THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS:

THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PRoVINCE oF ST. JosEPH
Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

VoL. XVII

OCTOBER, 1954

No.4

EMMANUEL SUAREZ
OF THE
ORDER OF PREACHERS

(1895-1954)

T

HE THO MIST has not often intruded

editorially upon
its readers. Although its original plan proposed a
regular department of editorials, the actual development of the character of the review seemed to preclude frequent
editorializing. For THE THOMIST is a speculative review, and
as speculative has concerned itself with the world of ideas rather
than the world of personalities. Accordingly, while writers and
reviewers have assumed responsibility for their ideas and criticisms, the editors themselves have chosen to remain anonymous
and have applied themselves to the judgment of ideas and
criticisms insofar as they were well thought and well expressed,
without editorial statement of agreement or disagreement.

422

EDITORIAL

Thus in fifteen years of publication THE THOMIST has spoken
as a corporate entity once with a word of introduction to its
objectives, several times with words of appraisal about the
attainment of those objectives. There have been as few departures in the matter of personality. Only twice has THE
THOMIST offered personal tribute, once to Jacques Maritain as
an outstanding Thomistic philosopher, once to the memory of
Father Walter Farrell as an outstanding Thomistic theologian
and one of its original editors.
Now, however, since the editors are not altogether anonymous, but as proclaimed in each issue, Dominican Fathers of
the Province of Saint Joseph, they deem it only fitting and
proper that they should pay personal and filial tribute to the
memory of their Father General recently dead. While it is true
that Father Emmanuel Suarez will not be remembered primarily as an author of speculative theology and philosophy, as
were several former Masters General like Cardinal Cajetan and
Sylvester of Ferrara, his attainments in related fields, his
brilliant work of administration and his direct encouragement
and assistance to those engaged in speculation richly deserve
commemoration and honor.
Emmanuel Suarez was born November fifth, 1895, at Herias
in the Asturias of Spain. He entered the Dominican Order as
a young man of eighteen and was ordained to the priesthood in
1920. Except for a brief period of teaching philosophy, his
entire career, which was to last almost thirty-five years, was
devoted to legal study, teaching and administration. Having
obtained his Lectorate in Theology at Salamanca, he received
two doctorates in law, one in Roman Law at the Apollinaris,
the other in Canon Law at the Angelico. His professorial career
in law likewise began in Rome at the Angelico, and in due time
his care to show the theological principles of the law won for
him the Order's highest i'ntellectual distinction, the Masterate
in Sacred Theology. A year later he
Dean of the Canon
Law faculty at the Angelicum, then later its Rector Magnificus,
in which capacity he served until his election as General in
1946. During this period of teaching and academic administra-

EMMANUEL SUAREZ, 1895-1954

tion, Father Suarez wrote many articles of scholarly interest
and published his treatise De Remotione Parochorum. The
Spanish Government honored him for his intellectual attainments with membership in the Superior Council of Scientific
Investigations, and awarded him the Grand Cross of Isabel the
Catholic.
Even before he was make General, he had served the Holy
See with devotion and fidelity in many of the Sacred Congregations, Commissions and Tribunals of Rome. His work was so
highly esteemed that he was persuaded to continue even after
he was charged with the heavy burden of the care of his own
Order. His magnificant work as a churchman and as an agent
of the Holy See, like Saint Dominic himself, ceased only with
his death. This labor for the Church was not confined to any
limited sphere of activity; not only was he, in virtue of his
office as General of the Dominicans, Consultor to the Supreme
Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, but also Consultor of
the Sacred Congregations of the Council, for the Oriental
Church, of the Discipline of the Sacraments and of Religious;
a member of the Commission of Judgment of Matrimonial
Cases and of the Commission of Vigilance of the Ecclesiastical
Tribunals for the Congregation of the Sacraments; a consultor
of the Commission for the Authentic Interpretation of the
Canons of the Code; an advocate of the Sacred Roman Rota;
a Pro-Synodal Judge of the Tribunal of the Vicariate of Rome;
and a Pro-Defender of the Bond at the Sacred Roman Rota.
When Father Suarez was elected eightieth General of the
Order of Preachers, the Order like the Church herself was
passing through a most critical period. A great world war was
hardly over; its aftermath was all too evident not only in the
physical ruins which scarred the face of the earth in Europe
and in Asia but also in the spiritual wreckage of the souls of
men, a wreckage which sometimes manifested itself jn an
uneasy restiveness and an impatient contempt for all which
was traditional. In another sense, the war was still not over,
for half the world groaned under the tyrannical domination of
a God-hating power. Father Suarez had himself encountered

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EDITORIAL

anti-religious persecution in his native Spain during its civil
war and had narrowly escaped. Now through the Iron Curtain
trickled word of entire provinces hampered in their apostolic
work and persecuted in their property and persons. But the
work of zeal went forward as new provinces were erected and
their apostolic labors begun, old provinces congratulated yet
exhorted to expand themselves and their apostolate.
In all his administrative work, the seventy-ninth vicar of
Saint Dominic never forgot the profound doctrinal implications
in his unique title as Master General and Professor of Sacred
Theology. In this, his vicar especially resembled Saint Dominic
himself, for although no theological writing of that holy
Patriarch has been preserved for us, history assures us that
he was an excellent theologian, Doctor Veritatis. What has
indeed been preserved is that admirable plan of practical
genius, the Constitutions of the Friars Preachers. Thus, while
Saint Dominic has been overshadowed at times in the eyes of
the intellectual world by some of his illustrious sons like Saint
Thomas, those who know the Constitutions know that it was
Saint Dominic who was the wise architect who laid the foundation, that Saint Dominic was the creator of the doctrinal
milieu which gave Saint Thomas and other doctors their
opportunity. Saint Thomas himself in speaking of the office of
the wise man (I Cont. Gent., c. 1) says that men are called wise
who direct things and govern them well.
For these last eight years Emmanuel Suarez, following in
the footsteps of Saint Dominic, has been the wise governor
and director of the Dominican apostolate. As a director and
governor his contribution to that doctrinal apostolate has not
been simply that of negative toleration or permission but that
of a very positive insph:ation and encouragement. On his first
visit to the College of the Immaculate Conception which houses
the editorial offices of THE THOMIST, he spoke with inspiring
audacity of fields white for harvest, of the needed growth of the
Dominicans and their apostolate. The scene could only recall
the first dispersal of the astonished brethren when Saint
Dominic announced: " We must sow the seed, not hoard it."

EMMANUEL SUAREZ, 1895-1954

425

The efforts of Father Suarez went far beyond inspmng
exhortation. At the Angelicum in Rome he fostered Institutes
of Spirituality and Social Studies even as he extended the
material facilities of that international college. The Dominican
Faculty at Salamanca, which had been the scene of such fruitful
scholasticism in the past, was now raised to the status of a
Pontifical Faculty of Theology. At Fatima a new house of
studies was erected. The Order no sooner received the care of
the Basilica of Saint Nicholas at Bari than another house of
studies was founded there. In Protestant Finland, the Studium
Catholicum, a cultural center was opened. The work of the
Leonine Commission for the critical edition of all the works of
Saint Thomas was reactivated, and its fruit has been evident
in the volumes currently appearing. And throughout the Order,
the General encouraged the continuation and amplification of
the intellectual life even as more material resources were provided for that life. Maintaining careful vigilance for Catholic
tradition and the teaching of Saint Thomas, the General did
not hesitate to encourage movements to bring Theology to
everyman-Theology for the Laity, Institutes of Spirituality
and Theology for Religious and Theology for Colleges. "We
must sow the seed, not hoard it."
Very particularly, THE THOMIST owes a special debt of
gratitude to the memory of Emmanuel Suarez. In letters to our
review, which was but seven years old when he assumed office,
the former Master General wrote: " The continued success of
your worthy review is a constant source of satisfaction to me,
and I encourage you to continue your loyal and self-sacrificing
labors in this great undertaking." In this same letter he invoked God's abundant blessing and the special protection of the
Angelic Doctor. In another autographed letter, he wrote of
" this important apostolate, the noble work of diffusing for the
good of souls the doctrine of Saint Thomas, that doctrine which
the Holy Father is pleased to speak of as ' efficacissima '
(Humani Generis, AAS, XXXXII, 1950, p. 573) ."
Any success THE TnoMIST may have enjoyed for half its
existence is in no small measure attributable to the patronage

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EDITORIAL

and direction of Father Suarez. For just as no Christian may
take full credit for his good works, realizing that he is an
unprofitable servant depending on the grace of God both to
will and to accomplish, somewhat analogously, no production
of a religious or group of religious may be said to be exclusively
their work, since as men subject to obedience, their will and
accomplishment is the will and accomplishment of their
superiors.
Thus, in recognition of the personal qualities of that noble
and generous soul and in gratitude for his paternal solicitude,
THE THOMIST honors the memory of Father Emmanuel Suarez
and prays for his eternal rest. Requiescat in pace.

*

*

*

*

In the interim until the election of another Master· General,
the Most Reverend T. S. McDermott, O.P., S. T. M. is the
supreme head of the Order as its Vicar General. As Provincial
of the Province of Saint Joseph, Father McDermott has had
direct and immediate care of THE THOMIST from its very
inception. Not only was this review founded at his personal
direction and command but has been constantly sustained by
his vigilant interest. He has supplied members of the Staff and
has encouraged the other members of his province to assist
THE THOMIST by the contribution of articles and reviews.
On a wider stage, Father McDermott has had long and
valuable experience in the direction of a multitude of works
in one of the largest provinces of the Order. In the years of his
Provincialate, the eastern part of the United States has witnessed a wonderful growth of the Dominicans both in men and
in the expansion of the apostolate. Parishes have increased and
multiplied, the work of preaching and giving retreats has gone
steadily forward.
On the educational scene especially, Father McDermott has
made some profound contributions, the full fruits of which will
not mature for years to come. However, even now the College
at Providence has had a phenomenal growth with nearly eighty
on the Dominican faculty and some seventeen hundred
students. The educational efforts of Father McDermott's

EMMANUEL SUAREZ, 1895-1954

427

province, nevertheless, have by no means been confined to
Dominican institutions but have branched out into other
Catholic and even some non-Catholic colleges and universities.
Of the greatest assistance in the preparation of these professors,
who are for the most part philosophers and theologians, was
the elevation under Father McDermott's care of the faculty of
the Washington House of Studies to a Pontifical Faculty of
Theology, with the right to grant, over and above the degrees
of the Order, papal degrees including the doctorate. Since the
inception of this Faculty over two hundred degrees in Theology
have been given. The graduates have gone out not only to
teach in colleges for men and women, but to give series of
Thomistic lectures to adults, especially professional groups, in
the major cities. Every summer over twenty institutions staffed
by these Dominican professors open their doors to Religious
Sisters pursuing a three to six-year course in the Summa of
Saint Thomas and allied subjects.
With such rich experience in his own Province, Father
McDermott comes well qualified to direct the work of the entire
Order. THE THOMIST offers the Most Reverend Vicar General
of the Order best wishes and prayers for abundant success in
his new work.

MARY IMMACULATE, PATRONESS OF
THE UNITED STATES

T

HE liturgy of the Church, as well as popular devotion,
perpetuates the venerable tradition by which special
patrons are invoked as special intercessors with God
and celestial advocates, so to speak, for particular localities,
groups or works within that Universal Church for which Christ
Himself makes constant intercession before the Throne of the
}'ather.
Such patrons probably began to be chosen as an outgrowth
from the early Church custom of honoring certain martyrs as
the "titulars" of churches and places. During the first three
centuries the faithful assembled for worship in private homes,
in the places where their beloved dead were buried or in other
secluded areas where neither the persecution nor the contamination of the paganism about them could invade the peace and
quiet of the Christian devotion. As occasion permitted, buildings were erected or adapted for Christian cult. These buildings
were not "dedicated" to saints originally, as churches and
institutions now are, but were set apart and cherished as
"houses of God" or "houses of prayer." Their Greek and
Latin names indicate this primary dedication of them: kyriaca,
dominica, oratoria.
It was only after Constantine accorded to Christians peaceful freedom in the practice of their religion and in the construction of churches that these began to be dedicated to saints.
The origin of the custom of so dedicating the gathering places
of the faithful seems natural enough. The sites chosen for the
construction of churches were usually places already beloved
by the Christian community because of their association with
the martyrs, greatest of the heroes among the Christians. The
association might have been because they were the scenes of
the triumphs of martyrs, of their glorious deaths, or because
428

MARY IMMACULATE,

PATRONESS OF THE UNITED STATES

429

they were made holy in some other way by the lives and the
memories of those who bore ultimate and most valiant witness
to their faith by the testimony of martyrdom.
And so it came to pass that early in the history of the Church
in Rome and elsewhere the buildings erected for Christian
worship took their titles from " titulars " among the martyrs
or other saints whose pious memories were associated with the
places on which the churches were built or with the communities by whom these buildings were erected, supported or frequented. It was inevitable, both as a matter of logic and as
a matter of piety, that those who gave their names to churches
and to institutions as their " titulars " should eventually be
thought of as the special protectors and " patrons " of the
places and peoples dedicated to them.

*

*

*

In general terms it may be said that down to the 17th century
it was largely popular devotion, though under the guidance of
ecclesiastical authority, which chose celestial patrons from
among the holy men and women renowned in life for their
miracles and for their special ties of piety to the communities
or institutions of which they became the protectors. In 1638,
however, Pope Urban VIII set down certain rules by which the
faithful of the Church itself should be guided in the selections
·henceforth of patrons for churches, cities or even countries.
Pope Urban was careful in thus codifying future procedure to
leave unchanged the long established customs by which traditional patrons were already venerated so long as these customs
were consistent with sound piety and theological principles.
The norms promulgated by Pope Urban systematized and
clarified many of the considerations by which particular patrons
had been chosen popularly in previous generations. Often a
saint was chosen as the patron of a region or of a community
because his body or some one of his major relics was in the
possession of those who chose him as their patron. Frequently,
a saint was chosen as patron of a place where he had preached
Gospel or had performed the labors of his dedicated life
had died in the odor of sanctity. Sometimes the selection of

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JOHN WRIGHT

patrons reflects the popular devotions preached at the time
when the choice was made.
The underlying doctrine sustaining and inspiring the custom
of choosing celestial patrons is, of course, the dogma of the
Communion of Saints. This dogma proclaims the spiritual bond
which exists among all those who love God and are thus united
to Him, whether by vision in Heaven or by faith on earth and
in Purgatory. The solidarity which unites those who love God,
whether they be in the Church Militant here below or in the
Church Suffering and the Church Triumphant in Purgatory
and in Heaven hereafter, causes one and all to be interested in
the fate of each. Those who are still on earth, and therefore
still able to merit by their prayers and their sacrifices, are the
advocates of the holy souls detained
the prison of love that
is Purgatory. Those who now stand unspotted before God's
merciful face serve as advocates for their brethren both m
Purgatory and on earth. Even their heavenly advocacy or
patronage, a Christian instinct assures us, will inevitably
the ties between them
colored and intensified as a result
the places or persons on earth that perpetuate their names as
"titulars" and patrons.

*

*

*

Against the background of this summary history and even
more sketchily summarized doctrine it is interesting to recall
how the Blessed Mother, under her title of the ·Immaculate
Conception, came to be chosen as the celestial patroness of the
United States. A preliminary observation is important and
interesting. On November 8, 1760 Our Lady, under her same
title of the Immaculate Conception, had been proclaimed principal patroness of all possessions of the Spanish Crown, including those in the Americas.
At the sixth Provincial Council of Baltimore, May 10, 1846
(with 23 Bishops and the representatives of four religious orders
present) , the Blessed Virgin Mary " conceived without original
sin " was chosen as the Patroness of the Province. On February
7, 1847 this selection of the Blessed Virgin Mary, under the
title of her Immaculate Conception, was extended so as to

MARY IMMACULATE,

PATRONESS

OF THE UNITED STATES

431

make her a principal patroness of the whole United States of
America. The first Plenary Council of Baltimore, May 9-20,
1852, confirmed all the enactments of the seven Provincial
Councils.
This choice of Our Lady under the title of the Immaculate
Conception to be patroness of the United States is considered
thus meditatively by Daniel Sargent in his book, Our Land

and our Lady:
In 1846, not long after the native American riots, there met in
Baltimore -the sixth provincial council. While it was meeting, the
armies of the United States were entering New Mexico and California. We were taking over more lands which the Spaniards had
dedicated to the Immaculate Conception. Those in the council
were not thinking of the invading armies. They had no way of
knowing even whether they were conquering or being conquered.
Yet they seemed unconsciously in one act of theirs to be preparing
our land to take over Spain's old responsibilities. Twenty years of
the Deluge had tightened the bond between the Church in our
country and the Mother of God. It was a spontaneous act, therefor, when in this council permission was sought from Rome that
we be allowed to elect as our patroness, her, who to the immigrants
was not only their life, their sweetness and their hope, but also
their only true equality, only true liberty, only true fraternity, the
" Blessed Virgin Conceived Without Sin " ( op. cit., p. 187) .
The fact that this petition for the designation of the Immaculate Conception as the patroness of the United States was
made eight years before the solemn definition of the dogma in
her regard has always been a further joy to Catholic Americans.
One cannot doubt that it has also been a source of special graces
to the United States and, one ventures to say, to the hierarchy
which officially took the action by which this happy choice was
made in 1846. It is surely not too much to suggest that the
Blessed Mother must have exercised a providential patronage
over the proceedings of the Plenary Council itself and, as a
result, over the myriad aspects of Catholic American life subsequently influenced by it.
The theological premises of the invocation of patrons which
we have recalled remind us of the inward spiritual union

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JOHN WRIGHT

the faithful, as members of Christ's Mystical Body, with all
other members of this Body, including the elect and the confirmed in justice whose participation in the Kingdom of God is
absolutely certain and through whose intercession help may
be given to the faithful still wayfaring on earth.
The intercessory power of the servants of Christ who have
triumphed through His grace is great before the throne of God.
How much greater is the power of her who is not only a servant
of God but the Mother of His Incarnate Son? Christ gave His
.Mother to all Christians on Calvary. The universal Catholic
people have taken Mary to themselves by their creed and their
cult, but Catholic Americans have made her their especial
patroness by the deliberate and formal action of the special
representatives of her Son in His Church in the United States.
The ties that bind us to the Immaculate Mother are therefore many and strong. The needs of the Church and of the
members of Christ's Mystical Body in the United States are
many and urgent. There is no one who can intercede for us
with Christ more effectively than His Mother. The consequences of her patronage for us cannot be exaggerated and
should not be minimized. Catholic Americans are Mary's
devotees by the added title of her election as our principal
patroness.
What the spiritual princes of an older day and world, supported by the piety of the subjects of their kings, did for Mary
in France and Spain, the bishops of America, seconded by the
believing citizens of our democracy, have in our days done for
her here. Sound reason and simple faith agree in suggesting
that Mary, as patroness of our land, will benignly insure among
us victories for faith and freedom comparable to those which
once she accomplished there.
WRIGHT

Bishop of Worcester

MARY IMMACULATE IN THE WRITINGS OF
ST. THOMAS

I

N this year dedicated to Our Lady Thomists have reason
to rejoice in St. Thomas' reverent and profound tribute to
the God-bearer; reason to rejoice in his many and masterful contributions to Christian understanding of the mystery
that is Mary.
But there is also the kindly suspicion that in this centenary
of the definition of the Virgin's Immaculate Conception the
followers of Thomas have not too much to rejoice in; for it
seems that in this very question of the Immaculate Conception
is St. Thomas' greatest-if not unique-theological failure.
Certainly the opinion that St. Thomas denied the Immaculate
Conception is both widespread and readily defended.
Perhaps nowhere more fittingly than in the pages of The
Thomist could there appear at this time of intense cultivation
of Mariology a re-examination of the text, context, and general
background of St. Thomas' teaching on Our Lady's primitive
sanctification. The study has but one purpose: to reproduce,
in its entirety, Aquinas' view of this mystery. Our procedure,
therefore, must be very simple: we shall examine first the texts
of St. Thomas which seem, either explicitly or implicitly, to
favor the Immaculate Conception; secondly we shall indicate
the three classes of texts which seem opposed to the dogma;
thirdly we shall examine closely the wording, context, and background of the principal texts.
That we approach this re-examination without pre-convictions is suggested first by reverence for so great a Doctor of the
Church as Thomas; for, as Pope Pius XI reminded us all, in
honoring Thomas we honor the authority of the teaching
Church. 1 It is suggested secondly by intellectual honesty: to
1 Pius

XI Ency. Studiorum Ducem, 29 June 1928.

433

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THOMAS U. MULLANEY

which may be appended, by way of public confession, the admission that this study was undertaken in the firm pre-conviction that St. Thomas had unquestionably denied the Immaculate Conception of our Lady!

I.
1. The texts of St. Thomas which must or can be interpreted
in favor of our Lady's Immaculate Conception are not confined
to any one period of his life.
At the beginning of his first theological work-his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard-Thomas gives us our
initial revelation of his thought on Mary's original freedom
from sin. We read: "The increase of purity (from sin) is in
accordance with the recession from its contrary; and because in
the Blessed Virgin this was a purifying from all sin, therefore
she attained the summit of purity; but beneath God, in Whom
there is not even capability of deficiency, such as is to be found
in every creature whatsoever." 2 And a bit later in the same.
Book of Sentences St. Thomas amplifies that statement, spells
out its meaning. "Purity is intensified by recession from its
contrary; therefore there can be some created reality than which
nothing in creation can be more pure, if (that reality) is stained
by no taint of sin; and such was the purity of the Blessed Virgin
who was immune from original and actual sin; yet (she was)
beneath God, inasmuch as there was in her capability of
sinning." 3
These closely-related texts need little comment. These points
alone need be urged with respect to them. First there is no
doubt whatever of their authenticity, no doubt whatever that
here St. Thomas expressly affirms Mary's immunity from
original sin, and from all sin. Secondly, the first of the two
texts, considered even apart from the second, is sufficient to
indicate St. Thomas' mind on the matter. Many early Fathers
of the Church and ecclesiastical authors whose words are cited
in favor of Mary's Immaculate Conception expressed them2

1 Sent., d. 17, q.

a. 4.

• Ibid., d. 44, q. I, a. 3, ad 3.

MARY IMMACULATE

IN THE WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS

435

selves only in such general terms as did St. Thomas in this first
place. Thirdly, however, too much importance should not be
attached to these texts for the reason that in the places cited
the Immaculate Conception is not being treated ex professo
but only incidentally.
fl. In Book Three, of St. Thomas' same Commentary on Peter

Lombard, occur other striking statements of St. Thomas' view
of our Lady's primitive sanctification. We read that it was
due to the Man-God alone that He should be bound by no
slavery of sin, since He alone redeems all from sin; therefore
"His Virgin mother ought to have not that purity but the
greatest after it." 4 Thomas immediately adds that she was
«more pure from sin than all other Saints "; that the privilege
of purification in the womb given to some-to John the Baptist
and Jeremias, for example--was beyond doubt "given much
more excellently to the Mother of God." 5 The meaning of the
above passage seems clarified in the very next point: " Of
wisdom it is said ' For wisdom will not enter into a malicious
soul nor dwell in a body subject to sins.' But the wisdom of
God not only entered into the soul of the Virgin ... He dwelt
in her body, assuming flesh of her. Therefore in her there was
no sin: which can be gathered from what is said in the Canticle,
'Thou art all fair, 0 my love, and there is not a spot in
Thee'!" 6
Now granted that these words occur in a section of St.
Thomas' writings which is usually considered one of his strongest statements against the Immaculate Conception, they still
have considerable force. Their progression is dear. We have
first, that Christ alone is in no way affected by sin, so that
Mary's freedom from sin is, after Her Son's, the maximum;
second, that her freedom from sin is greater than that of all
other saints without any exception, greater than the purity of
that John of whom Divine Truth said that no greater than he
Ill Sent., d. 3, q. l, a. 1, qcla. 2, ad 3.
Ibid., qcla. 3.
6 Ibid., a. 2, qcla. 2, argu. Praeterea
(sed contra 2•) .
4

5

436

THOMAS U. MULLANEY

was born of woman; third, that Mary's initial deliverance from
sin was much more excellent than that of others who were
purified before birth: what more excellent sanctification is there
than that of a John, sanctified before his birth? The answer is,
fourth, that Mary's sanctification left her without spot, without
stain of sin, so that to her St. Thomas applies the words of one
Canticle: "macula non est in te." In that is the great excellence of her sanctification.
3. More than fifteen years after writing the above St. Thomas
in his Summa Theologiae returned to the question of Mary's
primitive sanctification. Is there now any trace of the opinion
he had expressed in the Sentences? We find, for example: "The
Mother of God should have been adorned with the very greatest
purity." 7 Again, " reasonably we believe that she who bore
'the Only-Begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth'
received g ater privileges of grace than all others." 8 And
immediately after: "Under Christ who as universal Savior did
not need to be saved, the Blessed Virgin's was the greatest
purity. For Christ in no way contracted original sin ... the
Blessed Virgin was cleansed from it . . . In her coming forth
she was immune from original sin." 9 In the same question St.
Thomas makes his own Augustine's words (words so often cited
as indicating that the great Bishop and Doctor of Hippo taught
Mary's Immaculate Conception):
"Concerning the Virgin
Mary I will allow no question when treating of sins . . . we
know that greater grace was bestowed on her to overcome sin
under every aspect." 10 Again there is a certain progression.
Mary had under Christ the highest sanctity, higher than that
of all others, save Christ alone. Therefore she was in some
special way freed from original sin though not as Christ was,
since in Him was no reference to that or to any sin. Nevertheless, such was her special purity that according to Augustine
and Thomas she can truly be said to have overcome absolutely
7
8

Summa Theol., I-II, q. 81, a. 5, ad 8.
Ibid., III, q.
a. I.

• Ibid., a.
ad
Ibid., a. 4, Sed Contra.

10

MARY IMMACULATE

IN THE WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS

487

all sin with the consequence that no question of sin in hel' is to
be tolerated.
4. Dating roughly from the same period as St. Thomas' Summa
Theologiae his Commentaries on the Psalms and on certain
prayers also reveal his outlook at this time on Mary's
primitive sanctification. He writes, for example: " In Christ
and in the Virgin Mary there was absolutely no stain," 11 and a
bit later the words of Psalm 18-" He hath set his tabernacle
in the sun "-he explains to mean: " That is, Christ set His
body in the sum, i. e., in the Blessed Virgin who has no darkness
of sin." And again he refers to Mary the words of the Canticle:
" macula non est in te." 12
In St. Thomas' explanation of the Pater Noster he speaks of
" the Blessed Virgin who was full of grace, in whom there was
no sin, as Augustine says." And last of all his exposition of the
Ave Maria probably includes these words so reminiscent of the
first opinion he has long before penned about Mary. " As to
purity she exceeded the Angels, because the Blessed Virgin is
not alone pure in herself but she also procured purity for others.
With regard to fault (quantum ad culpam) she was most pure,
because the Virgin incurred neither original nor venial, nor
mortal sin." 18 Beyond any doubt St. Thomas in his magnificent
commentary on the Ave Maria did write: " The Blessed Virgin
surpassed the angels . . . in fulness of grace which is greater in
the Blessed Virgin than in any angel."
It is the asserted parallelism between Christ and Mary (an
admittedly imperfect parallel) which is most characteristic of
these passages and most remarkable in them. In Christ and
Mary there is absolutely no stain; as Christ has grace without
limitation, Mary has such fulness of holiness as to make sin in
In Psalm. 14.
Cf. in Psalm. 18.
18 This text is included here merely for the sake of completeness; from it we shall
not attempt to draw any conclusion, nor shall further reference be made to it. The
reason is that the phrase nee originale may be an interpellation; it seems better to
concern ourselves wholly with texts that are indisputably authentic than to engage
in a discussion of one which is only probably authentic.
11

12

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her unthinkable; she is even holier than the Angels who were,
grace! The sinlessness of
according to St. Thomas, created
the Savior and His mother is unique, so that the latter's
dom from sin is comparable only to Christ's own spotlessness:
if in her there is no stain or any question of sin at all, then
surely her Immaculate Conception seems implied in her original
holiness.
II
The texts of St. Thomas which seem to deny Our Lady's
Immaculate Conception are so numerous and found in so many
of his works that their compilation alone is a task-a task
perhaps more arduous than fruitful since many of the texts are
repetitive. For the sake of completeness, however, it is well to
point out where many of those texts occur.
In general they seem to fall under three headings: (1) those
which merely state that the Blessed Virgin was conceived in
sin, but offer no reason for that statement; (2) more general
texts
state
prove that
men save Christ
are
conceived
original sin. Such texts refer only by implication
to Our Lady, yet they are highly important in that they manifest some general principles
St. Thomas brought to bear
on the problem of Mary's freedom from original sin; (3) texts
concerned with proving that Our Lady in particular was conceived in original sin.
1. We find fairly frequently in St. Thomas' works mere
statements without any proof
Blessed Virgin was
conceived in original sin. For example, the Summa Theologiae
has these statements: "The flesh of the Virgin was conceived
in original sin"; 14 "the body of the Blessed Virgin was wholly
conceived in original sin"; 15 "the Blessed Virgin was conceived
in original sin.''' 16 The Commentary on the Ave
is quite
as clear. "Christ surpassed the Blessed Virgin in this that He
was conceived and born without any original sin. The Blessed
Summa Theol., III, q. 14, a. 3, ad l.
Ibid., q. 31, a. 7.
16 Ibid., q, 31, a. 8, ad.
14

15

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Virgin was conceived but not born in original (sin) ." In the
Quaestiones Quodlibetales we find: " This privilege is said to
be Christ's alone that He was conceived without original sin.
Therefore it does not befit the Blessed Virgin." 17 The Commentary on Psalm 45 reads: "The Holy Ghost sanctified her
(Mary) in her mother's womb after her body was formed and
her soul created."
It is as well to point out immediately that these texts really
prove nothing with regard to St. Thomas' apparent denial of
the Immaculate Conception. Leaving aside for the moment the
very last text (from the Commentary on Psalm 45), all the
others state substantially this: Mary was conceived in original
sin. But as St. Thomas understood and meant that proposition, it is in no way opposed to the truth defined by Pius IX.
In St. Thomas' view, as in that of his contemporaries generally
(following the ancient naturalists), conception preceded the
infusion of a human soul by a very considerable time. During
all that time there was as yet no apt subject for divine grace,
for the fetus, prior to its animation by a human soul, was considered to be of infra-intellectual nature, consequently incapable
of grace. As we shall see, this is an argument used by St.
Thomas to show that Our Lady could not possibly have been
sanctified before the infusion of her soul; and it is a valid argument if the supposition be granted that the fetus is for some
time infra-human.
This explains why we find in St. Thomas' works such propositions as: " The flesh of Mary was conceived in original sin,"
" the body of the Blessed Virgin was conceived in original sin,"
and " the Blessed Virgin was conceived in original sin." They
are all equivalent because in St. Thomas' judgment conception
is conception of the body only, not of the person (though it is
attributed to the person); and any flesh or body conceived by
human intercourse must inevitably be sin-infested in the sense
that it is the instrument which as it were carries original sin.
17 Quaes. Quod. q. 6, a. 7. Sed Contra. The same judgment is expressed in the
Commentary on Psalm 50 n. 3: "Omnes praeter Christum concipiuntur in originali."

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Sin is in it not formally (for only a person can be a sinner) but
virtually, or instrumentally. And all these passages in St.
Thomas' understanding and intention convey no more than
that.
So long as it is a question of conception, then St. Thomas is
saying merely that the fetus as infra-human is incapable of
sanctification or grace; but, given Adam's sin, it is an instrument for the transmission of sin to the person when the person
shall be constituted. Therefore the fetus in the womb of St.
Anne was capable of transmitting sin, like any other fetus so
begotten. This is not an assertion that the person who is Mary
was stained by original sin once that human person was constituted by the union of her human soul to her body. To read
into it any such assertion is quite literally to do violence to the
thought of Thomas, to refuse to read his words as he· penned
them. For him conception did not mark the beginning of life
as human, but was antecedent to one's personal history. Incidentally, this explains, too, why St. Thomas says more than
once that " Christ alone was conceived without original sin."
In Christ uniquely, accordingly to St. Thomas, the instant of
conception was identical with that of animation by His human
soul. But this was miraculous and predicable of no other than
Him, for it was divinely accomplished out of regard for the
exigencies of the Hypostatic Union.
In brief, the passages we have seen are not concerned with
the conception of Mary inasmuch as the dogma of the Immaculate Conception refers to her conception. The dogma
asserts that Mary was preserved free from all stain of original
sin in the first instant of her conception, i. e., in the first instant
that the person who is Mary was constituted. What St. Thomas
denied is that there was holiness there before that person was
constituted. The latter is not a denial of the former.
The last of the quoted passages refers to Mary's sanctification " after her body was formed and her soul created." But
again this is not probative. Does after (postquam) refer
necessarily to posteriority of time? Nothing in the text or

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context so limits or determines its meaning. As the passage
stands its determinate significance simply is not clear and to
insist that it is clear would be to substitute arbitrariness for
sound exegesis. Can the sense of this passage be fixed by
reference to other and fuller passages in St. Thomas? We must
attempt to ascertain this.
2. The texts we shall now treat. are general in character but
have immediate reference to our problem insofar as they show
why St. Thomas held that all men save Christ must be conceived in original sin. They give the background against which
he reached the particular conclusions about Our Lady.
In the Second Sentences we read:
He who is not subject to sin does not need redemption. If therefore
there were anyone, besides Christ, who was not born in original sin
there would be ... someone who would not need the redemption
accomplished by Christ, and so Christ would not be the head of all
men: which is not in accordance with faith. Neither therefore (is
it in accordance with faith) to say that anyone could be born
without original sin.18
Later in the Sentences much the same reason is repeated but
amplified.
It is erroneous to say that anyone except Christ is conceived without original sin; for he who would be conceived without original sin
would not need the redemption wrought by Christ; and thus Christ
would not be the redeemer of all men. Nor can it be said that they
did not need this redemption since this favor was bestowed upon
them that they be conceived without sin; insofar as grace was given
to their parents so that the defect of nature should be healed in
them ... or (the grace was given) to nature itself which was
healed. For it must be held that each man needs Christ's redemption personally and not only by reason of his nature. But only one
who has incurred a debt or fallen into evil can be freed from the evil
or absolved from the debt ... so the forgiving of the debt and the
freeing from evil cannot (so) be understood that one be born
without debt or immune from evil; but (must be understood in the
sense) that, born with the debt, he is afterward freed by the grace
of Christ. 19
18

II Sent., d. 81, q. 1, a.

19

IV Sent., d. 48, q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 1, ad 8.

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The De Malo yields no different line of argument:
It is erroneous to say that some are seminally derived from Adam
without original sin: for thus there would be some men who would
not need the redemption achieved by Christ. So it must be conceded that all who are seminally begotten from Adam contract
original sin in their very animation, 20 (i.e., in the uniting of human
soul to body).
The same question, of course, is considered in the Summa
Theologiae.
According to Catholic faith it must firmly be held that, Christ alone
excepted, all men sprung from Adam contract original sin from him;
otherwise not all men would need the redemption which is through
Christ: and this (proposition) is erroneous.21
These passages are uniformly remarkable for two things.
First, the argument in each case is the same, viz., that to exempt
anyone from original sin would imply a denial of the universality of redemption by Christ; secondly, a theological note of
some kind is found in each of the ways wherein St. Thomas
records that one argument. In every instance without exception
we find "secundum fidem catholicam" or its equivalent; or,
(qualifying a contradictory proposition) " erroneum est dicere"
or its equivalent. In St. Thomas this is putting the matter
with marked force.
It will be easiest to turn now to what St. Thomas has to say
in his ex professo arguments about Mary's sanctification in particular. The special significance of the general passages just
cited can be pointed out in relationship to the more properly
Marian texts to follow.
3. Of the several places in which St. Thomas argues about the
Blessed Virgin's primitive sanctity two are of outstanding
importance, and these we shall first indicate. In the Third
Sentences St. Thomas asks whether the Blessed Virgin was
sanctified before her animation, i. e., before a human soul was
20

21

De Malo, q. 4, a. 6.
Summa Theol., I-II, q. 81, a. 8.

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united to her body? The objections urge that she was; but,
says St. Thomas,
On the contrary, such is the order between the parts of man that
the soul is closer to God than is the body. But the power of an
agent reaches first to those things that are closer to it, and through
them to more distant things. Therefore the grace of sanctification
comes from God through the soul to the body. Therefore before
the body is animated it could not be sanctified. Again, contraries
are concerned with the same thing. But the grace of sanctification
is contrary to original sin. Since, therefore, before animation there
cannot be original sin in the offspring since the rational soul is the
proper subject of guilt; it seems that the Blessed Virgin was not
sanctified before animation.

Then in the body of the quaestiunculum we read:
To this ... question it must be said that the Blessed Virgin's
sanctification could not fittingly have been before the infusion of
her soul, because she was not yet capable of grace; but neither
(could it have been) in the very instant of infusion so that, namely,
by grace then infused into her soul, it should be preserved from
incurring original sin. For Christ alone among human kind has this
(dignity) that He does not need redemption, since He is our head;
to all others it belongs to be redeemed by Him. But this would not
be if there should be discovered another soul which was never
infected by original sin. Therefore this is to be conceded neither to
the Blessed Virgin nor to anyone else save Christ. 22

Many years later in the Summa Theologiae St. Thomas again
asked whether the most Blessed Virgin Mother of God was
sanctified before animation? The objections urge that she was:
but the Universal Doctor writes:
On the contrary, those things which were in the Old Testament are
figures of the New according to I Corinthians, 'all things happened
to them in figure.' But it seems that through the sanctification of
the tabernacle, concerning which it is said in Psalm 45, 'The Most
High hath sanctified His own tabernacle,' there is signified the
sanctification of God's Mother who is called a tabernacle of God.
According to Psalm 18, 'He hath set His tabernacle in the sun.'
Of the tabernacle however it is said in Exodus, ' after all things
22

Ill Sent., d. 8, q. 1, qcla. £.

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THOMAS U, MULLANEY

were perfected the cloud covered the tabernacle of the testimony,
and the glory of the Lord filled it! Therefore the Blessed Virgin
too was sanctified only after all her (constituent parts) were perfected, that is, soul and body.
I answer that the sanctification of the Blessed Virgin cannot be
understood before her animation for two reasons: first, because the
sanctification of which we are speaking is a cleansing from original
sin, since sanctity means perfect cleanness, as Dionysius says. But
sin can be cleansed only through grace, the subject of which is the
rational creature alone. Therefore the Blessed Virgin, before the
infusion of her rational soul, was not sanctified.
Secondly, since only the rational creature is capable of sin, the
offspring is not subject to sin before the infusion of a rational souL
If in any way whatever the Blessed Virgin were sanctified before
animation she would never have incurred the stain of original sin
and so would not have needed the redemption and salvation which
is through Christ, of Whom it is said in Matthew 'He shall save his
people from their sins! But it is unfitting that Christ be not the
Savior of all men, as He is called in I Timothy, Hence it remains that the sanctification of the Blessed Virgin was after her
animation. 23

These two texts are of the highest importance for in each we
find a denial that Mary was purified and sanctified prior to the
infusion of her souL In addition the first contains a denial that
she was purified and sanctified in the moment of the infusion
of her soul; the second expressly states that Our Lady was made
holy only after the infusion of her sout On the basis of these
two texts many theologians have concluded that we must
hold that St. Thomas denied the dogma of the Immaculate
Conception,
Their conclusion is certainly not difficult to
understand.
For the sake of completeness it is well to note here the existence of two other, and similar, texts of St. Thomas also of
importance in this maUer.
the Quaestiones Quodlibetales
occurs a familiar argument:
Each man contracts original sin by this that he was m Adam
secundum seminalem rationem (i.e., insofar as he is begotten of
his line by natural generation). In this way the Blessed Virgin
23

Summa Theol., III q. 27, a, 2.

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came from Adam because she like others was born through sexual
intercourse, and theref6re she was conceived in original sin and- is
included in the totality of those concerning whom the Apostle in
the Epistle to the Romans says, 'in whom all have sinned'; from
which totality Christ alone is excepted, He who was not in Adam
secundum seminalem rationem; otherwise, should this be true of
another than Christ, that other would not need the redemption of
subtract
Christ. We cannot attribute so much to the mother as
anything from the honor of the Son, Who is the Savior of all men
as the Apostle says (I Epistle to Timothy).
Aquinas goes on to explain the-custom of some churches of
celebrating a feast of Mary's Conception:
The Roman Church and many others, considering that the Virgin's
conception was in original sin, do not celebrate the feast of her
Conception. But some, considering Mary's sanctification in the
womb, the time of which is unknown, do celebrate her Conception;
for it is believed that she was sanctified quickly after her conception and the infusion of her soul. So the feast refers to her
Conception not by reason of the conception, but rather of her
sanctification. 24
Lastly the Compendium Theologiae offers this wording of
the arguments:
She (Our Lady) should have been conceived with original sin
because she was conceived through sexual intercourse. (And then
the second argument:) If she were not conceived with original sin
she would not need to be redeemed through Christ and so Christ
would not be the universal Savior of men; this would diminish
Christ's dignity. It must therefore be held that she was conceived
with original sin but purified from it in a special way . . . But
such sanctification did not precede the infusion of her soul. (If it
had) she would never have been subject to original sin and would
not have needed redemption. For the subject of sin can only be
the rational creature. Again sanctifying grace is per prius in the
soul, and comes to the body only through the soul, therefore she
must be believed to have been sanctified after the infusion of her
soul.25
A fair summary of St. Thomas' position in these places would
•• Quaes. Quod., (ll. 6, a. 7.

915

Oomp. Theol., c.

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THOMAS U. MULLANEY

seem to be the following. 1) In the question of the universality
of original sin he at all times reasons from the revealed truth of
the universality of Christ's redemptive activity to the universality of the need of redemption, i. e., to the universality of
sin in mankind. This teaching he always qualifies by a theological note. 2) In the special question of Our Lady's primitive
sanctification he in various places advances only three arguments
directed against her being sanctified before the infusion of her
soul. They are: a) before the soul is infused there is given no
apt subject of grace; b) all humans including Mary begotten by
carnal intercourse must inherit original sin; c) had Mary been
sanctified before her soul was united to her body her grace
would have been independent of Christ, i.e., Christ would not
be her Redeemer.
It is noteworthy that in every instance St. Thomas :refrains
from using any theological note or censure whatever in discussing the case of Our Lady. This might incline us a priori
to suspect that while he was very certain of the universality of
original sin as a general law for men he
no such certainty pro or con in the special question about Mary.

III
We are now faced with the heart of our problem, namely,
what is the proper meaning and interpretation of those passages
in which at first reading St. Thomas certainly seems to deny the
Immaculate Conception of Our Lady?
In trying to answer that question I shall consider first the
places in which the Angelic Doctor argues that Mary's sanctification occurred after the infusion of her soul; 26 then that place
in which he reasons that her sanctification was not in the instant of the infusion of her soul. 27 The reason for this procedure
is that St. Thomas' phrase " post animationem " extends in his
use of it to the temporal instant of the infusion of Mary's soul.
It follows that the passages in which he teaches Mary's sancti26
27

Summa Theol., III, q. 9.7, a. 9.; Comp. Theol., c. 9.9.4; Quaes. Quod., q. ill, a. 7.
Ill Sent., d. 3, q. l, a. 1, qcla. 9..

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fication post animationem in and of themselves contain neither
an assertion nor a denial of her original sinlessness. There
remains then the crucial question: does the argument denying
her sanctification in the instant of her animation definitively
deny Mary's Immaculate Conception?
1. Of the three placE-s which teach the sanctification of our
Blessed Mother post animationem the most important and the
most frequently cited is that found in the Summa Theologiae.
With it we shall therefore be principally, but not exclusively,
concerned.
The very text of the article in question indicates that in its
conclusion (viz., "therefore it remains that the sanctification
of the Blessed Virgin was after her animation ") , the preposition after (post) signifies nothing other than not-before;
therefore it can include the temporal instant of Mary's animation. I say this for the three following reasons. First the title
of the article is, " whether the Blessed Virgin was sanctified
before animation? " The four objections are worded so as to
conclude to this one proposition (which St. Thomas intends,
of course, to refute) that Our Lady was sanctified before the
infusion of her soul. In the entire article and in the question as
a whole there is absolutely no mention of Mary's sanctification
in the instant of her conception: St. Thomas' one concern here
is to exclude any grace in Our Lady prior to the creation and
infusion of her human soul. He neither overlooked nor was
ignorant of the possibility of a sanctification in the instant of
animation: in the Sentences he expressly adverted to that possibility. It would seem intentional, therefore, that in the Summa
he sedulously avoids any express consideration of Mary's sanctification in the instant of the infusion of her soul.
The question of sanctification before animation St. Thomas
answers negatively. Then, though there has been neither explicit nor implicit consideration of the very instant of animation, St. Thomas concludes that Our Lady was sanctified after
the infusion of her soul. But the preposition after (post) must be
merely equivalent to not-before. For either the Angelic Doctor

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was stupid in not seeing the possibility of sanctification in the
temporal instant of animation (a possibility he did see); or
else the af.ter is merely a negative of before which would
include the temporal instant of animation. Again, even in one
temporal instant St. Thomas distinguished aspects of priority
and posteriority, so that of two things that are temporally
simultaneous one can be said to be after another in the order
of nature. 28 So the phrase after her animation means not prior
in time to her animation, but posterior in nature. This explanation alone is coherent with St. Thomas' general doctrine, as we
shall see.
Secondly, if he meant post positively to exclude the instant of
conception, then St. Thomas' reasoning in the body of the
article is faulty and his conclusion opposed to his own teaching
elsewhere. In this place he urges against Mary's sanctification
before animation two arguments, namely, 1) that before animation there is no apt recipient of sanctification, and 2) that if
J\1ary were sanctified before animation, then she would never
have incurred any sin and so would not need to be redeemed
by Christ. The result would be that Christ would not be the
Savior of all men as Sacred Scripture says that He is.
From the first reason-that only a rational subject is capable
of receiving divine grace-can we conclude that sanctification
must come as temporally subsequent to the soul's infusion? St.
Thomas did not think so. He expressly taught that God not
only could give grace in the first instant to a rational creature
but that God had done so and would have done so for every
man had man remained faithful to God. According to St.
Thomas' express teaching, in that same instant in which there
is an angelic or human creature there is an apt recipient of
grace. The post animationem, therefore, to which St. Thomas
concludes from his first argument either extends to the instant
of animation, or if it does not, his conclusion does not follow
from his premises and is directly opposed to his general teaching.
The second argument-that if Mary were sanctified before
28

St. Thomas' familiarity with this distinction will be demonstrated later.

