THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE

QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS:

THE DoMINICAN

Publishers:

VoL.

FATHERS oF THE PROVINCE oF ST. JosEPH

The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

APRIL, 1956

XIX

No.2

NEWTONIAN ANTINOMIES AGAINST THE
PRIMA VIA

T

HE proof of God's existence from motion in the universe,
as originally proposed by Aristotle 1 and as later presented by St. Thomas, 2 was intended to be understood
by physical scientists. The terms in which it was couched were
technical terms with clearly defined meanings, and their application was straightforward and rigorous. Yet the proof, for all
its technical elegance, no longer convinces the scientific mind.
By and large, its terminology is unintelligible to modern scientists, and as a consequence the argument is now commonly
:rejected as having no scientific importance or validity.
There are many possible explanations for this enigma, most
of them reducible to the patent equivocation in the use of the
word " science " through the past three centuries. Prior to the
' Physics, Book Vll.
2 Summa Theologiae, I, q.

a. 3.

151

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seventeenth century, science .was commonly understood as a
body of certain and evident knowledge known to be true
through causes. Physical or natural science was further considered as having two maip. parts: a fundamental or generalized
part, dealing with the common features of natural things presupposed to other studies, and a specialized part in which
detailed investigation was made of the various types of natural
things. The
ewtonian revolution drastically affected
this understanding; it placed the accent on intensive specialized
investigation, minimized the search for causes, and in its place
methodology based largely mi. mathematical· correlations.3 From that time· until the present day, the meaning
of the term " science " has still not crystallized, but the prevailing modern opinion places the emphasis on specialized
investigation using a uniform postulational procedure that
engenders only probable kno\vledge. Thus' c'ausality, certitude
and truth are no longer the hallmark o..f science. Moreover,
there is no fundamental or generalized study of physical reality
prior to detailed experimental work. Such considerations, if
they are thought of at all, are usually relegated to the broad
field of philosophy, and they are not regarded as essential to the
intellectual equipment of the scientist.
The prima via, or the proof of God's existence from motion,
is refractory to the modern mind· simply because it is based
upon these fundamental, generalized concepts that are no
longer considered a. part of science and hence are not taught
to scientists. And the situation is further complicated by the
fact that modern specialized terminology frequently employs
the same terms as pre-Galilean science, but with more restricted
meanings than these terms enjoyed in the traditional fundamental understanding. Thus the modem- scientist finds considerable ambiguity in the classical .statement of the demonstration, and this constitutes an almost insurmountable barrier
to his acceptance of its conclusion.
,

8

I

E. F. Caldin, "Science and the Map of Knowledge," Blackfriara, XXXVI

(1955) • /)68-569.

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Yet there is a ray of hope for one who would reinstate the
prima via to its rightful place as a classical scientific demonstration. Oddly enough, this springs from the very man whose
genius distracted later generations from becoming interested in
the fundamental science of nature that rigorously establishes
the demonstration, namely, Sir Isaac Newton. Being at the
beginning of a new line of thought, Newton appreciated the
terminology of his predecessors and properly formulated his
own contribution so as not to be misunderstood by his contemporaries. But, as frequently happens, the scientists who are
now most indebted to Newton are generally unacquainted with
his original works, and thus have lost contact with this valuable
part of his writings. They miss the point of the very title of
his main contribution, the :fJ1athematical Principles of Natural
Philosophy, possibly because they are unaware of any other
principles with which Newton might be contrasting the ones he
there proposes. Even worse, in some instances they misrepresent his teachings, and use their own misconceptions to argue
against the premises of the prima via.
This situation has given rise to the so-called Newtonian
antinomies against the prima via. 4 They are not Newton's
arguments against this classical demonstration, but rather are
difficulties that present themselves to those who are acquainted
with Newton's laws of motion, and cannot see how these can
be reconciled with the analysis of motion presupposed to the
proof for God's existence. Although these antinomies appeal
immediately to anyone who has only a rudimentary knowledge
of Newtonian mechanics, moreover, they are quite difficult to
resolve, and have proved extremely bothersome to philosophers
and theologians who teach the prima via to students of modern
science.
The present study is an attempt to remove these difficulties
• R. Garrigou-Lagrange, 0. P., has already considered one such antinomy in an
appendix to God: Hi8 Existence and Hi8 Nature (London: B. Herder, 1986), II,
pp. 447-452. More recently, E. T. Whittaker has invoked a Newtonian antinomy to
reject the prima via in his Space and Spirit (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons,
1946).

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at their source by evaluating them in the light of Newton's
original doctrine. It aims to rediscover, for those acquainted
with the terminology of modern Newtonian physics, the physical import of the celebrated Principia, to show how this work
presupposes a fundamental science of nature based on generalized physical principles, and how in the light of these presuppositions answers can still be given to the basic problems Newton
raised about the physical world. And in thus removing the
apparent difficulties now contained in the Newtonian antinomies, it proposes to insinuate, at least, that the prima via
still remains a classical demonstration for scientists, that it is
in fact the monumental achievement of physical science for
anyone who can learn the generalized concepts on which it is
based and rigorously apply them to all he knows with certitude
about the physical world.
The three antinomies selected for resolution are based upon
each of Newton's three laws of motion. They are directed not
only against the conclusion of the prima via, but also against its
two basic premises, namely, the motor causality principle which
states that whatever is moved is moved by another, and the
regress principle which rules out either an infinite series or a
re-entrant series of corporeal movers.
Thus the first law of motion, which enunciates the principle
of inertia, would seem to affirm that the inertia of a body is
the sufficient explanation of that body's motion, and therefore
invalidates the principle that whatever is moved is moved by
another. Again, one consequent of the second law, which itself
seems to be an operational definition of force, mass and acceleration, is the inverse-square law of gravitational attraction. This
law would seem to affirm that mutually attracting bodies are
the sufficient explanation of gravitational motion, and thus they
invalidate the regress principle by invoking a closed chain of
moved moverso And finally, the third law of motion, stressing
the universality of action and reaction between movers and the
moved, would seem to exclude the very possibility of an unmoved incorporeal Mover as being the first cause of motiono

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More complex antinomies may have occurred to some readers,
and others could undoubtedly be excogitated with little effort,
but it is believed that the basic difficulties are contained in these
three. These also have the advantage that they can be solved
to an appreciable extent by reference to Newton's original
writings. From the viewpoint of textual analysis, it matters
little in which order these be considered. Their resolution can
best be accomplished, however, by first answering the antinomy
arising f:rom the law of gravitational attraction, then using the
concepts developed therein to reply to the antinomy based on
the principle of inertia, and finally by resolving the actionreaction antinomy.

*

*

In gravita.tional motion, all bodies mutually attract each other with a force given by the inverse-square
law. But this force adequately accounts for gravitational
motion without the presence of an extrinsic mover. Therefore
the two or more bodies are the mutual cause of each other's
motion, and they form a closed system in which no extrinsic
mover is needed, let alone a first unmoved Mover.
FmsT ANTINOMY:

This antinomy obviously presupposes the reality of gravitational attraction as a physical force that exists outside the
mind and is actually the cause of the falling motion otherwise
identified as gravitationaL Most scientists today will accept
this presupposition, for they commonly refer to the pull of
gravity as if it were something real, and some even discuss
quite seriously the problem of shielding gravitational attraction
in some way analogous to that in which magnetic and electrical
fields are shielded. 5 Whether o:r not this is a true presupposition, however, is another question. In fact, whether Newton
would subscribe to such an understanding of the attraction
concept he proposed presents an even more interesting problem, and one that will be fruitful to investigate at the outset
in order to prepare for the resolution of this antinomy.
• The Gravity Research Foundation, New Boston, N. H., has repeatedly offered
prizes for the best essay on this subject.

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W. A. WALLACE

Newton's conception of gravitational attraction can best be
understood in terms of the distinction that he made between
physical and mathematical principles at the very beginning of
his Principia. In the first sentence he states: "I have in this
treatise cultivated mathematics as far as it relates to philosophy." 6 He then goes on to outline the entire content of
the work, and stresses the role that mathematical demonstration
will play in the science he is presenting:
I consider philosophy rather than arts and write not concerning
manual but natural powers, and consider chiefly those things which
relate to gravity, levity, elastic force, the resistance of fluids, and
the like forces, whether attractive or impulsive; and therefore I
offer this work as the mathematical principles of philosophy, for
the whole burden of philosophy seems to consist in this-from the
phenomena of motions to investigate the forces of nature, and then
from these forces to demonstrate the other phenomena; and to this
end the general propositions in the first and second Books are
directed. In the third Book I give an example of this in the
explication of the System of the World; for by the propositions
mathematically demonstrated in the former Books, in the third I
derive from the celestial phenomena the forces of gravity with which
bodies tend to the sun and the several planets. Then, from these
forces, by other propositions which are also mathematical, I deduce
the motions of the planets, the comets, the moon, and the sea. 7

Newton's use here of the term "philosophy" is to be understood in the sense of the term " physics," as they were used
interchangeably in his time. He is quite dear in pointing out
that he is concerned with natural phenomena, and not merely
with calculations that .respect artifacts, such as levers and the
like, which were treated mathematically by the ancients. And
his mathematical principles are not the abstract principles of
pure mathematics; they have an intimate connection with
physical reality and are primarily ordered to explaining that
reality. He stresses this again in the introduction to the third
Book, where he says:
• I. Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (Great Books of the
Western World, vol. 34; Chicago: Encyclopedia Brittanica Inc.,
p. 1.
7 Ibid., pp. Hl.

NEWTONIAN

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In the preceding books I have laid down the principles of philosophy, principles not philosophical but mathematical:
such,
namely, as we may build our reasonings upon in philosophical
inquiries. These principles are the laws and conditions of certain
motions, and powers or forces, which chiefly have respect to philosophy .... It remains that, from the same principles, I now
demonstrate the frame of the System of the World. 8

Thus Newton's approach to physical reality was not completely physical, nor was it completely mathematical, but it
was rather a mixture of the two, and so it would be more proper
to designate it as physico-mathematical.
Moreover, in his
development of this new science, which has with good reason
come to be known as mathematical physics, he is not always
concerned with purely physical considerations. Since we are
interested now in his attitude towards " gravitational attraction," it will be well to trace here his development of the inversesquare law in an attempt to identify the physical and mathematical elements present in his reasoning process.
After stating his definitions and laws of motion, Newton
begins immediately to treat of the motions of bodies, and the
whole of Book I is devoted to this subject. He begins this
treatment, however, not with one body attracting another
body in any physical sense, but with the notion of one body
alone tending to a mathematical center. The first ten sections
are thus devoted to theorems which describe mathematically
the motion of such a body, and no reference is made whatsoever
to any attracting body that might be regarded as the physical
cause of the motion. Then, in the eleventh section, he takes up
the motions of bodies tending to each othe1·, and it is only in
the twelfth section, where he considers the attractive forces of
spherical bodies, that he derives the inverse-square law in the
second proposition.
It should be obvious from Newton's procedure that he considered the mathematical aspects of gravitational motion as
something that could be derived while abstracting completely
"Ibid., p. 269.

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W. A. WALLACE

from the physical causes of the motion, for otherwise he could
not possibly have followed this method of derivation. But the
question arises whether he himself actually thought that the
" attracting " body was a necessary physical presupposition, or
whether the entire derivation could be made rigorously while
remaining quite indifferent as to what might be the physical
cause of the motion. Or, to put it somewhat more generally,
could his new science be developed without necessary reference
to physical causes as they might exist in the real world, as
long as they did not contravene the mathematical principles
that successfully describe such motion?
Reference to Newton's original text will again throw light on
the matter. At the very outset, in his comments on Definition
VIII, he makes quite clear what he intends by the " quantities
of forces" to which he will have :reference throughout the three
Books:
These quantities of forces, we may, for the sake of brevity, call
by the names of motive, accelerative, and absolute forces; and, for
the sake of distinction, consider them with respect to the bodies
that tend to the center, to the places of those bodies, and to the
center of force to which they tend; that is to say, I refer the motive
force to the body as an endeavor or propensity of the whole towards
a center, arising from the propensities of the several parts taken
together; the accelerative force to the place of the body, as a
certain power diffused from the center to all places around to move
the bodies that are in them; and the absolute force to the center, as
endued with some cause, without which those motive forces would
not be propagated through the spaces round about it; whether that
cause be some central body ... or anything else that does not yet
appear. For I here design to give only a mathematical notion of
those forces, without considering their physical causes and seats. 9

The last sentence of the citation gives express indication that
Newton himself was abstracting from physical factors involved
in all types of motion attributable to such forces. That he
also had in mind gravitational " attraction " is beyond all
doubt, for he goes on to say:
• Ibid., p. 7.

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I likewise call attractions and impulses, in the same sense,
accelerative and motive; and use the words attraction, impulse or
propensity of any sort towards a center, promiscuously, and indifferently, one for another; considering those forces not physically, but
mathematically; wherefore the reader is not to imagine that by those
words I anywhere take upon me to define the kind, or the manner
of any action, the causes or the physical reason thereof, or that I
attribute forces, in a true and physical sense, to certain centers
(which are only mathematical points); when at any time I happen
to speak of centers as attracting, or as endued with attractive
powers. 10
This makes it quite clear that centripetal " attraction," for
Newton, was simply a mathematical way of looking at the
phenomenon, which in no way was intimately connected with
any physical presupposition as to why the phenomenon took
place. And he recurs to this theme immediately after deriving
the inverse-square law, where he again points out:
I here use word attraction in general for any endeavor whatsoever,
made by bodies to approach to each other, whether that endeavor
arise from the action of the bodies themselves, as tending to each
other or agitating each other by spirits emitted; or whether it arises
from the action of the ether or of the air, or of any medium whatever, whether corporeal or incorporeal, in any manner impelling
bodies placed therein towards each other. In the same general sense
I use the word impulse, not defining in this treatise the species or
physical qualities of forces, but investigating the quantities and
mathematical proportions of them.U
This was a point that was evidently misunderstood in
Newton's own day, so when he came to write the Optics some
years after the Principia, he returned again to the question of
gravitational" attraction" at the end of the tract on light, and
tried to make his position yet more explicit:
How these attractions may be performed I do not here consider.
What I call attraction may be performed by impulse, or by some
other means unknown to me. I use that word here to signify only
Ibid., p. 8.
Ibid., pp. 180-181.
12 Optics (Great Books of the Western World, vol. 84), p. 581.
10

11

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W. A. WALLACE

in general any force by which bodies tend towards one another,
whatsoever be the cause.12
Thus an unprejudiced study of Newton's presentation of
mathematical physics indicates that he thought :it quite valid
to discuss the mathematical laws and properties of motion,
while abstracting completely from the physical factors that are
the adequate cause of such motion. Does this mean that in
Newton's mind there were no proper physical causes for the
motion, or that these were out of the ambit of scientific consideration? Could his mathematical physics be said to deny
causality, or at least to place it in the realm of meaningless
questions? Far from committing himself to such an attitude,
Newton frankly states that there must be a cause for gravitational motion; indeed, he should like very much to know what
it is, but he has never been able to answer the problem to his
own satisfaction, and he does not want to venture an explanation that is purely hypothetical. Thus he states at the end of
the Principia, in the General Scholium where he summarizes his
views on the physical universe:
Hitherto we have explained the phenomena of the heavens and
of our sea by the power of gravity, but have not yet assigned the
cause of this power. This is certain, that it must proceed from a
cause .... But hitherto I have not been able to discover the cause
of those properties of gravity from phenomena, and I frame no
hypotheses. 18
The last words cited, hypotheses non jingo, have often been
quoted as Newton's great contribution over that of the scholastic thinkers, but its context seems completely forgotten in
the minds of many moderns.
The more one studies Newton's works, the more one becomes
convinced that Newton.used the "attraction theory" only as
a convenient mathematical device for deriving his laws and
equations of motion, but that he inclined to the opinien that
there was an inherent power in the bodies themselves that
caused them to gravitate, and not to be pulled by something
13

Mathematical Principles, p. 371.

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outside. This would seem to be confirmed by his method o£
derivation in the first ten sections of Book I mentioned above,
where he starts off initially with the notion of bodies tending
towards a center. There are also express indications in his
writings that he favored the impulse concept when he was
speaking physic&,Uy, as opposed to mathematically, as witness
his statement at the beginning of Section XI of Book I:
I shall therefore at present go on to treat of the motion of bodies
attracting each other; considering the centripetal forces as attractions; though perhaps in a physical strictness they may more truly
be called impulses. But these propositions are to be considered as
purely mathematical; and therefore, laying aside aU physical considerations, I make use of a familiar way of speaking, to make
myself the more easily understood by a mathematical reader. 14

Further, when he comes to mention various causes at the
physical level, he first names the action of bodies themselves
before considering other possibilities. 15 He also defines motive
force " as an endeavor or propensity of the whole towards a
center." 16 Later, when speaking of the motions of planets, he
prefers to speak actively rather than passively and mentions,
"That all the planets gravitate one towards another, we have
proved before." 17 These are not absolutely convincing in themselves, but when we consider them with some comments Newton
made in a letter to Professor Bentley in which he expressly
rejects the " attraction" concept, it seems that they give the
best explanation consistent with his other statements. For
Newton wrote to Bentley after the first edition of the Principia:
That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so
that one body may act upon another at a distance through a
vacuum, without the mediation of anything else, by and through
which their action and force may be conveyed from one to another,
is to me so great an absurdity, that I believe no man, who has in
Ibid., p. Ill.
'"Ibid., p. 130.
16 Ibid., p. 7.
17 Ibid., p. 281.
14

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W. A. WALLACE

philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking, can ever
fall into it.l 8

It is true that Newton's reasoning here is based on his abhorrence of a void, but the overall argument has cogency today in
view of the rejection of a Newtonian "ether" on the basis of
the Michelson-Morley experiment.
The only difficulty in Newton's mind about attributing to
bodies an inherent power which caused them to gravitate was
that such a power, from all the evidence he possessed, was
occult, and he had no predilection whatsoever for occult powers.
It is interesting in this connection to read Roger Cotes' implicit
answer to this difficulty when he wrote, at Newton's invitation,
the Preface to the second edition of the Principia. He there
makes this statement:
But shall gravity be therefore called an occult cause, and thrown
out of philosophy, because the cause of gravity is occult and not yet
discovered? Those who affirm this, should be careful not to fall into
an absurdity that may overturn the foundations of philosophy. For
causes usually proceed in a continued chain from those that are
more compounded to those that are more simple; when we have
arrived at the most simple cause we can go no farther. Therefore
no mechanical account or explanation of the most simple cause is
to be expected or given; for if it could be given, the cause were not
the most simple. These most simple causes will you then call occult,
and reject them? Then you must reject those that immediately
depend upon them, and those which depend upon these last, till
philosophy is quite cleared and disencumbered of all causes. 19

Cotes here gives implicit preference for the natural impulse
explanation for gravitational motion. And this explanation
being quite consistent with Newton's various remarks on the
subject, we have excellent reason to reject the "attraction"
notion as of mathematical utility but of little physical significance, and to look, therefore, for a proper physical cause for
gravitational motion.
18 Letter to Bentley, 1692/8, in Eddleston, Correspondence of Sir Isaac Newton
and Professor Cotes (London, 1850), p. 159.
19 R. Cotes, Preface to the Second Edition, Mathematical
Principles (Chicago:
Henry Regnery Co., 1951), p. xviii.

