THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS:

THE DOMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JOSEPH

Publishers:

VoL. XVIII

The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

APRIL, 1955

A THOMISTIC APPRAISAL OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY

T

HERE is more than one way to skin a cat and the ways
to be rid of metaphysics seem even more numerous.
A Descartes can make the connection between body
and soul so tenuous that the realities of the spirit rise up
into thin Berkeleyean air. The wisdom of the first philosophy
can be declared unknowable by a man in Konigsberg. Three
men in Jena will claim vision of it as a veritable nonsense.
Deny the mind's existence and sensation will perform the
exorcising. Deny the soul itself and matter with heavy tread
will tramp out all thoughts of being or the perfections of being
while itself marching gravely to the grave.
Therein lay the difficulty. Each scissoring performed its
task too well. Metaphysics was excluded but with it part of
the world still desirable to retain. With Kantian bifurcation
all was lost; recourse only in faith was left. With the positivist

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and materialist renouncement, all values were renounced as
well. Another cut could yet be made. It gave promise of
retrieving for man a life with more than atoms and molecules
on which to found his happiness. This was to divide not body
and soul, at least not immediately nor as the principle of
interpretation, not sensation and reason, nor matter from its
form, but the mind itself. It was to take the practical and
drop the speculative. At one stroke were values saved and
metaphysics excised.
This split, of the practical function of the mind from its
speculative power, was John Dewey's contribution to the
history of man's search for wisdom. He dedicated his philosophic life, an unusually long one, to the implementation and
exploitation of the practical and the extirpation of what he
considered the obstructionist chimeras resultant upon any
affirmation of the speculative. The result was the abundant
literature of pragmatism, instrumentalism and experimentalism,
as his thought was at various times called.
A Thomist, once aware of what was to be done, could predict
with confidence general features of such a philosophic truncation, notwithstanding Dewey's vehement objection to such
prophecy. After all, the practical function of the intellect
has not lacked the attention of thinkers from Aristotle onwards.
The nature, conditions, scope and limitations of the practical
order are clearly marked out in the Thomist tradition. General
traits of an exclusively practical philosophy can thus be readily
foreseen. However, the radical arbitrariness of such an outlook
forbids any particularization. The adoption of the practical
as fundamental attitude admits, in terms of content, of widely
diverse philosophic development. The insights into the practical afforded by tradition are best employed in analysis and
appraisal of the philosophy Dewey has produced.
The integrity, indeed, the consistency of that philosophy
has often been questioned. V. J. McGill, for example, regards
instrumentalism as embracing two features: "I) a theory of
meaning, and of truth or ' warranted assertibility ' and 2) a

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body of fairly flexible philosophical doctrines." 1 For him,
the connection between the two parts is not intrinsic. On the
other hand, Joseph Ratner, on many occasions an official interpreter of the philosopher, maintains that, granted Dewey's
analysis of experimentalism, all else follows.2 While in
nowise sharing Ratner's enthusiasm, Father Fleckenstein
would agree that in Dewey's thought method and philosophy
are inextricably bound together. 3 All are in a measure correct.
The inner necessities of a solely practical outlook are limited
to the disposition of only general features but, nevertheless,
fundamental and determining ones. The rest is a matter of
choice. Yet, a coherence is there and for a more profound
reason than arbitrary convenience for the sake of plausibility.
The division made by Dr. McGill is, however, suggestive of
a method of presentation. The British mathematical philosopher, Betrand Russell, designates Dewey's theory of inquiry
as his most distinctive philosophical doctrine. Certainly it
is in his theories of meaning and truth that Dewey differs
from his contemporaries and by them that he seeks to stabilize
the aims common to himself and Russell and most other nonChristian thinkers of the Western world. While today exposition of his thinking may follow a course made possible in the
light of the finished product, genetically the theory of knowledge was his approach to what was his subsequent theorizing
on metaphysics, education and the like. Moreover, investigation of what is involved in the exclusively practical character of
Dewey's theory of inquiry and of truth affords solid ground
for unfolding the consequences and implications of the practical in his philosophic enterprise.
1 D.
Runes, ed., The Dictionary of Philosophy (New York: Philosophical
Library, 1952), p. 246.
• J. Ratner, ed., Intelligence in the Modern World (New York: Modern Library,
1939)' p. 58.
• N. J. Fleckenstein, A Critique of John Dewey's Theory of the Nature and the
Knowledge of Reality in the Light of the Principles of Thomism (Washington:
Catholic University, 1954), pp. vi, 179.

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I . .ANALYSIS

OF THE PRACTICAL

To prove the existence of practicalism as a distinctive trait
of John Dewey's philosophy is unnecessary. Not only is it
universally acknowledged and, by his followers, acclaimed,
but its presence is so obvious as to impress the most casual
student of his works. That Dewey's practicalism is in accord
with the Thomistic analysis of the practical is, however, not
so apparent. Such an exposition can also serve the further
purpose of making explicit the various elements of the analysis
of the practical which can function as the instruments of
criticism.
i. The Speculative and the Practical
There is an obvious difference between the metaphysician
whose science leads him to know and the architect whose
knowledge finds term in a building. Both know and the knowledge of each is a science; but, the end of the science of metaphysics is truth absolutely considered and in itself, while the
end of the science of architecture is achieved in something
beyond itself. The former constitutes a speculative, the latter
a practical science. For Aristotle and St. Thomas these classifications, the speculative and the practical, constituted a primary division of philosophic sciences. Speculative philosophy,
having truth for itself, to be known and contemplated, for its
proper object, was divided further according to the grades
of abstraction into metaphysics, mathematics, and natural
philosophy. Practical science, concerned with the operable, is
by difference therein either of morals or art. 4
.
The nature of the speculative and the practical and the
consequent
and interrelations between them are
given profound and explicit treatment by both the Stagirite
and the Angelic Doctor. Commentators upon the teachings
of St. Thomas, such as Cajetan, Capreolus, and John of St.
Thomas, have further elaborated the subject. Recent years
'In Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. I; II Metaphys., lect. 2; III Cont. Gent., c.
n. 6; Summa Theol., I-II, q. 57, a. 1; I, q. 14, a. 16; De Verit., q. 8, a. 8; q. 14, a. 4.

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have produced studies by Labourdette, Maritain, Noble, Simon
and others. In 1945 Henri Pichette offered a brief but illuminating article and in 1948 Jean Petrin, 0. M. I., a very complete
e:xposition.5 Advantage is taken here of these works to recount
the outstanding and pertinent features of the nature and
relations of the speculative and practical.
The nature of each type of knowledge is best presented by
developing their characteristics as they are in opposition one
to another. The primary opposition is that of end. Says
Aristotle: " For the end of theoretical knowledge is truth,
while that of practical knowledge is action." 6 And again in
the De Anima: "the practical mind, which calculates means
to an end, differs from the speculative mind in the character
of its end." 7 In the teaching of Aristotle and St. Thomas ends
are associated with good and the appetite; end properly socalled in the full sense of the word is by them understood as
the good and as the object of the appetite. Is the end of the
speculative intellect one possessed of such qualifications? Is
it an end properly so-called? At first sight the answer might
seem to be contained in the words of St. Thomas: "Truth and
good include one another; for truth is something good, or otherwise it would not be desirable, and good is something true,
or otherwise it would not be intelligible." 8 Yet, while they
include one another, the good and the true are not thereby
identified; in such case, the objects of the speculative and the
practical would differ only as one particular good from another.
Hence, Dr. Pichette, who raises the question, concludes that
strictly the practical di:ffers from the speculative intellect in
the very fact that it has an end in the proper and full sense.
In the course of developing his thesis he unfolds much that is
• Henri Pichette, " Considerations sur quelques principes fondarnentaux de la
doctrine du speculatif et du pratique," Laval Theologique ef Phuosophique (Quebec:
Universite Laval, 1945), I, n. 1, pp. 52-70. Jean Petrin, Oonnaissance Speculative et
Connaissance Pratique (Ottawa: Editions de l'Universite, 1948).
•II Metaphys., c. 1, 988 B20.
•Ill De Anima, c. 10, 488 Al2.
8 Summa Theol., I, q. 79, a. 11, ad 2.

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of Vital importance to the understanding of the speculative
and the practical.
The truth is a good insofar as it is perfective of the intellect;
is, in fact, the greatest of goods as perfecting the highest and
most noble faculty. As such, it can be the object of the will,
an end to be pursued. As such, it can be the end of the practical intellect, to be sought by motion and operation, a work
to be done. On the other hand, the good is also a truth and
can be in its nature defined. As such, it can be the object
of the speculative intellect, constitutive· of speculative truth.
It, too, can qualify as a good, perfective of the intellect, and
be the object of the will and the practical intellect as a good
to be sought, a work to be done. To be noted is the fact that
the perfection of the speculative intellect, truth, its good and
end, remains within the intellect even when the truth considered
is the truth of the good as such.
While the will can tend toward the truth as a good, and
the speculative intellect can consider the good as a truth, the
consideration of the good as good is performed by the practical
intellect. Thus St. Thomas says: " Good can be considered
by speculative knowledge, as its truth alone is considered, as
when we define good and show its nature. Also it can be considered practically, if it is considered as good; this is if it is
considered as the end of motion and operation." 9 . The order
of the practical intellect to the end is to end as such, as the
good of the appetite. Hence even when operating toward that
good which is the good of the speculative intellect, truth, it
does so under the aspect of its being good as such, object of
the will. Whereas the speculative intellect remains under all
circumstances within its own limits, the practical, with equal
universality, tends always to that which is outside itself. 10 "In
short," says Pichette, " the goodness of the truth owes its
•De Verit., q. 8, a. 8, ad 9.
10 " Intellectus
practicus habet bonum quod est extra ipsum; sed intellectus
speculativus habet bonum in se ipso, scilicet contemplationem veritatis." Summa
Theol., I-II, q. 4, a. 5, ad !'l.

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perfection not to the fact that it is the object of the will, but
first and absolutely to the fact that it is the perfection of the
intellect. On the other hand, the good which is the object of
the practical intellect is the perfection of the appetite as
such." 11
The difference between the speculative and the practical
does not spring from the intention of the knower. The one
differs from the other in principle; of the speculative, the true;
of the practical, the good as good. The intention of the knower
does play a role, but the distinction based upon it is within
the field of practical knowledge. So, according to St. Thomas,
knowledge is called practical by reason of its order to some
work; yet, sometimes it is actually so ordered as when a builder
or architect, having conceived of a definite form, proposes to
bring about its actualization. On the other hand, the practical
is " sometimes knowledge, of itself possible of order to some
act, but not actually so ordered, as when the maker devises the
form of some artifact and knows according to the mode of
operation, but does not intend to operate." 12 The latter knowledge is, although not actually and completely practical, yet
practical formally and essentially. The extension of terminology
makes this an important consideration.
Thus, Cardinal Cajetan warns that the terms speculative
and practical are sometimes used to distinguish sciences according to their own proper conditions, and on other occasions to
express the intent or practice of the scientist. 18 The usage is
Pichette, op. cit., p. 55.
Aliqua vero cognitio practica dicitur ex ordine ad opus, quod contingit
dupliciter. Quandoque in actu; quando scilicet ad aliquod opus actu ordinatur,
sicut artifex praeconcepta forma proponit illam in materiam inducere; et tune
est actu practica cognitio, et cognitionis forma. Quandoque vero est quidem
ordinabilis cognitio ad actum, non tamen actu ordinatur; sicut cum artifex
excogitat formam artificii, et scit per modum operandi, non tamen operari intendit;
et certum est quod est practica habitu vel virtute, non actu." De Verit., q. ll, a. S.
18 " Circa
hanc partem adverte primo quod practicum et speculativum hie
sumitur non solum ut sint conditiones scientiae secundum se, sed etiam ex parte
scientis. Et propterea dicitur quod ars dmrtificativa non intendentis domificare,
est speculativa ex fine, et practica ex modo et objecto: glossandum est enim de
11

12 "

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FERRER SMITH

familiar and common as distinguishing the theory and practice
of medicine, engineering, etc. The point frequently overlooked,
however, is that the denomination of such practical knowledge
as theory or speculative does not transform it into a science
essentially or formally speculative. The appetite in such knowledge is not functioning as motive, nor the end as impelling;
but the appetite and the good do enter as constitutive of the
scientific object. The end of the scientist is truth, but the
truth thus terminative is practical. What is sought is not the
truth of the good, its nature as such; that knowledge would
be completely and formally speculative. The determination
of a specific object in its relation to the appetite as convenient
or inconvenient, as a real or apparent good, has for its principle
the truth as such, and is a speculative consideration. What
is sought in all practical knowledge is the good as good, as
subject to operation, as able to be pursued. The principle of
practical knowledge is the object of the appetite as appetite.
Practical knowledge does not question the truth or falsity of
its object as to its essential nature but is concerned with it
solely as operable, as capable of being done or made. Consequently, even practical knowledge which is such only formally
and not actually or completely and which thus entitatively
remains within the intellect, yet retains an order to that which
is outside the intellect, to the object of the appetite. The distinction between the speculative and the practical, based upon
the consideration of the ends intrinsic to each, is profound and
independent of the knower involved; yet that based upon the
intention of the knower is, when properly understood, of even
greater significance. It is determinative of the limits within
which can be had practical science either formally or completely such.
The extension and comprehension of speculative and practical knowledge is referred to by St. Thomas when he remarks:
fine ex parte scientis, et non ipsius scientiae. Quoniam si loquimur de fine ipsius
scientiae ipse est etiam practica ex fine: quoniam finis ejus est domificatio."
Cajetan, In Summam Theol., I., q. 14, a. 16.

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" knowledge can be called speculative in relation to the things
known, which are not operable by the knower." 14 The most
frequent conclusion drawn from this observation regards the
root of the practical as consisting in the power to produce the
operable. This is possible of grave misinterpretation. H the
power of the knower be the principle of difference of the
speculative and practical within the genus of understanding,
then knowledge will be the one or the other purely by reason
of extrinsic denomination. John of St. Thomas exposes the
result: " all knowledge would then be in itself formally speculative." The intelligence would be incapable of representing
the contingent as contingent. For, the concern of the speculative is with the necessary, the essential nature of things;
of the practical, with the possible. If all knowledge were
speculative, all would be necessary. The power of execution
would be itself impossible. 15
The object of practical knowledge is constituted by the
operable. In itself the operable is characterized by the traits
of contingency and composition, the former resultant of the
latter. The necessary that is so entirely and without qualification is in no way operable, cannot be the object of practical
knowledge, cannot be made. Only God fulfills this requirement
absolutely; so is it said that His knowledge of Himself is
speculative in nature, not practical. 16 In all else, all creatures,
there is composition of some sort, at least of essence and
existence, and hence all are possible objects of practical knowledge. In each can be distinguished the material element, taking
material in its wide sense to designate the subject or determinable part, and the formal element or determining factor. As
recess is made from the pure immateriality of God to beings
properly material of their very nature, the objects become
u " ... aliqua scientia potest dici speculativa ... ex parte rerum scitarum quae
non sunt operabiles a sciente, sicut est scientia hominis de rebus naturalibus vel
divinis." Summ.a Theol., I, q. 14, a. 16. Cf. I Ethic., lect. 1, n. l.
15 Cursus Theol., t. I, disp. 2, a. 10, n. 4.
16 Summa Theol., I, q. 14, a. 16.

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FERRER SMITH

more and more operable as involving increased composition
and a greater degree of contingency. Angels and separated
souls have at very least an extrinsic physical contingency as
not having their existence essentially. Material beings have
an intrinsic physical contingency flowing from the compositive
principles of their essence, matter and form, and of their
becoming, matter, form and privation. From this can be seen
the close relation between the practical and the contingent.
It is further evident that the object of the practical is less
abstract, less immaterial than that of the speculative. The
truth of the latter is attained by abstracting from actual
existence. The end of the former is in existence, to bring about
an existent work or deed. The tendencies of each are in fact
opposed, one toward the necessary, the other to the contingent.
As contingency qualifies the object in increasing degree the
more operable it becomes and, according to St. Thomas, of
less interest speculatively as having little of fixed verity. 11
It is from this order of the practical to the real that can be
resolved the problem of the root of the practical. The operable
by definition involves order to act. The act to which it is thus
ordered and which is prior and principle to the operable as
such is the act of the appetite toward the good as good. It is
by order to that act that the operable derives its specification.
Hence, it is the actuality on the part of the subject which is
the appetite of good that constitutes the root of the practical,
the good diffusive of itself. Not the power of the subject to
make or to do but the goodness of the subject, its abundance
of actuality, first represents the operable as such. The power
to communicate good is itself rooted in the goodness of the
subject. The knower cannot have a practical knowledge of an
operable because he cannot do or make it. Yet, the latter
17 " Aliquando illud verum quod utroque
modo potest considerari non habet
magnam utilitatem, nisi inquantum ordinatur ad opus; quia cum sit contingens,
non habet fixam veritatem, sicut est consideratio de operibus virtutum. Et tune
talis consideratio, quamvis possit esse et speculativi et practici intellectus, tamen
est principaliter practici intellectus." III Sent., d.
q.
a. 8, sol.

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deficiency is one ultimately of goodness on his part. It is when
understood in this context that the intention of the knower
can be called determinative of the limits of practical science.
"Operability," as Pichette remarks, "is not an absolute
property of operable things." 18 The root is formally on the
part of the knower. The practical knowledge of the operable
does not consist in its nature considered in itself.
While speculative knowledge is not of itself practical, there
is nevertheless an important bearing of the one upon the other.
By reason of its object as operable, the practical depends upon
the speculative. The concern of the practical is with order,
with the relation of o;ne thing to another, with means to an
end. Ultimately, that order must rest upon the knowledge of
things in their proper natures. Otherwise, as John of St.
Thomas points out, the order and regulation of the practical
reason will be made imperfectly. 19 Hence it is that St. Thomas
speaks of the practical as an extension of the speculative. 20
It is noteworthy that the meaning here is not of knowledge
which is only formally practical or, as sometimes denominated,
the speculatively practical, but of speculative knowledge as
such. The metaphysical principle involved is that operation
follows upon the nature or essence. The practical order must
be built upon the speculative order and, while of many things
a practical knowledge will suffice, it is impossible to depart
from the speculative order entirely. The good as good is end
and principle of the practical and hence not the intellect but
the will; but, the will follows the intellect in the order of
nature. It is the intellectual appetite. 21 It is the teaching of
St. Thomas that all sciences are to be referred to speculative
science and ultimately to God:
That which is lovable only because of another is for the sake
of that which is lovable for its own sake alone; because we cannot
Pichette, op. cit., p. 61.
Cur8U8 Theol., t. 1, disp. 2, a. 10, n. 4.
••Summa Theol., I, q. 79, a. 11. Cf. Petrin, op. cit., pp. 119-U9.
21 Summa Theol., I, q. 78, a. 1, ad 8; q. 80, a. l; q. 81, a. I.
18
19

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FERBER SMITH

go ori indefinitely in the appetite of nature, since then nature's
desire would be in vain, for it is impossible to pass through an
infinite number of things. Now all practical sciences, arts and
powers are lovable only for the sake of something else, since their
end is not knowledge, but work. But speculative sciences are
lovable for their own sake, for their end is knowledge itself. Nor
can we find any action in human life that is not directed to some
other end, with the exception of speculative consideration. . . .
Accordingly, the practical arts are directed to the speculative arts,
and again every human operation to intellectual speculation, as
its end. Now, in all sciences and arts that are mutually ordered,
the last end seems to be the one from which others take their
rules and principles. . . . And such is the relation of first philosophy
to other speculative sciences, for all others depend thereon, since
they derive their principles from it, and are directed by it in
defending those principles; and moreover first philosophy is wholly
directed to the knowledge of God as its last end. 22
The inferiority of the practical to the speculative as they
exist in man is further demonstrated in its greater dependence
upon the faculties of sense. Both pertain to the rational part
of the soul, because each is rational by its very essence. Thus
they are distinguished from the powers of the irrational part
of the soul, both appetitive and cognitive, which are rational
by participating in the rationality of reason. One of these
latter is of considerable importance to the operation of the
practical and serves to illustrate its dependence on the senses
and the ground therefor. This is the sense faculty called the
vis cogitativa, the estimative power or particular reason.
As Robert Brennan explains:
According to the Thomistic interpretation, man's intellect does
not grasp singulars directly, but by an indirect movement wherein
it returns to consider the phantasm from which it abstracted its
universal idea and thereby comes to analyze the singular thing
represented to analyze the phantasm. It is obvious that, for the
achievement of such indirect knowledge,· some kind of continuity
must be effected between intellect, on the one side, and sense on
the other. In the teaching of Aquinas, this mutual extension of
material activities into the sphere of the immaterial, and of im••Ill Cont. Goot., c. 25.

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material activities into the sphere of the material, is accomplished
through the cogitative faculty or particular reason.23
The necessity for such a power is radicated not in the singularity of the singulars but in their materiality, a condition
opposed to the immateriality which is the principle of knowledge.
When the continuity to be established is of practical knowledge which terminates in the singular and particular, this
cogitative power acts as the intermediary. Because the practical, even the formally and not completely practical, so tends
it is constantly dependent upon it. The almost infinite variability of the singular necessitates an unceasing learning, for
the formally practical is always in some measure inadequate.
The universals that constitute it cannot overcome the indeterminacy of the contingents with which it is concerned. As
Cardinal Cajetan points out. such universals are often " constructed," a work of the mind seeking unity rather than
representative of reality. 24 This condition, however, does not
necessarily militate against truth in the practical order.
Speculative truth consists in the conformity of the intellect
to things. Practical truth, on the other hand, consists in the
conformity of the intellect to right appetite. Thus the objects
of speculation are true or false, either as corresponding to the
things known or not. Ontologic being, things in reality, constitute the measure. The end of the practical is the good as
good which is determined as such by its order to the appetite.
Hence, the measure is constituted by the appetite, for the
practical intellect performs its task by producing the good
which the appetite desires. The truth, then, of the practical
reason is achieved by attaining the good which the appetite
desires; it achieves the true good if the appetite is rightly
ordered to that good.25
•• R. Brennan, Thomistic Psychology (New York: Macmillan, 1941), p. !!01.
Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 86; a. I; De Verit., q. 10, a. 5; III De Anima, Iect. 8.
••In Summa Theol., I, q. 82, a. 8.
•• " Dicit ergo, quod honae et malae mentis, id est intellectus vel rationis, quae

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In.this relation it must be observed that the term 'practical
truth ' is to be applied only of those sciences which are completely practical, i. e., actually and existentially functioning
in the production of the good. The formally practical sciences
remain as such within the intellect and hence their truth is not
completely practical but speculative. Such sciences are practical in their nature and proper object but speculative secundum
quid, after a fashion. This does not mean that thus they
coincide with the properly speculative. End for them is still
the good a.$ good; for the speculative, truth. Such is the foundation of the essential division of sciences into speculative and
. practical intrinsically; the end of the scientist, by which practical conclusions are held speculatively, is extrinsic to the science
as such. 26
Stress on the distinction between the speculative and the
practical might lead to the conclusion that they represent
distinct powers. This might be based on what has been said
of the necessity of diverse powers for the perception of generically diverse objects. Such is the foundation for stipulating a
cogitative faculty and such also is the basis for not making
any real distinction between the speculative and the practical
as powers of the soul. The latter, even as the former, revolves
about a universal consideration of its object. The difference
is one of end in function. 27
The two orders of intellectual knowledge are distinct in
terms of their respective ends, objects, and in the mode proper
to each. In recapitulation, the nature and the differences of
est speculativa et non practica, consistit simpliciter in vero et falso; ita scilicet quod
verum absolutum est bonum ejus, et falsum absolutum est malum ipsius. Dicere
enim verum et falsum est opus pertinens ad quemlibet intellectum. Sed bonum
practici intellectus non est veritas absoluta, sed veritas 'confesse se habens,' id est
concorditer ad appetitum rectum." VI Ethic., lect. 2. Cf. Summa Theol., I-II,
q. 57, a. 5, ad 8.
•• OurSU8 Theol., t. I, disp. 2, a. 10.
•• " Dicendum est ergo, quod intellectus practicus principium quidem habet in
universali consideratione, et secundum hoc est idem subjecto cum speculativo, sed
terminatur ejus consideratio in particulari operabili." VI Ethic., lect. 2, n.
Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 14, a. 16; q. 79, a. II.

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the practical and the speculative can be thus delineated: For
the latter, the end is knowledge, truth as the good of the
mind; for the former, the end is a work to be done or made,
good as good, as ordered to the appetite. The speculative
remains within the intellect itself entirely; the practical, even
the formally and not perfectly practical, has an order to that
which is outside the mind, to the good of the appetite. The
object of the speculative is measured by reality, its truth
consists in conformity to the thing; the object of the practical
Is measured by the appetite, its truth depends ultimately on
that appetite being rectified to the order of God. The practical
depends upon the speculative in principle and end; all practical
sciences must be referred necessarily to the speculative as
defending and terminating them. The speculative is concerned
with the universal, increases in dignity and certitude as it
grows more abstract and advances in degree of immateriality.
The practical consists ultimately in application to the individual, is resolved by operation in the particular, finds more
room for exercise as matter enters into the object considered.
So, absolutely, the knowledge of the particular adds nothing
to the speculative penetration of the universal and necessary.
The practical, on the other hand, is under constant compulsion
to the particular since it is concerned with the possible and the
contingent.
ii. The Practical in Dewey
The identity of the Thomistic analysis of the practical with
that made by John Dewey is striking despite differences in
vocabulary. It is the more striking in the face of Dewey's
denial of the speculative, since this left room for the introduction of arbitrary features that might have obscured or even
completely hidden the basic elements of the practical. The
instrumentalist theory of inquiry and of truth are forthright,
and almost bare, expositions of the nature and functioning of
the practical. Paradoxically, these considerations thus constitute the nearly unique example in Dewey's thought of

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FERRER SMITH

speculation properly so-called, attaining to and, in fact, tenaciously maintaining a reality in terms of its proper nature.
Unfortunately, although perhaps to be expected, the speculative
function of the mind does not fare as well in Dewey's hands and
his criticisms are in major part rendered inept by initial
distortion.
The theory of inquiry, as proposed by Dr. Dewey, makes
explicit the steps and factors entering into the exercise of the
practical function of the intellect. In the course of this" natural
history of thinking," some of the elements of cognitive psychology are given definition from an exclusively practical viewpoint. The nature and conditions of the practical are evident
in the following summary, made for the most part in Dewey's
own words:
1. The context of thinking:
. . . the two limits of every unit of thinking are a perplexed,
troubled, or confused situation ·at the beginning and a cleared up,
unified, resolved situation at the close. The first of these situations
may be called pre-reflective. It sets the problem to be solved; out
of it grows the question that reflection has to answer. In the final
situation the doubt has been dispelled; the situation is postreflective; there results a direct experience of mastery, satisfaction,
enjoyment. 28

2. The states of thinking:
In between, as states of thinking, are (I) suggestions, in which
the mind leaps forward to a possible solution; (2) an intellectualization of the difficulty or perplexity that has been felt (directly
experienced) into a problem to be solved, a question for which
the answer must be sought; (3) the use of one suggestion after
another as a leading idea, or hypothesis, to initiate and guide
observations and other operations in collection of factual material;
(4) the mental elaboration of the idea or supposition (reasoning,
in the sense in which reasoning is a part, not the whole of inference) ;
and (5) testing of the hypothesis by overt or imaginative action. 29
""J. Dewey, How We Think (Boston:
•• Ibid., p. 107. Italics in text.

Heath, 1988), p. 106. Italics in text.

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3. Restricting discussion, for the moment, to the inner traits
of inquiry, the following might be mentioned as outstanding:

a) The source of thinking is doubt, defined objectively.
The peculiar quality of what pervades the given materials, constituting them a situation, is not just uncertainty at large; it is
a unique doubtfulness which makes that situation to be just and
only the situation it is.... It is the situation that has these traits.
We are doubtful because the situation is inherently doubtful. 30

b) The inquiry is evoked and regulated by the problematic
situation.
The nature of the problem fixes the end of thought and the end
controls the process of thinking. 31

c) The idea functions as a suggestion, as a plan of action.
An idea is first of all an anticipation of something that may
happen; it marks a possibility .... The suggestion becomes an
idea when it is examined with reference to its functional fitness;
its capacity as a means of resolving the situation. 32 The fact is
that an idea, intellectually, cannot be defined by its structure,
but only by its function and use.ss

d) The status of facts and ideas is defined operationally.
Observed facts in their office of locating and describing the
problem are existential; ideational subject-matter is non-existential.84

e) Reasoning as science is concerned with relations.
In science, since meanings are determined on the ground of
their relation as meanings to one another, relations become the
objects of inquiry and qualities are relegated to a secondary status.s 5
The scientific definition is founded, not on directly perceived
qualities nor on directly useful properties, but on the way in which
certain things are causally related to other things, i. e., it denotes
a relation. 86
80
81

J. Dewey, Logic (New York: , Holt, 1939), p. 105.
How We Think, p. 15.

Logic, p. '109.
How We Think, p. 136.
8 ' Logic, p. 11!!. Cf. ibid., pp. 111, 118 and passim; How We Thin,k, pp. 220-230.
86 Logic, p. 116.
86 How We Think, p. 163.
82

88

2

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FERRER SMITH

f) Since the facts and meanings are operational in character,
experiment is indispensable.
The operative force of both ideas and facts is thus practically
recognized in the degree in which they are connected with experiment. Naming them 'operational' is but a theoretical recognition
of what is involved when inquiry satisfies the conditions imposed
by the necessity for experiment. 37 Sometimes direct observation
furnishes corroboration .... In other cases, experiment is required;
that is, conditions are deliberately arranged
accord with the
requirements of an idea or hypothesis to see whether the results
theoretically indicated by the idea actually occur. 88
g) The term of inquiry as cognitional is warranted assertability; as had, is consummatory experience.
The termination of inquiry, with respect to the procedures of
inquiry that have led up to it, is a resolved situation whose
primary status and value is cognitional. But the terminal material
is also a directly had situation, and hence capable ·of treatment
on its own account as an enriched experience.39 That inquiry is
related to doubt will, I suppose, be admitted. The admission carries
with it an implication regarding the end of inquiry: end in both
senses of the word, as end-in-view and as close or termination.
If inquiry begins in doubt, it terminates in the institution of
conditions which remove need for doubt. The latter state of affairs
may be designated by the words belief and knowledge. . . . I
prefer the words 'warranted assertibility.'
... the term 'warranted assertion' is preferred to the terms
belief and knowledge. It is free from the ambiguity of these latter
terms, and it involves reference to inquiry as that which warrants
assertion. When knowledge is taken as a general abstract term
related to inquiry in the abstract, it means 'warranted assertibility.' The use of a term that designates a potentiality rather
than an actuality involves recognition that all special conclusions
of special inquiries are parts of an enterprise that is continually
renewed, or is a going concern. 40
••Logic, p. 114.
••How We Think, p. 114.
•• J. Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder," in P. Schlipp,
ed., The Phuosophy of John Dewey (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1989),
Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. I, p. 568.
••Logic, p. 7.

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-That this is, and for the most part accurately, an analysis
of the practical is, in the light of the treatment previously
given, obvious enough. Elements of the practical as distinct
from the speculative are made even more explicit than discussion of both simultaneously permitted. In Dewey we find,
and without any twisting of the sense, the end, object, mode
of knowing and, as we shall see more clearly, degree of truth
proper to the practical order. Nonetheless, some further
elaboration is necessary to make equally explicit the conclusions to be drawn.
The gloriously agonizing intellectual doubt of Descartes has
here its most humiliating devolution to equivalence with a
stubbed toe. But only apparently. The real tension giving
birth to thought is not at all objective. Actually the situation
becomes unsettled when appetite enters in, when the inquirerto-be decides that the situation needs reconstruction. By
throwing the emphasis upon the possible conditions giving rise
to this volition, the necessary wilful act remains a not too well
hidden secret. Radical voluntarism cannot be avoided.
From the beginning of pragmatism this objection has been
made to its teaching and, in every instance, Dr. Dewey has
met and defeated his opponent to his own and his followers'
satisfaction. (His success might be taken as the reward earned
by adoption of the exclusively practical; one of its major functions is to extricate from predicaments.) The reason has been
failure to realize that the basis of distinction of the speculative
from the practical is other than that which separates the
formally practical from the completely practical. The former
is based on the nature of the end intrinsic and proper to the
speculative and to the practical, the latter on the intention of
the knower and does not affect, except extrinsically, the end
or nature of the science as such. Thus the whole thought of
Dewey, and here his theory of inquiry, is of a practical nature.
It matters not, to the intrinsic nature of the " science " he
proposes, whether it be done or not " for the sport of it." 41
"This has been Dewey's frequent non-technical retort. Cf. "Experience, Knowl-

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FERRER SMITH

The problem, end controlling thought, is, in final analysis, one
of good as good, related to the appetite. It is something to
be done or made, an operation not a speculative truth. The
object is a truth as operable. The goal of thinking is the end
as end, in all its force, appetitive. This is again reflected in
the term of inquiry; as cognitional, it pertains to the formally
practical and as consummatory, to the completely practical.
While Dr. Dewey's analysis of the "natural history of
thinking " tends to dislocate the cognitive side of practical
knowledge from its relation to the appetite, the latter nevertheless does enter in. What is, in effect, the whole process of
the institution of a problem save to answer the question: what
do I want? In emphasizing the search for means the instrumentalist but asks: what can I get? Even the description of
doubt is in affectional terminology; the " perplexity " and
" troublesomeness " are " felt " and " unsatisfactory." Furthermore, the character of what knowledge there shall be is
determined in part (and the more formal part) by current
activity. And activity is of the will, a matter of appetite. 42
Once it is established that Dewey's pattern of inquiry is
intrinsically practical, then all the other phases fall in place
and become intelligible. In practical inquiry the idea is a plan
for action as functionally defined. Facts and meanings are
operationally conceived. The need for experiment is but the
requirement of the practical for ultimate resolution in the
singular and of constant recourse thereto. The outlook is
forward and James' oft-uttered clarion call " of looking toward
last things, fruits, consequences, facts," 43 becomes understandedge and Value: A Rejoinder," iam. cit., p. 528. Also Experience and Natwre
(Chicago: Open Court, 1925), p. 151.
•• " For had our selection been different, our attention differently directed,
our knowledge would not have been the same." J. H. Randall and J. Buchler,
Phuosophy: An Introduction (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1942), p. 182.
context is of " ideas as instruments " explaining instrumentalism, the philosophy
adopted by the authors.
••Columbia University Department of Philosophy, Studies in the History of
Ideas (New York: Columbia, 1985), II, 868.

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able even as applied to Dewey, if not ultimately more defensible
in one than in the other.
Intelligible, too, becomes that problem so truly perplexing
to students of pragmatism and instrumentalism since its origin
with Peirce. What is truth? As Dr. Dewey has remarked:
The nature of truth given by the experimental and functional
type of logic is completely a corrollary from the nature of thinking
and ideas. If the view held as to the latter is understood, the
conception of truth follows as a matter of course.44
Such is the case. Dr. Dewey rejects the "correspondence
theory " of truth, that truth consists . in the agreement of
thought with reality. Equally positive is he that truth does
not hide within the " coherence theory " which stresses the
harmony of an idea with others. The former can be predicated
on only a presentative theory of the manner of knowing. Such,
in his mind, would obviate the whole necessity for inquiry.
Why find out what is already known? 45 The coherence theory
stands self-condemned:
The elaboration and refinement of ideas to the uttermost still
leaves us with an idea, and while a self-consistent idea stands a
show of being true in a way in which an incoherent one does not,
a self-consistent idea is still but an hypothesis, a candidate for
truth. 46
The instrumentalist notion of truth is presented via the
much-quoted illustration of the man in the wood. The problem
is one of finding the way out and home. The correct idea will
be" a practical plan of action which will lead to success." The
truth of the idea "is evidenced in the successful meeting of a
need." Therein lies the method of securing the correspondence,
the agreement between idea and reality.
Now, one may say, my idea was right, it was in accord with the
.. J. Dewey, Reconstruction In Philosophy (New York: Holt, 1920), p. 155.
••Cf. J. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic (Chicago: University of Chicago,
1916). pp. 281 ff.

••Ibid.

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FERRER SMITH

facts; it agrees with reality. That is to say, acted upon sincerely,
it has led to the desired conclusion; it has, through action, worked
out the state of things it contemplated and intended. The agreement, correspondence, is between: purpose, plan and its own
execution, fulfillment; between a map of a course constructed for
the sake of guiding behavior and the result attained in acting
upon the indications of the map. Just how does such agreement
differ from success? H

Here, in all clarity, is manifested that what is sought is not
speculative but practical truth. The conformity is not of the
mind with the thing but of the latter with the mind. The
measure is the mind and, in principle, the will by way of the
mind. For, it is the end which regulates the problem and its
solution from start to completion.
Yet, it must be remembered that even in practical truth
there is. the correspondence of things and mind, mind and
things. It is not a correspondence of mind and thing in terms
of the latter's nature but only of the operability, its possibility
to fit in relationally and actively with other things toward the
production of the end in view. The only truth it has is that
of being so related, so operable. However, in statement it can
be made to appear as a conformity of the mind with thing
rather than a measure of the mind imposed upon the thing.
Dr. Dewey sometimes does this when he is using " warranted
assertibility " as his equivalent for truth. Certainly he so
regards the practical truth terminating inquiry cognitively or
in action as the only " truth " possible. Its quality as practical
he recognizes and glories in:
It is said that the error of the pragmatist is to take the process
by which truth is found as the one by which it is made. The
claim of ' making truth ' is treated as blasphemy against the very
notion of truth; such are the consequences of venturing to translate the Latin ' verification ' in to the English ' making true.' 48

Ibid. Italics in text.
•• J. Ratner, ed., The Philosophy of John Dewey (New York: Holt,

07

p. 198.

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II. THE PRACTICAL AS A PHILOSOPHY
When from a solely practical knowledge and in terms exclusively thereof it is desired to construct (and this literally)
a philosophy and in it embrace, at least apparently, more than
an accumulation of facts and general norms of operation, the
desired expansion must derive from another source. Human
knowledge of the practical order cannot of itself provide a
metaphysics, a cosmology, nor even more than a part of experimental psychology. Indeed, of itself it can offer no sufficient
logical theory, regulative of its own development. For Aristotle
and St. Thomas, admitting the existence and validity of the
speculative, the problem was simply one of the application
of the logic developed in the Organon. The difference between
the speculative and the practical was not one of being; the
mind in both operated intentionally and proceeded from apprehension to judgment to the conclusion of reasoning. In practical affairs, insofar as science of them was possible, the end
to be sought performed the regulative tasks that in speculative
matters was undertaken by first principles. 49 Certainty was
possible in each and the norms of demonstrative logic applicable. The moral sciences, ethics and politics, were sciences in
the strict sense of the word.
Science, so taken, deals with the necessary, the universal,
and concludes to the certain. Not all affairs are of this nature
nor knowledge of them more than of probability. To deal
with things not known in their proper natures, and hence not
with necessity and certitude, is the office of dialectics. It is
not logic as that science is regulative of demonstration. It is
logic in being of the rational processes and in amplitude of
subject-matter. Like philosophy it extends to all being. Because of its importance in evaluating Dewey's philosophic
enterprise a more extended consideration of the nature of
dialectic is apropos.
••Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q.
VI Ethic., Iect. 4.

a. 7, ad

q. 47, a. 6; I-II, q. 18, a. S;

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1.

Science and Dialectic

Aristotelian logic concords with a metaphysical conception
whereby essence and substance are possessed of ontological
validity. Demonstrative logic, normative of the reasoning
processes by which true science can be attained, is indissolubly
linked with the conviction that each existent has a nature or
essence which is proper to it. The certitude and necessity
which qualify demonstrated conclusions derive from the real
necessity by which things are what they are and are exclusive
of what they are not.
Equally true is it that Aristotelian logic presupposes a mind
capable of grasping reality. The conditions and rules posited
for demonstration would be indeed the by-laws of a club of
ghosts were it denied perfect correspondence maintains between
the principles of things and the principles of knowledge. The
epistemological validity of primary. notions and principles ,and
the ontologic presence of specific natures together make possible
and defensible a theory of demonstrated truths. Simply, this
means the recognition of the principles of identity and contradiction as holding in both the entitative and logical orders.
Otherwise, the demand by the Stagirite that demonstrative
science proceed from premises qualified as true, first and
immediate, causal of the conclusion, and that the medium of
the reasoning process be proper of the subject, an essential
quality or " passion," is rendered meaningless and all Aristotelian logical theory can be denominated as merely formal
and, in Dewey's word, irrelevant.
While scire, science characterized by unqualified certitude,
is reserved for knowledge attained by strict demonstration,
reasoning is not therein exclusively circumscribed. St. Thomas,
commenting upon Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, notes a similarity between the operations of reasoning and those of nature.
In each case can be discerned a threefold diversity. In the
realm of nature certain things act as they do from necessity
and always; others pursue a definite course for the most part;

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and hence, when they fail to do so, constitute the third classification. Likewise in the processes of reasoning, the demonstrative syllogism yields necessary truth, dialectic concludes
to probability, and sophistic discourse reaps fruit in error. 50
In maintaining the primacy of demonstrative reasoning and
focusing upon it their chief interest, neither Aristotle nor St.
Thomas denies or neglects the usefulness and importance of
the dialectical procedure. In pursuance of his oft-repeated
methodological axiom that science must proceed from the more
known to the less, Aristotle acknowledges in theory and in
practice the efficacy of dialectics to initiate and further scientific
investigation. Theoretically he says of dialectical reasoning
that " it is useful for the study of the philosophical sciences,
because the ability to raise searching difficulties on both sides
of a subject will make us detect more easily the truth and
error about the several points that arise "; it is " a process of
criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries." 51 Practical illustration is easily afforded by a glance
at the opening chapters of his treatises on the soul, on physics,
on ethics. In each instance the Stagirite makes a beginning
by enumerating and discussing the most common principles of
the subject to be investigated, the common opinions of men
and of other philosophers concerning it. 52
In the fourth book of the M etaphysi,cs Aristotle compares
the philosopher, the dialectician and the sophist. " For sophistic
and dialectic turn on the same class of things as philosophy,
but this differs from dialectic in the nature of the faculty
required and from the sophistic in the respect of the purpose
of the philosophic life. Dialectic is merely critical while philos"0

I Poster., lect. 1.

