THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS:

THE DOMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JOSEPH
Publishers: The Thom.ist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

VoL.

XVIII

OCTOBER, 1955

No. 4

THE UNITIVE PRINCIPLE OF MARIAN
THEOLOGY

B

EFORE the end of the last century there were very few
theological works treating all of Marian Theology as a
separate unit. The Spanish Jesuit, Father Bover, writes
that the definition of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception
was the signal for a tremendous growth not only of Marian
piety, but also the Mariological science.1
Previous to this period of Mariological history, doctrines
concerning the Blessed Virgin were usually treated as an
integral part of Christology. Also a great deal of theological
literature was devoted to particular Marian problems, such as
the Immaculate Conception. A few exceptions are to be found,
for instance, the Mariological writings of St. Albert the Great
and St. Bonaventure, but as a general rule the exclusively
Mariological works came into being at the begining of this
1

Bover, S. J., Sinteais organica de la Mariologia, p. S.

443

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PAUL MAHONEY

century. This, being the age of specialization, such a development is quite understandable. Theological specialization is
rather common today; this is the age of Mariology, Ecclesiology
and other such special studies of doctrine.
With this development of Mariology, the theologians have
naturally attempted to build the tract as an organic whole.
Consequently the problem of a primary Mariological principle
has been of great concern to the Marian theologian. The
prime principle is the foundation and the unifying element of
any systematic and scientific treatment of a subject. Science,
we must remember, is not a mere collection of facts, but rather
it is the organization of these facts into an intelligible whole,
the indication of a relation of one fact upon another. In Theology the positive theologian may be quite content to find the
facts in the sources of revelation, but the speculative theologian
demands that a logical order be established among these facts
of faith. So quite naturally the speculative Mariologist has
sought a prime principle for his tract.
Some have asserted that there is no one prime principle in
Mariology, rather the whole tract can be reduced to two irreducible principles; the Divine Maternity and Mary's association
in the Redemptive activity of her Son.2 Yet, others claim that
one Marian doctrine or the other serves the purpose of a
primary principle. Some of these propose the doctrine of the
New Eve, which is a biblical-patristic analogy indicating Mary's
association in the Redemption. The vast majority, who hold to
but one Mariological principle, favor the Divine Maternity as
the seminal and fundamental doctrine of the tract.
We do not intend to examine in detail each of these opinions,
but rather to seek out the principles of solution for the problem.
However, there are certain necessary points that must be first
looked into: namely, the nature of Mariology, its relation to
Theology and the nature of a theological principle. Once having
arrived at the principles of solution, we will consider the two
principal Marian doctrines in the light of these principles.
• Roschini, Mariologia, tom. I, pp. 324-337. Father Roschini gives a complete
p1·esentation of all the opinions offered in solution of the problem.

THE UNITIVE PRINCIPLE

1. THE NATURE

OF MARIAN THEOLOGY

445

OF MAru:OLOGY

According to the classic Aristotelian-Thomistic method of
arriving at the knowledge of the nature of a subject, one must
proceed from the more known to the less known. Thus time
and time again in the Summa Theologiae the Angelic Doctor
begins his investigation of a subject with its nominal definition
and ends with the real definition. ,Having established the real
definition, he points out the logical consequences which necessarily follow. This is the method which we will here utilize in
the investigation of t4_e nature of Mariology.
The word, Mariology, quite obviously is derived from the
Their latin equivalents are
Greek words: Ma.p£a and
Maria and sermo, and in English, Mary and discourse. An
investigation of these two words will shed much light upon the
nature of Mariology.
First, let us see why the notion of discourse is found in our
subject. In its first sense,
sermo or discourse means
simply the spoken word. It is that oral sound signifying
thought. In the course of time philosophers applied the word,
to that which these oral intelligible sounds signified,
namely, the mental word or concept. The word has been even
further extended to signify not merely one concept, but judgments, which are composed of concepts. Discourse, further,
has come to mean an orderly intelligible series of judgments.
The
of Mari,ology, then, signifies knowledge of some kind
concerning the Blessed Virgin. Is this, however, the knowledge
that the ordinary faithful have of her: knowledge that she is
the Mother of God, immaculately conceived and our Mother
also? This is the knowledge that comes from faith and it is
within the reach of the simplest of minds. The suffix logy,
signifies more than that; it has always implied an orderly
logical knowledge of facts. In other words, it is scientific knowledge as opposed to vulgar knowledge. Mariology, then, is a
science, the science of the Mother of God.
Granting the scientific character of Mariology, the next
logical step is to inquire whether it is an independent, but

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PAUL MAHONEY

subordinated, science, or is it a part of a science? Ordinarily we
do not find the suffix, 'logy, attached to proper names. We do
not commonly find courses, such as Caesarology, Napoleonology, W ashingtonology or Lincolnology, offered on the curricula
of the Universities. These are individual persons of history.
Biographies have been written about them and scholars have
studied their lives, but most scholars recognize that these
studies are not independent sciences. Rather, they are parts
of the science of History. Although we do find the terms,
Mariology and Christology, we cannot say that they signify
independent autonomous sciences. Science is about the universal and the necessary; the humanity of Christ and Mary,
although exalted, is still singular and contingent. Since
Mariology is not an independent science, it must be a part of
some other science. Is this science history? It is quite conceivable that Mary the Virgin could be the object of historic
investigation and in fact she has been. But the limiting of
Mariology to the status of historic science is patently inadequate. Mariology deals with realities that are over and above
history. The lives of Jesus and His mother are historical facts
(of that there can be no doubt), yet historical research falls
short of giving us a knowledge of the most important factors of
their lives. Relying solely upon history we know that a certain
Jesus of Nazareth was born of a woman, called Mary, and that
this man died the death of a slave. It fails, however, to inform
us that this man was not a human person, but divine; that
consequently His mother is truly the Mother of God, conceived
without sin and assumed bodily into heaven. There is something more here than history; mystery is here, mystery that
can be known, thanks only to faith. The basis for this science
is the supra-historical my.st.eries of faith, therefore, Mariology
must be related in some way to the science, whose principles
are the mysteries of faith, that science being the science of
Theology.
Mariology is related to Theology as a part is related to its
whole. St. Thomas distinguishes three types of wholes: the
universal whole, which has subjective parts; the integral whole

THE UNITIVE PRINCIPLE

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447

with its integral parts; and the potential whole with its potential parts. 3 The universal whole is said to be in each and
every one of its parts according to its whole nature and according to all its power. Thus animality is found totally in both
man and horse. Are the parts of Theology related in this
manner to Theology itself? Is Theology a universal whole,
having subjective parts, like the relation of mathematics to
arithmetic and geometry? To answer in the affirmative would
be to destroy the unity of Theology, because a science, related
to another science, as a subjective part to its whole, has a
formal object different from the objects of the other parts of
the whole and of the whole itself. St. Thomas is insistent that
Theology has but one formal object, namely, God precisely
considered under the aspect of His divinity. 4 Mariology, consequently, is not a subjective part of Theology.
If it is not a subjective part of Theology, can we assert that
it is related to Theology as a potential part? "The potential
whole," writes St. Thomas, " is present to each of its parts in
its complete essence, but not in all its power " (De SpirituaUbus
Creaturis, a. 2, ad 2). The Angelic Doctor's classic example
of this type of whole is the human soul with respect to its
vegetative, sensitive and intellective functions (I, q. 76, a. 8;
q. 77, a. I, ad I). The whole soul is active in each of these
functions; yet, its complete power is not active in each, e.g.,
in the function of vegetation, the soul's sense and intellective
powers play no part. The human soul, a single form, is able
to exercise the operations proper to the vegetative soul, those
peculiar to a sensitive soul and the operations proper to it
inasmuch as it is rational and intellective. This form includes
within itself a multiplicity of operations. Theology, too, is a
potential whole and its potential parts are the various activities
and functions, which it exercises in reference to its object.* In
•Summa Theol., II-II, q. 48, a. 1.
'Ibid., I, q. 1, a. 7.
* F. Muniz, 0. P., The. Work of Theology, (trans. John P. Reid, 0. P., Washington: The Thomist Press, 1958, p. 7.) Note: This comparison of Theology to the
soul does not of course in any way imply that Theology and the soul are the same
sort of whole. The former has the unity proper to a sapiential habit; the latter has
a unity proper to a substantial form.

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PAUL MAHONEY

this manner Theology explains its principles, def ends them and
from them it deduces conclusions. Each function is truly theological, containing the whole essence of Theology; yet, no
theological function exhausts the entire power of Theology. In
this sense of the whole-part relation we cannot say that Mariology is a part of Theology, since all these functions are used
in Mariology. The Mariologist, for instance, explains, defends
and deduces with reference to the Divine Maternity. In passing, let us note that this type of whole-part relation is the basis
for the division of Mariology into Biblical Mario'logy (the
discovery of Mary in the Scripture), Patristic Mario'logy (the
Marian doctrine in Tradition), Scholastic Mariology (the explanation and defense of the principles of Mariology and the
deduction of conclusions from these principles).
The only remaining explanation of the relation of Mariology
to Theology is the relation of the integral part to the integral
whole. The integral whole is not in each and every one of its
parts either according to its whole nature or according to its
entire power. It is rather the result of the coalition of all the
parts taken together. Thus the essence and power of a house
is only had in the actual conjunction of all its parts and it is
not found in any one of these parts or any number of them,
taken separately. Is science so constructed? Although science
is one and simple as a habit, nevertheless its material object
is multiple. Its material object is the aggregate of all those
things that can be considered under the formality of its formal
object. Theology is concerned about an almost infinite number
of material objects, which constitute a certain total object, i. e.,
everything that is revealed. Thus we have the basis for the
division of Theology into tracts, v. g., concerning the One God,
concerning the Trinity, concerning the Redemptive Incarnation, etc. Mariology is one of these tracts; it is an integral part
of Theology. To remove it from Theology would be like removing a hand from the human body. The hand is useless
disconnected from the body; so too is Mariology of no avail
removed from Theology. Why is this study part of Theology?
It is a part of Theology only because the immediate subject

THE UNITIVE PRINCIPLE

OF MARIAN THEOLOGY

449

matter is related in a unique way to God, the proper subject
of Theology. 5
Establishing the fact that Mariology is an integral part of
Theology, we have been led to the immediate object of the
tract. The suffix, logy, has expressed the connection of this
tract with the science of Theology; while the main stem of
the word, Jfori, expresses the immediate material object of this
portion of Theology. The Virgin Mary is a person about whom
many things are revealed by God through Scripture and Tradition. A problem, which arises, concerning the proper object
of this theological tract can be expressed in the question: why
must there be a theological tract on the Blessed Virgin, when
other persons in Holy Scripture are not so treated. The solution
to the problem is found in a principle of St. Thomas" ... the
more a thing approaches the true nature of divinity, the more
especially should it be considered in this science." 6 Since
Mariology deals with that human person, who was related to
God as a mother, the very closest relationship possible, then we
must conclude that outside the tracts on God and the humanity
of Christ, Mariology is the most important of the theological
tracts. It is important and its importance springs from the
fact of her close relationship to God. The relationship of any
material object of a theological tract to the Divinity is the
only reason for the being of that tract. Thus Mariology considers Mary under the precise formality of her relationship
to God. The expression of this unique relation is the first
principle of the tract.
In summary let us define Mariology as that integral part of
Theology which treats of the Blessed Virgin Mary under the
formality of her unique relationship to God. Before ending
this discussion on the nature of Mariology, we must explicate
that which is U:nplicit in the definition.
Since Mariology is not an independent science, but a part
of Theology, then it has not only a scientific character, but
•I Sent., q. 1, prolog., a. 4.
• . . . quanto aliquid magis accedit ad veram rationem Divinitatis, principalius
consideratur in hac scientia. Ibid.

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PAUL MAHONEY

also a sapiential character. Theology is not just a science;
rather it is a science which is at the same time wisdom. 1 There
are three speculative intellectual virtues: Wisdom, Understanding and Science. The object of understanding is the
principles of knowledge, while science is concerned with conclusions. 8 In a more eminent manner wisdom is concerned
with the objects of both and thus in a certain sense includes
both. Wisdom, then, has two diverse functions: 1) to explain
and defend principles, and 2) to infer conclusions. The application of this to Mariology is summarized schematically as
follows:

The functions of Scholastic Mariology.

in regard to the
principles of faith
concerning Macy.
(Sapiential work)

to explain
these

by analogy with
nature.
by indicating their
interrelation.
by indicating their
relation to the
ultimate end of
man.•

to defend these principles
of faith.

in regard to
conclusions-to deduce these from the
principles (Scientific Work).

Mariology, being part of Theology, has the same objects as
Theology. The material object of this tract is all revelation
concerning the Blessed Virgin Mary. The formal object quod
is Mary's relationship to God, since the formal object of Theology is God precisely as He is God. The formal object quo
(i.e., the light by which these truths are attained) is the light
of natural reason under the positive direction of faith. 10 Since
the objects of Mario logy are the same as those of Theology,
'Summa Theol., I, q. 1, a. 6.
8 Ibid.
•Council of the Vatican, session iii, cap. 4 (Denzinger 1796.)
10 Muii.iz, op. cit., p. 22.

THE UNITIVE PRINCIPLE

OF MARIAN THEOLOGY

451

it would be much better to give this tract the title of Marian
Theology. For the name, Mariology, is misleading, inasmuch
as it seems to imply an independent science with distinct
objects. Its use is permissible only if its relation to Theology
as part to whole is always kept in mind. Its object is the
same as that of Theology, indeed it is Theology dealing with
Mary, consequently its principles are theological. This leads
us to the next prenote.
THEOLOGICAL

PRINCIPLES

St. Thomas, following the lead of Aristotle, defines a principle
as that from which another proceeds in any manner. 11 Obviously this is an analogical term (by reason of analogy of proper
proportionality), since a principle of quantitative measurement
(e.g., the first point of a line), a principle of becoming, a
principle of being and a principle of knowledge are realities
simply different and only proportionally alike. Our concern
here is centered about the principle of knowledge.
Truth is found in the judgment and therefore a principle 0£
knowledge is a judgment externally expressed through a proposition. However, not all propositions are principles. Only those
propositions may be called principles, from which other truths
proceed. Such propositions are of two types: those which are
necessary for all human thought and those which belong to a
science. The former are called common principles and the latter
proper principles. Everyone, who has the use of reason, at
least in exercise makes use of the common principles of knowledge. Presupposed to all our thinking are such propositions as
" nothing can be and not be at the same time and under the
same aspect"; "everything must have a sufficient reason for
its being," etc. Since we are dealing v.-ith the question of the
principle 0£ a scientific tract, the proper principles of a science
are our concern.
Proper principles are propositions productive of conclusions
in a science. In any science an order exists between such
11

Summa Theol., I, q. SS, a. 1.

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PAUI, MAHONEY

principles, thus we have the first proper principle of a science
and secondary proper principles. The secondary principles are
conclusions in regard to the prime principle, which in its turn
may be the conclusion of the principles of another science, but
in its own order it must be indemonstrable.
What proposition holds such an eminent position in a
science? St. Thomas tells us that it is the proposition which
expresses "what a thing is" (" quod quid est") .12 The definition of the subject of a science is the first principle in that
science. The definition of a thing expresses its essence, which
is its first constitutive element in the substantial order, that
by which the thing is distinguished from all else and finally the
foundation or root of all its other perfections. For instance, the
first proper principle of Theology is to be
in the fourth
article of the third question of the first part of the Summa. In
this article we find the assertion that God is His own existence,
which is equivalent to saying that He is Pure Act. According
to our knowledge this is an expression of what God is; it is
our feeble definition of Him.
We find a very enlightening statement of St. Thomas in
the Secunda-Secttndae about theological principles. He asserts
that the articles of faith are the proper principles of Theology. 13
The very first, " I believe in God " indicates the unity of God,
the unity of His essence and His existence in the supernatural
order. This is the first principle of Theology, as we explained
above. The articles of faith are the proper principles of Theology; they are the definitions of the various material objects,
which are united through a common relationship to God.
Properly to understand the function of these principles, let us
examine them as they are in the sapiential office of Theology
and then in its scientific office.
The sapiential office of Theology is twofold: it is defensive
and explicative. When Theology defends the articles of faith,
it makes use of principles that spring from the light of natural
reason. Certainly no attempt is made to demonstrate matters
12
13

Ill Cont. Gent., c. 97.
Summa Theol., II-II, q. 1, a. 7.

THE UNITIVE PRINCIPLE

OF MARIAN THEOLOGY

458

of faith, but principles of reason are used to refute all the
possible objections that can be brought to bear against faith.
This is a unique characteristic of a sapiential science; it rightly
uses inferior sciences in defense of its own principles. In defensive Theology, consequently, the proper principles of the
science play a passive role; they are defended.
The explicative function of theological wisdom is performed
in a threefold manner. First, the individual principle is explained; second, its logical connection with the other principles
is sought; finally, its relation to man's ultimate end is elucidated.
In the first case the proper theological principles are explained, not so that they become evident, for then they would
no longer be of faith, but rather through the use of analogy
with natural things the precise meaning of the terms of the
proposition are understood (more in a negative sense, rather
than positive), so that we know precisely what is the mystery.
In other words, the terms are negatively understood, while the
connection between them is unseen.
In connection with this sapiential function of Theology, we
must not neglect the fact that many of the articles of faith
express facts, which are above nature and at the same time
are established by God's free choice. That the Word became
:flesh lacks absolute necessity; it is only hypothetically necessary, presupposing the ordination of the Divine Will. In
relation to created things, even in the supernatural order, God
can be compared to an artist, and the creature is His handiwork. Thus an article of faith, which expresses a fact of a
supernatural reality, includes within itself all the circumstances,
particularly the circumstances of purpose, as established by
divine ordination. Thus the article of faith, which expresses the
Incarnation, does not stand for the abstract· notion of the
Incarnation of God, which could be applied equally as well to
all sorts of possible Incarnations of God, but rather for the
Redemptive-Incarnation, which God actually willed. Therefore, the proper principles of those theological tracts, that deal
with supernatural objects, are to be understood in the concrete

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PAUL MAHONEY

order in which God willed them. The importance of this point
will become evident as we proceed further.
The explicative function of Theology is also perfected
through the interconnection of the theological principles. In
this particular function it is a question of the logical sequence
of one article of faith after another. The question quite
naturally arises, how an article of faith can be a conclusion
and also a principle. There is no contradiction here, because it
would be a conclusion of a superior theological tract and still
the first proper principle of its own. This interconnection of
the articles of faith is achieved through argumentation, which
is twofold: arguments of metaphysical necessity and arguments
of convenience. The conclusions of the former are strict theological conclusions, while the conclusions of the latter are only
probable. An example of the first type is the argument which
proceeds from Christ's human nature to the existence of a
human will in our Savior in virtue of the principle that a human
will is a necessary property of human nature. The important
point to note is that this conclusion is itself found in revelation
and therefore is of faith. Thus we have two matters of faith
being connected by an apodictic argument. Matters of faith
can also be connected by reason of arguments of convenience
or fittingness; indeed among the contingent matters of faith
very often this is the only connection possible. Arguments of
convenience of themselves produce probable conclusions. From
the revealed fact of Mary's cooperation in the acquisition of
grace we could argue from convenience that like the humanity of
her Son she is a physical instrumental cause of the production
of grace in the individual soul.14 Unless it can be shown that
this conclusion is revealed in Scripture or Tradition (in this
particular case most theologians deny that it is) , then the
conclusion remains at best probable. However, when we argue
through convenience from one matter of faith to another, then
the conclusion is probable by reason of the argument, but
"Cf. Roschini, op. cit., tom. II, pp.
Here Father Roschini treats the
proofs (scriptural, traditional and from papal authority) for the fact of Mary's
cooperation in the acquisition of grace.

THE UNITIVE PRINCIPLE

OF MARIAN THEOLOGY

455

certain by reason of revelation. Should Theology even bother
with such argument? The master theologian, St. Thomas, constantly makes use of them in the Summa and we should
suspect, therefore, that the argument of fittingness is a valid
theological instrument. Remembering that Theology is " faith
seeking understanding," to use Augustine's terminology, we
must admit that it is the theologian's duty to establish the
interconnection between matters of faith, whether by arguments of necessity or convenience. Arguments of fittingness are
essential instruments in the performance of the sapiential work
of Theology. In such arguments there it a real procession from
principle to conclusion. The articles of faith used in such arguments are truly theological principles.
The explicative function of Theology is perfected finally by
means of ordering the principles of faith to man's ultimate end.
The order to be found in the Summa Theologiae is a perfect
example of this. " Since the principal purpose of this sacred
doctrine," says the Angelic Doctor in his introduction to th0
second question of the First Part of the Summa, " is to lead
to a knowledge of God, not only as He is in Himself, but also
as He is the principle of all things and their end, especially of
the rational creature, we intend to expose this doctrine, I) by
treating of God, 2) of the motion of the rational creature to
God, 8) of Christ, who according to His humanity, is the way for
us to reach God." Thus Thomistic Theology involves a knowledge of God, as He is in Himself and as He is the Alpha and
Omega of all creatures, particularly the rational creature. A
procession of creatures start out from the tract on Creation
and these creatures find their end in the tract on the Last
Things. In the function of interconnecting the principles of
Theology, our attention was directed more to the instrinsic
nature of each mystery, whereby we sought to see the dependence of one upon the other. In this function of relating the
mysteries to the ultimate end we look rather to the ultimate
purpose of these mysteries expressing supernatural realities,
rather than their inner natures.
The scientific office of Theology produces the theological

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PAUI.

conclusion, strictly so-called. The theological mind must draw
out what is virtually contained in the articles of faith. The
arguments used in this function are metaphysical arguments,
producing theological certitude ' concerning the conclusions.
Here- we apply reason to faith, not so much for the purpose
of understanding the proper principles of Theology, but rather
to give birth to new truths which are virtually contained within
them.
Having seen the use of theological principles in each function
of Theology, let us now turn to the subject of our discussion.
3. THE FmsT PRINCIPLE

OF MAm:oLOGY

From the aforesaid we can lay down certain conditions that
must be verified of the first Mariological principle. From revelation we can find many propositions about the Blessed Virgin,
either formally or virtually contained therein. Among these we
must find one that is the first. This principle must be:
1. Formally reveal,ed. This is so because the first principle

must be the most certain of all the propositions of the tract.
The -highest degree of certitude in Theology comes from the
authority of faith; thus this principle must be de fide.
2. A definition (or a quasi definition) of the subject of the
tract. This is evident from the nature of the scientific method.
The first scientific step is to seek through observation the
definition of the subject under consideration. Once it is found,
then through deduction one proceeds to its properties. The
first principle is not demonstrated, at least not in its own order,
for definition is the product not of demonstration, but rather of
observation. Therefore, the first principle of a science is the
definition of the formal object of that science. In our case· it
will be a quasi definition 1 since, being the primary principle of
a theological tract, it must express that primary, distinct relationship of our Lady to God. Thus it will not be that which
specifies her in the natural order, but rather in the supernatural
order.
3. The source of al,l other judgments concerning Mary. Thi!!

THE UNITIVE PRINCIPLE

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457

follows from the very nature of principle itself. A cognitive
principle is that from which another proceeds in the order of
knowledge and thus a first principle must be that from which
all other propositions come. In regard to this condition it is
important to remember that the first principle of Mariology,
being a theological principle, will be the source of all others not
only through arguments of metaphysical certitude, but also by
means of arguments of physical and moral certitude. As was
explained previously, the sapiential character of Theology
makes use of arguments of fittingness (i. e., physical and moral
arguments). In Mariology, then, the first principle will be
directly linked through such arguments to the other cardinal
principles of the tract (which are certain by reason of faith)
and indirectly to the conclusions flowing from these principles.
In the light of these principles of solution let us now consider
the various theories, proposed by 1\fariologists, in regard to this
question.
4.

THE DuAL PRINCIPLE THEORY

Chief among the proponents of the " dual principle " theory
is the ]ate Father Bittremieux of Louvain University. His
position is presented in his Mariological text and in two magazine articles. 15 Briefly his arguments are the following.
1. The notion of mother and that of associate are fonnal1y
distinct and therefore two fundamental principles are in order
in Marian Theology.
2. The existence of two fundamental principles in Mariology
has a perfect parallel in Christology, in which the propositions:
" Christ is God " and " Christ is Redeemer " serve as two
fundamental i:r:reducibleprinciples for the whole science.
3. " A principle, if it is fundamental, ought to be most
firm and not merely one of convenience," but the Divine
Maternity demands Mary's association in the Redemption only
by reason of convenience. Therefore, it cannot serve as the
15 Bittremieux, Marialia, Brussels, 1936, pp. 16-ft9; "De Principio Supremo Mariologiae," Ephemerides Theologiae Lovanienses, VII, (1931) !M9-Wl; ibid., XIl,

(1935)' 607-609.

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PAUL MAHONEY

only fundamental principle of Marian Theology; consequently
we must resort to two principles.
Father Bittremieux was one of the most eminent Mariologists of our age; consequently his arguments deserve our respectful consideration. The premise of the first argument can
be denied by none and is, in fact, explicitly admitted by the
opponents of his theory. This distinction between motherhood
and association is of vital importance in Mariology, since it is
all too easy to .reduce Mary's Compassion, the central act of
her Association, to a mere mother's sorrow caused by the
suffering of her son. True, this is involved in it, yet, if we
neglect the fact of her office of Associate, the efficacy of her
Compassion is entirely missed. Bittremieux dearly saw this
and so insisted upon the distinction to the extent of dividing
Mariology into two distinct tracts. We humbly suggest that
he went too far by reason of this distinction. To be the Mother
of God the Redeemer is not formally the same as being the
Associate of the Redeemer; nevertheless, can we not say that
the second is virtually contained in the first and
related to
the first as to a principle? We feel that Bittremieux's mistake
consisted in the confusion of the implicit presence of one thing
in another with virtual presence. A conclusion need not be
implicitly contained in its principle (i.e., actually present); it
is sufficient that it be present virtually (i. e., as in its cause) .
An analogy to this exists in Natural Philosophy, in which we
admit the distinction between the faculties of the soul and the
soul itself and yet assert that these same faculties come from
the soul as from a root, a source and a principle. Admitting,
therefore, Father Bittremieux's premise, namely the distinction
between mother and associate, we feel obliged to deny his conclusion, that is, the necessity of two Mariological principles.
His second argument is a confirmation of the first. Christology is divided into two distinct parts dependent upon two
irreducible principles. Most theologians consider first the
person of Christ and then His work. " Cannot the authority of
St. Thomas," he asks, " be invoked; in the Third Part of the

THE UNITIVE PRINCIPLE

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459

Summa he first considers the person of Christ and then after
this considers those things which Christ .did and suffered? " 18
At first glance this argument. seems very convincing. Yet
a closer examination of the Third Part of the Summa will show
that a unity of principle does exist in Thomistic Christology.
St. Thomas lays down this principle, which is the foundation
of the whole tract, in the very first question, where he treats
of the motive of the Incarnation. He there shows that this
Incarnation is redemptive. Further, the principle that Christ
is Redeemer is used in the first section, for example, in the
question treating of the defects of Christ's body. "It was
fitting for the body assumed by the Son of God to be subject
to human in:fumities and defects . . . first, because it was in
order to satisfy for the sin of the human race, that the Son
of God, having taken flesh, came into the world" (III, q. 14,
a. I) . Also the divinity of Christ is used by the Angelic Doctor
to explain the efficacy of Christ's passion, since His condign
merit presupposes as a principle His theandric acts, which flow
from His divine personality. St. Thomas' Christology is not
based upon two irreducible principles. Rather, it enjoys a unity
of principle, based upon the Redemptive Incarnation. Far
from being a confirmation of Father Bittremieux's theory, the
Angelic Doctor can be invoked as a refutation of it.
The third argument offered by the eminent Louvain theologian is based upon his insistence that the consequence between principle and conclusion must be of necessity and not
merely of convenience. Father Bittremieux felt that the argument of fittingness is by nature weak. If Theology were merely
a science, then we would be obliged to foJlow his lead in this.
However, as we insisted in the earlier pages, Theology is not
only scientific but also sapiential. Therefore, the necessary link
between the Divine Maternity and Mary's Redemptive Association, which flows from the highest Principle, through His
eternal decree, cannot be ignored by Theology. We feel that
Father Bittremieux has excessively limited theological argu16

Loe. cit.

2

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PAUL MAHONEY

mentation; indeed we believe he has overlooked in this instance
the sapiential character of Theology.
As was indicated at the beginning of this article those theologians who hold for a single Mariological prime principle are
divided as to which doctrine fulfills this office. Some assert
that the doctrine of the New Eve is primary in Mariology;
while others place the Divine Maternity in this position.
5. THE NEW EVE PRINCIPLE

The New Eve doctrine has a Scriptural origin in the Woman
of Genesis, in St. Luke's account of the Annunciation and in
the Pauline doctrine of the New Adam. Its original development is by St. Justin, Tertullian and St. Irenaeus. A full
explication of this doctrine, however, is only now in 'the process
of development. Briefly we can express it in the following
proposition: what Eve lost for the human race by reason of her
cooperation with the sin of Adam, Mary regained through her
cooperation with the redemptive activity of Christ, the New
Adam. This antithetical parallelism is the scriptural-traditional
expression of Mary's mediatory office. Since Mary's mediatory
activity is certainly an object for the consideration of Mariologists, this principle is of the greatest importance in Marian
Theology. Indeed, the tremendous growth of Marian Theology
is a direct effect of the labors of theologians with reference to
this principle. Without it Mary's mediation would be for us a
confused and nebulous notion. However, even granting its importance in Mariology, we feel that it cannot be accepted as
the prime principle in the tract. We propose the following three
reasons in support of our position.
1. The first principle of Mariology must be a truth which
enjoys the greatest certitude, that is, it must be formally revealed. Is the New Eve doctrine such? The very most we
can say about this doctrine in the order of certitude is that
it is proximate to faith. As yet the Church has not exercised
its extraordinary magisterium with reference to it. Granting
that someday it may be defined, its certitude is still dependent

THE UNITIVE PRINCIPLE

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461

upon the Divine Maternity. This is true both in its Scriptural
and patristic arguIQ.ents. As we noted previously, its Scriptural
foundations are in Genesis, St. Luke's Gospel and in St. Paul,
It seems to us that the keystone of these three is Luke's
narrative of the Annunciation. The Woman of Genesis and St.
Paul's New Adam are meaningless as far as the New Eve goes,
except in the light of the Annunciation. Quite obviously the
primary truth contained in the Annunciation is the fact of
Mary's motherhood. Looking to the context of the New Eve
of St. Justin, Tertullian and St. Irenaeus 17 in each instance we
discover that these Fathers are talking primarily about the
Divine Maternity. Since, then, the New Eve doctrine is dependent upon the Divine Maternity for its certitude, we cannot
accept it as the prime doctrine of Mariology.
2. The first principle of Mariology must be a quasi definition
of Mary in the supernatural order. Now a definition should
express the static element rather than the functional element.
The most obvious thing about the New Eve doctrine is its
concern with Mary's operation. The Divine Maternity, on the
other hand, expresses Mary's place in the order of supernatural
being. The New Eve doctrine relates Mary to the redemptive
activity of her Son; while the Divine Maternity establishes her
place in the hypostatic order. The New Eve doctrine, then,
lacks that static element which is necessary for the first prin·
ciple of Marian Theology.
3. The prime Marian principle must be the source of all
other Mariological truths. Now, since Mary's association is in
the order of activity and the Divine Maternity in the order of
being, we must conclude that the second is the source of the
first, inasmuch as action follows beirig. It is true that in the
cognitive order we do proceed from action to being, but this is
by way of invention. Cognitive invention is not a procession
from principle to conclusion, rather it is the seeking after the
principles of a· science. The product of
invention is
11 Mignc PG vol. 6, col. 710 (Saint Justin), PL vol. 2, col. 827 (Tertullian), PG
vol. 7, col. 958 (Saint Irenaeus) .

