THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS:

THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PRoviNCE oF ST. JosEPH

Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

VoL. XV

APRIL, 1952

No.2

WALTER FARRELL, 0. P.; APUD POSTEROS
SAGER

W

HEN St. Thomas received his degree in theology at
the University of Paris, he preached. his first public
sermon. We have a record of the notes that he used
on the occasion; and I could not help but recall his inspiring
tribute to the role of the Master in Sacred Theology, in the
economy of the Church's life, when I learned of the death of my
dear friend, Father Walter Farrell.
After some reflection, Aquinas chooses a passage from the
Psalms to express his thoughts. "Thou waterest the hills from
thy upper rooms: the earth shall be filled with the fruits of
thy works." 1 Then he explains. Just as the hills soar above
the rest of the earth, so the Master should strive for that level
of perfection where he is completely occupied with the things
1

Psalm 108 : 18.

199

ROBERT EDWARD BRENNAN

of God. Moreover, the hills are the first to receive the light
of the rising sun, and to be washed by the fertile rains of
heaven. So the Master must first be enlightened by the radiance of God's knowledge, and bathed in the waters of His love,
before he can bring wisdom to bear efficaciously on the souls
of others. Finally, the hills of a country are a natural defense
against its enemies. So the Master .is marked out by Providence
to be a bulwark against those who attack the precious possession of the faith. 2
Wisdom, then, mothered by charity and savoring of the
ineffable goodness of God, must be the main concern of the
Master: the kind of wisdom that is not obtained by study so
much as by penance, prayer, and acts of loving contemplation.
Shortly after he was made a Master, I received a letter from
Father Walter. In it, he made it abundantly clear that he
would take his new obligations with all the seriousness of
his generous soul; and I know fhat he prayed constantly for
that divine wisdom which is at once the earmark of the apostle
and the Holy Ghost's special gift to those who love Him without reserve.
It is not possible here to recount all of Father Walter's
priestly achievements; but I should like to comment briefly
on his apostolate of the pen, and the good effects that it
secured for those who fell under his influence. He was largely
responsible for the founding of THE THOMIST; and, by the
admission of everyone, was the guiding genius in the first
critical years of its existence. Now, it is safe to say that what
he had in mind, in shaping its policies, .was the realization of
the Dominican ideal wherein the truths of our faith, and their
theological exposition, are rendered more beautiful and more
conducive to the Christian way of life by their emergence from
the fulness of a divine contemplation.
2 St. Thomas' sermon notes are entitled:
De CO'ffiiTTI..e1ldtioneSacrae Scripturae.
The text on which he bases his discourse is applied to " Doctors of Sacred Scripture "; that is, to those whose duty it is to be well read in the sacred sciences.
Such, of course, are the Masters in Sacred Theology. See S. Thomae Aquinatia
Opuacula Varia. Edited by P. Mandonnet, 0. P. (Paris: Lethielleux, 1927) , tome
iv, opusculum xi.

WALTER FARRELL, 0. P.; "APUD POSTEROS SACER"

201

Father Walter will
best remembered, however, as the
author of the Companion to the Summa. It was the result of
the contemplative principle, operating in the secret chambers
of. his own heart, before its fruits were fully revealed in the
classroom and on the lecture platform. Like the Summa of
St. Thomas, it came to be the very raison d'etre of his being.
One of Martin Luther's public acts was to burn the great
theological masterpiece of the Angelic Doctor-as though anything so futile as the destruction of a book could undermine
the foundations of the Church or rend the fabric of her divine
teaching. The rock will always remain more enduring than
the pen-even the pen of so brilliant a genius as Aquinas. Yet
the fact remains that the Summa has been declared by Peter
himself as solid and substantial doctrine, and always a safe
norm to follow in matters of faith and morals. For this reason,
Father Walter could not have selected a more important text
on which to fix his splendid energies of mind and heart. He
was a natural choice for such a work. All his instincts and
training were on the theological side. He had no great taste
for science, although he was always sympathetic to its claims.
In this respect, his gifts were closer akin to those of St. Thomas
than to St. Albert's. Nothing could distract him from his
theological preoccupations; so that he saw art, science, and all
secular learning always within the framework of their theological implications. His Companion to the Summa has the
marks of a great piece of work in theology, even if it shows
some of the minor weaknesses of a theplogian who was neither
a scientist nor a professional student of literature.
At the end of his life, St. Thomas had formed a rather low
estimate of his own writings. His Summa, for example, he
looked at as so much chaff-beside the golden vision of God's
inner life that had been granted him. Still, he was willing to
let it stand until something better should come along. Nothing,
however, has ever replaced it Now I think that Father Walter
had much the same humble attitude towards his Companion.
In his own eyes, it was only a sketchy set of notes for lectures
that he gave to layfolk. Yet, like the original on which it was

ROBERT EDWARD BRENNAN

founded, it is becoming indispensable to many teachers; and
as a work of reference for English-speaking students, it has
worked its way into our Catholic system of theological instruction. It has its shortcomings. It is not written with the polish
of a James or a Santayana. It violates the rules of metaphors.
It mixes its imagery. Its allusions to scientific findings are not
made with the assurance of a savant. But its appeal is inescapable! And Father Walter, I daresay, was not unconscious
of its defects, when matters of infinitely greater price were at
stake-the illuminating of intellects with the truths of salvation, and the disposing of the wills of sinners for the reception
of grace. Like the man in the Gospel, he knocked importunately on the doors of men's consciousness; and each burning
metaphor that rose from his imagination, each figure of speech
and modern instance that scintillated from his pen, was a blow
that, by some curious circumstance of personal equation, might
remove a barrier that separated him from his prey: the soul
desperately in need of light and understanding. His Companion
must be judged as an organism that lives in the same way as
the Summa lives, representing the total force and beauty of
the Church's teaching. Because of its practical aims, I believe
that those who come to it without theological prejudices, and
even without theological learning, are sometimes better judges
of its intensely real purpose than the " masters in Israel " themselves; and the record of assuagement, deepened insights, and
conversions that have followed from its study are a complete
vindication of its existence. For, God would seem to have given
it the unction of a gratuitous grace.
The simplicity of Father Walter's character is distilled into
all his writings. As some of the psychologists of the spiritual
life point out, notably Father Faber, 3 simplicity often manifests itself in a disconcerting quality of boldness-disconcerting,
that is, to those who have lost their singleness of view in a world
full of intrigue. The frank and straightforward manner in which
}"'ather Walter expounds his thought, looking fearlessly at life
• For example, in Bethlehem
p. 177 ff.

(New York:

Murphy,

25th American edition),

WALTER. FARRELL, 0. P.; "APUD POSTEROS SACER"

208

and death and all their shuddering implications, is much the
same bold manner as one finds in the writings of St. Thomas.
As Chesterton says, it is not only a grasp but also a grip of
Christian realities. " It is the perfect example of the iron hand
in the velvet glove." This sort of courageousness in calling a
spade by its proper name may jar on our sensibilities; but if it
moves us to more resolute Christian living, then its existence,
too, is justified as a tool of our spiritual renovation.
But Father Walter was not content to write his Companion.
He felt the urge to spread
its message of faith and good
will. From this, undoubtedly, arose his ceaseless efforis to
establish schools of theology for layfolk. He built his apostolate
on two solid propositions: first, that deeper knowledge of God
is a need in the modern world; secondly, that lay people have
a clear title to such knowledge. It is not a question of pampering them with luxurious tidbits, but of feeding them the
strong and well-balanced food by which they can grow " unto
the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ." 5 If life around
us is secular; if its gaze is fixed on earthly things as though
these were our last end; if it presents the aspect of a picture
puzzle that has fallen to pieces; then only an enlightened
Christian layfolk can help restore order, by putting together
again the fragments of our scattered Christian in:heritance.
In a recent article for The Priest,6 I delineated the kind of
teacher who should lead such theQlogical discussions for our
laity. "The man I have in mind is well-read in the sacred
sciences. He is familiar with history in its major trends. He
does not smile down his nostrils at the weaknesses of modern
pagans, just because they are modern and pagan. He remembers that St. Paul also dealt kindly with dilettantes of his
day-people who dabbled in religion and raised a monument
' to the unknown God.' He has a clear grasp of the position
of Catholic layfolk in the world today. He has counseling
• St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1933), p. 233.
• Ephesians, 4 : 13.
6

July, 1950, p. 503 ff.

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ROBERT EDWARD BRENNAN

skill for their problems, the power of healing the wounds of
their souls, of shedding light on the dark comers of life, of
giving himself without stint to the needs of his fellow creatures.
Perhaps I can best sum it up by saying that the ideal master,
like St. Thomas, lives by a strong interior spirit which makes
all that he says to flow from the wells of divine contemplation."
It is scarcely necessary to add that the picture I painted here
was drawn from the living image of Father Walter. 7
In all his writing (and he contributed a wide range of articles
to magazines, and carried on an important correspondence with
the souls whom he was directing in the way of perfection)
Father W
always showed himself a true follower of St.
Thomas. He had grasped the meaning of our Christian philosophy: as something always new, with the appeal of perpetual youth in its freshness and Vitality; and, as having
practical as well as theoretic implications for the round of
daily duties. For him, as for the Angelic Doctor, it was not
only an idea of reality, conceived by a mind that was purified
by the truths of revelation; but also an ideal, seized on by an
eager heart, and transformed into Christian action by a charity
that is patient, kind, and free of ambition, that " rejoiceth not
in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth." 8 As part of this
divine love, Father Walter was convinced that he must write
and preach in terms of the needs of our own day and age. From
the beginning of his public ministry, therefore, he set himself
to consider the intellectual and moral problems of the modems
whose way of life presently seems to have brought on a new
crisis among the effects of original sin. And always, his diagnosis of each folly and fallacy is made with the same balanced
temper of thought, the same superabounding love, that distinguished St. Thomas in his dealings with his contemporaries.
7 In line with this movement to provide more ample instruction for our layfolk,
Father Walter was instrumental in setting up several chairs of theology for
religious sisters so that they, too, through the medium of the classroom, might
have a share in the apostolate. He also defined the goal and set a standard of
clear exposition for the pamphlet series of the Holy Name Society: Theology for
the Layman.
8 I Corinthiam, 18 : 4-6.

WALTER FARRELL, 0. P.; "APUD POSTEROS SACER"

Father Walter was admirably equipped to accomplish his task.
No man I have ever known was more thoroughly sympathetic
with the modern outlook and its peculiarities; no one was more
spiritually allergic to its errors and weaknesses. At the same
time, no one was more fearless in meeting its challenge. Hence
he did not hesitate to apply the lancet of his keen insights to
the suppurating wounds of society; and then, with a Christlike gesture, to spread the balm of charity over the opened and
drained infection. Only men of his wisdom and charity, in fact,
can understand the ignorances and waywardness of the moderns
and discuss their problems with profit. For these are the marks
of a living Christian philosophy: when it enriches the mind
with a theocent:ric conception of reality; when it casts out error
and strengthens the soul against the regrettable mistakes of
the past; when it gives an earnest of peaceful and harmonious
living for the future. And when knowledge such as this is lifted
up and employed on a theological plane, when it is motivated
by a goal that is supernatural, it takes on at 011ce a quality of
diffusiveness that will not be satisfied until every nook and
corner of society is permeated with its goodness. By such a
Christian outlook, we are automatically protected against the
selfish inversions that shut us off from communion with our
fellowmen. To teach and preach and make others sharers of
our precious treasures then becomes a passion; and to this
passion, Father Walter was wholly subject in his Master,
Christ.
Towards the end of his life, Father Walter turned his energies
towards a special study of that part of the Summa which deals
with the life and death of our Savior. 9 In a sense, this was
• Father Walter was always greatly attached to the Christology of St. Thomas;
and to its lovely theological counterpart, the Mariology. For him, these two parts
of the Summa held a very special place in hagiographic literature: they were lives
of Our Lord and His Blessed Mother, written by a theologian who was a saint,
for the instruction and edification of other theologians. In a popuiar work called
The Looking Glass, Father Walter unfolds the thesis that Mary is the mirror of
all virtue. The psychology of the book is essentially feminine, depicting the
spiritual beauties of God;s Mother for the beauty-conscious soul. of the modern
woman.

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ROBERT EDWARD BRENNAN

inevitable, since it represents the most practical theological
focus for a scholar who wants to be holy, and the supreme law
of perfection for all who would be true Christians: absorption
in Jesus Christ, whose Godhead is our final happiness, and
whose earthly life, in its smallest detail, is the model on which
our own conduct must be founded. As Grabmann points out,
in his delicate little study, this was also a basic element in the
character of the Angelic Doctor. 10 Nonnisi Te, Domine was
the demand of a divine rashness, asking an exchange of the
infinite for the finite. The Creator surrendered Himself to His
creature; and straightway, with the assurance of our Lord's
interior presence in his soul, St. Thomas went on to write that
part of his Summa which treats of the Christology.
Now, all this was not lost on the soul of Father Walter. He,
too, crowned his efforts with the plan of a life of Christ. But
his moment came before the plan was fully realized; and we
are certain that the resolve was accepted by his Master in all
its fullness. He had contemplated his God; and in Him he
had found " aU the treasures of wisdom and knowledge!' 11 He
was utterly convinced, like St. Thomas, that true wisdom is
to be sought only in Christ. For, what do the efforts of the
world's greatest thinkers amount to when laid beside the
articles of faith revealed to us by God! And Father Walter
often used the example cited by St. Thomas in his Commentary
on the Apostles' Creed: "With all their learning, no philosophers before Christ could have known as much about God
and the truths needed for salvation as an unlettered woman
now knows by the gift of faith!' 12 The human nature of Christ
is the sacrament of sacraments, and the road by which we come
to the Divinity, being ourselves made divine in the process.
10 The Interior Life of St. Thomas Aquinas.
Trans. by N. Ashenbrener, 0. P.
(Milwaukee: Bruce, 1951), part ill.
11 Colossians, 2:3.
12 See, The Catechetical
of St. Thomas Aquinas. Trans. by J. B.
Collins, S. S. (New York: Wagner, 1939), p. 4. (The instructions are made up
of five of St. Thomas's opuscula. The Commentary on the Apostles" Creed is
opusculum livi, in the catalogue prepared for the canonization process.)

WALTER FARRELL, 0. P .; " APUD POSTER OS SAC:ER "

207

All of Father Walter's knowledge was preparing him for a
deeper understanding of the supernatural psychology of Christ;
and because he saw the absence of such a psychology in the
lives of men today, he was dedicating the last strokes of his
apostolic pen to a portrait of the Only Son of God-all to the
end that what men learn by Revelation, they may also earn
by actual imitation of Christ, whose every word and deed was
meant to be a lesson to us. 13
At this stage of his life, Father Walter had already estimated
the perishable goods of earth at their proper value; and he had
rejected those that did not lead him to Christ. It was the
moment when life dealt its last blow-with what pangs of
suffering we can only surmise! It was also the moment in which
God bestowed His final grace. 14 From the human point of view,
it would seem that he died too young; but this is a deception.
The hour of our passing is fixed from all eternity. It is not a
matter of chance; or if some accident is involved, it is completely subject to the will of God. Howsoever untimely his
death appeared to men,
life was reaching its
absolute maturity and the ripest fruits of his wisdom might
be expected-the truth is that Christ called Father Walter at
precisely the instant of time when He knew, with infinite certainty, that the destiny of His servant had been fulfilled. He
had arrived at that moral stature which was intended for him
from the beginning. He had realized the pattern of earthly
existence that had been eternally conceived in the mind of
God. His pilgrimage was done; and there was not a single
loose string among the bonds that attached his soul to Christo
All that remained was the mystery of judgment. 15
13 There is still the possibility of Father Walter's book being completed from
his notes; in which case it will appear as a Sheed & Ward publication.
" Here I have borrowed some of the consoling thoughts of Pere Sertillanges in
his meditations on death. See, Recollection. Translated by the Dominican Nuns
of Menlo Park. (New York: McMullen, 1950), pp. 215 ff.
15 It is not unlikely that Father Walter was aware of this impending judgment.
Certainly, he was resigned to it, without fear. He had written: "The thought
of death is the nourishing food savored by the Christian from infancy to old age ";
and in the November issue of The Sign (the month in which he died): "The

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ROBERT EDWARD BRENNAN

By human standards, St. Thomas also left his work incomplete. But he had seen a vision; and he was ready to die.
Perhaps Father Walter, too, was given some intimation of God's
special pleasure with his pains and labors. The Summa and the
Companion to the Summa belong to the order of human
creations which is an order of imperfection. What Father
Walter now enjoys, we pray, is the perfect vision of God. And
part of that vision, one can feel very sure, is a soul companionship with the man who, when he lived on earth, was a unique
example of the Dominican ideal: the matchless scholar, the
scholarly saint, Thomas Aquinas.
RoBERT

EDWARD

BRENNAN,

0. P.

St. Mary of the Srtings
Columbus, Ohio

Christian, in common with the young, sees the truth of death's meaning. Life is
for death, and death is for unending life."

CHRISTIAN LIBERTY

"EVERY

day makes more evident the fact that two
strong essentially incompatible ways of life will divide
.
the loyalties of men and nations in the political
world of tomorrow. They are genuine democracy and Marxian
totalitarianism."' 1 It is noteworthy that the American Bishops
who issued the statement containing these two sentences make
no reference to that false liberalism which is likewise opposed
to genuine democracy, though at the opposite extreme from
totalitarianism. The omission is doubtless due to the fact that
nineteenth-century liberalism is a dying creed, where it has
not already passed away, in this day of increasing concentration of power in the absolute State. There is little need to
warn the world against so thoroughly discredited a doctrine.
There is great need, on the other hand, to beware of twentiethcentury absolutism, the most serious actual threat to society
and one more detrimental to souls than liberalism ever was.
Liberalism is the political consequence of Naturalism, a philosophical doctrine which repudiates the supernatural order and
all revealed teaching, and holds that the human reason is the
supreme principle, source, and judge of truth. 2 Totalitarianism
1 From a statement
by the Administrative Board of the National Catholic
Welfare Conference, April 14, 1945.
• "What Naturalists or Rationalists aim at in philosophy, that the supporters
of Liberalism, carrying out the principles laid down by Naturalism, are attempting
in the domain of morality and politics. The fundamental doctrine of Rationalism
is th«;l supremacy of the human reason, which, refusing due submission to the
divine and eternal reason, proclaims its own independence, and constitutes itself
the supreme principle and source and judge of truth. Hence these followers of
Liberalism deny the existence of any divine authority to which obedience is due
and proclaim that every man is the law to himself. So arises that ethical system
which they style independent morality, and which, under the guize of liberty,
exonerates man from any obedience to the commands of God, and substitutes a
boundless licence . . . It follows . . . that the authority in the State is then
taken to come from the people only; and that, just as every man's individual

209

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DAVID A. O'CONNELL

is the political consequence of Liberalism, as an extreme reaction to the excessive liberty and defiance of authority which
the error of the Liberals created. It is therefore a grandchild
of Naturalism and Rationalism, though often so unnatural and
irrational that the family :resemblance is hardly perceptible; the
ancestor was clearly eccentric but the descendant is maniacal.
In the pages that follow we shall try to show that the Supernaturalism of the Catholic Church's teaching is the only effective answer to the Naturalism which bred Liberalism first,
then Totalitarianism. Emphasis will be laid therefore on the
theological aspects of the modern political problem created by
the friction between a dying Liberalism and the growth of
Totalitarianism.
Specifically we shall concentrate upon the
problem of liberty, which is not only a political, but even more
fundamentally, a theological problem. And our main concern in
dealing with this point will be to show the relevance of the
Christian theology of human liberty to politics. As far as possible we intend to :rely on the social teachings of recent Pontiffs, especially Leo XIII, Pius XI, and Pius XII, as well as
on the theological doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas.
Since liberty is of the essence of genuine· democracy, a
proper understanding of its meaning is vital to the success of
a democratic order. That understanding will never be complete
without a theology of liberty, The widespread decline of civil
and political liberty in the twentieth century is due as much to
ignorance of the nature of freedom as it is to any other cause.
And the nature of freedom is never more unknown, never more
mysterious, than when the light of :revelation and the theoscience of revelation are not admitted as pertinent to
the mystery.
Liberalism and Totalitarianism are not only political errors;
they are also theological errors, heresies. As such, they must be
dealt the strongest blow by orthodoxy on the theological leveL
reason is his only rule of life, so the collective reason of the community should be
the supreme guide in the management of
public affairs. Hence the doctrine of
the supremacy of the greater number, and that all right and all duty reside in
the majority." Leo XIII, Libertas (June 1!0, 1888).

CHRISTIAN LIBERTY

211

Though both are very vulnerable also on philosophical grounds,
it is at least a tactical error to limit opposition to them to the
lower plane. And once it is understood that both Liberalism
and Totalitarianism are creeds as well as philosophies, whose
appeal is as much to the :religious as to the political instincts of
men, the neglect of a theological resistance is seen to be unwise
and short-sighted. Liberals or totalitarians may claim that their
" isms '' are grounded on a purely rational and scientific approach to human problems, but the claim will not stand up
under investigation. Their disavowal of religious intent does
not make them less religious in fact. Liberalism's deification of
the individual and Totalitarianism's apotheosis of the state are
the first principles of systems political in intention and religious
in execution. Their harnessing for political ends of a zeal and
devotion worthy of better causes is a diversion of :religious
drives in the nature of man which must be utilized in the service
of an idol if they are not turned to the true God.
These heresies must be opposed and drained of their attraction on a theological plane. No merely philosophical attack will
succeed in· unsettling the faith of their adherents. If the liberals
and totalitarians were not believers, holding to dogmas they
accept on the authority of men who have deceived them or have
themselves been deceived, logic alone might be more effective
in stripping the mask of plausibility from their errors. As it is,
only the logic of events has thus far succeeded in leading
multitudes of liberals to abandon their heresy. and there is
danger that time alone will convince the devotees of absolutism of their errors, as the fruits of their fallacy ripen. Only
a faith, and a far more reasonable faith, can successfuly challenge the attractiveness of superstitions whose grip on the will
is much more steady than its seat in the mind. 3
The crisis of the modern world is no merely political or
economic struggle; it is essentially a moral and religious crisis.
3 '' Every
living culture must possess some spiritual dynamic . . . Normally
this dynamic is supplied by a religion, but in exceptional circumstances the
religious impulse may disguise itself under philosophical or political forms." C.
Dawson, Progress and Religion (New York, 1938), p. viii.

DAVID A. O'CONNELL

It has been justly described as not so much a struggle between
Right and Left as between Above and Below. It is a battle
to the death between a Naturalism that has plunged in recent
years into a veritable denial of nature itself, and the Supernaturalism of Christianity; between the divinely planned City
of God, and the humanly planned City of Man. In its depths
it is a battle between Christ and Satan, with the souls of men
as the prize of victory.
Knowledge of the devil and of his influence upon human
affairs is only one of the many illuminating contributions theology makes to a complete political theory. The philosopher
may tell us much of God's dominion over mankind, but only
the theologian can speak with authority of Satan's potent influence upon history. This point alone should make it evident
that philosophy can never deal adequately with all social
problems and of itself light the road to a solution of social disorders, no matter how true be its principles or how legitimate
its conclusions. For philosophy, qua philosophy, has no knowledge of diabolical pressures upon mankind, no assurance even
of the existence of the angelic order, and certainly no consciousness of the sole remedy for demonic interference in
society, that is, the Passion of Christ and the grace merited
by His Death. There is great wisdom in the words of de
Rougemont, " What democracies in general, and America in
particular most lack is belief in the Devil." 4
Though theology has in modern times been dethroned, outside the Church, from the royal position of queen of the
sciences, there have not been lacking eminent witnesses to its
importance in the field of politics. Proudhon, atheist and
anarchist, wrote one hundred years ago, "It is surprising that
at the bottom of our politics we always find theology." 5 More
recently, General Douglas MacArthur, speaking of the world's
4 D. deRougemont,
The Devil's Share (tr. Haakon Chevalier) (New York, 1945),
p. 11.
6 Quoted from Les confessions d'un Revolutionnaire
(Paris, 1849), p. 61, by G.
Briefs, "Philosophy of the Democratic State,'' Proceedings of the American Catholic
Philosophical Association, 1939 (Washington, 1940), p. 36.

CHRISTIAN LIBERTY

218

vain efforts for peace, declared, " The problem is basically theological and involves a spiritual recrudescence and improvement
of human character that will synchronize with our almost
matchless advance in science, art, literature, and all material
and cultural developments of the past two thousand years.
It must be of the spirit, if we are to save the flesh."
The very titles of recent writings on the democratic and
liberal tradition indicate a new awareness and a new attitude
regarding the relationship of Christianity and theology to
political questions. Even outside the Church there is an increasing realization that the brotherhood of mankind which
everyone postulates as a condition of social order cannot be
had without divine help, as the Catholic Church has never
ceased to proclaim; and that the chief error of the liberal and
secular approach to human problems has been the neglect of
the God who makes true fraternity possible.6
Within the Church the doctrine most highly recommended
for the solution of social and political disorders is the philosophy and theology of St. Thomas Aquinas. Leo XID wrote:
Domestic and civil society, which is so sadly imperilled by the
curse of pernicious opinions, would subsist much more securely
and peacefully if the doctrines inculcated in the academies and
schools were sounder and more accordant with the authoritative
teaching of the ·Church, such as the works of St. Thomas contain.
For the opinions of St. Thomas respecting the true nature of liberty
now running into licence, respecting the divine origin of every
form of authority, respecting laws and their binding force, respecting the paternal and just dominion of sovereigns, respecting obedience to the higher powers, and mutual charity to all, have very
great and indeed irresistible power for the overthrowing of those
• Recent writings of this type include: N. Nicklem, The Theology of Politics
(Oxford, 1941); W. Orton, The Liberal Tradition {Yale University Press, 1945),
a work subtitled " A Study of the Social and Spiritual Conditions of Freedom ";
R. B. Perry, Puritanism and Democracy (New York, 1944); D. Runes, Bible for
the Liberal (New York, 1946); "Needed: A Spiritual Basis for Democracy,"
N.· Y. Times Magazine, May 27, 1945; "The Spiritual Basis of Democracy,"
Science, Philosophy and Religion (New York, 1942), and "The Religious Background of Democracy," ibid.

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DAVID A. O'CONNELL

novel principles of legislation which are plainly seen to be perilous
to a peaceful state of things and the public weaP
Pius XI renewed this recommendation:
Since [St. Thomas] is so clearly perfect in his theology, he gives
secure reasons and precepts not only for the direction of man's
individual life, but likewise for domestic and civil society. Thus
he is our source for economic and political science. In the second
part of his Summa Theologica he deals with paternal authority and
family life, with the lawful authority in state or nation, with the
law of nature and international law, with peace and war, justice
and property, with laws and allegiance, with our duties to private
individuals and the common good, and that in the natural as well
as the supernatural order. If in private,' in public, and in international relations all these things that Thomas lays down were
kept holy and inviolate, nothing more would be needed to reconcile
man to the ' peace of Christ in the Kingdom of Christ ' which the
whole world so greatly desires.8
What has been said regarding the supreme importance and
indispensability of a theological viewpoint on these matters
provides an apologia, if one is needed, for what follows in these
pages. Pope Pius XII has said, " Thank God, one may beand Gospel
lieve the time has passed when the claim that
principles should guide the life of
and peoples was disdainfully thrust aside as unreal. The events of these war years
have amply confuted the scorners of those principles in a harder
way than one could ever have imagined." 9 If much of what is
said here seems platitudinous or proverbial, it will not follow
that these things go without saying. For these fundamental
human and Christian truths have been long forgotten, or
ignored, in a large part of the modern world, in practice at
least if not always in theory. Our chief intention is to emphasize the essential and indivisible relationship between Christianity and a just social order, between Christian liberty and
social and political liberties, between true democracy and the
• Aetemi Patris (August 4, 1879) .
8 Studiorum Ducem (June 29, 1923).
• Christmas Message, 1944.

215

CHRISTIAN LIBERTY

spiritual side of man's nature. For the restoration of order and
the preservation of freedom is " essentially a spiritual task
which demands the spiritual· vision that is faith and the
spiritual will that is charity." 10

I.

NATURE

OF CHRISTIAN

LIBERTY

1. Liberty in General.
" Of all the loose terms in the world liberty is the most
definite." 11 So wrote Edmund Burke in the eighteenth century.
Two centuries later we find the same indefiniteness in the use
of this word. Burke's complaint was followed by a definition:
" The liberty I mean is social freedom. It is that state of
things in which liberty is secured by equality of restraint . . .
This kind of liberty is, indeed, but another name for justice
• • ." 12 But the laxer intellectual
standards of our day do not
compel modern statesmen to exercise the same care. Definition
of terms is carelessly (or even, in some instances, carefully)
disregarded; the resulting semantic confusion has actually become one of the chief modern implements of tyranny. In the
process of becoming a catchword, " liberty " has almost ceased
to be a concept.
Before attempting anything else, then, we must try to disentangle the network of meanings, true, half true, or false, which
are twined round the word. Etymologically, liberty stems from
the Latin adjective liber :;tnd the corresponding noun libertas,
meaning respectively, "free from slavery, of free birth," and
"freedom, as opposed to slavery." 13 As far as modern English
is concerned, " liberty " and " freedom " are practically synono'"C. Dawson, The Judgment of the Nations (New York, 1942), p. 221.
Quoted from Correspondence, I, 312, in J. A. Ryan, and M. F. X. Millar,
The State and the Church (New York, 1922), p. 146.
12 Ibid.
13 The Greek equivalents
of liber and libertas are eleutheros and eleutheria. In
the New Testament these words have in some contexts a special meaning, i.e.,
freedom not to practice the Mosaic law; freedom from the yoke of Jewish rituals.
Cf. Dictionnaire de la Bible, IV, 237-B.
11

2

216

DAVID A. o' CONNELL

mous. Though shades of meaning are suggested in dictionaries
and elsewhere, we shall use the two words interchangeably. 14
The philology of " liberty " and " freedom " presents no
problem. It is freedom as a reality and ideal which so often
evades precise definition and creates confusion. Since liberty
is predicated of the Creator and of creatures, of spiritual and
of material things, of internal as well as external actions, of
supernatural as well as natural life and activity, of powers as
well as of
and habits, of evil as well as of good actions, the
need of the broadest possible viewpoint in studying the nature
of the reality designated by the terms "liberty" and "freedom " is obvious.
Theologian and philosopher agree that the most general implication, the common denominator, in the idea of freedom,
wherever it may be applied, is " immunity or exemption from
something." 15 The antonyms of freedom are "slavery" and
« subjection." 16 As a privation, each species of liberty will
have to be defined in terms of the type of subjection or servitude to which it is opposed. 17
Before proceeding to distinguish on this basis the various
kinds of freedom, however, it may be well to call attention here
to the chief defect in many, if not most, definitions of freedom.
That defect lies in isolating one type or aspect of liberty and
attributing to it the universality of the genus. The concept of
liberty itself thus lives in bondage, imprisoned in the limits of
philosophies too narrow to embrace the whole of its :reality.
Civil and political freedoms are often regarded, especially in
modern times, as the principal, or even the only, types of freedom, and freedom is then defined, for example, as " liberty
from legal obligation, which is left or granted by a sovereign
u Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, 1942, fifth ed.), p. 899. Cf. also
Ross Hoffman, Tradition and Progress (Milwaukee, 1938),
103-104; Fulton
Sheen, Freedom under God (Milwaukee, 1940), p. 25!'t
15 Billuart,
Summa Sancti Thornae (Paris), " De Actibus Hnmanis," .Diss. II,
art, I, no. l (p. 225 ff); Hugon, Metaphysica (Paris, 1907), I, HiO.
16 Billuart, loc. cit.
17 II Sent., d. 25, q. 5, a. 5, corp.

pp.

CHRISTIAN LIBERTY

217

government to any of its own subjects "; 18 or as "the assurance that every man shall be protected in doing what he
believes his duty against the influence of authority and majorities, custom and opinion." 19
Sorokin has justly pointed out that this emphasis on a particular type of freedom, to the exclusion of other, and more
important, kinds, " is the most common mistake of all the works
on history and the progress of civil and other liberties written
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries." And he adds,
". . . They imply that liberty appeared in human history only
with the ' Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens,' or
the like. For their authors, there was hardly any freedom or
liberty in the history of the Oriental and other countries, or in
medieval Europe." 20 With good reason then does he hold that
"it is superficial to discuss freedom generally, without specifying the type involved." 21 We shall try to avoid this mistake
by qualifying the terms liberty or freedom wherever the context
does not make clear which of the many types of liberty is under
discussion.
18 Austin's
definition, quoted by Ryan-Millar, op. cit., p. 146, from Lectures on
Jurisprudence, edited by R. Campbell, p. 159. Cf. Ryan-Millar, op. cit., pp. 140 ff.
for other definitions and a criticism of them.
19 Lord Acton's definition, quoted ibid., from his History of Freedom and Other
Essays (London, 1909), p. 3. Lord Acton knew at least two hundred definitions of
freedom, only twelve of which he could accept. Few appear in his writings.
(Cf. F. E. Lally, As Lord Acton Says (Newport, R. I., 1942), pp. 134-135). For
other definitions cf. also J. Clayton, ''Where is Freedom?", Blackfriars, XII (June,
1940), pp. 347-352.
20 P. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics,
III (New York, 1937), 163. In
God in Economic Life (New York, Paulist Press, 1943), p. 'i!'i!, Wilfred S. Parsons,
S. J., brings out the same point: "It has grown to be a custom among uninformed
popular writers to speak of liberty and equality as if they were an invention or
discovery of the revolutionists in America and France in the eighteenth century.
This is simply because they are ignorant of history. But because these popular
writers talk this way, Catholics often have an uneasy suspicion that there is something heretical about liberty and equality. Nothing could be more untrue. The
Fathers of the Church and the Medieval writers. in talking about the state, constantly spoke of liberty and equality,· and held that it was in fact Christianity
which introduced these two concepts into Western civilization."
21 lbid.

218

DAVID A. O'CONNELL

2. Kinds of Liberty.
A. Uncreated Liberty
Freedom, understood as immunity or exemption from subjection or bondage of one kind or another, is predicated of God
as well as of creatures. The first distinction to be made, therefore, is between uncreated and created liberty. Like other
perfections discoverable in creation and predicated of the
Creator, freedom is to be attributed to God analogically, not
univocally, for in Him the mode of freedom differs infinitely
from the manner in which creatures may share it. 22 Liberty
is found in God formally, like being, truth, goodness, and other
perfections in whose formal concept no imperfection is implied.
It is a perfectio simpliciter simplex, like intelligence and life;
not a perfectio mixta, like reason or sensory life. In other words,
liberty is a perfection which can be attributed to God without
reservation and in a formal sense, once our minds have stripped
the concept of the limitations and imperfections associated with
freedom in finite and created entities. In God freedom is absolute, without limitation of any kind; in creatures it is relative,
according to the various limited modalities of the natures which
participate in it. 23
God's liberty is a perfection of His will.24 It consists in a
supreme independence of all things apart from Himself, a complete immunity from subjection or necessity of any kind, except
the essential necessity of knowing and loving Himself in an
eternal unchanging act that is identical with His nature. Creation is a product of this infinite freedom, 25 and God's independence in relation to all His creatures is as absolute after as it is
before they are brought into being.
»>Summa Theol., I, q. 18, a. 5; also R. Garrigou-Lagrange, God: His Existence
and His Nature, I (St. Louis, 1984), pp. !l05 ff., concerning analogy; also IT (St.
Louis, 1986), pp. !lOS ff.
29 Y.
Simon, "Liberty and Authority," in Proceedings of th,e American
Catholic Philosophical Association, 1940, pp. 86 ff.
•• Summa Theol., I, q. 19, a. 8; I Cont. Gent., 88; de Ver., q. 24, a. 8.
•• Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum (Freiburg, 1987), 874; 706; etc. Cf.
also Summa Theol., I, q.19, a. 8; Garrigou-Lagrange, op. cit., IT, 841 ff.

