THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS:

THE DOMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JOSEPH

·Publishers:

VoL. XVIII

The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

JULY, 1955

No. 8

SACRAl\IENTAL GRACES: l\IODES OF
SANCTIFYING GRACE

M

ANY Thomistic theologians have seen in the theory
of John of St. ThQmas that sacramental graces are
modes of sanctifying grace, a satisfactory explanation of the nature of sacramental grace. It does not seem,
however, that there has been a satisfactory solution to the
problem of integrating this theory into the Thomistic sacramental synthesis as a whole. While John of St. Thomas undoubtedly saw that his doctrine of modality was related to
the sacramental principles laid down by St. Thomas, nowhere
does he directly explain this relationship. Nor in the whole of
his philosophical and theological treatises is there to be found
more than a passing reference to the nature of modes. As a
result, many adherents to the modal doctrine of sacramental
grace have accepted it principally on his authority.
Our purpose is to propose a doctrine on modes with suf311

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ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

ficient clarity to demonstrate that the distinct modes which
constitute sacramental graces must result from the instrumental efficiency of the sacraments-that is, we shall attempt
to show that the different instrumental causes of grace which
are the sacraments must produce distinct modes in the sacramental effect which is grace. In this solution the existence of
a distinct mode in sanctifying grace granted sacramentally is
traced to the instrumentality of the disjoined instrument, the
sacrament. The diversi,ty of these sacramental modes is
accounted for by the external signification of the sacrament
which determines the instrumentality of each sacrament. Thus,
both the existence and diversity of the sacramental modes are
established and the theory is seen as the logical culmination of
St. Thomas' teaching concerning sacramental signincation and
causality.
The first part of this work is a textual study of St. Thomas'
writing concerning sacramental grace. This will enable the
reader to see clearly the development and progress of the sacramental teaching of the Angelic Doctor. This consideration is
necessary for an understanding of the difficulties involved and
also for a true evaluation of the proposed solution. The rejection or acceptance of the modal theory of sacramental grace
must ultimately be based upon its success or failure as a solution which safeguards the known teaching of St. Thomas regarding sacramental grace.
The main portion of the article is devoted to establishing
the principles upon which the modal theory of sacramental
grace is based, namely, that diverse instruments cause diverse
modes in: the effect produced by the principal efficient agent;
and, that the sacraments are diverse efficient instruments. The
first principle demands 1) an exposition of the nature of modes
which will indicate how a modification of the efficiency of the
principal cause necessarily diversifies the mode of the effect;
then,
a treatment of efficient instrumentality with emphasis
upon the manner in which ·this instrumentality modifies the
efficiency of the principal agent. The last part of the article is

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directed to an exposition of the second principle: the sacraments are diverse instruments. It contains 1) an explanation
of the teaching of St. Thomas regarding the efficient instrumentality of the sacraments, including a reply to the more
important objections raised against this doctrine. Since, however, it.is the form of the instrument which limits the efficiency
of the principal agent and hence diversifies the mode of the
effect, this section 2) also sets forth the nature of sacramental
signification as the formal and limiting principle of the sacramental 'instrument.

I.

SACRAMENTAL

GRACE IN THE WRITINGS

OF ST. THOMAS

Nominal Definition of Sacramental Grace. In the broadest
meaning of the term all the effects gratuitously bestowed by
God upon the recipients of the sacraments may be called sacramental graces. These would
sanctifying grace, the
special grace which is an effect proper to each sacrament, and
lastly, the character. According to the more common usage,
however, sacramental grace is distinguished from the character
and refers to the primary sacramental effect, sanctifying grace
as including the grace ordained to the special effects of the
individual sacraments.
There is no question concerning the fact that sanctifying
grace is conferred by all the sacraments of the New Law. It
is the express teaching of the Council of Trent that the sacraments both contain and confer the grace which they signify. 1
Moreover it is theologically certain that each of the sacraments
has a special effect. Writing of these special effects the Council
of Florence declared:
For by baptism we are spiritually reborn; by confirmation we
increase in grace and we are fortified in the faith; reborn and fortified
we are nourished by the divine food of the Eucharist. But if through
sin we contract a sickness of the soul, we are spiritually cleansed
through penance; spiritually and corporally, as befits the soul,
1

Cone. Trid. sess. 7 can. 6; Denz. 849.

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ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

through extreme unction; by orders the Church is spiritually governed and multiplied; by matrimony it is bodily increased. 2

It is to these special effects of the individual sacraments that
the Sacred Scriptures and the Fathers generally refer.3 In the
evolution of sacramental doctrine theologians eventually came
to consider these effects in a generic concept in some way different from sanctifying grace in general, and for this concept
they reserved the name of " sacramental grace."
St. Thomas writes of the use of sacramental grace in this
restricted sense in the Sentences: " Whence this effect [of the
sacrament] does not have a proper name but retains the name
of its cause, and is said to be sacramental grace." He repeats
this explanation of the derivation of the term in almost identical language in the De V eritate: " The effects of the sacraments do not have a proper name but are called by the name
of grace, for they are called sacramental graces." 5 In the
Summa Theologiae he indicates the use of sacramental grace
as distinct from sanctifying grace when he states: " sacramental
grace adds to the sanctifying grace, commonly so-called, something that produces a special effect, and to which the sacrament
is ordained." 6
Thus the nominal definition of sacramental grace is, according to St. Thomas, properly reserved for the special effect to
which each sacrament is ordained. It is in this restricted sense
that the term is used hereafter.

Sanctifying Grace and the Virtues. Because of the intimate
connection between sanctifying and sacramental grace, it is
advisable to preface the textual study of St. Thomas' doctrine
•Cone. Flor., Decretum 'fJ'l'O Armenia; Denz. 695.
• Thus Sacred Scripture speaks of Baptism as: a burial with Christ (Rom. 6: 86);
the bath of regeneration (Titus 8: 5); the newness of life (Rom. 6: 4). The Fathers
write of Baptism as the spiritual regeneration of the soul (St. Augustine, De peccatorum meritia et remisaione c. 2, 23, P. L. 44, 177); the burial and resurrection with
Christ (St. Ambrose, De Spiritu Sancto, c. 1, P. L. 16, 722).
'IV Sent., q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 5.
•De Verit., q. 27, a. 5, ad 12.
•Summa Theol., III, q. 62, a. 2.

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concerni.Iig sacramental grace with a brief summary of his
teaching on the nature and division of grace in general. Moreover, since wherever he explicitly treats of sacramental grace,
he compares it to sanctifying grace by an analogy with the
relation existing between sanctifying grace and the virtues, it
will be useful also to summarize his doctrine on the virtues.
Whereas nominally grace signifies any gift freely bestowed
by God upon man, it more properly refers to those gifts which
surpass man's natural endowments. St. Thomas makes a general division of grace into that which is intended for man's
personal sanctification and that which a man receives in order
to assist others, i.e., charismatic grace. 7 The former grace can
be understood either as a divine help by which we are moved
to will or act well (actual grace) or as an habitual gift which
is divinely infused into the soul.8 This habitual grace, sanctifying grace, which is subjected immediately in the essence of
the soul,9 pertains to the first species of quality. 10 Since it is
subjected immediately in the essence of the soul, it is distinct
from the virtues which reside in man's potencies. 11 The supernatural habit of sanctifying grace makes man a formal participant in the divine nature,1 2 whereas the infused virtues are
ordained to the performance of acts in conformity with that
participation. 13 Moreover, since this grace is a formal participation in the divine nature, it is impossible that there could
be essentially diverse species of sanctifying grace.14
The theological and infused moral virtues physically emanate
from habitual grace in the essence of the soul into its potencies
in somewhat the same manner that the potencies themselves flow
•Ibid., I-II, q. 111, a. I.
" Ibid., a. 2.
•De Verit., q. 27, a. 6.
10 Gratia reducitur ad primam speciem qualitatis, nee tamen est idem quod virtus,
sed habitudo quaedam quae praesupponitur virtutibus infusis, sicut earum principium
et radix (Summa Theol., I-II, q. 110, a. 8, ad S).
11 Ibid., q. 50, a. 2.
'"Ibid.
18 Ibid., a. 8.
"R. Garrigou-Lagrange, 0. P., De Gratia (Rome: Marietti, 1947), p. 118.

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ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

from the essence of the soul.15 The virtues differ essentially
not only from sanctifying grace but are specifically distinct
from one another by reason of their diverse formal objects. 16
Lastly, the gifts are habits distinct from the infused virtues
whereby man is made docile to the motions of the Holy Ghost. 11
The importance of the foregoing summary will become clearer
as we proceed to a consideration of St. Thomas' writings on
sacramental grace.

Sacramental Grace in the COMMENTARY ON THE SENTENCES.
In this section the principal texts in the Sentences on sacramental grace will be given to enable the reader to see in the very
words of St. Thomas his teaching on the matter. At the end a
brief summary will be made of the principal points of his
doctrine. The same procedure will be followed in ·the next
section of this part with regard to texts from the Summa
Theologiae. Finally, a brief comparative study will be made to
highlight any differences in his method of treatment or doctrine
revealed in these textual studies.
In the article in the Sentences dealing with the causality of
the sacraments, St. Thomas places as the fifth proposition to
be considered: "It seems that the grace which is in the sacraments does not differ from that which is in the virtues and
gifts." 18 As will become evident from his reply to the objections and also the main body of the argument, in the proposition under consideration the expression " the grace which is in
the sacraments " has reference to the grace of the sacrament
which is ordained to the special effect of the sacrament. The
same evidence serves to identify the grace " in the virtues and
gifts" as sanctifying grace.
Three arguments are given in support of the proposition.
15 Sicut ab essentia animae "effiuunt ejus potentiae quae sunt operum principia; ita
etiam ab ipsa gratia effiuunt virtutes in potentias animae, per quas potentiae
moventur ad actus (Summa Theol., I-II, q. 110, a. 4, ad 1).
1 • De Verit., q. 27, a. 2; Summa Theol., I-II, q. 61, a. 4; q. 62, aa. 1, 2, 8.
17 Summa Theol., I-II, q. 68, a. 1.
18 IV Sent., d. l, q. l, a. 4, qcla. 5.

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The first states that since the grace granted by the sacraments
is sanctifying grace and is thus the same grace as in the virtues
and gifts, these two graces are one by reason of the unicity of
sanctifying grace.19 The second argument identifies the two
graces by reason of an identity of effect, namely the destruction of sin.2° Finally, it would seem that the effects of the two
graces are merely diverse terms of the same motion and hence
are not distinct but one. 21 Thus, in
three objections St.
Thomas raises the fundamental question which he and all succeeding theologians faced in treating of the nature of sacramental grace: how were they to explain the diverse sacramental
effects while safeguarding the unicity of sanctifying grace? His
replies to these objections are as follows:
Sanctifying grace is one in the essence of the soul; but it is multiplied insofar as it perfects the potencies and destroys their defects. 22
The grace of the virtues is opposed to sin insofar as sin contains
· an inordinate act; but sacramental grace is opposed to it as it
wounds the natural good of the potencies. 23
The removal from sin as it is opposed to virtue and is an approach
to the perfection of virtue pertains to the same grace; but the removal from sin insofar as it [sin] wounds nature does not, because
here there is required a special remedy, as is apparent even in the
case of bodily disease. 24

What is the meaning of defects of sin in these responses?
St. Thomas writes of two kinds of spiritual defects. The first
type consists in the placing of a contrary, i. e., sin, which rules
19 Gratia enim quae est in sacramentis, est gratia gratum faciens, quia fecit dignum
vita aeterna, ut patet de baptismo. Sed gratia gratum faciens est una tantum, quod
patet ex unitate subjecti quod est essentia animae et ex unitate efl'ectus quod est Deo
acceptum facere. Ergo cum gratia quae est in virtutibus et donis, sit gratia gratum
faciens, videtur quod eadem gratia sit hie et ibi (Ibid.) .
' 0 Unum uni opponitur.
Sed tam gratia quae est in sacramentis quam illa quae
est in virtutibus, opponitur peccato, quia utraque peccatum destruit. Ergo est una
tantum gratia (Ibid.) .
11 Idem est motus in n&tura a termino et ad terminum. Sed gratia sacramentalis
ordinatur contra peccatum, gratia autem virtutum ad perficiendum animam et Deo
conjungendum. Ergo est una gratia (Ibid.) .

•• Ibid.

•• Ibid.

•• Ibid.

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ROBERT REGINALD :MASTERSON

out grace in the soul as illness in the body removes health.
The second type consists in the removal of something which is
necessary for the performance of spiritual duties and leaves
the soul weak in regard to these tasks. Remedies against the
first type are truly purgative, since they remove the contrary.
Remedies directed against the second type of defect do not
remove any reality but rather make some addition. Hence
they are called perfections. 25 Since even this second type of
defect requires a remedy, such defects are healed by the sacraments of the living, i.e ., those which require grace in the
recipient in order to be worthily received as such sacraments
do not remove a contrary but supply some defect. 26
St. Thomas speaks of this second type of defect as a penalty
of sin. The first penalty for sin is that of temporal and eternal
punishment. The sacraments are directed against these punishments only indirectly, insofar as by removing the cause, sin,
they also remove the effect. The second penalty for sin is an
immediate consequence of the inordinate act and which in turn
leads to further sinful actions, such as the debility of nature to
resist sin. It is against this second penalty that the sacraments
are directly aimed, " namely, against the defect which results
from the withdrawal of some necessary aid rather than from
the withdrawal of any contrary form." 27
25 Defectus spiritualis dupliciter contingit, sicut et corporalis. Uno rnodo ex positione contrarii, sicut quando corpus .est aegrum et quando in anirna est peccaturn.
Alio modo ex subtractione ejus quod ad perfectionern necessariurn erat vel corporis
vel anirnae: sicut quando corpus est debile ad exercenda corporalia opera, et similiter
quando spiritus ad exequenda spiritualia. Rernedia ergo quae dantur contra prirnurn
defecturn, aliquid realiter tollunt, et ideo purgationis rationern' habent. Rernedia
autern quae sunt contra defecturn secundurn, non tollunt aliquid secundurn rem,
sed solurn aliquid adjiciunt ad perfectionern. Et ideo talia rernedia non dicuntur
purgare, sed perficere (Ibid., d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 1, ad 2).
•• Illa sacramenta quae gratiain in suscipiente praeexigunt non ordinantur directe
contra culparn; quia non sunt ad tollendurn
sed ad supplendum defectum
(Ibid., qcla. 4, ad I).
27 Contra primam autern poenam non datur sacrarnenturn in remedium directe,
sed ex consequenti ut scilicet curata causa, scilicet peccato, cesset effectus, scilicet
poena; sed contra secundarn poenam datur directe aliquod sacramentum, ilia scilicet
quae in remedium sunt contra defectum contingentem ex subtractione necessarii, non
ex positione contrarii (Ibid., qcla. 8) .

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A specific application of this teaching is found in reference
to the grace of Confirmation. In this same text there is to be
noted the diverse effects of sanctifying and sacramental grace
in relation to the defects of sin.
Sacramental grace, which is the principal effect of the sacrament,
although it has a connection with the grace which is in the virtues
and gifts, is, however, distinct from it, because sacramental grace
perfects primarily and principally the defect consequent upon sin,
but the grace of the virtues and gifts perfects by inclining to the
good of the virtues and the gifts. Just as the grace of Confirmation
perfects by removing the disease of infirmity, the gift or the
virtue of fortitude perfects by inclining to the good which is proper
to the virtue and the gift. 28

In the main argument against the proposition that sacramental and sanctifying grace are identical, St. Thomas has
three conclusions: 1) The sacramental effects are not diversified by sanctifying grace which is one, but by the diverse desince the sacramental
fects of sin to which they are
effects are less known than the acts of the virtues, they are
called sacramental graces; 3) sacramental grace differs from
sanctifying grace but has some connection with it.
St. Thomas arrives at the first conclusion by use of an
analogy which had been used by St. Albert. 29
Sanctifying grace is one and is in the essence of the soul as in a
subject; the virtues and gifts fl.ow from it to perfect the potencies
of the soul, just as the potencies fl.ow from the essence [of the soul].
And these virtues are distinguished according to the diverse acts
for which the potencies of the soul need perfecting. In a similar
way there flows from that grace in the essence of the soul something
to repair the defects which have resulted from sin; and this is
diversified according to the diversity of the defects. 30

This same analogy is used in the Second Book of the Sentences
to refute an argument against the unicity of sanctifying grace, 81
••Ibid., d. 7, q. ii!, a. ii!, qcla. ii!, ad ii!.
••Opera Omnia (Rome: Vives, 189.5), Vol. 29, In IV Sent., d. 7, a . .5, ad 1 et
ii!; p. 168.
••IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qcla . .5.
•1 II Sent., d. ii!6, q. 1, a. 6, ad .5.

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ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

in the De Veritate, 32 and, as we shall see later on in this chapter,
in the Summa. 33
In the second conclusion St. Thomas gives the reason for
the failure of the sacramental graces to have a name other
than that of their cause. He attributes this to the fact that
the defects which they remedy are less known to us than are
the acts of the virtues. 34 Elsewhere he gives the same reason,
describing these defects as hidden. 35
In the third conclusion there is stated the relation existing
between sanctifying grace and sacramental grace.
[Sacramental grace] cannot be without grace which affects the
essence of the soul nor without the virtues. And the grace in the
essence of the soul cannot be without the virtues. And therefore the
virtues have a connection [as properties] with [sanctifying grace].
This grace [sanctifying grace] can be without sacramental grace,
however. Therefqre the sacramental graces do not have a connection. And thus. it is apparent that the grace which the sacrament directly contains differs from the grace which is in the virtues
and gifts, although they also [virtues and gifts] are connected to
that grace [i:n the essence of the soul] as a certain extension [of it]. 36
1

Does this text imply that there is no connection between sanctifying and sacramental grace? It seems at the most to imply
that the connection which exists between them differs from
the connection between sanctifying grace and the virtues. For
in the De Veritate St. Thomas says "that the diverse sacramental effects . . . depend upon sanctifying grace as do the
virtues and gifts .... These [sacramental] effects pertain to
sanctifying grace which is connected with these effects and
thus they have a common effect, which is sanctifying grace,
•2

38

De Verit., q. 27, a. 5, ad rn.
Summa Theol., III, q. 62, a. 2.

•• Sed quia hujusrnodi defectus non sunt ita noti sicut actus ad quos virtutes
perficiunt; ideo hie effectus ad reparandum defectum non habet speciale nomen,
sicut virtus, sed retinet nornen suae causae, et dicitur gratia sacramentalis ad quam
directe sacramenta ordinatur (IV Sent., d. 1, q. l, a. 4, qcla. 5).

De V erit., loc. cit.
•• lV Sent., loc. cit.

36

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along with their proper effects." 87 He also speaks of the sacramental graces as "certain emanations of sanctifying grace." 88
Although the manner in which the diverse sacramental graces
differ from one another is not as clear-cut as the distinction
between virtues, which fact is due to the hidden nature of the
defects which they remedy, St. Thomas sheds some light on
their distinction in comparing the graces of Baptism an(J
Confirmation.
Because baptismal grace is given for the perfection of those things
which pertain to the common state of the christian life, whereas the
grace of confirmation is given to perfect man in those which are
most difficult in that state, namely, to confess the name of Christ
against persecutors; for this a special grace is required. It is for
this reason that the grace of confirmation differs from the grace of
baptism, and is given to remedy a different defect. For the grace of
baptism is given to remedy a defect which impedes the ordinary
state of justice in christian life, namely, original and actual sin; the
grace of confirmation is given to remedy the defect opposed to the
strength demanded in those who confess the name of Christ, namely,
infirmity .39

St. Thomas also indicates that the specific diversity of these
graces can be explained by reason of the fact that the defects
which they remedy are in diverse potencies. Baptismal grace
perfects the intellect that it might rightly believe the truths
of faith whereas the grace of confirmation seems to pertain
more to the irascible appetite. 40 Because of this diversity one
sacrament does not directly perfect the sacramental grace of
another sacrament, but only indirectly insofar as it bestows an
increase of sanctifying grace from which all the sacramental
graces proceed. 41
37

De Verit., loc. cit.

•• (Illae perfectiones quae diversis sacramentis conferuntur), quaedam emanationes sunt illius gratiae de qua nunc loquimur, sicut et virtutes (II Sent., d. 26, a.
6, ad 5).
••IV Sent., d. 7, q. 2, a. 2, qcla. 2.
• 0 Ibid., ad 1.
" Accipiendo autem gratiam baptismalis et confirmationis secundo modo, sic
dii·ecte auget earn, cadens in eamdem essentiam cum ipsa, sicut baptismus directe
auget gratiam quam prius invenit (Ibid., qcla. 8) .

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ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

The doctrine of St. Thomas on sacramental grace as contained in the Commentary on the Sentences may be summarized in the following conclusions:
1. There exists some distinction between the grace of the
virtues and gifts, i. e., sanctifying grace, and sacramental grace.
2. This distinction appears to be a real one as sanctifying
grace can exist in the soul without sacramental grace.
8. Though really distinct from sanctifying grace, sacramental grace has some connection with it because it " Hows
from," " emanates from," and " depends upon " sanctifying
grace as do the virtues and the gifts.
4. The relation of sacramental grace to sanctifying grace,
while similar to the relation between sanctifying grace and the
virtues, differs from it because sanctifying grace may never be
present without the virtues and gifts.
5. Sacramental grace is diversified by the diversity of the
defects which it remedies.
6. These spiritual defects are principally those which are
consequent upon sin, such as the weakening of nature to resist
sin, the removal of which defects is necessary for the performance of spiritual duties.
7. The exact nature of this sacramental grace or remedy
is nowhere stated, although it would seem to be something
both intrinsic and permanent by reason of the permanent and
intrinsic nature of the defects which it remedies.

Sacramental Grace in the SUMMA THEOLOGIAE. In vain does
one look in the Summa for some clarification of the teaching of
St. Thomas regarding the nature of the special effect of the
sacrament which is called sacramental grace. The treatment of
this matter in the Summa is brief and is confined to the second
article of the sixty-second question of the Third Part where
St. Thomas inquires " Whether Sacramental Grace Confers
Anything in Addition to the Grace of the Virtues and Gifts? "
Here, as in the Sentences, the body of the article and the re-

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sponses to the objections serve to establish that the term
"sacramental grace" is taken in its most formal sense, namely,
as the special aid by which the distinct sacramental effects are
attained; 42 and the grace of the virtues and the gifts is to be
understood as sanctifying grace.
Though in the Summa St. Thomas makes little positive addition to his teaching concerning the nature of sacramental grace,
there is evidence of evolution in his thought concerning the nature of the sacramental effects. The first objection to the article
stresses this change in his teaching. As a study of the texts of
the Sentences has revealed, the emphasis there was principally
upon the negative aspects of the sacramental effects, namely,
the removal of the defects consequent upon sin. In the Summa,
however, the primary emphasis is laid upon the positive perfections which are placed in the soul by the sacramental graces.
The first objection states that both the essence of the soul and
its potencies are sufficiently perfected by the grace of the virtues and the gifts. Hence, since all grace is ultimately ordained
to the perfection of the soul and its faculties, sacramental graces
do not add anything to the perfecting capacities of habitual
grace. To this St. Thomas replies:
The grace of the virtues and gifts perfects the essence and powers
of the soul sufficiently as regards the general ordination of acts: but
as regards certain special effects which are necessary in christian
life, there is required sacramental grace. 43

There is a tendency to interpret this response as referring
only to the individual moral actions of those who have been
sacramentally initiated into the christian life. This limited
interpretation does not seem to be in accord with the explanation given by St. Thomas himself when enumerating the reasons for the seven sacraments. Drawing an analogy between·
the spiritual and corporeal life of man, he sets forth the various
•• John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus (Paris: Vives, 1885), t. IX, d. M, a.
n. 7; p. 285; Cajetan, Comm. in Summam Theologiae (ed. Leonina; vol. IV, Opera
Omnia). In III, q. 62, a. 2.
••Summa Theol., III, q. 62, a. 2, ad I.

ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

perfections of bodily life and then explains how the sacraments
effect a corresponding perfection in the supernatural life of the
soul. He enumerates the seven perfections of the soul in those
things that pertain to the worship of God according to the rite
of the christian life, namely, life, strength, conservation, healing, restoration, power and propagation. These perfections,
then, are the "special effects" necessary in christian life.44
The second objection of this article in the Summa contains
in substance the three objections in the Sentences since it proceeds on the basis that the grace of the virtues and gifts sufficiently excludes all sins and also the defects resulting from
sin. Sacramental grace, being ordained to the removal of the
defects of sin, cannot therefore add anything to the grace of
the virtues and gifts. To this argument St. Thomas responds:
Vices and sins are sufficiently removed by virtues and gifts, as to
present and future time; insofar as they prevent man from sinning.
But in regard to past sins, the acts of which are transitory whereas
their guilt remains, man is provided with a special remedy in the
sacraments. 45

Certainly, St. Thomas had no intention of teaching that the
grace of the virtues and gifts does not exclude the contrary
vices or that past sins are not destroyed, but rather, in accordance with his teaching in the Sentences, he states that the defects of sin remain and hence require special remedies lest they
retard man in the attainment of full supernatural perfection.
What are these defects of sin? St. Thomas declares that
sanctifying grace takes away the stain and restores the order
of the soul to God; but, although the wound of sin as far as the
will is concerned is healed, there are medicines required for the
healing of the other powers of the soul which were disordered
by sin. 46 And again he writes: "Sacramental grace is opposed
to sin insofar as sin wounded the natural goodness of the
soul." 47
•• Ibid., q. 65, a. 1.
••Ibid., q. 62, a. 2, ad 2.

••Ibid., I-II, q. 87, a. 6, ad 8.
••IV Sent., d. l, q. 1, a. 4, q. 5, ad 2.

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As a result of original sin Adam lost not only sanctifying
grace and the preternatural gifts which perfected his composite
nature, 48 but the very natural inclination of his powers to virtue
was wounded. The reason is subject to ignorance and experiences difficulty in attaining to truth; the will is deprived of its
order to good by mal,ice and is prone to evil; the irascible appetite is subject to weakness and shrinks in the face of an arduous
task; by concupiscence man is inordinately inclined to the
sensible good. These four wounds of nature, found in us as a
penalty of original sin, are increased by actual sins, both venial
and mortal. 49 Since the subjection of the body to the soul
was lost through the withdrawal of original justice, death and
all consequent bodily defects also became penalties of original
sin. 50 St. Thomas describes how the various sacraments are
given as a remedy against these penalties when giving reasons
for the number of the sacraments.
We may likewise gather the number of the sacraments from their
being instituted as a remedy against the defect caused by sin. For
Baptism is intended as a remedy against the absence of spiritual
life; Confirmation against the infirmity of soul found in those of
recent birth; the Eucharist, against the soul's proneness to sin;
Penance, against actual sin committed after Baptism; Extreme
Unction against the remainders of sins, of those sins, namely, which
are not sufficiently removed by Penance, whether through negligence or through ignorance; Order, against divisions in the community; Matrimony, as a remedy against concupiscence in the individual, and against the decrease in numbers that results from death.
Some, again, gather the number of sacraments from a certain
adaptation to the virtues and to the defects and penal effects resulting from sin. They say that Baptism corresponds to Faith, and
is ordained as remedy against original sin; Extreme Unction, to
Hope, being ordained against venial sin; the Eucharist, to Charity,
•• Tertium vero bonum [donum originalis justitiae] naturae totaliter est ablatum
per peccatum primi parentis (Summa Theol., I-II, q. 85, a. 1).
•• Ibid., a. 8.
•• Sed Deus, cui subiacet omnis natura, in ipsa institutione hominis supplevit
defectum naturae, et dono iustitiae originalis dedit corpori incorruptihilitatem quandam, ut in Primo dictum est. Et secundum hoc dicitur quod Deus mortem non
fecit, et quod mors est poena peccati (Ibid., a. 6) .

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being ordained against the penal effect which is malice, Order, to
Prudence, being ordained against ignorance; Penance, to Justice,
being ordained against mortal sin; Matrimony, to Temperance,
being ordained against concupiscence; Confirmation, to Fortitude,
being ordained against infirmity. 51

The sacraments then are as diverse medicines healing the
defects of sin. These defects, as we have seen, since they vary
in individuals, are hidden from us and the sacramental grace
does not have a proper name as do the virtues. 52 The physician
of the body in recommending a diet primarily intends the
nourishment of the patient but he is not always aware of the
many diverse infections against which the food will prove to
be a remedy. So also, for example, one receiving the sacramental grace of the Eucharist will be fortified not only against
the malice resulting from original sin but also the malice resulting from whatever type of actual sins he has committed.
Though the sacramental graces will never restore to man in this
life· the despotic control of reason over passion which Adam
enjoyed, our political dominion over it should increase as a
result of the fruitful reception of the sacraments and a fidelity
to their graces by the practice of virtue. "Just as concupiscence
is diminished by Baptism, so as not to enslave us, so also are
both the aforesaid defects [proneness to evil and difficulty in
doing good] diminished, so that man be not overcome by
them." 53 The sacraments do not remove the bodily defects as
the Christian retains a passible body in this life so that he may
suffer in conformity with Christ and the penalties of sickness
and death are not taken away until the resurrection. 54
To the doctrine that sacramental grace adds something real
to sanctifying grace St. Thomas places as a third objection that
such an addition would seem to make grace an equivocal term.
This objection is based on the fact that any addition to a form
varies the species. His response to this objection has given
rise to considerable difficulty.
u Ibid., ID, q. 65, a. 1.
••De Verit., q. 27, a. 5, ad 12.

sa Summa Tkeol., ID, q. 69, a. 4, ad 8.
•• Ibid., a. 8, ad s.

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Sacramental grace is compared to grace commonly so-called as
species to genus. Wherefore just as it is not equivocal to use the
term animal in its generic sense, and as applied to a man, so neither
is it equivocal to speak of grace commonly so-called and of sacramental grace. 55

The first difficulty arises over the fact that in the objection
sacramental grace is referred to as adding to the grace of the
virtues and the gifts, i. e., sanctifying grace, whereas in the
response the term " gratia communiter dicta " is used. With
the exception of Cajetan, most commentators are agreed that
in the light of the wording of the objection itself St. Thomas
did not intend by common grace to speak of gratia in communi
but rather of sanctifying or habitual grace.
Granted this interpretation of the terminology involved, the
solution of the second problem is much simpler, namely,
whether the addition which sacramental grace makes to sanctifying grace is essential or accidental. Though the example
which St. Thomas uses in his response is that of essential species
to proximate genus, namely, man to animal, the doctrine which
he holds concerning the unicity of sanctifying grace rules out
the possibility of admitting that he intends to describe each
of the sacramental graces as true species of sanctifying grace.
This line of reasoning seems to be confirmed by his statement
concerning the relation of the sacramental grace of Baptism
and that of Confirmation.
Sacramental grace adds to sanctifying grace commonly so-called
something that produces a special effect, and to which the sacrament is ordained. If, then, we consider, in its wide sense, the grace
bestowed in this sacrament, it does not differ from that bestowed in
Baptism, but increases what was already there. On the other hand,
if we consider it as to that which is added over and above, then one
differs in species from the other. 56

Were the sanctifying grace granted by these two sacraments
essentially diverse, one sacrament would not increase the grace
of the other but would be an entirely new habit infused into
••Ibid., q. 62, a. 2, ad 8.

