pre-revolutionary Bolshevik ideas have
been put into effect in the Soviet Union, which ones set aside, and why?
Secondly, what can we 1earn from this historical experience about the role
of ideas in general?" (p. 9)
The author's consideration of the complex problem involved and his
suggested answers to these two central questions may be very briefly
summarized as follows.
The emergence of Marxist-Leninist ideology in Russia is related on one
hand to the weakness of the middle class which hindered necessary reforms
that were in progress and on the other to the catastrophe of World War I.
This allows one to take the middle position '' that there were considerable,
though not necessarily insurmountable, obstacles in the way of Russian
development along western democratic lines." (p. 21) However, "the
journey was begun late and its course deflected. Sufficient social tensions
had accumulated so that, when released by the disintegration of the war,
the moderates would be swept from power after a few months. These social
tensions Lenin and his followers would turn to their own account. In revolutions, as Miliukvo observed, the appetite for change comes with the
eating. Each concession by those in power suggests to those out of power
the possibility of greater gains. This inherent dynamic of revolution often
creates a tremendous ·advantage· for the extremist movement." (p. 27)
This did happen in Russia. The extremist group which did receive this
advantage and made effective use of it, was the Marxist one, organized as
the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in 1898, with its left wing,

530

BOOK REVIEWS

the Bolsheviks being formed in 1908. Its success caused surprise even
within the Party, which was not adequately prepared for it.
In the early development of this Party, fragments of democratic, individualistic thought existed along with dictatorial thought. The Party in
general " desired first a ' bourgeois ' parliamentary republic to be followed
at a later stage of history by a socialist society." (p.
The "democratic
republic " was the immediate goal in the conspiratorial overthrowing of the
Tsarist government and was to serve as an instrument (which would become obsolete) in the spread of Communism throughout Russia, from
which it would proceed to Europe. When the revolution of 1917 occurred,
Lenin decided to skip ·the " bourgeois republic" stage aJ\D.OUncing " the
definite conclusion that the demand for a parliamentary regime should be
scrapped, and that the soviets were the ' only possible form of revolutionary
government'." (p. 87) This led to the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Hence, Communist ideology in Russia emerged and was tempered in the
Marxist theoretical fires, the practicalities of the Revolution of 1917 and
the authoritarianism of the dictatorship in whose vise-like grip it remains.
With this as background Lenin proposed this plan. " The immediate
objective was to establish a republic of soviets based on the proletariat and
the poor sections of the peasantry, and to abolish the police, the army, and
the bureaucracy. In the economic field, Leninist doctrine demanded the
replacement of the existing managerial groups with a centralized system
of control by the industrial workers, together with a sharp reduction of
inequalities in pay and the eventual introduction of full equality. In agriculture, Lenin proposed the introduction of cooperative farming only on
the large landed estates, while the disposal of the rest of the land was left
up to the local population. At the same time he wanted to avoid, if possible, the. transformation of Russia into a land of small peasant proprietors.
In the international field, he expected that a successful revolution in Russia
would set afire the socialist revolution in Europe, with the result that
the western proletariat would come to the aid of the hard-pressed workers of Russia. Nearly every one of these hopes and expectations was
disappointed." (pp. 57-58)
This disappointment is largely attributable to the nature of the five main
problems which the successful revolution of November 7, 1917 brought to
the Communist leaders: These problems were (1) how should industry be
organized in this new proletariat nation?
What was to be the status
and organizational form of the industrial workers in this new nation?
(8) How could the peasants be managed and induced to furnish sufficient
food for the urban workers? (4) What systematic basis and expression of
authority, discipline and status within the now ruling Communist Party
and within the nation could be provided? and (5) What ought to be the
correct relationship between this new proletarian nation and the hostile

BOOK REVIEWS

581

non-proletarian world? These were the major interrelated problems which
created dilemmas for Soviet Russia and with which it was preoccupied for
the. next fifteen years. In the beginning of this period " War Communism "
was introduced with the nationalization of June 28, 1919 as a "temporary
measure,; (p .. 90) to insure survival against both foreign and domestic
enemies. This was followed by a sharp change in plans which brought in
the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921 reswting in "granting to the
peasantry of the right to trade in the open market in whatever produce
they hild left, after a certain specified amount had been turned over to the
government. This decision meant the return of the profit motive and exchange relationships to an important sector of the economy. In the field
of industry the government retreated to the ' commanding heights ' of
control over banking, transportation, and certain large industries, permitting private enterprise to take the rest. In one of his speeches Lenin
candidly described the NEP as a partial return to capitalism." (p. 98) ,
In the light of the above the twenties was a period of problem solving
for Soviet Russia. In spite of these problems and the vigorous differences
which arose because of them the Communist Party " overtly united upon
two fundamental objectives. In the first place there was complete unity
on the goal of retaining power in Communist hands. Also, there was broad
agreement on the desirability of achieving at some future date a socialist
transformation of Russian society." (p. 97)
Within this united framework there was room for disagreements which
did occur giving birth to three differing solutions for the problems besetting
the new proletarian nation. These three solutions were (1) Trotsky's
which advocated pressing " forward on both the domestic and the international fronts toward a socialist revolution"'; (p. 98) (2) Bukharin's which
institutional framework left by Lenin and the NEP "; (p. 98) and (3)
Stalin's who first made. use of " Bukharin's genera lapproach, and in the
process was able to discredit and eliminate Trotsky as a political opponent.
Then since Bukharin's solution appeared to be leading into a blind alley, he
took over many but not all, of the essential features of Trotsky's program
and eliminated Bukharin from power." (p. 98)
Stalin's selection and merger of the preferred and useful elements in the
Bukharin and Trotsky solutions plus the addition of his own ideas resUlted
in five specific suggestions "(I) rapid industrialization; (2) planning;
(S) collectivization in agriculture; (4) socialism in one country; and (5)
a more intransigent and leftist policy for the Communist International."
(p. 108) With these suggestions the problems of the twenties were confronted but never fully solved.
Leaving the twenties, we find new problems arose before the old were
resolved. " In the thirties came the crisis of forced-draft industrialization
and the campaigns for the collectivization of agriculture. This state of

582

BOOK REVIEWS

chronic political and economic tension favored the development of a campaign psychology and the further elaboration of the authoritarian aspects
of the Marxist-Leninist tradition." (p. 117) Political competitors over a
period of time were ruthlessly eliminated. The kulaks were -physically
suppressed. Freedom everywhere was curtailed as the Communist Party
commenced to consolidate its dominant position through "the systematic
application of terror" (p. 124) facilitated by. the "crisis-strewn history
of the Bolshevik regime." (p. 139) Power to make important decisions
became concentrated in the hands of the ruling few. "With this there took
place a corresponding diminution in the infh1ence of the rank and file on
matters of major import." (p. 146) ("The taming of the rank and file
was very largely completed by the end of 1925.)" (p. 151) From this concentration of power in the hands of the members of the Central Committee
and within the Politburo there emerged the" Monolithic Party." (p. 152)
Democratic centralism had become narrow centralism without democracy.
By 1931 the Right Wing was completely defeated and the Left remained
in undisputed control.
Class struggle, allegedly, was resolved, equality of rewards was
as being " incompatible with the major goal of industrialization." (p. 188)
Revolutionary tactical procedure was subsequently subordinated to international power politics which had been previously rejected. One nation
was pitted against another for the benefit of Soviet Russia. All its foreign
revolutionary objectives had failed to be realized; hence leaders of Soviet
Russia felt " compelled to split the capitalist front, or to take advantage
of splits in this front, in order to preserve and enhance their own power
and security." (p. 215)
By 1930 Stalin's political victory over his opponents was secure. This
gave time and opportunity for domestic changes. " From about 1934
onward a very definite stabilization of political and economic relations in
the Soviet Union may be perceived." (p. 221) This was a basic reorientation. " One outstanding characteristic of this era has been· the endeavour
to reconcile the older Leninist doctrine that the masses are the masters of
the country and of their fate with the fact of the concentration of power
at the top levels of the Party." (p. 222) The attempt is made to justify
the use of force, elimination of competitors, suppression of liberty, reduction of the role of the individual, and the absence of free elections. The
attempt is not successful and the weakness of it is made ever more apparent
by "the glorification of a single leader" (p. 229) which was begun about
1929 and has developed steadily since then.
With this and other related developments, bureaucracy has increased
over the years instead of decreasing as Lenin predicted in 1917. " Since
that time the Soviet regime has become what may be fairly described as
the bureaucratic state par excellence of modern times." (p. 277) In theory

BOOK REVIEWS

538

the masses are to participate in everything and are to own and control all,
making the basic decisions. This does not work out well in practice. Even
in such important decisions as planning production, distribution and consumption needs, only the small, select few at top decide. They decide the
economic fate of millions, yet in the industrial order of things, far removed
from the ideal though it may be, " the Soviets have come closer to achieving their original goals" (p. 316) than in other spheres of endeavor.
By way of summary the author's conclusions and implications can be
stated thusly:
l. " The idea that inequalities of authority are necessary in human
society, that is, that some must command and others must obey received
very little recognition in the prerevolutionary Bolshevik ideology of ends."
(p. 402)
2. " On the other hand, the Bolshevik ideology of means laid heavy
stress upon the need for authority and discipline. Lenin wanted the Party,
which was to be the instrument of the liberation of Russia and eventually
of the human race, to be a strictly centralized, highly disciplined organization, responding to the orders of its leaders like a well-trained orchestra to
a wave of the conductor's baton." (p. 402)
3. "With the assumption of political responsibility in l!H 7, the Bolshevik ideology of means played a greater role in the determining of
behaviors than the ideology of ends." (p. 403)

4. " In this process the original anti-authoritarian ideas, and the practices which flow from them, have um;lergone a sea-change, with the result
that they now serve as justifications and additional supports for an authoritarian regime; The safeguards of democratic centralism and self-criticism
have been modified in such a way that they do not act as a check upon
the power of the top leaders. Instead they serve as devices to strengthen
this power ... " (p. 403)
5. "In foreign policy the Communists in Russia came to power with
their own revolutionary interpretation of foreign policy. This they have
abandoned for the present resorting to the more traditional balance-of-power
techniques." (p. 405)

6. "The Bolshevik experience, it is suggested, reveals the need for
inequalities of power in industrial society. At the same time it reveals the
need for a functional· division of labor and for inequality of rewards. All
these requirements add up to the necessity of a system of organized social
inequality." (p. 406)
7. It can be said only very tentatively " ... that through the device
of the bureaucratic and authoritarian state men may be able to diminish

584

BOOK REVIEWS

the inequalities of opportunity characteristic of other societies and ages."
(p. 407)
8. " It may also be inferred, on the basis of the Soviet experience, that
some variety of competitive stimulus is a necessary ingredient in a modern
industrial society." (p. 408)
9. "Likewise, the Soviets have not been able to do away with certain
other conceptions of the dismal science of economics, such as that the
costs of production have to be met out of receipts, that capital investment
means the postponement of present satisfactions, and that there are efficient and inefficient ways of combining labor and capital to turn out the
finished products." (p. 408)
10. " In the international sphere, the record of Soviet relations with
the rest of the world indicates that the Russians have been compelled to
adapt themselves to the pattern of world politics prevailing in the twentieth
century many of whose features have existed in other times and places."
(p. 408) In essence it is power politics.
11. Of all the ends which the Russian Communist started out with, the
only one which has to a real extent been reached is the " transfer of the
means of production to the society as a whole " (p. 408) and some might
consider this to be a means rather than an end.
There are limitations to the book. Some of the more obvious are as
follows:
1. The author does not seem to give sufficient consideration to the
possible Messianic content of Marxist-Leninist ideas. Marxism to some
has become a vision, the nature of which ought not to be underestimated
in evaluating the role and strength of ideas in the social order. If it be
true that Marxism as a vision is the corruption of the best, the. inverting
and polluting of religious drives, then, an analysis of the ideological skeleton
only leaves something more to be desired. As F. J. Sheed has stated in his
fine book "Communism and Man" (Sheed and Ward, New York) when
a man has given himself sincerely to Communism, he is possessed. " He
has seen a vision; the vision of inequality conquered and the poor inheriting
the earth-and if we underrate the power of his vision, it may very well
destroy us." (p. 98)
- The author is not as clear as he could be in discussing adaptations
which Marxism-Leninism has been forced to make with the stubborn facts
of actual social conditions and those which have facilitated or resulted in
the revision, alteration, mutilation and perversion of Marxism-Leninism as
originally conceived. The adaptation of an ideal to actual living conditions
does not necessarily mean that the content and purity of this ideal must
be lost as is the case with Communism.

