THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS:

THE DOMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PRovINCE OF ST. JoSEPB
Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

VoL.

XVIII

JANUARY, 1955

No. 1

ST. THOMAS ON THE NATURE OF
SACRAMENTAL GRACE

T

HE purpose of this article should be quite evident from
the very title itself. It is an endeavor to get the
definitive doctrine of Aquinas regarding the nature of
the grace coming to us through the sacraments of the Church.
Any such attempt, however, necessitates an examination of
the various writings to see whether his teaching is constant
or otherwise, since this is by no means a foregone conclusion.
We shall try to point out as clearly as possible the Thomistic
conception of the nature of sacramental grace; this necessarily
entails a correct understanding of the function of that quasimysterious element of the sacramental process, the res et sacramentum, which to date does not seem to have been solved in
so clear a manner as to make any of the several solutions
proposed apodictic. We shall see that the simplicity and the

1

CHARLES A. SCHLECK

unity to which St. Thomas has reduced the sacramental process
is one more proof of his having penetrated into the secrets
of God and His supernatural plan in a most profound manner.
Everything closely and intimately connected with the interior
workings of the Divinity must necessarily reflect these perfections so proper to the Godhead. The sacraments are ordained
to bring about sanctity, which, in the last analysis, is simplicity,
the simplicity of a child in regard to its Father. We would
naturally, therefore, expect the cause of this sanctity (even an
instrumental cause), the sacramental process, to contain this
note in an eminent degree.
Not that there will not be difficulties; this is already evident
if we but consider that there are several theories which claim
to be the exponent of the mind .of the Angelic Doctor. We
might reduce these difficulties to the following:
1. The change of St. Thomas' teaching on the nature of sacra-

mental causality.
2. An obscurity as to just what he meant by the term quosdam
effectus in the text occurring in the Summa.
8. A failure to consider as of very great importance the fifth
article of the same question.
4. A lack of accurate consideration regarding those teachings
which have some definite bearing on the problem at hand: the
notion of habitus, of grace, of original justice and of original sin.

If we keep these points in mind, we should be able to arrive
at some idea of the mind of St. Thomas in regard to the nature
of sacramental grace.
It is best to follow a chronological treatment of the problem,
so that if there is any development or change of doctrine, it
will be the more apparent. That brings us first to a consideration of the Sentences and of the De V eritate. But before
beginning our inquiry into the more important texts from these
works, in which sacramental grace comes up for ex prof esso
discussion, it is essential that we have some idea of the sacramental process as conceived by St. Thomas at the time of the
composition of his commentary on the Sentences.

ST. THOMAS ON THE NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL

GRACE

8

The division of this process was generally accepted as being
made up of an action with a twofold effect, that is to say in
sacramental terminology res et sacramentum, and the res
tan tum.
The sacramentum, or the sacramentum tantum, was the
external rite, the sensible part of the sacramental process. The
res et sacramentum can be considered as a sacramental character, or an ornatus animae. It is this which St. Thomas considers as the immediate effect of the sacramental action. The
sacramental rite did not cause directly and immediately
sanctifying grace, even if we consider it as an instrument of
God. The reason for this is that at this time, the Angelic
Doctor, following the teaching of his day, considered grace
as being something created in the soul by God, something
on the order of the human soul, and therefore, something which
no creature could produce, even instrumentally. Nevertheless
the dicta sanctorum made it essential to consider the sacraments as causing grace in some way, as being not mere causae
per accidens, in no way inducing the effect.
Following an opinion being taught in his day, as is evident
from the way in which he exposes it "And therefore some say," 1
he says that two things are produced in the soul by the
external sacramental action: the res et sacramentum and grace.
The first effect was brought about effectively by the sacraments. 2 With regard to the second effect, they were merely
dispositional causes, causae disponentes, bringing about a disposition which of itself necessitated the infusion of grace.8
This creates a difficulty. Just what is this talis dispositio of
which he speaks? 4 Is it something physical over and above
the res et sacramentum? 5 If that were the case, there would
be a threefold effect following from the sacramental action:
the res et sacramentum, the disposition exacting the last effect,
1 IV Sent., d. 1, a. 4, qcla. 1.
•Ibid.
•Ibid.
'Ibid.
5 N. B. Such as Peter de la Palu and Capreolus maintain.

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CHARLES A. SCHLECK

and the ultimate effect itself, or grace. St. Thomas, however,
speaks of only two effects,6 and clarifies the role of the second,
this talis dispositio, in the context:
... but in addition, insofar as they (the material instruments)
are instruments of the divine mercy which justifies, they bring
about instrumentally (mo do perf ectivo) a certain effect in the soul,
which corresponds to the first effect of the sacraments, such as the
character, or something of the sort.
They do not, however, bring about (modo perfectivo) the last
effect which is grace, not even as an instrument, except in a dispositional manner, INSOFAR AS THAT WHICH THEY DO EFFECT INSTRUMENTALLY (modo perfectivo) IS A DISPOSITION WHICH OF ITS NATURE
NECESSITATES

THE RECEPTION

OF GRACE. 7

He identifies the first effect, or the immediate effect of the
sacramental rite, which he has called above the res et sacramentum, with the disposition which necessitates the infusion
of grace. It is God who immediately produces the form or
sanctifying grace in the soul, and it is the sacramental rite
which instrumentally produces the res et sacramentum, or the
immediate effect; it is this latter which acts as the disposition
for the infusion of grace, as the disposition which normally
accompanies it. 8 So much for the effects of the causality of
the sacraments in the commentary on the Sentences.
One other thing that could cause us difficulty is the term
gratia sacramentalis as used in the earlier works. From its use
it seems to have different meanings in various contexts. For
at one time it seems to be something, an effect, that flows out
of sanctifying grace and, therefore, presupposing the presence
of the latter; at another, it appears to be Something, a disposition, which precedes sanctifying grace. The solution is closely
connected with the above problem, and is an application of
Loe. cit. (cf. note (1)).
Ibid.
• N. B. The word dis-position here is not used in the sense of an incomplete
habitus which disposes something " bene vd male." It is used to denote a kind of
state of "matter" which precedes, in ordine naturae, non temporis, the infusion of
form.
6

1

a

ST. THOMAS ON THE NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL

GRACE

5

the principle causae sunt ad invicem causae, sed in diverso
genere. This disposition is something which precedes the infusion of the form in the genus of material causality, and something which follows upon the infusion of the form in the genus of
formal causality. But there is a difficulty, at least an apparent
one: is not the agent who produces a form the one who is
responsible for the disposition necessitating the presence of that
form? It is God alone who infuses the form in the case of the
sacraments; the latter do not effect it, even in an instrumental
manner. But if they do not effect the form, how can they
effect a disposition which presupposes that form, at least in
the genus of formal causality?
The answer is quite simple, and is in perfect consonance
with the nature of instrumental causality which is, as St.
Thomas says so clearly, movens motum. 9 God Himself
directly infuses the form or the sanctifying grace, but He uses
an instrument to bring about that disposition which the form
requires. But in accordance with the nature of instrumental
causality, the instrument does not move to produce its effect
except insofar as it is moved by the principal cause. Ultimately,
then, it is God Who causes both the form and the disposition
required for the form. For the operation of the instrument as
instrument is none other than the operation of God Himself;
the same principle can be applied here as for the Sacred
Humanity of Our Lord, " it is not distinct from the operation
of the Godhead." 10
Now to apply this to the problem at hand, the meaning
of the term gratia sacramentalis; it is used by St. Thomas to
indicate something which can be considered in one of two
ways, either as a disposition preceding the infusion of grace,
or, as an effect flowing from it. It is, we must note, the same
reality, considered under different aspects in accordance with
the principle mentioned above. If the term is not used in this
•IV Sent., d. l, q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 1.
10 Summa Theologiae, III, q. 19, a. 1, ad !l; the same thought is expressed in the
Sentences: cf. Ill Sent., d. 18, a. 1, ad 4 and ad 5.

6

CHARLES A. SCHLECK

manner, then we shall see that it is impossible to understand
the texts that we shall examine.
Occasionally, in the earlier works, St. Thomas uses the
expression to denote the last effect of the sacramental rite,
or grace. This, however, is always more than evident from
the text. 11 With this as a guiding norm, we can now move
into our problem.
A. The Sentences
The best method of discovering St. Thomas' conception of
the nature of sacramental grace at the time of the composition
of the Sentences would be to analyze all or at least the most
important texts in which sacramental grace is discussed. This
would, however, make an article on the subject unduly long.
For our purposes, namely, to discover the elements in the earlier
works from which the definitive doctrine of the Angelic Doctor
proceeds, it will suffice to synthesize or sum up what we consider to be the teaching that occurs here.
The following are the conclusions which would be deduced
from such an analysis:
1. The sacramental graces flow out from the grace which perfects
the essence of the soul, in a way similar to that in which the
virtues and gifts do. 12
2. The sacrament;il'.lgraces, properly so-called, really differ from the
gratia gratum faciens. For the latter perfects the essence of the
soul, while the former is ordained toward the removal of defects
left by sin, with respect to the natural good of the powers of
the soul.13
3. The sacramental graces are not identical with the virtues and
the gifts, and are therefore really distinct from them."
4. The sacramental graces are specifically distinct from one
another. 15
Cf. IV Sent., d. 4, g_. I, a. I, ad 4.
Cf. (a) II Sent., d. 26, q. I, a. 6, ad 5.
(b) IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 5.
(c) Ibid., d. 7, q. 2, a. 2, qcl. 2 and ad 2; qcla. S.
18 Cf. (a), (b), and (c) in note 12; cf. also IV Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 1, ad 2.
"Ibid.
1 • Ibid.
11
12

ST. THOMAS ON THE NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL GRACE

7

5. The relation of the sacramental graces with habitual grace is
that of a disposition for it, or of an effect fl.owing from it,
depending on the genus of causality under consideration. 16
6. The sacramental graces do not expel any forms which might be
in the powers of the soul as the virtues do.17

It is by no means certain to say, as some authors do 18
that the sacramental graces differ from the gratia gratum
faciens in the same manner as do the virtues and the gifts, and
that they are, therefore, habitus distinct from this grace. The
point at issue in each of those texts where this might appear
to be so, must be taken into consideration. Moreover, from
certain other texts in the Sentences and from the teaching on
original sin, we shall see that the sacramental graces are not
to be considered as habitus in the strict sense of the word.
In the· fourth book of the Sentences, in his consideration of
the grace given by the sacrament of Baptism, St. Thomas
gives us his idea of just what the special grace of the sacrament
is ordered to:
In original sin, such was the process, that the person corrupted
the nature, and the nature the person. Whence in considering this
sin, we can look for something that pertains to the nature, and
something that pertains to the person.
The Passion of Christ was sufficient to remove both. But because
the sacraments are applied to persons, the sacrament of Baptism
removes from us that corruption of the person which overflowed
from the corruption of the nature. And therefore, it takes away the
infection of guilt insofar as this affects the person, and also the
punishment which would deprive the person of That Act which is
Cf. texts listed under (a) and (b) above ..
Cf. text (c), and IV Sent., d. !!, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 1, ad !!.
18 Capreolus, Defensiones Tkoologiae D. Thomae Aquinatae in Quarto Sententiarum, VI, Dist. 1-Il-ill, q. 8, a. 8, § 8, p. 77 Turin, 1906); cf. also B. Brazzarola, La
Natura del,la Grazia Sacramentale nella Dottrina di San Tommaso (Doctoral Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Gregorian University, Rome), Grottoferrata,
1941. (The author attempts to prove in the work that the sacramental graces are
kabitus in the strict sense of the word.) Cf. also Cajetan, Commentarium in IIIam
partem, q. 62, a. 2, n. 2; he admits that this may have been the mind of St. Thomas
in the following places: II Sent., d. 26, a. 6, ad 5; IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 5;
IV Sent., d. 7, q. !!, a. 2, qcla. 8; De Verit., q. 27, a. 5, ad 12.
16
17

8

CHARLES A. SCHLECK

the Beatific Vision. But it does not take away, at the time in which
the sacrament is conferred (actu), the infection which touches our
nature; this is clear from the fact that through generation a baptized person transmits original sin to the offspring. Nor does it
remove the penalties which pertain to a nature deprived of the
grace of innocence of the first state, such as the rebellion of the
flesh against the spirit, and other punishments of the sort which
follow from the fact that man is composed of contraries, both in
regard to the body, and in regard to the soul in a certain sense, that
is, with respect to the appetite of the sense and that of the intellect.
However, baptismal grace does effect this result, that the penalties which remain no longer dominate the person; that they become,
on the contrary, more subject to him, and that he might use them
to his own advantage making them serve as an opportunity for
virtue and an occasion for humility .19

And again we read:
But against the other punishment, following upon the constitution of corrupted nature, such as is the concupiscence or the "fomes
peccati," a remedy is applied in Baptism, so that they no longer
·
dominate the subject. 20

In treating of the sacrament of Confirmation he says:
The disease of sin is removed in one of two ways; as regards the
guilt: if it is original, it is removed in Baptism; if it is actual, it is
removed in Penance. In regard, however, to the punishment by
which we are inclined to sin, this is removed in Confirmation and
in the other sacraments. 21

One other text that illuminates the nature of this special grace,
is taken from the Supplement, in regard to the sacrament of
Extreme Unction:
The principal effect of this sacrament is the remission of sins
with respect to the reliquiae peccati. . . . These are not to be
considered as disposition.s resulting from actions; they are rather
kinds of inchoate, or initial habitus creating a kind of spiritual
weakness existing in our reason. When this is removed, even though
1 • IV Sent., d. 4, q. 2, a. 1, qcla. S.
••Ibid., a. S, qcla. 1, and ad 2.
21 Ibid., d. 4, g_. S, a. I.

ST. THOMAS ON THE NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL GRACE

9

the habitus or dispositions remain, the reason cannot be so easily
inclined to sin.22
Sacramental grace must be considered in the light of original
sin. If man had not sinned, there would have been no Passion,
and consequently no sacraments, since the latter receive all
their efficacy from the Passion of Christ. The sacraments were
to be remedies against sin and the defects which it leaves in
the soul, that is to say, the inclinations towards sin, or the
wounds of the natural powers of the soul. They were ordained
gradually to restore man to that pristine state of harmony
which was found in our first parents before sin.
Original sin had brought about the loss of that marvelous
harmony which consisted in a stable threefold subjection, of
the mind to God, of the inferior powers of the soul to the
reason, and of the body to the soul. It dissolved this by introducing into our will an aversion from God, and into the inferior
powers a conversion toward commutable good.
From the texts cited above the special effects of the sacraments are ordained to rectify that disorder found in the inferior
powers of the soul, at least partially. Their purpose is therefore, to rectify concupiscence, or the material element of original
sin. The nature of this is described by St. Thomas in the

De Malo:
Concupiscence, according as it pertains to original sin, is not
actual concupiscence, but rather habitual. It belongs to a habitus
to· make us trained (habile) for something. But an agent is also
said to be inclined (habile) towards an operation from the subtraction of that which impeded this operation. So too, concupiscence can be said to be habitual in one of two ways, first as a
disposition or habitus inclining us to doing something opposed to
the dictates of our reason. Such would be the case in one who had
the habitus of concupiscence from a repetition of acts. Original
sin, however, is not considered to be concupiscence in this manner.
Another way in which concupiscence can be understood to be
habitual, is as an inclination to act outside the dictates of reason.
This results from the fact that the concupiscible power is not pera: Summa Theologiae, Suppl., q. 80, a. 1, c. and ad 2.

10

CHARLES A. SCHLECK

fectly subject to our reason, given the fact that original justice has
been lost. It is in this sense that original sin, materially speaking,
is habitual concupiscence. 23

The sacramental graces do not replace any form, because
original sin is not a habitus in this sense of the word. They
are ordained, rather, to restore partially something of that
habitual disposition or harmony which was found in our first
parents. They are to bring back, in some way, the subjection
of the inferior powers to the reason. In the last analysis,
then, they seem to replace merely imperfectly the material
element of a habitus that does not impress any form on the
soul, but which consists in a disorder existing in our nature,
which disorder was prevented from coming about by a certain
power of grace in the state of innocence. 24
The term " concupiscence " is used here to denote the wounds
of the natural good of the powers of the soul, or the " fomes
peccati " inclining us toward sin. The sacramental graces serve
to diminish the dominating force of this inclination, which,
considered apart from its form.al element, or with its form.al
element removed, does not have the ratio of a habitus, whether
operative or entitative, since it is in via, or on the way to being
removed.
It is true that St. Thomas frequently says that sacramental
grace has some similarity with the virtues and the gifts of
the Holy Spirit, but this comparison cannot be pushed too
far. They both flow out of the entitative habitus perfecting
the essence of the soul, and they are both ordained to produce
special effects in the powers of the soul, the one a remedial
effect, the others a perfecting effect.
But sacramental grace, from all the descriptions of it given
in the texts cited above; cannot be a habitus on the order of
those of the virtues and gifts. For the latter are operative
habitus, while sacramental grace, if anything would be an
entitative or a quasi-entitative habitus, perfecting the powers
••De Malo, q. 4, a. ad 4.
••II Sent., d. 19, q. I, a. 5, sol.

ST. THOMAS ON THE NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL GRACE

11

not for operation (which function belongs to the virtues and
gifts) but in ordine ad se. In this remedial aspect, which seems
to be the aspect St. Thomas treats of predominantly in the
Sentences, 25 it is ordained to natural,ize a power of the soul,
as John of St. Thomas says. 26 It is ordained to restore the
power, or powers, to its or to their pristine health. 21 Its
function, then, is to remove the obstacle, at least to some
extent, to the free and unimpeded performance of virtuous
acts; or fet us say, that the remedial function of sacramental
grace is to perfect the powers of the soul " in ordine ad motum
rationis," such that the reason should find no obstacle on the
part of the powers of the soul to its dictates.
Moreover the idea of a quasi-entitative habitus has no
foundation in St. Thomas. For he speaks of only one entitative
habitus in the soul, and that is grace.
Our final conclusion is, then, that the term sacramental
grace refers to the immediate effect of the sacramental rite,
or the res et sacramentum, precisely as such, if we consider
it in one of its two relations with sanctifying grace, that is,
as a disposition for it. It is not a habitus, either entitative or
operative, but it is a remedy tending to bring back the powers
of the soul to the subjection they once had in the state of
innocence. Their function is one of restoration. Just as some
of the old parts of an ancient monument can still be seen as
a kind of witness to its restoration, so too, in the great work
of restoring humanity, the latter has not been restored in all
its parts so as to reach that state of harmony which existed
between the inferior powers and the reason in the state of
innocence. 28
We cannot conclude with Capreolus, following Peter of
•• IV Sent., Prologue of St. Thomas.
•• CurBUS Tkeologicus, IX, q. 62, disp. 24, a. 2, n. 22.
•• "Ad secundum dicendum quod gratia virtutum opponitur peccato, secundum
quod peccatum continet inordinationem actus; sed gratia sacramentalis opponitur ei
secundum quod vulnerat naturale bonum
IV Sent., d. I, q. I, a. 4,
qcla. 5, ad 2.
•• P. Gounin, "La Grace Sacramentelle," Revue Apologetique, 55 (1982), 149-148.

CHARLES A. SCHLECK

Palu, or with Fr. Brazzarola, that the sacramental graces are
habitus in the strict sense of the word, and operative habifas;
nor can we even say that the texts of the Sentences" favor the
identification of the sacramental graces with new habitus." 29

B. The De V eritate
Next in our consideration comes the text which has been
used by both those who consider sacramental grace to be a
habitus distinct from that of habitual grace, and by those
who consider it to be a modality of this grace. Since the work
was undertaken a little later than the commentary on the
Sentences, we will be able to see whether there was any change
or development of the ideas expressed there. 30
The text occurs in an article parallel to one which is found
in the Sentencea-" Whether there is in every individual only
one'gratia gratum faciens.81
We shall have to consider the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth objections preceding the corpus of the article, insofar
as the pertinent response is given as a solution for all of these.
We might trace the objections per modum unius, so that the
one response given for them will be somewhat more easy to
grasp.
The sacramental graces are recognized as being specifically
distinct from one another; 32 in fact so specifically distinct,
that the objector conceives of them as different species of
sanctifying grace 33 and not as one form that the various
sacraments increase. 34 Under this light then, a person could
have several gratiae gratum facientes, each of the sacraments
producing its own.
•• H. Bouesse, O.P., Le Sauveur du Monde 4. L'Economie Sacramentaire (Chambery-Leysee-Paris, 1951), p. 428.
••Fr. Walz, O.P., in his chronology of the works of St. Thomas, gives the De
Veritate as having been written between 1256-9; the Sentences, between 1258-5;
" Chronotaxis Vitae et Operum S. Thomae de Aquino," Angelicum, 16 (1989), 470478.
81 Cf. II Sent., d. 26, q. a. 6.
••De Verit., q. 27, obj. 14.

••Ibid., obj. 12.
"'Ibid., obj. 18.

ST. THOMAS ON THE NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL GRACE

18

Moreover, the sacraments are considered as being directed
principally against the guilt we have contracted, 35 and for
that reason are not charismatic gifts in the sense of which
St. Paul speaks, 36 because these are not opposed to any guilt.
Having already refuted some of the .difficulties within the
objections themselves, in the response one point will receive
the special attention of St. Thomas-acceptance with clarification, or rejection of the assertion: " There are several species
of habitual grace."
His response is a follows:
. . . just as the diverse virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit are
ordered to different acts, so too the different effects of the sacraments are as different medicines against sin, and participations of
the power of the Passion of Our Lord, which depend upon the
' gratia gratum faciens,' just as do the virtues and the gifts.
The virtues and the gifts, however, have a special name, because
of the fact that the acts towards which they are ordained are evident; for that reason, they are distinguished from grace according
to name. 37 The defects of sin, against which the sacraments have
been instituted, are hidden; as a result, the effects of the sacraments
do not have a proper name, but they are called by the name of
grace, i.e., sacramental grace. It is with respect to these that the
sacraments are distinguished insofar as these are considered their
proper effects. Nevertheless these effects pertain to habitual grace,
which is joined to them. Along with their proper effects, then, the
sacraments have a 'common effect, habitual grace, which they give
to one who does not yet have it, or increase in one who already
does. 38
35

Ibid., obj. 14.

I Cor. 12: 4.
In the Leonine edition of the De V e:ritate, which will appear shortly, the last
phrase will read as " should read ' unde etiam secundum nomen a gratia distinguuntur '." This is also the reading which occurs in the text where Capreolus
discusses the nature of sacramental grace, referring to this text of the De Veritate.
This would not seem necessarily to indicate that the virtues and the gifts are of the
same nature as the sacramental graces; it would merely indicate that the virtues
and the gifts differ from habitual grace on two accounts--because of their special
effects, and, nominally. The sacramental graces differ from it on one, the fact that
they have special effects. The nature of sacramental grace is not the point at issue.
38 De Ve:rit., q. 27, a. 5, ad 12.
36

37

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CHARLES A. SCHLECK

The sacramental · graces are to be considered as diverse
medicines against sin, and participations of the power of Our
Lord's Passion; and they depend, as do the virtues and the
gifts, on habitual grace. But we must interpret this in the
light of the entire response. The aim of the Angelic Doctor
is to show that the special effects of the sacraments cannot be
called diverse habitual graces perfecting the essence of the soul.
He is answering principally the difficulty of the article" Whether there can be more than one habitual grace? " The
answer is categorical-No.
As regards the nature of sacramental grace, this is not determined because this cannot be decided perfectly until the special
defects against which the sacraments are ordained are known;
and they are as he expressly states not known (latentes sunt)
Whence it is that we cannot give them any name such as
" virtue " or " gift." It is true that we know something of the
effects of the various sacraments, but we do not know the
nature of the defects against which they are given. We know
. that until we perceive the nature of an object, we cannot know
adequately the nature of that which is specified by the object.
And therefore, we must conclude that until we know the
nature of the defects, we cannot know adequately the nature
of the sacramental graces or effects. If the causa causarum,
the final cause is unknown, then the formal cause cannot be
completely understood. And that is the exact cause we have
here. For St. Thomas avows that the final causes, the defects
for which the graces are given are hidden, or are not known.
We do know that the sacramental graces in some way pertain
to habitual grace, as do the virtues and the gifts, and that
habitual grace is joined to them, giving the sacraments not
only their proper effects, but also a common effect, namely
sanctifying grace.
Here again we note the position of sacramental grace with
regard to habitual grace. It depends on habitual grace, and as
such, presupposes it; and it also contains it by a kind of continuation, insofar as " the sacraments along with their proper

ST. THOMAS ON THE NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL GRACE

15

effects, have also a common effect, habitual grace, which they
either give initially, or increase."
From two other responses in the same article, we can see
a re-affirmation of the role sacramental graces are called upon
to play. In the answer to the eighth objection, he says that
in the consideration of sin, we can tum our attention to one
of two things, the aversion which is the same for all mortal
sins, in that they all tum us away from God, the unchangeable
good; or we can consider sin in regard to the conversion it
involves. It the latter consideration, the virtues oppose themselves to sin, such that the various virtues exclude the sins
which are opposed to them. For contrary forms expel contrary
forms or dispositions.
In the :fifteenth response, St. Thomas says that if we consider
sin precisely from the view-point of the aversion it involves,
we have one wound inflicted on the soul, and that wound is
healed by habitual grace. But if we take sin from the conversion to commutable good that it involves, it inflicts several
wounds, which are healed by the virtues and by the special
effects of the sacraments.
The virtues are sufficient to expel the forms opposed to
themselves, as we can see from the answer to the eighth objection. The sacramental graces or effects must heal in another
way, which is not expressed here, but which is probably that
which is expressed in the
acting as a remedy
against the wounds of the natural good of the powers of the
soul, which wounds, as we can see from the De Malo, do not
require the infusion of any form or habitus. But regardless
of the assertion of this last phrase, the fact that he does not
mention how the sacramental graces heal, accords perfectly
with ·the avowal that he has in the response to the twelfth
objection-the defects against which they are given are unknown. For the De Malo was written at least four years after
the De Veritate.39
•• N. B. The dates given by Mandonnet for the composition of the De Veritate
are 1256-9; for the De Malo, 1263-8. Cf. " Chronologie Sommaire de la vie et des
cicrits de Saint Thomas," Revue des sciences phuoaophiques et theologique8, IX
(1920)' 148.

16

CHARLES A. SCHLECK

From our consideration then, we can arrive at three conclusions:
I. The sacramental graces are distinguished from habitual grace,

not in such a way, however, as to create different species of
habitual grace perfecting the soul.
2. The relation of the sacramental graces with habitual grace
appears to be exactly the same here as it was in the Sentencesdisposition for, or effect following from, depending on the genus
of causality under consideration.
3. The sacramental graces do not seem to expel any forms in the
p<>wers of the soul as do the virtues.

Beyond this, neither the text, nor the context allow us to go.

*

*

*

*

There is one other text in this same work in which St. Thomas
speaks of sacramental grace, a text, which, strangely enough,
is not very often cited in regard to the problem. He merely
repeats something that we have already seen in the commentary on the Sentences,4° as regards the effects of the causality
of the sacraments.
The sacraments do not arrive directly and immediately at sanctifying grace, but rather at their proper effects which are called
sacramental graces upon which there follows the infusion of habitual
grace or its .increase.41

We saw above that that which the sacraments caused
directly and immediately was the res et sacramentum, which
is a cha:racter, or an "ornatus animae" or something of the
sort, in the case of the sacraments which do not impress any
character. The sacraments do not cause immediately and
directly the habitual grace perfecting the essence of the soul;
they cause this only in a dispositional way. Are we to infer
from this that St. Thomas wishes to identify the sacramental
character with sacramental grace? I believe that he does not
mean to identify the sacramental character with sacramental
••IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 1.
De Verit., q. 27, a. 7, c.

