TH THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH

EDITORS:

Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

APRIL, 1953

VoL. XVI

No.2

STo THOTh1AS' THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN
N OUTLINE of the doctrine of St. Thomas on the
transmission and nature of Original Sin will show, as
far as possible, the development of his thought in
different writings. For the comparison of certain articles in
the Summa Theologiae with the corresponding ones in the
Commentary on the Sentences reveals a very great difference
of approach. Little of the argumentation is common to the
two works, although the conclusions are the same, and scarcely
any of the data of the CommentaTy on the Sentences is thrown
aside, but rather remains as an essential basis for the more
advanced theory of the later works.

I.

THE EXISTENCE

OF ORIGINAL

SIN

St. Thomas uses a number of scriptural, theological and
rational arguments to show that original sin exists, and a
survey of them is instructive. They find their chief develop-

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ment in the Summa Contra Gentiles (IV, c. 50). They are as
follows:
I. Genesis 2:16-17.
"And He commanded him saying: of every tree of paradise thou
shalt eat: but of the tree of knowledge of good and evil thou shalt
not eat. For in what day soever thou shalt eat of it thou shalt die
the death."

From this text St. Thomas infers that, since it is implied
that man was not created in a state in which he was subject
to the necessity of death, we must say that this is a punishment
for sin. Taking this as revealed, he argues that, since a punishment can only be inflicted justly for sin, wherever we find the
punishment, that is, liability to death, there must we also find
sin. Now this penalty is found in all mankind, even in those
not capable of actual sin; hence it follows that there must
be in all mankind a sin not incurred by an act of the individual's will, but transmitted to him by his very birth or origin.
2. Romans 5: 12-14.
" Wherefore as by one man sin entered into the world, and by sin
death; and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned."
This is the text most frequently quoted, and is understood
by St. Thomas to be an explicit statement of the fact of original
sin, and is used by him as an argument not only in determining
its existence, but in many questions relating to its transmission
and nature. He rejects the Pelagian interpretation which explained the text as applying to actual sin, which entered the
world by Adam, insofar as all men imitate his transgression
when they sin. 1 His most usual argument against their exegesis is that cited by Peter Lombard from St. Augustine: had
transmission by imitation been meant, St. Paul would rather
have said that sin entered the world by the devil, quoting
Wisdom 2 : 24: " But by the envy of the devil death came
into the world."
1

Ad Rom., c. 8, lect. 5; Summa Theol., I-II, q. 81; IV Cont. Gmt., c. 50.

STo THOMAS'

THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN

163

In the Contra Gentiles, however, he urges against the Pelagian interpretation that if this were intended SL Paul would
not have said that " death passed into all men," since then
both sin and its penalty would only pass into those who imitated Adam by sinningo Whereas he expressly asserts: 2 " death
reigned from Adam unto Moses even over them also who have
not sinned after the similitude of the transgression of Adamo"
Again in the Commentary on Romans 3 the Scriptural use of
the singular " sin " is put forward as an argument: for though
the plural can be used of original sin understood in its true
sense, the singular could hardly be used were it only an imitation by many actual sinso
It is remarkable, and we shall see why later, that St. Thomas
does not make use of" in whom all sinned" in the Commentary
on the Sentenceso In his later works he several times repeats
the explanation of St. Augustine which is found in the text
of the Sentences: that "in quo" can be understood as "in
which first man" or as "in which sin." In the Summa Theologiae he says: "inasmuch as Adam's will is looked upon as
In whom
ours, in which sense the Apostle says (Romo 5:
all have sinnedo" 4 What he means by this inclusion in Adam,
or in his sin, or in his will, must be understood in the light of
Sto Thomas' whole theory. Subsidiary texts used are Psalm
50: 7; Job 14:
Epho 2: 3; but these do not throw any
special light on his theoryo
3o Baptism. 5
Sto Thomas also argues from the necessity of Baptism, and
the reasoning is given in its fullest form in the Contra Gentiles.
Infant baptism is practised by the Church; now baptism is a
remedy against sin, and therefore implies a sin in its recipienL
This cannot be actual in infants, it must, therefore, be originaL
The objection that baptism is not necessarily a remedy for
sin, but only a condition of entry into heaven, is met by the
argument " nothing forsakes its end except on account of sin."
3 Loc. cit.
• Romans 5 :14.
• III, q. 84, a. 2, ad 3.
• IV Cont. Gent., c. 50; de Malo, q. 4, a. l; IV Sent., d. 30, q. 2.

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4. Rational argument. 6
He also uses a " sttasio " from reason to show that man was
not created in his present unsatisfactory state; this shown, the
process of the argument is the same as that from Genesis, where
this fact is taken as revealed. It is inferred that the defects
which we experience must be penalties, and that there must
consequently be sin wherever they are found.
In showing that man was not created in his present state, he
does not attempt to prove that these imperfections are not
natural, but argues from the providence of God, admitting
that, considering human nature in itself, they are natural weaknesses arising from the composite, spiritual and material nature
of man. But, if the nature of man is in this way so unsatisfactory, it is highly probable that God would come to its aid
in view of the dignity of the higher element, so that the body
should not interfere with the well-being of the soul, nor the
lower powers with reason and will, whose servants they are by
nature. Hence, if we find that an unsatisfactory state exists, we
can probably sufficiently
probabiliter probari potest
-that they are penal, and conclude to original sin.
In many of the foregoing arguments we find a common process of reasoning, which may be summarised thus:
There is a revealed fact, supported by reason, that man
was not created in his present defective state, but in a state
in which body and soul were in harmony" It can be inferred
that these defects are therefore penalties for sin. But since a
penalty can in justice only be inflicted for a sin, wherever the
penalty is found, we can conclude to sin that is in all men.
Since this sin cannot be actual, its sign, the penalty, being
found in those without actual sin, it must be " original."
It is important to elucidate the exact extent to which St.
Thomas sees in the passage of Romans not only an assertion
but also a proof of the existence of original sin in us, and
notably in v. 14: "But death reigned from Adam unto Moses
even over them who have not sinned after the similitude of
• IV Cont. Gent., c. 52.

ST. THOMAS'

THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN

165

the transgression of Adam." In the Contra Gentiles this is
used, not as a direct proof of the existence of original sin,
but as proving that St. Paul in his preceding statement is
speaking of original sin and not of actuaU There, and in the
Commentary on Romans 8 the proof given by St. Paul is used
against the Pelagians who interpreted the Apostle as meaning
actual sin. St. Paul is understood as proving by the universality
of death, even in those who have not sinned themselves, that
all men are in a state of original sin. The argument leads to the
existence of original sin, but its process is different from that
which we have summarised above where death is regarded as
the penalty of original sin, and inference made from punishment
to "fault. Here what is supposed is not that death is a penalty
for sin, but that it is an effect of sin. 9 St. Thomas understands
the Apostle thus: Supposing that by sin death entered the
world/ 0 it follows that wherever death is, there is sin like to
Adam's. But not like to Adam's by imitation, since those who
have not sinned like to Adam in this way also die, therefore
like to Adam's originally. 11
The argument must thus be carefully distinguished from
that which proves the existence of original sin by arguing
from punishment to fault, an argument based on moral necessity. Here the existence of original sin is presupposed as
revealed, and the argument only illustrates the doctrine by
excluding actual sin, by a reasoning based on a physical connexion between death and sin; a connexion eventually to be
expanded into the doctrine that original sin consists in the
deprivation of original justice (here " death ") . Where there
is death, there is original sin, for the two are materially the
• Ibid., c. 50.
• Lect. 4.
• IV Cont. Gent., c. 50: " since by sin death entered the world, death would befall
only those who sin like to the first man who sinned; ad Rom., loc. cit.: since death
is the effect especially of original sin.... "
10 Voste in loco; "death stretches as far as sin."
11 Ad Rom., loc. cit.: "As though he should say that they died not from their
own sin, he shows that there was in them a widespread likeness to the sin of Adam
through origin. And this is what the Apostle intends to show, namely, that it
[death] entered the would through the original sin of Adam."

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OSWIN MAGRATH

same thing, will be St. Thomas' final conclusion. The principal difficulty in an explanation of original sin consists in showing how it can be culpable in all men. The weakest point in
many of the arguments lies in the illation from penalty to
fault. It is not difficult to show that the natural defects incurred by Adam's sin can pass to his descendants; a tolerable
explanation can be made to prove that they are penal even in
us; but if divine justice is to be safeguarded this is not enough; 12
it must be shown that there is also guilt. The argument from
punishment to fault may evidence a moral necessity for the
fact of culpability; but a formal theological explanation must
be sought elsewhere. The progress of this explanation can be
traced in St. Thomas' works.

II.

THE TRANSMISSION

OF ORIGINAL

SIN

St. Thomas rejects Traducianism as "heretical"; 13 he also
:rejects as insufficient the theory that original sin is transmitted
in the same way as bodily failings and some defects
soul,
owing to a deficiency in the semen. 14 This latter theory fails
to explain the culpability in us of the defects we inherit from
Adam. In the Compendium Theologiae it is granted that such
a theory accounts for the lack of original justice in us, and he
seems to admit that it suffices to explain why this deprivation
is not unjust; and in the Commentary on Romans it is offered
as a reasonable elimination of the appeal to Traducianism. But
in each place St. Thomas then proceeds to inquire how the
quality of sinfulness is to be explained. We must return to this
question after St. Thomas's doctrine in the Commentary on the
Sentences has been seen, since in his rejection of the above
theory as insufficient he seems to criticise implicitly his own
earlier explanation,
on the Sentences,
a. In the
In the Commentary on the Sentences St. Thomas approaches
the question of original sin on the same lines as we have already
IV Sent., d. 30, q. 1, a.
c.
'"Summa Thevl., I, q. H6, a.
'"Ibid., I-ll, q. 81, a. 1, c.; ad Rom., c. S, lect. 4; Comp. Theol., c.

12

ST. THOMAS' THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN

167

seen in his arguments from Scripture, developing the reasoning
there sketched with its consequences. He opens the treatise by
asking whether the defects we experience are a penalty for
the sin of Adam; then if any defect is culpable in us, and lastly
by offering his explanation of how this sin can be transmitted.
i. The defects of fallen nature are penalties for sin.15
St. Thomas starts from the state of original justice, just as
he took from Genesis the fact that man was created in a state
far more perfect than that in which he now finds himself.
It is not necessary here to determine the much disputed point
of the precise inter-relations of grace and original justice; we
may note, however, that in the Commentary on the Sentences
St. Thomas explicitly leaves the question open, whether man
was created in grace or not/ 6 and distinguishes justitia originalis
and justitia gratuita. 11
The argument to show that human misery is a punishment
starts from the supernatural end of man. It was necessary, if
man was to attain an end above nature, that he should be provided not only with his natural powers, but with something
beyond them, to enable him to achieve his end easily. Now
his direct relation to end is by intellect and will: thus, in order
that the higher part of his nature might direct itself with
facility towards God, the lower powers were subjected to it, and
the body made free from suffering and death, so that nothing
could impede the mind's flight to God.
With the first sin this subjection of the mind to God was
interrupted; the very reason for the existence of the gifts which
harmonised man's various faculties was gone; hence man was
reasonably allowed to fall back into his natural state of
disharmony .18
Hence these defects can be considered either in relation to
the natural principles of human nature, and then they are
18 I Sent., d. 29, q. 2.
II Sent., d. so, q. I, a. 2.
II Sent., d. 20, q. 2, a. 8, c.
18 II Sent., d. SO, q. 1, a. I, c.:
"Man was left with only those goods which
1"

17

flowed from his natural principles."

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OSWIN MAGRATH

natural defects and no penalties; or in relation to that pristine
state, and so they are penal to the nature of man. 19 In II Sent.,
d. 32, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1 this latter point is made clearer: the
deprivation is of something gratuitously given to the nature,
not to the person: the person is not deprived of anything due
to his nature as received by him. Hence it is a punishment of
the nature, and not of the person.
It must be noted that in this argument St. Thomas, working
towards the existence of original sin, is only speaking of the
defects of the sensitive appetite and body, " defects which we
feel " as the title has it. He is not yet discussing the essential
imperfection, and he does not mention original justice. He will
argue from the penal nature of these defects, shown in this
first article, to the existence in us of some defect which is
culpable. The immediate point is only to show that the defects
we feel are the result of the deprivation of a gift, and hence
penal.
So far this explains the transmission of a similarly defective
nature in us: for Adam's fallen nature necessarily produced
fallen natures. 20 There is no need to appeal to any transmission
of soul by generation, since the soul being essentially related
to the body, and the body lacking the qualities that rendered it
subject to the soul, the soul naturally lacks those qualities by
which it controlled the body perfectly.
The important element to be retained from the above reasoning is the notion of a natural defect or penalty, and that in
relation to man's supernatural end. The defects resulting from
the Fall are in themselves natural imperfections of our composite nature; it is only in relation to our first state and supernatural end that they are penal. The Fall consists in man being
reduced from a supernatural end to his natural one, and hence
losing all the perfections given him in view of that end.
For human nature, being intellectual and free, is incompletely
determined in relation to operation and to its end. By nature
19 Loc. cit.: " And thus without doubt they are punishments for it [human nature],
because one is also said to be punished by the privation of a thing freely granted
him."
"0 11 Sent., d. 81, q. 1, a. 1.

ST. THOMAS' THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN

169

its object and end is only " good in general," and this is an
object and end insufficiently determined for operation. Hence
it is necessary for man to be determined to some particular
end. Normally this determination comes from a personal act of
free will; but we can conceive of a determination of nature
anterior to all personal acts and impressed upon it by the
author of nature. Such a determination we postulate in the
state of original justice: it was natural in the sense of being
prior to all personal acts, and given in such a way as to be
transmitted with the nature: it was natural also in the sense
that it was a determination of the potentiality of nature. It
was, however, preternatural in the sense that it was not implied
in the constituent elements of nature, but caused gratuitously
by God.
Hence the corresponding defect is also natural: firstly, insofar as it is a lack of something belonging to the nature and
per modum naturae, and not to the person: secondly, in the
sense that to be thus defective is natural, a result of the constitutive elements of nature. It is the first sense of natural
defect that is of importance here. St. Thomas has shown that
there is a natural defect and a natural penalty, in the sense that
there is a lack of perfection given to the nature and per modum
naturae. He is now going to argue from this penalty of nature
to the idea of a sin of nature. We have accounted for a natural
defect in all men which is also a penalty; there must be also a
sin of nature corresponding to the penalty.
ii. There is sin among the defects transmitted to us.21
The precise difference between a defect and a sin lies in the
voluntariness of the latter. A defect is sinful insofar as it is
voluntary: it is the voluntary lack of something which ought
not to be lacking. It must be noted that St. Thomas is careful
to exclude all actual sin from the notion of original sin in us:
he is always speaking of habitual sin. Is this defect of nature
inherited from Adam voluntary? Clearly it is. It could have
"' Ibid., a.

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OSWIN MAGRATH

been avoided: it was in the power of human nature to have
retained original justice; its loss was voluntary by a will in the
nature. Hence in all individual men this loss is voluntary and
culpable; not indeed by their individual wills, but by the will
of Adam who lost the perfection of original justice in the whole
of the nature descended from him. We are in the presence,
then, of a natural voluntary defect, a sin of nature.
Here, therefore, in the Commentary on the Sentences, St.
Thomas conceives of original sin in us as the lack of those
perfections that in man's original state co-ordinated him with
a supernatural end, as incurred by Adam's sin. The conception
is not difficult. Just as actual sin produces the deprivation of
a personal good, so original sin causes the loss of a natural good:
other deprivations are voluntary and sinful only in relation to
the act which produced them, and in themselves are to be described as habitual sins.22 St. Thomas also compares original
sin to the deprivation of a man's estates for some fault, or
to the deprivation of honor in his descendants by his fault.
This deprivation, redounding to them without any fault of
theirs, can 'even in them be called sinful and sin in relation to
the father's culpable act. 23
We have said that this explanation is rejected as insufficient
by St. Thomas, and superseded in his later works by another.
The reason is that it does not explain how the lack of original
justice is a sin, even habitual, of Adam's descendants. It shows
that they inherit a nature culpably and voluntarily deficient,
but not that they inherit a culpable nature; it is not their sin,
rather is it Adam's and his alone, since the only connexion
established between him and them in relation to the defect of
nature, is that they have received such a nature from Adam.
The defect is precisely and solely theirs by origin, and as such
rather a matter- of commiseration than- of blame. It is not
really a sin of nature, but a sin of a will in the nature, pros• Sin is an analogous idea. Venial sin falls short of the full notion of sin in that
it is not fully evil; original sin in that it is not fully culpable; only mortal actual
sin is fully evil and fully voluntary. Cf. II Sent., d. 85, q. 2, ad 2.
28 Summa Theol., I-ll, q. 81, a. 2; etc.

ST. THOMAS' THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN

171

ducing a nature with defects which are sinful. What the theory
lacks is a link between the individual.natures enabling Adam's
culpability to be predicated of the whole human race. We have,
indeed, established the presence in all men of a culpable defect,
but the culpability is so far only attached to Adam.
The inference of the sin from the penalty is also abandoned
by St. Thomas in his later writings. For to be valid it would
have to start from a punishment that deprived the nature of
a good due to it as such in aU the individuals. We have no
example of such a loss. The deprivation of original justice is
the loss of a good belonging to the nature, not as such, but
insofar as propagated from Adam. It is only in this sense that
a person can be punished justly for another's sin-inquantum
est res patris. We are deprived of a good not belonging to us
of our own right, not demanded by our very nature, but only
ours precisely as descendants of Adam. Hence this loss is not
strictly a punishment for us but for Adam. To show that it is
a punishment for us it must first be shown that we ourselves,
our individual natures, are "quaedam res Adae ": the theory
only shows that our preternatural gifts are such. The illation
from punishment to sin must be performed strictly, going from
that which is due but deprived, to the person to whom it is due.
Original justice in us was due to Adam as he was created; it
is not due to us as such (except some other basis be found) :
hence we can only conclude to sin in Adam, not in us.
Therefore, St. Thomas will abandon this approach, and
taking the fact of original sin as revealed, will try to find a
rational explanation filling the lacuna· in his theory of the
Commentary on the Sentences, and showing that there is a
unity of human nature making it possible ·to predicate sin and
culpability of all the individuals descended from Adam.
b. In St. Thomas' later works. 24
"' And thus we must proceed in another way " (Summa
Theol.); "this question is easily solved if distinction is made
"'IV Cont. Gent., c. 52; de Malo, q. 4, a. l; Comp. Theol., cc. 200-201; Summa
Theol., I-ll, q. 81; ad Rom., c. 5, lect. 8.

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OSWIN MAGRATH

between person and nature" (Comp. Theol.). The new attempt commences by laying down a certain unity of mankind.
Firstly, in the static order, mankind can be compared to a community or collegium participating in some common characteristic such as citizenship, and thus looked on as one man. The
individuals in such a society are then like the members of a
body, able to act in virtue of the whole, in that their actions
are regarded as the actions of the whole when they act in
virtue of the common characteristic. In the same way all men
share in one nature, and as such can be regarded as one man,
and each man a member of that one man, insofar as he shares in
the common nature--or more precisely in the Compendium
Theologiae/ 5 and in the Commentary on Romans, 26 "as certain
members of human nature." This precision is important, for
thus far we have not advanced beyond the theory of the Commentary on the Sentences, but have only taken a different viewpoint of the same community of nature on which that theory
was based. This unity is logicaJ (with a real basis, of course),
a unity of logical essence, but not yet a :real unity of nature.
It only establishes a potential membership, since membership
is in relation to action and to the end of nature. Here we have
only a static logical unity of essence, just as in the city we
have only a logical, moral unity of citizenship. For this unity
to become :real and actual, we must postulate some real link
between the various members of the nature.
Many commentators here build the bridge needed by postulating a divine decree o:r pact made known to Adam, by which
he was constituted moral head of the human race, and his
will held for ours. They thus make this part of the comparison
the final theory, and only reserve the motio generationis for the
role of necessary condition of our sharing in Adam's nature.
The contrary is seen in St. Thomas who does not mention
this first unity in the Commentary on Romans, who and in
the Compendium Theologiae and De Malo says: " as one community o:r rather as one body of one man." Similarly in the
•• "&Jc. cit.

•• C. 5, Iect. 8.

ST. THOMAS'

THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN

173

Summa Theologiae this unity of community or citizenship is
only an introduction to the unity of membership of one body,
and is only mentioned in the :first article. This can be further
discussed after we have seen what is the central point of St.
Thomas' theory, the point which he added to that of the
Commentary on the Sentences: the unique nature of the movement of generation. Here is a link, a natural act, between the
already established unity of nature and the unity of individuals
which is sought. It is the extension of the static unity to a
dynamic one that supplies what is needed to complete the
theory.
The comparison is now advanced between actual sin in the
members of the body and original sin in the members of human
nature. Just as in the one person of a man there are many
members, so in the one nature of man there are many individuals. And as the hand is in potency to be constituted an
actual member by the movement of the will, so different men
are in potency to be constituted actual members of human
nature by the movement of generation. The difference is that
the person is already an actual unity in being, and only in
potency to a unity in action; the nature is also in potency to
unity in being. The hand can be reduced by the will into a
state of actual sinning, the individual nature can be reduced by
the movement of generation into a sinful state of being.
We have then a parallel between the actual personal membership of the hand acting under the movement of the will,
and the actual natural membership of an individual coming
into being under the movement of generation, in virtue of which
parallel the individual natures are members of a real unity of
human nature, just as the members of the body are members
of a real unity of personal action.
Now the sin of a member as such is not by its own will, but
by the will of the whole man; similarly the sin of an individual
human nature is not by the will of the individual but by the
will of the whole. The only will which can be called the will
of the whole is that of the man in whom all the individuals

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existed virtually; it is more accurately a will in the nature than
of the nature. The morally defective action in the hand is
called the sin of the hand insofar as the hand is made an actual
member of the person by the sinful movement of the will; so
also the morally (as has been shown) defective condition of
the individual nature is called a sin of the individual nature
insofar as it is constituted an actual member of human nature
by the movement of generation. Just as the sin of the hand is
voluntary by the will of the person of whom it is a member, so
is the sin of the individual nature voluntary by the will of (or
rather in) the nature of which it is a member. Hence, just as
granted a voluntary defect in action transmissible to the hand
by a movement of the will there can be a sinful act of the hand,
so given a voluntary defect of nature transmissible to the individuals of the nature by the movement of generation there
can be a sinful state of the individual natures. And as the
sinful action is imputed to the hand insofar as to the degree
that it is made a member of the person acting by a movement
of the will, so the sinful state is imputed to the individuals
insofar as made members of the nature by the movement of
generation. Now we have seen that the lack of original justice
is such a voluntary defect of nature, and is necessarily transmitted by the movement of generation; hence in the individuals, considered precisely as receiving that
human
nature by the movement of generation from Adam, as members
of human nature in this sense, it is sinful. In the individual
it is in the first place a sin of the whole nature, and only
belongs to him insofar as he is constituted a member of that
nature by the movement of generation. The individual, therefore, himself is sinful, insofar as he is one with Adam in human
nature; it is not only the lack of original justice which is now
a" res Adae," he himself is such. We have a real sin of nature,
not only a culpable defect in nature. The theory of the Commentary on the Sentences remains as the basis of the new
theory; indeed only in the light of the new theory does the
old gain its full validity. We have now reached the sin of
nature at which the earlier argument aimed. It is to the real

STo THOMAS'

THEORY OF ORIGINAL

SIN

175

unity of voluntarily defective nature that the sinfulness of
the individuals is attachedo The nature itself is sinful in any
of its concrete examples, united by this bond of generation; the
abstract nature is not such, but only accompanied by a sinful
defecto
We can thus distinguish three moments in the transmission
of original sin: firstly the Fall, the actual sin of Adam, the
punishment of which is the loss of the preternatural gifts given
to him in view of his continued adhesion to God; secondly
the transmission of this loss and its results by natural generation, the fallen nature being unable to generate a better than
itself; thirdly, and simultaneously with the last, the transmission of the culpability of this loss, insofar as Adam's descendants are members of his natureo
The key lies in the unique nature of the act of generation,
which produces the individual in a state of deprivation, in an
analogous way to the movement to actual sin of the bodily
member of a person, coupled with the fact that original justice
was given to the nature and extended to the bodyo27
We have said that many commentators and other theologians demand a divine decree for the explanation of original
sin transmitted. Now we have seen that such a moral unity
of mankind is the least essential part of St. Thomas' theory,
and is used only as an introduction to the more difficult concept of physical membership. The explanation also raises difficulties, notably on the score of divine justiceo What it seems
to involve is that God should make us responsible for what we
have not willed with our own wills, by an arbitrary decree
whose only effect appears to be the propagation of the evil of
sin. If, however, we lay the blame at the door of natural
necessity, God is no longer positively :responsible for our sinfulnesso It is urged by some that it makes our sin necessary.
St. Thomas answers this by saying: " nor is it required for the
nature of fault that each sin be voluntary by the will of the
members by which it is exercised, but by the will of that which
"" Cf. de Malo, q. 4, a. 8, c.

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OSWIN MAGRATH

is principal in man." 28 Other reasons given for the divine
decree of moral unity are that it is necessary to restrict our
share of his first sin, and to exclude share in sins of intermediate parents. Both these are answered by St. Thomas by
recourse to the sin of nature. Only Adam's first sin deprived
human nature of a natural good. Had Adam not sinned, the
descendants of the first sinner, whoever he was, would have
contracted original sin, as St. Thomas explicitly states in De
Malo/ 9 , although some theologians are constrained to deny the
authenticity of this text, in order to maintain their theory of a
divine decree constituting a moral head of the race.

III.

THE NATURE

OF ORIGINAL

SIN

After analysing the mode of transmission of original sin and
the analogy on which St. Thomas' theory is based, the precise
nature of this sin requires elucidation. What is this defect of
nature in relation to man's supernatural end?
a. In the Commentary on the Sentences. 30
We have seen that in the Commentary on the Sentences
original sin is conceived of as a deprivation of certain gifts
given in view of a supernatural end. In every sin, says St.
Thomas, there is a formal and a material element, and he
proceeds to make a comparison between actual and original
sin. It is only in this context that such a comparison appears
the Commentary on the Sentences.
An actual sin, or deordinate act, contains two elements: the
act and its deordination, or conversion to commutable good
and aversion from God. The disorder or aversion is what
makes it evil, so that this is the formal aspect; the act itself is
the material element. (It may be remarked that this is not
the disputed question whether actual sin is formally constituted
by its positive part: here the analysis is of sin as evil, not
precisely as an act of the person, which is the other question.
28 Comp. Theol., c. 196.
•• Q. 5, a. 4, ad 8; cf. also 1l Sent., d. 83, q. 1, a. l, ad 8.
•• ll Sent., d. 80, q. 1, a. 3.

ST, THOMAS' THEORY OF ORIGINAL

SIN

177

We are now treating not of the culpability but of the evil of
original sin.) Like actual, original sin has two elements: the
disorder of the lower powers tending towards their natural
objects, and the disorder in :regard to the end. The first disorder is the absence of the bond that held the other powers
under the will; the second the absence of the determination of
the will to God which it had in the beginning; the latter is
formal in regard to the former, since it is by the will that the
other powers were subjected to the end of man. Hence the
loss of subjection to God in the will plays a formal role in
relation to the loss of subjection to the will in the lower powers.
Consequent on this material disorder, the lower powers tend
each to its natural object: this we call concupiscence, not
indeed the actual movement of appetite, but the tendency to
inordinate desire which results in the lower appetite, arising
from the loss of the bond which held it subject. Both these
elements of original sin are privative. The tendency spoken of
is that left by the removal of the bond which held the passions
or
subject to the will, not any " conversio " either
habitual; it is, as it were, a positive aspect of original sin,
although it is a positive
solely from a deprivation, and
it is called original sin by transference of the material to the
whole.
Original sin, therefore, is formally the lack of determination
directing the will to its end, God; materially, the lack of subjection of the lower powers to the will, which in its positive
aspect we call concupiscence.
b. In the De Malo, 31
Since in this work the theory of the movement of generation
has been elaborated, it is thence that a start is made, conceiving of original sin, not in the manner of the Commentary
on the Sentences, as a destitution of original justice, but as
" that which reaches him (the individual man) from the sin
of the first parent"; just as sin in the hand is what reaches it
from the movement of the sinful wilt Now in the case of the
01

Q. 4, a, 2.

2

178

OSWIN MAGRATH

hand what reaches it is " a certain effect and impression of the
first inordinate movement which was in the will, whence it is
necessary that it bear its likeness." The sin of the will consists
in turning to some temporal good without right order to its
due end; so the sin of the hand is " its application to some effect
without some order oi justice." There is in this actual sin
aversion and conversion, the formal and material element; and
these two elements are shared by the hand because it is a
member of the person sinning; in the same way in Adam's sin
there was a formal and a material element, aversion and conversion. From the first there resulted in his nature a loss of
original justice; from the second his lower powers experienced
" a sinking down to lower things," explained as deprivation of
that by which they were subject to reason, and abandonment
to their natural tendencies. In those born of him the higher
powers lack that order to God which original justice conferred,
and the lower powers and the body are not subject to reason
perfectly, but tend to their natural objects incontinently.
must, of course, eliminate from the constitution of original sin
all those powers which have no order to the end of man; but
among the moral powers of man the will plays a formal part
in relation to the rest. Hence the privation of the perfection of
the will is formal in relation to the privation or disorder in
the lower part of the soul, its liability to inordinate passion.
Original sin, then, in the children of Adam " is nothing other
than concupiscence with the lack of original justice," the latter
being formal, the former materiaL
St. Thomas repeatedly insists that it is not any positive concupiscence that is meant, or positive turning to evil; but only
the openness to evil left by the loss of rational control.
Yet the attempted parallel between actual and original sin
is uncomfortable, and it is necessary to stress the positive aspect
of concupiscence to bring it out; hence in the Summa, while the
positive consideration of original sin is developed, the comparison with actual sin is dropped, and the analysis is made
according to its proper nature of habitual sin.

ST. THOMAS' THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN

179

c. In the Summa Theologiae.32
The question is thus opened up from a new angle, in the
Summa; " Whether original sin is a habit? " Indeed, St.
Thomas seems to have developed his doctrine, for in the
Commentary on the Sentences 33 and in De Malo 84 he denies
that original sin is a habit (speaking of an operative habit),
and regards it simply as " proneness or disposition to concupiscence, which is from this that the concupiscible power is not
.perfectly subjected to reason with the removal of the restraint
of original justice"; but here in the Sed Contra he argues:
" disposition is said according to some habit " and he proceeds
in the article to distinguish between operative and entitative
habits.
A habit is: " a disposition whereby that which is disposed
is disposed well or ill, and this in regard to itself or in regard
to another: thus health is a habit." 35 It is differentiated from
other qualities by being a determination of the subject in
relation to its nature-bene vel male. The relation is primarily
to the nature of its subject, and only
to operation,
insofar as it is the end of nature or conducing to its end. Hence
there are two kinds of habits, distinguishable according to
their subjects: those which are subjected in the essential parts
and dispose the subject in relation to its form or nature; and
those subjected in potencies of their nature operative, which,
therefore, dispose the subject in relation to the nature of those
potencies, i. e. to operation. The first of these is an entitative
habit, and is a determination of the entitative potency of its
subject, and with this we are now concerned.
In the body there is a certain potentiality in regard to the
soul: it can be well or ill disposed in its regard; there can be
entitative dispositions in the body such as illness or health.
Owing to their instability they are rather to be called dispositions than habits. Can there be an entitative habit in
the soul? Not in regard to the natural form, for the soul itself
•• I-II, q. 82.
•• II Sent., q. 30, a. 1, a. 3, ad 2.

•• Q. 4, a. 2.

•• Summa Tkeol., I-II, q. 49, a. 1.

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OSWIN MAGRATH

is that. But the spiritual soul is peculiar in that it is itself
in potency, and can be determined in relation to a higher
nature, the divine nature, by grace, which is thus a unique
case of an entitative habit subjected in the form. It is in this
sense that St. Thomas calls original sin a habit: it is an illdisposition of the nature in relation to God, in comparison with
the state of harmony in which it was created. Here in the
Summa it is not the privation as such which is original sin,
qua habit, but the positive element of indisposition of the parts
of the soul. But this indisposition is in relation to the primal
state or man's supernatural end, not to the nature as such. 36
How can this habit be analysed? The specific nature of an
inordinate disposition is taken from its cause. Now the cause
of original sin is the privation of original justice which subjected the human mind to God. 37 Hence original sin will be
specified by this cause. Now original justice caused an order
in the soul, expressed primarily in the subjection of the will
to God, upon which the order of the other powers under the
will followed. Hence the disorder of the soul resulting from
the loss of original justice consists formally in the lack of
subjection to God by original justice expressed by a lack of
subjection of the will.38 The subject of original sin (as of
original justice) is primarily the essence of the soul. But its
immediate development is in the will " according to its inclination to act." 39 Original sin is not an operative but an entitative
habit, as has been seen. But every habit has a mediate inclination to act, insofar as directly disposing the nature it also
disposes the principle of action. For nature is the essence
considered as a source of action, or in relation to the end. In
man this relationship to the end is expressed by the will: the
primary inclination to the end or away from it is by the will.
Original sin, therefore, primarily affects the will among the
potencies, and leaves it with an inclination to an object insufficiently determined, hence prone to sin. The habitus or
•• Ibid.
87 Ibid., a. 2.

•• Ibid., a. 8.
•• Ibid., q. 88, a. 8.

ST. THOMAS'

THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN

181

original sin immediately indisposing the nature by rendering
it indetermined in its essence, consequently makes its act
indetermined, and so inclines to the possibility of sin. There
can thus (with Cajetan) be distinguished a primary aspect in
the formal part of original sin, the privation of the gift which
subjected the mind to God, and a secondary, the privation of
subjection itself. The formal part of original sin is, therefore,
the lack of subjection to God by original justice, the material
part all other inordinations. Looking ·at it as a habit these
things are considered in a positive aspect: the lack of subjection in the will as a positive order to an end less determinate
than it should be (not a turning to any particular good) ; and
in the other faculties a similar positive order to objects less
regulated by reason than they should be. Original sin is this
state of soul, insofar as it is voluntarily and culpably incurred
by human nature in the sin of Adam. In itself it is a habitus
corruptua, and an indisposition of the nature; but this indisposition being in the principle of operation, the habit, like its
subject, has an inclination to act, and in the sense explained, to
sin, which is expressed by the will.

IV.

THE ANALOGY

OF ORIGINAL

SIN

The doctrine of St. Thomas on original sin is based on a
rather complicated analogy, which it is useful to draw out. Sin
in the strict sense is actual mortal sin; in secondary senses we
have venial sin, the sin of a limb or of a passion, habitual
mortal sin, original sin. With venial sin we are not here concerned, for the purposes of our analogy it is univocal with
actual mortal sin, being both actual and immediately voluntary, whereas the point of the analogy is that original sin is
neither.
Sin of necessity includes two elements: an evil and the voluntariness of that evil. Actual mortal sin in the will contains
both elements in their perfection, or rather in a state of identification: it is an evil act of itself voluntary.
Analogy becomes possible on the real distinction of these

OSWIN MAGRATH

two elements, when the evil willed is found outside the act
of the will causing it. This evil can be found in an act or in
a state. If it is in an act of a member it is univocal with the
evil of actual sin in the will; both are privations of order to the
end in an act. If in a state it is analogous thus:
Privation of order to end
(Voluntary) Act

Privation of order to end
(Personal) State

This founds the distinction between actual and habitual sin,
the one being actual, the other habitual evil. The voluntary
element founds another distinction, that between the sin of
the will and that of the member, which two are univocally
evil but analogously voluntary. The sin of the will is voluntary
immediately of itself, the sin of the member is voluntary by the
will to which it is united in person, thus:
Privation of order to end
The will as immediate per
se cause

Privation of order to end
The will as per se cause
mediante persona.

Original sin is univocally habitual sin insofar as it is evil, being
the privation of the order to the end in the person. The analogy
lies in the voluntariness of this state, and it thus forms a third
analogue of our second division, while at the same time being
analogous to actual sin in the first manner, thus:
ACTUAL SIN
OF WILL
Privation of order
to end
ACT

(of will)

ACTUAL SIN
OF LIMB
Privation of order
to end
ACT

(of limb)

HABITUAL
SIN
Privation of order
to end
STATE

(of person)

Will as per
se cause

Will as per

Will as per 8e

se cause

cause

IMMEDIATELY

MEDIANTE PERSONA

IMMEDIATELY

ORIGINAL SIN
Privation of order
to end
STATE (of person)

Will as per
se cause
MEDIANTE

NATURA

Thus the analogy proper to original sin is that between it
and the actual sin of a member in the order of voluntariness.
This must be studied more closely; it contains a double
analogy:

THOMAS'

act
person

183

THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN

will
state
bodily member

will

and
nature

person.