••Ibid., q. 72, a. 7, ad 8.

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the soul. It must be concluded, then, that the sacramental
graces constitute accidental species of sacramental grace. The
whole purpose in raising the objection seems to have been to
show that sacramental grace has a relation to sanctifying grace
similar to that which exists between. species and genus, i.e., it
adds to and terminates, without destroying, the essence of that
which it adjoins.
In the Sed contra of a preceding article St. Thomas argues
to the existence of sacramental grace as an effect distinct from
sanctifying grace by reducing the opposing argument to absurdity. If sacramental graces do not add anything over and
above the grace of the virtues and the gifts, the sacraments
would be conferred in vain upon those who already possess that
grace. Since God does not work in vain, it would seem that
the sacraments must make some special addition to sanctifying
grace.51
One might object to this reasoning on the basis that the
sacraments confer an increase of sanctifying grace and hence it
is not contrary to Divine Wisdom to have instituted the various sacraments. This does not explain, however, why there
are seven sacraments. To increase grace it would seem that
two or perhaps three sacraments would suffice. Thus St.
Thomas' argument manifests that by the special effect of the
sacraments he does not mean merely an increase in sanctifying
grace but something superadded to sanctifying grace. The
plurality and diversity of sacraments would be rendered superfluous if one sanctifying grace in all ways the same could be
obtained through a single sacrament. Furthermore, the Council of Trent has declared that all seven sacraments are necessary for salvation, though not all for every individuaL 58
The argumentation in the body of the article is brief. St.
•• Ibid., p. 62, a. 2, aed contra.
•• Si quis dixerit, sacramenta novae legis non esse ad salutem necessaria, sed
superflua,
sine eis ant eorum voto per solam fidem homines a Deo gratiam iustificationis adipisci, licet omni singulis necessaria non sint: A. S. (Cone. Trid., sess.
7, can. 4; Denz. 847.)

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Thomas first establishes the fact of diverse sacramental effects,
not from the defects of sin as he did in the Sentences but from
the need for certain special effects in Christian life. He illustrates this fact by the sacrament of Baptism; then applying
the analogy between sanctifying grace and the virtues to sanctifying grace and these sacramental effects, he arrives at a single
conclusion: sacramental grace adds to sanctifying grace a
divine aid to obtain the end of the sacrament.
As stated in the second part, grace considered in itself, perfects
the essence of the soul, insofar as it [grace] is a certain participated
likeness of the Divine Nature. And just as the soul's powers fl.ow
from its essence, so from grace there fl.ow certain perfections into the
powers of the soul, which are called virtues and gifts, whereby the
powers are perfected in reference to their actions. Now the sacraments are ordained to certain special effects which are necessary in
the Christian life: thus Baptism is ordained to a certain spiritual
regeneration by which man dies to vice and becomes a member of
Christ: which effect is something special in addition to the acts of
the potencies of the soul: and the same holds true of the other
sacraments. Consequently, just as the virtues and the gifts confer
a certain special perfection ordained to the powers' proper actions,
so does sacramental grace confer over and above grace commonly
so-called and in addition to the virtues and the gifts, a certain divine
assistance (divinum auxilium) to attain the end of the sacrament.
It is thus that sacramental grace confers something in addition to
the grace of the virtues and the gifts. 59 •

The doctrine of St. Thomas regarding sacramental grace as
set forth in the Summa is evidently not entirely clear, and this
lack of clarity is evidenced by the wide divergency of interpretation given to it by his principal commentators. His doctrine
in the Summa can be summarized in the following statements.
I. There are diverse sacramental effects or graces because
of the diverse perfections required in the Christian life.
2. These sacramental graces also serve to heal the permanent defects resulting in the potencies from original and actual
sin, i. e., ignorance, malice, infirmity and concupiscence.
59

Summa Theol., III, q. 62, a. 2.

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ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

3. The relation between sacramental grace and sanctifying
grace is similar to the relation between genus and species, i.e.,
it adds to and terminates sanctifying grace without destroying
the nature of this latter grace.
4. The existence of seven sacraments seems to argue to the
reality of diverse sacramental effects or graces.
5. These sacramental graces are a divine aid to accomplish
the end of the sacrament. The nature of this divine aid is not
explained.
Conclusion. The most important difference to be noted between St. Thomas' doctrine on sacramental grace in the Sentences and in the Summa is that already mentioned, namely,
the change of emphasis from the defects of sin to the need for
special effects which these sacramental graces fulfill in the
Christian life. With this emphasis upon them as positive perfections St. Thomas becomes somewhat more explicit and
describes them as divine aids.
In the Summa as in the Sentences sacramental grace is described as healing the defects of nature resulting from original
and actual sins. In the Summa St. Thomas introduces a new
analogy to describe the relation between sanctifying and sacramental grace, comparing it to the relation between genus and
species. This would seem to imply that while sacramental grace
adds to and terminates sanctifying grace intrinsically, it does
not destroy the essential nature of sanctifying grace.
Combining the common features of his teaching in the Sentences and the Summa, the following points summarize the
known doctrine of the Angelic Doctor regarding sacramental
grace. Any successful attempt at the completion of his teaching concerning the precise nature of this grace must necessarily
safeguard these features of his doctrine.
1. Sanctifying grace is a single habit in the soul.

2. Sacramental grace makes a real addition to sanctifying
grace.

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3. There exists a real distinction between sanctifying and
sacramental grace.
4. There are diverse sacramental graces because of the
diverse perfections required in the Christian life and the diverse
defects which these graces remedy.
5. Sacramental grace is permanent and intrinsic because its
effects are permanent and intrinsic.

Interpretations of the Thomistic Doctrine. As this consideration of the writing of St. Thomas reveals, the Angelic Doctor
did not set forth with completeness his own teaching regarding
the nature of sacramental grace. This failure, if it may be
termed such, is not surprising when one considers the fact that
it was only during his own lifetime that theologians had begun
to consider the nature of the sacramental effects. St. Thomas
recognized the evident teaching of the Scriptures and the
Fathers that grace received through the sacraments produced
effects over and above grace received extra-sacramentally. The
problem confronting theologians was to account for these special
effects while safeguarding the essential unity of sanctifying
grace.
That there was some addition to the grace of the virtues
and the gifts when received saeramentally was almost universally admitted, though, as we have noted, there was disagreement as to the nature of the distinction between these two
graces. St. Bonaventure observed that there had already appeared in the thirteenth century two extremes regarding the
nature of sacramental grace. 60 One, emphasizing the unicity of
habitual grace, affirmed the real identity of sanctifying and
sacramental grace and admitted only a rational distinction between the two. The proponents of this opinion based their
arguments on the premise that both graces are ordained to the
same effect, namely, sanctification. The other extreme, by
placing emphasis on the distinct effects of sacramental grace,
•• Opera Omnia (Ex. typ. Coll. S. Bonaventurae, Florence: 1989), IV Sent., dist.
1, p. 1, Unic. Quaest., 6.

ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

concentrated on the reality of the distinction which exists between sacramental and sanctifying grace.
In general there are three principal attempts to complete the
teaching of the Angelic Doctor concerning the nature of sacramental grace.
1. Sacramental grace adds to the grace of the virtues and
gifts a distinct habit. This was the opinion of Peter Paludanus
(d. 1842), and Capreolus (d. 1444). Although it has never
gained any widespread acceptance, it has from time to time,
even in our own day, found some adherents.
2. Sacramental grace adds to the grace of the virtues and
gifts not some habitual gift but an actual divine aid extensive
of the grace of the virtues and the gifts to the proper effect of
each sacrament. Cajetan appears to have originated this doctrine, which became, for lack of a better interpretation of St.
Thomas, the more commonly accepted theory until the time
of John of St. Thomas. Under this classification can be included
the opinion of those who interpreted the doctrine of Cajetan
as a right or title to actual graces.
3. Sacramental grace adds to sanctifying grace an intrinsic
and permanent mode ordered to the attainment of the special
effects of each sacrament. In addition to this mode which varies
in species for each sacrament there is conferred a title to the
actual graces needed for the attainment of the special sacramental ends.
This last opinion, which is generally held to have been first
proposed in a systematic manner by John of St., Thomas, is
now the common Thomistic doctrine on sacramental grace.
According to this theory sacramental grace is a new mode,
or formality, which is entitatively identified with sanctifying
grace and only modally distinct from it. The graces of the
various sacraments are specifically distinct from one another
but constitute only accidental species of sanctifying grace. This
theory, therefore, safeguards the unicity of sanctifying grace;
it explains the reality of the addition made by sacramental

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grace, while saving its real distinction from sanctifying grace;
it offers a specific diversity of sacramental graces to explain the
diverse effects of the various sacraments; and it makes sacramental grace intrinsic and permanent to sanctifying grace. It
thus conforms to all the express doctrines of St. Thomas concerning the nature of sacramental grace without itself involving any contradiction. While this explanation of the nature of
sacramental grace has found widespread acceptance among
Thomists, the problem of accounting for the existence of this
perfecting mode which constitutes sacramental grace seems .to
be somewhat neglected. Nor has there been any wholly successful express effort to integrate this solution into the other
principles of Thomistic sacramental theology. The remainder
of this article will be an attempt to solve these two problems.

II.
A.

PRINCIPLES

OF SOLUTION

THE NATURE OF MODES

Despite the importance of modes in speculative thought and
the validity of their existence, there still remains to be set forth
by scholastic philosophy a universally accepted treatment of
their nature and origin. 61 It has been in part the lack of such a
doctrine which has impeded the development and evolution of
any clear exposition regarding the influence of sacramental
causality on the ensuing effect, sanctifying grace.
The doctrine concerning the nature of modes which is set
forth here is not intended to be exhaustive. The extent of our
treatment of modes has necessarily been limited by their relation to the problem at hand; but the exposition of their nature
as given here should be adequate to render acceptable the solution which is proposed, namely, that the existence of the distinct modes in sanctifying grace produced sacramentally is due
to the diverse efficient instrumentality of the sacraments.
61 The only explicit treatment of modes which we were able to find in available
sources was that concerning accidental modes by Father E. Hugon, Cur8'Ul1 Pkilosophiae Thomisticae (Paris: Lethielleux,
Vol. III, tr. 3, q. 3, a. 8; p. 543.

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ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

Mode as a Commensuration to an Extrinsic Principle. One
definition of a mode given by St. Thomas is found in his opusculum On Modal Prapositions. In his consideration of the
modal proposition, he writes:
Because a modal proposition is denominated from the term
" mode," in order that we may know what is the nature of a modal
proposition, it is necessary first to know the nature of a mode. A
·mode is a determination adjoining something. 62

This admittedly broad definition of a mode requires considerable clarification.
The fact that the genus of this definition is " determination "
of some sort indicates the existence of a potentiality in the subject modified. Every determination presupposes in the determinable subject a potentiality or capacity for the reception of
the new form or determination. The reality which is a mode
must therefore immediately be excluded from God as there is
nothing determinable in Him: 63 Every actually existing being,
substantial or accidental, other than God will possess some
type of mode. The reason for this is that every created form
necessarily implies the notion of composition and hence of limitation. St. Thomas writes, " Wheresoever there is something
received there must be a mode since what is received is limited
according to the recipient: and therefore since created being,
essential and accidental, is received, mode is found not only
in accidental things but in substantial things." 64 Hence mode
is a transcendental because it is found either actually or reductively in all the categories of being except relation. 65
But what is the nature of this determination which constitutes a mode? St. Thomas replies to this question by stating
that " mode is that which a measure determines: wherefore it
••De Propositionibus Modalibus (Opera Omnia, ed. Misurgia-Parma).
•• Nisi effective Deus dicatur species, modus et ordo accidentium (I Sent., d. 8, q.
2, a. 8) ; non ponitur in. Deo modus qui sit qualitas divinae substantiae superaddita
(De Pot., q. 10, a. 2, ad 2).
••De Verit., q. 21, a. 6, ad 5.
•• Cf. Hugon, loc. cit.

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implies determination according to a certain measure." 66 Since
a mode bespeaks a determination according to a measure and a
measure is necessarily extrinsic to the thing measured, a mode
is a determination or commensuration of a thing according to
some extrinsic principle.
The Subject of Mode. In any modification the received thing
is modified by the receiver; and in all composed things it is
the form which is received into matter. Hence the commensuration or mode falls upon the form. " The form of each thing,
howsoever it be . . . is according to a certain measure . . . and
from this it has a certain mode." 67 A mode does not affect the
essential notes of the received form. These essential notes are
not capable of determination without variation of the essential
species. A mode therefore is said to be extrinsic to the essential notes of the form.
The form of walking, for example, is a special kind of locomotion. In itself it implies a potentiality for either speed or slowness. When the walking is actual one of these potentialities will
be actualized; but only one at one time. The actualization of
the potentiality cannot be explained through the essential notes
of the form itself. These notes are in themselves indifferent to
the ultimate determination which is the mode. Moreover, since
the form does not have actual existence until one of these potentialities is actualized, and the exercise of causality demands the
existence of the cause, the form modified could not cause its
own mode.
To explain this ultimate determination in the form, recourse
must be had to those extrinsic principles of the form which are
the efficient and material causes. "To form there is pre-required a determination or commensuration to its principles,
whether material or efficient; and this [commensuration] is signified by mode." 68 The mode by determining imposes limita•• Modus autem est, ut dicit Augustinus, super Gen. ad litteram, quem mensura
praefigit: (L. IV, c. 8, n. 7: ML 84,' 299) unde importat quandam determinationem
secundum aliquam mensuram (Summa Theol., 1-11, q. 49, a. 2).
"'Ibid., I-II, q. 85, a. 4.
••Ibid., I, q. 5, a. 5.

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ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

tion upon form. Since the form is 'the perfecting principle, it
cannot simultaneously be the limiting principle, but demands
that its mode come from principles extrinsic to it.
If an artist wishes to use marble as the matter for a statue,
he must measure or limit the form to be induced in accordance
with the properties of the marble, i. e., the artistic form will be
determined, modified, to some degree by the exigencies of the
matter. This predetermination of the form required by the
matter to be informed is accomplished through a modification
of the efficiency of the agent inducing the form. The material
cause, while it necessarily affects the mode of the form, is not
the sole determining factor; the more important principle in
the determination of mode is the efficient cause.
In the production of a form the efficient agent intends
through his activity the attainment of some end, and he consequently produces a form which will not only attain the end
desired but which will do so in a manner conformable to his
intention. The form which is produced must possess not only
what is essentially required for the ordination to the erid but
the necessary perfection or mode required that such an end be
attained in accordance with the intention of the agent. Thus
Cajetan remarks that wood cut for use in building a ship will
necessarily have a different mode than wood which is being cut
for firewood.69 This added perfection or mode of the form is
dependent for its commensuration upon the efficient principle
intending the attainment of this end, and, as will be seen in
the following section, upon the illstrument used in the cutting.
For example, an artist who wishes to include in a picture an
horizon which will portray a sunrise will produce in the colors
a mode which will resemble such a light as closely as his own
artistic talents permit. The mode of the effect will primarily
reflect the end which the artist intended even though it will be
further modified by the perfection of the efficient agent himself
and the instruments which he uses to attain it.
Applied to the sacraments this means that if the grace pro••In Summam Theol., I-II, q. 4, a. 8.

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duced through their instrumentality is to attain the end
ordained by Christ in their institution (namely, "the removal
of the defects of sins and the accomplishment of the special acts
of the Christian life ") , it must possess not only the essential
notes of sanctifying grace, but also a mode enabling it to accomplish the sacramental effects in a manner conformable to the
intention of the principal agent, who in this case is God
Himself.
Thus far it has been ascertained that a mode is a determination of a form which implies a commensuration to the extrinsic
principles of the form, namely, the material and efficient causes.
It has also been seen that this determination, while falling upon
the form, does not affect the specific notes of the form. But is
their adjoinment wholly extrinsic to the form or does it have a
positive effect in the form itself?

An Intrinsic Adjoinment. While a mode is extrinsic to the
essential formal mode of a thing, i.e., to its specific notes, some
modes complete the form in its own order, while other modes
adjoin a thing already completed in its own order but measured
by still other extrinsic principles. John of St. Thomas distinguishes these two types of mode in regard to the Aristotelian
categories of being.
Briefly I say this . . . that modes are in a twofold division. Certain
ones . . . pertain to the very constitution or completion of any
thing or its nature, as the constitution of substance is accomplished
through a union (which is a mode) and completed through subsistence (which is another distinct mode), an accident through inherence, a quality through a grade of intensity or remissness . . .
and these modes are reduced to the predicament of the thing which
they compose or terminate by modifying .... The other modes,
pertaining neither to the constitution nor to the completion of a
thing but convening only from some extrinsic ratio or principle . . .
are capable of constituting predicaments, such as ubi, situs, etc.
70

7 ° Curs. Phil. (ed. Reiser; Turin:
p. 502, b88.

Marietti, 1980), Vol. I, Log., II, p., q. 14, a. 1,

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ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

As we have seen, according to the doctrine of John of St.
Thomas sacramental grace pertains to the very completion of
the quality which is sanctifying grace and hence will only reductively be placed in a category.
The reason why modes which only complete a form in its
own order do not constitute distinct predicaments is due to
the fact that one requirement for a thing to be a predicamental
being is that it be an ens completum, that is, that it constitute
a nature or quiddity. 11 Modes completing a form enter into
the very constitution of the thing they modify and do not constitute a distinct being. On the contrary, modes resulting from
adjoinment to a form already completed in its own order, affect
an already constituted being, constitute a tertium quid in relation to the subject which they adjoin, and are thus predicamental accidents.
This distinction between modes which complete a being in
its own order and those which affect a being already completed
sharply accentuates the very reason for our difficulty in attaining to a knowledge of the former type of modes. Our minds are
made to know the essence of things, that is, after the manner
of a totum ens. Hence, while considerable knowledge can be
gained concerning the modes which constitute predicaments, or
predicamental modes, the attainable knowledge of intrinsic
modes must be analogical. Consequently, in order to determine
whether the determination which results from the adjoining
of an extrinsic principle, a mode, is purely an extrinsic denomination or whether it implies a change instrinsic to the form
which it adjoins, it will be profitable to. examine further the
nature of the predicamehtal modes.
While the predicamental modes are extrinsfo denominations
insofar as they arise from a commensuration to an extrinsic
principle, it must not be admitted that they are wholly extrinsic
to the form which they adjoin. There is a twofold extrinsic
denomination. J.'he first type is wholly extrinsic since it de71

Ibid., al6.

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nominates without any change, e. g., a thing seen which is
denominated from vision. The second type of extrinsic denomination " denominates by means of some application and mode
of itself to another, from which mutation or application there is
necessarily left something quasi-changed in that to which it is
applied . . . thus the principal denominator is the extrinsic
form from which the change originated but insofar as it is
applied to the actual informing of the other thing it is a
mode." 72 Since the predicamental modes constitute a genus
of real being they cannot be purely extrinsic denominations,
which could not constitute such a genus, but they are extrinsic
in the second sense. In this type of denomination the intrinsic
change while bespeaking an essential o:rder to and dependence
upon the concurrent extrinsic form 73 does not depend upon the
extrinsic form as upon a pure term but " as upon a principle
and form from which it derives its denomination." John of
St. Thomas concludes that the last six predicaments, precisely
as modes, are determinations a:ffecting forms, although the determinations arise from principles extrinsic to the form which
is modified and hence they are transcendental relations" 74
Applying this concept to those modes which complete a
fonn in its own order, it can be said that a mode is not something entirely extrinsic but is a transcendental relation which
principally signifies something absolute in the form and which
Ibid., q. 19, a. 1, p.
b35.
Forma denominans non est solum forma extrinseca ut extrinsece manet, sed
ut relinquit ex sua adiacentia exteriori aliquam mutationem in re, quae non est sola
applicatio et conditio, sed ratio denominandi cum ordine et dependentia essentiali
ab extrinseco concurrente ad ipsam denominationem. Itaque si forma mediante inhaerentia informat, resultat forma intrinseca in ratione informandi. Si mediante
aliquo modo, qui non sit inhaerentia, sed mutatio ex adiacentia relicta, est forma
non pure intrinseca mediante immutatione intrinseca, quae est ratio denominans
(Ibid., p.
a34) .
74 Ista praedicamenta
dependere ab aliquo extrinseco existente, non ut a termino,
sicut relatio secundum esse, sed ut a principio et forma, a qua originetur vel circa
quam versatur denominatio. Et iste respectus est secundum dici ve! transcendentalis
quia, licet dependeat ab existentia. illius extrinseci, ut actu existenter denominet,
tamen quia essentialiter et per se a tali extrinseco dependet . . . ideo dicitur ilia
relatio transcendentalis et secundum dici (Ibid., b33) .
12

73

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ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

arises from the adjoinment of an extrinsic principle upon which
it depends for denomination.

The Modal Distinction. There remains the problem of determining the type of distinction which exists between the
mode and the thing modified. A real distinction is either absolute or formal. 75 The former is that which exists between two
individuals of a species, or between quality and quantity, etc.
The latter type of distinction is that which exists between somethiug and its mode, i. e., between a tree and its place; or between two modes really identified with one object but modally
distinct. This is exemplified in the distinction which exists
between action and passion and between them and motion. 76
Action and passion are really distinct since they constitute distinct predicaments. The fact that the real distinction between
them is not absolute but only modal is established from the
fact that in order for the reality of motion to be denominated
action, there is not required any new reality, but only that the
same reality be related to the agent as originating from it. Or it
is denominated passion in relation to its term. This relation,
since it is not a new reality, cannot be a predicamental relation but a transcendental relation. Action is consequently only
a mode, i. e., not a new reality but a new relation and modification of the same thing. 77 This fact is confirmed by the
example of one person striking another. In the same act by
which one strikes and another is struck, there is both action
'" Distinctio realis dividitur in realem simpliciter, ut inter duas res, v. g., Petrum
et Paulum, quantitatem et qualitatem, et in realem modalem seu formalem, ut inter
rem et modum, v. g., inter hominem et sessionem vel ubi, sive inter duos modos,
qui realiter identificantur cum subiecto, id est ab illo realiter non differunt, modaliter
autem distinguuntur (Ibid., q. 2, a. 3, p. 294, b24).
•• .Actio et passio non distinguuntur sola distinctione ratione, sed distinctione
modali seu formali reali, tam inter se quam a motu (ibid., Vol. II, Phil. Nat.,
Ip., q. 14, a. 2, p. 300, a33).
"Quod vero distinctio istorum trium non sit nisi modalis, ex eo probatur, quia
ut realitas ilia motus dicatur actio, non requiritur realitas superaddita, sed quod
eadem se habeat ad agens secundum rationem originis ab eo; solum ergo est modus
aliquis, non realitas distincta, sed eiusdem realitatis nova respicientia et modificatio
(Ibid., p. 301, a24).

SACRAMENTAL

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841

and passion by reason of the relation of the motion to the
origin of the motion and the recipient. 78
The reality of this distinction of modes from their subject
is likewise illustrated in the case of ubi and situs. These two
modes or accidents of the subject can be changed without the
subject being essentially affected or ceasing to exist; yet as
modes they are identified with the subject. 79

Conclusion. The following conclusions summarize the doctrine on modes which has been set forth:
1. Since a mode follows upon the reception of one thing by
another, all created substantial and accidental being will have
mode.
2. The determination which is a mode, since it is affixed by a
measure, implies commensuration to an extrinsic principle.
8. Since the form is the received thing, the commensuration
or mode will fall upon the form.
4. Since the extrinsic principles of form are the material and
efficient causes, a mode implies commensuration to these causes.
5. Modes caused by the activity of created being are intrinsic or extrinsic, depending upon whether they complete the
form in its own order (intrinsic) or adjoin a form already
completed (extrinsic) .
6. A mode is not something entirely extrinsic but is a transcendental relation which primarily signifies something absolute resulting in the form from the adjoinment of an extrinsic
principle.

Definition. Interpreting the definition of St. Thomas that
"a mode is a determination adjoining a thing" in the light of
•• Et constat etiam ex eo, quia eodem actu, quo impello vel percutio alterum, ille
dicitur percussus vel impulsus. Non ergo requiritur distinctus actus seu realitas, ut
motus sit actus activi et actus passivi, sed sufficit distincta modalitas (Ibid., p. 801,
a88).
•• Haec enim est natura modorum, ut licet identificetur .cum re, tamen possint
amitti vel desinere esse ipsa re permanente, licet non possint separatim existere sine
re, ut patent in ubi et situ et relationibus, quae amittuntur vel ponuntur subieeto
non pereunte, et tamen identificantur ut modi (Ibid., p. 808, a45).

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ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

these conclusions, it can be said that a mode is a determination
of a form, which determination implies a transcendental relation to its extrinsic causes, namely, material and efficient, and,
though the mode is identified with the thing it modifies, it is
formally distinct.
Considering this complete definition of a mode there seems
to be no conflict between the teaching of St. Thomas concerning sacramental grace and the opinion of John of St. Thomas
that sacramental grace is a mode of sanctifying grace. First,
sacrament,al grace as a mode is really and formally distinct
from sanctifying grace; secondly, while intrinsic to the form
of sanctifying grace, it does not affect the essential notes of the
form and hence does not vary the essential species and so preserves the unicity of habitual grace; lastly, the mode explains
how sanctifying grace can accomplish distinct sacramental
effects while remaining essentially the same.
The problem which remains to be solved is to account for
the existence and diversity of the new mode in sanctifying
grace which is caused through the sacramental instrumentality.
We shall try to show that the solution of this problem rests
upon the fact that since a mode implies a commensuration to
the efficient cause, any limitation of this efficiency necessarily
affects the mode which the principal efficient agent can produce in the resulting form. In the following section the role of
instruments in determining the efficiency of the principal agent
will be examined in order to set forth the instrument's role in
the production of a new mode in the effect.
B.

EFFICIENT

INSTRUMENTALITY

Our purpose here is limited to an examination of the essential
characteristics of efficient instrumentality in order to demonstrate how this type of causality modifies the activity of the
principal efficient cause and, in doing, so, produces its own
modality in the effect. Secondarily, the exposition includes a
treatment of those elements of efficient instrumentality which

SACRA1\1ENTAL GRACES:

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343

offer the greatest difficulty to understanding how this type of
instrumentality can be properly applied to the sacraments.
Principal, and Instrumental Efficiency. The efficient cause is
divided by reason of subordination into principal and instrumental cause. The former is an efficient cause which acts in
virtue of its own proper power, as the writer who uses a pen;
the latter acts not by reason of its own proper power, but
insofar as it is moved by the principal efficient cause as the pen
used by·the writer. When it is said that the principal cause
acts by its own proper power, that power is meant which is
permanent in the principal cause and proper to its very nature.
Causes are termed principal precisely because they move without being moved: movens non mota. 80
An instrument in the wide acceptation of the term is taken
to signify any type of causal subordination. Consequently, in
this wide acceptation, instrumentality can be applied to any
combination of diverse causes, insofar as one is subordinated
to the other ministerially. This would include the subordination which exists between the motion of God as primary principal cause and man as secondary principal cause in the production of human actions. 81 The term instrument, however, is
properly taken in a more limited sense as applying to three
particular types of instrumental causality, namely, moral, logical and physical instrumentality.
The moral instrument, which John of St. Thomas calls a
metaphorical instrument, is that which moves an efficient cause
by way of final causality. 82 As an illustration of this type of
•• Dicuntur causae principales, quatenus effectus a causa producitur seu principaliter movetur a virtute propria agentis, noll' a motione accepta ab alia causa, et
ideo formaliter loquendo causa efficiens principalis movet non mota, in quantum agit
(movet) virtute propria (non mota seu motione accepta) (F. X. Marquart, Elementa Phuosophiae, [Paris: Blot, 1937], Tom. III, pt. 2, p. 223).
81 De Pot., q. 3, a. 7.
•• Omittimus in praesenti instrumenta moralia, quae ut instrumenta sint, non
requirunt aliquid reale sibi superadditurn, sed sufficit aliqua denorninatio extrinseca,
v. g., aliquod pacturn vel designatio aut praesentia, ad cuius positionem causa physica operatur, et sic tale instrurnenturn solurn se habet ut conditio requisita et rnetaphorico rnodo dicitur instrumentum (Cursus Phil., Vol. II, p. 513, Ml).

3

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ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

causality St. Thomas cites the traditional example of the lead
coin, which, though it has no intrinsic value itself, has, from
the edict of the ruler, the effect of moving the ruler to grant
the holder of it certain favors. Its causality is presupposed to
the actual operation of the efficient cause.
The logical instrument is a sign and, as such, leads the one
observing it to a knowledge of the object for which the sign
stands. The sign consequently exercises the same type of causality as any other knowable object, namely, that of extrinsic
formal causality.
The physical instrument is an instrument from which there
flows an effect, a physical reality, by reason of its subordination
to a principal efficient cause to which it ministers and by which
it is moved. Since this type of instrument exercises its ministerial activity in the order of efficient causality, it alone can be
properly termed an efficient

The Instrument Attains an Effect Beyond its own Power.
St. Thomas points out that whether the instrumental cause
attains to the ultimate perfection of the form which the principal agent produces or only to the disposition for the form,
in every case it acts beyond the power which belongs to it
according to its own nature. 83 The reason for this is manifest.
If the instrument did not attain an effect beyond its proper
power, the effect would be attributed to the instrument as to a
principal cause and it would not require movement from
another to produce its effect.
Yet this aspect of instrumentality does not furnish a sufficient basis for distinguishing an instrumental cause from a
principal cause. There are cases where the principal agents
attain effects which are beyond their proper nature but this
does not make such principal causes instruments. Man, for
example, is the principal agent in the production of supernatural acts, since these acts proceed from infused habits. The
fact that the instrument attains an effect superior to its own
••IV Sent., d. I, q. I, a. 4.

SACRAMENTAL

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nature while a necessary condition of true instrumentality
not the essential characteristic of such causality.