41

ST. THOMAS ON THE NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL GRAC:JE

17

grace, but rather the res et sacramentum with sacramental
grace. Or let us say that he identifies the character with
sacramental grace, not insofar as it is a character (for under
this precise aspect it is something which is directly ordained
towards cult), but insofar as the character is the res et sacramentum of a sacrament.
We must picture the sacramental causality as expressed here
in exactly the same manner as we did in the Sentences. The
immediate effect can be considered under one of two aspectseither as the res et sacramentum,, or a physical disposition
exacting of its nature the infusion of sanctifying grace, as we
see it considered here; or we can regard it as an effect flowing
from the grace in the essence of the soul; as we saw from the
first text of the De V eritate. There can be no questioning the
fact that the Angelic Doctor identifies the sacramental graces
with the immediate effects of the sacramental rite. Nor can
there be any question that the role
sacramental grace is
twofold, and can only be explained by having recourse to the
principle "causae sunt ad invicem causae, sed in diverso
genere."
The notion of sacramental grace insofar as it is expressed
here is exactly the same as that which we found in the
Sentences. The nature is not determined here, either in the
text or in the context, and indeed, it is difficult to know the
exact nature, because the defects against which it is ordained
are hidden. From the response to the eighth objection, we
see that they do not infuse into the powers of the soul any
form such as the virtues do; they are not, therefore, operative
habitus, on the same order as are the virtues or the gifts of
the Holy Spirit.
With this then, let us turn to the nature of sacramental
grace as proposed in the Summa.
C. The Summa Theologiae
The problem which has been facing us throughout our
study is the nature of sacramental grace, or sacramental grace
considered in regard to its formal causality. We would expect
2

18

CHARLES A. SCHLECK

that a consideration of the other three causes would help
us to reach a solution. While it is true that we have already
considered them, we have not pointed them out as such,
pref erring to wait until we should study the problem in the
Summa, since it is here that we have the definitive and concise
teaching of the Angelic Doctor on the subject.
That brings us, therefore, to a study of sacramental grace
in relation to (1) its efficient causes, God and the sacraments;
(2) its material cause, or the subject to whom it is given,
man wounded by original and actual sin; (8) its final cause,
or the ends for which it is given. However, since the final and
material causes are so closely related, we can consider them
together.
I
SACRAMENTAL

GRACE IN RELATION

TO ITS EFFICIENT

CAUSES

When we consider the position of the articles on sacramental
grace in the Summa, we can be quite certain of one thing, ·that
he is considering here, from the very posi,tion of the articles,
sanctifying grace, or habitual grace, not insofar as it perfects
the essence of the soul, nor insofar as from it there flow virtues
and gifts to perfect its powers; he is considering grace here
precisely as it is given to us in and through the sacraments
with a view to giving us help in regard to certain difficulties
with which we are faced in our spiritual life, which is now a
Christian life, or a life depending upon and imitating the life
of Christ, the Incarnate Son of God.
THE TERM Gratia Sacramentalis

The understanding of the solution regarding the nature of
sacramental grace, will be much easier and more convincing,
if we understand the meaning of the term gratia sacramentalis.
In the Summa St. Thomas does not use it merely to denote the
special effect of each of the sacraments, qua effectus specialis,
such as he did in the earlier works. If we were to consider the
term in this sense, we would destroy the trend and the unity

ST. THOMAS ON THE NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL GRACE

19

of the question in which is occurs. For all the other articles
consider grace as an effect of the sacraments, or we might say,
they treat of grace as conferred sacramentally, implying therefore an opposition to the consideration of grace merely in the
abstract, the grace of the virtues and of the gifts.
This interpretation is confirmed in the sed contra where
St. Thomas tells us that if grace, coming to us through the
sacraments, did not have something in addition to the grace
of the virtues and of the gifts, then the sacraments would be
frustra, useless, for one already having this grace of the virtues
and of the gifts. The grace therefore, given by the sacraments
is not exactly the same, essentially and accidentally, as that
of the virtues and of the gifts.
Secondly, it is confirmed in the body of the article where
he opposes grace secundum se considerata to the grace
ferred by the sacraments. The question to be answered in the
article is whether the grace given through the sacraments adds
something to the grace which perfects the essence of the soul
and the virtues and the gifts which perfect the powers of the
soul. He answers in the affirmative, and in explaining the
answer he says that it adds a certain divine help. He does not,
therefore, identify sacramental grace with the help that it
gives, but says rather that grace as given through the sacraments has something in addition to the habitual grace, or
as he says, to the grace of the virtues and of the gifts. That
" something " enables the one receiving a sacrament to live·
the Christian life, or that aspect of it symbolized by the
particular sacrament received.
Part of the reason 42 for this change in the use of the term
gratia sacramentalis is given to us in the first article of the
same question, that is to say, because of the fact that he
changed his teaching on the causality of the sacraments. The
two questions are very closely related. The fact that the sacra•• N. B. I say "part of the reason" because he had already broken from the idea
that grace was directly created by God in the soul, at the time of the writing of the
De Veritate. Cf. De Verit., q. 27, a. 8, ad 9; a. 4, ad 15.

20

CHARLES

A. SCHLECK

ments cause grace perfective, according to the teaching we find
here in article one, is an indication that most probably sacramental grace is no longer considered as a disposition, not even
in genere causae materialis, as it definitely is in the commentary
on the Sentences .and in the De V eritate, where he proposes
the theory of dispositional instrumental causaHty. 43
might
also note that Capreolus who considers sacramental grace as
a habitus, also considers that St. Thomas taught the theory o:f
dispositional causality in the Summa as well as in the other
two works. 44 So it seems that there is more than a coincidence
in linking up the causality o:f the sacraments with the nature
o:f sacramental grace, and especially with the term gratia
sacramentalis.
Lastly, the manner in which St. Thomas speaks of sacramental grace here, is quite different from that of the preceding
works, just as is the manner in which he speaks of sacramental
causality. This comes from his conception of the entire sacramental system. For the sacraments are considered as giving
as their
and immediate effect sanctification, 45 a sanctification which is accidentally diverse in accordance with the
sacramental symbolism of the various sacraments. The limitation, or better, the determination of the sanctification given
by the sacraments, has been established by God according to
the exigencies of the spiritual life which has some conformity
with our corporal life. 46
In short, the entire conception
sacramental theology a15
found in the Summa is more unified and more simple than we
43 JV Sent., d. l, q. 1, a. 4, 'qcla. 5:
"Et ita patet quod gratia quam sacramentum
directe continet, differt a gratia quae est in virtutibus et donis; quamvis etiam illam
gratiam per q11amdam continuationem contimant." Cf. also ibid., d. 7, q. 2, a. £,
qcla. 2, ad 2. It is even more clear in the De Verit., q. 27, a. 7, c. (in fine): "Et
hoc modo gratia quae est in sacramentis; et tanto minus, quanto sacramenta non
perveniunt directe et immediate ad ipsam gratiam, de qua nunc loquimur; sed ad
proprios effectus qui dicuntur gratiae sacramentales, ad quod sequitur infusio gratiae
gratum facientis, vel augmentum."
44 Caprcolus,
lac. cit., q. I, p. 4.
45 Sllmma Theol., HI, q. 60, a. 2, c.
46 Ibid., q. 65, a. 1, c.

ST. THOMAS ON THE NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL GRACE

find it in the other works, because here he is laying out a sumtotal of theology, according to a definite plan, which receives
its unity from that of its object, God, Who is Himself perfectly
simple. The whole notion, then, of sacramental grace is more
positive, more closely bound up with the sanctifying aspect
of grace, infiltrating into the acts which are of their very nature
supernatural.

*

*

*

*

As we consider the article 47 we see that St. Thomas places
it immediately after one of the articles on sacramental causality.
The sacraments cause grace, a grace which is not merely a
special effect, but sanctifying grace by which we are joined to
God as adopted children "enjoying the Word, and being
participators of Him from a certain kind of an affinity of likeness," to use the very deep and mysterious words of St. Thomas
himself. 48
The sacraments confer this grace, not by setting up or
causing, even physically, merely a certain disposition in the
soul, exacting from God the infusion of grace; rather they
themselves confer sanctification on the soul by being elevated
and moved by God to produce an effect which is beyond their
natural powers. In other words, the sacraments cause their
principal effect perfective.
We would naturally expect that the next question he will
ask will concern the principal effect of the sacraments also,
which is, as he says in the Prologue, grace, around which centers
the entire consideration of the present question. He proposes
the question " Whether the grace which is caused by the
sacraments is the same as the grace of the virtues and of the
gifts."
He answers in the negative, and says that it adds something
••Ibid., q. 62, a. 2.
48 " Et licet Verbum Dei sua virtute penetret omnia, utpote omnia conservans et
portans, creaturis tamen intellectualibus, quae proprie Verbo perfrui possunt et eius
participes esse, ex quadam similitudinis affinitate et eminentius et ineffabilius potest
uniri." IV Cont. Gent,. c. 41.

CHARLES A. SCHLECK

which he calls rather indefinitely a quoddam divinum auxilium,
a certain divine help to enable the sacrament and the one
receiving it to attain the end for which it was instituted. In
the body of the article he does not proceed much farther in
determining the nature of the help; he allows that to remain
somewhat obscure, or let us say that he allows the mystery
which is contained in the life of grace as sacramentalized to
remain. 49
He does tell us the reason for our sacramental grace-life,
namely, to produce special effects necessary in a life which is
now according to divine providence essentially Christian, or
Christ-like, insofar as we are now imagines Filii sui. 50 These
special effects are " something beyond the acts to which the
powers of the soul are ordained . . ." and we might add, considered naturally or supernaturally; that is to say that the
powers of the soul can in no way produce these effects even
perfected by the grace of the virtues and of the
The
sacramental grace is not this effect, as can be shown from the
fact that throughout the entire Summa St. Thomas, when
speaking of the special effect of the various sacraments, never
calls it the sacramental grace of the sacrament. This special
effect is the final cause of the sacrament, while the sacramental
grace adds beyond the grace of the virtues and of the gifts a
certain help or strength by which the final cause of the sacrament is attained. The sacraments would be useless, if the
grace they give was iri. no way different from the grace of
the virtues and the gifts, and the causality of the sacraments,
as expressed by the phrase efficiunt quod figurant, 51 would
simply be untrue.
But that grace is ·different, and that difference is brought
••"Es gehort niimlich zum Wesen des sakramentalen Mysteriums, dass das
Mysterium auch in Sakramente, Mysterium bleibt. Das wiire nicht der Fall, wenn
es in demselben schlechtweg offenbar wiirde; es soll ja eben etwas im Sakramente,
im lnnem desselben Verborgenes sein und bleiben." M. J. Scheeben, Die Mystaien
des Christentums (Herder, 1951), p. 460.
50 Rom. 8:
51 Summa Theologiae, III, q.
a. 1, ad I.

ST. THOMAS ON THE NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL GRACE

!l8

out more clearly in the answers to the objections proposed.
The grace of the sacraments is ordained to effect a spiritual
life in us which is essentially Christian, requiring certain special
effects, in addition to the normal ordering of our actions which
is taken care of by the activity of the spiritual organism, or
the grace of the virtues and of the gifts.
We might ask ourselves just what these effects could be that
the grac;e of the virtues and of the gifts cannot produce. For
this is of itself sufficient to perfect the soul and its powers, to
incline them to the doing of good, and to exclude all sin which
is the cause of the defects of the soul.
In the third response St. Thomas wards off this attack .. The
grace of the virtues and of the gifts introduces into the· soul
habitus or forms which are directly opposed to sin and to the
vices, or the habitus inclining us to evil. By these new forms
sin and the vices are excluded, as regards our present state
and that of the future; for we are prevented from sinning by
these perfections, establishing goodness, and inclining us toward
the doing of good. This, however, does not say anything for
the sins, which are past as far as their commission is concerned,
but whose guilt (reatus), implying an obligation of satisfaction,
remains; for this a special remedy is given through the sacraments. The mere infusion of grace into the soul does not
necessarily imply a remission of the temporal punishment due
to sin. Grace, however, infused into the soul, by the instrumental causality of the sacraments, implies to some extent
satisfaction for the temporal punishment due to sin, in addition
to excluding the eternal punishment, by bringing into the
soul the presence of sanctifying grace. 52
We might also take this phrase in a more limited sense, that
the sacraments give ·a special remedy diminishing the material
element of original sin, the fomes peccati or concupiscence,
inclining us toward sin. Regardless of how we take the phrase,
however, he is not talking about any habitus that is added by
sacramental grace, as is evident both from his conception of
•• N. B. We shall see more of this role of sacramental grace later on.

CHARLES A. SCHLECK

satisfaction, which we shall see later on, and from that of
the material element of a kind of natural habitus affecting our
very nature as well as our supernature as did also the habitus
of original justice." 3 It would then be, as we have shown above,
11either an operative habitus nor an entitative or quasi-entitative habitus.
In the third response St. Thomas refutes an objection that
would multiply the number of habitual graces sanctifying the
soul. The objector states that every addition or subtraction
in forms changes the species of the form. If therefore sacramental grace adds something to the grace of the virtues and
of the gifts, we would have a species of habitual grace that
would differ specifically from this grace. If such be the case,
then nothing certain can be shown from the fact that the
sacraments are said to cause grace; for we do not know what
kind of grace they would cause.
The objection proceeds from the notion of habitus, how it
grows and increases. Sacramental grace according to the objector, insofar as it adds something to the habitus of grace, necessarily changes it specifically. The objector is not convinced
of this himself; he is merely trying to show that the thesis
proposed would lead to this. For this theory of addition implies
that sacramental grace would be ·a special habitus, not in the
same category as the gratia gratum faciens.
St. Thomas refutes the objection, not by denying that sacramental grace is a species of grace, but by explaining how it is·
a species of grace. If we keep in mind the meaning of the
phrase gratia sacramentalis as the grace which is conferred in
the sacramental action or the res sacramenti according to all
it implies, we will not have to distort the answer in any way,
especially in respect to the comparison he uses. We can accept
it simply as it is given.
- The reasoning of the major of the objector is not to be
denied. It is, as a matter of fact, St. Thomas' very own.54 But
53

Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 82, a. I, c., and responses.

"'Ibid., q. 52, a. 2, c.

ST. THOMAS ON THE NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL GRACE

25

the application of the major to the present problem is the
thing against which St. Thomas reacts. We are not treating
of the addition of one form to another; we are treating of the
extension of one form to certain special effects which in
accordance with divine providence are not ordinarily accorded
except in and through the sacraments. In speaking of the
growth of habitus, St. Thomas tells us:
A cause increasing or augmenting a habitus always effects something new in the subject, but it does not always effect a new form.
It may give more perfect existence to a form already existing in a
subject, or it may make the subject extend itself further. 55

And we might add, to the special effects necessary in the
Christian life, or the spiritual life set up for us by Christ the
Incarnate Son of God. And so St. Thomas could say, to use
a comparison, that sacramental grace is opposed to the gratia
gratum faciens as a species is to its genus. It contains in its
very essence the grace of the virtues and of the gifts, just as
humanity in its very essence contains animality. Just as
animality as found in a horse and as found in a man is not
an equivocal concept, neither is grace as found in the phrases
gratia sacramentalis and gratia virtutum et donorum. Sacramental grace adds something to the concept of the grace
of the virtues and of the gifts, somewhat as man adds something to the notion of animal.
Here we see the import of the response; he is trying to show
that sacramental grace and the grace of the virtues and of the
gifts are not equivocal graces, or equivocal habitus of sanctification. Rather, sacramental grace includes the grace of the
virtues and of the gifts and, in addition, adds something to it.
The sacramental graces insofar as they contain the grace of
the virtues and of the gifts do not differ from one another; but
they do differ specifically from one another with respect to the
quoddam divinum auxilium that they give to attain the end
of the sacrament in question.
•• Ibid., ad 2.

26

CHARLES A. SCHLECK

This.interpretation :finds its confirmation in a response which
we :find in the question on the sacrament of Confirmation.
The question to be answered is whether the sacrament of Confirmation confers habitual grace. The objector is pictured as
denying that it does:
... habitual grace does not differ in regard to species, since it is
ordained to produce one effect. Two forms of the same species
cannot be in the same subject. Since therefore, habitual grace is
conferred upon a person in the reception of Baptism, it seems that
it is not conferred by the sacrament of Confirmation, which is
administered only to one who has been baptized. 56

In his response St. Thomas points out two flaws in the argument: 56 that the grace of Confirmation (gratia sacramentalis
Confirmationis) is not exactly the same as gratia gratum
faciens, or habitual grace; 57 one and the same form can be
increased in the same subject, per modum intensionis. He has
already pointed that out in treating of the notion of habitus and
the virtue of Charity. 5 e
In the response we see that the res tantum of the sacrament
of Confirmation, if considered according to all that it implies,
that is, adding something over and above the element that it
as well as all the sacraments gives, namely, habitual grace,
this res tantum of the sacrament of Confirmation is not the
same specifically as the res tantum of the sacrament of Baptism
considered in all that. it implies. The grace of Confirmation
differs from that of Baptism, not insofar as we consider the
element they have in common, but in regard to the special
effect that each of them gives, thus making the res tantum of
the particular sacrament in question different from the res
tantnm of another sacrament. The special element or effect
that each of the sacraments adds is a kind of specific difference,
if you will, but St. Thomas does not intend to say that this
specific difference constitutes a species in exactly the same way
that rationality does when added to animality.
••Ibid., III, q. 72, a. 7, obj. 8.
Ibid., ad 8.

11

••Ibid., I-II, q. 52, a. 2; II-II, q. 24, a. 5.

ST. THOMAS ON THE NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL

GRACE

27

In a short article on the effect of the sacraments, Fr. Unterleidner gives what appears to be a sufficient clarification of
the point at issue:
Sacramental grace is to common grace as species is to genus.
It contains therefore, common grace, just as the notion of man for
example, contains the form animal, the generic form which he
shares with the beast. But it contains something more, just as the
concept of man embraces the generic form of animal and something
more. But he .does not press the comparison any further, and therefore restrains the proportions of the two relations, in order to avoid
making habitual grace a genus (of grace) divisible into species in
the strict sense.59

St. Thomas uses the comparison then, but not to its fullest
possible extent. For this would give us specifically different
habitus of sanctifying grace, which is exactly the point the
objector is trying to make, and St. Thomas trying to refute.
To regard the article in this light saves the trend of the question, and gives to sacramental physical or direct causality all
that it should have; the sacramental rite causes the res et sacramentum and the principal effect of the sacrament, the sacramental grace, which includes habitual grace together with the
quoddam divinum auxilium, sanctifying the soul or let us say,
the person, in a special manner, for the role he or she plays in
the sacramental life. Thus sacramental causality and sacramental symbolism, which exact that the sacraments efficiunt
seu causant quod figurant seu significant, are preserved. 60
In an earlier question St. Thomas tells us that the sacraments
are signs of something sacred insofar as they sanctify men. 61
That which they confer through the res sacramenti is sanctification. This latter is not merely habitual grace such as we
would find it abstractly considered; it is habitual grace with
a certain divine help or strength added to it. This latter
•• "L'Efl'et lmmediat des Sacrements," Revue Augustiniimne, XII (1908), 198194; cf. John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus, IX, q. 62, disp. 24, a. 2, nos. 5, 17
(Paris: Vives, 1885).
00 Summa Theol., III, q. 62, a. 1 ad 1.
• 1 Ibid., q. 60, a. 2, c.

CHARLES A. SCHLECK

element, too, has a sanctifying force or role, not separate from
or independent of habitual grace's role of sanctification, but
intimately and necessarily connected with it, extending the
sanctification which the latter effects. It is this habitual grace,
precisely insofar as it sanctifies in a special manner, that St.
Thomas calls sacramental grace; the special manner of sanctification is in accordance with the signification of the symbolism
of the sacramental rite.
This, then, seems to be the thought of St. Thomas on perfective causality and on the nature of sacramental grace,
such as that is given to us in this particular article, and both
receive from this reinforced simplification more unity and
strength. This interpretation exacts a change in the use of the
phrase gratia sacramentalis, just as the use of the phrase causa
instrumentalis in regard to the sacramentum of the sacramental
process no longer in the Summg, means mere dispositional cause,
but perfective cause, as a result of the conviction of St. Thomas
expressed in the tract on grace 62 and in the De Veritate, 68 that
grace is not created, insofar as it is not a subsistent entity. 64
Without hesitation, then, we can say that the reason for
the change in speaking of sacramental grace came not so
much from a clarification of the final causality of the various
sacraments, as from a more simplified view of the efficient
causality of the sacramental action. As a consequence of this
simplification and unification of the teaching of St. Thomas,
we no longer need have recourse to the distinction which we
noted above in the Sentences and in the De V eritate in explaining the relation between sacramental grace and sanctifying
grace. The term gratia sacramentalis should no longer be
applied to that special effect which acts as a disposition for
the res sacramenti, in ge'l}ere causae materialis, or as the special
effect flowing from the grace of the virtues and of the gifts,
in genere causae formalis.
Ibid., q. no, a. 2, ad 8.
••Ibid., q. 27, a. 8, ad 9; a. 4, ad 15.
••Cf. ibid., I, q. 45, a. 4, c.

•2

ST. THOMAS ON THE NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL GRACE

Above all we should not consider sacramental grace and
sanctifying grace as "physically the same grace which is at
the same time, and according to different modes, sacramental
and sanctifying." 65 For if we are going to consider sacramental
grace as a modality of sanctifying grace, or as the res tantum
of the sacrament, then we should not say that sacramental
grace is a " preparation for sanctifying grace under one aspect,
and an emanation from it under another aspect." 66 This would
be to use the term sacramental grace in two different senses,
that is to say, both for the special effect, which can be considered under one of two aspects, and for the modality of
sanctifying grace which is nothing else than the principal effect
of the sacramental action, or the res tantum. O:r we might say
that we should not use the same term to indicate a disposition
for a form, and the form, and consider them as being only
modally different. To say the least, this is quite confusing.
That which is modally different is the one form considered with
or without the· special effect received through the sacramental
action.

*

*

*

*

In conclusion, then, from what we have seen sacramental
grace is in the strict sense of the word a habitus; it is not,
however, the habitus which some theologians have tried to
make it; for it is not a habitus on the order of those of the
virtues and of the gifts. Nor is it anything that flows from
the habitus of sanctifying grace such as do the virtues and the
gifts. Nor is it for St. Thomas a special vigor which is added.
All of these notions come from taking sacramental grace in the
strict sense of the word, or as the special effect. Sacramental
grace is nothing but the habitus of sanctifying grace modified in
accordance with the particular exigencies of the various phases
of the spiritual or Christian life.
It is from the failure to distinguish between sacramental
•• E. Hugon, O.P., "Correspondance
Revue Augustinienne, loc. cit., p. 844.

••Ibid.

sur 'L'effet

immediat des sacrements ',"

30

CHARLES A. SCHLECK

grace in the strict sense, or the special effect or vigor and
sacramental grace in the broad sense, or sanctifying grace as
modified in accordance with the ends of the sacramentsit is from this failure that most of the difficulties in this question
have arisen. If we call it the modification of sanctifying grace,
then we should not call it the special effect, or the special vigor;
in the one case it is a habitus, and in the other it is not. Sacramental grace for St. Thomas is a habitus, on the same order
as habitual grace; or more correctly, it is habitual grace, or the
grace of the virtues and of the gifts, now modified with a certain
divine help making it attain the special ends of the sacrament.
Those theologians who identify sacramental grace with the
special vigor, or with the special effect, are not wrong, but
they should not quote this article from St. Thomas to support
their stand. For the term gratia sacramentalis is not used in
this sense in the Summa. 67
CHARLES

A. SCHLECK,

c. s. c.

Holy Cross College,
Washington, D. C.

(to be continueil)

67 Fr. Hugon, in his response to Fr. Unterleidner,
acknowledges this, that sacramental grace and sanctifying grace are one and the same physical entity, and that
if we consider physical causality as being only perfective, and drop the idea of
dispositional physical causality, then we should also simplify our conception of
sacramental grace to that which we have given above. This can and should be done,
and is, no doubt, the mind of Aquinas. He was " merely trying to conciliate the
texts of the Sentences with those of the Summa." Cf. art. cit., p. 845.

CAN QUALITIES BE MEASURED?

D

EVELOPMENT in modern experimental science began
at the moment when qualities were measured; and the
basic factor of progress in such science has been
advancement in measuring qualities.
It is impossible in our day to think of experimental science
except in terms of measuring heat, light, weight, voltage,
valence, radiation, emotion, sensation, intelligence, behavior,
and other like entities. While science has preserved much of
its ancient naturalistic and qualitative character, it has
advanced, nevertheless, by increasing measurement and quantitative treatment of the beings which in other times were qualitatively analyzed and described. Such measurement has
produced undeniable results; and theories which have their
foundation in measurements have been successful in predicting
future phenomena. This indicates that the process of measuring
qualities is valid.
For the philosopher of science, therefore, questions are bound
to be raised which are the theoretical foundation of measuring
qualities: Are such qualities truly measurable? If they are so,
why? Are there any limitations to the measurability of qualities? Finally, how does one measure them?
These are fundamental questions. For, if it is true that
qualities cannot truly be measured, then the scientist is engaged
in an illusory enterprise. And further, if there are limitations
which accompany measurability in qualities, then these restrictions will necessarily condition the truth, the meaning and the
accuracy of the measurements; and make it necessary to
modify, restrict, and interpret the use of data obtained under
such limitations.
Adequate solutions to these problems of measurability in
qualities may be reached by an application of several principles
31

32

MARK HEATH

of the philosophy of nature of Aristotle and St. Thomas
Aquinas. Concerned with such application this study first considers the act of measurement and those properties which it
requires in the object to be measured. It establishes that these
properties are present in qualities-but with limitations; and
concludes that under these restrictions, qualities are measurable. Finally it treats the problem of direct and indirect
measurement of qualities.

I. ON MEASURABILITY

IN GENERAL

1. The Nature of Measure and Measurability

Measure, says Aristotle, is that by which quantity is known. 1
This is the fundamental and truest meaning of the word
measure. It includes a "means of knowing" and "quantity."
Measure is the determination and estimation of quantity. " ...
Measure is found first of all in numbers, secondly in magnitudes." 2 It is properly spoken of in quantities, says St.
Thomas, for measure is that by which the quantity of a thing
is made known. 8
The use of the term measure is extended by analogy from
its basic meaning, however, to include any norm which may be
applied in any genus: " Measure is found first of all in numbers,
secondly in magnitudes, and in a certain other way in all other
genera, as it appears in IX M etaph." 4 Measure may reach
beyond the quantitative aspect-thus any object is judged
to be a more or less true species of a class, according as it
approaches or recedes from the ideal of the class. It is said
thus to be measured by the ideal. This is true of whiteness,
intelligence, courage, and societies. Men "measure up" to
the standard and are judged as true members of a class, or they
do not. Measure is found even in the genus of substances
Meta. X, 1, 1052 b 20.
• De Virtut. Card., a. 8.
3 I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, ad 8.
• De Virtut. Card., a. 8.

1

CAN QUALITIES BE MEASURED?

88

where the measure of all other beings in the genus is that
substance which has being most perfectly and most simplywho is God. 5
Fundamentally, however, measure is said of quantities: that
by which the quantity of a thing is made known.
The act of measuring is defined in its most general meaning
as the act of the intellect applying certain principles to the
examination of objects proposed at hand-" to judge or measure
is an act of the intellect, applying certain principles to examine
propositions." 6 Joining the fundamental quantitative notion
of measure to this act of the act of measure, the definition of
measure becomes: the act of the intellect applyl.ng certain
and determined quantitative elements to proposed quantified
objects for the purpose of determining their quantity.
From this fundamental and commonly agreed definition of
measurement it is possible to gain insights into the first problem of this essay: the notion of measurability, or the properties
required or postulated by the object in order that it be
measured.
The first property, the root of all others is that it be a quantity.
This is a capital point and hence the definition of quantity, its
properties, its species, its causes and effects, its analogous
extension to qualitative realms and particularly to the psychical,
will be given a more detailed treatment in this study.
fl. The Notion and Properties of Quantity

Measurability is quantity. Whatever is quantitative is by
definition measurable: wherever there is an aspect of quantity
there is an aspect of measurability. But if the quantity is only
metaphorical, so also will be the measure, really no measure
at all. If the quantity is said under restrictions, so also will
there be restrictions on the measure. If the quantity is analogous, measurability and measure are analogous also.
But what is quantity? Which things are quantified? Are
qualities, love, intellectual things? Are these measurable?
• I Sent., ibid.

3

•Summa Theol. I, q. 79, a. 9, ad 4.

84

MARK HEATH

Quantity is a form possessed or radicated in bodies by which
they have all the various and multiple effects and properties
by which we identify them as quanta or quantified objects.
Because quantity is one of the most simple and fundamental
notions, one of the ten most general classes of being, one can
define it only by reference to these effects and properties known
to us, rather than through a genus or class in which it can be
placed. 7
Quantity first of all is a property of physical bodies, those
composed of matter and form, natural bodies. Quantity,
properly speaking, is physical and material. It is the first
accidental determination of these bodies, and it is characteristic
of bodies because it arises from the fact that all bodies are
material. Without matter there is no quantity. 8
Defining it through the effects and properties it possesses
in matter, i.e., through the peculiar determinations and characteristics it gives to matter and bodies, we may say that it is an
accident adhering in a physical body which makes it divisible.
That divisibility is the exact and first property or effect
which quantity gives to a body is disputed by many Thomistic
philosophers. All agree, however, on several properties which
are the effects of quantity and of nothing else. The precise
problem is to determine which of these is the first property
and which is the order in which they proceed from one another.
Among these many formal effects of quantity are the following:
divisibility, extension of parts in body, actual extension in
place, impenetrability, and measurability. 9 Another is the
property of possessing integral and homogeneous parts. The
precise problem of which of these is first will not interest this
paper. Each of the effects comes to a body from quantity, and
suffices to establish a clear idea of its nature. We can therefore
define quantity in terms of each of them. Quantity is that
form which gives a body integral parts, or which gives it an
•A. Pirotta, 0. P ., Summa Philosvphiae (Turin: Marietti, 1986), II, l!U
8 Summa Theol. III, q. 77, a.!!.
• Pirotta, op. cit., p. 12!!.

CAN QUALITIES BE MEASURED?

35

order of parts in the whole body; or quantity is that form which
makes a body divisible.
On one property we may be more specific. Measurability
is not the first of the formal effects of quantity. It is rather
one of the latter. For it is only after a body is constituted
with parts, in space and impenetrable, that we are able to
relate it to something extrinsic to the body, which is to
measure it.
Because the notion of quantity is so fundamental, Aristotle
does not define it in his treatment, but chooses rather to begin
his tract by naming the various species of· quantity: discrete
and continuous quantity. Continuous quantity is that quantity
in which the parts are joined by a common term; and discrete
is that in which the parts are not so joined. Continuoul'l
quantity is called magnitude, and it is measured. Discrete
quantity is multitude and its property is to be numbered. The
first instance of discrete quantity is number, a multitude to
which has been added the relation of measure, a multitude
measured by unity. Instances of continuous quantity are lines,
surfaces, solids, time, and place. 10
Once the quantity of a body is established absolutely: i. e.,
to be so great or of such a number, it receives quantitative
determinations relative to other quantities or to some norm.
Thus its extension is divided into length, if it is the greater
linear dimension, a determination which comes to it from a
relation to the other dimensions, or breadth if it is the shorter
dimension, or depth if it is a perpendicular dimension. Relative
to another quantity it may be more or less. Relative also to the
normal, natural, or perfect quantity for the body, the quantity
it now possesses may be termed great or small. It is great when
it approaches the perfect, small when it does ·not. What is
great for a man is small for an elephant. In the same way it
may be prolonged or brief, wide or narrow, deep or high. In
discrete quantity it may be many or few.11
1

° Categ. 6, 4 b 20-5 a 14.