The first presents no special difficulty, being the analogy
tween actual and habitual sin: as the will moves the bodily
member (or itself) into an ACT not rightly related to the end,
so the will moves the person into a STATE not rightly related to
the end. The notion common to both is that of a voluntary
privation of order to the end, the analogy lying in the proportionate realization of the same in an act, and in a condition
of the person. In the one case it is a positive tendency to
another end which founds the privation; in the other it is a
simple absence of coordination to the end. But both these, the
act and the person, as deprived, imply a tranescendental relation to the cause which deprived them, and which alone can
deprive them in the moral order, the will. That this transcendental relation is implied in the immediate act of the will and
in the immediate effect of the will is clear. It is a relation of
potency to act and of effect to cause. But the exact relation of
the member to the will is less clear, and still less so is its
analogue in the relation of the individual men to the will of
Adam.
As St. Thomas says in the Compendium Theologiae,40 the
solution lies in the distinction between nature and person. The
analogy is drawn between the person in relation to its parts
and the nature in relation to its individual supposits:
person

members

nature

persons.

In the case of a sin of a member it is necessary that the
member denominated sinful be united in person with the sinner;
an instrument is not itself called sinful. It is rather the person
who sins by his will and hand, and the hand is only called sinful
precisely as part of the person sinning, who is himself sinful
by his will. The person is denominated sinning by an act of
the will (sinfully moving the hand); the hand is denominated
sinning by its personal union with the person sinning.
•o C. 196.

184

OSWIN MAGRATH

in an analogous way in original sin the individual persons
are denominated sinful by the nature, which is in a state of
habitual sin, the nature being such by the movement of the
will of Adam. In either sin there is, in the first place, a movement of the will, reducing on the one hand the person into a
sinful act, on the other· the nature into a sinful state. In the
second place there is a movement prolonging the condition of
the person to its members and the nature to its individuals; a
movement actualising, on the one hand, the potential unity of
the person in action, on the other, the potential unity of the
nature in many derived individuals.
To apply this to the two: in the sin of the hand there is,
firstly, an act of the will moving the hand in the same way as
any other instrument; secondly, a state of actual sinning by
this act of the will in the person; thirdly, the denomination of
the hand as sinning owing to the condition of the person of
which it is a part, consisting in the privation of the order to
the end In the hand as part of a responsible person. In original
sin there is similarly an act of Adam's will moving the nature
into a state of sin; by this the individual nature of Adam is
denominated sinful (here intervenes the postulate of original
justice as belonging to nature). This is similar to other habitual
sins, except that its subject is not only the person but the
nature, the nature being deprived of its order to its end, as well
as the person. There follows a movement producing other
persons in a similar state in a necessary manner. These persons
are then denominated sinful because their nature is in a state
of sin by a necessary connection with a nature immediately
rendered sinful by Adam. That nature, wherever found hypostatized, can be said to be sinful; it is a sinful person. We may
attempt to rearrange the analogy between the sin of the hand
and original sin in schematic form:
Privation of
order to end
Privation of
order to end

Hand moved by
will physically
Person moved
physically

person moved
morally
nature moved
morally

will
sinning
will
sinning

ST. THOMAS'

THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN

185

The analogy peculiar to original sin is therefore:
Hand moved by will physically
Person moved morally

person moved by generation
physically
Nature moved morally

In both a moral taint is communicated by a physical movement. The analogy is in the similar or proportionate relations
of hand to person and of person to nature that makes this
communication possible-a relation of membership, consisting
in a substantial unity in relation to the end. In the person this
unity is accomplished by the movement of the will which
reduces the member to an act of sin in substantial unity with
the person. A habitual sin of the person is not thus communicated to the limb, the unity in relation to the end remaining
potential. In the case of original sin the real substantial unity
of the nature is produced by the movement of generation,
reducing the individual person into a state of substantial unity
with the (habitually) sinful nature. This sin of the hand,
therefore, in the last resort consists of the evil act o'f the hand,
with a transcendental relation to the person producing it; and
original sin in the evil state of the person with a transcendental
relation to the nature producing the person in that state. This
relation is one of membership in relation to the act and the end,
or substantial oneness. This is in the one case a personal unity,
in the other a natural unity, real, not logical: a person acting
deficiently, a nature being deficiently. This unity is produced
by a reduction to act of the potency to personal union in
action, and to union of being, by descent, in nature. The evil
state is a privation (a pure privation in the case of habitual
or original sin) , but it is founded on the positive entity of the
act or nature, founding a relation of disproportion to the end.
For while a physical privation is in re the same as a negation,
being privation in relation to the exemplary cause which exists
in the mind, a moral privation is a privation in relation to the
final cause, and is necessarily based upon a relation of disproportion. For, whereas a thing physically deficient is not in
consequence positively different, a deficiency in relation to an

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OSWIN MAGRATH

end as such necessarily implies another end, as no nature can
remain without an end, whereas it can remain without a parL
Hence in actual sin there is a positive conversion to another
end, which is the basis of the privation in regard to the rule of
morals; and in original sin there is positive conversion (habitual,
potential) to another end founding the privation in relation
to God:
Privation
Relation of disproportion
Conversion to particular end
person

Privation
Relation of disproportion
Conversion to indeterminate end
PERSON
nature

will

will

ACT

This positive entity, since the privation is sinful, is transcendentally related to a responsible cause: the person immediately responsible by his will, or the nature responsible in
Adam owing to the process of generation. Original sin, therefore, is the deprivation of the determination to God, in a
person united by substantial generation to the responsible
depriver. It must be noted that this positive element disproportioned to the end is not necessarily a contrary end, but may
be an end implicitly including the end deprived. It is nonetheless a moral defect if the determination to a particular end is
morally due to the subject so deprived, the person or the nature.

v. THE EFFECTS OF ORIGINAL SIN
By original sin, according to the traditional phrase, man is
"spoliatus in gratuitis, vulneratus in naturalibus." Is there a
real diminution of natural good resulting from original sin,
so that man is now in a worse state than he would have
been in a state of pure nature, without any gifts natural or
preternatural?
a. In the Commentary on the Sentences. 41
It is repeatedly insisted thatnone of the natural constituents
u J.l Sent., d. SO, q. 1, a. l, ad. 3; etc.

ST. THOMAS' THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN

187

of man are lost or diminished; original sin is entirely a matter
of deprivation of a gratuitous perfection. In the Commentary
on the Sentences the privative point of view is very clear. The
only wounding of nature that can be spoken of is in relation
to the end " inasmuch as man has become less disposed to and
more distant from the attainment of the end: And for this
reason also he is said to be despoiled of gratuitous gifts and
wounded in nature." This identification of the two, loss of
gratuitous gifts, and wounding of nature, seems to be St.
Thomas' doctrine through all his works, only clearer in the
Commentary on the Sentences owing to the more purely privative consideration of original sin found there.
b. In the later works.
In his later works St. Thomas starts from a more positive
idea of original sin, as " that which reaches him from the sin of
the first parent." Still, in the De Malo the privative character
of these effects of the Fall is dearly maintained, to quote but
one passage among many: " The superior part of the soul
lacks the due order to God which obtained through original
justice, and the lower powers are not subjected to the reason
but are turned according to their own impetus; and even the
body itself tends to corruption according to the inclination of
contraries from which it is composed." 42
In De Malo 43 the difference between pure nature and nature
in a state of original sin is marked in answer to the objection
that the privation of the vision of God is not a penalty but a
natural privation of man without grace. St. Thomas distinguishes between the states: "which would not have in itself
whence it might arrive at the divine vision," and " which would
have in itself something from which the lack of the divine vision
would be due to it." This 1s only a positive moral difference,
for, St. Thomas explains; 14 in original sin there is no conversion,
"but only aversion or something corresponding to aversion,
namely, the soul's foresaking of original justice."
But is there a positive physical difference too? In the Summa

'

•• Q. 4, a. 2, c.

'" Ibid., a. l, ad 14.

•• Ibid., q. 5, a. 3, c.

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OSWIN MAGRATH

with the conception of original sin as a corrupt habit, and with
the treatment of the effects of original sin in a more concrete
manner together with the effects of actual sin, it might appear
that St. Thomas has altered his views. A careful consideration
of the whole doctrine of St. Thomas in the Summa will show
that his doctrine remains unaltered, though presented in a form
which emphasizes the positive aspects of original sin. Looking
on it as a complex of conflicting disordered appetites, it is easy
to see that it can be called a wounding of natme in a stricter
sense than if regarded as a privation having certain positive
results. The positive state of conflict looks more unnatural
than the privative state. Hence many expressions. But in
the article where St. Thomas expressly asks about the wounds
of nature, the whole emphasis returns to the privative nature
of the effects of original sin: " And this destitution . . . is
called the wounding of nature," a phrase which seems to minimize them in the same way as the one quoted from the Commentary on the Sentences. It is true that he says that the
powers of the soul are "in a certain manner destitute of the
proper order by which they are naturally ordered to virtue,"
and that this is the destitution that he here means. But it is
impossible to understand this of any destitution of the constituent parts of nature, which he explicitly excludes; nor can
it be a diminution of the inclination to virtue by a positive disposition to evil, such as is left by actual sin. In the first place
there is no evidence for this :positive inclination in St. Thomas;
the contrary is frequently asserted in his other works, and it
should be clear that the same doctrine underlies the slightly
different point of view of the Summa. The diminution of the
inclination to virtue must be a loss of the determination to
reasonable good possessed in the beginning: a determination, it
must be noted, natural not only in the sense that it is fitting
to nature, but also in the sense that it is a determination called
for by the very nature of the powers as human, and a determination that must be produced by repeated acts, if not implanted by the Author of nature.

ST. THOMAS'

THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN

189

The wounds of nature, therefore, are the natural disorderliness of the powers of the soul, considered in comparison with
the pristine state of integrity, and also with the natural ideal
of human perfection.
It seems, therefore, that St. Thomas' teaching reduces all
the effects of original sin, the wounds of nature, not to any
physical or moral deterioration, however minimum, but to the
natural unsatisfactoriness of human nature owing to its composite spiritual and material character.
This opens up the vast field of the relation of natural and
supernatural, of the need and desire of man for grace and
glory, with which the doctrine of original sin is so necessarily
bound up.

Oswrn MAGRATH, 0. P.
St. Nicholas Priory,
Stellenbosch, C. P.,
Union of South Africa

NATURAL SCIENCE AND THE I:rt'fAGINA'fiON

I

I. INTRODUCTION

MAGINATION, or as Aristotle called it " phantasy,"
first received its formal and philosophical airing in his
treatise De Anima. Like many other principles of human
knowledge introduced there, the imagination has certain obscurities. However, unlike most of the other principles treated
in the De Anima, the imagination has not been explicated and
elucidated to general satisfaction. There has, it is true, been
much written about the imagination as a factor in artistic
creation, as a source of fallacies and temptations in morals, as
the matrix of the unreal, the fanciful. But little has been done
to analyze it as it was originally presented to us by Aristotle, a
principle of knowledge. 1
Our analysis will be limited to the speculative or scientific
function of the imagination, and we think that this is a sound
policy. For the imagination, being a principle of knowledge
should, like all principles of knowledge, be primarily analyzed
in terms of knowing simply. If we analyze the imagination as
the point of departure for artistic or moral action, we are beginning from a derivative position on the imagination; and since
it is speculative knowledge that has primacy in the order of
knowledge as such, it is to our best advantage to understand
the imagination as a principle in this context. Moreover, the
present discussion of imagination is restricted to an analysis of
the imagination in terms of knowledge, and not in terms of
psychology.
not interested in imagination as a principle
1 The Scholastic commentators in general have restricted themselves to repeating
in the same terms what Aristotle said about the imagination. The treatise on the
imagination by Pico della Mirandola does not go beyond a general summation
of Scholastic opinion on the imagination.

190

NATURAL SCIENCE AND THE IMAGINATION

191

in the construction of the human psyche, but our interest in
it lies in its cognitional significance and function" In other
words, we are here elaborating the place of the imagination in
a theory of knowledge-and necessarily a metaphysic-rather
than its role in human life.
We believe that in the economy of knowledge imagination
has a pivotal and essential function because of the peculiar
structure of one field of knowledge, viz. Nature. Nature is the
object of the Philosophy of Nature insofar as we consider it
as the totality of existence qua movable" But Nature admits
of another scientific study, which we call the positivistic study
of Nature" Fmm this study of Nature are produced those
bodies of knowledge called the Natural Sciences" Since these
sciences necessarily have recourse to the sensible as the ultimate
arbiter of the validity of their rationalizations, and because
this same sensible was the point of departure for the rationalization, it is necessary that the sensible be apprehended as such,
if scientific knowledge proper to the Nat ural Sciences is to be
possible. If we could not grasp Nature qua sensible, there
could not be any Natural Science, and we hope to show that
it is in virtue of the imagination that this apprehension is
brought about" If we could never abstract the sensible from
its temporal context as we always find it at the level of empirical experience, there could never be any science of Nature
qua sensible. For at the level of empirical experience we do not
grasp the sensible-the object of Natural Science; but rather
we are confronted by the temporal in one of its modes, either
in a present intuition, or in a memory" At the level of empirical
experience, i. e. temporal experience, there is no abiding object,
such as is demanded by any scientific enterprise, but only
a multiplicity of different and exclusive existences" Science
first emerges from the welter of atomic intuitions of the temporal at the level of the sensible qua sensible-and that is the
product of the imagination. Thus, in brief, we have set out
the orientation of our investigation into the problem"

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THE ARGUMENT

According to Aristotle, " the proper object of unqualified
scientific knowledge is something which cannot be other than
it is." 2 However, in empirical experience what we know is
that which is in a now, as Aristotle calls it; and thus the
object of empirical experience is first grasped in the presento
But, as he further points out, that which is in a now is intrinsically different and exclusive in its "to be." Hence, to the extent that something exists in a present now, it is necessarily its
cause of being past as a now, with the result that the now is the
source of both sameness and otherness in existence, as Aristotle says: " All simultaneous time is the same, for the now
is the same as that which once was-although their to be is
different-for the now limits time in respect of before and
after." 3
Does it follow, then, that any context of reality in which the
now occurs is radically ·and irremediably unscientific? There
have been, I believe, three positions taken in answering this
question. The first two agree with each other in that they
hold that there is no possibility of science in regard to such
reality. The third position, which is an elaboration of the prinwhich
ciples afforded by Aristotle, reaches a science of reality
the now occurs through the collaboration of mind and imagination, the former giving the mode of knowing, and the latter the
object of science.
The first of the three positions indicated maintains that there
are two distinct realms of cognition: the sensible, which has
only practical or utilitarian value, but no scientific worth; and
the ideal or noetic realm which alone supplies appropriate
objects for science. 4 The second of these three positions holds
that the sensible world alone is existent, and, consequently, it
• Posterior Analytics, 7l b, 14-15, translated by G. R. G. Mure.
Physics,
b,
unless otherwise noted, the translations are those of the
author.
4 Cf. W. A. Gerhard, "Idealism:
The Primacy of The Good," THE THOMlST,
XIII, January, 1950.
3

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alone can supply objects for scientific knowledge. In this latter
case, however, science is a transformation of sense_ experience
into logical forms expressed symbolically by words or mathematical signs. Hence, science is not an
reproduction in the mind of sensible things, but rather results from the
sensible reality being metamorphosed into verbal, logical or
mathematical existence. Consequently, the so-called empirical
position depends radically upon the injection of mind into
reality which is thus changed into a scientific object.
The essential difference between these two positions does not
result from the one postulating that the genesis of science is
from the mind's comprehension of noetic forms, and the other
holding that science results from sense. For the second position
also holds that science derives from mind. These two positions
differ insofar as the first finds an objective counterpart of the
mind's existence as scientific in a noetic realm; while the second
position maintains that there is no objective counterpart as
such of the mind's scientific knowledge. But the agreement
of these two positions is quite fundamental. They both agree
that, in a context of reality where we experience only that
which is in a now, the sensible, there cannot be any basis for a
kind of knowledge which must be universal, necessary, imperishable-viz. science. The corollary from this primary thesis
is likewise identical in both positions: since there · must be
science, it must be the product of the mind itself, alone and
una betted.
Proceeding from this thesis, and its corollary, it is possible to
explain a metaphysic, a philosophy of nature, and mathematics.
For in each of these disciplines the. object to be known is explicable qualitatively in terms of the mind's categories as
adapted to each of these disciplines. But in neither of these
critiques can we handle the science of Nature, not insofar as
it is purely rational, or philosophical, but insofar as it is
sensible. For, as we have seen, the sensible is that which exists
in a now. For only in a now can the sensible exist, since the
sensible requires the simultaneous existence of contrary sensible
qualities, which constitute the sensible; and, as we have seen,
3

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it is the now which is the principle of simultaneity, as well as
the source of the before and after. But such existence is the
very contrary of that required for a scientific objecL Hence, to
speak of the science of the sensible is ridiculous.
We must not underestimate the objections of the two positions outlined. For unless their thesis and corollary can be
answered, there cannot be any science of the sensible. So, we
must establish first that there can be given the sensible object
as such, and secondly, that this object can be analyzed in terms
of science properly so-called.
But let us spell out the objections brought up by the two
positions cited. To have an object of natural sciences, we must
analyze the existence of such an object in terms of the principles proper to it, for thus only can the science of an object be
generated. However, the principles proper to this form of existence are principles proper to time. For the object of such a
science exists in a temporal contexL The principles in terms
of which time is analyzed are three: the now, and the before
and after. The now can be considered first as a principle of
existence. The object of the perfection of sense knowledge is
not the individual sense quality, but rather the object of the
communis. This object is specified by being that which
exists in a now, and is known by means of the various sensible
qualities. But the existential now, not the sensible qualities,
is the formality and term of this knowledge. However, the
existential now is dual, for it exists by reason of being a now
as the limit of the before and after as well as being the present.
Thus, the now, :rather than being a principle of unity, is the
cause of atomic, disconnected existences. 5
• Post. Ana., 45 b, 3-10: "It is evident, we may suggest, that a past event and
a present process cannot be " contiguous," for not even two past events can
be " contiguous." For past events are limits and atomic; so just as points are
not " contiguous " neither are past events, since both are indivisible. For the
same reason a past event and present process cannot be contiguous, for the
process is divisible, the event indivisible. Thus the relation of present process to
past event is analogous to that of line to point, since a process contains an infinity
of past events:'

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Nor can we handle the problem better by considering temporal existence in terms of the principles of before and after.
For even these principles cannot enable us to achieve an object
of science. For, as Aristotle has said, time consists of the
number of the before and after, but it is neither number nor
motion, but only motion that can be numbered: " Time is
not motion, but motion insofar as it has number . . . and time
is the numbered but not that by which we number." 6 Hence,
time itself contains a contrariety in itself so that it can only
be expressed by a numerical series. But the expression of time
by number is merely a description of what time is by telling
its property. For time is not, as Aristotle noted, number.
Time, in se, is ineffable, because it cannot be as such, but must
be of contrary parts, the before and after, in both of which
time is, but is in contrary modes. So to seek a scientific object
at the level of the temporal considered as before and after,
is to find the same intrinsic dialectical contrariety in existence
such as has already rebuffed our attempts at the level of the
now. 7 is it impossible, then, to have science of motion that is
numerable, because we do not have a requisite object? And, it
is to be remembered, all motion that is numerable means all
existence that occurs in time-and this constitutes all the
matter of empirical experience. To pose our question radically,
therefore, we must ask: Is all natural science impossible because it deals with that which exists temporally, a kind of
existence that necessarily renders objects unscientific?
To return to the two problems which must be answered if
there is to be natural science: (1) How can we achieve the
sensible as such as an object? and (2) How can this object be
analyzed scientifically? As for the problem concerning the
intrinsic unscientific nature of temporal existence, there is no
• Physics, 219 b, 2-8, passim.
7 Obviously, we cannot
say that, since we find the now as unstable as a
scientific object, we could find a scientific object to whose existence we could attach
the predicates of before and after. For the before and after become such in virtue
of the now (cf. Physics, 219 a & b), and if their determining principle is
unscientific, a fortiori they also are.

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refutation by showing that the problem arises from a specious
or erroneous analysis. The objective context as such cannot
be found for a science of the temporal. If, then, we are to have
an object for the natural sciences, we canot find it ready-made,
but we must, so to speak, make it. However, the making of a
scientific object is not in any way unusual in the Aristotelian
economy, for it is completely in keeping with Aristotle's metaphysics. Hence, in saying that we shall resolve our problem
by making the scientific object, we are completely consonant
with Aristotle's analysis in other sciences. But the making of
the scientific object differs in different sciences.
In speaking of mind in the De Anima, Aristotle specifies it
thus: " Of it you cannot predicate any nature other than this
-it is able. For that which is called the mind of the soul (by
mind I mean that whereby the soul knows and judges) is
none of the existents before it thinks. . . . And so they say
well who call the soul the place of forms, except that the whole
soul is not such, but only the noetic (soul), nor is it actually
the forms, but only potentially." 8 And again he says: " And
mind in one sense can become all things, but in another it
makes all things ... and in its substantial being is as actual." 9
According to these two excerpts, mind has two attributes:
(1) it is the form potentially, and (2) it can make all things
because mind is substantially actual. Form, as we know from
other contexts in Aristotle, is that whereby a thing is what
it is, that whereby the nature of the object is determined. 10
But Aristotle, when relating the formal cause to the material
cause, does not speak of it as that which the matter is potentially. For the matter never is the form-it is determined by
the form. However, in the case of the mind, Aristotle says that
it is potentially the form. Hence, when in act-in knowing-it
is the form. But it is the form of itself, because it is substantially actual; and since its actuality is being the form, per
se it is the form. What does this mean? We do not say that
an object is the form, but rather it is caused in its " what "
8

De Anima, 429 a, 21-29.

1

°Cf. De Generatione et Corruptione, 885 b, 5-8; Physics, 194 b, 26-28.

• Ibid., 429 a, 15-18, passim.

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197

by the form. That which per se is form would be that which
makes the form of an object be qua form. Hence, the mind in
being that which makes the form of an object be qua form is
properly specified as the form of form. But, what makes the
form be as such is its being as the determinant of existence,
for it is form which causes existence to be " what." Thus, radically, what makes form be qua form is existence. For it is in
virtue of existence that the formal determination of existence
is as such. Therefore, that which is the form of form, that
whereby form realizes itself in its purity, is existence. Consequently, when Aristotle says that mind makes all things because
it is actual, he is saying that mind, insofar as it is the form
of forms, is nothing but existence. This is the perfection of
mind-science-when the mind is as the form of form. Aristotle speaks of this knowledge when he says:
vVe suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge
of a thing as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in which
the sophist knows, when we think that we know the cause on which
the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and of no other, and,
further, that the fact could not be other than it is. Now that
scientific knowing is something of this sort is evident-witness both
those who falsely claim it and those who actually possess it, since
the former merely imagine themselves to be, while the latter are
also actually, in the condition described. Consequently, the proper
object of unqualified scientific knowledge is something which cannot be other than it is.U

Obviously, the object of science cannot be other than it is,
because it is the formal principle of existence, that which makes
existence be " what." And since of mind we can predicate only
existence, when it knows it is the formal cause, and hence is
the form of the object. For the formal cause is in either caseboth in the object and in the mind-identical
its formality;
in either case-both in the object and in the mind-identical in
its formality, viz. determining existence to be a "what." In
such knowledge the mind makes the object since it gives the
form its pure existence as a form, i. e. it makes a form to be
11

Post. Ana., 71 b, 8-16.

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what it is, a pure determinant of existence. For outside of
the mind the form is not as a form, but as a form of a thing;
whereas in its existence in the mind, it is as a form of the form
of forms, viz. the mind, and such a condition is the existence
of the form qua form. Thus, when we say the mind makes the
object, we only mean that it generates the existence whereby
a formal principle of existence can be qua a formal principle.
And since this formal principle of existence is as such when
it exists through the act of the mind, to say that the mind
makes the object of science, is only to say that mind is the act of
existence of that which is only to determine existence. The
mind, therefore, makes the object to be since it gives existence
to the form in its purity; but the mind in being as knowing is
determined by the form, i. e., the determinant of the existence
of the
act is not the result of the mind, although the
existence of the act is/ 2
In such knowledge we have a perfect science, for it is scientific in object and in mode of knowing. In saying that we have
a scientific object, I mean that the object of knowledge is the
formal cause, a pure determining principle of existence, whether
the existence be noetic or objective; and in saying its mode of
knowing is scientific, I mean that the knowledge is in virtue
of the mind being fully as the form of form, that its existence
is identical formally with the existence of the object known.
Thus, when our object of knowledge is a formal determinant of
existence, there is an identity between the object and the mode
of knowing, for the principle determining existence is one. 13
Hence, the making of the scientific object is the making of the
mind as scientific, and both exist as one.
But when we come to the problem of the natural sciences,
12 We have here only touched upon a large and profound subject to the extent
that it serves our present purposes, which primarily are concerned with mind in
human knowledge. At this level of mind, it is true that mind makes the existence
of knowledge, but not the " what " of knowledge. However, in the primary analogate
of mind, there resides not only the causality of the existence of knowledge, but
also of the "what" of knowledge. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphytrics, 107£ b.
13 Cf. Post. Ana., 78 a, !i!l-79 a 83.

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199

we have seen that we cannot have a principle determining
existence in a permanent mode, since the existential principle
there is intrinsically manifold, and, consequently, the existing
object is per se manifold. How, then, can we have science in
respect of such an object? For it seems that there cannot be
science unless there is an identical, stable, and necessary principle determining noetic and objective existence. It woulrl seem
that the mode of knowing as scientific is impossible unless the
object is a formal principle determining existence, which can
also determine mind to be as scientific. This would be true if
the existence of the mind as scientific were the result only of
the formal principle known. However, the mind, rather than
the form known, is the source of the existence of science, since
it is the mind that gives the existence of the form known.
Hence, it does not follow that science is absolutely impossible
if there is not given a formal principle of existence as an object.
Since the mind can give the existence of science, it is possible
to have a scientific mode of knowing by projecting the formal
aspects of its own existence as scientific to serve as the formal
aspect of any object considered.
But unless we are treating of the formality of the existence
of the mind as scientific, we cannot achieve a full and complete science by the projection of the mind's scientific existence to serve as the object. For only in the sciences concerned with objects whose existence completely depends upon
their being known, can we validly have the mind serve both
as the scientific object and the subject of the scientific mode
of knowing. As far as the natural sciences go, we cannot
fully explain the existence of their object as scientific by
stating that the mind can project its own laws and creatures
to serve as the objects. For if we explain the natural sciences
in such terms, we no longer have the natural sciences, but
rather a logic or a mathematics of nature.
But, if this is true, then we are still faced with the difficulties
presented by the nature of the object that is to serve as
the object of the natural sciences. It is an object whose existence as we experience it through the sensus communis, is that

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of a now, and as such it has within it the contrariety that we
have seen occurring in that which is in a now. For the now is
both the cause of itself and its other, in that it is in se the
indivisible present, but as indivisible it is necessarily the principle of the divisible before and after. And since the principle
determining the object's existence must be the principle of
both the same and the other in respect of the object's existence, we cannot say that such a principle could determine
existence necessarily and constantly. Hence, we cannot say
what the object is, for it is both what it is, and what it was
and will be, and these existences are incompatible as contraries.
Yet to know this object, I must have in my knowledge of it
this same and other aspect, since that is what constitutes the
very nature of the object. But to know the object I must also
transcend the contrarieties of existence as given in the now.
Thus, my problem is to substitute for the contrary modes of
existence arising from being in a now, a sameness and otherness that allow a permanency and simultaneity of existence.
Sameness and otherness can be considered in two ways: (1)
same and other implying exclusive existences, as occur in the
present and the before and after; and (2) same and other
implying simultaneous existences. If every case of same and
other were only of the first type, it would never be possible
to achieve an object of the natural sciences. For insofar as an
object exists in the present, it is in its existence different from
that which exists in the past, and since all knowledge is of
existence, our knowledge of that which is in the present is different from that which is in the past, and thus our knowledge
of temporal existence is concerned with atomic existences.
Considered in this way, the whole endeavor of the natural
sciences is impossible, since each object in a now is the principle both of its own existence and that of its other.
It was in this way only that we considered temporal existence previously, when we concluded that not only that which
is in a now, but also that which is as before and after, could

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201

not serve as a proper object for science. But it may be that
we were hasty in thus concluding, for now the problem appears
somewhat different. Although the before and after, as well as
the now, are all modes of existence that render an object unable
to be as the object of science, since they cause its existence to
be successively excluded, yet if we can transcend all of these
modes of existence, and apprehend the formality of existence
whence they derive, we can transcend the exclusive and, consequently, unscientific modes of existence adhering to natural
objects, and reach them as being simultaneous and scientific.
This means, obviously, that we must achieve the temporal
object formally in its temporality, not being in any mode of
time, nor being affected by any limit of time.
At the level of the individual external sense, we are not in
contact with the temporal as such. For the object of each
sense is a quality, and as such has a homogeneous simplicity
and unity quite unlike the exclusive and contrary parts of
temporal existence. Hence, any contrariety in any object
known through the external senses does not result from
contrariety in any given quality, but rather by one quality
being contrary to a quality of another kind. From this it
results that in the object apprehended by the external senses,
we have a multiplicity of specifically different qualities. For,
as we have seen, within itself each quality has no principle of
limitation, and the multiplicity we apprehend in what we sense
is that of specifically different qualities. 14
Now, obviously, the problem to answer in this case where
we are faced with a specific multiplicity is to find a principle
of unity accounting for the co-existence of the specific multiplicity, and for the unity of our knowledge of it. But we cannot reduce the sensible multiplicity to a unity definable as
sensible. For the sensible is definable only in terms of the
sense, and vice versa. 15 Thus, to say that all sensibles can be
reduced to the sensible as such implies that there is a sensible
which is not any particular sensible. But this would require
14

Cf. Meta., 1057 b, 35-1058 a, 28.

15

Cf. De Anima, 425 b, 26-27.

WILLIAM A. GERHARD

that the sensible as such could not be a quality, for a quality
as such cannot be simply,
it is that not in virtue of which
a thing exists simply, but that in virtue of which a thing exists
in such and such a manner. However, since the sensible is that
which is definable in terms of the sense-for the sense is the
sensible in act-it follows that the sensible cannot be simply,
but can exist only as the sense in act, or insofar as it makes
something be such and such. Thus the reduction of the multiple species of sensibles must be to a unity indefinable in terms
of sense qualities. But it must be a unity that can be made
such and such, that is, a unity which can: be manifested by
the multiple species of sensible qualities.
That unity to which the sensible plurality can be reduced,
and to which this plurality is related not as a group of principles of existence, but as manifestations of existence insofar
as the plurality makes the existent being appear as such and
such, must be of a manifold nature. The primary determination of making it appear such and such by the sensible qualities, is to make.its existence appear as exclusive and manifold.
That is to say, since the sensible qualities cannot be reduced
to any one sensible quality, but necessarily are always many,
it follows that the only existence they can make appear such
and such is an existence intrinsically partitive, manifold, and
exclusive. For, since sensible qualities make the object qualified to be as such and such, what they qualify must be of such
a nature that it can be manifested in this fashion. However, the
reduction of the multiple sensible qualities to a unifying principle cannot be achieved if they are reduced to the existence
they manifest, insofar as it is multiple and exclusive, formally
and actually. Hence, the reduction can be achieved only if
that existence can be apprehended in a mode of existence of
which unity is predicable. This is tantamount to saying that
this form of existence must be able to be in two existential
modes in respect of its properly exclusive and manifold existence: (1) potentially multiple and exclusive in its substantial
existence, but actually multiple in its qualitative, or phenomenal, existence-and it is in this mode that the sensible

NATURAL SCIENCE AND THE IMAGINATION

qualities can be apprehended as reducible to a unity, for thus
they serve as expressing its multiplicity actually through their
qualitative multiplicity-it is this that is known in a now as
present and indivisible; 16 and
. as actually being multiple
and partitive, both in its substantial and phenomenal existence-and this is what is known when the object is known
not only in respect of the present, but also in respect of the
before and after. Moreover, if this is the case, it is clear that
knowing this existence through the plurality of sensible qualities, insofar as they are manifesting the potential mode of an
existence that is multiple and exclusive when existing actually,
is valid. For since this object is known through its qualitative
aspect, and in this aspect is known formally-although only
qualitatively-as multiple, the knowledge of this object is
valid. For since knowledge is of existence, knowledge of the
multiple and exclusive substantial existence, achieved in a
potential mode through multiple and exclusive qualities, is
valid, since it is impossible that such an existence can be without being actually multiple and exclusive in some way or the
other-either substantially or phenomenally. Hence, in knowing an existent, whose substantial existence is multiple, in
terms of its actual qualitative multiplicity, the knowledge is
valid since it is based upon existence-although I do not experience the substantial existence in its actual manifoldness,
but only in its potentiality through the sensible qualities. 11
16 De Anima, 427 a, 10-14: "What is called a point is divisible insofar as it is
either one or two. Insofar as it is indivisible it judges as one and at the same
time, but insofar as it is divisible, it is not one.· 'For 'at the same time the same
symbol is used twice. Hence, so far as the limit is used as two, it separates two
things as itself being distinct and separated; insofar as ·it uses the limit as one
(it is one) and acts in an identical time."
17 Ibid., 425 a, 14-125 b, II:
"But of the common (sensibles) it is not possible
that there should be a proper sense; these we sense by each sense, and not in
an accidental fashion; such as motion, position, shape, magnitude, number, one.
For all these we sense by motion, such as magnitude by motion; and also figure,
for magnitude is a sort of figure. But rest we know by a lack of motion; and
number by the denial of continuity, and by the proper sensibles, for each sense
senses one thing. And so it is clear that it is impossible that there be a proper
sense of any of these, e. g., of motion. Thus, the case is as that in which we now

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But since the existence expressed in the act of knowledge is
formally identical with that of the thing known, although the
mode of existence has changed, our knowledge of it as formally
temporal is impossible since the now is atomic and incapable
of traverse. For to know the object as formally temporal is
to have our act of knowledge express the actuality of temporal existence intentionally. That is to say, our act of knowledge must formally create an intentionally existent object that
is manifold and exclusive, not only qualitatively, as occurs
in the knowledge of the sensus communis, but substantially.
For in that way alone can we apprehend the temporal as such.
But here-arises a difficulty. Temporal existence in itself includes
intrinsically both the indivisible now, as well as the divisible
before and after that are bounded by nows. To be in time is
to be progressively before and after, which results from being
bounded by a now. Hence, to attempt to comprehend temporal
existence without the now, is to pervert the whole idea of such
existence. Yet to comprehend it only in a now is likewise to
distort this form of existence, for that is to know it in an
indivisible mode of existence. Thus, if we are to know temporal existence formally, it is requisite that the object must
sense the sweet by our sight. This happens because since we have both sensations,
insofar as they occur together, we know them at the same time. But if this were
not the case, it would not . be different from our sen•ing accidentally, such as
Cleon's son, not because it is Cleon's son, but because he is white, and it just
happens that this son is Cleon's. Of the common (sensibles) we have a common
sensibility, and this not accidentally. But it is not a proper sense, for (if this were
a proper sense) we would perceive them in no other way than has just been said
about our seeing Cleon's son. The senses apprehend the proper qualities of each
other accidentally, not insofar as they are qualities, but insofar as they form one,
whenever at the same time there is a sensation of the same object, e. g. that
bile is bitter and yellow. For it is not proper to different senses to say that both
are one, wherefore there is the deception that if it is yellow, it is thought to be
bile. One might ask why we have many senses, and not only one. It might be so
that we might not miss the concomitant and common sensibles, such as motion,
magnitude and number. For if there were only sight, and this would be of white,
these (the common sensibles) would escape our notice, and color and magnitude
would seem to be all sensibles, because they accompany each other. But since now
the common sensibles are in other sensibles, it is made clear that each one is
different from these."

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205

be as an intentional manifold which expresses temporal existence potentially, such as occurs in knowing it in the indivisible
now, manifested through the sensibles; and likewise must
express the object intentionally as a manifold existence, substantially and actually.
This necessity of including the now results from the fact that
temporal existence must be considered to have as primary
contraries not the before and the after, but the now and the
before and after; while the before and after are contraries of
time as it is manifold or divisible. Hence, to express temporal
existence formally requires that the one existential principleto be temporal-determine the intentional act in such wise
that its primary contraries be simultaneously. But since the
principle called upon to cause the simultaneous manifold, is a
principle that causes successive and exclusive existences, it is
impossible that this principle could cause the now and the
before and after to be simultaneously as parts of the manifold
in the intentional act of existence. Consequently, temporal
existence as the form determining the act of knowledge constituting science is impossible. For it is formally both the source
of the now and the before and after, although it cannot be as
both, formally and actually. That would mean that simultaneously the temporal object would be known as indivisible and
as divisible. But this is obviously impossible. Hence, the
formality of temporal existence must have a substitute to provide the object of knowledge. We have seen that the mind cannot of itself provide the principle supplying this object of
knowledge, for that would produce either logic or mathematics,
rather than an object for the science of temporal existence.
We can :find a solution to this problem in Aristotle's analysis
of the imagination. Aristotle describes the imagination as a
kind of motion that does not occur without sensation, for its
content is that which is grasped in sensation; hence, it is of the
same kind as sensation, but unlike sensation, it can do and
suffer in many ways, and it can be both true and false. An
analysis of these attributes of the imagination can answer the

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A. GERHARD

problem now posed: How can the formality of temporal existence be known scientifically?
Like all cognitive powers, imagination is a motion selfactuated. That is to say, as the act of sensation, or of intellectual knowledge, exists by the causality of the sense or the
mind, respectively, so the act of imagination is the effect of
the imagination itself. However, in the case of the mind, as
we have seen, the act of knowledge consists of two existential
principles: the mind itself and the formal principle that serves
as the content or determination of the existence caused by the
mind. Likewise, in the case of the sensus communis, the existence of the act of knowledge results from the sensus communis, while the formality existing intentionally is the past or
present now. Thus, in both of these two forms of knowledge
the existence of the act of knowledge is given by the cognitive
power, but how the existence is determined is governed by
another principle of existence. Thus we call the mind the form
of forms and the sensus communis the form of the past or
present now. But in the case of the imagination, the content
of its act is that whereby the now is apprehended in the act
of sensation. However, it is not the sensible qualities that
specify sensation. What specifies the act of sensation as it
occurs in the sensus communis is the being in a now. Hence,
in the act of imagination we shall not include the now. Since
the sensible qualities are not the specific property of the sensus
communis, it follows that they can be cognitional factors common to other forms of knowledge. Thus, when Aristotle says
that the imagination will contain that which is grasped in
sensation, we must conclude that it will not be the now, since
that specifies the act of sensation, but it will be the sensible
qualities whereby the now is perceived. Thus the act of the
imagination will consist of sensible qualities existing by the act
of the imagination. But, unlike the sensus communis and the
mind, the act of the imagination will not have two principles
determining existence; for the sensible qualities do not determine existence, but rather manifest existence in different ways.
What will determine existence in the act of the imagination?