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The foregoing analysis of Newton's work centers attention
on the fact that the use of mathematics in this science can well
obscure factors that pertain to physical causality. It is well
to insist on this, and to make quite clear what the contribution
of mathematics is for Newtonian science, for otherwise there is
danger in replacing its physical aspects by an all-consuming
mathematicism that confers great exactness and rigor on a
description, but is not at all sure about what reality is ultimately described.
The most significant word in the vocabulary of the mathematician is the term "equation." The use of mathematics in
a physical science is immediately directed towards the writing
of equations that describe particular classes of phenomena.
And this in turn makes it necessary to equate quantities. The
only difference between mathematical physics and pure mathematics from the point of view of these quantities is that the
former is concerned with quantities that are the result of
measurements performable on various physical bodies and their
qualities, while the latter is concerned with quantities that are
pure numbers. The former considers numbers with a dimensional tag attached, while the latter considers numbers alone.
The dimensional specification introduces an additional step into
the calculations of the mathematical physicist, for he not only
has to be sure that his equations are numerically correct, but
also that they equate on the score of dimensional analysis.
But he still must equate. H mathematics applied to physical
problems can produce no equations, it is sterile and does not
generate mathematical physics. It is only in terms of equations
that the hybrid science becomes intelligible.
Now the peculiar thing about an equation is this: if it does
not express a tautology, then the only way it can equal two
things that are not identical is by abstracting from certain
features that are not common to both. In fact, abstraction
must be made from everything that would either disturb the
equality, or does not enter into it essentially. An equation
that is not a tautology, by the very fact that it is an equation,

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must of necessity give only a partial account of physical reality.
This is not to say that such a partial account may not be an
important one; it may well be extremely fruitful and useful in
describing the properties and relations that obtain between
particular phenomena. But it must abstract from some physical
considerations-whether
they be known or unknown in the
mind of the mathematical physicist is immaterial at this point
-it must equate parts, and thus of its nature it gives only a
partial account of the physical world.
When Newton's second law is given mathematical formulation, for instance, there are only three things that enter
the equation: force, mass and acceleration. Whatever be the
physical situation to which it is applied, every physical aspect
other than those which can be ascertained by these three
measurements is unimportant. More than that, every other
aspect must be neglected at the price of disturbing the equality.
A boy pulling a sled cannot be equated to the sled. There is
no doubt that he is the physical cause of the sled's motion,
and yet there is no way of showing this in the Newtonian
equation. All that the equation can say is F equals ma.
Granted the motion, whatever be its physical cause, the relation
between certain measurable aspects of the bodies involved will
be expressed accurately by the equation. But the price of the
very writing of the equation is the neglect of some factors that
are physically necessary to an understanding of the phenomenon. The question of physical causality is by-passed at the
point where mathematical physics begins.
If this were all that could be said for modern physics and its
knowledge of the physical universe, however, the prima via
would be a quite hopeless undertaking. The fact is that recent
years have shed light on the inadequacy of a mathematical
physics that equates quantities numerically and dimensionally,
and then stops at that. Modern scientists are returning to the
concept of a mathematical physics that uses its equations as a
tool, as a starting point to ask questions about the physical

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reality that lies beneath the description, which Newton clearly
espoused. 20
One sign of this is the tendency, in certain quarters, to distinguish between mathematical physics and theoretical physics.
According to this conception, the mathematical physicist may
well restrict himself to writing equations, to investigating the
consequents of certain postulates and the mathematical formulation of hypothetical constructions, and yet be withal divorced
from questions immediately respecting the physical world. He
may be two steps closer to that world than the pure mathematician, and one step closer than the applied mathematician
who "tailors" equations for him, but he still refrains from
passing judgment on the physical reality that lies behind his
final results. Not so the theoretical physicist. He now is
approaching the classical conception of the integral physicist.
He not only knows the final results of the mathematical
physicist, but he knows what they mean in terms of the physical
world. Mathematics is one of his most powerful tools, but it
is only a tool; there are still physical questions that can be
asked, and it is his business to find the answers. 21
It is to such a theoretical physics, developed in the light of
the principles of a generalized physical science already known
to Aristotle and Saint Thomas, that the solution of the problem
of gravitational attraction must be referred. 22 The inverse
square law, on the face of it, is powerless to say what is the
cause of gravitational motion. Recourse must be had to physi20 Mathematical Principles (Great Bocks of the Western World, vol. 34), p. 181:
"In mathematics we are to investigate the quantities of forces with their proportions
consequent upon any conditions supposed; then, when we enter upon physics, we
compare those proportions with the phenomena of Nature, that we may know what
conditions of those forces answer to the several kinds of attractive bodies. And this
preparation being made, we argue more safely concerning the physical species,
causes, and proportions of the forces."
21 Cf. W. H. Kane,
B. M. Ashley, J. D. Corcoran, R. J. Nogar, Science in
Synthesis (River Forest, Til.: Albertus Magnus Lyceum for Natural Science, 1958),
pp. 86, 87.
•• Cf. Pope Pius XII, "Science and Philosophy," Address to the Pontifical
Academy of Sciences, April 24, 1955. The Pope Speaks, Vol. 2, No. lil (11155),
pp. llS-UO.

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cal concepts to find the answer, and since Newton himself
seems to have inclined to the natural impulse explanation, it
offers a convenient concept with which to begin the search.
Nature, taken in a strict technical sense, is a principle of
motion that exists within a primary unit. 23 It is the source
from which proceed all movements that are called " natural,"
and thus such movements are conceived as originating in some
way within the moving body, and not imposed on it completely
from without. Natural motions are therefore different from
compulsory motions, which are the result solely of extrinsic
agents acting on the body. 24
When studying the local motions of fishes and birds and
other living things, there is no great difficulty in recognizing a
natural motion and distinguishing it from a compulsory motion.
If a fish is taken and thrown into a bucket, there cannot be
much question that its motion, as it flies in a graceful arc
through the air, is not natural for a fish; " thrown " motion is
compulsory motion, and it matters little whether the thing
thrown be a fish or a baseball, because the cause of the motion
is quite clearly from without. And if the fish be seen swimming
in an aquarium, there is also no great difficulty in identifying
this motion as naturaL That is one of the ways you go about
identifying fishes and various species of living things; their
characteristic motions manifest their natures, and thus have a
primary claim to being termed naturaP 5 Somewhat the same
thing may also be said for the motions that proceed from
inorganic primary units, particularly when the motions considered are alterations and fundamental changes. For instance,
it is natural fo:r radium to break down to lead by radioactive
disintegration, The very fact that such a phenomenon is
referred to as natural radioactivity is a tacit admission of the
validity of this view. But when the problem is raised about the
•• St. Thomas, ll Physic., lect. 1; Aristotle,
b
•• Compulsory motion is also called violent motion. Cf. IV Physic.,
b 88,
lect. 12.
•• Cf. W. H. Kane, "Comment on Dr. Foley's Paper," Proceedings of the
.American Catholic Philosophical Association, XXVI (191i2), pp. 144-146.

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local motion of inorganic bodies, and particularly about gravitational motion, the answer is not so obvious. Is gravitational
motion a compulsory motion, something imposed on the body
completely from without, or is it a natural motion that proceeds
in some way from within the falling body itself? This is the
basic issue at stake in the question of gravitational attraction;
it must be faced squarely if an answer is to be given in terms of
fundamental physical principles.
The most simple way to solve the difficulty, of course, is to
enumerate the various features of natural motions that are
found in more obvious cases, and then to apply them to the
case under consideration. If all can be verified of gravitational
motion, then there is strong reason for holding that the latter
is a natural motion. If, on the other hand, this motion has
nothing in common with other motions that are known to be
natural, then the presupposition that it is only a compulsory
motion should be favored, and the search started for the compelling agent or the physical causes that properly produce the
compulsion.
Nat ural motion can be identified from these conditions that
accompany the work of nature: it is from within/ 6 spontaneous,
uniform in its action/ 7 and always directed to a definite goal
or term. 28 Furthermore, the term to which it is directed is
characteristic of the particular primary unit having that nature.
Moreover, all these conditions are verified in gravitational
motion, and thus it should be regarded as a natural motion.
Gravitational motion is from within. No matter what extrinsic factors may affect the motion, the single most important
cause of the motion is the characteristic of the body that makes
it ponderable. We refer to this as its gravity, and measure it by
the various operational procedures for determining weight or
mass. But there is something within the body that we are
measurmg, and this is the most fundamental source of its
motion.
•• Cf. II Physic., 199 b 26, lect. 14.
•• Cf. VIII Physic., lect. 15.
•• Cf. II Physio., 198 b 10, lect. 4, lect. 12.

2

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Further, because gravitational motion is from within, it is
spontaneous. As soon as the props are taken out from under a
heavy object, it immediately and spontaneously falls to the
ground. As soon as any massive body is left to its own devices,
it immediately and spontaneously seeks its proper place in the
physical environment in which it happens to be. There is no
sluggishness, no indifference as far as the manifestation of the
tendency is concerned. All that is required is the removal of
the impediments restraining the tendency, and the material
body will unhesitatingly seek a physical place compatible with
its nature.
Again, gravitational motion is always uniform in its action.
Bodies of any particular chemical element, to make the case
simple, will follow exactly the same path, will .fall with exactly
the same velocity in a given medium as they seek their natural
place. If this were not the case, all of Newtonian physics
would have to be rejected immediately. Obviously, the particular details describing the motion will vary for different
chemical elements, for different chemical compositions that
might characterize various bodies, but given the same type of
body it will always follow a characteristic path. Nature acts
uniformly unless it is impeded by an outside agent, and this is
also seen to be the case in gravitational motion.
Finally, gravitational motion is always directed to a definite
goal or term that is characteristic of the falling body. This is
not to say that every body has an absolute point in empty
space to which it tends. The term referred to here is not a
mathematical entity, but rather a term that is understood in a
physical context. If a gas chamber contained atoms of all the
elements in the periodic table, and the atoms were allowed
to :reach equilibrium at a given temperature, all of them would
seek definite levels of stratification characteristic of their particular natures. In fact, that would be one way of sorting out
the various elements and classifying them, and has been so used
by Aston in his mass spectrograph. Similarly, bodies composed
of various elements would seek definite places in any physical

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environment determined by the proportions of the elements of
which they were composed. The term sought in any particular
environment is the natural place of the body, and when it is
attained, the body comes to rest. This, too, is characteristic of
natural motions, for nature is the principle of motion and rest,
as has been clearly asserted by Aristotle. 29 Thus gravitational
motion gives all the indications of being a natural motion.
It might be objected at this point that these arguments are
convincing enough, but they do not prove that gravitational
motion is a natural motion in the sense that they remove all
doubt, nor do they completely exclude the hypothesis of another
body or a corporeal medium acting outside the falling body and
causing its motion. The objection is valid, but there is a twofold
difficulty involved in it that needs elucidation.
First of all, to say that a motion is a natural motion is not
to eliminate the need for an efficient cause of that motion.
Nature is a principle of motion within the body undergoing
motion, but it is a principle in the order of formal or material
causality, not in the order of efficient causality. Thus, even a
body that is naturally in motion must have an efficient cause of
that motion, it must be moved by an agent distinct from itself.
This is no less true of motions that proceed from active principles within living organisms, than it is of non-living things
having only a passive principle of motion within them. But the
mover in the case of a natural motion has to be one that can
move the body naturally, i.e., in accordance with its nature.
It cannot be a violent agent that leaves no determination to
the thing moved by pushing it or pulling it from without in
haphazard fashion.
Secondly, the identification of the efficient cause of a natural
motion is a problem that is considerably more difficult than
recognizing that particular motion as natural. But it does not
require proof of the naturalness of a motion before it can be
discussed. In fact, that any motion is natural cannot be proved
in a strict sense; it can only be discovered. Nature is itself
•• Ibid., 19!l b

lect. 1.

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W. A. WALLACE

such a fundamental principle that there is nothing more fundamental in terms of which it can be demonstrated, and the same
thing is true of natural motions. In general, however, when
nature is known to be the first principle of motion that proceeds
from within a body, the first question that should be asked
about any motion is whether or not it can be properly explained
by this principle. Hypothetical conjectures about extrinsic
movers are all right in their place, but they have no place
obscuring the proper order of investigation into the world of
nature. That any motion is natural cannot be demonstrated,
but it can be recognized, and when the available evidence is
in its favor, it is quite unscientific to overlook this evidence
for a hypothetical mechanical explanation that neglects the
most obvious features of the motion. 811
Yet for those who remain unconvinced that gravitational
motion is a natural motion, it is still possible to argue against
this antinomy by questioning the physical reality of gravitational attraction, for this is something that has never been
proved. One of the best indications of this is that Newton, who
first used the concept, over and over again explains that it is
only a mathematical device, to which he sees no reason for
assigning a physical reality. If he thought that its physical
existe:nce could not be proved, and repeatedly warned against
accepting it as a reality, it is foolhardy for his students to urge
such a " reality " against the prima via.
Moreover, as far as the antinomy itself is concerned, Newton
and the founders of mathematical physics would never have
subscribed to it. Far from being convinced that the inversesquare law made God unnecessary, they were quite convinced
that gravitational motion could only be explained by ultimate
reference to God. As one Newtonian scholar has written:
He (Newton) points to the necessary existence of some active
principle of force which would conserve and compensate lost motion.
Newton did not take very seriously the attempt to explain this
conservation mechanically, as has been noted above from his
80

Ibid., 198 a !'l, lect. I.

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letters to Bentley, saying that gravitation. must be caused by an
agent following certain laws. He is willing to have Cotes refer to
the fact that it is the Creator who by his will produces gravitational
action. The same references are to be found in the words written
by Newton himself, and in the writings of Newton's best defenders;
also Samuel Hosley, the editor of Newton's Opera, says that.the
originator and sustainer of gravity is not material but divine, and
that Newton did not explain his laws of motion in terms of repulsion
but in terms of immaterial causes, not perceivable to the sense, but
manifested to the spirit and effect of God. 31

A confirmatory argument ii;J. the rejection of gravitational
attraction, and one of particular appeal to those who favor
facts over the endless multiplication of hypothetical constructions, is the fact that such an attraction has never been shielded.
It is all well and good to speak of magnetic and electrical
attraction, for these have physical meaning; the influence of a
magnet or a charged body can be and has been shielded many
times over in the laboratory. This gives indisputable evidence
of the physical existence of such attraction. But the remarkable
thing is that for all the advances that have been made in every
field of physical research in the two and a half centuries since
Newton's Principia first appeared, not the slightest evidence
has been obtained of gravitation ever being shielded. This may
be due to our appalling ignorance of facts concerning the
physical world, it is true, but it is certainly no less likely that
it is due to a fundamental misconception of gravitation itself.
Further, if any additional proof be needed for those who
would identify mathematical concepts with the physical reality
they so accurately describe, new developments in theoretical
physics also disregard the theory of gravitational attraction.
For instance, " least action " concepts as developed by
Hamilton can be used to give a very elegant treatment of
gravitational phenomenona, with no mention of attractive
forces. One of Hamilton's basic notions is that all bodies try
to reach a place of least potential energy, and in so doing, seek
81 A. J. Snow, Matter and Gravity in Newton's Physical Philosophy
(London:
Oxford Univ. Press,
pp. 162-168.

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W. A. WALLACE

the path that involves the least work. This is the principle of
least action, which Bertrand Russell has named the "law of
cosmic laziness." When the energy equations are written and
calculations are made of the paths of falling bodies, for instance,
exactly the same results are attained by Hamilton's method as
by the use of Newtonian equations. 32 This again reveals the
superfluous character of attraction concepts.
Another development along the same line, perhaps more
startling in its experimental confirmations, is Einstein's theory
of General Relativity. This theory does not regard gravitational motion as something initiated by a pull extrinsic to
the body itself, but rather conceives the whole motion as an
" event" in the space-time continuum. A physical evaluation
of this theory will not be attempted here; it suffices to note only
that its mathematical formulation is made without reference to
any attractive forces. And yet calculations made with Einstein's equations give results that not only approximate
Newton's predictions, but in three now classical experiments
give a more accurate description of phenomena.""
The solution to the first antinomy should thus be clear. It
is based on a false, or at best, an arbitrarily taken supposition,
namely, that gravitational motion is a violent or compulsory
motion caused solely by the mechanical pull of another body.
A more penetrating analysis of all that is involved in this type
of motion reveals that it is properly a natural motion, proceeding from an intrinsic principle within the body. And like all
other natural motions, it requires physical pre-motion by the
Author of Nature, either directly or at least through an intrinsically subordinated chain of moved movers, at each instant of
its motion. 34 It is possible that this causality be exercised
•• Cf. A. G. Van Melsen, The Philosophy of Nature (Pittsburgh: Duquesne
Univ. Press, 1958), p. 161.
33 The three experimental verifications offe1:ed by Einstein were:
(l) the advance
of the perihelion of the planet Mercury, (2) the deflection of a beam of light
passing the limb of the sun, and (3) the shift of spectral lines in the gravitational
field of the sun. Cf. G. Rainich, The Mathematics of Relativity (New York:
John Wiley, 1950), pp. 159-167.
•• The details of this proof constitute the positive exposition of the prima via,

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instrumentally through some corporeal medium, or even
through surrounding physical bodies. But these can never be
the adequate efficient cause of gravitational motion, any more
than a baseball bat, of and by itself, can be the adequate
efficient cause of the motion of a baseball.
Moreover, there can be no conflict between this explanation
and the methods used by Newton to derive the inverse-square
law. This particular law, as a physico-mathematical relation
between various measurable properties following on gravitational motion, abstracts completely from an efficient mover. 35
It does not deny the existence of such a mover, it does not reject
one mover or even a system of movers. It merely states an
equality that is found to obtain when the resulting motion is
described mathematically. Therefore it does not follow that a
mutual " attractive force " gives an adequate physical explanation of gravitational motion. The inverse-square law does not
dispense with a single mover in an intrinsically subordinated
chain, let alone manifest the superfluity of God, and anyone
who would speak as though it did is only creating for himself
an apparent difficulty.

*

*

*

*

*

According to Newton's first law of
motion, a body in uniform rectilinear motion will continue in
that motion indefinitely unless acted upon by an external force.
But such a body is sufficiently moved by its own inertia and
does not require an external mover. Therefore it is not true
that whatever is moved must be moved by another, and thus
the proof for God's existence based on this principle must be
rejected. 86
SECOND ANTINOMY:

which can be illustrated and understood on its own merits, quite apart from the
peculiar difficulties associated with gravitational motion. Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 2,
a. 8; I Cont. Gent., c. 18; VII et VIII Physic.
•• Cf. J. A. Weisheipl, 0. P., "Natural and Compulsory Movement," The New
s'f:holasticiam,XXIX (1955), 80, and also the two other excellent articles by the
same author: "The Concept of Nature," ibid., XXVlli (1954), 877-408, and
"Space and Gravitation," ibid., XXIX (1955), 175-228.
•• This is basically Whittaker's rejection of the prima via. Cf. Space and Spirit,
p. 47.