11

Pirotta, op. cit,. p. 136.

36

MARK HEATH

These names or determinations of quantity are relative. They
are called the modes of quantity. They are not species or
instances of quantity, nor are they effects or properties brought
to a body by quantity. They are determinations in the quantified object which depend upon its being quantified and arise
from a real relation of the quantified object to another quantum
or to a quantified norm extrinsic to it. Notable among them
are great and small, determinations of quantity which come
to it relative to what is normal, natural, or perfect for the
body. Seven feet is great for a man, small for a giraffe. Five
feet is small in a man, but great in a monkey.
Aristotle takes up the quantum and the measurable in X
Metaphysics 12 in a text in which he makes a list of measurables
which parallels that of the species of quanta listed in Categories
6 18-with a notable addition, however.
The first measurable is discrete quantity or multitude: " All
quantity qua quantity is known by the one, and that by which
quantities are primarily known is the one itself." 14 This "one
itself" is unity, the principle of number, which is the measure
of multitude. He extends the notion of quantum, however:
" In other classes, too, ' measure ' means that by which each
is :first known, and the measure of each is a unity-in length,
in breadth, in depth, in weight, in speed." 15 Thus he extends
the class of measurable objects to the three dimensions of
continuous quantity. These, too, are measurable by a unity.
This listing is similar to that of quanta in Categories 6.
To these he adds weight and speed; and then qualifies this
statement by making a significant distinction on these two
last quanta. " The words ' weight ' and ' speed ' are common to
both contraries, for each of them has two meanings-' weight '
means both that which has any amount of gravity and that
which has an excess of gravity, and ' speed ' both that which
Meta. X, 1, 1052b20-b27.
Categ. 6, 4b20-5a14.
"Meta. X, 1, 1052 b 22.
12

1•

'"Ibid., 1052 b 24.

CAN QUALITIES

BE MEASURED?

37

.has any amount of movement and that which has an excess
of movement; for even the slow has a certain speed and the
comparatively light a certain weight." 16
Aristotle adds this clarification to indicate that speed and
weight as 'that which has any amount of gravity' and 'that
which has any amount of movement ' are qualities, not quantities; and hence are not measurable; while, on the other hand,
weight as ' that which has an excess of gravity ' and speed
as ' that which has an excess of movement ' are in a certain way
quanta and measurable.
The distinction is one between quantity and quality; and
indicates at least the fact that quality, although it is not
quantity, is in a certain way nevertheless measurable. This is
clear because he classes two qualities among the measurables.
In summing up his treatment of measurables he makes a similar
reference to qualities, but in this instance more explicitly:
"Evidently, then, unity in the strictest sense, if :we define it
according to the meaning of the word, is a measure, and most
properly of quantity, and secondly of quality." 17 Clearly, however, qualities are not measurable except in virtue of some
relation to quantity for the quantum and the measurable are
by definition convertible.
In general, then, the measurable is the quantum. To be
measurable an object must be quantified; and the properties
of the measurable object will be those properties and effects
of quantity: divisibility, having homogeneous parts, impenetrability, extension in the quantum, and so forth.
3. A Thomist Critique of a Modern Theory of Measurability

Modern statements of the requirements of measurability
accord with the teaching of Aristotle and St. Thomas. According to Spaier, for example, 18 measurement postulates: 1) the
homogeneity of the object; 2) its divisibility as indicated by
Ibid., 1053 b 27.
Ibid., 1053 b 5.
18 A. Spaier, La Pensee et la Quantile
(Paris, 1927), p. 322.

1•

17

38

MARK HEATH

the units of the graduated instrument; 3) the permanence or
fixity of the measurable species; 4) the invariance of dimensions; 5) the continuity of the object; 6) its spatial objectivity.
Of these six, three are reducible to the effects of quantity as
taught by Thomists. Others relate rather to the optimum conditions for measurement. Reducible to quantity are: ·homogeneity, divisibility, and continuity of the object. Belonging
to the optimum conditions for measurement are: the permanence or fixity of the measurable species, the invariance of
dimensions, and the spatial objectivity of the object.
Homogeneity, understood as specific or substantial homogeneity, is required by measurement; and according to the
Thomists is an effect of quantity. 10 Homogeneity understood
as including accidental homogeneity is not required. Ten
"animals" can be counted and a many-colored surface can
be measured. Quantity causes this specific homogeneity. It is
the first accident inhering in a subject, and thus it measures
substance immediately, 20 other accidental determinations following it in the substance, as color, qualities, relations etc. The
parts of a quantum are simpliciter homogeneous, that is of the
same species.21 A head and a foot, both "man" and "this
man," are specifically homogenous, although heterogeneous in
their accidental organization, function, place, etc.
Divisibility is proper to quantity. It is one of the formal
effects of quantity, and part of its definition. It is the fundamental reason why we are able to number units in a continuum,
as Spaier remarks. 22 It is by means of divisibility that we are
able to obtain an absolute value for a quantity.
Continuity is a property of one species of quantity; and
hence in measuring bodies it is required. But the other species
of quantity, discrete, i.e., multitude, is measurable as well.
This is by definition non-continuous. The molecules in a
1 • Pirotta,
op. cit., pp. U2-IH.
••Summa Theol., I, q. !!8, a. 2, corp.; ID, q. 77, a. 2.
"' Pirotta, op. cit., p. H2.
•• Spaier, op. cit., p. 822.

CAN QUALITIES BE MEASURED?

89

volume of gas are not continuous, nor are the emissions from
a radioactive substance, yet they can be measured.
In order to establish a functional relationship between two
quantities, continuity ·must be established, it is true. Often,
however, this is an assumed continuity, assumed for the purposes of the function, when in fact it is known that one variable
is discontinuous. " In dealing with a discrete medium of
particles, we may, provided each element of volume contains
a large number of corpuscles, regard the medium as continuous
for purposes of mathematical analysis." 23
Of the conditions which· belong to the optimum conditions
of measurement there are the permanence and fixity of the
measurable species and the invariance of dimensions. This
permanence or fixity may be considered as specific or substantial, namely that the object remains the same sort of thing;
and this is homogeneity in time; and is required by measurement. Or it can mean a permanence in accidental characteristics. This is part of the ideal measuring condition and is
never in fact achieved. Invariance of dimensions is a species
of this accidental permanence, and is in fact only approximated.
St. Thomas sees in this impermanence of dimensions and
other accidental characteristics an application of a philosophical
principle, namely that in changeable things, as physical and
corporeal realities, there can be nothing completely and immutably permanent. 24 He applies the principle in a second way
when he writes: "Nor ought it to be that every measure be
completely infallible and certain, but according as it is possible
in its genus." 25 The best that one can hope for in measurement
is that the dimensions will be invariable as the conditions allow.
Perfect invariance is impossible.
The laboratory confirmation of this principle is found in the
fact that no measure is perfect. All measures in physical science
•• V. E. Smith, Philosophical, Frontiers of Phyaica (Washington:
versity, 1947), p. 85.
••Summa Theol. 1-Il, q. 97, a. 1, ad ft.
••Ibid., 1-11, q. 91, a. 8, arg. 8 et ad 8.

Catholic Uni-

40

MARK HEATH

are only approximate. 26 This imperfection in measurement
is caused in part by the instrument, which can never be perfect
and limits the accuracy of the measure by its own degree of
perfection, in part by the observer, who is changeable, and in
part by the act of observing which modifies the object being
observed. In the measure of mutable beings by mutable beings,
using mutable instruments, the best will be an approximation,
St. Thomas would say.
The last of the qualities of the measurable listed by Spaier
is that the object possess spatial objectivity. This spatial
quality is inseparable from continuous objects since all continuous quantities are found in bodies, which are spatial.
Measurement of discrete quanta in physical measurement is
ultimately the measurement of bodies as well. In this sense
spatial objectivity is a function of quantity.
This desideratum of spatial objectivity is often understood,
on the other hand, to mean that all measurements must reduce
themselves to spatial measurements, ·that is, upon a spatial
scale, a measuring of the spatial displacement of an indicator
or index from a
In this sense spatial objectivity is part
of the optimum measuring condition. " All instruments," says
Smith, "involve the registering of results by geometrical
means." 21 That is the ideal.
The fundamental reason for this reduction of all measurements to spatial terms, as the spatial coincidence of a point
upon a scale, is that these spatial elements are the fundamental species of quantity. Titchener notes a psychological
reason as well. Linear magnitudes are the prototypes of all
measurements and all others are reduced to that. The reason
is that spatial magnitudes and dimensions are easy for us to
handle and we are practised in these and not in weights and
brightnesses. 28 This spatial objectivity is only ideal and not
necessary because we could measure ·weights by comparison
••Smith, op. cit., pp. 84-87.
97 Ibid., p. !?!?.
•• E. B. Titchener, Experimental Psychology, II i (Stud. Quant.) 1908, xx.

CAN QUALITIES BE MEASURED?

41

with a series of standard weights instead of using a standard
spring and pointer or the linear displacement of a pointer in a
scale balance. Spatial objectivity is not required for measurement, although it provides the best and psychologically most
convenient and most accurate way to measure.
In sum, then, for Thomists, following Aristotle and St.
Thomas, measurability is a function of quantity. Where there
is an element of quantity, there also will there be measurability.
Quantity is the cause of many formal effects in a body; and
brings to it also certain relative determinations, as to be great
or small. Finally, Aristotle extended the notion of measure to
qualities indicating that certain qualities as weight and speed
were measurable under the aspect of being an " excess."
Modern theories of measurability concur with this teaching
of the scholastics.

II. THE UNIT OF MEASURE
Among the total requirements for measurements, other conditions must be met besides those demanded in the measure'able object. Required is the principle of the measurement, the
norm, or unit. And needed also is the act of measure, or the
application of the norm or unit to the quantified object to
determine its quantity.
The norm or unit, the " measure " must be homogeneous
with the measured object, be an indivisible in the genus of the
measured object; and must be more simple than the quantum;
although it need not be the cause.
Homogeneity of measure and measured is necessary in order
that the measure be not useless, for the purpose of measurement
is to know a class of things by means of one: all lines by one
unit length, the hotness of all hot bodies by the unit of heat,
and so forth. The measure must be in the genus of the
measured in order to give us knowledge of it. 29
The measure must be the indivisible in the genus of the
••Summa Theol., I-II, q. 96, a. 1, ad 1.

42

MARK HEATH

measured. It is this either by natural choice or by our own
decision. It need not be the absolute indivisible, but that
which seems indivisible to sense. Thus Aristotle says: " ... the
first thing from which, as far as our perception goes, nothing
can be subtracted, all men make the measure, whether of
liquids or of solids or of size; and they think they know the
quantity when they know it by means of this measure." 80
And St. Thomas remarks that the measure may be absolute
or according to our choice: " the measure is the minimum in
the genus of quantity, either absolutely (si,mpliciter) as in
number which is measured by unity, or according to our choice
of it as in continuous quantity, ... and thus we use the palm
of our hand to measure cloth or the furlong as the measure
of a road." 81
This measure may be the indivisible we choose to measure
an absolute quantity, the foot or inch; or it may be the indivisible we use in a relative measure: thus the normal or perfect
quantity for a man is the measure by which we measure this
man to determine if he is " large," or " small." In all cases
it is an indivisible, or is considered so.
The measure or unit may be intrinsic to the quantity or
extrinsic to it. " A body is measured," says St. Thomas, " by
an intrinsic measure as a line or a surface or a depth; or by an
extrinsic measure . . . as a piece of cloth is measured by one's
forearm." 32

III.

THE

ACT OF MEASURING

The third part of measurement is the act of measuring, the
formal constituent of measurement. This is the act of the
intellect applying the
or norm to the quantified object
in order to determine its quantity.
The act of measuring is essentially· an act of the intellect,
a judgment. It is made up of two formalities, the act of judging
••Meta. X, 1, 1058 a 5.
31 I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a.
••De Veritate, q. 1, a. 5.

ad S.

CAN QUALITIES BE MEASURED?

43

and the act of computation of the quantity. Because the act
of measurement is an act of the intellect it requires those factors
necessary to every intellectual judgment. The two terms of
the judgment must be known, and they must be known or
seen together in some way.
The essential act of measure is the judgment which falls
on the two entities to be compared: the measurable object
and the norm or unit which is applied to it. The :first quantitative judgment is " equal " or " unequal," or " more " or
" less." This is a measurement. It is a comparison with a
determination of quantity: the object is greater than or less
than the norm. This act of judging equal or unequal is .the
basic act of measurement iri the physical sciences, especially
in the measurement of quality· intensities, as will appear in
later pages. And in fact, in many measurements it is impossible
to determine quantity more absolutely than that. The second
formality is the determination of the absolute quantity of
the quantum: fifty cubic feet. This is the perfection of measurement, is found in the measurement of only certain quantities,
and is not always realizable.
A contemporary definition of measure, that of Nagle, 83 notes
this intrinsic limitation in some measurements: " Measurement
is the process of correlating numbers with things that are not
numbered." It consists first in the assignment -of suitable
units to material quantified phenomena, and secondly in the
computation, by proper mathematical operation on these units,
of related magnitudes. 84 This definition does not include the
notion of determining absolute quantities, but speaks rather
of correlating numbers with things not numbered. This allows
for the correlation of ascending intensities of a quality, brightness or hardness, for example, without the necessity of making
a computation or estimation of the absolute amount of the
hardness. Brightnesses are observed and arranged in an
88 E. Nagle, On the Logic of Measurement (New York, 1980), p. 87, cited by
Smith, op. mt., p. 22.
•• Smith, op. cit., p. 22.

44

MARK HEATH

ascending series: B1, B2, Ba. Hardnesses are arranged serially
as one substance is able to scratch another. The judgment in
this measurement is "more or less." To this series of ascending brightnesses or hardnesses we correlate an ascending series
of numbers: 1, 2, 3, 4 ... etc., or even 10, 20, 30 ... etc. The
number chosen for each intensity is not a measure of its absolute brightness or hardness, but indicates only that this intensity is greater than that correlated with a lower number. This
is a true measure, and in fact represents the process which.
takes place in many measurements in physical and psychological science. 35
Measurement is divided into direct and indirect. Direct
measurement is that in which the measure or unit is homogeneous with the object and is applied to it in such a way that
the judgment can be made immediately. Indirect measurement
is verified when the unit or immediate norm is not homogeneous
with the object, e.g., in reading weight from a linear scale,
o:r in the case when the unit although homogeneous cannot
be applied to the quantum except through some intermediary.
Kiilpe distinguishes measurement into direct, which formulates
a process in terms of conventional units of the same kind, and
indirect, which gives a quantitative expression to a quantum or
measured object by noting its functional relation to some
directly measurable process. 36 The hotness of mercury is
measured by the linear extension of the column of mercury,
because this expansion is always in constant functional relation with the temperature. The linear displacement of the top
of the column gives us a value for hotness in terms of distance.
At first sight indirect measurement seems to contradict the
Aristotelian dictum that the unit and the quantum must be
homogeneous, because e.g., in measuring heat by linear extension, they seem to be heterogeneous. John of St. Thomas noted
this difficulty and wrote: " When we say that the unit must
35 M. R. Cohen, and E. Nagle, An Introduction
to Logw and Scientific Method
(New York: Harcourt Brace, 1934), pp. !e93-296.
•• 0. Kiilpe, Outlines of Psychology (1909), p. 45.

CAN QUALITIES BE MEASURED?

45

be homogeneous with the object measured, this can be understood either as proportionately or by likeness. Those things
which share in one genus and are contained under it are said
to be homogeneous according to likeness ... That which receives
a certain form and is determined by it is said to be of that
other's genus by proportion because it is proportioned by that
which it receives and is reduced to its genus as by a principle
quo. This reduction is not formal, but by participation." 87
This is the functional reduction of one quantum to another
about which Kiilpe wrote. 88
Thus mercury has one form: heat. This heat intensity is
the object to be measured. An increase in the intensity of the
heat causes the volume of the mercury to increase, or in a tube,
the length of the column of mercury. The heat of the mercury
is informed or determined by the linear expansion which it
receives, because the heat is prior to the length. This expansion is a principle quo of knowing the heat, and reduces the
heat to the genus of length or extension; not formally because
there is no change of nature, but by participation or proportion. The unit applied, the linear gradation on the thermometer
scale, is homogeneous with the linear extension of the mercury,
and by proportion, with the heat in the mercury. The functional relationship which is sought between the directly observable quantum and the remote object in the case of indirect
measurement is found in three classes of relations. The direct
measure may be something prior in nature to the remote
quantum, as its cause, and thus one measures light intensity
by the amount of voltage at the lamp filament; or it may be
something concomitant with it as a biological process in a
psychological function; or it may be something that follows,
its effects, as radiation follows heat intensity. Through functions based on these three relations a value for a remote
quantum in terms of a directly observable one may be obtained.
••Joannes a S. Thoma, Cursus PhilosophiC'US (ed. Reiser; Turin: Marietti, 1930),

n, 882, a 20-22.
•• Kiilpe, op. cit., p. 45.

46

MARK HEATH

This suffices for· measure and measurability. The task that
remains is to continue investigation into the nature of the
measurable quantity, making explicit the direction Aristotle
gave the notion of the measurable when he added speed and
weight to the list of measurables in X Metaphysics. 39 It will
then be the time to judge if sensation does or does not fit the
requirements demanded for the measurable.

IV. THE MEASURABILITY

OF QuALITIES

I. The RATIO QUANTITATIS in Intense Qualities

The quantum is the measurable. And hence there has never
been any doubt that lines, surfaces, and volumes, as well as
a multitude, were measurable. These were quantities in the
strictest and most proper sense of that word.
The concept of quantity, however, from the time of Aristotle,
has expanded itself beyond t.he realm of its strict and proper
application: as accident of a physical body. It has been applied
to qualities as well, so that among the measurables we count not
only the primitive species of quantity but qualities of all
species, not however without some distinction.
As we have seen, Aristotle himself makes this extension. In
the
of measurables he makes in X Metaphysics, to the list
of strict quanta, lines and surfaces, he adds two: speed and
weight. To clarify this addition he states: · " The words
' weight ' and ' speed ' are common to both contraries, for each
of them has two meanings-' weight ' means both that which
has any amount of gravity, and that which has an excess of
gravity, and' speed' means both that which has any amount
of movement; for
of movement, and that which has an
even the slow has a certain speed, and the comparatively light
a certain weight." 40
The difficulty in including speed and weight as quanta is
that in one sense they are qualities and not quantities. And
yet they are measurable as experience shows. St. Thomas,
••Meta. X, 1, 1052 b H-b SO.

' 0

Ibid.. b 27-SO.

CAN QUALITIES BE MEASURED?

47

commenting on this distinction of Aristotle, shows the reason
for the difficulty and the solution which Aristotle gives:
There is no doubt that dimensions are quantities and that
properly and first (primo) it belongs to them to be measured.
But there could be a doubt about speed and velocity because they
seem to be more qualities than quantities.
And therefore he states how they pertain to quantity and how
they can be measured, saying that speed and weight are common
to both contraries, for in one of the contraries you can find the
other; thus the heavy is in a certain way light, and vice versa; and
the fast is in a certain way slow. There is a twofold consideration
of each of these. Heavy is said in one way absolutely, namely, of
that which has an inclination to the center, without considering
how much it has of such inclination; and in this sense it does not
belong to the genus of quantity, nor can it be measured. In another
sense heavy is said in comparison with another heavy thing: that it
exceeds another in this aforesaid inclination, as when we say that
earth is heavy with respect to water, and lead in respect of wood;
and therefore by reason of this excess there is as an aspect (ratio)
of quantity and measure. In a similar way, speed is said in a twofold way .... In one way it has an aspect of quantity and measure;
and in the other not. 41
Here then the quantity of qualities is stated under a distinction. Qualities considered absolutely or si,mpliciter have no
element of quantity; but considered in comparison with another
quality, relatively, they have an element (ratio) of quantity
and of measure.
St." Thomas accepts this extension of quantity to qualities in
other places, particularly in the Summa. He states in one text
the general conclusion: "Quantity imports the element (ratio)
of measure, which is found first of all in numbers, secondly in
magnitudes, and in a certain way in all other genera." 42 He
makes this more specific:
Quantity is twofold. There is quantity of bulk or dimensive
quantity, which is found only in corporal things ... There is also
quantity of power (quantitas virtutis) which is measured according
to the perfection of some nature or form: to this sort of quantity
01

X Metaphys., lect. !l, nn. 1941-194!l.

••De Virtut. Card., a. 8.

48

MARK HEATH

we allude when we speak of something as being more, or less hot,
for as much as it is more or less perfect in heat. 43

According to scholastic philosophers, then, quantity, though
primarily said of spatial and divisible bodies, is said in a certain
way of qualities as well. But this attribution of quantity to
quality comes to qualities not as they are understood absolutely, but as they are understood relatively. This quantity
is called the quantity of virtue, the quantity of power, or the
quantity of perfection.
But what is the justification for this transfer of quantitative
notions to qualities? Does one speak truly of quantities in
such beings as virtues, hotness, sin, or sensation? This is the
next problem.
St. Thomas begins his defense of virtual quantity by placing
the general conditions for the transfer of quantitative names:
Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity, is transferred
from bodily quantities to intellectual and spiritual things on account
of the natural connection of the intellect with corporal things, which
come under the imagination. 44

In the Disputed Question: On the Virtues in Common, he
applies this principle to the problem of increase:
For it is to be noted that since names are signs of ideas, as it is
said in I Periher., as we know the less known from the more known
so we name the less known from the more known. And hence it is
that because local motion is the best known .of all motions, the
name of distance is derived from contrariety of place to all contraries between which there can be motion: as the Philosopher
says in X Metap. And likewise because the motion of substance
according to quantity is more evident to sense than motion
according to alteration, the names proper to motion according to
quantity are derived to alteration. Just as· a body which moves to
a perfect quantity is said to increase, and the perfect quantity is
called great with respect to the imperfect, so that which moves
from imperfect quality to perfect is said to increase according to
••Summa Theol., I, q. 42, a. 1, ad 1. Cf. also: I-II, q. 52, a. l; II-II, q. 24, a. 4,
ad I; a. 5, ad 2; I Contra Gentes, c. 43: De Verit., q. 29, a. 3.
•• Ibid. I-II, q. 52, a. 1.

CAN QUALITIES BE MEASURED?

49

quality, and the perfect quality is called great with respect to the
imperfect. 45

This is the teaching in the Summa:
Now in corporal quantities a thing is said to be great according
as it reaches the perfection of quantity due to it: wherefore a certain
quantity is reputed great in a man which is not reputed great in
an elephant. And so also in forms we say a thing is great because
it. is perfect. And since good has the nature of perfection, therefore
' in things which are great, but not in bulk, to be greater is the
same as to be better' as Augustine says (De Trin. v. 8) .46

The teaching of St. Thomas is incorporated in the context
of a problem of change or increase of quality because it is his
intention to manifest the possibility of the increase of virtue.
The principles of his argument, valid for the more general
problem of the quantity of quality, may be set forth here. On
the one hand, there is the more known-the experience of
quantity. We know that one substance is greater than another
-that it has a greater quantity and we are able to compare
the two stating that S1 is more or less great or small than
S2, a judgment we obtain immediately upon knowing the two
substances. This is a judgment on their quantity. In addition,
we are able to compare the quantity of S1 with a norm, e.g.,
what is normal, natural, or perfect for the species of the substance; and on the basis of this comparison, state that S1 is
great or small, as seven feet is great for a man, where the norm
is six feet, and small for a giraffe, where the norm is fifteen.
These names, more or less, greater and smaller, are names
which are used in quantitative comparisons.
In qualities, the lesser known, we have a similar experience,
no less fundamental and immediate than in quantities. Thus we
observe two qualities, whitenesses, or intelligences, or brightnesses; and within the same species we are able to make an
immediate judgment that W 1 is whiter than W 2, or Ii is a
greater intelligence than I2 and so forth. This fact Aristotle
••De Virtut. in Comm., a. 11.
•• Summa Theol., I-II, q. 52, a. I.

4

50

MARK HEATH

made a property of quality: " Whiteness is predicated of one
thing in greater or less degree than of another. This is also
the case with reference to justice. Moreover, one and the same
thing may exhibit a quality in greater or lesser degree than it did
before, if a thing is white it may become whiter. 47 In a similar
way, we are able to compare any whiteness, Wa with the
normal whiteness for this body, or compare any intelligence
Ia with the normal intelligence for this species, and judge that
the case present is a high or great whiteness, or that it is a
great intelligence. Ia shows, we might judge, great intelligence
for a chimpanzee, but small intelligence for a man.
But, because, as St. Thomas notes, our experience with
quantity is more known due to " the natural connection of
the intellect with corporal things, which come under the
imagination " 48 we transfer the terminology of quantities,
" great " and " small," " more " and " less," to qualities, whose
properties are less evident to sense, and so speak of " gr.eat "
intelligence or " more " white.
But the properties of qualities to which we give the quantitative names are intrinsic to qualities, are real, and are evident.
" It is proper to quality to receive more and less." 49 The
experience of perfect and imperfect relative to a norm is one
which is fundamental and immediate. To this experience we
apply the names " more," " less," " great," and " small." It
is to this property of receiving more and less that is the foundation for the quantity of perfection or quantity of virtue, the
names given by St. Thomas to qualities as they possess the
relative properties common to quantity and quality.
Although qualities do not possess the · absolute properties
of quantity, since absolutely they are of a different genus:
"heavy is said in one sense absolutely ... and in this sense it
does not belong to the genus ··of quantity, nor can it be
" Categ. 8, 10 b !!5-b !!8.
••Summa Theol., I-II, q. 5!!, a. I.
•• Pirotta, op; cit., .I, !!28. Cf. also other scholastic authors in the tract on the
praedicament of quality, e.g., J. Gredt, Elementa Philosophiae AristotelicoThomisticae (8th ed., Barcelona: Herder, 1946), I, 168, n. 189.

CAN QUALITIES BE MEASURED?

51

measlired. 50 But qualities do possess the relative properties
of quantity-some of the modes of quantity-to be more or
less than another, or to be great with reference to a norm:
"in another sense heavy is said in comparison with another
heavy thing: that it exceeds another ... and therefore by reason
of this excess, there is an element (ratio) of quantity." 51
These same distinctions may be applied to measure: that
by which the quantity of a thing is made known.
2. Intense Qualities are Measurable
Measure of quantity is twofold. It may be 1) relative, as
when we compare the quantum to be measured with another
quantum of the same species, and judge that it is greater or
less than the measure; or if the measure be a standard, that
is, what is natural or perfect, we may judge that the measured
quantum is " great " or " small." This is the first and basic
measure, and common to all measures of quantity. Or it may
be 2) absolute, when we compare the quantum to be measured
with a unit, the most simple element of the genus, in order to
determine its absolute quantity, e.g., two inches in length.
This is the perfection of quantitative measure.
In qualities there is parallel measure. There is relative by
which we compare one quality to be measured with another
quality of the same species and judge that it is more or less
than the other, more white, or less; or we compare the given
quality with a norm or standard, the perfect or natural, and
judge that it is " great " or " small " for the subject in which
it is an accident. Thus the same measured intelligence is great
for a girl, but small for a boy of a certain age.
But there is no absolute measure for qualities. It is impossible to compare a quality with a most simple unit of the
genus in order to determine the value of the quality, as five
degrees of whiteness, eight grades of charity, and so forth. This
measurement presupposes a property of quantity which is not
possessed by qualities: that of being formed by addition.
10 X

Metaphys., lect. 2, n. 1942.

&1

Jbid.

52

MARK HEATH

The cardinal properties of a quantum, e. g., that the quantum
whose number is 6 be three times that whose number is 2, and
six times that whose number is 1 (this is the meaning of the
absolute measure, for the unit is by definition of value 1)depend on the ability of the quantum to be formed by addition
of unit, 1 to 1 to 1, etc. This must be the case at least conceptually, or in potency, even if it were not true that the
quantum were formed by addition in the first place.
When it is stated that a given lines is six inches long, that
a given multitude contains three hundred pieces, or that an
area contains fifty square inches, one means that the unit,
whether it be the inch, the square inch or the unity, can be
applied successively to the given quantum until the whole
quantum is exhausted; and the absolute quantity is determined
by the number of times that the unit was applied. This procedure clearly implies that the quantum was formed, or can
be thought as being formed, by the addition of unit to unit.
The concept of addition is bound up in the very notion of an
absolute measure; thus absolute measures require quanta that
are formed by addition. 52
But addition as a mode of increase is proper and unique to
dimensive quantity. 58 Lines, areas and number can be increased
in no other way. In quantities of this sort, all inequalities are
caused by subtraction or addition; 54 ; and the quanta can be
made equal only by addition or subtraction. Hence dimensive
quantities, bodies, volumes, areas, lines, quanta in the strict
sense of quantity, alone are measurable absolutely.
The mode of increase of qualities, on the other hand, is not
by addition, but by a deeper radication of the form in the
substance of which it is an accident. And therefore qualities
are not measurable absolutely, but only relatively. This may
be manifested in the following way.
•• Maquart, Elementa Philosophiae, II, 169; P. Hoenen, Cosmologia (2nd ed.;
Rome: Gregorianum, 1986), p. 204, n. 141; Joseph Tonquedec, Questions de
Cosmologie et de Physique (Paris: Vrin, 1950), p. 106, n. 4; F. J. Thonnard, Precis
de Philosophie (Rome: · Desclee, 1950), p. 874, n. 829.
••Summa Theol., II-II, q. 24, a. 4, ad 1; I Sent., d. 17, q. 2, a. I.
•• Maquart, op. cit., II, 178.