845

is

The Formal Constitutive of Efficient Instrumentality. An
instrument, properly so called, performs a function to which it
is directed by the principal cause, and one which of itself it
does not possess the power to perform. For this reason an
instrument is defined as an agent which is raised by the power
of the principal cause or agent to produce an effect of a higher
order t}lan its own nature, and one which is proportionate to
the power of the principal cause alone. Hence the formal aspect
of instrumental causality consists in its operating as moved
by the principal agent. 84 It is this dependence ·of the instrument on the principal cause which underlies St. Thomas'
dictum: " Est ratio instrumenti in quantum est instrumentum,
ut moveat motum." 85
Although a secondary principal cause needs to be moved
from first to second act in order to operate, this motion of the
primary principal cause is only the condition for the operation
of the secondary principal cause and not the formal constitutive
of the causality of the secondary principal cause as is the case
with instrumental causality. St. Thomas writes, "An instrumental cause does not act through the power of its own form,
but only through the motion by which it is moved by the principal cause, whence the effect is not attributed to the instrument but to the principal cause." 86 Again he says that there is
no motion in the instrument unless it is moved by the principal
agent which is the essential mover. 87 In the Contra Gentiles he
•• Propria et formalis ratio causae instrumentalis, ut distinguitur a principali,
consistit in eo, quod operetur ut mota a principali agente (John of St. Thomas, op.
cit., Vol. II, p. 515, b43) .
85 II Cont. Gent., c. 21.
••Summa Theol., III, q. 62, a. l.
•• Instrumentum enim ut dictum est, non operatur nisi inquantum motum a principali agente, quod per se operatur, et ideo virtus principalis agentis habet permanens
et completum esse in natura, virtus autem instrumentalis habet esse transiens ex uno
in aliud et incompletum, sicut et motus est actus imperfectus ab agente in patiens
(Ibid., a. 4) .

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ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

insists that the instrument operates through the manner of
motion and states that this is the distinctive formality of its
causality. 88

The Instrumental Power. From the above it follows that
there is received in the instrument, after the manner of a
motion, a power derived from the principal cause. This motion
enables the instrument to truly attain the effect of the principal cause, which effect exceeds the proper power of the instrument itself. This instrumental power which is received by
the instrument from the principal agent is a transitory entity
which begins and ends with the action for which it is given,
and which is received intrinsically by the instrument which it
perfects. Being thus something which is intrinsically received,
it affects the nature of the instrument; and so it is said to be a
natural or physical entity as opposed to a moral one which
acts from without. 89 Further, such a physical or transitory
assistance communicated to the instrument by the principal
cause, being essentially a transitory and passing help given to
the instrument for the purpose of action, is called a motion;
and, since it is presupposed to the action of the instrument, a
premotion.
What is the nature· of this transient power in instances in
which corporeal instruments might be used for the production
of spiritual effects? It cannot be corporeal or there would
••Loe. cit.
•• This doctrine of St. Thomas rules out the possibility of there being in the
instrument an active obediential potency. To conceive of the obediential potency as
having an active character would be to place the instrument in first act. The power
it receives from the primary principal agent would be merely the condition for
its own operation ru.uch the same as the relation between primary and secondary
principal agents. An active obediential potency would make the instrument positively ordered to the efi'ect of the principal agent, and would thus rule out the
possibility of there being any physical instruments with respect to supernatural
efi'ects. Nor would mere extrinsic assistance suffice to explain instrumental causality
while preserving the notion of a true instrument. If the subordination of the
instrument to the principal cause were extrinsic, the only efi'ect which would truly
proceed from the instrument would be that which is proportionate to its own proper
power.

SACRAMENTAL

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347

exist no proportion between it and the effect produced. On
the other hand, it does not seem that a corporeal subject is
capable of receiving a spiritual power. St. Thomas replies:
" The power is neither properly corporeal nor incorporeal, for
corporeal and incorporeal are the differences of complete being,
but this power is properly spoken of as being to an incorporeal
effect, just as motion is spoken of as to being rather than a
being." 90 The instrumental power in question ought to be
proportionate to the effect and not to the subject receiving
the power because by its means the subject is elevated to attain an effect beyond its proper power. If the power were
bodily merely because it was received in a corporeal subject,
it would be impossible to explain a spiritual effect attained by
such an instrument.
The difficulty which some experience in understanding how
a spiritual power can inhere in a corporeal instrument arises
from a misinterpretation of the transient nature of instrumental
power. To understand the term "transient" to mean merely
of short duration and the term " permanent " of long duration
is only an accidental consideration. The power should rather
be conceived of as transient and incomplete or permanent and
complete by reason of the special task which it accomplishes.
Thus
permanent-and complete power is primarily given to
constitute a subject as the principal agent, whereas the transient and incomplete power is given to subordinate one subject to another as serving the former in the attainment of its
effect. 91 Thus such a transient power, even though ordained
to a supernatural effect, can be subjected in a corporeal subject, not absolutely, but insofar as that subject is capable of
being used by a spiritual power for the attainment of a spiritual
effect.92
••De Ver., q. 27, a. 4, ad 5.
Nee intelligimus nomine virtutis transeuntis et permanentis virtutem, quae parvo
tempore vel multo duret, hoc enim per accidens est, sed intelligitur virtus transiens
et permanens completa vel incompleta ratione muneris et officii, quod exercet (John
of St. Thomas, op. cit., Vol. II, q. 26, a. 1, p. 520 a.34).
•• Nihil tamen prohibet in corpore esse virtutem spiritualem instrumentalem,
11

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ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

The Proper Action of the Instrument. The instrument when
elevated by the principal agent to an effect beyond its proper
power nevertheless requires some action proper to itself. With
regard to the use of instruments by created agents, the necessity for this proper activity is readily understood. Creatures
use instruments precisely because of the imperfection of their
nature. A sculptor is incapable of producing an image in marble
unless he employs some instrument which will assist him in
overcoming the resistant quality of the marble. " Because an
instrument is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of
the end, a thing is better, not for being a greater instrument
but for being more adapted to the end." 93 But since God does
not use instruments to attain a spiritual effect because of
any dependence upon the proper operation of the instrument,'
the question arises as to the necessity for a proper action in
corporeal instruments used by God.
St. Thomas replies that even in these cases the instrument
must have its own proper activity if the true concept of instrumentality is to be preserved. It must be remembered that
when the instrument receives the transient power from the
principal cause, the nature of the instrument is intrinsically
affected and in the very operation of its own power the effect
of the principal agent is accomplished. 94 It is this fact which
rules out the possibility of there being an instrument in creation. Creation presupposes no subject; it is the production of
something from nothing. But a created instrument, even under
divine influence, must have a subject upon which it exercises its
inquantum scilicet corpus potest moveri ab aliqua substantia spirituali ad aliquem
efl'ectum spiritualem inducendum (Summa Theol., III. q.
a. 4, ad 1).
••Ibid., II-II, q. 188, a. 7, ad 1..
•• 1nstrumentum habet duas actiones: unam instrumentalem, secundum quam
operatur non in virtute propria, sed in virtute princip.alis agentis: aliam autem habet
actionem propriam, quae competit ei secundum propriam formam, sicut securi
competit scindere ratione suae acuitatis, facere autem lectum, in quantum est
instrumentum artis; non autem perficit instrumentalem actionem, nisi exercendo
actionem propriam, scindendo enim facit lectum. (Ibid., a. 1, ad
Sed diligenter
consideranti apparet hoc esse impossibile. Nam actio alicuius, etiamsi sit eius ut
instrumenti, oportet ut ab eius potentis egrediatur (De Pot., q. 8, a. 4).

SACRAMENTAL

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849

proper activity. Consequently, for an instrumental cause to
exercise its ministerial
it is necessary that there be
some proper action which it administers and, insofar as it is
elevated, this action attains something b<?yond its proper effect.
Nor is it necessary that the instrument by this proper action
produce in the subject of the effect a term distinct from that
of the principal agent. To be a true efficient instrument it suffices that in using the instrument the principal agent conform
his action to the manner of operation which pertains to the
instrument. This is a most important distinction because it
marks the difference between the use of instruments by God
and by created agents. Many have been deceived by interpreting the words of St. Thomas, " dispositive operari," to mean
" operari dispositionem." 95
Created agents, as we have said, make use of instruments to
assist them in the attainment of desired effects and they choose
the instrument whose operation will be most suitable for the
attainment of that effect. Created agents employ instruments
since they do not have the power over the nature of the subject of the effect. Likewise, created agents do not have the
power over the nature of the instruments which they employ
and must consequently modify their activity in conformity
with the form of the instrument.
When the principal cause takes hold of the instrument, the latter,
in the very motion it receives, restricts and determines to its own
form the force which passes through it. Consequently, it impresses
its particular mark on the final result. The principal cause is
obliged, in its action, to yield to the exigencies of the instrument, to
adapt itself to it, to let itself be determined and influenced by it;
and this determining influence is necessarily found in the effect.
It is the role of the instrument thus to impose itself on the principal
cause, and to canalize its action. 96
•• Quod instrumentum debet dispositive operari ad affectum principalis agentis,
per ly dispositive non intelligit aliquid transiens ad ipsum effectum, aut subjectum
ejus, sed aliquid quid disponitur intra se instrumentum, seu sit capax motionis
principalis agentis ad effectum, quia non potest illam motionem accipere, nisi aliquid agendo (John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theol., t. IX, De Sacramentis, q. 62, a.
24, a. l; p. 208).
•• C. V. Heris, The Mystery of Christ (Westminster: Newman, 1950), p. 82.

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ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

Since the mode of the effect, as indicated in the previous chapter, depends upon the commensuration to its efficient cause, the
limitation of the efficiency by the instrument necessarily affects
the mode of the effects. Indeed, the artist chooses the better
of two pianos to play a masterpiece because the mode of the
instrument will be reflected in the effect. The instrument of
the created agent does then produce in the effect a term distinct at least modally from the effect of the principal agent.
·while even in the use of instruments by divine power there
must be some proper activity on the part of the instrument, all
that is required is that the instrument limit the mode of operation of God. He, as it were, adopts his activity to the operation
of the created instrument for the production of the effect. God
is not limited, however, in attaining His effect by reason of the
particular form of the instrument. He can use any instrument
to attain any effect insofar as it does not involve a contradiction. As we have pointed out, the created agent must act in
accordance with the exterior properties of things, i. e., from
without. God acts on the very being of the thing which he uses.
While it must be kept in mind that even God must be limited
in His activity by the operation of the instrument, He does not
choose one instrument in preference to another because there is
any positive ordination in it to attain a spiritual effect.
It is as being, and not because it is such a being that God deigns
to make use of it. In the respect, there is a proportion between the
instrument elevated by Divine Power and everything that can be
produced in the order of being. . . . Thus there are no effects, even
supernatural, which cannot be brought about by created instruments in the hands of God. 9 7

Created instruments used by God in the production of supernatural effects, while diversifying the mode of His action
through their diverse proper operations and thus fulfilling the
essential conditions for true efficient instrumentality, are not
capable of producing in the supernatural effect any mode com07 Ibid., p. 85. Cf. C. Spicq, 0. P. "Les Sacrements sont cause instrumentale
perp.
fective de la grace," Divus Thomas (Piac.), XXXII

SACRAMENTAL

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351

mensurate to their natural fornl. God is not limited by their
proper operation as regards the effect and there is no proportion between the natural form of such an instrument and the
effect produced through its ministerial activity. If, then, there
is to be an instrument which produces a mode in a supernatural
effect, the form of that instrument must be proportioned to the
effect. Since the supernatural effect can only be produced by a
supernatural agent, the form of the instrument proportioned
to such an effect must likewise be received from a supernatural
agent. If the proper operation of the created instrument must
modify not only His activity in accordance with the natural
operation of the created instrument but also the very divine
power which is communicated to the instrument in order that
the effect produced will be commensurate with the signification He has imposed upon the instrument. It is in this respect
that the sacraments differ from all other forms of divine
activity. Our next task is to explain the theory that there
is a divine power transiently communicated to the sacraments
to make them true efficient instruments, and, secondly, that
the effect produced through their instrumentality is limited by
their supernatural signification, the formal element of the sacramental instrument, producing in sanctifying grace the new
mode which is termed "sacramental grace."

Principle I: Diverse Instruments Produce Diverse Modes
A mode implies a commensuration of a form to its extrinsic
principles, namely, efficient and material causes. Any limitation of these principles will consequently produce in the form
measured by them a determination or mode commensurate to
such limitation.
An efficient instrument employed by a created agent limits
the efficiency of such an agent to the proper operation of the
instrumental form. In receiving the influx of the principal
agent, the instrument exercises a determining causality upon
the principal agent, leaving in the power it receives from that
agent a commensuration to its own form. The modification

ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

produced will necessarily vary in accordance with the diverse
form of the instrument. Since the mode in the effect will :reflect any modification produced on the principal efficient cause,
diverse instruments produce a diverse mode in the ensuing
effect, which mode is commensurate to the instrumental form.
Though created instruments used by God in the production
of supernatural effects are not capable of producing in the
effect any mode commensurate to the natural form of the
instrument, when such instruments have a supernatural form
proportionate to the effect, which form limits the divine power,
such instruments will produce a mode in the supernatural effect.
C.

SACRAMENTAL

INSTRUMENTALITY

Theological Foundations. The doctrine of sacramental causality proposed by St. Thomas in the Summa Theologiae was
indeed an innovation when compared to the theories which
were then being taught. But it ceases to be an innovation
studied in the light of
The Angelic
ever sought to evolve a doctrine soundly rooted in authority.
Seldom has this eminent quality of his teaching been so manifest as it is in this question of sacramental causality. In the
Sentences, lacking a mature doctrine of his own, he expounded
the theory of dispositive causality because " this seems more
in conformity with the doctrine of theologians and the saints." 98
In his rejection of the theory of occasional causality, he appeals
to the authority of the Saints. 99 Thus it was St. Thomas' purpose in proposing the theory of efficient instrumentality to
explain satisfactorily the doctrine of faith concerning sacramental efficacy. Although it is not our purpose here to elaborate completely on the positive theological foundations of this
theory, a brief glance at several scriptural and patristic texts
IV Sent., d. l, q. 1, a. 4.
Secundum hoc igitur sacramenta novae legis nihil plus essent quam signa
gratiae: cum tamen ex multis Sanctorum auctoritatibus habeatur quod sacramenta
novae legis non solum significant, sed causant gratiam (Summa Theol., HI, q. 62,
a. 1).
98

99

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858

enables one to see how this theory explains these texts in their
most proper sense.
Christ speaks of the efficacy of Baptism in his conversation
with Nicodemus: " Amen, amen I say to thee, unless a man be
born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into
the kingdom of God." 100 Accepted in its most proper sense,
this text refers to Baptism of water and implies from the use
of the single preposition "of" (in Latin, "ex") and the particle " and " in a conjunctive sense that there is a twofold
principle in the production of grace, namely, water and the
Holy Ghost. Since the material element cannot be the principal
cause, it must be concluded that the water is the instrumental
cause and the Holy Spirit the principal efficient cause in the
production of baptismal grace. To accept the word " and " as
used disjunctively forces a metaphorical interpretation and
would twist the text to mean that just as water cleanses exteriorly, so the Holy Spirit cleanses interiorly. Such an exegesis
would run contrary to tradition which has always accepted this
text as referring to the sacrament of Baptism. If the words of
St. Paul, "He saved us through the bath of regeneration and
renewal by the Holy Spirit," 101 were interpreted in the light
of moral causality, it would likewise force a metaphorical interpretation and the word " and " would be used disjunctively.
According to this theory the sacramental instrument is in the
order of moral cause while the Holy Spirit works efficiently.
Even Cardinal Franzelin was compelled to admit that moral
causality could not fully and sufficiently explain the words of
Christ that " unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and
drink His blood, you shall not have life in you," 102 for it implies
a sanctifying power intrinsic to the material elements of the
sacrament.
In patristic sources, as in the Scriptures, one will look in
vain for any explicit treatment of the nature of sacramental
causality, yet the examples used by the Fathers and their de100

John 8: 5.

101

Tit. 8: 5.

102

John 6: 54.

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ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

fense of the intrinsic power of the material elements in the
sacraments to sanctify can only properly be understood by
means of the transient vis proper to true efficient instrumentality. Thus St. Basil responds to the heretics who said the
water would be equal to God if it possessed the power of sanctification: " The grace which is in the water is not from the
nature of the water, but from the presence of the HoJy
Spirit." 103 While the heretics argued that the water is nothing more than a simple sign, Basil held that there is in the
water some power productive of grace. St. Gregory of Nyssa
compares the baptismal water to the semen which is the " causa
hominis effectrix," 104 which would imply a true intrinsic
efficacy. St. Cyril of Alexandria drew an analogy between the
effect of water heated by fire and water used in Baptism. As
the effect of the heated water is not other than the manner in
which fire itself heats, so the water used in Baptism is refashioned to a divine power. 105
In the West Tertullian, in reply to a certain Quintilla who
was denying the efficacy of baptismal water, answered: "Is
it not proper to divine action to combine power with simplicity?
God really imparted to the water that wonderful efficacy, which
some refuse to admit." 106 St. Ambrose likewise testified to the
intrinsic power of water to sanctify: "It may seem impossible
that water can blot out sin ... but what was impossible, God,
who alone can grant grace, made possible." 107
While the Fathers were not speaking in a strict philosophical
10 •

Si. quae est in aqua gratia, non ex aquae natura est, sed ex praesentia Spiritus

(On the Holy Spirit, c. 15; PG XXXIT, 127).
'°'Oration on the Baptism of Christ; PG XLVI, 479.
105 Quemadmodum
viribus ignis intensius aqua calefacta non aliter urit quam
ipse ignis; sic Spiritus Sancti operatione aqua qua baptizati corpus aspergitur,
reformatur ad divinam virtutem et potentiam (Commentary on John, bk. 2, S: 5;
PG LXXIIT, 243).
100 ••• quae denegas Deo proprietates
suas, simplicitatem et potestatem. (Quid
ergo? nonne mirandum est lavacro dilui mortem?) (On Baptism, c. I; PL I, 1309).
'°' Impossible videbatur ut peccatum ablueret aqua . . . sed quod impossible
erat, fecit Deus esse possible, qui tantum nobis donavit gratiam (On Penance, c. 2;
PL XVI, 499).

SACRA1\'1ENTAL GRACES: IVIODES OF SANCTIFYING GRACE

855

sense, their constant use of examples of efficient instrumentality makes it seem clear that they intended to attribute a
true efficient causality to the material element in the sacraments.
Nor can the decrees of the Councils of Florence and Trent
be understood in their proper sense except by attributing to
the sacraments a true efficiency. These Councils taught that
the sacraments confer and contain grace. 108 If the system of
moral causality were applied to interpret this text, its meaning would be that the sacraments signify the grace which God
alone confers; the sacraments themselves would not properly
confer the grace. The Council of Trent spoke of the sacraments as having a vis or power and taught that in the Eucharist
the conversion takes place by the force of the words. 109 According to the theory of moral causality, the power would be solely
in God. Melchior Cano stated that the majority of the theologians at the Council of Trent favored the doctrine of St.
Thomas. 110 Thus, though the Fathers of this Council had no
intention of explicitly proposing a specific doctrine of causality,
they chose terminology which can only be most aptly interpreted in the light of true efficient instrumentality.
As John of St. Thomas points out, the theological reasons
for this theory of causality can only be reasons of convenience,
since the sacramental causality of grace is dependent upon the
will of God. 111 The first of these reasons is the necessity of
attributing to the sacraments of the New Law a type of causality
which surpasses that of the sacraments of the Old Law. The
sacraments of the Old Law possessed a moral causality, and
Circumcision at least conferred grace ex opere operato passive.
In order, therefore, that the sacraments of the New Law be
distinguished from those of the Old Law, an intrinsic power
•••Cone. Flor., Deer. pro Armen.; Denz. 695. Cone. Trid., sess. 7, can. 6;
Denz. 849.

•••Cone. Trid., sess. 7, can. 1, de Baptismo; Denz. 857. Sess. 18, can. 8; Denz.
876.
110
111

Relectio de Sacramentis (Madrid, 1764) P. IV, 1, 2; pp. 425-484.
Op. cit., t. IX, q. 62, d. 24, a. 1, n. 551; p. 271.

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ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

ought to be attributed to them in order that they may truly be
said to confer the grace which they contain. Moreover, it
seems that they should possess a causality similar to the
physical instrumentality of the Humanity of Christ. Finally
other theories of sacramental causality fail to remove the sacraments from the order of signification insofar as they limit the
causality to that of extrinsic formal or final causality.

Objections to the Theory of Efficient Instrumentality. One
of the principal objections to the doctrine that the sacraments
are efficient instruments in the production of grace is based on
the teaching that grace is created and hence does not permit
of the use of any instrument in its becoming. This objection
is alleged to arise from the authority of St. Thomas himself. 112
The fact is, however, that the proper object of creation is a
subsistent being. 113 The fact that grace is not a subsistent
being but rather an accident inhering in a substance can be
deduced from the words of the Council of Trent: " Men ought
to be justified by grace and charity, which is poured forth
through the Holy Spirit, and inheres in their hearts." 114 Since
grace is dependent in being upon the pre-existence of its subject, it cannot properly be the term of creation.
A search of St. Thomas' writings reveals that St. Thomas at
least three times expressly denies that grace is created, and in
none of his works is there expressly stated that the doctrine of
the creation of grace is his own opinion. On the contrary, St.
Thomas is careful to avoid even the expression "creation of
grace," which was in common usage among theologians of his
time. 115
112 S. Thomas docet instrumentum attingere gratiam in se; sed objicies primo, loca
illa D. Thomae supra relata in quibus aperte <licit non operari instrumentum ipsam
gratiam, secundum entitatem suam, sed aliquid praevium ad illam, quam sententiam
non apparet D. Thomam alibi retractasse (Ibid., n. 298; p. 208) .
113 Summa Theol., I, q. 45, a. 4.
1 u Per Spiritum Sanctum caritas Dei diffunditur in cordibus eorum qui iusti:ficantur, atque ipsis inhaeret (Denz. 800).
11 • M. Tuyaerts, 0. P., "Dtrum S. Thomas Causalitatem Sacramentorum Respectu
Gratiae Mere Dispositivam Unquam Docuerit," Angelicum; VIll, 2 (1931), 180.

SACRAMENTAL

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Another argument frequently lodged against the theory of
the efficient causality of the sacraments is that no corporeal
instrument can attain to the very entity of grace as this exceeds
the proper object of the instrument. Moreover, it seems that
an instrument should dispose the subject for the reception of
the effect of the principal agent and the sacraments do not dispose the soul for the reception of grace. As St. Thomas writes,
" An instrumental cause does not participate in the action of
the principal cause unless it dispositively operates for the effect
of the principal agent through something proper to itself." 116
To this reasoning it must be conceded that no corporeal instrument can act beyond its natural object by its proper power,
but this does not prevent it from attaining a more noble effect
insofar as it is moved by the power of a superior agent. In
an instrument a threefold object must be distinguished. The
first is the object of its proper power according to which it can
act as a principal agent. The second object extends to the
natural agent as it is the instrument of a superior natural
power. Finally, insofar, as the natural agent is moved by an
infinite agent, God Himself, there is not required any proportion to the effect attained, but only an obediential potency
which is nothing other than its non-repugnance to being used
by God for any purpose. Thus the sacraments can attain to
grace insofar as they are moved by the divine power of the
principal agent who is God.
As for the confirmation of this argument that the instrument
must dispose the subject for the reception of the action
principal agent, it has been pointed out that the instrument
does not require a distinct term. All that is required is that the
instrument does operate and that the action proceeds from its
potency. As long as the action proceeds according to the disposition and manner of action of the instrument, the instrument is said to operate dispositively. 117 As explained in treating of the nature of true efficient instrumentality, the twn116
111

Summa Theol., I, q. 45, a. 5.
John of St. Thomas, op. cit., n. 819; p. 218.

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ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

siently received power must proceed from the potency of the
instrument if it is to be a true instrument. In the sacraments
the operation of the divine power presupposes and is limited
to the manner of operation of the material elements, i. e., to
the pouring of the water in Baptism. The sacramental instruments thus operate dispositively.
To understand how the sacraments can be said to touch the
very entity of grace demands a clear notion of instrumental
causality. The power of the principal agent is communicated
to the instrument after the manner of a motion. Thus grace,
as an effect, depends upon a divine power and this divine
power is communicated to the instrument. The effect which
is attained by the divine power is also attained by the power
of the instrument. Since the instrument does not act through
a proper form communicated to it but by means of the instrumental power transiently received from God who is the principal cause, the instrument can exercise an action which attains
the effect. This is the formal reason why St. Thomas attributes
a perfect efficient instrumentality to the sacraments in the
production of grace, i. e., the instrumental action by which
they attain the entity of grace is the same divine power which
attains the entity of grace, but it is in the sacraments by way
of a transient motion.
It is also argued that since the sacraments are corporeal,
they cannot be the subject of a spiritual power. While it must
be admitted that a complete and permanent spiritual power
cannot adhere in a corporeal subject, there is no repugnance to
such a subject receiving a transient and incomplete spiritual
power, just as the human voice is said to have a spiritual
power. Since the instrumental power is of this nature, there
is no incongruity in attributing such an incomplete spiritual
power to the sacraments. 118 Furthermore, the instrumental
power of the sacraments is not properly said to be spiritual.
It is only reductively so insofar as it is reduced to the genus
l:LS

Summa Theol., m, q. 62, a. 4.

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of its principle, which is the complete power of God, or as it is
reduced to the genus of its term, which is grace.
Nor can it be objected that since the sacraments do not
touch the soul itself, the contact necessary for causality is lacking. While it must be granted that there is not a contact of
supposit between the material element of the sacrament and
the soul of the recipient, there is contact of sacramental
power.119 It is true that there must be some immediate contact with the subject of the effect in order that a principal
agent reach its term, but it is not necessarily required that
his contact be by the immediacy of a quantitative contact of
the instrument. When natural principal causes are not present
to the subject of the effect, at least when they are not present
under the formal aspect of cause, they require instruments in
order that their power be communicated to the subject. In this
case it is required that the instrument make contact with the
subject of the effect either by a quantitative contact or through
some other medium. If all contact is lacking to the instrument,
the effect will not be accomplished. The power of God, however, because of His immensity, is intimately present to all
things and it is not required that it be rendered present to the
subject of the supernatural effect by means of quantitative
contact with the subject of the effect. Nor must the instrument of the divine power be present to the subject of the effect
by an immediacy of supposit, but merely by reason of its
instrumental power. The sacraments directly attain the effect
by the divine power which they modify, even though a quantitative contact with the subject of the effect, the human soul,
is lacking. Thus the phantasm, a material thing, does not have
any quantitative contact with the possible intellect but exercises its instrumental power by modifying the power of the
agent intellect.
11 • Praesentia corporea, seu indistantia quoad quantitatem, dicitur contactus molis,
qui obtinetur inter corpora contigua, id est quorum extrema sunt simul. Praesentia
vero spirituum, qui in corpora agunt, dicitur analogice contactus, seu contactus
virtutis, ad designandum indistantiam virtutis agentis spiritualis in passum corporeum (F. X. Maquart, Elementa PkUosophiae, IT, p. 106).

4

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ROBERT REGINALD :MASTERSON

The opponents of the theory of efficient instrumentality
believed that the common doctrine of reviviscence presented
an insurmountable objection to this theory. According to the
doctrine of reviviscence when some of the sacraments are received with an obstacle to grace, if the sacrament be validly
received, grace is produced when the obstacle is removed.
The question then arose: how can the sacraments produce
grace efficiently when the rite has ceased to exist? While the
problem is too complex to be given a full treatment here, a
most satisfactory solution to this problem was offered by Father
Marin-Sola, 0. P. 120 His explanation, which its author claims
is merely a perfecting of the doctrine of John of St. Thomas,
is that every sacrament produces some physical modification
in the Baptismal character in which the sacrament virtually
endures. In the case of Confirmation and Holy Orders this
modification is perpetual and indelible, and hence these sacraments can always revive. In the case of Matrimony and Extreme Unction this modification is temporary, and, as long as
it remains, this modification can be elevated by God to be
the instrument for the efficient causality of grace. Since the
modification produced by Holy Eucharist and Penance is transient, these sacraments cannot revive. This theory is founded
upon the fact that the Baptismal character is a passive physical
potency for the reception of the other sacraments and it is
modified through their reception as a physical potency through
the reception of its proper act.

Conclusion. Thus the sacraments possess the necessary conditions for being efficient instruments in the production of
sanctifying grace: they receive an influx of divine power and
modify the operation of the principal agent, God Himself,
through their own pro;per operation and thus virtually attain
the effect produced in the soul. In attributing this type of
causality to the sacraments of the New Law, St. Thomas conformed his teaching to the most proper sense of scriptural and
120 " Proponitur
nova solutio ad conciliandam causalitatem physiciam sacramentorum cum eorum reviviscentia," Divus Thomas (Frib.), III (1925), 49-68.

SACRAMENTAL

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patristic texts concerning sacramental efficacy and adequately
distinguished them from the " weak and beggarly elements " 121
of the Old Law.
The fact remains, however, that despite their modification
of the manner of operation of the divine power, the physical
form of the material elements does not limit or measure the
effect produced in the soul. There is no proportion between
this effect and the physical form of the sacramental elements.
Consequently, in order to explain this modification of grace,
the efficient instrumentality of the sacraments cannot be
divorced from its subordination to the sacramental signification which is the formal element to be considered. The limitation of this instrumental power is thus explained by its relationship to the sacraments as signs.
D.

THE PROPER FORM OF THE SACRAMENTAL

INSTRUMENT

Supernatural effects produced by God through the use of
corporeal instruments do not necessarily leave in the effects
which result from their instrumentality any mode commensurate to their natural forms. The only proportion that is
required between the corporeal instrument which God employs
and the effect to be attained is the being of the instrument.
The natural form of corporeal elements in the sacraments cannot therefore limit or modify the divine power passing through
them except as to the manner of operation. Consequently, if
the sacraments do produce a new mode in the sanctifying grace
received through their instrumentality, they must in some way
exercise a determining causality upon the divine power so that
there will result in the effect a commensuration to the proper
instrumental form.
It has been established that according to the doctrine of St.
Thomas the sacraments are true efficient instruments in the
production of sanctifying grace. It will now be our endeavor
to establish that when such instrumentality is joined to a prac" 1

Gal. 4: 9.

ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

tical sign of the supernatural effect, as is the case with the
sacraments, the causality of the sign is not limited to the order
of extrinsic formal or final cause, i. e., the order of signification, but by reason of their conjunction in the sacramental
artefact the signification is the proper form of the sacramental
instrument and exercises a determining causality in the order
of efficiency. Since, as has been shown, such an instrumental
form, in limiting the efficiency of the principal agent, produces
a new mode in the effect, the sacramental instrument likewise
produces a new mode in sanctifying grace by reason of its
proper form, the signification. In order to demonstrate this
argument it will be necessary to consider the nature and causality of signs as applied to the sacraments and the relation of
signification and causality in the sacramental instrument.

Nature and Causality of Signs. A sign formally consists in
an absolute relation, a relation secundum esse, to the thing
signified. Insofar as the sign is natural this relation is predicamental; if the signification be imposed by some agent exterior to the sign, the relation of the sign to the thing signified is one of reason. 122 But whether the relation of the sign
to the thing signified be predicamental or of reason like every
absolute relation it presupposes in the sign some foundation
for the relation. That foundation in the sign is its representation to a cognoscitive faculty, a transcendental relation. This
distinction between the absolute relation in which the sign
formally consists and the transcendental relation which is its
fundament is most important in reference to the causality of a
sign. The absolute relation in which the sign formally consists
possesses no causality; its whole essence consists in its order
to a term, namely, the thing signified. The causality of a sign
therefore rests upon the transcendental relation, the fundament
of the sign, which is signified in obliquo·.
Three things are involved in making the presence of an object
known to the faculty: I) the production of the species, which
122

John of St. Thomas, Cursus Phil., Vol. I, p. 2, q. 21, a. I; pp. 647-650.

SACRAMENTAL

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takes place in the potency from the object or extrinsic sign;
2) the excitation of the potency to this production; 8) the
conjunction of this species with the potency to bring forth a
concept of the thing signified. There is no doubt that some
efficient cause is required for the production of the impressed
species, the exciting of the faculties, the production of the expressed species, etc. The question which must be solved is how
these acts depend upon the sign, that is, whether efficiently or
merely objectively as upon causes which specify extrinsically.
St. Thomas seems to have answered this question very clearly
in one brief statement: " The efficient principle of knowledge
is not signs, but reason proceeding from principles to conclusions." 123 His response is based upon two facts. First, an
object, precisely as it manifests itself to a potency, is only in
the order of extrinsic formal causality. The efficiency by which
the sign is applied to the potency is from the knower. If the
object possesses any power to impress itself on the potency,
this power is material and accidental to it precisely as object. 124
The second fact is that the sign possesses the same type of
insofar as it stands in the place of the
causality as the
principal object signified. It is for this reason that some signs
are called instrumental, not because they are an efficient instrument but as an instrument in the order of formal cause, i. e.,
not informing as a
within the knowing power, but as
extrinsically representing an object. A formal sign, which
inheres in the potency, likewise does not enter into the order of
efficiency precisely as sign, but remains in the order of formal
causality. Thus the causality of both an instrumental sign and
formal sign, precisely as they are objects known, is that of
extrinsic formal cause. Their conjunction with the efficient
cause for the excitation of the faculty is accidental to their
formal causality and pertains to them as they are physical
realities.
De Verit., q, 11, a. 1, ad 4.
m F. X. Maquart, " De La Causalite du Signe," Revue Thomiste, XXXII

10 •

(1927). 52-58.

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ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

Is there any essential difference between the causality of a
purely speculative sign and a practical sign? A practical sign
differs from a speculative sign in that the former is derived
from the practical intellect whereas the latter is derived from
the speculative intellect. Since the practical intellect operates
by directing to an end to be attained exteriorly, the practical
sign manifests the thing signified as something to be accomplished by the one who institutes the sign. Thus a traffic light
manifests the will of the legislator that vehicles approaching a
determined intersection shall stop. Whether the sign itself
should be instrumental, either morally or physically, in the
production of the effect is extrinsic to it as sign, since the whole
purpose of a practical sign is to manifest exteriorly the manner
in which the practical intellect interiorly considers the thing
signified, i. e., as an end to be attained. The traffic light does
not cease to be a sign merely because certain motorists ignore
it. The causality of the practical sign is therefore essenextrinsic
tially that of the speculative sign,
causality .125
The example of a practical sign which we have used is termed
a moral instrument insofar as it manifests the will of the legislator to a citizen subject to his jurisdiction. In this case it
binds the driver morally to obey and as such enters into the
order of final causality. The only example in the natural order
of a sign being used as an efficient instrument in the production of an e:ffect seems to be the unique example of the phantasm in the order of cognition. 126

The Sacraments as Practical Signs. As St. Thomas indicates,
the term" sacrament" as it is used in the present context is to
be taken as a sign of something sacred. 127 That the term has
been so accepted traditionally cannot be proved by any a priori
reasoning but can only be determined by its usage in Sac:red
Ibid., pp. 54-57.
John of St. Thomas, op. cit., Vol. HI, p. 4, q. 10,
'"'Summa Theol., Ill, q. 60, a. 1.
125

126

pp. 506-$03.

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Scripture and by the Fathers. 128 This usage is confirmed, however, by the very nature of the sacraments for they are essentially expressions of man's faith. Because man is led to the
spiritual through material things, the sacraments must be
sensible and external. Since the cause of sanctification is rather
an internal and hidden operation, the sacraments should more
properly be placed in the genus of sign rather than of cause.129
Moreover, the sacrament is a practical sign, " a sign of a
sacred thing insofar as it sanctifies men." 130 In the institution
of the sacraments God did not merely intend the representation
of something sacred, which we would call a sacramental, but
ordained that through their use the sanctification would actually be bestowed upon the recipient. Hence the sacraments
possess the causality proper to practical signs, .extrinsic formal
causality, plus the moral instrumentality resulting from the
divine decree to grant the grace signified by their use. As the
traffic signal is the occasion for the operation of the driver to
stop so the sacraments of the Old Law were merely the occasion for the bestowal of grace by God.
All will concede that a sacrament is not a mere natural sign,
i. e., founded wholly upon some natural connection between
the sign and the thing which it signifies. There is certainly no
such connection between the sensible element of the sacraments and the supernatural effect which is signified. Consequently, the sacrament is a conventional sign, signum ad placitum. The relation which exists between the sign which is
the sacrament and the effect signified is solely from their institution by God and as such is formally a relation of reason.
This should not prove surprising if it be borne in mind that
the sacraments are artefacts which result from the imposition
of a signifieation upon a sensible object. Thus the sacrament
pertains formally to the genus which results from that signification and not that to which the matter pertains. Every
Doronzo, De Sacramen.tis in Gcnere, p. 41.
Hugon, De Sacramen.tis in Comm.uni, q. 1, a. 2; p. 10.
180 Summa Tkeol., Ill, q. 60, a. 2.
128

1 ..

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ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

artefact pertains to one genus absolutely and, as such, is in
the genus of the matter; but formally it pertains to the genus
which belongs to it by reason of its artificial form.181 Thus the
ablution of the water in the sacrament of Baptism absolutely
pertains to the category of action, but formally, as a being of
reason, to the genus of sign.
While the material element of the sacrament lacks any ordination to the effect produced, Christ did not leave the choice
of the material elements to chance. He chose those which
possessed some analogy to the spiritual effect which they were
chosen to signify, such as water in Baptism, etc. It is for this
reason the sacraments are said to be symbolic conventional
signs. Many have erred concerning the nature of the sacraments by confusing this natural aptitude of the material elements to signify with the signification which arises from their
institution as sacraments.
The sacraments, then, are instrumental practical signs which
possess the causality proper to such signs plus the moral instrumentality resulting from the divine decree of their institution.

Relation of Sacramental Signification and Causality. The
sacraments of the New Law are efficient instruments as well
as practical signs. As we have seen, it is accidental to the
order of signification whether the sign be a cause of the thing
signified; it is likewise accidental to the order of efficiency
whether the causality be exteriorly manifest. Signification and
efficiency have no essential co-relation; they are essentially in
disparate orders. In the sacraments, signification and efficiency
are at least physically related by their accidental conjunction in
a common subject: both are spiritual uses of a sensible reality .132 The signification is the imposition of a relation of reason on the sensible reality; the efficient instrumentality draws
the sensible reality into a real relation with the effect produced.
Does the relation of these two orders, however, remain accidental in their sacramental conjunction?
181

111

John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theol., t. IX, d. 22, a. 1, nn. H, 25; p.
Summa Theol., III, q. 61, a. 1, ad 1.

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The relation of these two orders in the sacraments of the
New Law can be considered in a twofold manner. First, insofar
as the sacraments are in the genus of sign, they also must have
a specific difference within that order. Accordingly, this difference is due to the fact that the sacraments of the New Law
not only signify the giving of grace by God, hut they signify
this giving as being accomplished in and through the sacraments. Causality is thus said to pertain to the sacraments of
the New Law essentially insofar as it is required to confirm the
truth of their signification. 133
According to a second manner of consideration the relation
of causality and signification is taken precisely as the sacraments were instituted by Christ not only to signify but to cause
grace. The causality of grace cannot enter into the order of
sign to become a specific difference, for to cause grace is hidden
action. To cause grace sacramentally, i.e., as sensibly manifest
by the signification and subordinate to it, nevertheless pertains
essentially to the sacraments of the New Law by reason of their
institution by Christ.
Therefore the institution of Christ joined these two [signification
and causality] so that they would be a particular kind of sign,
having efficacy from His passion and participating in its instrumental
causality of grace. And given this institution, or supposing it, it is
essential to our sacraments to be signs as well as causes; though the
former is the generic element. Whence that institution, though it
established both [namely, the formality of sign and cause] as it is the
institution of a sacrament, intended it to be only a sign. N evertheless this institution simultaneously ordained the sign to be a cause,
and the institution pertained to both aspects, not by force of its
sacramental essence [i. e., by reason of its being a sign] but by reason of its peculiar institution. And, although that which is used to
cause in the sacrament is not the form or essence of a sign, but that
which is natural and sensible in a sacrament, it therefore belongs
essentially [to the sacrament] by reason of its matter .... Whence
our sacraments have a twofold analogue to the name sacrament, that
of sign and of cause, though the notion of cause is subordinate to
118

John of St. Thomas, Cur81U Theo'l., Coe. cit., n. 119; p. 86.

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ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

the notion of sign and they are called sacraments m a unique
manner. 134

Consequently, although the sacraments are causes by reason
of their material element, the natural form of the element is
not the proper form of the sacramental instrument. The proper
operation of water in Baptism, while required for the sacramental instrumentality is not the proper form of the sacrament
as it is only the form of the material element. The proper form
of the instrument is therefore derived from the signification.
operation
Since the action of an instrument is diversified by
of its proper form, the signification diversifies the instrumental
activity and constitutes the sacraments as diverse instruments.
For example, the artisan who combines metal, wood, and
wire to construct a piano does not unite their natural forms
into a new physical essence, but acquires an artificial unity
through the imposition of an artificial form. While the musician
who plays the piano depends upon the proper operation of the
natural forms of the various elements, e. g., resistance, vibration, etc., it is not the natural forms of these elements which
are the ultimate determining factor in the instrument, but the
artificial form which unites them into a unique artefact. The
same elements united by a different artificial form would produce sound distinct from that of piano music. So also in the
sacraments, while the operation of the physical elements is
necessary that the sacrament be a cause, their forms are not
the proper form of the instrument. Their instrumentality receives its ultimate determination and they are constituted
diverse instruments by reason of their essential unity and subordination to the artificial form which is the sacramental
signification.

Principle II: The Sacraments Are Diverse Instruments
Instruments are diversified by their proper forms. Artefacts
used as instruments diversify the activity of the principal
11 '

lbid., n. 15, p. 8; n. 16, p. 9.

SACRAMENTAL

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efficient agent, not by reason of the natural form of the material elements of the artefact, but by their proper form which
is the artificial form induced by the maker of the instrument.
The sacraments are both pract1cal signs and efficient instruments. While in the sacraments of the New Law these two
orders are only accidentally united in the physical order, by
reason of the institution of Christ they constitute an artificial
unity or sacramental instrument in which they are essentially
related and whose proper form is the signification. Thus, insofar
as the sacraments have a diverse signification, they are diverse
instruments.

III.

CONCLUSION

AND SUMMARY

Conclusion. In considering the nature of instruments it was
pointed out that their use by men is due to the inability of
human agents to attain particular ends without the assistance
of the operation of other things. Because created agents are
necessarily limited by the proper operation of the instrumental
form, such agents are guided in their choice of instruments by
the proportion of the instrumental form to the end to be attained. God's power, as has been seen, knows no such limitation by natural forms. This is especially true in reference to
supernatural effects, since natural forms have no positive proportion to such effects. In confecting the sacramental artefact,
however, God has given this unique instrument, not a natural
form, but a supernatural one, and it thus bears a true proportion to the effect produced through its instrumentality. The
divine power in employing the diverse sacraments to sanctify
men is limited by their diverse signification. By analogy, as
the natural form of the created instrument limits the efficiency
of the finite agent and produces a corresponding mode in the
effect, so the supernatural signification of the sacramental
instrument limits the efficiency of the infinite Agent and produces a corresponding mode in sanctifying grace.
Thus we find here, deliberately willed by God, one of the
conditions of that instrumental causality, to which our defective

870

ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

activity is necessarily subject, and in accordance with which the
instrument imprints its own special mark on the ensuing effect. The
sacraments, being essentially signs, stamp their own likeness on the
soµl in producing what they signify. In that respect, it must be
remarked, they differ from every other form of divine activity. 185
Though each of· the sacraments essentially signifies the bestowal of sanctifying grace, this grace, as the signification indicates, is patterned to suit the recipient in accordance with his
condition and needs in the Christian life. As there are, accordh1g to the enumeration of St. Thomas, seven special acts of the
Christian life: life, strength, conservation, healing, restoration,
power and propagation, so there are seven distinct modes of
sanctifying grace, each the result of a distinct sacrament.

Summary. Our purpose has been to demonstrate that the
theory of sacramental grace as a mode of sanctifying grace is
not only in conformity with the known teaching of the Angelic
Doctor concerning the nature of this grace but is in complete
harmony with his doctrine concerning sacramental signification
and causality.
In order to accomplish this end it was necessary, first of all,
to study the writings of St. Thomas to determine as .precisely
as possible his teaching regarding sacramental grace. Our study
of these texts led us to the conclusion that, although he did not
explicitly describe the precise nature of this grace, he taught
that it makes a real addition to sanctifying grace; is really
distinct from the latter grace; is diversified by the diversity of
ends to which it is ordained; and, finally, that it is permanent
and intrinsic.
The problem which confronted his commentators in trying
to find the nature of this grace was to explain the diversity of
sacramental effects while safeguarding the unicity of sanctifying grace. Moreover, in doing so, if their doctrine was to be
truly a Thomistic doctrine, it had likewise to preserve the
known teaching of St. Thomas concerning the qualities of this

>•• H&is, op. cit., p. 14i.

SACRAMENTAL

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grace. The lheory of sacramental grace as a mode of sanctifying grace is generally regarded as the only theory which
successfully fulfilled these requirements.
Our main task was the solution of a problem which seems
somewhat neglected by those who have espoused this theory
of sacramental grace: can the existence and diversity of the
modes which constitute sacramental grace be explained through
the known principles of Thomistic sacramental theology? In
answering this
it was essential to explain how mode
was necessarily connected with instrumentality./ This involved
a consideration of the nature and origin of modes and the role
of efficient instruments in their production. Secondly, it was
necessary to expound and defend the teaching of St. Thomas
that the sacraments are true efficient instruments in the production of sanctifying grace. Finally, since divine power is not
limited by natural forms, it was necessary to explain how this
instrumentality when united by. the sacramental essence to the
practical sign of the supernatural effect has for its proper form
the signification. The sign, having a direct proportion to the
supernatural effect, leaves in the sanctifying grace produced
through the sacramental instrument a mode commensurate to
the signification.
As the following conclusions indicate, the theory of sacramental grace as a mode of sanctifying grace preserves the teaching of St. Thomas concerning this grace and is the logical
consequence of his doctrine on sacramental signification and
causality.
1. The doctrine of an intrinsic mode accounts for the exist-

ence of formally distinct sacramental effects. In the genus of
sacramental grace, the intrinsic mode of sanctifying grace
caused by the various sacraments is something formally distinct and hence constitutes an accidental species.
2. This doctrine explains how there can be a real distinction
between sacramental grace and sanctifying grace without destroying the essential unity of this latter grace. The distinction

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ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON

between a mode and the subject it modifies is not a numerical
one, ut res a re, but an inadequate distinction. There is no
reason therefore to suppose the existence of entitatively distinct
habits to explain the reality of this distinction.
8. The addition which sacramental grace makes to sanctifying grace according to this teaching is both a real and a
positive one, namely an intrinsic mode, and furnishes a basis
for the distinction between sacramental and extrasacramental
justification.
4. This mode, being both intrinsic and permanent, explains
how sacramental grace can accomplish the special acts necessary in the Christian life and the removal of the defects of sin
which have a permanent effect upon man's nature. Nor does
this doctrine exclude the conferring of actual graces at the
proper time for the performance of other actions necessary in
attaining the ends of the various sacraments.
5. Although St. Thomas did not elaborate on the nature of
this grace, the doctrine of an intrinsic mode is intimately joined
to his teaching regarding the nature of sacramental signification and causality and gives meaning to his statement that the
sacraments cause what they signify. The mode is, in the effect
produced in the soul of the recipient, the very link between
these two facets of the sacramental reality.
ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON,

Dominican House of Studies,
St. Rose Priory
Dubuque, Iowa

0. P.

THE NATURAi,, TERRESTRIAL END-OF MAN

T

HIS article is written to establish the existence in the
philosophy of Aristotle and Aquinas of a coherent teaching on the natural end of man. That teaching is to this
effect: that man has a natural, terrestrial, ultimate end (Aristotle) which, although supremely good in the natural order, is
imperfect relatively to man's supernatural end (Aquinas).
This position is one that is almost native to the balanced
Christian intellect. Even recent Catholic critics of the natural
end of man 1 have not directly questioned it. They have been
concerned to show that man has no natural end in the next
life. There is no discussion here of any such end. What is
proposed here is that man has a natural end achievable in the
present life. It is assumed that he has a supernatural end
achievable in the next life.

I.

ARISTOTLE

1. Man has a natural, terrestrial end.

That man has a natural end in this life, and that its constituents are rationally determinable, are two of the major
conclusions of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. The existence
of some ultimate end in this life is the point of Book One; the
final determination of the constituents of that end is the point
of the last half of Book Ten. Most of the intervening books
are concerned with the means to that end, namely, intellectual
and moral virtue.
That the end of man envisioned by Aristotle is natural, not
supernatural, is but a corollary to the fact· that he is a pagan,
and not of the Judaic-Christian dispensations. Tb.at this end
should refer to the present life, unlike the closing myth of
1

Henri de Lubac, Surnaturel (Paris: Aubier, 1945); Joseph Buckley, Man's Last

End (St. Louis: Herder, 1949).

373

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JAMES V. MULLANEY

Plato's Republic, arises from Aristotle's uncertainty about any
future life.2 Better, he would judge, to be clear about the
meaning and purpose of this life of which one is sure, than
to occupy oneself analyzing an end postulated in some future
life of which one is unsure. There is much to be said for this
hard-headed attitude, granted his religious situation. It is
therefore within the framework of the natural and terrestrial
that Aristotle establishes the existence of some end for man.

a) The existence of the end:
Aristotle's argument proving the existence of a natural, ultimate end in this life is characteristically pointed. A means
is chosen for the sake of something else, but an end is chosen
for its own sake. If there were no end, but means only, then
everything would be chosen for the sake of something else, to
infinity 8-so that nothing would ever be chosen. Rephrased,
the argument is this: a means is a relative thing. There can
be no means except as bearing on some end. If nothing is loved
for its own sake (end) , then nothing will be loved for the sake
of it (means) . To say that there is no end, is to imply there
are no means, for the end is the reason of the means. That we
employ no means is so clearly contrary to human experience
as to need no comment.
Any objection based on intermediate ends misses the point.
Such an end partakes of the formalities both of end and of
means: it is desired both for its own sake (end) and in
reference to a further end (means). Insofar as it is itself an
end loved for its sake it justifies the argument of the preceding
paragraph: there is some end. Insofar as it is a means it also
bears out the preceding argument, because a means is loved in
reference to a further good loved for itself alone. As means
implies end, so the intermediate end implies an ultimate end. 4
•Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I, 11; llOlb 22-1101" 8; De anima, I, 4; 408b, 1829; II, 2; 413b 24-27.

"Aristotle, Ethics, I, 2; 1094 8 17-21.

'Ibid., I, 7; 1097• 80-85.

THE NATURAL,

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b) There is only one end:
However many constitutive goods may enter into this ultimate end, it is itself one only. For the ultimate end is the realm
of the good in itself, loved for itseJf. So if wisdom is good. and
lovable in itself, and virtue is good and lovable in itself, and
friendship is good and lovable in itself, then happiness, the end,
is not any one or two of these things, but all three: and not
these three alone but these together with whatever else may
enter into the good for man. For the good that is the end, or
human happiness, is that collectivity of all things humanly
good. Since it is all-inclusive it can hav-e no competitor. 5
c) All men have the same end:
Man's end is one not only in the sense that there is no
plurality of ultimate ends for any given man, but also in the
sense that all men have the same end. That is, "happiness "
has an objective meaning. It is true that some men locate
terrestrial happiness in wealth, others in pleasure, still others in
power, a few in virtue, and so on. But a philosophical analysis
is not a sociological report. What men do in fact seek as their
end may have regrettably little correlation with what their
nature objectively requires.
All men do have the same specific nature, and therefore the
same set of needs. All men, for example, need to move about
in air rather than under the water. Hence what is fatal to a
fish is good to man. Similarly, all men need food to eat, love to
respond to, virtue to practice, truth to think upon, a society
predicated upon the responsible freedom of each. Because we
all have the same nature and, consequently, the same objective
needs, it will be the same set of good things (happiness, the
end) which will satisfy those needs. 6

The constituents of the natural end.
a) The goods:
What is that set of good things which constitutes man's end
•Ibid., I, 7; 1097b 18-22.

5

•Ibid., I, 7; 1097b 23-1098• 17.

876

JAMES V. MULLANEY

by satisfying the objective needs of his nature? Looking at
man roundly, as intellect, will, heart and body, it is clear that
he needs, and that as a result his end must include, wisdom and
the other intellectual virtues; the moral virtues; love, friendship, honor, some degree of power and the other social goods;
reasonable bodily pleasure and health; and the financial means
to sustain modestly the kind of life here described. He needs,
to be brief, goods of soul (intellectual and moral virtue); social
goods (friendship and the good society); goods of body
(pleasure and health); and external goods (moderate wealth).
The collectivity of these is his end achieved.7
b) Hierarchy:
But man's end is not an indiscriminate collection of these
goods, it is the hierarchically ordered collection of them. For man
is a tension of diverse powers which are in themselves not coordinated but hierarchically ordered. The powers of his nutritive
life are subordinate to those of his animal life; 8 the powers of his
animal life are subordinate to those of his rational life; 9 and
among his rational powers intellect is superior to will.10 The
goods corresponding to these grades of life have, as constitutents of man's terrestrial end, a corresponding hierarchy. External goods, such as wealth, are subordinate to his vital needs,
such as health; any reasonable man cheerfully pays for medical
care. The goods of his vegetal life are in turn less important
than the reasonable demands of his animal life, such as bodily
pleasure: those partial to vitamin pills may postpone them to
continue the keen joy of a tennis game. Animal passions in
turn are evidently subordinate to the will: one may yield to
desire only to the degree that it is morally commendable to
do so. The will in its turn is subordinate to the intellect, in
the way the appetitive is subordinate to the cognitive, namely,
as that with a less extended object (being as good) is subIbid., I, 8; 1098b 9-1099b 8; X, 8; 1178• 8-1179" :18.
Ibid.,.!, 7; 1097b 84-1098"
•Ibid., I, 7; 1098"
10 Ibid., X, 7; 1177•
7

8

THE NATURAL, TERRESTRIAL

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877

ordinate to that with a more universal object (being as true) .11
Hence rational goods are superior to moral goods, the contemplative life to the active.
Aristotle's view of the constituents of man's natural, terrestrial end may be summarized as follows:
I. External goods

. . . . . . .

2. Goods of the body { as
3. Social goods

as sentient
. . . . . . . .

4. Goods of the soul { as will . . .

as intellect .

wealth
health
pleasure
love, friendship, honor,
power, etc.
moral virtues
contemplation and other
intellectual virtues.

Happiness on this earth consists in attaining each of the
goods appearing at the right of the above diagram; and attaining them in the order indicated (ascending importance) . It is
not any single good, such as contemplation, which is the end,
but the hierarchically ordered collectivity. Wealth, in itself a
means, must be counted as a constituent of the end on the
realistic assumption that it is indispensably implicated in some,
if not all, of the other constituents. However otherwise noble
he may be, the destitute beggar is not the model of human joy.

3. Essential and integral happiness.
Virtue, both intellectual and moral, occupies a position of
unique importance among the goods which constitute happiness. Whenever happiness is defined in the Ethics, it is defined
in terms of contemplation and moral virtue: happiness is
operation of soul springing from the perfection of virtue. 12 The
seventh chapter of the tenth book all but identifies perfect
happiness with contemplation,1 3 and the eighth chapter of the
same book seems to equate human happiness with moral
virtue. 14 Moreover, four complete books-almost half on the
Ibid., VI, 2; 1039" 21-32.
Ibid., I, 7; 1098" 16-18; I, 13; 1102• 5; X, 7; 1177• 12.
13 Ibid., x, 7; 1177°18.
"Ibid., X, 8; 1178" 8.
11
1•

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JAMES V. MULLANEY

Ethics-are devoted to an analysis of virtue. The conclusion
is inescapable: essentially happiness consists in contemplation
(the highest of the intellectual virtues) and moral virtue.
Yet integrally considered, happiness includes also the social
goods, goods of body and external goods, such as a modicum
of wealth. Not only are these good for man in· themselves, and
therefore necessarily included in his end, but they are indispensably required for contemplation and virtue. It is obvious,
for example, that the life of moral virtue presupposes the social
goods: it is hard to conceive justice where there are no fellow
men. Equally, it supposes wealth; the poverty-stricken cannot
be generous. It supposes also health: the sickly cannot be
courageous in warfare for they will never be admitted to basic
training. Even the contemplative life presupposes minimum
means, such health as to sustain thought, friendships to spark
and to encourage the more or less solitary responsibility of
thought. 15 Pleasure is inseparable from the acquisition of any
good, even the intellectual and the moral. 16 If goods of soul
are essential happiness, all the others-social, bodily, externalare still required for the integrity of happiness.
In the Jight of this distinction between essential and integral
happiness, the problem, 17 whether happiness is predicable only
of human life as a whole, or of its separate moments, becomes
soluble. If happiness means integral happiness, this is predicable only of life as a whole. One cannot, for example, be
engaged in philosophic contemplation and, at the same time,
be generously helping another. The reason for this is that
human life is successive, not simultaneous. Hence its perfecting
crown, the collectivity of all human graces, is also successively
attained.
But if, on the other hand, happiness means essential happiness, the life of wisdom and virtue, then it is predicable of each
moment of one's adult life. For intellectual and moral virtue,
once acquired, are permanent qualities of the soul, shaping our
Ibid., X, 7-8; 1177• 11-1179b 88.
Ibid., X, 5; 1175• 22-1176• 29.
17 Ibid., I, 10; 1100• 10-1101" 20.

16

1•

THE NATURAL, TERRESTRIAL

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attitudes ·and actions at each moment, including the moment
of the loss of the lesser goods required for integral happiness.
4. 1'he primacy of contemplation.

Granted that happiness is essentially virtue, which kind of
virtue is it-moral, intellectual, both? If both, in what order?
Plato had answered that question in the myth of the cave. 18
The fulfilled human life, he had said, has two moments: contemplation followed by action. After having withdrawn to the
vision of the pure "sun" of intelligibility, the form of the
Good, one must return to this shadow land of terrestrial compromise between reality and unreality, in order to lead one's
fellow man to the vision one has oneself already enjoyed; or,
failing that, to lead him to a life not inconsistent with that
vision. For Plato there is no " either-or " as between contemplation and action, which latter is the realm of virtue. It is
rather a question of action based on contemplation.
Aristotle's eventual answer agrees with Plato's. But the
various steps in reaching that agreement are of moment. Characteristically, the first part of Aristotle's answer is highly
analytical. That first part is this: in the order of specification,
the contemplative life is superior to the active. His reasons are
two. First, reason is higher than will, with the result that the
life of reason is higher than the life according to will. Especially
is this the case when it is a question of reason's highest perfection, namely, wisdom or contemplation. Second, the object
of the contemplative reason is the highest being, whereas the
object of moral virtue is the specifically human, either one's self
(courage and temperance) or other men (justice). In brief,
happiness means the perfection of man's specific nature. But
man is specifically intellectual. Hence his happiness, his end,
lies in intellectual fulfillment, of which the highest instance is
wisdom or contemplation. 19
This conclusion is no instance of a philosopher's complacent
self-satisfaction. It is rather a call to an intense effort of sus1•

19

Plato, Re'J)'Ublic, VII; 514-5!U.
Aristotle, Ethics, X, 7; 1177• U-19.

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JAMES V. MULLANEY

tained concentration, a demand that one free oneself from
laziness, from devotion to pleasure, from love of routine, from
established habits of thought. We must not, Aristotle warns
us, heed those who counsel homocentricity, who urge that the
proper study of man is man. We may be merely human, merely
mortal, but there is that in us, namely, the contemplative
reason, which is supra-human, and we must tense ourselves to
live according to it. 20
Not infrequently Aristotle is his own best critic because in
him genius for philosophical analysis is balanced by a strong
stra.in of empirical common sense. So, having called men to
the contemplative life in the name of an analysis of their nature,
he immediately adds a reservation. To live according to contemplative reason is life not according to man's composite
nature, but according to a supra-human element of that nature.
It is divine rather than human life.21 The kind of life specifically
suited to man's composite nature is the life of moral virtue, and
this is happiness in a secondary sense. 22
Of man as inteHect (man in the order of specification) contemplation is the proper end. Of man as man (man in the
order of exercise) the life of moral virtue is the proper end, as
is clear from the facts of life; for these are the court of final
appeal in practical matters. 23 This neat distinction-man as
intellect and man as man-is suspect by virtue of its very
neatness. For is not man, in his very manhood, intellectual?
Must there not be some meeting point of the two ends, contemplation and virtue?
Prudence is the meeting point. Moral virtue is based on
prudence, 24 so that prudence is materially moral. But it is
formally intellectual. It requires wisdom or contemplation both
at its beginning and at its end. At its beginning, because
knowing how to achieve the end (prudence) presupposes knowl•o Ibid., X, 7; 1177b 80-1178" l.
"'Ibid., X, 7; ll 77b
••[bid., x, 8; 1178• 8-10.
•• Ibid., X, 8; 1179"
"'Ibid., X, 8; 1078• 16-18; VI, 5; 1140•

80.

