THE THOMI T A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY Tm:: DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE oF ST. JosEPH EDIToRs: Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoL. XVI JANUARY, 1953 No.1 EXEMPLAR CAUSALITY AND THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER B OTH the purpose of this study and the profound theological problem which lies behind it demand a brief introduction. Recent years have seen many attempts to force a gap between the teaching of the Latin and the Greek Fathers concerning man's intimate supernatural relations with God. According to the theologians who supported these attempts, the Latins started from the notion of unity in the Divine Essence, which is common to all Three Persons. Applying that unity strictly to all the divine ad extra operations, they explained the relationship between the soul in a state of grace and the Trinity according to the iron law of appropriation. The Greeks, on the other hand, taught a more personal doctrine. They started from a scriptural basis. i.e. from the idea of the Trinity of Persons in God, and consequently they were able to discover, in those same ad extra operations, a 1 DAVID L. GREENSTOCK personal relationship between the soul and the Divine Persons which was based on something more than mere appropriation. This theory, which started with Petau, Sheeben and others, was not able to stand up to the serious criticism of its fundamental tenets by Froget and Galtier/ so much so that, at one time, it appeared to have lost most of its adherents, only to be revived once more through the influence on Catholic thought of the modern existential philosophies, with their doctrine of contact with God through immanent experience and the fundamental consciousness of one's own existence. This is the theme which runs through all existential writings, from Kierkegaard and Jaspers to Marcel, Lavelle and Zubiri. In their view man's inner consciousness reveals God to him as the Transcendent Being in whom all exist-a vain hope and a useless theory, perhaps, but one which reveals a mental anxiety, together with a desire for God which He, in His infinite wisdom and goodness, has already satisfied in the supernatural order through the gift of sanctifying grace with the subsequent Indwelling of the Blessed Trinity in the soul. Under pressure from this modern philosophy theologians returned to the attack, because many of them considered that the classical explanations were not sufficient to satisfy this desire for God revealed in the existential writings. Would it not be possible to establish a more personal relationship between the soul in grace and the Three Divine Persons? To many of them the doctrine of appropriation still seemed vague and deficient, although they were able to see the difficulties which lay ahead. On the one hand, the Scriptures seemed to imply this personal and individual activity, whereas the unity of the Divine Essence in the Three Persons seemed to exclude it. Also the Encylical Mystici Corporis contained a warning which could not be ignored: but, under pain of departing from true doctrine and the true teaching of the Church, they [that is, the theologians] must all 1 Cf. B. Froget, 0. P., De l'Habitation du Saint Esprit dans les ames Justes, pp. 447 sq.; Galtier, S. J., L'Habitation en nous des Trois Personnel!, pp. 4-150. EXEMPLAR CAUSALITY AND THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER 8 hold this as quite certain, that any explanation of this mystical union is to be rejected if it makes the faithful in any way pass beyond the order of created things and so trespass on the Divine sphere that one single attribute of the eternal God could be predicated of them in the proper sense. Moreover, this certain truth must be firmly kept in mind, that in these matters all things are to be held common to the Blessed Trinity, insofar as the same relate to God as the supreme efficient cause. 2 This clear teaching of the Vicar of Christ altered the situation considerably. The approach along the line of efficient causality was definitely closed. Any attempt to establish such a personal contact between the soul and the individual Persons through formal causality would lead inevitably to open conflict with the decrees of Trent, while material causality was useless and absurd. There remained only two lines of approach to be tried, that of :final causality and that through the notion of the exemplar cause. Theologians have turned their attention to the latter as holding out more hope of the personal relationship which they are seekingo3 The purpose of this article is to study the notion of exemplar causality as it is developed for us by St. Thomas, in order to see if it can throw some light on these great mysteries of the supernatural life of man, including the mystery of Grace, the adopted sonship and the Indwelling of the Blessed Trinity in the souL The few attempts which have been made up to now to study this approach are, to our way of thinking, deficient, mainly because the clear philosophical notions have been wanting. All these reasons force us to begin any study of this problem with a brief summary of the philosophical basis for exemplar causality as St. Thomas understands it. The exemplar cause has its origin either inside o:r outside the mind, but, when we come to examine it more closely, we discover that it is essentiMystici Corporis, C. 'I'. S. Trans., p. 48, n. 78. Cf. Dom. Lucien Chl\mbat, 0. S. B., Les Missions des Personnes de la Sainte Trinite selon S. Thomas d'Aquin (Editions de Fontenelle; Abbaye S. Wandrille, 2 3 1947). 4 DAVID L. GREENSTOCK ally something which is internal to the mental process. Thus, the artist may have an external model for his painting, but that model reaches his canvas by means of the mental idea which he forms of it. For this reason no two artists have ever reproduced the same external object or scene in exactly the same way. In its strictest sense, therefore, the exemplar is that form or idea which the agent has in mind, and which he seeks to reproduce in an external medium. In this description of the exemplar the words " form or idea " indicate the genus, since the exemplar naturally belongs to the realm of ideas. The rest of the definition serves to distinguish the exemplar from all other ideas. From this it will be evident that the exemplar cannot be identified with the impressed species, since of its very nature the exemplar must be clearly known, while the impressed species does not form the object of knowledge, being, in the language of the text books, a « medium quo incognitum." Nor can we identify the exemplar with every expressed species or idea properly so-called, but only with those which are regarded by the intellect as capable of external reproduction. The whole idea of the exemplar is that it should be an internal model of what the agent wishes to produce externally, for which reason it must belong to the sphere of the practical intellect rather than to that of the speculative. Since it cannot exist outside an intelligent cause, St. Thomas defines it as " forma quam aliquid imitatu:r ex intentione agentis qui determinat sibi finem"" 4 From which it follows that, even though there may be an intimate :relation between them, nevertheless the exemplar is also dearly distinguished from the internal form which enters into the intimate constitution of the effect. One look at any work of art will be more than sufficient to prove to us that the exemplar undoubtedly fulfills an the conditions necessary for a real cause; but, when we attempt to determine the exact nature of its causal influence on the final effect, we find ourselves in a more difficult position. Unless we wish to claim that the exemplar forms a fifth class of cause all 4 De Verit., q. 3, a. 1. EXEMPLAR CAUSALITY AND THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER 5 on its own, we are forced, it would seem, to reduce it to one of the four causes. The classification is by no means an obvious one, and so it need not surprise us to find that there are several opinions on this subject. In his commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics St. Thomas includes the exemplar under the general heading of the formal cause, but it is clear that, in this passage, he is using the word " formal " in an analogous sense. In other words, there are several classes of things which may be called forms, some which exist inside the mind and others which are external to it. 5 A simple scheme will make his teaching clear. Extrinsic to the mind and intrinsic to the effect Form . . . . the formal cause, strictly so called. The impressed species (medium quo incognitum). Intrinsic to the mind and extrinsic to the effect The simple idea, The expressed { species .... The exemplar idea. This does not, however, mean to say that there is no relation whatever between the exemplar and .the other causes apart from the formal cause. In some ways, as St. Thomas himself indicates, there is a very definite connection between the causal activity of the exemplar and that of the final, efficient and instrumental causes. Nevertheless, since it seems to have much more in common with the formal cause, the exemplar is usually called the formal extrinsic cause. The reason why we incline to the opinion which relates these two causes so closely is simple. Not merely is the idea a productive form which has 5 V Metaphys., lect. !i!: "Alio autem modo dicitur causa species et exemplum, i.e. exemplar: et haec est causa formalis, quae comparatur dupliciter ad rem. Uno modo sicut forma intrinseca rei, et haec dicitur species. Alio modo sicut extrinseca a re, ad cuius tamen similitudinem res fieri dicitur, et secundum hoc exemplar rei dicitur forma." 6 DAVID L. GREENSTOCK for its object the formation of a new effect of which it is a true cause, but also it is the rule and the measure of the thing produced, specifying it in much the same way as the external object specifies the faculty which· perceives it. 6 For which reason we say that any effect is more or less perfect according to the degree of accuracy with which it represents the idea in the mind of the person who produced it. This depends, to a great extent, on the intrinsic form which constitutes the effect in a given species and is, at the same time, an imitation of the model in the mind which produces it. In this sense the roles of the intrinsic form and of the exemplar coincide, i. e. insofar as both are necessary to constitute the effect in a given species and both are forms. The exemplar reaches out to the effect produced through the medium of the efficient and the instrumental cause, but since these are not in the genus of forms, it is not related to them so closely as it is to the intrinsic form. The relation between the exemplar and the final cause is obvious, but whereas the end in view provides both the motive for action and also the term produced and is willed as such by the agent, the exemplar is not desired or willed for itself, but rather with a view to the effect. The notion which is really specific to the exemplar is that of something which is imitable. This explanation which is so important for a full understanding of the role of the exemplar cause has very deep roots in the metaphysics of Aquinas. In it we can find the ultimate reason for many of those philosophical axioms which appear so frequently in his writings. For example, the fact that every effect is contained in its cause " eminenter," L e. on a higher plane, is sufficiently illustrated, not merely by the power of the cause, but also by the fact that, if the cause is an intelligent one, the very form which is destined to constitute the effect in one species rather than another is contained in the exemplar idea. Applying this to the Divine Cause St. Thomas points • Cf. de Verit., q. 3, a. 3. EXEMPLAR CAUSALITY AND THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER 7 out that even those things which, in themselves, are without life are alive in God. 7 Similarly, if we consider the very notion of truth itself, and if we really wish to establish the reason for St. Thomas' definition of it as " adaequatio rei et intellectus," we can find the full and perfect explanation only with reference to the exemplar idea, i. e. insofar as all creatures represent perfectly the divine idea according to which they were created. This likeness lies at the root of all truth, and to ignore it would lead us, in the long run, to a purely relative or voluntarist idea of truth, lacking in all ontological value. We have already mentioned the fact that to act in conformity with and through the medium of exemplar ideas is something which is proper to beings possessing intelligence. St. Thomas brings out the full significance of this when discussing the difference between rational and irrational natures. In the latter the " form " of the effect as it exists in the cause is to be found in the nature, and by means of it we can prove the truth of the axiom that " omne agens agit sibi .simile." In the intellectual creature, however, over and above this natural tendency to produce effects in its own likeness, there is also to be found the exemplar idea, which is the intellectual pattern or model according to the details and the design of which the effect is produced. 8 This is of considerable importance when we come to apply these general notions of exemplar causality to the First Cause, God. There will be no need to stress the fact that, as the First Cause, God must have in Himself the exemplar idea of all 7 Summa Theol., I, q. 18, a. 4, ad 2: "Dicendum quod exemplata oportet conforman exemplari secundum rationem formae, non autem secundum modum essendi .... Unde et rationes rerum, quae in seipsis non vivunt, in mente divina sunt vita, quia in mente divina habent esse divinum." 8 Ibid., q. 15, a. 1: "Agens autem non ageret propter formam nisi inquantum similitudo formae est in ipso. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter. In quibusdam agentibus praeexistit forma rei fiendae secundum esse naturale, sicut in his quae agunt per naturam ... in quibusdam, vero, secundum esse intelligible, ut in his quae agunt per intellectum." 