CAN QUALITIES BE MEASURED?

The increase of qualities is not by addition because this
adding can happen only when the super-added quality is
distinct either in kind from that to which it is to be added, or
numerically, since addition requires distinction of some sort;
and these are the two possible ways in which there can be
distinction. But the quality to be added cannot be distinct
in kind because it is by definition the same quality: whiteness
or intelligence. Nor can it be distinct in number because
numerical distinction in accidents comes from the subject in
which they are radicated. But in this case the new quality is
to be radicated in the same part of the same subject as the
present quality to which it is to be added. And therefore it
cannot be numerically distinct. Thus it is not distinct in any
way; and cannot be conceived as being added. 55
The increase of qualities is had by a deeper radication of
the form in the subject because the quality is a form which
is actualizing the subject in a certain manner (quale). But
every form more perfectly exerts its formal causality by more
completely exhausting the potency of its subject. The notion
of more perfectly qualifying a subject is that very notion
which is implied in the notion of more or less intense qualities.
Qualities become more intense, increase therefore, precisely by
a deeper radication in their subjects. 56
These considerations are per se and proper to qualities. As
qualities they increase by more completely actualizing the
potency of the subject to possess them. Certain special forms
and qualities however may increase in a manner which is
accidental to them as qualities. Thus motion which is one,
that is of constant direction, has a sort of more or less insofar
as it approaches the end of the motion, the term. And science
which is one by the intelligibility of its object, and is per se
increased as that object is known more perfectly, nevertheless
has an increase inasmuch as more conclusions may be seen in
•• Pirotta, op. cit., p. 825. Maquart, op. cit., p. 164. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 24,
a. 5; I Sent. d. 17, q. 2, a. 2.
••Summa Theol., I, q. 67, a. 8, ad 2; II-II, q. 24, a. 5; I Sent. d. 18, a. 8, ad 8
et ad 9; d. 17, q. 2, a. 2 et ad 8.

MARK HEATH

the principles of the science and brought under the science.
The science in a way is said to increase as it extends to more
objects. Motion has two ways of increasing, then, one per se
by which the body is said to travel faster, an increase in
speed, and another by which the moving body increases by
approaching the term of the motion. A science has a similar
twofold mode of increase, one by which the things and objects
of the science are better known, more deeply penetrated and
understood with a deeper intelligence, this is the proper and
per se increase of science, and the second by which more objects
are known. This is an increase but is secondary and accidental
to the science.''1 Other qualities, e. g., sensation, have a similar
accidental increase.
Per se and properly, qualities increase not by addition but
by a more perfect and fuller determination of the subject, by
more deeply exhausting its potency. And since only additive
quantities can be measured absolutely, it is necessary to. conclude that qualities have no absolute measure. But as we
have seen, they can be measured relatively because they intrinsically and properly increase in perfection, share a " more or
less"; and have a real property, in virtue of a comparison of
any quality with the perfect or natural, of being called" great"
or " small."
The measure of qualities, therefore, consists in arranging
them in the order ·of their intensity as we are able to judge
this by our experience, either by crude common experience,
or by an experience refined and corrected by instruments, which
nevertheless relies on the " equal or unequal "; " more or less,"
judgments which we must make in comparing them. We can
arrange a group of brightnesses in this manner, for example,
or hardnesses. Hardnesses may be placed in an ascending series
by the ability of a substance of any hardness to scratch another.
Thus wood scratches chalk, glass scratches wood, steel scratches
glass, and diamond scratches steel. Their hardnesses can be
arranged as that of chalk, wood, glass, steel, and diamond.
· 67

Summa Theol., I-II, q. 52, a. 1. De Virtut. Card. i!,. 8.

CAN QUALITIES BE MEASURED?

55

To these ascending intensities we assign numbers: H1 for the
lowest, and to it assign the value 1 or 10; H2 for the next and
assign the number 2 and 20; and so forth. With instruments
we may perfect our ability to determine the series, but we do
not change the principle. These numbers are a true measure
of the qualities, but they do not indicate any absolute quantity.
The hardness of value 12 is not 12 times that of a unit whose
value is l, nor is it three times the hardness whose value is
4, etc.
The measurement of qualities, then, is done by arranging
the qualities according as one is more or less intense than
another, providing in this way a series. This measure is not
absolute but relative; and is a true measure. Because qualities
are increased not by addition but by a deeper formalization
or radication in a subject they cannot be measured absolutely.
But because we really experience more and less intensity among
qualities of the same species, they allow a relative measure.
This is the teaching of the Thomist school; it is also that
of many modern philosophers of science. Thus, for example,
Cohen and Nagle write: 58
Both in daily life and in the sciences it is often essential to
replace propositions simply affirming or denying qualitative differences by propositions indicating in a more precise way the degree
of such differences. It is essential to do this in the interest of
accuracy of statement as well as in the interest of discovering
comprehensive principles in terms of which the subject matter can
be conceived as systematically related .... Theoretical and practical considerations lead us, therefore, to replace qualitative distinctions by quantitative ones. 59

The authors point out that the measure of qualities possesses
pitfalls which must at all cost be avoided: "The employment
of number to indicate qualitative differences requires a careful
examination if it is not to lead us into error and absurdity." 60
The substance of the careful examination which the authors
••Cohen and Nagle, An Introduction to Logic, 289-296.
00 Ibid., 290.
•• Ibid., 289-290.

56

MARK HEATH

conduct is an affirmation of the scholastic doctrine on the
measurability of qualities and of the limitations to such
measurement, and a defense of the distinction between the
absolute and relative properties of dimensive quantities:
Hardness and softness, like temperature, shape, density, intelligence, courtesy, are nonadditive qualities. Such qualities are frequently called intensive. They can be " measured " only in the
sense that the different degrees of the qualities may be arranged
in a series. Concerning them questions of how much or how many
times are meaningless.61

v. THE MEASURING OF INTENSE QUALITIES
The measure of qualities according to their ordinal measure
involves the problem of discovering and determining this order
and of classifying the qualities so measured. There is a direct
and an indirect form of this measure. 62 There is first of all
the direct measure: when intensities are arranged by direct
sensory observation. One case is that of hardnesses, another
of measuring temperatures by one hundred substances each of
a different temperature. The substances are observed directly
by the sense of touch, arranged in the series of their increasing
temperatures, and finally a number is assigned to each. 63
The inconvenience of this direct measurement led men early
in the history of science to devise indirect measurements, that
is, a measure of a quality by means of a direct measurement
of one of its causes or effects. These indirect measurements
were necessary or useful for two reasons. The first is the
inaccessibility of the quality: the fact that it cannot be
observed directly, e.g., the temperature of a celestial body or
the electric charge on a molecule, or sensation in an animal.
The second reason was a need for scientific precision and rigor
in the measure. In indirect measures devised for this reason,
the intensity of the quality is measured in terms of the quanti•1

Ibid.,

•• Thonnard, op. cit., pp. 874-881. Hoenen, op. cit., pp. 179-195; 488-497. Maquart,
op. cit., pp. 169-178.
•• Hoenen, op. cit., 185.

CAN QUALITIES BE MEASURED?

57

tative increase of some strictly measurable quantity. This is
usually an extension, as heat is measured by the length of
the column of mercury. Thus the varying degrees of increase
of the quality are correlated with a cause or effect of the
quality which varies with it, and is a strictly measurable
quantum. Through the cardinal properties of this quantum,
a measure of the quality is to be had.
This strict measure of the cause or effect confers on the
measure ef the quality an element of precision. It does not
remove the essential ordinal character of the measure nor
bestow cardinal properties on the quality. It does make possible
a more careful control of the measure, it adds rigor and accuracy
and it provides a more uniform way of measuring the quality. 64
The measurability of the quality itself never exceeds the limits
of ordinal measure. 65
This indirect measure is made through some cause or effect
or through some concomitant phenomenon of the quality which
is being measured. St. Thomas remarks:
Virtual quantity is measured both in regard to being and with
regard to action; in regard to being for as much as things of a more
perfect virtue are of longer duration; in regard to action for as
much as things of a more perfect nature are more powerful to
act. 66 ••• A thing is said to be a great power which is able to
lift a great weight or in any way to do a great thing. 67

St. Thomas here mentions the effect as a measure of the
qualitative intensity. The cause might have been chosen as
well: the distance of a unit lamp from a screen may be used
as a measure of the intensity of the brightness .on the screen.
Or it might be a concomitant function as blood pressure is a
measure of the intensity of fear in a psychological experiment.
This indirect measure of qualities by means of their effects
is common to all qualities, even the most spiritual. Thus for
••Ibid., 188-189. Thonnard, op. cit., p. 880.
" 5 Hoenen, ibid., 186.
a. 1, ad 1.
•• Summa Theol., I, q.
• 7 De Virtut. in Comm. a. 11.

58

MARK HEATH

example the discrete number of problems solved in a unit time
is a measure of intelligence. 08 Required, of course, is the relation of the cause to some directly measurable effect.
The ease of this measure and the precision and accuracy
of it increase as the quality is more related and bound up to
a material subject. 60 The most sublime qualities, at one
extreme, which are in no way related to quantified matter,
are in no way measurable, while other qualities, at the other
extreme, deeply immersed in matter, as heat, are easily and
accurately measurable. The reason is clear: the measure is
made in virtue of the bond which exists between the quality
and its subject, and between the intensity of the quality and
the amount of the effect. In subjects which are materiai and
physical the effects are in the physical and quantitative order;
and one such effect can be chosen as a measure of the quality
itself.
Physical qualities, therefore, are the most measurable of all;
and their measurements may be used as the foundation of
scientific work. Three conditions which make it possible to
erect a science on a structure of intense qualities are: 1) a
property of all intensities, namely, that if intensity A equals B
and B equals C, then A equals C; and also that if A is greater
than Band Bis greater than C, then A will be greater than C.
Numbers and intensities have this in common. 2) that the
cause or effect chosen be a strictly measurable quantum with
cardinal properties, as an extension. This is the ultimate reason
for the dictum of Smith that ultimately all scientific measurements involve the registering of results in geometrical terms, 70
i. e., in terms of a directly and cardinally measurable primary
quantity. 71 8) that the quality be continuous, that is to say,
that the increase of the intensity be a motion without discrete
intervals. This condition is required in order to express the
relation of the quality to a continuous cause or effect, or to
•• Thonnard, op. cit., 876.
•• Ibid.
••Smith, Phifosophical Frontiers, p. 22.
71 Hoenen, op. cit., p. 191. · Thonnard, op. cit., pp. 874-876.

CAN QUALITIES

BE MEASURED?

59

other qualities, in a formula valid for all intensities of the
quality.
There are many examples of measures fulfilling these conditions. Thus heat, mechanical energy, light, electricity, all
are expressed and measured by units which are quantities,
although the qualities themselves are not, and can be measured
only ordinally. 12
The measure of intensive qualities conducted in this way has
great scientific value; it is upon such a structure of qualitative
measures that the physical and chemical sciences have advanced. lh a similar way, this indirect measure of qualities
can be used in formulating hypotheses which intend to explain
the observable effects of phenomena in terms of theoretical
causes. 73
By means of this indirect measure of intense continuous
qualities in terms of their strictly measurable quantitative
effects, a special quasi-cardinal property may be attributed
to quality intensities: the inequality or equality of their
proportions.
If we take three points on a quantitative extension AC, we
are able to state that the differences A - B equals or is greater
than the difference B - C. Or we may make proportions and
compare these and state that A : B equals or is greater or
less than B : C. In treating of continuous intense qualities we
may initiate a similar comparison. Here we find a difference,
however. The comparison between differences is impossible
because intensities do not admit differences, being made up of
non-additive parts. In the comparison of proportions, however,
the whole undivided quality intensity is compared with another
undivided quality intensity. And this comparison of intensity
proportions is valid. Of three intensities of different values
we may state that A : B equals B : C, or that A : B is greater
or less than B : C. 74
73 Hoenen, op. cit., p. 189.
Thonnard, ibid., pp. 877 sq.
Ibid., 190-194. For a criticism of Hoenen, which, however, does not weaken
his position l:.ut rather clarifies it, see: J. Tonquedec, Questions de Cosmologie
et de Physique, pp. rno-rn2.
72
74

60

MARK HEATH

CONCLUSION

We may conclude of the ordinal measure of quality intensities: Qualitative intensities cannot be measured cardinally" how much " and " how many times "-because their mode
of increase is not by addition but by a more complete radication
of their form in their subjects. They can be measured ordinally
however, that is arranged in a numbered series according to
their increase in intensities. This measure may be made directly
by an observation of the various intensities by which the
intensities are ordered and numbered by a direct sensory judgment on each intensity.
Precision and rigor, however, are added to the measurement
if it is made indirectly, that is, through an effect or cause of
the quality intensity which is itself strictly measurable, and
which admits all the properties of cardinal measurement. By
means of the direct measure of this effect, the quality intensities
can be ordered, and then introduced into scientific treatment
and calculation.
The measure of intensities carried out in this way, although
it never exceeds an ordinal measurement, is however sufficiently
rigorous and accurate to be the foundation for a scientific
treatment of the quality, both in experimental and in theoretical
science.
Furthermore, by means of this indirect measure also, a certain
cardinal property is attached to continuous qualities, by which
intensities which cannot be compared by addition or subtraction or multiplication or division, since they are in themselves
undivided, may be compared as proportions; and relationship
of equality and inequality, may be predicated of these
proportions.
MARK HEATH,

La Salle College
Phuadelphia, Pa.

O.P.

THE RELATION OF RELIGION TO HISTORY
IN EARLY CHRISTIAN THOUGHT

T

HE good tidings of the new and final Revelation, which
proclaimed the arrival of the Savior and through Him
the deliverance and redemption of mankind, mark for
the early Christian the fulfillment of time and history. As the
beginning of the final world-epoch, the coming of Christ, at the
same time, also reveals the true meaning of the past, including
that of creation and the fall of man. This insight, so far, had
been partially hidden from man, leaving him without any real
historical understanding. In addition, the New Testament also
indicates clearly the means by which the faithful may attain
to salvation and the life everlasting, thereby pointing to the
true future through which the present as well as the past
achieve their fullest significance. In this sense the coming of
Christ integrates into one single and continuous meaning the
whole of historical existence in its aspects of past, present and
future. The result of such a realization was that the early
Christian discovered the import of history in the actual manifestations of the manifold and continuous relations of God
to man and man to God. This discovery was confirmed by the
conviction that the all-pervading Divine Love was the decisive
force throughout total history. It was fortified by the spiritual
solidarity of mankind as the beloved children of God. It found
additional support in the awareness of universal sinfulness,
human weakness, and man's craving for salvation. It had its
ultimate basis in the unshakable faith of a common deliverance
and redemption. Thus this " God so loved the world that He
gave His only-begotten Son," became a conception of history
of the first magnitude.
The ultimate and true meaning of universal history, therefore, was to be recognized in that divinely ordained continuity

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ANTON-HERMANN

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which, as a religious (and ethical) conception of time and
history, begins with creation and the original fall of man and
his freedom to sin. Its highest overtones are reached in the
redeeming message of the New Revelation and the atoning
sacrifice of Christ. It concludes with the Last Judgment and
the complete and irrevocable separation of good and evil, and
the final victory of the good over evil. This conception of
history makes Christ the vital center of universal history. For
it is Christ Who forever decides the struggle between light and
darkness, good and evil-the basic metaphysical problem of
the :religious and moral interpretation of history advanced by
the early Christians.
Hence history, viewed from the depth of the irreversible
Divine Resolve, is actually the unique stage of the single and
continuous " world drama." In conforming to this conception
of history the early Christians were able to achieve an identity
of religion and history. At the same time they established that
unity and continuity of time-events which constitutes the
foundation of a metaphysics of history. Moreover, in an
anticipatory mood, the early Christians considered the divine
plan of revelation and salvation in its relation to time and
time-sequence, the ultimate criterion of all history and historical
actuality.
These conceptions of the significance of time and history
were greatly strengthened by the apocalyptic or eschatological
expectations professed by the early Christians. These expectations or hopes were founded on Christ's own words that He
would soon return in order to judge the world in righteousness.
As a matter of fact, many people felt that the time of man's
work had run out and, consequently, they not only saw the end
of time as being imminent, but actually yearned for this final
and conclusive event. The belief in t:Qe proximity of the final
Kingdom of God as well as the realization that Christ's kingdom was not of this world, should also help to explain why some
of the early Christians displayed an attitude of general indifference toward affairs and issues of a predominantly secular

THE RELATION OF RELIGION TO HISTORY

63

nature. It should also serve to understand why some did not
actively participate to any appreciable degree in the existing
social, cultural, legal or political events of the day, except in
those instances where the dictates of charity demanded conclusive action. In the face of the proximity of the Last Things
there could really be only one relevant command-an apodictic
METANOEITE-a most urgent" repent and return to God."
Within the historico-religious view of the early Christians
we can observe that for them the imminent event of the Last
Judgment, as the final and irrevocable step in God's resolve,
constitutes the complete and irreversible consummation of the
divine plan of salvation and redemption. The Last Judgment,
therefore, is the total realization of the one all-embracing
anticipation of man's ultimate reunion with God. This conviction dominated the whole historical outlook of the early
Christians. To the true believer history, in its fullest meaning,
is nothing other than the expectation of man's final and complete delivery from all earthiness and evil and, hence, from
all history in the common sense of the term. In the midst of
historical motion and change the consoling restfulness of the
Eternal City of God is envisioned. But such a conception
already initiates a transcending of all history within history
itself. The iniquities of history and historical existence are
sublimated by the realization of the everlasting significance
of mere temporality. Thus finite historical existence itself
becomes infinitely exalted and glorified inasmuch as Christian
faith proclaims that the infinite and eternal enters the historically finite and there reveals itself in its eternal glory to those
who in the simplicity of their hearts are able and willing to read
the signs. The infinite distance between the wholly perfect God
and the wholly imperfect man, it was felt, does not preclude
an intimate relationship between God and man, or the communication of the fulness of the Divine Life. It is this personal
communion which gives rise to an ever new life and ever new
beginnings, and thus constitutes the foundation of a conception
of history as it was understood by the early Christians.

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The presence of the eternal in history and mere temporality
finds its innermost expression in the fact that the Eternal God
reveals Himself within the framework of history. And in so
doing the Eternal God imposes not only infinite tasks upon
finite historical man, but also sets in motion forces and events
of everlasting significance which are understood by man within
the framework of historical finiteness. This realization of the
presence and efficaciousness of the eternal in finite history
should be considered as that event which initiates a concept of
universal history. At the same time this realization also gives
true dignity to every form of individuality and individual
existence.
The complete absorption of man in God-the total surrender
of all separate individuality to the One God, however, is not
tantamount to an extinction of human individuality and the
historical significance of individual man in all his personal
actions and volitions. The Christian idea of man does not
deprive him of his essential being or his unique personality.
Notwithstanding this complete subordination in the Divine
Will, man's absorption in the fellowship of God rather preserves
and, indeed, enhances man's personal ai::id historical significance
and worth. By spiritually delivering himself from the casual
nexus of a blind cosmic fate which seems to control ancient
man, the Christian man is no longer confined within the narrow
and frequently oppressing limits prescribed by nature and the
natural processes. The total moral and spiritual regeneration of
man proposed by the New Testament means the possibility of
ever new beginnings and ever new moral creations. Hence the
history of man, in the light of these novel conceptions, is no
longer "natural history," as it was for instance with the
ancients, but " supernatural " history.
The most profound Greek thinkers, to be sure, have attempted to interpret temporal and historical life as the reproduction of eternity. But this kind of reproduction failed to
visualize the entrance of the eternal into time and finite historical existence. The predominant and traditional Graeco-Hellen-

THE RELATION OF RELIGION TO HISTORY

65

istic ideal of man and his historical existence within what was
considered a closed universe of causal nexus, could maintain
itself only with reference to an essentially timeless and static
present which actually extinguished historical existence. Such
a philosophy, which knows of no significant past or future,
presupposes a moral and intellectual strength which always
feeds on itself, and which could not endure as soon as the
redeeming power of reason began to be questioned seriously.
The classical expression of the particular attitude is the famous
passage found in Marcus Aurelius (2.17) : " What, then, is
that which is able to guide man? One thing, and. one thing
only, philosophy."
This wholly negative attitude of the ancients toward the
historical position and significance of man actually proved a
definite and serious moral drawback in that it did not provide
the means for a fundamental inner revival of man. Its failure
to offer any new and wider spiritual and moral horizons-its
inability to point to a truly significant future transcending the
momentariness of intellectual or aesthetic pleasure-all these
definite limitations became a real burden at the time when the
defects of historical existence and temporal life, even the most
virtuous, could no longer be denied. The rather dismal failure
of antiquity to comprehend the real significance of historical
temporality-its inability to grasp the meaning which the concept of the future has upon the historical present, is closely
related to the prevailing Greek conviction that historical change
and movement could not bring about an appreciable improvement. In the final analysis, this failure was but the result of
those cosmological teachings of antiquity which insisted upon
a meaningless repetition of cyclic and essentially identical world
periods.
It is only too obvious that such philosophical notions could
not very well promote the idea of moral improvement or
historical progress. As long as the optimistic and heroic vitality
of the overwhelmingly aesthetic Greek intellectualism was able
to maintain itself, these notions seemed to be quite acceptable.
5

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ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

But with the gradually waning faith in philosophical speculation, and with the progressively increasing realization that
philosophy by itself was incapable of successfully coping with
more profound moral wisdom and insight, traditional philosophy soon came to be looked upon as something intolerably
sterile. The ancient views on the meaning of life and history
bore throughout an unhistorical aspect which found its salient
expression in the idea of an endless procession of identical
cosmic cycles which continuously and, hence, meaninglessly
always revert to their starting point. Obviously, within such
rather aimless cycles of generation and corruption all significance, historical or personal, is completely lost in a kind of
mechanism which itself not only defies all meaning, but which
always threatens to extinguish all true human dignity and
worth.
Already during the fourth and third centuries before Christ
the Hellenic world began to show definite signs of intellectual
decline. At the same time the unavoidable contacts between
the various philosophical viewpoints and the serious conflicts
which arose therefrom, has made it more and more obvious that
philosophy by itself could not elevate man to a state of inner
contentment or happiness. No longer was philosophy credited
with the ability to offer convincing insights into the nature
of things or the essential moral needs of man. This complete
loss of faith in the redeeming power of philosophy found its
most marked expression among the Sceptics who finally came
to the conclusion that virtue consists in the renunciation of
all knowledge rather than in any attempt to acquire knowledge.
Hence it was felt that man, by his own intellectual efforts and
resources, could gain neither real knowledge, nor true virtue,
nor lasting happiness.
In the midst of these disappointing realizations an intense
desire for abiding spiritual and moral comfort waxed stronger
and stronger. Thus the paramount philosophical interest which
characterizes the close of ancient philosophy, became increasingly transferred from the earthly to the heavenly sphere. Man

THE RELATION OF RELIGION TO HISTORY

67

began to feel the urgency for a better world as well as for his
own salvation beyond mere sensate happiness. This new religious fervor found perhaps its most adequate philosophical expression in Plato's metaphysics. As a matter of fact, Plato, at
least during the last phases of Hellenic thought, became the
foremost intellectual guide for all those who were seeking the
inner road back to their heavenly home. But Plato's efforts
to point out the eternity of a higher and purer world, had their
serious limitations. For the philosophical " high-road " to
salvation, according to Plato and the Platonists, could be
managed only through the proper use of a highly sophisticated
reason, while with the orthodox Christians it meant the total
regeneration of man through joyous faith and good works.
Hence it is not altogether surprising that the Christians should
regard the religious intellectualism of the pagan philosophers
as feeble and inept efforts of mere natural reason abstractly to
express what the faithful, through supernatural revelation,
already fully believed.
The fact that the Christians saw the Divine Efficacy manifesting Itself in one single and irreversible purposive trend
throughout the whole of historical duration, constitutes the
basis of a conception of history which welds both religion and
history into one single and unique significance. And this reduction of all historical existence to a religious conviction endowed
history itself with an entirely new meaning. To the Hellenic
thinker history could not really have any profounder significance. For within such a mode of thinking human action and
human resolve at once were lost in an endless and inwardly
unrelated succession of " nows " which problematically separate
an eternally extinguished " past " from a practically illusory
"future." The idea, so essential to Christian thinking, that
the present, at least in a moral sense, partakes in a morally
relevant and even decisive future stretching, as it were, into
infinitude, remained a conception totally alien to the ancient
mind, often as distasteful as the notion of infinitude itself.
The ultimate triumph of Christian religion over Graeco-

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ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

Hellenistic cosmological speculation was greatly stimulated by
the emergence of a new conception of history. Christian religion
most profoundly influenced the question concerning the end of
human existence and human progress, and hence the problem
of history itself. In general, classical antiquity believed in only
two possibilities: the ultimate good consists either in the life
or quiet intellectual contemplation, or in some extravagant deed,
or perhaps in the combination of both. Yet it might consist
in the welfare of the whole, thus becoming a collective good
in which the individual became somewhat submerged and even
extinguished. But even the classical ideal of heroic or intellectual greatness, being, as it were, primarily worship of heroism
or intellectualism, lacks that element which brings to the fore
the historical person rather than the impersonal and hence
really unhistorical achievement.
The early Christian interpretation of history and historical
existence within a divinely ordained measure of time, on the
other hand, is basically religious and moral and, hence, historical in a profounder or, shall we say, metaphysical sense. Early
Christianity, as a religion of salvation and redemption, views
the whole of historical actuality from the position that every
historical event, every act as well as every free human resolve,
despite its finiteness has in itself definite consequences of everlasting nature. This type of historical interpretation in all
its religious and moral implications is actually based on the
realization that the infinite future constitutes the sole time
notion that could be called fully adequate to the historical
problem as such, that is, to a history which was to be understood in terms of moral action and religious truth. The infinite
future, the eternal and irrevocable consequences of every
human act, always remain the ultimate criterion, justification
and consummation of all history-if history is to be understood
as the sum total of human actions and human volitions. Hence
it is this infinite future which also endows the past and the
present, that is, all of history with its true meaning. The
Christian conviction of life everlasting, the sole and true issue

THE RELATION OF RELIGION TO HISTORY

69

of all temporal human existence and human history, could
only look to this infinite future. For this infinite future contains
the absolute and irreversible consequences and, therefore, the
decisive criterion of all historical events. Interpreted in this
manner the present is, in a religious or moral sense, merely a
" hint " or anticipation of the future-a mere opportunity to
conquer the everlasting future and, by so doing, to make true
history. Only through this infinite future can the present
acquire any real historical significance. Hence, judged from the
point of view of religion and its relation to history and historical actuality, the present is merely an anticipatory and, at
least morally speaking, a relative term. The joyous surrender
to the future and to the definite promises it holds becomes the
decisive trend within the conception of history held by the
early Christians.
The first important attempt to designate the infinite future
as the only really relevant time notion is to be found in the
exhortations of St. Paul (Philip. 3: 12-14): "Not that I have
already obtained this, or already have been made perfect, but
I press on hoping that I may lay hold of that for which Jesus
Christ has laid hold of me. . . . Forgetting the things which are
behind, and reaching forward into the things which are before,
I press on toward the mark, to the prize of God's heavenly
call in Jesus Christ."
Christianity, by the very fact that it is a religion of salvation
and redemption, directs man's historical conception beyond
ordinary history in that it points to a future world or a " future
history." But this reaching beyond ordinary history into a
future world does not imply a complete estrangement from the
present or the past. On the contrary, the spiritual teachings
of Christianity in their moral and cultural aspects are definitely
constructive in respect to this world. For what the future alone
can bring to full fruition and actualization, is already contained
in present and past history.
The early Christian conception of history also differs from
the classical idea which proclaimed that heroic life consists in

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CHROUST

a dramatic conflict between virtue and fate. This idea was
completely discarded when Christianity abandoned the Greek
antithesis of man and nature. No longer, according to Christianity, is man's fate and, hence, history determined by a
blindly working mechanism or cosmic fate so frequently referred
to by the great tragic poets of antiquity. Neither is man the
toy of capricious designs of mystical powers external and often
inimical to him. The forces which guide men, according to
Christianity, like those which govern his environment, are
subject to the laws of God and thus by no means hostile to
man. In this fashion history itself becomes the continuous
record of man's conscious and moral life-a life, that is, which
is created both free and potentially happy, either temporally
or eternally, depending on man's capacity for conscious action
and deliberate choice: " You shall know the truth, and the
truth shall make you free." (John 8: 82) But this truth is
to be found neither entirely within, nor yet entirely without
the frontiers of creation and history.
ANTON-HERMANN

Mediaeval Institute,
University of Notre Dame,
Notre Dame, Indiana.

CHROUST

THE NEED OF INTERNATIONAL 'SOCIETY
A. WHAT Do WE MEAN BY SocIETY?