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PAUL MAHONEY

the prime principle. Even though, by way of invention, we
may use the New Eve doctrine to understand fully the Divine
Maternity, nevertheless, it would be erroneous to assert that
Mary's assocation is thereby the principle of the Divine Maternity. The right scientific order is to proceed from the first
principle, which has been established by way of invention, to
the properties of this principle. This is the deductive process
and its starting point is the first principle. On these three
counts, therefore, we believe that the New Eve doctrine must
be rejected as the solution to our problem.
6.

THE DIVINE MATERNITY

The Divine Maternity does seem to fulfill perfectly all the
conditions necessary for the first principle. At the outset let
us precisely define what is meant by the Divine Maternity. It
is that relationship of Mary to the Second Person of the Trinity
that arose due to her generation of His human nature. The
principles of faith express reai facts, thus we are not restricting
this principle to the abstract notion of Divine Maternity, but
rather we are considering this relation as it exists in the concrete
order of redemption. The principle, thus considered, can be
expressed in the following proposition: Mary is the Mother
of God the Redeemer as such. She is the mother of that divine
person who became incarnate for the precise purpose of redeeming mankind.
This principle has the certitude of faith. Implicitly it is
found in those passages of Scripture that assert the facts that
Mary is the mother of Christ and that Christ is God the
Redeemer. It is contained in the Fathers and was defined by
the Church in 481 A. D. at the Council of Ephesus. 18 It fulfills,
therefore, to an eminent degree the demand of certitude that
must be found in a first principle.
This principle is, moreover, a definition of Mary's place in
the supernatural order. A definition is that which expresses
the proper· element of the defined; it is that element by which
1•

Denzinger, Enchiridion aymbolorum, n. 118.

THE UNITIVE PRINCIPLE

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468

the defined is distinguished from all other beings in the same
order. In the supernatural order the genus of any definition
will be relationship to God and the specific difference will be
the type of relationship involved, since the dignity and distinction of creatures in this order is dependent upon their reference
to God. The relation of mother, terminated by the divine
person of the Word, establishes her primum esse in the supernatural order and distinguishes Mary from all other creatures.
The Divine Maternity, concretely considered, is the theological
definition of the subject of our tract; consequently it is its
first principle.
Finally the Divine Maternity is the source and root of all of
Mary's privileges. The truth of this assertion becomes clear,
when we view Mariology in its proper theological setting. St.
Thomas tells us that all the articles of faith are reducible to
two. " All the articles of faith are contained implicitly in
certain primary matters of faith, such as God's existence and
His providence over the salvation of men .... For the existence
of God includes all that we believe to exist in God eternally,
and in these our happiness consists; while belief in his providence includes all those things which God dispenses in
time. . . ." 19 Theology is simply the working out of these two
principles. In Marian Theology the theologian develops the
mystery of Mary which is one of " those things which God
dispenses in time."
Remembering that providence is the divine plan whereby
all things are ordained to their ultimate end, 20 the theologian
must seek out the purpose of providential supernatural beings.
Purpose is the most important aspect in all actions, even divine;
consequently these providential beings must be viewed from the
aspect of means to end relationship. This is verified in Marian
Theology, for when we speak of the Divine Maternity as the
source and root of all Marian privileges, we mean that this
supreme privilege is the end to which all the others are related
as means. Our task, then, is simple: to show that such a
relationship does exist among Mary's prerogatives.
1•

Summa Theol., II-II, q. I, a. 7.

••Ibid., I, q. H, a. 1.

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PAUL MAHONEY

In order to prove the existence of such an order in Mariology,
we must show that the Divine Maternity has the nature of end
among the Marian privileges. There are two characteristics of
an end. First, the end is the reason why the means are willed; 21
and secondly, the end is related to the means as form is to
matter. 22 Applying this to Marian Theology, we must show
that God would not have decreed Mary's other privileges, if
He had not decreed the Divine Maternity and, further, that the
Divine Maternity in a certain sense informs all Marian prerogatives. Would Mary have been the Immaculate one, the
perpetual Virgin, full of grace or the Coredemptrix, if she were
not the Mother of God? This question is similar to that raised
by St. Thomas: whether God would have become incarnate, if
Adam had not sinned. Thus the principle, which St. Thomas
used to solve his question, should be the same, which we must
employ to solve ours. "Such things as spring from God's will
and beyond the creatures' due, can be made known to us only
through being revealed in the Sacred Scripture, in which the
Divine Will is made known to us .... " 23 Searching the Scriptures, St. Thomas could find for the Incarnation only one
reason, man's salvation; so he concluded that God would not
have become incarnate, if man had not sinned. We feel that
a search of Marian Scriptural texts will show that the ultimate
reason for Mary's prerogatives is the Divine Maternity. We
cannot deny, of course, that many of her prerogatives were
willed because of her association in the Redemptive activity of
her Son, but this in its turn was decreed because of her
maternity. Thus ultimately all were divinely ordained to the
Divine Maternity.
If we consider all the Marian Scriptural texts in which Mary's
prerogatives are either formally or virtually revealed, we must
admit the Divine Maternity as the central theme. The Woman
of Genesis, between whom and the serpent enmity exists,
enjoyed such a divinely given gift only because of her seed and
Ibid., I-II, q. 8, a. !i!.
Ibid., q. 4, a. 4.
••Ibid., III, q. 1, a. s.
21

22

THE UNITIVE PRINCIPLE OF MARIAN THEOLOGY

465.

His victory over the serpent. 24 Could such exist, if she were
not related to the seed? Obviously not. Isaias predicts that
the Virgin will conceive and give birth to Emmanuel. 25 Micheas
says she will bear Him (the Ruler of Israel) .26 Her plenitude of
grace and her vow of virginity are revealed by St. Luke in his
narrative of the Annunciation, the central theme of which is
Mary's motherhood. 27 It is the" mother of my Lord" who, is
greeted by Elizabeth and surely the "great things" to which
Mary refers in her Magnificat are the miraculous workings of
God by which she became His worthy mother. 28 Luke describes
the very central act of her maternity: His coming forth from
her womb at Bethlehem. 29 "Simeon said to Mary his mother,
". . . thy own soul a sword shall pierce . . ., " because of her
maternal union with Him. 30 The fulfillment of this prophecy we
find in the gospel of St. John: " Now there were standing by
the cross of Jesus his mother," and when He spoke to her and
to the beloved disciple, He talked of motherhood. 31 If we are
to admit, as many Catholic Scripture scholars do, that the
Woman in the Apocalypse is Mary, then we ought to notice
that this woman is set apart from all other women inasmuch as
" she brought forth a male child, who is to rule all nations with
a rod of iron." 32 In every text about Mary, from Genesis to
the Apocalypse, she is always described as the mother of Jesus
and anything else contained therein is merely an ornament to
this, the greatest of her prerogatives. If God had not decreed
her Divine Maternity, is it possible to say, from what the
Scriptures tell us,c that she would have received any other
extraordinary gifts? The answer must be negative, for remove
the Divine Maternity from the Marian Scriptural texts, little
or nothing is left. It would seem, then, that God has ordained
all Marian prerogatives to the Divine Maternity as means to
an end. The very reason for the existence of these prerogatives
is tb.e Divine Maternity.
'" Gen. S: 15.
26 Isaias 7: 14.
•• Micheas 5: 1-2.
21 Luke 1: 26-88.
98 lbid., 1:89-56.

29

80

Ibid., :i!: 1-:i!O.
Ibid., 2: 88-85.

31 John
32

19: 25-27.
Apocalypse 12: 1-18.

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PAUJ, MAHONEY

Certainly Sacred Tradition teaches the same. Pope Pius XII
expressed that tradition, when he wrote, "Indeed from this
sublime office of the Mother of God seem to flow, as it were
from a most limpid hidden source, all the privileges and grace
with which her soul and life were adorned in such extraordinary
manner and measure." 33 Before him Pope Pius XI noted the
same in his Encyclical Letter, Litx Veritatis; as also did Pope
Pius IX in the Apostolic Letter, lneffabilis Deus, in which the
dogma of the Immaculate Conception was defined. 34 Papal
doctrine it is, then, that the Divine Maternity is the principle,
the root and the measure of all Marian graces and privileges.
To say that it is the measure of all her gifts, a term frequently
used by Mariologists, brings us to the next step in our proof of
the Divine Maternity's central position in Mariology. We asserted above, using the words of St. Thomas, that the end is to
the means as form is to the matter. This is a puzzling statement
at first glance. Most certainly the Angelic Doctor did not mean
to identify final and formal causality. In what sense is the
analogy true? The key to the analogy can be found in another
statement of the Angelic Doctor: " the exemplary for min a
certain way has the nature of end." 35 A thing is an end inasmuch as it motivates activity and the materially same thing is
an exemplar inasmuch as it specifies the means. Purpose or
end, then, give the means a certain uniqueness; the means
assume a certain distinctive characteristic from their end by
which they are distinguished from all other means. This idea
is verified on all levels of activity. On the level of craftmanship it is true; for example, a baker uses flour for the production
of most of his products and yet the quality of the flour will
differ depending upon the purpose for which he uses it. For
cake he uses a fine flour, while for bread his flour will be coarse.
In the military the end gives a distinctiveness to the means. In
•• "Fulgens Corona Gloriae," in Papal Documents on Mary, compiled and
arranged by Wm. J. Doheny and Joseph P. Kelly, Milwaukee, Bruce Publishing
Company. 1954, p. 256,
••Ibid., "Lux Veritatis," p. 175; "lneffabilis Deus," pp. 9-10.
••De Veritate, q. 8, a. 1.

THE UNI'fIVE

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467

World War II strategic bombing was folly employed since
the purpose of the war was the unconditional surrender of
Germany; while in the Korean War our bombing was frustratingly limited since the war was purely defensive in purpose.
In society this truth is also verified. The exercise of family
authority differs from that of civil authority inasmuch as the
end of the family differs from that of the state. In religious
society we find a different use of the choral office in the Order
of Preachers from that of the Order of St. Benedict, since the
purpose of both Orders is so different. This idea is not strange
in Theology. We say that charity specifies the other virtues.
The objects of the other virtues are related to the object of
charity as means to an end. This accounts for the difference
between human virtues and Christian virtues. We say, too,
that the ends of the Sacraments modify sanctifying garce,
which modification is called sacramental grace.
Now if we can show that the Marian prerogatives have a
certain maternal modification, coming from their end, her
motherhood; then we can be certain that they are related to
her maternity as means to an end. All of these prerogatives
can be reduced to four general classifications: 1) those which
have primary reference to God; 2) those which are related to
her own person; 3) those relating her to men; 4) those which
relate men to her. In the first class we must place the Divine
Maternity itself, together with the affinity to the Trinity which
results from it and also her Association with God the Redeemer.
In the second class we have her plenitude of grace, which includes her gifts of body and soul. In her body she had the
grace of perpetual virginity and an anticipated glorification in
the Assumption. In the soul this plenitude can be considered
negatively in the doctrines of her Immaculate Conception and
her freedom from actual sin. Positively considered, it includes
her plenitude of habitual grace, the gifts and the virtues. In the
third class we have the doctrine of the Mediatrix of all graces
and her Queenship. In the fourth class the hyperdulia worship
men owe to Mary is the subject of consideration. Taking each
in its turn let us seek a certain uniqueness resulting from the
Divine Maternity.

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PAUL MAHONEY

Mary's relationship to the Trinity: Because of divine generosity all men will have or have had the opportunity to be
related to the Trinity as adopted children through sanctifying
grace. Mary is so related and yet over and above this she is
also related by affinity to the Father and the Holy Spirit.
Obviously the only explanation for her unique position with
reference to the Trinity is her maternal relation to the Son,
inasmuch as one who is related by blood to another person
becomes related by affinity to those who are naturally related
to this person.
To God Incarnate the Redeemer all men are related as the
redeemed to the Redeemer. Since Mary was redeemed due to
the foreseen merits of her Son, she too is so related. Yet God
has seen fit to grant her the relationship of AssoCiate to the
Redeemer, one who actively participates in the redemptive act.
Why was she so chosen? The Divine Wisdom usually grants
such privileges for some reason intrinsic to the one to whom it
is granted. Since in the natural order God ordains that there
should be friendship between mother and son and that a consequence of friendship is concord, i.e., a union of wills, which is
the very heart of human association; then it is fitting that in the
supernatural order He should grant to the Mother of the
Redeemer, the office of Associate of the Redeemer, particularly
in view of the fact that she was the closest blood relation to
Christ. When we come to the consideration of Mary's office
of Mediatrix, we shall then see the fulfillment of this office and
that this fulfillment is decidely maternal.
The supernatural perfection of JJt.ary's soul and body: The
sanctification and justification of a soul is the result of habitual
grace. There are two aspects of habitual grace, namely, the
absence of sin and the positive aspect of sanctification, together
with the supernatural operative habits of the gifts and the
virtues. Most men initially receive sanctifying grace by means
of the sacrament of baptism; some men, like John the Baptist,
were sanctified while still in the womb; but only Mary received
grace at the very instant of her human conception. Thus she
was immaculately conceived; original sin touched her not. It

THE UNITIVE PRINCIPLE

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is morally possible for a person to go through life without
losing sanctifying grace, but it is morally impossible, except
due to a singular privilege from God, to remain free from ever
committing a venial sin. 36 Mary, however, never committed
an actual sin, either mortal or venial; indeed, most theologians
assert that she had the privilege of impeccability:. Add to this
distinctive freedom from sin, a positive degree of grace, the
gifts and the virtues, which is difficult to describe except by
means of comparison with others, and we get a faint picture
of her unique perfection in the supernatural order. Why is it
so? Because God so willed it is a correct answer and yet Divine
Wisdom must have placed something in Mary, which makes
her unique among men. Once again, that something is the
Divine Maternity. The maternal-filial relation is the basis for
friendship in the natural order and certainly, then, in the
supernatural order the Divine Maternity, by which Mary
became Christ's only blood relation, demanded this friendship,
which is achieved through sanctifying grace. It must be a
unique degree of grace, since this is a unique relationship.
Mary's perfection was not limited to her soul; it extended
even to her body. Thus she had the privileges of perpetual
virginity and a bodily assumption into heaven. Because of
both these privileges, Mary enjoys a unique position in the
human race. Two states are possible under the divine 011ler to
women: that of perpetual virginity and that of maternity; but
to no woman, except Mary, are both states possible. Only
Mary, due to the miraculous power of God, was situated in
both states in a perfect degree. Why was Mary so uniquely
blessed among women? The answer is obvious: Mary temporally generated Him, whom the Father eternally generated. It
would have been completely out of place for Him to have a
human father; thus, His mother gave birth to Him at the same
time preserving her virginity. Furthermore, motherhood together with wifehood very often demands a divided loyalty in
a woman. Mary's virginity, therefore, made it possible for her
•• Denzinger, nos. 106, 888.

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PAUL MAHONEY

to be all mother with her complete attention directed to
her Son.
Mary's glory is unique. All the redeemed, she being the
sole exception, are glorified in their souls first and the beatification of their bodies will come on the last day. Only Mary's
body received an anticipated glorification. This privilege was
hers, because God would certainly not permit that flesh, from
which the body of His human nature came, to become corrupt.
It is true, of course, that this privilege is implicit in the doctrine
of her Association with the redemptive activity of her Son; but
remembering that the New Eve doctrine is a result of her
maternity, we must say that the ultimate reason for Mary's
assumption is the Divine Maternity.
In summary, Mary received a plenitude of grace in both her
soul and likewise in her body because of her proximity to God.
In regard to the plenitude of grace in the humanity of Christ,
St. Thomas uses the principle that the nearer any recipient is
to an inflowing cause, the more does it partake of its influence. 37
Since the Divine Maternity relates Mary closer to God than
any other human person, then it follows quite logically that
she should enjoy a unique position in the order of grace.

Mary's relationship to men: Mary is related to us as our
Mediatrix and our Queen. By reason of the first title she has
dependently on Christ reunited us to God and by reason of the
second she has a participated dominion over our lives. As
Mediatrix our Lady had to b(-' in possession of an aptitude for
the office and also she had to actually exercise mediatory
activity. An aptitude for the office of mediator is that the one
mediating must stand between those who are to be joined. The
actual exercise of the office consists in the bringing together of
the extremes. Christ, of course, is pre-eminently the Mediator
between God and men, because He had the aptitude for the
office, being distinct from God in His humanity and distinct
from men by the dignity of His grace and glory; because, too,
He actually exercised this office by uniting men to God through
.'"Summa Theol., III, q. 7, a. 1.

THE UNITIVE PRINCIPLE

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the efficacy of His death, by which God was appeased and men
received sufficient grace for redemption. As St. Thomas points
out, the fact of Christ being mediator does not rule out the
possibility of others sharing in His mediation. 38 Tradition
teaches that Mary shares in His office of mediation. Of course,
there are certain qualifications that the analogy of faith places
upon Mary's mediatory office. 1) Only Christ's mediation is
in itself sufficient; Mary's is of itself insufficient and receives its
total efficacy from Christ. 2) Christ alone is the absolutely
necessary mediator; Mary's mediation is only hypothetically
necessary inasmuch as God has so willed it. 39 8) Christ is the
absolutely universal mediator; Mary's mediation is universal
only in the sense of being for all men except herself.4-0 But
even with these qualifications she can be truly called a
mediatrix.
The Divine Maternity plays a very important role with
reference to her mediatory office. As was noted above, the
person who mediates must in some sense stand between the
extremes who are being joined together. Mary is distinct from
God, since she is a creature and she is distinct from men by
reason of the eminent dignity of her Divine Maternity, which,
to use the words of Cajetan, " approaches the very borders of
Divinity." 41 Mary, then, would not have the aptitude for the
office of mediatrix, if she were not the mother of God. Now
•• Ibid., q. 26, a. I.
••Perhaps a word of explanation is in order here. Christ's mediation is absolutely
necessary, not in the sense that it was outside the divine power to restore men to
grace without Christ the Mediator, but rather in the sense that presupposing the
divine decree that man was to be restored to grace by means of condign merit,
Christ, who alone could produce condign merit and satisfaction (condign here
taken in the absolute sense of the word), was necessary to achieve this end (cf.
Summa Theol., III, q. I, a. 2, ad 2.) We cannot apply the same sort of necessity
to Mary's mediation, since hers was necessary only because God deemed fit that she
should share in the activity of her Son.
mediation extended even to herself (cf. Ephem.
' 0 Lebon asserts that Mary's
Theol. Lov., II (1939), 129-159). His conclusion is based upon the principle that
Mary's rnediatory activity and that of Christ we;e united per modum unius. Since,
however, this question is not under discussion, we have followed what seems to be
the opinion of the majority of Mariologists. (cf. Roschini, op. cit., torn. II, p. 261.)
.. Cajetan, Commentarium in Summam Theologicam, II-II, q. 103, a. 4.

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PAUI, MAHONEY

even the very exercise of this office has a distinctive maternal
modification.
Mary, the Mediatrix of grace, exercised her office in a twofold manner: 1) she mediated for us by cooperating in the
acquisition of the graces of redemption; 2) she is mediatrix by
cooperating in the distribution of all graces to all men. By
reason of the first she is called the Coredemptrix; while the title
of Dispensatrix of grace is hers because of the second function.
The function of coredemption and its modifications resulting
from the Divine Maternity have been treated elsewhere! 2 An
understanding of Mary's coredemptive activity can be obtained
from an analogy with the redemptive activity of her Son. This
activity was beautifully analyzed by St. Thomas in his tract
on the passion of Christ. 43 Christ's passion was meritorious
action and further it was satisfactory, sacrificial and redemptive
in the strict sense of the word. Mary's compassion had similar
modalities. Yet her coredemptive activity was distinct -from
that of Christ and that of men. Mary's merit was specifically
distinct from Christ's merit, in that her merit was completely
dependent upon His and that her merit was only congruent,
while His was condign. 44 Yet her merit is specially distinct
from that of other men. Some men can merit for others some
grace, but only Mary merits all grace for all men. By reason
of this fact her merit is distinct in extent from that of other
men. When we say that. some men can merit for others, we
mean that they merit the distribution of grace to others. But
Mary's merit was not limited to this; she merited the very
acquisition of grace for men. Because of this fact her merit is
••Cf. Thomas U. Mullaney, 0. P., " The Meaning of Mary's Compassion," American Ecclesiastical Review, CXXV 1-6, 120-129, 196-207.
••Summa Theol., III, q. 48.
" Here and later in the text we .propose that Mary's merit and satisfaction are
only congruent. This point is disputed. Some, like Fernandez, 0. P., Cuervo, 0. P.,
Balfe, Lebon and others, assert that her coredemptive merit and satisfaction were
condign in a relative sense (cf. Roschini, op. cit., tom. II, pp. S64-S72.} Since,
however, those who hold
opinion admit the dependence of Mary's merit and
satisfaction upon Christ, the uniqueness of Mary's activity is still preserved and
thus our point is proved.

THE UNITIVE PRINCIPLE

OF MARIAN THEOLOGY

473

unique in kind. How do we explain this unique quality of he.r
meriL God's Will is the ultimate explanation, yet Divine
Wisdom demands an intrinsic :reason. The principle of me:rit
is charity and consequently Mary's fullness of grace and charity
explains why her merit is distinct in extent. Since her merit is
specifically unique, we need to seek out some other intrinsic
reason for its being so. The difference between Mary's grace
and charity and that of other men is only a matter of degree.
Therefore there must be something unique in species in Mary,
which explains the uniqueness in species of he:r merit. Quite
obviously the Divine Maternity is that something. God gave
her a distinctive merit, because He had ordained her to a
distinctive position in the supernatural order. Her coredemptive activity was not only meritorious but also satisfactory.
Satisfaction limits the notion of me:rit to mean only meritorious
works that a:re done to balance the offense of sin and consequently they must be penal
character. Many of Mary's acts
were of such a nature. She intended that her sorrows would be
the
men,
the very act of he:r
a
consent at the Annunciation she wined to become the
of the
of Sorrows. These sorrows were distinctively hers;
they differed from those
Christ and
those of other men.
Christ's sorrows were of infinite value and He is united to all
men by reason of the Mystical Body, thus He offered to God
condign satisfaction. Mary's satisfaction for the sins of others
was only of congruent value. Further her satisfaction received
its total worth from Christ. Although it is inferior to Christ's
satisfaction, it is specifically superior to the satisfaction of men.
VVhen we say that one man satisfies for the sins of another, we
mean that he satisfies not for the sins themselves but the
penalties due to these sins. :Mary, however, satisfied
compassion not only for all
penalties due to the sins of
men,
also for all sin, actual or original,
men.
understand why it is so, we must penetrate the nature
satisfaction. A work is satisfactory because it is such dignity
and worth that it balances off the offensiveness of the sin for
which satisfaction is made. Now a work is of greater value

474

PAUL ::\1AHONEY

dignity according as the doer is of greater dignity. Thus Christ.
who is the infinite Son of God, producing works of infinite
value, performed works of infinite satisfaction. Therefore,
Mary's works were specifically unique in their satisfactory
value, because she had a specifically distinct dignity in the
supernatural order, the dignity of the Divine Maternity.
Mary's coredemptive activity is also sacrificial. Sacrifice is
an act of religion, involving the offering and the immolation
of a victim, for the purpose of placating God. The sacrifice
of Christ is the only acceptable sacrifice, for He is the divinely
appointed perfect Priest and Victim. What did Mary contribute to this sacrifice? Her contribution was unique; it was
a twofold contribution: :remote and proximate. Remotely by
exercising her maternal office she prepared the victim, bearing
Him, nourishing and protecting Him. She performed these
functions with full knowledge that He was ordained to offer a
bloody sacrifice and she consented to this. Proximately she
cooperated in His sacrifice by immolating Him insofar as it
pertained to her to do soo This immolation consisted in the
abdication of her maternal rights over her Son for the salvation
of men. 45 Notice that her cooperation in the sacrifice of her
Son, both remote and proximate, was unique because of the
Divine Maternity.
Our Lady's Compassion was redemptive in the strict sense
of the word. Redemption, strictly taken, adds to meritorious,
satisfactory and sacrificial activity the note that this activity
is a price acceptable to God to free men from the bonds of sin,
the devil and the punishment due to sin. Christ, by shedding
His blood, paid the price demanded by God for our liberation.
Mary cooperated in this act and so she is called the Coredemptrixo A Coredemptrix is she who de jure can and de facto does
cooperate in the very act of paying the price demanded by
God. Our Lady, and she alone, de jure could, and de facto did
so cooperate. Now in both instances she could do so only
because of the Divine Maternity. To have the capacity to pay
the price, it was necessary that Mary in some sense own that
45

Benedict XV, Encyclical letter, " Inter sodalicia."

THE UNITIVE PRINCIPLE

OF MARIAN THEOLOGY

475

which was offered. It was because she was His mother that she
had maternal rights over the victim, Christ, and consequently
the capacity to pay the price with something that was her own.
She exercised this capacity by surrendering those rights; this
surrender was begun at the very moment that she acquired the
rights at the Annunciation in view of her intention to give
up the Man of Sorrows at the appointed hour. At the foot of
the Cross she exercised her redemptive activity by co-suffering
with her Son. Now only a mother could do this. For St.
Thomas points out that normally a person suffers evils inflicted
on himself and commiserates at the evils inflicted on another;
but he adds " if there are some persons so bound to us as to be,
so to say, something of us, for example children or parents, at
their evils we do not commiserate, rather we suffer as on
account of our own injuries." 46 Mary is Coredemptrix because
she is the mother of the Redeemer-God.
Certainly she, who cooperates in the very act of acquiring
graces for men, must also play a cooperative part in their
distribution. Theologians dispute whether our Lady's role in
this matter is by means of efficient causality or moral. That
Mary is the physical instrumental cause of the production of
grace in the souls of men is at most a probable opinion. There
is no difficulty about the possiblity of such being the case;
rather it is a problem of finding it revealed in Scripture or
Tradition. The safer opinion seems to be that her cooperation
in the distribution of grace is not in the physical order but
rather in the moral order of intercession. Since it is intercessory activity, it does not differ from that of the saints. Yet
there is a twofold uniqueness in Mary's intercession. First,
other saints intercede for the bestowal of some graces in the
souls of some men; while the intercession of the Queen of Saints
extends to all graces for all men. This could be explained by
the plenitude of her grace and glory, which ultimately has its
explanation in the Divine Maternity. Further, it is unique in
another way. Mary's intercession has the note of infallible
••Summa Theo!., II-II, q. 80, a. 1, ad

3

476

PAUL MAHONEY

power. She is never refused. How else can we explain this
except by reason of those maternal rights over her Son. Thus
once again we find a uniqueness in Mary's privileges due to her
Divine Maternity. She is the unique Coredemptrix, the unique
Dispensatrix and the unique Mediatrix, because she is singularly related to God as His mother.
Mary participates in Christ's dominion over men and thus
she enjoys the title of Queen. She is Queen not in the sense
of a Queen who exercises kingly rights nor in the sense of a
Queen-Mother. She is Queen in the sense of being the consort
of Christ the King. 47 The Queen-Consort is one who by law is
uniquely associated with the person who is King. Others
partake in the function of dominion in the kingdom of Christ:
angels, Pope, bishops and priests; but none enjoy the position
that Mary holds. She is the closest associate of the King.
Once again we must appeal to the Divine Maternity in explanation of her unique position, for by that maternity she entered
into the royal family of the Trinity. Her queenly function
consists not in command, for this is an act proper only to the
King, but rather like all Queen-Consorts her role is one of
intercession. It is said that the Queen's request is never refused;
she is all powerful with the King. How else can we explain this
all powerful, never failing intercession except by reason of the
rights she gained over her Son in her maternity. This is the
thought so beautifully developed and drawn to its logical conclusion by the Apostle of Mary, St. Louis Marie de M-0ntfort.48
Men's relation to Mary: We are overwhelmed with the
Theology of Mary, since it presents to us so many sublime
truths, expressive of her glory and of her tremendous love for
us. Mariology would hardly be complete if we did not consider
our obligations to her. She is our Mediatrix and our Queen
and these two notions are summarized in the popular title of
"our Blessed Mother." How better could we express her re«Thomas U. Mullaney, 0. P .. "Queen of Mercy," American Ecclesiastical Re-

view, CXXVI, 415.
••Cf. St. Louis Marie de Montfort, Treatise on True Devotion to the Blu1MVirgin Mary, (Montfort Fathers, Bay Shore, N. Y., 1941).

THE UNITIVE PRINCIPLE OF MARIAN THEOLOGY

477

lationship to us than by the analogy of a mother to a child. We
are her children and consequently we owe,her filial reverence.
This brings us to the subject of the hyperdulia worship owed
by us to Mary. Worship is an act ,of the virtue of religion by
which we pay honor to God and those closely related to Him.
It is of three kinds: !atria, dulia and hyperdulia. Latria worship
is that which is paid to God Himself; while dulia and hyperdulia
is that paid to those related to God. Quite naturally the degree
of dulia- worship is dependent upon the proximity of the one
honored to God. Thus St. Joseph, who was the foster father
of our Lord, enjoys the very highest degree of dulia worship.
Mary's proximity to God differs from that of the other saints
not just by reason of degree;
her proximity is specifically
distinct from that of the saints because of her Divine Maternity. Therefore she deserves a type of worship that is
distinct in species. " The Church pays to the Queen and Lady
of the al!_gels a worship more eminent than that granted to the
other saints," reads a document of the Congregation of Rites,
" to which
is owed not dulia worship, but hyperdulia, inasmuch as, she is the Mother of God." 43 Devotion to Mary
includes many elements besides worship, but its foundation isworship. We owe her confidence, since she is our Mother; we
owe her thanks for her mediatory activity; we owe her sorrow
for our sins, since she is the Queen of Sorrows; we owe her
admiration for her plenitude of grace; but we owe her worship
of a hyperdulia type for her eminent dignity as the Mother of
God.
We have seen that all the Marian prerogatives and the distinctive modality that is theirs is due to the Divine Maternity.
That maternity is truly, then, the form of these prerogatives.
The Divine Maternity gives to Mary's privileges a life that is
uniquely Marian. This, being so, we can say without doubt
that the Divine Maternity is the principle, root and measure
of all Mary's graces and gifts. Therefore, it fulfills that third
condition necessary for the first principle of Marian Theology.
1

••Decree of the Congregation of Rites, June I, 1884.