CHRISTIAN LIBERTY

219

Since there is no real division or distinction of any sort in
God, we can say that God is liberty, just as we say God is love
or truth. All true freedom outside of Him is a reflection of this
limitless liberty whereby the divine will is immune from necessitation and coercion and is unchangeably fixed in infinite
goodness. In God there is liberty per essentiam; in creatures,
per participationem.
B. Angelic Liberty.
This distinction leads us logically to a consideration of the
varied types of created participation in the absolute freedom
of God. Here the broadest differentiation is between angelic
and human freedom. 26 In both the angelic and the human
order the basic liberty is the natural freedom of choice which
is proper to intellectual essences. 27 This is clearly distinguished
from the supernatural liberty of grace and glory by which the
freedom of angels and men is most truly fulfilled. In other
words, we must distinguish on both the angelic and the human
levels between the natural liberty of the created will and the
supernatural liberty which perfects the wills of creatures in
union with God.
As imperishable and indestructible as the spiritual substances
in which it is rooted, the natural freedom of choice in the angels
is an immunity in the intellectual appetite from inner necessitation and outer violence; it gives the angels dominion over
their activity. They have both liberty of contradiction, i.e.
liberty of exercise, by which their wills are free to act or not
•• Though " freedom " is often predicated of irrational creatures, or even of
inanimate natures, this is an extension of the use of the term; more accurately,
the activity of creatures lower than man should be called " spontaneous " rather
than " free." Spontaneity implies an absence of external restraint, whereas
freedom or liberty mean an absence o'f any inner necessitation or determination.
The former is freedom only from exterior compulsion; the latter, immunity from
interior necessity. Rational creatures can have both; lower creation, only immunity from outer coercion. Cf. Billuart, loc. cit., p.
27 Summa
Theol., I, q. 59, a. S; corp.: " Wherever there is intellect, there is
free-will. It is therefore manifest that ju,st as there is intellect, so is there freewill in the angels, and in a higher degree of perfection than in man," Cf. also
ibid., q. 88.

DAVID A. 0' CONNELL

to act; and liberty of specification, by which their wills, in the
act of deliberate choice, may choose any of several possible
objects presented to the will by the intellect. As a natural
property of the created will, it is found intact in the fallen
angels as well as in those who persevered in grace. 28 For not
only the blessed angels in heaven but the reprobate also in hell
and this is true also of human spirits in either place-are free
to choose this or that object, free to use the power of choice or
not to use it, even though their wills are unchangeably fixed in
their last ends. 29 Immutability in the final possession of the
last end is no hindrance to all exercise of liberty, for the act of
election is the proper act of the free will, and election is not
concerned with a choice of ends. The impossibility of a change
or choice in relation to the final end of the will does not eliminate the power to choose among goods that are ad finem. For
freedom of choice, in angels as well as in men, is definable in
terms of means rather than ends: "the faculty of choosing
means fitted to the end proposed." 30
But it was not for this freedom that the angels were created,
though it is the basic liberty from which every other kind of
freedom must flow. Freedom of the will is a power to be perfected, not the perfection of freedom. And the angels' natural
freedom of choice is perfected by the infusion of the supernatural freedom of grace and glory. This freedom the rebel
angels lost when they fell from grace. They are condemned to
an eternity of sinfulness and undeveloped freedom in suffering
that loss of God which is the essential penalty of their sin.
It may be noted here that the beatified angels have in their
supernaturalized wills that freedom through charity to which
Christian men are taught to aspire, but that freedom in them,
•• Though the freedom of the angels is not a defined doctrine of the Church,
it is a teaching which clearly pertains to faith. In the Scriptures the angels are
described as creatures whose good or evil use of freedom is rewarded or punished;
with regard to the fallen angels the Fourth Council of the Lateran (1215)
says: " Diabolus enim et alii daemones a Deo quidem natura creati sunt boni
sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali." (Denz. 428)
'
•• Summa Theol., III, q. 18, a. 4, ad 8.
•• Leo XIII, Libertas. Cf. also Summa Theol., I, q. 88, a. 8; ill, q. 18, a. 4.

CHRISTIAN LIBERTY

though supernatural, is not Christian freedom. The reason is
that the human Christ is not the channel for the infusion of
supernatural life into the angels, but into men. 31
C. Human Liberty.
We have pointed out above that the distinction between
natural and supernatural freedom must be applied to the liberty
of men, as well as of angels. In the natural freedom of the
human will a twofold distinction must be made, between freedom from coaction and freedom from necessitation. The
former, also termed freedom of spontaneity, is immunity from
external determination or violence; the latter, freedom from
both external and internal determination. In this second type
of liberty we have natural freedom of choice properly so called.
The first, freedom of spontaneity, is found in all activity that
proceeds from some intrinsic principle, and is absent only from
things done by force or extrinsic impulse against natural inclination.32 Freedom of spontaneity is rather freedom of action
than freedom of volition.
There are three aspects to the will's freedom from necessitation: freedom of contradiction, of specification, and of contrariety. The first is the will's liberty of exercise with regard
to its act; the phrase, " freedom of contradiction," denotes the
power to will or not will. The second is the will's freedom with
regard to particular objects which are means to the end; " freedom of specification" signifies that the will can elect this or
that object to specify its act, as and when it chooses. The third
is the will's freedom in relation to its last end; "freedom of
contrariety" is had when the will is at liberty, physically,
though not morally, to choose evil as well as good. This last,
sometimes termed moral liberty, is not essentially different
from freedom of specification; except for the fact that liberty
of contrariety deals with a choice of ends rather than means
to an end, it is identical with freedom of specification. 33
lll Sent., d.18, q. 2, a. 2.
•• E. Hugon, 0. P., Metaphysica (Paris, 1907), I, 160 ff.; 179.
•• Cf. H. Merkelbach, 0. P., Summa Theologiae Moralis (Paris, 1988), I, 87.
"1

DAVID A. O'CONNELL

The first of the above types of natural liberty is of the essence
of human freedom; the second pertains to the perfection of
freedom; the third is a defect found in the liberty of those
creatures who are imperfect by reason of not being finally
The choosing of evil may be regarded
confirmed in
as· a sign of liberty, as sickness is a proof of life. But to will
evil is not liberty or a part of liberty. 35 If the power to choose
evil were of the essence or of the perfection of freedom, God
Himself would not be free, nor would Christ and the blessed
in heaven. Sin is in a real sense more truly slavery than an
expression of freedom; freedom is most perfectly developed
where sin is an impossibility. 36
What was said of the natural liberty of Angels is true also
of free will in man: man was not created for this liberty alone.
The free will is a faculty to be developed, not the perfection
of human freedom. The fulness of development comes to it
not from nature alone, but from the supernatural life of grace,
which perfects nature. Without grace the will and its freedom
remain, but survive. undeveloped, cursed with an inborn deficiency in the pursuit of true good. For the will has been
vitiated by the sin of Adam; since the fall, man is inclined to
choose evil, even though the will is never forced, against the
original drive of its nature, to make an evil choice. Man lost
the fulness of liberty in Eden, his original freedom from fault
and unhappiness; 87 in its place is a moral bondage from which
no power or effort exclusively his own can release him. The
primitive misuse of freedom by the father of the race has
infected our wills, and the other faculties of the soul also, to
such an extent that they cannot be without sin, as they could
•• Merkelbach, ibid.; Diet. Theol. Cath., IX, 659 fl'.; de Ver. q.
a. 6.
•• De Ver., loc. cit.
•• Summa Theol., I, q.
8, ad 8: "It belongs to the perfection of its
liberty for the free-will to be able to choose between opposite things, keeping
the order of the end in view; but it comes of the defect of liberty for as to
choose anything by turning away from the order of the end; and this is to sin.
Hence there is greater liberty of will in the angels, who cannot sin, than there
is in ourselves, who can sin."
37 Summa Theol., I, q. 88,
ad 8.

a.

CHRISTIAN LIBERTY

before the fall. 38 The will's bias towards evil cannot be rectified
by any natural means; free will must be emancipated by divine
grace, or it is the tool of man's self-destruction. 39 Grace alone
makes a free will a good will.
The supernatural life of divine grace is then the only source
of full spiritual freedom for intellectual creatures, a freedom
which means union with God and emancipation from the
bondage of sin. There are two stages in this supernatural
freedom: the freedom of grace in this life; the freedom of glory
in the next. This is the freedom, ·shared in varying degrees
but essentially the same in all, possessed by all the just on
earth and all the angels and saints in heaven: on earth imperfect and incomplete, in heaven perfect and fulU 0 On earth the
degrees of this liberty correspond to the degrees of charity in
the soul, or the three stages of development in the supernatural
life: of beginners, of the proficient, and of the perfect. 41
As it is in men, this freedom of grace and glory is essentially
Christian freedom, because it was won for men, and is given
to them, by Christ. In the angels, however, as we have pointed
out above, this same liberty is supernatural without being at
the same time Christian, since Christ did not redeem the angels
but only mankind. He is their Head, but He is not their
Liberator, because grace was given to them independently of
Christ's influence when they were created, and glory also was
the reward of those who persevered, without the mediation of
the God-Man. Christian freedom is, therefore, a specifically
human freedom, though the supernatural liberty of the angels
is generically the same life of grace and glory.
We shall return later to a fuller treatment of Christian
freedom. Here we must continue to distinguish various other
types of freedom, all of which are related in some manner to
the supernatural freedom of grace and glory. Up to this point
we have been dealing entirely with the internal and spiritual
De Ver., q.24, a.4, ad6. Cf. Summa Theol., I-11, q.85, a.S.
•• De Ver., q. 24, a.l.
•• In Joann., cap. 8, lect. 4.
"Summa Theol., 11-11, q. 184, a. 4.
88

DAVID A. O'CONNELL

freedoms of intellectual creatures. Man, however, as a composite of spirit and matter, needs for his perfection both as a
man and as a Christian, external liberty. The first distinction
to be placed, therefore, is between man's natural freedom and
his supernatural freedom; the second, between internal and
external freedom in both the natural and the supernatural
order. 42
Man's internal freedom in the natural order is the freedom
•• The divisions of liberty we have indicated up to now are outlined in the
following schema:
uncreated
of contradiction
natural

Liberty

{

of specification

angelic {
supernatural
{ of cont ra d'Ictlon
.
internal
of specification
{
(freedom of of contrariety

created
human

natural

{of grace
f I

supernatural
(Christian)

0

of perfect

g ory

external

We may observe here that we are not assigning a place in our division of liberty
to the perverse freedom of actual sin, except to the extent that it is implied, as
act is implied in potentiality, in "freedom of contrariety." St. Thomas declares
that this so-called freedom " is truly slavery, and liberty only according to
opinion." (Summa Theol., 11-II, q.l88, a. 4) Elsewhere he has specified whose
opinion he means: " that a man be not checked by the rein of reason from
following concupiscence is liberty in the opinion of one who conceives of that
pursuit as the summum bonum." (In Rom., cap. 6, lect. 4)
In his commentary on the second book of Sentences, after enumerating
freedom of choice; freedom from sin by grace, and freedom from unhappiness
by glory as the three types of true liberty simpliciter, St. Thomas adds that
the freedom of sin, in St. Paul's terminology "freedom from justice," is freedom
only secundum quid, and therefore merits no place among the principal species
of liberty. He admits, however, that it is similar to the freedom from sin by grace
" by reason of likeness in mode, for just as sin per ae retards one from good
after the manner of a habit or a disposition, so also does justice retard one from
evil." (II Sent., d. !M, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2; ad 8)

CimiSTIAN LIBERTY

of choice we have treated above. Hi.s external natural liberty
is of two main types: freedom for man as an individual; freedom
for men as members of society. We shall use the terms individual and societal to designate these two kinds of external
freedom.
As an individual, every man has certain rights flowing from
the natural law itself, which he must have exterior liberty to
exercise. Nature itself is the basis for each man's right to life,
to property, to growth in knowledge and virtue, to divine worship according to the dictates of a right conscience. Pius XII
has enumerated the following as "fundamental personal
rights":
the right to maintain and develop one's corporal, intellectual and
moral life and especially the right to religious formation and education; the right to worship God in private and public and to carry
on religious works of charity; the right to marry and to achieve
the aim of married life; the right to conjugal and domestic society;
the right to work as the indispensable means towards the maintenance of family life; the right to free choice of a state of life, and
hence, too, of the priesthood or religious life; the right to the
use of material goods, in keeping with one's duties and social
limitations. 43

Even apart from whatever liberty the infusion of supernatural life may bring to men, these rights are essential to
human nature and its normal development. From this liberty
of the individual based on the natural moral law are to be
clearly distinguished what are now usually termed "liberties,"
which flow from positive law and human agreements. These
"liberties" may be further distinguished as either civil or
political; the most important difference between the two is that
civil rights have as their immediate end the welfare of the
individual, while political rights are primarily directed to a
public purpose. 44
Civil rights are those which the individual has as a member
of the community," conferred by the State for the promotion
43

Christmas Message,

•• Ryan-Millar, op. cit., pp.

"Tlie Rights of the Citizen."

DAVID A. O'CONNELL

of the common good and the welfare of the individual." 45
Among the rights guaranteed by positive legislation are usually
found many already due to men as natural rights; these rights
can then be termed "civil liberties" as well as natural rights.
Already man's inalienable possession as gifts of God, these
rights cannot be granted by the State; but the State can
guarantee them. Civil rights properly so called, however, are
those guaranteed in human law which are not already granted
in the law of nature. The right to a trial by jury in criminal
prosecutions is, in the United States, a civil right or liberty
in this sense, inasmuch as it is not a right contained in the
natural moral law. In the same manner, the political rights of
the citizen, which" have to do mainly with voting and holding
office" 46 are guarantees of positive rather than natural law.
Without prejudice to the natural law civil liberties may be,
through constitutional processes, increased, restricted, or abrogated. The nullification of the right to vote, for example, " does
not amount to a violation of any natural right. The elective
franchise is not among the natural rights of the individual. It
is created by the State for a civil purpose which might conceivably be attained, and in several countries has been attained,
without universal suffrage." 47
•• J. A. Ryan, The Catholic Church and the Citizen (New York, 1928), p. 86.
•• Ibid., p. 91.
•• Ibid. Cf. also Declining Liberty and Other Papers (New York, 1927), by the
same author. On pp. 8-4 of this work he writes: " Modern public liberty is of
three principal kinds: civil, economic, and political. The first affects the individual
in the ordinary activities of life. It includes freedom of worship and expression,
freedom to move about, to engage in a lawful occupation, to join with one's fellows
in various forms of association, to make contracts, and to enjoy due process of law.
Economic liberty falls under the head of civil liberty in so far as it concerns the
right to labor, to follow a business, to acquire property. As economic opportunity,
however, it constitutes a special and very important kind of liberty. In this sense,
it means not merely absence of arbitrary restraint. It denotes the presence of
effectual and reasonable opportunity. Obviously this is considerably more than
mere freedom to enter economic contracts. For these may or may not be adequate
to a reasonable kind of life. Finally, political liberty denotes the legal power of the
citizen to take part in the processes of representative government. It covers
chiefly membership in political associations, exercise of the electoral franchise, and
holding public office." Cf. also Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law
(New York, 1948).

CHRISTIAN LIBERTY

227

This distinction between the external personal freedom which
is of natural right and the liberties granted the individual by
human law is most clearly evidenced in regimes where slavery
was a legally recognized institution. For slaves, even though
they may not be in possession of the civil and political rights
of citizens, have natural rights anterior to positive law which
may not be denied. Human slavery is of the body, not of the
souU 8 No master may compel an obedience which would be
sinful, or make demands contrary to fundamental human rights
in matters that pertain to the nature of the body. 49 Slave or
free, every man enjoys all the fundamental rights that spring
from the principles of his hmnan nature: " the right to life, to
bodily integrity, to the necessary means of existence; the right
to tend towards his ultimate goal in the path marked out for
him by God; the right of association and the right to possess
and use property." 50
As organized in society, and especially in the natural societies
into which they are born, men have by natural right other
indestructible freedoms. The family, imperfect society of the
natural order, must have its own societal liberty to exercise
all the rights due it by the natural law. The family is "a
society limited indeed in numbers, but a true society, anterior
to every kind of State or nation, with rights and duties of its
own, totally independent of the commonwealth . . . governed
by a power within itself, that is to say by the father." 51
Summa Theol., II-II, q. 104, a. 6, ad 1.
Ibid., a. 5, corp.
50 Pius XI, Divini Redemptoris.
48
49

In the Declaration of Independence, the terms ''life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness " include the rights spoken of above. "Happily for the United States,
the doctrine of natural rights has a definite place in American political principles.
It is specifically and strikingly recognized in the Declaration of Independence ...
Life and liberty include a very large part of the province of natural rights, while
the pursuit of happiness implies the right to marry, to possess property and to
enjoy some measure of economic opportunity. Liberty is a term of very wide
comprehension comprising, in addition to freedom of movement and immunity
from political oppression, freedom of education, :religion, speech, and writing. The
right to life includes immunity from all forms of arbitrary physical assault." Ryan,
The Catholic Church and the Citizen, pp. 85-86.
51 Leo XIII, Rerum N ovarum.

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DAVID A. O'CONNELL

No regime can be just where the natural rights of domestic
society are ignored or denied. 52 The right to marry, to beget
children, and to educate them in accordance with divine law
cannot be destroyed or interfered with; no government may
subvert the natural rights of the family by intruding into the
life of the home in such a way as to prevent the exercise of
God-given liberties. 53 The free family must be at the base of
any truly just, free, and fully human social order.
A second great societal freedom belongs to men collectively
as members of the social order: the freedom of the State. As
the perfect society in the natural order, the State has strict
rights to liberty in its own sphere of action. It has an autonomy, due it by the natural moral law, which no other State
can justly impede, and which the Church too must respect.
Within the limits.of its own legitimate activity, it is free and
independent. 54
•• " Provided the limits be not transgressed which are prescribed by the very
purposes for which it exists, the family has, at least, equal rights with the State
in the. choice and pursuit of those things which are needful to its preservation and
its just liberty. We say, at least equal rights; for since the domestic household is
anterior both in idea and in fact to the gathering of men into a commonwealth,
the former must necessarily have rights and duties which are prior to those of the
latter, and which rest more immediately on nature. If the citizens of a State, if
the families, on entering into association and fellowship, experienced at the hands
of the State hindrance instead of help, and found their rights attacked instead of
being protected, such association were rather to be repudiated than sought after."
Ibid., p. 174.
•• " The idea, then, that the civil government should, at its own discretion,
penetrate and pervade the family and the household, is a great and pernicious
mistake. True, if a family finds itself in great difficulty, utterly friendless, and
without prospect of help, it is right that extreme necessity be met by public aid;
for each family is a part of the commonwealth. In like manner, if within the
walls of the household there occur grave disturbance of mutual rights, the public
power must intervene to force each party to give the other what is due; for this
is not to rob citizens of their rights, but justly and properly to safeguard and
strengthen them. But the rulers of the State must go no further: nature bids
them stop here." Ibid.
•• Cf. the Encyclical Immortale Dei of Leo XIII (Nov. 1, 1885) for a summary
of the Church's teaching on the State and the relationship between Church and
State. The twentieth century finds the Church defending the rights of the State
in such statements as the following from Pius XII:
" A fundamental condition of a just and honorable peace is to assure the right

CHRISTIAN LIBERTY

D. The Aristotelian notion of liberty.
Before turning to a discussion of Christian freedom, a brief
treatment here of another approach to the nature of freedom
will be helpful. We have already distinguished many types of
liberty on the basis of the general notion of freedom as " immunity or exemption from servitude or subjection." For our
purposes this mode of defining and dividing is an adequate
method of arriving at fundamental concepts and of relating
the freedom which is specifically Christian to other species of
freedom. But this is a negative approach, as the very words
"immunity" and "exemption" imply. There is another, and
a more positive method, which should not be passed over,
since it provides a complementary view of the concept of
freedom. It is found in the Aristotelian definition of the free
man as causa sui, " the man who exists for his own sake and
not for another's." 55 St. Thomas has adopted the formula and
uses it frequently. 56 "A slave differs from a free man in that
the latter has the disposal of himself, as is stated :i.n the beginning of the Metaphysics, whereas the slave is ordered to
another .... That man is master of another as his slave when
he assigns the one, whose master he is, to his own-namely,
the master's use." 57 The definition of a slave given in this
to life and independence of all nations, large and small, strong and weak. One
nation's will to live must never be tantamount to a death sentence for another."
Christmas Message, 1939.
" Within the limits of a new order founded on moral principles there is no room
for the violation of the freedom, integrity, and security of other States; no matter
what may be their territorial extension or their capacity for defense. If it is
inevitable that the powerful States should, by reason of their greater potentialities
and their power, play leading roles in the formation of economic groups comprising not only themselves but also smaller and weaker States as well. it is.
nevertheless, indispensable that in the interests of the common good they, as all
others, respect the rights of those smaller States to political freedom, to economic
development and to the adequate protection, in the case of conflicts between
nations, of that neutrality which is theirs according to the natural as well as
international law." Christmas Message, 1941.
•• I M etaphysica, c. 2.
•• Summa Theol., I, q. 96, a. 4; IV Cont. Gent., 22; In Gal., cap. 5, lect. 3; etc.
57 Summa Theol. I, q. 96, a. 4.

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DAVID A. O'CONNELL

text col'responds to another Aristotelian concept, which terms
a slave an instrumentum animatum, a living tool for the
master's use and for his purposes. 58 Both liberty and slavery
are thus described in terms of causality, slavery being inferior
because it implies an inferiority in causality.
Though Aristotle's definition is given of a species of freedom,
i. e., civil freedom, the universal applicability of the concept
causa sui is evident. Self-causality or self-causation should be
discoverable in some degree in all types of freedom.
St. Thomas has further elaborated this notion by pointing
out that the free man is his own cause in two orders of
causality; efficient and final. 59 (This is to be understood, of
course, in the light of the general Thomistic doctrine concerning
the divine causality as the first efficient cause of all free as
well as necessary actions.) That man is free who acts as he
himself chooses and for his own ends, rather than under the
impulse of another's choice and for another's purpose.
This concept of freedom, properly understood and with the
necessary qualifications that arise from the analogical character of such predication, is verified in the absolute and uncreated freedom of God Himself, Who acts as He wills, without
interior or exterior constraint, and Who freely wills Himself
as the first object of His activity. The divine aseity is an
infinite freedom which means supreme independence of all
causation in the order of efficient and final causality. As uncaused, God is infinitely causa sui, uninfluenced in the exercise
of His power or the direction of His activity by anything save
His own wisdom and goodness.
The concept of freedom as self-dominion or self-causation
may be applied to each of the members of the division of liberty
given above. The dominion over personal activity is greater
in the angelic order than in the human, because the natural
powers of causality in angels are greater than those in men.
When the natural powers of intellectual creatures are elevated
by the influx of grace and the supernatural life, the increase
•• I Politica, !!.
•• In V Pol., lect. 7; in VI Pol., lect. 2; in Gal., cap. 5, lect. 8.

CHRISTIAN LIBERTY

231

in the powers of causation implies a corresponding development in the freedom and self-dominion of the creature. In
other words, men and angels enjoy freedom, naturally and
supernaturally, to the extent and degree they can act, under
God, of themselves and for themselves. The perfection of
their liberty varies, according to the degree of causative power
they receive. In men, the actualizing of spiritual powers by
good habits (the intellectual, moral, and especially the theological virtues), by increasing causal power in intellect and
will, enlarges the self-possession and self-mastery which are
identical with human freedom. Every supernatural or natural
influx of causal power, habitual or transient, means growth in
freedom. The greater the creature's participation in God's
infinite causality, 'the greater its freedom.
There is an analogy for this truth in the development of
corporeal perfection. Just as the natural perfecting of the body
in strength, health, and maturity makes the adult far freer than
the child physically, by reason of the increase in exterior selfpossession and self-dominion, so also a development of perfections that are specifically human, i. e., virtues of the intellect
and the will, bring an intellectual and moral maturity which
involves fuller interior freedom. Such perfections mean an increased sharing in the divine aseitas, God's absolute liberty and
independence of all things outside Himself; they mean a growth
in inwardness, self-possession, and autonomy, which tends to
the perfect freedom of the sons of God.
Inasmuch as true freedom must be a reflection of the divine
independence and perfection, error, which means intellectual
imperfection, and sin, which means deficiency in the will, are
excluded from any place in real freedom. Evil is in no sense a
God-like perfection; as a privation of being, evil in itself is
nothingness; in itself it has no being, no existence, no causality.
To the extent that any creature is deficient and evil, it is not
causa sui, since evil cannot be a cause except per accidens,
i.e., through the good in which evil if found. 60 Per se, therefore,
error and sin, the evils of the intellect and the will, are devoid
•• Summa Theol., I, q. 48, a. 1, adS.

3

DAVID A. 0' CONNELL

of reality, and obstacles to causality and the freedom which
flows from causality; in man they are impediments to action
"according to intellect and reason, and towards one's personal
good according to intellect and reason"; thus they stand in
the way of freedom since " man is said to be free especially
when he acts according to intellect and reason, and towards a
good of his own according to intellect and reason." 61
Only perfections, therefore, can contribute to the essential
inner freedom of intellectual creatures; only development in the
orders of truth and of goodness can make the creature increasingly causa sui. In the hierarchy of these perfections, natural
and supernatural, grace and charity stand in the highest place
as the closest approximation to the divine aseitas of the inner
life of the Holy Trinity; for grace and charity beget in the soul
a voluntariness in the fulfillment of God's law through an
affective union of the human will with the divine. The supernatural life of the soul gives men a supernatural self-dominion,
in which the concept of the free man as causa sui is perfectly
verified.

3. Christian Liberty.
A. Essence of Christian Liberty.
We have already indicated the need of distinguishing between
man's liberty in the natural order and his supernatural liberty
by grace. To both members of that distinction we must add
the further sub-distinction between internal and external freedom. For the nature of man as a composite of matter and spirit
demands an extension of liberty, be it the freedom of nature or
of grace, into the external life of mankind.
The interior perfecting of the human soul, mind, and will by
habitual grace and its accompanying virtues and gifts is the
essential Christian freedom. It is
not the creation of human power and will, but the birthright of the
Christian as child of God, reborn in Christ and vivified by the
Spirit. It is therefore a much more fundamental thing than what
we commonly understand by religious freedom. In modern times
61

In V Pol., lect. 7.

CHRISTIAN LIBERTY

Christian free9-om has usually been considered in reference either
to the freedom of the individual conscience against external compulsion or to the freedom of the Christian community-the Church
-against the State. But the first freedom from which these are
derivative and dependent is the freedom of the spirit-the new
creation which changes man's nature and liberates him from the
state of psychological and moral bondage to the world and the
forces that rule the world.62
The purpose of that freedom is the sanctification and eventual
salvation of the human person, accomplished by the elevation
of man to a state of divine sonship through the infusion of a
supernatural life which is a created participation in the divine
nature. There are two stages in this life of supernatural liberty:
the first, the life of grace on earth; the second, the life of glory
in Heaven.
St. Augustine describes the unfolding of this higher freedom:
The first stage of liberty is to be free from crimes . . . When a
man has begun to be free from these (and every Christian ought
to be so), he begins to raise his head to liberty; but that is liberty
begun, not completed . . . In part liberty, in part bondage; not
yet pure, not yet full liberty, because not yet eternity . . . In
what measure we serve God we are free; in what measure we serve
the law of sin, we are still in bondage. . . . When shall it be a
full and perfect liberty? When enmities are no more; when death,
the last enemy, shall be destroyed. 63
In his commentary on the same verses in St. John's Gospel
which inspired the above statement of St. Augustine, St.
Thomas systematizes, with characteristic precision, the Augustinian teaching, and amplifies it:
To be a disciple of Christ is a privilege of great dignity . . . Yet
to know the truth is still greater, since that is the goal of a disciple. This too the Lord gives believers: therefore does He say:
You shall know the truth, namely (a) of the doctrine I teach; ...
(b) of the grace I impart; . . . (c) of the eternity in which I abide
... But the greatest [privilege] of all is the gaining of that liberty
•• C. Dawson, "Christian
pp. 5-6.
63

Super Joannem, tract 41.

Freedom,"

The Dublin Review, CVI (July

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DAVID A. O'CONNELL

which the knowledge of the truth begets in those who believe;
therefore He says: And the truth shall make you free . . . And
this freedom is from three things: for the truth of Christ's doctrine
will free us from the error of falsehood; . . . the truth of His grace,
from the bondage of sin; . . . the truth of His eternity, from corruption ... True and spiritual liberty ... is the liberty of grace,
which is' to be free from crimes.' This is imperfect ... The liberty
of glory is perfect and full . . . because there will be nothing
inclining us to evil, nothing oppressing us, for there will be freedom
from sin and from punishment. 64

It is evident from these descriptions of Christian liberty that
there are involved in it two elements: a deliverance from sin
and all sin implies, and a movement towards God. As sin
itself implies an aversion from God as well as a conversion to
creatures, so the spiritual liberation of the Christian soul involves a retreat from evil and an advance to good; an escape
from sin's dominion and a flight to God's.
The reality of the sinner's slavery is affirmed in the words of
Christ: " Every one who commits sin is a slave of sin." 65 The
soul in this bondage serves also whatever incites to sin, that is,
the world, the devil, and the flesh. But the world and the devil
make use principally of the flesh and its desires to tempt men
and deepen their slavery. Before the reign of grace in the soul
the flesh rules the spirit, the disorderly inclinations of the
sensual appetite impelling the soul to act contrary to the rule
of reason. 66 Only when "Strengthened by grace can the soul
assert its due dominion over the body. For the disorder arises
from the loss of grace by the sin of. Adam, and only the grace of
the new Adam can restore the primitive order in the appetites
of men.
This liberation from the dominion of sin includes also deliverance from subjection to the devil. By original sin and grave
personal sin men become slaves of the devil. Satan is an
invisible master to whose despotism men condemn themselves
by mortal sin 67 but from whom they cannot in like manner
•• In Joann., cap. 8, lect. 4.
•• John, 8 : !l4.

•• Summa Theol., I-II, q. 91, a. 6.
67 Ibid., q. 80, a. 4, ad !l.

CHRISTIAN LIBERTY

23.5

voluntarily release themselves. The price of ransom from the
double slavery to sin and the devil was paid for mankind in
the Passion of Christ, Who alone can apply the grace of freedom to the enslaved. No purely human power can aid them. 68
Satan can lord it over sinners only because God in His justice
permits hlm to do so.69 It is for thls reason that the devil is
termed by St. Paul "the god of thls world," 70 God's wisdom
and justice allowing worldlings to serve him. 71 As Christ is
actually head of all those justified by His grace, so Satan is head
of all in the state of sin; 72 sinners are the devil's sons, as the
just are the sons of God. 73
Thus it is dear that man is always in subjection, whether
he enjoys the true freedom of the sons of God, or the freedom
from justice of followers of Satan. Human liberty must necessarily bow under one yoke or the other; there is no escaping the
subordinate condition of our nature.
Negatively, then, the interior freedom of the Christian soul
means liberation from the bondage of sin and Satan. Positively,
it means freedom to be a child of God and a citizen of heaven,
and opportunity to grow in that sonship and citizenship. The
68 C. Dawson, '' Christian Freedom,"
p. f.!: "The Gospel of Christ was essentially
the good news of the coming of the Kingdom, but at the same time it raised the
whole idea of redemption and deliverance to a new plane. It was no longer a
question of national deliverance by the establishment of a social or political
theocracy. It was the reversal of a universal
process which had reduced the
whole human race to a state of slavery. It was a moral deliverance, but it was
also much more than that. We are so accustomed to the traditional Christian
terminology of sin and redemption that we are apt to forget what these words
meant to the early Christians. For to them sin was not simply unethical behaviour, it was a real state of slavery to powers outside humanity and stronger than
man, the spiritual forces of evil which were the
of this dark age. Modem
writers . . . have described almost precisely the same conceptions and the same
psychological attitude among converts from paganism today."
69 Summa Theol., IH, q. 48, a. 4, ad f.!.
70 II Cor. 4:4.
71 Summa Theol., I, q. 65, a. l.
72 Ibid., III,
q. 8, a. 1; a. 7. It should be noted, however, that the devil's
influence upon sinners is exterior only, and not interior like the influence of Christ
the Head upon His Mystical Body.
'
73 Ibid., I, q. H4, a. 3, ad 2.

DAVID A. o' CONNELL

infusion of habitual grace begins a divine life in the soul and
initiates the restoration of the original harmony and liberty
that reigned in Adam before the fall.
Habitual grace generates in the soul the status of Christian
freedom; it is the esse of spiritual liberty. This life of freedom
bursts into action through the virtues and gifts which flow
into the powers of the soul from grace, but especially through
the virtue of charity which is rooted in the will, the power where
natural liberty resides. It is charity above all which gives the
soul the agere of Christian freedom. Thus the infusion of grace
means the birth of supernatural liberty; the infusion of charity,
its growth and perfection.
Charity gives the will a spontaneity and pleasure in virtuous
activity which no natural perfection can impart to the powers
of man. "No virtue has so great an inclination to its act as
charity, nor does any operate with such delight." 74 This freedom of charity is transmitted to all the other powers of the
soul whose acts is commands; It circulates in the whole man.
By fixing the will upon its true last end, charity leaves freedom
of choice unimpeded in the selection of those objects which are
ad /ine1n. Thus it gives adequate direction, not from outside
the will but from within, to the act of election which is the
proper act of free wilL75 More than that, it is a stimulus to
activity which will bring about the growth of love and supernatural liberty. For the degrees of charity are the degrees of
Christian freedom.

B. Degrees of Christian Liberty.
Though the natural freedom of the human will does not admit,
per se, of degrees, there are gradations in the perfection of
supernaturalliberty. 76 "Free will, as freedom from compulsion,
"'Summa Theol., II-II, q. 23, a. iil, corp.
•• " The free-will is not a distinct power from the will. Yet charity is not in the
will considered as free-will, the act of which is to choose. For choice is of things
directed to the end, whereas the will is of the end itself. Hence, charity, whose
object is the last end, should be described as residing in the will rather than in
the free-will." Ibid., q. 24, a. i, ad 3.
76 Summa Theol., I, q. 59, a. 3, ad 3.

CHRISTIAN LIBERTY

does not admit of the more and the less; but when freedom from
sin and from unhappiness are taken into account, it is said to
be freer in one state than in anothex"o"77 In this life the degrees
of Christian freedom are the degrees of charity. Progress in
the love of God and neighbor brings an increase in freedom
from sin in this life, and the degree of charity possessed at
death determines the degree of perfection in the liberty of glory.
The three stages of Christian perfection: the purgative, illuminative, -and unitive ways, are stages in the development here
on earth of the liberty of the Christian soul. 78 In this life no
limit can be set to the increase of spiritualliberty. 79
Thus there is no uniform level of spiritual liberty among
Christians in the state of grace. Freedom in the pursuit of
goodness and the search for God will not be identical for the
prodigal newly restored to friendship with God, and for the
saint who has never lost his baptismal innocence. Among
sinners too, there is a corresponding lack of uniformity in the
measure of their spiritual enslavement; since there is variation
in degree in vice as well as in virtue, there are depths of bondage
to which not every evildoer will descend, just as there are
heights of liberty none but saints will scale. 80 The stronger the
disposition to sin, the deeper the soul's enslavement; yet no
such impulse, no matter how deeply rooted, will destroy the
will's innate freedom of choice, or of itself eliminate the soul's
responsibility for sinful action. 81
•• De Ver., q.
a.lll, ad 7.
•• Summa Theol,, II-II, q. 183, a. 4, corp.; cf. also ibid., ad l; U Sent., d. !'t5,
q,l, a.4.
•• Summa Theol., II-II, q. 24, a. 7.
80 11 Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 4:
"The free will is so called from the fact that it
cannot be forced. But force ... is of two Idnds: one compelling, and the other,
inducing or impelling. Now it is natural to, and of the essence of, the free will;
not to be completely (sufficienter) constrained by any compelling force, and this
belongs to it whatever be its state; accordingly, such liberty as this is not increased
or lessened per se, but only per accidens. . . . But that liberty which is from
impulses or dispositive causes which incline the will in one direction rather than
another, is increased and lessened, acquired and lost; this type of liberty, then, is
also enlarged or diminished per se in man according to the different states in
which he is found."
"' Ibid., ad 4.