8 DAVID L. GREENSTOCK creatures. However, although all such effects have their model in God, that does not mean to say that they all imitate His divine perfections in the same way. Thus, e. g. the exemplar of color which is in the Divine Cause is not quite the same as that of goodness or truth. All the magnificent effects of light and of color are found, as in their exemplar, both in the divine essence and also in the divine intellect in which their archetypal idea is formed; but they are there only virtually, i.e. inasmuch as the divine nature has the power to produce them. On the contrary, when we consider the created perfections of goodness and truth, not merely are their exemplar ideas to be found in the divine intellect, but also their concept is to be found formally in the divine as such. Naturally, such perfections are to be found in God in a much more perfect way than in His creatures, being infinite and free from all imperfection. Nevertheless, they do actually exist in God according to their formal concept. Therefore, we can say that God is good and true, and we mean that just as it stands. Not so, however, can we say that God is color.9 These truths are familiar to every theologian, but a deeper penetration into them is necessary if we are to understand the applications of the doctrine of exemplar causality to the spiritual life of the soul. The exemplar ideas of all created things can be found both in the divine essence and also in the divine wisdom, but not always in quite the same way. The very simplicity of God demands that His divine knowledge should be one simple act of understanding. In that etemal act by which He comprehends His own divine essence He also knows the infinite variety of ways in which that essence can be imitated ad "I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, 4: "dicendum quod exemplar rerum est in Deo dupliciter: vel quantum ad id quod est in intellectu suo, et sic secundum ideas est exemplar intellectus divinus omnium quae ab ipso sunt, sicut intellectus artificis per formam artis omnium artificiatorum. Vel quantum ad id quod est in natura sua ratione suae bonitatis qua bonus est exemplar omnis bonitatis, et similiter est de veritate. Unde patet quod non eodem modo Deus est exemplar coloris et veritatis." Cf. Quodl. IV, q. 1, a. 1. EXEMPLAR CAUSALITY AND THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER 9 in creatures. Thus, this one simple idea contains in its infinity the essences of all individuals. Such variety in absolute simplicity is not impossible in God, as Aquinas points out/ 0 because there is a difference between the idea as such and the exemplar. The latter is destined to be reproduced outside the thinking subject, and thus always implies a direct relationship to the effect produced. As St. Thomas says, speaking of this divine essence and its simple idea, " secundum ergo quod exemplar est, secundum hoc se habet ad omnia quae a Deo fiunt secundum aliquod tempus. Secundum vero quod cognoscitivum est, se habet ad omnia quae cognoscuntur a Deo, etiamsi nullo tempore fiant." 11 It is, however, essential that this relationship between God and His creatures which is based on the exemplar idea should not be misunderstood. Every relation between God and the created world has to be judged from two very different points of view. From that of the creatures, there is a real relation between them and God both as the First Cause and also as the Exemplar Idea. From God's point of view, however, such a real relationship would be impossible, and thus in place of it there exists a relation of reason only, implying no dependence of God on His creatures" Such is the constant teaching of Aquinas. 12 To sum up, then-the divine wisdom is the exemplar cause of all creatures insofar as God, by His perfect knowledge of His divine essence, sees the infinite variety of created imitations of that perfection" This He sees in one simple act of knowledge which virtually contains many ideas when it is compared with the actual effects produced. But what of the divine essence itself? Is not that also the exemplar of creatures, since, however imperfect they may be, all creatures are the finite imitations of the infinite perfection of God? The attempt to reply to 1 ° Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 15, a. :i!c., et ad 9.!; q. 44, a. 3c.; de Pot., q. 7, a.l, ad 3; II Cont. Gent., c. £. 11 Summa Theol., I, q. 15, a. 3c., cf. de Verit., q. 12, a. 6c. 12 Cf. Summa. Theol., I, q. 28, a.l, ad 3; q. 32, a. 2c.; q. Ul, a. 7, ad 4; 1 Sent., d. 14, q. 2, a. l, qcla. l, ad l; ibid., d. 14, q. 1, a. 1; d. 37, q. 2, a. 3. 10 DAVID L. GREENSTOCK that question will take us one step further along the road we wish to travel in this article. In God everything which implies causality belongs, of its very nature, to the divine essence, since God is the cause of created things by His essence which is identified with the causal attributes of intellect and will.13 However, as we have already seen, not all the perfections of the creature are to be found in the same way in that divine essence. Some are found there only virtually, insofar as God has the power to produce them in His creatures by His causal activity; while others are to be found there in their formal concepts, but in a more perfect way than they exist in creatures. It is this latter class of perfections which gives rise to the image of God in His creatures, inasmuch as the creature possesses a created participation of them in a greater or a lesser degree. For this reason St. Thomas says, " unumquodque dicitu:r bonum bonitate divina, sicut primo principio exemplari effectivo et formali totius bonitatis. Nihilominus, tamen, unumquodque dicitur bonum similitudine bonitatis sibi inhaerente, quae est formaliter sua bonitas denominans ipsum." 14 It is interesting to notice that at the very root of this question of exemplar causality in God lies the fact that the creature participates, not merely in the perfections of the divine essence as such, but also in the perfection of the divine being. 15 In God this being is identified with His very essence, while in creatures it is distinct, since no creature can be pure act. Also the divine essence is not merely the foundation of the divine exemplar causality, but also it holds the key to all human knowledge. If there is any harmony between the human intellect and being, that harmony which we call truth,-it is due 13 De Verit, q.lO, a.l3: "Omne illud quod in divinis causalitatem habet ad essentiam pertinet, cum Deus, per essentiam suam, sit causa rerum." u Summa Theol., I, q. 6, a. 4c.; cf. ibid., II-II, q. 27, a. 3; I Cont. Gent., cc. 40-42; de Verit., q. 2, a. 4. 15 I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 2c.: "Unde patet quod divinum esse dicitur esse omnium rerum a quo omne esse creatum effective et exemplariter manat." Cf. Quodl. IV, q.l, a.l. EXEMPLAR CAUSALITY AND THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER 11 to the fact that man's intellect is made on the pattern of God's, and because his knowledge is a participation of that infinite knowledge which is the exemplar idea of all things. Man can know truth because the things which form the object of his knowledge conform absolutely to the divine exemplar idea which, in its turn is based on the divine essence. 16 According to the degree of participation in the divine perfections we can measure the perfection of the individual creature both in. its nature and also in its imitation of the divine exemplar. According to the degree of perfection in this imitation we say that, whereas all creatures are made to the likeness of God, some, by reason of their special perfection, are made "in His Image." When speaking of this image of God in His creatures we have to be careful to distinguish two distinct uses of the term. In its wide sense " image " can be used both to signify the exemplar idea which God has of all creatures by means of the operation of the divine intellect, and also the creatures themselves as being imitations ad extra of that idea. Apart from this general use, however, the word image has a strict theological meaning when applied to the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity. In this sense it refers to the Word of God, who is the perfect Image of the Father, proceeding from Him by intellectual generation. In this sense, as St. Thomas tells us, the word signifies the Person directly and the essence indirectly or " in obliquo," as identified with the Person. 11 Thus it is possible for us to distinguish between the idea as such and the Word of God, since the idea signifies directly the exemplar in the divine mind, while the Person of the Word implies first of all origin by a process of intellectual generation which gives rise to a perfect Image of the Father, in which Image creatures have their due place. 18 ·Not merely are they 16 De V erit., q. 3, a. 2: " Et ideo, ipsa divina essentia, cointellectis diversis proportionibus rerum ad earn, est idea uniuscuiusque rei . . . . et est quidem una omnium ex parte essentiae, sed pluralitas invenitur ex parte diversarum proportionum creaturarum ad ipsam." 17 Cf. I Sent., d. 28, q. 2, a. lc. 18 Cf. de V erit., q. 4, a. 4, ad 4, et ad 5. 12 DAVID L. GREENSTOCK represented therein, but also the Word of God, together with the Father and the Holy Ghost, is the operative principle through which they come into being. The perfect Image of God, then, is the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity. Thus, when the word " image " is used of creatures it will be necessary to understand that application properly so as not to confuse the creature with the Creator. 19 There are certain conditions which have to be fulfilled before anything can be said to be a true image. First, there must be a similarity between it and the object of which it is the image, and this similarity must be not merely analogous or generic, but a likeness in species, or at least, in some quality which is regarded as a sign of that species. In this way a man's face, represented in a picture, is said to be an image of him insofar as it reproduces the various lines and contours of his face .. Secondly, the image must have its origin in the object or person of which it is an image. We do not say that one egg is the image of another, but we do speak of a son as being the image of his father or a portrait as being the image of the sitter. From this it is now possible to distinguish several types of image. There is the artificial image, as in a photograph or painting; the intentional image in the mental expressed species; and lastly, the natural image, which originates from the object of which it is the image, has the same nature and the same mode of being. It is in this latter sense that we speak of a son as the image of his father. The origin or cause of the image is, strictly speaking, the exemplar, while the object itself which proceeds from it with these conditions is the image. 20 The foundation of this relationship of image to exemplar is that particular quality of the object which fonnally fulfills these conditions. Thus, a son is the image of his father in his very nature; the portrait is the image of the sitter insofar as it reproduces in itself the lines and the contours of his face. Once this has been clearly understood we can see why the Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 93, a. 1; ibid., ad 2; I Se:nt., d. 34, q. 2, a. 2c. •• Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 35, a. 1, ad l; a. 2, ad 3. 19 EXEMPLAR CAUSALITY AND THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER 18 term " image " is reserved in its strictest sense to the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, since the Son alone proceeds from the Father by way of intellectual generation in identity of nature. Consequently, only the generation of the Son by the Father demands, by the very nature of the originative process, the production of a term which is the image of the Father in all things. For this reason St. Thomas says that the term " image " cannot be applied to the Holy Ghost, except insofar as He has the identical divine nature with the Father and the Son-and not because of the nature of the originative process itself. When we apply these notions of image to creatures we find that, while all without discrimination are made in the likeness of God, only the rational or intellectual creatures are called images of God. Even then, as Aquinas tells us, it is better to say that they are made " in the image of God," to indicate that, at best, they are imperfect images! 1 In the purely natural order, man is the image of God because of his faculties of intellect and will, which give him a natural aptitude and capacity for the knowledge and the love of God, not as He is in Himself, but as He can be known and loved through His created effects in the natural order. This doctrine is closely allied to what we have said with regard to the intimate connection between God and truth. All our natural knowledge is but a participation of the divine truth, which impresses itself upon ou:r minds through the medium of created things-a fact which at once brings us up against the doctrine of the divine exemplar causality. 22 When we apply this same notion to the supernatural order, we find that man is made in the image of God insofar as he possesses a supernatural capacity for knowing and loving God as He is in Himself, imperfectly in this world by faith and charity, and perfectly once he is face to face with God in the beatific vision. This image of the divine perfections is a direct effect of sanctifying grace, and would be impossible without that gift. 23 Ibid., a. 2, ad 8; q. 98, a. l, ad 2. Cf. Quodl. VIII, a. 4c.; ibid., X, a. 7. •• Cf. Summa Tkeol., 1, q. 93, a. 4c. 21 22 14 DAVID L. GREENSTOCK The vision of God face to face is proper to God alone and can never be the proper object of any created intellect in the natural order. 