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This antinomy is built around the concept .of inertia in
much the same way as the first antinomy employed the concept
of gravitational attraction. In a sense, however, it presents a
more straightforward argument. The force of the objection
would seem to follow directly from the principle of inertia,
enunciated as the first law of motion, and not from a particular interpretation of an equation such as the inverse-square
relation. Further, since no equation-is mentioned explicitly, it
would appear that the distinction between physical and mathematical principles invoked in the solution of the first antinomy
cannot be applied in this case. Finally, the first law of motion
is simply stated by Newton at the beginning of his technical
exposition of the Principia, with no detailed derivation and
with no extended argumentation in its justification. Thus it
would appear that he thought it sufficiently obvious and selfevident to be accepted immediately at the beginning of the
tract. Therefore the arguments that were used in the solution
of the first antinomy drawn from Newton's own admissions
would not seem to be applicable in this case.
These observations highlight the additional difficulties present in the second antinomy, and at the same time point out
the main problems that have to be solved before the antinomy
can be resolved. As in the preceding solution, the textual
approach will serve as a good introduction to these problems,
so it will be convenient to begin with a discussion of the first
law of motion and the position it occupies in Newton's
Principia.
Newton entitled his work, as will be recalled, the Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. Yet he did not write
it as a modern textbook with a long list of equations functioning
in each derivation. Rather he started out with a few definitions
of basic concepts, then stated the three laws of motion and
their corollaries, and immediately launched into the various
propositions that could be deduced reasonably from these principles and their consequents. Some propositions functioned for
him as theorems and lemmas, and others were introduced

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merely as problems. But all propositions were stated in words;
except for an occasional proportion, all his derivations are
described in the expositive form of an essay without the mathematical derivations that characterize present-day treatises on
mechanics. The point is of historical interest, but it also
accents a significant detail. The absence of an explicit mathematical equation does not indicate the absence of a mathematical principle. Because a principle or law is stated in words
does not- indicate that it is not basically mathematical, or at
least founded on mathematical presuppositions.
Newton stated the first law of motion, which was the very
first of his "Mathematical Principles," in these words:
Law 1: Every body continues in its state of rest, or of uniform
motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state
by forces impressed upon it. 37
On face value, there is nothing in this statement that would
seem to imply that it is a mathematical principle. It should
be noted, however, that this law has been preceded in Newton's
text by eight Definitions and one Scholium, though of all the
terms mentioned in the law, only one is considered in the
definitions, viz., " forces." Yet this may be of some significance,
for Newton does state in Definition VIII: " I here design only
to give a mathematical notion of those forces, without considering their physical causes and seats." 88 This may be a clue
to the solution, but at best it is only a clue, for the term
"forces" does not seem to enter essentially into the statement
of the first law. It plays only a negative or accidental role.
What the first law states is that without these forces, even
mathematically considered, a body will continue in its state of
rest or of uniform motion in a right line. The real problem is
the first part of the principle of inertia. How is this to be
conceived? Is it physico-mathematical or purely physical, and
if the former, in what precise sense does mathematics enter into
it? This is the key problem involved in the principle of inertia
•• Mathematical Principles, p. 14..
•• Ibid., p. s.

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W. A. WALLACE

from the viewpoint of a foundational physics, and quite fundamental to the solution of the second antinomy.
There can be no doubt that the principle of inertia, as we
shall henceforth designate the first law of motion, is not a
physico-mathematical principle in the sense that it will ever
enter explicitly into an equation of mathematical physics.
There is no way of writing it in the form of an equation, and
it does not seem to express an equality that could be of any
use in any other equation. ·At best it tells what can be left out
of another equation, and this is hardly a positive contribution.
As far as the positive, formal principles that bear directly on
the derivation of conclusions of mathematical physics are concerned, the principle of inertia should not be included among
them.
Yet the principle itself has some positive content. Moreover,
it states what obtains in a limiting case, and thus presupposes
the use of a limit concept in its derivation. And since such limit
concepts pertain more to mathematical modes of reasoning than
to physical ones, the principle of inertia is more physico-mathematical than it is physical. Thus Newton was justi:tied in
enumerating it first among the mathematical principles of
natural philosophy.
As a matter of fact, the concept of a body proceeding in a
uniform motion in a straight line to infinity is mentioned by
Newton in his explanation of Definition V even before he states
it in the first law. In the discussion following this definition,
which defines a centripetal force as that by which bodies tend
towards a point as to a center, he also gives clear indication of
the reasoning which led to the statement of the principle of
inertia. He says in part:
That force ... by which the sling continually draws back the stone
towards the hand, and retains it in its orbit, because it is directed
to the hand as the center of the orbit, I call the centripetal force.
And the same thing is to be understood of all bodies, revolved in
any orbits. They all endeavor to recede from the centers of their
orbits; and were it not for the opposition of a contrary force which
restrains them to, and detains them in their orbits, which I therefore

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call centripetal, would fly off in right lines, with an uniform motion.
A projectile, if it were not for the force of gravity, would not
deviate towards the earth, but would go off from it in a right line,
and that with an uniform motion, if the resistance of the air was
taken away. It is by its gravity that it is drawn aside continually
from its rectilinear course, and made to deviate towards the earth,
more or less, according to the force of its gravity, and the velocity
of its motion. The less the gravity is, or the quantity of its matter,
or the greater the velocity with which it is projected, the less will
it deviate from a rectilinear course, and the farther will it go.39
Before giving the rest of this citation, it will be weH to point
out that the last sentence states the empirical basis for the first
law, for it states something that can be observed experimentally.
It also shows how this empirical basis is to be used in reaching
a limit concept, insofar as the approach to the limit is stated
as a proportion. The less the gravity or the greater the velocity,
Newton notes, the less the deviation from rectilinearity and the
farther the projectile will go. This is a true observation as far
as it goes, and it sets up the conceptual framework for approaching the limit. Newton continues:
If a leaden ball, projected from the top of a mountain by the force

of gunpowder, with. a given velocity, and in a direction parallel
to the horizon, is carried in a curved line to the distance of two
miles before it falls to the ground; the same, if the resistance of
the air were taken away, with. a double or decuple velocity, would
fly twice or ten times as far. And by increasing the velocity, we
may at pleasure increase the distance to which it might be projected, and diminish the curvature of the line which it might
describe, till at last it should fall at the distance of 10, 30 or 90
degrees, or even might go quite round the whole earth before it
falls; or lastly, so that it might never fall to the earth, but go
forwards into the celestial spaces, and proceed in its motion ad
infinitum. 40
Here he continues to apply the proportion, increases the
velocity at pleasure and at the same time allows the ai:r resistance to go to zero, and thus concludes to the limiting case:
the projectile will proceed in its motion in infinitum. This
•• Ibid., p. 6.

•• Ibid.

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W. A. WALLACE

reasoning process is not completely original with Newton;
Galileo, in his "Discourses on Two New Sciences," had discussed similar situations and had shown how limit concepts
could lead to interesting conclusions. 41 But Newton's genius
consisted in this: he did not restrict himself to the mathematical
proportion involved in approaching the limit, but rather concentrated on the limiting case itselt He stated the limiting case
as a general principle for all local motion when he formulated
the first law.
As should be evident from this analysis, the principle of
inertia is actually a conclusion, an inference drawn from a
physico-mathematical approach to a limit, and for this reason
is not a purely physical principle but is itself physico-mathematicaL A more rigorous statement of the approach to the
limit that is actually involved would be this: the distance a
projectile will travel in a resistive medium under a given
impulse is an inverse function of the resistance of the medium.
Similarly, the limiting case might be stated: as the resistance
of the medium goes to zero, the distance travelled goes to
infinity.
Examining the principle of inertia in the light of this analysis,
then, it can be seen that it is neither a self-evident principle
nor demonstrable. The reason why it is not self-evident is
simple enough. It is never found in ordinary experience that a
body in uniform motion continues in such motion indefinitely.
All the bodies met with in ordinary experience encounter
resistive forces in their travel, and sooner or later come to rest.
Nor does refined experimentation and research supply any
instances where such resistive forces are absent. The best
vacuums attainable in well-equipped laboratories are still quite
gross, and present-day information about so-called " empty "
interstellar space indicates that the :rarest matter density that
can be expected there is one nuclear particle per cubic centimeter. So it would appear that resistive media are a quite
universal phenomenon.
"E. g., Discourses, Third Day, prob. IX, prop.

Scholium.

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But it might be objected that this is to overlook the second
half of the principle enunciated explicity by Newton, viz.,
"unless it is compelled to change that state (uniform motion)
by forces impressed upon it." When this is taken into account,
although it might be conceded that the first part is not evident
to sense experience or to laboratory measurement, the entire
principle seems evident to reason, to rational analysis. Unfortunately, however, this type of self-evidence must be rejected
too. Th'e second half of the statement cannot be taken as
confirmatory of the first half, even when rationally considered.
When the first half is considered in the light of the second half,
all that is left is the statement, made notorious by Eddington,
that " every particle continues in its state of rest or uniform
motion in a straight line, except insofar as it doesn't." 42
Literally correct, no doubt, but hardly a first principle on which
to build a mathematical physics.
The principle of inertia is not self-evident, then; furthermore
it cannot be demonstrated, for there is no way of proving that
it is true. Another way of saying the same thing is that the
principle of inertia is a dialectical principle, and this by reason
of the limit concept involved in its verification. The principle,
as has already been noted, is an inference from observational
data by means of a limit concept. The observational data are
certainly true, but the only way in which it may be maintained
that the limiting case is also true would be by maintaining that
what is verified in the approach to a limit is also verified at
the limit itself. The latter statement, however, cannot be
maintained, because it is not universally true. There are many
instances in mathematics where it is known to be violated.
One illustration is the approach of polygon to circle as the
number of sides is increased indefinitely. All through the
approach to the limit, assuming the simple case where all
figures are inscribed in the limiting circle, every figure constructed that has a finite number of sides is a polygon. The
•• The Nature of the Physical World (New York:
1937)' p. 1£4.

The Macmillan Company,

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W. A. WALLACE

limiting case is a figure of a different species, it is no longer a
polygon, but a circle. It is not true to say that a polygon is a
circle; the difference is as basic and irreducible as that between
the discrete and the continuous. In this case, what is verified in
the approach to the limit (polygon) , is not verified at the
limit itself (circle) .
Now if it is not always true that what is verified during the
approach is necessarily verified at the limit, and indeed there
are excellent arguments to show that it can never be true/ 3 then
the fact that the observational base for the principle of inertia
is true cannot be used to prove, or demonstrate, that the
limiting case stated in the principle is also true. Thus it
remains that the first law as stated by Newton is neither
self-evident nor demonstrable, and as such is not certainly
verifiable of physical phenomena in the real world. 44
But this does not necessarily derogate from the utility of the
principle of inertia as a physi<;!o-mathematical principle. What
it does indicate is that this principle does not have the broad
applicability of a generalized physical principle that would be
universally verified in all real motions. Rather it gives an
idealized account of local motion that abstracts from extrinsic
factors present in the real world and affecting such motion.
And since it abstracts from extrinsic factors acting on real
bodies moving in a physical enviroment, it should not be
surprising that it also abstracts from efficient causality influencing the body in its motion.
In point of fact, in all observable cases in the real world, an
extrinsic mover is needed in order to have a motion that is
exactly uniform. The reason is obvious from what has been said
above about resistance being present throughout the known
universe, and therefore the need for such a mover is quite consistent with the statement of the first law. Resistance is always
encountered from objects extrinsic to the thing moved, and to
•• Cf. J. Lalor, 0. F. M., The Concept of Limit (unpublished doctoral dissertation;
Quebec: Universite Laval, n. d.).
"Cf. Weisheipl, "Natural and Compulsory Movement," loc. cit., p. 72.

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overcome the decelerating effect of this, an extrinsic force will
have to continue to be applied to the object being moved. Of
course, it is possible to abstract from this resistance, and
conceive of a body moving uniformly without reference to its
external physical situation. But when one does this, it is very
analogous to conceiving of a body at some arbitrary temperature in the real world that maintains this temperature indefinitely despite any changes of temperature occurring around it.
It is all well and good to conceive of insulators that suppositionally isolate it from the real world, but all physicists know
that such insulators do not exist in practice. Making the
supposition eliminates the problem of a heat source to maintain
the body at the given temperature, but it does this only in
the mind of the physicist. The same thing goes, mutatis
mutandis, for idealized local motion. If one makes a supposition
that eliminates thinking about extrinsic movers, then for him
they do not exist, but that does not eliminate their necessity
in the real world.
It might be objected that what has been said here is true
enough if one wishes to be a rigorist and speak of motions that
are exactly uniform. However, it would seem that Newtonian
physics does not attempt to give an exact account of the physical universe, but only an approximate account. Therefore, if
the motions of stars and planets are considered, or of projectiles
in very rare media, they.will actually decelerate slightly, but the
resistance is so small that in practice it can be neglected. Thus
the motion that is in practice referred to as uniform, though in
fact slightly decelerated, does not :require an extrinsic mover,
but is sufficiently accounted fo:r by the inertia of the moving
body.
The answer to this further difficulty, like the basic answer to
the difficulty of gravitational attraction, must be given in terms
of a generalized science of nature such as that developed by
Aristotle and Saint Thomas. In fact, there is a marked similarity between the two cases, as will become apparent in the
development below. But there is also a considerable difference,
and it will be well to make this clear at the outset.

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Inertial motion is universally taken as opposed to gravitational motion. The latter is usually referred to as "free" or
natural motion, while the former is " forced " or compulsory
motion. In the strict understanding of natural motion, it is
called such because it proceeds from the nature of the body
itself, it proceeds in some way from within the body undergoing the motion. Compulsory motion, on the other hand, is
imposed from without; it is violent, it is contrary to the
natural inclination of the body being moved. The reason why
it is recognized as not being a natural motion is that it does
not fulfill the conditions mentioned above as associated with
all natural motions, viz., it is not from within, nor spontaneous,
nor is it uniform in its action, nor does it always tend to the
same term characteristic of the particular body. Obviously, if
a motion is a composite of gravitational and inertial components, care will have to be taken to isolate what comes from
nature from what is imposed from without. But assuming, in
the spirit of the difficulty that has been proposed, an inertial
'or compulsory motion in which gravitational tendencies can
be neglected, these conditions will also be lacking. The inertial
motion does not originate from within, but rather from without.
It is not spontaneous, but is initially forced and sluggish. It is
not uniform in its action for any particular body, for the same
projectile may be thrown fast or slow, it may be rolled or spun,
it may be juggled back and forth. And it is not directed to a
place determined by the particular body and its physical
environment, for it may be directed now up, now down, now
in any direction conceivable for a three-dimensional vector.
Thus inertial motion is not natural motion.
Yet there seems to be something about inertial motion that
is similar to natural motion. When a projectile is thrown, it
appears that an impulse is imparted to it by the thrower, and
impulse further appears to be in some way the source of its
motion. Again, once initiated, the motion proceeds in a uniforrn
fashion for that particular impulse, and moreover, it proceeds
in a very determined direction. It is true that it does not seek

NEWTONIAN

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188

a compatible place in a particular physical environment, but
there does not seem to be any doubt of an inherent tendency in
a particular direction. And this direction is not necessarily that
intended in the mind of the thrower, but appears to be objectively realized in the thing thrown; otherwise it is extremely
difficult to understand how there can be such a thing as poor
marksmanship. What is objectively realized does not have the
perfectly determined tendency of a nature, but it nonetheless
has an inherent tendency sufficient to make the physicist realize
that momentum is a vector.
These reasons impel us to argue that there is associated with
inertial motion an impulse that is analogous to the impulse of
gravity found in natural gravitational motion. 45 In a sense,
this impulse is a sort of " second nature." It is not natural
as coming from within the body itself. Rather, it is more like
a behavior pattern induced in animals from without, by training
or by continued application of certain stimuli. Still it is different
from this, because all material bodies have an immediate susceptibility for the impulse of inertial motion. And further, once
it has been imparted to a body, there appears to be no reason
to believe that it would not perdure endlessly, unless overcome
by something extrinsic encountered in the course of its motion,
which however is always the case in our experience. 46
Now, granted the existence of such an impulse associated
with inertial motion, it is important to realize that even this
impulse needs an extrinsic mover in order to sustain the motion
efficiently. The reason is basically the same as that advanced
for an extrinsic mover in natural gravitational motion. Just as
•• Cf. Dominicus de Soto; Super octo libros Physicorum Quaestiones (Salamanca,
1551), Lib. VIII, q. 3, fol. 104v-105v.
•• The precise entitative status of this impulse is disputed among Thomists, as is
the subject of its inherence, some maintaining that it is in the medium surrounding
the projectile, others that it is in the projectile itself. For a summary of opinions,
cf. A. Rozwadowski, S. J., "De motus localis causa proxima secundum principia S.
Thomae," Divus Thomas Piacenza, XVI (1939), 104-114; P. Hoenen, S. J.,
Oosmologia (4th ed., Roma: Aedes Pont. Univ. Gregorianae, 1949), pp.
Father Weisheipl has a good evaluation of these opinions in "Natural and Compulsory Movement," loc. cit., pp.

3

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W. A. WALLACE

the nature itself requires an extrinsic mover, so the "second
nature " which is a modification of the nature must be actuated
from without. Both are principles in the order of formal or
material causality, and both therefore require actuation in the
order of efficient causality in order to be continually operative. 47
When abstraction is made from such an efficient agent, of
course, it is possible to conceive of the impulse itself as an
inertia, as some type of explanation of the compulsory motion,
and it is possible to speak also of measures of this, such as
momentum. Such measures will be useful in accounting for the
apparent uniformity of the motion, for estimating the potentiality of the thing moved in originating other motions, etc. But
neither inertia nor momentum sufficiently accounts for the
entire motion any more than a body's gravity can completely
account for its fall.
Further, far from the principle of inertia disproving the existence of God, the more one tries to verify this principle, the
more one is led to affirm the existence of an infinite Mover.
If all the idealized concepts that have been discussed be
granted, and the idealized case be considered as physically :real,
then not only is some extrinsic mover required, but also one of
infinite power, and this can only be God. The reason for this
is based on the proportionality that must exist between cause
and effect. If it be maintained that a finite impulse can impart
a motion that will perdu:re ad infinitum, this is to hold that
an infinite effect can proceed from a finite cause. 48 Since such
a position is untenable, if the principle of inertia in this understanding is to be maintained, it must be held that the cause is
finite from the part of the formal cause (the impulse), but
infinite from the part of the efficient mover that sustains the
motion. And such an infinite efficient mover would be none
other than God. Thus the principle itself, taken in the most
realistic sense possible, leads to the postulation of a first
unmoved Mover.
•• Cf. Weisheipl, "The Concept of Nature," loc. cit.
•• Cf. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, 0. P., God: His Existence and His Nature (London:
B. Herder, 1938), II, 447-452.

NEWTONIAN

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THE '" PRIMA VIA "

185

Now it may come as a surprise to the modern physicist, but
this explanation that has been offered is quite consistent with
what Newton himself thought about inertial motion. It is true
that he does not explicitly mention an extrinsic principle for
such motion in his discussions throughout the Principia, apart
from what he says generally about God as the universal Mover
and to which we will refer in the solution of the third antinomy.
But in his animadversions on mechanics that occur at the end
of the Optics, he does explicitly clear up any misunderstanding
that might exist about his position on inertial motion, quite
apart from his reservations on gravitational motion. He states:
The vis inertiae is a passive principle by which bodies persist in
their motion or rest, receive motion in proportion to the force
impressing it, and resist as much as they are resisted. By this
principle alone there never could be any motion in the world. Some
other principle was necessary for putting bodies into motion; and
now they are in motion, some other principle is necessary for
conserving the motion. 49

A clearer statement could not be made about the necessity
of an extrinsic mover, not only at the beginning of inertial
motion, but also at every instant throughout that motion, The
evidence is thus indisputable that Newton would not have
rejected the fundamental principle, " whatever is moved is
moved by another," on the basis of the law he was first to
enunciate.
The solution to the second antinomy should therefore be
dear. The first law of motion and the concept of inertia that
it involves state only partial truths. They are not verified of
an entire physical reality, but rather abstract from efficient
causality and its relation to compulsory motion. Although not
explicitly mathematical, they nevertheless are based on a physico-mathematical reasoning process and invoke a limit concept
in their verification. Because of the dialectical aspect of the
approach to the limit, the principle of inertia cannot be proved
to be true in a complete and self-sufficient sense. Nor is it
•• Optics, p. 540.