THE NATURAL, TERRESTRIAL

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edge of man, of his end, and of his present metaphysical situation, all of which pertain to contemplation. At its end, because
prudence, through morally virtuous action, leads to that happiness of which contemplation is the highest constituent. 25 Hence
the life of moral virtue flows from and to the contemplative life
through prudence. In Aristotle, as in Plato, happiness is a
morally virtuous life based on contemplation. Yet there is
order between the two. Contemplation is prior to moral virtue
in the order of specification, and moral virtue is prior to contemplation in the order of exercise.
5. Is the natural end attainable?

An end normally unattainable is no end at all. Is it concretely possible for most adults to have a sufficiency of
economic goods, to have health, reasonable pleasure, love,
honor, esteem and the other social goods, moral virtue and
contemplation? And to have each in the right proportion,
relatively to each other good? Can the insane contemplate?
Can the emotionally maladjusted secure the social goods? Can
the incurably ill be healthy? Can the proletariat have sufficient
economic goods? Is the Aristotelian end an end?
It is clear that whole groups of persons are excluded from
one or other of the goods required for integral happiness. The
ill are not healthy, the poor are not moderately wealthy. To
put the matter another way, the possession of integral happiness depends, in part, on factors beyond our own control.
Whether one is honored and loved (social goods) depends, in
part, on the generosity of others. Whether one has health
depends, in part, on the pooling of medical research, and the
availability of medical services. Whether one has modest
wealth depends, in part, on the economic organization of
society. Other people, society at large, and chance 26 play a
large part in the achievement or non-achievement of integral
happiness.
••Ibid., VI, 12; 1144• 4-11.
••Ibid., I, 10; 1100• 10-1101• 20.

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JAMES V. MULLANEY

But the achievement of essential happiness, of the contemplative spirit and of virtuous habits depends upon oneself, 21
at least when one surrounds it with the qualification Aristotle
was careful to employ; namely, that each of us must live
according to the noblest element of his nature so far as that is
concretely possible in each individual case. 28 To develop a
contemplative bent of mind so far as our native endowment
permits-this is open to all, even to the retarded, and even to
the insane during their lucid periods. To be virtuous according
to our capacities-even the least gifted of men knows this to
be in his power. Integral happiness is, taking life as a whole,
to be hoped for; but essential happiness is to be attained by
one's own efforts. Each may achieve this end in a way filling
up his individual nature. The degrees of essential happiness are
objectively varied, but each is subjectively satisfying .
. More than that. The absence of integral happiness is but
a sterner call to the acquisition of essential happiness. Essential
happiness can transform the absence of integral happiness into
strength, gentleness, compassion. One cannot avoid separation
from those one loves; but the lonely are not necessarily joyless.
There are happy men who have heart trouble. One can be
worried about finances, or better, two can be, and yet live
joyously. It is unrealistic to deny that lesser goods enhance
essential happiness. It is pathetic to deny that, where intelligence and moral strength are found, vigorous joy is possible
however calamitous other factors may be. 29
There is one lingering doubt-a doubt of which Christians,
not the least among them St. Thomas Aquinas, were later to
make capital at Aristotle's expense. It is this: happiness, the
end, should exhaust the thirst for good; it should be something
which definitively quiets desire. 30 Now, suppose we had attained the Aristotelian end: would our desiderative capacities
have been quieted? Suppose we had attained to that ordered
set of goods which is integral happiness: would it constitute an
21
2•

Ibid., X, 7; 1177" 28-1177b 1.
Ibid., X, 7; 1177b 80-1178• 1.

29
•0

Ibid., I, 19; llOOb 18-20, 28-88.
Ibid., I, 10; 1101a 18.

THE NATURAL,

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388

ultimate end? When we have attained what Aristotle proposes,
is it happiness that we have attained?
One must distinguish. Such a man would have human happiness, but not absolute or supra-human happiness. 81 This simple
distinction is pregnant with wisdom. It implies, first, that
happiness is an analogical, and not a univocal, concept. The
happiness of a rational spirit which is the form of a body is not
univocally identical with the happiness of a pure spirit. Man
must look for human happiness, not for angelic or divine. It
implies, second, that a certain discipline of the will in the
matter of happiness is called for. So long as one stays within
the natural order .• and for obvious reasons Aristotle was committed to staying there, velleities for supra-human happiness
must be treated with the same sternness that is accorded other
velleities. To desire the concretely impossible is madness. To
rejoice in the concretely attainable, which in this case is the
full perfection of human nature, is a part of wisdom.
This distinction between human happiness and absolute
happiness implies, finally, that the Aristotelian happiness is
one proportioned to human nature. It is nothing less than
perfect human happines. To allege that a proportionate end
is not an end because it is proportionate could elicit only one
Aristotelian response-the silence of scorn.

II. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
1. The criticism of the natural end.

St. Thomas seems to be opposed to the position that man
can have an ultimate end which is natural and terrestrial. No
created good, and no set of created goods can, he argues,
constitute happiness. For happiness connotes ·the definitive
quieting of desire. Now what the will desires is goodness itself
which can be found not in any created good or set of created
goods, and only in God. Since God alone can satisfy man's
will, He alone constitutes man's happiness. 82 Analyzing the
81

Ibid., I, 10; 1101• 19-fW.

••Summa Theol., I-II, q. fl, a. 8.

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JAMES V. MULLANEY

Aristotelian view that man has a natural, terrestrial end consisting not in absolute happiness but in happiness proportioned
to human nature, Aquinas remarks that, given such a view, it
is small wonder that great minds such as Aristotle's suffered
from the confinement of this opinion. 33 Fo:r even if the end
Aristotle proposed were achieved, :restlessness would prevail
in man, since such an end would not fill up his need for absolute
goodness. A limited set of limited goods cannot satisfy man's
win; it is, therefore, no end.
This argument rests on the nature of the will, in which connection it is useful to recall a few of Aquinas' own reservations.
The intellect is, of its nature, made for truth; but it is not,
solely of its own natural powers, made for the Beatific Vision.
Similarly the will is, of itself, ordained to goodness; but it is
not ordained, solely of its own natural powers, to the Trinity
as It is in Itself. The desire of the will for goodness itself is
natural, innate, necessary. But the desire of the will for the
vision of God as He is in Himself is, on the contrary elicited,
free, conditioned and inefficacious. 34 At the very least, then,
the natural desire of man's will for good cannot be arbitrarily
identified with the desire for God. So momentous a question
is not to be settled by a brief sentence or two from Aquinas:
his whole attitude to the natural end must be explored. That
attitude was well summarized by the late Father Walter
Farrell, 0. P. in a little-noted article a decade ago. 35 Man's
last end in the natural order cannot, Father Farrell pointed
out, consist in the contemplation of God, for this is supernatural. The exercise of the natural speculative virtues is the
highest natural good, but cannot be the natural end, because it
it a good, not the good. Similarly the common good is the
highest social good, but not the natural end because it too is a
partial good. The natural terrestrial end of man, natural happi33 Ill Cont. Gent., c. 48.
••Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange,

The One God (St. Louis:

Herder, 1943), pp.

35 Walter Farrell, "The Person and the Common Good in a Democracy,"
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, XX (1945),

THE NATURAL, TERRESTRIAL

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ness, must consist then in the successive possession of all the
things good for man over his whole life, by means of virtue.
2. JYJan has a natural, terrestrial end.

That man has a natural, terrestrial ultimate end as well as
a supernatural, celestial ultimate end is the constant teaching
of Aquinas. Man's happiness, his end, is, Thomas proposes
repeatedly, twofold. One end is natural: that is, it is proportioned to human nature, and it can be be obtained by man's
own effort. The other end is supernatural: that is, it altogether
surpasses man's nature and can be obtained only by the power
of God. 36 The :first is studied by the philosopher, the second
by the theologian. It is in this way principally that moral
philosophy <lifters from moral theology. Moral philosophy
ought to be a natural ethics directed to a natural end, whereas
moral theology ought to be supernatural ethics directed to a
supernatural end. 37
To say that man's end, which is happiness or beatitude is
of two kinds is not to imply that the natural end is ultimate in
precisely the same sense that the supernatural end is ultimate.
The concept of happiness as applied to nature and supernature,
and also, within supernature, as applied to God and created
intellects, is not univocal but analogical. Consider a parallel
case. The intellect has two objects, adequate and proper. The
adequate object of the human intellect, that is to say, the
object of the human intellect as intellect is being. But the
proper object of the human intellect, that is to say, the object
of the human intellect as human is the quiddity of corporeal
substances. Similarly the object of human happiness as happiness is the Beatific Vision. But the object of human happiness
as human is that hierarchy of goods which Aristotle proposed.
86

Summa Theol., I-II, q. 6!il, a. l; cf. also I, q. 6!il, a. 1.

37

I Ethic., lect. 9; cf. also de Verit., q. 14, aa. !il, 3. One is not unmindful that so

notable a Thomist as M. Maritain has, by proposing what he calls "moral philosophy
adequately considered " called this way of understanding of St. Thomas into serious
question. The evaluation of M. Maritain's position is, however, a problem distinct
from the present one.

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JAMES V. MULLANEY

Thus Aquinas makes his own Aristotle's capital distinction
between absolute happiness and proportionate happiness,
applying the first to the supernatural, celestial end and the
second to the natural, terrestrial end. 38 It is because the
natural end is proportionate to man's nature that it can be
achieved by his own efl'orts.39 That man has a terrestrial ultimate end, proportioned or connatural to him, as well as a supernatural ultimate end is amply evident in numerous other places
in Aquinas. 40
3. The constituents of man's natural, terrestrial end.

a) The goods:
St. Thomas proposes no angelistic view on the terrestrial end
as consisting exclusively in some kind of contemplation. He
agrees 41 rather with the soundly humanistic view of Aristotle,4 2
Cicero 43 and Newman 44 that food is better for a hungry man
than metaphysics: and even happy men become hungryperhaps especially happy men. Happiness is an ordered collectivity of goods, humble and sublime, answering the enormous
diversity of human needs.
First he makes it quite clear that the natural end, terrestrial
happiness, consists not in any single good, but in an ordered
collection of good things. It has parts, 45 each part being one
of those goods which collectively constitute happiness. 46
Next he spells out the precise collection of good things which
constitute this end; namely, external goods, such as wealth;
goods of body, such as health; and goods of soul, such as
38 Ill Cont. Gent., c. 48; cf. also Summa Theol., I-II, q. 8, a. 2, ad 4.
••Summa Theol., I-II, q. 5, a. 5; cf. also de Virtut. in Comm., q. unica, a. 10, ad 1.
'°For example, de Verit., q. 27, a. 2; Summa Theol., I, q. 28, a. I; I-II, q. 62, a. S;

q. 91, a. 4.
41 Summa Theol., I-II, q. 82, a. 8.
••Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 982\ 22-24.
••Cicero, On Moral Duties, I, 4 .
.. John Henry Newman, Idea of A University, V, S.
••Summa Theol., I-II, q. 2, a. 2.
••Ibid., a. 6.

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contemplation and moral virtue 47-substantially the same set
of goods Aristotle proposed.
Aquinas establishes the necessity of including each of these
goods among the constituents of happiness. Contemplation,
or wisdom, is required, and required in the very first place, for
the obvious reason that man is an intellectual substance. 48 But
the natural end also requires the more specifically human
happiness of the active life; that is, of the life of moral virtue.
The contemplative life is primary, the active life of virtue is
secondary, terrestrial happiness 49 because man's intelligence
is practical, and therefore action-directive, as well as speculative. But the practical is subordinate to the speculative.
Happiness must include also the social goods, particularly
human love, as its third element. The happy man needs friends
not for the sake of utility or of pleasure, but he needs them
because the generous love of others, for their own sake, is
one of the implications of human nature. He needs them in
order that he may be good to them; be strengthened himself
by their excellence and love for him. One needs human love
to sustain either the active or the contemplative life, and
certainly to sustain the life which partakes both of contemplation and of action. 50 The integrity of human terrestrial happiness calls also for goods of body and for modest wealth. Bodily
well-being is needed because happiness is operation according
to the perfection of virtue, both intellectual and moral. But
bodily imperfections can hinder every operation of virtue. 51
Wealth is an instrumental constituent of the natural end, to
supply the needs of a well-disposed body, to enable him to
fulfill social obligations, to establish such moral virtues as
generosity as concretely possible, and to free him, so far as
necessary, for contemplation. 52
"Ibid., a. 7, ad. 1.
••Ibid., q. 8, a. 5; cf. also III Cont. Gent., c. 44.
••Summa Theol., I-II, q. 8, a. 5; cf. also de Verit., q. 18, a. 7, ad 7.
••Summa Theol., I-II, q. 4, a. 8.
01 Ibid., a. 6; cf. also q. 8, a. 8 ad 8; q. 4, a. 5.
••Ibid., q. 4, a. 7.

388

JAMES V. MULLANEY

b) The hierarchy of the goods:
As in Aristotle, these categories of goods are required not
coordinately, but according to a hierarchical ordering, corresponding to the hierarchy of human powers. Contemplation
is first, and moral virtue second. 53 Social goods, such as friendship, are third, 54 then goods of body 55 and finally external
goods. 56 That goods of body are superior to external goods is
clear from the fact that life is superior to non-life. That social
goods are superior to bodily goods follows from the superiority
of the human to the merely vital. Virtue is superior to social
goods by as much as the moral order exceeds the social. Contemplation is, in the order of specification, superior to virtue
because intellect is superior to will.

c) Integral and essential happiness:
Goods of soul are more immediately constitutive of the
natura] end than social goods, goods of body or external goods.
For these latter are good not only in themselves but also instrumentally, as being required for contemplation and virtue,
as is clear from the way Aquinas established their inclusion in
the complete natural good. It is the good of the soul, wisdom
and virtue which constitutes happiness essentially. 57 Hence
all the other goods pertain to the integrity, not to the essence,
of happiness, which is why happiness can be retained even in
their absence.
d) Primacy of contmnplation:
The position of Aquinas on the relative dignity of the two
goods of the soul, contemplation or wisdom, and virtue, is as
complex as Aristotle's position on the same question.
In the first place, in the order of specification contemplation
is superior to moral virtue, the contemplative life superior to
the active life.58
In the order of exercise, however, the active life, the life of
••Ibid., q. S, a. 5.
"'Ibid., a. 8.
•• Ibid., a. 6.

••Ibid., a. 7.
••Ibid., q. a. 7, ad 1.
••Ill Cont. Gent., c. 44.

THE NATURAL, TERRESTRIAL

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889

moral virtue, is more specifically human, and in that sense
more suitable to man, than the contemplative. 59 Nobler, however, than either the contemplative life or the active life is the
mixed life: the life of action, of moral virtue, springing from
contemplation. Hence while contemplation is prior to action,
the union of the two is higher than either separately. 60
4. Relation of the natural end to the supernatural end.

a) The natural end is objectively inferior to the supernatural
end:
It is already clear that St. Thomas teaches that, however
excellent the natural end may be, considered in itself, still it is
highly imperfect as compared to the supernatural end. " Imperfect happiness " is the usual Thomistic synonym for the
natural end. This is, of course, an obvious corollary from
metaphysics. The creature is real, does exist; yet comparatively
to God is as if it were not. Similarly the creature's connatural
end is genuinely excellent; yet comparatively to God who is the
creature's supernatural end, is as if it were nothing. What is
highest in the natural order may still be incommensurable with
the supernatural order. It is easy to stress the goodness of the
natural end and to neglect its relative poverty and thereby to
run the risk of moral homocentrism. It is also easy to stress
the relative nothingness of the natural end and to neglect its
superlative natural goodness, and thereby to run the risk of
denying a natural moral order. The balanced position, which
is the position of Aquinas among others, is this: that the
natural end is a genuine end, the highest natural value of
human life, embracing in ordered fashion every human good;
and yet that same end is imperfect relatively to that Divine
Happiness which God has gratuitously invited men to share.
The natural end is true human
but not happiness
according to its absolute character-an Aristotelian distinc••Summa Theol., I-II, q. 8, a. 4 and ad 4; II-II, q. 51, a. 1, ad 2; de Verit., q. 18,
a. 7, ad 7.
00 Summa Theol., II-U, q. 182, a. 2.

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JAMES V. MULLANEY

tion 5 l which Aquinas never tires of repeating. Human happiness is natural and terrestrial, whereas absolute happiness is
supernatural and celestial. 62
The natural end is to the supernatural as the imperfect to the
perfect. It is simply not absolute happiness, but it is human
happiness. That man should have been invited to live hereafter
a life of absolute hapiness overshadows without obliterating the
fact that he is also invited to live here a life of human
happiness.
b) Yet the natural end is genuinely ultimate:
Granted that man's natural end, which is terrestrial happiness, is objectively inferior to that Beatific Vision which is
his supernatural end, then is the natural end, which Aquinas
habitually calls " imperfect happiness," an ultimate end? How
can the imperfect be ultimate? One can sharpen the question
even further. Does the phrase" imperfect happiness" have any
meaning? Would not the imperfectness of imperfect happiness
cancel out the happiness of it? Would not the degree of happiness wanting to imperfect happiness make us so unhappy as
to poison the presumed happiness?
The phrase " imperfect happiness " bears analysis. For a
thing may be imperfect either in itself or relatively to some
other, and higher, thing. A horse which has hoof and mouth
disease is imperfect in itself. But a perfect specimen of a horse
is still imperfect relatively to man, inasmuch as it lacks intelligence.
Now the natural happiness which is man's terrestrial end is
perfect relatively to him whose end it is. That is to say, it is
happiness proportioned to the nature of man. It is happiness,
as Aquinas repeatedly points out, as human. The same happiness is imperfect from another point of view; namely, relatively
to that super-human, supernatural happiness which is naturally
proportioned to God alone. This latter is happiness as happiAristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I, 10.
••Summa Theol., I-II, q. S, a. 6 and ad l; q. 5, a. S and ad I; In Boet. de Trin.,
q. 6, a. 4, ad S; I Ethic., lect. 16.
61

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891

ness, not as human. Hence the phrase " imperfect happiness ,,
does not imply that something is lacking to make man happy,
but only that something is lacking to make God happy: and,
of course, to make man happy insofar as he is, not man, but
man participating in the nature of God. It would be absolute
falsehood to pretend that man as he is, fallen but redeemed,
could find perfect happiness in the natural end. It would,
equally, be absolute falsehood to pretend that this incapacity
for happiness in the natural end arises from man's nature, for
it arises from super-nature in him.
Because man is relatively imperfect-not being itself, but a
human being-so his natural end is relatively imperfect-not
happiness itself, but human happiness. But this end is ultimate,
absolutely ultimate, in the natural, human order. The relative
imperfection of man's natural end is no more an argument
against its ultimacy than the relative imperfection of man's
being is an argument against his existence. That this is
Aquinas' position can be made clear from four arguments.
i. The argument from the natural moral order.
There can be no doubt that Aquinas held the existence of a
natural order of morality: natural law, natural virtues, natural
duties and rights. This natural morality is discoverable by
reason, and is analyzed by philosophers. There can be no doubt,
either, that Aquinas viewed the whole moral realm as suspended
from the end. Morals is a series of corollaries from the principle
of finality. Unless there be an achievable end, there is no
morality. Thus he sums up all of morals as a study of the end
of man, the means to that end, namely, human actions and the
principles of those actions, both intrinsic, namely, passions and
habits and extrinsic, namely, law and, in the case of supernaturally good acts, grace. 6 :
Now if there is a natural moral order, then there is a natural
end, since any moral order flows from its end. It will not do
to hedge by saying that there is a natural moral order with
••Summa Them., I-II, the end, qq. 1-5; human actions, qq. 6-fU; passion, qq. 2448; habits, qq, 49-89; law, qq. 90-108; grace, qq. 109-114.

6

392

JAMES V. MULLANEY

a natural end, which however is onJy an intermediate end. For
an intermediate end is not an end, simply speaking, it is a
means-end. Hence any moral order which Hows from it is as
precarious, as ambivalent as the end itself. An end which is
not altogether an end can be the foundation only of a morality
which is not altogether moral. Either there is a natural ultimate end and as a result a natural moral order, or else all
non-believers in the supernatural end are condemned to moral
scepticism. A stable natural moral order presupposes a natural
end that is stably an end.
ii. The argument from Limbo.
That a purely natural end is most genuinely an end, in
millions of cases the only end, is clear from Aquinas' treatment
of infants who die before baptism can be administered, and who
therefore do not enjoy the Beatific Vision. Speaking of these
souls Aquinas points out that a rational person is not saddened
by the lack of that which is in no way due to him, by the lack
of that which altogether exceeds any proportion to his nature.
Most adults do not grieve over their incapacity to Hy like a
sea-gull or to exercise the political power of an emperor. One
is saddened only by losing that for which he has an aptitude.
Hence_ the unbaptized infant's state is one of pure rejoicing in
what he has, namely, possession of the end in a way suited to a
separated soul. 64 They are not saddened by the lack of the
Beatific Vision because, quite simply, they do not know what
they are missing. That man was created for this vision of
God is an item of supernatural, not of natural knowledge. It
pertains to natural knowledge to know that man was made for
beatitude, that is, for the attainment of perfect good. But
perfect good can, and in the case of unbaptized infants does,
have a purely natural, yet completely satisfying meaning. 65
This argument, taken: in itself, does not establish that natural
terrestrial happiness is a genuine end for those who achieve
moral responsibility. What it does emphatically establish is
6'

II Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 2.

••De Malo, q. 5, a. 3.

THE NATURAL, TERRESTRIAL

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this: that there is no contradiction between " happiness " and
"imperfect"; further, that there is no contradiction between
" imperfect happiness " and " ultimate end." If there is no
contradiction between these notes, then it is at least possible
that natural, terrestrial happiness should be a genuine
end, since for some-unbaptized infants-natural happiness is
the only ultimate end.
iii. The argum.ent from the proportion between end and
nature.
The natural end of each thing corresponds to the nature of
the thing: the happiness of a man is not the happiness of an
angel or of a dog. Hence the connatural happiness of the
Absolute Being is absolute happiness, but the connatural end
of man is happiness, not absolute but human.
Man is an imperfect being. That is to say, there are grades
of reality which man does not include within himself: he lacks,
for example, the being of an angel, or of God. Even if he were
perfect according to his kind or in his own order, he would still
be imperfect, in the absolute order. Hence it is not a fact,
merely, but a necessary fact that his end, his natural perfection,
should be imperfect, should be happiness according to his kind
or order but not absolute happiness. That which is ultimate
in the human orde.r is still imperfect in the absolute order. So
the ultimate natural end or perfection of man is of necessity
imperfect happiness. Philosophically viewed, the problem is
not, how can imperfect happiness be man's ultimate end? For
that is not a problem but a necessary truth. The problem isgiven Christianity-how can an imperfect being possibly have
perfect happiness as his (supernatural) end? And the answer
is that, philosophically speaking, he cannot. It is not insofar
as man is human that perfect happiness is his ultimate end, but
insofar as he is divinized, a sharer in the divine nature. From
the philosophical point of view man's ultimate end could not
be anything except imperfect happiness.
iv. The argument from Aquinas' language.
Whatever problems the fact may create, it is a fact that

894

JAMES V. MULLANEY

Aquinas speaks habitually of man's twofold ultimate end; of his
twofold felicity; of his twofold ultimate good; of his twofold
happiness. He simply does not speak, when discussing man's
natural end, as if that end were a means, or a proximate end, or
an intermediate end. Always it is treated as an ultimate end.
Each of these ends, the natural and the supernatural, is in its
own order ultimate: though, as has already been pointed out,
" ultimate end " is predicated of the natural and the supernatural not univocally, but analogically.
c) The ordination of ends.
Granted that St. Thomas does hold the natural end to be
genuinely ultimate, there is still the puzzle of how he can do so.
Does he not himself hold that it is impossible for man to have
more than one last end? For, he argued, the ultimate end must
so satisfy man's desiderative capacities as to leave nothing
desirable left, else it is not ultimate. Hence there cannot be two
last ends unrelated to each other, two last ends without any
ordination between them. 66
Now if Aquinas teaches on the one hand that man has two
ultimate ends, and on the other hand that two last ends not
ordained to one another are impossible, then this conclusion
seems inescapable: that the natural end is somehow ordained to
the supernatural end. The problem then becomes this: how
can a.n end which is genuinely ultimate in the natural order be
ordained to some further end in the supernatural order?
When the problem is phrased in this way it becomes clear
that we are facing a particular instance of a more general
problem, the problem of how the natural order is related to
the supernatural order.
The general principle of that relationship is that the supernatural does not destroy but perfects the natural. That is, as
applied to the present problem, the existence of the supernatural end does not wipe out the natural end, but includes it
eminently; that is, includes it formally, affirms it, reinforces it,
while transcending it. The supernatural end includes the
natural end formally in three different ways. First, as Augustine
••Summa Theol., I-II, q. 1, a. 5.

THE NATURAL, TERRESTRIAL

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895

pointed out, 67 the supernatural end in the next life includes
formally all those ordered natural goods which collectively constitute natural happiness .. Second, the supernatural end achievable in the next life, by being sought in this life through
appropriate supernatural means, aids in the achievement of the
natural end. Third, the man who· attains in this life the natural
end thereby disposes himself, so far as human nature of its own
effort may, for the descent of the supernatural, even though he
be unconscious of that disposition. The man, for example, who
has achieved human wisdom is surely wise enough to have
discovered, with Socrates, 68 that human wisdom is largely a
discovery of one's ignorance and, therefore, he is open to the
possibility of a Revelation from Wisdom Itself. Such a man is
in a position to see that faith is not rational, because it is suprarational, but not anti-rational. 69
Yet it cannot be said that the natural end is a means to the
supernatural. To say this is to claim at once too little and too
much. Too little: because if the natural end were a means to
further end, the former would be only an intermediate, not
an ultimate end. Too much: because the natural can never be
a means to the supernatural as end, since the supernatural is
entirely gratuitous.
The more exact thought of Aquinas is this: the natural end
is to the supernatural as the imperfect is to· the perfect; as that
which participates to that in which it participates. The natural
end is a disposition to the supernatural end, which means that
when a man has achieved fully his terrestrial end then is he
most open to the supernatural order. To have achieved human
happiness is to have discovered that the perfection of human
nature is openness to absolute happiness. To be thoroughly
human is to have cast aside homocentricity. For the perfection
of the relative is precisely to be relatively to the absolute.
Manhattan College,
New Yark, N. Y.
• 7 Augustine, City of God, XIX, 10.
••Plato, Apology,

JAMES V. MULLANEY

••I Cont. Gent., c. 6.

POETRY, AN IMITATION OF NATURE
THOMISTIC PRINCIPLES

CLARIFY AN AGE-OLD PROBLEM IN
AESTHETICS

I

N aesthetics, as in other fields of practical philosophy, so
much ink is spilled over theoretical problems that most
readers find their ideas left in a very muddled state. One
of the main bones of contention among the critics is the
question of Imitation of Nature. Does art really imitate nature,
and if so, how? Aristotle, following Plato, popularized the
term long ago. Hundreds of critics have used and abused it
since. The question still a burning one: What does Imitation
of Nature mean? Is it even philosophically possible to find out?
The answer now, as ever, is to be found in that vast and
comprehensive legacy of thought left to us by St. Thomas
Aquinas. Thomistic thought in some practical fields-especially
in that of ethics and moral conduct-is very specific, not only
in laying down general norms but in drawing their applications.
In others, a short and busy life left him time only for a systematic treatment of principles, with their application relegated to
others. On still other important points of practical philosophy
St. Thomas' gems of wisdom are hidden away in an A.d
secundum, to be ferreted out by the specialists. St. Thomas'
reflections on art fall under these two latter heads. In bringing
them to bear on the problem at hand it is the author's intention
to find concrete applications for them in the field of poetry.
It is to be kept in mind, however, that a few faulty applications
of these principles do not damage the status of the principles
themselves.
I
Imitation of Nature, as an aesthetic question, should first
be approached from the historic point of view. Only by seeing
what authors have thought and said on the matter can we

896

POETRY, AN IMITATION OF NATURE

897

realize the force of the problem and evolve our own solution
of it.
Plato, with his theory of participation of forms, was the
first to venture an opinion on imitation and the artist. It
was far from sympathetic, sad to say, although Plato himself
was a literary genius. The natural world, said Plato, is only
a distant imitation of the subsistent forms. Art, therefore, is
the imitation of an imitation-thrice removed · from reality!
Aristot]e's Poetics did not treat the problem quite as conclusively as we might wish, since it dealt only with narrative
and dramatic poetry. The Stagirite here lays down the norm
that both tragedy and epic are an imitation of men acting.
There is a full development of this point, of course, but it is
not quite universal enough to be applied in detail to all arts.
It is rather in the second book of the Physics that Aristotle
comes to grips with this larger problem. His statements are
the basis of St. Thomas' close analysis, which will be considered
shortly.
Longinus, in his essay On the Sublime, introduced imitation
under a new guise. Imitation, for him, meant following in
the footsteps of genius. Three rules sum up his ideal very
neatly: strive to rival the greats; imagine how Homer or
Sophocles would have expressed your idea; try to envision
Homer or some other great poet listening to you recite your
poem.
Horace's outlook on poetry in general, and imitation in
particular, was typically shrewd and practical rather than
broadly philosophical. But some of his Renaissance descendants opened a Pandora's box to all future literary critics, and
art critics in general. Julius Scaliger, for example, was of the
opinion that " poetry adds a fictitious element to the truth "
and that it " fashions images of those things which are not, as
well as images more beautiful than life of those which are." 1
Sir Philip Sidney argued that the poet " doth in effect growe
another nature, in making things either better than Nature
1

Scaliger, Poetics.