24 However, our Faith teaches us that God has granted this face to face vision to His intellectual creatures, and that, in order to make it possible for them to attain it, He has raised them up to the supernatural level. This vision of God would be impossible unless God produced in the intellectual creature some proportio'n between the created intellect and the divine essence as its object. For this reason we are forced to conclude that sanctifying grace is a created participation of the divine nature itself, which alone can raise man up to the supernatural level and thus make him capable of this vision. Now, we are indebted to the Salmanticenses for the clear distinction between the two elements which enter into the notion of participation, i. e. that of imitation and that of relationship. 25 Any relation between two things is always limited to that point in which they chance to agree and which can be formally predicated of both extremes of the relationship. Imitation goes further than this, because any image represents its exemplar in something which is proper to that exemplar as it is in itself. The exemplar and the image may differ to an infinite degree in their mode of being, but, at the same time, there is a relation and a proportion between them which depends on the very notion of exemplar and image. With this in mind St. Thomas says, " Deus non est forma ipsius animae vel voluntatis qua fo:rmaliter vivere potest, sed dicitur vita animae sicut p:rincipium exemplarite:r influens vitam gratiae ipsius." 26 Grace is not, then, the divinity itself, but it is the foundation in the supernatural order by reason of which man is said to be made "in the image of God," having for its exemplar the divine nature itself. Thus, there is a direct proportion between grace and the divinity. We may notice, in passing, that St. 24 Cf. Ill Cont. Gent., c. "' Cf. Salmanticenses, De Gratia, I, c. sub; IV, n. 63. •• Cf. 1 Sent., d.l7, a. 7, ad l, et ad 2. EXEMPLAR CAUSALITY AND THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER 15 Thomas closes the door against any kind of pantheism by excluding the possibility of God playing the part of the formal intrinsic cause, even in the supernatural order. Man is the image of God, then, principally because he is raised to the supernatural level through sanctifying grace. Nevertheless, other things are also said' to be images of God, and therefore the explanation we have just given is not altogether sufficient of itself to define exactly the nature of grace or to distinguish it clearly from all other created effects, whether natural or supernatural. To do that efficiently it will :first of all be necessary to distinguish between the two very different types of image, i. e. the ontological and the intentional. The intentional or intellectual image belongs, of its very nature, to the order of knowledge, implying a relation between the intellect and its object, or between the object and its representative idea in the mind, in both cases producing a unity between these two extremes which belongs to the intentional order. The ontological image, on the other hand, has its foundation in the real order, as something which reproduces or copies the thing of which it is an image in its very being. Now, it should be obvious that grace is not an image of God in the first sense, because no creature can fully represent to the understanding the divine essence as it is in itself. are left, therefore, with the ontological image which, as we have already indicated, can be of several kinds. The perfect ontological image demands absolute equality between itself and its exemplar. This equality is not demanded by the imperfect image, which only requires imitation· of its exemplar in some way or other. 27 Thus, within the Trinity there is a perfect Image, the Word of God; but outside the Trinity there are only imperfect images which vary in their degree of participation in the divine essence and perfections. •• Summa Theol., q. 98, a. I: "Aequalitas non est de ratione imaginis, quia, ut Aug. dicit, ubi est imago non continuo est aequalitas . . . est tamen de ratione perfectae imaginis; nam in perfecta imagine non deest aliquid imagini quod insit illi de quo est expressa. Manifestum est autem quod in homine invenitur aliqua 16 DAVID L. GREENSTOCK We must keep in mind all the time that the image is always at one extreme of a relationship, and, furthermore, of a relationship which is based on origin. Now, the two extremes of any relation are united merely through the foundation on which that relation is based. Where is this foundation to be found in the case of sanctifying grace? If we can answer that question we shall have discovered not merely the real basis for the supernatural nature of grace, but also the reason why it is an image, however imperfect, of the divine nature as it is in itself. This foundation will have to be found in the very nature of grace itself, and not primarily in the fact that through it we are able to perform acts of virtue which enable us to attain to God as He is in Himself. To look for such a foundation in the virtues alone, in the beatific vision which is the term of grace or even in the act of loving God through the medium of charity, is really a waste of time. It is true that grace is the foundation of such operations, but it is not itself formally operative. Also we have to remember that the mode of being does not enter into the concept of the image, nor indeed, into that of formal participation; whereas the relationship which is the result of the participated form does enter into that concept. 28 Thus, St. Thomas says, "exemplata oportet conformari exemplari secundum rationem formae, non autem secundum modum essendi." 29 This brings out even more clearly the close connection between the notions of formal cause and exemplar. Dei similitudo, quae deducitur a Deo sicut ab exemplari. Non est autem similitudo secundum aequalitatem; quia in infinitum excedit exemplar hoc tale exemplatnm." •• I Sent., d. 84, q. a. " Cum Deus sit causa exemplaris onmium rerum, ipsae creaturae proponuntur ut quaedam imago Dei, per quam in ipsum devenire possumus. Similitudo autem in aliqua imagine reperta dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, quantum ad rationem formae, et sic imago ab exemplari non dissidet, et id quod notat formam imaginis potest etiam exemplari convenire. Alio modo consideratur quantum ad esse quod habet in imagine, et sic dissidet ab exemplari . . . . nomina ergo illa quibus designatur ratio formae secundum quam creatura est Dei quasi imago, de Deo et de creatura dicuntur; per prius de Deo, cnm ilia ratio formae a Deo in creaturam effiuat." •• Summa Theol., I, q. 18, a. 4, ad. EXEMPLAR CAUSALITY AND THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER 17 By keeping these facts in mind it should be possible for us to obtain some idea of what we mean when we say that grace is a formal participation in the divine nature in such a way that it implies in itself the notion of image. Grace plays the part in the soul of a new supernatural nature, and this it does by reproducing in a created and imperfect manner the divine nature itself with its perfect activity as the root cause of all the divine operations and perfections. Nothing less than this would do, because grace has for its object the beatific vision, which is proper to God alone. Therefore grace must have for its exemplar the divine nature itself, and consequently, produces in man an image of that nature. Of its very nature it belongs to the supernatural order, and contains all the other supernatural gifts within itself as the seed contains the flowers or the fruit which flow from it. No other gift of God expresses the divine archetype so universally or so perfectly. The divine exemplar of which grace is the created image must, therefore, be the divine essence itself, as common to the Three Divine Persons. In other words, grace is not merely an effect of the common operation ad extra of those Three Persons existing in one and the same divine nature from the point of view of efficient causality, but also it is related to that same divine nature as to its exemplar cause. For this :reason St. Thomas says, "g:ratia quae in nobis est, est e:ffectus essentiae divinae non habens :respectum ad distinctionem pe:rsonamm!' 30 To make it quite clear that he is speaking not merely of efficient causality but also of the exemplar cause he distinguishes, in the Summa, between the two meanings which must be given to the phrase " in the image of God." In one sense this phrase refers to the efficient cause, the whole Trinity operating through the unity of the nature. In yet another sense it refers to the exemplar cause, which is, as he says, " ipsa essentia divina, quae abusive imago dicitur secundum quod imago ponitur pro exemplari." 31 30 81 Ill Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 2, sol. lc.; d. de Verit., q. 10, a.13c. I Sent., d. 28, q. 2, a. lc. 2 18 DAVID L. GREENSTOCK Thus, we may put aside any ideas of a personal relationship between the soul and the individual Persons of the Trinity which is based on the nature of grace itself, whether we consider that divine gift in its efficient cause o:r in its exemplar. In both senses it is related not to the Persons directly but to the divine essence. 32 However, grace produces in the soul as a result of its presence there certain effects, such as the adopted sonship and the Indwelling of the Three Divine Persons of the Trinity. Therefore it will be necessary to examine these effects briefly, in order to see whether they imply a more personal relationship between the soul and the individual Persons of the Trinity from the point of view of exemplar causality. 1. The Adopted Sonship. We may take it as an established fact that grace confers upon man the gift of divine adopted sonship, with a consequent right to the joys of the beatific vision. Because this effect is produced in the soul as a direct result of the divine love for man, it is attributed to the Holy Ghost, as to the Sanctifier of souls. However, even a brief meditation on the nature of this adopted sonship will make it clear that it unites us very closely to Christ, the Second Person of the Trinity, who is the Eternal Son of God. This relation is brought about, not merely because He won for us our redemption by His incarnation, passion and death on the Cross, but also because His eternal sonship is the exemplar on which our adoption is based. 33 It is important, however, to distinguish the role of grace in our adoption from that of the Three Divine Persons. 1 •• De Verit., q.lO, a.18: "Omne illud quod in divinis causalitatem habet, ad essentiam pertinet, cum Deus per essentiam suam sit causa rerum. Propria autem personarum sunt relationes quibus personae, non ad creaturas, sed ad invicem referuntur." Cf. IV Cont. Gent., c. fll. •• Ill Sent., d. 10, q. 2, a. l, sol. 3: "Potest autern notare formalem causam, et hoc dupliciter, vel inhaerentem vel exemplarem. Si inhaerentem, sic adoptati sumus per Spiritum Sanctum, cui appropriatur cariti!S. . . . Si vero designat causam exemplarem formalem, sic adoptati sumus per Filium, unde Rom. 8. ' quos praescivit conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui '." EXEMPLAR CAUSALITY AND THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER 19 Our adoption is an effect of grace insofar as grace is a formal participation in the divine nature. From the point of· view of grace, then, we are adopted by the whole Trinity and the exemplar of our adoption is the divine essence itself, of which grace is the created participation. This does not make it any less true to say that our adopted sonship is a created imitation of the eternal sonship of the Second Person of the Trinity. In this wa.y we are united in a very special way to the Son of God, whose eternal sonship is the exemplar of our own. St. Thomas explains this very simply. He points out the differences between our sonship and that of Christ, indicating, at the same time, that our adoption must be common to the Three Persons from the viewpoint of efficient causality. There is, nevertheless, a similarity between our adoption and the sonship of Christ; and thus, while our sonship is an effect of the united action of the Trinity, still it is appropriated to the Father as its author, the Son as its exemplar and the Holy Ghost as the Sanctifier of souls.84 From our point of view, then, this analogous participation in the eternal sonship produces in us a special relationship between our souls and the Three Divine Persons, and especially to the Second Person. This relation, like all others between creatures and their creator, must be real on our part and only a rational relation on the part of God. We can distinguish several elements in this relationship. Its efficient cause is the divine action on the soul which is common to all Three Persons. The formal cause of it is grace as a participation in the divine nature and the root of all supernatural gifts. Its exemplar cause is to be found in all Three Persons, as identified with the divine nature, but in a special way in the Second Person, whose eternal sonship is the divine model of our adoption. While we are speaking of the ·Second Person of the Trinity it is as well to indicate that, in St. Thomas' teaching concerning the Incarnation, this idea of exemplar causality has full play. For example, he points out that Christ's Resurrection from the dead is the exemplar of our resurrection at the last •• Cf. Summa Theol., ill, q. a. DAVID L. GREENSTOCK day. 33 The mysteries of His life on earth have a direct bearing on our lives, as the model or exemplar to which we, as members of His Mystical Body, are expected to conform. We may leave it to writers on the spiritual life to develop this idea in its full perfection. Here it will be sufficient for us to point out that this teaching of Aquinas with regard to our adoption can only be correctly understood in the light of his doctrine with ence to the Divine Missions, of which we shall have more to say later. 