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207

First, obviously, like all cognitive acts, the existence of the
act of imagination will be the result of the imagination itself.
And, since there is no other principle to determine existence
in the act of the imagination, the determination of the existence given by the imagination will also result from the imagination. Thus, unlike the other powers of knowledge, which
become their object, the imagination in being active does not
become something else formally other than itself. Its act consists of becoming apparent, i. e. of becoming the phenomenon.
The content given the imagination by the sensus communis is
not a principle determining existence, but is only a principle
manifesting existence, viz. the sensible qualities. Hence, insofar
as the content of the image is the sensible qualities, the content of this form of knowledge will not explain the nature of
the object known. For this content:-the sensible qualitiesdoes not constitute existence but only makes it manifest.
Hence, what these qualities manifest in the act of imagination
is something different from them. But the only other element
in the imaginational act is the imagination itself. Therefore,
the sensible qualities exist as making apparent the imagination
itself in its act, the image.
Consequently, in the image the imagination exists actually
as having caused itself to appear. Its actual existence is to
appear as sensible qualities intentionally existing in the image.
The imagination, then, can be designated as the form of sensible
qualities. But we must recognize that, when we call the imagination the form of sensible qualities, the implication is that it
is the imagination itself which is qualified by the sensibles existing intentionally. Therefore, there is no determining principle
of the imaginational object other than the imagination itself.
This being so, we do not have a criterion for truth or falsity
at this level of knowledge such as we have in the cases of the
sensus· communis and the mind. There truth depends upon the
identity of a principle determining two forms of existence, the
noetic or intentional, and the objective. But here we have one
form of existence determined in two ways, as the subject of
knowledge and as the apparent object of knowledge, the only

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extra-imaginational element in this act being the sensible
qualities which were derived from the acts of the sensus
communzs.
What has occurred in the imaginational act is that we have
preserved the qualitative aspects of the knowledge of the
sensus communis, but we have substituted as the existential
principle the imagination itself in act. We have freed the object
from the attribute of being in a now, and in producing a subject
free from being in a now, we have in effect abstracted it from
temporal existence entirely. It is in virtue of being in a now
that an object can be in time as before and after. But, although
we have removed the object from temporal existence, either
from its divisible or indivisible mode, we have preserved the
formality of temporal existence insofar as the object of the
imagination manifests the two essential forms of temporal existence, viz. sameness and otherness, or simultaneity and succession. For temporal existence has two contrary principles,
the now and the before and after-and these are principles of
exclusive modes of existence. And the temporal being becomes
actual by successively being in these exclusive modes of existence. But the imagination has become actual in the image
wherein it has successively become phenomenal in each sense
quality contained in the image. Hence, in its act, the image,
the imagination is identical with itself by being actual in the
image; but it has become other than itself by being phenomenally different in each sense quality, each of which exists also
as the imagination in act. Thus, in being phenomenally different in each imagined sense quality, the imagination is presented as existentially other; but insofar as in each imagined
sense quality, as well as in the totality of them-the image, we
have the identity of the imagination with its actuality. Of the
imagination, therefore, we can say that it is the existential
principle of the phenomenal, and as such it is one with itself in
being phenomenal, but other than itself in becoming phenomenally different. But, even in being phenomenally different, the
imagination is one in that its being is to be phenomenal. And
since in the phenomenal there is no formal principle of

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209

existence other than that whose act is to be phenomenal-the
imagination, there is in the image no existential contrariety,
with the result that in the image the phenomenal existence is
given as one, the act of the imagination.
Thus, to the extent that sensible qualities in the image exist
as the imagination appearing, their contrariety remains as sensible qualities; but they have the unity of the imagination itself
-its being as appearing. Hence, in the image comprising contrary qualities, we do not have a limitation and exclusion of
the imagination's existence-as we do of the temporal in its
being
the now and in the before and after, which are contrary
modes of existence; but rather we have the imagination being
successively in each of the qualities by means of which it is,
as well as being the principle of the unity of the image. In
the image we have the formality of temporal existence given,
thus giving for contemplation an object comprising simultaneity and succession, the formality of temporal existence.
The one drawback is that the determination of the object of
the imagination is the imagination itself. Thus, we cannot say
that this object fulfills the primary requisite of a scientific
object, viz. that it be necessary, and thereby generate a form
of knowledge that is stable. If the image is to serve as a
scientific object, the determination must come from outside the
imagination itsel£.18
There are two such determinations, one negative and one
positive. The image is determined negatively by the knowledge
of the sensus communis. Since the imagination has as its
content the sensible qualities, the matter at hand for the
imagination to become actually phenomenal in is limited by the
experience that occurred in a now, either past or present. This
determination of the imagination is a determination of the
image as sensible.
18 Cf. I. Kant,
Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Analytic, Analytic of
Principles: the crucial difference between the Kantian and Aristotelian positions
occurs here in the matter of the imagination. For in Kant the imagination con·
comstitutes and knows the object that in Aristotle is the object of the
munis, since it exists in a now. Whereas in Aristotle existence and knowledge of
existence begins in the now, in Kant it begins in the object of the imagination.

4

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A. GERHARD

The second determination of the image
as scientific---and
here we tum to answer the second question that we said before
must be answered: How can this object produced by the
imagination be analyzed scientifically? For this supposed object
of science has not been made by the proper maker of science,
the mind, but the imagination, the principle of the phenomenaL Hence, since science is a form of existence produced
only by the mind, at the level of the imagination we have not
yet begun the scientific process. Rightly Aristotle has said that
knowledge of the imagination is not true or false, but can be
either. When he says that it can be true or false, but per se
is neither, he implies that the truth or falsity involved will
occur when we have begun the scientific process in regard to
the image. Now in the sciences whose object is a formal determinant of existence, we cannot say that the object can be
true or false. For since it is a determinant of noetic existence,
as well as any other mode of existence, it will necessarily determine knowledge according as it is-and this is to know truly.
But since in the object of the natural sciences there is no principle determining existence as the object, but rather an object
that is only by means of imaginational existence, we cannot
say that there is a principle that will necessarily determine
noetic existence according to its formality. All questions of
truth and falsity in regard to the imaginational object of the
natural sciences will result from the fact that this object is
scientific only by reason of the analogy of attribution. By this I
mean that insofar as the mind formalizes this imaginational
object-gives it the form of intelligibility, and thus makes it
scientific-the object becomes one of science, and thus is the
object of knowledge. Since the knowledge about this object
becomes scientific not in virtue of the object's determination
of noetic existence, but in virtue of the mind analyzing it
formally, according to the mind's scientific existence, all questions of scientific truth or falsity will ultimately result from the
mind alone, and will not be determined by the object-as is
the case in the formal sciences.
To illustrate what I have said, I point to logic apd mathe-

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211

matics, the two sciences whose objects exist actually only by
reason of the actual existence of the mind. These sciences, so
to speak, are completely and uniquely the property of the mind,
for in the first, logic, the object is the mind itself in act scientifically; and the second, mathematics, can be as such, only
through being known in the act of the mind. It is according to
these two scientific modes of knowledge that the mind analyzes
the imaginational object serving as the object of the natural
sciences. But we must qualify this statement. The imagination
of itself does not produce an object of science, since we have
seen that any scientific principle of determination must come
from without. Rather than saying that the mind analyzes the
imaginational object presented to it as subject to scientific
analysis, we should say that there is a rational context set by
the mind, one that is constructed according to logic or mathematics, according to which the synthetic act of the imagination
is interpreted. Thus, an object is produced by the imagination
that is describable according to logical or mathematical cause
and effect relations, and imagination is extrinsically determined
in its act according to these regulative principles. In the biological sciences, in general, the mode of knowledge is formally
that which is established as scientific in logic, analyzing the
images in terms of genus, species, difference, and properties;
while in the physical sciences the mode of knowledge established as scientific in mathematics is utilized. Since in both of
these cases of the natural sciences the scientific element of
knowledge is drawn not directly from the object of knowledge,
but rather from the object of other sciences, the object of the
natural sciences is scientific only by attribution. Hence, the
imaginational object of the natural sciences is scientifically
true only insofar as it occasions an analysis in terms of logic
or mathematics to be elaborated in its regard. But the object
does not cause this scientific analysis formally. However, the
question of scientific truth ultimately resides formally in the
logical or mathematical analysis, for the object of itself, not
being a formal principle of existence, cannot be the cause of
scientific truth. When proceeding either logically or mathe-

WILLIAM

A. GERHARD

matically, the mind knows scientifically; but when the mind
attempts in terms of its own existence as scientific to analyze
the image, there is always the problem that the scientific
procedures of logic or mathematics are not the terminal function
of this cognitional operation, but rather the description of the
image in terms of the scientific existence of the mind.
Thus, all analysis in the natural sciences is at best demonstrations of fact-the analysis can never be a demonstration
of the reasoned fact. For the best that we can do in the
natural sciences is to establish that the imaginational object
can occasion a logical or mathematical analysis. It is impossible to establish the reason why the object is scientific in itself,
because the reason why the object is supplied as an object
occasioning a scientific analysis is the act of the imaginationand the act of the imagination cannot be the fonnal cause of
the object being as a scientific object. 19
19 Post. Ana., 78 a, 21-79 a, 15:
"Knowledge of the fact differs from knowledge
of the reasoned fact. To begin with, they differ within the same science and in
two ways: l) when the premisses of the syllogism are not immediate (for then the
proximate cause is not contained in them-a; necessary condition of knowledge of
the reasoned fact): (2) when the premisses are immediate, but instead of the
cause the better known of the two reciprocals is taken as the middle; for of two
reciprocally predicable terms the one which is not the cause may quite easily be
the better known and so become the middle term of the demonstration. Thus
(2) (a) you might prove as follows that the planets are near because they do
not twinkle: let C be the planets, B not twinkling, A proximity. Then B is
predicable of C; for the planets do not twinkle. But A is also predicable of B,
since that which does not twinkle is near-we must take this truth as having been
reached by induction or sense-perception. Therefore A is a necessary predicate of
C; so that we have demonstrated that the planets are near. This syllogism, then,
proves not the reasoned fact but only the fact; since they are not near because
they do not twinkle, but, because they are near, do not twinkle. The major and
middle of the proof, however, may be reversed, and then the demonstration will
be of the reasoned fact. Thus: let C be the planets, B proximity, A not twinkling.
Then B is an attribute of C, and A-not twinkling--of B. Consequently A is
predicable of C, and the syllogism proves the reasoned fact, since its middle term
is the proximate cause. Another example is the inference that the moon is
spherical from its manner of waxing. Thus: since that which so waxes is spherical,
and since the moon so waxes, clearly the moon is spherical. Put in this form, the
syllogism turns out to be proof of the fact, but if the middle and major be
reversed it is proof of the reasoned fact; since the moon is not spherical because

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213

An excellent corroboration of what has been said about the
object of the natural sciences being scientific only by attribution, is found in the function of the experiment. In the experiment we attempt to reproduce our image of the object, derived
from our present intuition and our past memories of what it
appears as, so that it may be intuited by all as a composite of
what we see and remember to have seen. We set up our image
by establishing an " antiseptic " environment, by which I mean
a context free of everything, especially temporal sequence,
it waxes in a manner but waxes in such a manner because it is spherical. (Let C
be the moon, B spherical, and A waxing.) Again (b), in cases where the cause
and the effect are not :reciprocal and the effect is the better known, the fact is
demonstrated but not the reasoned fact. This also occurs (1) when the middle
falls outside the major and minor, for here, too, the strict cause is not given, and
so the demonstration is of the fact, not of the reasoned fact. For example, the
question " Why does not a wall breathe? " might be answered, " Because it is not
an animal "; but that answer would not give the strict cause, because if not
being an animal causes the absence of respiration, then being an animal should
be the cause of respiration, according to the rule that if the negation of x causes
the non-inherence of y, the affirmation of x causes the inherence of y; e. g. if the
disproportion of the hot and cold elements is the cause of ill health, their proportion is the cause of health; and conversely, if the assertion of x causes the
inherence of y, the negation of x must cause y's non-inherence. But in the case
given this consequence does not result; for not every animal breathes. A syllogism
with this kind of cause takes place in the second figure. Thus: let A be animal,
B respiration, C wall. Then A is predicable of all B (for all that breathes is
animal), but of no C; and consequently B is predicable of no C; that is, the
wall does not breathe. Such causes are like far-fetched explanations, which precisely consist in making the cause too remote, as in Anacharsis' account of why
the Scythians have no flute-players; namely because they have no vines.
Thus, then, do the syllogism of the fact and the syllogism of the reasoned
fact differ within one science and according to the position of the middle terms.
But there is another way, too, in 'which the fact and the reasoned fact differ,
and that is when they are investigated respectively by different sciences. This
occurs in the case of problems related to one another as subordinate and superior,
as when optical problems are subordinated l.o geometry, mechanical problems to
sterometry, harmonic problems to arithmetic, the data of observation to astronomy.
(Some of these sciences bear almost the same name; e. g. mathematical and
nautical astronomy, mathematical and acoustical harmonics.)
Here it is the
business of the empirical observers to know the fact, of the mathematicians to
know the reasoned fact; for the latter are in possession of the demonstrations
giving the causes, and are often ignorant of the fact: just as we have often a
clear insight into a universal, but through lack of observation are ignorant of some
of its particular instances. These connexions have a perceptible existence though

WILLIAM

A. GERHARD

except what we synthesize in this context. When we speak of
" controlling " the experimental environment, we imply that
we wish to present to perception the synthetic product of the
imagination as perfectly as possible, free from all influences
except those of the imagination. Hence we hold that what is
seen in the experiment is not occurring in any time nor in any
particular place-it is the pure presentation of the object as
it appears. But what we see in the experiment is not a scientific object-it is an image made perceptible. The object
presented in the experiment becomes " scientific '' by serving
as an occasion of scientific analysis according to the principles
of logic or mathematics. 20
Obviously, science of this kind is perilous, since the scientific
knowledge about an object distinct from the existence of the
mind, and not formally a determinant of scientific existence, is
based upon scientific principles drawn from the objects of
logic and mathematics. Thus, the ultimate criterion of truth
in respect of natural. sciences is not the principles of logic or
mathematics, but the imaginational object as it is made universally intuitive in the experiment. But even the experimental
they are manifestations of forms. For the mathematical sciences concern forms:
they do not demonstrate properties of a substratum, since, even though the
geometrical subjects are predicable as properties of a perceptible substratum, it
is not as thus predicable that the mathematician demonstrates properties of them.
As optics is related to geometry, so another science is related to optics, namely
the theory of the rainbow. Here knowledge of the fact is within the province of
the natural philosopher, knowledge of the reasoned fact within that of the
optician, either qua optician or qua mathematical optician. Many sciences not
standing in this mutual relation enter into it at points; e. g. medicine and geometry:
it is the physician's business to know that circular wounds heal more slowly, the
geometer's to know the reason why."
20 The prediction
of which the natural scientists speak is not really prediction
in the sense that prediction, or prophecy, is the science of the future. What the
scientist usually means when he speaks of prediction is what I have described in
the text. Given the image that he has formed, as we have described, and having
utilized the image as an occasion for the logical or mathematical elaboration, he
must " universalize " his image by presenting it to universal intuition in the
experiment. Since the experiment 1 to be valid, must be independent of temporal
existence in any of its modes, we cannot say that what occurs in the experiment
is prediction. For it is merely universalizing intuitively what formerly existed only
in the imagination.

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215

object is not the unquestionable arbiter. For since this object
is the image, which radically depends upon the experience of
the sensus communis for its qualitative content, it is always
open to revision on the basis of further experience of that
which exists in a now. Thus, it is necessary to recognize the
inevitable and constant limitations of scientific knowledge in
respect of the imaginational object: (1) the knowledge is
scientific not in respect of its object, but only in respect of its
mode of knowing, drawing this mode from objects distinct
from the object known; and (2) the object is always open to
further revision on the basis of further knowledge of the sensus
communis. Obviously, the second results from the first, for
since the object is scientific by reason of the mind's formal
sciences-logic and mathematics-rather than by reason of its
own causality, we cannot even say that it is a scientific fact,
for its existence as a scientific fact results from the causality of
other objects.
It is, therefore, in the imagination that the entire possibility of the natural sciences resides. For only in the act of
the imagination can the temporal object be raised out of the
welter of atomic nows, and thus also freed from being in a
before or after, by being expressed intentionally as successive
and simultaneous. But in that coming to be intentionally, the
object has become an intentional object not by reason of a
formal causal determination independent and distinct from the
formality of the imagination. It is tme that the content of the
imagination results finally from the experience of the temporal
apprehended in a now; but even the content, insofar as it is
in the image, is there by reason of the act of the imagination.
For the sensible qualities in the image are such by being a
modification of the imagination itself in act. Thus, when we
come to know this object scientifically, it is necessary to find
the principles causing the mind's knowledge of it as scientific,
independent of the object. This form of knowledge, therefore,
constitutes the lowest possible form of science. For it is not
scientific in regard to the object, while the mode of knowing is
scientific through the causality of principles drawn from other

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A. GERHARD

scientific objects. But even at the end of such formal scientific
analysis attributed to the object, the imaginational object
remains the ultimate arbiter of truth. And this object is ultimately known by intuiting it as a complex of sensible qualities.
Because Aristotle recognized only two forms of scientific
knowledge of nature, that of the fact and that of the reasoned
fact, and did not recognize a science of nature which is formally
scientific in the mode of knowing, but is intuitive and imaginational in respect of its object, he did not develop his doctrine
of imagination further. He did not recognize the science of the
sensible as such as different from that of the movable as such,
and hence felt that the causal principles of movable existence
as such were univocally applicable in knowing natural beings
in all their respects. Hence, as the causal principles of form,
efficiency and finality were the determinations of movable
existence as such, and thus such existence could be explained
in terms of them; so nature insofar as it was qualitative could
also be known through these same principles formally. 21 But,
as we have seen, nature as qualitative is not a scientific fact
formally, nor a reasoned fact in the sense that its existence can
be ultimately explicable in terms of formal causal factors.
Hence, it was necessary to explain how it is possible to have
scientific knowledge of nature considered purely qualitatively.
Elaborating on principles laid down by Aristotle, we have
attempted to show that it is in virtue of the imagination alone
that the natural sciences are possible. For the termination, as
well as the point of departure of aU scientific process, in the
natural sciences, is intuition of the image, which is the ultimate
arbiter of truth. Such a scientific endeavor Aristotle apparently did not apprehend, although he supplied us with all
the raw materials needed for a foundation, as well as a critique,
of such knowledge.
WILLIAM

A. GERHARD

Brooklyn College,
Brooklyn, N. Y.
21 Cf. De Partibus Animalium,
639 a, 13-64!!:h, !!:, passim, where Aristotle deals
with what he considers to be the methodological problems in the natlll'al science
enterprise.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW OF THE
EPICUREANS
(Concluded)

I

N HIS effort to lay the foundation of a new philosophical
based solely on reason, 122 as well as in his attempt
to elaborate this system in all its provinces and details,
Epicurus did not omit also to deal with problems concerning
(at the age of 14, if frag. 179
reliable evidence; at the age
of l!i!, if we rely on Suidas) Epicurus moved to Teos (Strabo 14.638), undoubtedly in order to study under Nausiphanes, who in his day seems to have
been a very popular teacher. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. 1. !i!. It was to
Nausiphanes that Epicurus owes his first acquaintance with the doctrines of the
Atomists whose teachings he later prominently incorporated into his own philosophy.
Diogenes Laertius also suggests (10. !i!) that Epicurus came across some of Democritus' own works, and that his atomistic leanings were due to his self study of
Democritus. If, on the other hand, Epicurus later did not speak too favorably
of his former teacher Nausiphanes (cf. frag. 114, Usener), this fact should be
attributed not so much to Epicurus' effort to make himself appear an entirely
independent and original thinker (d. Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. 1. 3: inrep
roD ooKetP avroiJloaKros elva<), but rather to his personal dislike of mathematics,
rhetoric, and scholiasm in general-subjects in which Nausiphanes seems to have
excelled. The impression which Democritus' atomistic teachings made on Epicurus
was so profound that for a long time he actually referred to himself as a " Democritean." Cf. Plutarch, Adv. Coloten 3. 3. Later, however, he came to the rather
sudden conclusion that he actually had little in common with Democritus. Cf.
Diog. Laert. 10. 8; Cicero, DB Natura Deorum l. 9!6. 79!; 1. 33. 93. This sudden
change of heart might have been prompted by Epicurus' excessive vanity. Besides
Nausiphanes he also studied under the Platonist Pamphilus who, however, did
not impress him at all and of whom he thought very little. Cf. Diog. Laert.
10. 14; Cicero, op. cit., l. 26. 72; Suidas.
During his stay at Colophon (after 329!) Epicurus developed his own philosophy
mainly by self study and apparently without the influence of any known teacher.
Hence his proud conviction that he owed his philosophy to no one but himself
and his autodidactic efforts- In 310, at the age of 39!, he began to teach at
Mytilene, and later at Lampsacus. Cf. Diog. Laert. 10. 15. In 307/306 he moved
to Athens (Diog. Laert. 10. !i!), where he founded his school. Cf. Diog. Laert.
lO.U; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. 9. 64.
122

As a very young man

!LetpaKlwv, a stripling of about 14 years-constitutes

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ANTON- HERMANN

CHROUST

the nature and function of law, :right, justice, the legal order,
and politically organized society. 123 For since the time of the
Sophists these problems had become an integral part of Greek
speculation. But although the general doctrines of Epicu:rus,
which at times were violently championed and without doubt
consistently developed, often assumed airs of great importance
and true novelty, they were essentially but the product of old
ideas merely sifted out or shifted about. His legal and political
sayings, therefore, lack real originality, and cannot arouse our
genuine interest for their own sake. For they are in many
respects only restatements of views already held by Protagoras,
Democritus, and many others. In addition, they were merely
developed in the direction which had been previously determined by the real end envisioned by Epicu:rus: to establish an
all-encompassing practical philosophy of life intended to become the " wise man's guide " to a happy and serene, but
altogether solipsistic, life.
Epicurus' own theory of the nature and function of law,
right, and justice, as well as his views concerning the legal
order and politically organized society under the rule of law, 124
are most prominently displayed in the so-called
S6gat123 Although
Epicurus excluded practical politics from his philosophy of life,
and although he counselled against active participation in public life, he nevertheless frequently referred to and discussed theoretical politics and the theory
of the social, legal, and political order.
As to Epicurus' philosophy of law, cf. R. Philippson, " Die Rechtsphilosophie
der Epicureer," Archiv fiir GfJSchichte der Philasophie 22 (1910), 289-337; 433446; A. Haas, Uber den Einfiuss der epicureischen Staats-und Rechtsphilosophie
auf die Philosophie des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, 1896).
••• It should be noted here that, with the exception of the Cynics, Cyrenaics,
Epicureans, and certain Sophists, the Greek philosophers considered the problem
of the State a predominantly moral issue, an indispensable prerequisite of the
rational moral and civilized man. Cf., for instance, the whole tenor of Plato's
Republic, The Laws, Crito, etc., or Aristotle, Politics 125£ a 1 ff., to mention
only a few. Aristotle actually considers "politics" a body of moral norms and
hence a part of ethics. Cf. Nic. Eth. 1094 b 8: " ... the end is the same for a
single man and for a State ... ."' Also ibid., ll30 b 28; 1181 b.l4, where he points
out that both ethics and politics are "philosophy of human nature." Cf. Politics
19!76 b 9!1 ff.; 1£78 b l ff.

THE PHILOSOPHY

OF LAW OF THE EPICUREANS

219

the " Sovereign Maxims." 125 Already the Sophists had rather
eloquently and vehemently discussed the nature of law, and in
doing so had admitted that the law (1-o 8£Kawv) constitutes the
foundation of every politically organized society. The real
Sophistic argument, therefore, revolved around the issue
whether or not the existing law or laws were cpvuEt, that is to
say, according to nature, or merely OeuE,, that is, man-made
laws and man-made justice. 126 In essence this distinction
merely restates the old controversy: namely, whether or not
something is true KaT' aA:q8Emv--accordingto objective truth125 The tcvp<a.<
found in Diog. Laert 10. 189-154 and H. Usener, op. cit.,
71 ff.; 894 ff., are a collection of rather losely connected dicta ascribed to Epicurus.
They contain-or supposedly contain-the most important and authoritative
(tcvp<a.<) statements uttered by the " master " concerning the
Usener,
op. cit., 78 ff., informs us on good authority that this Epicurean " catechism "
of basic truths, this list of " sovereign maxims," which for a long time has been
considered the authentic work of Epicurus himself, is actually an ecclectic compilation and collocation whiclt did not originate with Epicurus, but rather with some
of his immediate disciples or followers. It is fairly safe to assume that this compilation had been completed either during the lifetime of Epicurus or, at least,
very shortly after his death in 270. It is also permissible to assume that these
" sovereign maxims " represent the original and genuine Epicurean tradition. For
otherwise the great and undisputed authority whiclt the tcvp<a.<
enjoyed and
the traditional opinion that Epicurus himself had been their author, could not
very well be explained. Cf. H. v. Arnim, in: Pauly-Wissowa, Realenzyklopiidie
des klassischen Altertuma, new edit. 6. 140 ff.
W. Criinert, Kolotes und Menedemoa 24, reconstructs the text of papyr. 1005.
lie [Z'I]v...v] tca.l etc TWV
[tcvpl...v
...v
col. 7. line 18 ff., as follows:
evla.s}-" [Zeno] also expurgated (or, re-edited) some [dicta] written into the
[tcvp<a.<
If Criinert's reconstruction should prove correct, and I have no
doubt that it will, then we may safely assume that Zeno considered the reediting of the " sovereign maxims " a necessary task, and that he could not have
regarded Epicurus as their true author. For to re-edit and correct the sayings of
the "master" himself would have been for an Epicurean tantamount to sacrilege.
In view of the now fully established fact that in most instances these various
dicta have been tom from their immediate and original context, they cannot be
used or relied upon except with utmost caution.
126 We should remember that with the Sophists Oeuet liltca.<ov and v6p.lf1 liltca.<ovas opposed to <{>vue< liltca.tov-are one and the same thing, both denoting man-made
laws and justice and, hence, arbitrary rules. The Stoics, on the other hand
declared true morality to be man's complete harmony with nature (<{Jvuts) and
the laws governing this nature, that is, with the cosmic reason (11.6-yos) or cosmic
law (vop.os). Hence with the Stoics <{Jvu<s and vop.os are two equivalent terms.

ANTON-HERThfANN CHROUST

or merely according to convention (Kara v6p,ov, vop,(f!,
or,
B€u-et) .127 It does not, as it is sometimes suggested, primarily
concern itself with the formal or practical validity of the law or
laws. Only by confounding the formal validity of the existing
law with that other problem, namely, whether or not the existing law is q;vu-<H SiKtawv or vof.L(f! SiKawv, could certain Sophists
and some of Socrates' disciples (the Cynics and the Cyrenaics)
arrive at their dogma of complete lawlessness and anarchy. 128
For some unexplainable reason Epicurus has been charged
with having denied the existence Of a q;vmEt OLKaWV, OI what is
right and just according to nature. In other words, he has been
credited with having rejected the existence of "natural law
and right." 129 Obviously, this latter opinion is utterly untenable
in view of Kvptat S6gat 31, where Epicurus states in unmistakable terms that" the law of nature (q;vu-ewc; oiKawv) is declaratory of 130 what is useful or conducive to not injuring one
or being injured." 131 In short, the principle of use127 Polystratus,
in his work 10ept aAO')'OV Karaif>povfwews (Vol. Hercul. Papyr. 4,
edit. Th. Gomperz, Hermes n [1876] 399 ff.; and ibid., 12 [1877] 510 :ff.), col. 12
line 6, informs us that his " opponents," the Cynics, claim that right and wrong do
not exist if>VIYEL, but merely vow;J. Cf. Philodemus, Philodemi Volumina Rhetorica,
edit. S. Sudhaus, l. 147.
128 Socrates himself refuses to disavow the validity
of the Athenian laws which
condemn him, the most righteous man, to death, and which thus could not have
been if>vrm OlKawv. Cf. Plato, Crito 48A; 50A ff.; 51A; 54C.
129 Thus Seneca
(Epist. 87. 15) states that he " disagrees with Epicurus on the
point where the latter insists that nothing is just by nature--nihil iustum esse
natura." It is quite possible that Seneca had in mind a passage found in K.vpaxt
33: "Nothing was by itself justice .... " H. Usener, op. cit., 398, attempts
to link this Epicurean statement directly to Aristippus' claim that " there is no law
according to nature." Cf. Diog. Laert. 2. 93.
130 The Greek term
a sign by which one knows or infers a thing,"
cf. Lidell-Scott, Greek-English Dictionary, 6th edit. (1878), 1529-means not only
" symbol," but also " symptom " or " evidence." Although in its plural form this
term is also used in the sense ,of "treaty," "agreement," or "covenant" (cf.
Aristotle. Politics 1280 a 35 ff.), ][ am more than convinced that in d!pau
31
it means "declaratory of." Cf. Aristotle, De lnterpretatione 16 a 4: "Spoken
words are <rvf.Lf3ol\a (that is, declaratory) of mental experience." Ibid., 23 a 32. See
note 131 infra.
131 rO r7]s ¢Vuews OlKatOv €urr. uVP-f3oAov roD UVf.uj>Epovros els TO ILTJ {1AU1rretv
aAl\?jl\ovs p;1Jiie {3AV1FreiYOa,.

THE PHILOSOPHY

OF LAW OF THE EPICUREANS

fulness and expediency constitutes the absolute or natural
principle of law and righL Hence Epicurus expressly acknowledges a law of nature or natural law, a rij<;; 4>vcrewc; oiKawv,132
and thus accepts the« natural origin of law and right." 133 We
might even be permitted to define Epicurus' 4>vcn:.wc; SiKawv as
the" idea of law, right, and justice," or, as the Germans would
put it, as die Rechtsidee. Hence we could translate dictum 31
as follows: "the idea of law, right, and justice is declaratory
of what is useful. . . ." Obviously the content of the cpva-Ew<;
8£D<mov is the a-vpcpepov, that which is useful and expedient in
I am amazed to notice that such an outstanding scholar as E. Zeller, in
Philosophic der Griechen, 3d edit. 8. part !il. 455 ff., translates this passage as follows:
" The law, according to its nature, is an agreement. . .. " The original Greek text,
also quoted by Zeller, however, reads ro r?js <f>vo-<ws olKatov, and not, as Zeller's
translation would suggest, To Kara <f>uo-tv
or, To <f>vo-<ws oiKawv. As to
Zeller's translation of o-vp,f3oll.ov with "agreement," cf. note 130 supra. Zeller's
translation of o-vp,f3oll.ov Toll o-vp,<f>€povros with " agreement concerning that which
is useful," is likewise spurious in view of the fact that the passage in Kvptat
81 does not read q{,p.fJoll.ov 1repl roll o-up,¢epovros as this translation would suggest,
and as we find it, for instance, in Aristotle (Politics
a 39; ibid.,
a 10).
Neither does it read o-vp,{3oll.ov iJ1rep Toil o-vp,<f>£povros,as we find it in KVptaL
33.
I strongly suspect that Zeller confounds Epicurus' definition of law (
with
that of justice (oc:Kawo-vv'Y/).
In legal phraseology, to be sure, ra o-vp,fJoXa usually mean a covenant between
two or more parties. But then this term nearly always appears in the plural. Cf.
Thucydides l. 77 (a/ c:bro o-vp,f36"Awv olKa.c:, meaning "lawsuits"); Aristotle, loc. cit.;
Demosthenes, Orat. Attic. (edit. Reiske) 570 (ra o-vp.f3oll.a o-v"fxeew, meaning "to
violate a treaty"); ibid. 79 (o-up,f3oll.a 1roc:eio-liac: 7rpos 1roll.tv, meaning "to make a
treaty with a city"); Antiphon, Orat. Attic. (edit. Stephens) 138. 31 (cbro o-vp.fJ6"Awv
/lc:Kajeo-llac:
meaning "to bring action under the terms of an agreement ") .
In Polybius 24. l. 2, however, the phrase appears: .q Kara ro o-vp,fJoA.ov OLKaw/ioCTia
1rp6s nva. Cf. ibid., 32.17. 3; Appian, Civil Wars 8.l3!il. Hence we are on rather
safe ground if we translate o-vp,f3ol\.op with "symbol" or "declaratory of." In
addition, it would make little or no sense to state that "the law of nature or.
the law, according to its nature, is a reciprocal agreement as to what is useful."
For one does not agree on what is useful, that is, on what constitutes the
principle of usefulness or utilitarianism, but rather on what conduct conforms to
this principle of utilitarianism, the o-vp,<f>epov.
u 2 In Kvptat
15, Epicurus speaks of "natural riches," o Tijs <f>vo-ews 1r"!l.ollros.
Cf. ibid., 7, where he defines steadfastness (M<f>aA€ta) as ro T?]s </>VO"€WS a"fa06v.
183 He does not,
therefore, strictly follow the tradition established by the
Sophists, Cynics, and Cyrenaics who reduced the origin of law and right to llf.o-et.
Cf. Kvpta<
87: .q roiJ lhKalov q,vo-ts.

ANTON- HERMANN

CHROUST

preventing men from injuring one another or being injured. It
is the
that which is to one's advantage, which is in some
way the mother of all law and right. 134 In this manner Epicurus aimed at grounding law and right in the specific human
nature of the individual, as well as in the natural needs, desires,
and interests of individual man and the satisfaction of those
needs. That which reason declares as being useful to man, in
other words, as being in full agreement with man's natural
craving for things useful to him or expedient in the satisfaction
of this craving, is natural law and right. And that which is to
one's advantage
or useful to man (uvf.Lcpepov) constitutes that simple and, for Epicurus, self-evident element by
which the complex and composite structures of actual legal
and social life could rationally be explained and naturally
justified. In short, the uvf.Lcpepov or
which form the basis
of law and right, underlie the complexity of those structures,
the function of which consists in preventing men from injuring
one another. 135
This
j3A.d..-rrmv p:r;'8€ j3A.a7r'mr()at makes it quite obvious
that law and right in their application are based upon the
principle of reciprocity; and that they can exist and function
only within an established society. 136 According to its true
nature, justice ('8umwuvv7J), as contrasted with law and :right
(SI.Kawv), is, therefore, an essentially relational concept, a fact
which Epicums fully acknowledges 137 when he states that, since
all justice is but relative, 138 there is not, and never was, such a
u. xpela &cnrep p:frrr;p
'TOJII OtKalwv. Cf. H. Usener, op. cit. 319; Demosthenes, Aristogeiton
" ... the law intends what is right ... and
advantageous."
135 KVpta.t
31: TO tJ.>i (37\{urre<v &.7\J\?j)\ovs.-It should be noted, however, that
Epicurus does not limit the usefulness or expedience of the State merely to the
safeguarding of the existing laws, as we shall see presently.
136 Cf. Aristotle,
Eth.
b
"This form of justice . . . is . . .
virtue, not absolutely, but in relation to our fellow men." Ibid., 1130 a 4.
137 Kvpuu
33: OLK(J.<O<TVV7J ••• ev rais fJ.ET' &."J\1\?j/\wv <TU<Trpo<f>ais.
138 We should
remember that, according to Epicurus, no pleasure in itself
(tea()' €avril) is good, that is absolutely good, but merely in relation to its aftereffects. Cf. Diog. Laert. 10.
10.