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DAVID A. O'CONNELL

C. Extent of Christian Liberty.
Though the supernatural Christian freedom of which we have
been speaking is essentially interior, rooted in the soul and its
faculties, its influence is not limited to the interior life and
activity of man. Man, as we have noted, is a unit composed
of matter and spirit, and it is the whole composite that is
sanctified by divine grace; it is the whole man who is freed
by grace from the bondage of sin. Consequently, this liberty
of grace must he externalized in the visible and earthly life
of the Christian; it must overflow into his contact with men
and society.
The natural liberty of free choice does not remain locked in
the human heart in such a way as to have no exterior manifestation and influence; so also the supernatural freedom of the
Christian soul must have its proper exte:rnalization. Perhaps
a better place to find an analogy to the external Christian
freedom is in the supernatural term of Christian liberty, the
life of glory, rather than in the natural freedom of the will
which it perfects. In the life of glory, the perfect happiness
and complete liberty of the sons of God will, after the general
Resurrection, overflow into their bodies, per redundantiam, as
St. Thomas says. 82 Since the life of grace and faith on earth
is the seed of the life of glory, we should expect a redundance
here on earth also of their inner blessedness and freedom in the
outer life of Christians, to whatever extent that overflow of the
invisible into the visible may be possible. Does not the same
Apostle who wrote " Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is
freedom," tell us also that the bodies of true Christians are the
temples of the Holy Spirit? 83
In any case, even apart from these considerations, it is dear
that the influence of the body upon the soul demands that certain essential external requirements be provided to help guarantee the survival and development of the inner Christian
liberty. From either point of view, L e., the soul's influence
upon the body, or the body's upon the soul, the necessity for
•• Summa Theol., I-II, q. 4, a. 5; a. 6.

•• II Cor., 3: 17; I Cor., 6:19.

CHRISTIAN LffiERTY

239

an outward. realization of Christian freedom is evident. 84 We
may speak of these external manifestations of Christian freedom as Christian liberty per redundantiam vel per participationem, the internal emancipation by grace from the slavery
of sin constituting Christian freedom per essentiam. These outward expressions of the inward Christian life are not necessary,
absolutely speaking, ad esse but ad bene esse of the Christian
soul and the liberty of the sons of God.
What external liberty or liberties flow from the inner Christian liberty as its normal expression, or as an essential condition
for its existence and enrichment? In general, the answer will
be: every exterior freedom needed to be and to live as a
Christian. 85 Specifically, those external liberties will include all
that freedom outlined above which belongs to all men by
natural right either as individuals or as organized in society.
In a word, all the natural freedoms due to men individually and
collectively are due them a fortiori as Christians; the inner
" freedom wherewith Christ has made us free " 86 gives supernatural rights to any outer expression the legitimate exercise
of Christian freedom demands. Not that Christians must necessarily have more external rights and free(ioms than nonChristians, but rather that Christians have more reason for
the same rights, i.e., they have the same natural rights as
all others a fortiori. In other words, the freedoms guaranteed
the race by the natural law have been christened by the Liberator of mankind, and consecrated to the fulfillment of higher
duties than the natural law imposes. The natural freedoms thus
baptized may rightly be called Christian, for when the sons of
•• Cf. Summa Theol., I-II, q. 4, a. 5-8, for St. Thomas's doctrine on the relationship between body and soul in the development of the life of grace, as well as a
discussion of the need of external goods and of association with other men in the
pursuit of interior perfection.
86 " For Christian life to develop it must have recourse to external and sensible
means; . . . the Church, being a society of men, cannot exist or develop if it does
not enjoy liberty of action, and . . . its members have the right to find in civil
society the possibility of living according to their conscience." Pius XI, .Firmiasimam C0118tantiam (Nos es Muy) Apostolic Letter on the Religious Situation in
Mexico.
•• Gal., 4 : 31.

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DAVID A. o' CONNELL

Adam achieve by grace the nobler status of sons of God, both
the interior freedom of choice and the exterior liberties due the
free creature are elevated to a higher plane, perfected by
becoming Christian. 87
The chief external manifestation of the Christian's freedom
is a true freedom of conscience which Leo XIII has expressly
termed " Christian liberty!' It is a liberty of conscience which
means that
every man in the State may follow the will of God and, from a
consciousness of duty and free from every obstacle, obey His
commands. This, indeed, is true liberty, a liberty worthy of the
sons of God, which nobly maintains the dignity of man, and is
stronger than all violence or wrong-a liberty which the Church
has always desired and held most dear. This is the kind of liberty
the Apostles claimed for themselves with intrepid constancy, which
the Apologists of Christianity confirmed by their writings, and
which the martyrs in vast numbers consecrated by their blood.
And deservedly so; for this Christian liberty bears witness to the
absolute and most just dominion of God over man, and to the
chief and supreme duty of man towards God. 88

Thus the freedom of conscience which is man's right by
natural law is christianized in the freedom of the baptized to
follow Christ without let or hindrance from others. In rendering to God what is God's according to the dictates of a Christian conscience, he is not to be deterred by the secular authority
of the State or by any other institution. " The believer has an
inalienable right to profess his faith and put it into practice in
the manner suited to him. . . . Laws that suppress or make
this profession and practice difficult contradict the natural
law." 89
87 Pius XI, Divini Redemptoris:
"Man has a spiritual and immortal soul. He
is a person, marvelously endowed by his Creator with gifts of body and mind ....
God alone is his last end, in this life and the next. By sanctifying grace He is
raised to the dignity of a son of God, and incorporated into the Kingdom of God
in the Mystical Body of Christ. In consequence he has been endowed with many
and varied prerogatives: the right to life, to bodily integrity, to the necessary means
of existence; the right to tend to his ultimate goal in the path marked out for
him by God; the right of association and the right to possess and use property."
88 Libertas Praestantissimum.
80 Pius XI, Mit brennender Sorge.

CHRISTIAN LffiERTY

241

It is to be noted here, however, that in the exercise of her
authority the Church cannot violate the Christian liberty of
her members, since her judgments and commands cannot fail
to be a protection and guide for Christian freedom. In other
words, the State can interfere with the exercise of Christian
liberty; the Church cannot, either by her doctrinal guidance of
the human mind, or by her disciplinary measures. 90
Freedom to become and to remain a Christian, to receive a
Christian education, to profess the Christian faith in private
and in public without fear of penalty-all these rights are
implied in true liberty of conscience.91 This basic freedom of
90 The eighteenth proposition of the Synod of Pistoia was condemned by Pius
VI as " false, temerarious, scandalous, pernicious, offensive to pious ears, injurious
to the Church and to the Spirit of God, by which she is governed, at least
erroneous," because the doctrine it sets forth '' subjects to scrutiny the discipline
established and approved by the Church, as if the Church could establish a useless
discipline or one which would be too onerous for Christian liberty to bear." (Denz.
1578)
After referring to this condemnation in Testem Benevolentiae (to Cardinal
Gibbons, Jan.
1899), Leo XIII protests against those who "judge that a
certain liberty ought to be introduced into the Church, so that, limiting the
exercise and vigilance of its powers, each one of the faithful may act more freely
in pursuance of his own natural bent and capacity. They affirm, namely, that
this is called for in order to imitate that liberty which, though quite recently
introduced, is now the law and foundatiol)- of almost every civil community.
On that point we have spoken very much at length [in the Encyclical Immortale Dei] ... We have also shown the difference between the Church, which
is of divine right, and all other associations, which subsist by the free will of men.
It is of importance, therefore, to note particularly an opinion which is adduced as
a sort of argument to urge the granting of such liberty to Catholics. For they
say, in speaking of the infallible teaching of the Roman Pontiff, that after the
solemn decision formulated in the Vatican Council, there is no more need of
solicitude in that regard, and, because of its now being out of dispute, a wider
field of thought and action is thrown open to individuals. A preposterous method
of arguing, surely. For if anything is suggested by the infallible teaching of the
Church, it is certainly that no one should wish to withdraw from it; nay, that all
should strive to be thoroughly imbued with and be guided by its spirit, so as to
be the more easily preserved from any private error whatsoever."
91 The religious freedom of the Christian implies also " the right to a reasonable
liberty in the choice of a state of life and fulfillment of a true vocation; a personal
right, this last, if there ever was one, belonging to the spirit and sublime, when the
higher imprescriptible rights of God and the Church meet, as in the choice and
fulfillment of the priestly and religious vocations." Pius XII, in his Pentecost
Radio Broadcast, June 1, 1941.

DAVID A. O'CONNELL

the Christian, which can appeal to a higher law in the face of
every secular attempt to impede or destroy the supernatural
liberty of the soul, becomes a safeguard of other fundamental
human freedoms. Leo XIII has pointed out that obedience to
God rather than men in cases where human power exceeds
of God,
itself by demanding what is contrary to the
results in the erection of an effective defense against tyranny.
''The authority in the State will not have all its own way, but
the interests a:rid rights of all will be safeguarded-the rights
of individuals, of domestic society, and of all the members of
the commonwealth.- All are thus free to live according to law
and right reason; a:nd in. this ... true liberty really consists." 92
Is man's natural right to freedom of conscience the only
human freedom which is christened by dedication to the service
of Christ? Or may we rightly extend the term Christian also
to other rights and liberties Christians possess? It seems clear
from the Church's use of the term Christian liberty that we
need not restrict the phrase either to the inner freedom of the
soul by grace or to the freedom of conscience treated above.
Leo XIII, for example, uses it to designate civil freedom when
he says: "Wherever Christian morality and laws/ are in high
repute, wherever religion has so developed men that they
observe justice and hold human dignity in honor, wherever
there has spread far and wide the spirit of fraternal love which
Christ has taught us, there neither slavery nor cruelty nor
barbarism can remain; but there a high morality flourishes, and
a Christian liberty held high in civil esteem." 93 In a prayer for
the Roman Emperor in the Missal, unused since 1804, the
Church employed the term to designate the external freedom
of the Christian people: " Accept, 0 Lord, the prayers and
offerings of Thy Church for the safety of Thy suppliant st·rvant;
and for the protection of faithful nations work the ancient
marvels of Thy power; that, the enemies of peace overcome,
Christian liberty may serve Thee in security." 94 Elsewhere we
•• Libertas Praestantissimum.
•• Leo XID, Letter Ecclesiae Catholicae (Nov. 20, 1890), to Cardinal Lavigerie.
Lettres Apostoliques de S. S. Leon· XIII, II, 298-303.
•• Orationes diversae, 5.

CHRISTIAN LffiERTY

find the .equivalent phrase " evangelical iiuerty " designating
external freedom in the political order. 95
It is safe to assert then that in the mind of the Church
Christian liberty, though principally and primarily a freedom
of the spirit, must also be in its fulness a freedom of the flesh;
there must be an exterior Christian liberty flowing forth from
the intangible inner life of supernatural freedom.
The economic liberty due to man as. a natural right, so ably
defended by Leo XIII and Pius XI in their social encyclicals,
is a truly Christian freedom in a social order where property' is
dedicated to Christian aims and its use is regulated by Christian ideals. The false teachings which would concentrate wealth
under the control of the State or of a powerful faction within
the State are as opposed to revealed doctrine as they are to
reason. In other words, not only man's natural dignity and
development in the human -Order but his supernatural dignity
and development as well require economic security and freedom, security and freedom which we may justly terni Christian. 96
Any social structure which defrauds men of their human and
Christian rights to property is evil, since it can thus " lay upon
the masses of the poor a yoke little better than slavery itself." 97
•• Leo XIII, In Plurimis (May 5, 1888): "Towards the end of the fifteenth
century . . . the base stain of slavery had been nearly blotted out from among
Christian nations, and states were anxious to stand firmly in evangelical liberty."
•• We have been unable to find any official statement of ·the Church which
speaks directly of economic liberty as Christian liberty (though it may be obliquely
referred to in the citations given above from Leo XIII). We can see no reason
why the economic freedom which belongs to man as man cannot be regarded as
a Christian freedom when elevated by dedication to a supernatural end. Recognition of the Christian character of economic freedom is to be found in the stress
laid by the Popes of recent years on the need of a just and Christian social order
to enable men to fulfill their obligations as Christians. The Church's defense of
property as an essential human liberty is based on fundamental Christian teaching
concerning the nature of man, society, and material goods. The Church proclaims as a divine demand that society be so organized as to provide every man
with such external means as will facilitate the practice of Christian virtue. If the
natural right to serve God according to His will is for Christians in the professing
of their faith Christian liberty, so also the natural right to the use of private
possessions is deserving of the name Christian when the right is exercised for
Christian aims.
•• Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum.

DAVID A. O'CONNELL

In the mind of the Church an equitable distribution of the
world's wealth must be a necessary externalization of mankind's free service of Christ, as well.as a necessary condition
for the inner life of Christian freedom. 98
While it is true that religious freedom and an economic
liberty essential to the practice of virtue are the primary external requisites for the full inner life of Christian freedom, it
remains true also that the survival and enlargement of supernatural life do not require civil or political liberty as a sine qua
non. It is entirely possible for Christians to lead lives of high
sanctity in the condition of civil servitude, and the history of
the progress of Christianity among the slaves of the Roman
Empire is concrete proof of that possibility. Yet it belongs to
Christians to be free externally, and it is solidly established that
•• " Our immortal predecessor Leo XIII, in his famous Encyclical Rerum
N 01,1arum, has already established the principle that for every honest economic
and social order there must be laid down as its basic foundation the right to
private property . . . This private property is in a special manner the natural
fruit of labor, the produce of an intense activity on the part of the man who
acquires it, through his active will, to ensure and improve his own person, his
own living conditions and those of his family, to create for himself and for those
dear to him a field in which they may rightly enjoy not only economic freedom
but also political, cultural, and religious freedom. The Christian conscience cannot admit as just a social order which either denies in principle or renders impossible or nugatory in practice the natural right to property ....
" On the one side we see immense riches dominating public and private
economic life, and often even civic life; and on the other, the countless numbers
of those who, deprived of every direct or indirect security of livelihood, take
no proper interest in the true and higher value of the spirit, abandon their aspirations to genuine freedom, and throw themselvt;!s at the feet of any political party,
slaves to whomsoever promises them in so!I)e way bread and security. Experience
shows what tyranny, under such circumstances, human nature is capable of even
in our own time.
" In defending, therefore, the principle of private property, the Church pursues
a high ethico-social purpose ... The Church aims ... at securing that the
institution of private property be such as it should be according to the designs of
God's wisdom and the disposition of the elements in the social order-a necessary
presupposition to human initiative, an incentive to work to the advantage of life's
purpose here and hereafter, and an instrument of the liberty and dignity of man,
created in the likeness of God, Who from the beginning assigned to him for his
benefit dominion over material things." Pius XII, Radio Message on the Fifth
Anniversary of World War II, Sept. 1, 1944, in Bishops' Statement on International
Order (Washington, 1944, N. C. W. C.) pp.
(Italics ours.)

CHRISTIAN LIDERTY

245

civil and political liberty have always been furthered whereever the Church's influence has penetrated. Leo XIII had no
hesitation in saying, " The powerful influence of the Church
has ever been manifested in the custody and protection of the
civil and political liberty of the people . . . It is sufficient to
recall the fact that slavery, that old reproach of the heathen
nations, was mainly abolished by the beneficent efforts of the
Church." 99
· The Christian religion was not created to bring men the
temporal blessings of .civil and political freedom, but a spiritual
emancipation so far superior that St. Thomas speaks of lesser
liberties as "vain" in comparison. 100 But the overflow of that
deliverance from the bondage of sin by Christian doctrine and
discipline must normally result in a true exteriorization of
Christian freedom in civil and political life.101
The liberating grace of Christ sanctifies not only the individual life of man but also his societal life. Just as man's
natural personal freedoms are "christianized" and elevated
by the influence of the supernatural, so are the race's societal
liberties consecrated, in a Christian social order, to divine
service. The freedoms of both the family and the State become
Christian when they serve Christian purposes.
•• Libertas Praestantissimum. Cf. Acton, op. cit., p.
"The Church has
succeeded in producing the kind of liberty she exacts for her children only in those
States which she has herself created or transformed. Real freedom has been known
in no State that did not pass through her medieval action. The history of the
Middle Ages is the history of the gradual emancipation of man from every species
of servitude, in proportion as the influence of religion became more penetrating and
more universal. The Church could never abandon that principle of liberty by
which she conquered pagan Rome. The history of the last three centuries
exhibits the gradual revival of declining slavery, which appears under new forms
of oppression as the authority of religion has decreased. The efforts of deliverance
have been violent and reactionary, the progress of dependence sure and inevitable."
Cf. also J. Balmes, European Civilization (New York, 1850) pp. 90-115.
' 00 In Joann., cap. 8, lect. 4. St. Thomas is not condemning temporal freedom
from the condition of slavery as he condemns sinful freedom, terming it ''perverse ";
civil freedom is not evil, but rather, unimportant, especially when viewed sub
specie aetemitatis and compared to the spiritual liberty of grace and glory.
'" 1 E. Quinn, "Free Will in the Modern World," Blackfriars, XXI (Aug., 1940),
pp. 459-464.

246

DAVID A. O'CONNELL

As far as the family is concerned, this elevation of natural
rights and consecration of natural liberties has been accomplished by Christ Himself directly through His institution of
the Sacrament of Matrimony. Here, in directly christianizing
the natural contract of matrimony, Christ sacramentalizes the
whole social structure of which the Christian family is the cell.
For the sacramental nature of Christian marriage benefits not
only the family itself and the Church, but the State as well.
The State participates in the supernatural influences that perfect the natural elements of civil society when Christ's power
penetrates and permeates the political order through the family.
For the spiritual emancipation of the Christian home as well as
of the individuals who form the family cannot fail to have a
spiritual influence upon the body politic and contribute to the
advancement of purely secular freedoms.
The Church, likewise, has of divine right an inalienable
liberty: freedom to exist, to preach the Gospel, to administer
the Sacraments, to rule her members with executive, legislative,
and judicial power. As the State is supreme and independent,
by natural right, in temporal affairs, so also the Church is
supreme and independent in matters that conce).-n men's spiritual life, and is subject to no authority but that of God Himself.
"The Church, founded by Christ as a perfect society, has a
natural and inalienable right to perfect freedom and immunity
from the power of the state; . . . in fulfilling the task committed to her of teaching, ruling, and guiding to eternal bliss
those who belong to the Kingdom of Christ, she cannot be subject to any external power." 102 From the very first days of her
existence, the Church has always claimed that freedom and
boldly exercised it to the fullest possible extent despite every
attempt at suppression andpersecution.

DAVIn A. O'CONNELL, 0. P.
(To be continued)
Providence College
Providence, R.I.
100

Pius XI, Quas Primas (Encyclical on the Kingship of Christ, Dec. 11, 191Ui).

\

THE DYNAMICS OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION

G

OD'S creative covenant demands perfection of all
hills or the grass, which is today
reality. The
and tomorrow is no more, have all known the mandate
to perfection promulgated in their natures. To men, whose
compliance must be conscious, the command was repeated: " I
am the Almighty God: walk before Me and be perfect." 1 In
a restless heart or in a revolving cosmos the pattern of perfection is much the same: to fulfill oneself is to find God. Each
creature, then, in striving for its own perfection is seeking
something of the divine likeness.
Nowhere is that likeness more fully realized than in the
supernatural sonship of Christian perfection. Infinite as the
formal equivalent of divine life, adoptive sonship is at the same
time imitative. A completeness above human needs, it in no
way contradicts human nature. As in His own Person divinity
and humanity are subsistently united, so through Christ's
merits the heights and the depths are contactually one. The
Infinite freely shares His life that nothing may be lacking to
the finite. " A new creature " for whom " all things are made
new" 2--especially his motives ·and movements toward perfection-has1 come to be through rebirth in water and the
Holy Ghost. His perspective of perfection is supernatural and
his possibility of attaining it secure, since " grace and truth
came through Jesus Christ." 3 At once promissol'y and mandatory, then, are Christ's words: "You, therefore, are to be
perfect, even as your heavenly Father is perfect." 4
In the vocabulary of Christ and his followers, however, the
notion of perfection--even with its unequivocal demand for
an infinite norm-lost none of the calculated latitude it had had
with the philosophers. The germinal idea of perfection reGenesis 17 : 1.
• II Cornithians 5 : 17.

1

4

"John1:17.
• Matthew 5 :48.

DOMINIC HUGHES

mained " that to which nothing of the elements proper to it is
lacking." 5 Nor are its analogical usages abandoned. 6 Although
in a Christian context completeness, i. e. " perfection," in evil
merely illustrates perfection in good, this latter meaning has
several senses. Perfection may signify the absolute realization
of the notion in boundless divine goodness, or it may have any
number of relative meanings amidst the partial perfections of
creatures. When these latter meanings are ordered hierarchically they form a Jacob's ladder of perfections from the least
to the limitless.
At the summit and beyond any hierarchy of perfections is
God's ineffable self-possession. With absolutely nothing
in His own loveableness or in His act of love, His perfection is
complete and comprehensive. 7 lmmobilely active, infinite in
its intensity and
in its constancy, God's perfection is
identified with Himself. Such completeness in simplicity is
beyond the piecemeal understanding of any creature, yet upon
the authority of Him Who ·descended from heaven it is the
objective and the norm of any progress in the incomparably
inferior degrees of created supernatural perfection.
The dependent degrees of perfection in Christ's grace are as
variegated as cells in His mystical body. Yet each is relatively
complete. Classification of these various perfections has distinguished them first by state of nature and then by stage of
development. In the blessed state of heaven the human soul
will know a perfection almost unimaginable upon earth. Since
his intellect and will are in immediate contact with God, in
Whom neither sufficiency nor satisfaction are lacking, a human
being functions to the full ·capacity of his unimpeded soul.
Nothing possible to his nature is then lacking to him; grace
has brought him to the maximum perfection his nature will
allow.8 In this life, however, the intensity and continuity of
even a man's most perfect act is perforce impeded and inter• V. Metaphysics, c. 16.
0 Summa Tkeol., I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 1 and De Perjectione Vitae Spiritualis, c. I.
7 Summa Tkeol., II-II, q. 184, a. 2.
a Ibid.

THE DYNAMICS OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION

249

rupted. Because he walks in Faith and because his way is long,
a wayfarer's completeness in Christ cannot be measured by
heavenly norms but only by those proper to his present state.
He cannot be expected to have at all times or even for a
moment an activity equal to the total capacity of his nature,
but only such as his pilgrim status will permit. 9
A Christian's pilgrimage in perfection lies between two polar
conditions. One is that indispensable minimum of divine life
which excludes everything contrary to itself-the presence of
sanctifying grace, the virtues and gifts. 10 The other is that
fullness of supernatural activity through which the soul
nates whatever might impede its progress toward " full stature
in Christ." Each of these stages is a true perfection. In the
first, nothing is lacking in supernatural capacity; "the seed of
glory " has been implanted in the soul. In the second, the
divine dynamism of actual grace leaves nothing wanting to
providential progress toward that eternal happiness in which
ultimate human perfection consists.
Just as human happiness involves an aggregate of ordered
goods, so Christian perfection in all its various states and stages
is a complexity of integrated factors. Simple in its source,
Christian perfection is intricate in its proximate principles. No
single faculty, no simple act of the human composite is sufficient for perfection of the whole. Harmony among several
elements is required for supernatmal completeness. In each
stage of its development and throughout an individual's entire
career in grace, Christian perfection demands more than a
single virtue and more than a uniform pattern of activity.
Complexity in either virtue or activity need not be confusion,
however, since many factors can cooperate in a single organic
hierarchy. Then, just as all human and relative perfections
are compared to the perfection of God, so all lesser virtues will
stand in relation to one God-like virtue. In that virtue Christian perfection will be radically constituted even if not
pletely realized.
• Ibid.

10

Ibid.

250

DOMINIC HUGHES

Most frequently and most authoritatively identified as the
dominative and constitutive virtue in Christian perfection is
the divine virtue of charity. Other virtues have been nominated to charity's regnancy, but they have received only
half-hearted or heretical sponsorship. Ancient Gnostics and
enlightened Modernists have considered perfection as a prerogative of an intellectual aristocracy. 11 Extraordinary gifts
and sanctity were one in the mind of the Montanists, and many
sincere but ill-guided Christians thought of holiness as identical
with extraordinary penances. 12 For the Quietists passivity
exaggerated even to the detriment of the act of loving God
was the supreme accomplishment of Christian living. 13 None
of these substitutes for the" bond of perfection," however, has
ever possessed the inner consistency or the extrinsic authority
to make it catholic among Christians. Charity, on the other
hand, has not only within itself all the qualities for regency
among the virtues but in addition it has been anointed with
scholastic, patristic, apostolic and even divine approbation.
Among the various testimonies to charity's place in the
divine plan is Christ's own preceptive summary of supernatural
dogma. 14 Cited as a command known to all who know the true
God, Christ's covenant is, however, new. The measure of
charity is not the whole of a human heart's love, but the love
of Christ Himself. The end of the commandment for Christ
and for Christians is not prosperity but perfection. 15
Apostolic understanding has continued the explanation and
exemplification of Christ's covenant. St. John found in charity
not only the cohesive force binding all virtues together but the
adhesive principle of the soul's union with God. 16 St. Paul has
11 Dictionnaire apologetique de la foi catholique, ed. D'Arles
(Paxis, 19ll), III,
1000.
12 G.
Bardy, "Montanisme," Dictionnaire de la theologie catholique (Paris,
19£9), X, £355-£370, and J. de Guibert, Documenta Ecclesiastica Christianae
Perfectionis (Rome, 1931), nn. 32-38.
13 D. T. C. (1937), XIII, 1537-1581.
14 Matthew
££: 35-40; Mark 1£:28-31.
15 John 17 : 12 and 13 : 34-35.
16

John 4: HI.

THE DYNAMICS OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION

Q51

a classic hymn to charity and many other passages to show that
the entire law was comprised in love. 17
Patristic testimonies to charity's place in Christian perfection are abundant and forthright. St. Irenaeus reiterated St.
Paul's preference of charity to charisms. 18 St. Gregory of
Nyssa considered the way of charity toward salvation most
perfect and happiest. 19 For St. Augustine, Christian perfection
and charity were indissoluble. 20 St. Gregory continued the
tradition that charity draws to itself the other virtues and
confirms them. 21
Among the scholastics there is no doubt of the intimate relationship of charity and Christian perfection. St. Bernard and
Richard of St. Victor give degrees of charity and degrees of
perfection as a single reality. 22 With St. Thomas the consistent
Christian tradition was formulated in such a way that since
his time there has been little deviation from his canonized
usage. 23
Neither the usage of St. Thomas nor that of the tradition he
recapitulates gives warrant, however, for making of the one
virtue of charity the whole of Christian perfection. Charity
dominates other virtues, it does not destroy them. Constituting
the basis of perfection, charity always requires other virtues
as its complement. St. Paul, in giving praise to charity, mentions an entourage of lesser virtues, and his list is by no means
complete. 24 St. Thomas in giving the principal place to charity
not only implies but expressly states that there are other
secondary virtues in the totality that perfection involves. 25 The
very existence of the supernatural entity depends upon charity,
F. Prat, S. J., The Theology of St. Paul (1939). ll, p. 333.
Adversus Haereses, I'll, 33, 8-9, PG, VII, 1079.
1 " In Canticum canticorum homilia I, PG, XLIV, 765.
20 De Natura et gratia, 70, PL, XLIV, 290; Enchiridion, 117, PL, XL, 286.
21 Homilia in Evangelium 'il-7, l, PL, LXXVI, 1205.

17

18

22 De Diligendo Deo, 12-15, PL, CLXXXH,
994; De Gradibus Charitatis, PL,
CLXXXXVI, 1195, ss.
23 Summa Theol., II-II, q.l84,
a.l.
•• I Corinthians 13:4-7.
•• Summa Theol., II-II, q. 184, aa. l and 3.

DOMINIC HUGHES

but charity can neither live nor grow unattended by other
virtues. Absolute as its control over the other virtues may be,
therefore, charity is not autonomous.

1. The analogical description of the relationship of
charity and the other virtues.
The precise relationship between charity and the other virtues has been variously described. Charity has been compared
to a root, inasmuch as through it other virtues are nourished. 26
" Mother of all virtues " is another title accorded to charity
since, in conceiving its own end, it produces those of the other
virtues. 27 Besides these metaphorical references to charity as
the origin of other virtues, charity has been called the end of
all virtues. 28 Whatever may be the explanatory phrase used
to show the relationship of charity and the other virtues, it is
certain that Christian perfection consists "especially" and
" in an absolute sense " in charity and " secondarily " and " in
a relative sense" in the other virtues. 29 In such terminology
the various factors in perfection are described in terms of one
another. To explain their meaning more fully an analogous
situation must be found through which the relationship between charity and the other virtues may be judged.
One such analogy is realized in the :relationship of substance
to accidents. Although this relationship may seem intricate and
Summa Theol., II-II, q. 23, a. 8, ad 2.
QQ. Disp., De Caritate, a. 3.
28 Summa Theol., II-II, q. 23, a. 8, ad 3.
29 Summa Theol., II-II,
q. 184, a. l, and ibid. ad 2. Neither textual criticism, as
is evident from the Leonine edition, nor philosophical principles, would seem to
justify Cajetans's remark (in loco) that the text of St. Thomas should be
corrected. Cajetan would argue that the substantialiter of the reply to the second
objection should be substituted for the speeialiter of the body of the article.
Cajetan's substitution would eliminate from the words of St. Thomas the basis
for a dynamic analogy between charity and the notion of principal causality,
which would be contrary to the teaching of St. Thomas. Cf. Summa Theol., I-II,
q. 114, a. 4. Moreover, Thomists teach that perfection consists formally not in the
habit of charity but in its activity. Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, Les Trois Ages de la
Vie lnterieure, vol. I. p. 213. For the contrary opinion see Suarez, de Religione,
III, L l, c. 4, n. 10.
26

27

THE DYNAMICS OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION

9Z53

philosophical, it has been established as the classic basis of
comparison. 30 It is justifiably introduced, not because of its
appeal to the imagination, but because of its intelligibility for
the human understanding. It has at least a certainty and
clarity for the human intelligence that is not easily realized in
moral matters because of their contingent character. Moreover, the comparison of charity and the virtues in terms of
substance and accidents is not a metaphor but a proper analogy,
based upon formalities proportionately realized in each. Within the order of Christian perfection, charity has the same relationship to the other virtues as substance has to its accidents
in the order of predicamental realities. Just as being is realized
in substance in an absolute sense and in accidents as they are
related to substance, so in perfection the very being of supernatural living is in charity absolutely, and in the other virtues
only relatively. For other comparisons compensations have to
be made, since they are of the corporeal order, but in the case
of the relationship between substance and accidents there is
no such limitation. As an analogue, then, the concept of substance and its accidents is sufficiently abstract and universal
to allow it to be used to parallel the various states and stages
in the activity of charity in Christian perfection.
This single analogue, apt and expressive as constant usage
has always found it, however, is not identical with the notion
expressed in the words " principally " as applied to charity and
" secondarily" as applied to the other virtues. 31 The relationship of charity and the other virtues goes beyond the static one
of substance and accidents. At any given stage in the development of charity and the other virtues the comparison is exact.
No account, however, is given of the movement from one stage
to another, or the passage from one state to another. The
process of increase in charity and the other virtues deserves an
explanation. Formally, substances do not admit of increase;
3 ° Cf. Cajetan In Summa Theol., II-II, q. 184, a. 1, ad 2. and J. de Guibert, op.
cit. n. 266.
81 P. Passerini, O.P., De Hominum Statibus et Officiis (Lucca, 1782), in II-II,

q. 184, a.l.

254

DOMINIC HUGHES

they do not operate efficiently. 32 Nothing, therefore, that is
predicated substantially of another, as is charity in Christian
perfection, is predicated as increasing. 33 Charity cannot be
called more of the substance of Christian perfection as it
develops. 34 Nor precisely as a substance can it be said to
merit. 35 For the aspect of the relationship between charity
and the other virtues in Christian perfection involving meritorious movement and increase another analogy must be established. Without going beyond the scope of the words " principally " and " secondarily " a dynamic comparison may be
found to better illustrate and adequately parallel the causality
of charity in Christian perfection.
The causality of charity in Christian perfection must itself
be briefly sketched before a clarifying analogy can be meaningful. The causality of charity is a notion formally distinct from
the notion of the activity of charity. Charity is active for
eternity; only in this life is charity a cause: The causality of
charity is in the order of merit which ceases with this life.
During this life, however, each activity of charity is a causal
activity. Each. contributes in some way to progress toward
Christian perfection and toward an eternal reward.
As a meritorious rather than a physical cause of Christian
perfection, charity is itself subordinate to a higher cause. The
primary principle of perfection is not in man but in God. His
will fixes the limits of perfection for each individual, not only
for all eternity but at each moment in time. Because, therefore,
His ". . . grace is not given to all in a uniform way nor equally,
but according to the measure of Christ's gift ... "/ 6 no rigid
measure may be established either for a final accomplishment
nor gradual progress. Rather each individual has the task of
working out his own perfection. Although heavenly mansions
may be allotted to children who die without meritorious action,
82 Cajetan, In Praedicamenta Aristotelis, c. 5, ed: Laurent
(Rome, 1989), p. 79
and John of St. Thomas, Cursus Philosophicus (Rome, 1988), vol. II, p.

•• QQ. Disp., De Virtutibus, a.ll.
lbid. ad 4.
Summa Theol., I, q. 54, a. 8. and II-II, q.
•• St. Thomas, In ad Ephesios, cap. 4, lect. 4.

84

85

a. 4.

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255

Christian perfection in this life is gained only by volitional acts
informed by charity. Perfection, then, is the gradual maturing
of a soul in human and divine life.
Living a life of loving God does not entail a development as
in growth, or even in knowledge, that involves the addition of
more and more objects. Maturity is rather in the intensity and
consequent effectiveness of the act. 37 The effectiveness of
charity's act in the activity of the other virtues is a consequence of the intensity of love of God. It is a sign of perfection,
since the causal activity of charity in Christian perfection is
not that of a separated soul which functions without interruption and without hazard and hostility. Meritorious causality
is not always serene and without obstacles. In the human
composite, limited, weakened by the effects of sin and impeded
by exterior forces, charity must struggle to survive and progress
unless it is aided by ancillary virtues. It must not only elicit
acts of affection but command other acts as welL Subordinate
to God's will, charity then becomes a cause of progress not only
through its own acts but by subordinating the acts of other
virtues to itself. In it Christian perfection consists " principally " and for its causality a dynamic analogy must be found.
The causality of charity in Christian perfection is progressive
and productive. In its production of effects it involves other
causes subordinate to itself. The analogy of human growth
fails, therefore, since although it indicates progress, it does not
imply subordinate causes in the production of a common effect.
Local motion likewise fails to illustrate any subordination in
causes. There is, however, a single analogy in the order of
causality which adequately parallels charity in its relation to
the other virtues in Christian perfection. Although hitherto
never employed or delineated as an analogy of dynamic progress in Christian perfection, it forms a fitting complement to
the static analogy of substance and accidents commonly given.
The analogy adequate to the dynamic task is found in the
relationship of principal and instrumental causality. The notion
of instrumental causality, like that of substance and accidents,
37

Summa Theol., I-II, q. 52, a. 2.

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DOMINIC HUGHES

is admittedly intricate and involved in philosophical difficulties and distinctions. 38 Once appreciated, however, it affords
a single, universally applicable key to the still more obscure
interrelation of charity and the other virtues in the dynamic
progress of Christian perfection. A communion of several
causes in the production of a common effect-all subordinated
to a single dominant principle-cannot otherwise be explained
than through the notions of principal and instrumental causes.
Because of the involved nature of the notion of instrumental
causality its fundamental aspects must be disentangled before
it can be applied in the context of Christian perfection.