478

PAUL MAHONEY

All Mariology is summarized in the statement:
Mother of God the Redeemer.

Ma:ry is the

CONCLUSION

The benefits that result from constructing Mariology in the
manner above described are manifold. Let us note but three
of these reasons.
We must never forget that Mary would have no place in
Theology or indeed in the supernatural order itself if it were
not for her Son. To make the Divine Maternity the first principle of Mariology brings out this truth clearly. For by this
means we· see that a truth that is but a conclusion in Christology is the first truth of Mariology. Thus from this single point
of departure in Christology we have the whole Theology of
Mary. Likewise, this first principle gives us a similarity
between the two tracts. Just as all Christology, which treats
principally of the mysteries of the Incarnation and the Redemption, is reducible to the principle of the Redemptive Incarnation, so all :Mariology is reducible to a like principle. As in
life, so in Theology, Mary and Jesus are inseparable.
Secondly, this principle is fitting for a theological tract. The
aim of Theology is to see things with a vision approaching the
simplicity in which God sees them. God sees all things with
one act of knowledge and therefore, the theologian should try
to see Mary with the greatest simplicity possible. Our principle
gives us such simplicity and it unites this tract with the rest
of Theology. It is a foreshadowing of the vision of the blessed,
who see Mary as that beautiful united being, the first masterpiece of God.
Thirdly, this principle dearly brings out the omnipotence
and mercy of God. The Divine Maternity could not be merited
either condignly or congruently; it is a. divine gift in the most
absolute sense of the
Now since all the gifts and
00 The absolute gratuitousness
of Mary's predestination to the Divine Maternity
in the order of divine intention is clear from the fact that merit presupposes grace
which in its turn presupposes, in Mary's case, the Divine Matemity. However, in

THE UNITIVE PRINCIPLE

OF MARIAN THEOLOGY

479

privileges of our Lady come from this one as from a principle,
God's mercy is manifested. Mary, who having a human nature,
by the rights of nature deserved nothing from God, received
the greatest possible gift conceivable. It should serve to remind
us that all good comes from God. It is perhaps the most
beautiful application of that profound truth, so often and
lovingly repeated by St. Thomas: God does not love one
because of the creature's goodness; rather one is made good
because of God's love.
PAUL MAHONEY,

O.P.

Loretto Heights College
Denver, Colorado

the order of execution we can admit a certain qualified meriting of the Divine
Maternity. Certainly it is not condign merit, since there is no proportion between
Mary's meritorious activity and the hypostatic union to which she is related by the
Divine Maternity. It is possible, however, that she could have congruently merited
the office of Mother of God; indeed, Tradition seems to assert that such was the
case, since the testimony of Augustine, Bernard, Peter Damian, Epiphanius,
Chrysostom, Basil, Thomas and Albert the Great can be invoked in proof. (Cf.
Friethoff, 0. P., De Alma Socia Christi Mediatoris, pp. 81-86.

PROTESTANTS AND THE MARIAN DOCTRINE

I

N this study an important place is accorded the comparison
between sixteenth century and contemporary Protestantism. At the very outset ·it will be noticed how different
these positions are. This difference is all the more evident from
a comparison of the thought of Luther with that of contemporary Calvinism. I believe that on this point Hebert Roux
represents the average contemporary Calvinist attitude. He
writes: " To the question, ' What place does the Virgin Mary
hold in reformed piety?,' we can and must reply with firmness,
'None whatever.'" 1 This position, moreover, may be considered as the logical outcome of the very principles of the
Reformation. We shall see, however, that at the beginning of
the Reformation the position was less radical, especially in the
mind of Luther. Indeed, we may speak of Luther's Marian
devotion, despite his denial of fundamental 'elements of Catholic
theology concerning Mary.
LUTHER

In his commentary on the M agnificat, in the explanation of
the verse, " The Almighty has done great things for me,"
Luther writes: " These great things are just this, that she has
become the Mother of God. So great and numerous are the
bless.ings which have been bestowed upon her by this event,
that no one can comprehend them. All honor and happiness
flow from it, as likewise the fact that in all mankind, one person
ah:me is above all others, to whom no one may be held equal,
since a unique Child, and what a Child, is the Son of the
Heavenly Father and also her very own. Therefore, the honor
due her can be summed up in a single word, by calling her the
1

Jean Bose,

Bourguet, Pierre Maury, and Hebert Roux, Le protestantisme

et la Vierge Marie, Paris, 1950, p. 8.

480

PROTESTANTS

AND THE MARIAN DOC'l'RINE

481

Mother of God .... No one could say to her anything more
grand. Nothing greater can be said of her." 2 The tone of this
passage is striking, so far removed is it from the reserve of the
average contemporary Protestant position.
As far as Luther is concerned, Mariology is shaped by two
principles, Christus solus and Scriptura sola. But within this
framework Luther seeks to give Mary a real place. In the
name of his Christological principle Luther rejects the cult
which acknowledges Mary as "Queen of Heaven." For this
reason he cannot tolerate the Salve Regina. How could one
possibly say that Mary is " our Life, our Sweetness, and our
Hope"? The Regina Caeli ought also to be discarded. To
call Mary " Queen of Heaven is to attribute to a creature that
which belongs to God alone." 3 Speaking of Mary, Luther
continues, " I accept the fact that she prays for me, but that
she is my consolation and my life, this I cannot admit." 4
Mary's merits may not even be considered. According to
Luther the angel's salutation, " Thou hast found grace with
God," does away with the idolatry of placing Mary on a level
with God Himself. All that Mary has is grace, not merit. No
confidence may be placed in Mary or in her merits, but in
God alone. In the devotional order we must reject the distinction between dulia and hyperdulia, which is " man-made
thought without basis in Holy Scripture." 3
Attributing to a creature the exercise of divine mercy is, on
Luther's part, cause for great indignation. The rebuff at the
wedding of Cana serves precisely the role of stressing that
Christ alone is Mediator. With polemic excess, Luther does
not hesitate to say that all Christians are of the same rank.
Peter is no greater than the thief on the cross, and the Mother
no higher in dignity than the sinner, Mary Magdalene. 6
•Cf. R. Schimmelpfennig, Die Geschichte der Maienverehrung im deutschen
Proteatantismus, Paderborn, 195!it, p. l!it.
•Cf. Schimmelpfennig, op. cit., p. 9.
•Ibid.
•Cf. Schimmelpfennig, op. cit., p. 10.
•Cf. Schimmelpfennig, op. cit., p. 11.

482

JEROME HAMER

In accord with his Scriptural principle, Luther remarks that
Holy Scripture is purposely silent concerning Saint Ann, precisely in order to avoid our going elsewhere to find what we
ought to find in Christ alone. " Today we are running in all
directions, and are thereby losing the true Savior, Jesus
Christ." 7 If Holy Scripture has nothing to say on the birth
of Mary, this is to prevent our exalting her beyond measure.
The same care to reverence the message of the Bible and
not to stretch its meaning unduly makes Luther suspicious of
certain allegorical interpretations, which introduce into the text
things which the simple mind is not able to discover there.
Granted, Christians ought to venerate Mary, but in an authentic manner. "I concede veneration to her, but such as
does not warp the meaning of the Scriptures." 8
As to the positive aspects of his doctrine, it is to be noted
that many of Luther's texts on Mary may be drawn from his
sermons on the Virgin. Indeed, we must not lose sight of the
fact that Luther, right up until his death, preached on the
occasion of Mary's feast days. First of all, then, let us investigate Luther's view on those points which constitute for us
today Marian dogma.
Luther vigorously defends the Divine Maternity in opposition to the "obscure innovator, Nestorius." 9 For support
in his unreserved adherence to this dogma, the Reformer relies
on the message of the Annunciation; also on the praise uttered
by Elizabeth, and on the Pauline text, " God sent His Son made
of a woman" (Gal. 4: 4). "These words show that without
doubt Mary is the Mother of God." 10
He also accepts her Perpetual Virginity in the traditional
sense, ante partum, in partu, post partum. Luther, whose convictions are often embodied in very colorful language, treats
Helvidius, the adversary of the Perpetual Virginity, as a
"vulgar fool." 11 These heretics err in claiming that Mary
had other children after Jesus. Even if St. Matthew's text
10 Ibid.
Ibid.
11 Cf. Schimmelpfennig, op. cit., p. 14.
Ibid.
•Cf. Schimmelpfennig, op. cit., p. U.

7

8

PROTESTANTS

AND. 'rHE MARIAN DOCTRINE

488

(l: 25) says merely, "He did not know her until she brought
forth her firstborn son," this does not imply that after the
birth Mary and Joseph lived as a normally married couple.
It is stated this way only because the Evangelist does not
concern himself with Mary after the Savior's coming into the
world. Afterwards he treats of Jesus alone.
Astonishing as it may seem, Luther also defends the Immaculate Conception. In the theological controversy which at
this time separates the Thomists from the Scotists, Luther
takes sides with the latter school. If Mary is " freed and
purified from original sin, it is because of her dignity as Mother
of God." 12 Mary was purified from original sin the very
moment that her soul was united to her body. "At the first
moment of her existence, when she began to live, she was
without stain." 13
Ce1tain traces of the dogma of the Assumption may be found
also in Luther's thought, but the texts are quite ambiguous.
In a sermon on the occasion of this feast in 1522, Luther
declares that the Gospel says nothing about " how Mary is in
heaven." Moreover, it is not a matter which must necessarily
be
It suffices for us to know that the saints are living.14
Schimmelpfennig believes that from this the conclusion may be
drawn that Luther did not exclude faith in the Assumption.
In any case, it is true that Luther was in favor of retaining
this liturgical feast for a little while longer.
Friedrich Heiler, who wrote a critical review of Schimmelpfennig's work, does not agree with this appraisal. 15 He is
convinced that Luther rejected the dogma of the Assumption.
The text quoted above, he thinks, cannot be interpreted otherwise. Heiler produces, in addition, another text: " We know
nothing about any Assumption . . . save that of our beloved
Lord Jesus Christ." 16
12

Schimmelpfennig, op. cit., p. 15.

Ibid.
"Ibid.
13

16
20

Cf. F. Heiler, Theologische Literaturzeitung, 1954, t. LXXIX, col. 49.
Erlangen edition of Luther's works, 82 , 418, Sqq.

484

.JEROME HAMER

The intercessi.on of Mary is a point upon which stress must
be laid, since later it will be discussed more at length. At the
beginning of his commentary on the M agnificat, Luther has
recourse to Mary's prayer: "May the sweet Virgin Mary
obtain for me the light necessary £or a profound and useful
interpretation of her canticle." 11 Further on in the same
commentary Luther adds, "God does everything. It is important, nonetheless, to invoke Mary, in order that God, for
her sake, will give and bring to accomplishment that £or which
we ask. Likewise, it is necessary to invoke other saints, but
always in such a way that the whole work remains God's and
His alone." 18 The Christian, who, throughout his life, has
contemplated the work of God in His saints, and who has
sought to imitate them, in his last hour will also call upon
" all the angels, and in particular his guardian angel, the
Mother of God, the apostles and the blessed," and will ask
them to help him, in union with Christ, to overcome death,
sin, and hell.19 One may still continue to recite the Hail Mary.
After all, this is not a prayer, but rather a simple salutation,
simply an act of praise.
In his doctrine on the intercession of Mary, Luther distinguishes between Fursprache (speaking £or someone) and
Furbitte (praying for someone). Rejecting the former, he
admits the latter. Mary cannot be our advocate. The saints
are, like ourselves, poor and weak. Let us not make idols of
them. Yet Mary prays for us-which is not the same thing. 20
Luther ends his commentary by asking God £or a true understanding of this canticle, that he may be able not only to
enlighten and teach, but
to be inflamed with it and to live
it, body and soul. Luther's closing words are," May God grant
us this through the intercession of His Blessed Mother." 21
In determining Mary's place in cult and devotion insofar as
Cf. Schimmelpfennig, op. cit., p. 16.
Ibid.
10 Ibid.
••Ibid.
21 Ibid.
17
18

PROTESTANTS

AND THE MARIAN DOC'.l'RINE

485

she is our Model, Luther puts strong emphasis on her helpfulness in regard to her cousin, Elizabeth, but he glorifies especially
her humility. Once again a passage from the commentary on
the M agnificat bears this out: " I have translated the word
humilitas by baseness or state of wretchedness, and have conceived Mary's sentiments as follows. 'God has deigned to look
upon me, poor, frail maiden, scorned and unattractive. He
could very well have found queens, or daughters of princes
and great lords, who were rich, well bred, noble and powerful.
He could very well have chosen the daughters of Annas or of
Caiphas, who hold first place in the land; but out of pure
goodness He deigned to cast His gaze upon me. Thus He has
made use of a humble, lowly girl, so that no one will exalt
himself in His sight for having been or presently being worthy
of such a favor. And I must also declare that this is out of
sheer goodness and grace, in no wa{ due to my merit or my
dignity ... .' She glories neither in her worthiness nor her unworthiness,/but only in the divine favor, which surpasses all
conceivable goodness and grace." 22
ltcan be gathered that Luther is glad that the Magnificat
is/sung every day at Vespers. As for the Marian feast days,
Luther's position is this. He wishes to· retain the Purification
and the Annunciation, for, as a matter of fact, these are Christ's
feasts, just as much as are the Epiphany and the Presentation
in the Temple. Indeed, for Luther the Annunciation is one of
the most important feasts. 23 Regarding the feasts oJ the Assumption and of the Nativity, Luther says that" they should
be preserved for a little while longer." 24
•• Bose, Bourguet et al., op. cit., pp. 98-94. The text quoted here was translated
into French by Pastor Bose, who presents large extracts of Luther's commentary
(pp. 91-101). Concerning these extracts, however, I must make a somewhat severe
criticism. The choice of texts is unilateral, i. e., only a single aspect of Luther's
thought is presented. Luther's appeals for the Virgin's intercession are passed over
in silence. Of course when it is a question of isolated passages, each author chooses
according to his intent. But it is unfortunate that in the only existing French
translation of Luther's commentary, greater care was not taken to give the work a
more balanced perspective.
•• Cf. Schimmelpfennig, op. cit., p. 84.
•• Schimmelpfennig, op. cit., p. 18.

486

.JEROME HAMER

Iconoclasts receive no encouragement from Luther. On the
contrary, images can be kept and put to good use. The crucifix
and images of the saints ought to be more than tolerated. They
are signs which should incite us to reverence and imitation.
Did not even the pagans carve the likeness of the emperor on
their coins? 25
Evidently, therefore, Luther's Mariology is conditioned from
start to finish by the two principles noted above. But in contrast to the Mariology of contemporary Protestantism, which
retains but the negative aspects of these principles, Luther
sought further to interpret them positively. For Luther there
is room for devotion to Mary in the purely Christological
perspective, and likewise from the purely scriptural point of
view.
Luther acknowledges, besides, that the veneration of Mary
is " inscribed in the very depths of the human heart." 28 But
this praise of Mary ought not to distract us from Christ. We
must go on further to the Savior Himself. " Honor the Mother
of God, but in such a way as not to be detained by her; rather
push on to God and fix your heart on Him. Thus you will be
keeping Christ in the center." 27
ZWINGLI AND CALVIN

Regarding the two reformers, Zwingli and Calvin, we shall
indicate only the points in which they differ from Luther.
Zwingli holds views quite akin to those of Luther. The Divine
Maternity and the Perpetual Virginity do not trouble him.
He too considers Helvidius to be a "mad wrestler." As for
the Immaculate Conception, it is impossible for us to infer
anything conclusive from his own statements. Because the
Ave Maria is not a prayer, Zwingli considers its recitation quite
legitimate. It must be kept in mind, however, that in those
days only the first part of the salutation, which is composed
entirely of scriptural texts, was in question. Indeed, Zwingli
disapproves of the invocation of Mary and the saints. This is
••Ibid.

••Ibid.

••Ibid.

PROTESTANTS

AND THE MARIAN DOCTRINE

487

really Zwingli's main departure from Luther. In his view invoking the saints is putting them in the place of God. Neither
is it necessary to call upon God through the saints, for the
only thing that matters is to come into God's presence. Likewise, concerning images Zwingli does not follow the path traced
out by the German Reformer. He forbids their retention, for
they are not and ought not to be for us a means of instmction.
Teaching is the function of the Bible alone. 28
In concert with the other reformers, Calvin admits Mary's
Perpetual Virginity. "Helvidius plainly showed himself to be
ignorant by affirming that Mary had several children merely
because occasional mention is made of Christ's brethren." 29
Calvin, therefore, translates adelphoi as " cousins " or " relations." As regards the Divine Maternity, Calvin's position
is recognizably more reserved. Whereas Luther ordinarily describes Mary as " Mother of God," Calvin never uses the term
theotokos, or any equivalent expression. True, he does not
dispute the term, and we even find him condemning Nestorianism rather sharply; nevertheless, he avoids the word even where
it seems that its use is called for almost necessarily. For Calvin
Mary is simply the " Mother of the Lord." 00 As for honor
rendered Mary, Calvin does not hesitate for a moment in a
denial, which is pure and simple. Neither can we find in Calvin
or Calvinism any support for the Marian feasts. The rejection
of any invocation of the saints is based upon the sufficiency and
unique character of Christ's mediation. 31
In Calvin, therefore, progress in the Protestant idea is per•• CC. Schimmelpfennig, op. cit., pp. 19-!!1.
••Cf. M: Thurian, "Mariology, (d) Reformed," Waya of Worship, the Report of
a Theological Commission of Faith and Order, London, 1951, p.
Portions of the
original French appear in Dialogues sur la Vierge Marie (Ronda-Points, I), Lyon,
1950, pp.
In the study of Calvin, the Geneva Reformer, we cannot use
Schimmelpfennig's excellent book, limited as it is to a treatment of German
Protestantism. However, even though up to the present time the Mariology of
Calvin has been the object of very little study, from the information at our disposal
we may give an approximate outline of his thought on Mary,
•° Cf. J. Hamer, "Mariologie et theologie protestante," Divua Thomas, (Frib.),
p ..
11 Cf. Hamer,

ibid.

488

JEROME HAMER

ceivable. The tendency towards a more resolved attitude,
evident here, can be noted in other main themes of the Refor- ·
mation. It is particularly striking in the doctrine of the Holy'
Eucharist. It seems evident that it is Calvin's desire to follow
to their final conclusion the master-ideas of the Reformation.
This movement with regard to the subject now under consideration is only accentuated in the subsequent generations
of Protestantism.
DECLARATIONS

OF FAITH AND ECCLESIASTICAL

CONSTITUTIONS

We shall quote here only one text of ·particular importance
from the Confession of Augsburg. 32 One especially cannot be
passed over in> silence, article twenty-one of the Confes8Wn
which is Lutheranism's first systematic presentation. The
article is entitled De Cultu Sanctorum. " We teach that the
saints should be remembered, so that our _iaith may be strength-,
ened, by the sight of how they obtained grace and how faith
has helped them. Moreover, each according to his state ought
to take their good deeds as an example) just as the emperor in
good conscience may follow the example of David, when making war on the Turks; for both of them hold a royal position;
which obliges them to protect and defend their subjects. But
it cannot be proved by Holy Scripture that we must invoxe
the saints or implore their help. ' For there is but one reconciliator and mediator between God and. man, Jesus Christ,'
who is the only Savior, the only Sovereign, sacrificator, and
mediator between God and man." 33 In summary, then, the
saints 1) present for our consideration the gift of grace, 2) are
our example, 3) ought not, however, to be invoked. All things
are based upon Christ's unique mediation. It is known, of
course, that the Conjes8Wn of Augsburg was drawn up by
Melancthon, with Luther's approval. Nonetheless, it is evident
•• In treating of the declarations of faith and ecclesiastical constitutions, use is
made again of the valuable data furnished by the work of Schimmelpfennig, especially regarding Lutheranism.
••La Confession d' Augsbourg, 1580, trilingual edition (German, ,J'.,atin, French),
Oberlin, Strasbourg, 19 rue des Francs-Bourgeois, p. 86.

PROTESTANTS

AND THE MARIAN DOCTRINE

489

that the position taken is much more reserved than Luther's
own. We cannot examine here jndividually the other confessions of faith. They contain, moreover, substantially the
same doctrine. 84
The Ecclemastical Constitutions, documents concerned with
the discipline of the churches, are interesting especially as testimony of the cult rendered Mary throughout the liturgical year.
Here Luther's idea reappears, sc., the necessity of retaining the
feasts of the Virgin, which are also Christ's feasts, namely, the
Annunciation, the Purification, and the Visitation. In a text
dated 1569, which affects the territory of Pomerania, an indication is given that the feasts of the Assumption and the
Nativity are to be celebrated no longer. This is again quite in
conformity with Luther's view. The suppression, however, was
not accomplished overnight; and it can be proved that these
feasts, in accord with the desire of Luther, disappeared only
progressively. In the statutes of the city of Gorlitz, in 1565,
the following feasts are still provided for: the Assumption, the
Nativity, and the Conception of Mary. 85
In the Lutheran districts care was taken not to offend
popular piety by too radical and sudden reforms. This is a
sign of the more steadfast attachment of these regions to the
Marian cult.
CONTEMPORARY

EXEGESIS

CONCERNING

OF BIBLICAL TEXTS
MARY

As far as present-day Protestant exegesis is concerned, it may
be said that in general Mary appears in the New Testament as
a character of secondary importance. Granted, Mary does
occupy an important place in St. Luke's account of Christ's
infancy; but all this is necessarily modified by the affirmation of
the words of Christ Himself, "Rather, blessed are they who
hear the word of God, and keep it" (Luke 11: 28). The only
meaning of the scene at the foot of the Cross is that which is
"'Cf. Schimmelpfennig, op. cit., pp. 8!l-S4.
••Cf. Schimmelpfennig, op. cit., p. S6.

490

JEROME HAMER

in harmony with the Virgin's most unassuming attitude at the
wedding feast of Cana. Mary has access to her Son only insofar as she is a member of the Christian community. The ties
of blood confer no special privilege upon her. She, too, lived
in the anguish of faith, sharing the same conditions as many
of Jesus' early followers. At the beginning of the Acts of the
Apostles Mary is mentioned as one of those who " persevered in
prayer"; but here again no intimation is given that Mary
occupied a place in the least conspicuous in the midst of the
community of Jerusalem. 86
Although this merely suffices as an outline, one other point
needs to be stressed. It concerns a new and rather strange
interpretation of the 1Cexapir<»pi.V7Jof Luke 1: fl8. Pastor Pierre
Maury, followed on this score by Pastor Hebert Roux, 87 not
only asserts that the translation, "full of grace," is incorrect,
but also-and his exegesis seems hazardous--claims that the
term "in reality signifies pardoned ... that is to say, an
object of an act of divine mercy .... This grace is granted as
a gratuitous favor from a declaration of goodwill, i.e., pardon."
Since this " grace " is opposed to the " fear " mentioned in
verse 30, Pastor Roux comments," What fear, therefore, could
she (Mary) have, if not the fear of every sinful creature before
the Holy God? " 88 Further on the same writer adds, " That
this grace is in no way a special grace, but truly the total grace
which is in Jesus Christ for the remission of sins, reconciliation
with God, and the establishment of His kingdom, all this is
quite evident from the very content of the account of the
Annunciation."
(The italics in these passages are the present
writer's).
This general interpretation corresponds rather well with the
position of contemporary. Protestantism, which denies Mary a
privileged place, and therefore ranks her purely and simply
among the members of sinful humanity. But the problem is
••Cf. Hamer, art. cit., p. 849.
Cf. Bose, Bourguet et al., op. cit., pp. 44 and 77, respectively.
••Ibid., i.e., p. 77.
87

••Ibid.

PROTESTANTS

AND THE MARIAN DOCTRINE

491

not this precisely. Rather it is, can this conclusion be the result
of an exegesis of this text? 40 It might be added, however, that
the interpretation of Pastors Maury and Roux has no support
from the history of exegesis.
For others the sinfulness of Mary is linked with the ceremony
of the Presentation in the Temple and the Purification. In the
words of Max Thurian, "According to the law of Leviticus
(12: 6-8) every woman, after the birth of a son or a daughter,
had to appear in the temple and present to the priest (an
offering) in sacrifice for sin. Therefore, . . . Mary brought a
pigeon as a sacrifice for sin. So it was necessary for her to be
purified, just as any other woman here on earth. She
a
sinner even as others are." 41
CONTEMPORARY

PROTESTANT

SYSTEMATIC

THEOLOGY

With a view toward doing justice to the thought of the
various authors, I have deemed it better to expose separately
the work of three important Protestant theologians, without
proceeding to too hasty syntheses. The three who are to hold
our attention in this matter are Karl Barth, Max Thurian, and
Hans Asmussen. It goes without saying that Barth, because
of the importance of his work, occupies first place.
Since Barth accepts the two dogmas of the Virginal Birth
and the Divine Maternity, we are going to center our exposition
of his thought around them. Barth, then, affirms that the
Virginal Birth is a fact; but what precisely is its significance?
First, it is a miracle accessible to faith alone. It is not, therefore, a miracle which may serve as an argument of credibility.
Neither is it a fact which can be proved, escaping as it does
rational investigation of any kind. This miracle, however,
really belongs to the essential mystery, the Incarnation. Doubtless no causal relationship exists between the miracle and the
' 0 Here I simply state the question with no intention of solving it.
Cf. the
article by P. Lyonnet in Biblica, 1989 (XX), pp. 181-141, "Kaire kekaritomene."
The expression under consideration, K•XO.PLT"1µiv'I/,should be rendered as "privileged
one," understood as a proper " prophetic " name.
"Thurian, art. cit., p. 811.

4

49ft

.TEROME HAMER

mystery. The Virgin Birth is not a" technical" explanation of
the Incarnation. The mystery could have been realized just as
well through a normal birth, the result of the consummation of
a marriage. On the other hand, a Virgin Birth need not necessarily have brought into the world a God. A prophet might
very well have been born of a Virgin. The relation is not
" ontic " (ontological) , but " noetic." The Virgin Birth is a
sign of the Incarnation. Between these two realities there is an
existential link. As a sign, therefore, the Virgin Birth has for
its object to call attention to the Incarnation. But does it
reveal to us the mystery? At the instant "ex Maria Virgine"
· is announced to us, do we know thereby the dogma of a God
made man? Of course not! The· " noetic " role of the sign is
simply to attract attention, to single out the mysterious character of the Incarnation. The Virgin Birth, a sign of the
mystery of the Incarnation, makes known to us some general
characteristics of the Incarnation as mystery. It emphasizes
the divine initiative by showing that man is only present there
as object, and in no way as agent. 42
Secondly, we must determine what in Barth's mind is the
essence of the dogma of the Divine Maternity. The answer is,
nothing more than a sign of the authenticity of the Incarnation.
The theotokos signifies two things: first, that Christ has come
into history, second, that the Son of Mary and the Son of
God are one and the same. Catholic theology, he says, has succeeded in diverting our attention, creating out of the dogma
of Ephesus a Mariological dogma, whereas it is essentially
Christological. Indeed, Mariological doctrine is that which is
distinctive of the Roman Church. It typifies and sums up the
doctrine affirming the cooperation of the human creature in
the work of Redemption. It is this cooperation which is the
Roman " heresy " par excellence. Thus it is not in the least
astonishing that the Church occupies a similar place in the
unfolding of salvation. Catholic ecclesiology, like Mariology, is,
in effect, but an echo of this " heresy." It is no coincidence,
'"Cf. Hamer, art. cit., pp. 858-858.

PROTESTANTS

AND THE MARIAN DOCTRINE

498

therefore, that during the same
both the Immaculate Conception and Papal Infallibility were defined. It is the
duty of Protestant theologians once more to proclaim far and
wide the sovereignty of God. There is but a single mediator,
other than whom no other is conceivable. Revelation and
reconciliation are exclusively the work of God.43
We shall consider two of Max Thurian's articles, the first
written for the volume on Ways of Worship,44 the second on
the occasion of the definition of the dogma of the Assumption. 45
He deals with two separate aspects of Reformed Mariology,
namely, the relationship of Mariology with the doctrine of grace
(quite similar to Barth's concern), and the presence of Mary
in the Church.
Thurian's emphasis on the link between Marian theology and
that of
is helpful fqr the understanding of the
Protestant/position. For Catholicism,, he says, " being is physically (according to its very nature, which changes) in communion with Christ." For Protestantism " it is a question
rather of the dwelling of the Holy Spirit in a nature. which
remains itself sinful, but which serves as an instrument -for
God's work' of sanctification, allowing itself to be conquered
by and subject to Him, all the while being drawn away from
Him by the revolt." 46 Thus there exists a tremendous difference betwen Protestant and Catholic Mariology. For Catholicism," Mary, the physical Mother of Jesus, becomes the Mother
of the faithful in a concrete and direct sense." 47 " Th€ doctrine
of the Immaculate Conception means simply this physical preparation of Mary, which enables her to become the Mother of
God, since she is only capable
Him into her womb
as into a dwelling place which is quite intact." 48 The Protestant position may be summed up as follows. Mary plays
••Cf. Hamer, art. cit., pp. 358-861.

"Art. cit.
••For a summary, cf. Hamer, art. cit.
08 Thurian, art. cit., pp. 810.

''Ibid.
•• Thurian,_ art. cit., p. 811.