36 Our relations with God, whether in the natural or the natural order, can be considered under two very different aspects: either from the point of view of the divine causality or from that of the created effect which follows from that causality. We make no apology for repeating once more that, if created effects are considered from the aspect of divine efficient causality, then they are all common to the Three Persons in such a way that it is not possible to distinguish in them the action of one individual Person rather than another. Causality in God is an essential and not a personal attribute, and, as we shall see, this is true of all causality. If, however, we consider this relationship between creatures and God from the point of view of the effect produced, then the position is very different. All efficient causality achieves its object in the effects it produces by means of a formal cause, which plays the major part in conforming the effect produced to the exemplar idea of it in the mind of the agent. This fact accounts for the close relationship between the formal and the exemplar causes. The created effect always has a real relationship to the essential attributes which are common to all Three •• Ibid., q. 56, a. 1, ad 3. •• St. Thomas indicates this when he says: "Dicendum. quod filiatio adoptiva est quaedam partici.patio filiationis naturalis, quod fit in nobis appropriate a Patre qui est principium naturalis filiationis, et per donum Spiritus Sancti, qui est amor Patris et Filii .... et ideo, sicut Filio incarnato, adoptivam filiationem accipimus ad similitudinem filiationis eius, ita Patre incarnato, adoptivam filiationem reciperemus ab eo tamquam a principio naturalis filiationis, et a Spiritu Sancto tamquam a nexu communi Patris et Filii." Ibid., q. 3, a. 5, ad S; cf. II-II, q. 45, a. 6, ad 1; III, q. 23, a. 2, ad 3. EXEMPLAR CAUSALITY AND THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER 21 Divine Persons, but occasionally there can also be noticed in it a certain similarity between some quality which it possesses and a proper attribute belonging to one of the Divine Personso It is on this similarity that the whole doctrine of appropriation on the lines of exemplar causality is built upo Thus, returning to our adoption by God, it has a relation to the essential attributes of God as have all other created effects, but also there is an undoubted similarity between it and the true, eternal sonship of the Second Person" Similarly, the virtue of charity is infused into the soul by the joint action of the Three Persons. But this same virtue, both insofar as it has its origin, as a free gift, in the divine love for man, and also because it enables man to love God with a love of true friendship, bears a special resemblance to the Holy Ghost, as the personification of Divine Love, and therefore, as its exemplaro St. Thomas says, " Quae quidem (caritas) e:fficienter est a tota Trinitate, sed exemplariter manat ab amore, qui est Spiritus Sanctus: et ideo frequenter invenitur quod Spiritus Sanctus sit amor quo diligimus Deum et proximum!' 37 We shall see that this phrase, " exemplarite:r manat," has for St. Thomas the meaning of appropriationo 2. The Indwelling of the Blessed Trinity. Before we can hope to consider this mystery in the light of exemplar causality we must first of all examine its implications both in itself and also in connection with the doctrine of Aquinas on the Divine Missions. St. Thomas' teaching on the mystery of Divine Indwelling can be summed up as follows. This presence of the Trinity in the soul is real and substantial, distinct from the general presence of God in all His creatures through His divine immensity. Nevertheless, the presence of Indwelling presupposes the general presence of immensity, and that for several reasonso Before the Trinity can be substantially present in the soul we have to presuppose the existence of the soul and also the •• l Sent., d. 17, q. l, a. lc.; ct ibid., d. 30, q. l, a. et ad 8; d. 15, q. 4, a. lc. DAVID L. GREENSTOCK creation in it of sanctifying grace, both of which demand the general presence of immensity. Also, since the presence of Indwelling is brought about by the knowledge and the love of God which proceed from grace, unless the Three Persons were already present to the soul in a general way as identified with the divine essence, this knowledge and love would never be able to produce more than an intentional or affective presence -which implies a denial of the substantial nature of this Indwelling. There is only one supernatural gift which can make this Indwelling possible, and that is sanctifying grace; not as an effect of the divine operations ad extra, but as the root cause of the operations of knowledge and love which spring from grace. 38 For that reason St. Thomas says, " nullus alius e:ffectus potest esse ratio quod divina Persona sit novo modo in rationali creatura nisi gratia gratum faciens." 39 It is important to keep this fact in mind, in view of the opinions of some modern authors which we shall examine later. Notice that we have described grace as the formal cause of the Indwelling, not simply because grace is an effect of the divine in the supernatural order, but insofar as it gives rise to the knowledge and love by which man attains to God as He is in Himself. God is the cause of grace by the divine essence with which all divine causality is identified, and not by reason of the Trinity of Persons. Consequently, if we consider grace merely as an effect of the divine causal activity, it can never give rise in the soul to a relation with the Persons. 40 Yet, if this presence of Indwelling is to be real and substantial, such a real relationship must be established, and that through the medium of sanctifying grace. Moreover, this real relationship must be to God 38 Summa Theol., I, q. 48, a. 8c.: "Et quia cognoscendo et amando creatura rationalis sua operatione attingit ad ipsum Deum, secundum istum specialem modum Deus non solum dicitur esse in creatura rationali, sed etiam habitare in ea, sicut in templo." •• Ibid. •o St. Thomas teaches this fundamental truth in many places in his writings, cf. ibid., q. 8, a. 8; q.45, a. 8, ad l; q. 86, a. 4, ad 7; I Sent., d, 29, q. 1, a. 4, ad fl; d. 2, q. 1, a. 4; d. 5, q. 1; de Pot., q. 9, a. 9, ad 8; de Verit., q. 10, a. 18. EXEMPLAR CAUSALITY AND THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER 28 as He is in Himself, i. e. one in nature and three in Persons. Can such a real relationship be established by grace, which is an effect of the common action of the Three Divine Persons? Let St. Thomas answer the question for us. He says, " creatura attingit ad ipsum Deum secundum substantiam suam consideratum, et non secundum similtudinem tantum, et hoc est per operationem, secundum quam aliquis fide adhaeret primae veritati et caritate ipsi summae bonitati, et sic est modus quo Deus est in sanctis per gratiam." 41 From this passage and from others in which he insists on the same idea it is evident that, for him, grace is the formal cause of the Indwelling, but only insofar as it gives rise to the theological virtues which have for their direct object God as He is in Himself. This is confirmed by what we already know of divine exemplar causality. Grace, both as an entitative habit and as a new supernatural nature, has its exemplar, not in the Persons, but in the divine essence which is common to them all. Therefore, neither as an effect of the divine efficient causality, nor as an effect of the divine exemplar causality can grace bring about a new relationship between the soul and the Persons of the Trinity which will result in this new mode of presence which we call Indwelling. It is only when we consider grace together with the supernatural operations of knowledge and love which flow from it that we find this new relationship with the Three Persons for which we are seeking. The theological virtues which flow from grace adorn it in much the same way as the human faculties adorn the human nature which is their root. These theological virtues are supernatural faculties, being in themselves operative habits. As such, they have a special relation to their proper object, which is God as He is in Himself. By reason of the general presence of immensity the Three Persons are already in the soul as identified with the divine essence. Grace, by giving rise to the theological virtues, brings about a new relationship between the soul and the Three Persons as distinct one from another. Thus, by grace, "I Sent., d. 87, q.l, a.!!. 24 DAVID L. GREENSTOCK God who until now has been present in the soul as the First Cause of our being, begins to manifest Himself to us as the intimate object of our knowledge and love, thus granting us a certain measure of intimacy with Him which we did not enjoy before. 42 In the state of grace our knowledge and our love terminate in the Three Persons, not as a mere intentional or affective object far distant from us, but as intimately present to the soul. Thus, the presence of Indwelling depends for its reality on the previous presence of immensity-a fact which Suarez overlooked in his attempt to find a solution to the difficulties of this question, and which has been the cause of much confusion of thought ever since. Two very important conclusions can be drawn from what has been said with regard to this presence of Indwelling. In the first place, the conclusions of some modern authors on this subject, in which they speak of a double presence of the Three Persons in the soul, one by means of grace itself, and the other by means of our assimilation to the Divine Persons by the gifts of Wisdom and Charity, are not founded on the teaching of Aquinas. 43 In fact, it would seem that such conclusions have been reached simply because these writers have ignored the fact that it is grace as the root of the theological virtues which brings about the Indwelling, and that the reality of this new presence depends on the previous presence of immensity. There are, in fact, many relationships between the soul in a state of grace and the Blessed Trinity-that cannot be denied. •• John of St. Thomas, In lam Partem., q. 43, disp. 17, a. 3, n. II. "Hoc ergo modo existit Deus in omnibus quasi radix occulta et principium omnibus dans esse magis intimum . . . Cum ergo, mediante gratia, se manifestat incipit id quod est radix et principium comparari ut objectum se manifestans ipsimet intellectui creato cui adest ut radix et principium infiuens esse, et sic manifestat seipsum ut objectum, non quomodocumque, sed omnino intimum, utpote radix totius illius esse. Unde talis manifestatio et familiaritas et convictum necessario importat novum modum praesentiae, nempe, non solum per modum radicis et principii influentis esse, sed per modum Personae conviventis et seipsum manifestantis in ratione objecti." •• Such seems to be the opinion of Fr. S. I. Dockx, 0. P. in his work Fils de Dieu par grace, pp. 1U sq. This is a novel presentation of the theory of Petau, De Regnon and others. EXEMPLAR CAUSALITY AND THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER 25 However, there is only one :relationship which effects this :real and substantial presence of the Trinity which we call the Presence of Indwelling. Grace puts us into direct contact with the Divine Nature of which it is a created participation, and with the Divine Persons as identified with that Nature. Consequently, both from the point of view of God and from that of the soul in grace there is but one fundamental relationship. From the point of view of God, the Three Persons act through their one common nature. From man's point of view there is a direct relation to the Divine Nature as subsisting in Three Divine Persons. If we were to affirm any individual causal relationship between the Three Persons and creatures we should be going contrary to the teaching of St. Thomas. Such personal activity is excluded for at least two reasons: the complete identity of the Nature in all Three, and the identity between God's power and His operation. In all their ad extra operations the Persons act through the one common nature and there can be no multiplication of essential attributes in God. Secondly, there is no need to appeal to the divine exemplar causality as an explanation of this presence, but :rather we are forced to conclude that there is no question here of exemplar causality at all! Here we are dealing with a real relation between the soul and the Persons which terminates in their proper attributes. To grasp what this implies we shall be forced to consider this presence of Indwelling in its relations with the doctrine of Aquinas on the Divine Missions. The notion of Divine Mission implies two things, the eternal origins of the Persons and a new mode of existence in the e:ffect.44 Strictly speaking, therefore, only the Holy Ghost and the Son can be sent, while the Father gives Himself to us. Since the whole idea of the Missions is connected with the possession of the Divine Persons by creatures, it follows that the notion of mission also includes that of " gift," i. e. something to be possessed and enjoyed. Thus, the notion of Indwelling implies, at one and the same time, those of mission, of gift, 00 Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 43, a. lc.; I Sent., d. 14, q. £, a.£; d. 15, q. I, a. 1. DAVID L. GREENSTOCK and also of the subsequent possession of the Divine Persons by the souL Since the notion of Mission includes in itself that of the eternal origin of one Person from another, it will be clear that the temporal mission of one Person also necessarily includes the presence in that Mission of the other divine Persons. Thus, Aquinas says, " cum Pater sit in Filio, et Filius in Pat:re, et uterque in Spiritu Sancto, quando Filius mittitur simul et venit Pater et Spiritus Sanctus .... et ideo, adventus vel Inhabitatio convenit toti Trinitati." 