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the infusion of her soul she would not need redemption through
Christ-again does not exclude the possibility of sanctification
in the instant of animation. For the point of the argument (as
St. Thomas makes dear in a passage in the Fourth Sentences,
a passage we shall soon consider) 29 is that sanctification prior to
animation would be a sanctification either of nature, or of the
principles of nature; a sanctification therefore which would be
prior to the person as person. Hence the person so sanctified
would be as a person in every way outside the order of those
who need redemption. Such sanctity as that would indeed
militate
man's universal dependence on Christ as
Redeemer.
But that argument would by no means hold for a sanctification achieved in the temporal instant of animation; St.
Thomas taught that the person is naturally prior to grace; so
there could be in one instant of time 1) the :infusion of the
soul into the fetus, which would constitute the person; 2) some
order to sin in the person so constituted (because the soul would
be united to a flesh which ought to beget sin in the person),
and 3) grace excluding sin from the person.
Again we must conclude that the premises of St. Thomas'
second argument in the article under discussion do not contain
the conclusion that Our Lady was actually in sin in the moment
of her animation. They contain only the conclusion that she
was not sanctified before that moment. We have already seen
that that is the only question St. Thomas set out to answer,
so it is not remarkable that it is the only question he does
answer. If we interpret post animationem to exclude sanctification in the moment of animation, we must say that St.
Thomas either stupidly or dishonestly pretended to solve a
question by an argument that was irrelevant. Therefore, either
the whole article hangs together and the conclusion answers
the question through pertinent arguments, or else St. Thomas
was trying to answer a question he had not asked by arguments
which would not lead to that answer. The latter alternative is
not impossible; but it is neither necessary nor likely.
29

IV Sent., d. 43, q. l, a. 4, qcla. 1, ad 3.

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Lastly with respect to the text of this article the second
objection demands scrutiny. The objection proceeds from SL
Anselm's famous dictum, " it was fitting that this Virgin should
shine with such purity that under God none greater can be
imagined." 30 But St. Thomas adds: " The purity of the
Blessed Virgin would have been greater had she never been
stained by the contagion of original sin. Therefore it was given
to her to be sanctified before her flesh was animated."
The point here is the conclusion of the objection. What follows from the premises is this: therefore it was given to her
never to be stained by original sin; but St. Thomas concludes:
she was sanctified before her animation. What is the difference?
Such preservation from sin as really follows from St. Thomas'
objection might have been either before animation or in the
instant of animation. Yet he concludes only to sanctification
before animation. But Thomas knew that the former is the
correct conclusion. From the very same premises he concludes
in the Sentences: " Either therefore her flesh was sanctified
the very instant of infusion
before animation, or, at least
31
her soul received grace."
Why then in the Summa did he
express as a conclusion to be rejected only a part of what
followed from his premises? The answer seems clear: he had in
writing the Summa no desire to reject the possibility of Mary's
sanctification in the instant of the infusion of her souL That
was a possibility he would neither reject, nor discuss; so he
sacrificed laws of logical deductions in order to avoid any express consideration of the matter. Once in his youth he discussed in the Sentences the instant of the infusion of Mary's
soul; but from that day until his death he never again returned
to that discusion even though it was to the forefront in the
schools of his own day, and a question that almost demanded
treatment in his own writings. But this man of genius who so
boldly, though reverently, rewrote much theology, and who,
when he was certain of his position, humbly dared stand against
30

31

St. Anselm, de Conce:ptu Virginali; c. 18; M. L., 158 : 451.
Ill Sent., d. 31, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 2.

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his masters and predecessors and contemporaries: he in all his
works :refused ever to ask " whether Ma:ry was sanctified in the
instant of her animation? " He does ask: " Was she sanctified
before animation?"; "Was she sanctified after it?"; but he
pointedly avoided any ex professo article on the ve:ry instant
of animation; he scrupulously avoided any exclusion of Mary's
sanctification in the first instant of her lik If one would maintain that St. Thomas here in the Summa did exclude such
sanctification, one must be willing to admit that Thomas was
too dull to see and to treat the problem as a distinct question;
for nowhere does he raise it as a distinct question.
In the Summa St. Thomas uses the phrase " after animation "
in an indetermined sense, as equivalent to not-before animation.
Does after imply posteriority of time or merely of nature? St.
Thomas left that question open. He would seem, therefore, to
have considered it possible that 0Uil' Lady was sanctified only
at some time after her animation, but, he also considered it possible that she was sanctified in the instant of animation. Neither
the title of the article, nor the sense of the objections, nor the
force of his two arguments in the article implies or contains a
denial of the latter possibility; and in the one objection which
almost demanded that he take a stand on the matter he refused to do so. That is not the procedure of a man who has a
definite opinion on a question, especially when that man is
accustomed to think and to express himself with supreme
clarity and precision.
Against all this stands a very obvious objection. Even
granted that in the Summa the preposition after need not be
taken as signifying temporal succession, in another of St.
Thomas' works it is used determinately to signify temporal
posteriority. In the Quaestiones Quodlibetales St. Thomas
wrote of Our Lady: " she was sanctified quickly after her
conception and the infusion of her soul (cito post conceptionem
et animae infusionem) ." 32 Since in this context St. Thomas
uses after to signify in a temporal sense we can conclude, it
32

Quae8. Quod., q. 6, a. 7.

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is argued, that he so uses it in the Summa and in the
pendium Theologiae.
But an examination of the context with Quaestiones Quodlibetales reveals that the words cited are not an expression of
St. Thomas' own opinion! The paragraph reads:
Although the Blessed Virgin was conceived in original sin (and
conceived is used in the limited sense as designating the production
of the fetus prior to its animation by a human soul as is evident
from St. Thomas' distinguishing in the same paragraph between
conception and animation), she is believed to have been sanctified
in the womb prior to her birth. Therefore there have grown up
diverse customs of (different) churches with regard to the celebration of her Conception. The Roman Church, and many others,
considering that the Virgin was conceived in sin do not celebrate
a feast of her Conception. But other (churches) considering her
sanctification in the womb, the time of which (sanctification) is
unknown, do celebrate her Conception; for it is believed that she
was sanctified quickly after her conception and the infusion of
her soul. ...

St. Thomas is not saying: "
was sanctified
after the infusion on her soul"; nor is he saying: "I hold that
Our Lady was sanctified quickly after the infusion of her soul ";
he says simply: "This is believed" (creditur). Believed by
whom? Believed certainly by those who at that time celebrated
the feast of Mary's Conception, for St. Thomas gives this belief
as the basis of their practice. Believed also by St. Thomas?
Of this there is no evidence" In the context St. Thomas makes
in his own name only one statement about the time of Mary's
sanctification, viz., "it is unknown" (ignoratur) . It is a very
different thing to say: " It is unknown when a particular event
occurred," than to say: " I believe that the event occurred
soon after that other event." The latter statement denies temporal simultaneity of the two events; the former neither affirms
nor denies such simultaneity, but leaves it an open question.
In fact nothing in the text of St. Thomas indicates that he
intended the preposition after to be used determinately to
signify posteriority of time or of nature; everything about the
careful wording of the text seems to indicate that he intended

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to avoid fixing the meaning of his own phrase. "Tempus
ignoratur " sums up his attitude: and that judgment is not a
denial of the Immaculate Conception nor an affirmation of it.
Clearly then the texts in which St. Thomas states that our
Lady was sanctified after the infusion of her soul ought not to
be interpreted in a determinately temporal sense. Is there
justification in St. Thomas' teaching as a whole for maintaining
that by post animationem he himself could have understood
posteriority of nature? Did he have any awareness of posteriority of nature in simultaneity of time? If he was familiar
with both sorts of posteriority then we can say that he meant
either indeterminately in those places where he used the preposition indeterminately. H, on the other hand, he knew only
posteriority of time-as some have maintained,-then he must
have meant temporal posteriority in every instance in which
he used the preposition post.
In fact, the Angelic Doctor was very familiar with posteriority of nature and moreover, he specifically taught posteriority
nature in this matter of the sanctification of creatures.
Treating of God's creation of the angels St. Thomas defends
the position that God created the angels in the state of
fying grace. To his own position he objects that Augustine had
written that " the angelic nature was first created in an
formed way ... and afterwards was formed"; and by this
" formation " is to be understood grace.
The answer to the objection reads: " That lack of formation
... can be understood either by comparison with the formation
which is glory, and in that sense lack of formation came before
formation in time; or by comparison with the formation that is
grace and so (lack of formation) came before (formation) not
in the order of time but in the order of nature!' 33 The text
speaks for itself.
Later in discussing the justification of an adult human being
St. Thomas distinguishes four parts or aspects of the process.
He adds: " These four ... are simultaneous in time ... but
•• Summa Theol., III, q.

3

a. 3, ad L

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the order of nature one is before the other; among them, in the
natural order first is the infusion of grace, second the motion
of the free will toward God," and so forth. 34 Again the text
could not be clearer.
Thirdly, speaking of the sacred humanity of Christ, the
Angelic Doctor wrote: " Although the human nature did not
in the order of time exist before its union (to the Word), yet
we must consider it in itself before (considering it) as united;
. . . even according as it is considered united, it is still distant
from the divine nature according to the condition of its nature
. . . and so there can be through invisible grace ... a mission
to the human nature although the nature does not precede
grace in time." 35
All three texts show St. Thomas using, as a familiar tool, the
distinction between priority of nature and of time; but they
seem to show more than that. The first and third of these texts
distinctly imply that it is a general rule among creatures that
nature precedes grace in ordine naturae; as indeed a subject
must always precede an informing form, a substance precede its
accidents. St. Thomas expressly teaches that grace comes after
nature " secundum ordinem naturae et NON secundum successionem temporis." 36 When therefore he states that Our Lady's
sanctification was after the infusion of her soul, i. e., after the
constitution of her nature, must we conclude that he means
after in a temporal sense? It would seem highly arbitrary so
to conclude in light of the fact that he teaches with respect to
a) all rational creatures in general, b) all the angels, and c) the
man-Christ in particular, that their sanctification was after the
constitution of their natures, but expressly denies posteriority
of time in that succession. If in so many instances after means
only successiveness in the order of nature, is it not at least
possible that St. Thomas included this possible signification in
this instance?
A second argument from the general teaching of St. Thomas
•• Ibid., I-II, q. lUI, a. 8.
•• I Sent., d. 15, q. 5, a. 1, qcla. 8, ad. I.
a. ad 1.
•• II Sent., d.

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has already been suggested. Briefly it is this. Aquinas sought
only to deny of Our Lady any sanctification which would make
her holy by reason of generation (for holiness such as that
would make her independent of Christ). But, as St. Thomas
knew, the exclusion of such sanctity does not demand that her
sanctification be temporally subsequent to the infusion of her
soul. Therefore by after animation he does not exclusively
designate temporal posteriority.
The major, I think, has been established already. With remarkable caution Thomas side-stepped the question of Our
Lady's sanctification in the instant of her conception, never
once penning an article under that title, always avoiding reference to the problem. Yet with all assurance he could write:
" If, in any way whatever the Blessed Virgin had been sanctified
before the infusion of her soul ... she would not have needed
the redemption and salvation which is from Christ." 37 Any
sanctification that precedes animation is rejected; sanctification
with animation is carefully not discussed. The former he sought
to exclude,
it.
As to the minor. In the Fourth Sentences we read:
Anyone who would be conceived (i.e., prior to animation) without
original sin would not need redemption ... and so Christ would
not be the Redeemer of all men. Nor can it be said that they did
not need this redemption because it was granted to them to be
conceived without sin, inasmuch as that grace was given to their
parents in order that the sin of nature be healed in them ... or
(grace was given) to the nature :itself which is healed. For it must
be held that each needs Christ's redemption personally, and not
alone by reason of his nature. But only he can be freed from evil,
or absolved from debt who has incurred the debt or fallen into
the evil.38

That is the point. Redemption must have a starting point;
Mary was redeemed; therefore there must have been in her
personally a terminus a quo of redemption. Any sanctification
prior to the constitution of her person (ante animationem)
37

38

Summa Theol., Ill, q. 'J-7, a.
IV Soot., d. 43, q. 1, a. 4, qda. l, ad 3.

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would mean that in the person who is Mary there never was
anything bespeaking order to redemption; therefore St. Thomas
vigorously rejects every sort of saPctification prior to animation,
whether of Mary in her parents, or of her flesh alone, or of her
soul alone. Any of these would imply a sanctity prior to the
person who is Mary; therefore prior to any relationship (of
dependence on Christ) modifying that person. This is what he
vehemently rejected.
But the exclusion of such sanctification need not involve that
Mary's sanctification be temporally subsequent to her animation. For it is conceivable that the person be constituted in a
normal way and, therefore, relative to her human progenitors,
have some order to sin; yet in' that same instant of animation be
so graced by God as to have no infection of sin. We would then
have in one instant of time a) the person b) with a debt of sin
c) but, by grace, delivered from the actual infection of sin.
Hence the fact of personal need of redemption does not necessarily demand that one have actually been for a time in the
guilt of sin.
But did St. Thomas know of any such possibility? That he
did is shown perhaps most easily by considering as a whole his
teaching on Our Lady's sanctification. We have in that teaching three major points: a) Our Lady was not sanctified before
her person was constituted, i. e., before the infusion of her soul
because, b) every human person has personal need of redemption, i. e., some modifications of the person such as bespeaks
relationship to sin in some way (else Christ would not be the
Redeemer of that person as such), c) yet Our Lady" was immune from original and actual sin." 39 Hence St. Thomas'
teaching taken as a whole does clearly imply in one instant a)
the constitution of the person who is Mary b) with some order
to sin c) yet by grace delivered from any actual stain of sin.
This argument is probative, however, only for those who
agree that in the question of the Immaculate Conception St.
Thomas did not contradict himself or change his opinion. It
•• I Sent., d. 44, q. 1, a. 8, ad. 8.

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457

rests on the supposition, unacceptable to many, that Aquinas'
various dicta on Mary's primitive sanctification fonn parts of
one integrated body of doctrine.
Can we show to the satisfaction of those who deny intellectual consistency to the Angelic Doctor that his doctrine
admits at least the possibility of a) a person b) having some
true order to original sin c) yet in one same instant preserved
by grace from actually incurring sin? That can be shown by the
following argument. Original Bin insofar as it pertains to the
person as such is a penalty rather than a Bin. This is Thomas'
own teaching. "The lack of original justice (and original sin
is the habitual privation of original justice) is in nature; . . .
if it is referred to this man insofar as he is a ce1·tain person ...
it is a penalty; if however it is :referred to the principle in whom
all have sinned it has the aspect of guilt." 40
But by God's grace persons who have actual order to penalty
for sin can be delivered from that penalty in the very instant in
which the debt of punishment obliges. " The penalty is removed
by God
can ... condone penalties." 41 And speaking of
death as a penalty for sin he says that though we are all sinners
yet not all need undergo death, " for this is achieved from a
special divine dispensation, that, out of liberality, God remits
this penalty; for the will of God, and His power, is not bound by
the order of fault to penalty .
Such men (as may escape
death) have in their nature the necessity of dying; but, given
that, they are freed by a special grace from this necessity . ... " 42
We have these truths. Original sin, as it regards the person,
has the aspect of penalty. But God's grace can remit a penalty;
that is, while the order to the penalty (necessitas, St. Thomas
calls this order) is :retained, God delivers the person from
actually suffering the penalty. Hence in one instant there is
a) the person b) with order to sin (or penalty) but c) without
actually having the sin (undergoing the penalty).
The application to Our Lady is transparently evident. If
o

De Malo, q. 4, a. 2.
Summa Theol., I-ll, q. 81, a. 3.
•• ll Sent., d. 31, q. I, a. 2, ad 2.

40

41

•

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according to St. Thomas God can deliver from penalties due to
sin, and in fact does deliver some men from actually falling
under the penalty due to them (death) at the time that obligation urges, then God could have (according to St. Thomas'
doctrine) delivered Mary from that penalty which is original
sin as it affects the person; and this at the very moment when
that obligation urged (namely the moment of the constitution
of that person) . I emphasize that the point here is not that St.
Thomas taught this as a fact (he did not); but that he did
teach in general terms the possibility; so that his doctrine does
not exclude the possibility of Mary's having in one and the
same instant a debt of sin in her personally and divine grace
actually preserving her from all sin. This is quite in accord
with the defined dogma of Mary's Immaculate Conception.
It is important to point out that the above interpretation of
St. Thomas and its application to the Immaculate Conception
of Mary is neither new nor extraordinary. The master of all
commentators, Cajetan, was proposing it as Thomism nearly
four and a half centuries ago. He expressly teaches that the
necessity of having original sin without the stain of original sin
itself, is sufficient to constitute need of redemption; and this
teaching he bases on St. Thomas. 43
It is apparent then that St. Thomas knew that sanctity which
depends on Christ need not imply actual contamination by sin
at any time; he knew that a debt of sin or penalty was sufficient
to make one dependent on Christ. Hence in the passages we
have seen he was in no instance concerned to deny of Our Lady
a sanctification which would be given in the temporal instant
of the infusion of her soul; for such sanctification implying a
personal debt of sin is, according to Thomas' own general
doctrine, reconcilable with dependence on Christ.
fl. There remains to be considered only one further point,
namely, the one place in which St. Thomas states that the
sanctification of Our Lady could not properly have been " in
the very instant of the infusion of her soul."
•• Cf. Cajetan, in I-II, q. 81, a. S; Opusc. de Conceptione B. M. V., c. s.

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We have seen so far Thomas' teaching that a) Our Lady
was without original sin b) yet conceived in sin so that c) she
was sanctified after the infusion of her soul. We have seen that
the latter two judgments can be reconciled with the first. For
in saying that Mary was conceived in sin St. Thomas understands conception to precede in time the infusion of the human
soul; so his meaning is merely that our Blessed Mother was not
made holy before she was made human, and capable of holiness.
In saying that she was sanctified after the infusion of her soul
he does not mean that sanctity was necessarily subsequent in
time to her animation by a human soul; he means merely that
there had to be in her personally some order to sin, some real
terminus a quo of redemption. This we have tried to show both
from the text of St. Thomas and from the context of his general
teaching on human sanctification especially after original sin.
Nevertheless the Angelic Doctor did write that Our Lady was
not sanctified in the very instant of the infusion of her souL
Must we concede that at least in that place he denied the doctrine .of Mary's Immaculate Conception? Again we can arrive
at a balanced judgment only by careful examination first of
the text in question, and then of the general context of St.
Thomas' doctrine.
The text in which the passage under discussion occurs is very
revealing. 44 It contains no denial, actual or implicit, of the
sanctification of the person who is Mary, in the first instant of
her life, i.e., it contains no denial of Mary's Immaculate
Conception.
First, the title of the quaestiunculum reads: " Whether the
Blessed Virgin was sanctified before the infusion of her soul
(ante animationem) ? " Since everything else in this quaestiunculum is directed to answering that question, there is a presumption that whatever we shall find written herein refers to
the possible sanctification of the holy Virgin before her soul
was infused into her body.
The first two objections concluding to the sanctification of
.. Ct Ill Sent., d. 8, q. l, a. l, qda.

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Our Lady at some time prior to the infusion of her soul need no
special comment. The third objection is really the same as the
one already discussed in connection with the article in the
Summa. The objection is that, according to St. Anselm, the
Mother of God should have such sinlessness that no greater
under God is conceivable. " But," adds St. Thomas, " there
would be a greater purity if her soul had never had the infection
of original sin than if for some time it had had (that infection)
and afterwards been cleansed. Therefore, either her flesh was
sanctified before its animation, or at least in the instant of
infusion her soul received grace through which it was immune
from original sin."
Note that the objection is concerned with establishing Mary's
sanctification before the infusion of her soul. Thus in the conclusion alternate possibilities are proposed: either the prior
sanctification occurred in her flesh (" aut igitur caro sanctificata
fuit ante animationem ") or in her soul (" vel saltem ... anima
gratiam suscepit ") . But neither alternative supposes as accomplished the union of body and soul which constituted the
person who is Mary; that is why no mention of Mary, the
person, is made in the conclusion but only " either her flesh
. . . or at least. . . her soul received grace through which it
was immune. . . ." That conclusion, of course, St. Thomas was
to reject; P.nd because he intended to reject it he formed it
w
What he intends to reject is not "either the
Jn of Mary was sanctified before its animation or at least in
J1e moment of the infusion of her soul she received grace "; no,
what he wrote for rejection was " her soul received grace in the
first instant, etc." And this latter is a quite different proposition, for it envisions a sanctification of her soul which would be
in the order of nature prior to its union with her body. There
is the point. The sanctification ante animationem might have
occurred in the soul prior (in nature) to its infusion into the
body. That would mean that the person then to be constituted
would not be dependent on Christ for sanctity.
Unless this be the sense of the objection then: a) there is no
accounting for St. Thomas' discussing in an article about sancti-

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461

fication before animation what took place in the instant of
sanctification; b) there would be no reason for the rather
strained wording of the second alternative, viz., " the soul
received grace through which it (the soul) was immune .... "
A much more normal manne.r of speaking would be "' the
Blessed Virgin received grace through which she was immune.
. . ." The latter is not said for the excellent reason that it is
not meant, and therefore not meant to be positively rejected.
Immediately after the objection come the two arguments Sed
contra quoted earlier; then the body of the solution, also previously quoted. In the body occur the famous words: " the
sanctification of the Blessed Virgin could not fittingly have
been ... in the very instant of the infusion (of her soul) !' The
whole statement must be read: " The sanctification of the
Blessed Virgin could not fitly have been ... in the very instant
of the infusion of her soul so that, namely, by grace then
infused into the soul it would be preserved from incurring the
stain of original sin. For Christ alone among human kind . . .
does not need redemption, because He is ou:r Head; to all others
it belongs to be redeemed by Him. But this would not be if
among these were found any other soul which had never been
infected by the original fault."
What these words deny is not any and every conceivable
sanctification in the instant of the infusion of Mary's soul, but
a very determined mode of sanctification, that, namely, which
would have for its subject not the person of Our Lady but her
soul so that the soul, considered prior to the person (for in the
order of nature the creation of the soul is prior to its infusion
into the body, and a fortiori prior to its function in constituting
the person) would already be sanctified. This sort of sanctity
must be denied; for it would imply, as Aquinas immediately
adds, holiness prior to the person so that the person as to
holiness would not be dependent on Christo Thus Sto Thomas
is in agreement with St. Bonaventure: " The natural is prior
to the spirituaL First therefore the soul is conceived to be
united with the body, and then grace to be infused by God." 45
•• Ill Sent., do 8, par. I, a. 1, q. 2.

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This interpretation, viz., that SL Thomas in this passage
rejects only a sanctification which in the order of nature would
precede the person is borne out a) by the reason he alleges: for
a sanctification in the first instant of time but subsequent in
the order of nature to the person would not make the person's
sanctity independent of Christ; b) by the words of St. Thomas;
for he speaks of grace being given in the first instant not to Our
Lady, but to her soul; he speaks of the preservation not of Our
Lady but of her soul; considering the grace and preservation not
as privileges of the person of Mary but as a gift that would
come to the person through the soul and would be, by priority
of nature, in the soul first; c) lastly, this interpretation is sustained by the fact that the words occur, as we have noted, in
a passage devoted to the problem of a sanctification ante
animationem. What is discussed in them is a sanctification
which would be (in the order of nature) before animation
although temporally in the very instant of animation.
In this interpretation alone St. Thomas' :reasoning, his choice
of words, and the order of the passage become intelligible.
That interpretation which can explain St. Thomas' leaving
intact his order, language, and logic seems preferable to that
which can justify none of these three.
Secondly, this interpretation-that in the disputed passage
Aquinas is excluding from the first instant of Our Lady's human
life only sanctification
would precede (in the order of
nature) her person-is completely in accordance with Aquinas'
general teaching.
As we have seen Aquinas teaches clearly that in each human
as a person and not merely by reason of his nature, there must
be need of redemption. The inevitability of this St. Thomas had
previously pointed out, " From the act of nature which is the
propagation of the body there is left in the nature of the one
generated a certain disposition, called concupiscence ... inclining to evil. From the very fact that that corruption ... which
contains in itself the virtuality of sin which caused it, touches
the person, it renders that person unworthy of God's grace;

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thence there is in the soul a stain and lack of grace " (rnacula
et defectus gratiae) .46
Within our very nature rebellion has been introduced by the
principle of that nature, Adam. That rebellion is a real modification within us, handed on together with our nature; for it is
a real disposition in the flesh which virtually transmits our
nature. Even before there is a human soul there is already (at
least by a priority of nature) the fomes peccati inthe embryo;
at the instant that the human soul is joined to that :flesh the
soul is already unworthy of God's grace by the fact of union
with the body virtually carrying original sin. Hence the person
who is constituted by and in that union of soul and body, by
the very fact of such constitution is unworthy of God's grace.
That real unworthiness, called the debt of original sin (debiturn
peccati 01ig·inalis), is inseparable from human generation after
the sin of Adam and therefore transmitted in every natural
genemtion.
If somehow prior to the constitution of the person sanctity
were to come to the nature in its principles (material, formal
or efficient), then the person as person would .bespeak no order
whatever to sin and so would not look to Christ who gives
grace only as redeeming grace. That is why St. Thomas wrote:
" He alone can be delivered from evil or forgiven a debt (i. e.,
redeemed) who has incurred the debt or fallen into the evil." 47
All redemption presupposes the person (or persons) to be
redeemed, and presupposes him (or them) somehow contained
within the order of those needing redemption. Therefore any
sanctification of Mary or of anyone else which would precede
the person in time or in nature would imply independence of
Christ and be, for that reason, unthinkable. That is what St.
Thomas teaches.
The Church teaches this same doctrine. The Collect for the
feast of the Immaculate Conception reads in part: " 0 God
... we beseech Thee that Thou who by the foreseen death of
•• II Sent., d. 8!il, q. l, a. l.
•• IV Sent., d. 48, q. l, a. 4, qcla. 1, ad. 8.

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the ... Son of God didst preserve her from all stain. . . ." Thus
by Christ's redeeming death Mary was preserved; she was not
independent of His satisfactory sacrifice. Pope Alexander VII
expressly taught Mary's preservation from sin through the
merits of Christ, Redeemer of the human race.48 It is most
surely true that none can be redeemed except those who are
in need of redemption: hence in Mary as a person we must
suppose a debt of sin. In light of this St. Thomas did require
in Our Lady a debt of sin prior (at least by priority of nature)
to her grace; for otherwise grace in her would not be Christian
grace.
This debt of sin, as distinct from the actual infection of sin is,
however, all that is requisite according to St. Thomas' general
doctrine. The reason for this we have already seen; original sin,
as it regards the person, is a penalty rather than a guilt, and one
falls within the order of those subject to the penalty by having
a debt, even though the penaity itself is never actually incurred.
" The lack
original justice ... if it referred to this man insofar as he is a person ... is a penalty." 49 " This is achieved by a
special divine dispensation that out of liberality God remits this
penalty ... (such persons as are so graced) have in rtheir
nature the necessity" of undergoing the penalty, "but .
they are freed by a special grace from the necessity " of
actually incurring the penalty. 50 .
Even Cajetan does not understand St. Thomas' saying that
Our Lady is not sanctified in the instant of the infusion of
her soul to mean more than that she had a debt of sin. "It
pertains to Catholic faith," he writes," that all men, save Christ
alone, contract original sin." He adds that this is to be understood in the same way that we understood the proposition that
all men incur the penalty of death " so that as all incur death,
L e., the necessity of dying, so all incur original sin, i.e., the
necessity of incurring original sin . . . If anyone should not
incur original sin EITHER actually OR as to its debt, he would
•• Bull Sollicitudo omnium eccles., 8 Dec. 1661.
•• De Malo, q. 4, a. 2.
""11 Sent., d. :n, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2.

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not need redemption, which is hereticaL But ... not only does
one actually held (by sin) need redemption, but also one liable
to captivity." 51 And he adds that Thomists must note this
well in questions concerning Mary's conception.
In another work he is, if possible, even more to the point.
" Not only is he said to be cleansed from original sin who is
purified from its actually contracted stain, but also he who is
purified from the stain as to its debt. . . . And let no one think
I propose this from my own imagination, but let him see St.
Thomas." 52
It seems then f:rom the text of St. Thomas, from the context
of his general teaching, and from the understanding of his greatest commentator, that his saying that Our Lady was not sanctified in the very instant of her animation by no means need
imply that she contracted the stain of original sin. His statement in itself and in his understanding of it is completely
:reconcilable with the_ fact of grace bestowed on Our Lady at
the first temporal instant of her human life, provided one also
admits
her a debitum peccati which in the order
nature
preceded her sanctifying grace. And this is not opposed to the
defined dogma of Ou:r Blessed Mother's Immaculate Conception.
This explanation suggests why St. Thomas neve:r uses a
theological note or censure in discussing Mary's primitive sanctification. The general doctrine of the necessity of incurring
original sin he unfailingly qualifies by some note, as we have
seen. It is a tenable position that he avoided using censures in
this question because he considered the doctrine itself as probable, and so refrained from even the appearance of reflecting on
it but qualifying any theory in explanation of it. Quite surely
the lack of all theological notes in his discussion al'gues that in
his own mind this matter was not completely certain one way
or the other.

51 In I-II, q. 81, a. 3.
•• Opusc. de Oonceptione B. M. V., c. 3.

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CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion as a whole suggests certain conclusions about St. Thomas' teaching on the Immaculate Conception of Our Lady,

l) St, Thomas did indisputably teach that doctrine at least
in his earlier work. We must conclude that he had found some
good :reason for assenting to it,
2) His later works do not repeat that unequivocal teaching
that Mary was free from original sin,
3) Some of the later works contain a denial of the Immaculate Conception which is merely verbaL Mary is said to have
been conceived in sin; but the meaning is that, prior to the
infusion of her human soul, her body like any other fetus was
unsanctified, and was therefore an instrument apt to transmit
original sin to her soul when that soul should be infused into
her body. This is by no means opposed to the dogma of Mary's
Immaculate Conception.
4) Some of St. Thomas' works contain the fmther statement
that Our Lady was sanctified after the infusion of her human
soul; one contains the statement that she could not (fittingly)
have been sanctified in that instant. However, the wording of
these texts, and the context in which they occur, demand on
careful analysis that they be interpreted in accordance with St.
Thomas' doctrine as a whole, namely, as not excluding the
possibility of Mary's sanctification in the first instant of her
human life.
5) Therefore, as it would be absurd to maintain that in the
later works St. Thomas taught the Immaculate Conception, it
is also manifestly contrary to the text and general teaching of
St. Thomas to hold that he in any instance excluded or denied
the sanctification of Mary in the first temporal instant of her
human life, that is, that he excluded or denied her Immaculate
Conception,

MARY IMMACULATE

IN THE WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS

467

6) St. Thomas' attitude toward the problem seems to be best
described as one of caution, reserve. Having at first taught
that Mary was without original sin, he thereafter with marked
circumspection and at the cost of evident incompleteness in his
works refrained from ever again definitely committing himself
to an afl:irmative or a negative position. In every case his words
imply the possibility but neither affirm nor deny the fact that
Mary was preserved free from original sin.
7) The reason for St. Thomas' later reserve seems very likely
to have been the attitude of the Roman Church. His earliest
years had been spent in the vicinity of Naples where the feast
of Mary's Conception has been celebrated many generations
before his day; that fact may help account for his early unequivocal afl:irmation of Mary's freedom from original sin. But
the Church of Rome in St. Thomas' day did not admit any feast
in honor of Mary's conception, though, as St. Thomas says, the
custom of other Churches of celebrating that feast was not
totally reprobated. In addition the greatest theologians of the
day were teaching that the object of the feast, where it was
celebrated, was not the sinless conception of Our Lady but her
sanctification at some undetermined time. St. Thomas would
not take the stand that in a question of supernatural fact his
private view was to be preferred to the attitude of the Holy
See; so, like the Church, he reserved any further explicit expression of judgment.
8) Since St. Thomas never withdrew his early admission of
the Immaculate Conception by expressing its contradictory
but rather expressly taught, as had the Fathers, that Mary was
absolutely free from all stain, it is likely that his personal
opinion continued to be that Our Lady had been immaculately
begotten. If that were the case, reverence for the highest
authority in Christendom demanded that he hold the proposition as no more than probable, until the Roman Church should
decide the matter. In any case his position of reserve was, in
light of the attitude of Rome, the best possible position in his
day. Three and a half centuries after St. Thomas' death the

468

THOMAS U. MULLANEY

Holy Father was to declare that divine wisdom had not yet
made the matter clear to the Church! 53 Surely one whose whole
wisdom was derived from the Church could hardly have been
certain.
Whatever else is to be found in St. Thomas' discussions of
the Immaculate Conception, this much is evident-submissiveness to the Church of Rome. In that there is no failure; in that
is, ultimately, only triumph-moral, intellectual and eternal.
THOMAS

u. MULLANEY, 0. P.

Dominican House of Stucl:ies,
Washington, D. 0.

•• Brief Oatholicae relig., 4 June, 16!!2, Annalibus Minorum XXV, 462.

ORIGINAL SIN, PRIVATION OF
ORIGINAL JUSTICE

I

T IS a well-known fact among theologians that St. Thomas
is claimed as their patron by followers of the most clearly
opposed doctrines. The very same texts of the Saint are
not infrequently understood in widely different meanings. So
much so that ,one wonders at this irreducible division among
Thomists. Is there any possibility at all of getting at the
genuine teaching of the Common Doctor?
One of the controverted interpretations regards St. Thomas'
texts and his idea of original sin as privation of original justice.
The disputed point is well known: does original justice whose
privation constitutes original sin comprise in itself sanctifying
grace, or is sanctifying grace adequately distinct, though not
separable, from original justice? Both answers are given by
Thomists and each of them claims faithfully to echo St.
Thomas' teaching. Both theories argue from his texts and
from intrinsic reasons based on his principles. Each also has an
answer ready for the arguments of the opposite opinion. Is
there any way out of the deadlock?

Contemporary Controversy: Its History.
Before 1915 modern Thomists commonly taught, as being
the faithful interpretation of SL Thomas, that the essential
and formal element of original justice is sanctifying grace. The
latter, therefore, is but inadequately distinct from the former,
as is a part from its whole. No one seemed to have any doubt
or difficulty about this. And it was taken for granted, rather
than concluded from a study of the original texts, that such
was the authentic interpretation of St. Thomas' teaching: Since
the concept of original sin as privation of this justice explained
perfectly well how the hereditary fault is a sin in the proper
sense of the word, that is, death of the soul because of the
469
4

470

P. DELETTER

absence of sanctifying grace, such as the Tridentine decree on
original sin demands it and still more explicitly the projected
Canon of the Vatican Council, no one was led to suppose that
the Common Doctor could have. taught any different doctrine.
It was Fr. R. Martin, 0. P., who opened the controversy by
calling into question this common interpretation. In an article
on the doctrine of original sin in the Summa contra Gentiles 1
he showed, from a minute analysis of the three chapters on
original sin (Book 4, chapters 50-52) and from the study of
the sources, that St. Thomas held, with the Scholastics of the
previous and of his own century, that sanctifying grace is not
included in original justice, the privation of which constitutes
original sin. Original sin is the privation of the preternatural
integrity of nature only, and this privation entails the absence
of sanctifying grace in the individuals who inherit that nature.
Martin's study-because, no doubt, of the unsettled conditions
of the First World War-provoked little comment. His thesis
was taken up again in 1921 by Canon J. Bittremieux, professor
at Louvain University, who extended the field of research to all
the works of St. Thomas. He examined the question of the
distinction between original justice and sanctifying grace
according to St. Thomas/ and concluded in favour of Martin's
thesis. A year later Fr. J. Kors, 0. P., devoted a volume of the
Bibliotheque Thomiste to the same study. 3 In it he combines
both historical research in pre-Thomist teaching on original
justice and original sin, and critical study of St. Thomas' own
1 R. Martin,
0. P., "La doctrina sobre el pecado original en Ia Summa contra
Gentiles," Ciencia Tomista, VI (1915) 1, pp. 889-400; 2, pp. 228-286. He expressed
the same opinion about St. Thomas' teaching in Revue des Sciences Philosophiques
et 1'heologiques, V (1911), 825 f., and again ibid., IX (1920), 678. Other historical

studies of his on the problem: " La question du peche originel dans Saint Anselme,"
ibid., V (1911), 785-749; "Les idees de Robert de Melun sur le peche originel,"
ibid., VII (1918), 700-725; VIII (1914), 489-466; IX (1920), 108-UO; XI (1922),
890-415; "Le peche originel d'apres Gilbert de Ia Porree et son ecole," Revue
d'lfistorie Ecclesiastique, XIII (1912), 674-691.
• J. Bittremieux, "La distinction entre la justice originelle et la grace sanctifiante
d'apres Saint Thomas d'Aquin," Revue Thomiste, XXVI (1921), 121-150.
• J. Kors, 0. P., La Justice Primitive et le Peche Originel d'apres Saint Thomas.
Les Sources. La Doctrine. Paris, 1922.

ORIGINAL

SIN, PRIVATION

OF ORIGINAL

JUSTICE

471

texts. His conclusion confirms the re-discovered authentic
teaching of St. Thomas: Original sin is the privation of original
justice, that is, of the preternatural rectitude of nature; necessarily connected with it, but adequately distinct from it, is the
privation of sanctifying grace, which grace is extrinsic to the
primitive justice.
It was to be expected that the novel interpretation of St.
Thomas' teaching would meet with opposition in the common
Thomist school. We need not recall here all the participants in
the debate nor their refutation of the arguments brought
forward in favor of the innovation. 4 We just note that the
defenders of the common, perhaps century-old interpretation of
St. Thomas hardly go in for a critical and historical study of
his texts, but :rather base their proofs on speculative reasons
connected with certain principles or phrases of his donum
naturae and donum personae, causa efficiens and formalis, condito sine qua non and dispositio; or with the teaching of Trent
that original sin is a real sin. It is precisely this arguing on
both sides from the very same reasons or texts which looks
intriguing: Hmv to find an objective approach to the texts? 5
A partial attempt at bringing together the two positions, or
rather perhaps at finding an easy way of maintaining the more
common interpretation in face of the novel one, was made by
F. L. Teixidor, S. J., in an article on" A lexicographical question.
4 Cf. C. Vollert, S. J., "Saint Thomas on Sanctifying Grace and Original Justice,"
Theological Studies, IJ[ (1941), 369-387, who examines the five mam reasons given
for the adequate distinction between original justice and sanctifying grace, and
gives an answer for each. He also gives the bibliography. Cf. also J. Coppens,
" Une controverse recente sur Ia nature du peche originel," Epheme1ides Theologicae
Lovanienses, I
185-191.
5 As an example, cf. the two articles
in Revue Thomiste, XXVI
J.
Bittremieux, art. cit., and A. Michel, "La grace sanctifiante et Ia justice originelle,"
pp.
One cannot help noticing, when contrasting these two studies, that
Bittremieux' conclusion in favor of an adequate distinction between original justice
and sanctifying grace is based on a historical study of the texts, whilst Michel's in
favor of an inadequate distinction must be found in (or read into) St. Thomas'
texts because Trent and the Vatican Council (projected canon) require it (cf. p.
. This looks as though the former interpretation were ' historical ' and the
latter ' doctrinal.'

47.2

P. DELETTER

The use of the phrase ' original justice ' in St. Thomas." 6 In
it the author defends the thesis that St. Thomas uses the
phrase " original justice " in two different meanings: one in
which it includes sanctifying grace, another in which it designates only the preternatural justice of nature. When St.
Thomas defines original sin as the privation of original justice,
the latter is taken in the broader sense, including sanctifying
grace as its formal element. Fr. C. Vollert, S. J., who approves
of this conclusion, applied it to the study of some fourteenth
century Scholastics/ Henry of Ghent, Durand us of St. Poure;ain,
Peter Paludanus, James of Lausanne and Guido Terreni. To
his happy surprise he detects in all of them a similar awareness
of the twofold meaning of original justice; just as, by a sort of
afterthought, he had found it also in He:rvaeus Natalis whom
he had studied before. 8 Would this not be a way out of the
deadlock and an open door to mutual understanding? I am
afraid this attempt will convince few readers. It is difficult to
escape the impression that their inquiry was greatly inspired
by the desire to detect the common Thom:ist teaching in the
texts of St. Thomas and those of his commentators. In point
of fact, even if their studies did not pass unnoticed, they seem
to have little influenced the followers of the new interpretation.

Historical Approacho
To reach the objective teaching of St. Thomas such as it
was understood by his contemporaries, the only suitable apIf we wish to underproach seems to be the historical
6 L. Teixidor, S. J., " una Cuestion lexicografica. El uso de Ia palabre Justicia
Original en Santo Tomas de Aquino," Estudios Eclesiasticos, VI (1927), 337-376;
VIII (1929), 23-41. Cf. an allusion to the same idea in A. Michel, art. cit., p. 427,
n. ft.
7 C. Vollert, S. J., "The Two Senses of Original Justice in Medieval Theology,"
Theol. Stud., V (1944),
8 C. Vollert, S. J., "Hervaeus Natalis and the Problem of Original Justice," Theol.
Stud., III (1942), 231-251. Cf. of the same author, "The Doctrine of Hervaeus
Natalis on Primitive Justice and Original Sin," Analecta Gregoriana, XLII (Rome:
1947).
• Cf. the illuminating remarks of 0. LoUin, 0. S. B., "Pour un commentaire
historique de Ia Morale de Saint Thomas d'Aquin," Phychologie et Morale au XII
.et X Ill siecles, III (Louvain: 1949), 579-601.

ORIGINAL

SIN, PRIVATION

OF ORIGINAL

JUSTICE

473

stand his (not our) doctrine on original sin and original justice
we must replace it in its historical setting, and see what was
commonly taught about these points of the faith by his predecessors and contemporaries and by his first commentators. We
must set aside the desire to find in his writings (or in those
of the other Scholastics) either of the two positions which
today divide his followers, avoid even reading his texts in the
light of the Tridentine definitions which he himself never knew.
It is not surprising, but rather to be expected, that St. Thomas'
problematique is not the same as ours. Seven centuries of
theological reflection; not uninfluenced by the reflection of the
outside world, separate us from him. If we project into his
texts our own way of viewing the problem, little wonder that
different interpretations, governed by different pre-conceptions,
result from their reading.
The approach to the historical teaching of St. Thomas on
original justice and original sin has been facilitated by several
recent historical studies. Besides the book of Fr. Kors already
Originel "
mentioned, we
historical article on "
in the Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique 12 (1933) by A.
Gaudel (for the Scholastic period, col. 482-510); the volume of
Fr. Martin on "The controversy on original sin in the 14th
century" 10 which edits unpublished texts; and especially the
series of studies on the doctrinal history of original sin in the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries by Dom 0. Lottin, 0. S: B., 11
10 R. Martin, 0. P., La Controverse sur le Piche Originel au Debut du XIV Siecle.
Textes lnedits (Louvain: 1930).
11 0. Lottin, 0. S. B., "Le peche originel au XII siecle," Recherches de' Theologie
Ancienne et Medievale, XI (1939), 17-32; XII (1940), 78-103; 236-274 (referred to'
below as LoUin, XII siede); "Le traite du peche originel chez les premiers maitres
dominicains a Paris," Ephem. Theol. Lovan., XVIII (1940), 27-57 (ref. Lottin,
maitres dominicains ") ; " Le traite du peche originel chez les premiers maitres
franciscains a Paris," Ephem. Theol. Lovan., XVIII (1941), 26-64 (ref. Lottin,
" maitres franciscains ") ; "Le. peche originel chez Albert le Grand, Bonaventure et
Thomas d'Aquin," Rech. Theol. Anc. Med., XII (1940), 271l-3'i!8 (ref. Lottin,
"Albert ... "); "Bapteme et peche originel de S. Anselme a S. Thomas d'Aquin,"
Ephem. Theol. Lovan. XIX (1942), 225-245 (ref. Lottin, " Bapteme ").
We have not been able to make use of the earlier study of J. N. Espengerge:r,
0. So B., "Die Elemente der Erbsiinde nach Augustin und der Friihscholastik,"

474

P. DELETTER

based on the study of the manuscript texts of which he edits
the most important. Without doing over again their detailed
inquiries, it will suffice for our purpose to note their main
conclusions and see where St. Thomas' position comes in; designate also in what precise points St. Thomas eventually introduces something new with regard to his predecessors, and
where, eventually, modern Thomists have done the same with
regard to Thomas' position.
For the reader's convenience, we may briefly state the result
of our study at the outset. It comes down to this: St. Thomas'
concept of original justice remains the same as that of his
contemporaries, for whom original justice is the preternatural
rectitude of nature, adequately distinct from sanctifying grace.
But he establishes a connection between this justice and grace
which makes both dependent on each other for their existence.
Later on, when new viewpoints and problems arise, the justice
of nature is conceived somewhat differently. Modern Thomists
accordingly express the connection which St. Thomas had estawhole complex of prete:r-and
blished by saying that in
supernatural gifts which Adam received, sanctifying grace is
the formal element and the preternatural gifts the material
element. In their new problematique the manner of expression
is different from that of St. Thomas; the objective reality
expressed is much the same. The influences that have determined the shifting over to a new way of viewing the problem
come mainly from the Tridentine insistence, in opposition to
Luther, on the" vera ratio peccati" found in original sin which
is death of the soul, "mors animae." This led to including in
original sin the privation of sanctifying grace.
To lead up to that conclusion we must: 1) briefly state the
development of the ideas on original sin as privation of original
justice before St. Thomas;
recall St. Thomas' concept; 3)
indicate some of his immediate commentators; 4) examine as
far as possible what influences determined the slow shift to a
new problematique; and 5) lastly point out the identity and
differences of doctrine in the two theories.
Forschungoo zur chrisilichoo Literatur und Dogmengeschichte, I (Mainz:
79-184.