2. The foundations and functions in a principalinstmmental causal relationship.
Fundamental to the notion of principal and instrumental
causes is the fact that they involve a relationship primarily
in the order of acting-not in the order of being, as do substance and accidents. 39 The intellect, for example, while it is
more excellent in being, is related to the will as a subordinate
cause in the production of human acts. In the order of acting
the principal-instrumental relationship is strictly within the
scope of fulfillment or the execution of the act, not in the
realm of intention. 40 Thus motives are of little moment in this
relationship. What is -done rather than why it is done is the
basis of the union of causes called a principal-instrumental
relationship.
The combination of causes of which one is instrumental to
another is distinguished from every other type of efficient
causality involving the conspiracy of two causes. In the production of a single effect, two causes may concur as equal; two
men may pull a canal barge. The two causes may also be
unequal, one subordinate to the other-and this latter situa•• " ... tractatus

iste (on instrumental causality) provectioribus convenientior

est quam tironibus." John of St. Thomas, op. cit. p. 270.
•• Summa Theol., q. 17, a. 4; IV Sent., d. I, q.l, a. 4, qua. I.
•• Summa Theol., I-ll, q. 18, a. S.

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PERFECTION

257

tion is found in two ways. In the first, the effect may be attributed in an absolute sense to both the causes, one as primary
the other as secondary; each is complete within its own order. 41
Thus God is the cause of an act of love and a man with the
virtue of charity is likewise. Secondly, the effect may be
attributed in an absolute sense to only one of the two or
several causes and to all the others only relatively. In this
last instance, the unique principal-instrumental
relationship
42
is realized.
The principal cause and its instrument do not cooperate as
a matter of chance. They are related in the production of a
common effect, and their order to one another in that production is essential to both principal and instrumental causes. 43
It may be accidental for a principal cause to use this or that
instrument, or a whole series of numerically distinct instruments, e. g., a carpenter may use several hammers to produce a
chair. Yet whatever a principal cause does use to produce
an effect is truly an instrument and a per se cause of all or
part of what is done.
The effect produced is, however, similar to the principal
cause rather than to the inst:rument. 44 The artifact is a representation of the art of the artist, not of the instruments he uses.
In the production of the effect, moreover, both causes are
necessary in joint action. The instrument shares the action of
the principal agent and the principal agent uses the action of
the instmment. 45 From this mutually beneficial communion of
causes a common effect is produced, and the principal-instrumental relationship in causality is discoverable.
Besides the conditions which must be present for the principal-instrumental relationship in causality there are qualifications which must be found in each of the members of the
partnership. The principal cause has properties that distinguish
"Ibid., q. 79, a. 4 and Ill Cont. Gent., 67.
42 IV Sent., d. 8, q.
ad L
43 Ill Cont. Gent., 70.
44 Summa Theol., HI, q.
a.l.; IV Sent., d.l9, q.l,
45 Summa Theol., HI, q. 19, a. l.

qua. I.

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DOMINIC HUGHES

it from other causes and from its instruments. The instruments,
for their part, have features that are not to be found in a
principal cause.
The notion of a principal cause is, first of all, clearly
tinguished from that of a proper cause. The former implies the
use of instruments, the latter does not. One and the same
cause may be both, but not under the same aspect. God, for
example, can produce grace as a proper cause without the use
of instruments, but he is not said to be the principal cause of
such grace unless he employs subordinate causes such as the
sacraments.
In contrast with its instruments, the principal cause has
a unique prerogative. It possesses its causality in a complete
and permanent way. 46 Artistry, for example, is an enduring
quality in the soul of the artist, although it is a passing impulse in his arm or brush. Since it has its causality as a
property of its being, the principal cause is capable of transferring that form to instruments. In fact, it impresses its form
of causality upon each of the instruments ordained to its effect.
In so doing it does not dissipate its causality because all instruments subordinated to the same effect are one by a unity of
order. 47 Under the principal cause the instruments are so
ordered that they share the impress of its form in a piecemeal
fashion. No one of them is capable of producing the effect
without the others. In the arm of the artist, for example,
artistry is useless without a brush. 48 Finally, unlike the instrumental cause, the principal cause cannot be considered a sign
of the effect, even though it might be more manifest. 49 God
is not a sign of the presence of Faith in a soul, although the
administration of the sacrament of Baptism may be.
Among principal causes there is a fundamental division to
be observed. Not only as a being, but as a principal cause,
God must be distinguished from all other causes called principal. As the primary principle of all being and all causality,
•• Ibid., q. 62, a. 4.
" Ibid., ad 8.

•• IV Sent., d. 8, a. 8, ad 9; a. 4, ad 5.
•• Summa Theol., III, q. 62, a. I.

THE DYNAMICS OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION

259

God may use whatever He chooses as His instrument. His very
act of employing it fashions it to His purpose. Lesser principal
causes, however, have no such control. They must have, already prepared for their use, instruments apt to their purposes.
An artist, for example, cannot use a chisel in painting or a
brush in carving. He, as every secondary principal cause, picks
up his tools for a higher work than they could do of themselves,
but they for their part must be prepared. The instruments
must be qualified to function in conjunction with the principal
cause.
Contrary yet complementary to those of a principal cause
are the qualifications for instruments. In the instrument the
form of the principal cause- which is later reproduced in the
effect is transient and incomplete. 50 God's power of cleansing
from sin, for example, is in the Baptismal water only at the
moment of actual washing. Incomplete and transient as it is,
the form of the principal cause shared by the instrument is in
the latter an intrinsic reality. 51 It is not merely an extrinsic
assistance or an innate obediential potency, much less is it a
mere intention of the agent or observer. As something incomplete and ordered to a further term, the motion within an instrument may be described as intentional. It is not, however,
intentional in the sense of being merely a projection of intention from a principal cause. Rather it is a form, a physical
reality superimposed upon the already existing form and activity
of the instrument. 52 A real transmission of motion takes place
in the principal-instrumental relationship and there is involved
au actual sharing in efficiency.
This transmission of motion, so vital to instrumental cooperation, is felt first in the instrument and then in the effect. Even
if there is no observable sequence in time, at least by an order
of nature, the principal cause first elevates its instrument and
60 Ibid., q. 6!!, a. 4; IV Sent., q.l, a. 4, qua.!!; QQ. Disp., De Veritate, q. !!7,
a. 4, ad 6.; ad 7.
•• John of St. Thomas, loc. cit., p. 513 ss.
•• IV Sent., d. 1, a. 1, a. 4, ad I.

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DOMINIC HUGHES

then applies it to its act, the production of a higher effect than
it would natively be capable of producing. 53
Presupposed to any influx from the principal cause, however,
is the presence and activity of a form proper to the instrument.54 The functioning of a pen, for example, is presupposed
to the writing of intelligible signs. Consequently, within the
one motion toward producing an effect there is a twofold formality. One formality belongs to the instrument as a being;
the other belongs to the instrument precisely as such, as sharing
in the activity of the principal agent. 55 This latter action is
directly efficacious in producing the effect. The former-that
of the instrument as being-contributes to the effect only
indirectly. It causes a disposition in either the effect produced
or the mode in which the principal cause operates. 56 If a saw
did not have the proper action of cutting it would not be useful in making furniture; and if a saw is dull or misshapen, it
will condition both the wood and the manner in which it is
used. As with the saw, so in all instruments there is a proper
action that is somewhat independent of the action of the principal cause. That proper action must be present or the principal
cause cannot elevate the instrument to the production of higher
effects. These effects higher than that appropriate to the native
energies of the instrument, however, need not be on the same
plane as the effect of the principal cause. 57 Nor need the instrument be more elevated than the effect produced, since the effect
is likened to the principal cause and not the instrument. 58
These complementary conditions on the part of the instrument and principal cause make possible a communion of action
that is something more than cooperation. Subordinated rather
than coordinated, instrumental causes are truly secondary to
the principal cause in which causality is found in an absolute
sense. Possessing causality as a property, on the other hand,
the principal cause shares it with its subordinates that it might
58 Ill Contra Gent., 48; 149; de Ver., q. 27, a. 4.
•• Summa Theol., III, q. 62, a. l, ad 2.
56 Ibid., q. l!l, a. l, ad. 2.
57 IV Sent., d. l, q. l, a. 4, ad l.
•• Ibid., I, q. 45, a. 5.
•• Ibid., qua. 1, ad 3.

THE DYNAMICS OF CHRISTIAN PEHFECTION

261

better produce its own effects and raise them to a communion
of causality of which they would otherwise be incapable. The
Humanity of Christ and His sacraments have a causality that
is best explained through the doctrine of the principal-instrumental relationship. These same principles may be applied to
the relationship in dynamic progress of charity and the other
virtues in Christian perfection.

3. The principal-in.<drumentalrelationship as applied
to charity and the other virtues.
The application of the principal-instrumental relationship to
charity and the other virtues is taxing but rewarding. First
of all, the conjunction of causes must be outlined and the
common effect designated. Then the conditions for both the
principal cause and the instrumental causes must be carefully
applied to charity and the other virtues.
The conjunction of causes in a common effect is obviously
realized in the relationship between charity and the other
virtues. Neither charity nor the other virtues are causes in
the sense of being subsistent principles which produce effects.
Rather they are principles by which a man acts. Nevertheless,
within the order of such principles-principia quo-charity and
the other virtues have a definite relationship in causality. Just
as charity and the other virtues-all accidents-may be compared as substance and accidents in Christian perfection, so in
the same context they may be likened to principal and in'strumental causes. The application is analogous but proper and
precise. 59
The precision of the analogy is more apparent with each
factor in the relationship to which it is applied. The production
of a common effect is certainly realized in the relationship of
charity and the other virtues. The common effect is Christian
59 De Ver., q.14, a. 5. Charity is said to be the instrument of grace in only an
improper sense. As an operative habit concerned with the nltimate end ·through
a union of love, charity is the primary created principle of meritorious action. Cf.
Salmanticenses, Curaus Theologicus (Paris, 1878), t. 12, p.

DOMINIC HUGHES

perfection itself. That perfection, like the eternal reward
toward which it is directed, is twofold. Just as the eternal
reward has an essential element, the beatific vision, and an
accidental, the aureolae and other accidental joys, so Christian
perfection has its essence in charity and its accidents in other
virtues. 6 ° For an increase in charity an act of that virtue
alone is sufficient as a proper, although meritorious, cause. An
affective act is sufficient for an augmentation in the essence of
Christian perfection and even in the eternal reward. Likewise,
an act of another virtue, fortitude, for example, is adequate as
a proper cause in an increase in both the accidents of Christian
perfection and those of heavenly life. When, however, the subordinate virtues function under charity, not in order to produce
an accidental effect but to produce an effect in the essence of
Christian perfection or the eternal reward, then they are operating as instruments of charity. The production of such a
substantial increase in Christian perfection cannot otherwise
be explained than through the analogy of the principal-instrumental causal relationship. The effect is common and the
result of a communion of action; only the role of the members
needs further explanation. Charity, then, is not only the substance of Christian perfection, it is the principal created cause
of completeness in Christ.
Charity's claim to the title of principal cause in Christian
perfection is well founded. In this " virtue of virtues " 61 are
realized all the characteristics for hegemony among meritorious
causes. There is no rival in rank of virtue or effective accomplishment in the whole realm of Christian living. An exposition of the characteristics of charity, therefore, is a sufficient
defense of charity's right to be considered Christian perfection's
principal cause.
In the meritorious production of a substantial increase in
Christian perfection, which is identical with an increase in
charity itself, charity does more than act as a proper or even
an exemplary cause. It is a principal cause. As a proper cause
80

81

Summa Theol., Suppl., q. 96, a. 1; de V er., q. 26, a. 6, ad 8.
II Sent., d.
q. 1, a. 4, ad 5.

THE DYNAMICS OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION

fl68

charity elicits acts of love sufficient of themselves for a merited
increase in perfection. As an exemplary cause, charity gives
the pattern of virtuous action for other virtues to approximate.
Charity as a principal cause, however, gives something of its
own power and purpose to other virtues, losing nothing of
itself and destroying nothing in them. They fulfill their own
functions, yet as instruments of charity, all the theological and
moral virtues attain a higher effect, i. e. meriting an increase
in the substance of Christian perfection itself.
The effect of the combined action of charity and the other
virtues, a merited increase in perfection, is more like charity
than any or all the other virtues. Merit depends upon two
factors: divine ordination and human willingness.62 , In both
of these charity is preeminent. Under the aspect of divine
ordination charity excels all its rivals. As an infused virtue,
it comes immediately from God in both its origin and its
increase. As a theological virtue, it is ordered in the direction
of the divine. Because it is in the will, it transcends the limitations of Faith as it goes out to God in Himself as the
Supreme Good. Through charity, then, as through no other
virtue, a man has a divine ordination fundamental to merit.
This "rapture" of charity, however, is at the same time most
·human. No act is more willingly done than an act of love.
Love has only to exist to be operative. Charity has for the
" new creature " in grace a supernatural spontaneity unequaled
by any virtue involving conceptual adjustments like faith or
corporeal organs like fortitude. Moreover, while all the other
virtues await the command of the will before they act, charity
and the will are wedded into one principle of action. Most
voluntary among men and most exalted before God, charity is
more closely united with merit than is any other virtue.
The intimate association between charity and merit is more
than a happy coincidence; it is a formal identity. Without
charity there can be no merit, and with every act of that
virtue some merit accrues to the soul. As an abiding quality
82

Summa Theol., q. 114, a. 4.

5

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DOMINIC HUGHES

of charity's earthly activity, merit is a permanent form in its
causality. Other virtues have merit as an essentially participated and passing modification of their proper acts, since the
merit of even faith and hope depends upon their being formed
by charity. Charity alone, therefore, possesses meritorious
causality as a permanent form, and its consequent jurisdiction
over merit is charity's first prerogative as the principal cause
in Christian perfection.
Although charity is the husbandman of substantial merit
among the virtues, it cannot prosper alone. For its own sake
as well as for the benefit of lesser virtues, charity must engage
in commerce of meritorious causality. In its various transactions, charity exchanges its own form, given in a transient
way, for the meritorious ministry of other virtues. To a lesser
degree all the virtues may assist one another. No one of them,
however, can gain the profit in merit that charity accepts as its
right. This dominative right is derived from the very object of
charity, the ultimate end of human life, eternal happiness. 63
Because of this elevated objective toward which charity tends,
it draws to itself all the other virtues, giving them at the same
time finality and effectiveness in merit by imparting to them
an instrumental form. 64
The form with which charity endows the other virtues supplements rather than supplants their proper form. Virtues
moved by charity remain essentially the same, but in their
activity in perfection they assume at least for a time a new
form from charity. 65 Transiently assumed, the instrumental
form in the lesser virtues is effective in meriting an increase in
the virtue of charity and the substance of Christian perfection.
Imparting a form to other virtues in the efficient order which
produces a substantial increase in perfection is another of the
prerogatives of a prinoipal cause, another of the unrivalled
rights of charity among the virtues.
The right of charity to move other ·virtues to its end has a
""Ibid.
•• De Caritate, a. 5, ad I.
•• Summa Theol., II-IT, q. 28, a. 8.

THE DYNAMICS OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION

265

parallel in the action of the will over the other faculties. Without destroying their own proper action, the will may move the
other faculties. 66 Even the intellect, superior to the will in
being, is subservient to it in motion. Like charity in the order
of supernatural virtues, the will holds its privileged position
among the faculties because of its object. 67 The will is not
concerned with any particular good but with the universal good
and end of human life. Since, then, the will and charity combine to form a single principle of supernatural operation,
charity, like the will itself, has all the forcefulness and all
the limitations of a secondary principal cause in Christian
perfection.
The extent and effectiveness. of the causality of charity
depend upon both the aptness of its instruments and the
intensity of charity's own act. Upon those virtuous actions
adaptable to its purpose, charity imparts a meritorious form
in proportion to the impulse of its own act. Because the form
is in the order of causality and not merely an association in
sanctifying grace, the modification imparted by charity binds
the virtues in a more purposive union. The supernatural virtues
of themselves have a sympathy of objects and a harmony of
functions, because they are rooted in sanctifying grace. Because, however, they are subordinatec:J.to charity, they have a
new driving force toward a single goal-meriting an increase
in Christian perfection. The amount of contribution of each
subordinate virtue depends not so much upon the perfection
of the virtue or even the degree of sanctifying grace in the soul
as upon the immediate impulse of charity in an act. A saintly
person, for example, acting on occasion with a remiss charity,
might p:reserve a virtue like temperance but he would not
have prospered as he should in meriting an increase in perfection. A more perfect person performing a more perfect act,
therefore, might not advance by that act as far as a less perfect
person with an act of a lesser virtue but moved at the moment
by a greater charity. The measure of merit is primarily the
intention and the intensity of the act of charity.
•• lb.id., I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 8; q. 81, a. 8.

•• Ibid., 1-11, q. 9, a. I; 11-11, q. 28, a. 8.

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DOMINIC HUGHES

The intention required of charity in its influence over other
virtues need not involve an actual intention. Since it is impossible for a human intellect in this life to keep God as the
Supreme Good in the forefront of consciousness at all times,
a constant actual intention is beyond human power. 68 A mere
habitual intention, on the other hand is not enough. Such an
intention once made and not retracted does not influence a
current series of actions. Habitual charity has not the notion
of principal cause about it, since no form of merit flows from
it to influence independent actions. That meritorious form of
charity is, however, transmitted through a virtual intention.
Less than an actual intention psychologically, since it is lacking
in conscious attention, the virtual intention is far more morally
than a mere habitual intention. From the moral influence of
a past act there perdures in a virtual intention a form sufficient
for many subsequent acts. Just as upon all the foreseen consequences, malice spreads its venom through. a virtual intention,
through a similar moral reality the intended beneficent effects
of charity feel the initial impulse of the charitable act. Through
a virtual intention, therefore, as well as in actual attention
charity may impose its form of merit upon an entire series of
subsequent actions per se subordinate to its influence. 69 The
length of the series and temporary deviations less than lethal
to charity do not destroy the continued flow of its influence
over all actions intended at the time of the original act of
charity. If, then, a man ordains himself and all things to God
by an act of charity, his subsequent acts share in the causality
and effectiveness of charity in meriting an increase in Christian
perfection.
The degree of intensity is not identical with the kind of
intention in either
or voluntary acts. Under a
virtual intention of charity an act may have more of the impulse of merit than under a remiss but actual intention. In an
act of religion the presence of an influence from charity may be
a matter of conscious effort, yet in the immediate resistance of
88

De Caritate, a.ll, ad 1.

•• De Ver., q. 26, a. 4.

THE DYNAMICS OF CIDUSTIAN PERFECTION

a temptation the meritorious force of charity may be more
intense. Intention and intensity, then, are distinct factors in
charity's causality.
As either an actual or virtual intention, the influence of
charity admits of degrees. 70 The rudimentary influence of
charity is toward a common and confused choice of God as the
ultimate end of all action. The commonness of such causality
of charity is. both in the scope of its influence and in the
frequency with which such a choice is found in Christian living.
Whenever charity comes to act for the first time, it involves a
dedication of all to God. The life of grace that comes down
from God rises upward again through acts of charity. The
confusion in the common choice of God as end of all actions
results from a lack in explicit experience in charity's meritorious causality. Yet in this weak beginning is the dynamic
movement toward perfection. The movement toward perfection under a beginner's charity is slow and irregular. Because'
the influence of charity is tenuous and imperfect, other virtues,
scarcely seem subordinate to it. Each virtue is apparently concerned with its own proper act rather than with the effect it
might produce in communion with charity. Beginners are more
concerned with virtuously avoiding sin than with progressing
perfection. Yet with a modicum of influence of charity's
causal form a minimum of merit is realized, and real progress
becomes something more than a possibility.
Somewhat more substantial and precise than the rudimentary
form is charity's second -degree of influence. In it charity is,
at least remotely, the reason that a thing is done rather than
not done. When charity motivates a man to
the vows of
religion, for example, it imposes its form. of meritorious causality upon all subsequent acts which are per se connected with
the vows. In the second degree of influence the chain of
causality from charity to the work done has fewer and stronger
links. The impelling power of charity leaves less to other

in

•• Goudin, Tractatus Theologicus, ed. 1874, Vol. II,' p. 415. These degrees of
charity are found between the minimum and maximum possible in this life according
to St. Thomas in Summa Theol., II-II, q. 184,

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impulses. Virtuous action is more unified. Since a man may
be sure that in other than a c-ounselled course of action he
might save his soul, he follows a more difficult way because of
a higher motive. His charity does not allow him to leave undone even what he need not do. In doing what is not of obligation by lesser norms, he gives evidence of a stronger influence
of charity upon his actions than if he were merely doing what
he must do to preserve his love for God. When the influence
of charity is thus felt upon actions, progress in perfection is
gathering momentum.
When in the movement toward perfection a quiet calm pervades every action, the influence of charity has reached its
third degree. Then charity lives in each act and seems to
accomplish of itself the tasks of the other virtues. Lesser
motives are not scorned neither are they scrutinized. Whatever is done is done for the love of God. Actual attention cannot be given to labelling every minor act with the stamp of
charity, but nothing escapes its formative influence in merit.
With frequently renewed acts of charity the soul is capable
of doing as much as it can in this life to make the meritorious
influence of charity constant and complete.
Whatever may be its intensity and completeness, the scope
of charity as a principal cause is limited by factors in Christian
life which are above, beyond or beneath its control. Beneath
the control of charity are those elements of human life over
which a man has little or no dominion. 71 AU his vegetative
functions and some of his fundamental sense reactions are not
under the control of his will and consequently escape the influence of charity. Because these actions of a man are less than
human, charity cannot at the same time make them apt instruments and elevate them to its purpose. Unlike God who by an
eternal and absolute power could raise up stones to praise Him,
charity has a permanent but participated power. It is a
secondary principal cause in meritorious action, and hence some
actions in a man's life are not instruments for its purpose and
are beneath its influence.
71

Summa Theol., I-II, q. 6, a. 1.

THE DYNAMICS OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION

Beyond the influence of charity, yet within the control of
the will, are all those truly human actions which ate sinful.
Such -sinful human actions as cohabit the realms of perfection
with charity are venial sins.72 Between these sins and charity
there is no commerce of causality. Venial sin has nothing to
offer charity to assist it in its progress, yet charity can suffer
no more than an interruption of its -action because of the
piracy of venial sin over the intention of the will. Charity, for
its part,_ cannot lend its form to an action which is deformed
however slightly. Deformity makes moral outlaws of even the
most voluntary of actions.
Ordinarily the human will and charity form a single principle
of action. At times, however, the naked and native will can
hold charity and the other virtues in abeyance. 78 In their dignified but ineffectual presence, the will may commit itself to
venial sins of injustice. The will can, moreover, relax its control
over the feral tendencies of the lower appetites. These sense
inclinations are of themselves sufficient to seek their own proper
objects, and released from the control of the will their acts
escape the influence of charity. Only when the will and the
sense appetite have been held in check in their first-parental
weakness for insubordination and led captive to charity, progress in Christian perfection is possible. Except by an extraordinary privilege, these interruptions to progress will not be
eliminated, but the more complete the control of charity the
more continuous is progress in perfection/ 4
Above the control of charity, yet free and meritorious, are
some of a Christian's most perfect actions. These actions
recognize no commanding power over them other than the Holy
Ghost, since they are actions which flow from His Gifts. These
Gifts of supernatural sanctification from the Holy Ghost are
coeval and concomitant with charity, but they are not subordinate to even charity's human and deliberative standards. 75
•• Ibid., q.
a: 5.
•• Ibid., q. 50, a. 1.
"' Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolomm, n. 888.
•• Summa Theol., I-II, q. 68, a. 5.

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DOMINIC HUGHES

Instead of being instruments of charity as the secondary principal cause in merit, they are the instruments of the direct
movement of the primary principal cause in perfebtion, the
Holy Ghost HiJnself. Their contribution to Christian life is
not a distincti'te kind of work, but an inimitable workmanship.76 What the' will may do badly and the virtues well, the
Gifts do best. While the virtues indicate the way and prepare
for an advance in
the Gifts sweep· the soul to its
accomplishment. There is certainly no· conflict between charity
and the Gifts, but rather a communion of an unusual kind.
Charity cannot command the Gifts, but they do not impede
its causality. Since an action of a Gift is frequently accompanied }>y, an action of the appropriate virtue, charity can
exercise ·its- :IDfluence concomitantly with the. instrumental
action of the Gift of the Holy Ghost. Subordinate to a Higher
Cause, the Gifts are never subversive of the activity of charity.
They are coordinate with charity rather than subordinated to
it in the meritorious process which is progress in Christian
perfection.
Despite actions above, beyond and beneath charity, the best
sign of charity is the scope of its influence. Charity itself, as
a principal cause, cannot be the sign of the presence of other
virtues. They, however, can indicate both its presence and its
causality. Since they may receive a transient form of charity
and pass it on to the effect, the virtues stand mid-way between
the hidden principal cause and its effect. In all and each of
the instruments of charity, then, is the form that will indicate
their own instrumental action and the causality of the principal
cause in Christian perfection.

4. The orderly effectiveness of charity as principal cause.
Charity is never chaotic. Neither the objects it loves nor
the instruments it uses are in confusion. Both, on the contrary,
are arranged in well-defined hierarchies. Just as the objects
of charity have their own proper order, so the instruments of
•• Ibid., a. !!, ad 1.

THE DYNAMICS OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION

charity are disposed one after another according to their proximity to the principle of merit, charity itself. Furthermore, the
objects of charity in this life have not one but two principles
of their order. One is proximity to God; the other is closeness
to the one loving. 77 Likewise, the instruments of charity,
which exist as such only in this life, have a multiple principle
of arrangement in their service to charity.
The primary basis for distinction among the instruments
of charity lies in the difference between instruments which
attain the full effect of charity through merit and those which
do not. Even those factors of Christian life which do not
reproduce the full effect of charity contribute materially to its
reproduction and are in an extended sense its instruments in
merit. Emotions and external goods, for example, as something less than human actions, cannot bear the title of merit
except in a secondary sense. 78 Their contribution to merit is
of a much lower order than that of virtuous actions, but under
the impulse of charity they have an effect higher than one
properly theirs. Without the material subministration of emotions and external goods many acts of the moral virtues and
consequently of charity would be impossible. By a unity of
order the very least factors in Christian life, external goods,
can share in. the instrumentality of the moral Virtues under
charity. They do not attain the full effect of the principal
cause in any formal way, but they are as much a part of merit
as the artist's brush is a contributing factor in his artistry.
In their causality they remain subordinate to human and virtuous actions which attain the full effect of charity in merit.
Virtuous action itself does not attain the full effect of charity
through meritorious causality in a single uniform way. Upon
the diversity of manner in meriting under charity the second
hierarchy of charity's instruments is founded. In this hierarchy the supernatural and infused virtues precede the natural
and acquired. Among the infused virtues the theological virtues
Ibid., II-II, q. 26, a. 4, ad 1; a. 7, adS.
•• De Ver., q. 26, a. 6.

77

DOMINIC HUGHES

hold first place and the moral virtues are secondaryo 79 The
former are of themselves more intimately associated in the work
of Christian perfection than are the lattero Although any
virtue may be meritorious under the impulse of charity, the
theological virtues are most apt as instruments in attaining
the end of charityo They themselves are concerned in a lesser
way with the same object, God Himselt The more closely,
therefore, a virtue is associated with the ultimate end of human
life, the higher is its place in the hierarchy of virtuous instruments under charityo
The primacy of the supernatural virtues in the instrumental
causality of charity cannot be questioned. They are of the
common stock of graces infused with charity. Each infused
virtue has an intrinsic independence, but for its perfection in
tending to the common end of the Christian life each virtue
depends upon charityo The theological virtue of faith, for
example, can exist in a soul without charity, but it cannot
reach its complete perfection as virtue without sharing a form
by
from charityo 80 The infused moral virtues are
charity in much the same way. Charity does not make them
what they are, but what they do is worthless in the way of
salvation without the " virtue of virtues." In all the infused
virtues, therefore, charity is intrinsic not to their natures but
to their perfection even as virtues.
The natural virtues, on the other hand, have what they have
of virtue and perfection even without charity. Their objective
is limited but they have it of themselves. The imperfect perfection of the acquired virtues is, however, the lowest grade of
instrumental aptness in charity's causality in Christian perfection. In a Christian soul, the acquired virtues function in
and through the infused virtues,S 1 and through these latter
the acquired virtues obtain a share in the impulse of merit
initiated by charityo In this way charity enters into the perthe
fection of the act of the acquired virtue by :raising it
•• Summa Theol., I-II, q. 6!1!, 11. !i!.
80 Ibid., II-II, q. 4, II. 3.
81 De Virtutibus,
10, ad 4.

THE DYNAMICS OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION

supernatural order, but it does not enter into the perfection of
virtue as such, as it does in the case of the infused virtues.
Among the infused virtues as instruments of charity the
theological virtues hold first place. The theological virtues of
faith and hope have as their proper function the immediate
ordering of the soul to God. They prepare the soul for the
supernatural friendship of charity, and they are the means of
fostering a constant communication between God and the
Christjan soul.82 This proper action they have and maintain of
themselves. From charity they receive the instrumental function of effectively meriting an increase in the substance of
Christian perfection itself.
The moral virtues hold a secondary place among the infused
virtues because they perfect a soul relative to things other than
God. 83 They are concerned with the needs and tendencies of
the human composite. Temperance and fortitude give man
possession of himself, so that he may give himself more completely to God. Justice establishes a right order among human
actions, some of which are referred to God through the virtue
of religion. The moral virtues, therefore, are related to divine
friendship not as direct dispositions but as removing obstacles.
In removing the obstacles to charity, the moral virtues under
the impulse of that " virtue of virtues " merit not only an
increase in their own proper perfection but in the substance
of Christian perfection itself.
Christian perfection in its meritorious increase admits of a
variety of instruments. Some of these instruments merely
minister materially to other instruments which attain the full
effect of the principal cause, others attain that effect directly.
Among those instruments which attain the full effect of the
principal cause there are natural instruments and supernatural.
Of these latter some pertain directly to the relationship between the soul and God, others merely remove obstacles to
that relationship. All these instruments function in a marvelous harmony under the " bond of perfection." They are
•• Summa Theol., I-II, q. 65, a. 5.

88

Ibid., q. 62, a. 2; q. 68, a. 8, ad 2.

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DOMINIC HUGHES

united together, and together unite the soul to God. In that
unity of personal perfection and union with the Principle of
perfection, charity is the cohesive force and principal cause.
Charity does not, however, attain its full effect in composite
human nature without a noteworthy contribution from each of
its instruments, especially the moral and theological virtues.
Union with God is both an instrumental and a proper function of the theological virtues. Through faith the soul assents
to God as the Primal Truth. 84 In hope He is the Almighty and
Merciful Helper. 85 These proper actions of the virtues of faith
and hope are presupposed to their instrumental function under
charity. With charity faith and hope rise to an even higher
type of union with God, a union through love. 86 In this union
the soul attains God as He is in Himself, not as He is through
some relationship to created reality. In thus uniting the soul
and faith and hope with God, charity is both a proper and a
principal cause.
As a proper cause charity establishes and fosters the union
of love. 87 As a principal cause charity employs other virtues
in increasing that same union. 88 The instruments share transiently in a form permanent in charity, which effebts the union of
love. Without destroying their proper mode of union with God,
therefore, charity elevates even the theological virtues to the
higher effect of a meritorious intensification of the union
through love. In that uniQn and in its relationship with charity,
however, faith and hope have distinct proper activity dispositive to their common instrumental action under charity.

5. The theological virtues as instruments of charity.
In both· its instrumental activity and its act as an instrument
faith is related to charity. Faith retains its specific form independent of any association with charity, but by its specific form
alone faith is not an apt instrument of charity. 89 Even in a soul
Ibid., IT-II, a. 1, a. 1.
Ibid., q. 'J.7, a. I.
•• Ibid., q. 28, a. 6.

Ibid., q. 24, a. 6, ad 1.
III Sent., d. 80, a. 5.
89 Summa Tkeol., II-II, q. 4, a. 4, ad 1; a. 5, ad 8.

8'

87

85

88

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275

in mortal sin the specific form of faith need not be destroyed.
Yet such faith without the formation given to it by charity is
not disposed to assist charity, since charity is no longer extant
in the soul. The formed faith of a person in the state of grace,
however, is suitable to the purpose of charity. 90 The formation
of faith through charity, therefore, while it is not essential to
the notion of faith as such, is essential to its function as an
instrument producing its proper effect of a perfectly virtuous
union with God.
Since a faith not formed by charity is totally incompatible
with charity, faith must be first fashioned by the "virtue of
virtues " as an apt instrument before it can be receptive to
the instrumental form of meriting an increase in charity itself.
Faith, then, :receives a form from charity for two purposes; one
is for assent, the other is for use.
Because of the formation from charity in assent faith itself
is perfected. What would be merely a matter of free-will and
an unformed supernatural virtue is a matter of merit when faith
is formed in the very act of assent by charity. In its assent to
revealed truths without intrinsic evidence faith differs from
science, and its essential characteristic is established. 91 Yet a
difference eventually more meaningful exists between a faith
whose act is meritorious and one whose act is not-between an
act whose assent is governed by a free-will motivated by charity
and one which is not.
Besides the perfection given by charity to faith in the act
of assent, there is another formation given to faith for its
function in instrumental causality. This is the use to which
charity orders faith. In the matter of use under charity, faith
and science are similar. 92 In science the assent to truth is not
subject to free-will, but the actual consideration of what a man
knows may be. He may consider it or not as he chooses. If
his soul is elevated to the supernatural level and his action of
considering scientific truth is motivated by charity, that action
is meritorious. Likewise, in the case of faith, charity, over and
•• Ibid., q. 2, a. 1.

91

Ibid., a. 9, ad 2.

92

Ibid.

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DOMINIC HUGHES

above its formation in perfecting assent, commands acts of
faith which will increase charity itself. Under the aspect of
assent, therefore, charity gives a formation to faith that perfects
faith, under the additional aspect of instrumental usage for
the greater perfection of charity itself.
In faith, three so-called forms must be distinguished and
ordered one to another. The primary and essential form of
faith is independent of charity and belongs to the order of
formal causality. In the order of final causality toward faith's
own end, charity adds a form to assent that makes that assent
meritorious. In the order of efficient causality, which is at the
same time final causality for charity, the " virtue of virtues "
adds a third instrumental form in a transient way. The third
form is extant and effective just so long as charity under an
actual or virtual intention moves the act of faith. The second
form of faith remains so long as there is grace and the habit
of charity in the soul. The primary form of faith is destroyed
only by an action contrary to faith itself. These three formalities remain distinct but inseparable in any act of faith
which is instrumental under charity in meriting an increase
in the substance of Christian perfection.
When charity adds a third form to faith, already formed in
its essence and fashioned to perfection, it is not merely ornamenting the act of faith with an extrinsic assistance. Rather
it elevates the proper act of faith to a new effect. Extrinsic
assistance would be merely an application of faith to its own
act, whereas the third form given by charity raises faith to an
instrumental contribution to a ·higher union with God. Nor
is the third formation of faith merely an obediential potency,
which indicates a non-repugnance to act but no actual functioning. Rather charity gives faith a form in the efficient order
which is just as real as the form it imposes upon faith in the
final order.
The reality and interrelation of the forms of faith given by
charity may be illustrated by two examples. 93 A person who,
•• Gonet, Clypeus theologiae thomisticae (Paris, 1876), Vol. IV, n. 167.