898

JAMES TORRENS

briligeth forth, or quite a new formes such as never were in
Nature." He goes on to speak of the poet as one who" goeth
hand in hand with Nature, not inclosed within the narrow
warrant of her guifts, but freely ranging onely within the
Zodiack of his owne wit." 2 Marco Vida told the budding
writers of his day" that to imitate was to extract, with slight
changes, the best verses and most striking images of the
ancients. Unfortunately, he was more than taken at his word
by the minor writers of the period. The only dissenting voices
among the critics of this age seem to have come from the
French Pleiade poets, Ronsard and Du Bellay. They are
sensible souls who looked to the substance of poetry and were
not tripped up by accidentals.
In N eo-Classical days, Alexander Pope and Boileau dictated
the tastes of the times. Not only literature but, as always,
painting and music followed the leaders of the day. Pope's
attitude was that "Nature and Homer are the same." He
urges: " Learn hence for ancient rules a just esteem; To copy
Nature is to copy them." 3 Pope had too much common sense
to carry this to an extreme; but not so with many of his
contemporaries. They make a fetish of the works of the
"ancients," leading Swift to his stinging ridicule of The Battie
of the Books.
Thus was laid the stage for Edmund Young's Conjectures on
Original Composition, which reacted and counter-attacked
vigorously. If imitation is what Pope and Dryden said it to
be, I'll have none of it, said Young in effect; " Imitation is
inferiority confessed." Soon a much more radical reaction than
Young's set in. The young Romantics, exulting in their own
imaginative powers, determined to break all bonds of artificiality and spring to the open woods. When Jean-Jacques
Rousseau sounded the call of " back to Nature," it was taken
up not only by the poets Victor Hugo, Shelley, and Keats, but
it was also triumphantly echoed in the critical writings of
Wordsworth, Sainte-Beuve, Taine, and a host of others. A
•An A.pologie fO'I' Poetrie.

• EBBay on Criticism.

POETRY, AN IMITATION OF NATURE

399

glorious era of nature-poetry set in, but there was also a sinister
and blighting emphasis on unredeemed man.
In modern times so many ways of imitating Nature have
been devised-Impressionism, Expressionism, Naturalism, Imagism, as well as Cubism and Surrealism in painting-that both
critics and readers are left in utter confusion as to what styles
are good, which are even justified, and just what Imitation of
Nature really is. To clarify these issues it is necessary to resort
to the writings and commentaries of Thomas Aquinas.

II
Imitation of Nature, in both St. Thomas and Aristotle, has a
double meaning. The first is Imitation of Natural Beings,
µiµ:ficri<; TWV ovTwv. The second is Imitation of the Process of
Nature, µiµ:f,cri<; T1j<; cf>vcrew<;. This imitation in the first sense
may be considered imitation of specific natural forms in their
esse. In the second sense one may look on it as imitation of
the motive process, the universal modus fiendi of all natural
forms. The second sense follows necessarily from the first, since
fieriest via ad esse.
St. Thomas' comments on imitation of natural beings are
scattered through his many works and must be gathered
sedulously by the philosopher of art. On the other hand, a
very exact analysis of how art imitates the process of nature
is compressed into his commentary on the second book of
Aristotle's Physics. It but remains to apply this to the field of
poetry.
A consideration of Art as an Imitation of Natural Beings
will have to be as multifold as Nature itself. From the start
it is plain that arts of man will have to imitate material nature,
since his knowledge is limited to forms received in matter (at
least, his immediate knowledge) . Human arts, therefore, will
have to deal with singular embodiments of the universal. The
artist will have to draw on past observation of the world about
him. As St. Thomas says, expanding Aristotle's notions.

400

JAMES TORRENS

The reason for art's imitating nature is found in the fact that
knowledge is the principle of artistic operation; and since all of
our knowledge is received from sensible and natural objects,
through the senses, we must form our artifacts in the likeness of
things found in nature. 4
In another, more God-centered approach to the question,
St. Thomas shows that when the artist imitates the creative
act of God, he imitates it according to those creations of God
with which he is already familiar.
If some teacher of an art were to make a work of art, it would be
the duty of his disciple, who has learned the artistic habit from him,
to study his product, so as himself to work after its likeness. And so
the human intellect, to which a light of intelligence is communicated
from the· divine intellect, must be informed by inspection of natural
creations, in order to operate in a similar manner on its own
products. 5

Even Holy Scripture speaks to mankind through images and
metaphors telling its readers of the " hands of God " and
of the heavenly songs of the angels. How much more so will a
strictly human art speak to the mind through sensible realities,
and thus raise men up to universal knowledge and even to
natural wisdom by intimate contact with the world about them.
The poet, who is using a potentially universal instrument,
words, as his medium, will inevitably break forth with a blunt
statement of the universal. He will do this, however, as a
climax and but briefly, thus avoiding the shoals of didacticism.
Some of the most unforgettable lines of Shakespeare, for
example, are those quick, piercing insights of reality that serve
• " Eius autem quod ars imitatur naturam, ratio est quia principium operationis
artificialis cognitio est; omnis autem cognitio nostra est per sensus a rebus sensibilibus et naturalibus accepta; unde ad similitudinem rerum naturalium in artificialibus operamur." II Physic., lect. 4. (All translations are the author's own.)
5 " Si enim aliquis D:i:structoralicuius artis opus artis efficeret, oporteret discipulum,
qui ab· eo artem suscepisset, ad opus illius attendere, ut ad eius similitudinem et
ipse operetur. Et ideo intellectus humanus ad quern intelligibile lumen ab intellectu
divino derivatur, necesse habet in his quae facit informari ex inspectione eorum
quae sunt naturaliter facta, ut similiter operetur." Prologue to the Commentary
on the Politics.

POETRY, AN IMITATION OF NATURE

401

to crystallize a character or lay bare the issues of some episode,
and which have become aphorisms of every age since.
To insist on the pictorial element of poetry, however, is by
no means to call it little more than an enlightened photography.
One is reminded, on the contary, of the devastating comment
of Cezanne on the painting Laboureur Nivernais: "It's
horribly like the real thing." 6 The artist holds the world in
his brain as if it were a great kaleidoscope, which he can shake
into any formation and shape he pleases. Nature herself, as
St. Thomas reminds us, cannot do this. It can produce one
product in only one way.
Every swallow fashions its nest in the same manner, and every
spider follows the same pattern in spinning its web, which would
not happen if they operated consciously and from art, for not every
builder constructs his house in the same fashion, since an artificer
can decide about the form of his product and vary it.7

Pictorial matter am.d details must never be allowed to
fascinate and absorb the poet, so as to impede the main idea
("idea" not in an abstract but in a concrete sense) from
blazing through the accidents of matter to the mind of the
reader. This is what has happened to all the sensists, phenomenologists, and ultra-realists who have ever set pen to paper.
By luxuriating in color or form, by lingering over the details
of physical agony, they animalize the soul of things instead of
spiritualizing the body. As Pere Longhaye puts it: " In default
of realities, we have the realist description." 8 In his question
on Ceremonial Precepts, in the Prima Secundae, Saint Thomas
emphasizes the fact that exterior ritual and symbol are not an
end in themselves but must be used as instruments to join
man to God by the interior powers (q. 101, a. 2). Thus the
bare realities of the natural world should not obscure its higher
•Quoted by Jacques Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 147.
• " Omnis hirundo similiter facit nidum, et omnis araneus similiter facit telam, quod
non esset si ab intellectu et arte operarentur: non enim omnis aedificator similiter
facit domum, quia artifex habet iudicare de forma artificiati, et potest earn
variare." 11 Physic., lect. 18.
• L. Longhaye, S. J. Theorie des Belles-Lettres, ch. V.

402

JAMES TORRENS

meaning and real symbolism for us. We must see through to
the soul in things.
But just what is this " soul in things? " Such a term sounds
dangerously pantheistic. At best it seems to cloud rather than
clarify the issue. We must recall Aristotle's concept, however,
in which Nature, as it " ought to be " instead of " as it is "
(taken in the sense of pure photography), is taken as the
object of the poet. Poets express a secret which Nature has
communicated to their own souls. Many other souls have
caught this secret, too, but only the poet (plus the artist and
the musician) are able fully to express it. Browning has caught
this truth in the words of Fra Lippo Lippi:
Take the prettiest face, is it so pretty
You can't discover if it means hope, fear,
Sorrow or joy? won't beauty go with these?
Suppose I've made her eyes all right and blue,
Can't I take breath and add life's flash,
And then add soul and heighten them three-fold?
... We're made so that we love
First things we have passed
Perhaps a hundred times nor cared to see:
And so they are better, painted-better to us,
Which is the same thing. Art was given for that:
God uses us to help each other so,
Lending our minds out.

Browning has hit it off; poetry helps us to see sharply and
to love mightily the simplest perfections of God's world. As
Hopkins put it, in God's Grandeur, " there lives the dearest
. freshness deep down things."
To discuss the question less enigmatically it may be said,
first of all, that the artist takes the external world, not merely
in itself but as related to man. Without sacrificing a blade of
grass or a drop of dew, he fits them into the harmony he sees
between man and the universe made for man. Nature, even in
its stormy and destructive moods, is linked to man through
original sin. In all its attitudes-sombreness, gaiety, tension,
the hopefulness of spring, the fulfillment of summer, the blight

POETRY, AN IMITATION OF NATURE

408

of winter, external Nature has a definite causal influence on
man's spirit and an ontological sympathy with his moods.
Man's spirit itself is, to be sure, the focal point of poetry.
It is because such dramas as Othello, Macbeth, and Hamlet lay
bare the inner workings of man's moral nature that they are
classed among the masterpieces of all time. " Know thyself "
is a dictum as appropriate to natural contemplation as to supernatural. The best dramatic characters have a universality
which helps them win their way into the audience's interest
without losing that personal uniqueness proper to every man
in the ratio that his life is intense.
It does not suffice, however, for poetry to be merely of this
world. Somehow, somewhere, God must be included, at least
implicitly. The reason, God's causal influence on the world, is
obvious. If we overlook Him we distort the meaning of things.
Hopkins grasped this idea with all its depth and power, making
it not only the motive for all his poetry but the central theme
for some of His greatest creations, as Pied Beauty, God's
Grandeur, and the incomparable Wreck of the Deutschland.
To Hopkins, a field of grain in harvest time, or a skylark on
the wing, or a speckled trout in a stream meant but one thing:
Give glory to God; " praise Him."

m
So much for Art (and particularly Poetry) as an imitation
of the beings of Nature; now a word remains to be said about
it as imitation of the process of Nature. Here St. Thomas can
be of much more help, since he lays down principles much more
clearly defined. His starting point is Aristotle's definition of
Nature: " Nature is a source of being moved and of being
at rest in that to which it belongs essentially." 9 Art, too, must
therefore contain a principle of motion and rest relative to that
being whose perfection is its concern. We find this, by analysis,
to be true. Between Art and Nature th<ere is only this difference:
• Physic., IT, c. I.

404

JAMES TORRENS

Natural objects differ from non-natural objects only in this, that
they have the principle of their motion in themselves.10
The difference is considerable, of course. Nature is an
intrinsic principle, moving a being from inside; Art is an extrinsic principle, working on the being from without. Given
this similarity, however, it is well to proceed to a more detailed
comparison of Nature and Art according to the four causes,
remembering that what is said of Nature will be applied
analagously to Art.
In natural beings the substantial form is active principle of
all motion to their own fulness of development. The artefact,
on the other hand, being a per accidens nature, does not order
itself to produce its own proper effect, but rather is an instrument ordered by the more universal cause, the artist. In
producing its own proper effect, the printed or sounded word
of a poem, for instance, also carries a higher intentio or esse
fiuens impressed on it by the poet. By a confluence of these
particular causes the poet attains his own higher end and is
thus the real efficient cause.
Nature, in corporeal beings, is the substance considered as
final cause, both in intentione and in executione. N aturale means
aptu11i natum, i. e., a natural being has an ingrained aptitude
and tendency to a certain self-perfection. This self-perfection,
or finis, is "the essence of that which is coming to be," as
Aristotle said. 11 It will follow, then, that just as Nature is
propter aliquid, so Art will be also. That means-to take an
example from poetry-that the poet orders his words to convey
a certain form (a universal form embodied in particular
matter) to the reader 12 of the poem. It is sufficient that the
reader be the poet himself; still, some reader must be presupposed. Thus every poem has a specific finality imbedded in
it, and the finality is aimed at a human intellect able to grasp
it. St. Thomas explains this:
10 "Naturalia
... non differunt a non naturalibus nisi inquantum habent principium motus in seipsis." II Physic., lect. 1.
11 Physic., II, c. 7.
12 Hopkins prepared his poetry rather for hearers than readers, thus aiming to
actualize the full potency of words, i. e., sound as well as meaning.

POETRY, AN IMITATION OF NATURE

405

We are, in one sense, the end of all products of art ... because,
as it is said in metaphysics, " that for the sake of which " something
happens can be taken in two ways, namely, the one for whom it
happens (cuius) and the purpose for which it happens (quo); so
the end of a house, in the first sense, is the inhabitant, and in the
second, the dwelling therein. 13

St. Thomas makes it very plain that neither anything
natural nor anything artistic can produce its proper action
casu, by chance. Thus the poet who dabbles in ambiguous
meanings is defeating his own purpose. Further, the dramatist
who introduces a deus ex machina, e.g., a surprise event to
help untang]e the complication of his plot, is contravening one
of the first laws of art.
As for the formal cause in natural beings, it is distinct from
their nature by a distinction of reason. It is looked on as the
principle giving esse to the supposit. However, substantial
form has an important place in the discussion of Art and
Nature because it is the cause of the actuality of a natural or
artistic being at any given moment. At the beginning of motion
it is incomplete; at the end, it is complete. From beginning
to end there must be a logical and continual procession. " There
is a development from prior to latter in both art and nature." 14
Aristotle's statement in the Poetics that every tragedy must
have a beginning, middle, and end is not so inane, then, as
would at first appear. It implies that the character of inain
dramatic interest must emerge from an initial state of moral
potency, develop gradually under stress, until the final fullflowering at the climax. There is always a possibility of outside
influences, casus, deeply disturbing or profoundly helping him;
there is always liberty of will; but the seed of his moral development must have been present at the beginning.
The last of the four causes to be considered is the material
18 " Nos sumus quodammodo finis omnium artificialium ... quia sicut dictum est
in philosophia prima, dupliciter dicitur id cuius causa fit, scilicet cuius et quo;
sicut finis domus ut cuius est habitator, ut quo est habitatio." II Physic., lect. 4.
14 " Similiter ex prioribus pervenitur
ad posteriora in arte et in natura." II
Physic., lect. 13.

406

JAMES TORRENS

cause. Since the artist imitates nature, and all natural beings
(at least the material ones, with which we are directly acquainted) have matter, the artist, too, must deal with matter.
Furthermore, he does not create the composite, form with
matter, pure and simply, but must work with the matter that
is given him. He must deal with a certain defined medium.
The poet, for example, works with words in a certain orderly
pattern. It is not erroneous to say that the artist is subject to
the necessity of the matter.
No disposition can be made of natural bodies and raw materials
of an art without material principles able to be disposed in the
corresponding manner; for a house could not stand, were the heavier
parts not used as a foundation, and the lighter placed above ....
We do not say that the end is necessarily such-and-such, because
the matter is of a certain kind, but rather the contrary, i.e., because
the end and the form is specified, there is need for the matter to
be of a determined type. 15
Thus it is that the artist must have technique, a habit of
skill with his tools, whether they be words, or paints, or
musical notes. This forms an integral part of his habit of art.

IV
Such, in brief outline, is St. Thomas' answer to the artist's
perennial problem: What is Imitation of Nature? His answer
is twofold: Imitation of natural beings and of the process of
nature. "\<Ve have his own specific words to this effect:
It is necessary both that the very procedure of art imitate the
procedure of nature; and that those things which are products
of art, imitate those which are in nature. 16
15 "Non est dispositio fa.eta in rebus naturalibus et artificialibus, sine principiis
materialibus habentibus aptitudinem ad talem dispositionem: non enim domus
convenienter constaret, nisi graviora in fundamento ponerentur, et leviora superius.
. . . Non enim dicimus quod necessarium sit esse talem finem, quia materia talis
est; sed potius e converso, quia finis et forma talis futura est, necesse est materiam
talem esse." II Physics,, lect. 15.
1 • "Necesse est quod et operationes artis imitentur operationes ]laturae; et ea quae
sunt secundum artem, imitentur ea quae sunt in natura." Prologue to the Com-mentary on the Politics.

POETRY, AN IMITATION OF NATURE

407

It remains now only to give the question a :final twist by
saying, with St. Thomas, that Nature itself is nothing else
than an art, and that the artist working from it is actually
modelling off the product of a higher artist, God. " For
Nature," says Thomas, " is nothing else than the unfolding of
a certain art, which is divine, ingrained in things by which they
are moved to a determined end." 17 Praise be, then, to the
Divine Artist!
JAMES TORRENS,

s. J.

Mount St. Michael's
Spokane, W ashinglon

17 " Natura nihil est aliud quam ratio cuiusdam artis, scilicet divinae, indita rebus,
qua ipsae res moventur ad finem determinatum." II Physic., lect. 14.

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS
ROBERT R. MAsTERSON, 0. P., S. T. Lr., S. T. D., is professor of dogmatic
theology at St. Rose Priory, Dominican House of Studies, Dubuque,
Iowa, and professor of homiletics at Mount St. Bernard Seminary in
the same city. He is an associate editor of Cross and Crown.
JAMES V. MULLANEY, Ph.D., is chairman of the Liberal Arts Program at
Manhattan Colliege, New York City, and a frequent contributor to
THE THOMIST.
JAMES TORRENS, S. J., Ph.D., has been assigned to Mount St. Michael's,
Spokane, Washington, and at present is doing special studies at The
University of San Francisco.
JOSEPH L. LENNON, 0. P., Ph.D., received his degree from Notre Dame
University and is presently professor of education at Providence
College, Providence, R. I.
HENRI DuLAc, S. T. L., Ph.D., is a member of the faculty of St. Thomas
College, St. Paul, Minn., and at present has Ford Foundation Fellowship at Harvard University.
JAMES J. DAVIS, 0. P., S. T. Lr., S. T. L., is professor of biblical languages
at the Dominican House of Philosophy, St. Rose Priory, Springfield,

Ky.

408

BOOK REVIEWS
Social Relations in the Urban Parish. By JosEPH H. FICHTER, S. J.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954. Pp. 264 with appendix
and index. $5.50.
Father Fichter's Social Relations in the Urban Parish is a volume certain
to be discussed over rectory dinner tables for many months to come. It
makes no pretensions to stylistic excellence, but it more than compensates
for this In serious scholarship and painstaking documentation. Tribute
must be paid to Father Fichter for publishing this fitting sequel to his
work Dynamics of a City Church. The controversy provoked by the findings of this latter work, which somewhat beclouded the main issues of the
study, probably will not ensue with the publication of this volume. The
emotion-fraught criticism of the first study-some of it trivial, part of it
valid, some of it tangential, but little of it constructive-tended more to"
inflame feeling than to clarify the problems emerging from the research.
A creditable sociological study in its own right, interest in Social Relations
is heightened by the author's conviction of the value of such study for the
work of the Church (cf. Appendix) , and for his sincere concern for findiRg
the best means of carrying out that apostolic function amid the difficulties
of the changing urban parishes in the United States. The last chapter in
the volume on the ethical limitations of sociological reporting exhibits at
once his respect and fidelity to the canons of scientific objectivity and his
understanding of the moral restrictions placed upon the researcher in that
delicate area where publication of data may lead to the damage of reputations. Indeed, the moral sensitivity of the author to the rights, feelings
and reputations of the persons who are objects of sociological study and
his application of ethical principles to his difficult area make this chapter
well worth reading for anyone engaged in similar work.
Some of the things that Father Fichter has to say have been said before,
and without the trappings of sociological jargon. That does not make them
any less less worth saying, for it is often the obvious that is missed and
little appreciated. The parish priest will discover many of his own personal
experiences reflected, his generalizations substantiated and his observations
corroborated in this scientific study. At the same time, he is sure to find
more than one clerical sophism exploded and more than a few cherished
misconceptions laid to rest. Best of all, he will be furnished with many
new insights into some of the puzzling aspects of parochial life and will be
challenged to think through previously held conceptions regarding the role
of the parish in the sanctification of the laity.

409

410

BOOK REVIEWS

Early in his study Father Fichter attempts to determine to what extent
persons may be classified under the term " parishioner." He uses six criteria:
baptism, place of residence, racial and national origin, intention, religious
observance and social participation. On the basis of this last criterion, the
author is of the opinion that the urban Catholic parish is not a formally
organized group or association, but rather " a social unit which might be
called a statistical population, a social aggregate or category." This opinion differs from that of Nuesse and Harte (The Sociology of the Parish,
Milwaukee, 1951), but steers a middle course between those who look on
the urban parish as a close-knit, well-integrated unit and those who consider
it as no more than a haphazard collection and agglomeration of people.
Attempting to provide a typology of persons who participate in parochial
life, the author roughly classifies them into nuclear, modal, marginal and
dormant Catholics. The nuclear parishoner may be considered the ideal
parishioner. He is most faithful in fulfilling his religious duties, most active
and co-operative in parochial affairs, most integrated in the sense that he
carries over into his other activities the high moral values contained in his
religious convictions. Unfortunately, he is very much in the minority, constituting, according to the author, only 5.7 per cent of the white Catholic
parishoners. According to the oft-quoted saying that the convert usually
makes the best Catholic, we should expect converts to figure largely in this
group. But in terms of the criteria of this classification, if converts make
the best Catholics, they do not always make the best parishioners. The
nuclear Catholic tends to be a "born Catholic." He is usually a member
of a deeply religious family, has a slightly better education than the
average parishioner, is a salaried or wage worker belonging to the lower
middle class, and is marked by unwavering adherence to the principles of
his faith in all phases of his life and conduct.
The modal parishioner is the ordinary " practicing " Catholic. His name
is legion and it is from this group that those outside the Church often draw
their picture of what the Catholic Church is and what it stands for. According to the profile presented by the author, certain interesting aspects
of the religious life of the modal Catholic became evident. As a youth (1019 years), he shows the highest degree of religious observance (Sunday
Mass, monthly communion, Easter duty. He slackens off somewhat in
his twenties until he reaches the nadir of religious vitality in his thirties.
Fidelity to religious duties may suffer in the thirties because of the care
of small children in the home, because a married couple with several children
have chosen at this time to limit the size of their family by artificial birth
control, because at this period a man is most concerned with " getting
ahead" in his occupation or profession. The middle years (40-60) exhibit
a decided upswing in observance, while the downward trend in the sixties
makes the author feel that we can no longer give credence to the adage

BOOK REVIEWS

411

that" religion interests only the very young and the very old." The women
folk lose no face in this analysis, for on the basis of sex difference women
are more faithful to religious practice in every category. Whatever reasons
may be given for this, it is a fact that has long been recognized by popes,
priests and people at large.
Unlike the nuclear Catholic, the modal parishioner has the tendency to
compartmentalize his beliefs, and hence often fails to exhibit the high ideals
of his faith in all areas of his activity. The conduct of the Christian should
be but the natural expression of that inner all-embracing charity which
should be the governing principle in all interpersonal relations. Unfortunately it is not always so with the modal Catholic. Indeed, his most
conspicuous failure in the demonstration of charity is found in his relations with the Negro. "The modal white Catholic unites more readily,
more cordially, and more permanently with almost any other person,
whether Jew, Protestant, or atheist, than he does with his fellow-Catholic
who is a Negro." Perhaps this fact is not so surprising, especially in
Southern cities where there exists a system of racially segregated parishes.
Nevertheless. it is a glaring inconsistency wht;n prejudice triumphs over
the bond of charity which should exist in Christ's Mystical Body. More
incongruous, however, but something which has not as yet been made a
subject of study, is the situation in some more Northern cities where
Negroes have displaced the white population in deteriorated parish areas,
but where little or no effort has been made to evangelize the Negro.
But if there is a rigid demarcation separating Catholics along racial lines,
there is also a less obvious but no less real division among Catholics according to occupation, education and social class. This can hardly be considered unusual, since informal group life is centered around common
interests and one does not ordinarily expect the professional person and the
wage earner, the college man and the grammar school graduate to mingle
on the same social plane-unless it is in the interest of some higher goal.
Happily, among Catholics (and only among Catholics) increased education is generally accompanied by more faithful religious observance.
Nevertheless, Catholic college graduates sometimes have been accused by
the urban parish priest of being slackers when it comes to a question of
participation in parochial activities. This is due, it is said, to an assumed
social and intellectual snobbery which makes the college graduate loathe
to associate with those to whom he feels superior (America, "Feature X,"
LXXXV, No. 17, July
1951). Perhaps a more valid reason is found in
the fact that the various forms of group activity in both high school and
college tend to pull the student away from parochial activities and to
center his interests on the high school and college. With the college frequently located a great distance from the parish, with the broadening preoccupation with athletic teams, school dances, academic achievements, etc.,

412

BOOK REVIEWS

it is not surprising that the parish and its activities become more and more
remote to the student. This divergence from parochial life is continued
after graduation when school ties are retained through various alumni
associations. Moreover, the relationship with one's alma mater may cause
friction in the parish when the graduate seeks permission to be married
in his or her college chapel, or when it is insisted that a priest-teacher perform the ceremony. Many pastors feel that a parishioner's first loyalty
should be to his or her own parish.
The situation, as the author observes, may be aggravated by the fact
that both clerical and lay teachers in Catholic colleges are so far removed
from the parish that their attitudes are largely supra-parochial. This in no
way implies that they disdain the parish. It merely means that their work,
their associations and their experiences " have been along the more universal lines of broader Catholicism." If the parish does not figure largely in
their thinking, and this may be indicated in various ways, then one could
hardly expect the college student to consider parochial activity of much
importance.
Whether this explanation is valid or not, this study shows that Catholic
college graduates are not active in parish affairs. Indeed, the author
points out that those male Catholics who are most active in parish
societies are " also either relatively unsuccessful in their economic pursuits
or will participate only in those parochial activities which have a commercial aspect." In the opinion of such men, only the money-making enterprises have a real value for the parish and the highest praise they can give
a priest is to call him " a real business man." Such a situation presents a
challenge to the priest who is interested in utilizing the best talent in the
parish for the common good of all parishioners. Of course, if the more
educated members of the parish are called upon only to help out in bingo,
cake sales and bazaars, one can readily understand their disinclination to
participate and their tendency to seek other forms of activity commensurate
with their needs, interests and education. In spite of all efforts, however,
this study seems to provide enough evidence " to predict that the future
life of the present Catholic student will be less and less parochial in the
rigid narrow sense of the term."
The chapter entitled " Social Status and Religious Behavior " indicates
that the modal Catholic in many instances is more influenced by the
standards of the class to which he belongs than by the values inherent in
his religious beliefs. This is· evident in the racial attitudes held by some
Catholics and by their failure to exercise the "social virtues. As people rise
in socio-economic standing, they tend to adopt the values of their newly
attained status. They form new friendships, they engage in different kinds
of social activities, their economic views change. While remaining faithful
to religious observance, their thinking may be secularized to such an extent

BOOK REVIEWS

418

that the social encyclicals of the popes are ignored and they become blind
lo the demands of social justice. In other words, such Catholics appear
hardly different than non-Catholics, thinking and acting on some questions
largely as their social status demands rather than their faith would indicate.
As the author remarks: "The institutional environment has a much greater
impact on human behavior than most Christians seem willing to admit."
The marginal Catholic is like a house divided. He is outside the Church,
yet within the Church. He claims he is a Catholic, yet he does not want to
live like one. He is pulled one way, then another. He does not strongly
affirm Catholic teaching, yet he does not completely deny it. He is the
kind who says, "You can't run a business on Gospel
or "You
can't be a good Catholic and at the same time a successful politician,
doctor, lawyer, etc." The marginal Catholic is frequently a material heretic
and a moral relativist. Neither hot nor cold, he is a religious hybrid, a
compromiser, a "split personality." According to the author's tentative
estimate, he constitutes one fifth of our Catholic population. Seldom at
Sunday Mass, more often than not neglecting his Easter duty, hardly ever
thoughtful of a Catholic parochial school education for his children, the
marginal Catholic is more deeply influenced by the secular standards of the
society in which he lives than by the faith he half-heartedly professes. It
is from this group that we find many who grumble and rebel against the
Church for her stand on sex sins, birth prevention, divorce, etc., and who
resent the authority of the priest, protesting that his activity should be
strictly confined to the sanctuary. Because of his tenuous connection with
the Church, the marginal Catholic presents a unique problem to the parish
priest. He still holds on to many of the outward symbols of his religion,
but internally he has become de-Christianized. He is immune from, indifferent to, or untouched by the principles he is supposed to believe. Always capable of returning to the full vigor of his faith and to the
practice of his religion, he seems doomed to be submerged in the everwidening gulf between the claims of his Church and the demands of a
secularized society. The marginal Catholic taxes the ingenuity of the parish
priest to devise fitting means in order to bring back this strayed sheep who
has adopted many of the values of a pagan culture.
From the
of -reclamation, the dormant Catholic poses an even
more diflicult problem. As time lengthens it becomes increasingly difficult
one has rejected, to a Church one has renounced,
".
practice one nllS'abandoned. There are too many deterrents to such a·
course. of action-:-emotional ties, social and business reasons, an habitual
way . of living, a bad matriage or any one of a host of considerations. ·:But
,fallen-away Catholics can and sometimes do come back to the Church before they die. Perhaps this provides the basis for the saying: " It is hard
to live by the Catholic faith, but it is easy to die in it." And so pri€'sts and

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faithful often remark: "Once a Catholic, always a Catholic." It is a
hopeful and optimistic viewpoint, but the truth of it is as difficult to
ascertain as are the reasons for, and the amount of, leakage from the
Church. The author of this work intimates " that a much smaller percentage
of dormant Catholics ask for the priest at the end of life than are baptized
or married in the Church." In other words, if some Catholics are dormant,
it is with the kind of sleep from which frequently there is no awakening.
Whatever the percentage of reclaimed dormant Catholics may be, this group
of "lost sheep" constitute, according to the author, about thirty eight
percent of the ftl,754 white baptized Catholics who were the object of
inquiry.
Because of the multiple factors involved and because of the tendency of
people to rationalize their conduct, the attempt to discover why Catholics
leave the Church is a hazardous occupation. But this work provides a
tentative analysis. The wisdom of the bishops of this country in their
insistence on the establishment of Catholic schools is seen in the fact that
three-quarters of the dormant Catholics had received no parochial school
training and had been taught little or nothing about their religion at home.
In slum areas, families which have a low income and a high degree of family
disorganization in the form of divorce, desertion, etc., usually make up the
group with the largest number of dormant Catholics. Mixed marriages have
always been notorious as a source of defection from the Church, but the
author points out that they are " as often a source of conversion to the
Church as they are a source of leakage from the Church." Then there are
those who blame the behavior of priests and religious for their dereliction;
while others point to the bad example of Catholics, the Church's growing
policy of de-segregation, the teaching on birth control, the incompatibility
of Church membership with social aspiration, or simply, especially with the
very old, a gradual drifting away through tiredness, boredom or loss of
interest. In any event, even though they join no other religion, dormant
Catholics are lost to the Church. They engage in no parochial activities,
have only slight contact with Church functionaries (at time of baptism
and marriage), disclaim any membership in the parish and can be called
Catholic only in the nominal sense by reason of baptism or by lack of enrollment in a non-Catholic sect. Unlike the marginal Catholic who is still
in the conflict, the fallen-aw,ay Catholic has followed the line of least
resistance. He has given up the fight; he has capitulated to the demands
and has fully adopted the standards of a secularized society. He cannot
avoid meeting other Catholics; he will be reminded of his former faith in
many ways; he may be shunned and criticized by Catholic relatives and
friends, but his former faith has little influence upon him.
Some interesting observations are provided in the chapter dealing with
the position of the priest in the parochial system. The lot of the urban

