THE
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
EDITED BY THE DoMINICAN FATHERS

GE ERAL I DE
VOLUME I (1939)
TO

VOLUME XV (1952)

THE THOMIST PRESS
Publisher.<t

CONTENTS

GENERAL INDEX

PAGE

1. Analytical Index of Articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

Authors of Articles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

3. Book Reviewers.........................

.........

27

4. Books Reviewed.................................

35

5. Brief Notices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

44

GENERAL INDEX
l. ANALYTICAL

INDEX OF ARTICLES

Act, The Interpretation of the Conjugal -- and the Theology of Marriage.
(B. Lavaud Qp)
I (1939) 360-380
Ages, The Conflict of Methods at the End of the Middle-. (J. Maritain)
III (1941)
Y (1943) !el9-228
America, Contemplation in -. (J. S. Middleton)
--,The Assumption and Devotion to Mary in-. (A. G. Cicognani)
XIV (1951)
Analogy, On-. (I. M. Bochenski op)
XI (1948) 424-447
Analysis, A Thomistic - of Peace. (F. E. McMahon)
I (1939)
Answer, To Be--That is the -. (E. Chapman)
v (1943) 137-152
X (1947) 133-158
Apostle, Twentieth Century-. (W. Farrell op)
Aquinas, The Idea of the Church in St. Thomas -. (M. J. Congar op)
I (1939) 331-359
--,Beauty in- and Joyce. (F. L. Kunkel)
)(II (1948) 261-271
--, Cf. Thomas, Thomisrn, Thomistic.
Aristotle, Euclid and-. (T. Greenwood)
XV (195!e) 374-403
Aristotelian, The Characters of - Logic. (T. Greenwood)
IV (1942) 221-246
--, -and Mathematical Logic. (H. Veatch)
}[III (1950) 50-96
Art, Outline of a Philosophy of-. (A. J. Steiss)
II (1940) 14-48
--, in France and England. (J. U. Nef)
v (1943) 281-307
Aspect, The Cognitive- of Emotions. (R. Allers)
IV (1942) 589-648
Aspects, Cognitive - of the Heisenberg Principle. (V. E. Smith)
XII (1949) 474-499
Assumption, The- and Devotion to Mary in America. (A. G. Cicognani)
XIV (1951) 22-30
--, The- and the Modern World. (F. J. Sheen) XIV (1951) 31-40
--, The Dogmatic Definition of the-. (C. Friethoff op)
XIV (1951) 41-58
--,The- and the Immaculate Conception. (G. M. Roschini osm)
}[IV (1951) 59-71
.
--, The- among Mary's Privileges. (K. J. Healy ocarm)
XIV (1951) 72-92
--, The- in the Spiritual Life. (M.D. Philippe op)
J{IV (1951) 93-108
--, The Places of the-. (F. M. Abel op)
XIV (1951) 109-117
--, The History of the Feast of the-. (W. O'Shea ss)
XIV (1951) 118-132
--, A Bibliography of the-. (J. B. Carol ofm) )(IV 1951) 133-160

4

GENERAL

Attitude, The Humanitarian

INDEX-VOLUMES

I TO XV

versus the Religious -.

(A. Kolnai)
VI 1944)
Authority, The Bases of the International Military Tribunal's -. (J. P.
Kenny op)
XI 1948)
--, The - of St. Thomas. (S. Ramirez op)
XV
1-109
Bases, The -- of the International Military Tribunal's Authority. (J. P.
Kenny op)
XI (1948)
Basic, - Confusions in Current Notions of Propositional Calculi. (H.
Veatch)
XIV (1951)
Basing-Point, The Morality of- Pricing. (R. Jancauskas sj)
XV
349-373
Basis, The - of the Suarezian Teaching on Human Freedom. T. U.
XI (1948) 1-17, 330-369,
XII (1949)
Mullaney op)
48-94,
Be, To --That is the Answer. (E. Chapman)
V (1943)
Beatitude, Matter,-, and Liberty. (A. C. Pegis)
V (1943)
--, The Social Character of Heavenly-. (R. C. Petry)
VII (1944) 65-79
Beauty, Value,- and Professor Perry. (H. E. Cory)
IV
l-40
--, The Lure of -. (J. Fearon op)
VIII (1945) 149-184
--,The - of God. (T. C. Donlan op)
X (1947)
--, -in Aquinas and Joyce. (F. L. Kunkel)
XII (1949)
(W. H. Kane op)
Being, The First Principles of Changeable-.
VIII (1945)
Believe, What the Modern Man Should Not-. (P. H. Conway op)
}([ (1948)
Bibliography, - of Jacques Maritain:
(R. Byrns)
(1943) 345-371
--, A- of the Assumption. (J. B. Carol ofm) XIV (1951) 133-160
Blessed,- Pius X and Theology. (J. M. Egan op) XIV (1951)
Bodily, The Effects of - Temperament on Psychical Characteristics.
(L. M. Bond op)
X · {1947)
XI (1948) 28-104
Body, Sacramental Incorporation into the Mystical -. (J. T. Dittoe op)
IJC (1946) 469-514
--, Thomistic Soteriology and the Mystical-. (E. Sauras op)
XV (1952) 543-571
Burke, The Theory of Oligarchy: Edmund-. (R. M. Hutchins)
(1943) 61-78
Calculi, Basic Confusions in Current Notions of Propositional -. (H.
XIV (1951)
Veatch)
Case, The- for Confirmation. (J. R. Gillis op)
X (1947) 159-184
Xlli (1950) 353--400
Casuistics, International -. (T. Greenwood)
Catholic, Claudel and the - RevivaL (L. S. Bondy osb)
(1943) 171-187
Century, Twentieth- Apostle. (W. Farrell op)
X (1947) 133-158
Certitude, The - of Hope. (W. M. Conlon op)
X (1947) 75-119,

v

v

v

ANALYTICAL

5

INDEX OF ARTICLES

(W. H. Kane op)
VIII (1945) 27-67
Character, The Social- of Heavenly Beatitude. (R. C. Petry)
VII (1944) 65-79
--, The Configuration of the Sacramental-.
(J. S. McCormack op)
VII (1944) 458-491
Characteristics, The Effects of Bodily Temperament on Psychical -.
(L. M. Bond op)
X (1947) 423-501
){I (1948) 28-104
Characters, The - of the Aristotelian Logic. (T. Greenwood)
IV (1942) 221-246
Charity,- and the Social Order. (L. S. Ryan op)
III (1941) 539-563; IV (1942) 70-120, 247-265
--, Hope and - in St. Thomas. (P. DeLetter sj)
XIII (1950) 204-248, 325-352
Christian, The Role of Sacramental Grace in the -Life. (C. B. Crowley
II (1940) 519-545
op)
--, The Militant- Virtues. (H. I. Smith op)
IV (1942) 193-220
--, St. Thomas and-- Perfection. (D. L. Greenstock)
XIII (1950) l-15
--, Kierkegaard and - Philosophy. (J. Collins)
XIV (1951) 441-465
-, - Liberty. (D. A. O'Connell op)
XV (1952) 209-246, 404-493
--, The Dynamics of- Perfection. (W. A. Hughes op)
XV (1952) 247-288
Church, The Idea of the- in St. Thomas Aquinas. (M. J. Congar op)
I (1939) 331-359
--, Mystici Corporis and the Soul of the -. (J. I. McGuiness op)
XI (1948) 18-27
Claude!,-- and the Catholic Revival. (L. S. Brady osb)
v (1943) 171-187
Cognition, The Intellectual - of Particulars. (R. Allers)
III (1941) 95-163
Cognitive,- Aspect of the Heisenberg Principle. (V. E. Smith)
}(II (1949) 474-499
--, The -Aspects of Emotions. (R. Allers)
IV
589-648
Common, The- Sense, Perfection of the Order of Pure Sensibility. (B. J.
Muller-Thym)
II (1940) 315-343
--, The Meaning of the"- Man." (A. Kolnai) XII (1949)
Community, The International - according to Francis de Vitoria. (H.
Munoz op)
X (1947) 1-55
Comparison, A between Human and Divine Friendship.
(L. M.
Bond op)
III (1941) 54-94
Concept, The Thomistic- of Devotion. (J. W. Curran op)
II (1940) 410-443, 546-580
--, The Thomistic - of Culture. (R. E. Brennan op)
(1943) 111-136
Changeable, The First Principles of- Being.

v

6

GENERAL INDEX-VOLUMES

I TO XV

Conception, The Assumption and the Immaculate -. (G. M. Roschini
osm)
XIV (1951) 59-71
Configuration, The-- of the Sacramental Character. (J. S. McCormack
VII (1944) 458-491
op)
Confirmation, The Case for-. (J. R. Gillis op)
X (1947) t59-184
Conflict, The- of Methods at the End of the Middle Ages. (J. Maritain)
III (1941) 527-538

Confusions, Basic - in Current Notions of Propositional Calculi. (H.
Veatch)
XIV (1951) 238-258
Conjugal, The Interpretation of the - Act and the Theology of Marriage.
I (1939} 36G-380
(B. Lavaud op)
Connection, Notes on the- of the Virtues. (P. Lumbreras op)
XI (1948} 218-240
Contemplation, - in America. (J. S. Middleton)
V (1943) 219-228
Contemporary, - Theories of Man. (J. Collins)
XII (1949) 17-47
Continuum, The Platonic Theory of the -. (T. Greenwood}
VII (1944} 179-203

Conversion, Theological Problems of-.

(C. F. Pauwels op)
XI (1948} 409-423
Corporis, Mystici- and the Soul of the Church. (J. I. McGuiness op}
XI (1948} 18-27

Creation, The Value of-. (J. F. Keleher}
VIII (1945} 233-243
Critical, Concerning a "- Review." · (J. Maritain)
III (1941) 45-53
Criticisms, The Significance of Current - of the Syllogism. (H. Veatch)
J{V (1952} 624-641

Culture, The Thomistic Concept of -.

(R. E. Brennan op)

v (1943} 111-136

Current, Basic Confusions in - Notions of Propositional Calculi. (H.
Veatch)
)(IV (1951) 238-258
--, The Significance of - Criticisms of the Syllogism. (H. Veatch)
J{V (1952) 624-641

Dante,- and Thomism. (D. Sargent)
V (1943) 256-264
Darkness, On-, Silence, arid the Nought. (R. Allers) IJ{ (1946) 515-572
Date, A- in the History of Epistemology. (G. Smith sj}

v (1943) 246-255

Definition, The Dogmatic- of the Assumption. (C. Friethoff op}
)(IV

(1951) 41-58

Democracy, The Theory of-. (W. Farrell op and M. J. Adler)
III (1941) 397-449, 588-652;
IV (1942} 121-181, 286-354, 446-522, 692-761;
VI (1943} 49-118, 251-277, 367-407;
VII (1944} 8G-131

Demonstration, The -

of God's Existence.

(M. J. Adler}

v (1943) 188-218

--,A Reply: The- of .God's Existence. (H. T. Schwartz)
VI (1943) 19-48

Determinism, Public Opinion,- and Free Will. (W. A. Gerhard)
lJ{

(1946) 172-185

ANALYTICAL

7

INDEX OF ARTICLES

Deus, Munificentissimus -. (Pius XII)
Devotion, The Thomistic Concept of--.

XIV (1951) tHll
(J. W. Curran op)
II (1940) 410-443, 546-580
--, The Assumption and- to Mary in America. (A. G. Cicognani)
XIV (1951)

Dewey, John -

and Modern Thomism.

(W. O'Meara)

.

v (1943) 308-318

Dialectics,--

of War and Peace. (J. T. Delos op)
XIII (1950)
Distinctive, The- Nature of the Gift of Understanding. (J. I. McGuiness
op)
III (1941)
XV
Docility, The Virtue of -. (R. Smith op)
Doctrine, The- of God in Personalism. (J. A. Creaven sma)
XIV (1951)
V (1943) 103-110
Dogma, The Role of- in Judaism. (L. Finkelstein)
Dogmatic, The -Definition of the Assumption. (C. Friethoff op)
XIV (1951) 41-58

VIII (1945)
Doubt, The Portals of -. (E. P. Farrell op)
Dynamics, The- of Christian Perfection. (W. D. Hughes op)
XV
Effects, The - of Bodily Temperament on Psychical Characteristics.
(L. M. Bond op)
Cf. Bodily
589-648
Emotions, The Cognitive Aspect of -. (R. Allers) IV
End, the Ultimate- of Venial Sin. (A. J. McNicholl op)
II (1940) 373-409
41-69

Ending, In Search of a Happy-. (P. H. Conway op) IV
V (1943)
England, Art in France and -. (J. U. Nef)
Epistemology, A Date in the History of -. (G. Smith sj)

v (1943)

--, Personalism, Thomism and -.

(J. A. Creaven sma)
VIII (1945) 1-26
--,The- of Thomas Hobbes. (W. A. Gerhard)
IX (1946) 573-587
Estimation, Instinctive - of Practical Values. (W. A. Gerhard)
VIII (1945)
Euclid, - and Aristotle. (T. Greenwood)
XV
374-403
Evaluation, Toward an - of Music. (J. A. Oesterle)
XIV (1951) 323-334

Existence, The Demonstration of God's -. (M. J. Adler)

v (1943)

Existence, A Reply: The Demonstration of God's -. (H. T. Schwartz)
VI (1943) 19-48
--, Existentialism and -. (V. E. Smith)
XI (1948) 141-196,
Existentialism, - and Existence. (V. E. Smith)
XI (1948) 141-196,
Extent, The Nature and- of the Philosophy of Nature. (W. H. Kane op)
VII (1944)

8

GENERAL INDEX-VOLUMES

I TO XV

(J. F. Anderson)
XV (1959!) 136-161
VII (1944) 323-362
Factors, Functions, - and Faculties. (R. Allers)
Faculties, Functions, Factors and -. (R. Allers)
VII (1944) 323-362
Faith, The Rejection and Protection of -. (P. F. Mulhern op)
III (1941) 33-44
--, The Meaning of -. (I. Forest)
VI (1943) 230-250
--, Max Scheler and the -. (J. M. Oesterreicher)
JCIII (1950) 135-203
IX (1946) 129-171
Family, Peace and the -. (L. Lachance op)
Farrell, Walter-, 0. P.: Apud Posteros Sacer. (R. E. Brennan op)
JCV (1952) 199-208
Fate, The - of Representative Government. (W. Farrell op)
II (1940) 175-207
Fatherhood, The- of the Priest. (T. E. Hennessy op) )( (1947) 271-306
Fatima, --: The Rosary and the Immaculate Heart of Mary. (M.
Llamera op)
JCIU (1950) 453-527
Feast, The History of the - of the Assumption. (W. O'Shea ss)
JCIV (1951) 118-132
Fecundity, The- of Goodness. (R. Garrigou-Lagrange op)
II (1940) 226-236
First, The - Principles of Changeable Being. (W. H. Kane op)
VIII (1945) 27-67
France, Art in - and England. (J. U. Nef)
V (1943) 281-307
Free, Public Opinion, Determinism and - WilL (W. A. Gerhard)
IX (1946) 172-185
Freedom, The Basis of the Suarezian Teaching on Human -. (T. U.
Mullaney op) cf. Basis.
Friendship, A Comparison between Human and Divine -. (L. M. Bond
op)
III (1941) 54-94
--, Justice and -. (G. B. Phelan)
V (1943) 153-170
VII (1944) 323-362
Functions, -, Factors and Faculties. (R. Allers)
Ghost, The Gifts of the Holy-. Cf. Gifts.
Gift, The Distinctive Nature of the- of Understanding. (J. I. McGuiness
III (1941) 217-278
op)
Gifts, The - of the Holy Ghost (by John of St. Thomas).
(J. M.
Egan op and W. D. Hughes op)
VIII (1945) 244-284, 369-403, 471-519;
IX (1946) 66-ll6, 266-326, 421-460
God, The Philosophical Approach to- in Thomism. (H. Carpenter op)
I (1939) 45-61
--, Meditation and the Search for-. (J. M. Egan op)
III (1941) 450-466
--, Pen and Sword versus-. (J. C. Osbourn op and P. H. Conway
op)
VI (1943) 285-317
--, The Beauty of -. (T. C. Donlan op)
)( (1947) 185-225
--, Ways to Know -. (E. Stein)
]_)( (1949) 379-420

Eternal, Time and the Possibility of an -

World.

ANALYTICAL

INDEX OF ARTICLES

9

--, The Doctrine of- in Personalism. (J. A. Creaven sma)
XIV (1951) 161-216
God's, The Demonstration of- Existence. (M. J. Adler)
"{1943)
--, A Reply: The Demonstration of- Existence. (H. T. Schwartz)
"I {1943) 19-48
(J. F. Keleher)
Good, The Search for the Intelligible--.
(1944) 492-504
--, Idealism: The Primacy of the-. (W. A. Gerhard)
XITI (1950) 16-49
Goodness, The Fecundity of -. (R. Garrigou-Lagrange op)
II (1940)
Government, The Fate of Representative -. (W. Farrell op)
II {1940)
Grace, The Role of Sacramental- in Christian Life. (C. B. Crowley op)
II (1940) 519-545
"II (1944) 1-64
Greek, Socrates and - Wisdom. (X. Zubiri)
Happiness, Plotinus' Quest of-; (G. Carriere omi) XIV 1951)
Happy, In Search of a- Ending. {P. H. Conway op)
IV
41-69
Heart, Fatima: The Rosary and the Immaculate- of Mary. (M. Llamera
XIII (1950)
op)
Heavenly, The Social Character of - Beatitude. (R. C. Petry)
"II (1944) 65-79
Hegelianism,- and the Making of the Modern World. (M. W. Hess)
XIV {1951) 335-350
E. Smith)
Heisenberg, Cognitive Aspects of the- Principle.
XII {1949) 474-499
Hierarchy, The Position of Mathematics in the - of Speculative Science.
III (1941) 467-506
(J. F. Whittaker op)
Historical, The- Opportunity of Orthodoxy. (W. J. Grace)
X"
History, A Date in the- of Epistemology. (G. Smith sj)
" (1943)
--, The- of the Feast of the Assumption. (W. O'Shea ss)
XIV (1951)
Hobbes, The Epistemology of Thomas -. (W. A. Gerhard)
IX (1946) 573-587
Hope, The Certitude of-. (W. M. Conlon op)
X (1947) 75-119,
--, -and Charity in St. Thomas. (P. DeLetter sj)
XTII (1950)
Household, "irtues of the-. (W. Farrell op)
IX (1946) 337-378
Human, The Basis of the Suarezian Teaching on - Freedom. (T. U.
Mullaney op) Cf. Basis.
--, Natural Necessitation of the - Will. (R. P. Sullivan op)
XIV (1951) 351-399,

"n

<"·

10

GENERAL

Humanitarian,

The -

INDEX-VOLUMES

I TO XV

versus the Religious Attitude.

(A. Kolnai)
VI (1944) 429-557
Humility,- according to St. Thomas. (R. Garrigou-Lagrange op)
I (1939) !il-13
--, The Virtue of -. (J. S. Carlson, op)
VII (1944) 135-178, 363-414
Imagination, The Role of the - in the Making of Poetry. (Sr. Jeanne
Marie Lyons op)
II (1940) 344-37!il
Immaculate, Fatima: The Rosary and the - Heart of Mary. (M.
Llamera op)
XIII (1950)
--, The Assumption and the - Conception. (G. M. Roschini osm)
XIV (1951) 59-71
Imperfections, The Morality of-. (J. C. Osbourn op)
IV (1942) 388-430, 649-691
Idea, The- of the Church in St. Thomas Aquinas. (M. J. Congar op)
I (1939) 331-359
Idealism,-: The Primacy of the Good. (W. A. Gerhard)
XIII (1950) 16-49
Incorporation, Sacramental - into the Mystical Body. (J. T. Dittoe op)
IX (1946) 469-514
Individual, Social Unity and the -. (C. Miltner esc)
I (1939) 31-44
Ingredients, The Theological- of Peace. (J. C. Osbourn op)
v (1943) 23-54
Inspiration, The Platonic Theory of -. (A. E. Vassilion)
XIV (1951) 466-489
Instinctive, -Estimation of Practical Values. (W. A. Gerhard)
VIII (1945) 185-232
Instruments, Toward a Philosophy of Physical -. (V. E. Smith)
X (1947) 307-333
Intellectual, The - Cognition of Particulars. (R. Allers)
III (1941) 95-163
--, The - Virtue of Prudence. (W. A. Gerhard)
VIII (1945) 413-456
Intelligible, The Search for the - Good. (J. F. Keleher)
VII (1944) 492-504
International, The Virtue of Social Justice and- Life. (F. E. McMahon)
v (1943) 55-60
--, The - Community according to Francis de Vitoria. (H. Munoz
)( (1947) 1-55
op)
--, The Bases of the- Military Tribunal's Authority. (J. P. Kenny
op)
XI (1948) 197-217
--, - Casuistics. (T. Greenwood)
XIII (1950) 353-400
Interpretation, The - of the Conjugal Act and the Theology of Marriage.
I (1939) 360-380
(B. Lavaud op)
Introduction, - to Philosophy. (W. H. Kane op)
I (1939)
Intuition, Notes on -. (M. De Munnynck op)
I (1939) 143-168
Joyce, Beauty in Aquinas and -. (F. L. Kunkel)
XII (1948)
Judaism, The Role of Dogma in -. (L. Finkelstein) V (1943) 103-lHJ

ANALYTICAL

11

INDEX OF ARTICLES

I (1939) 9.!95-330
Justice, The Field of Social -. (P. Hyland op)
--, The Virtue of Social- and International Life. (F. E. McMahon)

v (1943) 55-60

--, - and Friendship. (G. B. Phelan)
V (1948) 158-170
--, No Place for Rain. (W. Farrell op)
XII (1949)
Kierkegaard, - and Christian Philosophy. (J. Collins)
XIV (1951) 441-465

Know, Ways to - God. (E. Stein)
IX (1949) 379-450
Language, The Philosophy of -. (L. Lachance op) IV (1949.!) 547-588
--, - and Sense Perception. (M. W. Hess)
X (1947) 56-74
Law, The -of Nations and the Salamanca School of Theology. (J. M.
De Aguilar op)
IX (1946)
V (1943)
Liberty, Matter, Beatitude and -. (A. C. Pegis)
--, Christian -. (D. A. O'Connell op)
XV
209-£46, 404-493
Life, The Role of Sacramental Grace in Christian -. (C. B. Crowley op)
II (1940) 519-545
--, The States of -. (J. Fearon op)
XII (1949) 1-16
--, The Assumption in the Spiritual-. (M.D. Philippe op)
XIV (1951) 93-108
Living, - Thomism. (E. Chapman)
IV (194£) 869-387
Logic, The Characters of Aristotelian -. (T. Greenwood)
IV (1942)
--, The Unity of -. (T. Greenwood)
VIII (1945) 457-470
--, The Inconsistency of Jean Paul Sartre's -. (M. Blondel)

X (1947) 893-897
(H. Veatch)
XIII (1950) 50-96
Lure, The- of Beauty. (J. Fearon op)
VHI (1945) 149-184
Man, Modern Psychology and-. (R. E. Brennan op)
HI (1941) 8-32
--, The Rebuilding of-. (G. Vann op)
IV (1946) l-21
--, What the Modern- Should Not Believe. (P. H. Conway op)
XI (1948} £77-296
--, Contemporary Theories of-. (J. Collins)
XII (1949) 17-47
--, - in Medieval Thought. (C. Pepler op)
XII (1949) 136-154
--, The Meaning of the" Common-." (A. Kolnai)
XII (1949) 272-835
Maritain, Jacques -: A Biographical Impression. (H. L. Binsse)
(194:'!) 5-6
--,Jacques-:
Est, Est, Non, Non. (R.N. Anshen)
v (1943) 79-84
--, Bibliography of Jacques -: 1910-1942. (R. Byrns)
(1943) 345-371
Maritain's, On - Political Philosophy. (W. Gurian)
(1943) 7-22
--, -Philosophy of the Sciences. (Y. B. Simon) V (1943) 85-102
Marriage, The Interpretation of the Conjugal Act and the Theology of -.
(B. Lavaud op)
I (1939) 360-380
Mary, The Wisdom that is -. (C. D. DeKoninck)
VI (1943) 1-18
--, Aristotelian and Mathematical-.

v

12

GENERAL

INDEX-VOLUMES

I TO XV

--,Fatima:
The Rosary and the Immaculate Heart of -. (M.
XIII (1950)
Llamera op)
--, The Assumption and Devotion to - in America. (A. G. Cicognani)
XIV (1951)
Mary's, The Assumption among - Privileges. (K. J. Healy ocarm)

XIV (1951)

Mathematical, Aristotelian and- Logic. (H. Veatch) XIII (1950) 50-96
Mathematics, The Position of - in the Hierarchy of Speculative Science.
(J. F. Whittaker op)
III (1941) 467-506
--, Concerning Some Views on the Structure of-. (E. H. Larguier sj)
IV

431-445

Matter, --, Beatitude, and Liberty. (A. C. Pegis)
V (1943)
VI (1943)
Meaning, The Problem of -. (J. A. Oesterle)
--, Another Approach to the Problem of-. (J. A. Oesterle)
VII (1944) 233-263
--, The - of Faith. (1. Forest)
VI (1943)
--, The- of the" Common Man." (A. Kolnai)
XII (1949) 272-335
XII (1949) 136-154
Medieval, Man in - Thought. (C. Pepler op)
Meditation,- and the Search for God. (J. M. Egan op)
III (1941) 450-466
Metaphysics, Two Studies in-. (J. F. Anderson)
III (1941) 564-587
-.-, Physical -. (A. J. McNicholl op)
XII (1949)
Methods, The Conflict of- at the End of the Middle Ages. (J. Maritain)
III (1941) 527-538)
Middle, The Conflict of Methods at the End of the- Ages. (J. Maritain)
III (1941)
Militant, The- Christian Virtues. (H. I. Smith op) IV
Military, The Bases of the International Tribunal's Authority. (J. P.
Kenny op)
XI (1948)
Modern,- Psychology and Man. (R. E. Brennan op)
III (1941) 8-32
--, John Dewey and - Thomism. (W. O'Meara) V (1943) 308-318
--,What the- Man Should Not Believe. (P. H. Conway op)
XI (1948)
--, The Assumption and the- World. (F. J. Sheen)
XIV (1951) 31-40
--,Hegelianism and the Making of the- World. (M. W. Hess)
XIV (1951) 335-350
Morality, The - of Imperfections. (J. C. Osbourn op)
IV
388-430,
(R. Jancauskas sj)
XV (1952) 349-373
Motet, -: De Ordinatione Angelorum. (A. Lourie) V (1943) 319-344
Munificentissimus, -Deus. (Pius XII)
XIV (1951)
Music, Toward and Evaluation of-. (J. A. Oesterle)
XIV (1951)
Mystical, Sacramental Incorporation into the - Body. (J. T. Dittoe op)
IX (1946) 469-514

--, The -

of Basing-Point Pricing.

ANALYTICAL

13

INDEX OF ARTICLES

--, Thomistic Soteriology and the- Body. (E. Sauras op)
){" (1952) 548-571

Mystici,- Corporis and the Soul of the Church. (J. I. McGuiness op)
){I

(1948) 18-27

Nations, The Law of- and the Salamanca School of Theology. (J. M.
De Aguilar op)
I){ (1946) 186-221
Natural, -Necessitation of the Human Will. (R. P. Sullivan op)
){N

(1951) 851-899, 490-528

Nature, The Distinctive- of the Gift of Understanding. (J. I. McGuiness
III (1941) 217-278
op)
--, The - and Extent of the Philosophy of -. (W. H. Kane op)
VII (1944) 204-282
Necessitation, Natural- of the Human Will. (R. P. Sullivan op)
){N

(1951) 851-899, 490-528

New, Thomism lllld the- Theology. (D. L. Greenstock)
){III (1950) 567-596

Northrop, Dr. -, Technology and Religion (J. B. McAllister)
){II (1948) 886-862

Notes,- on Intuition. (M. De Munnynck op)
I (1989) 148-168
--, -on the Connection of the "irtues. (P. Lumbreras op)
){I

(1948) 218-240

Notions, Basic Confusions in Current - of Propositional Calculi. (H.
){N (1951) 288-258
Veatch)
Nought, On Darkness, Silence, and the -. (R. Allers)
Obligation, The Roots of -. (W. Farrell op)
Oligarchy, The Theory of -: Edmund Burke.

I){ (1946) 515-572
I (1989) 14-80

(R. M. Hutchins)

v (1948) 61-78

Opinion, Public-, Determinism and Free Will. (W. A. Gerhard)
I){ (1946) 172-185

Opportunity, The Historical- of Orthodoxy.

(W. J. Grace)
){V (1925) 289-810

Order, The Common Sense, Perfection of the- of Pure Sensibility. (B. J.
II (1940) 815-848
Muller-Thym)
--,Charity and the Social-. (L.A. Ryan op) cf. Charity.
Organism, Thought, Volition, and the -. (T. Gilby op) II (1940) 1-18
Orthodoxy, The Historical Opportunity of -. (W. J. Grace)
){V (1952) 289-810

Outline,- of a Philosophy of Art. (A. J. Steiss)
II (1940) 14-58
Particulars, The Intellectual Cognition of-. (R. Allers)
III (1941) 95-168

Patristic,- Schools in the Summa.

(N. Halligan op)
VII (1944) 271-822, 505-543

Peace, A Thomistic Analysis of-. (F. E. McMahon) I (1989) 169-192
--, The Theological Ingredients of-. (J. C. Osbourn op)

v (1948) 28-54

--, and the Family.

(L. Lachance op)

I){ (1946) 129-171

14

GENERAL INDEX-VOLUMES

--, Dialectics of War and -.

I TO XV

(J. T. Delos op)
XIII (1950)

Pen,- and Sword versus God. (P. H. Conway op and J. C. Osbourn op)
VI (1948)
Perception, The Problem of-. (N. Mailloux op)
IV
--, Language and Sense-. (M. W. Hess)
X (1947) 56-74
Perfection, The Common Sense,- of the Order of Pure Sensibility. (B. J.
Muller-Thym)
II (1940) 315-348
--, St. Thomas and Christian -. (D. L. Greenstock)
XIII (1950) 1-15
--, The Dynamics of Christian-.
(W. D. Hughes op)
XV
IV
1-40
Perry, Value, Beauty and Professor-. (H. E. Cory)
Personalism,-, Thomism and Epistemology. (J. A. Creaven sma)
VIII {1945)
--, The Doctrine of God in -. (J. A. Creaven sma)
XIV (1951)
Philosophical, The- Approach to God in Thomism. (H. Carpenter op)
I (1989) 45-61
Philosophy, The Mansions of Thomistic-. (R. E. Brennan op)
I (1989)
--, Introduction to-. (W. H. Kane op)
I (1989)
--, Outline of a - of Art. (A. J. Steiss)
II {1940) 14-58
--, Some Suggestions on the Respective Spheres of Science and -.
(H. Veatch)
III (1941)
--, The- of Language. (L. Lachance op)
IV
547-588
--, On Maritain's Political -. (W. Gurian)
V (1948)
--, Maritain's - of the Sciences. (Y. B. Simon)
V (1948)
--,The Nature and Extent of the- of Nature. (W. H. Kane op)
VII (1944)
--, Science and -. (A. J. McNicholl op)
VIII (1945) 68-180
--, Toward a- of Physical Instruments. (V. E. Smith)
X (1947) 307-333
--, Kierkegaard and Christian-. (J. Collins) XIV (1951) 441-465
Physical, Toward a Philosophy of- Instruments. (V. E. Smith)
X {1947) 307-333
--,- Metaphysics. (A. J. McNicholl op)
XII (1949)
Pius X, Blessed - and Theology. (J. M. Egan op) XIV (1951)
Place, The- of Religious Sentiment in St. Thomas. (M. B. Mailhiot op)
IX (1946)
--,The- of Holy Scripture in the Theology of St. Thomas. (J. Van
der Ploeg op)
X (1947)
--, No - for Rain. (W. Farrell op)
XII {1949)
--, The- of Tradition in the Theology of St. Thomas. (G. Geenen
op)
XV
110-185
Places, The- of the Assumption. (F. M. Abel op) XIV (1951) 109-117
Plato,- and the Poets. (J. A. Mourant)
XIII {1950)

ANALYTICAL

INDEX OF ARTICLES

15

Platonic, The- Theory of the Continuum.

(T. Greenwood)
VII {1944) 179-203
--, -Theory of Inspiration. (A. E. Vassilion) XIV 1951) 466-489
Plotinus',- Quest of Happiness. ('G. Carriere omi) XIV (1951) 217-237
Poetry, The Role of the Imagination in the Making of -. (Sr. Jeanne
II (1940) 344-372
Marie Lyons op)
Poets, Plato and the -. (J. A. Mourant)
XIII (1950) 249-270
Political, On Maritain's - Philosophy. (W. Gurian)
V (1943) 7-22
VIII {1945) 293-368
Portals, The - of Doubt. (E. P. Farrell op)
Position, The - of Mathematics in the Hierarchy of Speculative Science.
III (1941) 467-506
(J. F. Whittaker op)
Possibility, Time and the- of an Eternal World. (J. F. Anderson)
XV. (1952) 136-161
Practical, Instinctive Estimation of - Values. (W. A. Gerhard)
VIII (1945) 185-232
(R. Jancauskas sj)
Pricing, The Morality of Basing-Point-.
XV (1952) 349-373
Priest, The Fatherhood of the-. (T. E. Hennessy op) X (1947) 271-306
Primacy, Idealism: The- of the Good. (W. A. Gerhard)
XIII (1950) 16-49
Principle, Cognitive Aspects of the Heisenberg -. (V. E. Smith)
XII (1949) 474-499
Principles, The First- of Changeable Being. (W. H. Kane op)
VIII (1945) 27-67
Privileges, The Assumption Among Mary's -. (K. J. Healy ocarm)
XIV {1951) 72-92
Problem, The- of Species. (M. J. Adler)
I (1939) 80-122, 237-270, 381-443;
II {11940) 88-155, 237-300
--, Solution of the - of Species. (M. J. Adler) ITI (1941) 279-379
--, The- of Perception. (N. Mailloux op)
IV (1942) 266-285
--, The- of Meaning. (J. A. Oesterle)
VI (1943) 180-229

--, Another Approach to the -

of Meaning. (J. A. Oesterle)
VII (1944) 233-263
Problems, Theological - of 'Conversion. (C. F. Pauwels op)
XI (1948) 409-423
Propositional, Basic Confusions in Current Notions of - Calculi. (H.
Veatch)
XIV (1951) 238-258
Protection, The Rejection and - of Faith. (P. F. Mulhern op)
III (1941) 33-44
V (1943) 229-245
Providence, -. (W. R. Thompson)
Prudence, The Intellectual Virtue of -. (W. A. Gerhard)
VIII (1945) 413-456
Psychical, The Effects of Bodily Temperament on - Characteristics.
(L. M. Bond op). Cf. Bodily.
Modern- and Man. (R. E. Brennan op)
III (1941) 8-32
Public,- Opinion, Determinism and Free Will. (W. A. Gerhard)
IX (1946) 172-185

16

GENERAL

INDEX-VOLUMES

I TO XV

Rain, No Place for-. (W. Farrell op)
XII (1949)
Rebuilding, The- of Man. (G. Vann op)
IX (1946)
Reference, Thomism as Frame of-. (D. C. O'Grady) I (1939)
Rejection, The -.,- and Protection of Faith. (P. F. Mulhern op)
III (1941) 33-44
Religion, Dr. Northrop, Technology and -. (J. B. McAllister)
XII(l948) 336-362
Religious, The Humanitarian versus the - Attitude. (A. Kolnai)
VI (1944)
--, The Place of- Sentiment in St. Thomas. (M. B. Mailhiot op)
IX (1946)
Reply, A-: The Demonstration of God's Existence. (H. T. Schwartz)
VI (1943) 19-48
Representative, The Fate of- Government. (W. Farrell op)
II (1940) 175-207
HI (1941) 45-53
Review, Concerning a" Critical-." (J. Maritain)
Revival, Claude! and the Catholic-. (L. S. Bondy osb)
v (1943) 171-187
Role, The - of the Imagination in the Making of Poetry. (Sr. Jeanne
Marie Lyons op)
II (1940) 344-37£
--, The- of Sacramental Grace in Christian Life. (C. B. Crowley op)
II (1940) 519-545
--, The- of Dogma in Judaism. (L. Finkelstein) V (1943) 103-HO
Roots, The- of Obligation. (W. Farrell op)
I (1939) 14-30
Rosary, Fatima: The - and the Immaculate Heart of Mary. (M.
Llamera op)
XIII (1950) 453-527
Sacramental, The Role of- Grace in Christian Life. (C. B. Crowley op)
II (1940) 519-545
--, The Configuration of the - Character. (J. S. McCormack)
VII (1944) 458-491
--, - Incorporation in the Mystical Body. (J. T. Dittoe op)
!}( (1946) 469-514
--, -Signification.
(A. J. McNicholl op)
X {1947) 334-348
Salamanca, The Law of Nations and the - School of Theology. (J. M.
De Aguilar op)
IX (1946) l86-fl21
Sartre's, The Inconsistency of Jean Paul - Logic. (M. Blonde!)
X (1947) 393-397
Scheler, Max- and the Faith. (J. M. Oesterreicher) XII (1950) 135-203
School, The Law of Nations and the Salamanca - of Theology. (J. M.
De Aguilar op)
IX (1946) 186-2£1
Schools, Patristic - in the Summa. (N. Halligan op)
VII (1944) 271-3fl2, 505-543
Science, Some Suggestions on the Respective Spheres of- and Philosophy.
(H. Veatch)
HI (1941) 177-216
--, The Position of Mathematics in the Field of Speculative-.
(J. F.
Whittaker op)
HI (1941) 467-506
--, -and Philosophy. (A. J. McNichoU op)
VIII (1925) 68-130

ANALYTICAL

INDEX OF ARTICLES

17

Sciences, Maritain's Philosophy of the -. (Y. B. Simon) V (1943)
Scripture, The Place of Holy - in the Theology of St. Thomas. (J. Van
X (1947) 398-422
der Ploeg op)
Search, Meditation and the- for God. (J. M. Egan op)
III (1941) 450-466
--, In- of a Happy Ending. (P. H. Conway op) IV (1942) 41-69
--, The- for the Intelligible Good. (J. F. Keleher)
VII (1944) 492-504
Sense, The Common-, Perfection of the Order of Pure Sensibility. (B. J.
Muller-Thym)
II {1940) 315-343
--, Languages and- Perception. (M. W. Hess}
X (1947) 56-74
Sensibility, The Common Sense, Perfection of the Order of Pure -. (B. J.
Muller-Thym)
315-343
Sentiment, The Place of Religious -in St. Thomas. (M. B. Mailhiot op)
IX (1946) 22-65, 222-265
Significance, The - of Current Criticisms of the Syllogism. (H. Veatch)
XV (1952) 624-641

Signification, Sacramental -. (A. J. McNichol! op)
X (1947) 334-348
Silence, On Darkness,- and the Nought. (R. Allers) IX (1946) 515-572
Sin, The Ultimate End of Venial-. (A. J. McNicholl op)
II (1940) 373-409
Social, - Unity and the Individual. (C. Miltner esc)
I (1939) 31-44
--, The Field of -Justice. (P. Hyland op)
I (1939) 295-330
--, Charity and the- Order. Cf. Charity. (L.A. Ryan op)
--, The Virtue of- Justice and International Life. (F. E. McMahon)

v (1943) 55-60
(R. C. Petry)
VII (1941) 65-79
Socrates, - and Greek Wisdom. (X. Zubiri)
VII (1941)
Solution,- of the Problem of Species. (M .•J. Adler) III (1941) 279-379
--, The -

Character of Heavenly Beatitude.

Soteriology, Thomistic -

and the Mystical Body.

Soul, Mystici Corporis and the- of the Church.

(E. Sauras op)

XV (1952) 543-57:1.
(J. I. McGuiness op)
XI (1948) 18-27

Species, The Problem of -. Cf. Problem.
--, Solution of the Problem of -. Cf. Solution.
Speculative, The Position of Mathematics in the Hierarachy of - Science.
HI (1941) 467-506
(J. F. Whittaker op)
Spheres, Some Suggestions on the Respective - ·of Science and Philosophy.
(H. Veatch)
HI (1941) 177-216
Spiritual, The Assumption in the - Life. (M. D. Philippe op)
XIV (1951) 93-108

States, The - of Life. (J. Fearon op)
XII (1949) 1-16
Structure, Concerning Some Views on the - of Mathematics.
(E. H.
Larguier sj)
IV (1942) 431-445
Studies, Two- in Metaphysics. (J. F. Anderson)
III (1941) 564-587
Suarezian, The Basis of the - Teaching on Human Freedom. (T. U. Mullaney op). Cf. Basis.

18

GENERAL

INDEX-VOLUMES

I TO XV

Suggestions, Some- on the Respective Spheres of Science and Philosophy.
(H. Veatch).
III (1941) 177-216
Summa, Patristic Schools in the -. (N. Halligan op)
vn (1944) 271-322, 505-543
Sword, Pen and- versus God. (P. H. Conway op and J. C. Osbourn op)
VI (1943) 285-317
Syllogism, The Significance of Current Criticisms of the -. (H. Veatch)
XV (1952) 624--641
Teaching, The Basis of the Suarezian - on Human Freedom. (T. U.
Mullaney op). Cf. Basis.
Technology, Dr. Northrop, - and Religion. (J. B. McAllister)
){II (1948) 336-362
Temperament, The Effects of Bodily - on Psychical Characteristics.
(L. M. Bond op). Cf. Bodily.
Theological, The - Ingredients of Peace. (J. C. Osbourn op)
(1943) 23-54
--, - Problems of Conversion. (C. F. Pauwels op)
){I (1948) 409-423
Theology, The Interpretation of the Conjugal Act and the -of Marriage.
(B. Lavaud op)
I (Hl39) 360-380
--, Toward a- of Woman. (B. Lavaud op)
II (1940) 459-518
--, The Law of Nations and the Salamanca School of -. (J. M.
DeAguilar op)
IX (1946) 186-221
--, The Place of Holy Scripture in the- of St. Thomas. (J. Vander
Ploeg op)
X (1947) 398--422
--, Thomism and the New-. (D. L. Greenstock)
XIII (1950) 567-596
--, Blessed Pius X and -. (J. M. Egan op)
XIV (1951) 313-322
--, The Place of Tradition in the- of St. Thomas. (G. Geenen op)
l{V (1952) 110-135
xu (1949) 17-47
Theories, Contemporary- of Man. (J. Collins)
Theory, The- of Democracy. Cf. Democracy.
--, The - of Oligarchy: Edmund Burke. (R. M. Hutchins)
(1943) 61-78
--, The Platonic - of the Continuum. (T. Greenwood)
VII {1944) 179-203
--, The Platonic - of Inspiration. (A. E. Vassilion)
XIV (1951) 466-487
Thomas, Humility according to St.-. (R. Garrigou-Lagrange op)
I (1939)
--, The Place of Religious Sentiment in St. -. (M. B. Mailhiot op)
IX (1946) 22-65, 222-265
--, The Place of Holy Scripture in the - of St. Thomas. (J. Van der
Ploeg op)
.
X (1947) 398-422
--, St. - and Christian Perfection. (D. L. Greenstock)
XIII (1950) 1-15
--, Hope and Charity in St.-. (P. DeLetter sj)
XIII (1950) 204-248, 325-352

v

v

ANALYTICAL

19

INDEX OF ARTICLES

The Authority of St. -. (S. Ramirez op)
XV
1-109
--, The Place of Tradition in the Theology of St.-. (G. Geenen op)
XV
110-135
Thomism, The Philosophical Approach to God in-. (H. Carpenter op)
I (1939) 45-61
--, -as a Frame of Reference. (D. C. O'Grady) I (1939)
--, Living-. (E. Chapman)
IV
369-387
--, Dante and -. (D. Sargent)
V (1943)
--,John Dewey and Modern-. (W. O'Meara)
V (1943) 308-:'HS
--, Personalism,- and Epistemology. (J. A. Creaven sma)
VIII (l9·M)
--, -and the New Theology. (D. L. Greenstock)
JCIII (1950) 567-596
Thomistic, The Mansions of - Philosophy. (R. E. Brennan ap)
I (1939)
--, A- Analysis of Peace. (F. E. McMahon)
I (1939)
--, The- Concept of Devotion. (J. W. Curran op)
II (1940) 410-443, 546-580
--, The- Concept of Culture. (R. E. Brennan op)
(1943) lll-136
--, - Soteriology and the Mystical Body. (E. §auras op)
XV
543-571
Thought,-, Volition and the Organism. (T. Gilby op) II (1940) l-Ull
--, Man in Medieval-. (C. Pepler op)
XII (1948) 136-154
Time,- and the Possibility of an Eternal World. (J. F. Anderson)
XV (1952) 136-161
Tradition, The Place of- in the Theology of St. Thomas. (G. Geenen op)
XV (1952) 110-135
Tribunal's, The Bases of the International Military - Authority. (J. P.
Kenny op)
XI (1948)
Twentieth,- Century Apostle. (W. Farrell op)
X (1947) 133-158
Ultimate, The- End of Venial Sin. (A. J. McNicholl op)
II (1940) 373-409
Understanding, The Distinctive Nature of the Gift of-. (J. I. McGuiness
III (1941) 217-278
op)
Unity, Social- and the Individual. (C. Miltner esc)
I (1939) 31-44
Unity, The - in the Universe according to Alfred N. Whitehead. (E. J.
Lintz)
VI (1943) 135-179, 318-366
--, The - of Logic. (T. Greenwood)
VIII (1945) 457--470
Universe, The Unity in the - according to Alfred N. Whitehead. (E. J.
VI (1943) 135-179, 318-366
Lintz)
Value,-, Beauty and Professor Perry. (H. E. Cory)
IV
1-40
--, The- of Creation. (J. F. Keleher)
VIII (1945) 233-243
Values, Instinctive Estimation of Practical -. (W. A. Gerhard)
VIII (1945) 185-232
Venial, The Ultimate End of- Sin. (A. J. McNicholl op)
II (1940) 373-409

v

20

GENERAL INDEX-VOLUMES

I TO XV

Virtue, The- of Social Justice and International Life. (F. E. McMahon)

v {1948) 55--60

--, The- of Humility.
--;The Intellectual -

(J. S. Carlson op)
VII (1941) 185-178, 868-414
of Prudence. (W. A. Gerhard)
V1II {1945) 418-456

--, The- of Docility. (R. Smith op)
XV {1952) 512--628
Virtues, The Militant Christian -. (H. I. Smith op) IV (1942) 198-220
--, -of the Household. (W. Farrell op)
IX (1946} 887-878
--, Notes on the Connection of the-. (P. Lumbreras op)
XI (1948) 218-240

Vitoria, The International Community according to Francis de -. (H.
Munoz op)
X (1947) l-55
Volition, Though,- and the Organism. (T. Gilby op}
II (1940) 1-18
War, Dialectics of- and Peace. (J. T. Delos op}
XIII (1950) 805-824, 52So--566

Ways,- to Know God. (E. Stein)
IX (1949} 879-420
Whitehead, The Unity in the Universe according to Alfred N. -. (E. J.
Lintz}
VI (1948) 185-177, 818-866
Will, Public Opinion, Determinism and Free-. (W. A. Gerhard)
IX (1946) 172-185
--, Natural Necessitation of the Human-. (R. P. Sullivan op)
.
XIV (1951) 851-899, 490-528
VI (1948) 1-18
Wisdom, The- that is Mary. (C. D. DeKoninck)
--, Socrates and Greek -. (X. Zubiri)
VII (1944} 1--64
Woman, Toward a Theology of -. (B. Lavaud op} II (1940} 459-518
World, The Assumption in the Modern-. (F. J. Sheen)
XIV (1951} 81-40
--,Hegelianism and the Making of the Modern-. (M. W. Hess)
XIV (1951} 335-350
--, Time and the Possibility of an Eternal-. (J. F. Anderson)

XV (1952} 186-161

GENERAL INDEX
2. AUTHORS OF ARTICLES
Abel, F. M. op. The Places of the Assumption.
XIV (1951) 109-117
Adler, M. J. Problems for Thomists: I-The Problem of Species.
I (Hl39) 80-12Q, 237-Q70, 381-443;
II (1940) 88-155, 237-800
--.·Solution of the Problem of Species.
III (1941) 279-379
The Theory of Democracy. (and Farrell, W. op)
(1941) 397-449; 588-652;
IV (Hl42) 121-181, 286-354, 446-522, 692-761;
VI (1943) 49-118, 251-277 367-407;
VII (1944) 80-131
The Demonstration of God's Existence.
V (19M3) 188-218
Allers, R. The Intellectual Cognition of Particulars.
HI (1941) 95-168
--. The Cognitive Aspect of Emotions.
IV (1942) 589-648
--. Functions, Factors and Faculties.
VII (19·M) 323-862
--. On Darkness, Silence, and the Nought.
IX (1946) 515-572
Anderson, J. F. Two Studies in Metaphysics.
III (1941) 564-587

m:

--. Time and the Possibility of an Eternal World.
XV (1952) 136-161
V (1943) 79-84
Anshen, R.N. Jacques Maritain: Est, Est, Non, Non.
Binsse, H. L. Jacques Maritain: A Biographical Impression. V (1943) 5-6
Blonde!, M. The Inconsistency of Jean Paul Sartre's Logic.