45 Thus, in these divine Missions there can be no question of individual causal activity ad extra of one Person apart from the others, since in God causality is an essential and not a proper attribute. At the same time, the temporal Mission connotes the eternal origins of the Persons, together with an effect which is produced, not in eternity, but in time-thus giving rise to a new mode of existence of the Persons. St. Thomas distinguishes clearly between this eternal and temporal aspect of the Divine Missions when he says, " Si igitur mittens designetur ut principium Personae quae mittitur, sic non quaelibet persona mittit, sed solum ilia cui convenit esse p:rincipium illius personae; et sic, Filius mittitur tantum a Patre, Spiritus Sanctus autem a Patre et Filio. Si vero persona mittens intelligitur esse principium effectus secundum quem attenditur missio, sic tota Trinitas mittit Personam missam." 46 How is it, then, that certain theologians have found a place for exemplar causality within the framework of the Divine Missions? 47 The answer probably lies in the fact that they have not distinguished with sufficient care between the notions of Mission, Indwelling and Assimilation-three things which are intimately connected with sanctifying grace and yet so very different in themselves. The spiritual perfections which flow from grace produce in the soul an assimilation to the Three Persons which is some•• l Sent., d. 15, q. !l, ad 4. •• Summa Theol., I, q. 43, a. 8c. "Cf. Dom Lucien Chambat, 0. S. B., op. cit., p. 179. EXEMPLAR CAUSALITY AND THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER 27 times called a " sealing," 48 since certain of those perfections, such as those which belong to the intellectual order, impress on the soul a likeness to the Word of God, while others which belong to the spheres of love and power give it a likeness to the Holy Ghost and to the Father. This fact has made such a deep impression on some theologians that they have declared it to be the reason for the Presence of Indwelling. St. Thomas himself :refers to the fact of the assimilation produced by grace in the soul; and in some of his writings it may even appear as if he, too, sees in it the real explanation both for the presence of Indwelling and also for the Divine Missions. However, such passages have to be interpreted inside the general framework of his whole teaching, not outside it. Once we consider them in that way, then we shall see that, far from being the formal cause of this Indwelling, such assimilation is, in fact, an effect of that presence, and is attributed to individual Persons by appropriation on the basis of exemplar causality. That this is the true interpretation of St. Thomas' mind on this subject seems to be confirmed by his teaching on the formal cause of the Indwelling as we have already explained it. As Aquinas himself tells us, the assimilation which we have described above can only be attributed to individual Persons of the Trinity by appropriation, while the Indwelling is a substantial presence, " secundum propria "-a fact which follows from his teaching on the Divine Missions, which include in their concept the origins of the Persons. Therefore he insists, " adventus vel inhabitatio convenit toti Trinitati quae non dicuntur nisi ratione effectus conjungentis ipsi Trinitati, quamvis ille effectus ratione appropriationis possit ducere magis in unam personam quam in aliam." 49 This, in turn, is in perfect conformity with his general teaching on ad extra causality in God. The eternal processions of the Persons are not the direct causes of the created effects, but only insofar as they include the essential attributes of intellect and will. In other words, this •• Cf. I Sent., d. 14, q. it, ad 2. •• Ibid., d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4. 28 DAVID L. GREENSTOCK likeness or assimilation to individual Persons of the Trinity which can be observed in the perfections which flow from sanctifying grace is due to appropriation, and that through the medium of exemplar causality. This is not the place to undertake a detailed study of St. Thomas' teaching with regard to appropriation, but it can be noticed that, among the four classes of appropriation which he defines, a special place is reserved for that class which depends on exemplar causality. Indeed, it would be difficult to separate the two notions entirely, although we do not maintain that every appropriation is based on exemplarity, but merely that it is the basis for many of those appropriations which we can find in the writings of St. Thomas. Thus, wisdom is appropriated to the Son as the image of the Father by eternal generation. Charity is appropriated to the Holy Ghost as the Personal Love of the Father and the Son, while all effects which imply the use of divine power are attributed to the Father as to the " principium sine principio." The created effect is attributed to the individual Person because of some similarity between the proper attribute of the Person and the essential attribute which causes the effect. St. Thomas makes this clear when he says, " dicendum quod per unum et idem Deus in ratione diversarum causarum se habet: quia per hoc quod est actus purus, est agens, et est exemplar omnium formarum, et est bonitas pura, et per consequens, omnium finis." 50 This becomes even clearer when we remember that this assimilation of the created effect to God, the Cause, is effected simply because the creature is reproduced according to the exemplar idea of it which is in the divine intellect and which is put into effect by the decree of the divine will. " Appropriatio causae ad effectum attenditur secundum assimilationem effectus ad causam. Assimilatio autem creaturae ad Deum attenditur secundum hoc quod creatura implet id quod de ipsa est in intellectu et voluntate Dei ... Sic, igitur, Deus propria causa est unicuique creaturae, inquantum intelligit et vult unam50 De Pot., q. 7, a. l, ad 8. EXEMPLAR CAUSALITY AND THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER 29 quamque creaturam esse." 51 We are driven back every time to the essential causal attributes of intellect and will. Some theologians have found difficulty in accepting this doctrine owing to certain passages in the writings of St. Thomas in which, at first sight, he seems to indicate special activity of the Three Divine Persons individually, based on exemplar causality. One such passage which is frequently quoted is to be found in his Commentary on the Sentences, where he writes:"in reductione rationalis creaturae in Deum intelligitur processio divinae personae .... inquantum propria relatio ipsius personae divinae representatur in anima per similitudinem aliquam receptam quae est exemplata et originata ab ipsa proprietate relationis aeternae .... " 54 Seen in the light of St. Thomas' general teaching on the Trinity this and similar passages present no real difficulty, nor do they imply individual activity on the part of the Divine Persons based on exemplar causality. There are two essential attributes which enter into every act of Divine Causality, i.e. those of intellect and will. These attributes are both the cause of the identity of the Divine Nature in all Three Persons and also of the distinction between the Persons themselves. They are also the cause of the production of all created things. In the production of creatures these attributes have an essential activity, while in the processions of the Persons their activity is purely notional, but the same attributes are at work in both cases. Therefore, it follows that the relations between the Persons enter into all the divine activity ad extra insofar as all creatures are made in the image of Godo In the rational or intellectual creatures this likeness will be much more perfect, since they too are capable of acts of knowledge and love which, under the influence of grace, will lead them to know and love God as He is in Himselfo The exemplar cause of this likeness is not to be found in any personal or individual activity of the Three Persons nor in 51 64 Ibid., q. 3, a. 16, ad 5. I Sent., d. 15, q. 4, a. 1; cf. d. 14, q. 2, ad 3. 30 DAVID L. GREENSTOCK their proper attributes as such, but in the Divine Essence insofar as it includes the essential attributes of intellect and wilL For this :reason St. Thomas himself affirms many times that this similarity is based on appropriation. This at once excludes any idea of individual causality on the part of the Persons, as we have already explained. Thus the difficult passages from the Sentences fit in perfectly with the rest of Aquinas' teaching, forming with it one harmonious whole. In the Summa we can see his own interpretation of these difficult passages. Thus he affirms:-" Unde oportet quod imago divinae Trinitatis attendatur in anima secundum aliquid quod representat divinas personas representatione speciei, sicut est possibile creaturae .... attenditur igitur divina imago in homine secundum verbum conceptum de Dei notitia, et amorem exinde derivatum." 55 If we compare this quotation with the passage cited above from the Sentences we shall see clearly what St. Thomas means by the " similitudinem aliquam receptam quae est exemplata et originata ab ipsa proprietate relationis aeternae .... " This similarity is through the knowledge and the love of God as He is in Himself, which is possible only to the soul in a state of grace. It is worth noticing that this similarity is consequent on the state of grace, as one of its effects and, therefore, although the presence of Indwelling cannot be brought about by this similarity, that presence can give rise to the divine image in the soul which is afterwards appropriated to the Persons as identified in the one Nature with the essential attributes. From all this it follows that those theologians who persist in their attempts to find a more personal relationship between the soul and the individual Persons of the Trinity through the medium of exemplar have not understood this connection between the divine exemplar and the doctrine of assimilation which" is based on appropriation. 52 Nor have they kept in mind the fact that, in God, all causality is an essential and not a proper attribute. It is the divine essence which is the 55 Ibid., q. 93, a. Sc.; cf. ibid., a. 7; q. 45, a. 6, ad 2; I Sent., d. 15, q. 4, a.l, ad S. •• Summa Theol., q. 39, aa. 7-8. EXEMPLAR CAUSALITY AND THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER 31 exemplar, either as it is in itself, or as it is communicated to the Persons. For which reason it would be absurd to identify the work of sanctification in the human soul with the Person of the Holy Spirit in such a way as to exclude the other Divine Persons from that activity, since such effects are attributed to Him as being the personification of divine goodness and holiness, and these are essential attributes. 53 From its very beginnings in the Garden of Eden the great tragedy of the human race has been its vain seeking for something which it already possessed. Frequently theologians themselves are not exempt from this charge. There is a real relation between the soul in a state of grace and the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity by the very fact that grace, as an invisible Mission of the Trinity, brings the Persons into contact with the soul in a new way, as the objects of its knowledge and love. This real and substantial presence far exceeds anything which could be attained or imagined along the lines of exemplar causality-and yet there are still some theologians who are not content with what they actually possess, but who would throw away the substance for the shadow. The theological position of Aquinas is very different from that adopted by such writers as Sheeben, Petau, De Regnon and Tyciak It is in perfect accord with the teachings of both the Latin and the Greek Fathers, and serves as an admirable commentary on their doctrine with regard to the Indwelling of the Trinity in the souL It expresses perfectly the personal nature of this union between the soul and the Three Persons, without going to any extremes. If St. Thomas' doctrine on the relation between exemplar causality, appropriation and assimilation had been more closely followed perhaps there would not have been so many extremes in the writings on this subject. DAVID L. GREENSTOCK, T. 0. P. Colegio de lngleses, V alladolid, Spain 53 Ibid., q. 45, a. 6. "secundum hoc processiones personarum sunt rationes productionis creaturarum, inquantum includunt essentialia attributa quae sunt scientia et voluntas." VENIAL SIN AND ITS FINAL GOAL T HE question of the ultimate end of venial sin is one of the minor speculative problems in the theology of sin which has engaged the attention of scholars from the days of St. Thomas down to our own. Many solutions have been proposed but none of them, apparently, has proved fully satisfactory, They have failed to carry conviction to their readers, and perhaps to their authors as welt Their very number and intricacy seem to hint that there is something wrong with the approach to the problem, It may look strange but the case is not uncommon for so ordinary a thing as our daily faults to have been for centuries a crux theologorum. The problem is wont to be formulated as follows: 1 Every voluntary act must needs intend or be directed towards an ultimate goaL But venial sin is not directed to an ultimate end that is evil, else it would no longer be a venial but a mortal sin, Nor does it, apparently, aim at the true final end, God: if it did, it would not be a sin. What, then, is its goal? The history of the solutions up to SL Thomas inclusively was written some thirty years ago by A. Landgraf. 2 A more recent study of J. J, Fajardo 3 completed that history for the 16th and 17th centuries. Brief systematic studies in our days have asked and answered the question anew. 4 But who has felt satisfied 1 Ct Th. Deman, art. "Peche," Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique XII !'t87-Q44,-Peche veniel et fin derniere, St. Thomas' solution (288-241) is contrasted with that of other theologians (241-248), 2 Das Wesen des liisslichen Sunde in der Scholastik bis Thomas von Aquin, Bamberg, 1926. Cf. M. de la Taille, "Le peche veniel dans la theologie de S. Thomas d'Aquin d'apres un livre recent," in Cfregorianum 7 (1926), QS-48; R. Schultes, review in Bulletin Thomiste I (1924-), 136-142; Deman, op. cit., 244. 