THE T OMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS:

THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PRoVINCE OF ST. JosEPH

Publishers:

VoL.

XVII

The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

APRIL, 1954

THE PRESENCE, MISSION, AND INDWELLING
OF THE DIVINE PERSONS IN THE JUST

I.

THE FACT OF THE PRESENCE

Scripture assures us of the reality of such a
presence by affirmations which are well-known. Nonetheless it is worthwhile to examine these affirmations in
order to draw from them the greatest possible light on a
mystery at once so beautiful and impenetrable. Our Lord
asserts:
If any one love me, he will keep my word, and my Father will
love him, and we will come to him, and will make our abode with
him. 1 If you love me, keep my commandments. And I will ask
the Father, and he shall give you another Paraclete, that he may
abide with you forever. The spirit of truth who ... shall abide with
you, and shall be in you. 2 If I go not, the Paraclete will not come
John 14: .
• lbid. 14: ll.i-17.

1

131

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LUIGI CIAPPI .

to you; but if I go, I will send him to you.8 But when the Paraclete cometh, whom I will send you from the Father, the Spirit
of truth, who proceedeth from the Father."
St. Paul confirms the testimony of the Saviour:
We are the temple of the living God.5 The charity of God is poured
forth into our hearts by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us.6 Or
know you not that your members are the temple of the Holy
Ghost, who is in you, whom you have from God? 7 Know you not,
that you are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God
dwelleth in you? ... For the temple of God is holy, which you
are.8 And because you are sons, God hath sent the Spirit of his
Son into your hearts, crying: Abba, Father. 9
These texts, considered in their entirety, affirm clearly the
presence of the Three Divine Persons in all Christians who are
in possession of grace and charity, even in baptized infants. 10
The coming of the Father and the Son and the mission of the
Holy Spirit, which seem conceded exclusively to adult Christians, since they are capable of actually loving the Son and of
observing His commandments, can be understood only in the
sense of a new coming and a new mission, not of the substantial
but of the accidental and psychological order, which is proper
to love and the practice of Christian virtue. Hence, there is no
doubt that all Christians without distinction become through
grace the habitation and temple of the Holy Spirit and, for
this reason, of God and of the other two Divine Persons, since
they are indivisible in essence and operation. If the Holy
Spirit is said to be in a special manner the guest of the soul and
body of the just through the grace and charity by which the
sanctified Members of the Mystical Body are informed, this
does not mean that the Third Person has a presence which is
proper and exclusive,. but only an appropriated presence, because of the special affinity which the Apostle supposes to exist
between the love of charity and the Holy Spirit. This has been
7 I Cor. 6:19.
• II Cor. 6:16.
"Ibid. 16:7.
"Rom. 5:5.
• I Cor. 8:16-17.
• Gal. 4:6.
• Ibid. 15: 26.
1 ° Cf. Council of Vienne, Const. "De Summa Trinitate,"
Denzinger, Enchiridion
Symbolorum, ed. 17, no. 483; Council of Trent, sess. 6, chap. 2, Denzinger, no. 800.

THE DIVINE PERSONS IN THE JUST

133

the interpretation which the Greek and Latin Fathers have
given to the thought of St. PauL They, in fact, are in accord
in asserting and defending the consubstantiality, circuminsession, and identity of the attributes and operations ad extra
of the Three Divine Persons. None of the actions comprised
in the sanctification of the soul is attributed to the Holy Spirit
in such a way as to make us think that His union with the soul
in grace is informative and personaL Therefore, to ascribe to
the Greek Fathers (as Lessius, Petavius, Thomassin, Scheeben
have done) the opinion of an immediate, proper, personal union
between the sanctified soul and the Divine Paraclete, is to
falsify the real meaning of patristic thought. The Fathers,
especially the ante-Nicenes, who adhered more in doctrine and
language to Divine Revelation, certainly placed in relief the
action of the Holy Spirit in the divine work of sanctification,
but only with the intention of noting the special conformity
and resemblance between the gifts of God and the Prime Gift,
which is the Personal Love of the Father and the Son. Thus
the peculiar relations between the soul and the Holy Spirit are
unfolded always in the sphere of exemplary causality, but never
in that of infonnative, efficient, or final causality. And even
the exemplarity, or in other words the resemblance, is asserted
not as exclusive but as more manifest in virtue of the
" appropriation." 11

II.

NATURE

OF THE PRESENCE

oF THE TRINITY

IN THE JusT

A. Is the testimony of Sacred Scripture in favor only of a
psychological, that is, an intentional and affective presence; or
also of an ontological, substantial and therefore thoroughly real
presence? The texts cited above beautifully conciliate both
meanings. They speak to us explicitly of a mission and an
indwelling which are effected only in the just who love God
and observe His commandments; but, implicitly, they suppose
11 Cf. Dom L. Chambat,
0. S. B., Les Missions des Personnes de la SainteTrinite, selon Saint Thomas d'Aquin (ed. Fontenelle, Abbey St. Wandrille, 1943),
p. 196; P. Galtier, S. J., Le; Saint Esprit en nous d'apres les Peres grecs (Rome,
1946); and L'Habitation en nous des trois Personnes (Rome, 1950).

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LUIGI CIAPPI

a real and substantial presence of the Blessed Trinity in all
Christians who are in the state of grace. We have, however,
sufficient basis in Revelation to distinguish the "presence" of
the Blessed Trinity from the " coming " of the Father and the
Son, the " mission " and " gift-giving " of the Holy Spirit, and
the " indwelling " of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The
"presence," demanded and revealed by the supernatural gifts
of grace and charity, can be only physical and substantial
because, according to the multiple affirmations of the New
Testament, only God is the immediate author of grace. And
the author of grace is the triune God, since grace renders us
participants of the innermost divine nature which is unique and
subsistent in three distinct Persons. Only one who possesses
grace and charity can love the Son of God, observe His precepts, and receive the Father and the Son into himself as permanent guests. In like manner, only one who is already a son
of God through grace is made worthy to receive also His Spirit
-indeed, to have the right to exclaim, "Abba, Father! " But,
as an obvious conclusion, who can with greater right be the
giver of grace and the gifts if not the triune God, who is really
present in us because working in us. Therefore, the physical,
substantial, and immediate presence of the Three Divine Persons, communicating to us their gifts and, through these gifts
forming in us their .supernatural image, is the presupposition
and the ontological foundation of another presence, of us to
them, which is effected psychologically by the twofold process
of experimental knowledge and of love.

B. The opinions of modern theologians. It is not our
intention to explain all these opinions extensively, but only
to sum up their essential content, which must then be evaluated
in the light of the Magisterium of the Church and the doctrine
of St. Thomas:
of the Blessed Trinity
1. The real and substantial
in the soul of the just is the result of the divine action which
is productive of grace, of an action which in the order of efficient causality is common to all Three Divine Persons. God,

THE DIVINE PERSONS IN THE JUST

135

One and Three, is present in all creatures as cause of their
natural being (the presence according to natural immensity);
but through a new title and in a more intimate way He becomes
the liberal giver of supernatural being (the presence according
to supernatural immensity). Grace and charity, therefore,
reveal the real and substantial presence of the Blessed Trinity
in the just and are, in turn, the efficient cause of the intentional
and affective presence of the Divine Persons inasmuch as they
are made the object and term of supernatural knowledge and
love (Vasquez, Coninck, Terrien) .12
The real and substantial presence of the Trinity in the
just is the proper effect of charity inasmuch as charity, being
a relation of supernatural friendship between God and man, is
the meritorious cause of the real presence of God, One and
Three, in the soul who loves Him. It is, indeed, most fitting
that God, the best and all-powerful Friend, make Himself really
present to those who love Him in order to make them enjoy
more intensely His divine friendship (Suarez) .13
3. The :real and substantial presence of
One God, the
Creator, is the proper result of the creative action, which is
common to the Three Divine Persons by reason of the identical
divine nature (the presence according to immensity)" The
presence of God, One and Three, who abides in the soul of the
just as object of a quasi-experimental knowledge and of love,
is founded on grace and is due, actually, to the exercise of the
gifts of wisdom and of charity. This presence necessarily presupposes the first (but is specifically distinct from it) and is
reserved only for the just, while the presence according to
supernatural immensity is common even to sinners who have
faith (Cardinal Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Gardeil, GarrigouLagrange, and others) .14
'"G. Vasquez, Comment. et Disput. in lam Partem D. Thomae, q. 8, disp. 80,
c. 3 (ed. Compluti, 1598), p. 235; Coninck, De Trinitate, disp. XV, dub. II, 2•;
Terrien, La grfice et la gloire, I, p. 246. (Quoted by A. Michel, article " Trinite "
in DTC., CXLII, 1947, coL 1842-1843.)
13 Suarez, De Trinitate, lib. XII, " de missione divinarum personarum,"
c. 5, nos.
9-10 (ed. Vives, I, p. 810).
14 Cajetan in Summa Theol., I, q. 43, a. 3; John of St. Thomas, Curs. theol., in

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LUIGI CIAPPI

4. God, One and Three, is already present in all creatures
as the unique and indivisible author of their natural being (the
presence according to immensity) . But by producing grace in
the just, He makes Himself really and substantially present,
not only as efficient cause but also as formal-exemplary cause,
since grace is a formal participation of the divine nature which
is subsistent in three distinct Persons; then the gifts of wisdom
and charity reproduce in the soul, at least by appropriation,
the image of the Word and of the Holy Spirit. From this
ontological presence, which is actualized in the sphere of a
twofold causality (efficient and exemplary), follows the psychological presence of the Trinity in the soul of the just man,
inasmuch as through grace and the gifts connected with it he
is rendered capable of possessing in his own faculties God, One
and Three, as object of knowledge and love (D'Ales, Galtier,
Michel, Retailleau, Menendez-Reigada, Urdanoz, Parente, and
others) .15

C. The teaching of the Magisterium of the Church. Leo
XIII, after confirming that all the "perfections and works''
manifested by God and produced outside Himself are common
to the Blessed Trinity by reason of the one and only divine
essence, recognizes as legitimate the use of appropriation.
Here are the words in which he concludes with reference to
the presence of the Blessed Trinity in us:
This wonderful union, which is properly called " indwelling,"
differing only in degree or state from that which binds the blessed
to God in eternal happiness, although it is without doubt produced
Summa Theol., I, q. 43, a. 3 ad. 17, a. 3; A. Gardeil, 0. P., La structure de l'ame et
l'experience mystique, II, p. 75; B. Froget, O.P., De l'habitation du Saint-Esprit
dans les ames justes, p. 157; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, 0. P ., Perfection chretienne et
Appendices, pp. 116-117.
contemplation (Paris,
15 A. D. Ales, De Trinitate, De Deo Trino (Paris, 1934), p.
P. Galtier, S. J.,
L'Habitation e:n nous des trois personnes (Rome, 1950); A. Michel, "Trinite.
Habitation dans les ames,"' DTC, CXLII (1947), col. 1849-1851; M. Retailleau,
J. M. Menendez-Reigada, 0. P.,
La Sainte Trinite dans les justes (Angers,
"Inhabitacion, clones y experiencia mistica,' in Rev. Esp. de Teologia, 6 (1946),
61-101; P. Parente, De Deo Trino (Rome, 1941), pp. 308-309; T. Urdanoz, 0. P.,
"La inhabitacion del Espiritu Santo en el alma del justo," in Rev. Esp. de Teologia,
6 (1946)' 465-534.

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137

by the presence of the whole Trinity ... is attributed in a peculiar
manner to the Holy Spirit. And although traces of the power and
wisdom of God appear even in the sinner, only the just share in
charity which is, as it were, the characteristic of the Holy Spirit. 16

In even clearer words Pius XII :reaffirms the teaching of his
great predecessor:
But let all agree uncompromisingly on this, if they would not err
from truth and from the orthodox teaching of the Church: to reject
every kind of mystic union by which the faithful would in any
way pass beyond the sphere of creatures and rashly enter the
divine even to the extent of one single attribute of the eternal
Godhead being predicated of them as their own. And besides let
aU hold this as certain truth, that all these activities are common to
the most Blessed Trinity, insofar as they have God as supreme
efficient cause. Let it be observed also that one is treating here of a
hidden mystery; which in this earthly exile can never be fully
disclosed and grasped, and expressed in human language. The
Divine Persons are said to be indwelling inasmuch as They are
present to intellectual creatures in a way that lies beyond human
comprehension, and are known and loved by themY

D. The doctrine of St. Thoma8. Faithful to the teaching of
Revelation and of the Fathers of the Church, but especially to
the teaching of St. Augustine and to that of his master Albe:rtus Magnus, the Angelic Doctor proposes to investigate the
inscrutable mystery of the presence of the Trinity in us insofar
as such an investigation is possible by " reason enlightened by
faith," ratio fide illustratao 18 Here a:re the essential points in
which the real thought of Aquinas seems to be found:
1. The whole Trinity dwells in us through grace; the attribu-

tion to one distinct Person has only the value of appropriation:
" The whole Trinity dwells in us through grace, but in a special
manner the indwelling can be appropriated to one Person
16 Leo XIII, Encyclical Divinum illud munus, A. S. S. (1897), p. 653. Author's
italics.
17 Pius
XII, Encyclical Mystici Corporis Christi; A. A. S (1943), pp. 35-36.
Author's italics.
18 Vatican Council, Denzinger, no. 796.

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LUIGI CIAPPI

through some special gift which has a :resemblance with the
Person, by reason of which He is said to be sent." 19
2. We are sons of all three Persons of the Blessed Trinity.
We cannot call ourselves sons of one Person more than of
another except through appropriation: "We are called sons
of the Trinity through grace." 20 " Although the act of adoption
is common to the whole Trinity, it is appropriated to the Father
as author, to the Son as exemplar, to the Holy Spirit as impressing in us a likeness to this exemplar." 21

3. The real and substantial presence of the Three Divine
Persons in the soul in grace is due properly to their common
activity in the production of grace; through appropriation such
a presence is attributed to the Son or to the Holy Spirit:
Since the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit have the same power and
essence, all that God effects in us, as by an efficient cause, is done
at the same time by the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, the word of wisdom sent to us by God, by which we know
Him, is the proper reflection of the Son; and, similarly, the love
by which we love God is the proper reflection of the Holy Spirit.
. . . Since the divine effects not only begin to exist by divine
operation but are also held in their being by it .... But nothing
can work where it is not, for the worker and the work must be in
action at the same time, as the mover and the thing moved. Thus
it is necessary that wherever there is any effect of God, God
Himself must be there as the agent. 22 In the reception of gifts of
this kind the Divine Persons are had as if in a new manner, as
leading or joining us to the end. 23

4. The invisible procession or mission of the Divine Persons
:in the soul in grace is attributed solely to the Son and the Holy
Spirit because they alone have their origin from one or more
of the other Persons in the bosom of the Trinity. With regard
to the Son, the mission is effected through the gift of wisdom,
De Veritate, q. 27, a. 2, ad 3; cf. I Sent., d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3.
Ill Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 2.
21 Summa theol., III, q. 23, a. 2, ad 3.
"' IV Cont. Gent., c. 20.
23 l Sent., d. 15, q. 4, a. 1; Summa Theol., I, q. 43, a. 3, ad !ll; a. 6; H-II, q. 45,
19
20

a. ll, ad 2.

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189

originated (hy appropriation) from the Word and reproducing
properly (in other words, specifically), the image of the Word,
who is " generated Wisdom," Sapientia genita. With regard to
the Holy Spirit, the mission is effected through charity, having
its origin (by appropriation) in the Holy Spirit and reproducing properly the image of the Third Person, who is " Personal
Love." Such attribution, although proper, is not exclusive.
Neither does it denote separation between the two missions,
because the aforementioned gifts do not reproduce the image
of the Divine Persons perfectly and according to their most
distinctive and incommunicable characteristic, which is a real,
relative opposition, as the Council of Florence authoritatively
affirms: " In God all things are one, where there is no opposition of relation." 24
For this reason, although through the Incarnation only the
Word is united to human nature, all Three Divine Persons,
through wisdom and charity, are in some way represented,
perceived, and enjoyed. The mission of the Son is had principally in the actual perception, by means of the act of the
gift of wisdom, that is, of the procession of the Word from
the Father; and the mission of the Holy Spirit, in the joyful
perception, through the acts of wisdom and love, that is, of
the procession of Personal Love from the Father and the Son:
"to be sent, in respect to the Son, means to be from the Father.
And as to be the gift of God in respect to the Holy Spirit, means
to proceed from the Father; so to be sent, is to be known to
proceed from the Father." 25

5. Both the Son and the Holy Spirit are given to us, but to
the Holy Spirit alone belongs the name of Gift of the Father
and Son:
Because the Holy Spirit is love, He has in Himself, by reason of
His procession both that which is given and that which is the
principle of giving; whence He is of Himself and primarily gift....
•• Council of Florence, Deer. pro Iacobitis, Denzinger, no. 708; I Sent., d. 15,
q. 4, a. I; Summa Theol., I, q. 48, a. 5.
115 St. Augustine, De Trinitate, IV, 20, 29; PL, 42, 908, quoted by St. Thomas in
Summa Theol., I, q. 48, a. 5; cf. I Sent., d. 15, q. 4, a, I.

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LUIGI CIAPPI

Whence just as love is proper to Him, so is also the gift. ... Wherefore although the Son is given or sent, the reason of the free giving
is love, who is the Holy Spirit. And that reason does not pertain
to the Son, whence He cannot properly be called gift even. though
He is said to be given. 26

6. The physical, immediate, and substantial union between
the Divine Persons and our soul in this life is gained only in
the sphere of efficient causality; but this union, being common
to all creatures/ 7 is not a prerogative of the state of grace. The
union with the Trinity through representation (or in the order
of exemplary causality) is of itself neither physical nor substantial nor immediate; nor is it even peculiar to the state of
grace, since man, even naturally, was created to the image and
likeness of the august Trinity, inasmuch as he is capable of
knowing and loving God. 28 In an accidental and supernatural
manner the state of grace deepens and perfects the pre-existing
representative union which was impressed on the substance and
the faculties of our soul. The union with the Trinity as object
of knowledge and love (that is to say, in the sphere of formal
and final causality) is not-so long as "we walk by faith, and
not by vision" 29-a physical, immediate, and substantial
union. Such a union will be had in heaven, when, in order to
render Itself actually visible and seen, the Divine Essence will
unite Itself immediately to our intellect, which will be strengthened by the light of glory. 3 ° Charity, on the other hand, will
not unite us in such a manner to God, not even in heaven.
Charity binds the soul immediately to God by a " spiritual
bond," that is to say, by affection, not in the sense that it
makes our will adhere physically to the Infinite Good, but in
the sense that it makes us love God for Himself, as the Highest
Good and the Final End. Moreover, it is in this life the efficient meritorious cause of the real possession of God in heaven.
26 1 Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a.
and ad 1; cf. IV Cont. Gent., c.
I, q. 38, aa.
27 Cf. Summa Tkeol., I, q. 43, a. 3; q. 45, a. 6.
•• Ibid., I, q. 93, a. 8.
•• II Cor. 5: 7.
8 ° Cf. Denzinger, no.
530.

Summa Tkeol.,

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THE DIVINE PERSONS IN THE JUST

But the real and immediate union between our soul and the
Trinity will not be formally effected except through the act of
visiono31
7o Union with the Triune God, as object of experimental
knowledge and of love, is proper and exclusive to the supernatural ordero This union is verified in the exercise of the gifts
of wisdom and charity. In this life the gift of wisdom gives us
only a quasi-experimental knowledge of the Son and of the
other Divine Persons, that is to say, an indirect and mediate
knowledge, inasmuch as such a gift is an image of the Word
through which the movement of the intellect is borne toward
God Himself. The same can be said of charity: it is the source
of the true and proper fruition of the Divine Persons, but
imperfect and indirect, because such joy does not spring immediately from the presence of God clearly seen, but from a
filial affection which confirms and unites our spirit with the
Spirit of Loveo32
It must not be thought, however, that this union is only
intentional, such as is effected with someone known only in a
speculative way and not present to us, but whom we desire to
possess. It is rather an effective, experimental union which
implies a certain presence of the Divine Good by His most
excellent effect: " Charity is the love of God .
and for this
reason what is loved is in the lover by its most excellent effecto
... And so the spiritual joy which has God for its object is
caused by charity." 33 But because the union is not immediate
and the fruition not perfect the soul does not have the certainty of the presence of God and of the supernatural character
of its own sentiments. 34
0

•

8. Baptized infants are already actually temples of the Holy
Spirit and 'of the Trinity, who live in them substantially as
efficient cause of grace; but infants do not possess the Trinity
31 Cf. Summa Theol., I-II, q. 91:, aa. 4-8; q.
a. 1; II-II, q.
a. 4 and ad 8;
Dante, Paradiso, 28, 106-111.
32 Cf. 1 Sent., d. 14, q. 2,
ad 3; Summa Theol., I, q. 98, a. 8; I-II, q. H, a. 4.
33 Summa Theol., II-II, q. 28, a. l.
•• Cf. I Sent., d. 15, q. 4, a. l, ad l.

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LUIGI ClAPP!

as object of knowledge and love except virtually or, in other
words, in habitu:
God is said to indwell supernaturally, as if in a familiar home, in
the just whose mind is capable of knowing and loving God, even if
they may not know and love in act, so long as they have through
grace the habit of faith and charity, as is well-known in the case
of baptized children. 35

9. All the just, since they are endowed with the gift of
wisdom and with charity, are in a degree enabled to enjoy the
presence of the Divine Persons; yet, as new missions occur
" according to the progress of virtue and the increase of grace," 36
enjoyment of the indwelling becomes more frequent and intense
as the soul advances in the spiritual life, and in the third stage,
that of the unitive life, it is almost continuous.
So He is said to dwell in such persons, because He works in them
secretly that they may be His temple; and this He accomplishes
in the proficients and in those who are persevering in their efforts
to become proficient. 87
10. It cannot be proved with the authority of the Angelic

Doctor that the divine essence and the Holy Spirit are rendered
really and substantially present in the will as the uncreated
term of our act of love-" realite d'amour." 38 The texts cited
in regard to this can be explained as referring to God as efficient
or exemplary or final cause, but not yet as arrived at immediately in Himself. And it does not even seem conformable to
the thought of St. Thomas to explain his saying, " Everything
•• In I ad Cw. 8:17; lect. 8; cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 48, a. 6; q. 97, a. 7.
•• Summa Theol., I, q. 48, a. 6; cf. I Sent., d. 15, q. 5, a. 1.
•• St. Augustine, Epist. 187, 8, 27; P. L. 88, 842.
•• Cf. S. J. Dockx, 0. P., Fils de Dieu par grace (Paris: Desclee, 1948), p. 71.
The author realizes that he has against him the Salmanticenses, who, though
conceding a certain probability to his opinion, consider themselves unable to accept
it, even for the will of the blessed in heaven, for the following reason: " quia de
ratione impulsus interni est quod oriatur effective a voluntate quam trahit et
impellit ad obiectum amatum; nam praedictus impulsus est pondus, quo quis sponte
fertur in rem amatam. Implicat autem ut t, :It[ feratur et moveatur per impulsum
sibi non spontaneum, nee voluntarium; nam eo ipso quod pondus impellens vim
appetitivam non esset illi voluntarium, violenter potius quam spontanee illam
traheret." Salmanticenses, Curs. theol. XII, "De. Car.," disp. IV, dub. I, nn. 19-20.

THE DIVINE PERSONS IN THE JUST

143

loved is in the lover insofar as this is possible," 39 in the sense
of a real, immediate presence. 40
CoNCLUSION

The teaching of the Angelic Doctor, considered integrally,
appears entirely in keeping with the data of Divine Revelation
and the doctrine of the Fathers; moreover, it justifies the discordant theories of modern theologians by harmonizing them.
It is true, in fact, that the presence of the Three Divine
Persons, existing in the human soul as " object of knowledge
and term of love," is founded on the state of grace and has,
as its efficient cause, the activity of the gift of wisdom and of
the virtue of charity. It is likewise true that, by reason of
certain supernatural charisms, the mission and the gift-giving
of the last two Persons and the indwelling of the Blessed Trinity
are properly and actually effected.
Therefore, the physical and substantial presence of the august
Triad in the soul, which presence precedes ontologically the
quasi-experimental perception which is achieved through the
acts of wisdom and charity-such a presence, I say, consisting
formally in a " relation of closeness " between the Blessed
Trinity and the soul, is founded on the divine trinitarian action,
causative of grace and its consequent gifts.
The presence of the Blessed Trinity in the soul of the just,
even in those deprived of the use of reason, is a supernatural
:reality which the human mind, although illumined by faith,
cannot fully grasp in its innermost truth. The various theories
devised to explain it must be fused in the Thomistic theory so
that their convergent light may dissipate as much as possible
the sacred shadows of the mystery. We do not presume to
understand the mystery, and are content to affirm the exact
significance of the revealed truth without impoverishing or
denying it with the fogginess of our illogical assertions.
•• IV Cont. Gent., c. !ill.
•• Cf. F. Bourassa, S. J., "Les missions divines et le sumaturel chez S. Thomas
d'Aquin" in Sciences eccUsiastique'S, I (Montreal, 1948), p. 85.

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LUIGI CIAPPI

God, One and Three, is present in the just as efficient,
exemplary, and final cause of their sanctificationo Through
efficient causality alone, however, we have in this life the first
substantial and immediate presence of the Divine Guest, while
imitation, knowledge, and love unite us to Him, already existing in us, by means of His giftso The love with which we love
and taste the goodness of God, is an effect of the Spirit of Love
whom we already possess: " The charity of God is poured forth
into our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to uso" 41 The
knowledge of the Three Divine Persons which we have through
the gift of wisdom is a foretaste of the blessed vision which is
communicated to us by the Word, but this knowledge is unable
to tear aside the veil of faith: " We see now through a glass
in a dark manner, but then face to face/' 42
LUIGI

Collegium Angelicum
Rome, Italy

01 Rom. 5: 5; cf. Summa Theol. I, q. 43, a. 3 ad 2.
'"I Cor. 13:12.

CIAPPI,

Oo Po

THE PHYSICS OF LOCAL MOTION

T

I

HE science of local motion is fundamental in natural
philosophyo Locomotion is the primary kind of motion;
it is generated last of the three kinds of motion so that
in order of being it is first, as the Philosopher has observedo1
Thus, owing to its primacy, a proper knowledge of the nature
of local motion is necessary for a full understanding of the first
of the five ways by which St. Thomas establishes by reasoning
the existence of God as the Author of Nature, namely, the
argument from motion in the world. 2
In the philosophia perennis, unfolded by Plato, Aristotle, the
later Greek and Roman philosophers, and the Jewish, Arab, and
Christian doctors of succeeding ages, motion is recognized as a
transition from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality;
further, such a transition to actuality can only come about by
the influence of something already in a state of actuality; hence
we have the principle that whatever is in motion must be moved
by anothero This principle illuminated the sciences of Nature
and guided philosophers along sure paths during those ages in
which the philosophia perennis was the inspiration of an but a
few eccentric and misguided individuals.
However, since the revolution in physical science in the seventeenth century and the appearance of sciences of Nature alien
to the philosophia perennis, an entirely different doctrine concerning local motion has generally prevailed. Newton's first law
of motion lays down that every body in the universe continues
in its state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line unless
compelled by external force to change that state, On Newtonian
1
2

Aristotle, de Caelo, 310 b 33-35; Physic., 243 a 12; 260 a 26-29; etc.
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3.

145

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GAVIN ARDLEY

dynamics a freely moving body does not require an external
mover; a mover is required only to change the motion of the
body, i.e. to cause acceleration, not to continue its steady state
of motion; the Newtonian theory of locomotion thus evokes the
principle of the inertia or impetus or momentum possessed by
bodies. Newton's doctrine is thus quite at variance with the
doctrine of Aristotle and SL Thomas according to which a
moving body must be moved continuously by another agent if
its movement is not to cease.
The Newtonian system was not wholly new; it was rather
the definitive form of doctrines of motion which were propounded in the fourteenth century by Jean Buridan, Nicolas
Oresme, and others of the University of Paris; doctrines which
became ever more widely disseminated until their final triumph
in the seventeenth century with Galileo, Descartes, Newton and
hosts of others who participated in the elan of the times.
These doctrines of motion are quite foreign to the philosophia
perennis; with the triumph of the impetus doctrine in the seventeenth century came the general abandonment of the traditional
doctrine of motion; the ancient science of nature with its rich
patrimony of so many centuries henceforth found no hearing
in the universities of Europe; the ancient learning was preserved
in obscurity by a discriminating few, for the most part in the
seclusion of the cloister, while the learned world followed new
and seductive paths.
Further, not only were the Aristotelian doctrines of motion
abandoned in the seventeenth century, but the whole framework of the philosophia perennis was given up at the same time
by the generality of philosophers, and indeed has :remained in
general oblivion to this day. There are no doubt many reasons
for this great seventeenth century tidal movement in philosophical opinion, but prominent among them is this: it was
believed very widely that the experimental physics of Galileo
and Newton had overthrown the Aristotelian physics, and it
was further generally believed that this defeat in the field of
physical science was of such a fundamental character that the

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147

whole Aristotelian system was thereby rendered untenable, and
that other philosophies of the world must be sought. The
science of motion was certainly not the prime mover in the
philosophical revolution; for that we must look deeper; but the
doctrines of motion precipitated this revolution and confirmed
it in popular estimation even to our own day.
The science of local motion is thus of the greatest import, not
only intrinsically but also historically in understanding the
sway which these philosophical vagaries have exercised during
the last three centuries. We shall now examine the doctrines of
local motion, and in particular the general principle that whatever is moved must be moved by another.

The Two Doctrines of Local Motion.
Our first general inquiry will be directed to this question:
does the physics of Galileo and Newton truly render the Aristotelian physics of locomotion untenable, or does the common
belief that this is the case rest on a misconception of the respective natures of these doctrines?
There are several matters which must be considered:
(1) The principle that motion requires a constant mover is of
such a general character that it does not depend on any particular theory of locomotion. Motion means the transition from
potency to actuality, and this can only be brought about by
something already in a state of actuality. Thus, for instance,
we heat a pot of water by placing it on the fire; again, a man
cannot teach arithmetic to another unless he already knows
arithmetic himself.
This contention is so fundamental to the world that it may
justly be termed metaphysical rather than merely physical. It
belongs to a higher and more general order than the particular
processes of physical science; it does not rest upon the latter,
but rather the particular doctrines of the special sciences flow
from the general principle.
To trace the operation of our general principle in its ramifications in local motion will lead to a deeper understanding of
2

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GAVIN ARDLEY

local motion, since the inner springs of that motion will thereby
be made manifest.
(2) We have discussed elsewhere 3 the doctrine that the
system of physics inaugurated by Galileo and Newton is
only prima facie physics in the proper sense of that science,
namely, an inquiry into the physics or nature of things.
According to this contention (which win be one of the bases of
the present inquiry into motion), physics since Gaiileo has been
progressively detached from the family of the real sciences and
no longer has any community with the head of the family,
namely, metaphysics. A science so detached we shall henceforth
designate as Kantian.
The structure of modern Kantian 4 physics has been built up
as an elaborate tour de force with its own autonomous domestic
economy, and with a goal which is ultimately pragmatic.
The
laws and principles of Kantian physics are imposed on Nature
by the physicists, and are not found in Nature; they are not the
real principles of Nature any more than the patterns of the
formal gardens of Versailles or the conventional lines of latitude
and longitude on a map represent Nature.
Consequently, the fact that Newton's laws of motion are
fundamental to modern physics does not establish these laws as
the laws of Nature. Hence the general principle that motion in
the world requires a constant mover is in no way invalidated
by the existence of a prima facie conflict between this principle
and Newton's laws of motion. The conflict is only apparent, not
real: the metaphysical principle pertains to the real world, the
Newtonian principle to an artificial world.
(3) In investigating the nature of local motion we shall not
be able to derive immediate assistance from the physical theories which have been entertained since the days of Gnlileo, for
the reasons mentioned in (2). However, these systems are not
wholly fruitless for our purpose. The systems of modern or
8 G. W. R. Ardley, Aquinas and Kant, ch. 3 (Longmans:
London, 1950).
• The reason for associating such sciences with the name of Kant is that Kant was
the first to glimpse their true nature (cf. Aquinas and Kant).

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149

Kantian physics being mosaics drawn from a variety of sources,
they frequently contain disjointed fragments and echoes of
metaphysical doctrines. Moreover, if we inquire closely we can
often find devious connections of an indirect kind between the
modern systems and the nature of the world. 5
Consequently, although we cannot directly draw upon the
theories of Kantian physics to formulate the science of locomotion, yet we may draw instructive comparisons and illustrations from these various theories.
(4) It might be thought that the highly mathematical character of so many of the laws and theories of modern physics
would preclude any significant comparison with the non-mathematical peripatetic physics. Further reflection, however, suggests that this is not really so, since the mathematical character
of the modern laws would appear to be not so fundamental and
distinctive as it seems at first sight. Thus, the essentially qualitative and non-mathematical field theories of Faraday are
exactly equivalent to, and may be completely transformed into
the mathematical system based on the inverse square law of
force. The mathematical theory, in spite of its semblance of a
different nature and greater precision, is rather only a different
language, and in truth has no more content that the nonmathematical theory.
It seems likely that a similar equivalence between qualitative
and quantitative theories extends to all branches of modern
physics, although it has not everywhere been yet unfolded.
Hence we need not be deterred from a tentative juxtaposition of
mathematical and non-mathematical principles.
(5) The primary laws of a Kantian physics, such as Newton's
laws of motion, rarely or never fit into Nature as they stand.
Consequently, along with the primary laws we almost invariably
find an array of secondary modifying rules which are designed
to bridge the gulf between the laws of physics and accepted
5 A general type of connection to be sought between the law found on modern
physics and the real structure of Nature has been formulated very succinctly by
Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Tractus Logico-Philosophicus 6. 342.

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GAVIN ARDLEY

phenomena. The bridging of the gulf in modern physical science
is somewhat analogous to equity in law: that which bridges the
gulf between the law of the State and the norms of natural
Justice. Thus Newton's laws in their simple form are immediately modified for terrestrial motions by such secondary
rules as Stokes' law for the movement of an object through a
viscous fluid. Without these appropriate adjustments the
primary laws could not seriously be entertained. 6 In comparing
our physical doctrine of locomotion with Newtonian theories,
these modifications of the latter by secondary principles will
assume considerable significance.
(6) The physics of locomotion
the proper sense will be a
fundamentally more coherent and ordered system than the
Newtonian theory of matter and motion. The real physics is
grounded on reality and illumined by universal principles; the
Kantian artifact physics lacks a nature proper to itself and is an
inherently mutable and contingent structme enjoying a human
rather than a natural authority.
It is not to be supposed, however, that the separated physical
system is wholly errant like the Prodigal Son; it has a charter,
that of pragmatic success, and its separation for this purpose is
quite legitimate. Even with this charter, however, modern
physics, cut adrift from the steadying hand of a paternal metaphysics, is ordained to pursue mutable and airy paths to its
limited goal, in contrast to the permanent and substantial paths
of :real physics.
The pragmatic goal of the modern systems is less exacting
than the ontological goal of real physics. In the real physics
a dazzling excess of light from nobler natures or a lack of power
in the human intellect to penetrate earthly obduracy may
render progress difficult. Hence the spectacular but shallower
successes of the modern systems while the real physics has continued its sober disciplined inquiries in cloistered seclusion. We
distinguish in order to unite and thus we bring the separated
6 This is a fact which is usually
overlooked in discussions of Galileo's supposed
experimental refutation of Aristotelian doctrines concerning falling bodies.

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151

sciences back into their proper places in the family of the
sciences.

The State of the Question.
Since the seventeenth century the science of Nature has been
obscured and discussions of the subject vitiated by the promiscuous mixture of theories and doctrines belonging to different
orders, so that today this science is in a more confused condition than it was when left by St. Thomas. By distinguishing the
different orders we remove this confusion and restore the true
doctrines of Nature to their proper authority. The wealth of
observation of Nature which has accumulated in recent centuries has not yet been properly made use of to enrich the :real
science of N atm·e. Our inquiries into locomotion will be a first
step in this direction.
The course we shall follow is historical. In general we may
regard the history of physics in one of two ways: We may regard past physical doctrines as merely the debris in the evolutionary march of physical science towards greater conquests of
Nature; or we may survey the whole field in such a way that
the history of physics becames comparative physica: this is a
science like comparative anatomy or comparative law. We
invoke the comparative science here in order to :reach a deeper
understanding of the physics of locomotion.

The Impression of the Agent on the Subject.
When we throw a stone it continues to move after it has left
the hand; this suggests the necessity for a general inquiry into
the persistence of impressions made on a subject by an agent.
St. Thomas discusses this matter in various places. Thus, he
points out/ there are several cases:
(1) The impression of the agent remains permanently in the
effect after the agent has ceased to act, if the impression becomes part of the nature of the effect. For instance, if a stone
7

Ill Contra Gentiles, c. 65.

GAVIN ARDLEY

is generated in Nature, it persists with its properties, as its hardness and its heaviness.
(2) Some things become partially attached to the nature of
the subject and may persist for a long time; so habits, dispositions, etc., in man.
(3) Things of a more noble nature do not remain for an
instant after the action of the agent has ceased; so light does not
remain in a body when the source of the light is removed.
To these cases we might add a fourth, allied to (2) :
(4) Impressions such as the violent motion given to a stone
by the thrower, the heat induced in a body by being in the
neighborhood of a fire, and the potency of the semen; 8 these
impressions persist for some time after the action of the original
agent has ceased; the duration of their persistence depends upon
the surrounding medium and its ability to conserve the original
action; the subject itself has no firm grip on such impressions.
Transient impressions which come under case (4) must not
be confused with permanent impressions belonging to case (1).
Thus, in (1), if a heavy body is generated, the body retains its
heaviness indefinitely after the generator has ceased its operation, because the form of heaviness has been imprinted on the
body and has entered into its nature. Accordingly, if at any
subsequent time an obstacle is removed, the body will move
spontaneously downwards towards its natural place. Similarly
for light bodies which move upwards. 9 On the other hand, in
(4), if a body is moved violently, the violent motion is not
given to the body as its form or nature, and consequently the
body does not of itself retain the violent motion; the motion
which the archer imparts to the arrow persists for a certain time
and then fails. The violence received from man never becomes
part of the nature of the arrow as does an impression received
by the creative operation of God; the violence is a transient
thing given to the body in addition to its nature. 10
De Potentia, q. 3, a. 11, ad 5.
• Aristotle, VIII Physic., c. 4.
10 Summa Theol., I, q. 103, a. l, ad 3.

8

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153

Thus, St. Thomas, in his Commentary on the DE CAELo of
Aristotle, discusses the question of natural and violent motion
and is at pains to make this distinction between them. 11 It
must not be thought, he remarks, that the mover producing the
violent motion of the stone impresses on the stone motive
virtue by which it is moved, in the way in which the virtue of
the generator impresses on the thing generated a form from
which the natural movement of the latter results. If this were
so, continues St. Thomas, the violent motion of the stone would
be an intrinsic principle in the stone, which is contrary to the
notion of violent motion. Further, it would follow that the
stone, from this very fact that it is moved locally by violence, is
altered, which is against common sense.
In general, writes St. Thomas in another place," that which
creatures receive from God is their nature, while that which
natural things receive from man in addition to their nature is
somewhat violent." 12 And again: " Art takes its matter from
nature, and nature receives its matter from God through creation. Now the products of art are preserved in being by virtue
of the products of nature; for instance a house by the solidity of
13 In figurative terms we may say that a:rt is
the stones ...
God's grandchild.
It is clear then that the impressions made by art on nature
are not permanent, but are inherently subject to attenuation
and disappearance; the arrow falls, the house perishes. While
the impressions of art do persist, they are preserved by natural
means invoked for the purpose, as by the archer and the
architect. Let us now consider how the violent motion of the
arrow is continued for some time after it has left the archer.
0

"

How is Continued Violent Motion Possible?
The Philosopher gave much thought to this subject. " If
everything that is in motion, with the exception of things that
11 Ill de Cael. et Mund.,
lect. 8: "Omne corpus quod recto motu naturaliter
movetur, gravitatem habet vel levitatem-quomodo naturalis motus et violentus
perficiantur ... " this is in the commentary on the de Caelo 301 a 23-301 b 33.
13 Ill Cont. Gent., c. 65.
12 Summa Theol., loc. cit.