X (1947) 393-397
Bochenski, I. M. op. On Analogy.
XI (1948) 424-447
Bond, L. M. op. A Comparison Between Human and Divine Friendship.
III (1941) 54-94
--. The Effects of Bodily Temperament on Psychical Characteristics.
X (1947) 423-501;
XI (1948) 28-104
Bondy, L. S. csb. Claudel and the Catholic Revival.
V (1943) 171-187
Brennan, R. E. op. The Mansions of Thomistic Philosophy.
I (1939) 62-79
--. Modern Psychology and Man.
HI (1941) 8-32
--. The Thomistic Concept of Culture.
V (1943) Hl-136
--. Walter Farrell, 0. P.: Apud Posteros Sacer. XV {1952) 199-208
Byrns, R. Bibliography of Jacques Maritain: 1910-1942.

v {1943) 345-:<.m

Caldin, E. F. Modern Physics and Thomist Philosophy.

II (1940) 208-225

Carlson, S. op. The Virtue of Humility.
VII (1944) 135-178, 363-414
Carol, J. B. ofm. A Bibliography of the Assumption. XIV (1951) 133-160

21

22

GENERAL INDEX-VOLUMES

I TO XV

Carpenter, H. op. The Philosophical Approach to God in Thomism.
I (1989) 45-61
XIV (1951) 217-287
Carriere, G. omi. Plotinus' Quest of Happiness.
IV (1942) 869-887
Chapman, E. Living Thomism.
--. To Be-That Is The Answer.
V (1948) 187-152
Cicognani, A. G. The Assumption and Devotion to Mary in America.
XIV (1951) 22-80
XII (1949) 17-47
Collins, J. Contemporary Theories of Man.
--. Kierkegaard and Christian Philosophy.
XIV (1951) 441-465
Congar, M. J. op. The Idea of the Church in St. Thomas Aquinas.
I (1989) 881-859
X (1947) 75-119, 226-252
Conlon, W. M. op. The Certitude of Hope.
Conway, P. H. op. In Search of a Happy Ending.
IV (1942) 41-69
--. Pen and Sword Versus God. (and Osbourn, J. C. op).
1VI (1948) 285-817
--. What the Modem Man Should Not Believe. XI (1948) 277-296
IV (1942) 1-40
Cory, H. E. Value, Beauty and Professor Perry.
Creavcn, J, A. sma. Personalism, Thomism and Epistemology.
VIII (1945) 1-26
--. The Doctrine of God in Personalism.
XIV (1951) 161-216
Crowley, C. B. op. The Role of Sacramental Grace in Christian Life.
II (1940) 519-545
Curran, J. W. op. The Thomistic Concept of Devotion.
II (1940) 410-448, 546-580
De Aguilar, J. M. op. The Law of Nations and the Salamanca School of
Theology.
IX (1946) 186-221
VI (1948) 1-81
DeKoninck, C, D. The Wisdom That Is Mary.
DeLetter, P. sj. Hope and Charity in St. Thomas.
XIII (1950) 204-248, 825-852
Delos, J. T. op. Dialectics of War and Peace.
XIII (1950) 805-824, 528-566
DeMunnynck, M. op. Notes on Intuition.
I (1989) 148-168
Dittoe, J. T. op. Sacramental Incorporation into the Mystical Body.
IX (1946) 469-514
X (1947) 185-225
Donlan, T. C. op. The Beauty of God.
II (1940) 59-87
Drewitt, N. op. Faith and Mysticism: Two Studies.
Egan, J. M. op. Meditation and the Search for God. ill (1941) 450-466
--. The Gifts of the Holy Ghost (by John of St. Thomas). (and
VIII (1945) 244-284, 869-408, 471-519;
Hughes, W. D. op, tr.)
IX (1946) 266-826, 421-460
-·-. Blessed Pius X and Theology.
XIV (1951) 818-822
Farrell, E. P .. op. The Portals of Doubt.
Vill (1945) 298-868
Farrell, W. op. The Roots of Obligation.
I (1989) 14-80
--. The Fate of Representative Government.
II (1940) 175-207
The Theory of Democracy. (and Adler, M. J.). Cf. Adler.
--. Virtues of the Household.
IX (1946) 887-878
--. Twentieth Century Apostle.
X (1947) 188-158

AUTHORS

OF ARTICLES

No Place For Rain.
XII (1949)
VIII (1945) 149-184
Fearon, J. op. The Lure of Beauty.
--. The States of Life.
XII (1949) l-16
Finklestein, L. The Role of Dogma in Judaism.
V (1943) 103-110
Forest, I. The Meaning of Faith
VI (1943)
Friethoff, C. op. The Dogmatic Definition of the Assumption.
XIV (1951) 41-58
Garrigou-Lagrange, R. op. The Fecundity of Goodness.
II (1940)
--. Humility According to St. Thomas.
I (1939) 2-13
Geenen, G. op. The Place of Tradition in the Theology of St. Thomas.
XV
H0-135
Gerhard, W. A. Idealism: The Primacy of the Good. XIII (1950) 16-49
--. Instinctive Estimation of Practical Values. VIII (1945)
The Intellectual Virtue of Prudence.
VIII (1945) 413-456
Public Opinion, Determinism and Free Will. IX (1946) l
The Epistemology of Thomas Hobbes.
IX (1946) 573-587
Gilby, T. op. Thought, Volition and the Organism.
II (1940) l-13
Gillis, J. R. op. The Case for Confirmation.
X (1947) 159-184
Grace, W. J. The Historical Opportunity of Orthodoxy.
XV (1952) 289-310
Greenstock, D. L. St. Thomas and Christian Perfection.
XIII (1950) 1-15
--. Thomism and the New Theology.
XIII (1950) 567-596
Greenwood, T. The Characters of the Aristotelian Logic.
IV
221-246
The Platonic Theory of the Continuum.
VII (1944) 179-203
--. The Unity of Logic.
VIII (1945) 457-470
--. International Casuistics.
J{III (1950) 353-400
--. Euclid and Aristotle.
XV
374-403
v (1943) 7-22
Gurian, W. On Maritain's Political Philosophy.
Halligan, N. op. Patristic Schools in the Summa.
VII (1944)
505-543
Healy, K. J. ocarm. The Assumption among Mary's Privileges.
XIV (1951) 72-92
Hennessy, T. E. op. The Fatherhood of the Priest.
X (1947) 271-306
Hess, M. W. Language and Sense Perception.
X (1947) 56-74
--. Hegelianism and the Making of the Modern World.
XIV (1951) 335-350
Hughes, W. D. op. The Dynamics of Christian Perfection.
XV (1952) 247-288
--. The Gifts of the Holy Ghost (by John of St. Thomas). Cf. Egan.
Hutchins, R. M. The Theory of Oligarchy: Edmund Burke.

v (1943) 61-78

Hyland, P. op. The Field of Social Justice.
I (1939) 295-330
Jancauskas, R. sj. The Morality of Basing-Point Pricing.
XV (1952) 349-373

24

GENERAL

INDEX-VOLUMES

I TO XV

John of St. Thomas. The Gifts of the Holy Ghost. Cf. Egan.
Kane, W. H. op. Introduction to Philosophy.
I (1939)
The Nature and Extent of the Philosophy of Nature.
VII (1944)
The First Principles of Changeable Being.
VIII (1945)
Keleher, J. F. The Search for the Intelligible Good. VII (1944)
-·-. The Value of Creation.
VIII (1945)
Kenny, J. P. op. The Bases of the International Military Tribunal's
Authority.
XI {1948)
Kolnai, A. The Humanitarian versus the Religious Attitude.
VI (1944)
--. The Meaning of the" Common Man."
XII (1949)
XII (1949)
Kunkel, F. L. Beauty in Aquinas and Joyce.
Lachance, L op. Peace and the Family.
IX (1946)
--. The Philosophy of Language.
IV
547-588
Larguier, E. H. sj. Concerning Some Views on the Structure of Mathematics.
IV
431--445
Lavaud, B. op. The Interpretation of the Conjugal Act and the Theology
of Marriage.
I (1939) 360-380
--. Toward a Theology of Woman.
II (1940) 459-518
Lintz, E. J. The Unity in the Universe according to Alfred N. Whitehead.
VI (1943) 135-179, 318--366
Llamera, M. op. Fatima: The Rosary and the Immaculate Heart of Mary.
)(III (1950)
Lourie, A. Motet: De Ordinatione Angelorum.
V (1943) 319-344
Lumbreras, P. op. Notes on the Connection of the Virtues.
XI (1948)
Lyons, Sister Jeanne Marie, op. The Role of the Imagination in the
Making of Poetry.
II (1940) 344-372
McAllister, J. B. Dr. Northrop, Technology and Religion.
XII (1949) 336-362
McCormack, J. S. op. The Configuration of the Sacramental Character.
VII (1944) 458-491
McGuiness, J. I. op. The Distinctive Nature of the Gift of Understanding.
III (1941)
--. Mystici Corporis and the Soul of the Church.
XI (1948)
McMahon, F. E. A Thomistic Analysis of Peace.
I (1939)
--. The Virtue of Social Justice and International Life.
(1943) 55-60
McNichoH, A. J. op. The illtimate End of Venial Sin. II (1940) 373-409
Science and Philosophy.
VIII (1945) 68-130
--. Sacramental Signification.
X (1947) 334-348
--. Physical Metaphysics.
XII (1949)
Mailhiot, M. B. op. The Place of Religious Sentiment in St. Thomas.
IX (1946)
Mailloux, N. op. The Problem of Perception.
IV
Maritain, J. Concerning a "Critical Review."
III (1941) 45-53

v

25

AUTHORS OF ARTICLES

The Conflict of Methods at the End of the Middle Ages.
III (1941) 527-588

Maritain, R. Motet: De Ordinatione Angelorum. (selection of texts by -)
"

(1948) 819-844

" (1948) 219-228
Middleton, J. S. Contemplation in America.
Miltner, C. esc. Social Unity and the Individual.
I (1989) 81-44
Mourant, J. A. Plato and the Poets.
XIII (1950) 249-270
Mulhern, P. F. op. The Rejection and Protection of Faith.
III (1941) 88-44
Mullaney, T. U. op. The Basis of the Suareziap Teaching on Human
XI (1948) 1-17, 880-869, 448-502;
Freedom.
XII (1949) 48-94, 155-206
Muller-Thym, B. J. The Common Sense, Perfection of the Order of Pure
Sensibility.
II (1940) 815-848
Munoz, H. op. The International Community according to Francis de
"itoria.
X (1947) 1-55
Nef, J. U. Art in France and England: 1540-1640.
" (1948) 281-807
X" (1952) 209-246, 404-498
O'Connell, D. A. op. Christian Liberty.
O'Grady, D. C. Thomism as a Frame of Reference.
I (1989) 213-286
O'Meara, W. John Dewey and Modern Thomism.
" (1948) 808-818
O'Shea, W. ss. The History of the Feast of the Assumption.
(1951) 118-182

Oesterle, J. A. The Problem of Meaning.
"I (1948) 18Q-229
--. Another Approach to the Problem of Meaning.
(1944) 288-268

--. Toward an Evaluation of Music.
XN (1951) 828-884
XIII (1950) 185-208
Oesterreicher, J. M. Max Scheler and the Faith.
Osbourn, J. C. op. The Theological Ingredients of Peace. " (1948) 28-54
--. The Morality of Imperfections.
N (1942) 888-480, 649-691
--. Pen and Sword "ersus God. (and Conway, P. op).
(1948) 285-817

Pauwels, C. F. op. Theological Problems of Conversion.
XI (1948) 409-428
Pegis, A. C. Matter, Beatitude, and Liberty.
" (1948) 265-280
XII (1948) 186-154
Pepler, C. op. Man in Medieval Thought.
Petry, R. C. The Social Character of Heavenly Beatitude.
"II (1944) 65-79
Phelan, G. B. Justice and Friendship.
" (1948) 158-170
Philippe, M. D. op. The Assumption in the Spiritual Life.
XN (1951) 98-108

Pius XII. Munificentissimus Deus.
(1951) 8--21
Ramirez, op. The Authority of St. Thomas.
X" (195f<l) 1-109
Roschini, G. M. osm. The Assumption and the Immaculate Conception.
XN (1951) 59-71

Ryan, L. A. op. Charity and the Social Order.
N
Sargent, D. Dante and Thomism.

III (1941) 589-568;
(1942) 70-120, 247-265
" (1948) 256-264

26

GENERAL

INDEX-VOLUMES

I TO XV

Sauras, E. op. ThomisticSoteriology and the Mystical Body.
54:'3-571
XV
Schwartz, H. T. A Reply: The Demonstration of God's Existence.
VI (1943) 19-48
Sheen, F. J. The Assumption and the Modern World. XIV {1951) 31-40
Simon, Y. B. Maritain's Philosophy of the Sciences.
V (1943)
Smith, G. sj. A Date in the History of Epistemology V (1943)
IV
Smith, H. I. op. The Militant Christian Virtues.
Smith, R. op. The Virtue of Docility.
XV
Smith, V. E. Toward a Philosophy of Physical Instruments.
X (1947) 307-333
XI (l948) 141-196,
Existentialism and Existence.
--. Cognitive Aspects of the Heisenberg Principle.

XII (1949) 474-499
Stein, E. Ways to Know God.
IX {1949)
Steiss, A. J. Outline of a Philosophy of Art.
II (1940) 14-58
Sullivan, R. P. op. Natural Necessitation of the Human WilL
XIV (1951) 351-399,
Thompson, W. R. Providence.
V (1943)
Van der Ploeg, J. op. The Place of Holy Scripture in the Theology of
St. Thomas.
X (1947)
Vann, G. op. The Rebuilding of Man.
IX (1946) 1-21
Vassilion, A. E. The Platonic Theory of Inspiration.
XIV (1951) 466-489
Veatch, H. Aristotelian and Mathematical Logic.
XIII {1950) 50-96
--. Some Suggestions· on the Respective Spheres of Science and PhiIII (1941)
losophy.
Basic Confusions in Current Notions of Propositional Calculi.
XIV (1951)
--. The Significance of Current Criticisms of the Syllogism.

JCV
Whittaker, J. F. op. The Position of Mathematics in the Hierarchy of
Speculative Science.
III (1941) 467-506
Zubiri, X. Socrates and Greek Wisdom.
VII (1944) l--64

GENERAL INDEX
3. BOOK REVIEWERS

Allers, R. La Methode Psychoanalytique et la Doctrine Freudienne. Vol. I
Expose. Vol. II Discussion. (R. Dalbiez)
I {1939 131-138
--. Etudes Plotiniennes. I Les Etats du Texte de Plotin. (P. Henry
sj)
I (1939) 138-139

--. Catholics and Unbelievers in Eighteenth Century France. (R. R.
Palmer)

II (1940) 454-457

--. The Problem of Matter and Form in the "De Ente et Essentia"
of Thomas Aquinas. (J. Goheen)
II (1940) 451-454
The Philosophy of Physical Science. (Sir A. Eddington)
III (1941) 385-387

Physics and Reality. (K. Riezler)
III (1941) 387-391
III {1941) 507-510
Man on his Nature. (Sir C. Sherrington)
III (1941) 667-668
Philosophy for our Times. (C. E. M. Joad)
--. An Essay on Nature. (F. J. E. Woodbridge) ill (1941) 669-670
Experience and Substance. (D. H. Parker) ill (1941) 670-672
Between Science and Philosophy. (P. Frank) IV (1942) 183-188
IV (1942) 359-361
Hegel's Hellenic Ideal. (J. G. Gray)
Reason and Revolution. Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory.
IV (1942) 359-361

(H. Marcuse)

--. The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl. The Origin and Development
of his Phenomenology. (E. P. Welch)
IV (1942) 539-542
--. Schelling, The Age of the World. (tr. F. de Wolfe Bolman, Jr.}
VI (1943) 122-123

--. Philosophical Essays in honor of Edgar Arthur Singer, Jr. (ed.
E. P. Clark and M. C. Nahm)
VI (1943) 123-126
--. Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino. (P. 0. Kristeller)
VI (1943) 410-414

--. History of Psychology from the Standpoint of a Thomist. (R. E.
VIII (1945) 287-288

Brennan op)

--. Prevoir et Savoir. (Y. Simon)
X (1947) 262-264
X (1947) 267-268
Religion of a Scientist. (G. Th. Fechner)
--. The Idea of Perfection in the Western World. (M. Foss)
X (1947) 502-509

--. The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities.
Northrop)

(F. C. S.

XI (1948) 241-246
Metafisica dell'Essere Parziale. (C. Ottaviano)
XI (1948) 374-380
Nervous Disorders and Character. (J. G. McKenzie)
XI (1948) 392-393
--. Medicine for Moderns. (F. G. Slaughter)
XI (1948) 392-393

'l7

28

GENERAL INDEX-VOLUMES

I TO XV

Selbstkritik der Philosophie und vergleichende PhilosophiegeXII (1949)
schichte im Umriss. (A. Dempf)
--. Cybernetics. Control and Communication in the Animal and the
Machine. (N. Wiener)
XII (1949)
--. Thomas Heute. Zehn Vortriige zum Aufbau einer neuen existentiellen Ordnungs-Metaphysik nach Thomas von Aquin. (A. SilvaTarouca)
XII (1949)
--. Personality in Nature, Society and Culture. (ed. C. Kluckholm
and H. Murray)
XIII (1950} 115-118
--. Power and Morals. (M. J. Hillenbrand)
XIII (1950)
--. Man and his Works. The Science of Cultural Anthropology.
Xill (1950) 61o-615
(M. J. Herskovits)
--. Philosophical Physics. (V. E. Smith)
XIV (1951)
Alluntis, F. ofm. The Transcendentals and their Function in the MetaXI (1948}
physics of Duns Scotus. (A. B. Wolter ofm)
Anawati, M. M. op. A Commentary on the Creed of Islam, Sa'd al Din
al-Taftaziini on the Creed of Najm al Din al Nasafi. (tr. E. E.
Elder}
XIV (1951)
Arnot, R. E. The Common Sense Psychiatry of Adolph Meyer. (ed. A.
Lief)
XIII (1950) 410-417
Baker, R. R. A Companion to the Summa. Vol. I. The Architect of the
Universe. (W. Farrell op)
IV
355-356
Bird, 0. A Catholic Looks at the World. (F. E. McMahon)
IX (1946) 333-335
Brennan, R. E. op. Cognitive Psychology. (T. V. Moore osb)
II (1940) 156-163

--. The Successful Error. (R. Allers)
II (1940) 581-584
--. The Psychology of Aristotle. (C. Shute)
IV
358
Biiki, G. osb. Kant's Metaphysics of Experience. A Commentary on the
First Half of the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft. (H. J. Paton)
XV
498-501
Cardozo, M.S. The Fall of the Spanish-American Empire. (S. de Madariaga)
XII (1949) 117-119
Chapman, E. Science, Philosophy and Religion. Second Symposium.
VI (1943}
Coffey, J. R. Los Dominicos y el Concilio de Trento. (V. D. Carro op)
XIV (1951} 400-403

Collins, J. Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion. (R. Thomte)
XII (1949)
Connell, F. J. cssr. A Companion to the Summa. Vol. IV. The Way of
VI (1943) ·
Life. (W. Farrell op)
Considine, J. S. o'p. The Origins of Christian Supernaturalism. (S. J. Case)
--.

X (1947) 349-355
(R. J. Leonertz op)
XI (1948) 370-373
(ed. E. C. Messenger)
XV
651-657

The Apocalypse of St. John.
Theology and Evolution.

BOOK REVIEWERS

Conway, P. H. op. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature. (R. A.
Kocourek)
XII (1949) 227-229
Curran, C. A. Psychologie et Morale aux XIIe et XJIIe Siecles. (0. Lottin)
XIII (1950) 424-432
Curran, J. W. op. The Theology of Prayer. (J. C. Fenton)
II (1940) 163-166
Davey, W. P. The Judgment of the Nations. (C. Dawson)
VIII (1945) 136-146
Della Penta, J. C. op. Adversity's Noblemen. (C. E. Trinkhaus, Jr.)
III (1941) 518-520
Donlan, T. C. op. The College Seeks Religion. (M. Cuninggim)
XII (1949) 95-101
--. Religion in the 20th Century. (V. Ferro)
XII (1949) 95-101
--. The Administration of the Catholic Secondary School. (ed. M. J.
McKeough)
XII (1949) 372-380
--. The Philosophy of Catholic Higher Education. (ed. R. J. DeferXII (1949) 372-380
rari)
Egan, J. M. op. True Humanism. (J. Maritain)
I (1939) 286-291
--. Bernard, Abbot of Clairvaux. The Steps of Humility. (G. B.
,
III (1941) 391-392
Burch)
--. The Intent of the Critic. (E. Wilson, N. Foerster, J. C. Ransom,
W. E. Auden)
IV (1942) 534-539
--. The Novel and Society. (N. E. Monroe)
IV (1942) 534-539
--. The Mind of the Maker. (D. L. Sayers)
IV (1942) 534-539
--. Principles for Peace: Selections from Papal Documents-Leo XIII
to Pius XII. (ed. H. C. Koenig)
VII (1944) 264-266
Education at the Crossroads. (J. Maritain) VII (1944) 415-425
The University and the Modern World. (A. S. Nash)
VII (1944) 415-425
VII (1944) 415-425
Liberal Education. (M. Van Doren)
What is Education. (E. Leen cssp)
VII (1944) 415-425
Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. (ed. A. C. Pegis)
IX (1946) 117-120
Presence et Union: Les Missions des Personnes de la Sainte-Trinite
selon S. Thomas d'Aquin. (L. Chambat osb)
IX (1946) 461-465
--. The Three Ages of the Interior Life. Vol. I. (R. GarrigouXI (1948) 119-122
Lagrange op)
--. Common Mystic Prayer. (G. Diefenback)
XI (1948) 119-122
--. Principes de Morale. I Expose Systematique. II Complemente de
Doctrine et d'Histoire. (0. Lottin osb)
XII (1949) 363-371
Theologie de Realites Terrestres. I-II. (G. Thils)
)[III (1950) 401-410
Karl Barth. (J. Hamer op)
XV (1952) 503-506
Farrell, W. op. Christianity and Morals. (E. Westermarck)
II (1940) 301-306
L'Humanisme Politique de Saint Thomas. (L. Lachance op)
II (1940) 585-590

30

GENERAL INDEX-VOLUMES

I TO XV

--. · The City of Man. (The Committee of Fifteen)
III (1941) 653-667
Living Law of Democratic Society. (J. Hall)
XIV (1951) 259-273

--. American Democracy and Natural Law. (C. G. LeBoutillier}
XIV (1951) 259-273
--. Human Rights. (ed. Unesco)
XIV (1951) 259-273
Fay, B. U. op. The Theory of Human Culture. (J. Feibleman)
)( (1947) 523-527

Foley, L. A. sm. On Understanding Science. (J. B. Conant)
XI (1948) 265-266

--. Cosmology: Elements of a Critique of the Sciences and of Cosmology. (F. Renoitre)
XV (1952) 501-503
Formica, I cp. Evil and the Christian Faith. (N. F. S. Ferre)
XI (1948) 253-257

Forster, C. P. op. Method for the Easy Comprehension of History. (J.
Bodin)
IX (1946) 120-124
Gallagher, D. A. Leon Bloy. Pilgrim of the Absolute. (ed. R. Maritain)
XI (1948) 259-261

--. An Historical Introduction to Modern Philosophy. (H. Miller)
XI (1948) 516-520

Gavigan, J. J. osa. T. Lucreti Cari de Rerum Natura Libri Sex. (ed. W. E.
Leonard and S. B. Smith)
VI (1943) 408-410
Grace, W. J. Citizen Thomas More and his Utopia. (R. Ames)
XIII {1950) 417-424
Hackett, J. W. op. A Scientist's Approach to Religion. (C. W. Miller)
XI (1948) 262-264

Halligan, N. op. Praelectiones Juris Matrimonii. · (Th. M. Vlaming)
)(V (1952) 320-322

Hart, C. A. Reality, a Synthesis of Thomistic Thought. (R. GarrigouXIV (1951) 412-417
Lagrange op)
Healy, K. ocarm. Carmelite and Poet. (R. Sencourt)
VIII (1945) 131-136
Heath, R. M. op. A Philosophy of Poetry: Based on Thomistic Principles.
(J. Duffy cssr)
IX (1946) 588-597
Hennessy, A. P. cp. The Love of God and the Cross of Jesus. I. (R. Garrigou-Lagrange op)
)(III (1950) 28D-286
--. The Three Ages of the Interior Life. II. (R. Garrigou-Lagrange
op)
XIII (1950) 28o-286
Hess, M. W. Signs, Language and Behavior. (C. Morris)
.

)( (1947) 265-267

XI (1948) 257-259
Hughes, J. N. Fearful Symmetry. (N. Frye)
Hughes, W. D. op. Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth.
(E. Frank)
VIII (1945) 404-410
Kearney, J. C. op. Theology and Sanity. (F. J. Sheed)
X (1947) 527-530

Kelly, B. The Journals of Soren Kiekegaard. (ed.-tr., A. Dru)
I (1939) 274-286

BOOK REVIEWERS

31

Kerr, W. Meaning and Truth in the Arts.

(J. Hospers)
)( (1947) 365-371
Kocourek, R. A. The Philosophy of Anaxagoras. (F. M. Cleve)
J{II (1949) 382-384
Lanomen, I. Soviet Politics-The Dilemma of Power. (B. Moore, Jr.)
XIV (1951) 529-536
Ledvina, J. P. How to Read a Book. (M. Adler)
II (1940) 444-451
Lintz, E. J. Essays in Science and Philosophy. (A. N. Whitehead)
XI (1948) 389-391
--. Whitehead's Philosophy of Time. (W. W. Hammerschmidt)
XIII (1950) 299-301
Lumbreras, P. op. The Eternal Quest. (W. A. O'Connor)
)(II (1949)
McAllister, J. B. Between Man and Man. (M. Buber)
XII (1949)
--. The Works of George Berkley, Bishop of Cloyne. 4 vols. (ed. A. A.
Luce and T. E. Jessop)
XV (195£) 165-Hi9
--. The Life of George Berkley, Bishop of Cloyne. (ed. A. A. Luce)
XV
l6!H.69
McGuiness, J. I. op. Cursus Philosophiae. 3 vols. (H. Grenier)
IJ{ (1946) 465-467
Cicero in the Courtroom of St. Thomas Aquinas. (E. K. Rand)
)[ (1947) 120-125
X (1947) 379-381
The Existence of God. (E. G. Jay)
Does God Exist? (A. E. Taylor)
)[ (1947) 379-381
XI (1948) HJ5-H2
Politica de Vitoria. (A. G. Robledo)
La Filosofia de la Ley segun Domingo de Soto. (A. Z. Vegara)
XI (1948) 105-112
The Main Problems of Philosophy. (0. Robles)
)[I (1948) 105-112
McLoughlin, W. A. op. The New Testament in English. (R. A. Knox)
VIII (1945) 285-287
--. Form Criticism of the Synoptic Healing Narratives. (L. J.
VIII (1945) 535-540
McGinley sj)
McNicholl, A. op. The Categorical Imperative. (H. J. Paton)
}[III (1950) Q71-280
--. Essays in the History of Ideas. (A. 0. Lovejoy)
}[IV (1951) 407-412

--. Ernst Cassirer: The Problem of Knowledge: Philosophy, Science
and History since Hegel. (W. H. Woglom and C. W. Hendel)
J{V (1952) 64Q-650
--. The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer. (ed. P. A. Schilpp)
J{V (195Q)
XV (1948) 394-396
McSweeney, A. cp. Ethics. (R. A. Tsanoff)
Maloney, J. R. op. The Mother of the Savior and our Interior Life. (R.
XIV (1951) Q79-Q83
Garrigou-Lagrange op)

32

GENERAL INDEX-VOLUMES

I TO XV

Morris, H. osm. La Mere du Sauveur et Notre Vie lnterieure. (R.
XIII (1950) 606--610
Garrigou-Lagrange op)
--. The Love of God and the Cross of Jesus. II. (R. GarrigouXV
494-498
Lagrange op)
Mullaney, J. V. The Wisdom of Catholicism. (ed. A. C. Pegis)
XIII (1950) 603--605
--. Walls Are Crumbling. (J. M. Oesterreicher)
XV
311-313
Murphy, R. T. A. op. Greek Popular Religion. (M.P. Nilsson)
III (1941) 167-171
--. From the Stone Age to Christianity: Monotheism and the HisHI (1941) 510-517
torical Process. (W. F. Albright)
Archaeology and the Religion of Israel. (W. F. Albright)
VI (1943)
--. Revelation and Response in the Old Testament. (C. A. Simpson)
XI (1948)
Murray, J. C. sj. Separation of Church and State in the U. S. (A. W.
Johnson and F. H. Yost)
XII (1949) 384-385
Murray, R. cp. De Gratia. (P. Lumbreras op)
XI (1948)
Nadeau, L. V. op. The Life of Science. (G. Sarton) XIII (1950)
XIII (1950)
Neill, T. P. Le Sens de l'Histoire. (N. Berdiaeff)
--. Meaning in History. (K. Lowith)
XIII (1950)
Nestor, M. cp. I Was A Monk. (J. Tettemer)
XV
176-179
Nuesse, S. J. Foundations of Democracy. (ed. F. E. Johnson)
XI (1948)
Unity and Difference in American Life. (ed. R. M. Maciver)
)(I (1948)
An Introduction to the History of Sociology. (H. E. Barnes)
XII (1949) 516-523
Historical Sociology. (H. E. Barnes)
XII (1949)
O'Connell, D. A. op. Man's Freedom. (P. Weiss)
XIV (1951) 536-543
O'Connor, M. J. op. John Henry Newman: An Expository and Critical
Study of His Mind, Thought and Origin. (C. F. Harrold)
IJ{ (1946) 327-333
Oesterle, J. A. Science and Man. (Symposium)
IV (1942) 762-768
Inner Laws of Sociology. A New Sociology. (L. Sturzo)
VIII (1945) 520-535
X (1947) 355-365
The Myth of the State. (E. Cassirer)
Meaning and Necessity. (R. Carnap)
XII (1949) 106-ll2
Art and Faith. (J. Maritain and J. Cocteau) XIII (1950) 97-103
Osbourn, J. C. op. Why the Cross? (E. Leen cssp)
I (1939) 444-450
Pick, J. Immortal Diamond: Studies in Gerard Manley Hopkins. (ed. N.
VVeyand)
XIII (1950)
--. Gerard Manley Hopkins: A Study of Poetic Idiosyncrasy in Relation to Poetic Tradition. (W. H. Gardner)
XIII (1950)
Gerard Manley Hopkins: A Critical Essay toward the Understanding
XIII (1950) 289-296
of his Poetry. (W. A. M. Peters)

BOOK REVIEWERS

88

Porreco; R. E. Early Medieval Philosophy. (G. Bosworth Burch)
XV (1952) 822-825
Quirk, C. B. op. Religion in Economics. (J. R. Everett)
}(I (1948) 112-119
Reese, T. J. De Fundamentis Actionis Catkolicae ad mentem S. Gregorii
}(I (1948) 525-581
Magni. (J. Voss)
--. The Theology of Catholic Action. (T. M. Hesburgh esc)
}(I (1948) 525-581
Ross, E. J. Society as the Patient. (L. E. Frank)
XII (1949) 119-121
--. Family and Civilization. (C. C. Zimmerman)
XTII (1950) 286-288
--. Tke Family of Tomorrow. (C. C. Zimmerman)
}(III (1950) 286-288
Ryan, J. K. Language and Reality. (W. Marshall Urban)
III (1941) 164-167
--. Spinoza, Portrait of a Spiritual Hero. (R. Kayser)
X (1947) 882-888

--. George Berkley: Philosophical Commentaries; Essays toward a
New Theory of Vision; Theory of Vision Vindicated. (ed. A. A.
Luce)
}(II (1949) 289-240
Ryan, L.A. op. The Crisis of Our Age. (P. A. Sorokin)
IV (1942) 528-588
--. The Condition of Man. (L. Mumford)
Vll (1944) 544-552
Schroeder, H. J. op. Thomas von Aquin. Sein System und seine geistesgeschichtlicke Stellung. (H. Meyer)
I (1989) 127-181
Schwartz, C. A Companion to the Summa. Vol. III. The Fullness of Life.
(W. Farrell op)
Ill (1941) 380-884
Schwartz, H. T. St. Augustine's Philosophy of Beauty. (E. Chapman)
I (1989) 45o-458

Sister Marie Carolyn op. Marxism and tke Democratic Tradition. (A.
Landy)
X (1947) 125-127
Lions under the Throne. (C. P. Curtin, Jr.) X (1947) 517-528
--. The Shaping of the American Tradition. (L. M. Hacker)
}(I (1948) 880-884
--. Liberty against Government; tke Rise, Flowering and Decline of
a Famous Juridical Concept. (E. S. Corwin) }(II (1949) 214-219
--. Chapters in Western Civilization. (Columbia College)
}(III (1950) 613-618
Sister M. Madeleva esc. Figures for an Apocalypse. (T. Merton)
XII (1949) 101-106
Sister M. Martin op. Religious Trends in English Poetry. III. 1180-1830.
(H. N. Fairchild)
}(Ill (1950) 108-110
Smith, E. F. op. From Aether to Cosmos. Cosmology. (C. N. Bittle ofmcap)
IV (1942) 856-858

Smith, M. How to Educate Human Beings. (E. A. Fitzpatrick)
XIV (1951) 288-285
Smith, M. T. op. Religious Sisters. (Symposium)
XIV (1951) 548-548
Smith, R. op. Logic for the Millions. (A. E. Mander) X (1947) 509-517
-. Basic Logic. (R. J. McCall)
X (1947) 509-517

34

GENERAL

INDEX-VOLUMES

I TO XV

A Philosophy of Submission.

(H. V. Sattler)
XII (1949) 236-238
You Can Change the World. (J. Keller)
XIII (1!150) 111-115
Catholic Social Action. (J. J. Cronin)
XIII (1950) 111-115
--4
Barbara Celarent. (T. Gilby op)
XIII (1950) 601--603
Whitehead's Theory of Experience. (E. P. Shahan)
173-176
XV
Smith, V. E. The Meeting of East and West. (F. S. C. Northrop)
An Intro, uction to Peirce's Philosophy.

X (1947)
(J. Feibleman)
X (1947) 371-378

La Synthese Tkomiste.

(R. Ga:rrigou-Lagrange op)
XI (1948)
The Protestant Era. (P. Tillich)
XII (1949)
Der Glaube bei Emil Brunner. (L. Volken) XII (1949)
The Religion of Philosophers. (J. H. Dunham)
XII (1949)
L'Etre et l'Essence. (E. Gilson)
XIII (1950)
Von der Wakrheit. (K. Jaspers)
XIV (1951)

385-388
220-227
220-227

104-108
273-277
Albert Einstein, Philosopher-Scientist. (ed. P. A. Schilpp)
XIV (1951) 404--407
Rudolf Allers ou l'anti-Freud. (L. Jugnet)
XV
Preface to Happiness. Vol. II. A Guidebook to the Summa.
XV (1952) 314-316
(E. F. Smith op and L. A. Ryan op)
The Existentialists: A Critical Study. (J. Collins)
XV (1952) 658--660
The Existentialist Revolt. (K. F. Reinhardt)
XV
658-660
Sparks, T. M. op. The Analysis of Objects. (A. J. Osgniach osb)
II (1940) 166-171
Stevens, G. osb: Kant's Metaphysics of Experience, a Commentary on the
First Half of the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft. (H. J. Paton)
XV
498-501
Stock, M. op. An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy. (A. H. Armstrong)
XIII (1950) 597--600
Veatch, H. Philosophical Analysis: A Collection of Essays. (ed. M. Black)
XV
169-173
Visker, J. M. op. Erlosung und Sunde in Neuen Testament. (A. KirchXIV (1951) 549-553
gassner)
Voll, W. U. op. Apologia pro Vita Sua. (J. H. Newman)
XI (1948) 503-516
--. A Grammar of Assent. (J. H. Newman)
XI (1948) 503-516
--. The Idea of a University. (J. H. Newman) XI (1948) 503-516
Walker, J. B. op. La Double Experience de Catherine Benincasa. (R.
Fawtier and L. Canet)
XII (1949) 500-516
Welch, L. Thomistic Psychology. (R. E. Brennan op)
IV (1942) 182-183
Wild, J. The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr. (E. J. Carnell)
XV (1952) 317-319

GENERAL INDEX
4. BOOKS REVIEWED
Adler, M. J. How to Read a Book. (J. P. Ledvina)
IT (1940) 444-4/H
Albright, W. F .. Archaeology and the Religion of Israel. (R. T. A.
Murphy op)
VI (1943) 278-281
--. From the Stone Age to Christianity: Monotheism and the HisIII (1941) 51(}-517
torical Process. (R. T. A. Murphy, op)
Allers, R. The Successful Error. (R. E. Brennan op) IT (1940) 581-584
Ames, R. Citizen Thomas More and his Utopia. (W. J. Grace)
Xlll (1950) 417-424

Anshen, R. N. Science and Man .. Symposium. (J. S. Oesterle)
IV (1942) 762-768

Armstrong, A. H. An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy. (M. Stock op)
Xlll (1950) 597-600

Auden, E. H. (et al.). The Intent of the Critic. (J. M. Egan op)

IV (1942) 534-539
Barnes, H. E. An Introduction to the History of Sociology. (C. J. Nuesse)
)(II (1949) 516-523
--. Historicql Sociology: Its Origins and Development; Theories of
Social Evolution from Cave Life to Atomic Bombing. (C. J. Nuesse)
}(II (1949) 516-523

Berdiaeff, N. La Sens de l'Histoire. (T. P. Neill)
)(III (1950) 296-299
Berkley, G. Philosophical Commentaries: Essays toward a New Theory of
Vision; Theory of Vision Vindicated. (J. K. Ryan)
){Jl

(1949} 239-240

Bittle, C. N. ofmcap. From Aether to Cosmos-Cosmology. (E. F. Smith
op)
IV (1942) 356-358
Black, M. (ed.). Philosophical Analysis: A Collection of Essays. (H.
Veatch)
XV (1952) 169-173
Bodin, J. Method for the Easy Comprehension of History. (C. P. Forster
op)
IX (1946) 120-124
Bolman, F. (tr.). Schelling, the Age of the World. (R. Allers)
VI (1943) 122-123
Brennan, R. E. op. History of Psychology from the Standpoint of a Thomist.
(R. Allers)
VITI (1945) 287-288
--. Thomistic Psychology. (L. Welch)
IV (1942) 182-183
Buber, M. Between Man and Man. (J. B. McAllister)
XII (1949) 121-123

Burch, G. B. Early Medieval Philosophy. (R. E. Porreco)
XV (1952) 322-325
--. Bernard, Abbot of Clairvaux-The Steps of Humility. (J. M. Egan
op)
lll (1941) 391-392

85

36

GENERAL INDEX-VOLUMES

I TO XV

Canet, L. (and Fawtier, R.). La Double Experience de Catherine Benincasa. (J. B. Walker op)
Xll (1949) 50o-516
Camap, R. Meaning and Necessity. (J. A. Oesterle) Xll (1949)
Carnell, E. J. The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr. (J. Wild)
XV
317-319
Carro, V. D. op. Los Dominicos y el Concilio de Trento. (R. Coffey op)
)(rV (1951) 400-403
Case, S. J. The Origins of Christian Supernaturalism. (J. S. Considine op)
X (1947) 349-355
X (1947) 355-365
Cassirer, E. The Myth of a State. (J. A. Oesterle)
Chambat, L. osb. Presence et Union: Les Missions des Personnes de la
Sainte Trinite selon S. Thomas d'Aquin. (J. M. Egan op)
IX (1946) 461-465
Chapman, E. St. Augustine's Philosoph-yof Beauty. (H. T. Schwartz)
I (1989) 450-458
Clark, E. P. (and Nahm, M. C., ed.) Philosophical Essays in Honor of
Edgar Arthur Singer, Jr. (R. Allers)
VI (1948)
·
Cleve, F. M. The Philosophy of Anaxagoras. (R. A. Kocourek)
XII (1949)
Cocteau, J. (and Maritain, J.) Art and Faith. (J. A. Oesterle)
XIII (1950) 97-103
Collins, J. The Existentialist: A Critical Study. (V. E. Smith).
XV
658-660
Columbia College. Chapters in Western Civilization. (Sr. Marie Carolyn
XIII (1950) 615-618
op)
Committee of Fifteen. The City of Man. (W. Farrell op)
III (1941) 653-665
Conant, J. B. On Understanding Science. (L. C. Foley sm)
XI (1948)
Corwin, E. S. Liberty against Government: The Rise, Flowering and Decline of a Famous Juridical Concept. (Sr. M. Carolyn op)
XII (1949)
Cronin, J. F. Catholic Social Action. (R. Smith op) XITI (1950) 111-115
Cuninggim, M. The College Seeks Religion. (T. C. Donlan op)
XII {1949) 95-101
Curtain, C. P. Jr. Lions under the Throne. (Sr. M. Carolyn op)
X (1947)
Dalbiez, R. La Methode Psychanalytique et la Doctrine Freudienne.
vols. (R. Allers)
I (1989) 131-188
Dawson, C. The Judgment of the Nations. (W. P. Davey)
VIII (1945) 186-146
Deferrari, R. J. (ed.). The Philosophy of Catholic Higher Education.
XII (1949)
(T. C. Donlan op)
De Madariaga, S. The Fall of the Spanish American Empire. (M. S.
Xll (1949) 117-119
Cardozo)
Dempf, A. Selbskritik der Philosophie und vergleichende PhilosophiegeXll (1949)
schichte im Umriss. (R. Allers)
Diefenback, G. ofmcap. Common Mystic Prayer. (J. M. Egan op)
XI (1948)

BOOKS REVIEWED

87

Dru, A. (ed.-tr.). Tke Journals of Soren Kierkegaard. (B. Kelly).
I (1939)
Duffy, J. cssr. A Philosophy of Poetry: Based on Thomistic Principles.
IX (1946) 588-597
(M. Heath op)
Dunham, J. H. Tke Religion of Philosophers. (V. E. Smith)
}(II (1949)
Eddington, A. The Philosophy of Physical Science. (R. Allers)
III (1941) 385-387
Elder, E. E. (tr.). A Commentary on the Creed of Islam Sa'd al Din
al-Tafta:ziini on the Creed of Najm al Din al Nasafi. (M. M.
Anawati op)
XIV (1951)
Everett, J. R. Religion in Economics. (C. B. Quirk op)
JCI (1948)
Fairchild, H. N. Religious Trends in English Poetry. Ill 1780-1830. (Sr.
M. Martin op)
}(Ill (1950) 108-110
Farrell, W. op. A Companion to the Summa.
I. The Architect of the Universe. (R. R. Baker)
IV
355-356
II. The Fullness of Life. (C. Schwartz)
III (1941) 38o-384
VI (1943) 119-121
IV. Tke Way of Life. (F. J. Connell cssr)
Fawtier, R. (and Canet, L.). La Double Experience de Catherine Benincasa. (J. B. Walker op)
}(II (1949) 500-516
Fechner, G. Th. Religion of a Scientist. (R. Allers) X (1947)
Feibleman, J. An Introduction to Peirce's Philosophy. (V. E. Smith)
X (1947} 371-378
--. Tke Theory of Human Culture. (B. U. Fay op)
/
}.( (1947)
Fenton, J. C. Tke Theology of Prayer. (J. W. Curran op)
II (1940) 163-166
Ferro, V. Religion in the
Century. (T. C. Donlan op)
JCII (1949) 95-100
.
Ferre, N. F. S. Evil and tke Christian Faith. (1. Formica cp)
XI (1948)
Fitzpatrick, E. A. How to Educate Human Beings. (M. Smith)
){IV (1951)
Foerster, N. (et al.). The Intent of the Critic. (J. M. Egan op)
IV
534-539
Foss, M. Tke Idea of Perfection in the Western World. (R. Allers)
){ (1947)
Frank, E. Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth. (W. D.
Hughes op)
VIII (1945) 404-410
}(II (1949)
Frank, L. E. Society as tke Patient. (E. Ross)
Frank, P. Between Science and Philosophy. (R. Allers)
IV
183-188
Frye, N. Fearful Symmetry. (J. N. Hughes)
XI (1948)
Gardner, W. H. Gerard Manley Hopkins: A Study of Poetic Idiosyncrasy
){IIJ (1950)
in Relation to Poetic Tradition. (J. Pick)

38

GENERAL

INDEX-VOLUMES

I TO XV

Garrigou-Lagrange, R. op The Three Agelf of the Interior Life. I. (J. M.
Egan op)
XI (1948) H!l-122
La Synthese Thomiste. (V. E. Smith)
XI (1948) 885-388
The Love of God and the Cross of Jesus. I. (A. P. Hennessy cp)
XIII (1950) 280-286
The Three Ages of the Interior Life. II. (A. P. Hennessy cp)
XIII (1950) Q80-286
La Mere du Sauveur et Notre Vie Interieure. (H. Morris osm)
XIII (1950) 606-610
The Mother of the Savior and our Interior Life. (J. R. Maloney
XIV (1951) 279-283
op)
--. Reality, a Synthesis of Thomistic Thought. (C. A. Hart)
XIV (1951) 412-417
--. The Love of God and the Cross of Jesus. II. (H. Morris osm)
XV (1952) 494-498
Gilby, T. op Barbara Celarent. (R. Smith op)
Xill (1950) 601-603
XIII (1950) 104-108
Gilson, E. L'Etre et l'Essence. (V. E. Smith)
Goheen, J. The Problem of Matter and Form in the "De Ente et Essentia" of Thomas Aquinas. (R. Allers)
II (1940) 451-454
Gray, J. G. Hegel's Hellenic Ideal. (R. Allers)
IV (1942) 359-861
Grenier, H. Cursus Philosophiae. 3 vols. (J. I. McGuiness op)

IX (1946) 465-467
Hacker, L. M. The Shaping of the American Tradition. (Sister M. Carolyn
XI (1948) 380-384
op)
Hall, J. Living Law of Democratic Society. (W. Farrell op)

XIV (1951) £59-273

Hamer, J. op. Karl Barth. (J. M. Egan op)
XV (1952) 503-506
Hammerschmidt, W. W. Whitehead's Philosophy of Time. (E. J. Lintz)

){III (1950) £99-301
Harrold, C. F. John Henry Newman: An Expository and Critical Study
of his Mind, Thought and Origin. (M. J. O'Connor op)
I)( (1946) 3£7-333

Hendel, C W. (and Woglon, W. H.) Ernst Cassirer: The Problem of
Knowledge: Philosophy, Science and History since Hegel. (A. J.
McNichoH op)
XV (1952) 642-650
Henry, P. sj. Etudes Plotiniennes. I Les Etats du Texte de Plotin. (R.
Allers)
I {1939) 138-139
Herskovits, M. J. Man and his Works. The Science of Cultural Anthropology. (R . .Allers)
DH (1950) 610--615
Hesburgh, T. M. esc. The Theology of Catholic Action. (T. J. Reese)
}(I

(1948) 525-531

Hillenbrand, M. J. Power and Morals. (R. Allers) XIII (1950) 432-434
Hospers, J. Meaning and Truth in the Arts. {W. Kerr) X (1947) 365-371
XIV (1951) 273-277
Jaspers, K. Von der Wahrheit. (V. E. Smith)
Jay, E. G. The Existence of God. (J. I. McGuiness op)
X (1947) 379-381
Jessop, T. E. (and Luce, A. A., ed.). The Works of George Berkeley,
Bishop of Cloyne. 4 vols. (J. B. McAllister) XV (1952) 165-Hl9

39

BOOKS REVIEWED

Joad, c, E. M. Philosophy for our Times. (R. Allers) III (1941) 667-668
Johnson, A. W. (and Yost, F. H.) Separation of Church and State in the
U. S. (J. C. Murray sj)
XII (1949) 884-385
Johnson, F. E. (ed.). Foundations of Democracy. (C. J. Nuesse)
XI (1948)
Jugnet, L. Rudolf Allers ou l'anti-Freud. V. E. Smith)

){V

Kayser, R. Spinoza, Portrait of a Spiritual Hero. (J. K. Ryan)
J( (1947)
Keller, J. You Can Change the World. (R. Smith op)
JCIII (1950) 111-115
Kirchgiissner, A. ErlOsung und Sunde in Neuen Testament. (J. M. Visker
op)
JCIV (1951) 549-558
Kluckholm, C. (and Murray, H., ed.). Personality in Nature, Society and
XIII (1950) 115-118
Culture. (R. Allers)
Knox, R. A. The New Testament in English. (W. A. McLoughlin op)
VIII (1945)
Kocourek, R. A. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature. (P. H.
XII (1949)
Conway op)
Koenig, H. C. (ed.). Principles for Peace: Selections from Papal Documents-Leo XIII to Pius XII. (J. M. Egan op)
VII (1944) 264-266
Kristeller, P. 0. Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino. (R. Allers)
VI (1948) 410-414
Lachance, L. op. L'Humanisme Politique de Saint Thomas. (W. Farrell
II (1940) 585-590
op)
Landy, A. Marxism and the Democratic Tradition. (Sr. M. Carolyn op)
J( (1947) 125-127
Leboutillier, C. G. American Democrac;; and Natural Law. (W. Farrell
JCIV (1951) 259-278
op)
Leen, E. cssp. What is Education. (J. M. Egan op) VII (1944)
--. Why the Cross? (J. C. Osbourn op)
I (1939) 444-450
Leonard, W. E. (and Smith, S. B., ed.). T. Lucreti Cari de Rerum Natura
VI (1948) 408-410
Libri Sex. (J. J. Gavigan osa)
Leonertz, R. J. op. The Apocalypse of St. John. (J. S. Considine op)
XI (1948) 870-878
Lief, A. (ed.). The Common Sense Psychiatry of Adolph Meyer. (R. E.
JCIII (1950) 410-417
Arnot)
Lottin, 0. Pschologie et Morale aux XII• et XIII• Siecles. II. (C. A.
JCIII (1950) 424-482
Curran)
--. Principes de Morale. vols. (J. M. Egan op)
J(II (1949) 868-371
Lovejoy, A. 0. Essays in the History of Ideas. (A. J. McNicholl op)
)(IV (1951) 407-412
XIII (1950)
LOwith, K. Meaning in History. (T. P. Neill)
Lowrie, W. (and Fechner, G. Th., ed.-tr.). Religion of a Scientist. (R.
J( (1947) 267-268
Allers)

40

GENERAL

INDEX-VOLUMES

I TO XV

Luce, A. A. (and Jessop, T. E., ed.) The Works of George Berkley, Bishop
of Cloyne. 4 vols. (J. B. McAllister)
XV (1952) 165-169
--. The Life of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne. (J. B. McAllister)
XV
165-169
--. George Berkeley, Philosophical Commentaries: Essays toward a
New Theory of Vision; Theory of Vision Vindicated. (J. K. Ryan)
)(II (1949) 239-240
Lumbreras, P. op. De Gratia. (R. Murray cp)
XI (1948)
McCall, R. J. Basic Logic. (R. Smith op)
X (1947) 509-517
McGinley, L. J. sp. Form Criticism of the Synoptic Healing Narratives.
(W. A. McLoughlin op)
VIII (1945) 535-540
Maciver, R. M. ed.). Unity and Difference in American Life. (C. J.
Nuesse)
XI (1948)
McKenzie, J. G. Nervous Disorders and Character. (R. Allers)
XI (1948)
McKeough, M. J. (ed.) The Administration of the Catholic Secondary
XII (1949)
School. (T. C. Donlan op)
McMahon, F. E. A Catholic Looks at the World. (0. Bird)
IX (1946) 333-335
Mander, A. E. Logic for the Millions. (R. Smith op) X (1947) 509-517
Marcuse, H. Reason and Revolution. Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory.
(R. Allers)
IV (194£) 359-361
Maritain, J. True Humanism. (J. M. Egan op)
I (1939)
--. Education at the Crossroads. (J. M. Egan op)
VII (1944)
--. Art and Faith. (J. A. Oesterle)
XIII (1950) 97-103
Maritain, R. (ed.). Leon Bloy-Pilgrim of the Absolute. (D. A. Gallagher)
){I (1948)
Merton, T. Figures for an Apocalypse. (Sr. 1VL Madeleva esc)
XII (1949) 101-106
Messenger, E. C. (ed.). Theology and Evolution. (J. S. Considine op)
JCV
651-657
Meyer, H. Thomas von Aquin. Sein System und Sein geistesgeschichtliche
Stellung. (H. J. Schroeder op)
I (1939) 127-131
Miller, C. W. A Scientist's Approach to Religion. (J. W. Hackett op)
XI (1948)
Miller, H. An Historical Introduction to Modern Philosophy. (D. A.
Gallagher)
XI (1948)
Monroe, N. E. The Novel and Society. (James M. Egan op)
IV
534-539
Moore, B., Jr. Soviet Politics:._ The Dilemma of Power. (Ivan Lanomen)
XIV (1951) 5£9-536
Moore, T.V. osb. Cognitive Psychology. (R. :E. Brennan op)
II (1940) 156-163
Morris, C. Signs, Language and Behavior. (M. W. Hess)
}( (1947)
Mumford, L. The Condition of Man. (L. A. Ryan op)
vn (1944)

41

BOOKS REVIEWED

Murray, H. C. K. (ed.). Personality in Nature, Society and Culture. (R.
XIII {1950) 115-118
Allers)
Nahm, M. C. (and Clark, E. P.) Philosophical Essays in Honor of Edgar
Arthur Singer, Jr. (R. Allers)
VI {1943) 123-126
Nash, A. S. The University and the Modern World. (J. M. Egan op)
VII {1944) 415-425
Newman, J. H. Card. Apologia pro Vita Sua. (U. Voll op)
J(I

{1948) 503-516

--. A Grammar of Assent. (U. Voll op)
XI {1948) 503-516
--. The Idea of a University. (U. Voll op)
XI {1948) 503-516
Nilsson, M. P. Greek Popular Religion. (R. T. Murphy op)
III (1941) 167-171
Northrop, F. C. S. The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities (R.
Allers)
XI (1948) 241-246
--. The Meeting of East and West. (V. E. Smith)
X (1947) 253-262

O'Connor, W. R. The Eternal Quest. (P. Lumbreras op)
}(II (1949) 207-214

Oesterreicher, J. M. Walls Are Crumbling. (J. V. Mullaney)
XV (1952) 311-313
Osgniach, A. J. The Analysis of Objects. (T. M. Sparks op)
II (1940) 166-171

Ottaviano, C. Metafisica dell'Essere Parziale. (R. Allers)
XI {1948) 374-380

Palmer, R. R. Catholics and Unbelievers in Eighteenth Century France.
(R. Allers)
II {1939) 454-457
Parker, D. H. Experience and Substance. (R. Allers) III (1941) 67o-672
Paton, H. J. Kant's Metaphysics of Experience, A Commentary on the
First Half of the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft. (G. Biiki, osb; G.
Stevens osb)
XV {1952) 498-501
--. The Categorical Imperative. (A. McNicholl, op)
}(III (1950) 271-280

Pegis, A. C. Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. (J. M. Egan op)
IX (1946) 117-120
--. The Wisdom of Catholicism. (J. V. Mullaney)
}(Ill (1950) 603-605

Peters, W. A.M. Gerard Manley Hopkins: A Critical Essay Toward the
XIII (1950) 289-296
Understanding of His Poetry. (J. Pick)
Rand, E. K. Cicero in the Courtroom of St. Thomas Aquinas. (J. I.
McGuiness op)
X {1947) 120-125
Ransom, J. C. (et al.). The Intent of the Critic. (J. M. Egan op)
IV (1942) 534-539
Renoirte, F. Cosmology: Elements of a Critique of the Sciences and of
Cosmology. (L. A. Foley sm)
XV 1952) 501-503
Reinhardt, K. F. (et al.). The Existentialist Revolt. (V. E. Smith)
XV (1952) 658-660
III (1947) 387-391
Riezler, K. Physics and Reality. (R. Allers)

42

GENERAL INDEX-VOLUMES

Robledo, A. G. Politica de Vitoria.