3 La esencia del peccado venial en la segunda edad de oro de la teologia escolastica. Granada, 1944. ·. • R. " La fin ultime du peche veniel," in Revue Thomiste 29 (1924), 818-817; M. de Ia Taille, op. cit.; F. Zimmem:fimti, "Das Wesen des lasslichen Sunde," in Divus Thomas (Fribourg) 12 (1984), 408-441; A. J. McNichol!, "The 32 VENIAL SIN AND ITS FINAL GOAL 83 with these solutions often involved and based on distinctions which look as if they had been invented for the sake of getting out of a quandary? Why is it so? Why have seemingly all endeavors at a real solution failed? Would it not perhaps be because the question is asked the wrong way, or because the wrong question is asked? The history of theology has shown similar cases of insoluble problems. Students of apologetics know the thorny question of the analysis fidei: how to resolve the assent of the faith into the reasons of credibility. After many and all more or less unsatisfactory answers, the solution which today seems to prevail more and more is the one which maintains that the assent of divine faith need not, and cannot, be reduced to its motives of credibility; there is and ought to be a breach between the assent of credibility and the act of faith. Could a similar fate possibly befall the problem of the final goal of venial sin? The point at issue. It is important to formulate the problem in a correct manner. 0. Lottin 5 recently noted the different perspectives in which St. Thomas on the one hand and his commentators on the other envisage the question. St. Thomas, he says, studies the problem from a moral viewpoint only. His commentators shifted it onto the metaphysical level. The former merely examines the intention of the moral agent who happens to commit a venial sin. The latter consider the metaphysical necessity of the final causality without which no act of the will is possible; all that a man strives after he necessarily wills by virtue of his desire of the last End; and this must also be the case of venial sin. The remark is noteworthy and enlightening. Yet, it seems to stop half way on the right path. The very manner in which Lottin formulates the problem, 6 on all points identical with the one of Th. Deman referred to above, suggests this criticism. (1940), 373-409; 0. Lottin, Principes ffitimate End of Venial Sin," THE THOMIST de Morale II, Complements de doctrine et d'histoire (Louvain, 1947), pp. 249,-Peche veniel et fin derniere. • Op. cit., p. 244 f. • Op. cit., p. 3 84 P. DELETTER For, if one concedes the major and the minor of the argument, namely, that every human act must of its nature intend a final goal, and, that venial sin is a human act: if it were not a human act, how could it be a sin? How then can there be a way of evading the conclusion: venial sin also must have a final goal? And when this is allowed, no manoeuvring with distinction and subdistinction will succeed in taking away the impression of a merely verbal solution. 7 It then remains mysterious, or unexplained, why venial sin in the just does not share in the goodness of the ultimate End, and why in those in a state of mortal sin it is only venially sinful and not of necessity mortally wounded by the influence of their evil last goal. It would seem that the only way out of the difficulty is to · grant that venial sin does not intend a final goal,8 and that, accordingly, the question as to which is the ultimate end of venial sin does not arise. And it is submitted here that such is the position of St. Thomas. As noted by 0. Lottin,S St. Thomas never considered the question except as a reply to a difficulty; and, as noted already and as Lottin rightly insists, 10 in his answers to the objections which state the problem St. Thomas considers the moral aspect of the question. He nowhere applied to the case of venial sin his metaphysical principles which postulate the causality of the final End as a condition of the possibility of every voluntary activity. 11 Why did he omit this • Cf. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, op. cit., p. 814, "lls s'engagent dans des distinctions d'une subtilite telle, qu'elle n'est pas un grand indice de verite." 8 That is what, in substance, Thomists agree in saying when they state that venial sin has no concrete ultimate end (cf. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, op. cit., p. 815). The phrase, ' has no ultimate end,' implies a twofold meaning: a subjective one, the intention of the agent; an objective one, the influence of the end on the act. Let it be noted at the outset that in a moral act the intention of the agent measures the influence of the end on the act. That intention is the subjective aspect of an act, whereas the correlative influence of the end on the act expresses its objective aspect. 9 Loc. cit. The texts collected by Lottin are the only ones in which St. Thomas explicitly answers the difficulty. But the motivation of his answer is to be looked for in his teaching on the nature of venial sin. 10 Op. cit., p. 244 f. 11 Summa Theol., I-II, q. 1, a. 6, c. and ad 8. St. Thomas does not even make this application in I-II, q. 88, aa. 1 and 2, or q. 89, a. 4, although R. GarrigouLagrange, op. cit., p. 818 f., may seem to imply the opposite. VENIAL SIN AND ITS FINAL GOAL 35 application? Not because these principles do not apply to moral realities; they evidently do; for moral realities, such as good or bad actions, also " are." And his commentators were not wrong in doing what the master had left undone once the position of the problem was granted. But because the question is not to be asked. Venial sin is not merely a human act, actus humanus, which by definition intends a final goal; it is a human act of a peculiar sort, namely, one which of its very nature does not aim at a final goal but which stops at what is only a means. Venial sin is by definition only half a human act, and because of this essential incompleteness and imperfection it need not and cannot be directed, whether actually or virtually as every actus humanus must needs be, to any final end. This, we believe, is the position of St. Thomas. And we propose here to go back to his own texts and see what he actually taught about our problem. PRELIMINARY REMARKS With a view accurately to circumscribe the question, let it be noted at the outset what we mean by saying that, with St. Thomas, we consider venial sin as a moral act. Venial sin is an act of the will as a rational potency, that is, an act of the rational appetite following on an act of rational knowledge. There need be no question here of the tendency of the will as a natural appetite which is subjacent to every act elicited by the will as a free voluntary power. 12 This tendency which constitutes the very being of the will is active in every one of its voluntary acts. And this natural tendency of the spiritual appetite is of its nature directed to the one ultimate End, God. 13 This is so for every spiritual activity of man, whether good or evil, meritorious or demeritorious, venially or mortally sinful, Yes, in the very act of mortal sin the natural tendency which underlies the moral act does and cannot but strive after God. 14 This natural appetite for God, however, has nothing to do with the human act as such or as a moral act. It is the act of the Cf. LoUin, op. cit., p. 248. Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 60, a. 4; q. 82, a. 1, c. and ad 3; I-II, q. 10, a. l. 14 Cf. ibid., I-ll, q. 78, a. 8. 12 18 36 P, DELETTER will as nature, voluntas ut natura, not of the will as rational appetite, voluntas ut ratio, It is not, therefore, with this influence of the ultimate end, which is not peculiar to venial sin, that our problem is concerned. That presence of the natural tendency of the will in all its voluntary acts reveals itself also in the well-known principle about the formal object of the rational appetite: Whatever is object of the voluntary activity is so under the aspect of goodness, Even in a sinful act, whether mortally or venially so, the object is willed as a good, sub ratione boni.15 Does this inescapable consideration of the goodness of the object entail an explicit or implicit reference to the perfect Good, that is, the ultimate End? Per se, yes, it does; because objectively under the aspect of good really means, with :reference to the last GoaL But not necessarily so. As will be shown below, the consideration the goodness of an object can, for our discursive reason, stop short of the ultimate end and :rest confined within the means. In aspect still, when the influence of the End on act is viewed objectively, not subjectively in the consciousness of intention of the agent, the same idea is expressed by saying that the final causality of God, the Ultimate End, God, regards in every voluntary act, whether good or evil, the esse of the activity, without necessarily communicating to it His moral goodness. This effect is found only in the morally good actions, and not in the mortally or venially sinful poUVP7J. Cf. Diog. Laert. 10. 186; 10. 180. 18 Diog. Laert. 10.136. Cf. 10.189; 10.181; frag. 417 (Us!mer). Cf. Cicero, De Finibus 8. 9., who speaks of the stabilitas voluptatis. 19 Diog. Laert. 10. 129. 20 Painless rest is the highest form of pleasure (Diog. Laert. 10. and the acme of all pleasureis the extinction of all pain: "Opos -roO p.eyeOovs -rwv 7]/iopwp 7] 7!'aJITOS TOV d}vyoiinos (Diog. Laert. 10.189). 21 Diog. Laert. 10. 129. 90 ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST stand the real nature of pleasure and act accordingly. For only such understanding (cppovqcns) enables him to distinguish as well as to evaluate the various degrees of pleasure and pain to be expected or accepted in every particular instance; and to decide whether or not and to what extent he should give in to his desires or sensuous appetites. 22 Accordingly, Epicurus distinguished between those wants or desires (e1n8vp.£at) 23 which are natural (c/>VCTtKa£), and those which are empty and vain (Keval.). The natural wants are necessary and unavoidable (&.vayKaiat). Existence without their satisfaction proves impossible. 24 Hence even the wise man cannot free himself from them without suffering some ill or even fatal effects. The KEVru emOvp.l.at, on the other hand, are merely conventional (vop.cp or 86gq,) or imaginary desires and, consequently, should be avoided as much as possible. Between the natural and necessary wants on the one hand, and the conventional and vain or imaginary desires on the other hand, there are those many wants which are natural and thus have their natural justification (cpVCTtKa' p.ovov), but which are, nevertheless, not absolutely indispensable. They can very well be dispensed with. Only if their satisfaction primarily should bring about happiness, contentment, and pleasure; or should their denial become the cause of pain; then, and only then, the wise and judicious man will seek to satisfy them as much as possible. In order to determine whether or not he should renounce or satisfy these natural but dispensable wants or appetites he will have to be intelligently judicious and critical, that is to say, take recourse to the right crvp.p.ETp7JCTts,the rational or prudential faculty of proportionate evaluation, which also takes into account the consequences of his deliberate choice. For the crvp.p.ETp7Jutsproperly employed will tell him whether or not he will, in the final analysis, create through his own choice Diog. Laert. 10. 128; 10. 1!!9. •• Diog. Laert. 10. 1!!7. Cf. tcvp1a.1 li6Ea.1 26; 29; 30, in Diog. Laert. 10.139 fl'. H. Usener, op. cit., 392. 04 They are necessary either 1rpos dllia.&p.ovla." (to one's happiness), or 1rpos .,.r,,. Toii tflflp.a.Tos d.ox."A7Jtrla.ll (to one's physical well being), or 1rpos To !fw (to life itself). 12 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW OF THE EPICUREANS 91 an excess of pleasure over pain. In the right rests the essence of true (rational insight) which constitutes the highest philosophic good and the prime source of all virtue. 25 Epicurus and his followers sought the true mark of wisdom in the restriction of all ethical interests to man's individual happiness. 26 The sole positive content of man's peace of soul is pleasure enjoyed in secure retreat and hidden from the storms of this world. In the Epicurean dogma of the highest good the thoroughly blase but nevertheless judicious or aesthetical appreciation of pleasure remains the true essence of rational and moral life. For wisdom and virtue consist in man's capacity to enjoy wisely. All pleasure is either spiritual (intellectual) or physical.27 To be sure, in his psycho-generic approach Epicurus reduced all pleasure without exception to physical pleasure and, hence, to sensuous experience. 28 Since the physical enjoyments, however, are always accompanied by passionate agitation and turbulent upheavals or "motions" Epicurus declared the spiritual pleasures to be far superior to those of the senses. 29 For the former are derived and, therefore, refined joys, in other words, " pleasures in rest," while the physical joys are " pleasures in motion." By putting the intellectual pleasures ahead of the physical pleasures Epicurus simply restates his basic idea that the individual, upon whose independence ·Of the world every true happiness and contentment rests, can be more certain of intellectual than physical enjoyments, because man is to a greater degree the master over his own intellect than over his physical nature. The pleasures of the flesh always depend on health, riches, and other gifts of chance and fortune. But the enjoyments afforded by philosophy and the arts; by •• Diog. Laert. 10. 18!l; frag. 442 (Usener). •• Diog. Laert. 10. US; 10. 182; 10. 141. .. Diog. Laert. 10. 186. •• Frags. 411; 409; 40!l; 4!l9 (Usener). Cf. frag. 67 (Usener), where Epicurus states that the term " good " means nothing to him unless it is accompanied by the physical sensation of pleasure. •• Frags. 