T

1. The Concept of Sooiety

HE concept of society involves two elements: a plurality
and some kind of union. These two concepts, at first,
may seem contrary. In fact, they are not, because
union is nothing other than a plurality put together. Plurality
is contrary to unity but not to union. It is the division of unity.
Unity is more than union. 1 We have a unity when plurality
disappears giving rise to something new, as when the fusion of
hydrogen and oxygen gives rise to water. On the contrary, we
have a union when plurality (i.e., the parts) persists and tends
to form an aggregation. In the first place, we have an essential
unity; in the second, only an accidental unity, which we call
union. In a union we have an essential plurality and an
accidental unity.
Society is made of men. When men gather or assemble
together to form a society, they are not fused into one: they
do not disappear nor do they give rise to something new (as
oxygen and hydrogen disappear in giving rise to water). Society
therefore is a union of men, an essential plurality: Adunatio
hominum. Men form in society insofar as they are persons,
that is, subjects of rights and obligations, because through
free will they are masters of and therefore responsible for their
own actions. The human person may be considered in his
twofold aspect: his being and his actions (esse et agere), which
are really distinct, since being is continuous while actions are
intermittent. Society is not concerned with the being of persons.
It presupposes their unity in nature insofar as they all belong
1

"Unitas potior est quam unio" (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 26, a. 4; cf. also I,

q. 11, aa. 2, 8) .

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PAUL N. ZAMMIT

to the· same human nature; but society is only concerned with
the actions, the activities of persons and it is constituted by
their dynamic union.
There are two kinds of human or deliberate actions: immanent which remain in the agent, and transient which pass from
an agent to an object. Transient actions may affect ourselves
or others (ad alterum) . Every deliberate action in particular
is morally either good or bad, and it falls under a virtue or a
vice. Actions regarding other people and coming under the
general heading of justice are called social actions. 2
All these social actions may be exemplified as a motion from
its point of departure to its point of arrival; and, as such,
they receive their generic unity from the point of departure and
their specific unity from their point of arrival. From their
point of departure social actions are as many as the persons
from whom they proceed. The only possible union they can
have, therefore, must be from their direction and convergence
towards the same point of arrival. This point of convergence,
if it is to combine together dynamically these social actions
which in themselves are many, must be in itself a unity.
Now all deliberate actions, social or otherwise, insofar as
they are deliberate, proceed or are produced by the will; and
the object of the will is good. The converging point, therefore,
of all social actions must be the good of all the persons producing them, that is, the common good of all the members of
society. Society, therefore, is constituted by the dynamic union
of all the social actions of the members towards the common
good of all. In this sense, St. Thomas defined society: Adunatio
hominum ad unum aliquod communiter agendum. 8 He also
• "Necesse est omnem actum hominis a deliberativa ratione procedentem, in
individuo consideratum, bonum esse vel malum" (ibid., I-II, q. 18, a. 9). "Omnis
actus in aliquod bonum tendens, nisi inordinate in illud tendat, habet pro fine
bonum alicuius virtutis: eo quod virtutes sufficienter perficiunt nos circa omnia quae
possunt esse bona hominis" (II Sent., d. 40, q. 1, qcl. 5, ad 8). "Romines
ordinantur ad invicem per exteriores actus, quibus homines sibi invicem communicant. Huiusmodi autem communicatio pertinet ad rationem iustitiae, quae est
proprie directiva communitatis humanae" (I-II, q. 100, a. !i!).
• Contra lmpugnantes Dei cultum, c. 8.

THE NEED OF INTERNATIONAL

SOCIETY

refers to the definition by Cicero: Populus est coet.us multitudinis, j·uris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus.4
fl. The Essence of Society

Outside Christian philosophy there are two main theories
about the nature of society. One maintains that society is a
pure fiction, a resonant or loud-sounding nothing (Bastiat,
DeMichel, etc.). The other theory maintains that society is a
subsistent living organism: be it a big animal (Biological
school: Alfred Espinas; and Sociological school: Durkheim) ,
or a super-man (Historic school: De Savigny, Stahl, etc.).
These two theories refute one another, as neither one can
answer the serious objections of the other. In other words,
both are right in what they reject, and both are wrong in what
they profess to maintain. No power of imagination will ever
show us this huge animal or superman; nor can any force of
logic ever convince us that society and the state are nothing
but a mere mental fiction. The truth must be something
between and above these two opposite theories. Society must
be something subsistent independently of its members. This
is the Christian theory and this is how it is explained.
Society, we said, is the dynamic union of the social actions
of the members towards the common good of all. Let us for
a moment imagine a race of five men running towards a given
goal where there is a flag. We can distinguish the five men,
their individual running, the flag and the convergence of their
running towards the flag. The essence or nature of society is
this dynamic convergence of the social actions of the members
towards their common good.
That convergence is a relation. A relation is the order or
respect of one thing to another, for instance paternity is a
relation, i.e., that by which a man is called a father in respect
to his son; that by which he is called husband in order to his
wife is also a relation. A relation may be real or purely mental.
It is real, objective, i. e., existing independently of its being
•Summa Theol., I-IT, q. 105, a. 2.

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PAUL N. ZAMMIT

known or not by the mind, when it is something which actually
affects the subject to which it is attributed. It is purely mental
when it ·is attributed to the subject merely by the fact that
it is thought of, for instance, when I say: you are in my
thoughts, or you are seen by me; your relation to me is purely
mental. If I stop thinking of you, that relation you have to
me ceases. On the contrary, paternity is not attributed to a
man simply by my thought, but by the actual fact of generation, whether that fact be known or not by other people.
Now that convergence of the social actions of the members
towards their common good is real and objective, independently
of whether I think of it or not. It is just as in an automobile
factory where, by division of labor, the work of all concerned
converges in the making of cars. Real here does not mean something material or corporeal, which one can touch and hold
in his hands; only materialists would be guilty of such confusion; and yet a relation is not something absolute and subsistent. Paternity and filiation, by which one calls another his
father or his son, is a very real thing, yet is only a relation.
We can therefore conclude that the essence or nature of society,
i. e., the convergence of the social actions of the members
towards their common good, is a real relation. 5

B. WHAT GAVE RISE TO SOCIETY?
This question may be answered in two ways: a) by giving
the efficient cause of society; b) by giving the final cause or
the purpose of society.
1. The Efficient Cause of Society

Here again Christian philosophy is between and above two
opposite theories. On the one hand, Hobbes (1588-1679) and
Rousseau (1712-1778) maintained that society is due only to
• " Sciendum est quod hoc totum quod est civilis multitudo habet solum unitatem
ordinis, secundum quem non est simpliciter unum" (I Ethic., lect. l, n. 5). "In
quibusdam enim ipse omo habetur pro forma, sicut in civitate" (V Metaphys.,
lect. 5, n. 817).

THE NEED OF INTERNATIONAL

SOCIETY

75

a free contract; and, on the other, Spinoza
Hegel
(1770-1881), Comte (1798-1857) a,nd Darwin (1809-1882)
agree that society is a necessary product of natural evolution.
Christian philosophy maintains that society is both from nature
and from free will.
It is from nature in the sense that man by his very nature
is inclined to form in society with his fellow-men, which is
shown both by his needs 6 and by human speech. 7 And since
natural right is but the rational formulation of a natural inclination,8 it follows that man has a natural right to society and
that society thus formed is in accordance with human nature
and with natural rights.
It is from free will in the sense that the form of government,
i. e., a kingdom or a republic, a democracy or an unlimited
monarchy, is decided upon by the free choice or consent of the
members. To take an example: man is naturally ii;iclined to
marriage, and in this sense marriage is from nature. But the
particular choice between, say Joe and Jean, is only due to free
choice. Therefore every particular marriage is in a sense from
nature, i. e., from man's social nature; and in another sense
from the free choice of both parties.
Society therefore comes directly from man, ultimately from
• " Naturale est homini ut sit animal sociale et politicum . . . magis etiam quam
omnia alia animalia, quod quidem naturalis necessitas declarat. Est igitur necessarium homini quod in multitudine vivat, ut unus ab alio iidiuvetur, et diversi
diversis inveniendis per rationem occupentur" (De Regimine Principum, I, c. 1).
" The consciousness of his own weakness urges man to join his work with that of
others . . . It is this natural impulse which binds men together in civil society "
(Leo XIII, Rerum NovaT'l.llm).
7 " Est igitur necessarium homini quod in multitudine
vivat . . . Hoc autem
evidentissime declaratur per hoc quod est proprium hominis locutione uti, per quam
unus homo aliis suum conceptum totaliter potest exprimere " (De Reg. Prine., loc.
cit.). "Homini in civili societate vivere natura iubet ... quod praecipue demonstrat et maxima societatis consiliatrix loquendi facultas " (Leo XIll, Diuturnum
illud).
8 " Secundum ordinem inclinationum
naturalium, est ordo praeceptorum legis
naturae." " Ad legem naturae pertinet omne illud ad quod homo inclinatur
secundum suam naturam" (Suma Tkeol., 1-11, q. 94, aa. !l, 8).

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PAUL N. ZAMMIT

God, Who made man a social being; 9 and the proximate
efficient cause of it is man's social nature, i.e., nature and
free will. St. Thomas has stated this theory in any of the
following formulae: a natura inclinante et ratione perficiente;
ad quod natura inclinat, sed mediante libero arbitrio completur;
societas est a natura, sed cum consensu. 10
2. The Final Cause or Purpose of Society
According to the Christian doctrine, man, endowed with a social
nature, is placed here on earth in order that, spending his life in
society, and under the authority ordained by God, he may cultivate
and evolve to the full all his faculties to the praise and glory of his
Creator; and that, by fulfilling faithfully the functions of his trade
or other calling, he may attain both to temporal and eternal happiness.11 In the plan of the Creator, society is a natural means which
man can and must use to reach his destined end; since society exists
for man, not man for society .12

The end of society is the good or happiness of man; and
since " the good of anything depends on the condition of the
nature of that thing," 13 the end of society depends on, i. e.,
is measured by the nature of man. So whether we consider
the origin or the purpose of society, we arrive at the same
conclusion: society is by and for man insofar as he is a social
being. And what we say of man as such equally applies to
each and every man,14 because all men are of the same nature.
Man's natural socialness is the raison d'etre of society.
•This also applies, incidentally to civil authority, which comes from God in the
same sense that God, through man's natural socialness, wants society, and society
could not exist without authority. Therefore, authority as such, like society as such,
is from man's social nature; this or that form of authority, however, is man's
free choice.
1 ° Cf. VIII Polit., lect. 6; and Summa Theol., Su'[YPl., q. 41, a. I.
11 Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno.
1 • Pius XI, Divini Redemptoris.
18 "Bonum
in unoquoque consideratur secundum conditionem suae naturae."
(Summa Theol., I-II, q. 59, a. 5, ad S).
" " Manifeste apparet felicitatem unius hominis et civitatis esse eamdem et unius
rationis" (VIII Polit., c. 1). "Idem oportet esse iudicium de fine totius multitudinis
E-t unius" (De Reg. Prine., I, c. 14). "Quod autem de singulis hominibus, idem
de societate civili intelligendum est " (Leo XIII, Sapientiae Ohristianae).

THE NEED OF INTERNATIONAL

77

SOCIETY

Society and man's natural socialness are more intimately
connected than even the words convey. Man is by nature
social, because he is by nature rational, so much so that Aristotle and St. Thomas define man both as a rational being and
as a social being. 15 Also the nature or essence of society, as
we have seen, consists in a relation, and relation can only be
perceived by reason, i.e., by a rational being. Hence the
intimate connection based on reason between society and man's
natural _socialness.16

C. WHAT Do WE MEAN BY INTERNATIONAL

SocIETY?

Literally speaking, "international society" means a society
of different nations, and actually every political state is a
society made of different nations. Hence the necessity of
distinguishing between a nation and a state. The word
" nation " comes from nasci; but by " nation " is meant a
group of families having in common their origin, customs and
language. For the constitution of a nation some scientists add
to these three the following three things: religion, history and
civilization.
The state, on the contrary, is a juridical combination comprising people of different nations living under the same code
of laws. Hence, while a nation arises from a natural development, a state usually owes its formation to historically contingent circumstances, for instance, the need of self-defense
against an aggressor or invasion on the part of other groups
of families, etc. Actually, mankind is not divided according to
nations, but according to political states; in fact, there is no
state which is made of a single nation and every nation is
divided up among several states; so that now " nationality " is
synonymous with state allegiance. America is in itself a society
of practically all nations in the world.
Cf. note 6.
In fact they are correlative, i. e., neither can exist or be understood without
the other (Summa Theol., I-II, q. 94, a. 2).
16
16

78

PAUL N. ZAMMIT

It was this anomaly which gave rise during the last century
to the theory formulated in the "Principle of Nationality,"
proclaiming that every nation should unite to constitute one
political independent state, and that states should correspond
to nations. Aside from the practical impossibility of this idea,
the theoretiCal value of the principle of nationality is very
slight. Man has a natural right to form a society, not because
he is a member of a nation, i. e., not because he is Irish, English,
Scotch or Welsh; not because he is a descendant of a given
race, speaks a given language and has a given set of customs;
but simply because he is a man, and as such, social by nature.
Those who have in common the constitutive elements of a
nation may find it easier to unite and live together peacefully, if they so wish; but they are not bound by any natural
obligation to do so. Rights and obligations are necessarily
correlative, and where there is a natural right, there must
be a corresponding natural obligation. The members of a given
nation as such have therefore no natural right or obligation
to unite politically under the same state. By international
society, therefore, we mean a society among politically independent states. It would be better to call it interstatal society,
if such a word existed.

D.

THE NEED OF AN INTERNATIONAL

SOCIETY

We have said that by an international or interstatal society
we mean a society among states, and by society we do not mean
a unity but only a union, an essential plurality, or as St.
Augustine says:. concors multitudo, a converging multitude,
whose members are not absorbed or fused into one, but whose
social activity is directed towards the common good of all.
In our case, an international society would imply that the
international juridical activities of the individual states be
dynamically directed towards the common good of all the
state-members.
We maintain that it is in accordance with natural rights that
men should unite in separate states, independent from one

THE NEED OF INTERNATIONAL

SOCIETY

79

another in all that concerns the form of government of their
choosing and the manner of organizing their own life within
the legitimate frontiers of each state. But we also maintain
that the various states are necessarily and mutually bound
together by moral and juridical ties in one big family. 11 The
states, therefore, are bound to promote the confederation of
all mankind within one big family, regulated by special laws
with the view of fostering the union and the prosperity of all
peoples.

E. How FAR Is THE STATE A NATURAL SocmTY?
Is it not true to say that, according to the traditional
Catholic teaching, the state is a natural society as much as the
family? Let us examine this question closely. First of all, as
regards the traditional Catholic teaching, may I recall that
the state, as we know it now, is quite recent, and therefore the
word " traditional " cannot apply to it in its orthodox meaning
as used in the Church.
Secondly, the family society is natural in the sense that
without it man could not even exist; while the state society is
natural in the sense that without it man could exist, but not
so well or so comfortably. Therefore, while the family is
necessary and therefore natural for our very existence, the
state is necessary only for the welfare of man (ad esse, ad bene
esse.18 In fact, the reason generally put forward to prove that·
the state is a natural society is that man is social by nature
and indefinitely capable of improvement. Since, the family is
not sufficient to provide man with all the development of
which he is capable, man therefore needs a society, and a much
larger one, than the family for his complete development. 19
Pius XII, Summi Pontificatus.
Ad hoc · scilicet ut homo non solum vivat, sed ut bene vivat " (I Polit.,
Iects. I,
. That is why they both, Aristotle and St. Thomas, maintain that man
is more inclined by nature towards the family than towards civil society (VIII
Ethic., lect.
n.
.
". • • scilicet ut homo non solum vivat, habens omnia quae sibi sufficiunt
17

18 "

80

PAUL N. ZAMMIT

This larger society at the time of Aristotle was the city (hence
the word " citizenship ") ; at the time of St. Thomas it was the
city or kingdom (civitas vel regnum) ; 20 in later times it was
realized in the various states in Europe and the small state
in Italy; and recently also the Empire. Thus the concept
of a natural society larger than the family has progressively
widened with the extension of independent cities or kingdoms.
From this it follows that in this larger-than-the-family
society there are two aspects which we might call the widening
and the restricting aspects. The first indicates the starting
point, i. e., larger than the family; the ·other, the point of
arrival, i.e., the actual frontiers of that society. From the
above given reason one can only conclude that the larger-thanthe-family society is natural in its widening aspect, but not in
its restricting aspect. In fact, the actual delimitation of frontiers between one state and another, and the creation or
suppression of states are merely positive rights based on postwar agreements or rather dictated by the victor and changing
from war to war; and therefore they are not of natural but of
positive rights. As it is natural that families should unite to
form a bigger society, be it a city, county, a nation or a kingdom: 21 so also it is natural that states should unite to form
an international society and eventually a world society.
As the state does not absorb or destroy the natural rights
of families, but respects and defends them; neither should the
international or world society absorb or destroy the natural
rights of states, but rather respect and defend them. These
three: family life, state life and international life, are all
natural, each one in its proper sphere. Their aims are not
opposing but complementary to one another, and as the complete aim of the families cannot be attained outside the state,
ad vitam, prout scilicet in civitate sunt multa artificia, ad quae una domus
sufficere non potest" (cf. I Ethic., lect. 1, n. 4).
••Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 47, a. 11.
• 1 " Dicendum
quod sicut homo est pars domus, ita domus est pars civitatis.
Et ideo sicut bonum unius hominis ordinatur ad commune bonum: ita etiam
et bonum unius domus ordinatur ad bonum civitatis" (Ibid., I-II, q. 90, a. 8, ad 8).

THE NEED OF INTERNATIONAL

SOCIETY

81

neither can the complete aim of the states be attained outside
an international and even a world society: because' now all
states are dependent on one another and no state can prosper
in isolation from all the others.

F.

INTERNATIONAL

SOCIETY IS A NATURAL SOCIETY

Nature inclines both to state and to international society,
but more to the latter. This is shown by 1) the unity of mankind, 2) the international tendency of human progress, 3) the
right to international commerce, 4) the existence of international law.
1. The Unity of Mankind

a) Unity of nature and purpose. On the one hand, we all
have the same human nature with the same faculties, tendencies and aspirations; and by the same nature we tend to form
a society. We are all inclined to the same happiness in this
life, to the integral and harmonious development of all human
capabilities under the guidance of reason. On the other hand,
knowledge is essentially international and cannot be diminished
by the fact that it is shared by many or even by all men. All
disnations have to a certain degree cooperated iri
coveries, and all enjoy the benefits. Inventors and geniuses
are rightly looked upon as international; they belong to mankind as well as their inventions or masterpieces, whether monuments of science, art, music or films, etc.
b) Unity of origin. We all originate from the same family.
This is no longer denied by any serious scientist; in fact, all
the discoveries go to confirm the biblical narrative of the origin
of mankind from one and the same family. Comparative study
of human races has only shown accidental differences; while
interfecundation proves their common origin. Again, the origin
of all languages from common roots confirms the origin of mankind. We can, therefore, conclude with St. Thomas that insofar
as we all derive in an uninterrupted line from the same father,
6

82

PAUL N. ZAMMIT

we all form, as it were, one man. 22 Moreover, over and above
our common origin from the same family, we have all been
equally created by God. Our individual souls, because they
are indivisible and spiritual, could not be generated, but they
have been all individually created by God. From this universal
divine paternity there follows necessarily a universal brotherhood of men; for where there is one common father, all the
children are brothers.
c) Unity of habitation. All men dwell on the same planet
which God has given to all without any particular allocation
or distribution. In the Acts of the Apostles (17: 26) we read:
" It was He (God) Who has made, of one single stock, all the
nations that were to dwell over the whole face of the earth."
God has not only created men, but by His providence He also
guides and disposes all the history of mankind. He has fixed
the limits of time inside which the history of the various
nations is to evolve. Hence before we are citizens of such and
such a nation, we are by natural right the citizens of the world.
2. The International Tendency of Human Progress

Man, we have noted, is by nature capable of improvement
without limit, which is shown by his desire of knowledge and
happiness. The more he knows, the more his desire for knowledge increases. 28 And as for the desire of happiness, it is natural
and necessary in 'every human being, since no one can deliberately desire what he knows to be harmful to himself, nor could
anyone ever give up wanting to be happy. 24 Hence it is that
human progress tends to extend more and more widely. At
••Cf. Summa Tkeol.., I-II, q. 81, a. 1.
••" Anima intellectiva, quia est universalium comprehensiva, habet virtutem ad
infinita . . . per rationem et manus homo potest sibi praeparare instrumenta
infinitorum modorum et ad infi.nitos effectus" (ibid., I, q. 76, a. 5, ad 4). "Quanto
plus aliquis intelligit, tanto magis in eo desiderium intelligendi augetur, quod est
hominibus naturale ". (Ill Contra Gentes, c. 48, n. !il}.
••" Voluntas naturaliter vult et ex necessitate beatitudinem, nee aliquis potest
·velle miseriam" (De Mafo, q. 8, a. 8; de Verit., q. !il4, a. 1, ad 18). "Necesse est.
quod omnis homo beatitudinem velit" (Summa Them;, I-II, q. 5, a. 8).

THE NEED OF INTERNATIONAL

SOCIETY

88

first social relations, as we have seen, were limited within the
boundaries of the family; and as families grew into nations
and eventually into states, social relations widened accordingly. There is a natural inclination in all civilized peoples to
extend their contacts with all the peoples of the world, and
this inclination extends with progress. It is shown in all the
spheres of activity by international congresses of all sciences,
arts and professions by correspondence, by commerce, by migrations, etc. In fact, every social activity tends, as it progresses,
to become international.
On the other hand, the experience of centuries has shown
that those peoples who on account of geographical conditions
have remained isolated, remain backward and are dying out.
Moreover, those peoples who for political reasons deliberately
shut themselves up, who refuse to come into contact with
others, deprive themselves of many advantages, and create
suspicion and misunderstanding which usually lead to wars.
3. The Right to International Commerce

All the goods found on our planet are destined by the Creator
for the whole human race. So we read in Quadragesimo
Anno. 2 s Since we are all equal by nature, we all have the same
natural rights inherent to our nature. No one is to starve;
no one, individual or groups of individuals, can claim any
exclusive monopoly on the use of these goods which God has
destined for everybody. No one has the right to exclude others
from the use of such
God has distributed nature's good
unevenly over this planet. There are regions which are
naturally rich and others which are naturally poor. There are
regions which are over-crowded and others sparsely populated.
The boundaries between one state and another, we have seen,
•• " ... that the goods which the Creator destined for the entire family of
mankind . . .'' (no. 45) .
26 " Quantum ad usum ipsarum rerum non debet homo habere res exteriores ut
proprias, sed ut communes; ut scilicet de facili aliquis ea communicet in necessitates
aliorum . . . unde dives peccat si alios ab usu illius rei indiscrete prohibeat "
ad
(Summa Theol., II-II, q. 66, a.

84

PAUL N. ZAMMIT

are based on human and often arbitrary convention, with no
foundation in natural rights.
The institution of private property, which according to
Catholic teaching 27 is only of secondary right, must always
respect this divine ordination (as St. Thomas calls it) ,28 that
the use of all nature's goods should remain open to all men.
No legislation of human making can ever abrogate this plan
of God, who is the supreme owner of all things. Human laws
to be valid must conform to God's plan manifested by natural
rights. God who has distributed these goods unequally has
also created men social by nature, that they may share among
themselves these goods and thus cooperate freely in God's
government of the world.
Those countries which abound in certain natural goods are
other
bound by natural rights to share those goods
countries by means of international commerce. If we believe
that our economic system requires that we should burn and
destroy our surplus products rather than share them with
those nations who need them, there is something wrong with
our economic system, and like the Pharisees of the Gospel, we
are perhaps making void God's plan to suit the so-called
economic rules of our own making. 29
4. The Existence of International Law

Every state is governed by its own code of laws. No society
could subsist without a code of laws, and similarly laws can
27 Leo XIII in Rerum Novarum presents the. doctrine of St. Thomas on private
property as the doctrine of the Church, when he writes: " The Church without
hesitation answers " and here he repeats the doctrine of St. Thomas word by
word from the above quoted article. Now according to St. Thomas private
property is not of primary natural right, but only of secondary natural right:
"Secundum ius naturale non est distinctio possessionum (private property), sed
magis secundum humanum condictum. Unde proprietas possessionum iuri naturali
superadditur per adinventionem rationis humanae" (Summa Theel., II-II, q. 66,
a. !il, ad 1).
"" " Secundum naturalem ordinem ex divina providentia institutum, res inferiores
sunt ordinatae ad hoc quod ex his subveniatur hominum necessitati " (ibid., II-II,
29 Mark 7 : 8.
q. 66, a. 7).

THE NEED OF INTERNATIONAL

SOCIETY

85

only be given to society as such, never to individuals as such;
in other words, only society is a capable subject of laws.80
Now if man is social by his very nature, societies are certainly
not less social than man himself. Therefore, once various states
are constituted, there necessarily arise juridical relations between them, and consequently the need of international laws
regulating such juridical international relations between states.
St. Thomas explains how civil or state laws are derived from
natural law and he also proves the necessity of such laws, if
men are to live together in society. Those reasons equally
prove the necessity of international law if states do exist
together on this planet and are to have some kind of juridical
relations between them. 31 Now, laws can only be made for a
society, since only a society is a capable subject of laws; consequently only an international society is a capable subject of
international laws. In other words, if there is to be international
law, there must be an international society.
In international politics it seems that for over thirty years
we have been playing at international acrobatics. We want a
binding international law without an international authority.
In fact, we want an international law binding everybody else
except ourselves. We want individual states to bind one another
and yet remain independent and free as before. We want each
individual state to bind itself freely and to feel that it is free
and bound at the same time. When are our politicians going
to realize that the Kantian principle of self-determination is
a contradiction in terms? If outside the state there can be no
right, how could there be international rights or international
laws?
The following statements were considered to be self-evident
seven hundred years ago: No one can legislate for or bind any
save his own subjects; in fact no one can bind himself: Nullus
8 ° From the words quoted above in note
(21), St. Thomas concludes: "Unde
ille qui gubernat familiam, potest quidem facere aliqua praecepta; non tamen quae
proprie habeant rationem legis," because only a society can make laws and can
receive laws: Summa Theol., I-II, q. 90, aa. 2, 8.
31 Summa Theol., I-II, q. 91, a. 8.

86

PAUL N. ZAMMIT

cogitur a seipso, nullus proprie loquendo suis actibus
legem imponit." 82 A law which does not bind is not a law.
Lex quae non obligat, non est lex. 83 No law can bind without a
corresponding authority; in fact there can be no law without a
corresponding legislative authority. There can be no authority
without a corresponding society; and hence there can be no
international law without an international authority, nor an
international authority without an international society. Private persons, unless they form a society, cannot legislate. Similarly individual states cannot legislate for one another unless
they form an international society.

G.

ONLY AN INTERNATIONAL

SOCIETY

TO THE TITLE OF ABSOLUTELY

CAN LAY

CLAIM

PERFECT SOCIETY.

By absolutely perfect society we do not mean perfection
de facto, but only de jure; not as an end attained, but as a
tendency to that end. Society is not something absolute, like
a human organism, but something relative; in fact, it is in
itself a relation, and therefore a perfect society cannot be
defined absolutely in itself, but only relatively, i.e., by comparison with something else, as a husband can only be defined
in comparison with his wife. Hence, in our opinion, all definitions of perfect society taken from society considered absolutely
in itself cannot possibly be right; for instance, such a definition
as this: "perfect society is that which is independent in its
existence and self-sufficient in its action" is beside the point.
We have seen that whether we consider the efficient cause
or the final cause of society we come to the same conclusion,
namely, that society is caused and measured by man's natural
socialness, which is the raison d'etre of society. Therefore,
it is by comparison with man's natural socialness that perfect
society is to be defined; since the perfection of a thing, which
is measured by another, consists in being adapted and adjusted
to its measure, like a dress to a form, like a glove to a hand.
••Ibid., I-II, q. 96, a. 5, ad 8; q. 98, a. 5.
••Ibid., I-II, q. 90, a. 8, ad fl; q. 96, a. 5.

THE NEED OF INTERNATIONAL

SOCIETY

87

That society, therefore, is perfect which is perfectly adjusted
to man's natural socialness. But man's natural socialness is
international. Therefore only an international society can be
absolutely perfect. A society, to lay claim to the title of completely perfect society, must be actually international, and
potentially (i.e., in its actual tendency) it must be human or
world society, i.e., open to all
Hence whenever the
multiplicity and variety of states is in conflict with man's
natural socialness, this should prevail, and the former should
give place to man's international socialness.
I would like to conclude with the desire expressed by Pope
Benedict XV at the end of the first World War:
It is much to be desired, Venerable Brethren, that all states,
putting aside mutual suspicion, should unite in one league, or rather
a sort of family of peoples, calculated both to maintain their own
independence and safeguard the order of human society.... The
Church will certainly not refuse her zealous aid to states united
under the Christian law in any of their undertakings inspired by
justice and charity, inasmuch as she herself is the most perfect
type of universal society. She possesses in her organization and
institutions a wonderful instrument for bringing this brotherhood
among men, not only for their eternal salvation, but also for their
material well-being in this world.84

And that warning by Pius XI two years later: "No merely
human institution of today can be as successful in devising a
set of international laws which will be in harmony with world
conditions as the Middle Ages were in the possession of that
true Society of Nations, Christianity." 85
PAUL N. ZAMMIT, 0. P.
St. Albert's College
Oaldand, California

••Encyclical, Pacem, May 23, 1920.
•• Encyclical, Ubi Arcano, Dec. 1922.