THE DYNAMICS OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION

'1.77

with attrition, received the Sacrament of Penance would have
had faith and by the Sacrament would receive the habit of
charity, together with its habitual formation of faith. Should
that person elicit an act of faith before an act of charity-a
conceivable hypothesis-he would have merit of assent without merit of use. His act of faith would deserve a reward, but
it would be an accidental reward, not the essential reward of
the beatific vision. Should he die with only this one postconfessional act, he would receive the essential reward of
heaven as an inheritance from the merits of Christ, not from
his own personal activity. His act of faith would attain its
proper effect of an accidental reward, but it would not have
obtained for him the essence of heavenly life, the beatific vision.
Unless an act of charity, and not merely the habit, were pre.supposed, which would be contrary to the hypothesis, the act
of faith would lack the additional meritorious form by which
it might be instrumental to charity.
In much the same way, but to a lesser degree, a person who
acted from an intense and formed faith but moved by a remiss
charity would give evidence of the distinction between the formation ·for assent and the formation f,.r use. He would obtain
a greater increase of faith than he would of charity. If, on the
other hand, a person of weak faith were to act from the full
fervor of his act of charity, he would gain the primary effect of
his act in the union of charity and an increase of faith only as
a consequence of the interrelation of the virtues.
The essence of faith is distinct from the meritorious assent of
faith, and this latter from the instrumental use of faith, but in
proportion to its perfection in its proper act, faith becomes more
and more apt as an instrument of charity. The more intense
and willing is the assent of faith, the more facilely can charity
use it to gain an increase in the substance of perfection. The
greater the extent of the objects to which faith gives explicit
assent the more charity has an opportunity to turning these
acts to its own profit.
If, in tum, faith uses subordinate instruments to extend the
meaningfulness of its explicit acts and to intensify them, the

DOMINIC HUGHES

merit of faith is augmented rather than diminished. 94 Faith
may use human reason and sense observations for probable or
defensive arguments. Because these arguments are not antecedent but subsequent to the assent of faith they do not form
faith but rather are informed by faith itself. When a person
with charity uses both faith and human reason for a more
fruitful understanding of faith, therefore, he does not diminish
the merit of his faith but merits an increase in both faith and
charity.
In its subordination to faith all reality may be the instrument
of charity in meriting an increase in Christian perfection. Other
virtues have a limited subject matter, but faith falls upon the
testimony of the First Truth which it may corroborate with
any number of created truths. The artistic arrangement of the
universe impresses upon the intellect illumined by faith an
appreciation of the wisdom of God. The volcanic and oceanic
force in nature leaves no doubt of the power of God. Every
goodness and thing of beauty gives evidence of the Font of all
goodness. Every consideration of created reality may contribute to the aptness of faith as an instrument of charity. Knowing creatures, a man may know God more; loving God more, he
may use creatures to increase that love through the causality
of his charity and the instrumentality of his faith.
Like faith, hope is intimately united yet instrumentally subordinate to charity. Like faith, too, hope has its own specific
supernatural chapter independent of charity. In the gradual
realization or reestablishment of Divine Friendship a soul may
hope before it loves.95 Its hope, however, is helpless. Unless
charity contribute its perfection of finality to hope, as it does
to faith, hope is lacking in the perfection of virtue. 96 Hope
which excludes charity operates on the basis of God's power
and mercy, but hope which includes in its perfection a form
from charity relies as well upon the justice of God and previous
personal merits. In this latter case, God is a Friend inspiring
•• Summa Theol., II-II, q. 9!, a. 10, ad 8.
•• Ibid., I-II, q. 62, a. 4; II-II, q. 17, a. 8.
96 Ibid., ad 9!.

THE. DYNAMICS OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION

279

confidence in His power and mercyo The self-regarding love of
such a friendship is the proper act of formed hopeo In that act,
formed hope is an apt instrument of charity o
The proper act of hope as an instrument of charity depends
upon another past or presupposed act of charityo 91 Just as the
use of faith presupposes the assent of faith through charity, so
the use of hope is consequent upon acts of charity formative of
the perfection of hopeo The merits of charity are the basis of
a formed- hope, just as the imperfect love of an unformed hope
may have been the beginning of charity's perfect love. Charity
is thus ordered to hope as one effect to another, while hope is
ordered to charity as one motive to another, just as the state
and the individual are alternatively ordered to one anothero
Hope, therefore, depends for the fullness of its proper act upon
charity, since the latter must have produced its effect of merit,
if the former is to have its proper act as a formed and apt
instrumento
The instrumental act of hope in meriting an increase in
charity itself is obviously dependent upon the exercise
" virtue of virtues " in its dominion over hopeo Charity gives
in the efficient order a new form to hope by which it may
merit an increase in the substance of Christian perfectiono
Charity is constrained to communicate its causality to hope if
it wishes to increase its own perfection through an act of confidence in a helpful Divine Friend. Hope, therefore, has an
instrumental action under charity by which it :reaches to a
higher effect than is properly its own. Hope in this way attains
to the highest effect of virtue, a union with God through love,
Hope, however, is not so united with God either in its proper
or instrumental action that it excludes every reliance upon men
or temporal things as its inst:ruments. 98 ·Hoping in the intercession of the saints, for example, strengthens confidence in
Godo Under the impulse of charity, this same act of hope is
instrumental in meriting an increase in charity itself. Likewise,
a fervent act of charity can impel a firm and formed hope to
97

Ibid., ad 3.

6

98

Ibid., a. 5.

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DOMINIC HUGHES

use such a material object as a crucifix to increase both hope
and charity. These material instruments are one with hope
by a unity of order in their instrumentality under charity.
The· instrumentality of faith and hope in Christian perfection is intimately and intricately joined with the principal
causality of charity. As supernatural virtues tending to a
supernatural end, faith and hope depend for their formation
as instruments upon the perfecting power of charity. As
theological virtues, they are the closest approximation of union
with God through love. In faith and hope, therefore, charity
finds closest at hand its most apt instrument in meriting an
increase in the substance of perfection.
The substance of perfection however, is properly human as
well as theologically ordered. Charity cannot be content to
attempt a union with God through love, unless ·at the same
time it unifies the various factors of the human composite and
uses them to its purpose. Charity, therefore, can-and at times
must-employ instruments other than the theological virtues
in its advance to perfection. These instruments will have as the
object of their proper act something other than God but they
will be the means of :removing the obstacles to the way toward
God. The instruments which remove obstacles as their proper
act and increase charity through an instrumental act are the
moral virtues.
6. The moral virtues as instruments of charity.
The moral virtues are more than ornaments in Christian
perfection. They are integral complements to its substance
and instrumental in its increase. Because of the composite
nature of human life, perfection in Christian living, which is
properly human, cannot be attained by a single act or even
by a series of the same kind of acts. Maturity for men in either
the natural or the supernatural order demands a multiplicity
of actions. Unlike the angels, who merited the beatific vision
by a single act, men have a longer way to heaven. 99 Their
•• Ibid., q.

a. 5.

THE DYNAMICS OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION

281

meritorious progress is made and measured by all the actions
proper to composite human nature.
In his progress toward perfection a man's personal and
social activities are incalculable, and even the intrinsic principles of those actions are irreducibly many. From his intellect's practical judgment comes his command of what might
best be done in each situation. Through acts of his will he
establishes a relationship to others. By his concupiscible appetite he ingurgitates sense goods, and by his irascible appetite
he wards off or conquers evils. All of these principles of action
are operative almost constantly throughout any human life.
When a man acts not from the naked power of doing one or
another of the actions to be expected in human life but acts
with a fixed modification toward moral good, then he not only
lives as a human being but grows as a child of God. In that
growth repeated acts of affection for God are not enough. In
each of the potencies which are principles of human acts a man
must have the modification of moral virtues. Without them the
faculties of a man cannot be unified in action, and the man
himself cannot attain union with God, especially the union of
love.
The union of love, which is. the effect of charity, demands
that all the faculties of man be perfected with moral virtues,
because charity as a principal cause must .use those virtues as
its instruments. If charity were perfect in itself and the potencies it used as instruments were not perfected by moral virtues,
the causality of charity would be impeded. 101 Unless the instruments are well disposed by virtues, charity cannot use them
to merit an increase in its own perfection. When, however,
the various faculties of a man are disposed by the moral virtues, the way of charity is made easy and every human action
can contribute to a meritorious increase in Christian perfection.
The ministry of the moral virtues to charity's causality in
Christian perfection depends upon three cardinal points: their
concurrence in a common effect with charity, their own presupposed proper and dispositive activity, and their reception
100

Ibid., I-II, q. 65, a. 8, ad I.

101

De Caritate, a. 5.

DOMINIC HUGHES

of a new form from charity whic4 elevates them and applies
them to act toward a union of love.
That the moral virtues attain the same generic effect as
charity is beyond cavil. 102 Their acts are assuredly meritorious.
God rewards not only acts of love but other acts as well. The
reward given, however, is distinct from the reward proper to
charity. 108 In the distinctive reward of the moral virtues two
factors are involved. One is proper to the act itself; the other
is participated from charity. The ultimate heavenly reward for
charity is the essential happiness of heaven, for the moral
virtues an appropriate return is an accidental joy. The aureola
of a martyr or a virgin, for example, is a tribute to an outstanding victory in the order of moral virtue; it is not a reward
for the whole warfare of ·life. The accidental reward cannot
exist without the essential reward, however, any more than the
infused moral virtues can be present in the soul without charity.
The virtues and their respective rewards are distinct but not
separable.
Inseparably rooted in grace, charity and the moral virtues
admit of a variety of differences in their activities and effects.
One man might suffer martyrdom with a minimum of torture
but a maximum of charity. Another might suffer great torture
with a weak charity. The latter would gain a greater accidental
reward for his martyrdom, because of the exercise of the virtue
of fortitude. The former would not have such a lustrous aureola, but his appreciation of the beatific vision would be intensified.104 In each case the causality of charity is present. In the
case of the more severe martyrdom, however, charity has more
the function of lending extrinsic assistance by applying a moral
virtue to its proper act. In the less severe but more lovingly
endured martyrdom charity is a principal cause employing
the virtue of fortitude, as it might any other moral virtue, to
merit an increase in charity itself. Among the various saints,
therefore, rewards are distributed according to their virtuous
Ill Sent., d. 80, a. 5; Denzinger, op. cit., n. 1405.
Summa Theol., Suppl. q. 96, a. 1.
10 ' De V er., q. 26, a. 6, ad 8; Summa Theol., Suppl., q. 96, a. 18.
102
108

THE DYNAMICS OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION

288

activity on earth. The least willing of martyrs may gain a
greater accidental reward than the most devoted of confessors.
The latter, however, may merit more of an essential reward. In
him charity functions most perfectly as a principal cause, using
the moral virtues to produce an effect that is not proper to any
moral virtue but common to all virtues impelled by charity, an
increase in the essential reward of heaven.
As it is in heaven so it is on earth in the matter of rewards
for meritorious acts. An intensification of their own perfection
is the proper effect of each of the moral virtues. All, however,
contribute to the common effect of a meritorious increase in the
substance of Christian perfection. Under the influence of at
least a remote and virtual act of the love of God, the moral
virtues attain an effect higher than anything they might accomplish of themselves. Patience, for example, is meritoriously
self-perpetuating, but impelled by charity it contributes to the
perfection of all Christian living. This effect the moral virtues
have in common with charity and because of the influence
of that" virtue of virtues." Charity, therefore, not only applies
the moral virtues to their own act, it elevates them to a higher
unity among themselves and even to a union with God.
In the production of a common effect under the causality
of charity, the moral virtues, whether infused or acquired, lose
nothing of their proper formalities or functions. On the contrary, the proper and dispositive activity of each of the moral
virtues is presupposed to its being elevated to a higher ministry
by charity. In addition the specific difference between the
acquired and the infused virtues gives to each a distinctive
function under the impulse of charity.
The acquired virtues have as their regulative norm the
standards of natural reason. They are concerned with the good
of human society. Nothing in excess or defect of the balance
for individual or social living is compatible with the natural
habits which make a man good and his work good also. The
acquired virtue of temperance demands that nothing should be
done which would impair the health of the body or impede the
use of reason. Normality and equilibrium are the motives and

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DOMINIC HUGHES

accomplishments of the acquired virtues. They are the shreds
of decency of a man in mortal sin. Even for a person in the state
of grace, the acquired virtues have a formally distinct function,
inferior and subordinate to their correlative principles in the
supernatural order.
In the order above nature God is no less provident than in
the natural order. Each faculty and each morally distinct task
has its appropriate virtue. Not only because they are given by
God rather than acquired by repeated human acts, but because
they have distinct objectives and norms, the infused moral
virtues differ from the acquired virtues. In infused temperance,
for example, a man is concerned with more than preserving
his body from harmful excesses. He chastises his body and
brings it into subjection for motives unintelligible to purely
natural judgments. What is essential to an infused virtue is
superfluous and supererogatory to the acquired. Materially
they are the same, since each of the correlative virtues in either
order deals with the same object. Yet formally they are quite
di:fferenL105 These differences distinguish their contribution to
the causality of charity.
The formality of either the infused or the acquired virtues,
upon which their ministry to charity is based, has each its
relative importance. 106 The acquired virtues excel the infused
under one aspect, and the infused virtues cannot be approximated by the acquired under another aspect. Control is the
hall-mark of the acquired virtues, consistency of the infused.
Because of the laborious process through which a man must go
to acquire a moral virtue, once he has it, he has better control
than if the attainment of virtue were easy. His acquired virtue,
then, is capable of subduing unruly passions, of dominating the
inclinations of concupiscence or of timidity. In this regard, the
infused virtue may be somewhat deficient. God-given with the
presence or return of charity, the infused virtues have little
dominance over contrary dispositions on the part of the appetite. The ease and delight of action that are properties of
105

De Virtutibus, a. 10, ad 8"

106

Ibid., ad 14.

THE DYNAMICS OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION

285

virtues may be minimized for the infused virtues because of
the recalcitrance of the untamed appetites. In the consistency
of their operation, however, the infused virtues are superior to
the acquired. No single seriously sinful act is compatible with
any of the infused virtues, but it may be with the acquired.
Neither type of virtue can be the proper cause of sins contrary to its nature, but only the infused find sin so abhorrent
that they cannot exist in the same souL The acquired virtue
of justice, for example, may continue to exist in a soul despite
one or several lapses into serious injustices. In this compatibility with its contrary there is a certain inconsistency on the
part of the acquired virtues which is not found in the infused.
Both the control of the acquired virtues and the consistency of
the infused are, however, valuable as proper dispositive effects
of the instruments of charity.
The dispositive effect of an instrument which results from its
own proper action is directed either to the objects or to the
mode of operating. In the instrumentality of the moral virtues
under the principal causality of charity in Christian perfection,
the objects are the obstacles impeding the facile use of all of
a man's faculties for the expression and increase of charity. The
mode of operating is a supernatural concern for something other
than God. When, therefore, charity's causality involves a
supernatural concern for the obstacles to perfection, the moral
virtues make a contribution to its effectiveness.
In warning charity that many moral actions are incompatible
with the love of God, the infused moral virtues modify the
causality of charity. They make of it a principal rather than
merely a proper cause of perfection. Since they draw attention to their own objects as possible sources of perfecting the
whole of composite human nature, they place before charity a
concern for something other than affective acts toward God.
Because they are themselves supernatural they condition the
supernatural activity without straining it to artificial lengths.
The contribution of the proper activity of the infused moral
virtues, then, is to modify the activity of charity rather than
place a disposition in the object.

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DOMINIC HUGHES

For a disposition in the object-the obstacles to perfectionnothing more or less is effective than the acquired moral virtues.
Their dominance and control over the faculties disposes even
the most self-seeking of appetites to docile acceptance of the
sweet yoke of charity. Faculties which as a result of original
or personal sins might be obstacles to the causality of charity
are, because of the proper act of the acquired moral virtues,
fashioned into instruments. The acquired virtues, therefore,
while they may not directly move charity to its effect, are
dispositions to that effect inasmuch as they remove obstacles
to its fulfillment.
Of the two dispositions, that of the infused virtues is more
necessary than that of the acquired. 107 Without the intervention of the infused virtues the acts of the acquired virtues would
be in no way meritorious and in no way tributary to the effect
of charity. Without the acquired virtues, the infused virtues
would still be instrumental to charity. The acquired virtue is
of such an inferior order that it is not apt for the influence of
charity, unless the superior instrumentality of the infused virtue intervene. The infused virtue is adequate to its task of
channeling the causality of charity even if there are still indispositions remaining in the object because of the lack of the
acquired virtues. 108
When both the infused and the acquired moral virtues are
present and operative in the soul, charity has apt instruments
for its work. The action proper to its instruments is then
presupposed, the new form of instrumental action is possible.
This new form charity willingly and abundantly imparts. The
instrumental form, however, is given to the moral virtues only
transiently, that is, so long as they are moved by charity. Of
themselves they are utterly impotent in directly meriting an
intensification of the union of love between God and the soul.
They attain this meritorious activity .only when elevated and
applied to act by charity, and they contribute to the increase
in perfection in precisely the degree in which they are impelled
107

Ibid., ad 4.

108

Ibid.; de Caritate, a. 5, ad 7; ad 9.

THE DYNAMICS OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION

287

by charity. In the case of a man with the habit of charity but
not acts of that virtue-through the Sacrament of Penancean act of the moral virtues would gain an increase in the intensity of the particular moral virtue practised but there would
be no intensification of charity itself. The impulse of charity
effectively informing the acts of the moral virtues, therefore,
elevates without destroying the moral virtues to acts which
merit an increase in the substance of Christian perfection.
The moral virtues joined with the theological virtues are
instruments of charity. Each and all of them have the qualifications required of instruments, just as charity possesses what
is expected of a principal cause. Without the moral and theological virtues charity cannot fulfill its role as principal cause,
and without charity the moral virtues are limited and the
theological virtues lifeless. The common effect to be produceda meritorious increase in Christian perfection-cannot be fully
realized unless the subordinate virtues are present and aptly
instrumental. Charity, however, is not ordered to the mere
activation of moral or even theological virtues/ 09 Charity is
the end as well as the active principle of action, and it is not
subordinated to its own instruments. They, on the other hand,
are subordinated to charity for their own sublimation. In
union with charity, the moral and theological virtues attain a
new union with God. The moral virtues remove the obstacles
to that union, and the theological virtues dispose directly to
divine friendship. They are, therefore, apt instruments to
charity's principal causality in meriting an increase of the substance of Christian perfection.

7. Conclusion.
Christian perfection as a growth to maturity in Christ involves both fixed stages and intermittent progress. In the
classic parallel of the relationship of substance and accidents
the static relationship of charity and the other integrating
virtues finds sufficient and solid explanation. For the dynamic
100

II Sent., d. 88, q. 1, ad 5.

DOMINIC HUGHES

interplay between charity and the theological and moral virtues, however, only the analogy of the relationship in principalinstrumental causality is adequate. The progress and the
pauses in the development toward perfection depends primarily
upon the ebb and flow of the vital fervor of charity. Secondarily, the conjoined ministry of th,e other virtues dynamically
integrates all the subordinate factors in the human composite.
In the analysis of both of these analogies many adjacent
considerations clamor for attention. They cannot be heard,
however, until the fundamental appeal of the dynamic analogy
between the relationship of principal-instrumental causality
and the respective roles of charity and the other virtues in
Christian perfection is recognized. Through the acceptance of
a new dynamic analogy, as for so long through the classic
static one, a theological candle may be lighted. A beginning
may be made toward another understanding of St. Thomas's
meaning in applying the word " principally " to charity and
"secondarily" to the other virtues in Christian perfection. 110
Through St. Thomas then, another advance may be made
toward an appreciation and realization of our Heavenly
Father's covenant and Christ's command: "You, therefore,
are to be perfect, even as your Heavenly Father is perfect. 111
DOMINIC HUGHES,

Providence College
Providence, R.I.

110
111

Summa Theol., 11-11, q.184, a.l.
Matthew 5 : 48.

0. P.

THE HISTORICAL OPPORTUNITY OF
ORTHODOXY

I

I.

T is only through the exercise of the intellect that we can
be capable of moral responsibility. Unlike Socrates, a
Christian or a Jew cannot say that knowledge itself will
ma.ke him virtuous. But he can say that, without knowledge,
he is incapable of virtue. Christopher Dawson, in a memorable
passage, has put the matter succinctly:

For St. Thomas . . . the active intelligence is the very essence
of the soul and the root of human responsibility and liberty. 'For
if,' he writes, ' the active intelligence is a substance outside man,
the whole of man's activity depends on an extrinsic principle. Man
then will not be a free agent but will be acted upon by another,
and so he will not be the master of his own acts nor deserve praise
or blame; and the whole of moral science and of social science will
perish .. .' 1
These are essential words for the orthodox position: " the
active intelligence is the very essence of the soul and the root
of human responsibility and liberty."
The nature of the opportunity that orthodoxy meets in the
contemporary world is contained in these words, for orthodoxy
has claimed to be the guardian of the active intelligence.
By orthodoxy we mean the tradition of the Universal Church,
its principles and teachings. By tradition much more is meant
than a Platonic archetype. Tradition is universal; but it is
also individuated. It is existential and individuated in a concrete historic setting. The individual human person must often
apply principles to unique situations on the basis of his conscience and judgment. In this sense, individual persons (St.
Joan of Arc, St. Thomas More) are often historically ahead of
1

Medieval Religion (New York, 1934), p. 78.

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WILLIAM. J. GRACE

the pronouncements of the Church, and by their very lives help
to unfold its dogma and make it explicit. Nothing is more
opposed to orthodox tradition than the concept that reliance
on authority absolves us from the incessant responsibility for
the employment of the active intelligence.
The active intelligence is a paramount need in our historical
setting, for we have a society in which activity is placed above
contemplation, means above end. The pragmatic value degrades all values. Pragmatism makes us blind to being. We
can no longer see, we can no longer love. We cannot even judge
the things we make. We hate excellence, because excellence
does not pay. Because it does not pay, it is no longer excellent.
The hornme moyen, the least common denominator of our
economic society does not want excellence. He wants mediocrity; it gives him a greater sense of security. Finally, pragmatically, mediocrity becomes, is, excellence. Excellence in
the true sense is alien, the foreigner; it is Kafka's stranger,
T. S. Eliot's "An Unidentified Guest" in The Cocktail Party.
If we live up to the responsibility of our intelligence today, the
way of the cross is assured on that basis alone. Yet the increasing focus on those who see being and those who only see use
makes orthodoxy seem not only much more dramatic (witness
Merton's book) to the world, but much more real and valid.
I propose briefly to outline the opportunity that is presented
to an actively intelligent orthodoxy; secondly, to outline what
I believe are ideological influences, affecting the orthodox, and
hindering the presentation of the orthodox position to the
world; thirdly, to outline the powerful resources that orthodoxy
possesses.
The opportunity for orthodoxy today is indirectly related to
the loss of an adequate integrating principle in contemporary
life, due to a series of intellectual divorces increasing in effect
since the Middle Ages. In a disintegrating social picture,
orthodoxy has an attractiveness as a polarity, viewed purely
on the natural plane, even without reference to its supernatural
claims. Orthodoxy, in this sense of a complex of moral and
social values, embraces the main stream of the Judaic-Christian

THE HISTORICAL

OPPORTUNITY

OF ORTHODOXY

291

tradition, and the spring that is its source-its theological
foundations. In the more specific orthodoxy accepts Christian
revelation as substantial historical truth. 2
The opportunity of orthodoxy today is directly to be found
in the fact that this is an age of revolutions, and, when not
artificially frustrated, orthodoxy is a revolutionary doctrine.
Christ in His life and teaching is as radical as the planets that
swing in heaven, the surge of oceans, as love, as bread, as death;
so lacking in class consciousness that He became human in a
particularly helpless way in the Incarnation. Orthodoxy in its
true nature is a dynamic, awakening force, positive, as full of
life and flame as the Holy Ghost, intolerant of mediocrity, in
love with sincerity and :resistlessly passionate. It is the most
revolutionary of forces. It is a personal revolution and a revolution of persons, rather than of slogans and simplified ideas,
of impersonal mass social controls.
Space does not permit an analysis of the various causes that
have led to the present era of revolutions. 3 But it might well
be argued that contemporary revolutions have been distinguished by a singular negativism. They have not sprung from
positive energy, from optimism about the nature of man and
about the possibilities of justice, but rather from protest. There
has been so long a historical process of dehumanization that
there is blind insistence on security, even on bread and circuses,
at the cost of certain transcendent motivations that inspired
the great historical revolutions of the past. The Nazi and
Communist Revolutions were rather different from the French
2
It is well to think of the Church in the most inclusive sense as comprising
all men of good will. A man of good will does not '' become " a Catholic so much
as he joins the " visible fellowship of the Church." He is already a Catholic in
so far as he belongs to the " soul " of the Church. The " soul·" of the Church is
a reality, not a mere rhetorical expression.
3
It is an unfortunate semantic practice to think of the Church as " conservative "
rather than as "revolutionary."
If one thinks of a "dynamic" conservatism-as
of the effort to rewin and restate the universal truths in the concrete historical
setting of one's time--then such conservatism is "revolutionary."
As Donald
Attwater says in Modern Christian Revolutionaries (New York, 1947), ''there is
nothing (except sin and error) profane to the Christian Revolution."

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WILLIAM J. GRACE

Revolution in this respect. Once men have been sufficiently
ground down under iniquitous social conditions, they become
subhuman, and their revolutions have a subhuman quality.
Thus one character envisages modern revolution in Aldous
Huxley's Point-Counter-Point:
It's terrifying. It simply isn't human. Their humanity has all
been squeezed out of them by civilized living, squeezed out by the
weight of coal and iron. It won't be a rebellion of men. It'll be a
revolution of elementals, monsters, pre-human monsters.

It is the condition of " subhuman irresponsibility " that Eric
Gill so deplored in " The Creative Faculty in Man " where he
reminds us that it is true that a man can remain a Christian
in a factory but only insofar as he remains a man. Work, by its
divorce from the creative faculty of man, by its divorce from
human dignity therefore, has in many instances ceased to be
spiritually free and has become psychologically slave. Mechanistic man finds little joy in work; frequently he can only
tolerate it as a means to security. The unfortunate circumstances under which the industrial revolution took place, in an
atmosphere of rationalism, romanticism, capitalism, haunt us
very much now, poisoning the air we breathe, and in many
instances helping to destroy the effectiveness of orthodoxy
itself.
I£ the revolutions that have taken place in various ways,
successful and unsuccessful, in Germany, Russia, China, Italy,
have been distinguished by a good deal of barbarity, it is not
surprising, because in every case man has not been considered
a human person but a thing, an object manipulated by a force.
This is an hour when a truly revolutionary orthodoxy can shout
from the housetops that man is made to the image of God,
the Creator of heaven and earth-that man, too, must be a
creator and share as such in that goodness that endlessly
diffuses itself without diminution; that man, made to the
Image of God, shares in His immortality; has intelligence, free
will, autonomy, and is the lord of that nature which God
created for the use of all men.

THE HISTORICAL OPPORTUNITY

OF ORTHODOXY

Orthodoxy's main intellectual opportunity lies in reestablishing the meaning of man. Orthodoxy is, of course, primarily
concerned with God. But in reference to the social picture of
our times the most immediately effective concept to restore is
that of the true nature of man. For great numbers of people
today God is merely a word, a rhetorical expression. In
Michelangelo's work in the Sistine Chapel, man was presented
in the most universal meaning without parochialism or coyness
-without that endless set of discriminations beloved by competitive society. As you regard the saved and the damned in
Michelangelo's Last Ju,dgment you don't know whether man,
in his intrinsic manhood, is prince or peasant, pope or layman.
Michelangelo's Man is truly universal. Man is there faced with
a decisive cosmic struggle upon which his salvation depends,
co-sharer in the democracy of death and in the democracy of
the sacraments, a man of
will, yet dependent on God.
Such a work is not at the moment possible, for modern man
suffers not merely a split personality, but an atomized personality. A true Christian revolution of persons will first of
all reassert personality.
But how well are the orthodox equipped to reassert human
personality? For orthodox people themselves have suffered
from unfortunate external influences. Certain specific ideological influences, such as those that are presented here-Late
Augustinianism, Jansenism, Cartesianism, Romanticism, Capitalism-to name some of the principal forces derived from ideas
-have affected us in some degree as well as our neighbors. In
these forces, and in their direct or indirect influence among
the orthodox, some of the main reasons may be found for
critical weaknesses in the presentation of the orthodox position
to the world.
Each one of these forces implies a divorce ot some kind, a
further atomization of the human personality. Late Augustinianism implies a divorce of the soul from the body; J ansenism
a divorce of the supernatural from the natural; Cartesianism,
a divorce of religion from the intellect; Romanticism a divorce
of man from his humaneness; Capitalism, with its historical

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WILLIAM J. GRACE

denouement in Marxism, a divorce of the economic order from
justice and charity.
In order to understand the position of orthodoxy today some
analysis of these forces is required. It is not the purpose of
this paper to assess specifically how or when or where the
orthodox have been affected by these forces. Inferences can
be made on the basis of one's experience. All that need be done
is to explain what the forces are. If a person has been fortunate enough to escape their influence, he still must know
what these forces are in the concrete historical setting of our
time if he is to make his own contribution to orthodoxy
effective.

II.
The Late Augustinian position, which Etienne Gilson is
careful to distinguish from authentic Augustinianism, that of
St. Augustine himself, was one of theological pessimism and
maintained that man's nature was essentially perverted through
original sin; that his mind was so darkened and his will so
weakened that it was really pointless to speak of man's contribution to his salvation; man could only be saved by grace alone;
that man was under slavery to sin, and the state, representing
the rod of God, should chastise him for his own good; that the
natural world was a snare and a delusion; that man is essentially a Platonic soul unfortunately enmeshed in a material
body; that a sense of humility means a realization of one's
presumed essential worthlessness. 4 Sixteenth century Lutheranism was an offshoot of this considerably older tradition,
which, one has good reason to believe, was at least as widely
understood in the Middle Ages as Thomism. The Thomistic
position rejected the concept of intrinsic corruption through
the Fall, maintaining that the Fall had not affected the essence
of human nature; that man had lost certain super-added graces
not due to his essential nature through the Fall; that the
• Substantially this account is indicated in Gerald Vann, 0. P., On Being Human,
St. Thomas Aquinas and Mr. Aldous Huxley (London, 1988); G. K. Chesterton,
Etienne Gilson, Christianity and
St. Thomas Aquinas (London, 1988), pp.
Philosophy (New York, 1989), pp. 7-8.

THE HISTORICAL OPPORTUNITY

OF ORTHODOXY

295

treasury of the Redemption was a compensating factor, and
in this sense St. Thomas shares St. Augustine's view of original
sin as the Felix Culpa; that man has free will, rationality, and
autonomy; that the state has divine authority but through the
people (St. Thomas Aquinas, like St. Thomas More, believes
in representative government, with sovereignty residing in the
people) ; that nature-the material, and psychological side of
creation-reflects the glory of God and is good; that man is
essentially both body and soul; that the resurrection of the
body is an essential orthodox doctrine, and that humility consists in a true sense of what one is-ontologically a brother of
Christ.
Wherever islands of Late Augustinian influence have survived among the orthodox-and Late Augustinian influence
underwent a far-reaching revival in Jansenism-you find a
rejection of the natural world, a tendency to be uninterested
in the social mission of the Christian Church, a certain spiritual
aloofness, an unconscious racism, and an almost undeviating
respect for anything at all that suggests order. This last
characteristic in particulrur explains the sympathy that numerous of the orthodox had for Facism.
In orthodox tradition, you must have justice before you can
have order. But such of the orthodox as sympathized with
Fascism had the Late Augustinian view of the state as a
necessary consequence of original sin. 5 Intrinsically corrupt
man must be disciplined. Have order first, then you may get
justice. The concept of the state as an expression of the natural
law appears in St. Thomas who believes that even in the
Garden of Eden man would have lived in a state, because a
state is natural to men. In Eden we might well have had
traffic laws, town-hall meetings, judicial procedures. Of course,
we might have observed them better, but no better than we
should now if we freely accepted the channels of grace. Ortho• St. Thomas Aquinas rejected the pessimistic attitude to the state which culminated in Machiavelli's view of the state as "organized _evil." See M. F. X. Millar,
S. J., "Don Sturzo's Study of Church aud State," Thought (December, 1940);
Wilfrid Parsons, S. J., "St. Thomas Aquinas and Popular Sovereignty," Thought,
(September, 1941).

7

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WILLIAM J. GRACE

dox doctrine is one of the theological optimism-it, first of all,
really believes that man matters; that Christ loves man; that
man can reach out to the highest of destinies. You cannot
really be orthodox if you do not believe in the function of the
intelligence, in liberty of conscience. You cannot really be
orthodox if you do not trust people--think of how Christ
undiscriminatingly trusts us in the Incarnation. You cannot
render God justice-which is true piety-if you regard yourself,
His creation, as worthless. One cannot praise God, the Creator,
by belittling the Creation. In brief, one cannot be a Late
Augustinian and effectively present orthodoxy. One simply
cannot share in the Late Augustinian divorce of the soul from
the body, the intelligence from being, essence from existence.
The orthodox thinker in his optimism is, in fact, alone today.
He is the only person left, in our age of gimmicks and gadgets,
of Atom Bombs and H Bombs, intellectually committed to
hope in and for man.

ITI.
Another impediment to the ideological effectiveness of orthodoxy is Jansenism. Late Augustinianism, in its Protestant
development, became extremist Lutheranism and Calvinism.
Insofar as it remained within the Roman Catholic body, it
eventually led to Jansenism,-to speak loosely-a Catholic
Calvinism.
Under Jansenism, the Church is no longer regarded as truly
universal, but as consisting essentially of an elite group with
outer circles of marginal probationers. Man is regarded as
essentially spiritual, and his material and psychological realities
are ignored. Jansenism, like Late Augustinianism, has a paralyzing effect because it is separatist rather than embracive.
Like the Late Augustinians the Jansenists could not share what
Chesterton called " the great Dominican's exultation in the
blaze of being, or the glory of God in all his creatures." Chesterton also pointed out the danger of theological " Platonic
Pride " in the possession of intangible and untranslatable

THE HISTORICAL

OPPORTUNITY

OF ORTHODOXY

truths within, as if no part of wisdom had root anywhere in
the real world.
Rigor and asceticism have to be viewed with reserve if they
lead, as in Late Augustianism and J ansenism, to the denial of
the rightful meaning and value of the natural order. According to Chesterton a Christian should not even desire death,although he should not reject it, when it comes. All things have
a share of being; strictly speaking there is no vanity of vanities.
Vanity of Vanities may not be a truly Christian cry but a
primal sloth masquerading in a spiritual guise difficult to detect.
Far different is the truly orthodox love of being. These lines
quoted from Chesterton oppose to this pessimism the Christian
insistence on all values, not forgetting their hierarchy, their
subordination:
There is one sin: to call the green leaf gray,
Whereat the sun in heaven shuddereth,
There is one blasphemy: for death to pray;
For God alone knoweth the praise of death.
There is one creed: 'neath no world-tenor's wing
Do apples forget to grow on apple-trees,
There is one thing is needful-everythingThe rest is vanity of vanities. 6

" There is one thing needful-everything '' is a pretty inclusive statement. Orthodoxy is inclusive in this way, and it
cannot share in the divorce of the natural world from the supernatural world, that ultra-sensory dimension perceivable by a
Hamlet and a Kafka as well as a St. Thomas, a divorce repeated
in different ways in Cartesianism and Romanticism.