BOOK REVIEWS

585

3. The author does not seem to answer systematically the two questions
he set out to answer. It will be recalled he sought to determine which prerevolutionary Communist ideas have been put into effect in Russia, which
ones have not been put into effect and the reasons in each case. The conclusions he does draw are not exactly conclusive (which is no criticism as
such except in relation to the two questions he was going to answer) nor
are they systematically related to each other as would seem to be desirable
and necessary in order to demonstrate philosophically the validity of hi.s
suggested answers. (This will be apparent, perhaps, in reading his last
chapters on " Conclusions.")
4. The author is not altogether dear in his discussion of- the role of
ideas per se and the role of ideas as woven into a complete philosophy of
life such as Communism actually is. Communism (e.g. Marxism-Leninism)
is not merely a political utopia, an economic panacea OJ:' a social doctrine.
It is much more than this. It is the most complete and far-reaching philosophy of atheism ever devised and as such it purports to answer conclusively the great questions of life for every single person in the universe:
"What can I know?" "How should I conduct myself?" "For what
can I hope; what is my destiny?" In purporting to answer these questions, Communism gives many of it adherents a burning consciousness of
their role and purpose in life. Likewise it tells them in terms of a comprehensive world view, a Weltanschauung, where they stand today, where
they can stand tomorrow, what the ends are plus furnishing them means
for reaching the ends. In discussing. ideas in his book, the author is not
dear in evaluating the force or lack thereof behind specific and sometimes
relatively isolated ideas and the force or lack thereof behind the complete
philosophy or total ideology.
5. The reader on occasions receives the impression that the author is
of the opinion that the adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to changing social
conditions is almost tantamount to deviation from the essence of Marxism. Leninism. If this is his belief, it is debatable. This is so because Russian
Communist leaders have radically adapted .Marxism-Leninism to differing
physical circumstances without there being any real proof that by so doing
they have lost sight of their goals. Even postponement of their revolutionary goals (which the author mentions frequently) is not the abandonment of these goals. The flexibility of the principles of Marxism-Leninism
and the pragmatic content of the tactics which flow from them can reasonably account for a large variety of zig-zags, retreats, shifts, reversals, postponements etc. without causing the leaders to lose sight of the goals. In
fact this procedure, considered over a period of time, may move them closer
toward their goals-and, in fact, in some instances has done this.

6. The style is too frequently murky, jumbled and rambling. The or-

586

BOOK REVIEWS

ganization of the book gives the impression that the author took a huge
amount of research material and rather too quickly compressed it into the
form of a book. On the other hand, .the method he used in approaching
the subject made the organization difficult. And the subject matter itself,
irrespective of how organized, would not be easy to handle. Despite such
defects, however, this is an outstanding book.
!VAN LANOMEN

Washington, D. 0.

Man's Freedom. By PAUL W:E1ss. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1950. Pp. 334 with index $5.00.
Paul Weiss, Professor of Philosophy at Yale University and founder and
_editor of the Review of Metaphysi.cs, is also the author of Rea/,ity and
Nature and Man. The present work builds on the foundations of Nature
a,nd Man, but can be read independently of it. "Its primary objective is
to make evident how man through a series of free efforts can become more
complete and thereby more human." (p. v) Together with the earlier book
it attempts " to
a single study of a world which has-room both for
the simplest of meaningless acts and for the radical transformative decisions
of a creative will, for the rights of things and animals as well as of man,
private, political, and social." (ibid.)
In the :first of three parts Professor Weiss treats " Society and the Freedom of Preference." Here he explains his philosophy of the individual and
society. For a Thomist, perhaps the most intriguing doctrines in this
section are that man is not essentially social (pp. 37 ff.) and that "human
freedom, though different in scope and quality, is continuous with that of
all other beings." (p. 87)
In Part II, Weiss considers "Absolute Morality, Choice, and Law."
Here· he extends · his realism to morality and argues in defense of the
objectivity of the natural law.
In Part· ill, "The Creative Will," Professor Weiss holds that the
summum bonum is the universe perfected; that the primary ethical principle is " It is absolutely wrong to reduce values "; that evil and guilt are
inevitable in everything man does, but· should be reduced to a minimum
by sacrifice, love, and creativity. A six-page "Recapitulation;, summarizes
his teachings in ninety-nine propositions.
Few readers will fail to be impressed by the earnestness and effort this
book reveals. It is obviously the product of long study and' extensive
.reading, though regrettably there is no bibliography and only one complete
reference (p. 139). It is evident also that Professor Weiss's critical eclecticism has helped him to see through and spurn many of the more popular
ethical errors. But the reviewer must hasten'to add that on the whole it

BOOK REVIEWS

is a sad, depressing book. The only good things here are Professor Weiss's
negations. His rejection of various features of pragmatism, Freudianism,
existentialism, relativism, nihilism, and scepticism is certainly to his credit.
Especially noteworthy is his consistent opposition to idealism.
It is easy to agree with many of Professor Weiss's denials. But when he
affirms, even when he affirms such ethical fundamentals as freedom of the
will, natural law, the objectivity of morality, the reader will do well to
hesitate. For he does not always mean by these expressions what one
might think.
"No one ... is reasonable all the time. All allow their imaginations to
run away with them to some degree, and all have a superstition or two."
So says Professor Weiss (p. 85) . He, at least, is no exception to test his
rule. There are so many here that it is very hard to single out his dominant
superstitions. Basically, perhaps, they are the evolutionism that warps his
psychology and the' agnosticism that undermines his ethics. But the most
explicit superstition is an all-embracing " anthropomorphism," an " anthropomorphism in reverse" which attributes human characteristics not to God
but to the sub-human world.
Many of Professor Weiss's philosophical aberrations, including the one
just mentioned, are partially traceable to fundamental errors in logic.
More specifically, his use of words introduces into these pages a kind of
dialectical nightmare. Consequently, it will repay us, before investigating
his doctrines further, to study Professor Weiss's way with language, fm;
what he says frequently seems to control what he thinks. Moreover, the
tyranny of words dominates his concept of what others think, as is apparent in his references to Christian. teaching and Aristotelian philosophy.
So we shall treat first, his use of words; secondly, his doctrines; and finally,
his version of Christianity and scholasticism.
Professor Weiss uses words like accordions, stretching and narrowing
them at will. The resultant semantic discord produces a series of intellectual shocks. " Freedom," for example, the one word above all which
he should use with care, he expands to the utmost, equating it with
"ability," that is, potentiality, all potentiality, active or passive, "an that
a being could possibly do or become." (p.
. Thus freedom must be
predicated of all things, even of plants and animals as well as men.
"Evil" too is inflated, for it becomes synonymous with all imperfection
and limitation. Professor Weiss holds that evil is the negation of good,
not a privation. No wonder then, since all creation is shot through with
imperfection and limitation, that he says, "Every being and act, though
good because it is ... is also bad. It has defects . . . Whatever exists is
at once good and bad ... " (p.
In other words, bonum et malum et
ens convertuntur!
At other times, he contracts the meaning of his words. " Love," for

588

BOOK REVIEWS

instance, is so defined that he can conclude, " We cannot love ourselves "
(p. 807) . And only a few pages before he had insisted that in using a
word with religious origins, " sacrifice," in a secularized sense, he only followed "common speech and common sense" (p. !!71). Is "self-love,"
of all the expressions in any language, a departure from common usage?
Surely it ought to have occurred to Professor Weiss that in such a bizarre
conclusion a re-examination of his concept of love is indicated.
The reader who perseveres will find that a chapter titled " Some Basic
Definitions " begins on page 217. It would not have been helpful any
earlier, however, because; to put it bluntly, Professor Weiss does not know
how to define. How else can we interpret his complaint that the definition
of man as a rational animal is unsatisfactory because it " makes no provision for any difference between males and females, leaders and followers,
adults and children, and has application therefore oiily to abstract and not
to concrete human beings " (p. 88) . It is only because he could not take
the objection seriously that ·he could continue to write and think at all,
and attempt, at least occasionally, to define a universal in universal terms.
It is hardly necessary to add that an ignorance of analogy is manifest
throughout the book. The consequence is that predication is univocal at
best, and often ludicrously equivocal. In fact we find an unconscious mastery of equivocation seldom found off the stage. A large percentage of his
arguments die of amphibology. Here is an example, in which the word
"injury" is given two different meanings in the same sentence: "We do
and should punish men for what they have dope. The retributive theory
sees this . . . It rightly insists that an injury to the offender be appropriate
to the injury he brought about . . . " (p. 160) . Is it necessary to point
out that "injury" is used first in the physical sense (unless just penalties
are really a violation of human rights), and used again in the moral sense.
It is his failure to see this that leads the author to concli,ide at once that
the theory of retribution " claims that by some miracle two wrongs can
produce a right" (ibid.).
In brief, Professor Weiss's thought suffers from a downright disregard of
the rules of definition and division. Not that he does not attempt to define
and distinguish. He does both. The distinctions, however, like the definitions, are generally useless. He distinguishes, for example, unnecessarily
and in defiance of popular speech, between end and goal, between freedom
of choice and freedom of preference, between sin, evil spirit, and wickedness.
But a necessary distinction like the difference between freedom of specification, which seemingly is the only form of human liberty he recognizes, and
freedom of exercise is missing entirely, Perhaps his most damaging failure
in this regard is his total neglect of the difference between the physical
and moral orders. On his principles, of course, the distinction is not required. But this is a sample of what results: " Each being, animate or

BOOK REVIEWS

inanimate, has some value, some degree of excellence
To destroy it
is to do some wrong. But to do wrong is to breach a right. It is because
each being has a natural right to be the kind of thing it is and not some
other that it is wrong to destroy it . . . These rights all ought to respect,
or risk the guilt of destroying an irreplaceable value. If we refuse to
acknowledge that other beings have rights, we will have to deny them to
ourselves for the same reason or we will have to separate ourselves off from
the rest of nature as beings who are made of radically different stuff "
(p. 30).
It is clear in this passage that Professor Weiss is faithful in his fashion
to the principle he has wedded. But unless he really feels guilty, when he
breathes, of violating the rights of air, or when he eats, of infringing the
rights of food, he should sue for divorce. The grounds are invalidity and
incompatibility.
The human mind was not created for an espousal to
nonsense.
In his doctrines, the author of this book, as must be apparent by now,
is the intellectual victim of his own verbalism. One result of his failure
to define and to distinguish properly is a species of Monism. For example,
freedom is equivalent to potentiality, and potentiality is synonymous with
imperfection, and imperfection is identical with evil; thus freedom is evil,
because it is potential and imperfect. Everything, it seems, is everything
else.
The same failure to differentiate, to note what is proper in things as well
as what is common, leads to some fanta>itic conclusions. Take this one,
based on the "rights" of animals: "No matter how desirable the destruction, mutilation, or modification of others may be, the loss of value which
they involve is always wrong. Those who hunt for need have an accounting
to make, just as those who hunt for pleasure. The latter merely have more
to answer for " (p. 30) .
The marvel to the reader is that Professor Weiss can say things like this
with no trace of a smile: "Because men must use and destroy other beings
does not mean that the use and destruction are not wrong. Eating is no
mere indifferent activity . . . Eating, however, can never be an act unqualifiedly right, for it always involves a loss of the value of the eaten.
Vegetarians avoid one evil to concentrate on ;mother. They are appreciative
of the value of animals but overlook the value which vegetables embody ...
We can mitigate and relatively justify, we cannot avoid, all the wrong
which the act of eating necessarily involves " (p. !i!58) . All this, and much
more of the same, with a straight face!
Here again it is obvious that the author is unaware of the distinction
between moral and physical evil. But that is because he is unaware of the
essential difference between man and lower creation. If the basic distinction between man and lower creatures is eliminated by the denial of his