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W. A. WALLACE

evident either to experiment or to reason. Consequently it
cannot be invoked as a certain argument against the validity of
the foundational principle: whatever is moved must be moved
by another.
Further, looking at the truth contained in the first law from
the vantage point we have now attained, it can be seen that the
former attains its full stature and most intelligent justification
when understood as requiring tP.e continued application of an
extrinsic mover. The latter mover's influence may not be
directly measurable, but it is knowable. Although it is not
known to modern physicists, moreover, it was known to
Newton, the father of their science, who knew better than
they the limitations of the principles he first formulated. Far
from underm,ining the motor causality principle, it furnishes
yet another instance of its universal verification. The principle
still stands, and along with it the proof for God's existence from
motion in the universe-motion both gravitational, and inertial.

*

*

*

*

*

To every action, there must correspond
an equal and opposite reaction. But there can be no such
interaction between any body and an incorporeal mover. Therefore it is impossible that motion proceed from an incorporeal
mover, and any proof that would terminate with such a mover
must be rejected.
THIRD

ANTINOMY:

The third antinomy does not contain difficulties of the magnitude of those presented by the first two. It is not, like them,
directed at the fundamental principles which function as the
premises of the' prima via. Rather it raises a question about
the term of the proof, and this in a general way. It proposes
that there can be no such thing as an incorporeal mover, and
thus jeopardizes the proof by maintaining that it reaches a
nonsensical conclusion. 50
•• The attitude of mind underlying this objection is characteristic of logical
positivism and operationalism, both of which would categorize an incorporeal
mover as a "meaningless concept."

NEWTONIAN

ANTINOMIES

AGAINST

THE " PRIMA VIA "

187

The answer to this antinomy, as to the preceding ones, is
suggested by Newton's treatment of the problem in his development of the Principia. Actually, he does not state the actionreaction principle in the very broad and general way in which
it is employed in the antinomy, but restricts it specifically to
actions where two bodies are involved. His original statement
of the third law is this:
Law III: To every action there is always opposed an equal reaction: or, the mutual actions of two bodies upon each other are
always equal, and directed to contrary parts. 51
His explanation of the law also makes clear that he is excepting the case of incorporeal movers from its ambit, for the only
illustrations he furnishes in justification of the action-reaction
principle involve corporeal movers. Thus he states:
Whatever draws or presses another is as much drawn or pressed by
the other. If you press a stone with your finger, the finger is also
pressed by the stone. If a horse draws a stone tied to a rope, the
horse (if I may so say) will be equally drawn back towards the
stone; for the distended rope, by the same endeavor to relax or
unbend itself, will draw the horse as much towards the stone as it
does the stone towards the horse, and will obstruct the progress of
the one as much as it advances that of the other. If a body impinge
upon another, and by its force change the motion of the other, that
body also (because of the equality of the mutual pressure) will
undergo an equal change, in its own motion, towards the contrary
part. 52

It is interesting to note here that of the three instances that
Newton uses for exemplification of the principle, two concern
cases where bodies are in physical contact, and the third is
clearly an instance of an intrinsically subordinated instrumental
motion, viz., the case of the horse pulling a stone by means of
a rope. We shall have occasion to return to this later, but for
the moment it will suffice to note that all are concerned with
corporeal movers.
51

Mathematical Principles, p. 14.

52

Ibid.

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W. A. WALLACE

Now it may be maintained that Newton restricts himself to
corporeal movers in this principle because he is convinced that
these are the only type of movers that exist, and so it would
be nonsensical to :refer to incorporeal movers in his Principia.
Or the possibility suggests itself that he himself might have
believed in incorporeal movers, but that he did not think they
had any place in physical science, and therefore left them out
of consideration. Both of these hypotheses, however, are untenable in the light of explicit citations from the great scientist.
As to the existence of incorporeal and immaterial entities in
the physical universe, he takes the general position that such
things do exist. For instance, in discussing his meaning of
attraction in one of the texts already referred to, he states:
"I here use the word attraction in general for any endeavor
whatever ... whether it arises from the action of the ether or
of the air, or of any medium whatever, whether corporeal o:r
incorporeal." 53 Again, in a letter to Bentley after the first
edition of the Principia had appeared, he mentions: "Gravity
must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to
certain laws; but whether this agent be material or immaterial,
I have left to the consideration of my readers." 54 A person who
was convinced that material movers were the only type that
existed would never make the allowances explicit in these
statements.
Beyond this, it is further evident that Newton attributed
actual dominion to the supreme Being over
the workings
of the physical universe, and this for him also included motion.
Insofar as God was the mover and governor of the universe, He
also pertained to the :realm of physical science. Newton makes
these ideas explicit in the General Scholium which he wrote at
the end of the third book of the Principia, where he is at pains
to exclude the type of interpretation of his opus which is at
the root of the antinomy now under discussion. Some citations
which bear this out are the following:
•• Ibid., p. 130.
54 Correspondence of Sir Isaac Newton and Professor Cotes, p. 159.

NEWTONIAN

ANTINOMIES

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189

It is not to be conceived that mere mechanical causes could give
birth to so many regular motions .... This most beautiful system
of the sun, planets, and comets, could only proceed from the counsel
and dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being. 55
It is the dominion of a spiritual being which constitutes a God ....
And from his true dominion it follows that the true God is a
living, intelligent, and powerful Being; and, from his other perfections, that he is supreme, and most perfect. 56
In him (God) are all things contained and moved; yet neither
affects the other: God suffers nothing from the motion of bodies;
bodies find no resistance from the omnipresence of God. 57
He (God) is utterly void of all body and bodily figure, and can
therefore neither be seen, nor heard, nor touched; ... We have
ideas of his attributes, but what the real substance of anything is
we know not . . . all our notions of God are taken from the ways
of mankind by a certain similitude, which, though not perfect, has
some likeness, however. And thus much concerning God; to discourse of whom from the appearances of things, does certainly
belong to Natural Philosophy. 58

The very last sentence indicates the relevance of God to
physical science in Newton's estimation, for his use of the term
" natural philosophy " was equivalent to our understanding
of physics and astronomy. And the citation stating that God
moves all things, " yet neither affects the other: God suffers
nothing from the motion of bodies, etc.," supplies his direct
answer to the third antinomy.
As should be clear now from the distinctions that have been
made in the solution of the previous difficulties, the actionreaction principle is a physico-mathematical relation that holds
only between quantified bodies that are already being moved
by some physical agent. It merely stresses the mathematical
symmetry involved in the transmission of mechanical impulses,
and this is wholiy consistent with what one would expect in
terms of more fundamental principles. If bodies are in contact
and an impulse is being transmitted, obviously its metrical
aspects are the same whether it be looked at from the viewpoint
55 Mathematical Principles, p. 369.
•• Ibid., p. 370.

Ibid.
•• Ibid.

57

190

W. A. WALLACE

of the transmitter or the receptor. And the same thing is true
if a physical case is being considered where a motion is being
transmitted by a series of connected instruments. Here, as can
be seen on a moment's reflection, there is specifically only one
motion involved. One should therefore not be surprised if its
metrical aspects will be the same in each of the transmitting
instruments.
It is further true that the action-reaction principle, precisely
as physico-mathematical, can also be extended to the twobody problem in the case of gravitational motion. For instance,
if two bodies in a given physical environment approach each
other in seeking their natural places in accordance with the
inverse-square law, there is a certain mathematical symmetry
about the phenomenon. As far as the mathematics is concerned,
it makes no difference whether one is conceived at rest while the
other approaches, or the second is at rest while the first approaches, or both approach each other. And if either of the
first two cases are to be conceived in terms of "attractive
forces," evidently the latter will manifest the same equality as
the motions. Thus the action-reaction principle can be applied
to "attractive forces" in gravitational motion, and it will be
found to be operationally verifiable.
But while this is a valid principle of mathematical physics,
it is not true when the total :reality is considered, it cannot be
taken as a strict physical principle of universal validity. The
reason is simple enough. If there is a strict equality between
agent and receptor, there can be no motion. Nothing dynamically new can proceed from strict equality. One rope, of and
by itself, cannot pull another rope. That is the reason Newton,
in explaining the third law as cited above, makes a slight excuse
for the example of the horse drawing a stone by a rope. He
says, " ... the horse (if I may so say) will be equally drawn
back towards the stone .... " The reason he inserts " if I may
so say " is that there is a big difference between the horse and
the rope and the stone when aU three are considered physically.
A rope, of and by itself, cannot pull a horse, but a horse can

NEWTONIAN

ANTINOMIES

AGAINST

THE "PRIMA VIA"

191

pull not only the rope but also something tied to it. If
abstraction is to be made from this fact for the purposes of
noting physico-mathematical equalities, all well and good. But
the physical reality contains much more than the physicomathematical equality.
The obvious answer to the third antinomy then is that
it is based on a misunderstanding
of the third law of
motion. The physico-mathematical character of the actionreaction principle accents the fact that it abstracts from
efficient movers considered in their physical totality. It neglects
all movers except bodies already in local motion, and then only
seeks an equality that is verified of the moving parts. It abstracts from the movers that form the subject matter of the
prima via, but it does not reject them. Indeed, it presupposes
them, for Newton's third law of motion, like his other two, has
its only solid foundation and ultimate justification in the physical movers which lead their discoverer inexorably to the existence of God.

*

*

*

*

*

This completes the resolution of the three Newtonian antinomies. Apart from their utility in penetrating the prima via
through a more thorough understanding of local motion, they
also contain a message for the modem physicist. For it should
be clear now that the scope and intent of the science Newton
proposed never was clearly grasped by his successors. The
many generations of physicists who now are referred to as
" classical physicists " concentrated on the physico-mathematical aspects of his Principia, to the neglect of the further ordination that Newton made of the new science to discovering true
physical causes. Flushed by early successes in predicting the
details of many macroscopic phenomena, they saw the physicomathematical technique for the powerful tool that it was, and
then forgot that it was only a tool. Not possessing the traditional foundation in which Newton himself was grounded, they
read too much into the father of their science. They took his
mathematical principles as the total explanation of physical
reality, and were content to stop where he had begun.

l9i

W. A. WALLACE

Needless to say, such men were not prepared for the rise of
the new physics. Having slipped into the error of mathematicism, not appreciating the methodological use of mathematics in
physical science, their illusions of a facile explanation for the
entire gamut of physical experience were quickly dashed to the
ground. Later generations of physicists seemingly profited by
their mistake, and so began anew. But the pendulum did not
swing to center; its momentum carried it to the other extreme.
The philosophers of the new physics still failed to grasp the
importance of a generalized physical science which could give
true and certain knowledge of the universe; they claimed now
that nothing could be certain or absolute. They were content
to settle for a provisional explanation of reality; hypothetical
constructions and mathematical models were the " ultimate "
they were willing to concede. Their concern became manifest
when the rapid multiplication of postulational systems soon
involved them in contradictions, and so they turned to the
problem of logical consistency. Here the logical positivists
began to have their day, for a super-mathematicism has become
the vogue, and this in turn is nothing more than logicism.
Amid present confusions as to what is logic and what is
mathematics, there are very few scientists who have intelligent
notions on the basic question of what is ·physics. But the
question has been raised anew, and there is hope that the
present generation of physicists may start to work on the
answer. Of all the attempts made so far, the foundational
physics of Aristotle and St. Thomas alone gives full meaning to
the term" physical," as opposed to" mathematical" and" physico-mathematical." Newton had sufficient knowledge of this to
orient his new science properly at the outset. His sons would
do well to return to where he began. Not only will they find
there the answer to the nature of their science, but they will
learn how such science can lead them to their God.

w. A. WALLACE, 0. P.
Dominican House of Philosophy
Springfield, Kentucky

EXISTENTIALISM AND THE DEGREES
Of KNOWLEDGE

I

N an issue of THE THOMIST of some time ago, Professor
Max Charlesworth has shown, in an article on The Meaning of Existentialism, how " certain principles and distinctions drawn from the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas . . .
provide a perspective for the proper appreciation of the importance of Existentialism." 1 Professor Charlesworth's main
conclusions, if I understand him correctly, are to the effect
that "the findings of the Existentialists are of value and can
... be integrated into an authentic philosophy of man," and
that "so long as the Existentialists keep to their own proper
sphere . . . their conclusions are valid and valuable." 2
But what are we to understand, in that context, by " integration"? In what sense is it true, as Prof. Charlesworth
affirms, that some existentialist conclusions are " valid and
valuable"? Evidently, he does not mean that existentialism
can be integrated with an authentic philosophy of the nature
of man by way of fusion or merger; otherwise he would not
warn us of the " fundamental confusion of Existentialism "
between the metaphysical and the existential, and that " the
error of the Existentialists consists in merging the metaphysical
order into the existential order." 3 The implication, it seems,
is that there is some distinction between these two orders: if so,
what is this distinction and how can the two orders of knowledge be integrated? And again, evidently Prof. Charlesworth
does not believe that some conclusions of existentialism are
valid as they stand and as they are meant by the existentialists;
1

M. Charlesworth, " The Meaning of Existentialism," THE THOMIST, XVI

(1958)' 472-496; p. 472.
• Ibid., p. 494.
8 Ibid., pp. 486 and 490.

193

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LESLIE DEW ART

otherwise he would not warn us of the " absurdities " and
" errors " of existentialism. The implication is, it seems, that
the doctrines of existentialism must be understood only in a
certain way and in a certain context before they can be considered valid and valuable: they must be understood, as he
puts it, in " their own proper sphere." But precisely what is
the proper sphere of existentialism?
Thus, Prof. Charlesworth's "a priori" approach not only
puts in relief for us the importance of existentialism and suggests that Thomists should not dismiss existentialism too airily
lest they get rid of the wheat along with the chaff, but also
raises further problems. It raises the problem, particularly, of
how Thomism can profit, if at all, by re-adapting existentialism
to itself in accordance with its own needs; that is, by incorporating or digesting, if such an " integration " is possible, whatever there may be of truth in existentialism. Therefore, the
enquiry which logically follows after Prof. Charlesworth's
article is to examine more closely the nature of existentialism
and its relations to the various philosophical sciences in order
to conclude whether, and if so, under what conditions, it may
be considered valid philosophical knowledge. That is precisely
the purpose of this study, namely, to present and explore the
question whether existentialism has a valid place within the
hierarchy of the philosophical sciences as described and explained by Thomistic philosophy.

I
INTRODUCTION

We must note from the outset that although existentialism
offers itself as a full-fledged system of philosophy, or indeed,
sometimes as the only valid system of philosophy, we need not
take existentialism's own conception and appraisal of itself in
order to recognize its peculiar contribution, if any, to the
perennial stream of philosophical knowledge itself. We are not
required to take the existentialist's word at face value when
he offers a substitute for metaphysics or for ethics or for

EXISTENTIALISM

AND THE DEGREES OF KNOWLEDGE

195

philosophy as a whole. It may well be that the real novelty and
true philosophical value of existentialism, if any, do not consist
in its being a new way to solve old problems, but rather in
its being a new way to approach new problems and to attempt
their solution from its own particular viewpoint. Very especially, the fact that existentialism deals with being-or, perhaps,
even with being as being-need not mean that existentialism
must be taken as a metaphysics or not at all. It is true that
existentialists usually think, it seems, that any "doctrine of
being," or of " being as such " is metaphysics or ontology; but
to show that existentialism is not true metaphysics is not to
show that existentialism is not true knowledge at all: it is to
show that existentialists do not know what metaphysics is.
By the same token, the erection of existentialism into a
system of ethics, which seems to be a fairly common event
among existentialists, should not blind us to the possibility
that existentialism may have something all its own to offer,
even if as ethics it is false and, perhaps, even corrupt. Of
course, it is very important to demonstrate that existentialism
is committing, not merely an error, but even a tragic blunder
(with overtones of moral perversity) when it aspires to be
metaphysics or ethics. It is even more important to show, as
at least one Thomist has shown, that the metaphysical aspirations of existentialism, insofar as they are legitimate, could be
realized only within the existentialist metaphysics of St. Thomas,
and that, insofar as they are illegitimate, they constitute an
irrational attempt to destroy the intellect itself and to substitute philosophy by the art of forcing the mind to feed on
absurdity rather than on being. But once that work is done the
question proposed here still comes up: is it not possible that
existentialism provides us with a new and additional valid way
of looking at being? Is there not a sense in which existentialist
philosophy is valid and valuable knowledge? The question is
important, because if the answers are in the affirmative, then
existentialism-or, at least, that type of philosophical enquiry
which is typical of existentialism-win have its own proper

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LESLIE DEW ART

place within the scheme of philosophy, and it will, therefore,
offer its own unique contribution to philosophical knowledge:
philosophy would become all the richer for it.
It may be asked, however, whether it is a legitimate procedure thus to disregard existentialism's own conception of
itself. In answer, let us note that a somewhat similar procedure
is followed by epistemology when it studies the positive sciences.
The conception of science which is common to many scientists
is false; yet, Thomists agree that the positive sciences, properly
understood, have a rightful place among the degrees of knowledge. To determine the nature of science and to defend its
legitimacy is not necessarily to take the view that science
(i.e., positive science) is the only true knowledge or the only
scientific knowledge (properly so-called) which man can
acquire. Nor is it to accept uncritically each and every
scientific doctrine, nor to accept each and every scientific discovery without discriminating between the scientific truth
itself and whatever philosophical (or pseudo-philosophical)
interpretations may be offered along with it. We do not fail to
recognize (at least, not lately: we have so failed in the past)
the limited, but unique, knowledge-value of the
sciences
merely because some scientists (or however many; all, if you
· wish) seem to think that they are a substitute for metaphysics
and ethics and, sometimes, even for religion. By the same
token, we may very well, for our present purpose, disregard
existentialism's own appraisal of its nature and its value.
Our problem, then, which is essentially an epistemological
one, is to ascertain what is the nature of an existentialist philosophical analysis. Thereafter we shall have to fix the position of
this type of analysis within philosophy, and to determine the
order that obtains between it and the other philosophical disciplines. Now to achieve this end we shaH have to make use of a
standard of distinction among sciences. Thomists will agree
that a science is characterized, and therefore distinguished from
another sicence, by its peculiar " disposition with :reference to

EXISTENTIALISM

AND THE DEGREES OF KNOWLEDGE

197

separation from matter " 4 or, in more recent terms, by its
degree of abstraction. We may otherwise refer to it as the
idiosyncracy of the conceptualization which is proper to any
given science, which in turn is rooted upon the type of abstraction which is distinctive and characteristic of the exercise
of the science in question. 5 Consequently, to investigate the
problem of the relation of existentialism to the Thomistic
scheme of the sciences we shall try to ascertain what is the
way of conceiving and defining which is peculiar to existentialism. Thereafter, a comparison of that characteristic mode of
understanding with those of the other degrees of philosophical
knowledge will give us some indication of what their relations
may be. This characterization and this comparison, in an
inchoative, limited way, are what will be attempted in the
remaining sections of this article.
II
ABSTRACTION

IN EXISTENTIALISM

So far it has been possible for us to speak of existentialism as
a philosophical genus, but if one would attempt to express in
what consists its characteristic way of conceiving it would be
necessary to specify exactly which of the many varieties of
existentialism one has in mind. Let us, therefore, restrict existentialism, for the present purposes, to the " phenomenological
ontology" of Sartre and Heidegger. What applies simpliciter
to this type of existentialism will apply secundum quid to other
expressions of this movement. Now, as is well known, the term
" phenomenological ontology " is Sartre's, not Heidegger's: indeed, Heidegger would probably object strongly to the application of the name, " ontology " to the doctrine of L' Etre et le
N eant. However, thS:t is only a question of terminology; Heideg• St. Thomas, In Boetk. de Trin., V, 1, ed. P. Wyser, p. 26, line 21; trans. A.
Maurer (Toronto, 1958), p. 7.
• I am taking for granted here the doctrine of John of St. Thomas concerning the
distinction and unity of the sciences. See especially his Logica, II, Q. 27, a. 1; ed.
Reiser (Turin, 1980), pp. 822-828.