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GAVIN ARDLEY

move themselves [i. e., animals], is moved by something else,
how is it that some things, e. g., things throW:n, continue to be
in motion when their movent is no longer in contact with
them? " he asks. 14
Some have suggested, continues the Stagirite, that the solution to the problem lies in a process of " mutual replacement "
(antiperistasis): the thrower at the same time as he throws the
thing thrown, also imparts motion to the air, and the air in
motion in turn imparts further motion to the thing thrown. 15
In general, A pushes B, B pushes C, C pushes D, and so on,
and even, in a circular fashion, Z pushes A; hence the motion is
continued, like the trucks in a railway train or the endless
motion of a revolving belt. But it is manifest, says the Philosopher, that in such a case all the members, whatever the
exact sequence may be, would have to be in motion simultaneously, or at rest simultaneously, and hence when the original
movent ceases to move the series all movement would instantly
The process of antiperistasis on this ground alone, not to
mention other defects, fails therefore to explain the continued
motion of the single thrown body after the original act of throwing has ceased. Hence, observes Aristotle, we must look elsewhere for the explanation of the thrown body .16
It is not the continued movement of the medium which explains the movement of the projectile; this only pushes back
the problem one step, since we still have to explain the continued movement of the medium. The continued local movement of the medium must be ruled out as the source of the
projectile's continued motion: yet the source must lie with the
medium in some way, since the medium is the only possible
Physic. 266 b 27-SO (Oxford ed.).
Physic. 215 a 15; 266 b SO f.; 267 a 16 f.; etc. Ross' Commentary on the Physics
of Aristotle may profitably be consulted on antiperistasis and related matters.
16 It is remarkable that so well-informed an historian as Pierre Duhem should have
been mistaken about the Aristotelian doctrine on this matter. He attributes, quite
wrongly, the absurd theory that the moving air impels the projectile, to Aristotle.
In fact, as we have seen, Aristotle is at pains to show how untenable such a theory
must be (cf. Leonardo, t. S, pref., 1>. vi, etc.).
14
15

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155

source of the projectile's continued motion after it has left the
thrower, so the Philosopher writes. 17
Thereafter while we must accept this explanation [antiperistasis]
to the extent of saying that the original movent gives the power
of being a movent either to air or to water or to something else of
the kind, naturally adapted for imparting and undergoing motion,
we must say further that this thing does not cease simultaneously
to impart motion and to undergo motion: it ceases to be in motion
at the moment when the movent ceases to move it, but it still remains a movent, and so it causes something else consecutive with it
to be in motion, and of this again the same may be said. The
motion begins to cease when the motive force produced in one
number of the consecutive series is at each stage less than that
possessed by the preceding member, and it finally ceases when one
member no longer causes the next member to be a movent but only
causes it to be in motion. The motion of these last two-of the
one as movent and of the other as moved-must cease simultaneously, and with this the whole motion ceases.18

In another place the Philosopher sums up the theory of the
continuance of violent motion in a succinct manner when he
says: " the force transmits the movement, to the body by :first,
as it were, impregnating the air .... If the air were not endowed with this function, constrained movement would be
impossible." 19
The original violence initiates the movement and gives to
the circumambient medium the power of continuing it; however
this is a transient power, and diminishes and :finally fails, whereupon the violent movement ceases and the projectile falls.
It would appear that we must recognize in the medium not
only a propulsive but also a resistive agency; the medium offers
different resistance to the body's movement according as the
medium is more or less easily divided by the body. 20 Thus, we
17
18

Physic. 267 a 2-12.
It is instructive to compare this process described by Aristotle, of combined

motion and power of giving motion, with wave progression: e. g., the spreading
ripples produced on the surface of a pond when a pebble is thrown in. We shall
have more to say on this matter hereafter.
10 De Caelo_ 801 b !Ul-29.
•• Physic.
a 80, etc.

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GAVIN ARDLEY

can throw a stone more readily in air than under water. We
shall further consider this twofold action of the medium later in
connection with natural motion.
St. Thomas fully agrees with the foregoing doctrine of Aristotle. In the section of this Commentary on the DE CAELo to
which we have previously referred, 21 St. Thomas lays down,
that in the violent movement of a stone the mover impresses
motion only while it is in contact with the stone. Nevertheless,
because air is both subtle and light it is susceptible to impressions. Consequently, when the violence of the mover
desists, the air in contact with the stone continues to propel
the stone, and gives also propulsive power to the conjoined air,
which in its turn propels the stone, and so on. Consequently
the first violence endures in the stone to all appearance, but
really the stone continues to move because of the successive
impressions of the air. Hence, if there were no such bodies as
air, there would be no violent motion-si enim non esset tale
corpus quale est aer, non esset motus violentus.
Aristotle and St. Thomas are unanimous that movement in
a void, if such could exist, would be impossible.28 In a void
there would be no motivating medium to cause motion; nor
would there be any determinate direction for movement, so
that there could be no directed motion, which is absurd. 24 A
stone could not be thrown from the hand nor an arrow shot
from the bow in a void, if there were such.
This principle is the antithesis of the doctrines of original
impetus (of which more in a later place) advanced by Buridan,
Descartes, Newton, etc. According to the impetus doctrine,
motion in a void is not only possible but is the most free of all
21 III de Cael. et Mund., lect. 7.
•• Let us remark here that tlie so-called " vacuum " obtained by pumping the air
out of a vessel is not to be regarded as a void, but rather as a medium of rare
lightness and subtlety in which both natural and violent motions proceed with
facility under the influence of the aethereal medium. A suggestive similitude will be
found in the theory of "wave mechanics," a subject we shall discuss later.
•• Physic. 215 a 18.
•• Ibid., 215 a 23.

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157

motions .and persists indefinitely; the function of the medium
for the impetus theory is merely to retard motion.

The Principal Agent and its Instruments.
St. Thomas embarks on an interesting discussion of motion in
the De Potentia. 25 He compares the continued movement of
the arrow with the retention by the semen of the force originally
imparted to it by the soul. This comparison has sometimes been
taken to mean that St. Thomas subscribed to a theory of impetus for moving bodies. 26 In truth, however, it cannot be thus
interpreted. Let us consider St. Thomas' words:
An instrument is understood to be moved by the principal agent
so long as it retains the power communicated to it by the principal agent; thus the arrow is moved by the archer as long as it retains the force wherewith it was shot by him. Thus in heavy and
light things, that which is generated is moved by the generator as
long as it retains the form transmitted thereby: so that the semen
also is understood to be moved by the soul of the begetter, as long
as it retains the force communicated by that soul, although it is in
body separated from it. And the mover and the thing moved must
be together at the commencement of but not throughout the whole
movement, as is evident in the case of projectiles.

It will be evident in the first place that St. Thomas' comparison here between the semen and the projectile is somewhat
general, and is not to be taken in an unduly literal manner. The
force impressed on the semen is more firmly attached to its
nature than is the violent motion of an arrow. Furthermore, St.
Thomas holds that the form of heavy and light bodies is not
the cause of natural local motion, but is its principle, as he relates in the Contra Gentiles: 27 the form determines the place to
which the body has a tendency, the actual movement to that
place must have another and external cause, namely, the im•• De Pot., q. 8, a 11, ad 5.
•• So, apparently, Garrigou-Lagrange: God: His Existence and His Nature, I,
!t74 f. Dominic Soto, 0. P. (1494-1560), the celebrated Spanish philosopher and
theologian, invoked this discussion of St. Thomas' to support, it is said, an impetus
theory of motion. Cf. Duhem, Leon. t. 8, p. 286 f.
•• III Cont. Gent., c. 28.

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GAVIN ARDLEY

pulsion of the medium. Thirdly, even the continued force of the
semen is dependent upon a suitable medium to preserve that
force/ 8 as indeed is manifestly the case with the preservation of
any living thing.
In this discussion in the De Potentia St. Thomas does not
refer to the action of the surrounding medium because here he
is taking that action for granted. With the semen the retention
of the force given to it by the soul of the begetter depends on
the proper medium to conserve and apply that force. So with
the arrow: the retention of the force given to it by the archer
requires the participation of the medium, to preserve in itself
the impression for as long as is proper, and to guide the arrow
to the place determined by the original act of the archer.
St. Thomas is primarily concerned in this discussion with the
fact that a body receives its power from the original agent, and
retains it for a time after it leaves that agent; the arrow does
not take off on its own account, nor does the semen acquire
its force except from the begetter. The medium cannot originate
the movement, only the initial act can accomplish this; but the
force or impulse once given by the principal agent, the medium's
function is to take up the subordinate task of carrying out the
movement; so the movement persists after the body has separated from the principal agent. Thus, the captain directs and
the sergeant sees that the direction is carried through. The
whole. movement depends on the initial act of the principal
agent and is executed by the instruments of that agent under
the agent's direction. Failure to achieve the end laid down by
the principal agent is due to the defectibility of the instruments.
On the primacy of the principal agent St. Thomas writes:
" An effect is ascribed more especially to the direction of the
first mover towards the end than to the instruments which receive that direction." 29 Thus he can continue: " The arrow
•• An interesting case may be found in the modern practice of artificial insemination in animals which often requires the prolongation of the force of the semen beyond its ordinary span. This is accomplished by providing a suitable medium at a
favorable temperature.
•• III Cont. Gent., c. !M: "How even things devoid of knowledge seek the good."

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159

receives its direction to a fixed end through the impulse [ex
impulsione] of the archer, so, too, natural bodies receive an inclination to their natural ends from their natural movers [the
beavens], from whom they derive their fonns, powers and movements," without in any way implying a doctrine of impetus. In
the impetus doctrine no instrumental agent is required to continue the original action; in St. Thomas' doctrine a continuous
hierarchy of movers is required.
Thus in no way in his doctrine of ]ocal motion does St.
Thomas weaken the force of the principle that whatever is
moved is moved by another.

The Attenuation of Violent Motion.
Why does the arrow finally fan? Why does its flight not
continue indefinitely under the influence of the propelling air
when once started by the archer? In considering this question
we should see it in its more general content: always we perceive
that the nearer a thing is to its cause the more powerful is the
effect
cause. Thus the nearer a body is to a fire the
ter it is: the heat of the fire is actual and it moves the neighboring body from potency to act, so that heat becomes actual in
the body. The nearer the body to the fire the greater is this
effect, and consequently the hotter the body becomes. 30 So, a
man who knows arithmetic teaches it to another, and the more
conscientiously the pupil applies himself, the more does he learn.
Duhem cites an illuminating passage from al Bitrogi, the
disciple of ibn Rushd, in which the attenuation of violent motion is compared with the general inward :radial attenuation of
motion in the cosmos, al Bitrogi writes: 31
[the stone and the arrow] continue to move, bu.t by means of a
virtue which remains applied to the stone or to the arrow after the
projector has launched it; the more the arrow is separated from :its
30 On the doctrine of heat see, for instance, the last paragraph of Ill Cont. Gent.,
c. 69 (cf. Aristotle, Physic.
a
It will be evident that this doctrine of heat
differs fundamentally from the theory of heat held in modern " Kantian " physical
science.
31 Duhem, Leon., t. 2, p. 191.

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GAVIN ARDLEY

motor; the more feeble the virtue becomes. As this virtue is consumed when the arrow falls, so the virtue that the Supreme Mover
confers on the inferior spheres diminishes continually until it comes
to the Earth which remains naturally immobile.

An influence radiating from a central point through a hierarchy of agents is attenuated and divided and diversified the
farther removed it is from the center. 32 This is true whether
we consider a state or a transition, whether the spreading ripples caused by dropping a pebble into a pond, or the cosmos as
a whole proceeding from God.
The general principle illuminates such diverse things as the
imperfection and contingency of the sub-lunary world and the
inferiority of man's intellectual powers to the angel's. The
eventual fall of the arrow; the crumbling of the old house; the
impotency of seeds kept too long; the gradual cooling of hot
bodies when the fire is removed; each of these processes of decay
may be hastened or retarded in its own way according to the
surroundings; but its ultimate extinction is as certain as the
imperfection of terrestrial affairs compared with celestiaL

Natural Locomotion.
Heavy bodies, like earth, tend to their natural place which
is below, and light bodies, like fire, to their natural place which
is above. How are we to account for these natural downward
and upward movements? The Philosopher had to expend a considerable amount of intellectual effort on this subject. It is
clear in the case of violent motion that the motion derives from
the motor agent which initiates the movement. But how are
we to identify the agent responsible for the natural upward and
downward motion of the elements?
It would almost seem that these bodies have within themselves some spring of movement; 33 although this cannot literally
be so, yet the appearance of autonomous motion must be accounted for. Aristotle examines the matter minutely in VIII
Ill Cont. Gent., c. 64; Summa Theol., I, q. 89, a. l, etc.
•• De Caelo 308 a 3; 310 b
etc.

82

THE PHYSICS OF LOCAL MOTION

161

Physic., 4: When light and heavy things are in motion to positions which are the reverse of their natural places, i.e., when
heavy bodies are thrown up, and light bodies down, their
motion is violent, and the source of the violent motion is manifest. When, however, these bodies are in motion to their proper
places, the heavy down and the light up, their motion is
natural. Whence comes this natural motion?
The natural motion is not self-sufficient, since we know that
whatever is moved by another. Nor can it be like the movement of animals which is prima facie self-sufficient; in the case
of animal motion one part causes motion in another separate
part, and thus the whole is moved; this is possible only because
the animal is composite, having active parts which move passive
parts. A stone, however, is one and continuous and without
differentiated parts, so that its motion can have no source like
that of animal motion. Furthermore, Aristotle points out very
cogently,S4 if the stone's natural motion were animal-like, then
it would be in the stone's power to stop itself, or to move in any
direction, both of which animal characteristics are absent from
the stone. Thus a falling stone and a bird differ radically in
their behavior.
The problem of natural motion is solved by Aristotle by a
close examination of the implications of the notion of potency.
Let us consider the Philosopher's words: 35
One who is learning a science, potentially knows it in a different
sense from one who, while already possessing the knowledge, is not
actually exercising it. Wherever we have something capable of
acting and something capable of being correspondingly acted on, in
the event of any such pair being in contact, what is potential becomes at times actual: e. g., the learner becomes from one potential
something another potential something: for one who possesses
knowledge of a science but is not actually exercising it knows the
science potentially in a sense, though not in the same sense as he
knew it potentially before he learnt it. And when he is in this condition, if s9mething does not prevent him, he actively exercises his
knowledge.
•• Phyaic. !t55 a 5 f.

•• Ibid., 88 f.

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GAVIN ARDLEY

So, too, in the case of natural bodies; as witness a cold body
which becomes hot and thereupon burns, unless something prevents it; likewise a heavy body when generated will realize its
proper activity and descend, and a light body rise, unless something hinders the movement. Thus, a pile-driver at the bottom
of its stroke illustrates the first state of potency, at the top the
second, and the release from the top allows its proper motion of
descent to occur. So, a trigger releases an activity in the gunpowder; likewise an archer when he releases the drawn bow.
Hence we see that the natural motion of heavy and light
things to their respective places is the completion of the original
action on the removal of some hindrance which has up to that
moment been preventing the last stage of the activity. Thus
we may appropriately ascribe these natural motions of bodies to
the generator which initially brought the heavy and light bodies
into existence, and again successively, to that which releases the
hindrance. 86
We can see now why it is that these bodies appear to have
within themselves some spring of movement. The appearance
of autonomous motion derives from the fact that natural locomotion of light and heavy bodies to their natural places is the
last transition to full being for such a body; in its natural place
becoming is at an end and the body enjoys its proper being and
completion. 37 Now, the appetite of matter towards its form is
the greater as its state is the more perfect, 38 the natural appetite
of inanimate things for their proper end being like the will or
intellectual appetite in intellectual substances. 89 Consequently,
the more perfect the state the less is the external influence
needed for the natural motions of the heavy and the light;
hence the appearance of a spring of movement within the body
after the generator and the remover of hindrances have performed their functions.
St. Thomas confirms Aristotle's judgment on natural motion.
•• Ibid., 256 a 1.
87 De Caelo 810 b 82 f.

•• III Cont. Gent., c. 22.
•• Ibid., c. 88.

THE PHYSICS OF LOCAL MOTION

168

He renders the theory more precise even than the Philosopher
left ito Thus, in the Contra Gentiles we read: 40
Simple forms do not cause movement, they are principles of
movement, since natural movements, like all other natural properties, follow from themo . o The form is the principle of local
movement inasmuch as to a particular body in respect of its form,
is due a particular place, to which it is moved by virtue of its form,
which tends to that place; and because the generator gives this
form, it is said to be a mover. Thus, it is due to fire, in accord with
its form, to be in a higher placeo
0

And again: 41
As the arrow receives its direction to a fixed end through the
impulse of the archer, so, too, natural bodies receive an inclination
to their natural ends from their natural movers, from whom they
derive their forms, powers, and movements.

There is thus a dose analogy between one who releases a
catapult and one who pulls away a pillar supporting a :root
Just as it is necessary to attribute to the circumambient medium
an agency whereby motion is continued after the projectile
leaves the catapult, so, too, it appears that we must attribute to
the medium the propulsion which maintains the downward
motion of the falling stoneo Although this downward motion
is in accordance with nature, and not by constraint, yet there
must still be a separate mover to move the body to the completion of its acL Likewise with the heavenly bodies, the fifth element of which they are composed undergoes circular motion by
nature, but yet, it must be so moved by an external intelligenceo
In the case of violent motion the medium, under the action
of the initial motor, moves the body against its natural motion;
in the case of the falling body the medium is acting in accord
with nature; nevertheless a propulsive medium is necessary in
both kinds of motion. In violent motion the medium propels
the body to the goal designated by the initial motor violence; in
natural motion the goal is determined by the form of the body,
and the medium assists the body to reach its natural goaL
40

Ibid., c. '23.

3

41

Ibid., c.

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GAVIN ARDLEY

Furthermore, with violent motion the speed diminishes to
zero as the source is left behind and the goal is approached,
while with natural motion the speed generally increases as the
body comes nearer to the goal; 42 since the body's appetite for
its form grows as it approaches its end as a hungry man approaching his dinner.
, Again, with violent motion, the greater the body the more
effort is needed to move it, while with natural motion the heavier
the body the faster does the body descend; and likewise the
greater the bulk of a light body the more rapidly does it ascend,
as, for instance, a mass of :fire. " Whenever bodies are moving
with their proper motion, the larger moves quicker," says
AristoUe. 43
Summing up, then, we conclude that for natural motion Form
is the principle of the movement determining the destination,
and the Cause is, in successive orders, the generator, the remover of the obstacles, and the circumambient medium.
The Functions of the Medium

Natural Motion.

If the universe were infinite there would be no up or down
or middle, and hence no natural motion, which is contrary to
experience. If there were a void, since there is no difference in
nothing, there would again be no up or down, and hence no
'"Physic. 230 b 25; de Caelo 277 b 7, etc.
48 De Caelo 290 a 1; ct 273 b 32; 277 b 4; 308 b 20, etc, The assertion that heavier
bodies fall faster than lighter bodies is often referred to by modem authors as a
point on which the Peripatetic philosophers were mistaken, and that Galileo, by
his experiments with falling bodies, proved the ancient philosophers to be in error
by showing that all bodies, small or great, fall together.
This dispute is, however, somewhat insubstantial.
To put the matter in Newtonian
language, the Galileans are referring to an artificial or " ideal " case of a free fall
under gravity without resistance; then (by definition) all bodies fall with equal
acceleration, e. g,, independent of mass. The Aristotelians, on the other hand, are
referring, not to an "ideal" fall, but to an actual natural fall; again in Newtonian
language, the viscous resistance of the medium (in accordance with Stokes' Law
R = 6>T?Jva for a sphere of radius a and velocity v) causes a falling body to attain a
constant" terminal velocity," the value of which is greater for larger bodies. Hence
in Nature heavier bodies do in fact fall faster; a proposition which is indeed manifest
to common sense, and which certainly did not escape the vigilant eye of the
Philosopher.

THE PHYSICS OF LOCAL MOTION

165

natural motion, so the void too is impossible.44 Thus we rule
out Newton's infinite structureless universe. But there is
another reason for rejecting the existence of a void, i. e., a space
containing nothing: there would then be no propellant agent
for violent motion, nor for natural motion, so that no locomotion would occur, which is manifestly absurd. Conversely,
we can argue that in a thinner medium motion occurs more
readily, and hence in a void motion should occur at infinite
speed/ 5 The notion of a locomotion through a space devoid of
a medium is thus antinomous and absurd from whatever viewpoint we consider it.
It is apparent that in the motion of a body the action of the
medium is two-fold: (1) propulsion, (2) resistance. In Newtonian doctrine the action of the medium is merely retarding
(as expressed quantitatively in Stokes' Law); in Peripatetic
doctrine the medium is primarily propulsive and secondarily
resistive. Thus a stone falls more rapidly in water than in
treacle; it is propelled to its proper destination by the medium
in both cases, but it cleaves the water more readily than it
cleaves the treacle, and hence moves more rapidly. 46
That the motion through the medium is a combination of
propulsion and resistance is recognised in Newtonian physics in
an oblique way: the density of the medium is regarded as the
propellant factor, in that it modifies gravity, as, for instance, in
the case of a bubble of air rising in water; the viscosity of the
medium is regarded as the retardant factor.
It is a curious paradox in the Newtonian system that we must
artificially view the rise of the air bubble in the lake, and the
fall of the stone in the lake, as fundamentally different; the fall
of the stone as primary, and the rise of the bubble as secondary.
In Peripatetic physics both processes are viewed together; the
water in each case assists the body to its natural place, i.e., up
or down, subject to the water's retarding influence.
•• Physic. 215 a 5 f.
'"Ibid. 215 b. Note also: on the Newtonian treatment, from Stokes' Law, as
0, terminal
oo.
•• Ibid. 215 a 80.

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GAVIN ARDLEY

The case of the airplane is instructive; (1) We must fill the
fuel tank, i.e., give the machine its initial virtue, or it does not
move (its ordinary motion not being natural) .
Air is
necessary for its subsequent propulsion by means of the rotating
propeller. (3) Air is responsible at the same time for retarding
the motion. The air both propels the flying-machine and :retards it. Similarly for the flight of birds, and for the water in
the case of a man swimming; so to in a marked manner for the
swerving flight of a spinning tennis ball.
What of the case of rocket propulsion? On Newtonian physics the air in this case contributes nothing to the propulsion
but is merely retarding, so that a rocket airplane should travel
with greater facility when beyond the Earth's atmosphere.
Rocket propulsion in vacuo is closely related to natural fall in
an evacuated vessel. These so-called vacua are not voids; we
must regard them as filled with a rare medium under the propulsion of which motion takes place more readily than in air;
in these conditions the rocket-propelled airplane moves more
rapidly; likewise the guinea and feather in the famous experiment fall in the evacuated vessel with equal velocity, and more
:rapidly than in air.

The False Doctrine of Impetus.
The doctrine that a body once set in motion continues to
move by its own impetus without further outside aid is the
antithesis of the Peripatetic doctrine that for locomotion, as for
aU motion, the continuous action of an external mover is necessary. The doctrine of impetus or inertia has been held universally in physical science since the seventeenth century, and
constitutes one of the principal articles in the revolt against
Aristotelian science. However justified such a doctrine might
be for the peculiar domestic purposes of modern physical
science, which is a pragmatic simulacrum of the real science of
Nature, the impetus doctrine is absurd if regarded as an
article of the real science of physics.
The seventeenth century revolt against Peripatetic principles

THE PHYSICS OF LOCAL MOTION

167

of physics was prepared in the fourteenth century by the
Nominalist philosophers at the University of Paris, notably by
Jean Buridan and Nicolas Oresme. The doctrine of impetus has
a longer history than this, however; it can be traced back at
least to Johannes Philoponus the grammarian and philosopher
of Alexandria (c . .500 A. D.).
In his Commentary on the Physics of Aristotle, 47 Philoponus
discusses the physics of local motion and advances the impetus
doctrine in opposition to Aristotle's doctrine that the medium is
propellant. For Philoponus, the medium is merely resistive and
exercises no propellant function; the impetus given to the
thrown body suffices to continue its motion until the resistance
to motion offered by the medium brings the body to rest. It
will be evident that in this doctrine of Philoponus we have the
implicit denial of the general principle that whatever is in
motion is moved by another.
The critical case in distinguishing Aristotle's doctrine from
the impetus doctrine is motion in a void. According to the
Aristotelian principle a body could not move through a void
with either natural or violent motion because there is no propellant and no destination. According to Philoponus' impetus
doctrine, motion through a void would occur with the greatest
facility, since there is nothing to impede it; no propellant is
needed and destination is determinate initially and not finally.
Philoponus discusses at some length the theory of antiperistasia, believed by some to account for the continuance of
the forced motion of a projectile; the supposed process whereby
the air moving round behind the arrow by some means pushes
the arrow forward. Like Aristotle before him, Philoponus
decides that antiperistasis and its variants are incapable of
explaining the facts of forced motion. Unlike Aristotle he concludes that therefore we must dismiss the notion of the ai:r as
propellant. Thus he writes: 48
47 Selections in English translation
will be found in M. R. Cohen and I. E.
Drabkin, Source Book in Greek Science (New York, 1948), pp. Ql7-QQ3.
•• Cohen and Drabkin, loc. cit.

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GAVIN ARDLEY

From these considerations and from many others we may see how
impossible it is for forced motion to be caused in the way indicated
[i. e., by the motion of the air]. Rather is it necessary to assume that
some incorporeal motive force is imparted by the projector to the
projectile, and that the air set in motion contributes either nothing
at all or else very little to this motion of the projectile. If, then,
forced motion is produced as I have suggested, it is quite evident
that if one contributes motion contrary to nature, or forced motion,
to an arrow or a stone, the same degree of motion will be produced
much more readily in a void than in a plenum. And there will be
no need of any agency external to the projector ....

We have seen that the Philosopher likewise found that antiperistasis, or any doctrine that relies entirely on the local movement of the medium, is inadequate to account for violent
motion. We must recognize that what the projector imparts to
the medium is primarily a power of giving motion, and any
local movement of the medium itself is incidental. Philoponus
appears to overlook this distinction; hence, having dismissed
the movement of the medium as inadequate to account for the
violent motion of the projectile, he mistakenly supposes that the
only alternative is the impetus of the projectile; he advances
this principle in spite of the fact that the impetus doctrine is
nonsense metaphysically.
Philoponus' criticism thus fails to reach the essence of the
Peripatetic doctrine of the function of the medium; the Philosopher's doctrine of local motion is unshaken.

The Impetus Doctrine of Buridan.
The impetus doctrine was revived in the fourteenth century
at the University of Paris 49 by the Nominalist philosophers
under the leadership of Jean Buridan, Rector of the University
•• It is mainly due to the labors of the great French savant, Pierre Duhem, in the
early years of the present century, that the doctrines. concerning the natural sciences
current in the fourteenth century have been rescued from oblivion. The doctrine of
impetus has since been recognized in the work of the Dominican, Robert Kilwardby,
in the thirteenth century, and, it is claimed, in some of the Arab philosophers. It
would seem that this pernicious error, like all aberrations and heresies, is always
lurking, awaiting an opportunity to show itself.

THE PHYSICS OF LOCAL MOTION

169

(c. 1340) .50 Buridan held that all locomotion, whether terrestrial or celestial, is governed by impetus. Buridan is the
parent of the mechanistic theory of the universe in its modern
cycle. His doctrines developed and spread steadily until they
were taken up with enthusiasm in the seventeenth century and
have been de rigueur well-nigh ever since in scientific circles.
In one of the sections of his Quaestiones on the de C aelo of
Aristotle, 51 Buridan discusses local motion. He maintains that
the theory of impetus accounts for the facts much better than
does the Aristotelian doctrine of a propellant medium:
"Finally we ask the question," he writes," whether, when a
stone is thrown or an arrow is shot from the bow in like cases,
it is kept moving after leaving the projector by virtue of some
power intrinsic to it or by virtue of some extrinsic cause."
Buridan argues first that the air offers a resistance to the
moving body and hence, he claims, it cannot be the propellant.
But we have already discussed this matter and seen that there
is no impediment to the notion of the air filling both roles in
different phases of its operation; so a swimmer could not be
propelled without the water, and at the same time experiences
a resistance from the water.
Next, Buridan brings forward the old objection that if
moving air keeps the projectile moving, what keeps the air
moving? This objection is, however, beside the point in considering Peripatetic doctrine, since Aristotle likewise dismissed
this theory as absurd and advanced the quite different doctrine
that the air is given not a movement, but the power of being
a mover.
Buridan goes on to discuss antiperistasis, and points out its
inadequacy to account for projectile motion; he recognises,
too, that the Philosopher did not accept the doctrine of antiperistasis as an explanation of the motion of projectiles. In
•• Buridan is popularly remembered today in connection with the psychological
dilemma of "Buridan's ass." But he was a man of wide learning and wrote extensively on all branches of philosophy.
51 Johannis Buridani, Quaestiones super libris quattuor de caelo et
(ed. E.
A. Moody, 1942) bk. m.

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GAVIN ARDLEY

refuting the antiperistwtis doctrine Buridan puts forward the
interesting cases of the revolving hoop and the smith's grinding
stone: it is manifest that in such motions of revolution, since
the air is not being cleaved, antiperistasi.s with regard to the air
brings no solution to the problem of the continuance of revolution for some time after the agent which set them revolving has
ceased to act.
Has the air any other influence on the persistence of revolution? Buridan proposes a number of experiments: for instance,
if you take a cloth and drive away the air contiguous to the
revolving wheel you do not thereby stop the revolution. This,
and other tests of a similar character, Buridan believes. suggest
that the air is not concerned with the maintenance of the
rotation.
It should be pointed out, however, that the argument from
the rotating wheel is somewhat oblique in its significance. For
rotational motion is not motion directed to a place, and is therefore of a radically different character from rectilinear motion.
It is in:deed the nature of the heavenly bodies to revolve unceasingly in circles, propelled by the intelligences directing
them. But there is no natural circular motion beneath the
sphere of the Moon: the only circular motion found on Earth
is accidental or artificial, e. g. whirlpools, wheels of vehicles, etc.
Natural motion on Earth is rectilinear, up for light bodies and
down for heavy bodies, which thereby obtain their natural
places of rest and completion. This being so, the rotation of a
wheel or a grindstone is not, strictly, violent, since it is not the
opposite of a natural rotation.
Hence in investigating the violent motion of an arrow the
example of the wheel is not directly relevant. Supposing it were
true that a wheel set rotating would continue to rotate for some
time in vacuo (if there were such). This would in no way
establish that a projectile would continue ·to move in vacuo
without a propellant medium, nor that a natural movement of
rise or fall would take place in a void where destination and
propellant alike fail.

THE PHYSICS OF LOCAL MOTION

171

In fact, however, we can see that a wheel could not continue to rotate in a void when the operator has ceased, any more
than a stone could be thrown in a void. A propellant medium
must be at work for the continuance of rotation as for translation, although we do not fully grasp its mode of action. Buridan
is correct in maintaining that the process of contained rotation
is not one of antiperistasis; but, while the exact process escapes
us, the necessity for a propellant is evident from first principles.
Aristotle, after laying down that in violent rectilinear motion
the medium has a propellant power conferred upon it by the
motor which persists for some time before attenuating to zero,
wisely desists from speculating into the precise mode of operation of this power. So, too, we must leave open the case of
the rotating wheel as regards the mode, while being assured of
the principles.u
Buridan, however, has no metaphysical scruples in abolishing
the need for a separate mover in accounting for the motion of
the projectile. Thus he continues:
Therefore, since these appearances and many other things cannot
be saved by that opinion [the motive power given to the air], I
rather believe that the mover impresses on that which is made to
move not only the movement but equally some impetus or some
power or some quality-it does not matter by what name it is
called. This impetus, however, has the natural capacity for moving
that on which it is impressed, just as the magnet impresses on the
iron some power which makes the iron move to the magnet. 53 And
insofar as the motion of the mover is quicker, so also is the impetus
more intense; and that impetus in the projectile or arrow is certainly
being diminished by the resistance contrary to it until it can no
longer make that projectile move. If you should find some other
way of saving Aristotle's opinion and the appearances at the same
time, I should gladly adhere to it.

Thus we have the impetus theory or locomotion laid down
•• The effect of rotation on the flight of a golfball is interesting in this connection:
It is admitted on all hands that the swerve of the spinning ball is due to the air;
the further claim of the Peripatetic physics is that the translational motion, too, is
due to the air.
•• Physic.
a

GAVIN ARDLEY

explicitly. In his Quaestiones on the Physics of Aristotle, Buridan applies the principle of impetus to the movement of the
heavenly bodies. 54
By means of the principle of impetus Buridan bridges the
disjunction which had formerly been held well-nigh universally
between the celestial and terrestrial realms. For Buridan, all
local movement is governed by impetus, whether it be of the
arrow or the revolving star. He thereby abolished the distinction between the four terrestrial elements with radical natural
motion and the fifth element of the heavenly bodies with circular natural motion; at the same time he abolished the doctrine
that the heavenly bodies are pro:r>elledby motor intelligences or
angels. All is now subject to the reign of impetus.
At the Creation, Buridan contends, God set the heavens in
motion; they have continued in those motions ever since by
virtue of their impetus. Because of this automatic motion God
no longer needs to make special provision to propel the heavens,
and indeed this is Buridan' s exegesis of the statement in Scripture that God rested on the seventh day.
Buridan's doctrine of original impetus thus leads to a fundamentally different conception of the governance of the world
from that entertained by St. Thomas. For the latter, God is the
first cause of all being and all activity in the world; not merely
the first cause in time, but the first cause immediately in the
hierarchy of being and action, both efficiently and finally; indeed, the world may not have been created in time at all (St.
Thomas contends that this cannot be known Jrom creatures,
but rests on Revelation), but God would still be the first cause
of everything in Nature. Buridan puts God's principal function
into the creation of the world at some epoch in the past; God's
role since then, as Buridan sees it, might be likened to that of a
retired monarch who contemplates the autonomous evolution
of the world he started; the constant governance of the world
by Divine Providence is thus implicitly denied.
This aberrant teaching about the locomotion in the world
•• Bk. Vlll, q. a (cf. Duhem, Leun. t. 8, p. 84 f.).

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THE PHYSICS OF LOCAL MOTION

flowed outwards from the University of Paris in a great wave
of naturalistic philosophy, and became the parent of the
mechanistic philosophy and cosmologies of later centuries.

n
LocAL MoTION IN MoDERN PHYSICAL

SYSTEMS

We have considered the nature of local motion as revealed
in the philosophia perennis, and remarked the aberrant doctrine
of impetus. The impetus theory of locomotion, propounded by
the nominalist philosophers of the University of Paris in the
fourteenth century, became one of the fundamental articles of
the new physical science of the seventeenth century. This
doctrine of impulse has, seemingly at least, :remained fundamental to physics throughout its evolutions until our day.
However, closer inspection of the systems of physics prevailing
since Newton reveals that the principles of locomotion found
in those systems are more equivocal than might appear at first
sight. Modern or ' Kantian ' physics, by its own pragmatically
governed development, has forsaken the simple impetus principle of Newtonian mechanics, and in our time, under the name
of «wave-mechanics," has produced a theory of locomotion
which is remarkably analogous in form to the Peripatetic
principles, albeit without the inner substance possessed by
those principles.
The evolution of the theory of locomotion illustrates a
general characteristic of Kantian systems: under their innate
utilitarian impulsion they tend to evolve into fragmentary and
spectral counterparts of the real hierarchical science of nature"

The Peripatetic and the Newtonian Systems.
It is remarkable that the action of the circumambient
medium should have been rated so low by the later Scholastics
and the seventeenth-century physicists. It is manifest that the
medium exercises a very potent influence on local motion: drop
a stone in air and then in treacle and observe the difference in

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GAVIN ARDLEY

its motion. To dismiss this difference as merely secondary is
patently quite artificial and ad hoc.
We have seen that in the Peripatetic doctrine sub-lunary
local motion is due to a) the medium, which has a propulsive
and a resistive function; b) in natural motion, the form of the
body determining its destination; c) in violent motion, whatever force is communicated initially by the violent agent to the
body and the medium. In the case of the motion of the
heavenly bodies these external factors are replaced by one:
the motor intelligence.
The Newtonian picture of the universe is fundamentally
different from the Aristotelian. Newton's universe is an infinite
void containing discrete, mutually gravitating, massive particles obeying the three laws of motion. The behavior of these
particles is considered to be determinable mathematically from
any given initial configuration by the application of the infinitesimal calculus which Newton propounded to be a necessary anciUa to his system of physics.
The feature which appears immediately as the direct antithesis to Aristotle's universe is that Newton's space is an
infinite undifferentiated void; while for Aristotle space has a
structure: it is a finite sphere with a determinable center and
periphery, and every corporeal body in the world has its own
natural place within that sphere, which place it constantly
strives to attain if it does not already reside there. Hence, for
Aristotle, all locomotion must have an end or goal; it cannot
continue indefinitely or to infinity; without a determinate goal
there could be no natural locomotion; no body could be moving
to a place at which it could never arrive. 55 Thus, contends the
Philosopher, the universe can be neither void nor infinite, since
in either case there would be no natural movement in the world,
which is a manifest absurdity: if it were infinite there would be
no middle nor up nor down, i. e., no differentiation in space;
and similarly, if it were void, the void being nothing, and there
being no difference in what is nothing, there would once more
•• De Caelo 274 b 15; 277 a 27, etc.

THE PHYSICS OF LOCAL MOTION

175

be no differentiation; and in both cases there would in consequence be no natural places for bodies to seek, and hence no
natural motion. 56
Further, continues the Philosopher, if the universe were
either infinite or void or both, then " no one could say why a
thing once set in motion should stop anywhere; for why should
it stop here rather than here. So that a thing will either be at
rest or must be moved ad infinitum, unless something more
powerful get in its way." 57
Some two thousand years later Newton was to announce the
same theorem in his Principia as his first law of motion; the
foundation stone of the Newtonian system was the very proposition which Aristotle had advanced as a reductio ad absurdum.
Newton, after laying down a model of the universe as an
infinite void proceeds to enunciate the first law of motion for
the bodies contained therein: " Every body continues in its
state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is
compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it." 58
It will be observed that Newton preserves the notion of
natural motion, but for him natural motion is of quite a different character from Aristotle's natural motion. Indeed, we have
the paradox that Newton's "natural" motion never occurs in
Nature, since there is no body in the universe completely free
from external forces. The fall of the stone and the ceaseless
revolutions of the heavenly bodies, which for Aristotle exemplify natural motions, are for Newton forced motions.
We have remarked that the strength of Newtonian and allied
systems of physics is pragmatic rather than rational. The
system of Newton, insofar as it may profess to rest on principles
of a philosophical nature, has little to recommend it; the principles which are implicit in Newton's fundamental theorems
are evasive and eccentric. The true character of this system
will be rendered more evident by viewing it in a wider context
of physical theories.
Physic. 215 a.
Ibid. 215 a 20.
58 Newton, Principia Mathematica (tr. Motte, ed. Cajori), p. 181.

50

57

176

GAVIN ARDLEY

Theories of Light.
Newton extended the principle of the motion of particles to
several branches of physics, and notably to the theory of light.
He envisaged light as a stream of corpuscles emitted from the
luminous body; the corpuscles impinging on the retina of the
eye give rise to the sensation of vision. These corpuscles obey
the laws of motion, and by making various assumptions the
elementary phenomena of optics, rectilinear propagation, reflection, refraction, etc., were readily accounted for. 59
However, Newton's contemporary, Huyghens, proposed quite
a different theory concerning the nature of light. Huyghens
envisaged light not as a stream of corpuscles but as waves
spreading from the source, as the ripples on the surface of a
pond when we throw in a pebble. In the wave theory, too,
the elementary properties of light were :readily explained. 60
From the seventeenth century to the early nineteenth
century the corpuscular theory of light was generally adhered
to. But early in the nineteenth centmy, chiefly owing to the
work of Young and Fresnel on the phenomena of interference,
the wave theory replaced the corpuscular theory in popular
acceptance.
The later development in the theories of light are too well
known to require lengthy description; we shall merely
late the basic characteristics in order to discuss their signifiTowards the end of the nineteenth century, commencing with
the study of the photo-electric effect, corpuscle-like properties
came to be recognised in light as well as wave-properties. In
the year 1900 Max Planck was obliged to introduce his celebrated quantum theory of radiation to account for the shape of
the energy distribution in the :radiation from black bodies. According to the quantum theory, radiation is not emitted from
the source in a continuous manner but is discontinuous in space
and time, i.e., it is emitted, not as spreading waves, but as
•• Newton, Opticks (1st ed., London, 1704) .
•• Christian Huyghens, Traite de la Lumiere (Leiden, 1690).