494

JEROME HAMER

a role that is elevated, even sublime; she is the instrument of
an extraordinary mission. But Mary is not interiorly adapted
for this role. She remains what she is. "Mary, predestined
fi:-om her mother's womb, was not conceived immaculate, but
was directed infallibly by God, in spite of her sin, to the accomplishment of her role in the mystery of the Incarnation." 0
(italics added) We may say, therefore, that Mary is an instrument, which is not psychologically adapted for the role
which it must fulfill.
The Catholic doctrine on Mary's presence in the Church,
according to Thurian's interpretation, tends to separate Mary
from the body of the Church, from sinful men such as ourselves.
He thinks that this tendency is particularly marked in the two
dogmas of Perpetual Virginity and the Assumption. Furthermore, reformed theology must emphasize the presence and the
testimony of Mary in the Church. To look for Christ only in
the Trinity and in biblical history is an attitude which leads
necessarily to a narrow and individualistic piety.5-0 Christ must
be sought in the Church and in the witnesses of every age. This
does not compromise " the love due to Christ alone; to the
adoration and obedience which are His alone; nor even to His
Sacrifice and His intercession. It is He Who is loved in His
saints, adored when they are venerated, obeyed when their
example is followed." 51 On this score we may summarize
Thurian's position as follows. Mary is present in the Church
to be loved and to lead us to the love of Christ; to be imitated
and to lead us to the imitation of Christ; finally, to be praised
and to lead us to the praise of God. For this reason Thurian
judges that Mary should be included in reformed piety and
worship.
He winds up with an appendix, rather hesitant in tone, on
the legitimacy of intercession in reformed theology. His preceding discussion did not go this far. Thurian was satisfied
merely to ask the question. It seems, however, that his personal
••Ibid.
••Cf. Thurian, art. cit., p. 818.
11 Ibid.

PROTESTANTS

AND THE MARIAN DOCTRINE

495

reply would be affirmative. Intercession constitutes one of the
most solid ties of the Christian community. " If we can invoke
the intercession of our living brethren, why ... should we
not be able to ask the saints departed to pray for us." 62 On
these various points concerning the presence of Mary in the
Church, it may be remarked that Thurian attempts to assert
and show the value of certain doctrinal points within twentieth
century Calvinism, which were quite familiar to Luther, but
which the average Calvinism of our era passes over in silence,
if not attacking outright.
Next we shall outline Thurian's thought regarding the definition of the Assumption and the problem of mediation. First,
he says that in the Catholic Church there is a distinctly
"doketist" tendency. Catholic theology compromises the authenticity of Christ's mediation. The Catholic Church is
actually being carried irresistibly towards " doketism." Her
theology grows weaker in the confession of Christ's Humanity.
In a progressively spiritualised framework Christ moves further
away from us and gives place to Mary. Mary is becoming the
Humanity of Christ. She is assuming the role which belongs to
Christ's Humanity in our salvation. The perfect balance established by the definition of Chalcedon is thus destroyed.
Christo logy is becoming Mario-Christo logy. But this evolution
continues. J\fary, in her turn, is carried upward by this movement. Her Immaculate Conception and her Assumption are
but two stages in this process. Almost imperceptibly, therefore,
Mary is alienated from the level of common humanity. So
much so is this true that sooner or later it will be necessary to
provide for and prepare other substitutes.
Mediation as such, nevertheless, must not be condemned. On
this point Thurian differs sharply from Karl Barth. He asserts
unhesitatingly that Catholic doctrine is a doctrine of mediation
(Word, sacraments, witness, intercession). He goes still further: "The denial of all mediation other than Christ's even
though this is a mediation by Him and in Him, results . . . in
'" 1

Thurian, art. cit., p. 817.

496

JEROME HAMER

the denial of the real mediation of the Christ-God." 53 Thus,
according to Thurian, there is no authentic mediation of Christ
unless it be extended into time and space.
Hans 'Asmussen, like Thurian, belongs to that group of
Protestant theologians who are trying to bring back into prominence the entire positive content of the sixteenth century
Reformation, and who are not satisfied by negation alone. It
is necessary to recognize, moreover, that in this movement they
both tend to overestimate the content of the Reformation in
its traditional sense. Luther would never have permitted the
idea of mediation to be attributed to Mary.
A few years ago Asmussen published in Germany a small
book entitled, Mary, the Mother of God, a work which attained
some notoriety and gave rise to heated co:ritroversy.54 The
central idea of the book is as follows. We must take seriously
the title, Mother of God, and stress its importance. To take
seriously the Divine Maternity means to take grace seriously.
The simple antinomy, God-Man, does not sufficiently explain
everything. Protestantism generally errs on this point. The
texts of the New Testament which deal with grace present quite
another view of the matter (II Pet. 1: 4; I John 3: 2; John 17:
22) . Even though grace is from its beginning divine goodwill,
and then a gift of God, it ends up, nevertheless, as something
in men's hands, administered by the Apostles. The priest or
the minister may find himself at God's side and in the presence
of other men. Likewise, in another order God and His saints
form together a certain unity, and here Mary occupies a special
place. It is the duty of the Church to acknowledge Mary's
place and thereby her role. Before the throne of God Mary is
not only an object of the divine work, but also, in a certain
sense, a subject.
Although, according to Asmussen, Mary is Mediatrix, she is
such in a different sense than that which he attributes to
Catholic theology. Taking up the traditional objection, he
deems that Catholic theology compromises the uniqueness of
••Cf. Hamer, art. cit., p.
•• The main ideas are contained in Hamer, art. cit., pp.

PROTESTANTS

AND THE MARIAN DOCTRINE

497

Christ's mediation. We may gather what his own personal
position is from the following passage. " One who is priest and
mediator cannot be ranked purely and simply with God, nor,
on the other hand, wholly with men. Rather, he represents God
before men, and men before God." 55 Now, according to the
Scriptures, every Christian life implies a priestly element. This
supposes, therefore, the possibility of a mediation in Christ,
excluding all mediation alongside the unique Mediator. Such
mediation in Christ shows quite simply that the work of Redemption has not remained without fruit. It is evident how
much this position is akin to that expressed by Max Thurian
in his second article.
In conclusion, therefore, we may, first of all, essay an evaluation of the importance and relative influence of the authors
studied. Of the three, Karl Barth certainly represents best and
with the most authority the general Protestant position in its
Calvinist purview. On the point at issue here Barth is ordinari]y looked upon as representative of a modern system substantially faithful to Calvin. In this regard, of course, because
of his fidelity to Calvin, Barth is far away from the position
held by Luther. The two others, more closely allied to the
Catholic position on many points, are not so accredited in the
Protestant world. Thurian and Asmussen, the latter even to a
greater extent, in seeking to evaluate and assert the positive
element in the Reformation, in a more traditional sense, sometimes even go beyond (at least on certain questions) the stand
of Luther himself. In the sixteenth century we look in vain for
the acknowledgement of a form of mediation which is not
strictly and exclusively that of Christ. Here classical Protestantism has been satisfied to affirm Christ's mediation and
to defend its absolutely unique character, while rejecting
categorically any other sort, whatever its guise.
Next we may sum up the Protestant position in three theses.
First, Mary is, before all, the object of the grace of the Redemption. Second, she is the exemplar by the· same right as other
'"lbi,d.

498

JEROME

HAMER

witnesses of the faith, who manifest Christ to us. Finally, Mary
is, nevertheless, in no way a subject (in the causal sense) of
the Redemption. Therefore, she is not and cannot be the
partner of the Savior, much less His collaborator as Co-Redemptrix. These three theses represent the via media alluded
to above, of which Karl Barth is an authorized representative.
Thurian and Asmussen would refuse to accept the third thesis
as such. A good re-statement of this average Protestantism are
the words of Jean Bose, which are concerned mainly with the
second thesis. " Mary is first among the witnesses of the grace
of God, but she is solely a witness of grace." 56
CATHOLIC

THEOJ .. OGICAL ATTITUDE

Confronted with this Protestant position I believe that the
mission of Catholic theology is threefold: first, to determine the
extent of agreement; second, to meet by an adequate exposition
of our own theology whatever there is legitimate in the Protestant emphasis upon the unique character of Christ's mediation; finally, to show exactly where the disagreement lies, and
to uncover its cause's and motives.
The three theses just stated facilitate our efforts to appraise
the situation. Unquestionably we can assent to the first two,
precisely in the way in which they are formulated there. On
the other hand, we ought to point out clearly our disaccord
with the third. Concerning the first thesis, let us stress again
that we understand it in its rigorous sense. Mary, as an object
of grace and Redemption, is interiorly transformed by this
divine gift. As to the second, the Catholic theologian may
recognize as legitimate Barth's developments of the idea that
Mary is a sign of the mystery of the Incarnation. Everything
about Mary serves to make known to us the Christ. This is
a point which must necessarily be emphasized.
The Catholic position does not compromise the unique character of the mediation of Christ. Protestants see in any mediation other than Christ's a threat undermining His mediation, a
••An article entitled, " Careme maria!," in the journal Reforme, April 3, UMi4.

PROTESTANTS

AND THE MARIAN DOCTRINE

499

desire to· show the insufficiency in this unique mediation. One
of the most important duties of Catholic theology at this point
is to stress how such an interpretation is based on a misunderstanding. In any work on this question (here I give only the
bare outline for such a work) it would be of primary importance
to show that we have no intention of weakening the force of
St. Paul's words," There is one God, and one mediator of God
and men" (I Tim. 2: 5). Christ is our unique mediator.
Rather the following course must be taken. "Christ alone is
the perfect mediator of God and men." 57 If there are other
mediators, they compete in no way with this unique mediation.
The other mediators can be conceived of only in a subordinate
sense. "However, nothing hinders certain others from being
called mediators, in some respect, between God and man, forasmuch as they cooperate in uniting men to God, dispositively
or ministerially." 58 The mediation of Mary, therefore, is relative to Christ's. As Laurentin says with accuracy, "Mary is
not so much Mediatrix beside the Mediator, as in Him and
through Him." 5 G In no way, therefore, is the mediation of
Mary a supplement of Christ's mediation. She is not given to
us by reason of any insufficiency in Christ's mediation. It is,
on the contrary, by reason of the abundance of the goodness
of God, Who willed to associate Mary in the economy of
divine Providence. 60
What is the basic cause of disagreement? Evidently, as
Thurian himself has well shown, it is the doctrine of grace and
justification. Let us recall here, first of all, the essential distinction between the Catholic position and the Protestant
position on this central point. For Catholic theology the grace
of God is not only His goodwill; it is also a gift which divinizes
us, which heals us of our sin and makes us really and inwardly
••Summa Theol., III, q. 26, a. I, "Solus Christus est perfectus Dei et hominum
mediator."
58 Ibid., " Nihil tamen prohibet aliquos alios secundum quid dici mediatores inter
Deum et hominem: prout scilicet cooperantur ad unionem hominum cum Deo dispositive vel ministerialiter."
•.• Cf. Laurentin, Court traite de theologie marial, Paris, 1964, p. 102.
••On this point, cf. Summa Theol.,, I, q. H, a. S.

500

JEROME HAMF..R

children of God. In the Protestant view, on the contrary, grace
is an act of God, His favor, which does not bring about a
divinization. Here is an authorized expression of this view.
" The grace of God is the act by means of which a person condemned to death receives reprieve ... the non-obligatory and
unmerited act of his acquittal. . . . The word ' justification,'
as the antithesis of ' condemnation ' or ' reprobation,' expresses
the decision by which God acquits those who merit eternal
death." 61 (italics added) What was said earlier with respect
to Max Thurian must also be borne in mind. For him justification is not a transformation of man by God, but an indwelling of the Holy Ghost in sinful man. 62 We see, therefore, that
the Catholic theology of man's cooperation in the work of
salvation is wholly subordinated to this theology of grace.
Where grace is not a gift it is impossible to have any cooperation in the work of the Redemption, since this cooperation has
as its sole basis the grace that is in us and given to us
continually by God.
The criticism of the Protestant position ought to be both
scriptural and theological. Regarding the scriptural criticism,
it may first be asked, is the Protestant notion of justification
the biblical notion? Exegetes (even Protestants) are more and
more coming to agree that Luther's interpretation on this
score is biased and, therefore, distorted. Luther passes over all
the realism of justification in St. Paul.ea
01 " Catholicisme
et protestantisme. Lettre pastorale du Synode generale de
l'Eglise Reformee des Pays:Bas sur l'Eglise Catholique Romaine," La Revue Reformee, n. 11/12, 1952/8-4, t. III.
•• Another good exposition of the Protestant view of justification may be found
in the work of H. Strohl, Protestant theologian and historian, La Pensee de la
Rijorme, Neuchatel and Paris, 1951, pp. 85-91.
••For the study of this important subject the following may be of use: S.
Lyonnet, "De 'justitia' in Epistula ad Romanos," Verbum Domini, 1947 t. XXV,
pp. !!S-84, 118-121, 129-144, 198-208, 257-268. This article may be obtained in a
separate volume: Rome, Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1947, pp. 52; also a summary
containing the main ideas of the work in Ephemerides theol. lov., 1947. t. XXIII,
p. 461 (Lucien Cerfaux); by the same author, "De Rom. S: SO et 4: 8-5 in Concilio
Tridentino et apud S. Robertum Bellarminum," Verbum Domini, 1951, t. XXIX, pp.
88-97; some interesting observations also on the part of Bouyer, L., Du Protutantisme a l'Eglise, Paris, 1954. This last is a more summary treatment.

PROTESTANTS

AND THE MARIAN DOCTRINE

501

The theological criticism ought to revolve around the pivotal
notion of grace, and also around that of cooperation. The
theologian's role will be to show how Catholic theology has
understood better these two notions in the whole of the divine
plan as revealed to us.
Concerning the notion of grace, it seems that the direction
to be followed is that stated in the Summa Theologiae, I-II, q.
110, a. 1, where St. Thomas treats of the creative character
of God's love. Protestants rather conceive of the love of God
as if it were a human love. In reality the love of God is the
cause of the goodness of things. Thus one may say that in
Protestantism there is a latent anthropormorphic tendency.
With regard to the notion of cooperation, the background is
furnished by St. Thomas in the Summa, I, q. 22, a. 3 and q. 103,
a. 6. Here we must not lose sight of the fact that for Karl
Barth the Catholic thesis of cooperation in the work of Redemption is, according to the expression of Turrettini, which
Barth adopted as his own, a substitution of the creature for
the Creator. "Quid est creaturam loco creatoris ponere, si hoc
non est? " 64 For the Protestant the collaboration of man in
the work of God denotes a diminution of divine power. For
the Catholic, however, this collaboration is an eminent manifestation of the omnipotence and infinite goodness of God. God
governs beings through intermediaries not because He has need
of such to complete His power but by virtue of His bounty,'
which confers the dignity of causality upon His creatures. 65
The problem posed by the cooperation of man in the work of
grace is of exactly the same proportion as that of the relationship of the Mass to the Cross. For Protestants the Catholic
conception of the Eucharist is a denial of the " once for all "
of Golgotha. 66 Catholics, they say, would add the Mass to the
••Cf. "Repercussions du dogme de l'Assomption hors de l'Eglise catholique,"
Dooomentation catkolique, n. 1089, Feb. 25, 1951, col. 185.
••Cf. Summa Tkeol., I, q. 22, a. S, "Non propter defectum suae virtutis, sed
propter abundantiam suae bonitatis ut dignitatem causalitatis etiam creaturis communicet."
•• Cf. note 61 above.

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JEROME HAMER

Cross because Calvary is insufficient. However, according to
orthodox Catholic theology the contrary is true. It is from the
superabundance of grace effected by the unique Sacrifice of
the Cross that the Mass draws all its power. The Sacrifice of
the Mass is not an autonomous sacrifice independent of the
Sacrifice of the Cross. Evidently the same principle may be
applied here too, propter abundantiam suae bonitatis.
In the field of criticism of Protestant theology, Mariology is
valuable as a touch-stone. It is the sign of a theology which
has maintained true balance regarding the revealed data.
"Thus it is in the cult of the Virgin that today, even as at
Ephesus in 481, we shall find the touch-stone of both theoretic
and practical attitudes of one Church or another with respect
to the most vital problems of the Gospel: What relationship
ought we to suppose exists between man and God, between
nature and grace, in the authorship and in the work of
salvation." 67
JEROME HAMER,

o: P.

College theologique
La Sarte (Huy)
Belgium

"L. Bouyer, Le Culte de la Mere de Dieu dans l'Eglise catholique, Chevetogne,
1960, p. 8.

THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

I

T IS not immediately evident why anyone is interested in
the subject of metaphysics. The physical world is so much
with us, it contains so much to attract our attention and
to excite our wonder and curiosity, that we could be well occupied with it for a lifetime; Particularly in this atomic age
which is just beginning, it might seem that the center of attention is and should be focused on physical reality and on physical
science.
But even in this age of theoretical and applied physics, men
are still human. We naturally desire to understand not only
the intimate details of the parts of things, but also the general
and ultimate reasons of the whole. An inquiry which is concerned with the whole of reality and its ultimate reasons or
causes is called metaphysics-whether we like it or not.
THE PROBLEM

Let us suppose that we do not like it. Is it not entirely too
pretentious? Where could such an inquiry begin? If it is to
be conducted in an orderly way, there must be a reasonable
approach to the whole through its parts. Certainly we cannot
attain, a genuine understanding of everything all at once and
nothing first. What part can we begin to consider with the reasonable hope of attaining through it a certain and systematic
grasp of the whole?
This is a question of no little importance, and one very difficult to answer. Unless there is a starting point for metaphysics, there simply is no genuine metaphysics. This, of course,
is what many persons have said and are saying: there is no
room for metaphysics. In physics we are already studying the
only reality presented to us. We have begun as best we can
with the parts which are accessible to us. Surely we have no
503

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WILLIAM

H. KANE

reason to expect that the work will be done and the whole
explained in our lifetime.
On the other hand, some persons still insist tp.at there is
need for metaphysics, and they believe that such an inquiry is
both reasonable and reasonably fruitful. Unfortunately they
do not agree on the starting point of metaphysics, nor on how
this is to be established. Among recent authors a complete
spectrum of opinions has been proposed. Even those who agree
in saying that common being is the subject of metaphysics
often disagree in their explanations of the term. Some hold it
· is common to everything which is or can be, whether real or
not real; others hold that it is common to all the real, whether
Creator or creature; others that it is common to all created
things, whether corporeal or spiritual; others that it is common
to all· sensory things, whether substances or acCidents; others
that it is common only to the individual self and one's own
characteristics.
Where there are so many different answers to a qµestion, it
is likely that there is some confusion about ·the sense "of the
question itself; Just what do we mean. when we ask about the
subject of metaphysics? What do we mean by the subject of a
science? And what is science?
THE LOGICAL APPROACH

Science, we are sure, is genuine knowhig.1 Whether we have
it or not, we know what we mean: knowledge of the reason,
or cause of something, as the proper cause of that thing and
no other, and that it cannot be otherwise. Each one of us
thinks he knows some things in this way, and this is what we
mean by science in the sense of genuine knowing.
Such knowledge is not attained without certain
or ,pre-requisites. We must already know that certain things
are, and what they are, before we can proceed to kno.w something else in a scientific way. 2 Whether we consider science as
1

Arist., Poat. An., Bk. I, Ch. 2, 7Ib, 9.

•Op. cit., 71a 11.

THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

505

a single act of reason attaining an object in a scientific way, or
as a systematic habit of such knowing, we must have previous
knowledge of certain principles, whether general or special, and
also a subject of consideration or inquiry. We must be assured
that the principles are true, 3 and know that the subject is, and
what it is. Without principles known to be true we do not
know anything perfectly. We cannot know what a subject is
unless we know previously or concomitantly that it is.4 Furthermore;. we do not as a rule attain scientific knowledge by
our own unaided efforts, but usually with the help of a teacher
or textbook, and so we need to know also the meaning of the
words employed to express the facts and reasoned facts of the
science.
There are, therefore, three elements which enter into the
constitution of every science: the principles, the subject, and
the attributes which are proved of the subject. 5 Before we can
proceed to the attainment of scientific knowledge in the sense
of genuine knowing, we must already know (or reasonably
believe) that the principles are true, both the common axioms
and the special principles or postula:tes of the science; we must
know that the 11ubject is, and what it is; and we must know
at least the meaning of the words by which the attributes of
the subject are signified.
Let us consider more carefully what is meant by the subject
of a science, in the sense of a habit of conclusions, not just a
single act. It is a subject of inquiry; indeed of scientific inquiry:
something which is knowable in a scientific way. If it is knowable speculatively, theoretically, it is something which is not
under man's power: 6 something which man can neither make
nor do, but only understand theoretically. It is something
which can be analyzed or resolved into its proper principles,
• Op. cit., 71b U.
• Op. cit., 92b 5.
• Op. cit., 75a 40.
• Speculativarum vero scientiarum materiam oportet esse res quae nostro opere
non fiunt ... et secundum harum rerum distinctionem oportet scientias speculativas
distingui (St. Thom., In Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 1, c.).

506

WILLIAM

H. KANE

causes or elements, 7 and which can be defined in terms of its
own proper principles, whether intrinsic or extrinsic. It is not
an individual sensory thing as such, but a nature as such, and
not specific but generic: a supreme genus. 8 It is something
which is a starting point in a science-the starting point, to be
exact, because it is the center which first attracts our attention.
It is something which can be pointed out to a beginner without
too great difficulty: something which does not presuppose an
extensive knowledge of the science, but which allows the development of the whole science.
When we consider the subject of a science before beginning
the science itself, we are considering the subject as subject,
not the subject as it is in itself. Our question is about the subject as something knowable, not as known; it is about something which is later to be explained, not about something which
is already explained or in the process of being explained. We
are asking whether there is something knowable in such a way
as to specify a special science; we are not yet asking what this
thing is in itself. It is like asking whether there is something
visible, that is, something sensible in such a way as to specify
vision, and to distinguish vision from hearing or smelling; not
like asking what it is which is seen or heard or smelled.
Before we can dissect a cat, we must first catch the cat.
When we are seeking the subject of metaphysics we are, metaphorically speaking, in search of a metaphysical cat: something which we can analyze rationally and through which we
can develop the whole science of metaphysics.
Is there, then, a subject for metaphysics? Is there something
which can be known metaphysically, that is, something which
can be known in a way which is irreducibly different from the
physical and mathematical ways of knowing, and which has its
own first principles distinct from the first principles of the
physical and mathematical sciences?
• In omnibu8 scientiis quarum sunt principia aut causae aut elementa, intellectus
scientia procedit ex cognitione principiorum, causarum et elementorum (St. Thom.,
l Physic., lect. 1, 8, ed. Pirotta).
8 Po11t. An., 87a 87.

THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

507

One way of solving this question is to consider whether there
are genuine problems which are not usually discussed in any
of the special sciences. From this point of view it is easy to
see that there are many problems which are not solved in the
special sciences, and that these are problems which concern
the whole of reality. Our most universal concepts and principles: being and not-being; the one and the many; the whole
and the part; substance and attributes; cause and effect; the
true and the good-concerning all of these things there are
urgent and difficult problems which are not usually discussed
in any of the special sciences. Indeed there is no more reason
to discuss them in one special science rather than another, in
physics rather than mathematics. 9 Nor can we say that these
things are sufficiently well known, because they bristle with
difficulties which challenge our understanding. 10 How can there
be any truth if there is nothing stable? How can there be anything stable if everything is in motion or changing? Is not
being one, and not-being nothing? How then can there be
many beings? How is motion possible if things are infinitely
divisible? Is not the part as great as the whole, if each is
infinite? How can the present determine the future, if everything is indetermined? Such questions as these are not usually
discussed in the special sciences. These sciences treat of particular kinds of things, and they employ the general concepts
and principles of reasoning only so far as their own particular
subject matters require. 11
Yet it is a fact both of experience and of history that physicists who think that all beings are sensory or corporeal beings
do discuss these general problems about the whole of reality. 12
•Nee iterum in una aliqua particulari scientia tractari debent: ... pari ratione
in qualibet particulari scientia tractarentur (St. Thom., Prooem. Metaphya., ed.
Cathala).
10 Hujusmodi autem non debent omnino indeterminata
remanere, cum sine his
completa cognitio de his quae sunt propria alicui generi vel speciei haberi non
possit (ibid.) .
11 Post. An., 75a S7.
11 Quidam tamen naturalium de his se intromiserunt; et hoc non sine ratione.
Antiqui enim non opinabantur aliquam substantiam esse praeter substantiam cor-

5

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WILLIAM

H. KANE

Nor can we say that these questions cannot be solved by the
methods of the physical or mathematical sciences-at least not
before we establish the possibility of some other kind of science.
Scientific methods are not prison bars behind which a scientist
encloses himself, but rather instruments of investigation which
are to be used reasonably for what they are worth, and are to
be supplemented as best we can whenever necessary.
THE APPROACH

THROUGH PHYSICS

Hence if we wish to proceed rationally and not build upon
faith, we have no other choice than to begin our philosophical
inquiry by considering natural beings 13 which manifestly have
in themselves the proper principles and causes of their own
distinctive behavior. Hand in hand with these investigations
we can develop mathematics, both in theory and in applicapoream mobilem, de qua physicus tractat. Et ideo creditum est quod soli determinent de tota natura, et per consequens de ente, et ita etiam de primis principiis
quae sunt simul consideranda cum ente. Hoc autem falsum est ... cum probatum
sit in octavo Physicorum esse aliquod ens immobile (IV Metaphys., lect. 5, 598).
13 Post. An., 7Sa. We note also the following:
Innata est nobis via ut procedamus incipiendo ab iis quae sunt nobis magis nota
in ea quae sunt magis nota naturae. . . . Et quia iste est naturalis modus sive ordo
addiscendi, ut veniatur a nobis notis ad ignota nobis: inde est quod oportet nos
devenire ex notioribus nobis ad notiora naturae. . . . Nos procedimus intelligerido
de potentia in actum; et principium cognitionis nostrae est a sensibilibus, quae sunt
materialia et intelligibilia in potentia; unde ilia sunt prius nobis nota quam substantiae separatae qu.ae sunt magis notae secundum naturam (I Physic., lect. I,
15-18).
Magis universalia secundum simplicem apprehensionem sunt primo nota, nam
primo in intellectu cadit ens. . . . Sed quantum ad investigationem naturalium
proprietatum et causarum, prius sunt nota minus communia; eo quod per causas
particulares quae sunt unius generis vel speciei pervenimus in causas universales.
Ea .autem quae sunt universalia in causando sunt posterius nota quoad nos, licet
sint prius nota secundum naturarn; quamvis universalia per praedicationem sint
aliquo modo prius quoad nos. nota quam minus universalia, licet non prius nota
quam singularia; nam cognitio sensus qui est cognoscitivus singularium in nobis
praecedit cognitionem intellectivam quae est universalium. . . . Illa enim quae sunt
a materia penitus separata secundum esse, sicut substantiae immateriales, sunt
magis difficilia nobis ad cognoscendum quam etiam universalia; et ideo ista scientia
quae sapientia dicitur quamvis sit prima in dignitate est tamen ultima in addiscendo
(I Metaphys., lect. S, 46).

THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

509

tion. In physics it can readily be demonstrated that although
motion is common to all mobile beings, and each may be mover
or moved, still motion is in the mobile as such, not in the mover
as such. 14 The mobile requires a mover in order to be moved,
and the mover moved (supreme genus) requires a mover unmoved.15 This in an important conclusion of physical science.
It is not the conclusion of a demonstration in the strict sensenot knowledge of a reasoned fact-but simply knowledge of a
fact attained by reasoning from an effect,16 motion in the
mobile, to the truth that there is or exists a mover unmoved
beside the whole genus of movers moved. The subject matter
of physical science requires that we use our most general concepts and principles thus far to determine that there is a first
cause or principle of motion which is a mover unmoved. 17 At
this point we see at least that not every being is a mobile being,
and we know that the science of mobile being is not the science
of all reality.
Likewise when we consider man in natural science and determine that the human form is an intellective soul, and that the
act of human intellection is subjectively independent of physical matter, 18 we see that this form is separable from matter,
and can be apart from sensory matter and motion. But to con"Non est necessarium quod docens addiscat vel quod agens patiatur .... Et
ideo, etiam dato quod agere et pati sint idem, cum non sint idem ratione ut dictum
est, non sequitur quod cuicumque convenit agere quod ei conveniat pati. (Ill Physic.,
lect. 5., 612).
10 Accipiatur
igitur aliquid quod movetur secundum locum; hoc movetur ab
altero; aut ergo illud alterum movetur aut non. Si non movetur, habetur propositum,
scilicet quod aliquid sit movens immobile, quod est proprietas primi moventis. Si
autem ipsum movens movetur, oportet quod moveatur ab altero movente; et hoc
iterum movens, si et ipsum movetur, movetur ab altero. Sed hoc non potest
procedere in infinitum, sed oportet in aliquo stare. Erit ergo aliquid primum
movens, quod erit prima causa motus, ita scilicet quod ipsum non movetur sed
movet alia (VII Physic., lect. 2, 1782).
16 Post. An., 78a 22.
17 In naturalibus
oportet semper supremam causam uniuscujusque requirere
procedere usque ad causam supremam; et hoc ideo est quia effectus nescitur nisi
sciatur causa ... quousque perveniatur ad primam causam (II PP,ysic., lect. 6, 896).
18 Terminus considerationis scientiae naturalis est circa formas quae quidem sunt
aliquo modo separatae, sed tamen esse habent in materia. Et hujusmodi formae

510

WILLIAM

H. KANE

sider what the form is which is separated from matter, or what
the unmoved mover is, does not pertain to physical science.19
It is because not all beings are mobile beings that physical
science cannot give us the whole story, nor even the principal
part of it. In natural science we consider all that is proper to
mobile beings as such: their general principles, causes, properties and elements, the various species both living and nonliving, with all their properties and interrelations. But we do
not in physics consider the unmoved as such, nor substance
as such, nor accident as such, nor cause as such, nor the whole
or the part as such, nor the first principles of demonstration.
All these things and many others pertain to a science which
is distinct from physics and the other special sciences. This
science is rightly called metaphysics, 20 because it treats of those
things which remain to be considered after physics and the
special sciences.
But in metaphysics we must treat of these things in an
orderly way. We do indeed consider common being and its
many attributes, its first principles and causes and the immaterial beings. But not all these can be considered as the subject of the science, which is a very special consideration. 21
A SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM
As we have seen from logic, the subject of metaphysics is
something which is analyzable in a metaphysical way, that is,
in a way which is genuinely scientific yet distinct from the
ways of knowing proper to the other sciences. It is something
sunt animae rationales; quae quidem sunt separatae inquantum intellectiva virtus
non est actus alicujus organi corporalis, sicut virtus visiva est actus oculi; sed in
materia sunt in quantum dant 1¥!Se naturale tali corpori op. cit., lect. 4, 855).
19 Sed quomodo se habeant formae totaliter a materia separatae et quid sint, vel
etiam quomodo se habeat haec forma, idest anima, rationalis, secundum quod est
separabilis et sine corpore existere potens, et quid sit secundum suam essentiam
separabile, hoc determinare pertinet ad philosophum primum (loc. cit., 857) .
•• Metaphysica (dicitur) in quantum considerat ens et ea quae consequuntur
ipsum. Haec enim transphysica inveniuntur in via resolutionis, sicut magis communia post minus communia (Prooem. Metaphys.).
21 Non taJ11en considerat quodlibet eorum ut subjectum (loc. cit.).

THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

511

which presupposes the knowledge that not all beings are material beings, or that there are both material and immaterial
beings.22 If all beings were material beings, then physics would
be first philosophy; there would be no metaphysics, and the reasons of the whole of reality would have to be rendered by
physics. But after we know that there are both material and
i:m.material beings, the subject of metaphysics can be estabfoihed, or at least pointed out, without great difficulty. It is
something which has firm and solid being in itself, 23 without
admixture of privation or negation; something neither dark nor
dim nor difficult to grasp, but rather bright and stable for
the understanding, capable of being rationally analyzed into its
own proper principles and allowing the orderly development of
the whole science. In Thomistic terminology this subject is
called common being,24 that is, being as such or being as being.
By being we mean that which is.25 This is the intelligible,
the object of intellect. 20 The being which is first known to us
is apprehended in a very imperfect and confused way, like a
luminous fog before the mind. Yet this first knowledge of being
is the beginning of human wisdom, and its light reaches from
end to end. In an implicit, confused and virtual way it encom•• Quaedam vero speculabilia sunt quae non dependent a materia secundum esse,
quia sine materia esse possunt, sive nunquam sint in materia ... sive in quibusdam
sint in materia et in quibusdam non, ut substantia, qualitas, ens, potentia, actus,
unum et multa, et hujusmodi, de quibus omnibus est theologia, id est scientia
divina, quia praecipuum in ea cognitorum est Deus, quae alio nomine dicitur metaphysica, id est trans physicam, quia post physicam discenda occurrit nobis, quibus
ex sensibilibus oportet in insensibilia devenire (in Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 1, c.).
•• Quartum autem genus est quod est perfectissimum, quod scilicet habet esse
in natura absque admixtione privationis, et habet esse firmum et solidum, quasi per
se existens, sicut sunt substantiae (IV Metaphys., Iect. 1, 548).
•• lpsum solum ens commune (op. cit., prooem.). Dicit autem "secundum quod
est ens " quia scientiae aliae quae sunt de entibus particularibus· considerant quidem
de ente, cum omnia subjecta scientiarum sint entia, non ta.men considerant ens
secundum quod ens, sed secundum quod est hujusmodi ens, scilicet vel numerus,
vel Iinea, vel ignis aut aliquid hujusmodi (IV Metaphys., lect. 1, 580).
•• Hoc nomen ens quod imponitur ab ipso esse, significat idem cum nomine quod
imponitur ab ipsa essentia (ibid., lect. 2, 558).
•• In prima quidem operatione est aliquod primum quod cadit in conceptione
intellectus, scilicet hoc quod dico ens (ibid., lect. 6, 605).

512

WILLIAM

H. KANE

passes everything, somehow even God, because the aspect of
being is most universal and all-inclusive. Through sensory
experience we are presented with many objects for understanding, and we proceed to understand being more explicitly and
distinctly: we see and assert that this is not that, that being
is not not-being. This knowledge of being and not-being is
proper to man: it is the knowledge of being possessed by a
human being with the aid of sensory experience.
The proper object of the human intellect is the essence or
quiddity or necessary core of sensory being, understood as
being or that which is.21 After we have attained explicit and
distinct knowledge of many different kinds of material beings,
and have learned also that immaterial beings exist, then we
can generalize this knowledge in a universal concept including
both material and immaterial beings. 28 Furthermore, by leaving out of consideration all differences of material beings both
living and non-living we can conceive substantial being or substance simply as a nature: the nature of that which is, whether
material or immaterial. In this concept we express being as
the ultimate intelligible in an implicit way, and substance as
such in an explicit way: we cannot cut anything off from the
ultimate intelligible, but we can conceive many other things
explicitly, and with distinct and proper concepts. Substantial
07 Intellectus cognoscit naturam speciei sive quod quid est directe (III de Anima,
Iect. 8, 718) .
28 In his autem
quae secundum esse possunt esse divisa, magis habet locum
separatio quam abstractio. . . . Substantia autem quae est materia intelligibilis
quantitatis potest esse sine quantitate. Unde considerare substantiam sine quantitate magis pertinet ad genus separationis quam abstractionis. Sic ergo in operatione intellectus triplex distinctio invenitur: una secundum operationem intellectus
componentis et dividentis, quae separatio dicitur proprie, et haec competit scientiae
divinae sive metaphysicae; alia secundum operationem qua formantur quidditates
rerum, quae est abstractio formae a materia sensibili, et haec competit mathematicae;
tertia secundum eamdem operationem universalis a particulari, et haec competit
etiam physicae, et est communis omnibus scientiis, quia in omni scientia praetermittitur quod per accidens est, et accipitur quod per se est. Et quia quidam non
intellexerunt differentiam duarum ultimarum a prima, inciderunt in errorem, ut
ponerent mathematica et universalia a sensibilibus separata (in Boet. de Trin.,
q. 5, a. 8, c.).

THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

513

being as such has proper accidents and attributes, and it has
proper principles and causes, both intrinsic and extrinsic. The
extrinsic causes of substantial being are indeed the First Principle, which is itself the Supreme Being. 29 All these things are
treated in an orderly way in the science of metaphysics, but to
manifest the logical order we must first determine the subject
of the science.
At the beginning of metaphysics we do not suppose that we
already know the first principles or ultimate causes of things.
Rather we are searching for the first principles and causes of
everything which we already know in some explicit way,
whether distinctly or imperfectly. In a word, we desire to know
the first principles and causes of common being as such, whether
material or immaterial. But the subject of a science is that
which has first principles and causes through which it is knowable scientifically, 30 into which it is rationally resolvable,
through which it is definable, which are the reasons for its
being and its attributes. The subject of a science accessible in
the light of human reason is not the first principles themselves,
nor is it one or another of the attributes. Rather it is that
which has first principles and causes or elements into which it
is resolvable, and it is that which has attributes which can be
demonstrated of it. This is the case in all the sciences: m
physics and in mathematics. Therefore, the subject of metaphysics is common being as such, not the first principles, nor
God, nor the separated substances, nor the attributes of common being.
Common being as such in some way includes both substances
•• Arist., Met., Bk. XII, Ch. 7,
11.
00 Hoc enim est subjectum
in scientia cujus causas et passiones quaerimus, non
autem ipsae causae alicujus generis quaesiti (Prooem. Metaphys.). Nos quaerimus
prima principia rerum et altissimas causas, sicut in primo dictum est; ergo sunt
per se causa alicujus naturae. Sed nonnisi entis. Quod ex hoc patet, quia omnes
philosophi elementa quaerentes secundum quod sunt entia, quaerebant hujusmodi
principia, scilicet prima et altissima; ergo in hac scientia nos quaerimus principia
entis in quantum est ens: ergo ens est subjectum hujus scientiae; quia quaelibet
scientia est quaerens causas proprias sui subjecti (IV Metaphys., lect. 1, 533).

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H. KANE

and accidents, whether material or immaterial. 31 But subs-tance
is being simply and primarily, explicitly and distinctly known.
Considering the order of our knowledge, other things are first
called beings by analogy of attribution because of their diverse
references to one and the same thing, namely, substance. 32 Substance is one, not merely in the sense of a common form of
understanding, but as a certain nature. It is a genus which in a
certain way is common to all substances, whether material or
immaterial, and it is the subject with respect to which proper
accidents and attributes are referred. Hence the primary subject of metaphysics is substantial being as such, common to
material and immaterial beings. Common being which is a
genus of things is the subject genus of the science of metaphysics.
A substance has proper accidents which are in it or by which
it is related to something else, and these are said to be with
reference to substance. 33 Qualities and quantities, for example,
are said to he inasmuch as they are in a substance; motions and
generations are said to be inasmuch as they tend to substance
or to something in a substance; privations and negations are
said to he inasmuch as they remove substance or something
from a substance. Each of these depends upon substance in
order to he: substance is their common subject, and they are
81 Quaecumque communiter unius recipiunt praedicationem, licet non univoce sed
analogice de his praedicetur, pertinent ad unius scientiae considerationem; sed ens
hoc modo praedicatur de omnibus entibus; ergo omnia entia pertinent ad considerationem unius scientiae, quae considerat ens in quantum est ens, scilicet tam
substantias quam accidentia (lac. cit., 584) .
•• Illud unum ad quod diversae habitudines referuntur in analogicis est unum
numero, et non solum unum ratione, sicut est unum illud quod per nomen univocum
designatur. Et ideo dicit quod ens etsi dicatur multipliciter, non tamen dicitur
aequivoce, sed per respectum ad unum; non quidem ad unum quod sit solum
ratione unum, sed quod est unum sicut una quaedam natura (ibid., 586).
88 Ens multipliciter dicitur. Sed tamen omne ens dicitur per respectum ad unum
primum. Sed hoc primum non est finis vel efficiens . . . sed subjectum. Alia enim
dicuntur entia vel esse, quia per se habent esse sicut substantiae, quae principaliter
et prius entia dicuntur (ibid., 589). Et ad hoc sicut ad primum et principale omnia
alia referuntur (ibid., 548). Sed substantia est hoc primum inter omnia entia
(ibid., 546).

THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

515

called bemgs with reference to substance by analogy of attribution, just as diverse things are called healthy with reference
to one thing which in this case is the health of the organism.
In cases such as these we consider in one and the same science
both that which is primary and all that is secondary but which
depends upon the first and is named after the first. For example, with reference to the art of medicine we consider primarily the art itself of the medical man, and secondarily his
medicines or medical instruments. In like manner the subject
of metaphysics includes both substances and accidents, whether
material or immaterial, but the substance principally and the
accidents secondarily. Common being understood in this way,
that is, as including both the substance and the accidents which
can be without matter and which are named with the same
name by analogy of attribution, is the proper or formal subject
of metaphysics.
In regard to this common being, or beings, we desire to know
the first principles or causes of being. In metaphysics we consider common being-primarily the substance and secondarily
the accidents-as being, that is, as having or manifesting the
ultimate reasons to be. This act of existing, this" to be" which
is found in everything, yet ne'7er twice the same, but diversely
in diverse things, which is in both substance and accidents,
caused in accidents by their substances, derived by the substance from some ultimate principles and causes of being: this
is the formal aspect under which the subject of metaphysics is
considered, in the light of which the whole inquiry proceeds.
In metaphysics we do not consider the different species of
common being: 84 this is the task of the special sciences. But
in the most general science we consider common being-substance and accidents whether material or immaterial-and
whatever is proper to common being, and we consider it precisely as being or under the aspect of being, that is, inasmuch
•• Nam omnes substantiae inquantum aunt entia vel substantiae pertinent ad
considerationem hujus scientiae: inquantum autem aunt talis vel talis substantia,
ut leo vel hos, pertinent ad scientias speciales (ibid., 647).

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WILLIAM

H. KANE

as it has first principles and causes on which it depends in
order to be. We wish to determine the relation of common
being with respect to its ultimate reasons to be, both intrinsic
and extrinsic. This is the most important and the most difficult problem of metaphysics.
After we have determined the subject of metaphysics, but
before we proceed to develop the science itself, we must consider the other prerequisites of the science, namely, the truth of
our first principles of demonstration, and the names of the
attributes and other elements of the science. We must explain
and defend the validity of our knowledge of common being at
both extremes, the intellectual and the sensory, 35 and we must
determine the meanings of the names for all the elements of
the science. 36 This consideration of names is important particularly in metaphysics, because the same name is used to signify
diverse conceptions, and in this science things are said to be
in many different ways, although in a certain order wherein
something is principal and something secondary.
At this point we are ready to begin the science of metaphysics itself. 37 We must manifest the division of our subject
both from the subjects of other sciences and in itself also, in
order to see what needs to be considered, and in what sequence,
and how things are to be defined with respect to their reasons
to be.
METAPHYSICS

IN RELATION

TO THE OTHER SCIENCES

From these considerations it is clear that metaphysics as well
as physics is solidly based on the realities of sensory experience.
Both sciences require a skillful use of reason on the part of the
student, and this can be acquired through the discipline of the
liberal arts. In the order of learning, metaphysics naturally
35 Philosophi erit considerare de omni substantia
inquantum hujusmodi, et de
primis syllogismorum principiis (ibid., 595).
•• Distinguit intentiones nominum quae in hujus scientiae consideratione cadunt
(ibid., 749).
87 Incipit de ente determinare, et de aliis quae consequuntur ad ens (VI Metaphya.,
lect. I, 1144).

THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

517

follows upon physics, because causes which are nearer to sense
are known before those which are remote from sensory experience. Yet this is not to say that metaphysics is intrinsically or
doctrinally dependent upon the conclusions of physics. Through
physics itself and beyond physics we see the possibility of a
higher wisdom, for which we must make a new departure.
Contrasted with physics and mathematics, metaphysics is
very simple indeed. Here there is no galaxy of species with
their hosts of properties and interrelations to be consideredthis is the business of the special sciences. When we are ready
to develop metaphysics, we can and should begin without
assuming anything whatever. We simply accept the being and
not-being which is presented to us through sensory experience.
We naturally separate or divide not-being from being by the
judgment of the intellect, and we distinguish the intentional
being of our knowledge from the being which things have in
themselves, which we know directly. We distinguish one and
many, substance and cause. We separate or differentiate immaterial beings from material ones, and we abstract the essential
from the accidental. We neglect all the individual and specific
differences of things in order to concentrate our attention on
being as such, which is primarily the generic nature called substance taken together with a few secondary natures such as
qualities and relations, each with its reasons to be. We define
the nature of substance and accident in terms of genus and
difference, matter and form, potency and act, and consider each
with respect to its reasons to be. Then we manifest the attributes of common being by orderly explication, not by demonstrating through extrinsic causes as we do in physics. Finally,
by reasoning from sensory effect to cause in various ways and
according to distinct orders of causality, we arrive at the wonderful truth that there is a first efficient, exemplary and final
cause which is the First Principle of being as such, which itself
is above common being and all the modes of common being.
This is a fortunate discovery on our part, and quite unforeseen,
It is attained through effects which are contingent beings, not

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WILLIAM

H. KANE

necessary ones, and which are utterly insufficient to manifest
the proper nature of the First Cause. By many analogies we
try to explain a few of the sublime attributes of this First
Cause, and of the separated or spiritual substances also, and we
try to grasp the teleological order of common being with respect
to the inner harmony of creatures and their relation to the
transcendent end.
REPLY TO SoME DIFFICULTIES

Because metaphysics is simple in comparison with the other
sciences and is concerned only with the most general aspects
of things, and with their most general principles, one might be
led to think that it could or should be learned first, before any
of the special sciences.
But what is simple in itself is not therefore easy for us to
understand, nor is it always :first in the natural order of learning. The immense treasures of ordinary and pre-scientific
knowledge are indeed sufficient for human life, if not for our
well-being, and they contain sufficient matter for metaphysics
itself. But these treasures are held largely in an implicit and
confused way, not in an explicit, clear or orderly way. It is
difficult for us to put order in our knowledge, because this requires the deliberate effort of reflection and the application of
certain guiding principles. Yet it is this logical order of concepts, judgments, principles and conclusions which makes the
essential difference between scientific knowledge and mere ordinary knowledge. It is very difficult to learn two things at once,
such as the correct or logical method and another science, and
so the student should learn logic :first, that is, general logic.
The special methods of the various sciences should be considered near the beginning of each.
But does not ordinary knowledge together with the help of
logic suffice for beginning metaphysics? In metaphysics we consider being and not-being, the one and the many, substance,
cause and things of this sort, which are known even by children.
Therefore it does not seem necessary to approach metaphysics

THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

519

through the special sciences. If metaphysics is a science in its
own right it must have its own self-evident principles, and it
must be independent of the conclusions of the other sciences.
In reply to this difficulty, we must acknowledge that the
most universal aspects of things are first known by us, not
indeed in a distinct or orderly way, but in an imperfect and
confused way. The opposition between being and not-being is
manifest to the child, and the multiplicity of sensory beings is
most evident to us. But this knowledge is not sufficient to
establish the possibility of a science of reality distinct from
physics, or the need for such a thing. The general aspects of
things are first known as confused and common attributes
which are predicable of all subjects which we know explicitly
or. distinctly. Sensory beings are the only ones which are immediately evident to us, and these things considered as naturally
mobile beings with their own natures or proper principles of
sensory behavior are considered in natural science. In order to
see the need for metaphysics we must know that there is some
other kind of being which is not material being.38
Each science is essentially related to being of one kind or
another, or under one aspect or another. In order to establish
the possibility of metaphysics as distinct from physics, we must
determine a subject for metaphysics. In order to accomplish
this we must know that there are both material and immaterial beings or substances. If there were only material substances, or if we knew only material ones, then physics would be
first philosophy. That there are both material and immaterial
beings is generally known and is a part of ordinary knowledge.
But this is an important point which needs to be clarified by
the methods of natural science, both in general physics and in
psychology. It is only through our knowledge of material
things that we can prove that immaterial things are or exist.
After this we see the need for a science distinct from physics•
which will treat of common being, that is, of substance, con88 Si non est aliqua alia substantia praeter eas quae consistunt secundum naturam,
de quibus est physica, physica erit prima scientia (ibid., 1170).

520

WILLIAM

H. KANE

sidered not as sensory or mobile, not even as substance, but of
substance whether material or immaterial, and of accidents
likewise material or immaterial, under the aspect of being,
that is, as having ultimate reasons to be. 39 In relation to common being considered in this way metaphysics does have its
own principles which are self-evident. Metaphysics is not formally or doctrinally dependent upon the conclusions of the other
sciences, but only materially and in the order of systematic
learning.
But can physics be of any service in these matters? Natural
science is abstract and conceptual, and it treats of natures as
essences or forms without reference to the act of existing. How
can natural science establish the existence of immaterial beings?
In reply we recall that natural science is the seience of
natural things, that is, of things which have in themselves the
fundamental principles of their own sensory behavior. These
things are material and contingent in themselves, and as such
they cannot be known scientifically. Science is knowledge of
the necessary and the immaterial or intelligible. Only by
abstracting from singular matter and motion can we know
natural things scientifically, and for this reason natural science
is abstract, and does consider natures as essences or forms.
Nevertheless, in physics we do not entirely lose sight of actual
existence, but remain very much concerned with the sensory
world as it actually is.
The necessary reason to be is not found in sensory things
absolutely. Indeed this is found only in the First Principle, at
••Principia eorum quae sunt semper, scilicet corporum coelestium, necesse est
esse verissima. . . . Et per hoc transcendunt in veritate et entitate corpora caelestia:
quae etsi sint incorruptibilia, tamen habent causam non solum quantum ad suum
esse, ut hie Philosophus expresse <licit (II Metaphys., lect. 2, 295). Primas enim
causas entiurn generativorurn c:1portet esse ingenitas, ne generatio in infinitum procedat; et maxime has quae sunt omnino immobiles et immateriales. Hae sunt
causae sensibilibus manifestis nobis, quia sunt maxime entia, et per consequens
causae aliorum ... sunt causae entium secundum quod sunt entia, quae inquiruntur
in prima philosophia. Ex hoc autem apparet manifeste falsitas opinionis illorum
qui posuerunt Aristotelem sensisse quod Deus non sit causa substantia caeli, sed
solum motus ejus (VI Metaphys., lect. 1, H64).

THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

5U

the height of metaphysical inquiry. But in the teleological
order we do find many hypothetically necessary reasons to be,
not only in nature but also in morals and in the arts. Elsewhere
there is only the necessity of essence or form, generally speaking. Yet these abstract essences can be considered not only in
an abstract way but also in comparison to existing things, in
which they are, and of which they are the essential reasons. 40
In this way essences and forms which have been abstracted
from sensory things by ourselves can be employed as principles
for our understanding of existing things, even in the special
sciences. This consideration taken together with the common
axioms which are used in every science enables us to establish
in physics the existence of immaterial beings, the unmoved
mover and the separated souls. Thus by means of the particular
sciences the mind can be disciplined to logical and realistic
thinking, and can be disposed for scientific knowledge of the
whole of reality by study of the principal parts which are
closer to sense and easier to understand. Through physics and
psychology particularly we learn of immaterial beings which
require metaphysical consideration. Even material things have
immaterial virtualities or aspects which are distinguishable by
the inquiring mind, such as the aspect of being, substance,
cause, etc., and these are as windows through which the mind
looks out on the domain of the immaterial, which is that of
metaphysics.
WILLIAM

H. KANE, O.P.

Albertus Magnus Lyceum
for Natural Science,
River Forest, Ill.

•• Possunt ergo hujusmodi rationes abstractae considerari dupliciter: uno modo
secundum se, et sic considerantur sine motu et materia signata, et hoc non invenitur
in. eis nisi secundum esse quod habent in intellectu; alio modo secundum quod
comparantur ad res, quarum sunt rationes, quae quidem res sunt in materia et
motu, et sic (sunt) principia cognoscendi ilia, quia omnis res cognoscitur per suam
formam; et ita per hujusmodi rationes immobiles et sine materia particulari consideratas habetur cognitio in scientia naturali de rebus mobilibus et materialibus
extra animam existentibus (in Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 2, c.) .

THE NOTION OF CERTITUDE 1

E

TYMOLOGY sometimes helps to suggest philosophical
meanings. The Latin verb cernere, whence our adjective
" certain " is derived, means to separate or sift, and, by
extension or transference, to distinguish, decide, determine, and
the like. An object therefore can be declared " certain in itself "
if it is or has been separated or sifted. But from what? One
may reply, in the most general terms: from any admixture with
anything else. Accordingly, we obtain the notion of a fixing
upon, a determination to, one thing, through the exclusion of
all else.
Thus it is legitimate to speak of " certitude " in the natures
of things and their operations, inasmuch as a thing by its
nature is fixed upon or determined to its proper connatural
object. In this sense, natural non-cognitive tendency or inclination has of itself the property of certitude. So likewise has
sense appetite. Bodies heavier than air tend downward with
'certitude'; sight is with certitude adapted to the perception of
color, hearing to sound, etc.
Certitude in this broad meaning is found also in the virtues.
A virtue, especially a moral one, can be said to function in the
mode of nature so far as it is determinative with respect to
some single end, inclining its possessor toward it. A man enjoying the virtue of justice ' naturally ' tends to be equitable in
his dealings with others and with himself; and so in all other
1 The reader may consult tlie following texts from St. Thomas Aquinas as
illustrative of the fundamental positions represented in this article.
Summa Theol., I, q. I, a. 5, ad l; I-II, q. 40, a. ad 8; q. 56, a. 8; II-II, q. 4,
a. 8. with ad 8. and q. 4, a. !!; Ill Sent. dist. !!8, q. !!, a. !!, sol. 1, with ad I and
ad !!; ibid.,
8 and qcl. 8; dist. !!6, q. !!, a. 4, with ad I and ad !!; De Veritate,
q. 6, a. S; q. 10, a. I!!, ad 6; q. 11, a. I, ad IS; Contra Gentiles, II, cap. 4; In Boeth.
do Trin., q. 6, a. I. II Metaph., Iect. 5, n. 886 (Cathala edition).

THE NOTION OF CERTITUDE

528

cases; a virtue gives a set to action, channels it, predisposes it
to some end, fixes it upon that end, habituating its subject to
adhere firmly to it.
This term " certitude," however, is attributed to natural and
virtuous orientations, determinations or fixities, only in a
secondary sense; it is simply a datum that, in the major
Western languages at least:. "certitude" denotes primarily a
quality or state of knowledge. Of course this mere fact of usage
is no philosophical reason for such derivative meanings of
the word as have been mentioned; but a good philosophical
explanation exists, and it is summed up in the proposition that
the operation whereby anything tends toward an end is directed
by some intelligent agent. This is manifestly so in voluntary
and intellectual agents, such things being the self-directing
causes of their actions toward ends. True it is also of natural
involuntary, knowledgeless agency; in the field of non-cognitive
causality we find determinate operations-operations toward
termini or ends. Indeed, to be .determinate is to be directed
to some end; an utterly indeterminate· action is inconceivable, a
contradiction. Now a power can be determined to its object,
and therefore its possessor can cling tenaciously to it, only if
the one is ordered to the other. But the ordering of one thing
to another requires intelligence, is an act of directive intelligence. The operations of things totally devoid of cognitive
powers manifest intelligence.
Mention may be made, too, of the welding of the senses to
their proper objects. Now sense powers are by their nature
passive or receptive; and, having the same mode of existence in
individual corporeal matter as the senses themselves do, sensible objects are of themselves naturally capable of impressing
their likenesses upon the cognate sense powers. For this reason
sense-cognition is said to be specifically certain and infallible,
the sense power being determined absolutely to its specific
and specifying object-sight to color, hearing to sound, etc.
The specific certainty of the cognition of specific sense objects
follows necessarily from this natural, non-free determinationa determinatio:n which, as we have seen, however, exhibits
6

JAMES F, ANDERSON

directive intelligence; the perception of relations is an act of
intelligence; the consequent ordering of one term of the perceived relation to another term is an act of directive intelligence. Where is this directive intelligence lodged?
The great classical argument, of course, is that the whole of
non-intellectual creation is moved to its proper objects and
ends by the intelligent Author of nature, Underlying this
doctrine is the consideration that action of any sort presupposes
intelligence, because every action is for some end, and the end
intended, or tended toward, exists as such only as known and
willed; for the end intended is the end to be attained, an end
which does not yet exist actually, but only intentionally; no
agent, intellectual or other, would tend toward an end were it
not fixed upon it by some prior knowledge of it.
The ' certitude ' found in the realm of non-cognitive operations is easily seen to have as its source, its primary and
principal cause, intellectual certitude, namely, a determination
in an intellect specified by its object. So too with the 'certitude
virtue';
a virtue principally so-called can exist only in
the will as ]ts subject or in some power so far as it is moved
by the will; and will is a faculty set in motion in consequence
of an act of reason or intelligence.
Consider that in every case reviewed so far " certitude " has
signified that. which makes something definite, fixed; a principle
of finality, therefore, of finalization, of determination to ends. 2
Now since certitude is primarily and principally in the intellect,
let us consider two fundamental modes of intellectual operation,
\vith a view to discovering the kind of certitude appropriate
to each-if indeed there is certitude in each.
Fittingly designated as the first operation of the intellect is
the immediate apprehension of intelligible objects, e. g., 'man,'
' animal,' ' plant '-the simple grasping of the meaning of terms.
In this pre-judgmental, or non-judgmental, act, considered in
itself (I speak formally; acts of intellect may entail or carry
with them judgments at least implicit) , there is no assent or
2 Cf. the informative article, "Certitude
in St. Thomas Aquinas," by Francis A.
Cunningham, S. J., in The Modern Schoolman, XXX, 4 (May 1953),

THE NOTION OF CERTITUDE

525

dissent, no affirmation or denial; yet in it the intellect adheres
to its object, is fixed upon it, determined to it. Hence, according to the meaning of " certitude " here proposed, it cannot be
denied that the intellect in the act of simple or immediate
apprehension of an intelligible object does attain certitude, a
quality which therefore is indefinable formally, or essentially,
by reference to judgment or assent; though it is a cognitive
perfection, certitude does not appertain to knowledge only
when it possesses the property of truth, if by " truth " we
designate a judged relation.
If certitude is not formally defined exclusively in terms of
judgment, it would be much less formally correct to speak of
" certitude " in regard to the intellect engaged upon a work of
inquiry or deliberation. Those philosophers who dialecticize the
intellect by considering it as essentially and primarily a faculty
of movement are compelled to say that certitude in knowledge
is unattainable. And when a person posits this concept in the
form of a final epistemological conclusion, he contradicts himself, while at the same time illustrating the fact that certitude in
knowledge, in the sense of determination of intellect to some
term or object, cannot be rationally denied. Certitude is by its
very nature terminative or conclusive.
Now if we attend to what is designated naturally as the
second operation of intellect, namely, the act of assent or
dissent-judgment-, we find the preceding observation strikingly verified; itself a conclusive act, judgment consists in
bringing the terms of a proposition to a close. So one would
expect to discover certitude in this act, if anywhere.
The very word" assent" can be instructive;" assent" stems
from " sense," and it is the property of sense, as distinguished
from intellect and will, to be determined to one object; the
sense faculty has by nature no relation to a plurality of objects
specifically diverse. In view of this strict fixing upon one
specific object, which is characteristic of sense, other facultative
determinations have been named from that of sense; the determination of thought to something is appropriately called
"assent," implying primarily the intellect's act of agreeing to

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JAMES F. ANDERSON

(ad) a judgment as true, that of the will "consent," because
it presupposes thought, with (con) which the will acts simultaneously, while tending to that which the reason judges to be
good. The intellect's act of assent is its self-determination to
one of two or more alternatives. Let us consider three of the
most significant rnlations in which the intellect can be viewed
with respect to this self-determination by way of assent, and
the proper modes of certitude resulting from it.

Firstly, the intellect can be regarded in relation to itself; it
is then seen to be determined immediately by the very presence
of an intelligible object. Such is the case when, by the light
of the agent intellect alone, certain forms are illuminated; so
also, in the intuitive understanding of first principles. Similarly,
in the judgment proper to the sense faculties we find that the
immediate apprehension of their kindred objects is due to the
fact that the objects are in themselves immediately subject to
the faculties. Now the
judgmental cognition of the
intellect has the classical name of "vision"; a seeing by way
of assent; vision (true insight) is by its very nature certain,
because the determination to the object is here innately necessary; and necessity is of the essence of cognitive certitude,
which, excluding relativity to many, always entails determination to one.
Secondly, the human intellect can be considered in relation
to the reason. Reason naturally ends in intellection, or intuitive
understanding, by analyzing conclusions into principles essentially evident. 8 When such analysis is correctly made there
exists in the intellect ' scientific ' certitude, or certitude by way
of scientific assent; this, at least, is the root significance of the
•I use the expression "essentially evident" in preference to "self-evident,"
because the latter expression all too often suggests to modern minds a ' subjective,'
psychological relativism whereas we wish to convey by the term " essentially
evident " an 'objective ' property of intelligible relations; thus a "self-evident"
proposition is one in which the essential meaning or concept of the predicate is
included in the essential meaning or concept of the subject, or vice versa; a person's
apprehension of these essential meanings or concepts and the relations between
them is entirely irrelevant to the question of their essentially evident, or inevident,
character.

THE NOTION OF CERTITUDE

527

act of scientific knowing as the Aristotelians have always
understood it.