1!105),

ORIGINAL SIN, PRIVATION

OF ORIGINAL JUSTICE

475

Original Sin as Privation of Original Justice Before St" Thomas"
In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries up to SL Thomas'
entrance into the Scholastic field, the concept of original sin
as privation of original justice is not the only, nor even the
more commonly accepted, theory. LoUin's studies have traced
the curves of three other conceptions. First, the so-called
Augustinian theory 12 defines original sin as concupiscence. This
is followed in the school of Anselm of Laon (t 1117) and of
William of Champeaux (t 1122) / 3 and it flourished throughout the twelfth and in the thirteenth centuries as welU" Another theory is that of Peter Abelard (t 1142) and Gilbert of la
Porree (1154) who conceived original sin as being nothing else
than the necessity of undergoing temporal and eternal punishments.15 After having known a real success towards the end of
the twelfth century, it was, especially on account of Abelard's
condemnation at the council of Sens (1141), to disappear for
good. A third theory was that of Stephen Langton (t 1228)
which defines original sin as a stain on the soul/ 6 and which had
some following in the beginning of the thirteenth century.
12 For St. Augustine's
concept of original sin, cf. A. Gaudel, art. cit., col. 371-381;
392-402; o:r before him, Kors, op. cit., pp. 3-22. According to the latter, original
justice does not, for St. Augustine, include sanctifying grace, though Adam had
received grace, and (but this is less clear) was created in sanctifying grace. Cf.
however B. C. (appuyns) in a review of A. Slomkowski, "Relatio gratiam sanctificantem inter et iustitiam originalem secundum doctrinam S. Augustini, Collect.
Theol.," XVIII (1937), 32-52, Bulletin de Theologie Ancienne et Medievale, III
(1938), n. 730, who says that Slomkowski is right, against Kors, when showing that
St. Augustine identifies justice and sanctifying grace.
13 Cf. Lottin,
" XII siecle," pp. 20-22; authors of this school: Robert Pullen
(Lottin, art. cit., pp. 239-40; Hugo of St. Victor (ibid., pp. 241-242); the Summa
Sententiarum (ibid., pp. 249-251); Peter Lombard (ibid., pp. 246-248); Robert of
Melun (ibid., pp. 248-249); Sententiae Udonis (ibid., pp. 249-251); Peter of Poitiers
(ibid., pp. 258-259); Praepositinus of Cremona (ibid., pp. 259-263); Peter of Capua
(ibid., pp. 264-265) . Further, William of Auxerre (Lottin, " Maitres franciscains,"
pp. 28-38), Hugo of St. Cher (ibid., pp. 38-46).
14 Cf. Lottin, "XII siecle," pp. 236-265.
15 Lottin, "XII siecle," p. 103, summary of the evolution of this theory.
Authors:
Abelard (ibid., pp. 78-79), Sententiae divinitatis (ibid., pp. 82-83), Tractatus Paris
Maz. 1708 (ibid., pp. 83-86), Simon of Tournai (ibid., pp. 86-90, London Brit.
Museum Royal 9 XII (ibid., pp. 90-94), Alanus of Lille (ibid., pp. 94-97),
Radulphus the Ardent (ibid., pp. 97-101), Nicholas of Amiens (ibid., pp. lOl-102).

476

P. DELETTER

The concept of original sin as privation of original justice,
which was to become the classic Scholastic theory of the future,
was originated, as is well known, by St. Anselm of Canterbury
(t 1109) .17 Departing largely from the prevalent Augustinian
concept he defines original sin as " the bareness of the due
justice which was induced by Adam's disobedience, and by
which all have become sons of wrath." 18 By justice he means
" the rectitude of the will kept for its own sake." 19 Does this
primitive justice imply sanctifying grace? It certainly originates from a grace and is more than a natural gift. Whether
the grace it involves is sanctifying grace St. Anselm does not
say clearly; only by reasoning on his texts can we connect
sanctifying grace with justice. 20 But the Scholastics of the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries who take over St. Anselm's
definition explicitly note that, for St. Anselm, the justice of
16 Lottin, " XII siide," pp. iit66-iit7iit; "Maitres dominicains," Roland of Cremona,
pp. 47-59. No one will wonder at this variety of opinions if he remembers that in
the twelfth century, till well in the thirteenth, the very notion of sin, speculatively
considered, is still fluctuating. The history of the theology of sin (mortal, habitual,
venial sin) in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is as yet unwritten. Hints at this
unsettled state of ideas are found in A. Teetaert, La Confession aux Laiques dans
l'Eglise Latine (Louvain: 19iit6) and 0. Lottin, Psychologie et Morale aux XII et

XIII Siecles, passim.
17 Cf. R. Martin, "La question du peche originel dans Saint Anselme," Rev. Sc.
Theol. Phil., V (1911), 785-749; A. Gaudel, art. cit., col. 485"441; Kors, op. cit., pp.

!it8iit8-85.
18 "Factam per inobedientiam Adae iustitiae debitae nuditatem
per quam omnes
sunt filii irae" (De conceptu virginali, c. iit7; ML 158, 461).
19 "Iustitia
est rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata " (ibid., c., 8; ML 158,

486).
2 ° Cf. Kors, op. cit., p. iit7. The obscurity
in St. Anselm's teaching lies in his
statement that this justice is both due to the rational creature and given in view
of the vision: " Rationalem creaturam a Deo factam esse iustam, ut illo fruendo
beata esset, dubitari non debet" (Cur Deus homo, lib. lit, c. 1; ML 158, 899).
Martin, art. cit., p. 789, against J. Toner ("Anselm's definition of original sin,"
Irish Theological Quarte:rly, III (1908), 4iit7) who wrote: "For our Saint original
justice meant nothing more than the natural and connatural rectitude of will due
to a rational creature" (p. 4iit8), proves that this natural justice is due to a grace.
Cf. Kors, op. cit., p. S7, iit9; Michel, "Justice Originelle," Diet. Theol. Cath., Vill
(19iit5), col. iit088. Note also that in the twelfth century the doctrine that sanctifying grace is a habitus in hardly formulated as yet.

ORIGINAL SIN, PRIVATION

OF ORIGINAL JUSTICE

477

which original sin is the privation is " natural justice," not
" gratuitous justice." 21
It may seem strange but it is a historical fact that throughout the twelfth century little attention was paid to St. Anselm's
innovation. Lottin can point to only three authors who follow
him: Honorius of Autun (t 1150/60) ,22 the author of the
Ysagoge in theologiam, of Abelard's school, 23 and Achard of St.
Victor (t 1171) .24 To these may be added an earlier author,
Odo of Cambrai (t 1113) 25 who was one of the first to write
a treatise De Peccato originali. Apart from these, the early
Scholastics are nearly unaware of the new idea. With the turn
of the century this situation would change. The first Dominican and Franciscan Masters of Paris definitely usher m the
Anselmian concept of original sin.
Among the Dominicans John of St. Giles (t 1258) is the
first to follow it: Original sin is " the absence of due justice.
And justice is, according to Anselm, the rectitude of the will
kept for its own sake." 26
More resolute to adopt the new idea are the Franciscan
Cf. below, nn. 8, 80.
Lattin, " XII siecle," pp; 286-289; Kors, op. cit., pp. 40-48; Michel, art. cit., col.
2084; Gaudei, art. cit., col. 441-442. Honorius hints at the distinction between
original justice and sanctifying grace, " ut voluntate iustitiae corpori subdito imperaret, et voluntate beatitudinis Deo obediret" (ML 172, 1212).
23 Lattin, art. cit., pp. 244-246, " Culpa originalis est concupiscentia mali et duplex
debitum, habendi scilicet originalem iustitiam quam semper servare potuit, et
satisfaciendi pro inobedientia a qua semper cavere potuit."
•• Lattin, art. cit., p. 251. Achard is mentioned as a patron of this opinion in the
Allegoriae N. T. (ML 175, 887) which is probably the work of Richard of St.
Victor (Lottin, p. 258), and in the commentary on St. Paul's Epistles of the ms
Paris Arsenal 535, "Originale ergo peccatum est iniustitia originalis, id est privatio
sive absentia cuiusdam originalis iustitie que debet esse in prima etate secundum
primam institutionem Dei." The same opinion is referred to in London Lambeth
199, "Alii dicunt quod peccatum originale est privatio cuiusdam iustitie quam
habuisset homo si non preccasset, et quia privatur ilia iustitia, privatur et gloria "
(Lottin, art. cit., p. 256) .
•• Cf. Gaudel, art. cit., col. 442.
26 " Peccatum originate est carentia debite iustitie. Justitia vero secundum Anselmum est rectitudo voluntatis propter seipsam servata "; Lattin, "Maitres dominicain•,'' pp. 58-54.
21

22

478

P. DELETTER

Masters of Paris. The anonymous author of Douai 434 27 attempts to synthesize the Augustinian and Anselmian ideas,
an attempt that will be repeated after him. He defines original
sin as " the absence of the due justice and proneness to sin."
By justice he means, not the gratuitous justice, but, as Anselm
says, the natural justice. Original sin is not properly speaking
the absence of grace, but the spoiling of the natural gifts. 28
After him John of la Rochelle (t after U45) 29 lists six opinions
on the nature of original sin and hesitatingly chooses the
Anselmian doctrine: absence of the due justice, that is, not
of the gratuitous but of the natural justice. Another anonymous author, Paris Nat. lat. nouv. acq. 1470, also adopts the
Anselmian definition. 30 And so does, even more fully and more
explicitly, Alexander of Hales (t 1245) according to the Paris
Nat. lat. 15 272 and 16 404: 81 original sin is the absence or
bareness of the due original justice which was incurred from
elsewhere, that is, privation of Adam's natural justice by
virtue of which all his descendents would have been just from
their birth, had he not sinned. 32 Alexander, too, attempts a
synthesis of this idea with the Augustinian concept of concupiscence, by which, he says, Augustine did not express the
whole of original sin but only a part of it. Just as in actual sin
there is a turning away from the changeless Good and a turning
to a perishable good, so also there is in original sin the aforesaid
Lottin, "Maitres franciscains," pp.
"Peccatum (originale) non est proprie privatio gratie, sed corruptio naturalium,
que naturalia, si essent in sua rectitudine naturali, disponerent ad gratiam," Lottin,
It is " abenstia debite iustitie et pronitas ad peccandum" (ibid.,
art. cit., p.
p. 81). This justice "aut ... sumitur pro iustitia gratuita, aut pro naturali. Pro
gratuita non; quia . . . dicit Anselmus."
29 Lottin, art. cit., pp. 84-41, " Absentia debite iustitie; . . . iustitia gratuita que
solum descendit a pratre luminum, et de hac nihil in presens "; it is the "iustitia
naturalis " as defined by Anselm, "rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata " (ibid.,
p. 87).
30 Lottin, art. cit., pp. 41-48, "Privatio
iustitie debite," that is, of the "iustitia
naturalis," which " erat in nobis posse non concupiscere et debere non concupiscere."
31 Lottin, art. cit., pp. 48-54.
32 " Carentia
vel nuditas originalis iustitie debite aliunde contracta " (Lottin,
art. cit., p. 48); that justice was "iustitia uaturalis qua omnes procedentes ab ipso
(Adamo) essent originaliter iusti, si stetisset" (ibid., p. 45).
27
28

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absence and the aforesaid concupiscence. 33 We find the latter
idea also with Odo Rigaud (t 1275) .34 The two elements of
original sin are: the absence of the due justice which is by way
of aversion, and concupiscibility which is by way of conversion. For all these authors, Lottin remarks/" " original
justice does not formally designate anything supernatural,
its definition the habitus
still less does it in any way imply
of sanctifying grace."
A singular exception to this rule is St. Albert the Great
(t 1280). He belongs to the Anselmian current of doctrine
and defines original sin as privation of original justice.
he departs in this respect, that, against the common opinion,
as he explicitly says himself, he includes sanctifying grace
original justice and its privation in original sin. 36 His reason
for doing so is twofold: first, he holds, also against the common
opinion, and with only one predecessor among Scholastics,
Praepositinus of Cremona,S 7 that Adam was created
sanctifying grace, in gratuitis, and not in naturalibus, that is, not with
33 In actual sin, " aversio a bono incommutabili
et conversio ad bonum commutabile "; in original sin, "predicta carentia et predicta concupiscentia" (Lottin,
art. cit., p. 48).
34 Lottin,
art. cit., pp. 56-62, "carentia debite iustitie (que) est per modum
aversionis, et concupiscibi!itas per modum conversionis" (ibid., p. 59).
35 Art. cit., p. 63.
30 Lottin,
"Albert ... ," pp. 280-282. It is mainly, if not exclusively, according
to an unpublished ms. attributed to St. Albert that this novel theory of his is
known; cf. Fr. M. Henriquet, "Vingt-deux questions inedites d'Aibert le Grand dans
un manuscrit a I' usage de St. Thomas d'Aquin," New Scholasticism, IX (1935),
313, n. 49; Lottin, art. cit., p. 282. Kors, op. cit., pp. 62-64, who bases his study on
the printed works only, leaves this point undecided, or rather inclines to the
opposite view. Lottin himself, art. cit., p. 282 n. 14, gives a hint in the same sense.
St. Albert's text in the unpublished quaestio disputata is as follows: "Secundum
veriorem sententiam carentia fuit debite iustitie gratuite; verior enim sententia est
quod gratiam habuit in statu innocentie " (Lottin, loc. cit.) Even for St. Albert
the iustitia naturalis ( = praeternaturalis) is distinct from iustiiia gratuita.
37 Cf. Michel, "Justice
Originelle," Diet. Theol. Cath., VIII I (1924), col. 2035,
Praepositinus was the first to propose this theory which would become common after
St. Thomas. He claims as his authorities St. Anselm and St. Gregory the Great.
Note with Michel, loc. cit., that creatus in naturalibus means in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries in praeternaturalibus (sine gratia sanctificante). Only later
on it will come to mean in donis pttre naturalibus tantum.

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the preternatural gifts only. Secondly, unless original sin implies the privation of sanctifying grace, he does not see how it
can make men sons of wrath. 38 Another point on which St.
Albert makes a new start is the application to the doctrine of
original sin of the Aristotelian ideas of matter and form: in
original sin the proneness to evil is the matter, the absence of
due justice is the form. 39
St. Bonaventure ("f 1274) ,40 contemporary of St. Thomas,
also synthesizes St. Augustine and St. Anselm, following at
the same time St. Albert's example in applying the Aristotelian
matter and form concepts. With a stress on Augustinian concupiscence he defines original sin, formally, as privation of original justice, and materially, as concupiscence. And he understands this in the following manner: original justice is the
(preter) -natural rectitude in which Adam was created, that is,
without sanctifying grace, as held by the then more common
opinion. 41 Concupiscence, or the inclination to evil, following
on the loss of original justice, is the material element of original
sin; it connotes and includes positively the formal element. 42
We may sum up these brief notes by saying that, St. Albert
the Great excepted, the Scholastics who before St. Thomas
defined original sin as the privation of original justice, understand the primitive rectitude in the sense of a natural (=preternatural) rectitude of the will, distinct from the gratuitous
justice. And they do so, because such was St. Anselm's idea,
and because they commonly teach that Adam was not created
in gratuitis, but in naturalibus (= praeternaturalibus) .
As for those who conceived original sin differently, whether
as concupiscence, or as reatus poenae, or as a stain (macula) ,
38 Cf. Lottin, art. cit., p. \!!82, nn. 13 and 14. To an objection, "Originale non est
carentia nisi debite iustitie naturalis; defectus autem boni naturalis non contrariatur
gratie; ergo per originale non est homo filius ire," St. Albert answers by granting
that, " secundum veriorem sententiam (peccatum originale carentie fuit debite
iustitie gratuite."
39 Cf. Lottin, art. cit., pp.
40 Ibid., pp. 287-294.
41 Ibid., p. 290, n. 35.
42 Ibid., p. 291. Cf. E. Catazzo,
0. F. M., De Justitia et Peccato Originali iuxta
S. Bonaventuram (Vicenza: 1942).

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their very phrases show that they do not include in original
sin the privation of sanctifying grace. When these same theologians happen to speak of the justice in which Adam was
created, they mean a (preter) -natural rectitude, without sanctifying grace. This grace Adam either never received before
his sin, or if he did receive it before his sin, then at any rate
not immediately with his creation.
Accordingly, it is historically certain that in the theology of
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries up to St. Thomas the idea
of original justice did not include sanctifying grace. In the
mind of the theologians who conceived original sin as privation
of original justice-unless they explicitly say that they do not
follow the common opinion, as St. Albert did-the hereditary
fault does not include in its essence the privation of sanctifying
grace.
Unless St. Thomas also explicitly says the opposite, the presumption will be that he understood original justice and original
sin in the meaning commonly accepted by his contemporaries.

St. Thomas' Concept of Original Sin as Privation of Original
Justice.
The facts seem indeed to confirm that presumption. Before
even reading St. Thomas' own texts, it is striking how historians
who have studied them, after Martin and Bittremieux, 43 are
agreed in saying that St. Thomas does not consider sanctifying
grace as an intrinsic constituent of original justice, nor its
privation as of the essence of original sin. On this point, they
affirm, St. Thomas has not abandoned the common doctrine
of the time. So do Kors, Gaudel, Lottin, in their respective
studies on the question. 44 And for one who reads the texts with
Cf. above, nn. 1 and 1!.
In the studies quoted above nn. 3 and 10 and p. 3. Even Michel. in the article
on original JUstice of the Diet. Theol. Cath. referred to above, n. 37, does no longer
say, as he did when writing an answer to Bittremieux, that the interpretation of St.
Thomas' teaching in the sense of an adequate distinction between original justice
and sanctifying grace is less in conformity with Trent or the Vatican. Coppens,
art. cit. above, n. 4, rightly notes that the projected canon of the Vatican Council
purposely substituted the term ratio for essentia (peccati originalis), in order not
43

44

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P. DELETTER

a mind free from doctrinal bias, it is hard to evade their
conclusion. There is no need to quote and to comment on aU
these texts in the chronological order in which they should be
read. 45 A few remarks will suffice for our present purpose,
namely, to show that in fact St. Thomas remains faithful to the
common opinion of the time as regards the distinction of original
justice and sanctifying grace-though, as will be shown presently, he did change regarding some other aspects of the
problem.

The Texts.
In the Commentary on the Sentences he states that distinction in the same terms as his contemporaries: he distinguishes
in Adam an original justice and a gratuitous justice. 46 These
are distinct, yet, according to the opinion which he considers
more probable, not separated in time but given simultaneously.47 Nowhere in the Commentary does he designate the
complex of
the gifts Adam
received in
very creation
with the phrase" original justice." He does not seem, however,
to call this justice in opposition to the gratuitous justice,
naturalis, as many of his predecessors did; he paraphrases the
idea: this justice put order
human nature itself at its very
to enter into the controversy, rather dormant at the time, concerning the adequate
or inadequate distinction.
45 The order of the chief texts is the following: 1) ll Sent., d. !ilO, q. 2, a. 3; d.
q. 1, a.
d. 32, q. l, a. 1, ad l; £) IV Summa contra Gent., c.
3) Summa
Theol., I, q. 95, a. l, c and ad 5; q. 100, a. l, c and ad £; 4) De Malo, q. 4, a. 2,
c and ad 1 and £ (e tertia serie obi.); q. 5, a. 1; 5) Summa Theol., I-II, q. S!il, a. 3;
6) Expositio in Epist. ad Roman, c. 5, lect. 3; 7)
Theologiae, c. 186. c.
19£, and c. 196. For this chronology, cf. M. Grabmann, Die Werke des hl. Thomas
von Aquin, 3rd edit., 1949.
•• II Sent., d. £0, q. £, a. 3, " ... duplex iustitia primo homini poterat convenire,
Una originalis, quae erat secundum debitum ordinem corporis sub anima, et inferiorum virium sub superiori, et ;uperioris sub Deo ... Alia iustitia gratuita quae
actus meritorios elicit."
47 11 Sent., d. !il9, q. 1, a. £, "Hoc tamen probabilius
est, ut cum homo creatus
fuerit in naturalibus integris, quae otiosa esse non poterant, quod in primo instanti
creationis ad Deum conversus, gratiam consecutus sit." Cf. also Summa 7'heol., I,
q. 95, a. 1, ad 5.

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beginnings through a divine favor. 48 It is the privation of this
justice which constitutes original sin. In it he distinguishes a
formal element, the rectitude of the will, and a material element,
the order of rectitude in the lower powers. 49 Similarly, in original sin there is a formal element, namely, the privation of
the formal element of original justice, that is, of the rectitude of
the will; and a material element, the privation of the material
element of original justice, that is, of the order in the lower
powe:rs.50 This shows well enough that St. Thomas does not
consider sanctifying grace as included in original justice; he
finds in original justice a formal element that is distinct from
48 ll Sent., d. 20, q. 2, a. 3, after the triple subordination
which St. Thomas
includes in original justice, as distinguished from gratuitous justice, namely,
"(iustitia) originalis quae erat secundum debitum ordinem corporis sub anima, et
inferiorum virium sub superiori, et superioris sub Deo," he adds, " et haec quidem
iustitia ipsam naturam ordinabat in sui primordio ex divino munere."
49 ll Sent., d. 32, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1, "in originali iustitia erat aliquid quasi formale,
scilicet ipsa rectitudo voluntatis, et secundum hoc sibi opponitur culpae deformitas.
Erat in ea etiam aliquid quasi materiale, scilicet ordo rectitudinis impressus in
inferioribus viribus: et quantum ad hoc opponitur sibi concupiscentia et fornes."
50 ll Sent., d. 30 q. l, a. 3, " ... destitutio ipsius voluntatis
ub ilia rectitudine ad
flnem quam habuit in institutione naturae, in peccato originali formale est; et hie
est privatio iustitiae originalis [Note: iustitia originalis, is taken here for its formal
element, ordo iustitiae in voluntate, which is a submission of the will to God distinct
from the iustitia gratuita] ... subtractio illius vinculi quo (vires appetitus sensibilis)
quodammodo sub potestate voluntatis rectae detinebantur materiale in peccato est
... concupiscentia," Cf. ibid., ad 4, " ... defectus ordinis in appetitu voluntatis est
formale et completivum originalis peccati quod est privatio rectitudinis voluntatis
quae inerat secundum originalem iustitiam; defectus autem ordinis in appetitu
inferiori est materialiter in peccato se habens: et hoc est concupiscentia, sicut dictum
est." In 11 Sent., d. 30, q. 1, a. l, the "ordinatio mentis in Deum," which is
" ali quid ultra (illud quod ex principiis naturalibus debebatur) per quod facile in
flnem perveniret," is in the context of St. Thomas' ideas, the preternatural submission of the will to God, not the supernatural submission " ex iustitia gratuita."
What is this natural (preternatural) subjection of reason to God? Nothing else
than the natural love of man for God, supreme end and universal Good, according
to which he (or an angel) naturally loves God more than himself; cf. Ill Sent.,
d. 29, a. 3; Summa Theol., I, q. 60, a. 5. After the Fall, this natural love for God is
no longer possible to man because of the disorder of his nature expressed in concupiscence; cf. Summa Theol., 1-II, q. 109, a. 3. Before the Fall, original justice or
the primitive rectitude of his nature made that love possible. And so in the complex
unity of that original justice, the subjection of reason to God was its formal element,
the other subjections, of the senses to reason and of the body to the soul, being its
material element.

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P. DELE1'TER

the gratuitous justice. The same appears in the way in which
he explains how baptism remits original sin: baptism does not,
by infusing grace, take away the material element of original
sin, but it removes its formal element, namely the insubordination of the will. How and why? By remedying what makes
the privation of that justice a sin of nature which infects the
person: " Baptism gives grace, and in virtue of that grace the
infection which the person contracted from nature is removed;
hence the guilt and the obligation to undergo a punishment
also vanish."
The Summa contra Gentiles also distinguishes a double good
Adam lost by sin: a personal good, namely, grace and the right
order of the soul, and a good that pertains to the common
nature. The latter comprises the threefold subjection already
found in the Commentary on the Sentences: " the inferior
powers were perfectly subject to reason, reason to God, and
body to the souL" This original justice was no effect of nature
but of grace: God supplied by grace what nature could not
give. It is the privation of this favor of God bestowed on the
whole of human nature which in the descendants of Adam
constitutes original sin. 52
The Prima Pars of the Summa Theologiae is not less clear
about the distinction under investigation. When St. Thomas
treats of the threefold subjection which is involved in original
justice-of reason to God, of the inferior powers to reason, and
51 II Sent., d. 32, q. 1, a. I, "Per baptismum autem gratia confertur, cuius virtute
illa infectio ab homine tollitur quae ex natura in personam devolvebatur: et
secundum hoc anima purgatur a macula culpae, et per consequens solvitur reatus
poenae." (Cf. Lottin, "Bapteme," p. 244.
52 IV Cont. Gent., c. 52, "Primum peccatum primi hominis non solum peccantem
destituit proprio et personali bono, scilicet gratia et debito ordine animae, sed etiam
bono ad naturam communem pertinente. Ut enim supra dictum est, sic natura
humana fuit instituta in sui primordia quod inferiores vires perfecte rationi
corpus, Deo per gratiam supplente quod ad hoc
subicerentur, ratio Deo et
deerat per naturam .... " Cf. Bittremieux, art. cit., p. 142: Lottin, "Albert ... ,"
p. 304. As noted by these authors. "per gratiam " does not mean that the subjection of reason to God, which is part of the "bonum ad naturam communem
pertinens," is the formal effect of sanctifying grace. From the context it appears
that this subjection of reason is not part of the personal grace of Adam, but of
the common gift to nature.

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of the body to the soul-of which the first is the cause of the
other two, he distinguishes a double subjection of reason to
God: one which is natural, another which is a supernatural gift
of grace. 53 The latter is necessary in the very creation of man
as the root cause of the whole of original justice. The rectitude
in which man was created was not natural, that is, flowing
from the constituents of nature. It required grace as its permanent cause. 54 Because of this intimate connection between
original justice and sanctifying grace, St. Thomas may seem
partly to neglect in original justice the subjection of reason to
God which is natural (= preternatural) , because it is, as it were,
taken up and raised in the supernatural subjection of reason
to God that arises from sanctifying grace. But it subsists there
nevertheless.
This is perhaps still more the case in the De Malo. It is not
as though the adequate distinction between original justice and
sanctifying grace were stated less plainly here; rather, the
most definite expression of that distinction is found in q. 5, a. L
Both sanctifying grace and original justice are supernatural
gifts of God: the former is necessary for every rational creature
that is destined for the vision of God; the latter is necessary
for man only because of his composite being, that is, because
his nature is composed of spirit and matter. 55 The first, grace,
is not a part of the second, original justice. Original sin is the
53 Summa Theol., I, q. 95, a. 1: one submission of reason to Goj is "secundum
naturam," another " secundum supernaturale donum gratiae." The first is the
preternatural rectitude of the mind and reason which consists in this, as pointed out
above n. 50, that because of the harmony in man's composite nature, reason and
will can freely follow their natural inclination to love God above all things.
54 Ibid., q. 100, a. l, ad
Here again St. Thomas distinguishes "iustitia gratuita"
and " iustitia originalis "; but he holds that they in fact exist together, the first
being the root cause of the second. And " iustitia gratuita " is " subiectio supernaturalis rationis ad Deum quae est per gratiam gratum facientem."
55 De Malo, q. 5, a. l, " ... aliquod divinum auxilium necessarium est communiter
omni creaturae rationali, scilicet auxilium gratiae gratum facientis, qua quaelibet
creatura rationalis indiget, ut possit pervenire ad beatitudinem perfeetam. . . . Sed
praeter hoc auxilium necessarium fuit homini aliud supernaturale auxilium, ratione
suae compositionis. . . . Hoc autem auxilium fuit originalis iustitia, per quam mens
hominis subderetur Deo, ei subderentur totaliter inferiores vires et ipsum corpus,
neque ratio impediretur quominus possit in Deum tendere." St. Thomas here clearly

5

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P. DELETTER

privation of original justice and the subtraction of grace is
its punishment. 56 We should not be misled by a text of the
previous question which says, " Original justice includes sanctifying grace." 57 The very context shows what this inclusion
means: " I do not believe it to be true that man was created
with purely natural endowments." Or another text, " The
opinion that sanctifying grace is not included in the idea (ratio)
of original justice I believe to be false." 58 Why? "Because
since original justice primarily consists in the subjection of
the human mind to God, which subjection cannot be firm
except through grace, original justice could not be without
grace." In this context, inclusion of sanctifying grace in original
justice or in its idea (ratio) means nothing else than its necessary connection with original justice. But necessary connection
does not mean inclusion as of an intrinsic element.
Is there any change in the I-II of the Summa where St.
Thomas deals ex professo with original sin? It does not seem
so. Original sin is an inordinate disposition that flows from the
destruction of the harmony in which consisted original justice. 5 9
speaks of a twofold subjection of reason to God: one due to sanctifying grace, the
other to original justice. The first is distinct from original justice.
This text shows clearly what St. Thomas meant by original justice and original
sin. Original justice is the perfect harmony of man's composite nature which
makes him fit, in the same way as other rational creatures, for the supernatural life
of grace. It is presupposed to sanctifying grace. Original sin is the wilful disharmony of that composite nature, wilful through Adam's sin, on which naturally
follows the loss of sanctifying grace. Modern Thomists more generally conceive
things in a different way.
56 Ibid., " Hoc autem auxilium iustitiae originalis subtrahitur per peccatum originale . . . et . . . conveniens poena peccati originalis est subtractio gratiae."
57 De Malo, q. 4, a. 2, ad 1 in serie Sa obi., "Originalis iustitia gratiam gratum
facientem: nee credo verum esse, quod homo sit creatus in naturalibus puris."
58 Ibid., q. 5, a. 1, ad 18, "ratio ilia procedit secundum opinionem ponentium
quod gratia non includatur in ratione originalis iustitiae: quod tamen credo esse
falsum; quia cum originalis iustitia primordialiter consistat in subiectione humanae
mentis ad Deum, quae firma
non potest nisi per gratiam, iustitia origiualis
sine gratia esse non potest." Cf. Lottin, "Albert .. ,'' p. 805, n. 72.
•• Summa Theol., I-II, q. 82, a. 1, "Est enim quaedam inordinata dispositio
proveniens ex dissolutione illius harmoniae in qua consistebat ratio originalis
iustitiae." Cf. ibid., q. 85, a. 8, "Per iustitiam originalem perfecte continebat ratio
inferores animae vires, et ipsa ratio a Deo perficiebatur ei subiecta. Haec autem

ORIGINAL

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By the privation of original justice the submission of man's
mind to God was abolished. 6 ° For the whole order of original
justice comes from this, that man's will was subjected to
God. 61 And so the formal element of original sin is the privation
of that original justice by which the will was subject to God;
every other deordination of the powers of the soul is its
material elemenL 62 That means: in the disorder of nature
which is original sin, 63 the chief element is the disorder of the
will: the other disorder, which may be called concupiscence, is
consequent on the former and is secondary to it. No mention
is made of sanctifying grace.
The Expositio in Epistolam ad Romanos, when commenting
on St. Paul's classical text on original sin, has no other concept
of the hereditary fault. It is the sin of nature, committed by
the will of the first principle of nature. 64 That inordinateness
of nature is the privation of original justice which had been
given to the first man, not only as to an individual person but
as to the principle of human nature, to be transmitted to his
posterity together with nature. 65 Now after his
transmits to us the privation of that justice. Did this justice
include sanctifying grace? To the threefold subordination
originalis iustitia substracta est per peccatum primi parentis. . . ." Ibid., ad 5,
" ... per peccatum primi parentis sublata est iustitia originalis .... "
60 Ibid.,
q. 81!, a. 2, " ... privatio originalis iustitiae per quam sublata est
subiectio humanae mentis ad Deum."
61 Ibid., a. 3, " Tota autem ordinatio originalis iustitiae ex hoc est, quod voluntas
hominis erat Deo subiecta." Both preternatural and supernatural submission of
the will to God are meant here, the
supposing the first, and vice-versa.
Cf. Kors, op. cit., p. 137.
62 Ibid., " Sic ergo privatio originalis iustitiae, per quam voluntas
Deo,
est formale in peccato originali; omnis autem alia inordinatio virium animae se
habet in peccato originali sicut quiddaro. materiale."
•• Cf. ibid., a. 4, "defectus originalis iustitiae . . .": ad l, "soluto vinculo
originalis iustitiae, sub quo quodam ordine omnes animae vires animae continebantur .... "
64 Ad Rom., c. 5, lect. 8, "peccatum
originale est peccatum naturae, quod per
voluntatem principii naturae commissum est."
65 Ibid., " Est autem hie defectus carentia
iustitiae originalis, quae erat primo
homini collata, non solum ut erat persona quaedam singulruris, sed etiam ut erat
principium humanae naturae, ut scilicet earn simul cum natura in posteros traduceret."

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which we know already-of the mind to God, of the lower
powers to the higher, of the body to the soul-a fourth one is
added here: of the exterior things to man, so that they served
him and he suffered no harm from them. 66 The first is the
reason and cause of the others. It flows from a special gift of
God who gave the soul power and strength to keep command
over the body in a manner to which its natural weakness was
not equal. 67 Is this virtus sanctifying grace? No mention is
made of it.
Lastly, the Compendium Theologiae explains in what the
state of original justice consisted. The triple subordination of
the body to the soul, of the inferior powers to reason, and of
reason to God, belonged to that state. Is this last subordination preternatural or supernatural? It is the cause of the two
previous ones. By it man referred all things to God as to his
last end. 68 It is not stated that it is sanctifying grace, though
we must necessarily conclude that it depended on sanctifying
grace. The complex of this manifold order is original justice.
It was given to Adam not as to an individual person but as
to the first principle of human nature. From him it was to be
transmitted to his descendants together with human nature. 60
•• Ibid., " Quae quidem iustitia est quaedam recitudo, ut mens hominis esset sub
Deo: et inferiores vires essent sub mente, et corpus sub anima, et omnia exteriora
nocumentum
sub homine ... ut scilicet ... omnia (ei) servirent, et nullum ex
acciperet."
67 Ibid., ". . . supplevit potentia divina quod deest naturae humanae, dans animae
virtutem continendi corpus incorruptibiliter .... " Note that the permanent source
of this virtus is sanctifying grace; the virtus itself is the preternatural gift of
integrity.
•• Compendium Theologiae, c. 186, "Ex hoc vero quod voluntas hominis erat
Deo subdita, homo referebat omnia in Deum sicut in ultimum finem, in quo eius
iustitia et innocentia consistebat." Note again, that this reference of all things to
the last end is both preternatural and supernatural, cf. above n. 61.
•• Ibid., " Hie autem hominis tam ordinatus status, originalis iustitia nominatur
... qui quidem status primo hominl fuit concessus non ut cuidam singulari personae,
sed ut primo humanae naturae principio ita quod per ipsum simul cum natura
humana traduceretur in posteros." Is sanctifying grace the formal element of this
original justice? In the Compendium no explicit mention is made of sanctifying
grace. The subjection of reason to God, as far as this flows from criginal justice,
is the natural love of God above all things made possible by the pl'eternatural gift

ORIGINAL

SIN, PRIVATION

OF ORIGINAL

JUSTICE

489

Now its privation, following on Adam's sin, constitutes original
sin, the sin of nature. 70 Does it include or entail the privation
of sanctifying grace? One of the two, yes: it either includes or
entails that privation. That this privation is intrinsic to original sin is not stated.
From this rapid glance at St. Thomas' texts it appears that
nowhere does he state explicitly that sanctifying grace is the
formal element of original justice. Nor does he do so implicitly.
In his first works, where he finds in original justice a formal
element distinct and different from sanctifying grace, this is
clearly excluded. In his later works in which the connection
between original justice and sanctifying grace is stressed more
and appears to be closer and tighter than before, it is not said
to be that of a whole to its part, but of two realities one of
which is dependent on the other for its existence and permanence as on its root cause, not however (at any rate, it is
not stated, as the material element of one complex is dependent
on its formal element. To conceive of the relation between
original justice and sanctifying grace in this latter framework
seems to add to St. Thomas' texts.n

The Teaching: Old and New.
These brief remarks on St. Thomas' succesive treatments of
our problem suffice to show that, within some evolution in
his ideas from his first to his later works, on this precise point
of the adequate distinction between original justice and sanctifying grace he has not departed from the common teaching of
the time. Yet he has departed on several other closely connected points. Two of these we must mention here.
First, St. Thomas departs with regard to the more common
teaching of his day (as noted above, only very few of his predecessors or contemporaries had proposed the idea) in holding
that Adam was created in sanctifying grace. Hesitatingly at
of the right order of reason and will. But this submission cannot be stable unless
man has sanctifying grace which is the root canse of original justice.
70 Ibid., c. 195 and 196.
71 That such addition goes against the ideological context of St. Thomas' teaching
should appear from the following pages.

490

Po DELETTER

first in the Cmnmenta:ry/ 2 later as a firmly established conclusion,73 he proves that the very state of original justice
required sanctifying grace in Adam. Two reasons mainly prove
his statement. First, the preternatural gifts of original justice
could not remain inactive; man naturally turned to God in
the very first instant of his creation and so received sanctifying
grace. 74 Secondly, original justice depends on sanctifying grace
as on its root cause/ 5 from which it draws the firmness of the
harmony it establishes in man. 76
This last reason leads us to the second point that needs
stressing, namely, to the interrelation St. Thomas conceives
between original justice and sanctifying grace. Here also he
departs, with regard to the teaching of his contemporaries, by
making this connection between the two so close as to render
each of them dependent on the other for its existence. Original
justice, in the sense of primitive rather than natural :rectitude
of nature, cannot exist without sanctifying grace which is its
cause and root. 77 Nor can sanctifying grace, in the primitive
state of man, exist without the disposition
nature prerequired
for it, namely, the integrity of nature. 78 This reciprocal cauII Sent., d. 29, q. l, a. !i>, "Hoc tamen probabilius .... "
Summa Theol., I, q. 95, a. 1; q. 100, a. l, ad 2; De Malo, q. 4, a. 2, ad 1, "nee
credo verum esse quod homo sit creatus in naturalibus puris "; cf. ibid., q. 5, a. 1,
72

73

ad 13 .
.., 11 Sent., d. 29, q. l, a. 2, "Hoc tamen probabilius est, ut cum homo creatus
fuerit in naturalibus integris quae otiosa esse non poterant, quod in primo instanti
creationis ad Deum conversus, gratiam consecutus sit"; cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 95,
a. l, ad 5, " cum motus voluntatis non sit continuus, nihil prohibet etiam in primo
instanti suae creationis primum hominem gratiae consensisse." Note that in the
Summa this reason is secondary.
75 Summa
Theol., I, q. 95, a. l, "Quod fuerit (homo) etiam conditus in gratia,
ut alii dicunt, videtur requirere ipsa rectitudo primi status, in quo Deus hominem
fecit"; q. 100, a. 1, ad 2, "Cum radix originalis iustitiae in cuius rectitudine factus
est homo, consistat in subiectione supernaturali rationis ad Deum quae est per
gratiam gratum facientem .... " Cf. II Sent., d. 32, q. 1, a. l, ad 2, " ... ex qua
(gratia) rectitudo voluntatis eausatur."
•• De Malo, q. 5, a. 1, ad 13, "Cum originalis iustitia primordialiter consistat in
subiectione humanae mentis ad Deum, quae firma esse non potest nisi per gratiam.
77 Cf. above, n. 75.
"'Cf. De Malo, q. 5, a. l, and above n. 74; Bittremieux,

art. cit., pp. 136-139.

ORIGINAL SIN, PRIVATION OF ORIGINAL JUSTICE

491

cality between sanctifying grace and original justice, the first
being the cause of the other in the order of efficient causality,
and the second the cause of the first in the order of dispositive
causality, may well have been unknown before St. Thomas.
Does it entail that original justice and sanctifying grace are to
each other as matter and form, or disposition of the subject and
new perfection infused? Not necessarily. Not in the texts nor in
the mind of St. Thomas. In his context the reciprocal causality
between original justice and sanctifying grace is demanded I and
sufficiently explained by the interrelation existing between
nature and person. But a later evolution of his doctrine among
his followers under the influence of new ideas and a new perspective will come to state that sanctifying grace is the formal
element in the sum total of gifts bestowed on Adam (called now
original justice) whilst part of these gifts, namely, the preternatural ones (formerly named original justice), is the disposition for sanctifying grace. The evolution did not happen without tacitly modifying St. Thomas' concepts. That evolution
was perhaps invited by St. Thomas' texts or ideas; but evolution
there is.
Another factor in the later development is St. Thomas' concept of original justice as rectitude of nature, and of original
sin as sin of nature. For as will appear later, it seems mainly
to have been a change in the idea of nature in this connection
that has given rise to the chief difference between the" Thomasic " and the " Thomistic " conceptions of original justice and
original sin.
What does St. Thomas mean to say when calling original
justice a good or gift of nature, bonum vel donum naturae? 79
There are mainly two ideas connected with this phrase. First,
though original justice is not a perfection that flows from the
constituents of human nature, and in that sense is more than
natural and is a divine favor, a gift of God and a grace, 80 yet it
•• Cf. IV Cont. Gent., c. 52, "bonum naturae quod per gratiam superadditum
fuit "; Ad Rom., c. 5, lect. S; cf. Bittremieux, art. cit., p. 125 f. On "Donum
naturae," cf. Kors, op. cit., p. ISO f, and the texts quoted there.
•• II Sent., d. 20, q. 2, a. S, above n. 48; IV Cont. Gent., c. 52, above n. 52.

49fZ

Po DELETTER

does not add any objective reality to the constituents of nature
nor any perfection which would raise man to a higher order,
the order of the specifically supernatural or of the divine. It
is bonum naturaeo It perfects nature in its own order by making
it whole and sound, by establishing in it, in a firm and
manent manner, the harmony and order that befit its components from their very essenceo81 In this aspect original
justice cannot but be adequately distinct from sanctifying
grace which raises man to a higher order, a sharing in the
divine lifeo82 Original justice is only a natural, though preternatural, good; it means nothing more than the intergrity of
nature. We find this aspect of original justice throughout SL
Thomas' works, stressed more perhaps in his first writings in
which he is still less personaL In his later works, in which he
insists on the necessity of sanctifying grace as pennanent root
cause of original justice, the " grace aspect " of this justice
naturally stands out more than its " naturalness."
The other aspect of original justice, as a donum naturae, a
gift made by God to human nature, reveals that this justice
was not given to the person of Adam, as his individual good,
but to the common nature. As such, it is to be considered as
a (preternatural) accident of the specific human nature, accidens naturae speciei, 83 a specific property of the nature, to be
transmitted through generation together with nature. Sanctifying grace, on the other hand, is of its very essence a gift to
a person; it cannot mean or be a gift to nature, because it means
adoptive filiation which regards persons only, 84 and it is intended to enable persons for a new life and destiny .85 It
cannot, therefore, be transmitted by generation but must be
infused by God directly: He it is who adopts and regenerates
His sons. That is another reason for the adequate distinction
between original justice and sanctifying grace. Sto Thomas'
81 Cf. above
the texts about the triple harmony and subordination
which is the formal effect of original justice, nn. 48, 52, 53, 55, 65, 68.
82 Cf. Kors, op. cit., p. 125 f. and quotations
ibid., nn. 2, 3, 4, 5.
83 Summa Theol., I-II, q. 95, a. 1.
•• Cf. Kors, op. cit., p. 126.
•• Cf. Kors, loe. cit.

in nature,

ORIGINAL SIN, PRIVATION

OF ORIGINAL JUS'fiCE

493

teaching on the point has not varied, and even after he conceived the connection between the two as a necessary one,
this connection did not, in his eyes, diminish their adequate
distinction.
It is this aspect of original justice as gift to nature which
explains, as Fr. Kors remarks, 86 that St. Thomas knows only
two states of nature: the one of sound nature, natura integra,
that is, endowed with original justice; and that of fallen nature,
natura lapsa, that is, deprived of the gifts of original justice.
In both o.f these the presence or absence of sanctifying grace,
as such, makes no difference for nature as such, because grace
regards the person, not nature. Grace, though according to
St. Thomas necessarily connected with original justice as its
root cause, did not add anything to nature as such. 87 Nor does
it, when restored in baptism, repair nature. Nature after
baptism remains a fallen nature. 88 The state of repaired nature,
natura reparata, is still to come: it will obtain only after the
resurrection.
Parallel to this concept of original justice as good or gift of nature runs St. Thomas' idea of original sin as sin of nature. Here
also we distinguish two aspects. First, inasmuch as it entails
the loss and destruction of the harmony of nature, it is a wound
of nature, 89 involving the loss of a natural good or a good of
the natural order, not of a strictly supernatural perfection.
The subtraction of sanctifying grace that follows in its wake,
of necessity, because of the mutual interdependence of the two,
is a punishment of original sin: 90 it is not original sin itself.
This may involve that original sin is a sin in a very analogical
meaning of the term. Yet, that is undoubtedly the idea of
St. Thomas and of his contemporaries: original sin is the
(wilful) disharmony or disorder of nature.
Op: cit., p. 186 f.
Cf. Kors, op. cit., p. 1!Ui f. The state of grace is a state of the person, its
presence or absence does not affect (specific) nature as such.
88 That is why baptized paxents transmit
original sin which they themselves no
longer have. Cf. Kors, op. cit., p. 186.
•• Summa Tkeol., I-II, q. 85, a. 8.
•• Cf. De Malo, q. 5, a. 1.
86

87

494

P. DELETTER

Secondly, it is a sin of nature in the sense that the persons
who contracted it did not themselves, through their own will,
commit the act on which followed the sinful disorder. This
disorder was caused by the will of him who was the principle
of human nature. 91 The first man, by his sinful action, threw
off from nature the harmony of original justice, just as and
because he threw off the personal gift of sanctifying grace. He
in a true sense continues to cause this disorder in his posterity
in every act of natural generation, 92 which transmits. a nature
deprived of original justice. By that very fact original sin in
Adam's children does not involve on their part a personal
refusal of grace, such as there is in personal sins. It means only
that their nature is indisposed for sanctifying grace. 93 It is not,
therefore, a voluntary privation of sanctifying grace itself,
though the loss of grace necessarily follows on iL It is, properly
speaking, the voluntary privation of original justice or of the
primitive order and wholeness of nature,-voluntary, that is,
through Adam's wilL In this disorder, if one wishes to distinguish with St. Tho;mas a
material element,
formal part will be the disorder of that power in nature which
is meant to direct and rule the others, namely, the will.94
This is no longer subject to God as it should be. And the
material element is the disorder of the lower powers. But the
very concept of original sin as sin of nature and not of the
person makes it impossible to include in it the privation of
sanctifying grace which necessarily affects the person and
does not as such designate a disorder of nature.
From the above the conclusion seems inescapable: St.
Thomas conceives the distinction between sanctifying grace
and original justice in the same way as his contemporaries,
Cf. above, n. 59.
Sum.ma Theol., I-II, q. 81, a. 1: cf. Kors, op. cit., p. 149 fl'.-Cf. om study,
"Hereditary Guilt "-to be published in Irish Theological Quarterly.
93 Cf. v. g., Summa
Theol., I-IT, q. 82, a. 1, "Est enim quaedam ino:rdinata
dispositio proveniens ex dissolutione illius harmoniae in qua consistebat ratio originalis iustitiae," Cf. Kors, op. cit., p. 157 f.
•• Cf. above, n. 62.
91

92

ORIGINAL

SIN, PRIVATION

OF ORIGINAL JUSTICE

495

namely, as an adequate distinction. His immediate followers,
not unnaturally, did not depart from his teaching.