"'I Topic., c. 1, 101 A34; c. 2, 101 BS.
•• Thus St. Thomas notes in Aristotle's ethical treatise that, in determining the
proper constitutive of human happiness, the philosopher enumerates the various
applicants for the role as they have been defended by other thinkers and in
practical living. I Ethic., lect. 4. The Physics opens with a prolonged examination
of the possible principles of movable being as· proposed by such predecessors
as Anaxagoras, Milissa, Plato, etc. I Physic., cc. 1-4.

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ophy claims to know, and sophistic is what appears to be
philosophy but is not." 58
In his commentary upon Aristotle's teaching, St. Thomas
elaborates the Stagirite's meaning. Philosopher and dialectician "convene in this, that dialecticians treat of all things
without exception." Since this requires a unity of subjectmatter and " all things do not convene except in being, it is
manifest that the matter of dialectics is being and those things
which are of being, about all of which the philosopher also
treats."
Yet they differ. The philosopher is distinctive in power, having
greater virtue in his consideration than the dialectician. He proceeds demonstratively and knows with certitude, whereas the
dialectician proceeds from probable premisses and yields not science
but opinion. Reason for this is found in two-fold nature of being:
being, namely, of reason and being of nature. Being of reason is
properly denominated of those. intentions of the mind which it
constructs concerning the things it considers; such are genus,
species and similar intentions which are not indeed to be found
as such in the realm of nature but which follow upon the consideration of the mind. The subject of logic is properly of this
type of being, that of reason. Such intelligible intentions can,
however, be made equal to the entities of nature since all natural
things fall under the consideration of the mind. And hence the
subject of logic extends to all things of which natural being may
be predicated. Whence it may be concluded that the subject of
logic is equal to that of philosophy which proceeds from the
principles of this science to prove those qualifications which are
common to being as such. The dialectician proceeds from the
intentions of reason which are of themselves extraneous to the
nature of things. Whence is dialectics tentative since to tend is
proper to such a procedure. 54

From these statements and analyses emerges a clearer conception of what is here intended by the term dialectics. The
most general view would equate dialectic and argument. As an
art of debate it is popularly associated with Plato and the
••IV Metaphys., c. 2, 1004 ASS-1004 B26 .
.. IV Metaphys., lect. 4.

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Platonic dialogues; as a special philosophical doctrine, with the
thesis-antithesis-synthesis of Hegel and the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels. In the early stages of his philosophical
career Mortimer Adler confined dialectic " entirely to the universe of discourse." 55 It, for him then, embraced philosophy
and theology and was significant of the undemonstrative and
tentative nature of these disciplines. While he has since repudiated the latter doctrine, 56 his former analysis of dialectic accords
in great part with that of Aristotle and St. Thomas. In the
minds of the latter dialectic is a rational process. It must
be noted, however, that it is not identified with the whole field
of logic. As Robert Brennan points out: " There are no
grounds for it in the authentic tradition of Aristotle, where
the term is restricted to mean those forms of reasoning which
proceed from opinion or probability." 57 Likewise, the linking
of dialectics with sophistics may react to the depreciation of
the former. A dialectician performs a real and valuable function and is so-called by reason of the development of the
faculty to perform that function. The sophist, on the other
hand, is so denominated by reason of his purpose in arguing,
namely to appear wise whereas in fact he is not. 58
The central note, discriminative of dialectic from other
rational procedures, is best stated negatively. Dialectic is not
concerned with proper principles. And this negative approach
is preferred even though a positive statement can be made in
the words of St. Thomas. According to the Angelic Doctor:
" Dialectics derives from common principles, arguing not only
from the common principles of reason but of things." 59 Yet,
not every argument from common principles is thereby dialectical. All sciences communicate in common principles insofar
as all make use of them in their reasoning processes as prin•• M. Adler, Dialectic (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1927), p. 243.
56 E.g., M. Adler, What Man Has Made of Man (New York:
Longmans, 1937).
57 R. Brennan, 0. P., "The Mansions of Thomistic Philosophy,"
The Thomist.
I (1939) , 66.
59 I Poster., lect. 19.
••I Rhet., c. l, 1355 Bl5-23.

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FERRER SMITH

ciples, as media in demonstration. The subject of first philosophy or metaphysics can be denominated common since being
is the most universal of conceptions. Yet from it is derived
a demonstrative science concerned with the characteristics
proper to being, consequent upon its very nature. Equally,
the subject of logic, rational being as contrasted with ontologic
real being, extends to all things as subjects of the mind's operations. Nevertheless, demonstrative logic can make no use of
such common intentions to reach certain conclusions concerning
the subject matters of the several sciences of nature. Dialectics
is under no such restraint and, in forwarding its arguments,
makes use both of the common principles of the mind and of
reality.
By way of illustration of the dialectical process, Aristotle
and St. Thomas offer the following:
1) The dialectician argues that hatred is an act of the consince contraries are of the
cupiscible appetite even as
same genus. The medium of proof is not derived from the
proper nature of hatred but from an extraneous and logical
principle. 60
2) Arguing against possibility of an actually infinite sensible
body, Aristotle proffers as dialectical reasons: "If bounded
by a surface is the definition of body there cannot be an infinite
body either intelligible or sensible. Nor can number taken in
abstraction be infinite, for number or that which has number
is numerable. If then the numerable can be numbered, it would
also be possible to go through the infinite." St. Thomas explains
that both reasons are probable, proceeding from common
principles, since it is not the nature of body that it must be
terminated by a surface and number adds to the nature of
multitude the notion of measure which is extrinsic to it as
such. 61
3) Aristotle refers to Bryson's famous method of squaring
the circle. St. Thomas expounds its dialectical character.
00
•1

Ibid.
III Physic., c. 5, !204 B5-9; St. Thomas, in loco, lect. 7.

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Bryson's argument proceeded thus: In every genus wherein
there is to be found something to which there is given a greater
and a less there is also given an equal. In the genus of squares
there can be found one less than a circle, another greater, and
hence there must be one equal thereto. Again the medium
of the proffered " proof " is a common and logical principle;
" for equal, greater and less exceed the genus of the square and
circle." 62
In each of these, as in every instance of dialectical reasoning,
the argument rests upon a principle that is not proper to the
subject involved. From this condition stems the characteristics
of the dialectical mode and its opposition to demonstrative
science. The latter, as drawing its cogency from the necessary
connection between the subject of demonstration and its proper
passion, cannot proceed from principles extraneous to that
subject. The principle offered in dialectical proof is always so
extrinsic. Stated in another fashion, the principles of demonstrative science are of the same genus as the conclusion; those
of the dialectical argument may be of a different genus. Again,
from the same source derives the universal extension of dialectics. To say that it extends to all subject matters is but
to recognize that its adequate object is being, whether logical
or ontological. Thus, argument from common principles can
embrace all actual and possible entities; for, only the proper
principles of a subject can restrict the science of that subject.
By its proper passion any being is circumscribed and defined
as specific, as such a being. So Aristotle and St. Thomas, as
already shown, posit a resemblance between the dialectician
and the philosopher. Finally, for the same reason dialectics
is tentative, tending toward certainty in more or less degree,
but never of itself yielding such certainty as can only follow
natural or real necessity. While not inherently ordained to
error, dialectical reason must be satisfied to achieve the probability which is its most conspicuous mark. 68
••I Poster., c. 9, 75 B40; St. Thomas, in loco, lect. 16.
68 I Poster., lect. 14, 19; 1 Rhet., c. I, 1854 Al-U; I Top., c. l, 100 A80.

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That Aristotle and St. Thomas employed dialectics and
recognized its value has already been indicated. A closer
examination is necessary to determine the place held by dialectical reasoning within the framework of their systems of thought.
Logic as a science and acquired habit is an artifactive construct
reared upon the natural inclination or aptitude by which men
tend to proceed in an orderly manner in their reasoning; it
is perfective of so-called natural logic. As an art and science
it is directive of the act of reason whereby a man may proceed
easily, in an orderly fashion, and without error. As such, logic
can be subjected to a two-fold consideration: as docens, in
which are taught, declared, proved and explained the laws of
logical thinking as a mode of knowing; as utens, in which
these laws are actually applied to the several sciences, and,
indeed, as exemplified in the very science of logic itself. 64
The nature and end of logic are most perfectly realized in
demonstrative logic but the definition and division given also
pertain to dialectic as a part of logic. St. Thomas explicitly
distinguishes a dialectica docens and utens. He does, in fact,
go so far as to say that the former, dialectica docens, can
constitute a science in the demonstrative sense since it is
developed from the proper principles of the logical intentions
involved. As applied, however, or utens, dialectics can conclude only to probability and hence fails of the full definition
of science. In concluding his observations on this condition of
dialectics, St. Thomas emphasizes yet again that distinctive
note of dialectical reasoning, the use of logical principles to
adduce conclusions of the real order.
In demonstrative logic only the doctrine pertains to logic, the
use to philosophy and to other particular sciences concerned with
the things of nature. Hence the use of demonstrative logic consists
in using the principles of things concerning which the demonstration
is evolved and which belong to the ontologic sciences, not in the
use of logical intentions. It is evident, therefore, that some parts

•• 1v Metaphys., lect. 4, n. 576; Boet. de Trin., q. 6, a. 4, qcla. 1. Cf. Cajetan,
ln Summam Theol., I-II, q. 54, a. 4.

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of logic pertain to it as both doctrine and for use, as do dialectics
and sophistics; while another part only as a doctrine and not for
use, as does demonstrative logic.65

The development of dialectics as a doctrine, as docens, is
to be found in the books constituting the Topics of Aristotle.
Unfortunately no commentary on this work directly was done
by St. Thomas. The usefulness of dialectics is indicated by
Aristotle in his discussion of likeness and difierence. 66 This
applicability is threefold: "with a view both to inductive arguments and to hypothetical reasons, and also with a view to
the rendering of definitions." So, as to the first, utility in induction, dialectics finds place especially in those works which deal
with nature in its more concrete forms; in the Historia Animalium, De Partibus Animalium, De Generatione Animalium,
the Parva Naturalia, Meteorologia, etc. Yet in all these dialectic performs, after all, a minor role since demonstrative science,
even though inductive, is the aim. 67 St. Thomas makes use
of dialectics to provide hypothetical reasoning as a pedagogical
device.68 But it is chiefly " with a view to the rendering of
definitions " that the Stagirite and the Angelic Doctor employ
dialectical reasoning, as it is " a process of criticism wherein
lies the path to the principles of all inquiries." 69 The proper
resolution of the dialectical movement is to be found in such
a judgment, one by which is grasped the essential nature of
things. Further and similar use is incident within the individual
sciences as exemplified in the previously given illustrations. 70
In comparson with the extent of their demonstrative science,
dialectics found but small play in the doctrines of Aristotle
and his medieval exponent. They were concerned, primarily
and finally, to expose those truths which could be known with
IV Metaphys., lect. 4, n. 577. Cf. Boet. de Trin., q. 6, a. 1.
I Top., c. 15, 108 BS-33.
67 I De. Part. Animal., c. 1, 639 Al5-00;
639 BS fl'.; 640 Al8 fl'.; 642 A3i-B3;
c. 2, 645 A35; I De Gen. Animal., c. 17.
68 I Poster., lect. 19.
69 Supra, n. 52.
7 ° Cf. I Poster., cc. 19, 22; I Top., c. 2, 101 A37-B3.
65
66

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certainty. In whatever field to which their inquiry reached
out, this was their unfailing aim. Only upon the basis of
definitively demonstrated truths could they construct science
as that word was for and by them defined. Only such science
could yield the wisdom to which the very name philosophy
proclaimed devotion.
ii. The Dialectic of Practice
That the expanding principle of Dr. Dewey's espousal of
the practical should be dialectics is appropriate. It was, first
of all, timely and kept instrumentalism in the fashionable
mode. The scientists whose method Dewey strives so hard
to emulate have, in greater part, adopted the dialectical procedure. It is consonant with their concern over the common
and extraneous principles of things, with quantity, structure,
function, and the like. Revolving about probability, it relieves
them of defending the provisional nature of their conclusions
or theories. Dialectic is modern, an appellation much beloved
by Dewey. As John A. Oesterle puts it: "The essential condition of modern communication is first to relapse exclusively
into dialectic .... " 11
Further grounds of convenience are evident in the comparison of the nature of dialectics with the practical. As
dialectic is not concerned with the proper natures of things,
so the practical passes over these in favor of relationships
of operability. From another aspect, dialectic proceeds by
means of principles extraneous to the nature of the thing discussed. Operability is extrinsic to the being; the measure is
not of an essence but of a thing to an end. In demonstrative
science there is, and must be, maintained a homogeneity of
principles and conclusion. Dialectics imposes a logical unity
and the practical an operable one.
St. Thomas points out,
72
dialectics of itself is tendential.
It requires resolution and
71

J. Oesterle, "Another Approach to the Problem of Meaning," The ThomU!t,

VII (1944) , !i!33 ff.
72

I Poster., lect. 14.

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finds it, properly, in the judgment of demonstrative science.
The practical by definition tends to the end and is resolved in
operation concerning it. Left to itself and unresolved the movement of dialectic is without term. Given no ultimate end the
practical exhibits the same characteristic.
Since the adequate object of dialectics is being, real and
rational, the adoption of it expands the possible subject matter
as far as can be done. Not that Dewey had a choice in this
instance; if he was to think at all, he had to do so demonstratively or dialectically (or sophistically). But, whereas
demonstrative logic as utens or applied is severely restricted
in its extension to the necessary and proper and, moreover,
cannot employ its own principles as such in cogent demonstration, dialectics is under no such compulsion. In that, it apes
philosophy itself and brings, like it, all subject matters and
all sciences under its sway.
It is, in fact, of too wide an extension for Dewey. A restrictive principle is provided by the practical. Dialectic preoccupation gives Dewey, should he so wish, the chance of developing quite another philosophy. The scope of dialectic embraces
all being and, of itself, gives no limitation to the type of philosophic thought in which it may be employed. Presenting, as
it does, the contradictory solutions to any problem that may
be raised, the dialectician may freely adopt either as his own.
He may even adopt both and maintain both at least to the
point short of that wherein the innate contradiction is explicated. Even here, since in natural change, should it be the
subject, the same matter may be, but successively, substrate
of contraries, the dialectician can maintain that each of his
solutions apply; provided no claim is made of identity of time,
aspect and subject. Add nominalism to the amalgam and this
necessity is one solely of thought or discourse.
Upon the dialectic the practical operates as a restrictive
principle. Only those solutions dialectically possible of extension will be actually chosen which meet the requirements of
operability. Hence, the field is narrowed, for the dialectic of
3

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itself includes both the speculative and the practical. In the
milieu of modern materialism this restriction is, however, of
itself an extension. The dialectic of materialism, until the
advent of pragmatism, was restrained by either the conception
of matter or the necessity of reduction to sensation. The
operable manages to embrace not merely the matter of absolute
materialism and the sensations of the positivist, but also those
realities which to both were either inexplicable mysteries or
illusions: human actions and values. So Dewey could, and
did, invade the moral field and not in the spirit (at any rate)
of destruction but with propriety since that field is properly
of operables as such.
The dialectic of practice is evidenced in Dewey's philosophic
program, in his major philosophic doctrines, in particular
tenets, and in the positions ascribed his thought by students
of it.
According to Professor Sidney Hook, Dewey proposes to
philosophers "that they directly confront the major problems
and beliefs of our society, make explicit our value assumptions,
project alternatives of social choice, investigate methods of
investigation, formulate a theory of inquiry that may aid in
overcoming intellectual confusions, and furnish, if possible,
intelligent grounds of action in meeting the times and its
troubles." 73 In Hook's estimation Dewey is himself most
eminently successful in the carrying out of his own program.
Professor Hook speaks of " the fresh perspectives of his
thought," of the fact that " there is hardly a phase of American
thought to which he has not made some contribution, hardly
an aspect of American life which he has left uninterpreted.
His influence has extended to the schools, the courts, the
laboratories, the labor movement, and the politics of the
nation." 74
A question may be raised. May not this, at least in part,
be due to the fact that Dewey's own philosophy has no principle
78
74

S. Hook, An Intellectual Portrait (New York:
Ibid., p. 4.

John Day, 1939), p. 37.

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of fertility, save the individual will, and must constantly seek
particular situations to hew and hammer into the perspective
of the practical? All philosophers striving to know more than
the fictional conditions of a world of their own imaginings must
confront reality and endeavor to make explicit its intelligibility.
Could it be that in Dewey's case the confrontation of "problems and beliefs " derives from an added necessity of a development largely possible only by way of dialectical opposition in
choice of alternatives? To confront truly philosophical problems philosophically requires affirmation of the speculative
function of the intellect; to the exclusively practical outlook
they can appear only "diseased formulations." Psychology,
education, law, economics, sociology and religion, persistent
foci of Dewey's interest, do admit of practical exploitation.
Metaphysics, the philosophy of quantity, cosmology cannot
be moored in the practical; rather the reverse. But, once
given by other philosophic efforts, developed on other grounds,
they can be subjected to criticism by a dialectic of practice.
In this realization lies the answer to the absence of any
"system" to Dewey's thought. Dewey himself recognizes
system making as foreign to the genius of his enterprise and
Hook extols this characteristic as a virtue of instrumentalism.
Rather, the narrowness and particularism of the practical viewpoint, with its concern about the individual, the operable, the
relative, the experimental, and all in the measure of the natural
goodness and power of man, prevents any ultimate integration
or synthesis. The most that can be accomplished in the formally but incompletely practical order is the profferring of a
series of hypotheses possible of application to a series of particular problems; any other eventuation is predicated upon the
adoption of a regulative ultimate end, which Dewey rejects.
Professor W. H. Werkmeister indicates the dialectical source
of the deficiency of system: " Only in the broad sense of
defending from a variety of angles a somewhat loosely defined
general point of view can Dewey at all be regarded as sys-

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tematic." 75 The vantage point from which Dewey perceives
reality and conceives his philosophy of it is loosely defined;
the effort of his life has been to generalize it. Unfortunately,
it is too tight and restricted a point in itself.
In Reconstruction In Philosophy, first issued in 1920, Dr.
Dewey develops his program in more detail. Introducing its
republication, in 1949,76 he notes the intervening years have
served only to increase the urgency of that program's undertaking; to speak of its fulfillment would negate its nature.
He bewails the widespread revival of interest in the philosophic
systems of the past and the renewed search for the fixed and
certain. These constitute, to his mind, a withdrawal from the
philosopher's true problems: "those growing out of the changes
going on with ever-increasing rapidity, over an ever-increasing
human-geographical range, and with ever-deepening intensity
of penetration." 11
To meet the situation is, in great part, the work of intelligence. The latter must in no sense be regarded as the " reason,"
or " pure intellect," or the highest organ or faculty of tradition
apt to the grasp of ultimate truths. "It is a shorthand designation for great and ever-growing methods of observation, experiment and reflective reasoning .... " 78 It is, in brief, a dialectic
of practice.
The text itself, unchanged after the quarter century, indicates the avenues of application of intelligence in philosophy
in general, in changing conceptions of experience and reason,
the ideal and the real, in reconstructing logic, morals, and
social philosophy. It is a dialectical development of Dewey's
position with regard to cosmology, ethics, even, in a measure,
metaphysics, with the traditional viewpoints ossified into lifeless rigidity yet withal providing a great deal of the subject
matter to be fitted, literally, into the forms and shapes of
72 W. H. Werkmeister,
A Phifosophy of Science (New York: Harper, 1940),
p. 544.
•• J. Dewey, Reconstruction In Philosophy (Boston: Beacon, 1949), pp. v-xli.
•• Ibid., p. viii.
••Ibid., p. vii.

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the practical taken as the interpretation of the " methods of
science." Reconstruction is a work of craftsmanship, taking
the bricks and timbers provided by the past and redisposing
them at will; the while leaving open, and indeed pointing the
way, for other hands and other wills to make yet other dispositions.
Thus the world of ancient and medieval philosophy was
" a closed world, a world consisting internally of a limited
number of fixed forms and having definite boundaries externally. The world of modern science is an open world, a world
varying indefinitely without possibility of assignable limit in
its internal make-up, a world stretching beyond any assignable
bounds externally." 79 Admitting the wide acceptance of the
contrast, may it not be asked whence the contrast derives its
force? Neither modern science, especially as Dewey diagnoses
its method, nor a philosophy of the practical can deliver a
conception of any " world." They can but enumerate changes
and describe the sequential order involved. To excogitate
worlds is to clothe their hypothesis with gratuitous reality not
subject to their methods of inquiry or it is to credit them with
a mystical insight more proper to the seer. May it be noted
that Dewey's "world" is entirely negative in character, a
denial of each of the attributes of the Greek and medieval
world; " open," " varying," " boundless " give an exciting
vocabulary to an essential agnosticism.
A more honest comparison is that between ancient philosophy
and modern thought in their attitude toward change. In
Dewey's words: "The world in which even the most intelligent men of olden times thought they lived was a fixed world,
a realm where changes went on only within immutable limits
of rest and permanence, and a world where · the fixed and
unmoving was . . . higher in quality and authority than the
moving and altering." 80 Again, development is by denial, here
implied and later made explicit. Further, there is thus given
to the consideration of change the perspective
authority
••Ibid., p. 54.

"0

Ibid.

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of philosophy. No charge is made, although their efforls are
belittled, that the philosophers of olden times failed to recognize change. They were, in fact, concerned to give it its place
and were devoted to the task of the intelligibility of reality,
not its manipulability. The contrast serves to make the projects
identical and arrogate to the technicians of control the dignity
of the search for wisdom.
The book may serve to raise the fundamental question.
The theory of practice must be located within a context of
reality known speculatively, a knowledge of what is; otherwise it is but a sprawling bit of jetsam floating in an uncharted
sea. The reason for this necessity briefly and ultimately is
agere sequitur esse. Apart from this context the practical man
can rise only to rules of conduct whether of life or of the
production of artifacts. His definitions of realities are limited
strictly to his perceptions or hypotheses of their operability.
No grounds are given by the exclusively practical for formulating theories as to what the world is, what is man, what is
knowledge, what is practical knowledge itself. The intelligibility of reality is to be plumbed no deeper than its possible
control. The traditional question that distinguished the philosopher, quid est, what is it, no longer should be asked. The
question now properly is how. Dewey has consistently recognized this fact: "We know an object when we know how it
is made, and we know how it is made in the degree in which
we ourselves make it." 81 Man can no longer find his end in
thought or contemplation. 82 The hierarchy of knowledge, the
subordination of the practical to the speculative, of the physical
Experience and Nature, p. 428.
Now there can be no doubt that the theory of knowing as contemplative was
also 'operative ' in the very important sense that it operated to influence men's
minds and thus to some extent guide their conduct, misguidance being also a
form of guidance. In fact, to render this theory innocuous or inoperative was
the chief purpose of the book under discussion (Reconstruction in Phil.osophy).
In a very real sense, it may truly be said that Dewey has dedicated his life's
work to the accomplishment of this myriad formed, if not hydra-headed task."
J. Ratner, "Dewey's Conception of Philosophy," in The Phil.osaphy of John
Dewey, ed. by Schilpp, iam. cit., p. 64. Cf. Experience and Nature, p. SS2.
81

82 "

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and mathematical to the demands of being is destroyed. A
new end must be found or all end denied.
In the denial is not philosophy itself abjured? It is, and
for many years so Dewey acknowledged. So he said in 1917:
" But the chief characteristic trait of the pragmatic notion
of reality is precisely that no theory of Reality in general,
uberhaupt, is possible or needed." 83 Such a stand is rather
frustrating to one who makes of philosophy a profession. The
change in opinion was gradual but productive and in 1925
appeared Experience and Nature 84 in which, as Ratner notes,
" he explicitly developed a general ' theory of nature, of the
world, of the universe.' " 85 The " metaphysic " of Dewey
consists in the " location " of knowledge within experience,
experience within nature.
J

Reconstruction presaged the Procrustean nature of this performance. All things and thoughts are stretched, lopped off,
disfigured in the attempt to fit them with the requirements
set by the practical. The point here made is that the things
and thoughts, the very project itself are not derivative from
the practical but only from the mind's speculative function.
How else account for asking" what is" of realities not subject
in their nature to the making of man? Dewey's consistency
forbids that the answers be more than of" how.'' But, whence
derives the data taken, to use the term he prefers to given,
upon which the forms of practicalism are imposed? Spectator
and presentational theories of knowledge, all therefore save
that of experimentalism, are accused of "reading off" reality,
ready made. What is the operation of the instrumentalist mind
in constructing a metaphysics if not a " reading in " of solely
•• J. Dewey, "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy," in Dewey, Moore,
Brown and others, Creative Intelligence (New York: Holt, 1917), p. 55.
84 Experience and Nature incorporated the Paul Carus Lectures delivered by
Dewey the preceding year. A second edition was published in New York by
Norton in 1929. The presentation underwent considerable change, especially in
the earlier chapters, but the doctrine remained essentially the same.
85 Ratner,
"Dewey's Conception of Philosophy," p. 66. The noting of this
"shift" is the primary concern of Ratner's contribution.

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practical meaning to things and thoughts necessarily ready
made?
To describe an idea as " a plan of action " is to presuppose
the idea as existent, the term as previously proffered, and to
take an aspect functional in limited circumstances as the
reality involved. In answering how, the idea itself escapes
consideration and only its use, and that in part, occupies
investigation. The question, what is an idea, has seemingly
been raised but definitely left unanswered save in the sense
that nothing is anything.
One reason for the writing of Experience and Nature may
well be the compulsion felt by Dewey to devise an account
in terms of the practical for the things and thoughts with which
he must perforce deal if he is to say anything remotely philosophical in character. In this undertaking the attitudes and
Yocabulary of evolutionism are of invaluable service. By means
of a conjectured series of " adaptations," ideas and even the
mind itself are portrayed as the consequences, not the causes
of language. The reversal is, by the way, symptomatic of the
whole precedure: realities are to be defined in terms of eventual
functions, their being equated to their use.
In this instance, by means of a constructed universal embracing language with all signal activities, language is a matter
of signs and significances which " came into existence not
by intent but by overflow, by-products, gestures and sound." 86
Beginning is made with the squirting of the cuttlefish, the
clucking of the hen. These occasion reflexes in other animals
and transition to the human occurred when reaction was to the
meaning involved in the gestures; thereby making the reaction
participative, initiating the sharing that is communication. The
heart of language lies in this communication. Sounds and
gestures are endowed with meaning; a human learns to respond
not to individual movements but to the intent thereof and
so language is not an expression of something antecedent, but
anticipative of a common action. Mind, as intellect, can be
••Experience and Nature, p. 175 ll'.

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defined as the possession of and response to meanings. A
bit of a leap is involved about which even Dewey is uneasy:
"It is difficult to state the exact physiological mechanism
involved. But about the fact there is no doubt." BT
Dewey's view of the world and of man is similarly constructed. A practico-logical unity is evolved by the longitudinal
perspective of ongoing histories, the latitudinal analysis of
adaptive interactions. Assuming nature as the most available,
and beloved, general term, the experimentalist attitude is
described by Dr. Ratner:
Nature is an inclusive history of multitudinous ongoing histories,
the comprehensive interactive continuum consequent upon the
interactivities of an infinite number of interactive continua of an
indefinite number of general kinds.BB
Among these interactivities are the operations that support
life and among the living are those of sufficiently developed
nervous systems to support the interactions generically
described as experience. Within this matrix arise the conditions
productive of language, giving new and social dimensions to
man's existence. The cultural matrix in turn forms and shapes
the actions, beliefs and purposes of men.
The sense of watching the assembling of a prefabricated
structure according to a well known plan is particularly present
in the practical interpretation of traditional philosophical conceptions during the elaboration of Dewey's rather unique
notion of experience.
To counteract a long tradition, nurtured by introspective
psychology, that experience is a subjective, personal affair, new
definitions must be formulated of mind and matter, mind and
body, sensation, perception, consciousness and personality. All
are affairs qualitative of natural events, arising in and out of
nature. Just as the organized interactions exemplified by
87 Ibid., p. 179. For later
and further developments of these conceptions of
mind, language and the knowledge transaction confer Dewey and Bentley,
Knowing and the Known (Boston: Beacon, 1949) .
""Ratner, ed., Intelligence in the Modern World, p.

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digestion and respiration are characteristic of life and define
natural events at the level of the psycho-physical, so mind and
matter are characteristics of them at another level. " Matter
expresses their sequential order and mind the order of their
meanings in their logical connections and dependencies." 89
Neither is the ultimate "stuff" of reality; they are properties
of the interactive continua which are natural events. Likewise
there is but body-mind, an integral whole. As life is the
organization of antecedent physical events, so mind is the organization of antecedent physiological, vital events. " Chemicophysical processes go on in and by interactions which have
reference to the needs of the organism as a whole and thus
take on psychical quality, and in human beings at least, are
in such connection with the social environment as confers upon
them an intellectual quality." 90 The difficulties of traditional
philosophy concerning mind and matter, soul and body vanish
in the face of the operational unity herein given logical status.
Parenthetically the process of "inverted reductionism" at
work might be noted. Whereas the nineteenth century devotees
of materialistic evolution were engaged in leveling the differences distinguishing the living from the non-living, man from
beast, the twentieth century new naturalists are concerned to
retrieve what was so forfeited without acknowledging differences in essences and specific natures but merely by reversing
the reductive process and retracing the way back to the affirmation of mind, life, etc. At any rate, the self-congratulation
heralding the process has as much, if not more, justification
than its nineteenth century counterpart. No more philosophic
or scientific reason is given for the one than for the other.
Rather convenience and dedication of purpose seem in each
instance to play the major role. The nineteenth century
materialist was influenced by his quarrel with idealism and with
religion. The twentieth century naturalist, at root no less
materialistic, wishes above all to recoup lost values.
The other factors entering into the discussion of experience
89

Experience and Nature, p. 74.

00

Ibid., p. 76.

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suffer si.inilar fate. According to Dewey, the traditional misconceptions result from treating experience as an affair of
knowledge and the factors enumerated in isolation. Experience is an affair of the interaction of the organism and environment; it is not exclusively nor primarily cognitive. Within
it sentience, feeling, perception, thought, emotion, impulse,
and purpose play cooperative roles.
It is from the standpoint of the roles played that Dewey
defines each. To speak of sensation as consequent upon language, mind, and discourse rather than antecedent or causative
in their regard may seem startling at first. It is no more than
to pay tribute to the function of, say, red, to mark off a dress
or a toy and guide their choice or use. 91 Or, it is to note that
in refined inquiry sensations may function as the ultimate
irreducible meanings to check or verify other meanings. 92 It
must be recollected that account is being made of an organismenvironment interaction in a world of change. 89 In such a
world any stimulation of the sense organs and determination
of an object as contemporaneously affecting the organism is
a matter not of "immediate perception" but of inferences,
of inquiry into the antecedents of awareness. " 'Peripheral
origin • marks an interpretation of events,' a discrimination
scientifically valid and important, but no more an original
datum than is the spectrum of Betelgeuse." 94 In any event,
91 " The notion
that sensory affections discriminate and identify themselves,
apart from discourse, as being colors, sounds, etc., and thus ipso facto constitute
certain elementary modes of knowledge, even though it be only knowledge of their
own existence, is inherently so absurd that it would never have occurred to
anyone to entertain jt were it not for certain preconceptions about mind and
knowledge." Ibid., p. 259.
•• This function does not imply that experience is made up of compounding
atomic sense data. ". . . experience as such cannot be reduced to sense data,
since immediate reality in experience consists of things, not of qualities." Dewey,
"Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder," in Schilpp, op. cit., p. 584.
••The sole subject matter of awareness is " things in the process of change."
Dewey, Essays in Honor of William James, p.
Contained in Ratner, The
Philosophy of John Dewey, p. 85.
••Experience and Nature, p. 884.

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sensations are not elementary forms of knowledge but serve
eventual and logical functions in Dewey's scheme of things.
The awareness which may be discriminated by inquiry into
emotion, sensation, thought, desire, dream, and which is the
consequence of change is consciousness. As such it can only be
had, not known. 95 Within it, mind plays its role; in fact,
mind is essentially active. "Mind is primarily a verb. It
denotes all the ways we deal consciously and expressly with
the situations in which we find ourselves." 96
Equally " dynamic ,., is the conception of the thinking self,
the ego. Viewed as the subjective phase of the organismenvironment interaction, "personality, self-hood, -t>ubjectivity
are eventual functions that emerge with complexly organized
interactions, organic and social." 97 The conception is interesting and reminiscent of Hegelianism. That there appears in
nature an individual with a mind is the effect of organic and
social interactions. The mind that appears in individuals is
" a system of beliefs, recognitions and ignorances, of acceptances and appraisals of meanings which have been instituted
under the influence of custom and tradition." 98 As in the
individual and due to his inherent plasticity and preferences,
this mind undergoes changes, directed reconstruction, out
of which emerges self-hood, personality. Here clearly and in
a quasi-ontological context is the affirmation of the primacy
of the will in the practical. It is the preferential bias of the
individual that issues forth " initiating, adventuring, experimenting, dissolving" to reshape and remake the world. 99
The outcome of these considerations is the experimentalist
concept of experience. Experience, like matter, mind, bodymind and the rest, is something that is transacted in nature,
arising within it and consequence of its interaction. It is not
of a self, not subjective nor yet objective, not set off from
95 Ibid., p. 306.
•• J. Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Minton, Balch, 1934), p. 263.
97 Experience and Nature, p. 208.
99 Ibid., p. Mfl.
••Ibid., p. fll9.

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reality as a reaction to it or copy of it. 100 Experience is
approached behavioristically not as evidence of a substance but
as a mode. It is an affair of the interaction of organism and
environment; both are implicated within it. It iS characterized
by change, the conjunction of the relatively stable and relatively contingent, that is the condition of nature. So it includes
habit and impulse, mind and consciousness, having and being
and thinking; so it embraces the earth and the stars, birth
and deatb., life and growth. Experience is all these and none
of them exclusively. It is assimilated to history, " as deep and
wide and full as all history on this earth." 101
Briefly, experience occupies in Dewey's thought the position
of being, ens, real and rational, in the thought of Aristotle
and St. Thomas. While being emphasizes the fixed, the permanent, experience dramatizes flux, the changing; where the perfection of being is found in the act without any potentiality,
the perfection of experience is its perfectibility, its potentiality
to become. As Aristotle's is a philosophy of being, Dewey's
is a philosophy of experience. Experience is not a mental state,
not primarily nor even most importantly; it is the distinctive
subject matter of Dewey's inquiry. As such it transcends
definition: " We shall never account for it by referring it to
something else, for ' something else ' always is only for and
in experience." 102
The term, nature, is, after all, only a more generalized term
in the sense of providing a convenient location for experience,
a context to which appeal can be made, to which the unknown
and perhaps unknowable may be ascribed; nature is a recognition of man's limitations. It is no accident that by many
naturalists nature is acknowledged as god in the only sense
100 Hence the effort to disprove its subjective character,
not to make it objective
(for it is neither; subject and object constitute a distinction not of universal
but limited reference); but because the accumulated bias, to Dewey's mind, of
psychological tradition tends to render a subjective account of the mental, mind,
consciousness, perception, sensation. Cf. Ratner, ed., The Phuosophy of John
Dewey, p. 87.
'
101 Experience and Nature, p. 8.
•••Ibid., p. 28.

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FERRER SMITH

intelligible to them; nature serves to perform the functions
and provide the explanations that theists attribute to divinity.
The true subject matter of Dewey's philosophy is experience
as he himself so clearly perceives. He is concerned with its
character, manifestations, modifications, and, above all, with
its control. Exclusively in terms of the last, control, is he
interested in knowledge. His dedication is to extend the instrumental worth of knowledge unto the " extension of the range
of persons enjoying consummatory experiences, enrichment of
their contents, and increased control of their occurrence." 103
In the development of Dewey's thought, as these examples
are indicative, may be noted particularly dialectic, the practical,
evolutionism. Thus, the unacknowledged functioning of the
speculative, either by other philosophers or by Dewey himself,
provides much of the subject matter for philosophic consideration. Dialectic contributes the mode of procedure, the practical
canons for resolution and interpretation of alternatives, and
evolution the vocabulary with which to speak. The result is
more an exercise of transposition than a philosophy, a cacaphony signifying nothing in place of speculative harmony.
The elements of the analysis serve the further purpose of
accounting for the traits of Dewey's thought as these have
been noted by students of it. The anti-intellectualism disturbing to Woodbridge is but the negation of the speculative made
particularly evident when any truly philosophic issue is raised.
Since the practical is resolved in operation the activism noted
by White is inevitable. 104 Since the operable is by nature
relational in character, the extreme relativism decried by Crosser as source of nihilism is equally unavoidable. 105 The practical
is concerned with the possible and that possibility finds root
objectively in the degree of materiality. So instrumentalism
•••Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder," iam. cit., p. 563.
••• M. G. White, The Origin of Dt'/Wey's lnstrumentalism (New York: Columbia,
1943)' pp. 22, ll7.

••• P. K. Crosser, The Nihili8m of John Dewey (N"ew York:
Library,· 1955).

Philosophical

APPRAISAL OF THE PHILOSOPHY

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is most at home in this material world and precisely in its
materiality. Potentiality, not act, is the obvious trait of the
possible. The contingent in its contingency, change as changeable and changing, motion as a potency to be actuated, only
these are admissible, only these are expressible in operational
terminology. Dewey had perforce to become a philosopher
of becoming; being could not be fitted in even if desired.
Desire does play its role. From that discriminating element
of the p:ractical, the end in the good as good, follow also those
conditions by which instrumentalism is tendential, concerned
with existence and devoted to the expansion of the goodness
or exercise of the power of the practitioner. All these are
consequents in turn of radication in the will. Herein lies the
proximate source of that voluntarism with which pragmatism
has been identified so often. As he so frequently does, Dewey
clothes necessity with the robes of virtue. " Honest empirical
method will state when and where and why the act of selection
took place, and thus enable others to repeat it and test its
worth." 106 Commenting on this statement, the instrumentalist
Donald Piatt explains: " Philosophic thought depends upon
an act of choice and of selective discrimination for a purpose
or preference." 107
Within the limits set by exclusive devotion to the practical,
this selectivity is allowed free play in determining the other
traits characteristic of instrumentalism.
These consist of
doctrinal adjuncts in which Dr. Dewey's contribution has not
been so original as the exploitation of the practical. In the
main, they were in the philosophic air which he breathed. Thus
the evolutionistic setting and language in which he clothes
his thought are those of the age of Darwin and Spencer, the
temporal clime of Dewey's philosophical begetting. Another
naturalist, Thelma Lavine, calls such pan-evolutionism into
question. " To affirm the ' growth ' of the higher out of the
10 •
10 •

Experience and Nature, p. 86.
D. A. Piatt, "Dewey's Logical Theory," in The Philosophy of John Dewey,

Schilpp, ed., p. 108.

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FERRER SMITH

' lower,' to deny ' gulfs,' ' gaps,' or ' breaks ' is to speak the
language of the seer, not that of common sense or of science." 108
Although he made it appear to be such, the doctrine of
evolution is not essentially related to the core of Dewey's
teaching. It has provided him with a vocabulary of functionalistic jargon without which he would probably have been speechless. And this literally, for without the backing of evolutionistic
teaching his analysis of thought derived from language and
the latter from biological responses to stimuli would probably
have not been excogitated, much less proposed. Evolution
further furnished the " vision " whereby he was able to locate,
in continuity and interaction, knowledge, experience, the world
and the universe. Without that frame of reference the fitting
of all thoughts and things into the practical would have been
made evident for the rigor mortis that it is, rather than endowed
with a semblance of life in the likeness of the digestive system.
Conversely, the ease with whicp. the theories of extreme evolutionism coincided and found support in the instrumentalist
doctrines is suggestive of an error common to both, the denial
of the unique character of the human intellect and intellection.
Dewey's nominalism, that" ancient sin," as Jacques Maritian
calls it, at work " in the roots of all modern philosophies," 109
might be described as a secondary effect of practicalism. There
is no obligation on the practical man as such to become a
nominalist so long as he does not wish to philosophize. Then
his concern with relations, with operability, his negation of the
speculative will leave him no alternative. While his affirmation
of the practical function of the mind gives to his nominalism
a novel twist, verging on conceptualism, by his negation of
speculation he must maintain that essences, proper natures,
the ontological foundations of universals are illusions. Historically, perhaps, Dewey's nominalism so derived. It was also
and still is the current positivist doctrine.
10 • T. Z. Lavine, "Naturalism
and the Sociological Analysis of Knowledge,"
in Naturalism and the Human Spirit, Y. Krikorian, ed. (New York: Columbia,
1944)' p. 188.
10 • J. Maritain, The Degrees of Knowl,edge (New York:
Scribners, 1988), p. 1.