THE PHILOSOPHY

OF LAW OF THE EPICUREANS

223

thing as absolute justice. 139 Although law or right is
8iKawv because it is declaratory of the basic and first principle
which, according to Epicurus, constitutes the true or natural
essence of man, namely, man's era ving for things useful to him
-justice is merely a "state,"
other words, the practical
application of the
8iKawv to a concrete situation with a
view to this situation. Hence justice must be relative in a
twofold sense: in one sense it is relative because it is not, as
for instance, in Plato, a quality of man, 140 but rather something
concerned with actual human relationships; 141 in another sense
it is relative because it is always dependent upon time and place
O'ITYJAiKov<> 87] 7TOTE
ro'ITov<;) •142 In other words, while the
principle of usefulness and expediency constitutes the absolute
or natural principle of law and right, the application or practice
of this principle, that is, justice, is but a relative principle in
that it deals with actual concrete human relationships and
hence has to take into consideration such empirical facts or
factors as time, place, tradition, and particular circumstances. 143
This is also brought out by Polystratus, a disciple of Epicurus,144 who demonstrates that the relativity of certain legal
precepts in their practical application does not disprove their
universal usefulness and " validity." 145
139 OvK
n Ka8'€cwro IJcKaLOIJ'{wYJ. This passage from KVpcac
33 has frequently been used in an effort to demonstrate that Epicurus did not acknowledge
the existence of a natural law. Cf. notes 129 and 131 supra.
140 This
statement might contain a direct attack upon Plato. Cf. Rqmblic
353D: "Justice is the excellence of the soul."
141 In this fashion Epicurus actually proposes a kind of" analytical jurisprudence"
which operates with basic jural relations by elaborating a scheme or system of
"jural opposites" or "jural correlatives." Cf. W. Hohfeld, Fundamental Jural
Conceptions, edit. Cook, 35; Aristotle, Nic. Eth. H34 a 29 ff.
142 Kvpcac
33. Cf. ibid., 36.
143 Ibid., 36.
Cf. ibid., 33.
144 In his wepl al\O')'ov Kara</>poviwews. Cf. note 127 supra. This work has the
subtitle, wept al\6')'oV Kara</>povr}IJ'<WS €v TOtS 7rOAAOtS
the
Unwarranted Disdain of Popular Opinion. Cf. notes 310 ff. infra.
145 Polystratus
in particular objects to the Cynic contempt for the traditional
and " popular " conceptions of right and wrong, good and evil. The Cynics insisted
that these concepts are meaningless and, hence, worthless, because they are neither
<j>vuec nor Kar' &./1.-fJO«av, but IUueL or v6p,r,>, that is, artificial and arbitrary.
The

ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

The fact that justice varies with time and place 14 c is further
illustrated by Epicurus' insistence that the law (SiKawv) contains two distinct features: certain common (Kowa) and certain particular (£Sta) elements. 147 Hence it might be said that
the Kowov SiKawv constitutes the "primary natural law," while
the tSLa 8£Kata represent what could be called the " secondary
natural law." That part of the law which is common to all men
is always and everywhere the same. But this " common law "
is not always determined by its usefulness to every single
individual within a given society. For "that which in a
general way proves itself useful or expedient within a given
society, has an the prerequisites of a SiKawv, irrespective of
whether or not it is the same for everyone." 148 Conversely,
that which is to the advantage of the individual as such is not
necessarily always to the common advantage of society. Hence
the advantage of the individual or of individual situations is
taken into account by the particular (£Sta) elements of the
Cynics clinched their argument by pointing out that animals do not possess the
notion of right and wrong. Polystratus objects to these arguments by showing
that animals are incapable of reasoning. Although he admits that different peoples
or nations hold different views as to the nature of right and wrong, he nevertheless
insists that this relativity neither disproves the existence of such concepts or
conceptions as right and wrong, nor impairs their absolute usefulness, even should
their specific content or meaning vary with time, place, and circumstances.
In
this Polystratus is ably supported by Hermarchus (Porphyry, De Abstinentia
l. lQ), who rejects the Cynic notion that the existing legal or moral precepts are
alitiupopa (meaningless) because they apparently lack universality.
The views expressed by Polystratus and Hermarchus seem to be in line with
the general Epicurean tradition which counselled obedience to the existing laws of
the land. Cf. Diog. Laert. 10. lQl. Aristotle, Nic. Eth. 1134 b 25 ff.: "Now some
people think that all law and justice is of this kind (scil., man-made or v6p,'IJ,
and not by nature or ¢v(J"EL), because that which is by nature is unchangeable
and has everywhere the same force or validity .... But this is not true in an
unqualified sense ... [for] with us there is something that is just even by nature,
yet all of it is changeable .... "
146 Kuptat
33. Cf. ibid. 36: " ... in its application to particular cases of
various localities and conditions, [justice] varies under different circumstances."
147 Ibid. 36.
Cf. Aristotle, who likewise distinguishes between a Kow!Js and an
rows POP,M. Nic. Eth. 1134 b 18 ff.; 1134 b 24 ff.; Rhetoric 1373 b 6 ff.
148 Kuptat
37.

THE PHILOSOPHY

OF LAW OF THE EPICUREANS

law.149 The iSLa StKaLa-the particular aspect or application of
the law-are the historically developed and accrued body of, but
only locally valid and enforced, legal precepts, rules, or norms.
These iSta StKata are conditioned by the peculiar " legal genius ''
of a certain people, which in turn is determined by time, place,
and circumstances. 150 In this sense, and only in this, justice,
being based upon the iSta StKata, always remains a relative
term. 151 The fact that two nations or cities may have two
different bodies of iSta StKaLa and, hence, two different forms
of justice, does not preclude, however, their sharing in certain
common (Kowa) laws and rights. Since, however, the iSLa StKata
are also subservient to the natural principle of usefulness and
expediency, and must be considered the product of "natural
factors " such as the " legal genius " of the people or a particular time, place, or circumstances', they are still cpvO"ew<; StKaLa,
natural law, or to be more exact, "secondary natural law.''
From all this it follows that justice develops and exists only
within a given society/ 52 conditioned by time, place, and certain particular cirl!umstances. Now we are told that, according
to Epicurus, society is not a natural institution, but has been
brought about by men as the result of reflection and for the
sake of the general advantages which are expected from social
life. While the Stoics declared human solidarity a dictate of
reason and, hence, part of the natural order of things/ 53
149 Zeller's insistence (op. cit., 457) that Epicurus did not acknowledge a common and absolute law, is not supported by the available sources. I suspect that
Zeller, when making this statement, had in mind KvptaL
83 which states that
there never has been an absolute justice, that is to say, an absolute " administration of justice." But this passage does not, as Zeller implies, refer to the nature
of law and right (lllKawv). Justice, as stated by Epicurus, signifies man's personal
relationship to the alKawv or the alKata, to the Kotva as well as fllta alKata-to
certain absolutely as well as merely relatively valid legal precepts, that is to say,
to certain absolute legal precepts as well as to a merely historically developed and
accrued body of locally or temporarily enforced legal precepts. Hence there cannot
exist such a thing as absolute and universal justice, but only " local " justice.
151 Ibid., 33.
15 ° Kvp•a•
87.
152 Ibid., 38: . . . ev Tats p.er' ci.XX'IjXwv ITV1TTporpa£s ••••
153 Cf. Cicero, De Finibus 8. 19. 64; 8. 20. 67; De Legibus 12. 88; De Officiis 1. 7;
Seneca, Epist. 95. 52; 47. 3; 1Marcus Aurelius, Thoughts 8. 4; 5. 16; 6. 14; 6. 88; 7. 55;

5

ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

Epicurus has been accused of having denied most vehemently
not only every fonn of natural association among men, but
even the mere existence of a natural social instinct. 154 In view
of the still available evidence it cannot be ascertained with
complete definiteness whether or not Epicurus actually repudiated the social nature of man. 155 In any event, Hermarchus,
one of Epicurus' immediate and most loyal followers, who can
be fully trusted as having handed down to us genuine Epicurean
notions, makes it a special point to emphasize the natural relation which exists among all men on account of their being
essentially alike physically as well as mentally. 156 If we disregard certain secondary and not too reliable sources/ 57 we thus
may assume that Epicurus believed in a cpVu€t Kowwvl.a in the
same way that he insisted upon a cpvuewr; 81.Kawv.158
The relative nature of justice-8tKatouvv17 as opposed to
81.Katov-is further brought out by KVptat 86ga, 33, where Epicurus states that justice is " a kind of covenant (or mutual
agreement-<TvvlhjK17)neither to injure nor to be injured." 159
8. 7; 8. 84; 8. 59; 9. 1; 9. 9; 9. 28; 10. 2; 11. 8; 11. 18; 12.80; Diog. Laert. 7. 129;
Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Matk. 9. lSI; Epictetus, Diss. 2. 20. 2; 2. 20. S; and the
many passages in the works of Panaetius and Posidonius.
'"' Cf. Epictetus, Diss. 2. 20.2: "For what does he (scil., Epicurus) say? ...
There is no natural relation between rational beings." Lactantius, lnstituticmes
Divinae S. 17. 42: "Dicit Epicurus ... nullam esse humanam societatem."
155 Cf. Epictetus, op. cit., 1. 23. 1:
"Even Epicurus is sensible of the fact that
we are by nature sociable (.pvue• tup,ev Ko<vwv<Kol)." Ibid., 2. 20. 2: "Thus also,
when Epicurus would destroy the natural relation of men to one another, he makes
use of the very thing he is destroying." It should be noted that Epicurus is
not being accused here of .denying the existence of natural relationships among
men, but merely of destroying them.
158 ln Porphyry,
De Abstinentia 1. 7.
157 These secondary and rather unfavorable sources are mainly of Stoic origin,
and therefore polemic rather than historical in their significance. Undoubtedly
the Stoics tried to accuse the Epicureans of having denied everything which they
themselves accepted as basic or self-evident truths.
168 Kvpuu 86Ecu Sl.
, •• u""o-q"11 r•s v... 11.1! ffA&..,.re•v
fJll.&..,.reufJa.•.
Plato (Republic S59A fi.) had already said that men, after having both done,
as well as suffered, injustice, come to the conclusion that " they had better agree
among themselves to have neither. Hence arise laws and mutual agreements
(tr1JJIIJ7jKa.<)." Cf. Cratylus S84E. " •.. all is convention .... " Tke Laws 879A;

THE PHILOSOPHY

OF LAW OF THE EPICUREANS

227

From all this it follows that not the law or right as such
(Si:t<awv), but merely justice, the practice and application of
the basic legal precepts (S,t<atouVV7J), rests upon a "sort of
agreement." For justice, according to Epicurus, is the practical
and concrete attitude of the various individuals towards the
established positive legal order (v6p.o') towards whatever is
authoritatively held as being useful and expedient in the mutual
intercourse among men. 160 ·The established, that is, historically
developed and locally conditioned positive legal order (v6p.o,,
or v6p.cp S,KatoCTVV7J), in the final analysis is but the cpvuEW'>
Si:Ka,ov, the universal principle of usefulness and expediency.
This cpvuews S£t<awv, which in its further development and its
efforts to adapt itself to the particular exigencies of time, place,
and particular circumstances, has turned, through the authority
vested in a particular society, into the v6p.o' or v6p.cp S,KawuvV7J,
and thus, in some way, acquired the characteristics and function of a uvvfJ.qK7J or a sort of crovfJ.qK7J.161 Obviously, then, the
Si:Kawv--the Kowov Si:t<awv as well as the iS,a S£t<a£a-did not
rest originally on a uvvfJ.qK7J. Because otherwise Epicurus would
not have called this Si:t<a,ov a cpvuews S£t<a,ov, but rather fJeue'
or v6p.cp (vop.,ufJevra) S£t<a,a.162 This is also fully supported by
Hermarchus, who states that men had, although not consistently, always observed certain legal precepts even before laws
(v6p.o') had been established. 163 In view of' the fact that
Hermarchus closely adhered to the orthodox Epicurean tradition, his statement, which reiterates the existence of a cpvuews
Si:t<awv, is of greatest importance. 164
Aristotle, Politics 1280 b 10: " ••. and law is merely a convention or mutual agreement (tca.l o 11op.os uv11fJiJICTJ)." Rhetoric 1876 b 9: ". . . the law itself as a whole
is a sort of (rls) covenaut
a.vros o 116p.os uvvfJiJtcfl rls eun11) ." The rls is
importaut because it modifies this statement by defining the law . as a " sort of
16 ° Kvp•a.•
covenaut."
88.
161 Cf. note 159 supra, particularly as to the importance of the term rls.
162 Kvp•a.•

88.

In Porphyry, De Abstinentia 1. 10. Porphyry also opines (ibid.) that even
before laws aud cities had been established men by their very natural instinct aud
without rational design had understood the usefulness of mutual preservation
(4ll.o-yos p.viJp.fl roil uvp.<f>epollros).
1 .. Lucretius (De Rt!II"Um Natura 5. 1019 fi'.) also states that even before the
168

ANTON- HERMANN

CHROUST

If the v6wcp Sl.Katov is a
or agreement, then the
is to say, the contractual nature of the
v6p,cp o[Katov-also determines the specific validity, function, and
content of this v6f-Lcp oiKawv. Hence there is no such thing as a
lawful or unlawful conduct (or justice) in one's .relationship to
animals or things incapable of entering into mutual ag.reements.165 Neither can there be justice towards nations or
peoples which are incapable of, or unwilling to share in, a
system of law and right, or unfit to become a party to an agreement on account of their low mentality o.r fierce nature. 166 In
the light of this observation, the beginning of Kvptat 86gat 33,
ovK 1jv n Ka(J' €avro OtKawa-vvr; (" originally there was no such
a-vv()Tjwr; itself-that

invention of language men " began eagerly to unite themselves in friendship, in
that neighbors strove not to injure one another or to be injured."-This "nee
laedere nee violari " of Lucretius is but a translation of Epicurus' p.7} {JA.chrrotv
p:qll€ {Jil.a7!"nl18a<.

If, on the other hand, Lucretius also informs us that, although in this manner
complete " concord could not be achieved," at least " the majority kept the
covenant unblemished " (bona magnaque pars servabat foedera caste; ibid.,
5. 1025 fl.), then these foedera (in Epicurus the uvv8ijKru) are but the product of
man's natural instinct for things useful to him. And it is this instinct which drove
man to form social unions" These foedera or uvv!Jfi;au are not covenants in the
strictest sense of the term, but merely "a sort of" 11vv1Jfw'1, a uvv!Jf};cq rls, because
these foedera are not the result of deliberate calculation, but rather that of
natural instinct. Should, therefore, Lucretius represent the genuine Epicurean
tradition in this particular issue-and I have no doubt that he does, especially
in view of the fact that all Epicureans most faithfully adhered to the dicta of the
" master "-then we may also assume that Epicurus himself accepted the existence
of something like a silent agreement (op.6'Ao'lfos) or quasi-agreement among men
living in a state of nature, and that this silent agreement is actually the product not
of deliberation and rational design, but of a natural impulse of self-preservation.
Cf. Plato, Crito 5ii!D: " ... you agreed to be governed by us (scil., the existing
local laws of Athens) in deed, and not in words only."
Hence the 11vv8fJKTJ rls of the Epicurean state of nature, being not the result of
rational design but of a natural " blind " urge, originally is not absolutely compelling. For it becomes a real and, therefore, binding 11vv1Ji}K7J only through the
definite establishment of a detailed legal order which, in turn, becomes the f'l/'l/V7Jr7Js
or surety of this 11Vv0i}K7J. Cf. Aristotle, Politics 1280 b H.
165 Kvpuu
32. cf. Aristotle, Nic. Eth. 1161 b 1 ff. " ... there is no ..
justice towards lifeless things. B11t neither is there any friendship towards a horse
or an ox, nor towards a slave qua slave. For there is nothing common to the
two parties."
166 Kvp«u
32.
0

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229

thing as absolute justice," that is, a state where the cpvuewr;
8iKaLov generally could be applied to a concrete situation) ,
acquires additional meaning: since justice does not apply to
those who for some reason fail to accept or understand the
relational or, to be more exact, reciprocal nature of justice; 167
and since in the primitive state men as a rule apparently did
not, or would not fully acknowledge the reciprocity of just
action, We cannot Speak of absolute (Ka(}' eawo) justice. 168
Although in the most primitive stages of human history or
civilization there was no manifest justice, it is admitted by
Epicurns or, at least, by some of his disciples, 169 that there
existed in this state of nature a " sort of uvvOfJI<"fJ,"170 a kind of
latent and not yet articulate and truly manifest sense of what
is right and just. To the Epicureans this primitive instinct for
justice apparently is also a uvv0.fJKTJ.111 In the course of the
ever mounting human intelligence or evolution of mankind this
uvvB.fJK"fJ
is replaced by the articulate and truly manifest
uvv()-/jK"fJ, that is, by a definite actual covenant based upon an
actual agreement of :reciprocity. In this fashion the laws
(v6;wt) governing cities are established and with them certain
167 The wording of KVpuu
3!i! permits us even to assume that Epicums toyed
with the possibility of a "law of nations " based upon reciprocal agreements or the
" covenant of covenants," that is to say, the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
'""This ovK
KaO'tauro •.• o<Kaw<rvvrJ .•. , however, does not preclude the
existence of a ¢v<rews olKawv in the state of nature. The ¢v<rews oi!;;awv is but the
most universal principle or idea of law and right, in other words, of what is
useful to man. As such it is valid for all times and places, no matter what the
particular circumstances might be. Here the <f>vuews oiKawv merely expresses that
the law, or, for that matter, all laws, must be useful to man. Justice, on the other
hand, signifies what is useful and expedient in a particular situation. Thus justice,
in order to state authoritatively what is useful to man, always presupposes first
the existence of an absolute and universal principle of usefulness and expedience,
secondly, a certain state of social development to which this absolute principle
might effectively be applied.
169 Cf. Hermarchus,
in Porphyry, De Abstinentia L 10; Lucretius, De Rerum
Natura 5. 1019 ff.; 5. 1024 ff.
170

A

Obviously with the Epicureans, as with other philosophers, the vopm developed
along natural lines an evolution analogous to that language and the arts. Only
at a late stage of this development did the law or laws acquire the features of
something conventional. Cf. Diog. Laert. 10. 75; Plato, Cratylus 383A ff.
171

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ANTON-HERMANN

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dearly

defined and strictly delimited rights
Or, as we would say today, this articulate uvv8iJI<'YJ
determines within a given politically organized society what
shall commonly be accepted as being right and, hence, what
interests shall be secured through the authority of this politically organized society. Since, however, these vop,tu(}f.vra StKata
or the v6p,oL are essentially the result of certain natural factors
modified by the varying conditions of time, place, particular
circumstances, and the "legal genius" of the people, the
various vop,tufJf.v-ra Si:Kata as well as the v6p,ot of different cities,
nations, or peoples must be different in their specific content. 173
But these differences are not due to artificial causes, but rather
to such natural factors as time, place, and particular conditions.
The vo;uufUvm lltKata could therefore also be defined as the
historically developed and accrued body of authoritative
grounds of, and guides to, actual determinations of controversies arising out of a conflict of " interests."
Only to the extent to which they are in complete accord
with the natural concept (7rpOA1Jo/t<;) and essence of the cpvueoo<;
8£Katov, in other words, as long as they serve the " natural "
idea of usefulness as regards society or individual man living
in society, the vop.cn or vop.taBevm o[Kaw, may be called
"just." 174 Any vop,o<; that fails to live up to this fundamental
condition must be considered as being contrary to the dictates
of the 4>vueoo<; SiKcuov. 175 Hence it is also possible that a v6p,or;:
is "just" for a limited period of time, namely, fo:r the time
during which it proved itself useful and expedient in a certain
concrete situation determined by time and place. 176 For even
StKata) •112

Kvpuu ll6Ea• 88.
Cf. Kvpuu
88; 86.
17• Kopuu
37: "Among the things accounted just by the Po;wt, 'whatever
in the exigencies of mutual intercourse is attested as being useful and expedient, is
thereby stamped as just. . . ."
175 Ibid. 87: " ... in case any law is made which does not prove suitable to the
exigencies of mutual intercourse, then this law is no longer just." Cf. H. Usener,
op. cit., 79; 80.
176 Kvptat
37: "And should the usefulness or expediency which is expressed
by the law vary and only for a time correspond with the prior conception (scil.,
172

173

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fl81

what once under different circumstances had been useful to man
must be termed " just " under those circumstances, as long as
it remained useful and expedient, 171 although later it might
have ceased to be useful and hence becomes" unjust." 178
In this manner Epicurus openly defies those Sophistic
theories of law and justice 179 which declare any and every form
of v6p.lfJ Bf.Ka,ov to be arbitrary and " unjust," and thus contrary
to nature on account of its changing content. But more than
that: .by confronting the v6p.o' with the cpvcrews 8£Kawv he raises
once more the old and apparently never to be settled controversy between natural law 180 and positive law,181 or to be
of usefulness, that is, the <f>vuerAs lilKa.Lov), nevertheless for the time being it was
just .... " Ibid., 88:. " ••• wherever the laws have ceased to be useful or
expedient in consequence of circumstances, in that case the laws were for the time
being just when they were expedient and useful for the mutual intercourse of
the citizens; and subsequently ceased to be just when they ceased to be useful
and expedient."
177 Cf. Plato, Theaetetus 167C:
"Whatever appears to the State to be just,
so long as it is regarded as such, is just ... to it." Ibid., 172B: " ... when they
(scil., the followers of Pythagoras) speak of justice or injustice ... they are confident that . . . the truth is that which is agreed upon at the time of the
agreement, and as long as the agreement lasts. . . ."
178 Kvp•a.•
88: " Where without a change of circumstances the laws (v6p.o•),
when judged by their consequences, were seen not to correspond with the idea
of justice, such laws were not really just."
179 It is quite possible that Epicurus attacks here certain Cynics or Cyrenaics
who .in their longing for an ideal state of nature ruled exclusively by " the laws
of nature," refused to acknowledge any of the laws (v6p.o•) to which a civilized
and politically organized society submits itself. For the Cynics and the Cyrenaics
rejected everything that in their opinion was merely a man-made institution or the
result of tradition. Cf. Polystratus and his sarcastic discussion of the Cynic point
of view in matters concerning the "legal convictions of the people." Cf. notes
810 ff. infra.
18 ° Cf. A.-H. Chroust, "On the Nature of Natural Law," InterpTetations of Legal
Philosophies: Essays in Honor of Roscoe Pound, edit. P. Sayre, Oxford Univ.
Press (1947), 70 ff.
By " positive law " we mean a historically developed and accrued body of
authoritative grounds of, or guides for, actual determination of controversies. These
grounds or guides may serve as rules for actual decisions or as guides to a
definite conduct in a certain definite and detailed situation. They may also
function as the bases for predicting " official " action. This body of authoritative
materials, moreover, operates through a definite judicial or administrative process-and this process in itself is merely a development and application of these

ANTON-HERMANN

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more exact, the problem concerning the validity and justification of the positive laws in the light of the absolute dictates
of the cpvueco<; StKatov. Certain radical Sophists, on the one
hand, had insisted that only those laws are justly authorized
which nature itself had determined, while human laws, on the
whole definitely go beyond this and, hence, actually tyrannize
man by forcing him to do things contrary to nature. 182 The
cpvueco<; StKatov is used here primarily to criticize and combat
the existing v6ftot and, at the same time, the established legal,
social, or political order backed by these v6ftot or the v6wtJ
StKatoCTVVTJ. Protagoras, on the other hand, had a least attempted to prove that both natural law and positive laws
essentially agree with one another/ 83 a view which to some
extent is also shared by Epicurus and his followers.184 We
furthermore remember that Aristotle generally distinguished
between universally valid or " common " (moral) law (tuov
S£Kawv) / 85 and "statutory"
or "positive law" (v6ftLftOV
S£Kawv). Now this v6fttftOV StKatov, which operates to the common advantage of all/ 86 in the main is but the practical application of the Aristotelian moral concept of justice and the
tuov S£Kawv within a given organized society. Epicurus seems
to follow the Aristotelian pattern insofar as according to him
the v6ftot as well as the VOfttCTOeVTa S£Kata, which arise with the
v6ftot, are but uVftfJo'Aa -roil CTVftcpepov-ro<;, and, therefore, the
particular manifestations of the cpvueco<; S£Kawv, backed by the
authority of politically organized society. 187 And like Ariauthoritative materials through the employment of an authoritative technique,
which itself is likewise the product of historical development and accrual.
18 " Cf. Plato, Protagoras 887C (Hippias).
183 Cf. Plato, Protagoras 322A fl'.
184 Cf. Kupuu
87; 38.
183 Upon the Aristotelian
lcrov IJlKa.tov rests the moral concept of justice which
is defined as " that type of moral disposition which renders men apt to do the
good things and which causes tliem to act justly and to wish for what is just."
Nic. Eth. 1129 a 6 ff. The moral virtue of justice, in other words, is a state of
the mind which makes man inclined to render unto everyone his due.
186 The vop.tp.ov IJlKO.LOP of Aristotle is that law which is to "the advantage all."
Cf. Nic. Eth. 1129 b 15 ff.
187 The JJop.tp.oJJ IJlKa.wv of Aristotle
also contains the tro"AtnKov IJlKa.LOJJ (Nic.
Eth. 1134 a 18 fl'.), that is, the law established within politically organi2ed society

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stotle, 188 he does not deny the validity or binding force of the
189 although
these
may in their specific application
at times not always be in full accord with the <f>vU"ew<; 8iKawv
and the idea of universal usefulness or expediency. 190 And
although the v6p,m may not at times completely express the
<f>vU"ew<; 8iKawv, according to Epicurus it is nevertheless advisable and even necessary to observe them, 191 because their disregard might become the source of unpleasant and painful
consequences.

*

*

*

It seems that Epicurus believed :in the necessity of certain
legal sanctions in order to make the v6p,ot truly workable and
effective. It is the deterring effect of sanctions and punishment
which, according to Epicurus, contributes to the maintenance
of the established legal or social order. 192 For the evil-doer
cannot hope to remain unnoticed and thus escape punishment
forever. 193 Hermarchus, who in this probably follows closely
in the footsteps of Epicurus, informs us that the v6p,ot had been
and valid for politically organized society as contrasted by the l!etY'If"onKov I!{Kawv
and the olKovofuKov olKawv (the rights or the right of the head of the household,
cf. Nic. Eth. 1134 b 7 ff.). Epicurus dispenses with a specific 'lf"OA<TLKOV oiKawv,
because to him all vof-'OL are wo"AtnKo1 vopm, or to be more exact, because he does
not acknowledge any v6f.'o< outside the politically organized society.
188 The vof-'OS of Aristotle
" possesses compulsory force because it is something
which proceeds from a sort of practical wisdom and reason." Cf. Nic. Eth. 1180
a Ql.-This passage, however, might be an anonymous quotation.
189 Cf. Philodemus,
wepl eiJtYe{3las (edit. Gomperz) 120.
19 ° Kvp'"'
38. Ibid. 36; 37.
191 Cf. Philodemus,
op. cit., 120.
192 Cf. Plato, Protagoras 324B fl'., where Protagoras,
in discussing the nature of
rational punishment, states that " no one punishes the evildoer ... for the reason
that he has done evil. . . . He who desires to inflict rational punishment does
not retaliate for the past wrong which cannot be undone; he has regard for the
future, and is desirious that the man who is punished, may be deterred from
doing wrong again. He punishes for the sake of prevention. . .. This is the notion
of all those who retaliate upon others either privately or publicly."
193 Kvptat
35: " It is impossible for the man who secretly violates an
article of the covenant ... to feel confident that he will remain undiscovered, even
if he has already escaped ten thousand times. For right on to the end of his
life he is never sure that he will remain undetected."

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ANTON-HERMANN

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introduced by the philosophers in order to terrify people
through the threat of sanctions.m Thus it appears at first
sight that Epicurus interprets the
and the existing legal
order as a system of threats. 195 However, this notion requires
some considerable modification, insofar as Epicurus himself
admits that only the ignorant, but never the wise and understanding and, hence, just man, conceives of the laws as a threat.
He abstains from evil-doing merely because of the threatened
consequences. 196 Those who correctly reason about what is
useful to society as a whole as well as to themselves do not
stand in need of such inducements in order to do the right
thing or restrain themselves from evil-doing. But those who
are incapable of understanding that which is useful or expedient
to society at large or to themselves require the restraining
effects of legal punishment and sanction. 197 Hence the v6pm,
as regards the intelligent and wise man, have not been introduced in order to restrain the latter from being unjust, but
rather in order to protect him from being injured by others. 198
Merely the great mass of the ignorant requires laws and legal
sanctions, which are designed to prevent the ignorant from
evil-doing through the very threat which they contain: " T]
' ••• KaKOV
'
amKtrL

("ECT'nV ) ••• EV
• T(f;J KaTa' T'YJV
' •

.r.'

.1.., e1
'I'OfJ(f;'·

••• , 199

Obviously Epicurus' general remark that " injustice is not in
itself an evil " is in complete accord with his basic tenet that
no pleasure--and, hence, no pain-by itself could be called evil,
'"•In Porphyry, De Abatinentia 1. 8.
Kvpuu
84: " Injustice is not in itself an evil, but only in its consequences-namely, the terror which is excited by the apprehension that those
appointed to punish such offenses will discover the injustice."
196 Kvpu;u llOEa.• 17:
" The just man enjoys the greatest peace of mind (cira.pa.K6ra.ros)' while the unjust is full of 'the utmost disquietude." Cf. ibid., 5: "It
is impossible to live a pleasant life without living ... justly .... "
107 Hermarchus,
in Porphyry, op. cit., 1. 8 ff. Cf.
Tke Laws 875C: "If
a man were hom so divinely gifted that he could naturally apprehend the
truth, he would not stand in need of laws to rule over him." Statesman 297A:
"Nor can wise rulers ever err while they, observing the one great rule of distributing justice to the citizens with intelligence and skill, are able to observe
them [the laws].... "
108 Stobaeus, Florilegium 58. 189.
199 Kvp•a.•
84.
196

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285

although some pleasures are to be a voided on account of their
painful consequences.200 Now in «.VpuLt 86gat 84 we are told
that in the case of a contemplated disregard of the existing
laws the fear of certain unpleasant consequences seems to be
an inducement to abide by these laws. But it does not say
that this fear is the sole and only restraining power which
keeps the multitude in line. In other words, the law or legal
order is not exclusively an order of threats; and the laws will
not exclusive1y be observed merely because of certain possible
sanctions which might take effect in case of a disregard of the
law or laws. 201 We have already pointed out that the educated
man does not stand in need of laws or legal sanctions in order
to do what is useful to society. 202 This view finds additional
support in the rather caustic remark of Epicurus: " Will the
wise man do something contrary to the existing v6JLot, even
if he realizes that his conduct will escape detection? A sllp.ple
answer to this cannot easily be found." 203 As a matter of fact,
Epicurus had already answered this query most thoroughly
when he stated that " the wise man, who is in possession of the
highest good mankind could ever devise, always acts and conducts himself in the proper manner, even though he should
remain unnoticed." 204 This much is certain, then, that the
wise man who fully understands and appreciates the true meaning of happiness, will always conduct himself in a manner above
reproach. But will he also abide by the voJLot, particularly if the
latter do not coincide with his conception of the cpvuewt;; 8£t<awv,
the natural moral law? Undoubtedly the cpvuewt;; 8£t<awv is of
••• Ibid., 8; Diog.

10. 141. Cf. Diog. Laeri,
129.
Hence Seneca (frag. 581, Usener) misunderstood Epicurus when he says
that according to Epicurns " crimes must be avoided because the fear (scil. of
subsequent apprehension and punishment) cannot be avoided."
••• Stobaens, Florilegium 58. 189.
••• Frag. 18 (Usener).
••• Frag. 588 (Usener) .-Cicero {De Fi:nibus 2. 9. 28) misconstrues this passage
when he writes that " it conveys the impression that there is no deed so base that
he (acil., Epicurus) would not be ready to commit it for the sake of pleasure,
provided he were guaranteed against detection." Cf. Epictetns, Disa. 8. 7.1:
" Epicurus does not pronounce stealing an evil, only the being found out. . . ."
•• 1

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an higher order than the vop,ot, the man-made laws. This
does not, however, excuse man from abiding also by the particular vop,ot of the politically organized society in which he
lives. For should he find himself incapable of acknowledging
the laws of the city or land in which he lives because he
considers them incompatible with his notion of the
8£Kawv, then he had better leave the city and go elsewhere. 205

*

*

*

The State or politically organized society under the rule of
law is primarily an instrument or institution to secure peace
and order among its citizens. It is designed not only to make
them abstain from injuring one another or from being injured
in their mutual intercourse, but also to promote their personal
welfare and interests by protecting them fmm each other.
Moreover it is also intended to prevent through covenants or
treaties clashes with the inhabitants of neighboring cities or
countries, if only the latter are willing and morally or mentally
capable of entering into such agreements or " non-aggression
pacts." 206 Wherever these neighbors are either unwilling or
morally incapable of doing so, that is, if they do not renounce
by mutual agreements war and aggression, the State will have
to protect its citizens agamst these actual or potential foes:
He who best knew how to meet the threat or fear of external foes
made into one family all the creatures he could reach. ·And those
he could not reach, he did at any rate not treat as aliens. And
where he found even this impossible, he avoided all intercourse,
and, as far as this proved expedient, kept them at a distance. 207
205 Cf. Philodemus,
Philodmni Volumina Rhetorica !i!. !(!.59.-Philodemus might
have been inspired by Plato, Crito .52D: " ... you were at liberty to leave the
city ... if our covenants appeared to yon to be unfair. Yon had your choice .... "
That the Epicureans did not believe that an evil-doer could really be happy even
should he escape detection forever, can be gathered from Cicero, De Officiis 3. 9.
38 ff., where the Epicureans flatly refuse to take issue with the Gyges myth (Plato,
Republic 359C ff.) by declaring that the whole story is both fictitious and impossible. Hence it might be assumed that they did not consider Gyges 2
206 Kvpta< o6(aL 3!i!.
happy man.
207 Ibid., 89.
Cf. ibid., 6: " In order to obtain security from other men any
means whatsoever of procuring this security was a natural good."

THE PHILOSOPHY

OF LAW OF THE EPICUREANS

fl37

In other words, the first concern of the State is to weld all
those who think and feel alike about certain social matters
into one big family or community. In so doing the State orders
its own internal affairs by abolishing internal rifts and clashes.
After this is achieved, the State has to be secured from external
aggression. This is done by incorporating those who are not
members of the original community but who have certain
things in common with the original " communal group '' and
can, therefore, rather easily be absorbed into this group. Those,
however, who lack these common traits and who could not be
absorbed, are pacified by mutual pacts of friendship. And,
finally, those neighbors who could neither be incorporated into
the "family," nor disarmed or appeased by friendly treaties,
the State will either completely avoid or, if feasible and
expedient, attack and drive away. 208
Kvptat 36ga, 40, which likewise refers to the origin and development of law and State, informs us that
those who were most capable of providing themselves with the
means necessary to secure themselves against their neighbors, are
thus in the possession of the greatest guarantee [of peace] and,
hence, passed the most agreeable life in each other's company....
As in KVptat S6ga, 39, the protection and security of the commonwealth by strong and effective methods is considered the best
way to safeguard the State and promote the greatest possible
happiness among its citizens. For " there would be no advantage in providing security against our fellow-citizens so
long as we are alarmed [about some threat from without].
• • ." 209
Only " when tolerable security against our fellow
man is attained, then on a basis of power sufficient to afford
support 210 and through material prosperity arises in a most
208 Hermarchus and Lucretius
(see mfra) make it quite clear that these rather
fragmentary statements deal with problems concerning the origin and evolution
of law and State.
••• Kvpuu
13.
210 Some scholars read
instead of
or lEepeLtTTLKfJ. If
lEoPLtTTLKV be read, then this passage should be translated as follows: ". . . then
on the basis of power sufficient to expel and on the basis of material prosperity ... ," in other words, " on the basis of power sufficient to ward off and
drive away (acil., hostile neighboring tribes) .... "

238

.ANTON-HERMANN

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genuine form the security of a quiet private .life withdrawn
from the multitude (auc/JaAeta)." 211 It is this security from
violence and aggression both from within and without the
corpus politicum which the State and the legal order backed
by the authority of the State provide. This security constitutes the necessary prerequisite of the ideal of a happy and
contented life as envisioned by the Epicureans: " The greatest
fruit of justice is the arapa,r.a." 212
Since the
of the wise man constitutes the ultimate
end of the State and the legal order, it also determines the
general attitude of the philosopher towards public life. The
. wise man will, as far as this is possible, " not mix in politics," 213
because it will most certainly upset his equanimity and
threaten his personal security. " The crown of the
is incompatible with [the notion of] great political power
(aa-6p.fJA7Jrovrats p.eyaAats iJyep.ovr.ats)." 214 Epicurus also seems
to have opined that the philosopher is not properly equipped or
prepared to enter public 'life on account of his one-sided in.terest and training in philosophy and philosophical theory
which make him little qualified to deal with practical issues
or to. exercise any decisive influence over the masses.215 Epicurus himself, according to the testimony of Diogenes Laertius, 216 is said " to have carried his deference to others to such
excess that he did not even enter public life." Because of
this attitude he actually advised ldomeneus to throw off all
political ties as soon as possible.211
Although the ideal Epicurean postulate of MOe fJu!Juas,218
Kvpuu Bofa.• 14.
Frag. 619 (Usener) . Cf. KVpta.t B6fa.t 17.
118 Frag. 8 (Usener):
" ... ovBe 71'0'AtTeVtTETI1.< • ••• "
"'" Frag. 656 (Usener). Cf. frag. 548 (Usener) which emphasizes that not
those who hold public office (d.pxa.l) or power, but those who are free from pain
and the worries of public life must be called happy and blessed. Cf.
B6Ea.•
7; Lucretius, op. cit., 6. 1120 11'.
115 Frag. 187 (Usener) .
118 10.10.
217 Frag. 188 (Usener).
Cf. frag. 182 (Usener).
••• Frag. 551 (Usener).
" 11

111

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OF LAW OF THE EPICUREANS

fl39

as well as the idea of the clucpaA.e,aseem basically to determine
Epicurus' theoretical and practical attitude towards the State
and political life in general, 219 we might interject here that if
Epicurus wanted security in order to live the happy and secluded life he envisioned, he must also have desired the means
which would guarantee this security: namely, an orderly corpus
politicum under the rule of law. 220 Hence even Epicurus could
not entirely depreciate the art of statesmanship and statecraft. 221
As a matter of fact, Philodemus, who in this seems to rely on
Epicurus, does not outright condemn all statesmen or politicians, but, following the famous example of Plato, merely
denounces certain demagogues or rabble rousers. 222 For Philodemus the art of politics rests upon experience, practice, and
historical knowledge; 223 in other words, upon a sort of practical
"know how," which, although it cannot strictly be called a
science, is nevertheless not without some definite merits or
completely devoid of usefulness. These notions of Philodemus
had found some support in Epicurus, who himself admits that
" in order to obtain security from other men any means whatsoever of procuring this was according to nature." 224 Hence
" some men have sought to become famous and renowned
(lv8ogot Kat 7TEp£{3A.e'IT'To,),believing that thus they would make
themselves secure against their fellow men. If, then, the life
of such persons really was secure, they attained a natural
019

Cf. in this connection, Plutarch's belated attack upon the Epicurean Colotes.