The First Thomists on Original Sin as Privation of Original
Justice.
The practical criterion which allows one to decide whether
an author is faithful to St. Thomas' teaching about the adequate
distinction may be any of these three: when the privation of
sanctifying grace is said to be the punishment of original sin,
not the sin itself; or when original justice is conceived as
separated- in time from sanctifying grace; or when original
justice is said to be connected with sanctifying grace in such a
manner that the latter is cause of the first or the first the disposition of nature for grace.
There is little need to follow up the non- Thomistic theories
about original sin in the centuries following St. Thomas. Of
the three conceptions accepted before him alongside
that
of St. Anselm, the Augustinian current of thought continues
the
on its way
Henry of Ghent (t about 1292), Matthew
Aquasparta
(t 1302), the Franciscans of Oxford, Peter Auriol (t 1345), and
the Hermits of St. Augustine, Thomas of Strasburg (t 1357)
and Gregory of Rimini (t 1358) .95 Their idea
original sin
as concupiscence, and perhaps also St. Thomas' more nuanced
,I
concept, are aimed at by the rationalizing criticism of Durand
of St. Pour«;ain (t 1334) who reduces original sin to a reatus
poenae. 96 In both these schools it is dear that privation
95 Cf. Gaudel,
wrt. cit., coL 491-496; 1\IIartin, "La controverse . . . Henry of
Ghent," (peccatum originale) dispositio pronitatis ad peccatum, pronitas ad consentiendum carni in peccatum" (Quodlib. II, q. H; Martin, op. cit., p. 10);
Matthew of Aquasparta, " (Peccatum originale) est concupiscentia, secundum
Augustin urn, cum debito non concupiscendi " (Gaudel, a•·t_ eit., col. 498); Peter
Auriol, " habitualis rebellio appetitus sensitivi universaliter ad rectam rationem,
privativa iustitiae et obedientiae eiusdam appetitus a Deo primis parentibus generose
collatae, displicens et odibilis divinae maiestati " (Gaudel, art. cit., col. 495);
Gregory of Rimini, "vitium concupiscibilitatis per quod homo inclinatur ad
actualiter concupiscendum " (Gaudel, art. cit., coL 496) .
96 Durand of St.
"Verum est quod non est culpa proprie, vel poena,
sed reatus poenae ex culpa proveniens" (Gaudel, art. cit., col. 487; Martin, op. cit.,
p. 177).

496

P. DELETTER

sanctifying grace does not belong to the essence of original sin,
even if that privation is necessarly connected with the hereditary fault.
We must investigate the main representatives of the AnselmoThomistic school which follows and interprets the doctrine of
the Angelic Doctor. There can be little doubt that SL Thomas'
concept of the adequate distinction between original justice and
sanctifying grace and the corresponding idea of original sin
as privation of that justice-not including in its essence,
though entailing, privation of sanctifying grace-continues to
prevail with them up to the Council of Trent as the more
commonly accepted teaching. That is so for the strictly Thomistic school with William Goding (i" 1836) and its most
renowned master Hervaeus Natalis (t 1323) .97 A remarkable
exception to the rule, one of the rare Thomists who in the
fourteenth century part company with St. Thomas in the
theory of original sin and define this as privation of sanctifying
grace, is Peter of La Palu (t 1342) .98
Not only in the Thomist school but in the new Scotist and
Occamist schools as well the· traditional idea of original justice
and original sin finds admittance. According to Scotus 99 original
sin is the "carentia iustitiae originalis debitae "; it is not the
privation of sanctifying grace which goes with original sin.
Original justice, moreover, in Scotus' mind existed without
sanctifying grace. Occam did not differ from Scotus in his idea
of original sin.100 Nor would the general theory of the School
on the eve of the Reformation abandon that concept. The
97 Cf. Gaudel, art. cit., col. 499-501. Godin, in Martin, Les questions sur le peche
originel dans Ia 'lectura thomasina' de G. Godin, in Melanges Mandonnet I (Kain
1930), pp.
" ... qualiter ilia substractio originalis iusticie habet racionem
culpe in nobis" (p. 414). Hervaeus Natalis, cf. Martin, "La controverse ... ,"
" peccatum originale formaliter loquendo est carenica iusticie originalis; sed inordinata
concupiscencia habitualis sive ipsa inordinacio talis concupiscencie est in ipso peccato
originali materiale, et est peccatum originale materialiter" (p.
98 Peter
of Ia Palu, cf. Martin, "La controverse ... ," " ... videtur quod
essecialiter non sit aliud culpa originalis quam privacio gracie gratum facientis in
parvulo propter peccatum Ade" (p.
Cf. Gaudel, art. cit., col.
•• Cf. Gandel, art. cit., col. 504-505.
' 00 Occam, "carentia
iustitiae originalis cum debito habendi": Gaudel, art. cit.,
col. 504.

ORIGINAL SIN, PRIVATION

OF ORIGINAL JUSTICE

497

most illustrious representative of nominalist Scholasticism in
the fifteenth century, and that nearly means of the whole
School at the time, Gabriel Biel (t 1492), expressly distinguishes original justice and sanctifying grace: the latter is not
the formal element of the former; it is only its crown. Accordingly, original sin is the privation of original justice, not of
sanctifying grace. 101
Such was the nearly common idea in the School at the
advent of Protestantism. It is necessary to stress this historical
fact:
the rise of Protestantism and the Catholic Reform
of Trent another way of interpreting St. Thomas' idea of original justice and original sin was hardly known. Trent itself
abstained on purpose from defining the essence of original sin.
It did not want to settle Scholastic disputes among Catholic
theologians; it only intended to defend the Catholic dogma
against the heresies of the innovators. Against these, it stressed
the sinful nature of the hereditary fault and the efficacy of
baptism in remitting it, thus indirectly setting aside the
pseudo-Augustinian idea of original sin as identical with concupiscence. It did not say anything as to whether sanctifying
grace and original justice were two distinct divine gifts or only
one; nor whether original sin, though a real death of the soul
and necessarily entailing privation of grace, was identical with
that privation or did at least include it in its essence.

A Novel Interpretation.
The initiator of what was till recently the more common way
of understanding St. Thomas' doctrine on the essence of original
justice and original sin, but what was and was considered as
an innovation in the sixteenth century, was a theologian of the
Council of Trent, Dominic Soto (t 1560) .102 He knows that
101 Biel, " carentia
iustitiae originalis cum debito habendi ": Gaudel, art. cit.,
col. 506.
102 About Dominic Soto, cf. Gaudel, art. cit., col.
" (peccatum originale)
mera privatio iustiae quoad formale. Quapropter, cum in remissione originalis
restituatur nobis gratia in ordine ad Deum, non tamen vires inferiores in ordine ad
rationem, optime ait S. Thomas, quod in baptismo restituitur iustitia originalis
quoad formale" (ibid., vol. 530).

498

P. DEJLETTER

the Council did not intend to define the essence of original
sin, and he attempts a new explanation which he connects with
SL Thomas' teaching. He identifies the formal element of
original justice with sanctifying grace and gives to understand
that the essence of original sin lies in the privation of that
privilege, sanctifying grace. If this is SL Thomas' theory, then
it has been modified considerably. Yet, this is the interpretation of the Angelic Doctor's teaching which became, for nearly
four centuries, the unquestioned manner of understanding his
teaching. Before our own day Bellarmine, 103 Suarez/ 04 the
Carmelite Thomists of Salamanca/ 05 were to follow Soto's explanation. So were Gonet 106 and Billuart. 107 Among contemporary Thomists, except for the few who followed in the
reaction originated by Fr. R. Ma:rtin/ 08 the greater number
103 For Bellarmine, cf. Gaudel, art. cit., col. 531 and 543. Controve1·siae (Opera V),
" privatio doni iustitiae originalis peccatum originale dicitur, quatenus idem est cum
aversione a Deo habituali" (p. 450); ". . . peccatum habituale est privatio
rectitudinis habitualis, quae est habitus gratiae" (p. 451).
104 Suarez, " Peccatum originale privat iustitia quod idem est caritate et gratia "
(De vitiis et peccatis, IX, ii, n. 18. Cf. Gaudel, art. ci-t., col. 531 and 543.
105 " Dicendum
est propriam et formalem rationem constitutivam peccati originalis esse privationem gratiae voluntariam nobis ex vi peccati Adami" (Cursus
Theologicus. De Vitiis et Peccatis, disp. XVI dub. v, n. H3). Cf. Gaudel, art. cit.,
col. 555-556.
105 Gonet, Clipeus Thomisticus, IV, De Vitiis et Peccatis, disp. VII, art. v, § iv,
n. cix; "ea opinio videtur probabilior, ac menti et doctrinae D. Thomae conformior,
quae docet rationem formalem constitutivam peccati originalis esse privationem
iustitiae originalis, voluntariam nobis ex vi peccati Adami, non ut tollit omnes eius
effectus, sed ut aufert praecipue ipsius effectum primarium, communem tali iustitiae
et gratiae sanctificanti, qui est sanctificare et rectificare animam in ordine ad
Deum."
107 .Billuart, Cursus Theologiae, De Peccatis et Legibus, diss, VI, art. v, "Essentia
sen formale contitutivum Peccati Originalis consistit in privatione iustitiae originalis quoad primarium eius effectum, ut voluntarium nobis voluntate capitis." Cf.
prob. 3°: "Peccatum habituale consistit in privatione grat.iae
ut
voluntaria voluntate propria personae; Ergo Peccatum Originale consistit in
privatione eiusdem gratiae ut voluntaria vohmtate capitis."
108 Cf. above p. 1 f.
An example, A. Van Hove, Tractatus de Deo Creante et
Elevante (Malines: 1944), p. 308, "Peccatum originale est privatio subiectionis
praeternaturalis rationis ad Deum simul cum concupiscentia "; cf. p.
f: " S.
Thomam admisisse distinctionem adaequatam inter iustiam originalem et gratiam
sanctificantem, probabilius est .... "

ORIGINAL SIN, PRIVATION

OF ORIGINAL JUSTICE

499

accept the substance of Soto's explanation as the authentic
interpretation of St. Thomas. 109

Influences that Determined the Shifting to a New
Problematique.
How did the shifting from the ancient to the new
tion happen? 110
Historically there seems to be little doubt that the main
cause of this change is the combined negative and positive
influence o-f the Protestant idea of original sin and of the
Tridentine reaction to it. The first of these inclined to reduce,
or actually did reduce, the hereditary fault to the corruption
of nature manifested in concupiscence. The original integrity
lost with sin, Protestants taught, is nature's ability to abstain
from sin. Had not the ancient Scholastic idea of sin of nature,
or of its disorder resulting in the loss of nature's harmony, some
faraway similarity with the Protestant error? Did it not at
any rate weaken the sinfulness of the hereditary fault? But
Protestants further taught-in opposition to the Scholastic tradition-that the sinfulness of nature consequent on the Fall
persists even after justification. Against the pessimistic concept
109 Cf. Hugon, Tractatus dogmatici II, ed. 5
De Peccato Originali, q. Jll,
a. 1, "Peccatum originale consistit essentialiter in privatione iustitiae originalis; ita
quidem ut concupiscentia se habeat ut materiale et privatio gratiae originalis ut
formale, et ut illa privatio "dicatur et sit nobis voluntaria per connexionem cum
voluntate Adami capitis naturae elevatae" (p. 39). R. Garrigou-Lagrange, De
Deo trino et Creatore (Turin: 1944), "Unde pro multis thomistis elementum
formale peccati originalis est privatio ipsius gratiae sanctificantis, quae est radix
intrinseca seu cause formalis intrinseca iustitiae originalis. . . . Haec communior
sententia est vere conformis cum textibus S. Thomae ... " (p. 447) .
no We should note that there two ways of conceiving the idea that original sin
consists formally in the privation of sanctifying grace.. One says that the privation of
sanctifying grace is the whole of original sin, and that the privation of the preternatural gifts does not belong to its essence. The other conceives original sin as the
privation of original justice (understood as including sanctifying grace and preternatural gifts) in which the privation of sanctifying grace is the formal element of
original sin, and the privation of the preternatural gifts, its material element. The
first of these concepts clearly departs from the idea and terminology of St. Thomas
who says that original sin is the privation of original justice. The second way of
explaining St. Thomas' teaching is the one we consider here in contrast with the
old, and now re-discovered, interpretation.

500

P. DELETTER

of fallen man, and still more of justified man, Trent defined
the nature of original sin as death of the soul, loss of sanctity
and justice, a real sinful state. It no less explicitly taught that
whatever is actually sinful in the hereditary fault is wiped away
in baptism, though concupiscence, it is too evident, is not taken
away from the baptized. 111
From this Tridentine teaching it is evident that original sin
is a (habitual) sin in the true meaning of the word; it contains
the substance of (habitual) sin, for it entails the privation of
sanctifying grace. By the very fact the restitution of sanctifying grace in baptism remits original sin.112
With this insistence of Trent on these two points: original
sin is a real sin in us, and, it is forgiven in baptism which
restores grace, the way lay open to Soto's novel interpretation
of St. Thomas' teaching. A real sin entails privation of sanctifying grace; just as, inversely, infusion of sanctifying grace
remits sin. Does not then .original justice, whose privation,
according to St. Thomas, constitutes original sin, imply sanctifying grace? Trent had not said so in so many words. But
was there another way of understanding St. Thomas in the light
of Trent? If the infusion of sanctifying grace in baptism remits
what is formally sinful in original sin, is not the obvious reason
that the privation of sanctifying grace is the formal :element in
original sin-because sanctifying grace itself is tlhe formal
element in original justice? 113
Denzinger 787-792.
On purpose: Theologians had been directed, "sequantur exernplum antiquorurn
conciliorum quae non per diffinitiones, sed per effectus cuiusmodi sit hoc peccatum
declarant" (Concilium Tridentinum, V, p. 163). Do the Acts of the Council
mention these ideas? The phrases themselves, "iustitia naturae," "peccaturn
naturae," may not be there; but equivalent considerations occur repeatedly. The
traditional definition is there: " Peccatum originale est carentia iustitiae originalis
inesse debitae" (op. cit., p. 165, et passim). Considerations occur as these,
" Gratiae datae Adam non ipsi tantum sed naturae datae fuerunt . . . et amisit pro
natura, id est, ornni suae posteritate" (ibid., p. 174); or "per peccatum prirni
hominis corrupta est humana natura; sed natura sic corrupta corrumpit alias
personas" (ibid., p. 80).
113 Does the projected canon of the Vatican Council sanction this conception? Its
text is as follows, " Si quis dixerit, privationem gratiae sanctificantis ad rationem
peccati originalis non pertinere seu de eius ratione non esse, A. S." This does not
111

112

ORIGINAL SIN, PRIVATION

OF ORIGINAL JUSTICE

501

This seems to have been the logic of ideas that led from St.
Thomas via Trent to Soto and the new interpretation. Its
widespread and general acceptance in the School is, no doubt,
mainly due to the influence of Bellarmine, Suarez, the Salmanticenses, who patronized the new idea. Perhaps it was mainly the
widespread influence of the Doctor eximim and his " broad "
Thomism throughout the centuries of low-level Scholasticism,
together with the loss of contact with St. Thomas' own texts,
that were the determining reason for the success of the new
interpretation.

The New Ideas.
The shift from the old to the new way of understanding St.
Thomas did not come about without a considerable warping
of his original ideas. It is imperative to point this out, if we
are to get a grasp of the real and apparent differences between
the two theories. Both St. Thomas and modern Thomists may
use the same terms and the same phrases. Both may say:
Original justice is a gift given to nature; Original sin is a sin
of nature and not of the person. But these same phrases and
statements do not mean the same thing for both. St. Thomas
means by a gift bestowed on nature the preternatural rectitude
of man's composite nature, that is, perfect harmony in his
natural being by which the lower powers were subordinate to
the higher and the higher powers to God: a supplementary
perfection of nature in its own order of perfection which did not
raise man to a share in the divine life (only grace does so) .
Consequently this rectitude given to man by way of a specific
accident or preternatural "pmprium" of his nature was to be
transmitted through generation together with nature. This
second characteristic of original justice, namely, its transmissibility through generation, is only a consequence of the first; it
is not the primary meaning of the phrase, " gift to nature."
When modern Thomists speak of original justice as a gift to
say that the privation of sanctifying grace is of the essence of original sin. St.
Thomas' idea also implies that privation of sanctifying grace is of the " ratio
peccati originalis."

6

P. DELETTER

nature they consider only this second and secondary characteristic which is, in a way, more apparent; they overlook the firsL
That is why they can include in original justice, as its formal
element, sanctifying grace itself which is supernatural strictly
speaking and does not perfect nature on its own level but
raises man to a share in the divine nature. Sanctifying grace
cannot, by itself, be an "accidens naturae speciei "; it cannot,
properly speaking, be transmitted by generation; yet it may be
said to be so transmitted improperly, in the sense that the
disposition of nature which " necessitates "
infusion of sanctifying grace is transmitted by generation. According to His
own free disposition God infuses grace
nature is disposed
for it by the preternatural rectitude; much the same way as
human nature is said to be transmitted by generation even
though what is its formal element, namely, the spiritual soul,
is not so transmitted but directly created and infused by
God. 114
This idea of original justice as formally including sanctifying
grace is only a consequence
T.ridentine
concept of original sin which is said to be spiritual death
the soul. The sin of nature we inherit by being born from Adam
is not only a moral defect but a :real sin. What else can such
death of the soul be if not privation of the supernatural life of
sanctifying gTace? Can there be a formal sin, whether of nature
or of the person, unless its formal constituent be privation of
sanctifying grace? Original sin must therefore include privation
of sanctifying grace. It is a sin of nature in the sense that due
to natural generation newborn infants are sinners. They receive
a sinful nature deprived of original justice; they are born
without sanctifying grace. Privation
s:mctifying grace is
what makes the state of original sin truly sinful, not the
tion of the preternatural gifts which are a gratia gratis data,
not gratum faciens, Privation of sanctifying gTace is, therefore,
the formal element in original sin; the other privation connected
114 This Thomistic systematisation
is not found readymade in St. Thomas. Its
patrons grant this; but they maintain that it develops on the lines of St. Thomas'
thought. History makes this statement questionable.

ORIGINAL

SIN, PRIVATION

OF ORIGINAL

JUSTICE

503

with it is only its material element, that is, disposition to the
first. 115
St. Thomas's idea of original sin as sin of nature is different.
Nature, stained with original sin or deprived of the preternatural gift of original justice, is truly sinful; but not because it
is deprived of sanctifying grace. To say so would be an imperfect and incorrect way of speaking. Nature cannot be deprived
of sanctifying grace because it cannot be given sanctifying grace.
This is a gift to a person; it does not perfect nature as such
but raises the person to a share in the divine nature. Original
sin causes nature to be sinful because it, so to speak, makes
it impossible for God to infuse grace, by indisposing man for
this infusion, that is, by depriving his nature received from
Adam of what is, in God's plan, the necessary and sufficient
disposition for God to infuse sanctifying grace. The formal
element of original sin, therefore, is not privation of sanctifying'
grace which is extrinsic to the sin of nature .• but privation of
what is the formal element in the preternatural justice of
nature, that is, of the preternatural subjection of the will to
God. Its material element is the disharmony of the lower
powers no longer subject to the higher ones. Privation of sanctifying grace, accordingly, is necessarily connected with original
sin, but it is not its formal element. Consequently, original
sin is spiritual death of the soul, not exactly fonnaliter, but
rather causaliter.
St. Thomas no doubt agrees with Trent that original sin is
a true sin, veram rationem peccati habet. 116 But perhaps more
"' 5 It should be noted that this concept turns original sin not only into a sin of
nature but also to an extent a sin of the person (who is deprived of sanctifying
grace). We may leave out of consideration the question of the voluntariness of
original sin, because this is explained the same way in both interpretations we are
contrasting.
116 As noted above, n. 113, St. Thomas agrees that privation of sanctifying grace
"pertinet ad rationem peccati originalis." His perspective is different from that of
Trent, because he considers original sin first and foremost as sin of nature; and for
him this idea settles the question whether privation of sanctifying grace belongs to
its essence or not: that privation cannot be of the essence of a sin of nature. Trent
considers the reality of the state of original sin in Adam's posterity (without looking
for exact definitions), and that state most certainly includes privation of sanctifying grace.

504

P. DELETTER

than Trent did he insisted on the analogous character of that
sin, of necessity involved in his idea of sin of nature. This idea
for him means more than that original sin is contracted by
mere natural generation. It also implies what is the presupposition of that mere fact of transmission through generation,
namely, that nature is sinful because it is indisposed to grace.
This indisposition of nature transmitted from Adam is the
proper sinfulness of the sin of nature: it is nature's way of
refusing sanctifying grace for the person that inherits sinful
nature. And this indisposition evidently can be and is properly
transmitted through natural generation. A necessary consequence of this transmission is that persons born with such a
sinful nature are deprived of sanctifying grace. Their souls are
spiritually dead.
We touch here on the different nuance in the ideas of justice
of nature, sin of nature, according to St. Thomas and postTridentine Thomists respectively. Nature is taken in two
different senses. St. Thomas takes it to mean the specific nature
as distinguished from the individualized nature which alone
exists as such. Modern Thomists take it in the sense of the
concrete existing nature.m St. Thomas says that nature is
just or sinful according as it is endowed with its own rectitude
and harmony (preternatural, of course) or is deprived of it.
This nature as such is passed on in natural generation. Modern
Thomists say that nature is just or sinful because the concrete
persons who are born with it are just or sinful, that is, are
born in friendship with God through sanctifying grace, or
enmity with God because of privation of sanctifying grace. They
are so born by the mere fact of their descent from Adam, no
matter whether or not sanctifying grace or its privation, which
formally constitutes their justice or sin, be properly transmitted
by generation. 118
117 ,Should we refer to a contemporary idea and say that Trent's position is more
"existentialist" and that of St. Thomas more "essentialist" (in the concept of
original sin) ?
llB Another factor that seems to have contributed
towards the shift of perspective
is the idea of reciprocal causality between sanctifying grace and preternatural gifts.
Reciprocal causality plays between the material and formal constituents of a

ORIGINAL

SIN, PRIVATION

OF ORIGINAL

JUSTICE

505

Real and Apparent Differences between the two InteTpretations.
Do the two interpretations imply only real differences?
Granted that the Thomist position initiated by Soto is an
interpretation of St. Thomas' teaching which modifies that
teaching in the sense and for the reasons pointed out above, 119
do the two positions express objective differences, or do they
say the same thing in other words or at any rate, when they
use the same words and phrases in different meanings, do these
apparently different statements perhaps in fact say the same
thing? At the risk of some repetition we must still answer
this last question,
The precise difference we are studying is the following: St.
Thomas' idea of original justice is that this justice is adequately
distinct from, though necessarily connected with, sanctifying
grace, Preternatural original justice, with its own formal
element,-preternatural subjection of the higher po·w·ers to God,
and its own material element,-preternaturai
subjection of the
lower powers to the higher, is the disposition of nature for the
granting of sanctifying grace to the person who possesses that
nature. Sanctifying grace is both root and crown of that
justice. And so, whenever original justice is passed on with
nature through generation God infuses sanctifying grace in
the newly created soul. Post- Tridentine Tho mists generally
conceive original justice as the whole complex of sanctifying
composite reality. St. Thomas certainly considered the preternatural gifts, which he
called original justice, as the disposition of nature for sanctifying grace in the
person (when the person receives grace with nature): just as he conceived sanctifying grace as the root cause of original justice. It would suffice to unite the two
elements as determining and determined parts of one whole, and then sanctifying
grace is called formal element, and the preternatural gifts the material element of
that complex reality. St. Thomas was prevented from doing so by his idea of
donum naturae: sanctifying grace cannot be that: if original justice is a gift to
nature, then sanctifying grace is extrinsic to it. As to the reciprocal causality
between the two, in St. Thomas' position this obtains fully when one is gift to the
person and the other gift to nature: nature and person are interrelated, in the
concrete existent men, in that manner.
119 The historical question of an evolution in the Thomistic tradition,
after what
we have said, seems to be answered in the affirmative: the post-Soto Thomist
position modifies that of St. Thomas.

506

P. DELETTER

grace and preternatural gifts bestowed on Adam and to be
transmitted to his children; the former is the formal element,
though not properly transmitted in generation but only called
for by generation; the latter is the material element, ultimate
disposition of nature for the infusion of sanctifying grace. Is
that anything more than a difference in words? Does it make
any real difference to call original justice only the preternatural
gifts bestowed on Adam, or so to call these gifts together with
sanctifying grace, if in fact the transmission of these gifts is the
same in both theories? After all, the name matters little if the
reality expressed is the same.
As far as original justice goes and the transmission of the
"sanctity and justice" in which Adam was established at the
beginning, there seems to be between the two conceptions little
more than a difference of names and of viewpoints in the idea
of nature. The necessary connection between preternatural
gifts and sanctifying grace and the mode of transmission, of the
preternatural gifts and of sanctifying grace alike, are the same
in both. In both conceptions it is God who directly infuses
grace when nature passed on through generation is disposed to
it; and grace is given as a gift to the person. To call sanctifying
grace the formal element of original justice, or to distinguish it
adequately from original justice as its cause or root, makes no
real difference with regard to those two points. 120
But there is a difference in the idea of original sin. The
difference may, perhaps, be mainly one of emphasis, yet it is
certainly real. In St. Thomas' mind, original sin, privation of
original justice in the sense in which he understood the phrase,
is a sin of nature and not of the person, in the sense that it is a
disorderly indisposition of nature fo:r grace, but it is not, by
itself, privation of sanctifying grace which affects the person.
That sinful disposition of nature is a sin in the analogous meaning of the term, namely, to the extent that sin, which is properly
120 Because of the real agreement on these two points between both interpretations, the differences in the ideas about the state of original justice are more nominal
than real as far objective realities go. A real difference, however, remains in the
concepts of " justice of nature "; and still more in the idea of original sin.

ORIGINAL SIN, PRIVATION OF ORIGINAL .JUSTICE

507

an act and a habitual disposition of a person, can be shared
by nature. Its sinfulness entails, no doubt, privation of sanctifying grace and spiritual death of the soul for the one who
inherits original sin; but even apart from these, which later
on for Trent give to original sin the real ratio peccati, the
original disorder is already sin in the analogical sense. 121 St.
Thomas insisted less on the idea, emphasized by Trent and
afterwards, that original sin veram rationem pecca-ti habet; he
rather stressed, because he conceived it as sin of nature, a
notion which Trent left out of its official teaching, its analogous
character. Original sin for St. Thomas is a sinful disposition
of nature; its necessary consequence for the person who inherits
it is privation of sanctifying grace. But in his mind it hardly
makes sense to speak of nature as deprived of sanctifying grace;
as said already, nature cannot be given sanctifying grace nor
be deprived of it; only a person can. It is because St. Thomas
conceives the idea of sin of nature in the full meaning of the
phrase that he need not and cannot include in the notion of
original sin the privation of sanctifying grace. 122
For Thomists after Soto the idea of original sin is different.
They, after Trent, emphasize that original sin is sin in the full
sense of the word; that it is spiritual death of the soul. Accordingly they include in the idea of original sin the privation of
sanctifying grace. They know, many of them, 123 that sanctifying grace is a gift granted to the person; but because of its
inclusion in original justice, which is a gift to nature and whose
formal element it is, its privation, implied in the privation of
original justice, is a sin of nature because it is necessarily
121 In this conception,
after the remission of original sin by the infusion of
sanctifying grace, the original disorder of nature remains as defect, but no longer as
sin; because the natural disorder of the will (formal element in it) which as
consequent on the loss of the preternatural submission of the will to God, has been
remedied by the supernatural orientation of the will to God (sanctifying grace).
122 But, evidently,
as pointed out already, the state of original sin necessarily
implies privation of sanctifying grace, not less according St. Thomas than according
to modern Thomists.
123 Only those who identify original sin with privation
of sanctifying grace (cf.
above n. 110), and not with privation of original justice whose formal element they
conceive as sanctifying grace, overlook this personal aspect of sanctifying grace.

508

P. DELETTER

incurred by all those who are born from Adam by the mere fact
that they receive their nature from him through generation.
Hence they weaken both St. Thomas' ideas of sin of nature and
of the analogous sense of sin.
The idea of sin of nature is understood as the sinful disposition of a concrete existing nature, a sinfulness which, insofar
as it includes privation of sanctifying grace, affects the person as
well and not only nature. Correlatively, the idea of sanctifying
grace as a personal gift is weakened, since its privation is conceived as affecting nature, at any rate, a concrete nature. The
sinfulness of original sin in this conception is a disorderly
disposition both of nature as privation of its preternatural
harmony, and of the person as privation of sanctifying grace.
The latter is the chief or formal element in original sin. The
idea of sin of nature is thus reduced to mean above all that men
contract original sin by being born from Adam or by receiving
their nature from him. 124 The other element involved in the
idea of sin of nature, namely, sinful disposition of nature as
such, which is a prerequisite to its transmission by generation,
has become secondary. It only remains as the material element
of original sin.
Hence, secondly, the analogous character of original sin is
weakened as well. The analogy will chiefly be looked for in the
question of the voluntariness of original sin: its relation to the
will of Adam, instead of to the will of the individual original
sinner. 125 The disorder which consists in the privation of sanctifying grace is found in original sin in the same way as it is in
habitual mortal sin. This allows, no doubt, an easier explanation of Trent's teaching that original sin is a real sin, spiritual
death of the soul. But does it not do so at the expense of
accurateness and formalness of St. Thomas' ideas?
Need we say that those among today's Thomists who prefer
1 .. This is, moreover, one element in the dogmatic meaning of the idea that
original sin is sin of nature. We may note in this connection that both systems of
interpretation respect the whole dogmatic truth about original sin, and do so equally
well.
125 The current
phrase of manuals is W!lll-known: original sin in voluntary
"voluntate Adae capitis naturae."

ORIGINAL

SIN, PRIVATION

OF ORIGINAL

JUSTICE

509

to follow the original position of St. Thomas, and not that of his
interpreters, are as faithful to the complete
teaching of Trent as the others? They say with equal truth
that the state of original sin entails privation of sanctifying
grace 126 and spiritual death of the soul. But they remain more
faithful to the formal teaching of St. Thomas. Perhaps the
evolution of Thomistic teaching after Trent, commanded in
fact by the dogma of the Council, was but natural and to an
extent hardly inevitable in the circumstances. But it was an
" evolution "-perhaps no progression,-including a partial departure from the position of the Angelic Doctor.

P. DELETTER, S. J.
St. Mary's Theological College
Kurseong, India

126 In that sense, therefore,
they also say that privation of sanctifying grace
belongs to the "ratio peccati originalis," as the projected canon of the Vatican
Council, stated; cf. above, n. 113.

ST. THOMAS AND THE PROBLElVl OF
KNOWLEDGE

,rHE

I

average man is rarely concerned about the problem
of knowledge because knowledge as a common and
ordinary human experience does not present itself as a
problem. Knowing things imperfectly, he meets problems in
his knowledge; he solves problems through his knowledge or
fails to solve them because of his lack of knowledge, but the
knowledge itself he generally takes for granted. Although he
makes the ordinary efforts to distinguish between what is true
and what is false, it very seldom occurs to him to investigate
the validity of knowledge itself or to inquire into the basis
certitude.
him knowledge is really no problem at alL
He lives and works, eats and sleeps, and has no difficulty
his knowledge as such, though he is well aware of frequent
mistakes. He knows his wife and family; he knows his friends
and associates; he knows his business or profession. Knowledge
for him is not a problem to be solved but a fact to be faced.
As far as the ordinary person is concerned, Scepticism or Idealism-if he knew or thought about them-would be simply silly.
He is a realist because he has to be.
The philosopher, however, is not satisfied
this naive
acceptance of knowledge and what it seems to reveal to us.
The philosopher, the man of reflective thought, wants to get
to the bottom of things, and therefore knowledge itself, on
reflection, begins to pose problems that lead him to investigate
the validity of knowledge and the basis of certitude. He is
faced with many facts that need explaining, for example, that
we all make mistakes, that many of us hold contradictory
opinions about the same things, that we are constantly changing, revising and correcting ideas, judgments and conclusions

510

ST. THOMAS AND THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

511

that we once considered adequate and certain. These facts
evoke questions that, properly understood, make up the various
facets of the problem of knowledge. Is any of our knowledge
true? Can we be certain we have the truth about anything?
Does my knowledge represent a world of reality, a real world,
or are my ideas which seem to represent reality merely private
experiences elaborated entirely within my own mind? These
and related questions have always troubled philosophers,
though with varying intensity at different times; and the
crucial nature of the problems involved, concerned as they are
with the very foundations of all certitude, has impelled reflective minds to seek a complete and satisfying solution.
For almost three hundred years philosophers have been
especially tormented by the problem of knowledge. It has
been taken for granted that before anyone can enter into the
temple of wisdom he must begin with a critique of knowledge
to determine whether or not our ideas correspond with reality.
That method was inaugurated by Descartes and Kant, and
perfected
their
So deeply were all
convinced of its necessity that they tended to make the problem
of the critique of knowledge not merely the preliminary question but the entire content of philosophic investigation. As a
result, modern thought has been for the most part lost in the
maze of epistemology and has begun only lately to escape from
it. Philosophers since the time of Descartes and Kant have
been swinging on a pendulum of their own making that has
touched periodically the two extremes of Idealistic Monism
Materialistic Monism. The history of modern philosophy
is largely the account of the series of epistemological reactions
that followed the acceptance of Descartes' extreme dualism.
Ignorance of man's composite nature leads naturally to oversimplification in explaining his knowledge, and the various
theories offered are significant only in pointing up the utterly
contradictory positions to which thinkers can be led when they
approach the problem of knowledge. Something must be
seriously wrong when sincere and capable investigators must
do an about-face each generation in their attempts to find the

512

GEORGE C. REILLY

solution to so fundamental a question as the problem of knowledge.
From the viewpoint of Thomistic philosophy, it is probably
true to say that of all the divisions or classifications of philosophical science the newest, the most unsatisfactory and the
most unfinished is that branch usually called Epistemology
or Criteriology which seeks the solution to the problems surrounding knowledge. It is also the most controversial part of
philosophy, giving rise to differences of opinion, among great
Scholastics, that have persisted to the present day. There is no
unanimity about the name, the proper subject matter or even
about the precise problems that the science must solve. Some
important thinkers even maintain that it is a wholly synthetic
discipline which owes its very existence neither to reality nor
to the exigencies of the human mind but only to the need for
a reaction against false contemporary epistemologies and
theories of knowledge; in short that it has no separate place in
Thomistic philosophy which as an integral realism need not
and, in fact, cannot be criticaL
Yet the fact remains that there is a critical problem and
always has been. That it has become especially prominent and
articulate only in our time, whereas it was dealt with rather
summarily and incidentally by the ancient and medieval
thinkers, does not remove it or solve it or lessen the need for
attacking it now. There is a critical problem and it must be
faced. This does not, however, mean or imply that the solution
to the problem of knowledge is to be found in a completely
distinct science with its own principles apart from the principles
of metaphysics and psychology. In recognizing epistemology
for what it really is, and in placing it in its proper relation to
the other philosophic discipliness, two dangerous exaggerations
must be carefully avoided.
The first exaggeration derives from an over-emphasis of the
historical fact that St. Thomas in the construction of his
philosophy made no provision for a separate epistemology or
critique of knowledge. It is a simple step from the acceptance
of this fact to the easy conclusion that Thomistic philosophy is

ST. THOMAS AND THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

518

non-critical, and that because it is an integral realism its approach to the critical problem is entirely naive, resting only on
what we might call ordinary common sense. In my opinion this
view is highly exaggerated and can lead to serious misconceptions about the whole Thomistic
The philosophy of St. Thomas, on the contrary, is not at all
naive but deeply critical in its foundations which are firmly
anchored in an immediate contact with reality on both the
intellectual and the sensory levels. A careful reading of the
De V eritate will easily dispel any idea that St. Thomas was
unaware of the necessity of a critique of knowledge at the very
beginning of the elaboration of his metaphysics. In the sixth
article of the tenth question he writes: " All our knowledge
in its origin consists in the knowledge of the first indemonstrable "principles. Our knowledge of these arises from sense
experience as is made clear at the end of the Posterior Analytics. Our scientific knowledge, therefore, derives from sense
experience." In the commentary on the sixth book of the
Metaphysics, moreover, St. Thomas outlines a complete critical theory of the act of judgment in which alone, he maintains,
truth is found. Examples could be multiplied to show that we
have here no naive acceptance of knowledge without a critical
appraisal and no appeal to ordinary common sense, but a
thoroughly scientific criticism of the origins and foundations of
knowledge.
The other exaggeration is to conceive the deeply critical
element in St. Thomas' philosophy as something completely
independent of metaphysics and psychology, and this might
well issue into an attempt to construct an epistemology possessing its own principles and conclusions, properly antecedent to
metaphysics and of which metaphysics would be merely the
corollary. This is the trap into which modern epistemology
fell and from which it is beginning, happily, to extricate itself.
Actually, the key to the grasp of what epistemology properly
should be and what should be its relations to the other branches
of philosophy can be found in St. Thomas' method of approaching the critique of knowledge. He never attempts to treat it as

514

GEORGE C. REILLY

an isolated problem, but always as a function of metaphysics
and psychology. It is not viewed as a type of investigation that
is self-contained with principles and evidence of its own, but
rather as metaphysics in the precise role of self-examination
and self-criticism. The principles of metaphysics are primary
and self-evident and regulatory of all other sciences, but this
very self-evidence, naive perhaps at the beginning, can and
must be subjected to a critical examination. This critical selfexamination is properly epistemology, a necessary and early
element of metaphysics. We can find its origin precisely where
we find the origin of metaphysics itself, that is, in the inborn
curiosity of the human mind, the natural thirst of the intellect
to grasp the real in all its satisfying fullness. We may well call
this beginning a methodic doubt, not in the sense that the mind
mistrusts itself or its hold on first principles, but in the sense
that the object of knowledge, the ideas, the principles, the acts
of knowing and the power of knowing itself must be scrutinized
so that the scientific validity of the entire process may be
laid bare.
When these two exaggerations are eliminated we move into
a position to meet the two demands made upon any follower of
St. Thomas who would seek a solution to the problem of knowledge in its present setting. The first and basic demand will be
for a competent grasp of the truly critical nature of Thomistic
philosophy and an understanding of the place and the relationship of the critique of knowledge in the whole Thomistic
scheme. With this assured the contemporary Thomist will then
be able to meet the legitimate demands for the solution of contemporary problems in their actual frame of :reference, never
losing sight either of their immediate urgency or of their proper
reference to the entire field of philosophy.

n
For St. Thomas, then, philosophy does not and cannot begin
with the problem of knowledge, because a critique of knowledge
presupposes both metaphysics and psychology. We do not first
know knowledge; we first know things. At the very beginning

ST. THOMAS AND THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

515

knowledge is not a problem but a fact of consciousness to be
examined and explained. Philosophy, moreover, has a definite
objective in view, true and certain knowledge of things through
their causes, and this goal makes it necessary that truth and
certitude be possessed initially, from the very beginning of
the search, since they cannot be created out of nothingness. If
we do not have truth and certitude about something as our
point of departure, we shall be without them at the end of. our
investigation. The attainment of ultimate knowledge has as
its condition the possession of primary knowledge; ultimate
truth can rest only on primary truth. The alternative is no
truth, no certitude and in fact no knowledge. This can only
mean that all our philosophical knowledge is ultimately based
on the certitudes of immediate evidence. As against all the
theories of knowledge that can be traced to Descartes and
Kant, Thomism maintains that we can and must begin with
the absolute certitudes of immediate evidence. These certitudes are the basis of all knowledge on both the sensory and
intellectual levels.
Where can these certitudes be found? Where does all our
knowledge begin? Where has everything we know its ultimate
origin? To these questions only one answer is .possible. All
knowledge of every type begins with the immediate evidence
of our senses in direct contact with the physical, sensible world.
Thomistic philosophy depends completely and entirely for its
material on the direct and immediate experience of the sensible
universe, and in so depending finds a solid foundation on the
primary facts of experience. Our external senses directly experiencing their proper objects in material things are the only
sources through which our knowledge can ultimately come.
The first object of all knowledge is the material world around
us, the material bodies that present themselves to our senses
as the subjects of continual changes and movements. The
channels through which we are able to possess this primary
knowledge are the external senses commonly distinguished as
sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. The value of this knowledge is guaranteed by the immediate contact of our senses with

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GEORGE

C. REILLY

their proper objects in material things. No bridge from subject
to object is necessary nor is any possible; the contact is immediate and direct.
To seek positive proof that such really is the origin of our
knowledge is both unnecessary and impossible; unnecessary because immediate experience, direct intuition excludes all need
of proof; impossible because proof must proceed from something more fundamental, better known than the thing to be
proved and nothing can be more fundamental or better known
than the immediate knowledge of the senses. Proof needs a
middle term; there is none here. But if this first fact of experience cannot be proved directly because the evidence is immediate, we may give an indirect indication of its validity by
observing that the lack of any one of the senses deprives a man
of all knowledge that sense might apprehend. A man born
blind, for example, knows nothing of color and no amount of
teaching wiH help him. Color for him is unimaginable and
unthinkable, a clear indication that the materials of knowledge
come only through the experience of the senses. It is, therefore,
through the experience of the senses that knowledge originates,
and the first object of aU knowledge is the sensible, material
world.
The validity of this sensory knowledge, moreover, depends
not merely on this indirect indication but can be defended
positively by an analysis of sensation itself which will show
that the facts of external experience are infallibly known by the
intuitive knowledge of the external senses. St. Thomas makes
such an analysis in the Summa Theologiae/ where he poses the
question: " Whether there is falsity in the senses? " In answer
to the first objection he says: "The affection of the sense is
its sensation itself. Hence from the fact that sense reports as it
is affected, it follows that we are not deceived in the judgment
by which we judge that vye experience sensation." Aristotle had
said the same thing when he noted that " illusion does not
occur without our actually seeing or perceiving something.
Even to see wrongly or to hear wrongly can happen only to one
1 Summa

Theol., I, q. 17, a.

ST. THOMAS AND THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

517

who sees or hears something real, though not exactly what he
supposes." 2 And in this case the false supposition is an error
of intellectual judgment, not an error of sense.
Sensory knowledge is intuitive in the strictest sense, that is,
knowledge which terminates directly and immediately in an
object really present by its real physical existence. It does not
suffice, here, that there be only that intentional presence which
occurs in all knowledge, but it is necessary that the knowledge
terminate at the object in its physical existence. Such knowledge must attain its object as it really is, for otherwise it would
have to apprehend an object that is not present, which means
that it would have nothing as its object-an absurdity. When
our senses report contact with anything, we can have infallible
assurance that we are in contact with the real, and with that
real object as it really is, no matter what its nature may on
further analysis turn out to be. The reason for this infallible
assurance is that no legitimate distinction between appearance
and reality can make what appears to be, unreal. If there is an
appearance to the senses, there is a reality appearing; the alternative is to face the contradiction that perception can terminate
in nothing, and that nothing can appear. In short, if we sense,
we sense something; if we sense something, we sense it as it is.
The alternative here is not to sense at all.

III
Closely bound up with and dependent upon this knowledge
of the material world is the knowledge of the self, the knowing
subject, because coincident with the sense knowledge which
put us in immediate contact with the reality of the universe,
we have the consciousness of ourselves as knowing subjects.
This consciousness of self is not, as Descartes thought, prior to
the knowledge of external things, but is rather awakened by
this knowledge which is in its origin always sense knowledge.
It is true that the consciousness of self is more perfect in intellectual than in sense knowledge, but even in the primary se;nse
• V Metaphys., c. 84.