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BOOK REVIEWS

spiritual soul, man is different from subhuman life in degree only, like cow
and calf, not in kind, like cow and coal. Because he subscribes to the complete evolutionary theory, that is Professor Weiss's position. Two possible
consequences arise: either the things that have always been regarded as
specifically human - intelligence, freedom, rights, duties, morality, and so
on - will be denied, ignored, or entirely eliminated; or they will be recognized but extended also to the lower creation with .which man is entirely
continuous. Professor Weiss has consciously chosen the latter alternative,
ridiculous as it is. But he has not gone all the way. He attributes " rights "
to things below man, animate and inanimate, but not " obligations "; " freedom" but not" morality." Perhaps a later volume will take care of these
omissions. The logic of his position demands it.
Professor Weiss will not give up freedom for man, but on his premises
he is compelled to extend it to all animate and even inanimate things.
[n other words, if you begin to treat men as animals, you must end by
treating animals, and even inanimate creation, like men. It seems a shame
to take this kind of thinking seriously, but Professor Weiss is very serious
about it. His defense of the " rights " of animals and inanimate things in
the name of ethics is consistent thl'Oughout the book. He laments the way
human law is inhumanly biased against animals: " Though mankind in
practice and in conscience has repeatedly recognized the rights of nonhuman beings (sic!), its theories of ethics, politics, and morals have been
all too human, denying in principle what was acknowledged in fact. How
inhumanly human it is to say that a man has no rights at all. But how
humanly human it is to say that man has an unrestricted right against all
the rest of nature - and how wrong" (pp. 31-32). We might ask, in
passing, the difference between " ethics " and " morals." This wholesale
nonsense leads the author to extend the Golden Rule to our dealings with
lower creatures as well as to "any divinity there may be" (p. 152).
As we have already mentioned, Professor Weiss is anthropomorphic but in reverse. he apotheosis of nature demands something of the sort.
[n a sense his book is more about equality and fraternity than about liberty,
for he identifies man with nature in such a way as to blunt all differences.
The ethical product is a kind of democracy of dust, leading to exhortations
like this: " Let us stop then following the traditional ethicists in the shameful neglect of the truths all men know. There is something amiss when
one animal kills another, even though the killer is thereby pleased or even
when the act promotes the good of the species or the good of man . . .
A daffodil improves the world, just by being itself, and it is wrong to
destroy it out of hand. Even a disease germ, playing havoc on all about,
has value in it8elf. To exterminate it is relatively right, but inseparable
from an absolute wrong " (p. 257) .
There is a levelling process implicit in materialism which inevitably leads

BOOK REVIEWS

541

to the democratization of all being. This tendency is found in Professor
Weiss's philosophy. It is especially evident in a long chapter on"
in which he argues for the need of sacrifice but insists that it can only be
for the benefit of things which are in some way inferior to the one who
sacrifices. Thus sacrifice is for the purpose of equalization. So also God,
if acknowledged at all, is lowered, and subhuman creatures are elevated.
Human imperfections are attributed to the doubtful Creator, and human
perfections to plants and animals. No neect arises for analogy in predication because all being is univocal. Here, in- short, is the inbuilt reductio ad
absurdam of" liberty, equality, fraternity" as interpreted by materialism.
It may be that Professor Weiss would disown matenalism, but there can
be no doubt that he is infected by it. Hence his antipathy for God and
sympathy for beasts.
Professor Weiss's treatment of Christianity and scholasticism is very
trying on one's patience. We invariably find misrepresentation. Whether
the travesty is deliberate or not, it is- inexcusable in a scholar. For example, he attributes to "'classical theology," represented by St. Augustine
and St. Thomas Aquinas, the doctrine that " evil is a derivative fact, the
outcome of the desirable exercise of good powers on the part of angels and
men . . . Had angels or men not abused their absolutely good will, nothing,
classical theologians think, but good would be. Their position, however,
cannot be maintained " (p. 242) . The " classical theologians " knew enough
to differentiate between moral evil and its punishments, on the one hand,
and natural evil, on the other, when they stated their position. But Professor Weiss, ignoring their distinction, accuses them of overlooking natural
evil entirely and proceeds to demolish a straw man: "Natural evils ...
do not depend for their being on the goodness or badness of men. Indeed,
they exist and are evil where and when men do not exist" (ibid.). It is
not so difficult to find lines like these, however, in St. Thomas: "He (God)
in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards
the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will,
by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus, in willing
justice He wills punishment; and in willing the preservation of the order of
nature, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted" (Summa Theol.,
I, q. 19, a. 9, corp.) .
In this same connection the author sets up a false opposition between
theology and theodicy. " A better answer can be found by turning from
the writers of theologies to the .writers of theodicies, from an Augustine to
a Leibniz, from an Aquinas to a Hegel. They at least have a place for evils
which are independent of vice " (p. 242) . Then he attempts a synthesis
of the two positions; his efforts, of course, are wasted.
Another instance of his misreading of Christian thought is found in this
explanation of Christian charity: "Love your neighbor, men are told,

BOOK REVIEWS

because they also are creatures, because they too owe their origin to God,
the source of all value. Such reasons are based on the belief that nothing
in this world has value of its own' . . . But each thing has a nature of its
own and is so far a locus of limited, self-sealed value " (p. 806) . Again a
straw man to crush, as if no one had ever written: " It is absolutely true
that there is something first which is essentially being and essentially good,
which we call God . . . Hence from the first being, essentially being and
good, everything can be called good and a being inasmuch as it participates
in the first being by way of a certain likeness. Everything therefore is
called good from the divine goodness, as from the first exemplary, effective,
and final principle of all goodness. Neverfheless, everythi1i(Jis called good
by reason of the likeness of the divine goodness belonging to it, which is
formally its own goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all
things there is one goodness, and yet 'Tifany goodnesses" (Summa Tkeol.,
I, q. 6, a. 4, corp.). Professor Weiss is no Christopher Columbus, discovering a New World of values in nature for ignorant Christians; he is
more an Amerigo Vespucci.
Surely Christian teaching in 'its entirety is not so secret after nineteen
hundred years that a man with pretensions to learning cannot find and
reproduce an ungarbled version of it. Perhaps, the real trouble with Professor Weiss in this regard (and with many others like him whose name is
legion) is thft they have no real respect for Christian thought, and no
slight suspicion it might contain anything of intellectual value for them.
So any misstatement will .be of small consequence; they have prejudged it
anyway, and mention Christianity only because it is an academic fashion
to do so.
Professor Weiss makes it clear that he does not have a high regard for
the God of Revelation. He holds that " men ought not to look to a God
until they have reached the limit of human capacity. God is an ethical
vanishing point • . . He may prove to be, for ethics, an unnecessary
hypothesis, since we have no need of Him except at the point where all
'numan power, present and future, fails. But then we cannot rightly invoke
Him, in an ethics, until all other forces have been expended. 'God' is for
the ethical man not the name of a being who does work; He is the name
that residue which might be left over after all other agencies
of that
have been employed. The orthodox religions have work for God to do
because, having antecedently limited man's powers and agencies, there is
left to them but the denial of man's obligations or the insistence
that God actually does help man fulfill those obligations. Unfortunately
for their position, man's limits are not evident, and God's existence, nature,
and operation not clearly known. We have no right to say that God
functions as an ethical agent, that He perfects anything" (p. 261).
The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, according to Professor Weiss,

BOOK REVIEWS

548

was sometimes unreasonable in His commands, as in the case of the. sacrifice
of Isaac, and Abraham should have disobeyed. " And this would have
been eminently reasonabie, for true obedience to the divine entails a refusal
to make the innocent suffer. By being more reasonable and yet without
ceasing to be religious, Abraham could have avoided terrorizing Isaac.
Isaac undoubtedly had nightmares throughout his later life, all because
Abraham listened so uncritically and obeyed so unreasonably." (p. 82}
No comment is necessary.
There are several brief references to Aristotle. In the first, he pits
Aristotle the psychologist against Aristotle the moralist. The Philosopher,
accordmg to Professor Weiss, "offered' different accounts of man in different places . . . In the Aristotelian biology and psychology a man is
defined to be a rational animal . . . In the ethics and politics a man is
defined to be a political or social animal . . . The two were not and cannot
be brought together ... " (pp. 37-38). This passage speaks for itself.
Much more might be said about this book, which the jacket describes as
" a profound and original contribution to ethical thought . . . a brilliant
probing, and fresh, arresting
inquiry full of revelations, of
views." But perhaps we have already given it more attention than it
deserves. One can only hope that Professor Weiss stands alone in his
untenable, upside-down position.
Since the author prefers " theodicies " to " theologies," it is better to
refer him to Aristotle rather than St. Thomas for his philosophical rescue.
As an avowed realist, he is not beyond hope. But he cannot start with
the realism of the Metaphysics, or Ethics. He must begin at the beginning,
with the first book of the Orga:non. Otherwise he will continue to inflict
bewildering nonsense like this volume on a world whose thinking is muddled
enough already. Except as a sad case history of what can happen to a good
mind in modern universities and as a glaring confirmation of the dictum
of St. Thomas, error in principio est pessimus, this book is worthless.

D. A. O'CONNELL, O.P.
Providence College,
Providence, R. I.

Religious Sisters. A Symposium. Oxford: Blackfriars, 1950. Pp. 325. 15s.
This work is basically an English version of two. French works written
by a group of French Religious Priests and Prelates for the Sisters and
Congregations of France. These works were Directoire des Superiettres and
Les Adaptations de la Vie Religieuse. Certain sections of practical interest
only in France have been omitted and in place of a section entitled
Psychologie Utile a Toute Superieure a paper on Psychology itself written

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BOOK BEVIEWS

by an English medical doctor of wide experience in such matters has been
substituted.
The purpose of the book is to suggest to Religious Communities of
women, and especially to Superiors, the solution of difficulties in· attracting
and holding vocations at the present time. It is not, of course, a detailed
plan of campaign to accomplish this object, but a setting forth of principles by the use of which it may be accomplished. It professes to be, and
is, an analytical exposition of the very foundations of religious life, and it
suggests various ways of adapting these foundations to present needs. The
compilers themselves were conscious of the danger involved in rash adaptations which could easily become dangerous compromises of the very foundations themselves, and for the most part they have taken care to keep
clear of such dangers.
The work is divided-into five parts, each part being made up of two or
more articles of varying lengths. The First Part treats of the " Theology
of the Religious Life " and is composed of five tracts, namely " Christian
Perfection in Religious Life" by M. J. Nicolas, 0. P., "The Vow of
Poverty" by Stephane Pait, 0. F. M., "The Vow of Chastity" by Dom
Massatki, 0. S. B., " The Vow of Obedience " by Pere Nicolas, 0. P. The
Second Part on the " Office of the Superior " consists of the paper oii the
" Superior and the Sanctification of Her Religious " by Paul Marie de la
Croix, 0. C. D., and the "Superior, Servant of the Common Good" by
Abbe Kothen. Part ill on the " Knowledge Required by a Superior " is
longer consisting of four articles: "Faith and Theology" by A. Henry, 0. P.,
"Psychology" by R. E. Havard, M. D., "Elements of Canon Law" by
P. Delchard, S. J., and "Government in Practice" by P. Bergh, S. J. The
Fourth Part on " The Vocation and Training of Religious " is made up of
a paper by P. Loret, C. SS. R. on the "Discernment of Vocations" and
another by Reginald Omez, 0. P. on the "Training of Novices." The
Final Part on " Adaptations in Modem Religious Life " consists of the
following five articles: " The· Principle of Adaptation," and " Applications
of the Principle of Adaptation," both by Victor de la Vierge, 0. C. D.;
"The Adaptation of Poverty" by Msgr. Ancel, Auxiliary Bishop of Lyons;
"The Adaptation of Religious Obedience" by Pere Omez, 0. P., and
"Adaptations in Community Life and Fr.atemal Charity."
Without hesitation the book may be declared praiseworthy, both in object
and in execution. It· is a well-stocked arsenal of very valuable material,
tightly compressed. For this very reason it is not an easy book to read; it
requires close attention and careful study. Those who give such attention
and engage in such study will be repaid, but the number who will benefit
will very likely be reduced. Moreover, some general difficulties of a very
practical order may further reduce its actual utility. For one thing, any
article or collection of articles composed for as broad a subject as "Religious

BOOK REVIEWS

545

Sisters " loses much of particular application, and in fact the title is more
restrictive than the subject, for a not inconsiderable portion of some of the
papers are applicable, or primarily applicable, to monasteries of nuns.
Then, too, when simplification is attempted with the idea of compressing
much matter into a small space, there is danger of over-simplification and
erroneous statements result, a danger not always avoided in this work. It
is apparent, therefore, that the articles are of uneven merit.
Before proceeding to a more detailed comment on the particular papers,
it should be noted that there is not more than an analogy and not always
close at that, between conditions in this country and those in France, as
set forth in the Preface by Pere Pie, 0. P. Perhaps that is because some
of the proposed adaptations have already been of rather long-standing over
here, or it may be that the difference in atmosphere has led to different
reactions. Nevertheless, many of the recommendations, and not a few of the
criticisms, are applicable to communities in this country too.
Now as to the particular chapters: Pere Nicolas begins with an excellent
paper on " Christian Perfection in Religious Life." It lays the firm cornerstone for the theology of Religious Life in solid Thomistic principles and
develops the theological concept of the various juridic elements in a
masterly manner, concluding with a consideration of Jesus Christ, the Model
of Religious, thus exposing the Ideal as integrating but eminently exceeding
the essential elements. Of particular interest to Religious Sisters is the
development on pp. 20-21 of how the idea of " consecration " in religious
profession is found also in simple profession.
The chapter on the " Vow of Poverty " is excellent, both theologically
and canonically. However, it omits entirely from consideration one of the
gravest practical difficulties· in institutes of simple vows, namely, the reconciliation of the provisions of canon 580, par. I by which the professed of
simple vows has the right of retaining and acquiring goods intuitu personae;
of canon 588 in r by which the same religious is forbidden to abdicate
dominion of his goods by gratuitous title; and of canon 594, par. I by which
common life is imposed to be accurately observed by all, and by which
peculium is ruled out. It is quite true that the patrimony of canon 569
furnishes the proper solution, but this is so generally unknown or disregarded that it certainly should have been brought out clearly in a
practical treatise of this sort, and the more so inasmuch as this work is
primarily intended for superiors.
The chapter on the " Vow of Chastity " can be commended without
qualification, but there must be one or two reservations to the commendation
given to that on the " Vow of Obedience." It is to be regretted that, in
dealing with the admittedly thorny question of the binding force of commands and constitutions which declare they do not bind under pain of sin,
the author on p. 78 might seem to be attributing greater binding force to an