In his Adversus Colote:n Plutarch points out that there could be no civic life and,
hence, no government, but merely anarchy and civic disorder, if this maxim of
}\aiJt {j11hcra.s should be carried out to its ultimate consequences. Cf. Epictetus,
Diss. 8. 7. 1; 8. 7. 2 .
14.
••• Cf. KVpLa.L
••• Cf. Kvp•a• /MEa• 6; 7; 89; 40. Ibid., 5, where Epicurus states that " it is
impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely.... " To live wisely,
however, implies also the acceptance of the necessary means to ·a happy and
unperturbed life, namely a well ordered and regulated State under the rule of law,
governed by people well versed in the art of statemanship.
•••1n Philodemi Volumina RhetOTica 2, suppl. 88; 84; 85; 45; 241; 247.
"""Ibid., 2, suppl. 84. Cf. ibid., 88.
••• Kvp•a• li6Ea• 6.-A marginal gloss to this dictum mentions governments and
monarchies as the proper means to obtain security.

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good.
." 225 Thus Epicurus admits that, at least during the
early stages of the evolution of social organizations, man's
desire to rule and to engage in public life was a beneficial, that
is, natural, desire and, therefore, fully justified. 226 And Plutarch
tells us 227 that Epicurus did not deny outright that political
or public activity and fame might, indeed, become the source of
some pleasure and contentment-a statement which seems to
be supported by Epicurus' letter to Idomeneus. 228 To be sure,
Epicurus himself admits 229 that ambitious people should follow
their nature and engage in political activity. Because by not
complying with their natural desire they might actually be
more unhappy and restless than they would be if they entered
political life, with all its vicissitudes and turmoils. Hence
Epicurus' general advice that the intelligent man should not
let himself be drawn into politics is but relative: " One should
consider the best means as to how one can safeguard the
greatest good of life; and no one will on his own free volition
assume those public offices which the masses confer." 230 But
if in order to secure or safeguard these goods of life it becomes
necessary, the wise man will assume the office of a judge/ 31 and,
under certain circumstances, even flatter the tyranL 232

*

*

*

When evaluating and analyzing Epicurus'

theory of law,

225 Kvpteu
7. Cf. Lucretius, op. cit., 5.11S!O ff.: "Men desired to be
famous and powerful in order that their fortune might remain on a stable and
secure foundation; and that being wealthy they might be able to pass a quiet
life .... " This passage from Lucretius is practically a literal translation of
Kvp<a<
7.-It seems to me that
Kal 7r<pif3A<7rTOS should be translated
as " outstanding and renowned in public affairs," or as " influencial and powerful
in political matters."
229 Frag. 555 (Usener).
226 Cf. KVp<a<
29.
23 ° Frag. 554 (Usener).
227 Frag. 549 (Usener).
231 Frag. 576 (Usener).
228 Frag. 132 (Usener).
232 Frag.
579 (Usener). Cf. frag. 557 (Usener): "He who aspires glory and
power, shall honor the tyrant. But he who will not tolerate inconveniences, had
better avoid the royal palaces .... " As a matter of fact, many disciples and
followers of Epicurus became engaged-successfully or unsuccessfully-in the many
political struggles which soon after the death of Alexander broke out among his
heirs and successors.

THE PHILOSOPHY

OF LAW OF THE EPICUREANS

241

right, and justice, and, incidentally, his ideas concerning the
State or politically organized society, we will always have to
keep in mind that to him law is but an integral part of his
general philosophical outlook, or to be more exact, of his ethico- ,
practical teachings. Hence the moral ideal, the happiness of
the self-seeking individual, constitutes not only the starting
point, but also the paramount end of his legal or political
theory. 233 The happiness of the individual is defined not only
as the presence of pleasure, but also as the absence of pain/ 34
and hence as the unperturbed peace of the mind (aTapagf.a).235
In order fully to enjoy this aTapag£a, man must obtain the
greatest possible security from any sort of interference (&.ucptfAEta) •236 This aucpaAELa might be threatened either by other
members of the community in which we live, or by hostile
neighboring communities. The existing laws or legal order as
well as their enforcement protects the citizen against the aggression of his fellow citizen, while the organized might of the State
safeguards him from foreign attacks. 287 Covenants with other
nations are possible and even desirable,. if these nations are
able and willing not only to enter into such agreements, but
also to keep them. 238 This shows that Epicurus believed in
the possibility and workability of a " law of nations " besides
mere local laws. By providing the aucpaAELa, the State justifies
its existence and fulfills its purpose. 239 For the end of law and
justice and, incidentally, of all legal, social, or political organizations or institutions, is the principle of usefulness, 240 the
personal advantage of the individual or, at least, of the majority.241 This usefulness is determined by the degree to which
the law or the State is capable of producing happiness, which,
••• Diog. Laert. 10.128:

"Pleasure is the principle and end of life.... " .Cf.

ibid., 10. 129; 10. 181; et passim.
••• Diog. Laert. 10. 128: "For the end of all our actions is to be free from
pain .... " Cf. ibid., 10. 181; ICilpta< o6Ea< 8; et passim.
238 Ibid., 82,
••• Diog. Laert. 10. 128.
••• Kvp<a<
14.
••• Ibid., 89; 40.
037 Ibid., 14; 82.
... Ibid., 81; 88; 86; 87; 88.
•u Ibid., 87: " ... 'whatever ... is attested to be useful or expedient, is
thereby stamped as being just, whether or not it be the same for all. . .. "

6

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ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

in turn, consists here in the pleasure of having one's essential
needs wholly satisfied, and in the realization of one's being
secure from wanton aggression and violence. 242
Law or laws (v6p,ot) are that which is useful to man living
within a community, or to be more exact, that which effectively
prevents the citizens from injuring one another. 243 Hence laws
are possible and expedient only within an already established
society. 244 All vop,ot are derived from a silent and not yet articulated original agreement or quasi-agreement
not
245
to injure one another.
This origin of all laws is Kara cfnxnv,246
not only because it expresses the most natural and basic desire
of man to live a happy and undisturbed life, but also because
without this first social postulate-namely, not to injure another
or to be injured-there could be no human institutions or
organizations of the social type. Out of this silent quasiagreement the various detailed laws (vop,ot) or legal systems
have evolved. Some of these detailed laws are absolute and
universal (Kotva 8iKata, iuov 8iKawv); others, those which have
been conditioned by time, place, and particular circumstances
(vop,tufJevra 8£Kata), are but relatively valid (i8tu 8£Kata) 247
yet are nevertheless acceptable on account of their particular
expediency or usefulness. 248
The v6p,ot or vop,tuOevra 8£Kata replace and articulate the
8iKatov,249 the natural law/ 50 although the latter always
remains the criterion of the v6p,ot, the positive law.:m Only as
long and insofar as the v6p,ot are in full accord with the dictates
of the
8iKawv are they serving the true end to which
they were dedicated. 252 Nevertheless, even should the v6p,ot at
times deviate from the
8£Katov, the citizens would be
bound to abide by them. 253
Justice is primarily man's attitude towards an established
Ibid., 89; 40.
••• Ibid., 81; 88.
••• Ibid., 86; 87; 88.
••• Ibid., 88.
••• Ibid., 81.
••• Ibid., 86.
B ..

••• Ibid., 87.
••• Ibid., 81.
••• Ibid., 86; 88.
••• Ibid., 87; 88. Cf. 86.
••• Ibid., 87; 88.
••• Ibid., 87.

THE PHILOSOPHY

OF LAW OF THE EPICUREANS

243

and existing particular legal order or established laws (vop,ot) .
Hence there cannot be such a thing as absolute justice 254 especially since justice is a relative or relational concept expressing a relationship to a definite positive legal order. This
relationship in turn is determined by the kind of legal order in
which we live. And this legal order itself has been conditioned
by such relative factors as time, place, or special circumThus what might be just in Sparta could very well
be unjust in Athens. For to Epicurus the law (v6p,ot or
vop,u:r{N.vra S£Kata) as a whole is always something determined
or conditioned by "meta-legal" factors. 256 By expressly repudiating the notion or postulate of an abstract ideal State
and ideal law or justice/ 57 he makes it quite clear that each
society as well as each period has its own particular laws.
Nevertheless the fundamental principle or end of law and justice, namely, to be useful to man, remains universally valid
and, hence, constitutes the absolute philosophical criterion of
any and every particular law or legal system. 258 In this sense it
might be said that Epicurus was the first thinker to hit upon
the idea of an immutable and absolute natural law with a
changing and relative manifestation-the first legal philosopher
who attempted to reconcile the claims of the "Natural Law
School "with those of the " Historical School of Jurisprudence.''
The sanctions attached to the vop,ot are to be applied against
those who defy these laws. Thus it might be said that, in
are intended
accordance with their ultimate purpose, the
to prevent the citizens from injuring one another. 259 Hence
they also appear as threats which materialize whenever someone conducts himself in a manner contrary to what these v6p,m
prescribe as the " right " conduct in certain detailed and
definite matters. We could maintain, then, that the specific end
of the v6p,m and the sanctions attached to them is to deter
ignorant people from evil-doing. It is the ever-present fear or
threat of being detected and punished which becomes an e:ffecIbid., 33.
Ibid., 33; 36; 37; 38.
256 Ibid., 33; 36; 37; 38.

Ibid., 33.
Ibid., 36.
259 Ibid., 31; 33; 35.

254

257

255

258

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ANTON- HERMANN

CHROUST

tive means of social control through law. 260 Evil-doing in
itself is no evil, for the true evil rests in the pain or pangs of
fear which the evil-doer experiences. 261 The wise and educated
man, however, does not stand in need of sanctions in order to
be "just " and do the right thing. 262 Knowing what is good
for society and, hence, for himself, he always acts in the right
manner, even if he knows that he would remain forever undetected.263 He requires the v6j.wt only to the extent that they
provide him with effective protection against the trespasses
of the ignorant. 264 To deter rather than to educate or rehabilitate is the aim of legal punishment and sanction. But the wise
do not need to be deterred, while the ignorant, being incapable
of improvement, can only be kept in check by the realization
of the dire consequences of their wrong-doing.
The wise man win submit to the established legal and political order, but will comply with his civic duties only to the
extent that this is absolutely necessary to his own safety and
happiness. 265 He will
from aspiring to or entering
political discussions. 266 For the
public office or partaking
personal dangers he might incur by entering public life; the
envy which it might arouse;' and the emotional disturbances
which are always the result of ambitious undertakings, will
most certainly disturb his philosophic ideal of aiapa{;ia and the
Acf()e f3ul>a-ar;.267 Besides this, the true philosopher lacks that
particular knowledge or art necessary for a good and successful
statesman or politician. 268 Only those who would suffer greater
pain by avoiding an active political life than by putting up with
all the vicissitudes of civic strife, should enter politics. 269 The
wise man will contribute to the commonwealth not by becoming
261 Ibid. 34; 35; 17.
262 lbid., 17.
Ibid., 34; 35; 17.
Stobaeus, Florilegium 43. 139. Cf. frag. 18 (Usener) and frag. 533.
264 Stobaeus, loc. cit.
205 Kvp<aL
17; 14. Cf. ibid. 37; frag. 519 (Usener).

260
263

266

8 (Usener).

267

Frag.
Frag.
268 Frag.
269 Frag.

556 (Usener).

Cf. frag. 548 (Usener)

187 (Usener).
555 (Usener).

Cf. frags. 576; 579.

and frags. 132; 133; 554.

THE PHILOSOPHY

OF LAW OF THE EPICUREANS

245

a politician, but rather by strictly observing the laws; by his
generous and kind deportment; by wise counsels; and by
educating the youth to become good and law-abiding citizens.

*

*

*

Metrodorus of Lampsacus, 270 perhaps the most important and
most faithful among the more immediate disciples of Epicurus, 271
was even more emphatic in his insistence that the wise man
should abstain completely from mingling in public affairs. To
him the commonweal is of no concern whatever. 272 With open
contempt for those who aspire to public life or public office, he
is said to have written: "Some so-called wise men in their
excessive vanity have misconstrued the true meaning or task of
philosophy to such degree that they actually plunged head
over heels into the same passionate attitude towards the principles of life and virtue as did Lycurgus and Solon." 273 Hence
" we may truly chide all those . . . who like to be another
Lycurgus or Solon," 274 because they are but the slaves of
external circumstances and, therefore, deserve the contempt
of the man who relies solely upon himsel£.275 Nevertheless, like
his master and teacher Epicurus, Metrodorus does not completely deny the practical or pragmatic importance of the
State and the legal order. For to him practical politics, the
EJL1THpia
constitutes that organized " power ... which
is not contrary to the happiness of the majority." 276
27 ° Cf. Diog. Laert.
10.
ff.-He lived between 331/30 and
and was
perhaps the most famous teacher of the Epicurean School after Epicurus. Cf.
" ... paene alter Epicurus .... "
Cicero, De Finibus 2.
271 In view of the dominant influence of Epicurus, who actually outlived him and
whose dicta he often merely repeated, Metrodorus cannot be classified as a truly
original thinker. Cf. Plutarch, Adv. Coloten 17 fl'.; G. Korte, M etrodori Fragmenta:
Testimonia
272 Frag. 39 (Korte).
273 Plutarch,
op. cit., 33.
270 Plutarch,
op. cit., 33. Cf. G. Korte, op. cit., 540.
275 Plutarch,
op. cit., 33.
276 In Philodemi Volumina Rhetorica
we are also told that politics
and statecraft as well as all political power have arisen from custom, history, and
practical experience; and that political aptitude must be based on experience and

246

ANTON- HERMANN

CHROUST

If Herculaneum Papyri, no. 831, can actually be ascribed to
Metrodorus, as Korte endeavors to do, 277 then l\1etrodoms
would have completely accepted Epicurus' views as to the
nature and origin of the v6p,ot. This badly mutilated text also
speaks of
alrrxpov as contrasted with the vof.Lq? alrrxpovof what is shameful or evil by nature as opposed to what is
shameful or evil by convention. 278 In addition, we find here a
statement expressing the necessity of observing the lawsprobably local laws-which have grown out of convention and
local custom. And finally, we are informed that the arrcpaA.eta
or the
'ijv, the external security necessary for a happy
and serene life, is based on law and justice.
Colotes of Lampsacus, 279 likewise an intimate friend and
disciple of Epicurus, fully adheres to the latter's opinion that
the wise man should, as far as possible, avoid any kind of entanglement in public or civic affairs. But, like his master, he
admits that law and order and, hence, the State, as long as
they are grounded in the principle of usefulness and expedience, must be considered institutions of general convenience.
In his vicious polemics against all non-Epicurean philosophers
and philosophies, 280 he also takes issue with certain political
and legal theories proposed by some contemporary philosophers
whom he fails, however, to mention by name. 281 Against these
the understanding of history, that is, a knowledge of particulars. Philosophy, on
the other hand, is merely concerned with universals.-It is quite possible that
these passages go back directly to Metrodorus.
277 In Philodemi l'olumina
Rhetorica £. 588.
278 Epicurus
speaks of ¢6<Jews i'iiKcuov and volu<JO€v i'iiKcuov.
279 Cf. W. Cronert,
"Kolotes and Menedemos," Studien zur Paliiographie und
Papyruskunde (edit. C. Wessely) 2. 5 fl'.; 2. Hi2 ff.; H. Usener, op. cit., 144 ff.;
Plutarch, Adv. Coloten; Plutarch, N e suaviter quidem vivi posse secundum
Epicurum; Macrobius, De Somnio Scriptionis 1. 2; Diog. Laert. 10. 25-Plutarch's
Adv. Coloten, which constitutes our main source of information concerning Colotes,
is essentially only a refutation of the latter's work, Sn Kara ra rwv· a"AA.wv
¢<Ao<J6<j>wv oo"fp,ara

oVIJ€

In Colotes, 5n Kara rd. rwv aAAwv <j>LAO<JocjJwv 00"/P,UTa ova€ !:iiv
281 Plutarch,
Adv. Coloten, is of the opinion that Colotes turns especially on
Bion of Borysthenes, a Cynic, and Antidorus, an Epicurean apostate. Cf. Diog.
Laert. 10. 8, where Epicurus is said to have called Antidorus a <Javvlowpov-a
fawning gift-bearer.-This
much, however, seems to be certain: the target of
280

THE PHILOSOPHY

OF LAW OF THE EPICUREANS

"prophets of the beastly life'' (fJTJpl.wv f31.o<;) he points out
most emphatically that " those who established the laws,
authoritatively declared what is lawful, and set up a sovereign
rule over cities or states as well as introduced civil administration, endowed life with a high degree of external security
and prevented civic uproars." 282 In short, law and
the political order under the rule of law are useful to man and,
therefore, desirable because of their expediency and the protection they afford. It is also interesting to note that Colotes
does not give any preference either to a monarchic
or to a democratic-bureaucratic
form of
government, a fact from which we may infer that neither he
nor Epicurus ever envisioned an ideal State under an ideal
form of government. For, according· to Epicurus' basic ideas
concerning the origin of the various legal or political orders or
organizations, each politically or legally organized society will
develop that form of government or that body of laws which,
according to time, place, and particular circumstances, is best
suited for this society.
Hermarchus of Mytilene, 2 8'3 the disciple and successor of
Epicurus in the scholarchate, 284 has presented us with a most
interesting and astute theory of the origin and evolution 285 of
law and justice. 286 Homicide, we are told, is contrary to nature,
Colotes' attacks and vituperations are the Cynics, a fact which might be gathered
from the term 87Jplwv ,Bios-the beastly life--which Colotes uses in orde.r to describe
the kind of life lived by his otherwise unnamed opponents. Cf. Diog. Laert. 10. 8,
where Epicurus calls the Cynics the ex8povs .,.?is 'E;>.;>.c£aos-thefoes of Greece.
282 Plutarch,
Adv. Coloten
(edit. Xylander).
263 About
Hermarchus, also spelled Hermachus,_ cf. ·Diog. Laert. 10. ff.; H.
Usener, op. cit., 167; frags. 49; 76;
(Usener). As to Hermarchus' writings,
cf. Diog. Laert. 10.
Seneca, Epist. 6. 6;
4.-Hermarchus was already a very
old man at the time of Epicurus' death in
264 Cf. Diog. Laert.
10.
where Epicurus in his supposedly authentic last
will and testament states that Hermarchus " has grown old with me in the pursuit
of philosophy, and is left at the head of the school."
••• -yev•a.;\o-yla., according to Porphyry, in Porphyry, De Abstinentia 1. 7; or
p. 46, line
edit. A. Nauck.
••• This theory is found in Porphyry, De Abstinentia 1.
Cf. note
supra.-Porphyry, in his attack upon Empedocles and the Pythagoreans in general
for having taught that man should neither kill animals nor consume meat, heavily

248

ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

not only because of the fact that all men, due to their physical
and mental similarity, are somehow related to one another, 287
but also because the practice of homicide would seriously en. danger certain basic interests common to all men. 288 Hence the
earliest lawgivers, in full agreement with the fundamental dictates of the law of nature, have declared homicide a sacrilege. 289
Only a few people failed to grasp by themselves the necessity of
this, and to understand the common advantage which all men
derive from not murdering one another. The many, however,
abstained from homicide merely because of the threat of terrible retaliations or sanctions. 290 In other words, the intelligent
man, who intuitively realizes that it is to his own advantage to
submit to common laws, from the very beginning observed
these laws without coercion/ 91 while the ignorant person did
so out of fear of certain serious and painful consequences or
sanctions which had been instituted by a few with the approval
of the many. 292 Thus no law or laws-whether written or
unwritten-have ever been enacted without at least the silent
consent and voluntary submission of those subject to the law
or laws, because everyone could at least, if he only tried,
understand that the laws and their observance are to everyone's
advantage. The ancient lawgivers themselves were not brutal
tyrants, but outstanding men of highest intelligence. 293 Their
real task consisted merely in reminding the intelligent, but at
times forgetful, man, through gentle persuasion rather than
relies on Epicmean views on these matters, and particularly on Hermarchus
(op. cit., l. 26, or Nauck p. 58, line 28) or Hermarchus' hrurroXtKlx. 1repl 'E!k7relioKX€ovs (in 22 books). Cf. J. Bemays, Theophmst uber die Frommigkeit 8.
As to Democritus' rules against the killing of animals or the consuming of meata dogma which in the final analysis is merely the result of his theory of reincarnation (frag. 117 Diels) -cf. frag. 137 (Diels); H. Diels, op. cit., liB 7; 45E
(Pythagoras); 21B 129, 4 ff.; Diog. Laert. 8. 36.
287 Porphyry,
De Abstinentia l. 7 (Nauck p. 46, lines 29 ff.).

Ibid.
Ibid.
290 Ibid. (Nauck p. 47, lines 3 ff.).
288

289

Ibid. (Nauck p. 46, lines 32 ff.).
Ibid. (Nauck p. 47, lines 3 ff. and line ll).
293 Ibid., l. 8 (Nauck p. 47, lines 15 ff.):
291

292

if;uxfis, ov PWf.L7J uwwzros • •••

THE PHILOSOPHY

OF LAW OF THE EPICUREANS

9l49

physical force, of the advantages inherent in the law or laws
and their strict observation; and in terrifying the ignorant
" bad man." 294 In this fashion Hermarchus defines the purpose
as well as the necessity of sanctions, adding, however, that
sanctions could very well be dispensed with if only men, in
equal measure, would grasp and always keep in mind the
advantages which the laws afford. 295
While homicide in any form is absolutely and always contrary
to the common advantage of mankind and of society in particular, the killing of animals is definitely in the interest of man 296
and, in many instances, something actually necessary, particularly whenever man's own safety is being threatened by
wild animals. 297 Hence the destruction of anything that by its
ferocious nature might endanger the well-being of civilized
man is but part of man's general defence against whatever
could seriously threaten his own safety (c1a-cpaA.eta): "It
was . . . advantageous to keep away [from enemies], and
not to do anything injurious to those who, living in the same
land, are joined together in the expulsion of wild animals as
well as united in combatting those neighboring tribes which
are bent upon doing harm." 298 In other words, social life and
294

Ibid. (Nauck p. 47, lines 16-23).
Ibid. (Nauck p. 47, lines 26 ff.) .-Hermarchus'

insistence upon punishing
involuntary homicide (aKovuws <f>6vos) is motivated by two considerations: first,
such punishment will prevent a premeditated murderer from escaping just punishment altogether by falsely pleading involuntary homicide; and, second, it will have
a generally salutary effect in that it will become an effective instrument of reducing
the number of actual involuntary homicides. Cf. ibid., 1. 9 (Nauck p. 48, lines
3 ff.) .-Plato (Laws 860D.) had already distinguished between voluntary and
involuntary crimes.
In order to achieve a reduction in the number of homicides, Hermarchus even
admits that it would be useful and effective to instill into people the fear of the
gods and of divine wrath, something which Epicurus in particular had intended
to abolish altogether. Cf. Diog. Laert. 10. 124; 10. 133 ff.; KVptat /Mea• 10; 12.
296 Porphyry,
De Abstinentia 1. 10 (Nauck p. 49, lines 2 ff.).
297 Ibid. (Nauck p. 49, lines 7 ff.).
298 Ibid. (Nauck p. 49, lines 13-17).
Cf. ibid. 1. 12 (Nauck p. 51, lines 21 ff.),
where Hermarchus, in full accord with Kvptat
32, opines that it would be a
good thing to enter into agreements with wild animals for the purpose of mutual
preservation and protection. Since, however, wild animals are devoid of reason
295

250

ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

social conduct are not merely an end in themselves, but something expedient and useful in an effective defense against the
inroads of wild animals and hostile neighbors! 99 Even without
much ratiocination about utility and expediency in general 300
men actually did recognize the need and advantage of mutual
consideration. 301 For otherwise, weakened by fratricide, they
would soon become the prey of wild animals or foreign enemies.
The lawgiver, therefore, must above all restrain those who are
bent upon murder and who thus would weaken the community
internaJly in its struggle against wild animals and hostile neighbors. In consequence, the first and basic laws were those which
decreed the merciless extermination of all who by committing
homicide acted against this fundamental interest of the
commonweal. 302
In opposition to the Cynics, Hermarchus objects to that
view which professes that all moral and legal precepts and,
hence, all morality and justice (To KaAov Kat To StKawv) are
but the product of man 1s personal opinion or the result of
. human convention. 303 Thus he admits, at least by implication,
that there is such a thing as a Kowov StKawv, a law common to
all
men-a natural law-as well as Kowa StKa,a; 304 or,
to speak with Epicurus, 305 that" in its common aspects, justice
is the same for all . . . ; but in its application to particular
cases according to time or special conditions, it varies under
different circumstances." If, therefore, a man should fail to
recognize universally valid rights or a law common to all civiland thus incapable of entering into bilateral agreements, we must continue
exterminating them for the sake of our own security.
••• Cf. Epicurus,
89 .
. 300 &l\o7os
p.vfw:q Tofi uvp.<p€povTos, in Porphyry, op. cit., 1. 10 (Nauck p. 49,
line 25).
301 Ibid. (Nauck p. 49, lines 17 ff.).
302 Ibid. 1.11
(Nauck p. 49, lines 25 ff.). Cf. Plato, ProtagOTall 822D: " ... he
who has no part in . . . a sense for moral restraint and a feeling for justice shall
be put to death, for he is a menace to the State."-ln Laws 785B ff. he suggests
that all disturbing elements should be removed from society.
303 Porphyry,
op. cit., 1. 12 (Nauck p. 50, lines 81 ff.).
30 ' Ibid. (Nauck p. 51, line 12).
305 Kvp•a•
86.

THE PffiLOSOPHY

OF LAW OF THE EPICUREANS

251

ized men, this failure is due to the fact that he erroneously
considers these Ko£va 8l.Ka£a or the Kowov 8l.Kawv as being indifferent (a8uicf>opa) and without universal significance. 306 Conversely, certain laws are merely of local validity (To
t8,ov 8l.Kawv), that is, they are but the products of a particular
locality and specific conditions and, hence, are not compelling or
valid for those who do not dwell in that particular locality. 301
On the whole, Hermarchus merely restates the doctrines
authoritatively laid down by Epicurus as to the origin, function,
and end of law and justice as well as of the politically organized
society under the rule of law. Like Epicurus, he emphasizes the
contractual nature of laws; and with Epicurus he holds to the
distinction between a Kowov 8l.Kawv and the t8£a 8l.Ka£a, that is,
between a law common to all men and a particular justice or
legal order adapted to the particular exigencies of a particular
time and place. To Hermarchus, as to Epicurus, certain definite
sanctions or threats attached to certain laws are only meant
to overawe and restrain the ignorant from evil-doing through
the fear of dire retaliation. 308 And like Epicurus, Hermarchus
conceives the State to be a politically organized society under
the rule of law, governed by the basic Epicurean principle
underlying all laws, namely, the maxim of expediency and
greatest usefulness to the greatest number. In other words, the
State is a definite and articulate legal organization backed by
the authority of politically organized society. This !egopolitical organization, again, has as its ultimate purpose the
effective protection of all citizens and their interests or rights
against every aggression either from within or from without.
Whoever by his asocial conduct seriously weakens the protective power of the State-the first task of all communal
organizations-must be punished without mercy.
Polystratus, the successor of Hermarchus in the scholarchPorphyry, op. cit., 1. U (Nauck p. 51, lines 17-21).
Ibid. (Nauck p. 51, lines 9-14).
308 By calling upon the fear of divine wrath as an effective means of social
control, Hermarchus goes not only beyond, but actually against, the basic
teachings of Epicurus. Cf. note 295 supra.
306

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ate, 309 has presented us with a remarkable little treatise, " llep£
310 -" Concerning
dA.oyov
Unwarranted Disdain." 311 The third part of this work deals with the nature and
validity of the concepts or conceptions of the KaAov (good,
beautiful, right) and aluxpov (shameful, wrong, evil). Polystratus' anonymous opponents, 312 against whom this treatise is
directed, claim that these two concepts-on which, in the final
analysis, not only the law or laws, but also justice, the legal
order, and politically organized society rest-are based merely
on convention, personal opinion, and circumstance rather than
upon nature (c/Jvuet). Hence they have no real validity or
significance, and should, therefore, be completely ignored. 313
To this Polystratus replies 314 that such a philosophy, if actually
carried into practice, would have disastrous consequences. For
it would cause its proponents to be expelled from any society,
unless, driven by dire necessity, they would in fact refuse to
live up to their own theories or convictions. When dealing with
such problems the true philosopher
always keep in
mind the relativity-or relational nature-of all things; for
different things affect different people differently. Nevertheless, the empirical fact or truth that we have such concepts as
the Ka'Aov and aluxpov cannot be denied. 315 Neither can we deny
309 Diog.
Laert. 10.
is not certain whether or not Polystratus was a
personal disciple of Epicurus.
310 In Vol. Hercul. 4
(edit. Th. Gomperz), in Hermes 11 (1876) 399 ff.; and
Hermes lZ (1877) 510 ff. Cf. K. Willke, Polystrati Epicurei 7rep1 aAO')'OV KarappovfJ!IeWS Libellus; R. Philippson, " Polystratus' Schrift tiber die grundlose Verachtung der Volksmeinung," Neue Jahrbucher fur das klassische Altertum
and
(1909), no. 7. 487 ff.
311 This
little pamphlet carries the subtitle 7rep1 aM')'ov KarappoviJIIews lv

TOLS 7i"OAAOLS

the Unwarranted Disdain of Popular Opinion.

Obviously, this subtitle, which is based on col. 14 a Q; QQ a Q; and Q3 b 13, constitutes a later addition.
312 Col. lQ b l fl.-Obviously
Polystratus' opponents and the target of his attacks
are the Cynics, the "foes of Greece" as they are called by Epicurus. Cf. Diog.
Laert. 10. 8.
313 Col. 13 a 13.
314 Col. 13 b 10-14 b 9.
315 Col. 14 b 10-18 b S.

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the empirical fact or truth that such a thing as human action or
conduct exists, a conduct, that is, to which the concepts of
KaAov or alaxpov are related. Now the righteousness or uprighteousness of any actual conduct is determined by its usefulness. And usefulness, although its. particular nature and
may vary under different circumstances, is, nevertheless, something empirically true and actual, and subject to
empirical analysis. 316 To ignore these obvious empirical truths
and, by doing so, to criticize the " moral genius " of the people,
who in such matters always shows sound judgment, is the
acme of folly and will, in due time, lead to most unpleasant
experiences.317
In order to gain a profounder insight into the nature of
law, right, and justice, Polystratus attempts to understand
thoroughly the " legal genius of the people " of a given time
and place 318-a genius, that is, which unfolds and manifests
itself in the commonly voiced and generally upheld legal polity
or jurisprudence of a given people. For this " legal genius " is
but the product of a slow and deeply rooted evolution or
evolutionary conviction which in itself is but a part of " natural
empirical truth." This definitely " conservative reverence "
for, established legal tradition voiced by Polystratus seems to
imply that he preferred 319 the "law that is" to any extensive
philosophical speculation as to the " law that ought to be."
Already, with Epicurus, we discovered that "should the expediency which is expressed by the law vary and only for a
time correspond with the prior conception [of expediency],
nevertheless for the time being it is just law, so long as we do
not trouble ourselves with empty words, but simply look at the
facts." 320 In other words, the reverence for the existing and
Col. 18 b 8-18 b 11.
Col. 18 b
a 1.
818 On account of this procedure or method, Polystratus might be called the first
known representative of the so-called " Historical School of Jurisprudence."
••• This preference might have its psychological origin or motivation in the fact
that that any disregard of, or contempt for, the existing laws or the enforced Jegal
order is frequently the cause of dire and painful consequences.
80 ° Kvpuu
87.
816

811

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established laws to no little extent relegates the philosophical
element of jurisprudence to a secondary position. For in some
way this type of thinking, which directs all legal thought
towards a definite positivistic treatment of the actual reality
of the law, always remains opposed to any theorizing about
the ideal meaning, function, or end of law. Nevertheless it cannot completely dispense with, or repudiate, every philosophy
or philosophical evaluation. What it repudiates is merely a
value differentiation or distinction between the various historically developed and accrued legal systems. In short, to
Polystratus all legal systems which express the " legal genius "
of a people and sound common views as to the nature of law,
right, and justice, are true and, hence, good or just, because
they are the product of a natural or normal growth. 321
It is commonly accepted that Cicero's information concerning Epicurean philosophy of law 322 is based upon his personal
acquaintance with Zeno the Epicurean, 323 Siro, 324 Phaedrus, 325
and perhaps Philodemus. 326 Thus it is permissible to assume
321 Cf. col. 18 a 14 fl'.-Undoubtedly,
Epicurus' statement (in l<vpuu
33;
36; 37; 38) that the particular P6pm or the justice prevailing among different
peoples or nations has been conditioned by time, place, and special circumstances,
contains the root of the basic ideas underlying the " Historical School of Jurisprudence " so vigorously advocated by Polystratus.
322 Mainly
in De Finibus 1. 16.50-53.
323 Also called Zeno of Sidon.
He was a disciple of Apollodorus who had the
surname of o KrJ7rorvpa.vvos-" the tyrant of the Garden." Cf. Diog. Laert. 10.
7. 35. In 79/78 Cicero and his friend Atticus attended Zeno's lectures in Athens.
Cf. Cicero, De Finibus l. 5.16; Tuscul. Disp. 3.17. 38; De Natura Deorum l. 34. 93.
59,
Cicero also calls him the "princeps Epicurem"Um." Cf. De Natura Deorum l.
Tuscul. Disp. 3. 17. 38. Diogenes Laertius refers to him as a voluminous writer.
Cf. 10.
324 Also spelled Sciro, Syro, Scyro, or Sirio.
Cf. Cicero, A cad. 2. 33. 106; De
Finibus 2. 35. 119.-According to Vergil, Catal. 7. 9; 10. l, he was Vergil's teacher.
325 A teacher of Cicero in Athens.
Cf. De Natura Deorum l. 33. 94; De Finibus
l. 5. 161; 5.1. S; De Legibus l.
53. According to Ad Familiares 13.1, Cicero
also attended his lectures in Rome which were delivered there about the year
90 B. c.
326 Cf. R. Hirzel,
Untersuchungen zu Cicero's philosophische Schriften
687 fl'.;
H. Usener, op. cit.,
In De Finibus
119, Cicero speaks of "our excellent
and learned friends Sirio and Philodemus," while ibid., l. 5. 16, he mentions Zeno
and Phaedrus.