I TO XV

(J. I. McGuiness op)
}[I

Robles, 0. The Main Problems of Philosophy.

(1948)

(J. I. McGuiness op)
}[[ (1948) 105-11£

Ryan, L.A. (and Smith, E. F.) Preface to Happiness, Vol. II. A GuideXV (195£) 314-316
book to the Summa. (V. E. Smith)
Sarton, G. The Life of Science. (L. V. Nadeau op) XIII (1950) 118-121
Sattler, H. V. A Philosophy of Submission. (R. Smith op)

1{11 (1949)
Sayers, D. L. The Mind of the Maker.

(J. M. Egan op)
IV

534-539

Schllpp, P. A. (ed.). Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist. (V. E. Smith)
XIV (1951) 404-407
--. The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer. (A. J. McNichol! op)
XV
642-650
Sencourt, R. Carmelite and Poet. (K. Healy ocarm) VIII (1945) 131-136
Shaha,n, E. P. Whitehead's Theory of Experience. (R. Smith op)
XV (1952) 173-176
Sheed, F. J. Theology and Sanity. (J. C. Kearney op)

X (1947) 527-530
Sherrington, C. Man On His Nature. (R. Allers)
III (1941) 507-510
Shute, C. The Psychology of Aristotle. (R. E. Brennan op)
IV (1942) 358

Silva-Tarouca, A. Thomas Heute-Zehn Vortriige zum Aufbau einer· neuen
existentiellen Ordnungs-Metaphysik nach Thomas von Aquin. (R.
Allers)
xn (1949) 240-241
X (1947) 262-264
Simon, Y. Prevoir et Savoir. (R. Allers)
Simpson, C. A. Revelation and Response in the Old Testament. (R. T.
Thlurphy op)
XI (1948) 122-126
Slaughter, F. G. Medicine for Moderns. (R. Allers) XI (1948) 392-393
Smith, E. F. (and Ryan, L. A.). Preface to Happiness, Vol. ll. A GuideXV (1952) 314-316
book to the Summa. (V. E. Smith)
Smith, S. B. (and Leonard, W. E., ed.). T. Lucreti Cari de Rerum Natura
VI (1943) 408-410
Libri Sex. (J. J. Gavigan osa)
Smith, V. E. Philosophical Physics. (R. Allers)
1{lV (1951) 277-279
Sorokin, P. A. The Crisis of Our Age. (L.A. Ryan op)
IV (1942) 523-533
Symposium. Religious Sisters. (M. T. Smith op)
XIV (1951) 543-548
Sturzo, L. Inner Laws of Sociology. A New Sociology. (J. A. Oesterle)
VIII (1945) 52G-535
X (1947) 379-381
Taylor, A. E. Does God Exist. (J. I. McGuiness op)
Tettemer, J. I Was A Monk. (M. Nestor.cp)
XV (1952) 176-179
Thils, G. Theologie de Realites Terrestres, I-II. (J. M. Egan op)

]{III (1950) 401-410
Thomte, G. R. Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion. (T. C. Donlan op)
Tillich, P. The Protestant Era. (V. E. Smith)

XII (1949) 38G-382
DI (1949) 220-227

BOOKS REVIEWED

Trinkhaus, C. E., Jr. Adversity's Noblemen.

48

(J. C. Della Penta op)
III (1941)
Tsanoff, R. A. Ethics. (A. McSweeney cp)
XI (1948) 894-896
XIV (1951)
Unesco (ed.). Human Rights. (W. Farrell op)
Urban, W. M. Language and Reality. (J. K. Ryan) III (1941) 164-167
Van Doren, M. Liberal Education. (J. M. Egan op) VII (1944)
Vergara, A. Z. La Filosofia de la Ley segun Domingo de Soto. (J. I.
McGuiness op)
XI (1948)
Vlaming, T. M. Praelectiones Juris Matrimonii. (N. Halligan op)
)(V
L. Der Glaude bei Emil Brunner. (V. E. Smith)
.
)(II (1949)
Voss, J. De Fundamentis Actionis Catkolicae ad Mentem Sancti Gregorii
XI (1948)
Magni. (T. J. Reese)
XIV (1951) 586-548
Weiss, P. Man's Freedom. (D. A. O'Connell op)
Welch, E. P. The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl. The Origin and Development of His Phenomenology. (R. Allers) IV
Westermarck, E. Christianity and Morals. (W. Farrell op)
II {1940) 801-806
Weyand, N. (ed.). Immortal Diamond: Studies in Gerard Manley Hopkins.
(J. Pick)
XIII (1950)
Whitehead, A. N. Essays in Science and Philosophy. (E. J. Lintz)
XI (1948) 889-891
Whittaker, Sir E. Space and Spirit. Cf. Analytic Index. Physical Metaphysics.
Wiener, N. Cybernetics, Control and Communication in the Animal and
t/te Machine. (R. Allers)
XII (1949)
Wilson, E. (et al.). Tke Intent of tke Critic. (J. M. Egan op)
IV
584-589
Woglon, W. H. (and Hendel, C. W.) Ernst Cassirer: Tke Problem of
Knowledge: Philosophy, Science, and History since Hegel. (A. J.
McNicholl op)
XV
Wolter, A. B. ofm. The Transcendentals and their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus. (F. Alluntis ofm)
XI (1948)
Woodbridge, F. J. E. An 'Essay on Nature. (R. Allers)
III (1941) 669-670
Yost, F. H. (and Johnson, A. W.). Separation of Church and State in the
U. S. (J. C. Murray sj)
)(II {1949} 884-885
Zimmerman, C. C. Family and Civilization. (E. J. Ross)
)(III (1950)
.
--. Tke Family of Tomorrow. (E. J,. (Ross) XIII (1950)

GENERAl. INDEX
5. BRIEF NOTICES

Adler, M. J. A Dialectic of Morals: Towards the Foundations of Political
Philosophy.
III (Hl41) 673
Agar, W. M. Catholicism and the Progress of Science.
III (1941) 173-174
--.The Dilemma of Science.
IV
545
Allgeier, A. (ed.). Die Neue Psalmeniibersetzung.
XIV (1951) 433-434
Almeida, E. op. Santo Tomas de Aquino y el Problema Psicol6gico de la
Union del Alma con el Cuerpo.
XIV (1951)
XV
Alvarez, A. G. Introducci6n ala Metafisica.
Anawander, A. Die Religionen der Menscheit.
XIV (1951) 430--431
Aquinas, St. Th. The Soul. (tr. J. P. Rowan)
XIII (1950)
--. La Liberte des Enfants de Dieu. Richesse et Pauvrete. Rites et
Prieres de la Messe.
IX (1946) 127
--. Compendium of Theology. (tr. Cyril Vollert sj)
}[II (1949) 248-249

--. De Principiis Naturae. (tr. John J. Pauson) XV (1952) 193-194
--. Love and Friendship. On Aristotle's Ethics, bks. VIII-IX. (tr.
(Pierre Conway op)
XV
--. The Virtues in General. (tr. J. P. Reid op)
XV (1952) 330
Arintero, J. G. op. The Mystical Evolution in the Development and Vitality
of the Church. Vol. I.
XIII (1950) 628-629
Arnold, F. X. Untersuchungen zur Theologie der Seelsorge. I-II.
XIV (1951) 430-431
Artz, F. B. A Guide to the Intellectual History of Europe from St. Augustine to Marx.
III (1941) 675
Attwater, D. Modern Christian Revolutionaries.
XI (1948) 131-133
--. A Catholic Dictionary.
IV {1942) 191
Augustine, St. Against the Academics. (tr. J. J. O'Meara osa)
XV (1952) 190-191
Az-Zarnuji. Ta'lim al-Muta'allim-Tar'iq f.lt-Ta'allum.
XI (1948) 127
Baker, R. R. The Thomistic Theory of the Passions and their Influence on
IV (1942) 366
the Will.
Ill (1941) 173-174
Baldwin, M. W. The Medieval Papacy in Action.
Bardy, G., et a.l. L'Enfer.
XIV (1951)
Bentley, E. Out of Bondage.
XV (1952) 346
Berenson, B. Aesthetics and History in the Visual Arts.
]]1 (1949) 387-388

Bergstraesser, A. (ed.).

Goethe and the Modern Age.
XIV (1951) 435-437

44

BRIEF NOTICES

45

Bernadot, M. V. op. Notre Dame dans ma Vie.
VII (1944) 426-427
XIV (1951) 487
Blackstone, B. English Blake.
Bl&kney, R. B. Meister Eckhart: A Modem Translation. VI (1948) 182
Bochenski, I. M. op (ed.). Bibliographiscke Einfiihrungen in das Studiwm
der Philosophic. I-XI.
XIV (1951) 806-807
--. Precis de Logique Matkematique.
XIII (1950) 446-447
--. Der Sowjetrussiscke Dialektische Materialismus (Diamat).
XIV (1951) 420-422
--. Europaische Philosophic der Gegenwart.
XI (1948) 267-268
Born, M. Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance. XV (1952) 185-187
Thomas and tke Greek Moralists. XI (1948) 588-585
Bourke, V. J.
--. Augustine's Quest of Wisdom.
IX (1946) 126
--. Thomistic Bibliography, 1920-1940.
VIII (1945) 411
IV (1942) 545
Bradshaw, M. J. Philosophical Foundations of Faith.
Bridgmann, P. W. Reflections of a Physicist.
XIV (1951) 557-559
Brinton, C. Ideas and Men.
XV (1952) 188-185
Brooks, van W. The Times of Melville and Whitman
XIII (1950) 181-182
--. A Chilmark Miscellany.
XIII (1950) 181-182
Brown, S. J. and McDermott, T. A Survey of Catholic Literature.
VIII (1945) 411
Brucker, H. Freedom of Information.
XIII (1950) 128-129
Bruckmann, W. D. Keystones and Theories of Philosophy.
X (1947) 18Q-181
Bruehl, C. P. Tke Pope's Plan for Social Reconstruction.
II (1940) 81Q-811
--. This Way Happiness.
IV (1942) 865-866
Brugger, W. (ed.). Philosophisches Worterbuch.
XII (1949) 249
XV (1952) 661-668
Bruno de Jesus-Marie ocd (ed.). Satan.
Bryan, W. L. Wars of Families of Mind.s.
III (1941) 675
Caldin, E. F. The Power and Limits of Science: A Philosophical Study.
XIV (1951) 294-296
Campbell, R. (ed.). Poems of St. John of the Cross. XV (1952) 339-340
Cardwell, A. S. Poland and Russia. Tke Last Quarter Century.
VIII (1945) 412
VI (1943) 132
Cargill, 0. Intellectual America.
Carritt, E. F. An Introduction to Aesthetics.
XIII (1950) 123
Castell, A. An Introduction to Modern Philosophy. VII (1944) 182-133
II (1940) 172
Cayre, F. A. aa (ed.). Oeuvres deS. Augustin.
Chase, C. T. The Evolution of Physics.
XI (1948) 180
Chenu, M.D. op. Introduction a l'Etude de Saint Thomas d'Aquin.
XIV (1951) 554-556
Coffey, R. op. The Man from Rocca Sicca.
VII (1944) 269
Copleston, F. sj. A History of Philosophy. II.
XV (1952) 835-837
Cory, H. E. The Emancipation of a Freethinker.
IV (1942) 190
Cossa, P. Du Reflexe en Psychique.
XII (1949) 256-257
Cotter, H. C. sj. Theologia Fundamentalis.
III (1941) 395
Cronin, J. F. ss. Catholic Social Principles.
XV (1952) 518-519

46

GENERAL INDEX-VOLUMES

I TO XV

D'Entreves, A. P. Natural Law. An Introduction to Legal Philosophy.
XV (1952) 584-585
Davitt, T. E. sj. The Nature of Law.
XV (1952) 826-827
De Ajuriaguerra, J. (and Marchand, L.). Les Epilepsies; leurs Formes
-Cliniques; leurs Traitements.
XII (1949) 257
De Beauvoir, S. The Ethics of Ambiguity.
XIll (1950) 485-486
Deferrari, R. J. (ed.). Essays on Catholic Education in the U. S.
VI (1948) 182
Delfgaauw, B. M. I. Het Spiritualistisch Existentialisme van Louis Lavelle.
X (1947) 583
De Lubac, H. sj. The Drama of Atheist Humanism. XIV (1951) 290-291
Deman, T. op. Aux Origines de la Theologie Morale. XV (1952) 524-526
--. Construction de la Paiz.
ill (1941) 175
XII (1949) 129-180
Dempf, A. Die Krisis des Fortschrittsglaubens.
Dewey, J. Reconstruction in Philosophy.
XII (1949) 525-527
De Tonquedec, J. Questions de CoQmologie et de Physique chez Aristote
et Saint Thomas.
XV (1952) 188-189
DiNapoli, J. Manuale Philosophiae. 2 vols.
XV (1952) 884-885
XV (1952) 514-515
Dockx, S. I. op. Fils de Dieu par grace.
Donnelly, D. The Bone and the Star.
VIII (1945) 290
Du Noiiy, L. The Road to Reason.
XIll {1950) 125-126
Ebenstein, W. (ed.). Man and the State: Modern Political Ideas.
XI (1948) 897-898

Eberle, J. Die Bibel im Lichte der W eltgeschichte und W eltliteratur.
XIV (1951) 568-565
Edman, I. (ed.). The Philosophy of Santayana.
VII (1944) 188
Edman, I .. (and Schneider, H. W.). Landmarks in Philosophy.
IV (1942) 1890-191
Eisenstein, I. The Ethics of Tolerance.
VI (1948) 181
XV (1952) 187-188
Evans, M. E. The Seed and the Glory.
Feckes, C. The Mystery of Divine Motherhood.
II (1940) 812
Fenton, J. C. The Concept of Sacred Theology.
IV (1942) 190
--. The Concept of the Diocesan Priesthood.
XV (1952) 180-181
Ferm, V. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Religion.
IX (1946) 126-127
Fichter, J. H. Man of Spain: A Biography of Francis Suarez.

m (1941) 174

X (1947) 884-885
Fisher, M.S. Robert Boyle, Devout Naturalist.
Flew, A. G. N. (ed.). Essays on Logic and Language. XV (1952) 827-829
Foster, K. op (and Humphries, S. op, tr.); Aristotle's De Anima in the
Version of William of Moerbeke and the Commentary of St. Thomas
Aquinas.
XV (1952) 665-667
Frege, G. The Foundations of Aritlimetic: A Logico-mathematical enquiry
into the Concept of Number.
XIV (1951) 296-297
VI (1948) 282
Furfey, P. H. A History of Social Thought.
Gardiner, H. C. (ed.). The ·Great Books.
XIll (1950) 124-125
Garin, E. Der Italienische Humanismus.
XI (1948) 582-588
Garlan, E. N. Legal Realism and JUstice.
IV (1942) 862
ll (1940) 807
Garrigou-Lagrange, R. op. Predestination.

BRIEF NOTICES

47

Gemelli, A. ofm (and Zunini, G.). Introduzione alla Psicologia.
Xlli {1950)
Gerber, W. The Domain of Reality.
XI {1948) U9
Giacon, C. Il Devenire in Aristotele.
XI (1948)
XV
337-338
Gilson, E. Heloise and Abelard.
--. History of Philosophy and Philosophical Education.
XI (1948) 533-534

--. The Mystical Theology of St. Bernard.
ill {1941)
-. God and Philosophy.
IV
189
XV
513-514
Grace, W. J. Triple City.
Greenberg, S. The Infinite in Giordano Bruno.
XIV (1951)
Greenstock, D. L. Christopher's Talks to Catholic Parents.
XV
537-538
Gregoire, F. Aux Sources de la Pensee, de Marx, Hegel, Feuerbach.
XI {1948)
Grene, M. Dreadful Freedom.
XI (1948)
Grenier, H. Thomistic Philosophy.' 4 vols.
XV (1952) 668-669
Grunebaum, G. E. von. Medieval Islam.
X (1947) 387-389
Guerrero, L. J. (ed.). Aetas del Primer Congreso Nacional de Filosofia.
XV (1952) 671-672
Guitton, J. Essay on Human Love.
XV (1952) 509-511
Hanke, L. Bartolome de Las Casas.
XV {1952) 535-536
XIII (1950) 633-634
Harper, R. Existentialism.
XI (1948) 406
Harriman, P. L. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Psychology.
--. The New Dictionary of Psychology.
XI (1948) 128-129
Harrington, M. Calvary and Community.
XV (1952) 663-665
Harrison, M. op. The Everyday Catholic.
XII (1949) 253-254
Hartdegen, S. J. ofm. A Chronological Harmony of the Gospels.
VI {1943) 128-129

Hartman, S. J. Fundamentals of Logic.
XII (1949) 391-392
XIV (1951)
Hawkins, D. J. B. The Essentials of Theism.
Haydon, J. K. The God of Love.
Vill (1945) 412
Hayek, F. A. John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor XV (1952) 343-344
Hertz, R. Chance and Symbol.
XII (1949) 251-253
XIII (1950) 437-438
Higgins, T. J. Man as Man.
Hirschberger, J. Geschichte der Philosophie. I Altertum und· Mittelalter.
Xlli (1950) 630
IV {1942) 189
Hocking, W. E. Living Religions and_a World Faith.
Hoffman, E. J. S. The Spirit of Politics and the Future of Freedom.
XV 1952) 333-334
Hofstadter, R. The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made
It.
XIII (1950) 129-131
III {1941) 673
Houck, F. A. Man's Triumph with God in Christ.
Hughes, W. D. op. (tr.). The Gifts of. the Holy Ghost by John of St.
Thomas.
XV (1952) 182-183
Humphrey, R. Georges Sorel, Prophet Without Honor. A Study in AntiIntellectualism.
XV (1952) 526-527
III (1941) 395
Hunt, E. Joannis Dominici Lucula Noctis.

48

GENERAL INDEX-VOLUMES

I TO XV

Iswolsky, H. Soul of Russia.
VII (1944)
VII (1944) 188
Jaeger, W. Humanism and Theology.
VI (1948) 181
Jarrett, B. op. Social Theories of the Middle Ages.
Jedin, H. Papal Legate at the Council of Trent: Cardinal Seripando.
)(!

(1948) 898-400

Jeffres, L. A. (ed.). Cerebral Mechanisms in Behavior. The Hixon Symposium.
XV
667-668
Joad, C. E. M. How Our Minds Work.
XI (1948) 585-587
John of St. Thomas. De Certitudine Principiorum Theologiae; de AuctoriXII (1949)
tate Summi Pontificis.
Jolivet, R. Essai sur le Probleme et les Conditions de la Sincerite.
XV
--. Traite de Philosophie. I Logique-Cosmologie.
II (1940) 178
Jones, A. Unless Some Man Show Me.
XV
840
Jones, J. W. Historical Introduction of the Theory of Law.
IV
Juenger, F. G. The Failure of Technology.
XIV (1951) 484-485
II (1940) 818
Jiirgensmeier, F. The Mystical Budy of Christ.
XV
515-516
Katz, J. Plotinus' Search for Truth.
Kean, C. D. The Meaning of Existence.
X (1947)
VIII (1945)
Kent, M. The Bond of Peace.
Kerwin, J. G. The Great Tradition: the Democratic Idea.
XIII (1950)
Klein, F. The Doctrine of the Trinity.
III (1941) 895
Knox, R. A. Enthusiasm.
XIV (1951)
Kol, A. van sj. Christul Plaats inS. Thomas' Moraalsysteem.
XV'
IX (1946)
Koyre, A. Discovering Plato.
· Krapf, E. E. Tomas de Aquino y la Psicopatolog£a. VII (1944)
VI (1948)
Kresinski, A. J. Is Modern Culture Doomed.
Kuhn, H. Encounter with Nothingness.
XIV (1951) 556-557
Lamont, C. Humanism as a Philosophy.
XIII (1950) 448-449
Laval University. Laval Thiologique et Philosophique. Vol. I n. I.
IX (1946) U5
Leclerq, J. Marriage and the Family.
IV
865
XII (1949)
Liebman, J. L. (ed.). Psychiatry and Religion.
XII (1949) 888-890
Loomis, C. G. White Magic.
Lossky, N. 0. History of Russian Philosophy.
XV
Lowinger, A. The Methodology of Pierre Duhem.
IV
769
McDermott, T. (and Brown, S. J.). A Survey of Catholic Literature.
VIII (1945) 411
McFadden, C; J. osa. The Philosophy of Communism.
II (1940) 807-808
McGarry, W. J. sj. Paul and the Crucified.
II (1940) 809
XIII (1950) 489-440
Maciver, R. M. The Ramparts We Guard.
MacPartland, J. The March toward Matter, Descensus Averno.
XV
669-670
McWilliams, J. A. Philosophy for the Millions.
VI (1948) 18G-181

BRIEF NOTICES

49

Maeterlinck, M. The Great Beyond.
X (1947) 886-887
IV (1942) 868
Magid, H. M. English Political Pluralism.
Mailloux, N. op (ed.). Regards sur les Sciences Experimentales.
IV (1942) 866-867
Manchester, F. (and Shephard, 0., ed.). Irving Babbitt, Man and Teacher.
IV (1942) 864-865
Marcel, G. The Philosophy of Existence.
Xill (1950) 681-688
XII (1949) 254-256
March, H. The T.wo Worlds of Marcel Proust.
Marchand, L. (and Ajuriaguerra, J.). Les Epilepsies: leurs Formes Cliniques; leurs Traitements.
XII (1949) 257
Margenau, H. The Nature of Physical Reality.
XIV (1951) 299-300
Maritain, J. Science and Wisdom.
III (1941) 172
--. A Preface to Metaphysics.
ill (1941) 172-178
--. Court Traite de l'Existence et de l'Existant. XI (1948) 278-274
--. Scholasticism and Politics.
ill (1941) 894
XV (1952) 668-665
Masure, E. Le Sacrifice du Corps Mystique.
Mauriac, F. The Eucharist.
VII (1944) 426
Maziarz, E. A. The Philosophy of Mathematics.
XIV (1951) 298-299
Melsen, A; G. M. van. Natuurwatenschap en Wijsbegeerte.
.
XII (1949) 124-126
Mersch, E. sj. Morality and the Mystical Body.
II (1940) 818-814
Micklem, N. National Socialism fl,nd the Roman Catholic Church.
m (1941) 175
Mitterer, A. Eltemschaft und Gattenschaft.
XIII (1950) 624-627
Monahan, W. B. The Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas.
VII (1944) 188
Monks, J. L. sj. Great Catholic Festivals.
XV (1952) 517-518
IV (1952) 545
Moody, J. Fast by the Road.
Moore, P. S. esc (ed.). Publications in Medieval Studies.
II (1940) 178
Morgan, G. A., Jr. What Nietzsche Means.
IV (1942) 868-864
Mother Mary of St. Austin. The Divine Crucible of Purgatory.
III (1941). 678-674
Muller-Thym, B. J. The Establishment of the University of Being in the
Doctrine of Meister Eckhart of Hochheim.
II (1940) 811
Mullins, Sr., Patrick Jerome op. The Spiritual Life According to St. Isidore
of Seville.
ill (1941) 895
XI (1948) 185-186
Needham, J. History Is On Our Side.
Nef, J. U. War and Human Progress.
XIV (1951) 559-560
Neff, E. The Poetry of History.
XII (1949) 127-129
XV (1952) 845-846
Neill, T. P. They Lived the Faith.
Nelson, L. Socratic Method and Critical Phif,osophy: Selected Essays.
xm (195o) 448-446
Nock, A. J.' The Theory of Education in the U. S. XIV (1951) 80Q-802
Nuttin, J. Tendances Nouvelles dans la Psychologie Contemporaine.
XV (1952) 528
--. Psychoanalyse et Conception Spirituelle de !:Homme.
XIV (1951) 426-427
Nys, D. Cosmology.
IV (1942) 548

50

GENERAL

INDEX-VOLUMES

I TO XV

Oates, W. J. (ed.). Basic Writings of St. Augustine. Xlli (1950)
O'Connor, J. J. The Catholic Revival in England.
IV
769
II (1940)
Oggioni, E. La "Filosofia Prima" di Ari.,totele.
Organ, T. W. An Index to Aristotle.
XIII (1950) 619
Ortega y Gasset; J. The Dehumanization of Art and Notes on the Novel.
Xlli (1950)
Pap, A. The A Priori in Physical Theory.
X (1947) 887
II (1940)
Parsons, W. sj. Which Way, Democracy?
II (1940) 809
Pegis, A. C. St. Thomas and the Greeks.
Perkins, M. Speaking of How to Pray.
VID (1945)
Phelan, G. B. Some Illustrations of St. Thomas' Development of the
X (1947)
Wisdom of St. Augustine.
--. St. Thomas and Analogy.
IV
544
Pingel, M. M: An American Utilitarian: Richard Hildreth as a Philosopher.
XIII (1950) 68o-681
Pouget, W. (and Gitton, J.). The Canticle of Canticles.
XII (1949)
Prat, F. sj. Jesus Christ, His Life, His Teaching, His Work.
XV (1952) 507
Prentice, R. P. ofm. The Psychology of Love According to St. Bonaventure.
XV
581-588
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association.
IV (1942) 189-190
1940. The Problem of Liberty.
1941. Philosophy and Order.
IV (1942) 548-544
The Philosophy of Christian Education. (Western Division)
IV (1942) 548-544
XI (1948) 186-188
Regis, L. M. op. St. Thomas and Epistemology.
Reichenback, H. Elements of Symbolic Logic.
XI (1948) 587-588
Reiser, 0. L. World Philosophy: A Search for Synthesis.
}(Ill (1950) 486-487
Renard, H. The Philosophy of Man.
XII (1949)
Renoirte, F. Elements de Critique des Sciences et de Cosmologie.
X (1947) 885-886
Riedl, C. C. (tr.) . Robert Grosseteste on Light.
IV (1942) 544
XV (1952) 586-587
Rilke, R. M. The Life of the Virgin Mary.
Rintelen, F. J. von. Von Dionysos zu Appollon.
XIII (1950) 447-448
VI (1948) 180
Robinson, R. Plato's Earlier Dialectic.
XIV (1951)
Robles, 0. Filosofos Mexicanos del Siglo XVI.
Roemer, T. The Catholic Church and the U. S.
XID (1950) 627-628
II (1940) 808
Rolbiecki, J. J. The Prospects of Philosop.hy.
Rossiter, C. L. Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the
Modern Democracies.
XII (1949) 245-247
XIV (1951) 807-808
Roucek, J. S. Slavonic Encyclopedia.
Ruggiero, G. de Existentialism.
XI (1948) 269-270
Russell, R. P. osa. Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil ..
VI (1948) 180
ill (1941)
Russell, B. An Inquiry into the Meaning of Truth.

BRIEF NOTICES

51

Rutten; F. J. Het Domein der Godsdienst-Psychologie. IT (1940) 173-174
Ryan, J. K. Modem War and Basic Ethics.
ill (1941) 175
Ryle, G. The Concept of the Mind.
XIV (1951) 427-428
Sagnard, F. La Gnose Valentinienne et le Temoignage de Saint /renee.
}.[[1 (1949) 386-387
St. Augustine. Against the Academics (tr. J. J. O'Meara).
XV (1952) 190-191
Saintonge, F. sj. Summa Cosmologiae seu Philosophia Naturalis Generalis.
IV (1942) 191
Santayana, G. Dominations and Powers.
XV (1952) 507-509
Sartre, J. P. L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme.
X (1947) 384
Saunders, D. J. Reason to Revelation.
XIII (1950) ·623-624
Scharff, C. oesa. L'Habitus principe de simplicite et d'unite dans la vie
spirituelle.
XV (1952) 517
VI (1943) '130:...131
Schmid, M. osb. 'The Solution is Easy.
Schmitz, P.· Histoire del'Ordre de Saint Benoit.
· XIV (1951) 560-562
H. W. (and Edman, I., ed.). Landmarks in Philosophy.
IV (1942) 190-191
Schuyler, H. C. Life's Final Goal.
III (1941) 174
XI (1948) 127-128
Schwarzchild, L. The Red Prussian.
Sellery, G. C. The Renaissance.
XIV (1951) 303-304
Sherman, J. E. The Nature of Martyrdom.
VII (1944) 426
XV (1952) 672
Sertillanges, A. G. op. Kinships.
Shephard, 0. (and Manchester, F., ed.). Irving Babbitt, Man and Teacher.
IV (1942) 364-365
Silverman, H. L. Philosophy: its Significance and Contemporary Civilization.
XI·. (1948) 403-404
Simon, Y. Nature and Functions of Authority.
III (1941) 178
Sister Mary Just op. Immortal Fire.
XV (1952) 198
XV (1952) 522-528
Siwek, P. sj. The Philosophy of Evil.
Smith, G. sj. Jesuit Thinkers of the Renaissance.
II (1940) 312-318
Smith, M. And Madly Teach.
XIV (1951) 300-302
Smith, Sr. Enid. osb. The Goodness of Being in Thomistic Philosophy and
XI (1948) 133-134
its Contemporary Significances.
Smith, V. E. Footnotes for the Atom.
XV (1952) 194-195
-. Idea Men of Today.
XIV (1951) 418-420
Sorokin, P. A. Altruistic Love: a Study of American Good Neighbors and
Christian Saints.
XIV (1951) 428-430
Spedalieri, F. sj. Selectae et Breviores Philosophiae ac Theologiae ConXV (1952) 511-513
troversiae.
Spenser, F. A. op. The New Testament: A New
from the
Original·Greek.
III (1941) 175
Spitzig, J. A. Sacramental Penance in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries.
XII (1949) 390-391
Starmans, A. H. Psychologische Analyse von den Jeugddagboek von
II (1940) 174
Frederik van Eeden.
Stein, E. Kreuzeswissenschaft: Studie iiber Joannes de Cruce.
XV (1952) 191-198

52

GENERAL

INDEX-VOLUMES

I TO XV

Steenberghen, F. van. Epistemology.
XIII (1950) 620-621
XV (1952) 520-521
Stenonis, N. Opera Theologica.
Stern, K. The Pillar of Fire.
XV (1952) 338-339
Straubinger, H. Religionsphilosophie mit Theodizee. XIII (1950) 441-442
Sullivan, J. V. The Morality of Mercy Killing.
XIV (1951) 432-433
Switalski, B. cssr. Neo-Platonism and the Ethics of St. Augustine, I.
X (1947) 128-129
II (1940) 308-309
Symposium, Natural Law-. Notre Dame Lawyer.
--, Science, Philosophy and Religion.
HI (1941) 674
Taft, C. P. Why I am for the Church.
XI (1948) 404-406
Tausch, P. H. Benediktinisches Monchtum in Osterreich.
XIV (1951) 562-563
Timasheff, N. S. Religion in Soviet Russia.
VII (1944) 132
Tiverton, W. D. H. Lawrence and Human Existence. XV (1952) 844-345
XIV (1951) 304-306
Toynbee, A. J. War and Civilization.
Tremblay, P. op. Preliminary Notice of Canadian Summa.
III (1941) 521-524
True, G. De J. P. Sartre L. Lavelle.
X (1947) 533
Trueblood, D. E. The Logic of Belief.
VI (1943) 129-130
Ullman, S. Words and their Use.
XV (1952) 327-329
Vann, G. op. Eve and the Gryphon.
X (1947) 531
--. St. Thomas Aquinas.
HI (1941) 675
Voggensperger, R. Der Begriff der Geschichte ala Wissenschaft.
(1949) 524-525
Wahl, J. The Philosopher's Way.
XIII (1950) 438-439
Walsh, G. C. Medieval Humanism.
IV (1942) 769
Ward, J. Thomas Edward Shields.
XI (1948) 130-131
Watkin, E. I. Catholic Art and Culture.
VIII (1945) 290-291
Weldon, T. D. States and Morals: a Study in Political Conflicts.
3CII (1949) 242-244
Wellmuth, J. sj. The Nature and Origin of Scientism.
VIII (1945) 291
Whyte, L. Law-the Unitary Principle in Physics and Biology.
JCIII (1950) 442-443
Woltring, B. Gelijkenis van TweeZingen.
II ( Hl40) 17 4
XII (1949) 244-245
Zacharias, H. C. E. Proto-History.
Zunini, G. (and Gemelli, A. ofm). lntroduzione alla Psicologia.
JCIII (1950) 62Hi23
Zwemer, S. M. Heirs of the Prophets.
XI (1948) 127

a

.

xu

THE THOMIST
A SPECUL,ATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS: THE DoMINICANFATHERS OF· THE PRoviNCEOF ST. JosEPH
Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

VoL. XV

No.4

OCTOBER, 1952

THOMISTIC SOTERIOLOGY AND THE
MYSTICAL BODY

T

HERE is perhaps no theological problem of more actual
import today than that of the Mystical Body. In
recent years excellent treatises have been written on
this subject and Pope Pius XII has placed in relief its doctrinal and spiritual importance in the encyclical Mystiei Corporis. The content of the doctrine of the Mystical Body is
essentially psychological and is expressed in vital, realistic and
impressive formulas. St. Paul, for example, repeats more than
once that Christ is our life,1 that Christ is formed in us, 2 that
we are the fullness of Christ,S and that all of us form with Him
one new man/ one Christ. 5 St. Augustine repeats the Pauline
expressions and adds other that are extraordinarily expressive:
Christ is not only the Head, but also the body; the total or
Gal. ft :ftO.
• Gal. 4:19.

1

"Eph. I :ft3.
• Eph. ft : 13-15.

543

• I Cor. 1ft : 12.

544

EMILIO

SAURAS

integral Christ consists of head and body; Christ is ourselves
and we are Christ; He and we form the one beloved Son of God.
Some have said that scholastic theology and its great
masters were not able rightly to develop the dogma of our
incorporation in Christ because this dogma has an eminently
and vital psychological character, whereas the Scholastics were
given more to the study of being rather than life. They grasped
very well the dogmas of the Trinity, the hypostatic union, and
the real presence in the Eucharist because in expressing these
dogmas they could use the metaphysical notions of relation,
subsistence, hypostasis, person, essence and nature. But they
were not prepared to expound a truth of so distinct a character
as that of our vivification through Christ. This is especially
true because the revealed formulas which express this dogma
do not have as determined and concrete a meaning as do those
which express the other dogmatic truths just mentioned; and
the theologians of the Schools loved precision and avoided
vague and indefinite formulas. Hence it is not strange that
the doctrine of the Mystical Body should have suffered an
eclipse in the time of Scholasticism and that we should find it
necessary to return to the Fathers to obtain a more finished and
exact idea.
Such opinions have frequently been expressed but they are
far from being exact. The truth of the matter is that scholastic
theology expresses the one and the same truth with more exact
formulas. Therefore, instead of speaking of the " full Christ "
o:r the " total Christ," it speaks of the " mystical person of
Christ." The word " person " gives a much more precise meaning than totality or plenitude. Furthermore, the Scholastics
do not say that Christ is ou:r life, but that our grace is a
participation in His grace.
Restricting ourselves to St. Thomas, we can state with all
assurance that the Angelic Doctor has effected a remarkable
synthesis of all sote:riology by using the doctrine of ou:r incorporation in Christ. For the redemption has two aspects: the
first is called objective :redemption or redemption effected; the
second is called subjective or applied redemption" The first

THOMISTIC

SOTERIOLOGY

AND THE MYSTICAL

BODY

545

was realized by the works which Christ performed while in
the world; the second, by the sacraments which He instituted
to apply to us the fruits of objective redemption.
The realization of the work of redemption is explained by
the fact that Christ is the Head of humanity and therefore,
endowed with capital grace. In fact, the redemption was effected by the classical five-fold way mentioned in theology: the
way of merit, of atonement, of redemption, of sacrifice, and
of efficiency. 6 And if Christ was able to merit, atone and
sacrifice for us, and to redeem us and accomplish our salvation
efficiently, it was because He possessed capital grace and because we are His members. 7
Subjective or applied redemption is also explained by the
headship of Christ and our incorporation in Him as Head. This
redemption is principally realized through the sacraments.
Sacramental grace sanctifies or redeems us not only because
it bestows on us the divinizing element and makes us sharers
in the divine life, but also because it bestows on us the Christianizing element, making us share in the perfections of Christ
in Whom it incorporates us by means of the sacraments, as
St. Thomas teaches. 8
Therefore, not only did the doctrine of our incorporation in
Christ suffer no eclipse during the period of Scholasticism, but
on the contrary, St. Thomas so much appreciated its importance that the entire third part of the Summa, aU of his Christology, is explained only on the presupposition of Christ's heads.hip and our incorporation in Him as His members. Even more,
St. Thomas summarizes the whole of Pauline theology in this
one truth, for as he says in the prologue of his commentary on
the Epistles of St. Paul:
He wrote fourteen Epistles, of which nine contain teachings directed
to the churches of the Gentiles; four, to prelates and princes; and
Cf. Summa Theol., III, q. 48.
In regard to merit, cf. III, q. 19, a. 4; q. 48, a. l; concerning satisfaction, cf.
III, q. 48,
ad 1; in regard to liberation, cf. I-II, q. 49, a. 1; concerning sacrifice,
cf. IiH, q.
a. 1, ad 3; and concerning efficiency, cf. III, q. 8, a. I, ad I.
8 III, q. 62, a. 2.
6

7

546

EMILIO

SAURAS

one, to the people of IsraeL And all these teachings concern the
grace of Christ, which can be considered in three ways: first,
according to the manner in which it is in the Head, that is, in
Christ, and this the Apostle expounds in his Epistle to the Hebrews;
secondly, according to the manner in which it is in the principal
members of the Mystical Body, and he does this in his Epistles
directed to the prelates; thirdly, according to the manner in which
it is in the Mystical Body itself, which is the Church, and he uses
this in his Epistles to the Gentiles. 9

We believe, then, that it is not only useful but even necessary
to expound the doctrine of the Mystical Body by following
the authoritative and exceptional methods of St. Thomas. He
clarifies the dogma with a special light and he would wish us
to be able to see and to make known something of what he
himself has taught us. To follow some kind of order, we shall
divide our treatment of the subject into four sections: 1) In
what sense Christ is Head of the Mystical Body; 2) The
vivifying element of the Head and the members of this Body;
3) How the life of the Head is communicated to the members;
4) The means of communicating this life.
We shall see that St. Thomas is original in regard to the
first point; namely, in determining the element by which the
dignity of headship is attributed to Christ. And since his
doctrinal summary is not an empirical summary of affirmations and proofs, but follows a rigorously logical process, we
shall see this originality necessarily reflected in the other
succeeding points.
1.

CHRIST As HEAD OF THE MYSTICAL BoDY

Christ is a very complex being. There are in Him parts
which are substantially divine, such as the nature of God and
the Person of the Word; there are other parts which are substantially human, such as His body and the human soul which
informs it. Finally, there are accidental elements, such as
habitual grace, the infused virtues, capital grace, human
perfections, etc,
9

Comment. in Epist. Sti. Pauli, Proem.

THOMISTIC

SOTERIOLOGY

AND THE MYSTICAL

BODY

547

When it is stated that Christ is Head of the Mystical Body
there is no doubt that this headship pertains to Him in His
totality: as man united to the divine Person and with all the
natural and supernatural perfections which adorn Him. But
this is not what we are seeking; rather we are seeking the
formal reason why this particular subject or totality is constituted Head of the human race. For St. Thomas this formality is not something substantially divine; it is neither the
divine nature nor the Person of the Word. It is a divine but
accidental perfection which, as accidental, is received in Christ's
human nature, for God has no accidents. Consequently, the
headship is attributed to_ Christ insofar as He is a man perfected by a divine element which is distinct from the Person
of the Word. In other words, Christ is Head insofar as He is
a man supernaturalized by means of capital grace and not
precisely as the incarnate o:r humanized God.
This does not mean that the headship of Christ prescinds
from the hypostatic union. It presupposes and connotes it,
since headship is given
as a consequence
But to presuppose and connote the hypostatic union is not the
same as to say that this union formally constitutes the headship" Christ's headship is not constituted by the hypostatic
union and therefore it is not predicated of Him precisely as
the God-man; :rather it is constituted by capital grace and is
predicated of Christ considered as man. This is the thought
of St. Thomas" He alone thought this way in his day and to
reach this conclusion he had to rectify the traditional teaching
of the Schools.
The common opinion in the time of St" Thomas was that
the headship pertained to Christ by reason of His double status
as God and man. Even the Angelic Doctor, in his early writings, did not disagree with this manner of thinking, although
even at the beginning he points out with sufficient clarity what
appeared to him to be incompatible in this line of reasoning"
But in the Summa Theologiae he corrects this thought
completely.
Various enumerations of the :requisites for headship are still

548

EMILIO SAURAS

preserved, for the writers of the Middle Ages composed more
than one. Nevertheless it is not difficult to comprise all of
them in two elements: primacy of life in relation to the members and homogeneity of nature with the members. We presuppose that one is here treating of a supernatural life and
nature; more concretely, of a life and nature in the order of
grace. Hence headship belongs to one who has the primacy
of supernatural life and at the same time possesses a unity
of nature and life with those of whom he is said to be the head.
The primacy of supernatural life has many manifestations,
but these are the principal ones: primacy of order, of perfection,
of external influence or government, of internal influence or
life. Whoever exercises any of these four types of primacy
fulfills the first of the two conditions required for headship. If
moreover, he possesses the second-homogeneity of nature
with the members-he can in all exactness be called the head.
Now according to many early theologians, primacy belongs
to Christ by reason of His status as God and He enjoys homogeneity of nature with us by reason of His condition as man.
Consequently, headship is attributed to the composite, the
union of the divine Person and human nature. He is Head
principally by reason of His divine Person and secondarily by
reason of His status as man, or vice versa, according as one
maintains that the headship demands more primacy than
or, on the contrary, that. homogeneity plays a
more important role than primacy. Likewise, there are not
lacking those who would say that the dignity of headship is
equally divided between the divine Person and the human
nature because both are equally necessary for the capital dignity. Such were the various opinions in vogue when St. Thomas
approached the question.
If one considers the condition of primacy, says the Angelic
Doctor, it can be said that Christ is Head because He is God.
Actually, since He is God, He has the fulness of divinity and
for that reason He is first in the order of perfection; He exercises over us a vital and sanctifying influence, and He governs
us, directing us to Himself. Thus one can find in Christ the

THOMISTIC

SOTERIOLOGY

AND THE MYSTICAL

BODY

549

four types of primacy listed above: " Christ can be said to be
the Head ... according to His divine nature because according
to that nature He has the plenitude of divinity, as the Apostle
says (Colos. 9l: 9), whence He is over all things God, blessed
forever (Rom. 9 : 5) and from Him as God comes all spiritual
grace to us and likewise as God He directs us to Himself." 10
But the four manifestations of primacy in the divine life
are also found in the Father and the Holy Ghost and for this
reason the other two Persons have an equal right to be called
Head of the Church. St. Thomas states this in the same article.
Finally, these four manifestations of primacy are also verified of Christ's humanity, though less perfectly, and therefore
His humanity also enjoys primacy of order, of perfection, of
influence and of government. It enjoys primacy of order because is occupies the first place from the moment that it was
elevated to hypostatic union with the Person of the Word; of
perfection, because just as all the senses are radicated in the
head, so in Christ-man are contained all graces and gifts; of
vital influence, because from Him we receive the sense of faith
and the movement of charity, as St. John states when he
affirms that through Jesus Christ come all grace and truth; of
government, because by His example and doctrine He directs
us in our daily advance to God. 11
However, the second condition required for headship is found
only in the humanity of Christ. The head and the members
must be of the same nature and the same life; thus the head of
man and his members enjoy human nature and human life,
though each exercises different functions, some noble, others
lowly. We use as a starting point the fact that the nature of
the members is human and that man's supernatural life is
accidental or participated" It is, therefore, necessary to approach Christ as man, sanctified by grace, to find this condition
of homogeneity with the members. Christ's humanity had a
divine personality, but His formal sanctification in esse naturae
was not effected by the Person of the Word, but by individual
and capital accidental grace.
10

Ill Sent .• d. Ul, q.

a. l.

n

Ibid.