7

518

GEORGE C. REILLY

knowledge gained by contact with material things, consciousness of self is present. Descartes' dictum: "I think, therefore,
I exist," which he considered the one unassailable certitude, is
acceptable only on the supposition that his thinking have a
real objecL To think without thinking of something is impossible. We can more correctly say: " I know something,
therefore, I exist/' With the knowledge of things the consciousness of self is necessarily coincidenL
If all knowledge begins with the senses, it does not end there,
since we have within us a higher power of knowledge, our intelligence, which uses the material supplied by the senses to
elaborate ideas, judgments and reasoning processes. Although
the knowledge of the intellect is on a different level
the
knowledge of the senses, and although this experienced fact
forces us to distinguish these two types of knowing, we must
not conceive this power of intelligence as operating alone and in
isolation from the senses. Neither our personality nor our
knowledge can be so divided because there is absolute unity and
continuityo
the knowledge of the senses the knowledge
the intellect goes hand in hand occuring simultaneously
in
a collaboration so intimate that in the concrete process of knowing it is impossible to mark off the exact limits of eacho
Sensible knowledge is concerned only with external and sensible
qualities. Intellectual knowledge, on the contrary, penetrates
to the essence and intimate nature of a thing; for example, by
our eyes we see the color of a plant, but by ou:r intelligence
we know what a plant is-matter endowed with vegetative lifeo
The intellect gives us a knowledge of intelligible being; its
knowledge differs from the knowledge of the senses in that it
penetrates beyond the sensible phenomena to the nature, the
being of the objecL
We have, therefore, two different kinds, two different levels
of knowledge, which operate mutually to complement and complete each othe:ro In spite of these two levels of knowledge,
human consciousness is a simple unity, not composed of watertight compartments set side by side but rather forming a
cognitional oneness wherein intelligence and sensation act in

ST. THOMAS AND THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

519

such close collaboration that together they grasp the object
which is in itself at once sensible and intelligible. Such is the
starting point of our intellectual knowledge and such is its
critical foundation. It is quite clear that we can have no pure
intellectual intuition without sensation, fo:r ou:r mind is so
constituted as to find its objects only w'ith the aid of the senses;
it is in this way and this way alone that it graps the :real. But,
on the other hand, the senses do not either penetrate o:r completely dominate the reality they present to the mind; they
reach only to the external appearances. The intimate being of
things, their true and deep reality escapes the senses and
appears only in the light of intelligence, Yet this light is always
present and active; there can be no such thing as a moment
pure sensation in our conscious lives.
This conviction of the collaboration of the senses and intel:realism
ligence is fundamental
Thomism and it gives to
of Aquinas a character that is peculiar and proper to it. If we
are in contact with the real only through our sensations, all the
of
are recognized
always have to be tied to experience. St. Thomas does not shirk
this consequence, but applies it consistently and with fearless
logic throughout his entire synthesis.
The validity of the knowledge given us by our senses is
guaranteed by the immediate contact of our senses with objects
in the material world. That aspect of the problem of knowledge is solved by our consciousness of direct and immediate
experience. But how may we justify the validity
our intellectual knowledge? Here, too, as in the justification of the
validity of sense knowledge there is no necessity or possibility
of direct proof. We can only analyze reflectively what takes
place when we know a thing intellectually. Now the mind has
three operations, the conception of ideas, the formation of
judgments, the process of reasoning. We know from psychology
that any power of knowledge must have, and be distinguished
by, its formal and proper object. Taking for granted, again,
that the intellect is a different cognitive power from the senses,
we seek its formal object. Reflection on what occurs when we

520

GEORGE C. REILLY

know something assures us that whereas the senses enable us
to grasp the phenomena, the appearances of things, we are at
the same time grasping intellectually what is within, that is,
the intelligible being in its true determining features which we
express to ourselves in terms of what the thing is. We do this
by grasping the being of the thing with the determinations of
the thing that are unfolded in the light of intelligence playing
upon it. We see being as exemplified in some determined way
in this particular object. In the concrete this means that we
know it as a thing, as a substance (or accident), as a body,
etc. This intelligible being of the thing is impervious to the
senses, but is the formal object of the intellect. Just as what is
visible in a body is known only in terms of color and in relation
to color, so what is intelligible in a thing is grasped in terms
of being and in relation to being.
In every case of intellectual apprehension the intellect shows
itself to be a living relation to being, to the real. Being is the
center and core of each idea and without it there is no meaning.
It is this primary function of the mind grasping being and the
basic determinations of being that guarantees the ontological
validity of the act of apprehension. What we grasp intellectually is not sensible phenomena but the determinations and
differences hidden under the phenomena and characterizing the
essential nature of the thing. Again, we repeat, there can be
no direct proof of this validity, but the truth of this analysis
can be clearly seen if an image of anything be compared with
the idea of the same thing. The different levels of determination in each are obvious. Whereas the determining features
of the image will always be singular, concrete and material,
those that characterize the idea will always be universal, abstract and immaterial. When we, for example, form a visual
image of a house, the determinations of that image will be in
terms of its color primarily, and then of its shape, size, location,
etc., all singular, concrete and material characteristics. When,
on the other hand, we know what a house is, we have shifted to
the intellectual level; we are asking a question that the intellect
alone can ask, and the answer given in terms of our apprehen-

ST. THOMAS AND THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

sion can only encompass determinations that are universal,
abstract and immaterial. To sum up, we grasp the object in
terms of the determinations of being that are visible or more
properly intelligible only to intellect.
The reason why the intellect, in its basic function of apprehension, cannot be false has a parallel in the situation found
in sensory apprehension, and St. Thomas uses and applies the
analogy when he answers the question: " Whether the intelligence can be false." He says: "For, every faculty as such is
per se directed to its proper object; and things of this kind are
always the same. Hence so long as the faculty exists, its
judgment concerning its own proper object does not fail ...
hence, as regards simple objects not subject to composite
definitions we cannot be deceived unless we understand nothing
whatever about them." 3 Being, that is, what the thing is, is
not grasped by the senses but only by the intellect, and this
immediately and as its proper object, just as color is perceived
by sight. The alternative to grasping intellectually what is
there is grasping what is not there; this would mean having
nothing or emptiness as an object of knowledge, a patent
absurdity. The intellect possessing the form of the thing that
it knows is put into immediate contact with the reality of the
thing. It knows the thing in its being, and as it is. Here, as in
the senses, there is required no bridge from mind to thing,
since the thing present by its form makes any such bridge
unnecessary. Our intellectual knowledge in apprehension is
valid because the light of the intellect penetrates to the reality
of the object, and cannot avoid doing so.

IV
It is, however, in his analysis of the judgment that the truly
critical spirit of St. Thomas shows at its best, since it is in
the judgment alone that truth or falsity is properly found. The
judgment, moreover, is the intellectual act by which the first
indemonstrable principles of knowledge are grasped. In this
3

Summa Theol., I, q. 85, a. 6.

GEORGE C, REILLY

propositional type of knowledge is the real foundation of the
truths of all science and all wisdom. This is what St. Thomas
is referring to when he says: " In its origin all knowledge
consists in becoming aware of the first indemonstrable principles." 4 And he tells us very clearly how these principles are
formed: " Among things apprehended there is to be found a
certain order. The notion which we grasp before anything else
and which is included in every apprehension is being. And on
the notion of being and non-being is based the first indemonstrable principle, namely, that the same thing cannot. be affirmed and denied at the same time. On this principle are based,
in turn, all other principles." 5 The need of this supreme principle of being and thought derives from the nature of the first
two operations of the mind, apprehension and judgment. We
cannot go back indefinitely in tracing our ideas. One must be
first. An analysis of our concepts will eventually arrive at the
first concept, the concept of being. As St. Thomas says: " The
first of all notions reached by the mind is that of simple being,
and then non-being, division and oneness follow in logical order;
finally the mind acquires the notion of multitude in which is
implied that of division." 6 The same is true of a series of
judgments. The first, most simple and universal judgment must
have being for its subject and that which primarily helongs to
being as its predicate. So we see by immediate evidence that a
being cannot be and not be itself at the same time, and this is
the principle of contradiction, the first stepping stone toward
the discovery of truth, which if ignored can produce nothing
but error and confusion. This first principle of thought is the
foundation of all our intellectual constructions. There is no
certitude in the last analysis unless all knowledge be resolved
back to the first principles of thought whose own certitude is
based on immediate evidence necessitating the mind to assent.
From further material, supplied always by the senses, the
intellect perceives other first principles which form the basis
• De Verit., q. 10, a. 6.
• Summa 1'heol., 1-11, q. 94, a. 2.
"IV Metaphys., lect. 8.

ST. THOMAS AND THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

523

of each particular field of knowledge. The precise form these
primary judgments take is analyzed by St. Thomas at the very
beginning of the De V eritate. 1 These judgments are simply the
primary mental assents at which our mind naturally and
necessarily arrives in its inspection of reality, both in terms o:f
the general modes of being common to everything, and in
terms of the special modes of being proper to the different kinds
of things in our experience. The judgments relating to the
general modes o:f being concern the transcendentals and are the
origin of all the principles and conclusions of metaphysics. The
judgments relating to the special modes of being concern the
categories or various types of reality found concretized in
things, and are the origin of all principles and conclusions of the
special sciences. In this latter field research properly means the
investigation of real things in the light of these principles. The
ultimate test of the truth of any judgment, then, can only be
the analytic resolution of that judgment back to the first
principles, which is the reason why St. Thomas can say:
" There is never falsity in the intellect if resolution into
first principles be rightly caried out." 8 The human intellect
does not learn these principles nor does it assume them; it
arrives at them naturally and necessarily and immediately upon
a knowledge of the terms that make them up. The mind thus
attains truth and certitude by grasping first principles, and
then proceeding from these to conclusions. This does not mean
that from these principles all knowledge may be deduced, but
only that before anything can be deduced they must be admitted and applied. As :regards contingent things, for example,
in :research in the natural sciences, this will mean that material
things will be investigated, weighed and measured in the light
and under the guidance of these primary principles involving
the first principles of metaphysics and the first principles of the
special science in question. The application of these principles
to the data of experience will produce the conclusions of that
science.
In order to make any of these primary judgments it is
• De lVerit., q. l, a. 1.

8

ibid., q. 1, a. Hl.

524

GEORGE C. REILLY

necessary to have primary concepts, and for these material
images or phantasms are required. These phantasms, derived
directly from the objects in contact with the senses, are the
psychological connection of the intellect with reality. And it
is well to note that a judgment does not take place by comparing mentally two different concepts which are then seen to be
compatible or not. A judgment is an assent, a dynamic act
of the mind which occurs after a reflection on a composite
concept which is the result of a composite phantasm. Unless
the two elements are simultaneously known in one composite
concept there can be no judgment. This act of composing or
dividing occurs as the result of the reflection which sees that the
predicate is in the subject, and is properly the affirmation of
this connection. This connection or nexus, seen as possible in
the apprehension, is affirmed in the judgment, which is a dynamic statement of the conformity between mind and reality,
that is, the known conformity of the bond between the elements
of the composite concept in the mind and the objective makeup of the object in reality.
Here in the analysis of the act of judgment is the heart of
St. Thomas' critical theory and the solution to the problem of
knowledge. Here is the touchstone of all truth, and the real
bridge that closes the gap between our mind and reality.
Because of this, our intellect, judging, can penetrate the secrets
of the universe and unravel the mysteries of matter. We can
detect the order in the world, and put order into our lives and
our relations with other men and women. Through the mind,
judging, we can regulate our conduct according to the laws of
nature and we can know the eternal law of God as the ultimate
rule of our actions. The mind in its power of judgment leads
us upward to the life of the spirit, and ultimately to God,
whence we may understand that it is because of our ability to
make judgments that we are said to be " made to the image
and likeness of God."
GEORGE

The Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. C.

c. REILLY, 0. P.

THE ESSENCE OF THE SACRIFICE
OF THE 1\IASS
(AN ANALYSis oF FR. DoRoNzo's THEORY)

I

SING the definition of sacrifice in its broad sense as a
point of departure, theologians divide the numerous
theories about the essence of the sacrifice of the Mass,
proposed since the Council of Trent, into two groups. The
first group includes those theories which regard the oblation of
Christ's past immolation of the cross as the essence of the
Eucharistic sacrifice. The second group includes those theories
which require Christ's immolation as well as His oblation.
The second group is further subdivided into several categories, each differing in its concept of immolation. Modern
theologians belonging to this group generally agree that Christ's
bloody immolation is represented in the twofold distinct consecration performed by the priest. Some, however, restrict the
immolation of Christ to the external separation of the species
of bread and wine, while others affirm that Christ is internally
immolated under the sacramental species.
In the first hypothesis, the separation of species seems to be
a mere picture of the sacrifice of the cross (L. Billot). In the
second hypothesis, the separation of species refers to the body
and blood of Christ; this seems to make the immolation of
Christ a new one which supplements the immolation of the
cross (A. Michel).
The Benedictine School (Dom Odo Casel, Abbot Ansgar
Vonier) proposes a new Mass-theory, which claims that the
immolation of the cross is essential to the Mass. According
to Fathers Vonier and Casel, the drama of Calvary is made
present before us in the Mass; the Eucharistic Rite (in their
view) is the sacrament-sacrifice o:r the sacramental sacrificeo It
525

ADOLPH TYMCZ.AK

effects what it signifies; since it signifies the body and blood of
Christ in the state of separation, it makes Christ immolated on
Calvary sacramentally present. 1
The Eucharistic sacrifice, in contrast to natural sacrifice, is
not subject to human observation and experience; it is rather
a mystical sacrifice. " The sacramental presence and the sacramental offering are not historical events in the career of Christ."
The Mass " cannot be a new sacrifice, but it must be the
representation, pure and simple, of the historic and natural
sacrifice." 2 Both sacrifices, that of the Mass and that of the
cross, belong to different modes of being: one to the natural
order and the other to the sacramental order. One represents
the other: " We are dealing with His representative life, representing the natural life." 8
Dom Casel accepts this viewpoint and stresses even more
the
mystical meaning of the sacramental sign (the dynamic
side of the mystery). The sacraments are mystical actions
(Mysterienhandlungen); through them past soteriological facts
the faithful participate
them " not
are made present
only by faith or disposition, but also in a physical and a concrete form, in a mystery." 4
Thus, according to the Benedictine School, the sacrifice of
the Mass is real, though sacramental; it is performed in the
supernatural «esse of the mystery."
Fr. Emmanuel Doronzo, 0. M. I., professor of Dogmatic
Theology at The Catholic University of America, Washington,
D. C., subscribes (at least partly) to the Benedictine theory of
the sacrifice of the Mass. 5 He does not accept the theory of
1 Dom Ansgar Vonier. 0. S. B., A Key to the doctrine of the Eucharist,
(West
minister, Md.: The Newman Press, 1948), pp. 60, 80 ff., 97, 138.
2 Loc. cit., pp. 88 f., 135 f.
• Ibid., pp. Ill, 94, 118.
• Odo Casel, 0. S. B., "nicht etwa bloss im Glauben oder in der Gesinnung,
sondem in physisch-konkreter Form, im Mysterium." Das Christliche Kultmysterium (Regensburg, ( 1932), p. 41.
5 Cf. for other viewpoints especially Fr. J. B. Umberg, S. J., Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie (quoted abbrev. ZKT), v. 52 (1928) and v. (1930) :and P. Rupprecht, 0. S. B., "Sacrificium Mediatoris," Divus Thomas, 9 (1931) -11 (1933). I
repeat here the arguments of these authors in connection with the theory of Fr.

THE ESSENCE OF THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS

527

the physical presence of the cross in the Mass proposed by
Dom Casel, nor Masure's theory of the efficacious sign of
Christ's passion; but with them he holds to the concept of
representative immolation, and particularly the notion of the
real presence of the sacrifice of the cross in the Mass as proposed
by Abbot Vonier.6
Fr. Doronzo deserves our thanks for having dealt with this
vital question and for having tried to work out the Benedictine
theory. 7 But he runs into the same difficulties that have
plagued the Benedictine School; in addition, he meets with other
difficulties that derive from his own speculations.
Some of these difficulties, proposed by various theologians
during the seventh annual convention of the Catholic Theological Society of America at the Universtity of Notre Dame on
June 24, 1952, have not been adequately answered by Fr.
Doronzo. In the discussion at the time, I spoke against Fr.
Doronzo's concept of the immolation of Christ in the Mass
and against his positive proofs, i. e., his interpretation of Holy
Scripture, the Fathers of the Church, the Council of Trent, the
texts of St. Thomas and the " Mediator Dei." Below I should
like to explain my position point by point.
The theory of Fr. Doronzo, if I understand itproperly, can
be summarized in these three affirmations:
1. The sacrifice of the Mass is an essentially relative and
representative sacrifice.
Doronzo, as related by Fr. Eugene Florkowski, Nowy pollld na istat<; mszy sw.
(A new opinion concerning the essence of the sacrifice of the Mass), Ateneum
kaplanakie (The priestly Ateneum), 34 (1984), 225-251, and art. in "Ko8ci6l"
(The Church), (Lublin: Uniwersytet, 1936), 115-124; cf. J. M. Hanssens, S. J.,
Periodica de re morali, canonica, liturgica, 28 (1984), 112, 182, 160; B. Poschman,
art. in Theologische Quartalschrift, 116 (1985), 58-116; Eugene Masure, The Christian Sacrifice (New York: Kenedy, 1948), pp. 265, 262; cf. pp. 225, 269-280; cf.
ibid., Preface; Le Sacrifice du Corps mystique (Paris: Desclee, 1950), p. 71, n. 1.
• On the essence of the sacrifice of the Mass, Proceedings of the Seventh Annual
Convention of the Catholic Theological Society of America, Notre Dame, Indiana,
June 28-25, 1952, pp. 67, 69, 79, 68.
• Proceedings, pp. 70-82; Emmanuel Doronzo, 0. M. 1., De Eucharistia, II (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1948) 1016-1026.

528

ADOLPH

TYMCZAK

2. The immolation and oblation of the Mass is essentially

one and the same as the immolation and oblation of the cross.
3. The immolation of the cross is repeated in the Mass " non
in esse physico, sed in esse objectivo et intentionali."

II
Tradition concermng the Immolation of Christ in the Mass
The theory of Fr. Doronzo stands or falls by the positive
arguments from tradition and Holy Scripture which are adduced in its support.
l. The interpretation of Holy Scripture. The sacrificial
expressions found in Holy Scripture 8 affirm the real presence
of the body of Christ under the species of bread and the :real
presence of the blood of Christ under the species of wine. The
words of institution also imply a relation between the sacrifice
of the cross and its mystical representation in the Eucharist.
Theologians deduce from these expressions the truth that the
Eucharist is a true sacrifice, as Fr. Doronzo himself does.
But, aside from this, theologians cannot decide whether these
Scriptural expressions (the participles St86p,Evov, eKxvwop,Evov)
refer to the actual willingness of Christ to give His body and
shed His blood on the cross, the bloody immolation being represented only by the Eucharistic symbols of bread and wine; or
whether the Scriptural expressions refer to the future immolation of Christ on the cross, the bloody immolation being made
present really-sacramentally under the Eucharistic species.
The first supposition is more probable. The body and blood
of Christ as He really existed in the cenacle are present under
the Eucharistic species which symbolize the immolation of
the cross. The second supposition is improbable. The participles 8tSop,Evov, eKxvvvop,Evov, most probably cannot signify the
body and blood of Christ in the state of separation on the
cross, because the bloody immolation had not yet taken place
8

"Corpus Christi quod datur, sanguis qui effunditur "; Mt. 26 : 26-28; Mk. 14:
Luk. 22: 19-iW; l Cor. 11 : 24-25; cf. E. Doronzo, De Eucharistia, 873-883.

THE ESSENCE OF THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS

529

on Calvary. 9 Hence, these sacrificial words do not prove
" Eucharistiam in tantum esse sacrificium in quantum est ipsum
sacrificium crucis in ea praesens," as Fr. Doronzo affirms.
Neither do these sacrificial words prove that the" tragedy and
sacrifice of Calvary really and mystically become present at
the altar." 10
As regards the doctrine of St. Paul, the Apostle speaks of
one bloody oblation of Christ on the cross; 11 but he does not
exclude an unbloody oblation. Hence, the theory of two,
numerically distinct, acts of immolation of Christ is not contrary to the teaching of St. Paul. The suffering Christ offered
Himself once on the cross (a bloody immolation); the natural
Christ, as He existed on earth, offered Himself at the Last
Supper and now the glorified Christ offers Himself a second
time under the species of bread and wine (an unbloody immolation) . But on the other hand, the renewal of the immolation
of the cross in "esse reali" seems to be opposed to St. Paul's
teaching. Hence, the numerical oneness of the two sacrifices,
that of the cross and that of the Mass, seems not to be contained in Holy Scripture.
2. The doctrine of the Fathers of the Chtlrch. In his Book
"De Eucharistia," Fr. Doronzo quotes many texts of the
Fathers of the Church. I limit my criticism to an examination
of these texts, in order to show that rightly interpreted, they
do not substantiate Fr. Doronzo's theory.
St. Cyprian directs his 63rd Letter against those (" aquarii ")
who use water only in the celebration of the Mass. Therefore,
he teaches that wine mixed with water should be offered, in
accordance with the example and institution of Christ. St.
Cyprian calls the Eucharist " Dominicae passionis et nostrae
:redemptionis sacramentum," " passio est enim Domini sacn• Umberg, ZKT, 52 (1928), 862; cf. E. F!orkowski,art. cit., p. 242 f.
De Eucharistia, 1019, 1018.
11 Heb. 9:12, 25 ff.; Hl: 12-21; cf. St. Thomas,
Summa Theol., III, q., 88, a. l,
ad 2; Cone. Trid., sess. 22. cap. 1. Henricus Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum
(quoted abbrev. Denz.), ed. Joannes Bapt. Umberg, S. J., (Friburgi, Br.: 1987), 989.
10

ADOLPH TYMCZAK

ficium quod offerimus." 12 In their context, both these texts
should be understood in the sense that the Eucharist is " the
memory of the passion •• of Christ:
1) because (as St. Cyprian points out) the wine is converted
into Christ's blood which was shed on the cross. St. Cyprian
calls the body and blood of Christ the matter of the sacrifice;
2) because the passion of Christ is mentioned in all sacrifices;
8) because St. Cyprian quotes St. Paul (I Cor. 11: 26) saying
that we offer the chalice in order to commemorate the Lord and
His
A misunderstanding of the words " passio est enim Domini
sacrificium quod offerimus" has probably led Fr. Doronzo to
the affirmation that, according to St. Cyprian, " in missae sacrificio ipsa passio Christi offertur ." 14
St. Ambrose praises the effects of the death of Christ, which
we are sealed
brought life to all. He says
death, and that we announce the death of Christ in our prayers
and our sacrifice.
" Orantes, anm.mtiarrms mortem eius,
offerentes, praedicamus mortem eius." 15

Textual parallelism calls for this interpretation: Offering,
we announce the death of Christ. Fr. Doronzo's interpretation:
" Offerentes mortem eius " 16 seems to be contrary to the text
of St. Ambrose.
12 Ep. 68. nn. 14, 17. Patrologia Latina, 4, 897, 898 f.; cf. n. 9, coL 39!1:; J. Schwane,
Dogmenguchichte. (Freiburg, Br.: 1892), I, 514 f.
13 P. L., 4, 399.
14 De Eucharistia, 1020, the CO'I'I'ect sense is this "sacrificium quod offerimus est
(vocatnr) passio Domini," i.e., memoria passionis.
""De excessu fratris sui Satyri, 2, 46. P. L., 16, 1385; cf. the parallel text De fide
ad Gratianum, IV, c. 10, n. 124. P. L., 16, 647. Another text quoted by Fr. Doronzo
" nunc Christus offertur ... quasi recipiens passionem " (De officiis, l, 238. P. L.,
16, 100 f.), when compared with the parallel texts, evidently excludes the real
passion of Christ in the Mass: " as if receiving the passion."
16 De Eucharistia, 9HJ, 1020.

THE ESSENCE OF THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS

531

St. John Chrysostom speaks of the Victim whose death is
commemorated in the Mass: 17
L Unus ubique Christus,
£. una hostia,
3. tunc ( olim) futi oblata,
4. semel oblata,
5. unum sacrificium.

l. Eius mortem

revocamus m
memormm;
2. eandem semper o:fferimus,
3. quotidie o:fferimus,
4. multis in locis,
5. sacrificii commemoratio.

The texts in question do not state that the death of Christ
is really. renewed in the Mass, but that it is commemorated
(" in memoriam, in recordationem eius quod factum est ") .
St. Augustine continued the traditional doctrine concerning
the sacrifice of the Mass in his sermons, his homilies on St.
John, the De Civitate Dei, etc. He followed the teaching of
certain Greek Fathers (St. Gregory Naz., St.
and certain Latin Fathers (St. Ignatius, St. Ircnaeus, St.
Cyprian, St. Ambrose).
St. Augustine's fundamental idea is his concept of the sacrifice as the visible sign of an invisible sacrifice.18 This general
definition is in agreement with Augustine's explanation of
Christ's immolation in the classical passage which distinguishes
between bloody and unbloody immolation. According to this
and other passages of St. Augustine, Christ: 19
was once immolated:
I. cn1ente,

2. in suo corpore (physico) ,
3. in re,
4. semel.

now is immolated:
1. incruente,
2. in sacramento (mysterio),
3. in similitudine,

4. omni die.

The above texts of St. Augustine are very important for the
doctrine of the sacrifice of the Mass, because they have influenced many theologians. The Eucharistic elements are symbols of the sacrifice offered on the cross. On the other hand,
the elements of bread and wine (composed of grains and
ln Ep. ad Hebr., hom. 17, n. 3, P. G., 63, 131.
De Civ. Dei, 10, c. 5; c. !i!O. P. L., 41,
De Trinit., 4, c. 4. P. L.,
10 Ep. 98. n. 9 ad Bonifacium, P. L., 33, 363; cf. Contra Faustum,
c.
385; cf. Fr. Doronzo, De Eucharilltia, 908.
17

18

901.

P. L.,

ADOLPH

TYMCZAK

grapes) signify the participation of the mystical body in the
sacrifice of the Masso
Summarizing the various elements in the teaching of St.
Augustine," 0 we can say that, according to him, the sacrifice of
the Mass, is a relative sacrifice: it represents and commemorates the immolation of the cross and applies the fruits of the
cross to the faithfuL
Faustus Reiensis, following Sto Cyprian, St. Ambrose, and Sto
Augustine, writes about the commemorative character of the
Mass and its efficacy. He praises the fruits of the sacrifice of
the cross which are applied in the Masso He holds that both
sacrifices are united by the same Victim and the same fruitso 21
1. Quod semel o:fferebatur m

1. ut jugiter coleretu:r per

pretium,
2. rede }ltio pro hominum
salute,

2. perpetua redemptionis

3. perennis Victima,

unica Hostiao

mysterium;
oblatio, (quotidiana applicatio),
3. ut viveret in memoria, et
praesens esset in gratia.

Sto Gregory the Great gives expression to the traditional
view of the sacrifice of the Mass. He holds to the opinion of
St. Augustine in his interpretation of St. Paul (Romo 6: 9) and
other scriptural passages, and like Sto Augustine, Gregory distinguishes between the
of the Mass and that of the
22
cross:
1. Hoc sacrificium (Missae)
1. (Christ us passus et
passionem Unigeniti Filii
mortuus est),
semper imitatur;
2. Resurgens a mortuis iam non 2. Iterum in hoc mysterio sacrae
moritur,
oblationis immolatur;
3. In suo mysterio pro nobis
3. Hostia suae passion:is.
patitur ad absolutionem
nostram.
According to Sto Gregory, Christ is now glorified in heaven;
Sermo !2!'!7. P.L., 38, 1099; In Joan., tract. !i!6, n. 15, 17. P.L., 35,1614.
Homilia de corpore et sanguine Christi, inter opera S. Hieronymi, P. L., 30,
22 Dialog. 4, 58, 59 P. L., 77, 425, 428; Hom. in Evang. 2. hom. 37, 7 P. L., 76,
1279.
20

21

THE ESSENCE OF THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS

538

His passion is not really repeated in the Mass, but reenacted
only "in imitatione, in mysterio "; nevertheless, the fruits of
the real passion on the cross are applied to us in the Mass.
Hence St. Gregory exhorts the faithful to become victims whenever they celebrate the mystery of the Lord's passion.
The Venerable Bede follows St. Ambrose and St. Augustine.
In his homilies he conceives the Mass as the symbolical commemoration of Christ's passion; the memory of Christ's passion (not the immolation of the cross) is renewed on the altar
in order to forgive our sins every day. 23
Venerable Bede (like other Fathers of the Church) uses the
word " immolare " in a wide sense, as synonymous with the
word " sacrifice," but he also employs it in the strict sense
of " mactare." Other Patristic expressions quoted by Fr.
Doronzo 24 "quasi recipiens passionem" (St. Ambrose), "eius
mortem revocamus in memoriam" (St. John Chrysostoin),
" in mysterio iterum pati," " passionem semper imitari " (St.
Gregory the Great) do not prove that the same passion of
Christ is offered in both sacrifices. The Fathers, on the contrary, expressly distinguish betwe_en the unbloody and mysterious passion of the Mass and the bloody and real passion of the
cross, as is indicated by context and the use of such words as
" quasi, imitari, memoria, commemoratio, mysterium."
St. Augustine and other Fathers speak of this immolation in
terms which are synonymous: "mactatio vel immolatio incruenta, in sacrificio, in mysterio, in similitudine, in repraesentatione, in symbolo, in sacramento," i.e., in signo sacro. This
sacred sign, which designates likeness (not identity) -with the
signified thing, is a symbol of Christ's passion, not its real
repetition. The immolation of Christ in the Mass, according to
the Fathers of the Church, is only figurative, because Christ
is now in a glorified state; th!s immolation represents as in (1,
picture and commemorates the sacrifice of the cross once
offered on Calvary. The expressions of the Fathers, however,
. •• " Lavat itaque nos a peccatis nostris quotidie in sanguine suo, cum eiusden
beatae passion is ad altare memoria replicatur." Hom. 14 P. L., 94, 75.
•• De Eucharistia, 1020, 891;
54.

8

534

ADOLPH

TYMCZAK

do not exclude some internal and mysterious immolation, which
is in agreement with the glorified state of Christ.
In spite of the representative character of Christ's immolation, the Fathers of the Church speak of a real oblation in
the Mass: 25 the same victim is offered on the altar and on the
cross. Some Fathers stress the active role of
Church, the
mystical body of Christ, in the Eucharistic oblation. The
redemption was effected once on the cross; its application is
made every day in the Mass; the faithful who participate in
the Mass receive the fruits of the cross
are inspired to the
imitation of Christ's passion and the practice
virtues.
Hence the theologians, whom Fr. Doronzo unjustly reproaches with levity, 26 rightly affirm that the texts of the
Fathers support the representative
commemorative character of the Mass based on
unity of the Priest and Victim.
The patristic texts, if correctly explained, say nothing· about the
same immolation or the numerical oneness of the two sacrifices.
of
According to Fr. J. B. Umberg, no
or theologian affirms that the Eucharistic sacrifice includes the
past passion of Christ just as it contains
body
blood
Christ. 27 Hence F:r. Doronzo seems to have no justification
for claiming that " the same oneness of the two sacrifices is
also directly (formally or equivalently) asserted by Traditiono" 28
The doctrine of the Fathers of the Church became the
teaching of the writers of the Middle Ages. The famous passage
of St. Augustine quoted above is found in the works of almost
all medieval theologians. 29 They describe the Mass as a symbolic and mystical immolation and oblation of Christ. They
say that He is really present in the Eucharist in the manner
Cf. Diet. Theol. Cath., X, l, art. "Messe" (A. Gaudel). 991 f.
"Quam leviter plures theologi a vi istorum textuum sese expediant."
Eucharistia, 1021.
21 ZKT,
(1928), 376-391; cf. E. Florkowski, art. cit., p. 246 f.
28 Proceedings, 71; De Eucharistia, 1021.
29 DTC, loc. eit., col. 970.
25

26

De

THE ESSENCE OF THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS

535

which He really exists; that the mortal Christ is present in the
sacrifice of the Last Supper; that the glorified Christ is present
in the Mass, and that in spite of His glorified state, Christ is
immolated in the Eucharist.
In order to explain this seeming contradiction, medieval theologians :repeat the expressions of the Fathers of the Church,
especially those of SL Augustine in their " Expositiones missae."
They speak of immolation " in sacramento, mysterio, similitudine, :figura, imitatione, imagine," etc.; this immolation belongs to the essence of the Mass and is reconciled with the
glory of Christ existing in heaven, in contrast to the immolation
the cross. Let us quote some of the authors with whom Fr.
Doronzo himself cites. 30
Paschasius RadbeTtus, writing against Ratramnus, insists on
the identity of Christ's body in the natural state and in the
Eucharist; the same body of Christ, which was once immolated
on the cross, is now really present in the Eucharist. In agreement with Sts. Cyprian, Ambrose, Augustine, and Gregory the
Great, Paschasius distinguishes
the concept of sacrifice
between the external, visible symbol and the invisible reality.
The Mass, according to him, is a symbolic action, in which an
actual oblation of the Victim of the cross is made under the
figure of bread and wine.
Paschasius calls the Eucharist " the mystery of the death of
Christ," " the commemoration," which brings to us the fruits
of the passion of Christ. Christ, he points out, is said to be
immolated in the Mass, because as salutary food He is the
Victim for our sins. 31 Although Paschasius uses the word,
" immolate " both in the general sense of " sacrifice," and in
the strict sense of " mactare," he nevertheless rules out the
real presence of Christ's passion in the Mass: "nee illud
:reiteratu:r in facto, ut mo:riatur Ch:ristus." He explicitly distinguishes between two immolations:
30 De Eucharistia,
Proceedings, 55 f., 71.
"'Expositio in Matt. ll, c. !i!6. P. L., l!i!G, 894.

536

ADOLPH

Christus in cruce:
l. immolatus est pro salute

mundi,
2. semel,
3. in seipso,
4. nee illud reiteratur

m facto,

5. quod pependit in cruce,
6. quod manavit ex Christi
latere.

TYMCZAK

Christus tn celebratione
sacramenti:
l. immolatur ut hostia pro
peccatis nostris,
2. quotidie,
3. in mysterio,
4. sed immolatur pro nobis
quotidie,
5. ut idem percipiamus in pane,
6. ut (idem) bibamus in calice. 32

Ratramnus differs from Paschasius Radbertus in describing
the manner of Christ's presence in the Mass. According to
him, this eucharistic presence differs from Christ's earthly life.
Nevertheless, Ratramnus agrees with Paschasius on the real
presence of Christ in the Eucharist and the figurative character
of the Mass. 33
Basing himself on the teaching of Isidore of Seville,
Ratramnus distinguishes between Christ's passion on the cross
and the immolation in the Mass; 34 this distinction appears in
his comments on Holy Scripture (Heb. 7: 26-27; 1 Peter 2: 21):
l. Quod Christus se offerens

l. hoc in eius passionis memo-

adimplevit,
Q. semel fecit,

riam geratur,
2. quotidie eadem oblatio
( eiusdem Victimae et
fructuum),
3. neque tamen falso dicitur
quod Dominus immoletur
vel patiatur,
4. per mysteriorum Dominici
corporis et sanguinis celebrationern, per imaginem,
sirnilitudinem, repraesentationem passionum in mysteriis.

3. in seipso passus est, nee quotidie in seipso patiatur,
4. exemplum nobis reliquit, nos
passionibus eius sociari
debere.

Ep. De Corp. et Sang. Domini ad Frudegardum, P. L., lQO, 1354 f.
Some theologians interpret in a heterodox sense the text of Ratramnus, i. e.,
that the Mass is the pure figure of the passion of Christ without His real presence
(cf. DAC, loc. cit., coL l013f.). In any case Ratramnus does not admit the real
presence in the Mass of the immolation on the cross.
34 De Corp. et Sang. Domini., cc. 38, 39. P. L., H!l, 143 f.
32
33

THE ESSENCE OF THE SACRIFICE

OF THE MASS

537

The Eucharistic controversy between Paschasius Radbertus
and Ratramnus originated because the terminology used to
describe the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist had not
yet been clearly determined.
Lanfranc contributed to the clarification of this terminology.
He affirms, on the one hand, the real presence of Christ in the
Eucharist (against Berengarius). On the other hand, he uses
such terms as " species, similitudo, sacramentum (signum) ,
figura, mysterium" (with St. Augustine) to designate the
passion of Christ in the Mass; 35 Christ was once immolated on
the cross; since His resurrection He is immortal, but His body
is immolated in the Eucharist. Although Lanfranc regards
communion and not the consecration as the figure of Christ's
immolation, he nevertheless does not affirm that the immolation of the cross is really present in the Mass.
Using the same approach and basing themselves on the teaching of St. Augustine, the following two writers have best
reconciled the reality of the oblation with the figure of Christ's
passion.
Guitmundus A versanus explains the immolation of Christ as
a likeness to a real passion. Commenting on the teaching of
St. Augustine, Guitmundus states the relation of the Mass to
the sacrifice of the cross in these words:
" Quoties celebratio corporis et sanguinis Domini agitur,
non equidem Christum iterum occidimus,
sed mortem eius ... memoramus; estque ipsa celebratio
passionis Christi quaedam commemoratio . . . Domini passionis
signum ...
pro nobis olim mortuus (Christus) designatur ...
non est enim celebratio ipsa dominica passio, sed dominicae
passionis iam peractae significativa commemoratio." 36

Algerius Leodiensis, important for his comments on St. John
Chrysostom, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine and St. Gregory the
Great, the champions of traditional teaching, writes that on
35 "

Dominicae passionis designativa nomina " Decorp. et sa,ng. Domini, c. 20.

P. L., 150, 427.
35

De Corp. et Sang. Christi veritate in Euchar., 2. P. L., 149, 1455; cf. 1434.

538

ADOLPH TYMCZAK

the altar there is the same Victim which was on the cross and
that both sacrifices produce the same fruits for our salvation. 81
The same Victim
on the cross
on the altar
l. was offered once,
L is offered every day,
2. in true passion and death.
2. in :figure, similitude, :representation of the passion,
3. truly suffered;
3. the memory of His passion is
repeated,
4. true immolation,
4. :figurative, mystical immolation,
5. in Himself, that is, in human 5. in the sacrament, that is, in
form.
the form of the bread and

wme.
The immolative action (" in cruce vera, in altari figurata ")
constitutes the difference between the two sacrifices. In spite
of the difference in immolation, the same grace of salvation
comes to us because the same true Christ is in both sacrifices.
The unity of the sacrifice of the Mass and that of the cross is
made effective by the one and the same Victim, and not by one
and the same irnrnolation. 38
Peter Lombard distinguishes in the Eucharist between the
real presence of the body and blood of Christ (reset sacramentum) and the representation of the passion of Christ (species
of bread and wine, breaking of the host, communion) . Like his
predecessors, the Master of Sentences accepts the word " immolate " both in the general sense of " sacrificare " and in the
strict sense of the figurative immolation of Christ; " Christi
passio non rei veritate sed significandi mysterio." 39
Peter Lombard writes that the Eucharistic sacrifice or the
immolation is " the memory and representation of the true
sacrifice and the holy immolation which was made on the altar
of the cross." 40 Both sacrifices are united by the same Victim
and the same fruits. This view appears in his commentary of
St. Augustine and St. Ambrose.
87 De Sacram. Corp. et Sang. Domini, l, 16, P. L., 180, 786, 787, 790.
"'Ibid., col. 788.
•• IV Sent., d. 10, n. 8. P. L., 192, 861.
•• Ibid., dist. 12. n. 7. col. 866.

THE ESSENCE OF THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS

589

Peter Pictaviensis regards the immolation of Christ in the
sacrament as a mere representation of the immolation of the
cross. 41 Other twelfth century writers such as Robert Paululus,
Peter Blesius, Balduin Cantuariensis, Sicardus Cremonensis,
Lothar de Segni (Pope Innocent III) present the doctrine of
the Mass in the liturgical aspect and conceive it as a figure of
Christ's passion.
The Great Scholastics (Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure,
St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas Aquinas) follow the Fathers
of the Church, especially St. Augustine, in defining the Mass
as a sacred sign of the internal sacrifice whose effects are the
sanctification of the faithfuL They regard this sign as the
oblation of the whole mystical body. Christ is the principal
Priest who offers Himself through the visible priest. They
make a distinction between the real presence of Christ and the
symbolism of Christ's passion in the Eucharist.
In order to shorten this presentation, I shall consider the
view of St. Thomas, without however attempting to review his
whole teaching on the sacrifice of the Mass. 42 According to the
prince of theologians, the Mass is the sacrament of Christ's
passion, and as such it is a sign commemorative of the past
passion of Christ (res signi:ficata et non contenta), a sign
demonstrative of the present grace of ecclesiastical unity (communio cum Christo, res contenta) and the sign foretelling tke
future glory. 43
St. Thomas writes of the relation of the Mass to the sacrifice
of the cross in a threefold sense:
a) "as the representative image of Christ's passion."
b) " as the commemoration of the sacrifice of the cross,"
c) "as the application (participation) of the fruits of the passion." 44
41 Sent .•

5. c. 13. P. L., £11, 1'256.
Cf. DTC, loc. cit., col. 1052 ff.; A. Hoffman, "De sacrificio Missae iuxta S.
Thomam," Angelicum, 15 (1938), 26£-285.
43 Summa Theol., III, q. 73, a. 4; q. 60, a. 3.
44 Snmma Theol. a) III, q. 83, a. 1; Dom Vonier comments on this text:
"The
sacrifice of Calvary and the sacrifice of the Eucharist are to each other in the
relationship of the exemplum; one is the replica of the other. One contains what the
other contains." (A Key, p. 150). My observation on this comment: St. Thomas
42

540

ADOLPH TYMCZAK

The representation of the passion of Christ in the Mass is
necessary, because of the application of its frui.ts.45 The passion
of Christ is represented and commemorated, according to St.
Thomas, in the Mass: a) by the ceremonies, especially the
sign of the cross, b) by the double consecration, although both
forms (either that of the body or that of the blood) taken
separately :represent the passion of Christ; nevertheless, the
consecration of the blood of Christ represents Christ's passion
more explicitly; c) by holy communion (the effects of Christ's
passion) .46
According to St. Thomas, the Mass is the representative
image of Christ's passion, like the altar which represents the
cross. 47 This comparison shows that, according to the Angelic
Doctor, the word "repraesentare" does not mean "to make
really present," but it means "to make present in picture-like
As
altar is not identical with the cross, so the
celebration of the Mass is_ not identical with the passion of
Christ; it :represents the passl.on as a man's portrait represents
his person. The same idea is indicated by St. Thomas' quotation from St. Augustine" sicut imagines " and from St. Ambrose
"ad recordationem mortis eius " (Christi) ; these quotations
and examples would be misleading, if they should prove, as
Fr. Doronzo would have us believe, "the making present" of
the separation of Christ's body and blood. 48
affirms with St. Ambrose (ad 1) that the same body of Christ is offered in both
sacrifices; but he does not affirm that the same immolation is really present in both
sacrifices, because, according to him, the Mass represents in a picture-like manner
the immolation of the cross. The word " exemplum ·'' means the same as "figura"
(cf. III, q. 83, a. 2, ad 2). In the fifth article of the same question, St. Thomas
describes in detail how the passion of Christ is represented by the words and signs
of the Mass. b) III, q. 22, a. 3, ad 2; IV Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, qcla. 6, sol. 3; c) III,
q. 79, a. 1; a. 7, ad 2; cf. q. 73, a. 4; a. 5, ad 3; q. 80, a. 4; q. 83, a. S!; cf. Umberg,
ZKT, 52 (1928), 384 ff.; 54 (1930), 101 ff.
45 Summa Theol., III, q. 73, a. 5.
46 Ibid., a) q. 83, a. 5, ad 3; b) q. 76, a. 2, ad 1; cf. ad 2; q. 80, a. 12, ad 3; q. 78,
a. 3, ad 7; c) q. 74, a. 1; cf. IV Sent., d., 11, q. S!, a. 1, qcla. 3, sol. 1.
47 " Sicut celebratio huius sacramenti est imago repraesentativa
passionis, ita a! tare
est repraesentativum crucis ipsius." Ibid., q. 83, a. l, ad 2.
48 l\'Iissae ratio
sacrificalis derivatur " ex ipsa praesentia Christi passi " (De
Eucharistia, 1022).

THE ESSENCE OF THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS

541

St. Thomas's words " sacrificium autem quod quotidie in
Ecclesia offertur, non est aliud a sacrificio quod ipse obtulit,
sed eius commemoratio " should be understood in the light of
the passage quoted in the context from St. Augustine, 49 that
is: the identity of the two sacrifices is based upon the identity
of the same Priest and the same Victim: "Ipse ChristusSacerdos et Oblatio (Victima) ."
Let us add that the word " commemorare " in the above
passage is used in relation both to sins and to sacrifice; sins
are commemorated in the prayer " forgive us our sins " and
the sacrifice of the cross is commemorated in the Mass. Hence,
the word "commemoratio" should be taken in the same sense
in both phrases, i. e., as a memorial or a representation in a
picture. St. Thomas does not speak of any other immolation of
Christ in the Mass than that of the representation of the
sacrifice of the cross and the application of its fruits.
St. Thomas stresses rather the real presence of Christ in the
Eucharist, using such words as "contineri, praesens esse, esse
in sacramento!' 5 ', St. Thomas's expression "continens
urn passum " signifies the presence of the glorified Christ who
has suffered. 51 This is dear from the comparison of the Old
and the New sacrifices. The sacrifice of the New Laws contains
" ipsum Christum passum, non solum in significatione vel
figura, sed etiam in rei veritate." 52 St. Thomas affirms here the
real presence of the body and blood of Christ, and not the
49 Summa Theol., III, q. 22, a. 3, ad 2; De Civ. Dei, 10, 20; Fr. Doronzo writes:
" Patet mentem S. Thomae esse sacrificium eucharisticum consistere formaliter in
ipsa oblatione et immolatione crucis, ut representative reiterata in celebratione
missae" (De Eucharistia, 1022). He is perfectly right, if he means that the immolation of the cross is represented in the Mass; if. however, he means that the
immolation of the cross is made present (" reiterata "), then this sense is not
contained in the text of St. Thomas. And Fr. Doronzo uses the term in the second
meaning: ratio sacrificalis derivatur " ex tali specifica repraesentatione QuAE
EXERCETUR IN IPSA REALI PRAESENTIA CHRISTI PASSI" (Jbid.; Italics mine.)
50 Summa Theol., III, q. 73, a. 4, ad 3; cf. q. 79, a. 7; q. 83, a. 2c., ad 1, 2. Cf.
Umberg. ZKT, 52 (1928), 387 fl. and E. Florkowski, art. cit., p. 247.
51 Summa Theol., III, q. 73, a. 5, ad 2; cf. A. Vonier, A Key, p. 54; E. Doronzo,
De Eucharistia, 1023.
52 Summa Theol., III, q. 75, a. l.