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that Cicero essentially only restates the teachings of Zeno and
his disciples. 327 According to Cicero or his authority, Epicurean
justice is closely :related to pleasure:
Not only does it [scil. justice] never cause any harm, but, on
the contrary, it always adds some benefit, partly owing to its
essentially pacifying influence upon the mind (quod tranquillet
animos) , partly because of the hope it warrants of a never-failing
supply of the things that an uncorrupted nature really needs .... 328
Unrighteousness (improbitas), when firmly rooted in the heart,
causes restlessness by the mere fact of its presence; and if once it
has found expression in some act of wickedness, however secret
the act, yet it can never feel assured that it will always remain
undetected. 329

Besides the threat of secular punishment by their fellow men,
the unrighteous" still dread the gods, and fancy that the pangs
of anxiety gnawing at their hearts night and day are sent by
Providence to punish them." 330 And besides the burden of a
guilty conscience and the penalties of the law (poena legum),
the malefactor gains nothing but the hatred of his fellow
citizens (odium civium) .331 "Men of sound natures, therefore,
are called upon by true reason to conduct themselves according
to the dictates of justice." 332 But " justice cannot properly be
said to be desirable in and for itself; 333 for it is so because it
is so highly productive of gratification (quia incunditatis vel
327 It should also be remembered
that some of Philodemus' teachings are merely
restatements of Zeno.
328 Cicero, De Finibus I. 16. 50.
329 lbid.-Cf.
Epicurus, Kvptat
35; 34. It should be noted that, according
to Zeno, unrighteousness of the heart, even before turning into an evil deed, is
17: " ... the
already the source of restlessness and unhappiness. Cf. KVptaL
unjust is full of utmost restlessness. . . ."
33 ° Cicero, De Finibus 1. 16. 51. Already Hermarchus
(Porphyry, De Abstinemtia
L 9), in opposition to the general Epicurean teachings, had pointed out the
practical usefulness and restraining influence of religion and religious fear in the
prevention of crime.
331 Cicero, De Finibus l. 16. 51.
332 Ibid., l. 16. 52.
333 Cf. Epicurus,
KVpLaL
34: "Injustice is not in itself an evil, but only
in its consequences .... "

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plurimum ajjerat) . For esteem and affection are gratifying,
because they render life safer and richer in pleasure." 334
"Hence we hold that unrighteousness is to be avoided not
simply on account of the disadvantages that :result from being
unrighteous, but even far more (sed multo etiam magis) because when it dwells in the hearts of man it never suffers him
to breathe freely or to know a moment's rest." 335 In other
words, Zeno, or whoever supplies Cicero with this information,
definitely rejects Epicurus' statement 336 that fear of subsequent detection and physical punishment constitutes the main
and perhaps sole reason why the average person refrains from
doing evil. In place of fear as the determining motive, Zeno
substitutes the public esteem which the righteous and just
man will most surely inherit from his righteousness, and the
general hatred and contempt which is the sure reward of the
unrighteous and unjust man for his unrighteousness. In his
belief in the efficacy of such means of social control as the pangs
of conscience and the wrath of the gods, which are but
the wages of unrighteousness, Zeno definitely goes beyond
Epicurus. 337
Perhaps also under the influence of Zeno, but definitely
antagonistic to the general Epicurean tradition, are those passages from Cicero's De Legibus 338 which call it a" most foolish
belief that everything found in the customs, institutions, or
particular laws of the various peoples or nations is absolutely
just. 339 For, "i£ justice is but conformity to written local laws
335 Ibid.
Cicero, De Finibus l. Hi. 53.
••• Kvpta<
34; 35; 17.
W. Cronert, Kolotes und Menedemos 24, reconstructs the text of papyr.
1005, col. 7, lines 18 ff., to read as follows: "[Zeno] also expurgated (or, re-edited,
[some dicta] inserted into the [dptat
insistence that the
pangs of moral conscience or the fear of divine wrath are effective means of social
control might be part of Zeno's effort not only to re-edit but also to add some
838 Cicero, De Legibus l. 15.
new ideas to the original Kvpta<
889 Obviously this passage refers to the idea voiced by some Epicureans
(Polystratus, for instance) that local laws are just because they are the product of
such natural factors as time, place, and particular circumstances; in other words,
they are the product of a natural and normal historical growth in which the
"legal genius" of a particular people manifests and unfolds itself. And this
" legal genius " itself is something which is likewise conditioned by time, place,
:and circumstance.
33 •

337

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257

or certain special institutions or customs of the different nations
-and if, as some persons claim [no doubt, the Epicureans],
everything is to be tested by the standard of utility (utili tate
omnia metienda sunt) , then anyone who thinks it will profit
him, win, if he is able to do so, disregard and violate the
laws." 340 Should this passage from the De Legibus actually
have been inspired and, hence, directed against Zeno, then
we may safely assume that the latter also belonged to that
group of Epicurean thinkers who, like Polystratus, firmly
believed in what we may call the "historico-philosophical
approach to jurisprudence!' 341
Philodemus of Gadara 342 insists that the true philosopherand we may assume here that he means the Epicurean philosopher-is by the very nature
his general attitude towards
life better adapted to live successfully within the politically
organized society than the ever orating politician. 343 Because
the latter, while seeking publicity and public acclaim, will
sooner or later arouse envy
enmity and, although he might
be motivated by the noblest of intentions, is often banished
or even killed by his fellow citizens. Nevertheless, it is advisable that even the philosopher, although he would fare better,
should refrain from entering public life or engaging
politics. 344
By abstaining from every fo:rm of political activity the philosopher will above all gain the lasting esteem of his fellow citizenso
34

° Cicero, De Legibus l. 15. 4\!.

Needless to say, this manner of approach to the problems of law and jurisprudence, at least by implication, in a most general way had already been suggested by Epicurus himself. Cf. KVptat
33; 36; 37; 38. cr. note 3\!1 supra.
342 He lived
in Rome during the time of Cicero, who praises him as " an
excellent and learned man." Cf. De Finibus Z. 35. 119. Of Philodemus' philosophical works no less than 36 have been found in Herculaneum. Cf. Vol. Hercul.
4. Aside from earlier but rather unsatisfactory attempts, S. Sudhaus, in Philodemi
Volumina Rhetorica, !i! vols. and suppl., edited Philodemus' writings on rhetorir
which also contain his views on law and the State.
343 In this Philodemus
definitely differs from Epicurus, who insisted (frag. 187,
Usener) that the politicians who have an understanding of particulars and of
history, are better suited to enter public life than the philosophers who are primarily interested in universals, first principles, and abstractions.
344 S. Sudhaus,
op. cit., L \!34. Cf. ibid., \!. 147; Epicurus f:rags. 8; 548; 554;
132; 133 (Usener).
3 "'

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For " even if the philosophers do not become entangled with
politics, they are of much greater assistance to their country in
that they instruct youth to observe the laws which have been
enacted for the common welfare." 345 " In this manner the
philosophers tum bad men into accomplished and law-abiding
citizens who are not spiteful, but sociable. . . ." 346
The wise and intelligent man will submit spontaneously and
without coercion to the dictates of justice: " It behooves one
who knows to be 'obedient to the whole law ... but only to
obey ... , not because of the laws as such, but rather because
of the advantage which such conduct entails for the commonweal." 847 Here again we encounter a theory of law which
seems to be rather " classical '' with the Epicureans, namely,
that the law is a threat which materializes in case of a conduct
contrary to that demanded by a definite and detailed law. This
threat the wise man does not fear, because he understands the
meaning of the principle of common advantage and, hence, will
on his own free determination abide by the established laws.
Only the ignorant or perverted person experiences the laws as
a system of threats.
In a most interesting passage Philodemus discusses a problem which is very much akin to the old controversy between
theory and practice, in other words, between " the law in the
books " and " the law in action." He is quite conscious of the
fact that philosophers often have been accused of having
declared that certain common and established notions of right
and wrong, lawful or unlawful, are actually contrary to
nature and reason. Thus they were often suspected not only
of endeavoring the devise entirely new laws, but also of despising the existing ones.348 But even though these philosophers
might be capable of imagining supposedly " more just laws,"
their efforts are truly of little significance because society as
••• S. Sudhaus, op. cit., !t. 155.
••• Ibid., 2. 188. Cf. 2. 162.
"" Ibid., 1. !t88.
"' 8 This seems to be a revival of the argument proposed and expounded in
Polystratus' Concerning Unwarranted Disdain of Popular Opinion. Cf. notes 810
and 811 supra.

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a rule rejects their proposed innovations or reforms. Moreover, should they themselves attempt to act in accordance
with their novel ideas, they would most certainly find themselves confronted by solid popular antagonism. 349 For such
conduct, even if it were prompted by the most lofty ideas o:r
ideals, would be definitely contrary to the existing laws, the
strict observance and enforcement of which is always insisted
upon by the people in their popular demand for law and
justice. 350 Hence the true philosopher fully accepts as being
just o:r unjust, lawful or unlawful, whatever the established and
deeply rooted popular jural tradition considers as such. 351 He
only differs from the rest of the people in that he does this
on :rational rather than on emotional or sentimental grounds;
and in that he is always fully conscious of the rational meaning
of the terms " just " or " unjust." 352 And unlike the vulgar
masses, he does not consider public offices and the like a means
to achieve real happiness and contentment. 353
In complete accord with the people-the " legal genius " of
the people-the true philosopher will always agree with the
popular conceptions of the nature of laws, right, and justice,
the more so, since these conceptions, in the final analysis, are
always the product of natural and, hence, true insights into
what constitutes common usefulness and expediency. He might,
however, at times disagree about certain questions of fact to
which these conceptions are related or applied, and voice his
dissenting opinion as to what is most expedient and useful to
the community in a particular instance. 354 Thus, although he
may at times differ from popular opinion in some minor detail,
the Epicurean .philosopher in all essential matters fully shares
the existing popular views as regards law, right, and justice.
In other words, he completely identifies himself with the " legal
S. Sudhaus, op. cit., 1.
Ibid., 1.
351 The influence of Polystratus
on Philodemus is here more than obvious.
352 S. Sudhaus,
op. cit., l.
Cf. Hermarchus, in Porphyry, De Abstinemtia
1. 8 (Nauck 47); ibid., l. 10 (Nauck 49).
353 S. Sudhaus, op. cit., 1.
""' Ibid., l.
340
350

260

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genius " of the people. He is not one who despises or combats
the legalistic tradition of a certain people, but rather one who
has always in mind the principle of social or common usefulness--one who acts in full accordance with this principle which,
after all, finds its most telling expression in the " legal genius "
of the people. In this fashion the true philosopher carries on
the legal tradition of the people which is based upon the principle of common usefulness and expediency. 355
Thus it seems that Philodemus considers any and every historically developed, accrued, and generally accepted body of
laws as being good and just. Because whatever is the product
of natural evolution and the unfolding of the ever mounting
human intelligence, or the manifestation of the" legal genius"
of the people, cannot be contrary to reason and truth. Reverence for the existing legal order merely because it exists as the
result of natural evolution-a reverence which at times transcends all philosophic criticism or evaluation-is the true hallmark of the "Historical School of Jurisprudence." Reverence
of what " is," instead of a philosophic quest for what " ought
to be," forms the basic attitude of this type of lego-philosophical thinking which could very well be called " jural quietism "
or " legal pietism." Hence we might also understand why
Philodemus is so strongly opposed to radical reforms or innovations as well as to sudden changes of the legal order; 356 and
why he has such a high esteem for the inner and silently working forces of the " legal genius " of the people.
Philodemus rejects the notion that the basic precepts of
law and right could ever vary to the extent to which certain
customs or local usages change according to time, place, and
circumstances. He points out most emphatically that, from
the very beginning of human civilization everywhere, that
which is common to all peoples or by the use of which all people
resemble one another, has been considered by the rulers as
well as the ruled to be To cpva-et 8£Katov Kat «aMv (that which
••• Ibid., 1.
••• Ibid., I.

I.

!t. 147; 2. 158; 2. 188;

155.

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261

by nature is right and good) .357 Hence Philodemus definitely
acknowledges the existence of a natural law, of a cfn}cu.t 8iKawv
which to him is but that of which all peoples make use/ 58 and
by the common use of which all peoples resemble one another.
This natural law, in turn, consists of the Kowa 8£Kata which are
accepted and practised by all civilized nations. But in order
to cope with particular conditions resulting from differences
in time, place, or special circumstances, each nation or people
has developed its own ZSta oiKata which are, in the final analysis,
but the various adaptations of the Kotva 8iKcua to particular
instances, localities, or times. Consequently the ZSta oiKata
must vary, and actually vary, under different circumstances,
a fact which is completely according to nature. 359 In some
instances these Z8ta OtKaw become the vop.to-(N.vm SiKata, the
enacted particular laws and rights backed by the authority of
the politically organized society which enacts them.
Philodemus is fully aware of the fact that the rsw. OtKata as
well as the vop.to-(Jf.vm StK.ata or the v6p.ot are not always in
complete agreement with basic dictates of the
(or cpvm:w<>)
SiKawv, the natural law or the law common to, and commonly
used by, all nations and peoples. Nevertheless, he insists that
we must abide by these iSLa 8iKaLa, even though we may not
always consider them fair and just, or else leave the country. 360
For if we do not think that we possibly could live happily
under such laws, or obey these laws without coming into conflict with our conscience-if, in other words, we do not feel
that we should respect these laws out of our own free will and
without compulsion-we had better move to another country.
Only by strictly complying with the established laws of whatever community he happens to be a member, will the philosoIbid., 1. fl59.
This is simply the Roman Law definition of the ius gent-ium. Cf. Digest 1. 1.1
De justitia et jure 2; Institutes l. 2 De jure naturali, gentium et civili: "Jus
gentium est quo gentes humanae utuntur."-It should be remembered, however,
that in Pre-Justinian jurisprudence the ius gentium and the ius naturale! were
often completely identified: naturale (scil., ius) etiam dicitur ius gentium.
35.
••• S. Sudhaus, op. cit., l. 259. Cf. Epicurus, KVp<a<
360 S. Sudhaus, op. cit., l. 259. Cf. Plato, Crito 5£D.
357

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ANTON-HERMANN

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pher not only gain the confidence and the admiration of his
fellow citizens, but also prove himself a most useful and
respected citizen. But he will, as much as possible, refrain from
entering public life, and limit his civic activities to the quiet
education of youth. For he is not really equipped to become a
"politician" or to lead the people in political matters. 861 As a
rule he lacks that particular gift of the true politician which
consists in a thorough knowledge not only of the pedple's
various moods or, as we would say today, the psychology of
the masses,362 but also of the intricate art of legislation. For
the laws, aside from certain general and universally valid
precepts, contain also certain particular provisions which take
into account particular situations with which only the politician, but never the philosopher, is thoroughly familiar. 363 The
philosopher always looks at universals, and his main interest is
focused on the application of logical principles. The successful
politician, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with particulars. Hence the good politician or statesman must be a
man of extensive practical experience backed by a thorough
knowledge of history, 364 while the true Epicurean philosopher
actually despises historical knowledge.
In his De Rerum Natura/ 65 Book V, lines 925 ff., Lucretius
presents us with a vivid description of the natural origin and
development of law and soCial order, an account which in many
respects, although more elaborately, reiterates the version
881 S. Sudhaus, op. cit., it. 1it: " The word of the wise man does not reach the
masses.... " Cf. ibid., it. it9; it. 88; it. SO.
"""Ibid., it. 1it il'.
••• Ibid., it. 41 ff.
••• Ibid., it. 81. Cf. ibid., it. itOS; it. it08 fl'.; it. it45.-Philodcmus also points out
that the politician does not stand in need of philosophy (ibid., it. itit5; it. it67),
although philosophy and philosophical training might prove a valuable ·and useful
asset in all public functions. Cf. ibid., it. it71.
••• Cicero, in his Epistola to his brother Quintus, frag. it. 9. S., says about the
De Rerom Natura: "Lucretii poemata, ut scribis, ita sunt, multis luminibus ingenii,
multae tamen artis. ... "
The De Rllll'Um Natura closely adheres to the basic ideas and views laid do'wn
by Epicurus. Thus even its title is but a Latin translation of Epicurus' work
1repl
Many passages in the De Rerum Natura actually are notlting else
than literal translations from the Epicurean original.

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found in Hermarchus. In the most primitive stage " men
could not have conceived of any kind of communal good.
Neither did they know among themselves of any customs nor
use any laws." 366 But soon " they began eagerly to unite
themselves in friendship, in that neighbors strove not to injure
another or to be injured; and they asked protection for their
children and womankind." 367 And they resolved " that it was
right to pity the weak." 368 In this manner " concord could not
altogether be brought about, but a good part, and the majority
kept the covenant unblemished. . . ." 369 In short, social life
begins to evolve in a natural way through the practice of the
first dictate of natural social reason which demands that men
mutually desist from injuring one another. In the further development of this polity, men of excellence 370 became rulers
who founded cities and established private property. 311 This
relatively happy era did not last, however: greed and envy
as well as unbridled ambition caused its rapid decline and early
fall. 372 The rulers were slain, 378 and" things came to the uttermost dregs of confusion," 374 thus forcing the people themselves
to assume absolute sovereignty and power. 375 Then there arose
some " who taught the people how to create magistrates and
establish laws and rights, so that the people might desire to
make use of the laws." 376 Tired of brutal force and arbitrary
••• De Rerum Natura 5. 958-959: ·• Nee commune bonum poterant apectare
neque ullis moribua inter se scibant nee legibua uti."
••• Ibid., 5. 1019-1021: " ... inter se nee laedere nee violari." This is essentially
nothing else than a translation of Epicurus' formula: p.;q pxa..,..,.etJJ dXXoqXovs p.'fllie
fJM.7rreu8at.

••• Ibid., 5. 1028.
••• Ibid., 5. 1024-1025: " ••. sed bona magnaque pars servabat foedera caste."
••• Ibid., 5.1106-1107: " ... bmigni ingenio qui praestabant et corde vigebant.
. . ." Cf. Hermarchus, in Porphyry, De Abstinentia I. 8 (Nauck p. 47, lines 151f.):
t/JpoJJoquet 'if;vxf}s, o6 pwwo uwp.11.ros.
871 De Rerum Natura 5. 1108-1110.
878 Ibid., 5.ll86.
"'"Ibid., 5. 1118-1185.
au Ibid., 5. 1141.
••• Ibid., 5. 1142.
••• Ibid., 5.1148-1144; " •.. iuraque constituere, ut vellent legibua uti."-The
" established laws and rights " are but Epicurus' JJop.tu8eJJra liLKa.ta (in: Kvptat
81), that is, rights backed or secured by the authority of politically organized
society. Hence these established rights are contrasted by the q,6uews lilKatoJJ.

264

CHROUST

regimes, 377 the human race by its" own free
submitted to
the rule of law and to strictly defined and delimited rights " 378
which had sprung from communia foedera pacis. 379 Thus law
and order not only replace tyranny and bloody personal
feuds, 380 but also exercise a restraining control over man in
that the laws enunciate certain threats or sanctions which no
evil-doer can hope to escape forever. 381
Unfortunately, we do not possess any of the writings either
of Dionysius, the successor of Polystratus in the scholarchate, 382
or of Basilides, who succeeded Dionysius. 383 Likewise we are
completely uninformed about the teachings of Protarchus of
Bargylium 384 and his disciple Demetrius the Laconian; 385 nor
do we know of those of Apollodorus, the author of over 400
books 386 and the teacher of Zeno of Sidon. Of some minor
Epicureans, who might have been the source of valuable information, little more than their names have come down to us. 387
Hence there is a gap of nearly one hundred years between
Polystratus and Zeno of Sidon. The first serious attempt to
Ibid., 5. 1146 ff.; 5. 1148 ff.
Ibid., 5. ll47: " ... sponte sua cecidit sub leges artaque iura."
379 Ibid.,
5. 1155.-These "communia foedera pacis" are nothing else than
Epicurus' 11'vv0f}K'YJ inr"Ep roil l''iJ {lha1rre<P f'1JOe f3"1\a7rreCieru, in Kvpw.,
33.
380 Ibid., 5. 1148 ff.
381 Ibid., 5. 1151 ff.:
" Hence comes fear of punishment that taints the goods of
life; for violence and injury enclose in their net all those who do such things and
generally return upon him who began it all; nor is it easy for one to pass a quiet and
peaceful life whose deeds violate the bonds of common peace. For even if he
hide it from the gods and from men, he must yet be uncertain that it will forever
35; 34; 17 (cf.
remain hidden."-These passages strongly remind us of d;p<a<
notes 193, 195, and 196 supra), of Zeno, in Cicero, De Legibus I. 16. 50 (cf note 329
supra), and of Hermarchus, in Porphyry, DeJ Abstinemtia l. 8 (Nauck p. 47, lines
26 ff.); l. 9 (Naud: p. 48, lines 3 ff.; cf. notes 295 and 308 supra).
382 Diog. Laert. 10. 25.
383 Ibid.
384 Strabo
14. 2. 20.
385 Diog.
Laert. 10. 26; Strabo 14. 2. 20; Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhonia 3. 137;
Adv. Math. 8. 348; 10. !Wl.
386 Diog. Laert.
10. 25.
387 The two Ptolmys of Alexandria, Orion
(cf. Diog. Laert. 10. 26), Diogenes of
Tarsus (cf. Diog. Laert. 6. 81; 10. 97; 10. ll8 ff.; 10.136; 10. 138), and Timagoras.
Cf. Cicero, Acad. 2. 25. 80; Stobaeus, Flmilegium 4.173.
377

378

THE PHILOSOPHY

OF LAW OF THE EPICUREANS

introduce Epicurean philosophy into Rome 388 seems to have
been made by C. Amafinius 389 (around 150 R C.), who soon
gained many followers, mainly on account of the simplicity of
his Latin version of Epicurean texts. 390

*
Perhaps no philosophical school adhered more strictly to the
original tenets laid down by its founder than the Epicureans,
Epicurus himself is said to have been so dogmatic and so
thoroughly convinced of the excellence of his dicta that he
insisted that his disciples should memorize them. 391 In view
of the fact that he enjoyed a reverence among his followers
more becoming to a god 392 -something to which he seems to
have been not entirely averse-it is not altogether surprising
that his disciples did not dare to change, challenge, or even
modify to any noticeable degree the original teachings of the
venerated master. 393 In their continuing efforts merely to
restate or paraphrase the " Sovereign Maxims " of the master.
his pupils were not inclined to pay any attention to the
ments of other philosophical schools; nor apparently were they
capable of appreciating the ideas of other thinkers. 394 Barring
two known minor exceptions, we should not marvel, therefore,
that also in matters concerning the nature, function, and origin
of law, right, and justice as well as politically organized society
388 According
to Athenaeus, in Deipnosophistae 12. 547A, under the consulate
of L. Postumius (173 or 155 B. C.), the two Epicureans (or Cynics) Alcius and
Philiscus were expelled from Rome on account of the bad influence their teachings
had on Roman youth. Cf. Diog. Laert. 6. 80; Julian the Apostate, Oratio 6.
389 Cicero, Tuscul. Disput. 4. 3. 6; 4. 3. 7.
390 Ibid., 4. 3. 7.
391 Diog.
Laert. 10. 12; 10. 83; 10. 85; 10. 35 ff.; Cicero, De Finibus 2. 20.Epicurus' last exhortation to his disciples was TWP oo-yp.a:rwv p.ep.viJrrOat. Cf. Diog.
Laert. 10. 16.
302 Cicero, De Finibus 2. 3. 7; Plutarch,
Adv. Coloten 17. 5; 17. 4; Ne suaviter
quidem vivi posseJ secundum Epicurum 18. 5; Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 1. 62 ff.;
3. 1 ff.; 3. 1010 ff.; 5. 1 ff.; 6. 1 ff.
393 Cf. Seneca, Epist. 33. 4; Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica 14. 5. 3 fl'.
394 Cicero,
De Natura Deorum 2. 29. 73; 1. 34. 93; Macrobius, De Somnio
Scipionis L 2. Cf. Diog. Laert. 10. 8.

266

ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

under the rule of law, his disciples did not endeavor to deviate
from the basic principles and directives authoritatively laid
down by Epicurus. These minor modifications appear in the
fact that Hermarchus and Zeno regard the fear of divine wrath
and retaliation as an effective means of social control-something which Epicums himself had expressly set out to deny. 395
Perhaps the most noteworthy Epicurean contribution to legal
philosophy must be sought for in the discovery, particularly
by Polystratus, and after him Philodemus, that the various
laws or legal systems of the different nations or peoples are
but manifestations or the unfolding of what we might call the
natural " legal genius '' of the people, prompted by such determining factors as time, place, and particular circumstances.
In this fashion Polystratus initiated an approach to the problem
of jurisprudence which much later became the hallmark of the
so-called " Historical School." But even this approach of
Polystratus is not as original or heretical for an orthodox
Epicurean as it might appear at first sight. For the very
nucleus of such notions is already implicitly contained in
396
Epicurus' K:vpuu
This general lack of genuine philosophical productivity
among the followers of Epicurus; this inability or unwillingness to build upon and expand the foundations laid by the
master is in itself the most eloquent condemnation of the
philosophical content of Epicureanism. The mere mechanical
repetition of memorized statements or sentences does not speak
well for the philosophical ability of the disciple. The profession
of abject loyalty to the founder of a school of thought can
hardly be considered sufficient compensation or excuse for the
mental laziness of the pupiL A philosophy which fails to stimulate the disciple to intellectual originality or intelligent independence; which,in other words, calls for accurate scholiasts
rather than productive thinkers, somehow condemns itself.
Although Epicureanism probably contributed least to the ad396 Diog. Laert. 10.
KVptcu
33; 36; 87; 88.
••• Kop•a•

lfl; et passim.

THE PHILOSOPHY

OF LAW OF THE EPICUREANS

26'1

vancement of ancient philosophy, it became not only the most
widespread and enduring of the many schools of Hellenistic or
Roman thought, but also the philosophy which most stubbornly
held on to its shallow teachings. This phenomenon can only
be explained by the fact that in its shallowness Epicureanism
was mentally, morally, and politically best adapted to an era
of political giantism, to an era, that is, which in its tendency
towards political bigness for its own sake, called for and promoted individual shallowness and smallness.
ANTON-HERMANN

Mediaeval Institute,
University of Notre Dame,
Soutk. Bend, Indiana

CHROUST

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS
Oswi.N MAGRATH, 0. P., of the English Dominican province, teaches in
the Dominican Studium at Stellenbosch, South Africa. While secretary to the Apostolic Delegate to Iraq from 1931-1934 he studied
Arabic, Syriac, Persian and Mohammedan theologies and received
the lectorate in Sacred Theology from the Dominican Biblical
School of St. Stephen at Jerusalem. Since 1934 he has labored
in South Africa where he published a " Vocabulary of Catholic
Terms " in Afrikaans, written in both English and Afrikaans many
articles in South African and English journals on Eastern Christians,
Missiology, Calvinist theology, the religious vows. He will shortly
publish a study of South African Dutch Reformed theology.
WILLIAM A. GERHARD, Ph. D. (Notre Dame), is Assistant Professor and
Deputy Chairman of the Department of Philosophy, Brooklyn
College. He has contributed to THE THOMIST and to New
Scholasticism.
ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, Ph. D., of Notre Dame University, published
his first installment on the January issue of this year.
RoBERT EDWARD BRENNAN,
P., S. T.M., Ph.D., noted author and
lecturer, is stationed at the College of St. Mary of the Springs,
Columbus, Ohio.
ELIE DENISSOFF, Ph. D., Agrege of the University of Louvain, is professor
of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame.
GREGORY STEVENS, 0. S. B., S. T. D., teaches Mystical Theology at St.
Anselm's Priory, Washington, D. C.
WILLIAM AuGUSTINE WALLACE, O.P., S.T.B., M.Sc., B.E.E., is assigned
to the Dominican House of Studies, Washington, D. C.

268

BOOK REVIEWS
St. Thomas and the Existence of God. Three Interpretations. By William
Bryar. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1951. Pp.

$5.00.

To date, the role of modern logic in the development of Thomistic
thought has been little more than negligible. The work of I. M. Bochenski
in logistics has thus far been the dominant contribution, and that mainly
in the history of formal logic. Now we have another significant study in
the field of semantics, this time by a student of Rudolf Carnap and pointed
directly at clarifying the prima via of St. Thomas. The result is as stimulating as the enterprise is unexpected.
By reason of its heterogeneous background, Mr. Bryar's book is one that
can be easily misunderstood. It must be read in the context of modern
logical thought, particularly in the light of recent theories propounded
by the University of Chicago school. Even then the mixture of scholastic
terminology and technical expression peculiar to semiotics is a fecund source
of confusion. Add to this the fact that the study is tentative, exploratory,
and employs a style of writing that is so " conscious of itself " as to be
extremely artificial, and the difficulty of comprehending the thesis becomes
not inconsiderable.
Yet the author sincerely addresses himself to a real problem that has
merited the attention of numerous commentators in the Thomistic tradition. Moreover, he claims to throw light on the meaning of a most
important text of the Angelic Doctor. For these reasons, if for none other,
his work merits analysis and evaluation from the viewpoint of traditional
logic.
The complexity of Mr. Bryar's argument suggests that an exposition
first be made of his general position and source material, then a description
of the technical details of his systematic interpretative study, and finally
a summary of his conclusions. These will then be set off against the
traditional position in an attempt to evaluate the work as a contribution
to current Thomistic thought.

*

*

*

The general position of the author may be highlighted by the following
observations. He is not concerned directly with demonstrating God's
existence. Rather he limits himself to the precise logical study of analyzing
the meaning of St. Thomas' text, determining presuppositions and basic
options, and ascertaining the interpretation of the prima via most consonant with his findings. His work is descriptive and explicative, not

269

270

BOOK REVIEWS

argumentative. He does not reject traditional interpretations, nor does he
intend to supplant them with this study. His aim is simply to elaborate a
more or less neutral interpretative mechanism that would reconstruct the
thought process implicit in St. Thomas' work. This he attempts through
a study of the structure of the first twenty-six questions of the Prima Pars,
which is the basis for his systematic interpretative study. The latter is
only a hypothetical construction; yet it suggests three lines of meaning
implicitly contained in St. Thomas' argument from motion. Thus the author
concludes to a pluralistic interpretation of the prima via.
The implementation of Mr. Bryar's theoretical plan depends heavily on
his source material, viz., an analysis of the tract in the Summa entitled
De Deo Uno, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, an exegesis of chapter
thirteen of the first book of the Contra Gentiles (Appendix I). Space
limitations prohibit an extensive report on either of these studies, yet some
illustrations from the former will be of interest.
For instance, relative to I, q, 2, a. 1, the author contrasts St. Thomas'
fundamental option with one that would allow self-evident knowledge of
God. As to a. 2, he notes that it builds up a knowledge of God's existence
which is taken to involve no knowledge of God's essence, and he is
prompted to ask what function demonstration quia will have in the case
of setting up different answers to the question quid sit. Apart from the
five ways in a. 3, he observes from the objections that St. Thomas takes a
enough field of vision to embrace a God whose infinite goodness
would exclude all evil from the world, or a God related to the world as
nature to aU natural things. The particular problems on the ways roughly
divide into having them say too little or too much. Particularly in view
of the subsequent development in the tract, the meaning of God seems
to Mr. Bryar to be too big for any demonstration working up from the
effects of God. Yet, at the other extreme, the premises of the fourth way
are so broad as to admit a whole host of dubious or false statements of
entities. (pp. l-14)
Moving into the tract, the author keeps an eye on the terms that are
henceforth denied of God-moving, caused, contingent, limited, ignorant.
His anlaysis is directed at disclosing certain families of terms which work
up from creatures to God, and questioning how we can derive by argument meaning or content which were not originally put into them. Questions 3 and 9 are subjected to dose scrutiny in the process. Mr. Bryar
asks with respect to q. 3 what is the basic framework which determines the
particular alternative formulations suggested by St. Thomas in each article.
He notes a gradual growth and consequent wealth in the meaning of
" simplicity " as the question progresses, and is led to investigate the
.source of this meaning. (pp.
Similarly, as to q. 9, he notes that in a, 1 "mutability" is set off as

BOOK REVIEWS

271

incompatible with pure actuality, simplicity, and infinity. The process by
which movement is denied of God is radically different from that in q.
a. 3. So Mr. Bryar inquires what there is in things that allows for these
quite different types of discourse. The refinement of meaning again raises
a problem. Is this simply a good pedagogic practice, or are there systematic reasons for not putting certain terms to work directly in a syllogistic
framework, and using them only to explicate more general terms? (pp.
From these and similar analytical observations Mr. Bryar concludes to
three sets of terms that characterize the tract. The first series contains
terms under which experienced things are envisaged, such as " moving ";
the second set regards mutability and immutability under substantial and
accidental aspects; the third concerns essence and existence, and includes
(at least implicitly) such terms as "creation" and "annihilable." To
explain these is the burden of the systematic interpretative study. The
author mentions that the success of this explanation will be measured
first by its fruitfulness in providing a framework for explicating all the
detail of the text of St. Thomas, secondly by its own internal consistency
as an intellectual work. (pp.
The systematic interpretative study is thereupon undertaken. Being a
very technical work, it suffers more in this syncopated abridgement than
the foregoing. But the main lines may still be indicated in summary
fashion, more as an expedient for later discussion than as an accurate
reporting of the analysis.
Mr .. Bryar's theoretical study comprises three divisions, the first dealing
with the proposition of existentiality, the second with the proposition of
partiality, and the third with the proposition of contentuality. Each is
concerned with a particular family of terms occurring in the tract, as
noted above, and explicates an area of discourse ultimately reducible to
the single propositions themselves. (pp. 30-34)
The first division is more extensive than either of the succeeding
divisions. Beginning with an examination of " is " in the everyday statements: John is, Peter is, Fido is, the lump of coal is, ·the author asserts the
proposition of existentiality. He then elaborates this through analysis
and derives relations between the terms esse and essentia, and " creator "
and " creature," and also rules which are based on these terms. One of
the latter is the rule or proposition of explanation, which refers to alternate
relations ?f the internal components esse and essentia, denoted respectively
by "identity" and "non-identity."
(pp.
The remainder of the first division is used in elaborating alternative
complexes given in the proposition of explanation. This is done by means
of four attributes of esse, viz., stability, inclusiveness, perfectiveness, and
determinativeness. Generally, wherever there is an opposition of these

BOOK REVIEWS

attributes on the esse-essentia line, there is a sign of "non-identity " and
creaturely dependence. The author then extends the meaning of each of
these attributes by detailed explication, giving a fuller elaboration through
the proposition of conjunction, discussing the inference that can be made
to " non-identity " by the proposition of connection, and finally making
both " identity " and " non-identity " very precise through the propositions
of internality and externality respectively. (pp. 43-89)
The second division is similar to the first in structure, though somewhat
abbreviated. In it the author takes as his empirical base the everyday
statements: "John is a tall man, Peter is a tall man, Fido is a dog, the
lump of coal is heavy. The "is" is examined here also, and this leads to
the proposition of partiality. This is elaborated through analysis, and
relations are derived between the terms " particularity " and " content,"
which in tum are further explications of the terms aliquid and res. A
further relation is discerned between " cause " and " caused," and this,
together with the foregoing, leads to the rules of coherence, fulfillment and
causality. Finally an elaboration similar to that of the first division is
indicated on the basis of the four attributes of partiality, viz., conservativeness, uniqueness, unqualifiedness, and irreducibility. (pp. 90-108)
The empirical base of the third division is found in the everyday statements: men are earth-dwellers, men are visible, square is not circular, red
is not blue. Here again the development is analogous to that of the first
division. The author derives the proposition of contentuality on the basis
of this use of the words " is " and " are." Then he elaborates contentuality
through the three rules of alpha, psi and omega, and also through the
proposition or rule of demonstration. Rules of alpha treat of " instances
of content " as such, while rules of psi typify the governance of statements
in mathematics, rules of omega similarly in the natural sciences. The rule
of demonstration is then explained; this permits a conclusion to be drawn
by way of statements which join various "instances of content." Finally,
the conclusion of the entire theoretical part of the book is devoted to a
brief discussion of divisions of sciences and kinds of knowledge in terms
of the three divisions, or three lines of meaning, elaborated in the interpretative study. (pp. 109-131)
With the completion of this terminological structure Mr. Bryar is in a
position to interpret the prima via. His statement of St. Thomas' proof
is orthodox in that he divides it into the empirical datum, the two premises
" omne quod movetur . . ." and " non est procedere in infinitum " with
their proofs, and the conclusion. The latter, however, he divides into the
conclusion proper," necesse est devenire ad aliquod primum movens," and a
corollary, "quod a nullo movetur," which appears to us an innovation.
(pp.
As to the empirical datum, " that there is something which moves,"

BOOK REVIEWS

Mr. Bryar says that this leaves the question open to any of the three lines
of meaning. The premise" omne quod movetur ... "immediately pertains
to the third line, hut it can be rendered meaningful in each of the three
lines. In the first line, this is true because it can be explicated in terms
of " creature " and " creator"; in the second line, because it can be explicated, by the terms " caused " and " cause "; in the third line, because
it properly contains " instances of content." A question arises on the third
line, because if it can only be explicated under the rule of omega (experimental science), much contemporary thought would grant the proof only
some measure of probability. Also there is a difficulty about St. Thomas'
use of " potency " and " act " in the argument sustaining this premise.
These appear in a universal statement that is very high and very abstract,
but they still pertain to the third line and have a quite limited meaning.
(pp. 135-140)
The premise "non est procedere in infinitttm" primarily pertains to an
" instance of content " also. However, it can be explicated on the first line
because of the opposition of " moved movent " to the first attribute of esse,
and ultimately in view of the creative relation. It can likewise be explicated on the second line as going from " caused " to " cause," invoking the
propositions of causality and fulfillment. In either of these lines the statement is established on a proper examination of its terms. The third line
again presents problems. It is not dear how this premise can be " explained " by reference to an observable " instance of content," e. g., as
cited by St. Thomas, and there are difficulties in obtaining from the rules
of alpha or psi or omega a significant explanation. Nonetheless, the argument sustaining this premise as stated in the Summa directly pertains to the
third line. (pp. 141-146)
Likewise the conclusion can be shown to be explicable on all three lines
of meaning. In the first line, the " first movent " can be explicated as
"creator," and in the second, as "cause"; but neither of these require
the adjective " first " in view of the propositions of creativity and causality
respectively. The term " first movent " is found more apt for working on
the third line, where the " instance of content " can meet the requirements
of the proposition of demonstration. Then what Mr. Bryar terms the
corollary of the conclusion is explicated in similar fashion using the propositions of conjunction and connection on the first line, various other
propositions on the second and third lines. Still, not all the propositions
developed in the theoretical part figure in the interpretation of the
prima via. Some were only necessary in view of the subsequent development of De Deo Uno. (pp. 147-149)
This, then, is the basis for Mr. Bryar's threefold interpretation of St.
Thomas' argument for the existence of God from motion. The three
interpretations or explications, for him, yield three demonstrations with a
certain common likeness.