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LESLIE DEW ART

ger believes that beyond his doctrine of Sein und Zeit there isor there may be-an ontology properly so-called, namely, a
study of being as such, to which Sein und Zeit is only propaedeutic. Sartre, on the other hand, apparently believes that
the seemingly restricted and partial " doctrine of being " which
can be reached through the method of phenomenology is the
whole of ontology, and indeed, the whole of philosophy. The
question of whether in maintaining this doctrine Sartre is more
consistent with his own principles than Heidegger is with his,
need not detain us at this point. The more important fact is,
rather, that the ontological propaedeutic of Heidegger and the
phenomenological ontology of Sartre coincide in at least this one
respect: in both cases a phenomenological approach is used in
order to arrive at a doctrine of the meaning of being human
(or, what is the same, of being humanly or of being in a human
way). It is, partly, insofar as both systems arise out of the
implications of the " phenomenal field," and insofar as both
philosophies reach a weltanschauung concerning human existing, that they may be grouped together under the heading of
existentialism.
Now, as Maritain has explained, "the central intuition at
work in . . . existentialism . . . [is that] of the nihil whence
we come and towards which we tend . . . [of ourselves ]-the
intuition of pure nothingness (which is the sole residue discoverable in the creature once the Creative Action has been
suppressed) and of the radical absurdity of an existence uprooted from God." 6 We must bear these words in mind.
However, for the epistemological purposes of the present
enquiry we have to attend primarily, not to the meaning of
this central intuition, but rather to the way in which the mind
of the philosopher must .work (i e., the way in which it must·
abstract and conceptualize) in order to possess such an intuition. Let us suppose, therefore, that we share with the
existentialist this intuition into the nothingness which is at the
heart of created being, and that we agree with Maritain as to
• J. Maritain, Existence and the Existent, (New York, 1948), p. 134.

EXISTENTIALISM

AND THE DEGREES OF KNOWLEDGE

199

the true meaning of that intuition: how is our mind working
when it possesses such an intuition?
At this point we must remember Hegel. Being and nothing
negate each other; but being and nothing are not the mere
contradictories of Aristotelian logic. They are, rather, related
as thesis and antithesis; that is, they are real contradictories
and therefore at the root of the one reality, becoming, which
they (by themselves only "abstractions") constitute by their
very contradiction. Consequently, the nothingness of being
and the being of being are one: indeed, it is the nothingness
of being which constitutes the being of being.
What the existentialist is trying to do when he thinks this
way is to transcend abstractive thought: he is trying, as it
were, to swallow reality whole. But why? Because, having
previously identified abstraction with total abstraction (abstractio totalis, in the language of Cajetan and John of St.
Thomas; extensive visualization, in that of Yves Simon and
Maritain) , he has become disappointed in abstraction as a
means of discovery. 7 In a word, existentialists try to reject
abstraction because they have seen the consequences of identifying logic and metaphysics. 8 And the metaphysician can well
sympathize: after aU, no amount of logical reasoning can
substitute for understanding. 9
7 G. Marcel
explains the existentialist disappointment in "abstraction" in his
Man Against Mass Society (Chicago, 195Z), pp. 114 ff.
8 Note that this
corrupts not only metaphysics, but also logic itself.
See J. Maritain, Sept Lerons sur l'Etre (Paris, 1954), pp. 43-44. Perhaps we should
refer, instead, to the identification of metaphysics with a nominalistic or aprioristic
logic.
9 In a well-known doctrine which is cardinal for the proper understanding
of the
nature of metaphysics, St. Thomas explains that metaphysics is said to proceed
"according to the mode of intellect" (intellectualiter) rather than "according to
the mode of reason" (rationabiliter); for it is clear that " ... rationalis consideratio
ad intellectualem terminatur secundum viam resolutionis, in quantum ratio ex
multis colligit unam et simplicem veritatcm. Et rursum, intellectualis consideratio
est principium rationalis secundum viam compositionis vel inventionis, in quantum
intellectus in uno multitudinem comprehendit. Ilia ergo consideratio, quae est terminus totius humanae ratiocinationis, maxime est intellectualis consideratio." (In
Boeth. de Trin., VI, 1; ed. P. Wyser, p. 60, lines U-18). However, it should be

4

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LESLIE DEW ART

But is there any alternative to abstractive thought? As a
matter of fact, says the existentialist, there is an alternative:
I can transcend abstraction if I can bring myself to break
away from logic, even from the logic of Hegel. Indeed, as we
have just seen, the logic of Hegel has taught me this much,
which I will save after discarding the systematic wrappings
in which it is offered: I transcend abstraction when I realize,
when I become immediately aware, when I feel in the marrow
of my bones, indeed, when I directly experience and actually
live the truth that nothingness is the being of being. It is by
living this truth, by being this truth that I can reach being.
And so, my experience of nothingness (however arrived at:
through dread, consciousness, or what you will) reveals to me
the mystery of being.
Thus, after the logic of Hegel, (which is at the same time
the last refuge of rationalism and the point of origin of irrationalism), the existentialist is literally free to think and philosophize about existing being and not merely about concepts,
for he will not be restricted by contradiction nor repelled by
absurdity when he has just discovered that existing itself is
contradiction and absurdity. This freedom, he says, is one with
his freedom from abstraction. For those of us, however, who are
aware of the distinction between total abstraction and formal
abstraction or intensive visualization, the existentialist way of
thinking remains abstractive regardless of its avowed emancipation from logical categories. We may still speak, therefore, of
existentialist abstraction and conceptualization.
How, .then, does the existentialist conceive existing? How
does his mind work when he possesses the intuition of existing
which we have just studied? Strikingly enough, the existentialist conceives existing in much the same way as the ordinary
man does (albeit the former does so habitually, and the latter
only occasionally and rarely) when the latter, for example,
noted that ". . . intellectualiter procedere non attribuitur scientiae divinae, quasi
ipsa non ratiocinetur procedendo de principiis ad conclusiones, sed quia ejus ratiocinatio est intellectuali considerationi propinquissima, et conclusiones ejus principiis."
(Ibid., p. 61, lines 7-10).

EXISTENTIALISM

AND THE DEGREES OF KNOWioEDGE

£01

complains about " leading a difficult existence " or when he
describes with deep concern (and not merely outwardly) "the
vicissitudes of his existence " or how he has managed to " eke
out his existence." Beyond the simple, vague, everyday meaning of being and existing, beyond that esse which everyone
takes for granted and without which no thought or speech is
possible, yet below the metaphysical meaning of being, the
ordinary man sometimes thinks and talks in a pre-metaphysical
way about his life, his existence and his being. As a matter of
fact, the ordinary man talks about existence in this way precisely for basically the same reasons as the existentialist does:
because he, too, sometimes finds his undisciplined, pre-scientific,
merely logical way of abstracting, insufficient and radically
inadequate to reach the depths of the subjectivity of being. It
is at this point that the possibility of genuine metaphysical
conceptualization is opened to the ordinary man: but the chasm
from philosophical ignorance to metaphysical habit is often too
wide to be bridged successfully when it looms up suddenly.
And so, the metaphysical seed falls, if not by the wayside,
among the rocks or the brambles, and his experience fructifies,
if at aU, only in the idioms, the wise sayings and the popular
insights which others will soon process into the flour of the
truism and the insipid bread of the cliche.
But the fact that this conception of existence fails to reach
the heights of metaphysics does not mean that it does not
rise above the level of everyday, common sense experience. A
question has been asked and the intellect has been excited.
And the possibility of philosophical enquiry at this level may
not be apparent to many, but it does not elude the existentialist.
It is unfortunate, however, that because of a complex of
historical circumstances the existentialist also, in his own way,
is prevented from ever realizing his true metaphysical aspirations when he finally concludes that only this type of philosophical enquiry and this level of philosophical knowledge may
possibly be reached by the human intellect. And yet, felix
culpa! if the metaphysical failure of the existentialist leads to

LESLIE DEW ART

a discovery that will enrich the treasury of human philosophical
knowledge.
But let us return to the question in which the ordinary man
first conceives existence in an existential way: what is the
meaning of "existence," what is the meaning of "life? " Note,
first of all, that in this connection " life," as the synonym of
being or existence, is shorn of aU Biological meaning: that is,
the question is not one for Biology. If I ask, in this everyday,
reflective (but pre-metaphysical) way, for the "meaning of
life," no amount of biochemical or physiological information
comes even near to answering my question. Similarly, an
ordinary philosophical explanation of the nature of man (e. g.,
that he is a rational animal) , even if it were a true explanation,
also fails to answer my question in the sense in which I am
asking it. What I am asking about is something more simple,
more personal, a great deal less learned and sophisticated, and
yet, a little more important. I am enquiring about this very
· curious happening which is happening to me, or which, more
properly, I am doing, and which I call enduring or living or
existing. Existence, in this sense, is what a mother gives to
her child: it is what one does when one "brings a life into the
world." It is existence in this sense, existence which is both
exercised and perceived by me as mine (because I am " doing "
it), which is of interest to the existentialist, for it is the origin of
a number of philosophical problems.
Thereafter, from the direct, lived, existential, "ontic" experience of existence, the existentialist proceeds, by means of
certain techniques, to analyze that experience in order to
extract, as it were, its meaning-or :rather, its meaningfulness.
He goes on to codify and systematize its characteristics, to
distinguish what is basic and proper to it from what is adventitious, and finally, to search for a " theme " which will
thread together the aspects in which existence has been analyzed, and which will fit together the various facets cut at
different times into existence by a temporalizing human intellect. In other words, he proceeds to treat existence (the

EXISTENTIALISM

AND THE DEGREES OF KNOWLEDGE

203

"ontic" datum), scientifically, philosophically and systematically, and thus arises "ontology." But the same way of
conceptualizing existence remains throughout the philosophical
and scientific systematization of the implications of ontic data
or experience. In Heidegger, for example, the point of contact
between the ontic and the ontological, and the reason why the
ontological must be preceded by the ontic, is precisely that the
ontic always provides the basic intuitions, the root experiences,
the raw data which once analyzed and systematized can become
philosophy. Similarly in Sartre: the elaborated doctrines and
the final conclusions (i. e., the " ontology ") of L' Etre et le
N eant are obtained by drawing out the implications of a
number of experiences. For instance, the experience of feeling
ashamed implies the possibility of my becoming an object for
another, and so reveals the possibility of the alienation of the
transcendence of my being. 10
The ontic, therefore, notwithstanding its non-scientific status,
is what characterizes most distinctively the conceptualization
of existentialism. It provides the basic intuition which is the
point of departure of an existentialist analysis. An existentialist
analysis is only the systematic elaboration of an ontic datum.
The typical abstraction of existentialism, therefore, and its
characteristic way of conceiving and defining, is what might be
called, for the present, ontic abstraction. The ontic is the
existential of existentialism: existentialism only adds the ism to
the existential.

III
EXISTENTIALISM

AND METAPHYSICS

It is quite possible that even from the etymological point
of view the term ontic is also adequate to characterize the
degree of abstraction which is proper to the philosophical
analyses of existentialism. We have come to associate so
customarily To ov with metaphysics (i.e., with metaphysics in
•• See e. g., J-P. Sartre, L'Etre et le Neant (Paris, 194ll), p. S!i/:0.

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LESLIE DEW ART

the Thomistic sense) that we seem to forget that, as some historians of philosophy tell us, the term has been in philosophical
circulation since long before a metaphysics of being had been
suspected. To ov is usually translated as " being " or as " the
real," which does not prevent us from saying that St. Thomas
was a realist and his metaphysics a metaphysics of being, but
which should not lead us, if Fr. Owens is right, to read into
Aristotle what is only in St. Thomas. 11 Now, existentialism
also deals with being and with the real; indeed, it professes to
deal with " being as such," and it may be permitted to wonder
whether the existentialist usage of the term is not closer than
the Thomist to the original (especially the pre-Aristotelian)
Greek meaning, whence the etymological propriety of ontic
abstraction.
At any rate, the important point is that " the real" does not
convey to the existentialist the same meaning as "that which
is " conveys to the Thomist metaphysician. It would not do
to identify the id quod est of the Thomist with the '' :really
being " of the existentialist, because the being of existentialism
is real in much the same sense as that of everyday language
when we say that " this problem is real," or "this is what
really matters." It is real in much the same sense as Longfellow's when he says that "Life is real, life is earnest .... " 12
The real being of existentialism is real because it is earnest,
because it matters, because, resorting again to Longfellow, you
must" Tell me not in mournful numbers, 'I..ife is but an empty
dream.' . . ." The aptness of the name " Existentialism,"
therefore, is not entirely unapparent: existentialism is not a
philosophy of being or of human being properly so-called; it is
a philosophy of existence, especially of human existence. Indeed, perhaps it could be said that the most distinctive difference between existentialism and Thomistic metaphysics is that
the latter deals with being as being, whereas the former deals
11 See J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, (Toronto,
1951).
12 This verse, and those quoted
shortly after, are from Longfellow's "A Psalm
of Life."

EXISTENTIALISM

AND THE DEGREES OF KNOWLEDGE

with being as existing. The being of metaphysics is being which
is. The being of existentialism is being which exists.
What is meant, however, by this distinction between being
and existing? It is the outcome of two different ways of
regarding " the reaL" To understand this let us consider two
ways in which we may regard an " appearance." When we
say that something " appears to be " such and such, the implication is that it may or may not truly or really be what it seems
to be: the appearance may or may not be one with the real.
In this sense, therefore, appearance is not identical with being:
behind the appearance there is being, and what matters is not
what things appear to be, but what they :really are. It is clear,
moreover, that this sense of " appearance " does not entail
for the Thomist (unlike, as it seems, it did for the pre-Socratics)
a divorce between appearance and reality, for the mind does
not grasp an appearance from which it concludes to, or posits,
a reality. Rather, the intellect grasps as intelligible-or as
being-the being that the senses grasp as sensible. The Thomist
knows better than to hold that the senses grasp accidents and
the intellect grasps substances, for although it is true that the
intellect alone can apprehend an intelligible substance, the
intellect also grasps as intelligible-or as being-the accidents
that the senses grasp as sensible. Being, therefore, is " behind "
appearance not only when the appearance is deceptive, but
quite as surely when the appearance is perfectly truthful. That
is why we say that the appearance may or may not be as it
seems.
On the other hand, when we say that so-and-so " put in an
appearance," there is no question of there being anything else
beyond' or besides the appearance. The appearance is a fact
and a reality in itself, and, from this point of view, it is as
ultimate a fact and a reality as it could possibly be. Even if
so-and-so appeared as a deceiver or as an impersonator, so that
I might mistake him for someone else, the reality of the appearance and the fact of his appearing are not altered in the least.
From this point of view reality and appearance are identical.

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Everyday experience furnishes many examples of this way
of considering appearances. For instance, if a child experiences
fear of ghosts, the real existence, the metaphysical reality or
unreality of ghosts is quite irrelevant to the fact of his fear.
In his experience ghosts do exist, because they are that of which
he is afraid. From his point of view ghosts are real, because
they are identical with his experience of them. And the fact is
that he is afraid even though ghosts do not, as we might say,
really exist, and even though so-called ghosts are only an
appearance, the only reality of which may be a tricky shadow
or a lively and unruly imagination. From the child's point of
view, which is an existential one, the appearance of the "apparition" of its very nature produces fear, and the more
"metaphysical" or ontologically-oriented considerations are
completely out of order. Clinical psychologists know this very
well, and that is why they will not commit the error of trying
to " reason" with the child. They know that the only way he
can cease to " see ghosts " is to re-structure his " phenomenological field: " he must be made not merely to conclude that
ghosts do not exist, but rather to experience the same environmental stimuli with a different meaning. He must be made
" to perceive in different terms," which in turn is made possible
only by facilitating the re-organization of his personality.
Of course, the type of conceptualization which is proper at
the scientific level of existentialism is more greatly refined and
probably a great deal less common than the experience of a
child being afraid of ghosts. However, the \point of the preceding illustration is this: what characterizes the ontic abstraction of existentialist philosophy is the essential reference
of the real to experience, and, therefore, the phenomenological
identity of appearance and reality. When the metaphysician
as such conceives being, he is, on the contrary, oblivious of
himself and his own experience. Even if he conceives his own
being, he objectifies himself, quite unlike the existentialist,
who tries to subjectify, insofar as it is possible, whatever he
beholds. The metaphysician sees in being a unique perfection

EXISTENTIALISM

AND THE DEGREES OF KNOWLEDGE

or actualization which is not unlike a deserved merit or an
intrinsic right possessed by that which is precisely because it
is. When under the transcendental aspect of truth being speaks
to the mind of the metaphysician, " what is then manifest is
of the nature of an obligation attached to being. An I ought
to be consubstantial with I am." 13 He may give recognition
and respect to being, but that is only a consequence of the
resonance that being produces on him. What characterizes
his conceptualization is that he sees the perfection of being as
possessed by being itself whether or not that perfection is
recognized and respected by anyone.
But whereas the metaphysician loses himseH and disappears
before being, the existentialist finds himself and reveals himself
to himself in being, because being is, for the latter, recognized
being or respected being: that is why the being grasped by
ontic abstraction is always being-in-experience. Consequently,
for existentialism the real is identical with the really-appearing
or, what is the same, with the apparently-real. If we must
give it a more descriptive name, then let us say that the
typical way of abstracting and conceptualizing which is proper
to an existentialist analysis is not only ontic but also, and more
precisely, phenomenontic. If metaphysics, whether by inherent
right, prescription or common agreement, is to be granted title
to the name Ontology because it deals with being, then that
type of philosophical knowledge which obtains through existential analysis, and which deals with appearing-being should
perhaps be given the name Phenomenontics.
The use of some kind of phenomenological method, therefore, is essential to existentialist philosophical analysis, for if
we abandon the description and interpretation of what-is-inexperience and attempt to get at what is beyond experience,
we have thereby abandoned our distinctive way of conceiving.
However, unlike the original phenomenology of Husser], where
the phenomenological E'lToxl] is undertaken in order to cut the
13 J. Maritain,
A Preface to Metaphysics
l' Etre (Paris, 1934), p. 76.