IV.
The philosophy of Descartes, because it affected orthodoxy
in many collateral ways, as well as lineal, may well have been
the most effective force in emasculating orthodoxy. 7
G. K. Chesterton, "Ecclesiastes," Collected Poems (New York, 1932), p. 310.
In estimating the social force of an idea it must be observed that the idea
continues to be effective long after it has been abandoned or rejected by responsible
authority. Cartesianism was condemned by the Church, but its habits. of thought
6
7

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WILLIAM J. GRACE

Briefly the influence of Cartesianism was in the direction of
the separation of religion from what Dawson has called the
" active intelligence, the very essence of the soul and the root
of human responsibility and liberty." Descartes believed that
all the knowledge that was available to us was in the form of
innate ideas. All our knowledge was in the form of these ideas
-all we had to do to know them was to make an act of
the will. But unfortunately we had no innate idea for Revelation. Revelation, therefore, we could never really know, but
only accept it on authority. Religion for Descartes is, therefore, something we should accept but not think about. It is
merely a series of steps from divorcing religion from the intelligence to divorcing it from life. Some religiously-minded
persons still regard what we call theological mystery as something that we should not explore with our intellects, something
that really should not excite us, but rather as an advanced
lesson for which we shall be better prepared in the next life,
and which we should ignore now. The same type of thinker
separates this life from the next, without realizing the organic
relationship between the two, and that this life, fu. one sense,
is our next life.
The eighteenth century witnessed theologians actually forced
to defend the need for Revelation. To the optimistic eighteenth century philosophers " nature " was a complete demonstration of the existence and goodness of God. Unlike Tennyson, they had not forseen the possibility of a " nature " red
· in tooth and claw. If everything can be known by innate ideas
or by reason, why was a historical Revelation of an otherness
ever necessary? Just as in Descartes the leap from the world
of innate ideas to that of the world outside of man demands the
intervention of God, so that the external world is itself Revelation, so, similarly in Locke, reason is so extended in meaning
could not altogether be escaped: For a modern example, we might note how the
Church has condemned Anti-Semitism and the principles of Capitalism in so far
as the latter have " jelled." But in broad social perspective not all Catholics are
free either from Anti-Semitism or Capitalism. Cartesianism, as part of the secular
culture affects the orthodox in so far as they accede to contemporary mores.

THE HISTORICAL

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299

that there is no otherness radically different from the" nature''
before uso This cozy adjustment between man and environment (Descartes, Locke) has,_ of recent years, been acutely
questioned by science itself (the science divorced from the
hierarchy of knowledge that Descartes so strongly, if indirectly,
encouraged) .8 The optimistic view with which the Deists and
the rationalists viewed " nature," the complacency with which
science was exalted and historical Revelation expunged, have
now reached their denouemento In the words of a contemporary
philosopher, a segment of modern science has tended strongly
to the concept of a meaningless universe:
Many scientists take the view that the world is just what it is,
and that is the end of all inquiryo There is no reason for its being
what it is. Everything might have been quite different, and there
would have been no reason for that eithero9
The ironic effects of the collateral and lineal influence of
Cartesianism, and its ultimate offshoot, scientific positivism,
upon orthodoxy is to be found in regarding religion as primarily
an emotional o:r devotional expression, rather than an intellectual oneo Cartesianism is so much a part of ou:r secular
culture, that its influence is particularly strong upon us. The
intellect in Cartesian :rationalism is intended for -things of this
world, for" nature" and the other semantic devices that have
been substituted for this ambiguous wordo Cartesianism naturally allies itself with Late Augustinian and Jansenistic influences in rejecting the intelligence in the service of Godo In all
three systems, Late AugUstinianism, Jansenism, Cartesianism,
man is an angel of a sort, but he is not an orthodox Christian.
A Christian is not a pure spirit who never thinks. A Christian
is not, and never will be, a pure spirit, .but he should never
cease thinking, especially in regard to the Churcho Emotions
8 See in this connection
Jacques Maritain, The Dream of Descartes (New York,
1944).
9 Dr. W. T. Stace, "Man Against Darkness,"
The Atlantic Monthly (September,
1948) .. An extension of these remarks about the analysis that Dr. Stace provides
is to be found in my article, ''Social Impact of Current Tensions," American
Journal of Economics and Sociology (July, 1950).

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WILLIAM J. GRACE

are essentially part of us, but emotion and emotional power
. are only truly set in motion by the intelligence. Emotion unfounded in intelligence is one of the most dreadful of calamities
-sentimentality.
Under Cartesian influence, sentimentality
has been delegated to religion; intelligence to science.
Christopher Dawson in Religion and Culture has indicated
this divorce in these words: "We have a secularized scientific
culture which is a body without a soul; while on the other hand
religion maintaiJls its separate existence as a soul without a
body."

v.
Space prevents any but brief mention of Romanticism, the
influence of which upon orthodoxy is so widespread and concealed that it really requires a complete treatment of its ow:p..
But I would stress one main point here-the Romantic fatuity
of " idealizing " man-frequently again the effort to turn him
into a pure spirit, ignoring · his psychological and material
realities. Romanticism implicitly and explicitly denies the Incarnation. With a deep interior, frequently unconscious, pessimism in_regard to man's nature, it attempts to exalt him in
terms of the non-human. Setting impossible goals for men,
Romanticism not only does not appreciate, but rejects, their
ontological reality.
The Romantics stressed the idea of infinite extension. Man
should grow into another being-whether angel or devil does
not seem at times too important. " Yet are thou still but
Faustus and a man" said the hero of Marlowe's play. To be
merely a man, to be merely human, seems to the Romantics
to be a sign of mediocrity. Apparently exalted, man is actually
degraded, because the reality of his being (including his limitations) is denied. Be endlessly something else, be distinct,
be absolute, but beware of being human and, therefore, subject
to limitations. The Romantic view is in this sense the reverse
of that of the Humanist, classical and Christian, who believes
in interior control and harmony and in finding God in the
contemplation of the spirit within one, and who likewise avoids

THE HISTORICAL OPPORTUNITY OF ORTHODOXY

801

extravagant ambition and the desire for expansion for the same
reasons. It is especially a viewpoint opposed to that of the
Christian Humanist who sees in the Incarnation the central
fact of Christian life. " The Word was made flesh and dwelt
amongst us." To be properly human in the Christlike sense is
man's highest honor. To the classical humanist, on the other
hand, nothing could seem more absurd than man, whose life
is but for a day, in his exalted hubris devising a gadget to kill
all men.- He can infinitely destroy, but remains subject to
human limitations himself.

VI.
The rejection of the human is characteristic alike of Late
Augustinianism, Jansenism, Cartesianism, and Romanticism.
It may be partly due to such influences, filtered through various
and contradictory channels, that we do not implement as well
as we can the tremendous social implications of " the Word was
made flesh and dwelt amongst us." To be human, to serve God
with our limitations, to abide in Him is our true goal. Christ
is within us-he is not the ever-receding goal of an infinite
extension.
Space does not permit me to show the degree to which not
so much orthodoxy, but the orthodox, have in varying degrees
been affected by these ideologies and in that degree handicapped in the fulfillment of their mission. But it is obvious we
are not sufficiently aware at times of the concreteness, of the
existentialism, if you like, of the individuation of the Incarnation. Partly by our own default, such romantic movements
as Nazism and Communism, with their special adaptations of
the idea of infinite extension, have threatened in our time the
very foundations of civilized life. Communism, for example,
has a social, communal mystique which is a socially effective
travesty of the great social sacrament of the Church, the
Eucharist. Communism's psychological appeal is essentially
religious. But Cartesian influence has tended to make orthodox
religion a private devotional affair rather than a manifestation

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WILLIAM J. GRACE

of the social and intellectual solidarity of the orthodox body.
We have much more than the" answer" to Communism in the
solidarity of Christ, but we have ourselves first to awaken to
its Transcendent Meaning; we have truly to be guardians of
the active intelligence.
Nazism and Communism were dynamic and even demonic
ideologies with strong mystical appeals, and the alternative lies
in our penetration into the meaning of the Incarnate Word. We
do not lose ourselves; we do not dissipate our personality in
reaching out to infinity; infinity comes to us. The divorce set
up by Romanticism between man and that humaneness which
Christ made sacred in the Incarnation has to be bridged.

VII.
It remains to speak of another ideology which has had disturbing effects on the orthodox-the ideology of Capitalism.
I consider this basically an economic philosophy derived from
:rom1mtic concepts, and having a close affinity with Marxist
Communism in that it gives man meaning in terms of an infinite extension into the world of things. Man becomes what he
pos!'!esses. His radical difference from the material world is
unrecognized. Popular thinking, I know, presents Capitalism
and Communism as polarities. 10 But, if you examine history,
you will find a time when Protestantism and Catholicism were
presented as polarities. In historical retrospect, they do not
seem as vastly different as they once did. I would make a historical analogy here. What Calvin did for Lutheranism in
reducing it to a system and coherent theory, Karl Marx did for
Capitalism.
1°
Mauriac stated recently in Figaro (his remarks were quoted in the
N. Y. Times for February
19.50): "It is not what separates the United States
and the Soviet Union that should frighten us but what they have in common.
Their ideological oppositions are perhaps less to be feared by us than their agreement. regarding the scale of human values. These two technocracies that think
themselves antagonists are dragging humanity in the same direction of dehumanization." We have, of course, reason to hope that neither nationalism is to be
completely identified with its prevalent ideology.

THE HISTORICAL OPPORTUNITY

OF ORTHODOXY

303

Unfortunately for us the semantics of Capitalism are very
confusing. Belloc views Capitalism as analogous to a cosmic
dice game in which the law of numbers decrees that those who
start with large reserves shall abound and those with little shall
lose even the little they think they have. Uninterfered with by
public controls, wealth becomes concentrated in the hands of
the few while most of the citizenry are reduced to a dispossessed
proletariat. In a time of crisis the easiest and smartest move
for the state is to dispossess the wealthy minority, and then
the means of production are transferred to the state. That,
according to Belloc, is Marxist Communism. It can take place
openly and vulgarly as in Russia, where the change-over was
more from a feudal economy than a capitalist economy, or it
can take place gradually through taxation and death duties as
in England. You will then have a dispossessed proletariat dependent on the welfare state. Belloc's view is that Capitalism
destroys property and prepares the cultural climate whence
Marxist Communism can take over.
The phrase, " Free Enterprise," is abused like the word,
" freedom," because of popular Rousseauistic conceptions
freedom. Freedom in regard to property is frequently misstated. The nineteenth century is the age of unrestricted
Capitalism, and many views a:re fostered in that culture that
are not compatible with orthodoxy. Orthodoxy takes a specifically optimistic, though not a sentimental view of man's
nature. In view of man's personality, man should be free to
manipulate matter, thereby to hold property so that he may
serve the community the better. 11 Man, though· capable of
losing his soul, is made to God's image, and in view of his
high dignity, is the lord of nature. But his right to ownership
is strictly related to the public good. The orthodox concept of
11 See Eric Gill, "Property and Catholic Morals," The American Review (November, 1936). Gerald Vann says in Awake in Heaven (New York, 1948), pp. U9-l20:
" The Church upholds the right to ownership, yes; but not as the term is nowadays
understood. No one is absolute owner of anything except God. He may not use
his property against the common good; he may not waste it; he may not use it
to injure his neighbor; he must use it to help his neighbor when he is in need ... "

804

WILLIAM J. GRACE

property rejects the thesis that property rights are absolute
and should not be interfered with by positive law, an offshoot
of the Romantic concept of freedom divorced from law.
A key word in national life is " freedom," and it is a word
badly in need of
The frequent sentimentality and
intellectual shortcomings in the use of this word derive from
Romanticism. Rousseau reverses the Late Augustinian concept that man's nature is essentially corrupted through original
sin; he maintains instead that man living according to nature
(natural law) is entirely good. Where then does evil come
from? Evil is the direct result of State and Church law
as contradistinct to natural law.
Rousseau, in fact, alters the subsequent meaning of natural
law. For the orthodox thinker there is an organic hierarchy
of law. First is the law of nature which is assumed to be
universal and implanted in the heart of man; secondly is
supernatural or revealed law which God has directly made
known to us; thirdly is the positive law, or the law of the community having legitimate authority. Positive law is responsible to natural and supernatural law. The community can
tax me, order me to render military service. It
order me
to practice limitation of offspring which I
regard as
opposed to both the law of nature and revealed law. For
Rousseau there is only one law-natural law. But for this very
reason it is not the sam.e natural law as that of orthodoxy.
Under Capitalism "economic" law-an invention of the
nineteenth century-is identified with Rousseau's "natural"
law, and the insistence of Rousseau's "natural law" upon
freedom " from " control by State or Church is retained.
But orthodoxy does not opose freedom to law. That opposition is a romantic concept of freedom. For orthodoxy, freedom
is the fulfillment of the law. You are free when you positively
do what you should. For orthodoxy, to quote Milton," Virtue
alone is free."
Individualism, rugged or otherwise, cannot be reconciled with
the social and mystical dimensions of orthodoxy. "Individualism " like the phrase " free enterprise " infiltrates our thinking

THE HISTORICAL OPPORTUNITY

OF ORTHODOXY

805

and causes intellectual havoc. It can he generally more accurately replaced by "anarchism" or "anti-social behavior." It
certainly does not mean the uniqueness of human personality.
Orthodoxy recognizes the authority of the state, and enjoins
its duty of looking after the public welfare. On the other hand,
orthodoxy is opposed to socialism, the modern absolutist theory
that all rights are vested in the state. It believes that men have
rights anterior to those of the state. In the essential sense, however, that orthodoxy is dualistic, recognizing higher laws than
economic law identified with Rousseau's natural law, it must
part from the Capitalist and Communist ideologies in their
emphasis on monistic, all-emhracive, economic law. Orthodoxy
cannot share in the divorce of economic law from justice and
charity. It cannot share in Capitalism's rejection of positive
law; it cannot share in Communism's identification of the state
with natural-economic law.
Marxist Communism has identified Rousseauistic " natural "
law with the state, a curious paradox, hut, according to Marxist
theory, this identification is merely transitory. The main
Marxist thesis is that world history is following a definite
pattern of evolution toward a classless and nationless society.
This process of evolution should he aided by human agency,
though the evolution itself is regarded as basically predetermined. Actually man is not regarded as having any personal
immortality, he is basically a portion of cosmic matter directed
by the forward sweep of evolution with which, of course,
" economic " law derived from " natural " law is identified. The
dehumanization of man is thus made complete. Ultimately the
state withers away; all men will be naturally good when the
classless society, the perfect Rousseauistic environment, has
been achieved.
But if this is ever to occur, we can not forget that Capitalism,
with its own adaptation of Rousseauistic principles, prepares
the way. Here again we have another important divorce to
bridge, that between economic law and true natural law, the
law of justice, and the law of charity.

806

WILLIAM J. GRACE

VIII.
What are the powerful resources of orthodoxy that we can
effectively use after we have purified ourselves from any overt
influences of Late Augustinianism, Jansenism, Cartesianism,
Romanticism, and Capitalism?
We have postulated that orthodoxy is the guardian of the
active intelligence. Now we are repeatedly told that the great
enemy of orthodoxy today is Marxist Communism. And this
statement is, of course, partly true, but I don't think it goes
deeply enough. Marxist Communism is. a surface disease of
which the hidden causes are much deeper. It is primarily these
hidden causes with which orthodoxy must deal. . The basic
modem problem arises from the flight of the intelligence from
reality. Secular society today is a master of instrumentalities
while its thought is in chaos. The breakdown of tradition, of
semantics, is simply enormous. Evelyn Waugh in Brideshead
Revisited pointed out the deceptive appearance of modem
education. People appear so well-informed, so self-assured on
the surface, but a little prodding reveals great gaps in intellection that one would never have suspected were there. It is
because of this situation that the old polemical, over-rationalistic process to modem problems is ineffective-it is no longer
even intelligent in our modem context of disintegration.
What we need is a new emphasis on the real in a new order
of experience. The application of scientific discoveries in recent
times is forcing us ever nearer that terrible moment when by
external evidence we shall be compelled to awaken from our
dreams of self-perpetuating progress, and to acknowledge the
supremacy and primacy of the supernatural, without denying
material and psychological realities, or else forfeit the right
of being altogether. We shall lose spiritual being and become
of less value than the matter, which, in Marxism, we are
supposed to express, or, in orthodoxy, supposed to dominate.
The net effect of such forces as I have described-Late
Augustinianism, J ansenism, Cartesianism, Romanticism, and
Capitalism-has been a mental simplification of our approach

THE HISTORICAL

OPPORTUNITY

OF ORTHODOXY

807

to reality. The multiple stratification of reality has been
levelled down by a series of intellectual divorces to such an
extent, that even the concept of theological mystery has been
largely lost. It is such artists as Kafka, for example, who are
suddenly and painfully amazed at the modern loss of the sense
of the Other, the radically different, the supernatural. Reality
remains what it is and it is pure illusion to cut it down to our
size-it is simply an act of intellectual anaesthetization. The
Copernican revolution had an unexpected effect in that man
subsequently tended to regard himself as a self-possessed person
in a self-possessed universe, rather than one dependent in many
ways on the supernatural in an ever more mysterious universe.
Though medieval man may have believed that the earth was
the center of the cosmic system, he did not believe that he
was the center of the universe. After Copernicus, though, the
earth was no longer regarded as central, man himself tended to
become the center. Modern dynamicism, activity, business,
committee meetings seldom constitute a dynamicism of true
movement, which is,
philosophical language, " becoming,"
but they represent rather a mechanistic substitute, so well contrived that it will not interfere and rob man of his sense of
security and self-possession. Modern man frequently has the
sad illusion of " being on the move," when he is in fact more
stationary, far more unmoved in the true sense than he has
probably ever been. This illusion is frequently modern man's
only sense of reality. To him things are real, when they do
something, which to him means when they move. Activity and
locomotion are made equivalents to one another. I am active
only when I move; when I do something I am real, at least
to myself.
Such is the contemporary view, and this in part explains the
misunderstanding and rejection of mysticism. Fortunately,
science itself is developing a sense of reverence and even of
helplessness which cuts across our secular culture. In Life
(October 10, 1949), Dr. Oppenheimer, Head of the Advanced
Study Institute at Princeton, is quoted as saying that " the
problem of doing justice to the implicit, the imponderable and

308

WILLIAM J. GRACE

the unknown is always with us in science, it is with us in the
most trivial affairs, and it is one of the great problems of all
forms of art." In the same article the tendency to think of
infinity in terms of the diminutive is stressed-not only can you
infinitely extend, you can also infinitely subdivide. There is
apparent scientific corroboration, at least on one level, for
Blake's statement about holding infinity in the palm of your
hand.
But here again we are up against the Cartesian divorce.
"We have a secularized scientific culture which is a body
without a soul; while on the other hand religion maintains its
separate existence as a spirit without a body." An ironic comment on this divorce was contained in a news report about Dr.
Einstein in The New York Herald Tribune for December
1949:
A later verification, this time of the equation e = mc2 , came in
the form of the atomic bomb.

The equation is undoubtedly just and magnificent, but the
atom bomb touches another order of reality altogether.
" Religion maintains its separate existence as a spirit without a body." If that is so, the influences I have described are
still too much with us.
Modern irony resides in the flight of the intelligence from
reality. We have objective evil, as in the Nazi concentration
camps and in our destruction of Hiroshima, without a corresponding sense of subjective moral responsibility. The Japanese
civilians at Hiroshima are thoroughly dead, but not one single
person, as far as I know, has had sufficient sense of personal
responsibility to come forward and throw ashes on his head.
Actually no one feels to blame. Probably many individuals
were privately shocked, but here we run into the problem that
the isolated individual today is often cut off from any norm of
social expression. He is a spectator, rather than an actor. That
is part of the process of dehumanization. 12
12 To quote Mauriac again, ". . . man is treated as a means and no longer as
an end-this is the indispensable condition of the two cultures that face each

THE HISTORICAL OPPORTUNITY OF ORTHODOXY

309

It is a platitude to say that this is an age of crisis. It is a
fact that everyone admits, and many of us greet with a very
curious apathy. The secret of the apathy is deep and concealed.
Contemporary society has been so dehumanized and impersonalized, that horror itself is impersonal. It is about as tangible as Los Alamos or the Metropolitan Telephone Company.
The concentration camp and Hiroshima, if they occurred, surely
never touched us. We had no part in them. Our innocent
citizen, like the character in Marlowe's play, committed fornication but "that was in another country." It doesn't count,
any more than being accidentally in a parade or pageant counts.
Orthodoxy, to meet its historical opportunity, must be aware
of such divorces as I have described, not merely on the theoretical level but on the individual and social level of personal
intellectual communication and private action. It must understand what the true nature of evil is, avoiding the Late Augustinian and Jansenist tendencies toward the Manichean concept
that evil is a positive force, external to ourselves. Evil as we
know is not something positive that you can locate in an idea,
a people, a geographical area, and by obliterating that idea,
people, or geographical area, remove evil. War theoretically
may be fought in self-defense, but it should not be mistaken
for a missionary activity. Evil is something we all share inthat is why the only acceptable sacrifice is Christ himself. He
is the only one without sin. Out of a sense of self-preservation
therefore, we should be discreet in talking about removing evil
through force. It can't be done. Nevertheless, orthodoxy,
even in a confused condition, is the only great intellectual tradition that still maintains that there is hope for man. But hope
has meaning, like all the virtues, when allied to reality. Hope,
like all the virtues, is related to the active intelligence.
The virtue of Hope, because it is allied to the real world and
to the intelligence that perceives the real world, will prevent
us from repeating the old mistakes of divorcing the spirit from
other." He is speaking of Capitalism
(U.S.S.R.).

(U. S. A.) and Marxist Co=unism

310

WILLIAM J. GRACE

the body, the transcendent from the individuated, as occurred
in Late Augustianism, Janesenism, Cartesianism, and Romanticism. Many men today are unawakened to their own universe.
They have eyes· but have not been allowed to use them. They
have not had the leisure, the basic minimum of economic justice, to permit them to think, to employ that " active intelligence " which is the very essence of the soul and the root of
human responsibility and liberty. If we are blinded by pessimism ourselves, we cannot help in their educative process.
Ultimately, orthodoxy as practiced in the individual person,
not merely as a complex of ideas, has the resources of the Christ
immanent in history, in the sacramental universe. In this
sense, Christianity does not belong to religion (Descartes);
Christianity belongs to life. Its supernatural dimension is
especially pregnant to us at a time when man is obliged to meet
a demonic choice, above and beyond the plane of Cartesian
rationalism or Romantic irrationalism, either to reach out to
being or to annihilate himself.
WILLIAM

44 M omingside Drive,
New York,N. Y.

J. GRACE

BOOK JtEVIEWS
Walls Are Crumbling. By the Rev. JoHN M. OESTERREICHER. New York:
Devin-Ada.ir,
This book, sub-titled "Seven Jewish Philosophers Discover Christ," is a
study of the religious and philosophical thought-thought in the context
of their llves-of Henri Bergson, Edmund Husser!, Adolf Reinach, Max
Scheler, Paul Landsberg, Max Picard and Edith Stein. It is a profoundly
rich book on several different levels.
As spiritual biography, it traces the call of seven gifted souls to Christ.
Sometimes there is unhesitating submission to that call, as in Edith Stein;
sometimes hesitancy despite conviction, as in Bergson; sometimes an unclear
response, as in Husserl; sometimes final infidelity, so far as man can judge,
as in Scheler. On this level of spiritual biography the book is a history in
miniature of the diverse responses to God open to man.
Walls Are Crumbling is a book of major importance in the history of
philosophy. The writings of each of these seven philosophers are separately
analyzed and evaluated, for when philosophical positions are proposed,
judgment by the competent becomes a duty. The analysis is noteworthy
for its completeness, fidelity, detail, penetration. The evaluation is carried
on in a spirit of sympathy, balance, and objectivity. Here writes a man
with genuine mastery of the philosophers in question. But Father Oesterreicher has such a mastery of Christian theology and philesophy as a whole
that while he generously rejoices in the genius of those he presents, he is
also ever open to their limitations; the justice of his estimates seems itself
a kind of genius. There is no study in English of these philosophers which
approaches the flawlessness of this one.
This study of " Seven Jewish Philosophers Discover Christ" is a book of
living apologetics: living, because it is a study of the claims of Christ and
His Church on the person. To each reader, believer or unbeliever, it is an
invitation to see the Church anew through the eyes of seven pilgrims from
Jerusalem to Rome. Walls Are Crumbling is beyond any dispute between
conflicting styles of apologetics. Here is the Church, today as she has ever
been, exacting in anticipation, loving in embrace, like a chaste woman whose
joys are withheld until the sacramental union.
Without one word of preaching the book is a profound, sustained sermon,
at least indirectly. It is impossible to see the demands of Christ on these
seven late contemporaries and their partial or full response without becoming aware that Christ makes the same demand of total submission to
His Love of every man. I have seen the response of these men: what is

311
8

BOOK REVIEWS

my own. No one, Catholic or non-Catholic, will be able to avoid that
insistent question, which not the author but the reader asks.
Such are some of the levels of the book as a whole. But each chapter
has its own fascination: more accurately, each has several fascinations:
content, biographical data, spiritual odyssey with eternity
known to be in the balance. There is the sadness of seeing Bergson die
without baptism because of his loyalty, in itself noble, to his fellow-Jews
whom he did not wish to appear to desert in their persecution. There is
a hierarchy of loyalties, and Bergson did not choose the highest. There is
the strange but too easily understood unbalance of Husser! in whom
seriousness and frivolity, profundity and banality, co-exist without intrapenetration, so that his response to Christ is ambiguous to the end. There
is Reinach consumed with desire for communion with Christ and so eager
for baptism that he embraces it at the hands of a minister but without
precluding the possibility of eventual Catholicism. There is the horror of
seeing Scheler, with his own presentiment of final abandonment, twice
converted, twice apostate; and the futility of his final renunciation of the
Church, refuted in advance by his own writings. There is Landsberg suffering from the twin weaknesses of the intellectual: weakness of will and
inordinate love of " experience." But he had the heroic courage in days of
desolation to see and to embrace the one solid reason against suicide: that
we must not say " no " to the sufferings sent by a suffering Christ. There is
the beauty of Max Picard's analysis of marriage. There is the closing glory
of Edith Stein whose answer to God was as simple and as final as Mary's
" Be it done unto me according to Thy word."
Each chapter is patterned in the same way. Firstly, an introduction
which, by significant detail, characterizes the man and his (or her) thought.
Then, biographical data. Thirdly, a lengthy exposition of the religiophilosophical thought leading to the awakening to Christ. Lastly, each one's
final relation to the Church.
The style is majestic as befits the subject. Biographical details are given
with supreme good taste. But what, above other attributes, characterizes
the author's work is balance and interiority. By balance I mean that
sureness, that objectivity which appreciates, which sympathizes, but which
never excuses error. The author is never satisfied with the almost true,
or the equivalently true; he is exacting, but impersonally so, as a selfefl'acing spokesman for reality. He is the master-student who does not
evade the responsibility of judging.
By interiority I mean that each of these seven studies seems to be
written from within the person studied. The thought and the religious
situation of each is so presented that author and even reader seem transported into the soul of the man being studied. The author has so effaced
himself in revealing the mind and heart of others that it is as if seven
Augustines had each written their several Confessions.

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BOOK REVIEWS

In his Preface Father Oesterreicher speaks of the contribution to Christian
thought of these men who discovered Christ. Now Christian thought is,
in its sources, various and complex: most perfectly contained in the good
news of Christ, yet it .stems too from Israel's prophets and Greece's
philosophers, from the Fathers, Eastern and Western, from the mediaeval
schoolmen. Not only is it possible to speak meaningfully of classical
Christian thought; one can go further and judge the work of one's contemporaries in its light. One can say of Maritain, for example, that he is
in the line of Christian thought and has advanced it. One can say of
Sartre that he is a deviation from, and in part a corrupter of, classical
Christian thought. Our standard for such judgments is always complex and
frequently not fully explicated in our own mind, but always it includes at
least these two notes: that the human person has a supra-cosmic dignity;
and that the dignity is not self-enclosed but constituted by man's humble
relation to God. So understood, one happily seconds the judgment of
Father Oesterreicher. Each of these men is in the line of classical Christian
thought; each does make a contribution to it.
Of the living tradition to which each of these seven is a contributor St.
Thomas Aquinas is the most eminent spokesman. What then is the attitude
of this book to Thomism?
Father Oesterreicher is no letter-perfect Thomist who, for example, would
scornfully reject Bergson's analysis of time because it does not paraphrase
St. Thomas' commentary on Aristotle's Physics. Thomism to him is a
fundamental wisdom which, having been absorbed, sets one free to investigate lovingly but responsibly and therefore discriminatingly the truths
proposed by our contemporaries. Like Edith Stein, Father Oesterreicher
is no either-or Thomist: it is not a question of Plato or Aristotle, Augustine
or Thomas, Newman or Maritain. He tests thought by the light of
Christian wisdom, and principally by the expression of that wisdom in St.
Thomas. By virtue of that very commitment to wisdom he takes truth
where he finds it, knowing that it must be ultimately consistent with
Thomism and may very well enrich it. He has the spirit of St. Thomas:
to assimilate and to order truth wherever found.
As spiritual biography, as philosophy, as living apologetics, as an implicit
chaUenge to every soul, this book has the dimensions of greatness. It is
dedicated to John Henry Cardinal Newman and has a foreword by Jacques
Maritain. It opens with a genius, Bergson, and doses with a saint, Edith
Stein. It is worthy of the company it keeps.
JAMES

Manhattan College,
New York,N. Y.

v. MULLANEY

314

BOOK REVIEWS

Preface to Happiness. Vol. II. A Guidebook to the Summa. By E. F.
SMITH and L. A. RYAN. New York: Benziger, 1950. Pp. 301 with
index. $4.00.
Thanks greatly to the verve and the vision of the late Father Walter
Farrell, the movement usually called " theology for laymen " has lit up a
new fire in American Catholic life. In the wide background from business
men to lay professors, from doctors and lawyers to college freshmen, there
now glows a whole spectrum of interest in St. Thomas Aquinas not merely
as a required seminary subject but as a living theologian with an assuring
message for our times.
In the foreword to the first volume that appeared in his Companion to
the Summa-it stands as Volume II in the completed set-Father Farrell
proposed his four works as " guidebooks," related to the Summa as a map
to a city and designed to inspire a reading and study of the original. Yet
by the gifts of his genius, Father Farrell managed to draw much more than
a map and write much more than a guidebook. He wrote a layman's edition
of the Summa. He wrote for the beginners of our day in the spirit in
which St. Thomas wrote for the beginners of a thirteenth-century study of
theology. Father Farrell left us a work that can be read and understood
without consulting St. Thomas. Unlike a guidebook or a map, the Companion is a city in itself, modelled with twentieth-century words and images
upon the great thirteenth-century capital which was the originaL
One of the important extrinsic effects of the Companion was and is to
arouse interest in the Summa, and it is to enlarge and orient this interest
that confreres of St. Thomas and of Father Farrell are bringing out a new
series, A Guidebook to the Summa. Preface to Happiness, Volume II of
the whole series but the first to appear in print, is a welcome addition to
the instruments for bringing St. Thomas to the laity. The present volume
fully qualifies as a guidebook, a map, a direction-finder. The authors are
tooling their series to capture the interest which Father Farrell aroused
and to focus it boldly on the pages of St. Thomas. Unlike the Companion,
the Guidebook can hardly be understood without the control of constant
references to St. Thomas, and in this respect, the Guidebook is a mediator
between the Companion and the Summa itself.
Apart from Father Farrell's Companion, Preface to Happine88 has intrinsic
merits that make it a genuine contribution to Catholic learning and
Christian culture. The authors are emphatic about their purpose; they
want to enkindle in laymen "the habit of thinking theologically," and
they insist that such an objective is both desirable and practicaL To the
arguments they propound to defend their aims they could even have added
the twentieth-century call of the Holy See for " the participation of the
laity in the work of the hierarchy." To answer this call, the laity needs a
proper theological training.