THE PHYSICS OF LOCAL MOTION

177

" bundles " or quanta. Each quantum has an energy of h v erg,
where v sec-\ is the frequency of the radiation, and h erg. sec.
is Planck's constant.
From this and subsequent developments, the quantum
theory of radiation became firmly established. Light was regarded as having a dual nature: in some respects it was wavelike, and in other respects particle-like. But there was as yet
no satisfactory bridge between the two natures.
From about the year 19S!5 onwards it came to be recognised
that matter also has a dual nature; in some respects matter
behaves like particles and in other respects like waves. This
discovery was due to the experimental investigations of Davisson and Germer and of G. P. Thomson on the diffraction of
electron beams and to the theoretical work of de Broglie
on the dose analogy between the equations of optics and
mechanics.
If we have a stream of particles each of mass m gm. moving
with a velocity of v em. sec-\ then the associated wave length
of such a beam is given by the equation

h

A=mv

where h is Planck's constant. The wave properties of a beam
of electrons are determined by this relation, and likewise for all
moving bodies; for instance, a rifle bullet in flight has its
associated wave whose frequency is thus determined by the
bullet's mass and velocity.
Thus by about 1925 it was generally recognized that both
matter and radiation have dual natures: in some respects they
are particle-like and in other respects wave-like. This duality
was still a contradiction, however, since as yet the wave and
particle theories were merely juxtaposed as alternatives rather
than integrated into a unified theory.

The Characteristics of the Two Systems.
We see then that from the seventeenth century until the first

178

GAVIN ARDLEY

quarter of the twentieth century two patterns were normative
in theories of physical science, namely waves and particles:
(1) Waves. These were held to owe their movement
entirely to the medium; the source merely initiates the disturbance and thereafter the medium takes charge. So, when
we drop a stone into a pond and create spreading waves, the
behavior of the waves is determined by the medium, namely
the water. (More specifically in this case by gravity and
surface tension) . This total dependence on the medium is
clearly shown by the well-known equation for the velocity of
transmission of elastic waves in a medium; thus:
1 _ . I modulus of elasticity of medium
d enSlty
. of me d"mm
ve . - '1

(2) Particles: These were held to owe their movement
entirely to themselves in accordance with Newton's first law
of motion, once an impetus is imparted to them initially by
the source. A homogeneous medium plays no part in the
transmission of the particles except to act as a hindrance.

Wave and Particle Theories and the Peripatetic Doctrine.
It is most instructive now to compare the theories of wave
propagation with the Peripatetic doctrine of local motion. The
Peripatetic theory holds that local motion is due intrinsically
to a combination of (1) the motive influence of the medium,
and (2) the influence of the source in violent motion and the
goal in natural motion.
In violent motion the motive cause initiates the movement
and gives to the medium the power of continuing the movement to its intended destination, as when the archer shoots the
arrow at the target. In natural motion, when the hindrance is
removed, the body moves under the intrinsic motive power of
the medium to its proper destination; it generally increases in
speed as the goal is approached owing to its growing appetite
for completion and rest as it nears its endo
It appears then that the wave and particle theories of classi-

THE PHYSICS OF LOCAL MOTION

179

cal physics may be regarded as, in form, two fragmentary
extremes separated off from the Peripatetic doctrine, The
patetic physics envisages both the activity of the medium and
that of the source or goal; the wave theory concentrates entirely
on the medium, the particle theory entirely on the source.
The theories of locomotion in classical physics may thus be
described as polar with respect to Peripatetic physics. The
theory of light since the seventeenth century has oscillated
between the two poles and has recently become ambivalent.
The theory of matter has recently undergone a similar transformation.

The Theory of Wave M eckanics.
After 19fl5 the dual nature of both light and matter had
become firmly established. The next step was to solve the
antithesis by means of a unified theory. This was accomplished
in the mathematical structure now known by the titles of
"wave-mechanics " and " quantum-mechanics "; they were due
to the labors of a number of theoretical physicists, notably de
Broglie, Sch:rodinger, Heisenberg, Dirac, etc. Schrodinger was
able to show that the abstract " quantum-mechanics " of
Heisenberg was mathematically equivalent to his own system
of ., wave-mechanics!' 61 Accordingly we need consider here
only the system of wave-mechanics.
The wave-mechanics brings the wave and corpuscular aspects
of light and matter together into a higher synthesis. As we
might expect from such a synthesis, in view of the polarization
of classical theory, the general pattern of wave-mechanics is
manifestly aligned with the Aristotelian doctrine of locomotion;
albeit that the inspiration of the modern system is pragmatic,
its character partial, and its substance a simulacrum, whereas
the ancient system is truly hierarchic and reaL
This formal approach to the Peripatetic doctrine of locomotion has come about in the course of the natural evolution
61 E. Schrodinger, Annalen der Physik, 79, 1926, "On the relation between the
Quantum Mechanics of Heisenberg, Born and Jordan, and that of Schrodinger"
(Eng. tr., Coll. Papers, London, 1928).

4

180

GAVIN ARDLEY

of pragmatic physics; an approach which could scarcely have
been dreamt of by rti-neteenth-century physicists with their
horizon narrowly bounded by the disparate wave and particle
theories. The physicists of the seventeenth century by failing
to observe the artificial character of the new theories of physics
were alienated from the ancient science of nature. 62 But in the
twentieth century with the substitution of wave-mechanics for
Galilean- Newtonian mechanics, the prima facie conflict between
the new and the old principles is substantially reduced, and
so the historic pretext for the unreasoning rejection of the
Aristotelian natural science loses its force.
The theory of wave-mechanics is principally the creation of
Louis de Broglie, extended by the work of Schrodinger .68 The
object of his work de Broglie expressed thus:
Under pressure from the results of experiments, physicists have
been obliged to admit that the old dynamics, even when enlarged
by relativistic ideas, could not interpret phenomena involving
quanta. Today it appears necessary to create a new mechanics
closely connected with the theory of waves. This is the idea which
I have been endeavoring to work out for some years, and which the
recent beautiful work of Schri:idinger has rounded off and extended.
6<l

The object of the wave-mechanics is to create a synthesis embracing both the dynamics of a material particle and the theory of
waves as conceived by Fresnel. On the one hand, the effect of this
synthesis must be to introduce the idea of points of concentration
of radiant energy into optics, an idea which at present seems to be
required by the recent results of experimental physics; on the other
hand, it must introduce the conceptions of the theory of waves into
•• There were a few more in the seventeenth century, such as Cardinal Bellarmine,
who suspected the equivocal character of the new sciences. But little heed was paid
to their judicious counsel.
•• De Broglie unfolded his new theory in a doctorate thesis in
followed
by a series of papers. The most interesting of these papers, translated into English,
will be found in de Broglie and Brillouin, Selected Papers on Wave Mechanics
(London, 1928).
•• De Broglie, "The Principles of the New Wave Mechanics" (1926), Selected
Papers, p. 55.

THE PHYSICS OF LOCAL MOTION

181

our picture of material particles in order to account for the occurrence of quanta in mechanics, and for intra-atomic phenomena.65
De Broglie founded his system on the remarkable parallel
between the classical dynamics of a material particle and the
theory of geometrical optics. 66 He postulated a fundamental
connection between waves and corpuscles in order to explain
the equivalence of the laws. Thus he associated the propagation of waves with the motion of all the different kinds of
elementary particles; he took the particles to be points in the
wave where in some way energy is concentrated, so that the
laws of wave propagation are fundamental, and the dynamical
laws governing the motion of a particle are deductions from the
laws of wave propagation. The dynamics of light quanta were
taken to be the limiting case of the dynamics of ' material '
particles when the velocity approaches the constant c.
The wave-mechanics of de Broglie was extended by Schrodinger who developed the fundamental equation governing the
propagation of the waves in terms of the wave function t/J.
This system gives an integral theory in which particles and
quanta are everywhere guided by t/J-waves. The wave function
t/J thus becomes the fundamental entity in modern physics.

W ave-M eckanics and Newtonian M eckanics.
The system of wave-mechanics supersedes Newtonian dynamics for the motion of bodies. Insofar as the Newtonian
dynamics is successful the two systems give identical results.
Thus, in the case of the deflection of a beam of electrons by an
electric field we have the two interpretations:
(1) In the Newtonian system, the force exerted by the
field on the charge of the electron deflects the electron which
pursues a curved path of a radius at each point determined by
the magnitude of the deflecting force.
(2) On the wave-mechanics system, we consider not the
electrons, but the guiding waves. When the t/J-waves enter the
field they are changed in wave-length (by an amount corre•• Ibid., p. 133.

•• [hid., p. 9.

GAVIN ARDLEY

sponding to the changed electron velocity), i.e., the waves are
refracted like light entering a block of glass. The electric field
is analogous in its action to an optical medium of continually
varying refractive index, and the 1/J-waves are accordingly deflected in a path the curvature of which is easily shown to be
identical with the curvature of the path in which the electrons
are bent on the Newtonian principles. Thus the two interpretations give identical results in this simple case; so, too, with all
the phenomena.. which were successfully treated by Newtonian
dynamics. But the wave-mechanics covers also a multitude
of phenomena to which classical theory does not apply. Hence
the Newtonian mechanics appears as a peculiar and circumscribed system which leads to the same results in some specific
cases as does the more powerful wave-mechanics which rests
on such radically different foundations.
It will be observed that in the 1/J-wave theory the locomotion
of a body at each point in its path is attributed to the action
at that point of what we can only call, whether figuratively or
literally, the medium in which the waves reside. This action of
the medium is in turn determined by the initial conditions
under which the locomotion commenced and any other conditions imposed en route. This theory of locomotion is thus
quite alien to the Newtonian theory where locomotion is
continued by the quality of impetus and is not due to the
activity of the medium, which functions only as a retardant.
The wave-mechanical theory must also be distinguished from a
simple wave-theory where motion is attributed entirely to the
local-action of the medium with no regard to the influence of
that which commenced the motion. Wave-mechanics combines
the virtues of both wave and particle notions.
It might be remarked that Newton's invocation of the force
of gravity, combined with impetus, now appears as a substitute
for the immediate propulsive or guiding action of the medium
in natural motion. It should be noted that Einstein in his
theory of General Relativity has likewise abolished the notion
of a force of gravity and replaced it by notions of the geometry

THE PHYSICS OF LOCAL MOTION

ISS

of a space-time continuum. Development after Newton led to
the invocation of electric and magnetic fields; however, the
paths of charged bodies under electric and magnetic forces
cannot be accounted for in the Einstein manner by the properties of the space-time field. It seems likely that the 1{1-wave
theory will fill this lacuna, so that electric and magnetic
actions, as well as gravity, will be completely subsumed into a
general theory of the action of the medium: de Broglie and
Einstein are the rightful successors of Faraday. 67
The system of wave-mechanics was developed in the first
place with a view to elementary particles such as electrons.
However, it seems that the same principles should be applicable
to the macroscopic world; that we should envisage the flight of
the arrow or the cannon ball as due to the guidance of
The wave-mechanical theory for the macroscopic world still
awaits development. Many questions suggest themselves. For
instance, what is the connection between sound-waves in the
air accompanying a cannon ball and the 1{1-waves? What of
ultra-sonic waves?
such questions are answered we
shall be further advanced toward a general mathematical theory
of locomotion; and it seems likely that the more perfect such
a general theory becomes merely under the impulsion of its
own utilitarian charter, the more the plan which emerges will
resemble the far-seeing wisdom of the Peripatetic principles of
locomotion.
The theory of wave-mechanics is far removed from the uncompromising rigidity of the impetus theory of locomotion,
with its denial of the motive-power of the medium, as advocated by Buridan, Galileo, and their successors, The extravagant subservience to the impetus theory, which has prevailed
since the seventeenth century, is now left without support, In
the x-wave theory physics has returned to the notion of immediacy in the cause of locomotion.
67 Cf. de Broglie, "The Universe of Five Dimensions and the Wave Mechanics,"
Selected Papers, p. 101. Lest it be thought paradoxical that such a professedly
" phenomenalist " physicist as Einstein should be seen as akin to such " realist " as

i84
Wave-Mechanics

GA'VIN ARDLEY

and Peripatetic Physics.

The Peripatetic doctrine of locomotion rests on immutable
grounds of general experience; no subsequent particular observations can either invalidate or validate it, although such observations may help to enrich our insight into the general doctrine.
Consequently it is not to be thought that wave-mechanics
establishes Aristotle's doctrine, any more than we could believe
Newton's system really overthrows the Aristotelian principles.
Rather the reverse is true; the more universal judges the more
particular.
From the point of view of the pure science of nature, the
wave-mechanics is interesting because it represents a formal
approach from within modern Kantian physics to the established Aristotelian principles of nature. Physics underwent its
pragmatic revolution in the seventeenth century. Thereafter
it pursued success without regard to the real nature of the
world; the ruthless external Procrustean method gave it great
power.
Nevertheless, in view of the hierarchical nature of the world,
the true system of natural science, if it could be sufficiently
grasped, would be itself the most fertile and productive of all
systems. The Kantian external physics is a short-cut to power
from a different starting-point, but we would expect that ultimately the path of Kantian physics would turn towards the
real physics and become an inferior image of the real science.
Hence the interest of the wave-mechanics to the philosopher
of nature.
After the initial violent break-away of the Galilean-Newtonian system, setting up the Kantian external physics, three
centuries of evolution in the theory of locomotion have brought
us to a point closer to the :real physics than ever before. Is this
merely a chance resemblance, or is it a permanent approach
to the goal? If the latter, then it should suggest that the
evolution of modern physics is approaching its end. However,
Faraday, let it be pointed out that the meeting of seemingly opposite extremes is no
uncommon occurrence in philosophical systems.

THE PHYSICS OF LOCAL MOTION

185

we should be cautious. There have been, in the past, many
prima facie and ephemeral approaches to various aspects of
Peripatetic physics: for instance, in the statement in mechanics
that potential energy tends to a minimum we might see a
resemblance to the purposeful character of Aristotle's natural
science. Such resemblances are, however, little more than
fortuitous: the content of the same theorem can be expressed
in other and quite non-Aristotelian language. As an item in
Kantian _physics the theorem has no metaphysical significance.
The case of the wave-mechanics, on the other hand, seems to
represent a much more substantial convergence.
Whatever be the future course of physical science, the hold
which the Galilean-Newtonian principles of motion obtained in
the seventeenth century has been broken irrevocably. The
strangely prevailing opinion that Galileo and Newton showed
Aristotle's physics to be untenable can scarcely be defended
longer. The Aristotelian science of nature can once more be
pursued dispassionately, and with it the whole perennial philosophy of the world.
GAVIN ARDLEY

Mount Albert E10
Victoria, Australia

NAMING GOD IN ST. AUGUSTINE'S
CONFESSIONS

HOW

shall I call upon my God? " With this question
St. Augustine launches the fundamental search recorded in his autobiography-a book named as much
for its efforts to confess God's praise as for its admissions
of sin and error on the part of the penitent-saint. By isolating
this primary aspect of the Confessions-the 'proclaiming of
God's praise--we can make some discoveries about the author's
way of naming God, a way which in some important respects
had no precedent among other early Christian writers.
To the opening query, rephrased to read, "What art thou,
my God? " Augustine gives a tentative answer in a series of
affirmations-four superlatives, " most high, most excellent,
most potent, most omnipotent," and a long list of paradoXical
attributes, which seem alternately to affirm and to deny:
" most hidden, most near . . . unchangeable, yet changing all
things ... never new, never old ... always working, yet ever
at rest ... changing thy ways, leaving unchanged thy plans." 1
In the last four books of the Confessions, which contain the
praise of God in creation, this search to state some of the
divine attributes comes into focus. It is mainly through the
developments in these closing books that St. Augustine is able
to give an unhesitant answer to his initial question and to end
on the confident assertion: " But thou, being the Good, needing
no good, art ever at rest, because thou thyself art thy rest." 2
Who shall teach man to understand this, he asks; but he no
longer fumbles for a fitting name for God nor suggests that this
attribution in itself does not express the truth.
With the single view of discerning to what extent this
so]ution to his initial problem rests on philosophical principles,
1

Confessions, I, 4.

• Ibid., xm. s7.

186

NAMING GOD IN ST. AUGUSTINE'S

«CONFESSIONS"

187

we shall examine St. Augustine's handling of God's attributes
in the Confessions, with particular attention to the final books.
Within these four books it is not immediately evident that the
author is approaching any unified resolution of his question, for
he gives a name o:r assigns an attribute to God two hundred
and ninety-eight times, with the most frequently repeated one,
" truth," recurring only twenty-six times with nine variations
among these twenty-six.
Such varied calling upon God has led many to speculate on
the divine attribute which seems most central to St. Augustine's
thought, but the answers have no striking unanimity. Father
Portalie says that this central attribute is extreme sirnplicity. 3
Father Fulbert Cayre believes that Augustine holds special
predilection for the attributes of wisdom and goodness. 4 E.
Logos points out that the saint will break the thread of any
controversy and begin again if he is in danger of understating
the pivotal attribute of immutability/ an opinion concurred
in by Vernon J. Bourke. 6 And Father Capello says that, apart
from assertions made to combat error, divine providence and
the presence of God in all things are the attributes preeminently stressed, at least in the Confessions. 7 In another work
of the saint's mature years he himself gives an answer that at
first, at least, seems unrelated to the climactic ending of the
Confessions: for in the De Trinitate out of twelve attributes
selected from many more he states that wisdom seems adequate
to contain them all. 8 Thus Augustine himself introduces complexity into the question of the divine attribute most central
to his thinking.
3 P. Portalie, "Augustin
(Saint)," Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique. Vol. I
(Paris: 1939), col. Q328.
• Fulbert Cayre, La Contemplation Augustinienne (Paris: Andre Blot, l9'il7), p.
251.
5 E. Logos, "La Pensee de Saint Augustin," Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie,
89-40 (1906), Q79.
• Vernon J. Bourke, Augustine's Quest of Wisdom (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1945), p.
97.
7 S. Aurelii Augustini, Confessionum.
Edited by J. Capello (Rome: Marietti,
1948), p. xxxii.
• De Trinitate, XV, 6.

188

SISTER RITAMARY BRADLEY

Speculation on this point follows from the fact that the
proper ratio of each divine attribute differs from the proper
ratio of any other. However, since aU of these attributes are
materially identical among themselves because each is identical
with the divine essence, the fundamental problem may be
approached by asking what St. Augustine says of God's being,
of God in Himself. This is, in fact, the aspect which Gilson
finds central to Augustine's thinking: though he begins each
approach to God through the notion of truth, it is towards
the God of Exodus that he directs his steps-towards being
in its plenitude, the " stability " in the essence, the immutability, the eternity which is not considered in any way as an
attribute but as the very substance of God. 9
Gilson finds this ascent to being intrinsically beyond the
reaches of a Plotinian metaphysics, which Augustine knew and
used, while admitting that in many respects the language in
which the saint speaks of God betrays his Hellenic indebtedness:
What happened to Augustine is only too clear .... The God of
Augustine is the true Christian God, of whose pure Act of existing
nothing better can be said than: He is; but when Augustine undertakes to describe existence in philosophical terms, he at once falls
back upon the Greek identification of being with the notions of
immateriality, intelligibility, immutability, and unity. Every such
thing is divine .... 10

But, as Gilson himself notes of Augustine (and even more
specifically of Dionysius, the pseudo-Areopagite), if one is to
remain true to the leq,ding principle of Plotinus one may not
affirm of the transcendent :F'irst Principle that it is a beingbecause " to be " is conceived of as something limited whereas
the transcendental One of Plotinus is without form or limit. 11
Etienne Gilson, Introduction a L'Etude de Saint Augustin (Paris: J. Vrin, 1943),
edition, p.
10 Etienne
Gilson, God and Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press,
9

1944), p. 60.
11 Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto:
Mediaeval Studies, Revised Edition, 1952), p. 34.

Pontifical Institute of

NAMING GOD IN ST. AUGUSTINE'S" CONFESSIONS,

189

Hence, it is necessary for Augustine to depart from a key point
of Plotinian thought when he considers the Transcendent God
as being and as being without limit. Plotinus had proceeded
by identifying the intelligible with essence, and essence, thus
knowable, with being. Augustine, on the other hand, accepts
the truth that God is beyond man's comprehension but asserts,
nonetheless, that God is-for so he would read in Exodus 3:14:
" Tell them that He Who Is hath sent thee." How can his
metaphysical principles encompass this new truth, wherein
being will be identified with the Transcendent One and Goodand not bounded by what in our experience is the exhaustively
"intelligible"? Does he violently yoke together a Christian
concept and Plotinian terms?
It would seem, indeed, that he really uses the Plotinian
central notions of unity and immutability in his efforts at
thinking about the Supreme Reality. He can say, as a Christian
or as a neo-Platonist, that the Supreme Reality is one, good,
eternal, and unchangeable. But when he wishes to assert of
God, the Christian God, that He is Beauty, then he must,
whether by philosophy or faith, think in the framework of a
notion of being not found in Plotinus.
In the thought of Plotinus beautiful forms are in flux and
unite with matter only as imperfectly as images unite with the
water or glass which passively receives them. 12 The external
beauty around us is made up of changing times and variations;
and in this context it connotes restlessness rather than rest, for
all of its attractiveness. 13 Hence, it cannot simply and immediately correspond to an archetype of beauty in the divine order,
such as unity and goodness would seem to, for example. How
does St. Augustine reconcile the focal notion of immutability
with the enigmatic attribute o£ beauty so that he can say that
beauty is paradoxically ever the same, ever renewed: " Too
late have I loved thee, 0 Beauty, ever old and ever new." 14
Exemplarity alone is not a satisfying explanation-for how
12

Enneads, 3, 6, 7.

18

Ibid., 7, 22.

10 Confessions,

X, 27.

190

SISTER RITAMARY BRADLEY

can the immutable God encompass the exemplars of those
beauties which are fair because they are changing? 15
Let us see how Augustine goes about the resolution of this
problem by looking at his assertions (1) about God in Himself;
(2) about God's attributes as they correspond to the chief
attributes of the intelligible essences of a Plotinian metaphysics;
and (3) about beauty in particular, as an attribute which is
difficult to reconcile with immutability and which therefore
calls fo:r a substantially different idea of being.
When Augustine speaks of God in Himself, he says again and
again that He spoke His name in Exodus-His incommunicable
name which is " He who is," 16 made equivalent in an approximate rendering as idipsum. What is idipsum except that which
is, that which God meant when He said to Moses, " I am who
am ... Tell them He who is hath sent thee." 17 Augustine
seems to chant this name of God in a triple refrain in the
twelfth book of the Confessions: "Thou, therefore, 0 Lord,
who art not one thing in one place, and otherwise in another,
,,,.,,:"·'""""'and idipsum and idipsum." 18 As in this exclamation God in Himself is said to be unchangeable with regard to
place, so in another passage God is set off from all else (even
created wisdom) because nothing else is idipsum: "Hence
comes it so to be of thee, our God, as to be manifestly another
than thou, and not idipsum? " 19 Finally Augustine plainly
15 Plotinus
had thus referred to the seeming inextricability of beauty and evil:
"It [evil] appears necessarily, bound around with bonds of beauty, like some captive
bound in fetters of gold." (from Enneads 1, 8,
See Wm. R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus (New York: Longmans, 1948), p. 22.
16 "Dei nomen proprium.
Jam ergo angelus, et in angelo Dominus, dicebat Moysi
quaerenti nomen suum, Ego sum qui sum. Dices filiis Israel: qui est, misit me ad
vos. Esse, nomen est incommutabilitatis."
(St. Augustine, Sermon VII, 7) . Cf.
Enarrationes in Psalmos 101, 10: "Quid vocaris? ... Ego sum. Quis? Qui sum.
Hoc est nomen tuum? "
17 " Quid est ergo idipsum, nisi quod est? Quid est quod est? Quod aeternum est.
Nam quod semper aliter atque aliter est, non est, quia non manet: non omnino non
est, sed non summe est. Et quid est quod est, nisi ille qui quando mittebat Moysen,
dixit illi: Ego sum qui sum? (Ex. 8: 14) ." (St. Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos
121, 8). Cf. also note 16.
18
19

Confessions, XII, 7.
Ibid., 15.

NAMING GOD IN ST. AUGUSTINE'S" CONFESSIONS"

191

asserts identities between idipsum and magnitude, knowledge,
and unity: " ... in itself a limit to Itself yet illimitable; whereby it is, and is known to itself, the unchangeable idipsum by
the abundant magnitude of its unity." 20 Significantly this
same way of naming God is linked with the notions of peace
and rest, anticipating the final answer which Augustine gives
to his search for the divine name (" thou thyself art thy
rest ") : " 0 in pace! 0 in idipsum! . . . And you are in the
highest degree idipsum, who changest not . . . and in thee is
rest .... " 21 We see, therefore, that each time St. Augustine
returns to the self-naming of God in Exodus he acknowledges
also God's essence, His self-identity, and often His immutability.
How then does he speak of those attributes which he names
separately though they are one substance? Eternity, immutability, and unity are asserted as belonging properly to God
alone. Wisdom, truth, and goodness, since they are by their
nature immutable, since in their light man judges and takes
counsel, are referred without hesitation substantively to God
as their first principle wherein they truly are. 22 But when St.
Augustine speaks of God as present to all creatures, he uses
words which carry more than a slight suggestion of Plotinian
influence, such as fountain (fons) and light (lux or lumen) .28
But particularly in the attribution of beauty to God, perhaps
for the reasons advanced above, the saint becomes involved
in the difficulty of keeping the notion entirely spiritual and
free from any hint of variation and mutability. He faces at
the outset of the Confessions the paradox between beauty and

xm.

•• Ibid.,
n.
21 Ibid., IX, 4.
•• Cf. De Genesi ad Litteram Liber Imperfectus, 1, 2: " ... id est Sapientiam et
Virtutem suam consubstantialem sibi et coaeternam. . . . "
•• Cf. Confessions, III, 10: "ad fontem tuum "; ibid., XIII, 16: "fons vitae";
ibid., X, 84: "ipsa est lux, una est." In De Oivitate Dei, VITI, 9-10 he says that
the Platonists knew that God was the " causa constitutae universitatis, et lux
percipiendae veritatis, et fons bibendae felicitatis." Although it is not always clear
whether light is God or created light in some contexts, it is evident that someand lumen are used as names for God.
times at least both

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SISTER RITAMARY BRADLEY

change when he calls God "most beautiful yet most strong,"
which is almost in apposition to the correlative phrase, " unchanging yet changing all things." 24 Again, he explicitly
admits that when he still conceived of God as in some way a
body, it was by way of magnitude and beauty-qualities which
he took to be divine attributes in a corporeal sense:
I tried so to understand, 0 my God, thy wonderful and unchangeable unity as if thou hadst been subjected to thy own greatness
and beauty. But a body is not great or beautiful because it is a
body, seeing that if it were less great or beautiful it would still be
a body. 25
A step in the spiritualization of this notion of beauty is
achieved by noting that in one sense the beauty of things is
in the order of the whole: " All beautiful bodies also express
this, that in the well-ordered union of the whole there is a far
higher degree of beauty, even though the members be individually beautiful." 26 At another time he says that God is
beauty in a supremely higher degree than are creatures:
" They are beautiful, but Thou art unspeakably more beautiful." 27 Again, there is a sense in which God is not only the
highest beauty among beauties but the very " beauty of all
things beautiful," 28 as surely as He is Truth. Or from a related
point of view the beauty of all things is thought of as their
voice whereby they praise God-a voice which utters its praise
whether or not men trouble themselves about questioning these
beautiful creatures: "nor will they alter their voice (that is,
their beauty) ." 29 But this discovery follows in Augustine's
case only after a period of confusion between transient beauty
and spiritual unchanging beauty: " I could not . . . discern
that beauty to be embraced for its own sake, which cannot be
discerned with the eye of the flesh, it being visible only to the
inner man"; and this" inner beauty" is opposed to restlessness
and change, for the passage concludes, " and thou alone art
rest." 30 Indeed, there is a law of beauty above the mind
•• Confessions, I, 4.
25 Ibid., IV, 16.

•• Ibid., XIII,

27 Ibid., XII.
•• Ibid., III, 6.

•• Ibid., X, 6.
•• Ibid., VI, 16.

NAMING GOD IN ST. AUGUSTINE'S

"CONFESSIONS"

193

whereby mutable things are to be judged-a law made equivalent to unchangeable truth; 31 and they alone understand the
beauty of creatures "who compare that voice received from
without with the truth within." 32 A further reason for praising
God lies in this: that that beauty which is above our minds
and for which we long as our rest is in a way conveyed into
beautiful patterns through the medium of the hands of artists. 33
These men, he observes, learn the art of judging beautiful
things but not of using them. This artistic creation is an
analogue of the work of God's creation, which is completed only
by the formation of interior beauty in the soul by the Word of
God. 34 Such a concept is governing Augustine when he asserts
that he failed to find beauty among the beautiful forms around
him because he was not himself interiorly beautiful; he was
deformed rather than conformed to that Beauty which is God. 35
But the most revealing assertion is that in which he says that
he rose above even that power of his mind for judging the
beauty of aU things and beheld in a momentary flash that
is. 3'6 Such an insight as this one supports his
statement in the De Trinitate that beauty may be safely
equated with wisdom as its equivalent and both with God. 37
This is in harmony with expressions recurring in the commentaries on the Psalms-such as when he exclaims: " God
is Beauty-the Word with God." as Hence, the lament, "Too
late have I loved thee, 0 Beauty, ever old, ever new" is a
resolution of the enigma which beauty presented-an enigma
not offered by truth or goodness-that this late-discovered
beauty (in a spiritual sense) is somehow impervious to change,
somehow eternally renewable. Yet even with all this insight
it is God as Beauty which Augustine expressly states is beyond
Ibid., VII, 17.
Ibid., X. 6.
33 Ibid., 34.
34 Cf. Enarrationes in Psalmos 95. 7; 148.15.
35 Confessions, X, 'i!-7.
•• Ibid., VII, 17.
37 D(j Trinitate, XV, 6.
•• Enarrationes in Psalmos 44. 3.

31

32

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SISTER RITAMARY BRADLEY

our conceiving; under this aspect we see God only in an enigma,
in the mirror of the heavens. 39
Some, though not all, of these ideas had been stressed by the
neo-Platonists. Unity and immutability, important to the
thought of Augustine's Hellenic predecessors, had been identified with being, as we have seen; but the Transcendent One was
not being but a "beyond-being." Plotinus had said that the
things of the world speak of their divine origin by their beauty,
though he had not rooted this voice of praise in a free creation. 40
He had further observed that the beauty of art communicates
itself to the artist and from the artist to the matter; 41 that
true beauty is wisdom; 42 and that true beauty is to be identified
with the divine intelligence. 43
In summary, then, we might ask (1) what has St. Augustine
done by way of positive contribution towards expressing the
essence and attributes of the Christian God in metaphysical
terms; and (2) where does he stand in the tradition of his near
contemporaries in the attempt?
With regard to the first point it is safe to assert that St.
Augustine uses the " I am Who Am " of Exodus as truly a name
for God, understood as that which is, the plenitude of being
possessed all at once and unchangeably. Negatively, God is
not what creatures are, because they have been something
which now they are not. 44 God's immutability is above that
even of minds, which are yet in flux in the order of time, but
have as their destined beatitude rest in God's eternity. Thus,
the " I am who am " may be expressed as an identity with
eternity, truth, and love. 45 In some way, too, "He Who is" is
the highest way of asserting God's beauty, though the intuition
of this is as yet bound up in an enigma. Again, beauty is
39 Confessions, XIll, 15; cf. Ef!arrationes in Psalmos 36.
"Servatur ergo nobis
nescio quod dulce spectaculum omnino: et si cogitari ex aliqua parte in aenigmate
et per speculum potest, dici tamen nullo modo
pulchritudo illius dulcedinis:
."
quam servat Deus timentibus se (Ps. SO,
48 Ibid., 1, 6, 9; 5, 8, 3.
40 Enneads, 8,
L
41 Ibid., 5, 8, l.
•• Confessions, XI, 4.
•• lbid., VII. 10.

NAMING GOD IN ST. AUGUSTINE'S" CONFESSIONS"

195

identified with being, inasmuch as it is the " fetters of gold "
which set off evil things from absolute nothingness.
In relation to his philosophical milieu St. Augustine accepts
some points and goes beyond others, as appears in his answers
to certain questions: (1) Does God exist? Yes, for all that
non-being can mean is denied of God; " He Who is " can be
spoken with full propriety only of God.46 This admission, as
we have noted, departs from the neo-Platonic reluctance to
say that the transcendent First Principle is a being. (2) Is
it fullness of essence rather than of existence that is attributed
to God? Formally perhaps yes, since Augustine's distinction
between God and creatures is not in the essence-existence
relation but in the fact that the creature possesses its essence
in times and variations, a distinction which makes it difficult
to call God an archetype of beauty. Yet neither must we forget
that Augustine searches primarily to give God a name-not a
designation in the order of essence, but a personal name. St.
Ambrose (d. 897) in his commentary on the text in Exodus
8.14 is admittedly reluctant to apply" name" to God's answer
to Moses:
What is a name unless that which signifies what is unique, what is
not common to other things .... Moses asked, "What is thy
name?" And knowing his mind, God did not answer with His
name but ... He expressed a fact, not an appellation, saying, " I
am Who am." 47

St. John Chrysostom (d. 407), who brings into focus the
teachings of the schools of both Antioch and Alexandria and to
whom Augustine makes reference in 421,48 accepts but one neoPlatonic concept for God-ineffable-and
otherwise draws
from Scriptural and Hebraic sources for some forty ways of
calling God incomprehensible. 49 Dionysius is as deeply indebted
•• De Fide et Symbolo, 4. 7.

•• In Psalmum XLIIT, 19.
•• Augustine invokes St. John's authority in the controversies with Julian of
Eclanum in 421.
•• Jean Danielou, "L'incomprehensibilite de Dieu, d'apres Saint Jean Chrysostome," Recherches de Science Religieuse, XXXVII (1950), 176-194.

5

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SISTER RITAMARY BRADLEY

to neo-Platonism in his treatise on the Divine Names as is
Augustine in the Confessions, but it is not clear-though there
is between Augustine and Dionysius this striking overlapping
in their common use of Christian concepts and Plotinian terms
-that the later writer was not overcome by Hellenism.
Somewhere, then, between the almost non-philosophic position of St. John Chrysostom and the philosophic position of
Dionysius which led, at least in certain of his followers,
straight out of Christian orthodoxy, lies St. Augustine's contribution: to elements of Christian thought essentially different
from neo-Platonism he has applied with profit some neoPlatonic philosophic notions. It would seem that the name of
God in Exodus, known by faith and perhaps by a grace-aided
intuition, served in St. Augustine to lift neo-Platonic notions to
orthodoxy by identifying them with Being. Such a procedure,
while not, of course, bringing God within a Christian's comprehension, enabled Augustine to be somewhat expansively articulate in naming God.
SISTER RITAMARY

Marycrest College,
Davenport, Iowa

BRADLEY,

c. H. M.

THE MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE
HELLENISTIC-ROMAN WORLD

D

URING the "classical" period of Greek thought 1 the
term "philosophy," as developed in the great speculative systems of Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle, stood
primarily for a fixed conceptual frame which constituted the
theoretical setting for the scientific treatment of detaiJ.2 With
this first predominantly theoretical meaning of the term, however, there had been early associated a second meaning which
dealt with the fundamental problem as well as scientific exploration of man's practical interests, tasks, and needso3
With the disciples of Plato and Aristotle, the purely theoretical interest in philosophy, as far as it was able to survive an
essentially antiquarian trend, was directed to various special
" philosophies " or sciences which now, in part, assumed the
names of their particular subjects. This newly arising theoretical or scholarly interest in the scientific treatment of detail,
which in itself changed fundamentally the theoretical aspect of
philosophy, was stimulated to no small degree by Aristotle's
Organon. 4 Philosophy, as it nearly always does in the hands
1 The " classical period " of Greek speculative thought was definitely the product
of a " national " and exclusively Heilenic .civilization. The military conquests of
Alexander the Great and the subsequent foundings of the empires of the so-called
Diadochi threw open the East to the influences of Greek science, art, literature,
and philosophy. As a result of this intermingling of East and West, Asia and
Hellenic Europe, a novel and distinct civilization developed which is commonly
referred to as Hellenistic culture. The term " Hellenistic " is derived from the
Greek word €"1\"!l:rJvlfe<v (graecissare) and actually means "to behave like a
Greek," or "to imitate a Greek," in contrast to the term "to be a Greek."
• Cf., in general, A.-H. Chroust, "Philosophy: Its Essence and Meaning in the
Ancient World," Philos. Rev., LVI, No. l (1947) 19-58.
• It should be remembered that in Plato's philosophy both theoretical speculation
and practical interest were inseparably fused together.
• It might be said that through the logical works of Aristotle, science, or to

197

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ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

of epigones, suddenly came to mean a body of vast and often
superficial erudition. Instead of a pursuit of general metaphysical theories or systems devised to embrace detail, we
encounter now a strong tendency exclusively to promote the
study of detail and to develop the special sciences along narrowly defined and delimited lines. This pronounced emphasis
on detail, on the other hand, brought about a general indifference towards the basic issues of metaphysics.
And this
indifference, in turn, became the stronger the more it appeared
that useful and fruitful investigations in the special and detailed provinces of factual learning or empirical knowledge
were quite possible without entering into profound discussions
about metaphysics. Thus a strong theoretical interest in factual knowledge for its own sake developed-with the result
that truly philosophical productivity of the metaphysical type
became extremely limited. 5
Aside from this emphasis on scientific detail and scholiasm
displayed by the Early Academy and the Peripatus, scientific
life began to
investigations concerning the proper conduct
emerge in the Post-Aristotelian era as an ever more essential
issue and, in many instances, as the sole aim and content of
all philosophical speculation. In this fashion the term philosophy gradually acquired the practical meaning of an art of
life or the study of human character based upon scientific principles or doctrines as to the ultimate significance and purpose
of human existence .. In other words, philosophy came to mean
an organized body of moral convictions which attempted to
deduce from certain generalized results of human reasoning or
experience a rational and reliable guide that might guarantee
the happiness of the individual by leading him safely through
the vicissitudes of life. This novel insistence on ethico-pracbe more exact, the sciences had come to realize their own particular processes
with the aid of which they could tackle successfully. their various specific problems.
• With the exception of the Stoics and the Neo-Platonists or Neo-Pythagoreans,
the various philosophies of the Hellenistic-Roman period, although they lll"e somehow related to one major school of thought or another, nearly always display a
marked indifference towards metaphysics.