Thirdly, the intellect can be regarded in relation to the will,
which may be capable of determining the intellect to an object
neither evident intrinsically in the order of reason nor reducible
to anything thus evident. The will could effect such determination by proposing to the intellect something transcendently
intelligible to be adhered to as its good-an object not only
inevident to the intellect but one incapable of being resolved
into any self-evident or self-justified principles. "Faith"
(theological) is the name of the intellect's assent to such an
object. And, in the· Augustinian phrase, faith "captivates
understanding" since the intellect is then determined to an
object, not by its own proper activity, but by the will's
command; in the believer the intellect attains its term not by
means of the understanding but by means of the will. Note,
however, that in the case of faith the intellect is terminated,
closed upon an object, ' determined to one,' so that it does
certitude; for faith is an act of
enjoy certitude-intellectual
assent, not. of consent. The assent of faith, while certain, is, of
course, completely non-evidential; and the believer is said to
have assent simultaneously with thought; " to believe," as
Augustine well put it, 4 "is to think with assent "-ipsum
credere nihil aliud est quam cum assensione cogitare. The
beliver's intellect remains open to many possible objects, being
determined to one only extrinsically, by the will.
To sum up: In the first act of the intellect, simple apprehension, there is always simple or absolute certitude, without
there being either assent or reasoning. In the second act, so
far as it entails the understanding of principles, there is simple
or absolute certitude by way of assent, without discourse or
reasoning. In ratiocination, if it terminates in scientific knowledge, there is simple or absolute certitude, by way of assent,
with discourse-not discourse with assent, but discourse before
assent, since reasoning issues in intellection or intuitive under.. Liber de praedestinatione sanctorum., cap. 2, n. 5, PL 44, 968.

5!il8

JAMES F. ANDERSON

standing through analysis into principles grasped in their selfevidence or intrinsic, essential intelligibility. Faith is distinct
from all these acts in that it involves assent simultaneously
with a movement of thought. Indeed faith occupies a middle
position between two movements of thought, the one inclining
the will toward belief (and this movement precedes the act of
faith) , the other tending toward intellection or intuitive understanding of the things already believed; and it is this latter
movement which is simultaneous with the assent of faith-an
assent nevertheless, be it remarked, and therefore an intellectual act that is of itself absolutely firm, absolutely certain.

*

The philosophical meaning of certitude outlined in this article
cannot be grasped adequately except in its proper theological
context, which is for us primarily the problem of faith.
Now, in general, cognitive certitude-the only certitude principally and strictly so-called-is possessed when the intellect
attains to something as it in fact is. The act of knowledge is
fulfilled or achieved or completed in the judgment. But primary
judgmental knowledge results from knowing causes, namely,
principles, whether remote or proximate, which contribute positively to the production or maintenance or movement of being
in some mode. (Any more restricted notion of" cause" would
be defectively metaphysical) . Therefore it is upon the knowledge of the cause or causes of things that the certitude of our
knowledge chiefly depends; the cause of the thing known is
the prime source and ground of the certitude of our knowledge
of it; so that the higher and more perfect is the cause of a
thing known to us, so much the greater is the degree of certitude
which the knowledge of that thing can have.
It may _be supposed that the reference here is to what is
commonly called ' objective ' as opposed to ' subjective ' certitude; on the contrary, it is a question of the' objective' causes
of ' subjective ' certitude. For it should be observed that
certitude considered formally and actually is always ' subjective,' always a quality in and of a subject. Obviously, more-

THE NOTION OF CERTITUDE

529

over, no ' subjective ' quality exists or can exist without having
causes, ' objective ' as well as ' subjective ' ones. The following
remarks about several of these causes may throw some light on
the meaning of the existential fact which certitude is.
This rule: The nobler the cause of a thing, the higher the
degree of certitude regarding it,-applies to what may be
termed the extrinsic material cause, namely, the subject or
matter concerning which there is knowledge. For example,
among the natural acquired intellectual virtues, prudence (or
practical wisdom) and art deal with contingent matters-those
which can be otherwise-, while wisdom, science and understanding are devoted essentially to necessary things-those
which cannot be other than they are. In the latter three virtues,
therefore, we find a higher degree or level of certitude than
in the former two; contingency in the subjects or matters of
knowledge is of itself a bar to certitude. But of the last three
intellectual virtues named, the immediate subjects are natural,
or at least in no case are they formally supernatural. If the
immediate and direct, as well as primary and principal matter
or subject of knowledge is both formally supernatural-supernatural taken precisely as supernatural-and existentially necessary, then the knowledge. of which it is the cause will possess
a higher degree or intensity of certitude than that whose
actual immediate matter is natural, or not formally supernatural. (Understand, of course, that all this is being said
only in reference to the extrinsic ' material ' cause of certitude) .
It follows that faith, whose immediate subject is both formally
supernatural and necessary in the most absolute mannernecessary in being, and hence uncreated-, enjoys a greater
degree of certitude than natural wisdom, science, and understanding.
The rule stated above applies also to that cause which we
shall call the principal intellectual light. Again, in this causal
perspective we see that faith is more certain than any of the
three intellectual virtues-- wisdom, science, understanding-,
since faith is caused by the light of the divine truth-the
illumination proceeding from God as self-subsistent Truth-,

680

JAMES F. ANDERSON

while certitude in those virtues results from the created light
of human reason; of course, that first light is of itself infinitely
more powerful as a cause of certitude than this second one is.
On the other hand, if certitude is considered precisely from
the point of view of the receptivity of its inherent subjectshall we say, of its intrinsic material cause-it is clear that
the more closely knowledge is adapted to the nature and
capacity of its possessor, so much the more certain it can be.
As regards this causality, too, God must be said to enjoy the
highest possible degree of cognitive certitude; for His knowledge is Himself; the relation of knower to known and of known
to knower is in God a simple substantial coincidence.
In this same realm of subjective causality, the next highest
rank in the order of certitude would fall to the created intellectual substance, because of its immaterial nature and its
consequent pure intellectuality. We shall not argue here concerning the existence of such substances, confining ourselves
to the remark that, according to classical Christian doctrine,
there are in them no material organs to impede the intellect's
immediate self-determination to its objects, or to necessitate, as
in man, the discursive movement of reason; angelic intellectuality being by nature more perfect than the human, angelic
certitude is purer and more intense.
As to the competence of the human subject for intellectual
certitude, is it not clear that the same principle is the determining, explanatory, one? That is to say, the human intellect
will, in a certain sense, possess the maximum certitude about
these things to whose knowledge it is most perfectly proportioned. In what sense? Is the measure of this adequation the
prime criterion of certitude? This problem will be taken up
later. 5 Suffice it for the present to observe that, since the
things of faith transcend man's intellect, they are said to be
less certain to him, precisely because of this disproportion
between intellect and object (and the resulting inevidence of
object to intellect), than things known through the natural
intellectual virtues of wisdom, science, and understanding.
• See below pp. 584-588.

THE NOTION OF CERTITUDE

581

Further, viewed in a different perspective of ' subjective '
causality than heretofore, we discover the same order in certitude: the most perfect certitude is God's, because His intellect
is infinite and one with Himself; next, the angelic intellect,
though finite, is not even extrinsically dependent upon matter,
and hence is a more powerful and free cause of certitude than
the human one, which is thus dependent.
The same hierarchy of certitude exists in the world of the
formal intelligible cause, which, for God, is the infinite intelligible Species that He Himself is; for the angel, finite intelligible species or forms derived from God; for man, finite
inteUigible species abstracted from creatures.
Lastly, considering the final cause or end of certain knowing,
one sees that in God this cause is His infinite knowledge of
His own divine truth; in the angel and in man, a finite intellectual participation in the divine truth-much more perfect
in the first than in the second.

*

The outline is hardly complete; but at least it suggests something of the complexity of the problem of certitude. " Certitude," except in God, is the name of an effect-and no effect
can be understood sufficiently apart from its cause or causes;
but this axiom holds throughout: the greater the cause, the
greater the certitude it can lead to or produce. Among all the
causes of certitude so summarily reviewed above, which one
is humanly speaking the most significant, the most determinative of actual, subjective, certitude in ·man's knowledge?
Is it not that cause which we have named the principal
intellectual light?
Now from what has been said certitude clearly may entail
two things: firm adherence to an object, and the evidence or
' visibility ' of the object to an intellect. Actual certitude is a
quality or perfection of a knowing subject; ' evidence ' is a
property of intelligible objects in relation to knowing subjects.
Actual certitude then is measured according to the power and
degree of the subject's adherence to the object, and is defined
most essentially or formally, therefore, in terms of this ad-

582

JAMES F. ANDERSON

herence, not in terms of evidence. (I speak only of genuine,
truth-founded adherence).
As regards the subject's firmness of adherence to the object,
faith is more certain than any natural knowledge, because the
divine Truth, which principaHy causes the assent of faith, is
more powerful-infinitely more powerful-as a cause of certitude than is the light of human reason, effecting the intellect's
assent in natural types or ways of knowing. And yet if certitude
is taken to imply intellectual evidence of vision, then, of course,
faith must be said to have no certitude whatever.
Bear in mind that it is with reference to the principal productive cause that an effect is considered in the most primary
and absolute way, while it is viewed in secondary and relative
fashion with respect to the passive potency or capacity of the
subject in which it exists. Thus knowledge is judged ' absolutely' in terms of its prime objective cause,' relatively' in terms of
the passive potency or capacity of the subject possessing it.
Since faith is maximally certain by virtue of its principal
effective cause, namely, the light of God's truth, it is said to
be ' simply ' or ' absolutely ' more certain than the most certain
natural knowledge, despite the fact that natural ways of knowing are more certain 'relatively to us '-more certain, that is
to say, in the order of intrinsic subjective causality, being
adapted to, or not incommensurate with, our natural cognitive
powers. For example: the certitude of scientific knowledge
consists both in the evidence of the object to the knower and
in the firmness of his adherence to it, whereas the certitude
of faith lies wholly in the believer's adherence to the object
believed. Nevertheless the certitude of faith is 'absolutely'
greater, by virtue of the nobility of its cause, and greater
actually and formally, by virtue of the strength and intensity
of the adherence proper to it.
In brief: certitude, according to the doctrine of this article,
is primarily and principally intellectual; the power and nobility
of every certitude and mode of certitude is commensurate with
the power and nobility of its causes, and especially of the
' principal light ' productive of it; certitude necessarily involves

THE NOTION OF CERTITUDE

533

firm adherence to something, but not necessarily v1s1on or
evidential knowledge of it. These considerations, we believe,
provide a meaningful background for the distinction, not only
of all kinds of natural, cognitive certitude from one another
and from the certitude of faith, but also of both these varieties
of certitude from opinion, doubt, suspicion and nescience.
An introductory and exploratory study leaves no room for
any detailed treatment of subsidiary problems, but at least it
may be usefully remarked that, in its non-evidential character,
faith shares something in common with opinion, doubt and
suspicion, since, as in those three, the natural tendency of the
believer's intellect toward the vision of its object remains
unterminated. Hand in hand with a perfectly firm assent there
is, in faith, the continued natural movement of thought toward
intuitive understanding-a movement which, when terminated
in the beatific vision, at once eliminates faith. And perhaps it
is well to emphasize again that by faith things are not known
with any certainty at all, if certainty be understood to require
the intellect's repose in its object, and that therefore such a
requirement cannot enter the essential, formal definition or
concept of certitude. 6 Thus, although the natural modes of
certitude exceed the certitude of faith as regards ' evidence,'
they do not exceed it as regards firmness or certainty of adherence.
I say "or certainty" because it is a central thesis of this
article that certitude consists formally in the intellect's steady
attachment to an object, not in the intellect's vision thereof.
Now certitude is indeed found first of all in the realm of intellectual cognition, consisting as it does primarily and principally
in the intellect's determination to something one. But the point
is that true firmness of adherence presupposes the determination of a cognitive power to a unitary object, and that this
6 While faith is immediately an intellectual
not a voluntary act, the believer's
intellect nevertheless is determined to its object, not by virtue of its own vision of
it-for it has none-, but solely by the will's intervention. Yet the fact bears
insisting upon, that were the act of faith immediately voluntary, it could not be
said to be "certain," if certainty is (as here maintained) a quality of intellect.

584

JAMES F. ANDERSON

determination principally or in its source is brought about by
intellectual cognition.
For the correct appreciation of this entire doctrine, what is
of key importance (as I see it) is the fact that the degree,
measure and order of actual certitude in human as well as
angelic knowledge are determined principally and absolutely
by the prime intellectual cause involved, and only secondarily
and relatively by the subject's dispositions, aptitudes, or competencies. Let us try to make this point quite clear.
It is not seldom said that what is more certain" objectively,"
or .considered in itself, can be less certain "to us." But we are
maintaining that there is no actual certitude 'in itself,' or
apart from cognition. The dictum just cited merely illustrates
the fact that actual, cognitive certitude can be viewed in two
different relations, namely, in relation to its subject-matter, or
material object, and in relation to its human intellectual subject. Moreover, the statement is not to be taken as expressing
an ' absolute ' consideration of certitude, for it is not with
regard to its material object, but to the principal intellectual
light productive of it, that certitude is so considered.
That the primary measure of the degrees and levels of
certitude lies in the principal intellectual cause is strikingly
illustrated by the doctrine of the eminent position of revealed
theology in relation to other sciences. One speculative science
is said to be higher than another, not only as regards the
status of its subject-matter, but also its certitude. Now in
both respects theology is superior to all other speculative
sciences; its subject, of course, is uniquely transcendent, and
in certitude it surpasses the other sciences because they derive
their certitude from the natural light of human reason, which
can err, while it is from the light of God's own knowledge or
'science,' which cannot .err, that theology acquires its certitude.
Because the quality of actual, subjective, certitude is determined principally by its intellectual cause, and is exactly proportioned to the power and eminence of that cause, theological
certitude is, precisely as certitude, existentially and not only
essentially greater than all other certitudes in this life; more

THE NOTION OF CERTITUDE

585

intensely than they, it enjoys the character of firm adherence.
True it indeed is that, judged in terms of evidential cognition,
the certitude of theological knowledge must be declared inferior
to all our natural intellectual certitudes-sapiential, scientific,
intuitive. Yet it is difficult to overstress the point that certitude
is being regarded in derivative and relative fashion when
measured in relation, not only to its cognitive subject and its
essentially evidential or non-evidential quality, in the realm
of reason, but also to its subject matter.
The firmness of adherence (grounded upon truth) of a
cognitive power to its object is what constitutes certitude
formally and actually. The intellectual light primarily causing
this well-grounded adherence is what constitutes certitude principally and absolutely.
Again the background of this doctrine, what is to be made
of the famous theory that mathematical knowledge is the
' most certain ' of all?
Let the salient features of the theory be represented as
follows. Because mathematics is situated midway between
natural philosophy and metaphysics, it is said to be more
certain than either of them. Firstly, in mathematics abstraction
is made from physical matter and physical motion, whereas
natural philosophy is about things existing in matter and
subject to motion-impermanent, variable things-, the knowledge of which is naturally less firm than of permanent things.
Generally speaking, in natural philosophy, as in all the natural
and operative sciences, there is de jure less certitude and less
possibility of attaining certitude than in mathematics, both
because of the multiplicity of objects that have to be considered
in those fields-the primary objects of theoretical mathematics,
on the other hand, are comparatively few in number-, and
because of the variability of those objects. Secondly, the
mathematical way of proceeding in the acquisi,tion of knowledge-the expression " mathematical knowledge itself " ought
not to be used here-is more certain than that of metaphysics,
because the objects of the latter are more remote from the
senses, whence all our knowledge ultimately takes rise-more

536

JAMES F. ANDERSON

remote both in the case of separated substance (to the knowledge of which things derived from our senses cannot adequately
lead us) and in the case of the common or transcendental
principles of metaphysics, which, being maximally universal,
under
are the furthest removed from the particulars
sense cognition. On the other hand, the material objects of
mathematics are things capable of being sensed, and they are
therefore imaginable; consequently, the human intellect, abstracting from all sensible factors, acquires knowledge of them
with greater ease and certainty than it does of a separated
substance, or even of such objects as the essential nature of
substantial being or of such metaphysical principles as potentiality and act. Mathematical thought, in short, is by nature
easier and more certain than the cosmological, the metaphysical, and that proper to the operative sciences.
Consider the linking here of ' ease ' with ' certainty.' This I
believe is significant. For there exists an important distinction
between the conformity of the intellect to its object-between
the mutual adaptability of intellect and object-, and the
power or intensity of the intellect's attachment to its object.
Given this conformity or adaptability, the intellect enjoys an
immediate aptitude to cling to its object and a consequent
natural ease in its ability to know it. But the integral quality
of the adherence-its true strength, intensity, constancy, reliability, lastingness-, this is determined and measured, not
primarily by such conformity or adaptability, but by the power
of the principal intellectual light that causes it. That which
is the more easily known is the more certainly known, where
certai:n'ty is understood to imply, not so much firmness,
strength, constancy, reliability, lastingness of adherence, as
strictness of cognitive adaptability or conformity. The latter
is not, we have maintained, the primary formal requirement
of certitude, still less the object of an ' absolute consideration '
of it.
Relevant to our problem is another basic element in the
doctrine of mathematical certitude with which we are presently
concerned, namely, the notion that in mathematics we find the

THE NOTION OF CERTITUDE

587

' most certain ' method of reasoning; the notion that it pertains
to the very nature of mathematics-the classical variety, at
any rate-to proceed demonstratively, by way of explanatory,
as distinguished from factual, demonstration.7 There is no
need to enter here into a discussion of this distinction; suffice
it to point out that the doctrine under review does not claim
that mathematical knowledge is simply the most certain knowledge, but that the mathematical way of demonstrative reasoning is the easiest and most certain to us, namely, the adult
human· intellect functioning normally. Now the ease and
certainty of this kind of reasoning is due both to the invariability of its objects (abstracted as they are from the hylomorphic flux which is their natural milieu) , and to the natural
conformity of the human intellect to them, inasmuch as they
are forms taken out of matter, and hence do not exceed, indeed
are inferior to the intellect's own level of being, yet are adapted
to it because of their immaterial state. In short, man's proper
object as knower is form in matter, but not his proper object
as certain, scientific, demonstrative knower, because matter
is a principle of indeterminacy, mutability, variation, while
certainty in knowledge demands permanence and constancy.a stable ground, a fixity, a ' determination to one.' Certitude
then is to be sought, not in the world of matter, but of form.
What form? Form abstracted from matter is that which is
most commensurate with man's natural competency for scientific-demonstrative knowledge.
Observe, however, that although this natural commensuration of the human scientific intellect with the mathematical
object guarantees the highest degree of cognitive facility, it
does insure the loftiest grade of truth-founded intensity in the
intellect's attachment to its term; and it is in this intensity,
strength, tenacity of intellectual adherence that the quality of
certitude formally consists. Of course mathematical certainty,
like all certainty, follows from the intellect's conjunction with
its objects; but the qualitative character of this union stems
., Called by the Scholastics, respectively, demonstratio propter quid and demonstratio quia.

588

JAMES F. ANDERSON

primarily from its principal intellectual cause. No slightest
suggestion is being made that mathematical certainty does not
entail a firm, an unwavering, attachment of intellect to object;
assuredly it does, yet it is the quality, the distinctive character
of this adherence that marks the mode and degree of actual
(subjective) certitude.
Clearly, therefore, no contradiction exists between the
doctrine (1) that divine faith is more certain than any natural
knowledge, and (2) that the mathematical way of proceeding
in rational demonstration is more certain than any other kind
of scientific discourse. Here, as everywhere in this problem, it
is. simply a question of different causal perspectives in which
certitude is being viewed. Indeed the problem of certitude, in
common with every existential one, is first of all a problem of
causality, and if it is to be sufficiently understood, and perhaps
in some measure resolved, it must be studied in the full compie:xity of the causal factor3 and principles actually involved.
The complex, however, always flow from the simple, and
the many from the one. Conduding, then, let us indicate
briefly the ultimate causal explanation (as it appears to us) of
the existence of certitude in created knowledge.
In good classical doctrine it is a commonplace that the whole
certitude of scientific knowledge arises from the certitude of
the cognition of principles, since conclusions are known with
certainty when, and only when, they are analyzed into principles. The Christian metaphysicians added that something is
known with certainty because of the light of reason with
which we are endowed by God and through which God speaks
in us; that the certainty of our knowledge is not caused by a
human teacher except insofar as he instructs us by resolving
conclusions into principles, and that we would never attain the
certitude of scientific knowledge were there not present in us
knowledge of principles into which the conclusions are
resolved. Evidently, then, the certitude of scientific knowledge
a person possesses is only from God, who bestows upon him the
light of reason through which he knows principles, from which,
turn, the certitude of scientific (demonstrative) knowledge
derives.

in

THE NOTION OF CERTITUDE

589

Obviously, too, what has just been remarked concerning the
certitude of scientific knowledge applies to all human natural
certitude, being in fact only a particular application of the
principle that all created intellectual certitude, angelic as well
as human, supernatural as well as natural, is participated from
the uncreated inteHectual certitude which is God's knowledge
of Himself. The uncreated light of God's own certitude is the
creative source of all other certitude and the primary' measure
and criterion of it.
JAMES F. ANDERSON

Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS
PAUL MAHONEY, 0. P., S. T. Lr., Ph. L., is professor of theology at Loretto
Heights College, Denver, Colorado.
J:ERoME ILu1ER, 0. P., S. 1'. Lr., S. T. D. (Frihourg), is professor of
dogmatic theology and Lector Primarius at the Dominican College
of La Sarte, Belgium. He has taught also at the Angelicum in Rome.
His work, Karl Barth, was published in 1949. He has written
numerous articles in the field of Protestant theology in European
journals.
WILLIAM H. KANE, 0. P., S. T. M., is professor of philosophy at the
Dominican House of Studies, River Forest, Ill., and director of the
Albertus l\Iagnus Lyceum of Physical Science.
JAMES F. ANDERSON, Ph.D., is professor of philosophy at Marquette
University. He is the author of The Bond of Being and The Cause
of Being. He previously taught at Loyola University in Chicago and
the University of Notre Dame.
CHARLES A. HART, Ph.D., LL. D., professor of philosophy at The Catholic
University of America, is National Secretary of the American
Catholic Philosophical Association and a frequent contributor to
THE THOMIST.
DAVID A. DILLON, Ph. L., S. T. D., is professor of dogmatic theology at the
St. Paul Seminary and a contributor to THE THOMIST.
JoHN A. OESTERLE, Ph.D., author of the text, Logic, is a former Fulbright
Research Scholar and a member of the Department of Philosophy
at the University of Notre Dame.
EDWARD T. SMITH, Ph.D., is assistant professor of philosophy at De Paul
University, Chicago.

540

BOOK REVIEWS
God and Polarity. By WILLIAM H. SHELDON. New Haven:
versity Press 1954. Pp.
with index. $8.00.

Yale Uni-

This vast work by the emeritus Sheldon Clark Professor of Philosophy
at Yale University is a most ambitious attempt to reconcile the chief
perennial disputes among the various opposing schools of philosophy as they
have developed in the history of philosophy and as they now present themselves, including the thought of both East and West. It is the author's
conviction that historically these various systems may be arranged in
counterpart pairs, each member of a pair providing what the other member
lacks.
idealism is compared with materialism, Thomism with process
philosophy, monism with pluralism and rationalism with irrationalism. In
this way there is created a graded system of polar opposites ranging from
inanimate matter to the Deity. In reality this graded polarity is a protest
against the pure intellectualism inherited from Greek philosophers which
reaches its extreme in Hegelianism. Actually reality cannot be comprehended by intellect alone but only by a union of intellect with feelings and
will.
Professor Sheldon is moved to write his opus magnum by the vast futility
of opposing systems of philosophy, each of which avows that it alone is
right and the others wrong. Yet as Aldous Huxley writes: "l\Ien live in
accordance with their philosophy of life, their conception of the world. This
is true even of the most thoughtless. It is impossible to live without a
metaphysics. The choice that is given us is not between some kind of
metaphysics and no metaphysics; it is always between a good metaphysics
and a bad metaphysics."
Professor Sheldon suggests that perhaps all systems of metaphysics are
in the main correct except where each thinks it has refuted the other. Each
may have shown its truth and all can pool their results without any one
being relegated to an inferior grade, " in short that philosophy has succeeded
to a high degree; that its manner, not its matter, has caused its downfall.
Well, such is the case as the following pages are to set forth .... The
situation of man today is unique, unique because it is critical as never before in recorded history. To meet it man must have a firm assurance of the
powers that control his_ universe, powers good, bad, or indifferent, to which
he must adapt his living if he would survive or perhaps progress-yes even
if those powers are only his own. So does the moving finger write Philosophy
in these days, giving it an opportunity, a task, a momentous choice to
integrate itself or die in its seclusion, and perhaps man with it." (p. 3)

541

542

BOOK REVIEWS

After one of the longest and best reviews of idealism, ci>vering nearly a
third of the text, Sheldon. concludes that this philosophical approach in its
three major forms has indeed done mankind great service in keeping man's
mind fixed on the highest values, those of the spirit, proving as it does
that law and order are to a high degree present in the universe and necessary for the best human life, that social order is no more than a means to
the needs of individual persons where progress first must be rooted; " that
'there is an absolute personal spirit or God in some sense ubiquitous; that
the deeper personal values are powers, real entities, upon which man may
rely in guiding his life. However, the idealist experiment has not proved its
clear exclusions: that matter, time, space and other categories of the physical and mental reality are to a degree unreal, that the Deity is in any
way limited, etc., as detailed above. But how vague! say the modem precisians. What is person? Define mind! How much law and order do we need?
Define your absolute personal spirit. All this long and dreary argument for
so slim a result." (p. 860)
Polar to idealism will be materialism, which the author disposes of in a
-relatively short discussion. Materialism is considered as rightly insisting
on the ultimate reality of physical being insofar as, we can at present aee.
It is wrong in denying that consciousness, mind, spirit exists in its own right
by
it to a phy&ical function however complex. Both minds and
bodies are ultimately real and ultimately different in their nature; mental
and physical are irreducibly other. The way is pointed to a synthetic
perspective.
After a brief glance at some of the Eastern philosophies which exhibit
some degrees of realistic dualism, Sheldon finally settles upon scholastic
philosophy, as expressed in Thomism, as incorporating within itself all that
is true and positive in the polar philosophies of idealism and materialism.
After observing that " there probably never was so much hostility today
as toward this age-old type ... though few of its critics have understood
the system," the author affords a long analysis of Thomism as it is expressed primarily by one of its contemporary interpreters, Professor Etienne
Gilson, and that in a single introductory work of Gilson, namely, " The
Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas,'' admittedly such a method has its
limitations but if it had to be used, for whatever reasons Professor Sheldon
might give, it is fortunate that so reliable a spokesman has been selected.
Sheldon's conclusion is that " Thomism, with the earnestness of the religious
motive and -the breadth of view furnished by the maturity of the speculative
Aristotle, combined to produce the greatest synthesis in history; greater in
ordered articulation, in wealth of detail, and panoramic vision. . . . Without question it is the fullest synthesis as yet offered to thinking man." (p.
441) Of all the other systems that have survived, materialism, monist and
pluralist idealism, becoming or process philosophies, mysticisms, even the

BOOK REVIEWS

548

new irrational existentialism, each of these, says Sheldon, is scarcely more
than a single thesis. Each may have certain truth in what they include.
They are in error in what they exclude. Thus do they war upon one another
to the confusion of the rank and file. Scholasticism alone is a system. Says
Sheldon, " Scholasticism today is Thomism." (p. 444) The author is himself
at pains to answer effectively the chief charges against this most inclusive of
philosophies.
Nevertheless, despite his acceptance of most of the synthesis of Thomism
as an integration of what truths are contained in the polar philosophies of
idealism and materialism, Thomism itself contains an important limitation
even if it may not be classed as a definite error. This may be said rather
to be overemphasis on the purely intellectual-the Greek; and not the
Christian inheritance-on the intelligibility of being, and a corresponding
underrating of the significance and value of the active phase of man's mind
and of certain extrarational factors of being which should rather be coordinated with the purely intellect and intelligibility. The affective-conative
contribution to reality should have greater stress. Far from lowering the
dignity of reason, it gives man's intellect a far wider scope than is assigned
to it. An example of this underrating of what is not purely intellecual is
the Thomistic rejection of the so-called ontological argument for God's
existence. " In making action, volition; process-life in general inferior to
still contemplation the Thomist has, to a degree, treated certain phases of
being as other systems have treated certain beings." (p. 502) Being here
is polar Neither intellect nor will is superior, still less supreme, in full
actuality, over the other. The Bergsonian injunction is here in order: "Act
as men of thought, think as men of action." Thus the Thomist existential
intellectualism neglects the realm of the purely possible for the quiet contemplation of the permanent unchanging substances.
Here enters the polar philosophy of modem process philosophy which
is only now reaching its maturity, especially in the West where it pervades
to a high degree the outlook in the sciences and arts, education, morals, and
religion. Its general notion is that " in this universe of constant change is a
principle favorable to advance towards the better." (p. 581} To quote one
of its great exponents, Bergson: " It is a creation that goes on forever in
virtue of an initial movement. This movement constitutes the unity of the
organized world-a prolific unity of an infinite richness, superior to any
that the intellect could dream of, for intellect is only one of its aspects or
products." It is generally materialistic and atheistic though not necessarily
so. Progress is the key word. For purpose substitutes a more neutral
word-impulse, drive, elan-purpose savors of idealism or theism.
Sheldon, however, cannot accept process philosophy as a final solution.
Process is a growth ·toward the better in the sense that progress may be
an opportunity. That it is more than an opportunity, that it is inevitable

544

BOOK REVIEWS

or even probable, is not proven. It cannot refute the positive teaching of
other types of philosophy. Its denial of such bifurcations as spirit and
matter is erroneous. The Thomistic argument for First Cause, which is
rejected by process philosophy, is established by a compelling argument.
Evolution is by no means a universal upward thrust. " Most variations "
to quote J. S. Huxley, "have been deleterious." The course of evolution
goes sidewise or forward or ceases to go at all. Process is still too overcast
with the old Greek inheritance to go further and turn irrationalist as has
been the case of the practical metaphysics of the East.
Thus arises the polar type of irrationalism against all rational philosophies. This is represented by Mysticism and Existentialism. Perhaps, says
the author, the term extra-rationalism would be better but irrationalism is
the more familiar title. With it the last of the outstanding types is complete.
In this return to a search for the good over the search for the true and
knowledge for its own sake the circle is closed. Man has no other access
to reality than through his intellect or through his valuations; thus are the
alternatives exhausted. Mysticism, generally, both Eastern and Western,
seeks a consummate union with the source of Being, and immediate experience that God is spirit. On the positive side the presence of the Divine is
certainly indubitable, the more specific teaching is at least in some degree
true inasmuch as it is vouchsafed with something of the authority of the
experience of the One. Too frequently, however, it tends to exclude the
reality of the many, especially in its Eastern expression.
Existentialism is a much more extreme form of irrationalism. Philosophers
of most diverse stripe from atheists to Roman Catholics have been so
labelled. It is not so much existence generally as existence of man that is
its concern. Even more particularly it is by way of man's will, his free
decisions, that we have the clue to reality. Thus its appeal is more to the
conative, as distinct from the affective appeal of the mystic. Both feel
certain of the failure of the traditional report of intellect. Since reality is
determined by man's choice it obviously can be as varied as his phrases
within such extremes as the religious supernaturalist wing choosing absolute
dependence on God as in the case of the Danish theologian, Soren Kierkegaard, who has often been regarded as its founder, or of Gabriel Marcel of
France or the three American Protestant theologians, Reinhold Niebuhr,
Richard Kroner and Paul ':(illich, to the complete denial of God which
characterizes the position of Jean Paul Sartre of France and Karl Jaspers
of Germany.
With irrationalism the picture is complete. In its positive aspect, like the
other systems preceding in its various forms, it possesses certain truth. And
like the others it is false in its exclusions. It rightly emphasizes the affectiveconative approach to reality. It is wrong in its almost total rejection of
the intellectual approach. Apparently mankind is doomed forever to

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545

gyrate between these poles never arriving at anything which might be
called a fundamental fulness of truth. The history of philosophy is called
upon to establish the truth of this law of polarity. Apparently the case
seems quite complete. The panorama presented in this work is a vast one
with almost no end of confirming details, the richness of which can only be
slightly suggested in this brief account.
Leaving aside scores of minor points upon which we might wish to enter
demurrers, what may one say who acknowledges openly a Thomistic point
of view, of a study which by all standards must be admitted to be a vast
achievement? We must say that Professor Sheldon has not established his
case. True the history of philosophy does indicate that we may conveniently use the so-called principle of polarity to dramatize the limitations
of man's mind in his search for an ultimate understanding of reality beyond
that of the appearance of things presented to the senses. To raise it to the
dignity of a principle governing man's mind one must ignore the fact of
absolutely contradictory disagreements on the most fundamental of issues
concerning reality. In the principle of polarity this is not admitted. It is
the very freedom of polarity that furnishes the key to the settlement of the
great perennial quarrel of types. Polarity lets each type say: "I am right in
and by myself, so are you my opposite. If I never heard of you, nor you of
me, each of us would have just as true, though not as full a system. Let us
then gladly recognize the truth of _each other and cooperate to gain a
broader though not a truer view." (p. 677)
The disadvantage of this approach may be well seen in the case of
Thomism. Under his principle of polarity Sheldon must regard the principles of being as paired things or opposite counterpartagents. This leads
to a definite misrepresentation of the very nature of Thomistic metaphysics
which by its principles of being is not a polarity of opposites but a gradation of Creator and creature. Sheldon readily grants, indeed insists, there is
here no polarity. As he says: "Creation is a free act; there is in God no
need of the creatures in the sense that He requires their cooperation for
His own full being." (p. 678) This Thomistic position leads of necessity
to the analogical predication of being without which reality cannot be
grasped in its most ultimate character. The author has readily granted that
Thomism is " without question the fullest synthesis as yet offered to thinking man." As we have seen, his chief criticism of this synthesis. which
alone seems to cover the whole range of reality, is that it has not sufficiently emphasized the affective-conative approach to reality. It has overemphasized the intellect and underrated the significance and value of the
active phase of man's mind. However, it is granted that there is nothing in
Thomism which in any way excludes such approach. If this be true, then
there seems to be no ground for requiring a polar philosophy for Thomism
in a philosophy of becoming or process philosophy except the necessity of
somehow finding a universal application of the author's general principle.