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175

Moreover, other influences were at work. It is a matter of
dispute 110 how much attention Dewey gave to the work of
Peirce when he was formulating instrumentalism, but the
logical continuity of Peirce, James and Dewey in the problem
of meaning has been affirmed by Dewey himself. 111 The original
question proposed by the founder of relational logic concerned
the verification of the objects of conception to determine
whether they were meaningful. It was this that led him to
formulate the pragmatic maxim of clarifying ideas by attention
to their consequences. This was extended by James with
emphasis upon the voluntary aspect and evolved into, among
other results, "the will to believe," associated with James'
philosophy. Dewey incorporated the pragmatic outlook, after
changing the emphasis to that of verification, into his own
theory with which it was congenial. Oesterle has pointed out
that no small part of the problem rested on the false grounds
resultant of the neglect of the Aristotelian and scholastic
doctrine of the supposition of terms. 112
Supposition can be defined as " the taking of a term for
something concerning which it is verified." 118 It must carefully be distinguished from signification. The latter is a substitution whereby a word is taken as a sign in place of a thing;
the former is
·
a sort of applicative substitution whereby after the intellect takes
the representation and signification of a word, it applies this name
in various ways in propositions, so that it stands for that to which
someone wishes to apply it. 114

Briefly, the word in its function of signification and as representative sign of the thing is prior to any supposition. Its
validity as sign does not depend upon its verification; it is
the result of the apprehensive power of the mind. The supposiWhite, op. cit., p. 8.
Studies in the History of Ideas, II, pp. 858 ff.
11 • J. Oesterle, "The Problem of Meaning,"
The Thomist, VI (1948), 180-!!!!9.
118 Joan. a S. T., Cursus Phil., Vol. I, p. !!8, alO.
1 " Ibid., p. !!9, bl6.
110
111

4

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FERRER SMITH

tion by which the term is applied and by which it forms part
of a proposition does require verification. What is verified
is not the meaningfulness of the term (that is presupposed)
but the truth of the proposition. To confuse the substitution
that takes place in the signification for that which supposition
performs is to deny the apprehensive power of the mind and
say that words get their meaning from application. The
nominalism of Dewey seems to result, at least more proximately, from this error latent in the pragmatic maxim. 115
Critics, favorable and adverse, have enumerated many other
traits of Dewey's thought. W. T. Feldman has pointed out
as characteristic, monism, p:rovisionalism, organicism, and
perspectivism. 116 Savery in his eulogistic analysis has emphasized Dewey's neutralism, perspective realism, concatenism,
tychism and naturalism. 111
Some of these, as the provisionalism, perspectivism and concatenism, are so many implications of
practical as such.
Concern with relations cannot but issue as a concatenistic
development of the connection of one thing with everything
else, especially in the construction of a world view. Perspectivism by which " each of us is limited to his own particular
perspective and reality-from-a-perspective is all that can be
known " 118 is a direct consequent of the dropping of the speculative and the denial of the apprehensive power of the mind.
It is further possible of interpretation in terms of Dewey's
realism. Strictly, Dewey is an idealist, making the old idealist
115 Dewey's "correction"
of James did not consist in removing the part played
by the will. So long as he wished to subscribe solely to the practical, he could
not remove it. Rather it consisted in the complete abandonment of the speculative
and the insistence that no formally practical science be admitted that could not
be made completely practical by the instrumentalist himself. The ultimate measure
of the practical is man and man, moreover, as distorted by Dewey's analysis
of his nature.
116 W.
T. Feldman, The Philosophy of John Dewey: A Critical Analysis
Johns Hopkins, 1934) .
(Baltimore:
117 Savery,
"The Significance of Dewey's Philosophy," m Schilpp, op. cit.,
pp. 481-513.
118 Feldman,
op. cit., p. 13.

APPRAISAL OF THE PHILOSOPHY

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error in mistaking the medium or id quo for the object or
id quod of knowledge. This is necessitated, not as often alleged,
by his Hegelian background, but by the practical impossibility
of giving more than a phenomenological and functional account
of the idea as such. So " reasoning " remains entirely within
the mind and is without existential validity. Ultimately, it
is by the practical that Dewey literally crashes through to
realism, by means of the operations demanded for a completely
practical knowledge.
The traditional naturalistic opposition to every form of
dualism found integration and support in Dewey. In his
thought the ultimate root is to be found in the fact that practical
knowledge deals with relations. For Hegel, monism was the
result of viewing concepts as interwoven, interdependent.
Hence reality was conceived in terms of an organism, every
part of which owed its specific character to the position it
occupied in terms of the whole. In Dewey, by reason of the
practical concern with relations, this conceptualization issues
as the functional interpretation of the elements of any area
of thought and things. So knowing· includes actions, the idea
includes its practical consequents, the subject is such only in
relation to object. 119 The Hegelian organicism of which Russell
accuses Dewey 120 is a mode of conceptualization and interpretation enforced by the practical outlook and not, as Dewey
has noted, a theory about the universe. 121 Dualism is negated
because the proper natures of things, foundation of the distinction between matter and form, soul and body, etc., are denied
in affirmation of relations as the sole constituents of reality
so far as knowledge can attain it. The eventuation is Hegelian,
not one world but one mind; not, however, as a mental construct, as an ens rationis, but of mind imposed through action.
119 Cf. Dewey, Logic, pp. 109 :ff., 188, 166 and passim; The Quest for Certainty
(New York: Minton, Balch, 1929), pp. 18, 82, 58, 244, and passim; Problems
of Men (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), pp. 809-821.
" 0 B. Russell,
A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1945), p. 828.
121 "Experience,
Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder," p. 570.

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FERRER SMITH

Tychism, stressing the element of change and indeterminism
in reality, may be regarded as a refreshing return to the
doctrine of Aristotle, after the long dark night of absolute
determinism settled on philosophy by nineteenth century
materialism. A practical philosophy in search of something to
do and to make had little choice in the matter. The contingent
as such constitutes its life-blood.
Neutralism is a recent sophistication of the body-mind
problem. In Savery's words, it means: The same sort of
entities enter both into our experience and also into the existential order of the physical world. Such entities in their
essential nature are neither physical or psychical. 122 Hence,
they are neutral. Dewey himself does not use the term although
his classification of mind and matter as "different characters
of natural events " 128 justifies the appellation. The doctrine
as elaborated was, so far as his fundamental practicalism is
concerned, a matter of choice. Only some such explanation
could fit the bed Dewey had made for himself. The alternative
was admission of radical differentiation between idea and thing,
between the physical and psychical orders, and led inevitably
to the existence of a soul. Fundamentally, neutralism is idealism in reverse and for Dewey the practical dictated the reversal.
The touted " Copernican revolution " in the theory of knowledge, celebrated particularly in The Quest for Certainty,1 24
is itself nothing more than that same reversal. The conflict
between mind as a spectator of and as active participant in
the changes of nature is that between speculative and practical
knowledge. The reversals so fondly tabulated by Dewey are
only the recognition that in practical knowledge the end is
the principle, that the thing is measured by the mind ra£her
than the mind by the thing, that practical knowledge is resolved
by operation. Where Thomism surpasses and reconciles the
,.. Savery, op. cit., p. 487. Thus the New Realism rebelled against Idealism's
reduction of everything to mind by reducing mind to everything.
193 Experience and ty ature, p. 74.
12 • Quest for Certainty, ch. XI, pp.

APPRAISAL OF THE PHILOSOPHY

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179

issues that divide idealist and realist, naturalist and sensationalist, Kant and Hume, Comte and Hegel, instrumentalism
by-passes or, more properly, under-passes the problems by
cutting off the factor that raises the difficulty. As Dewey
rightly observes, there c.an be a problem only if it is admitted
that the mind can know things in their natures, that it can
grasp and apprehend reality. 125 Deny the premises, negate
speculative knowledge and the epistemological problem is a
" diseased formulation."
The contrast between the thought of Dewey and that of
St. Thomas is radical in nature. 12il They are opposed as a
philosophy of becoming to a philosophy of being and hence
in the positions defended with regard to essence and existence,
matter and form, body and soul, substance and accidents,
causality in its every phase. Philosophically the worlds of
Dewey and of St. Thomas are worlds apart. The sole ground
common to both is the practical. Yet even here the meeting
is but a fleeting one and more of words than of minds. Restricted
to the narrow forms and shackling method of exclusive practicalism, Dewey cannot account for Thomism but only seek to
explain it away, and this rhetorically, perhaps sophistically,
never philosophically. Thomism, on the other hand, not only
can enlarge on the minimum of truth found in instrumentalism
but account for its errors.
It is speculative knowledge that is concerned with the universal and necessary, with the eternal and immutable. In it
certainty is attained by reduction to first principles, immediately known and indemonstrable. It is the function and end
of speculative knowledge to know, to have science in the
Aristotelian sense of the term. To practical knowledge it pertains to transform its object in accordance with the requirements of the end, to redirect and redispose antecedent conditions. It is the ultimate function and end of practical knowledge to do and to make. It is always a means, an instrument,
1 ••

Ibid., pp. 17, U, 170 ff., 290 and passim.

186

Cf. the clear and penetrating analysis of Fleckenstein, iam. cit.

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FERRER SMITH

a tool. As unique and supreme practical "intelligence in the
modern world " exists to control, to secure escape from peril,
to subject all to the power of man. The supremacy of method
cannot then be challenged. Ancient Cratylus, who also judged
that all the world was change, did not deem it right to say
anything but only wiggled his finger. 127 Dewey would harness
the universe to the wiggle.
CONCLUSION
The philosophy of John Dewey is undoubtedly superficial.
Regulated by the principle of an exclusive practicalism it could
not be otherwise. The great philosophers of the past reckon
their achievements in terms of the extent and penetrating
nature of their speculations upon ultimate questions. For
Dewey speculation radically can never rise beyond the character of a guess, a conjecture. Thinking for its own sake can
never be more than a "sport," presumably of a leisured few.
The relativism consequent upon the denial of man's speculative
capacity renders baseless any discussion of ultimates. The
sensism that is bulwark to practicalism, and its inevitable
premiss, dooms instrumentalism to a descriptive particularism
foreign to true philosophic inquiry. Even the "shift," noted
by Ratner, from the denial of all metaphysics to the affirmation
and exposition of a " naturalistic metaphysics " does not overcome the obstacle to philosophic thought initially placed by
Dewey himself. The "general problems," as distinguished
from " problems in general," but afford the opportunity to
measure objective reality according to the preformed limitations imposed upon man's powers to know. "Essences"
tailored to fit a preconceived pattern are not essences at all
and any objective essential natures must be, and are explicitly,
denied. Dewey has avoided the fantasy of a metaphysic
divorced from reality at the expense of reality itself. By his
primary postulate Dewey condemned himself to investigate
11 •

IV Metaphy11., c. 5, 1010 AIO.

APPRAISAL OF THE PHILOSOPHY

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181

the proper interests of philosophy .;mly to deny or distort
them. His heralded. excursions into education, sociology,
applied psychology were not solely justified by needs in those
fields; they were necessitated by Dewey's whole thought. He
had nowhere else to go.
Nevertheless, practicalism is not a complete nihilism. To
split the mind, as Dewey has, and take but one facet as the
whole is to place in the beginning an obstacle insuperable and
thus necessarily to reap many inconveniences in the end. Yet,
the intellect is practical as well as speculative. Because he
has taken that veritable practical function as his guiding idea,
Dewey has crippled rather than destroyed himself. A forthright
sensationalism eliminates all intelligence; it cannot account
for its seeking to account for anything. Rather than acknowledge any idea, it should, at least logically, deny itself. Even
by the elaboration of complicated associative processes it cannot extricate itself from its initial isolation in the singular.
Dewey is, eventually, a sensationalist but sensationalism is not
his primary or regulative category. So sensationalism is not
for his thinking a foundation but an adaptation. He admits
a mind not only in name but in fact, even though he develops
a theory negating all that justifies the name or explains the
fact. This perceived, it is not difficult to understand both his
own difficulties in fitting his position with either nominalism
or conceptualism and his readers' confusion and conclusion of
innate, though mysterious, contradiction.
Similar analysis on the basis of subjectivism and objectivism
yields like results. A thoroughgoing subjectivistic system of
thought cannot, again logically, rise beyond its primary postulate of complete skepticism. Locked within self, it cannot affirm
certainty even of self. Sensationalism must be skeptical of
essences; the skepticism of subjective idealism is primarily of
existences. Dewey's explicit delineation of the theory of knowledge has its proper term in the pitfall of idealism, the identification of the medium quo of knowledge, the idea, as the object
of knowledge. The case cannot be otherwise since the aware-

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FERRER SMITH

ness produced by the interaction of object and physiological
mechanism can only terminate in the effect of that interaction
within the organism. Any psychic existence radically distinct
from physical existence, any " grasping " or power of " otherness" is pointedly excluded in theory. So does Dewey deny
sensation to be knowledge at all and labor at the distinction
between "having" and "knowing." Yet he affirms we know
things rather than ideas and realism is imputed to him. Again
it is by the saving grace of the practical as guiding norm. A
complete mind, one both speculative and practical, is safeguarded in realistic attitude by acknowledging that the mind
is measured by reality. A mind that is solely practical achieves
realism in that, to retain its practicality, things, reality, are
measured by the mind. Such a realism cannot ultimately
account for itself, being but a portion of the whole truth, and
so is, after all, best simply adopted, proclaimed, and denominated " naive."
Multiplication of instances will but confirm the diagnosis
that, with the practical functioning to control the development
of his thought, Dewey will retain a part of truth. Despite his
adaptations of other doctrines which of themselves contain the
seeds of complete disruption, the dominance of the practical
will exercise a constant rectification. He cannot in its face
identify himself with either the rationalism of Kant or the
positivism of Comte. Equally, and for the same reason he
avoids the extremes of Locke and Hegel, of absolute empiricism
and absolute idealism. With practicalism at the helm, the
course steered by Dewey sheers away from the mentalistic
nominalism of subjective idealism in emphasizing the real
nature of philosophic subject-matter,. The equally nominalistic
standpoint, proper to sensism and limiting the designation
real to the physically particular, is, while embraced, modified.
Ideas as plans of action read into nature, function as universals
even though their status as such is disavowed.
The practical, point of view thus contributes a measure of
truth and protection in matters of epistemology, as in the

APPRAISAL OF THE PHILOSOPHY

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183

avoidance of complete sensationalism; also, though to a lesser
extent, in ontology, as in providing weapons against subjective
idealism. In morals, however, the exclusive adoption of the
practical has led to contradictory conclusions. That this should
be so follows from the limitations of the practical reason.
Practical reason is concerned with means. It does not establish
nor propose the objects which are the ends of the appetites
but is concerned with them solely as goods to be effected or
attained: It cannot demonstrate the existence of God, the
spirituality of the soul nor that soul's immortality. Thus, if
left to its own devices, it cannot be concerned with goods that
are, by the elimination of speculative reason, excluded from
its horizon. Only sensible goods remain upon which to focus
its power. Since the securing of these is already sufficiently
provided for in the sensitive order, the practical reason becomes
a superfluous appendage adding only a new dimension to the
possibilities of the abuse of sensible goods. The grotesque
result is a brute animal gratuitously endowed with a power
of self-destruction. Moral science is an impossibility and the
procedures termed moral are but the extension of the instinct
of self-preservation dictated by the threat of suicide.
There is, however, another way open. If the practical reason
does not of itself provide ends, it does not, on the other hand,
exclude ends otherwise provided. While it cannot account for
such goods as peace, honor, charity or justice, it can, upon
their assumption, proceed to function toward their realization.
In justification can only be adduced the desirability of such
goods to the appetite and hence a radical voluntarism must
result. The moral system erected upon such a basis must be
necessarily subjective. It could, also, be true and ordered to
the proper perfection of man, if the good assumed as end
and regulative principle be the true end of man.
So do the incapacity of the practical to establish ends and
its potentiality to realize ends otherwise provided account for
the contradictory tendencies within, the moral system of John
Dewey. The only ends he can account for cognitively are those

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FERRER SMITH

of the sensible order; hence, he is under compulsion to reduce
what spiritual goods he adopts to that order. From this
derives his persistent efforts to define anew the ideals he proposes that he may account for them in his own terms. More
than the reasons alleged this necessity impelled to the.definition
of sensation itself as a" having"; as by so erasing any essential
discrimination between the affectional and cognitional welcome
could be extended to any object of the appetites. Such an
object once admitted can be by subsequent " knowledge,"
couched in terms of means of realization, be defined. Ends, of
course, not within the practical powers of man to effect must
perforce be denied. Even this has the propagandizing advantage of making the denial of the existence of God and the
immortality of the soul seem consequents of the " sciences "
espoused, rather than its presuppositions.
Despite the protestations, the followers of Dewey have seized
more the freedom to assume ·ends than the ends he himself
proposed. They failed to realize that whatever of worth his
doctrines contain derives not from the control over destiny
he seemingly releases to man but from the goods he arbitrarily
assumes for him. Dewey's own faulty perception of what he
has done and consequent stress upon the instrumentality of
intelligence as conferring a unique power to man must be held
responsible. Abetted by the behaviorism, materialism and
sensism with which it has aligned itself, experimentalism has
in overt practice made more evident its tendency to selfdestruction than its accidental ameliorative possibilities.
As initiated by Dewey the latter have been principally in
the social field. The true worth of the individual as the image
of God cannot be admitted. The possibility of natural perfection by way of growth in the moral virtues is acknowledged
only obliquely; the ends of the virtues enter by way of methodological categories. Basically, the goods possible for Dewey to
assume for the individual within his self-imposed limits are
too insignificant and too blatantly sensible to suffice as human
goods. The oft-remarked propensity for the man of Dewey's

APPRAISAL

OF THE PHILOSOPHY

OF JOHN DEWEY

185

philosophy to dissolve in a maze of relations is due to more
than the relativistic position taken by him.
Unfortunately, in his efforts for social amelioration, even
when the goals he has chosen are admittedly valuable, Dewey's
concept of man has intervened to distort his prescriptions. It
might be said that the perfections to which he had denied any
antecedent ontological status he posits as possibilities to be
striven after, that reality for him becomes ideal in the ethical
order. This, however, is true only in a wide sense; Dewey is
too vague, and necessarily so, concerning the goals of on-going
existence. Principally, he has brought to bear a needed emphasis upon the disparity between the ends professed by society
and the ends currently realized by the means in actual operation, upon the inability of the will to impart by mere wishing a
beneficial result to means essentially harmful of eventuation.
So has he indicated a task that must be undertaken by Catholic
theology. He has charged that man is living daily in a world
by means of works that are divorced from the ends proffered
by the Christian faith. That charge must be examined and
answer made, and change also if necessary, if the spirit of God
is to prevail over the spirit of man.
FERRER SMITH,

Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D. C.

0. P.

TUE VITALISM OF HANS DRIESCII
I
EXPOSITION

T

O many a modern biologist or thinker conversant with
the problem of the nature of life, an examination of the
neo-vitalist position is practically identified with the
study of the views of Hans Driesch. Not that Driesch alone
today defends the vitalistic fortifications, for those who uphold
the autonomy of life are many and distinguished. Indeed, if
some happy chance brings unanimous agreement one day on
the true nature of life, it may well be seen that many of
Driesch's contemporaries in the service of vitalism have had
deeper insights and profounder explanations than his. Nonetheless it is Driesch's name that first is mentioned in every
modern summary of the problem, his views first discussed, his
objections given first hearing.
Nor is the pre-eminence of Driesch in this field surprising.
Quite literally he devoted his life to the study of the problem.
As a biologist his most famous experiments have had to do with
the exhaustive study of those phenomena wherein the animate
differs most remarkably from the inanimate; his later work as
a philosopher was concerned with putting vitalism ·on sound
theoretical foundations, and with drawing out the consequences
of his one central doctrine in terms of a world view. Moreover
a good part of Driesch's fame is based on the fact that he was
a pioneer in the attempt to study the problem experimentally;
hence he is viewed by those affiicted with scientism as a" scientific " vitalist, a position which they feel that they can respect,
even if they cannot agree with it. 1
1 Of course Driesch's later defection to the camp of philosophers disappointed
and dismayed those who contend that true and certain knowledge can only come
through the " scientific method?' His metamorphosis, however, merely served to

186

THE VITALISM

OF HANS DRIESCH

187

His L1FE
Born October 28, 1867 in Kreuznach, Hans Driesch was the
son of a wealthy merchant family. During his studies at the
universities of Hamburg, Freiburg, Munich, and Jena, he
showed marked interest in and aptitude for the natural sciences,
especially for biology on which he concentrated his principal
attention. Following his graduation Driesch embarked on a
tour of the Far East, and, upon his return in 1891, went to
Naples to work for the zoological station there.
It was during his stay in Naples that Driesch carried through
most of the experiments on which his reputation rests. Influenced by certain experiments performed by Gustav Wolff and
William Roux, Driesch formulated a series of critical experiments to test the teleological orientation-static or dynamicof various organisms. To some of the more important of these
we shall later have occasion to refer.
The results of these experiments and Driesch's analytical
interpretation of them were published in a series of works published between 1893 and 1904.2 Finally in the Gifford lecturee
for 1907 and 1.908, Driesch presented his fully matured vitalistic
theory and incorporated it within the body of a comprehensive
logical and philosophical theory. 8
strengthen the conviction that the nature of life, like other natures, is inaccessible
to " scientific" knowledge, and is only a matter for "abstract speculation," a
mental crime to be shunned and despised by the faithful positivist. E. g., cf.
Erik Nordenskiold, The History of Biology, trans. by L. S. Eyre (N. Y.: Tudor,
1940).
2 Hans Driesch, Die Biologie als selbstandige Grundwissenscheft, 1898; Analytische
Theorie der Organischen Entwichlung, 1894. In these first two works Driesch enters
into the analysis of certain basic notions involved in the controversy. Having
decided in 1895 that vitalism alone could explain the actions of animate things,
Driesch published his first proof for vitalism in Die Lokalisation M orphegenetischer
Vorgange. Ein Beweis vitalischen Geschehens, 1899, a second proof in Die
organischen Regulationen, 1901, and the third in Die' Seele' als elementarer Naturfaktor, 1908. A summary of the work done thus far was published in 1904 under
the title N aturbegriff und N aturteile.
• Driesch, The Scientific and Philosophy of the Organism, Gifford Lectures of
1907-1908 (London: A&C Black, 1908) 2 vols. A revised second edition in one
volume was issued in 1929 by the same publisher, and is referred to uniformly
throughout this work.

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EDWARD

T. SMITH

This attempt at the interpretation of vitalism in terms of a
wider world-view marked a change in the direction of Driesch's
interest towards philosophy. In 1909 he became Privat-dozent
in Philosophy at Heidelberg, advancing to the rank of Professor
of Philosophy in 1911. In 1920 he went to Cologne in the same
capacity, and in 1921 he transferred to the University of Leipzig. There he remained until his death in 1941.4
The main body of Driesch's philosophic conclusions will be
briefly summarized later. There is, however, one part of
Driesch's philosophic analysis upon which his vitalistic theory
places its full weight. This portion is his analysis of causality.
CAUSAL FouNDATIONs

oF DnrnscH's

THEORY

We are aware of certan fixed relations, according to Driesch,
among the succession of objects in our thoughts. And among
these fixed relations we find that of consequence or implication; I am aware, for example, that I am thinking of this
because it is implied in that. I may think of animal because I
have been thinking of sheep, and the concept of the first is implied in the idea of the second. The relationship of implication
and consequence, therefore, is recognized by the mind as a
possible type of relation between objects.
The question now arises whether this co:ricept can be " thrown
outwards " upon the world of natural objects. Looking to
nature, I find that this concept of " consequence " is indeed
found in the extra-mental world in a form that may be called
causality. 5 Not to be confused with mere temporal sequencealthough it takes place in time-causality expresses a propter
hoc in addition to the post hoc. Neither must causality be confused with functional dependence, the fixed ratio of change of
two variables which can take place without any dependency
•For life of Driesch, cf. his History and Theory of Vitalism, trans. by C. K.
Ogden (London: Macmillan, 1914), pp. 176-178.
• Indeed it is by judgment of the rationality of the becoming in terms of causality
that Driesch distinguishes the world of nature from that of dreams and imagination.
Cf. History and Theory of Vitalism, p. 198.

THE VITALISM

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189

between them. 6 Briefly, the idea of causality includes three
elements: the element of consequence, that of the application
of this concept to the empirical world, and that of a temporal
sequence.
From the assimilation of causality to the concept of consequence or implication certain practical results may, and indeed
must, be drawn. Most important of these for our purpose here
is an axiom that may be stated, " A system, in the course of
becoming, is unable to increase its manifoldness by itself." 7
Obviously a concept which is contained in another and is implied by it must not be richer or more complex than that from
which it is derived. This truth, then, must express a universal
property of consequence, applicable to causality.
Understanding that in a given spatial system, the complexity
at any time cannot exceed that of a preceding time without
the intervention of an outside system, Driesch proceeds to analyze the possible varieties of causal· interaction and the sources
from which they may proceed. This analysis will give only the
a priori possibilities in causality, but we shall then be able to
consult nature to see which of these varieties of causal relations
we find actually existing'!
Suppose a number of billiard balls rolling at a uniform velocity parallel to the short sides of a frictionless billiard table. As
long as this situation remains unchanged, no explanation is
needed. But as soon as the number, velocity, or positional complexity of the ball changes, we shall require an outside cause.
The ordinarily anticipated explanation would be the presence
of another spatial system interacting with the first. We might,
for instance, look for a player who puts more balls on the table
or strikes them with a cue. This alternative Driesch calls
"singular causality." 9
Science and Phuosophy of the Organism, p. 817.
Ibid., p. 819.
• Ibid., p. US.
•Cf. Driesch, The Problem of Individuality (London: Macmillan, 1914) pp. 4950. Cf. also Science and Philosophy of the Organism, p. 821, and History and
Theory of Vitalism, p. 198.
6

7

190

EDWARD T. SMITH

But what if the number of balls were to increase without the
intervention of any external spatial system? That is, what if a
few balls suddenly appeared on the table without being transported to it from some place outside of it? To make such an
event rational we shall have to postulate the existence of a
non-spatial cause which Driesch calls a "matter creating
causality." 10
Similarly, if we suppose our billiard balls initially at rest and
then suddenly moving without being set in motion by an outside spatial system, we shall have to postulate the existence
of a "motion creating causality." 11
Finally, let us suppose that we find a difference from one
time to another in the complexity of relationships of our billiard
balls. For example, if the balls in the first place were arranged
in a fairly simple configuration, e.g., a square, and if at a later
time the outline they form is the comparatively complex one of
an animal, we shall be forced to postulate an exterior cause for
the new complexity. Even in the absence of any new elements
(billiard balls) or becomings (movements), we should be forced
to admit the existence of such a cause, and this type of relation
may be called "individualising causality." 12
Of course, it would be impossible to say that anything theoretically possible never happens. But in the normal state of
affairs considered by physical laws, it is clear that not all these
types of causality are realized. The law of the conservation of
matter eliminates the second type of causality from our ordinary consideration, while the law of the conservation of energy
does a similar job in eliminating the third type. This elimination process, then, leaves us with only the first and last types
of causality as possibilities. Of these, the first type, singular
causality, embodies the ordinary relations existing between in10 Science and Philosophy of the Organism, p. 321, History and Theory of Vitalism,
.
p. 199, and Problem of Individuality, p. 50.
11 Science and Philosophy of the Organism, p. 320, History and Theory of Vitalism,
p. 199, Problem of Individuation, p. 50.
12 Science and Philosophy
of the Organism, p. 320. History and Theory of
Vitalism, p. 199.

THE VITALISM

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191

animate material objects and is studied by physics and chemistry. Concerning the existence of individualising causality we
cannot at this stage be sure, but it at any rate offers a promising
clue in our investigation of biological problems. 13
THE EXPERIMENTS

Superficially, the development of the organism from a singlecelled unit to the full-grown adult represents (if we neglect
the increase in the number of units) an example of just this
increasing complexity of relationship. If this naive reasoning
is correct, there are two ways in which an outside cause could
be conceived: as a spatial entity, in which case the organism
might be conceived of as simply being a machine constructed
by another machine, or as a non-spatial cause, in which case
there exists the disputed vital principle. Closer attention, however, reveals that we have overlooked a third alternative-that
the complexity of the result is already actually present in the
single cell from which the organism evolved. Of course, the
zygote will not contain th3 completely formed animal in miniature, including such standard accessories as teeth, limbs, eyes,
hair, and so forth. 14 But is it not at least possible that there
be a corresponding complexity of, say, a chemical type, which
forms the evolutionary basis for the later physical complexity?
How shall we decide among the three alternatives? It was
at least partially to answer this question that a famous series
of experiments was undertaken, beginning with the work of
Roux on the embryological development in a frog. And among
those who followed Roux in the investigation of this crucial
question was Driesch; by his results the latter was led into the
camp of vitalism.
13 Science and Philosophy of the Organism, p. 822-828. History and Theory of
Vitalism, pp. 200-201. Problem of Individuation, p. 52.
u Such a possibility was, of course, widely and loudly upheld for over a hundred
years as the " preformation " theory. The absurdity of countless unborn organisms
being contained fully formed in each germ cell, together with the negative testimony
of the high-power microscope finally did the theory to death. Cf. History and
Theory of Vitalism, pp. 38-40.

5

192

EDWARD T. SMITH

Briefly Roux's experiment may be described as follows: he
killed one of the two first cells of an embryo frog, keeping the
other one alive. On the assumption that the parent cell contains within itself the organization of the entire adult, then
half of this organization should pass to each of the first two
blastomeres, and out of each, half of an embryo will be formed.
And that is precisely what happened. Out of the surviving
blastomere there developed half of a typical frog embryo" an organism, indeed, which was as much a half as if a fully
formed embryo of a certain stage had been cut in two by a
razor." 15
It was in checking the results of Roux's experiment that
Driesch made the discovery that was to make· him a vitalist. In
Driesch's experiment the general plan was identical, although
the experimental subject was different-he used the eggs of the
common sea-urchin (Echinus microtuberculatus) -and his experimental technique was somewhat different-instead of using
a hot needle, Driesch shook the eggs of the Echinus at the two
cell stage until one of the cells died or the two were separated-.16
-At first the results of this division seemed to bear out Roux's
results, for there
from the one separated blastomere
a hemisphere instead of the sphere usually produced by a
normal egg. By the time the embryo had reached the blastula
stage, however, it had formed into the usual spherical shape
and appeared to be in every way normal, except that it was
only half the normal size. Furthermore this apparent wholeness persisted and in the end gave rise to a small but complete
pluteus-larva of the sea-urchin. 17
Beyond this experiment Driesch proceeded to show that the
Science and Philosophy of the Organism, p. SS.
A somewhat less violent method of accomplishing the same object was
established later by the discovery of Herbst that cells of the Echinus, dividing in
water lacking calcium, lose contact with each other. Hence any number of divisions
may be allowed under such circumstances, and the separate cells then transferred
to a normal sea-water environment in which the cells will go on dividing and will
cling together. The results were the same as the experiments mentioned in the text.
Cf. Science and Philosophy of the Organism, pp. 65-66.
17 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
15
16

THE VITALISM

OF HANS DRIESCH

193

same result could be obtained from any of the cells at the four
cell stage of the embryo, and that three of these four cells also
produced a normal larval stage. 18 Indeed one-fourth-any onefourth-cut at random from the embryo at any time up to the
blastula stage of the sea-urchin gave rise to a small but fullyformed larval stage. 19
VITALISTIC

INTERPRETATIONS

There is only one conclusion that Driesch can draw from all
this-and there is much confirmatory evidence besides-and
that is that the potentialities of a given embryonic cell are not
limited to its actual fate. This particular cell is destined to
give rise to these organs having this location and no other-yet
it has the power (and under varying circumstances it will
realize this power) to give rise to other organs having other
locations, other functions, and other histological characteristics.
In short, the cells are equipotential, each one having the same
possible goals in the developed animal as the others. Moreover,
in each individual case, these potentialities develop harmoniously, each one actually developing precisely that potency that
is most suitable for ·the organism as a whole. Hence Driesch
calls the total of these cells a "harmonious-equipotential
system." 20
What could be the influence that determines which of the
many equally present potentialities will be actually developed?
As we have already seen, we have to take three possibilities into
account: the presence of some outside influences, the previous
state of the system within itself, or finally a non-spatial cause.
Of these alternatives, the first need scarcely be considered.
Most outside forces are completely equal in direction, acting
upon one side no more strongly than on the other. Hence if
the actual fate of cells in a harmonious-equipotential system
varies without a corresponding variation in outside forces, the
Ibid., pp. 40 fl'.
History and Theory of Vitalism, p. 209.
••Science and Philosophy of the Organism, p. 88.

1•

19

194

EDWARD T. SMITH

second is not causally connected to the first. Of course, there
are some forces, e.g., light and gravity, that are one sided, so
to speak, but while these have some influence in the development of plants, they are well-known to have no such influence
in the case of animals. 21 Neither directional nor non-directional
external stimuli will, therefore, answer our problem.
Is it not possible that there exists within the structure of the
embryo an organization of either a physical or chemical typei.e., a machine in the broad sense-that precontains the organization of the complete organism, so that no real new complexity
of relations has been produced at all?
That such an explanation might bear the weight of accounting for normal embryological development Driesch will admit;
but that it does so in view of the experimental facts seems to
him fantastic. For the very nature of a machine consists in a
varying arrangement of parts-parts which must differ in size,
density, shape or composition, and therefore in function, and
which should be arranged in a certain order so that the activities of each part may be properly co-ordinated.
A machine cannot be divided at any point and remain what
it is, for the order and the sequence that constitute the very
essence of the machine would be thus destroyed. To quarter a
printing press would be not to get four printing presses but to
get four piles of junk. The organism of the embryo, however,
can be split into four pieces and will remain what it is. The
source of the final organization, therefore, cannot be precontained in the embryo as a machine. For even if we supposed
the embryo to be made up of four machines, this would not
explain how we could divide the system almost at will and
still retain its wholeness and typical organization. 22
It is equally impossible that this differentiation of the parts
of an organism be due to a purely chemical means-to the
disintegration, for example, of some chemical substance, the
break-down products of which would then migrate to different
Problem of Individuality, p. 16; Science and Phuosophy of the Organism, p. 88.
••Science and Philosophy of the Organism, pp.
Problem of Individuality,
pp. 17-18,
21

THE VITALISM

OF HANS DRIESCH

195

poses of the embryo to serve as means of specifying their rate
of growth, morphological characteristics, activities and so forth.
Such a theory would involve as a consequence, first of all, that
the organism would follow in its development the strictly geometrical distribution characteristic of chemicals in building
forms, a distribution exemplified, for example, in a crystal; and
this consequence is simply not realized in living things. Moreover, parts of the body having identical chemical compositions,
e.g., the bones, differ widely in shape and structure from one
part of the body to another; these differences, then, are obviously not accounted for by chemical means. 28
With the elimination of these two possibilities, we are left
with only one alternative as an explanation of the wholeness
and organization of a living thing-that it is dependent for its
existence upon the causality of a non-spatial agent, an agent
that, without adopting the Aristotelian treatment of the nature of the life source, Driesch calls by the Stagirite's term,
"entelechy." 24
FURTHER

DEMONSTRATIONS

For the existence of this entelechy Driesch advances two
other proofs, one from the existence of so-called complex-equipotential systems within the organism, and the other from the
historical basis of action in some organisms.
A complex-equipotential system may be described as a
system in which " all the elements are equally able to form the
same complex totality out of themselves." 25 The ovary of an
animal, for example, is such a system, for each of the cells
within the ovary, i.e., the eggs, are equally capable of giving
rise under proper conditions to the complex whole of an adult
organism. 26
Science and Philosophy of the Organism, pp.
Ibid., pp. 98-101.
25 Problem of Individuality,
p.
•• Such a system differs from a harmonious equipotential system, e.g., the
blastula, wherein each member is equally capable of giving rise to any of the
relatively simple organic parts of which the whole organism is composed. The
division does not seem too precise, and at best refers to a difference in degree
rather than in kind.
23
2•

196

EDWARD T. SMITH

In the very fact that such a system exists there is nothing
that is exclusive of a chemico-mechanical explanation of life,
nor is there any such proof to be gleaned from following the
development of a single member of such a system to the adult
stage. 27 But if, taking the opposite course, we follow the tracks
of such a system back to its origin, we shall find a different
opportunity for profitable analysis awaiting us. Here we discover a startling fact: that all of the members of this system
are descendants of a single cell, its Anlage in the technical
German description. 28
If now we say that each cell of this complex-equipotential
system contains a machine that is the source of the vaster
machine we call an adult organism, we are faced with a rather
embarrassing choice. For either we say that the Anlage itself
was a machine, in which case we are maintaining the absurdity
that a machine can divide almost countless times and still
remain itself (an impossibility as we have already seen), or we
are maintaining that the source of the machine is not the organization of the Anlage, and must, therefore, be a non-spatial
cause not identical with the system itself. 29 Once again, therefore, our argument is carried irresistibly to the existence of an
entelechy.
Thus the second argument is quite similar to the first, both
being based ultimately upon the impossibility of conceiving
any machine that periodically splits in half and yet remains
identical through any number of such divisions. In our consideration of the third proof we shall meet with an entirely
new aspect of the difference between an organism and a machine, and particularly is this true of certain operations characteristic of animals and men. It is in this latter area, the field
where the divergences are greatest, that we shall find our proof.
There are two cautions which Driesch urges before beginning
the examination of this proof. One is that the instinctive action
of animals must be eliminated from consideration in the proof.
27 I.e., nothing we have not already considered.
••Problem of Individuality, p. 22.
••Science and Phuosophy of the Organism, pp. 147-150.

THE VITALISM

OF HANS DRIESCH

197

Instinctive motions are specifically perfect the first time that
they occur, and such a motion may be mechanically explained,
though with considerable straining of credulity. 30 Moreover,
since the approach to this problem is biological rather than
psychological, the methods used in .studying animal and even
human behavior cannot include introspection; Driesch, in short,
adopts the method of the Behaviorists. 31
Driesch concentrates his attention upon the phenomena of
animal action, i.e., that phase of the behavior of animals that
is learned. For just as some actions arise perfectly formed in
kind upon the first adequate stimulus (though they may be
perfected in facility later), so there are other responses to
stimuli which do not arise, at least immediately, in answer to
the first appropriate stimulus, but do so after many repetitions
of the stimulus. The behavior of a nursing child is an instance
of the first sort of response, and these we shall call instinctive.
The tying of a shoelace is an obvious case of the second sort,
and these we shall agree to call actions.
The determining character of an action, therefore, is due not
to the immediate stimulus alone; at least, it must be posited
that other stimuli during the life of the individual have also a
determining effect upon the specific nature of this reaction.
It is a behavior pattern with a history. If we had not excluded
psychological description we could say that in action the behavior of the organism is modified by experience. 32
So far, this description of action could apply equally well to
a machine as to an organism, for many machines are capable
of producing actions determined by long-past stimuli. One of
the most obvious cases of this kind is the phonograph, an instrument that is reproducing for us today the songs of a Caruso
dead for a quarter of a century.
Problem of Individuality, pp. 24-U.
Science and Philosophy of the Organism, p. 203. Driesch rejects the whole of
introspective psychology, calling it a "pseudo-psychology." Cf. pp. 193 and 203.
He does not deny the causal nature of conscious phenomena, merely agrees with
the Behaviorists that they cannot be studied scientifically. Cf. p. 203.
3 • This smuggling of psychology in through the windows is Driesch's procedure,
not mine. Ibid., p. 204.
30

31

198

EDWARD T. SMITH

Yet in this example of the machine that reacts on a historical
basis we intuitively recognize that its behavior is vastly different from what we call action. The machine simply reproduces the stimuli which have been impressed upon it, whereas
the organism does nothing of the sort. While the organism has
its action modified by its history, the action cannot be said to
be wholly determined by its past stimuli-there must be other
specifying causes to account for the kind of an action produced.
More precisely, the principal difference between machine and
organism seems to be that in the phonograph there is immediately set up a determined correspondence between one stimulus
and one response. What is given out on subsequent playing
back of the record is not only always the same, but it is the
specific stimulus simply reproduced. In the case of an animal,
however, what appears to happen is that, first of all, the response is by no means necessarily of the same kind as the
stimulus, and moreover the various stimuli together with their
previous effects seem to be broken down into elementary components and stored up to make a sort of reservoir of possible
responses to situations.
That this is so may be seen even in such elementary types of
action as the conditioned reflexes investigated by Pavlov in
dogs. The production of the response of secreting saliva at the
stimulus of ringing a bell, produced in the dog by ringing a bell
while it was eating, is obviously a connection between what is
ordinarily a mismatched stimulus-response team.
Again let us say, an animal tries to escape from a painful
situation by three unsuccessful methods before achieving freedom by the fourth. If the animal has the power of learning, on
subsequent occasions it will make fewer unsuccessful attempts,
and finally will produce the successful response immediately. 33
Now nothing of the sort is found in machines. At most,
changes of behavior in machines due to their history are quantitative changes due to some lingering effect in the machine, e.g.,
wear, magnetization, etc., and are analogous to the organic
•• Ibid., pp. 2U-218.

TH:fil VITALISM

OF HANS DlUESCll

199

phenomenon of fatigue rather than to the characteristic of
actions that we have been studying.8<1
Even more striking is the contrast between the responses of
an organism and that of a machine with regard to the wholeness
of a stimulus. For if a complex stimulus is impressed on a
machine, each of the various elements will produce its own individual response; the stimulus will be to the machine the sum
of the simple stimuli contained therein, the effect will be simply
the sum of individual effects.
In organisms, the case is often entirely different. The animal
reacts-at least in certain cases-to a stimulus as a whole;
hence a small change in the stimulus may result in a drastic
change in behavior, while a drastic change in the stimulus may
produce no change in the response at all. The dog that, at the
approach of its master, goes bounding down the street with
joyous yelps may remain entirely unmoved or growling hostilely at the approach of anyone else. Even more remarkable
is the behavior of a man in a conversation. Here the words,
" Your brother is sick," referring to a long-absent and little
missed member of the family may produce an entirely different
reaction in kind and degree than will the statement, " Your
mother is sick." Yet the only change in the stimulus is a change
from the letters, "hr," to the letter, "m," in the sentence, a
change not at all in proportion to that of the reaction. On the
other hand, if the hearer understands French, the sentence,
" V otre mere est malade," though a totally differing entity in
its physical parts, produces the same effect as the English
equivalent. The only explanation is that each complex group
of sounds makes up, as a stimulus for the organism, a whole
that is different from and more than the sum of its parts. Once
again, therefore, we find the organism acting in a way that is
only not different from a machine, but would be impossible in
one. 35
On the basis of these three proofs, working out as they do
to a single conclusion, Driesch rests his case for the reality of
•• Ibid., pp.