PHILOSOPHY IN THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN

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199

tical issues did not, however, completely dispense with certain theoretical doctrines and speculations which, in substance,
were merely modifications of certain metaphysical problems
inherited from a more creative past. But such theories, which
essentially lacked originality, met with little genuine interest
for their own sake. If they were developed at all, they were
intended only to furnish a general rational basis for a kind of
practical wisdom on which the proper and befitting conduct of
life could be securely based. They were intended to provide
man with a theoretical foundation for his all-important practical actions. 6 Hence the key to many of the theoretical doctrines of the Post-Aristotelian period must nearly always be
looked for in the prevailing basic conviction that the definition
of " the good life " and, accordingly, of " the virtuous life," as
well as that of " the wise man," lends itself to theoretical
analysis.
In its further development this emphasis on ethico-practical
problems gradually but inexorably divulged that mere moral
wisdom based solely on human reason and human experience
was no satisfactory compensation for religious faith. This
realization, in turn, brought about a significant transition from
an ethico-practical point of view to a religious standpoint in
philosophy .7 It had its innermost causes in philosophy itself,
• Cf. A.-H. Chroust, loc. cit., 48.
This new religious mood found its most adequate philosophical expression in
Plato's metaphysics. During the last centuries of Graeco-Hellenistic thought Plato
became the foremost intellectual and moral guide for all those who attempted
to satisfy the ever growing spiritual and religious need through the comforts of
philosophy. In this Plato was not only antiquity's great prophet of a more
profound moral life--one who was expected by his followers to show man the road
back to his heavenly home-but also one of the truly important founders of
religion whose real influence, however, was not actually felt until centuries after
his death. Compare, for instance, Numenius, in: Eusebius, Praep. Evang., 9. 7.
Cf. A.-H. Chroust, "The Metaphysics of Time and History in Early Christian
Thought," New Scholast., XIX, no. 4 (1945) 885-887. It should also be remembered that the spiritual monotheism proposed by Aristotle had made a deep
and lasting impression on subsequent philosophers, and that with the Stoics the
ultimate metaphysical issues had led to seeking the basic principles of morals
in a divine command.
7

ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

in that it had become quite evident by now that philosophy
as such could not redeem its promise, namely, to give man
those deeper and surer insights which are the foundation and
prerequisite of all true happiness and real virtue. The rapidly
gaining sceptical type of philosophy already had come to the
sad conclusion that virtue and " the good life " consist :rather
in the renunciation of all efforts to know than in knowledge
itself. In this the Sceptics could and actually did fully exploit
the fact that each and every philosophical school or tradition
in the main seemed only to prove the falsehoods and inconsistencies of every other school of thought. In other words,
the unavoidable contacts between the different philosophical
viewpoints, and the many serious conflicts which arose therefrom,8 made it more and more obvious that philosophy by itself
could not bring about a state of man's inner peace and contentment. Thus it had to be admitted that even the ideal of
"the wise man," as envisioned by the Stoics, could no longer
be attained by philosophical or scientific means alone.
Under the impact of this rather disconcerting impression it
was finally :realized that man by his own unaided intellectual
or moral efforts alone could gain neither :real knowledge, nor
true virtue, nor lasting happiness. 9 This realization taught
man that his most essential interest and deepest yearning had
to be transferred from the earthly to the heavenly sphere. A
passionate craving for the salvation of the soul (uwr"fjpta), a
religious urgency without parallel increasingly made itself felt
in the midst of a complete philosophical disillusionment. Philosophy began to seek the ultimate solutions of its problems in
religion, while the rising tide of religious interest required a
scientific basis and formulation for its convictions. Thus it
came about that the demands of traditional philosophy and the
needs of religion fused in a new type of religious metaphysics.

*

*

*

The trend to replace general philosophical inquiries with
• Cf. Cicero, Acad., II. 38. 120; De Nat. Deor., 3. 32.80 ff.; 3. 25-31.
• Cf. Sextus Ernpiricus, Adv. Math., 7.!59; 8. 316 ff.; Pyrrhonia, 1.164 Iff.; 1.178.

PHILOSOPHY

IN THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN

WORLD

201

scientific and systematic treatment of detail is first to be
noticed in the works of the Academician Speusippus, Plato's
nephew and successor in the scholarchate (348/7-339/8) .10
This trend is clearly brought out by Aristotle's remark that,
in order to define and divide one need not know the whole of
existence ( awavra €tOEVaL Ta Ovra) . Yet some (T[ve<;) hold that it is
impossible to know the differentiae (ras ow<f>opa>) distinguishing
each thing from every other single thing without knowing every
other single thing. And one cannot, they say, know each single
thing without knowing its differentiae, since everything is identical
with that from which it does not differ, and other than that from
which it differs. 11

This passage should make it quite obvious that the followers
of Plato in the Early Academy, although they still adhered in a
greater or lesser degree to Plato's metaphysical system, meant
by philosophical inquiry the treatment and elaboration of detail rather than the further development and improvement of
the solutions to the basic metaphysical problems which they
had inherited from their master and teacher. 12
1 ° Cf.,
in general, F. Ravaisson, Speusippi Placita (Paris, 1838); M. Fischer,
De Speus-ippi Vita (Rastadt, 1845); P. Lang, De Speusippi Academici Scriptis
(Bonn, 1911); C. Ritter, Neue Untersuchungen iiber Platon,
ff.; E. Frank,
ff.
Platon und die sogenannte;n Pythagoreer,
11 Aristotle,
Post. Analyt., 97 a 6 ff.-The various commentators dealing with

this particular passage (Philoponus or Themistius)
insist that the term rives
(some) refers to Speusippus, although it is quite possible that Aristotle had in
mind several other members of the Academy. Cf. M. Wallis, Joanni Philoponi in
Aristotelis- Analytica Priora Commentarii, preface 5, note 4; and the able discussion
of this passage in H. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy,
59 ff.-As to Aristotle's own attitude towards detail in general, see Metaph.,
1003 a
1064 b
1005 a 30; 1005 b 8;
a 17; 1005 a
ff.; 1061 b 11;
1061 a 4; 1061 a
a
1059 b 11; 1061 b
b
ff.;
a 9: "The
wise man knows all things as far as possible, although he has no knowledge of
each of them in detail." Cf. De part anim. 644 b
ff.; H. Cherniss, op. cit.
12 Speusippus,
according to the testimony of Epicrates (in: Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae,
59D ff.), busied himself with the classification of animals and plants.
Cf. ibid.,
86C; 3. 105B; 4. 133B; 7.303D; 9.369A; Diog. Laert., 4. 5, where
Speusippus is mentioned as the author of the 5f1ma, containing no less than ten
books on the classification of animals and plants.- Xenocrates of Chalcedon likewise wrote many works on the detailed sciences. For titles see Diog. Laert., 4. H ff.;
Cicero, A cad., II. 46. 143.- Heracleides of Pontus, whom Cicero calls the doctor

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ANTON -HERMANN CJEIROUST

The same scientific treatment of, and emphasis on, detail is
also manifest in the writings of the Peripatetic Theophrastus,
the successor of Aristotle in the scholarchate (32'2/1-288/7 or
287 /6) .13 His main efforts consisted not only in expanding in
greater detail some of Aristotle's basic teachings, but also in
defining more precisely the detailed contents of these teachings.14 While he generally adhered to the fundamental Aristotelian doctrines, Theophrastus nevertheless attempted to
complement, particularize, and departmentalize these doctrines by incorporating into them a vast body of scientific
observations. At the same time he tried to apply Aristotle's
principles of scientific method to particular and detailed instances or provinces of learning. 15 The same can be said about
imprimis (Tuscul., V. 3. 5; about his many writings, see Diog. Laert., 5. 86 ff.),
wrote also on grammar, rhetoric, history, geography, and music.-Philip of Opus,
according to the testimony of Suidas, wrote numerous works on mathematics,
astronomy, and meteorology. Cf. Plutarch, Ne suaviter quidem vivi posse secundum
Epicurum, 11. !i!; Pliny, Hist. nat., 18. 31. 3H!; Vitruvius, De archit., 9. 7; Stobaeus,
Eclogues, 1. 558.- Eudoxus of Cnidus (Diog. La.ert., 8. 86 ff.), who became deeply
interested in mathematics, astronomy, geography, and medicine, enjoyed a great
reputation for his polymathy. It is quite possible that the study and interpretation
of Plato's Timaeus by his disciples had a definite influence on this pronounced trend
in the direction of detailed investigations.
18 Diog.
Laert., 5. 36 ff.; H. Usener, Analecta Theophrastea (Leipzig, 1858);
H. Diels, Theophrastea (1883); H. Diels, Doxogr. Graec., lO!i! ff.; E. Howald,
"Das Schriftenverzeichnis des Aristoteles und des Theophrast," in Hermes, LV
(199!0)

9!04-!i!!i!l.

Boethius, In Arist. de definitione, !i!!l!i!: "Theophrastus, ut in aliis solet, quum
de similibus rebus tractat, quae scilicet ab Aristotele ante tractatae sunt, in libro
quoque de affirmatione et negatione iisdem aliquibus verbis utitur, quibus in hoc
libro Aristoteles usus est. . . . In omnibus enim, de quibus ipse disputat post
magistrum, leviter ea tangit, quae ab Aristotele dicta ante cognovit, alias vero
diligentius res non ab Aristotele tractatus exsequitur."
16 It should not be forgotten that scientific thought and scientific method actually
came into their own through the logical works of Aristotle. For in the Organon
this method had received those fundamental concepts which made possible a
scientific and detailed study of individual phenomena.- Aristotle himself, in what
might be considered an " autobiographical " statement, had admitted that the
study of detail was something of great importance. De part. animal., 644 b 22 ff.:
" Of things constituted by nature some are ungenerated, imperishable, and eternal,
while others are subject to generation and corruption. The former are excellent
beyond comparison and divine, but less accessible to knowledge. The evidence
14

PHILOSOPHY IN THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN

WORLD

203

Eudemus of Rhodes/ 6 the contempora.cy of Theophrastus,
whose numerous works were dedicated partly to an elaboration
of the general Peripatetic teachings, and partly to exact and detailed histories of the various special sciences.11 His main aim
seems to have been a faithful appropriation and further expansion of the scientific method devised by Aristotle. 18 Aristoxenus of Tarentum/ 9 a disciple of Aristotle, owed his schola::dy
reputation to his works on music/ 0 which for accurateness and
detailed studies remain unsurpassed in the annals of Hellenic
thought. In addition, he was deeply interested in specialized
research in the provinces of the natural sciences, psychology,
ethics, and politics. 21 Next to Theophrastus and Eudemus,
St:rato of Lampsacus (c. 370-c. 268) 22 enjoyed the greatest
that might throw light on them, and on the problems which we desire to solve
respecting them, is furnished only scantily by sensation. Whereas, as regards
perishable plants and animals we have abundant information, living as we do in
their midst, and ample data might be collected concerning all their various kinds,
if we only are willing to take sufficient pains. Both departments, however, have
their special charm. The scanty conceptions which we can attain of celestial things
give us, from their excellence, more pleasure than all our knowledge of the world
in which we live; just as half a glimpse of persons whom we love is more delightful
than a leisurely view of other things, whatever their number or dimensions. On
the other hand, in certitude and in completeness our knowledge of terrestrial
things has the advantage. Moreover, their greater nearness and affinity to us
balances somewhat the loftier interest in the heavenly things that are the object
of the higher philosophy."
16 Cf. L.
Spengel, Eudemi Peripatetici Fragmemta quail IIUperiiUnt,
edit.
(Berlin, 1870); Comment. in Arist. Graec., edit. Acad. Reg. Boruss., indices.
17 He wrote among others, a History of Geometry; a History of Arithmetic; a
History of Astronomy; and perhaps a History of Theology. Cf. L. Spengel, op. cit.
18 Cf. Simplicius, Comment. in Arist. Phys., 93 b 18: ... p,aprvpe'i oe rfii l\.6-y<t>
Ktti EiJOnp.os b "{V7JcrLWraros rWv 'ApurTorl'Aous

Eralpwv.

Cf. W. Mahne, Diatribe de Aristoxeno philosopho Peripatetico (Amsterdam,
1793); R. Westphal, Aristoxemus von Tarent und die Rhytmik des klassischen
Hellenentums,
vols. (Leipzig, 1883-1893).
20 His surname was o p,ovrrtKos. Cf. Alex. of Aphrod., Comment. in A.rist. Top.,
49.
ff., who considers him the greatest authority on music. Cf. Plutarch, Ne
IIUaviter quidem vivi ... , 10. 95; Cicero, De fin., V. 19. 50; De orat., III. 33. Ul2;
Vitruvius, De archit., l. 14; 5. 4.
21 Cicero, Tuscul,, I.l8. 41; Gellius, A.tt. Noct., 4.11. 4.
22 Diog. Laert.,
5. 58 ff.; Cicero, A cad., I, 9. 34; De fin., V. 5. IS; Simplicius,
a 31 ff. Cf. H. Diels, "Uber di!S
Commemt. in A.rist. Phys., 187 a 15 ff.;
19

ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

reputation as a scholar, scientist, and scholiast. 23 His many
writings, which deal with nearly all the domains of learning
and human knowledge, are concerned primarily with a penetrating analysis of detail rather than with establishing or
expounding a comprehensive philosophical system.
On the whole this general interest in detailed analysis and
highly specialized treatment of a definite and restricted body
of knowledge bears out the contention that with certain PostAristotelian thinkers "philosophy " came to mean the object
of any one of the many highly departmentalized empirical
sciences. 24 Demetrius of Phaleron, 25 the disciple of Theophrastus, transplanted to Alexandria this tendency of identifying philosophy with the study and treatment of scientific
detail, thus becoming actually the founder of the Alexandrian
school of scholiasts. In this he determined the whole of philosophical development for centuries to come.

*

*

*

While the immediate followers and disciples of Plato and
Aristotle predominantly identified philosophy and the general
physikalische System des Strato," in Sitzungsbericht d. Berlin. Akad. (1893), 101127. Strato, whose surname was o <f>vtn«:os, succeeded 'fheophrastus in the
schol&chate.
28 Cf. Plutarch,
Adv. Coloten, 14. 3; Pseudo-Galen, Hist. Philos., 2 (p. 228).
As to Strato's numerous writings, see E. Zeller, Philos. d. Griechem, 3d edit.,
H. 2. 902, note 3.
•• Already during the scholarchate of Aristotle (335/4-323/22), the scientific
work of the Peripatetic School was essentially that of an "institute " in which
experienced and specially trained scholars joined together in various major research
programs. The collecting as well as elaborating and digesting of the many materials
gathered from nearly all the fields of human knowledge demanded huge and
expertly handled archives, detailed and accurate experiments, and specialized as
well as departmentalized experience on the part of each member of this vast but
apparently well organized " institute." Thus the " institute " itself had to train
its own specialists capable of carrying out, everyone in his own field of research,
certain assigned special studies.
25 Cf. C. Ostermann,
De Demetrio Phalerone vita (part I, Hersfeld, 1847; p&t
II, Fulda, 1857); Diog. Laert., 5.80 fl'.- Demetrius went to Alexandria around
297, where he persuaded Ptolomy Soter to found the famous library. It was this
huge collection of primary source materials which greatly stimulated philological
and historical research.

PHILOSOPHY IN THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN

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205

philosophical task with scientific erudition and the detailed and
departmentalized development of the special theoretical 26 sciences, the Stoics endowed the term " philosophy " with a theoretical as well as practical meaning, the emphasis constantly
varying with individual authors. Upon closer scrutiny the general Stoic meaning of philosophy, however, dissolves into three
major problems: (a) the practico-teleological nature of philosophy; (b) the definition of what might be called " practical "
or deontological, a definition which is carried out with the help
of the concept of " rational conduct " based
right reason;
and (c) the substantiation of this rational conduct on the basis
of right reason and in conformity with "nature." According
to the Stoics, the ultimate purpose of all philosophy-in other
words, the nature and function of philosophy-is to be discovered in the fact that it constitutes the true foundation of
the moral and, hence, rational conduct of :rational man. Seneca
informs us that some Stoics considered " the pursuit of wisdom" (philosophia) as virtue, while other Stoics are said to
have declared it a means of improving one's mind, and others
again to have called :it the quest for the recta ratio. 27 Philosophy, therefore, is above all the proper exercise of an art
or technique, or to be more exact, the exercise of the highest
of arts, namely virtue. 28 In short, it is the apprenticeship of
virtue through the practice of virtue. 29 But virtue, in turn,
can only be acquired through the proper exercise of philoso26 The Peripatetic
Dicaearchus of Messenia, however, puts issues of practical life
ahead of theoretical speculation and scholarly research. Cf. Cicero, Ad Attic.,
16: "Quoniam tanta controversia est Dicaearcho, familiari tuo, cum Theophrasto, amico meo, ut ille tuns Tov wpa.KTLKOP {3iov Ionge omnibus anteponat, hie
autem Tov Oewp7JrtKov." Compare ibid., 7. 3.
27 Epistola, 89.5.
28 Cf. Placita philos., l, proem.: ol p,€11 oliv "Zm••iiKot
r1}v p,ev uo<f>la.v

elvar. Oelwv re Kat dvOpw1rlvwv €7rurr1;f.J/1]P. r.f}v 0€ cj;n.A.ouo<f>lav li.CTK7Jlrtv r€xv7Js €7rtT7jOelov. E1rr.r{]Oewv O'elvar. p..lav KaL &.vwrtirw r7}v &.per7]v . . . ; Sextus
Adv. lliath., 9.13: · TTJV qnll.ouo<f>la.v <f>a.ulv [o! ZTwi"t<ot] E11"<Tf!oeucnv elva.L uopla.s,
r?]v 0€ uocplav Etrr.uriJf.k1JV 8Elwv re Ka.L iiv8pw1rlvwv
29 Seneca, Epist., 89.4:
", .. philosophia studium virtutis est, sed per ipsam
virtutem. .
" Ibid.: ", .. philosophia ... studium corrigendae mentis ...

est . ... "

ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

phy. 30 Hence philosophy in general might be called virtue, 31
and its various parts or departments are nothing other than
just as many particular virtues. 32 This interrelation of our
theoretical or speculative interest in moral goodness and the
practical pursuit of the moral good-in other words, this correlation of theoretical moral interest and practical virtue-is also
brought out by a remark, ascribed to Chrysippus, 33 that philosophy constitutes something necessary to right reason, 34 and
that philosophy itself signifies the pursuit of, and devotion to,
wisdom (E7Ttr1}Swcns- rij-; uocp£a-;) .35 Aristo of Chius, 36 on the
other hand, definitely banished all theoretical speculation from
his concept of philosophy by limiting the latter exclusively to
ethico-practical problems which were to be solved with the help
of a kind of moral intuition. 37
According to the majority ·of the Stoics, which in this seems
to follow the Cynic-Socratic tradition, the main issue of all phiSeneca, Epist., 89. 4. Cf. note 9!9, supra.
Seneca, quoted in Lactantius, Inst. Div., 3. 15: "Philosophia nihil aliud est
quam recta vivendi ratio vel honeste vivendi scientia vel ars rectue vitae agendae.
Non errabimus, si dixerimus philosophiam esse legem bene honesteque vivendi,
et qui dixerit illam regulam vitae, suum illi [scil. nomen] reddidit." Cf. Placita
Philos., l. prooem., quoted in note 28, supra.
32 Cf. Placita Philos. l, prooem. 2: &.pe-ras
-ras "/<V<Kwrchas -rpels, pvutKf}v,
-fJOtKf}v, AO'Y<Kf}v. ••• Diog. Laert. 7. 46: avTTJV ll€ r1}v otaA.eKT<t<f}v, &.va'Yt<et&.v elva<
80

31

KaJ &.per1J1' E elOe ?reptixovcra.v &.penis. . . .
33 Isidore of Pelusium, in: Patrol. Graec., 78, col. 1637.
•• H. v. Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, III.l5, 19!; 41, 28; 18, 25. Cf.
ibid., I. no. 293.
35 Sextus Ernpiricus, Adv. Math., 9. 13; Placita Philos., l. prooem. 2.- It should
be noted that this definition is originally Platonic. Cf. A.-H. Chroust, "Philosophy:
Its Essence and Meaning in the Ancient Word," Sl fl'.
36 Diog. Laert., 7. 160 ff.; ll. v. Arnim, "Ariston,"
in: Pauly-Wissowa; A. Mayer,
"Aristonstudien," Philolog. Supplem., XI (1910), 483-610.
07 Cf. Seneca, Epis
89.13; 94. l-12; Cicero, Acad., II. 89. 128; Diog. Laert.,
7. 160; 7. 162; 7. 163; lutarch, De audiendo, 8 (p. 42); Sextus Empiricus, Adv.
Math., 7. 13; Stobaeus, Floril., 4. 110; 4. lll; 82. H; 82.15; 82. Hi; Lactantius,
Inst. Div., 7. 7.- This 'anti-intellectualism"
of Aristo is definitely under the
influence of Antisthenes and the Cynic tradition in general. As a matter of fact,
Aristo, the disciple of Zeno, definitely reverted to the early Cynicism of Zeno
which the latter, under the influence of Crates, had professed in his earlier life.
Cf. Diog. Laert., 7. !1:4.
A

PHILOSOPHY

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WORLD

losophy consists in the virtuous life. 38 To this paramount
problem all other issues of philosophy must remain completely
subordinate and subservient. Logic (dialectics) and physics, 39
no matter how important they may appear to other philosophers, are, in the opinion of Chrysippus, mere instruments or
ancillary topics enabling us to discern between good and evil,
between what ought to be done and what ought to be avoided. 40
Hence, purely theoretical studies undertaken merely for the
sake of theory or erudition, are tantamount to an immoral act
38 It might
be interesting to remember that Zeno, the founder of Stoicism,
came from Cition, a town in the south-eastern part of the island of Cyprus. Cition
was for a long time the center of Phoenicio-semitic culture and influence in Cyprus.
Diog. Laert. (7. 1) calls Cition a 1r6'Aurp,a 'EAA'JP<Kov
i1rolKous. Thus it
seems that the original Greek settlers of this town were soon joined by immigrants
from Phoenicia. Cicero (De fin., 4.
56) refers to the inhabitants of Cition as
Phoenici prefecti, while Diog. Laert. (7. 3; 7. 15; 7. 30; 114) calls Zeno an outright
Phoenician. Cf. Suidas, "Zenon"; Athenaeus, Deipnos., 13. 563 E; Cicero, Zoe. cit.
When Diog. Laert. (7. 6) speaks of the ol ev :z,owv< K<n<Zs, we may assume that the
close contacts between Cition and the major Phoenician cities must have persisted
for a long time.
This brings up the rather interesting question whether Stoic philosophy, particularly Stoic ethics, was not under the influence of Semitic and perhaps even Hebrew
notions of morality. In any event, the high moral standard of Stoic ethical
teachings could very well have been of Semitic or Hebrew origin. It should be
:remembered, however, that Zeno came to Athens at the relatively early age of 22;
that his teachers, at least in Athens, were Greeks; and that Crates the Cynic
was perhaps the most powerful philosophical influence he experienced. But then
again, it should also be recalled that he did not go to Athens on his own free
volition, but was apparently forced to remain in Athens for some time because
of a shipwreck.
•• It should be kept in mind that the Early Stoics in particular included among
"physics" not only theology, but also all those subjects which Aristotle had
incorporated in his Metaphysics. For according to the Early Stoics, all reality
is corporeal and hence physical reality. Thus, since Stoic "physics" also included
theology, it actually enjoyed the most exalted rank among the various philosophical
disciplines or parts of philosophy. But since the Stoics on the whole displayed
little interest and even less originality in their "physics," they borrowed heavily
from Heraclitus of Ephesus for their natural philosophy, and from Aristotle for
detail.
Their ethical teachings, however, constitute their most prominent
achievement.
10 Cf. Plutarch, De repug. Stoicis, 9. 6:
... lie< 'Yap rovro<s (scil., Tots <f>V<J'<Ko<s)

TOP wepL &."YafJwv Ka! KIJI.KWV ii.6"YOP, OVK oiiO''JS aAA'JS apxfis CI.V'TWP ap,elPOJIOS
ov/l' &.va.<f>opfls, ovll' a)\'/l,ov 'TIVOS eveKEP Tfjs <f>UO'LKijS (iewplas 'lr01.pa.'/1,'1'li''TijSoiJO'"'S ij 1rp!Js
rT§v wepl &:yaewv il KII!.Kwv lhaqra.""'·

208

ANTON-HERMANN

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of seeking pleasure for pleasure's sake; 41 they have no place
in a philosophy properly so-called. H, therefore, Herillus, the
disciple of Zeno, declared knowledge for knowledge sake as
the highest intellectual good and the true purpose of life, then
this statement must be considered a distinct deviation from
the general Stoic doctrine. 42
With the Stoics the meaning as well as the ultimate end of
all philosophy is fully determined by the Stoic conception of
virtue. 43 To them philosophy is the true and safe guide to
moral action and the virtuous life. Thus philosophy is also
defined as the cultivation and practice of true wisdom. It is
" the understanding of things both divine and human." 44
Seneca expressed the same idea when he proclaimed that philosophy signifies "the study and pursuit (studium) of the
highest virtue." And this highest virtue is nothing other than
wisdom, and as such " the science of things both divine and
human." 45 Hence philosophy, in the final analysis, signifies
" the study and pursuit of virtue for virtue's sake," 46 the
sapientiae amor et affectatio 47-a statement which definitely
41 Cf. Plutarch,
De repug. Stoicis, 3. 2: /law il€ inroXap,f3avovat </JtA.oao<f>ots E1Ctf3&A.A.etv p,aA.tiTTa TOP axoXaanKOV f3lov ,;,,· &pxiis, ovrol P,O! 8oKOVO"! OLap,apravELV
inrovooiJvres Ota')'w')'i]s rtv6s EveKev Oe'iv roilro TrOteZv ?} l£7\Aov ru.vOs ·nvOs 7oVr4J
wapa7r\7Jcrlov Kal. -rOv OA.ov fJlov oVrw 1rws Ote"'AKVctaL roVro
liv cracjJWs 0€Wp7J8fj,
1}o€ws.
&

"Cf. Diog. Laert., 7. 165: "Herillus ... declared knowledge to be the ultimate end (r€Xos) ." Ibid., 7. 37; Cicero, Acad., II, 42. 129: "Herillum, qui in
cognitione et scientia summum bonum ponit .... " De fin., 2. 13. 43: "Herillus
autem ad scientiam omnia revocans unum quoddam bonum vidit." Ibid., 5. 25. 73:
" ... Herillus scientiam summum bonum esse defendit." Ibid., 4. 14. 36.
•• According to Plutarch, De repug. Stoicis, 3. 2, Chrysippus called hedonists all
those philosophers who considered "theoretical life " or theoretical philosophy an
end in itself. Neverthless, the majority of the Stoics admitted that the true
and the f3los Ao')ltKos had to be based on Oewpla. Hence the difference between
the Cynics and the Stoics must be seen in the fact that the latter granted theoretical philosophy at least some importance .
.. Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math., 9. 13.
•• Seneca, Epist., 89.7.
•• Seneca, Epist., 89.8.
47 Seneca, Epist., 89. 4.
This passage might be under the influence of Plato,
Bepubl., 475 lB: •.• ol11cofiv m! rov </>tMao<fJov <lo<f>las <f>f}aop,ev o7rdJup,rrr1Jv eivou. .•.

PHILOSOPHY

IN THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN

WORLD

209

recalls Plato's often reiterated definition of philosophy as the
love of wisdom. 48
Virtue or " right conduct," according to the Stoics, always
means rational and intelligent conduct; and only that kind of
conduct can be called rational and intelligent which is in conformity with the true nature of man and the innermost essence
of things. 49 Hence real virtue signifies man's complete submission to the cosmic order and the cosmic reason. It is, in other
words, the KaTaAYJ!fn<;; fJEiwv Kat &:vBpw1rivwv 7TpayfLaTwv-the comprehension and complete coincidence of things both divine and
human. 50 This definition of virtue, which manifests a universalistic conception of philosophy, induced some Stoics to
include theology in philosophy. 51 The submission to the cosmic
order as well as the coincidence with the governing cosmic
reason, however, of necessity presupposes a definite understanding of this order and the rational forces which work in and
through it. For this very reason the Stoics, at least the more
prominent among them, could not wholly ignore the problems
of cosmology, ontology, and general metaphysics. And these
problems in turn forced them to deal with questions of logic
and dialectics.
In complete accord with the Socratic teachings, the Stoics
insisted that philosophy and the wisdom which it engenders
a:re the first and indispensable prerequisites of true virtue.
Thus philosophy properly so-called turns into the afTKYJUL<;; E1rL7YJ•• Cf., among others, Plato, Republ., 480A; 485B; 475B; 376B;
484D; 490A;
500C; 511B; 543B; 486A; Sophist,
Symposium,
Phaedrus,
Theaetetus, 176B; Phaedo, 68A.
•• This notion can already be found among the Early Cynics, and particularly
in the writings of Antisthenes, who in this betrays the Sophistic-Socratic background of his philosophy.
5 ° Cf. H. Diels, Doxogr. Grace., 9!73; 609!; H. v. Arnim.
Stoic. Vet. Frag., II. no.
35; 36. It should be noted here that this basic definition of philosophical wisdom
found a prominent place in the Corpus Juris of Justinian. Digest (or, Pandects),
l.l.lO.
Institutes, 1. 1.1: "Jurisprudentia est divinarum atque humanarum
rerum notitia." Placita Philos., 1. prooem. £, uses the term
instead of
rrpa:y/)-a.. ITp&oy!La. expresses more the practical aspect of wisdom, while e1runi}w11
denotes its theoretical meaning.
51 Cf. Diog. Laert., 7. l; 7. 41.

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ANTON-HERMANN

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8etov rexvTJs--the practice of a necessary and befitting art or
"way of life." 52 Wisdom is fully identified with philosophy,
that is, with the tlm<1JU£<; E7Tt7"1J8etov TEXVTJ<;; at times it means
nothing else than virtue itself: 53 • • • E7rtrr}8etoJJ8' e!vat fLtav Kat
' , TTJV
' apETTJV
• ' [set·z., e'l'auav
".).
·· 'J • • • •54 Th"IS proavwrarw
at• ""
-"'TW£KO£
nounced practico-teleological significance of the whole of Stoic
philosophy also determines the theoretical task of philosophy:
both theoretical speculation without virtue and virtue without
theoretical speculation are impossible. 55 For it is this theory
which furnishes the rational basis for establishing the proper
harmony between man and the cosmic logos. And it is also
this harmony or katalepsis, this complete submission to the
cosmic order, which constitutes virtue and the recta ratio.
Thus it should become quite obvious that even though philosophy is primarily the guide to the virtuous life,56 it cannot
perform this function properly without some theoretical understanding of the nature of the ·cosmic order.
The importance of a theoretical comprehension and study of
the cosmic order and its working was not accepted or emphasized by all Stoics alike. While Chrysippus, for instance, is
said to have suggested that philosophy is synonymous with
right reason and logic, including theoretical reason, 57 Aristo of
Chius, as we have already pointed out, considered virtuous
action the sole concern of man 58 and, hence, the sole task of
all philosophy. 59 Since theoretical inquiries or logical subtleties
•• See note 50, supra.
Seneca, Epist., 89.8: "Nam nee philosophia sine virtute est nee sine philosophia virtus."
•• Placita Philos., 1. prooem. 2.
•• Seneca, Epist., 89. 8. Cf. note 58, su-Pra.
58 Cicero, Tuscul., 5. 2. 5.
67 Patrol. Graec., 78. col. 1687 (Isidore of Pelusium).
68 ln Lactantius,
Inst. Div., 7. 7. Cf. Stobaeus, Florileg., 6.111; Plutarch, De
audiendo, 8 (p. 42); Cicero, De fin., 5. 29: "Omnis auctoritas philosophiae consistit
in beata vita comparanda."
•• Polemon, the scholarch of the Academy between 815/14 and 270/69, firmly
objected to the " ethical radicalism " of the Stoics. He preached that we should
practice moderation even in the practice of virtue. Cf. Clement of Alex., Stromata,
i. 188; Cicero, De fin., 4. 6. 14 ff.; 2. 11. 88. Crantor, also a member of the Academy,
68

PHILOSOPHY

IN THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN

WORLD

211

do not contribute anything to virtue, 60 Aristo urged, they can
readily be dispensed with. 61 Aristo's extreme "anti-intellectualism," however, must be considered the exception among
the Early Stoics rather than the rule. This might be gathered
from the significant fact that Zeno had already subdivided philosophy into logic (dialectics), ethics, and physics. 62 And by
doing so he had given, at least by implication, equal prominence to ethico-practical and theoretico-speculative issues.
Cleanthes likewise wrote extensively on logic and physics, 63 as
did Sphaerus of Bosporus after him. 64 In any event, with the
leading Early Stoics, logic, ethics, and physics constituted but
special branches of universal philosophy, although it must be
admitted that both logic and physics to some degree seem
always to remain subordinate to the pre-eminent position held
by the ethico-practical issue. Particularly after the earlier Stoic
system of philosophy had been fully developed by Chrysippus,
in his famous work 7r€p1
likewise and for the same reason objected to the
Stoic doctrine of the " apathy " as regards all affections. He demanded that we
should practice moderation and restraint rather than eradicate all affections
(;urpo1r&llwx,). For complete "apathy" would abolish all feelings of benevolence
or friendship. Cf. Cicero, A cad., II. 44. 135; Tuscul., 3. 6. 12; Plutarch (?), Corvsolatio ad Apollonium, 3. Remnants of this p.erpo1ra/Jm;, are still to be found in
Seneca, Ad Polybium de consolatione, 17. 2; 18. 5 ff.; Ad Helviam matrem de conI!Olatione, 16. l.
6 ° Cf. Stobaeus,
Florileg., 82. 7; 82. 15;
16; Diog. Laert., 7. 161; 7.163. Cf.
notes 86 and 37, supra.
61 Cf. Diog. Laert.} 7. 162; Sextus Empiricus,
Adv. Math., 7. 13; Seneca, Epist.,
94. l-12.- It is quite obvious, however, that the point of view of Aristo does not
represent the typical Stoic position. His attitude must be understood rather as a
polemic outburst directed not only against the Academy and the Peripatetics, but
also against certain Stoics who, like Chrysippus, gave prominence to physical and
logical (semantic) investigations.
62 Cf.
Diog. Laert., 7. 39: rptp.epf} <f>acrlv (scil., ol
eivat rov Kara
cjnAouo¢lav A6"'(ov. elvat 'YO..p aVroiJ rO tJ-Ev rt ¢vatK6v, rO Of 'IJ8tK6v, rO 0€ A.orytK6v.
oilrw 0€ 1rpWros Oc€LAe Z-f}vwv . . . €v rcfj IIep£ AO'You Kaf. XpVcnrnros. . . .
Cf. Plutarch, De repug. Stoic., 8. 1; 8. 2. Plutarch tells us that Zeno not only
devised logical sophisms and paralogisms, but actually tried to solve them. See
also Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math., 7. 16 ff.; Seneca, Epist., 89.9; 89. 14 ff.
•• Diog. Laert., 7.174 fl'.
64 Diog. Laert.,
7.178ff.-According
to Diog. Laert., 7.40, Zeno, Chrysippus,
Archidamas, and Eudemus (or, Eudromos) mention logic in the first, physics in
the second, and ethics in the third place.

6

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ANTON- HERMANN CHROUST

the importance and usefulness of logical and physical investigations for philosophy became generally recognized. For,
according to Chrysippus, all ethical inquiry had to be based
on a thorough understanding of the natural, that is, rational
cosmic order of things which is a physical cosmos. Only by
mastering the conceptual structure of the rational order might
we fully comprehend its true and abiding nature and thus be
capable of making universally valid statements concerning the
nature of good and eviL65
In full accord with the general Stoic emphasis on ethico-practical issues and on virtue, and also because of their subdivision
of all philosophy into logic, ethics, and physics, the Stoics, true
to their definition of philosophy as the a(J"K'Y}IJLc; E7TtT7JOELOV TEXV'YJ'>,
actually spoke of a logical, ethical, and physical virtue or
&.pe-r1}.66 These three "virtues," however, are always inseparably linked together 67 and have, therefore, in the final analysis,
actually one single and aU-encompassing ethico-teleological
meaning. Cleanthes, again, mentioned six subdivisions 68 of philosophy 69 and, hence, six basic philosophical virtues: dialectics
(logic), rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, and theology. 70 Obvi65 Plutarch,
De repug. Stoic., 9. 4: ofJ oyap €O"nP evp<iv rijs ouw.wO"{wrJs li."II."!I.1Jv
dpx'hv oVO' l1Ah7Jv "flveucv ?} r7rv f.K roD L'ltOs
€K T1js
rj:JVO'ews. EvreVBev
"fO.p Oet rr8.v rO rowVrov r7}v dpx?]v Mxetv, el p,EAA.op.Ev] [rt f.peiv rrepi d'Ya8Wv Kat KaKWv
Cf.
9. 5: oV "'(ci.p €errtv Ci.AA.ws oVO!I olKeL6Tepov f.1reA8e'iv i1d rOv rWv d-yafJWv
Kat KaKWv A6-yov oVO brl. rch dperO.s oVO'thd eVOa.ttJ-OVlav, di\A' ?} d1rO rfjs Kotvijs ¢Vcrews
Ka1 a?TO
roil KOO"P,OV OLOLK-f)O"<WS. Diog. Laert., 7. 42; 7. 46 fl.
66 Placita Philos., 1 prooem.
2, quoted in note 32, supra. Cf. Cicero, De fin.,
3. 21. 72; 3. 21. 73. Diog. Laert., 7. 46:
OE
avaoyKalav eivat

KaL ciper7}v E.v eLOet rreptf.xovuav dper&s . ...
67 Sextus Empiricus,
Adv. Math., 7. Hi.
•• The Stoic terms for these subdivisions are: p,eprJ, r6rros, .ron, or oyevos.
69 H. v. Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag., I. no. 482; Diog. Laert., 7. 41.
70 It should be noted, however, that the six subdivisions proposed by Cleanthes
can easily be reduced to the original three subdivisions: (a) dialectics (or logic)
and rhetoric; (b) ethics and politics; and (c) physics and theology.- Since with
the Stoics physics or natural philosophy deal with the cosmic, that is, the rational
and hence divine order of things which is at the same time the divine logos, it
should be obvious that Stoic physics or, as we would say today, the "metaphysics
of nature," must be co-extensive with theology or the science of the things divine.
Already Aristotle had referred to his metaphysics as theology. Cf., for instance,
Metaphysics, 1026 a 18.

PHILOSOPHY

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ously, logic or dialectics in its relationship to physics and ethics
is always governed by the latter; 71 for ethics and the ethical
problem always remain the dominant issue in Stoic philosophy;
and ethics, being the " ruler," certainly is not dependent on
those it rules. Thus ethics would depend on logic or dialectics
only in the sense that a superior relies on servants or instruments which he employs for his purposes. 72 The relationship
of physics to ethics, however, is not always so clear. For, on
the one hand, ethics signifies to the Stoics the ultimate end
and, therefore, the dominant issue of all philosophy; philosophy
is, after all, virtue and the practice of the moral way of life. 73
This virtue, this moral way of life, on the other hand, consists
in man's submission to, and harmony with, the rational cosmic
order and the universal nature of things. To determine this
cosmic order as well as the nature of things remains the foremost task of Stoic physics. Thus with the Stoics, physics seems
to have as it proper object a higher issue: the conceptual
definition of a universal standard which is used by ethics and
ethical evaluation to determine the moral good in terms
complete coincidence of action and nature. 74
Philosophical wisdom, according to the Stoics, is" the understanding of things both divine and human as well as their
causes," 75 or, as Cicero puts it, " the understanding of the first
principles and the causes of everything." 76 It is, in other words,
Cf. Diog. Laert., 7. 39; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math., 7.17 ff.
Cf. Philo of Alex., De agricultura, 189 (edit. Mangey); De mutatione nominum,
589 (edit. Mangey) .
73 Cf. H. Diels, Doxogr. Graec., £73; 602; H. v. Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag., II.
no. 85; 36.- The Cynics, particularly Antisthenes, had already pointed out that
virtue is the sole prerequisite for the happy life; and that virtue, being nothing
other than the practice of the virtuous life, does not stand in need of any
theoretical or scientific foundation. Cf. Diog. Laert., 6. 11; 6. 13.
74 Cf. Plutarch, De repug. Stoic., 9. 4, quoted in note 65, supra.
75 Seneca,
Epist., 89. 8: ". . . sapientiam quidam ita finierunt ut dicerent
divinarum et humanarum rerum scientiam. Quidam ita: sapientia est nosse divina
et humana et eorum causas."- This passage might have been inspired by Plato,
Republ., 475B: "May we not say of the philosopher that he is a lover, not of a
part of wisdom, but of the whole? "
7 ° Cicero, Tuscul., 5. 3. 7; De fin., 2. 2.- This definition could very well have
71

72

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ANTON-HERMANN

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·
,f,
>
eEWJV Kat av> epW7TtVWV 7rpayJLaTWV. 77
th e KaTaA'Y}'f't<;
Or €7TUTT'YJJL'YJ
Philosophy, as distinguished from philosophical wisdom," is to
some the study of virtue, while to others it signifies the effort
of improving one's mind; and to others, again, it is the quest
for right reason." 78 It should be noted here that the definition
which sees in philosophy the "adpetitio rectae rationis," 79 on
the one hand, and the study of virtue, on the other hand,
definitely contrasts a m9re particular and restricted theoretical
meaning of philosophy with its general ethico-practical or
ethico-teleological significance.80
1\

I

*

I

'

*

I

I

*

In the general vernacular of the Later Stoics the term" philosophy" denotes, above all, that type of practical knowledge
or understanding which might be inferred from its practical
efficacy. In this sense philosophy was considered "a most
urgent art," and virtue as
" of the most urgent necessity." 81 The perfect and indissoluble union of true philosophy
and moral wisdom, of real understanding and genuine virtue,
found its most telling expression in Seneca when the latter
proclaimed that " philosophy is the pursuit of virtue, but solely
through virtue itself. Because it is impossible to practice
b 9:
been under the influence of Aristotle. Cf., for instance, Metaphysics,
" This must be a science that investigates the first principles and causes."
77 Sextus
Empiricus, Adv. Math., 9. 13. Cf. Placita Philos., 1. prooem.
Pseudo-Galen, Hist. philos., 5.
78 Seneca,
Epist., 89.5: "alii studium illam .[scil., sapientiam] virtutis esse
dixerunt, alii corrigendae mentis, a quibusdam dicta est adpetitio rectae rationis."
This "adpetitio rectae rationis," is really nothing else than the E11"LT,jBevo-<s M-yov
opfJOT7JTOS, ascribed to Chrysippus.
Cf. H. v. Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag., II. 15, U;
II. 41,
II. 18,
III. no.
Patrol. Graec., 78. col. 1637 (Isidore of Pelusium); Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math., 9. 13.
79 Seneca, Epist., 89. 5, quoted in note 78, supra. Compare, in this connection,
Plato, Republ., 475C: " Who then are the true philosophers? Those, I said, who
are the lovers of the vision of truth."
8° Cf. Papyr. Hercul.,
E11"LT,jBEIIO"LS M-yov opfJOT7]1"0S. Cf. H. v. Arnim, Stoic.
Vet. Frag., II. 15, 12:
ern E11"LT-IJf>eVO"LS AO')'Otl op0oT7JTOS .r,.· E11"LO"TfJP.7J •••
Ibid., II. 41,
III. no.
This dual definition of philosophy has also been
used by the author of the epistle erroneously ascribed to Musonius. Cf. 0. Hense,
Musonii Rufi reliquiae, 141. ff.
81 Placita Philos., 1. prooem.