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415

parish priest is not an easy one. It is required that he function in many
roles-as minister of the sacraments, preacher, leader, adviser, disciplinarian,
comforter, administrator, business man, recreational director, educator,
pastor and confessor. He must be in the world, but not of the world. He
must be all things to all men, yet he must always retain the dignity of his
priesthood. In days gone by and in less complicated environment, he often
had close contact with families and individuals in the parish. He knew their
virtues and their vices, their accomplishments and their aspirations, their
sorrows and their disappointments. Because he knew his parishioners so well,
his influence was directed and pervasive. The moral and social behavior of
his flock was always subject to his scrutiny and consequently could not be
but improved thereby.
Such a situation no longer exists. The priest-parishioner relationship
has, to a large extent, become depersonalized. The demands of the ministry
in our modern urban parishes exclude the possibility of close contact with
parishioners. The parish priest has become more of a " rectory " priest.
Office hours, appointments, multiple instruction of converts and those
coming to be married are some of the devices used by the priest to facilitate
the daily routine of the large city parishes. While the functions of the
priest have increased, his personal contact with, and hence his influence
over parishioners has diminished. As the author points out, residential
mobility across parish lines may not have an adverse effect on faithfulness
to religious practices, but it is definitely an obstacle to participation in
parochial affairs and at best it makes contact with the clergy casual and
sporadic.
It is an often-heard lament of the urban priest that he knows only a
fraction of his parishioners. Many families will have moved into and will
have moved out of the parish territory before the priest has an opportunity
to meet them. The problem is complicated further by the tendency of
many Catholics to put off or to neglect registering at the rectory when
they take up new residence in the parish. Of course this lack of personal
knowledge of parishioners is somewhat counterbalanced by the contact
made and the information obtained in the parish census. But this is more
often a hope than an actuality, for " very few large urban parishes can
boast of a conscientious bi-annual census, in which the priests themselves
call on every family in the parish." Parishioners sometimes complain that
the priest seldom if ever visits their homes. They may chat with him on the
street, but more often only catch a glimpse of him as he rides by in
his car. Some may even charge him with visiting the homes of the more
affluent members of the parish. These grievances indicate that only a
small minority are cognizant of the manifold duties of a priest in a large
parish and few seem to realize that his time is so absorbed by the many
roles that he has to exercise that personal contact with the majority of

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BOOK REVIEWS

parishioners becomes a practical impossibility. To what extent the priest
is responsible for this condition it is difficult to judge. One thing this study
would seem to indicate: the more the priest assumes functions which lie
outside his holy office, and which in mahy instances can be handled more
efficiently by the laity, so much the more does the sacred ministry suffer
and so much the more does he lose his effectiveness as a priest.
The preaching office is one phase of the priest's work which deserves
consideration. The priest himself may possess a high degree of spiritual
vitality. He may be an effective teacher in the parochial school, in the
released-time program and in the catechism class. He may exert a powerful
influence for good in the parish sodalities and societies, in private counseling and in the confessional. But the one place where he has the greatest
and most sustained contact with his people is in the pulpit at Sunday Mass.
After receiving the sacrament of Confirmation, few Catholic parishioners
receive any formal instruction in the truths of their faith. Perhaps they
read a Catholic newspaper or periodical occasionally, or listen to a Catholic
radio broadcast, or attend a parish mission. For the most part, however,
due to the pressure of business, family or social activity, or even laziness
and indifference, the knowledge of the teachings of their Church remains at
a somewhat juvenile level. Because of this condition, this reviewer believes
there is more than an element of truth to the saying that if many people
are going to be saved, they will be saved through the Sunday sermon; there
is hardly any other occasion that they will hear anything about religion.
This is not an ideal situation, but few would gainsay that it
the true
one. The one aspect of the priest's behavior which is most talked abouteither praised or criticized-is the Sunday sermon. Indeed, the very
reputation of the priest, the esteem or disesteem in which he is held, the
degree of his influence is most often reckoned according to what he says and
how he says it at Sunday morning Mass. One wonders if the parish priest
realizes or truly appreciates this fact: it should be a powerful antidote to
lack of preparation in preaching.
In any event, while the priest, as the author observes, is the pivotal person in the. parish, he is not solely responsibJe fur the success or failure of
· -parochial activities. He must possess at· least .a'·fonited proficiency in the
various
.. which he is cast, but ;tli,.e
of the laity is
-the success M: ;;_n,y parochial
This. -0rganized co<.iperationd prkst and people obtained •®ly,•wifen_.too goals sought. are
', ·.'":,"'
- .· · ·
mutually -esteemed. hy ;the
·· What ls. ·the validity of
Does
claim that-his
.. ·
Chnrch
or -enly
tO .a
o1it? Does
--::dlow the :itcts
for tliemselves, -0r
are they strained into a mold in order to oonfonu t-0' his preconeeived ideas?
Are his interpretations sound. or are -they· vitiated by an arbitrary sub-

BOOK REVIEWS

417

jectivism? Aside from its sociological value, in what manner can a study
of this nature be helpful for the work of the Church?
Because of the criticism of his Southern Parish, the author is careful
to point out that his findings are specifically applicable only to the members
of those groups who were the subjects of his investigation. For instance, in
the chapter dealing with the religious life-profile of southern, white, modal
Catholics in a particular area, he states: "No claim can be made that a
similar religious life-profile will be found among Catholics in rural areas,
in national or racial parishes, in other regions, or even among white
Catholics in other southern cities." Hence while it is possible for him on the
basis of his study to offer a descriptive typology of church membership,
he realizes that this can be predicated of other parishioners only when it is
verified by further research. St. Thomas observes that the acquisition of
moral science demands patient effort, attentive and prolonged observation
of the character of men, and practical experience in the customs of human
life (I Ethic., lect. 4) . What is true of ethics is no less true of sociological
study of the parish. Armchair theorizing is fruitless unless tested by factual
knowledge obtained through research. It is for this reason that Father
Fichter and other social scientists laboring in the same field of parish
sociology deserve commendation for their spade work at the grass roots
level of Catholicism.
When the author moves into the more difficult area of setting up criteria,
selecting and interpreting data and judging motives from outward activity,
one may wonder if his opinions are not sometimes given the same weight
as are his scientific conclusions. For example, there are undoubtedly elements in the success ideal prevalent in our culture which are incompatible
with Christian principles, but who can say to what extent material affluence
and commercial interests are detrimental to spiritual growth? Can we infer
that a person who follows the customs of segregation in a particular section
of the country in which he resides is thereby being unjust and uncharitable?
Does religious and social reform require a reformation and repatterning of
various social statuses and roles, and is class status' of itself an obstacle
to the spontaneous display of charity? Questions of this nature make the
selection of data, and the interpretation based upon this selection, a delicate
task, for, as the author remarks, any such selection " may result in a
distorted picture so that the actual reciprocal relation between environment
and individual may appear to be one-sided." In other words, the author is
treading on risky ground when he proposes ideals and norms and then
judges conduct according to those standards, because there is always the
possibility that his criteria may be arbitrary, his behavioral data prejudicially selective and his interpretations tendentious. This should not,
however, and does not prevent the author from attempting the task, and
succeeding, I believe, to a great extent.

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BOOK REVIEWS

There are few priests in large cities who are not cognizant of the difficulties involved in exercising the ministry at the parish level. Any insights,
information, clarifications or understandings which can be given to these
hard workin!§ dedicated men so that they may become better instruments
of God in the salvation of souls will be greatly appreciated. As the author
points out, it is precisely in this area that social science can be useful.
Guesswork has little value in comparison to factual knowledge; vague assumption is a poor substitute for verified generalization; personal opinion
and subjective evaluation carries little weight in the face of empirical research and scientific explanation. The puzzled priest may wonder why
he is not obtaining the co-operation of teen-agers in the religious and recreational program of the parish. A partial answer is provided in this
study. The Holy Name Society moderator may feel frustrated in his efforts
to attract members from the thirty-year age group or from certain occupational categories. A plausible explanation of this situation is offered by the
author. Many other examples could be cited to show how the priest could
utilize knowledge obtained through research to direct his energies, plan his
strategy, extend his apostolate, mobilize the laity and penetrate into areas
hitherto untouched by his ministry.
No one can deny the phenomenal numerical growth of the Church in the
United States, but there are some who wonder if this correlates highly with
proportional growth in church membership. Everyone will grant there is
room for improvement. More and more research is needed in the sociology of
the parish, for it is only by further study that one can answer the question
posed by many priests: Is the parochial system, as it now operates in our
urban American society, an adequate instrument for the salvation and
sanctification of souls? The question admits of no easy answer; but if any
answer is forthcoming, it will emerge from the facts garnered by the social
researcher. The thesis expressed in Father Fichter's Southern Parish was
that Catholicism will suQceed or fail in reconstructing and integrating modern
society on the basis of the strength or weakness of its individual parishes.
Assuming that this thesis is correct, anything that will contribute to a
reinforcing of the parochial system will be a boon to the Church. Indeed,
with the accumulation of research and systematic interpretation of findings,
the day may not be far off when courses in pastoral theology taught in
our seminaries are supplemented by sociological studies of the parish.
This is in keeping with the prescriptions of the popes, especially since the
time of Leo XIIl. Stressing the necessity of an adaptation of the apostolate
to the needs and conditions of our times, present and past pontiffs have
suggested that the pastoral ministry be recast along certain lines. New
ways of penetration and influence must be devised. The newly ordained
priest should be trained in the methods and new forms of the apostolate
introduced by our age. Environmental and cultural factors which shape the

419

BOOK REVIEWS

thinking of the faithful will have to be weighed and the apostolate made
more direct and personal in its scope. Secularism should be recognized as
the principal obstacle to the success of the ministry and the help of the
laity should be sought for the intensification of apostolic work. Finally,
there must be a recognition of the various levels of social stratification so
that the apostolate may be diversified according to the social milieu in
which the priest must work. In a recent address to the pastors and
preachers of his own diocese of Rome, Pope Pius XII warned them against
superficiality in estimating the condition of the parish and urged them to
employ more exact methods in their pastoral care of souls. Calling for " a
statistical effort made with seriousness, exacting realism and quiet impartiality," the Holy Pontiff suggested that such research would be an
effective antidote to clerical complacency and an accurate method of gearing the apostolate to the needs of the faithful.
With Social Relations, Father Fichter has produced a representative
sociological study which should benefit the ministry, provide enlightenment to the laity and be a guide to those working along similar lines. Although marred by a few typographical errors (pp. 46, 134, 147, 185, !l45,
!l46), this work avoids the occasional triviality, repetition and unnecessary
detail which were found in his first study. This reviewer looks forward to
the publication of more studies of this nature, because he feels that those
who work, like Father Fichter, in this field of parish sociology can contribute much to the mission of the Church.
JOSEPH L. LENNON,

o. P.

Providence College,
Providence, R. l.

Building a Philosophy of Education. By HARRY S. BROUDY. New York:
Prentice-Hall, 1954. Pp. 495 with index. $5.00.
It has been alleged tha.t most books on education read as if they had
been badly translated from the German. Mr. Broudy's Building a Philosophy of Education does not. It is a very readable book written in an
unpretentious and sometimes witty manner. He manages to be informal
and simple without over-simplifying or talking down to his readers.
Students of philosophy and of education will note the freedom from the
stock phrases and the circumlocutions so often used by writers in both
these fields. Mr. Broudy tries to avoid the use of expressions that everyone
thinks he understands as well as a technical vocabulary that gives a professional air to a book but prevents its being read outside its field. He has
written a book that can be understood by a college student regardless of the
amount or kind of course he has had in philosophy or education.

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BOOK REVIEWS

For Mr. Broudy "education is the process or product of a deliberate
attempt to fashion experience by the direction and control of learning."
(p. 9) The philosophy of education could mean either the application of
philosophy to education or a philosophical analysis of educational problems.
The author here regards the philosophy of education as " the systematic
discussion of educational problems on a philosophical level, i. e., the
probing into an educational question until it is reduced to an issue in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, logic, or aesthetics, or to a combination of
these." (p.
His method, consistently followed in the book, is to examine
the needs revealed in an educational problem, analyze various answers, and
propose a solution. His solutions to the various problems ultimately make
a coherent whole that responds well to the ends and principles from which
the author works.
Briefly, the order of the book is such that Mr. Broudy begins with a
discussion of the aim of education, the good life. Then in several chapters
he takes up the means either given by the nature of things or to be chosen
by man in order to realize the aim: the structure of human personality, the
roles of government, family, and churches in education, the habits and
skills to be acquired in school, the content of the curriculum, method, and
the organization of an educational system. Part Two of the work treats the
way that education is concerned with values: economic, hygienic, recreational, associational, aesthetic, moral, and religious.
Mr. Broudy forthrightly states that his general position in philosophy is
Classical Realism, and a little reading shows that he is very much in the
Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. However, he has carefully re-thought
traditional teachings not to be original but in order to understand them,
and that is certainly one of the primary tasks of a student of philosophy,
Nowhere that I could see is Mr. Broudy trying to say something new and
different just to make a new opinion, but he has nevertheless succeeded in
turning out a genuinely original work, because he has thought about today's
version of perennial problems and has given solutions in a way understandable today. He has taken account of modern educational psychology and
the more basic contributions of John Dewey's Instrumentalism. Since Mr.
Broudy is a professor in the State College in Framingham, Massachusetts.
he is at home in concrete educational problems and is conversant with
educational literature. It is therefore easy to see why his book is so well
suited to students preparing to teach.
Chapters three and five present a great deal of philosophical matter and
are fundamental to the rest of the book. Chapter three treats of natural
and elicited appetite, analyzes the notion of self, and describes the freedom
necessary for self-determination. The author examines many philosophical
views that are influential today, e.g., those of James and Dewey as well
as many common opinions that are widely held but are not always so

BOOK REVIEWS

4U

formally expressed. On the whole, the treatment of " reflective freedom "
seems to be well done, although I do not think so much emphasis need be
given to the role of symbols in free choice. Chapter five contains a good,
though not very formal, discussion of knowledge with some notion of the
formation of concepts. Special attention is paid to the Instrumentalist
view which identifies the act of knowing with the process of problem
solving. Mr. Broudy, of course, disagrees, since "each step of reflective
thinking-defining the problem, framing hypotheses, evaluating and verifying them-would be meaningless and impossible unless we could apprehend
certain qualities and relations directly and immediately, as the Realist
insists." (p. 144)
The chapter on " Education in the Social Order " analyzes. the claims of
education to autonomy and the limitations to that autonomy. It is done
with clarity and with good sense, even though one can be sure that citizens
of one community or another might sometimes be inclined to modify the
views presented here. Mr. Broudy summarizes the relation between the
school and the state as follows: "It is the school's role to specify the curriculum, organization, and methodology. But the implementation of this
program depends on factors beyond the school's power and jurisdiction.
It is up to the government, speaking for the people, to decide how much of
the resources it can devote to the accomplishment of the program; whether
it can build a new gymnasium or not; whether it can buy the books and
equipment indicated as desirable; and whether it can afford to educate
everybody to the age of 18 and at what tuition. These decisions are made in
specific situations with the citizens consulting each other in the light of the
Common Good." (pp. 103-104) There is in the chapter an admirable delineation of the provinces of home and school in education. It is, for
example, not the objective of the school to establish physical and emotional
health in the child, although the school may be one among the multitude
of influences on those habits. The fundamental role of the school is the
perfection of the skills and habits of knowing. As for a church's part in
education Mr. Broudy has a good description of the Naturalist point of
view, and he appreciates that the modern attitude of ignoring religion is
perhaps worse than the violent anti-clericalism of the eighteenth century.
In general, it seems that the section on churches and education is well done.
A Catholic would have to make clear that the Church is competent to judge
matters of revealed fact and not merely to make interpretations which are
calculated to arouse religious experiences. Incidentally, "religious experience " is used in a loose sense here and in chapter :fifteen to mean any
feeling of communication with something holy. The author rightly insists
on the inviolability of the individual conscience on page 117, but he goes on
to say," a religious sect may be powerful enough politically to ban certain
plays and books, but it cannot claim the sanction of the natural law for

422

BOOK REVIEWS

such· an act unless it is already admitted by everyone that it has access to
some revealed truth." Surely, the "sanction of natural law" does not
depend on revealed truth, although it might often be clarified or made more
certain by revelation.
Chapters six and seven on the curriculum are two of the most important
in the book and along with chapter eight might well be of the most interest
to people in education. They should be read, however, in dependence on the
preceding chapters. With balance and good sense, Mr. Broudy reviews
the problems of motivation, and the development of ability to think that
are involved in settling on a type of curriculum. He considers the subject
matter curriculum and the problem centered curriculum, as well as a third
view which is ordered to providing the student with the skills of learning
and an understanding of actual problematic situations. The use of " habit "
is somewhat loose in this chapter, but perhaps it is well adapted to common
usage today. How can the author reconcile his view that habits are forms
of activity, and as such, "they have no specific content" (p. 183) with
the fact that the intellectual habits, e. g., understanding and the various
sciences, surely do have content? In chapter six there is a sympathetic
presentation and evaluation of Dewey's notions on learning.
Chapter seven contains some well thought-out and practical suggestions
for curriculum construction. They are based on clear principles, but they
are not abstract deductions, rather they are carefully adjusted to the needs
of students at the present time. One cannot go into the details here, but
the author divides the curriculum into Natural Science, Social Science, and
what he regrettably calls Self Science (including psychology, literature,
philosophy, fine arts, and knowledge about religion) to which is added a
guidance program. Each general subject matter ought to be accompanied
by a course covering current problems. A sample taken from a section on
the course treating current social problems follows. Should the class arrive
at a decision favoring some particular solution? " As the study progresses,
opinions will be formed and transformed. A group decision, however, is
meaningless unless the group is in position to carry it out. No school group,
as a rule, is in such a position and, therefore, on most issues decision-making
is only a gesture. The group is in a position to understand and perhaps
to be convinced by that understanding, but conviction is not equivalent to
action. The school is responsible for understanding, but not for social
action." (p. 194)
The chapter on method is again a practical and well considered approach
to the subject. Mr. Broudy's view of method as the matching of the levels
of abstraction of the pupil and the task seems to be admirable. The chapter
on the organization of an educational system distinguishes well between
the intellectual and the social goals of education. It treats of grouping on
elementary, secondary, college, and university levels. One of Mr. Broudy's

BOOK REVIEWS

428

most ingenious ideas is the " Adjustatorium," an institution to take care of
a group that cannot profit from further formal training but can nevertheless
get something out of more group activity and social cooperation. The
suggestion would seem to have some merit if everyone is to remain in school
until he is seventeen or eighteen years old and if, on the other hand, students of superior ability are not to waste time in a program that offers them
no challenge. At one point the author says, " Our best and finest hope for
democracy and the good life lies not in keeping all people somehow in the
same school as long as possible, but rather in finding for each boy and girl
a type of schooling that will fully exploit his or her potentialities for formal
learning." (p. 259)
In Part Two Mr. Broudy courageously takes up questions of education
and values. Perhaps this section is bound to be less satisfactory because
the principles governing judgments of value are less easily identified and
agreed upon. However, it is refreshing to find some one treat these matters
in a analytic manner. The author frankly comes out for the objectivity
of values. "For, at best, a doctrine that holds all values to be relative is
a protective theory, i.e., it justifies our resistance to aggressive people who
insist on their own value scheme as final. But it does not give us a weapon
with which to wage war on injustice, cruelty, or any other state of affairs
that we regard as 'evil.'" (p. 280)
The general chapter on " Education and Values " is soundly conceived
as are the more particular discussions of economic values, aesthetic values,
etc. Catholics might go a bit further than Mr. Broudy does on the subject
of moral values, but he is certainly right that ultimately moral decisions
must be made by the individual deliberately choosing. The statement,
"What we ought to do we learn nowhere," (p. 410) needs some modification. After all, we can learn what we ought to do in general, although we
cannot learn concrete individual acts in any scientific way. Our general
knowledge of what we ought to do surely is useful to us in our practical
decisions, even though it may not be sufficient to account for all the contingencies involved in any practical act. To the extent that there is something we can learn about what we ought to do, there can be a course
teaching just that. Why not? There is a subject matter and reasons can
be given or at least a good many statements about what we ought to do.
Learning about morality is not limited to such a course, but the role of
ethical teaching ought not to be neglected.
Again, in the chapter on religious values, a Catholic would find it necessary to supplement the text-not so much to contradict it as to add points,
for J\Ir. Broudy, of course, is writing a non-sectarian treatise. It must be
emphasized, however, that he does not take a secularist point of view. He
recognizes the gap between the natural and the supernatural and understands that there is no natural proof of the supernatural. He sees that the

8

BOOK REVIEWS

adolescent's knowledge of God and religion must keep pace with his intellectual development in other spheres, otherwise the maturing youth will
regard religion as something childish and without intellectual content. The
author rightly sees that a generalized religion is too vague and formless
to be of any use in religious education, and he sees that practical difficulties
would prevent courses in philosophy of religion from being widely introduced
on the secondary level, although he is of the opinion that such courses would
be good. Serious doubts can be raised against the philosophy of religion
courses he suggests. Are they really so objective? One point alone is
enough to challenge that objectivity: often the philosophy of religion treats
what is really supernatural as a merely natural phenomenon. A proposition
known by divine faith is no less objective than olie known by natural
knowledge, even though the relation between evidence and assent may be
different. One last reservation might well be made to this chapter; that
Mr. Broudy associates religion a little too much with feeling.
Despite occasional modifications or additions one might make, Building a
Philosophy of Education can be recommended for classes in the philosophy
. of education with enthusiasm. I wish to go further and suggest it as a good
supplement to other philosophy courses particularly because of the fresh
way of expressing traditional teachings and because of the way it reveals
and criticizes much of the philosophy of John Dewey and others. It does
a better job than many textbooks that explicitly set out to do either of
these two things. Lastly, anyone interested in philosophy or in education
will certainly find this book absorbing and stimulating reading. Mr.
Broudy has genuinely performed the functions of a philosopher and he has
done so in a way that consistently arouses admiration and agreement.
HENRI DULAC
Harvard University,
Cambridge, Masaachsetta

Teolog£a de San Jose. By BONIFACIO LLAMERA, 0. P. Madrid: Biblioteca
de Autores Cristianos, 1953. Pp. 689 with index.
" The Holy Spirit will not cease to act on the hearts of the faithful until
the universal Church will shower honors on the divine Joseph with new
veneration, and will erect monasteries, build churches and altars in his
name, multiply his feasts and celebrate them _more solemnly.... For the
honor of his name God has chosen St. Joseph as head and special patron of
the kingdom of the Church Militant. Before the day of judgment it must
happen that all peoples know, honor and adore the name of the Lord and
the great gifts of God which He Himself has placed in St. Joseph and which

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425

he has left almost in obscurity for a long period
. the Lord will open
the ears of the understanding and great men will search out the inner gifts
of God that are hidden in St. Joseph, and they will find an exceedingly
precious treasure such as was never found in the fathers of the Old Testament . . . his name will be listed on the calendars of the saints, no longer
at the end but at the beginning."
Isidore de lsolanis wrote these words in
when St. Joseph was not
honored by any special feast-day nor even mentioned in the Litany of the
Saints. Now that his prediction has been fulfilled in so many respects,
especially in regard to the devotion of the Church, it is not surprising to
find the Lord opening the ears of the understanding, and great men searching out the inner gifts
God that are hidden in St. Joseph. While many
books have confined themselves to the devotional aspects, there is a
discernible movement towards a genuine theology of St. Joseph which is
being called Josephology.
The work of Father Llamera avoids the extreme of " pious rashness "
which bases itself on privileges erroneously supposed and its opposite overcautiousness which would entirely reject arguments of fittingness as if
theological deduction had no value when it did not achieve complete certitude. St. Thomas says that, despite the universal character of science,
theology can concern itself with individual facts, so Father Llamera feels
justified in speaking of Josephology as a "part of the science of theology
which, from revealed principles, studies the holy Patriarch as spouse of the
Mother of God and putative father of the Incarnate Word, with all the
graces and privileges w:hich are derived from this ministry." (p. 9) The
sources of this theology are the Sacred Scriptures, papal documents, the
Church Fathers, and theologians.
Scripture itself presents four principal statements about St. Joseph: 1)
he is the spouse of the Blessed Virgin;
as a result, Joseph was considered
by the people as the father of Jesus; 3) Joseph did indeed exercise an office
as head of his family; 4) Joseph was a just man. Papal documents are few
until the time of Pius IX when there begins a steadily increasing number of
discourses, decrees, apostolic letters and encyclicals.
There is an interesting development in the writings of the Fathers on St.
Joseph. The earlier Fathers simply do not mention him, and this is hardly
surprising in view of the fact that the apostolic catechesis began with John
the Baptist, when it would seem that St. Joseph was already dead. Later
Fathers mention Joseph insofar as his name occurs in the sacred teXt. In
their expositions they were so concerned to defend the perpetual virginity
of Mary that some allowed themselves to be unfortunately influenced by the
deliramenta apocryphorum. Thus St. Joseph was at times presented as an
elderly man and indeed art still has him carrying the blossoming rod which
the apocrypha gave him. At other times, the apocryphal legends provided

of

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an easy exegesis for the "brothers of the Lord" by making Joseph a
widower with children by his first marriage. The great doctor of the
Scriptures, St. Jerome, with his customary contempt for such legends, seems
to have been the first to oppose all this, and states flatly that St. Joseph,
like Mary, was a virgin. St. Augustine came to this opinion, too, and others
followed so that St. Peter Damian in the eleventh century could write:
" it is of the faith of the Church that he was a virgin."
St. Thomas teaches not only that St. Joseph was always a virgin, but
that he vowed his virginity. Besides these two principles St. Thomas
teaches that there was a true and perfect marriage between Joseph and
Mary. Most Thomistic commentators, Suarez excepted, pass over these
doctrines in silence. Fr. Llamera offers the explanation that the commentators rarely went beyond the twenty-sixth question of the Third Part except
to repeat the conclusions of St. Thomas. Nevertheless from the fifteenth
century theological writings on St. Joseph have continued to grow from
Isidore de Isolanis and Gerson, through St. Bernardine of Siena down to
Cardinal Lepicier and the current interest in Josephology.
After this introductory background Father Llamera divides his own work
into three main parts: the foundations of the theology of St. Joseph which
involves a discussion of the meaning of his marriage to the Blessed Virgin,
his virginal paternity towards Christ, his relation to the hypostatic union
and cooperation with the redemption; then the consequences to Joseph-his
dignity, holiness, virtues and gifts, his virginity, privileges and glory; and
finally his relation to us-universal patronage and the cult due to him.
Since the last two sections are in the nature of corollaries to the main thesis,
we confine ourselves to the main principles of Josephology as set forth in
the section of Fr. Llamera's work.
The marriage of St. Joseph is considered from both the scriptural and
theological aspects. In regard to the scriptural aspect, Father Llamera
explains the Hebrew customs of marriage, especially the distinction between
espousals and nuptials. The Gospel narrative raises the problem of Mary's
exact status at the time of the Annunciation-was she simply espoused to
Joseph or was she completely married and dwelling with Joseph? Although
there are many arguments in favor of the espousal theory in both ancient
and modern exegesis-St. Luke, the acknowledged Greek scholar among the
Evangelists, uses the word .€.µ,VYJ<Frruµ}.V'Y/ (2: 5} which is usually rendered
"espoused "-Fr. Llamera thinks that the text and context do not demonstrate simple espousal. However, the author thinks that many Fathers and
exegetes who hold for the complete marriage interpretation obviously do
not understand Hebrew marriage customs. In this section a number of
minor points are raised such as the Davidic descent of Joseph which is
evident from the Evangelists' genealogies of Jesus, the residence of St.
Joseph which is taken to be Nazareth rather than Bethlehem or Jerusalem

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427

as some ancient opinions held, his age which is given as uncertain although
the author from arguments of convenience holds for the younger hypothesis.
From the theological point of view, marriage is defined with all its elements
and bona with the Thomistic conclusion that Joseph was truly married to
the Blessed Virgin.
The paternity of Saint Joseph treated in the next chapter is a more difficult matter. Paternity is first discussed through the action of generation
which constitutes the relation paternity-filiation; then the various kinds of
paternity-divine, natural and adoptive are considered. As to the fact
of Joseph's- paternity there can be no doubt. Scripture clearly teaches
that Mary called Joseph the father of Jesus, and that Joseph was considered by the Jews to be such. Since Jesus was, as Scripture records, sub·
ject to Joseph, it is evident that Joseph by giving his name and his
paternal care did indeed exercise the function of father of the holy Family.
However, certain theories about the nature of that paternity Father Llamera
is at pains to reject. Of course the " natural paternity " for which Cerinthus held is certainly heretical, and the " physical supernatural paternity "
theory of Father Corbat6 according to which the Holy Spirit takes the
seed of St. Joseph, sanctifies it and unites it miraculously to the Blessed
Virgin is rejected. But so also are theories of incomplete natural paternity
and real paternity. Father Llamera states his own thesis: "The denominations of legal, putative, provider (nutricio), adoptive, virginal and vicarious
father of the heavenly Father only express partial and incomplete aspects
of the paternity of St. Joseph." Then he states more positively that " the
paternity of St. Joseph is new, unique and singular, of a superior order to
natural and human adoptive paternity," and proves this by authority and
by reason of Joseph's marriage and virginity. His final conclusion is that
"St. Joseph had true paternal sentiments towards Christ" which is proved
from the nature of divine grace, which is more effective of love than nature
alone.
The apex of the work for theological speculation is the relation of St.
Joseph to the hypostatic union. The problem is admittedly difficult for St.
Joseph's position is unique and human language cannot adequately express
in any single term the notion of his relationship to the Incarnate Word.i But
there is an unquestionably true relationship which ancient writers hinted
at in their references to St. Joseph as" minister of the Incarnation,' as one
" united in a profound manner to Christ," as a " cooperator in the Redemption," as a minister " necessary and proximately related to the very person
of Christ." Even though more has been written recently on the possible inclusion of St. Joseph in the order of the hypostatic union, there is little
positive development on which Father Llaniera can work. He, however, not
only collects but penetrates the ideas of various ecclesiastical writers. After
discussing the hypostatic union itself and the various ways of belonging to

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it, Father Llamera rejects the opinions that St. Joseph belonged to that
union either intrinsically and physically or intrinsically but morally. He
prefers to say that St. Joseph cooperated in the constitution of the
hypostatic order in a way which is true and singular, but to be denominated
extrinsic, moral and mediate. Moreover, the cooperation of St. Joseph in
the conservation of the hypostatic union was direct, immediate and necessary. After an exhaustive explanation of his terms, the author concludes
that Saint Joseph was indeed included in the divine decree of the
Incarnation.
The final question of major moment for theology is St. Joseph's part in
the work of our Redemption. Once the concepts of redemption, co-redemption and satisfaction are applied to Jesus and to Mary, a parallel conclusion
in regard to Joseph is established: "In being chosen spouse of the Virgin
Mary and virgin father of Christ, St. Joseph was also associated in a
singular way in our redemption by a real and objective, though extrinsic
and moral, cooperation." Its reality is based on his particular capabilities
for that office, especially his divinely bestowed graces, the divine ordering
of. his entire life and ministry to the Redemption, his voluntary acceptance
of this divine plan, and his intimate union with the Redeemer Himself and
the Co-Redemptrix. The cooperation 'of Saint Joseph remains extrinsic and
moral for Joseph did not contribute to the meriting of redeeming graces to
the degree that Mary did, nor did he have her close union to the hypostatic union. Since Father Llamera holds that Mary is a physical, instrumental cause in the communication of grace, his conclusion that Joseph's
cooperation is inferior to this and moral causality quite naturally follows.
St. Joseph's cooperation in the work of redemption consisted in his selfimmolation in the silent service of Jesus and Mary long before Jesus was
publicly revealed as the Messias. The Gospels show this immolation consisted in a life of great interior suffering united to the sufferings of Jesus
and Mary.
The inclusion of the early Josephology of Father Isidore de lsolanis, 0. P.
increases the value of Father Llamera's own work, for the Latin text of this
sixteenth century work has long been difficult to obtain. Now this text of
an early and very significant contribution to the theology of St. Joseph
is made available in the Latin text with a Spanish translation. Thus the
greatest theological synthesis of St. Joseph in its own day is placed side by
side with more modern developments. Father Bonifacio Llamera, as well as
his director Father Nuniz, deserve our thanks for these contributions.
JAMES J. DAVIS, 0. P.
Dominican House of Phllo11ophy,
St. Rose Priory,
Springfield, Ky.