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS
CHARLES A. SCHLECK, C. S. C., S. T. D., formerly of the faculty of the
University of Notre Dame, is professor of dogmatic theology at
Holy Cross College, Washington, D. C.
MARK HEATH, 0. P., S. T. Lr., Ph.D., has taught philosophy at the
Dominican House of Philosophy, Somerset, Ohio and the College of
Notre Dame of Maryland, Baltimore. He is chaplain and professor
of philosophy at La Salle College, Philadelphia.
ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, of the University of Notre Dame, has frequently contributed to THE THOMIST.
PAUL N. ZAMMIT, 0. P., S. T. M., formerly of the philosophical faculty of
the Collegio Angelicum, Rome, is professor of philosophy at the
Dominican House of Studies, College of St. Albert the Great,
Oakland, California.
URBAN VoLL, 0. P., S. T. Lr., M.A., is professor of moral theology at
Trinity College, Washington, D. C.
EuGENE MALY, S.T. D., S.S. L., is a priest of the Archdiocese of Cincinnati,
Asociate Professor of Sacred Scripture at Mount Saint Mary's of
the West, Norwood, Ohio, and a contributor to the Catholic Biblical
Quarterly.
JAMES V. MULLANEY, Ph.D., is chairman of the Liberal Arts Program at
Manhattan College, New York City, and a frequent contributor to
THE THOMIST.
LEo R. WARD, C. S. C., is a professor of philosophy at the University of
Notre Dame, and the author of Philosophy of Value, Values and
Reality, Blueprint for a Catholic University, Christian Ethics.

88

BOOK REVIEWS
Morals and Medicine. By JosEPH FLETCHER. Princeton:
with index. $4.50.
versity Press, 1954. Pp.

Princeton Uni-

The first reaction of a Catholic on encountering a book by a Protestant
theologian on specific moral problems such as the patient's right to know
the truth; contraception, artificial insemination, sterilization and euthanasia
is pleased surprise. Perhaps the traditional Protestant vagueness on
definite moral issues, deplored on the dust-jacket and in the preface by
Dr. Karl :Menninger, is to give way to a more conclusive moral theology
which, while probably differing on some points, will at least provide a
basis for civic cooperation. Such happy expectation of a new ally is
heightened by the high praise there accorded to Catholic moralists for their
diligence.
With such a gracious introduction, it is possible to thumb blissfully, if
not too carefully, through the first two chapters. The first, on human
rights, displays an interesting historical insight into the relations of religion
and medicine, with an impressive background of reading in modern medical
problems as well as Catholic moral theology. The author is quite concerned
with the interference of old religious beliefs in medicine. He carefully
distinguishes reflective or rational morality from theocratic or revealed
morality and chooses the second as his frame of reference, while at the
same time professing his belief in the revelation of the Old and New
Testaments, and expressing the hope that his conclusions fall within the
range and provision of Christian theology. His opposition is reserved, it
seems, for a third type of morality which he calls customary, that is, the
confusion of mores with morals. The problem encountered in the second
chapter is that of the moral right of the patient to know the truth about
his condition. This preliminary skirmish, like the introductory chapter,
is, at first glance, uneventful. However, both chapters strike the tone which
is maintained throughout the work. The reader is reminded by the smooth
urbanity, worldly wit and amicable benignity with physicians that the
discussions of these medico-moral problems were originally the Lowell
lectures. There is a slightly discordant note in rather constant and petty
peevishness with Catholic moralists, but then this might be expected in
a field the author confessed had already been filled by those whom he
could not approve in every respect.
The real shock comes in the succeeding chapters. The pleased surprise
this time is for the medical men rather than the moralists. It was perhaps
best expressed by the science editor of the New York Times who wrote

89

90

BOOK REVIEWS

in his review: "As a devout clergyman, Dr. Fletcher might be expected
to champion theological conceptions of morality. He opposes them." The
nature of that opposition the disappointed moralist may glean by turning
back to the subtitles in the table of contents. Contraception is there
described as our right to control parenthood. But that is only the third
chapter. The fourth, fifth and sixth are successive illuminating explosions.
Artificial insemination is the right to overcome childlessness. Sterilization
is our right to foreclose parenthood; euthanasia, our right to· die.
What proof is offered for these interesting conclusions, so novel in a
moralist? Each chapter discusses the history of the practice, its current
medical and legal status,' but the discussion of morality is in each case a
negative argument directed against Catholic moralists and anyone who
agrees with them, be he Protestant clergyman or physician. Are the
conclusions of these four chapters, the bulk of the book, then merely assumptions? Oddly but perhaps significantly, the principles which are
supposed to guide the conclusions, while dispersed rhetorically as slogans
throughout, are not found in anything like definite form until the seventh
and last chapter which is on the ethics of personality. Dr. Fletcher there
justifies his procedure by stating (p. 214): "Deliberately we have relied
upon a cumulative support for our central thesis, choosing to bring out
what it means in a clinical style .by examining concrete problems rather
than by presenting a contrived and systematic construction of ethical
doctrine." This process from conclusion to principle undoubtedly would
enjoy a certain attractiveness for men accustomed to the inductive methods
of scientific research. Yet, while apparently avoiding aprioristic reasoning,
it is actually far more aprioristic in the pejorative sense than the genuinely
scientific method of Aristotle, for it makes the principle fit the conclusion.
The actual result is a process from prejudice to principle, a work of
rationalization rather than reasoning.
Unfortunately a point-by-point refutation would take a shape larger than
the provation. A great deal of ground is covered, and many passages from
Catholic moral manuals are quoted. Yet as the book progresses, it becomes
increasingly evident that the praise accorded Catholic moralists is a great
deal like that which Mark Antony accorded Brutus and the rest in his
famous speech. "So are they all, all honourable men." In this connection,
it is interesting to note that Paul Blanshard is cited for his " somewhat
tendentious (book), for all its careful documentation." Dr. Fletcher is
mildly deprecating about the whole thing, remarking: "Mr. Blanshard has
chosen to shock his readers rather than to explain the tortuous and detailed
arguments with which Catholic moralists handle these matters. The
result is an inexact and incomplete account of the Catholic views." (p. 19)
The quality of Dr. Fletcher's scholarship is often of the same kind as
Blanshard's for all its careful documentation, and the best thing that can
be said of his contribution is that it is less inexact and incomplete. Some-

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times the inexactness is picayune, as when he writes libror censorum for
censor librorum or Liturgy for Litany of the Saints. But sometimes it is
more important, as in his accusation that popes and moral theologians
condoned sterilization to obtain soprani falsetti choirs. Surely the author's
mind, so subtle in other respects, could have discerned in one of the sources
adduced, the Moral and Pastoral Theology of Father Henry Davis, S. J.,
a distinction between such sterilization and the use for church music of
those already made eunuchs. And still other times the author's explanation
is incomplete, as when he challenges the inviolability of the sacramental
seal for the sake of agape. In that case, the author implies that the reasons
for the seal. of confession are "institutional expedience (such as creating
confidence in the inviolability of the confessional ' no matter what ') ."
(p. 57) Such reasons are neither exclusive nor compelling, and it is unjust
to Catholic moralists to omit the main reason they give, while conducting
a debate on the matter.
Since a detailed rebuttal is clearly impossible, any critic must search out
and judge the underlying bases for Dr. Fletcher's conclusions. It is exceedingly difficult to get at the moral principles of the book because of its
technique, and indeed even when they are uncovered, they are quite
nebulous. One may wonder to what extent the good physicians understood, or even cared to understand, the moral justification of such inviting
conclusions as the legitimacy of contraception, artificial insemination,
sterilization and euthanasia. These doctors are practical men, busy in their
research and practice, and if this earnest clergyman, who seems to enjoy
the blessing of his co-religionists in his position as professor of pastoral
theology and Christian ethics in an Episcopalian theological school, says
that these things are good, why, so much the better. The conclusions
indeed seem to benefit the human health and happiness the physicians are
sworn to serve, and here is obviously a scholarly man, well acquainted with
medicine and legal practice, who must also be an expert in moral matters.
If other theologians oppose such conclusions, they are surely less enlightened; they must have, as Dr. Fletcher says they have, theocratic ideas
tinged with customary or primitive morality. Of course, such an attitude
on the part of the physicians really involves an act of faith in Dr. Fletcher,
which would mean a betrayal of the reflective, rational morality on which
he takes his stand. Thus those tempted to the conclusions owe it to Dr.
Fletcher as well as to themselves to examine carefully his principles, his
general ethical position, and to satisfy themselves of the soundness of those
principles and their logical connection with the conclusions. In doing this,
there is one further difficulty; Dr. Fletcher frequently anticipates objections
by qualifying his principles to meet the objection. In that case, the critic
must insist that he follow the qualified principle rigorously to the conclusion.
The main principle of Morals and Medicine is what is called Personalism.

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" The bias of my ethical viewpoint, apart from its frame of reference in the
Christian faith," the author writes in his Preface, "is probably best pinpointed as personality." Personalism is described immediately as "the
correlation of personality and value; the doctrine, that is, that personality
is a unique quality in every human being, and that it is both the highest
good and the chief medium of the good." How the human person is the
highest good will be reserved for later discussion. The question now is
how it is found in every human being, since Dr. Fletcher denies human
rights to the unborn child (p. 152) and later denies personality itself to
an unconscious person since he cannot communicate with others. (p. 201)
Then the ancient ontological definition of the person as the individual
substance of a rational nature would certainly not be accepted in the
author's context. Just what a rational nature is the author finds in a
somewhat dubious condition, which may have to be revised in the light of
increasing knowledge. "On any view, all the way from Aristotle to a Ralph
Linton," the author writes in his final chapter of principles and qualifications (p. 221), "there is no reason to regard this personality of men as
fixed, static and predetermined." He says in the same place that men become persons; he emphatically denies that they are persons. What then constitutes human personality?, Not the soul, since the very word is in a
dubious, murky condition and " too obscure, not to say obscurantist, to deserve any further use in either common-sense or Christian ethics." (p. 218)
The direct creation of the soul is denied as "antiquarian" and as committing the " genetic fallacy of judging the worth or value of a thing by its
origin, rather than by its achievement." (p. 222) The immortality of the
soul is similarly denied as a pagan notion, although the New Testament
faith in eternal life demands the qualification that there is a resurrection of
the spirit (distinct then from soul) for the just. The other alternative is
extinction (hell, of course, does not merit mention). If the soul then is
rejected, and the nature of man apt for revision, what remains of the
being of a human person in Dr. Fletcher's personalism? Certainly not the
body, for it has no part in personality. The body is an it, a thing; at best,
the body is the material of the artist, man.
The important thing about the human person for Dr. Fletcher is selfconsciousness, which marks the frontier between thou and it. And the real
significance of self-consciousness is the freedom of choice it gives. Paul
Tillich's notion of personality is quoted: "Personality is that being which
has the power of self-determination, or which is free; for to be free means
to have power over one's self, not to be bound to one's given nature." (p.
66) " To be a person," Dr. Fletcher himself says, " to have moral being
is to have the capacity for intelligent causal action." (p. 218) There is more
than a little truth here, although it is difficult to see how one can be certain
of the conclusion when so much confusion exists about the notion of personality and the concept of man is in such precarious condition that it is subject

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to further change without notice. Probably the author regards intuition as
sufficient to establish the fact, but the omission of the ontological background causes some serious confusion. However, the idea that is being
sponsored in this personalism is for the present simply this. The evolution,
progress and growth of personality consists in independence. Although Kant
is quoted twice, and Hegel and Engels given credit for the proper ideas
of freedom and necessity (despite the terror of investigation which is
supposed to reign in academic circles, the citation is from the Handbook
of Marxism), the author qualifies by saying that the person of man is
not to be put in God's place and that man, for all his ingenuity and growth
is still a creature of the natural order. The question to ask is how this
qualification to meet anticipated objections is followed in the conclusions
drawn.
However, it is quite naturally the moral situation which is the heart of
Dr. Fletcher's problem. The matters of personality and freedom are but
preliminaries. In his introduction to the concrete problem of contraception,
he isolates four factors in every human act, four things to be considered in
every moral judgment. These are first, the motive; second, the intention,
which is also called the object or end sought; third, the means or method;
finally, the result or· consequences. These factors would seem to provide a
working basis for the discussion of morals except for the fact that the
explanation given asserts that not only the first factor; motive, but even
the second, intention is subjective, internal and psychological as opposed to
objective, external and behavioral. In practice, the second factor is sometimes reduced to the first, sometimes to the third so that there is no
clear statement about the objectivity of a particular moral end, independent
of the motive of the agent. This confusion about a moral object is at once
so elemental and yet so serious that any college sophomore writing an
examination paper on general ethics would receive a resounding " F " for it.
One of the fundamentals of any sound morality is the objectivity of a moral
object or end, independent of the physical nature of the act and likewise
independent of the motivation of the person performing the act. Murder
is intrinsically evil, even though the physical action is the same as legitimate
self-defense,.execution of a criminal, or military action in a just war, because
murder is unjust killing. Dr. Fletcher himself makes use of this distinction
to justify euthanasia which he does not see as unjust killing. Nor does the
motive of the agent justify a moral object already intrinsically evil; certainly
the Robin Hood motivation of the Communist powers does not justify
their lying and stealing. So likewise does adultery remain intrinsically evil,
despite the ever-so-noble motivation of the adulterers, which Dr. Fletcher
suggests may be the fulfillment of the parental impulse. But in both these
cases-euthanasia and artificial i.nsemination by a donor-Dr. Fletcher can
and does argue that the moral object is not intrinsically evil. In two other
cases, he admits, at least for the sake of argument or for the conscience of

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the questioner, that an action may be wrong and still be justified by its
motivation. This means that in practice, Dr. Fletcher, who has some unkind
things to say about the application of the principle of the double effect,
really goes much further, so that indeed the end may justify the means.
In the first case, on artificial insemination, he writes: "And even if we
grant that masturbation is self-abuse when practised for its own sake, does
it not lose that character when it becomes the method or means to a
procreative process which is otherwise impossible? " (p. 118) To those
who may feel some scruple about sterilization, Dr. Fletcher has a word of
hope and comfort offered " only half in jest." " Repentance in Christian
he says, "is supposed to be a high virtue as well as the gateway
to a larger life. Why not then, if unhappy circumstances require it, obey
the moral claims of sterilization, and then repent, that is, be sorry, as any
sensible person would be anyway? " (p. 170) Here is a coarse version of
the pecca fortiter which Luther himself would disown; here now is a
Protestant indulgence which really is a license and permission for sin.
The relativity of the author's moral system becomes increasingly apparent. The reason for the relativity is the lack of an absolute. Whatever
may be said about the freedom ethic, if it is to remain an ethic, it must
have an end. The confusion of immediate ends and means is all too
obvious; the question of an ultimate end is never considered, except the
single reference to the resurrection of the spirit without any advice on the
means to take thereto. Of course, a book on particular moral problems is
not intended to be a complete course in ethics, but surely some assumed
or postulated end must color any judgment of human actions, if they are,
as was said, causal. The description of person already quoted states that
the person himself is the highest good. In that to be taken literally? It
would seem not, from other references to God, but those references apply
to God as creator, not as goal. Nevertheless, the purposiveness of the person
and his freedom is entirely neglected. Thus the primary principle of ethics,
that the morality of a particular action depends on its order to the ultimate
end of man himself has not yet been refuted; in this new ethic it is simply
passed over in disdainful silence.
How then shall the critic speak of the eternal law of God as the way God
instructs us to reach our true goal? Dr. Fletcher has what amounts to
an allergy towards any kind of law. The civil law is too tainted with
customary morality, too much under the influence of theocratic moralists.
It is always discussed, but as frequently deplored, and the physicians are
invited to work for its liberalization, or failing that, to get around it. In
one instance there is a very strong hint that the Hippocratic oath does not
bind in the case of euthanasia, for after all these centuries Dr. Fletcher
finds it mutually contradictory in its promises to relieve pain and at the
same time to refuse drugs which produce death.

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The divine law as promulgated in the Old and New Testaments the
author acknowledges, mentioning that this is one qualification for the
Lowell lectures he may besaid to possess. However, frequent references to
theocratic morality and Bible-bound moralists make one wonder how Dr.
Fletcher intends to have and to eat his cake. Admittedly it is a question
of interpretation, as he himself indicates. When, for instance, he anticipates
an objection to the anthropocentrism of his freedom ethic, he replies:
" Given a theocentric context for the analysis of these matters, ' what doth
God require of thee? ' how is that to be determined?" (p. 189) In the
determination of God's requirement or the interpretation of Scripture it is
sufficient, in this matter of euthanasia as in others, that " many Christians
do not find any theological logic (natural reason) or revelation to condemn
euthanasia." Dr. Fletcher duly records the long history of pagan and
Christian opposition to suicide, but the opposition is nearly always dismissed
as theocratic tinged with customary morality. Here as in his other conclusions, Professor Fletcher is impressed neither with Church Councils, even
of the earliest age, nor with Church Fathers like Augustine and Jerome
who are treated with contempt, nor with modem writing, whether Catholic
or non-Catholic.
In his own use of Scripture, the author is eclectic. If a text suits, it will
be used innumerable times for many purposes. " Blessed are the merciful "
is stretched not only to cover a multitude of sins, but even to the denial
that there are sins to cover. But if a text does not suit, it must be corrected
or explained. An example of the first is Christ's condemnation of evil
thoughts taken from the same sermon as the beatitude of mercy. Since
psychiatrists maintain guilt-complexes about evil thoughts are harmful,
Professor Fletcher undertakes to correct (his word) Christ, using for the
occasion another sentence, which in context was uttered against false
prophets: "By their fruits, you shall know them." This wrenching of
Scripture for previously contrived purposes is far more evident when the
text forms a telling argument against one of the practices deemed necessary
for freedom. The account of Onan's sin in Genesis is described as a
deceptive evasion of levirate marriage, which it was. But, by a bit of rapid
exegetical legerdemain, it becomes " quite clear that Onan was punished
for the deception, not for the method he used." (p. 118) The interpretation that the self-defilement which was used as a means was itself sinful
is rejected as "uncritical." Then "all Jewish and non-Catholic exegetes
are agreed about this." (p. 118) Evidently the standard Protestant
exegetical work, the International Critical Commentary, is no longer to be
considered either critical or non-Catholic, for Professor John Skinner in his
exegesis on Genesis there writes: "Onan, on the other hand, is slain
because of the revolting manner in which he persistently evaded the sacred
duty of raising up seed to his brother. It is not correct to say ... that

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his only offence was his selfish disregard of his deceased brother's interests."
(pp. 451-452) Fletcher himself is forced by Deuteronomy 25 : 7 to admit
that the penalty for the evasion of the levirate responsibility was not death
but public ridicule; yet no connection is seen between the direct slaying
by the Almighty and the crime which merited such an awful punishment.
" The account in Genesis merely states that ' the thing which he did
displeased the Lord.' " (p. 88) "Merely " is a very light word to use
about God's displeasure and the consequent punishment.
Yet perhaps the most disturbing position assumed by Professor Fletcher
in regard to Christian revelation is his attitude towards suffering as part
of the divine plan. This may seem to be a small matter compared to
some of the things already mentioned; after all, if there is to be such
ruthless living in respect to the generative function, surely a ruthless
attitude towards the dying is not unexpected. Still, the very centrality of
Christian living is its revolutionary way of suffering, which is neither
hedonist nor stoic. Dr. Fletcher himself admits with Brunner that "it is
not without significance that the picture of a dying man is the sacred sign of
Christendom." " But when it is applied to suffering in general it becomes,
of course," he goes on, " a rather uncritical exemplarism which ignores the
unique theological claims of the doctrine of the Atonement and the saving
power of the Cross as a singular event." (p. 197) Is then Christ Himself
guilty of " uncritical exemplarism " when He declares that " if any man
will come after Me, let him deny himself, take up his cross, and follow
Me? " Is St. Paul, of all people, unaware of the uniqueness and singularity
of the Cross and Atonement when he writes: "I rejoice now in the
sufferings I bear for your sake; and what is lacking of the sufferings of
Christ I fill up in my flesh for His body which is the Church? "
Whatever the stand of the reverend gentleman on the revealed morality
of God, there can be no doubt that his choicest shafts and most poisonous
barbs are reserved for the natural law target. Catholics sometimes assume
that Protestants, whatever their differences with them on the place of
the Scriptures in revelation and on their interpretation on certain points, are
at least one with all who profess Christianity, as indeed all men of good
will, in their acceptance of the natural law. Reinhold Niebuhr would
correct this assumption: " There is something ironic in the fact that the
concept of the Natural Law is regarded by Catholics as a meeting-ground
for Catholics and non-Catholics, and for Christians and non-Christians,
whereas, as a matter of fact, it is really a source of tension between the
Catholics and non-Catholics." (" A Protestant Looks at Catholics " in
Catholicism in America). Niebuhr's objection is that " ... rigid Natural
Law concepts represent the intrusion of Stoic or Aristotelian rationalism
into the dynamic ethic of Biblical religion." Fletcher's attack proceeds from
an entirely different quarter; as interpreted by its proponents the natural

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law interferes with medical care and ultimately with that supreme good, the
freedom of the human personality.
However, his direct attack legitimately centers about the vague and
loose use of the word "natural." It may be said at once that any
ambiguity in the use of the word is not confined to Dr. Fletcher's opponents.
In one of those after-thoughts of the last chapter he speaks of a " moral
order " which was called by ancient and medieval moralists the Natural
Law; by religionists the Will of God; by the American Founding Fathers,
certain inalienable rights. No further information is given in this postcript
except that this morality, which is an aspect of what is as well as what
ought to be, is an article of faith. Faith probably is not to be taken
literally in what promised to be a morality of reason.
At any rate, it will not be unfair to select one place of the many places
in the book where the natural law is attacked, for the infection seems to
bring itself to a head in the argument for sterilization. Casti Connubii is
given as the provocation: " Christian doctrine establishes, and the light
of human reason makes it most clear, that private individuals have no
power over the members of their bodies than that which pertains to their
natural ends .... " Dr. Fletcher writes on his side: "Here again we
are back to that counter-Reformation version of the Natural Law as
something physiologicaUy determined, which we have previously described
as a denial of true morality, and as a submission to fatality and to physical
(material) determinism." (p. 159)
Saint Thomas had some things to say about the Natural Law almost
three centuries before the Reformation, and he is not generally credited
with ambiguity. The Natural Law is not a physiological law; the Holy
Father was not condemning the use of spectacles or store-teeth because
these things do pertain to the natural ends of the parts of the body affected.
Nor does the natural law refer to human nature (otherwise Dr. Fletcher
who points to man's ability to walk upright as the sign of his reasoning
ability could not be allowed an occasional somersault). The word" natural"
refers to right human reason; it refers to the "ought" judgments. Dr.
Fletcher himself says that the " moral order " is an aspect of what is as
well as what ought to be. Certainly then the " ought " should be based
on reality, and part of reality is the physical organism which the person
uses. But the real question is the determination of the " ought "; or to use
Fletcher's terminology," the moral order." What is man ordered to? Every
human action has an order to an end. Particular ends are not enough.
What is the final motivation, the ultimate end? This book never tells,
unless one may assume that the statement that the person is the highest
good is to be taken in an absolutely literal sense. In that event, what is
the purpose of man? Again the darkness and confusion close in, for there
is no answer to be found here. And because there is no answer to this most

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fundamental question, there is no satisfactory answer to secondary questions
about proximate ends, and there are egregious blunders in the evaluation
of moral acts.
The natural law is not blind submission to fate. It is an intelligent
examination of the law of God written on the fleshly tablets of the human
heart. It goes far beyond the examination of physical phenomena where Dr.
Fletcher, for all his inveighing against physical determinism, stops. It helps
the human person use physical things below it as means to a higher freedom
than is ever mentioned in Morals, and Medicine.
Sex is an important question here, for three of the five problems discussed
in this book center around its meaning. Sex is assumed to be good, which
it certainly is, but what meaning can the word good have if it is not also
an end? The purpose and function of sex is reproduction. The author does
mention that, but seems more often concerned with the mere assuagement
of a natural desire. But what role does sex play in the entire human
personality? Is it only an animal function, only the expression of love or
does it too have a part in the direction of the human personality to its true
ultimate end?
The meaning of life itself enters the last moral problem entitled the
right to die. The natural desire for sex played such an important part in
the previous three chapters that one might expect the natural desire to
live to play an important part in this chapter. The author admits" the valid
generalization that the wish to live is among the strongest instinctual drives
in the higher animals, including men." But this instinctual drive, so unlike
the one to sexual satisfaction, is to be ignored. Even Freud's testimony
that in the subconscious everyone is convinced of immortality is overriden
by the slogan, "pathetic immaturity."
What then is this wonderful maturity? It is freedom, freedom from
nature, but with due provisos and exceptions. But how does it apply? For
what purpose is this freedom to be utilized? For the development of
personality. Dr. Fletcher is heartened by the ability of science to remove
moral compulsions; thus, contraceptive devices have removed the triple
restraints of conception, infection and detection from extra-marital sexuality, But this is, to use a distinction he proposes, only physical freedom
(can) , not moral freedom (may) . Still, Dr. Fletcher praises the enhancement and heightening of moml stature by such physical freedom, though
he is forced to confess by the recorded promiscuity of the Army during the
last war and the Kinsey report that the heightened personal responsibility
and the increased physical liberty also enhance the chances for moral
failure. Now if it is evident that mere physical freedom is not an unmixed
blessing, why is it so extolled? The question might be by-passed if the
author had said more about the use of moral freedom in the achievement
of a true ultimate end. As it is, the only end proposed is the untrammeled

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pursuit of science without regard to other human values and without regard
to the supreme human value which is the achievement of the end to which
God has destined the human personality.
It is unlikely that Dr. Fletcher, and those who agree with him, would
be willing to consider their problems in what they would call a theocratic
context. Nor is there any better hope that the purposiveness of Aristotelian
ethics will find a place in their reflective, rational morality. The adroitness
displayed in dodging what is prejudicial to pre-conceived theses is too
reminiscent of the sophists whom not even Socrates, Plato and Aristotle
could silence forever.
Nevertheless, the Catholic moralist should not be discouraged. Despite
the number of books which are currently appearing against the natural
law, this concerted and concentrated attack hardly represents the entire
Protestant or non-Catholic community. The number of quarrels Dr.
Fletcher has with other Protestants in the course of his remarks is some
evidence that the battle has not yet been decided. Indeed, in his own
Episcopalian communion there are many who do not share his views.
Moreover, there are powerful, discerning writers like C. S. Lewis who are
poles apart from Dr. Fletcher in their views on what constitutes Christian
behavior. It is interesting to note that Fletcher quotes only one insignificant
passage from Lewis' Problem of Pain, a book whose whole tenor would be
against Fletcher's ideas on euthanasia. Neither it nor any of the works like
Christian Behaviour which would touch on the other problems of Morals
and Medicine are as much as mentioned in the bibliography.
For those men of good will who are likely to listen, then, the Catholic
moralist has a special work to do. He must show how reasonable are the
conclusions which he says are binding not simply on Catholics but on all
men. For Protestants who accept the revelation of the Scriptures, he must
perform the task which Pope Pius XII said was one of the noblest. tasks
of the theologian, to show how his conclusions may be found in revelation.
(Human Generis) Here he faces a serious difficulty, for the main current
of Protestant thought is not at all in sympathy with the great Thomistic
principle that grace perfects nature. The education of ministers by-passe11
philosophy to begin at once with a theology. In the more advanced
theological seminaries there is an attempt to " systematize," that is, order
revelation through reason. But the philosophy chosen will be personalism,
humanism, existentialism or any philosophy but the Aristotelian philosophia
perennis which they regard with ancient hostility and fear. Although some
early Protestants did attempt something with scholasticism, modern
Protestant thinkers regard this attempt as unfortunate, and are nearly
always suspicious of it. Nevertheless, it is certainly feasible to present to
those who accept and love the Scriptures the conclusions of the natural law
in their divine, promulgated form. Not only the decalogue and the sermon

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on the mount are to the point; indeed, even the Pauline epistles, so highly
favored by Protestants, have things to say about the natural law. For
instance, the divine words of St. Paul to the Romans, in which he upbraids
those pagans for their abandonment of God and their consequent degradation and dishonor in unnatural intercourse with women and unnatural
homosexuality, should indicate to the believing Protestant that there is
more to the natural law than a mere pagan ethic. St. Paul likewise in his
first epistle to the Corinthians is not at all unlike the Catholic moralist who
sees in the natural law a meeting place for Christians and non-Christians
when in his condemnation of fornication, adultery, effeminacy and sodomy,
he asserts: "And such some of ye were." If these things were sins only
for those who accepted Christianity, how could these converts be stigmatized for what they had done in their pagan life when they were without
knowledge of Christian teaching?
For those who do not accept Christian revelation, it is still possible to
show how philosophy itself, however faintly and incompletely, leads to the
moral conclusions of the natural law. Many may have embraced philosophies which are really barriers between reason and the discovery of
moral truth. But, as Newman once said: " While we are men, we cannot
help, to a great extent, being Aristotelians .... In many subject-matters,
to think correctly, is to think like Aristotle; and we are his disciples
whether we will or no, though we 'may not know it." The cooperation of
non-Catholics in the Natural Law Institute of Notre Dame University,
where the meaning, history and presence of the natural law in American
ideals and even non-Christian religion is discussed, is a harbinger of hope.
There is a valuable lesson, then, for the Catholic moralist in Dr. Fletcher's
book. Although some may justly claim they have been badly used, this
book will serve as a good reminder about incautious and incomplete
remarks. Even when Catholic moralists write for the Catholic community,
other eyes, some unfriendly and some friendly, are reading over their
shoulders. It will not be sufficient to stamp the magisterial foot, while
reciting: "The Catholic Church teaches" or "the Natural Law holds."
Especially in the case of the latter it will be necessary to show how these
conclusions are derived, and to perform not only the function of an
explicator but that of an apologete. Here there is a parallel with the one
conclusion of Morals and Medicine we may accept. The patient has the
right to know the truth about his condition insofar as he can understand
it and in terms intelligible to him. The physician himself-and this is true
of any professional man and indeed every man-has the right to know
insofar as he can understand and in terms intelligible to him, the reason
why moral guides say this action is right; this, wrong.
This principle may be applied to the morality of the book under review.
The conclusions of the book make it a scandal, in the Scriptural sense of
that word, for it presents the occasion of spiritual ruin. The means used in

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arguing to the conclusions are unfair, incomplete and self-contradictory.
There is an even stronger word for such judgment of higher things by lower,
and it is the opposite of wisdom. Dr. Fletcher calls at least one Catholic
argument simple and foolish. It is not simply a return of the compliment,
but a strict, technical use of the words to say that Dr. Fletcher's arguments
are not simple; they are stupid.
URBAN VOLL,

O.P.