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IN THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN

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215

virtue without pursuing and studying virtue; or to study and
pursue virtue without possessing virtue." 82 And "not in mere
words, but in the things themselves resides philosophy. This
type of philosophy educates as well as edifies the soul; it brings
harmony into man's life; it regulates human actions; and it
adds to the understanding of that which one ought to do and
that which one ought to avoid. It forms the governing factor,
and decides on the path which leads you safely through the
uncertainties of life." 83 In this sense true philosophy is always
the " ars vitae," 84 and as such is " the mother of all the arts
as well as the true invention of the gods." 85 It is, in other
words, the "omnis rerum optimarum cognitio et in iis exercitatio." 86 For, in the final analysis, philosophy means virtue,
which is nothing other than the intelligent .display of right
reason; and right reason is reason motivated by truly moral
considerations. 87 In short, philosophy signifies the rational and
virtuous conduct of life: 88 " 0 vitae philosophia dux! 0 virtutis indagatrix expultrixque vitiorum! " 89
Like Aristo of Chius before him, Seneca, 90 the practical
Seneca, Epist., 89. 8.
Seneca, Epist., 16.
Cf. notes 141, 176, and 304, infra, and the discussion of
•• Cicero, De fin.,
the definition of philosophy as the TEXP'YJ rexvwv, in notes 304 fl'., infra.
85 Cicero, Tuscul., 1.
64.
86 Cicero, Tuscul., 5. 3. 7.
87 Cf. H. v. Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag., 1.15, 12; I. 41, 28; I.I8,
HI. no.
Cicero, Acad., I. 10. 38: "his [scil., Zeno] omnes [scil., virtutes] in ratione
ponebat." Tuscul., 4. 15. 34: "Ipsa virtus brevissime recta ratio dici potest."
Seneca, Epist., 113.2: "Virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus quodammodo
se habens."
88 H. Diels, Doxogr. Graec.,
H. v. Arnim. Stoic. Vet. Frag., II. no.
35; 36.
89 Cicero,
Tuscul., 5. £. 5. Cf. ibid., l. !i!6. 64;
4. 11 ff.; De officiis, £. 2. 5 fl'.;
De legibus, 1. !i!2. 58 fl'.
90 There can be no doubt that Seneca fully intended
to adhere to the general
Stoic tradition. Cf., for instance, Epist., 113. 1; De constantia sapientis, 1; Ad
Polybium de consolatione, l!i!. 4; Epist., 83. 9.-Nevertheless, he occasionally claims
it his right to deviate from the traditional Stoic teachings. Cf. Ad Gallionem de
vita beata, 3. S!; Ad Serenum de otio, 3. l; Epist., 33. ll; 45. 4; 80. 1; 64.7 If.;
82

88

De ira, 1. 6. 5.

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Roman, had little faith in-and even less use for-purely theoretical or dialectical discussions and niceties. 91 Rather, he believed in the ethico-practical efficacy of philosophy and philosophical inquiry. Thus he simply disregarded or considered
outright superfluous many problems of philosophy with which
some of his predecessors had seriously been concerned. Although he repeated occasionally the usual Stoic definitions
concerning the nature, function, or parts of philosophy, 92 in
the main he concentrated on its moral or practical significance: 98 "Facere docet philosophia, non dicere." 94 It is not
for man to quibble over concepts, meanings, or principles. 95
Philosophy is, above all, the eloquent " humani generis paedagogus," 96 the " ars rectae vitae agendae." 97 It constitutes the
basic regula vitae 98 which can very well dispense with semantic
controversies. For philosophy is not intended to be a mere
display of dialectical acumen, but must be conceived as the
01 While Seneca had little use for logical inquiries, he displayed
some interest
in physics-physics in the Stoic sense of the term. In this he definitely showed the
influence of Posidonius of Rhodes, who furnished Seneca with many ideas for this
Naturalium quaestionum libri VII. But this occupation with physics was recommended by Seneca primarily for practical reasons: ignorance of the true causes of
natural phenomena is the source of many of our needless fears. Cf. Nat. quaest.,
6. 8. 2. The correct understanding of nature, on the other hand, is the source of comfort and courage. Cf. Nat. quaest., 6. 1. 8; De benejiciis,5. 6. 4. At the same time a
fuller understanding of the greatness and magnificence of this world and of the
deity will make us realize our own insignificance. Cf. Nat. quaest., 1. prooem. 18 ff.
•• Cf. Epist., 94. 47 :ff.; 95. 10.
•• Cf. for instance, Epist., 88. 18: " Scis quae recta sit linea: quid tibi prodest, si
quid in vita rectum sit, ignoras? " Epist., 88. 28: "Una re consummatur animus,
scientia bonorum ac malorum immutabili, quae soli philosophiae conpetit: nihil
autem ulla ars alia de bonis ac malis querit." Epist., 88. 88-85.
•• Epist., 20. 2; 24. 25.- Antisthenes had already shown that true virtue is
based solely on practice rather than theory. Cf. Xenophon, Memorab., 1. 2. 19.
And Cicero, in De officiis, 1. 44. 158, insisted that " omne officio, quod ad coniunctionem hominum tuendem valet, anteponendum est illi officio, quod cognitione et
scientia continetur."
•• Epist., 88. 48: " Audi, quantum mali faciat nimia subtilitas et quam infesta.
verita.ti sit." Cf. Epist., 109. 11.
•• Epist., 89.18.
97 In Lactantius,
Inst. Div., 8. 15.
98 ln Lactantius,
Inst. Div., 8.15. Cf. Seneca, Epist., 117.12; 94. 89.

PHILOSOPHY

IN THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN

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217

foremost remedy of the morally sick soul. 99 At the same time
it is the most outstanding teacher/ 00 but whatever it teaches
will be of little real value to us unless it is applied to our own
moral improvement. 101 What true advantage, Seneca queried,
might be gained from polymathy or the historical sciences?
" Cuius ista errores minuent, cuius cupiditates prement? Quem
fortiorem, quem iustiorem, quem liberaliorem facient? " 102
True philosophy or philosophical wisdom is a rather simple
thing which does not require a great or vast knowledge of
facts, 103 For wisdom (sapientia), and not mere learnedness
(sapere), constitutes real philosophical good, 104 AU men, Seneca
concluded, to a greater or lesser degree, are morally sick and,
hence, stand in urgent need of a moral cure, And philosophy
is the sole remedy which can achieve such a cure, 105
Similar views were also expressed by the so-called Sextians, 106
who insisted that all efforts to acquire great learning are i.dle
and vain attempts unless they are meant to improve man
momlly, 107 The truly wise man, according to Q, Sextius, goes
99 Epist., 117.33:
"Adice nunc, quod adsuescit animus delectare se potius quam
sanare et philosophiam oblectamentum facere, cum remedium sit,"
100 Epist,, 20. 2; 24. 15; 89. 13.
101 Epist., 89. 18:
"Quicquid legeris ad mores statim referas." Ibid., 89. 9!3:
" Haec aliis die ... omnia ad mores et ad sedandam rabiem adfectuum referens."
Cf. Epist., 117. 23; 117,33.
102 Ad Paulina-m de brevitate vitae, 13.
103 Epist., 106. 11:
"In supervacaneis subtilitas teritur: non faciunt bonos ista,
sed doctos. Apertior res est sapere, immo simplicior. Paucis est ad mentem
bonam uti literis: sed nos ut cetera in supervacaneum diffundimus, ita philosophiam
ipsam.
Quemadmodum omnium rerum, sic literarum quoque intemperantia
laboramus: non vitae sed scholae discimus." Cf. Epist., 47.4 ff.; 87.38 ff.; 88. 36:
"Plus scire velle quam sit sa tis et, intemperantiae genus est."
104 Epist., 117.18:
"Omnia ista circam sapientiam, non in ipsa sunt: a nobis
in ipsa commorandum est , .. haec vero, de quibus paulo ante dicebam, minuunt
et deprimunt, nee, ut putatis exacuunt, sed extenuant." Cf. Epist., 82. Q2.According to the Early Cynics, the wise and virtuous man has but contempt for
reading and writing, inasmuch as they detract him from living the good and
virtuous life. Cf. Diog, Laert., 6, 103.
105 Epist.,
50, 4; 28. 9.- As to the origin of the notion that philosophy is a
remedy for the morally sick soul, cf. note 113, infra.
106 Cf. Seneca, Epist., 64. 5,
107 Seneca, Ad Paulina.m de brevitate vitae, 13. 9.- This statement
has actually

ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

safely through the perils of life and its vicissitudes, armed with
his philosophy and with his virtues. 108 And philosophy or
virtue is not perchance a remote ideal, but rather something
that can actually be attained and fully lived. 109 Musonius, 110
the younger contemporary of Seneca, emphasized even more
than Seneca himself the ethico-teleological significance of philosophy,111 although he also dealt to some degree with certain
theoretical or speculative aspects of philosophy. 112 Thus it
may be surmised that he merely rejected that sort of theoretical speculation which is being carried on for its own sake and
without any reference to the practical demands of moral life.
According to ·Musonius, all men are morally sick. To regain
their moral health they sorely stand in need of continuous
and competent medical treatment. 113 And philosophy is the
only physician, the sole remedy capable of curing the ailing
soul. 114 For philosophy is the only possible and secure path to
virtue, and virtue the sole healthy state of the soul.115 Hence,
been ascribed to Fabianus Papirius. About Fabianus, see Seneca, op. cit., 10. 1;
Epist., ll. 4; 40. 12; 100. U; 58. 6; 100. 9; 100. 1 ff.; Ad Marciam de consolatione,
5; Nat. quaest., 3.
3.
108 Seneca, Epist., 59. 7.
109 Seneca, Epist., 64. 5.- In this the Sextians definitely proved the fact that
they were practical Romans rather than theorizing Greeks.
110 0. Hense, Musonii Rufi reliquiae (Leipzig, 1905); P. Wendland, Quaestiones
Musonianae (Berlin, 1886); T. Pflieger, Musonius bei StobaeuB (Tauberbischofsheim,
1897).
111 See "topics" no.
6; 9; 17, in Hense, op. cit.
11 ° Cf. Stobaeus, Florileg., 117. 8; 108. 60; Epictetus,
Discours., 7. 3.
118 Plutarch, De cohib. ira,
Gellius, Attic. noct., 5.1.
The notion that man
is actually a morally sick person goes back to the Cynics (Antisthenes). C(. Diog.
Laert., 6. 4; 6. 6; 6. 30; 6. 36; Lucian, Vit. auct., 8; Dio Chrysostom, Orat., 8. 7 ff.;
Stobaeus, Florileg., 13.
3.
Plutarch, An viciositas ad infelicitatem sufficiat, 8.
By impressing their listeners with the need of living according to nature, the Cynics
were really the first philosophers who held that philosophy was a " cure for the
morally sick soul." It should be noted here that an la.rpLKos M'Yos had already
been ascribed, although erroneously, to Empedocles. Even Plato (Republ., 489 B;
Theaet., 167 B) compared the philosopher to the physician, as did Philo of Larissa
9; 50. 4). Cf. note 105, supra.
(Stobaeus, Eclog., 40 ff.) and Seneca (Epist.,
110 See note US, supra. Cf. notes 1!M; U5; 158; 156; 174;
infra.
115 Stobaeus, Florileg.,
48. 67.

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219

all people should occupy themselves with philosophy. 116 The
only real content as well as purpose of philosophy is virtue; for
philosophy, properly understood, signifies nothing other than
the full appreciation and practice of those principles which
underlie right conduct. 117 Real virtue, however, is the reward
of a philosophical life rather than the result of philosophical
instruction and discussion. 118 The true philosopher and the
truly virtuous man are actually one and the same person, 119
for philosophy and virtue are only two different designations
for one and the same thing. It remains the prime task of the
real philosopher to stimulate the moral improvement of his
fellow men by ministering to them and their moral needs. 120
Epictetus, 121 the disciple of Musonius, likewise saw the main
function and purpose of philosophy in its practical effects on
man's moral evolution and edification. To philosophize means,
above all, to learn and to understand that which we should
pursue and that which we should avoid. 122 All philosophy
begins with the realization of our own weakness and deficien116 Stobaeus, Florileg., !'l. 18. 126; Musonius, "topic" no. 3; no. 4 (in Hense).
Cf.
note IQO, infra.
117 Stobaeus, Florileg., 2. 48. 67; 2. 67. :'lO: ov "fap o-1} </><AOG'oif>eiv grepov n <j>alverru
ov r; ro a wpe7re< Kal &. 7rpouijKE< AD'Y'lJ J.'EV
ll€ wpft.rretv • ••• Cf. ibid.,
!'l. 13. 128: if><Aouo<j>ia KaAoKa-yaOias €uT1v bnTijoevuts /Cal oilo€v gnpov. Ibid., 2. 13.

126:

lTKOtre'iv 01rws f3u.huovrat KaAWs, Cnrep rO ¢tAor.tocj>e'iv

Stobaeus, Florileg., 29. 78; Lucius, in: Stobaeus, op. cit., l. 7. 46.
119 Stobaeus, Florileg., 79. 51:
TO o€ 'YE elva< rl'Ya0ov Tii> <j>L\ouo<j>ov eivat Tavr6v
eun. Hence the philosopher is preeminently qualified to be a king, and the good
king is necessarily a philosopher. Ibid., 48. 67. The affinity of this passage with
Plato, Republ., 473 C; 494 B; and 501 E, is rather obvious. Cf. 0. Hense, op. cit.,
"topic" no. 8, quoted in note 120, infra.
12 ° Cf. Gellius, Attic. noct., 5. 1; Epictetus,
DiscourS"., 3. 28. 29. See also Musonius
and his many suggestions concerning the nature and purpose of philosophy and
philosophical training, in "topic" no. l (in 0. Hense, op. cit.): 5n ov oet wo"/1."/l.ats
7rpos
7rpfi-yp,a xpiJuauOat. No. 3: 5n Kat
</>tAOUo<j>ijreov. No. 4:
el 1rapawA'Y]ulws 7rac0evrEov rCts 8v')larEpas rots ino'is. No. 5: 1rp6repov luxvp6repov
f; "11.6-yos. No. 8: 5n if><"ll.ouo<j>7Jreov Kat Tots f3aut"ll.evu<v. No. 11: rls b <j>t"ll.ouoif>t;J
1rpouijKwv 1r6pos, to which Musonius replied, o 1ropos eK -yewp-yias <j>alverat i'ilv Tii>
¢t"ll.ouoif>o/ 7rpe1rwo£uraros. No. 14: el ep,w6owv ro/ <j>t"ll.ouo<j>etv -yft.p,os.
121 Cf. A. Bonhiiffer, Epiktet
und die Stoa (Stuttgart, 1890); P. Wendland,
Hdlenistik-Romische Ktdtur, 3d edit.; R. Asmus, Quaestiones Epicteteae (Freibmg,
1888); C. Martha, Les m01'alistes sous l'empire Romm'n (Paris, 1896).
122 Discours., 3. 14. 10; l. 1. 8; ll. 1. 4.
118

ANTON-HERMANN

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cies: he who desires to become good and virtuous must first
of all be aware of his own moral shortcomingso 123 The true
philosopher is really nothing else than a physician 124 who
ministers to those who are sick in their souls. 125 Hence, his
main task consists in helping and healing rather than debating
and proselytizing. He will appeal to man's moral conscience
by showing him the wretchedness of his ignorance and the
evils which follow in the wake of sin. And he will essay to turn
him into a true philosopher and virtuous man rather than an
erudite scholar or scholiast. 126 He who aspires to nothing except
to live as a free man and who fears nothing is the real philosopher.127 For this is the essence of all philosophical wisdomto be able to discern what is within our power to attain and
what is not. 128
To Epictetus philosophy signifies a sermon of the deity delivered through the mouth of the wise man. 129 This being so,
the true philosopher will not challenge the unphilosophical and
evil world with an attitude of conceit and unwarranted selfand quiet
confidence,
will face it in a spirit of
resignation. Neither will he play the part of the outraged moralist who rants about the iniquities and foolishness of this
world; like a good and conscientious physician who pities
rather than denounces his patients, the philosopher faces this
sorry world of ours in a spirit of charity and humility. 130 Inasmuch as Epictetus considered virtue and the practical application of moral wisdom as the only relevant function of philosoDiscours., 2. 11. l; Stobaeus, Florileg., l. 48.
Cf. notes 113 and 114, supra.
125 Discours.,
3. 23. 30; 3. 5!1. 8; l. 9. 10 ff. Cf. Stobaeus, Florileg., 4. 94.- This
definition reappears in Demonax. Cf. Lucian, Demonax, 6 .
12 ° Cf. Discours., pref.
of Arrian 5 ff., where the latter states that Epictetus'
philosophical ideas, " even when he uttered them, . . . aimed at nothing more
than to excite his listeners to virtue .... His audience could not help being affected
in the very manner he intended they should .... "
127 Discours., 5!. 17. 29; 1. 4. 18.
128 Discours., 1. l. 21; 1. 25!. 9 ff.; Enchiridion, 1; 3.
129 Discours., 1. 3. 36 ff.
18 ° Cf. Discours., 1. 18. l ff.; l. 28. l ff.; 3. 3. 2; 2. 26; 3. 7. 15; 3. 23. 21; 3. 21. 8;
2.19.
128
124

PHILOSOPHY IN THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN

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phy, 131 he did not think too much of the theoretical or speculative sciences 132 which to him were only ancillary topics subservient to the greater moral issues of life.
Perhaps the most enlightening summary of the Late Stoic
interpretation of the meaning of philosophy can be found in
Marcus Aurelius:
What then is that which is able to guide man? One thing, and one
only-philosophy. But this consists in keeping the soul (demon)
of man free from violence and harm, superior to passions and
pleasures, doing nothing without a purpose, nor yet falsely and
with hypocrisy, not feeling the need of another man's doing or not
doing anything; and besides accepting all that happens, and all
that is allotted, as coming from hence, wherever it is, whence he
himself came; and finally, waiting for death with a cheerful mind. 133
The prime function of philosophy, therefore, consists in shaping our character and soothing our disturbed soul; and to
accomplish this, " philosophy insists only on the things on
which thy own nature insists." 134 Since philosophy is the sole
occupation which endows us with a solid and stable foundation
in this everlasting flux of changing sensations and phenomena,
" let ... philosophy be to thee step-mother and mother; turn
to philosophy frequently and repose in her." 135 "For never
to desert philosophy in any events which might befall us, nor
to hold trifling talk either with an ignorant man or one unacquainted with nature, is a principle held by all schools of
philosophy; but to be intent only on what is now being done
and on the instruments by which it is done." 136
Panaetius of Rhodes (c. 185-110/109) 137 tried to avoid
Cf. Discours., l. 4. 5; 2. 17. 27 ff.; 8. 21. 1 ff.; l. 7. 1 ff.; 2. 29; 1. 8. 4 ff.
Antisthenes had already pointed out that virtue does not stand in need of
M'Yo' and
Cf. Diog. Laert., 6. 11; 6. 31.
183 Thoughts, 2. 17.
••• Thoughts, 5. 9.
185 Thoughts, 6. 12.
186 Thoughts, 9. 41.
187 Cf., in general, A. Schmekel, Die Philosophie der mittleren
Stoa in ihrem
geschichtlichen Zusammenhang (Berlin, 1892); H. Fowler, Panaetii et Hecatonis
Librorum Fragmenta (Bonn, 1885) .
131

132

ANTON -HERMANN CHROUST

some of the one-sided features of Stoic teachings 138 by refusing
to define philosophy exclusively in terms of moral life actually
lived. As a matter of fact, he insisted quite strongly that
every province of philosophical inquiry constitutes an essential
and integral part of philosophy. To him philosophy signifies
the proper means enabling man to attain the perfection of reason as well as that of morals. Philosophy is that one compelling
force which brings about the fullest unfolding of man's total
individual essence. By emphasizing the power of philosophy
over the minds and hearts of men, and by believing in its practical efficacy to bring about the intellectual as well as moral
evolution of mankind, Panaetius definitely broke away from
the rather negative Stoic idea of the a1rcUJw:t, which, by preaching resignation rather than action, did not hold out much hope
for mankind. His insistence that in its practical and efficient
aspects philosophy should help individual man to unfold intelligently his natural gifts and talents to the utmost, turned
philosophy into a great humanizing force and made it an
portant factor in bringing about the true humanitas.
Posidonius of Apamea (c. 135-c. 50) ,139 according to the
testimony of Seneca, 140 is said to have declared philosophy the
mother of all the arts and sciences. 141 Thus he established not
only the preeminence of philosophy over all the other sciences,
but also defined its relationship to every branch or province of
human leamingo The central position of man in the hierarchic
structure of the universe-man partakes both of the physical
and spiritual world-according to Posidonius, makes man himself, as well as the science of man, the foremost and most pressing problem of all philosophyo In this fashion the old Socratic
Cicero, De fin, 4. 28. 79.
Cf. A. Schmekel, op. cit.; K. Reinhard, Posidonius (Mtinchen, 1921); W.
Jaeger, Nemesios von Emesa (Berlin, 1914); E. Norden, Agnostos Theos.
140 Epist., 88. 24; 88. Ill; 90. 7; 90. 1!3.
141 Cicero, who was a disciple of Posidonins,
took over this definition. See
note 85, supra.
188

139

PHILOSOPHY

IN THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN

exhortation of yvw(h uEavTov becomes a
such the :real core of all true philosophy .142

*

*

WORLD

223

f.avrov, and as

*

All these definitions of philosophy devised by the Stoics or
coined under the influence of Stoic tradition lack that precise
line of demarcation by which Aristotle had tried to set apart
his " first philosophy " from all the other " special philosophies." 143 With the Stoics in general, philosophy is thought
of in terms of the sum total of aU intelligent efforts in their
relationship to the " good life " and the wise or virtuous man.
It is needless to say that this interpretation much resembles
the earliest definitions of philosophy in the Hellenic world. 144
The oldest and certainly the most comprehensive meaning of
the term philosophy 145 was the intelligent quest for balanced
erudition and culture
or, as Cicero put it, the
" omnium rerum optimarum cognitio et in iis exercitatio." 146
According to this " classical " definition the philosopher is one
This is also the
who ;.tErEtAYJcpE 1ratoeiac; Ota4>6pov
meaning of the term philosophy used by Pericles when he said
about the Athenians that 4>tAoKa"Aov;.tEv;.ter' EVTEAELa<; Kat 4>t'Aouo4>ov;.tev aVEV fLUAUKta<;.147 This comprehensive definition reappeared suddenly during the second century after Christ, when
Aelius Aristides, 148 a late Stoic, called philosophy" a certain love
fo:r the beautiful and the discussion of what is intelligent. This
love, however, is not a mere momentary fancy, but rather a
universally valid education." 149
142 This
idea of making man and the knowledge of man the center of all
philosophical inquiry, is also found in Porphyry (in Stobaeus, Florileg., 21. 27),
Proclus (in Comment. in Plat. Alcib. 1. p. 296), and Julian the Apostate (Orat. 6,
p. 238, edit. Hertlein). Cf. W. Jaeger, op. cit., 40 ff.
143 Cf. A.-H. Chroust, loc. cit., 36 ff .
... Cf. A.-H. Chroust, loc. cit., 20 ff.
146 Cf. A.-H. Chroust, loc. cit., 20 ff.
, .. Tuscul., 5. 3. 7.
147 Thucydides,
2. 40: "For we engage in good taste judiciously and treat
philosophy without effeminacy."
148 0. Weinreich, in:
Neue Jahrb., 35 (1915), 224 ff.
140 Orat., 46 (p. 407, edit. Dindorf) : <fn\oKa"ll.la ns Ka! lharpt{J'IJ 7rep! M-yovs Kal
oVx 0 viiv Tp61ros
c:iAhO: trcuOela. KotvWs.

ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

It should be noted that the Late Stoics, who insisted upon
the complete autarchy of virtue, had much in common with
the Cynics, 150 who experienced a strong revival during the
:first two centuries of the Christian era. 151 Under the impact of
certain Cynic teachings, philosophy-particularly
the Stoic
notion of philosophy-underwent a noticeable change. It was
no longer considered a science or way of living the good life,
but rather a loosely defined study of human character.152 Although Demonax (2d century A. D.), like most of the Late
Stoics, called philosophy the foremost cure of the morally sick
soul/ 53 he saw in it above all that intelligent general attitude
or disposition of man which frees him from all entanglements
with things external that are beyond his control. True philosophers, like truly happy men, are only those who neither hope
for nor fear anything; in other words, those who are always
conscious of the vanity of everything human. 154 Dio Chrysostom (c. 40-110) 155 likewise defined philosophy as the foremost effort to heal the moral ills of mankind. 15e Philosophy,
160 This is particularly
true of Musonius and Epictetus. On the whole, Stoic
philosophy contains certain elements which are Antisthenian in origin. Cf. Diog.
Laert, 7. 2-5.
181 The more important
of these Late Cynics were: Demetrius, Oenomaus of
Gadara, Demonax of Cyprus, Dio Chrysostom (or, Dio of Prusa), and Peregrinus
Proteus.
••• The interest in the study of human character might be traced back to Aristotle. The ratller detailed enumeration and description of the various individual
ethical virtues by Aristotler-the Nic. Eth. (1107 a 28 ff.) mentions thirteen, while
the Eudem. Eth. (1220 b 88 ff.) fourteen, and the Rhetoric (1866 b 1 ff.) ninerindicate not only Aristotle's keen sense of observation, but also his profound
interest in the study of human character. This interest had a lasting influence on
the Peripatetic tradition and found expression in the n6•Kol xa.pa.KT-ijpes of Theophrastus. Cf. also Epicharmus, frag. 258 (Kaibel): "Character (Tp671'os) is a
man's good guiding principle (6a.lp,wv)." Heraclitus of Ephesus, frag. 119 (Diels):
"Character
is the guiding spirit of man (6a.lp,wv)." Meander, Epitrepontea 479 ff.
158 In Lucian: Demonax, 6 ff.
'"'Ibid., 20. Cf. ibid., 4.
105 Cf. H. v. Arnim, Leben und W erke des Dion von Prusa (Berlin, 1898);
H. v. Arnim, Dionis Prusaensis . . . quae extant omnia (Berlin, 1898-96); L.
Dindorf, Orationea recogn. et pref. (Leipzig, 1857) .
156 Orat., 18 (p. 481, Dindorf);
orat. 12 (p. 874 ff., Dindorf).

PHILOSOPHY IN THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN

WORLD

225

which in itself is virtue and the truly happy life/ 57 actually
means nothing else than living the righteous and simple life.158
Lucian, who wrote shortly after the death of Marcus Aurelius
(180 A. D.), considered philosophy the expression of practical
wisdom and plain common sense. It is primarily an attitude
or disposition of the human soul, as well as a general direction
of the human will; thus it cannot be based upon or even satisfactorily explained by any scientific method or system. It was
this conception of philosophy, which identified it with common
sense, that induced Lucian to ridicule and despise all " professional " philosophers/ 59
To Epicurus 160 and his followers 161 philosophy meant " that
Orat., 23 (p. 515, Dindorf) .
Orat., 13 (p. 431, Dindorf).
159 Piscat., 5 ff.
16 ° Cf., in general, H. Usener, Epicurea
(Leipzig, 1887), and the many writings
of E. Bignone on Epicurus and the Epicureans. See also Ueberweg-Heinze,
Geschichte der Philosophie, H!th edit. (Praechter), I. 436 ff., and pp. 133 ff. of
bibliography.
161 The more important
Epicureans were: Metrodorus of Lampsacus; Polyaenus
of Lampsacus; Hermachus of Mytilene; Colotes of Lampsacus; Idomeneus of
Lampsacus; Polystratus; Dionysius; Philonides; Basilides; Demetrius of Laconia;
Apollodorus; Zeno of Sidon; Phaedrus the Epicurean; Philodemus; Lucretius Carus;
and Asclepiades of Bithynia. Perhaps no other school of philosophy adhered more
strictly to the original tenets laid down by its founder than the Epicureans. Owing
to the fact that Epicurus enjoyed a tremendous reputation among his followers,
it should not surprise us that his disciples did not dare to change, challenge, or
modify to any noticeable degree the teachings of the master. Cf., for instance,
Seneca, Epist., 33. 4; Eusebius, Praep. Evang., 14. 5. 3 ff. In their efforts merely
to restate or paraphrase again and again the "Sovereign Maxims" (Kvpuu
in Diog. Laert., 10.36 ff.) of the master, his pupils were neither inclined to pay
any attention to the achievements of other philosophers nor apparently capable of
73; Macrobius, De somnio
appreciating their ideas. Cf. Cicero, De nat. deor.,
Diog. Laert., 10. 8. This general lack of genuine philosophical
Scipionis, l.
productivity among the followers of Epicnrus; this inability or unwillingness to
build upon and expand the foundations laid down by their first teacher, in itself
is the most eloquent condemnation of the philosophical significance and value of
Epicureanism. The mere mechanical repetition or restatement of memorized sentences or dicta (cf. Diog. Laert., 10.
Cicero, De fin.,
7. 20) does not speak
very well for the philosophical ability of the disciple. For mere profession of
abject loyalty to the founder of a school of thought cannot be considered sufficient
compensation or excuse for the mental laziness or lack of speculative ability on
the part of the pupil. A philosophy which, like Epicureanism, fails to stimulate
157

158

ANTON -HERMANN CHROUST

kind of action or activity which through the proper employment of rational discussions and ratiocination guarantees a life
of bliss." 162 Theoretical knowledge and mere learning, however, contribute little-and then only indirectly-to such a
life. Hence theoretical knowledge is to be tolerated only if it
helps to promote our understanding of what constitutes right,
that is to say, rational conduct. 163 The true philosopher or
" wise man " is one who has the right and pious conception of
the nature of the gods-one who possesses a real appreciation
of all earthly goods and also does not dread death. He is at
the same time one who does not acknowledge a pre-ordained
fate, and who therefore rises above the contingencies of everyday life through his genuine wisdom and profound insight. 164
In other words, he is one who in his retirement from an unpleasant and noisy world ('AaOe f3u!Jua<;) lives like a king among
men, enjoying everlasting pleasures. 165 These basic views of
Epicurus were later restated by Diogenes of Oinoanda/ 66 who
defined philosophy as that spiritual guide which will liberate
man from the dread of the gods, from a fear of death, pain,
and sorrow, and restrain him from desiring things in excess of
his natural needs. 167 This definitely one-sided emphasis on the
practical issues relegates all theoretical or speculative inquiry
to a secondary or ancillary position. 168 Even physics or natural
the disciple to intellectual originality or intelligent independence, which, in other
words, calls for accurate scholiasts rather than productive thinkers, effectively
condemns itself.
189 Sextus
Empiricus, Adv. Math., ll. 169: E7rlKovpos lAE')'e T1jv rjnAouo¢lav
evep'Yelav elva• M'Yo•s Ka! (J,aAo'Y•Up,ols TOP eMalp,ova {3{op 7rep•7rOWVUaP. Cf. Diog.
Laert., 10.
188 Cicero, De fin., I.
71: "Nullam eruditionem esse duxit, nisi quae beatae
vitae disciplinam adiuvaret." A cad., II. 33.
Diog. Laert., 10. 6; Plutarch,
Ne suaviter vivi posse ... , 12.1; 18. 1; Athenaeus, Deipnos., 13. 58A; Sextus
Empiricus, Adv. Math., 1.1.
184 Diog. Laert., 10. 185.
185 Diog. Laert., 10.180.
188 He lived during the second century after
187 Frag., I. 8;
4. 6; 16.1;
(edit. Williams).
168 We have already
pointed out that Epicurus denied the value of learning
for learning's sake. Cf. note 163, supra. Undoubtedly his hostile attitude towards
learning only reflects Epicurus' own lack of solid erudition. Cf. Sextus Empiricus,

PHILOSOPHY

IN THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN

WORLD

227

philosophy, which in a naturalistic and materialistic type of
philosophy such as Epicureanism might be expected to hold a
rather prominent position, is not dealt with by the Epicureans
for its own sake, but merely on account of the practical or pragmatic significance it has for the proper adjustment of life. 169
The sole purpose of a correct understanding of nature and the
natural causes is to relieve the soul from fear and superstition.
Thus, according to Epicurus, if we were not visited by such
fears, we would not need any natural philosophy at all. 170 The
fourfold function of natural philosophy and, as a matter of fact,
of all philosophy is, therefore, the " fortitudo contra mortis
timorem; constantia contra metum religionis; sedatio animi
omnium rerum occultarum ignoratione sublata; moderatio natura cupiditatum generibusque earum explicatis." 171
While Philo of Larissa, 172 the disciple of Cleitomachus,m
compared philosophy to a physician/ 74 Cicero 175 defined it as
Adv. Math., 1. 1; Diog. Laert., 10. 4; Cicero, De fin., 1. 7. 26: "Vellem equidem,
aut ipse doctrinis fuisset instructor-est enim . . . non satis politus iis artibus
quas qui tenent eruditi appellantur-aut ne deterruisset alios a studiis." Athenaeus,
Deipnos., 13. 58A.- It seems, therefore, that Epicurus turned his own shortcomings
into a principle of philosophy. Cf. Cicero, De fin., 1. 21. 71. No wonder that
Epicurus treated with contempt the efforts of logicians, grammarians, historians,
dialecticians, and mathematicians. See also Diog. I.aert., 6. 73, where Diogenes of
Sinope expresses his contempt for music, geometry, astronomy, and like studies.
169 Cicero,
De fin., l. 19. 63.- Similar ideas had already been expressed by
Aristippus. Cf. Diog. I.aert., 2. 68; 2. 72.
170 Diog. Laert.,
10. 85; 10. 87; 10. 112; 10. 79; 10. 143; Cicero, De fin.,
4. 5.11; Lucretius, De rer. nat., 1. 62 ff.; 3.14 ff.; 6. 9 fl'.; Plutarch, Ne suaviter vivi
posse ... , 8. 7.
171 Cicero, De fin., l. 19. 63 ff.
172 Cf. Schmekel, op. cit., 385 ff.; C. Grysar, Die Akademiker Philon und Antiochm
(Ki:iln, 1849).
178 Cicero, Acad., II. 6.17.
174 Stobaeus, Eclog.,
40:
"'fO..p Tfj larptKfi cr1rov07} 1rO.ua. wept rO rfA.os, roilro lt 1}v iryltEwr., Kal. rfl ¢thouo¢lf!. wept
ri}v eVOcup.ovla.v.
175 In order to understand
Cicero's sceptical eclecticism we have to realize that
at one time or another he came into contact with all of the vadous philosophical
schools which were then dominant in the Hellenistic-Roman world. He studied
under Phaedrus the Epicurean; Philo the Academician; Diodotus the Stoic;
Antiochus of Ascalon, the Academician; Zeno the Epicurean; and Posidonius the
Stoic eclectic. It should be noted, however, that Cicero's scepticism and eclecticism

ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

the ars vitae and " the mother of all arts." 176 To him it is "the
true invention of the gods," 177 the "understanding of things
both divine and human, and, at the same time, the comprehension of the first principles and causes of everything." 178
Philosophy, to be sure, starts with doubt and scepticism. But
scepticism is merely the first step in the direction of a more
positive conviction. Even though we will have to concede that
such a positive conviction-which, after all, can be no more
than reasonable approximation of truth-still lacks absolute
scientific certainty, we are nevertheless confident that this
approximation furnishes a sufficient basis for practical action
which constitutes the true end of philosophy. This view is
brought out once again in Cicero's famous statement that
"omnis auctoritas philosophiae consistit in beata vita comparanda." 179 Hence the discovery of what is reasonably probable forms the first task of all philosophical inquiry. Scepticism is only a means or prerequisite for the achievement of
this all-important task. 180 The treatment of truly practical
and practically relevant problems or, to put it more poignantly,
the intuitive certainty of man's moral conscience is to Cicero
the dominant issue of all philosophy. 181 Admittedly, science
and knowledge of the theoretical type constitute a good. 182
But they never are a good in themselves, but rather on account
of their effects on man's action and conduct. In this sense, and
are not so much the result of original thinking on his part, but rather the product
of a pronounced " hesitatio iudicii " in the face of, so many conflicting philosophies
Il. 48.147.
with which he came in contact during his lifetime. Cf. Acad., II.
176 De fin.,
Cf. David, Proleg. et in Porphyr. [sag. Comment.,
ff., in
Comment. in Arist. Graec., 18.
Cf. note 804, infra.
177 Tuscul., 1.
64.
178 Tuscul., 5. 8. 7.- This definition is patently Stoic; it is, as a matter of fact,
nothing else than a Latin translation of the most prominent Stoic definition of
philosophy. Cf. notes 50 and 77, supra.
170 De fin., 5.
This statement was undoubtedly prompted by the influence of
Theophrastus' 7repl eV8a.t(.tovla.s.
180 De fin., 5.
79.
181 Cf. De legibus, 1. 18. 89.
181 De fin., 1. 7.
4. 5. U; Tuscul., 5.
ff.; De nat. deor., 1. 8; Acad., II. 41.
U7; Tuscul., 5. 8. 9; 5.
69. Cf. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, 14. 9.