417; 489 (Usener). Cf. Diog. Laert. 10.187. ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST the intimate intercourse with noble and congenial friends; and by a mind free from all passions and desires and, hence, serene and self-contented-all these are the secure possession of the wise man, since they remain wholly untouched the changes of fortune. Hence the true philosopher seeks only the enjoyments of the mind in aesthetic refinement 30 and the comfortable arrangement of daily life; 31 in other words, in that pleasant association with noble friends 32 which is stimulated by witty conversation and sentimental delicacy. 33 He is himself the main source of the bliss of self-enjoyment self-satisfaction; and his real pleasure is in being pleased with himself. He knows through his rational insight what he is able successfully to secure for himself, and of this he denies himself nothing. At the same time he does not quarrel with fate or begrudge the fact that he cannot possess everything. In his retirement from the world dwells in an atmosphere complete unconcern for the exigencies of his time, and thus considers himself not only indepenof his time above the demands also above any real responsibility or duty towards his environment. Freedom and true moral stature to him are not to be found in an active and disciplined participation the various social tasks of public life or the intelligent and responsible conduct of, or interest in, public affairs, but rather in everyone's right to do as he pleases. 34 The highest Epicurean maxim of life, namely the " pleasure in passiveness," is but the cogent result of a blase and emasculated as well as emasculating philosophical mood; and the gardens of Epicurus became the nursery of noble but vain employments, practiced in a decadently refined and delicate manner in the midst of an essen8 °Frag. 5!{HT) to be the governing principles of cities and the bonds of friendship and conciliation.56 53 Aristotle, on the other hand, insists that man outside a definite social order is more dangerous and evil than a wild beast. Politics 1258 a 4. Cf. Homer, Iliad 9. 68: " ... he that foments civil discord is a clanless, hearthless outlaw." •• CC. Plato, Protagoras 822 B ff. 55 Protagoras and the Sophists in general based their appeal for a " just " society upon the natural interests of individual man and the fullest realization of these interests; and not upon the idea of the unique and irreplaceable moral dignity and worth of the human personality. For such notions were essentially alien to them. •• Plato, Protagoras 822 C. 102 ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST And Hermes was instructed to impart these two heavenly gifts to all men alike. For Zeus intended" them all to have a share. Because cities cannot exist, if only a few share these virtues." 57 In other words: while men's entering into associations with one another as such is necessitated by natural distress, the successful maintenance of these associations and, hence, the continued effective guarantee of a permanent assertion of man's selfish interests-although his real purpose always remains individualistic-requires certain social or " political virtues " of the altruistic type, namely a sense of justice and a feeling for restraint; in short, a form of altruism which, however, is but altruism for egoism's sake. 58 "'Ibid. 58 According to Protagoras the olK'YJ and alows are the foundations of the true art of government or social control through the instrumentality of the law. They constitute, as it were, the " cohesive element " within every society or social order originally brought into existence by the essentially disruptive forces of man's selfish pursuit of happiness and the things he generally craves for. Obviously, then, the DiK'YJ and alliws are two virtues the practice of which is the true art of government, the more so since their practice is essentially for the continued welfare of the commonweal. Cf. Anonymous Jamblichi 7. 9.-Anonymous Jamblichi, in H. Diels, Die Fraymente der Vorsokratiker, 2d edit., 629 ff., is by an unknown author who, judging by his style as well as by the content of his statements, wrote on ethico-political subjects during the second half of the fifth century B. C. The Neo-Platonist Jamblichus incorporated into his Protrepticus many lengthy passages from this anonymous author. Cf. F. Blass, Comment. de Antiphonte Sophista Jamblichi Auctore. The Anonym. Jamb!. is definitely under the influence of Protagoras and his views on law and State, particularly as regards the juxtaposition of evvop,ia. (social order under the rule of law) and avop,la. (a state of lawlessness) . The treatment of the necessity of social organizations and institutions in Anonym. Jambl. strongly remind us of the famous passages in Plato's Protagoras 3ii!ii! B ff. The importance of certain " cohesive virtues " for the maintenance of the already established legal and political organizations as well as for the effective promotion of the selfish interests of the individual, has been fully recognized by certain Sophists. Antiphon, for instance, declared the op,ovoLa- the " bond of common friendship and conciliation "-the foundation of all truly prosperous social and political life. Cf. H. Diels, op. cit., 60ii!, and frag. 61; Xenophon, Memorabilia 4. 4. Hi. The active support of law and the legal order (justice) and, hence, the "social solidarity" manifest in one's personal conduct constitute the very basis on which every well ordered society rests. And this " social solidarity" is also that one attitude which more than anything else promotes individual prosperity and happiness. H. Diels, op. cit., 631. The most pernicious foe of the individual and his personal well being is the avop,la; and the gravest danger threatening society is from one who seeks THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW OF THE EPICUREANS 108 The similarity between Protagoras on the one hand, and Epicu:rus, Hermarchus, and Lucretius on the other hand, in matters concerning the origin and scope of politically organized society under the rule of law is, as we shall see presently, somewhat astonishing. 59 How, then, did Protagoras' theory of the origin and end of law and State come down to Epicurus? Did Plato and Epicurus make use of the same common sources? so Did Epicurus and his followers rely on Plato's mythological report in the dialogue Protagoras which contains perhaps a personal attack upon Plato's contemporary Democritus rather than upon Protagoras himself, from whom Democritus had borrowed many an important notion as to the origin nature, after gain and advantage at the expense of all others H. Diels, op. cit., 631. It is the interest of the majority, the happiness of the greatest number (ro .,.,;; 7rAfJIJet uvJLcpepov, Anonym. Jambl. 7. 14) which is given here an important sociopolitical role. Cf. Anonym. Jambl. 3. 3: '11"A·{J(Je< 'TE av a.pe'Ti}S IJpeyop.evov Ti}S uvp.wttrr7JS UKnrrfov dva.t.9 €K Tlvos ltv A6')'ou 7} €p')'ov lipurros Ef'Yf. rowVros 0' liv efn 0 T(J\.elurots wcpe'AtJLOS &v. This statement is definitely akin to Jeremy Bentham's famous formula of "the greatest happiness to the greatest number." A conduct contrary to that " desired " by the existing legal order which, on a " collectivist" basis society has agreed upon for the convenience of the individual, creates distrust and enmity on the part of all other individuals. Such a conduct is reprehensible not so much on account of its "immorality" or "illegality," but rather because of the fact that in the long run it will have disadvantageous consequences for the " immoral" or "lawless" person. A conduct aimed at taking unfair advantage of another person or an act of crude force (To -ri] Kpttros), for instance, should not be condemned because it interferes with certain social or individual interests, but rather because most certainly it will become the source of danger and misfortune to the perpretrator of such deeds. For sooner or later the latter will have to face the closed ranks of a hostile and antagonistic majority against which he will prove himself powerless. Cf. Anonym. Jambl. 6. 1 ff. A purely selfish conduct merely bent upon self-assertion and self-preservation at the expense of the interests and the happiness of all other individuals (<'AD1f;vxla., ) to one another of what is right and just ... which law has no real power to make the citizens themselves good and just." 94 In his definitely analytical approach to the function of law, Lycophron seems to have emphasized the fact that the essence of law rests in this that it denotes something that ought to be done because it had been agreed upon. In his outspoken positivist interpretation Lycophron .above all insists on the purely formalistic, that is, compelling nature of a " convention " or covenant in its application to action. The definition of law suggested by Lycophron offers, however, many a puzzling problem, particularly as to the relationship of the voJLo<; to the SiKIW'k. For the appears here as the very factor which guarantees (€yyvTJr'0<>) the uvv(}TjK'YJ and, hence, can11ot itself be this a-vvfJTjK'Yj. It seems rather that the VOJLO'> is something which " takes part " in, or which is the result of, a a-vv8.fJKYJ as to certain individual rights or interests. In other words, it appears as something which " enforces " the carrying out of a convenant as to certain rights. Hence we might reconstruct Lycophron's definition of law as" a surety or guarantee to one another of certain rights which have been agreed upon by convention." 95 From all this it follows that the the personal rights and inGorgias of Leontini, while Kaerst (Zoe. cit.) stresses his dependence on Protagoras. Niedermeyer (loc. cit.), on the other hand, holds that Lycophron was under the influence of the Pythagorean tradition, although he admits that Protagoras might have shaped some of Lycophron's ideas. •• Aristotle, Politics 1280 b H: .... Kai i> vo[los uvpiJ{JK7J Kal ••.. E"/'Yll7Jr1Js &.AA'l]Aots rWv Ou,aLwv, lfAA oVx olos 'ffOr.eZv d:ya.OoVs Kai Ot.Kaiovs roils woAlras. 95 o vop,os ht'YV7JTi}s &.hhi}ho, therefore, rests upon, or, at least, is closely related to the notion of a mutual agreement of convenience or expediency and not, as it were, upon the idea of an ethico-social solidarity. Hence the v6p,oc; of Lycophron cannot· educate men to become morally good citizens. Not without some influence upon the Epicurean attitude towards law and politically organized society in general were also the teachings of those Sophists who, like Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, insisted that law and justice are nothing else than the interest of the stronger. 101 In other words, those in power by such cleverly devised means as laws compel everyone to do demned slavery) . The concord in every form of human association is looked upon as the most ideal situation (cf. Antiphon, in H. Diels, op. cit., 631), because the wise man will always remember that by not injuring one another he will best safeguard his own person as well as his own personal interests from being injured. Cf. Antiphon, frag. 58 (Diels) . 100 To the Sophists of the "Protagorean school " the fullest realization and unfolding of the individual and his personal or selfish interests, needs, and aspirations remain the first concern of every legal, social, or political order. It is, therefore, the promotion .of the individual and his interest which, in the final analysis, justifies the existence of any social institution. Every legal, political, or social order itself, however, means also the sum total of all those personal interests. This sum total of interests in tum depends on the possibility of harmonizing and balancing the manifold, diversified, and often conflicting personal interests of individuals for the sake of their peaceful and prosperous co-existence. At the same time it also presupposes the essential equality of all these individuals. lt is the equality enjoyed by every one before the establishment of law and the legal order which demands equality and equal rights or duties of every one within the legal order and under the rule of law. This basic postulate of human equality and equal rights and duties for every one in the unfolding of the natural and healthy instincts of individual man in the direction of free self-assertion can be realized intelligently and effectively only under the protective shield of common laws, of that universal and equal "surety of one another of certain rights " which guarantees to every one his own. 101 Plato, Republic 338 B. 112 HERMANN CHROUST what is to the ruler's personal advantageo 102 And Callicles 103 must have found many a willing follower among the Epicureans and licence, if they are when he preached that " luxury provided with means, are virtue and happiness-all the rest [namely restraining laws, moral precepts, and the respect for the rights of others] are mere agreements contrary to nature 104 Only the stupid fellow submits to the laws and, by doing so, merely serves the interests and ambitions of others; 105 while the strong and intelligent man is not taken in by human laws and conventions. The free man, who is also the wise man, will refuse to acknowledge the existence of a rule above himself and, therefore, will not restrain his desireso106 On the basis of such notions any agreement among men mutually to refrain from injuring one another for the sake of social harmony is contrary to "nature" because it would curtail the "natural right" of the stronger to dominate the weaker, or, as the Epithe right of the wise man to do as he cureans would put pleases. Despite their professing a philosophy of inequality Thrasymachus and Callides admit, however, at least implication, that it is the collective desire for social, political, or legal equality voiced by the majority, which constitutes the 0 0 • 0 0 0 ." 