••Ibid., p. 214.

EDWARD T. SMITH

the entelechy. We can, it is true, add other indications of the
truth of vitalism: from the facts of regeneration and healing,
for example, or from the little knowledge of instincts that we
have been able to gain. Still these indicia are not to be considered final, whereas the proofs as given are thought to be
inescapable demonstrations. 86
Can we find out more about the nature of this mysterious
agent in itself, and about the causal relationships linking it to
the material components of the organism? Since we are engaged in an a posteriori proof, let us look at the causal link
between body and entelechy first, and go on after the settlement of those questions to the study of the entelechy considered
in itself.
How THE ENTELECHY

CoNTROLS

THE ORGANISM

A primary difficulty seems to arise from the fact that the
body of a living thing seems to submit to two different kinds
of law; it is at once governed by the physical law that binds
inorganic nature and by another group of laws unique to the
biological kingdom. The first step in clarifying the relations of
body and entelechy must be to ask to what extent the entelechy voids the physical law and how this is accomplished.
What can possibly be meant by saying that the organism
is subject to physical laws? The implication here is that the
living being is in some respect a machine, for physical laws are
machine laws, based precisely upon the assumption that everything is made up of extended matter moving in space. 37 Physical laws, have for their function the statement of the energetic
relations between one body and another, or between a body
and its motion. 88
History and Theory of Vitalism, pp. 214-215.
For the purpose of our present analysis let us ignore the question of whether
this matter is qualitatively the same or not. The ultimate hope of every mechanist
is to reduce all matter to one common kind, e. g., the ether. Whether or not this
is possible, however, makes little ultimate difference; the basic requirements of
quantified matter and motion in space remain constant in all theories. Science
and Philosophy of the Organism, p. 269.
••Ibid., pp. 269-270.
36

87

THE VITALISM

OF HANS DRIESCH

Now because the body is obviously a material system whose
parts, e.g., the cells, have a certain spatial relationship, it must
be considered in itself as a machine, and whatever non-mechanical action it exhibits must be attributed to the entelechy.
Thus the nature of the body itself explains its subjection to
the mechanical laws, and its relation to the entelechy renders
intelligible the appearance of new determinants. How far, however, does this modification go?
We have already answered that question in large part. We
have seen that matter-creating causality and energy-creating
causality, while a priori possible in the world, are not actually
realized even in the organic realm, that is to say, that the
principles of the conservation of energy and of matter hold
true in living as in inorganic things. 39 Hence the type of causality left to entelechy is the individualising causality. 40 Driesch
suggests, therefore, that the entelechy must interfere with the
normal course of the natural laws only by guiding and arranging
them for its own purpose.
To describe the mode in which such a thing may come about
Driesch proposes three possible solutions. His own theory is
that the entelechy might be supposed to suspend temporarily
certain actions that would otherwise take place according to
physical laws. This implies a double power within the organism,
for in addition to being able to stop one action, and later, of
course, to allow it to resume by lifting the suspension, the
entelechy would be able also to exercise control over a "choice"
of two different actions. If chemical compound " a," for instance, has the power of combining with either " b " or " c,"
but has a greater affinity for " b " under conditions of the nonliving world, the organism may still allow a union to· take place
between " a " and " c " even when " b " is present by the simple
expedient of suspending the reaction of " a " with " b." 41
In addition to explaining how entelechy does modify the laws
of nature, this theory has the advantage of accounting for many
••Ibid., pp. 255-W6.
••Cf. supra, pp. 190-191.
Science and Phuosophy of the Organism, pp. 261-264.

41

EDWARD T. SMITH

events that do not happen. For example, it explains why the
organism cannot become independent of its environment. Entelechy, as the suspension theory explains, does not create the
difference that enables one substance to act upon the other,
hence there will be no reactions between physical or chemical
agents not already potentially reactive by nature. Nor can the
entelechy create a substance it needs from elements that would
not naturally cause such a result. All it can do is to interrupt
and cause to resume a series of events that can take place
according to nature's laws. 42
A second possible way in which entelechy might interfere
with the mechanical laws of inanimate nature is suggested by
Descartes' analysis of the mind-body problem. The mind, according to Descartes, cannot change the total energy in a
dynamic system, 43 but could be conceived of as changing the
direction of that energy. Since such an action ordinarily implies an expenditure of mechanical energy, it seems that such
a solution requires the entelechy to be an energy-creating cause,
a possibility that has been rejected already. In a later study of
this possibility, however, Eduard von Hartmann has suggested
that the energy required to effect this transportation of energy
from one spatial axis to another might be drawn from the
energy itself. Whether such a refinement is necessary is (to
Driesch at least) questionable, since ill any case the total
amount of energy represented by a moving body remains the
same, and the part of the principle of inertia dealing with the
straight-line motion of moving particles is abrogated for
organisms. 44
There is still a third imaginable solution to this problem.
For the action of the entelechy might well be a purely negative
one, a prohibition rather than a command. According to this
••Ibid., pp.
•• Knowing nothing of the later distinction made between kinetic and potential
energy, Descartes evolved this solution to account for changes in direction of
kinetic energy alone. Hence such a solution as the suspension of energy-a process
that involves transforming kinetic into potential energy-would be impossible for
him. Cf. ibid., p.
••Ibid., pp. 272-275.

THE VITALISM

OF HANS DRIESCH

208

account the material particles would ordinarily follow their own
courses except that they might be prevented from doing so in
some respects, much as a beam of light is reflected from its
natural course by a mirror. The role of entelechy would be
something like a " Keep off the grass " sign in a park. This
Driesch calls the " hypothesis of immaterial resistance." 45
To tell which of these theories is the one that corresponds to
reality is, in the present state of knowledge, impossible. There
are, however, certain indications that make possible some tentative judgments of their relative worth. For instance, the second
explanation, since it seems to limit the powers of entelechy by
nothing but the total of available energy, does not have the
advantage presented by the others of being able to account for
the activities the entelechy cannot perform. 46 And since the
third theory restricts the power of the non-spatial agent more
than any of the others, it is perhaps to be preferred; it is easiest
to explain in this way the peculiarities of individual organisms
due to their mechanical configuration as well as the universal
features they exhibit because of their entelechy. 47
THE INDEPENDENCE

OF THE ENTELECHY

If these are the most promising theories of the action of
entelechy on organism, the causal relations in the opposite
direction are still in doubt. Is the entelechy that causes these
actions of the organism dependent itself on the material body,
as being the result either of some special kind of living matter
or of a particular configuration of chemicals that we call a
living body? Before answering this question we shall have to
deal with two preliminary points, the nature of a material substance and the existence of a living material substance.
It seems that all material substances have this characteristic
in common, that they consist of simple substances existing beside each other in extensity. This characteristic holds true
whether it is assumed that the mechanical or the dynamic view
of reality is held. For even in the latter view, supposing that
'"Ibid., pp. 275-276.

'"Ibid., p. 273.

" Ibid., p. 276.

fl04

EDWARD T. SMITH

matter is made up of forces emanating from indivisible, unextended centers, still the forces themselves are extended and
the substantial complex exists in space in an extended way.
And this is the only universal characteristic of matter. The
other qualities of such substance may change from one body to
another, but the requirement that they all alike must be extended does not vary. 48
In what sense, then, do we speak of a living material substance? A careful analysis of the scientific evidence on this
point is scarcely helpful in our search for such a substance.
True the scientists speak freely, for example, about assimilation,
and this we presume to be the action of a living being increasing
its substance at the expense of the components of its environment. However, on a closer look such a definition is seen to be
mere assumption witn very little basis in reality. Who could
·say, for example, at what point this presumed assimilation takes
place, or what sort of mysterious process it might be?
The facts that are really presented to us by biochemistry
inform us that the living organism is actually made up of a
mixture of many different chemical substances, none of which,
taken in itself, is alive or shows any of the characteristics of
life.49 Furthermore, not any one of the specific substances in
the body by acting on food changes this into its own substance;
this is always performed by another element, viz., an enzyme.
The process of assimilation on its chemical showing turns out
to be a pseudo-assimilation, and there is here to be found no
sign of the existence of a living substance. 50
As a matter of fact there are many indications (and to
Driesch not merely indications but proofs), that there can be
no such thing as a "living, material substance." To say that
there exists such a thing as a material, chemical, living sub•• Ibid., p. 276.
•• Not that there are not chemical substances that are specific, in nature at
!east, to living things, although many of these substances can be synthesized outside
living things, and probably there is no a priori impossibility concerned in synthesizing the others. In any case, however, the individual substances do not manifest
to us any of the characteristics of organisms, e. g., nutrition, sensitivity, etc.
•• Loe. cit., pp. 290-292.

THE VITALISM

OF HANS DRIESCH

205

stance that" bears" entelechy would be to attribute extensity
to the entelechy, for the one characteristic of material substance is extension. That entelechy is extended is impossible,
otherwise the divisions performed in the embryo of the sea. urchin would have given very different results than they did.
The fact that a complete organism was evolved shows that the
entelechy must itself have been left whole and undivided by
the division. 51
Another argument against the " living substance " theory
can be found in the strange consequences that follow from such
a notion. Theoretically, we should be able to buy in the market,
if the theory were true, " six pounds of lion substance, or a
pound and a half of eagle substance, or three ounces of earthworm substance." 52 Now you might be able to buy six pounds
of lion meat, but this is merely a mixture of proteins, fats,
sugars, and other non-living substances-a collection of elements, not one " homogeneous chemical material which is supposed to represent the ' being-a-lion.' " 58
But still a third difficulty prevents Driesch from considering
entelechy as the result of a material substance. If such were
the case, entelechy would, of course, be itself material and as
material would be subject to changes by material energy. However it has already been established 54 that the reaction of an ·
entelechy to body is not affected by such a transfer of energy.
Once again, therefore, the theory of a living matter as a cause
for entelechy fails to account for the facts. 55
But if there is no one living substance that can be considered
as the cause of entelechy, would it not be possible to assign
the origin of entelechy to a combination of compounds arranged
in a typical "constellation"? Once again our answer must be
negative. For the human-mind cannot rest content with the
explanation of a new elementary factor out of simply nothing;
the new factor must have pre-existed somehow, either as a
potentiality of one of the substances. in a constellation or as a
63 Loe. cit.
Ibid., pp. 292-293.
•• Ibid., p. 293.
••Cf. supra, p.
•• Science and Philosophy of the Organism, p. 295.
51

206

EDWARD T. SMITH

substance itself that becomes active only under certain conditions.56 In either case, however, we are once again reducing
entelechy to a material thing with the same contradictions seen
above. 57
For Driesch, therefore, the entelechy, while dependent in its
actions upon a material substance, is not dependent for its
existence upon the body. " The activity of an architect depends
on the existence of stones. But would you care to say that the
architect's existence depends on-stones? A heap of stones
without an architect is a heap of stones, and the matter of an
organism without entelechy is an amount of matter." 58
NATURE OF THE ENTELECHY

Obviously to say that entelechy is neither a material substance nor the effect of a material substance is not to deny that
entelechy is in itself a substance. 59 As a matter of fact, the
reasoning proves that entelechy must be considered as a substance, since the effects we attribute to it must be produced by
some substances, and we have seen that the extended substances of the material world could not be the causes of such
behavior. 60
But what sort of substance can this be? What are its properties? Is it essentially a psychic or non-psychic thing? Is the
same entelechy common to many bodies, or does its individu•• Thus the appearance of electricity produced by rubbing a glass rod must
be explained by supposing either that the rod has an electric potential (E) to begin
with, or that there exists a substance of electricity (electron) that is broken loose
in the act of rubbing.
67 Science and Phuosophy of the Organism, p. 295.
58 Ibid., p. 296. The similarity of this figure to Plato's "pilot and ship " is striking.
Indeed Driesch borrows a Platonic argument from Alcibiades I (12Sa-129b) to
prove the independence of the entelechy, viz. the living substance is distinct from
that which belongs to it; now the body is said to belong to the substance, for we
say that a dog has (not is) paws, teeth, body, etc. Hence the dog is its entelechy.
The body is not the dog but belongs to the dog. Ibid., pp. 812-818.
•• I. e .. a substance " in the sense of something irreducible which remains the
always unchangeable bearer of its changeable qualities." Ibid., p. 297.
•• Ibid., pp. 800 and 824.

THE VITALISM

OF HANS DRIESCH

fl07

ality correspond to that of the material organism? Is it immortal? If so, in what sense? To some of these questions there
are easily available answers; to others, the answer is impossible
or at least out of reach at present. Let us begin by seeing what
can be known of the nature of the entelechy.
The only way we can know entelechy is by means of the
effects produced by it on the body. This causality," individual
causality," consists of creating in a material system a complexity of relationship not belonging to this system of itself.
All the effects of entelechy are always complex " manifolds "
that are extended either in space-the organism itself-or in
time-the actions of the organism. The entelechy itself, therefore, must in some fashion contain this organization; it must be
a " manifold " itself.
The kind of manifoldness the entelechy possesses must differ
from the extensive manifold.riess characteristic of the material
substance. The first and second proof both show that the entelechy must be a non-spatial cause; indeed, both are founded
upon the impossibility of dividing an extended manifoldness
without taking away any of its parts. The nature of an entelechy, therefore, could be described as an "intensive manifoldness." 61
But such a definition of entelechy is merely a sketch of this
non-spatial substance in a state of potentiality. For just as an
architect is an architect in actu only in the act of building, so
entelechy reaches its actuality only by acting on matter. "As
far as it is entelechy actu it is causality of the individuating
form." 62
The characteristic of inextensiveness in an entelechy raises
an interesting point about its divisibility: how can an unextended substance be divided? Yet apparently the entelechy is
so divided, e.g., in the ovary. 63 Nevertheless the division of a
non-spatial system is impossible; the very idea is a priori conorganism that is divided,
tradictory.· It can be only the
61 Ibid., pp. 245-!M7.
•• Ibid., p. 824.

••Cf. supra, second proof, pp. 195-196.

6

fl OS

EDWARD T. SMITH

the entelechy itself is not. Here is the first bit of evidence to
solve the problem of individuality of the entelechy. There are
not as many entelechies as organisms. 64 Driesch, as a matter of
fact, cannot escape the conclusion of a sort of world-entelechy.
But of this we see a little more later.
One more property of entelechy follows from its non-spatial
character: it cannot be confined to any one place in the body.
the pineal gland is unDescartes' localization of the soul
necessary. True, there are some parts of the okanism that seem
to be acted upon by entelechy while others
but this is
merely a matter of points of relation and does not justify
calling any of these centers of activity the "seat" of the
entelechy. 65
Nor is there any justification for indulging in the pseudopsychological assumption that every entelechy must be conscious or psychic. Consciousness we can affirm certainly only
of ourselves. Nonetheless, Driesch accepts provisionally the
Aristotelian division of souls: the nutritive soul is found in all
living organisms, the sensitive soul is found as the source of
sensation and instinct in all animals, and :finally the " psychoid," as the seat of reason and of " actions," is found in the
higher animals and in man. 66
Here again we run headlong into the problem of the unity
and multiplicity of the entelechy. In this case we have postulated a plurality of entelechies for a single organism, 67 whereas
the unity of the organism, and particularly the unity of the
Ego, seem to demand the oneness of entelechy. Besides, looking
at the problem from the aspect of the many organisms produced

in

Science and Philosophy of the Organism, pp. 298-299.
Ibid., p. 299.
•• Thus departing from Aristotle who attributes the rational soul to man alone.
Driesch's argument is that the higher animals possess more than mere instinct
inasmuch as they are able to learn by experience. This fact entitles them to a
memory, but it hardly seems to require their being intellectual besides. Ibid., p. 885.
••Another indication of such plurality Driesch finds in such " stupid " acts of
entelechy as the development of half an embryo when the other half can never
mature (as in Roux's experiment.) This argues an organization of entelechies, each
one performing its appointed task in relative isolation from the others. Ibid., p. 280.
64

05

THE VITALISM

OF HANS DRIESCH

by one, we are faced with the metaphysical absurdity of supposing that non-spatial entities can be divided or even fused.
To Driesch, the conclusions from these indications seems to
be the existence of one super-personal entelechy, which, however, exists in two different states: " in the one-modus and the
many-modus." The apparent division of entelechies can then
be regarded. as merely a multiplication of the modes of the one
entelechy; the facts of the unity of organic life can be accounted
for by the one basic ens that is the entelechy. 68
Besides the ones mentioned, there are many other indications
of the simultaneous unity and multiplicity of the entelechy.
The unity of the species and even, if we accept the theory of
evolution, of all life, find in this unity of entelechy their best
explanation. 69 Even the whole of empirical reality exhibits that
wholeness of order that we seek to explain in organisms by
entelechy. 7° Finally, such psychological phenomena as split
personalities are understandable only in terms of a single entelechy that has been modified in its modes. 71
THE FINALITY

OF ENTELECHY

So far we have not said much about the place of finality in
Driesch's treatment of the problem of life, and yet it is apparently in the nature of finality that Driesch ultimately finds
the clue to the basic differences between organism and machine. 72 The reason for this omission Driesch himself makes
clear: the notion of teleology has been suspect in the physical
sciences from the time of Newton. Justified or not, this skeptical attitude can easily be understood, for only too often arguments from teleology have been based on an extension of the
conscious end-seeking of man. 78 However, if the word "end"
is correctly understood in its analogical sense as that toward
which an agent has a tendency, there is no necessary objection
••Ibid., pp. 881-882.
' 0 Ibid., p. 824.
71 Ibid., p. 884.
••Ibid., pp. 882-888.
72 Hi.story and Theory of Vitali.sm, pp. 1-7 and 176-177.
73 Science and Philosophy of the Organism, p. 248.

210

EDWARD T. SMlTH ·

to its use in biology, since all natural agents tend to act in one
way rather than in any other. To exclude the element of conscious desire, Driesch prefers the term " causa finalis " to the
more anthropomorphic " purpose." 74
The two outstanding examples of goalward tendencies in
the non-human realm are to be found in organisms and in
machines. Ordinarily we do not speak of purpose with regard
to natural things below the level of the organism, since purpose
refers principally to processes, and non-living things are inert.
What then is the difference teleologically between a machine
and an organism?
The actions of the parts of a machine are end-seeking only
in virtue of two determining facts: it is in terms of the whole
alone that the part has meaning, and the purposiveness of individual actions is derived only from their positions in the whole.
Each part acts in its singularity, and the action of the whole
is analyzable into the sum of these individual actions. 75
On the other hand, the end-seeking of the organism cannot
be broken down into the action of the parts, for parts can be
removed and the end is reached anyway. Even less can the
action of the parts in relation to the end be reduced to a function of position, for the same part may fill any number of
duties. This sort of teleology Driesch calls dynamic, that of
the machine, static. 76
But is there anything in the end itself that would explain
the difference in the characteristic end-seeking processes of
machines and organisms? Though not a definite answer, the
following passage may give a clue to Driesch's thoughts on
this problem, the root of any theory on the nature. of life:
Let us then borrow our terminology from Aristotle and let that
factor in life phenomena which we have shown to be a factor in
true autonomy be called Entelechy, though without identifying
our doctrine with what Aristotle meant by the word £11rt:Alxt:ia. We
shall use this word only as a sign of our admiration of his great
•• Ibid., p. 828.
••History and Theary of Vitalism, p. 4.
•• Ibid., p. 5

THE VITALISM

OF HANS DRIESCH

genius; his word is a mold which we have filled and shall fill with
new contents. The etymology of the word f.vTf>.i.xfw. allows us such
liberties, for indeed we have shown that there. is at work a something
in life phenomena "which bears the end in itself." 8' lx€i f.v £avTI/}

II
EVALUATION

Remarkable and striking as the work of Driesch has been
in examining the aspect of biological problems most obviously
inexplicable on physical or chemical grounds, that work has
commanded more respect than agreement among his fellow
biologists. Among philosophers who still hold to the specific
distinction between the living and the inanimate, Driesch's
following is considerably larger. 78 From a human point of view,
this situation is entirely understandable, inasmuch as, in view
of the tremendous reputation enjoyed by the empirical sciences,
any scientific support for a philosophical opinion is apt to seem
to philosophers and public alike a sort of practical vindication
of the reputedly over-abstract and unreal philosophic opinion.
Long before this, however, past experience should have warned
philosophers to beware of scientists before looking carefully
over their gifts. The obvious philosophical weakness of various
"scientific" arguments for the existence of God has probably
helped to make more agnostics and atheists than all antitheistic arguments combined. As in that other case, the argument of Driesch for an" entelechy" rests upon the inadequacy
of physical theory to explain a given set of facts, to account
for which, therefore, another sort of cause is postulated. We
should be sure that the impossibility of such a physical or
chemical explanation is really an intrinsic impossibility, and
not merely a reflection of our present ignorance.
There are three basic points on which disagreement with
Science and Phuosophy of the Organism, p. 106.
This is merely a personal opinion, a general impression that I got during the
course of my research on Driesch.
77
78

EDWARD T. SMITH

Driesch might be possible. One of these can be found in his
basic philosophical assumptions, the second in his argument
against the mechanical interpretation of the actions of the
organism, and the third in his analysis of the relation that exists
between entelechy and the material organism. This chapter will
attempt a brief evaluation of each of these questions.
COMMENTS oN Dnrnscn's

NoTION oF CAUSALITY

Driesch's principal philosophic presupposition is concerned
with the nature of causality. And here we can distinguish three
elements within his treatment:
First, Driesch accounts for the origin of the idea of causality
by claiming that the notion has its beginning in our experience
of the relation between ideas rather than in our experience of
the relation between things. Thus the necessary implication of
the idea of the genus within the notion of the species, e.g., of
" animal " in " man," first gives us the idea of a necessary
·sequence proper to the definition of causality. This idea of a
necessary sequence is then transferred on the basis of our experience to relations in the extra-mental world.79
Second, Driesch's definition of causality includes three elements: the notion of sequence in time, the element of dependence, and the trait of real applicability to the empirical world.
Hence Driesch shows himself as a realist in matters of knowledge, and as an intellectualist in his affirmation of the intelligibility of the real world. 80
Third, there are four basic kinds of causality distinguished
by Driesch:
1. Singular causality, whereby a spatial system is influenced in its constituents of number, motion, or arrangement by another external spatial system.
2. Matter creating causality, whereby the number of
elements within a spatial system is increased by the intervention of a non-spatial system.
79
80

Driesch, Science and Philosophy of the Organism, p. 819.
Science and Philosophy of the Organism, p. 817.

THE VITALISM

OF HANS DRIESCH

218

3. Motion creating causality, whereby the elements of
a spatial system are reduced from rest to motion by a
non-spatial cause.
4. Individualizing causality, whereby a spatial system
is given a new and more complex arrangement (without
the creation of matter or motion) by a non-spatial system. 81
Without attempting a detailed examination of Driesch's account of the origin of the idea of causality, we might remark
that it is rather dubious whether a concept of an ens rationis,
a relation existing between ideas, can be established with any
certainty to apply outside the realm of ideas. It is interesting
to note that historically it was this very difficulty (about
applying to things a concept that refers only to related ideas)
which bears a large part of the responsibility for the origin of
modern idealism in Berkeley. 82
Driesch, it is true, considers it as an established fact that the
relation of dependency is found in the outside world as well as
among ideas, but it is noticeable that the external material
world that Driesch discusses later is a mechanical one where
causality is reduced to an absolute minimum. And it is equally
noticeable that the locus of any causality characteristic of the
organism is moved from the material body to a substance more
nearly resembling an idea in its existential status.
Assuming, however, that the real and universal applicability
of causality in becoming can be established, even if not on
Driesch's grounds, we must examine the kinds of causality
enumerated by Driesch to see what this division will tell us.
The first and obvious characteristic of this distinction is that
all the kinds of cause enumerated are subdivisions of efficient
causality, and this in spite of the fact that the origin of the
idea of causality is a sort of formal causality for Driesch. At
any rate, Driesch, in dealing with the external world, is con81

Jbid., pp. 8ft0-8!U.

Cf. Etienne Gilson, The Unity of Philosophieal Experience (N. Y.: Scribners,
1950) p. 194.
82

214

EDWARD T. SMITH

cerned principally with extrinsic causes, a factor that influences
his treatment of the entelechy later on.
A second observation I would like to make concerning
Driesch's division of causality is that even in the genus of efficient cause the distribution can be considered adequate only
if we assume_ a mechanical point of view. The three things
assumed by Driesch to need explanation by either an extended
or an unextended causal system are precisely the elements that
the mechanist finds basic to the material world, a multiplicity
of particles, motion in those particles from one place to another,
and the spatial configuration of these particles. Since Driesch's
view of the organism is not primarily a mechanical one, it seems
that this is not the place to enter into an extended discussion
of mechanism. However the ontological emptiness of a machine
is apparent. The machine as such has no activities and no
being; whatever it may seem to have of either it has in virtue
of sources external to itself. Driesch's statements are not uniformly mechanical, since he speaks of various chemical forces
and of various other qualitative forces of light and matter. 83
Nevertheless he is explicitly in sympathy with the mechanistic
ambition to explain even these forces in terms of extended
matter, locomotion, and position.
A third brief observation might be made concerning Driesch's
division ot causality. Of the three kinds of effects possible to
non-spatial causes-,-number of particles, motion, and positiononly the last is considered as being actually realized in the
experimental world. It is very difficult to understand, for nie
personally at least, how such a cause can be the cause of the
configuration of particles without being the cause of the coming-to-be of that configuration in any way whatever. And
since the only way particles can assume a position they have
not had before is either by being created there, or by being
moved there, it is obvious that according to Driesch the nonspatial system is just such a cause of being but not of becoming.
All of these difficulties in Driesch's theory of causality, it
88

Science and Philosophy of the Organism, pp. 97-98.

THE VITALISM

OF HANS DRIESCH

215

seems to me, are the result of a certain conflict that must inevitably arise between experience and the
necessary to the experimental method, between the philosophic and
the empiriological elements in man. The philosophic experience
teaches us that there are certain qualities in reality that are
distinct from and in a sense superior to any geometrically
understandable arrangement of discrete elements, otherwise
the geometrical shape itself would be not only unintelligible
but completely unknowable. On the other hand, the physicist,
being himself incapable of the direct generation of most natural
effects, and observing that the only way for him to produce
such an effect is by bringing the proper cause into spatial conjunction with the appropriate matter, in a way is forced to
deal with qualitative features in terms of geometrical :figures.
Driesch almost instinctively recognizes, therefore, that there
are aspects of reality that are not intelligible from the point of
view of undifferentiated matter in a state of locomotion, but
his scientific background seems to coerce him into regarding the
material co-efficient of these as a machine-like arrangement of
parts. In a way this confusion already implies an entirely immaterial cause of such phenomena and the divorce between
being and becoming that we have already noticed. However
unlikely his theory may be otherwise, the separated entelechy
is the only possible solution to Driesch's epistemological difficulties.
In spite of criticisms here made of Driesch's outlook on
causality, his insistence upon the objectivity and necessity of
the relation is without question necessary to a rational and
realistic experimental science. Our quarrel is not with these
characteristics, but with the restriction of their application to
the purely mechanical sphere in Driesch's science.
DEMONSTRATIONS

OF THE ENTELECHY

In his application of these concepts Driesch proceeds to show
that there must be a non-spatial cause of a spatial configuration
of elements within the organism by a process of elimination.

fll6

EDWARD T. SMITH

Having decided against the normal operation of any mattercreating or motion-creating causality on the basis of the principles of the conservation of matter and of the conservation of
energy, Driesch proceeds to show by a series of three arguments
that what he calls " singular causality "-the influence of one
material system on another-does not account for the observable data in organisms.
First, no mechanical cause, either physical or chemical, can
account for the element of purposefulness exhibited in an organism when divided as an embryo. Thus a quarter of the
embryo of the sea-urchin, separated artificially, developed
normally although on a small scale. Obviously the parts of this
embryo are not determined by their nature to produce any one
part of the fully developed organism, because a part that
develops into one part in the case of the undivided embryo
develops into another in the case of the divided one. Nor can
this purposefulness be accounted for on the basis of external
causes, most of which are non-directional and the rest of which
are known to have no specifying influence in certain kinds of
embryonic development. Nor can there be any structural
forces, internal to the organism but external to the parts, accountable for the differentiation between what becomes of the
part in one case and what happens to it in another. If this
structure were purely physical, it would be destroyed by the
divisions; if chemical, its results. would be geometrically regular
like a crystal, and all parts having a similar composition would
be alike in structure. No spatial system, therefore, is capable
of accounting for the structure of the adult organism, hence
there must be a non-spatial cause. 84
Second, in a similar way the "complex-equipotential" system
of the ovary is made up of numerous cells, all descended from
the same parent cell or" Anlage." Moreover, each one of these
cells has basically the same potentiality as all of the others and
as the Anlage itself-the power of developing into a complete
organism. If, then, the livirig organism is a machine, it follows
••Ibid., pp. 88-106.

THE VITALISM

OF HANS DRIESCH

217

that the Anlage and its daughter cells are machines too, and if
this is true, the consequence is that a machine can be divided
indefinitely, and still retain its nature as the same machinean obvious impossibility. The only alternative is a non-spatial
cause different from. the spatial system itself. 85
Third, an analysis of stimulus-response reactions in the
learned (as opposed to instinctive) actions of animals also
reveals the difference between the animal and a machine. Even
if the examination is carried on from a behavioristic standpoint,
it remains true that the learned reactions to stimuli differ from
modifications in the behavior of a machine due to past stimuli
(e.g., in a phonograph) in the following particulars: that the
reaction of the machine thereafter is fixed and identical with
the stimulus that set up the new behavior pattern, whereas the
changed reaction of the animal is not necessarily identical with
the stimulus that set up the pattern but is governed by a
specific end of the animal's behavior, and at least the nature
of the response is entirely different from that_ of the stimulus.
Moreover, the animal responds to the stimulus as a whole,
whereas the reaction of the machine varies in exact accordance
with the variation of the parts of the stimulus. Thus it is obvious that these learned actions of animals differ essentially
from anything that is produced by a spatially organized system
(a machine), and must, by elimination, be caused by a nonspatial cause. 86
Insofar as a scientific proof of the differing natures of the
living and non-living is possible, Driesch's work is certainly
such a proof. However, no proof of the nature of a thing can
be based entirely upon experimental science, inasmuch as these
sciences deal solely with the interconnections of the observable.
If therefore a really apodictic proof of the non-mechanical
nature of the organism is to be achieved, it seems to me that
it depends upon a philosophic analysis of the machine, an
analysis that will reveal some facet of mechanical operation
that is completely incompatible with the behavior of living
85

Ibid., pp. 147-150.

86

Ibid., pp. !W2-!U4.

us

EDWARD T. SMITH

things. Obviously Driesch tries to perform just some such
analysis. Furthermore, if we are speaking of a purely physical
machine, i. e., one in which the differentiation between the
parts is solely a differentiation of position and shape, then
Driesch clearly succeeds in his analysis, for it is just such an
organization, e.g., in a printing press, that cannot be divided
without being destroyed. However, if the organization under
discussion be an organization of chemical substances, Driesch's
case is not quite so clear. The difference between the chemical
and the physical machine is this: that a shape, when it is divided, is no longer the same shape, but a chemical substance
can be divided into extremely small parts without altering its
nature or its basic activities. A division of the extension of a
thing certainly changes the extension, but it does not necessarily change anything else. Supposing, therefore, a polar
chemical organization within a living cell, it is conceivable that
very many divisions could take place along a certain axis without destroying the basic organization, and consequently without destroying the chemical machine. In this case, therefore,
Driesch supplies the lack of intelligible necessity with certain
observable consequences of chemical organizations within inanimate things, viz., that chemical organizations always have a
regular, geometrical form, as in crystals, and that parts with
chemically identical natures should have the same shape. Now
both of these consequences may seem highly probable to us,
and indeed it may be that in nature they are absolutely necessary, but their necessity is by no means obvious to us. Indeed,
in the second case, since the varying physical structures of
the organism are presumably produced by the interaction of
various chemicals within our presumed machine, varying interactions would tend to produce differing structures, even though
the basic chemical substance out of which the structures were
formed were the same. These observed differences may be
enough to force Driesch to conclude that the organism differs
from the physical and chemical machines found in inanimate
nature, but they are not enough to show that those differences

THE VITALISM

OF HANS DRIESCH

U9

are and must be essential. An indication they may be, even
a proof to the degree that scientific proof of the problem is
possible; but since certain of the impossibilities supposedly
resulting from· the hypothesis that the organism is a machine
are merely statements that spatial systems do not produce such
results, and not really demonstrations that they cannot, the
certainty produced by this proof is not of a philosophic level.
Pretty much the same shortcomings show up in Driesch's
third proof for the existence of an entelechy. It is quite obvious
that the behavior of animals in response to external stimuli
differs considerably from anything found in the non-living
world. It is equally clear that Driesch has with considerable
skill selected and pointed out some of the differences observable
between the two classes. Unfortunately it is not so obvious, at
least not from Driesch's analysis, that the differences discussed
by Driesch are of an essential nature. They are simply disparities of operation that do, de facto, exist between mechanical
and living beings. I do not say that a case could not be made
out that some of the differences mentioned by Driesch really
are essential; I think that this is particularly quite possible in
the case of the response on the part of the animal organism to
the wholeness of the stimulus. What I do say is that Driesch,
unhappily, does not make the essential character of the difference clear. The point of the reaction to the stimulus.on the
part of the organism is that from a purely mechanical point of
view, or from any material stand-point at all, this wholeness
does not even exist; the unity, e.g., of a sign, is a meaningful
unity and can only exist on an intentional level. What Driesch
succeeds in proving, consequently, is that animals act by means
of knowledge, a conclusion so obvious that even many materialists, like J. B. S. Haldane, admit its validity. 87 What Driesch
might do is to show that knowledge can in no way be considered
a mechanical or non-vital action. However Driesch himself
makes this approach impossible by what seems to be a purely
87

Cf. J. B. S. Haldane, Marxist Philosophy and the Sciences, pp. 158-154.

EDWARD T. SMITH

gratuitous assumption of the behavioristic methodology.BB From
a behavioristic viewpoint, it seems to me slightly inconsistent
of Driesch to bring into evidence a conscious unity while throwing out consciousness. In short, Driesch is once again working
on the periphery of an apodictic proof, dealing with truly
essential differences in behavior without showing why the disparity is really specific. Once again we might say that Driesch
really proves his point, but that the proof as it stands lacks
certainty.
THE NATURE OF THE ENTELECHY

In a way, Driesch's proof for the existence of the entelechy,
as well as his rather mechanistic view of the nature of material
reality, are responsible for the development of his views concerning the nature of the relation of entelechy to material organism and the nature of the entelechy itself. Of these conclusions, the most important are those having to do with the
nature of the entelechy considered in itself.
First of these conclusions is the unextended character of the
entelechy. This follows from the fact that a division of the
organism does not destroy the wholeness of the entelechy, as
such a division would do if the entelechy were extended.B9
Second, the entelechy is not dependent for its existence upon
any body. This Driesch proves indirectly by a reductio ad
absurdum. If the entelechy did not exist independently, then
the body would be the cause of the entelechy, and this would
in turn involve three results contrary to fact and reason:
a) The entelechy would be itself extended and hence
divisible. But this, as we have seen, is not true. 90
b) There would have to be a kind of" living subst3'nce"
to bear the entelechy. But the "living substance" turns
out to be simply· a mixture of highly complex but quite
obviously inanimate chemicals. 91
88 As we noticed before, Driesch is himself unable to resist the temptation
of
explaining how we are able to understand the behavioristic proof by smuggling in a
little introspective psychology. Cf. Science and Philosophy of the Organism, p. 204.
00 Ibid., p. 293.
89 Ibid., p. 293.
•1 Ibid., p.

THE VITALISM

OF HANS DRIESCH

221

c) The entelechy, as the result of a material thing,
would be material and subject to alteration by material
forces. This, however, is not true. 92
Pretty much the same objections are valid if we consider the
entelechy as the result of a constellation of elements-at any
rate the first and third impossibilities still hold.
As against the Aristotelian position that there must be some
sort of activity independent of matter before an existence independent of matter can be postulated, Driesch objects that
this principle is not universally true. The architect does not
depend for his existence upon bricks, though he could not act
if it were not for the existence of these same bricks. 93
Third, the entelechy is an" intensive manifold," since it produces a spatially complex result without being extended itself. 94
Fourth, it is not "located" in any one part of the body.
This is once again the result of its lack of extension. 95
Fifth, Driesch embraces a somewhat neo-Platonic view of
the unity of the entelechy. The impossibility of dividing the
entelechy when the organism reproduces, and the obvious fact
of unity in the universe lead Driesch to an assertion of a sort
of world-entelechy-a super-personal source of unity in the
universe. Again, the multiplicity of organisms and of levels of
function even within one and the same organism coax an admission of multiplicity of modes within this unified entelechy. 96
It takes Driesch the whole of a two-volume work to establish
his proofs of these points, and it seems a little presumptuous
to pass judgment on his conclusions in such a brief discussion.
I would like, so far as possible, to limit my comments to the
second point, the independence of the entelechy.
One point that immediately strikes us in connection with
Driesch's discussion on this subject is a peculiarity in his idea
of substance. His speaking of the impossibility of buying lionsubstance, as distinct from the composite that is lion-meat, in
•• Ibid., p. 298.
••Ibid., p. 296.
"'Ibid., pp. 245-247.

••Ibid., p. 299.
••Ibid., pp. 881-882.

EDWARD T. SMITH

the market place manifests an underlying supposition that the
unified substance must be qualitatively homogeneous. Within
a particular philosophic system such an assumption might be
consistent, e.g., within the mechanistic system where qualities
are regarded as functions of extension. To make this assumption even within that system, however, is to assume that we
know the nature of the substance before we know the nature of
its effects, a supposition that is contrary to all of our experience.
The one conclusion that can be reasoned to with certainty concerning substance is that it exists in itself, and the one substance of which we have a direct experience is not qualitatively
homogeneous in either its spatial or its temporal extension. A
philosophy that makes any such presuppositions about the
nature of reality does not wait for the evidence to decide
whether or not there is a difference between the physical organism and the substances of the inanimate realm, the question
is prejudged in the principle. For either substance is homogeneous and thus quite dead, or else the organized body is not
a substance and can be only a machine. The question in that
case is not, " Is this organism a machine? " but, " Where did
this organic machine come from? " And even this question presents an already settled pair of alternatives, for the ontological
emptiness of the machine as such is bound eventually to drive
causal explanations of such systems back to some non-spatial
cause. The same relentless logic that so often drives a basically
mechanical philosophy into idealism is operative here too.
In a way the same basic supposition is visible in Driesch's
arguments that if the entelechy were dependent for its existence
upon the body, it would be material and extended, a result
that is impossible on the basis of his experiments. Here the
immediate difficulty seems to be in a univocal use of the terms
" material " and " extenaed," ·as being synonyms for the word
"body." Hence when Driesch says the entelechy cannot be
material or extended, he means that the entelechy cannot be a
body like the body it produces. It is not perfectly obvious that
we should use these words only in the restricted sense. We
might easily refer to the art of a painter as being a material

THE VITALISM

OF HANS DRIESCH

extended art, not only insofar as the painter is an extended
thing, but insofar as the exercise of the skill involves the use of
severally spatially separated parts of the body. It would be
ridiculous, however, to talk of the skill itself as a body that
inhabits the body of the painter, or to say that if we guillotine
the painter we chop off a piece of his art at the same time. The
art is material and extended because it depends on the existence
of a material man, but not because it is itself a body of determinate size and shape. Similarly the art is divided when it is
possessed by several painters, although there is no way of
drawing a diagram of how the art is to be cut up when it is
apportioned among the many artists. The art in this case would
be said by Aristotle to be material and extended and divisible
accidentally, as opposed to the body of the painter which is
said to have these characteristics by its very nature. 20
Such an alternative seems not even to have occurred to
Driesch, and it is worth while seeing why. The argument he
gives is that an effect produced by the body must be of the
same nature as the body, hence material, extended, divisible in
precisely the same way as the body is itself. Clearly it is true
of the efficient cause that it cannot produce a being of a higher
order than itself, and it seems to be this fact that leads Driesch
astray. For as we have already seen, Driesch in his preliminary treatment of causality analyzes only extrinsic causality.
Consequently the sort of accidental materiality that might arise
in a being from dependence on a cause that remains in the
effect (in this case, from a material cause) could not possibly
occur to Driesch in view of his somewhat truncated view of
causality. And this abbreviated outlook on the possibilities of
dependence in existence might be traced (though Driesch himself does not derive the thought through these channels) to his
mechanistic basic outlook, an outlook that begins by searching
for being and action in something outside of the being and
agent.
Digressing a moment from the nature of the entelechy as it
••Aristotle, Physics, II, ch. 8, 195a 84-86.

EDWARD T. SMITH

is related to individual entelechies, we can notice a similar bias
arising in Driesch's opinion concerning the universal entelechy.
In some fashion this affirmation of a universal entelechy is
merely a recognition of the fact that the presence of unity and
determinate action in a world marked by potentiality and imperfection demands the presence of an efficient cause, actual
and perfect, distinct from the corporeal world. But Driesch
carries the argument to the point of identifying the unity of this
physical universe with that of the immaterial cause, of reducing
the actions of material beings to the actions of the entelechy.
In this way, Dreisch robs the whole material world of any claim
to agency, to intelligibility, and eventually to being. 98 At least
we might say that Driesch so pilfers reality from the corporeal
world in his conclusions were it not for the fact that the mechanism assumed for practical purposes by the physical scientist
implies, in its philosophical form as a first principle, the ontal
vacuity of matter that is reflected in such a philosophy's conclusions.
To return to our discussion of the entelechy of the organism,
we have seen that Driesch's argument for its independence is a
negative one that suffers from the fact that it overlooks one of
the possible alternatives; however, the question still arises as
to whether or not the conclusion is correct, even if the argument
is not wholly adequate to establish that correctness. The dialectic behind Aristotle's position that the existential status of
a being is reflected in its operational independence would be a
needless digression here. 99 Actually the truth of the principle is
based on a state of affairs recognized by Driesch himself: the
fact that whatever is in the cause can be reflected in the effect,
but that nothing else besides what is actually present in the
cause can appear in the effect. The principle does not claim
that every action of an independently existing being will be
independent, but simply that some of them are, and that it is
by means of the independent acts that we can know about the
••This fact is even recognized by some of Driesch's fellow vitalists. Cf. J. Arthur
Thomson, The System of Animate Nature (N. Y.: Henry Holt,
p. 170.
••For this proof, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, De Anima, art. 13.