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315

The authors of the Preface wisely remark that a habit has parts, that
the right order of the parts is essential to the habit, and that the best plan
for the habit of theology is charted out in the Summa. The nine chapters
of the present volume, therefore, parallel the Prima Secundae, like Volume
IT of the Companion. The authors have written a useful nine-page general
introduction on the nature of theology, the place and order of moral
theology, and the distinctive character of Thomist moral science.
Through their more than three hundred pages of writing, the authors
have never forgotten that their's is a guidebook, and the result is a careful
map to take discerning readers to a destiny in the Summa and even
to points beyond. Each chapter opens with a pointed introduction to
place the given topic in perspective and to weigh its doctrinal and historical
importance. Then follows in each chapter a history of the question being
treated. Not concerned to drag out dead doctrines with a view to understanding only the predecessors of St. Thomas, the authors push the history
of each question squarely up to the living present. Thus, the initial chapter
on man's ultimate end opens with the well-known Socratic view on the
subject, scans across antiquity and the middle ages, through Eastern
philosophy and theology, down the array of modern thinkers, and ends
with men like Mussolini and Rosenberg. Not merely the layman but the
professional theologian and philosopher will be grateful for these historical
summaries. The dates of all the men cited are included in the text.
Following the historical sections of each chapter comes a probing of
doctrinal backgrounds for the question in each chapter. This includes
references to Sacred Scripture and to the pronouncements of the Teaching
Church together with an outline of the philosophical equipment needed in
the theological discussion. Then the book guides the reader into St. Thomas.
Here the general question of each chapter is broken down into a set of
problems, and the problems in turn are split up into special questions.
Under each special question, the authors give first the principles of solution
which are Sacred Scripture, tradition, the doctrine of the Church, and the
theological reason. The compiling of the first three principles involved in
each question will be of considerable use to both professional and lay
theologian and to both teacher and student. The fourth of the principles
escorts the reader into the downtown sections of the Summa. In cases
where any of the first three principles are missing historically, they are
naturally not mentioned.
The fourth principle, the theological reason, tested the ingenuity of the
authors even as the other three taxed their scholarship. It is in reference
to this fourth principle that Preface to Happiness, as a guidebook, must
stand or fall. To the credit of the two authors, the book stands with sureness of foot and balance of head. Unless the Prima Secundae is already
known or being studied in parallel with this book, the reader will not be

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BOOK REVIEWS

able to follow the reasoning in Preface to Happiness. He will find, it is true,
that the principles in each question are laid out for him in bold type, but
such principles, as enunciated and even expounded in the Guidebook,
remain pedagogical summaries to help the reader find his way through St.
Thomas because he has been told the goal to which that way leads. As a
result, the discussion of the theological reason in each question is in the
manner of hints and helps that will not be understood unless the Guidebook
is in one hand so that the Summa may be open in the other. The Guidebook
is no more than a skeleton; the Summa is and was intended to be the flesh.
All students of theology for laymen will be grateful for this combination,
and the serious student, in addition to being thankful, will derive a good
measure of profit from a teaching book that could make the Summa
armchair reading.
Each subject within the various chapters is followed by questions, and
each chapter as a whole is followed by a section on discussion topics and
a studied bibliography containing chapter and page references for books
cited. The questions and discussion topics are not of the type to permit
the reader the ease of giving back, parrot-like, the material in either the
Guidebook or the Summa. The questions are, in many cases, timely and
searching thrusts into contemporary problems, and all of them can test
the reader's" habit of thinking theologically." Preface to Happiness remains
through and through a teaching book, a book for the professional teacher
as well as for those who can be "self-taught." As final teaching and learning aids, there is a glossary, textual citation of the principles derived from
tradition and from the doctrine of the Church, and a copious index of
both name and subjects. If there is any pedagogical aid that the authors
have omitted, this reviewer cannot discover it.
This is a book about a book. Unlike the ordinary work in theology or
philosophy, it is not intended as a terminus ad quem, but more as a
terminus a quo. It bridges across an important no man's land between
manuals and the original St. Thomas and between the professional and
lay theologian. The general excellence of this book should recommend
it to all who are interested in the cause of theology, priests, teachers,
students, adult discussion groups, in short all educated Catholics.
a triumph in the
The authors of the Guidebook series have
matter and form they unite in their present work. There is one typographical error that should be noted by those who already own or will
acquire this book possibly for teaching purposes; in footnote 1 on page 16,
read" Summa Theologica."
"Companion to tke Summa" in line four
Since this footnote sets up the referencing apparatus for the footnotes, a
noting of this error may prove helpful to many readers.
VINCENT

University of Notre Dame,
Notre Dame, Indiana

Enw ARD SMITH

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317

The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr. By EDWARD J. CARNELL. Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1951. Pp.
with index. $3.50.
The American school of neo-orthodox theology has appropriated the term
realism for its doctrines. This school has been strongly influenced by
modern liberalism as well as by the dialectical theology of Karl Barth on
the Continent of Europe. Reinhold Niebuhr is at present its most
ential representative. Mr. Carnell's book includes a clear presentation of
the salient features of Niebuhr's thought and, at the same time, a very
acute appraisal of it from the standpoint of early Reformation theology.
The author devotes considerable attention to the anthropological and
philosophical views which underlie Niebuhr's Ethics and Theology. Idealism and naturalism are sharply opposed to one another as impossible
extremes, and intermediate positions, like that of Aristotle, are almost
completely neglected. The anthropology which emerges from this dialectical
discussion is strongly tinged with voluntarism. The will is " at the very
center of human personality," and theoretical reason is not clearly disReason
tinguished from practical reason. (Human Nature, pp. 16 and
is viewed as a manifestation of freedom, the most fundamental and distinctively human trait. This freedom is almost unlimited and separates
man from nature. The theory of natural law is rejected. " It raises ideology
to a higher degree of pretension, and is another of the many illustrations
in history of the force of sin in the claim of sinlessness." (Human Destiny,
p. 253) Nevertheless, Niebuhr does admit "certain permanent norms such
as monogamy which . . . are maintained not purely by Scriptural authority
but by the cumulative experience of the race." (Human Nature, pp.
He has a profound respect for " science," and often uses the supposed
results of " science " to justify his sceptical doctrines. But for philosophy
itself, especially metaphysics, he has no hope at all. This anti-philosophical
philosophy runs through all of Niebuhr's work, and plays a crucial role in
the development of his theological dialectic.
Its key concepts are derived from an interpretation of the moral or
" existential " experience of men, and the chasm which yawns between
the ought and the is. According to Niebuhr, this chasm is sin, something
the same time inevitable.
for which we are responsible, and yet is
(Human Nature,
ff.) It is caused by the persistent refusal of men to
remain within their appointed limits. This may happen in two ways. On
the one hand, men may hold to their unlimited freedom as an absolute,
which leads to anarchy. On the other, they may identify the norm with
some imperfect status quo, which leads to tyranny. "These twin evils
... represent the Scylla and Charybdis between which the frail bark of
The only sound
social justice must saiL ... " (Human Destiny, p.
escape from this dilemma of moral experience lies in the recognition of a

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BOOK REVIEWS

transcendent, religious norm beyond history but sufficiently in history to
clarify human possibilities and limitations. This dialectical tension between
time and eternity is the heart of Biblical Christianity.
According to Niebuhr, the interpretation of Biblical revelation is confronted by two dialectical extremes, liberalism which remains oblivious to
the transcendent references and implications, and orthodoxy which takes
literally and reduces them to bad science and worse metaphysics.
The truth is accessible only to an intermediate, dialectical position which
takes Biblical concepts as symbols for what transcends all rational insight,
and Biblical doctrines as myths. The truth is revealed, though in a confused and uncertain manner, in the inner, moral experience of men. The
Bible must be interpreted in the light of this experience rather than
vice versa. Thus the Jesus of history was a finite and imperfect creature.
" It is not possible for any person to be historical and unconditioned at
the same time." (Human Destiny, pp. 60-1) Christ is an abstract symbol.
" Christ is the symbol both of what man ought to be and of what God is
beyond man." (Beyond Tragedy, p.
Any attempt to work out a
coherent interpretation of the doctrine of the Incarnation is condemned as
a metaphysical corruption of the purity of faith. " The logical nonsense
is not as serious a defect as the fact that the statement tends to reduce
Christian faith to metaphysical truths which need not be apprehended
inwardly by faith." (Human Destiny, p. 61)
Such are the salient features of Niebuhr's dialectical theology. Mr.
Carnell is a disciplined philosopher, and his comments are both pertinent
and penetrating. Four basic criticisms emerge from this discussion. They
may be briefly summarized as follows.
First, philosophical issues are inescapable. To scorn them or to oscillate
between contradictory doctrines in a " dialectical " manner is not to solve
them. Mr. Carnell subjects this antirationalism to a careful scrutiny
throughout the book. His comments on the self-contradictory consequences
of Niebuhr's moral relativism (pp. 130 ff. and p.
are especially worthy
of attention. This relativism is no doubt in part responsible for Niebuhr's
defence of the balance of power (cf. pp.
ff.) and his generally cynical
and opportunistic attitude towards international order. (pp.
ff.)
Secondly, Mr. Carnell calls attention to the many philosophical and
theological difficulties attaching to Niebuhr's subjectivist or existential
epistemology of "inner experience" and "feeling." (cf. especially pp.
195 ff.) This has its roots in the neglect of intentionality, and the resulting
subjectivism which is still so influential in contemporary philosophy. But
if rational insight is discarded as untrustworthy and as a manifestation of
intellectual pride, it is hard to see how Niebuhr's elevation of "feeling"
as an inerrant guide can be consistently exempted from the same charges.
Not only does this faculty play the most decisive role in deciding philo-

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319

sophical issues but in deciding theological issues as well. Even the Bible
must be interpreted in the light of the moral experience of men. This
reduction of revelation would seem to be peculiarly open to the charge of
idolizing a mode of human action, which Niebuhr vehemently urges against
rationalism of every kind. Are we then to infer that it is only the rational
faculties of men that are subject to criticism? (cf. pp. 173, 195-6)
Thirdly, Mr. Carnell acutely calls our attention to the many doctrines
and attitudes which Niebuhr shares with that liberalism or modernism to
which he is supposedly most bitterly opposed. He scorns philosophy and
metaphysics. He maintains that the Bible must be interpreted in the light
of an experience available to all men, though in his case this is an inner,
moral experience. He agrees with the modernist that " science " has now
undermined the orthodox interpretation of the Bible. As Mr. Carnell
remarks: " It never occurs to Niebuhr that this obsequious devotion to
science may itself be part of an unwarranted liberal optimism which has
trailed along in our bourgeois culture." (p. 174) His constant employment
of the terms symbol and myth in connection with religious dogma casts
a mist of obscurity over the whole dialectical theology. This may be an
advantage in arguing with contemporary modernists and atheists, but it
does not lead to precision and clarity.
Finally, Mr. Carnell carefully examines Niebuhr's vague and seemingly
conflicting statements about the Incarnation. He clearly shows several
crucial confusions involved in this symbolic approach, and even raises the
question as to whether Niebuhr's assumed belief in the Incarnation can be
reconciled with his existential and symbolic premisses. (pp. 144-5, and
154-6) On the one hand we are presented with a " a relative historic
Jesus," and on the other with the myth of "an absolute transcendent
Christ." Since metaphysics and Christology are rejected as sterile rationalism, we are never given any light as to how the two are to be brought
together. Time and eternity are radically opposed. They are somehow
in dialectical tension. But no light is shed on how this can be even
possible. We are left not with a mystery, but rather with a contradiction.
It is no wonder that Carnell concludes that " Niebuhr's 'mythical ' interpretation of the Christian dogmatic tradition forces him to do away with
the Incarnation." (145)
This book is written by a disciplined mind. Its thought is sharp and clear.
It offers the reader an adequate summary, and a very cogent criticism
of an influential, contemporary school of theology. A wide audience could
profit from its reading.
JoHN WILD
Harvard University,
Cambridge, Mass.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Praelectiones Juris Matrimonii. By TH. M. VLAMING. (4th edition by L.
Bender, 0. P.) Bussum: Paulus Brand, 1950. Pp. 594 with index.
$6.85.
The fourth edition of the respected work on Matrimony by Vlaming
brings to the moral theologian and the canonist a complete and recent
study in this very important field. The third edition was first published in
1919, shortly after the promulgation of the Code and was widely used.
Vlaming himself died in 1985.
Obviously, much legislation, many subsequent decisions and interpretations, as well as commentaries, have appeared in the meantime. Fr.
Bender set about to preserve the contribution of his fellow Hollander and
to incorporate into the work the various corrections and additions which
the intervening years made necessary and useful. While preserving the
original structure and division into twelve parts, Fr. Bender has improved
many chapters and articles by means of change in form or by an entirely
new development. Intended primarily as an international or general
manual, with Roman students in view, this work leaves out particular
civil and ecclesiastical legislation, especially the heavy Dutch emphasis of
the original author. The new edition has many mechanical features to
recommend it over its predecessor. The former two volume work has been
brought out in a single but ample volume. The choice of type fonts, paper
and general make-up offers a far easier and more pleasing medium for
study and reference. The wording of the subtitles in the alphabetical index
has been simplified.
Some of the particular contributions of the latest editor can be singled
out. In the first place, he has more extensively and systematically developed the chapter on the sacrament of matrimony, as well as devoted a
whole chapter of three articles to the ends of marriage, concerning which,
since Vlaming's time, there has been some confusion. With succinct clarity
Fr. Bender states and explains the intrinsic ends of this institution and the
role of voluntary or personal ends (fines operantis) . More prominence is
given to the properties of unity and indissolubility, explaining the difficulties
and objections involved in this admittedly intricate question. The divisions
of matrimony are fairly wholly original in this edition-especially the
notion that the constitutive element of an invalid marriage is the mutual
external act which is the manifestation of matrimonial consent.
Fr. Bender (pp. 150-158) supports the opinion that the "cautiones,"
even if given falsely or insincerely, are true promises and thus do not affect
the validity of the dispensation from the impediment of mixed religion.
This opinion would appear to be far less tenable in view of the Rota
decision in the Albany case. (The Jurist, IX [Jan. 1949], 50-64) .
There is a very interesting discussion (pp. 458-462) on the morality of

BOOK REVIEWS

artificial insemination. Here Fr. Bender disagrees m particular with the
opinion favored by Merkelbach.
An entirely new addition is the appendix on Civil Marriage, unusual in
its length (pp. 554-563) and original in much of its theological thought
and development. It contains " most difficult and intricate questions,"
among which two are noteworthy here.
The first is the author's insistence upon matrimony as an unique species.
Only one specific contract has been instituted by God in nature, which is at
the same time a cause and a sign of grace for those men whom it can
affect, namely, the baptized. Thus, the bond of marriage, as instituted by
God or nature, is one thing. Nature has left the formalities surrounding
the assuming of or entrance into this bond, the celebration of this contract,
to the legitimate determination of the civil and ecclesiastical authorities,
each in its own area of competency. These are the prescribed formalities,
the accidental solemnities, which do not institute but presuppose matrimony
already existing as an institution, and which regulate the valid celebration
or inauguration of the contract in view to the common good,-the State
for the unbaptized, the Church for all the baptized. He describes civil
marriage as matrimony established by nature celebrated in the form prescribed by civil law. By this he insists that civil marriage is not opposed
to the natural bond but rather distinguished against the spiritual or
supernatural bond. Thus the natural bond remains intact with its inseparable obligations and effects, to which are joined the purely civil effects,
i.e. those which depend solely on civil law.
Modern legislators intend to touch not only these merely civil effects,
e. g. property rights, etc., but also the bond and its natural properties, i. e.
all its civil effects. From this fact together with the results of his analysis
of the natural and sacramental character of matrimony, Fr. Bender investigates the morality of the various civil acts pertaining to marriage: the
legislator in establishing a form of marriage or a divorce law, the catholic
judge rendering a divorce decree, the spouse seeking civil marriage or
divorce, the lawyer's action in a civil divorce case, the witnesses of a civil
marriage.
As a second point, attention should be drawn to the teaching exposed
here on the Catholic judge. Fr. Bender discusses the vexing question of
the lawfulness of granting a decree of civil divorce. He employs the words
of the Sovereign Pontiff to the Catholic Jurists of Italy (Nov. 6, 1949) to
the effect that such an act of a judge is not intrinsically evil and may be
lawful for the gravest reasons. In his search for the theological reasons
explicative of the papal teaching on this long-controverted point, Fr. Bender
rejects the opinions of Capello and Duynstee and offers his own solution
on the basis of the instrumental character of the judge. The Catholic
j_udge intends to exercise his office in conformity with divine norms. These,

BOOK REVIEWS

however, deny him competence to sever the matrimonial bond with its
inseparable natural obligations. Knowing this, and being but the intellectual instrument in this juridical act of applying the law in a particular
case, the Catholic judge therefore intends only the purely. civil .effects of
his sentence. This explanation by Fr. Bender of the Pontiff's words justifies
the presence of the elements necessary for the application of the principle
of the indirect voluntary. Although de facto the judicial sentence does
create the observance in practice of the total effects desired by the legislator, this is entirely outside the intention of the judge. With similar argumentation Fr. Bender establishes as lawful in certain circumstances the
petition of a spouse for a civil divorce.
In his Prologomena Vlaming declared his purpose was to oollect into
one tract all that future priests need to know about marriage, including
not only the prescriptions of the law, but also what pertains to the doctrine
of the faith, to moral and pastoral theology, and to sacred liturgy. Through
the recent labors of Fr. Bender this fourth edition has certainly realized
that purpose in our day. Professors of the tract de Matrimonio will lind
this volume of inestimable value in helping in the understanding of the
often complex matter treated, and in the preparation of lectures which will
be more convincing due to the cogency of the arguments and reasons
proposed here. This book can be strongly recommended to all who are in
the market for a complete, up-to-date and readable manual in the broad
field of matrimony.
NICHOLAS HALLIGAN, 0. P.
Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. 0.

Early Medieval Philosophy. By GEORGE BoswoRTH BURCH. New York:
King's Crown Press, 1951. Pp. 150 with index. $2.50.
The title of this book could easily lead one to believe that it does much
more than " describe the doctrines of five outstanding philosophers " of
the early Middle Ages. Professor Burch admits in a very brief preface
that ". . . he cannot hope that there will be complete agreement as to
which philosophers of the period are the most interesting or significant."
We can infer then that the five medieval scholars who, in his opinion, most
eminently qualify according to these criteria of significance and interest
are the ones of whom he writes. He also tells the reader that his book is
based entirely on the sources, most of these being found in Migne's
Patrologia Latina.
The book is divided into five chapters and a brief conclusion with

BOOK REVIEWS

828

bibliography and notes for each chapter. A chapter is devoted to each
of the following men: John Scotus Erigena, Anselm of Canterbury, Peter
Abelard, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Isaac of Stella.
Professor Burch contends that John Scotus Erigena ". . . was not so
much the first medieval as the last ancient philosopher ... " (page 30}
Ancient philosophy is distinguished from medieval insofar as the former
was a search for truth whereas the latter was not. " Medieval philosophy
no longer searched for truth, for it already possessed truth in the dogma of
the Church; it was the attempt to understand that truth and explain how
it is known." (Ibid.) According to Professor Burch, the real medieval
philosophy begins in the eleventh century with Anselm of Canterbury.
The center of interest for medieval as well as for modern philosophers is
the knowledge problem. For the medieval thinkers, Professor Burch points
out," ... the truth about the being of nature was given by Christianity, just
as for modern philosophers it is gh:en by science." (page 31) The reader
should then conclude that about all that remained for medieval thinkers to
discuss was how they knew the truth that they already possessed, whether
it was able to be known by reason or must be held by faith. The professor tells us that ". . . a controversy over this question heralded the
dawn of medieval philosophy in the eleventh century." (Ibid .. )
Professor Burch's study of John Scotus Erigena is adequately and fairly
presented. The professor is at pains to understand the latter's pantheism,
and does much to help dispel the cloud that has hung over this ninth
century philosopher. That John Scotus confused Gregory of Nazianze with
Gregory of Nyssa is the contention of the author who says that this
occurred through the writings of the latter Gregory's commentator, Maximus. If true, this is an interesting fact, but it is not substantiated in any
way by Professor Burch.
In his chapter on St. Anselm of Canterbury the professor gives due
credit to St. Thomas Aquinas for having distinguished between philosophy
and theology. It seems that a central problem of medieval speculation could
have been more accurately portrayed in terms of various attempts to make
this distinction rather than with the veiled assumption that Anselm of
Canterbury initiated the epistemological discussion that is so prominent
in contemporary philosophy.
After some preliminary remarks about the life of St. Anselm, Professor
Burch presents brief analyses of the M onologion, the Proslogion and the
Cur Deus Homo. The" ontological argument" for the existence of God is
objectively explained in detail, and the criticism of St. Thomas Aquinas,
Descartes, Kant and Hegel is noted.
The chapter on Peter Abelard, who is one of the most interesting and
brilliant medieval thinkers,,is relatively lengthy. This chapter begins with
a discussion of the problem of universals, which is briefly traced back to

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BOOK REVIEWS

Porphyry and his presentation of the problem. The extreme realism of
William of Champeaux is dutifully explained as well as his " indifference
theory." Abelard's pre-eminence as a dialectician is noted in brief accounts
of his stormy career as a student and a teacher. Abelard's own answer to
the problem of universals, as well as his criticism of other theories, seems
to be accurately presented.
A good half of this chapter is devoted to Abelard's theology, under which
heading are discussed Abelard's life, his views on faith and understanding,
the Trinity and ethics. In the actual discussion of Abelard's theological
views the reader can gain a fairly clear idea of Abelard's rationalism and
of his excessive devotion to logic. The chapter is concluded with a comparison of Abelard and Bernard of Clairvaux which may leave some readers
with the impression that the latter's unremitting hostility toward the former
was entirely unjustified.
Evidently, Professor Burch has made a special study of St. Bernard of
Clairvaux who is cast in the role of a zealous reformer, a talented scholar
and a brilliant orator. In many ways, Bernard is a foil for Abelard
representing the monastic as against the scholastic spirit. The Professor
briefly discusses the monastic spirit of this period and speaks of Bernard's
mysticism which he describes in terms of eleven steps which the soul
uses in ascending to perfection.
The final chapter on Isaac of Stella indicated some rather original
research on the part of Professor Burch. Isaac seems to have been
neglected by some other historians, and his name is not even listed in such
relatively complete histories as those of Frederick Copleston and William
Turner. If Isaac of Stella effected a "remarkable synthesis of scholasticism
and monasticism," as Professor Burch tells us, this would seem to be a
rather serious omission. The published works of Isaac are to be found in
Migne's Latin Patrology, and these consist of fifty-four sermons and two
essays on The Soul and on The Office of the Mass. Professor Burch presents a brief analysis of Isaac's philosophy under the headings of Ontology,
Cosmology and Psychology. This analysis reveals a rather devout thinker
who seems to have an unusually good understanding of the relationship
between faith and reason and of the philosophy of the period. Without
doubt, many readers will want to make a personal examination of Isaac
of Stella's sermons and measure his importance accordingly.
In the opinion of this reviewer the book might have been more objectively
written as five separate essays on early medieval thinking. Where Professor Burch fulfills his original intention of basing his work " entirely on
the sources," the reader cannot but pay tribute to his scholarly research.
However, when he strives for continuity and to exemplify the unity of
philosophical experience he is guilty of oversimplification and betrays some
prejudice or at least compromises the truth in favor of dramatic detail. One

BOOK REVIEWS

325

instance of oversimplification has already been noted in his pivotal
assertion that " ... medieval philosophy no longer searched for truth ... "
There are several instances of prejudice. Abelard is portrayed almost too
sympathetically; it is quite possible that he was egoistic and difficult to
get along with, that he had a quarrelsome nature and was unsparing of his
own adversaries. It is difficult to believe that Abelard's difficulties with
the monks of St. Gildas and St. Denis were all caused because these monks
were evil and he was good.
The reader will find that Professor Burch's short volume on early
medieval philosophy makes interesting reading. One would find it difficult
to choose other men in the early medieval period whose lives were more
interesting. However, this volume might well give beginners a wrong
impression of medieval philosophy.
R. E. PoRREco
Catholic University,
Washington, D. C.

BRIEF NOTICES
The Nature of Law. By THOMAS E. DAVITT S.J. St. Louis: Herder Book
Co., 1951. Pp.
with index. $4.00.
" This book is a historical introduction to a problem." Thus, in the
opening sentence of the introduction, does the author announce the purpose,
the sc<>pe, and the limitations of his work. The problem is the problem
of the nature of law in its relation to the philosophy of intellect and will
from which every theory of law necessarily proceeds. The history is the
history of those theories of law which arose during the great fertile period
of Christian jurisprudence from the 13th to the early 17th century. Father
Davitt recounts the history and places the problem by analyzing the legal
writings of certain key figures of that period in order to extract from those
writings the theory of law which each writer professed, the source of that
theory in the same writer's psychology of intellect and will, and the natural
effect of that theory in his notion of obligation. Finally, he shows the
effect of this theory of law and obligation upon the same writer's views
on the controversial question of penal laws.
Upon that simple, but very solid, foundation the entire work is built.
The writers are divided into two groups, those who hold for the primacy
of the intellect and those who hold for the primacy of the will in the
concept of law. In each analysis of a particular writer Father Davitt is
careful to point out how an error or a truth in one area of thought leads
to a corresponding error or truth in another subordinate or consequent area
of thought. For example, the concept of the primacy of the will as a
faculty leads to the conclusion that command or imperium is essentially
an act of the will. Since law is the act of command, or imperium, this
leads to the conclusion that law is essentially a thing of the will. From
this we can conclude that the source of obligation in law is the will of
the legislator, not the relation between end and means perceived by the
intellect. Finally, this same emphasis upon will in law causes these jurists
to argue for the existence of purely penal laws, which are specified as penal
by the will of the legislator.
In treating of those who hold to a voluntaristic theory of the faculties,
of command, of law, of obligation, and of penal law, the author examines
Henry of Ghent, Scotus, Ockham, Biel, de Castro, and Suarez. As for
the adherents of an intellectualistic or rational theory of faculty supremacy,
command, law, obligation, penalty-he examines St. Albert the Great,
St. Thomas, Cajetan, Dominic Soto, Medina, and St. Robert Bellarmine.
The work is thus no more, and yet no less, than it purports to be-a

826

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history, and an introduction to a problem. Yet the orderly manner of
treatment, the careful way in which the internal relationships in the
thought of a given writer are worked out, the depth of analysis, make it
an extremely valuable introduction to a problem.
Furthermore, it must be said to the author's credit that he is not content
with the easy role of the historicist who stands off in detachment from the
very real clash of opinions implicit in the contradictory positions he is
examining. Father Davitt casts his lot with the rational theory of law and
considers the future of legal theory to rest in a full working out of the
principles of the Thomistic analysis.
If there is one source of dissatisfaction with the work, it is the treatment
of penal law. Father Davitt obviously intended that the most practical
and pertinent application of the voluntaristic or rational theories he describes would be in deciding the question of the existence of purely penal
laws .. But while he comes to the conclusion that the rational or intellectual
theory of law which he favors necessarily excludes the possibility of laws
which are penal only, he does not really prove, nor does he adequately
answer the objections which he himself raises against it. It must be said,
however, that the formulation of the question, and the statement of the
principles on which a solution depends, are both clearly presented. And it
may well be that the failure we have noted is not a failure at all, but
merely an imperfection intrinsic to a work which is concerned with " an
introduction to a problem," and which is content to indicate the main lines
on which a solution of the problem of the penal law must be worked out.
Whatever be the limitations of a method which does not reach the full
maturity of criticism, the quality of the work as a whole cannot be questioned, nor can its depth and accuracy of statement. It is consoling to find
someone who is seriously attempting to reveal the psychological and metaphysical roots of legal theory. It is even more consoling to be able to
recommend to students of the law a study of legal antecedents which is
not only serious but successful.
.

Eaaaya on Logic and Language. Edited with introduction by A. G. N.
FLEW. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. Pp. 213. $3.75.
Words and their Use. By STEPHEN ULLMANN. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1951. Pp. 108 with bibliography. $2.75.
The first of these books is a collection of essays illustrating and highlighting the growth of the linguistic movement in philosophy, largely as it
has been taking place in the universities of England during the past few
decades. All of the articles' included are reprints from British philosophical
journals, so selected as " to be immediately readable by and intelligible to
9

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the layman." The thesis maintained throughout the book is that most, if
not all, philosophical problems are problems about language, and that
these problems will be seen to vanish if a proper use of words is made in
their systematic restatement.
The second book is a brief introduction to semantics in the " Man and
Society Series." It too is addressed to the layman, but at a less sophisticated level than Logic and Language. The author's avowed intention is
" to make people more word-conscious "; in so doing he touches on the
problem of meaning, the interpretation of word-behavior and changes in
vocabulary, and the shortcomings of language. Viewed philosophically, however, the work amounts to a mild, almost innocuous, endorsement of the
linguistic movement publicized in the first book.
In Logic and Language, Antony Flew succeeds in his plan of presenting
the key essays that have been the outgrowth of Prof. Wittgenstein's school
at Oxford. His contributors include, among others, Gilbert Ryle, J. N.
Findlay, Margaret Macdonald, G. A. Paul, and John Wisdom, and the
problems they discuss reach into all the domains of traditional philosophy.
Prof. Ryle's article, entitled "Systematically Misleading Expressions,"
touches some logical difficulties about predication; his main concern is to
show that the apparent subject terms in many simple propositions are really
concealed predicative expressions, and formal propriety demands that such
propositions be restated as composite propositions. An important consequence of such restatement would be to show that the metaphysician's
problems about "being," existence" and "reality" are largely illusory.
Some of Ryle's perplexity, it seems to this reviewer, would be dispelled by
a clear understanding of the scholastic doctrine on suppositio and the
individuum vagurn. Prof. Findlay launches into a discussion of statements
involving time, and raises questions as to the legitimacy of using the term
" now " when referring to events that take place over a period of time.
He also considers St. Augustine's puzzles about time in the eleventh book
of the Confessions and Zeno's paradoxes. Apparently oblivious of Aristotelian solutions to such problems, Findlay looks for an answer in various
impulses underlying linguistic behavior. In so doing he makes a considerable dent in the traditional science of cosmology. G. A. Paul follows a
similar pattern; he would eliminate much of rational psychology by his
answer to: "Is there a Problem about Sense-Data?" Mr. Hart and Miss
Macdonald invade the field- of moral philosophy in talking about " The
Ascription of Responsibility and Rights " and " The Language of Political
Theory," respectively, while Mr. Wisdom completes the cycle with a
practical negation of natural theology in his article, flippantly entitled
"Gods." Beyond these, there are: Flew's "Introduction," a somewhat
long-winded and subjective foreword that adequately sets the stage for
what follows; and three articles that are more properly concerned with

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329

logic than the others-one by Paul Edwards on induction, another by
Miss Macdonald on analogy, and a third by F. Waisemann on verifiability.
All the articles are self-contained and intelligible, except possibly Mr.
Paul's article, which presupposes a detailed knowledge of the term "sensedatum" and its use by contemporary philosophers, and Dr. Waisemann's,
which was originally part of a symposium and presupposes the discussion
prior to it. The latter author uses a few technical terms from symbolic
logic, but he is the only offender in this regard; all the others, true to
the editor's boast, "write in plain untechnical and unsymbolic English."
Space does not permit, nor do the arguments warrant, a detailed rebuttal
of the philosophical theories propounded in these articles. All the writers
appear to suffer from undue reverence for the success of empiriological
science; they take their point of departure from a subjective appraisal
of language use, and then uniformly apply a dialectic that permits no
other verification than statements concerned with material objects. To
the scholastic philosopher, the resulting treatment of philosophical problems cannot appear as other than impressionist and, to say the least,
shallow. It is true that the manner of stating philosophical propositions
is an important consideration, and the philosopher should always be alert
to the question, " Can you say that? ", no matter what his field of interest
may be. Yet by the very nature of things, the statement must follow the
thought, and talking can never take the place of thinking. Now it seems
that these authors would much rather talk about difficulties than think
about them, and in their talking they ignore, consciously or otherwise,
centuries of profound thought in the established traditions. Apart from
this, more than a little nationalism rears its proud head in their essays;
the impression is created that if Aristotle knew " Basic English," mankind
would have been spared much intellectual anguish. A suspicion of the
ultimate foolishness of this attitude may have dawned on st>me proponents
of the linguistic movement, for W aismann avers (p. 137) : ". . . I m1.1st
warn you that I can't see any ground whatever for renouncing one of the
most fundamental rights of man, the right of talking nonsense." But if
people must talk nonsense, surely they have not the right to expect to
be taken seriously.
Dr. Ullmann's book, on the other hand, does not deserve such harsh
appraisal. Words and their Use is written in an engaging style, and
furnishes much revealing information about philology and its utility as an
adjunct to logic. Purged of the influences of Morris and Korzybski, it
would make good supplementary reading as an introduction to semantic
studies. Still it is related to Logic and Language as shadow to substance;
close inspection shows neither to be of profound philosophical import.

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The Virtues (in General). By St. Thomas Aquinas. TraJ,J.s. J. P. REm.
0. P." Providence: Providence College Press, 1951. Pp. 207. Paper
$2.00, cloth $8.00.
We welcome another Providence College publication making available in
English a previously untranslated work of St. Thomas, the Disputed
Question on the "Virtues in General." The translator gives an introduction to the Disputed Questions in general, and to this one in particular,
giving its historical and doctrinal significance. The moral life, and the
place in it of the virtues, are briefly set forth. The translation itself is
well done and readable, with footnotes on such :words as " ratio " etc.
which are left untranslated at times. The text is preceded by a useful
general outline, and followed by synoptic summaries of each article which
should prove particularly useful to students. Appendix II gives about
fifty pages of notes, many of which are quotations from S. Thomas or
from some modem writer, in explanation of difficult points. St .. Thomas'
determination of the " subjects " of the virtues is seen as one of his
major contributions. We might add that another contribution is the
Thomistic division of moral science into a general and special branch.
N. 88 (p. 152) me.t;ttions the effects of corporal dispositions on the virtues,
but no mention is made of the psychic dispositions of which we learn so
much from modern psychology. N. 48 (p. 159) discusses the theological
value of the doctrine of infused moral virtues. It would have been well to
say something on this point of the modern debates based on historical and
doctrinal investigations if only for the sake of completeness (cf. de Vooght,
Epkem. Tkeol. Lovan. [1988], I, pp. 282-242). There is a good summary of
the teaching on the increase of the virtues (p. 167) witliout, however, any
references to the commentators or to the fairly abundant modern literature
on this question. Some attention also should have been given to the nature
of the habits (habitus) with some bibliography (e. g. the works of
Satolli, Roton, P. Bernard in his translation of the section of the Summa
on the Virtues in the 'Revue des Jeunes' edition), as well as to the
somewhat forgotten distinction between habits and dispositions (cf. Cajetan,
Commentaria in Praedicamenta Aristotelis, ed. Laurent [Rome, 1989], pp.
which has recently been emphasized by J. M. Ramirez, 0. P.
(Studia Anselmiana, Vol. 7-8, pp. 121 :fl.).
These remarks do not detract from the value of this translation, which
may well be recommended for even Latin readers of St. Thomas, but which
will be especially useful to students who read the Angelic Doctor only
in English. We look forward to more translations of this sort from
Providence College.

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831

Love and Friendship. St. Thomas Aquinas on Aristotle's Ethics, bks. VillIX.. Trans. PIERRE CoNWAY, 0. P. Providence: Providence College
Press, 1951. Pp. 148. $2.50.
An English translation by Fr. Pierre Conway, 0. P. of St. Thomas'
Commentary on that section of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics dealing
with friendship is welcomed for three reasons: 1) It will make available
and stimulate interest in the Thomistic Commentaries on Aristotle, books
in which many questions, treated briefly in the Summa, are examined in
more detail. 2) English reading students of St. Thomas will be presen,ted
with the Angelic Doctor's teaching on friendship, a subject rarely treated
in an entirely satisfactory way by ascetic writers, stressing only the case
of "particular friendships," and not at all, usually, by moralists. To the
first of these, St. Thomas declares: "Friends are necessary in all conditions of life"; and to the other, "it pertains to moral philosophy to treat
of friendship." (Book Vill, ch. I) 3) The Thomistic doctrine on charity
as a strict friendship with God can be better appreciated by an understanding of just what the " Doctor communis " means by friendship.
A brief introduction by the translator on the general moral teaching of
St. Thomas and Aristotle is well done though rather brief. The place of
friendship is shown as a " practical necessity " of human happiness in virtue
of man's social nature and as an elective habitus based on virtue. (cf.
n. 2, p. 121) The necessity and virtuous basis of true friendship can be
stressed to counter-balance any exaggeration of some spiritual writers. It
would have been well, for those readers unacquainted with Thomistic moral
thought, to have added a few references to books of a general character
(e. g., those of P. Sertillanges and M. Gilson on St. Thomas' moral philosophy), as well as to works of a more specific character (e. g., that of
P. Simonin on Love, in Arch. d'Hist. Doct. et Litt. du Moyen .Age [1931],
VI, 174-277; and to the chapter in the general work of Sertillanges on
Friendship) .
The English of the translation is uniformly good, and more readable
than that of some other current translations of St. Thomas. Fr. Conway'
deserves praise for this, for it is difficult to render Scholastic Latin into
easy and. understandable English.
The notes, given in the rear of the book, are useful and well done. It is
good to see a recognition of the primacy of the common good (n. 3, p. H!2),
and of the value of the passions " to live a complete and unified life as a
man." (n. 4) One could hope for a note on similitude as the fundamental
cause of love, occasioned by the mention of this matter in Chap. I, Book
VIII .(p. 4). Also, with regard to the love of father and son, there is no
Vill (p. 49, and n.
reference to the interesting passage in Chap. 12,
1705 in the Spiazzi-Marietti Latin edition) which gives 'some Aristotelian

BRIEF NOTICES

basis for the principle of the relation of part and whole; explaining why the
. common good is loved more than the merely individual good. (cf. Summa
Theol., I, q. 60, a. 5, I-II, q. 109, a. 3; II-II, q. 26, a. 3) Rightly maintaining
the impossibility of a strict friendship with God without grace, Fr. Conway
does not mention the fact of an imperfect and analogical friendship of
man with God on the merely natural plane. (cf. S. Thomas, I ad Cor., c. 13,
lect. 14)
Another note (n. 18) mentions " communicatio " as a basis of friendship
and describes it as " an active unity based upon some common ground."
If we take the " common ground " as refering to some formal similitude,
or "communicatio in forma" (emphasized almost exclusively as the basis
of friendship by Fr. Keller, 0. P. in "De virtute caritatis ut amicitia
quaedam divina," Xenia Thomistica, II, 233-279), then Fr. Conway would
be combining this with the active union of lives, the" convivere" (stressed
unduly, perhaps, by P. Coconnier, O.P., "La Charite d'apres S. Thomas
d'Aquin," Rev. Thom., XII, 611-660; XIII, 5-30; XIV, 1-17). Thus, the
author would see no difficulty in reconciling the two opposing schools of
thought on this matter. With this, we are in full agreement, for neither
the basic formal similitude nor the active living"together can be considered
exclusively as the causes of frie1;1dship, just as neither " bonum " nor
" similitudo " can be considered exclusively as the causes of love. One
should, however; stress· that the "communicatio in forma" is the more
fundamental basis of friendship," secundum ordinem naturae."
Note 34 (p. 129) discusses man's self-love. This might be supplemented
by mentioning the fact that, in Thomistic doctrine, the " amor amicitiae "
and the " amor concupiscentiae " are but two aspects of the same act of
love, and that the form of love man has for himself is technically an
" amor amicitiae seu benevolentiae."
In the second paragraph of note 41 (p. 131), Fr. Conway seems to imply
that the problems raised by Kant, at least in Ethics, are " pseudoproblems." This can hardly be correct, any more than can the critical
problem of Kant be called a pseudo-problem. To say also that for Kant
all knowledge is subjective, without the necessary qualifications, is an exaggeration. For both the philosopher of Konigsberg and the Angelic Doctor,
knowledge has both its subjective and objective components.
In closing, we may :recommend this volume to a wide public, and
especially to both clerical and lay students of St. Thomas for whom a
better knowledge of friendship could not but be advantageous.