102 Thrasymachus admits, however, that ordinary men are unable to defend themselves against injustice and, at the same time, find themselves incapable of obtaining the power to inflict injustice on others. Hence " . . . they think they had better agree among themselves to have ... justice (which) ... is a compromise between the best of all-which is to do injustice and not to be punished-and the worst of all-which is to suffer injustice without being able to retaliate. And justice . . . is tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil .... " Plato, Republic 359 A ff. 103 Callicles, whose real name was probably Charicles, opined that the laws were invented by the great mass of the wealc and insignificant as a bulwark and threat against the overbearing attitude of the strong. Plato, Gorgia.s 483 B ff. 104 Plato, Gorgia.s D. Cf. Republic 348 A ff. 10 " Plato, Republic 343 C.-According to man-made laws it might be a disgrace to commit an act of injustice; according to the basic laws of nature (VO'H lJiKawv), however, it is shameful to let any one else govern one's action. Cf. Plato, Gorgia.s 483 A ff.; 484 A fl'.; 4·88 C ff.; 491 E ff. 10 " Thus Polus, by quoting certain historical events, essays to disprove the claim that only submission to the laws will promote real happiness. Cf. Plato, Gorgia.s 471 B ff. For according to Polus only shrewdness paired with complete disregard of law and right promises good fortune and success in this world. Cf. Plato, Republic 344 A; ibid. 360 C. THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW OF THE EPICUREANS 113 ultimate and, at the same time, original and decisive motive behind the common struggle against the ruthless "superman." 107 In other words, this desire for equality becomes the true purpose of any social, legal, or political order under the rule of law. Hence it might be said that the social philosophers of the type of Thrasymachus and Callicles have toyed with the idea of a just social order under the rule of common laws, but merely in the sense that to them it denoted primarily a conspiracy of the weak against the" divine rights" of a few chosen ones. 108 If, therefore, Thrasymachus and Callicles in their polemics attach a definite significance to the social order under the rule of just laws, this, then, but manifests their view that the laws are, after all, an instrument by means of which men secure one another their rights and interests as well as hold down those who in complete disregard of the rights of others seriously threaten social harmony and peace. Thus even Thrasymachus and Callicles, although not without misgivings, acknowledge the need for common laws, which, after all, constitute the sole effective means affording general protection to everyone. Although, according to them, the laws or legal order are but a fiction created by the weak and stupid for the sake of their petty interests, both Thrasymachus and Callicles have to admit that, in the long run, no one could maintain himself successfully or escape permanently dire reprisals unless he submitted to the established laws and legal order backed by the authority of politically organized society. Faced with the prospect of being exterminated sooner or later by the supporters of the established laws and the legal order, even those who think themselves superior to the lowly lawabiding masses will consider their acquiescence to the established common laws the lesser of two evils. For this submission will at least protect them from total annihilation. Thus the view which clings to the notion that submission to the existing laws constitutes the sole means of affording protection to every107 Cf. Plato, Gorgias 483 C: " . . . I think they are only too glad to have equality .... " Ibid. 484 A; 488 C ff.; Republic 359 A ff. 108 Cf. Plato, Republic 343 C; 338 E; 359 A ff.; Gorgias 484 C; 491 D; 383 B; et al. 8 114 ANTON- HERMANN CHROUST one, is in some respects not entirely incompatible even with a doctrine which upholds the " divine rights " of the supposedly superior man. By replacing the "strong man" of Thrasymachus or Callicles with the Epicurean " wise man of true insights " we find in these radical ideas certain notions which are not entirely alien to the Epicureans. The so-called Hedonists or Cyrenaics, that is, Aristippus 109 and his followers, preached a philosophy of unrestrained pursuit of pleasure or enjoyment achieved only by the complete satisfaction of man's volitional life and sensuous appetites. 110 They insisted that all laws were ultimately mere instruments or institutions devised by clever scoundrels and valid solely for the unenlightened masses. 111 The educated man does not trouble himself about laws, traditions, or conventions, 112 but with109 It should be noted here that Aristippus in his ethico-practical teachings took his point of departure from the obvious incompleteness of Socrates' doctrine concerning the nature of the good. Socrates had defined virtue as rational insight and this in turn as the knowledge of the good. But he had failed to give the concept of the good a particular content or meaning. This incompleteness made it possible for the most diverse philosophies to introduce into the Socratic system of ethics their specific views or definitions as to the nature of. the ultimate moral good. 11 ° Cf. Diog. Laert. 2. 90 ff.; 2. 66; Aristotle, Nic. Eth. 1172 b 9; 1101 b 27.In view of the fact that Diogenes Laertius (2. 65-104) and Sextus Empiricus (Adv. Math. 7.11.190 ff.; Eusebius, Praepar. Evang. 14.18. 31; 19.1 ff.; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 2. !i!l. 130 fl'.), our main sources of information concerning the so-called Hedonist school, merely refer to the Cyrenaic teachings in general, it is impossible exactly to divorce the ideas of Aristippus proper from those of his followers and disciples who progressively might have modified or adulterated his original statements. Cf. note 47 supra. According to the Cyrenaics happiness is that frame of mind which is the result of a completely satisfied desire. It is a matter of total indifference what the particular objects of this desire and of this gratification are. Hence true pleasure depends on the strength or intensiveness of the feeling of satisfaction which is present to the highest degree in the case of sensuous enjoyments. Virtue, therefore, is the knowledge of how to achieve this happiness; how to enjoy pleasure as much and as intensely as possible. In other words: virtue is the ability and capacity for unrestrained enjoyment. Cf. Cicero, De Officiis 3. 116. 111 Theodorus, the "Atheist," insisted that the wise man would even steal or commit adultery and sacrilege if the circumstances would permit him to do so. For these acts are not "unlawful " or " immoral " in themselves, but are merely forbidden by convention. Cf. Diog. Laert. !i!. 99. 112 Thus Theodorus was firmly opposed to the religious tradition of his day. Cf. Diog. Laert. 2. 97. He denied not only the existence of the traditional Greek gods, but also that of a supreme Godhead as such. Cf. Cicero, De Natur(}, Deorum 1.12. THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW OF THE EPICUREANS 115 out restraint enjoys all things that come into his possession. 113 In this fashion the Cyrenaics regarded the man-made laws, the VOf.LqJ (or, (Jf.uet) SiKawv, that is, the historically developed social conventions and legal institutions, a distinct limitation of man's natural right (vuE£ SiKawv) to unlimited and unrestrained enjoyment.n4 This fundamental right man may and, indeed, should exercise without giving much thought to the existing laws, traditional conventions, and social institutions. 115 The 113 The Cyrenaics considered sensuous enjoyments to be the most perfect joys because they are joys of the present and hence without any responsability as to the past or the future. In short, these sensuous enjoyments are irresponsible joys and for this very reason perfect joys. 114 Diog. Laert. ll. 93: ... p:YJli€v re elva.< VO"EL olKa.wp •.• aAAa VOP,o/ Ka.l Me<. 115 ln some respects the teachings of the Cyrenaics and those of the Cynics are very similar. In their effort to define more specifically the Socratic concept of the good (cf. note 109 supra) both attempted to demonstrate the intrinsic meaning and end of life by showing in what man's real happiness consists; and how man must be constituted or must conduct himself in order to attain to true happiness and virtue. The Cynics, in general, insisted that the intelligent and :rational conduct of man's life alone makes man happy and contented (cf. Diog. Laert. 6. 13), not through its practical consequences, but rather through itself. Cf. ibid. 6. 103 ff. The inner contentment, which is the product of the right life itself, is, therefore, complete independence of the outer world. Virtue itself-the complete independence of the world-is sufficient for true happiness. And virtue is the sole sure possession among the vicissitudes of life. Cf. Diog. Laert. 6. ll. Since every want is essentially a shackle that makes man dependent upon fortune and the course of this world, true virtue and happiness consist in the complete suppression of all desires and the total restriction of every want. Cf. Xenophon, Symposium 4. 34-44. Virtue, then, is but freedom from want and desire. By applying these basic tenets to the problems of practical life in general, the Cynics arrived at a completely negative attitude towards all traditional political, social, ethical, legal, or cultural ideas or institutions of the day. In their attempt to reduce man's wants to the absolutely necessary, and in their insistence that every effort to rise above this " existential minimum " be regarded as vain and even pernicious, the Cynics in effect strove for the ideal " state of nature." Cf. Diog. Laert. 6.11; Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae 4.159 C. Hence they preached that the wise man adjusts himself only to what nature demands, and despises all that which is merely the product or result of human institutions, opinions, or convention. Not the existing laws or the established legal and political organization (cf. Aristotle, Politics a 15; Diog. Laert. 6. ll4; 6. 34, Athenaeus, op. cit., but virtue alone interests the Cynic. Cf. Diog. Laert. 6. ll ff.; 6. 38. Refinement, fame, or honor meant as little to him as those pleasures of the senses which go beyond the satisfaction of the most elementary demands of nature. Likewise did he scoff at the arts or at science. Cf. Diog. Laert. 6.103; Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.1.11 ff. He treated with utter contempt the institutions of matrimony and family. H6 ANTON- HERMANN CHROUST Cyrenaics gladly accepted and shared the refinements of life which Greek civilization had brought about and Greek laws effectively protected. They found it most convenient and permissible to enjoy and abuse without restraint the fruits gathered and preserved by the labors of those whom they at heart despised and ridiculed. But no sense of gratitude or duty bound them to society or civilization. 116 The base egoism of their philosophy a purely sensuous enjoyment of the achievements of others resulted in a complete denial of any sense of social, political, or legal responsibility. Sacrifice for others, devotion to the common good, active and constructive participation in the public affairs of their city state-all these were looked upon as mere foolishness unbecoming the wise and virtuous man. The practical philosophy of the Hedonists was one of " parasites who feasted at the full table of Greek beauty; but it was as removed from the ideal meaning of that beauty as was the of the beggars who lay at its 117 threshold." In the final reckoning, however, the Cyrenaics themselves prove by their own doctrine if happiness, enjoyment, and satisfaction of sensuous desires are to be the ultimate meaning and purpose of life, life itself of necessity completely misses this very purpose and is, therefore, to be rejected as something essentially worthless and meaningless. For even the most rabid Hedonists could not deny that enjoyment without pain, or happiness without sorrow always remain something unattainable. 118 Thus he who achieves merely a state free all pain, sorrow, and actual discomfort is already to be considered happy. 119 But since pain, sorrow, and discomfort-the discomfort of unsatisfied desires-always preponderates, Hegesias actually suggested that it would perhaps be better not to Cf. Diog. Laert. 6. 72. He had no attachment to his native country or city (Diog. Laert. 6. 63); nor did he respect religion or religious tradition. Cf. Diog. Laert. 6. 8; frag. 8 (Mullaeh). n• Diog. Laert. 66. " 7 W. Windelband, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophic, 12th edit., 71. ns Diog. Laert. 2. 9·4. " 9 Diog. Laert. 2. 9'1,-96. THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW OF THE EPICUREANS 117 live at all.120 Abject pessimism is the final and most devastating consequence of heedless hedonism, which in Hegesias completely and conclusively refutes itself: " The wages of sin is death." 121 These are, as far as we are still able to ascertain, some of the traditional ideas which influenced and shaped, at least in part, the basic Epicurean doctrine as to the origin, function, and purpose of law, right, justice, and politically organized society under the rule of law. Only in the waning days of a once great and glorious tradition did the Epicureans, together with their more effeminate Roman disciples, become infinitely more delicate than their robust spiritual ancestors. Hence the content of Epicurean legal or political philosophy was more aestheticand more decadent. For even the real zest and spirit of enjoyment had been lost; and in place of the rabblerousing vigor of the Sophists and Cyrenaics or the lofty ideas of Plato and Aristotle we find but the gentle and self-complacent rustle of mere smiling witicism-refined, intellectual, and infinitely blase. ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST M ediaevallnstitute, University of Notre Dame, South Benul, Indiana (To be continued) 120 The fervor with which Hegesias preached the utter futility of life earned him the surname of o 1Te<