THE VITALISM

OF HANS DRIESCH

225

independent existence. In Driesch's own example of the architect whose activity depends on bricks, but whose existence
does not, it is quite clear that the architect is a complex being
who has certain activities that have nothing whatever to do
with bricks, and even has certain activities as an architect that
do not involve the aotual, as opposed to the intentional existence of bricks. If it were not for the existence on either the intentional or actual level of some sort of building materials, the
existence of the architect qua architect would be impossible.
Furthermore the only way that Driesch knows that the architect goes on existing with or without bricks is that the man
goes on acting with or without them.
Applied to the problem of the organism this principle insists
that not merely the effect but the operation by which the effect
is produced is material, insofar as the operation involves the
transportation and qualitative change in food and the spatial
disposition of the qualitatively differing parts. There is simply
no activity in the case of most living things that bears witness
to an independent existence of an entelechy different from the
organism itself.
It is possible to make out a case for the immateriality of
thought as an operation,1°0 although it is not within the compass
of the present treatment to do so. On this supposition, however, Aristotle points out that the soul that possesses such an
activity is separable from the body. Even on this basis, it is
simply impossible to account for men as spiritual beings that
happen to be related to a body as its efficient cause. Even if it
were not for the fact that certain operations that belong to the
ego are operations that involve the body (i. e., the sensitive
powers), it would still be the case that the union between an
independently existing soul and its machine-like body would be
contrary to the proper order of being. St. Thomas Aquinas
says: 101
100
101

Aristotle, De Anima, III, ch. 4, 429a!M.
De Anima, art. 1, trans. by Dr. John Rowan.

EDWARD T. SMITH

This position is untenable .... Inasmuch as the human soul has
an operation transcending the material order its act of existing
transcends the body and does not depend on the body. But inasmuch as the soul is naturally capable of acquiring immaterial
knowledge from material things, evidently its species can be complete only when it is united to a body. For a thing's species is
complete only if it has the things necessary for the proper operation
of its species.
St. Thomas explains this necessity of the body for the sake
of knowledge more fully in another passage dealing with the
Platonic theory of knowledge: 102
Now according to this theory, it appears that no explanation can
be offered as to why the soul is united to the body. For (if the
body does not contribute to the knowledge of the soul) this union
is not for the sake of the soul, because the soul when it is not united
to the body can still exercise its own proper operation, whereas its
proper operation is impeded by its union with the body. Similarly,
according to this view, it cannot be argued that the union of soul
and body exists for the sake of the body, for the soul does not exist
for the sake of the body, but rather the body for the soul, because
the soul is nobler than the body.
The question of the living substance, therefore, eventually
Jepends upon the being that is the final end of the agent's
action, in the sense of that for the benefit of which the agent
acts, since that end is the agent itself. In the case of those
living things that manifest the vegetative and sensitive operations only, the beneficiary is obviously the organism as a material being. On the supposition that the immaterial mind has
an end that is not the end of a material thing, the " entelechy "
or soul of an intelligent being could be considered as an independent agent, but de facto in the case of the material intelligent beings of our experience, i. e., human beings, it is necessary
for them to operate as material beings in order to attain the
immaterial end that is the completion of their nature.
Nevertheless, it remains true that if there is any validity in
the arguments for an entelechy or soul distinct from the spatial
102

De Anima, art. 15. Clause in parenthesis ia mine.

THE VITALISM

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227

arrangement of parts within the material organism, that life
principle is the actuality in virtue of which the organism is able
to act. In this sense, the entelechy is the efficient cause of the
living operations, and is even the efficient cause of the developed organism itself, insofar as the mature body is the result
of those vital activities. There is not, therefore, so much a
question of disagreeing with Driesch, at least with regard to
the positive results he has come to, as there is a problem of
seeing how he could have arrived at those results without seeing
that the further implications of the scientific approach itself
point in the direction of the Aristotelian solution. The biological science sets out to study the nature of the organism as
a given fact in the material world; Driesch's vitalism in the
long run abdicates this task in favor of studying the activities
of a being of another order entirely. Yet it seems to me that it
is perhaps the fault of the science itself that this result comes
about, for by dealing with the activities of the organism on a
phenomenal level and only in their interconnections with other
phenomena, by explaining those operations in terms of causes
that are extrinsic and not intrinsic, the biological science, like
all its experimental brothers, tends to breed a philosophic forgetfulness that there is more than one type of dependence, and
that a causal interaction may be mutual rather than simply
one-sided.
EDWARD

De Paul Univll'l'sity
Chicago, Illinois

T. SMITH

THE STRUCTURE OF THE CONCEPT

S

INCE Locke wrote his Essay Concerning Human Understanding philosophers have struggled with the problem of
conceptual structure. Does the concept have a structure?
And if it does what are the parts involved and how are they
derived? What is the cause of their union in knowledge, and
the plan according to which they combine? To resolve these
questions is to determine the limits of human knowledge and
the extent to which it attains the real.
Locke was led to pose the problem by a suggestion of Descartes: "The second (rule) was to divide each of the difficulties which I examined into as many small parts as possible and
as would be required the better to resolve them." 1 A problem
may be looked upon as a whole containing many parts. The
first step toward its solution is the division of the whole into
its parts. Once these elements of the problem are known the
whole can be understood by reconstruction. The whole is intelligible in the architecture of the parts.
If division is taken in the logical sense, the resolution into
genus and species, then this suggestion cannot be considered a
new idea. Philosophers had, from time immemorial, known and
used it. Classical logic had fully unfolded its nature and function. But Descartes did not have this logical division in mind.
He intended to translate into the framework of philosophical
thought the methodical division of mathematical analysis., The
geometrician sometimes proves a property of a figure in virtue
of the knowledge of its essence. This supposes the division of
the figure into genus and species to form the definition. But
the analytical geometrician (to whose method of procedure
Descartes contributed the fundamental concept) begins by
dividing the figure into quantitative parts and then proceeds
to define the object as the sum of those parts. A curved line
1

Discourse On Method, Part Two.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE CONCEPT

229

may be considered in its genus and species, or it may be divided
up into indefinitely many small parts whose addition reconstitutes the original figure. It was this second method of proceeding which Descartes proposed for philosophy. He wished
to resolve the object of philosophical thought not into genus
and species but into " integral components."
The analogy between the method of geometrical analysis
and the philosopher's way of division was vague in the thought
of Descartes. He did not advance it substantially beyond the
initial intuition nor purify it of its mathematical point of origin.
But it was sufficiently suggestive to the mind of Locke to lead
him to apply it to the problem of the concept.

*

*

*

It occurred to Locke that no thinker of the past had applied
Cartesian analysis to human concepts. Philosophers had always
divided the concept into genus and species as a prelude to
definition. And from the definition of the object they had proceeded to deduce its properties. But they had never thought
to dismember the concept in the image of the geometrician
dividing the mathematical figure thereby the better to know it.
The undivided ·figure is a puzzle to his mind. But when he has
reduced it to 'its fundamental parts and rebuilt it out of them,
it is totally intelligible to him in their relations. Just as the
intricate works of a watch are a mystery to the layman until he
has taken it apart and successfully reconstructed it, so it is
with all intued wholes. So it may very well be with concepts.
Locke, just as Descartes before him, was acutely aware of the
vast confusion of contradictory philosophical opinions. It now
seemed to him that their resolution might fundamentally hinge
upon the application of this new analysis to conception.
If we approach this problem with Locke's conviction that
conception has a structure we are naturally led to seek confirmation of our belief in the finding of likely parts. This is not
a difficult task. For the qualities of external things presented to
us by our senses seem clearly to act as the passive elements of
combination and the relations of the mind seem to play the role

230

KEVIN A. WALL

of the principle of union. This initial solution (an intuitive
one) is both suggestive and fruitful. It suggests that all of our
concepts, if properly dissected, reveal a union of sensible elements through mental relations. And the endeavor to analyze
particular concepts-the fundamental notions of substance,
cause and effect and the rest-meets with success confirming
the primary intuition. In the Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke endeavored to analyze these fundamental concepts of human thought and found in all of them the anticipated
structure. Nowhere was there conflict with the initial intuition
of conceptual composition. He concluded, then, that he had
made a fundamental discovery. From that time forward it
would be possible to dismantle the scaffolding of human science,
as a watchmaker takes apart a clock, and consciously to reconstruct it. Philosophers would thereby have a tool of incalculable worth and a method of procedure which would stimulate
creative speculation.
For I thought that the first step towards satisfying several inquiries
the mind of man was very apt to run into was to take a survey of
our own understanding, examine our powers, and see to what things
they were adapted. Till that was done, I suspected we began at
the wrong end .... 2

Once this analysis has been achieved, there must be the subsequent process of reconstruction, rebuilding the complexity of
rational thought out of the elements of sensible qualities.
Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we may say, white paper,
void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be
furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy
and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from experience; in that is
all our knowledge founded, and from that it ultimately derives
itself. 3

By this process it seemed to Locke that human knowledge
could be completely defined and its limits clearly determined.
•Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book I, chap. I, Introduction.
3 Ibid., Book II, chap. I.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE CONCEPT

231

But not everyone agreed. For there were philosophers who
found the presuppositions of the method of Locke fallacious.
Human knowledge could not be divided in the way that Locke
proposed and consequently his pretensions were vain. Knowing
is a vital operation which, like every living thing, if divided into
parts, is destroyed. A line may be divided into segments and
then reunited to restore the original whole. But if a plant be
resolved into its chemical components no combination of those
elements will bring back the living whole. So it is with thought.
For in breaking it down into parts, as Locke pretended to do,
it is destroyed. The living thought is more than the combination of the components which issue from the intentional analysis. The most that we can conclude of a plant after breaking it
down into elements is that it is such an organism as to yield
the discovered components upon application of the specific
analytical method. We cannot pretend adequately to define the
original in terms of the quantitative addition of the residual
parts. The most we can conclude of human conception, after
applying the analysis of Locke, is that it is such an object of
thought as to yield the elements which he discovered. We
cannot conclude that it is essentially no more than the additive
integration of those elements. It is therefore impossible to reconstruct the original content in terms of the discovered parts
or adequately to define the original in function of the parts.
Serious as this objection undoubtedly is, it is clear that it
concerns not the general possibility of applying an analysis to
thought but the interpretation of the results of a particular
method. It objects to definition of conception in terms of
elements discovered by segmentation. The objection would dissolve if it were possible to discover a method of analysis by
which the unity of consciousness would yield the secret of its
inner composition without the need of segmentation. In such
an analysis the structure would reveal itself without destroying
itself. The purposes of Locke would be achieved without the
limitations of his method. Kant thought that he had found
the necessary way in his" transcendental analysis."
In his novel approach to this problem Kant did not attempt

KEVIN A. WALL

to separate the object into " integral parts " but rather to
isolate the elements by a sort of indirect abstraction. He did
not pretend that at the end of the division the parts would
subsist as isolated objects of contemplation. On the contrary, he
concluded that the parts could not truly exist in a state of
separation. The elements of the combination would then lack
objective character and the principles of the unity of consciousness would have no content. But nevertheless, he maintained
that they could be detected by their effect upon the conscious
whole. To see them through the visible effects is effectively to
separate them in the mind without damaging the living unity
of the concept. In the light of this discovery Kant tried to
achieve the goal which Locke had proposed: to take a survey
of understanding, examine the powers of the human mind and
see to what things it was adapted, to determine to what extent
it assimilates the real.

*

*

*

When one considers the energy expended on this problem
by men of great intelligence, and the predominant position it
has occupied through all of modern thought, it seems a hardy
thing to reject it all as futile. Can it be that so many minds
of such clearly outstanding intelligence could have labored in
vain? Do we render this world of thought sufficient justice in
simply pointing out its obvious defects? Is there not, perhaps,
a more positive approach from the interior of the doctrine of
the Schools itself by which a reason can be given for these
speculations of the modern mind and the results which have
followed from them? Many cogent reasons impel the mind to
make a deeper search in this direction.
There is this, first of all, to consider: within the limited range
of the data involved the theories of Locke and Kant have a
certain verisimilitude. By that I mean that there is an appearance of compounding in conception such that sensation presents
the matter for the relations of the intellect. However inadequate this might be for a final decision concerning the nature
of conception its apparent justice within the boundaries of the

THE STRUCTURE OF THE CONCEPT

233

problem as Kant and Locke posed it is in need of explanation.
How can these theories at all seem right and command the adherence of intellects of the first order if they are totally wrong?
This is surely a question which we must answer from within the
framework of Thomistic thought.
Nothing, of course, is more distasteful to coherent thought
than a debilitating eclecticism which juxtaposes doctrines without any organic principle of union. We cannot seek to answer
the problem of modern thought by so combining the more
recent speculations with the doctrine of the Angel of the Schools.
We cannot conceive of St. Thomas as simply approaching the
subject from a different point of view so that his doctrine forms
another aspect of the total truth. The doctrines are in contradiction. Philosophy does not grow, as does mathematics, by
pushing back indefinitely the genus of the subject, taking an
ever broader but not contradictory view, but rather it goes to
the.ultimate subject immediately. In the fundamentals, it cannot expand by generalization for divergency of opinion on
fundamentals is irresolvable contradiction. Whatever reconciliation is to be made must be produced in the heart of a
system. The doctrine of St. Thomas must from its own inner
resources render reason for the speculations of the modern mind.
There is an interesting analogy from the methodology of
mathematical physics which advances this thought. In the investigations of experimental science one sometimes induces an
equation which, within the limits of the tests, closely approximates the quantitative facts of the object of the experiment.
The equation is then tentatively posed as universally valid for
the object even beyond the boundaries of the test. Subsequent
investigations in the more extended field reveal that there the
equation does not hold exactly. It is then so modified as to
yield the same results within the original field and conform
closely to the newly observed phenomena. For example, the
equations of Newtonian dynamics were derived from observation of macroscopic bodies moving at a slow speed relative to
the speed of light. It was found, at the advent of atomic and
subatomic physics in more-recent times, that the simple appli-

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KEVIN A. WALL

cation of these rules without any modification would not accurately predict the movements of atomic particles moving near
the speed of light. The equations were then so modified as to
break down into the equations of Newton, under the conditions
of his observations, but accurately to predict the movements
of atomic particles under the conditions of great speed and
energy. The modified equations constitute the theory of relativity of Einstein.
By analogy, then, we might say that the theories of Locke
and Kant closely approximate the appearances within the range
of observations from which they arise. But, beyond that field,
they are inaccurate and must be replaced by a theory which
corrects their defects. The full and correct theory of the concept, then, would be such a theory as to yield the results of
Locke and Kant within the restricted field of their data but
at the same time yield the results of Thomistic thought in the
completely expanded field. It would offer a cogent explanation
of why the modern speculations, though fundamentally defective, seem at all to meet the demands of truth. Of course,
the analogy limps and it is not possible to make a simple
transfer of mathematico-physical notions into the realm of
metaphysical speculations. But it is suggestive even in its lack
of precision. Let us follow up the idea by tentatively developing a general theory of the structure of the concept.

*

*

*

The concept, according to the postulates of our procedure,
must be such as to verify the tenets of Thomistic thought completely. It must conform to a moderate realism and must not
be a product of the thinking mind but of the world outside.
Moreover it must be such as submitted to the methods of
analysis of Locke and Kant to reveal a structure, not to be a
simple intentional content. Let us proceed, as in mathematical
physics, from the restricted case outward.
The theory of Locke states that conception is a compound
of sensation and relations added by the thinking mind. The
world, as presented to us by the senses, is a complex amalgam

THE STRUCTURE

OF THE CONCEPT

235

of multiple qualities. The mind, in bringing this vastness under
the order of reason, removes the sensible qualities from the
chaos of sense presentation by relating them in the unity of one
consciousness so that they form an intelligible unity in reason.
Such a process of binding together the manifold of sensation
in the unity of rational consciousness is radically subjective.
The relating is not something of the world, but rather of the
thinker. The combination of the external qualities and the
relating .activity of the thinker results in the ordered cosmos
which we call nature.
Now it is clear that there is an appearance of verisimilitude
in this position. It is the intellect which seizes upon the relations of things, not the senses. Reason is distinguished ,from
sensation by the fact that it apprehends relations. Relations,
then, seem to be the peculiar contribution of intellection to
knowledge. And the totality of knowledge seems to be an integration of sensation, and the relations so contributed by the
mind.
Moreover, proceeding according to the more sophisticated
theory of Kant, it would seem that knowledge properly consists
in the unification of the manifold of sense qualities by the categories of the intellectual order. Sensation, organized by the
sensible forms of space and time, acts as a matter for the application of the a priori forms of the understanding. A remarkably detailed correlation can be found between the sensible
matter, the possibilities of combination on the intellectual level,
and the factual distinctions of human conceptions. All of these
appearances confirm the initial intuition that Locke proposed.
But there is also a serious defect. Both theories, which are substantially the same, proceeding as they do from a common
inspiration and tending to a common goal, reject the objectivity of the intellectual relating act. This is a consistent
inference in the writings of Locke and a clearly stated conviction in the writings of Kant. The modified theory must begin
by correcting this point. Let us say, then, that the relationprinciple is not, as they suppose, something from the mind but
something derived from the external world. The relations exist

KEVIN A. WALL

in reality and are received into the mind from the world just
as are the sense qualities. This correction moves the theory
closer to an acceptable Thomist position. But we must be
careful to see that it still maintains the analytical results of
the investigations of Locke and Kant.

*

*

*

It is clear that there is one interpretation of the situation
which will not meet this requirement. If we conceive the mind
to apprehend terms and relations a pari (that is to say, that
some of the objects perceived are non-relational and some are
relational and that there is no priority or order in this perception)-; then the analytical methods of Locke and Kant will yield
the anticipated results in their application to the relational
contents but not in their application to the non-relational
contents. In the latter case it will not be possible to find a
structure. This would be contracy to the position of Locke and
Kant according to which all of the basic concepts of thought
reveal structure.
But there is another interpretation which avoids this difficulty. Let us suppose that the mind perceives first of all rela.tions and through them related things. This is not to pretend
to a grasp of the relational without the related terms, but
merely to affirm that the apprehension of relation is prior in
. nature, that the term is apprehended only qua term, qua related. Then, because of this priority, relation and the relational
structure will run through all of thought and every concept of
the mind will be found to have an analyzable structure. If we
posit this interpretation, then we meet the demands of moderate
realism since the relations are supposed to be basically real.
And we meet the analytical requirements of the investigations
of Locke and Kant. Because of the basically relational constitution of human thought it will always reveal the presence
of parts to the searching mind.
Moreover, this corrected theory seems to offer an intuitive
explanation of two serious difficulties for modern thinkers: the
universality of conceptions and the reality of the categories of

THE STRUCTURE OF THE CONCEPT

Aristotelian logic. With respect to the universality of concepts:
there is something peculiar about the relational which separates
it from other modes of being, and ties it to the property of
universality. Of all modes of existence it seems most strangely
to escape the limitation of singularity. It is not an absolute
modification of the receiving subject but projects it outside of
itself to what is other. In this intuitive sense it seems to escape
from the singularity of both of the terms it binds and recede
into the non-individualized or universal, and thus, taking relation as the heart of conception, to render an explanation for
the universality of human conception.
The same position seems intuitively to meet the demand of
justifying the system of the categories. For it is only a basically relational concept that can be organized and arranged in
classes. The relations form the cement and the links in the
network of conception. This would explain why nature takes
on a static quality in human conception as opposed to its
dynamic quality in the external reality. It is not because conception falsifies nature or fails to attain the external reality
but because the world, as it enters the human mind, takes on
the properties and characteristics of that part of reality which
is first apprehension.
It would seem, therefore, that the position of relation as
fundamental in hu.man thought, in the way we have just explained, meets the appearances as postulated for an expanded
theory of the concept. So constructed it would meet the requirements of the theories of Locke and Kant, rendering a
reason for the results of their analyses. It would also satisfy
the requirements of moderate realism essential to Thomistic
doctrine. Of course, this mode of argumentation is merely a
first approximation (as the mathematician would say) but
it suggests that the intuitive hypothesis may rest on solidly
scientific grounds. To establish this last possibility we are in
need of a convincing argument beyond the intuitional level.
This is had by a consideration of the essence of human conception as ordered to judgment.
The judgment is basically the attribution of a predicate to
c

238

KEVIN A. WALL

a subject. When we say: A is B, we attribute the predicate
conception B to the subject conception A. Now the fact of
this attribution, if investigated as to its nature and possibility,
indicates that both A and B (the symbolic representation of
any concept whatsoever) have structure. For the judgment
affirms that A is B, that is to say, that A and B are identical.
But it also affirms, by the fact that there is a judgment at all,
that A and B are different. If A and B are not identical then
the judgment is impossible. It does not simply relate two distinct entities but poses them as identical, so that any relation
besides that of identity excludes the judgment. If A and B are
not different, on the other hand, then the judgment is likewise
impossible or at least futile by reason of tautology. All that can
be known of an object, is such a case, is sufficiently achieved in
one simple conception of it. It therefore follows, from the
nature of the judgment, that A and B are both identical and
different. How is such a situation possible?
Clearly A and B can be both identical and different only if
they possess composition and a structure. They must necessarily be composed of fundamental parts. In virtue of one part
possessed in common, they are identical. In virtue of another
part different in both, they are distinct one from the other.
The judgment affirms the identity of A and B in virtue of the
intued common part, and poses their distinction in virtue of
the intued divergent parts.
That this is necessarily true is brought out by considering
another possible position. A and B are simple contents. If this
be the case, and they are identified in any way, as is essential to
the judgment, then they are totally identified and the judgment is pure tautology. It becomes a useless act of the mind.
In this case, all human knowledge, as the divine or the angelic,
would reduce to the simplicity of fundamentally one conception.
Moreover, if it be true that A and B are " simple " contents,
lacking structure, and that they are different, then it follows
that they totally differ one from the other and can in no way be
identified. One might perhaps say that A and B are simple
totally different mental contents, whose identification in reality

THE STRUCTURE

OF THE CONCEPT

289

is affirmed in the judgment by reason of a super-conceptual
apprehension of such identification. Thus the identity of A and
B would not be perceived in the contents of these concepts, or
in any act of conception, but would be a peculiarity of the act
of judging itself. The act of judgment would have the property
of reaching out beyond the simplicity of A and B to the reality
in which they are found united. Thus there would be no need
to postulate a structure in either concept in order to explain
the judgment. But, this position implicitly gives back to the
concepts what it intends to remove from them. For it affirms
that the concepts as such are not sufficient for posing an act
of judgment but that the judgment must reach beyond them
to apprehend their convergence upon one identical reality. Only
when this identical element is added to them do they enter into
judgment. But once it is added then they are no longer simple
but rather constructed contents. The elaborate circumvention
of the argument is futile. We are forced again to the conclusion
that the judgment postulates the existence of structure in the
subject and predicate conceptions.
One might say: A and B are essentially simple contents, but
accidentally structured. This structure, which is added over
and above the heart of the conceptions, is the basis of the
judgment. But this again would be entirely unacceptable.
Human knowledge, in such a position, would be essentially
intuitive, conceptual and simple. In this case, it would be difficult to explain what is added over and above the essential
knowledge by the accidental. Moreover, as is theoretically
necessary for intuitive intellectual knowledge, the intuition is
basically one. It would be impossible to explain the multiplicity of conception around one identical object in such a
supposition. Clearly, then, all of these positions, which deny
structure to human concepts, lead to disagreement with the
observed facts of human thought. It is necessary, therefore, to
hold that human concepts are fundamentally structured.

*
8

*

*

240

KEVIN A. WALL

The medium involved in the foregoing argument is essentially logical. The same conclusion can be reached by a psychological argument. It is a basic tenet of philosophy that all
knowledge arises in the senses. This knowledge, basic and rudimentary, is completed by the knowledge of the intellect which
is coordinated with it. We thus have two orders of knowledge,
specifically distinct, but so focused on one object as to form one
unified consciousness. Is this situation possible in the supposition of the simplicity of the concept? Clearly it is not, for in
order that there be objective unity in the combined acts of
knowledge there must be some form of objective contact which
is not possible in the case of two intuitive acts of knowing
specifically distinct.
Let us suppose that the act of intellection is intuitive and
simple, as well as the act of the sensation, and endeavor to explain the fact of their coordination. The unity of consciousness
might be explained by some common formality in the objective
content of both orders of knowing by means of which the two
would fuse; But this is not possible for the specifically distinct
orders of sensation and intellection. Such a position would reduce the intellect to a sort of inner sense reflecting upon the
external senses and forming one sensible " consciousness " with
them in virtue of the common formal object of sensibility.
It is possible that the intellect be intuitive, as are the senses,
and that it have, nevertheless, the same object as the latter.
But fn this case it could not form one objective unity with them.
The situation would be analogous to that which obtains between the divine and the human knowledge of Christ. They
may focus upon the same object, but they do not form one
consciousness. The principle of integration is outside the realm
of the intentional in the real order of the supposit. So it would
be in the case of intuitive human knowledge on the conceptual
level combining with sensible knowledge. The principle of union
would lie outside of the intentional in the real-in the supposit.
There would be two flows of " consciousness." It would be
impossible, then, to explain the teleology of body and soul, the
purpose of the union of an intellectual nature to a body. For

THE STRUCTURE OF THE CONCEPT

241

in such a situation the knowledge of the intellect would in no
way depend upon the knowledge of the senses.
To explain, therefore, the coordination and dependence of
these two orders .of knowledge it is necessary to pose structure
in the concept. In order that the two may form the unity of
one objective consciousn.ess it is necessary that one be simple
and the other composed, that one be intuitional and the other
relational. The intuitive knowledge presents the terms and the
relational knowledge combines them in one concept. It is here
that we find the point of contact and dependence. Sensation
presents the terms and the intellect unites them in a relational
concept. It is for this reason that the intellect, though specifically distinct from the senses, depends upon them and forms
one unified consciousness with them. It is for this reason, too,
that the intellect, even though in possession of the species by
means of which it knows, nevertheless can never pose an objective content without " conversion to the phantasm." Without
the terminal content supplied by the senses, there is no object
for the relational apprehension of the intellect. So, from a
psychological point of view, we are led back to the same conclusion. The reason for the appearance of validity in the speculations of the moderns on conception is to be found in the fact
that concepts have a structure. Any discussion of the properties of conception leads back ultimately to this basic truth.
Perhaps the most lasting contribution of modern thought to
the perennial philosophy will turn out to be just this: there is
an architecture in human conception whose investigation is
fundamental to the understanding of the great edifices erected
by the human mind.

KEvm A. WALL, O.P.
St. Albert's College
Oakland, Calif.

ST. THOMAS ON THE NATURE OF
SACRAMENTAL GRACE
(Concluded)

II
SACRAMENTAL

X

GRACE IN RELATION
AND MATERIAL

TO ITS FINAL

CAUSES

NY treatment of sacramental grace which would leave
out of consideration its final causality or the causa
causarum cannot give us a conclusive and definitive

idea of its nature. Indeed it is precisely from this that we must
arrive at our definition of sacramental grace. For by knowing
the effects of the sacraments, or of the sacramental graces, we
can deduce with an equal amount of certitude the nature of
their cause. 1
In the fifth article of question sixty-two, and in the first
article of the sixty-fifth question St. Thomas discusses the overall effects of the sacraments, and the res sacramenti of each of
the individual sacraments respectively .. It is, then, from these
two sources that we shall try to arrive at not only the same
notion of sacramental grace that we deducted from the efficient
causality of the sacramental rite, but also at some understanding of the special effect, or the quoddam divinum awxilium
which is given through it.
In treating the question of whether the sacraments of the
New Law receive their power from the Passion of Christ St.
Thomas, after re-affirming the conclusion of the article that we
have just seen, distinguishes between an instrument which is
joined or linked to its principal cause, and an instrument which
is separated from it. The Sacred Humanity of Our Lord is
1

Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., De Unione Sacerdotis cum Christo Sacerdote d
Rome, 1948), p. 18.

·Victima (Marietti:

ST. THOMAS ON NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL

GRACE

248

considered to be the instrumental cause joined to the principal
cause, Who is, of course, God, while the sacrament is the instrumental cause separated from the principal cause. Since the
separated instrumental cause is moved by the non-separated
instrumental cause, St. Thomas concludes that the " healthbringing ·power which the sacraments give is derived from the
divinity of Christ through the sacraments." And then he
concludes:
Sacramental grace, however, seems to be ordained especially to two
things: that is to say, to remove the defects of past sins insofar as
they are past as far as their commission goes, but present as far as
their guilt goes (remanent reatu). Secondly, it is ordained to
perfect the soul in those things which pertain to the cult of God,
in accordance with the religion of the Christian life. It is clear from
what we have said above, that Christ freed us from our sins especially through His Passion, which was not only an efficient and meritorious cause, but also a satisfactory cause (of this liberation).
Likewise through His Passion He also initiated the rite of the
Christian religion, offering Himself as an oblation and as a Victim
to God .... Whence it is evident that the sacraments of the
Church in a special manner have their power from the Passion of
Christ; this power is joined to us in a certain manner through the
reception of the sacraments. 2

The finality of the grace of the sacraments is presented to us
quite clearly. The res sacramenti is given to us with an eye to
bringing about two things. Both of them have been touched
upon in the article that we have seen, but they are brought out
here much more clearly. Nevertheless a complete understanding of them will necessarily involve having recourse to other
questions either in the tract on the sacraments or elsewhere.
§1

The Remedial Aspect of Sacramental Grace
In the Sentences the sacramental theology of St. Thomas
seemed to be concentrated on this aspect of sacramental grace;
not that the positive aspect is not there, but the emphasis on
• Summa Theol., IlI, q. 6!l, a. 5, c.

244

CHARLES A. SCHLECK

the remedial aspect of the sacraments, and the grace it brings,
is much more pronounced. The Christian life was for him
essentially a redeemed life, or redemptive, and for this reason
we find the emphasis on the sanans, or the healing effect of
sacramental grace. He still retains this notion, and very much
so, in the Summa, but he also brings out much more clearly
the elevating nature of sacramental grace, which we shall see
later on.
The remedial aspect of the grace of the sacraments, is contained in the expression " ad tollendos def ectus praeteritorum
peccatorum, inquantum transeunt actu et remanent reatu," and
also in the insistence of St. Thomas on the fact that the Passion
of Christ not only effectively and meritoriously liberated us
from sin, but also satisfactorily. These are two ideas which he
plays against one another, so to speak, in the present article.
In the Prima Secundae, in listing the effects of original sin, we
find that they are three: the corruption of the " bonum
naturae," the " macula " of the soul, or the loss of its beauty
or splendor, and thirdly, the obligation to undergo punishment,
or the "reatus poenae." 3
In the present article we have seen that St. Thomas speaks
of sin as being past as far as its comission goes, but as remaining as far as its " reatus " or guilt goes. It involves the payment
of a debt that we have contracted by having offended God, or
the satisfying of the justice of God by some difficult work
spontaneously taken up for a fault, or which is borne patiently
as coming from God. 4 In the present article St. Thomas opposes
to this term the notion of satisfaction, thereby explicitly relating this remedial notion to the role of satisfaction contained
in the Passion of Christ. We might say, then, that the remedial
role of sacramental grace corresponds to the role of satisfaction
which the Passion of Our Lord played in the divine plan of
redemption. 5
•Ibid., I-Il, q. 85, Introduction.
•Ibid., q. 87, a. 6, c.
6 Ill, q. 6!l, a. 5, c: cf. Charles Crowley, 0. P., "The Role of Sacramental Grace
in the Christian Life," The Thomist (1941) Il, 5!l0.

ST. THOMAS ON NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL

GRACE

M5

The Angelic Doctor tells us that it was necessary for the
liberation of the human race from sin that someone make satisfaction to the one offended, and that this someone be both man,
and therefore capable of satisfaction, and God, or as he says,
something (aliquid) above man, so that his merit might be
sufficient to satisfy for the sin of the entire human race. In
order to bring about this adequate satisfaction for sin, God
decreed the Passion and death of the Son of God Incarnate. 6
But the Passion and death of Christ was not a cause of our
salvation in, any way whatsoever; His Passion was the meritorious, and efficient; and satisfactory cause of our salvation.
For " anyone constituted in grace, who suffers for the sake of
justice, by this very fact, merits for himself salvation." 7 Christ
had received grace not merely as an individual, but as the
Head of the Church. Consequently Christ by His sufferings
merited salvation for all His members.
It is true that a meritorious act does not necessarily include
satisfaction. That is why St. Thomas separates the two
thoughts when discussing the manner in which the Passion of
Christ brought about the effects to which it was ordained. 8
Satisfaction, on the other hand, supposes an offense committed,
an inequality not only opposed to justice, but also to friendship. And so, in order that an offense might be removed,
through satisfaction, not only is it necessary that the equality
of justice be restored through the recompense of punishment
equivalent to the offense, but it is also necessary that the
equality of friendship be restored. 9 Therefore, a work which is
performed either for merit or for satisfaction must be at least
commanded by charity.
It remained, however, for the satisfactory merits of the Passion and death of Christ to be applied to us in some way; it
remained for us to share in them, so that His satisfaction might,
in some way, be accounted as our satisfaction, restoring us to
•IV Cont. Gent., c. 54; Summa Theol., III, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2.
•Summa Theol., III, q. 48, a. I, c.
8 Ibid., and a. 2.
•IV Sent., d. 15, q. I, a. 8, qcl. 1, ad 2.

CHARLES A. SCHLECK

terms of justice, friendship with God. We can see how this was
to be done, by citing a few pertinent texts.
The Passion of Christ although corporal, still has a spiritual power,
given the fact that the divinity is united to the humanity. And so
it works its effect by means of a spiritual contact, namely, through
faith and the sacraments of the faith. 10
. . . because the Passion of Christ occurred as a kind of universal
cause of the remission of sins, it must be applied to individuals for
the remission of their sins. This is done through Baptism and
Penance, and the other sacraments which have their power from
the Passion of Christ. 11

The sacraments of the Church are the ordinary means by
which men are freed from sin and from the power of the devil.
Not only that, but this effect, namely, freedom from the obligation of undergoing punishment, is applied to us through faith
and charity, and through the sacraments of the faith. 12
Faith informed by charity is a sufficient means by which we
might realize in ourselves the fruit of the Passion of Christ,
and that fruit about which he is speaking is " liberatio a reatu
poenae," or the freedom from guilt. That is to say that the
satisfaction of Christ which is the means by which we are freed,
is accounted as our satisfaction, too, insofar as we become His
members uniting ourselves to Him in charity. 13
But this satisfaction is not only applied to us through faith
and charity; it is also applied to us through the sacraments of
the faith. 14 It is in the second response cited that St. Thomas
gives us an insight into the meaning of the term " reatus
poenae." There we see that it extends to death, too, which is, as
he says, a certain punishment inflicted on. us by the justice of
God, because of original sin, voluntary in all of us and therefore
meriting punishment. Christ's Passion was satisfactory to such
an extent that it assured all those who participate in it, or to
Summa Theol., III, q. 48, a. 6, ad 2.
Ibid., III, q. 49, a. I, ad 2.
12 Ibid., a. S, ad 1. ,
u Ibid., q. 49, a. 1, c; q. 48, a. 2, ad 2.
"Ibid., ad S; cf. also I-II, q. 85, a. 5, ad 2
10

11

ST. THOMAS ON NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL

GRACE

247

whom it is attributed, of immortality, not the immortality of
Adam in the state of innocence, but an immortality far surpassing his; it was to be the immortality of glory to be given us in
the resurrection. We are freed from the obligation of undergoing perpetual death, but we are not freed from a temporal
death nor from the penalties of the present life. The reason is
because we do not enjoy that satisfaction unless we become
members of Christ, configured to Him, which means that we
must bear the penalties of the present life and death. But
these penalties are not inflicted on us as they were before our
union with Christ because of the fact that we are personally
guilty of punishment. We are subject to death and the other
penalties because of the state of our nature. 15 For by the fact
of our incorporation in Christ, we are freed from the personal
obligation of undergoing any punishment whatsoever, when it
is a question of the sacrament of Baptism.
The sacraments of the Church, then, like the Passion of Our
Lord in whose power they bring about their marvelous effects,
confer not only sanctification but also satisfaction for sin, thereby making us pleasing to God and applying to us the satisfying
power of the Passion of Christ. They are, therefore, sanans et
elevans insofar as the effect they produce is such. This brings
us to the conclusion that the term reatus poenae, as used in the
present article under discussion, refers also to the guilt which
we have with respect to original sin and to those things which
flow from it, death and the penalties of the present life, or the
loss of the perfect subordination of the inferior powers to the
reason, and of the body to the soul. We are guilty of all these
punishments 16 and of those which we incur through the commission of actual or personal sins. All these punishments are
taken away in virtue of the satisfactory merits of the Passion
of Christ, which are applied to us through faith and charity and
through the sacraments of faith.

1•
1•

Ibid., ID, q. 69, a. 7, ad 8.
Ibid., I-IT, q. 85, a. 5, c.

248

CHARLES A. SCHLECK

§2

How the Sacraments Apply this Effect
The very nature of justification brings with it union with
Christ; it brings with it an application of the fruits of the
Passion of Our Lord liberating us from the eternal punishment
due to sin, whether original or mortal, or both, as well as from
at least some of the temporal punishments due to sin, whether
original or actual.
All justification is, in a sense, sacramental, at least according
to the ordinary plan of Divine Wisdom. For the transition
from the state of original sin to that of justification is had on
condition that Baptism be received, whether of water, or of
blood, or of desire, at least in proposito and implicitly; the transition from the state of mortal sin to that of grace in those who
fall after having received Baptism can be had only on condition of the reception of the sacrament of Penance, and again,
we must add, ordinarily, at least in proposito, and implicitly. 17
Freedom, therefore, from the eternal punishment due to sin
is also, in a sense, sacramental, and is had in virtue of the Passion of Our Lord. We ourselves cannot satisfy in any way whatsoever for the eternal punishment due to sin; we must rather
depend on the application of the Passion of Christ, or the satisfactory merits of the Passion, which are ordinarily had
through the reception of the sacraments of Baptism or of Penance in one of the ways just mentioned.
Regarding the temporal punishment due to sin St. Thomas
tells us that it is twofold: first, that which affects all human
nature as a result of original sin. Under this he lists the necessity of dying, the sufferings of the present life, the disobedience of the flesh to the spirit, and " other things of the sort. "
These are not taken away immediately by the reception of the
sacrament of the Passion, he tells us, but only at the end of
the world. The second temporal punishment is that which is
11 Council of Trent, sess. VI, c. 14 (Denz. n. 807); cf. also Summa Theal., ID,
q; 68, aa. 1-2; Quodl. IV, q. 7, a. 1, c.

ST. THOMAS

ON NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL

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a result of our actual or personal sins. We are freed from this
latter in one of two ways:
L through the sacrament of the Passion or Baptism, by which
we are buried together with Christ unto death, " in which death,
the divine power, which knows no inefficaciousness,_works ,our
salvation."
2. through real conformity to the Passion, " when we suffer with
Christ suffering," that is, in the sacrament of Penance.18

The sacraments, when received fruitfully, effect satisfaction,
a satisfaction for sin in accordance with the symbolism of the
sacrament in question. We receive the fruits of the Passion of
Christ with respect to the punishment due to sin in a measure
which is determined by two things: the sacramental symbolism,
and the dispositions of the one receiving the sacrament. Let us
take a quick glance at the individual sacraments.
The satisfaction of Christ which is applied to us in the sacrament of Baptism is complete, freeing us from the obligation of
undergoing any punishment whatsoever, whether eternal or
temporal, although, as we have seen, certain penalties remain
because of the state of our nature. The sacrament produces
what it symbolizes, a perfect rebirth in Christ, so that the Passion of Our Lord is communicated to the one baptized as though
he himself had suffered and died and had, therefore, sufficiently
satisfied for all his sins. 19 The power of the sacrament of Baptism is for the individual what the Passion of Christ is for the
human race, sufficient to ·remove all punishment due to sin. It
even has the power to take away the punishments of the present
life, but this power of the si;tcrament is withheld, according to
Divine Wisdom, until the resurrection. 20
Like Baptism the sacrament of Penance also applies to us
the satisfactory power of Christ's Passion and in accordance
with its symbolism,_ that
.on condition of our becoming configured to Christ suffering, that we ourselves have the firm
III Sent., d. 19, a. 8, qcl.
Summa Theol., III, q. 69, a.
10 Ibid., a .. 8, c.
11
19

c.