*
8

*

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BOOK REVIEWS

Mr. Bryar's thesis is at variance with traditional logical analysis of the
prima via on several scores, but there is one aspect in which they both
agree. His study is primarily a reflective study, and although his method
is more that of Wittgenstein than of Cajetan, it nevertheless fulfills this
primary requisite for logical analysis. The artificial structure employed in
the interpretative study accents the reflective or second-intentional character of the work, and is a definite asset in that respect.
But there is a sharp divergence between Mr. Bryar's general position
and that of traditional Thomism in the way in which he applies the
reflective or interpretative method. The author is interested only in
explicating the proof in the Summa, and in no way is concerned with
actually demonstrating the existence of God. For the Thomist, this is an
impossibility.
In traditional logic, there is a technical distinction between an explication
and a demonstration. One is in no way reducible to the other. The
existence of God can be demonstrated a posteriori from effects that are
more known to us, but in so doing we proceed to a truth that was previously unknown by means of premises that are already known. The new
truth that is arrived at is not actually contained in the premises; that is
precisely why a demonstration is defined as syllogismum faciens scire. The
new truth can be said to be there virtually in view of the power of the
human mind, functioning under an intellectual habit or virtue, to see the
new conclusion through the premises. But this is far different from the way
in which the conclusion is contained in the premises of an explicative argument. In an explication, the conclusion is actually contained in the
premises, though implicitly. A new truth does not result, but a truth that
is already known, and really is presupposed to understanding the premises,
is made more explicit through the explanatory procedure. The process goes
from the implicit truth to its explicit expression, which is the reason it
is called " explication " in the first place.
Now there is nothing tautological about the prima via; there is no reversible procedure by which the conclusion can be shown to be convertible
with the premises on a semantical basis. What is required is an act of
the intellect to see a new truth by actually making an illation from the
truths contained in the premises. Logical form, or meaning, either taken
alone, does not suffice for this act of the intellect. The content of the
premises must be grasped with their form, and when the new truth is
seen at the instigation of the complexus, the one seeing it is functioning
under the light of a real science, not purely as a logician. According to the
teaching of St. Thomas, a logician cannot understand and comment on a
demonstration as used in a real science (logica utens), unless he operates
under the habit of that science. This is not true of a dialectical argument,
where the analyst can remain i.n the logical order throughout the examina-

BOOK REVIEWS

fJ.75

tion of the proof. But for a demonstration of the type interpreted in this
book, a logical analysis on the basis of meanings alone, as in Mr. Bryar's
text, or on the basis of form alone, as in Appendix HI (Salamucha) , is
inadequate for an understanding of the proof.
Once the illation is made, of course, the person understanding the proof
can reflect on it, explain the premises, clarify the meanings, and try to aid
others to see the demonstration for themselves. This is the proper role
for a logical analyst, but it is nowhere apparent that Mr. Bryar is aware,
in actu signato, of the strictly demonstrative character of the work he is
interpreting. In fact, he develops his first two interpretations of the proof
without any reference to demonstration whatsoever, and only introduces
the tenn towards the end of the third line of meaning. Even then, as we
shall point out later, his usage in this place is far from being in accord
with the traditional meaning.
Thus, for the Thomist, it would be impossible to reduce the demonstration involved in the prima via to a set of propositions or meanings that
would pre-contain the conclusion to even q. £, a. 3, never mind the entire
tract De Deo Uno. It is undeniable that there will be a growth of meaning
where demonstrations and strict argumentations are employed. Such
meanings, however, cannot be separated out on purely semantical grounds
and placed as the pre-suppositions or philosophical options necessary for
the logical development of the science of theology. That would reduce
theology to a game of concepts.
With this basic point in mind, the traditional logician would look askance
at any attempt to " explicate " the prima via, particularly through a study
of uses to which its conclusions will be put in the subsequent development
of De Deo Uno. But despite the irrelevance of qq. 3 to 26 to an interpretation of the proof from motion, there is one question raised by Mr. Bryar
in his commentary on this section that merits consideration. This is the
continued insistence on finding sources for the growth of meaning in certain
families of terms used. One gets the impression that the author believes
that the entire tract on the attributes of God is derived explicatively
from the terms involved in the five ways. This is not true. More than
explication is again involved here; there is considerable demonstration and
indirect argumentation employed, and these provide for a growth in
knowledge, for more precise forms of predication, and consequently for
a growth in meaning. These demonstrations are not a posteriori; they are
negative a priori proofs that deny particular properties of God. Some
argumentations are indirect, through a reduction to the impossible, while
others are direct, using either proper or remote principles; and for the most
part they use one or other of the conclusions to the quinque viae as a
premise.
Thus the meaning of the term " simple " as spoken of God in the pro-

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BOOK REVIEWS

Iogue of q. 3 is certainly far less refined than that at the conclusion of the
same question. St. Thomas' procedure through this particular question is
one of successively eliminating from God all substantial composition,
as well as metaphysical (aa. 3 and 4), and even
physical (aa. I and
logical (a. 5), then accidental composition (a. 6) and summarily all
intrinsic composition (a. 7), and finally even extrinsic composition (a. 8).
When the theologian thus concludes that God is completely simple, he
obviously means it in a much more refined sense than a biologist does
when he refers to an amoeba as simple. But when pressed for an answer
as to what "simple " means to him, and where it acquired such a subtle
sense, he can only reply in terms of the media or argumentation that led
him to his statement. His " simple " has something in common with normal
usage, but it is also different in many respects. It is truly an analogous
term, as are all the terms we are led to predicate of God in the study of
sacred theology.
Moving on now to the systematic interpretative study, we note in
general that this suffers from an overly great concern with logical consistency. The author regards internal consistency almost as an end in
itself. This seems to the traditional logician a trivial and minimum requirement for an intellectual work. Moreover, there is no .end to the detail
in which the Wittgensteinian method involves the user as soon as he
delves into matters of ordinary scientific complexity. If the human intelligence must ultimately be trusted as an expedient in analysing such matters,
one wonders why it should be so mistrusted in the early stages of thought.
In the first division, the author is concerned with an area of discourse
that hinges around such terms as esse, essentia, " creator " and " creature,"
all of which arise from a study of the analogous predication of "is." It is
extremely difficult to see the relevance of the statements in this division
to the argument from motion for the existence of God. Presumably the
author has not fallen into the Anselmian error of deriving God's existence
from his essence; presumably he is not presupposing the existence of a
creator, and presumably he is not presupposing that John, Fido and the
lump of coal can be identified as creatures. Thus the only thing he can
hope to establish in this division is the logical consistency of making a
possible predication, "God is." This seems a hopeless undertaking. There
is no a priori way of guaranteeing logical consistency here. The best anyone
can hope for is an a posteriori proof of the truth of the logical proposition
" God is," and then he can take off from there on the analogous predication
of esse. But short of actually demonstrating this, he will never know
whether there is even a problem to talk about.
Moreover, the use of the terms "creator" and "creature" does not
pertain to the prima via. St. Thomas delays the entire discussion of the
procession of creatures from God until q. 44, and when he does examine

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creation, he nowhere uses the proof from motion. He mentions the possibility of considering creation as a motion only to deny it in the strict sense.
Nor do we see the relevance of Mr. Bryar's statement about the omne
quod movetur principle, namely, "granted that a creator should explain
the totality of the being, he can grant that it undoubtedly must in that
sense explain its motion." (p. 135) In the prima via St. Thomas is arguing
from the proper principles of motion, not from principles so remote as
those that explain all of created being.
The terms involved in the second division have more relevance to the
prima via. It is undeniable that the notion of causality is essential to an
understanding of each of the quinque viae. Yet even here it is difficult to
see in the particular area of discourse anything that limits the proposed
interpretation of the first proof, as distinct from the second proof, or even
the fourth. In fact the reducibility of the entire division to the proposition
of partiality suggests the proof from participation used in the quarta via,
while the discussion of the causal relation is more apt to the secunda via
than to the argument from motion. The notion of causality in general is
certainly presupposed for the prima via, yet the precise point of departure
therein is the passivity of moved things, not the activity of cause causing.
The traditional logician would hardly be impressed by an interpretative
mechanism for the first way that failed to differentiate it from the other
ways of proving God's existence.
The third division uses terms and makes statements that are closer to
the meaning of St. Thomas in this text than either of the other divisions.
The disappointing thing about this division is that the author stops just
just when he approaches the difficult points in the proof. When he comes
to real problems, he merely states them without offering a solution.
In particular, as we noted above, his discussion of demonstration in this
division is most incomplete. He states that " demonstration proceeds by
way of statements which join various ' instances of content,' and through
the ' relation of implication ' draws a conclusion." (p. 122) But what is
meant by " implication " here is not made clear. If the author intends
senses as used in modern formal logic, e. g., either " material " or " strict,"
he does not establish this as St. Thomas' meaning for true demonstration.
The Thomist would be prompted to ask how such implication would distinguish it from any other type of rational explication or argumentation,
direct or indirect. Further, Mr. Bryar seems helpless to explain how any.
universality of " instances of content " can be established. (p. 126) This is
basically the problem of induction and it has always been a " bug-bear "
for logical positivists; yet until it is solved it is useless for them to discuss
possibilities of demonstration.
For the Aristotelian, the value of any discussion of the sciences will be
determined in large part by its appraisal of demonstration. A science is

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much more than a particular area of discourse governed by certain rules.
There is no royal road to it, no magic formula that will show how " connections " of new propositions can be made ad infinitum. Rather it is
fundamentally an intellectual habit that exists in the mind of the user.
This is generated when he grasps the definition of his particular subject
matter, and it grows as he demonstrates either properties of his subject
or its proper causes. Without the intellectual habit, syllogisms are only
groups of words; neither they nor all the rules in the world will ever lead
the reader to a new conclusion he can hold with certitude.
Finally, the traditional logician could hardly agree with the conclusions
Mr. Bryar reaches at the end of his study. H(' would reject the particular
pluralistic interpretation offered on the basis of ihe irrelevance of the first
two lines of meaning to the actual text of St. Thomas. If he granted them
any value as a sort of metaphysical propadeutic to understanding the
premises of the prima via, it would be with a serious caution to avoid the
pitfall of the ontological argument and to beware of a watered-down version
of St. Thomas' proof as applied to the physical order.
The third line of meaning offered by Mr. Bryar seems to be most proper
in the light of St. Thomas' text, as he himself notes. But even here it is
disputable whether the author's notion of a logic of modern sciences would
stand up in Thomistic circles. It is one thing to speak of rules of psi and
omega as being the accepted logical norms for governing statements in
mathematics and natural science. It is quite another thing to justify the
existence of such norms for any real science. This is a problem that has
not as yet seen a meeting of minds between Thomists and logical positivists,
and is clearly antecedent to an application of such norms to the prima via.
The author is certainly justified in his observation that contemporary
scientific thought would only accord some measure of probability to St.
Thomas' proof. The difficulty this reviewer has experienced with logical
positivists is one of finding anything in the intellectual order that they
will accept with certitude.
Though we thus reject Mr. Bryar's particular interpretations, there are
some points about his study that merit praise. For instance, the author
gives evidence of himself understanding both the argument from motion in
the Summa and also the text of the Contra Gentiles. His difficulties do
not stem directly from a doctrinal standpoint; rather, we believe they are
rooted in a presupposition that Carnap and St. Thomas are basically
reconciliable, and that the former's method can be fruitfully applied to
the study of the latter's text. This still remains to be proved. Another
merit of the book is that the author raises a number of provocative
questions about the structure of the first twenty-six questions in the
Summa. It is a rare achievement these days to be able to ask intelligent
questions about St. Thomas' work. Even if the correct answer is not

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279

given in the same book, it at least arouses the curiosity of the reader.
And the question being asked, there is the possibility that an answer may
be forthcoming from some quarter.
Finally, Mr. Bryar has uncovered a number of real difficulties in explaining the prima via to the modern mind. It is to be hoped that his
work will stimulate others to consider in detail these barriers that isolate
St. Thomas from a large segment of our university people. Such a sequel,
while possibly not all that Mr. Bryar had hoped for, would yet register
for him a worthwhile contribution to modern Thomism.
AuGusTINE WALLACE, O.P.
Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

Psychiatry and Catholicism, by JAMES H. VANDERVELT, 0. F. M. and
RoBERT P. 0DENWALD, M.D., New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
195Q. Pp. 442, $6.00.

The Foreword states: " there has been a long-felt need of a book that
would present a scientifically sane integration of psychiatry and Christianity." The present work certainly does not satisfy this need completely.
It is, however, a step in the right direction; and should serve to allay the
antagonism harbored by some Catholics towards psychiatry. The work is
intended for the educated layman as wen. as for the priest, and its object
is to give a brief, simple exposition of modern psychiatry, to weigh
psychiatric theories and techniques in the light of Catholic moral te,aching,
and to propose some points of practical value to the reader.
The two initial chapters treat respectively of "Person and Personality,"
and "The Moral Law, Conscience, and Responsibility." The first deals
briefly with the philosophy of the human person, and discusses the psychology of personality. The second chapter is devoted to a presentation
of theory in its essential points. As the title indicates, all is centred around
the notions of law and conscience. The _authors do not show how the
passage from external law to the internal forum, the forum of conscience,
is to be effected; and thus they exclude any consideration, however brief,
of the moral or practical syllogism. There is a gap between the objective
standards of the law and the internal standard of conscience which ought
to be filled with a treatment of the moral act, and with a more satisfactory
treatment of the natural law .. There is, unfortunately, no consideration of
the moral life as a dynamic seeking of happiness, nor of the " good life "
as distinct from that of mere obedience to law. The place of love in the
moral life (whether natural or supernatural) is not mentioned. The chapter
is an example of the rather unhappy stress on law in so many modem

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manuals of moral theology. In what is called "an outline of the fundamentals of the Catholic system of morality " (p. 19) only the law is
discussed, the eternal law, the natural law, and positive law. Actually
the treatise on law is but a part of the " Catholic moral system " and it is
necessary to see this treatise in due proportion to the other and more
fundamental sections. This point is of no little practical importance in
treating of the relations of Catholic morality to psychiatry since the conflicts of the emotionally disturbed often center around the problem of
authority.
Moral responsibility itself is seen as a matter of obedience to law rather
than as a means to happiness: " In brief, moral responsibility is a man's
capacity of moral guilt." (p.
For the Thomist, moral responsibility
as a capacity for gnilt certainly is not in any way a true definition of
moral responsibility. The end of the moral life is the divinization of man.
The moral life Is concerned with the ideal of man, with what he must be,
not primarily with what he is must do or not do. The very heart of
Thomistic moral theory is that love of the good, as a living interior law,
impels man to seek God. Freedom is considered positively as a means to
God, as a capability, not so much of guilt, but of good. A proper orientation in considering the moral life of man is of utmost importance.
The understanding of the traditional Thomistic moral doctrine would
be of greater value to an integration of psychiatry with moral theology
than is a moral doctrine based only on legal concepts. The traditional
teaching emphasizes the dynamism of human moral life, the dynamisms
of will and intellect in the 1pursuit of the good and the true, and of God,
and takes into account the dynamic energy of the emotional and affective
elements in human nature. Such a conception is especially fruitful when
considered in comparison with the dynamism of the emotional life stressed
in modern psychiatry. Furthermore, since the aim of Thomistic morals
is the wholeness of purpose of the integrated personality, the positive contributions of modern psychiatry could well be considered as aids to this
goal. Since the authors do not adopt such an approach, one often feels
that the moral discussions of emotional disturbances in this volume are
mere external appendages. In most cases, the authors content themselves
with trying to give suggestions for the determination of responsibility of
sufferers from mental disorders in their single acts. This is certainly
necessary and of undoubted pastoral importance, but a real synthesis
of moral theology and psychiatry must penetrate deeper than this. It must
seek an integral understanding of the problems of psychic aberation in the
background of the dynamisms operative in the human person, and must
seek to evaluate the emotional factors of human activity in the light of
modern findings, and to direct these emotional forces to that goal which
is the object of man's highest striving. The hoped-for integration must
also concern itself with an appraisal of the psychological findings

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fl81

theories of modern psychiatry in the general background of Thomistic
psychology. Little has been attempted along this line in the present work.
One may note, on the part of the authors, a bit of uncertainty when
dealing with the description and etiology of the various forms of emotional
disorders. (Chapters 14-22) This is due partially to the differences of
opinion in modern phychiatry, partially to the eclecticism of the authors,
and partially, at least, to a neglect of the dynamics of these aberrations.
This is especially clear in the discussion of the obsessive-compulsive
neuroses and of scrupulosity. The case reports do not help a great deal
in giving a picture of the disorder under discussion. In dealing with
psychosomatic disorders the authors include more than is generally considered under this specific category. Thus conversion hysteria manifestations are listed as " psychosomatic " though this term is restricted generally
to those physical effects of emotional disturbances that are without
"psychic content." Furthermore, the authors seem to assume a closer
dependence between certain definite types of emotional states and certain
definite physical effects than is usually conceded to be the case.
In dealing with Freud, the authors divide his work into three sections:
philosophical basis, psychological theories, and therapeutic method. Some
attempt is made to evaluate the philosophical basis of Freudian theories,
though one could hope for a bit more scientific detachment in dealing with
Freud's views on religion, God and sex. Chapter Nine--" The Evaluation
of Psychoanalysis "-has a bibliography which gives not a single reference
to the works of Freud himself whose theories are being criticized. Such
references should be made in accord with the demands of scientific method.
There is no mention of the work of French Catholics, both theologians and
psychiatrists, on the matter of integration of psychiatric theories and moral
theology. The authors should have noted with regard to one book in the
bibliography (Gaetani, La Psicanalisi-p. 158, note 2) that its author proceeds with a minimum of scientific method. The authors seem less unfavourably disposed towards Jung's theories. It would seem that the more
exact and scientific contributions of Freud offer more valuable contributions
to the understanding of emotional disturbances and are more useful to
moral thought than Jungian psychology.
The section on Freud's psychological theories is at times rather weak.
The authors seem rather hasty and uncertain of themselves in trying to
appraise some of these theories and in seeking to appreciate the possible
integration of some of these conceptions with those of the traditional
psychology. This is particularly evident in their discussion of the super-ego.
While it is true that Freud recognized no true moral conscience in the
Catholic sense of the word, his findings on the super-ego are not to be
passed over because of the fact that Freud thought the emotionally-derived
super-ego to be the only form of moral conscience. The authors would do

BOOK REVIEWS

well to consider the importance of the influence which the super-ego exerts
in matters of morality and religion (on the question of the relations of
conscience to the super-ego, vd. " La Formation Integrale du sens moral,"
J. J. Hayden, 0. S. B., M.D., Ph. D., in Psyche, IV, nn. 30-31, avril-mai,
1949, pp. 335-350).
The authors often include in their discussions some practical directions
for the reader. Unfortunately, so many classes of readers have been
envisaged that these counsels are too often vague and uncertain.
We may welcome the publication of this volume as indicative of a
more scientific and open attitude towards modern psychiatry on the part
of Catholics. The work has definite merits, and the criticisms are to be
taken as constructive, showing that a great deal is yet to be done in this
field. With these important reservations, the book is recommended to the
clergy and laity desirous of acquainting themselves with the vast and
necessary field of psychiatry.
DoM GREGORY STEVENs,

0. S. B.

St. Anselm's Priory,
Washington, D. C.

Descartes and the Modern Mind. By ALBERT G. BALZ. New Haven:
University Press, 195!l:. Pp. 506. $10.00.

Yale

Hardly a year passes but there appear several works on Descartes.
Among those published during 1952, the volume of Professor Balz of the
University of Virginia is striking for its impressive size and excellent
presentation.
The book opens with a reference to Socrates: "Socrates, in the Republic,
relates that the aged Cephalus went away laughing to the sacrifices,
leaving to his son the problem of justice. Perhaps Plato meant to convey
that the wisdom of tradition must be supplemented, if not reevaluated as
well as supplemented, by wisdom that should accrue from inquiry. Perhaps
Rene Descartes is the heir of Plato as well as of Cephalus." (p. 3) The
reference is made in order to discuss the problem of the separation of
scientific and philosophic knowledge from theology, a separation characteristic of the modern mind but foreign to the medieval mind. On the
one hand, Scientia, as Professor Balz puts it, and Theologia on the other,
meet and fuse in Wisdom. In the evolution of the conception of Wisdom,
Augustinism, Thomism and Cartesianism are so many stages. In order to
understand well the change which thus occurs, Professor Balz proposes
to distinguish between the act of faith, or the attitude towards the
supernatural, and the act of Faith which involves assent to a theological
doctrine; between Faith which does not presuppose any inquiry, and
Theologia which represents the sacred science of the content of the Faith.

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283

In each man the indispensable ground is the act of faith; but, Professor
Balz says, the man of faith has the assurance of Faith. As to Theologia
the field is wide open for controversy. With these distinctions made, the
Augustinian ideal, according to Professor Balz, appears to be a single
aU encompassing Wisdom directed towards a vision of the divine. The
Thomistic ideal of Wisdom foresees, on the other hand, different functional moments in the quest for Wisdom which are Scientia and Theologia.
They are destined to converge at infinity, hence the unity of Wisdom is
not endangered. If such unity was broken, one or the other, or both,
pursuits should be recognized as being illusory. The Cartesian ideal of
Wisdom does not draw back before such risks. Scientia and Theologia are
not only separated, but Theologia is even distinguished from Faith. The
architectonic of Wisdom becomes tripartite: there is the knowledge represented by Scientia bringing together the sciences and philosophy; the
knowledge constituted by Theologia, sacred science; and finally the knowledge constituted by Faith, a knowledge which is apprehensible but not
comprehensible. This architectonical division might be then described as:
Reason-and-Faith-in-Scientia, Reason-and-Faith-in-Theologia, and Reasonand-Faith-in-Sacred-Mystery.
These last terms, Professor Balz very appropriately points out, " are however too cumbrous for constant use." (p.
50, n. 1)
Because it is based on this tripartite ordering of Wisdom and the distinction of the sciences and of theology, the work of Descartes may be placed
under the auspices of modernity. However, Professor Balz sees the stately
figure of St. Thomas Aquinas behind Descartes. For, insofar as St. Thomas
is responsible for this ordering, it may be urged that he has defined the
auspices of modernity. As for Descartes, he adopts, or one might say, he
adapts and takes advantage of the Thomistic architectonic of Wisdom.
Such was the evolution of Wisdom up to Descartes according to Professor Balz. But does this tripartite division of Wisdom really belong to
Descartes? In order to be able to assign it to him one would need an
explicit recognition by him of each of the three divisions of knowledge.
Now in searching the writings of Descartes one can find nothing like it
in them. The position of Descartes as regards theology is particularly
ambiguous and often contradictory. Professor Balz is the first to recognize
this situation and he points out that the sincerity of Descartes in his
attitude toward theology has often been questioned. In the discussion of
the problem, Professor Balz says, " the issue, in fact, seems to me to be
insoluble " (p. 15, n. 15) without a more complete historical study of
Descartes and the milieu in which he lived. Under these circumstances
one wonders to what extent it is legitimate to present the tripartite theory
of Wisdom as being essential to the conviction of Descartes, and to declare
that "this architectonical order of Wisdom, accordingly, defines the con-

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BOOK REVIEWS

ditions under which Descartes must seek to launch the search for truth
in the sciences." (p. 53) For if one has to admit, with certain critics,
that Descartes attaches no value to theology, Scientia, to use Professor
Balz's terminology, would become the sole content of Wisdom in Descartes.
Theologia would disappear from view and the act of Faith would resolve
itself in an act of faith. In short, there would be no tripartite architectonic,
and Descartes' views would come close to those of the moderns, of whom
Professor Balz speaks at the end of his book, who consider any and every
theology as illusory. What is, in fact, the true face of the philosophe au
masque? That is the problem which ought to be solved before treating of
his architectonic of Wisdom. It can only be done with the aid of an
exegesis, a comparison of texts and discussion of their significance in the
light of historical circumstances-a work which is lacking in Descartes and
the Modern Mind. This gives the book a speculative character contrary
to the historical spirit.
Committed to the method of conjectures, Professor Balz cannot escape
from it. Instead of instructing us on the way Descartes speaks and thinks
as expressed in his writings, he describes from one .end of the book to the
other the way which, according to him, Descartes could have or should
have thought. Thus, Professor Balz writes, Descartes " could ask: Do
my scientific and metaphysical ideas conflict with the Truths of Faith?
He could also ask: Do they serve adequately in the task of formulating
and convincingly expounding the Truths of Faith. . . . Again he must
ask: What is the relation of my theology ... to the generally accepted
theology?" (p. 18) It is along these lines that the book is written. Speculative reasoning even penetrates history. "Viewed in historical perspective
-as, perhaps, a Descartes might have perceived-the following could be
said .... " (p. 41) One could easily add to the number of quotations of
this kind. Yet, it might be said, the book is not without references to
Descartes and his works. But they are insufficient in number for the
subject treated in this book, and we have no doubt but that any authority
on Descartes, on reading any chapter of the book, would agree with us.
We should point out, too, the way in which the texts of Descartes are
handled. Professor Balz does not compare texts in order to bring out the
thought of Descartes, but uses them rather to decorate the description he
makes of the Descartes he is imagining. The quotations placed at the
head of each chapter or part of the book frequently seem to have been put
there to dress up the book. 9ne is very frequently intrigued by the relationship which Professor Balz establishes between their content and that
of the chapter.
Contrary to what these remarks might seem to suggest, our intention is
not to deny the value of the book which is full of interesting insights. We
simply wish to point out that the book is more a speculative than an his-

BOOK REVIEWS

torical work. The truth is, as the author confides in the Preface of the
book, that he has allowed himself to be pushed " by a kind of internal
impetus " (p. viii) which carried him in his exposition beyond the framework of an historical study of the subject. Descartes and the Modern Mind
became primarily a fruit of the personal meditations of Professor Balz, a
product of his literary talents. If the historical Descartes disappears, what
does it matter? Was it not the case of Socrates in Plato and would one
reproach Plato for having sacrificed the historical figure of Socrates for
the needs of literary production? The comparison of Professor Balz with
Plato is not fortuitous. What little knowledge we have of him after reading
his book has revealed him to us as a mind related to Plato.
For the purposes of literary presentation Plato surrounds Socrates with
his disciples and friends and exposes his philosophy in the form of discussions among them. For the purpose of literary presentation Professor
Balz makes two persons of Descartes and makes each one discuss things
with the other. Here is how he explains this symbolism: "Descartes
may be understood in a dual way." He can receive "the name of Cartesius to signify Reason itself," and that of Rene Descartes, who "is
Everyman, and we are to cancel variant selves by identifying ourselves
with him." With the two figures so defined the dialogue begins: "Rene
Descartes, who is a symbol for every conductor of inquiry, may then be
described as one who proposes to report what he has learned from Cartesius, the very voice of Reason." The distinction between Cartesius and
Rene Descartes " is, of course, a rhetorical device to be justified only by
its expository utility." (pp. 66-68) Professor Balz has no difficulty in
admitting it. But such utility, foreign to the historical order, can only
be justified in a work of literature. If it is simply a question of Professor
Balz's own " Cartesian meditations " he is, of course, free to present them
as he wishes. It is only on such a basis that one can justify the divisions
he adopts for his book and the titles he gives to its three parts: Part One,
CARTEsxus: Part Two: RENE DESCARTEs; Part Three, THE QUEST FOR WISDOM.
We shaH treat the third part separately. The first two take us immediately out of the historical framework in which Descartes lived and free us
from the finality required of the historian in the exposition of his thought.
We are immediately transported to the purely speculative order. In
the first part, Cartesius, or Reason itself, is entrusted with telling us about
the Quest for Certainty, the Quest for the Absolute, the Fundamenta
Scientiae Mirabilis, of the Dubito, of the Cogito ergo sum, of the Cogitatio,
of the Hyperbolical Doubt, to cite but a few. One is only supposed to
see them from the point of view of the speculative implications. In the
second part, Rene Descartes, Everyman, in discussing with Reason itself,
tells us of the Idea of Nature, and while on this subject, of the Experimental Mythos, of Truth in the Sciences obtained by the Correlation of

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Symbols, the Teleology and Analogy, the Diversification of Existence;
finally of the Images of Nature, World, Man, Creation. The moral climate
of each part of the book differs, from the fact that Cartesius speaks with
authority but Rene Descartes does not. This is because Cartesius is
Science and Philosophy and treats of matters in a systematic order while in
Rene Descartes, the anthropocentric predicament, as Professor Balz calls
it, intervenes. One has to distinguish between Knowledge as such and
the pursuit of knowledge, a distinction which can however, be attenuated:
in assuming the office of inquiry men become auxiliaries of Reason. Discoverers, who cannot discover without Reason, are functionally auxiliaries
of Reason. The problem of neutralizing the anthropocentric predicament,
accordingly, pivots upon the distinction between the inquiry-power and
its auxiliaries. Perhaps Rene Descartes did think this a way of avoiding
the anthropocentric predicament. But he has listened to the stern voice
of Cartesius who would declare that this avoidance itself depends upon a
set of claims eventuating from inquiry and implying the distinction
between truth and falsity.
The third and last part of the book abandons in part Cartesius and
Rene Descartes in order to return to just Descartes. It is not, however, to
the Descartes of the seventeenth century that these pages are devoted,
but to a Descartes living in the twentieth century and undertaking the
search for wisdom. " I have, as it were, sought," the author writes, " to
imagine the reactions of a Descartes examining the great book of the
world of today .... I hope that it will be understood that the content
is tentative, conjectural, and explorative." (p. 424) The author concludes:
" A Cartesian philosophy for and of the future sciences may hope to
attain some vision of what Socrates calls the first principle of the whole, by
an ascent whose first steps are the composites of ideas and images provided
by these sciences." (p. 485)
The limited space of a book review has not permitted us to give, as we
should have liked to give, a more ample description of the .contents of
the book. What we have said, however, will encourage, we hope, the
reader to obtain a copy of the book and to read it himself. We must,
however, make a few final remarks. First, our own training in historical
methods has created a prejudice in us against the use of a person as a
figure. There is something shocking about using Cartesius to designate
Reason itself, and Rene Descartes to represent Everyman. As it is the
method Plato used with Socrates to produce an incarnation of Wisdom,
we willingly admit that this is a matter of custom. Yet Professor Balz
cannot ignore the difficulty this symbolism will present for many readers
and we suggest that it be suppressed in any new edition of the book. The
author himself is aware of certain inconveniences which this symbolism
presents since he writes: "I am aware of the dangers inherent in my
own devices signified by Cartesius and Rene Descartes." (p. 110, n. 4)

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287

We would also suggest that in a second edition he abandon Deseartes
himself and present the book as being the fruit of his own reflections. The
book would unquestionably gain in scientific value. A more accurate title
would be Cm·tesian Meditations or JJ!editations on Descartes. Unless
presented as suggested the book is subject to the objections we have made.
They all come down to criticizing Professor Balz for forgetting Descartes.
As it is, the title of the work is deceptive. We agreed to review the book
because we had the impression it was a work of scholarship. Only after
reading it did we realize that it was less an exposition of the thought of
Descartes than an " experiment of adapting Cartesianism to the conditions
of the present." (p. 444). Although we may claim some competence on
Descartes, we have very little on Cartesianism later than the seventeenth
century. We are not well qualified, therefore, to evaluate the neo-Cartesianism of the author who, in the preface, gives this important warning
to the reader: " The author was driven beyond originally anticipated
limits and beyond the limits of his competence." (p. viii) The first part
of the phrase gives us the key to the disequilibrium one notes in the book.
The author started with the intention of publishing a work on Descartes
but led on by his "internal impetus " made the book an exposition of his
own Cartesian reflexions. The second part of the phrase seems to relate to
the value of ahesc meditations and requires us to be prudent in our evaluations of his Cartesianism. We finish the book with a favorable impression
of the ideas of Professor Balz, but we prefer to leave to others more competent the task of analyzing them.
Finally, we might add a list of technical faults with the book which
should be of help, we trust, in preparing subsequent editions.
One is quickly struck by the lack of a suitable bibliography. Professor
Balz refers (p. ix) the reader to a bibliography he is preparing which
will soon be issued in mimeographed form by the Bibliographical Society
of the University of Virginia. It is obvious how unacademic such a reference to mimeographed copies is. A book is supposed to satisfy the reader
at any time and place. What seems to have escaped Professor Balz is
that the reader is not interested in a general bibliography of Descartes,
but in a selection of the books corresponding to the contents of the work.
The reader's position is made worse by the fact that there is no indication of the state of the question treated. We are not told of anything
that has been written on the subject. The author simply says that he has
a " large collection of notes made somewhat at random " which constitute
" evidence of my indebtedness to many Cartesian scholars, past and contemporary."
(p. ix) In order to know the extent of this indebtedness
and consequently of the originality of Professor Balz one would have to
rummage through his collection of notes.
A "List of Works Cited" is given (pp. 486-489) but this is

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BOOK REVIEWS

certing in many ways. Many of the basic authors on Descartes are
omitted. One is happy to note five works of Professor Gilson but these
concern rather St. Thomas and Thomism. The only work of Professor
Gilson on Descartes listed in his Etudes sur le role de la pensee medievale
dans la formation du systeme cartesien. The Discours de la methode, with
its precious notes, the Index scolastico-cartesien, and Professor Gilson's
articles on Descartes are nowhere mentioned. For most of the authors
cited in the List, one notes, upon checking the Index of the book, that
they are cited only once in the book. In the List of Works Cited each of
these authors is given an abbreviation-symbol.
One wonders why these
symbols are necessary if the author is only mentioned once. R is used as
the symbol for the Regulae of Descartes and also for the work of J. Wahl
entitled Du role de l'idee de l'instant dans la philosophie de Descartes.
One is tempted to find the reason for certain errors in Descartes and the
Modern M·ind in the author's insufficient knowledge of the literature on
Descartes. We have particularly in mind the question of the dates of
Descartes' stay at La Fleche. In the table: " Life of Descartes " placed
at the end of the Preface (pp. ix-xii) the dates given are from l604-l6Hl.
But the question has been the subject of careful research by Monsignor
Monchamps (Hll3), by Cohen (1920), and by Sirven (1928). All agree
Descartes went to La Fleche in 1606 and left in 1614 or 1615. The whole
Professor Gilson in his
question has been very exactly summed up
commentary on the Discours de la methode, Paris, 1947, pp. 103-105.
We regret that in referring to review articles the author gives no page
references. The reader is thus unable to realize immediately the length of
the articles. The Index of proper names leaves much to be desired. Certain
names appearing in the book are not in the Index (Rosenfeld, p. 316, Roth,
p. 4, 6, etc.) , others are in the Index but with incomplete references.
ELIE DENISSOFF

University of Notre Dame,
South Bend, Ind.