546

BOOK REVIEWS

even possibly capr1c10us non-formal command of a superior than to' the
fundamental, ecclesiastically approved basic law itself. While what he
actually says there may be literally true as a general rule, the implication
should have been purged. It should never be forgotten that while epikeia
may, of course, more readily be invoked in the case even of a constitution
than of a direct command, there is much more chance of the latter
being capricious, invalid as an order, and even downright illicit as to
substance. And closely connected with this question is the other one of
submission of judgment or " blind obedience." After stating so unequivocally in the first chapter that " the intelligence is not a faculty that
can be sacrificed" (p. 15 footnote), it is too bad that he did not here draw
the logical conclusion and repudiate it altogether instead of trying to
weakly support some thin vestiges of it. (pp. 79-81)
In the chapter on " Observances, Prayer and the Liturgical Life," there
are a few points calling for corrective notice. On p. 93 occurs this somewhat
inaccurate and possibly misleading statement: " On the one hand, entire
liberty-such as in fact defined by Canon Law--is to be left to the religious
in the choice of a confessor as also for the confidential communications they
make to him and to him alone." First of all, the liberty in the choice of
confessors is very much restricted by the law itself and, further, the law
neither prescribes nor grants privileges to any confidential communications
outside the Sacred Tribunal itself.
On page 96 is the categoric statement that " for the sake of convenience
Communion may never be habitually separated from the Mass, or what
comes to the same, be given before Mass." This seems another occasion
of a liturgist privately legislating beyond the law. While the old and
fortunately disappearing custom of receiving before Mass for no sufficient
reason is to be discouraged and disapproved, it may very well happen too
frequently in parochial convents that even habitually this situation must
prevail for the sake of convenience, which is by no means light.
Again, on p. 97 the strictures against. Masses of Exposition in se are not
easily reconcilable with the provisions of canon l!t74, par. I for the Octave
of Corpus Christi. This time it is not privately legislating beyond, but
against the law.
In the chapter on " The Superior and Sanctification of Her Religious "
one general observation should be made, namely, that it seems here that
we have definitely a case of too general a scope. When the author
to apply some of his norms to major as well as local superiors the stretch
becomes impractical. Only in a stable monastery of nuns, and properly
with a life-time abbess, could a superior acquire the individual knowledge
of each subject here prescribed. Certainly it is impossible in the case of
Generals or Provincials ruling several hundred or even thousands of
subjects for relatively short terms. And it is equally impossible for the

BOOK REVIEWS

547

local superior of a constantly changing community whose own term is at
most six years. Desirable as the situation prescribed may be, it is in far
greater part impracticable.
In the following chapter on "The Superior, Servant of the Common
Good " there is apparent but one flaw in an otherwise excellent paper-and that flaw a minute one. On page 148 where it gives the qualifications
for superiors from canon 504, which canon it cites, it does not state that
these are requirements for major, not merely local superiors.
We have an example in the fine paper on" Faith and Theology" of where,
at least in spots, the cloistered nun seems to be primarily in mind. On p. 151
in detailing the richness of the liturgy as a source of sound doctrine bringing us " into touch with the Scriptures, with the homilies and sermons of
the Fathers and with the lives of the saints " the reference is unmistakably
to the major Divine Office and nothing else. Actually, this has little application, then,
the mona.5teries of nuns; for few Religious Sisters
recite the Divine Office.
The very fine chapter on " Psychology " written especially for this translation by Dr. Havard is a high point, but the next chapter on the" Elements
of Canon Law " is the most notable example of the dangers and errors
involved in over-simplification: Generalizations without necessary distinctions, dogmatic statement of disputed questions, confusions and inaccuracies
are the result. To be specific: (1) It is much disputed whether or not the
· Local Ordinary has the right to command in virtue of the vow of obedience
even in diocesan congregations unless the particular Constitutions give it
to him. (p. 172) (2) "Exempt" in one place seems to be synonymous with
" pontifical," but a few lines below another and vague meaning is given for
the term "exempt." (p. 173) (8) The statement that "higher" superiors
should be forty or at least thirty years of age (p. 174) is inaccurate. All
higher superiors must be thirty and generals forty years of age is the
accurate statement and there seems no reason for not making it. (4) The
statement a few lines below that the superior of a school, hospital, etc.
is limited to two three-year terms by common law (p. 175) is simply
incorrect. The Religious Superior of the Community in charge of such
institutions is so limited, but the director of school or hospital as such
is not. (5) Finally, the wide distinction between the occasional confessor
of canon 522 and the confessor of the sick in 528 is completely passed
over in silence when treating of confessors. (p. 175)
The following chapter on "Government in Practice" which .is again
largely a digest of Canon Law escapes the d'efects noted in the preceding
paper and furnishes a very good and very practical treatise on the subject.
The chapter on " Discernment of Vocation," while very good in great
part, presents a problem. It opens as though it were to be a guide for
spiritual directors but then turns almost completely into one for superiors-

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BOOK REVIEWS

and the two viewpoints are far from identical. Though too particularized
in one sense in stressing the Attraction and Inspiration theories, it is from
another point of view too general, or rather makes too great a jump from
generalities to particulars and thus has to lean over heavily on positive
legislation. Even in this matter there is some inaccuracy. Since the Code,
illegitimacy has not been an impediment to admission to religion under
common law. It is the practice of the, Sacred Congregation to approve
constitutions which have this impediment as their own, but not to force
it into constitutions which do not have it. Therefore it is inaccurate, or
at least misleading, to say that " the. Church does not encourage the
reception of such children (illegitimate) into religious life" (p. 217).
In the chapter on the" Training of Novices" we have a rich stock of
developed principles and good, sound advice, based on years of experience.
However, a word of warning might be called for in the application of some
of those things recommended in the section on the " Formation of Conscience." (p. 235) In this matter Novice Mistresses and Superioresses
must tread very lightly and circumspectly.
The final chapters on " Adaptation " are very well done, contain some
very wise observations and prudent recommendations. Especially to be
noted favorably is the stress put on the distinction between the fundamental
law itself and the accretions of "customs." In any adaptation these latter
should first be screened very carefully and pruned very thoroughly-and
probably not much further adaptation would be necessary in many cases.
By no means all the adaptations (suggested here in particular) are necessary or desirable under conditions in this country. Others might call for
something more decisive. For instance, the proposed adaptation of the
Chapter of Faults proposed on p. 277 is not a desirable one here. Savoring
as it does of Buchmanism or the "Legislatio "-a more desirable solution
would be the abolition by Decree of the Holy See after the manner of the
Quemadmodum of Dec. 17, 1890, under Pope Leo XIII. Again, in the final
chapter in speaking of " Desirable Adaptations " in regard to "Religious
Poverty," the writer says: " ... it implies the entire renunciation of every
individual possession, the real and complete pooling of all material goods."
(p. 508) But against this in the case of Sisters of simple vows stands the
strict prohibition of canon 583, n. r' against renouncing their goods by
gratuitous title during their life.
From the above it can be seen that this is a valuable book; that it has
a limited scope; that it cannot be read and digested easily or lightly; that
it will repay close study; but that some of it can only be accepted with
important reservations, amendments, and even corrections.

M. T. SMITH, O.P.
Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

BOOK REVIEWS

ErloBUng und Sunde im Neuen Testament. By ALFONS
Freiburg: Herder, 1950. Pp. 336. D. M. 14.

549
KrncHGAssNER.

To obtain the grade of DoctOT Theologiae at the University of Freiburg
in Breisgau, Dr. Alfons Kirchgiissner has presented a study about "Redemption and Sin in the Theology of St. Paul." This study forms the first
and, in our opinion, the most important part of this book. (pp. 1-137)
In the introduction (pp. 8-20) the author treats of the history of the
problem in Protestant exegesis. Luther and his orthodox followers considered it to be the teaching of St. Paul that the Christian is at the same
time sinner and righteous (si1nul peccatOT et justus). The author shows
how in later times various Protestant theologians and biblical scholars did
not agree with this Lutheran interpretation of the ideas of the Apostle.
In different ways they explain the fact that in the Epistles the Christian
is described as necessarily righteous and without sin, while, at the same
time, the Apostle exhorts him to avoid sin and to attend to the things of
God. These different opmions of the main Protestant scholars about the
".relation of indicative and imperative in the teaching of St. Paul" are
related in their historical and logical connection.
· The second section (pp. 21-157), entitled "The Problem" and divided
into various chapters, studies the question of sin in the Christian life. Dr.
Kirchgassner is lead by the desire to prove that neither the opinion of
Luther nor the opinions of later non-Catholic authors are justified by the
sayings of St. Paul; he refers especially to the theory of Windisch, who
considers the Pauline teaching of the Christian as being holy and without
sin and the fact of the exhortations in the Epistles as a contradiction,
which historically has to be explained.
The first chapter (pp. 21-82) treats of the idea of sin in the writings
of St. Paul. The author shows here also that the Apostle does not consider
every involuntary desire or concupiscence a sin. In the second chapter
(pp. 33-42) , St. Paul's testimony about himself is studied. If this testimony would rirove a continuous consciousness of being " simul peccator et
justus," then this consciousness would have been proved essential to the
Christian, because the Apostle considers himself a true Christian. Kirchgassner shows convincingly that this consciousness of sin and guilt is absent
in the Epistles. The Apostle knows that he has sinned by his persecution
of the Church, but there cannot be quoted any text which would justify
the supposition ef this specific consciousness of sin and guilt. Romana
7: 7-11 is not the testimony of St. Paul's personal experience since his
conversion, but expresses the situation of the Jew-under-the-Law in general.
The third chapter, a study about "The Struggle against Sin in the
Christian Communities " (pp. 4Q-56) , shows that, according to St. Paul,
the possibility of sin is not excluded in the Christian although it is much

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lessened, because the force of the " Pneuma " came in the place of the
weakness of the unredeemed man.
" The Christian without Sin " is the title of the fourth chapter (pp.
56-136); which has various divisions. The author wishes to prove that
St. Paul's general idea of a Christian is that of a man who is normally
without sin. This does not signify that for the Apostle every Christian is
always without even incidental sins, but it means that sin is by no means
included in the" idea" of a Christian. Texts such as Galatians 5:17, II
Corinthians
etc., which often are quoted as proofs for the thesis that
the Christian is "simul peccator et just-us," are particularly treated, and it
is proved that no text supports the opinion that for St. Paul the consciousness of continuous sinning is essential to the Christian.
After studying briefly the teaching of the Apostle about the expiatory
death of Christ, the author considers different elements of Pauline theology
in their relation to the problem. The texts and teachings concerning
baptism,. the union with Christ, and the possession of the " Pneuma "
never speak of or imply an absolute impossibility of sinning (non posse
peccare), but only the possibility of not sinning (posse non peccare). At
the same time, these spiritual realities are for St. Paul the root of ethical
obligations.
In a special division are studied the " juridical categories " of remission,
reconciliation, redemption, justification and salvation. The texts, which use
these juridical concepts and terms, say that the Christian is rid of sin and
punishment, but never exclude the possibility of sin in Christian life. As
far as these concepts express not only the negative side of Christian life
(to get rid of sin and punishment) but also its positive side (the justice
of God), they are a source of moral obligation.
Dr. Kirchgassner comes to the same conclusions in his study about the
concepts of holiness and of the" New Eon" to which the Christian belongs.
They exclude the Lutheran idea of the Christian being at the same time
sinner and righteous, but they do not imply an absolute impossibility of
sinning.
As the last in this series of concepts of Pauline theology the author treats
of conversion. He does not find expressed in the writings of the Apostle
the necessity of continuous .conversion. St. Paul speaks mainly about the
conversion fo the Christian religion and life, but the impossibility of conversion after receiving baptism is nowhere affirmed.
After summarizing his conclusions about" the Christian without sin," Dr.
Kirchgiissner speaks in the fifth chapter (pp. 136-147) of "the Christian
who sins." Is the Christian who sins still a Christian? It is certain that
he loses certain effects of the redemption, because sin is in itself opposed
to salvation. But that does not mean that the Christian who sins does not
belong any more to the Christian community. St. Paul never says so.
We have to consider that, for the Apostle," sin" means primarily a lasting