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CHARLES A. SCHLECK

resolution of doing some penal work, that which is imposed by
the priest, in satisfaction for the offenses committed against
God. St. Thomas contrasts the sacraments of Baptism and
Penance in their application of the satisfactory power of the
Passion thus:
The Passion of Christ is sufficient of itself to remove all the obligation of punishment, not only eternal, but also temporal; it is
precisely in accordance with the manner in which one participates
in the power of the Passion of Christ that he receives absolution
from having to undergo this punishment. In Baptism we participate entirely in the power of the Passion of Christ, as through water
and the Holy Spirit we die with Christ to sin and in Him are reborn
to a new life. And so in Baptism we gain the remission of all
punishment. In the sacrament of Penance, however, we acquire the
power of Our Lord's Passion according to the manner of our own
acts which constitute the matter of Penance, as water does of
Baptism. And so the entire debt due to sin is not cancelled following upon the first act of Penance, in which sin is remitted, but only
on completion of the other acts·of the sacrament. 21

The first act of the penitent is sufficient to remit some of the
temporal punishment due to sin, even before the actual completion of the other acts. Likewise the absolution of the priest
has a satisfactory power to it other than that of contrition and
the infusion of grace, and apart from that obtained through the
performance of satisfactory acts by the penitent. 22 But it does
not remit all the temporal punishment. For the infusion of
grace here, while also being sanans et elevans, is such in accordance with the sacramental symbolism. The latter consists in
our conformity with Christ suffering, and therefore, we must
perform some satisfactory act ourselves. 23 But, we should note,
we do not have to satisfy as much as our sin requires, because
the Passion of Christ the Head flows into His members; from
the power of His Passion then, the quantity (of satisfaction on
our part) is diminished, in proportion as we are united to Him
Ibid., q. 86, a. 4, ad 8.
so IV Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 8, qcl. 2.
" Summa Theol., ill, q. 49, a. 8, ad i.

11

ST. THOMAS

ON NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL

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in charity. 24 Even this diminished satisfaction that we perform
takes on a marvelous aspect:
... as the offense had a certain infinitude about it because of the
infiniteness of the divine majesty, so too, the satisfaction receives a
kind of infiniteness because of the infinitude of the divine mercy,
insofar as the satisfaction comes from one in the state of grace,
through which is rendered acceptable whatever man can render.25
Briefly we can say that the sacrament of Penance applies the
satisfaction of Christ's Passion to us by removing our guilt
with regard to eternal punishment absolutely, and with regard
to temporal punishment relatively, that is in accordance with
our conversion back to God, or as St. Thomas says " secundum
motum fervoris in Deum." 26 While it is true that the notion of
satisfaction is more difficult to find in the other sacraments,
nevertheless it can be found.
In explaining just how venial sins are remitted, St. Thomas
tells us that every new infusion of grace remits at least some of
the venial sins present, and so he concludes that all the sacraments of the New Law can remit venial sin,27 and furthermore,
their guilt, but this latter not always entirely; this is remitted,
as we have seen, according to the fervor of our flight towards
God, 28 which is stirred up or aroused by the infusion of grace
in the reception of the sacrament.
Moreover, as we have seen above, the notion of reatus poenae
applies to all the defects brought about by sin, original and
actual, and therefore includes death, suffering, and the proneness or the inclination of our nature to evil, and the difficulty
we find in the doing of good. Every infusion of grace gives
us just that much more domination over these tendencies.
Therefore we can say that these wounds of our nature are
removed also by the satisfaction of Christ applied to us in
Ill Sent., d. 19, a. 3, qcl. 2; Summa Theol., III, q. 49, a. 3, ad 2.
IV Sent., d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1.
26 Summa Theol., III, q. 87, a. 3, ad 3.
27 Ibid., c.
•• Ibid., ad 3.
2•

25

CHARLES

A. SCHLECK

virtue of the sacraments which in tum derive their power
from the Passion of Our Lord. 29
Coming to the individual sacraments we see that the grace
of Confirmation serves as a remedy for the double infirmity
which is a penal consequence of sin, namely, fear and human
respect, " ut neque propter timorem neque erubescentiam nomen
Christi confiteri praetermittat." ao Moreover, not only the effect
of the sacrament of Baptism is perfected in the reception of
this sacrament, but also the effect of the sacrament of Penance,
" quia per gratiam collatam in hoc sacramento consequetur
poenitens pleniorem remissionem peccati." 31
While it is true that the sacrament of the Eucharist is given
directly to nourish the soul, uniting it more closely to Christ
and to His members, still, indirectly, it does have the effect of
satisfaction, even as sacrament:
... but because this unity comes about through charity, from
whose fervor or intensity we gain the remission not only of sin, but
also of the punishment due to it as a result, by a kind of concomitance with the principal effect, we receive a remission of the
punishment due to sin, not all, of course, but in proportion to our
devotion and fervor.32
Extreme Unction, the sacrament preparing us for immediate
entrance into the beatific vision, is directed toward the removal
of the " reliquiae peccati." This latter consists in an ineptitude
or weakness which is left in us by original sin, or actual sin, and
which prevents our having full vigor for the acts of grace or of
glory. 33
The grace of Holy Orders acts as a remedy particularly
against an egoistic attitude centered on the interests of this
world, which attitude is the result of original and actual sin. It
brings, therefore, the " grace of forgetfulness of self." 34 While
••Cf. C. Crowley, 0. P., art. cit., pp. 531-53!'l.
80 Summa Theo!,., III, q. 7!'l, a. 9, c.
81 Ibid., a. 7, ad !'l.
3 • Ibid., q. 79, a. 5, c.; a. 4, c.; a. 6, c., and ad !'l.
88 Suppl., q. 30, a. l, c.
_

•• H. Boiiesse, 0. P., Le Sauveur du Monde, 4. L'Economie Sacramentaire, p.

ST. THOMl\.S

ON NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL

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253

it is true that the sacrament is given to prevent the dissolution
of the multitude, and is remedial principally for the entire
Church rather than for the person, nevertheless, we cannot ex. elude its being a remedy for the latter. He receives the plentitude of grace in order to make him worthy of his priestly office,
and to render him capable of performing his priestly functions
holily. Because He is called upon to " embrace the precepts of
the Christian teaching in their fullest possible integrity . . .
(since) he must with daily more eager steps press on to the
attainment of the perfection required by his exalted priestly
dignity, .. (since he must imitate Christ) as a Victim for the
salvation of His brethren," 85 he must receive, in virtue of Holy
Orders, the grace necessary to dominate over those tendencies
which would lead him away from the fulfillment of his priestly
calling.
Finally, the sacrament of Marriage serves as a remedy against
the ill-regulated attractions of concupiscence and brings with
it the help to accomplish generously the obligations of this
state by virtuous actions, often very difficult to perform.

*

*

*

In conclusion to this consideration of the remedial aspect of
sacramental grace we must say that the grace of the sacraments
is the " grace of the Passion effecting our salvation by way of
satisfaction " 36 by removing in accordance with the symbolism
of the sacrament " the guilt of sin, and its punishments and
defects," 37 or whatever can be included under the term reatus
poenae.
Sacramental grace and sanctifying grace as given in the
present economy, and therefore, not merely elevans, but also
sanans, do not differ from one another essentially, but only
modally, or modaliter; that is to say, the effects of sanctifying
grace under the present economy are given for a Christian life
and in accordance with the symbolism of the various sacra••Pius XII, Menti Nostrae, AAS, XXXXII (1950), 661.
36 C. Crowley, 0. P., art. cit., p. 525.
87 Ibid., p. 581.

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mental actions, or rites. The special remedial help which this
sacramental grace gives, and which St. Thomas in the earlier
works of the Sentences and the De V eritate called sacramental
grace, is ordained to remove the defects resulting in the soul
from sin, original or actual, by applying the satisfactory power
of the Passion of Christ. Thus God's wrath is appeased and our
nature healed imperfectly in the present life, but with a guarantee of a more perfect reparation, more perfect than we ever
could have imagined, when we will participate in the glorious
resurrection of Our Lord. So we see verified the words of St.
Thomas that " the power of Christ works in the sacraments by
way of healing and by way of a kind of expiation (per modum
sanationis et expiationis cuiusdam) .38
The teaching that we find here is exactly the same as that
which we saw in the earlier works, as regards the remedial
aspect which the sacraments bring to the soul, with this simplification, however, that the term "sacramental grace" is
used to denote not merely the special effect, but sanctifying
grace possessing that effect.
Under the unification and simplification of sacramental causality this special divine help pertains to what St. Thomas calls
the principal effect of the sacramental rite, or grace. The Angelic Doctor admits of only two effects of the sacraments, grace
and the sacramental character. Therefore, in the sacraments
which do not imprint a character, the res et sacramentum must
be found and as connected with the effect they do produce
grace. But we shall see more of this in the next section.
§3

Sacramental Grace and Cult
Very frequently we.forget about the other aspect of the sacraments, an aspect which is just as essential to them as the concept of sacrifice is to the Passion of Our Lord. I am speaking
about the aspect of cult or worship which the sacraments con88

Summa Theol., III, q.

a. 8, ad ft.

ST. THOMAS ON NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL

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255

tain. Even St. Thomas in the texts we have seen from the
Sentences and the De Veritate does not mention this aspect of
sacramental grace explicitly. In this he was merely following
the current of his time, which regarded the sacraments and the
grace which went with them principally as remedies for fallen
man. They emphasized the fact that the Sacrifice of the Cross
was an act of satisfaction and expiation, that the sacraments
were something like the act of the good Samaritan binding up
the wounds of a traveller who had been attacked while on his
Journey.
All this is true; the sacraments, like the Sacrifice of the Cross,
do just this. But they do something more than this, as Dom
Vonier notes in his work on the Eucharist, and I believe his
thought to be a perfect representation of the mind of St.
Thomas as expressed in the Summa. In his Key to the Doctrine
of the Eucharist he says:
But the same adage ( sacramenta sunt propter homines) would
defeat its own ends, or certainly would defeat the end of the sacramental system, if it were meant to express an exclusively utilitarian view of the sacrament .... No supernatural grace could
ever be so one-sided. A grace represents the interests of God as
well as the interests of man; it implies the glory of God as well as
the salvation of man. We may propound it as the general maxim
in the doctrine of grace that man's profit and God's glory are the
twofold aspects of one and the same thing, grace. . . . Sacraments
consequently represent the Cross in the double aspect of atonement
for sin and of worship of God. 39

In the Summa St. Thomas brings out much more clearly this
side of our sacramental life, and consequently of sacramental
grace. Not that he excludes in any way the notion of the sacraments and the grace they bring, as remedies against sin, but
nevertheless his entire treatment of the sacraments follows
more closely and more perfectly and harmoniously from the
complete understanding of the Incarnation and Passion of Our
Lord, the exposition of which just precedes his teaching on the
•• Op. cit. (Burns, Oates, London: 1981), pp. 45-46.

9

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CHARLES A. SCHLECK

sacraments and which gives them all the power and efficacy
they possess.40
St. Thomas has already mentioned this tie-up of cult with
sanctification when speaking of the virtue of religion. The
sacramenta, or the external rites of the sacraments, are acts of
the virtue of religion. They are those external acts of the virtue
by which "that which is God's is assumed by man." 41 This is
as far as he goes in regard to the sacraments in this particular
place, most probably because the sacraments can in no way be
understood except that they be related to the Passion of Christ,
from which they receive their entire meaning and force. Not
having treated of that, he puts off his discussion of the sacraments until he shows that the Passion of Christ is both an act
of cult and an act of satisfaction. 42
We know that all grace after the Fall has a double role, that
of elevating our nature or making us participators of the divine
nature, and that of healing it of the wounds caused by sin.
Of itself, habitual or sanctifying grace does not have this second
aspect. After original sin, however, all sanctification had to be
had through faith in Christ, and ordinarily, through a faith
professed externally as well as internally, by certain sensible
signs, determined or not, by the Creator. 43 Insofar as they
were and are certain protestations of our faith they were and
are at the same time means or acts by which we worship God. 44
Our sacraments of the New Law are just such external rites or
acts by which we worship God, professing or acknowledging
the divine excellence and our subjection to It, not by delivering
something to Him (except in the case of the Eucharist as Sacrifice) but by assuming or receiving something divine. 45 They
••Summa, Theol., III, q. 60, Introduction: This thought has been brought out
by some recent theologians commenting on this tract of St. Thomas: cf. A.-M.
Roguet, 0. P., Les Sacrements (Revue des Jeunes, avant propos), p. 6. Cf. also
H. Boliesse, 0. P., op. cit., p. 248.
41 Ibid., II-II, q. 84, Introduction;
q. 89, Introduction.
••Ibid., III, q. 48, aa. 2-8; q. 62, a. 5.
••Ibid., III, q. 61, a. 8, ad 2.
••IV Sent., d. 18, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4.
••Summa Theol., II-II, q. 81, a. 8, ad !l.

ST. THOMAS

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257

are also the means, the acts par excellence, by which we are
sanctified. By the reception of the sacraments, then, we reverence God, proclaiming our faith in Christ, subjecting ourselves
to the divine will by receiving sanctification through the medium
of sensible signs. Let us consider then, the elements of the
sacramental process and their relation to cult.
1*

The Res et Sacrament'um, the Res tantum, and Cult
The sacraments of the New Law have been instituted for
two things: to be a remedy against sin, which role we have
already seen; and to be a perfection of the soul in those things
pertaining to 1-he worship of God, in accordance with the rite
of the Christian religion, or we might say, to make our worship
a Christ-like worship. This latter is our present field of inquiry.
Some of the sacraments were to do this by deputing us ex
officio 46 to worship God in this rite, by configuring us to the
unique High-Priest of the New Testament, imprinting on the
cognitive faculty of our souls sacramental characters, which St.
Thomas calls " sanctifications " 47 or " consecrations," 48 permitting us to. take part in the authentic and official cult originated by the High-Priest of the New Law when He sacrificed
Himself to the Father. By these accidental consecrations we are
authorized, or acquire the power to receive or to give to others,
those things pertaining to the cult of God. 49 These actions are
performed by us as ministers of Christ, or as His instruments;
by us therefore, performing divine actions, as instruments,
actions, which have and which receive their meaning and import from Him Who plays the principal role in the worship of
the New Testament, Our Lord Himself, in His role as the One
Mediator and Priest of the New Alliance. For God accepts no
worship, except that which is offered" per Ipsum, et cum Ipso,
••Ibid., III, q. 72, a. 5, ad 2.
••IV Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 4, qcl. 2.
••Summa Theol. III, q. 63, a. 6, ad 2.
••Ibid., III, q. 63, aa. 2-3-4.

fl58

CHARLES A. SCHLECK

et in Ipso." All honor and glory, and therefore, all official
worship of restored humanity given to God, mounts to Him
through the God-Man, Who is the Eternal Character of the
Father. 50
Although the character is to dispose the soul directly and
proximately to perform those actions of divine cult, or to act
ex officio in what pertains to the Christian religion, it does not
insure of itself the worthy and holy performance of these instrumental acts of cult. It is "God Who, out of His bounty,
bestows on us who receive the character, the grace whereby we
might fulfill those actions for which we are deputed, in a
worthy manner." 51 The immediate and proximate goal of the
character is to dispose the soul, or more precisely, the practical
intellect, in which power we find the virtue of faith, to actions
of cult. 52
Nevertheless, it does have some connection with the res
sacramenti or the last effect of the sacrament. For the sacramental character puts a man in a certain state, in the Christian
body. It gives him a certain role to play in the Christian
society, and in order to make him perform: it fittingly, it postulates, unless the recipient places some obstacles in the way, the
grace necessary for this. St. Thomas shows us the twofold function of the sacramental character in the response to an objection
in Question sixty-three:
. . . the sacramental character is a res with respect to the exterior
sacrament; and it is a sacramentum in regard to the last effect of
the sacrament. From this something can be attributed to the
character in one of two ways. Insofar as we consider it as sacramentum, it is a sign of the invisible grace conferred in the sacrament. Considering it precisely as character, it is a sign configuring
the one who receives it to some principle possessing authority
regarding that for which one is deputed. 53
00

Ibid., 11-11, q. 98, a. 2, c; III, q. 68, a. 8, sed contra; IV Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 4,

qcl. 4.
• 1 Summa Tkeol., ill, q. 68, a. 4, ad I.
"'Ibid., ad 8.
••Ibid .• q. 68. a. 8. ad '1.

S'l'. THOMAS

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259

The character, then, makes us instruments through which
Christ continues to exercise His worship, a worship which had
its origin in the sacrifice of the Cross and which now continues
in the Eucharist, through which all sacramental worship of the
members who have not yet attained the consummation of the
sacrifice of their Head, mounts to Our Creator and Lord, Whom
we now call Father.
While it is true that the sacramental character configures us
to Christ, that it is a certain participation of the priesthood of
Christ; and while many theologians say that the formal constitutive element of this priesthood is the grace of union, 54 we
must remember that Christ was priest insofar as He was man,
or more exactly, according to His human nature. Not only was
He Priest according to His human nature, but He was also
Victim by it. The act of cult by which He initiated the rite of
the Christian religion, as Priest and Victim, was a human
action if we consider the principium quo of this act; however,
because of the Infinite Person offering it, the principium quod,
it had an infinite value, or as St. Thomas says, " non fuit alia
ab operatione divinitatis," considering that in this action, which
was the Sacrifice of the Cross, the human nature of Christ was
the instrument of the divinity. 55 The sacerdotal action of Christ,
although truly the action of a Person Who is God, was nevertheless the action of this Person by reason of His human nature.
Through the character, then, we participate not in the concrete reality of Christ the Word, Esse Infinitum, but in the
priesthood of Christ, an office, which exacts a power, 56 and
which belongs to Him only according as He is man. 57
It does not suffice to say that the character gives us a participation in the Hypostatic Union, without any further exau Sacerdoce du Christ," Laval Theologique
and others consider
the capital grace of Christ derived from the grace of union as the formal constitutive element. Because of the cogency of the texts they cite from St. Thomas
theologians still remain divided.
55 Summa Theol., HI, q. 19, a. l, ad 2.
56 IV Sent., d. 4, q. l, a. 2, qd. 2, ad 3.
57 Summa
Theol., III, q. 22, a. 3, ad l.
54

Cf. L. Audet, "Notre Participation

et Philosophique (1945), I, 24 (note 3) . The Salmanticenses

260

CHARLES

A. SCHLECK

planation. The character configures us to Christ the Priest,
giving us a share in His priestly power 58 making us instruments, perpetually capable of being moved by Him Who is the
principal agent in the cult of the Christian religion. It gives us
no participation in the consecration of the Hypostatic Union
insofar as this formally sanctified Christ. But it does impress
upon us an invisible" lumen" as St. Thomas implies, 59 making
us, as it were, " lumina Christi " 60 or images of Christ the
Priest:
... every effect in a creature is produced in us by the Trinity. The
character, therefore, is not merely from the Son, but from all three
Persons. It is attributed to the Son, however, both because of
the likeness to something proper to a Person, insofar as He is,
properly speaking, the image and figure or character of the Father;
and because it is the power of the Passion of Christ that works in
the sacraments. 61

Although it is true that St. Thomas changed his notion on
the causality of the sacraments, there is no indication that he
changed his mind on the relationship existing between the res
et sacramentum and the principal effect of the sacrament, grace.
In the Summa the Holy Doctor admits of only two effects of
t4e sacramental rite, sacramental grace and the character. The
res et sacramentum of the sacraments which impress a character on the soul can be considered under one of two aspects,
secundum rationem sacramenti; or precisely as character, secundum characteris rationem. 62
Taken in the latter sense, it directly disposes the soul to
accomplish those things which pertain to the worship of God.
As a potency it is ordained toward specific operations. But like
every other potency, in order that it be perfected in such a way
as to perform these operations well, it must have a habitus, 63
68 IV Sent., d. 4, q. I, a. I, ad 8.
••Summa Theol., III, q. 68, a. 2, ad 2.
60 E. Doronzo, De Sacramentis in Genere, p. 804.
61 IV Sent., d. 4, q. I, a. 4, qcl. 4.
••Summa Theol., III, q. 68, a. 8, ad 2.
63 IV Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. I.

ST. THOMAS ON NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL

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261

and that habitus is grace. The character as such, then, is a
disposition for grace, but in a remote sort of way, or as St.
Thomas says, ex consequenti, 64 or per quamdam congruitatis
dignitatem, 65 What Fr. Doronzo applies to the res et sacramentum in general, we would rather apply to the res et sacramentum, precisely as character, that is to say, " a moral condition or exigency of a form or an effect." 66 To be a disposition for grace in this way is not something proper to the sacramental character as Cajetan points out; for there are many
other things which dispose us for the reception of grace in this
manner too. 62
We cannot, however, apply this role of the character to the
sacramentum which effects the character, as Cajetan points out
in a rather long passage which merits being quoted here:
We see that we cannot attribute to the sacrament the condition of
character. Since the character is a remote and ex consequenti disposition for grace, it remains that grace is the principal effect of the
sacrament. This would not be so, if grace were given by the sacrament only as a sequel to the character .... Baptism is principally
a laver of regeneration as sons of God, as members of Christ, and
secondarily, it impresses a character. It confers grace under the
first aspect principally, and in addition, it includes something el::se
whence it confers grace ex consequenti, that is because of the character ... the character, in the order of nature, is the effect of
grace, by which one becomes a formed Christian. In the order of
nature, esse, which corresponds to grace, is prior to posse, which
here corresponds to the character. Because of this, it is a disposition
ex consequenti for grace, for a posse given by God, is accompanied
either before or after the bestowal of the bene posse.68
The character, or the res et sacramentum, rather, secundum
rationem sacramenti, is a sign of the invisible grace which is
conferred in the sacrament. Together with the sacramentum
64

65

Summa Theol., III, q. 63, a. 4, ad I.
IV Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5.

66 "

Doctrina

de 're et sacramento ' in genere," Revue de l'Universite de

l'Ottawa, sec. spec. (1934), 252.
67 Comm. in IIIam Partem, q. 63, a. 4, n. 2.
68 Ibid., n. 8.

CHARLES A. SCHLECK

tantum, or the external rite, the res et sacramentum, secundum
rationem sacramenti is a cause of the res tantum. The sacramentum tantum is a cause of grace in genere causae effi,cientis,
while the res et sacramentum, qua sacramentum, is a cause of
grace in genere causae materialis seu dispositivae, insofar as it
is a disposition for the principal effect of the sacramental action.
The res et sacramentum, under this aspect, is not a remote
disposition for grace, but rather a proximate or an immediate
disposition for it, that disposition of which St. Thomas spoke
in the Sentences and in the De V eritate, and which he called
there sacramental grace.
The only change that we find in the teaching of St. Thomas
regarding the res et sacramentum and the res tantum, is not
in their relationship with one another, but in relationship with
their efficient cause. In the earlier works we have seen that
he considered God as the efficient cause of both the form and
the disposition accompanying that form, using an instrument
to bring about the latter. Here he considers that God uses an
instrument to bring about not only the latter, but also the
former, not only the disposition, but also the form. The opinion
of some theologians 69 that the Angelic Doctor changed his
teaching on the res et sacramentum in relation to grace, or the
res tantum, does not seem to be correct. For even in the
Sentences, where he considered the res et sacramentum as the
immediate disposition for grace, he also regarded it, insofar as
we identify it with the character, and precisely as character, as
a remote disposition for grace. 70
Briefly then, the character as such is a potency and takes its
entire meaning from the object to which it is ordained, namely,
actions of cult. Insofar as it is sacramentum, however, it is a
cause of sacramental grace in genere causae materialis seu dispositivae.

*

*

*

In connection with this treatment of the sacramental character and sacramental grace it would be well to consider the
•• E. Doronzo, op. cit., p.

10

IV Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5.

ST. THOMAS ON NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL

GRACE

9l63

fifth opinion concerning the nature of the latter, of which I
spoke in another article.rn•
At the turn of the century, in a book devoted exclusively to
the determination of the nature of sacramental grace and its
role, an author came to the conclusion that it was nothing but
the res et sacramentum, the sacramental character or that
which corresponds to it. 71 He bases his conclusion on the notion
of sacramental causality expressed by St. Thomas in the Sentences. Sacramental grace, he says consists in the state signified by the sacrament. 11 Unfortunately he goes on to say "no
sacrament, however, signifies sanctifying grace." 73
This is completely foreign to the mind of St. Thomas as expressed in the Summa. It is quite evident from the teaching of
St. Thomas on sacramental signification, as we see in the third
article of the sixtieth question, namely, that the sacrament
signifies the form of our sanctification which consists in grace
and the virtues. 74 In fact, he insists on this point as we can
gather from the response to the third objection, where he says
"it suffices for the notion (ratio) of the sacrament, that it
signify the perfection which is the form," or we would say that
the sacrament must at least signify the form of our sanctification.
Furthermore, he considers the res et sacramentum as constituting a state of the soul. This would be to liken (I do not
say equivocate) the res et sacramentum of all the sacraments
to the res et sacramentum of those which imprint a character,
and precisely as character. The role of this res et sacramentum
would thus be contracted to its role in relation to cult, and it
would thus be merely a remote disposition for grace. He would
have great difficulty in explaining the texts where St. Thomas
speaks of sacramental grace as flowing from habitual grace.
••• "On Sacramental Grace," Revue de L'Universite d'Ottawa, XXIV (1954),
227 *-251.*

Abbe de Bellevue, La Grace Sacramentelle (Paris: Retaux, 1900), pp. 103-104.
Ibid., p. 103.
••Ibid., p. 104-5.
"Cf. also q. 69, a. 4, ad 1.
71

' 9

264

CHARLES A. SCHLECK

The principle invoked above--causae sunt ad invicem causae
sed in diverso genere,-can only be applied where this disposition would be an immediate disposition for a form.
While we must admit that St. Thomas in his earlier works
identifies sacramental grace with the first effect of the sacrament which he calls the res et sacramentum, or the sacramental
character, or the ornatus animae, he does not mean to identify
the sacramental character, precisely as such, with sacramental
grace. It is identified with it, there in the earlier works just as
it is here, secundum rationem sacramenti, and not secundum
characteris rationem. For only under the former aspect is it
ordained immediately toward grace; under the latter it is ordained directly toward cult.

2*
Sacramental Grace and its Relation to Cult
From what has just been said above one might be led to
think that only the sacraments which imprint a character are
ordained to the cult of God. Nothing could be further from
the truth. For while it is true that not all the sacraments are
directly ordained to divine worship, whereas all are ordained
directly to serve as a remedy against sin, 75 nevertheless, to
exclude any relationship whatsoever between the sacraments
not imprinting a character and divine worship would be to
falsify the sense of the article just cited, and to kill the marvelous germ of fruitfulness which St. Thomas has given to our
sacramental doctrine.
Just as the Eucharist which does not imprint a character on
the soul, is, nevertheless, very closely linked up with our worship, being in fact, the sacrament in which the worship of
God principally consists, 76 so, too, the other sacraments not
imprinting a character are related to the cult we give to God,
insofar as they have as their end and goal the sacrament of the
Eucharist, and insofar as they confer grace. We might say
••Ibid., III, q. 63, a. 6, c.

••Ibid.

ST. THOMAS

ON NATURE

OF SACRAMENTAL

GRACE

'265

that the vital notion of the sacraments as emphasized more
particularly in the Summa is connected intimately with the
Christian life, which is a sacramental life, or a life of worship.
It is a life of rendering to God the reverence that is due to Him
as a Creator, and in the present economy of the New Law, as a
Father.
Whereas the Old Law did not lead us to perfection, being
the .lex timoris, the New Law does; for it is the lex amoris,
begun, sealed, by the sacrifice of Christ on Calvary, with the
death of Our Lord. The whole tenor of the New Law comes
from the fact that the heart and soul of the sacrifice which
Christ offered was the manner, the way, in which He offered
that act of worship by wh.ich He began the rite of the Christian
religion. He suffered " ex obedientia et caritate." 77
The sacraments, as certain continuations
the humanity of
Christ, were to reproduce this note in the worship of the members of the Body of Christ, to make the interior spirit of the
Head become also the spirit of the other members joined to it
to form the «quasi µna persona mystica." 18
Sacramental grace was to insure the continuation of this holy
worship which God exacts of a creature, of a worship not merely
external, but permeated with the spirit of Christ Himself, which
was a spirit of love. The spiritual life, or the sacramental life,
is in all of its phases connected with the worship of God, or
with the virtue of religion, by which we worship God.
The cult that is given to God under the New Alliance is not
according to our determination, but rather according to that
established by God; an.d that is, that under the present plan
of Providence sanctification and worship be so closely linked
together that they should both be realized in the same sacramental rite. 79 For, under the New Law, by leading this life of
giving and receiving according to the sacraments of the Christian life, we lead a life of cult, insofar as we are constantly,
through the sacramental order, professing our faith in God and
the dispensation He has planned from all eternity.
71

Ibid., q. 48, a. 2, re.

78

Ibid., q. 48, a. 2, ad !il.

' 0

Ibid., q. 60, a. 5, c.

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CHARLES A. SCHLECK

We saw above that the sacramental character in no way
gives us a participation in the grace of union insofar as the
latter formally sanctified the humanity of Christ. It was this
uncreated grace of union which made Christ the" holy one of
Israel," or Sanctity itself. It was because of this holiness that
the cult given to God by Christ the Priest, according to His
human nature, was so pleasing to God. The sacramental graces
were to give us, the instruments which Christ by means of our
sacramental character uses in the continuation of the cult He
began on Calvary,-the sacramental graces were to give us a
participation of this holiness, so that our worship, through, with
and in Christ Our Lord might also be pleasing and acceptable
to God, as well as holy in His sight. They were to give us this
holiness in proportion to and according to the different relationships in which the sacraments place us in our Christian
religion; for the soul was to be sanctified for the living of the
Christian life, which is the Christian religion, according to the
significations of the various sacramental rites. The latter were
not intended to sanctify us by formal sanctifications differing
essentially from one another, but rather, by one and the same
sanctification given in different ways in accordance with the
various phases of our life in Christ. In other words, all the
sacraments confer the same life, but not in the same mode, or
manner. The sacraments, therefore, modify the grace they give,
sanctifying their recipient according to the role he is to play
in the cult of the Christian religion.
· The spiritual effects indicated by St. Thomas in giving us
the comparison between the spiritual life and that of the body
are none other than those which are given by the grace of the
virtues and of the gifts. Our life is not essentially changed by
our maturing; the life
a man, for example, is not essentially
different from that of a boy. Nor do we see a change in a life
that is restored by the use of some reniedy, or through a cure;
it is the same life, now restored, either in a complete or in an
incomplete manner. In regard to nourishment, the food that we
eat does not serve to produce in us new principles of life or of

ST. THOMAS ON NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL

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267

action; it serves to build up that which was lost, to fortify and
give us the necessary strength for the work of the present and
of the future. Similarly, there is no change in the internal
structure of a man who receives a position in government; he is
perfected insofar as he must rule well not only himself, but also
those over whom he is placed. He lives the same life, but according to a certain office or state. Likewise the state of matrimony does not change-add to, or subtract from,--or alter in
any way -the internal structure of our corporal life. It places
us in a social status where we live our life with the purpose of
perpetuating that life in others.
So, too, in the spiritual life; there is no essential change in a
life which is developed or restored. It remains one and/ the
same life adapted, or as Cajetan says, " extended " to meet the
requirements of new circumstances. Nor are the actions required for the various phases of this spiritual life substantially
different in any one of them. They spring from principles that
are essentially the same, although affected accidentally in accordance with the demands of the pa:p:icular situation in which
the soul :finds itself. 80 It is these special "states, or relationships " 81 which might bring into play more especially this or
that principle of action rather than others, and in this or that
way.
We cannot emphasize this comparison too much. It is in
perfect harmony with the whole of the sacramental doctrine of
St. Thomas. For the sacraments were given to us because of
the condition of our nature, that we should be led to an understanding of our sanctification through the medium of sensible
signs. Since the sacraments were to be concerned with a new
life, it was only fitting that it be given to us under significations or symbols which would correspond to similar aspects of
•• N. B. It must be remembered that we are speaking of sacramental grace, and
not of the sacramental character which does give us a principle which we did not
have previously with respect to our actions as instrumental causes; sacramental
grace, however, is concerned with us as principal, even though secondary, causes
in the supernatural order.
81 Summa Theol., m, q. 65, a. I, ad

CHARLES A. SCHLECK

our corporal life. In the Summa we find St. Thomas treating of
the individual sacraments, constantly reverting to this comparison, in describing their positive or perfecting effect. He is
merely continuing the initial step he took in beginning the
sacramental tract, by emphasizing the notion of sacramentumsignum, without, however, destroying the notion of the sacramentum-secretum, or the mysterious element that must remain
in the sacrament. 82
Under no condition are we forced to bring into our consideration new principles of action, or habitus, in regard to this
spiritual life, any more than we are forced to have recourse to
this in considering the various phases of our corporal life. In
other words, because of this comparison protracted throughout
the entire sacramental tract of St. Thomas, the opinion that
he visualized the sacramental graces as adding new habitus,
entitative, quasi-entitative, or operative, is entirely without
foundation, if we consider the texts of the Summa in which he
speaks about them ex professo.
Furthermore,_ St. Thomas retains here in the text the opinion
of certain theologians who accepted the number of the sacraments by a kind of adaptation to the virtues and to the defects
of our sins and punishments; 88 he retains this opinion not as
his own, as we can readily see, but he does not reject it com. pletely. If he held that the sacraments through the sacramental graces added new habitus, then he certainly would have
refuted this opinion, for the two are opposed to one another.
Moreover, there is more than a coincidence involved between
considering the number of sacraments " by a kind of adaptation to the virtues," and the thomistic teaching that the acts
to which the various sacramental graces are ordained are substantially the same as those to which the grace of the virtues
and of the gifts is ordained.
In conclusion, then, from our study of the Summa, very
briefly, sacramental grace is specifically Christian, coming to
ss Cf. St. Thomas, Prologue to I ad 00'1'.
••Summa Tkeol., ID, q. 65, a. 1, c.

ST. THOMAS ON NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL

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269

us as it does through the Passion of Christ. The healing effect
of sacramental grace carries with it the application to us of
the satisfactory power of the Passion of Christ, freeing us from
the reatus poenae taken in its complete sense. The perfecting
power of this grace is merely the determination of our gracelife in accordance with the exigencies of a spiritual life which
of its very nature gives praise to God through, with and in
Christ Our Lord. Habitual grace, therefore, of itself 84 merely
elevates to divine adoption; sacramental grace which is a modification of this habitus, elevates us to divine adoption, and in
addition heals and strengthens us for a determinate phase of
our life in Christ.

m
CONSEQUENCES

O:F THIS CONCEPTION OF SACRAMENTAL

GRACE

§I

Sacramental Grace and Actual Grace
The sacramental rite of its very nature is intended to produce
directly the res tantum. There is no intermediate stage which
acts as an efficient cause, in the strict sense of the word, necessitating the infusion of grace. Nor does the sacramental character, secundum rationem characteris, give the recipient a right
to the principal effect of the sacrament. That which gives the
right to the infusion of grace, insofar as we can speak of a
right, is the res et sacramentum ut sacramentum est, that is,
insofar as it is joined to the external sacramental rite, in which,
according to St. Thomas, the notion of sacramentum is principally found. 85
What is the connection, however, between sacramental grace
and the actual graces we receive after .the reception of a sacrament in order that we might attain the end of the sacrament?
That is our present question.
Actual grace is necessary for two things, namely justification,
8'
85

N. B. That is, abstracting from any given economy.
IV Sent., d. 7, CJ· I, a. 1, qcl. I.

270

CHARLES

A. SCHLECK

that is to say, to dispose us for the reception of sanctifying
grace, and also for the accomplishment of supernatural actions
even in the case of one already justified. The necessity for this
actual grace after justification comes from the condition of our
human nature in the present state. The infusion of grace does
away with the formal element of original sin by healing the
mind, but it does not remove the material element, for there
remains in our nature a corruption and infection with regard
to the flesh, and a certain obscurity in the intellect. For this
reason as well as the more basic one of physical pre-motion
we need the help of God directing and protecting us even after
justification. And this help is supernatural quoad substantiam
with respect to supernatural acts. 86 Those theologians who
maintain the theory of intentional causality in regard to the
sacraments claim that the res et sacramentum is the title not
only to sanctifying grace, but also to all the succeeding actual
graces necessary for the ends of the sacrament, to be conferred
at the opportune time. For them, therefore, the character or the
res et sacramentum is the foundation or fundament for the
relation that exists between the right and the actual graces.
There is one difficulty to this solution phrased very aptly
by Fr. Boiiesse:
Who would maintain, however, that souls marked sacrainentally
with something independent of the sanctifying grace received, who
would maintain that even in the state of sin they still have a real
right to actual graces capable of being regarded as sacramental? I
agree that God might not allow the Christian or the priest to remain
a sinner; but can the sacraments exercise really by virtue of that
which remains of them in those who knowingly and voluntarily
have received them without fruit, can these sacraments exact actual
graces corresponding to the sacramental sanctification which they
normally ought to have produced? 87

There is no question of whether the character or the res et
sacramentum brings about the ultimate effect of the sacrament
86

Summa Theol., I-II, q. 109, a .. 9, c.; cf. also R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P., De

Gratia, pp. 81-82.
•• Op. cit., p. 245.

ST. THOMAS ON NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL

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271

when the obstacle is removed, through a physical, or at least,
through a moral causality. But that the character or the res
et sacramentum secundum rationem characteris should give a
right to sanctifying grace or to the actual graces corresponding
to the sacramental sanctification in one who is in the state of
sin, this does not appear to be true. No one in the state of
mortal sin merits justification or has a right to the actual graces
necessary to arrive there.BB
We said above that the res et sacramentum ut sacramentum
est is that which exacts the infusion of grace. The character or
the res et sacramentum ut character est, or ut res est, is merely
a moral condition postulating the infusion of grace. In regard
to the actual graces, therefore, given after sanctification, another
opinion has been proposed by theologians which seems more
consonant with the doctrine of Aquinas. Sacramental grace is
the fundament for the right to the actual graces corresponding
to the ends of the sacrament. This moral right is a relation and
as such exacts a fundament, something permanent and intrinsic
in the soul. Sacramental grace not only adds this right, but is
the very fundament for it.B9
These actual graces, then, presuppose a state, that is a permanent fundament to which they correspond. This is nothing
other than the Christian life, or the spiritual life of which St.
Thomas spoke in the sixty-fifth Question. The sacramental
graces as various states or aspects of this spiritual life are
sanctifying grace modified or adapted to meet the ends or
needs of a particular state in it. Since it is a habitus, it disposes
us to act connaturally in this or that particular phase of our
life in Christ. But like the habitus of sanctifying grace of which
it is only a modification, it must be helped in order to proceed
to its actions by actual helps. 90 John of St. Thomas sums up
the problem thus:
Summa Theol., 1-11, q. 114, a. 5, c.
R. Garrigou-Lagrange, 0. P., De Unione Sacerdotis cum Christo Sacerdote et
Victima, p. 16.
80 Summa Theol., 1-11, q. 110, a. 2, c.
88

88

10

CHARLES A. SCHLECK

In order that a person might bring about these effects (sacramental actions), the actual concursus of God does not suffice, unless
we presuppose a form or perfection to which that concursus is
accommodated; for it is not only God Who operates, but also the
person, and not as a mere instrument, but as a principal cause .... 19

In regard to sacramental actions, and that is what we are
considering, man acts as a principal, even though secondary,
cause. He needs a form, therefore, by which he can carry out
his sacramental actions connaturally. These actual helps, given
with an eye to producing sacramental acts, correspond to a
sacramental form, habitual grace given to the soul through the
modification of the sacramental rite or they correspond to a
sacramental grace. Not that there are seven sacramental forms
differing from one another specifically, metaphysically speaking; 92 it is the same form with the same principles of action
directed to the same objects, surrounded, we might say to use
a comparison, by different circumstances not changing the
species of the objects.
,
The actual graces, then, are ordained to move a vital principle to its actions. The sacramental grace, by placing one in a
vital role in the supernatural life, is that which exacts the
actual helps from God that are necessary to accomplish that
role. We can say, then, that it is the disposition of the recipient
brought about by the res et .sacramentum, that exacts the
infusion of sacramental grace, and it is the latter which demands from God the necessary grace helps for the accomplishment of the ends of the sacrament.

The Growth of Sacramental Grace
'

Naturally speaking, anything that is vital or living is capable
of growth and development. This is no less true of sacramental
Oursus Theologicus, lX, q.
disp.
a.
n. U (Paris: Vives, 1885).
Nee potest dici quod gratia sanctificans sit vere et essentialiter genus metaphysicum gratiae sacramentalis; sic enim ex gratia sanctificante et gratia sacramentali fieret unus habitus essentialiter, sicut ex genere et difl'erentia fit unum, cum
tamen gratia sanctificans sit unius speciei atomae" ibid., n. 19.
81

92 "

ST. THOMAS ON NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL

GRACE

fl73

grace. This necessarily follows from the fact that it is entitatively the same as habitual grace, which is capable of
increase, since " progress in the motion of grace or in the
development of our spiritual life is according to the increase of
charity or grace." 98 Just as we say that the virtues and the
gifts become more radicated and intensified, so too, we can
say that the sacramentalized virtues, or the principles of our
sacramental actions corresponding to the sacramental duties
of a sacramental life, become more firm, more intense, and
more prompt.
Herein lies the beauty of this conception of the nature of
sacramental grace., The sacraments infuse into us or perfect
in us a new form, which is nothing short of grace itself, creating us, as it were, in a new existence, which is that of a son of
God. 94 For grace is given to us in the sacraments, to heal and
to elevate us communicating to us creatures a likeness of the
eternal natural filiation of the Son of God, 95 enabling us to
carry out, in a fitting and holy manner, the actions of our
position in a life which is specifically Christian " remedially
and perfectingly," to use an expression.
To a certain extent we may subscribe to the assertion of
several theologians who maintain that sacramental grace is not
given in its entirety at the moment of the reception of the
sacrament. Our manner of conceiving this growth is through
the increase or radication of the habitual gift of sanctifying
grace, adorned, so to speak, with a certain healing power and
strength flowing into the virtues and the actions which they
produce in our spiritual life. For them, however, its nature is
the ensemble of the gifts given in the sacrament and the consequent actual graces. 96 But as Fr. Neveut notes:
The Christian who is in the state of grace ought to have, more than
anyone else, a certain right to actual graces, and the more intense
••Summa Theol., 1-Il, q. 114, a. 8, c.
••Ibid., q. 118, a. 2, c.; q. 110, a. 2, ad 8; a. 8, c.
••Ibid., III, q. 28, a. I, ad 2, and a. 2, ad 8.
••Hurter, S. J., Theologiae Dogmaticae Compendium, III, n. 269.