Trinity College,
Washington, D. C.

Cardinal Newman's Doctrine on Holy Scripture. By JAAK SEYNAEVE, W.
F. Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1953. Pp. 596.
Even a cursory reading of the works of John Henry Newman will reveal
that man's deep interest in and wide acquaintance with the Holy Scriptures.
" Like medieval sermons his are often for pages on end a mosaic of Bible
texts." (p. 46) And this interest and acquaintance could only have been
the result of a constant study of the inspired text. But yet, to attempt an
analysis of Newman's teaching on Sacred Scripture is not an easy task.
For he was not a professional biblical scholar, nor did he publish, in any
sense of the word, an introduction to that science.
It is true that the Cardinal did write various treatises on particular
aspects of Sacred Scripture. But these treatises were generally the result
of some controversy that had been stirred up by the Liberals of his age.
(And Newman was a controversialist, and lived in a controversial period.)
It would be necessary, therefore, in order to present any kind of complete
picture of his biblical teachings to analyze all of Newman's writings. The
present book represents such an attempt. And to its author, Jaak Seynaeve,
professor at the White Fathers' Theological College in Louvain, are due the
thanks of all those interested in Newman as well as of those whose interest
is in the development of biblical science. For the book is a definite
contribution to the study of the religious thought of Newman and his age.
An introductory chapter presents the historical and doctrinal background
of Newman's biblical teachings. And it is only by a thorough study of
that background that we can understand the controversial trend of much of
Newman's writings. For the " sudden growth of physical sciences and the
introduction of more scientific, critico-literary methods in Bible study "
(p. 44) had a strong influence on the deeply religious scholar .. And
especially is this to be noted in the problem of squaring the findings of
science with certain statements of the Bible. That Newman faced this
problem by a thorough investigation of the nature of inspiration need not
be stressed. But the same could not. be said of many of the so-called
Christians of the time. Even some of his Anglican friends were surrendering

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to the camps of the Rationalists. This fact was a constant source of sorrow
to the future Cardinal, and could not but increase the intensity with which
he fought on the side of Orthodoxy. And it is only by an understanding
of the ardent zeal of the man that we can fully appreciate much of what
he said and wrote.
Newman's biblical teachings are presented in two main sections. In the
first is presented his doctrine on inspiration, and in the second his
hermeneutical principles are analyzed. Several appendices of some 160
pages contain the previously unedited manuscripts of Cardinal Newman
on Holy Scripture. Of particular import among these is an essay on the
inspiration of Holy Scripture written between the years 1861 and 1868.
Better, perhaps, than anything else these writings reveal the struggle that
was going on in Newman's mind, a struggle to satisfy fully the demands
of the new sciences without abandoning the position of the Church. His
failure to publish them was due in part to his dissatisfaction with them,
but more especially to the general apathy and even hostility with which,
he felt, they would be met, even by the members of the Hierarchy. " ...
he was very much afraid of coming into conflict with the Hierarchy if he
carried on his controversial work as before." (p. 67) Their present
publication contributes nothing to our knowledge of the nature of inspiration, but they do contribute much to our understanding of the man who
wrote them.
When the question of Newman and inspiration is raised the first
thought of many is directed to the famous (or infamous) "obiter dicta,"
as though his whole position on the subject could be summed up in those
two words. But that this is. not the case is evident from the thorough
study of the problem in the first part of this book. Here the historical
buckground for Newman's various writings on the subject, especially the
so-called "Inspiration Papers" of 1861-1863 and the Articles of 1884, is
first presented. Then is analyzed his teaching on the subject, first as an
Anglican, secondly as evidenced in the " Inspiration Papers," and finally
as presented in the Articles of 1884.
It would exceed the general purpose of this review to present all the
arguments of the author with regard to this question of inspiration. But
his general conclusions can be stated and some comment made on them.
First of all, as an Anglican Newman had little to say concerning the
problem of plenary inspiration. He never doubted it. And the historical
circumstances were not yet such as to raise any doubts.
But in the year 1855 there were published two books which prepared the
way for the publication of many others along the same lines of historical
criticism. The two were Stanley's Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul
to the Corinthians and Jowett's Epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians.
Stirred into action by these books and others of the same nature Newman
began work on the "Inspiration Papers" of 1861-1863. It is here that he

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shows a close acquaintance with the problem of inspiration. It is ·true that
there are some statements in these papers which are suspect. But to judge
Newman's mind on the matter from isolated statements would, as Seynaeve
points out, be unfair. At the same time it must be remembered that for
the future Cardinal the doctrine of inspiration traditional among theologains was inadequate in coping with the new difficulties. He must devise
a theory that would be, in some respects, new. And it is Seynaeve's opinion
that this theory does, at least, avoid the dichotomy between inspired and
uninspired portions of Holy Scripture. " Scripture is tota inspired, as a
whole, sed non totaliter, not in all its aspects; is inspired tota when considering its extent, but non totaliter when considering its depth; only the
thread as it were of matters fidei et morum is inspired. But this moralreligious thread is everywhere present from beginning to end of Scripture,
whether it is to be found in the literal sense reinforced by the Divine
Breathing, as it normally is, or in the mystical sense, whenever the
literal proves itself unsufficient." (p. 149) This, in the reviewer's opinion,
is a fair summary of Newman's view on inspiration in the papers of
1861-1863. And this will surely shed light on some of the less happy
statements of Newman with regard to matters not pertaining to faith and
morals.
As for the Articles of 1884, where the well-known reference to the
"obiter dicta" is made, the author sums up his opinion in these words,
" ... we think that according to his views, they (i. e., the " obiter dicta ")
do not fall under the influence of inspiration. But we must add at once
that Newman never definitely made up his mind. He keeps wavering;
doubt prevails." (p. 178) Such a statement is certainly a far cry from the
position of those who would qualify Newman's theory as "simply erroneous," or of those who "read into Pope Leo Xlll's Biblical Encyclical
Providentissimus Deus a direct though implicit condemnation of Cardinal
Newman's doctrine." (p. 154) And after a study of his arguments the
reviewer must agree that Seynaeve's position seems justified. Newman's
solution was not a final one, nor did the Cardinal himself look upon it as
such. And always in his eyes " the solution to this problem rests with
the Church."
What was it that contributed to Newman's difficulties in his understanding of the problem and, at the same time, to our difficulty in under'3tanding his teaching in the matter? There were two main factors. The
first was Newman's lack of Scholastic training. As the author points out,
". . . he was not sufficiently familiar with Scholastic terminology and
distinctions, in terms of which the problem was worked out in Catholic
theological circles." (p. 191) This was especially true in his failure to
" penetrate the full significance of the notion of instrumentality." (p. 176)
And, as all agree, the concept of instrumental causality is most important

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for a ·correct understanding of inspiration. In Seynaeve's opm1on, "
according to Cardinal Newman's view, no word can, strictly speaking, be
the result of a double causality .... " (p. 176) Does not this failing, then,
help to explain how the Cardinal could be so vehement in his defense of
the plenary inspiration of Scripture and yet so ambiguous in his explanation
of it?
But there is yet another factor which, in the reviewer's opinion, should
be emphasized. And that is the general nature of the Cardinal's writings
of this period. They were not, as a rule, composed in the reflective calm
of an undisturbed mind, but in the heat of battle. He wrote, not & textbook for students, but an answer to adversaries. And, as in most controversial writings, exaggerated statements are to be expected. It would
be unfair to judge these without refeITing to others on the same subject.
This point must be all the more insisted upon when we realize that
"Newman had a great dislike for abstract reasoning, for 'cut and dried
arguments:' "
The second section of Seynaeve's work deals with the hermeneutical principles of Newman. And here especially is to be noted the transition from
the controversialist dealing vigorously with the enemy to the deeply
religious man expounding Catholic doctrine to his audience. For that very
reason the reading of this section is much easier. But the task of culling
the information must have been all the harder. For Newman but rarely
dealt ex prof esso with some hermeneutical principle, whereas he did treat
of inspiration in specific papers.
This section is divided into four chapters. The first deals with Newman's
two First Principles of Bible interpretation. And these are most important
for understanding how the man looked upon the inspired text and how
he used it in his writings. The first of these principles is that the Bible is
a religious book inasmuch as it has God for its author and for its supernatural end. Consequently it treats always of religious matters, and in
particular it treats ·of Christ. " Its pages breathe . . . of our Lord, and
of His work and teaching, from the beginning to the end." " Scripture, if
Christ were not in it, had nothing great or worth our study." (p. 209)
But despite this divine quality it is a book adapted to human capacities
and human nature. This divine adaptation is, for Newman, the Economical
System.
The second of his principles is that the Bible must be interpreted by
the Sacramental System which " is the doctrine that material phenomena
are both the types and instruments of real things unseen." The truly vast
range of this System can be glimpsed in these words, " the bare letter of
the Bible is a shadow of and at the same time leads to deep truths hidden
as it were behind a veil; sacraments as ' mystical signs ' confer supernatural
virtue and grace; and the visible Church, manifested as she is in the hierachy

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105

and in the sacramental activity; is both a representation and a
of
When one ponders
those heavenly realities, that 'fill eternity.'" (p.
over these thoughts of the great scholar it is difficult to imagine how any of
his writings could ever have been conceived as " dangerous."
In the second chapter the unity of the Bible and the harmony between
the Old and New Testaments are treated. As far as the first is concerned,
Newman had no doubt because of the divine origin of the book. It is a
work of God and "all God's works are founded on unity, for 'they are
founded on Himself, who is the most awfully simple and transcendent of
possible unities.' " As for the harmony existing between the Old and
New Testaments, Newman could well be an inspiration and guide to
modern scholars who are more and more concerned with this subject.
Briefly, he posits four main connecting links, typological, ceremonial,
historico-prophetical, and literary. But the unifying principle par excellence
is Christ, " whether it be the historical Christ with regard to both Old and
New Testaments, or the eschatalogical Christ in these the last times. It
is one and the same Christ; typified in the Old, God Incarnate in the New,
He will be our heavenly reward after His second coming." (p. 305)
In the third chapter the different senses of Sacred Scripture as used by
Newman are treated. And it seems that here we may find a clue to his
difficulty with regard to the problem of inspiration. First of all, he did
admit the existence of both the literal and the mystical or typical sense.
But for him each passage had either a literal sense or a typical sense.
And if the literal sense of the passage had no religious bearing, then a
deeper mystical sense was to be sought. Thus we can see how he could be
led to state that the literal sense without religious significance would not
fall under inspiration, while the same passage would be inspired because
of its mystical meaning. Assuredly, if Newman had known of the theory
of literary forms, today generally accepted, he would have avoided many
of these difficulties. At any rate throughout his writings he did prefer the
mystical sense, influenced as he greatly was by the Alexa.ndrian Fathers.
But he could not be considered guilty of the exaggerations of that School
in this regard.
Seynaeve is convinced that Newman admitted the existence of a sensus
plenior " as a definite kind of mystical meaning not to be identified with
the typological sense.'' Once again we can note the confused terminology,
for in other places he equates the mystical and typical senses. However,
he does speak of a " deeper " sense based on the " bare letter " of the Bible.
And so it is not too difficult to imagine that he did conceive of a sense
of Scripture that today's scholars would point out as the sensus plenior.
In the fourth chapter of the section Newman's ideal of the Christian
exegete is presented. We might sum up this chapter by saying that, in
Newman's mind, the external requirements are attention to Church au-

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thority' and to Tradition, while the internal requirements are intellectual
ability, moral dispositions, and supernatural faith and grace.
In a concluding chapter Seynaeve proposes the answer to three questions.
What are the sources of Newman's biblical thought? In what manner and
to what extent, has his biblical doctrine influenced subsequent thought?
What is its value in the light of modern investigation? As for the first
question, his principal sources were the Bible itself, the Alexandrian
Fathers, the Caroline divines of the seventeenth century, and contemporary
writers. After his conversion he did become acquainted with some of the
Catholic biblicists, but it is to be regretted that he never became familiar
with the great Scholastics. The influence of Newman's biblical thought has
never been too profound or extensive. But with regard to its value in the
light of modern investigation the reviewer agrees heartily with the author
when he says that " the partisans of what is commonly called a more
theological exegesis may find in Newman's biblical doctrine many a .
valuable and enriching indication." (p. 408)
In concluding this review it can be said that, though not written in the
mother tongue of the author, the book reads easily and smoothly. There
are a few errata and, infrequently, an ambiguous term. But these provide
no hindrance to the reader. A select bibliography is prefaced to the work
and indexes of proper names and of authors mentioned in Newman's
manuscripts are added. Briefly, the book is a scholarly and well documented
work worthy of being classed with the other magisterial theses that have
issued from Louvain.
EUGENE H. MALY
St. Mary's of the West,
Norwood, Ohio

A History of Modern European Philosophy. By JAMES CoLLINS.
waukee: Bruce, 1954. Pp. 864 with index. $9.75.

Mil-

This, the author's most ambitious work to date, is a textbook " designed
primarily for students who have some acquaintance with Scholastic philosophy and who seek an introduction to the vast field of modern
thought." (p. iii) It covers, roughly, the period 1500-1900, beginning with
Renaissance thinkers like M:achiavelli and concluding with Bergson. Each
of the nineteen chapters is concluded by a summary and a lengthy bibliography of editions, translations and studies net only in English but in the
various European languages. There are, in addition, approximately fifteen
hundred footnote references to specific statements of, or articles about,
special problems mentioned in the text. The restrained use of tables and
diagrams enormously unifies lengthy exposition.
This monumental work was undertaken to help establish " fruitful intel-

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107

lectual communication between Scholastic teaching and the representative
modern system " (p. iii) , an enterprise in which both Scholasticism and
modern philosophy have been conspicuously loath to engage, to their mutual
loss. The author's method of presentation is to explain the individual
systems in chronological order. He is, of course, aware of alternate methods,
like the problem method, the history of ideas approach; indeed he recognizes
the merits of each. But he is soundly convinced that " it is indispensable
to be grounded primarily in a study of the doctrinal systems of the individual thinkers." (p. iv) What Collins has omitted from this study is
quite as iquch a tribute to his sound judgment as what he has included.
Since the textbook is not " an encyclopedic work of reference," it gives a
robust account of each major philosopher, but of major philosophers only;
the minor figures, such as Malebranche, Vico, Rousseau, are excluded from
the exposition, though not necessarily from the notes. The result is a
structural simplicity which makes this lengthy exposition feasible for the
undergraduate as well as the graduate mind.
There is a basic similarity in the construction of the various chapters.
There is first a brief biography; then an explanation of the method and
guiding principles of the philosopher's system; finally an account of his
doctrine on various philosophical problems. These problems are basically
the same in all the chapters, but where necessary, individual problems are
discussed. A full, accurate account of the thought of each philosopher
makes possible a restrained effort at evaluation. " An attempt is made to
test the main assumptions and method operative in each system. A critical
appraisal is also made, from the Thomistic standpoint, of some of the
particular arguments advanced by the philosopher in question." (p. iv)
Naturally this work of evaluation is incomplete, leaving the instructor and
the student free to work out their own lines of criticism. The technique of
evaluation-Thomism comprehending modern thought in the latter's own
terms, and then evaluating it according to modern thought's " own manner
and tempel' "-is one of the two most significant achievements of this book.
The other great achievement, is, of course, the purity with which modern
thought has been uttered by Collins.
The initial chapter is devoted to a discussion of the nature and the
function of the history of philosophy, and to this Dr. Collins makes his
typically balanced contribution. The first task of the history of philosophy
is to master the sources, to have comprehended each system of philosophy
as it is in itself, and to describe precisely each of those systems. Comprehension achieved, responsible evaluation may not be avoided; and hence,
this task of evaluation, of judgment, is the principal aim of the history of
philosophy, and is the point at which "the historical study of philosophy
integrates itself with philosophy proper and serves the ends of the search
for wisdom." (p. 4)

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The Thomist necessarily finds himself faced with a dilemma by the
plurality of philosophical systems. That dilemma is " either of ignoring
these other philosophies and thus committing oneself to a sterile isolationism, or. of accepting their premises and thus entailing the conclusions that
necessarily flow from them." (p. 5) This is indeed a real cruel dilemma,
as any responsible teacher of philosophy knows. To accept the first
alternative is the safer course, which has largely been followed in the
Catholic colleges of the United States; but it has generated an hostility to,
and suspicion of, Thomism in the minds of many graduates of those very
colleges. The sentiment is general that, if Thomism be as sound as its
proponents allege, then there should be no fear of having it face modern
and contemporary thought. To accept, on the other hand, the second
alternative is to produce a generation of intellectually flabby, glib relativists who know the teachings of everyone and the truth of nothing.
History, Professor Collins points out, comes to our assistance here. Given
first a solid grounding in Thomism, then one can study each philosophical
system as a laboratory specimen, without committing oneself to either the
premises or the conclusion. One can afterwards evaluate, and assimilate to
one's own philosophical position, whatever of truth he has seen in the
various systems approached with the detachment of history.
The norms which the author employs for the historical study of
philosophy are four, adapted from Aquinas. a) "The study of philosophy
is directed not to a knowledge of what men think but to how the truth of
things stands." (p. 6) b) Philosophy is served not by negativity, by
wholesale rejection and criticism, but by discrimination, by simple openness
to truth wherever found. Intellectual justice must cooperate with intellectual effort. It is noteworthy, in this connection, that Collins is evenhanded in his criticism of Scholastic and non-Scholastic philosophers. It
is no secret that Scholastic criticism of modern thought has been at times
wrongly placed. Kant and Hegel, for example, have been criticized for
positions they did not hold, while genuine weaknesses in them have gone
unnoted. In correcting Scholastic criticisms Collins is as detached, as
scrupulous, as generous and as just, to the Scholastics as to the moderns.
c) "The story of philosophical development is not a black and white
record ... " (p. 7), one seeks to gain truth, and avoid error, from the
efforts of every philosopher. There is no question here of eclecticism, but
there is question of development. The firmer one's grounding in the principles of Thomism, the freer one's use of all philosophers' insights to enrich
that Thomism. d) The discovery of truth is a cooperative task of the
human race. The small contribution of any one man can be integrated
with th{) findings of others. " Thus a balance is to be sought between
permanent principles, healthy criticism of accepted views, and increment
of fre8h insights." (p. 7) And so, the approach to any philosopher must be

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a balance of three angles of vision, namely, the biographical, the systematic
and the relation of his system to other systems. No one of these can completely explain the others, or completely prescind from the others. A
philosophical analysis of a philosophy includes the interplay of these three
factors.
In lucidity of exposition, in depth and comprehensiveness of interpretation, in scholarly apparatus supplied to the student for independent
research, in modesty, balance and justice of evaluation, in creative interpenetration of modern and Thomistic thought this vast study marks a
new type of book in America. I should be inclined to label this a work of
organic Thomism: the work, tliat is, of a mind whose second nature is
Thomism, entering vigorously into the main stream of modern philosophy
in order to fortify the valid insights of modern thought with the metaphysical structuring of Thomism, and to nourish Thomism on those same
valid insights. The situation is simple, and it is this: in the mind of
Collins, Thomism and modern thought have met, and the name of the
meeting is philosophy. It is now about fifteen years since Maritain, in his
Preface to Metaphysics pointed out the enormous role that modern thought
had to play by way of assimilation, in the progress or development of
Thomism. The only obstacle, he pointed out then, would be the laziness
of Thomists. (He might have added that laziness wears many disguises).
The beginning, the very model, of what Maritain would describe as the
Thomistic actualization of the potential philosophy of the moderns, is
here in Collins' A History of Modern European Philosophy, as it was also
in his two earlier books and in his numerous articles in the various philosophical journals.
The influence of Collins' work will naturally be directly proportioned to
the readership of this volume. It may be safely assumed that as soon as
instructors in Catholic colleges, universities and seminaries have familiarized themselves with this book, that it will become the standard work in the
field in these institutions. But widespread use in secular colleges and
universities is also to be expected, for the simple reason that no study of
modern philosophy exists in English that is comparable in scholarship with
this one. Any instructor of realist and theist convictions will probably be
as moved by this volume as was Reinhold Niebuhr in his New York Times
review of Mr. Collins' The Mind of Kierkegaard. For A History of Modern
European Philosophy continues the two-way task its author seems to have
set himself: to reveal the relevance of the modern mind to the Thomist,
and to reveal the relevance of the Thomist mind to the modern. In making
each aware of the other, he also makes each more fully aware of its own
riches, and aware, too, of the community which embraces them both, the
community which is philosophy.
JAMES

Manhattan College
NeJW fork, N. Y.

v. MULLANEY

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Realms of Value. By RALPH BARTON PERRY. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954. Pp. 509 with index. $7.50.

The first volume of this work entitled General Theory of Value was first
published in 1926, and reprinted in 1950. It received more attention than
any other work in English on the subject of " value," and was widely used
as a basis for class discussion. A favorite topic for discussion with the
reviewer and others was how Professor Perry, now Emeritus Professor of
Philosophy, Harvard University, could be a realist in the theory of knowledge and still take a non-realistic tum in his theory of value. The subtitle
of that famous volume was, " Construed in Terms of Interest." What
the author meant by " interest " was naturally to be considered.
It is easy to suggest the reason for the discussion the book enjoyed.
It was an elaborate study, done on an high level, and written in an English
style that seems to us to have been maintained by almost all the great
English philosophers from Hobbes to Russell. Perhaps the study was too
elaborate in the care with which it attempted to prepare the way for its
own definition of value. In this regard it might be thought to be labored.
But this feature, if possibly overdone in relation to definition, made a
substantial contribution in another .regard since in chapter after chapter
Mr. Perry sought to show how the value phenomena are given and imposed
on us in various fields, such as general biology, psychology, economics,
politics, religion, and ethics.
Perhaps for some split second a man can exist without valuing. We
believe that he cannot. Whatever else it is, to be is, for man, to operate,
to act, and this in his case is to seek. Professor Perry has always made
much of this circumstance both in the old work and in this new volume
which comprises the Gifford Lectures given at the University of Glasgow
in 1946-47, 1947-48. We think that he might have made even more of the
circumstance. Man is a seeking, striving animal-and surely Mr. Perry
says so with a good deal of emphasis, since he tends to base all human
value on moral value, and to hold that moral value is achieved in the
resolution of a conflict or struggle. We think that here he might have gone
much further, without any straining of the evidence. He might have asked
whether struggle, seeking, conflict belong only to man, or belong to life,
or whether they are as possibly as wide as our given universe. It .is true,
as he said long ago in an article, that it is up to the individual philosopher
to decide whether he will cut the value cake thick or thin; that is, whether
in defining value he will aim to cover value for all life, or only for human
life.
Our own view is that it is not altogether up to the individual to make
this decision. The " value philosopher " begins, as Professor Perry has
said, with valuing phenomena or data. The question then is, where are

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111

these experienced or observed? Is it only in the individual himself? Mr.
Perry is no solipsist. Then the human family is not so diverse from the
animal family, the living family, the being family, that we .are not free to
raise the question of valuing, seeking, as a possible characteristic of the
given universe. Possibly all nature is struggling and groaning, each type
of thing in its own way. Here, it seems to us, Tolstoi was challenging
in his work What of Life? But Tolstoi might have gone further and said,
precisely in regard this struggle, What of being?
As a matter of fact, emphasis on effort and struggle is constant in
Western philosophy, and it seems to have this same constancy in Oriental
thought. The Greek thinkers repeatedly mentioned orexis and horme as if
these were to be taken for granted in the universe. Mediaeval theologians
and philosophers, perhaps Jewish as well as Christian, thought that not
merely man but the whole of creation is in some kind of inevitable
contest, a lethal struggle-say, with the devil or with "lower" nature-until it makes terms with God, a being Who simply is, and thus outside
struggle and conflict. Modern philosophy and science does not release
us from this notion of struggle, but in some ways confirms us in it. Think
of Spinoza and Kant, each with a sort of divine restlessness. Think of
Marx and the Marxists who struid for social conflict and war as the road
to the kingdom. Think of Darwinism and the struggle for existence, the
latter a narrow statement of the Thomistic notion that everything strives
to be its type of being, suo modo. It strives as vigorously, said Aquinas,
as it can and for all its worth, totis viribus. Think of this conative element
in psychology, see it everywhere in the great new philosophers, in Maritain
and, Przywara, the latter :finding God in the resolution of conflict.
The fundamental questions, raised by the phenomenon of valuing, are
not answered by the suggestion that they exist. Our wonder, in regard
to Professor Perry's remarkable volumes, is that he did not raise them,
since they seem to be wished on him. This omission is the more noticeable
in such an exact student, one who in 1909 in his The Moral, Economy
stated that men had long " shunned the deeper problems of ends and
purposes."
Any little fact of valuing seems, if pursued, to raise this whole chain
reaction of problems. First, does valuing at least imply a struggle and
effort, the natural conatus of Aquinas and Spinoza? Does struggle and
effort imply unfulfillment-the propensity and expectation featured by
Mr. Perry? Can this character of seeking, this more or less fulfillment, this
being and not being, be a mark or even the character of the universe, and
of what most truly is? If we shut up the human race in its seeking as
if this seeking entity, "man," were a self-enclosed finality, do we in fact
shun the deeper problems of ends and purposes?
Professor Perry means to be, and he certainly is, comprehensive. We

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wonder whether he is comprehensive enough. How far does this valuing
and seeking process go? If, conceivably, it is a mark of all reality, would
a fuller inquiry have to admit analogical types of valuing?
Simple questions such as these have always seemed to us relevant to a
complete philosophy of value, and they have more than once recurred while
we were reading and re-reading Mr. Perry's two volumes. They appear to
be appropriate addenda to his metaphysics and natural theology, even
more than to his ethics and philosophy of religion. It is true that Mr. Perry
is more at home in these latter disciplines, yet he himself enters all fields
of philosophy. This, we think, he is obliged to do if he is to do justice to
the philosophy of value, because in " value theory " a man is compelled
to ask· basic questions as, for example, concerning the nature of good or
value in relation to being, ·and questions concerning applications. The
author's definition of value in terms of " interest" is perhaps much less
important to his whole philosophy than what he thinks of man, of knowledge, of nature, and of destiny. If, with Mr. Perry, we define interest to be
a sort of drive toward or away from, an attitude of favor or disfavor-and
he consistently carries this designation through the two volumes-and if
we proceed to define value as any object of interest, we have only worked
out something of a conceptual framework, and we still are on a more or
less superficial, nominal level. The status of valuing in the universe is
yet a larger and more proper " value " question. What is it to be a man
valuing, or a cat, or a stone in its way of valuing? That question, we
submit, would suit an Emerson. The discovery of man valuing raises
questions that, if pursued as Mr. Perry pursues his" interest" ancl. "value"
and their levels, might well produce considerable fruit.
Remaining for years with a set of interrelated questions is Professor
Perry's chief merit, but seeing them. as refated is another matter. We
believe that he does not go far enough in the questions and their interrelations. As a final instance, we can note that in his zeal for the use of
psychological studies, the author must concern himself with the question
of the " individual " and the " person "; but yet, he seems not to know
that both these concepts have received much consideration in recent
decades, and the latter long has had a classic consideration.

LEo R. WARD, C. S. C.
University of Notre Dame,
Notre Dame, Indiana

BRIEF NOTICES
Truth. By SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS. Chicago: Regnery.

the set.
Vol. I. QQ. I-IX. Translated by Robert W. Mulligan, S. J.
Pp.
498. $7.00. Vol. II. QQ. X-XX. Translated by James V. McGlynn,
S. J. 1953. Pp. 474. $7.00. Vol. III. QQ. XXI-XXIX. Translated
by Robert W. Schmidt, S. J. 1954. Pp. 543, with index. $7.50.