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attitude which dominates men, and that he does not speak about what
theology called venial sins or the incidental and passing faults of Christians.
Furthermore, losing certain effects of the redemption does not mean losing
all its effects. The paranet.ic parts of the Epistles suppose that members
of the Christian community may be sinners. The author proves in a solid
argumentation that for St. Paul not every Christian who sins loses eo ipso
all relations to Christ and to the goods of salvation.
The sixth chapter (pp. 147-157) treats of the "Relation of Indicative
and Imperative." According to the author there is no question of contradiction between the two. The imperative-the ethical obligation-is a
consequence of the indicative-the real order of grace and salvation. This
follows from St. Paul's doctrine about the cooperation of God and man
in the process of salvation (synergismus), from his conception of supernatural life and of the dynamic character of being in Christ and the
possession of the "Pneuma."
The fact that the indicative indicates as an existing situation what,
according to the imperative, has still to be realized, is explained by the
theocentrism, the idealism and the eschatological doctrine of St. Paul and
also by the experience of the Christian life in his communities. The author
refers also to other reasons, but he does not pretend to give a complete
" solution " of the problem, because the tension between indicative and
imperative is essential to Christian life on earth. Incidentally, for understandable reasons, the Epistles to the Hebrews and the Pastoral Epistles
are treated in two special sections.
Dr. Kirchgiissner has given a solid and an interesting study. We do
not thil).k that any text important for the problem has escaped his attention.
We have to admire the extent of his reading: the numerous footnotes
prove his knowledge of the relevant literature. The various opinions which
exist about the idea of St. Paul have presented a difficult task for the
author. On one side, he has to take a position against the Lutheran thesis
of the Christian being "simul peccator et j1tstus," and he seeks to show
that, according to the Apostle, a continous consciousness of guilt is not an
element in the Christian psychology, and, on the other side, he aims at a
right understanding and definition of what St. Paul means when he seems
to say that the Christian is without sin. The fact that both these questions
had to be treated in this study, obscures at times the unity of conception.
The general thesis of the study states that, according to St. Paul, a
Christian is normally not a sinner, but that the Apostle does not· exclude
all sin or possibility of sinning from the Christian life. The author remarks
that St. Paul never ex prof esso concentrates his attention on the speculative
side of the question of sin in the Christian life, and he gives the probable
reasons for this.
The thesis of the study is proved in a careful and didactic way. The
analyses are clear; the divisions and summaries help the reader to follow

8

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BOOK REVIEWS

the argumentation. The author does not draw conclusions which are not
justified by the texts. He admits that in the writings of the Apostle who
was not a speculative theologian may be found different lines of thought
and manners of expression, without destroying or even damaging the
fundamental unity of his teaching.
The interpretation of some texts will always be subject to discussion.
Not everybody will agree with the author's exegesis of Romans 8:5-9 {pp.
148 ss.) according to which this text, at least, implicitly admits that a
Christian may possess the " Pneuma " while actually he works according
to the flesh. The interpretation of Romans 6: I ss. {pp. 78 ss.) might have
been more clear and succinct. But such remarks do not lessen the importance and value of this study of St. Paul's teaching.
The other parts of the book treat of the same problem of redemption and
sin in the other groups of writings of the New Testament: the Synoptic
Gospels, the Acts, the Catholic Epistles and the writings of St. John.
The Synoptic Gospels, which are studied from pages 177-207, do not
offer the theological richness of St. P;ml's writings but, nonetheless, are
necessary for completeness. After a study of the " Idea of Sin in the
Synoptic Gospels," Kirchgiissner expounds what Jesus said about man and
his sinfulness. He treats of the " ethical demands " and of the " remission
of sin " in the Synoptic Gospels and finally draws his conclusions about the
"Idea of the Disciple of Jesus and of the Christian Community": the
normal Christian has broken with sin; he is able to avoid sin and to
fulfill the high ethical demands of the Master. ·Although the disciple is not
necessarily perfect, there is in the Synoptics no indication at all of the
Lutheran idea of his being sinner and righteous at the same time.
Dr. Kirchgiissner is convinced that the Synoptic Gospels do not exclude
the possibility of sin in the Christian community, which does not consist
only of members without sin. This conviction does not restrain him from
criticizing the interpretatfon given to various parables (e.g. that of the
fishing net, Mt. 13: 47 ss., cf. pp.
s.) according to which these parables
teach that the Church is composed of good and bad members, of righteous
and sinners. In the opinion of the author this is not the point of these
parables and they do not speak of this problem. In many points we agree
with this view. Still it is our impression that the problem of sin in the
Christian community according to the Synoptic Gospels requires a longer
and more detailed study than the author could offer in this part of his book.
The parts dedicated to the Acts of the Apostles (pp. 211-222) and to
the Catholic Epistles, each of which is treated separately (pp. 225-249), are
the smallest parts of the book. The author proves that neither in the Acts
nor in any of the Catholic Epistles is found any indication of a teaching
about the sinfulness of the redeemed different from that found in the other
writings of the New Testament. Sometimes we can not agree with the

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553

exegesis of a text; e.g., we do not think that fames 8: 2 means only faults
of the tongue.
As may be expected, the study of the writings of St. John is a more
extensive one. The doctrine of the Gospel and. the Epistles is treated in
the first section. (pp. 258-801) Four chapters speak successively about
" The Idea of Sin," " The Struggle against Sin," " The Christian without
Sin," and " The Christian Who Sins." It is the same division as that used
in the exposition of the ideas of St. Paul. The most important chapter is
that about the Christian without sin. Dr. Kirchgassner maintains that
although the sin of the Christian is not excluded, for St. John, nevertheless,
he is normally without sin, and that the incidental sin is not an element
in the " idea " of the Christian that the· Apostle possesses.
The author understands that I John 1:4-6 can be used as an argument
against his interpretation of the teaching of St. John. He thinks that these
verses are not said of the Christian in general but of the false teachers, and
that the Apostle can use the "we "-form, because the Christians to whom
he writes are in danger of being seduced. (pp. 270-277) In our opinion this
interpretation is not very probable. We prefer to think that the verses
in question oblige us to moderate the rather absolute affirmation of the
sinlessness of the normal Christian. The words of John 20:28 seem to us
another reason for that.
Finally, Dr. Kirchgiissner speaks about the Apocalypse. (pp. 802-810)
This book considers the sinlessness of the Christian as the normal and ideal
case, but this does not mean that there is no hope for the sinner, nor that
he does not belong any more to the Christian community.
It seems to us that the study dedicated to the Epistles of St. Paul gives
the reader more satisfaction that do the parts about the teaching of the
other books of the New Testament. This may be due mainly to the fact
that the problem itself is presented by the writings of St. Paul in .a way
different from that of the other books of the New Testament. First of all,
the Epistles of St. Paul offer more material than the other New Testament
writings. Secondly, the problem has a more independent place in the teaching of St. Paul and, therefore, can be more easily isolated and treated in
itseU while in the rest of the New Testament the question can be dealt with
quite satisfactorily only when treated in connection with other questions
(e.g. the character of the Church in the Synoptic Gospels, the dualism of
St. John, etc.) . The different ways in which the problem presents itself may
also have been one of the reasons why the author did not give a synthesis
of the teachings of the New Testament.
Nothwithstanding the observations that we felt oblig«d to make, we
congratul&te Dr. Kirchgiissner on this solid monography concerning a subject
of New Testament theology, which, as far as we know, had not been treated
previously in a special study by any Catholic author.

J. M. VISKER, 0. P.
Catano, P.R.

BRIEF NOTICES
lrttroduction a l'Etude de Saint Thomas d'Aquin. By M.-D. CHENU, 0. P.
Montreal:

Institut d'Etudes Medievales, 1950. Pp. 805 with index.

Many excellent. introductions are available that lead the student to the
threshold of St. Thomas' great works and leave him there. After having
read them, he has much information about the works of the great Doctor,
factual details that can be helpful, and a few general principles of conduct
applicable once he had entered the edifice. Fr. Chenu does not neglect such
information, though he has reduced it to a minimum; he prefers to accompany the student across the threshold and show him around. "Il s'agissaient d'introduire, de ' faire entrer ' dans !'edifice majestueux et deconcertant de Foeuvre de saint Thomas, des etudiants dont cette oeuvre allait
etre, pendant des annees, en philosophie et en theologie, un des textes de
base." The author is presenting an" initiation," rather than an introduction·
(p. 5)
Agreeing with Carlyle, Fr. Chenu believes in the primacy and irreducibility of human genius, of which St. Thomas is an outstanding example;
yet there are other considerations that must be taken into account for a
complete picture even of genius. " ... mais nous savons aussi que la personne
est, a la mesure meme de son genie, solidaire de la communaute, des communautes humaines dans lesquelles elle se plante."
The aim of the work is very simply stated by the author: " Voir naitre
et travailler un maitre theologien, dans un siecle ou theologiens et theologie
n'etaient pas separes du monde, de ses conditions, de ses perspectives, de
ses techniques, de sa culture, c'est un grand spectacle, et une legc;m pour qui
voit desormais la theologie exilee et vainement jalouse de ses droits." (p. 6)
The book is divided into two parts, entitled: " L'Oeuvre " and " Les
Oeuvres." The second part is a rapid survey of the authentic works of St.
Thomas, rich in observations and insights that are the fruit of Fr. Chenu's
intimate acquaintance with them. If we pass over this part briefly, it is
only because the first part is incalculably richer, as a glance at its contents
will reveal.
In five chapters tl:ie author considers: the social background of the period
in which St. Thomas lived; the development of medieval literary categories
in the field. of philosophy and theology; the latin language and vocabulary;
the processes of documentation and scientific construction.
Chenu prefaces his chapter on the social background with a brief
biography of St. Thomas. All the important dates are summed up in less
than two pages. The apparent uneventfulness of St. Thomas' life is

554

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555

deceptive, as the author points out: " ... les grands evenements euxmemes de cette existence silencieuse se developpent a l'interieur de
l'universite; le drame ou se jouait, dans son esprit, dans sa vie religieuse, le
sort de la pensee chretienne, trouve ses causes et produit ses efl'ets dans
l'Universite; une universite, ii est vrai, ou se concentrent efl'ectivement tous
les facteurs d'une civilization en plein essor, ou consciemment, autoritairement, la Chretiente a engage sa doctrine et son ame." (p. 13)
There follows then a discussion of the various· factors that made their
mark on the scholastic and social environment of the Angelic Doctor;
sections on the revival of studies, especially in the
century; the Order
of Preachers and the renewal of the evangelical spirit in it and in the Order
of St. Francis; the augustinian tradition in the schools of theology; the
development of scholasticism. Most chapters of the book are followed by
what the author is pleased to call " Notes de Travail." .They are extremely
valuable; the designation chosen by t.he author is most apt. Tliey are notes,
rarely filling more than two or three pages, but they indicate
''. work " to keep even the most serious student busy for quite a while.
Taking. advantage of the work that has been done by himself and others,
Fr.
sketches the literary genesis of the "article" that is the most
striking feature of St. Thomas' works. The first task of the medieval
scholar was the reading (" lectio ") and elucidation of a text (Sacred
Scripture, the Fathers, Peter Lombard, Aristotle, etc.). Gradually, on the
occasion of difficulties presented by the text, the question was added.
At first, it was discussed within the reading of the text, but it soon became
separated, and formed the basis of the disputation. The masterly summary
of the fruits of a disputation found expression in the article.
The chapter on the Latin language and vocabulary gives many precious
indications of work that has been done, but greater challenges to further
research that must still be done. Likewise, the chapter on the processes
of documentation, which centers around the question of the use of authority
by the masters of the Middle Ages. Fr. Chenu succeeds in showing the
delicate balance of reverence and independence that characterized St.
Thomas' use of authority. "Aristotle et Augustin revivent vraiment en
Thomas d'Aquin; mais c'est Thomas d'Aquin qui, a travers Aristote et
Augustin, adhere a l'intemporelle verite." (p. 131)
Chapter V, on the processes of Construction, that is, of dialectical and
logical construction, is the heart of Fr. Chenu's "initiation" of the student
into the work of St. Thomas. One cannot help but admire the great care
with which, like a skilled anatomist, he traces the living proces8es of
Thomistic thought without tearing them from their living contexts. At
the conclusion of this chapter, where one would be led to expect "Notes de
travail," one finds a simple footnote: "Si nous ne proposons pas ici notes
de travail, c'est que tout ce chapitre-deja trop charge-est une invitation

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BRIEF NOTICES

a mener analyses et exercises, sur toutes les pistes ouvertes."