ADOLPH TYMCZAK

state of Christ's passion. These are my reasons for making
this claim. In this article St. Thomas:
1. Contrasts the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist
with His figurative presence in the sacrifices of the Old Law.
2. Rejects the error of Berengarius who admitted only the
figurative presence of Christ in the Eucharist.
3. Corrects the interpretation of heretics who interpreted
certain passages of St. Augustine exclusively in the sense of
the mystical and spiritual presence of Christ in the Eucharist
(ad 1, 2) .
4. Contrasts the visible presence of Christ " per modum
corporis" with Christ's invisible presence "virtute spiritus"
(ad 3, 4) .53
According to St. Thomas, " vi sacramenti " the body of
Christ is present under the species of bread, and the blood
of Christ is present under the species of wine; other parts
of the body and the soul of Christ are present under both
species " vi concomitantiae." 54 The Eucharist would contain
" Christum passum " only if the consecration would take place
during the three days between the crucifixion and resurrection
of Christ. 55
After the Great Scholastics, their view of the sacrifice of the
Mass was generally accepted and taught in the schools. Duns
Scotus, the subtle Doctor, and Gabriel Biel taught that the
Mass is the representation of the sacrifice of the cross; both
understood this in St. Augustine's sense. On the whole, how03

cr. ibid., q. 81, a. 3.

Cf. the opinion of Dom Vonier, A Key, p. 126 ("we immolate the Christ, but
not .
the Christ who is in heaven "; p. 208 ff. (a difference in the meaning
attached to vi verborum, vi conversionis, vi sacramenti); Fr. Doronzo, De Eucharistia, 1031 (" solum corpus Christi, sub ipsa oblatione et immolatione crucis est
formaliter loquendo hostia .
status gloriosus, corporis Christi . . . est tantum
quid concomitans ") . The distinction between sacramental and historical preseEce
involves the difficulty: Christ who once suffered is present in the Eucharist vi
sacramenti and the glorified Christ is present at the same time vi concomitantiae.
Christ who is immortal becomes mortal again. Cf. Umberg, loc. cit., Florkowski,
art. cit., p. 250, n. 92 f.
55 Summa Theol., III, q. 76, a. 1, ad 1; a. 2; q. 81, a. 4, ad 2, 3. Hence it seems,
that Fr. Doronzo wrongly quotes St. Thomas in favor of his theory.
54

0

•

0

•

THE ESSENCE OF THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS

543

ever, the theologians of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries
dealt rather with the value and fruits of the sacrifice of the
Mass than with its essence.
The above short presentation shows that the Scholastic considered the Mass as the representation and the fruitful commemoration of Christ's passion and death on the cross. The
same Victim who died on the cross is really present in the
Eucharist and is really offered in the Mass; both sacrifices
differ only as to immolation: that on the cross was real, while
the one in the Mass is figurative, mysticaL
The medieval theologians use Patristic terminology in writing
about sacrificial immolation; they employed such words as
"mysterium, signum, figura, similitudo, etc." Although some
medieval writers use the word "immolation" both in the general sense of "sacrificium" and the strict sense of "mactatio,"
or " repeated immolation," they nevertheless all agree that
Christ's immolation, because He cannot die, is only commemorative, i.e., the figure of the past immolation; or they say it is
contrast to the real immolation
mystical ("in mysterio ")
on the cross. 56 This distinction cannot refer to
Doronzo's
distinction between immolation " in esse physico " (on the
cross) and "in esse obiectivo et reali" (in the Mass) .

III
The Magisterium of the Church concerning the Immolation
of Christ in the Mass
The sixteenth century brought a new development in the
doctrine of the Mass because of the errors of the Protestants.
Luther denied that the Mass is a proper sacrifice of the cross
and regarded it only as a memory of the unique sacrifice of
the cross and the testament or sign of the remission of sins
made by God and confirmed by the death of Christ. " The
Mass is nothing else than the divine promise or testament of
Christ sealed with the sacrament of His body and blood." 57
Cf. Lepin, L'idee du sacrifice de Ia Mass (Paris, 1926), p. 98.
Works of Martin Luther, with Introduction and notes (Philadelphia:
Holman Company and the Castle Press, 1915-1932), vol. 9<!, p. 207.
56
07

A. J.

544

ADOLPH TYMCZAK

Other Protestants denied the expiative character of the
Mass. Melanchthon rejected the Eucharistic sacrifice on the
ground that it lacked real immolation, the shedding of blood,
which he said, is required according to St. Paul (Heb. 9: 22) for
every propitiatory sacrifice. Zwingli identified sacrifice with
immolation and affirmed that Christ suffered only once on the
cross, and could not suffer any more; hence sacrifice was
impossible.
Catholics who wrote against the Protestants stressed the
real presence of Christ in the Eucharist. In conformity with
medieval tradition they upheld the concept of sacramental
immolation. They stated that there was only one real immolation of Christ on the cross; yet in the sacrifice of the Mass,
Christ was immolated" modo quodam incruento, in imitatione,
in commemoratione passionis Dominicae, in mysterio, impassibiliter, invisibiliter, modo immolatitio." In other words, along
with the medieval interpreters of liturgical texts, Catholic
polemicists of the sixteenth century held that the mysterious,
figurative, symbolic immolation of Christ belonged to the
essence of the Mass.
The modus " immolatitius," of which Cajetan spoke, implied
a mystical manner of immolation that commemorated the
sacrifice of the cross. This manner of immolation (status or
modus immolationis, according to Cajetan, and R. Tapper)
signified only the separation of the Eucharistic species. Cajetan
in parallel statements differentiated between two manners of
offering: " in re mortis " and "in mysterio mortis," but he
never upheld the repetition of the passion of Christ, which Fr.
Doronzo wrongly ascribes to him. 58
1. The doctrine of the Council of Trent was directed against
the Protestants who denied the sacrificial character of the Mass.
The Council left
the essence of the Mass and the
concept of unbloody immolation. Hence no theory can invoke
the Council in its support, because the Tridentine Council deals
only with the errors of the Protestants. Each theory, however,
58

De Eucharistia, 1019, 1023; cf. DTC, X, 1 art. "Messe" (J. Riviere),

nos f.

THE ESSENCE OF THE SACRIFICE

OF THE MASS

545

must take into account the elements of sacrifice, as defined by
the Council of Trent.
During the discussions of the Council of Trent (1551-1552) ,
the Fathers agreed:
1) That the value of the sacrifice of the Last Supper derived
from that of the cross;
2) that the sacrifice of the Mass represented the sacrifice of
the cross; but they did not deal with the problem of the unity
of both sacrifices;
3) that Christ in the Mass was not in the state of passion;
the opinion that Christ in the Mass was "in statu passionis et
mortis" was eliminated from the initial discussions of the
Council. During their discussions the Fathers of the Council
stated that the essence of the Mass consisted of three elements:
1) the real presence of Christ,
2) the commemoration of the past bloody immolation of Christ,
3) the actual oblation of the body and blood of Christ.

Some Fathers added a fourth element-our union with God
(in the sense explained by St. Augustine) .59
Christ's immolation at the Last Supper was understood as
spiritual and figurative; some Fathers called it real because,
they said, the passion of Christ began at the Last Supper.
After the discussions the Council of Trent (sess. 22, September 17, 1562) defined the doctrine of the sacrifice of the Mass.
Against the affirmation of the Protestants that the Mass was
" an empty commemoration of the sacrifice of the cross," the
Council of Trent taught the fundamental dogma that the
sacrifice of the Mass was a relative sacrifice in the traditional
sense: a) as a representation of the sacrifice of the cross; b) as
a perpetuation (commemoration) of its memory; c) as an
application of its infinite fruits to souls. 60 The Council used the
Cf. Lepin, op. cit., p. 312.
Sacrificium quo cruentum illud semel in cruce peragendum repraesentaretur
eiusque memoria in finem usque saeculi permaneret atque illius salutaris virtus ...
applicaretur." Sess. 22, cap. 1 Denz., 938; cf. art. "Messe" (J. Riviere), DTC. loc.
cit., col. ]]30; M.D. Forrest, M.S. C., The Clean Oblation (St. Paul: Radio Replies
Press, 1945), pp. 64, 72, 162.
59

60 "

546

ADOLPH TYMCZAK

word " :repraesentare " in the same sense that St. Thomas
employed it, that is, to represent in a picture and not to make
really present the bloody sacrifice in the Mass. This is clear
from the other statements of the Council. 61 The word"
sentare " used by the Council expressed these two ideas: the
internal identity of both sacrifices based on the identity of the
principal Priest and Victim, and of the satisfaction and merits;
and the external (symbolic) representation of the bloody
sacrifice in the Mass.
The proof of this statement follows. First, the Council
contrasts the past and unique sacrifice of the cross with the
present and repeated sacrifice of the Mass. It contrasts the
"mactatio sacramentalis" in the Mass with the "mactatio
realis" on the cross.
Secondly, according to the teaching of the sixteenth century
and the discussions of the Council, the representation of the
sacrifice of the cross consists of the external rite: " Christus
mystice immolatur, prout vi verborum consecrationis seorsim
ponuntur eius corpus et sanguis, quamvis per concomitantiam
sint simul." The view about the presence of Christ in the state
of death was removed from the discussions.
The Council spoke of " oblation " and "immolation " in the
Mass. According to Batiffol, Kramp, the Fathers of the
Council used the words " offerre " and " immolare " in the
general sense of "sacrificare" referring to the entire sacrifice.
But this opinion, more probably 62 cannot be accepted for the
following reasons:
1) The distinction between "cruente" and "incruente"
refers to " immolare " rather than to " offerre."
2) The Catechism of the Council of Trent, in accordance
with the intent of the Council, distinguishes between oblation
and immolation.
3) The theologians of the Council, in agreement with medi61 Denz., 945, 986; cf. Umberg, ZKT, 54 (1930), 100 f., E. Florkowski, art. cit.,
Ateneum Kaplaftskie, p. 245, n. 76.
62 Cf. DTC, loc. cit., col. 1135; M. D. Forrest,
op. cit., pp. 64, H!6; E. Doronzo,
De Eucharistia, 1011.

THE ESSENCE OF THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS

547

as equieval writers, speak of immolation in the strict
valent to " mactatio " (incruenta) .
The real presence of Christ in the Eucharist is affirmed
against Protestants. But the real presence of the Victim once
immolated does not explain the terms of the Council, because
the Council distinguishes between the real presence (" continetur ") and sacrificial immolation" incruente immolatur ") .63
In agreement with the Fathers of the Church, the Council
speaks of two immolations:
The immolation of the cross:

The immolation of the Mass:

1. bloody,

1. unbloody,

2. past,
3. was made once,
4. through Christ Himself,
5. under His own species.

2. actual in every Mass,
3. is made daily,
4. through the visible priest,
5. under the species of bread
and wine.

The interpretation of the teaching of the Council of Trent
on this point can follow either one of two lines of thought:
I) The unbloody immolation is a new and mysterious immolation of Christ, formally distinct from that of the cross. The
unbloody immolation is a mystery, but it is something real in
the supernatural order. It is not merely an image of the past
immolation, i. e., it does not consist purely in the separation of
the species. The species of bread and wine manifest this
mysterious immolation only externally because the Council
affirms Christ's immolation under the species and not in the
species.64
2) The unbloody immolation is identified with that of the
cross, which is repeated in the sacrificial mystery. The term
" unbloody " means ritual or sacramental, because the unique
immolation of the cross is present under the sacramental sign.
This second opinion is less probable, 65 as will appear from
further considerations.
•• A. Michel, DTC, art. "Messe," X, I, U67.
•• " Seipsum ab Ecclesia per sacerdotes sub signis visibilibus immolandum in
memoriam transitus sui ex hoc mundo ad Patrem quando per sui sanguinis effusionem nos redemit." Sess. 22. cap. 1. Denz. 988.
•• Cf. E. Masure, The Christian Sacrifice, p. 265.

548

ADOLPH

TYMCZAK

The relation of the Mass to the sacrifice of the cross is conceived by the Council in the traditional sense. Both sacrifices
-that of the Cross and that of the Mass-are identical because
of: 1) the same Victim, Q) the same principal Priest, 3) the
same fruits. The only difference stated by the Council appears
in the words: " sola offerendi ratione diversa." 66
This " ratio offerendi diversa " does not refer to the single
act of offering which is made on two different levels of being. 67
The" ratio offerendi diversa" does not imply any difference in
the maimer of existence; it suggests rather a difference in the
act of offering in the Mass and in the act of offering on the
cross, because the Council makes a distinction between the
bloody immolation on the cross and the unbloody jmmolation
in the Eucharist.
The Council does not affirm that in the Eucharist the real
presence of Christ takes place in a double state: Christ in the
state of passion (vi verborum) and Christ in the state of glory
(per concomitantiam) . The Council says that the same
heaven and is
Christ exists according to His natural presence
present according to His substance in the Eucharist, in many
places without a contradiction. 68
" Vi verborum " the body of the glorified Christ is present
under the species of bread and the blood under the species of
wine, while other parts of the body and the soul are present
" ex vi naturalis connexionis et concomitantiae."
66 Sess. 9!2. cap. 2. Denz. 940; cf. Josephus
Mueller, S. J., De Missae Sacrificio,
(ed. 3; Oeniponte, 1932), p. 57 "modus offerendi seu modus actionis sacrificalis
est physica forma sacrificii; forma autem essentiam vel speciem alicuius rei determinat; ideo sacrificium missae et sacrificium crucis essentialiter differunt" (quia
modo offerendi differunt, cruente, incruente). Others conceive this difference as
accidental or modal (relating to the manner of offering), but in any case, " the
unbloody immolation is numerically distinct from the bloody immolation, though
the Victim and the Priest are numerically the same in each sacrifice." M. D.
Forrest, M.S. C., Abbot Vonier ind "The Clean Oblation," Emmanuel, 57 (1951),
297, cf. Umberg, ZKT, 52 (1928), 392; the answer of Dom Casel in Jahrbuch fiir
Liturgiewissenschaft, 8 (1928), 220 ff. does not convince, as relates E. Florkowski,
art. cit., p. 244.
67 "Penes
diversitatem esse physici et esse intentionalis."
Fr. Doronzo, De
Eucharistia, 1018; Proceedings, 71.
68 Sess. XIII, cap. l. Den::;;. 874; cf. cap. 3. Denz. 876.

THE ESSENCE OF THE SACRIFICE

OF THE MASS

549

The glorified Christ really present under the visible signs of
bloody death truly offers Himself to God the Father in an
unbloody manner (the unbloody immolation) ; therefore, according to the Council, the Mass is not " an empty commemoration " ("nuda commemoratio ") of the sacrifice of the cross,
Thus, on the one hand, the Council affirms the relation of
the Mass to the sacrifice of the cross, while, on the other hand,
it proclaims the true sacrificial act of the Mass. According to
the Council of Trent, the Mass most probably is both a relative
and an absolute sacrifice. The Mass and the cross are probably,
according to the Council, specifically identical, because the
Priest and the Victim are the same in both sacrifices; but the
numerical identity of both sacrifices finds no expression in the
teaching of the Council.
Writing against the theory of Fr. De La Taille, Fr, Doronzo
says that the De La Taille's view is opposed to the Council of
Trent: " identificatio sacrificii crucis et sacrificii coenae , , . non
videtur congruere doctrinae Concilii Tridentini, explicite distinguentis inter duo sacrificia et oblationes!' 69 On the other
hand, from the teaching of the Council concerning the same
Victim in both sacrifices, Fr. Doronzo concludes: '·It follows
that the two sacrifices are one, since the Victim specifies the
sacrifices, being the thing offered and. immolated!' 70 Are not
these two affirmations contradictory?
The conclusion of Fr, Doronzo cannot be admitted in the
light of the doctrine of the Council of Trent as explained above,
Some theologians admit that the presence of a mysterious and
internal immolation of Christ under visible signs would be in
conformity with the teaching of the Council; but the real
presence of the immolation of the cross in the Mass, although
not directly contrary to the teaching of the Council, finds no
support in the terminology used at the Council. The Council
does not use the word " :repraesentare " in the sense of " making
present."
Likewise, I cannot agree with Fr. Doronzo's interpretation of
69

70

Sess,
cap. l; De Eucharistia, 1015,
Proceedings, 71; De Eucharistia,
1024,

9

550

.ADOLPH TYMCZAK

the following passage in the Catechism of the Council of Trent
" what is performed in the Mass and what is offered on the
cross, is one and the same sacrifice " (Roman Cathechism) .
Neither do I agree with his interpretation of Pope Leo XIII's
statement that the Eucharist " offers not only an empty
similitude and commemoration of the reality (of the sacrifice
of the cross), but the reality itself, although in a different
appearance/' 71
These texts affirm the identity of both sacrifices in the traditional sense, but not their " numerical " identity nor the
identity of the "ratio sacrificii. " The Holy Father stresses the
fact that the Victim is really present in the Mass, hence, the
lvlass is not an empty commemoration of the cross, but he does
not say that the " ratio sacrificii crucis " is present in the Mass.
On the contrary, his expression "specie dissimili" suggests a
difference between the bloody and unbloody immolations asserted by the Council of Trent.
After the Council of Trent, theologians agreed that the Mass
and the Cross were one and the same sacrifice; but they did not
understand it as being numerically one. In spite of numerous
theories, they agreed that the same Victim is in both sacrifices,
although they did not agree on the same immolation. The one
and the same Victim is not multiplied, if the immolation of
the Mass is different from that of the cross, because the Victim
can be immolated in a different manner (or as the Council of
Trent states " sola offerendi ratione diversa ") .
We may put aside the theories which admit a real or virtual
destruction in the Mass. But let us see next how theologians
variously conceived mystical immolation. 72 They wrote of it
l) generally as an unbloody immolation;
2) specifically as the sacramental separation
Tanquerey),

of specxes (BiHot,

71 Epist. and Episcopos Scotiae, cf. De Eucharistia, 1020; Proceedings, 71.
The
conclusion of Fr. Doronzo: "Ergo ipsa veritas, seu ratio sacrificii crucis, constituit
sacrificium missae " does not flow from the quoted texts.
72 Cf. Doronzo, De Eucharistia, 992 f.

THE ESSENCE OF THE SACRIFICE

OF THE MASS

551

3) as the external state of death and destruction (Billot),
4) as the separation of the body and blood of Christ according to
the " esse sacramentale " (Michel, Herve) ,
5) as the sacrificial action which produced the separation of the
body and blood of Christ (Pasqualigo) .

Each of these unbloody immolations essentially represents
(but does not include) the bloody immolation of the cross.
The sacrifice of the Mass, according to Christ's institution,
applies the fruits of the natural sacrifice of the cross.
Some recent theologians state that in the Mass there is the
same immolation which took place on the cross. The Mass rite
offers the Victim that was once immolated on the cross; in other
words, it offers the past immolation of Christ (M. De La
Taille, Chr. Pesch, Lepin). The Benedictine School holds to
the real presence of the immolation of the cross in the Mass. It
teaches that the 1\Iass is the sacramental representation of
Christ's passion on the cross.
Aside from this School, theologians agree, in spite of their
differences, that the immolation of Christ in the Mass is only
figurative and representative; according to others, the immolation is mysterious and internal, but conformed to the glorified
state of Christ in heaven. In this way, modern theologians
continue the tradition of the Fathers and the medieval theologians. The same tradition is continued in the final document
which we shaH now consider.

The encyclical on the sacred liturgy " Mediator Dei " of
Pope Pius XII. This encyclical teaches the same doctrine of
Q.

the Mass as did the Council of Trent to which it refers. This
teaching, viewed in the light of the Tridentine Council, may be
summed up in several points:

a) The relation of the Mass to the sacrifice of the cross.
The Holy Father teaches the fundamental dogma that the Mass
is a relative sacrifice in the traditional sense, namely:
1) It is the representation of the sacrifice of the cross: The

552

ADOLPH TYMCZAK

Mass " represents the bloody sacrifice offered once on the
cross."
2) It is its commemoration: it "perpetuates its memory to
the end of time."
3) It is an application of its fruits: the '' salutary virtue (of
the cross) is applied in remitting of ... sins." 73
The sacrifices of the Mass and the cross are identified because
the same Priest, the same Victim, the same ends and fruits are
in both. " The august sacrifice of the altar is ... a true and
proper act of sacrifice, whereby the High Priest by an unbloody
immolation offers Himself a most acceptable Victim to the
Eternal Father, as He did on the cross." 74
The Holy Father teaches that the Eucharistic sacrifice represents and renews the sacrifice of the cross. 75 The word "repraesentare " used in the encyclical expresses, in conformity with
the Council of Trent, two ideas: the internal identity of both
sacrifices based on the identity of the same Priest, the same
Victim, the same fruits, and the external (symbolical) likeness
of the bloody sacrifice in the Mass, that is, the pictorial representation and not actual reenactment in the sense of " making
present." The arguments for this opinion are as follows:
The Holy Father contrasts, as the Council of Trent does, the
past and unique sacrifice of the cross with the present and
repeated sacrifice of the Mass. He contrasts the bloody death
on the cross with the unbloody immolation in the Mass. The
first belongs to the past, the second exists every day and is
:reconciled with the glorious state of Christ.
b) The differences between the sacrifice of the Mass and
that of the cross: " The manner of offering alone being different." 76 The Holy Father distinguishes between:
73 Acta
Apostolicae Sedis, XXXI (1947), 547. Encyclical Letter "Mediator
Dei" (quoted Enc.), (ed. the America Press, 1948), n. 67; the Council of Trent is
quoted (sess. 1!2. cap. 1) .
74 AAS, 548, Enc. n. 68.
75 Enc., n. 66 f., 164, 205.
76 AAS, 547 f.; Enc., n. 67, 70.

THE ESSENCE OF THE SACRIFICE

OF THE MASS

553

The immolation of the cross and the immolation of the Mass
1. The bloody death,
2. Took place on Calvary,
3. Once on the cross,
4. Christ offered Himself,
5. In His human nature,

6. Separation of His body and
blood.

1. The unbloody immolation,
2. Is repeated in every sacrifice,
3. He daily offers Himself,
4. By the ministry of His priests,
5. Under the external signs,
symbols,
6. The Eucharistic species under
which He is present symbolize the bloody separation of His body and blood.

The nature of the unbloody immolation, according to the

Mediator Dei, may be understood in either one of two senses:
1) Like the Council of Trent, the "Mediator Dei" teaches
that the unbloody immolation of Christ is figurative, yet " no
mere empty commemoration of the passion and death of Jesus
Christ." 77 The immolation does not only consist of the separation of the Eucharistic species; it is real, though mysterious, in
the supernatural order, because" the sacrifice of our Redeemer
is shown forth by external signs, which are symbols of His
death." 78 Christ is the Victim hidden under these symbols:
" Christ is symbolically shown by separate symbols to be in
a state of victimhood." 79
The unbloody immolation constitutes the essential nature of
the Mass: " the Eucharistic sacrifice in its very nature is the
unbloody immolation of the divine Victim, which is made
manifest in a mystical manner by the separation of the sacred
species and by their oblation to the eternal Father." 80
2) The unbloody immolation is identified with that of the

cross, which is repeated in a mysterious, sacramental manner.
Yet the numerical identity of the two sacrifices is not probable,
because it lacks support in the expressions of the encyclical.
The expressions of the Holy Father show much similarity with
those employed in the theory of Pasqualigo and Billot; they
•• AAS, 548, Enc., n. 68.
78 AAS, 548, Enc., n. 70.

7'
80

AAS, 549, Enc., n. 70.
AAS, 563, Enc .. n. 115.

554

ADOLPH

TYMCZAK

indicate that the act of sacrificing is performed " hie et nunc." 81
The encyclical favors rather the opinion that the unbloody
immolation is formally distinct from that of the cross. The
" Mediator Dei " teaches rather the specific identity of the
Mass and the cross.
The encyclical distinguishes between the real presence of the
body and blood of Christ and the symbolism of the passion,
" by the transubstantiation of bread into the body of Christ
and of wine into His blood, His body and blood are both really
present; now the Eucharistic species under which He is present
.1ymbolize the actual separation (cruentam separationem) of
His body and blood." 82
But the theory of Fr. Doronzo confuses the real presence
with the symbolism of the passion, because it conceives both
the body and blood of Christ and His passion as being really
present. According to the " Mediator Dei " (in conformity with
the Council of Trent) "the unbloody immolation at the words
of consecration, when Christ is made present upon the altar in
the state of a victim, is performed by the visible priest and by
him alone as the representative of Christ." He offers the divine
Victim. 83
According to Dom Casel, the priest consecrating does not
primarily offer, but only places the condition necessary for the
presence of the act of offering; consecrating, however, the
priest unites himself mystically with the present Offerer of
Calvary and thus co-offers with Christ. Likewise Fr. Doronzo
gives the answer. But if sacramental separation considered
formally, as Fr. Doronzo teaches, 84 is only the condition of the
81 The same interpretation
cf. M. D. Forrest, art cit., Emmanuel, 57 (1951),
E. Masure, Le sacrifice du corps mystique, p. 31; B. Kloppenburg, 0. F. M., who
writes that the Mass is the sacrifice specifically identical with the sacrifice of the
cross; but the Mass as the act of the whole Mystical Body is specifically different.
The encyclical "Mediator Dei " seems to be opposed to the sacramental theory of
Dom Casel. "A controversia sobre a teoria do Misterio," Revista eccl. Brasileira,
11 (1951),
according to a note in Ephemerides theologicae Lovanie:nses, 28
146.
82 AAS, 548, Enc., n. 70; cf. E. Doronzo, De Eucharistia, 1017; Proceedings, 74.
88 AAS, 555, Enc., n.
•• Proceedings, 75, 76; De Euchamtia, 1031 ff.

THE ESSENCE OF THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS

555

Eucharistic sacrifice and does not enter in its essence, then the
priest, contrary to the encyclical, performs only the condition
of the sacrifice and not the sacrifice itself.
Finally, it may be noted that Pius XII more than the Council
of Trent stresses the social character of the sacrifice of the
Mass, in which all the faithful cooperate and participate as
priests and victims: " Together with Him and through Him
Jet them make their oblation and in union with Him let them
offer themselves." This important element will be presented in
the future in a separate article.
CoNCLUSION

In opposition to the interpretation of the Benedictine School,
such is my understanding of the pertinent documents of the
Church; this interpretation is in conformity with the views of
other theologians who have criticized this School. Although
the Benedictine theory may be defended as not being contrary
to the Church documents, it is not traditional. It is contrary
to the traditional view which does not affirm the real presence
of the death of Christ on the cross in the Eucharist. As Fr.
Doronzo himself states, the traditional view speaks of the
symbolic representation of the bloody death of Christ and of
the real presence of the body and blood of Christ in the
Eucharist. The traditional view does not teach the presence of
two Christs in the Eucharist, that is, the suffering Christ (vi
sacramenti) and the glorified Christ (vi concomitantiae).
Neither the fact of representation of the cross in the Mass,
nor the identity of the same Victim and the merits in both
sacrifices proves their numerical identity nor the repetition " in
esse reali " of the immolation of the cross in the Mass, notwithstanding the opinion of Fr. Doronzo. 85 The sacrifice of the
cross does not need to be repeated; only its fruits are applied.
•• " This is what all Tradition summarized in its constant and emphatic assertion
that the Mass is a representation, nay a repetition of the sacrifice of the cross."
Proceedings, 76.
Fr. Doronzo does not admit the distinction between the immolation of the cross
and the immolation of the Mass, except in their manner of existence. According

556

ADOLPH TYMCZAK

Although these arguments are not complete and may be
developed further, they show that the theory of F:t;. Doronzo
has no foundation in tradition nor any basis in the " Mediator
Dei." Fr. J?oronzo's theory is open to grave objections in
common with the Benedictine theory; it is liable to even greater
difficulties on those points where it departs from the Benedictine theory, even though it uses its terminology.
Fr. Doronzo closes the presentation of his theory with the
words: "Our explanation has been, after all, only a theological
circumlocution of the essence of the sacrifice of the Mass," 86
because "we can never solve or properly explain the mystery,
for the Eucharist is fully a mystery." 87
I agree with this assertion. I would like, however, to add,
that Fr. Doronzo's circumlocution seems at times to be mere
tautology and involves a contradiction. The end of theological
to him, the oblation and the immolation of the cross are really (in esse reali)
contained in the Mass in the following ways:
l. in a representative

way.
. ." in esse repraesentativo,"
" in esse relat.ivo,"
2. in a relative way. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. in a vicarious way.
. . . . . . ........ " in esse vicariali,"
. in esse obiectivo,"
4. in an objective way. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. in an intentional way. . . . .
. .. "in esse intentionali,"
6. in a cognitive (intelligible) way .......... "in esse cognitivo (intelligibili) ,"
7. in a terminative order.
. ..... "in esse terminativo,"
8. in the order of finality. . . . .
. .... " in esse finali,"
9. in the order of mediation ................. "in esse mediationis
l 0. in the order of sacrificial.
. " in esse activo-sacrificali," 01:
action. . . . . .
. "in esse oblativo et immolativo,"
11. in a sacramental way. . . . . .
. .... " in esse sacramentali."
H

The sacramental separation formally considered " is nothing else than the selfsame sacrifice of the cross (the same immolation and the same offering) repeated
and re-acted in another way, i.e., "non in esse et modo absoluto," but "in esse et
modo relativo, vicario, obiectivo, intentionali." Proceedings, 75; other expressions
cf. bid., 72, 73, 74, 76, 81; De Eucharistia, 1017 1026 f. This collection of expressions
of different meaning cannot but create confusion, as :Fr. W. Jasinski, professor of
SS. Cyril and Methodius Seminary, Orchard Lake, Mich., observed during the
discussion at the convention at the University of Notre Dame. Can a theory which
creates such confusion be true? Some of these expressions are traditional (esse
repraesentativum); others are misleading (esse intentionale, cognitivum) and justly
invite criticism; still others require explanation (esse oblativum, immolativum,
activo-sacrificale).
•• Ibid.
•• Ibid., 77.

THE ESSENCE OF THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS

557

speculation is not to solve a mystery, but to explain what may
be explained and to show that we cannot go further in the
explanation of a mystery, precisely because what is being considered is a mystery. The theory of Fr. Doronzo does not
explain even what can be explained. And therefore, Fr. Doronzo
has rightly " stressed the necessity of inquiring ho'v the Mass is
an immolation or destruction besides being an oblation," 88
because, as one critic observed, "the theory in its core defies
clarification." 89
ADOLPH TYMCZAK

Immaculate Heart Seminary
El Cajon, California

88 Ibid., 81.
•• C. DeMuth, S. J., Theological Stud1es, lO (l949), 126.

THE IMPACT OF THEOLOGY

O

F all the ecclesiastical disciplines with which students for
the priesthood are to be imhued during their course of
studies, Sacred Theology holds the first place, both by
long-standing custom and by positive law. The other disciplines
are ordered to preparation for, completion or application of it;
(and in point of fact) it is apportioned many scholastic hours
in the program of studies. It is truly the center of ecclesiastical
studies in the Catholic Church. For this reason it has been
hailed over the past centuries as the Queen of all the sciences,
a higher science being inconceivable, since it is the science of
God under the " ratio " of God. It is a science which is taught
by God, teaches God and leads to God, according to the author
of the Summa Theologiae which is attributed to Alexander of
Hales; 1 a science of the Most High and from the highest, as St.
Thomas Aquinas remarks. 2
Now Natural Theology, which is the summit and goal of
all the sciences of the natural order, is without doubt about
the highest things, since it attains to God, Who is the highest
of all things that are and that can be known, Who is, to use the
words of the Vatican Council, " ineffably exalted above all
things which exist apart from Him and can be conceived." 3
Yet it does not proceed from the highest but from the lowest
things, since in this Theology He is known from creatures, as a
cause from effects. But on the other hand, Sacred Theology
attains to God and to divine things, and according to the proper
" ratio " of divine things, from the highest and divine things,
that is, from God Himself speaking of Himself and revealing
Himself to us, Whom we believe, by the gift of this same God,
Ed. Quaracchi, l9fl4: I, n °. fl, p. 3, ad objecta.
ad l.
• ln Boet. de Trin., q.
• Denz. no. l78fl.

1

558

THE IMPACT OF THEOLOGY

559

with a divine and supernatural faith. As a result of this, Sacred
Theology is of the highest and from the highest things in the
full, perfect and absolute sense, and not in a relative sense, as
is the case with Natural Theology.
Yet this Queen has at all times suffered critical reproaches
corresponding to the culture, difficulties and problems of different ages or different men. But aU are reduced to two chief
points: its scientific or intellectual value, and its vital or affective value. For, at times it is charged with a lack of scientific
vigor and precision, even with being excessive; and at times
with a lack of vitality and practicality, often with an excess of
the same.
There have been those who considered Mathematics or
Formal Logic or Metaphysics to be the ideal of science. Not
finding in Sacred Theology the rigor and evidence of the
mathematical sciences, nor the classifications, definitions and
syllogisms of Fonnal Logic, nor the demonstrative rigor of
Metaphysics working and speculating on necessary matter, they
have accused Sacred Theology of a mutilated scientific speculative precision, as if it were too practical, or too vague, o:r even
too positive.
Contrariwise, some who were eminent in historical culture or
learning, and who thus conceived the perfect science only as
historical or even as related to every type of erudition, have
accused Sacred Theology of a deficiency in learning, history and
the evaluation of sources, doctrines, systems and arguments,
and also of excessive speculation under the fonn of mathematicism, logicism or metaphysicism. Thus, they say, the scholastic theology of certain periods and of many theologians, rather
than being a science of God from God, has turned out to be a
logic or a metaphysics, the occasion for this being the supernatural truths revealed by God, and this according to the image
of a deductive science which they term W oHiian. And these in
turn charge those theologians who give themselves to positive
or historical theology with a theology reduced to a pure and
unsullied history or criticism, which collects the opinions and

THE IMPACT OF THEOLOGY

561

as it has been handed down in the Church for many centuries,
ought to be reformed at its very roots. For according to them it
is completely out of touch with and incapable of being in touch
with present realities, since the whole science depends on
Aristotelian or Scholastic philosophy which has long since been
rejected and consigned to oblivion. For example, the notions of
relation, person and nature, which are employed to explain the
dogmas of the Trinity and the Incarnation, are today wholly
to be rejected, for they seem absurd to modern philosophers.
This likewise holds for the notions of substance and accident,
which are used to explain the dogma of the Eucharist. Nothing
is absolutely true, nor is the mind of man able to grasp the
essences of things. And Metaphysics, whether it be called
Ontology or Theodicy, is wholly inaccessible to us. Accordingly,
since Sacred Theology, as it is commonly taught, acknowledges
the worth and truth of Metaphysics, there is no one who is
blind to the need for a radical change. To be sure, it was strong
and flourishing in its own day, namely, in ancient and medieval
times, for then notions of this type were admitted; but today it
retains only an historical and archaeological value.
Thus it should be adapted to modern ways, not only by
assuming current terms or modes of speech so that it might
appear to us and be presented to our contemporaries in modern
dress, but especially by taking over the sense and mentality of
present-day philosophies, for instance, of vitalism or existentialism; yet not in such a way that it will definitively hold on to
them always-for nothing is absolutely valid and :fixed,-but
here and now in this actual moment of human culture, being
at the same time disposed and prepared to take on new forms
as they appear in the course of time. For life should always
be actual and constantly renewed; what has already passed is
dead and buried. In like manner, in order that Sacred Theology be living and in touch with current reality, and not dead
or wasting away with old age, it should be suited to the actual
moment of human culture and be constantly renewed with it.
What then is to be thought of all this? Must it be said of
Sacred Theology that it falls short of satisfying the mind and

SANTIAGO

RAMIREZ

heart of man, that it is incapable of solving the fundamental
problems of human life? And as a consequence of this, is
Theology continually to be reformed in accordance with the
circumstances of men and times so as to be suited to the life
and evolutions of humanity? Finally, has Theology a value
and truth which is absolute, fixed and valid for every time and
every circumstance of life? Or is it rather to be said that it is
accompanied by merely a relative validity and a truth shifting,
flexible and variable in relation to the changeableness and perpetual upheaval of life itself?
To be sure, it can hardly be denied that some defects have
crept into the study of Theology or that it contains many
difficulties. But other sciences experience similar troubles, each
in its own sphere. How many difficulties arise from epistomology, history, methodology, the refinement of concepts and
the coordination of parts, from hypotheses and theories, and
applications! Is it any wonder, then, that they are found in a
science so arduous, lofty and universal as Sacred Theology?
But if the matter is closely examined, in Sacred Theology
such difficulties are not only held within just bounds, but are
easily dissipated. In the first place, faults of this type-if some
in fact exist, redound to particular theologians who do not
measure up to their office, and not on Theology itself. Secondly,
the above-mentioned accusations and charges, or other similar
ones, proceed from a somewhat imaginary and false notion of
Sacred Theology, and thus should be made their own best
refutation.
Sacred Theology is not a science which is univocal with other
sciences of the natural order, which are discovered and developed by the light of natural reason alone, but it differs from
them entirely, as St. Thomas says/ and transcends them in a
marvelous way, more than Metaphysics with respect to the
other natural sciences; yet it does agree with them analogically.
For it does not proceed from experience and abstraction, as do
the natural sciences, but from grace and divine revelation; nor
• Summa Theologiae, I, q. l, a. l, ad 2.

THE IMPACT OF THEOLOGY

563

are its primary and proper principles detected and formulated
by the light of natural reason alone, as happens in the other
sciences, but they are received by supernatural faith from God
revealing them.
Sacred Theology is divine faith seeking an understanding of
those things which are received and held by faith itself; and to
this end it summons all the powers of the soul and uses them
as means and as instruments.
Thus two things necessarily concur in our Sacred Theology:
the light or divine revelation and of faith from on high, and the
natural light of natural reason from below; the former as principal cause, the latter as a secondary and instrumental cause;
divine faith as the master, natural reason as a servant.
For as grace does not destroy nature but presupposes and
uses it for the attainment of the proper end of grace, and not
as the mistress but as the handmaid of grace, so also the infused, and especially the theological virtues act with respect to
the natural potencies or powers of the soul. Thus charity presupposes the human will in which it is received, and perfects
and elevates it and uses its naturally good movements to attain
its proper object. The same is true of divine faith with regard
to the intellect in which it is received, for it supposes its natural
light and elevates, perfects, completes and uses it to attain
more fully the proper object of faith.
Accordingly, two lights necessarily come to bear in Sacred
Theology, as it is in us: the supernatural light of faith descending from on high, and the natural light of our reason ascending
from below. Yet not in an equal degree, but the supernatural
is prior and principal, the natural comes after and is instrumental; the former as ruling, the latter as serving; the one
showing the way, the other following; as two causes essentially
subordinated, and not merely juxtaposed or coordinated.
From this essential subordination there results a light of a
unique kind which is called theological light, partly supernatural and partly natural: supernatural radically and by
origin, natural entitatively and formally, although its natural

564

SANTIAGO

RAMIREZ

aspect is not of the same nature as the naturalness of the light
of the natural sciences, but is by far of a greater dignity, being
purified and certified by the supernatural light of faith.
Moreover, the chief element for consideration in the nature
of this light and habit is that which is from above and comes
from above, not that which comes from below and is taken
from below; for the former is the more important and predominant and is the formal element, while the latter is secondary, subservient and is the material element. This is not
surprising, for in the causal connection of principal and instrumental cause, or of subordinating and subordinated cause, the
principal and subordinating causes possess the principal roles,
the secondary and subordinated causes the secondary and
dependent roles. For the instrumental power reaches down to
the instrumental cause from the principal cause which lays
hold of, elevates, perfects and applies the instrument to produce, together with itself, the proper effect of the principal
cause. And the instrument produces this effect by exercising
its proper power, in that it is a definite thing; just as a saw, by
cutting a board or plank by its proper power and the sharpness
of its teeth, artificially produces the desired cutting under the
positive direction, influence and application of the carpenter.
Now that which comes from above is the light of faith, which
is a certain formal participation of the divine truth supernaturally revealing itself. Moreover this truth exteriorly revealing itself to us is the same as the very truth of the divine
intellect, either divine science or wisdom, which is appropriated
to the divine Word and is most fully contained in Him.
But the divine intellect and divine science and divine wisdom
and divine truth and the divine Word expressing and speaking
it transcend all the differences and all the modes and all the
categories-speculative
and practical, theoretical and positive,
intellectual and vital-of the lower order, and yet contain them
all to a very eminent degree. For divine knowledge is neither
abstract nor barren, but is most real and comprehensive and
necessarily spirates love, just as the divine Word together with
the Father necessarily spirates the subsisting and personal Love

THE IMPACT OF THEOLOGY

565

Who is the very Person of the Holy Spirit, and Who for this
reason is in the fullest sense the Word of life, the most vital
and most affective Word.
In a like manner then, the knowledge of faith is at once both
eminently speculative and practical, intellectual and vital,
being in the category of contemplation and affection, as though
naturally demanding love in the will. This is especially apparent in the light of glory, which will supplant faith in heaven,
for all at once and in a more eminent way it is more illuminating
than faith; and it rectifies and directs the appetite in a more
compelling way than prudence does. Thus in its own way, yet
truly and most really, conditions of this type are shared by
the habit of Sacred Theology, which, to use the words of St.
Thomas, " bears, as it were, the stamp of the divine science,
which is one and simple, yet extends to everything." 5 Hence
that sublime saying of the Angelic Doctor:
the knowledge of God which is had. through the other sciences
enlightens the intellect alone, in showing that God is the First
Cause, that He is one, intelligent and so on; but the knowledge of
God which is had through faith, both illumines the intellect and
delights the affections, for it does not only tell that God is the
First Cause, but that He is our Savior, that He is our Redeemer,
that He loves us, that He became incarnate for us, all of which
inflame the affections. 6

And again:
the doctrine of Sacred Scripture has this characteristic, that in it
the matter is not proposed merely for speculation, as in Geometry,
but also for assent by the will. . . . Thus in other sciences it
suffices that man be perfected with respect to his intellect; but in
this it is required that he be perfected with respect to his intellect
and his will . ... And because what is treated in Sacred Scripture
(and in Sacred Theology) pertains to the will and not just to the
intellect, man should accordingly be perfect in both faculties. 7

Such perfection and elevation of this divine and principal
Summa Theol., I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2.
11 ad 001"., c. 2, lect. 8.
• Ad Hebr., c. I, lect. 2.
6
6

10

566

SANTIAGO

RAMIREZ

theological light require and postulate all the cognoscitive
powers of our soul in accordance with all the sciences which
have a relation with it, and it supposes these powers as adapted
and elevated under the direction of this light. For when we say
that in Sacred Theology the natural reason is subservient to
faith, natural reason is to be understood according to its full
vigor, and as enriched with every type of knowledge; and thus
with justice does St. Thomas say that all sciences serve Sacred
Theology, and that it partakes something of them all. "Since
the end of all philosophy is beneath the end of theology and
ordered to it, theology should command all the other sciences
and use what is treated in them." 8 It is served by sciences of
words, actions and things: "Theology, inasmuch as it is the
principal one of all the sciences, possesses in itself something o1
all the sciences; and thus it considers not only things, but the
meanings of words, for the attainment of salvation requires not
only faith concerning the truth of things, but also a vocal confession by words." 9 It is especially Ethics and Theodicy that
are closely connected with Theology, as Pius XII teaches in the
Encyclical Humani Generis.10
these are to be employed as means and as auxiliaries, and
not as the end nor as dominating. Yet it remains necessary
to uncover the divine truth which is under figures, and to penetrate it as much as is possible for us; this end is forwarded to
a great extent through the purifying of words and of concepts
according to the method of analogy which is transcendental and
even ultra-metaphysical in character. As a result of such procedure, theological speculation is on a far higher level than
philosophical, and transcends it more than does metaphysical
speculation that of the other sciences, just as the activity demanded by Theology is more sublime and profound than
merely ethical or natural activity. For as grace is of immeasurably greater dignity and sublimity than nature, so supernatural
8

I Sent., Prol., a. 1, c. in fine.

Ibid., d. 22, expos. textus.
10 Humani Generis, AAS, 42 (1950), 575.
9

THE IMPACT OF THEOLOGY

567

morality and life is of far greater dignity and sublimity than
the natural.
And thus it is that Sacred Theology, of all human sciences,
is at once the most cognoscitive and the most vital and affective; and not by a separation and multiplication of parts but by
its eminent unity, in line with the dictum: unified strength is
stronger. For as faith and piety and charity are useful for
everything which leads to eternal life, so also is Sacred Theology. But the phrase "for everything pertaining or leading
to eternal life " is to be insisted on, for of itself Theology does
not care about the other temporal and particular matters of
this present life. And neither should Theology be asked for
the solutions of all human questions,-questions of economics,
of bodily health, or of the construction of a house or machine.
For what the man of faith believes and hopes and follows after
by love, this alone Theology explains, and, strictly speaking,
nothing else. And, properly speaking, he hopes for and seeks
from God eternal and not temporal life, not the passing goods
of the present life except to the extent that they are of service
for gaining eternal and permanent goods, as is stated in the
Collect of the Third Sunday after Pentecost: " 0 God, the
protector of all that trust in thee; without whom nothing is
strong, nothing holy, increase and multiply upon us thy mercy,
that thou being our ruler and guide, we may so pass through
things temporal, that we may finally not lose the things
eternaL"
Therefore Sacred Theology under faith has the same validity
as faith itself; and according as it depends on and is derived
from faith, to this extent it is as firm and permanent as faith
itself. Nor need it be suited to the changing opinions of men
and times, but rather the converse, for the truth of faith does
not depend on man but on God. And God's knowledge, which
faith shares, is not caused by created things, but rather is their
cause.
It is also false that the human mind is unequal to the attainment of objective truth or the essences of things, for being is

568

SANTIAGO

RAMIREZ

its proper object, and no faculty can be stripped of its natural
power of really and truly attaining its object, without by this
very fact ceasing to be such a faculty. Thus being and the
attributes identified actually with it, on which are immediately
founded the first principles of reason, namely, the principles of
contradiction, identity, sufficient reason and causality, are
necessarily present to our intellect and are necessarily and
truly attained by it.
This is likewise true of the notions of substance and accident,
absolute and relative, nature and person, which do not come
properly from Aristotle or the Scholastics, but from the native
power of the human intellect, which is the root and origin of
perennial philosophy.
Accordingly, Sacred Theology does not accept these notions
as pertaining to this or that philosophical school, nor as flourishing in a certain specified moment of time, but rather as they are
the natural heritage of the human mind, of which it can never
be defrauded, since they necessarily accompany it. Therefore
they are good for all times and retain their significance even
today.
Another and far greater reason, as Pius XII points out, is
that notions of this type were not only employed by the Ecumenical Councils, but also sanctioned by them, so that it is
wrong to depart from them.
Hence to neglect, or to reject, or to devalue so many and such
great resources which have been conceived, expressed and perfected so often by the age-old work of men endowed with no
common talent and holiness, working under the vigilant supervision
of the holy magisterium and with the light and leadership of the
Holy Ghost in order to state the truths of faith ever more accurately, to do this so that these things may be replaced by conjectural notions and by some formless and unstable tenets of a new
philosophy, tenets which, like the flowers of the field, are in
existence today and die tomorrow; this is supreme imprudence and
something that would make dogma itself a reed shaken by the
wind. The contempt for terms and notions habitually used by
scholastic theologians leads of itself to the weakening of what
they call speculative theology, a discipline which these men

THE IMPACT OF THEOLOGY

569

consider devoid of true certitude because it is based on theological
reasoning. 12

This, then, is the supernatural and divine spirit which is
always to be retained and insisted on in Sacred Theology. The
latter's knowledge is to be resolyed to the superior science of
God and the blessed, to which it is subordinate, rather than
to natural truths or the natural light of reason, which cooperate
merely dispositively and instrumentally in approximately the
same way as our senses cooperate in intellectual knowledge, yet
really and truly in each case. When Theology is correctly developed, it offers the true and real solution for all the difficulties and problems of human life; it is not a solution of itself
natural and superficial, as many lacking the sense of Christ
are seeking, but supernatural and profound, since it is the
solution which God Himself gives in His ineffable and most
wise Providence, which is searchable by no man.
SANTIAGO RAMIREZ,

Conve:nto de San Esteban
Salamanca, Spain

11

Humam Generis.