PHILOSOPHY IN THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN

WORLD

in this alone, theoretical knowledge may be regarded as a vital
part of general philosophy. For theoretical knowledge and the
speculative sciences achieve their ultimate purpose only in
action, and action is always superior to theory. 188 Hence the
ascertainment of the highest moral good signifies the most
pressing and decisive issue of all philosophy. 184
In spite of the uncertainty and limitation of human knowledge and human reason this ultimate end of philosophy can be
fully achieved. 185 For while philosophy in general tells us nothing with absolute certainty, it nevertheless endows us with a
certain intuitive truth, sufficient to distinguish and determine
the things which are most important. In this, philosophy becomes the true dux vitae. 186 M. Terentius Varro, 187 the erudite
friend of Cicero and disciple of Antiochus of Ascalon, saw the
whole purpose of philosophy in bringing about the moral happiness of man. Only those philosophical teachings, we are told,
which contribute to the moral edification and improvement of
man, are worthy of being taken seriously. 188 Philosophy deals
primarily with the relation of virtue to what is " according
to nature." 189 Thus, the basic issue of philosophy revolves
around the question whether for the sake of virtue we should
strive after what is "according to nature"; or whether for the
sake of what is " according to nature " we should strive after
virtue; or whether we should strive after both for the sake
of both. 190 In any event, the practical ordination of philosophy
as well as the emphasis on the elementary demands and needs
188 De officiis, 1. 84.158; 1. 9. !lS; 1. !ll. 71.
Cf. Seneca, Epist., !lO. !l: "Facere
docet philosophia, non dicere."
18 ' De
fin., 5. 6.15: " ... hoc [scil., summo bono] constituto in philosophia
constituta sunt omnia .... "
185 Acad., I. 4.15; De fin., !l. 1. 1; Tuscul., 5. 4. 10.
186 Tuscul., 5. !l. 5.
187 Cf., in general, Teuffel-Kroll-Skutsch,
Geschichte der romischen Literatur,
6th edit. (Leipzig-Berlin, 1916), par. 165 ff.
188 Cf. St. Augustine, De civ. Dei, 19. 1-8.
189 St. Augustine, op. cit., 19. 8. !l.
190 St. Augustine, op. cit., 19. !l.

230

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of natural, practical life, are the salient points m Varro's
definition of philosophy. 191

*

*

*

The Sceptic point of view, not only espoused by Pyrrho
of Elis (c. 360-c. 270) ,193 Timon of Phlius (c. 320-c. 230) ,194
Aenesidemus of Cnosos (1st century B. C.) ,195 and Sextus
Empiricus (died c. 150 A. D.) / 96 but also propagated to some
extent by certain members of the so-called Middle Academy, 197
held it to be the prime task of all philosophy to investigate
the nature of things, not only in order to establish man's
pmpe:r relation to these things, but also in order to enable
man to know what he might or might not expect from them. 198
According to the general position held by the Sceptics, it is
evident that we can never know the true and objective nature
of things. 199 For these things are without constant features,
just as is our experience of them, and, hence, cannot fully be
192

191 In this Varro is definitely under the influence of his teacher Antiochus
of
Ascalon.
192 Cf. Diog. Laert., !l. 61-116; Suidas on "Pyrrho"
and "Timon." See also R.
Hirzel, Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften (Leipzig, 1877-1883);
E. Bevan, Stoics and Sceptics (Oxford, 1913); E. Pappenheim, Die Tropen der
griechischen Skeptiker (Berlin, 1885); H. Diels, Poet. philos. frag. (Berlin, 1901),
182 ff.; C. Wachsmuth, Corpusculum poesis epicae graecae ludubundae, fasc. 2
(Leipzig, 1885).
198 Cf. Sextus Empiricus, "Pyrrhonia."
194 C. Wachsmuth, op. cit.; H. Diels, op. cit. Cf. note 192, supra.
196 Cf. Photius, Biblioth., cod. 212 (lluppwvew<
M')'o<).
196 Ct H. Mutschmann's
edition of the llvppwvo!wv {nrorv'!C'WO"<wv, libri tres (Leipzig, 1912).
197 The
main representatives of the Middle Academy were: Arcesilaus (or,
Acesilas, 315/14-241/40); Lacydes of Cyrene (died c. 224); Telecles (died c. 215);
Euandrus; Hegesinus; Carneades (died c. 128); Cleitomachus (died c. 110), and
Charmadas. Cf. Diog. Laert., 4. 28-67.- Philo of Larissa, originally also a
spokesman of the sceptic tradition of the Middle Academy, later refuted Academic
Scepticism. Cf. also Suidas and his various "articles" on the members of the
Middle Academy; K Zeller, Philos. d. Griech., 3d edit., 3. l, pp. 478 ff.
198 Eusebius, Praep. Evang., 14. 18. 2 (quoting
199 Eusebius, Praep. Evang., 14. 18. Hl; Diog. Laert., 9. 61; 9. 76; !l. 114; 9. 105;
9.106 (Aenesidemus); Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math., ll. 140; Gellius, Att. noct.,

9.5.4.

PHILOSOPHY IN THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN

WORLD

231

determined. 200 Neither can we ever trust our sense perceptions, because, owing to the inconsistency of the things perceived, these sense perceptions themselves can never definitely
be called either true or false, right or wrong.201 This being so,
it is also impossible to determine man's relationship to things
or to establish with any degree of certainty the consequences
which will result from our actions. 202 Hence the argument is
advanced that, because there is no such thing as a true or reliable knowledge, and because about every statement of fact
an equally valid contradictory statement can be made, 208 right
action also is impossible.
Under such distressing circumstances the true philosopher or
" wise man " refrains as far as possible from committing himself either in a stated opinion or in a conclusive act. 204 In this
fashion philosophy turns into a completely negative attitude
towards the world-an attitude, that is to say, which counsels
complete suspension of any form of judgment or action. 205 The
only thing that might be of conceivable worth is virtue and
the peace of mind which virtue is capable of giving us.206 Thus
philosophy and that sort of happiness which is derived from
philosophy, consist in falling back on our own intellectual
resources. 207
Essentially the same problems re-emerge in Aenesidemus and
his followers,208 who actually reduce philosophy to a means of
attacking and ridiculing all the existing philosophies by insist••• Eusebius, Praep. Evang., 14. 18. Cicero, De fin., 4. 16. 4S.
201 Eusebius,
Praep. Evang., 14. 18.
Diog. Laert., 9. lOS; Sextus Empiricus,
Adv. Math., 11. 1.
••• Diog. Laert., 9. 61; 9. 107.
••• The so-called lo-oo-(Jeve<a. Twv M'Ywv.
••• The so-called arpa.o-la., or a«:a.Ta.X'f}Y,la., or tl'Yvwo-la.. Cf. Diog. Laert., prooem.
16; 9. 61; 9. 69 fl'.; 9. 74 fl'.; 9. 107; Eusebius, Praep. Evang., 14. 18. 2.
••• Diog. Laert., 9.
4S; S. S. 11; S. 4. U; 4. 16. 48;
9. 66 fl'.; Cicero, De fin.,
Eusebius, Praep. Evang., 14. 18.
••• Cicero, De fin., 4.16. 4S: "Pyrrho ... qui virtute constituta nihil omnino
quod appetendum sit relinquat." cr. ibid., 18. 48; 8. 4.
••• Cicero, De fin, IS. 48; Stobaens, Florileg.,
••• Cf. Sextus Empiricus, "Pyrrhonia," 1.164 ff.; I.
ff.; Adv. Math., 9. IS7 ff.;
9.
ff.; Diog. Laert., 9. 88 ff.

ANTON-HERMANN

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ing on the complete relativity of everything. 209 And the same
holds true of Arcesilaus of the Middle Academy, who, by refusing to admit any firm foundation of philosophy, 210 merely
essayed to disprove the validity of the teachings of all other
philosophers. 211 He conceded, however, that scientific probability constitutes a sufficient basis for practical action, 212 implying, thereby, that philosophy is at best a "theory of probability." 213 This identification of philosophy and "theory of
probability" was further developed by Carneades (o.
c. 128) with great acumen. 214
The so-called Platonists of the first two centuries after
Christ, 215 (who are called Platonists or representatives of
" Middle Platonism " mainly on account of their rather lengthy
and thorough commentaries to the works of Plato) 216 were in
fact eclectics. Thus Albinus (2d century A. D.) ,211 when defining philosophy, used the well known Platonic dictum, later
adopted by the Stoics, which declared it the
o-ocp£as,-the
••• Cf. Sextus Empiricus, "Pyrrhonia," l. 39; ll.135ll'.; Gellius, Att. noct., 9. 5. 7.
Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math., 7. 155; Plutarch, Adv. Coloten,
Cicero,
44 ff.; II. 20. 66; De oratore, 3. 18. 67; Eusebius, Praep. Evang., 14. 4. Hl;
A cad., I.
210

ll4.6.4.

Cicero, De fin.,
ll. 2; 5. 4. ll; De oratore, 3. 18. 67; Diog. Laert., 4.
Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math., 7.158.
218 Cf. Plutarch,
De tranquillitate animae, 9.
214 Sextus Empiricus,
Adv. Math., 7.159; 7.160-163; 7. 166; 7.167-170; 7.173;
Cicero, A cad., II. 3. 40 ff.; II. 26. 83; II. 9. 28.- The view that "probability" constitutes the sole form of philosophy or philosophical knowledge which could safely
be maintained, is also found in Favorinus. Cf. Gellius, Att. noct., 20.1. 9; Plutarch,
Quaest. symposica, 8. lO. 2.
"'" This Platonist movement should not be confounded either with the Middle
or Late Academy or the Neo-Piatonic tradition; hence it might perhaps best be
called "Middle Platonism." This " Middle Platonism " had a great influence on
the rise and development of Neo-Platonism.
216 The more important
members of " Middle Platonism " are: Dercylides, who
wrote eleven books on Plato's philosophy; Eudorus of Alexandria, who wrote a
commentary to Plato's Timaeus; Thrasyllus (he wrote during the reigu of Tiberius),
who became famous through his tetralogical grouping of. Plato's works; Plutarch
of Chaeronea; Theon of Smyrna; Gains, who wrote an Outline of Plato's teachings;
Albinus, who wrote a Prologue to Plato's dialogues and the Didascalicus (also called
Isagoge or Epitome).
017 Cf. E. Alberti, "Uber des Albinos Isagoge," in Rhein. Mus., 18 (1858), 76-100.
211

212

PHILOSOPHY

IN THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN

WORLD

233

longing after wisdom. And this wisdom itself is nothing other
than the science of things both divine and human. 218 At the
same time, by falling back on a famous Platonic definition, he
rijs lfrvx_ijs a1ro O"WfLU'I"OSalso called it the )\:uuts Kat
the soul's delivery from and rising above the body. 219 Theon
of Smyrna (who wrote during the reign of Hadrian) ,220
cidedly under the influence of Plato's Republic, 221 spoke of the
purifying effects of philosophy on the human soul. 222 He also
recommended the study of philosophy because it is philosophy
which makes us like God as far as this is possible 223 -a statement which he probably found in Plato's Theaetetus and Republic.224 Eudorus of Alexandria (last half of the first century
B. C.) ,225 in his 1rep'i -re.ll.ovs-,226 likewise defined the function and
end of philosophy as the OfWLWO"tS' fN.qJ Ka'TU TO ovvarov, 227 as did
Gaius (first half of the second century A. D.) 228 and Albinus. 229
218

Didascalicus, edit. Hermann,

p.

IJ.lwv Kill av0pw7rlvwv 7rpa-

'Y!Mi-rwv.
219

22

Didasc., p.

Cf. Plato, Phaedo, 64A; 80E.

° Cf. P. Tannery, "Sur Theon de Smyrne," in Rev. de philolog., 18 (1894),

G. Borghorst, De Anatolii Fontibus (Berlin, 1905).
Republ.,
D; Porphyry, Vit. Pythag., 46; Lucian, Vit. auct., 3; Stobaens,
Eclog.,
40. l1 ff. About the KidJap<ns doctrine, cf. H. Diels, Frag. d. Vorsokrat.,
221

45 D 1.
222 Plato
had already mentioned the cathartic nature of philosophy and particularly of the mathematical sciences (Republ.,
D). Theon of Smyrna, probably under the influence of Pythagorean teachings, distinguished five steps in the
" as«;endency" of philosophy:
(a) the laiiJap<Jts through mathematics, geometry,
astr(momy, and music; (b) the mastery of such primarily philosophical topics as
logic, politics, and physics; (c) the preoccupation with intelligible natures such as
the
(d) the ability of introducing others to pure philosophy; and (e) the
final end Of all philosophy and philosophical ascendency, the op,olw<Jts 0€'1' Ka-ra -ro
llvva!rov. Cf. Theon of Smyrna, Expositio (edit. Hiller), 14. 8; 14. 18 fl'.; 16. Hl. See
also note
supra.
223 In E. Hiller, Theonis Smyr. philos. Plat. expositio ... , 14. 8; 14. 18 ff.; Hi. 16:
Op.olwcns 8€'!! Kar&. -rO Ovva.r6v.
••• Theaet., l76B; Republ., 613AB.
225 Cf. E. Martini, " Eudoros," in Pauly- Wissowa.
••• In Stobaeus, Eclog., !'!:.
8 ff.
227 Ibid.,
49. 8.- Eudorus, however, ascribes this definition to Pythagoras liS
well as to Plato.
28 In Albinus, Didasc.,
(p. 181).
229 Didasc., 28 (p. 181):
Prologue, 6 (p. I51). It should be noted. here fhat

234

ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

Thus Eudorus of Alexandria, Gaius, and Albinus in more than
one sense might be called the immediate predecessors of Plotinus, who also based all philosophy and virtue upon the 1rpo<; rov
fJEOV o;.toiWCTL<;,230
Like Cicero 231 and the majority of the Late Stoics, Plutarch
(c. 45-c. 125) conceived the main task of philosophy to consist in its moral effects upon man. Only beginners, as a rule,
tum towards logic and physics, while those who really understand the meaning of philosophy consider it something which
develops the moral character of man. 232 Philosophy is, first
of all, an art, namely the art of healing the morally sick soul. 238
Hence the true philosopher, according to Plutarch, assumes a
rather sceptical attitude towards those philosophical systems
which attempt to explain everything in terms of concepts or
definitions. 234
Decidedly under the influence of Plato (particularly the
famous passages from the Theaetetus, 235 Phaedo/ 36 and theRepublic) ,237 were Eudo:rus of Alexandria, 238 Gaius, 239 Albin us, 240
Albinus' ethics is primarily the bn<friJv"J Kal oewpla roii 1rpwrov &-yaiJov. (Didasc.,
p. 179.) The ultimate purpose of ethics, however, is the O!J-olwrns IJi<:J Kara To
ilvvarov (ibid.,
p. 181). This all-pervading end or significance of ethics has
both a theoretical and a practical aspect (Prologue, 6, p. Hil) . Hence the op.olwrns
IJ€1# constitutes the basic meaning of the whole of Albinus' philosophical system.
Juncos (or Juncus) also defined the end of philosophy and its true significance as
the op.olw<fts O<i<;J. Cf. Stobaeus, Florileg., 117.95. The authority or source used by
Diogenes Laertius likewise declared the
rt;J IJ€C;J the ultimate end and
meaning of philosophy, and of ethics in particular.
Cf. Diog. Laert., 3. 78 ff.
280 Ennead, 1. 2. 1; l. 2. 3:
e.,;;, OflOtwOfivru.
281 De fin., 5. 29:
"Omnis auctoritas philosophiae consistit in beata vita comparanda."
282 Plutarch,
De profectibus in virtute, 7. Cf. Adv. Coloten, 3. 6.
••• Plutarch, De cohibenda ira, 2.
••• Plutarch, De defectu oraculorum, 37; De sera numinia vindicta, 4; De Pythio.e
oraculis, 30.
••• Theaet., 176B.
••• Phaedo, 62B; 66B; 67A.
237 Republ., 613AB. Cf. Aristotle,
Nic. Eth., 10. 7.
••• In Stobaeus, Ecloy., 2. 48. 8 ff.
••• Anonym. in Theaet., col. 7. 14; Albinus, Prologue, 6 (p. 1/H); Apuleius, De

Platone et eius dogmate,
240 Prologue, 5 (p. 151).

PHILOSOPHY IN THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN

WORLD

285

Theon of Smyrna/ 41 Plotinus, 242 Philo of Alexandria, 243 Julian
the Apostate, 244 and Themistius, 245 with their definition of philosophy as " that which makes-or should make-us become
like God as far as this is possible-the Of.wiwut<; ()f.(f) KOirii To
SvvaTov. Likewise influenced by Plato's Phaedo 246 are those
definitions which called philosophy the meditation on deathP,f.AET'I'"f Oavarov or P,f.AETTJ rov U'l'ro(}vr}uKf.W; 247 the release of the
soul from its incarceration in the
Ka&
rfjc;
248
1/Jvxijc; a1ro uwp,aroc;;
or the yearning for wisdom-l£pegtc;
uo<f>iac;.249 According to these authors, philosophy is primarily
concerned with the salvation of the soul, the rij-. 'ifivxi}-. uru'T'Y"fp[a.250 Galen, again, praised philosophy, which he identified
with theology or religion, by calling it the most exalted gift
of the gods/ 51 as was also done by Ammonius, among others. 252
The Stoic influence, on the other hand, is still felt in Aristobulus 253 and Albinus, 254 who described philosophy as the yvwut<;
knowledge and under(}e[wv Kat &vfJpw'l'rtvwv 1rpayp,&rwv-the
standing of things both divine and human.

*

The progressive transition of Hellenistic-Roman philosophy
zu Liber de astronomia, 14. 8. 18 ff.
••• Ennead, l. S. l; 5. 8. H.
••• De caritate (or, De humanitate), 23.168, in vol. 5, p. 319, edit. Cohn- Wendland; Legum allegoriarum libri tres, 3. 9. Philo also points out (in De opijicio
mundi, 1.144, in vol. 1, p. 50, edit. Cohn-Wendland) that the ultimate and
highest task of man is to become like God as far as this is possible: p.oll<J.I$ if!vxiJ!is
!J€jUfJJ 7rpou€pxeu8aL r£Aos .;(yovp.€vats T1jv 1rpbs T0v 'YEPPf}D'avTa. 8e0v €l;op.olwUf.P.
244 Orat., 6 (p. S88, 8, edit. Hertlein).
••• Orat., 2 (p. 39, 6, edit. Dindorf); orat., 24 (p. 417, 16, edit. Dindorl).
••• Phaedo, 80E; 67C; 81A; 64A..
••• Plutarch, De sera numinis vindicta, 18 ff.
••• Albinus, Didasc., 1. Cf. Apollonius of Tyana, in Philostratus, Vita Apoll.
Tyan., 8. 25. 4.
"'" Albinus, Didasc., l.
250 Porphyry,
in Eusebius, Praep. Evang., 4. 8. 1; 14. 10. 5.
251 Protrepticus, l.
252 In Ammonius, Comment. in Porphyrii quinque voces, 2. 12 :Ill., in Comment.
in A riot. Graec., 4. 3.
258 In Eusebius, Praep. Evang., 13. 12. 12.
••• Didasc., 1.

ANTON -HERMANN CHROUST

from an ethico-practical standpoint to a religious-metaphysical
point of view brought about a gradual identification of religion
(theology) and philosophy. 255 The original hope of winning
from certain generalized results of human reasoning and human
knowledge a conviction for the practical guidance of life finally
culminated in the effort to create a new and profounder religious insight which would replace the old religious beliefs that
had gradually been lost in the course of the centuries. Thus
the Neo-Platonist Proclus actually proposed to have philosophy styled theology/ 56 a proposal which is, however, not without precedent, having already been made by Aristotle. 257 In
this fashion philosophy, particularly with the Neo-Platonists
and Neo-Pythagoreans, became what we would call a sort of
theosophy or " philosophy of religion," and in some instances
was actually considered nothing else than a form of intellectual
ecstasis. 258 This view which saw philosophy as a form of theology, found some historical support not only in the works of
Plato, 259 Plutarch, 260 and in that of certain Aristotelian 261 and
Early Stoic authors, 262 but also in the writings of Philo
Alexandria}63 It is, ultimately, a religious or :religio-metaphysical
255

about

Proclus, for instance, speaks no longer about the "philosophy " of Plato, but
1] llMrwvos eeo"Ao-yia. Cf. Proclus, lnstitutio Theologica (:E.ro<xelwcm

(}eohO'YIKTj).

Cf. note 'M5, supra.
Cf., among others, Metaphys., 10!'l6 a 18.
258 Cf.,
for instance, Plotinus, Ennead, 6. 7. 35; 5. 9. 10; Proclus, Theologica
Platonica, 6. 10 (p. 193 ff.); 1. 24 (p. 60 ff.); 2. ll (p. 109); Numenius, frag. IO. 51.
259 Cf. Plato, Sympos., 218A: "The pang of philosophy is a madness and
in man's longing for wisdom and knowledge." Phaedo, 83A: "Philosophy . . .
received and gently comforted (the soul) .... " Republ., 490A: " ... the true
lover of knowledge ... by drawing near, mingling with, and becoming incorporate
with the very being, ... will have knowledge and will live and grow truly. And
then, and then only, will he cease from his travail." Phaedrus, 249B: " ... the
philosopher ... is inspired .... " Republ., 500C: " ... holding conversation with
the divine order he himself . . . become divine. . . ." Phaedo, 69C: ". . . the
mystics ... [are] the true philosophers." Cicero, De orat., 2. 46. 194.
260 De !side et Osiride, 77.
261 We have but to remember the Aristotelian
doctrine of the ()ewpla.
••• Cf., for instance, the Stoic doctrine of the KarcJ:I\'YJif!ts eetwv Kat
256
257

wpa:yp.&.rwv.

••• Quis rerum divinarum heres sit, 14.68 fl'. (p. 16 ff., vol. 8. edit. Cohn-Wendff. (p. 52 ,voL 2, edit. Cohn- Wendland).

laud); De gigantibus, H.

PHILOSOPHY IN THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN

WORLD

287

development as well as an exegesis of certain aspects of Platonism and of some apocryphal works which paraded under the
name of Plato and Pythagoras.
Already with such men as Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus
Aurelius, no less than with such popular moralists as Demonax,
Dio Chrysostom, and Demetrius of Phaleron, or with the more
serious Apollonius of Tyana, Moderatus of Gades, and Nicomachus of Gerasa, philosophy had turned into a religious doctrine and message of salvation and redemption based upon
religious asceticism and renunciation of the world. 264
According to Epictetus, all philosophy begins with a sensation of moral guilt, accompanied by a deep yearning for deliverance and salvation. 265 It teaches man to look upon all
things earthly as nothing more than smoke and, consequently,
nothing at alL266 Thus philosophy can no longer consist in an
independent roaming of the self-satisfied mind, 267 but must be
thought of in terms of a means of satisfying a deeply felt moral
and emotional want. Philosophy is meant, more than anything else, to give comfort and spiritual strength to aU those
who seek lasting peace and solace. 268 Marcus Aurelius exhorted
his contemporaries:
Wander no longer at hazard, for neither wilt thou read thy own
"memoirs"
nor the acts of the ancient Romans and
Greeks, and the selections from books which thou wast reserving
for thy old age. Hasten then to the end which thou hast before
thee, and, throwing away idle hopes come to thy own aid, il thou.
carest at all for thyself, while it is in thy power. 269
Cf. A.-H. Chroust, Zoe. cit., 54.
Discourses, 11. 1: "The beginning of philosophy, at least to those who enter
upon it in a proper way, . . . is a consciousness of our own weakness and
deficiency. . . ."
266 Marcus Aurelius, Thoughts, 10. 31.
267 This was the case with Aristotle.
Cf. Metaphys.,
a 5 fl'.
268 This is also true as regards Boethius, according to whom philosophy is the
consolation of the afflicted. Cf. the whole tenor of his De consolatione philosophia.
209 Thoughts,
3.14. Cf. ibid., 5. 11.- The Cynics had already told their
listeners not to waste their time with reading or writing, because these are useless
occupations which only distract man from his true purpose, namely the practice
of good life. Cf. Diog. Laert., 6. 103; 6.
Similar ideas were also expressed
by Seneca.
264

265

238

ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

ObViously, then, philosophy is primarily a doctrine and message of salvation. As a matter of fact, many of the definitions
of philosophy devised by Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius are
definitely religious or religio-mystical in character. In the
words of Epictetus, philosophy signifies something mysterious
and holy, an undertaking of utmost urgency which cannot be
entered upon without divine assistance. 270 The true philosopher is like a priest and minister of the gods,271 a messenger
dispatched by Zeus in order to teach mankind; 272 for the deity
speaks above all through the mouth of the philosopher. 278
Plutarch assumed outright that, if philosophy shall at all promote moral life, it can do so only on the basis of piety and
faithin God. 274 Hence philosophy reaches its absolute climax
as well as attains its final justification in theology. 275 Any
philosophy that loses sight of this supreme purpose deprives
man of the greatest source of inner happiness and spiritual contentment.276
The so-called Neo-Pythagoreans 277 likewise looked upon philosophy as being a means to attain the saintly and God-pleasing life rather than as an instrument to acquire knowledge and
the understanding of nature. Philosophy is " the way to God
and the communion with God " which can only be achieved
••• Discours., 8. 22. 6; 8. 22. 1. Cf. ibid., 8. 21. 1.
071 Marcus Aurelius, Thoughts, 8. 4.
••• Epictetus, Discours., 8. 22. 8; 4. 8. 6. Cf., in this connection, Plato, Protag.,
822 C: "Zeus ... sent Hermes to them, bearing a sense of moral restraint (czlBclls)
and a feeling for what is right and just (lJliC'tJ) ."
••• Epictetus, Discours., 8.1. 7.
••• De lside et Osfride, 8.
•
••• Plutarch, De defectu oroculorum, 8: tf>iXotrotf>la 8eoJI.O'ylczP ••. TAos
... Plutarch, Ne suaviter vivi posse ... , 20 ff.; 21. 5; 22. 4; 28. 1.- It should
be noted here that Plutarch considered religion or theology, and not politics,
the ultimate end of all ethics. In this he differs fundamentally from the " classical "
view of Greek ethical thought.
•n The more important Neo-Pythagoreans were: Nigidius Figulus, the friend
of Cicero; Ocellus; Apollonius of Tyana, who lived during the first century after
Christ; Moderatus of Gades, a contemporary of Apollonius; Nicomachus of Gerasa,
who lived around 140 A. D.; Numenius of Apamea, who lived during the second
half, of the second century after Christ; and Philostratus, who lived during the
first part of the third century.

PHILOSOPHY

IN THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN

WORLD

289

by the purity of life and by turning away from all earthly
things" 278 The foremost task of philosophy, according to Apollonius of Tyana, consists in disseminating the true knowledge
of God and in teaching sincere piety" 279 Following the example
of Plato's Phaedo, Apollonius also held that philosophy is
capable of liberating man f:rom a state of bodily incarceration,
into which we have been thrown because of our attachment
to the sensual world. 280 Numenius, again, in his effort completely to identify philosophy and theology (or religion), went
so far as to prove that his philosophy fully coincided with the
teachings and sayings of the prophets of the Old Testament. 281
The so-called Neo-Platonism, 282 in the final analysis, is overwhelmingly an attempt to bridge the infinite gap that separates man from God" This whole philosophical movement was
prompted not only by a deep yearning for divine revelation,
but also by the desire for an ultimate and abiding personal
union of man with God; union or communion, that is to say,
which constitutes the sole uwrYJp[a. Hence, immediate intuition, voluntarism, and religious ecstasy or mysticism, in
short, a pronounced "meta-rational"
fouJ!.dation, became
the basis of aU philosophical quests for truth and moral bliss.
It is, in other words, a " higher " metaphysics of religious
ecstasy which forms the first principle as well as the ultimate
end of all rational philosophy. Only by renouncing all physical
existence, that is to say, by completely reverting to inner
spiritual or mystic contemplation, can man's communion with
God be ac.hieved.283 And this introvert contemplation of the
In Stobaeus, Florileg., 44. 20.
In Philostratus, Vita A poll. Tyan., 4. 40 ff.
••• In Philostratus, op. cit., 8. 26. 4; 8. 7. 25 ff.
281 In
Porphyry, De antro nymph., 10. Cf. Eusebius, Praep. Evang., 9. 8;
Macro bins, De somnio Scipionis, I. 219.- Numenius also insisted that Plato was
a Moses who spoke the Attic language. Cf. Clement of Alex., Stromata, 1. 432.
••• The most famous Neo-Platonists were: Ammonius Saccas (c. 175-c. 242);
Origen the Neo-Platonist, the teacher of Longinus; Longinus (c. 213-c. 278);
Plotinus (c. 203/204-c. 269/270); Porphyry (c. 282/233-c. 810); Ameli us, who
lived during the second half of the third century; Jamblichus, who died during
the reign of Emperor Constantine, and Proclus, who died in 485.
••• Plotinus, Ennead, 4. 8. l.
278
279

240

ANTON- HERMANN CHROUST

spiritual essence is the beginning of all philosophy worthy of
the name. 284 Because of the spiritual origin and essence of all
true being, man is always striving to free himself of all physical
entanglements. 285 It is, therefore, the prime task of true philosophy to direct this effort, and to act as the proper intermediary between the natural and the supernatural world: to
guide man through the pitfalls of sensate experience and existence to the heaven of spiritual truth. 286 For the ultimate
object of philosophy consists in showing us the way to the
spiritual visualization of the Ineffable One in Whom aU conceptual definitions, all rational, voluntarist, and emotional
truths, dissolve into a single, everlasting ecstasy of sublime
vision. 287 Such notions finally led to the :realization that all
philosophy or conceptual speculation is but an infinitely inadequate attempt to deal with the highest truth, that is, the sole
truth worthy of our undivided attention-the Ineffable One.
Thus philosophy turned into what might be called a mere
metaphoric allegory of what is actually and forever beyond all
scientific or systematic comprehension. 288
The final purpose of philosophy, according to Porphyry, is to
influence our lives by curing our spiritual ills no less than by
purifying our thoughts and actions. But if philosophy should
it can do so
show us the road to
only if we ourselves are forever striving after true being.
Rational knowledge and understanding constitute the only
means of cleansing our mind. But :rational knowledge and
understanding by themselves are never of the essence of the
perfect spiritual life. 289 For of what use could philosophy be,
284 Proclus,
In Plat. Alcib. comment., in Procli opera, edit. V. Cousin (Paris,
1820-1825)' 2. 13.
285 Plotinus,
Ennead, 1.11. 7; 4. 7.12; 4. 8. 5; 4.10; 1. 2. 3.
••• Plotinus, Ennead, 1. 4.
287 Plotinus,
Ennead, 6. 7. 35; 6. 9. 4; 6. 9. 10; 5. 3. 14; 5. 8. 11; 5. 3. 1; 5. 4. 9 ff.
288 Cf. Damascius,
Dubitationes et solutiones de primis principiis, 38 (1. 79, lines
20 It, edit. Ruelle); 4 (1. 83, 26 fl'.); 42 (1. 85, 8 ff.); 107 (1. 278, 24 ff.). Cf.
Jamblichus, De mysteriis aegyptiorum (edit. Parthey), 1. 3-The attitude of
Damascius towards philosophy reminds us of the closing lines of Goethe's Faust,
part 2: " Alles Vergangliche ist nmr ein Gleichnis. . . ."
••• Porphyry, De abstinentia, l. 29.

PHILOSOPHY IN THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN

WORLD

241

if it cannot cure the ills of the soul? What else is the philosopher than a physician of the morally sick soul? 290 The one
and only object of philosophy is the salvation of man's soul,
the rijo;; lfivxiJ<> uwr7Jp£a.291 The true meaning of philosophy
is therefore a predominantly practical one, namely, to bring
about a reform of religion and theology by combatting the
various forms of superstition, and by restoring real piety. 292
With Jamblichus, the theological or theurgical significance
of philosophy became even more pronounced. Owing to the
complete- inability of human reason to gain by its own efforts
any true understanding, philosophy proves itself incapable of
attaining any valid knowledge without the aid of theology (or
religion) and the assistance of the gods. 293 Faith in the gods
and their benign efficacy forms the starting point of all true
philosophy. And the ultimate aim of all philosophy is to unify
the various :religions or religious cults into one single unshakable faith. 294 Philosophizing, then, means praying; for prayer
is the most effective way of securing the divine assistance
necessary to philosophical wisdom and spiritual happiness. 295
This complete identification of philosophy and religion soon
also lead to an identification of science and mythology, 296
speculation and magic. 297 It is not altogether surprising, then,
Porphyry, De abstin., l. 31.
Porphyry, in Eusebius, Praep. Evang., 4. 8. 1; 14.10. 5.
292 Cf. Porphyry,
De ·abstin., 9!. 61; Ad Marcellam, ll; 31; Hi ff.; 19; Epist. ad

290

291

Anebonem.
203 Jamblichus,
in Stobaeus, Eclog., L 1058 ff.
204 Jamblichus,
Adhortatio ad philosophiam, 4 (p. 326, edit. Kiessling).
295 Cf. Proclus, In Timaeum comment., 64D.- Similar ideas are to be found in
the writings of Julian the Apostate, who turned to philosophy because it appealed
to him as a means of communicating with the gods rather than as a method
of dealing with scientific problems.
296 Cf., for instance, Plotinus, Ennead, 5. 8. 6; 6. 9.11; 3. 6. 19; 4. 4. 27; Porphyry,
De abstin., 2. 38 ff.; 3. 16; 4. 9; Eusebius, Praep. Evang., 4. 9!0; 4. 23; l. 46; Stobaeus,
Eclog., l. 109!6 ff.; 3. 7; Proclus, In Timaeum comment., 9!4D; 53A; 48D; 292C;
306C; 44F; 47A; 9D; Jamblichus, in Stobaeus, Eclog., l. 888; l. 926; 1. 1058;
l. 1060; 1.1064; 1. 1068; Jamblichus, Vita Pythag., 219; Julian the Apostate, Orat.,
4. 132 ff.; 4. 138; 4.139; 4. 141; 4. 143; 4.135; 4. 149; Orat., 7. 219 ff.; Sallust,
De diis, 4; 6.
297 Cf., for instance,
Plotinus, Ennead, 4. 4. 38 4. 4. 40; 2. 9. 14; Porphyry, De

ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

that some of the Neo-Platonists began to call Linus and
Orpheus the first true philosophers, while others accepted the
so-called Chaldaean oracles as the fountainhead of the highest
philosophical wisdom. 298 Perhaps the most valuable Neo-Platonic definition of philosophy, one which does full justice to
the all-encompassing meaning of the term as it has been used
by the Neo-Platonists, was coined by Ammonius: 299 lcrreov o.Ov

on ai JJ-EV aAAat bna-rijp,aL Kat rexvat 1T€pi rwa p.ep£Ka Kam-

.1
ywovrat,
,

'

Fe"
'
'\
/
'\
:t
I'
owv
rEKTOVLKYJ
1T€pt
fLOVa
Ta' !:./::VAa,
YJe aa-rpovop.ta
I'

jJ-OVa 'l"U ovpavta,

I'

t''

t'

JLOVYJ OE YJ

,J, \.

,1..'

'

,

1TEpt'

'

1TEp! 1TUV1'U 'l"U OV'l"U KaTa-

ytverat.

To Hierocles of Alexandria, 300 who taught Platonic philosophy at Athens around 420 A. D., philosophy meant the purification and perfection of human life. For virtue, the foremost
subject of practical philosophy, purifies man, while truth, the
foremost subject of theoretical philosophy, perfects life.301 Thus
it is the first task of the philosopher to distinguish between
theoretical and practical reason; between theoretical truth and
practical virtue. The latter purifies man by helping him to conquer the a!..oyta, the irrational or emotional appetites of the
senses, while the former perfects him by divulging to him
absolute truths. Thus practical philosophy makes man a good
man, and theoretical philosophy turns him into a god. 302 The
most important, the final task of all philosophy, both theoretiabstin., 2. 41; 2. 53; 2. 51; 2. 48; Eusebius, Praep. Evang., 4. 7; 4. 8. 1; 6. l ff.; 6. 4. 2;
St. Augustine, De civ. Dei, 10. 9; 10. 21; Jamblichus, Vita Pythag., 90 ff.- Cf.
the anonymous tract De mysteriis, erroneously ascribed to Jamblichus.
••• Cf. Proclus, In Timaeum comment., 64 B ff.; Porphyry, De abstin., 4. 17.
Suidas mentions four books _of Porphyry dealing with the "philosophy " of Julian
the Chaldaean. About the so-called Chaldaean oracles, see, W. Kroll, De oraculis
Ohaldaicis (Breslau philolog. Abhandlungen 7. l, Breslau, 1894); W. Kroll, art.
:Xa;Ma;;K<l AO')'ta, in Pauly- Wissowa. It should be noted here that the early Christian authors likewise referred to their religious life as philosophy.
299 In Ammonius, Comment in Porphyrii quinque voces, 2. 12 ff. The term p.eptKu
signifies here specialization and scientific detail.
80 ° Cf. A. Elter, "Zu Hierocles, dem Neuplatoniker,"
in Rhein. Mus., 65 (1910),
pp. 175 H.-Compare also Praechter's article on Hierocles in Pauly-Wissowa.
801 Comment. in aureum carmen Pythag., introd.
••• Ibid., introd. Cf. idem., 20; 26.

PHILOSOPHY IN THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN

243

WORLD

cal and practical, is to endow us with the right insight into
the workings of divine providence and into the true nature of
the human soul. 303

*

*

An interpretation of the meaning of philosophy which we
find frequently mentioned in the " textbooks " of the philosophical schools at Alexandria, calls it " the art of all arts, and
the science of all sciences "-the rex.vrJ rex.vwv
E'ITtur'i]p,'YJ
.EmuTTJJ-tWP. This definition, which enjoyed great popularity
with the Neo-Platonists, reappears in a somewhat altered
formulation also in David's Prolegomena to Porphyry's lsagoge.304 David styled philosophy the p,'i]rrJp rwv rex.vwv
'
E'ITtUT"fJJ-tWV . . . :.e:: aVT'Yj'> yap ra<; apx_as Kat at TE)(Vat Kat att' E'ITt:J)

.....

:J)

1"1

'

'

,

'

'

,

'

This interpretation of philosophy also
shows clearly that by this time philosophy is no longer identified with religion, ethics, or theology. It is primarily concerned
with the overall scientific significance of the term and the
pre-eminent position it holds among all other intellectual
endeavors, rather than with some particular or detailed meaning.305 The same distinct trend away from specialization can
also be noted in Philo of Alexandria when he stated that ovBE
uriJftat

Aaftf3avovuw.

TOVTO n<; ayvoEt
U7repp,ara

on

'Tat<; Kara

f.g ciJv ava{3AaU'TEtV

ftEpO<; 'TU<; apx_a<; Kat ra
ra

8ewp'l]para,

c/:Jthouoc/JI.a

BeSwpr;rcu. 306

The definition which sees in philosophy the rex.vr; rex.vfln; Kal
has a rather interesting history. Ammonius
informs us that " there is also another definition of philosophy
devised by Aristotle, a definition, that is to say, which stems
from the pre-eminence which philosophy holds as :regards the
••• ibid., introd.
••• Cf. Davidis proleg. et in Porphyr. lsag. comment., 2. 12 ff. (in Comment. in
Arist. Graec., 18. 2); Cicero, De fin., 2. 21. Tuscvl., l. 26. 64. Compare notes 85,
176, and 141, supra.
805 Cf. the definition in Ammonius, Comment in Porphyrii quinque voces, 2. U Ill.
See also notes 299 and 304, supra.
306 De congressu eruditionis gratia, 21.146
(in vol. 3, p. 102, 15, edit. Cohn- Wendland) . Obviously the term 1dpos refers to the special sciences and scientific detail.
Cf. David, Proleg., 40. 13 ff.; Comment. in Porphyrii guinque voces, 2. 12 ff.

8

244

ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

other arts and sciences." 807 Elias, the famous commentator on
Aristotle 808 and the disciple of Ammonius and Olympiodorus,
insisted that "the fifth definition of philosophy according to
Aristotle ... [was] that of rexv'T/ rexv{;w Kat emCTT-qft'TI bnCTT'Tjftc;JV.
For in the Metaphysics (the JLETa Ta cpvCT£Ka 'ITpayJLare£a), also
called Theology,S 09 he [scil., Aristotle] defines it as such on
account of its pre-eminence." 310 Thus it might be assumed
that this definition was actually contained in some known edition of Aristotle's Metaphysics, 311 a fact which might be
gathered -also from a remark by Elias himself to the effect
that "some are in doubt that philosophy, being the art of
all arts, can itself be an art. And we say that as the art of
all arts, philosophy must be above and beyond art, or rather
that philosophy, which instructs all other arts, should be called
the art of all arts." 312 And a few pages prior to this statement, Elias, referring to the definition of philosophy as the
rexv'TI rexvwv, makes the following significant remark: 8£o Ka£
a'ITopovCTW on, 8ul.