550

EMILIO SA URAS

It is necessary to recall at this point the Thomistic doctrine
on the specific unity of sanctifying grace. All sanctifying grace
belongs to the one ontological species and there are strong
reasons in support of this affirmation which it is not necessary
to treat here. From this principle is deduced the fact that the
capital grace which formally sanctified the humanity of Christ
placed it in a category of sanctity or life specifically identical
with that in which men are when they possess sanctifying grace.
We say "life specifically identical" but it is to be noted that
we do not refer to an identity of the moral species. Under one
and the same ontological or metaphysical species there are
various moral species and this diversity exists in sanctifying
grace. The capital grace of the Head and the individual grace
of the members belong to diverse moral species, just as do the
specifically human life of a member of society who has the
office of commanding and the life of him whose duty it is to
obey.
All this leads to the following logical conclusion: the homogeneity of life which must prevail between the Head and the
members is not actually verified between God and ourselves
because God has substantial divinity and ours is accidental.
On the other hand, this homogeneity is verified between ourselves and Christ the God-man; hence He must be Head insofar as He is man. But the primacy, and especially the primacy
of vital influence which is more specifically capital, although
it is verified in both Christ-man and Christ-God, is especially
verified in Christ-God.
In the time of St. Thomas it was common to attribute a
moral efficacy to the humanity of Christ in the communication
of grace, reserving the efficient or factual (factiva) efficacy
to the divinity. Through His human nature supematuralized
by capital grace Christ merits, satisfies and sacrifices and
all this is to cooperate in a moral mannet; but He confers
grace through His divine power and this is to intervene in an
efficient manner. Now since the influence which the Head
exercises on the members is efficient and physical, besides being
moral, it follows that the primacy of the vital influence re-

THOMISTIC

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551

quired for headship would not be fully given in the humanity
of Christ. Therefore, it was necessary to appeal to His divinity
and this explains the prevalent opinion that Christ is Head of
the Mystical Body both as God and as man, but per modum
untus.
As we have already seen, in his commentary on the Sentences
St. Thomas admits the headship of Christ as God and as man,
and he continued to hold the same opinion in De V eritate. But
he seems to teach this simply because it had always been so
taught and also because he had learned it from his master, St.
Albert the Great. Yet in spite of saying that the capital dignity
is shared between Christ-God and Christ-man, he proposes the
question in the following manner: " Whether Christ as Man is
head of the Church " and in the conclusion he says: " properly
speaking He is head according to His human nature." 12
In the Summa, however, St. Thomas does not say precisely
that the headship pertains formally to Christ as God. He
treats the point in the section where he discusses those things
that were coassumed
Christ. 13 The Word assumed uu.<ua.u
nature and coassumed definite perfections and defects of the
same, and among the coassumed perfections is that of capital
dignityo 14 The headship, therefore, is something that pertains
to Christ as mano Sto Thomas repeats this in the very
ment of the problem, placing it in the form of a doubt: " It
would seem that it does not belong to Christ as man to be
Head of the Church"" 15 Then throughout the entire article
and in the answers to the objections he insists that the headship is assumed by the human nature, ending the answer to the
third objection in the words: « Christ is likened to the Head
in His visible nature in which man is set over man." 16
This is the definitive thought of the Angelic Doctor" In
order to substantiate it, he had recourse to a doctrine taught
by the Greek Fathers, specifically by SL John Damascene,
according to which the assumed human nature was an instrument of the divinity" Some Fathers did not think it opportune
12
13

Ibid.
Ill, qq. 7-15.

14
15

Ibid., q. 8.
Ibid., a. 1, obj. L

16

Ibid., ad 3.

552

EMILIO

SAURAS

to say this, because of the possible Nestorian interpretation
which the expression might have. If it is affirmed that the
human nature is the instrument of God then, since any instrument has a hypostasis distinct from that of the principal cause,
the humanity of Christ will have a personality distinct from
that of the Word. 17 Nevertheless, the Angelic Doctor affirms
that Christ as man is the instrument of the Word because
there are some instruments which have the same substance as
the principal cause (the arm of the body, for example). This
is true of Christ's human nature, which is a united or conjoined instrument and therefore it does not have a distinct
subsistence but subsists in the subsistence of the Word. Hence,
if the two conditions required for headship; i. e., unity of life
with the members and primacy of vital influence, can be verified
in Christ's humanity, then His humanity alone constitutes Him
as our Head.
That Christ as man possesses unity of life with us is evident
and no author has ever doubted it. That He also exercises a
vital influence which the Head exercises on the members was
an uncertain point up to the time of St. Thomas. True, an
influence of a moral character had been attributed to Christ's
humanity, but not that of an efficient character; and headship
requires an efficient influence. It had been maintained, as we
have seen, that this efficiency was something exclusive to God
and on this point headship had to be attributed to the
divinity. But as soon as it is stated that Christ's human nature
is an instrument of the divinity, there is placed in it an efficient
causality which is dependent and participated, it is true, but
efficient none the less.
He (Christ) has the power of bestowing grace on all the members
of the Church, according· to John 1: 16: Of His fulness we have aU
received. And" thus it is plain that Christ is fittingly called the
Head of the Church. 18
To give grace or the Holy Ghost belongs to Christ as He is God,
authoritatively; but instrumentally it belongs also to Him as man,
17

Ibid., q.

a. 6, ad 4.

18

Ibid., q. 8, a. l (reduced)

'I'HOMISTIC

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553

inasmuch as His manhood is the instrument of His Godhead. And
hence by the power of the Godhead His actions were beneficial,
i.e. by causing grace in us, both meritoriously and efficiently. 19

As is evident, the Angelic Doctor continues to think that for
headship it is necessary to have the two conditions to which we
have frequently alluded: homogeneity of life and primacy of
vital influence. He also continues to think that the first condition is fulfilled in Christ as man and the second condition,
in Christ as God principally and in Christ as man instrumentally or secondarily. This is his innovation by virtue of which
he applied to the humanity of Christ not only moral causality
which had always been attributed to it, but also efficient
causality which is characteristic of the Head.
The conclusion which St. Thomas drew is dear: since the two
conditions for headship are verified in the humanity of Christ,
it is necessary to say that Christ is Head precisely as man. But
'this conclusion must be rightly understood. It does not mean
that one prescinds from the Person of the Word and from the
hypostatic union, but only that these elements
not enter as
the formal constitutive of headship. It is certain that according to the present providence of God the Christ-man was constituted Head because He was assumed by the Word, but this
assumption is not the formal constitutive of headship; the constitutive reason is the social grace with which the assumed
humanity was sanctified.
Neither does this mean that the humanity as Head is the
fontal cause of the grace which is communicated to us, the
members. To be a fontal cause, says St. Thomas, is not a
necessary requisite for headship and as a matter of fact in
humanis the head is not the primary principle of the life which
is communicated to the members. 20
Ibid., ad l (reduced).
De Verit., q. 29, a. 4, "One can be understood to influence in a spiritual sense
and manner in two ways: in one way as a principal agent . . . in another
19

20

instrumentally. And thus even the humanity of Christ is the cause of the aforesaid
influence . . . And this seems to suffice for the nature of head. For the head of
the natural body does not have influence on the members except by reason of
hidden power."

554

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The consequences of the change introduced by St. Thomas
are of great transcendence and are perceived in the entire
development of the doctrine of the Mystical Body. At :first it
may seem that they minimize the doctrine, since they leave to
one. side the headship of God in order to postulate that of
Christ as man, but we shall see presently that the Thomistic
innovation greatly ennobles the mystery of our incorporation
in Christ.
2.

THE VIviFYING

ELEMENT

IN THE MYsTICAL

BoDY

We have just determined the thought of St. Thomas on the
headship of Christ, saying that it pertains to Him formally as
man. One refers, of course, to a headship in the order of grace
and consequently of grace as divine and participated by man.
In a word, we :refer to the precisely Christian life. This detail
is aU-important,
If Christ were our Head precisely as God, He would be so
because of certain characteristics which are essentially divine.
The vital element which would be derived from Him and which
would be transferred to us through the influence of His headship would be the divinity itself as participable, for it is evident
that a cause always places in the effect a reflection of what
it is in itself. H the cause, or he who produces the vital
influence, is God, that which He effects in the terminus, ourselves, will be an element which is essentially divine: grace
precisely as a formal participation in the nature, the being and
the perfections of God; grace precisely as elevating and
divinizing.
That is a great deal, but it is not all. If the Head exerted
His influence on the members precisely as lie is God, then our
relation to the Head of ·the Mystical Body would be the same
as that of the" angels. But such is not the case. To see this
clearly it is necessary to :recall that grace, which is formally
divinizing, is virtually much more in additiono It is not strange
that this should be so because the same thing is true of God
Himself. God also is formally some things and virtually others.

THOMISTIC

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555

Theology teaches that He is formally whatever has the characteristics of perfection simpliciter simplex: being, goodness,
truth, intelligence, life, etc. But He is virtually whatever.·bas
the
of perfection secundum quid or mixta.
Grace is formally a divinizing element and virtually it is
many other things besides. This multiple virtuality is " formalized" when it passes through Christ as man. Actually, the
healing power which is manifested in redemption from sin and
in atonement by means of penal and satisfactory actions, and
the priestly power which is revealed in redemption through
sacrifice, although they are powers of grace, are nevertheless
powers which are not in it so far as it is formally divine, but
as it is received in the humanity of Christ. On being received
there, these characteristics are formalized, whereas in grace as
divine they are present only virtually.
God, and for that matter the divine, are not susceptible of
suffering or sacrifice. Not of suffering, because they are impassible; nor of sacrifice, because sacrifice is always offered to
a superior and nothing is superior to God. The redemptive
functions by way of atonement and priestly sacrifice are therefore not attributed to grace as it is divine but so far as it is
received by man. Man can suffer, man can be a priest and
offer sacrifice. And these actions can have a divine value
through the grace of God which, on manifesting itself through
such acts, acquires the characteristics of healing and sacerdotal
grace.
This phenomenon of formalizing the virtualities of divine
grace through the human instrument which receives it falls
within the canons of theology. Actually, it is proper to the
instrument to determine in some way the virtuality of the
principal cause. Thus, one and the same power has various
manifestations according to the instrument which is used to
manifest it. One and the same human power, for example, will
be converted into music, painting, elocution, etc., according as
the instrument utilized for its manifestation is reason, the
faculty of speech, a brush, a violin, etc. The instrumental cause,
says the Angelic Doctor, cooperates in producing the effect of

556

EMILIO SAURAS

the principal cause by means of som:ething that is proper to
itself. For if an instrument could no nothing in virtue of its
ow1l power, it would be useless to employ it and there would be
no reason for using particular instruments to perform particular
Now the end for which Christ became incarnate and for
which He was constituted Head of the human race is redemption or the liberation from sin and the deification of the redeemed through acts of atonement and the priestly sacrifice.
That this might be effected, God chose an instrument capable
of determining divine grace (which is infinite in its virtuality
because it is divine, just as the virtuality of God is infinite)
and making it formally healing and formally sacerdotal at
the same time that it is formally deifying or elevating. It is
deifying because it is divine; it becomes healing because of the
acts of atonement; and it becomes priestly because a human
instrument, capable of suffering and offering sacrifice, formalizes these two characteristics ..
It follows from this that if the capital influence which Christ
exercises over us is realized in view of the fact that He is God,
His capital grace will be formally ·divine only; whereas if He
exercises that influence as man, yet without ceasing to be
divine (for this note always accompanies. grace), then His
grace will be likewise reparative and sacerdotal. And considering the transmission of grace from the Head to the members, that which we would receive from Christ solely as God
would be only divine, as is received by the angels; but if He is
also considered as man, that grace will likewise be reparative
and sacerdotal.
St. Thomas takes great pains not to call capital grace gratia
Dei; he calls it gratia Christi. 22 And the life which is transmitted by this grace he does not call vita divina, ·but vita
christiana.23 Not that the grace and life of Christ and the grace
and life of Christians are not divine, for they are that; but
Cf. I, q. 45, a. 5.
•• Cf. Com'Tfl,ent. in Epist. Sti. Pauli, Proem.
•• III, q. 62, a. 2.
21

THOMISTIC

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557

they are divine with the specific characteristics which we have
just mentioned. Divine life and grace are formally elevating
and virtually reparative and sacerdotal; but Christian life and
grace are formally divine, reparative and sacerdotal.
That the qratia Christi, the capital element of Christ, has
these characteristic notes is a truth which St. Thomas repeats
time and again in the whole third part of the Summa and he
summarizes it in the forty-eighth question where he reduces
the diverse aspects of the work of redemption (merit, satisfaction and sacrifice) to the dignity of Christ's headship. As
God, Christ could neither merit nor satisfy nor offer sacrifice.
It is true that the subject who does all this is personally God,
because Christ's Person is divine and therefore all that He does
has a personal value which derives from the Person of the Word.
But it is also true that the formal principle of merit, satisfaction and sacrifice is not the Person of the Word, but the human
nature divinized by habitual and capital grace. If Christ is
formally Head as man, if capital grace is the grace of Christ as
man, then since the life and grace of the members come from
the Head and have its characteristics, the grace and life of
Christians, who are members of Christ, will be not only truly
divine, but reparative and sacerdotal. Not in the same measure
in all, it is true, but to some measure at least in all.
All this is evident in the light of the arguments which we
have enuntiated, but St. Thomas also gives assurance of this
when he speaks of the communication of the vital element of
which we are speaking. He asks in one article of the Summ0;, 24
whether sacramental grace adds anything to the grace of the
virtues and the gifts. Sacramental grace is the grace of Christ
which is communicated to us by means of the sacraments
instituted by Him; the grace of the virtues and the gifts is
that which elevates and perfects the soul and its potencies by
capacitating them to work well. Therefore the question is
equivalent to asking whether Christian grace adds anything
to divine grace. The Angelic Doctor answers affirmatively:
•• Ill, q. 62,

2.

558

EMILIO SAURAS

The sacraments are ordained unto certain speci8J. effects which
are necessary in Christian life. . . . Consequently . . . so does
sacramental grace confer, over and above grace commonly so
called, and in addition to the virtues and the gifts, a certain
Divine assistance in obtaining the end of the sacrament.
The grace of the virtues and gifts perfects the essence and powers
of the soul sufficiently as regards ordinary conduct: but as regards
certain special effects which are necessary in a Christian life, sacramental grace is needed. 25

What special notes grace acquires when it is concretized in
Christ and in the Christian are indicated by St. Thomas in
the same article and in the fifth article of the same question.
Divine grace remits sin, with which it is incompatible, and
elevates the soul; Christian grace, in addition to this, is ordained to the diminution and eventual removal of the guilt of
sin which remains after the fault has, been pardoned and destines the soul who possesses it to determined acts of worship.
In other words, it has both a_ reparative and a sacerdotal character. "Sacramental grace," says the holy Doctor, "seems to
be ordained principally to two
namely, to take away
the defects consequent on past sins, insofar as they are transitory in act, but endure in guilt; and, further, to perfect
the soul in things pertaining to divine worship in regard to the
Christian religion." 26
This doctrine of the headship of Christ-man does not exclude
a superior divine influence but, on the contrary, presupposes it.
Christ as man exercises the vital influence in an instrumental
manner and the instrument always presupposes the principal
· cause. This doctrine simply affirms that in the humanity
assumed by the Word are found the two conditions required for
headship: homogeneity of supernablral life with the members
and an efficient influence over these members. And since the
passing of grace through Christ-man manifests not only its
divine and deifying formality but also its reparative and
sacerdotal formality,
result is that the Thomistic concept
explains how and why the members of the Mystical Body,
•• Ibid. (reduced) .

••m, q.

a. 6.

THOMISTIC

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559

besides being deified and thus reflecting with Christ the divine
perfections, are also christianized and reflect these perfections
with which the Christ-man was adorned.
Thus we see the scope of the words of the Apostle when he
says that for him to live is Christ and that Christ lives in him
and that Christ is formed in us. Actually, Christ is communicated to us not only as divine, but also as regards whatever He
has of passivity and suffering and priesthood. And since His
priesthood makes Him both a priest and a victim, the Christian
who is a reflection of Christ must also offer sacrifice and be a
victim for he must possess these two conditions inherent in the
priesthood of the New Law. This notion of offering oneself
as a victim and which is exacted by Christian grace as sacerdotal, makes us to be perfectly compenetrated with the sacrifice
which is offered daily on our altars. It makes us live the Mass
vividly and intimately.
We conclude this section by stating that whoever separates
the soteriological questions from the doctrine on the headship
of Christ-man does not understand the teaching of St. Thomas.
They are not separable. It is, therefore, necessary to see reflected in the Christian the characteristics of the Redemption
effected by formally human acts and personally divine acts of
the Redeemer: satisfaction, atonement and sacrifice.
A treatise on the vitality of the Mystical Body is not a
treatise on the grace of God (gratia Dei) nor does St. Thomas
treat of this vitality in the questions where he discusses divine
grace. 27 Therefore it was necessary to compose a distinct
treatise on the grace of Christ (gratia Christi) and this St.
Thomas does in the third part of the Summa. The grace of
Christ begins by being formally divine but it is also everything which we have indicated above.

··I-n, qq. Io9-u.
2

560

EMILIO SAURAS

3.

How THE LIFE OF THE HEAD Is CoMMUNICATED
TO THE MEMBERS

The life which is in the Head and which we have called, with
St. Thomas, Christian grace, is communicated to the members
by means of an efficient activity which is exercjsed by the Head
Himself, by Christ as man, but always under the principal
efficient influence of the Word. It is precisely because Christ
as man can exercise an activity of this type that He can be
and is Head, as we shall demonstrate immediately.
We have recalled that in the time of St. Thomas authors
distinguished the activity of Christ by attributing efficient
activity to the Word and moral activity to Christ as man. A
text from St. Albert will serve to demonstrate this point:
" Exigitur influentia capitis ... ad hoc quod efficienter secundum quod Deus, et meritorie secundum quod homo nobilis
influat similem gratiam suae gratiae." 28 From this supposition
they concluded that headship was a perfection which should be
attributed to Christ both as God and as man. The homogeneity
of the supernatural life with the members was 1 had
Christ
as man; but the efficient influence, also proper to the Head, He
had as God.
We know from what has already been said the innovation
that was introduced by St. Thomas. From the Greek Fathers
he took the notion of instrument and applied it to the humanity
of the Word, 29 thereby opening the way to attribute to Christ
as man the efficient causality required for headship. Thus,
asking whether Christ as man is Head, St. Thomas says: " To
give grace . . . belongs to Christ . . . instrumentally . . . inasmuch as His manhood is the instrument of His Godhead." 30
•• In Ill Sent., d. 13, a. 5.
•• Ill, q. 2, a. 6, ad 4.
8 '' ill, q. 8, a. 1, ad 1.
Throughout the entire third part of the Summa
St. Thomas constantly makes application of this doctrine. Thus, in q. 48, a. 6 he
affirms: "But since Christ's humanity is the .instrument of the Godhead ...
all Christ's actions and sufferings operate instrumentally in virtue of His Godhead
for the salvation of men." When treating of the Passion, he writes: "Christ's
Passion is the proper cause of the forgiveness of sins in three ways. . . . Thirdly,

THOMISTIC

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561

There were many reason,s why the Angelic Doctor should
insist on the notion of efficient causality in Christ as man.
Aside from the tradition of Greek theology, there were the
words of St. John which present Christ to us as "full of grace
and truth " and as the beginning through which grace l:!-nd
truth are produced. But the grace with which Christ was filled
has a double aspect: the entitative habit which perfects its
possessor in the order of being and which at the same time
perfects one in the order of operation. This is according to the
traditional definition of grace in which it is represented as a
participation in the divine nature, and nature or essence is
the first principle of operation. It follows from this that whoever participates in the nature of God has a divine principle of
being and operation.
Now whoever possesses grace in its plenitude will be
fected by it in this double order. And since the most perfect
type of operation is efficient, it follows that Christ, who had
the plenitude of grace, could thereby efficiently act on those
whom He had to act upon; that is, ourselves who are His
members. Let us examine this point a little more closely. We
have already stated that one who is to fulfil the function of
Head must possess, among other conditions, the absolutely
necessary one of efficiently influencing the life of the members
and of possessing a life which is specifically identical with that
which is communicated to the members. In his consideration
of Christ as man, St. Thomas states that Christ not only merits
but He is the instrument of the Word in the communication of
grace, producing it in an efficient manner.
Now the vital influence which the Head exercises on the
by way of efficiency, inasmuch as Christ's flesh, wherein He endured the Passion,
is the instrument of the Godhead" (q. 49, a. l). When he speaks of the death
of Christ he uses the same notion: " It is the same thing to speak of Christ's
death as of His Passion .... In this way Christ's death cannot be the cause of
our salvation by way of merit, but only by way of causality" (q. 50, a. 6). He
uses the same notion in speaking of Christ's Resurrection:
"Consequently,
Christ's Resurrection has instrumentally an effective power not only with regard
to the resurrection of bodies, but also with respect to the resurrection of souls "
(q. 56, a. !il).

569l

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SAURAS

members, which is the traditional " infiuit sensum et motum " 31
and which when transferred to the supernatural order becomes
" infiuere gratiam " 32 or the communication of the " sensum
spiritualem qui consistit in cognitione ve:ritatis et motum
spi:ritualem qui est per g:ratiae infiuxum," 33 this influence, we
repeat, is efficient in character. This is a point on which the
medieval doctors were in full agreement. However, they were
not unanimous in determining to whom this efficient causality
should be attributed and most of them attributed it exclusively
to God. But St. Thomas also attributed it to Christ as man
and for that reason he concluded, as we have seen, that in
Christ's humanity are verified all the conditions required for
headship. All authors were in accord, nevertheless, in asserting
that the influence of the Head must be efficient in character
and not merely moraL
Efficient causality is distinguished from moral causality in
this that it is :received directly by the subject which receives it,
while moral causality exerts its influence only indirectly. It
does not carry through to the terminus which receives the
effect but terminates in the operative potency which it
ences in the production of a determined e:ffe«;t. A dassic example of this type of causality is merit, which exerts a causative influence over mercy but strictly speaking does not produce it. The good meritorious act directly moves the divine
·will to grant mercy which is due, but the act itself does not
produce that mercy. On the other hand, when God, by way of
return, grants mercy, He can utilize Christ's humanity as a
mediate instrument which produces and communicates grace.
In this case Christ's humanity is the efficient cause of what is
merited.
Now the Head exerts its vital influence directly, since it is
efficient in character. Whence it follows that from the moment
that St. Thomas admitted and introduced the instrumental
causality of Christ-man in the production of redeeming grace,
the way was open for him to say also that Christ-man exercises
31

Ili, q. 8, a. l, obj. l.

32

Ibid., corp.

•• IJII, q. 69, a. 5.

THOMISTIC

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563

a capital or vital influence. And this efficient causality of
Christ's humanity, which satisfies for the first condition required for headship, also satisfies for the second condition.
Actually, a moral cause need not be of the same nature as the
effect which it produces because in. reality it does not produce
the effect. Consequently, the moral cause does not impress its
characteristic on the effect produced. It could, of course, happen that the effect attributed to a moral cause be similar to
that cause, as for example our grace which is merited by Christ
is similar to His grace, but this does not flow from the very
intrinsic requirements of moral causality which, as we have
said, does not itself reach to the terminus or effect.
Efficient causality, on the other hand, does place in the effect
its own manner of being and is homogeneous with the effect.
Therefore, it fulfills the requirements of headship which consists in the communication of its own life. Furthermore, it is
certain that the efficient cause is extrinsic to the effect produced; neither the material nor the formal cause constitute the
effect as such. But this is no obstacle to homogeneity between
cause and effect; it means simply that the efficient cause is
not numerically identical with the effect, as the father is not
numerically identical with his son. But it can and does constitute a specific unity whereby homogeneity of nature and
lile are preserved.
The reason for this is that " the effect is likened to the form
by which the agent acts." Now agents can operate with two
kinds of forms: natural or exemplary. He who works with the
first produces a univocal effect which is also homogeneous, as
happens in the act of generation. He who works with the
exemplary form produces an analogous effect, as happens in
artistic production. In the latter case, the cause and effect do
not pertain to the same specific nature and, although there
is no homogeneity between the artist and his work, there is a
homogeneity between the exemplary form and the work produced. Consequently, whatever the class of the efficient cause,
there is always a specific identity between the cause and the
effects; sometimes univocal, sometimes analogical.

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Let us now transfer these concepts to the humanity of Christ
which, for St. Thomas, is the cause of our grace. It does not
produce grace by means of a natural form but by means of an
artificial or acquired form; that is, by means of capital grace
with which it is gifted. By reason of this grace Christ-man
becomes an instrument of the Word in the production of grace
and consequently becomes our Head. And He produces a grace
in us that is similar to His own (as man, that is); not a grace
that is substantially divine, but divine in an accidental manner. He produces in us habitual grace which has all the characteristics which we have previously assigned to it.
We see, therefore, that in explaining the influence of Christ
by efficient causality we perfectly preserve the vital influence
and the homogeneity which prevail between the Head and the
members. It is worth while to insist upon the new light which
this explanation throws on the Pauline expressions formerly
cited. The life of Christ is a reality in us; His grace is ours
after the fashion that any efficient cause is in the effect. There
is a formal identity between ourselves and Christ; not in the
sense that Christ as Head and we as memberS!have the same
numerically identical form (grace), but that we both possess
a specifically identical form. Moreover, this specific equality
pertains only to the ontological species and not to the moral
species, for the grace of Christ is capital grace whereas in us
grace is personal or individual. There is, therefore, a formal
and specific identity between Christ and us, between Him as
Head and ourselves as members. Both of us have essentially
the same sanctity and the same perfection, though Christ has
the plenitude and we have only a participation. 84 We can,
therefore, say with St. Paul, " my life is Christ " and we can
also say that the Christian is another Christ.
.
It would be difficult to find a more sublime doctrine expressed in more exact theological terms. St. Thomas achieved
this through the introduction into soteriology of the notion of
efficient instrumental causality and its application to the hu•• III, q. 7, a. 9.

THOMISTIC

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565

manity of Christ. At the same time, he preserves the moral
causality which has traditionally been attributed to Christ.
4.

THE MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

BETWEEN

HEAD

AND MEMBERS

We now know what for St. Thomas is the Head of the
Mystical Body; it is Christ as man. We also know what is the
life that descends from the Head 1:0' the members; it is Christian grace. We know, finally, how it is transmitted; by a
causality of' an efficient instrumental nature. Let us now examine the medium of this transmission whereby the humanity
of Christ is placed in contact with the members.
When we speak of the humanity of Christ we do not refer
only to His soul, which is the most perfect and noble part
wherein grace is principally radicated. We refer to both His
body and His soul. .Both of them have an active role in the
communication of Christian grace. The process is as follows:
the grace of headship is rooted as in its proper subject in the
soul of Christ by means of which it also reaches to the body,
so that the two are sanctified and constituted spiritual Head
of all men who have been redeemed by the body and soul of
Christ. From the body of ·christ this grace descends to our
bodies and reaches our very souls which are the proper subjects
of Christian grace. 85
Therefore, the medium of communication whereby the life of
the Head reaches the members is made up of the two elements
which constitute the humanity of Christ. Grace is in His entire
being and His whole being is sanctified by grace. It is natural,
if it is in both His body and His soul, that both will serve as
instruments in the communication of grace. And they communicate grace to both our body and our soul because both
have need of grace since both are victims of the moral evil
which is healed by grace and both will eventually be recipients
"Hence the whole manhood_of Christ, i.e., according to soul
•• UI, q. 8, a.
and body, influences all, both in soul and body; but principally the soul, and
secondarily the body."

566

EMILIO SAURAS

of the glory which is attained through grace. There are sins
in both the body and the soul; in the body there is sensuality
and in the soul there is ignorance and malice. There is also in
the soul the wound of sin which we call fomes peccati. Thus we
see that both our constitutive elements have need of healing
grace and they further stand in need of elevating grace because
both must be divinized here in order to be glorified in heaven.
The manner in which the humanity of Christ is placed in
contact with our humanity in order to communicate grace to
us in an efficient manner and the problem of how Christ can
produce grace on earth without leaving heaven would be too
lengthy to explain here. We shall content ourselves with a
consideration of the means used to communicate this grace,
without trying to explain the way in which it is accomplished.
To produce anything efficiently there is required a certain
physical contact between the cause and the subject wherein
the effect is to be produced. The cause of the communication
of grace is the humanity of Christ, which is present only in
heaven and in the Eucharist. The subject on which the humanity of Christ works is ourselves. Therefore, in· order to produce
Christian grace in His members Christ makes use of the sacraments, and especially the sacrament of the Eucharist.
It is from the Cross that Christ principally exercises His
office as Head and, therefore, in His passion and death Chris.tians find the inexhaustible fount of the grace which vivifies.
The suffering humanity of the crucified Christ makes use of the
sacraments as separated instruments to communicate grace to
us. And since the vivifying influence of the Head must be
efficient, the sacraments which are used by Christ to effect
this communication are also said to produce grace efficiently. 36
It would be interesting to study the function of each sacrament
in the process of our vivification by Christ. Baptism is the
first because it initiates us into this incorporation with Christ. 37
The Eucharist, however, merits a special place.
•• ill, q. 6!il, a. 5.
87 ill, q. 69, a. !il:
"By Baptism a man is incorporated in the Passion and
death of Christ." Ibid., a. 8: " By Baptism, man is incorporated in Christ, and
is made His member."

THOMISTIC'

SOTERIOLOGY

AND THE MYSTICAL

BODY

567

For the Angelic Doctor, as also for. the generality of theologians, the Eucharist has two effects: one which is proper to
it, that of bestowing a nutritiye grace, 38 and the other which
is more general, grace considered as vivifying. 39 Therefore
theologians are wont to say that the unity of the Mystical
Body is especially maintained in this sacrament 40 and this
unity is the result of the communication to the members of
the life of the Head.
In the .case of the Eucharist the supernatural life of Christman is not communicated to us by any means distinct from
the humanity itself, as happens in the other sacraments. In
the Eucharist it is the very body of Christ which is placed in
immediate contact with men, that body which for us is the
vivifying element or, as the Apostle says, the "spiritus vivificans." 41 St. John assures us of the same thing when he says:
" Except you eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his
blood, you shall not have life in you. He that eateth my flesh,
and drinketh niy blood, hath everlasting life." 42
But how does the eucharistic flesh of Christ cause life in
those who eat it? Is His flesh perhaps vivifying? As flesh, no;
it does not cause supernatural life nor even natural life for,
since it is
it is not naturally assimilable. It vivifies
spiritually insofar as it is the subject of the spirit or the grace
of Christ, for it is not Christ's humanity as such that causes
our divine life, but the grace that is contained in His humanity. When the body of Christ comes in contact with ours
there is an intimate co:uuimnication of grace because for us it
is not body, but "spiritus vivificans." And when Jesus states
that whoever eats His body is with Him and that He is in
the one who communicates, He refers to a presence of His body
but
more to a presence of His. spirit and grace. Christ is
given to us in the Eucharist and in giving Himself to us He also
gives the grace which He possesses, which is not only divine,
as we have explained, but also Christian. :U:e therefore trans•• ni, q. 79, a. 1.

•• lll, q. 78, a. 8.

•• Ibid., ad 1.

01

I Cor. 15:45.

•• John 6 :54 f.

568

EMILIO SAURAS

forms us into what He Himself is spiritually. This is what is
meant by our incorporation in Christ.
But do not the other sacraments also unite us to Christ the
Head? St. Thomas teaches that they do, insofar as they are in
some way related to the Eucharist. 48 The desire for the Eucharist is interwoven in the other sacraments and becomes their
end and measure. The Angelic Doctor indicates this when he
says: " The Eucharist is, as it were, the consummation of the
spiritual life, and the end of all the sacraments . . . for by the
haHowings of all the sacraments preparation is made for receiving or consecrating the Eucharist. . . . By Baptism a man is
ordained to the Eucharist." 44 It follows from this that the
Eucharist will have a special efficacy in the production of
grace by the other sacraments.
St. John teaches that from the Eucharist proceeds life.45 St.
Thomas also states that whatever vivifying power grace has in
us proceeds from some desire for the Eucharist. 46 Therefore,
we can conclude that grace, considered as vivifying, though it
is likewise produced by the other sacraments, is done so only
insofar as they are ordained to the Eucharist. 47 And since the
communication of the life of Christ constitutes our incorporation in Him, it also follows that while the other sacraments do
incorporate us in Christ, 48 it is the Eucharist which has this
incorporation as a characteristic effect.49
To understand this we should recall that each sacrament produces a grace which is proper to itself. Thus, according to the
Apostle, Baptism causes death to sin and the beginning of the
life of Christ or the Christian life.50 Baptismal grace, as produced by this sacrament, has two formalities: death to an evil
life and resurrection to a new life. It is not the same thing to
die to sin and to live the supernatural life; they are two dis•• Ill, q. 79, a. 1, ad 1: "Hence it is due f!o the efficacy of its power, that
even from desire thereof a man procures grace whereby he is ·enabled to lead the
spiritual life."
"Ill, q. 78, a. 8.
•• John 6:54.
•• Ibid., q.
a. 5; q. 69, aa. 8.
•• Ill, q. 79, a. I, ad 1.
•• Ibid., q. 78, a. 8.
GO Rom. 6 : 4-8,
•• Ibid., q. 78, a. 8.

THOMISTIC

SOTERIOLOGY

AND THE MYSTICAL

BODY

569

tinct formalities, though in fact they are contained in the one
and the same reality, g_race. In the present divine economy
these formalities are inseparable; one cannot conceive of death
to sin without supernatural life. But this is so, not by the
natural exigencies of things, but because God has so determined. God could have willed that man should have a natural
perfection and in this case the liberation from sin would not
imply tb,e possession of divine life. God did not, however, will
so; rather, He willed that there should be no other perfection
save supernatural perfection. For that reason the remission of
sins carries with it the bestowal of grace. Rather, the sin is
remitted by grace which, at the same time that it heals the
evil, gives the good or the life of God.
by the one sacrament of
These two effects are
Baptism, as St. Paul says: " For we are buried together with
him by baptism into death: that as Christ is risen from the
dead by the glory of the Father, so we also may walk in newness of life." 51 But, although Baptism effects these two things,
it does not do so in the same manner. It can be said, therefore,
that Baptism of itself effects the death to sin; it also communicates new life, but insofar as it implies some desire for or ordination to the Eucharist, which is the vivifyip.g sacrament. In
like manner the words of the first consecration of the Mass
cause both the body and the blood of the Lord to. be present
on the altar; the body, by the power of conversion which the
words themselves contain, and the blood, by reason of an
objective ordination to the blood which is in the body. This
desire is based on the inseparability of the two elements, for
the two cannot actually be separated; where one is, the other is
also.
It is certain that St. John teaches that without the Eucharist
there is no divine life and also that the other sacraments somehow give life.52 It is, therefore, necessary to appeal to some
eucharistic influence over the other sacraments and which St.
"'Rom. 6:4.

69

John 6 :54.

570

EMILIO

SAURAS

Thomas explains by the objective desire which is in the sacraments themselves and not only in the recipient. 53
What we have said concerning Baptism is also true of the
other sacraments; i. e., they all cause a determined and particular grace which is a special mode of grace in general. But every
modality presupposes a subject to be modified and therefore
every modal grace presupposes grace itself which is thus modified. Now if the sacraments have the power of causing a
modality of grace, for example the grace of virility which is
caused by Confirmation, then they are said to cause grace
according to the modality in which it is :received. Hence
Confirmation increases grace as such in giving it a new modality. But grace as such has a vivifying character and this
character proceeds, as we have seen, from an ordination or
desire for the Eucharist. Therefore, Confirmation and the other
sacraments cause the grace which they cause insofar as they
have this objective desire for the Eucharist.
We conclude this section by saying with St. Thomas that
"the reality of the sacrament (the Eucharist) is the unity of
the Mystical Body.'' 54 The means by which the grace of the
Head descends to the members are the sacraments and more
especially the sacrament of the Eucharist. "This sacrament
has of itself the power of bestowing grace; nor does anyone
possess grace before receiving this sacrament except from some
desire thereof. . . . Hence it is due to the efficacy of its power
that even from desire thereof a man procures grace whereby he
is enabled to lead the spiritual life." 55 In a word, all the
sacraments bestow grace and with it the supernatural life,
though each one causes a special grace. Yet all the sacraments
effect this by reason of their dependence on the Eucharist,
which is antonomastically the sacrament of life, of union with
Christ and of the Mystical Body.

*
lli, q. 78, a. 8; q. 179, a. ll, ad L
lbid., q. 78, a. l.
55 Ibid., q. 79, a. 1, ad 1.
53

54

THOMISTIC

SOTERIOLOGY

THE MYSTICAL

BODY

571

With this we terminate our considerations. We have seen
that Christ is Head as man and that by reason of His being
Head as man the Vital element of the Mystical Body is not
divine grace but Christian grace. ·we have also seen that the
Head communicates His life to the members in an instrumental
and e:ffi.cient manner and that the sacraments, especially the
Eucharist, exercise the noble function of incorporating into
Christ those who are united to Him. If the members develop
the grace they receive, they will receive further
as they
graces until they are perfectly vivified.
EMILIO SAURAS,

Dominican House of Studiu,
Valencia, Spain.

0. p.

THE VIRTUE OF DOCILITY
HEN the disciples said to Christ, " Lord, teach us
to pray," 1 they acknowledged three things. First
they manifested their own lack of knowledge, for if
they already knew how to pray they would not have asked
for instruction. Secondly, they indicated their willingness to
learn, since they voluntarily asked Christ for the instruction.
Finally, the disciples showed that they recognized Our Lord
was a teacher and that as such He had certain authority in
matters of learning, as well as a right to respect because of His
knowledge. Otherwise they would not have approached Him
in the first place. In one word, we can say that the disciples
were docile. When they wanted to learn something they came
to their Teacher with a docile spirit.
The purpose of this article is to establish
quality called docility is a virtue and that, consequently, it is
a necessary part of man's equipment for virtuous living. Such
a consideration is of value today. By a clearer understanding
of docility we may find some solution to such modern problems
as juvenile delinquency and the general spirit of too much independence that grows from exaggerated notions of democracy
and equality.
In order to accomplish the objective of this study, it will
be necessary to follow St. Thomas' own method of determining
the nature of a virtue. The Angelic Doctor usually proceeds
from the objects since these give the formal cause of a virtue.
Once these objects have been discovered, there still remains the
consideration of the material cause or subject of inherence of
the virtue.
When the fact that docility is a virtue has been established,
then the all important task of proving that it is a distinct virtue
will be treated. Such a proof entails further emphasis on the
1

Luke n :I.

THE VIRTUE OF DOCILITY

578

objects of docility. We shall also include a section on the
virtues that resemble docility. Finally, the properties and
effects of docility will be considered plus the inevitable tract
on the vices opposed to the virtue.
Although the outline is obvious enough, there are special
difficulties in a treatment of docility. The meagerness of
material is one. Practically no one has determined whether
docility is a virtue, and if so, why, or what sort of virtue it is.
It seems to be taken for granted in a vague way that docility
is a special virtue. This also means that much concerning the
nature of docility has been presumed rather than explained.
Hence, confusion on precisely what docility is can easily arise.
The purpose of this essay, then, is to establish, according to
the principles of St. Thomas, that docility is a distinct virtue
and to delineate its character. Because of the lack ,..of material
on the subject our undertaking has the added note of originality, along with the dangers of all explorations.
1.

DociLITY

DEFINED

A favorite starting point with St. Thomas in treating of a
virtue was to cite the authority of St. Isidore. 2 The Spanish
bishop of Seville ·did not omit the word " docile " from his
famous lexicon. In a brief descriptive phrase, he says: " One
is docile, not because he is learned, but because he can be
taught; for he is capable and apt for learning." 3 Although St.
Thomas does not refer to this definition, he was undoubtedly
acquainted with it. His own definition is: ". . . it is a mark
of docility to be ready to be taught." 4 This is an extremely
brief observation, yet it is a starting point. By enumerating
what others have by way of truncated definitions, we shall
adds a
reach a clearer appreciation of docility. Thus,
few more notions in his statement of the meaning of docility:
" Docility is called that by which anyone is prompt and ready
• As a matter of fact, St. Thomas does just that very thing in the article
following docility. Cf. Summa Theol., 11-II, q. 49, a. 4.
8 P. L. LXXXII, 874.
• Op. cit., a. 8.

574

RAYMOND SMITH

in receiving discipline and acquiring knowledge from others." 5
Gonet includes the special purpose of docility in his expression
of its nature: " Docility implies an affection and promptitude
for learning, which also helps much for prudence." 6 Less
scientific, more wordy but nonetheless useful, is Msgr. Kerby's
definition: " It is the business of docility to foster a love both
which is so impersonal and holy that the ideal man shrinks
from neither effort nor sacrifice in seeking truth and serving
justice." 7 Finally we list Mortimer Adler's understanding of
docility which brings in several new ideas: " Docility is the
virtue which regulates a man's will with respect to learning
from a teacher." 8
These versions of docility hardly merit the distinction of
being called definitions, with the exception of Dr. Adler's. St.
Thomas was assuredly not even attempting a formal definition
since he qualifies his statement with the words " it is a mark
of docility." In other words, the Angelic Doctor implies that
there is much more to docility than readiness to be taught.
Nevertheless, from these various and closely related notions on
docility, we can formulate a working definition of our own. We
say: " Docility is a virtue that makes a man apt for learning
from others." This is a quasi-metaphysical definition of docility
inasmuch as it gives its genus, namely, virtue, and as its quasispecific difference we have the phrase "that makes a man apt
for learning from others." We shall return to this defuiition
as soon as we have treated certain necessary preliminaries that
arise from the relationship of docility to prudence.

a. Relationship of Docility and Prudence
In order to avoid a myriad of repetitions, it would be well
to explain the interplay between docility and prudence before
6 Commentarium in Totam Secundam Secundae (Venice: 1726), III, 214.
• J. B. Gonet, Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae (Paris: 1876), V, 856.
7 W. J. Kerby, "Clerical
Docility," The Ecclesiastical Review (Philadelphia:
1922), LXVI, 148 ff.
8 Mortimer J. Adler, "Docility
and Authority" and "Docility and History,"
Commonweal 81 (1940), 504 fl'. and 4 ff.

575

THE VIRTUE OF DOCILITY

examining docility in its recognized role of integral part to
prudence. A brief consideration of prudence itself will help to
throw some light on the nature of docility. The classic definition of this cardinal virtue is the one given by Aristotle:
prudence is the right reason of things to be done.ll The distinctive character of prudence consists in the fact that it is a
virtue formally intellectual inasmuch as it perfects the practical
intellect by directing human acts conformably with right
reason. On the other hand, it is ·materially moral since its
matter is moral acts. It is not the duty of prudence to determine the ends of moral virtues but rather to find the means
for attaining the ends already given by nature. It is under
this aspect of actually and ·effectively determining means to
ends that prudence takes on the role of coordinator unifying all
virtues. 10
There are three steps in the prudential act: counsel, judgment, and command. 11 Since judgment is concerned with the
facts already discovered and because command is the final and
decisive step to act, these do not pertain to our consideration.
Docility is about discipline, the acquisition, in other words, of
the truths upon which the prudent man will judge and, after
selecting one, will pass his command. Hence docility will be
closely adjoined to counsel whose function it is to make discovery by way of inquiry.
This means that we consider it outside the field of docility
actually to judge on the verity or falsity of information
supplied to it. Docility of its very nature seems almost to imply
a suspension of judgment. People who are too self-assertive in
their judgments are the ones who need docility most. The
reasonableness of this restriction that we are placing on docility
can perhaps be seen more clearly if viewed from the function
of the teacher. In answering the question whether one man can
teach another, 12 St. Thomas points out that the teacher is an
exterior principle of the pupil's learning. " ... anyone who
• Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 5.
Summa Theol., 11-ll, q. 47, aa. 1-7.

10

3

11
12

Ibid., a. 8.
Ibid., I, q. 117, a. I.

576

RAYMOND

SMITH

teaches, leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to
the knowledge of things previously unknown to him; according
to what the Philosopher says (Poster. I, 1): All teaching and
all learning proceed from previous knowledge." One who is
being led obviously is not making any decisions right at that
moment. Consequently, as will be pointed out later, the judgment on the new facet of information will not be made by
docility but ultimately only by the intellectual virtue employed
for gaining the knowledge.
Having thus :restricted docility's part in the virtue of prudence to the first act of prudence, that of counsel, it is fitting
next to consider in more detail the nature of counsel. This
act is enumerated among the twelve parts of a human act. It
is placed as its fifth act, the third of the intellectual ones. 13 It
is concerned with the means to the end and is a speculative
consideration of them.
The exposition of counsel as given by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics plus the commentary of St. Thomas will se.rve
for our purpose here. Counsel can be called deliberation with
oneself over material that offers reason for doubting. This
being so, Aristotle immediately eliminates certain objects from
the domain of counsel. 14 He reduces these objects to four
classes based on the causes of things. Thus no one deliberates
on the nature of things, for example whether a tree is a tree.
Nor does one, unless a fool or a madman the Stagirite does
not hesitate to say, take counsel about events that happen from
necessity, such as the rising of the sun. In fact, even those
things that happen purely by chance are not properly the
material for counsel, " like the finding of treasure." Finally,
we do not always deliberate about things man has done himself. "No Spartan deliberates about the best constitution for
the Scythians," observes Aristotle, or to bring it up to date, no
American takes counsel about the next election among the
Eskimos. There is but one reason for aU these not pertaining
13 R. Garrigou-Lagrange,
0. P., De Revelatione (Rome: 1929), I, 538. Also cf.
Summa Theol., I-II, q. 14.
14 Aristotle, op. cit., III, 8; St. Thomas, Ill Ethic., lect. 7.

THE VIRTUE

OF DOCILITY

577

to counsel-they are beyond the power of the man doing the
deliberation to alter or change.
However, when a doubt asserts itself, counsel is at hand to
perform. Nature determines the ends of the virtues themselves,
but it leaves man to discover the means for attaining these
ends. That is the service given by prudence, but it is counsel
that is the arsenal supplying judgment and command with
their matter for the final steps of prudence. The field of counsel
can be seen in the words of Aristotle: "Deliberation is concerned with things that happen in a certain way for the most
part, but in which the event is obscure, and with things in
which it is indeterminate. We call in others to aid us in deliberation on important questions, distrusting ourselves as not being
equal to deciding." 15 In the next paragraph Aristotle continues on this matter by remarking that men " ... assume
the end and consider how and by what means it is to be attained; and if it seems to be produced by several means they
consider by which it is most easily and best produced, while
if it is achieved by one only they consider how it will be
achieved, till they come to the first cause, which in the order of
discovery is last." 16
Thus St. Thomas observes that " counsel is a certain inquisition." 17 It is here that docility enters the scene. Since counsel
is concerned with investigation, it can do this either by private
discovery or by means of discipline. The latter is the way of
docility. Thus docility's, part in prudence is to supply counsel
with matter and the merit of the matter is decided by counsel
perfected by the virtue of eubulia. Left to itself counsel would
be in constant danger of erring. This is why it needs the virtue
of eubulia to perfect it. The very word means good counsel.
Thus docility precedes counsel and eubulia completes it. If this
is all that docility does it must remain forever an admirable
conditio sine qua non for prudence, but never will it attain the
full stature of a virtue.
Op. cit., III, 8, HUb 5; St. Thomas, op. cit., lectio 7.
Ibid., 1112b 15; St. Thomas, ibid., lectio 8.
17 Ibid.