(p. 170) It
is in this chapter that the author has achieved his aim: " Suivre la vie
d'un esprit en travail, des intuitions initiales aux ultimes constructions,
c'est le moyen le plus assure connaitre les verites qu'il propose. En ce sens,
il n'a pas de thomisme en dehors de la pensee de saint Thomas." (p. 182)
While recognizing St. Thomas' genius as a philosopher, Fr. Chenu rightly
insists that he is primarily a theologian. His words on this point are truly
eloquent and worthy of long meditation by every disciple of St. Thomas.
"C'est par i'exigence meme de sa foi, candide et audacieuse, que saint
comme si, discernant dans le donne
Thomas en poursuit
revele une hierarchie interne et objective des verites et de leur raison d'etre,
ii pouvait en quelque sort reconstruire en son esprit, sur son mode rationnel,
la science que Dieu a de lui-meme et de son oeuvre. C'est sous la pression
meme de l'auditus fidei (dont la theologie <lite positive est l'etat scientifique)
que s'engage et s'elabore l'intellectus fidei (dont la theologie speculative est
l'etat scientifique). D'ou cette stature parfaite et cette opulence spirituelle,
dont le principe est, selon Jes divers etages de cette intelligence de la
revelation, la confiance de la foi clans les ressources de la raison, de la
dialectique a la metaphysique. C'est fa le caractere propre de la theologie
scolastique, et le capital permanent du thomisme, beau fruit de la seule
renaissance qui ait reussi dans la Chretiente occidentale." (p. 60)

Encounter with Nothingness. An Essay on Existentialism. By HELMUT
KUHN. Chicago: Henry Regnery and Company, 1949. Pp. 168. $8.00.
Though existentialism appears-momentarily at least-to be in decline,
it is likely to have an impact on American thought either by the evolution
of certain species of our naturalism or by importation from Gerinany and
Frnnce. Even apart from the doctrinal relevance of ex,istentialism to us, we
have had no satisfactory exposition of its tenets as part of our English
historical record. The present work goes a long way toward providing a
sound historical and critical survey of the leading existentialists: Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers, and Sartre.
Kuhn makes no pretense at academic apparatus. There are neither footnotes nor index, though some references are provided parenthetically in
the text. (Jaspers and Sartre and possibly even Heidegger are planning
new volumes, and so a book about them, written with scholarly minutiae,
might find itself out of date by the time it reached print.) But Kuhn has
done a great service to American philosophical interests. In eleven chapters
covering a hundred and sixty-eight pages, he has given a broad outline of
existentialism in what is probably the best appreciation of the subject that
exists in English. It is written in nice, readable English, somewhat like the

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557

style of the existentialists themselves. There are numerous allusions to
classic and contemporary literature and a happy choice of words for making
intelligible even a man like Heidegger whom some critics believe to be a
captive in his own language.
The oilly book in English that could compare to the present one is
Marjorie Grene's Dreadful Freedom. Grene's work is more academic but
Kuhn's \is more complete and probably more useful for the uninitiated.
Kuhn is no mere repeater of other evaluations of the existentialists. He
has, for example, what appears to be an original theory of why Kierkegaard
wrote pseudonymously and of some of the philosophical roots of contemporary existentialism. He rightly points out, for instance, the influence of
Bergsonism, if not Bergson, on Sartre.
In comparing and contrasting existentialism with its rival philosophers,
he would have found Grene useful in her correlation between the pragmatists
and the existentialists. The allusions to Marxism might have been enriched
by references to Sartre's doctrine of the "worker." Though Kuhn opposes
existentialism with a kind of Kantian doctrine of the practical reason, is
there not really an alliance between the " imperative " in Kant and that in
the existentialists? The object is, of course, different in the two imperatives,
but this is a kind of historical proof of the arbitrary character of Kant's
doctrine of the practical intellect. The Kantian imperative, therefore, cannot
be the answer to existentialism, though Grene, like Kuhn, seems to think so.
One cannot accept Kant's version of the place of practical knowledge in
human life without admitting, with Kant, the anthropomorphic character
of speculation. It was such a twisted view of the speculative intellect which
paved the way for existentialism; on this point, Heidegger's book on Kant
is concrete evidence from the existentialists themselves.
The obtrusion of Kant into this book is quite minor. It will not offend
readers whose sympathies run counter to Kant's. The positive value of
the work is the simple,· clear exposition of existentialist dialectics and the
interesting historical analogies that Kuhn provides.
Finally, the Regnery Company should be complimented for continuing
its unusually high publishing standards.

Reflections of a Physicist. By P. W. BRIDGMANN. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1950. Pp. 392 with index. $5.00.
The author of this work is well known to philosophers for his operational
theory of knowledge and to physicists for his work in thermodynamics
which won him a Nobel Prize in 1946. He has here assembled what he calls
most of his " non-technical writings " spanning a period of about twenty
years; he has also added three papers now published for the first time. The
twenty-two chapters in the book are grouped under five headings. The

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BRIEF NOTICES

first group of papers under the title "General Points of View," discusses
operational analysis and, among other things, the public and private
character of " science." The second group, " Applications to Scientific
Situations," discusses statistics, thermodynamics, and the problem of time.
The third family of papers deals with social implications of science. Group
IV, called" Specific Situations," can be unified by the concern in each paper
with "science," democracy, and government. Finally, the fifth group
contains two self-styled prophetic papers, " The Prospect for Intelligence "
and "New Vistas for Intelligence."
If Bridgmann carries a unified message across these many somewhat
unrelated subjects, it is a faith in his operational method mingled wjth a
fear that " science " is in secret peril because of governmental supervision,
the economic pressures on budding young researchers, and the majority
vote of the human race for a "supernatural" approach to life. (p. 371)
To counteract such threats, Bridgmann urges more " intelligence " which is,
for him, broadly synonymous with the " scientific method." He rightly
emphasizes'that modern" science" is an effect of freedom, but he is wrong
in implying that a method, like that of physics, is a cause of freedom.
In short, " science " cannot provide the fuel to keep its own engines
turning. It depends morally upon the principles which keep the peace and
provide an atmosphere whete research is possible. It depends psychologically on those studies in the curriculum that enrich the imagination and
make for theoretical advance. It depends physically on government grants
or institutional endowmenis to provide the equipment which no present-day
Galileo or Faraday could afford as an individual. It depends socially on a
number of specialists, each working on his own problem and all of them
pooling their conclusions. The independent scientist today would not
learn much science. Such· absolute freedom would mean total ignorance.
Yet that independence, both in itself
in the threats now alleged
against its integTity, is the one string that binds these twenty-two essays
into somewhat of a unity. Bridgmann is even willing to argue for the
private character of " scientific " thinking, where the authority of qualified
men is accepted only to save one's own time in figuring out answers and
conducting tests. The history of modem thought
·on the contrary,
that "science," like industry, has grown into a huge social enterprise,
where there are many automatons and where comparatively few individuals
reach the top. "Science" depends on masses in its own order.
As though carrying out his philosophy of privacy in thought, Bridgmann
shows utterly no historical consciousness. He gives the impression that
Galilean physics began out of a vacuum. He shows no awareness that his
problems of the " I " and the " thou " and of " my sensation " versus " your
sensation " have been discussed and are being discussed today in other
quarters. If he knew even contemporary philosophy, he would know that

BRIEF NOTICES

559

the same reflections which he provides on the " private " character of
knowledge have led Sartre and his cohorts straight to existentialism, the
antipode of the " intelligence " that Bridgmann would champion. Also, as
a mattyr of historical scholarship, Northrop's name is written" Northrup"
in the preface (p. viii) and in the appendix (p. 391).

War And Human Progress. By JoHN U. NEF. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950. Pp. 464 with index. $6.50.
In his History of Florence Niccolo Machiavelli, describing a fierce battle
between the forces of the Duke of Milan and the Florentines, a struggle
that lasted four hours, relates that in the entire battle only one man was
, killed. And he was not wounded by the enemy but fell from his horse and
was trampled to death. Although it is generally admitted that not all the
battles of the fifteenth century were as bloodless as that described by
Machiavelli, it is certainly true that the battles and wars of that time were
mere scrimmages compared to modern wars. This was owing, not only to
the lack of instruments for mass slaughter, but to a different concept of
wl)J"-a concept that was the product of a different civilization which
followyd a different , moral system, because it believed in a different
doctrine.
How war has changed, why it has changed, and what effect that change
has worked upon the progress of man is the subject of this extensive work.
Professor Nef finds that in the Middle Ages the concept of total war was
unknown. All wars were restrained and limited, not only because of the
crudity of the weapons, but principally because of the moral convictions
of Christian nations. (Professor Nef is concerned with the nations of the
West. He does not discuss the scarred earth policy of the Moslem war
lords).
The first change in this attitude is noted during the religious wars of the
sixteenth century when, for the first time in the history of the Christian
West, fleeing armies were pursued in an effort to annihilate them.
Victorious commanders hitherto had been satisfied with the rout of the
enemy. Although the sixteenth century marks a change in the attitude of
Christian peoples in many things concerned with the conduct of life
besides war, the author rather forcibly denies that any responsibility for
this change can be imputed to the doctrines of the so-called reformers. He
points out, for example, how stupid it is to trace the rise of modern
capitalism to the Protestant revolt when the capitalistic system existed
before Luther. Yet, he himself goes on to prove that the controlled
capitalism .of the Middle Ages differs from modern predatory capitalism
not only in degree but in kind. How strange it is, too, that religious wars
before the sixteenth century, such as the reconquest of Spain by the

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Christians (completed in 1492), a war in which- religious feeling was
certainly at a peak, could be wager in a limited and restrained manner.
Considering the penetration the author demonstrates in his final section,
"The Intellectual Road to Total War," where he analyzes the evils of
modern civilization, it is difficult to understand why he cannot trace these
evils to their source. Considering his general knowledge of philosophy and
theology and the eventual effect of the doctrines of both upon the conduct
of men, it is difficult to understand how he can give the " Reformers " a
clean bill of health. He indicates, for instance, that one of the great evils
of our time is the decline of the doctri:q_e of original sin. Is it possible that
he lacks the ability to trace the contrary doctrine of the essential goodness
of man to its source-and its source was not Descartes, nor Kant, nor yet
Adam Smith.
This is not the only weakness of the book. For, although Professor Nef
enthusiastically subscribes to Toynbee's condemnation of the narrow views
and grubbing approach to history of the " specialist " school, he himself
demonstrates all the worst features of that school in the first section of
the book, where the reader may skip' :five or ten pages at a time without
missing anything more important than statistics on tin mining in Britain
from 1450-1465 or how weapons were made in France from 1560-1578.
(Professor Nef is a specialist in industrial history). The final section makes
the book worth while, and that section suffers by reason of the author's
already mentioned blind' spot.