(London, 1948), p. 66; Sept Let;ons sur

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LESLIE DEW ART

Gordian knot caused by the tangle of idealism and realism, the
modified phenomenology of existentialism does not grant that
there is even a problem of idealism against realism within the
boundaries of existentialism. Indeed, in order to grant not only
a solution, but even the very position of the problem itself, it
would be necessary to withdraw oneself from the existentialist
coign of vantage. To ask the critical question which may be
answered in terms of idealism or realism or, for that matter, in
t<erms of any possible third position, is to pass on, even before
an answer is given, to a different way of abstracting and conceiving, namely, to the metaphysical one, and therefore it cannot be done within Phenomenontics.
If the foregoing observations are correct, then it is clear that
the accidental similarity between the metaphysics of being
and the philosophy of existence hides a substantial distinction
between them. But since the metaphysics of being is concerned,
as we often say, with being in its existential character, while
the philosophy of existence is, in a way, concerned with that
which is insofar as it is, a number of equivocations are almost
inevitable. The fact that the philosophy of being deals with
existence and that the philosophy of existence deals with being
may easily obscure this other fact: namely, that, as we have
just seen, an existential metaphysics is no more existentialistic
than a phenomenological ontology is ontological. The being of
metaphysics (i. e., the second " being " in " being qua being ")
and the being of existentialism (i.e., the "existing" in" being
as existing ") are not univocally being: the being of existentialism is only analogically like the being of metaphysics by an
analogy of proper proportionality.

IV
EXISTENTIALISM

AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY

It may seem that the distinction drawn above between the
being of metaphysics and the existing of existentialism is due
to the superaddition of moral value to being pure and simple.

EXISTENTIALISM

AND THE DEGREES .OF KNOWLEDGE

209

Is not the very existential question concerning the meaningfulness of existence a moral question? When the metaphysician
asks what it is to be, his question is not put at the level of
moral philosophy, for he is merely concerned with speculative
matters. But if the question of the existentialist concerning
what it is to exist has any meaning, and if this meaning is not
metaphysical, is not the reason that he is not asking a purely
speculative question, but rather a moral one? Is that notthe
reason why the distinction has also been made between meaning
and meaningfulness? And that is why-it might be adducedmany doctrines of existentialism are reconcilable with metaphysics, namely, if they are understood only in a moral context.
For instance, how are we to understand the doctrine that
there is no human nature which is " ready-made " and
"
but that the only meaning of existing humanly or
being a man is that man gives his own meaning to himselfand so, " creates " his own nature-as he becomes or exists
in time? If this doctrine is meant to be taken metaphysically,
it could be said, then it makes no sense at all: it would involve
us in contradictions. From the point of view of moral philosophy, however, there would be no contradiction between
being something and becoming it. Man must become morally
what he is ontologically, namely, a man: man must acquire the
moral perfection which is due to what he, ontologically, already
is. From this point of view there is no contradiction at all in
saying that a man is not a man, provided it is true that he is
not a man, but, for example, a coward. Now, undoubtedly,
many doctrines of existentialism could be easily reinterpreted
in this fashion, but it may permitted to wonder if such a
reinterpretation does justice to the way of conceptualizing
which is proper to phenomenontics. This is what we now have
to investigate.
Let us recall that the existentialist analysis begins with an
ontic apperception. The scientific status of such an analysis
is not due to its abandoning the ontic mode of abstraction;
rather, it emerges out of the elevation of ontic abstraction to

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LESLIE DEW ART

the condition of reflexivity and systematization. Let us now
consider this ontic datum, an experience which is perhaps not
too uncommon: I look at myself and review my own existence,
and I find that although I have had few advantages from birth,
I have attained a much higher station in life than appearances
had led mE) and everyone else to expect. I am-to use a significant popular expression-a" self-made man." But now let us reflect. Must I have-attained a prominent position in order to be a
self-made man? Am I not always something, even if I have not
risen above' the crowd? The ordinary connotation of being
self-made is success; but some of us are failures, and if I am
a failure, who makes me a failure? Or, which is more common,
who makes each one of us the mixture of success and failure
that most of us are? And besides, leaving aside success and
failure, am I not in either case a certain kind of being? Do I
not exist in whatever way I exist and as whatever I exist? The
answer is that I have made myself to be whatever I am. Before
I am something, I can be anything, but I cannot remain and I
do not remain a pure possibility: I make myself into something.
Before I make myself, I am nothing. But how do I emerge
out of nothingness? By acting, by behaving, by living: in a
word, by being. Thus, my existing, which makes me be what I
am, is, in a sense, a perpetual struggle to overcome the nothingness that I am. I make me what I am out of nothingness; I
make my being, out of nothingness, precisely by existing or
being.
The point of this illustration is that the existential conception
"being self-made" is not philosophical until its speculative
value is disengaged for its own sake. That is why the experience
of being self-made will mean for the ordinary man no more than
an occasion for emotion or feeling: he is glad, or proud, or selfsatisfied of being self-made. But for the existentialist, systematically guided reflection upon the ontic datum will produce
not only a feeling, but primarly a conviction; it will produce
philosophical knowledge of a certain sort. We started with an
ontic datum, but now we know something about being, and

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AND THE DEGREES OF KNOWLEDGE

211

this knowledge is not ontic, but "ontological." Evidently, the
existentialistic or phenomenontic is closely connected with the
existential or ontic, as we have already seen. But the moral is
also closely connected with the existential, and hence the
possibility and danger of confusing phenomenontics and moral
philosophy.
Moral philosophy, however speculative as to the mode of
knowledge, is not speculative knowledge. Its end is not understanding for the sake of understanding, but for the sake of
action, which it directs more or less proximately. The practicality of moral philosophy is not superimposed upon its speculativeness as an afterthought. It is there from the outset, and
it is there essentially. 14 If anything-it might be figuratively
said-the speculativeness is what is imposed on it. We begin
by having problems concerning practical action: what am I to
do in this particular, concrete, existential situation? The
decision which I will take does not call of itself for any theoretical knowledge, but rather, for the exerci8e of prudence.
But this practical problem presents me not only with a situation
in which my person must engage itself in its entirety, but also
with a problem for my intellect, and so I may broaden the
scope of my deliberations and reflections. But even this does
not make my knowledge theoretical. Rather, I come to know
in a theoretical way what is to be done. Even if I intend never
to put into practice what I may discover concerning this
operabile, my knowledge remains practical as to its object,
which is the operabile: it is speculative only as to the mode
of knowledge. Moral philosophy, therefore, is not "applied"
speculative philosophy: it is an essentially different order of
philosophical knowledge.
14 " ••• Ia philosophie
morale procede de far;on pratique quant a ses finalites
propres et aux conditions de l'objet, et done quant a sa loi propre d'argumentation,
[mais] elle reste encore ... de mode speculatif ou explicatif quant a l'equipement
general ou fondamental de Ia connaissance. En cela !a philosophie morale est
consideree precisement comme philosophie, ou savoir speculativement pratique, par
opposition a Ia connaissance strictement pratique . . . . II importe cependant, pour
... ne pas s'imaginer Ia philosophic morale comme une science purement et simple-

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DEW ART

It is true, of course, that moral philosophy demands a
number of concepts of the speculative order, e. g., good, value,
end, norm, etc., which are basic to it and which are pre-requisite
to it. But it also demands a number of basic concepts of the
practical order, e. g., right, duty, moral fault, etc., which are
known by inclination or connatu.rality. 15 It is in this sense also
that moral philosophy may be said partly to arise from the
existential and the ontic: that is why moral philosophy
demands, as we say, a great deal of" experience" and a certain
degree of "sensibility."
And, incidentally, that is also the
reason why whereas a rationalistic metaphysics is empty and
vain, a :rationalistic ethics, out of touch with existence and
spun out of a priori concepts, is not merely vain, but positively
contemptible.
On the other hand, an existentialist analysis arises out of the
existential and the ontic, as we have seen, but the end of this
type of knowledge is knowledge alone. More important, its
object is not something to be done, but something to be known.
We want to know what it is to be man, and what it is to be,
not what is to be done. Of course, phenomenontics can be
applied, just as any type of speculative knowledge can be
applied under certain circumstances, but of itself it is not
practical and not directed to the practical. For examplereturning now to our previous item of existentialist doctrinewe say that man makes himself: but this is not the same as to
say that, morally, man must become what he is. We are not
saying that man should act in accordance with his nature;
indeed, the opposite would be nearer to the truth. We are
saying that when man acts (or is) he is bringing into being
ment speculative, nne metaphysique on une psychologic des vertus, de se rappeler
que si Ia philosophie pratique ... se distingue essentiellement de Ia philosophic
speculative, c'est que des l'origine elle est tourm\e vers !'operation ... et considere
!'operable en tant ·rneme qu'operable, de telle sorte que la raison formelle sous
laquelle elle atteint son objet, !'oeuvre scientifique a laquelle elle est ordonnee, Ia
lumiere spirituelle qui l'anime et Ia dirige, sont autres que celles des sciences
speculatives." J. Maritain, Les Degres du Savoir, (Paris, 1948; 5th ed.), pp. 880-881.
10 See J. Maritain,
Neuf Ler,;ons sur lea Notions Premieres de la Philosophie
Morale, (Paris, 1951), pp. l!H!S.

EXISTENTIALISM

AND THID DEGREES OF KNOWLEDGE

213

whatever meaning he has. We are merely asserting what we
believe to be a fact. Our judgment is speculative and only
speculative; if understood in its proper context it is as void of
moral value (although it may very well have what we may
call factual value) as that which says that man is a rational
animal. It merely helps us understand, at a certain level of
analysis, what it is like to be a man, or what it is like to
exercise human existence. Moreover, there may very well be
in this doctrine certain moral implications that may or may not
be explicitly drawn out; but, for that matter, there are moral
implications that can be drawn out of any philosophical
doctrine, which does not reduce all philosophy to moral philosophy.
The existentialists themselves are often guilty of failing to
perceive the notes that distinguish existentialism from moral
philosophy, just as they usually fail to perceive, as we saw
earlier, the distinction between existentialism and metaphysics,
and, indeed, just as they always fail to perceive that existentialism is only one type of philosophical knowledge, and not the
whole of philosophy. And if an existentialist commits this
initial error, then, when he considers the doctrine that man
makes himself, he is bound to understand it as directly contradictory to the " physical " doctrine of human nature, nature
properly so-called. He is bound to understand it in an absolute
and ultimate sense. And if so, if there is in man no nature
other than his self-made "nature," then there is no "right"
or morally nonnal way for man to achieve himself; there is no
measure for being human, there is no standard for human
behavior. From this point there is only a short step to the
anthropocentric humanism o£ existentialismo Existentialism becomes moral philosophy only by ceasing to be itself.

214

LESLIE DEW ART

v
CoNcLuSION

Although the type of abstraction which we have here tentatively called phenomenontic does not produce metaphysical
knowledge or ethical knowledge or knowledge of natures properly so-called, it produces, nevertheless, its own kind of knowledge. This knowledge, moreover, is scientific, because it ascertains causes. Evidently, it does not ascertain the same kind
of causes nor does it seek causes in the same way as the other
philosophical and non-philosophical sciences do. But it is also
evident that an analysis at this degree of abstraction provides
the mind with some kind of reasonable " account " for some
problems which confront the " being questioning being about
being." 16 Phenomenontics is a distinct type of scientific philosophical knowledge, the principal characteristics of which are
as follows.
First: the philosophical knowledge which is produced by a
phenomenontic analysis does not consist in disengaging essences
as such. As in all knowledge, essences are, of course, the
(hidden) guarantee of knowledge. What is studied phenomenontically, e. g., man, does have an intelligible essence, but the
achievement for which this type of analysis strives is not the
isolation and grasp of the necessary principle of intelligibility
which constitutes a thing into what it is. For this reason, and
also because a phenomenontic analysis tries to grasp certain
determinations of subjects not in the pure order of determination, but as in those subjects themselves (as will be explained
below in more detail), a phenomenontic expression must never
be taken formally. Unlike St. Thomas, it may be said,
materialissime semper loquitur Phenomenonticus. If one says,
for example, that " the being of man is essentially time," it
would be ridiculous to take this proposition in the sense that
"the esse of a rational animal is the measure of motion in
16 Cf. M. Heidegger,, Sein und Zeit
(Halle a.d.S., 19!'!7), [Jahrb. fur Phil. und
Phiinom. Forsch., vol. 8], pp. 5-8.

EXISTENTIALISM

AND THE DEGREES OF KNOWLEDGE

215

respect of before and after." It means, rather, among other
things, that temporality is a condition of the possibility of
being man, for it is the basis of the " transcendence " of human
existing.
Thus, when one says, at this level of knowledge, that the
nature of man is such and such, the term nature must be taken
in very much the same material sense as when a nuclear
physicist tells us about the "nature" of matter, or better still,
as when a news commentator tells us about the " nature " of the
latest international developments. Consequently, the kind of
causal explanation which is proper to phenomenontics is not
explanation properly so-called, but rather an explanation secundum quid; namely, that kind of" account" which is given by a
description and a systematization of facts. Phenomenontics,
therefore, is not a scire propter quid est; it is a scire quia est.
But it is, nevertheless, philosophical scire, as will be explained
below: a novelty which by itself may cause no little difficulty
in grasping the nature and appraising the value of existentialism.
Second: the existence in which we are interested in phenomenontics, which is not to-be, but be-ing, is essentially of individuals. Just as the real is essentially referred to experience,
existing is essentially referred to the individual, since for phenomenontics, as we have seen above, existing is always existingin-experience. Phenomenontics, therefore, is interested in the
existing of individuals, not in the abstract, but, precisely, as it
is exercised by individuals. However, the individual as such is
impervious to scientific knowledge, as the existentialists would
readily admit. Hence, an existentialist analysis, oriented
towards the individual and arising out of the ontic, can become
scientific only by "generalizing." It generalizes not by seekingto grasp natures, but by describing and systematizing " commonalities " in somewhat the same way as the empiriological
sciences do. Phenomenontics strives to penetrate the meaning
of the individual existing, but if this type of knowledge is to
proceed beyond poetry and become scientific, then concepts,
5

216

LESLIE DEW ART

which are universal, must be used: in the language of the
empirioschematic sciences, one must " adopt categories." As in
the special sciences, natures remain a hidden x which can be
discovered only by having recourse to a different type of
scientific knowledge.
On the other hand, the generalization of phenomenontics is
unlike the inductive generalization of the special sciences in
that the latter constitutes a succedaneum of the nature whereas
the
is a mere expedient, a means made necessary by the
inadequacies of human thought and expression. Consequently,
phenomenon tics generalizes for the purpose of understanding the
individual, and its espousal of generalization does not entail a
divorce from its desire to understand the individual existing.
This is one :reason why the novel and the drama are so appealing
a means of expression to some existentialists, whereas other
existentialists, notably Heidegger, emphasizing the distinction
between the ontic and the " ontological," find these literary and
poetic techniques repellent because of their lack of scientific
character.
Finally: phenomenontics, in common with the philosophy
of nature and the empiriological sciences, is scientific knowledge
at the first degree of abstraction. Its concepts are not resolved
in ens ut sic, but in ens sensibile. But whereas the philosophy
of nature places emphasis on the ens of ens sensibile and the
empiriological sciences on the sensibile, phenomenontics places
the emphasis on both ens and sensibile. This does not mean,
of course, that it is a mixture of the philosophy of nature and
the special sciences; it means, rather, that it is distinct from
both. It might be more accurate to say that it :resolves its
concepts in ens sen8ibile ut sic.
That is why phenomenontics can be, at the same time, a
science quia and philosophicaL It is not a science propter quid,
as we have seen above. But it is nevertheless philosophical
because, unlike the empiriological sciences, it seeks remote and
first causes (i. e., remote and first secundum quid) . The causes
that it seeks are remote and first, as contrasted with the

EXISTENTIALISM

AND THE DEGREES OF KNOWLEDGE

217

proximate and secondary causes of the empiriological sciences,
because they lie closer to the being of things. The conceptualization required by phenomenontics is deeper, more abstract
and of an essentially higher rank than that required by the
special sciences. That is why existentialists, who may dismiss
the explanations of " traditional " metaphysics as vain, or
meaningless, or false, will declare the explanations of the special
sciences to be merely irrelevant, however true they may be
in their own, lower domain. Of course, Thomists traditionally
distinguish between philosophy and the special sciences, in
one way, by reason of their respective type of explanation,
propter quid and quia. But this distinction is not an essential
one: 17 it has been adequate, per accidens, in the absence of a
philosophical science which is scire quia est, and it will continue
to be adequate as an approximate, pedagogically introductory
distinction, if abstraction is made of the peculiar case of
phenomenon tics.
Phenomenontics, therefore, stands halfway between the
special sciences
the philosophy of nature. At the first
degree of abstraction are found the sciences of mobile or sensible
being: of ens sensibile ut ens (philosophy of nature) ; of ens
sensibile ut sensibile (empiriological sciences); and of ens sensibile ut sic (phenomenontics). And so, we may accept once
again the formula that phenomenontics is the philosophy of
existence, provided we understand that this existence is not the
esse of the being of metaphysics: existentialism, as a friend of
mine has put it, is " concerned with existence insofar as existence is a matter of importance." Nor is it moral philosophy
thereby, for what is important is not necessarily moral: after
17 " Le scire an sit ou quia est (savoir dans le registre ou la perspective du fait)
n'est nullement limite au savoir de type inductif, cette expression designe d'une
generale (par opposition au scire quid est ou propter quid est, savoir dans le
registre ou la perspective de la raison d'etre) toute connaissance qui ne parvient
pas a saisir !'essence elle-meme dans toute sa constitution intelligible. C'est ainsi
par exemple que dans une discipline de type deductif comme la metaphysique le
scire quia est joue un role tres important, puisque toute la connaissance que nous
avons ici-bas de Dieu ressortit a cette sorte de savoir." J. Maritain, Lea Degres du
Savoir, (Paris, 1948), p. 66n.

218

LESLIE DEW ART

all, " there are genuine value judgments in speculative philosophy." 18 Phenomenontics is neither metaphysics, nor moral
philosophy, nor philosophy of nature, nor, of course, an empiriological science. It is a distinct philosophical science, with its
own point of view, its own formal object, its own way of
abstracting and defining, its own problems, its own answers to
those problems, and, therefore, with its own unique contribution to human philosophical knowledge.
LESLIE DEW ART

University of Detroit,
Detroit, Mick.