BRIEF NOTICES
The Third Revolution. By KARL STERN. New York: Harcourt, Brace,
1954. Pp. 818. $4.00.
The argument of this hook-as the author asserts twice (p. 90, 290)is primarily historical. It traces the origin and development of the " Third
Revolution." Three revolutions arose out of the nineteenth century: the
social, started by Marx, the biological and racist, due to Darwin and the
ev9lutionists, and the positivist revolution which began with Comte and
has become widespread through the ideas of the scientific positivists. The
aim of this Comtean revolution is to replace revelation, faith and philosophy by science, and science in this case means first the science of man,
that is, psychology and sociology. Positivistic psychology develops the
mechanistic concept of l'homme machine-which, it be said in passing,
derives from La Mettrie and not from Descartes, as the author asserts.
Stern feels that psychoanalysis now forms, to a startling degree, part of
the positivist revolution. By psychoanalysis the author understands the
Freudian type which consists of a psychological structure, the therapeutic
method, and a philosophical or superstructure. The author believes-contrary to several other Catholic authors-that the superstructure is not an
essential part of the Freudian system; hence, that it can be removed so as
to make the system philosophically neutral. In order to prove this statement the author in the first place uses a kind of pragmatic argument by
pointing out that a number of psychiatrists, with a Christian set of beliefs,
actually use psychoanalytical methods to great advantage. But his chief
piece of evidence is that the main tenets of psychoanalysis not only are
opposed to scientific positivism, but fit in perfectly with a Christian idea
of the nature of man.
If it were essentially materialistic and atheistic, it certainly would have
been embraced by the communists, but psychoanalysis is banned in the
Soviet Union. This is one of Stern's favorite arguments developed previously in an article published in the " Bulletin of the Guild of Catholic
Psychiatrists" (December, 1952)-which provided a kind of preview
the present book. Dr. Stern goes even so far as to say that Freud's entire
philosophical superstructure was not much more than an academic play.
Accordingly, the basic concepts of psychoanalysis-the dynamic unconscious, libido, sublimation and transference-can all be stripped of the
materialistic or mechanistic connotation which Freud and other analysts
have given them. For instance, no one really accepts Freud's crudely
mechanistic theory concerning sublimation, as if the " quantum " of libidinal

for

429

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energy were shunted back and forth in different channels. Stern particularly
stresses the concept of transference as altogether alien to materialistic or
positivistic interpretations. For transference means the relationship of " I
and Thou,'' and that is based upon empathy-the function by which one
re"feels another person's feelings or re-experiences his experiences, "as if
you were he " (p. 19 ff.) . In this relationship there is an interpenetration
of being and, therefore, it contains an implicitly metaphysical quality. For
that reason the concept of empathy is incompatible with materialism and
for the same reason we are able to integrate psychoanalytic teachings into
Christian philosophy and theology. In other words, Stern makes an attempt
to " baptize " Freud, as others have done before.
Has Dr. Stern succeeded in proving that the main features of psychoanalysis can be made philosophically neutral? Many readers will probably
be impressed by the author's evidence. However, what Stern gives with
one hand, he retracts with the other. In theory, he holds, it is possible to
isolate the therapeutic method from the rest of the system and thus make
it philosophically neutral, but in practice neutrality is impossible, precisely
because the analytical method is based on the mechanism of transference.
That unique relationship between patient and therapist never can be really
neutral, due to the fact that the moral attitude, the outlook on life, the
philosophy of the physician will necessarily enter into it. It works both
ways. As an atheistic and an amoralist attitude will permeate the atmosphere of the therapeutic situation, so will the philosophy of the Christian
physician. In neither case do they have to formulate in words their moral
or religious outlook; in both instances their very silence speaks. " In the
psychoanalytic process the praeter-verbal is as important as that which is
spoken. The total moral attitude of the physician, though never formulated,
forms the rock bottom" (p.
In the opinion of the present reviewer this is the core and the best part
of Stern's book. Out of it he develops his psychoanalytic views on the
symbolic language of the unco:rscious, the so-called organ language, personality development, the abortive form of puberty which is only another
word for infantile sexuality, guilt, anxiety, identification, and so forth.
Here we may ask, whether the author gives conclusive evidence that the
psychoanalytic concepts are empirically established, as he believes. Those
who before reading this book were already " converted " to psychoanalysis
will obviously feel "confirmed" by Stern's "baptizing" Freud. Those
readers who thus far had misgivings about Freudian psychoanalysis will
probably still feel reluctant to give them up, even though they will readily
admit that Stern has defended his case brilliantly. He proceeds in a friendly,
almost paternal manner, taking the reader, so to say, by the hand, leading
him through the labyrinth of mental aberrations and showing him with
numerous examples, not only how effective but also how Christianlike the

BRIEF NOTICES

481

analytic approach is. One may become almost convinced, but in retrospect
one may request some more evidence. For it may appear to one that most
of the argument is based on symbols, analogies, metaphors, figures, images,
hypothetical assumptions, and the usual verbiage of Freudian semanticsnot to speak of the typical analytical twist to turn opposites around.
Some readers, especially among the clergy, may feel that the author
generalizes too much, when he says that a large number of Catholic moralists are Jansenistic in matters of sex, and they may raise their eyebrows
when they hear Dr. Stern say that he has much more sympathy with our
moral relativists who advocate the abolition of " sexual taboos," than with
our Jansenist teachers of morality. On the other hand, most readers will
probably agree that they learned a great deal from this book. It means
a serious attempt to integrate psychoanalytic concepts with Catholic thinking. This is not only a brilliant but also a sound book-and some may
add that it would be a still better book if it had an index.

The Christian Experience. By JEAN MouRoux. Translated by GEORGE
LAMB. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1954. Pp. 370. $5.00.
In the larger purpose which he has set for himself, the Abbe Mouroux
will surely be commended. It is his object to expound the sound and traditional teaching concerning the elements that constitute the Christian experience, those elements, that is, of the daily life of the ordinary Christian
whose presence gives him the assurance that he is truly living as a Christian, whose presence in himself provides the evidence he seeks in this life
that he will be found worthy in the next.
As the Abbe points out in his introduction, this kind of theology especially recommends itself to the modern mind. If men today are searching
primarily for experience, if they value that which can be grasped directly
as working within themselves, if experience is the test of all things, then
insofar as it can be rightly and safely accomplished, we-who must also
be all things to all men-should try to satisfy that craving. If it is the
subjective that today holds men's attention, let us introduce Christ to
men through the subjective. If in the subjective approach there are special
dangers to spiritual life, by all means let us carefully and accurately map
out, in the subjective, the lines of true development.
There are dangers in the subjective approach to religion, and first among
them is the danger of psychologism, the danger of making psychological
reactions the prime facts of evidence and the ultimate norms of judgment.
Alive to this danger the author never falls into, nor even slips towards, the
rim of the abyss. He intends, and he accomplishes his intention, to inquire
philosophically and theologically. In the terms of his own distinction, he is

BRIEF NOTICES

not inviting an empirical approach, which relies on the probative or manifestative force of some particular more or less intensely felt condition. He
relies on the experiential approach, which places the proof of Christian
life in a certain pattern of structured experience. This is indeed the traditional teaching in a new garb, with the addition of at least this much,
that, to the ordinary listing of the signs of a good life, there is introduced a
theological analysis of their intrinsic connections and their hierarchic
formation.
Opening his treatment with a discussion of the nature of religion and
of experience, and consequently of religious experience, the author quickly
faces into the problem of the very possibility of a knowledge of the Christian experience. The main difficulty here is, of course, that man does not
know if he be worthy of love or hatred, does not know whether or not he
has charity, and hence whether or not he has anything that can be called
Christian life. Threading his way along the traditional paths that theologians have cleared among the dogmatic definitions, he establishes his right
to talk about Christian experience, and proceeds to the absorbing question
of the knowability of faith. (This chapter is weakened by a too long,
too involved digression into Suarezian opinions-suitable for a textbook but
destructive of the smooth development that an expository book should try
to maintain.) So much comprises the first part of the book.
Having laid down his main lines of approach, the author begins to gather
evidence extensively, culling from the Gospel of St. Matthew, the Epistles
of St. Paul and the First Epistle of St. John. Finally, the mass
of data is re-presented, re-organized along those lines which will most
happily illustrate the nature of the " structured experience." So the Christian experience is seen to be an experience in the Church, in Christ and
within faith. Considerable space is devoted, and justifiably, to a long
analysis of the part that feeling or afiectivity must contribute to the
spiritual life.
For so much, then, we must commend-for the excellence of the intention, for the diligent collation of material, for the earnest and vigorous
effort to trace out the main lines of a theology of Christian experience. If
we must regret anything, it is only a certain inconsistency in exposition.
In places the book proceeds simply as a commentary or summary of the
works of others, ill places like a biblical theology, and in other places it
labors heavily to bring forth in obscure and involved language truths that
would sound better in simpler dress. It almost seems that the raw materials
of the book were not thoroughly digested. Comprehended they were, but
not enough to be released from the conditions of the original authors. This
is regrettable principally because it makes the book more difficult to read
than the subject warrants. And this is regrettable because there is so much
in the book that warrants reading.

BRIEF NOTICES

438

Presentation de la Somme Theologique. By A. BERNARD, 0. P. Avignon:
Maison Aubanel Pere, 1954. Pp. 168 with index. Fr. 600.
This little book was written to assist souls of good will to become intellectually aware of the great truths of Thomism, especially those found in
the Summa Theologiae. The details of doctrine are left to those who pursue
the scientific study of theology; here the author presents only the outstanding theses of Thomistic doctrine which are adapted to other levels of intellectual culture. The work of adaptation is difficult, of course, but it is
necessary for otherwise the doctrinal content of a truly great book remains
inaccessible to the general reader. Pere Bernard has as a model the work
of an outstanding theologian who was at the same time a great preacher,
the late Pere Janvier, who could draw from the rich wealth of scientific
matter in St. Thomas' treatise on Justice a series of six simple conferences
on Justice and Rights which he preached in Notre Dame de Paris.
In a facile presentation expressed in a graceful style the author presents
the Thomistic synthesis in four parts: an introduction which takes up the
nature of Theology and its relations to Faith, to Science and to the purely
rational sciences; a treatise on God Himself and as the origin of all; another
on man's return to God; and finally a consideration of our. Lord Jesus Christ
Who is the Way by which man returns to God.
While there is certainly no serious divergence from the thought of the
Angelic Doctor, one may justly complain about what has been left unsaid.
The .sketches of the virtues and gifts with their opposed vices are really
too brief for any genuine comprehension of the meaning of the Second Part;
especially distressing is the cursory treatment or even complete omission
of the potential parts of the cardinal virtl:les, which at times, according to
St. Thomas, are more important than the cardinal virtues themselves.
While one can appreciate that the motive of adaptation demands brevity,
there must be present in any digest sufficient incentive for the reader to
return to the source itself in order to drink more deeply from the fountains
of truth.
On the other hand, of course, the digest of its very nature should preclude the technicalities involved in the scientific study of theology. The
author does not completely escape this pitfall either, for, instead of simply
interpreting the mind of Saint Thomas on a controversial point, he sometimes gives more than is necessary or wise. Thus he raises the question of
the formal constituent of the Divine Essence, and instead of proposing his
own theory as more likely, that it is God's subsisting Being, he goes on to
explain that some Thomists propose the Divine Intelligence as the formal
constituent. Such matters ordinarily would be beyond the grasp of the
ordinary reader; they would certainly be of little or no interest, and might
easily prove confusing. Thus various interpretations and even the statement of a controversy are better left to mature students and specialists.

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BRIEF NOTICES

Nevertheless this little work is a good beginning. Such work continued
and perfected would certainly achieve a position of eminence in the library
of the general reader not only in Pere Bernard's own country, but in this
country, too, where we have already profited from the same kind of work
from the pen of the late Father Walter Farrell. Even members of the
clergy who are hindered by pressing parochial duties from long personal
studies may find in such simple digests a means of recalling to memory
their past theological studies and thus more fruitful nourishment for their
work of preaching the Word of God.

Philosophy of Law. By GEORGIO DEL VECCHIO. Translated by Rev. Dr.
THOMAS 0. MARTIN. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of
America Press, 1953. Pp. 474 with index. $6.50.
For the first time, " Lezioni di filosofia del diritto " by the well-known
neo-Kantian Professor of Legal Philosophy at the University of Rome has
been made available in English. Philosophy of Law is a very competent
translation of the eighth Italian edition. This excellent textbook was
intended primarily for lay readers and for those lawyers who are not experts
in this specialized field. Dr. Del Vecchio has organized the presentation
of the material in accordance with his definition of philosophy of law: "the
course of study which defines Law in the logical universality, seeks its
origins and the general characteristics of its historical development, and
evaluates it according to the idea of justice drawn from pure reason" (p. 4).
The author first discusses the concepts and functions of philosophy of
law, its relation to allied subjects (including theoretical and moral philosophy, psychology and sociology), and the methods of philosophy of law.
Next follows a very comprehensive history of philosophy of law from the
ancient Greeks to the present time. The author employs his neo-Kantian
philosophy in criticising and evaluating the writings and teachings of the
philosophers and would-be philosophers who pass in review before him.
Space limitations have necessarily caused a curtailed treatment of these
subjects, resulting at times in possibly misleading oversimplified or exiguous
presentation. However, despite these limitations this historical summary
alone will make worthwhile the use of this book by students of law and of
philosophy of law. Dr. Del Vecchio endeavors in the last half of his book
to give a thorough vindication of his neo-Kantian philosophy of law and a
refutation of the principal opposing schools.
The author's concepts of law might be gleaned from a few excerpts: Law
is " the objective coordination of possible actions between several subjects,
according to an ethical principle which determines them, excluding the
impediments thereto" (p.
"The source of Law, in general, is human

BRIEF NOTICES

435

nature, that is, the spirit that shines forth in individual consciences rendering them capable of comprehending, together with their own, the personality of others. From this source are deduced the immutable principles of
Justice, that is, of Natural Law" (p. 304). "By Positive Law we mean
that system of juridical norms which gives form to and regulates in fact the
life of a people at a particular period in history " (p. 305) • " The methods
of manifestation of the preponderant social will are called the sources of
Positive Law" (p. 306). "Natural Law ... is the criterion which permits
us to evaluate Positive Law and to measure its intrinsic justice" (p. 450).
With these criteria in mind, it is not surprising that Dr. Del Veechio concludes that "·even the unjust law is law, and that it must be studied and
and understood in its logical species, since it has the formal character of
juridicity [a logical form answering the question quid jus?], and it must be
analyzed in its causes, since, as Positive Law, it pertains to the series of
natural facts " (p. 447) . The State is defined by Dr. Del Vecchio as " the
subject of the will which lays down a juridical arrangement, or . . . the
subject of the juridical order, in which is verified the community of life
of a people" (p. 359).
In a well-written critical foreword Dr. Brendan Brown, sometime Dean
of the School of Law of the Catholic University of America, states that
" This book may well be hailed as one of the greatest books of all time
in its field." However, neither this evaluation nor the recollection of Cardinal Newman's definition of a university has laid to rest a question which
lingers uneasily in the mind of this critic: Is it wise to make available,
under Catholic auspices, to Catholic lawyers and students of the law,
most of whom are either poorly instructed or entirely lacking in knowledge
of scholastic philosophy, a 456 page book on the philosophy of law by an
admitted neo-Kantian philosopher with only a ten-page critique in the foreword to guard such untrained readers against the author's errors?

Sancti Tlwmae de Aquino Super Librum de Causis Expoaitio. Edited by
H. D. SAFFREY, 0. P. Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1954. Pp. 223 with
indexes. Fr. 1800.
When composing his earliest works Saint Thomas accepted the opinion
of the time that the Liber de Causis was a work of Aristotle. Yet even then
he seems to indicate his doubt by the use of the phrase ille qui librum illum
condidit; and finally, in his Expoaitio, written in 1272, he concluded that
the work had never existed in the Greek but had been translated into Latin
from the Arabic. Perhaps it was the vague differentiation that existed in
his time between the fine details of Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine that
occasioned his own commentary, since the Angelic Doctor certainly makes

486

BRIEF NOTICES

many profound observations regarding the relationships between these two
positions.
A work of primary importance to Saint Thomas in his study of the causes
of things was The Elements of Theology of Proclus, made available in a
trustworthy translation by William of Moerbeke, O.P. in rn6s. This work,
Neo-Platonic and eclectic, was obviously a major source for the unknown
author of the Liber de Causis, for Saint Thomas observes that all is contained much more fully in the work of Proclus.
With this in mind the importance of having a critical edition is obvious,
particularly for one studying the Platonic influence on the thought of St.
Thomas. In his exposition the Angelic Doctor constantly clarifies the position secundum Platonicos, the sententia Aristotelis, as well as the thought
of Proclus, and of " the author of this book." To those who feel that the
Platonic influence on St. Thomas is being overemphasized today, the occasional phrase secundum fidei doctrinam et Aristotelis will be read with an
enthusiasm that springs from a realization that Thomas is seeking truth and
not merely playing favorites. Only once does the fides ecclesiae part company with Aristotle and that on the question of the eternal movement of
the heavens as opposed to creation in time.
Even though the editor admits that his research was neither exhaustive
nor final, the critical work is exceptionally well done. The text is readable,
makes sense throughout, and a glance at the critical apparatus reveals
Father Sa:ffrey's good judgment in editing a difficult manuscript. The
introductory notes on the history of the text and on the relative roles
of Platonism and Aristotelianism are well worth careful study. This critical work from the University of Fribourg is a valuable text for the study
and utilization of a mature Thomist.

Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Convention. The Catholic Theological
Society of America, 1954. The Secretary c/o The Sign, Union City,
N. J. Pp. il64. $3.00.
This report on the papers and discussions of the Montreal Convention of
the Catholic Theological Society indicates broad interests on the part of
American theologians. The major paper, "Morality and Contemporary
Psychology" of Pere Noel Mailloux, 0. P., of the Institut de Psychologie
at Montreal University, discusses with rare success the problem of diminished imputability which psychiatry and the so-called new morality
have brought into sharper focus. In this brilliant summary of the major
points of contact between moral theology and psychology the caricature of
moral theology often assumed by psychiatrists and the proponents of a
more subjective morality is dismissed by the presentation of moral theology

BRIEF NOTICES

487

as it is, or at least, as it ought to be. This very positive approach is not
confined. to theology; the author i;l.oes not hesitate to offer the theologians
valuable empirical data which psychological studies have already produced
or may reasonably be expected to produce. Although the applications and
examples given in the original reading are absent in this formal paper,
there is such material here that the reader is encouraged to hope for further
work in this field from the pens of those who, retaining a sound and vital
theology, pursue psychological investigation.
Father Coyle, C. SS. R. presented an historical study of the development
of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception with special attention to the
major obstacles which inhibited the understanding and acceptance of the
dogma. Likewise historical for the most part was the study of the ecumenical movement among Protestants and schismatics given by Father Hanahoe,
S. A., although the final part of the paper concerned itself with the liceity
of Catholic participation in such activities as last year's Evanston meeting.
Two of the seminars raised rather important problems and reached something of a solution. Father Martin J. Healy canvassed the theological
qualification or systems of notes such as theologice certa and proxima ficlei
regularly appended to propositions by theologians. Probably the most important distinction of these notes made was one on the part of their source;
judicial notes express the judgment of the Church's magisterium while
doctrinal notes are those of private theologians. In view of the confusi:ig
diversity among the latter revealed by this seminar, besides the general
need of a special work on this problem, it will certainly be necessary that
theologians explain carefully the meaning of the notes they use, follow
that given meaning rigidly and explain the source of their judgment as to
this particular note. Father Gardiner, S. J., conducted another seminar on
the meaning of obscenity in order to give some workable generalization for
censors in their determination of the morality of particular books or pictures. While there was wide divergence in the two-hour discussion of the
problem, a descriptive definition was achieved. " The obscene is that which,
in its general tenor, invites or excites to illicit sexual passions by appeal to
the sensitive appetite." In the course of discussion, Father Gerald Kelly,
S. J., on whose work Father Garcfiner had .telied, offered a healthy caution
tO Catholic reviewers to beware " .least their presumed artistic appreciation
blunt their realization of the Il<tl'tll'alreaction of the n.ormal readet'."
A panel discussion by four th,eologians under the .Cha.irmand,ip of .Monsignor O'Conn0r ·<in infased eonterl'iplation as the ·nomtlil dewloptpent of
the life of grace
the virtues 1mfortunately did ·not live up ·to expectatrons. Once the chairman had set up the problem; the four theologians
de:veloped their own points of view
independently of one another.. In
one instance a speaker wandered off on a completely tangential line,.and in
another the line of development was taken from personal experience which

and

488

BRIEF NOTICES

made the question bog down in an empirical quagmire. Father Michael
Griffin, 0. C. D., however, gave a lengthy and interesting interpretation of
St. John of the Cross on the point, and the traditional arguments were
developed in meaningful brevity by Father J. R. Gillis, 0. P. It was unfortunate that the floor discussion was so limited because the problem
had been well stated and deserved airing. Perhaps a better arrangement
would give the speakers a second chance to offer rebuttal to the other
speakers. Certainly these papers as well as those of the entire convention
offered ample evidence of the vitality of current theology.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Aubert, Jean-Marie. Le Droit Romain dans L'Oeuvre de Saint Thomas.
Paris: Vrin, 1954. Pp. 164.
Aybar, Benjamin. El Realismo Intuitivo. Argentina: Universidad National
Tucman, 1954. Pp. 99.
Berdyaev, Nicholas. (tr. by Donald A. Lowrie). The Meaning of the Creative Act. New York: Harper, 1955. Pp. 344 with index. $4.00.
Biddle, W. Earl. Integration of Religion and Psychiatry. New York: Macmillan, 1955. Pp. 183 with index. $3.75.
Bouyer, Louis. Liturgical Piety. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University
Press, 1955. Pp. 294 with index. $4.75.
Buckler, 0. P., Reginald. The Perfection of Man by Charity. St. Louis:
Herder, 1955. Pp. 244. $3.50.
Calvetti, Carla. La Filosofia di Giovanni Calvino. Milan: Ed. " Vita e
Pensiero," 1955. Pp. 295. L. 1500.
Ciappi, 0. P., Luigi. La Predestinazione. Roma: Editrice Studium, 1955.
Pp. 190 with index.
Cronan, Edward P. The Dignity of the Human Person. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. Pp. 223 with index. $3.00.
Cunningham, 0.
Francis L.B. The Indwelling of the Trinity. Dubuque:
The Priory Press, 1955. Pp. 421 with index. $7.50.
Donceel, S. J., J. F. Philosophical Psychology. New York: Sheed & Ward,
1955. Pp. 376 with index. $4.50.
Elaide, Mircea. (tr. by Willard R. Trask.) The Myth of the Eternal Return. Bollingen Series XLVJ. New York: Pantheon, 1954. Pp. 206
with index. $2.75.
Eldarov, 0. F. M. Conv., Giorgio M. Presenza delta Teologia. Chaska,
Minn.: Bede's Book-Nook, 1955. Pp. 155 with index,
Esslinger, Wm. Politics and Science. New York: Philosophical Library,
1955. Pp. 178 with index. $3.00.
Freman tie, Anne. The Age of Belief. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1955. Pp.
218 with index. $2.75.
Gilby, Thomas. (tr.) St. Thomas Aquinas Theological Texts. New York:
Oxford, 1955. Pp. 441 with index. $3.50.
Gilson, Etienne & Others. Truth and the Philosophy of Teaching. The
McAuley Lectures, 1953. West Hartford: St. Joseph College, 1955.
Pp. 28.

Haller, Wm. Liberty and Reformation in the Puritan Revolution. New
York: Columbia University Press, l!M5. Pp. 425 with index. Pp.
$6.00.

439

440

BOOKS RECEIVED

Harding, Arthur L. Natural Law and Natural Rights. Studies in Jurisprudence, II. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1955. Pp.
106 with index. $3.00.
Horton, Walter M. Christian Theology: An Ecumenical Approach. New
York: Harper, 1955. Pp. 316 with index. $3.75.
Johann, S. J., Robert 0. The Meaning of Love. Westminster: Newman,
1955. Pp. 141 with index. $4.00.
Jurgensmeier, Friedrich. (tr. by Harriet G. Strauss.) The Mystical Body
of Christ. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1955. Pp. 400. $5.00.
Kelley, S. M., John J. Bergson's Mysticism. Dayton: Marianist Puhl.,
1955. Pp. 151. $2.50.
Lamb, George (tr.). Tolerance and the Catholic. New York: Sheed &
,Ward, 1955. Pp. 207. $3.50.
Lamont, Corliss. Soviet Civilization. New York: Philosophical Library,
1955. Pp. 477 with index. $5.00.
Leblanc, Hugues. An Introduction to Deductive Logic. New York: John
Wiley, 1955. Pp. 256 with index. $4.75.
McCann, C. S. B., Leonard A. The Doctrine of the Void. Toronto: Basilian
Press. Pp. 146.
MacDonald, Margaret (ed.). Philosophy and Analysis. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. Pp. 303. $7.50.
Mandelbaum, Maurice. The Phenomenology of Moral Experience. Glencoe:
The Free Press, 1955. Pp. 338 with indexes. $5.00.
Merton, Thomas. No Man is an Island. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955.
Pp. 287. $3.95.
Osborne, Harold. Aesthetics and Criticism. . New York: Philosophical
Library, 1955. Pp. 348 with index. $6.00.
Palmer, S.J., Paul F. Sources of Christian Theology, Vol. [.-Sacraments
and Worship. Westminster: Newman, 1955. Pp. 249 with index.
$4.75.

Patch, Howard R. & Others. Christian Humanism in Letters. The McAuley
Lectures, 1954. West Hartford: St. Joseph College, 1955. Pp. 67.
Patrick, Catherine. What is Creative Thinking? New York: Philosophical
Library, 1955. Pp. 221 with index. $3.00 .
.Philippe, 0. P., Paul. The Blessed Virgin and the Priesthood. Chicago:
Regnery, 1955. Pp. 82. $3.00.
Pike, James A. Doing the Truth. New York: Doubleday, 1955.. Pp. 192.
$2.95.

.

Redfield, Robert. The ·Education<i/,Experience. l,lasadena: The Fund ·for
Adult Education, 1955. Pp. 61.
.
Roberts, W. Rhys & Bywater, Ingram
The Rhetoric and the 'foetics
of Aristotle. New York: Modern Library, 1955. f»p. 811 with index.
$1.45,

BOOKS RECEIVED

441

Romein, Tunis. Education and Responsibility. Lexington: University of
Kentucky Press, 1955. Pp. 224 with index. $3.50.
Rosenberg, Max. Introduction to Philosophy. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1955. Pp. 502 with index. $6.00.
Ross, Sir David. Kant's Ethical Theory. New York: Oxford, 1954. Pp. 96.
$.80.
St. John, 0. P., Henry. Essays in Christian Unity. Westminster: Newman,
1955. Pp. 163. $3.00.
Suzuki, D. T. Studies in Zen. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955.
Pp.
with index. $4.75.
Swabey, l\Iarie C. Logic and Nature. 2nd ed. New York: New York University Press, 1955. Pp. 211. $3.75.
Tillich, Paul. The New Being. New York: Scribner's, 1955. Pp. 179.
$2.75.
Ulanov, Joan and Barry (trs.), The Last Essays of Georges Bernanos.
Chicago: Regnery, 1955. Pp. 269. $4.50.
White, Andrew D. A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in
Christendom. New York: Braziller, 1955. Pp. 508 with index. $5.00.