0. P.

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS
MosT REVEREND JoHN J. WRIGHT, Bishop of the Diocese of Worcester,
Mass., Episcopal Chairman of The Mariological Society of America,
noted lecturer and writer, has been constant in his promotion of
Marian studies and devotion in this country.
THOMAS U. MuLLANEY, 0. P., S. T. Lr., S. T. D., Professor of Dogmatic
Theology at the Dominican House of Studies, Washington, D. C.,
is one of the foremost lecturers and writers in Marian Theology
in the United States.
P. DE LETTER, S. J., S. T. D., is Professor of Dogmatic Theology at St.
Mary's College, Kurseong, India. He is a frequent contributor to
theological and spiritual publications.
GEORGE C. REILLY, 0. P., Ph. D., is Associate Professor of Philosophy at
The Catholic University of America.
ADOLPH TYMCZAK received his doctorates in Theology and Philosophy from
the Collegio Angelicum in Rome. He
taught in seminaries and universities in his native Poland. In this country since
1946, he has taught Dogmatic Theology at SS. Cyril and Methodius
Seminary, Orchard Lake, Mich., and presently at the Immaculate
Heart Seminary, El Cajon, Calif. He has published several books
and articles on theological subjects, chiefly in Polish.
SANTIAGO RAMiREZ, 0. P., S. T. M., Regent of Studies and Praeses of the
Pontifical Faculty of Theology at the Dominican House of Studies,
Salamanca, Spain, enjoys a world-wide reputation as a foremost
Thomist. He previously published in THE THOMIST " The Authority
of St. Thomas Aquinas " (Jan. 1952) .
JAMES M. EGAN, 0. P., S. T. Lr., S. T. D., formerly Professor of Theology
at the Collegio Angelicum, Rome, and frequent contributor to THE
THOMIST, is Professor of Theology at Mary grove College, Monroe
Campus, Monroe, Michigan.
THOMAS R. HEATH, 0. P., S. T. Lr., S. T. L., is Professor of Theology at
Trinity College, Washington, D. C.
ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, J. U. D., Ph. D., S. J.D., is the author of
numerous articles in legal, historical and philosophical journals. He
is a member of the Graduate School and the Medieval Institute at
Notre Dame University, Indiana.
AMl3ROSE J. McNrcHOLL, 0. P., S. T. Lr., Ph. D., frequent contributor to
THE THOMIST and other journals, is Professor of Philosophy at the
Collegio Angelicum, Rome.

570

BOOK REVIEWS
The Theology of Paul Tillich. Library of Living Theology, Vol. I. Edited
by C. W. Kegley and R. W. Bertell. New York: Macmillan,
Pp. 384 with index. $5.50.
Systematic Theology: I. By Paul Tillich. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1951. Pp. 300 with index. $5.00.
What Present-Day Theologians are Thinking. By D. D. Williams. New
York: Harper, 1952. Pp. 158 with index. $2.00.
The Theology of Paul Tillich has been chosen to inaugurate a series of
volumes on outstanding contemporary theologians, similar in purpose and
outline to the series on contemporary philosophers: The Library of Living
Philosophers. The present editors give credit to Professor P. A. Schlipp,
who inaugurated the philosophical series. They have the same ideas in
mind: " To devote each volume in the series to the thinking of a single
living philosopher and to include in each: (l) an intellectual autobiography;
(2) essays on different aspects of the man's work, written by various
scholars: (3) a "Reply to his critics" by the philosopher himself; and
(4) a complete bibliography of his writings to date .... Our aim is to do
for present-day theology what he has done and is continuing to do so
well for present day philosophy " (pp. vii-viii).
Certainly no one will deny that the choice of Paul Tillich was a happy
one with which to inaugurate this series on present-day theologians. While
Tillich is, perhaps, not as well known as some other contemporary Protestant theologians, his extraordinary exposition of a systematic theology is a
vital influence on the contemporary scene. Reviewing the work of Paul
Tillich will always be a pleasure, especially to a Thomist, for he explicitly
intends to present theology systematically and utilizes in its service the
insights of a philosophy and the vast information contained in other human
disciplines. Several of the authors in the first volume make mention of the
relationship between Thomistic and Tillichian theology: Paul Tillich
himself makes occasional reference to St. Thomas. However, as we shall see,
the Thomist must also be on his gu;trd against such superficial links.
In his autobiographical reflections Paul Tillich reveals certain influences
on his development which should be kept in mind by a reader of his works.
He was born in a village in the province of Brandenburg, at the Silesian
border. His father was a minister of the Prussian Territorial Church. His
early years were dominated by the stringent discipline of such an environment. Nevertheless, he confesses to a "romantic" trend in his feeling and
thinking. This romanticism manifests itself in his relationship to nature

571

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and to history. As far as nature is concerned, he points out that: "It is
theologically formulated in my doctrine of the participation of nature in
the doctrine of fall and salvation." This is one of the most important and
valuable aspects of Tillich's thought. His interest in history and his
acquaintance with it is, as he admits, the inspiration for his notion of
"theonomy ": "Without this influence I certainly would not have conceived of the idea of theonomous periods in the past and of a new theonomy
in the future." Tillich admits that he had a difficult time breaking through
the restrictive pressure of his environment and especially of his father's
authority; nevertheless, he found one point at which resistance was possible.
He says: "In the tradition of classical orthodoxy my father loved and
used philosophy, convinced that there can be no conflict between a true
philosophy and revealed truth. The long philosophical developments which
ensued belonged to the most happy instances of a positive relation to my
father. Nevertheless, in these discussions the breakthrough occurred. From
an independent philosophical position a state of independence spread out
in all directions, theoretically first, practically, later." (p. 8)
One other point made by Tillich should be of interest to his readers. He
points out that in Europe there was a special tension between the humanist
and the religious traditions; he himself became keenly conscious of this
tension but solved it for himself in a way that becomes a basic outlook in
all his writings. "The problem of the humanistic education is in its
relation to the religious tradition which, even without a special religious
instruction is omnipresent in history, art and literature. Whereas in the
United States the basic spiritual conflict is that between religion and
scientific naturalism, in Europe the religious and humanistic traditions (of
which the scientific world view is only a part) have been ever since the
Rennaissance in continuous tension. . . . The result of this tension was
either a decision against the one side or the other, or a general scepticism,
or a split consciousness which brought one to attempt to overcome the
conflict constructively. The latter way, the way of synthesis, was my own
way." (p. 10)
Following the "
Reflections," come the " Essays of
Interpretation and Criticism of the Work of Paul Tillich." There are
fourteen of these essays and the editors had no difficulty in choosing as
topics for them the outline of Tillich's own Systematic Theology. It
should be noted that while only the first volume of this systematic presentation of Tillich's doctrine has been published, the writers of the various
essays had at their disposal the outlines for the second volume used by
Tillich in his classes. From their references to these notes, it is clear that
the second volume of Systematic Theology will reveal more clearly than
the first the definitive thought of Tillich on Christ and His Church.
The first three essays in this section c6ncem themselves with the significance of Tillich in contemporary theology, in his relation to secular culture,

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and for the situation in Germany. The following essays treat of the method
and structure of Tillich's theology: his doctrine on man, his ontology,
and his doctrine on God. Then follow essays on his epistemology, his relation to biblical thought, his Christology and his view of the Church. The
final essays are on his interpretation of history and his doctrine of
religious socialism.
The final pages of the volume are devoted to Tillich's reply to his
critics. He gratefully considers some of the, criticisms that have been
against his theology by the writers of the essays. An extensive
bibliography of Tillich's writings up to 1952 brings the volume to a close.
The systematic character of Tillich's thought can be easily seen from
a glance at the Table of Contents in the first volume of his major work.
At least half of the volume is devoted to methodological questions. A long
Introduction presents a careful discussion of the nature, organization,
method and structure of a systematic theology. Part I is devoted to a
lengthy discussion on reason and revelation: on " Reason and the Quest
for Revelation " and on the " Reality of Revelation." Part II, entitled
"Being and God," brings the reader into the heart of Tillich's theology.
Even here the systematic intent is quite clear, for the author feels the
need of clarifying his ontology before approaching the question of the reality
of God. In the final section of this second part, on the " Reality of God,"
it becomes quite clear that for a final judgment on Tillich's position,
especially in regard to the mystery of the Trinity, we must await the
Christological doctrine of the second volume.
As an example of Tillich's careful systematic thought we shall follow
his presentation of his own concept of the theological task. He says:
"Theology, as a function of the Christian Church, must serve the needs
of the Church. The theological system is supposed to satisfy two basic
needs: the statement of the truth of the Christian message and the interpretation of this truth for every new generation. Theology moves back
and forth between two poles, the eternal truth of its foundation and the
temporal situation in which the eternal truth must be received." (p. 8)
" Message " and " Situation " are the two poles, both of which should be
embraced by every vital theology. "Situation," Tillich insists, does not
refer merely to the psychological or sociological state in which individuals
or groups happen to live: " It refers to the scientific and artistic, the
economic, political and ethical forms in which they express their interpretation of existence. (p. 8-4) This broad and valid concept of the " Situation " explains Tillich's preoccupation with the vast field of human culture.
He goes on to point out that theological orthodoxy in Europe and
fundamentalism in America failed to make contact with the present
" situation " for fear of weakening the revealed message. This is not quite
so true of "kerygmatic" theology, which certainly emphasizes the unchangeable truth of the message over against the changing demands of the

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situation. Nevertheless in both cases there is this emphasis on the eternal
truth and a considerable neglect of the situation. On the other hand,
apologetic theology tries to answer the questions implied in the situation
in the power of the eternal message and with the means proved by the
situation whose questions it answers. Kerygmatie theologians have a
profound distrust of apologetic methods, because, as they say, in order to
answer a question one must have something in common with the one who
asks it. But to embrace a common ground with those outside the theological circle frequently waters down the message, as history testifies.
Tillich tries to assume a middle position. "Kerygmatic theology," he
insists, " must give up its exclusive transcendence and take seriously the
attempt of apologetic theology to answer the questions put before it by the
contemporary situation. On the other hand, apologetic theology must heed
the warnings implied in the existence and the claim of kerygmatic theology.
It loses itself if it is not based on the ' Kerygma ' as the substance and the
criterion of each of its statements." (p. 7) Tillich characterizes his own
theology as a " method of correlation ": " The following system is an
attempt to use the ' method of correlation ' as a way of uniting message
and situation. It tries to correlate the questions implied in the situation
with the answers implied in the message. It does not derive the answers
from the questions, as a self-defying apologetic theology does. Nor does
it elaborate answers without relating them to the questions, as a selfdefying kerygmatic theology does. It
questions and answers,
situation and message, human existence and divine manifestations." (p. 8)
It would not be an oversimplification to say that it is reason which asks
the questions and revelation that gives the answers. Yet Tillich distinguishes "controlling reason" from "receiving reason." "Controlling
reason " is technical reason, which has vast competence in the exact
sciences, but has no business in the sphere of ultimate concern. " Receiving
reason " alone has competence where it is question of ultimate concern.
Even here its competence is stringently limited by Tillich: it is competent
to recognize its own inadequacy and to formulate questions that only
revelation can answer.
It is not surprising that Tillich's references to St. Thomas should be
most frequent when he is discussing the correlation of reason and revelation. In his essay on "Tillich's Doctrine of Man," in The Theology of
Paul Tillich, David E. Roberts points out the contrast between Tillich
and Thomism and, I believe, it is a fair statement of Tillich's mind.
"Tillich's rejection of the Thomist solution, which in a sense stands between
the two opposed camps just discussed, can be indicated quite briefly.
Where he regards the positive link between the divine and the human as
furnishing the possibilities for a correlation between questions and answers,
Thomism tries to regard it as furnishing a basis for two sets of answersnatural and revealed theology. Tillich denies (a) that natural theology

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can furnish answers, and (b) that the answers of revelation are supernatural truths." (p. 113)
What Tillich seems to overlook in his judgment of St. Thomas (in his
Systematic Theology he manifests no more profound understanding of
Thomism than could be gathered from reading a History of Philosophy) ,
is that St. Thomas carefully delimits the scope of the answers that reason
can give to questions raised by man's historical state. A reading of the
early chapters of the Second Book of the Contra Gentiles, an acquaintance
with St. Thomas' handling of the question of the natural desire of man for
the vision of God and of what reason can glean from the experience of
human life without the revelation of original sin, would convince Tillich
that St. Thomas was quite aware of the questions reason may ask, but
not answer.
It may come as a surprise that a Christian theologian should repudiate
the supernatural character of God's gift of eternal life. Here again the
reader is forced to wonder whether his rejection is based on complete
understanding. In his essay on "Tillich's View of the Church," in The
Theology of Paul Tillich, Nels F. S. Ferre criticises this aspect of Tillich's
thought: "If Tillich can be counted ontologically as thoroughly within the
Christian perspective, he must be ranked as one of our greatest Christian
thinkers. Unfortunately, there are grave doubts on this point, which he is
now, however, free to clear up in his own reply. Does he actually operate
within the transcendental perspective, rather than within the transcendent?
His refusal to accept the great, immemorial Christian perspective of supernaturalism at least seems to convince us of this, whatever his use of
occasional words may be. Is God, in fact, the Creator of process, and in
this sense, above, before, and behind it? Is He personal Spirit in the sense
of a separate consciousness and an eternal being, beyond all created
beings . . . Is supernaturalism, defined in this sense, to be taken as normative, including secondarily all truth of naturalism, or are both to be
transcended in terms of some formal realm of meaning, or in terms of
some relation of being and the abyss to which we can refer finally only
in terms of myth and symbol? " (pp. 362-363)
In his "Reply," Mr. Tillich reaffirms his anti-supernaturalism. "I still
hold emphatically to this position which could be called self-transcending
or ecstatic naturalism. Mr. Ferre is afraid that this attitude makes my idea
of God transcendental instead of transcendent, that it prevents a genuine
doctrine of incarnation, that it implies the negation of personal immortality, that it evaporates the independent character of the Church, that it
denies a realistic eschatology. He is right if "transcendent" means the
establishment of a " world " behind the world, if " incarnation " means the
descent of a divine being from a heavenly place and its metamorphosis
into a human being, if " immortality " is understood as the continuation
of temporal existence after death, if the latent church within cultures and

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religions is denied, if a dramatic end-catastrophe some time in the future
is affirmed. All this is a supernaturalism against which my theology
stands." (p 341) Who can find the traditional concept of supernaturalism
in that jejune presentation of it?
While the Thomist will reject many of Tillich's position in both philosophy and theology, there is still the challenge of his example, his courageous
attempt to correlate the " message " of divine revelation with the " situation' in which men find themselves today.
In What Present-Day Theologians are Thinking the author attempts to
document his conviction that there is a theological rennaissance today. One
sign of this, he points out, is " that such Biblical words as Creation,
Redemption, Resurrection, and Last Things have come to appear as more
indispensable for us than was recognized in the modern period .... No
other words seem able to bear the weight of meaning which Sin, Reconciliation, and Atonement have. The core of faith seems intimately bound
up with the original language which expresses it." (pp.
If there is
a return to original words in Protestant theological teaching today, this
book shows that the meaning of these words is still at the mercy of the
various theologians.
The vital problems of theology are discussed under four headings: The
Bible and Christian Truth: Christian Ethics and Society: Jesus in History
and Faith; the Church. The Catholic position on these questions is also
presented, but an unfavorable impression is created by pitting the Encyclical Humani Generis against hasty opinions expressed m certain
" liberal " Catholic periodicals.
On the whole, though, we may be grateful to the author for a clear
presentation of the thought of Protestant theologians on these questions.
JAMES

M. EGAN, 0. P.

Manjgrove College
Monroe Cam'{fUII

Monroe, Mich.

Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce. Edited by PIULIP
WIENER and FREDERIC H. YouNG. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press,
Pp. 406 with index. $5.00.
Peirce and Pragmatism. By W. B. GALLIE. Baltimore:
195£. Pp. £47. $.65.

Penguin Books,

In philosophy, as in other pursuits, the man who strikes the spark may
be overshadowed by him who fans it into a flame and thus brings it to
the notice of the public at large. H W. James tended the fire of pragmatism
and placed the brazier in the market-place, it was Peirce who first lit that

BOOK REVIEWS

577

:lire, as, of course, James explicitly recognised. Not that Peirce was entirely original or unaided in this venture; he himself regarded Nicholas
St. John Green as the grandfather of pragmatism, in that he urged the
importance of applying Bain's definition of belief as "that upon which a
man is prepared to act." But it was Peirce who first made that application,
and so gave the first precise and reasoned expression to the idea that was
later adopted and developed and made both central and popular by James.
If James, by his gifts of extensive application and lucid expression of an
idea, quite overshadowed Peirce, he also interpreted and developed that
idea away from Peirce's understanding of it. And now that attention to
his brand of pragmatism has lessened there has been growing, over the last
twenty years, a renewed interest in Peirce the pioneer, who may be said
to be at last coming into his own.
This interest is not due primarily to Peirce's connection with pragmatism,
though this motive is not absent. More recent trends in logic, semantics,
methodology and the philosophy of science find much that is congenial in
his work, and stress both his importance and actuality. This interest has
found expression in many studies published about him, especially since
Hartshorne and Weiss edited his collected papers (1931-35), and has led
to the foundation of a Peirce Society, in 1946. It is to the initiative of
this society that we owe the present volume of essays by scholars engaged
in special studies of Peirce's work. The fact alone that there are twentyfour contributors to the volume indicates how wide spread is the interest
now being taken in one who has been as strangely neglected until recently
as he was during his life.
Not all the aspects of Peirce's vast output are covered by these essays;
notably absent are essays on his foundation of mathematics and logic, while
his sign doctrine, so central to his system, is but lightly touched on. The
contributors were left free to choose their own subjects, so that there
inevitably are some gaps; the essays do not form a systematic whole, and
often cover the same ground, though from different angles. The editors
have· grouped them into three doctrinal groups, and one biographical and
historical section, with appendices relating to Peirce and the Johns Hopkins
University, and some additions by Max Fisch and Daniel Haskell to
Morris Cohen's bibliography of Peirce's published writings.
The first group is of essays dealing with Peirce's pragmaticism, or theory
of meaning. A. 0. Lovejoy and W. H. Barnes are critical of Peirce's attempt
to formulate a theory of meaning; both agree that there is much to clarify
in the famous articles "How to make our ideas clear," and "Fixation of
belief." The former singles out as the dominant idea of those articles
" the assumption that thought exists for the sake of action ... to generate
habits of action," (p. 19) though he does not consider this assumption as
either self-evident or unambiguous. In defence of Peirce, J. Buchler accuses
Prof. Lovejoy of missing the point; the 1877-78 papers presuppose earlier

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ones, and especially Peirce's theory of signs. In the light of that theory
one must distinguish, in Peirce, the interpretant and the object or referent
of a sign. Peirce is concerned above all with the interpretant, whereas Lovejoy's criticisms envisage mainly the object. D. J. Bronstein points out that
Peirce himself was dissatisfied with his earlier attempts, and tried to revise
them in 1908 by invoking the correspondence theory of truth, assuming a
position of realism, and implying the objectivity of necessity and possibility.
This serves to place Peirce's theory of meaning against a wider background. At first Peirce was almost exclusively concerned with analysing
meaning in respect to the terminology of physical science; later on he tried
to arrive at a more generally valid theory. This however, leads to the
disclosure of an ambiguity, of which W. B. Gallie treats in his essay.
Pragmatism, in its earlier and narrower form, determined meaning by
reference to such criteria as are proper to terms used in the natural sciences;
if proposed as applicable to all empirically meaningful expressions it is
manifestly inadequate, as appears in the case of proper names or vague
predicates. Peirce, realising this, was led to evolve his doctrine of the final
logical interpretant, to which G. Gentry devotes his essay. If every thought
is a sign, it implies, apart from its referent (or object), an interpreter, one
to whom it is a sign. This cannot be merely a thought, for then we set
up an infinite process; Peirce rules out expectation, since it is not conditional (a view which Professor Barnes criticises), and decides in favour
of habit (which Gentry seems to interpret in purely physical tenns).
This interesting discussion undoubtedly throws much light on Peirce's
teaching and its development, and stresses some aspects of mental life that
may easily be overlooked. That thought and belief influence action and
reveal themselves in it, is a truth worthy of emphasis; that meaning relates
ultimately to habit is, however, by no means certain or evident. I may
refer to what seems to be a strange inconsistency, even in Peirce's developed form of the theory. He insists that what most properly distinguishes a sign (and therefore a thought) is its representative function,
its being a sign to a thought (5. 9!87; quoted p. 89!), in relation, therefore,
to "some thought which interprets it" (5. 183; ibid.). This, as Gentry
points out, leads him to the obvious difficulty of an infinite regress, which
he avoids by making habit the ultimate logical interpretant. But surely
this is a sheer evasion of the difficulty. If habit be regarded as still a
thought, the original difficulty remains in all its force. If habit is distinguished from thought, how can it be invoked as the ultimate logical
interpretant, when the interpretant must be a thought? Indeed, one may
pertinently ask, why should the interpretant be a thought? An interpreter,
or interpretant, is surely a person, or at least the mind of a person, and
not just a thought. Ideas may denote objects, and they are qualities in
their own right; but they are signs only to minds, to thinkers (those who
use them, and those to whom they are expressed). It is strange that in all

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this discussion one finds no reference to this most obvious requirement of
any theory of thought or sign, as though behaviorism, or some form of
materialism, were tacitly pre-supposed by all the disputants.
Peirce's own position is ambiguous. He disclaims sensationalism, yet does
not seem far removed from it. He insists on the reality of Generals, and
calls himself a scholastic realist. For him, "habit" is to be taken as a
General, as a way or rule of action with generality of reference to many
objects which exhibit common characteristics; and the function of the idea
is " simply to evoke or express those habits of thought or action which are
the ultimate subjects of logical criticism." (Gallie, p. 74) Thought is, or
involves, an activity (though a Thomist would here make some careful
distinctions), and general ideas may thus be said to express typical ways
of thinking, or acting mentally. But beyond the habit, or the act, lies the
mind, which alone thinks, and to which alone anything can be a sign,
known formally as such. And if habit, in Peirce's sense, is general, if " it
moulds our particular actions to conform to certain general features in the
bewildering variety of the world," (Gallie, p. 74), it can only be because
"our habits are adjusted to certain truly general conditions," (ibid.) which
implies that "generality is an indispensable ingredient in reality." .(5. 481)
Thought, in order so to rule action, must first apprehend such generality as
is exemplified in reality; and surely the primal aim of thought must be to
make known such generality to the mind of the thinker, to signify to him
what it, through its empirical origin, denotes. Habits of action may undoubtedly be pointers to that signification, and valuable aids in making our
ideas clear; they can hardly suffice as ultimate interpretants.
One should not confuse that which enables us to recognize ideas as
distinct with that which constitutes their meaning; one is intrinsic, the
other may be extrinsic. Peirce was right, in his earlier essays, in looking
exclusively to thought to provide the interpretant and the meaning of
thought; the difficulty of an infinite process arises only if one neglects
the mind, or the thinker who has the thought. If we try to explain or
convey to others the significance of our thoughts, we can do this only by
other thoughts; and it was to escape this obstacle that Peirce had to go
outside the field of thought to that. of action. He was concerned, not so
much with what constitutes meaning, as with what makes it clear, recognisable as distinct from that of other ideas. If thought is distinct from action,
that which constitutes its meaning must be in its own distinctive linesignificance to mind-not in that which follows on thought. In order that
one may discover the meaning of an idea, that idea must first possess
meaning in its own right. Such consequent or extrinsic marks of distinct
ideas as determinants of action are, moreover, signs primarily to minds
other than that of him who has the idea; and Peirce seems mostly concerned with such criteria as enable us to clarify the ideas of others. The
manifestation • of significance pre-supposes such significance as already

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constituted; and it is by no means certain that 'he who has an idea apprehends its meaning only or primarily through attention to its dynamic
implications. The essential function of the idea is to make present the
known to the knower; its meaning must be sought in that order to immanent activity, or intentional relationship between mind and object.
H we regard thoughts as signs to thinkers, rather than to other thoughts,
we do not open up an unending series; but if one says that in a purely
logical reduction all reference to a subsisting thinker must be eliminated,
there is still a very obvious distinction to be made in respect of ideas. Considered as psychical occurrences, as qualities, one may succeed, or lead to
another in a series which does not, of itself, postulate a limit; but this
consideration is every bit as "real" as that of a thinker. In logic, as in
phenomenology, the idea is considered above all from the point of view
of its intelligible content; in Peirce's terminology, as a "representamen."
From this point of view, a series of linked ideas is based upon inclusion and
implication; and here a double process of resolution or reduction is called
for. We may call them the ascending and the descending process in the
clarification of ideas. One who, like Peirce, is formed as a scientist, or is
empirically minded, will naturally try to sharpen the content of his ideas by
reference to controlled and exact experience; that is in fact how scientific
notions are made clear, and it holds good of all our notions insofar as they
are empirical in origin. But the mind, stimulated by reality through experience, makes its intelligible contribution, above all by expressing the
ultimate ideas, such as those which metaphysics seeks to penetrate; and
present in all and above all is the supreme reality of being. Ideas may also
be clarified by reduction to this primordial concept, which every idea
implies, and of which it is but a more express determination. They must
also be made more explicit by reference to experience, for knowledge is
born of the contact of mind with reality; but unless they are seen also in
relation to being they can never be ultimately clarified, and the <;oncept of
being is the natural limit to any such ascending series of implications. In
the orbit of thought there are two foci, the mind and reality as experienced;
it is the dynamic interplay of these that cause growth in knowledge and
clarity.
In R. M. Chisholm's essay, which heads the next section of essaysCommon-sense, Science and Logic-one finds that Peirce, in describing
"inquiry," allows for this interplay of mind-to which he grants an
instinctive power "to originate ideas that are true" (5. 50; cit. p. 97)and experience; and, in fact, lays more stress on " conjecture " than on
experience as a factor of progress in knowledge. Peirce's conception of
knowledge, as underlined in this essay, is more intellectual than would
appear from the previous essays. His " critical common-sensism," of which
A. F. Smullyan treats in the next essay, posits that there are indubitables
presupposed by all, or nearly all, inquiry. One is tempted to interpret these

BOOK REVIEWS

581

as self-evident first principles, grounded on the idea of being as obtained
through abstraction. Peirce's notion of abstraction is considered by T. A.
Goudge; it is an interesting contrast to the Aristotelian theory, though
not without points of contact. Some implications of a paradoxical nature
of Peirce's curious conception of realism and nominalism are pointed out
by M. H. Thomson, who seems to confuse idea as thing with idea as sign.
The conformity of idea with object, for an Aristotelian at least, regards the
idea, not as a quality, but as an intentional representation. Peirce's philosophy of science is dealt with by P. H. Wiener, who stresses Peirce's
aim of "welding scientific logic to a cosmic evolutionism which would make
room for freedom of the individual will and religious values." (p. 143)
He characterizes such philosophy as " an attempt to synthesize by means
of an idealistic metaphysic (drawn from Royce) the logic of relations with
evolutionism," (p. 150), preferring Lamarck, as favoring the inheritance
of acquired habits, to Darwin. G. D. Berry draws attention to Peirce's
contributions to the logic of statements and quantifiers; and in the final
essay of this section P. Weiss writes on the logic of the creative process
in Peirce, seeing the essence of this process in the activity of substitution
as based on a habit capable of being expressed in the form of a leading
principle.
The third section of essays deals principally with Peirce's metaphysics
and phenomenological method. D. Savan treats of his approach to his
three categories, as evolving from an earlier one, based on an idealism
inspired by Kant, to a later one grounded on empiricism as implied by
physical science. These two trends are traced in Peirce's system by Isabel
Stearns, who sees his entire philosophy as "a magnificent effort at mediation of the demands of empiricism with those of rationalism," (p. 195)
and carefully distinguishes the logical ahd ontological functions of the
categories. This distinction between the formal and ontological aspects is
also stressed by H. Schneider, who also indicates how Peirce's system might
be completed by a fourth category, that of value. C. Hartshorne develops
the theory of firstness in relation to the teaching of both Peirce and Whitehead, while disagreeing with Morris's analysis of the quality-feeling.
The comparison of Peirce with Whitehead is illuminating; they had much
in common, however different their terminology may be. Both were
logicians and scientists, and sought to raise a metaphysic on empirical
foundations. W. Reese draws a parallel between firstness (quality-feeling,
possibility), secondness (fact, resistance) thirdness (law, generality) and
Whitehead's categories of eternal objects, actual events and progress or
creativity. An Aristotelian will see many points of contact here with his
own doctrines of potency and act, as revealed through an analysis of
becoming or motion. Peirce, indeed, was well acquainted with Greek and
mediaeval thought, and called himself a Scotist realist, though it may be
doubted whether he fully understood the teaching of the Doctor Subtilis.

11

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There are undoubtedly elements of Scotism in Peirce's thought, as C.
McKeon in his essay on this subject points out; but a Thomist, at least,
would quarrel with Peirce on his very definition of realism and nominalism.
Another link between Peirce and mediaeval thought is his interest in
religion, though his views on this important subject have not received the
attention they deserve. J. Smith, in the last essay of this section, discusses
Peirce's ideas on religion and the grounds of belief in God, while pointing
out the defects of his critique of theology.
That Peirce was a difficult character, and his career anything but happy
or successful, is dearly brought out by the essays of F. Young, Max Fisch,
J. Cope and M. Keeton in the final section of this book. One cannot but
agree with Fisch and Cope that it was a tragedy that Peirce was not
granted the Carnegie funds to complete the treatise on logic on which he
had worked for thirty years, but was unable to finish, though that may
have been in part due to Peirce's own unsystematic character. His thought,
however, is systematic, and is fruitful in suggestion to those who take pains
to follow his ideas. J. Feibleman has tried to reduce these ideas to a more
systematic form in his "Introduction to Peirce's philosophy," (1946), and
in the last essay of this volume he speaks on the future of some of Peirce's
ideas. The vigorous and widespread movement of realism among presentday thinkers owes much to Peirce, and can learn much from him; his
message is not primarily that of the logician. He teaches the need and
possibility of a metaphysics, realist in inspiration, empirical in origin,
systematic, but open and capable of evolution and assimilation of new
findings; it is, perhaps, through such a system that the scientist or
positivist to-day may, his prejudices once removed, find his way back to
the complete metaphysics that is at once traditional and native to the
human mind.
In the Johns Hopkins University Peirce saw his ideal of the community
of fellow-workers united in the search of truth to some extent realized;
this volume of essays is, in a modest way, a realization of the same ideal.
Peirce would be very gratified by it, and very grateful for it; it is a worthy
tribute to one who must rank among the very greatest of American philosophers, and will surely do much to win for him the recognition and
appreciation which he so much deserves.
In Peirce and Pragmatism Professor GaHie attempts to give a popular
presentation of the teaching of this scientist, logician, mathematician and
metaphysician, omitting what is too technical, as for instance his symbolic
logic, and concentrating on his pragmatism, in relation both to Peirce's
theory of knowledge and to his metaphysics. His aim is to show the organic
unity of that system of philosophy, which the fragmentary nature of
Peirce's writings tends to obscure, and at the same time to offer some
criticisms where tliey seem called for. Having treated in an introductory
chapter of Pragmatism and the Pragmatists, and then of Peirce's life and

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588

writings, he deals at length with Peirce's theory of knowledge (the assault
on Cartesianism, critical commonsensism, and the doctrine of ThoughtSigns) in three chapters. The originality and value of Peirce's criticisms
of Descartes are ascribed to his superior logical equipment, which enabled
him to detect the uncriticized presuppositions of that thinker. Peirce's
critical commonsensism is shown to imply a rejection of all absolutely first
principles, in whose place he puts conjecture as suggested by an experience
that is ever subject to change and development. The treatment of the
theory of signs is reasonably full, and leads to a discussion of Pragmatism,
understood by Peirce rather as a principle of logic than, as in James, as a
principle of a metaphysic. Prof. Gallie devotes a chapter to an ambiguity
in Peirce's Pragmatism, which claims to provide a general criterion of
empirical meaningfulness, whereas it in fact is adapted only to determine
the meaning of standard scientific expressions. Peirce's metaphysics is the
object of the last two chapters, which consider his categories, and his
cosmology; the ontology is considered to be of more importance than the
cosmology, whose chief value is placed in its showing up of the defects of
classical mechanicism.
Prof. Gallic has succeeded in presenting us with a good, reliable and
clear introduction to the philosophy of Peirce in its main outline. We may
not agree with his own personal philosophic stand-point, and may feel
that we would criticize where he often approves; but he does not und,;ly
intrude his own views upon the reader (which cannot be said for some of
the other similar books of this series) and is for the most part content with
the humbler task of the objective historian. It is surely such who, in the
long run, do the greatest service to those thinkers whom they admire so
much.
AMBROSE J. McNxcHOLL, 0. P.
Collegia Angelicum
Rome, Italy

Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry. By Jacques Maritain.
Pantheon, 1953. Pp.
with index. $6.50.

New York:

The purpose of this book is twofold: first, to make clear the distinct
yet indissoluble relationship between art and poetry, and secondly, to
reveal the essential part played by the intellect in both art and poetry, and
especially to show that poetry has its source in the preconceptual life of
the intellect. Art, in this context, is taken to mean " the creative or
producing, work-making activity of the human mind," and poetry is not
" the particular art which consists in writing verses but a process both
more general and more primary: that intercommunication between the
inner being of things and the inner being of the human Self which is a

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kind of divination.
Poetry, in this sense, is the secret life of all the
arts." (p. 3) Many other aims are fulfilled, not least of which is the
exhaustive revelation of the author's mind on all related subjects.
The book has, we think, a threefold division. We may divide it: 1)
Creative Intuition in the Artist, and
Introduction to Creative Intuition,
3) ,Creative Intuition in the Work. The Introduction comprises two
chapters; the first carries out an inductive investigation of the world's art,
the second considers art as a practical virtue, and lays some groundwork
for the thesis of the work. Creative Intuition in the Artist is then studied
through the four causes in the next four chapters. In Chapter Three the
author considers the efficient cause; in Chapter Four the material and
formal cause; in Chapters Five and Six the final cause. The third main
division, Creative Intuition in the Work, considers the meaning of the
work in three steps; in Chapter Seven, the essential meaning; in Chapter
Eight the transmission of the meaning; and in the final Chapter, the full
meaning.
The author shows that all art has its roots in poetic intuition. Oriental
art, though intent on things, nevertheless reveals obscurely the Self, or the
subjectivity of the artist. Occidental art, though increasingly intent on
the Self, nevertheless reveals obscurely the inner side of Things. Two
arts, intent on opposite poles of interests, come out with the same answer:
a mutual revelation of Self and Things. The burden of the book is to show
that this is possible, and how, through poetic intuition.
After he has established some fundamentals on art, the author turns to
the field of modern art and sets down his brilliant analysis. The moderns
are making an attempt to rid their art of three things: I) the forms of
rational
nature, by carrying to extremes the laws of deformation,
language, which cannot express the singular, and 3) traditional forms of
thought, i. e., logical and conceptual reasoning. While this attempt has gone
to extremes, it has nevertheless resulted in a new and valid art form.
Scholastics should endeavor to understand it, and not insist that art should
proceed in a rational way. Aristotle, Plato, Plutarch, Cicero and others
are cited to show that there is an element of madness in art. Plato held
that a poet, being friendly with the gods, is bitten by a mania from on
high in somewhat the same fashion that Averroes was later to claim that
every man did his thinking through the powers of a separate intellect.
This Platonic muse, in the Maritain theory, descends into the soul to
become creative intuition; Platonic inspiration from above the soul becomes
inspiration from above conceptual reasoning, that is, poetic experience.
To establish this thesis the author begins by "demonstrating the existence
of a spiritual preconscious-distinguished
radically' from the Freudian
animal or automatic unconscious-by developing the doctrine of St. Thomas
on the agent intellect. This intellect, always in act, together with the
impressed species is solidly established by philosophy. So he argues in

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somewhat this fashion: if there is in the intellect a preconscious activity
in the abstractive function of intelligence giving birth to ideas, why not
the same sort of thing giving birth to poetry?
Chapter Four, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," is the heart
of the book. M. Maritain points up the Thomistic doctrine concerning
the emanation of the powers of the soul, showing how the less perfect
emanate from the more perfect. The senses, for example, proceed from
the essence of the soul through the intellect. Thus, in each power there is
activity, as it were, all the way back to the very essence of the soul, activity
which is largely preconscious. The author then makes his leap. The intellect is not entirely engrossed in producing concepts; another phase of its
life is free from this work, yet remains cognitive and productive, and is
carried along towards the manifestation of the creativity of the spirit. It is
here that poetry has its source. It is here that, apart from any process
tending to knowledge by means of concepts and abstract ideas, an activity
exists which is preconceptual, or nonconceptual, which does not even tend
to become a concept, but rather tends " to engender in beauty " by a free
creativity of the Spirit.
This is somewhat like God's creative activity. For as God knows His
own essence and from It creates, a poet knows his own subjectivity and
from it creates. A poet, however, is a poor god; he needs things before he
can find himself; and thus he knows things first, obscurely, through a
knowledge arrived at by affective union with them. This last is a knowledge
suggested by St. Thomas but which M. Maritain further describes as nonrational and non-conceptual. It comes about through an intentional,
significant, or spiritualized emotion that is tendential to creation, that
carries the reality into the depth of the subjectivity, where the intuition
is born.
·The intuition is both cognitive and creative. It knows concrete existences,
not essences, and goes beyond them to the infinite; it also knows the Self.
Yet as the author says in a rather typical sentence, being both brilliant and
obscure, "in the attainments of poetic intuition what is most immediate
is the experience of the things of the world, because it is natural to the
human soul to know things before knowing itself; but what is most principal
is the experience of the Self-because it is in the awakening of the subjectivity to itself that emotion received in the translucid night of the free
life of the intellect is made intentional and intuitive, or the determining
means of a knowledge through congeniality." (p.
italics his)
As creative the intuition is not an idea, since it does not represent anything, but is rather a spiritual matrix, or intellectual form, containing
formaliter-eminenter all that exists in a craftsman's idea-and more
besides. Later in the book all of this is summed up. Poetic intuition and
poetic knowledge is: " ... an obscure 'knowledge through inclination-born
in the preconscious of the spirit-in which the world is known in and

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tkrougk the subjectivity, grasped both together and inseparably by means
of an emotion become intentional and intuitive. Such knowledge is utterly
different from what we ordinarily call· knowledge. It is neither conceptual
nor conceptualizable: it is ineffable in itself, expressible only in signs and
images, and finally only in the work made. But precisely because it is 1not
abstractive or rational, it has no intelligible boundaries and expands, as it
were, to the infinite." (p. 184, italics his)
This statement we consider to be the core of the book. It is certainly
the clearest expression of the thesis, arrived at through pages of difficult,
profound thought, often brilliant, often obscure, but never mediocre. In
one place the author submits that his views are tentative and exploratory.
May I submit that the following criticism of the Maritain theory is also
tentative and exploratory, and is put down with no implication of having
a closed mind on a deeply mysterious and fascinating subject. This whole
area of art, beauty, poetic intuition, is open ground to the Thomist.
And let us recognize immediately many of the basic truths contained in
the Maritain theory. First, there ii some kind of knowledge by inclination
which is opposed to scientific knowledge. A boy in an orchard knows an
apple in a much different way than a botanist in a laboratory. St. Thomas
points out that a virtuous man can know what a virtue is without scientific
knowledge, through this knowledge of inclination. Secondly, poetic knowledge is certainly non-rational or non-logical, at least in the obvious sense
that it does not attempt to prove by syllogisms its insight into reality.
Poetry, after all, is not science. Thirdly, poetry and poetic knowledge must
be born in the preconscious of the spirit, since all knowledge comes through
the work of the agent intellect, of which we have no experience. But to
the statements that poetic knowledge is " neither conceptual nor conceptualizable," is " ineffable in itself . . . is not abstractive . . . has no
intelligible boundaries," we cannot but dissent.
If we are going to talk about poetic knowledge we must, it seems to me,
admit that it is knowledge. It may be, and it is, a special kind of knowledge, but if the Angelic Doctor teaches that the ordinary way of knowing
extra-mental reality is the only way, so long as man is a union of soul and
body, then poetic knowledge with all its special induits, must still conform
in its essentials to this way. At least, that would be the opinion of St.
Thomas. Asking whether the intellect can understand through its intelligible species without a phantasm (Summa Tkeol., I, q. 84, a. 7) he
quotes Aristotle with complete approval: " the soul understands nothing
without a phantasm." This implies, of course, that the soul can understand nothing without an intelligible species, or without a concept. He
even says further on (q. 85, a.
that "the intelligible species is to the
intellect what the sensible image is to sense." And again, when he asks
whether the separated soul can understand anything (q. 89, a. 1), he
answers that " the difficulty in solving this question arises from the fact

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587

that the soul united to the body can understand only by turning to the
phantasm."
We have limited this discussion to knowledge of extra-mental reality
since, textually speaking, St. Thomas is abundantly clear on this point; that
is, he refuses to admit nonconceptual knowledge to man in this life. This
is perhaps why M. Maritain works on the experience of the Self as an
essential element of poetic knowledge, for in the Thomist exposition of
how the soul knows itself, and especially on how it knows the affections
of the soul, there seems to me a legitimate doubt as to the necessity of
concepts. St. Thomas himself writes: Affectus animae TWn sunt in intellectu
neque per similitudinem tantum, sicut corpora; neque per praesentium in
subjecto, sicut artes; sed sicut principiatum in principia, in quo habetur
notio principiati. (I, q. 87, a. 4, ad 3). Just how this "notion" would
differ from a concept, if it differs at all, is a question, so far as I know,
not yet solved. But in any case, since poetic knowledge certainly involves
the knowledge of things, then it surely would involve concepts.
And does not the common consent of mankind give this position strength?
It attributes to the poets an ability to see more deeply into reality than
others, and to express more sharply what they have seen. And it is precisely the flash into the depths they get, the blinding concept, that calls
their emotions so much into play. The thing they see moves them deeply,
but it seems to me wrong to take away their sight, or to insist that their
knowledge is not knowledge, or that their concepts are not concepts. Their
knowledge of things is given a resonance by their knowledge of Self, and
it is quite clearly a non-scientific, illogical kind of knowledge, and is certainly born in the preconscious; but when it comes out finally, it comes out
in concepts.
Concepts need not be scientific. It is by no means necessary to have
a clearcut concept of man (i.e., man is a rational animal) in order to see
him. Our concepts may be obscure from the standpoint of logic, lacking
genus and species, but still brilliantly accurate in capturing some aspect
of man. Someone in musing over the tortures inflicted on him by men
of an opposing army, said: "Man is a dirty animal." Logically, that is
obscure. Descriptively, it is shattering clear. It is like a gunshot. It is,
we submit, the beginning of poetry; a flash into the depths.
Thus, when Jacques Maritain says" nonconceptual" we think he should
say " extremely conceptuaL" This is brought out, perhaps, in his discussion of the illuminating image. When Yeats writes,
The winds that awakened the stars
Are blowing through my blood
I do not think he is dealing with nonconceptual knowledge. He begins, I
believe, with a keen feeling of his exultation, and here we do see the
element of knowledge by inclination, or emotion, but he also has a dear

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awareness, and it seems to me a conceptual awareness of his exaltation.
He knows he has it and that it is unlike anything on earth. So he reaches
into the heavens for his illuminating image. Eliot, Hopkins, Crane, Lowell;
Merton, and all the good modern poets, though they may use obscure and
startling imagery, are not proceeding in a nonconceptual way. In his long
letters to Robert Bridges, which he called his crib notes, Hopkins explains
the concentrated thought and jammed concepts in his poems. A Hopkins
poem is a concept seething with meaning; it is not a nonconceptual poem.
For all this, I still believe this book to be the most outstanding achievement on art to come from any scholastic philosopher in this century.
Jacques Maritain may be an old man and Thomism an old philosophy, but
in this book they are both young again. The aging philosopher is a master
in facing up to all the new and pressing problems in the field of art. He
shows all the enthusiasm of a boy in bringing round his guns to fight the
enemy. Mauriac wrote some five years ago (in Renascence, v. :i!, no. 1, p.
Q3) , " I wonder if surrealism may not be one of the forces to be blamed
for the break in the Christian current. Its adherents hunted in the field
of religion. It was about l9QO when the devil turned loose into the
vineyards of God such beautiful sleek foes as Aragon, Breton, Eluard,
Soupault .... It is strange that it should be a Thomist philosopher,
Jacques Maritain, who fought them most successfully. But Maritain's
little house at Meudon is closed now." Yes, but 1\hritain's big book is
open now. And his flags are still flying; there is still thunder in his guns.
The book is handsomely bound. It contains as well sixty-eight reproductions of famous paintings and some hundred pages of source material
called " Texts Without Comment," both of which serve to illustrate the
points made in the work. The paintings, though better had they been in
color, and better still had they been referred to more explicitly in the text,
make the book a portable art gallery. The "Texts," consisting of poetry,
reflections of artists, literary men, philosophers and saints, make the book
a portable anthology of quotable quotes.
The book cannot be read casually, but thoughtful, reflective study will
have its reward. The author has summed up his many, many years of
penetrating thought on the problems of art, intuition, beauty, poetry, and
has, as we have seen, done some exploring into the twilight realm of the
preconscious. Some of what he says has already been put down in the
now well established Art and Scholasticism, and is as thorough-going and
brilliant a treatment of the general problems of art as can be found in
any book published today. The Maritain insights into the Thomistic doctrine of art as a practical and intellectual virtue, of the relation between
art and morality, have long enriched our scholastic literature and have
been received with joy even in fields normally beyond the ken of scholastic
philosophy.
It was in recognition of these insights, and of the solid reputation of

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the man behind them that the lectureship committee of the National
Gallery of Art invited M. Maritain to deliver six lectures in their initial
series of the A. W. Mellon Lectures, in the spring of 1952. This was a
great honor to Maritain as well as to his philosophy, and anyone then in
Washington who attempted to procure tickets for those lectures learned a
lesson about the prestige of this bent and benign philosopher. Creative
Intuition grew out of these lectures.
THOMAS R. HEATH, 0. P.
Trinity College
Washington, D. C.