15
10

578

RAYMOND

SMITH

Briefly stated, then, docility is related to prudence as an
integral part of a perfect virtue. By integral parts of a virtue
is meant those conditions that are necessary if the virtue is to
be had in its perfection. 18 Thus prudence, by the very force
of its object which is steeped in the contingent, needs docility
as a prerequisite to its own successful functioning. Without
docility, prudence would be overwhelmed by the multitude of
possibilities that are normally present in the particular undertakings of daily action.

b. Doeility: The Problem

It will be recalled that only Dr. Adler besides ourselves referred to docility as a virtue. There is a good reason for thiso
Since St. Thomas treats of docility as an integral part of prudence, an immediate difficulty arises in attempting to maintain that docility is a virtue. That which is an integral part
of a virtue is not itself a virtue, just as the roof is not the house
although it is an integral part of the house. If this analogy
made by St. Thomas of integral parts of a house were taken
absolutely, then docility could never be a virtue, any more than
a roof of itself could ever be a house. Of course the comparison
is not that rigid.
Nevertheless, it is true that precisely as an integral part,
such a part is not a virtue. St. Thomas is quite explicit on
the point: "Memory, understanding and foresight, as also
caution and docility and the like, are not virtues distinct from
prudence; they are, as it were, integral parts thereof, insofar
as they are all requisite for perfect prudence." 19 Thus it must
be conceded that, under the aspect of an integral part of prudence, docility is not a virtue. However, considered from
another aspect, two avenues are open to it for being a good
habit. It might be attached to a greater virtue as a potential
part; or secondly, it could be a species of a higher virtue. 20
Summa Theol., II-Il, q. 48.
Ibid., I-II, q. 57, a. 6, ad 4.
20 Ibid., II-II,
q. 48 where St. Thomas explains what is meant by integral,
28
19

subjective, and potential parts of a virtue.

THE VIRTUE OF DOCILITY

579

There are several examples in the Summa of an integral part
being also a virtue under another formality. In the tract on
fortitude, St. Thomas shows that from one point of view
magnanimity and magnificence are integral parts of the cardinal virtue, fortitude, but under another aspect they are
potential parts and so, true virtues. The same is shown of
patience and perseverance. 21 Hence, docility can quite conveniently serve a twofold function, that, namely, of being an
integral part of prudence and likewise, when referred to its
proper matter, of being a subjective or potential part of one of
the cardinal virtues.
Are there any solid grounds in the doctrine of St. Thomas
.for maintaining that there is more to docility than its intimate
connection with prudence might at first lead us to suppose?
The citing of other virtues that play the dual role of integral
part and true virtue only argues to the possibility of docility
having a similar part in man's moral life. It certainly does not
establish the fact. Indeed, from the case at hand one might be
led to conclude that St. Thomas did not consider docility to be
an independent virtue. If he did, one might ask, why did he
not treat of it here? In the examples just mentioned of other
virtues serving as integral parts, St. Thomas makes no such
omission. The Angelic Doctor acknowledges them as integral
parts and then examines them later in the tract as true virtues.
Hence this citation of magnanimity, magnificence, patience,
and perseverance seems more to militate against docility's
chances of being a virtue than to sponsor them.
On the other hand, we have texts from St. Thomas that
lead one to the conclusion that he actually regarded docility
as a true virtue and not as restricted to prudence as an integral
part. We can begin by examining more closely what St. Thomas
says of docility when he treats of it with regards to prudence.
One thing that immediately strikes the reader of this section
is docility's close link with knowledge. St. Thomas lists eight
integral parts of prudence: memory, reasoning, understanding,
21

Ibid., q. 128.

580

RAYMOND

SMITH

docility, shrewdness, foresight, circumspection, and caution.
The first five, which includes docility, regard prudence inasmuch as it is cognoscitive. 22 Although all five parts are concerned with knowledge, they approach it in different ways.
Thus memory and understanding are about knowledge itself:
memory insofar as it is past; while understanding treats the
facts at hand. As to the acquisition of knowledge we have
docility in learning by way of discipline and shrewdness in
learning by means of discovery. Finally it is reasoning that
makes use of this knowledge.
This notion of docility gaining knowledge for its possessor by
way of learning through discipline was contained in the nominal
definitions enumerated at the outset. It is this attribute in
docility that inclines one to see in it more than its prudential
aspects already noted. Under this latter consideration it was
pointed out that docility is connected with counsel, an act of
prudence. Counsel is not interested in natures, the necessary,
things beyond our control. Yet one of the special pedagogical
devices employed by St. Thomas is to render his pupil docile.
If the Saint had considered docility so related to prudence
that it could not share its fecundity other than with that
virtue's act of counsel, then it would have been a futile gesture
for him on the other hand to insist on rendering his pupil docile
in order to teach the student some discipline, such as philosophy, which certainly is interested in nature and the necessary.
First we shall consider the words of St. Thomas on this
point of making a person docile, in order to determine what
exactly is meant. In commenting on Aristotle's De Anima, St.
Thomas states that the Philosopher " ... does the three things
necessary in each preface . . . First, he renders the hearer
benevolent. Secondly, he makes him docile. Thirdly, he renders him attentive. Indeed, he makes him good-willed by
showing the utility of the science; docile by setting forth the
order and distinction of the tract; attentive by attesting to
the difficulty of the tract." 23 Cardinal Cajetan commenting on
22

/bid., q. 48.

23

I de Anima, lectio l.

THE VIRTUE OF DOCILITY

581

St. Thomas' De Ente et Essentia/ 4 shows that the Angelic
Doctor himself "by observing the art of rhetoric does three
things in the preface." They are the same three that St.
Thomas perceived in Aristotle's methodology. Obviously then,
docility is not for the sole purpose of perfecting prudence, but
is for " the acquisition of new knowledge ... by the experience
and teaching of others ... " in all fields of learning. 25 It is true
that in prudence where there is present so tremendous a number of possibilities for attaining an end, docility is manifestly a
necessity. Yet it is nonetheless true that for the acquiring of
any branch of knowledge, a man must be docile or else expose
himself to error because he lacks an experienced guide or even
give up altogether the pursuit of learning because of the impossibility of comprehending the whole field unaided. 2 c
If docility were restricted solely to prudence as an integral
part, then there would be little point in Aristotle, St. Thomas,
and Cajetan trying to make their pupils docile. Actually,
Aristotle does give us at least one insight into his mind on
the problem. Although not treating of docility and not formally
concerned with it at the time, he observes that a student's
lack of understanding of a principle need not be a barrier to
his progress in learning. He has but to accept the principle on
the authority of the teacher. 27 This is clearly another instance
of the need of docility on the part of the pupil. St. Thomas
also mentions the same thing in his commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. For the sake of clarity and by way
of bringing out the relation of all that has thus far been
exposed, the whole passage will be quoted. St. Thomas is
inquiring about the integral parts of prudence. Taking the
integral part called foresight as his focal point, the Angelic
Doctor enumerates three ways it can be impeded in its function
of ordering things to their end:
•• Cajetanus, op. cit., p. 1.
•• Walter Farrell 0. P., A Companion to theJ Summa (New York: 1940), III, 151.
•• This is evident since man is a social animal. Cf. Ill Cont. Goot., c. 117:
Cum homo sit naturaliter animal sociale, indiget ab aliis hominibus adiuvari ad
consequendum proprium finem.
•• I Post. Anal., II,
15.

582

RAYMOND

SMITH

It happens, however, that foresight can be impeded in three
ways:
Firstly, from the part of finding the way itself, which sometimes
seems good, and is not; and this impediment is taken away by
caution whose office it is to discern from virtues vices parading
under the appearance of virtues.
Secondly, from the order of itself to the end, lest, namely, the
way which of itself is apt to the end be impeded by something
extrinsic so that it cannot lead to the end; and this pertains to circumspection which is the safeguard against contrary vices by which
prudence is especially impeded.
Thirdly, on the part of the man himself tending to the end, who
cannot find ways accommodated for the end intended; whence it
is necessary that he should receive it from others through doctrine.
It is necessary that the prudent man have operable principles
either from himself or receive them readily from others. He, however, who has neither, is a useless fellow as is said in I Ethics, c. 2.
And this is docility in a passive sense. If, however, docility is
accepted in an active sense then it will pertain to prudence according to its most perfect existence, since it not only finds for itself,
but also for others, what things are useful to the
and thus
prudence is attributed to teaching the unlearned. 28

This lengthy quotation has the value of clarifying the position of docility in prudence from the very words of SL Thomas.
The concluding sentence gives reason for holding that the
object of docility is not limited only to the means to human
acts. Rather docility can be about the means of attaining any
branch of science. Passive docility lifts man from the false and
dangerous security of self-sufficiency to the high plane of
humble submission of knowledge.
Francisco de Vitoria also definitely understood docility as
closely related to knowledge or even to wisdom, and not merely
the magnificent cog in the mechanism of the prudential act
that all admit it to be. In an almost untranslatable passage he
says in substance: The Doctor declares what docility is, which
should be heard by the wise. All heresies and those that are
now arise from this, namely, indocility, as if it were said to
28

III Sent., d. 83, q. 3, a. 1.

THE VIRTUE OF DOCILITY

583

these what Augustine says: I was willing to accept, but it was
not proved. And thus these are indocile.29 In other words,
heretics might have good intentions, but because they did not
consider the dogmas of the Faith as operating ground for
docility, they fell into error. They may have had the docility
of prudence about the particular matters of action, but it
bogged down when it became a question of intellectual assent
to truths transcending the human intellect.
From these passages in St. Thomas and likewise from the
observations of the commentators, there are clear indications
that docility, in addition to being an integral part of prudence,
has functions quite distinct from its prudential aspect. One
obvious answer to the query why docility was not considered
by St. Thomas under prudence is that apparently under this
broader aspect docility does not belong to prudence. However,
the final statement on that point must wait further investigation. If it is going to be a virtue at all, docility will be either
a subjective or potential part of some higher virtue. Since
docility must fit under one of these two classes, it will be
necessary very briefly to explain what is meant by a subjective
part and a potential part of a virtue. Subjective parts of a
virtue are its species. Thus their relation to the principal virtue
is simply one of species to genus. The species shares the perfect
nature of the cardinal virtue and is distinguished from it by its
specific difference. The potential part, on the other hand, does
not partake of the complete nature of the main virtue, nor does
it measure up to the exacting standards of the principal virtue.
However, it does imitate it to some extent and share in its
nature. 30 The only way to answer satisfactorily the question
under discussion is to discover and explain the causes of the
virtue of docility. From this information it will be possible to
conclude as to the nature of docility and its place in the
hierarchy of moral virtues.
•• Doctor declarat quid sit docilitas, quod audiat a sapientibus. Hinc proveniunt
omnes haereses et quae nunc sunt, ut si dicatur illis, hoc dicit Augustinus: bene
volo, sed non probavit. Et sic isti sunt indociles. Francisco de Vitoria, Comentarios ala Secunda Secundae (Venice: 1726), ill, 877.
•o Summa Theol., 11-II, q. 48.

584

RAYMOND SMITH

DociLITY:

ITs NATURE

From what has been written thus far, it is becoming apparent
that docility can be viewed under other than its prudential
aspects. St. Thomas demanded docility in his students and in
so doing has given us the solid argument that he never intended
to limit the function of docility to the role of an integral part
of prudence. Fortified with this indirect support from the
Angelic Doctor in favor of a virtue of docility, we now proceed
to explain the very nature of docility itself.
The knowledge that we have of docility so far is based mainly
on the descriptions of it given above in our various nominal
definitions. From these, two notions stand out. In the first
place, the definitions emphasize the idea of knowledge to be
acquired, a fact that was reenforced by the insistence of St.
Thomas on docility as a necessary part of the student's equipment in the classroom. Secondly, the definitions agree that
the learning is to come from others. We can restate these
elements by saying that docility respects persons of learning
precisely because of their learning. Put this way we begin to
perceive that the prime point of docility and the key to its
relationship with the cardinal virtues will be found in the fact
that it is principally concerned with a relation to others.
Docility has respect towards men of learning either in their
books or in the classroom. This draws us near to the nature of
justice which extends to others and gives to each his due. 31
Since this is so, it would be valuable for the fuller understanding of our subject-matter to consider very briefly the aspects
of justice that have pertinence to docility.
a. Docility and Justice

In his general
of the cardinal virtues, St. Thomas
lists all the essential elements of justice when he writes: " ...
good as defined by reason and put into our operations as something right and due, is found chiefly in commutations and
distributions in respect of another person, and on a basis of
31

Ibid., q. 58, a. 11.

THE VIRTUE OF DOCILITY

585

equality." 82 When St. Thomas comes to his particular consideration of justice he follows the lead given by Aristotle and
Ulpian and formulates his definition of this cardinal virtue as
follows: "Justice is a habit whereby a man renders to each one
his due by a constant and perpetual will." 83 As he develops
this question on justice the Angelic Doctor explains the parts
of the definition. Some of these expositions have importance
.for our subject. Hence when St. Thomas points out that justice
'" ... denotes essentially relation to another," 34 we immediately
see that docility has at least this much in common with it. The
foundation for this relationship to others is the reality of
equality " ... for a thing is equal, not to itself, but to another." 35
From this characteristic of equality St. Thomas comes to the
important conclusion that the medium of justice is a real mean
and not only one of reason.
The matter of justice is external operation, insofar as an operation
or the thing used in that operation is duly proportionate to another
person, wherefore the mean of justice consists in a certain proportion of equality between the external thing and the external person.
Now equality is the real mean between greater and less ...
wherefore justice observes the real mean.36
Being medial, it should be noted, is a quality of moral virtues.
Good moral habits are between extremes, one of defect and the
other of excess, with regard to the rule or measure placed by
reason itself. In other words, a habit is good when it is in
conformity with right reason. When this rule of reason operates
upon matter already determined and fixed by the very nature
of the thing, as happens in justice, then we have the rational
and real mean coinciding. At other times the determination is
according to reason only, that is, it is subjective varying
according to a prudential evaluation by each person in each
thing, as occurs in the virtues of temperance and fortitude. 37
•• Ibid., I-ll, q. 61, a. S.
Ibid., II-II, q. 58, a. I.
•• Ibid.
•• Ibid., a. 10.
•• Ibid., a. 2.
37 Ibid., I-II, q. 64. See also E. T. Toccafondi, Philosophia Moralis Generalis
(Rome: 1948), p. 201-202.
88

586

RAYMOND SMITH

Although it would be possible here and now to examine the
mean of docility and thus compare it to that of justice, this
problem can be solved with greater facility if we postpone it
until we have considered the parts of justice. We shall discover that the mean of justice and its parts is a shifting ground
and hence we would expose ourselves to error if we did not
have before us the full doctrine on the mean of justice.
Justice, as was the case with prudence, has integral, subjective, and potential parts. Instead of considering the integral
parts immediately, as one might expect, St. Thomas first turns
his attention to the subjective parts of justice. 38 By doing this,
St. Thomas brings out the notion of debt and equality which
is so essential for understanding justice. The Angelic Doctor
considers as the two species of particular justice, distributive
and commutative justice. As always the words of St. Thomas
himself are clear:
In distributive justice something is given to a private individual,
insofar as what belongs to the whole is due to the part, and in a
quantity that is proportionate to the importance of the position of
that part in respect of the whole . . . in distributive justice the
mean is observed, not according to equality between thing and
thing, but according to proportion between things and persons
... the mean ... follows geometrical proportion, wherein equality
depends not on quantity but on proportion.
On the other hand, in commutations something is paid to an
individual on account of something of his that has been received,
as may be seen chiefly in selling and buying, where the notion of
commutation is found primarily. Hence it is necessary to equalize
thing with thing, so that the one person should pay back to the
other just so much as he has become richer out of that which
belonged to the other. The result of this will be equality according
to the arithmetical mean .. ,39

From this quotation it might be pointed out that distributive
justice is a relation of community to the individual, while com•• Some authors have reversed this order. Cf. B. H. Merkelbach 0. P., Summa
Theologiae Moralia (Paris: 1988), IT, !lSI and Toccafondi, op. cit., p. !!09. Fr.
Priimmer retains the order of St. Thomas, D. M. Priimmer, 0. P., Manuale
Theologiae Moralis (Fribourg: 19!!2) fi, 67.
•• Summa Theol., 11-ll, q. 61, a. 2.

THE VIRTUE OF DOCILITY

587

mutative justice is between person and person. How this and
the question of the medium of justice have reference to docility
will be shown presently.
After the subjective parts, St. Thomas treats of the integral
parts. These are to do good and to decline from evil. In the
answer to an objection St. Thomas explains these parts with
regard to the mean.
The reason why these two are reckoned parts of justice under a
special aspect of good and evil, while they are not reckoned parts
of any other moral virtue, is that the moral virtues are concerned
with the passions wherein to do good is to observe the mean,.which
is the same as to avoid the extremes as evils: so that doing good
and avoiding evil come to the same, with regard to the other
virtues. On the other hand, justice is concerned· with operations
and external things, wherein to establish equality is one thing,
and not to disturb the equality established is another. 40
Finally St. Thomas enumerates and explains the potential
parts of justice. Just as in prudence, so too in justice the
virtues annexed to it have something in common on one hand
and lack or fall short of the perfection of justice on the other.
" Accordingly since justice is of one man to another . . . all
the virtues that are directed to another person may by reason
of this common aspect be annexed to justice." 41 Recalling
that justice consists essentially in giving to each his due
according to equality, St. Thomas continues: "Wherefore in
two ways may a virtue directed to another person fall short
of the perfection of justice: first, by falling short of the aspect
of the aspect of due." 42
of equality; secondly, by falling
There are then listed nine potential parts of justice. 43 Three
of these " render another his due, but are unable to render the
equal due." In the first place stands religion. ". . . whatever
man renders to God is due, yet it camiot be equal, as though
41 Ibid.,

q. 79, a. 1, ad 1.
q. 80, a. u.

•• For the place of equity or epikeia cf. Priimmer, op. cit., ll, 278, and Merkelbach, op. cit., II, 845.

588

RAYMOND SMITH

man rendered to God as much as he owes Him ... " 44 Religion
consists in offering worship to God. Secondly we have the
virtue of piety whereby man gives what he can of the unpayable debt he owes to parents and country. Finally, there is
observance which gives deference and honor to those who excel
in virtue, since there is no way for man adequately to reward
the
Inasmuch as the object of a virtue lacks the aspect of debt,
that virtue falls short of the full nature of justice. St. Thomas
lists six potential parts of justice which are merely potential
because their object does not have the perfect aspect of something " due " strictly. Thus by a moral necessity man must
be truthful or the whole rectitude of the moral order would be
disrupted. Likewise a man must be grateful for good things
and vindictive on account of bad things. Thus we have gratitude and revenge. Last of all there are liberality and affability
which have little of the nature of anything due but are conducive to greater rectitude in. moral affairs.
With this information before us, we can now center our
attention on docility and see where it fits. It has already been
pointed out that docility has respect to others and hence we see
from this common aspect that it can be annexed to justice.
First of all we must decide whether docility is so connected to
justice that it can be a subjective part or species of this cardinal
virtue. We have seen that both distributive and commutative
justice attain an equality, but the former's is proportional and
the latter's is arithmetical. 45 Docility regards learning in
another. Now learning is a quality of the soul and not something that can be measured by a quantitative rule. Thus it
would be impossible to attain the precision demanded of both
distributive and commutative justice in establishing the
equality required for paying a debt according to its exact
demands. Because of this defect in docility,it certainly cannot
be a species of justice.
From this deficiency in docility it also follows that the real
•• Summa Theol., II-II, q. 80.

•• Ibid., q. 61, a.

THE VIRTUE OF DOCILITY

589

mean of justice, that is, something fixed and determined by the
very nature of the transaction, does not fully apply to docility.
Thus, for example, in commutative justice when a man owes
another five dollars he must pay exactly five dollars in order
to remove the debt. It would be foolish to argue that to the
teacher who taught a pupil history the pupil must erase the
debt by teaching in his turn the history to the professor. Yet
one should not conclude from this that there is rro real mean
in docility. Rather the rendering of the debt is not in the same
kind, which can even happen in commutative justice, when a
person gives a service equal to five dollars instead of the token
wealth. Nevertheless, it is true to say that there will be a
degree of subjectivity in the docile person inasmuch as one's
own learning will determine just how learned another person is
in relation to him.
Although docility cannot be an integral part of justice, since
the two parts enumerated by St. Thomas suffice, however,
docility is not concerned with the passions " wherein to do good
is to observe the mean." Rather it follows justice in being
concerned with external things, namely the learning received
from another and the problem of how to make return payment.
It is only when we come to the special consideration of the
potential parts of justice that the nature of docility becomes
more evident. We shall consider under our first group religion,
piety, and observance, all of which fail to attain the full stature
of justice in their deficiency of paying in full the debt that is
owed. As we proceed in our investigation we shall compare
docility with the virtue under consideration making use of the
knowledge that we already have from our definitions.
The first of the three virtues to be examined is religion, which
directs man to God. 46 It is a special virtue for it gives due
honor to God Who because of His singular excellence is most
worthy of all praise. Exactly what aspect of the Divine Excellence does religion have for its object? «Religion is formally
one unique and specific virtue because of the one formal reason
•• Ibid., q. 81, a. 1.

590

RAYMOND SMITH

of its object, namely, worship to God as the first and most
universal Principle." 47
Docility, as we know, gives respect and honor to a person
because of his learning. How then shall we consider it as related
to God, the .first and most universal Principle? God can be
viewed here exclusively under the aspect of Creator and we
discover that He is the source of all knowledge. Not only did
He make the objects that were to serve as man's medium of
learning; not only did He create the human soul endowing it
with the cognoscitive faculty of intellect; but He is also the
light of the intellect by reason 48 and has added another light,
far exceeding any ability of unaided man, that of Faith. Hence,
God is the ultimate source of all knowledge. It would not be
enough to state that God possesses all knowledge. Docility can
operate· only towards those who impart their learning, not to
those who hoard it. Through Revelation God has communicated to man the truths of the supernatural order and thus has
made Himself a legitimate object for docility. By all means it
can be said that one is docile to God and in a way far exceeding
the docility he would give to others.
Although in God there are many titles for being honored by us,
such as Father, which piety honors for us; Lord, which dulia renders
to Him; as Benefactor, which gratitude renders; as King and
Prince, which observance serves; and so forth; yet all are founded
in that unique reason of first and most universal principle which
religion regards. Hence religion itself honors God under all the
above mentioned titles ·under a more eminent reason, and so it is
eminently piety, observance, dulia, gratitude, and so forth .... 43

Hence the docility exhibited to God is an eminent docility.
This special type and function of docility belongs to mystical
theology. Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange wntes: "Mystical theology
treats principally of docility to the Holy Ghost, of the infused
47 Est religio formaliter una virtus atoma et specifica propter unam formalem
rationem obiecti, nempe cultus Deo ut primo et universalissimo principio.
Salmanticenses, CurBUS Theol.- (Paris:, 1870), Vl, 450.
•• In Joan, c. 1, lectio S.
•• Salmanticenses, op. cit. and loc. cit.

THE VIRTUE OF DOCILITY

591

contemplation of the mysteries of faith, of the union with God
which proceeds from it, and also of extraordinary graces, such
as visions and revelations, which sometimes accompany infused
contemplation." 50 Since we are seeking the essence of docility
in its proper nature rather than in its elevated state by reason
of having God for its source of learning, we shall not include
the docility annexed to religion in our future considerations.
After the virtue of religion, St. Thomas takes up that of
piety. This second of the triumvirate of virtues rendering honor
to others regards primarily one's parents and country. 51 St.
Thomas sums up the object and purpose of piety as follows:
Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways, according
to their various excellences and the various benefits received from
them. On both counts God holds first place. . . . In the second
place, the principles of being and government. Consequently man
is debtor chiefly to his parents and his country, after God. Wherefore ... does it belong to piety, in the second place, to give
worship to one's parents and one's country.52
Yet parents are more than merely the principles of a man's
being. St. Thomas always recognized the truth that parents are
the educators of their offspring as well. His arguments for the
stability and indissolubility of marriage are based on the fact
that parents are expected to bring their children to the perfect
man, a creature of knowledge and virtue. 53 St. Thomas explicitly lists the offices of the father: " ... a father is the principle of generation, of education, of learning and of whatever
pertains to the perfection of human life." 54 With the mention
of learning, once again docility comes to our attention. Parents
are certainly teachers and it is normally from them that children are taught their first words, are instructed in the habits
essential for daily living, and not infrequently initiated into
60 R. Gan:igou-Lagrange, 0. P., The Three Ages of the Interior Life (St. Louis:
1947), I, 10.
51 Summa Theol., II-II, q. 101, a. 1,

•• Ibid.
•• Ibid.; Suppl. q. 41, a. 1, and q. 67, a. 1.
6 ' Ibid., II-II, q. 102, a. 1.

4

592

RAYMOND SMITH

the truths of the supernatural order. The task of parents
includes not only intellectual virtues but, often of greater importance in the life of a child, also moral training. Yet here,
as in the case of docility towards God, we really are speaking
of a preeminent type of the virtue towards such a special object
as one's parents. With reference to parents docility falls under
the sway of piety and may be considered as one of its functions.
In like manner, the debt one owes to his country is discharged, so far as it can be discharged at all, through the virtue
of piety. By being a citizen of a nation one learns its spirit and
is instructed in its traditions and educated to civil virtue. If
we just consider the nation as a society capable of imparting
its meaning to its citizens we must say that there is room for
docility here also. Once again, as in the case of parents, this
docility properly is a function of piety and is hence a special
and eminent brand of docility rather than the special one that
we are attempting to discover and analyse.
Finally we arrive at the virtue of observance. Speaking of
this virtue St. Thomas remarks: "Therefore, just as, in a
manner, beneath religion, whereby worship is given to God, we
find piety, whereby we worship our·parents, ;so under piety
we find observance, whereby worship and honor are paid to
persons in positions of dignity." 55 And who are these persons
in position of dignity? " ... for instance, the governor of a
state in civil matters, the commander of an army in matters
of warfare, a professor in matters of learning, and so forth." 56
This reverence and honor that we give to a professor in
matters of learning flows from what we intend to show is the
special virtue of docility. It is true that we have placed docility
under both religion and piety. We have endeavored, however,
to show that the docility owed to God is embraced under the
virtue of religion itself. Thus all the acts that man renders to
God under the aspect of paying a debt can be said to flow from
the virtue of religion. Similarly, piety encompasses the docility
due to parents and country. Both in the case of religion and
G&Jbid.

""Ibid.

THE VIRTUE

OF DOCILITY

593

piety docility's object can be considered in this way: Docility
to God regards God as teacher; docility to parents and country
regards parents and country as teacher. But the proper docility
that we wish to examine regards teacher as teacher.
Hence returning to observance, we note that, taking it as a
genus, there are as many species under it as there are dignities
to receive special reverence. Many of these virtues are without
names because of our bankruptcy of vocabulary. 57 Such virtues
thus bear only the common names of observance. For instance,
there is no special name for the honor we pay to a general in
his capacity as military leader and exemplar of the peculiar
virtues of his type of life. Nor do we have any distinctive word
for the acknowledgment of accomplishments due to those dedicated to the thespian art or to poetry, although such individuals hold a certain dignity in the community by reason of their
unusual talents. However, in the case of the recognition of
another's learning we do have a special name for the virtue
that prompts such recognition, that of docility. Since docility is
a species of observance it will share its nature. Therefore, we
can consider the objects of observance and with but a minor
qualification show that these are likewise the objects of docility.
The point of distinguishing virtues through their objects is
for the purpose of clarification. Such a procedure has its foundation in philosophy. Thus the traditional example given is
that of how we see. We are told that color is the immediate
object of the eye and as a result of seeing colors we can behold
all other colored material objects. Yet none of this would be
possible were it not for light in the first place which serves as
the medium by which all things are visible. 58 This outline,
then, is used with much advantage in the field of the virtues.
It will be necessary to consider three objects: the primary
and secondary material objects and the formal object. 59 Taken
•• This is recognized by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics ll, 7, nosa 15.
58 E. Hugon, 0. P.
Cursus Philosophiae Thomisticae (Paris: 1920), I, 6.
59 Cf. Merkelbach, op. cit., I, 513 and footnote; Priimmer, op. cit., I, 319-320. Fr.
Merkelbach is closer to St. Thomas in his statement of the objects of a virtue, but
many moralists use the same division as given by Fr. P:riimmer. Thus, for them,

594

RAYMOND SMITH

together the three objects form what is called the formal cause
of the virtue. 60
b. The Formal Cause of Docility
Returning to observance we note that its secondary material
object is the reverence and cult or honor that we give to
superiors because of their excellence and our consequent submission to them. The primary material object of observance is
to establish the debt of equality between the honor exhibited
and the right of the superior to such consideration. The formal
object or the proximate motive is the special honesty of the
said equality. 61
Now the only change in the case of docility will be in the
secondary material object. Observance is the generic virtue.
It gives reverence and honor to superiors because of their
excellence. There is no specification as to that in which the
excellence consists. When this excellence is learning then we
have .a determined object upon which observance can operate.
This in turn .gives determination to the virtue which we call
docility. In other words, when the general virtue of observance
regards a person established in some dignity and the person
considered is a · professor in matters of learning we have a
specific determination and hence a species under observance
which is named docility. That docility is a formally distinct
virtue from observance will be established later. Since we
have here given the formal cause· of docility at least in its
broad outline, it would be well to discuss its material object
and thus terminate the treatment of docility from the point
of view of its nature.
the material object is all that which the virtue treats. The obiectum forrnale quod
is that which it immediately attains 8Jld by reason of which all others are
reached. The obiectum formale quo is that by whose medium the obiectum formale
quod is attained. However, when treating of Faith, St. Thomas simply makes
the distinction of material 8Jld formal. Cf. II-II, q. 1, a. I. We have followed this
method and hence use Fr. Merkelbach's 8Jlalysis of the objects of the virtues that
we ,shall consider.
80 Summa Tkeol., I-II, q. 1, a. S.
01 Merkelbach, op. cit., ll, 811.

THE VffiTUE OF DOCILITY

595

There need be no delay over the second group of virtues
annexed to justice as potential parts. Since we have already
shown that docility is connected with justice through observance, it can hardly be expected that some other virtue will
also serve this purpose. Secondly, the notion of debt in
remaining five potential parts differs from the obligation that
docility is prepared to fulfill.62 St. Thomas views these remaining potential parts of justice as rendering a moral debt as
contrasted with the legal debt of religion, piety, and observance.
c. The Material Cause of Docility
In determining the material cause of docility our concern
will be with a point already made, namely, that docility is
annexed to justice as a potential.part through the medium of
observance. It might be well to recall, in passing, that since
virtues are accidents and because accidents do not exist independently of a subject, we can legitimately designate the subject of an accidental form its material cause, by way of analogy
to a substantially composed. being in which the subject of the
substantial form is always matter. 63 Hence, when we speak of
the material cause of an accident we mean its subject of inherence. Thus to determine the material cause of docility is
nothing else than to discover to what faculty of the soul it
properly belongs.
We already know that docility imitates the mode of justice.
Therefore, we can conclude to its material cause or the subject
of that virtue. With St. Thomas we
... if man's will is confronted with a good that exceeds its
capacity, whether as regards the whole human species, such as
divine good, which transcends the. limits of human nature, or as
regards the individual, such as the good ·of one's neighbor, then
does the will need virtue. And therefore such virtues as those
which direct man's affections to God or to his neighbor are subjected in the will, as charity, justice, and such like. 54
•• Summa Theol., II-IT, q. SQ.
•• Cf. de Virtut. in Comm., a. 8 1¥1d F. X. Maquart, Elementa Philosophiae
(Paris: 1988), III, 164 et seq.
•• Summa Theol., I-IT, q. 56, a. 6.

596

RAYMOND

SMITH

Docility falls under the " such like " inasmuch as it is connected
with justice in precisely that aspect of giving what is due to
others. The will, then, is the subject of docility and this constitutes the material cause of what we hope to establish as
the virtue of docility.
Consequently, we agree with Mortimer Adler when he writes:
" I place docility in the group of virtues annexed to justice,
for it consists in rendering to teachers what is their due." 65
By docility we attain "a right attitude" towards teachers. 66
The debt that each student owes the true source of wisdom is
so tremendous that he can never fully repay it. The master of
a science has spent years in accumulating his fund of knowledge.
Through the powers of his mind and unremitting application,
the teacher has acquired a depth of understanding in his particular field of learning. The pupil approaches him with but a
mite of doctrine and receives from the man of learning all
the benefit of his study and investigation. What can the pupil
give in return? Since justice in its perfection demands equivalent payment, we see immediately that such an arrangement is
impossible in this case. There is no equality here. AU the
giving has been from the professor and all the receiving by the
learner. The latter cannot return knowledge for knowledge
because that would be pointless. Were he to pay the teacher
money or give him a service, it would be but a gesture or sign
of appreciation, it still would not recompense adequately for
the knowledge received. Just as a son can never fully repay
his father for his natural life, 67 so too a student cannot adequately recompense his teacher who by imparting knowledge
has, as it were, given life to his intellect. Thus we return to
what was said before, namely, that docility falls short of the
essential nature of justice as an equality in repaying what is
due. 68
65

Adler, op. cit., p. 504.

•• Ibid.
67

68

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VIII, 14.
Summa Theol., II-II, q. 58, a. 10.

THE VIRTUE OF DOCILITY

8.

597

THE VIRTUE OF DociLITY

Having determined the material and formal causes of docility,
it is a relatively simple step to the definite demonstration that
docility is a virtue. St. Thomas employs various middle terms
in his syllogisms establishing that a particular human habit is
a virtue. The most obvious method is to show that the habit
under scrutiny equates the definition of virtue. In this way
the habit is placed in the genus of virtue. From this generic
notion St. Thomas can then go on to discover whether the
good habit is a special virtue. Aristotle defined virtue as that
which renders a human act and man himself good.69 Now
docility does that since it establishes a just relation between
man and man.
How docility is a special virtue must be determined from
its object. A virtue is distinct by reason of the fact that it
regards its object in a special way, regards in it a distinctive
formality. 70 Examining the original definitions of docility word
by word will bring out the special trait to be found in that
virtue .. Docility is concerned with the acquiring of knowledge,
not with imparting it or correlating it. The former would
pertain to teaching, the latter to philosophy and science. It is
the acquisition of knowledge, not of money, fame, or even virtue
that is docility's forte. Finally the knowledge is had from
others, not from one's own efforts.
It has been sufficiently established that docility belongs to
the will by reason of its connection with the virtue of observance. Is it so connected with observance that it cannot be
independent? A superficial reading of St. Thomas might lead
one to conclude that docility is not a special virtue. In formulating an objection that observance is not a special virtue, St.
Thomas writes:
Further, just as honor and worship are due to those who are in a
position of dignity, so also are they due to those who excel in
science and virtue. But there is no special virtue whereby we pay
•• Nicomachean Ethics, II, 6.
•• Summa Theol., II-ll, q. 101, a. 8.

598

RAYMOND SMITH

honor and worship to those who excel in science and virtue. Therefore observance, whereby we pay worship and honor to those who
excel in dignity, is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues. 71
Our interest here is, of course, with the minor of the syllogism.
St. Thomas replies:
... the fact that a man has perfection of science and virtue does
not give him the character of a principle in relation to others, but
merely a certain excellence in himself . . . for as much as science,
virtue and all like things render a man fit for positions of dignity,
the respect which is paid to anyone on account of any excellence
whatever belongs to the same virtue. 72
Certainly this line of reasoning would seem to rule out the
possibility of ml:!-king docility a distinct virtue. However, we
must understand very precisely just what is the mind of St.
Thomas on the qualities required for a special virtue. We are
attempting to show that docility is a species of observance.
Hence it is true to say that all respect paid to persons by reason
of their excellence belongs to observance in the sense, namely,
that every species belongs to its genus. The same difficulty
comes up under the question of obedience. St. Thomas inquires whether there is a special kind of obedience for each
different type of superior.
Further, virtues differ in species according to their objects. Now
the object of obedience ,would seem to be the command of a
superior, of which, apparently, there are as many kinds as there
are degrees of superiority. Therefore obedience is a general virtue,
comprising many special virtues. 73
This example exactly parallels our own problem. Whereas we
are maintaining that docility. is a species of observance, someone else might come and argue that there is a special virtue
for each type of superior obeyed. St. Thomas in answering this
objection also solves our problem:
Reverence regards directly the person that excels: wherefore it
admits of various species according to the various aspects of ex"Ibid., q. IO!t, a. 1, ad !t.

79

Ibid.

73

Ibid., q. 104, a. 2, ad 2.

THE VIRTUE OF DOCILITY

599

cellence. Obedience, on the other hand, regards the precept of the
person that excels, and therefore admits of only one aspect.74
Hence, while obedience regards the precept and not the
person and thus has no species, observance regards the excellence and therefore can have species. When the excellence considered is a teacher's learning as teacher, then we have the
virtue of docility. It is important to recall that docility considers th_e teacher as teacher. One is held by the general virtue
of observance to respect the learning of all men of letters. This
is true even if these men never teach any one nor write a· book
for others to use in studying. Thus, for example, a Doctor of
Canon Law would be entitled to reverence for his learning even
if he had entered a Trappist Monastery immediately upon
completion of his course of studies and consequently never
taught a day in his life. But as teacher, the honor and respect
is due not only because of his excellence in learning but also
in view of the added quality of principle in relation to others,
namely, he is directive of the minds of his pupils to knowledge.
We can conclude that docility is a species of observance
having all the characteristics of its genus virtue but finding in
its object a special aspect that gives a new determination to
observance and makes it docility. From all the information
gathered it is now fitting to formulate an integral definition of
the virtue of docility. We say: docility is a moral virtue
nected with justice through observance, whereby one renders
the honor and attention £/:ue to one whose excellence in learning
merits such respect and reverence.
We do not have to seek the authority of any philosopher or
theologian in order to establish the existence of docility. The
need for such a quality is evident to reason from the very
nature of man. In learning, he must begin by proceeding in
the dark, blindly following the leadership of a more learned
person than he is. From man's own experience, he realizes that
he owes a debt to those who have given him knowledge and
who continue to do so.
"'Ibid.

600

RAYMOND SMITH

Likewise, he is aware of the respect and honor he owes the
teacher. The very sense of justice within man tells him to pay
the debt he. owes by the means at his disposal. Upon consideration, he will discover that the only method is by rendering
honor and attention. Of course, he will not formulate his conclusion clearly nor even necessarily be conscious of what he is
doing. Nevertheless, it is true that he is exercising the virtue
of docility.
Indeed, any teacher can perceive this virtue in his pupils.
He might misname it obedience or call it by some vague term
such as good-will or cooperation, but if he had the precision of
the philosopher he would call the respect and honor he receives
by the name of docility. The teacher is also aware of this
attention he deserves and that he is not unreasonable in demanding it in his pupils. Thus we see from either side of the
professorial chair, in the pupil or in the teacher, that at least
the acts of docility are evident to anyone who looks and
observes.

a. Docility and Related Virtues
i. The Cardinal Virtues
Although we have shown that docility is annexed to justice
as a potential part, for the sake of completeness we shall now
point out why it could not be otherwise. By a process of
elimination we thus shall have an indirect argument for maintaining that docility must belong to justice. This is a valid
method of procedure but, of course, it has many limitations.
It merely shows what a virtue is not, not what it is. However,
in our case what docility is already has been determined. At
the end of this section we shall have established that docility
does not belong to prudence, fortitude, or temperance. That
much we could easily conclude to even now. Yet, a special
examination of these three cardinal virtues will give us the why
and perhaps a few more insights into the nature and function
of docility.
Recalling our remarks on prudence, we should note here that

THE VIRTUE OF DOCILITY

601

we no longer view docility under its :role of integral part of
that virtue, for in this capacity it can never attain the status
of a true virtue. But what are docility's chances of being a
subjective or potential part of prudence? Such possibilities
evaporate under the heat of examination. Prudence is the right
reason of doing things and is especially manifest in its three
acts of counsel, judgment, and command. 75 Docility wjll not be
a subjective part of this virtue, for as stated above it does not
go beyond the act of counseL Thus it cannot perfectly share
in the nature of prudence either as an integral part, which is
patent, or as an independent virtue.
The potential parts of prudence listed by St. Thomas are
eubulia perfecting the act of counsel, which point we have
already discussed, and synthesis and gnome perfecting the act
of judgment. 76 To these docility does not pertain. In order
to be a potential part of a virtue it is necessary to imitate its
mode in some way. 77 With regard to eubulia, the docility which
is an integral part of prudence is perfective of it antecedentiy
insofar as it is informative to counsel itself. This aspect of
docility was given adequate treatment early in this article.
We conclude, therefore, that the virtue of docility is not
annexed to prudence, although there is no doubt that a man is
certainly being prudent if he is also docile. However, that is
true in practising any virtue.
We next consider the credentials of fortitude in claiming
docility for itself. There is no difficulty in showing that docility
will not be a subjective part of that virtue, for as St. Thomas
points out: " But fortitude, taken as a special virtue, cannot
have subjective parts, since it is not divided into several specifically distinct virtues, for it is about a very special matter." 78
The possibilities of being a potential part, again as with prudence, depend on a consideration of the mode of fortitude. This
cardinal virtue has for its special function the double role of
Ibid., q. 47, a. 1.
Ibid., q. 51, aa. 1-4.
77 Ibid., q. 134, a. 4, ad 2; q. 137, a. 2, ad 1; q. 157, a. 3, ad 2; q. 161, a. 4.
78 Ibid., q. 128.
75

76

RAYMOND SMITH

withstanding the dangers of death arising from perils and the
brave advance to such dangers when reason demands. There is
nothing in the nature of docility that indicates so glamorous a
career for its possessor. Teachers and books can sometimes be
deadly with the poison of error but when they are, docility
refuses to have any part with them at all. Although one might
picture a martyr being· docile to the executioner as to how to
place his head on the block, the mite of knowledge gained
hardly would warrant one in making docility a potential part
of. fortitude. Such a situation is unusual and purely circumstantial to docility.
Temperance is the virtue regulative of man's moral life as
regards the pleasures of touch especially insofar as these are
concerned with the perpetuation of the species and the individual himsel£.79 Under this aspect docility would seem to
have little in common with temperance. One does not eat a
book, much less a teacher, except under most unusual circumstances and then not out of any spirit of justice or desire
for learning. Nor does docility have any immediate connection with matrimony. However, we shall show now that docility
does find some virtues belonging to temperance that seem to
share its own characteristics.

ii. Virtues that Appear Like Docility
After our consideration of the cardinal virtues we can now
investigate those virtues that, on first sight, seem to have such
common notes with docility that they might seem to be identical with it. Under this heading we shall consider four such
virtues. The procedure will be simply to bring out the very
essence of the virtue selected and compare it with docility. In
this way it should be evident in what they agree and differ.
The virtues chosen for this comparative study are obedience,
meekness, humility, and studiousness. We shall focus our investigation first on obedience 'Which as a species of observance and
consequently a potential part of justice deserves first place. 80
.. Ibid., q. 141, a. 3.

80

Ibid., q. 104, a. 1•

THE VIRTUE OF DOCILITY

608

Obedience according to St, Thomas is based on the very order
of nature itself.
Just as the actions of natural things proceed from natural powers,
so do human actions proceed from the human will. In natural
things it behooves the higher to move the lower to their actions by
the excellence of the natural power bestowed on them by God: and
so in human affairs also the higher must move the lower by their
will in virtue of a divinely established authority, Now to move by
reason and will is to command. Wherefore just as in virtue of the
divinely established natural order the lower natural things need
to be subject to the movement of the higher, so too in human
affairs, in virtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors
are bound to obey their superiors, 81

Obedience has for its special object a tacit or expressed command.82 This is its secondary material object or the matter
about which it concerns itself, Docility, on the other hand,
has for its secondary material object the reverence or honor
due to teachers because of their excellence in learning. The
primary material object of obedience also differs from that of
docility. Obedience establishes the due equality between the
acts executing the precept and the right of the superior to
have those acts carried out. 83 Docility strives to establish the
debt of equality between the honor exhibited and the right of
the teacher to such reverence because of his learning. The
virtues agree in their formal object since both are species of
observance and consequently potential parts of justice,
Perhaps the fundamental reason for confusing the two virtues
is that they usually go together in the same person. We
normally think of a pupil as owing both docility and obedience
to his teacher. The teacher has the right to the first by reason
of his learning; he is generally given the second since he stands
in the place of the pupil's parents or guardians who have
jurisdiction from the very nature of things. Yet, the two virtues
need not be so closely related. For students in colleges or
universities we do not conceive of the teacher as also one to
81 Ibid.
""Ibid., q. 104, a.
•• Merkelbach, op. cit., H, 813-814.

604

RAYMOND SMITH

whom· obedience is due. In such institutions of higher learning,
rules and regulations are drawn up and violations are referred
to the dean of discipline. The teacher receives only as much
honor as his learning entitles him to and in no way is viewed
as an exercise boy in obedience. Thus the similarity between
docility and obedience is reduced considerably. Both have the
same material cause, being, as they are, rooted in the will. Both
attempt to pay the debt due to a superior: docility to the
person of learning; obedience to the lawfully constituted authority. Each contains an element of submission. 84 Obedience's
flows from the order of nature itself, unless it is religious
obedience and then the motive is supernatural. Docility's
submissiveness results from the docile person's awareness of
his inadequacies in knowledge. However, they differ, as, we
have shown, in their material objects. Therefore, we can conclude that docility and obedience are not one and the same
virtue but both are species of observance and parts of justice.
Superficially meekness might be confused with docility. Yet
when one recalls its definition such confusion vanishes. Meekness is a virtue that moderates according to right reason anger
and the desire for revenge. 85 Nevertheless, meekness does have
a role to play with regard to knowledge. St. Thomas brings
this out in an objection and its solution. In formulating an
objection concerned with knowledge of God, St. Thomas says:
" Now meekness above all directs man to the knowledge of
God: for it is written (James 1 : 21): With meekness receive
the ingrafted word, and (Ecclus. 5 : 13) : Be meek to hear the
word of God." He replies: " Meekness disposes man to the
knowledge of God, by removing an obstacle; and this in two
ways. First, because it makes man self-possessed by mitigating
his anger ... ; secondly, because it pertains to meekness that
a man does not contraaict the words of truth, which many do
This is simply another
through being disturbed by anger."
case of two virtues operating on like matter but for different
•• Cf. Summa Theol., li-II, q. 26, a. 9, ad I.
•• Ibid., q. 157, a. l.
•• Ibid., q. 157, a. 4, ad I.

THE VIRTUE OF DOCILITY

605

reasons. Meekness, a potential part of temperance, helps a man
considerably to attain learning, just as docility does. Meekness
accomplishes its purpose by restraining one of man's unreasonable appetites, which, unrestrained, would interfere with, or
render impossible that attainment of knowledge. Docility does
it by paying the debt of reverence and attention due to one
who is imparting the knowledge.
The note of reverence in docility might lead one to identify
this virtue with that of humility, one of whose outstanding
traits is to revere. "We must not only revere God in Himself,
but also that which is His in each one, although not with the
same measure of reverence as we revere God. Wherefore we
should subject ourselves with humility to all our neighbors
for God's sake ... " 87
The truth of the matter is that, if we scrutinize the nature
of humility, we discover how unlike docility it really is.
Humility is a potential part of temperance 88 contained under
modesty as one of its species. 89 The special matter of humility
is ". . . to temper and restrain the mind lest it tend to· high
things immoderately." 90 In technical language the complete
dichotomy between docility and humility is made evident.
Both differ in their material cause. Humility is essentially in
the irascible appetite 91 although it has its rule in knowledge
and is considered principally in the will when it is about a
spiritual good. Docility is not concerned with the lower appetite but is both essentially and principally in the will. The
objects of humility are vastly different from docility's. Humility
has a twofold office, namely, of suppressing the inordinate desire
for one's own excellence and of subjecting oneself to God.
Hence, aside from the element of reverence intrinsic to both,
humility and docility have little common ground.
Perhaps no virtue more than studiousness would be associated in the popular mind with docility. Both are immediately
concerned with knowledge. Both call forth visions of impetuous
Ibid., q. 161, a. 8, ad l.
Ibid., q. 148.
89 Ibid., q. 161, prologue.
87
88

90

91

Ibid., q. 161, a. 1.
Priimmer, op. cit., II, 547.

606

RAYMOND SMITH

anxiety to learn with a keen application to study. Yet from
St. Thomas' treatment of studiousness it is plain that it is
purely gratituous to identify docility with it. His doctrine on
studiousness is neatly summed up in an answer to an objection:
But as regards knowledge man has contrary inclinations. For
on the part of the soul, he is inclined to desire knowledge of things;
and so it behooves him to exercise a praiseworthy restraint on this
desire, lest he seek knowledge immoderately: whereas on the part
of his bodily nature, man is inclined to avoid the trouble of seeking
knowledge. Accordingly, as regards the first inclination, studiousness is a kind of restraint, and it is in this sense that it is reckoned
a part of temperance. But as to the second inclination, this virtue
derives its praise from a certain keeness of interest in seeking
knowledge of things; and from this it takes its name. The former
is more essential to this virtue than the latter: since the desire to
know directly regards knowledge, to which studiousness is directed,
whereas the trouble of learning is an obstacle to knowledge, wherefore it is regarded by this virtue indirectly, as by that which
removes an obstacle.92
Doubtless more virtues could be listed as appearing like docility.
All virtues are so intimately connected that each helps the
other in some way and thus takes on some of its beauty and
comeliness. To enumerate them all would merely be to build
up straw men in order to knock them down. It is, of course,
true that all four of these virtues play a part in the perfect
functioning of docility. Something of this interaction will be
discussed later.

b. Docility and Its Sources of Information
Having considered what is essential to docility, we may add
one note of an accidental nature. Since docility is about learning from others, the question arises concerning its sources of
information. We have called the object of docility many times
by the simple designation of "teacher:" In doing this we do
not mean to make docility exclusively a classroom virtue. On
the contrary, the word "teacher" was used in a wide sense.
•• Summa Theol., II-II, q. 166, a. !l, ad 8.