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Indeed Sheldon readily grants there is nothing in Thomism which excludes
the influence of the affective-conative approach to reality. Rather it is a
matter of overemphasis on the power of the intellect. It may be admitted
that there is some truth in this criticism. But it must be pointed out that
St. Thomas certainly never denied the role of the will in aiding the mind as
a whole in its effort to get in touch with reality. At the very beginning
of his Summa Theologiae he grants the proper role of knowing by just such
appctency, his so-called vis inclinationis, the peculiar knowledge of the lover
of God. He simply denies it as being the sole source of knowledge This
knowledge by connaturality or congeniality has been emphasized by such
Thomists as Rousselot, Vann, Maritain and Gilby and others, particularly
in relation to the aesthetic experience. St. Thomas himself may not have
explored its full possibilities but he has certainly provided for it. For a
philosopher who was so constantly under the influence of revelation such an
influence would hardly be avoided.
In the light of the high commendation Sheldon has expressed of Thomism
as " without question the fullest synthesis as yet offered to thinking man,"
we believe that it is only the author's own preoccupation with his so-called
principle of polarity that prevents him from advancing further in his
understanding of the relative completeness of .the Thomistic synthesis. We
suggest that for the moment he set aside his principle of polarity and explore, preferably at first hand, the key Thomistic doctrine of participation,
to which the principle of potential existence or essence limiting existence
leads. By this doctrine the human mind moves to the existence of an Infinite
Creator with an inescapable conviction. It is within this framework that
such truths as may be contained in other systems can be incorporated while
avoiding their exclusions, of which Professor· Sheldon so rightly complains.
Philosophical systems, as we have said, present us not merely with polar
opposites but real contradictions, the resolutions of which certainly seem to
have been more successfully accomplished by the principle of participation
which is the key to the unity of Thomism. This is true even by the criteria
which this author has himself established. Having come thus far we suggest
that most of the minor difficulties Sheldon has found in this relatively most
perfect synthesis will disappear if he will abandon his doctrine of polarity
for that of Thomistic participation. With all its limitations the human
intellect is really capable of a much more complete and final philosophical
synthesis than Professor Sheldon seems to think possible. This is in no way
to detract from the high value of his great stu.dy which may be considered
a kind of philosophy of the history of philosophy. Its always sympathetic,
yet most trenchant criticisms and sound evaluations of all the important
systems of philosophy that have engaged the minds of philosophers through
the centuries will stand as an accomplishment of the first rank.
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

CHARLES

A. HART

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547

Sckeeben·'s Doctrine of Divine Adoption. By Enwm HARTSHORN PALMER.
Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1958. Pp. 202.
This study of Matthias Joseph Scheeben's theology on grace, presented
as a doctoral thesis at the Free University of Amsterdam (Protestant) , is
evidence from a surprisingly new quarter that interest in his theological
work is still alive. The purpose of this study, Dr. Palmer states, is to make
Scheeben and his place in Catholic theology better known in Protestant
circles. This review will consider only those chapters in the book which
explain and evaluate Scheeben's theories on grace and divine adoption.
In three well-documented chapters Dr. Palmer sets forth the Catholic
doctrine on grace, and Scheeben's theories on the indwelling of the Holy
Spirit and ' fuller ' adoption of Christians. In his comparatively short career
Scheeben wrote three works which treated in whole or in part the Catholic
doctrine on grace. In his first work, N atur und Gnade, written shortly after
the completion of his studies, he presented the traditional theological
doctrine that habitual grace gives the Christian a participation in divine
nature and makes him an adopted son of God. He placed special emphasis
on the fact that Christian adoption is not a mere moral act on the part of
God raising a man to the legal and external rank of son, but is a ' real '
adoption in which grace confers on the soul a new nature and life. In his
later works, Mysterien des Christentums and Handbuch der katholischen
Dogmatik, especially in the latter, Scheeben altered his position somewhat.
From a long study of the Greek Fathers, especially St. Cyril of Alexandria,
he, like Petavius before him, was led to conclude that the traditional
doctrine on grace was insufficient to explain the intimate supernatural union
of the soul with God. If the Christian is to be called a true son of God, he
argued, account must be taken not only of grace which gives him a likeness
of divine nature, but also of another element: the personal connection between God and the soul. This latter element is supplied in sanctification by
the Holy Spirit dwelling substantially in the soul of the Christian. In
natural generation there is not only a similarity of nature, but there is also
a substantial connection between father and son. Hence, the definition of
generation: origo viventis a vivente conjuncto in similitudinem naturae.
Likewise, in the spiritual rebirth of adoptive sonship there is present both
gratia creata, a participation in divine nature, and gratia increata, the substantial indwelling of the Holy Spirit. The new element in the theory is
evident, namely, that in sanctification there is a twofold formal cause:
grace, whereby a man is made holy and pleasing to God, capable of merit
and worthy of eternal life; and the Holy Spirit dwelling substantially in the
soul, making the Christian worthy of eternal life as the son of Qod.
Scheeben called this theory ' fuller ' adoption.

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This. theory of the twofold formal cause of sanctification was the point of
Scheeben's theology most severely attacked by the theologians of the time.
In a debate carried on in theological journals, the German theologian,
Granderath, maintained that it was pure contradiction to say that the Holy
Spirit is the formal cause of a human being. The Holy Spirit, he said, is
indeed the efficient cause of sanctification and the term to which the soul
is joined in the union of grace. But the Holy Spirit could never be called
the forma constifoens of the supernatural life of the soul. In reply to this
charge Scheeben declared that the Holy Spirit is evidently not an inherent
physicaf'form constituting a nature as such. Nonetheless, He is causa
formalis, as a subsistent form bestowing a new nature. It is not impossible,
he thought, for one person to be the formal cause of another, provided this
is understood to mean forma subsistens insubsistendo informans and not
forma inhaerens inhaerendo informans. Scheeben admits, rather weakly,
that this is not the usual signification of formal cause, but he thinks it is
a legitimate one.
In the three final chapters Dr. Palmer turns from an exposition of
Scheeben's theories to an evaluation of the doctrines on grace, tlie indwelling
of the Holy Spirit and divine adoption. And in this task, it must be said,
the critic is much less successful than the expositor. Understandably, Dr.
Palmer may choose to criticize Scheeben from the viewpoint of Calvinist
theology. In doing so, however, he makes very difficult the task of
judging adequately such a profound problem. By cutting himself off from
the long tradition of Catholic theology he runs the danger not only of
failing to see the problem in its proper perspective, but also of misunderstanding the problem and even the language in which it is expressed. This
initial weakness may be observed in each of the point he treats.
His criticisms of Scheeben's treatment of grace is summed up in the
following manner: " But it is exactly here, at the heart of Scheeben's
theory of grace, that _we must be critical of his theory of gratia .mnctificans.
For this whole system of ontology is foreign to the Bible, and by no stretch
of the imagination can it be derived from it. It is Aristotelian in origin, and
not Christian. . . . If one considers, as Scheeben does, that outside of the
Bible there is another, additional source which is also authoritative, and
that this source teaches the Greek-originated form-matter theory, then it
is logical that one interpret the two sources by each other and harmonize
them ... we frankly reject this extra-Biblical norm, and going to the
Scriptures themselves, find absolutely nothing from which such an ontology
can be derived. It is non-Biblical." (p. 116)
This is not only an unwarranted charge against Scheeben, but it also
betrays a lack of knowledge about the work and function of the speculative
theologian and the use he makes of terms and propositions drawn from
philosophy. This fundamental misunderstanding is, in fact, at the basis of

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549

most of his criticisms of Scheeben's theories. It is evident in such statements as these: (in criticizing the Catholic doctrine on grace) "a grace that
is shackled to a pre-Christian philosophy " (p. H!6) ; " The Bible describes
God as good, holy, invisible, self-existent, immutable, simple, spiritual, etc.,
but no inkling is given that He is a substance composed [sic]ofpure actuality
as opposed to potentiality" (p. 148, n. 73); (after citing some examples
used by Scheeben) "when Scheeben speculates in this manner, we would
rather remain by the things revealed in God's Word and go no further."
(p. 162) His frequent criticism of Scheeben as " un-Biblical " can be partly
accounted for by the fact that he himself is not familiar with the background of Catholic theology. In a highly speculative analysis (not an
apologetic), the theologian may legitimately presume that the reader is
familiar with the texts.
The principal objection to Scheeben's theory of indwelling is the following: " we consider the theory of form-matter to be invalid, and therefore
we reject Scheeben's description of our relationship to the Holy Spirit in
these terms." Dr. Palmer expresses his own ideas on indwelling in such
statements as: " It is the Spirit who first of all comes in contact with the
soul"; "it is the Holy Spirit who chiefly and directly indwells man." (p.
162) But, nowhere does he analyze precisely what this indwelling is. And,
having taken the problem out of the context of formal causality, he is unable to evaluate the distinctive features of Scheeben's theory of indwelling.
In the discussion of adoption the difficulties only increase. Here the author
consistently identifies the terms source, ground, basis, and formal cause.
Consequently, when he finds Trent (or Scheeben) calling sanctifying grace
the formal cause of justification, he feels that such a notion is " demoting
Christ to only a meritorious cause," that " Christ is no longer deemed
necessary as the immediate ground for adoption, but is supplanted by a
fictitious spirituality (gratia sanctificans) ." (p. 185) From these and
other statements one can only conclude that Dr. Palmer has misconstrued
the problem of adoption as Scheeben presented it, and, in some respects,
has not even understood the terms Scheeben used. Fundamentally, the
critical part of the work is not an evaluation of Scheeben's theories at all,
but a simple restatement of the Protestant position on grace versus the
traditional Catholic doctrine.
This criticism is not meant to detract from the fine work of exposition
done in the earlie:rr part of the book. In the compass of a few chapters
Scheeben's theory with numerous quotations is presented in a form not
elsewhere available. It must be said, however, that while there are serious
objections to be made against Scheeben's theory of adoption, Dr. Palmer
has not made them.
DAVID A. DILLON
St. Paul Seminary
St. Paul, Minn.

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Aesthetics and Criticism. By HAROLD OsBORNE. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1955. Pp. 848 with index. $6.00.
" The present enquiry is concerned with the nature and functions of
criticisms. Its intention is factual and empirical, not dogmatic. We shall
not presume to dictate to the critics what sort of things they should be
about, what the task of criticism ought to be; but our study will more
modestly be to elucidate the aims which the critics themselves profess and
the purpose which are apparent in their works." (p. 7)
It is necessary to keep the author's aim in mind in reading his book, for
the tendency is to look for more than the book provides. Indeed, the title
Aesthetics and Criticism would lead one to expect that as much attention
would be given to aesthetics as to criticism; aesthetics, however, enters in
only because " criticism of necessity uses overt or tacit assumptions which
belong to the field of aesthetics." (p. 7) Within the limits of this aim, the
author, in general, is not only highly successful, but extremely readable and
stimulating. To provide the full setting for the appearance of this book, it
be remarked that Professor Osborne has written a separate book on
aesthetics, Theory of Beauty, upon which he leans and to which he
presumes the reader will tum if he wishes to make explicit the position of
Mr. Osborne on aesthetics itself.
The opening chapter is on " The Craft of Criticism." There seems to be
no question in Mr. Osborne's mind-and indeed there should not be-of the
legitimacy of the role of the critic and his distinction from the artist, but
there is considerable difficulty about defining criticism. Mr. Osborne faces
the difficulty fully.
The opening chapter summarizes as follows: Presumably criticism can be
defined only in terms of function. Is interpretation a main function? Or is
the principal function one of facilitating in others the appreciation of
literature and the arts? Or is the function both interpretation and appreciation, and other elements as well? The problem is further complicated by
the fact that various schools of criticism exist; some maintain that art
and therefore criticism is basically sociological or psychological, while others
hold that art and therefore criticism is " aesthetic " and hence independent
of any other discipline. Mr. Osborne's conclusion reduces to the following:
"Unlike the critics themselves, however, it will not be our concern to argue
that any one type of writing is alone ' true '
or ' deserves the name
of criticism ' . . . Our quest will be to uncover some hidden core of agreements, if such there be, and to expose common and tacit assumptions about
the nature of criticism which are rarely articulate beneath the clamor of
controversy." (p. 14) Nonetheless, the concluding sentence of this first
chapter states: " Criticism as such stands or falls by its profitableness as
an ancillary to direct appreciation." (p.

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The last chapter of the book is on " Anatomy of Criticism." I shall refer
to it now to pursue one point the opening chapter raises. By the end of the
book it is clear that for Mr. Osborne the main task of criticism is the
assessment and description of works of art in terms of aesthetic principles
and values. I think there is no question but that the author is right in this
main contention. It might seem a truism to state it. However, in this final
chapter, Professor Osborne lists schools of criticism which rest primarily
upon non-aesthetic principles. Thus, we have psychological criticism and
the approach via psychoanalysis, historical criticism, exegetical criticism,
and so on. There is no doubt that such approaches offer interesting observations on art and the artist, but I should like to stress even more than
Professor Osborne their extrinsic connection both with the work of art itself
and the work of criticism. Both artistic making and artistic criticism have
suffered much from psychologists who are neither artists nor critics; the
sociologist and the historian have done similar damage. The just remark
of Ezra Pound, which Mr. Osborne approvingly quotes, is relevant: "You
can spot the bad critic when he starts discussing the poet and not the
poem."
Presumably Mr. Osborne would not have written his book had he not
held the position that the critic has a distinctive function to perform, and
that there is a legitimate, not to say honorable, distinction between the
critic and the artist. I should think in a book of this dimension there could
have been a facing of the issue between the artist and the critic, particularly
a facing of the fact that artists generally have a somewhat less than
enthusiastic view of the critic. A positive and basic analysis of the function
and role of the critic as such would have added to the already considerable
depth of this book. The skill of the critic is not the skill of the artist, and
both perfections are needed for the mature development of the sensitive
viewer and listener of art. I suppose that the
blind spot artists
have about critics (apart from the understandable point that there are a
lot of bad critics) arises from the fact that extremely few artists are also
critics. The artistic habit and the critical habit are quite distinct and there
is no reason why they should be found in the same person; they are, in point
of fact, rarely found in the same person. There is need, then, for explicit
development of the distinction between these two abilities in man, an analysis which provides the basis both for a sympathetic understanding of the
artist by the critic and of the critic by the artist.
In conformity with the main purpose the author has, the book centers
on delineating the main assumptions which underlie methods of criticism.
It is worthwhile summarizing these main assumptions for, so far as possible,
such a summary will give the gist of the book.
The Realist assumption in criticism emphasizes that the excellence of a
work of art depends upon the veracity with which it copies or symbolize!

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something not itself. Mr. Osborne spends more time on this assumption
than on any other; it forms the primary topic of Chapters III, IV, and V.
To avoid an initial confusion of terms, it is well to note that " realism " as a
critical view in art criticism is different from " realism " as a philosophical
position, although it appears that " realism " in art criticism (but not
" naturalism ") derives from realistic philosophy.
Mr. Osborne recognizes the importance of mimesis in the realistic assumption, but by and large his grasp of artistic imitation is imprecise and
weak. He does not understand adequately imitation as developed by
Aristotle, so much so that he types Aristotle's doctrine of imitation as one
of "naive realism." His failure to see imitation as an artistic principle of
imaginative representation of reality in the broadest sense possible of the
term (but quite removed from "copying" reality) leads him to miss altogether how music, for example, in its manner and object of presentation
is just as much an art of imitation as drama or poetry or painting. Taking
into consideration the many other penetrating remarks the author puts forward about the realist assumption in art, I have the impression that with a
more analytic and profound grasp of artistic imitation, Mr. Osborne would
have come to see that the realistic assumption provides the best as well as
the most objective approach to understanding and criticizing art.
The Emotional assumption makes the excellence of a work of art depend
on the intensity of the emotion which it arouses in the observer. This view
is the basis for the romantic conception of art that held sway so long and
still affects many critics and observers, though not so much now the artists
themselves. The important kernel of· truth in this assumption is the fact
that worthwhile art does involve distinctive emotional response, but the
acceptance of any sort of emotional upsurge as an infallible sign of the
excellence of a work of art would lead one to accept, as Mr. Osborne notes,
such things as dentist's chairs and mink coats as aesthetic objects. Even
the refined theory of emotionalism in art, as developed by Mr. Clive Bell or
by Mr. A. E. Housman, who seek to establish the existence of a specific
aesthetic emotion, does not escape the basic flaw in the emotional assumption, the flaw that emotional reaction as such constitutes excellence in the
appreciation of art. Such an assumption, furthermore, is inescapably subjective.
The Expressionist assumption makes the excellence of a work of art
depend upon the exactness 'with which it causes to be reproduced in the
observer an experience previously had in the mind of the artist. Professor
Osborne brings out well the difficulty of this position by stating that no
objective comparison is possible between the experience in the mind of the
artist and the experience in the mind of the observer. A derived view not
explicitly mentioned by Mr. Osborne, is the position of self-expression in
art. It is perhaps the most barren of all positions in art criticism since it

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offers nothing at all by way of significantly analyzing or describing a work
of art. A hiccup, for example, is self-expressive.
The Transcendental assumption, as understood by Mr. Osborne, consists
in making the excellence of a work of art depend on the intensity with
which it arouses a special type of mystical emotion, which he calls " Revelatory." The exposition of this assumption seems to me the least satisfactory. There are instances to warrant the author's treatment of transcendentalism in this fashion, but the association of this assumption with
the Emotional assumption seems to do some violence to a transcendental
position. Historically, it does not seem to be primarily an emotional assumption; it is an assumption, rather, that art reaches an object over and
beyond what is given in normal, rational experience. It need not involve a
quasi-mystical experience, although it may.
In any case, it is curious to find the author stating that one system of
philosophy which alleges to provide a foundation for the claim of aesthetic
transcendentalism is " the scholastic theory of St. Thomas Aquinas as reinterpreted by Neo-Thomists such as Jacques Maritain and Thomas Gilby."
(p. Q07) It is hard to see how anyone who is at all acquainted with the
thought of St. Thomas would understand St. Thomas as a transcendentalist,
especially in Mr. Osborne's meaning of the term. Perhaps Mr. Osborne has
been swayed by the following sentence which he quotes from Maritain,
regarding poetic knowledge: " I believe it to consist in a knowledge by
means of affective connaturality with reality as non-conceptualizable, because awakening to themselves the creative depths of the subject " (italics
Maritain's). I am inclined to agree with Mr. Osborne when he says" I am
unable to believe that anyone who finds St. Thomas hard to understand will
gain enlightenment from language of this sort." But I do not see how Mr.
Osborne is justified in presuming that the little he has on St. Thomas
directly establishes his approach as a transcendentalist one. If St. Thomas
belongs in any one of the assumptions listed, it would be in the realist assumption, even though this view is not fully exposed.
There is, finally, the Configurational assumption, which makes the
excellence of a work of art depend upon the compactness with which it is
organized into an organic unity. As Mr. Osborne rightly notes, this position
affords an objective standard of criticism, and critics who use it tend to be
consistent and logical. In my judgment, perhaps the best chapter in the
book is Chapter IX on " Beauty in Configuration," where the author appears
to be more positive in his analysis than in other sections, where his emphasis is rather negative and his observations often inconclusive. It would
seem to me, however, that the configurational assumption is not really
separate from the realist assumption, provided the latter is not taken quite
so narrowly as Mr. Osborne does. Indeed, the organic unity of a work of
art is central to its excellence, and this organic unity flows from a realistic
approach to art.

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The author's principal aim in the book, to return to this for emphasis, is
" to elucidate the aims which the critics themselves profess." Professor
Osborne does not believe that it lies within the province of criticism to
justify these aims and assumptions, although this belief does not prevent
his making a certain number of critical evaluations about various features
of the different assumptions. I should like to repeat that within the limits
the author lays down, he admirably succeeds, by and large. There is a
wealth of information and comment in the book and a rich acquaintance
with what artists and critics have said and held. Presumably the author
thinks that the more definitive and positive evaluation of assumptions in
criticism belongs to aesthetics rather than to criticism, a separation that
he may press too absolutely. Nevertheless, the author makes it clear that
the task of aesthetics and philosophy of art is important and needs to be
done. What he has well done here is to show how criticism is significant and
intelligent when it proceeds consistently from original assumptions. Since
relatively few critics are successful in this respect, Mr. Osborne's book is
valuable and useful for aiding critics to write intelligibly. The larger and
more basic issue of aesthetics itself can then be faced more successfully.
JOHN

A. OESTERLE

University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana.

Concepts of Space. By MAX JAMMER. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1954. Pp. 212 with index. $3.75.

One of the major problems occupying the attention of modern Philosophy,
particularly that of American Philosophy, is that of integrating the results
of modem empiriological disciplines with a knowledge of the underlying
natures of things. This problem is especially difficult in the area of experimental Physics. The other phenomenal sciences retain a solid anchor
in the natural principles of human knowledge, but experimental Physics is
a strange discipline in which proficiency depends on an ascetic renunciation
of the normal tendencies of the mind.
It is possible, of course, to overstate the problem, and to insist that
natural philosophy be so altered that it is deduced from experimental
Physics, or at least that it assimilate the physicists' conclusions without
change. An analysis or the principles and IDf '.1ods reveals experimental
than a.'l immaterial
Physics as more of a conceptual substitute k
assimilation, more art than science.
But Physics is such a successful art that it set ns absurd to suppose that
this conceptual framework is a purely arbitrary construction. If we can

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manage qualitative data by treating them as though they were essentially
species of quantity, we must suspect, at least, that the two are so closely
related that their interdependence is not adequately expressed by the usual
insistence on locomotion as the basic type of motion and on quantity as the
first material accident, the foundation of the sensible qualities.
A discerning comparison of the philosophic notion of place and the
physicist. conception of space certainly seems one approach to the problem
in consideration of the basic part these two ideas play in the different
accounts given of local motion. Yet oddly enough there are few enough
works that undertake such a task on more than a textbook level. Max
Jammer's book, Concepts of Space, may not unravel the enigma of the
relation between the philosophical and the empiriological views on these
issues, but at least it is a step in the right direction.
Dr. Jammer lectures on Physics and on the history of science at the
Hebrew University in Jerusalem. On the evidence of this book, he seems
much more sensitive to man's achievement in the realms of theology and
philosophy than is usually the case with most historians of science. This
book, Concepts of Space, Dr. Jammer wrote while Visiting Lecturer at
Harvard University.
The contents of the book are well described by the subtitle, " The History of Theories of Space in Physics." The story begins with the concepts
of place and space in ancient Greek Philosophy, with the major emphasis on
Aristotle and his influence. Some reference is made to the presence within
Greek culture of a method of studying reality not entirely compatible with
Aristotelian natural science, namely the Euclidean geometry.
Dr. Jammer devotes the next section of his work to certain theological
considerations tending to the identification of space with a divine attribute.
Stressed particularly are the cabalistic identification of space with divine
immensity, and the unity of space with light and light with God by way
of the neo-Platonic light metaphysics. These influences are seen as being
funnelled through Henry More into the fundamental conceptions of Newtonian Physics. Other better-known influences on Newton are found in the
Renaissance reaction against Aristotle, a revolt which Dr. Jammer traces
all the way back to the commentators of the Peripatetic school itself. Some
exceptions among the Arabian philosophers to the prevailing adherence to
Aristotle are noted besides the more familiar examples of Crescas, Cusanus,
Telesio, Giordano Bruno, Gassendi, and the other European thinkers who
formed the transition from Aristotelian to modern trends in philosophy.
The last two chapters are devoted to the analysis of absolute space
particularly as embodied in the Newtonian conceptual scheme, and to the
development of the more reiative ideas of space at the foundation of
modern science. In the section dealing with the Newtonian scheme Dr.
Jammer emphasizes the fact that, although Newton considered the con-

8

556

BOOK REVIEWS

cept of absolute space a theoretical necessity for the principle of inertia, and
found some satisfaction of his religious feelings in the famous identification
of this space with the "Sensorium of the Godhead," it is Newton's treatment of relative space that fulfills the important operational functions in
his system. Some of the important philosophical reactions to the Newtonian
analysis are explained, especially Kant's elevation of Euclidean space to an
a priori form and Leibniz's reaction in favor of a more relative notion of
space.
In the last chapter Dr. Jammer undertakes the enormous task of laying
bare the whole modern revolution in Physics from the point of view of its
impact on spatial theories. In spite of the difficulties of explaining such a
complex reaction, the author does an outstandingly successful job in dealing
with all the relevant issues, both from the operational point of view and from
that of the mathematical contributions of Euler, Gauss, Riemann, and others.
He even manages to indicate such :fine points as the problems of measurement originating from the abandonment of the Euclidean notion of congruence by modern mathematics, and the theoretical considerations involved
in using quadratic equations instead of those of a higher power in determining the value of an infinitesimal line element in an n-dimensional continuum.
Finally Dr. Jammer gives a short resume of historical attempts to determine the number of dimensions in space on a priori grounds, and discusses
the current difficulties concerning the continuous nature of space in relativity Physics and its discrete nature .in quantum mechanics.
In evaluating Dr. Jammer's competence as a historian I feel that it is
only :fitting to pay homage to the rare erudition and scholarship that Dr.
Jammer displays. Particularly impressive is the breadth of his acquaintance
with medieval Jewish, Arabian, and Christian thinkers. His willingness to
report what these thinkers actually said is in marked contrast to the
somewhat diffuse disquisitions on servile acceptance of authority and on
the evil influences of theology that usually pass for the medieval section of
a history of science.
Generally speaking, Dr. Jammer manages to avoid the charge of being on
the wrong side of controversial interpretations of the men he treats by
giving alternative explanations from different sources. For instance, he
goes to considerable trouble to present divergent views on Newton's identification of space with the divine Sensorium. He does, however, depart from
this mode in connection with the Atomistic notion of the void, which he
presents as relative to and dependent on atoms, apparently in accordance
with a theory that all early philosophical inquiries can treat of space only
relatively. He also tends to carry the parallels between the Aristotelian
view of place and the spatial theories of modern relativity Physics to the
point of attributing to Aristotelian places a kind of efficient causality. Inas-

BOOK REVIEWS

557

much as many of the criticisms of Aristotle by later thinkers are based on
this same assumption, perhaps Dr. Jammer can be forgiven this lapse.
Dr. Jammer's work does not pretend to any completeness in recounting
the various philosophical theories of place or space. For instance, he barely
mentions the philosophy of Spinoza, in whose thought the analysis of
space is a key issue, and he does not do much better with Descartes, whom
he mentions principally by way of contrast to Newton and Henry More.
However, the principle of selection used in the work in the influence brought
to bear upon modern empiriological views by philosophers, and the triumph
of Newtonian concepts perhaps justifies the neglect of the Cartesian movement, whatever may have been its influence in its own time. I suspect that
from time to time the emphasis is guided less by the relevance of the
theories from a modern viewpoint than by the personal interests of Dr.
Jammer; but I for one found these bypaths more diverting than the more
pertinent issues.
But if this is an eminently satisfactory book from the aspect of a
scientific history, what is its value from a philosophic view? Of course it
would be remiss of anyone primarily interested in philosophy to feel himself so self-sufficient as to neglect familiarizing himself with the thought of
contemporary scientists. As a means to acquiring such an acquaintance, the
book is excellent. Although written for a general audience, the work avoids
the easy distortions usually found in explanations of Physics to the nonscientific public. It avoids the peculiar non-mathematical expositions of
non-Euclidean and four dimensional space, for instance, by presenting these
elements within Physics correctly as the result of the operational type of
mathematics required by that science. The explanations, on the whole, are
clear and require little of specialized knowledge of their comprehension. One
exception might be mentioned: some acquaintance with non-Euclidean
geometry is presupposed in the last chapter, but even this acquaintance does
not have to exceed the most primitive sort.
As a book that relates the changes in space to one of their ultimate
sources in the variations of fundamental attitudes toward science and its
methods, Dr. Jammer's book falls short of providing what a philosophical
reader might desire. This is possibly not a criticism, for there is no sign that
Dr. Jammer intended to write a book especially for philosophers. Besides,
it is misleading to say that Dr. Jammer is unaware of the philosophical, or at
least the logical foundations of the theories which he records. Like most
modern scientists he is acutely conscious of the limitations of the method of
experiental Physics and of the external and substitutive nature of the reconstruction of reality to which it leads. My point is simply that one of the
most important reasons for the development of the Newtonian and relativity
views of space is precisely the evolution of new logical and epistemological
attitudes, and that Dr. Jammer alludes to this relation only vaguely and

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BOOK REVIEWS

accidentally. Thereby he leaves out of account a factor without which his
subject is only incompletely understood. Moreover it is solely by understanding how much of the results of experimental Physics is simply a projection of the technique of the physicist that the philosopher will eventually
be able to decide which aspects of these results are an embodiment of the
real, and use those aspects to enrich his own understanding of nature. For
this purpose there are many works both within and outside the Thomistic
tradition that give greater insight into the relation between the philosophic
problem of place and its quantitative cousin space and into the principles
on which our knowledge of them begins than does Dr. Jammer's historical
treatment.
EDWARD T. SMITH

De Paul University
Chicago, Ill.