274

CHARLES A. SCHLECK

that state of grace is, the greater should be his right. But the
question of the consequences of sacramental graces is different from
that which is concerned with their nature. 97

This growth of sacramental grace is had through the repeated
reception of a sacrament, and therefore, ex opere operato, or
through the performance of meritorious actions corresponding
to the requirements of a certain sacrament, and therefore, ex
opere operantis.
In a similar manner, the loss of sacramental grace is intimately bound up with habitual grace also. These special permanent helps given by sacramental grace are lost when the
latter is lost. For since it is only a modification of habitual
grace, whatever would destroy the latter would also destroy the
former.

*

*

*

We may sum up the thought of St. Thomas on the nature of
sacramental grace in the Summa under the following points:
1. Considering the efficient causality of the sacraments, the term

" gratia sacramentalis " refers not merely to the special effect
of the sacrament, but to the grace of the virtues and of the gifts
plus the special help or determination which it has under the
present economy and in accordance with the sacramental symbolism geared to meet the ends of the sacrament.
Considering sacramental grace in relation to its final and material causes we may conclude:
a. that the sacramental effect, insofar as it heals the soul,
brings with it the application of the satisfactory merits of
the Passion of Christ. For it is ordained to remove the
reatus poenae or the effects which sin has left in the soul,
and for which we remain under obligation to make atonement to God, or satisfaction.
b. that the sacramental effect, insofar as it perfects the soul,
is a determination or special help flowing from grace into
the principles of our supernatural ;tctions, the virtues,
strengthening and directing our spiritual life to meet the
requirements of the place we hold in it.
3. The special effect which it adds is not a habitus, insofar as its
••"La gr8.ce sacramentelle," Divus Thomas (Piacenza: 1935), XXXVIII, 285
(note 3).

ST. THOMAS ON NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL

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275

functions to heal and to perfect do not require a new form, but
rather affect another form, the grace of the virtues and of the
gifts, either per modum dispositionis specialis, or per modum
effectus specialis, depending on the genus of causality under
consideration. If we take it in the former sense, it is the res et
sacramentum secundum rationem sacramenti, according to which
it acts as an " ornatus animae," or a disposition for the principal
effect of the sacrament, the res tantum. If we take it in the
latter sense, it is the vigor specialis added to the grace of the
virtues and of the gifts.
4. Sacramental grace has a similar relation to consequent or subsequent actual graces given to accomplish the actions towards
which it is ordained, as does habitual grace. Similarly, its
growth or loss is like that of habitual grace, of which it is but
a modification.

*

*

*

GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In retrospect to our study, we see that any understanding
of the nature of sacramental grace must necessarily take into
consideration the fundamental notions of the tract on Grace
in General, especially the fact that all grace given to man after
the Fall has not only the aspect of elevans, but also that of
sanans. For the state of man after the Fall found him divested
of his seamless garment and demanded a grace that would
move him not from the position of one merely lacking something, but from the position of one lacking something that he
ought to have.
Because of our nature which is that of a spiritual and material composite, and because of sin which rendered us even
more estranged from the things of the spirit, this grace, as
something invisible, was to be given to us ordinarily through
sensible things which both signify and cause it in the Christian
economy that we know today. God made these sensible rites
correspond in their symbolism to certain phases or phenomena
which we encounter in our natural life, just as He explains the
most sublime mysteries of our Faith through the medium of
things which make up part and parcel of our everyday existence. For the benefit of man, therefore, lest it be too difficult

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CHARLES A. SCHLECK

if his sanctification were to be effected in a manner which would
wholly abstract from corporal action, 98 God instituted the
sacraments of the Christian life conforming us to Him, as we
make our reditus ad Deum in His Spirit as miniature " imagines
et splendores Patris."
Because the sacraments receive their efficacy to heal and to
elevate through the Passion of Christ, they are, as it were,
certain continuations of it, working the effects it worked, not
in a universal manner, but in a manner limited to the symbolism and signification of the sacramental rite. These "corporal
exercises" 99. would serve to arouse certain sentiments in man,
sentiments which would differ according to the various exercises, and which would act as so many different dispositions or
"ornatus" exacting, so to speak, the infusion of grace, in such
· a mode or manner as to make it capable of producing this or
that special effect toward which the exercise was ordained.
This specific corporal exercise was not to add anything by
way of a principle of action to the grace which was to come as
its effect; it was merely. to prepare the way for and induce into
the soul this grace specially extended, as Cajetan would say.
It was to do this, not by its own proper action, but in an instrumental capacity as elevated and moved by the principal agent
Who limits and determines the effect.
Although it is true that St. Thomas frequently compares the
special effects of the various sacraments to the virtues, this
comparison is not intended to equivocate their natures; it is
intended to show the dependence of these special effects on the
grace perfecting the essence of the soul. For they cannot be
had (at least as formed effects) without this grace, as neither
can the virtues.
The sacramental rite confers a " species " or a special type of
grace, or it gives grace in a certain manner. It causes this
special grace and the special disposition that accompanies it,
not as a principal cause but as an instrumental cause, which
God Himself, as the cause of both the special grace and the
••Summa Theol., III, q. 60, a. 1, c.

•• Ibid., ad. 2.

ST. THOMAS ON NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL

GRACE

277

special disposition, employs, to effect this or that special extension of the grace of the virtues and of the gifts. The special
effect which flows out of the grace of the virtues and of the gifts
is not an effect different from that which serves as a special
disposition for the " species " or mode of grace given. It is the
same effect, considered under another aspect in accordance with
the principle " causae sunt ad invicem causae, sed in diverso
genere."
Furthermore, the sacraments of the Christian life insofar as
they are continuations of the Passion of Christ, and of a Passion that has already been endured, apply to those who receive
them the full satisfactory merit of this Passion which we can
expect to have here on earth, always, however, a satisfactory
merit in accordance with the symbolism of the individual sacrament. Although the sacraments of the Old Law applied the
satisfactory merits of the Passion of Christ, they did so in a
limited manner, as we evince in the Holy Fathers of the Old
Testament, who were retained in inferos, not because of their
personal sins which were already atoned for in virtue of the
satisfactory.merits of Christ's Passion still to be enacted, but
because of the sin which affected their nature; for the satisfactory power of the Passion not ·yet endured did not reach
the reatus poenae of this sin.
We should also note that the special effect which each of the
sacraments produces, if considered as the disposition for sacramental grace, is the res et sacramentum of the particular
sacrament, not insofar as we consider it as a res, as an effect
of the sacramental action, but precisely insofar as we consider
it in its relation to the res tantum or the sacramental grace of
any one sacrament; that is to say, insofar as it is a sacramentum
and insofar as it is a signum. For it is a sacramentum when
joined to the external sensible sign; 100 it is a sign with regard
to the invisible grace conferred in the sacrament. 101
100 " ••• character baptismalis et corpus .Christi verum non dicuntur sacramenta
nisi secundum quod conjunguntur exterioribus signis sensibilibus." IV Sent., d. 1,
q. 1, a. 1, qcl. S, ad S.
101 Summa Tkeol., III, q. 68, a. S, ad 2.
N. B. Just as a grace corresponding to the res tantum of a sacrament can be

9l78

CHARLES A. SCHLECK

The Christian sacramental life has as its goal the restoration
of mankind, a restoration which extends not only to the mind,
but also to the body. 102 It was to bring back to us, in some
degree, while still here on earth, something of the perfect harmony of matter and spirit, to one another, and to their Creator,
which existed in the state of innocence. Even though this harmony does not attain to the perfection it had in our first
parents, nevertheless the very imperfections which remain have
a grandeur almost inconceivable. For by the various sacraments we either become members of Christ, or are more firmly
cemented to Him, resembling Him, participating in His work,
as we like other Simons of Cyrene help to carry the Cross of
the Son of Man with something of the Spirit with which He
Himself carried it.
The sacraments of the Christian life, however, were not to
effect actually any immortality such as Adam and Eve enjoyed
in the state of innocence. Those who receive the sacraments
remain under the necessity of undergoing the sufferings of the
present life. But the sacraments are the ordinary means by
which we are marked with a pledge 103 which will one day cause
that Sacrament from Whom all the sacraments of the Christian
life derive their efficacy, the "Magnum Pietatis Sacramentum," 104 to raise us to an immortality far surpassing that of
our first parents, insofar as we shall share in the glory, the joy,
and in the trumph of the Resurrection of Christ the Incarnate
Son of God.
CHARLES A. SCHLECK, c. s. c.
Holu Cross College
Washington, D. C.

given outside of the sacramental rite, so too an effect corresponding to and coinciding with the res et sacramentum qua sacramentum can be had outside of the
sacramental rite. Cf. Sylvester of Ferrara, Comm. in IV Cont. Gentiles, c. 72, n.
xviii; Leonine Ed. XV.
102 A.-D. Sertillanges, 0. P., L'Eglise (Paris:
1917), I, 228.
. 103 II Cor. 5: 5; Ephes. 1: 14.
10 • I Tim. 8: 16..

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS
FERRER SMITH, 0. P., S. T. Lr., S. T. D., is professor of dogmatic theology
at the Dominican House of Studies, Washington, D. C., and professor of history of modern philosophy at Trinity College in the
same city. He is co-author of Pref ace to Happiness in the " Guide_book to the Summa " series.
EDWARD T. SM_ITH, is assistant professor of philosophy at De Paul University, Chicago. He received his M.A. from The Catholic University of America and has completed his work for the Ph.D. at the
University of Ottawa.
KEVIN A. WALL, 0. P., S. T. Lr., S. T. L., is professor of philosophy at St.
Albert's College, the Dominican House of Studies, Oakland, California.
CHARLES A. SCHLECK, C. S. C., S. T. D., contributed his first installment in
our issue of January, 1955.
JAMES M. EGAN, 0. P., S. T. Lr., S. T. D., formerly professor of dogmatic
theology at the Collegio Angelicum, Rome, and frequent contributor
to THE THOMIST, is professor of theology at St. Mary's College, St.
Mary's, Indiana.
DAVID L. GREENSTOCK, T. 0. P., D. D., contributor to THE THOMIST, The
Clergy Review, and the Oiencia Tomista, is Vice-Rector and professor
at the English College, Valladolid, Spain.
RunoLF ALLERS, M. D., noted psychologist and author, is on the staff of
Georgetown University, Washington, D. C.
Lmus WALKER, 0. P., Ph.D., who obtained his doctorate at the University
of Michigan, is assigned to the Dominican House of Studies, Washington, D. C.

BOOK REVIEWS
Theologie Trinitaire chez St. Thomas D'Aquin.
Paris: Vrin, 1954. Pp. 156.

By PAUL VANIER, S.J.

St. Thomas' treatise on the Mystery of the Most Holy Trinity in the
Summa Theologiae is probably the most perfect piece of scientific theological
writing ever penned. In it the Angelic Doctor, with perfect consciousness
of the infinite distance between the divine reality and the human modes of
conceiving and expressing it, humbly utilized all the resources of faith and
reason to reach some understanding of the inner life of God. Much has
been written about this treatise of St. Thomas, but new studies are always
welcome. Fr. Vanier is here engaged in presenting a new interpretation of
the development of St. Thomas' thought and of his supposedly final position
arrived at only in the Summa.
The author starts with two well-established facts: the diverse approaches
of the Greek and Latin Fathers to the mystery of the Trinity; the preeminent influence on the Scholastics of Dionysius, a representative of the
Greek tradition, and of St. Augustine, a representative of the Latin tradition and himself the source, to a great extent, of that tradition.
In Chapter I the author is concerned with expressing these diversities.
The Greek Fathers, concerned primarily with the problem of the origin
of the Persons, tended" d'envisager la pluralite des Personnes divines dans
leur jaillissement du Pere, Divinitas fontalis. A cette etape, la speculation
trinitaire n'envisage pas directement la nature divine, hors des Personnes
du Pere par procession. Bien plus,
qui y participent et qui la
comme elle tire toute sa lumiere de la consideration de la fecondite du Pere,
cette theologie aura tendance a voir dans la creation l'oeuvre de celui-ci en
prolongement des processions." (p. 16)
Latin theology, on the other hand, (especially after Arianism) " manifestera davantage et directement l'unite de la nature divine et en consequence l'hiatus abyssal entre la divinite trine et la creation." (p. 16) This
diversity of approach had its effect on the concept of notional act: " Au
premier moment de la theologie trinitaire, l'action notionnelle se presenterait
sous la forme d'un jaillissement d'une Personne de l'autre. Certains ont vu
fa une utilisation du concept neoplatonicien d'emanation. Dans la theologie
trinitaire augustinienne, le concept de procession, qu'exploite l'analogie
psychologique, a pris une place capitale; mais ce concept s'attache davantage
a l'aspect essentiel des operations divines, ii les considere plutOt en tant
qu'attributs divins qu'en tant qu'actes personnels." (p. 18)
In Chapter II the author undertakes to show that among the Scholastics

280

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281

(up to St. Thomas in the Summa) trinitarian doctrine was basically
augustinian with an "antique" dionysian coating. The tell-tale sign of
dionysian influence is the notion of good diffusing itself. " Et c'est ainsi que
la perspective neoplatonicienne centree sur la source diffusive du Bien, attire
de nouveau, au Moyen Age, la theologie trinitaire vers les problemes de
l'origine des personnes." (p. 22) Another sign is detected in the formulas
employed: "Par ailleurs, n'oublions pas que tous les developpements
dionysiens, centres sur la Bonte du Pere, semblaient continuer une tradition
ininterrompue qui avait constamment use des formules archai:ques telles
que: Pater, divinitas fontalis; Pater, principium totius divinitatis; legs des
Peres
qu'Augustin, par respect peut-etre, avait manque d'eliminer de
sa propre theologie dont elles contredisaient pourtant toute la perspective."
(p. 23)
Chapter HI is devoted to the establishment of the presence of the
dionysian influence among St. Thomas' contemporaries. In Chapter IV the
author takes the first steps towards establishing his thesis, which is, that
only in the Summa has St. Thomas himself succeeded in divesting himself
of all traces of this same dionysianism. It is quite evident in the Quaestiones
Disputatae de Potentia, which are nevertheless basically augustinian. It
would be even more predominant in the Commentary on the Sentences if
the text we now possess had not been emendated by St. Thomas after he
had arrived at his later position.
(The author offers his proof for this
statement in the second part of his work, which we are not going to consider in this review).
In Chapter IV, the author begins his analysis of St. Thomas' trinitarian
teaching in de Potentia. He points out that the last four questions form a
little treatise on the Trinity. In a footnote (n. 3, p. 40) he adds: " Si on
relie cette Question (Q. VIII) a la deuxieme, l'etude de la relation vient
immediatement apres l'etude des processions divines, et elle fonde toute la
speculation trinitaire subsequent." Now since Q. H is going to be his
principal source of evidence that the dionysian outlook is still present in
de Potentia, it is surprising that the author does not indicate the subject
of Q. X, which is, " De Processione divinarum personarum."
How does the author go about showing this dionysian influence in the
de Potentia? First he quotes from Q. II, in which St. Thomas identifies the
potentia generandi with omnipotentia. It would be alarming if St. Thomas
did otherwise, since they are re eadem. St. Thomas clearly indicates the
distinction between them; this does not satisfy the author, who will not
admit that the diverse character of a Quaestio Disputata and a Summa are
sufficient explanation.
Next he seeks evidence in Q. IX, a. 4. Here St. Thomas cites Dionysius
in a Sed Contra and approves (p. 46) . This article is entitled: Utrum in
divinis sint tres personae tantum, an plures vel pauciores. St. Thomas gives

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BOOK REVIEWS

six Sed Contra arguments, using about every reason of convenience proposed by his predecessors. They are not used by the Saint in his own
response. But Fr. Vanier also quotes from the corpus of the article, but
from the second part, where St. Thomas turns to the vestige of the Trinity
in irrational creatures and the image in man for further confirmation of
the number Three. St. Thomas' formal argument, from the immanent processions, which is identical doctrinally with the Summa, is passed over. The
author might object that he had already admitted that de Potentia is also
augustinian and this passage is an example. But he cannot establish his
thesis by quoting dionysian influences on the periphery of a solution in de
Potentia. He must show that such influence prevented St. Thomas from
formulating his principal arguments in an adequate way.
The chief piece of evidence is taken from de Potentia, Q. VID, a. 3, where
a combination of texts from the ad 5um and ad 7um leads the author to
this conclusion: " St. Thomas qui a explicitement reduit a la relation tout
aspect personnel de la vie trinitaire, peut sans se contradire repeter les
affirmations dionysiennes de ses contemporains. Pour ce faire, ii distingue,
dans Ia relation subsistante de paternite, !'aspect relatif, subsequent pour
!'esprit a la generation, et !'aspect absolu qui s'identi:fie--meme pour !'esprit,
semble-tcil-avec !'essence divine commune aux trois personnes. Et alors,
percevant !'essence commune avant la generation, nous percevons a la fois
!'aspect absolu de la relation constitutive du Pere. Cest ainsi que !'esprit
saisit !'essence appartenant au Pere comme principe" (p. 44). In this review, all italics in quotations from Fr. Vanier are his. True, the wording
of the responses quoted, at :first glance, might lead one to think that St.
Thomas is speaking of an hypostasied essence, as he does elsewhere; hut in
ad 11um he clearly indicates his mode of conceiving the Father as a Person
before generation: " Hoc ergo ipsum quod est esse suppositum divinae
naturae, commune est tribus personis communitate rationis, licet tres
personae non sint unum suppositum, sed tria; sicut Socrates et Plato sunt
duo homines; Iicet esse hominis sit eis commune secundum rationem.
Differentia autem quaeritur non solum in illis in quibus est aliquid commune
secundum rem; sed in quibus est aliquid commune secundum rationem." In
the Summa, I, q. 80, a. 4, St. Thomas devotes the whole article to elucidating
this point: he is speaking of the" individuum vagum" and not" de !'aspect
absolu qui s'identi:fie -meme pour !'esprit, semble-t-il, avec !'essence commune aux trois personnes."
This is a crucial point and we might pause to ask ourselves the following
questions: If there were only one Person in God, would there be a distinction between person and nature? Could such a God become incarnate?
If He did, would the union be in Person and not in nature? And, finally, in
such a case, could we express the difference between person and nature
in God adequately, though less clearly than now, when we know that relation pertains to the constitution of the person?

BOOK REVIEWS

283

To return to our author's argument. We can readily admit that in the
text of de Potentia there are more passages with a dionysian tinge that can
be quoted out of context. But an objective study of St. Thomas' own
argumentation will show no change of position in the Summa, unless one
agrees that the doctrine Fr. Vanier finds there is truly that of St. Thomas.
We might add that practically all the formulas that Fr. Vanier accuses of
being dionysian recur in the Summa. There is not sufficient space to document this statement but it is easy to verify.
With Chapter VIII Fr. Vanier begins his consideration of the Summa. He
is much impressed by the fact that St. Thomas starts with the concept of
"procession" and does not mention "notional act" until much later.
"Ainsi pour la premiere fois, a notre connaissance, le concept d'action
notionelle est clairement distingue de celui de procession: ce dernier envisage
I'action immanente a la nature divine en tante que propriete indeterminee
de Ia nature, et l'autre en tant qu'attributable a la personnel." (p. 58)
Note, please, the phrase: "propriete indeterminee." Two pages later, the
author states: " Dans le concept de procession purifie de tout aspect
notionnel et, pour cette raison meme, si facile a scruter par l'analogie psychologique, le Docteur angelique obtenait la verite premiere de sa theologie
trinitaire scientifique; dans le concept distinct d'action notionelle, il ne
satisfait ultimement qu'a une exigence de l'esprit." (p. 60) Here note the
final part of the quotation: one would hesitate to accuse the author of
contempt for the " demands of the mind " on the basis of this statement
alone. But there are other instances, e.g., pp. 84, 86. In fact he indicates
no awareness of the importance of grammar and logic, especially the modi
significandi, in St. Thomas' formulation of trinitarian doctrine.
It must be confessed that Fr. Vanier's explanation of St. Thomas' concept of procession is difficult to interpret. He states: " Dans les trois
Questions suivantes (Summa, I, qq. 29-30), Saint Thomas argumente
toujours en considerant la nature divine en elle-meme et en tant qu'elle
inclut les trois personnes." (p. 63) It is true that St. Thomas shows
perfectly that the processions belong to the nature of God. The question is:
does he explain them as arising from a " propriete indeterminee " of the
nature. Assuredly not! Take for example his definition of generation, which
the author also quotes: "Sic igitur processio Verbi in divinis habet rationem
generntionis: procedit enim per modum intelligibilis actionis, quae est operatio vitae: et a principio conjuncto .... " (Summa, I, q. 27, a. 2, c.).
Notice: "per modum intelligilibilis actionis" together with "a principio
conjuncto." What is this "conjoined principle"? Nowhere does the author
avert to it, yet it is the sign that St. Thomas' explanation is formally
notional, though he does not reflexively advert to it as such in this place.
Nor need he; he has the datum of faith that there are real processions in
God.

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In Chapter IX Fr. Vanier presents his original interpretation of the
concept of person and nature in the Summa. He finds a marked
in the way St. Thomas conceives of person and nature in this work and
attributes to this the different view of notional act which he also finds there.
sum, he maintains that St. Thomas finally attributed to relation in its
proper being the constitution of the person as subsistent in the Trinity: in
previous works, the relation constituted the person only inasmuch as it was
identified with the essence. " En montrant comment la relation constitue
exclusivement la personne divine tant comme subsistante que comme
opposee aux autres personnes et distincte d'elles, saint Thomas acheve le
developpement du point crucial de la thoologie trinitaire augustinienne."
(p. 76)
Unfortunately, the arguments of the author are not sufficient to convince
us that St. Thomas has adopted such a position. First of all, the author
contrasts St. Thomas statements on the signification of person in the two
works under discussion. In de Potentia, Q. IX, a. 4, St. Thomas, discussing
the notion of person, makes a distinction between formal and material
signification; he clearly indicates the distinction between them - formal,
signifying the general concept, with notes valid for every person, material,
signifying the notes proper to a divine, angelic or human person. Here is
Fr. Vanier's reading of that distinction: "Dans le de Potentia, en effet,
saint Thomas disait que la relation n'etait incluse que materialiter dans la
signification du mot personne en Dieu. . . . Par consequent, le role de
l'essence est, semble-t-il, d'assurer formellement la subsistance de la personne
divine .... " (p. 70)
He next explains the position of St. Thomas in the Summa: " Si done,
dans la Somme, saint Thomas tient que le mot personne designe immediatement la relation, et la relation en tant meme que subsistante,-per modum
hypostasis relationem ut subsistentem-iI entend que la relation elle-meme,
dans son etre propre, subsiste comme personne divine; qu'elle-meme constitue le subsisteris distinctum in natura divina" (ibid.). There is no
mention (at least at this point) that the parallel place in the Summa is not
that cited by him on p. 71, fn.
this: "Ad evidentiam hujus quaestio.nis considerandum est quod aliquid est de significatione, minus communis,
quod tamen non est de significatione magis communis; . . . Similiter aliud
est quaerere de significatione huius nominis. persona in communi, et aliud
est de significatione personae divinae " (Summa, I, q.
a. 4, c.) .
Certainly the terminology " formaliter " and " materialiter " was misleading and hence St. Thomas changed it. He does not change his position
on the distinction between the common sigi{i:ficationof divine person. It is
only when St. Thomas begins to speak of a divine person that the problem
arises as to whether it signifies essence directly and relation obliquely, or
vice versa, or, in a very special sense, neither.

In

BOOK REVIEWS

In his effort to establish the point that St. Thomas in the Sum,ma places
the notion of person formally in relation, the author quotes only part of the
reply. Since this article is the key-stone of St. Thomas' treatise, the reader
will bear with us if we quote it more fully. "Persona igitur divina significat
relationem ut subsistentem. Et hoc est significare relationem per modum
substantiae quae est hypostasis subsistens in divina natura; licet subsistens
in natura divina non sit aliud quam natura divina. Et secundum hoc verum
est quod hoc nomen persona significat relationem in recto et essentiam in
obliquo; non tamen relationem inquantum relatio, sed inquantum significatur per modum hypostasis. Similiter etiam significat essentiam in recto,
et relationem in obliquo, inquantum essentia idem est quod hypostasis;
hypostasis ai.item significatur in divinis ut relatione distincta; et sic relatio
per modum relationis significata cadit in ratione personae in obliquo."
As we noted above, Fr. Vanier quotes this text without citing the second
part, beginning, "Similiter etiam .... " Of it he says: "Cette proposition, preferee maintenant par saint Thomas, est la contraire meme de celle
du De Potentia qui tenait que relatio includitur oblique in significatione
personae divinae." (p. 69) In a footnote (ibid., fn. 8) he adds: "Dans
la Somme, saint Thomas ne refuse pas toute verite a cette formule. II ne
l'accepte cependant plus comme la meilleure." If we reread St. Thomas'
full text, it becomes difficult for us to understand how Fr. Vanier can state
which formula St. Thomas expresses a preference for; the " similiter etiam "
indicates an equality. But Fr. Vanier misses the cardinal point in both
formulas: St. Thomas states as clearly as possible that person in God
signifies: either "relatio" -"non tamen in quantum est relatio," but insofar
as it signifies " per modum substantiae quae est hypostasis subsistens in
natura divina: " or " essentia," yet not as " essentia," but " inquantum
essentia idem est quod hypostasis." Note the repetition in both formulations
of the words: "per modum substantiae" or "per modum hypostasis."
What St. Thomas is saying is this: divine person (e.g., the First) does not
signify" paternity" (this would be" relatio ut relatio "); it does not signify
"divine nature" or" divine essence" (this would be "essentia ut essentia,"
"natura ut natura "): it signifies either "Pater Deus" (this is "relatio
per modum hypostasis ") or" Deus Pater" (this is "essentia per modum
hypostasis" and "distinctum relatione subsistens.") Note also the number
of times the word " signified " is used in that key text.
In the first part of the corpus of this article St. Thomas cites various
positions of his predecessors and contemporaries on this question of what
"person" means when applied to God. The last position is thus worded:
" Quidam vero dixerunt e converso quod significat relationem in recto, et
essentiam in obliquo quia in definitione personae natura ponitur in obliquo."
Now is this not the position that Fr. Vanier attributes to St. Thomas? Yet

BOOK REVIEWS

of it, the Saint says: " Et isti propinquius ad veritatem accesserunt." In
other words, they haven't hit the exact truth yet.
The author might object at this point and say that the opinion to which
St. Thomas is referring does not predicate subsistence of the relation
precisely as relation; whereas St. Thomas does. But let us read another part
of this same article and see what St. Thomas says: this immediately precedes the long quotation above. " Distinctio autem in divinis non fit nisi
per relationes originis, ut dictum est supra. Relatio autem in divinis non
est sicut accidens inhaerens in subjecto, sed est ipsa divina essentia; unde
est subsistens sicut divina essentia subsistit. Sicut ergo Deitas est Deus,
ita paternitas divina est Deus Pater, qui est persona divina." Fr. Vanier
also quotes this text (p. 71, In. Q) , but he underscores "est subsistens."
This may draw attention away from the " unde," it does not obliterate it.
How can St. Thomas more clearly indicate his thought that the relation
is subsistent precisely insofar as it is identified with the divine essence.
Yet tl1e author insists that "c'est la relation en tant qu'elle subsiste dans
son etre meme qui constitue Jes personues et les distiugue pour notre esprit
de !'essence divine." (p. 76)
Perhaps the author's most serious misreading of a text of St. Thomas
occurs in what might seem to be a point of minor importance, yet the
statement of St. Thomas is not merely an aspect of his theological system;
it is, in my opinion, definable. Let us reverse the author's procedure and
quote the text of St. Thomas first. The subject is the " potentia generandi "
in God. " Respectu illarum actionum secundum quas aliquae res producuntur distinctae a Deo, vel essentialiter vel personaliter, potest attribui
potentia secundum propriam rationem principii. Et ideo sicut potentiam ponimus creandi in Deo, ita possumus ponere potentiam generandi vel spirandi.
Sed intelligere et velle non sunt tales actus qui designent processionem alicujus
rei a Deo distinctae, vel essentialiter vel personaliter. Unde respectu horum
actuum non potest salvari ratio potentiae in Deo, nisi secundum modum
intelligendi et significandi tantum; prout diversimode sig11ificatur in Deo
intellectus et intelligere, cum tamen ipsum intelligere Dei sit eius essentia,
non habens principium " (Summa, I, q. 41, ad 4, ad 3). Here St. Thomas
is considering various actions, which, according to our way of thinking, we must attribute to God. There are two sets: those according to
which something really distinct proceeds, either essentially, i.e., creation,
or personally, i.e., generation and spiration; those according to which nothing really distinct proceds, i.e., thinking and 'villing. For the first there is
real potency in God; for the second, potency is predicated "secundum
modum intelligendi et significandi tantmn."
Now here is Fr. Vanier's reading of this text, in which he arrives at the
contradictory conclusion regarding the "potentia generandi et spirandi."
"II demeure cependant que nous n'avons affaire, ici encore, qu'a un con-

BOOK REVIEWS

cept dont le but n'est que de satisfaire aux exigences de notre esprit. Car,
en Dieu, !'intelligence n'est pas principe reel de l'intellection, qui s'identifie
a elle et constitue en meme temps la generation; bien que notre esprit
conc;oive cette nature intelligente comme principe de la generation intellectuelle. II en va tout autrement de la puissance de creer. Celle-ci designe
}'essence divine comme principe reel de la creature, qui differe reellement de
Dieu." (p. 87) Here the author separates the " potentia creandi " from the
" potentia generandi et spirandi,'' which St. Thomas has clearly joined together. He then admits a real "potentia creandi,'' and denies a real
" potentia generandi et spirandi,'' because he confuses generation with intellection and spiration with volition, which St. Thomas carefully distinguishes. Possibly the author is not quite aware of what he is saying here.
Previously he made this statement: "L'essence divine n'est ni reellment
principe d'une action dont elle n'est pas reellment distinct, ni rellement
distincte de la personne perc;ue comme sujet de l'action." (p. 86} This is a
quite accurate statement; hence when St. Thomas explicitly states that the
" potentia generandi vel spirandi " is real, he obviously does not mean that
there is a real distinction between the Person, the act, and the potency.
Personally I am grateful to the author for having given me this opportunity to return to the great texts of St. Thomas on the mystery of the
Most Holy Trinity. A long-held conviction has been strengthened that St.
Thomas' formulation of trinitarian doctrine is, in essentials, the same in all
his works. Development took place in terminology, distinctions, presentation. He has also turned attention to the divergence between the East and
West in the formulation of trinitarian doctrine. St. Thomas was aware of
this divergence and he consciously strove to preserve the truth in each
position. He also succeeded. Much more work could be done on this aspect
of his teaching; for it will assume greater importance in the future. The
Christian community is hoping and praying that the day will be hastened
on which the Oriental dissidents will be united to Rome. One obstacle to
mutual understanding both before and after that day will be traditional
ways of conceiving the revealed doctrine of the Triune God. A humble
service that could be performed by theology to smooth the ways would be
a rethinking of both traditions in the light of the magnificient formulations
of St. Thomas.
JAMES M. EGAN, 0. P.
St. Mary's College
St. Mary's, Indiana

11

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Sacraments in Christian Life. By M. M. PHILIPON, 0. P. Translated
by John Otto. Wesminster: Newman, 1954. Pp. 410. $4.fl5.

In this present work Fr. Philipon develops a theme which is becoming
increasingly popular with modern spiritual writers, namely, the application to the modern world of St. Paul's doctrine that the Christian is another
Christ. The author points out that this identification is achieved by means
of the sacraments and the Sacrifice of the Mass. " For me to live is Christ "
is therefore the main idea behind the work. By means of the sacraments
the historic Christ becomes the Savior and the model of the individual soul,
not merely as an individual, but also as a member of the Mystical Body.
In fact, one of the merits of this book is undoubtedly the consideration
given to the social nature of the Sacraments.
In dealing with Baptism as an incorporation in Christ's death and
resurrection the author brings out the full force of St. Thomas' graphic
phrase " to each baptised person the Passion of Christ is imparted as if he
himself had suffered and died on the Cross." In this section one can
detect the influence on the author of Dom Marmion. This incorporation is
perfected by Confirmation, and in this chapter Fr. Philipon has many
interesting things to say. The perfection of the Word Incarnate is the
model for those who have been confirmed. They should be perfect Christs
in the modem world. In case this ideal appears too high we should remember that the grace of God must not be minimized. It is all-powerful
and abundant. In this connection the gifts of the Holy Ghost are explained
simply but adequately.
The chapters on the Holy Eucharist both from the sacramental and the
sacrificial aspects are very good indeed. The author points out how
impossible it is to reach a full understanding of the Mass if the sacramental
nature of the Sacrifice is neglected. This return to the simplicity and the
depth of St. Thomas' explanation of the Mass is refreshing and satisfying.
The fundamental idea of the Eucharist is brought out in these chapters and
they should provide excellent material for meditation. People who are in
love naturally have the urge to live together in a common life-and this has
found its highest expression in Holy Communion. The section dealing with
the Mass as the Sacrifice of the Total Christ is excellent both for its
doctrine and the way the liturgy is used to bring home the author's main
theme-that the Mass is the offering of Christ and the Church acting as one.
In the chapter on Penance there is plenty of matter for all souls, from
those who are still in mortal sin to those who are in the higher stages of the
spiritual life. By the redeeming power of Christ applied to the soul in this
sacrament the sinner is made one with the innermost sentiments of love and
expiation which filled the soul of Christ when He died for the salvation of
all men. This thought is useful for those who live in a civilization which has

BOOK REVIEWS

not only lost the sense of sin but also of expiation. The role of Penance in
the struggle for Christian perfection is also developed as a continuation of
the sanctifying power of Christ who came not to call the just, but sinners.
The author's treatment of the sacrament of Matrimony is both masterly
and extensive. If the doctrine contained in these chapters were sufficiently
meditated and put into practice the life of the Church would be far richer
in every way. The teaching outlined by Fr. Philipon is the only basis on
which a truly Christian married life can possibly be developed. Moreover,
he has the art of bringing the vital spiritual principles into every-day application, as, for instance, when he indicates that the basic law of Christian
love is the gift of self. The lack of this spirit of self-sacrifice is the main
reason for many broken homes and unsatisfactory marriages. The intimate
union with Christ, whose love led Him to give His life for us, is the secret of
the unity, indissolubility and faithfulness of the true Christian marriage.
The same principle is then applied to the birth and education of children,
which is from the educational point of view a continual bringing forth of
life in God. Here Fr. Philipon has many useful things to say with regard
to the training of the senses, especially through the virtues of fortitude and
temperance, the education of the mind and that of the will. The family
is truly the school of holiness. The section on conjugal spirituality is very
practical, since it accepts as its basic principle that man and wife are
called upon to become holy in the company of each other and through each
other. The community of bed and board has to be completed by a common
life of suffering and prayer. The author has some stringent criticisms to
make of the modern attitude towards family life and suggests the need for a
strong government program to deal with the evil.
The sacrament of Orders receives very full treatment both as it applies
to priests and also to bishops. There is also a section on the pope. The
social aspect of the sacrament is stressed and also the active cooperation
of the lay apostolate of Catholic Action in all its forms. Once again the
main theme is oneness with Christ as Mediator and also in His adoration,
expiation, thanksgiving and petition. The priest is essentially another Christ
because the sacramental character bestows on him the priestly power of
Christ and also because the grace of the sacrament conforms his soul to that
of Christ, the Mediator and Redeemer.
When dealing with Extreme Unction Fr. Philipon insists, with St. Thomas,
that the full purpose of this sacrament is to bring the soul to a state of
perfect holiness, so that it may be ready for the immediate vision of God
face to face. Even after a long life of sin, if the Christian receives the
sacrament of the dying with the appropriate dispositions, he will go straight
to heaven without having to go to purgatory. The reason is that Extreme
Unction is to Penance what Confirmation is to Baptism-its perfection. It
is the perfect purification, removing every last trace of sin and completing
the action of
in the soul. The author is careful to point out th.a,t

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the grace of this sacrament adapts itself in a remarkable way to the needs of
the individual soul-a truth which can apply equally to all the sacraments.
The final chapter of the book deals with eternal life in Christ and covers
a wide field, including the judgment, purgatory, limbo and heaven.
DAVID

L. GREENSTOCK

English College
Valladolid, Spain

Tacke, Reussite et Echec: Theorie de la conduite humaine. By JOSEPH
NuTTIN. Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1953. Pp. 530.
This work by the distinguished psychologist of Louvain aims at the
development of a comprehensive theory of human conduct by utilizing the
data of experimental and clinical psychology. This data is envisaged impartially without any prejudicial conceptions of what psychology or human
behavior ought to be. For this reason, this work of Professor Nuttin, as
well as his previous work, is genuinely scientific, for it is objective, critical
and free of pre-conceived ideas. The experiments are cleverly devised and
carefully evaluated. But the author likewise shows that the existing
literature on his topic and related topics has been carefully considered; here
one notes with gratification a thorough acquaintance with recent American
publications. Moreover this work is by no means restricted to the. findings
with which a so-called " objective " or " scientific " psychology is accustomed-or perhaps one should say, was accustomed-to be satisfied.
The author points out that his approach and his view of man as placed
within a situation or world differs from the approach and view of certain
contemporary philosophies which emphasize that one of the constitutive
aspects of the human being is to exist in a world. Nevertheless it seems
evident that these new movements in philosophy and philosophical anthropology have exercised a certain influence. Continental medical psychology
has in fact responded to these suggestions of the new philosophies much
more than general or experimental psychology. Moreover, two studies have
recently been published here dealing with these matters: Stern's work on
Sartre's philosophy and psychoanalysis and Sonneman's Existence and
Therapy which discusses Heidegger's ideas and Binswanger's application of
them to therapy. The psychiatrist or psychotherapist becomes aware in his
daily dealing with clients of the intricate relations existing between the
individual and his world. Now this work's experimental investigations and
their analysis show that these problems can also be approached from the
standpoint of general psychology. Thus Professor Nuttin's treatise is important not only to the philosopher who is concerned with the problems
of human nature in general, its motivation and conduct but also to the

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291

psychologist whether he is occupied only with the speculative problem or
whether he intends to apply his scientific insights to the practical problems
of therapy or education. Most particularly, however, this work is important
to the last class, to those whose task it is to advise others, to direct, and
if need be, to correct the behavior of others.
In the work itself, the author explains that human behavior depends first
of all on the idea or image a person has of himself; it is this conception of
self which determines a man's outlook on his situation and his possibilities.
Secondly, the results· of his actions react on this self-conception. Here it is
not the mere repetition of trial and error, nor the mechanism of establishing
an "S-R bond" or any similar process conceived more or less on the
pattern of physical reaction which determines human conduct. It is the
manner in which the individual evaluates his prior experiences and the
shaping of his self-conception by his knowledge of success or failure which
plays the most important role.
Since an exhaustive report on the findings and the analysis of the findings contained in this work is impossible, it will be sufficient here to indicate the field covered, which can be gleaned from the titles of the various
parts of the work. The introduction outlines some general viewpoints: the
determination of conduct by the personality and by the results attained,
both factors interfering with each other. Part I deals with the effect success
has on personality. Here it is shown that the subject's interpretation of the
results depends on his basic attitudes or self-interpretation.
Likewise the manner in which past experiences are recalled as successes or
failures depends to an unsuspected extent on this self-interpretation. Part
II goes on to discuss the relation of obtained results to further conduct,
especially to learning. Obtained results here are modified by the manner in
which they appear to the object. In this section there is a penetrating
critique of various theories of learning, particularly of the so-called " law of
effect." A great number of these comments and observations are most
pertinent to practical problems of education, teaching and guidance. The
final part summarizes the major points and develops a comprehensive
theoretical interpretation. One of the outstanding features of this interpretation is the emphasis given the cognitive element in human behavior in
contradistinction to those conceptions of human behavior which speak of it
as determined by needs, drives or other factors more e>r less mechanical.
In the light of such discussion, the book achieves an additional pertinence
for moral psychology in regard to the range in which man's actions are free
or limited by natural conditions.
Professor Nuttin's work is recommended to all concerned with its subject-matter not only by reason of the thoroughness of treatment but also
by its clarity of exposition.
RUDOLF ALLERS

Georgetown University
Washington, D. C.

BOOK REVIEWS

A Study of History. By ARNOLD TmiNBEE. Vols. VH-X.
Oxford University Press, 1954. $35.00.

New York:

The Lie About the West. By DouGLAS JERROLD. New York:
Ward, 1954. Pp. 85. $1.75.

Sheed &

The writings of Professor Arnold Toynbee have received a warm welcome in America since the last war. Perhaps this is because the intensifying
world crisis has made us all wonder whether our civilization may not also
perish, like all the others known to history. Perhaps it is also because
Professor Toynbee stresses the importance of freedom and activity in history, and because he points to an unending natural, spiritual progress in a
religion without creeds.
Toynbee's view of history is universal, comprising all known ages and
places on earth. His aim is " to throw some light on the mysterious unfolding of human life through time-space." (Civilization on Trial, N. Y.:
Oxford, 1948, preface) For him the smallest intelligible unit of history is
a whole civilization, not a national state like England. Toynbee's key to
the riddle of history is his hypothesis of challenge and response. According
to this theory, the rise and fall of civilizations result from the successful or
unsuccessful response of a society to a physical or moral challenge. There
are four stages in every civilization: 1) Birth, when the initial challenge,
usually physical, coming from the geographical environment, is met;
Growth, in which material obstacles are overcome and there is a progress
in meeting spiritual (moral) challenges; 3) Breakdown, which is caused by
the failure to meet a moral challenge; 4) and finally Disintegration. The
last is characterized by three conflicting classes: a dominant minority,
which establishes a universal state, like the Roman Empire; an internal
proletariat, which creates a universal church, like Christianity;· and an external proletariat, which produces barbarian war bands and attacks the
dying civilization from without. There is a rhythm of dissolution in a dying
civilization, following a pattern of rout-rally-rout, as rebellions are put down
or as various invasions are repelled only to occur again.
Toynbee tells of the genesis of his hypothesis in the first chapter of
Civilization on Trial and in his Study, vol. I, pp.
Finding race and
environment inadequate explanations of the rise and fall of civilizations and
Spengler's theory too rigid and deterministic, he turned to mythology and
received his inspiration from Goethe's Faust. In the prologue to this poem,
the heavenly choirs are praising the works of God, which are so perfect that
there is no room for His further creative activity. Fortunately, however,
God is freed from this impasse by the Devil, who challenges God to allow
him to spoil the perfection of one of His noblest creatures. God's response
is to accept the challenge and thus gain the opportunity of continuing and
advancing His creative activity.