THE VIRTUE

OF DOCILITY

607

Returning once again to the explicit treatment given docility
by St. Thomas, we read the following: " Hence in matters of
prudence man stands in very great need of being taught by
others, especially by old folk who have acquired a sane understanding of the ends in practical matters." 93 From Sylvius we
add a reason why old folks are particularly worthy to be consulted: " ... they have learned much both from great length
of time and many experiences." 94 Besides those whom years
have made wise, we have the scholars. Of them we read in St.
Thomas: " Man has a natural aptitude for docility even as
for other things connected with prudence . . . he must carefully, frequently and reverently apply his mind to the teachings
of the learned. . . ." 95 But not only the living are sources
of information. As to documents, Cajetan advises his reader:
" ... and attend how great a solicitude prudence demands for
the documents of the great. And add that docility calls forth
not only the records and suggestions of the great but also of
the lesser so that reason can perfectly discourse. And note that
negligence
contempt of
the living
now
96
dead is the mother of imprudence."
This distinction of dead
and living teachers was a favorite of Mortimer Adler in his
How to Read a Book. His observation from his article on
docility is of interest: " Books are instruments of instruction,
and obviously call for docility in those who would learn from
them, as much as living teachers do." 97 Hence docility is of
tremendous consequence to the student whether he is in the
· presence of a great teacher in the classroom or in the company
of a great book in his study. All the true sources of learning
merit the reverence and attention that are given by the docile
person.
Ibid., q. 49, a. 3.
Maxime indiget homo erudiri ab aliis, praesertim senibus, qui et temporis
diuturnitate, et multis experientiis plurima didicerunt. Franciscus Sylvius, Commentarium in Totam Secundam Secundae (Venice: 17)!6), III, 214.
95 Summa Theol., II-li, q. 49, a. 3, ad 2.
•• Cajetan, op. cit., li-U, q. 49, a. 3.
97 Adler, op. cit., p. 505.
93

94

5

608

RAYMOND SMITH

4.

THE PRoPERTIES

OF DociLITY

With the consideration of what pertains to the essence of
docility completed, we can now examine the properties that
flow from its nature. Every virtue has its special characteris_tics
and marks. Sylvius gives us a very general idea on this point
as regards our virtue: "Docility is called that by which anyone is prompt and ready in receiving discipline ... " 98 Of course
promptness and readiness are generic to all virtue. Yet in
docility they do take on a special significance. This importance
rests on the fact that the virtue of docility gives its possessor
two basic truths. First, he realizes that he owes a debt to his
teacher because of that person's excellence in learning; secondly,
he sees that as a pupil he is incapable of adequately paying this
debt. Impressed with these, the pupil does the one thing most
demonstrative of his appreciation for his teacher's efforts,
namely, he gives full cooperation to his instructor.
The attention that a student gives his professor is indicative of
his readiness and promptness for learning and is the first property of docility. Lack of attention would show not only a want
of interest in the subject taught but also a grave shortcoming
in the respect the teacher has a right to expect. Attention is
the act of the mind applying itself to some one thing. This
attention can be perfect or imperfect depending on whether the
pupil's intellect is intent on the object of consideration or remiss
in its application. 99 For the docile person there is, of course,
no alternative but to be attentive. The primary material object
of docility is the endeavor to establish the debt of equality
between the honor exhibited to the teacher and that teacher's
right to such consideration. There is no better way to attain
some degree of success in paying the debt due to the teacher
than for the pupil to be wholly intent on the exposition of
truth given by the teacher.
Two further properties of docility are evident from a statement of Msgr. Kerby: "Docility involves openness of mind
•• Sylvius, op. cit., p. !ll4.
•• Merkelbach, op. cit., II, 694-695.

THE VIRTUE

OF DOCILITY

609

and a certain hesitation in taking attitudes." 10 ° Certainly one
who closes his mind to an the founts of learning is incapable
of practising the virtue of docility. Hence one must listen to
his teacher or :read his book with the attitude of mind that
these sources of information have something worthwhile to
offer. When the reputation of a teacher or writer is well established then the pupil should have no fear in accepting the directives or facts that are offered. If the pupil lacks openness of
mind, all the efforts of the teacher are frustrated. In a word,
open-mindedness is the ready acceptance of the instruction
imparted by the teacher.
The hesitation that Msgr. Kerby mentions is not a pugnacious attitude but rather is indicative of the docile man's
realization of his need for guidance. He is uncertain and in a
state of cogitation. This reaction is found more in the college
and post-graduate student than in pupils of the grammar and
high school levels. These latter do not have the background
necessary for independent judgment and it is this trait in the
student
causes him some delay in accepting all the doctrine
presented to him. Hesitation is, therefore, not found
all
pupils but only in those already familiar with the field in
which they are receiving instruction. In
analysis, hesitation seems less a property and more an accidental circumstance
that sometimes finds its way into docility.
A final property of docility is submissiveness. Since the
teacher must be held in honor because of his excellence in
learning, the debt of reverence is always present in docility.
The prime motive and end of honor is reverence. 101 This reverence can only show itself by a fitting submission and a willing
acknowledgment of dependence on the teacher. Without submission and the awareness of dependence the honor exhibited
would be a mere external thing void of any meaning in the
pupil. The student, by docility, realizes that the teacher is
giving him the knowledge he lacks and thus the honor given
is the outward sign of the interior disposition to follow the
directions of the teacher in matters of learning.
10

° Kerby, op. cit., p. 146.

101

Merkelbach, op. cit., II, 435.

610

RAYMOND SMITH

Dr. Adler adds several other properties: "There is also an
element of gratitude in docility, responsive to the charity of
teaching; and an element of humility, because through docility
we are rightly ordered to superiors." 102 We can also add that
obedience, meekness, and studiosity, although not properties
In the strict sense, have integral roles to play in the virtue of
docility. These virtues have already been distinguished from
docility, yet their part in its perfect function remains to be seen.
Obedience helps to keep man's rational appetite, his will,
in proper rectitude towards his sources of knowledge. Since a
teacher is one who disciplines the mind of his pupil, of necessity he must give his students certain commands. If the student
is unwilling to obey the directive norms of the professor then
the efforts of the professor are nullified. The pupil is one
searching for truth. It is the task of the teacher to tell him
where to find it. A student who refuses to follow the suggestions
of the teacher is unreasonable in remaining in class. In the
course of studies the good student will encounter difficulties. It
is here that he especially needs the advice of a teacher. The
obedient student will carry out the methods advanced by his
teacher for solving intellectual problems. This simple intellectual obedience is crucial to the successful functioning of
docility. In its turn, docility makes the pupil attentive and
submissive and consequently makes reasonable the obedience
to the teacher that all discipline demands.
Meekness does the rectifying in man's irascible appetite.
Nothing is more disastrous to learning than an antagonistic
attitude toward the teacher on the part of the pupil. In such
an atmosphere, the classroom is turned into a gridiron whereon
the pupil is constantly attempting to steal the authority of the
teacher for himself. There is no objection to honest difficulties
and sincere requests for an exposition of some obscure point.
Rather, a problem arises when the pupil assumes a role of
equality or even of superiority and tries to match his imagined
talents against the genuine learning of the teacher. What the
10 "

Adler, op. cit., p. 504.

THE VIRTUE

OF DOCILITY

611

teacher should do is a matter of pedagogy, but what the pupil
obviously lacks is meekness. With such a lacuna in his virtuous life, docility would be impossible. Meekness, then,
moderates the impetuosity of youth in thinking that he knows
all the answers.
Humility, of course, strengthens docility's attitude of reverence, a point that has already been treated. Since humility is
a part of temperance it will have the moderating effect on
docility somewhat along the lines of meekness. 103 Both meekness and humility respect the irascible appetite. In checking
the individual's passion of hope, humility does the important
service for docility of keeping the pupil from depending too
much on his own efforts. Thus mindful of his limitations the
pupil is so much the better disposed to be attentive in class
because he realizes that such concentration will be his best
means for comprehending the subject being taught to him.
Finally, studiosity keeps aflame in the student the desire for
lmowledge. Learning at times entails a certain degree of drudgery. Laziness can be traced to man's
nature
the
impediment to learning that this causes is removed by studiousness. Yet primarily, this virtue annexed to temperance restrains the immoderate desire of seeking knowledge beyond
one's capacity. 104 It will be noticed that there is a certain
degree of overlapping in the influence of the virtues just treated
in the student's life. Their cumulative force, however, makes
docility's perfect exercise possible,
a. The Effects of Docility

i. In Daily Living
From the properties of docility and from the information on
the nature of this virtue, it is now possible to consider its
effects. In general it can be said that the field of docility is
as wide as is one's need for guidance. 105 The stranger in a new
Merkelbach, op. cit., ll, 970.
Ibid., p. 976.
105 "It is highly unlikely that we shall ever meet a man who is inferior to us

' 03
10 '

612

RAYMOND

SMITH

town can exercise the virtue in the presence of a twelve year
old child who gives him street directions. Since docility is
exhibited to persons of learning, then the most common place
for its flowering will be the classroom and, in the case of dead
teachers, in the company of books. Docility is in a sense the
sesame that opens the passage to learning. It removes the
stone that would block the progress of one's advance in
knowledge.
Specifically, the most important effect of docility is the intellectual formation that it gives the mind of the student. The
teacher molds the mind of his pupils. In the classroom not only
facts are explained but training of the intellect is afforded. It
cannot be denied that those taught the system of Aristotle, for
instance, and that of Schopenhauer are vastly different products when they leave school. Sometimes students remain
impervious to this important effect of docility either because
they receive no one definite kind of discipline or have minds
not quite capable of such precise formation.
it
A second effect of docility is the ease in learning
offers the pupil. Unable to conquer the vast field of learning
unaided, the student finds in the teacher one who is both a
guidepost and the travelling companion of his studies. The
teacher is a guidepost in his role of showing the direction in
which the pupil should go. This end in view is, of course,
truth. The teacher is the student's companion inasmuch as he
imparts knowledge to his pupil little by little and in proportion
to the student's intellectual ability. Likewise the teacher lessens
the burden of study. He directs the student to the best sources
of learning and relieves him of much of the weariness attached
to research. In short, docility makes it possible for students to
profit from the knowledge of others.
Considered in the pupil himself, one of the principal effects
of docility is its tranquilizing influence. It is said of St. Thomas
in every way; that is, in every man there will be some title to superiority on
the basis of which he has just claim to the payment we reserve for unpayable
debts, namely, honor and reverence, with a certain amount of subjection.'; Walter
Farrell, 0. P., "Virtues of the Household," The Thomist X (1947), p. 364.

THE VIRTUE OF DOCILITY

613

that, because of his huge physique and his reticence in class,
he gained the uncomplimentary nickname of " Dumb Ox." If
the fact of his non-loquaciousness is true, it would be but a
logical effect of docility. The docile pupil does not try to turn
the professor's lecture into a contest of matching wits. Not
that docility opposes questions from the pupiL It does, nevertheless, impose a momentary silence to allow time for grasping
the doctrine expounded rather than have one blurt out with a
thoughtless question. Docility also causes calmness in the pupil
from the fact that it removes the fear of error. The pupil who
feels himself being led by a competent guide l"an dismiss any
apprehensions of erring.
In reading books docility's role is of prime importance. It
is always possible to ask a professor to clarify his statement.
This is not so easy with the author of a book and often impossible if said author is deceased. In reading the great masters,
docility imposes an attitude of reverence on the student or the
scholar. 'the docile person reads a master bearing in mind that
he is trying to understand what the author has to teach.
Docility wards off the constant temptation of finding fault
with an accepted authority. It is easy to blame the author for
one's own lack of penetration. Docility both gives one the
determination to pursue one's study and restrains one from
dismissing a worthy author on flimsy grounds. This effect of
docility flows from its inherent note of justice towards others.
The virtue of docility is put to its severest test in the socalled Socratic method of pedagogy. Under this form of teaching, the pupil is led along by the teacher from what knowledge
the pupil already has acquired. The fund of information is
constantly challenged in order to make the pupil see its deeper
meaning. Under such duress, the pupil readily sees his own
shortcomings in so vivid a way that if he lacks docility he will
inevitably fall into a rebellious attitude toward his teacher.
He will become resentful of the embarrassing expose of his own
inadequacies. On the other hand, the student possessed of
docility will accept the exercise as a mental treat and a valuable means for giving him a more profound knowledge of what

614

RAYMOND

SMITH

he previously knew imperfectly while also opening the way to
new learning.
Docility is not the panacea to cure all the failures current in
teaching circles today. Along with the other virtues of justice,
however, it can do much to remedy the unfortunate state of
affairs now upon us. Docility is needed in the pupil if the
teacher is to have any success in conveying his matter. An
indocile pupil can raise an iron curtain as impenetrable as any
in the political order. Docility, on the other hand, makes the
task of teaching considerably lighter and is a source of encouragement to the teacher in his arduous task

ii. In the Spiritual Life
Docility to the Holy Ghost and aU the inspirations of God
pertains to a special aspect of that virtue. Although we eliminated an ex professo treatment of supernatural docility from
our present consideration, a few words on the relationship of
docility to spiritual direction is justified here. God communicates Himself to man through the ministry of man. Priests
by reason of ordination and canonical jurisdiction have the
task of sanctifying the faithful towards their supernatural end.
This includes not only gove:rning the members of the Church
but also the office of teaching. 106 There is, consequently, a
correspondent duty on the part of the faithful to be docile to
the priest.
The priest is particularly a teacher in the pulpit and the
confessionaL The Sunday instruction deserves a docile audience especially since such guidance as the priest gives in his
sermon has for its end supernatural life. In like manner, and
in some respects even more so, is this necessity for docility
true of confession. There the priest has the soul of an individual exposed to his judgment. With the special graces of
the Sacrament and the help of the Holy Ghost, the priest
advises the penitent as to a course of action in his spiritual
life. To fail in docility under such circumstances would be
'"" Prummer, op, cit., III, p. !i!79.

THE VIRTUE

OF DOCILITY

615

dangerous. Yet scrupulous persons are undoubtedly failing in
docility \vhen they cling to their own will in spite of the
superior knowledge and position of their spiritual director.
The need for docility toward ecclesiastical authorities is one
that should be stressed. The laity as a whole has a serious
obligation to follow the advice given by the Holy Father and
the other shepherds of souls. Pronouncements on labor, warnings against the dangers of materialism and the general pagan
atmosphere of the world are not only to be read by the faithful
but to be studied in a docile spirit. Disciplinary measures, the
reasons for which are not always readily available, require a
docile subject if they are to be effective. Suffice it to say on
this point of docility in the spiritual life that those who practise docility towards Church, parents, country, and teachers
have an excellent indication that it is :flourishing also in the
supernatural order under the Holy Ghost.

b. Vices Opposed to Docility
Every cloud has its silver lining, but each virtue manages to
find itself in competition with several opposing vices" The fact
that virtue stands in the middle 101 invariably leads to the
discussion of the vicious habits that lie in ambush on the side
of the road. In the case of docility there is no exception. There
are two extremes to which a man can go and therefore exceed
or fail to attain the mean of the virtue of docility.
The more obvious of these is indocility. Docility means paying the debt due to another for his learning; indocility refuses
the payment. It is not a question of not realizing another's
superiority and consequently one's inferiority. If one honestly
did not recognize the difference, then ignorance might excuse.
Indocility is present when an individual is very much appraised
of the true state of affairs but flatly refuses to act in the fitting
way about it. There is an air of self-sufficiency on the part of
the indocile person. However, his viciousness comes from his
failure to render to a man of learning what is his due. Such
101

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II, 6.

616

RAYMOND SMITH

accidental considerations as the personality of the teacher, the
type of print within the book are extrinsic to docility. Yet
these often form petty excuses for justifying indocility. The
man of knowledge has a special dignity from the very fact of
his erudition and the book has value from the truths that it
contains. The indocile person passes over these sources as
though they had no pertinency to his own progress in learning.
The person who is without docility is also lacking in gratitude, reverence, and submission to the source of learning. This
results from his bad attitude towards one who is capable of
teaching him. Since no one, in the ordinary run of things, is
ever intuitively endowed with all knowledge, docility towards
teachers is not an optional virtue. One cannot presuppose that
he knows everything or can learn all things on his own. Such
is patent folly and thus this deordination is rightly considered
to be a sin. It is against justice and we call it indocility.
Indocility has some interesting contrasts with docility.
Whereas the latter causes the pupil to be attentive, indocility
results in either an attitude of indifference or of a hostile,
fault-finding, perverted attention. Lack of interest will be
found in the lazy pupil who has little or no appreciation of his
obligation to perfect his intellect with truth or his will by
giving each man his due. Such a spirit of unconcern for his
teacher's efforts is negatively, at least, irreverent and ungrateful.
When a student is not slothful but adopts rather a certain
approach of tolerance and condescendence towards all sources
of learning, he readily becomes the eclectic. This is the great
intellectual compromiser. He refuses docility to all, has loyalties to none, and never fulfills his obligation in justice of giving
each man his due. The eclectic views himself as a liberal. He
conceives of himself as broadminded and not like the rest of
men who confine themselves to one stuffy system of thought
and thus stymie their mental progress. Without, in all probability, realizing it, the eclectic is too proud to be docile and too
lacking in perseverance to master any one school of thought.
He remains always the antique collector among thinkers,
gathering, as he does, into the storeroom of his mind the old

THE VIRTUE

OF DOCILITY

617

thoughts of various, and even conflicting, teachers. Like a
man without a country, he owes allegiance to no one. The
eclectic is the man who has discovered an intellectual jig-saw
puzzle whose parts can never be fitted together.
Another exponent of indocility is the skeptic. Included
under this heading are the agnostic, freethinker, and just plain
ordinary unbeliever. The skeptic questions the fundamental
doctrines of religion and philosophy and refuses to acknowledge
as valid the accepted conclusions of either. Docility is practically unknown to the skeptic. He has created in himself a
psychological block that prevents him from acquiring knowledge from others and limits himself, therefore, merely to
opinions freighted with doubts. By his very refusal to admit
man's ability to learn truth with certainty, the skeptic eliminates the possibility of having a debt to pay others as teachers
of truth. The skeptic particularly lacks the humility and meekness that are integral to docility if this virtue is to exist in the
individual.
At the other extreme from the vice of indocility, there is
slavery of the mind to a teacher. Actually one so afflicted is
not seeking to learn the truth but instead tries to learn or
parrot what another says. This vice is called subservience 108
and consists in an unreasonable submission to a person's genuine
or merely apparent excellence in doctrine. This defect from
docility offers difficulties not found in indocility. It has been
repeated frequently that docility fails to measure up to the
nature of justice because it camiot pay the full debt due to
the teacher. Subservience gives one the impression of paying
too much.
The question is less one of paying too much and more one
of rendering the honor and respect to the wrong individual.
It is the old story of robbing Peter in order to pay Paul. Not
every instrument of discipline is worthy of docility. Some who
occupy the seats of learning are not clothed with the robes of
pure truth. Although the pupil may not discover this immedi108

Adler, op. cit., p. 504.

618

RAYMOND

SMITH

ately, once the fact is known, then, of course, any obligation of
docility ceases. As shown above, docility does not make that
decision; this is left to the intellectual virtue involved in the
situation. Once this virtue has definite proof of incompetence,
then the pupil no longer owes docility to the pseudo-master.
Hence, the vice of subservience would occur in the case where a
person tenaciously submitted to one who had been proven
unworthy of honor as a teacher.
Yet what must be said of the pupil who goes to a :recognized
source of learning and acts like a sponge lapping up the waters
of wisdom? In other words, he merely accepts every conclusion
without any attempt to understand the premises. He is so awed
by the intellectual acumen of his master that he accepts everything proposed and commits it to memory considering himself
lucky to have discovered this royal road to knowledge. Obviously someone is being short-changed in this payment of the
debt of docility. Pertinent to this Mortimer Adler notes:
" ... for Catholic students, in contrast to those in our secular
subservience." 109
colleges, the motion should be away
Apparently Professor Adler found a supernatural hangover in
his Catholic students who, by reason of the gift of Faith,
assent to Divine Truth without hesitation. 110 Whether or not
Dr. Adler's analysis is correct is not at issue here. In any
event, whoever accepts truths knowable by the natural light
of reason on purely human authority when he is perfectly
capable of understanding them by his own effort is guilty of
subservience. Such an individual has opinion, not knowledgeo
He may even have a conviction but it is not intellectual, it
Ibid., p. 506.
no Perhaps Dr. Adler is a bit too generous in his evaluation of both Catholic
and secular students. It could be just a case of ordinary laziness that makes the
Catholic student so ready to accept all doctrine without dispute and the same vice
in secular students who simply do not bother to penetrate the doctrine presented
and find an easy out by rejecting it. If that is too stem a judgment, it is not
meant to be uncharitable. But the truth of the matter is that there are relatively
few good speculative minds in the world-and they would be the only ones who
would actually analyse each nugget of truth presented to the natural powers of
reason. For most pupils it is a case of the lecture going in one ear and out the other
and with just enough cramming at exam time to pass a mid-term or a finaL
109

THE VIRTUE OF DOCILITY

619

is volitional. The abuse of docility comes from the fact of
substituting it for the intellectual virtue by which the student
should have learned the subject of instruction.
We cannot, however, pass over this problem of subservience
without some further remarks. There is a vast difference in
approaching a teacher such as St. Thomas Aquinas and one of
the calibre of Karl Marx. The doctrine of St. Thomas has been
canonized, as it were, by the Church. The errors of Marx, on
the other- hand, have been
Thus, one goes to St.
Thomas as to a guide. One takes up Marx with a critical mind,
not a docile spirit. Any philosopher whose doctrine is infected
with error should be read only by those who have solid principles for judging what they read. Docility has no place here
in spite of the possibilities of discovering some truths among
the falsehoods. Purveyors of errors lack the excellence required
for docility. It would be intellectual idolatry to bow down
before the graven images of false science.
When one reads a master of knowledge such as St. Thomas,
if one fails to grasp at once certain truths, he would be most
rash to place the blame on St. Thomas instead of first trying
harder to understand what the Angelic Doctor said. Only
pygmy minds or intellectual midgets read the \intellectual great
with an attitude of trying to discover something wrong in their
works. These dwarfs of the classroom are indocile and have
completely gone to the extreme opposite of subservience. What
it comes down to is that they have accepted the teachings and
principles of no master ahd hence are matching their microscopic brains against the penetrating minds of the ages.
We conclude, therefore, that there are two vices opposed to
docility. That which is by reason of defect is named indocility,
while subservience designates the excess. of the mean of the
virtue. Indocility appears to be the more opposed to the virtue
because it completely eliminates any traces of docility and
successfully closes the door to learning from others which is,
after all, a greater fount of learning than one's own independent
efforts. Hence, indocility more extensively prevents our acquiring knowledge than does subservience. This latter vice imitates

620

RAYMOND

SMITH

docility and can, -when given to a good teacher, be the source
of learning. Yet, in this case, it cheats the student of his own
learning because it depends on human authority to a degree
that is detrimental to individual progress in knowledge.
c. .A.cquisition and Growth of Docility

When Cardinal Cajetan notes that docility is acquired and
not inborn, 111 he is but applying the familiar doctrine that
natural habits may have an innate tendency or beginning in
us but their perfection and growth only come with repeated
acts on our part. Of course, it is not here the question of the
infused virtues. Docility since it is a virtue will come into the
soul of the baptized along with the other virtues. Yet one's
development in this virtue will still be very much up to himself.
It is something he must work for if he lacks the predisposing
conditions that make its practise easy or else he must guard
it should he already have it, as it were, by nature.
Since docility has the notion of submission so closely bound
up with it, its acquisition and increase will normally proceed
along with the growth in humility. But even aside from that
fundamental virtue, another way of developing docility is to
meditate upon the impossibility of accomplishing anything
completely on one's own and at the same time on the many
sources of learning at one's disposal. This ends in humility
anyway, but it is a good preparation especially for one who
might have Cartesian inclinations toward doubting everything.
The Scholastic method and consequently that of the Summa
is an excellent indication of docility in act. First a question is
placed. The student is not certain of the answer or at least not
of the reasons. for the answer. Then the objections are presented in order, as it were, to convince the reader that without
the doctrine of the body of the article he would be at a loss to
solve the difficulties. In the Summa, by means of the Sed
Contra, St. Thomas usually cites some authority. And that is
sufficient to justify the reply/ 12 However, he does not stop
111
112

Cajetan, op. cit., 11-11, q. 49, a. 8.
e. g. Summa Tkeol., 1-U, q. 71, a. 6.

THE VIRTUE OF DOCILITY

here lest docility fall into subservience and the pupil become a
parrot instead of a man. The body of the article gives the intellect its opportunity to understand why the reply is what it is.
Docility does not, therefore, destroy the mind. It guides and
directs it. The student can spend as much time as is required
for mastering the reasons advanced in the response. He can
examine the proof. If he does this in a docile spirit then he can
accomplish much. The indocile person instead of trying to
understand what the writer says attempts to punch holes into
his doctrine. He is a faultfinder instead of a iruthfinder. In
the company of a master one can afford to be docile without
danger. Only in the case of false teachers does one read, if at
all, with a critical almost prejudiced mind constantly on guard
against intellectual booby traps. This latter state of mind is
hardly conducive to learning since it keeps the mind in· a constant state of trepidation. The concentration required for
learning is aided considerably if one can afford to study with a
docile mind. This is possible only in the presence of a true
professor and teacher of sound doctrine.
The horizon of docility will lessen as one advances in knowledge because he has fewer masters to whom he must pay a debt.
Yet no one will ever reach that state where doCility is without
use of function. Consequently, one should make constant efforts
at developing the virtue of docility. The man who is a consistent reader of intellectually superior books is strengthening
and intensifying his habit of docility. In philosophical journals,
in scientific periodicals, in business magazines, as well as in the
vast fields of specialized literature, the reader is challenged to
be docile in order that he may read the author's exposition
and arguments before judging the work. No one can be an
authority in every branch of learning and hence each has much
to gain from those who do know their subject well.
At no place perhaps is docility put to a more demanding test
than at the conference table. Docility is a virtue essential, for
example, to both labor and management if any rapprochement
is to be reached. Even in friendly discussions docility plays
its part. Many a person reads an item of interest but misses

RAYMOND SMITH

its significance. He can discover its meaning if he has the
docility to listen and learn from others. Indeed, the constant
and prolonged misunderstanding that exists between such
erudite men of learning as philosophers and scientists can in
part be traced to their mutual lack of docility. Each faction
is so anxious to assert its own position that they never give
their fellow intellectuals a chance to state theirs. Many an
apparent Gordian knot among men of learning can be broken
by the simple process of all becoming docile.
Conclusion

The docile man is singularly blessed, for he is learning something every day of his life. St. Paul wrote: " For since the
creation His invisible attributes are clearly seen . . . being
understood through the things that are made." 113 Nature is
shouting to man that there is a God, but if man is lacking
docility he will not learn this great truth. Hence of such an
indocile individual can it be said: " The fool said in his heart:
There is no God." 114
For the man who already believes and acknowledges the
existence of God, docility will deepen the knowledge and
strengthen the conviction of the Divine reality. In some ways
the docile man becomes like the poet. This latter person sees
not something old and routine each day but something new
and fresh even though his eyes have seen the same object
many times. The poet knows that we can never fully explore
the nature of any created thing. That is why every object is
always full of adventure for him. The docile man, without
necessarily becoming a poet,· does become poetical and turns
the hum-drum, lifelong acceptance of daily experience into a
thrilling revelation of truth.
Every creature, every action, every incident of the day contains a cargo of truths. To one who views life in this way,
the exercise of the virtq.e of docility is not confined to the four
walls of a classroom or the two covers of a book. Rather the
118

Romans 1 : !!0.

110

Psalms 6!! :1.

THE VIRTUE

OF DOCILITY

whole day is a perpetual opportunity to grow in docility. This
is significant. All nature is a mirror of the perfections of God.
Man is made to the image of God. Now since grace perfects
nature, it follows that in the supernatural order docility is of
prime importance since it is of such great value in the natural
order. Unlike faith which changes to vision, docility will always
remain because man can never pay the debt that docility sets
out to render. Therefore the docile man is actually preparing
himself for complete submission to the Holy Ghost and consequently the highest degree of docility in heaven.
Man's final beatitude will consist in the contemplation of
Eternal Truth. Then the beatified will perceive how important
docility was in human life. In subjecting himself to all sources
of truth, the docile man was in reality submitting also to
Infinite Truth, the Fount of aU true knowledge. By the· time
man attains to heaven docility will have so become a part of
him that learning from others will be one of the accidental joys
of heaven just as learning from God win be its essence.
RAYMOND SMITH,

Dominican House of l'huosophy,
Springfield, Kentucky

6

0. P.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CURRENT CRITICISMS OF THE SYLLOGISM
I. Is THE SYLLOGISM
DEDUCTIVE

FuNDAMENTAL

To

INFERENCE.

ITH respect to the syllogism, Prof. Lewis has spoken
with both assurance and finality: "To regard the
syllogism as indispensable, or as reasoning par excellence, is the apotheosis of stupidity." 1
The applicability of this apparent judgment from on high
would seem to be unmistakable. For so far as these present
essays are concerned, 2 one corollary of the conclusions reached
thus far would certainly be that there is no form of deductive
argument or ·demonstration but what is ultimately dependent
on the syllogism.
Thus in our first paper we tried to show that of the two
possible varieties of propositional composition, the conjunctive and the implicative, it is simply impossible to describe or
account for implicative compounds on a truth-functional basis.
And the reason such a thing is impossible is because the connection between the component propositions in any such compound is in no wise dependent upon the mere truth or falsity
of the propositions thus combined. Instead, the connection in
most cases 3 depends upon the mediation between two extreme
terms by a third or middle term.
Nevertheless, the grounds for this last point will doubtless
bear recapitulation. Thus it will be. remembered how in de1 Lewis, C. 1, "A Survey of Symbolic Logic,"
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1918), pp. l-2.
2 Previous articles in this series are "Aristotelian
and Mathematical Logic," The
Thomist, XIII (Jan. 1950), pp. 50-96, and "Basic Confusions in Current Notions
of Propositional Calculi," XIV (April 1951), pp. 238-258.
3 i.e. in all cases in which it is not a question of either an inductive
or an
immediate inference.

624

CURRENT

CRITICISMS

OF THE SYLLOGISM

625

scribing so-called implicative compounds, we pointed out that
there were really two kinds of them, hypothetical compounds
and categorical compounds. Of the latter, those that were
most properly implicative were the so-called causal propositions. On the other hand, the hypotheticals were represented
by conditionals and disjunctives. Now all of these compounds
being implicative in character, there must necessarily be in
each of them an implicative relationship between one proposition functioning as antecedent and another functioning as
consequent (i. e. between premise and conclusion) .4
But in virtue of what may the antecedent in such instances
be said to t'mply the conclusion? There are three possible
alternatives. It may be that the antecedent provides inductive
evidence of the consequent or conclusion. Or it may be that the
consequent is not a conclusion from the antecedent at all, but
only a different way of stating the same thing, an " immediate
inference," in other words. Or :finally, it may be that the antecedent contains, either implicitly or explicitly, a middle term
that mediates between the subject and predicate term of
consequent-in which case the whole conditional or causal
proposition would really be in the nature of an enthymeme. 5
Now of these three alternatives, the first is obviously not
relevant to our present concerns. As for the second, it does
not so much invalidate our thesis as confirm it-the thesis,
namely, that all deductive inference is syllogistic. In fact, as
we were at such pains to try to show in our second paper, an
immediate inference does not :represent an inference from a
proposition but rather a property of a proposition. 6 And if we
• This summary statement would, of course, have to be amplified somewhat in
order to fit the case of disjunctive propositions. Cf. " Aristotelian and Mathematical Logic," loc. cit., pp. 67-68.
5 Cf. the fuller discussion of this in our first paper, loc. cit., pp. 74-79.
• Indeed, the point would seem to be that when the same notions or concepts
come into play in the two cases, then immediate inferences may be seen to involve
a difference of " intention " as compared with mediate inferences. Thus, for
example, when one asserts that if virtue is knowl.,dge, it can be taught, what
one is talking about or intending are real natures or essences of things, viz. virtue,
On the other hand, let one assert that if, since
knowledge, and teachability.
virtue is knowledge, it can be taught, therefore if virtue can't be taught, it isn't

626

HENRY VEATCH

want to prove or demonstrate such a property actually to be a
property of a given proposition, our proof would invariably
seem to be syllogistic. 7
Accordingly, inductive inferences being not relevant, and
immediate inferences being shown to constitute no exception,
it follows that in any implicative compound involving a deductive relationship between antecedent and consequent, the
former will always be found to imply the latter in virtue of
some third or middle term which mediates between the two
terms of the consequent.
Moreover, what was thus set forth in our first paper-viz.
that all deductive inference must be syllogistic-was further
confirmed by the argument of the second paper. For
examining the theorems of the propositional calculus, we found
that far from representing a tremendous variety of types and
patterns of inference, these theorems were not properly representative of forms of inference at all. Rather they for the most
part did no more than exhibit the properties of various kinds
of compound propositions. And in the few instances in which
theorems were found that were representative of genuine types
of inference, these theorems, when closely examined, did not
seem properly to belong to a propositional calculus at alL Besides, the patterns of inference displayed in such theorems were
all of them based upon the principle of a mediation of two
·terms by a third, 8
Quite unmistakably, therefore, the whole of our argument
up to now would but serve to underscore the ancient Aristotelian contention that any sort of deductive proof or demonknowledge. In such a case, what is intended are not the real natures or essences
as mch but mther the propositions in which these natures !!Xe considered. In
short, the difference turns on the fact that in the one instance we are considering
objects of first intention and in the other objects of second intention.
7 We !!Xe referring, of course, to the proofs by so-called "substitution"
and by
modus ponens. For a discussion of these, cf. "Aristotelian and Mathematical Logic,"
loc. cit., pp. 85-87.
8 For instance, p ::J q · q ::J r: ::J • p ::J r obviously involves a polysyllogism. Cf.
our first paper, loc. cit., pp. 77-79. On the other hand, the syllogistic character
of p · p ::J q : ::J • q we have already exhibited in the preceding paper, "Basic
Confusions in Current Notions of Propositional Calculi," loc. cit., p. £48.

CURRENT

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OF THE SYLLOGISM

stration must perforce rest upon a procedure of mediating
between two extreme terms by a third or middle term. Accordingly, so far as Prof. Lewis is concerned, we have the choice
either of regarding him as having been at once over-confident
and confused, or of regarding ourselves as having indulged in
an apotheosis of stupidity. Peculiarly enough, our preference
is for the former rather than for the latter alternative.

IT. THE SYLLOGISM AS VIEWED BY THE MATHEMATICAL
LOGICIANS

But leaving admissions of temerity aside, our immediate
business now is that of explaining how such confidence and
confusion in regard to the syllogism could ever have arisen in
the mind of Prof. Lewis, or for that matter of any other mathematical logician. Why is it, in other words, that mathematical
logicians should have come to regard the syllogism as being
only one among many possible types of inference, and a comparatively insignificant type at that?
Already a partial answer to this q_uestion has been suggested
by the discussion of the preceding paper. For having regarded
all the manifold theorems of their propositional calculi merely
as so many different " validating forms of inference," 9 it is
little wonder that the mathematical logicians should have
derided unmercifully the claim of the Aristotelians that the
syllogism was the one and only basic form of deductive inference. But now that we have exposed these presumed validating
forms of inference and shown that they are not forms of inference at all, but rather mere " immediate inferences," may
we accordingly expect that Prof. Lewis et al. will graciously
defer to the power of argument and admit that it is not we who
have been stupid, so much as they who have been mistaken?
Hardly! For the issue is really not so simple. On the contrary, a mathematical logician such as Prof. Lewis would
probably throw out the whole of our argument in this con·
• This phrase, borrowed from Whitehead, is used extensively by Eaton, General
p.

Logic (New York,

628

HENRY VEATCH

nection simply because he would not recognize any such distinction between mediate and immediate inference as the one
we have tried to draw. Thus it will be remembered that following Maritain we said 10 that mediate inference always involves
an attempt to prove or demonstrate a new truth, whereas
immediate inference never involves more than an attempt to
state exactly the same truth over again in a different way. In
short, mediate inference is supposed to lead us to new knowledge, whereas immediate inference leads only to a new propositional formulation of what we already know.
But now so far as the mathematical logicians are concerned,
it would be difficult to find any of them who would admit that
deductive inference ever leads to such a thing as new knowledge. On the contrary, any deduction, they would say, the
minute one considers th principle on which it is based, will
be seen to involve nothing more o:r less than merely saying
over again in the conclusion what has already been laid down
in the premises. In this sense, the relation of conclusion to
premises in a syllogism, for example, is held to be like the
relation of predicate to subject in a so-called analytic proposition. In other words, the whole thing is a mere tautology in
the more usual and literal sense of that word.
Thus consider how Prof. I.ewis would put the matter:
the tautology of any law of logic is merely a special case of the
general principle that what is true by definition cannot conceivably
be false: it merely explicates, or follows from, a meaning which
has been assigned, and requires nothing in particular about the
universe or the facts of nature. Thus any logical principle (and,
in fact, any other truth which can be certified by logic alone) is
tautological in the sense that it is an analytic proposition. 11

Accordingly, such being Prof. Lewis' general understanding
of the nature of deductive inference, one may readily guess how
Prof. Lewis views the syllogism. Its treatment, of course, comes
under the algebra of classes; and as an inseparable concomitant
1

° Cf. " Basic Confusions ... ," loc. cit., p. 242 ff.

Lewis and Langford, Symbolic Logic (New York:
p. 211.
11

The Century Co., 1932),

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of the algebra there are the familiar Venn diagrams. Thus, for
example, consider a third figure syllogism of the mood I A 1:
Some a is c
Allaisb
Some b is c
This may be represented in a Venn diagram thus:

b

a

c
Now Prof. Lewis comments on this as follows:
This asterisk in the compartment a b c could be read ' Some a is
b ' or ' Some a is c ' or ' Some things are a, b, and c, all three,' as
well as ' Some b is c.' All of these conclusions, as a fact, follow
from the given premises. The syllogistic conclusion, is simply one
of the conclusions which the premises give; namely, that one which
meets two extra-logical requirements: (1) it follows from neither
premise alone, and (!'l) it does not involve the middle term, common
to the two premises . . .
The only further point involved is, in some cases, to remember
that an equation or an inequation can be read in more than one
way: for example a-b = 0 is 'No a is not-b' and 'No no-b is a,'
as well as 1 All a is b; and ab =/= 0 is ' Some b is a ' as well as ' Some
a is b.' Attention to these alternative readings will reveal the
fact that there are certain valid forms of syllogistic inference
which are not included amongst the traditional moods and figures
-but that point is not particularly
12

Ibid., p. 58.

630

HENRY VEATCH

Finally, several pages later Prof. Lewis adds this further observation which is also relevant to our purposes:
There is one point of considerable theoretical importance concerning which the algebra leaves no possible doubt: there is no
such thing as the conclusion from any premise or any set of
premises; given any premises whatever, there are an infinite number
of conclusions which may validly be drawn. This is an unavoidable
consequence of Poretsky's Law of Forms. 13

Quite obviously in this analysis of the syllogism the distinction between mediate and immediate inference is disregarded
entirely. As a consequence, there is no one conclusion which
the syllogism may be regarded as proving; rather there is a
whole infinity of propositions which one could formulate, and
which would none of them be conclusions in the proper sense
but rather mere variant ways of describing the basic situation
exhibited in the Venn diagram.
Moreover, the root of this disregard of the distinction between mediate and immediate inference, would seem to be
traceable to the fact that on such an analysis of the syllogism
there can be no question of arriving at new knowledge from
already known premises. For everything, including the conclusion, is in a sense already known: it is already there and
out on the table, so to speak, in the Venn diagram. Thus nothing is proved or demonstrated by a syllogism; instead, given a
certain set of facts, countless numbers of propositions can be
worked out that will be descriptive of that same given set of
facts.
So understood, it is quite obvious that the syllogism can
in no wise claim to be the sole form or pattern of deductive
inference. In fact, so understood, one may well wonder whether
the syllogism has anything to do with inference at all, in the
sense in which we have taken it. For if inference be supposed
to be a process of proof or demonstration of something new
from what we already know, it is clear that, as conceived by
Prof. Lewis, the syllogism performs no such function. Very
18

Ibid., p. 70.

CUIUiENT

CRITICISMS

OF THE SYLLOGISM

631

well, then, we can only conclude that Aristotle's understanding
of the syllogism and, for that matter, of deductive inference
itself must have been very different from Prof. Lewis. But
how may the character of this difference be brought into focus?

III.

CRITICISMs

oF THE SYLLOGISM

FUSION OF Ens AND

THAT INVOLVE A CoN-

Ens Rationis

Perhaps the best way to bring out the difference between the
Aristotelian view of the syllogism and more recent treatments
of it would be to remind ourselves once more of the so-called
intentional character of Aristotelian logic. For with this in
mind, it should be clear that from the Aristotelian point of view
Prof. Lewis' treatment of inference and of the syllogism really
has nothing to
with logic at all; in fact, Prof. Lewis isn't
even talking about the syllogism or about inference in the
Aristotelian sense. And the reason Prof. Lewis' investigations
must seem to an Aristotelian to be so wide of the mark is
because what Prof. Lewis is dealing with are manifestly objects
first intention, whereas logic is concerned only
objects
of second intention. In short, his error, like that of all the
mathematical logicians, would seem to He in a very serious
metaphysical confusion of real being with logical being, of
ens with ens rationis.
But to support these contentions, suppose we proceed in some
such fashion as this. Thus take the syllogism as it is to be
understood from the Aristotelian point of view. As such, it is
not anything real at all: ' it neither exists nor is capable of
existing in rerum natura. Instead, it is a mere being of reason,
like a proposition or a definition or a concept or any other
logical entity whatsoever. And yet, though not real itself, the
syllogism is a means or instrument by which we can come to
know and understand real things. In short, the syllogism is an
object of second intention, though an instrument of first intention.14
14 Of course, this does not mean to imply that it could not be used as an
instrument of second intention also. Thus we use logic in order to know about
logic itself.

HENRY VEATCH

Accordingly, the syllogism being only a being of reason and
not a real being, one must never confuse the order and connection of parts within the- syllogism with the order and connection of parts among real things in rerum natura. Thus to
take just one illustration, consider the example which we used
in our first paper:
Any two angles having the same supplementary angle
in common are equal.
The two opposite angles of intersecting straight lines
have the same supplementary angle in common.
The opposite angles are equal.
This syllogism is made up of three terms or concepts: (1) the
notion of the opposite angles of two intersecting straight lines;
the notion of equality; (8) the notion of two angles having
the same supplementary angle in common.
Now these three notions are all distinct in our minds and
then are joined together in
three propositions and in the
argument as a whole. But their juncture, no less than their
separation, is effected intellectually and in the mind.
In other words, the real things signified by these three
notions are not thus separated from one another and then
joined together in reality and in rerum natura. Instead, any
real instance of opposite interior angles of intersecting straight
lines is never really separate and distinct from the equality
of such angles. Nor, likewise, do such angles ever exist separately and apart from the fact of their having a common
supplementary angle. On the contrary, in reality and in rerum
natura there is simply a unity; and only intellectually and in
the mind are these things separated from one another and
then joined again in propositions and arguments/ 5
Similarly, so far as our knowledge and understanding go, we
may first know that the opposite interior angles do have the
same supplementary angle, and only later come to realize that
15 Cf. Aquinas' succinct statement of this, Summa Theol., I-II, q. 27, a. 2, ad 2:
Knowledge belongs to the reason, whose function it is to distinguish things which
in reality are united, and to unite together, after a fashion, things that are
distinct, by comparing one with another.

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for that very reason these two angles must be equaL On the
other hand, so far as the real order of things is concerned it
is obviously not the case that the opposite interior angles first
come to have the same supplementary angle and only later
come to be equal,16
Accordingly, returning to Prof. Lewis' analysis of the syllogism, we should be able to understand a little more clearly just
why such an analysis may be said to involve a confusion of
ens rationis with ens. For interpreting the terms of a syllogism
as classes and then illustrating the relations between these
classes by means of the Venn diagTams, Prot Lewis seems to
have fallen into the trap of confusing the logical relations
between the concepts with the real relations between the
circular areas of the diagram.
Thus in the diagram itself, of course, there are no premises
or conclusion; in fact, there just isn't any proof at all. Indeed,
if in the real diagram anything is prior to anything else, it certainly is not prior in the way in which premises are prior to
a conclusion. Instead, there are merely the three circular areas
and their mutual interrelations. And these interrelationships
in turn are susceptible of description through an infinity of
propositions. 17
Little wonder, then, that Prof. Lewis in the example cited
should have said that "Some a is b" or "Some a is c" or
" Some things are a, b, and c, all three " are just as much
" conclusions " as " some b is c." Presumably what he must
have meant by this is that the facts described by these various
propositions are all of them alike embraced by the original
geometrical situation exhibited in the diagram. In consequence,
when so regarded, these propositions are none of them, strictly
speaking, conclusions, simply because there hasn't been any
proof. Instead, all that has happened is a mere reading off of
interrelationships revealed in the diagram. 18
Of course, this must not be taken as excluding a real causal priority in things.
Assuming, that is, the soundness of Poretsky's law.
18 It might
be objected that this distinction which we are trying to draw
between the way the mathematical logicians view the syllogism and the way
16

17

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HENRY VEATCH

Indeed, this point has been made quite sharply, even if perhaps somewhat unwittingly and na'ively by Prof. Quine. Thus
in discussing the use of the Venn diagrams, he says:

In order to check the validity of a syllogism by diagrams, three
overlapping circles are used (as in Diagrams 5 et seq.) to represent
the three terms ' F,' ' G,' and ' H,' of the syllogism. We enter the
content of the two premisses in the diagram by the method explained in connection with Diagrams 1-4, and then we inspect the
diagram to see whether the content of the conclusion has automatically appeared in the diagram as a result of entering the two
premises. This is all there is to the method. 19
Now, of course, even though as so described, these" conclusions " have not been proved, but merely exhibited, there is no
reason why they could not be proved. After all, what one is
dealing with here are simply geometrical areas. Consequently,
just as ordinary propositions in geometry can be proved by
the Aristotelians view it really turns on the distinction between logic and psychology. Thus as Prof. Lewis himself has remarked (Suroey, p. 1):
The reasons for the syllogistic form are psychological, not logical: the
syllogism, made up of the smallest number of propositions (three), each
with the smallest number of terms (two), by which any generality of
reasoning can be attained, represents the limitations of human attention,
not logical necessity. (For a further discussion of the same point, cf. ibid.
pp. 198-!!01).
Unfortunately, however, this attempt to relegate the Aristotelian treatment of
the syllogism, and for that matter Aristotelian logic generally, to the realm of
mere psychology simply will not bear scrutiny. In the first place, those who have
come forward with this suggestion have seemingly never taken the trouble themselves to present a real philosophical account of the precise nature of the distinction
between logic and psychology. And in the second place, so far as the Aristotelians
are concerned, it is clear that psychology being a natural science, what is studied
in such a science are real events and happeningS in nature. In other words, the
science ofpsychology involves a concern with first intentions, rather than with
second intentions. Aceordingly, in the light of all that we have said about
Aristotelian logic's exclusive concern with entia rationis and second intentions, it
is simply incredible that anyone should suppose the Aristotelians to have confused
logic with psychology.
Nevertheless, an adequate treatment of this whole question of the relation logic
and psychology, as it is under$tood by the mathematical logicans on the one hand
and by the Aristotelians on the other, would lie quite beyond the confines of this
present essay.
19 A Short Course in Logic (Cambridge, 1946), p. 86 mimeographed. Our italics.

CURRENT

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635

regular syllogistic demonstration, so also these propositions
pertaining to the interrelationships between the areas of the
Venn diagrams should be subject to syllogistic demonstration.
Of course, in such a case we should not be demonstrating anything about logic or logical entities (objects of second intention) , but rather our demonstration would be about ordinary
objects of first intention (in this case, over-lapping surface
areas).
And yet such is not the way the mathematical logicians
regard the Venn diagrams: they do not think of them as
merely representing a certain subject matter that logical inferences may be about; no, they suppose them to represent
these inferences themselves. In other words, the confusion
that is involved here is as subtle as it is complex. But still
there is no reason why it cannot be disentangled and exposed
to full view.
Thus to begin with, let us :recognize that there is a distinction between ens and ens rationis, between objects of first
intention and objects of second intention. Next, let us :recognize
that the proper concern of logic is with objects of the second
type and not of the first. Third, let us :recognize that logic,
being thus concerned with these entia rationis, will inevitably
involve drawing distinctions between things that are really
united or uniting things that are really distinct. For instance,
concepts may be distinguished from one another, even though
the things they signify are really one. Or again, a proposition
may follow other propositions, even though the fact which
the proposition signifies does not occur in rerum natura after
the fact signified by the other propositions.
But now, being quite indifferent to First Philosophy, the
mathematical logicians have paid no attention to considerations of this sort. Instead, plunging right into a furious
business with terms and propositions and what not, they seem
scarcely to have stopped to consider what sort of things it was
they were dealing with. In consequence, they have taken those
traditional logical entities known as terms and concepts and
have treated them simply as classes; and these classes, then,

636

HENRY VEATCH

and their interrelations they have proceeded to represent by
means of Euler's circles or Venn's diagrams. Finally, by a
subtle confusion of the illustration with the illustrated, the
original logical entities or beings of reason, viz, terms or concepts, have come to be transformed into real beings, viz. circular surface areas. 20
In consequence, the fact is quite forgotten that logical
::elations between terms may be very different from real relations between circles. And so it is that the syllogism could come
to be regarded as not being a means of proof in the old sense
at all. Indeed, how could the syllogism possibly be an instrument of demonstration, if it no longer involve the mediation of
two terms by a third? But clearly, when the syllogism itself is
identified with the Venn diagram representing it, there is no
mediation involved in it whatsoever. In othe:r words, in such
a case the confusion of en8 rationis with ens, or logic with
mathematics, is complete. 21

IV.