18 J. Maritain, Neuf Let;ons sur les Notions Premieres de la Pkilosopkie Morale,
(Paris, 1951), p. 48.

THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH TO NATURAL
SCIENCE THROUGH MOTION AND MATTER

T

HE most fundamental questions which are raised in
modern science are concerned with matter and energy.
which are said to be different aspects of the same
reality. This reality is described in terms of particles and waves,
and there is good experimental evidence for both. Particles can
be recognized by their tracks in a photographic emulsion or in
a cloud chamber, and they can be recorded with a Geiger
counter. Diffraction and interference phenomena serve for the
study of the continuous field or wave character of matter, which
is manifested not only by light but also by electrons, neutrons
and protons. Thus particles appear as waves and waves as
particles: the two seem inseparable. Yet the difficulty of combining these two aspects of things in a unified picture is so great
that it has been called the main stumbling block which prevents
the formation of a stable and certain concept of matter.
It has been suggested that the particles may be more or less
temporary entities within the wave field whose form and
behavior are determined by the laws of the waves themselves,
which in certain cases permit waves to appear as if they were
permanent substantial beings. Or perhaps the wa.ve field is
merely a device for computing the probability of finding a
particle of given properties at a given position. At any rate
most theoreticians will probably admit that the individual
particle is not a well-defined and permanent entity whose
identity or sameness can be detected experimentally. In a
word, the modern analysis of matter leaves us uncertain
whether the world is a system o£ waves or particles or both.
The only thing which seems certain is that there are no welldefined and permanent entities.
This picture of physical reality may at first seem very dis-

219

WILLIAM

H. KANE

concerting and quite opposed to ordinary ways of thinking. For
reassurance we may take hasty refuge in the common view
that nothing is certain in science, nothing finaL New data will
surely be uncovered, and new principles will be formulated.
After all, science gives us only a tentative and partial view
which is always subject to revision and revaluation. But the
hypotheses of science are not opposed to previous valid findings.
On the contrary, agreement with the data of experience is what
validates a scientific principle. When new data exceed the limits
of former principles, new hypotheses must be formulated which
include as special cases the facts and correlations already
established.
The primary datum of our sensory experience is the fact of
change in the world around us and in us. When we realize that
we ourselves were born and will die; that we came into being
and will cease to be in this world at least; that not only organisms of all kinds but also the chemical compounds are generated
and corrupted, why is it surprising to be told by modern
scientists that even the chemical atoms and the elementary
particles of which they are composed are not permanent entities
but transitory things? Perhaps it is because we had become
accustomed to think of the atoms as indestructible building
blocks out of which all bodies are made.
Perhaps there is also a deeper reason for wonder. If everything is changing, how can there be anything even relatively
permanent in the world? ·what are air and water, rocks and
trees, animals and men? How can there even be change? Can
there be a wave without something waving? How can anything
come to be and cease to be in this world? To these questions
there is no certain answer in modern science. Yet these are the
very questions which the primary data of experience raise in
our minds. If we desire a fundamental understanding of
natural things we must account for change. We must explain
in terms of its own proper principles what a changeable thing
is and how it comes into being and ceases to be.
It is not customary in modern science to look for basic prin-

THE NATURALISTIC

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221

ciples. Often we are told by philosophers of science and scientific methodology that there are no principles which are
certainly first, and no universal or necessary truths. Of course
those who say these things do not hold that it is possible to
affirm and deny the same thing at the same time, or that something can both be and not be at once and under the same
aspect. They do not mean to deny that the world around us
is a source of our nourishment both physical and mental, or that
from it we draw the air which we breathe and the food which
we eat, and from it in a mysterious way we draw also our knowledge of things. It is obvious that our life and our happiness
depend upon our valid knowledge of the world around us and
within us. What they mean is that we do not know any first
or basic principles by which we can understand natural things
in a scientific way, by which we can judge of them with certitude and organize all our knowledge of them in an orderly way.
At the present time many scientists also are convinced that
we cannot attain any initial or final certitudes about natural
things. We must take them as given with all their marvelous
complexity and variety, but we cannot hope to determine what
they are in their inner essence or nature. The principles which
are admitted and employed in scientific reasoning are tentative
and subject to revision and reformulation. The conclusions
which are derived from these principles are verified only approximately. They are not universal and necessary consequences from certain basic truths, but more or less probable
consequences from principles which are convenient, useful or
fruitful but not strictly first or certain.
Many are the attempts which have been made to understand
and explain the world around us and within us. The child asks,
What is the sun or the moon? What is the firefly? How and
why do they shine or not shine? The scientist realizes that it
is difficult to answer such questions. He sees that every natural
thing is beautifully and wonderfully made. He sees an endless
variety and complexity of natural things which are distinct
from one another and which pursue their own objectives more

WILLIAM

H. KANE

or less independently of one another, or interdependently. He
sees that from their complex relations a certain order results
which is beautiful, vast and mysterious. He well knows that in
order to succeed in understanding the natural world we must
find some way to simplify the wealth of experience. We must
discover a way of knowing the whole through its parts, and a
method of comparing the less known with the better known, if
we desire to attain an objectively warranted, accurate and
systematic understanding or explanation of the world around
us and within us.
So great is the complexity of things that the very effort
toward objectivity and accuracy imposes a need for simplification. This need has been met by scientists in various ways.
Some have tried to construct in mind or matter a mechanical
model which will illustrate the structure and behavior of natural
things, and which will enable . us to understand things as if
they were like our device or contrivance. Others have sought
to interpret natural things in a more refined way by means of
mathematical models which transcend sense and even imagination, but which enable us to correlate vast amounts of measurable data and to infer consequences which agree well with
experience.
These explanations of natural things by means of mechanical
and mathematical models have both advantages and limitations. They do indeed help us to understand the complex and
mysterious workings of natural things in terms of something
simpler and more familiar, or at least more intelligible. They
help us to correlate observable and measurable phenomena, to
infer many valid consequences, and to discover new correlations
and consequences. In these respects they are powerful instruments for the analysis of natural things and for the control of
natural processes.
But these methods of interpretation also have definite disadvantages. In the first place they do not explain things by
their own proper principles, but employ extrinsic and very
different principles of interpretntion. They do not manifest

THE NATURALISTIC

APPROACH

TO NATURAL

SCIENCE

228

what a thing is in itself but compare it to something else quite
diverse. They explain the natural thing as if it were like the
mechanical or mathematical model, and tend to reduce the
intricate object to something simpler but dissimilar.
In the second place they are confined to the observable and
measurable as such, and do not manifest the natures of things.
They do not give us a fundamental understanding of natural
things and processes, or tell us the essential reasons of things.
The natural and the artificial, the non-living and the living
are explained in the very same way without regard for their
essential differences.
In spite of these shortcomings it is undeniable that modem
methods are both useful and fruitful, and it is not our purpose
here to minimize their value or to suggest anything to supplant
them. But it is fair to ask whether there is any other way by
which the mysteries of nature can be investigated and rendered
more intelligible. Is there a way to strengthen the foundations
of science and to supplement its deficiencies? Is there a method
by which the proper principles of things can be discovered?
Can the natures of things be manifested; and the essential
reasons and differences of things be explained? Can we determine the first principles and causes of natural things, and
establish a body of conclusions which are invariant, universal
and necessary? In a word, can we develop an understanding
of natural things which is not merely hypothetical and tentative
but genuinely demonstrative?

*

*

*

*

In the long history of natural science there is a method which
has been employed to reveal true and certain principles from
which strict demonstrations and ,genuine scientific knowledge
can be attained. This method, of course, is not foolproof, but
subject to human understanding and misunderstanding. But if
rightly understood and used, it can perhaps supply the solid
foundation which is admittedly lacking in modern science.
This method begins with the investigation of first principles,
because we are satisfied that we understand particular things

WILLIAM H. KANE

when we see them in the light of first principles. Besides the
most general and common first principles or axioms which
are required for any and all progress in knowledge, there are the
basic and proper principles of each subject of scientific investigation. To know a thing scientifically in the strict sense of the
term means to know it perfectly as man can know. We know a
thing perfectly when we know the proper reasons or causes
of its being or being so, because a thing is what its causes or
reasons of being determine it to be. The basic principles of
each subject of scientific investigation are understood as proper
causes of the subject itself. Hence in order to develop a
science of a certain subject we must first determine its basic
principles. Then we must determine its essential reasons or
causes and the relation of these to the basic principles. Finally
we must understand the causes or reasons in orderly relation to
their effects or consequences. We must organize our knowledge
so as to explain each effect by its proper cause, and see each
essential reason or cause as a middle term from which an
invariant and necessary conclusion results. Thus the whole
effort of scientific investigation is a search for essential reasons
or causes whose formulae or definitions can be employed as
middle terms in the demonstrations of the science.
Causes which are near to sensory experience are more evident
and better known to us than causes which are remote from
our experience. Moreover, although the particular is directly
sensible, it is the invariant or universal which is directly
intelligible. Hence we must begin our investigation of causes
with the general consideration of sensory and corporeal things.
This is fitting because our knowledge is at first confused and
general, and does not attain specific details without special
effort. Hence we can c(;mveniently simplify our consideration
of things by proceeding from the general to the specific.
Furthermore, we must consider first that which is fundamental
in things and on which all else depends in order to be and to
be understood.
Can these general rules of scientific procedure be applied in

THE NATURALISTIC

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TO NATURAL

SCIENCE

225

the study of natural things so as to develop a genuine science of
nature? Is a strictly demonstrative science of natural things
possible, or can we attain only probable and approximate
knowledge of these things? It must be admitted that there are
serious difficulties that stand in the way. Natural things do
not seem to be suitable subjects for science in the strict sense.
They are particulars, whereas science is of the invariant and
universal: they are mobile and contingent, whereas science is
of the necessary. Do natural things have first principles which
are basic and proper and on which we can establish aU our
scientific knowledge of them? How can we determine the
natures of things which are manifested to us only by sensory
phenomena? How can we discover the causes of things so
mysterious? Is there any necessity in things so variable and
unpredictable? These are questions which must be answered
if we hope to develop a genuine natural science.
Let us see whether we can determine the basic principles
which are proper to all sensory things. We shall proceed in the
light of that which is first and best known to us about the
sensory world. If we consider it as known by touch, we find
it pressing upon us or resisting us. It heats or cools us; it acts
upon the tongue and we taste its flavor; it acts in our nostrils
and we smell its odor; we hear its sounds, and see color and
shape, figure and movement. AU these are particular sensory
aspects of the world around us. We are aware also of the self,
of our activities and our unity. If we generalize these sensory
experiences we realize that the world is presented to us as
something which is changing sensibly: something which is
subject to sensory change. It is something which is not static
but dynamic: something which is not purely intelligible but
both sensory and intelligible. Furthermore, it is not simply one
thing, but many. There are the self and others. There are
many primary units with various operations and modifications.
There is an orderly system or world composed of multitudes of
primary units of different kinds complexly interrelated, each
moving itself or being moved in various ways and subject to
manifold change.

WILLIAM H. KANE

It
a mobile or changing world which is presented to
us and of which we are a part, a system of mobile things both
living and non-living, intelligent and non-intelligent. Do mobile
things as such have principles which are basic and proper to
themselves? A careful analysis of what is presented to us in
our sensory experience reveals that a mobile thing is not simple
but complex. It has various sensory qualities according to
which it is changable: color, sound, odor, etc. It has a where
in place and a when in time. It has measurable aspects, magnitude and figure. It has motions or activities, and principles of
motion. A mobile being is something which can come into
being and cease to be, either simply as a primary unit-a
compound or organism-is generated and corrupted, or in some
secondary respect such as color or figure.
The newly generated organism or compound is a primary unit
which previously did not exist. But things are not made from
nothing in the course of nature, nor do they pass into nothing.
Nor are they intrinsically made and constituted from something
which was and remains actual, because whatever is actual
already exists and cannot be made. Besides the actual there is
a real medium which is the inner subject of change. This
subject of change is potential, a real potency, something capable
of receiving a new determination called a form and becoming
actualized by it, or of being deprived of a form. The potential
subject as such is not directly observable, but inasmuch as it is
actual in other respects, or in sensory motion or transition from
potency to actuality, it is observable. The stone which can be
moved from place to place can be apprehended by sight or
touch. Modern theories tend to describe things as if they were
entirely actual, and do not acknowledge the potential as such.
Yet the potential subject of change is required in order that a
mobile being might become actual or cease to be actual, yet
not be made from nothing or turn into nothing. Thus the
basic and proper principles of mobile things as such are the
potential subject and the form. Every mobile being inasmuch
as it is one, whether a primary unit or something secondary, is
made of and consists of a potential subject and a form.

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227

The primary units, living or non-living, are subjects of
secondary modifications or forms according to which superficial changes occur. Water can be heated; metals can be
moulded; gases can be condensed or rarefied. But the fundamental subject from which a primary unit is made or generated,
and into which it becomes corrupted, is a purely potential
principle. Of course, a purely potential principle can neither be
nor be conceived apart from all determination or form. Whatever is or can be conceived is determined in one way or another.
The potential is known only in relation to the actual, as something which can be determined or actualized. It is the mobile
as such which requires both a potential and an actual principle
in order to become and to be, and it is motion or change
which more or less directly reveals the potential subject. The
generation and decay of primary units, such as organisms and
compounds, requires a purely potential subject from which they
are generated and into which they become corrupted.
A genuinely new primary unit, which preViously did not
exist actually, is generated from a purely potential subject. It
is generated from something, not from nothing; from something
which is not itself formal or actual, because what already is
cannot be made; from something which is indifferent and
capable of becoming and being this or that, because all kinds
of things are freshly made, although in a certain order and in
various ways. Consequently, the primary form in a mobile
being is the first and fundamental actuality from which the new
unit is composed and constituted. The primary subject which
is a purely potential always has an appropriate fundamental or
substantial form by which it is actualized. Nor is the first
subject ever without some fundamental form, even when fundamental or substantial change takes place, because the generation of the new is the corruption of the old: a new form is
actualized in the primary subject by an appropriate agent and
the old form ceases to be actuaL When some water is generated,
the hydrogen and oxygen as such cease to be.
It is generally admitted today that the actually existing

WILLIAM

H. KANE

individual, whether wave, particle or organism, is not permanent in this world. The world endures because the primary
subject of change which is purely potential, which is in all
sensory things and from which all are made, cannot be corrupted, but acquires a new form with the passing of the old
and is itself indifferent to all. This account goes to the roots
of the matter and explains what a mobile being is through its
first, basic and proper principles.

*

*

*

*

These principles, the subject and the form, are common to
everything which is capable of sensory change, whether natural
or not. But in natural science we are interested only in natural
things with their properties, and so we must determine the
principles which are basic and proper to natural things as such.
In a word, we must determine what nature is, or what is meant
by the nature of a thing, because a thing is said to be natural
because of its connection with nature.
Certain things have a nature and are made by nature,
whereas other things are not made by nature but by human
art, or by chance or violence, and such things lack a nature.
Shoes and hats are made by art, and they do not have a nature,
save inasmuch as the materials from which they were made are
natural and have a nature. The chemical elements and compounds, the plants and animals are made by nature and have
their natures. These things manifestly have in themselves the
primary and proper principles of their characteristic o:r typical
appearance and behavior. Each of the natural types has its
proper structure and functions by which it is characterized and
distinguished from aU others, as we see, fo:r example, in the
periodic table of the elements. But artificial things such as
chairs and tables, and
which are not primary units but
aggregates, whether heaped together or fastened together f:rom
without, do not have in themselves· a primary and proper
principle of motiono
We see that natural things which have a nature differ from
things which are not natural and which do not have a nature,

THE NATURALISTIC

APPROACH

TO NATURAL SCIENCE

229

and they differ by reason of the principle of motion which they
have in themselves. The nature of a thing, then, is an intrinsic
and special principle of motion, something which is in the
thing in which characteristic motion is found as a source of that
motion. It is something primary or basic, and proper or specific.
It is an inner, primary and special source of the behavior
which is characteristic of each type of primary unit, of the
horse or dog, of the element or compound. Each primary unit
is distinct from all others, and although it does not function in
complete independence of others, still it has in itself the primary
and proper principles of its own typical behavior. Only a
primary unit, an element or compound, a plant or animal, has
a nature. That which proceeds from a nature as its intrinsic
and proper principle is natural. The primary unit itself and
also its typical structure and behavior are natural. The barking
of a dog, the motion of a falling stone (supposing that this is
a primary unit) and the growth and structure of an oak are
natural: they proceed from the natures of these things. The
motion of a hammer or saw is not natural: it does not proceed
from a principle of motion in the hammer or saw, but from the
artisan.'
Natural beings have typical passivities as well as activities.
Each is generated from its own proper subject, which is a
primary and purely potential principle. This principle is
derived from primary elements or compounds. Each natural being has its own specific determinant, which is the primary or
substantial form. This principle is an actual or formal nature.
The formal nature in living things is active, and is the source
of vital movement by which organisms move and perfect themselves. These two principles, the primary subject or material
nature and the form, are proportioned to each other as a
specially disposed potency to its proper act. The matte'r is
differently disposed according to quantity, density, etc:, and
the form is different in the different natural types. The primary
matter and form together constitute the complete nature of
each type, as in iron or gold, the oak or the lion.

230

WILLIAM

H. KANE

Artificial things do not have a nature, either material or
formal. They are not themselves primary units, but modifications of such units, or compositions of many. Their forms are
not primary but secondary, as a chair has a secondary form or
modification in wood or metal, and a knife has a secondary form
in iron or bronze. There is no principle of motion in something
artificial, but at most a coordination of natural agents, as in
an automobile. The artifact is not made by nature but by
human art, nor is it made from a specially disposed primary
subject, but from various secondary subjects, as a garment may
be made from cotton or wool. In this case the cotton or wool
are in the garment which is made, and the change is not fundamental or substantial. But when a compound is generated in
the course of nature, the elements do not remain as such but
are modified by the reaction and are changed into something
new and different, with a different nature.
Human art cannot make a nature, or something with a
nature. Man can indeed mix and apply natural agents, but
when something with a new nature is produced it is made by
the natural agents, not by any man. A sign of this truth is the
fact that no man knows exactly how a thing with a nature is
made. The production of the so-called synthetic elements and
compounds is not proximately due to human art or human
action, but to the action of the natural reagents which specially
dispose the matter for the new form.
The natures of things are the principles or sources of sensory
characteristics and so they can be known through experience.
The typical structure and behavior of natural things is rooted
in their natures, and the natures themselves can be defined by
their typical manifestations. They are the primary or substantial principles which are the sources of the characteristic
stability and regularity, uniformity and difference which we
observe in natural things. Hence in natural science we can and
should determine the natures of things by accurate observation
and experiment. We can define the natures through their
typical and proper manifestations, and we can explain the
typical behavior of things through their natures.

THE NATURALISTIC

APPROACH

TO NATURAL

SCIENCE

231

In this respect natural science differs profoundly from mathematics. Natural science is a consideration of the whole naturally
mobile being with its basic principles of motion, or nature both
material and formal, and with its characteristic structure and
behavior. In mathematics we do not consider the mobile being
as such, but we consider something having quantitative determinations and relations which can be understood and demonstrated through the principles of quantity, such as points, lines
and units. Mathematical principles do not directly manifest
the natures of things.
Yet because natural things have quantitative aspects and
because the quantitative regularities of natural things do manifest the natures, mathematics is applicable to natural things.
Indeed they are useful and even necessary in strum en ts for
the perfection of natural science. Modern mathematics is
specially adapted for these applications, and modern physics is
characterized by its use of mathematics. Physics of this type
does not proceed in terms of the principles of motion, of matter
and form or nature, but in terms of mathematical principles
applied to physical quantities. Hence modern physics is a
mixed science which differs both from pure mathematics and
from natural science.
Many well-known physicists at the present time recognize
the need to complement mathematical and mechanical formulations and techniques with a genuinely physical picture of
reality which will at the same time be not merely naive but
scientific. Perhaps the authentic method of the Aristotelian
tradition when applied in natural science will furnish the
foundation for which they are looking, and will enable them
to integrate the various parts o£ our expanding knowledge of
the world in an orderly family of sciences.
WILLIAM

Albertus Magn'US Lyceum for Natural Science,
Dominican House of Studies,
River Forest, Ill.