Counseling in Catholic Life and Education. By CHARLES A. CURRAN. New
York: Macmillan, 1951. Pp. 488. $4.50.
Historically, Father Curran's text is the mature unfolding of a thesis
that was worked out several years ago in the clinical laboratory of Dr.
Carl S. Rogers, then professor of psychology at Ohio State University.
Himself an eminent authority in the field of non-directive counseling, Dr.
Rogers always regarded Father Curran as a psychologist of great promise,
despite the fact that differences of opinion existed between the two men

BOOK REVIEWS

in matters of interpretation. These differences, in the main, arose from a
simple cause. Thus, Rogers was content to remain at an empiriological
level in the explanation of his findings; whereas Father Curran, because of
his philosophic and theological training, and especially because of his
interest in the prudential wisdom of St. Thomas Aquinas, envisioned
meanings and applications of the counseling process that would effect not
only the more formal aspects of Catholic education, but also the wider
reaches of Christian perfection and the Christian way of life in a secular
world.
After a brief introduction in which the general nature of counseling is
set forth, and the particular nature of the non-directive method is fitted
within its Thomistic framework, Father Curran applies himself with care
to the task of analyzing the relation of counsel to prudence. The latter, as
we all know, is first in the line of the cardinal virtues. More important to
Father Curran's purpose is the fact that it is an incommunicable body of
knowledge; enabling us to make moral decisions about the singular and
contingent events in our lives. Because of the uniqueness of these events,
prudence is an intensely private affair, lying at the core of all those
movements that make for the integration of personality. From this point
of view, it is the most individualistic of all our natural virtues; and since
counsel is the prologue to the
judgment, it, too, reaches down
to the very foundations of our moral behavior. As St. Thomas points out,
counsel is essentially directive. The singular and contingent actions that
are so vital to conduct and character, are often shrouded in doubt and
obscurity, so that it is impossible to form a sound moral judgment about
them before previous inquiry has been set up. This preliminary search,
undertaken by reason before will finally fixes on the object of its choice,
is what Aristotle and Aquinas mean by counsel.
Note, however, that the man who is reasonable about his moral problems,
first takes counsel with himself, making trial of his own empiric knowledge,
before he discloses his difficulties to others. Indeed, it is only on condition
that he finds no answer within the categories of his personal experience
that he goes for advice. The function of non-directive counseling is to
enable a person, utilizing his own life record, so to speak, to untie the
moral knots in which he is presently held captive and to disengage himself
from the emotional tensions and conflicts that torment him. The term
" non-directive " is somewhat inadequate. What the non-directive counselor
actually does is to help the individual reduce his own potential consiliar
knowledge to act, in much the same way that a good teacher leads his
pupils through the mazes of a geometrical problem to an ultimate solution,
by making them conscious of new relationships between the elements of
knowledge they already possess. It is presumed, in both cases, that some
9

BOOK REVIEWS

power of insight is exercised, so that right moral or mathematical inferences
are drawn from the data at hand. Thus the counselor has succeeded when
the person with whom he is communicating, uses his own mental and
moral apperception mass to settle the issues that are troubling him-or at
least makes some sort of satisfactory and workable treaty with circumstances that he cannot change.
In the second section of his book, Father Curran is concerned with the
essential role of prudence. The virtue is defined as right reason about
things to be done, or better, right reason applied to our moral actions.
Here the accent again is one of intense personalism-the point of departure
and the goal of Father Curran's whole psychology. Counsel is the first of
the three elements involved in prudential behavior. It supplies the material
for the judgment which, in tum, is brought to bear on the contingent
situation that here and now faces us, giving rise to the act of command.
Prudence,
fine, is the habit by which all our moral movements are
properly integrated and formed into a pattern of rational conduct. For
the Christian way of life, its appearance is the natural prologue to the
exercise of the infused virtue of prudence that comes with sanctifying grace.
As St. Thomas insists, the purpose of natural prudence (and this is true,
a fortiori, of the other cardinal virtues) is twofold: first, to remove the
obstacles to the operation of grace in the soul; then, with a clear field
ahead, to allow full scope for the growth of the supernatural life. Now
the chief sources of our moral embarassments come from the world, the
devil, and the flesh; or, in terms of our fallen nature, from ignorance,
badly formed wills, and passions that are either very poorly managed or not
managed at all. The natural moral virtues are designed to correct these
disorders, and the starting point of the whole procedure is in prudence. This
is the tool, par excellence, of integration on the natural level, without which
it is idle to talk of a supernatural integration. Father Curran's main
interest, to be sure, is in the natural epigenesis of personality; and his
focus on prudence sets the problem in its proper Thomistic perspective.
Perhaps it would be well to recall at this juncture that, for the Angelic
Doctor, prudence is the most fundamental of all the natural virtues,
having formal relations with the mind, on one side; and the material
relations with the appetites, on the other. Indeed, it is so critical in everv
moral consideration that the rest of the cardinal virtues, with their nume;ous progeny, can be defined in terms of the prudential motive that
activates them. Moreover, the pervasiveness of prudence in the economy
of our moral lives merely serves to accentuate the importance of counsel,
since counsel is the basis of the prudential judgment. As aspects of the
problem of integration through counseling, Father Curran devotes a great
deal of space to such negative or retrograde factors as mental conflicts,
disorders in the emotional sphere where so many of our troubles are rooted,

BOOK REVIEWS

291

maladjustments that often go back to incidents m our childhood; and
then, on the positive side, to growth in self-reliance and the ability to face
up to situations-recognizing things for what they are in truth and reality,
even at the cost of unpleasantness or pain.
The third section of Father Curran's book deals with those psychological
forces that are necessary to the shaping of true counseling skill. Here the
case histories are multiplied, with the practical intent of showing the
delicacy of approach, sympathy, and sensitiveness to shifting accents in
the revelations made to him that the prudential counselor must possess.
Though no two records are the same (since the singular facts of human
existence, by their very contingency, vary from individual to individual)
it is possible to discern the general principle that guides the counseling
procedure when it is non-directive: not to give advice, but rather to so
conduct the interview that the individual finds his own solution to his
problems; in short, to make counsel client-centered. To come to grips with
one's difficulties in this manner-by frank self-exploration, by remembrance
of meaningful events in the past, by reasonable insights into the present,
by cautious foresight of what is to come, by docile acceptance of the facts
of reality-surely a solution of this sort will give more confidence in
oneself and a firmer prognosis of readjustment than if one is forced to
rely on outside help. And as long as a man has the use of reason, there
is always the possibility that he can be brought to see his difficulties in a
reasonable light, and to apply his own prudential knowledge to the
ments of his will and instincts.
But the techniques of non-directive counseling do not stop short at the
clinic or classroom. They have significance for all the walks of life and in
occupations both secular and religious. Their range of operation, in fact,
is bounded solely by the limits that ignorance, instability, and badly
lated emotions have placed on the centralizing forces of personality. They
may even reach into the confessional where, working in a supernatural
atmosphere, they can produce most salutary effects on the soul. Now the
goal of counsel is sinner-centered instead of client-centered; and from
conscious analysis of his failures in concreto, rather than from confused
efforts to recognize how general moral principles are applied to the contingent facts of sin, the penitent becomes more profoundly aware of the
reality of his transgressions; promises of amendment are made with a more
open mind and a more sincere heart; and the whole problem of supernatural integration, as it seems to me, is set on a surer footing.
These are some of the ideas with which Father Curran closes his book.
As at the beginning, so at the end, he is at pains to show the relation of
the non-directive type of counsel to the larger Thomistic conception of
prudence. His work opens up hitherto unopened avenues of thought, on
which it will well repay the reader to reflect; and in this sense it manifests

BOOK REVIEWS

the courageous qualities of every pioneering effort. Yet from another point
of view, it is a return, with ample empiriological evidence, to the ground
motif of the Thomistic morality, with its insistence on the major role of
prudential knowledge. With his superb control over the findings of the
counseling clinic, Father Curran illustrates how certain important aspects
of modern research can tighten the philosopher's and theologian's grasp
on the principles that lie at the foundations of the good life. More than
this: he has shown how such empiriological insights can become practical
in the development of natural virtue, thus laying a secure and lasting
foundation for the higher life of grace and Christian perfection.
RoBERT

St. Mary of the Springs,
Columbus, Ohio

EDWARD

BRENNAN,

0. P.

BRIEF NOTICES
The Trinity and God the Creator. By REGINALD GARRIGOU-Lii.GRANGE,
0. P. St. Louis: Herder, 1952. Pp. 681. $7.50.
Life Everlasting. By REGINALD GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE,
Herder, 1952. Pp. 281. $4.50.

0. P. St. Louis:

The first of these two recently translated works of the well-known
Thomist, Father Garrigou-Lagrange, 0. P., is a commentary on the Summa
of Saint Thomas, I, qq. 27-119. The series of volumes, of which this is a
part, was intended originally as a type of manual-commentary for the use
of students; and provides an excellent introduction to the works and
thought of the Angelic Doctor. The author does not over-simplify questions,
nor does he hesitate to present the fullness of Thomistic doctrine. His
style is clear, and in the manner of the earlier commentators follows
Saint Thomas article by article, with an introductory status quaestionis
and concluding recapitulations.
The resulting comx'nentary, resembling
those of Billuart and Gonet rather than the earlier commentators, is
directly intended for the use of students.
The treatise on the Trinity is preceded by an introduction dealing
briefly with Sacred Scripture and the Fathers, which is useful; but of
course, not adequate for a full appreciation of these sources. The difficulties concerning the existence of a real terminus in the act of love, really
distinct from the will, is not discussed fully in reference to the Holy Ghost.
With regard the formal constituent of personality, the author follows
Cajetan.
The second work, Life Everlasting, is a treatise on the four last things.
The first part deals with the " depth " of the soul, its unlimited scope, and
shows the basis of this depth in the spirituality of the soul, whose desire
for truth and goodness can be fully satisfied only by Sovereign Truth
and Good. It is, in a way, a restatement of the first questions of the
Prima Secundae on beatitude and man's final end. Of special note is the
study made of the language of the mystics regarding the inner depths
or " center " of the soul, of the substance of the soul.
The second half of the work is a treatise on eschatology, properly socalled, in which the greatest emphasis is placed on the beatific vision and
its nature. We would have rejoiced, had the author given greater consideration, as do many modern theologians, to the " social aspects " of heaven.
Father Garrigou-Lagrange stresses the "personal" rather than the "common good," whereas for Saint Thomas the notion of heaven as a bonum
commune is of great importance.

293

294

BRIEF NOTICES

The appearance of these two volumes in translation makes a welcome
addition to the growing library of texts of St. Thomas and of his followers
now available for those whose studies must be pursued in the English
language.

Super Evangelium S. Joannis Lectura. By St. THOMAS AQUINAS. Ed. by
Raphael Cai, 0. P. Turin: Marietti, 1952. Pp. 551. L. 2000.
In Aristotelis Libras: De Caelo et llfundo, De Generatione et Corruptione,
Meteorologicorum Expositio. By St. THOMAS AQUINAS. Ed. by Raymund M. Spiazzi, 0. P. Turin: Marietti, 1952. Pp. 768. L. 3500.
It is a pleasure to be able to give notice of the publication of two more
volumes in the reprinting of the text of St. Thomas by Marietti. The
format and arrangement of the texts are uniform with the previous
volumes of the series, and are a great improvement over the earlier Marietti
edition. The new typography and disposition of matter will render the
text much easier to read.
The text used for the Commentary on St. John is the same as that used
in the earlier Piana edition. Two useful indices have been added; one of
subject-matter, the other a general synoptic index. This particular Commentary dates from the later years of St. Thomas, H!69-H!79.!, and is of
undoubted authenticity. The reading of this work should give not only a
more profound understanding of the Sacred Text, but also should serve
to demonstrate the exegetical skill and scriptural knowledge of the Angelic
Doctor. It is thought too often by some that St. Thomas did not pay
sufficient attention to the sources of dogma. A careful study of this Commentary should serve to correct such a notion, since it manifests that the
author is truly a magister in sacra pagina. The Commentary, doctrinal
rather than philosophical, gives St. Thomas the opportunity of expressing
himself on many related matters, so that it is rich in references to many
other points of Thomistic doctrine. Of special interest is the discussion
of The Trinity occasioned by the Prologue of St. John.
The Commentaries on Aristotle are reprinted from the text of the
Leonine Edition. The Introduction, with some omissions, is likewise taken
from that edition, and contains a chronological table as well as three
synoptic tables. The critical notes of the Leonine have been omitted while
the textual arrangement has been altered to conform with the present
Marietti texts. It is manifest that this volume is to be recommended to
natural philosophers not only for its historical significance, but also for
the philosophical value of the natural philosophy of both Aristotle and
St. Thomas.

BRIEF NOTICES

295

The Heart of Saint Therese. By ABBE ANDRE CoMBES. Trans. by a Carmelite Nun. New York: P. J. Kenedy, 1951. Pp.
St. Therese and Suffering, The Spirituality of St. Therese in Its Essence.
By ABBE ANDRE CoMBEs. Trans. by Msgr. P. E. Hallett. New York:
P. J. Kenedy, 1951. Pp. 141.
These volumes are the last two of three by the French theologian, Abbe
Combes, on the spirituality of St. Therese; and they form an integral
exposition of her doctrine. The great value of these volumes is to show
the theological basis of St. Therese's "Little Way" and to demonstrate
that this Saint's spiritual way to sanctity is rooted in the essentials of
Christian doctrine. The object was to give the reader, theologian or layman,
a true understanding of St. Therese, so that her life, properly appreciated
and understood, could serve as a model for Christians. These sound
studies should have the happy result of lessening the over-sentimental
attitude so commonly and unfortunately entertained with regard to this
saint and mystic. Carried away by his admiration for the Saint, the author
becomes sentimental instead of allowing the life and writings of the Saint
to speak for themselves. However, this does not diminish the substantial
theological value of the works, based throughout on actual facts or texts,
with which the author is thoroughly conversant.
The Heart of St. Therese deals with the love for Christ which was the
dynamic force of the Saint's spirituality and is a fuller treatment of
Chapters II and HI of the first volume of the series. The characteristic
Theresian doctrines of the "Little Way" and of the "Spiritual Childhood" have nothing to do with pious sentimentality, but are the expression
and result of charity, an intimate, personal love for Christ. St. Therese is
thus in the line of the great mystic tradition, not only of Carmel, but the
Catholic Church. (cf. pp. 160 ff.) One point of particular interest to the
Thomistic moral theologian is the fact, often demonstrated by the author,
that it was this love which allowed the Saint to " solve " various problems
of her spiritual life: her inner trials, difficulties at prayer, her spiritual
desolation and abandonment, her striving for the very heights of mystic
union and sanctity, in spite of the accent on humility in the "Little Way."
(cf. pp.
114 ff., etc.) This is an excellent example of the harmonious
functioning in the moral life of charity and prudence. This latter virtue,
so vital to the Thomistic concept of the moral life, and so forgotten to-day,
rests on love; and, being directed by love, orders the rest of life in accord
with love; and achieves the objective standard for moral actions, not
attained by conscience. Though this is not mentioned by Abbe Combes,
the solution of difficulties by St. Therese is the work of supernatural
prudence based on charity.

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BRIEF NOTICES

The final volume of the series, St. Therese and Suffering, deals with the
basic principle of suffering as taught and exemplified by Christ, and illustrated by the doctrine and actions of the Saint. The love of suffering,
often misinterpreted, is not to be judged by merely psychological standards. (pp. 22, 28) Enlightened by a realization of the insufficiency of
all created things (p. 28), inspired by a call of grace (ibid.), it is the full
expression of St. Therese's desire to imitate the object of her love, Christ
Himself. This volume is of a different character from the preceding in
that the author, having a point to prove (p. 55), is at pains to document
every statement, and to refute other interpretations of the Theresian way
of suffering. The great attention here given to controversy is a bit disappointing, after the more irenic expositions of the earlier volumes. Nevertheless, the value of the book is to bring us into direct contact with the
Saint, that her own doctrine may be grasped.

Logic: The Art of Defining and Reasoning. By JoHN A. OESTERLE. New
York: Prentice-Hall,
Pp. 250 with index. $2.85.
From the Aristotelian-Thomistic point of view, none among the recent
publications oJ' logic texts approaches Doctor Oesterle's brillant contribution. Logic is the product of a genuine scholar of the traditional logic.
It is an achievement of the greatest moment for this classic discipline.
For this volume to be called a landmark is no exaggeration, since it is a
book that gives the college student a complete course in logic. It is not a
truncated edition, a presentation limited to formal logic. On the contrary,
it offers the whole subject with candor, authority, completeness, and
intelligence. The whole of the discipline of the Stagirite has been restored,
and students will now see for themselves that logic is more than mental
gymnastics, will see that it is a powerful instrument for clear thinking
in all fields of knowledge.
Some years ago in a lengthy report on two logic books, the present
reviewer suggested: " The way to teach logic is to return to the Organon
of Aristotle." (The Thomist, X,
Professor Oesterle has done just
that. His text attains such brilliance of composition and exposition that
it seems unlikely any book will equal or surpass it for sometime to come.
Even compared with many older and standard texts in the field, this
volume stands as the epitome. of perfection. Anyone familiar with the logic
of Aristotle can see this fact merely by glancing at the table of contents.
Doctor Oesterle has divided his work according to the three acts of
the mind. Part One includes two initial chapters on words, concepts, signs,
and the predicables. Then the catagories are treated. Since the book is an
introduction to logic, the categories are handled succinctly yet adequately.

BRIEF NOTICES

Division and definition conclude the first part. This section, as weH as
the whole work, is characterized by a splendid clarity of expression. In
his definitions, the author achieves a brevity and precision that excels,
while the style possesses a certitude and sureness that the reader cannot
escape.
The two remaining parts of the work live up to the promise of the
first section. Especially noteworthy is the chapter on supposition. The
author shows that this difficult but vital aspect of logic can be presented
in a clear fashion. Argumentation is competently explained in the Third
Part, and it should be noted that Doctor Oesterle has deliberately and
successfully directed his work to demonstration with the consequence that
the syllogism gains its proper significance. While the true and vital role
of the syllogism is shown, the need for induction is not ignored. Finally, a
very good summary of sophistical reasoning concludes the main text of the
book.
In case one were to doubt the validity of the author's procedure, he
has included an appendix which is a translation of Lesson I of St. Thomas'
commentary on the Posterior Analytics. In it, St. Thomas gives his complete doctrine on how logic should be presented. It is good that Professor
Oesterle has taken the Angelic Doctor's words to heart, for in so doing
he has produced an outstanding text of Aristotelian logic. Also included
in the appendix are the first three lessons on St. Thomas' commentary on
Aristotle's On Interpretation. The excellent translations are the work of
the author's wife.
Each chapter of the book concludes with two types of exercises. The
first is a series of questions, requiring essay answers, which test the
student's comprehension of the matter covered. The second consists of
problems which challenge the student's capacity to apply the knowledge
acquired. Whereas the first group of questions subjected the memory to a
test, the second set tries his ingenuity and reasoning process. These
exercises should be an integral part of the logic course.
Thanks to Doctor Oesterle there is still hope that Aristotelian philosophy
will not only survive at the college level, but will attract a more enthusiastic
audience among the students.

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Natural and Mathematical Sciences.
By Sister HELEN SuLLIVAN, 0. S. B. New York: Vantage Press, 19Ml.
Pp. 188 with index. $8.75.
As interest in intellectual synthesis grows rapidly among educators in
American higher education, an equally growing need for well thought out
directives is manifest. To see the arts and the sciences in the context of
highest wisdom is the mark of the wise man himself, and when the prin-

298

BRIEF NOTICES

ciples necessary to establish and maintain intellectual order are lost, the
process of rediscovery is slow and extremely difficult. The guidance of
wisdom is needed.
Sister Helen proposes the guidance of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas
in the contemporary quest for intellectual unity in the form of a discussion text designed for advanced students in a college seminar. In proposing the main outlines of modern Thomistic thought on the interrelationship of the several levels of knowledge, she is not embarking on an
untrodden path, for such proposals have been made before. The precise
contribution of this book is to provide a blueprint for seminar reading
and discussions which will enable the college student to see the knowledge
he has acquired in the sciences, arts and humanities in the matrix of
traditional wisdom.
An Introduction is designed primarly to serve as a guide for reading in
the field of philosophy of science for students who have completed the
major part of their advanced education and have had, in additiou, the
equivalent of fifteen hours of philosophy. This book is admirably suited
to stimulate a student with such a background to search for integrity
and wholeness of viewpoint. On the other hand, the thesis of the text
is so fundamental and the statement of the problems so clear that the
student with much less training could read the book with profit.
The first half of the text is devoted to an outline of an ideal synthesis,
that of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. The last section reviews the
problems of mathematical and natural sciences in the context of this unity
and suggests solutions to the knotty issues raised by modern science. Concrete discussions of mathematical, physical, chemical and biological problems aid the student in relating his courses to the main outlines of a
Thomistic synthesis, and a list of questions, topics for discussion and
suggested reading give strong practical guidance in matters which tend at
times to become abstruse.
Since the purpose of the book is to provide positive guidance to seminar
reading on the problem of integration, the reader might expect that many
pages would be devoted to the presentation of traditional Thomistic
teaching .. The blueprint outlined in the opening section of the text, however, is not itself without real issues open for discussion. The question
of the division of the sciences and the consequent place of contemporary
natural science and mathematics in that division is much debated among
Thomists today, ;md is perhaps the most important issue in the search for
principles of redintegration. This issue is not discussed in detail, however,
and the author selects one of the current positions which adheres "more
closely to the medieval notion of science" (p. 58) as the unifying theme
of her text. During the seminar discussion, one might ask about this
basic issue, but for the purposes of a text, it is necessary to organise the
matter around a single viewpoint.

BRIEF NOTICES

There are many other legitimate questions which the reader of An
Introduction might raise concerning the 6rganization and statement of the
theme. Why, for example, does the author place "A Study of Space,
Time and Motion " ,in the section on Mathematics? It would seem, according to the general motif of the text, that these subjects would be discussed
in the section on the physical sciences. On page 48 the reader is shown the
broad extent of AJ:istotle's natural knowledge, that "the great treatises of
Aristotle embraced studies dealing with every aspect of nature." But
then we are told that his works on natural philosophy are " largely comprised in the eight books of the Physics." The tremendous bulk of his
work is found in his other treatises which are called scientific by the
author (p. 49) but not philosophic. This suggests a division in Aristotle's
scientific approach which the author had before stated as integral. This,
too, might provide the seminar with debatable matter.
On page 166 we read that modern experimental sciences provide facts,
observations and calculations which, fa1: from being a mere collectivity,
really tell us something about the nature of the things studied. But even
though we are introduced to the properties, characteristics and qualities
of natures, we cannot discern the inherent necessities in these natures and
cannot achieve absolute certainty in these matters. Do not the constant
operations reveal the inherent natural necessity, and can we not have
physical certainty here? In natural science, do we ask for more than this?
Obviously, this book was not designed to give definitive answers to the
questions just raised, but rather to seriously raise them and many more
besides, and to give direction and useful aids to the advanced student
interested in organizing his knowledge in the light of higher wisdom. This
end _is certainly achieved in a most lively and trustworthy manner in
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Natural and Mathematical Sciences.

Philosophy and the Experimental Sciences. Proceedings of the American
Catholic Philosophical Association, Volume XXVI, April 1952. Washington: Catholic University Press, l-952. Pp. 232. $3.00.
The latest proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association give detailed examination to the areas of contact between scholastic
philosophy and modern science.
A sapiential background for the specialized papers is furnished by the
addresses of Etienne Gilson and Fr. F. X. Meehan, outgoing president of
the group. After these, Vincent Smith launches into a philosophical
analysis of abstraction and the empiriological method. Then the experimental sciences of physics, biology, and psychology are reported on by
Karl Herzfeld, Fr. Lucian Dufault, and Raymond McCall, respectively.

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The concluding section, which makes up half the publication, is devoted
to round table discussions ranging through all of philosophy from Logic
and Method to Ethics and Moral Philosophy.
One receives the dear impression from this volume that American
scholastic philosophers take a realistic view of the accomplishments of
modern science and its methodology. They do not condemn the experimental sciences, nor do they attempt to tell their proponents how to
develop them. Rather they are at pains to show that science can be
right, and .scholastic philosophy even more right, provided everyone keeps
the respective areas of discourse properly separated one from the other.
The prevalent view of the Association seems to be one of concordism,
after the Louvain school, between philosophy and modern science.
A refreshing note is sounded in two discussions by Frs. W. H. Kane, 0. P.
and .B. M. Ashley, 0. P. from the Albertus Magnus Lyceum of Physical
Science, River Forest, Illinois, who advocate a more unified view of the
science of nature in the pure tradition of Aristotle and St. Thomas. While
not o:ffering so facile a solution to modern difficulties as the majority view,
this suggests a more basic integration, not only of science with philosophy,
but even within the modern sciences themselves. The idea is so pregnant
with possibilities for directing contemporary scientific thought into a
Thomistic orientation that it would seem to merit a leading position on
subsequent agenda for the philosophy of science.

The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. By JosEPH OwENS,
C. SS. R. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 19tH.
Pp. 471. $5.00.
The problem posed in this book is this: what precisely is it that
Aristotle is studying when he is studying "being" in the Metaphysics?
The trouble is not that Aristotle failed to say what the object of metaphysics is, but that he said too often what it is, and rarely did he say it
twice in the same way. There are at least eleven different statements by
Aristotle on what that object is (enumerated on p. 6).
Father Owens first passes in review the solutions of the earlier Greek
commentators (Theophrastus, Eudemus of Rhodes, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Pseudo-Alexander, Syrianus, Asdepius and Clement of Alexandria)
and of the nineteenth and twentieth century commentators (Ravaisson,
Schwegler, Bonitz, Zeller, Natorp, Grote, Piat, Gomperz, Apelt, Dimmler,
Rodier, Hammelin, Jaegar, Ross, Carlini, v. Arnim, V. Ivanka, Oggioni,
Robin, di Napoli, Armstrong). Out of this meticulous research emerge
the two alternatives: "In the Greek tradition Being q'u.a Being seem to be

BRIEF NOTICES

301

ultimately identified with the Being of the separate Entities. Among
the Arabs there appears with Avicenna its interpretation as Ens Commune.
In this sense the Aristotelian phrase was understood in the mediaeval
universities. . . . These two general interpretations, though understood in
various ways, have been revived in the present era." (p. 22) Which
tradition, if either, is authentically Aristotelian? The alternatives having
been presented with historical and philosophical exactitude, the next
problem is that of method: how to read the Metaphysics to get at its
account of being as Aristotle understood being. First, there is acknowledged the necessity of combining form with content to understand
Aristotle, and general agreement with Jaeger's analysis of the form of the
Next, the working out of the methodical sequence of the
treatises which constitute the Metaphysics. By "methodical sequence"
the author means the order in which the mature Aristotle thought these
treatises should be read, which is not the order in which they are published
and not necessarily the order in which they were written. Finally the
various chronologies worked out by Jaeger, v. Arnim, Nuyen and Oggioni
are examined. The author finds none of them satisfying and so he follows
the methodical order previously devised by himself.
There follows the body of the book: an exhaustive investigation of the
Aristotelian text to determine the meaning of being as Aristotle understood
it. Out of this analysis emerges Father Owens' conclusion: the being that
first philosophy studies is form in the sense of act as found in the separate
Entities. " A science treating universally of Beings which is not identified
with the science of a definite type of Being, the primary type, is foreign
to the Stagirite's procedure." (p. 299) Being qua Being means to Aristotle separate substance, not Ens Commune: the Greek commentators
were right, Avicenna and his mediaeval Christian followers were wrong.
The authoritative seholarship of this book is suggested by the informed
balance of the author in, for example, his judicious treatment of Jaeger. It
is suggested, too, by the one hundred and twenty pages of notes and
references, and the bibliography of five hundred and two titles. This book
gathers together all the earlier scholarship on this problem, except the
Arabian; quite possible it is also the definitive treatment of it to date.

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BRIEF NOTICES

The Theory of Universals. By. R. I. AARON. New York:
versity Press,
Pp.
with index.

Oxford Uni-

One can congratulate the author on realizing the importance of this
topic, even while one must regretfully add that, in spite of a great deal of
hard work and good will, the treatment must be pronounced unsatisfactory,
mainly because Mr. Aaron makes no real contact with the mainstream of
scholastic teaching on the universals. Apart from an unsatisfying first
chapter, in which cursory and desultory references are made to Porphyry
and to various medievals, the focus of attention is on the empiricists:
Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and on the rationalists: Spinoza, Descartes, Kant,
and Leibnitz. The treatment of these authors occupies the whole of the
first half of the book, which is apologetically presented as a " sort of
anthology from the history of philosophy with a view to the requirements
of Part II." (p. viii)
This disproportionate emphasis is all the more surprising in that Mr.
Aaron does not set much store by their contributions to the theory of
universals. Thus he rightly judges that Locke's conceptualism ends in
scepticism; he finds Berkeley "disappointing," and criticises the Rationalists on the score of their not successfully proving the existence of innate
ideas or schemata. Only for Hume does he have any warm approval. Hume
is praised because he showed that " learning to use general words is not
normally a conscious act," but can be explained largely in terms of habits,
mental sets, or dispositions. The Thomistic view that knowledge progresses
from the confused to the distinct is here unjustly ignored. It is safe to
add that had the author been acquainted with R. Jolivet's .zlassic work,
LaNotion de Substance, he could have re-written most of Part I.
Part II represents an attempt at a positive theory. Unmindful of the
traditional triple distinction of universals viz., in significando, in causando,
and in essendo, the author treats only of the first and seeks to answer the
question, " How do we use general words? " He rejects successively the
ante rem theory, conceptualism, and nominalism. He then feels constrained to reject what he mistakes for Aristotelian realism on the ground
that this postulates that all universals are discovered, whereas, for example,
the universal " being human " is not found ready made in reality but is
rather " a quality for which we ourselves are partly responsible ... it is
to a certain degree ' the workmanship of the mind.'" (p. 218) Superficially, this statement closely resembles the traditional thomistic teaching
as given by M.D. Rolland-Gosselin in the preface to his edition of De ente
et essentia: "St. Thomas makes his own the strong expression of Averrocs
-'It is the intelligence which makes the universal.'" Unfortunately, the
resemblance is not more than superficial; the author nowhere realizes that
the universal can be abstracted from a single instance, but instead he

BRIEF NOTICES

808

thinks that " the fundamental basis of all generalizing . . is observation
of natural recurrences." (p. 242} The familiar distinction between the
logical and the metaphysical universal would have been of great assistance
to him at this point.
His final conclusion is that " universals are, first, recurrences, and,
secondly, principles of grouping." (p. 244} The second half of this statement might be favorably construed as a somewhat cumbrous attempt to
recognize the logical universal, but the first definitely rests on a failure to
understand the nature of abstraction. With becoming modesty, Mr. Aaron
ends his book with the admission that he has by-passed what some would
consider the "real problem of universals," namely, "the final explanation
of recurrences in nature." He spoils matters even here by thinking that
the one attempt to solve it is that made by" the friends of Forms." While,
to repeat, we consider his performance inferior to his promise, it is fair
to add that he merits commendation for his recognition of the< crucial
importance of the universal in any theory of thinking.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Anstruther, 0. P., Godfrey. Vaux of Harrowden. Newport, Mon.: Johns
Ltd., 1953. Pp. 567 with index.
Avery, 0. S. B., Benedict R. (ed.). Daily Compline. Pp. 104. $0.55.
Daily Prime. Pp. 93. $0.45. Collegeville: The Liturgical Press,
Bloomfield, Morton W. The Seven Deadly Sins. E. Lansing: Michigan
State College Press,
Pp. 496 with index. $7.50.
Bryson, Lyman (ed.). Facing the Future's Risks. New York: Harper,
1953. Pp. 326 with index. $4.00.
Buytaert, 0. F. M., Eligius M. (ed.) Peter Aureoli Script1tm Super Primum
Sententiarum. St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 1953. Pp.
476.

--.

Henry of Ghent, Summae Quaestionum Ordinariarum (Reprint of
The Franciscan Institute, 1953.
Carlson, 0. P., Sebastian. The Virtue of Humility. Dubuque: Wm. C.
Brown, Co., 1952. Pp. 155 with index. $3.50.
Clark, S. J., Joseph T. Conventional Logic and Modern Logic. Woodstock:
Woodstock College Press, 1952. Pp. 116 with indexes. $2.00.
Sapientiae. New York:
Cornford, F. M. (ed. W. K. Guthrie).
Cambridge University Press, 1952. Pp. 227 with index. $5.00.
Davies, J. G, The Origin and Development of Early Christian Church
Architecture. New York: :Philosophical Library, 1953.
165 with
index. $4.75.
Diekmann, 0. S. B. Godfrey L. The Easter Vigil. Collegeville: The
Liturgical Press, 1953. Pp. 62. $0.20.
Dirksen, C. PP. S., Aloys. A Life of Christ. New York: Dryden Press,
1952. Pp. 351 with index. $3.75.
Donlan, 0. P., Thomas C. Theology and Education. Dubuque: Wm. C.
Brown, Co., 1952. Pp. 142. $3.50.
Dopp, Joseph. Ler;ons de Logique Formelle. Vols. I, pp. 178; H, pp. 228;
HI, pp.
with indexes. Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1952. $7.00.
Eppstein, John (trans. and ed .. ). Code of International Ethics. Westminster: Newman, 1953. Pp. 271 with index. $4.00.
Faraon, 0. P., Michael J. The Metaphysical and Psychological Principles
of Love. Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown, Co., 1953. Pp. 99. $3.00.
Fenton, Msgr. Joseph C. & Benard, Rev. Edmond D. (eds.). Studies in
Praise of Our Blessed Mother. Washington: The Catholic University
of America, 1952. Pp. 291. $£.75.
Flood, C. S. B., Robert H. Bashful Chair. Rochester: St. John Fisher
Pp. 97. $3.00.
College,
1520 Edition) . St. Bonaventure:

304

BOOKS RECEIVED

305

Franciscan Fathers. First Franciscan National Marian Congress in Acclamation of the Dogma of the Assumption. Burlington: Portiuncula,
Pp. 315 with index.
Grandmaison, S. J., Leonce de (tr. by Angeline Bouchard). We and the
Holy Spirit. Chicago: Fides, 1953. Pp.
$3.75.
Grazia, Sebastian de. Errors of Psychotherapy. New York: Doubleday,
1952. Pp. 288 with index. $3.00.
Grossouw, William (tr. & ed. Martin W. Schoenberg, 0. S.C.). In Christ.
Westminster: Newman, 195£. Pp. 138 with scriptural index. $2.25.
Hayen, S. J. Andre. Saint Thomas d'Aquin et la Vie de l'Eglise. Louvain:
E. Nauwelaerts, 1952. Pp. 109 with index. $0.90.
Hopper, Stanley R. Spiritual Problems in Contemporary Literature. New
York: Harper, 1952. Pp. 314 with index. $3.00.
Howell, S. J., Clifford. Of Sacraments and Sacrifice. Collegeville: The
Liturgical Press, 1952. Pp. 182. $2.50.
Hyde, Douglas. The Answer to Communism. St. Paul: The Catechetical
Guild, 1952. Pp. 64. $0.15.
Ignatius, D. M. J., Mother M. As the Stars They Shall Shine. New York:
Vantage Press, 1952. Pp. £H. $3.00.
Johnson, A. H. Whitehead's Theory of Reality. Boston: Beacon Press,
Pp.
with index. $4.00.
Kenny, 0. P., John P. Principles of Medical Ethics. Westminster: Newman, 1952. Pp. 221 with index. $3.25.
Knox, Ronald A. Commentary on the Gospels. New York: Sheed &
Ward, 1952. Pp. 302 with index. $3.75.
Kraft, Victor. The Vienna Circle. New York: Philosophical Library, Hl53.
Pp.
with index. $3.75.
Lowrie, Walter. Action in the Liturgy. New York: Philosophical Library,
1953. Pp. 314 with index. $4.75.
McCormick, M. M., James A. Blueprint for Enslavement. St. Paul: The
Catechetical Guild, 1952. Pp. 64. $0.15.
Maritain, Jacques. The Range of Reason. New York: Scribner's, 1952.
Pp.
with index. $3.50.
Merton, Thomas. The Sign of Jonas. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953.
Pp. 362. $3.50.
Mesnard, Jean. Pascal. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. Pp.
227. $3.75.
Micklinghofl', 0. P., J. A.M. Openbaring en Geloofsgenade. Nijmegen:
Centrale Drukkerij N. V., 1952. Pp. 258.
Miller, S. C., Sr. M. Janet. General Education in the American Catholic
Secondary School. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University, 1952.
Pp. 187 with index. $2.00.
Osborne, Harold. Theory of Beauty. New York: Philosophical Library,
1953. Pp. 227 with index. $4.75.

10

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Oursler, Fulton. The Christmas Story. St. Paul: The Catechetical Guild,
Pp. 64. $0.15.
Parsch, Pius. The Church's Year of Grace, II. Collegeville: The Liturgical
Press, 1953. Pp. 410. $3.00.
Passmore, J. A. Hume's Intentions. New York: Cambridge University
Press,
Pp. 173 with index. $3.75.
Pp.
Picard, Max. The World of Silence. Chicago: Regnery,
$2.50.
Rock, 0_ P., Augustine. Unless They Be Sent. Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown,
Co., 1953. Pp.
with index. $3.50.
Rohof, S. J., Jan. La Saintete Substantielle du Christ dans la Theologie
Pp. 144. Fr. S. 11.
Scolastique. Fribourg: Editions St. Paul,
Russell, W. H. Teaching the Christian Virtues. Milwaukee: Bruce,
Pp.
with index.
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica. 5 Vols. Biblioteca de Autores
Cristianos. (distrib. The Catholic Classics,
E. Harrison, Harlingen, Texas.)
cloth, $15.50 leather.
Sheed, F. J. Society and Sanity. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1958. Pp.
with index. $8.00.
Sheen, Bishop Fulton J. Crisis in History. St. Paul: The Catechetical
Guild,
Pp. 64. $0.15.
Sister Mary Janet, S. C: (ed.). The Integration of the Catholic Secondary
School Curriculum. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University.
Pp. 159 with index.
Siwek, Paul. The Enigma of the Hereafter. New York: Philosophical
Pp. 154 with index. $8.00.
Library,
Thornton, Francis B. Sea of Glory. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1953. Pp.
$3.00.
Vann, 0. P ., Gerald. Eve q,nd the Gryphon,
Ed. London: Blackfriars,
Pp. 71. $MO.
--. The Pain of Christ, 8rd Ed. London: Blackfriars,
Pp. 79.
$MO.
Von Hildebrand, Dietrich. Christian Ethics. New York: McKay, 1958.
Pp. 480 with index. $6.00.
Pp.
with
Welch, Claude. In This Name. New York: Scribner's,
index. $8.50.
Wisdom, John. Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis. New York: Philosophical
$5.75.
Library, 1958. Pp.