BOOK REVIEWS

Toynbee's challenge and response are closely related to Hegel's thesis and
antithesis. He considers Hegel's account of creation an "academic abstract of the living truth," which " makes nonsense of it " by reducing it to
the purely logical process of the absolute intellect (Study, IX, 395). Hegel's
idealistic, pantheistic evolution is a dialectical process. It is dialectical because its dynamic force is a conflict of opposites-being and non-being,
thesis and antithesis-which are resolved in a higher synthesis, becoming.
This synthesis when opposed by its negation results in a new ascent in the
evolutionary spiral. Hegel's philosophy is pantheistic because the absolute
spirit (Hegel's " God ") is in each and all things. It is idealistic because
this evolutionary process is the purely logical workings of the absolute
spirit.
Toynbee in asserting the reality of matter and spirit, drops the idealism
of Hegel, and denies the pantheism, though he seems unable to avoid it
entirely. He keeps the dialectical evolution but rejects the determinism of
Hegel, for the will of man is free, being determinable by an infinite number
of possible objects. Although he does not claim to have discovered any
absolute, universal laws of history, he does find some apparently constant
patterns according to which men freely work out their destiny. The most
universal one is challenge and response. All progress results from a static
condition (a thesis in Hegelian terms) being challenged by some dynamic
force (antithesis). The resulting response gives genesis and growth (synthesis, becoming) . Such was the beginning, for example, of the Egyptian
civilization, which resulted from a. double challenge and response. 1) There
was a static condition when primitive men lived in the grasslands of North
Africa. Then there was a challenge when these lands became a desert at
the end of the ice age. Men responded by moving.
Some moved to the
Nile delta, were challenged again by the marshy land there, and responded
by draining it and founding a great civilization.
In 1953 Toynbee gave a series of radio lectures which were published
under the title of The World and the West. He viewed the present world
crisis as the result of a response by the rest of the world (Russia and the
Orient) to the challenge of continued Western aggression. Drawing a parallel
between Western and the declining Roman Civilization, he thought it
likely that the West would be converted to a new religion coming from the
East, as Rome had been converted to Christianity. He hoped that this new
religion would retain the Christian belief in a God of Love but would drop
Christian dogmatic exclusiveness for the more tolerant attitude of India.
(Letter to The Times Literary Supplement, Apr. 16, 1954)
Mr. Douglas Jerrold, an English Catholic historian, has written his
response to Professor Toynbee's challenge. His first response is to challenge Toynbee's facts. The West, he says, has not been continually aggressive. On the contrary, it was on the defensive for a thousand years

BOOK REVIEWS

agaii1st the Northmen, the Magyars, and against Islam. The East has
been aggressive too. Islam was a threat to Christendom from 700-1600 A. D.
The Russian hegemony has steadily expanded from 1480 to the present,
except for a brief set-back in 1918. Nor was Rome consistently aggressive.
She was on the defensive for centuries against barbarian hordes on her
north and east.
Mr. Jerrold also challenges Toynbee's logic. Because of his dialectical
theory of history, Jerrold thinks he too often forces historical facts into preconceived patterns. He creates an entity, "the West," which he does not
clearly define, then treats it as though it were a real unity, like one man or
one government, with a continual life and consistent policy. He makes it
appear to have such a policy by identifying any single aggressive Western
power with the entire West-for example, Germany in 1918 and 1941.
But in both wars the other Western powers were on Russia's side.
Finally Jerrold accuses Toynbee of treason against the faith of the West.
Christianity was not one of many Oriental, exotic religions imported to
Rome. It was preached by a Roman citizen. It was based on historical
fact and is therefore unique and binding. By questioning the unique value
of our Christian faith, our political institutions, our economic freedom, our
independent families, Toynbee spreads doubt against all the basic values
which the West has derived from Graeco-Roman civilization and from
Christianity. And by spreading doubt, he promotes the downfall of our
world.
By hurling the pebble of his little book at Goliath, Mr. Jerrold has scored
a hit, but has not slain his enemy. In the first place, his book is an answer
to Toynbee's series of lectures, not to the ten volume Study. In the second
place it is indignant and polemical in tone. Consequently The Lie About
the West will not appeal to professional historians because its language
is not restrained and scholarly. In the third place some of Jerrold's arguments are not convincing, for example, that Christianity was preached by a
Roman citizen, arose within the Roman Empire, and was therefore not a
foreign importation to Rome. For St. Paul was a Roman only de jure; the
Jews were a conquered people; and Jewish and Christian beliefs were alien
to Roman culture. Finally, Jerrold seems a little too patriotic in his defence
of the West, a little too unwilling to allow a modicum of truth to Toynbee's
arguments. He tends to identify the West with Christianity and to ignore
the apostasy of the Western powers. He" gasps" (p. 66) because Toynbee
says that " the spiritual initiative . . . has now passed, at any rate for the
moment, from the Western to the Russian side." But this is true enough
to make the reader weep, not gasp. Toynbee is referring to the ability of
Communism to inspire men to sacrifice for a cause. As he says (Times
Literary Supplement, Apr. 16, 1954), "Leviathan-Juggernaut has overtrumped our little idol-homunculus."
He means that the false common

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295

good and diabolical world society of Communism have made a greater appeal to many men than the goal of a secular, capitalistic individualismwealth, utility, and pleasure for every man.
Fundamental to Toynbee's way of thinking are his ideas on religion. The
section on " Universal Churches," therefore, is the most important one in
the new volumes of the Study and will be the principal source of what is
said below. Toynbee gives a religious interpretation to history, seeing
spiritual meaning and purpose in it. Religion is the end of civilization,
which exists to promote it. Toynbee has no naive belief in a steady and
inevitable material progress. His standard of progress is spiritual, not bigness or technical efficiency. All this we can only applaud.
Then in some places Toynbee seems at first glance to be sympathetic to
the Catholic view of things. For him the historic Church is the Catholic
Church, which is united by two great institutions: the Sacrifice of the Mass
and the hierarchy. (Civilization on Trial, p. 242) The Catholic Church was
the animating principle of Western Civilization, not a mere cocoon for its
genesis. The pope, " the Vicar of Christ," is its spiritual leader. (Study,
IV, 583) The Renaissance and Reformation were symptoms of cultural
sickness. The saints are our models for religious conduct.
But the context of such statements reveals that in using the language of
the Church, Toynbee does not mean what the Church means at all. His
theory of religion is naturalistic and evolutionary. It is influenced by
Modernism, which Toynbee praises. (VII, 456) Much of what St. Pius X
said in the first part of Pascendi is applicable to Toynbee. As we have
said above, Hegel seems to be his father: the evolutionary spiral of religious
progress moves on as a result of the conflict of opposites. Man is naturally
religious. As he progresses materially, however, he tends to idolize the
things which serve him-the forces of nature, a deified leader, or a totalitarian state. He does so because each spiritual advance causes its opposite.
The spiritual flowering under St. Benedict, for example, brought great
wealth and power to the monasteries which caused a spiritual decline and
eventually the suppression of the monasteries. The monks failed to meet
the challenge posed by their prosperity. On the other hand, the tribulations
of the Jews (a challenge) during the Babylonian captivity inspired
"Deutero-Isaiah"
to write the canticles of the suffering servant (a
response).
Toynbee finds antithesis at the core of all religious belief, causing new
beliefs in old religions and sometimes entirely new religions. The " feminine
epiphany of the Godhead " as Mother is opposed to the " masculine epiphany" as Father. The "forbidding aspect" of God as a jealous judge is
opposed to and difficult to reconcile with the " consoling aspect " as a forgiving" loving Saviour." Religion as social worship under a priest is opposed to individual, intimate communion with God. And so on. (cf. VII.

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BOOK BEVIEWS

716) · These conflicts are facile and misleading. First God is neither
masculine nor feminine; the masculine gender is used in referring to Him
because it expresses greater perfection. Second, He is a terrible judge only
if we place ourselves outside His mercy by sin. Third, it is a fact that some
saints have been most intimate with God in ecstasy during Mass.
Toynbee recognizes four " higher religions " or " universal churches," each
of which emphasizes one or the other pole of an antithesis: Christianity,
Islam, Hinduism, and Mahayana Buddhism. Each corresponds to, is
caused by, and serves some phychological characteristic of man. Following
Jung, Toynbee classifies Christianity and Islam as extrovert religions, tending to God as outside, transcendent; whereas Hinduism and Buddhism are
introvert religions, tending to God as within, immanent. He describes the
four according to Jung's four functions of the mind. Christianity emphasizes feeling in the doctrine that God is Love. Hinduism stresses thinking in seeing God as omnipresent. Islam, following sensation, teaches that
religion is a fact and that Allah is Power. Buddhism by intuition has
discovered that the desire for existence is the cause of evil and that escape
lies in the extinction of desire-Nirvana.
This classification depends on the reduction of the living religions to four,
which does not seem to be consistent with fact. It also depends on the
psychology of Jung, which is not entirely satisfactory. It might be possible
to reconcile thinking, feeling, and sensation with the Thomistic psychology,
but what is intuition? Is it instinct or an unscientific use of reason? One
must also ask, are not all faculties of the mind and all character types
represented in those who follow each of Toynbee's four religions? Were the
founders of these religions of the type corresponding to their religion? Did
Christ " feel " only ·and suppress thinking into His subconscious, while
Buddha made an " intuition " and suppressed sensation?
Toynbee professes belief in a transcendent God, but his God is apparently
finite and subject to limitations. (I, !i!79-!i!80) It is difficult to see how
Toynbee can escape ·the charge of pantheism, or at least andratheism, to coin
a word from the Greek, for God is the " Dweller in the Innermost," that is,
in the subconscious depths of the soul. (VII, 501) Perhaps like the
Modernists Toynbee confuses the action of God and the action of human
nature, thus confounding man's being and God's being, the natural and the
supernatural. (cf. Pascendi, 19) It need hardly be said that Toynbee tacitly
assumes the impossibility and inappropriateness of a special, supernatural
revelation through the external signs of miracles and prophecy and through
an internal, supernaturally infused propheti<; light. Miracles and special
revelations are classed by him as "myths" and "legends." Our Lady iii
his hands becomes an " etherealized " pagan goddess, her Annunciation a
Christ too is a " transfigured "
universal myth " transfigured." (I,
Mithras or Adonis. (VII, 437) Here Toynbee seems to be using the

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297

Modernist notion of "'transfiguration "-the elevating of a historical fact
above its true historical conditions so that by faith it becames clothed with
"religious truth." (cf. Pascendi, 9)
In developing his parallel between Christ and the pagan fertility gods,
Toynbee refers to Christ's "divesting" Himself of divine power in the
Incarnation and quotes Philippians 2 : 7, where St. Paul speaks of Christ's
"emptying Himself." But the context of this passage belies such an
interpretation, as do many other passages of the gospels and epistles, for
example, Colossians 2: 9, where we are told that in Christ" dwells all the
fullness of the Godhead bodily .... " St. Thomas explains that Christ
emptied Himself not in putting off the divine nature but in taking up a
human nature.
Philippenses, II, i, # 57)
Consequently there is no parallel between the Word Incarnate, who
suffered and died as Man through an assumed human nature, and a pagan
fertility god, who by nature dies and is reborn again as the greenness of the
earth dies in the autumn and is reborn in the spring. The evolution of Our
Lord and Lady out of pagan divinities is not a demonstrated fact, nor is
it even demonstrable.
Toynbee exalts flux, change, and becoming because of his hypothesis of
progressive evolution in history. Consequently a closed body of divine
revelation is an abomination to him, for religion, which evolves from within
man, must be constantly changing, adapting itself to changing human needs.
Fixed creeds only thwart this development. Our response to this is that any
progression is a movement towards an end. Objective revelation has reached
its end, having been completed with the death of St. John. It therefore
need not develop further. But subjective religion can and must progress,
for we must constantly advance in our penetration and practice of objective
revelation.
Consequently it is evident that Toynbee reads something that is not there
into the gospels which he quotes so often in support of his thesis and
into George Herbert's Pulley. (VII, 462) Herbert did not say that we
must give up our old beliefs for new as the price of advancing, but only that
as long as we are wayfarers towards God we cannot rest. Toynbee quotes
the process of canonization of St. Thomas Aquinas to illustrate his argument. (VII 484, n.) St. Thomas, however, did not change his beliefs when
after his ecstasy he could no longer write and considered all his writings
merely straw. For the process of canonization also tells of St. Thomas'
magnificent profession of faith in the Blessed Sacrament and his submission
of all his writings to the Church when he received Holy Viaticum.
Behind Toynbee's religious relativism is his false dichotomy of man's
faculties into the reason and the unconscious and of truth into the truth of
science and the truth of religion. Following the Modernists, Toynbee classifies historical fact as pertaining to science and reason and religious doctrines

BOOK REVIEWS

to faith and the unconscious. (cf. Pascendi, 16, SO) As a result he makes
religion something sub-rational, anti-rational. He unjustly accuses St. Pius
X of condemning Modernism for holding " that there is no ground for
collision between Faith and Science." (VII, 485, n.) Actually the condemnation was of the reasons of the Modernists in holding this, as the context of
the passage will show. (Pascendi, 16) It is a commonplace of Catholic
teaching that there can be no real conflict between true science and true
religion, because Truth, which is one, embraces both. Truth consists in the
correspondence of the mind to the objective reality. Therefore it cannot be
true by faith that Gou is a Trinity and that Jesus Christ is true God and
true Man, while at the same time according to science these statements are
not true.
Sister doctrines to the theory of the double truth in Toynbee's writings
are the equivalence of all philosophical systems and the futility of theology.
Philosophies are the by-products of civilizations such as the Hellenic or
Indic and are all ephemeral. At best theology makes only a verbal reconciliation between "scientific truth and prophetic truth." (VII, 474-476)
Creeds, we are told, are the product of theology. This is an egregious
error. Creeds pertain to faith and need not use theological language at all.
The deducing of conclusions from the creeds is the work of theology.
Toynbee accuses theologians of a refined form of anthropomorphism in
conceiving of God in terms of feeling, will, and intellect. They worship an
idol-" God the Reason." (VII, 467-68) But Toynbee overlooks the role
of analogy in theology. Theologians do not place God and creatures in the
same species. They speak of God and creatures analogically, by a remote
similarity in which there is more unlikeness than likeness. God is said to
be intelligent because He knows Himself and other things. His intelligence
is infinitely above ours; but by denying all imperfection in God's knowledge,
we can say that the relation of His mind to its objects is similar to the
relation of our mind to its objects. If as Toynbee says, there is no ground
for comparison between the infinite and finite, then God ca.Iinot be known
in any way. He becomes completely unintelligible. Yet Toynbee holds that
God exists and that He is Love. Surely these predications of God are no
more adequate than the predication that God is intelligent. We can know
God's existence and love only by comparison with the existence and love
that we know already. If we are to love God, we must also know that He is
good, perfect, holy,
wise, living, merciful, and in possession of all
beatitude. But although we know these and rp.any other essential attributes
of God, no theologian would claim that our analogical knowledge of God is
adequate to comprehend Him. St. Thomas was certainly well aware of the
limitations of theology long before his ecstacies. He was aware of it when
he wrote the first question of the Summa and in the prologue to the third
he said that we do not know what God is but rather what he is not.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Toynbee's notion that the Christian God is a God of Love but not of
Justice, that there is an incongruity between the God of Josue and Jesus
is not supported by the facts. Christians have always praised God by
singing the Psalms, where the power, majesty, and justice of God are extolled as well as His love and mercy. And Christ, said, "He that is not
with me is against me " (Matthew IQ: 30, proclaiming Himself as jealous
as when He gave the Decalogue. He warned, " He that believeth not shall
be condemned," (Mark 16: 16) and showed Himself as just as He was
merciful in promising mercy to those who believe and are baptized.
It shouJd be noted that Toynbee's own beliefs are almost all entirely
Christian in inspiration. He speaks of the sacrifice of the Incarnate God, of
grace, original sin, salvation, eternal life, the kingdom of heaven. Christianity is superior to all other religions in its " intuition " that God is Love.
But it is still dogmatic, and the broad tolerance of Hinduism is in advance
of Christianity. (VII, 735) This "charity" towards all other revelations is
the only inspiration which Toynbee has derived from the Orient. The new
religion which he hopes for as a result of a more universal outlook, of the
reconciliation of heart and head, of East and West would be a syncretistic
stew, a dogmatic cipher. He leaves the reader with no positive idea of what
it might be, except a monstrous blasphemy, if the sentimental, incongruous,
travesty of the Litany of the Saints in volume X, p. 143, be a sample of the
new "religion." Begging "Christ Tammuz" and other "Christs" to hear
Cybele " in the same breath
us, invoking " Mother Isis " and "
with Our Lady suggests that it might be a reversion to polytheism, which
Toynbee abhors.
There is much more that could and should be said. It is regrettable that
nearly all that has been said in this review has had to be negative. It is
even more regrettable that such a devoted historian of genius as Professor
Toynbee has sought to be a prophet and preacher as well.
LINUS

Dominican House of Studiea
Washington, D. C.

wALKER, 0. p.

BRIEF NOTICES
Opuscula Theologica. By ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. Vol. I. Edited by
RAYMOND VERARDo, 0. P. Pp. 531. Vol. II. Edited by RAYMOND
SPIAZZI, 0. P. Pp. 441. Turin: Marietti, 1954.
Opuscula Philosophica, By ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. Edited by RAYMOND
SPIAZZI, 0. P. Turin: Marietti, 1954. Pp. 379.
With the publication of these three volumes, Marietti substantially
augments its series of manual editions of the works of St. Thomas. The
Opuscula are among the more important minor works of St. Thomas,
written by him on the occasion of various disputes and consultations, and of
great value insofar as they deal integrally with a theological or philosophical
subject. These new editions, similar in format to the other manuals in the
series, are well arranged typographically both for systematic study and for
ready reference. While no attempt has been made to provide throughout a
definitive critical text, the editors havtl emended the old Parma text, drawing on the Piana and Veneta editions and recent scholarship for some variant
readings, and thus provide a sound doctrinal text suitable for manual use.
For practical reasons, the theologic&l Opuscula have been divided into two
volumes, the first entitled De Re Dogmatica et Morali and the second De
Re Spirituali. Admittedly this is not a perfect division, insofar as much of
the matter of each volume could easily pertain to the other. Especially
notable among the contents of the first volume are the Compendium Theologiae and Contra Errores Graecorum. To the latter opusculum has been
appended, for the first time, the anonymous Libellus on which St. Thomas
· based his refutations. Another innovation is the presentation of a second
text of the Responsio al Lectorem V enetum, complete with critical apparatus. The second volume contains, among other items, the various opuscula
written by St. Thomas against contemporary opponents of the religious
life, the exposition of the Creed, the" Our Father" and the" Hail Mary,"
and the Office of Corpus Christi. An appendix has also been added containing the complete commentaries on Boethius' De Trinitate and De
Hebdomadibus, edited by M. Calcaterra, 0. P. In the case of De Trinitate,
variant readings for the fifth and sixth questions taken from the new
Wyser edition have been indicated in the footnotes.
The philosophical Opuscula have been rearranged in order of subject
matter, rather than chronologically or according to the numeration of the
old Romana edition. As in the theological volumes, all works that are now
unanimously regarded as . apocryphal have been excluded, although the

800

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301

editors have retained the opuscula rejected as spurious by Mandonnet but
regarded as authentic by Grabmann. Some of the more important works in
this volume are De Ente et Essentia, De Principiis N aturae, and De
Regimine Principum. Where possible, a synoptic table of the argument
contained in each work has been indicated.
The editors have prefaced each volume with a general introduction, and
in addition have supplied special introductions for each opusculum. The
latter deal with historico-critical problems and take into account all major
difficulties, not so much to solve them as to present the state of the
question accurately. Bibliographies have been supplied for those who wish
to delve further into the matter. Paragraph numbering in each volume is
separate, and clear textual divisions have been indicated throughout, preserving St. Thomas' divisions in italics. Scriptural citations have been
furnished from the Vulgate, except that the psalms are cited from the new
version of the Pontifical Biblical Institute. As in the previous volumes of
the series, parallel places have been noted, and the indices are complete, including biblical references, authorities cited, subject matter, and general
tables of contents.
These new editions will be a boon to serious students of St. Thomas, as
well as to libraries attempting to amplify their Thomistic source material.
Until the Leonine Commission completes its voluminous work, they will
assure Thomists of reliable working texts with which to grasp an integrated
knowledge of important features of the Angelic Doctor's philosophical and
theological doctrine.

Nature and Grace. By MATTHIAS J. ScHEEBEN. Translated by CYRIL
VoLLERT, S. J. St. Louis: Herder, 1954. Pp. 385 with Index. $4.95.
Not the least advantage of this book is the foreword by the translator,
Father Cyril Vollert, S.J. Thanks to it the reader has a backdrop against
which Scheeben's work may be viewed - the Protestant despair of nature
and the Kantian despair of supernature, the abortive attempts of Catholic
theologians to exploit the new philosophies for the benefit of the Faith, and
the nascent neo-scholasticism of Scheeben's own Roman masters. In the
fusion of such elements his ambition crystallized to " make the drab
naturalistic world glow again in the light and beauty of grace, to bring back
to the consciousness of men the glorious destiny of their conformation to
God." Scheeben wrote for an age sick to death of the Enlightenment, and
his remedy was the systematic display of the inner treasures of the supernatural. Father Vollert here offers the same cure to an English-speaking
world no less in need of antidote for the venom of naturalism and despair
which, as Scheeben foresaw, "threaten to throttle and destroy all that is
specifically Christian."

802

BRIEF NOTICES

As preservative, or restorative, of the concept of the supernatural Nature
and Grace is singularly apt. It is also singularly difficult to appraise briefly.
To say that the theme of the book is " operatio sequitur esse " is obvious
over-simplification. It is also the truth. The distinction between the
natural and the supernatural orders was drawn by the Church through
centuries of conflict between the opposing heresies of Manichees and Pelagians, of Lutherans and modern " naturalists "; it yielded solutions of the
most vexing ethical problems. Scheeben contended that the same distinction
could be used· to solve the equally vexing intellectual and ontological problems of his day. He sets out to distinguish between two orders of knowledge
and truth, of morality and good; but to do this he must penetrate to the
deeper level of the ontological orders in which powers are rooted and whence
operations fl.ow.
By the term " nature " Scheeben does not mean that which man has of
himself absolutely, as apart from God. He is not an Augustine battling the
Pelagian theory that the power to do good is as much within human
competency as the power to do evil. Nor is he an Augustine against the
1\Ianichees, with their exaggerated contempt for nature. "Nature" here is
neither complete determination to all good, nor complete indetermination.
It possesses a certain indestructible goodness, and a potentiality for development towards a goal proportionate to its own powers. It possesses, moreover, an obediential faculty for being elevated to supernature.
Knowledge and love proceed from powers proportionate to the excellence
of the nature in which they are subjected, and have objects which vary
according to the same norm. The author accordingly leads his reader first
to the realization of the heights which man's spiritual nature can attain
in the knowledge and love of God as Author of nature. Beyond this is
revealed the knowledge and love of God as He is grasped by supernatural
faith and charity, founded upon supernature. Beyond this again lies the
knowledge and possession of the vision in which grace comes to fruition.
The chapter on " The Metaphysics of Supernature " is perhaps the most
original and the most deserving of special mention in a necessarily eclectic
review. The familiar relations between substance and accident, and between
first and second act, are here applied to the supernatural order to explain
that in this order the vital principle is itself not substance, but accident,
and at the same time is the common sub-stratum for other accidents, the
manifold supernatural faculties and acts rooted in the specific nature of the
graced being. ·This accidental character of grace is shown as t.he reason
why a single faculty, of faith for example, can be infused without the
substratum which would bring all other virtues along with it. By the same
token, the supernatural faculties have their cause in God, not in a substance
in which they, as accidents, inhere. An interesting application of the
Thomistic concept of the relationship between immateriality and intel-

BRIEF NOTICES

303

lectuality
that grace, strictly and formally, confers upon man the
likeness of the intellectual nature of God by which, in the beatitude of
heaven, he becomes capable of engendering by way of knowledge the image
of the divine essence.
In the two chapters dealing with the union of nature and grace, the
Author deals with the thorny problem of the relationship of grace to freedom. He follows Gregory of Valencia in the position which he later explains
more fully in The Mysteries of Christianity (p. 712 seq. of Father Vollert's
translation) . Scheeben thus stands midway between strict Thomists and
Congruists, and no matter which of these positions a reader may accept, he
will find this discussion both dispassionate and stimulating.
It would be impossible to give here an adequate idea of the cogency of
the reasoning throughout Nature and Grace, or of the spirit which illumines
and transforms its pages. It is indeed scientific theology, but it is not
coldly intellectual. It is a book which demands strenuous thought, but it
pays dividends in devotion. Finally, it is encouraging to remark the
hesitancy with which Scheeben breached ideas which he feared would
" strike readers as novel and unknown." Although his synthesis has lost
nothing of its freshness or vigor, neither his ideas nor his terminology sound
as strange now as they must have when he began his lifework with this
book. That American Catholics are prepared to accept and assimilate a
theological work of this calibre we owe to a century of painstaking theological writers and teachers like Scheeben and to translators and teachers
like Father Vollert.

Signs and Symbols in Christian Art. By Reverend GEORGE FURGUSON. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1954. Pp. 346, illustrated. $10.00.
This is undoubtedly one of the most beautiful works on religious art
published in this country. Its unique format, typography and delicate
illustrations, both colored and black and white, make it a very attractive
volume. Anyone seeking a fuller appreciation of Christian art or a simple
exposition of Christianity itself will certainly find general satisfaction here.
The scope of the book, to tell how the Christian attached religious and
spiritual meaning to all that he observed, is ambitious; yet is herein handled
with thoroughness and. discretion. Christian art is soundly judged and explained as an integral part of the Church's apostolic mission, using every
available means including the simplest natural analogies, to propose the
truths of revelation. The examples so beautifully presented are taken almost
exclusively from Renaissance painting, and the description and evaluation
of the signs and symbols follows a logical grouping and alphabetical order,
making easy references possible. The symbols are taken from the world

12

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BRIEF NOTICES

of animate and inanimate objects, the principal articles of the Creed, the
lives of Christ, Mary and the saints.
The author, an Episcopalian minister, quite naturally uses the text of
the King James version in his extensive quotations from the Bible. Quite
naturally, too, there is a constant reference to either the explicit word of
the Scriptures or mere legend, without any awarness of or sensitivity to valid
Christian tradition. This fact, of course, demands that the Catholic reviewer be cautious in his judgment.
Unfortunately then, the work does not fulfill all the hopes which its title
inspires. A truly. " comprehensive book about the sources and uses of signs
and symbols in Christian art" should provide an excellent locus from which
to argue theologically. This is where the work fails to satisfy, for its
extensive descriptions of each symbol are not substantiated by clear historical references, nor is there any distinction made between what is mere
legend and what is derived from Apostolic Tradition and the Faith of the
Church.
The doctrine of the Assumption of Mary, for example, is not separated
from the many legendary details that have developed and found expression
in Renaissance painting. Again, St. Nicholas of Myra or Bari, it is said,
"is regarded by historians as a purely legendary character," yet he is the
" chief patron saint of Russia." There is in these and other instances an
unfortunate carelessness which seriously diminishes its theological worth.
This present work does indeed present a challenge to Catholic art historians to reach further into Christian antiquity and with the aid of their
faith to discover and explain the significance of those signs and symbols in
Christian art which bear evidence of the true Faith in the Scriptures and
Apostolic Tradition.

Order and Law. By AEGIDIUS DooLAN, 0. P. Westminster: Newman, 1954.
no with index. $8.50.
Here is an excellent, elementary text for laymen, by an Irish Dominican,
setting out in a clear, simple style the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas on
law, justice and rights, with particular attention to the right of private
property. Catholic professional men, especially, need books like Order and
Law, which supply them, in a language they can understand, with the
principles they must know if they are to contribute articulately to the rebuilding of our society, permeated as it is with secularism. Father Doolan
has placed within the easy reach of Catholics teachings of the Angelic
Doctor which well-instructed
can apply in a way to influence the
thinking and actions of society in a manner beneficial to the common good.
The author has taken the risk of oversimplification in order to avoid the

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305

perhaps greater danger today that Catholic philosophy will not be read, even
by Catholic laymen. The chapters are short, permitting even the reader
sorely pressed for time to complete each topic at a single sitting. This
arrangement apparently arises from the fact that some of the material in the
material in the book previously appeared as a series of articles in Hibernia.
This book may lose some of its appeal to American readers because most
of the contemporary references are to persons, places and events which are
not familiar to them. In this connection, it is unfortunate that one of the
rare quotes from American sources should be erroneously attributed to the
Constitution of the United States instead of to the Declaration of Independence.

Treasury of Philosophy. Edited by DAGOBERT D. RUNES. New York:
Philosophical Library, 1955. Pp. 1304 with index. $15.00.
Excerpts from nearly four hundred philosophers, varying in length from
a paragraph to a very few pages, with each citation preceded by biographical
and analytical notes, constitute this Treasury. How valuable are the contents will depend upon the goals it is required to serve.
As a" comprehensive collection of philosophical writings," it is frustrating.
Too many philosophers, and of these too many of minor impact, are
represented and all much too briefly. Moreover, the representative character
of the selections is often questionable; as an outstanding example, the
stature of St. Bonaventure's thought is hardly conveyed by a page from
his "Life of St. Francis of Assisi." Since Dr. Runes' conception of philosophy is broad to the point of meaninglessness " the search for the indefinable," no quarrel can be made as to those included in the volume .. The
omissions, however, become all the more puzzling; for instance of Suarez,
Vittoria, Chesterton, Lavalle, Tillich, Niebuhr, Stalin. Copernicus, Galileo
and Newton are frequently referred to but not offered in their own works.
The philosophers are presented in alphabetical order instead of the chronological order which might have had the advantage of permitting note
of· the growth or decline of philosophy in scope and profundity; it might
also have been the sole, if superficial, indication of continuity. It would also,
of course, have revealed more clearly the preponderance of modern thinkers
and, more importantly, the remoteness of many of the selections from the
central philosophic interests of the age represented as well as the philosophers involved. Metaphysics, certainly of prime importance to many philosophers, brings but little of its gold to the Treasury.
Nevertheless, if so bulky a volume can be considered unpretentious (the
claims to greatness are of the dust jacket, not the preface), some purposes
convey far more
can be served by it. Its paragraphs and pages, though

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BRIEF NOTICES

of the ideals and ways of philosophic thought than the usual epigrams and
proverbs gathered together as " the wisdom of the ages." The emphasis
upon the Jewish philosophic contributions and the space allotted Oriental
thinkers help bring the actual state of philosophy into focus. The biographical and analytical notes are, for the most part, accurate and informative.
The inclusion of minor and little known philosophers may be later stimulating as well as at first irritating. The Treasury mirrors the present state
of philosophy itself and shows it to be, in John Dewey's phrase, " an ongoing enterprise."

Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. Vol.
XXVIII. Washington: The Catholic University of America, 1954.
Pp. flSfl. $8.00.
The theme of the current issue of the Proceedings is the Existence and
Nature of God. All the papers and discussions contribute in varying degrees
to the exploration of the theme which represents the summit of rational
speculation. Some contribute in a positive way, others negatively. Again
several of the major papers and discussions do this by re-presenting the
traditional triumphs of the golden era of scholasticism, while others by exposing notions current in modern philosophy. Throughout the entire Proceedings one is conscious of an awareness of the modern mind by the
various authors and of a sincere attempt to meet that mind with its mistrust of reason, its lack of a true metaphysics, its confidence in experimentalism. This attempt is most strikingly exhibited in the study on
" Ordinary Knowledge of God and Philosophical Demonstration " and in
the discussions on " The Value of the Moral Argument for God's Existence "
and " The Finite God in Modern Thought."
Two papers in the traditional vein are of particular interest. One concerns the proofs for the existence and nature of God as formulated by Duns
Scotus, the other a study on "The Prime Mover in Philosophy of Nature
and Metaphysics." The first, while in the manner of a commentary, is a
welcome contribution. The attempt to trace the arguments of Scotus affords
many an opportunity to see something of the reasoning of one too often
known only in his conclusions. The study on" The Prime Mover in Natural
Philosophy and Metaphysics " emphasizes a point too often forgotten or
obscured by many, i.e., the dependency of Metaphysics on Natural Philosophy in the way of invention. The excursions of the mind into the
realm of being are in most cases presented as a fait accompli, a study of an
object that somehow or other just appeared on the intellectual horizon, all
bedecked in metaphysical finery. The painstaking labor of the mind and the
rich results of that labor in the field of Natural Philosophy, wherein the

BRIEF NOTICES

807

intellect comes upon the existence of the Prime Mover, are overlooked, and
with important results. It is usually evidenced by the student's inability
to grasp the fact that he now stands at the summit of reality, at which
point he is immediately aware, or should be aware of the ultimacy of being.
The maturing process which the mind undergoes in the study of natural
being is a point worthy of some emphasis by the metaphysician, so that
the beginner may be in the way of appreciating the fact that he is at the
summit of speculation. Too often the ascent to the heights of speculation is
by way of a mental elevator which lifts the occupant up without so much
as .generating one drop of mental perspiration. The idea of mounting upward in this easy fashion, while hygenically appealing, is philosophically
repelling.

Modern Science and God. By P. J. McLAUGHLIN. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1954. Pp. 89. $2.75.
This little book contains a new translation of the Papal allocution made
to the Pontifical Academy of Science on November 22, 1951, together with
explanatory notes inserted between the numbered paragraphs of the text.
The allocution itself is a timely document which manifests the Holy
Father's interest in the remarkable progress of physical science. It shows
also a profound appreciation of the significance which recently discovered
facts concerning the extent; direction and duration of cosmic process have
for our knowledge of God and creation. Here there is no obscurantism or
skepticism, no extravagant affirmation, but rather a frank acknowledgement
of many solid achievements of modern scientific research, and a realistic
appraisal of them as empirical foundations for arguments which lead to a
knowledge of God the Creator. The explanatory notes are intended to help
the ordinary reader who is not a specialist in modern science or in philosophy, but who will welcome a little light from either or both. Text and
notes are clearly and simply presented in this neat little book. The work
will not only enlighten beginners, but also stimulate the more proficient to
a deeper and truer appreciation of nature as the interpreter of God.

Sovereign Reason. By ERNEST NAGEL. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954.
Pp. 315 with index. $5.00.
The sixteen studies in· the philosophy of science collected m this book
were written for different occasions and previously published. All save one
of these essays are critical studies of contemporary philosophers who have
been occupied more or less directly with the content and method of modern

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BRIEF NOTICES

science or with its bearing on contemporary thought and life, particularly of
Pierce, Dewey, Whitehead, Russell, Eddington and Blanshard. The final
essay treats of the perspectives of science and the prospects of men.
" Certitude is not and cannot be achieved by the actual methods of positive
inquiry." Nevertheless, "no antecedent limits can be set to the power of
scientific reason to acquire theoretical mastery over ·natural and social
processes. Every doctrine which pretends to set such limits contains within
itself the seeds of intolerance and repression." (p. 308) In other words,
nothing is so certain as uncertainty. Aristotle was much more consistent
when he defined science as knowledge of the necessary reasons of things,
insofar as they have necessary reasons. Whether we truly know some of
them or not, at least we think that we do, and this is what we shall always
mean by science in the sense of genuine knowing. Mr. Nagel has a sharp
intellect, and writes with skill and clarity, but he has suffered the grievous
accident of not doubting well. He needs a year's study of Aristotle's analytics and fundamental physics in order to understand some first principles
and how to apply them.

BOOKS RECEIVED
A Carmelite Pilgrim. As the Eagle. New York: Kenedy, 1954. Pp. 213.
$3.50.
Aaron, Richard I. Jchn Locke. 2nd. Ed. New York: Oxford, 1955. Pp.
334 with indexes. $4.00.
Anderson, John M. The Individual and the New World. State College,
Pa.: Bald Eagle Press, 1955. Pp. 202 with index. $4.00.
Anonymous. (tr. by C. F. Kelly) The Book of the Poor in Spirit. New
York: Harper, 1954. Pp. 303. $3.50.
Cotton, J. Harry. Royce on the Human Self. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954. Pp. 361 with indexes. $5.00.
Crosser, Paul K. The Nihilism of John Dewey. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1955. Pp. 249 with index. $3.75.
Dunner, Joseph. Baruch Spinoza and Western Democracy. New York:
Philosophical Library, 1955. Pp. 155 with index. $3.00.
Fairweather, A. M. (ed.) Aquinas on Nature and Grace. Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1954. Pp. 386 with index. $5.00.
Feibleman, James K. & Others. A Symposium on Kant. Tulane Studies in
Philosophy, Vol. III. New Orleans: Tulane University Press, 1954.
Pp. 165. $2.00.
Fremantle, Anne (ed.) The Age of Belief. The Mentor Philosophers
Series, Vol. I. New York: New American Library, 1955. Pp. 218 with
index. $0.50, paper.
Fulton, James S. Science and Man's Hope. New York: Bookman Associates, HJM. Pp. 179 with index. $3.25.
Ganss, S. J., George E. Saint Ignatius' Idea of a Jesuit University. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1954. Pp. 388 with index.
$5.50.
Gilson, Etienne. History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages.
New York: Random House, 1955. Pp. 846 with indexes. $7.50.
Hastings, Cecily and Nicholl, Donald (eds.) Selection II. New York:
Sheed & Ward, 1954. Pp. 221. $3.50.
Hoenen, S. J., P. De Noetica Geometriae. Roma: Univ. Gregoriana, 1954.
Pp. 293.
Jammer, Max, Concepts of Space. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1954. Pp. 212 with index. $3.75.
Jerrold, Douglas. The Lie About the West. New York: Sheed & Ward,
1954. Pp. 85. $1.75.
Journet, Charles. (tr. by John S. Chapin) The Primacy of Peter. Westminster: Newman, 1954. Pp" 158 with index. $2.75.

309

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Jung, C. G. (tr. by R. F. C. Hull) Answer to Job. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1954. Pp. 212 with index. ms. 6d.
Kirk, Russell. Academic Freedom. Chicago: Regnery, 1955. Pp. 210 with
index. $3.75.
Lebret, O. P., Louis J. (tr. by Robert and Martha Faulhaber) Human
Ascent. Chicago: Fides, 1955. Pp. 122. $2.50.
Maritain, Jacques and Raissa. (tr. by Marshall Suther) The Situation of
Poetry. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. Pp. 95. $2.75.
Meerloo, Jost A. M. The Two Faces of Man. New York: International
Universities Press, 1954. Pp. 247. $4.00.
Mouroux, Jean. The Christian Experience. New York: Sheed & Ward,
1954. Pp. 381. $5.00.
Millier, Alois. Ecclesia-Maria. Freiburg: Universitiitsverlag, 1955. Pp. 266
with index. 18 DM.
Munoz, Vincente. Zumel Y El Molinismo. Madrid: Estudios, 1953. Pp.
219 with indexes. 50 pts.
O'Neill, James.M. Catholics in Controversy. New York: McMullen, 1954.
Pp. 227 with index. $3.00.
Philippe, 0. P., Paul. La Tres Sainte Vierge et Le Sacerdoce. Paris:
Editions du Cerf, 1954. Pp. 175.
Pilkington, Roger. Revelation Through Science. New York: Macmillan,
1954. Pp. 191. $2.50.
Portnoy, Julius. The Philosopher and Music. New York: Humanities
Press, 1954. Pp. 283 with index. $4.50.
Raeymeeker, Louis de and Others. Truth and Freedom. Duquesne Studies,
Philosophical Series, # 5. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press,
1954. Pp. 140 with index. $3.00, cloth. $2.25, paper.
Rosmini, Antonio. Anthologie Philosophique. Lyons: E. Vitte, 1954. Pp.
508. Fr. 2,400.
S. Thomae Aquinatis. (ed. by Commissio Piana) Summae Theologiae cura
et studio Instituti Studiorum Medievalium Ottaviensis. Tomus Primus ..
Ia Pars. Ottawa: Commissio Piana, 1953. Pp. 728 with index of
questions.
S. Thomae Aquinatis. In Octo Libros Physicoruin Aristotelis Expositio.
Cura et studio P. M. MaggiOlo, 0. P. Turin: Marietti, 1954. Pp.
674 with index.
Simon, Yves R. and Others (trs.) The Material Logic of John of St.
Thomas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955. Pp. 672 with
indexes. $10.00.
Wayper, C. L. Political Thought. New York: Philosophical Library,
1954. Pp. 260 with index. $3.75.
Wicki, Nikolaus. Die Lehre von der Himmlischen Seligkeit in der Mittelalterlichen Scholastilc von Petrus Lombardus bis Thomas von Aquin.
Freiburg: Universitiitsverlag, 1954. Pp. 350. 14.40 DM.
Woodcock, P. G. (ed.) Concise Dictionary of Ancient History. New York:
Philosophical Library, 1955. Pp. 465. $6.00.
Xiberta, 0. C., Bartolome. El Yo de Jesucristo. Barcelona: Herder, 1954.
Pp. 172 with index.