Histoire de l'Ordre de Saint Benoit. By DoM PHILIBERT SCHMITZ, 0. S. B.
Maredsous: Les Editions de Maredsous. Vol. I, 1948, pp. 418. Vol. II,
1949, pp. 447.
These :first two volumes of the second edition of Dom Philibert Schmitz'
history of the Benedictines call for much more detailed consideration than
can be given in a brief review. Although the author denies it, it is surely
safe to say that, at least for many years to come, his work will be considered
the definitive one of its kind. The two volumes with which we are here
concerned treat of the origins and early history of Benedictinism and of its
contributions to the worlds of the Church and of civilization up to the
beginning of the 12th century. Five subsequent volumes bring the history
of the Order down to our own time, and include a description and evaluation of the contributions of Benedictine nuns to its work.
Some idea of the scale on which Dom Philibert has made his historical
survey, may be gained by pointing out that he devotes one book of the
first volume, a_ section of about 180 pages, to the Order's history from its
founding by S. Benedict up to the end of the 10th century. Within these

BRIEF NOTICES

561

pages are ·treat.ed the life of St. Benedict. the or1gms of his monastic
foundation, and the spread of Benedictinism to England, France, Belgium,
Italy, and Germany. This section ends with the Carolingian epoch; the
monasteries are already beginning to decline as the result of the royal
action of expropriation within Charlemagne's realm and as the result of the
slackening of original fervor in t.he other parts of Europe.
The section on the 10th century begins with a consideration of the
Cluniac reform, so soon to be itself the occasion for another reform move-·
ment within Benedictinism. Recent historians of this period have been
largely inclined to accept the figures of Orderic Vital, a contemporary of the
great days of Cluny (1075-1143), as to the vast number of Cluniac houses;
Orderic numbered them at above 2,000, which figure Dom Philibert finds
somewhat exaggerated-his investigations, impressively reported here, indicate that at its height the Cluniac movement could count about 1400
houses, more than 1300 of them in France with the remainder in Belgium,
Switzerland, Lombardy, England, and Scotland; in Germany, Cluny could
count no more than three or four daughter houses. Dom Philibert leaves
to be desired,· perhaps, so far as an account of life in the
Cluniac community is concerned, but we are amply provided with this
information in Miss Joan Evens' rather recent volume.
An entire book is next devoted to the spread of Benedictinism in the
various countries of Europe--Germany, England, Scotland, Ireland, France,
the Netherlands, and Spain receive especially detailed treatment. At the
outset of his section on England, D. Philibert is particularly interesting on
the interaction of political and religious affairs as they affected monasticism
immediately after the Norman Conquest. Readers of David Knowles'
definitive work on the monastic orders.of England may be rather surprised
at the relative amount of space devoted by Dom Philibert to Dunstan and
Wulstan; the Knowles volume tends to make Dunstan the monastic hero
of England, somewhat at the expense of Wulstan and other great founders;
the balance is here largely redressed.
It is perhaps with his chapter titled ' Constitution du monastere ' that
D. Philibert will begin to appeal most to the more general reader, who is,
interested more in the daily life of the monks and the round of their
activities than in historical and geographical matters. Particularly helpful
are the sections treating of those monastic officials who were necessary in
the vast houses of the 11th and 12th centuries, who were not provided for
in the Holy Rule, and whose offices have now ceased to exist. Besides the
cellerarius, for whom,. of course, the Rule specifically legislates, we learn of
a division of labor to provide for a cellerarius coquinae, who looked only
after' la cuisine,' and a
vini (vinitarius), the equivalent, to some
extent, of the more modern sommelier. The cellarer meddled not at all
with financial matters, those being entrusted to a camerarius, who seems

562

BRIEF NOTICES

also to have functioned as archivist, at least in some houses. And other
officers there were galore in the great houses, whose duties are here described.
One would have liked to see at this point some attention paid to the
develop:r;nentof the Oblate form of life within Benedictinism. D. Philibert
does, of course, refer to the work of D. Ursmer Berliere for fuller information,
and it may be that we must not expect too detailed a treatment of such
su l.sidiary matters in this work.
Tome II is mainly concerned with medieval Benedictine contributions to
European culture; we are familiar with the extent of these contributions in
many fields-literature,
the arts, architecture, agriculture and
horticulture; D. Philibert accents monastic medicine which he believes to
have been the most extensively developed of the scientific fields into which
Benedictines of this period entered.
A final chapter of Tome II is concerned with Benedictine spiritual writers,
to preface which study it is necessary to outline the characteristics of
monastic spiritual life of the time. D. Philibert finds six major marks of
this life:· 1. Devotion to liturgical prayer, especially the Divine Office in
choir; 2. Development of the inner life of prayer, and this in common,
despite the great numbers of the monastic family; 3. Carrying out of
individual labors, but always in moderation and always of a sort which
would not interfere with the aims of the monastic life as a whole; 4. Work
in the spiritual sciences and manual labor also
a means of keeping
occupied; 5. Austerity and penance as features of the life, but these always
tempered in accordance with the demands of the 'climate and a sane
corporal regimen; 6. Development of the decorative arts to beautify the
church and the monastery, with the high purpose of so elevating toward
God the .minds of those who prayed and worked in those surroundings.
All in all, these volumes seem as fine as we are likely to get in the way
of a modern history of Benedictine monasticism.

as

Benediktinisches Monchtum in (Jsterreich. Edited by Dr. P. H1LDEBERT
TAuscn, 0. S. B. Vienna: Herder, 19,19. Pp. 364. 11.20 S. fr.
In the 12th Century there were twenty-one houses of the black monks
of St. Benedict within the area that Austria includes on today's map. Of
these twenty-one, thirteen are still in existence. In the course of seven
centuries only two new foundations of Benedictine monks were made in
Austria; of these two, one, made in the last century, survives. Benedictine
monachism the world over claims a venerable tradition. In Austria it has
a continuity almost unique among religious groups in the Church. With
such a background, this modest volume of commemorative essays, a
Festschrift of the Austrian Benedictine abbeys and convents on the

BRIEF NOTICES

568

occasion of the 1400th anniversary of the death of St. Benedict, is particularly welcome and interesting.
The twenty-four papers, some only a few pages long, written by thirteen
different authors, have been integrated and arranged effectively, with a
minimum of duplication, by the editor, who is Prior of the Abbey of Admont
in Styria. He is the author of nine of the papers dealing with topics related
to Benedictine history and work. The longest of the papers is the one
dealing with Benedictine places of pilgrimage in Austria. Most famous of
these is Mariazell, where 373,000 Communions were recorded in 1755. A
well-known composition of Joseph Haydn is the Mariazellermesse; the
image of Our Lady of Mariazell can still be found all over Austria today,
even on postage stamps. Mariazell is the Austrian counterpart of Einsiedeln
in Switzerland or Montserrat in Spain.
For scholars, the
essay on the Benedictine University of
Salzburg is probably of greatest interest. Salzburg was one of the earliest
and greatest centers of Thomistic teaching; during its brightest days, in
the late 17th and early 18th Century, the enrollment exceeded 1700 students.
In those disputatious times, the Benedictines did not distinguish themselves
by violence in polemic; a Jesuit professor is quoted as saying: " Monachorum esse fl.ere, non docere " ! But the urbane and industrious spirit of
their forefathers still . prevails among the present-day members of these
ancient Benedictine houses, as this unpretentious book shows.
The book is well-printed, though a few minor points might be noted.
The year 742 for the date of the founding of Reichenau on page 18 seems
a misprint when compared with the date 724 given in the footnote on
page 16. On page 259 "several centuries" are indicated as elapsing between
St. Benedict (t 547} and St. Gregory (t 604} . There is but one map, at
the end of the book. Some pictures of the beautiful buildings would help
in their description, and an index might prove useful for a book of such
diversity. Still, we must appreciate the difficulties under which the book
was produced when we read· the foreword by the Austrian Abbot President
and join with him in his final wish " that in all things God may be glorified."

Die Bibel im Lichte der Weltgeschichte und Welltiteratur. By Dr. JOSEPH
EBERLE. Vienna: Herder, 1950. Pp. 321 with index. S. 37. 20.
In 1942 the Gestapo arrested the author of this book, and being allowed
to take only one book into the prison, he chose the Bible. From his readings
and meditations during the time of his arrest the initiative to write this
book was born.
Dr. Eberle, who died in 1947, was one of the best known Catholic
journalists in Europe during the period between the two world wars.
Although he was born in Germany (Wiirtemberg} , he was an Austrian at

564

BRIEF NOTICES

heart. Vienna was for nearly forty years the scene of his activities as author
and journalist. From 1925 until 1941, the year in which the Nazi-government forbade its publication, he was editor-in-chief of " Schonere Zukunft,"
an outstanding Catholic weekly. In his various articles and books, Dr.
Eberle paid special attention to the social and economic problems of his days,
especially to those of Austria, and always from a Catholic viewpoint.
Eberle felt that the Catholic layman during his education may be subject
to several influences which would lead him to consider the Bible as an
antiquated book without· much value to modern men, and that often the
Catholic intellectual does not get a general view of the Bible, of its religious
and spiritual importance, its beauty and profound teachings, a view that
might counterbalance these influences. He wants his book to be a contribution toward changing this situation.
He describes in a vigorous and often eloquent style the spiritual and
religious treasures of the Bible, especially of the Old Testament. The
clear exposition is, on the whole, positive and intends to bring forth the
eternal and universal teachings of Holy Scripture. In order to show its
superiority, the Biblical doctrine and its expression is sometimes compared
with the teachings of other ancient peoples, as the Greeks, Romans and
Indians.
After two introductions, one by the author and the other by the ed,itor
(Dr. Franz Konig prepared the edition of the manuscript after Dr. Eberle's
death), the first chapter {pp. 8-24) speaks about" Bible and Bible-reading."
It expounds convincingly the religious and literary values of the Bible as
a whole; the author sees the explanation of these spiritual and literary
beauties primarily in the divine inspiration, under which influence the Holy
Scripture was written.
In the second chapter {pp. 27-77) the author treats of" Bible and Biblecriticism." Here he describes briefly the attacks against the authenticity
of the Bible-books and the historicity of the narrated events, and points
to the general Catholic opinions about these questions. A scripturist would
have put some things in another and less simple way and would have
expressed· himself with more clarity in some passages of the first chapter,
dedicated to the subject of divine inspiration. Still, Dr. Eberle's eloquent
defense of the Bible against some kinds of petty criticism and his convincing
exposition of the necessity of considering the Holy Scripture not only on
the philological and historical, but primarily on the theological plane, are
and have strong apologetical power.
of great
The third chapter, entitled "The Old Testament," comprises the largest
part of the book. (pp. 79-806) Here the author gives a description of the
various periods in biblical history, always attending to their religious and
moral signification as related in the Bible. The section on the period of
the Kings contains a characterization of prophetism in Israel and of the

BRIEF NOTICES

565

personality and work of the main prophets. The didactic books are treated
in a special section. Without losing himself in details, Dr. Eberle succeeds
in propounding in a masterly way the spiritual teachings and the unique
religious and literary value of the various parts of Holy Scripture.
The exposition is weighted with a.strong personal accent. The definitions
and characterizations, although not always free from rhetoric, are often
striking. To avoid a false impression, it would, perhaps, have been useful
to mention more explicitly that not all parts of the Bible are of the same
spiritual beauty and depth.
Dr. Eberle not only gives witness of his personal convictions, but he has
also collected a large number of quotations from thinkers, poets, theologians,
philosophers and historians, who have expressed their appreciation and
evaluation of the Bibile and its different books. In the first two chapters,
and in all the sections of the third, the reader meets quotations from the
works of such men as Goethe, Chesterton, Nietzsche, van Ranke, Ernest
Hello, Newman and others. These quotations, which together form nearly
a fourth part of the book, illustrate what the author has expounded, and
prove that for the most intelligent and spiritual men of Westem civilization,
the Bible was a source of inspiration, a book of high and unique spiritual
the book of special
value. These extensive and numerous quotations
interest; they show what great men have thought of the Bible.
The complete title of the book is: "The Bible in the Light of World
Literature and World History." Indeed, the book supplies an interesting
collection of quotations, and the author shows how the main factors of the
history of the world and civilization in their essential characteristics find a
place in the Bible and Biblical History. Though it seems to us that this
rather broad title is not wholly justified, yet this is an interesting book
within its narrower scope.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Alaimo, B., De Francisci Henno Vita Opere Ac Doctrina Morali, 1950.
Palermo: Ex Typographia Greco, 1950. Pp. 170.
Allen, E. L., A Guide to .the Thought of: Emil Brybber-Reinhold Niebuhr
. -Karl Barth--/acques Maritain-Karl Jaspers and Nicholas Berdyaey (6 paper-bound booklets). New York: Philosophical Library,
1951. Pp. 46. $5.00 for set of 6.
Andrews, R. C., Nature's Ways. New York: Crown Publishers, 1951. Pp.
206, with index. $8.75.
Baker, G., I Had To Know. New York: Appleton-Century Co., 1951. Pp.
809. $8.00.

Banning, M: C., Fallen ,Away. New York: Harper & Bros., 1951. Pp. 814.
$8.00.