To review the complete translation of St. Thomas' Quaestiones Disputatae
de V eritate is a task of tremendous extensive and intensive dimensions,
not to mention virtual complexities. The reasons are quite obvious. In
this monumental work we find the accumulated wisdom and scholarship of
St. Thomas adequately expanded to cover practically every aspect of
" truth." Here is a virtual synthesis of Aristotle, St. Augustine and the
in a thirteenth century Christian philosophico-theological
treatise with the additional corroboration of Arabian and Jewish insights.
The treatise involves a panoramic view of the history of the topics treated
as well as their systematic discussion in a typical disputation setting. In
substance it is the same as he presented to his students at the University
of Paris during the academic years of rn56-rn59, which is early enough in
the Master's career to give us a glimpse of his extarordinary ability to
understand problems and of his basic genius for synthesis. Indeed, it goes
without saying the Truth is an excellent work to use as an introduction
to the thought of the Angelic Doctor.
In format these three volumes are agreeably adapted to the scholarly
achievements of St. Thomas' pupils in the twentieth century. In order to
be sure that we are adequately prepared for this intellectual quest of the
truth in all its academic implications, a scholarly introduction explains the
function of the disputed question in the pedagogical program of the
thirteenth century, discusses the historical setting for the work and gives
a doctrinal analysis of the contents of the three volumes in a topical framework. Dr. Vernon Bourke has written the introduction with his usual
scholarly exactness. The multitude of textual references have been tracked
down with even greater exactness than we find in the original Latin editions;
parallel treatments of the same problems are noted and contemporary
discussions of the same basic ideas and topics are called to our attention for
handy investigation and comparison.
'
The three volumes constitute a contribution of wise and deep scholarship
in respect to Truth in its metaphysical nature, God's Knowledge, Divine
Ideas, The Divine Word, Providence, Predestination, The Book of Life,
Knowledge of the Angels and the Communication of Angelic Knowledge
{Vol. I); The Human Mind, The Teacher, Prophecy, Rapture, Faith,

118
8

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Higher and Lower Reason, Synderesis, Conscience, Knowledge of the First
Man in the State of Innocence, Knowledge of the Soul after Death, The
Knowledge of Christ (Vol. II) ; Good, The Tendency to Good and the Will,
God's Will, Free Choice, Sensuality, The Passions of the Soul, Grace, The
Justification of Sinners, The Grace of Christ (Vol. III). Appendices
include aids to parallel readings and references, detailed references to each
article and a glossary of terms in each volume in addition to an index of
sources and an index of subjects in the third volume; quite a thoroughly
complete presentation of the apparatus and addenda so helpful for the
intelligent student.
The philosophico-theological contents are welcome and appropriate to
our times. The basic interest in the writings of St. Thomas possessed
by those lacking the linguistic achievement required for a critical perusal
of the original receives added stimuli and development by this work.
The Angelic Doctor's fundamental point of view, objective rather than
subjective, ontological rather than epistemological, will be a fresh outlook
to some contemporary discussions of the questions concerning " truth."
Moreover, a vital English presentation of the basic principles and discussions
found in this work may be of great service for the clarification of anglicizedLatin formulae found in other " translations " of other works of St. Thomas.
We are, indeed, grateful to the editors of the Library of Living
Thought for the selection of this work as a capable vehicle to achieve their
basic purpose in the series. The three translators should be congratulated
for a generally smooth and easy-flowing English rendition of ideas which,
at times, can be so succinct, obscure and profound in the original Latin as
to escape facile rendering into another language. " The aim of this translation . . . has been to express accurately in correct English the. meaning of
the original, and as far as possible in idiomatic English." In general, they
have achieved their purpose well. One can almost be quite sure that where
there are rough spots and unEnglish passages, there may be some technical
Latin phrases, quite frequently a source of embarrassment for the translator.
I say " can almost be quite sure " because the objective means of evaluating
the translation are unavailable. Since the translation is made from an
as yet unpublished text, the definitive Leonine text, we cannot actually
criticize the translation with any firm conviction of complete objective
validity. Their English rendition presents the basic thoughts of St.
Thomas in an attractive modem garb which avoids slavish transliterations
and academic cliches hallowed by many manual treatments of the same
topics. In the course of the reading one can become so absorbed in the
intellectual development of the discussion that he can become oblivious of
the fact that he is reading a translation. This is. quite an achievement as
translations of St.' Thomas go and it will make a much needed positive
.contribution to the contemporary understanding of St. Thomas' philosophico-theological treatment of the problems .involved.

BRIEF NOTICES

115

On the other hand, there are objective reasons for disagreement with the
.modification of certain formal aspects of the treatise, which may interfere
seriously with the pedagogical force of the presentation. In particular I
refer to the omission of Utrum at the beginning of all the articles, whereas
the goal of a disputed question seems to postulate its presence and St.
Thomas has used it in all but ten of the 258 articles... These articles, as
presented by St. Thomas, are argumentative in format for a pedagogical
reason, to stimulate thought and discussion on both sides of a Question
so that it would be genuinely Disputed. When the introductory Whether
is omitted and a simple question is asked, to which a categorical yes or no
coi:ild be or may seem appropriate, the whole pedagogical function of the
disputed question format is obscured, to say the least. This is especially
unfortunate when viewed in its close proximity to the introductory discussion of the importance of such a dialectical approach to the understanding
of the truth. The disputed question format and function may be lost sight
of also when the arguments for one side of the disputation are introduced
by the term " Difficulties." This term may have the implication that the
arguments presented are impediments to the correct understanding of the
problem. On the contrary, they are really presented as dialectical means to
reach the truth of the question disputed. In addition, the use of the word,
"Reply," for the Respondeo dicendum quod has little of the argumentative
force of the Master's determination. of the disputed question, that is, his
way of bringing the discussion to a terminal solution. In spite of these
criticisms we think that the translators have done a splendid work; we
hope that these volumes will .receive the extensive popularity they so
greatly deserve.

Agape. By VIKTOR WARNACH. Diisseldorf. Patmos-Verlag, 1951. Pp. 751,
with index. 26.50 DM.
One of the most extensive of the numerous recent studies on the love of
God is the present work by Dom Viktor Warnach, a monk of Maria
Laach. The immediate occasion of this volume was the monumental study
on Agape and Eros, published by the distinguished Swedish theologian,
Anders Nygren, to which Dom Warnach's work seeks to make a full reply
from the point of view of Catholic theology and faith. It may be said that
of all the various Catholic books and articles, dealing in some way with
Nygren's ideas, none has provided so complete a scriptural study of the
problem. The volume is supplied with complete bibliographical references,
lists of all biblical texts dealing with love, and a lengthy section on the
doctrine of love in Scripture. This section follows an introduction which
distinguished three conceptions of love: sex, eros, and
The one

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BRIEF NOTICES

difficulty with the exegetical study of the New Testament is that no real
theological synthesis is given that is based strictly on the texts.
This defect is due in part to Dom Warnach's great interest in and
sympathy for the " mysterion " theories of his late confrere, Dom Odo
Casel. This theory, which has caused so much theological discussion, is at
the basis of the detailed " speculative " study which forms the main part
of this volume. This preoccupation on the part of the author does not
lessen the value of some of the quite remarkable phenomenological and
personal insights into love and its nature. In such passages, Dom W arnach
does show that this method does have definite advantages, which a more
strictly speculative, " scholastic " treatment cannot provide, and, perhaps,
is not intended to provide. These advantages are principally to present a
warmer, more human, and more concrete description of love, and to show
that a merely rational discussion does not deal fully with such an important
element of man's life, both natural and supernatural, as love.
Theologically, however, the theories centering upon the participation of
the human spirit with God in the mystery of Christ brings back many
of the problems which Casel's theory presents. This application of the
" mysterion " theory to charity leads to such conclusions as not considering charity as a virtue, a habit of the will, but as an act of the whole
existential man, a conclusion which does not easily lend itself to
scientific conclusions of theology. Furthermore, the author accepts Nygren's
theologically and philosophically questionable position that the act of
Agape is not specifically or in any way affected by its object. Man is
said to love God by the very same (formally?-Warnach would perhaps
consider such terminology irrelevant) love as that by which God loves man,
and thus, in a sense, he even goes beyond Nygren, who concluded that
man's only response to God's agape was faith, understood in the orthodox
Lutheran sense. Such a conclusion seems to be a direct outcome of an
application of the "mysterion" theory. The author also goes beyond the
scriptural data, and common theological teaching in reaching this conclusion. It may be more exact to say that the confusions of Casel's theory
are manifest in this opinion on the nature of charity, or its act, as elicited.
by man.
In spite of these-difficulties this study may be re.commended to the moral
theologian, who is being presented these days with so much literature on
the subject of charity. It is certainly a need of Catholic theology to give
proper attention to the " form of the virtues," and one may hope, too, that
others with the proper background, both scriptural and theological, will
turn their full attention to a comprehensive and satisfactory answer to
the great work of Nygren. This volume does make a real contribution in
this direction.

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117

The Philosophy of Being. By Louis DE RAEYMAEKER. Translated by
Edmund H. Ziegelmeyer, S. J. St. Louis: Herder, 1954. Pp. 372,
with index. $4.95.
It would have been misleading to have given this book any other than its
present title, for throughout De Raeymaeker investigates philosophically
the manifestation, scope and complexity of being. This is metaphysics at
its best. It is a well ordered book, examining first the experience of being
and the difficulty of giving an intelligible and consistent explanation of
that experience; it then probes into the internal structure of being, viewed
both statically and dynamically, adding an excellent analysis of particular
being in its participated existence; and it concludes with a careful explanation of the cause of being, showing the complete dependence of
finite being upon the unlimited Absolute. Not only is there ascending
structure dominated by the Absolute but throughout there are circular
patterns of key notions constantly repeated, such as participation, the
value and mode of being, order, transcendental relation, and the complexus
of particular being.
Certain aspects of De Raeymaeker's presentation make this an unusual
and refreshing study. There is the psychological-epistemological point of
departure which has become a trademark of Louvain studies, the initial
analysis of conscious life in its experience of being. Traditional metaphysicians might object that such analysis slows up the presentation, but
the objection pales before the benefits accrued: a sense of immediacy,
realism and non-gratuity, in addition to an avoidance of shopworn essentialist terminology. Then there is De Raeymaeker's preoccupation with
integrating and unifying the study. Too frequently metaphysicians have
given a fragmented picture of being according to the set categories of act
and potency, substance and accident, the four causes, transcendentais and
predicaments. The present author avoids this by the unified structure
referred to above, by strategically scattered summarizings which are never
labeled summaries, by his brilliantly written defense of the Absolute as
the supreme foundation of being, and by a neat concluding chapter in
which the problem of being and its solution are restated.
A third aspect, less important yet attractive, is the historical notes
appended to those interpretations of being abcmt which there has been
considerable controversy over the years. These cover such subjects as:
the real distinction between essence and existence, the prineiple of individuation, substance and accident, the nature of the good, and causality.
With the exception of the treatment ol Scotus' position.· on individuation
which, though understandably short, might still have received a fuller
treatment, the historical surveys are adequate and well-documented. They
give depth and perspective to the author's picture.

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Not all of De Raeymaeker's interpretations will be acceptable to all
Thomists. When he says that " nowhere; in the vegetative and animal
world do we encounter the fundamental unity of a subsistent being," and
in another section (p.
depreciates the unity of substance of things
less than man, he seriously challenges the traditional Thomistic philosopher
of nature who leans heavily upon the theory of hylemorphism in the
essential constitution of a substantial unity in organic and inorganic bodies.
Not less controversial is De Raeymaeker's view that the principle of
existence is
formal constitutive principle of personality, since personality "does not involve the question quid est?, what is this reality?, but
rather the question an est?, does it exist?" For him, since personality is
the " last " perfection in the structure of a conscious being, its constitutive
root principle ought to be existence since the structure of a subsistent
reality terminates in existence. He closely associates personality and
subsistence, both of which have existence as their ontological principle.
Here again we see his tendency to limit subsistence to conscious beings,
those capable of personality.
Causality is particularly well-developed by the author, and he carefully
shows th,at the principle of causality cannot be deduced legitimately from
an abstract consideration of the principles of identity, contradiction, or
sufficient reason (as is so commonly dohe}, but solely from a consideration
of particular concrete being, the knowledge of which " formally attains to
the relativity of this being, to its belonging necessarily to an order of
beings, and therefore also to its reference to the cause on which it depends."
The translator's preface indicates that the study was not written as a
textbook but might readily be used as one. It seems to this reviewer that
background requiremen,ts for grasping some of the material, plus a certain
prolixity of' style, militates against such a use. Unquestionably the
teacher of metaphysics ought to have it at his fingertips.

In Defense of Plato. By RoNALD R LEVINSON. Cambridge:
"University Press, 1958. Pp. 674, with index, $10.00.

Harvard

Since book-reviewing fits within the scope of criticism, the reviewer must
use principles or conclusions at which he has arrived himself or which he
accepts from some trustworthy authority. If these principles or conclusions
are not sufficiently evident to the prospective readers of the review, then
he must clarify the principles which he is employing. This clarification is
prerequisite to any modern consideration of Plato and his teaching, as
also is the acceptance of the said principles and conclusions. The number
and quality of
among those fully acquainted with the Platonic
texts, and this in every age since Plato, lead one prudently to seek the

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119

guidance of a teacher whose conclusions in this matter have never been
seriously challenged. We could find no better guide in this regard than St.
Thomas Aquinas, who weighed the problem throughout his scholarly life
and arrived at the following conclusions: (1) That Plato was defective in
the art of teaching is evident from the fact that, in his statement of
philosophy, he almost exclusively used poetic dialectics, which leaves the
minds of the students in irresoluble doubt; and for this reason St. Thomas
does not try to determine what Plato meant, but he explains what follows
according to the "sound," or univocal sense of Plato's words, since this
univocal sense has misled many students of Plato (cf. I de Anima, lect. 8;
I de (Jael: et Mund., lect. 22, n. 8); (2) However, Plato's clear statement of
moral precepts enables us to call him "the Preceptor" (cf. Summa Theol.,
I, passim); (8) Since Plato was an outstandingly chaste man, it can be
supposed that he had the other moral virtues at least in some degree
(Summa Theol., II-II, q. 152, a. 2, ad 8); (4) Yet, although Plato was
acquainted with the book of Genesis and explained part of it (I Sent., d. 8,
q. 1, a. 4, ad l; de Pot., q. 4, a. 1, ad 2; Summa Theol., I, q. 66, a. 1, ad 5;
q. 74, a. 8, ad 4), he followed the false pagan opinion concerning sacrifice
to the pagan gods (Summa Theol. II-II, q. 152, a. 2, ad 8) .
We shall see shortly that all these conclusions have a bearing upon the
attacks and defense regarding Plato. However, the first conclusion is most
fundamental for understanding the history of Platonic thought after Plato.
Since his writings are dialectical, the resolution thereof will be into one
of the two possible contradictories implied in all dialectics. In general,
the pagan disciples of Plato resolved the poetic dialectics by taking the
figures and symbols to be univocal expressions of Plato's thought. Many of
the early Fathers and Doctors of the Church rightly understood the
Dialogues to be poetic and resolved the dialectics according to the demands
of divinely revealed truth. St. Augustine records the two possible resolutions
of Plato's dialectics in his own writings and shows how the conclusions
drawn according to one resolution contradict those following according to
the contrary resolution.
It is to be noted that St. Thomas concludes to Plato's lack of fitness
for teaching, not on moral or psychological grounds, but on the basis of
a logical analysis of the Dialogues, especially as regards the supposition of
terms therein. Some modern attackers of Plato, basing their objections on
the supposedly univocal expression in the Dialogues, claim his teachings to
be definitely erroneous; they would do well to read St. Thomas' remarks in
the referred commentaries on the de Ani·ma and the de Caelo et Mundo.
Others rashly attack Plato's morals. Those against whom Mr. Levinson
writes judge according to Freudian principles and the pseudo-moral science
drawn from these principles, and conclude that Plato was unfit to be a
teacher because he was a Freudian misfit. ·

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Unfortunately, the 674 pages of Mr. Levinson's proposed defense of
Plato contain little more than a rambling dialectic, based, in turn, upon
a dialectical analysis of Freud's teachings and upon history (which, in
relation to science, is really only preparatory dialectics). In other words,
Mr. Levinson tries to defend Plato's dialectic (which he does not recognize
to be dialectic) by another intrinsic dialectics. Not relying upon the
tradition of those who have resolved Plato's dialectic into true science, he
does not indicate a true path for resolving the difficulties in the Preceptor's
writings. And since defense must be based upon scientific grounds if it is
to be a sure defense, we may conclude that Mr. Levinson does not really
defend Plato.

Handbook of Logic. By RoLAND HoUDE and JEROME J. FISCHER. Dubuque:
Wm. C. Brown Co., 1954. Pp. 174, with index.
Workbook of Logic. By RoLAND HOUDE and JEROME J. FISCHER. Dubuque:.
Wm. C Brown Co., 1954. Pp. 138. $1.75.
Roland Houde of the Department. of Philosophy and Jerome J. Fischer
of the Department of English, both of Villanova University, have successfully combined their talents to produce a new textbook on logic and a
workbook companion. Throughout the work, the style is crisp and clear.
The Handbook is intended for an introductory course in the subject and,
as such, is adequate. The Workbook, undoubtedly, will receive a mixed
response depending upon one's own prejudice for or against such a device.
The Handbook comprises an interesting introduction followed by four main
divisions, the first three devoted to the acts of the mind, while the final
section deals with contemporary problems in logic.
It is encouraging to note that the authors continue the contemporary
trend away from the old material and formal division of the subject, and
as a result they achieve a solid presentation of the whole field of logic.
Even though there is nothing startlingly new or original in the composition
of the book, new examples, fresh and even witty, replace the hoary ones
that have filled logic texts since Aristotle composed them. The list of
suggested readings at the end of each chapter is superb in itself, but
perhaps too ambitious for the average first year student of philosophy.
Exception must be taken to the failure to include any treatment of the
Predicables. Such an omission, we believe, leaves the explanation of
definition incomplete. Although the authors merely suggest or hint at the
major problems in logic, their observations, often contained in the notes
at the ends of the chapters, will be of interest to advanced logicians.
In general, however, these two books should be well received inasmuch
as they achieve their purpose, the pleasing presentation of logic to
neophytes.

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121

Natural Right and History. By LEo STRAUSS. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1953. Pp. 323, with index. $5.00.
This expanded version of the author's Charles R. Walgreen Foundation
Lectures is devoted to a consideration of the reasons for the present day
rejection of natural right by modern social science and an able examination
of the development of the classical natural right doctrine of the Greek
and Roman philosophers and a criticism of the fallacies in the natural right
doctrines of certain "enlightened" philosophers of the eighteenth century.
" The majority among the learned who still adhere to the principles of
the Declaration of Independence interpret these principles not as expressive
of natural right but as an ideal, if not as an ideology or as a myth. Presentday American social science, as far as it is not Roman Catholic social
science, is dedicated to the proposition that all men are endowed by the
evolutionary process or by a mysterious fate with many kinds of urges and
aspirations, but certainly with no natural right." (p. 2)
Professor Strauss notes two reasons for the rejection of natural right
by modern social science: historicism, the view that, as all human thought
is historical, we are unable to grasp anything eternal, and the distinction
between facts and values which arises from the view that we can know
facts and their causes but are unable to answer questions of value because
there cannot be any genuine knowledge of the Ought. The author seeks
to overcome both of these reasons for rejecting natural right by going
back to the pre-scientific and pre-philosophic " natural world " where the
good was identified with the ancestral, and tracing the early development
of the idea of natural right by the Greek and Roman philosophers. This
is followed by critical analysis of the defective concepts of natural right
propagated by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Edmund Burke.
Professor Strauss notes that the modern rejection of the principles of
natural right, particularly as expressed in the Declaration of Independence,
is due at least in part to the peculiar interpretation of natural right by
eighteenth century philosophers who were unable to determine the ultimate
goal of wise actions. This speaks well of the value of the Christian heritage
and independent, critical attitude of the colonial leaders who though
thoroughly familiar with the writings of those philosophers did not permit
the disintegrating, corrosive effect of their ideas to undermine our Federal
Constitution or to dominate the early decisions of our state and federal
courts.
The scholarship evident in this work is impressive but the results are
unsatisfying. By limiting himself to natural right, the author has been able
to examine more exhaustively his subject matter, but only at the expense
of doing so without either the assistance of the indispensible criteria of
evaluation of the various natural right doctrines treated in his study or a
complete appreciation of the causes of modern fallacies.

BRIEF NOTICES

Natural right, as ii implies a duty in others to recognize the right,
depends upon justice for its enjoyment. The highest and basic norm of
natural law in the narrow sense is that justice is to be done. Natural right
is not justice and it is not natural law, yet it is only meaningful in the
context of justice and natural law. Thus it is not surprising that this
author without clearly distinguishing between natural right and natural
law, brushes off the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas in a single paragraph
in which he casts doubt on " whether the natural law as Thomas Aquinas
understands it is natural law strictly speaking, i. e., a law knowable to the
unassisted mind which is not illumined by divine revelation." (p. 168)
If Professor Strauss intends to indicate by this book what ought to be
the natural right teaching, and not to make a careful comparison of
doctrines, then he appears to either make antiquity the criterion for the
true and the good or, like Thomas Jefferson, to choose those sections of the
writings of philosophers which appeal to his natural predilections, omitting
or contradicting those which do not.

St. Thomas on the Object of Geometry. By VINCENT E. SMITH. The
Aquinas Lecture, 1958. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1954.
Pp. 99. $2.00.
St. Thomas' contribution to the foundations of mathematics is not found
neatly assembled in one classical locus, but rather is diffused through his
innumerable works. The resulting complication to the task of the researcher
would seem to have been a major factor in the eclipse of Thomistic thought
in mathematics during the past few centuries. Vincent Smith, Aquinas
Lecturer for 1958, here attempts to remedy the situation by singling out
one of the key problems in the foundations of geometry and thoroughly
exposing St. Thomas' solution to the difficulties it presents. Thus he makes
a modest but worthwhile contribution that should bring modern minds to a
better understanding of the universal genius of the Angelic Doctor.
The lecture may be divided into three parts, the first dealing with the
nature of mathematical abstraction, the second with an analysis of
quantified being, and the third with the problem of the continuum. Each
of these represents a well-documented study of Thomistic texts on the
respective subjects, with little original development other than the ordering
and lucid exposition of the doctrine. The lecture concludes with a brief
application of the matter presented to the problem of the relative validity
of Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries. Dr. Smith rightly defends
Euclidean geometry as the only real science of continuous quantity,
fortifying his position with metaphysical and dialectical arguments.
Of particular value in the study is the author's clarification of the senses
in which form is used in mathematics, and his solution of some antinomies

BRIEF NOTICES

HS

proposed against the position that parts do not exist actually in the
continuum. He also explains well the role of the imagination
mathematics. Without wishing to detract from the general excellence of the
work, this reviewer would have appreciated more attention to the function
of construction in geometrical demonstration, and to the criteria for
distinguishing real and rational being in the science of geometry.

Relativity and Reality. By E. G. BARTER. New York:
Library, 1953. Pp. 14!l. $4.75.

Philosophical

Ever since Einstein proposed his theory of special relativity in 1905, and
each time that he has furnished successive emendations, there has been a
flood of literature interpreting the relativity theory for the common man.
By and large these interpretations have discredited the common sense
position, insisting that man's primitive notions of space and time will have
to be radically revised, and even arguing to the complete overthrow of
the absolute in favor of an all-pervading relativism. The concern of some
philosophers over the patent contradictions between the mathematical
theories of relativity and the facts of everyday experience has made little
impact on modern thought, largely because the facile explanations of logical
positivism have universally shaken faith in the testimony of the senses.
Thus it is refreshing to see a book that reopens the entire question of the
relation between relativity and reality, and reinterprets the popular anomalies in such a way as to bring them back into accord with the facts of
common sense. Mr. Barter does this in convincing style in his Relativity
and Reality, presenting the case against mathematicism and positivism in
a way that. will delight the heart of any realist.
Unlike most books on relativity that are not specifically addressed to
theoretical physicists, this is far from being a popular presentation. Rather
it is a philosophical work, written by a person who comprehends the
technical details of the relativity theories, yet selects only those points
for discussion that have philosophical relevance. The author further
defers graciously to savants in the positivist tradition, devoting two
chapters to citations under the title of " Expert Opinion " before calmly
exposing the absurdity of each position with a ruthless dialectic. The
burden of his argument is that special relativity implies the very space at
rest which it denies, while general relativity implies the straighteness of
space from which its curvature departs.
This book will be heavy reading for one who does not have some technical
competence in modern physics and mathematics. Yet it is a thorough
piece of work, and will richly reward the investigator who is interested in
a defense of realism against attacks from relativity enthusiasts who
confuse their theories with the physical reality to which they apply.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Bernard, 0. P., A. Introduction a la Philosophie Thomiste. Avignon:
Maison Aubanel Pere, 1954. Pp. 136. Fr. 500.
--. Presentation de la Somme TMologique. Avignon: Maison Aubanel
Pere, 1954. Pp. 172. Fr. 600.
Berdyaev, Nicolas. Christianity and Anti-Semitism. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. Pp. 58. $2.75.
Boche1'tski, I. M. Die Zeitgenossischen Denkmethoden. Bern: Francke
Verlag, 1954. Pp. 151 with index. Fr. s. 2.80.
Bokser, Ben Zion. From the World of the Cabbalah. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. Pp. 219 with index. $3.00.
Broudy, Harry S. Building a Philosophy of Education. New York:
Prentice-Hall, 1954. Pp. 495 with index. $5.00.
Bruno de Jesus-Marie, 0. D. C., P. (ed.) Love and Violence. New York:
Sheed & Ward, 1954. Pp. 269. $4.00.
Buessing, 0. F. M. Cap., Venantius. Through Him and With Him and In
Him. New York: Wagner, 1954. Pp. 358. $3.50.
Campbell, Roderick. Israel and the New Covenant. Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1954. Pp. 347 with index. $3.75.
Ehler, Sidney Z. and Morall, John B. (trs. and eds.) Church and State
Through the Centuries. Westminster: Newman, 1954. Pp. 639 with
index. $6.75.
Ferguson, George. Signs and Symbols in Christian Art. New York: Oxford,
1954. Pp. 355 with index. $10.00.
Fichter, S. J., Joseph H. Social Relations in the Urban Parish. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1954. Pp. 271 with index. $5.50.
Gross, Feliks. Foreign Policy Analysis. New York: Philosophical Library,
1954. Pp. 194 with index. $3.75.
Guardini, Romano. The Lord. Chicago: Regnery, 1954. Pp. 546. $6.50.
Hawkins, D. J.B. Being and Becoming. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1954.
Pp. 176. $3.00.
Hasseveldt, Abbe Roger. (tr. by William Storey.) The Church-A Divine
Chicago: Fides, 1954. Pp. 275. $4.50.
Henry, 0. P., A. M. (tr. by William Storey). Introduction to Theology.
Theology Library, Vol. I. Chicago: Fides, 1954. Pp. 320 with index.
$5.95.

Horvath, 0. P., Alexander. M. Studien zum Gottesbegriff. Freiburg:
Paulusverlag, 1954. Pp. 328. DM 20.
Johnson, John S. The Rosary in Action. St. Louis: Herder, 1954. Pp.
9'!79. $1.75.

Joseph, 0. P., N. Benedict. The Virtue of Observance According to St.
Thomas Aquinas. Washington: The Thomist Press, 1954. }>p. 94 with
index. $1.00.

H4

BOOKS RECEIVED

Lavelle, Louis. The Meaning of Holiness. New York: Pantheon, 1954. Pp.
119. $2.75.
McLaughlin, P. J. Modern Science and God. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1954. Pp. 89. $2.75.
Maritain, Jacques. (tr. by E. H. Flannery). An Essay on Christian
Philosophy. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. Pp. 127 with
index. $2.75.
--. (tr. by Peter O'Reilly). Approaches to God. World Perspectives,
Vol. I. New York: Harper, 1954. Pp. 141. $2.50.
Muller, 0. S. B., J. P. Le Correctorium corruptorii "Quaestione." Studia
Anselmiana, Fasc. 35. Rome: Herder, 1954. Pp. 189 with index.
Mumford, Lewis. In the Name of Sanity. New York: Harcourt, Brace,
1954. Pp. 244. $3.75.
Moriarity, S. J., Frederick L. Foreword to the Old Testament Books.
Weston: Weston College Press, 1954. Pp. 127. $1.00.
Nagel, Ernest. Sovereign Reason. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954.
Pp. 315 with index. $5.00.
Philipon, 0. P., M. M. (tr. by Rev. John Otto). The Sacraments in
Christian Life. Westminster: Newman, 1954. Pp. 410. $4.25.
Rouget, 0. P., A.-M. (tr. by Carisbrooke Dominicans). Christ Acts
Though the Sacraments. Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1954. Pp.
162. Cloth, $2.00. Paper, $1.25.
Runes, Dagobert D. (ed.) Treasury of Philosophy. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. Pp. 1304 with index. $15.00.
Saffrey, 0. P., H. D. Sancti Thomae de Aquino Super Librum de Causis
Expositio. Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1954. Pp. 223. Fr. 1800.
Saw, Ruth Lydia. Leibniz. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954. Pp. 240 with
index. $.65.
Scheler, Max. (tr. by Peter Heath). The Nature of Sympathy; New
Haven: Yale- University Press, 1954. Pp. 328 with index. $5.00.
Sertillanges, 0. P ., A. G. Spirituality. New York: McMullen, 1954. Pp.
244. $2.95.
Stallknecht, N. P. and Brumbaugh, R. S. The Compass of Philosophy.
New York: Longmans, Green, 1954. Pp. 267 with index. $3.25.
Stern, Karl. The Third Revolution. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1954.
Pp. 318. $4.00.
Toynbee, Arnold J. A Study of History. Vol. VII,. Pp. 798. Vol. VIII, Pp.
741. Vol. IX, Pp. 766. Vol. X, Pp. 428 with index. New York:
Oxford, 1954. $35.00.
Vanier, S. J., Paul. Theologie Trinitaire chez Saint Thomas d'Aquin.
Paris: Vrin, 19.54. Pp. 156.
Veatch, Henry. Realism and Nominalism Revisited. The Aquinas Lecture,
1954. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1954. Pp. 75. $2.00.