Principium Sapientiae. By F. M. Cornford. Edited by W. K. Guthrie. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1952. Pp. 227 with index. $5.00.
This unfinished work of the late Professor Cornford, which was published
posthumously by Professor Guthrie, tries to uncover the "pre-philosophical" origins of Greek philosophy. The first ten chapters deal with the rise
of Greek " empirical theory of knowledge," that type of knowledge which
was in most direct opposition to the prevailing mythological, poetic, or
hieratic tradition of early Greek thought. Relying on the findings of W. A.
Heidel (Hippocratic Medicine: Its Spirit and Method, New York
Cornford ably discusses the attitude of the Hippocratic School towards the
importation of philosophical speculation or dogmatism into the art of
medicine. Protesting the use of philosophical postulates or hypotheses,
which are always at the basis of all that is beyond the reach of senseobservation and sense-verification, Hippocrates and his disciples maintained that medicine is an " art " with a long-established existence and
reputation of its own; whose paramount value is acknowledged by all those
who call upon its services on the gravest occasions and hold its practitioners
in highest esteem. Medicine is, and always has been, a practical " art."
Its history stretches back untold centuries before it came to have anything
even remotely resembling a "scientific theory." The physician was "a
healer" (larpo>), "a craftsman in the public service" (811/uoepyo>), or
" a worker with his hands " Cxnpovpy6>). Whatever his personal ideas
might have been as to the " nature " of man or the " nature " of " things,"
he had always to observe and deal with the symptoms of the individual
case to find out what was wrong and what had to be done in the particular
instance. His reputation, his survival, and, incidentally, his income, unlike
that of the speculative philosopher, depended on how successfully he could
cure. Hence his " art " had to be securely based on observation, " scientific
research," and the discovery of empirical and empirically verifiable facts.
For this reason he had no need of any postulates, maxims, or " metaphysics." The only valid standard of truth he recognized was the way in

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which each individual patient responded to the individual cure. Hence the
best physician was the one who made the least mistakes; who in this
" trial and error balance " was able to tip the scales in favor of concrete
success rather than to devise dogmatic theories based on assumptions
beyond experimental verification. Impelled by its immediate and rather
limited interests, ancient medicine became the only known practical "art"
to develop something of a truly " empirical method." This attitude of
the Hippocratic School, to some extent is also reflected by the practical
Xenophon when he ridicules those "philosophers" who concern themselves
with what goes on in the skies or beneath the earth (Memorabilia l. l.ll-16
and 4. 7. 1-lO). But it should be borne in mind that Xenophon is here
under the " anti-intellectual " influence of Antisthenes who, as may be
gathered from the few surviving sources, was wholly averse to any " theo(It
retical speculation " beyond immediate commonsense practicability.
could also be said that Xenophon, the pious country squire, thunders here
against the "modernistic" theories about heaven and earth which replaced
the old religious myths.)
From the surviving evidence we may conclude, therefore, that in
antiquity the empirical " theory of knowledge " originally was a "medical
theory " or " medical method," arising from reflections on the actual
procedures of successfully practicing physicians. It came about, Cornford
urges, when these physicians, in an act of supreme revolt, tried to disentangle their art from magical antecedents. (It is interesting to note that
the earliest Milesian "physicists "likewise attempted to divorce themselves
from mythical antecedents.) During the pre-Aristotelean period medicine
was the only scientific occupation that could be called " scientific," a fact
which Aristotle seems to have acknowledged when he divides the history
of early thought into metaphysics (and natural philosophy), mathematics,
and medicine. In this sense, Cornford holds, medicine was also a sort of
rebellion against the shamanism of the past.
Cornford then proceeds to deal with that type of knowledge which is
not acquired by the senses, but is anamnesis. This "recollection," which
in itself connotes something related to the supernatural, is not a personal
or individual memory-the waxen tablet of the empiricist-but an impersonal memory, the contents of which are the same with all human
beings. Taking the reader through a fine analysis of the Platonic Meno,
Phaedo, Symposium, Republic, and Phaedrus, Cornford expounds the
Platonic doctrine that the sour is immortal, and that it had already existed
before it became incarnate. This doctrine, which constitutes the cornerstone of Plato's new theory of knowledge, he has heard from "men and
women wise in divine matters " as well as from inspired poets such as
Pindar. It enables him to develop his earlier theory of Ideas, the objects
of knowledge worthy of that name, which are, like the soul, independent
of the concliete things that embody them. In sum, the Platonic theory of

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knowledge is vitally bound up with the belief in the immortality and preexistence of the soul. The close interconnection of anamnesis, immortality,
pre-existence, incarnation of the soul, and mathematics (as pure forms) in
Plato definitely points to a Pythagorean or Orphic source. The final result
is then that all knowledge is recovered out of the mind itself, a view which
was also held by Heracleitus of Ephesus.
Besides the anamnesis there exists also a type of knowledge that comes
to us by a sort of inspiration, like that of the seer or the poets who, " in
their rapt condition say many true things, but do not know what they
mean." They have no vovs, but are "possessed by divine inspiration."
This " fringe of mythical belief " is the " inspirational way of knowing,"
the " visionary insight into things." It constitutes the oldest " theory of
knowledge." In Plato most likely it goes back to Pythagorean or Orphic
religious traditions. This is " the gift of heaven," the " madness " or
"visionary power" which takes hold of the seer, the poet, and the true
philosopher (the Platonic Phaedrus enumerates four kinds of divine madness), the three purifiers of human souls who discover in the past those
forgotten errors of which present evils are the consequence. Since the
seer, the poet, and the philosopher have a divinely inspired passion for
the beautiful and love for the good, at least for Plato (Symposium) they
are really one and the same person. (Orpheus, according to Phaedrus
for instance, was the "union" of an forms of "divine madness": the
founder of mysteries, the prophet, the poet, and the teacher of Musaeus.)
The Platonic-Pythagorean combination of seer, poet, and sage (or philosopher), as well as the implied belief that all exceptional form of wisdom
is the prerogative of inspired persons who are in direct touch with gods
or spirits, leads Cornford, who in this is under the influence of N. Kershaw
and The Growth of
Chadwick's Poetry and Prophecy (Cambridge,
Literature (Cambridge,
to the assumption that we have here before
us a common Eurasiatic tradition which links the mantic cults of the
Teutonic-Norse and Celtic peoples and the shamanism of northern Asia.
The shamans or bakshas, who never degenerate into cheap witch-doctors
or vulgar " medici'ne-men," are inspired singers, poets, musicians, diviners,
priests, physicians, guardians of religion, teachers, and preservers of ancient
legends. They are the inspired (" mad ") intermediaries between the people
and the gods or spirits. The whole intellectual life of the community rests
almost wholly upon the shaman, who is held to possess superior and even
supernatural spiritual, intellectual, and artistic gifts. It is the " shamanic
inspiration " that may constitute the ultimate background behind the
mintrelsy of the Homeric cycle, or the didactic poetry of Hesiod-behind
the statement in the Hesiodic Theogony (27) about " fictions like the
truth," a statement that can also be found in Homer, Od. 14. U4 and
l!U03. Should Cornford's attempt at linking the shamanism of northern
Asia to certain types of Greek mythology and therefore to the beginning of

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Greek philosophy prove correct-and the evidence seems to support his
contention-then this monumental discovery would compel us to revise
some of our most cherished notions concerning the origin of Greek
speculation.
In the course of time the " philosopher " became the successor and
"rival" of the seer (or the poet) and shaman. Pythagoras, like so many
of the so-called " Wise Men of Old," according to tradition, belonged to
those " divine people," that is, " divinely inspired people," who became
legendary figures even during their life-time. No wonder that Pythagoras,
the· member of a mystical cult-society and the prophet of the mantic or
Hyperborean Apollo, is called by Aristotle (frag. 191) the successor of
Epimenides, Aristeas, Hermotimus, Abaris, and Pherekydes-all of them
" wonder-workers." In addition, tradition records many a miracle performed by Pythagoras. Heracleitus of Ephesus, the prophet of wisdom and
deep insight, in his oracular style maintained that he was no one's pupil,
but had " searched himself " and learned everything from himself (Diogenes
Laertius 9.1 and 9.5) . For as Pindar said: " Wise is he who knows much
by inborn genius; but those who have learned from others are like ravens
chattering in vain against the divine bird of Zeus." "Listen not to me
but to the logos ... ," (frag. 1) Heracleitus exclaims like an inspired
Eleusian hierophant, warning the faithful that they must understand the
" words " and be pure of heart and hand. Parmenides, the visionary and
inspired prohet of the wv>, who in the metric (hieratic) language of
prophecy claims that his poem is a " revelation " accorded to him by a
goddess behind the gates of Night and Day (possibly the goddess of
Reason) , dismisses the evidence of the senses as· a delusion. Like in the
shamanic tradition, he travels through the heavens to visit the goddess who
instructs him in all things. (The Siberian shaman, mounted on a bird, also
travels to Erlik Khan, the black ruler in the realm of the dead, or to the
sixteenth heaven, the abode of the highest god, to receive some revelation.)
In his Purifications, Empedocles, who displays a great affinity with Pythagoras, Pherekydes, and Epimenides, contends that during his many reincarnations he had been " born in all manner of life: I have been a boy
and a girl, a bush and a bird, and a dumb fish in the sea." But the same
is claimed by the Asiatic shaman, by the Celtic bard, and by the Norse
Othin. (Cf. The Voyage of Bran, the Welsh Book of Taliesin, or the Edda.)
The emancipation of the philosopher from the inspired seer or shaman
was a revolt of the first magnitude which perforce led to a bitter quarrel
between the two. The seer's business is to know and interpret the intention of the gods, and to foresee the future; the philosopher, in his sceptical
attitude " scans the skies and the earth beneath " for a " scientific " or
" materialistic " explanation of natural phenomena, thus endangering the
status of the seer. The seer, alarmed by such developments, struck back,
as the fate of Anaxagoras or Protagoras, to mention only a few, should

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indicate. It was the seer Diopeithes who carried a law that authorized the
indictment of those who disbelieved in " divine things " and " divine
signs," or taught " naturalistic theories " about what goes on in the
heavens (Plutarch, Pericles
. Tlie Clouds of Aristophanes, in the same
vain, denounce those who study " the things in the skies and beneath the
earth " (Clouds 365) -the traditional " travel routes " of the shaman.
(No wonder that the apologist Xenophon, in Memorabilia 1.1. ll-16, should
try to absolve Socrates of all suspicion of having been interested in " the
things in the skies and beneath the earth.") But I cannot agree with
Cornford's statement that the main theme of the Platonic Euthyphro is
a " collision " between the seer Euthyphro and the philosopher Socrates.
In my opinion Socrates-Plato here takes issue with the Antisthenian contention that one must put " honesty " above the duties of filial piety
(Diogenes Laertius
. For does not Socrates, after having listened to
the story of Euthyphro, retort with a "By Hercules!" (Jowett completely
misses the point when he translates " By the Heavens ")-an exclamation
which indicates that he is contesting an Antisthenian maxim.
Like the quarrel between the seer and the philosopher, so also the clash
between the philosopher and the poet-the " inspired visionary of the
past "-had much to do with the development of Greek philosophy. Aside
from Plato's strictures, we remember that Xenophanes rejected Homer's
anthropomorphism; that Heracleitus denied that the poets alone possessed
prophetic knowledge; that Parmenides insisted that poetic cosmogonies and
theogonies were pure fancy; and that Leucippus, Democritus, Empedocles,
Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, and others indulged in " unpoetic
abstractions." All these are, in the final analysis, instances of the clash
between the "inspired poet" and the "sober philosopher." It is here that
poets and philosophers part ways: the poets could not very well dispense
with the Olympian personalities, while the philosophers, unconcerned with
the cults or tradition of religion, rejected the mythological adventures of
personalized gods.
The second part of Cornford's book discusses the possible connections
that might exist between earliest Greek cosmogonies and ·theogonies and
certain creationist myths of the East, particularly those of Mesopotamia.
The present reviewer is not qualified to discuss the extremely informative
and interesting theories advanced by Cornford. At the same time, he is
fully aware of the dangers and difficulties inherent in all studies of " comparative literature," " comparative religion," and" comparative mythology."
It might be interesting, however, to add here a bit of information which
seems to have escaped Cornford. The Hittite-Hurrian Epic of Kumarbi,
recently discovered (and made accessible by the work of Giiterbock),
displays strong similarities both with the Babylonian Hymn to Marduk
and Hesiod's Hymn to Zeus. Undoubtedly, the Epic of Kumarbi is dependent on the Hymn to Marduk, and, conversely, the Hesiodic Hymn to

594

BOOK REVIEWS

Zeus is most likely under the influence of the Epic of Kumarbi. Now it is
quite possible that Minoan traders or Mycaenean travellers became
acquainted with the Epic of Kumarbi at Ugarit, the great trading center
and meeting place of the Minoan-Aegean peoples and the Hittites. From
Ugarit they may have carried this Epic (or a version of it) to Crete (where
it might have passed through a " Cretan phase ") , and from there to
Greece, where it could become the "model" for the Hesiodic Hymn to
Zeus. In this fashion the work of Hesiod could be linked to the Babylonian Hymn to Marduk.
The last work of Cornford, like all his writings, is not merely informative,
interesting, or challenging: it is brilliant, whether or not we can agree with
some of his ideas and interpretations. When death took the pen out of his
hand, he might possibly have stood on the threshold of certain basic discoveries which, if more fully verified, might compel us to revise radically
some of our traditional views concerning the background and origin of
"Western philosophy." The editor or editors, who had the courage to
publish an " unfinished manuscript," ought to be highly recommended for
their excellent judgment.
ANTON-HERMANN

Mediaevol Institute
University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana

CHROUST

BRIEF NOTICES
Neuf Lel}ons sur les Notions Premieres de la Philosophie Morale. By
JACQUES MARITAIN. Paris: Tequi, 1952. Pp. 195.
In this volume M. Maritain studies the basic principles of moral philosophy in nine " lessons," just as he did in the field of metaphysics, in
his Sept Lel}ons sur L'Etre. The author realizes the need for the moralist
to make a scientific and sympathetic approach to the discoveries of Freud
and other modern psychologists. He studies the various great ethical
systems, with special emphasis on the general principles of classical ethics,
of Kant, and of the sociological school. With this background, Maritain
proceeds to a discussion of the good, value, judgments of value, the end
and finality, the norm or rule of morality, duty and obligation, and
sanction. Throughout it is the author's aim to present these basic questions
according to the Thomistic doctrine, with a minimum of technical expression. As the eminent Thomist, Fr. J.-M. Ramirez, 0. P., has noted,
Maritain is not always too clear in his expositions, but one can see that
he has touched upon all the major problems of moral philosophy. We shall
limit ourselves to a brief discussion of some points of particular interest.
Of major importance is the author's discussion of the two main aspects
of the moral good. The first is that of value, in the perspective of formal
causality, signifying the intrinsically good quality of a human act; the
second is the consideration of the moral good in the perspective of finality,
of that to which man tends as a free agent. In the order of pure values,
one is concerned with the specification of the moral act, and with a static
order, while in the dynamic order of morality, of efficient causality or
exercise, it is the consideration of finality that is supreme. Except for
the use of the term "value," this is the classical Thomistic conception of
the absolute and relative aspects of the moral act. The absolute deals with
the abstract consideration of the human act in its goodness (as compared
to the judgment of reason, e. g., the abstract goodness of an act of justice);
the relative view concerns the moral agent, the act, and their relation to
the ultimate end in the actual order. Maritain lays far greater emphasis,
it seems, on the absolute, on '' value," though, on the other hand, St.
Thomas would appear to emphasize the aspect of finality as primary and
dominant in the moral order. Involved here is the very difficult problem
of what, in the last analysis, specifies the moral act. An act is absolutely
good, morally speaking, when in conformity with a judgment of suitability,
of "value "-thus the author analyses the notion of a "bonum honestum
morale" in the order of specification and formal causality: "value" applies
to something which of itself has the quality of evoking love for itself, and
is a good in itself to which the will naturally tends. In virtue of a judg-

595

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BRIEF NOTICES

ment bearing on such a " value," a human act is specified as good. The
problem here is-what function does finality, the consideration of the ultimate end, play in the order of specification? What function does finality
play in determining what is good, and according to right reason? One
may say that an act is termed morally good or evil in a relation of conformity or difformity, of adaptation or lack of adaptation to the ultimate
end of man. Just how are these two aspects of the morally good act to be
conceived in their mutual relations? Space does not allow us to enter into
a discussion of this matter at the present time, but it may be remarked
that in the Thomistic moral theory, it is necessary to consider the role of
finality, not only in the order of exercise, but also in that of specification.
M. Maritain has made too great a distinction between the final and the
formal aspects of the morally good act, and he should have discussed the
relation of the human act to man's ultimate end in his consideration of
the specification of the human act.
Closely connected with this problem is that of the origi.n and nature of
moral obligation. Basing himself on his doctrine of value, M. Maritain
states unequivocally that moral obligation depends on value, in the line
of intrinsic formal causality, and not on the order to the ultimate end. The
proof of this position is that otherwise there would be no obligation to
choose as the end of human life the true ultimate good. To establish the
obligation to choose the true ultimate goal, one must have recourse to the
consideration of value in the order of specification, and not to the consideration of finality. Again, this is a complex problem, and one to which
various answers have been given, as one may see by reading such modern
Thomistic authors as Gilson, Gillet, Lottin and Sertillanges. The first
problem here is whether or not it is correct to use the vocabulary of obligation in this regard. For formally and strictly, obligation implies a duality
of persons-the regulator and the regulated, and it is only by extension
that man can be said to be obligated by his own nature, which tends to
the true ultimate end in virtue of an immanent natural law. The second
problem is to determine whether obligation properly pertains to the order
of finality or to that of formality. It seems to be the commonly accepted
position of Thomistic authors, as of St. Thomas, to relate obligation to
finality, so that the source of obligation is the end, or the necessary connection of an act with that end. Under different aspects, it is true to say
both that the ultimate end is such because it is good, and to say that it
is absolutely good because it is the ultimate end: to say that a lesser end
is " honestum " because it is good per se, and to say that it is good because
as a means, it shares or participates in the goodness of the ultimate end.
Another related question is to be found in the proper understanding of
that basic moral principle: bonum faciendum, malum vitandum. We may
agree with M. Maritain that this is a proposition in the second mode of
per se predication, though further explanations of this position should be

BRIEF NOTICES

597

given for complete understanding. It does not, however, seem quite correct
to see this principle as the fust expression of " obligation." Rather, the
notion of obligation is based on this principle, but since obligation is not
the primary consideration of morality, neither does it seem correct to interpret this principle as dealing primarily with obligation, or even to put the
idea of obligation on an equal footing with that of the good conforming to
right reason which is the basic meaning of the principle. It is to be
remembered that the notion of strict obligation is not coextensive with
that of the moral good.
A final point to be mentioned is found in the Fifth Lesson, where M.
Maritain discusses the need for the moral philosopher to have an " adequate" existential view of man and his supernatural destiny. To those
acquainted with the author's works this doctrine on an "adequate" moral
philosophy-adequatement prise--one need not note that much controversy
has been occasioned by this position. For the present reviewer it is difficult
to see how M. Maritain can continue to maintain his opinion in view of
the solid and balanced criticisms offered by such eminent scholars as
Fathers Ramirez and Deman. There is no need to repeat here the cogent
arguments advanced against the position of M. Maritain, but one may
ask whether the problem raised is a real one, as the author maintains. Is
moral philo-sophy inadequate and insufficient without taking into account
the supernatural truths mentioned, relating above all to the actual ultimate end of man? On this matter, we agree with Fr. Th. Deman, 0. P.
that the " inadequacy " of moral philosophy does not prevent its being
a true practical science.
The remarks made on this volume are not so much criticisms as indications of the complexity of the fundamental issues of moral philosophy.
There is no doubt that this volume is one to be read and studied by all who
are interested in the Thomistic theory of ethics.

S. Thomae Aquinatis Catena Aurea in Quattuor Evangelia. Nova edlitio
cura P. ANGELIC! GuARIENTI, 0. P. Turin: Marietti, 1958. Vol. I, pp.
578. Vol. II, pp. 598 with index.
S. Thomas Aquinatis Super Epistolas S. Pauli Lectura. Ed. VIII revisa
cura P. RAPHAELIS CAI, 0. P. Turin: Marietti, 1953. VoL I, pp. 719.
Vol. II, pp. 578 with index.
In the Catena Aurea, written at the command of Pope Urban IV and
completed in 1£67, the Angelic Doctor wrote that he had selected texts
from the various authors with great care in order to avoid prolixity, and
even in some cases had changed word order for the sake of clarity. He
admitted that the work might appear lengthy, but he had made it as

12

598

BRIEF NOTICES

brief as possible in accord with his aim which was to expose both the literal
and mystical senses. St. Thomas also noted that the translation of Chrysostom's Homilies is poor, and that some of the works he used were
spurious. In view of this, we believe that the present edition would have
been enhanced had Father Guarienti, 0. P. attempted some critical work
upon the citations made by St. Thomas. This, however, is a minor defect
and in no way detracts from the usefulness of these volumes to theologians,
exegetes and preachers.
In editing the Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul, Father Cai
continues the fine work that he has done on other work of St. Thomas in
this series. He begins with an excellent critical introduction on the nature
of the Commentary, its place in the works of St. Thomas, and its various
editions. In the course of the work itself he has numbered the paragraphs
and to these added something which we consider to be of great value,
namely, a list of the parallel places in the principal works of St. Thomas.
At the end of each volume he has provided a schematic division of each
Epistle as given by St. Thomas in his commentary. At the end of the work
he has given an index of the authors quoted by St. Thomas, and, finally,
a topical index.
The Commentary itself, as we now have it, is really the fruit of the labors
of previous editors. The commentary on Romans and the :first seven
chapters of I Corinthians is the expositio of 'St. Thomas himself when he
lectured for the second time on the Epistles at Naples, U72-l273. The
remainder of the work is chiefly the reportatio of Reginald of Piperno, made
from St. Thomas' first series of lectures on the Epistles in Italy, 1259-1268.
Father Cai has not given us a complete critical edition. Nevertheless
he has done much in this regard, and he has indicated certain lines along
which future investigations should proceed. It is a great service that he
has rendered, both for theologians and for preachers.

The Analogy of Names. By THOMAS DE Vw, Cardinal.Cajetan. Translated
and annotated by EDWARD A. BusHINSKI, C. S. Sp. in collaboration
with HENRY J. KoREN, C. S. Sp. Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University
Press, 1953. Pp. 103 with index. $2.25, cloth. $1.50, paper.
The translation of Cardinal Cajetan's work on analogy is an event of
major significance for the English-speaking philosophical world. All the
more valuable is it because of the superb craftsmanship with which the
entire project has been accomplished. The volume is the fourth in a philosophical series issued by Duquesne University Press. In technical perfection as to format and print the book is superior in every way. This
precision in its mechanical aspects is but indicative of the magnificence of
its textual content.

BRIEF NOTICES

599

In the Foreword Father Koren explains the purpose of the work and the
scholarship that went into the finished product. For the most part, the
translation of the text is based on the excellent Latin Zammit edition.
This also supplies guidance for many of the useful footnotes and to these
Father Bushinski has made extremely valuable additions.
After the instructive Foreword there follows a life of Cardinal Cajetan
which is a gem of writing and shows what can be done in this field of
biography by someone with imagination in the presentation of the facts.
Cajetan emerges as a real flesh and blood personality who lived an exciting
life, packed with action, and still able to write profound, scholarly works.
Indeed, the sketch is so excellent that one hopes a full length work in
English in this fluent style might appear.
The remainder of the book is, of course, the actual translation of
Cajetan's great work plus the letter he wrote to his fellow Dominican,
Francis of Ferrara. In his literal translation Father Bushinski has lost none
of the flavor of Cajetan nor has he fallen into a stilted style of his own.
Each paragraph of the text is numbered, which provides quick and easy
reference. Especially long paragraphs are neatly divided making for better
reading. The book concludes with two superb indices.
Really everything about this book is magnificent. Some may take
exception to a footnote here and there where the translator expresses his
opinion one way or the other. For instance, there is the observation on
page 10, footnote 6, that the Zammit and Hering editions are misleading
in using the word species when speaking of analogy. It is feared that this
might lead one to think that analogy itself is univocal. In reply it can be
said that species is often taken in a broad sense simply to mean type.
However, such criticism is so trivial as to be insignificant. Duquesne can
be proud to have its name, its staff, and its press associated in the publication of Cajetan's The Analogy of Names. This is a volume that all
philosophers will want to possess.

Philosophico-Scientific Problems. By P. HENRY VAN LAER. Translated by
HENRY J. KonEN, C.§. §P. (Duquesne Studies, Philosophical Series 3).
Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1953. Pp. 179 with index.
After all that has been said and written about the relations of science to
philosophy and the other branches of human culture, this problem still
remains crucial for contemporary thought and education. The older
mechanistic and materialistic interpretations of physical reality have been
abandoned, but relativism and indeterminism have been widely accepted
in their stead. These new theories do not offer us either a picture or an

600

BRIEF NOTICES

intelligible explanation of things as they are, but rather an elaborate
dialectical construction which may be beautiful in itself and even useful
for new discoveries and technical applications, yet need not necessarily be
true. If we cannot determine the real natures of things, then we must face
the alternative that our genuine knowledge is limited to the data of sensory
experience. This new positivism is a symptom of the contemporary crisis
in educational theory and practice. We can hardly expect to build a solid
structure of reasonable understanding of the world or any practical wisdom
on the shifting sands of mere sensory experience.
Dr. Van Laer sees the way out of these difficulties along the path of a
realistic insight into the nature of reality which can be attained by the
right use of experience and reason. The outstanding defenders of the rights
and powers of reason and experience were Aristotle and St. Thomas, and
these great teachers have left us a precious common possession of fundamental principles and realistic theories. Of this ancient wisdom the
Christian schools are the fortunate possessors and guardians. Its methods
and principles not only forearm us against the confusions and uncertainties
in contemporary theories but also enable us to give a reasonable explanation of the established laws and properties of natural things in terms of the
four kinds of causes. Whatever the theoretician may say to the contrary,
the physicist investigates the causes of phenomena, and for this task he
will find much help in the Thomist philosophy.
The author believes that the return to Thomistic realism will be a long
and difficult journey. But it is one well worth making, because Thomism
is suited to the powers and needs of human nature. No one is satisfied with
sense experience alone, nor with mere dialectical constructions. Man craves
an intellectual insight into being and causes, and is loath to admit that
intelligibility is limited to sensory data. By defending the validity of both
experience and reason, Thomistic realism opens up broad possibilities of
knowing things directly and of understanding them through their proper
causes.
From this vantage ground we need not stand in childish awe of modern
science, but can appreciate both its strength and its weaknesses. Without
presupposing a profound knowledge either of science or philosophy, the
author proceeds to distinguish material things from immaterial, asserting
that extension is the criterion of matter. On this point he departs somewhat from Aristotle, who considered things with sensory motion or change
to be most evident, and from motion proved that every mobile or
material being is extended. (Phy. Vl, 234 b 9) The third chapter treats
of the principle of verification, and the long fourth chapter is a thorough
consideration of action at a distance. There are two chapters on causality,
determinism and finality, and the last chapter points out differences between physical science and mathematics.
The problems discussed in this book are genuine and timely. The careful
reader will be grateful for the light which is cast on many difficult ques-

BRIEF NOTICES

601

tions, and will have his appetite sharpened for more. It is a neat book,
easy to read, and the treatment is for the most part simple and solid. Yet
the harmony of the whole is broken in a few places by an unnatural contrast between science and the philosophy of nature, and this in spite of
the fact that naturalists are presented as men interested in the natural
causes of things. It is arbitrary to limit natural science to the causes of
phenomena as such. H the naturalist uses his reason as well as his senses
he can discover all the causes of natural things, from first to last, and in
every order of causality: material, formal, efficient and final. This is the
way Aristotle conceived natural science or the philosophy of nature, and
he carefully distinguished it from metaphysics. (Phys. H, 194 a 13) A
genuine philosophy of nature according to the mind of Aristotle and St.
Thomas will synthesize on the basis of the ancient principles of natural
science all that is certain or probable in contemporary knowledge of the
world.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Avey, Albert E. Handbook in the History of Philosophy. College Outline
Series. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1954. Pp. 836 with index. $1.50.
Ayer, A. J. Philosophical Essays. New York:
Pp. !il98 with index. $4.50.

St. Martin's Press, 1954.

Bivort de la Saudee, Jacques de. (ed.) God, Man and the Universe. New
York: Kenedy, 1954. Pp.
$7.50.
Campbell, Joseph. (ed.) Spirit and Nature-Papers from the Eranos Yearbooks. New York: Pantheon, 1954. Pp. 508 with index. $5.00.
Cohen, Morris R. American Thought. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954.
Pp. 360 with index. $5.00.
Costello, Harry. T. A Philosophy of the Real and the Possible. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1954. Pp. 153.
Dorenkemper, C. PP. S., Mark. The Trinitarian Doctrine and Source of St.
Caesarius of Arles. Paradosis: Vol. IX. Fribourg: The University
with index. 10 DM.
Press, 1954. Pp.
Ellard, S. J., Gerald. Evening Mass. Collegeville: The Liturgical Press,
1954. Pp. 99 with index.
Essays by Members of the Department of Philosophy. Perspectives in
Philosophy. Columbus: The Ohio State University, 1954. Pp. 147.
Fireman, Peter. Perceptualistic Theory of Knowledge. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. Pp. 59 with index. $1!:.75.
Fletcher, F. T. H. Pascal and the Mystical Tradition. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. Pp. 163 with index. $4.75.
Fletcher, Joseph. Morals and Medicine. Princeton:
Press, 1954. Pp. £60 with index. $4.50.

Princeton University

Haley, C. S.C., Joseph (ed.) Proceedings of the 1953 Sisters Institute of
Spirituality. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1954.
Pp.
$3.00.
Hart, Charles A. (ed.) Proceedings of The American Catholic Philosophical
Association. Vol. XXVIII-The Existence and Nature of God. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America, 1954. Pp. £8£.
$3.00.
Hering, 0. P., Hyacinthus M. De Fecundatione Artificiali. Rome: Catholic
Book Agency, 1954. Pp. 69 with index.

609l

BOOKS RECEIVED

608

Hoenen, S. J., P. De Noetica Geometriae Origine Theoriae Cognitionis.
Analecta Gregoriana. Roma: Universitas Gregoriana, 1954. Pp. 298.
Howell, S. J., Clifford. Of Sacraments and Sacrifice. Study Club Edition.
Collegeville; The Liturgical Press, 1954. Pp. 188. $.90, paper.
Jung, C. G. The Development of Personality. Collected Works, Vol. XVII.
New York: Pantheop., 1954. Pp. 248 with index. $8.75.
Kreyche, Robert J. Logic for Undergraduates. New York: The Dryden
Press, 1954. Pp. 818 with index. $2.90.
Louis of Granada, 0. P., Venerable. (tr. by Jordan Aumann, 0. P.) Summa
of the 'Christian Life, ol. I. Cross and Crown Series of Spirituality.
St. Louis: Herder, 1954. Pp. 247. $4.00.
McLoughlin, 0. P., William A. (ed. Rt. Rev. J. G. Cox) The Holy Years
of Mary. Philadelphia: John C. Winston Co., 1954. Pp. 119. $1.50.
Marc, S. J., Andre. Dialectique de L'Agir. Lyon: E. Vitte, 1954. Pp. 588
with index. Fr. 2. 400.
Merton, Thomas. The Last of the Fathers. New York: Harcourt, Brace,
1954. Pp. 128 with index. $8.50.
Muckle, J. T. The Story of Abelard's Adversities. Toronto: The Pontifical
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1954. Pp. 70.
Neumann, Eric. {tr. by R. F. C. Hull) 'The Origins and History of Consciousness. New York: Pantheon, 1954. Pp. 517 with index. $5.00.
Newman, Jeremiah. Foundaticms of Justice. Cork: Cork University Press,
1954. Pp. 148 with index. Us. 6d.
Nowell-Smith, P. H .. Ethics. Baltimore:
with index. $.85, paper.

Penguin Books, 1954. Pp. 824

Nugent, Francis E. Father McNabb Reader. New York: Kenedy, 1954.
Pp. 248. $8.50.
Pei, Mario A. and Gaynor, Frank. A Dictionary of Linguistics. New York:
Philosophical Reader, 1954. Pp. 238. $6.00.
Pieper, Josef. The End of Time. New York: Pantheon, 1954. Pp. 157 with
index. $2.75.
Pirlot, Jules. Destinee et Valeur. Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1954. Pp. 222.
$2.80.
Saint Thomas D'Aquin. Contra Gentiles-Livre Deuxieme. Texte de
l'Edition Leonine. Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1954. Pp. 447 with index.
St. Thomas Aquinas. {tr. by Robert W. Schmidt, S. J.) Truth, Vol. III.
Chicago: Regnery, 1954. Pp. 548 with index. $7.50.

604

BOOKS RECEIVED

Stebbing, L. Susan. Logic in Practice. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1954.
Pp. 98 with index. $1.50.
Stiernotte, Alfred P. God and Space-Time. New York:
Library, 1954. Pp. 482 with index. $8.00.

Philosophical

Unamuno, Miguel de. (tr. by J. E. Crawford Flitch) Tragic Sense of Life.
New York: Dover, 1954. Pp. 387 with index. $3.95, doth. $1.90,
paper.
Wendell, 0. P., Francis N. The Formation of a Lay Apostle. 2nd Ed. New
York: The Third Order of St. Dominic, 1954. Pp. 100. $1.25, doth.
$.50, paper.
Williams, 0. P., Cornelius. De Multiplici Virtutum Forma. Rome:
1954. Pp. 164.

THE GENERAL INDEX TO THE THOMIST
XVII (1954)

INDEX OF AUTHORS
ARDLEY, G. The Physics of Local Motion
BoDE, R. Review of Science in Synthesis, by W. H. Kane
BRADLEY, Sr. R. Naming God in St. Augustine's Confessions
CHROUST, A.-H. The Meaning of Philosophy in the Hellenistic- Roman
World .
---. Review of Principium Sapientiae, by F\· M. Cornford
CIAPPI, L. The Presence, Mission, and Indwelling of the Divine Persons in the Just
CoNDIT, A. The Increase of Charity
CoNNOLLY, T. K. The Basis of the Third Proof for the Existence of
God
DELETTER, P. Original Sin, Privation of Original Justice
EGAN, J. M. Review of The Theology of Paul Tillich. Library of
Living Theology, Vol. I, ed. by C. W. Kegley and R. W. Bertell;
Systematic Theology, I, by P. Tillich; What Present-Day
Theologians are Thinking, by D. D. Williams
GREENWOOD, T. Aristotle on Mathematical Constructibility
GusiNDE, M. Review of The Nature of Culture, by A. L. Kroeber
HART, C. A. Review of The Platonic Heritage of Thomism, by A.
Little
HEATH, T. R. Review of Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, by J.
Maritain
KANE, W. H. Abstraction and the Distinction of the Sciences
LAUER, R. Z. St. Albert and the Theory of Abstraction
McCARTHY, J. Review of Principles of Medical Ethics, by J.P. Kenny
McGUINESS, I. Review of Blueprint for a Catholic University, by
L. R. Ward; General Education and the Liberal College, by
W. F. Cunningham; 'rheology- A Course for College
Vol. I, by J. J. Fernan
McNrcHOLL, A. J. Review of Studies in the Philosophy of Charles
Sanders Peirce, ed. by P. Wiener and F. H. Young; Peirce and
Pragmatism, by W. B. Gallie
MEEHAN, F. X. Review of lYietaphysica Generalis, by G. Esser
MuLLANEY, J. V. Review of The Mind of Kierkegaard, by J. Collins

605

PAGE
145
268
186

197
589
131
367
Q81
469

571

84
114
264

583
43
69

100

388

576
96
261

606

INDICES OF VOLUME XVII

(1954)
:!.'AGE

MuLLANEY, T. U. The Incarnation: de la Taille vs. Thomistic Tradition .
---. Mary Immaculate in the Writings of St. Thomas
RAMIREZ, S. The Impact of Theology
REILLY, G. C. St. Thomas and the Problem of Knowledge
RovER, D. Review of Bentham and the Ethics of Today, by David
Baumgardt
SIMON, M. R. Review of The Eclipse of God: Studies between
Religion and Philosophy, by M. Buber; Judaism and the
Modern Man: An Interpretation of Jewish Religion, by W.
Herberg
SPIAZZI, R. Toward a Theology of Beauty
STARRS, P. M. Review of The Wisdom of Faith, by C. Journet and
Sacra Doctrina, by G. F. Van Ackeren
STEVENs, G. Review of Christian Ethics, by D. von Hildebrand
TYMcZAK, A. The Essence of the Sacrifice of the Mass
VEATCH, H. Review of Translations from the Philosophical Writings
of Gottlob Frege, ed. by P. Geach and Max Black
VELDT, VAN DER J. Review of Errors of Psychotherapy, by S. de
Grazia .
WRIGHT, J. J. Mary Immaculate, Patroness of the United States
WRIGHT, T. B. Review of Medieval Logic: An Outline of its Development from 1250 to ca. 1400, by P. Boehner

1
433

558
510
406

403
350

397
525
194
Hl

INDEX OF ARTICLES
Abstraction,-- and the Distinction of the Sciences. W. H. KANE
--, St. Albert and the Theory of--. R. Z. LAUER
Albert, St.-- and the Theory of Abstraction. R. Z. LAUER
Aristotle,-- on. Mathematical Constructibility. T. GREENWOOD
Basis, The-- of the Third Proof for the Existence of God. T. K.
CoNNOLLY .
Beauty, Toward a Theology of--. R. SPIAZZI
Constructibility, Aristotle on Mathematical--.
T. GREENWOOD
Distinction, Abstraction and the-- of the Sciences. W. II. KANE
Divine, The Presence, Mission and Indwelling of the-- Persons in
the Just. L. CxAPPI .
Essence, The --of the Sacrifice of the Mass. A. TYMCZAK
Existence, The Basis of the Third Proof for the-- of God. T. K.
CoNNOLLY .
God, The Basis of the Third Proof for the Existence of--. T. K.
CoNNOLLY .

43
69
69
84

350
84
43
131

Q81

INDICES OF VOLUME XVH

(1954)

60'1
PAGE

Hellenistic, The Meaning of Philosophy in the-- -Roman World.
A.-H. CHROUST
Immaculate, Mary-- in. the Writings of St. Thomas. T. U. MULLANEY .
---, Mary--, Patroness of the United States. J. J. WRIGHT
Impact, The-- of Theology. S. RAMIREZ
Incarnation, The--: de la Taille vs. Thomistic Tradition. T. U.
MuLLANEY
Increase, The-- of Charity. A. CoNDIT
Indwelling, The Presence, Mission, and --of the Divine Persons in
the Just. L. CIAPPI .
Just, The Presence, Mission, and Indwelling of the Divine Persons in
the --. L. CIAPPI .
Justice, Original Sin, Privation of Original--. P. DELETTER
Knowledge, St. Thomas and the Problem of--. G. C. REILLY
Local, The Physics of--Motion. G. ARDLEY
Mary,-- Immaculate in the Writings of St. Thomas. T. U. MULLANEY .
Immaculate, Patroness of the United States J. J.
WRIGHT
Mass, The Essence of the Sacrifice of the--. A. TYMcZAK
Mathematical, Aristotle on-- Constructibility. T. GREENWOOD
Meaning, The-- of Philosophy in the Hellenistic- Roman World.
A.-H. CHROUST
Mission, The Presence,--, and Indwelling of the Divine Persons in
the Just. L. CIAPPI .
Motion, The Physics of Local--. G. ARDLEY
Original,-- Sin, Privation of Original Justice. P. DELETTER
Patroness, Mary Immaculate,-- of the United States. J. J. WRIGHT
Philosophy, The Meaning of--in the Hellenistic-Roman World.
A.-H. CHROUST
Persons, The Presence, Mission, and Indwelling of the Divine-- in
the Just. L. CxAPPI .
Physics, The-- of Local Motion. G. ARDLEY
Presence, The--, Mission and Indwelling of the Divine Persons in
the Just. L. CIAPPI .
Privation, Original Sin,-- of Original Justice. P. DELETTER
Problem, St. Thomas and the-- of Knowledge. G. C. REILLY
Proof, The Basis of the Third-- for the Existence of God. T. K.
CoNNOLLY .
Roman, The Meaning of Philosophy in the Hellenistic·-- World.
A.-H. CHROUST

197
433
558
1
350

131
131

469
510
145
483

84

197
181
145
469

197
131
145

un
469
510

19'1

608

INDICES OF VOLUME XVII

(1954)
PAGE

Sacrifice, The Essence of the-- of the Mass. A. TYMCZAK
Sciences, Abstraction and the Distinction of the--. W. H. KANE
Sin, Original--, Privation of Original Justice. P. DELETTER
Suarez, Emmanuel-- of the Order of Preachers (1895-1954)
Taille, The Incarnation: de la -- vs. Thomistic Tradition. T. U.
MuLr..ANEY
Theology, The Impact of--. S. RAMIREZ
---,Toward a--of Beauty. R. SPIAZZI
Theory, St. Albert and the-- of Abstraction. R. Z. LAUER
Third, The Basis of the-- Proof for the Existence of God. T. K.
CoNNOLLY .
Thomas, Mary Immaculate in the Writings of St.--. T. U. MuLLANEY .
---, St.-- and the Problem of Knowledge. G. C. REILLY
Thomistic, The Incarnation: de la Taille vs. --Tradition. T. U.
MuLLANEY
Tradition, The Incarnation: de la Taille vs. Thomistic--. T. U.
MULLANEY
United States, Mary Immaculate, Patroness of the--. J. J. WRIGHT
World, The Meaning of Philosophy in the Hellenistic- Roman--.
A.-H. CHROUST
Writings, Mary Immaculate in the-- of St. Thomas. T. U. MuLLANEY .

5£5

43
469
421
1
558

350
69

281

433
510

1

1
428
19'1

433

INDEX OF BOOK REVIEWS
AcKEREN, G. F. VAN. Sacra Doctrina. (P. M. Starrs)
255
BAUMGARDT, D. Bent1U1m and the Ethics of Today. (D. Rover)
406
BERTELL, R. W. The Theology of Paul Tillich. Library of Living
Theology, Vol. I. (J. M. Egan)
5'11
BLACK, M. ed. Translations from the Philosophical Writings of
Gottlob Frege. (H. Veatch)
104
BoEHNER, P. Medieval Logic: An Outline of its Development from
1250 to ca. 1400. (T. B. Wright)
258
BUBER, M. The Eclipse of God: Studies in the Relation between
403
Religion dnd Philosophy. (M. R. Simon)
BURLEIGH, W. De Puritate Artis Logicae. (T. B. Wright)
258
CoLLINS, J. The Mind of Kierkegaard. (J. V. Mullaney)
261
CoRNFORD, F. M. Principium Sapientiae. (A.-H. Chroust)
19'1
CuNNINGHAM,W. M. General Education and the Liberal College. (I.
McGuiness)
388

INDICES

OF VOLUME XVII

(1954)

609
PAGE

EssER, G. Metaphysica Generalis. (F. X. Meehan)
FERNAN, J. J. Theology-A Course for College Students, Vol. I. (I.
McGuiness)
GALLIE, W. B. Peirce and Pragmatism. (A. J. McNicholl)
GEACH, P. (ed). Translations from the Philosophical Writings of
Gottlob Frege. (H. Veatch)
GRAZIA, S. de. Errors of Psychotherapy. (J. Van der Veldt)
HERBERG, W. Judaism and the Modern Man: An Interpretation of
Jewish Religion. (M. R. Simon) .
HILDEBRAND, D. VON. Christian Ethics. (G. Stevens)
JoURNET, C. The Wisdom of Faith. (P. M. Starrs)
KANE, W. H. Science and Synthesis. (R. Bode)
KEGLEY, C. W. ed. The Theology of Paul Tillich. Library of Living
Theology, Vol. I. (J. M. Egan)
KENNY, J. P. Principles and Medical Ethics. (J. McCarthy)
KRoEBER, A. L. The Nature of Culture. (M. Gusinde)
LITTLE, A. The Platonic Heritage of Thomism. (C. A. Hart)
MARITAIN, J. Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry. (T. R. Heath)
T:ILLICH, J. Systematic Theology. I. (J. M. Egan)
WARD, L. R. Blueprint for a Catholic University. (I. McGuiness)
WIENER, P. ed. Studies in the Philosophy of Charles
Peirce.
(A. J. McNicholl)
WILLIAMS, D. D. What Present-Day Theologians Are Thinking. (J.
M. Egan) .

96

388
576
Hl4

111
403

397

fl55

571
100
H4
!264
583
571
388

576
571

YoUJ.'<t., F. H. Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce.
(A. J. McNicholl) ·
576

END oF VoLUME XVII