BRIEF NOTICES
The Nature of Sympathy. By MAX ScHELER. Translated by Peter Heath.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954. Pp. 328 with index. $5.00.
Philosophical Essays. By A. J. AYER. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1934.
Pp. 298 with index. $4.50.

Max Scheler (1874-1928), who along with Brentano and Husserl must be
counted among the founders of Phenomenology, completed the first edition
of this book in 1912 and it was published the following year in Halle. A
second and greatly revised edition appeared in Bonn in 1922. The present
translation is based on the fifth edition, substantially identical with the
second, edited by Maria Scheler and, published at Frankfurt-am-Main in
11>48.
This book is of moment not only because the two significant editionsthe first and the second-span the most productive decade of Scheler's
career, but also because it contains most of the themes characteristic of
Scheler's philosophy. This translation is of moment not only because it is
the first of Scheler's works in English, but also because of the lucid and
balanced " Introduction " by Prof. Stark. This really is an introduction to
Scheler's general philosophical and religious positions.
The root problem raised here by Scheler is how we know other human
persons. Much of the book is a criticism of two theories which hold that
our knowledge of other men is indirect. The first of these theories is to
the effect that we know others by reasoning from analogy based on our
experience of the self. The second theory is that we know others by feeling
ourselves into them, by empathy. Both theories, apart from their individual
falsities, agree. on a common principle which Scheler holds is especially
false, namely, that self-knowledge precedes and is more fundamental than
knowledge of others.
Scheler's own view is that our knowledge of the psychic life of others
is direct, because originally experience of self and of others is undifferentiated; consciousness is originally common and contains in principle the
experience of others as well as the experience of the self. Both the ego and
the· non-ego are originally given in a common life-experience. Later' sel/consciousness supervenes and gives rise to egocentrism which in metaphysics
is named "relative solipsism" and in ethics is nambed "selfishness." This
egocentrism is destroyed only through love and sympathy, which enable us
to perceive that each human person is as real and as valuable as we are.
Of these two, love is the more fundamental. For sympathy is a response

559

560

BRIEF NOTICES

to the experience of others based on and limited by an underlying love.
Love, not knowledge, enables us to penetrate into the innermost recesses of
the person. In love, the perceived value realized in the person is but a
starting point. For the lover has a double vision of the beloved: he is
seen and loved just exactly as he is, for himself; yet he is seen also in all
that he might be. Love, then, is itself the force which strengthens the
beloved to move from the lower to the higher state, from potency to act.
It is a motion, as well as an emotion.
It is impossible to read anything of Scheler's without being saddened by
the tragedy of the personal life of this gifted, restless, wilful man. The
personal problems which darkened the last seven years of his brief life
darkened too the light of his intellect. It is to Prof. Stark's honor that
his "Introduction," which so vigorously calls attention to Scheler's genius,
does not flinch from acknowledging the gradual decay of that genius. The
Nature of Sympathy is not without shadows anticipating the later darkness, for the second edition was published at a crucial time in Scheler's
personal life. But it is not without brilliant truth, either. It is, like its
author, mixed; but as yet the brilliance, the insight, the simple truth,
predominate.
Professor Ayer's Philosophical Essays is, in spirit, as far removed from
Scheler's Sympathy as two books in philosophy can be. Professor Ayer, of
course, is no phenomenologist; he is an analyst. He is probably closer in
method to G. E. Moore than to Bertrand Russell, and the disagreements
between Moore and himself seem, to one who is not an analyst, less significant than the agreements as to methodology.
The present volume is a collection of essays each of which was published
previously, either in periodicals or in symposia. The essentially linguistic
approach of Ayer to philosophy is illustrated by contrasting his treatment
of our knowledge of others in the essay " One's Knowledge of Other Minds "
with Scheler's. Ayer concludes (1) that I am not any other person because
" I could not conceivably satisfy all the descriptions that some other person
satisfies" (p. 214); (2) to ascribe an experience to another person is to
asert that a given property (the experience itself) is co-instantiated with
certain others (all the other properties which collectively describe the subject having the experience); (3) hence I am not inferring his experience
from my own experience, but merely affirming that certain properties conjoined in one context will still be conjoined in another context; (4) this
affirmation is an inductive argument based on analogy. All of Ayer's conclusions are equally oblique.
In reading these Essays, which are unified only by the methodology of
linguistiC examination which never yields a really philosophical position, one
is tempted to succumb to the exasperated judgment that this is indeed
triviality, a criticism not uncommonly made by Thomists. But analysis,

BRIEF NOTICES

561

including Ayer's analysis, does embody four virtues: it is patient of detail;
it is modest, unpretentious; it is painfully honest, never pretending to
certainty while a single doubt or reservation remains to be exploited; and
it is aware, only too aware, that on the level of communication, philosophy
is necessarily verbal. It is true that these virtues, in the absence of more
significant philosophical gifts, create an atmosphere of peculiarly sophomoric debate. Yet some of the analysts' minute linguistic preoccupation has
a place in Thomism, and that place is in the examination of the first principles. The method of analysis is particularly suited to the kind of indirect
defense which Thomists undertake with regard to the principles of identity,
sufficient reason, causality and finality.
Ayer's book is as excellent a working model of the analytic method as
Scheler's is of the phenomenological method. The confluence in the thirties
and the forties of English analysis with Austrian logical positivism and
German scientific empiricism makes it likely that analysis is destined to be
as important in this country as Pragmatism, and more important than
Existentialism, Phenomenology or Marxism. If so, mere impatience, however understandable, is a dangerous luxury. It is always a mistake to decide
too quickly that there are no spoils in a given Egypt.

The Doctrine of the Void. By LEONARD McCANN, C. S. B. Toronto:
Basilian Press, 1955. Pp. 146.
St. John of the Cross has often been hailed as the " Doctor of the Void "
or the" Doctor of Nothingness." It is natural, therefore, that a study of the
spiritual doctrine of the greatest mystical writer since St. Augustine should
be devoted in part to this aspect of St. John's doctrine. It should be remembered, however, that St. John of the Cross. is not merely a Doctor of
the Void, though he does stress the necessity of the active and passive
purgations of the sense and the spirit in his Ascent and Dark Night. But
the Mystical Doctor likewise treats at length of the positive aspect of
growth in Christian perfection, as is evidenced in his Spiritual Canticle and
Living Flmne. Indeed, modern critics have shown that the former work
is completely Christocentric, dealing as it does with the transformation .of
the soul in Christ, and the latter is Trinitarian, since it describes with
incomparable clarity the soul'& experience of the divine indwelling.
Neither is it accurate to propound that St. John of the Cross established
a new school of spirituality, although it is true that his emphasis on active
and passive purgation would make a special appeal to Carmelites with their
insistence on mortification and detachment. But St. John is a universal
Doctor and consequently, his spiritual doctrine is the common and orthodox doctrine on the spiritual life.

662

BRIEF NOTICES

Father McCann has written brilliantly on the distinction between
speculative and experimental theology and he does well to insist that even
in spiritual theology there is a great difference between the speculative
study of Christian perfection and the ·description of the sublime wonders
of intimate union with God by one who has himself experienced these things.
It is the difference between the scientist, who explains what nature is, and
the poet, who describes how he has been affected by nature. The author
has also manifested his firm grasp of the doctrine of the spiritual life when
he writes on the distinction between the acquired and infused virtues and
the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
However, St. John of the Cross did not treat explicitly of the gifts of the
Holy Ghost in any of his works. It is a lawful supposition that he would
have done so, had he completed his commentary on the Dark Night, but
the fact is that he did not do so. And in this sense it seems that Father
McCann did not quite accomplish what he set out to do in his study of
the doctrine of the void, namely, to evaluate it in terms of Thomistic
theology. What he did do, and do well, is to correlate the doctrine of St.
John of the Cross with the spiritual doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas. By
outlining the spiritual doctrine of the Carmelite mystic, the author presented
a neat summary of the negative aspect of the struggle for Christian perfection. Then he turns the coin to the other side and shows the positive
aspect of that same spiritual struggle as taught by Aquinas. But the author
did not evaluate or explain the doctrine of the void in the light of
Thomistic theology.
There are a few points on which the present reviewer feels that the
author should have expatiated at greater length. For example. it would
have been very much in order if he had explained more fully the use of
the division of the spiritual faculties into intellect, memory, and will. Since
this threefold division is so common among mystical writers, there is a
very good foundation for it. St. Thomas himself refers to the memory that
is sensitive and the memory that is intellectual. Moreover, the purifying
effect of the theological virtue of hope will most certainly be manifested
primarily in the memory, since hope is a virtue that looks to the future and
to eternity.
It would seem also that a more accurate term to be used in speaking
of the dark nights would have been purgation or purification. The word
" void " may often carry with it the overtone of emptiness or nothingness,
which is certainly only half the picture that St. 'John was trying to convey.
He himself stresses repeatedly that the soul empties itself and seeks to
possess nothing so that it may be filled with God and thereby possess all
things. It is interesting to note that some Protestant theologians who have
written on St. John of the Cross have a predilection for the word " void,"

BRIEF NOTICES

568

while Catholic scholars prefer to use St. John's own expression of purification or purgation.
One final observation has to do with the author's selection of the first
redactions when quoting from the Spiritual Canticle and the Living Flame.
It is true that
Chevallier, 0. S. B., considered the first redaction of
the Spiritual Co:nticle to be the only authentic one, but this opinion has
been rejected by all modern critics and it is, in fact, outmoded since the
discovery of the manuscript of Jaen. As to the second redaction of the
Living Flame, Baruzi is the only critic who considers it spurious. The
author, therefore, could have used the second redactions of these two works
without any qualms whatever for they have been accepted as authentic by
the majority of critics and scholars since the eighteenth century.

Sources of Christian Theology. Vol. 1-:-Sacraments and Worship. Edited
by PAUL F. PALMER, S.J. Newman: Westminster, 1955. Pp. 249
with index. $4.75.
This is the first volume of an important series of textual compendia on
the key doctrines of the Christian Faith. The title, Sources of Christian
Theology, is explained in a general foreword. Sacred Scripture is not included except incidentally. All other sources from the Magisterium, the
Fathers, the Liturgy, are included. In other words, these volumes are going
to present the witness of Christian tradition down through the ages. A
special feature, of great value, is the inclusion of the actual texts of
heretical writings on the doctrines under consideration (e. g., in the present
volume, the writings of the Reformers have been chosen) .
This first volume is devoted to the three great sacraments of Christian
initiation-Baptism, Confirmation and the Holy Eucharist. All are intimately connected with the Liturgy and so the work begins with two
excellent chapters on: " The Early Rites of Initiation," and " The Early
Eucharistic Liturgies." Very helpful is the chart of the basic liturgies to be
found on pp. 67-71. The key chapter is the third on "The Sacramental
System." The work ends with two sections on the Eucharist as Sacrament and Sacrifice. Fr. Palmer has added helpful historical and doctrinal
notes.

564

BRIEF NOTICES

St. Thomas Aquinas Theological Texts. Translated by THOMAS GILBY.
New York: Oxford, 1955. Pp. 441 with index. $3.50.
Father Gilby has selected texts of St. Thomas on a variety of theological
topics, arranged them according to the order of the Summa Theologiae, and
finally set them out in a translation which he says is somewhere between
the literal and the paraphrase. Two things mark and signal this selection,
the choice of many little known but apt texts of St. Thomas and the high
quality of Father Gilby's translation.
The editor has ranged throughout the entire works of St. Thomas,
choosing a text for the shrewdness of its peculiar insight into a human
problem, or for the clarity of its exposition, or perhaps as an argument for
a familiar theological thesis, or even for its simple human interest. As a
result the texts throw new sidelights on long familiar Thomistic doctrines
and destinations. The reading of these is a delight because they combine
new insights in a homogeneity with traditional and more familiar teaching.
This is particularly true of the texts Father Gilby chose from St. Thomas'
sermons and commentaries on the Scriptures.
In the translation well-known
have a new crispness, brilliance or
a hidden bit of humor. Old expressions and distinctions appear in new spring dress. Reading them is a double delight, for there is the
joy of the substance of St. Thomas and the French cookery of Father
Gilby's English.
For those who have no experience with the Latin text or English translations, this book serves as a bright introduction to the mind and method
of St. Thomas. Most of the familiar doctrines and distinctions are here,
the definitions and divisions and examples so that the substance of his
theological thought is preserved.
On the other hand, the book is not sufficiently complete nor systematic
to serve as a basic text for a course or study club in theology. Too
much of the whole cloth of St. Thomas is omitted. Still the work will help
admirably in two capacities, for side reading or occasional reference for
the student of a course of theology in which St. Thomas is not used, or for
the lecturer who will find a variety of side-lights on theological doctrines
with sparkling quotations to quote.
As teachers know, Thomas without tears is an illusion. But Father
Gilby's book of texts will bring a smile, a chuckle, a light touch, a moment
of joy to an otherwise difficult and methodic proceeding. Students of St.
Thomas who read these will see some of the wit and brillance or the mind
of St. Thomas; teachers who use them can communicate that brilliance
to their own students.

BRIEF NOTICES

565

The Ethics of Rhetoric. By RICHARD WEAVER. Chicago: Regnery, 1958.
Pp. 284 with index. $8.50.
Some years ago Richard Weaver wrote a book called Ideas Have Consequences. If enough people now read his Ethics of Rhetoric, his own ideas
will have splendid consequences, for his present book is an invitation to his
readers to become accomplished writers and speakers of the truth. While
one might be at first glance misled by his table of contents into the impression that the book is nothing but a collection of disconnected critical
essays on such rhetoricians as Plato, Milton, Burke and Lincoln, further
perusal reveals a keen, lucid and constructive criticism of the use of rhetoric
by these and other famous writers and orators. Mr. Weaver is himself a
delightful example of a man with sharp observation, penetrating thinking
and superb writing.
He first uses Plato's dialogue "The Phaedrus" in his discussion of the
problem of the ethics of rhetoric. The orator indeed has a single definite
purpose, to persuade his audience. Does this purpose then allow him to
ignore the truth in his pursuit of his objective? Indeed it does not, for his
primary duty is to reveal the truth, truth itself being his most persuasive
weapon. Incidentally, although Plato, as the great mouthpiece of Socratic
dialectic, is used to propose the author's teaching, it is the philosophy,
especially the logic, of Aristotle which in the end dominates the book.
The Scopes evolution trial of 1925 is the initial case used by Professor
Weaver. With deft skill and brilliant use of juxtaposition, the arguments of
Darrow and Bryan are set forth, then carefully analyzed from rhetorical
and logical principles. 0£ even greater interest is .the comparison between
Lincoln and Burke which leaves the reader 'convinced that the " great
emancipator" was ethically a greater orator, and therefore a greater man
than the "great commoner." Aristotelian logicians will be happy to note
that Lincoln's power was derived especially from his skillful use of the argument from definition.
If the logician has cause to rejoice in the first chapters of Mr. Weaver's
well-ordered thought the rhetorician or English teacher will be interested in
the later chapters which set forth in good prose the art of grammar. Thus
teaching by example as well as by doctrine, this rhetorician explains the use
of each part of speech, sentence structure and stylistic devices. The author's
objective in what might seem a departure from his purpose is to show that
nouns convey the truth better than adjectives.
Thus the teacher of philosophy has in this book a wealth of examples
based on real people and real events; the student, a stimulant to the serious
study of philosophy and the art of speaking the truth; the general public,
a revelation of the practical uses of philosophy with a healthy (!aution
about the techniques of orators. The Ethics of Rhetoric is not only rewarding; it is refreshing.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Abel, Reuben. The Pragmatic Humanism of F. C. S. Schiller. New York:
King's Crown, 1955. Pp. 219 with index. $3.50.
Allers, Rudolf & Others. (ed. by Francis J. Braceland, M. D.) Faith,
Reason and Modern Psychiatry. New York: Kenedey, 1955. Pp. 325
with index. $6.00.
Berti, 0. S. M., Conradus. Metkodologiae Theologicae Elementa. Rome:
Desclee, 955. Pp. 241.
Broglie, Louis de. (tr. b;v Martin Davidson) Physics and Microphysics.
New York: Pantheon, 1955. Pp. fl86 with index. $4.50.
Cahill, 0. P., John.

The Development of the Theological Censures .After
the Council of Trent. Fribourg: University Press, 1955. Pp. 214 with

index. DM 12.
Carabellese, Pantaleo.
Fr. 540.

La Conscience Conerete. Paris:

1955. Pp. 219.

Casula, S. J., Mario. Marechal e Kant. Milan: Fratelli Bocca, 1955. Pp.
124. L. 600.
Collins, C. S. C., A. Leonard. 1954 Proceedings of the Sister's Institute of
Spirituality. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1955. Pp.
283. $3.00.
Danielou, Jean. (tr. by Walter Mitchell) Origen. New York:
Ward, 1955. Pp. 360. $4.50.

Sheed &

Dulles, S. J., Avery, Demske, S. J., James, and O'Connell, S. J., Robert.
Introductory Metaphysics. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1955. Pp.
with indexes. $4.50.
Elwes, R.H. M. (tr.) The Chief Works of Spinoza. New York: Dover
Publications, 1955. Vol. I, Pp. 420. Vol. II, Pp. 442. Paper, $3.00.
Evans, Joseph W. and Ward, Leo R. (eds.) The Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain. New York: Scribner's, 1955. Pp. 362
with
$5.00.
Gelin, Albert. {tr. by George Lamb) The Key Concepts of the Old Testament. New York: Sheed & Ward,'1955. Pp. 94. $2.00.
(tr. by A. H. C. Downes) The Mystical Theology of
St. Bernard. .New York: Sheed & Ward, 1955. Pp. 275 with indexes.

Gilson, Etienne.
$8.50.

5.66

567

BOOKS RECEIVED

Goldbrunner, Josef. Holiness ia Wholeness. New York: Pantheon, 1955.
Pp. 63. $1.75.
Guardini, Romano. The Rosary of Our Lady. New York: Kenedy, 1955.
Pp. 94. $2.50.
Haldane, E. S. and Ross, G. R. T. (trs.) Philosophical Worka of Descartes.
New York: Dover Publications, 1955. Vol. I, Pp. 458 with index.
Vol. II, Pp. 380 with index. Paper, $3.90 Cloth, $7.90.
Jaspers, Karl. (tr. by William Earle) Reason and Exiatenz. New York:
Noonday Press, 1955. Pp. 157.
Journet, Msgr. Charles. (tr. by A.H. C. Downes) The Church of the Word
Incarnate. Vol. I-The Apostolic Hierarchy. New York: Sheed &
Ward, 1955. P. 600 with index, $7.50.
Kierkegaard, Sjllren. (tr. by Walter Lowrie) On Authority and Revelation.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955. Pp. 232 with index.
$4.50.
Kik, J. Marcellus. Revelation Twenty. Philadelphia:
Reformed, 1955. Pp. 100. $2.00.

Presbyterian and

McCrossen, Vincent A. The Empty Room. New York:
Library, 1955. Pp. 156 with index. $2.75.

Philosophical

McGarry, Danile D. (tr.) The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1955. Pp. 333 with index. $5.00.
Marcel, Gabriel. The Decline of Wisdom. New York:
Library, 1955. Pp. 64. $2.50.

Philosophical

Maritain Jacques. Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism. New York:
Philosophical Library, 1955. Pp. 883 with index. $6.00.
Mora, Jose Ferrater and Leblanc, Hugues. Logica Matematica. Mexico:
Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1955.
Neibuhr, Reinhold. The Self and the Dramas of History. New York:
Scribner's, 1955. Pp. 9?55 with index. $3.75.
Orchard, W. E. Sancta Sanctorum. New York:
1955. Pp. 9?9?1. $3.50.

Philosophical Library,

Rossi, C. M., Giovanni Felice. Antiche e Nuove Edizioni degli Opuacoli di
San Tommaao d'Aquino e ll Problema della Lorro Autenticita.
Piacenza: Collegio Alberoni, 1955. Pp. 74 with index. L. 700.
S. Thomas Aquinatis. {ed. by Commissio Piana) Summa Theologiae cura
et studio Inatituti Studiorum Medievalium Ottaviensis. Tomus Secundus. I-II. Ottawa: Commissio Piana, 1955. Pp. 748 with index.
Smith, Wm. A. Ancient Education. New Work: Philosophical Library,
1955. Pp. 321 with index. $8.75.

568

BOOKS RECEIVED

Tillich, Paul. Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955. Pp. 95. $2.25.
Ussher, Arland. Journey Through Dread. New York: Devin-Adair, 1955.
Pp. 160 with index. $8.75.
Van Roo, S.J., Wm. A. Grace and Original Justice According to St.
Thomas. Rome: Univ. Gregoriana, 1955. Pp. 211 with index.
Van Steenberghen, Fernand. Aristotle in the West. Louvain: Nauwelaerts,
1955. Pp. 244. $2.00.
Van Til, Cornelius. The Defense of the Faith. Philadelphia: Presbyterian
and Reformed, 1955. Pp. 448 with index. $4.95.
Xiberta, 0. Carm., P. Battholomaeo, M. Tractatus de Verba Incarnato.
Vol. I, lntroductio et Christologia. Vol. II, Soteriologia. Madrid:
Consejo Superior de Investigationes Cientificas, 1955. Pp. 766.

THE

INDEX TO THE THOMIST
XVIII (1955)
INDEX OF AUTHORS

PAGE

ALLERS, R. Review of Tacke, Reussite et Echec: Theorie de la
conduite humaine, by J. Nuttin .
290
522
ANDERSON, J. F. The Notion of Certitude .
CHROUST, A.-H. The Relation of Religion to History in Early
61
Christian Thought
424
DAVIS, J. J. Review of Teologia de San Jose, by B. Llamera .
DILLON, D. A. Review of Scheeben's Doctrine of Divine A<loption,
by E. H. Palmer .
547
DuLAc, H. Review of Building a Philosophy of Education, by
419
H. S. Broudy .
EGAN, J.M. Review of Theologie Trinitaire chez St. Thomas D'Aquin,
by P. Vanier .
280
GREENSTOCK, D. L. Review of The Sacraments in Christian Life,
288
by M. M. Philipon .
480
HAMER, J. Protestants and The Marian Doctrine .
541
HART, C. A. Review of God and Polarity, by W. H. Sheldon
31
HEATH, M. Can Qualities be Measured? .
503
KANE, W. H. The Subject of Metaphysics .
LENNON, J. L. Review of Social Relations in the Urban Parish, by
409
J. H. Fichter .
443
MAHONEY, P. The Unitive Principle of Marian Theology .
MALY, E. H. Review of Cardinal Newman's Doctrine on Holy
101
Scripture, by J. Seynaeve .
MASTERSON, R.R. Sacramental Graces: Modes of Sanctifying Grace 311
MULLANEY, J. V. The Natural, Terrestrial End of Man .
373
---. Review of A History of Modern European Philosophy, by
106
J. Collins
OESTERLE, J. A. Review of Aesthetics and Criticism, by H. Osborne 550
ScHLECK, C. A. St. Thomas on the Nature of Sacramental Grace
1
186
SMITH, E.T. The Vitalism of Hans Driesch .
---.Review of Concepts of Space, by M. Jammer .
554
SMITH, F. A Thomistic Appraisal of the Philosophy of John Dewey 127
396
TORRENS, J. Poetry, An Imitation of Nature .
VoLL, U. Review of Morals and Medicine, by J. Fletcher
89

569

570

INDICES OF VOLUME XVIII

(1955)
PAGE

WALKER, L. Review of A Study of History: Vols. VII-X, by A.
Toynbee; The Lie About the West, by D. Jerrold .
292
WALL, K. A. The Structure of the Concept .
2!!8
WARD, L. R. Review of Realms of Value, by R. B. Perry .
110
ZAMMIT, P. N. The Need of International Society
71
INDEX OF ARTICLES
Appraisal, A Thomistic -- of the Philosophy of John Dewey. F.
SMITH .
127
552
Certitude, The Notion of--. J. F. ANDERSON .
Christian, The Relation of Religion to History in Early -- Thought.
A.-H. CHROUST
61
Concept, The St.ructure of the --. K. A. WALL .
228
Dewey, A Thomistic Appraisal of the Philosophy of John--. F.
SMITH .
127
Doctrine, Protestants and the Marian--. J. HAMER .
480
186
Driesch, The Vitalism of Hans--. E. T. SMITH .
End, The Natural, Terrestrial-- of Man. J. V. MULLANEY .
878
Grace, St. Thomas on the Nature of Sacramental--.
c. a. ScHLEcK .
1, 242
Graces, Sacramental--:
Modes of Sanctifying Grace. R. R.
MASTERSON
811
History,, The Relation of Religion to -- in Early Christian Thought.
A.-H. CHROUST
61
Imitation, Poetry, An -- of Nature. J. TORRENS .
896
International, The Need of--Society. P. N. ZAMMIT
71
Man, The Natural, Terrestrial End of--. J. V. MULLANEY .
878
Marian, Protestants and the -- Doctrine. J. HAMER .
480
--, The Unitive Principle of--Theology. P. MAHONEY
443
Measured, Can Qualities be --? M. HEATH .
81
Metaphysics, The Subject of--. W. H. KANE .
508
Modes, Sacramental Graces: - of Sanctifying Grace. R. R. MAS'l'ERSON .
811
878
Natural, The--, Terrestrial End of Man. J. V. MULLANEY .
Nature, Poetry, An Imitation of--. J. ToRRENS .
896
--, St. Thomas of the -- of Sacramental Grace. C. A.
I, 242
SCHLECK
Need, The--of International Society. P. N. ZAMMIT .
71
Notion, The --of Certitude. J. F. ANDERSON .
Philosophy, A Thomistic Appraisal of the-" -of John Dewey. F.
SMITH .
127

INDICES OF VOLUME XVIII

(1955)

571
PAGE

Poetry;--, An Imitation of Nature. J. TORRENS .
Principle, The Unitive--of Marian Theology. P. MAuoNEY
Protestants, -- and the Marian Doctrine. J. HAMER .
Qualities, Can -- be Measured? M. HEATH
Relation, The -- of Religion to History in Early Christian
Thought. A.-H. CHROUST .
Religion, The Relation of -- to History in Early Christian Thought.
A.-H. CHROUST .
Sacramental, -- Graces: Modes of Sanctifying Grace. R. R.
MASTERSON
-. -, St. Thomas on the Nature of -- Grace. c. A.
SCHLECK
1,
Sanctifying, Sacramental Graces: Modes of -- Grace. R. R.
MAsTERSON
Society, The Need of International--.
P. N. ZAMMIT
Structure, The -- of the Concept. K. A. WALL .
Subject, The--of Metaphysics. W. H. KANE .
Terrestrial, The Natural, -- End of Man. J. V. MULLANEY .
Theology, The Unitive Principle of Marian--. P. MAHONEY
Thomas, St. -- on the Nature of Sacramental Grace. C. A.
SCHLECK
1,
Thomistic, A--Appraisal of the Philosophy of John Dewey. F.
SMITH .
Thought, The Relation of Religion to History in Early Christian
--. A.-H. CHROUST
Unitive, The --Principle of Marian Theology. P. MAHONEY
Vitalism, The -- of Hans Driesch. E. T. SMITH .

896
448
480
81
61
61
811

242
811

71
228
508
878
448
242
127
61
448
186

INDEX OF BOOK REVIEWS
BROUDY, H. S. Building a Philosophy of Education. (H. DuLac)
COLLINS, J . .A History of Modern European Philosophy. (J. V.
Mullaney)
FICHTER, J. H. Social Relations in the Urban Parish. (J. L. Lennon)
FLETCHER, J. Morals and Medicine. (U. Voll) .
JAMMER, M. Concepts of Space. (E. T. Smith) .
JERROLD, D. The Lie .About the West. (L. Walker)
LLAMERA, B. Teologia de San Jose. (J. J. Davis) .
NuTTIN, J. Tacke, Reussite et · Echec: Thiorie de la conduite
humaine. (R. Allers) .
OsBORNE, H. Aesthetics and Criticism. (J. A. Oesterle) .
9

419
106
409
89
554
292
424
290
550

572

INDICES

OF VOLUME XVIII

(1955)
PAGE

E. H. Scheeben's Doctrine of Divine Adoption. (D. A.
Dillon)
PERRY, R. B. Realms of Value. (L. R. Ward) .
PHILIPON, M. M. The Sacraments in Christian Life. (D. L. Greenstock)
SEYNAEVE, J. Cardinal Newman's Doctrine on Holy Scripture. (E. H.
Maly) .
SHELDON, W. H. God and Polarity. (C. A. Hart) .
TOYNBEE, A. A Study of History: Vols. VII-X.
(L. Walker)
VANIER, P. Theologie Trinitaire chez St. Thomas D'Aquin. (J. M.
Egan) .
PALMER,

END OF VoLUME XVIII

547
110
288
101
541
292
280