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333

Tke Spirit of Politics and the.Future of Freedom. By Ross J. S. H9Fl!'MAN.
Milwaukee: Bruce, 1950. Pp. 98. $2.50.
This book, which is the amplified text of the Gabriel Richard Lecture, is
an interesting, stimulating and challenging analysis of the state of freedom
today and its chances for survival. The author believes that one of the
most significant characteristics of the modem political scene is the decline
of freedom. " Hence the danger to freedom, which to men who have known
it is the best of earthly values, is real and enormous." Liberty is threatened
not merely by Soviet Communism but also by the socialization of
democracy.
The .present challenge to freedom is the outgrowth of older, unsolved
difficulties. Before the first World War it was a question of " how to
place the liberal democratic state in the service .of improving society." By
1930 the western world was faced with a new phase of the problem.
" Liberal democracy appeared to be breaking down before the task of
overcoming the great economic depression." The scope of political power
was enlarged to enable it to cope with the economic depression. This
period witnessed the rise of European Fascism and the American New
Deal when it seemed everywhere necessary to fashion" new instruments of
government to enforce social justice and ward off the danger of Bolshevism." The author finds that the problem has now reached its third
and crucial stage. How are we to control the monster machines of public
power which were raised up to solve the problems of our generation? How
is the giant, renovated state to be " mastered and made organically instrumental to the real needs and permanent interests of society "? Are we to
be the wards or slaves of public power or its master?
In order to help preserve freedom, Professor Hoffman urges a change in
the spirit of politics. To bring this about, men must rediscover the " essential truths of the nature and destiny of man and make these truths again
the criterion to which all political actions are referred." The second
requisite for a change in the spirit of politics is the awareness that the
underlying principles of good political society are Divine Providence and
the universal moral law. "Nothing less than a knowledge of these realities
can empty us of presumption and implant that humility that is the beginning of wisdom." Professor Hoffman's philosophy might be summed up
in the words of Judge Jerome Frank with whom he agrees, " I cannot
understand· how any decent man can refuse today to adopt, as the basis of
modem civilization, the fundamental principles of the Natural Law relative
to human conduct as stated by Thomas Aquinas."
In general, the author is to be commended for both originality and
brevity in his survey of a complex question. The threat to freedom is
analyzed historically and philosophically. Especially noteworthy is the

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manner in which this threat is integrated into the general historical setting
of western civilization. The chapter on pragmatism in American life is a
good example of the Professor's originality in handling his subject. This
study contains a good deal of valuable material which merits further
discussion and investigation.

Manuale Philosophiae. By IoANNES DI NAPOLI. Rome: Marietti, 1950.
Vol. I Introductio Generalis-Logica-Cosmologia,
pp. 347; Vol. IT
Psychologia-Gnoseologia-Ontologia,
pp. 581.
New sets of manuals in philosophy for use in seminaries appear
cally. Few of them go beyond their first printing. Giovanni Di Napoli's
endeavor may have a happier fate. The author plans a four volume set,
two of which have already been published. These two will be sufficient
for some judgment of the set.
Since Fr. Di Napoli taught seminarians, he is qualified to write for
the specialized audience. Hence, as to the method of procedure, he is
guided almost exclusively by pedagogical considerations. As to the philosophical content, Di Napoli is professedly Thomistic. The result is two
volumes, beautifully printed, each page well blocked and clear to a point
of unequalled perfection, For the price of clarity of thought, however, it
is often necessary to drop difficult problems altogether or else give only
the most perfunctory notions about them.
By comparison to such manuals as Hugon, Gredt, and Maquart, Di
Napoli has achieved brevity and conciseness that surpasses any of them.
In both volumes he concludes each chapter with summaries and a bibliography. This latter is, by far, one of the best features of the books. They
afford valuable references for students with better than average ability.
Certainly the author has shown more originality and imagination in the
composition of his volumes than has been seen for quite some time. Some
objections, however, may be made. Cosmology, for example, has been
divided into somatologia and biologia. In doing this, Di Napoli shifts the
relation of cosmology to psychology in the Aristotelian- Thomistic concept
almost beyond reconciliation. Another difficulty arises in his understanding,
or at least in his presentation, of metaphysics. Critica is called gnoseologia,
the part dealing with being is termed ontologia, and the section dealing
with God is theologia rationalis. Now this division may seem traditional
enough, but in the way it is set forth, it results in the unity of the science
of metaphysics being confused and practically denied.
Probably the author intends the teacher to smooth out the apparent
errors which arise from the dictates of pedagogy. The chances are, however, that the students will not be the least disturbed. Moreover, they will

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385

welcome, along with the professor, the abundant new material from modern
sciences which has been introduced.
Rarely has a set of manuals been composed that makes philosophy
seem so easy. In that lies the greatest weakness of the new books.
quently they border on a popularization and sometimes an
cation of difficult and profound problems. Yet one may venture the guess
that these shortcomings will not weigh too much against the new volumes.
They may challenge others to overcome such defects while retaining Di
Napoli's improvements.

A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, Vol. II: Medieval Philosophy, Augustine to
Scotus. By FREDERICK CoPLESTON, S. J. Westminster: Newman,
1950. Pp. 6!i!4 with index. $4.50.
This book is the second of several volumes dealing with the history of
philosophy. As stated in the preface of the first volume on the history of
ancient philosophy, Father Copleston's chief motive in writing a complete
history of philosophy is to supply " Catholic ecclesiastical seminaries with
a work that should be somewhat more detailed and of wider scope than
the text-books commonly in use and which at the same time should endeavour to exhibit the logical development and inter-connection of
sophical systems." Adhering to his two objectives, the author tells us in
an illuminating introduction to this present volume that he has revised
his original plan of covering the entire development of medieval philosophy
(" understanding by medieval philosophy the philosophic thought and
systems which were elaborated between the Carolingian renaissance in the
last part of the eighth century A. D. and the end of the fourteenth century ") in favor of devoting two volumes to this period.
The present volume is divided into five parts with a concluding review
and appendices which include a short but adequate general ·bibliography
and special bibliographies for each chapter. The first part deals with
pre-medieval influences, the first chapter of this part covering the patristic
period. The next six chapters, comprising some forty-odd pages, are
devoted to a study of the life and teachings of St. Augustine. Father
Copleston gives detailed attention to the writings of Augustine discussing
many of his theological controversies and works. As he points out, Augustine, in common with the Fathers and early Christian writers, did not make
such a clear distinction betwen philosophy and theology, and very often
philosophical discussions are found in theological works.
A short separate chapter is devoted to the Pseudo-Dionysius, and it is
pleasing to note that Boethius whose importance was often neglected by
other writers is given due emphasis. About twenty-three pages on John

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Scotus Eriugena and a short chapter on the Carolingian Renaissance make
up the second part of the book. The author has availed himself of rather
recent research on John Scotus and other medieval writers and corrects
many false impressions about these men encouraged by previous historians.
Part three of this volume covers the tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries. Here, as elsewhere throughout the work, the author aims more at
bringing out " the logical development and inter-connection of philosophical
systems " than at producing separate and isolated analyses of the different
philosophers of this period whose activities were outstanding. This part
begins with a discussion of the problem of universals and in about twenty
pages deals with such men as Roscelin, St. Peter Damian, William of
Champeaux, Abelard, Gilbert de la Porree, John of Salisbury as well as
many minor thinkers of this period. By comparison Bishop William
Turner's history, which is widely used in Catholic seminaries, gives more
detailed information about these men and their writings. The third part
of this book also includes chapters on St. Anselm of Canterbury, the
School of Chartres, the School of St. Victor and a very short chapter on
Amalric of Bene and David of Dinant. Father Copleston, true to his
initial objectives, acquaints the student with the relative importance of
the various thinkers and shows how they fit into the general pattern of
medieval philosophy.
Part four, dealing with Islamic and Jewish philosophy and the various
translations of the works of Aristotle, lacks detail, but provides the reader
with an accurate view of the important influence of the Moslem and Jewish
writers on medieval thought of the thirteenth century. The reader will
find Father Copleston's brief analysis of the attitude of Dante towards
Averroes, Avicenna and Siger of Brabant interesting. The four pages
devoted to Jewish philosophy seem quite adequate in view of the stated
objective of the author.
The fifth part includes more than half of this volume and deals with
the thirteenth century. To St. Thomas Aquinas and his philosophical
system are allotted eleven chapters covering more than a hundred pages.
From Father Copleston's analysis the intelligent reader can get a fairly
good notion of the Thomistic synthesis. The author has, moreover, availed
himself of recent research on St. Bonaventure and John Duns Scotus. His
study of the latter philosopher, which covers almost seventy pages of this
volume, corrects many former misconceptions which have been fostered
by some older histories of philosophy.
That Father Copleston has done a great service for students of medieval
philosophy is unq1,1estionable. He has written an authoritative, well-documented history which the reader can trust. Although his work is far from
being a " popularization," it is not ponderous and has an easy style which
makes for pleasant reading. As the result of first impressions, this reviewer

BRIEF NOTICES

337

had some misgivings about the success of this history as a text-book for
the reason that certain discussions seemed too erudite for beginners and
presupposed a rather thorough knowledge of philosophy. Actually, however,
the history was primarily intended for Catholic seminarians whose curriculum usually extends over the whole field of philosophy, and who could be
expected to have a basic understanding of philosophy as well as its history.
It is hoped that Father Copleston's History of Medieval Philosophy will
be given a trial in the classroom and not be just another work that graduate
students and teachers can
consult.

Heloise and Abelard. By ETIENNE GILSON. Chicago:
1951. Pp. 209. $3.00.

Henry Regnery,

The greatest love story the world has ever kno.wn, as the romance
between Heloise and Abelard has been called, has been told in many ages,
many languages, and from many points of view. Here we have the philosopher and historian delving into the facts in the case itself and the
culture of the age in which it happened. With this combination of the
abilities of M. Gilson and the purpose he had in mind, namely, to tell the
accurate story from the letters written by Heloise and Abelard, one stands
a fair chance of getting the true picture of this "great love story."
Using as his main source, the correspondence which passed between the
lovers, the author shows forth the history of each after their marriage.
In depicting their lives, it becomes clear that Abelard was the more
spiritual in his repentance, whereas it is doubtful if Heloise ever repented
their illicit love, because, to her, there was nothing to repent. In her
soul of souls she could not convince herself-if indeed she ever triednor could Abelard convince her that her eternal salvation rested upon her
repentance.
There is one important practical point made crystal clear in M. Gilson's
treatment of the correspondence, the supreme difference between masculine
and feminine personality. It rings frequently enough through the letters to
be called a refrain. The man sees life and love from one point of view;
the woman, from another entirely different point of view. This might even
be called " the moral of the story " if there were no doubt as to the
authenticity of the letters. Heloise is the soul of dedication, the altruist,
capable of 'daily martyrdom; Abelard too often sees the world and their
love from his personal point of view. While there is no question as to the
theological correctness of Abelard's analysis of their deed, the psychological
reaction is depicted so clearly from these two points of view, that it might
be well for modern apostles of " equality for the sexes " to see in Heloise
and Abelard a contradiction to their own preachments. " l\iale and female

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He created them," and this maleness and femaleness goes so deeply into
the nature of the human being that modern education and employment
opportunities and votes for woman cannot equalize their natures.
M. Gilson spends some little time in establishing the authenticity of the
letters and also gives some space to refuting contradictory interpretations.
His .brief essay accomplishes its task well, that of the history, the philosophy, and the theology of the episodic careers of Abelard and Heloise.

The Pillar of Fire. By KARL STERN. New York:
Pp. 310 with index. $3.50.

Harcourt, Brace, 1951.

The roads to Rome are many and varied. In recent years that traversed
by numerous intellectuals has been the very direct but steep way laid
down by Saint Thomas with the Summa Theologica serving as a handy
road map. Karl Stern is one intellectual who arrived at his destination
over a different route. As a matter of fact Doctor Stern beat his own trail
mostly though wild and untraveled country, with only his heart for a
compass and divine grace as the magnetic pole. Unlike previous intellectuals
who have found their way into the Church, Doctor Stern's conversion was
not primarily intellectual; unlike many scientists who have arrived there,
he received a minimum of help from his scientific studies. None of the
usual intellectual aids served him as a preamble to Faith as history served
Newman; philosophy, Bergson; the theology of Saint Thomas, countless
others. All were drawn to the Church of Christ in spite of themselves but
they knew why they were drawn (even Bergson who could not make the
final step because of racial loyalty). Doctor Stern was drawn by a powerful
unseen force that was as mysterious as it was powerful.
Pillar of Fire, the account of that battle with God, is aU the more
fascinating because of that mystery. Taken as a whole, it is not the best
of the accounts on conversion, for a good part of the book has nothing to
do with the conversion, being merely a routine and prolix account of an
ordinary childhood. There is no restless search for truth in adolescence and
young manhood that i.s characteristic of most intellectual converts. After
a youthful gesture towards orthodoxy, caused rather by racial pride than
by hunger for truth, Karl Stem settled comfortably, and rather smugly,
into dialectical materialism. Not until the persecution of the German Jews
by the Nazis did Stern see through the error of dialectical materialism and
begin to hunger for God. His first reaction was to seek Him in Judaism
and once more he turned to orthodoxy, this time in deadly earnest, Realizing at length, by feeling rather than by reason, that Orthodox Judaism
was a beautiful relic rather than a living faith, he was compelled to enter
the Church. It would not be correct to say that he left Orthodox Judaism

BRIEF NOTICES

889

because Karl Stern feels he never left it (and indeed he is right), but he
did take (after a long internal battle) the step into the Catholic Church.
What convictions led him to make that final step Doctor Stern never does
make clear in the book because it is not clear to himself. The reasons he
gives are mystical rather than intellectual. Here is no well reasoned
Apologia Pro Vita Sua of a Newman, nor the brilliant apologetic work of
a Chesterton; not even the intellectually satisfying spiritual travelogues of
a Lunn or a Moody or a Stoddard. Here is an account of the action of
Divine Grace on the human heart, an action that is shrouded in mystery,
an action that took place without the intellectual preamble to Faith
experienced by them, It was eminently fitting that Karl Stern (who knew
Maritain and the Dominicans} should have been received into the Church
by a FrancisCan..
Doctor Stern's book is well worth reading. Even those who have little
taste for the prolixity of the first part of the book "'ill find the second
half where the " spiritual voyage " advertised on the dust cover begins,
fascinating.

Poems of Saint John of the Cross. Spanish text with translation. By RoY
CAMPBELL. New York: Pantheon Books, 1951. Pp. 98. $2.75.
Saint John of the Cross has admirably blended the exactness of a
theologian and the warmth and love of a mystic in the twenty-two works
that comprise his poetic production. His poems are highly concentrated
literary gems; their stanzas compress within their framework substantial
mystical ideas. These twofold qualities are not easily discoverable among
poets or scholars. As is evident, the poetic and mystical experience of
Saint John was not destined to be confined to the Spanish speaking world.
Attempts were made to translate it into other languages. Several English
translations have been published: by Audrey Bell, by David Lewis and by
E. Allison Peers. The latter, a renowned authority on Spanish mystical
literature, elaborated two different translations: one merely rhythmical and
the other metrical with a rhyme scheme. corresponding to the original. Now,
there has appeared this new translation whose aim is to preserve the utmost
conformity with the original, while prese:Q.tingthe poems in modern English
verse. The translator-poet has tried to arouse in English readers an esthetic
response equivalent to that experienced by the Spanish reader. This, of
course, called for a bilingual poetic mastery of a high order. Mr. Roy
Campbell shows manifold evidence of possessing these required creative
abilities.
His poems, when read without reference to the Spanish, give the impression, and strongly so, of original creations. However, when comparisons

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BRIEF NOTICES

are made with the Spanish by a bilingual reader, it must be admitted that
even though the borrowed thoughts and emotions are not often diluted or
modified in the process of translation, yet the esthetic impression is not
the same. These poems do not have that Latin musicality and vocalic
fulness which makes Spanish poetry a delight to the ear.
More critical readers will find slight flaws in the translation; they may
object to phrases slightly over-realistic in tone which seem out of place in
outbursts of mystical love; fault may be found with the choice of words
here and there, as, for instance: "They asked me for a ditty" ( p. 81)
referring to a hymn of Sion. However, the shortcomings brqught to light
by the constructive criticism of scholars will not take away the fact that
the average reader will find the translations a thorough joy, an opportunity of sharing in the mystical experiences of a saintly poet. This
enriching experience should lead the reader of the poems to the explanatory
prose writings of the Saint, and through them to the Supreme Beauty and
Love which is God.

Unless Some Man Show Me. By A. JoNES. New York:

Sheed & Ward,

1951. Pp. 173.

" These pages are written for the average person." These words form
the opening sentence in the forward to this book and are perhaps the least
intelligible, unless we are to understand that the average Englishman is
quite a scholar indeed. After four opening chapters on inspiration and
literary forms, Father Jones collects some of the knottiest problems from
the Old Testament, and applies to them the best of the latest solutions
provided by Catholic scholars. He shows a good sense of judgment in the
choice of solutions and a vast store of knowledge in their discussion. This
last is attested to by frequent references to Revue Biblique, Biblica, works
by Bea, Lagrange, Skinner, DeVaux, and others.
However, he is to be especially praised for the "literary form" that is
the vehicle for his presentation. With a keen sense of humor, that will
bring many a chuckle, he disposes of the critics' charges against the supposed attitude of the Church to science and the harmony of the latter with
the Bible. Yet it is this same "literary form" that at times leaves the
reader wondering just what Father Jones is getting at. Clarity of thought,
it seems, is being sacrificed for the clever phrase. Although it does provide
the sauce that makes the meat of such problems as the Canticle of
Canticles, the Book of Jonas, and the first three chapters of Genesis
palatable, it would ,require more than an "average" stomach to digest the
author's solution to a difficulty like the tree of knowledge of good and evil.
AU in all, nonetheless, this is a book worth reading-even study.

BRIEF NOTICES

841

History of Russian Philosophy. By N. 0. LossKY, New York: lnternat.
Univers. Press, 1951. Pp. 416 with index. $10.00.
The author, now teaching philosophy at the Russian Orthodox Seminary
in New York, was, until exiled by the Bolshevists, professor of Philosophy
at the University of St. Petersburg. Born in 1870, he has witnessed much
of the development of philosophy in his country 3I!d contributed notably
to it himself. His work fills an often felt lacuna; the West is but little
acquainted with the men and ideas representative of the Russian world,
that is, prior to the domination by Communism. To-day, the philosophical
tradition of Russia is alive with the emigres in various places.
A history of philosophy is essentially in the form of reports, and to report
on these again is hardly feasible. But out of the diverse currents of
philosophical thought analyzed, appraised, and sometimes criticized, an
over-all picture merges which one may try to outline.
Although there have been materialistic and positivistic thinkers, the
majority of Russian philosophers remains rooted in or, at least, closely
related to the religious tradition of Russian Orthodoxy .. Not a few men
found the way b11ck to the faith after having gone astray in their younger
years and have built up their philosophies of their mature age in accord
with the teachings of their faith.
To understand the spirit of Russian philosophy, one has to take account
of this close relation and of the peculiarities of the Russian religious sentiment. The influences which shaped Russian philosophy are, however, not
only those of religious orthodox doctrine and, naturally, the impact of
Western philosophies, but certain other ideas stemming from the East,
though not strictly from the Eastern Church. Still within the framework
of the latter, one may place the notions derived either directly from NeoPlatonism or indirectly through Pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus Confessor, and
others. Apart from this, there is a definite trace in some writers of the
Gnosis. Professor Lossky does not stress this last point, but his summary
of the ideas, e. g., of Father Pavel Florensky, reveals much of this influence.
Especially, the preoccupation of more than one thinker with the idea of
" Sophia " is strongly reminiscent of gnostic speculation.
Thus, the whole " intellectual climate " of Russian philosophy differs in
a remarkable manner from that of the West. No wonder that Western
ideas were often subjected to fargoing transformations and that a particular
influence fe11 to such ideas as show some resemblance to either NeoPlatonism or to mysticism. Both the acquaintance with and the importance
of medieval philosophy, especially its Aristotelian branch, seems to have
been almost null, compared with the recognition of Eriugena, Eckehart, and
of later writers such as Jacob Boehme. This renders also intelligible the
interest in Schelling, the peculiar interpretation of Hegel, and the insignificant role played by Kantian and Neo-Kantian ideas.

BRIEF NOTICES

Brief though the characterizations of many authors are, they furnish a
clear picture of Russian philosophy. They also reveal the intimate relation
of speculative thought with not only religious meditation but national and
cultural aims.
seems to be a strong and lively consciousness, pervading
the minds of almost all writers, of the peculiarities of Russian mentality
as set over against that of the West.
So far as one may venture to form an opinion without acquaintance with
the primary sources, Professor Lossky seems to be right when he points
out that one characteristic feature is " a keen sense of reality," giving rise
to a definite intuitionist trend of which the author himself is the most
outstanding representative. Most of these philosophers are, in epistemology,
realists. Another remarkable feature is the tendency towards a complete
integration of all sides of human life; therefore the preoccupation with ethics
which for many is the primary problem. The third basic characteristic,
already referred to, is the preservation of the connection of philosophy and
faith.
To name the <;hapters into which the book is divided seems unnecessary;
this would amount to a mere enumeration of names most of which are
unknown to the readers. The book should be read by everyone concerned
with the fundamental problems of. philosophy and interested in the unity
of the human mind. Through it one comes to know a mentality different
from that one is accu,stomed to view as typical of the speculative philosopher and one sees an approach presenting novel features.
Rewarding though the study of this work will prov;e, the reader may
regret certain defects. One is that it does not become clear always whether
a work referred to in the text is available in translation. All titles are given,
with very few exceptions, in English. The place of publication is not always
indicated. There is no bibliography and references usually are in the text,
not in footnotes. Another piece of information one might wish to see added
concerns the literature used by and known to the Russian writers, especially
as regards the Eastern sources mentioned above.
These are, however, slight imperfections. To judge from the chapters on
better known authors, the summary given of the views of the various
thinkers appears to be complete. At least, one gets the impression of a
comprehensive presentation. Thus, for instance, the author manages to
outline and criticize the conte111poraryphilosophy of " dialectic materialism "
in 3fl pages in a perfectly satisfactory manner. On the whole, one is grateful
to Professor Lossky for this valuable work.

BRIEF NOTICES

343

John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor. By F. A. HAYEK. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951. Pp. 8!l0. $4.50.
In this collection of letters, most -of which were exchanged between John
Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor (later Mrs. John Stuart Mill) , Professor
Hayek has refrained from interpretation, any attempt at which, he says,
". . . would almost inevitably have interfered with the impartial presentation of the documents." Since this lack of interpretation allows the reader
to indulge in one of his own, he may not be inclined to agree with the jacket
blurb that this correspondence " gives a significant and charming glimpse
of intellectual life in Victorian England." Instead the reader may be urged
to contend that though the glimpse given is significant, for it is based on
a certain amount of newly discovered correspondence, the glimpse is far
from charming.
There is a certain rampant rationalism dominant throughout these letters,
which may have been daring and radical a hundred years ago, but today
sounds considerably trite if not trivial. The positivism, the agnosticism,
and the utilitarianism espoused and expressed by these two thinkers of the
Victorian era have since been found to be horribly insufficient to achieve
the good society. The moral estheticism or eclecticism, thrusting aside all
religious implications, which Mr. Mill and Mrs. Taylor considered necessary to promote freedom and progress has been proven to achieve nothing
but social chaos. The really significant revelation of these letters is a
picture of two thinkers-inquiring, sincere, distrustful of the sacrosanct
values of the past, confident of the ultimate triumph of the natural man
over the presumed idiocies of society-whose minds are at bay.
Too, there is an unintentional and perhaps more interesting revelation
to be discerlted in these letters, that of the personalities involved. In Mill's
Autobiography, Mrs. Taylor is acclaimed extravagantly for her aid in
formulating his thought. Many of his contemporaries, particularly Carlyle;
and many others since have been of the opinion that she merely echoed
rather than inspired that thottght. Professor Hayek's work is supposed to
belie this opinion. Yet even a casual reading of his book, which is said to
provide direct evidence to the contrary, does not disclose any effective
impact on Mrs. Taylor's part as far as Mill's mind is concerned. It could
be possible, of course, that both were in such
accord that the differences in their thought can not be distinguished.
Furthermore, Mrs. Taylor is shown to be not as altruistic as the logic of
her philosophy would demand; she has the typical, Victorian grande dame
attitude toward servants and the poorer classes; she makes some calculating
observations regarding the discovery of gold in California that might not
agree with that utilitarian premise of the greatest
for the greatest
number; she can be querulous and shrewish, too, when she is balked. Then,
though this is hardly pertinent, one wonders, if she was 'as brilliant as she

10

344

BRIEF NOTICES

was supposed to be, why she ever indulged in some of the baflling syntax to
which she was addicted.
John Stuart Mill, whom Harriet Taylor considered to be so noble and
generous, hardly emerges as such in some of these letters, betraying instead
an irrit'ating smugness at times, particularly when abroad, mingling with
those he probably termed the " natives." His behavior toward his own
family appears to be inexcusably churlish. His conceit is occasionally appalling, a conceit shared by Harriet; they both agreed that their thought
was too sublime to be appreciated by the masses. There is a tragic irony also
in his doting earnestness about his " thought a day "; one wonders how
any man of intellectual pretensions, particularly a man like Mill, could
be so mesmerized by some of the platitudes he voiced.
This correspondence has, though, a sociological value, disclosing, as it
does, the Mill-Taylor attitude toward religion, marriage, divorce, politics
and economics; Mrs. Taylor's sublime contempt for all the sanctions of her
world, her retaliation against anyone who presumed to censure her conduct
or question her platonic friendship with Mill; Mill's interest in poetry, art
and music, his evaluation of the continental nations; the background of a
segment of Victorian society which is hardly known. For such information
is John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor worth the reading.

D. H. Lawrence and Human Existence. By WILLIAM
York: Philosophical Library, 1951. Pp. 139. $3.00.

TIVERTON.

New

The enigma of D. H. Lawrence is again assayed in this slim volume by
Father Tiverton, a member of an Anglican religious order. The task to
which the author has committed himself is an enormous one; though
Lawrence is considered one of the outstanding literary figures of the QOth
century, he was a man of baflling personality, chaotic ideas and repulsive
attitudes. Lawrence himself constantly quested for an absolute in life,
something which proved as elusive as the evaluation which Father Tiverton
tries to achieve in this criticism. Yet the effort and the probing which this
latest search into the labyrinthine character of Lawrence involved, do
deserve notice.
The author does reveal in a terse manner a portrait of Lawrence as a
man, as an artist, and as a thinker, while he tries to fit this three-dimensional
picture within a Christian frame. Etched though this picture is, with an
array of citations from Lawrence's prose and poetry, comments from his
friends and enemies, arguments culled from renowned thinkers, even St.
Thomas Aquinas, the figure is about as clear and impressive as one of
Lawrence's own self portraits; Lawrence was also a painter with a rugged
primitivism dominant in his work.

BRIEF NOTICES

845

Lawrence the man is shown to be the victim of an extremely unhappy
childhood, the son of a drunken, cruel father and an inhibited mother.
Though he was lionized by women, loved perhaps by a few, notably Frieda
von Richthofen whom he spirited away from her husband, he appeared to
be continually frustrated, travelling to the far corners of the earth in a
ceaselessly futile quest for happiness. To further his unhappy doom tuberculosis beset him during the latter part of his life. Even the prohibitions
imposed upon his books, whi<.;h made him notorious, proved extremely
irritating; he labored under the delusion that he was somewhat of a savior
fated to redeem mankind through an esoteric and somewhat unintelligible
evangel. As a man he emerges as a pitiable person.
Lawrence's artistry is perhaps best considered by Father Tiverton;'this
aspect of his life is judged by the concrete evidence of his works and admits
,of little if any argument. Lawrence was a powerful but erratic writer,
capable of an arresting lyricism, an intensity of feeling, deft description
(particularly of nature), and smarting satire. But he was also prone to
forego the artistically logical demands of his work in favor of ranting,
irresponsible attacks against his real or presumed enemies, and jeremiads
against any system of society which he loathed.
Lawrence's thought processes perhaps defy analysis, yet Father Tiverton
attempts to discern within them some system or consistency. This feature
of his criticism may be difficult to accept; Lawrence was too contradictory
to be examined by any frame of reference. For instance, though many of
his own novels were outrageously prurient, he said vehemently of Joyce's
Ulysses, "The 'last part of it is the dirtiest, most indecent, obscene thing
ever written." While he acknowledged himself to be a pantheist, he also
insisted that the problem of existence demanded that man find God.
Though he was somewhat of an advocate of polygamy, he emphasized the
necessity of monogamy to stabilize civilization. Such are too few examples
of his contradictory thought. Undaunted though, Father Tiverton examines
all of Lawrence's pronouncements, paying reverent due to any trace of
genuine religious feeling which they contain. Father Tiverton is to be
commended for his effort and his industry more so than for the result;
though his book is interesting, it is hardly convincing.

They Lived The Faith. By THOMAS P. NEILL. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1951.
Pp. 388 with index. $4.50.
Mr. Neill was prompted to the writing of this collection of sketches of
19th century Catholic lay leaders by two considerations: first because the
subjects of these sketches have been almost totally ignored by secular
historians. Second, because they have been largely neglected by Catholic
historians also, who are prone, says Mr. Neill, to emphasize the contribution

846

BRIEF NOTICES

of Churchmen: "of Gibbons, Manning, Newman, Dupanloup and Von
Kettler." The second statement is about as correct as saying that Cardinal
O'Connell is better known to Catholics of the twentieth century than AI
Smith, and the author needs no such weak excuse for presenting a fine
book, Mr. Neill's study of the thirteen Catholic lay leaders is an excellent
piece of work. Written in a popular, easy-to-read style it makes no display
of the solid, painstaking scholarship upon which it is based. Its one serious
fault is a tendency to repetition that can be easily discounted.
The work is divided into three parts: I. Political adjustment as represented by the battles of Daniel O'Connell, Count Charles de ,Montelambert,
Ludwig Windthorst and Garcia Moreno; IT. Social adjustment as shown by
the lives and works of Pauline Jaricot, Frederic Ozanam and Albert de Mun.
ill. Intellectual action as demonstrated by Joseph de Maistre, Joseph
GQrres, Donoso Cortes, Orestes Bro\vnson, Louis Veuillot and Wilfred Ward.

Out of Bondage. By ELIZABETH BENTLEY. New York: Devin-Adair, 1951.
Pp. 305. $3.50.
The burden of this tale of espionage is already well known to those who
adds some facts about her backread the newspapers. To it Miss
ground, including why she became a Communist, an agent for a foreign
government, and a traitor to her own. This is no learned treatise on
dialectical materialism, concerning which the author knows very little; nor
is it an expose of the overall strategy of the Communist Party, of which
she is equany ignorant. But it is a gripping cloak and dagger tale that is
better than most novels on a similar subject. The writer handles her
material with the skill of a good novelist, and if her work were to be
judged as a novel, its greatest weakness would be its improbability.
Before she turns her hand to further writing either of fact or of fiction
Miss Bentley should, for the honor of Vassar, polish her literary style. The
use of cliche and the repetition of favorite words and phrases are glaring
faults. Not once in the course of this history does she go normally to bed.
She always crawls there. And she never laughs except hysterically.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Alvarez, A. G., Introduccion a la Metafisica, 1951. Mendoza, Argentina:
Universidad Nacional de Cuyo. Pp. 393, with index.
Bruno de Jesus-Marie, Satan, 1952. New York: Sheed & Ward. Pp. 530.
$5.50.

Bryar, W., St. Thomas and the Existence of God, 1951. Chicago: Henry
Regnery Co. Pp. 277, with index. $5.00.
Camap, R., The Continuum of Inductive Methods, 1952. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pp. 97, with index. $3.50.
Chudoba, B., The Meaning of Civilization, 1951. New York: P. J. Kenedy.
Pp. 321. $4.00.
Deandrea, M., Praeelectiones Metaphysicae, 1951. Rome: Officium Libri
Catholici. Pp. 301, with index.
De La Gorce, A., St. Benedict Joseph Labre, 1952. New York: Sheed &
Ward. Pp. 213. $3.00.
Della Veneria, C. R., L'lnquisizione Medioevale, 1951. Torino: Berruti.
Pp. 2U, with index. 600 L.
Dowey, E. A., The Knowledge of God in Calvin's Theology, Hl52. New
York: Columbia University Press. Pp. 272, with index. $3.75.
Garrigou-Lagrange, R., De Beatitudine, 1951. Torino: Berruti. Pp. 485,
with index. 1800 L.
Gilby, T., St. Thomas Aquinas-Philosophical Texts, 1951. New York:
Oxford University Press. Pp. 427, with index. $3.00.
Feibleman, J. K., Ontology, 1951 Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. Pp.
826, with index. $9.75.
Giacon, C., Le Grandi Tesi del Thomismo (2nd ed.), Milan: Marzorati.
Pp. 325, with index. 700 L.
Gillet, M., Lacordaire, 1952. Paris: Dunod. Pp. !!.!48. 540 Fr. fr.
Guardini, R., Vie de la Foi, 1951. Paris: Les Editions du Cerf. Pp.
240 Fr. fr.
Guigo, (trans. Jolin, J. J.), Meditations of Guigo, Prior of the Charterhouse,
1951. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. Pp. 84, with index.
$!!.!.00.
Hanke, L., Bartolome de Las Casas, 1952. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press. Pp. 133, with index. $3.50.
Hatch, W. H., Facsimiles and Descriptions of Minuscule Manuscripts of the
New Testament, 1951. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Pp.
300, with index. $15.00.
Hoenen, P., Reality and Judgment According to St. Thomas, 1952. Chicago:
Henry Regnery Co. Pp. 340, with notes. $6.00.
Jeffress, L. A. (ed.), Cerebral Mechanisms in Behavior, 1952. New York:
John Wiley & Sons. Pp. 325, with index. $6.50.

347

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Klenke, Sr. A., Seven More Poems by Nicholas Rozon, 1951. St.
ture: Franciscan Institute. Pp. 171, with glossary.
Laidlaw, W. A., Latin Literature, 1951. New York: Philosophical Library.
Pp.
with index.
New York: Philosophical
Lamont, C. (ed.), Man Answers Death,
Library. Pp. 346, with index. $4.50.
La Pira, G., Tke Philosophy of Communism,
New York: Fordham
University Press. Pp. 318. $5.00.
Leibniz, G. W. (ed. Farrer, A.), Theodicy,
New Haven: Yale University Press. Pp. 448, with index. $6.50.
Marcel, G. (trans. Crauferd, E.), Homo Viator, 1951. Chicago: Henry
Regnery Co. Pp.
$3.50.
Westminster:
Messenger, E. C. (ed.), Theology and Evolution,
Newman. Pp. 337, with index. $4.50.
Mitterer, A., Dogma und Biologie,
Vienna: Herder. Pp.
with
index. $13.60 S. fr.
Nash, R., Tke Seminarian at his Pn'e-Dieu, 1951. Westminster: Newman.
Pp.
$3.50.
Nuesse, C. J., and Harte, T. J. (ed.), The Sociology of the Parish, 1951.
Milwaukee: Bruce. Pp. 365, with index. $4.50.
Padovani, U., and Sciacca, M., Bibliografia Filosofica Italiana, 1949. Milan:
Marzorati. Pp.
with index. 800 L.
Picard, M., Flight from God,
Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. Pp. 198.
$UO.
Pieper, J., Leisure, The Basis of Culture,
New York: Pantheon.
Pp. 169. $U5.
Powers, F. J. (ed.), Papal Pronouncements on the Political Order,
Westminster: Newman. Pp.
with index. $3.50.
Prentice, R. P., The Psychology of Love according to St. Bonaventure,
Pp. 150, with index.
1951. St. Bonaventure: Franciscan
$MO.
Rilke, R. M. (trans. Spender, S.), The Life of the Virgin Mary, 1951. New
York: Philosophical Library. Pp. 49. $9.!.75.
Scano, E., Il Cristocentrismo, 1951. Torino: Berruti. Pp. 180. 350 L.
Paris: Desclee de Brouwer.
Siwek, P., Au Coeur Du Spinozisme,
Pp.
with index.
St. Thomas Aquinas, Super. Evangelium S. Matthaei, 1951. Torino:
Marietti. Pp. 438, with index.
Vier, P. C., Evidence and Its Function according to Duns Scotus, 1951.
St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute. Pp. 185, with index.
Vocation Institute, Proceedings of Third Vocation Institute, 1949. Notre
Dame: The Vocation Institute. Pp. 88. $0.50.
Warfield, B. B., Biblical and Theological Studies,
Philadelphia:
Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co. Pp.
$4.50.