THE THEORY

CoNFUSION

oF RELATIONs:

A FuRTHER

EXAMPLE

OF

IN REGARD TO THE Being OF LoGICAL ENTITIES

But with this, we find that our argument in this present
paper would seem to be pointing to much the same conclusion
as ou:r argument in the first paper-the conclusion namely,
that mathematical logic, despite its impressive and elaborate
superstructure, is none-the-less erected upon a very serious
metaphysical confusion of ens with ens rationis. Thus in our
first paper we reached this conclusion in the course of our
examination of the truth-functional interpretation of propo20 Needless to say, this particular
discussion of the syllogism only serves to raise
the more general question of the significance and legitimacy of such a thing as
the algebra of classes. However, this question lies beyond the scope of our present
investigation.
Cf .. our earlier discussions, " Concerning the Ontological Status of
Logical Forms," The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. II, no. 6 (December 1948), 40-64;
also Intentional Logic (New Haven, 1952), pp. ll6-lll'7.
21 This statement
presupposes the validity of the Aristotelian account of the
nature of mathematics, an account which is certainly not widely recognized today.
Cf. our earlier remarks on this point, "Aristotelian and Mathematical Logic,"
loc. cit., p. 95.

CURRENT

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637

Indeed, we found that to interpret
sitional composition,
propositions truth-functionally was in effect to remove the
inescapably intentional character of propositions and thereby
to transform these logical entities into objects of first intention-in other words, a confusion of ens rationis with ens, And
now a similar conclusion has emerged from our investigation
of the syllogism and its attempted interpretation by means
of the class calculus and the Venn diagrams. For the effect
of such an interpretation was, as we saw, to transform logical
entities like terms or concepts into real entities like circular
areas, Once more, the confusion was one of ens rationis with ens,
Moreover, the position of Prof. Lewis in this whole situation
would seem to be a peculiarly anomalous one. Thus
nizing the inadequacy of a merely truth-functional interpretation of propositional compounds, Prof. Lewis by his calculus
of strict implication would seem to bid fair to avoid the error
of eradicating the intentional character of propositions. His
propositions do still seem to be propositions, and not some
wholly different object of first intention. On the other hand,
because he has fallen into the common error of all the mathematical logicians in his interpretation of the syllogism, he
seems to have completely misunderstood the nature of inference and proof; and in consequence. while his propositional
calculus is truly a calculus of propositions, it is none-the-less
vitiated by an apparently total ignorance of the significance
of the distinction between mediate and immediate inference, or
better, between a
pattern of inference on the one hand
and a mere determination of the properties of propositions on
the other,
And lest it be supposed that we have merely hit upon isolated
and exceptional instances of this metaphysical confusion of
ens and ens rationis on the part of the mathematical logicians,
we might also call attention in passing to still another example
of such confusion, although there is obviously neither time nor
space to discuss it in any detail here. This example is drawn
from the theory of relations, As is well known, the calculus of
relations, like the calculus of classes, is regarded as a most

638

HENRY VEATCH

important part of the whole development of mathematical
logic. Indeed, some logicians would regard it not as a mere
part, but rather as capable of embracing the whole of logic,
so that on such a view the appropriate name for logic would
not be so much mathematical logic or symbolic logic, but rather
relational logic. Moreover, for a rather glowing account of the
possibilities of logic as so conceived, we might cite a passage
from Eaton:
Since logic is necessarily abstract, it is possible that the definition we have given is not abstract enough. The notions of
' proposition ' and ' valid inference ' may not be relevant to a logic
of the most general form. Anything that can be called a system oj
entities, whether these entities be propositions, geometrical points,
tables, chairs, electrons, or numbers, has a structure; (what is
meant by structure would need to be carefully defined;) and we
can study the general features of system-structure in abstraction
from all particular subject-matters. Logic may be the science of
possible systems viewed merely as types of structure. Such a science
would not necessarily deal with propositions and inferences; a
system of propositional relationships would be a special case of
some more general type of structure, which might be exemplified
by other entities than propositions. This logic would enable us to
construct conceptual ' maps ' in the most abstract possible terms
of all that might be, without regard to whether or not these ' maps '
corresponded to anything real. It would be the sort of logic that
Leibniz's God might have employed in shaping the most general
outlines of his possible worlds. We mention this conception of logic
as indicating a direction, already suggested by the work of certain
mathematicians and logicians, which logical study may take in
the future. 22

Now as a piece of rhetoric, this passage may be rather unusual, at least for a logic text. But as a description of logic,
it reveals all too clearly the serious confusion of ens and ens
rationis which any su.ch logic of relations must necessarily
entail. For after all, some relations. and structures are real,
whereas others are mere logical relations or beings of reason.
•• Op. cit., p. 11. Eaton adds in a footnote, "The postulational methods of
Peano, Hilbert, and Huntington suggest such a view of logic, and it seems also
to be the conception which lies behind the work of Mr. H. M. Sheffer."

CURRENT

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639

For instance, relations like " greater than," " north of," " father
of," " similar
are real relations, capable of hqlding
between real thmgs tn rerum natma. On the other hand, the
relation of a predicate to a subject, or of a proposition to its
contrapositive, of a middle term to two extreme terms-these
are all mere relations of reason, which neither exist nor are
capable of existing between real things in rerum natma.
Moreover, to treat these relations of reason as if they were
homogeneous with real relations, or the real relations as if
they were of the same sort as relations of reason-such treatment, involving as it does a confusion of ens and ens rationis,
is bound to have disastrous consequences in any attempt at
understanding logical relations, just as we have seen it to have
in attempts at understanding logical propositions and classes.23
For instance, let us take just one concrete case in order to
see how such a confusion may manifest itself in the domain
of relations. Thus if we turn to Cohen and Nagel's text book
we find a short paragraph devoted to the discussion of so-called
" inference by Converse Relation ":
If Chicago is west of New York we may validly infer that New
York is east of Chicago; if Socrates was a teacher of Plato we may
••It may perhaps have occurred to the reader that this whole argument in a
sense may seem to be beside the point. For to judge from the quotation from
Eaton, it would hardly seem accurate to suggest that all mathematical logicians
have simply confused ens and ens rationis. On the contrary, one might say that
the relational logicians, so far from confusing the two, have rather been cOncerned
with abstracting from the specific differences of each, in order to construct a logic
of such generalized types of order as to be applicable to either entia or entia
rationis.
To this the answer is that there just is no genus which is capable of embracing
both ens and ens rationis as species. And to suppose that there is such ai genus is
but to commit the common, but none-the-less serious, metaphysical blunder of
treating univocally that which can only be handled analogously. Nevertheless,
there is obviously no time in this present study to defend and explain this point
of First Philosophy. Suffice it to say here that simply from our examples and
illustrations the reader may recognize how extremely dubious it is to talk about
that are to be considered neither as objects of first intention nor as
objects of second intention, neither as entia nor as entia rationis. Indeed, every
attempt to do so will in the concrete case turn out to be in no wise an abstraction
from both, but rather a confounding of both and a consequent surreptitious and
vicious reduction of the one to the other.

7

640

HENRY VEATCH

infer that Plato was a pupil of Socrates; if Seven is greater than
five we may infer that Five is less than seven. In each of these
pairs of propositions the two are equivalent. Such inferences are
of the form: If a stands to b in a certain relation, b stands to a
in the converse relation. 24
Now the interesting thing about this is that if we keep in
mind the distinction between ens and ens rationis, or that
between first intentions and second intentions, it should be
immediately obvious that a consideration of such relations as
are here cited has nothing to do with logic at alL Quite the
contrary, being " to the west of," or being " a pupil of," or
being "greater than'' represent real :relations and as such are
properly objects of first intention rather than of second intention. In fact, how do we know that if xis west of y, then y is
east of x? Certainly not from logic, but rather from a study
of the world of nature. On the other hand, if we want to know
whether pvq, implies qvp, it is clear that we must learn this
not from the study of nature, but rather from the study of
those beings of :reason known as propositions.
In other words, the convertibility of certain logical entities
such as propositions or terms in a proposition must in no wise
be confused with what has traditionally been called the mutuality 25 of certain real relations in rerum natura. This would
be the same sort of thing as confusing logical terms or concepts
with circular surface areas in geometry.
Of course, this does not imply that these so-called real relations may not be legitimately and fruitfully investigated. On
the contrary, one might very well abstract them from the
material conditions in which they exist and so proceed to order
them with genuine scientific rigor, demonstrating their various
properties and deducing certain ones from others that are prior
and more fundamentaL In this way the study of relations
might turn out to be a very important branch of mathematics. 26
,. An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method (New York, 1934), p. 63.
25 Cf. Gredt, Elementa Philosophiae, I
(Freiberg: Herder, 1937), p. 155.
26 On this
view of mathematics, cf. "Aristotelian and Mathematical Logic,"
lac. cit., p. 96.

CURRENT

CRITICISMS

OF THE SYLLOGISM

641

And yet for all that, it should certainly not be confused with
logic, inasmuch as its concern would perforce be with entia,
whereas logic's is with entia rationis.
With this, then, we may conclude this comparative examination and appraisal of Aristotelian logic and mathematical logic.
Not that such an examination has been by any means complete;
rather it has been really no more than begun. And yet from
such beginnings it is hoped that one can see that traditional
Aristotelian logic 27 can by no means be merely ushered off the
stage as comprising but a tiny and insignificant part of the
great whole of mathematical logic. On the contrary, mathematical logic itself as an integrated science is rendered profoundly suspect simply because of the philosophical naivete of
its founders and present exponents.
Moreover, when these metaphysical confusions that lie at
the base of mathematical logic are cleared up-and principally
the confusion of ens rationis with ens-; it may be found that
while the impressive developments in mathematical logic may
have great significance for some such subjects as mathematics,
they certainly have in no wise changed the character o£ logic,
and at most have contributed only additions of detail to the
main outlines of the science as it was originally foreshadowed
by Aristotle and later developed by the Scholastics.
HENRY VEATCH

Indiana University,
Bloomington, Indiana.

27 Provided,
of course, that such logic be adequately and properly understood,
and not merely taken in the watered down versions of it that have been current
in the last few centuries, q. v., ibid., p. 51, note 6.

BOOK REVIEWS
Ernst Cassirer: The Problem of Knowledge: Philosophy, Science and HistONJ since Hegel. Translated by W. H. Woglom and C. W. Hendel.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950. Pp. 350 with index. $5.00.
The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer. Edited by Paul A. Schilpp. Evanston:
Library of Living Philosophers, 1949. Pp. 954 with index. $6.00.
One of the most important works of the late Ernst Cassirer, and an outstanding contribution to the history of modern philosophy, particularly in
regard to the problem of knowledge, is his monumental " Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neuren Zeit," in four
volumes, the first of which appeared in 1906, the last now appearing in
English even before its German edition. The manuscript was completed in
1940, during the author's sojourn in Sweden, and was'brought to the United
States by his widow in 1946; no better memorial of a great scholar could
be offered to his many friends and admirers in the United States and
England than this fine translation, and one hopes that this volume will be
followed by the three companion volumes, as well produced and printed
as this one.
Cassirer's idea in this series was not just to write another history of
philosophy; he is concerned principally with the problem of knowledge,
and aims at showing how modern thought developed in antithesis to
mediaeval systems, primarily on account of the influence of modern science,
and particularly of the growth and spread of the mathematical mentality
from Descartes onwards. He traces the origin of the rationalistic as opposed
to the theological view of reality, and draws largely on the works of
scientists; one of the most remarkable qualities of this series is the va.it
erudition of the author, as evidenced by the references and footnotes
which testify to his wide reading and make this work one of the chief
examples of philosophical historiography in this century.
It is perhaps unfortunate that this volume deals far less with pure
philosophy than the other three. In the preceding volumes the classical
philosophers were considered in their relation to the scientific thought of
their day; in this volume Cassirer abandons the pure philosophers, in order
to treat of the scientific advances that influenced philosophers. As he himself says "We shall not follow out the findings attained in the theory of
knowledge by reference to the philosophical classics of the period under
discussion, but. shall try to penetrate the motives that led to their discovery." (p. 18) Such a study is very necessary and very opportune, but

BOOK REVIEWS

648

it does seem rather misleading to describe such a work as giving us. " philosophy, science and history since . Hegel." The philosophy of science,
however important it may be, does not exhaust the problem of knowledge.
It does treat in some detail of logic, and of one part of critical metaphysics;
it supposes general critics and the psychology of knowledge, as well as the
general ontologies underlying various systems, and none of these is touched
on in this work, except in a brief way in the introduction. (pp. 1-19)
Cassirer's aim is strictly limited; his theme is the problem of the relation
of philosophy to science since Hegel. He rightly insists that philosophy
has been profoundly influenced by science, and that to understand much
of modern philosophy one has first to take account of developments within
the various sciences. Ever since Galileo and Descartes, mathematics and
mathematical physics have more and more influenced the development of
philosophy, so that the first part of this work is dedicated to those sciences.
The last century and the present age saw the development of two sciences
that have increasingly affected the course of philosophic thought, namely
biology and history; in the second and third parts Cassirer traces the
development of these sciences. His method throughout is mainly historical,
though he does let his own preferences appear from time to time, and he is
more interested in epistemological problems raised by the advances in
science than in the progress of science itself. He has a rare gift of situating
past theories in their historical context and of penetrating to the core of
the theory, and the work is written with a clarity of style that is all too
rare in German authors. Cassirer himself hardly regarded his work as quite
complete, and would surely have added a conclusion, summing up the
results of his enquiries in the three domains of thought and exptessing
his own convictions had he not died, unexpectedly, in 1945. Evep. as a
history of the individual sciences there are many lacunae, for Cassirer did
not intend to treat of all the developments in mathematics, physics,
biology and history, but only of those which are significant from the point
of view of their methods and of the implied conception of knowledge. In
spite of such defects, this work remains one of the most thorough treatises
of our time on the philosophical implications of exact science, biology and
history, and fully deserves the attention of both philosopher and scientist.
In the first part, devoted to exact science, Cassirer treats of the content
of geometrical axioms in the light of the rise of non-euclidian geometries,
and then of the origin of geometrical thought. A Thomist would be inclined
to agree with Cassirer that the new geometry is " a pure science of relations which has to do not with the ascertaining of objects and their characteristics, substances and their properties, but with orders of ideas alone."
(p. 35) Then comes an interesting discussion on the nature of mathematics, tracing the rise of the new idea of that :science from Leibniz on,
in the primacy of the idea of order over that of measure, insofar as men-

644

BOOK REVIEWS

suration is seen to be a problem whose assumptions have to be sought out.
Modern research, in discovering these assumptions, has led to a fusing of
geometrical and physical science. Recent theories on the foundations of
arithmetic are next studied, from the empiricism of Stuart Mill, and the
substantive or representative theories of Cantor, Frege and Russell, to
the functional theory of Dedekind and the intuitionism of Brouwer and
Weyl. The last chapter in this section deals with mathematical-physics:
the abandonment of the mechanistic view and the transition to the symbolic of functional conception of this science, passing through the phenomenalism of Mach, the energetics of Lubeck, the theory of science of Hertz,
Poincare and Duhem, and finally the impact of the relativity and quantum
theories. These most recent developments in science are but scantily
treated, as the author has written of them extensively in other works,
notably in his " Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen
Physik," (1937), to which he refers the reader. This first section will be
extremely useful to the Thomist philosopher of nature who desires to keep
abreast of the recent scientific researches into such notions as space, number
and measure, and to the metaphysician engaged on the epistemology of
the sciences; Cassirer's lucid and brief exposition is a safe guide in a
notoriously difficult and abstract maze of conflicting and complicated
theories.
Whereas the distinction between living and non-living beings has always
been recognized, Cassirer maintains that the problem of biological knowledge, as opposed to the type of knowledge proper to the mathematical
natmal sciences, is first clearly stated by Kant, whose general solution is
dealt with in the first chapter of the second part of this work. It is evident that he regards the Kantian solution as essentially valid; the mathematical and biological interpretations of nature are rather complementary
than opposed, since they regard two forms of order in knowledge, allowing
us to complete a synthesis of appearances according to concepts, and not
the intimate nature of reality itself. " Causality has to do with knowledge
of the objective temporal succession of events, the order in change, whereas
the concept of purpose has to do with the structure of those empirical
objects that are called living organisms." (p.
Though one may disagree with this Kantian solution, one finds in this section a very dear
statement of the Kantian biology as contained in the " Critique of Judgement," particularly in this first chapter, and again when treating later on
of some recent advances in biology, v. g. pp. 198,
The development
of biological science itself is thoroughly expounded, beginning with Goethe's
contribution, his genial intuition of an idealistic morphology, and passing
through the rise of embryology (Von Baer, Schleiden) to the evolutionary
theories of Darwin and his first disciples, and finally to the opposing
school of vitalism (Driesch) . The last stage of this development is still

BOOK REVIEWS

645

characterized by the conflict between mechanism and vitalism, but Cassirer
does not bring us right up to the most recent developments in this field
and, as is only to be expected, shows more familiarity with German scholarship than with that of other nations. Yet the picture he traces of the
growth of biology is essentially complete, especially from his own chosen
point of view, that of the changes that have compelled biology to examine
the question of its own nature as science and thus to clarify to itself its
own specific purpose and methods of thought. One must, however, raise
the point, that Cassirer seems to take it for granted that it belongs to
the biologist, as to the mathematician and historian, to discuss and determine the nature of his science; there is more than a tinge of positivism
in such a position as defended by Cassirer, for such questions, for the
Scholastic, pertain essentially to metaphysics in its critical function. However, it is well known that some Louvain neo-Thomists would dispute this
view, and they certainly cannot be accused of positivism.
As biology was revolutionized, mainly through the idea of evolution, and
saw a transition from the ideal of a merely historical to that of a causal
evolution in the explanation of life, so too history, the subject of the
final part of this work, witnessed a change in its conception from a mere
record of events to the ideal of tracing the evolution and causal connection of events. Herder and Niebuhr were the principal agents of this
transformation, while Ranke developed the technique of historical investigation and Humbolt limited this investigation to purely natural causes,
though both he and Ranke postulated " spiritual existences " beyond the
natural causes, and Ranke identified such spiritual existences with the
thoughts of God. The cardinal function of history in revealing the laws
that govern phenomena was stressed by Comte, whose naturalism was
carried a step further by Taine, who transferred the Baconian ideal of
induction from physics to history. Mommsen and Droysen reacted against
such positivism, and conceived history as the interpretation of events in
the light of political forms. So arose the conflict, at the end of the nineteenth century, between political and general history, while Lamprecht
sought to base history on the new scientific psychology. The last chapter
in this section deals with the history of religion, particularly with mythology, the recognition of the value of myths, and of rites, in affording a
key to the interpretation of history.
From this brief sketch of the contents of this masterly work the reader
may gain an idea of the riches it contains;
statement and interpretation is fully documented; the foot-notes provide a valuable index to
the modern literature on the subjects treated and testify to the wide erudition of the author. His own treatment of these difficult subjects is a
splendid example of the modern ideal of historical investigation, especially
as regards the tracing of the development of ideas. But the work has more
than a historical value; if it is not strictly philosophy, it deals with subjects

646

BOOK REVIEWS

intimately connected with philosophy, and thus merits the attention and
gratitude of both historian and philosopher.
It may interest readers to know that an Italian translation of the fom·
volumes of this work is at present being published by Einaudi, at Turin,
under the title " Storia della Filosofia Moderna "; the first volume has
just been published
, costing L. 4,500.
The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer is the sixth volume in this notable
series which has already dedicated volumes to Dewey, Santayana, Whitehead, Moore and Russell. The death of Cassirer in 1945, while this work
was still in preparation, was, after consideration, not allowed to prevent
his inclusion in a series devoted to living philosophers; and instead of the
intended reply by the subject of the volume to the various contributors
the editor has given us Cassirer's essay on " Spirit and Life in contemporary
philosophy," (pp. 855-880) which was published in German in 1930 and
is now translated specifically for the present work by R. W. Bretall and
P. A. Schilpp. That Cassirer made a great impression in America, where
his forced exile from Germany took him in 1941, after some years in
England and Sweden, is evident from the section of this volume devoted
to his life and character. (pp.
Friends, colleagues and pupils alike
testify to the charm of his character and his gifts as a teacher. Perhaps
this charm, coupled with the sense of loss caused by his sudden and unexpected death, may explain a certain exaggeration in speaking of him
and in assessing his rank as a philosopher. He is note-worthy, but hardly
great, at least in the line of pure philosophy.
The Editor follows the plan adopted for the companion volumes of this
series, inviting contributory essays from twenty-three experts who deal
with the various aspects of Cassirer's many-faceted thought, and adding
a complete bibliography of his writings (compiled by C. H. Hamburg and
W" M. Solmitz; pp. 883-910) and a complete index. The result is a
scholarly, if massive, production, in which repetitions are inevitable; but
it must be judged successful, and will be invaluable, indeed indispensable,
for those who wish to study the thought of this truly remarkable and
exemplary scholar.
Cassirer's interests extended beyond the exact sciences to the cultural
or moral sciences (Geisteswissenschaften), to history, mythology, religion,
language and art. His knowledge was truly encyclopedic, and this wide
range of culture is reflected in the variety of subjects treated of in this
volume. Many of the essays deal with his contributions to those sciences,
and, in a more general way, with his humanism (J. Gutmann, pp. 443-464)
his philosophical anthropology (D. Bidney, pp. 465-544) and his philosophy
of culture. (H. Kulm, 545-574) Readers of The Thomist will be most
interested in Cassirer's properly philosophical thought, which is adequately
and extensively treated, particularly in the first nine essays.

.BOOK REVIEWS

647

Two very able historical studies at the end of the volume serve to
determine the immediate background to Cassirer's thought. Fritz Kaufmann writes on "Cassirer, Neo-Kantianism and Phenomenology," (pp.
799-854) tracing the points of contact, as of opposition, between the
Marburg school and that of Husser!, to which he belongs. In stating his
criticisms of the Marburg school he has much of interest to say, both on
the neo-Kantians and on phenomenology; and he traces in Cassirer a
development from his earlier logical idealism to a more objective form of
idealism. One of the best summary presentations of the ideals and teaching
of the Marburg school that we have met with is contained in W. H. Werkmeister's "Cassirer's advance beyond Neo-Kantianism."
(pp. 757-798)
Cassirer is shown to be essentially faithful to the Marburg ideals; but
whereas Natorp based his philosophy on Newtonian physics, Cassirer
turns to the more recent scientific theories, in which he finds confirmation
of the neo-kantian epistemology. His main contribution to the school was
that he generalized the neo-kantian position in order to provide a consistent epistemological basis for the cultural sciences, and he thus broadened and humanized a system hitherto based exclusively on the exact
sciences. The essentially neo-Kantian character of Cassirer's philosophy
is likewise stressed by I. K. Stephens in his essay "Cassirer's doctrine of
the A Priori." (pp. 149-181) He sees Cassirer developing from an earlier
view, essentially that of Kant, to a broader view that takes into account
the cultural sciences, so that the Critique of Reason becomes the Critique
of Culture. Yet he considers this attempt, magnificent though it be, to
have failed to establish truly a priori elements, mainly due to Cassirer's
more absorbing interest in logic and mathematics than in life. Though
remaining within the bounds of the Marburg mentality, Cassirer offers us
a new development and an extension of the doctrine of Cohen and N atorp
in his own distinctive philosophy, that of Symbolic Forms, which makes
him worthy to rank with the founders as the most eminent representatives
of that school. This distinctive philosophy is touched on in the three
essays just quoted, and in Ca:rl Hamburg's " Cassirer's conception of
philosophy"; (pp. 73-H9) it i.s treated specifically by R. S. Hartmann
(pp. 289-333) who presents it objectively, and by F. Leander (pp. 337357) who is critical from the point of view of one who affirms the primacy
of self-knowledge over mathematical science, and sees, rightly we think, in
Cassirer's predominantly mathematical mentality the reason for his neglect
of philosophy and its inner history as distinct from science, as well as his
aversion to metaphysics.
For Cassirer, reality is not that which is given, but that which can be
thought; philosophy must be essentially a critique of knowledge, and is
concerned with the structure of knowing objectively rather than with
objectivity itself. In this he is faithful to Natorp, who makes thought to

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BOOK REVIEWS

be the object of philosophy, and seeks "the immanent laws according to
which thought does not accept its object as simply given, but constructs it
in conformity with thought's own way of looking at things." (quoted, p.
818) Phenomena, or sensuous impressions, which may still be called the
raw material of thought, have no existence apart from a thought-context
which sustains, relates and interprets them. The fundamental reality is a
unified thought-process, which is a creative force, welding phenomena into
structural totality, a subconscious dynamism which, by virtue of certain
innate or a priori functions, succeeds in ordering and governing the welter
of sensations. Within this creative process consciousness emerges in progressive stages, according as certain universal and typical principles, or
invariant forms, appear, by which thought gradually moulds its raw
materials and thus constitutes its objects by a process of integration within
the totality of systemic thought. The different forms by which the mind
accomplishes its " objectivation of experience " are called symbolic forms,
symbolic in so far as they represent a union of thought and sense. These
forms are recognisable as variations of Kant's categories, extended and
deepened to include the realms of the cultural sciences; no empirical reality
can be meaningfully referred to .except under the implicit presupposition
of these forms, which furnish the context within which reality can be met.
Thought thus supposes " an ultimate constant standard of measurement," which must be a set of " supreme principles of experience in general,"
or a set of " fundamental relations, upon which the content of all experience
rests." These are the "universally valid formal functions of rational and
empirical knowledge," and are genuine a priori elements of knowldge, " the
ultimate logical invariants which lie at the foundation of every determination of a connection in general according to natural law." (Cassirer, quoted
p. 157) Knowledge is thus reduced to objectivation; " we do not know
'objects' as if they were already independently determined and given
as objects,-but we know objectively, by producing certain limitations
and by fixating certain permanent elements and connections within the
uniform flow of experience," says Cassirer (quoted, p. 159); and, as
Stephens adds, " the superiority of the mathematical concept over the
ordinary generic concept, its ' greater value for knowledge,' its ' superior
objective meaning and validity,' seems to be due to its closer logical
affinity for this set of ' supreme principles.' " The basic forms of consciousness are revealed, for .Cassirer, as space, time, cause, number, etc.;
whereas the main regions in which such forms are operative in the creative
thought-process are myth, language, art, religion and science. The process
within each region passes through the successive stages of expression,
presentation and meaning, according as the referent of the senses is the
affective-emotive system of man, his volitional-teleological system, or a
system of theoretical order-signs, so that the object is the term of a process

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649

of condensation or integration into the fully interrelated totality of
constructive thought.
Cassirer's philosophy is thus not an attempt to lay hold on reality, but
to mediate the reality-accounts offered by the various cultural disciplines;
it has been well described by Theodor Litt as a synthesis of Kant and
Herder. He sees the concept as the key to all thought-formation, and tries
to reduce all the main modes of knowing to one fundamental function, to
discover the basic mental function underlying the intellectual symbols by
which the sciences describe reality. This function is the symbol-concept;
" the concept contains nothing but the principle of the forms it represents,
the constitutive law of
structure, the genetic essence of their formation." (Hartmann, p. 308) The symbol-concept is meant to include all
phenomena which exhibit" sense in the senses," that is, in which something
sensuous is represented as a particular embodiment of a sense, or meaning;
for all knowledge implies the given-ness of perceptual signs and something
signified, and its formal element is the representative relation holding between the senses and the sense. The term " symbolic form " in Cassirer
may refer either to that symbol-concept, or to the variety of cultural forms
wherein it is applied (myth, art, etc.,) or to the symbol-relations (such as
space, cause, etc.) which constitute the domains of objectivity denoted by
the cultural forms. For the Thomist, the main interest in this teaching
would probably centre on the symbol-concept under its logical aspect,
in relation particularly to the scholastic doctrine on signs. That section
of our logic could certainly benefit by comparison with much modern work
done by mathematicians and idealistic philosophers such as Cassirer, as
also, to mention one of a different school of thought, of C. S. Peirce. The
Thomist who would undertake such a confrontation between modern authors
and, say, John of St. Thomas, on the theory of signs would render a signal
service to Thomism, and discover many points of contact with the moderns,
whose exhaustive researches on the subject cannot afford to be neglected.
In general, Cassirer replaces the concept of substance by that of a
pure functional unity. He tirelessly inveighs against the notion of substance, and this must be a major bone of contention between him and
the Thomist in ontology, as is his idealism in critics. He interprets the
history of science and philosophy on the basis of function as opposed to
that of substance, and his philosophy is essentially a critical idealistic
dynamism, dominated by the logical functions so clearly evident in mathematical science, but striving to take account of the mental functions in
other spheres. It is a valiant attempt to transform the narrow scientism
of Cohen and Natorp into a broad humanism, while remaining faithful to
their general inspiration; but it leaves unsolved all the objections that may
be urged against such an idealism. Some of these objections are forcibly
put by W. C. Swabey, in his essay "Cassirer's doctrine of the A Priori,"

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(pp.
in the name of a realistic and dualistic metaphysics. Subjectivistic systems such as Cassirer's inevitably are to a great extent arbitrary,
present a deformed and one-sided view of thing. The principle
of immanence, in itself a groundless assumption and denied by our most
primal evidences, is taken for granted; and once the link with objective
reality is thus severed, one can only seek within thought itself for a
starting-point. The choice of such a privileged function, as of the elements
conceived to be invariant and a priori., is determined largely by the philosopher's temperament and training. Cohen and Natorp looked to mathmatics to provide this, and Cassirer does but extent their position to cover
wider realms of thought. If philosophy means rigorous and controlled
knowledge of reality, it cannot, without error and mutilation, be whittled
down to a mere critical analysis of thought in its dynamic functions, however exact, no more than the philosopher himself can be reduced, as a
reality, to his thought-process, or reality to an abstract functional unity.
The endeavour to supplant substance by function can only lead in the
end, to a substantification of function and the mistaking of symbol for
reality. There is more in heaven and earth than is dreamt or symbolized
in philosophy, and there is more in life than in logic or in science.
The most interesting, and perhaps the most fruitful researches of the
Marburg school concern the philosophy of the sciences, and Cassirer has
brought this into line with the most recent scientific theories, with which
he is fully conversant. His work in this important field is considered in
four essays by Felix Kaufmann, D. Gawronsky, H. R. Smart and K. Lewin,
who treat of Cassirer's theory of scientific knowledge, his contribution to
the epistemology of physics, his theory of mathematical concepts, and his
philosophy of science and the social sciences. Here Cassirer speaks with
greater authority, though his views are determined by his idealistic standpoint which, historically, owes so much to the mathematical tendency
evident in so many modern philosophers from Descartes onwards.
Cassirer was indeed a man of many parts, sensitive to the appeal of many
sciences and different branches of culture, and deeply versed in the history
of those disciplines; in such scholarship a,nd exemplary devotion to his
calling he may be taken as a model by philosophers, few of whom will be
able to equal his erudition. This volume does him full justice, and does
honor to its editor and his well-chosen contributors, and deserves a place
in the library of every philpsopher interested in the thought of the modern
world.
A. J. McNICHOLL, O.P.
Collegio Angelicum,
RomiJ, Italy

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Theology and Evolution. (A Sequel to Evolution and Theology). By
Various Writers. Edited by E. C. MEssENGER, Ph.D. Westminster:
The Newman Press, 1952. Pp. 337 with index. $4.50.
In 19:'11 Father Messenger wrote a book entitled Evolution and Theology.
This work attracted widespread attention and was the occasion of much
controversy; some interesting and, for the most part, critical reviews and
articles appeared on the subject in English and continental Catholic
periodicals. The present work is a collection of some of the more important_ reviews or articles on the problem then presented together with
some original articles and replies to some of his critics. In the concluding
chapters of the present work he summarizes the position of his Evolution
and Theology and restates it in the light of this criticism and in accordance
with later developments.
In the Introduction to this volume Father Messenger gives the reason
for the present work. Evolution and Theology had " a fairly wide distribution throughout the world, but the remaining stocks of copies perished
during the air raids on England and in the second world war." Although
the copies perished the work made theological history. Prior to its publication " Catholic writers, especially theologians and philosophers had
regarded the subject as a very dangerous one." To the author's mind some
one would have ·to risk burning his fingers in probing the subject and he
decided to run this risk himself.
The work naturally attracted widespread attention. Some reviewers
obviously adopted an attitude of " wait and see." But the author notes,
" there was never even the slightest suggestion pf any censure on the
work by ecclesiastical authority and accordingly, the theologians, or at
least some of them, drew the appropriate conclusions."
Now that the original work may be reissued," I have thought it desirable
to accompany it with this other volume, which, though complete in itself,
may be looked upon as a
to Evolution and Theology. Because the
work was already in the hands of the printers when the new Papal
Encyclical, Humani Generis, which deals inter alia with the question of
evolution, was published, I have added a special section to Chapter XV of
Part One." In this section he quotes the words of the Encyclical and
their significance, and " willingly disclaims anything I may have
written which in any way is not in accordance with it, either in the
present or any former work. But a hasty revision has not revealed any
need for serious changes or modifications in the present work."
The present work is divided into two parts. The first part, comprising
216 pages, is concerned with Evolution and Theology and embraces
already published reviews and articles and some new replies. The second
part entitled " The Soul of the Unborn Babe " comprises l16 pages and

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is a study of animation theories. This section is by Fr. E. C. Messenger,
Ph. D., and the late Canon Henry Dorlodot, D. D., D. Sc., together with an
article by the Most Reverend Michael Browne, Bishop of Galway.
The relations between evolutionary theory and Catholic theology constitute one of the most delicate of all questions-for the evolutionary theory
deals with the origin and development of all things, a subject treated both
in Sacred Scripture and in Catholic Tradition, and a question on which
modern science claims to have thrown some new light.
Dr. Messenger has studied this problem at great length both in his
previous work and in the present volume. Both should be read together.
In his previous work he sets forth and explains some general principles.
He insists on the authority of the Teaching Church, sets down the sources
of revelation and outlines the purpose of the account of creation in Genesis.
There follows three sections on the origin of living beings, of the first man
and the first woman. In the present volume he treats these same subjects
but more in answer to the criticism directed at his conclusions.
In the case of the origin of living beings, the author reviews the Biblical
texts, the exegetical and theological tradition and concludes that evolution,
as an hypothesis applied to the origin of plants and animals, has won a
rightful place in Catholic theology and that a Catholic is free to accept it.
In chapters 14 and 15 of the present work the author notes a changed
and more favorable attitude towards his evolutionary thesis in the works
of some modern theologians. On page 171 after an analysis and comparison
of the four editions of the treatise De Deo Creante by Pere Boyer, S. J.,
the author concludes that the learned Jesuit has realized "the necessity of
modifying long established theses, in view of the progress of modern science,
and has not hesitated to adopt a much more tolerant and indeed benevolent attitude towards evolution in general, and a moderate form of the
evolution of man. This fact is all the more significant when we bear in
mind that the dogmatic theses taught in an institution such as the Gregorian University in Rome must first be approved by the proper ecclesiastical authority. Such approval is doubtless negative in character, but the
fact that such change should have been given is an indication of the
changed attitude in ecclesiastical circles." Of course, Dr. Messenger also
notes that there are some theologians who are resolutely opposed to the
idea of the evolution of man in any form and they have made their
attitude more and more plain in some recently published works, as P.
Daffara, 0. P., in his Cursus manualis Theologiae Dogmaticae ad usum
Seminariorum. Pere Boyer, however, in the treatise De Deo Creante notes
that in the last twenty years certain Catholic writers appear more tolerant
of certain forms of evolutionary theories and names the Abbes Bouyssonie,
Pere Teilhard de Chaudin, the Abbe Breuil, Pere Sertillanges, 0. P ., Pere
Pinard de la Boullaye, S. J., etc. There is at present a more tolerant

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658

approach to evolutionary theories in the works of certain Catholic apologists, philosophers and theologians. Perhaps this changed attitude has
been due to the works of Canon Dorlodot and Dr. Messenger. In this
connection, on page 171, Dr. Messenger recalls the significant statement
made by the Reverend Dr. Rhodes in his review of the work Evolution
and Theology in the Clergy Review for February 1982: "If the author's
thesis is at all widely accepted, and if it receives at least the tacit approbation of ecclesiastical authority, it will be scarcely possible to maintain in
future that there is much foundation for attaching any note of theological
censure to theories of ' moderate transformism ' of plants and the lower
animals
to a certain modified transformist theory of the evolution of
the human body."
The theory of evolution would not have been so disturbing to people's
minds if it had not been applied to man himself, with the more or less
avowed purpose of proving that man is only a perfected animal. Here
there is a new problem or factor in the question, namely the dignity of man.
But does Catholic doctrine prevent us from extending the theory of
evolution to the human body? Is there an essential difference between man
and animal, a difference which would prevent the application of Transformism to man in the same way as it is applied to an animal? The
Church, in agreement with sound philosophy, affirms that there is such
a difference because the human soul is immaterial and spiritual, whereas
the animal soul is material. A Catholic, then, cannot accept a theory of
evolution which suppresses or denies the creative action of God at the
origin of the spiritual principle, the human soul, in man.
The question of the soul of the first man being determined, there remains
that of his body. Dr. Messenger, of course, adheres to the conclusions of
the critics. He pronounces in favor of evolution-not that he considers
this proved, but rather he regards it as a possible hypothesis which has
never been condemned by the magisterium of the Church. Moreover, he
maintains that it can be reconciled without difficulty with the teaching of
Sacred Scripture and Tradition.
A Catholic might be drawn to maintain the theory of mitigated evolution
for three reasons. The first set of reasons are the scientific reasons. The
second are in the psychological order, a desire for a comprehensive formula
to explain nature, and the third are apologetic in character, designed to
meet the scientist on some common ground. These last two, of course,
follow from the first. The scientific case for evolution rests on a cumulative argument, no single element of which is absolutely cogent, as is
admitted on page 196. Unbiased critics will agree with this statement of
Yves Delage: "I am absolutely convinced that one is or is not an
evolutionist, not for reasons drawn from Nat ural History but by reason
of one's philosophical opinions. Were there any scientific hypothesis other

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than descent capable of explaining the origin of species, many tmnsformists
would abandon their position as insufficiently proved!' We may leave the
scientists to the care of the philosophers, noting however, that in this
connection Pere Sertillanges, 0. P., in his St. Thomas d'Aquin, has stated
that Thomism is quite ready for Transformism, when this becomes, scientifically, something more than an hypothesis.
Dr. Messenger is not directly concerned with the arguments for the
evolutionary hypothesis that he holds. This was not his purpose in writing
these books. Of course, he summarizes the arguments but his aim is rather
to dear the ground by showing that neither Sacred Scripture nor Tradition
are against the theory of evolution. And Dr. Messenger has neglected
none of the factors which might throw light on the question. He examines
aU the data, the texts of Sacred Scripture, the doctrine of the Fathers, all
the decisions of the teaching authority of the Church bearing on the
question: the replies of the Biblical Commission the decisions of the Holy
Office, and some famous cases, the cases of Mivart, Leroy, Zahn, etc.
From this point of view his work will have to be consulted henceforth
by any one who wishes to make a study of the relation between evolution
and Catholic doctrine.
With regard to Sacred Scripture and the evolution of man he maintains
that Sacred Scripture neither teaches nor denies the doctrine. The interpretation of the Scriptural and Patristic texts shows dearly that there is
no doctrine properly so-called on the manner of the creation of living beings
or of Adam's body. God formed or fashioned man from the slime of the
earth and the body of the first woman was formed from the first man.
The difficulty is whether the formation of the first woman from the first
man can be reconciled with a reasonable theory of evolution. Dr. Messenger
thinks that it can be so reconciled, but the explanation does not seem any
too satisfactory. Moreover Pere Lagrange, on pages 150-152 of this present
work, poses a number of questions relative to the formation of the body of
Adam and Eve based on the narrative of Genesis and which do not seem
capable of being satisfactorily resolved in the evolutionary hypothesis as
formulated and explained by Dr. Messenger. To these questions Dr.
Messenger makes this reply on page 153: "Pere Lagrange would seem to
imply that, unless we can answer aU the questions which arise if we accept
the extension of the evolution theory to the formation of the first human
body, it is scarcely worthwhile departing from the literal sense of the
narrative in Genesis. That attitude may perhaps be theological, but it is
scarcely scientific." Such a rejoinder is scarcely theological or scientific.
There are a number of questions that the work of Dr. Messenger does
not, and perhaps cannot, answer. This is but natural; it is not always
easy to reconcile intelligent criticism with dogma, nor does this detract
from the value of the work. Moreover, Dr. Messenger refers the reader on

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655

the question of the formation of Eve to his reconsideration of the problem
in the final chapter of the present work.
The final chapter of the present question, that is, Chapter XV of the
first part, is concerned with evolution and theology today, or a re-examination of the problem. The first part of this section is historical. In the past
many hard things have been said about this doctrine of mitigated evolution of the human body. Theologians maintained that even the mildest
form of it raises grave difficulties both for faith and reason. This ultraconservative view is still maintained or defended by some theologians, but
at the present time there are some theologians and philosophers, as well
as exegetes who more or less favor, or at least tolerate some form of
evolution as applied to the origin of the first human body.
The second section is exegetical; it involves the whole concept of the
nature and consequences of Inspiration and the interpretation of the first
chapters of Genesis bearing on this question cannot be determined apart
from Catholic doctrine. It is for the Church, the guardian and infallible
interpreter of Revelation, to determine the authentic sense of Sacred
Scripture. This infallible teaching of the Church is exercised by her
magisterium, either solemn or ordinary. There is also the non-infallible
teaching of the Church. Dr. Messenger discusses this doctrine from the
point of view of the magisterium of the Church as put forth in the following documents: Providentissimus Deus, Spiritus Paraclitus, certain decisions of the Biblical Commission, Divino Affiante Spiritu and the important
letter issued in the name of the Biblical Commission and published in the
Acta Apostolicae Sedis for 1948. Such are the official directives issued by
the Holy See in recent times and these Dr. Messenger does not depart
from in his discussion of the meaning of Genesis in his evolutionary
hypothesis.
The third section of this chapter is a recapitulation or re-examination
of the conclusion formulated in Evolution and Theology. The arguments
are the same but formulated in such a way as to answer, at least partially,
the objections of the conservative theologians. The· impression here at times
seems vague; perhaps there are too many needless concessions to science
and a theological speculation which is· not always entirely satisfactory.
The author himself (page 210) suggests "that it is in the highest degree
important that theologians should adopt a wise and prudent attitude on
all these questions. It is, of course the Church's business to teach the
Catholic faith, and as such she is not concerned with natural science. . . .
But we must always remember the existence of what St. Albert the Great
has so truly called the other Divine Revelation of God in Nature, as
studied in the Sciences. The work of adjustment of one and the other is a
delicate and difficult task. But it is one which must always be undertaken."
Dr. Messenger concludes this section with a note on that part of the

8

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Papal Encyclical Humani Generis which deals with the problems arising
out of the theory of Evolution, and the relations between certain ideas and
the teaching of the faith. The Pope distinguishes carefully between really
established facts of science and hypotheses which have only some scientific
foundation. Such hypotheses might be opposed to Divine Revelation
directly or indirectly and if so cannot be accepted. Some conjectural
opinions, as for instance certain forms of "polygenism," are opposed to
Divine Revelation. There are other hypotheses which are not so opposed
and they may be examined in the light of the present state of human
knowledge and of sacred theology, "provided that the arguments are
weighed and judged with due seriousness ... and provided all are prepared
to submit to the judgment of the Church. . . ." But the Pope adds a
rebuke: " Some, however, boldly overstep the bounds of this liberty ...
and behave as if the origin of the human body were already certain and
demonstrated . . . and as if nothing were contained in the sources of
Divine Revelation .... " Thus for the first time in history the Holy See
has expressed its mind on the question of the evolutionary origin of the
human body and has declared that the question is one which is open to
research and discussion, subject, however, to certain conditions. There
is no reference in Humani Generis to the question of the origin of Eve, or
rather, as to the manner of her origin from Adam, but Dr. Messenger
suggests that perhaps this problem is included in the Holy Father's Sermo
ad Academicos (page 188) , among the questions upon which we must wait
for further light.
The second part of this book is a study of Animation Theories. In the
Introduction to this part Dr. Messenger notes that the late Canon de
Dorlodot in his Darwinism and Catholic Thought referred briefly to the
two rival theories of the animation of the human embryo, "the Mediate
Animation theory and the Immediate Animation theory." Dr. Messenger
had long planned a work in whicl1 "the Mediate Animation theory should
be set forth in its proper light, and not only defended, as a possible view,
but vindicated as indeed the only theory consistent both with the facts of
modern science and with the established principles of the perennial philosophy." The result is the present study.
To vindicate this thesis Dr. Messenger begins with an outline of Embryology in the light of modern science, a history of Embryology, then
passes on to the Embryology of St. Thomas and a history of the Mediate
Animation theory and the Immediate Animation theory. Finally, he outlines briefly the philosophical and theological problems and arguments
involved.
According to Dr. Messenger the experimental and observational foundation for the Immediate Animation theory was demolished by the discovery
that the Graafian follicle (page 24£) was not itself the ovum. But even

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657

after this mortal blow to the Immediate Animation theory many Catholic
philosophers and theologians adhered to it, mainly for theological reasons
or difficulties.
The theological difficulties are four. The first difficulty arises from the
dogma of the Incarnation. According to the defined Catholic Faith, at
the moment of the Incarnation, the Second Person of the Holy Trinity
took to Himself instantaneously, in the womb of Mary, a true and perfect
human nature, of a true human body and a true human soul. Thus Faith
compels us to accept the Immediate Animation theory in the cast> of the
Sacred Humanity of Christ.
The second difficulty arises from the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. This feast is celebrated on the 8th of December and The Nativity
of the Blessed Virgin on the 8th of September. Because of this and the
doctrinal definition of Pius IX the defenders of the Immediate Animation
theory conclude that it must be accepted, at least in the case of Our :Lady.
The third difficulty arises from canonical legislation. The Church in
canon 747 ordains that an aborted foetus, of whatever age, is to be
baptised.
The fourth difficulty arises from the Church's condemnation of direct
abortion on the ground of murder and the use of contraceptive devices
on the ground of child-murder, which implies that the human soul is
present from the first moment of conception.
These difficulties are considered in various chapters of the present work.
These and other difficulties are also considered in a formal answer to
objections against the Mediate Animation theory in chapter 8 by the late
Canon de Dorlodot.
Dr. Messenger in his summation pleads " for a reconsideration of the
matter, and for a frank and impartial consideration of the grounds upon
which so many modem Catholic philosophers and theologians now prefer
the old Mediate Animation theory to the comparatively new Immediate
one." His conclusion is less restricted than his thesis for he concludes that
the question is still quite open. It may be theoretically but not practically,
it would seem, in view of canon 747. Perhaps canon 747 is not a doctrinal
decision, but when it comes to the matter of administering the sacrament
of Baptism the Church insists that we act on the theory that the soul
is infused at the moment of conception.
JosEPH

Dominican House of Studies,
River Forest, IU.

S. CoNsiDINE, 0. P.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Existentialists: A Critical Study. By James Collins. Chicago: Regnery,
1959.!. Pp. 9.!68 with index. $4.50.
The Existentialist Revolt. By Kurt F. Reinhardt.
1952. Pp. 254 with index. $3.50.