Campbell, R., Poems of St. John of the Cross. New York: Pantheon Books,
Inc., 1951. Pp. 90. $2.75.
Carro, V. D., El Maestro Fr. P. De Soto, 0. P. Y Las Controversias
Politico-Teologicas en El Siglo XVI, 1950. Salamanca: Convento de
.Dominicos. Pp. 898, with index.
Collinge, R., The Monks Who Worried. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1951.
Pp. 28. $1.00.
Cotter, A. C., The Encyclical 'Humani Generis.' Weston: Weston College
Press, 1951. Pp. 111. $1.00.
Cruz, I., Actas Del Primer Congreso Nacional De Filosofia, Vol. I, II, ID.
Mendoza: Universidad Nacional De Cuyo, 1949. Pp. 2197-8 Vols.
Davis, H., Artificial Human Fecundation. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1951.
Pp. -20. $0.S5.
Doronzo, E. (trans.), Dictionary of Dogmatic Theology. Milwaukee:
Bruce, 1951. Pp. 336, with index. $4.50.
Febrer, M., El Concepto De Persona Y La Union· Hipostatica. Valencia:
Editorial F;E.D.A., 1951. Pp. 380, with index. (paper bound) 45 pes.
Fenton, J. C., The Concept of the Diocesan Priesthood. Milwaukee: Bruce,
1951. Pp. 181. $8.25.
Gannon, D., Father Paul of Graymoor. New York: Macmillan Co., 1951.
Pp. 882, with index. $4.00.
Gewirth, A., Marsilius of Padua, Vol. I. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1951. Pp. 353, with index. $4.75.
Grace, W. J., Triple City (Poetry). New York: The Anno Domini Press.
1951. Pp. 53.

566

BOOKS RECEIVED

567

Guitton, J., Essay on Human Love. New York: Philosophical Library,
1951. Pp. 254, with index. $4.50.
Harrington, M., Calvary and Community. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1951.
Pp. 844. $4.00.
Hayek, F. A., John Stuart Mill and .Harriet Taylor. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1951. Pp. 854, with index. $4.50.
Henle, R. J., Method in Metaphysics. (Aquinas Lecture). Milwaukee:
Marquette University Press, 1951. Pp. 76.
Holloway, V. H., Religious Ethic.a and the Politics of Power. New York:
Church Peace Union, 1951. Pp. 72. $0.50.
Humphrey, R., Georges Sorel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951.
Pp. 250, with index: $4.00.
Jolivet, R., Essai Sur Le Probleme Et lea Conditions de la Sincerite. Lyon:
Vitte, 1950. Pp. 199, with index.
Jones, A., Unless Some Man Skow Me. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1951.
Pp. 178. $2.50.
Klubertanz, G., Philosophy of Human Nature .. St. Louis: The Modern
Schoolman, 1951. Pp. 198, with index. $8.00.
Knox, R. A., Stimuli. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1951. Pp. 225. $2.25.
Knox, R. A., Holy Week Boo/,, New York: Sheed & Ward, 1951. Pp. 852.
$2.50.

Kwant, R., Kievits, A., Phenomenologie En Wijsbegeerte; Phenomenologie
En Ontologie. Utrecht: Uitgeverij Het Spectrum, 1950. Pp. 48.
Leake and Romanell, Can We Agrei;. Austin: The University of Texas
Press, 1950. Pp. 106, with index.
Lockwood, D., Ugo Benzi. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951.
Pp. 457, with index. $8.00.
MacEoin, G., Commumst War on Religion. New York: Devin-Adair Co.,
1951. Pp. 264, with index. $8.50.
Mathis, L., Notes on the Theory of Progress: Riverside: Pine Avenue
Publisher, 1951. Pp. 68. $1.00 (paper).
May, J., Cardinal Newman. Westminster: Newman Press, 1951. Pp. 804,
with index. $8.25.
.
Menard, J., Les Dons Du Saint-Esprit ckez Mon.sieur Olier. Montreal: St.
Arnaud & Bergevin, 1951. Pp. 188, with index.· $2.50.
Merton, T., The Ascent to Truth. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1951.
Pp. 852, with index. $8.50.
O'Callaghan, S. M., Cinderella of Europe-Spain Explained. New York:
Philosophical Library, 1951. Pp. 199, with index. $8.75.
Owens, J., Tke Doctrine of Being in tke Aristotelian Metaphysics (A Study
in the Greek Background of Medieval Thought). Toronto: Pontifical
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1951. Pp. 478, with index. $5.00.
Pieper, J. and Raskop, H., What Catholics Believe. New York: Pantheon
Books, Inc., 1951. Pp.
with index. $2.00.
9

568

BOOKS RECEIVED

Robertson, D. B., The Religio'USFoundations of Leveller Democracy. New
York: King's Crown Press, 1951. Pp. 185, with index. $2.75.
Ryan, E. J., The Role of the 'Sens1is Com11iunis' in the Psychology of St.
Thomas Aquinas. Carthagena: Messenger Press, 1951. Pp. 208,
with index. $2.50.
Schilder, P., Psychoanalysis, Man and Society. Scranton: W.W. Norton &
Co., 1951. Pp. S92, with index. $4.00.
Sciacca, M. F., L'Existence de Dieu. Paris: Editions Montaigne, 1951.
Pp. 219.
Shahani, R., The Indian Way. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951.
Pp. 175. $S.75.
Simon, Y., Philosophy of Democratic Government. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1951. Pp. SSS, with index. $S.50.
Siwek, P., The Philosophy of Evil. New York: Ronald Press Company,
Pp. 2S5, with index. $S.50.
Smith, V. E., Footnotes for the Atom. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1951. Pp. 217.
$S.50.

Sparks, T. M., Summarium De C1iltu Cordis Immaculati Beatae Mariae
Virginis. Turin: Marietti, 1950. Pp. Sl.
Tettemer, J., I Was A Monk. New York: Knopf, 1951. Pp. 281. $S.50.
Valentine, C. W., Psyc/wl,ogy and Its Bearing on Education. New York:
Philosophical Library, 1951. Pp.
with index. $6.00.
Van Zeller, H., We Work While The Light Lasts. New York: Sheed &
Ward, 1951. Pp. 176. $U5.
Walz, A. (Trans. Bullough, S.)., Saint Thomas Aquinas. Westminster:
Newman Press, 1951. Pp. 26li, with index. $S.50.
Williams, G., Norman Anonymous of 1100 A.D. Cambridge: Harvard
University Prl"SS, 1951. Pp. 249. $2.50.
Wyser, V. P., Der Thomismus. Bern: ·A Francke, 1951. Pp. 120, with
index. 5.80 S. Fr.

INDICES OF VOLUME XIV (1951)

INDEX OF AUTHORS
PAGE
109
ABEL, F. M. The Places of the Assumption.
277
.ALLERs, R. Review of Philosophical,Physics, by V. E. Smith.
CAROL, J. B. A Bibliography of the Assumption.
188
CARRIERE, G. Plotinus' Quest of Happiness .
217
CICOGNANI, A. G. The
- and Devotion to Mary in
America
COFFEY, R. Review of Los Dominicos y el Concilio de Trento, .by
400
V. D. Carro .
441
COLLINS, J. Kierkegaard and Christian Philosophy.
CREAVEN, J. A. The Doctrine of God in Personalism.
161
818
EGAN, J. M. Blessed Pius X and Theology.
FARRELL, W. Review of Living Law of Democratic Society, by J. Hall 259
--. Review of American Democracy and Natural, Law, by C. G.
Le Boutillier .
259
259
--. Review of Human Rights (UNESCO).
FRIETHOFF, C. The Dogmatic Definition of the Assumption.
41
HART, C. A. Review of ReaJ,ity, A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought,
by R. Garrigou-Lagrange .
4i2
HEALY, K. J. The Assumption Among Mary's Privileges.
72
llEss, M. W. Hegelianism and the Making of the Modern Mind.
885
LANOMEN, I. Review of Soviet Politics-The Dilemma of Power,
by B. Moore, Jr ..
529
MALONEY, J. R. Review of The Mother of the Saviour And Our
Interior Life, by R. Garrigou-Lagrange.
279
McNICHOLL,A. J. Review of Essays in the History of Ideas, by A. 0.
Lovejoy
407
O'CONNELL,D. A. Review of Man's Freedom, by P. Weiss.
536
OESTERLE, J. A. Toward an Evaluation of Music.
828
O'SHEA, W. The History of the Feast of the Assumption.
118
PHILIPPE, M. D. The Assumption in the Spiritual Life.
98
RoscHINI, G. M. The Assumption and the Immaculate Conception.
59
SHEEN, F. J. The Assumption and the Modern World.
81
SMITH, M. T. Review of Religious Sisters.
548

569

570

INDICES OF VOLUME XIV

(1951)
PAGE

SMITH, M. Review of How to Educate Human Beings, by E, A.
Fitzpatrick·
SMITH, V. E. Review of Von der Wahrheit, by K. Jaspers.
--. Review of Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, by P. A.
Schilpp .
SULLIVAN, R. P. Natural Necessitation of the Humari. Will.
851,
VASSILION, A. E. The Platonic Theory of Inspiration.
VEATCH, H. Basic Confusions in Current Nations of Propositional
Calculi .
VISKER, J.M. Review of ErlOsung und Sunde im Neuen Testament,
by A. Kirchgassner . · .

288
278
404
490
466
288
549

INDEX OF ARTICLES
Assumption, The -- and Devotion to Mary in America. A. G.
CICOGNANI .
Assumption, The--and the Modem World. F. J. SHEEN.
Assumption, The Dogmatic Definition of the--. C. FRIETHOFF.
Assumption, The -- and the Immaculate Conception, G. M. RosCHINI
Assumption, The --Among Mary's Privileges, K. J. HEALY.
Assumption, The -- in the Spiritual Life, M. D. PHILIPPE.
Assumption, The Places of--. F. M . .ABEL.
Assumption, The History of the Feast of the--. W. O'SHEA.
Assumption, A Bibliography of the--. J. B. CAROL.
Bibliography, A--of the Assumption. J. B. CAROL.
Calculi, Basic Confusions in Current Nations of Propositional--.
H. VEATCH
Conception, The Assumption and the Immaculate--.
G. M.
RoscHINI .
Confusions, Basic -- in Current Notions of Propositional Calculi.
H. VEATCH
Definition, The Dogmatic -- of the Assumption. C. FRIETHOFF.
Devotion, The Assumption and--to Mary in America. A. G.
CICOGNANI .
Feast, The History of the--of the Assumption. W. O'SHEA.
God, The Doctrine of--in Personalism. J. A. CREAVEN.
Happiness, Plotinus' Quest of--. G. CARRIERE.
Hegelianism and the Making of the Modem Mind. M. W. HEss.
History, The -- of the Feast of the Assumption. W. O'SHEA.
Inspiration, The Platonic Theory of--. A. E. VASSILION.
Kierkegaard and Christian Philosophy. J. CoLLINS.

22
81
41
59
72
98
109
118
188
188
288
59
288
41
22
118
161
217
335

118
466
441

INDICES

OF VOLUME XIV

(1951)

.Life, The Assumption in the Spiritual--. M. D. P1nLIPPE.
Mary, The Assumption and Devotion to--in America. A. G.
CICOGNANI .
Mary's, The Assumption Among-- Privileges. K. .J. HEALY .
Mind, Hegelianism and the Making of the Modern--. M. W. HEss
Munificentissimus Deus. Pros XII
Music, Toward an Evaluation of--. J. A. OESTERLE.
Necessitation, Natural-- of the Human Will. R. P. SULLIVAN 351,
Personalism, The Doctrine of God in--. J. A. CREAVEN.
Philosophy, Kierkegaard and Christian--. J. CoLLINs.
Pius X, Blessed-- and Theology. J. M. EGAN.
Places, The -- of the Assumption. F. M. ABEL.
Platonic, The --Theory of Inspiration. A. E. V AssILION.
Plotinus' Quest of Happiness. G. CARRIERE.
Privileges, The Assumption Among Mary's--. K. J. HEALY.
Theology, Blessed Pius X and--. J. M. EGAN.
Will, Natural Necessitation of the Human--. R. P. SULLIVAN 351,
World, The Assumption and the Modern-. F. J. SHEEN.

571
PAGE
93
22
72
335

3
323
490
161
441
313
109
466
!el 7
72
313
490
31

INDEX OF BOOK REVIEWS
CARRo, V. D. Los Dominicos y el Concilw de Treinto (R. Coffey) .
FITZPATRICK,E. A. How to Educate Human Beings (M. Smith) .
GARRmou-LAGRANGE, 0. P. The Mother of the Saviour and Our
Interior Life (J. R. Maloney) .
--. Reality, A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought (C. A. Hart) .
HALL, J. Living Law of Democratic Society (W. Farrell) .
JASPERS, K. Von der Wahrheit (V. E. Smith).
Kmc1rnXssNER, A. Erlosung und Sunde im Neuen Testament (J.M.
Visker)
LEBOUTILLIER, C. G. American Democracy and Natural Law (W.
Farrell)
LOVEJOY, A. 0. Essays in the History of Ideas (A. J. McNicholl) .
MooRE, B., JR. Soviet Politics - The Dilemma of Power (I. Lanomen)
ScHILPP, P.A. Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist (V. E. Smith) .
SMITH, V. E. Philosophical Physics (R. Allers) .
WEISS, P. Man's Freedom (D. O'Connell) .

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