TOLOVrq> E'ITava8£7TAaCT£UCTJLfP KEXP'TjTU£.818
Assuming, then, th:at the definition of philosophy as the TEXV'T/
Texvwv Kat E7T£CTT-qft'TI E7T£CTT'TjJLWV actually was to be found in the
T£

original writings of Aristotle, we might surmise that it stood in
Metaphysics, book 1, chap. 2, possibly right after 982 b 7,814 on
account of the preceding apx£KamiT'T/ (" sovereign " or " authoritative"). This chapter has frequently been used by the Aristotelian scholiasts or commentators to explain and confirm the
pre-eminence (v7Tepox.q) of philosophy.
807 1n Porphyry, lsagoge, 6. 25. Cr. Ammonius, Comment. in Porphyrii quinque
voces, 2.12 ff. (in Comment. in Arist. Graec., 4. 8).
808 ln Comment. in Arist. Graec., 18.1.
••• Cf., in general, Asclepius, Comment. in Arist. Metaphys., 74. 5; ibid. at 8.11;
8. 18 (in Comment. in Arist. Graec., 6. 2) .
810 Elias, Comment. in Porphyrii lsagogen, 20 (in Comment. in Arist. Graec.,
18. 1). Cr. Asclepius, loc. cit.
811 Cf. A.-H. Chroust, loc. cit., 56.
810 Comment. in Porphyrii lsagogen, 28. 10.
818 Ibid., 20. 22.
au The whole passage in Aristotle, Metaphys., 982 b 4, reads as follows: "And
the science which knows to what end each thing must be done, is the most

PHILOSOPHY

IN THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN

WORLD

245

While Elias based the definition of philosophy as the TEXV'fl
rexvwv Kat
bna-rTJpwv definitely on the authority of
Aristotle, Ammonius 315 and some of his disciples, 316 among
them Asclepius 317 and Eustratius, 318 treated this definition as
something commonly known and universally accepted. Thus
Isidore of Pelusium, who may have made use of the Commentary of Elias or some other disciple of Ammonius, simply
stated that " other philosophers are of the opinion that philosophy is the art of all arts, and the science of all sciences .
. . !' 319 'We have already pointed out 320 that, in compliance
with the supposedly orthodox Aristotelian tradition revived at
Alexandria, the Neo-Platonist David called philosophy ,. the
mother of all the arts and sciences through which we might
gain true understanding not only of the first principles, but
also of all the special or detailed arts and sciences." 321 This
statement, which declares that philosophy is the matrix of all
the arts and sciences, actually goes back to Posidonius 322 rather
than Aristotle, although when formulating this definition Posidonius might have been under the influence of Aristotle. On
the other hand, the statement of Philo of Alexandria, that it
is impossible to discover within the various special sciences
such a first principle, and that only philosophy could tell us
anything about the latter, 323 is definitely Aristotelian, as is the
remark, made by Ammonius, that "philosophy, as the science
authoritative or sovereign of the sciences, and more authoritative or sovereign
than any ancillary science."
815 Comment. in Analyt. prior., 1. 10. 8 (in Comment. in Arist. Graec. 4. 6).
316 Simplicius,
Comment. in Arist. phys., l. 47. 30 ( in Comment. in Arist.
Graec., 9).
817 Asclepius,
Comment. in Arist. Metaphys., 74.5 (in Comment. in Arist.
Graec., 6. 2) .
818 Eustratius,
Comment. in Arist. ethic., 322.12 (in Comment. in Arist.
Graec., 20).
319 In Patrol. Graec., 78. col. 1637.
82 ° Cf. note 304, supra.
321 Davadis
proleg. et in Porphyr. lsag. comment., 9!, Hl ff. (in Comment. in
A rist. Graec., 18. 2) .
822 Seneca, Epist., 88. 24; 88. 21; 90. 7; 90. 23. Cf. also Cicero, De orat., 9!. 46. 194.
323 De congressu erud. gratia, 26. 146 (in vol. 3, p. 102, 15, edit. Cohn- Wendland).

246

ANTON -HERMANN CHROUST

of all sciences, alone is about everything that is or exists." 324
Thus Ammonius in fact only restated that, in accordance with
Aristotle's definition of the 7rpC:YT7J cptA.ouocpta,825 philosophy constitutes the yvwuts Twv ovTwv ovm. 326

v
*

*

*

The many " introductions "-prolegomena or isagogai--to
philosophy compiled during the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries at Alexandria and elsewhere a.nd used by the " universities " to acquaint the novice with the basic problems of philosophy, on the whole contain six major definitions of the
meaning of philosophy. All these definitions were looked upon
as being authoritative, despite the fact that in many respects
they must be considered as being partially contradictory and,
hence, mutually exclusive. 327 According to these "textbooks,"
philosophy is first of all the ')IVWUtS' TWV OVTWV ovm-the " science" of being qua being. This definition, which was ascribed
curiously enough to Pythagoras, 828 is in effect nothing other
than a restatement of Aristotle and as such is primarily concerned with and derived from the object of philosophy-a?To Toil
1J7T'oKEtJJ-Evov. The second definition is that of the OJJ-otwuts OiqJ
KaTa To SvvaTov-the becoming like God as far as this is possible. This definition, which is frequently used, is concerned
with the end of philosophy (eK Toil TEA.ovs), and actually goes
back to Plato's Theaetetus,S 29 Phaedo, 880 and Republic. 881 The

v

••• In Ammonius, Comment. in Porphyrii quinque voces, 12 ff.
325 Cf. Metaphysics,
a
a 80; 106I b I9. A.-H. Chroust, op. cit., 89.
ff.
· ••• In Ammonius, Comment. in Porphyrii quinque voces,
••• Cf. for instance, Ammonius, Comment. in Porphyrii quinque voces, I ff. (in
Comment. in Arist Graec., 4. 8); David, Proleg. et in Porphyr. I sag. comment.,
(in Comment. in Arist. Graec., 18.
Elias, Comment. in Porphyr. Isag.,
7,
ff. (in Comment. in Arist. Graec., I8. I); Asclepius, Comment. in Arist.
Metaphys., I.I8 (in Comment. in Arist. Graec., 6.
Eustratius, Comment. in
i2 (in Comment.
Arist. Graec.,
Cf. Julian the Apostate,
Arist. ethic.,
Orat., 6 (p.
edit. Hertlein) .
••• Cicero, Tuscul., 5. 8. 9, attributes to Pythagoras the statement that philosophy
consists in scanning closely the essential nature" of things.
••• Theaetetus, I76 B. Eudorus of Alexandria claims, however, that this definition
actually goes back to Pythagoras and Socrates. Cf. Stobaeus, Eclog.,
49. 8 ff.
It might be interesting to note here that the definition of philosophy as the

'n

PHILOSOPHY

IN THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN

WORLD

third definition, which also deals with the end of philosophy,
informs us that the latter signifies the YVO)(H<; (J.:iwv Ka'i av0pw1TLVWV 1rpay,uarwv-the
knowledge and understanding (or science) of things both divine and human. Although this definition is obviously Stoic in origin, 332 for some rather curious
reason it was credited to Pythagoras, 333 probably on account of
the nearly mystic reverence this ancient sage enjoyed during
the first centuries after Christ. 334 The fourth definition, which
calls philosophy a p,eAer-r; roil Oavarov-a meditation or discourse
about death-is definitely Platonic 335 and is concerned with
the end of philosophy. The fifth definition which tells us that
philosophy is the cfnA.£a rfjc; uo<Pi:ac;-the love and pursuit of
wisdom-is likewise Platonic or perhaps Socratic. 336 This last
definition, which attempts to explain the meaning of philosophy
by resorting to the etymology of the term, has also been
ascribed to Pythagoras, probably owing to the influence of
Jamblichus, 337 Hermias, 338 and Cicero. 339 The sixth definition
op.olwrns 8€<;?, which seems to go back to Plato (Theaetetus 176 B), can already
be detected in the writings of Antisthenes.
Cf. Diog. Laert. 6.105: "The wise
man is ... a friend of his like (rpiA.ov rfi> op.ol<;?) ." Ibid. 6. 72: "The gods are
friends of the wise." Ibid. 6. 37: "The wise are friends of the gods .... " Ibid.
6. 51: "Good men [are] images of the gods (OewP e!K{wa.s)."
830 Phaedo, 62B; 66B; 67A.
831 Republ., 613AB; 500C.
832 Cf. H. Diels, Doxogr. Graec., 273; 602; H. V. Arnim, Stoic. vet. frag., II.
nos. 35; 36.
••• Elias does this in his Comment. in Porphyrii Isagogen, 11.
••• Cf. Jamblichus, Vita Pythag., 58 ff.
••• Phaedo, 67C; 61B; 64E ff.; Republ., 486A.
••• Ct Republ., 48oA; 485B; 475B; 502C; 376B; 475E; 484D; 582D; 490A;
Phaedrus, 249B; Sophist, 268D;
176B; Sympos., 203D ff.; Phaedo, 6IA;
Gorgias, 484C; Euthydemus, 268A ff.- Seneca, in Epist., 89. 4, stated that philosophy merely points out what true wisdom has already achieved.
881 Vita Pythag., 58 ff.
••• Comment. in Plat. Phaedrum, 264. 10 ff.
••• Tuscul., 4. 3; 4. 4. According to Cicero, Pythagoras is said to have called
himself a philosopher, that is, a lover of wisdom, rather than a uo¢6s--a sage
who already possesses wisdom, because wisdom, according to Pythagoras, belongs
to God alone. Hence he did not wish to be called a wise man, but simply
a lover or friend of wisdom. Cf. Plato, Phaedrus, 278 D: " .. , wise ... is a great
name which belongs to God alone." Sympos., 203 D: " .. , no god is a philosopher or seeker after wisdom, for he is wise already; nor does a man who is

248

ANTON-HERMANN

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sees in philosophy the rlx.v'YJ rex_vf:xv Kat
E'TrUTT'lfJfl-WV, a
definition which proceeds from the exalted position (eK rfj'>
inrepox_fjc;) which philosophy holds among all intellectual and
intelligent pursuits. This last definition has been ascribed to
Aristotle, 340 and has been used extensively by Ammonius and
his disciples. 341
These six definitions of philosophy had already become what
might be called authoritative canons long before they were
finally restated by the School of Alexandria. The preeminently
mystical character of Plato's op.oiwcnc; 8€cp KUTU 'rO Svva·rov 342
undoubtedly appealed to the Neo-Platonists, and to Plotinus in
particular, who took over this Platonic statement by identifying cpvy7j with the o1wtwnc; 8eq_J.343 But even before Plotinus
this definition of philosophy as the opLotwav; 8€<p had been used
by early Christian thinkers. As a matter of fact, we find traces
of this definition not only in St. Paul 344 and in the Gospel
according to St. Matthew, 345 but also in Tatian, 346 Melito of
Sardes, 347 Justin Martyr, 348 and Clement of Alexandria. 349
wise seek after wisdom." Lysis, 218 A: " Those who are already wise
. are
no longer philosophers. . . ."
84 ° Cf. notes 307-314, supra, and the corresponding
text.
841 Cf. notes
supra, and the corresponding text.
••• Theaet., 176 B. Ammonius, in Comment. in Porphyrii quinque voces, 3. 8
(in Comment. in Arist. Graec., 4. 3); David, in Proleg. (edit. Brandis, scholia
13 a 45); and Elias, in Comment. in Porphyrii lsagogen, 16. 10 (in Comment. in
Arist. Graec., 18. 2), changed the original Platonic texts into " ... as far as this
is possible for a human being "-Kara ro livvarov avOpdnr<;J. Cf. also the various
interpretations of this famous Platonic passage in Themistius (Orationes, edit.
Dindorf, 2.
Plutarch (De sera numinis vindicta, 15; 24, edit. Wyttenbach);
and Julian the Apostate (Orat., 6, p. 184, edit. Lips).
••• Ennead, 2. 2. 1.
••• Romans, 8. 29: " ... to be conformed to the image of the Son .... " Cf.
ibid., 6. 5; Ephes., 4. 24.
••• Matthew, 5. 48; "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your father who is in
heaven is perfect."
••• Orat., 81.
807 In Eusebius, Hist. Eccl., 4.
••• Frag. 18.-Cf. J. Pfattisch, "Der Einfluss Platons auf die Theologie Justins
des Martyrs," in Forschungen zur christlichen Literatur--und Dogmengeschichte
(1910).
"'" Paeda.gogus, 8. 3H (edit. Stahlin, vol. 1); Protrepticus, 76 ff.; Stromata, 2. 26
(edit. Stahlin, vol. 2). Cf. Eusebius, Praep. Evang., 13. 672.

PHILOSOPHY

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249

Plato's other definition of philosophy as the fLEAET'YJ Bavarov,
or the Av<n<; Kal. xwpurf.Lo<; Tij'> 1/JvxiJ'> a1ro uwf.Lam<;,350 was most
readily accepted by the Stoics, who used it in order to justify
their views on suicide (€gaywyrj) .351 Thus Seneca stated:
"Egregia res est mortem condiscere ... hoc est ipsum quare
meditari debeamus." 352 But it was Cicero who really introduced this definition into the Latin world when he insisted
that " tota enim philosophorum vita, ut ait idem [sciL, Socrates], commentatio mortis est." 353 And a little later the
same writer insisted once more that " secernere autem a corpore animum ecquid aliud est quam mori discere?" 354 Apuleius
likewise called philosophy the " mortis affectum consuetudinemque moriendi." 355 It is not altogether surprising, therefore, that this particular definition, which could only appeal
to the early Christians, should find its way into the writings of
St. Jerome/ 56 St. John of Damascus, 357 and St. Augustine. 358 It
was, however, Cassiodorus 359 who more than anyone else conPhaedo, 64A; 67B.
Cf. Seneca, Epist., HZ. 10; l:Z. 25; 70. 11; 70. 14; 65. 22; H'l. 21 ff.; 120. 14 ff.;
Marcus Aurelius, Thoughts, 5. 29; 8. 47; 10. 8; 10. 32; 3. l; Epictetus, Discours,
l. 24. 20; 3. 24. 95 fl'.; Seneca,
providentia, 6. 6. Cf. Elias, Comment. in
Porphyrii lsagogen, 14 (Comment. in Arist. Graec., 18. 1).
••• Seneca, Epist., 25.
353 Tuscul., l. 30.
354 Tuscul., l. 31.
355 De Platone et eius dogmate, 277.
356 Epist.,
127, Ad Principiam virginem sive Marcellae viduae epitaphium, 6
(in Patrol. Lat., 22. col. 1091): " ... illud Platonicum, qui philosophiam meditationem mortis esse dixit."
357 llep! 'Yvc:urews, 6; 68.
It should be remembered that the llepl ')fvtfu:rews, among
others, is under the influence of Porphyry and Ammonius.
358 Epist., 155.
859 De artibus ac disciplinis liberal. litterarum, 3 (in Patrol. Lat., 70, col. H67).
Cassiodorus knew only four of the basic definitions of philosophy proposed by
Ammonius, Elias, and David, namely the " divinarum humanarumque rerum in
quanta est possibilis scientia "; the " ars artium et disciplina disciplinarum "; the
"meditatio mortis"; and the "[assimilatio] Deo secundum quod possible est
homini." The insertion of the word "homini" (Karil. ro ilvvarov dviJprfnr'lJ) is
not to be found in Plato, but mnst be considered a later addition made by
Ammonius, Elias, and David. Cf. note 342, supra. Boethius mentions only one
definition of philosophy, namely the " amo.r et studium et amicitia quodammodo
sapientiae," a definition which is probably taken from Cicero. Patrol. Lat., 64. ool.
850

351

250

ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

tributed to the propagation of this particular definition of philosophy during the early part of the Middle Ages. Isidore of
Seville,360 again, quoted five basic definitions of philosophy by
calling it the " rerum humanarum divinarumque cognitio cum
studio bene vivendi coniuncta "; 361 the" amor sapientiae ";the
" divinarum humanarumque rerum in quantum homini possibile est probabilis scientia "; 362 the "ars artium et disciplina
disciplinarum "; and the" meditatio mortis." 363
The six basic or " canonical " definitions of philosophy as
they have been listed by the School of Alexandria return with
the regularity of stereotypes in the works of the late HellenisticRoman writers and scholiasts. Probably the first author to
enumerate all these six definitions is Ammonius, who was
scholarch at Alexandria during the fifth century after Christ.
As such he had a great and lasting influence not only on the
Neo-Platonists of the sixth century-Damascius, Simplicius,
Olympiodorus, Joannes Philoponus, Asclepius, and Theodotusbut also on Byzantine, Syrian, and Arabic writers. In his Com10. Isidore of Seville, in Etymol., 2. 28. 2, quoting Cassiodorus, remarks that
" consuetudo itaque est doctoribus philosophiae antequam ad Isagogen veniant
exponendam divisionem philosophiae paucis attingere." This remark proves that
Cassiodorus was familiar with some of the Alexandrian polegomena philosophiae.
In addition, Cassiodorus also quotes a definition which is typical for Ammonius and
his disciples, namely the op.olwuts OECjJ Ka.TCt. TO 6uva.TiiV d.vOptfnrljJ. It has already
been pointed out that the addition of the word d.v6pw1r'l! goes back to Ammonius.
860 Etymol., 2. 24. 1; 2. 24. 2; 2. 24. 9.
861 Obviously this definition is a combination of elements borrowed from the
Early Stoics, Cicero, and Seneca.- The definition of philosophy as the "rerum
humanarum divinarumque cognitio cum studio bene vivendi coniuncta," can also
be found in Dominicus Gundissalinus, De divisione philosophiae (edit.
in
Beitriige zur Gesch. d. Philos. d. Mittelalters, 4. 7; lines 18-14. Gundissalinus
probably found this definition in the Etymol., 2. 24. 1, of Isidore of Seville, or
perhaps in the De definitionibus of Isaak ben Salomon Israeli in the translation of
·
Gerhard of Cremona.
868 This definition is plainly a combination of Stoic and Platonic elements.
868 Through the influence of Isidore of Seville and perhaps that of Cassiodorus
(Patrol. Lat., 70 col. 1167), these definitions, or at least some of them, were
transmitted to Alcuin, the Venerable Bede, Hugh of St. Victor, St. Bernard of
Clairvaux (De diligendo Deo, 11. 8, in Patrol. Lat., 182. col. 994; cf. ibid., 15. 89,
in Patrol. Lat., 182. col. 998), and many others.

PHILOSOPHY IN THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN

WORLD

mentary to Porphyry's lsagoge 364 he authoritatively stated
these six definitions, which from then on were accepted by
nearly all the later scholars and scholiasts without challenge, 365
According to Ammonius these six basic definitions fall into
three major groups, namely as regards their inroKE£fLevov (their
object) , their -reAo<; (their purpose or end) , and their mJvap,(their" complex meaning"), Although Ammonius also
mentioned several other definitions of philosophy, he did not
include them among his basic definitions, This fact might indicate that he merely made a selection from an already existing
collection of philosophical definitions, 366 Ammonius' six basic
(definitions) rfj<;;
reappear in the Prolegomena of Elias, It is quite possible that Elias is here under the
influence of a lost lsagoge of Olympiodorus 361 (who was the
disciple of Ammonius and the teacher of Elias), Like Ammonius, Elias derived his six fundamental definitions of philosophy 368 analytically (avaAvnKW<;) EK TOV inTOKEtfLEPOV; EK TOV
TeAov<;; and EK r7/s inrepox7/<; Tij<>
He differs from
Ammonius, however, in that he not only added another "category" from which he derived the meaning of philosophy,
namely eK r1j-; ervfLoAoy[a-;, but also in that he attempted definitively to assign the authorship of these six basic definitions
to various philosophers, Thus he claimed for Pythagoras no
Ammonius, Comment. in Porphyrii Quinque Voces, 1 (in Comment. in Arist.
Graec., 4. 8) ,
••• Cf. for instance, A.-H. Chroust, "The Definitions of Philosophy in the
De divisione philosophiae of Dominicus Gundissalinus," The New Scholast.,
no. 3 (1951),
866 Cf. Ammonius
and the remark prefacing his definitions of philosophy, in
Comment. in Porphyrii Quinque Voces, 2, line 16: lla.pa.il.ap,(3avovrat oil" rijs
36 •

</>IAOO'o</>las opt!IP,OL '/rOAAol· '/rOAAOL 'YfLP '/rOAAaxws &plO'avro TWP 'ffctAawrepwv avrijp,
867 David, in Proleg. (edit. Brandis,
scholia 14 b 83), actually quotes Olympiodorus.
368 Elias strictly
adhered to these six basic definitions of philosophy, which
number he also defended by ascribing to it certain magic qualities. Proleg., 7;
(in Comment. in Arist. Graec, 18.
Cf. Porphyry, Vita Plot. (edit. Kirchhoff),
p, XXXIX; chap.
Theon of Smyrna, Expositio rerum mathematicarum tUJ,_
legendum Platonem utilium (edit. Hiller), 45.

ANTON-HERMANN

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less than three definitions: the cptA.ia -rfi<; uocp[a<;,369 the yv&ut<;
TWV OVTWV ovm, and the ')'VWCTt<; TWV 8e£wv Kat av8pW'ITLVWV 'ITpayp.chwv-in short, all those definitions which follow EK -rfi<;
e-rvp,oA.oy[a<;and EK -roil tJ'ITOKEtp,f.vov-rfi<; cptA.ouocp[a<;. To Plato he
assigned two definitions: the p,eA.e-r'YJ 8ava-rov and the op,o£wut<;
(}f.cp Ka-ra -ro Svva-rov (av8pw1rcp)-in other words, those definitions which are derived EK -roil -rf.A.ov<; -rfi<; cptA.ouocp[a<;. And finally
he credited Aristotle with that definition which calls philosophy
the TEXV'YJ -rexvwv Kat ETrtun}p,'YJ e'ITtCTT'YJftWV, a definition which follows EK -rfi<; tJ'ITepoxfi<; -rfi<; cptA.ouocp[a<;. On the other hand, Elias
rejects that definition which sees in philosophy an la-rptKTJ 1/Jvxwv
(healer of souls) ,370 The same definitions as well as the same
reasons for proposing them are also to be found in the Prolegomena of David, 371 who undoubtedly is here under the direct
influence of Elias.
In the schools of Plato and Aristotle the term philosophy
acquired the meaning of a methodical study or inquiry concentrating on the particular and detailed sciences in which the
individual provinces of knowledge were to be investigated.
Parallel to this trend in the direction of scientific detail and
departmentalization, the problem o:t man's practical vocation
gained ever greater importance for all ,philosophical discussions.
Scientific instruction in the right conduct of life became the
essential task and, in some instances, the sole content of philosophy. In this manner philosophy acquired the practical
meaning of an art of life or that of a study of human character.
These efforts to derive from scientific principles and rational

n

••• The etymological definition of philosophy has frequently been credited to
Pythagoras. Cf. Diog. Laert., prooem. U; 8. 8; Cicero, Tuscul., disp., 4. 8 ff.; 5. 9;
Jamblichus, Vita. Pythag., 58 ff.; Hermias, Comment. in Plat. Phaedr.,
line
10 ff. Since, however, the rather unreliable llept 11o11'w11 of Heracleitus of Pontus
seems to be the source of all this information, we should not put too much
faith in it.
870 This definition was very popular with the Cynics and the Late Stoics.
Cf.
note 114, supra.
871 Edit.
Brandis, scholia
a-16 b.-It may be assumed, therefore, that both
Elias and David, through the medium of the Prolegomena of Olympiodorus which
have not yet been discovered, had taken over these definitions of philosophy
originally proposed by Ammonius.

PHILOSOPHY IN THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN

WORLD

253

insights a moral conviction for the direction of life finally culminated in an attempt to create a new religion or religious metaphysics that would bring solace, comfort, and salvation to man.
At the same time the commentators and scholiasts, primarily
for didactic reasons, attempted to restate and simplify in their
" Introductions to Philosophy'' the basic definitions of philosophy as they had been developed by Greek philosophers. It
was in this form that the Middle Ages, often through the
medium of Syrian and Arabic scholars, inherited many of its
definitions of philosophy.
ANTON-HERMANN

Mediaeval Institute, University
of Notre Dame,
Notre Dame, Indiana

CHROUST

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS
Lmm M. CIAPPI, 0. P., S. T. M., S. T. D., Professor of Theology at the
Angelicum in Rome, has written numerous articles in European
scholastic journals.
SISTER RITAMARY BRADLEY, C. H. M., Ph. D., is on the teaching staff of
Marycrest College, Davenport, Iowa. She has contributed to Speculum, Catholic Educational Review, Journal of Arts and Letters, and
other publications.
GAVIN W. R. ARDLEY is a new contributor from Australia. He is the author
of Aquinas and Kant (Longmans, 1950) . He has lectured in Physics
at the University of Melbourne, where he had received his Bachelor
of Arts from the School of Philosophy and his Master of Science
from the School of Physics.
ANTON-HERMANN CHnousT, J. U. D., Ph. D., S. J.D., member of the
faculty of the Graduate School and the Medieval Institute at Notre
Dame University, has previously contributed scholarly articles .m
the field of ancient philosophy.
PAUL M. §TARRS, 0. P., S. T. Lr., S. T. L., is a member of the faculty of
the Dominican Rouse of Studies in Oakland, California, and Professor of Theology at Notre Dame College, Belmont.
CHARLES A. HART, Ph. D., LL.D., National Secretary of the American
Catholic Philosophical Association, is a Professor of Philosophy at
The Catholic University of America.
JAMES V. MuLLANEY, M.A., is the Head of the Department of Humanities,
School of Business, Manhattan College.
RoY R. BoDE, Ph. D., is an Instructor in the School of Philosophy, The
Catholic University of America.
THOMAS B. WRIGHT has been pursuing graduate studies in Philosophy at
The Catholic University of America.

BOOK REVIEWS
The Wisdom of Faith. By CHARLES JouRNET. (tr. by R. F. Smith, S. J.)
Westminster: Newman,
Pp.
$4.25.

Sacra Doctrina. By GERALD F. VAN AcKEREN, S. J. Rome: Catholic Book
Agency, 1952. Pp. 135 with index.
The question of the nature and functions of Sacred Theology is one that
has evoked considerable interest in recent times, and within the past few
years these two works, among others, have appeared treating of different
aspects of the subject.
Msgr. Journet indicates that the principal purpose of his book, as the
title suggests, is to explain and elaborate the idea of " the wisdom of faith,"
which he takes to be identical with Christian doctrine or theology.
The first portion of his work-after a preliminary chapter on " The
Wisdom of Love," which is a discussion of the wisdom which is the infused
gift of the Holy Ghost-is devoted to what he calls " doctrinal," as distinguished from "historical," theology. Here he develops an important
idea when he speaks of " ambivalent propositions " (Chapter 2) for he
points out that the terms which are predicated of God, such as " one,"
"good," "wise," are analagous not only as they are terms applied to God
and creatures, but also as they are used in natural theology or theodicy and
in supernatural theology; for as they are terms used by God to make known
to us something of the Divine Essence Itself, they have a meaning simply
diverse from that which is attained even in the metaphysics of Uncreated
Being.
When he begins to discuss more in detail the precise character of doctrinal theology, Msgr. Journet puts the emphasis strongly upon what can be
called the " organizational " function of theology. This is for him its principal role, for while insisting that "that which specifies theology and makes
it distinct from faith and from natural disciplines is . . . the discursive
procedure of reason under the illumination of faith and from the data of
faith ... ," he immediately adds: " This discursive procedure can begin
with one truth of faith . . . and conclude to another truth of faith. In such
a case, the procedure of theology permits us to organize the truths of faith."
(p. 43) He quotes with approval a passage from Jacques Maritain wherein
this function of theology is called " principal," and theology is said to
include "chiefly, the very truths of faith, which are penetrated and
connected one to another with the aid of human inference."

255

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BOOK REVIEWS

He makes correspondingly little of the other role of theology, the deducing of new truths from revealed principles, which he calls " the extension
of the revealable." To pass so lightly over this function of theology is, of
course, to avoid an area filled with problems; to omit, for example, any
discussion of the nature of theological conclusions or of the way in which
one truth can be contained in another. Perhaps Msgr. Journet had no desire
to enter into this field, but the omission of some treatment of it can only
be considered as a rather serious defect in a work that professes to give a
comprehensive introduction to the nature of theological science.
In the second portion of his book Msgr. Journet considers "historical
theology." Here again he has recourse to the organizing character of theology; for whereas he has indicated that the function of doctrinal theology
is to discover the internal order of what has been revealed, he makes it
the purpose of historical theology to discover the successive order found in
the dispensation and unfolding in time of what has been revealed.
Here the author makes a distinction between the discipline which is
concerned with the historical examination of the sources of theological
knowledge on the one hand, and what he terms historical theology on the
other. To this former discipline, which he notes is generally called theology,
he would not accord the name theology in the full sense. " Rather it
appears ... to be but an initial movement, a fundamental phase of
doctrinal theology-the phase of topological exposition." (p. 66)
The term historical theology he would accord only to a discipline which
he concedes "has not yet been founded; nor," he adds, "is it so easy to
conceive its nature with great preciseness." (p. 90) He would assign to it
the task of offering " an ultimate explanation of the historical order to be
found in the revealable by theological reason, that is, by reason operating
in the light of faith and concerning the data of faith." (p. 91) It is,
because of its superior light, distinct from and higher than either historical
or exegetical science. It " applies itself to the discovery of the succession
according to which the history of salvation has been conducted." (p. 101)
It has " recourse to documents insofar as they manifest a providential
content." (p. 119).
We must agree with Msgr. Journet, however, that even after this explanation it is not " easy to conceive its nature with great preciseness "; and it
is rather difficult to see just how this kind of theological " second-guessing "
about the operations of Divine Providence in history can ever be developed
into a science. Nor do the "Themes of Historical Theology" suggested
by Msgr. Journet in his sevepth chapter help much in an understanding of
how this new science is to proceed.
Father Van Ackeren's book is considerable more limited in its scope,
being simply an attempt to discover the meaning of the phrase sacra
doctrina as it appears in the first question of the Summa. Its approach
is also much less rhetorical and more academic, which is quite understand-

BOOK REVIEWS

257

able when we note that the work was presented to the faculty of theology
at the Gregorian University as a thesis for the doctorate.
After outlining the interpretations that have been given to the phrase by
the classical Thomistic commentators and by certain prominent contemporary Thomists, Father Van Ackeren seeks to discover the meaning of the
term doctrina in the various works of St. Thomas, and comes to the conclusion that doctrina meant for St. Thomas primarily the action or activity
whereby a teacher makes something known to a disciple. In applying this
idea to the first question of the Summa the author strives to show that the
term has a single meaning throughout the whole first question: it is "an
action, the instruction of men in the knowledge of salvation ... " It is
" not to be identified with Sacred Scripture, nor is it to be identified with
the habit of sacred theology. It is doctrine in the formal sense of the
term: i.e. the generation of knowledge." (p. US)
Father Van Ackeren is to be congratulated upon his contribution to a
solution of the problem of the meaning of this phrase in St. Thomas. It
has the advantage of supplying a single meaning which can be applied to
all the articles of the first question of the Summa, and the meaning given
to the term doctrina certainly seems well borne out by the references to St.
Thomas' use of this word elsewhere. The author furthermore furnishes
some interesting and original suggestions on the relations which Scripture
and theology will have to this divine teaching activity.
One might note, as indeed Father Van Ackeren does, that his suggested
solution is not too far distant from that suggested by Pere Cougar in his
article " Theologie " in the Dictionnaire de theologie catholique, wherein the
basic idea of doctrine as instruction in the active sense is developed; though
Father Van Ackeren makes further distinctions and refinements, especially
regarding the precise relation of this sacred doctrine to Sacred Scripture
and theology.
A final word might be said about the format of the two books. Msgr.
Journet's work, published in this country, is well printed and bound, but
perhaps in the very interests of a pleasing typographical format, all notes
are relegated to the back of the book, a practice that can only cause
annoyance to the scholarly reader-and no one else is likely to be reading
this work. There is, furthermore, no index.
Father Van Ackeren's work, published in Rome, is in paper wrappers and
printed on paper of newsprint quality. The text, however, is relatively
free of typographical errors-something of an accomplishment, for the
continental printer usually takes a few liberties with the English language.
The footnotes are where they belong, at the foot of the pages, and there
is a good index.
PAUL M. STARRS, 0. P.
College of St. Albert the Great,
Oakland, Calif.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Medieval Logic: An Outline of Its Development from 11250 to ca. 1400.
By PHILOTHEUS BoEHNER, 0. F. M. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press,
Pp. 148. $3.00.
De Puritate Artis Logicae. By WALTER BuRLEIGH. Edited by Philotheus
Boehner, 0. F. M. St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute and
Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1951. Pp. 131. $1.50.
The first work is a booklet designed to promote harmony and understanding between scholastic and modern logicians. It is the author's contention that many modern scholastics do not have a genuinely scholastic
logic since they do not consider logic as an essentially formal science. And
the reason for this is that they are not acquainted with their own tradition,
namely, genuine scholastic logic of the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries
wherein there is found a logic containing many elements of a strictly formal
logic, so much so, that these elements appear to be definite anticipations,
if not the exact doctrines, of modern logic. Avoiding the vague phrases,
"traditional logic" and "classical logic," Fr. Boehner indicates precisely
what he means by " nco-scholastic logic," " Aristotelian logic " and " modem
logic," before stating and substantiating his conclusions. This is done in
the Introduction. The body of the work is divided into three parts; Part
One: Elements of Scholastic Logic; Part Two: Important Contributions
of Scholastic Logic; and Part Three: Systems of Scholastic Logic. Part
One is divided into two chapters: I, The Legacy of Scholastic Logic, and
II, New Elements of Scholastic Logic. For the legacy of scholastic logic
he has chosen Albert the Great's logical works as his source. There are
eleven works cited, paraphrases on the six works of the Organon plus
paraphrases on Boethius's works on division, categorical syllogisms, and
hypothetical syllogisms. The other two works are Albert's treatment of
the material found in Porphyry's Isagoge and Gilbert de la Poree's Six
Principles. These works are merely listed and summarily described with
regard to their contents. The new elements which Fr. Boehner lists in
chapter two are the small tracts added by later scholastics which he divides
into five groups: 1. De Syncategorematibus,
De proprietatibus terminorum, 3. De insolubili, 4. De obligatione, 5. De consequentiis.
Part Two contains three chapters: I, The Syncategoremata As Logical
Constants; II, The Theory of Supposition; and III, The Theory of Consequences. In the first chapter. Fr. Boehner indicates clearly the distinction
between categorematic and syncategorematic words and the significative
and suppositional dependence of the latter upon the former. He sees in
this distinction a definite parallelism with the modern distinction between
the constants and variables of logical discourse. A splendid quotation from
Albert of Saxony shows that the latter considered the syncategoremata
as formal elements which do not change. This is another indication of the

BOOK REVIEWS

formalized· character of medieval logic. In the second chapter Fr. Boehner
briefly schematizes the theories of Peter of Spain, William Ockham, and
Walter Burleigh on supposition. He likens the theory of supposition to
the modern functional calculus. In chapter three the author treats of the
notion and division of consequences according to William Ockham and
Albert of Saxony. He also gives a brief survey of the consequential rules
found in Ockham which have corresponding theorems of the propositional
calculus. He gives the rule in translation, followed by the Latin text;
then he explains and gives an instance of the rule; finally, he places it in
symbolization.
Part Three contains only one chapter in which the author merely indicates the content of five medieval logicians' works by schematizing a
division of their most important logical opus. The five logicians summarized in this manner are Peter of Spain, William Ockham, John Buridan,
Walter Burleigh, and Albert of Saxony. Two appendices contain a few
sophismata of Albert of Saxony as well as a major portion of his rules of
supposition.
The second work is believed to be the first edited text of the shorter of
two texts bearing the name De Puritate Artis Logicae. It contains Burleigh's treatment of the general rules of consequences and a much longer
discussion (eighty per cent of the text) on the syncategoremata. The
publication of this text stems from the author's belief that Burleigh marks
a milestone in the history of logic, since he, above all scholastics, fully
understood the importance of emphasizing the essential formalism of logic.
This is clear from the importance which Walter' attaches to the theory
of consequences, an importance so great, that syllogistics was swallowed
up by it as a subordinate part. Walter scarcely mentions 'syllogistics, while
the theory of consequences is the first topic discussed in his work.
The more valuable book is the Burleigh text. Fr. Boehner has produced
a very modern and readable edition of a work which, if his estimate of
Burleigh be correct, is indispensable towards the construction of a complete
history of medieval logic. This latter desideratum is only possible if the
medieval texts are made available to scholars who can reexamine them in
the light of contemporary logic.
The other work has a deceptive title. Medieval Logic, as a title, conjures up the impression of a monumental work, detailed and exhaustive,
of the whole of scholastic logic. The sub-title and the author's own
minimizing remarks fail to alleviate one's disappointment in the contents.
It is not the nature of these contents so much as their paucity that will
produce dissatisfaction for many readers, especially symbolic logicians.
This could have been avoided by a more appropriate title. In view of the
basic purpose of the work, namely, promotion of understanding between
scholastic logic and modern logic, this resultant dissappointment is most
unfortunate. The sub-title. hardly mollifies this disappointment because

9

260

BOOK REVIEWS

the booklet is not a real outline, since an outline, although not detailed
and exhaustive, is nevertheless supposed to be comprehensive. Yet it is
an interesting little book as far as it goes, and perhaps will tend to make
many moderns think twice before dismissing the content of scholastic
logic. It is felt by this reviewer that Fr. Boehner should have collected
more material and written a more comprehensive and detailed manuscript
before attempting publication. Quick publication of such minimal results
may not have the effect which he sought, but rather, just the opposite.
Certainly, many scholastics will be scandalized by his rejection of material
logic as a contradictory concept. A more cogent method of persuading
them to accept this truth would have been to show that St. Thomas,
foremost of all scholastics, was not opposed to logic as a strictly formal
science. Far from doing this, St. Thomas is scarcely mentioned! Even
modem logicians would have expected a brief discussion of St. Thomas in
a book entitled Medieval Logic. This is even more lamentable since it is
an actual fact that St. Thomas did not teach the formal-material approach
to logic, despite what Maritain, Gredt, and others say. St. Thomas did not
deny that the doctrine contained in the Posterior Analytics was logical;
he merely recognized that this " material " approach to syllogistics could
not be extended to the rest of logic as John of St. Thomas has it. This is
the only " material logic " understood by St. Thomas, and as such, it does
not deny the essential formalism of logic. It is nothing more than Thomistic
axiomatics. A schematization of St. Thomas' logic in the last chapter of
the author's work, though it might have revealed his logic as inferior to
other scholastics,' would have shown quite clearly that he did not believe
in the existence of a " material logic."
It is also felt that the doctrine of supposition exposed in chapter two of
Part Two will antagonize contemporary logicians. Suppositio is a rather
repugnant thing as found in discussions of medieval logicians, since it
represents their groping attempts to express adequately in natural language
the precise, quantitative refinements which are inherent in the logical
analysis of complex relationships and which are so succinctly stated in
modem notation. The scholastics cannot be blamed if they lacked an
adequate notation or medium in which to express their highly developed
logical analysis; but the resultant confusion produced by the linguistically
clumsy discussions of suppositio discreta, suppositio naturalis, suppositio
personalis, suppositio confusa, suppositio confusa tantum, and many others,
hardly helps to produce harmony and understanding between scholastic
and modem logic.
However, the author has shown there is a need to investigate the logical
literature of the Middle Ages, both because it is virtually unexplored (and
thus an authentic history is still lacking) , and also because it may reveal
many points which should have been transmitted by scholastics but were
not, thus necessitating their rediscovery by modem logicians. However,

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261

there is always the danger, in this hindsight or post mortem analysis of
older works, of reading too much into their contents. Extreme caution
must be observed and, if it is, then a proper historical judgment can be
made on medieval logic, and at the same time this accurate and comprehensive estimate of medieval logic may be the means of bringing together
these two great schools of logic. If Fr. Boehner's work succeeds in arousing
scholars to action towards the construction of this historical judgment, his
work will be justified, although his publication of such minimal results
probably will not sufficiently convince many that it is urgent for this
lacuna to be filled. More material and a more comprehensive outline,
even though it meant a later publication date, would have achieved his
purpose much more efficiently, it seems to us.
The most interesting part of Medieval Logic is the section which discusses Ockham's consequences, explaining them and symbolizing them in
modern notation. Of particular interest are those consequences which show
that Ockham had a complete mastery of De Morgan's Laws. This is the
best part of Fr. Boehner's book. Fr. Boehner is to be praised for his
editing of the Burleigh text and for his attempt to promote harmony between scholastic and modern logic, or rather between the descendants of
scholastics and modern logicians. There is a need of more men of Fr.
Boehner's stature, logicians acquainted with both scholastic and modern
logic, in order to bring about this harmony. Actually, the existence of such
logicians will constitute this very harmony.
THOMAS B. WRIGHT
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

The Mind of Kierkegaard. By JAMES CoLLINS. Chicago: Regnery, 1953.
Pp. 308 with index. $4.50.
The title of this book accurately indicates that it deals primarily with
the content of Kierkegaard's thought, " the structure of his shareable
convictions." This it tries to do, without overlooking the importance of the
personal attitude of response and responsibility before the truth, an oversight which Kierkegaard constantly criticized the ' dons ' for making."
(p. viii) The exposition " confines itself to the philosophical aspects of
his fundamental dialectic of esthetical, ethical and religious modes of
experience," (p. xi) leaving to the theologians the religious and theological
aspects of Kierkegaard's thought. In addition to presenting the thought
of Kierkegaard, this book also " attempts to give a philosophical appraisal
of Kierkegaard's standpoint." (pp. viii-ix) In this task of evaluation the
focus is primarily on Kierkegaard in himself rather than as a progenitor
of existentialism. He is, in this phase of Professor Collins' work, studied

BOOK REVIEWS

not only against his "proximate philosophical situation" of post-Kantian
German philosophy but also in the light of Christian philosophical thought
found in St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas.
Throughout the work Dr. Collins relies chiefly upon the works of Kierkegaard himself. Thus the initial chapter, "Kierkegaard The Man" is
based upon his Journals, and sketches his life as son, lover, author and
witness to the truth. The second and third chapters deal respectively with
the esthetic and ethical views while in the fourth and fifth the philosophical
works-Philosophical Fragments, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, and
the " Introduction " to The Concept of Dread-are considered. The fourth
chapter, " The Attack Upon Hegelianism " shows the negative aspect of
these works, that is, as a critique of Hegel; while the fifth, " The Meaning
of Existence," shows the positive contribution in the new theory of
existence.
The eighth and concluding chapter," Kierkegaard and Christian Philosophy," examines the degree to which "Kierkegaard's detached insights can
be rendered philosophically meaningful by incorporation into, and correction
by, the body of Thomistic doctrine concerning existence, man, and God."
(p. xii) Finally, a "Bibliographical Note" lists, among other things, the
twenty Kierkegaard titles available in English, and ·the major bibliographical, expository and evaluative works in English and other languages.
In the twenty-six pages of footnotes which follow there are contained some
independently valuable discussions.
This is a typical Collins performance: it is, therefore, the most mature
study of Kierkegaard in English. It is as definitive an account of the
thought of Kierkegaard as Walter Lowrie's Kierkegaard (Oxford, 1938) is
of the life of Kierkegaard. It is a detailed exposition of the Dane's teaching
and a balanced evaluation of it against the background of the classical
philosophy of the West. As exposition, it is richly informed, sympathetic,
cautious in showing how teaching on one point is modified by teaching on
a related point. As evaluation it is just, objective, positive. Dr. Collins
is aware of the legitimate claims of the " contextually true " without ever
confusing this with the " simply true." He neither imposes judgment on
Kierkegaard nor avoids that judgment. It is as though in Collins' mind
philosophy itself revealed the depths and the imbalances of Kierkegaard's
thought; though Collins did not formulate but merely discovered the judgment which reason itself had already passed. In him the voice of reason
and of philosophy speaks very purely.
His style has the same quality of purity. There is in it neither cleverness,
nor rhetorical device, nor the slightest intrusion" of self. The self-effacement,
the preoccupation with the problem at hand, which is so marked in
Aquinas, it found here. The brilliance of this book is intellectual, not
verbal. The writing is clean, having no unnecessary or inexact word.
Because the writing is studious, though not studied, so must be the reading.