Milwaukee:

Bruce,

Catholic scholars have long held the very front ranks in the task of interpreting and assessing the existentialists. Dialectical materialism has had
several champions in Europe and one in this country to come to grips with
one or other of the recent existentialists, and idealism has had a few
stalwarts like de Ruggiero and Kraenzlin to oppose the new generation of
Kierkegaardians; from the viewpoint of the contemporary logicians, Carnap
and Ayer have taken issue with Heidegger in rather minor skirmishes,
while the typical American naturalist has generally ignored even the
incisive criticism of Jaspers despite the dues of Marjorie Grene in Dreadful
Freedom that there is a rapprochement between certain phases of existentialism and of pragmatism. Catholics, on the other hand, can stake a claim
to an effective literature on the subject of the existentialists, in nearly all
languages.
Dr. Collins and Dr. Reinhardt have now supplied the English-speaking
world with worthy successors to the books of European Catholics like
Haecker, Moeller, Lotz, De Waehlens, de Tonquedec, and Jolivet. Both
Collins and Reinhar(lt have brought to their work the tools of long study
and reflection on existentialism. Writing in numerous American reviews,
Collins has been helpful for more than a decade in interpreting existentialists
studies of existentialism
for Catholics in this country; besides his
from afar, Reinhardt is a former student of Husserl, Heidegger, and
Jaspers. Both authors have studied the existentialists with understanding
and sympathy and the ambition to find positive achievements. Comparing
existentialists and philosophers like Augustine and Aquinas, Collins says in
his preface: "All these men are occupied with the same generic sort of
problems, the problems of existing men, despite the enormous differences in
historical situation and technique." Reinhardt's preface says, "It has long
been the author's conviction (which he shares with many contemporary
Thomists) that in their emphasis (and often over-emphasis) on the concrete ' historicity ' of human existence and in their revolt against an abstract
'essentialism' (or idealism), the modern 'existentialists' may aid in the
rediscovery of long-forgotten or neglected philosophic truths."
Both of these useful volumes cover roughly the same terrain: Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Husserl, Sarte, Jaspers, Marcel, and Heidegger. The
first three form the introductory chapter in Collins' work but appear in
the main body of Reinhardt's. Collins treats Heidegger last on the grounds
that the greatest potentiality for positive progress in existentialism lies
here; Reinhardt follows the more usual order in books of this sort by
culminating his historical treatment with Marcel. The similarity of these
two books is further emphasized by the concluding chapters in each, " The

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659

Thematic Structure of Existentialism" (Reinhardt) and" Five Existential
Themes." (Collins) Each volume contains a bibliography; in the case of
the Collins book, there are helpful subdivisions in terms of the sources,
translations, and studies appropriate to the philosophers treated.
fortunately, Collins' publisher has chosen to consign the illuminating
footnotes to the rear of the book to make ihe scholarly reading of a work
of this sort more difficult than it would normally be. Each of the two
books has a combined index of topics and names.
But despite their mechanical similarities, these two welcome volumes
do more than overlap; they supplement each other in presentation, in
emphasis, and in critical comment. Collins, for instance, shows throughout
a philosophical mood that will recommend his book to those already
familiar with existentialism; Reinhardt's work shows greater, though not
over-burdening, attention to historical and biographical factors and will
be of use to the uninitiated as well as to the scholar. Collins takes frequent
occasion to point up problems that existentialism cannot answer or that
the Thomist can answer better; Reinhardt's evaluations are broader and
more general. Both authors seem agreed that the chief contribution of
existentialism so far has been to recall philosophy to the concrete; they
seem hopeful that there may be a common ground between this central
inspiration of modern existentialism and the Thomistic existentialism
emphasized by Phelan, Maritain, and Gilson.
In both volumes, Sarte's philosophy is called "a postulatory atheism."
Collins argues that Sartre has made a double option: one for Neitzsche's
atheism and one for Husserl's autonomous phenomeno)ogy. This comparison, though not so pointedly, appears also in Reinhardt._ Both books
are concerned to honor the differences between Sartre and Heidegger and
to show that the god denied by existentialism is the god of Hegel or
Leibniz but not the God of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. In his critical
remarks on Sartre, Collins argues: " He consistently merges the view that
our knowledge of a contingent existence
be derived from knowledge
of a prior principle with the quite different contention that the existence
of the primal modes of being require no cause." (pp.
- Reinhardt's
criticism lists the " postulatory and unproven " premises of Satre's thought.
In dealing with Jaspers, Collins finds traces of Descartes but not of
Husser! and links Jaspers with Kierkegaard and Neitzsche through the
doctrine of transcendence roughly common to all three. Jaspers' existentialism is further portrayed as " an attempt to chart the course of Kantian
reason in the encircling sea of Kierkegaardian existence." (p.
Reinhardt groups Jaspers with Marcel and Kierkegaard in a common doctrine
that allows man to appear as "capax Dei." "Much of what Jaspers says
concerning God, transcendence, and reality," according to Reinhardt (p.
191), "follows at least in part the traditional doctrines of Christian
philosophy and theology." Collins would seem to concur, at least partially, in this appraisal. (p. 104)

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In dealing with Marcel, Reinhardt writes, " Philosophy is for Marcel a
phenomenological analysis with an ontological goal." (p. fl06) Collins uses
as one of his devices to present Marcel the Bergsonian distinction between
la pensee pensee and la pensee pensante. (p. lflfl) Both authors are in
accord that of all the existentialists Marcel has the greatest respect for
sensation and the reality of the human body. Collins makes the explicit
conclusion that there seems to be no room in Kierkegaard for any kind
of philosophy of nature, and no doubt the same verdict could be passed
against the other existentialists as well. Yet Marcel does come the closest
of all to the traditional views of matter and form.
The somewhat mysterious and rather elusive doctrines on God to be
found in the recent Heidegger are dealt with in both books. In Reinhardt's judgment, "There is no doubt that Heidegger has a high esteem
for Christian theology, although he insists that it refrain from engaging
in purely philosophical and metaphysical argumentation."
(p. 154) In
Collins' words, Heidegger " is not ruling out God from his philosophy but
is literally rendered speechless before the task of treating of Him in a way
consistent with his criticism of Scholastic ontology." (p. 160)
By their titles alone, the concluding chapters of these volumes will invite
the most interest from a Thomist glancing at the tables of contents. Their
structures are prompted by the prudent desire of both authors to make
no over-hasty definition of existentialism but rather to allow such a summary to grow as an inductive conclusion from their previous chapters. For
Reinhardt, the common ground of all the existentialists.• is a general ninefold doctrine of subjective truth; estrangement; existential anguish and
nothingness; existence and nothingness; existence and " the others "; situation and " limit situation "; temporality and historicity; existence and
death; existence and God. Five themes which Collins discerns deal with the
venture of philosophizing; descriptive metaphysics; man in the world;
man and fellow man; man and God. It is at the beginning of his last
chapter that Reinhardt makes his strongest comparison of the existentialists
and Thomists by citing De Ente et Essentia and Maritain's Existence and
the Existent.
The recent silence of the existentialists, except for Jaspers' logic and
Marcel's Gifford Lectures, would seem to indicate something of a crisis
in existentialism itself. Heidegger has produced only minor essays since
Sein und Zeit, and Sartre's recent public activity has been confined to the
theatre. There may be a hint here that existentialism has gone as far as
its potential could take it and that new and different directions may be
expected. The Collins and the Reinhardt books, by the fairness of their
expositions and the soundness of their counter-proposals, will be useful
guides to all who hope that the existentialist excesses will not reach
American shores.
VINCENT

University of Notre Dame,
Notre Dame, Indiana

EDWARD SMITH

BRIEF NOTICES
Satan. Edited by Pere BRuNo DE JEsus-MARIE,0. C. D. New York: Sheed
and Ward,
Pp. 531. $5.5.0.
This volume is a collection of essays on Satan, and is a translation of a
volume of the same title appearing in the series " Etudes Carmelitaines "
(Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1948) to which several other articles have been
added. As it is impossible to give an account of each article, we shall
discuss only those which seem to require special mention. The volume is
divided into four parts: the first deals with Satan himself and his operations, the second with pagan notions on the devil, the third with possession,
the " psychological devil," and the fourth with the devil in art and
literature.
The first article is a fine presentation of the Thomistic doctrine on Satan,
ably written by the late Fr. Walter Farrell, 0. P., and deals with the
nature of Satan himself, explaining what is meant by his being a fallen
angel, and discussing his powers as a spiritual being, the highest of the
creatures. There is also a clear exposition of St . .Thomas' teaching on the
nature of the sin of Satan. This is certainly one of the most valuable
articles in the entire volume.
When the impossibility of sins of carnal lust in the angels is mentioned
as a part of the Thomistic teaching (pp.
it would have been
interesting to have found an explanation of several puzzling passages of St.
Thomas. Difficulties in this regard arose from the interpretation of Genesis
6
as referring to the angels (also, among some Fathers, Jude 6-7 were
so interpreted) having sexual relations with women. At one point St.
Thomas seems to admit this interpretation (II Sent. d. 8, q. 4, qcla. I, a.
and sol. ed. Mandonnet, II, pp.
, though he later appears to reject it (Summa Theol. I, q. 51, a. S, ad 6). Yet, in both texts, the Angelic
Doctor speaks of the angels taking on' assumed bodies '-and this presents
difficulties as to the nature of the bodies assumed and as to the mode of
assumption. The explanation of the possibility of the devil's sexual relations is a rather puzzling one.
Furthermore, it might have been well in this section of the book to have
made some. mention of the history of the doctrine of the absolute spiritu.
ality of the angels, especially in view of the sharp criticism of St. Thomas
offered by P. de Lubac (Surnaturel, Paris: Aubier, 1946, pp.
especially). It would seem that a great many Fathers held only a relative
spirituality (or relative corporeity) in regard to the angels. That this
may have been the opinion (personal or private, not official) of the

661

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BRIEF NOTICES

majority of the Fathers at the Second Council of Nicea. {787) may be
evidenced by the letter of John of Thessalonica, advocating the liceity of
paintings of the Angels {Mansi, t. XIII, 166). In any case, this matter is
not discussed in this volume.
The next article by Fr. Bernard Leeming, S. J., is well-done and informative, in a discussion of the role of Satan, the adversary of God and
man, the tempter to sin. The most detailed study of Satan's power, however, is to be found in the next contribution, by P. J. de Tonquedec, S. J.
On page 43 (and note 8) the author seems a bit strong on the extent of
the devil's activity, but restricts 'himself on the following page to the
conclusion of St. Thomas. Satan's role in influencing collective decisions
is mentioned, but unfortunately not determined more exactly than to
point out
principles. The author believes that no one, without
exceptional privilege, escapes the temptations of the devil himself (p. 48) ,
but he gives no definite theological substantiation for this statement, which
must then be taken as a personal opinion. On the whole, he maintains a
well-balanced position between the extremes of seeing Satan himself everywhere and of scepticism as to his activity.
Part III is devoted to the question of possession and exorcism. By far
the finest article in this section is that of F. X. Maquart on the signs of
possession and the use of the rite of exorcism. Adhering closely to the
Roman Ritual, the author carefully explains the natural, preternatural and
supernatural, and the basis of their distinction; he rightly deplores the
" naive credulity " of the " ecclesiastical world " in attributing to direct
diabolical influence especially psychic manifestations which are rather to
be explained by the science of psychiatry. The question to be asked, he
states, is "normal or abnormal? " not "virtuous or vicious?" The article
repays a careful and thoughtful study.
The author of the following article, Jean Vichon, seems not to have
read Maquart's article, or else to be in complete disaccord with it. He
proposes as signs of possession a number of symptoms which he could
easily have observed in psychopathologically disturbed persons. The one
characteristic found in possessed persons is " aggressive impulsiveness "
(p. fl06), and the "two fundamental obsessions of the possessed" are
those of "moral solitude " and " guilt." (p. fl08) The author just mentions
the psychic origin of the guilt-obsession (p. fl08), but then considers it a
'sign of possession (pp. fllO-flll). The author would have done well to have
consulted an expert in the field of psychiatry on the symptoms of hysteria
and of the obsessive-compulsive neuroses. It seems to be certainly unscientific, not to say dangerous and misleading, to give such pathological
symptoms as signs of possession. No mention is made of the solid and
theologically sound criteria explained by Maquart.
The following article deals with diabolic influence in mission lands. As

BRIEF NOTICES

668

the author, Dom Kilger, 0. S. B., is a member of a miSsionary Congregation, one looks for evidence of diabolic activity which can be scientifically
established. He asserts that the devil's influence in mission lands is great.
If this is so, we could expect, instead of a detailed description of the rather ·
fantastic experiences of three Capuchin missionaries in the 16th century
court of Queen Nzinga in Japan, an· account of diabolic activity in more
recent times, and thus more easily subject to scientific historical examination. The author's assertion of diabolic influence in mission territories
is not substantiated by his article--" quod gratis asseritur, gratis negatur."
The next article, on the case of Jeanne Fery, also descripes an occurrence
in the sixteenth century. The author, Pierre Debongnie, C. SS. R., makes
some attempts to establish the historicity of his narrative, but after forty
somewhat tedious pages of detailed description and dialogue, we are left.
with the question: was all of this pathological or diabolical? The author's
only answer is that it may have been both. It seems certain that some
more recent, and more easily verifiable, accounts of possession would have
given a more scientific character to this section of the book. One could
also have mentioned examples of diabolic activity in the lives of some more
recent saints-here, at least, we could be sure that no serious pathological
states were present.
The article of the distinguished French physician, Jean Lhermitte, is
carefully done, and attempts some psychiatric conclusions, a summary
of which is to be found on page
It may be remarked here that what
seems to be needed is a truly scientific and detailed study of psychoneurotic and psychotic states in which are found many symptoms often
naively attributed to Satan. The lack of such a study, to parallel
Maquart's fine theological article, is a true lacuna,
decreases the value
of the volume.
While the volume is to be praised and recommended for some fine
articles, it is unfortunate that others have been included which can only
serve to confuse the very important subjects which are discussed.

Le Sacrifice du Corps Mystique. By Chanoine EuGENE MAsuRE. Paris:
65 fr. B.
Desclee de Brouwer, 1950. Pp.
Calvary and Community.
Ward, 1951. Pp.

By M. HARRINGTON.
$4.00.

New York: Sheed and

Although these two works are dissimilar in form and content, not to
mention language, they have an important common denominator which
justifies their being reviewed together. The first, a further elaboration
of Canon Masure's well-known " sacramental " theory to explain the
essence of the Sacrifice of the Mass (Le Sacrifice du Chef, translated into

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BRIEF NOTICES

English by Dom lltyd Threthowan as The Christian Sacrifice, and expounded in popular style by the latter in Christ and The Liturgy, Sheed
& Ward, 1951), is straight theology, while the second is best described as
devotional commentary upon theology; yet both are preoccupied with the
tremendous depth of meaning and spiritual utility inherent in this aspect
of the Mass. Indeed, the good Canon is himself moved to remark, in the
final sentence of his exhaustive and painstaking analysis, that " the faithful
have a right to know the riches of their Missal: what an immense task to
accomplish!" Fortunately, the latter's own theological zeal and acumen,
together with the efforts of others of his school, are inspiring devotional
treatises like Miss Harrington's in increasing number and variety, which
aim to clarify and apply, for the average Catholic, the profounder and
more speculative aspects of this Euchology.
In its turn, the latter may he summed up under the heading of that
newer and fresh approach to the understanding of the Mystery of Faith
which has been greatly stimulated by the monumental work of Pere de la
Taille, together with the researches of Dom Odo Case} and the expositions
of Abbot Vonier as well as the present author's. "Newer" that is, in
comparison with the conventional interpretations fathered by Lessius and
De Lugo, that have held sway since the late nineteenth century; hut in
reality, of far more venerable origin, as ancient indeed (if the author is
correct) as the Missal itself, in particular its Secret and Postcommunion
prayers which so often seem to he based upon it.
As an appropriate starting-point for his study, Canon Masure draws
attention to the complete silence of Mediator Dei in reference to the socalled " destructionist " theory as upheld by the opposing school, and to
its definitely discernible if cautious leaning in the direction of this more
ancient interpretation. Then he proceeds to a re-examination of the latter
as formulated by himself in previous statements, hut now in the light of
the Encyclical's implications and affirmations; and adduces further evidence
for his conclusions from other reputable sources ancient and modern. In
his view, the crux of the problem lies in explaining exactly what it is that a
" sacramental sign " is capable, ·o;f producing, effecting ex opere operata.
In the case of the Eucharist, this is simply, Christ's Sacrifice; hut with
all its vast implications, its totality as Opus Redemptionis. Thus the Mass
can legitimately he called the " sacrament " of Christ's Sacrifice: it not
only makes Him really present in our midst, or more accurately makes us
present with Him, hut does ·this in relation to Him as sacrificing and
sacrificed. Calvary is " made present " again through the Sign of the
Eucharist, minus indeed its historic " bloody " details, hut yet in its true
identity, its actual reality, "in mysterio."
The engaging possibilities of this interpretation, especially for purposes
of practical piety are, of course, obvious, as already stated; and indeed, are
clearly indicated in Mediator Dei itself.

BRIEF NOTICES

665

Pending ·an English translation of this stimulating treatise by Canon
Masure, which we devoutly hope will not be long in appearing, _we shall
have to be satisfied with the more popular orientations deriving from his
theory (and the similar expressions of it given by Billot, Casel, Vonier
et al.) such as the second volume under review. It covers about the
same territory, theologically speaking, as that of Le Sacrifice du Chef,
having as its focal point of interest the Sacrifice of Calvary, made present
on our altars by means of the sacramental sign that is the Eucharistic
rite; but written to edify rather than instruct, to enthuse rather than to
inform. I!! a series of meditative reflections upon the totality of Eucharistic
doctrine, from its ancient Hebrew types down to the historic setting and
then the mystical re-enactment, the author brings to bear a wealth of
imagery and moral (especially social) application upon the central Mystery,
viz. that " sacrificial sacrament, or rather sacrifice in a sacrament . . .
(which contains) the sacrifice of Calvary." (p. 228) At times the commentary tends to become overly sentimental, too prolix in the use of
analogy; and at times there appears to be some mixing of the two meanings
of " sacrament " in reference to the Eucharist: the stricter one connoting
the Real Presence, and the broader one connoting the Real and sacrificial
Presence.
Beyond this minor criticism however, and after voicing regret that Miss
Harrington did not grasp with both hands the golden opportunity presented by her material for advocating the cause of active popular participation (in the sense envisioned by Mediator Dei) in holy Mass, we
welcome this inspirational and not uninstructive aid to Eucharistic piety
from the pen of another Englishwoman who writes with insight and
distinction.

Aristotle's De Anima in the Version of William of Moerbeke and the
Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by KENELM FosTER,
0. P., and SILVESTER HUMPHRIEs, 0. P., with an Introduction by Ivo
THOMAS, O.P. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951. Pp. 504.
$6.50.

We again have the opportunity, in the pages o'f THE THOMIST to welcome
another translation of one of St. Thomas' Commentaries on Aristotle-this time, that on the " De Anima," which is of such importance not
only to psychology but also to epistemology.
The translation itself is based on the Pirotta (Marietti) Latin edition.
The translators have sought to make the text congenial to the modern
reader by dint of much " excision and compression " {pp. 5-6) without
sacrificing anything which would prevent a true comprehension of this

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BRIEF NOTICES

work. The reader who follows the Latin text along with this translation,
must take this intention of the translators into account. This procedure,
while having its disadvantages, has the benefit of presenting the analytical
text of St. Thomas in a form more easily comprehended by the modem
reader. In spite of minor difficulties in some passages, the rendering is
faithful, and may be safely used by the student. The translators did not
aim at the establishment of a definitive critical text, but rather at making
available in good, readable English this important work.
The translation is preceded by an Introduction by Fr. Ivo Thomas, 0. P.,
and discusses the nature of a Thomistic commentary, the date of this one,
gives a brief summary of the Averroist problem (of the "intellectus agens
separatus,") and of the Aristotelian method of definition, and treats of
several particularly difficult passages in some detail.
In the first section, in discussing the nature of St. Thomas' method of
commenting on Aristotle, Fr. Thomas rightly notes that the aim was not,
a merely historical or philological exposition, but the " exposition of an
inquiry composed within a living tradition still vitally active in speculation." (p. 15) He states that it is the text itself which is explained and
points out that the Aristotelian notion of science provides the basis for
the method adopted. Perhaps the writer did not have available Chenu's
excellent Introduction a L'Etude de Saint Thomas d'Aquin (Montreal, and
Paris, 1950) , but for the reader desirous of gaining a fuller and perhaps
clearer notion of St. Thomas' Commentaries the remarks of P. Chenu
should be of great help (vid. especially pp. 173-183) .
In dealingwith the date of this Commentary, the position of Ma,rcel de
Corte is rejected, and Fr. Thomas relies on the studies of Pelster and A.
Mansion for his conclusion that the proper date should be about 1271.
Thus, the latest and most valuable studies are employed. Chenu, it seems,
would hold the opinion of de Corte. (p. ui6 and n. 2)
In the section on the Averroist issue it is strange to find no reference to
the excellent study of F. Nuyens (L' Evolution de la Psychologic d'Aristote,
Louvain, 1948), which, in the opinion of this reviewer, supersedes that of
de Corte, on whom Fr. Thomas greatly relies. Nuyens could also have
been mentioned in the section on difficult passages, especially with regard
to the sixth one (pp. 34 ff.), on which the Louvain scholar has a useful
commentary (pp. 296-308). There is no reference either to the differences
of opinion on Aristotle's " De Anima," between de Corte and Jaeger.
The brief section on the Aristotelian method of definition should certainly
have contained a reference to the solid and excellent studies of P. M.-R.
Roland-Gosselin, 0. P. (" Les methodes de Ia definition d'apres Aristote,"
and 661-675).
in Rev. Sc. Pkil. et Theol., VI, l9H!, pp.
In general the Introduction is a bit over-technical, especially if the
volume is intended for a public of non-scholastics. The reader may be

BRIEF NOTICES

667

referred again to Chenu's work written in a more readable form and offering
a more complete and valuable introduction (especially Chaps. V and VI) .
We are, however, most grateful to Fr. Thomas and to the translators,
as well as to the Yale University Press, for making available such a fine
work, which should find its place among the " tools " not only of Thomists
but of all who are seriously interested in the philosophical problems of
psychology.

Cerebral Mechanisms in Behavior.
LLOYD A. JEFFRES. New York:
index. $6.50.

The Hixon Symposium. Edited by
Wiley & Sons, 1951. Pp. 825 with

J.

The Hixon Fund, granted to the California Institute of Technology,
serves to support scientific endeavor offering promise of an increased understanding of human behavior. It sponsored the symposium of which this
volume is the detailed report. Papers were read by J. von Neumann on
"The general theory of automata," by W. S. McCulloch, "Why the mind
is in the head," by K. S. Lashley, "The problem of serial order in behavior," by H. Kluver, "Functional differences between the occiptital and
temporal lobes with special reference to the interrelations of behavior and
extracerebral mechanisms," by W. Kohler, "Relational determination in
perception," by W. C. Halstead, "Brain and Intelligence," and by H. W.
Brosin, " The symposium from the viewpoint of a clinician." Each paper
is followed by a lengthy discussion which adds many further facts and
ideas. Indexes of names and of subjects are appended.
The highly technical nature of the problems and their presentation
forbid an extensive report on the contents of this volume. The brevity of
the review, however, must not be interpreted as indicative of a lack of
significance also for the non-specialist, least of all for the philosopher. The
latter ought particularly take cognizance of the recent advances in factual
studies and the development in the field of theory. This is necessary both
because it is the task of philosophy to integrate within its framework all
knowledge available and because the exposition and justification of any
" philosophy of the mind " cannot be effective unless it take account of
the actual state of knowledge. A fruitful discussion of the various aspects
of the mind-body problem is impossible if one part fails to consider known
facts and current ideas or bases his argument on views which have become
obsolete.
Apart from the special problems discussed in this symposium, there is a
general one which deserves attention. It is formulated and discussed in
a masterly manner by Dr. v. Neumann. One may state it as that of the
relations obtaining between purely logical and mathematical speculation on

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BRIEF NOTICES

one hand and the construction and interpretation of computers, automata,
and also the organism on the other. It is of great interest to realize how,
by means of collaboration and " team-work " such theoretical speculations
prove to be eminently practical.
The participants of the symposium are outstanding men, doing research
work in several fields. They are not philosophers and they do not wander
off into the reaim of philosophical speculation. The evaluation of their
findings and ideas will be up to the philosopher. He will discover much that
will force him to reconsider some of his ideas or, at least, how to reformulate them. He may also find, here and there, a corroboration of his own
conceptions. One example may be given. In the discussion on Dr. McCulloch's paper mention is made of the fact that the continuous alphawaves, in the electroencephalographic tracing, disappear when a stimulus
reaches the eye. However, as Dr. Gerard pointed out, the situation is more
complicated. Even a strong and patterned stimulus leaves the alpha waves
unchanged if the subject deliberately pays no attention to it. " Then, with
no change except what I can describe in no other way than as directing
my attention to the light," the waves can be made to disappear. (p. 94.)
Another rather significant remark was made, in the same discussion, by
Dr. Brosin: "we have wandered, he said, ... over a number of hierarchies
-the molecular, the neuronal, the cerebral-and the question has arisen
whether we need something beyond-the man or the observer."
It deserves to be pointed out that the eminent scholars, when discussing
their problems, give evidence of a notable modesty. They are no longer
sure, as their predecessors were not so long ago, that they will have in their
hands the answer to all questions, to-morrow or next year. They wisely
refrain from passing over into the field of philosophy; but one gets the
impression that, at least, some are quite aware of questions which transcend their own field.
The study of the book is earnestly recommended to everyone desirous
of forming and defending an opinion on the pertinent problems.

Thomistic Philosophy. By HENRI GRENIER, Ph. D., S. T. D., J. C. D. Translated by Rev. J. P. O'HANLEY, Ph. D. Charlottetown: St. Dunstan's
University, 1950. Vol. J., Logic, pp. fl68; Vol. II, Philosophy of Nature,
pp. 8fl0; VoL III, Metaphysics, pp. 888; Vol. IV, Moral Philosophy,
pp. 498.
The superb merits of the latin version of this manual were presented in
The Thomist (vol. IX, 1946, p. 465) by Dr. Ignatius McGuiness, 0. P.
In that review the hope was voiced that the proposed English translation
would do justice to the original work. Dr. O'Hanley, the translator, has

BRIEF NOTICES

669

realized this hope and has given to the collegiate world a very desirable
textbook in Thomistic Philosophy.
It was the college student that the translator had in mind in undertaking his work. He should be consoled by the fact that a dozen or more
colleges in the United States have already adopted the translation as
their official text.
The advantages of this work as a collegiate text in Philosophy are manifold. It is solid in its Thomism and has the additional merit of deemphasizing subtle and confusing disputations on problems that often are
inconsequential. It is succinct in presentation and leaves plenty of room
for the elaboration of expositions by the teacher. It is genuinely scholastic
in its devotion to definition and division in every area of philosophy, a
fact that experience shows is deeply appreciated by the average college
student of philosophy. It will help to eliminate a common result of some
contemporary teaching of philosophy, a wide and superficial reading of
philosophical literature without steady concentration on and organized
mastery of basic philosophical truth.
The formal method prevailing in this text demands a rigid mental
discipline that may cause some to recoil from it. Also the limited examples
presented in illustration of basic truths may lead others to conclude that
the text is dry. Others may be disappointed that the text does not follow
the usual pattern of appending to each chapter a list of suggested reading
linking Thomistic doctrine with contemporary thought and doctrine.
The text is substantial and one can be assured that in colleges where
it is adopted and used intelligently the students of philosophy will have
a solid knowledge of the field.

The March Toward Matter, Descensus Averno. By JoHN MAcPARTLAND.
New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. Pp. 80. $2.75.
The author of this essay has made a fully sincere attempt to deal with
a real problem, that of a rapprochement to be effected between the Thomistic criteriology and the theories of knowledge prevalent among modern
Idealists and Instrumentalists. He seeks to show the Thomistic doctrine
of knowledge as an immanent act to be a solution for the materialization
(the production of otherness, by synthesis, addition or by division) of the
mind, toward which many modern theories lead. (Chap. I).
This theme is developed by treating of the ' intellectus ' and ' ratio '
in Chap. H-this distinction, and the emphasis on ' intellectus ' would
provide a check to modern over-emphasis on ' ratio,' which is an evidence
of the march toward matter, and division. Chapter HI discusses the intentional union of subject and object in knowledge as a remedy for the

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BRIEF NOTICES

" speculator " or " copy " theories of knowledge. The value and need of
metaphysics forms part of Chapter IV, and is based on the doctrine of
abstraction (' Formalis ' and ' totalis ') as the epistemological basis for the
queen of the sciences. Chapter V. among other questions considers Kant as
an exponent of the materialization of the mind by the synthetic, additive
operation of the categories, and Descartes is seen as exemplifying the
divisive type of materialization (d. above, on Chap. I)". The next chapter
points out that a rapprochement can be made between Thomism and
those who, affected by Kantianism or Cartesianism, still grope for a
proper outlook. Thomism is seen to be of special value in dealing with
the questions of the " speculator " view of knowledge, the passivity of
the intellect, and the divorce of knowledge from action. (p. 76)
Unfortunately, the author's treatment of these interesting and important
questions seems quite confused. There appears to be some confusion
between the immaterial and the intentional (e:?se immateriale and esse
intentionale). The author seems to oversimplify the problem of the
intellect's grasp on being (this, in part at least, because he feels Kant
presents only a false problem) , and to minimize the necessary 'materialization ' and ' rationalization ' of the human mind. He misunderstands the
true Thomistic notion of abstraction and its role (due, perhaps, to too
much reliance on Maritain) , and thus does not see the importance of
"separatio" for metaphysics (vid. Geiger, "Abstraction et separation
d'apres S. Thomas," in Rev. Sc. Phil. et Theol. XXXI, 1947, pp. 8-40).
The general criticism, however, is that the author has attempted to deal
with such intricate matters not only in so short a space, but without the
real scientific background that is called for. To the non-scholastic the
understanding of the author's thesis would be very difficult, and the
scholastic reader, while recognizing the importance of the subject and the
general scheme of the author, would be impressed by the somewhat
confused presentation.
The system of foot-note references is very poor in many cases, with no
indication of full title, date and place of publication, etc. Many technical
terms are introduced without explanation. Some passages are examples
of how one is not to translate technical Latin phrases: " The reason to be
of metaphysics is that it treats being under an aspect which the other
sciences do not consider. That aspect is being qua being, or being in
virtue of its first to be . : ." (p. 54-Italics mine). On p.
mention
is made of Descartes' " universalis mathematicis " which, if in the dative
case, should read " universalibus "-at least, "the present form is not Latin.
It is unfortunate that such problems should have received this treatment,
and we may hope that the author will continue his studies and, at some
time in the future, produce a more useful work.

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671

Aetas del P11imer Congreso Nacional de Filosofia. Edited by Lms JuAN
GUERRERO.
Mendoza, Argentina: Universidad Nacionru de Cuyo,
HMO. Three Volumes, pp. f-!197.
These volumes record the proceedings of the first of the philosophical
congresses to be held quadrennially in Argentina under the joint auspices
of the government and the national universities. Perhaps, the present
congress would have been more fittingly described as " international "
rather than " national," because in the perusal of the list of participants
one discovers philosophers from twenty countries representing seventy-three
universities and institutes.
The scope of this congress was as wide as philosophy itself. This
extensiveness precluded an opportunity for all the philosophers invited
to utilize their talents in the intensive research, thought and discussion
of one major philosophical problem. An attempt at community of effort,
however, was made in the five Plenary Sessions which, in turn, were devoted
to: The Philosophy of the Life of the Spirit, The Human Person, Existentialism, Contemporary Philosophy, Philosophy and the City of Man. In
the closing session the entire Congress adopted resolutions recommending
a wider exchange of philosophical ideas, especially by American philosophers
who should take upon themselves the leadership of this undertaking. The
Congress affirmed that " in the search of an integral interpretation of
the human being, besides the corporeal which explains its radical relation
with the world, the spiritual explanation is no less necessary to account for
man's transcendental destiny, namely the Supreme Being to Whom the
human being ought to tend by its free activity."
At thirteen specialized group meetings 184 papers were read and discussed. Of these, a large number dealt with the Existentialist movement.
Perhaps, a dozen papers could be classified as Thomistic in orientation and
doctrine. Among the recognized Thomists present or participating by means
of papers submitted were: Father R. Garrigou-Lagrange, 0. P., Charles de
Koninck, Father J. Todoli, O.P., 0. N. Derisi, D. Labrousse.
Of special interest is the work of Argentina's philosophers, who read over
one hundred papers and communications. One cannot but conclude in
light of their works that the philosophical disciplines in the Argentine
universities have made great progress in the past several decades, and they
have produced thinkers worthy of the name. One gets the impression
that there is an underlying effort aimed at producing an Argentine national
philosophy, a counterpart, or reflection of that country's endeavors in
the political sphere.
Mention must be made of the North American contribution to the
congress. Seven representatives presented twelve papers: half of these
were historical in content, two on phases of Existentialism, the others on
9

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BRIEF NOTICES

Aristotelianism, anthropology, axiology and theology. Noteworthy is the
inexplicable omission of representatives from Catholic Universities in the
United States. It is to be hoped that this oversight will be corrected by
the organizing committee of the Second Argentine Philosophical Congress
in 1958.

Kinahips. By A. G. SEJRTILLANGES, 0. P. Translated by the Dominican
Nuns of Menlo Park, New York: McMullen,
Pp.
$2.95.
The late Pere Sertillanges was certainly one of the most, if not the most
fluent modem exponents of Thomism, as well as being one of the foremost
of Catholic apologists. Unfortunately he is not too well known in this
country, even, strange as it may seem, among graduates in philosophy
from Catholic universities. It is a pleasure, therefore, to be able to
welcome a translation of another of his spiritual books, written as a part
of his apologetical work. So often spiritual books have either a good style
of presentation with little solid doctrine, or else present substantial doctrine
in unpalatable form. Into neither of these categories could one place the
spiritual writings of Pere Sertillanges whose almost lyric style is a delight
to all who are acquainted with his works, even in philosophy, and whose
doctrine is that of one thoroughly imbued with Scripture and St. Thomas.
This happy combination of style and doctrine results in a truly worthwhile spiritual book.
Kinships deals with charity, and with man's relations to God, to self
and to others. The Thomistic reader will recognize on every page the
thought of the " Doctor Communis " expressed in terms both attractive and
accurate. The theme of the book is the central Thomistic moral doctrine
on the primacy of charity and love, and the author's practical suggestions
for daily application flow from solid doctrine and indicate a course of life
directed and inspired by the noblest of the virtues in man's relations to
God, society and to self. Of special value are the reflections (pp. l£7-156)
on self-love and its relation to the all-embracing love for God.
While wishing to express our gratitude to the translators and the publisher for making available this work of Sertillanges, we may take the
opportunity of voicing the hope that, in the near future, some more of
this author's serious philosophical works will also be published in English.
Kinahips may be recommended to all who, in the quantity of modern
spiritual literature, are seeking something of more solid worth.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Abbo, J. A., and Hannan, J. D. The Sacred Canons. St. Louis: Herder,
1952. Vol. I. Pp. 893. Vol. H. Pp. 936 with iri.dex. $19.00.
Allan, D. J., The Philosophy of Aristotle. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1952. Pp. 215 with index. $2.00,
Aquinas, St. Thomas, De Coelo et Mundo. Torino: Marietti, 1952. Pp.
685 with index. L. 3500.
Aquinas, St. Thomas, Super Evangelium S. Ioannis Lectura. Torino:
Marietti, 1952. Pp. 488 with index. L. 2000.
Aquinas, St. Thomas, Truth. (tr. by Robert W. Mulligan) Chicago:
Regnery Co., 1952. Pp. 433. $7.00.
Balducelli, P. Ruggero, Il Concetto di Carita. (Dissertation) Washington:
Catholic University Press, 1952. Pp. 236 with index. $3.00.
Boehner, Philotheus, Medieval Logic. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1952. Pp. 96 with index. $3.00.
Bruckberger, R. L., One Sky To Share. New York: Kenedy, 1952. Pp.
248 with index. $3.00.
Buytendijk, F. J., Phenomenologie de la Rencontre. Bruges: Desclee de
Brouwer, 1952. Pp. 59.
Cavanaugh, J. H., Evidence For Our Faith. Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1952. Pp. 352 with index. $3.00.
Charmot, F., The Sacred Heart and Modern Life. New York: Kenedy,
1952. Pp. 276 with notes. $3.50.
Clark, William R. (ed.) One in Mind, One in Heart, One in Affections.
Providence: Providence College Press, 1952. Pp. 101 with index.
$0.50 (paper only).
Copleston, Frederick C., Medieval Philosophy. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1952. Pp. 185 with index. $2.75.
Curran, C., Counseling in Catholic Life and Education. New York: Macmillan Co., 1952. Pp. 488 with index. $4.50.
Dawson, Christopher, Understanding Europe. New York: Sheed and Ward,
1952. Pp. 255 with index. $4.50.
Dobrowolski, Tomasz, Tomizm- Filozofia Szczescia. London: Privately
Printed by Author, 1952. Pp. 63.
Duncan-Jones, Austin, Butler's Moral Philosophy. Baltimore: Penguin
Books, 1952. Pp. 189 with index. $0.65 (paper) .
Frenay, A. D., The Spirituality of the Mass. St. Louis: Herder, 1952.
Pp. 306. $4.00.
Gallie, W. R, Peirce and Pragmatism. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1952.
Pp. 244 with index. $0.65 (paper)

673

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald, The Trinity and God the Creator. St. Louis:
Herder,
Pp. 661 with index. $7.50.
Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald, Life Everlasting. St. Louis: Herder,
Pp.
with index. $4.50.
Sister Teresia de Spiritu Sancto (tr. by Cecily Hastings and Donald
Pp.
Nicholl), Edith Stein. New York: Sheed & Ward,
$3.25.

Germany's New Nazis. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952.
Pp. 86. $2.75.
Geach, Peter & Black, Max., Translations from the Philosophical Writings
of Gottlob Frege. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. Pp. 244
with index. $5.75.
Geschel, A. J., The Sabbath, Its Meaning for Modern Man. New York:
Farrar, Straus, & Young, 1952. Pp. 118 with notes. $2.75.
Hirschbergers, Johannes, Geschichte der Philosophie-Neuzeit und Gegenwart. II Teil. Freiburg: Verlag Herder,
Pp. 593 with index.
29.50 DM.
Hoehn, Matthew (ed.), Catholic Authors-Contemporary
Biographical
Pp. 633 with index.
Sketches. Newark: St. Mary's Abbey,
$6.50.
Hotson, Leslie, Shakespeare's Motley. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1952. Pp. 133. $3.50.
Johnson, P. E., Christian Love. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press,
1951. Pp. 240 with index. $3.00.
Kimpel, B. F., Religious Faith, Language, and Knowledge. New York:
Philosophical Library, 1952. Pp. 172 with index.
Klubertanz, George P., The Discursive Power. St. Louis: The Modern
Schoolman, 1952. Pp. 329 with index. $5.00.
Koppers, Wilhelm, Primitive Man and His World Picture. New York:
Sheed & Ward, 1952. Pp.
with index. $3.50.
Messner, J., Ethics and Facts. St. Louis:- Herder, 1952. Pp. 316 with
index. $4.00.
Molloy, J. J., A Theological Interpretation of the Moral Play, Wisdom
Who is Christ. Washington: Catholic University of America Press,
with index.
1952. Pp.
Mulvey, Timothy J:, These Are Your Sons. New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., 1952. Pp. 278. $3.75.
Murphy, Francis X., Peter Speaks Through Leo, The Council of Chalcedon,
A.D. 451. Washington: Catholic University Press, 1952. Pp.l28 with
index. $Q.75.
Neill, Thomas P., Religion and Culture. Milwaukee: Bruce,
Pp.
102.
Nink, Caspar, Ontologie-Versuch einer Grundlegung. Freiburg: Verlag
Herder, 1952. Pp. 483 with index.

BOOKS RECEIVED

6'15

Olivier, Bernard, Petit Traite de l'Esperance Chretienne. Liege: La Pensee
Catholique, 1952. Pp. 104. 27 Frs.
Ory, Nicolao, Doctrina Petri Cardinalis Pasmany de Notis Ecclesiae.
Editrice "Fiamma del S. Cuore," Chieri, 1952. Pp. l!il4 with index.
L. 700.
Osbourn, J., The Morality of Imperfections. Westminster: Carroll Press,
1950. Pp. 260 with index. $3.25.
Palacios, Leopoldo, El Mito de la Nueva Cristiandad (2nd ed.). Madrid:
Ediciones Rialp, 1952. Pp. 148 with index.
Pfeifer, John Frederick, The Concept in Thomism. New York: Bookman
Associates, 1952. Pp. 215 with index. $4.00.
Reinhardt, K. P., The Existentialist Revolt. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1952.
Pp. 262 with index. $3.50.
Rosenheim, Richard, The Eternal Drama. New York: The Philosophical
Library, 1952. Pp. 292 with index. $5.00.
Rossi, Giovanni Felice, ll Codice Latino 14546 della Biblioteca Nazionale
di Parigi con gli Opuscoli di San Tommaso. Piacenza: Divus Thomas,
1952. Pp. 127 with index. L. 700.
Runes, D. D., Of God, the Devil, and the Jews. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1952. Pp. 186 with index. $3.00.
Sister Mary Alma, Operation Miriam. Maryknoll: Maryknoll Bookshelf,
1952. Pp. 64. $0.50 (paper).
Spiazzi, R., La Mediatrice della Riconciliazione Umana. Rome: Angelo
Belardetti, 1951. Pp. 450 with index.
Thevenaz, P., et al., Problemes Actuels de la Phenomenologie, Bruges:
Desclee de Brouwer, 1952. Pp. 164. 66 fr. belg.
Thibon, Gustave, What God Has Joined Together. Chicago: Regnery,
1952. Pp. 192. $UO.
--, Tulane Studies in Philosophy, Vol. I. New Orleans: Tulane University Press, 1952. Pp. 122. $2.00.
VanderVeldt, J. H. and Odenwald, R. P., Psychiatry and Catholicism. New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1952. Pp. 442 with index. $6.00.
Van Melsen, A. G. (tr. by Koren, H. J.), From Atomos to Atom. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1952. Pp. 252 with index. $4.25.
Veatch, Henry B., Intentional Logic. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1952. Pp. 395 with index. $6.00.
Von Waizsacker, C. F. (tr. by Grene, M.), The World View of Physics.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. 22 with index. $3.75.
Wall, Bernard, Tr., Gabriel Marcel, Metaphysical Journal. Chicago:
Regnery, 1952. Pp. 339 with index. $6.50.
Ward, Leo R., Christian Ethics. St. Louis: Herder, 1952. Pp. 288 with
index. $4.00.
Weil, Simone, Gravity and Grace. New York: Putnam, 1952. Pp. 235.
$3.50.

676

BOOKS RECEIVED

Wilson, R. M., The Lost Literature of Medieval England. New York:
Philosophical Library, 1952. Pp. 244 with index. $4.50.
Zubizarreta, Valentino, Theologia Dogmatico-Scholastica. Vitoria, Spain:
Procura Provincial de los PP. Carmelitas Descalzos., Vol. I, pp. 560;
Vol. II, pp. 615; Vod. ill, pp. 617; Vol. IV, pp. 510, with indexes.
Zubizarreta, Valentino, Medulla Theologiae Dogmaticae. Bilbao: Edit.
Elexpuru Hnos., 1947. Pp. 1053 with index.

INDICES OF VOLUME XV (1952)

INDEX OF AUTHORS
ANDERSON, J. F. Time and the Possibility of an Eternal World
BRENNAN, R. E. Walter Farrell, 0. P.: Apud Pooteros Sacer .
Bun, G. Review of Kant's Metaphysico of Experience, by H. J.
Paton
CoNsiDINE, J. S. Review of Theology and Evolution, ed. by E. C.
Messenger .
EGAN, J. M. Review of Karl Barth, by J. Hamer
FoLEY, L. A. Review of Cosmology; Elements of a Critique of the
Sciences and Cosmology, by F. Renoirte .
GEENEN, G. The Place of Tradition in the Theology of St. Thomas
GRACE, W. J. The Historical Opportunity of Orthodoxy .
GREENWOOD, T. Euclid and Aristotle .
HALLIGAN, N. Review of Praelectiones Iuris Matrimonii, by Th. M.
Vlaming
HuGHES, W. D. The Dynamics of Christian Perfection .
JANCAUSKAS, R. C. The Morality of Basing-Point Pricing .
McALLISTER,J. B. Review of The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop
of Cloyne, ed. by A. A. Luce and T. T. Jessop .
McNicHOLL, A. J. Review of Ernst Cassirer, by W. H. Woglom and
C. W. Hendel, and The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer, ed. by
P. A. Schilpp .
MoRRIS, H. Review of The Love of God and the Cross of Jesus, by
R. Garrigou-Lagrange
MuLLANEY, J. V. Review of Walls are Crumbling, by J. M. Oesterreicher .
NEsTOR, M. Review of I Was a Monk, by J. Tettemer .
O'CoNNELL, D. A. Christian Liberty .
PoRRECO, R. E. Review of Early Medieval Philosophy, by G. B.
Burch .
RAMIREZ, S. The Authority of St. Thomas Aquinas .
§AURAS, E. Thomistic Soteriology and the Mystical Body .
SMITH, R. The Virtue of Docility
---. Review of Whitehead's Theory of Experience, by E. P.
Shahan .
SMITH, V. E. Review of Rudolph Allers ou l'anti-Freud, by L. Jugnet
---. Review of Preface to Happiness, by E. F. Smith and L. A.
Ryan

677

PAGE
136
199

498
651
508
501
110

289
374

349

165

642

494

Sll
176
404
322
1
543

572
178
162

314

678

INDICES OF VOLUME XV

(1952)
)>AGE

Review of The Existentialists: A Critical Study, by J. Collins,
and The Existentialist Revolt, by K. F. Reinhardt .
STEVENS, G. Review of Kant's Metaphysics of Experience, by H. J.
Paton
VEATCH, H. The Significance of Current Criticisms of the Syllogism .
---. Review of Philosophical Analysis: a Collection of Essays, ed.
by M. Black
WILD, J. Review of The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, by E. J.
Carnell .

658
498

624
169

317

INDEX OF ARTICLES
Aquinas, The Authority of St. Thomas--. S. RAMrnEz
l
Aristotle, Euclid and--. T. GREENV'lOOD
374
Authority, The-- of St. Thomas Aquinas. S. RAMIREZ
l
Basing-Point, The Morality of-- Pricing. R. C. JANCAUsKAs
349
Christian,-- Liberty. D. A. O'CoNNELL
404
Christian, The Dynamics of-- Perfection. W. D. HuGHEs .
Criticisms, The Significance of Current-- of the Syllogism. H.
VEATCH
Docility, The Virtue of--. R. SMITH
572
Dynamics, The-- of Christian Perfection. W. D. HuGHEs
247
Eternal, Time and the Possibility of an--World. J. F. ANDERSON 136
Euclid,-- and Aristotle. T. GREENWOOD
374
Farrell, Walter-- ,0. P.: Apud Posteros Sacer. R. E. BRENNAN
199
Historical, The--Opportunity of Orthodoxy. W. J. GRACE
289
Inspiration, The Platonic Theory of--. A. E. VASSILION
466
Liberty, Christian--. D. A. O'CoNNELL
209, 404
Morality, The-- of Basing-Point Pricing. R. C. JANCAUSKAs
349
Mystical, Thomistic Soteriology and the-- Body. E. SAURAS
543
Opportunity, The Historical-- of Orthodoxy. W. J. GRACE
289
Orthodoxy, The Historical Opportunity of--. W. J. GRACE .
289
Perfection, The Dynamics of Christian--. W. D. HuGHES .
247
Place, The-- of Tradition in the Theology of St. Thomas. G.
GEENEN
'
110
Possibility, Time and the-- of an Eternal World. J. F. ANDERSON . 136
Pricing, The Morality of Basing-Point--. R. C. JANCAUSKAs .
349
Significance, The-- of Current Criticisms of the Syllogism. H.
VEATCH
624
Soteriology, Thomistic-- and the Mystical Body. E. §AURAS .
543
Syllogism, The Significance of Current Criticisms of the--. H.
VEATCH

INDICES OF VOLUME XV

(1952)

679
PAGE

Theology, The Place of Tradition in the--of St. Thomas. G.
GEENEN
Thomas, The Place of Tradition in the Theology of St.--. G.
GEENEN
Thomistic,-- Soteriology and the Mystical Body. E. SAURAS .
Time,--and the Possibility of an Eternal World. J. F. ANDERSON
Tradition, The Place of--in the Theology of St. Thomas. G.
GEENEN
Virtue, The-- of Docility. R. SMITH .
World, Time and the Possibility of an Eternal--. J. F. ANDERSON

110
110

543
136
110

136

INDEX OF BOOK REVIEWS
BLACK, M. ed. Philosophical Analysis: a Collection of Essays. (H.
Veatch)
BURcH, G. B. Early Medieval Philosophy. (R. E. Porreco) .
CARNELL, E. J. The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr. (J. Wild)
CoLLINS, J. The Existentialists: a Critical Study. (V. E. Smith)
GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE,R. The Love of God and the Cross of Jesus.
(H. Morris) .
HAMER, J. Karl Barth. (J. M. Egan)
JuGNET, L. Rudolph Allers ou l'anti-Freud. (V. E. Smith)
LucE, A. A. and JEsSOP, T. E. eds. The Works of George Berkeley,
Bishop of Cloyne. (J. B. McAllister) .
MEssENGER, E. C. ed. Theology and Evolution. (J. S. Considine)
OEsTERREICHER,J. M. Walls are Crumbling. (J. V. Mullaney) .
PATON, H. J. Kant's Metaphysics of Experience. (G. Biiki and G.
Stevens)
REINHARDT, K. F. The Existentialist Revolt. (V. E. Smith) .
RENOmTE, F. Cosmology: Elements of a Critique of the Sciences and
of Cosmology. (L. A. Foley) .
ScHILPP, P. A. ed. The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer. (A. J.
McNicholl)
SHAHAN, E. P. Whitehead's Theory of Experience. (R. Smith) .
SMITH, E. F. and RYAN, L. A. Preface to Happiness. (V. E. Smith)
TETTEMER, J. I Was a Monk. (M. Nestor) .
VLAMING, TH. M. Praelectiones Juris Matrimonii. (N. Halligan)
WoGLOM, W. H. and HENDEL, C. W. Ernst Cassirer: The Problem of
Knowledge. (A. J. McNicholl)

END OF VoLuME XV

169
817
658
494
508

165
651
811
498
658
501

178
814
176

642