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268

The work of James Collins, in his numerous articles, in The Existentialists
and now in The Mind of Kierkegaard raises two questions: first, how shall
his work be classified? and second, what is his own philosophical position?
or, more specifically, what are his own relations to Thomism?
It is not at all impossible that in the case of so young a man these
questions are impertinences or, at least, premature. It is desperately important to that freedom of soul without which philosophy is impossible,
that he be not catalogued, but simply be left alone to be himself. Yet the
quality of his researches is such that he cannot long escape being discussed
as one of the most important figures in American philosophy.
It is not easy to decide whether he is a philosopher or an historian of
recent and contemporary philosophy. Assuming that one refuses the disjunction and insists that he is both, then which is he formally? Is he a
philosophical historian, or is he a philosopher who philosophizes on the
data of the history of recent philosophy? I do not know. But I should
much rather worry about this problem and have Dr. Collins go on writing
his books than have Dr. Collins worry about it. What is certain is that
he is writing in a well-known philosophical genre and that in that genre
he has no betters.
His relation to Thomism is almost unique in this country. It is selfevident that he is fruitfully familiarizing the Thomists with contemporary
thought. Quite possibly he is also fruitfully familiarizing the non-Thomists
with Thomistic thought at the crucial point of contact: Thomism looking at
the contemporary scene. However successful this two-way explication may
eventually be, it is already evident that his Thomism has several admirable
characteristics. It is in the first place, internal, organic. His Thomism is
not a set of answers at the back of a mathematics book with which the
solution reached by student Kierkegaard is quickly and neatly compared by
teacher Collins. His Thomism is a habit of his own mind. No need to
consult a given article of the Summa because Thomas has gone too deep
into Collins. The spontaneous judgment of his own intellect is a Thomistic
judgment. For this reason, the less he mentions Aquinas the better.
His Thomism is, secondly, like that of Aquinas, discriminatingly assimilative. (The adjective without the adverb is mere lack of intellectual
discipline.) He is open, but reserved. And the reserve flows from precisely the same incorrigibly philosophic habit of mind from which the
openness flows. Thirdly, his Thomism is simple, uncomplicated. It is
merely that he perceives that both by virtue of the intrinsic excellence of
Thomas' philosophy, and by virtue of the comparative superiority of it
to .other ways of thinking, that it is most splendid in a rich tradition.
Perhaps the surest sign of that splendor is Thomism's capacity to give a
home to every fragment of truth, illumining it and being illumined by it.
The back door to Thomism is precisely the study of the most definitely
non-Thomistic philosophies, for sooner or later one is forced to see that

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BOOK REVIEWS

the point of their maximum intelligibility is the point of their critical
insertion into an open, personal Thomism. Dr. Collins is the specialist in
this sort of positive critique because he perceives that Thomas is the
greatest among greats, but not one against others.
JAMEs V. MuLLANEY

Manhattan College,
New York, N.Y.

The Platonic Heritage of Thomism. By ARTHUR LITTLE, S. J. Dublin:
Golden Eagle Books, 1952. Pp. 305 with index. 18s.
In this work Father Little offers a very convincing study of the decisive
influence of the thought of Plato in the formulation of the central doctrine
of participation as the key to Thomistic metaphysics. It is held that this
influence is not so readily recognized by many Thomists for the reason
that St. Thomas, an acknowledged Aristotelian, radically changed what
he consciously or unconsciously borrowed from Plato and expressed the
latter in Aristotelian language of potency and act. Thus with some degree
of truth, from different approaches, one might call practically all Thomistic
philosophy Platonic and yet also say nothing is Platonic. For the purpose
of this discussion the author at the outset (Preface) defines the term
Platonic influence thus: " What we shall mean by Platonic elements of
Thomism are those doctrines of St. Thomas that are derivable from the
parts of Plato's own philosophy that were rejected or neglected by
Aristotle." What Aristotle so indiscriminately rejected in the thought of
his teacher was, of course, the Platonic doctrine of Ideas or Subsistent
Forms, not only in its original expression, but in any modification of it.
Father Little feels that the reluctance of Thomists to admit this influence
(a reluctance noticeable in St. Thomas himself in view of historical circumstances under which he wrote) and to insist on an almost exclusive
Aristotelian source for the Saint's philosophy is to endanger the Thomistic
central doctrine of participation. Incidentally the author notes five other
philosophers in Italy, Germany, and France who also arrived at the same
conclusion independently of one another, namely, C. Fabro in his La
Nozione metafisca di participazione secondo S. Tomaso; P. Santele, S. J.,
in Der Platonismus in der Erkenntnislehre des heiligen Thomas; L. B.
Geiger, 0. P., in La Participation dans la Philosophie de S. Thomas; J. de
Finance, S. J., Etre et Agir, and G. Isaye, S. J., in La Theorie de la Mesure.
In an introductory historical section the author treats of the "battle
of Aristotle " and his commentators of more than a thousand years after
the Greek philosopher's death, especially the Mohammedan Averroes and
the Christian Siger of Brabant, both considered heretical within their

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respective faiths. Although St. Thomas had proved that a philosopher who
accepted Aristotle, and even Averroes, .with critical reserve need not be a
heretic, nevertheless defenders of the Stagirite, even where he taught the
truth, faced great difficulty in their defense, in view of the notable Aristotelian errors which were generally evident. The author also shows that
St. Thomas was sometimes more generous in his interpretation of Aristotle
than the latter deserved. For example, since Aristotle insisted on the
absolute or metaphysical necessity of eternal motion in the world it would
follow that God as the Immovable Mover was not the efficient causes
even of motion in the universe. Yet in his commentary on Aristotle's
Metaphysics (II, 2) St. Thomas seems to permit the conclusion that in
a single passage Aristotle (M etapkysics 993b25) held for such efficiency
which would be quite contradictory to his fundamental principle of eternal
motion in the universe. Thus Aristotle would be shown to have exactly the
same divergence from the doctrine of Creation as did Plato, both explaining
the world as forms efficiently produced by God in a subject matter independent of Him. Actually the cleavage between the universe and God in
Aristotle is far more complete within the exact interpretation of Aristotle's
own principles. This is a position at complete variance with the fundamental doctrine of St. Thomas.
In the second section we proceed to the fundamental thesis of participation as the ascent from the many to the one. In general, " to participate
means to have or to be in limited measure a perfection that in its fullest
possibility constitutes another." (p. 38) St. Thomas explains the word
participare as quasi partem capere or ab alia partialiter recipere, to receive
from another, as it were, a part of his perfection (II de Coelo, lect. 18;
de Hebdom. Boetii, c. 2) . Participation therefore means more than imitation or conformity with a model. Real participation will imply that the
standard is the efficient cause of its perfections as communicated to the
participants. But expressly and by definition participation is not efficient
causality, but merely the possession, in a way not explicitly declared, of
a part of the perfection of the standard by the participant. In his doctrine
of universal Ideas or Forms " what Plato asserted and Aristotle denied was
that this material world of ours was derived at least in its formal nature
from the spiritual world and only on this basis can any important doctrine
of participation be erected." (p. 42) For Aristotle the only real participation is participation by the imperfect in the relatively (not absolutely)
perfect in that which is perfect in the same line or genus ..
To Platonic principles we owe the doctrine that there is a real Supreme
One from whose perfection all lesser perfection is derived. St. Thomas
knew of this doctrine. To Aristotle we owe the doctrine that the One is
singular and concrete, not a realized abstraction. To St. Thomas alone we
owe the final perfection of the doctrine, the principle that the perfection
of the One can only be expressed in terms of the transcendentals and can

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only be participated analogically. Likewise in the problem of the universals
St. Thomas joins Plato against Aristotle in admitting the universal ante
rem but, of course, St. Thomas puts this universal in the mind of God as
against Plato's subsistent universal. In this way he is able to accept
Aristotle's whole doctrine of abstraction while recognizing it as incomplete.
Similarly St. Thomas relies on Plato rather than Aristotle for his proof for
necessary truth of the judgment in necessary being, a position which
Aristotle overlooked. However Aquinas at the same time corrects Plato's
error of assuming that necessary truth formally and not fundamentally
represented eternal being. Finally Father Little shows at great length the
strictly Platonic character of the famous Thomistic Fourth Way for proof
of God's existence based on exemplary causality. Its various versions and
interpretations are thoroughly considered prior to its vindication, both in
itself and in its related proof from eternal truths. Since the other four
ways depend on the objective validity of the principle of efficient causality
this section closes with an extensive " proof " for this principle, a discussion
which seems to us as unduly complicated since this principle is immediate
and self-evident once the distinct principle of existence is admitted as an
intrinsic principle and the highest expression of perfection in all the beings
of our immediate experience.
The concluding sections consider the descent from the one to the many
through the principle of passive potency in the latter. Then important
psychological, ethical, and social errors or obscurantisms in Aristotle's
philosophy which follow upon Aristotle's denial of participation are discussed. The condition of the possibility of finite beings is their distinction
from Infinite Being by their being composed with a kind of non-being or
limit really distinct from the perfection limited, that is, their famous real
distinction between essence and existence. " The doctrine of the possibility
of creatures by participation in God is a doctrine of the possibility of the
non-God that is yet like God. This likeness is necessary because by the
doctrine God is the exemplar of creatures which must therefore represent
or resemble him." (p. 17) Since similarity implies diversity, it is in the
passive potency in creatures and its exclusion from God (Pure Act) that
makes participated creatures possible. Here Aristotle and Plato mutually
correct each other to have their thought developed by St. Thomas in a
doctrine of participation far beyond their deepest speculations. This
influence is summarized as follows: "A. Plato held the real distinction
between essence and existence but never dreamed of the additional composition of the essence itself from matter and form; B. Aristotle admitted no
real distinction except that of matter and form in the essence, which he
conceived as two positive existences in the manner of Suarez: he too
admitted only one passive potency but a different one from Plato's; C.
Thomas saw the necessity of two passive potencies and united Plato's doctrine with Aristotle's; but his concept of passive potency in general was

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Platonic. This was to be expected, for if Plato's passive potency is general
and Aristotle's particular, being confined to material things, Aristotle's
limited vision can only be easily explained by supposing that he overlooked
some truth necessary to the idea of passive potency in general." (p. 9li09li)
Father Little also gives his own extensive defense of the distinct principle
of limit as passive potency and hence of the real distinction of essence and
existence in all finite beings. Then follows a careful comparison of the
respective views of analogy in Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas consequent
upon their positions with regard to the principle of limit.
To conclude his case the author shows how Aristotle's doctrine of eternal
motion makes it impossible for him to recognize passive potency formally
as a limit and therefore requires him to reject a doctrine of participation.
Hence metaphysically he can have no doctrine of real analogy, nor any
valid proof for God's existence. Nor does he have any real knowledge of
God's nature. Since the finite essence is not a similitude of God, it cannot
testify to His existence as its exemplar. On the same ground a denial of
Divine Providence follows. Psychologically and ethically the spirituality
and immortality of the human soul must be denied and its freedom considered to be untenable as well as its moral obligation in any true sense.
Man must be declared to have two natural and independent ends and his
moral personality is inadmissible. Socially the nobility of man's work is
without rational foundation since his spiritual personality is impugned.
Each of these erroneous propositions is shown to be corrected by St.
Thomas in the light of his own central doctrine of participation.
There can be no doubt that Father Little has made a brilliant case for
his position. It is admitted that of Plato himself St. Thomas was only
able to read and fully understand the Timaeus, and perhaps the Pkaedo
and Meno, which were probably the only dialogs in his time translated
into Latin. But of course he had the writings of the Neo--Platonists, St.
Augustine, Boethius, Produs, Erigenas' translation of the PseudoAreopagite, all of which may be generally characterized by Aristotelianized
Platonism. At the same time it can be said that St. Thomas may not
have recognized the Platonic influences but discovered their views independently for himself. To us this seems rather unlikely. However, our
chief interest, as Father Little says, is in the Thomistic doctrine itself
rather than in its historical parentage. What this work does is to underscore the very original and revolutionary character of the whole approach
of Thomistic metaphysics. Perhaps Father Little, in his enthusiasm, may
be charged with undue emphasis on the Platonic influence as contributing
towards that revolution, though we do not think that is true upon the
record here presented. We think of his study as a valuable counteraction
to the more traditional attempts to present St. Thomas as simply developed
Aristotelianism and more or less strictly confined within its limits. Emphasizing the Platonic influences which are irreconcilable with the Aristotelian

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may help us to see how different is St. Thomas from both the great Greek
thinkers and therefore how much .more profound is his own original insight
into the mystery of being. We believe this work a major contribution to the
real understanding of St. Thomas to be placed alongside the works of
Fabro, Santeler, Geiger, de Finance, and Isaye, on this important doctrine
of participation as the key principle of Thomism.
CHARLES A. HART
The Catholic Univ!N'sity of America,
Washington, D. C.

Science in Synthesis. By WILLIAM H. KANE, 0. P. and others. River
Forest, Ill.: Albertus Magnus Lyceum for Natural Science, 1953.
Pp. 9l89 with index. $3.50.
There is something quite wrong in the universe of modern scientific
thought. The error (or errors, depending upon how fundamental the roots
are) has its ramifications throughout the entire structure not only of
educational institutions but as well of the thinking of " modern man." The
fact that the error has som:e very definite relation to the lack of unification
of the sciences is recognized by some. There are others who maintain that
atomization on every level is the very instrument of and not merely a
sign of scientific emancipation and progress. Still others see no problem
at an.
There have been a great number of volumes addressing themselves to
the task of specifying this problem and offering various solutions. Philosophical and scientific conventions have devoted much time to the subject.
The results so far have had varying degrees of failure. In some instances
the readers have laid down the book or the participants have come away
from the discussions with really nothing but aversion to philosopher or to
scientist, or to theologian, to whomever might seem to be trying to shackle
the other.
The present volume is the published summary of a portion of what
seems to be the most promising approach to this problem to date. In
general it has overcome many of the difficulties which have prevented a
truly " scientific " analysis of the problem on a level where alone it might
be specified and solved. The authors do not believe that the problem can
be faced in the narrow thinking of one particular
nor in the confines of one particular age or stage of the development of' that science, but
rather that the problem must be specified and ultimately solved in the
context o'f the whole history of science and human thought and in the
broad expanses of all of the major disciplines. How this is accomplished
is the uniqueness of the Albertus Magnus Lycem for Natural Science.
The Lyceum is a " permanent institution of collaboration " established at

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the Dominican House of Studies, River Forest, lll. The dialectical methods
by which the institute overcomes the obvious handicaps of other attempts
are only new in the sense that they are not a part of the present scientific
society but rather have their lost roots in the " dialectical method " of
Socrates as well as the disputations of the Middle Ages. A meeting of the
minds is certainly an indispensable foundation for the objective of the
unification of the sciences for this can hardly be accomplished without the
unification of scientists. In coming to agreement," a meeting of the minds,"
it is perhaps even more important to discover underlying disagreement in
apparent agreement as it is to uncover underlying agreement amidst
apparent disagreement.
The method is precisely this: that of systematic discussion in terms of
questions and expositions among the members. The topics for discussion
are based on standard texts in the fields. A leader of the group had the
task of initiating the discussion with questions and also of closing each
session with a summary of the discussion. Though unanimity might be
desired, it was rather understanding which was the prime objective of the
sessions. As it turned out, it seems that there was little unanimity but
considerable progress toward cooperation and understanding. Total success
was, however, not achieved in any of the sessions but there does seem to
be manifest a progressive trend toward a perfection in this order as the
weeks proceeded. Whether this was due to the increased perfection of the
method or to the weekly changes in subject matter or to some other cause
it is difficult for a reader to determine.
One each of the first four weeks was devoted to physics, chemistry,
biology and psychology consecutively. The fifth and final week was given
to a summary of the work of the earlier weeks. Topics for discussion
touched some of the most basic questions in each of the sciences, beginning
with the pertinent question as to the very scope of the crisis in the sciences
of nature. Others took their points of departure from the so-called " revolutions" in scientific method exemplified by classics of Galileo, Newton,
Einstein, Harvey, Darwin, Watson and Freud. This device was used to
look back to the sources of the particular science to ascertain what was
actually retained as well as what was overturned. This was further fruitful
in making dear the little known ways in which modern science has its
roots in history and how relative the concept "modern " really is. It was
around these that other questions relative to a " meeting of the minds " as
well as the search for problems and their solution were
With these
as some of the points of departure some of the most interesting as well as
controversial issues were discussed such as quantity, mathematization,
natures and causality in physics; quantity vs. quality and the periodic
table in chemistry; the concept of Jiife, and evolution in biology; the bodymind problem, problems of cognition and of faculties in psychology.
Throughout the entire session general questions were raised such as the
11

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possibilities of demonstration and proof, the place of modern logic in
modern science and the relation between fact and theory in science. These
are some of the topics discussed. The topics which were chosen could be
but a representative list in view of the limited time and objective.
The fifth and final week of the session was devoted to a summary of the
preceding four. This summary included a comparison between Aristotle's
outline of the natural sciences and a modern outline. The possibilities of
the contributions which the ancients can make toward the modem goal
is noteworthy. The use of the Aristotelian unifying structure as a framework of modem scientific material is seen to be quite feasible.
A general conclusion was reached to the effect that true ancient science
and true modern science both have reality as their measure which is contrary to a common erroneous belief that they are in some ways based upon
preconceived " a priori " sources. It was concluded that both the ancients
and the moderns in actual practice put their conclusions to the test of
reality. Another general conclusion outlined was in regard to modem logic
as the logic of science. It was concluded that true " traditional logic "
does not contradict the " consistency " principle of hypothetical logic but
rather includes it. Neither is it true that the progress of modem science
is the consequence of the overthrow of Aristotelianism. It was further
concluded that there is a modem tendency on the part of other
sciences to yield to the temptation to imitate the formalism of " ideal "
physics, and that real physics along with the other sciences have much to
do in regard to the clarification of their own fundamental premises and
objectives.
The objective of this, the first summer session of the Lyceum, was this
presentation of a " tentative outline of a unified natural science." Certainly
progress was made and is here well outlined.
To some, the unsatisfactoriness in the conclusion as tentative might be
the sign of failure again. To those who for some time have sought in vain
for a solution; to those who have actively argued with· philosophers and
scientists with a view to the unification of the sciences, this lack of a
definitive gilt-edge solution is really a sign of encouragement. This seems
the healthiest start yet. It proposes no more in the conclusion than a
" tentative outline of a unified natural science," but progress was made in
the direction of the ultimate goal and this progress is here well outlined.
I am sure that those interested in the objective of the unification of the
natural sciences can profit immensely by the work already accomplished
by the Lyceum.
Attempts at criticizing science from without have been fruitless. There
are many ways in which science is autonomous and hence many places· of
refuge in the face of criticism. An underlying principle in the attempts of
the Lyceum is the most laudable principle of self-criticism. This can, I
believe, be a successful endeavor because the scientists themselves can

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come to realize that basic principles and presuppositions need to be understood and vindicated and that the formal, efficient and final causes must
be taken into account in the structure of any science. No one wants to
shackle true scientific progress with out-moded tools or methods. It is
true, however, that what is old is not necessarily out-moded. It may be that
the very heart of the present crisis of the sciences of nature is the loss of
foundation and hence ultimate direction which can be recovered by the
methods of the Lyceum.
Other centers of collaboration could be set up with profit, perhaps through
affiliation with the Albertus Magnus Lyceum, for they have learned much
by a good -start. It would be difficult to read this work without regretting
that you were not present to protest a point, to make a point, to clarify a
distinction.
The nature of the material reported will excuse some of the minor
shortcomings of the work.
RoY BoDE

The Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. C.

BRIEF NOTICES
The Work of Theology. By FRANcisco P. MuNIZ, 0. P. Translated by
JoHN P. REm, 0. P. Washington, D. C.: The Thomist Press, 1953.
Pp. 50. $.60.
An essential requisite for a good theologian is that he have a correct
notion of the nature of theology. Among theologians themselves there has
long been a tendency to place the definition of theology in the genus of
science. Fr. Mufiiz contends that this is too narrow a concept of theology;
moreover, it is not the way St. Thomas conceives of sacred doctrine.
Taking a higher view, therefore, Fr. Mufiiz defines it as "a discursive
wisdom, exercised under the light of divine revelation, on every truth
revealed by God, either immediately and formally, or mediately and
virtually." This is based on an analogy taken from the teaching of St.
Thomas himself: as understanding is to wisdom, so faith is to theology.
Fr. Muniz then proceeds to show how the habit of theology functions in
the various potential parts, with regard to the object and subject, with
regard to theology itself as a science, and with regard to other human
sciences. He concludes with a beautiful description of the sublime goal
that is held out to anyone who would become the perfect theologian.
The inclusion in a later edition of this monograph of the diagram which
accompanied the original article showing the whole of theology and its
parts would add greatly to the value and utility of this work. (Cf.
Angelicum, XXIV, 1947, insert pp. 120-1.)

The Philosophy of Human Nature. By GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ, S. J.
New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953. Pp. 444 with index. $3.50.
One of the most impressive evidences of the vitality of Thomistic philosophy and of its growing importance among the intellectual currents
affecting life in the English-speaking section of the world is the increasing
number and high quality of the books available in the field. No longer must
the student seek in vain adequate texts or reading material, and no longer
can the ignorance of careless and casual despisers of Thomistic thought
be excused on the basis of a lack of articulate presentation. The basic
formulation of the best human thinking in the main line of the great tradition of philosophy is once more flowing into the stream of English and
American literature.
The Philosophy of Human Nature, by Father Klubertanz, S. J. of St.

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273

Louis University, is a worthy addition to the steady stream of books
explaining and defending a sane philosophy of man. As an exposition
based on the thought of St. Thomas and at the same time coming to grips
with problems that have since arisen, it is adequate in content and well
written. The philosophical psychology of Aquinas has been thoroughly
digested by the author and is expounded with keen insight into its significance. There is throughout the work an insistence on evidence and a
reliance on experience comparable to the best writing in the Thomistic
tradition. And the fact that the author is not merely repeating or compiling stale formulas, but rather offering the considered product of his own
lively thinking gives the book a vitality that captures the reader's interest
and carries him eagerly from topic to topic. The style is generally lucid
and interesting, and is the result of a constant striving for accuracy of
expression that is in most cases achieved. Even where this accuracy of
expression is likely to cause difficulty to the superficial student there is no
talking down but rather an attempt to explain that frequently is highly
successful.
The result is an unusually fine textbook saturated with the wisdom of
St. Thomas and the other great investigators of the problems of human
nature. Original in arrangement and method it is geared to the demands
of the modern mind. Its very completeness, which could be a stumbling
block to some students, will be an added incentive to the more serious, and
the author has marked by asterisks those sections which can easily be
omitted in the interest of brevity. The definitions are usually good, the
readings at the end of each chapter well selected, and they cannot fail to
be helpful to an inquiring mind. An abundance of footnotes will lighten
the task of the teacher and aid the student by eliminating many sources of
confusion and misunderstanding, particularly those that occur because of
terminology.
The author's introduction is an invaluable aid to students wondering
about the differences between the philosophical and scientific approaches
to the study of man, and while it does not attempt to solve all the
problems, nonetheless it should be an effectual antidote against a " scientistic " attitude toward knowledge. The chapter on " The Unity of Man "
is, in general, clear and satisfying; its one fault is a failure to relate the
unity of man at once and explicitly to the hylomorphic doctrine which
is curiously left unemphasized in this and the following chapter. The
treatment of knowledge leaves little to be desired; most of the initial
difficulties of students are anticipated and completely met. The emphasis
on the passive nature of the powers of knowledge is sound, but it should
be counter-balanced to avoid misunderstanding; these powers are really
passivo-active.
The perennial difficulty of settling upon an English terminology that
will be presently significant yet related to the classical Latin expressions

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has been faced bravely and with success in some cases, but it is questionable whether the use of " the unifying sense " for the sensus communis
offers any advantage, since unifying is not its only function nor even its
chief one. Perhaps St. Thomas himself wrestled with the same problem.
In the discussion of the internal senses are to be found the weakest places
in the book. The definition of an internal sense as "a sense power which
deals with an object already known by one or more of the external senses "
(p. 150) is very bad, not only because it is so ambiguous as to be meaningless but because it misses the whole point which involves not time but
the mediation of the external senses between the internal senses and
the object. And there are several other difficulties in the description of
the internal senses. The author seems to dislike the term " expressed
species " and uses consistently the simpler word " image " which he prefers
to relate solely to the imagination. Yet the argument admitted as demonstrative in the case of the imagination (p. 140, footnote) seems equally
demonstrative as applied to the memorative and estimative powers. This
is of minor import since the question is obscure, but it is difficult to escape
a feeling of confusion when we are told that in imagining a mythical
object (e. g. a winged horse) "the only object I can be said to be imagining
is the image itself." This surely cannot be intended in its obvious subjectivistic sense, but it could easily be so understood. The difficulty is
probably a matter of expression and emphasis but could be baffling to
students. Another absolute statement to which exception may be taken
is that " every sense perception of a thing as a distinct object involves an
act of the estimative power." (p. 150) Is this true? Finally, in writing
about the appetites, the author reverses the usual procedure by treating
the will first and then the sensory appetites, but he gives a good reason
for so doing and the treatment is sound and exhaustive. This very completeness is sometimes permitted to blur the main outline of the discussion,
but again it is always possible to omit the sections pointed out by asterisks.
These few points are obviously of minor importance and in no way
detract from the general excellence of the work which we are certain will
see extensive service as a text. Professors and students alike are in debt
to Father Klubertanz for making this volume available.

Avicenna's Psychology. By F. RAHMAN.
Press, 1952. Pp. 139. $2.50.

London:

Oxford University

This book is substantially the contents of a doctoral dissertation presented to the University of Oxford in 1949. The full Arabic text has been
omitted but copious notes refer to variant readings and possible textual
emendations. As we have it the English translation gives a clear idea of
Avicenna's psychology in the general framework of his Physics. It casts

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a good deal of light on such topics as the practical intellect, the grades
of abstraction, proofs of the immortality of the soul and the denial of the
transmigration of the soul, which were not found in the psychology text
published by Landauer in 1875.
In format the actual 45 pages of text are preceded by an Introduction of
23 pages and followed by a Commentary with historical and explanatory
notes covering 59 pages. Unfortunately sections of the Introduction become
quite frequently just prolix discussions of the historical development of a
concept. It would have been more advantageous to have integrated such
discussions into the Commentary. On the other hand, it seems that much
of the simple summarizing of the contents of the chapters would have
been better placed in the general framework of the Introduction, which
already contains much of the same material.
Not everyone familiar with the content and development of Aristotelian
philosophy will agree with certain evaluations and interpretations in the
Introduction and Commentary which seem to be wedded to just one
element in the long tradition, that of Alexander of Aphrodisias. This would
explain the author's difficulty in understanding Avicenna's treatment of the
immortality of the human soul and his distinction between soul, viewed
in general just as soul, and human soul. At times it appears somewhat
difficult to equate the introductory analysis with the text itself which
follows. E. g. the author's interpretation of perception as merely " passive
reception of the form of the sensible object . . ." (p. 7) seems to be a
strange introduction to the translated text: "Tht; forms of all the sensibles
reach the organs of sense and are imprinted on them, and then the faculty
of sensation perceives them." (p. 9!7 italics mine.) For the most part the
whole subject of analogous predication has been ignored and as a result
many problems are presented in hopeless confusion as completely insoluble
and/ or meaningless.
Though the reviewer is unable to compare the translation with the
original text, the English version appears to convey the general impression
of fidelity to Avicenna's philosophical position in psychological studies
presented in other writings. It makes a welcome contribution to the
advancement of Avicennian studies. The Introduction and Commentary
should be read and weighed with careful, critical attention.

Right and Reason, Ethics in Theory and Practice. By AusTIN FAGOTHEY,
S. J. St. Louis: C. V. Mosby, 1953. Pp. 583 with index. $5.75.
The aim of the author is a college text which would be dear and
readable, avoiding both popularity and technicality. The whole of general
and special ethics is treated with sufficient explanation of the main points
of doctrine and with good bibliographies at the end of each chapter. While

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BRIEF NOTICES

there is abundant citation of other schools of thought, the author states
his allegiance to the Aristotelian-Thomistic system. However, students of
St. Thomas will at times be dismayed by the positions the author assumes.
For one thing, the norm of morality is said to be human nature taken
completely, while both Aristotle and Saint Thomas held that the proximate norm was recta ratio. Significantly, little attention is given to the
virtue of prudence which occupied a keystone position in AristotelianThomistic ethics. The emphasis falls here rather on law, obligation and
conscience giving the work an unbalance which is not to be found in St.
Thomas.

Ontologie-Versuch Einer Grundlegung. By CAsPAR NINK, S. J. Freiburg:
Pp. 508.
DM.
Herder,
This book characterized by the author as based upon the traditional
Aristotelianism and the metaphysics of the Schoolmen, is truly a neoscholastic work in ontology. It follows the three-fold classical division:
being and its constituent principles; the transcendentals; and substance
and acci · ·nts. Throughout the work the problems of modern philosophy
are cons1uered, particularly those of the German transcendentalists.
The author's fundamental thesis is that the intrinsic principles of being
have a natural and logical priority, to being, and although formally distinct are really identical in the indivisible unity of being. The four constituent principles of being-the essence or nature, the principle of singularity in general, the principle of individuation, and existence-are related
to each other as potency and act, which relation is. one of real identity and
formal distinction. This thesis is expounded with near classical dignity
in a logical and systematic manner. However, the author does not take
into sufficient account other scholastic opinions or objections to. his thesis,
and such allusions as are made are hardly adequate to clearly delineate
the difficulties.

The Good in Existential Metaphysics. By ELIZABETH G. SALMON.
waukee: Marquette University Press, 1953. Pp. 93.
This little book is the Aquinas Lecture delivered at Marquette University
in March,
and published one year later. The title is misleading. Not
one word is devoted to the metaphysics of existentialism, the notion of
good in existentialism, or any other phase of existentialism. A correct title
would be " The relation between the metaphysical good and the moral good
in Thomistic metaphysics." No doubt Dr. Salmon, by her choice of title,
meant to imply that Thomism is an existentialism or the existentialism.
There is much to be said for such a conviction, as M. Maritain's Existence
and the Existent demonstrated. But the identification of Existential meta-

BRIEF NOTICES

277

physics with Thomistic metaphysics, however true, is not so self-evidently
true as to be merely assumed without one word of explanation.
The specific problem Dr. Salmon sets herself is to determine the precise
point of intersection between the metaphysical notion of the good and the
moral notion. Her conclusion is that ". . . the ontological good in reference
to the maintenance of man as rational constitutes the basis of moral goodness." However, "the ideal, then, for man, would be that condition in
which the end, Pure Existence, could be present to man as an Existent .
. . ." (p. 74) Thus the Beatific Vision is seen as the supernatural coincidence of man's moral good with the highest ontological good.
This is a scholarly lecture, like most of those in the Marquette series.
But Dr.
gifts of communication do not do full justice here to her
gifts in philosophy. That she is a woman given to thought is evident.
That she evokes thought in others is not so evident here.

The Philosophy of Science. By STEPHEN TouLMIN. New York: Longmans,
Green, 1953. Pp. 184 with index. $2.40.
This book is an attempt to follow Einstein's advice and bring the
general reader into closer contact with what scientists actually do rather
than with what they say about their methods. Problems which puzzle the
layman when reading about the so-called exact sciences are touched upon
in order to show by simple examples some of the steps from common
sense to modern science. The meaning of discovery and the function of
explanations, the use of mathematical methods, the role of theories,
hypotheses and laws of nature, uniformity and determinism are all discussed from the point of view of the practicing scientist rather than from
basic principles.
In physical science mathematical methods and mechanical models are
fruitfully applied wherever familiar phenomena can be viewed in a new
light which reveals the mathematical form of the law and which permits
valid inference. By contrast the natural scientist, who cannot apply
mathematics as does the physicist, is said to be content with the appearance
and habits of organisms and to seek merely the law of the form. Laws
do indeed permit inference in special cases, but neither laws nor theories
are causal. The scientist presumes the formal applicability of laws to the
phenomena, but he does not assume the uniformity of nature or the universal validity of laws. Determinism is found in our inferential processes
rather than in things. Yet there may be an objective foundation for the
principles of physics and for our scientific procedures. "It is as a result
of experience that we find out what are the rational ways of studying the
world and its contents." (p. 154)
The ways here described are not profound enough to reveal the basic
principles of natural things and of physical and natural science.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Copi, Irving M. Symbolic Logic. New York:
with index. $5.00.

Macmillan, 1954. Pp.

Dooyeweerd, Herman. (tr. by David H. Freeman and William S. Young)
A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Vol. I. Philadelphia: The
Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1953. Pp. 605. $36.00 for
IV Volume sets only.
Dunkerley, Roderic. The Hope of Jesus. London:
236 with index. 15s.

Longmans, 1953. Pp.

Gaynor, Frank. (ed.) Dictionary of Mysticism. New York: Philosophical
$5.00.
Library, 1953. Pp.
Guzzo, Augusto. (tr. by M. L. Roure.) La Philosophie de Demain. Paris:
Editiones Montaignes, 1953. Pp. 108. Fr. 345.
Highet, Gilbert. Man's Unconquerable Mind. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954.
148. $:e.75.
Houde, Roland and Fischer, Jerome J. Handbook of Logic. Dubuque:
Wm. C. Brown, 1954. Pp. 174 with index. $2.65 ..

---.

Workbook of Logic. Dubuque:

Wm. C. Brown, 1954. Pp. 138.

$1.75.

Klauser, Theodore. A Brief History of Liturgy. Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1954. Pp. 32.
La Farge, S. J., John. The Manner is Ordinary. New York:
Brace, 1954. Pp. 416 with index. $4.75.

Harcourt,

Lawrence, 0. S. B., Emeric A. The Week With Christ. Collegeville: The
Liturgical Press, 1953. Pp.
Cloth, $2.50. Paper, $1.50.
Meyer, 0. S. F., Sr. Mary Edgar. The Sources of Hojeda's La Cristiada.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1953. Pp. 245 with index.
$5.00.

Nuttin, Joseph. Tache Reussite et Echec. Antwerp: Standaard-Boekhandel, 1953. Pp. 540 with index. Bound, F. 330. Paper, F.
Raeymaeker, de, Louis. (tr. by Edmund H. Ziegelmeyer, S. J.) The Philosophy of Being. St. Louis: Herder, 1954. Pp. 372 with index. $4.95.

278

279

BOOKS RECEIVED

Ricciotti, Giuseppe. (tr. by Alba Zizzamia.) Paul the Apostle. Milwaukee:
Bruce, 1953. Pp. 551 with index. $7.50.
Rouget, 0. P., A.M. (tr. by Carisbrooke Dominicans.) Holy Mass.
Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1953. Bound, $1.75. Paper, $.90.
Samuel, Otto. A Foundation of Ontology. New York:
Library, 1953. Pp. 170 with index. $3.75.

Philosophical

Sartre, Jean-Paul. (tr. by Hazel E. Barnes.) Existential Psychoanalysis.
New York, Philosophical Library, 1953. Pp. !il83 with index. $4.75.
Seynaeve, W. F., Jaak. Cardinal Newman's Doctrine on Holy Scripture.
Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1953. Pp. 596.
Smith, 0. P., Raymond. Whitehead's Concept of Logic. Westminster:
Newman, 1953. Pp. 188. $3.00.
Spier, J. M. An Introduction to Christian Philosophy. Philadelphia: The
Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1953. Pp. 9!69. $3.75.
Starsser, Stephan. (tr. by Jean-Paul Wurtz.) Le Probleme de L'Ame.
Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1953. Pp. !il72.
$3.60.

Trueblood, E. J. The Dawn of the Post-Modern Era. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. Pp. 196 with index. $3.75.
Unger, 0. F. M. Cap., Dominic. The First Gospel, Genesis 3:15. St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: The Franciscan Institute. Pp. 37!il with index.
Vecchio, del, Giorgio. (tr. by Thomas Owen Martin.) Philosophy of Law.
Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America, 1953. Pp.
498 with index. $6.50.
Warnach, Viktor.
with index.

Agape.

DUsseldorf:

Warnock, G. J. Berkeley. Baltimore:
index. $.50.

Patmos-Verlag,

l95L

Pp. 751

Penguin Books, 1954. Pp. 251 with

Weiser, Francis X. The Easter Book. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1954.
Pp. !il24 with index. $3.00.
Westacott, E. Roger Bacon in Life and Legend. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1953. Pp. 152 with index. $3.75.