6

H. KANE, 0. P.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE JUDGMENTA REPLY TO FR. WALL, 0. P.

I

N a recent issue of the TnE THOMIST there appeared an
interesting article by Fr. Kevin Wall, 0. P. entitled" The
Structure of the Concept." 1 One section of this article
seems to contain some mistakes, and since the argument of
that section is central to Fr. Wall's thesis, it may be useful to
comment on it.
Fr. Wail proposes to set out a convincing argument that
concepts must have parts in some sense other than that in
which we speak of dividing them by genus and differentia.
Such an argument, he says, is provided by " a consideration
of the essence of human conception as ordered to judgment."

I quote his argument in full:
The judgment is basically the attribution of a predicate to a subject.
When we say: A is B, we attribute the predicate conception B to
the subject conception A. Now the fact of this attribution, if investigated as to its nature and possibility, indicates that both A
and B (the symbolic representation of any concept whatsoever)
have structure. For the judgment affirms that A is B, that is to
say, that A and B are identical. But it also affirms, by the fact that
there is a judgment at all, that A and B are different. If A and B
are not identical then the judgment is impossible. It does not
simply relate two distinct entities but poses them as identical, so
that any relation besides that of identity excludes the judgment.
If A and B are not different, on the other hand, then the judgment
is likewise impossible or at least futile by reason of tautology. AU
that can be known of an object in such a case, is sufficiently
achieved in one simple conception of it. It therefore follows, from
the nature of the judgment, that A and B are both identical and
different. How is such a situation possible?
Clearly A and B can be both identical and different only if they
1

THE THOMIST, XVHI (April 1955), 228-241.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE JUDGMENT

233

possess composition and a structure. They must necessarily be
composed of fundamental parts. In virtue of one part possessed in
common, they are identical. In virtue of another part different in
both, they are distinct one from the other. The judgment affirms
the identity of A and B in virtue of the intued common part, and
poses their distinction in virtue of the intued divergent parts.
That this is necessarily true is brought out by considering another
possible position. A and B are simple contents. If this be the case,
and they are identified in any way, as is essential to the judgment,
then they are totally identified and the judgment is pure tautology.
It becomes a useless act of the mind.

This article will not attempt to show that concepts either have
or have not got structure; it win be concerned simply with the
argument as quoted above. There may be good reasons fo:r
saying that concepts are structured but I shall suggest that
none of them are contained in the quotation given. I hope to
show that Fr. Wall's analysis of the judgment is mistaken and
to recommend an alternative analysis. This alternative analysis
is the one proposed by St. Thomas Aquinas.
With Fr. Wall's first statement in the above quotation I am
in full agreement; every other categorical statement in the
quotation seems to me to be false. This may very well be due
to my failure to understand him and so it will be well to begin
by explaining how I interpret some of the things he says. He
says: "We say: A is B "; in view of this, I take him to mean
that " A is B " is a formula for a sentence, and I am sure that
he means an indicative sentence which is being used to make
a true or false statement. When he says that A and B are
symbolic :representations of any concept whatsoever, I take him
to mean that in the formula "A is B " we may substitute for
" A " and " B " words of any meaning we choose (provided, of
course, that this yields the :required indicative sentence). When
he speaks of " the conception A " I take him to mean " the
meaning of the word that has been substituted for' A.'" When
he simply speaks of A and of B (as, for example, when he says
" If A and B are not identical. ... ") I take him to mean by
" A " the same as he means earlier by " the conception A."

HERBERT

MCCABE

Let us substitute " Socrates " for " A," and "white " for
"B." If, then, I have interpreted him correctly, he asserts in
his second sentence that when we say that Socrates is white
we attribute the meaning of the word " white " to the meaning
of the word "Socrates." • Now plainly we do nothing of the
sort; the meaning of the word "white" is whiteness, 3 which is
the concept that the word signifies, but we are not attributing
whiteness to the meaning of the word " Socrates," we are attributing it to Socrates. It would be a peculiar thing to attribute
a color to the meaning of a word, but if we did want to do so
we should not say " Socrates is white " but " the meaning of
the word ' Socrates ' is white."
Fr. Wall goes on to say that the judgment affirms that A is
B, that is to say, that A and B are identical, and he means by
this that the conception A (in our example, the meaning of
" Socrates ") and the conception B (in our example, the meaning of "white") are identical. At first sight it looks as if this
must mean that " Socrates " and " white " are synonymous
words. Strange as it must seem, this is exactly what Fr. Wall
does mean, for he goes on to say that but for the fact that this
is not the whole story all judgments would be tautologies. (I
take him to mean by a tautology a proposition in which the
predicate term is a synonym of the subject term). However,
as he points out, this is not the whole of his story, for the
meaning of Socrates " and the meaning of " white " are both
structured and consist of parts. One part of the meaning of
" Socrates " is indeed the same as one part of the meaning
• Some contemporary philosophers would deny that we can speak of the meaning
of the word " Socrates," on the grounds that proper names have no mellllling. I
think they are mistaken in this but as there is no space to argue the point here,
I can only hope that Fr. Wall is in agreement with me about this. St. ThomiiS
unquestionably believed that proper names had meaning. See e. g., 1 Periherm.,
lect. 10: "Hoc nomen 'Socrates' vel 'Plato' aignificat naturam humanam
secundum quod est in hac materia."
• St. Thomas shows clearly (V Metaphys., lect. 9) that "white," even when
it is used concretely as when we speak of " the whites " as opposed to the chinese
or negroes, means whiteness. The difference between " white " and " whitenesss " is
one of modus significandi and not of signification.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE JUDGMENT

235

of " white," but there is another part of the meaning of
" Socrates " which is not the same as another part of the
meaning of " white " and so, after all, " Socrates is white " is
not a tautology"
I hope that what I have set forth is an accurate summary of
Fro Wall's argument. I now hope to show that the notion of
structured concepts is introduced in this argument in order to
save us from quite illusory difficulties about judgments" I
want to put forward St. Thomas' account of the logical
structure of statements and I think it will appear that on his
theory there is no question of concepts that are at once identical
and diverse, and hence that there is no need for the introduction of the theory of structured concepts at this point. I
repeat that it may very well be that there are other reasons
for maintaining that concepts are structured in the way that
Fr. Wall suggests, but with these reasons I am not here
concerned"

*

*

*

*

*

For St. Thomas, the sentence by which a judgment is
expressed (the enunciatio) consists essentially, in its simplest
form, of a name and a verb. The name may be a single noun
or a complex noun-phrase, and similarly the verb may be one
word or several; the important point is that there should be
two parts to the sentence which should have the distinct
functions of name and verb respectively. 4 St. Thomas has no
use for the degenerate tripartite theory of predication according to which all propositions consist of two terms (thought of
as names) joined by a third thing, the copula. For him,
" Socrates is white " consists of two logical parts and not three:
" Socrates," which functions as a name and indicates what is
being talked about, and " is white," which functions as a verb
and says something about what is indicated by " Socrates."
Using the matter-form pattern, he speaks of the subject as the
• Potest autem ex solo nomine et verbo simplex emmciatio fieri, non autem ex
aliis orationis partibus sine his (I Periherm., lect. 1).

HERBERT

MCCABE

matter of the proposition and the verb as the principal and
formal part (pars forrnalis et completiva enunciationis) .5
Although in his general analysis of statements St. Thomas
rejects the tripartite theory of two names and a copula, he
does recognize that we sometimes do make statements which
have this form. Such a statement is of a special kind; he calls
it a praedicatio per identitatem and says that it is not, properly
speaking, what we mean by a predication. He explains this
very clearly in the Commentary on the Sentences: Unlike
adjectives, he says,
Nouns are not only signs of a form but also of the suppositum of
the form, and they may occur predicatively in either of these
capacities. When a noun occurs in the predicate as a sign of the
suppositum which has a certain form, the proposition is called an
Identity-statement; when it occurs as a sign of a form, the proposition is called an Attribution-statement.
The latter rather than the
former is, properly speaking, a predication because ' terms in the
predicate are taken formaliter.' 6

I have put the last clause between quotation marks because
SL Thomas is referring here to a well-known tag of the medieval
logic schools. It is one which St. Thomas is never tired of
referring to because it is essential to his theory of the proposition.
A term which occurs as a subject is taken materialiter, to stand for
something, but when it occurs as a predicate it is taken formaliter
to signify a nature. 7

Thus in " Socrates is white," " Socrates," which is subject,
functions as a name standing for the man Socrates, whereas
" white," which occurs in the predicate, is not the name of
white (whatever that might mean) nor is it the name of white• Ibid.
• Substantiva enim significant non tan tum formam sed etiam suppositum formae,
unde possunt praedicari ratione utriusque. Et quando praedicantur ratione suppositi
Quando autem ratione formae dicitur per
dicitur praedicatio per identitatem.
denominationem sive informationem. Et haec est magis propria praedicatio quia
termini in praedicato tenentur formaliter (Ill Sent., d. 5, exp. text).
• Summa Theol., q. Hl, a. 7 ad 4.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE JUDGMENT

287

ness (the name of whiteness is "whiteness" not" white"); it
does not function as a name at all, it functions as signifying
(not naming) the nature whiteness.
Thus so far from saying, as Fr. Wall does, that whenever
we say " A is B " we are asserting the identity of A and B,
St. Thomas says that only in certain peculiar cases do we do
this and that such cases are not properly cases of predication
at all. They are cases in which both subject and predicate terms
are taken materialiter and function as names. Examples of
such cases are: " Abraham was Abram," and " Peter .was
Simon"; and the proper analysis of such a proposition is:
" What the name ' Abraham ' stands for is what the name
'Abram' stands for." But the proper analysis of" Socrates is
white," which is a genuine predication, is not " What ' Socrates '
stands for is what' white' stands for," because "white" does
not stand for anything; it is not taken materialiter but
formaliter.
Nevertheless, although St. Thomas denies explicitly that
whenever we say " A is B " we assert the identity of A and B,
he does maintain that what we are asserting could be asserted
by means of an Identity-statement, provided that we make
important alterations in the form of the sentence. When we
say " A is B," as an Attribution-statement, we are not, he says,
asserting that A is identical with B, but we are asserting that
A is identical with what has B-ness. In other words the
Attribution-statement " A is B " could be analysed as " What
the name ' A ' stands for is what the name ' What has B-ness '
stands for." He says in one place:
The compositio of the intellect differs from the compositio of things,
for the things that are compounded are diverse, whereas the
sitio of the intellect represents the identity of what is compounded.
For the intellect does not so compound as to say that a man is
whiteness, but it says that a man is white, that is to say has
whiteness; for the same thing which is a man is the thing having
whiteness.8
• Ibid., I, q. 85, a. 5 ad S.

288

HERBERT MCCABE

Thus the identity involved in the judgment is not, for St.
Thomas, the identity of two concepts, but the identity of one
thing. There is no question for him of the meanings of" man"
and " white " being partially identical and partially diverse in
virtue of different parts. The Attribution-statement that A is
B, is about A and not about " A," or about the meaning of
"A"; it asserts nothing at all about the relation between the
meanings of" A" and" B."
Having presented this brief and inadequate outline of St.
Thomas' theory of the structure of the judgment, I can only
leave it to the reader to choose between it and the theory
proposed by Fr. Wall. I have thought it necessary to criticize
Fr. Wall's article on this point because the analysis, or something very like it, is found only too commonly in textbooks and
manuals which claim to be" secundum mentem Divi Thomae."
I think it is extremely important to recognise that the claim is,
in this respect, utterly without foundation. I should like to
make it quite clear, however, that I am criticizing only one
short section of the article in question, and I should like to
think that one good result of this essay will be that readers
will turn back and re-read Fr. Wall's article which contains so
much of the spirit and wisdom of the philosophia perennis.
HERBERT

Blackfriara,
O:r;ford, England

McCABE,

O.P.

THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION AND THE
IMMACULATE HEART OF MARY

O

N November 27, 1830, Our Lady appeared to that
member of the Institute of the Daughters of Charity
whom we now venerate as St. Catherine Laboure. The
event took place at the Motherhouse on Rue du Bac in Paris.
There the Blessed Virgin showed St. Catherine the design of
a medal she wished to have struck: the "Miraculous" MedaL
On the front is the image of Our Lady Immaculate with the
words," 0 Mary, conceived without sin, pray for us who have
recourse to thee," while on the reverse are two hearts, one of
which is pierced by a sword. 1 Thus the Blessed Mother
self associated her Immaculate Conception with her HearL
We also, then, may be allowed to consider them together now,
following too, as we shall see, the example of the Church.
Our consideration will include three points: first, the meanings of our terms; then, the influence of the definition of the
Dogma of the Immaculate Conception on the development
both of the Cordimarian cult in general, and in particular, on
the ever mounting propagation of the chief prayer of that cult,
that is, the most Holy Rosary; and finally, our third point,
certain theological relations between the two.

*

*

*

*

*

The term " Immaculate Conception " may be taken in
several ways. In the order of knowledge, shall we say, it
designates a dogma, a solemnly defined doctrine of our faith:
Declaramus, pronunciamus, et definimus, doctrinam, quae tenet
beatissimam Virginem Mariam in primo instanti suae Conceptionis
fuisse singulari omnipotentis Dei gratia et privilegio, intuitu meritorum Christi Jesu Salvatoris humani generis, ab omni originalis
culpae labe praeservatam immunem, esse a Deo revelatam, atque
idcirco ab omnibus fi.delibus fi.rmiter constanterque credendam. 2
1
2

Cf. AAS, XXXIX (1947), 415.
Ineffabilis Deus, Dec. 8, 1854, in Coll. Lacensis, VI, 836.

239

240

TIMOTHY

M. SPARKS

In the order of reality, however, the words "Immaculate
Conception " designate first of all a remarkable fact in the life
of a particularly favored person. They designate that initial
grace with which Our Lady came into being, redeemed indeed
by Christ, but by a preventive redemption. The same words
may also be extended to signify not only that grace in its
inception, but also in its continued duration even into eternity.
Thus, we may speak now of the grace of the Immaculate
Conception which is the basic, fundamental holiness that is
hers, actually, in glory. In the order of reality there is still
another sense in which the words " Immaculate Conception "
are used. We may call Our Lady herself " The Immaculate
Conception," intending thereby to designate her not just at
the moment when she began life, but as she is now-in glory.
Our Lady herself gives us the example. At Lourdes she said:
" I am the Immaculate Conception." 3 And in a not dissimilar
way, Murillo called his masterpiece, depicting Our Lady in
unique glory, "The Immaculate Conception." There is something of the same in the prayer Our Lady dictated for the
Miraculous Medal: "0 Mary, conceived without sin, pray
for us who have recourse to thee."
The words " Immaculate Heart " designate, in theological
science, a particular, but nevertheless, it would seem, an allembracing Marian devotion. The Sacred Congregation of Rites,
in its definitive redaction of the liturgy of this devotion, precisely gave its meaning in these words:
Sub hujus (i.e., Immaculati) Cordis symbolo Dei Genitricis
eximiam singularemque animae sanctitatem, praesertim vero ardentissimum erga Deum ac Jesum Filium suum amorem, maternamque
erga homines divino Sanguine redemptos (Ecdesia) devotissime

In the order of reality, the words " Immaculate Heart,"
accordingly, designate the physical, living, glorious Heart of Our
• Cf., e. g., Pius X, Ad Diem lllum, ASS, XXXVI, 450.
• AAS, XXXVII (1945), 44 ff.; in subsequent references to the " Decree," this
document is meant.

THE IMMACULATE

CONCEPTION

241

Lady particularly inasmuch as it is a certain symbol. They
designate this heart as it actually is now; 5 particularly, however, as it has a definite symbolism. Sometimes, too, we find in
approved prayers of the Church, that the person itself of Our
Lady is indicated in the appeal to her Heart: " Dolce Cuore
di Maria, siate la salvezza mia "; 6 "0 Cuore di Maria, Madre
di Dio e Madre nostra ... "; 7 "0 Cuore purissimo di Maria
Vergine ... ottenetemi ... : 8 As St. Thomas remarks, 9
properly speaking it is not a part, but the whole subsistent
being which is venerated. In other words, in this devotion of
the Immaculate Heart, the mediate or remote (material) object
is the very person of the Blessed Virgin.
Special consideration is due the word " immaculate." Etymologically, it clearly implies being without stain or spot or
blemish. Occasionally, in Latin as in English, even in speaking
of the special prerogative of Our Lady, synonyms may be
found, e. g.," intaminata," 10 that is, uncontaminated, unsullied,
undefiled.
However, the most accepted terminology as far as the designation of Mary's Heart is concerned-or shall we say the
most precise terminology, theologically speaking-is, after the
Decree of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, " Immaculate."
Other adjectives have been, and are still used to indicate the
ineffable qualities of her Heart, but none is so distinctive as
"Immaculate." St. John Eudes Mezerai, the" Father, Doctor,
and Apostle of the liturgical cult of the Sacred Hearts," 11
entitled the first ex professo theological tract on Mary's Heart
"Le Coeur Admirable." 12 He employs many other adjectives 13
• Cf. Sparks, Summarium de Cultu Cordis lmmaculati B. V. M., pp. !i!0-22; in
subsequent reference this work is indicated " Summarium "; cf. also Card. Agagianian in Oss. Rom., 21-l-53.
• Ench. lndulg. (Rome, 1952), n. 386.
7 lbi4., n. 393.

Ibid., n. 387.
Summa Theol., III, q. 25, a. l.
10 AAS, XXXV (1935), 104.
11 Cf., e. g., St. Pius X, AAS, I (1909), 480.
12 Cf. ed. 1935, Paris.
13 Ibid., passim.
8

9

TIMOTHY

M. SPARKS

in his zealous endeavors to explain the mysteries of this heart:
" Tres saint, " Tres digne," " Sacre." " Tres auguste." In the
latest edition of the Enchiridion lndulgentiarum 14 the section
containing prayers to Our Lady's Heart is entitled " Ad Cor
Purissimum Mariae." The word " Immaculate," however, has
a distinctiveness aU its own after the definition of the Dogma of
the Immaculate Conception. There Our Lady's special grace is
spoken of as a singular privilege. And an echo of this is found
in the Decree of the Sacred Congregation of Rites on Our
Lady's Heart: it symbolizes Mary's "eximious and singular
holiness." Other Saints, for example, the holy Patriarch Saint
Joseph, may be said to be most pure, or of a most pure heart;
but after 1854, at least, we are accustomed to speak only o£
Mary, o:r o£ her Heart, as being immaculate.

*

*

*

*

*

The Sacred Congregation o£ Rites has summed up in its
decree, as it summed up in the VI Lesson o£ the Feast, the pre1854 history of the liturgical cult of the Immaculate Heart
thus:
Cultus liturgicus erga Cor Beatae Mariae Virginis, cujus remota
vestigia praebent commentarii Patrum de Sponsa Cantici Canticorum, cuique plures mediae et recentioris aetatis viri sancti et
mulieres proxime viam pararunt, ab ipsa Sede Apostolica primum
approbatus est ineunte saeculo undevicesimo....
Father M. Peinador, C. M. F., Father Jose M. Bover, S. J., and
Father N. G. Garces, in Vol. IV of Estudios Marianos/ 5 and
Father John Murphy in Mary's Immaculate Heart/ 6 tell us
more at length about these "pre-Ineffabilis Deus" beginnings
of devotion to the Immaculate Heart.
After the Dogmatic Definition o£ 1854, just as Mariology or
Mariological doctrine made great strides, 17 so likewise did this
" (Rome, 195!'l), p. 259.
(Madrid, 1945), pp. ll-!'l63.
16 (Milwaukee,
1951), pp. !'l-39.
17 Cf. Pius :XII, "Inter Complures,"
Oss. Rom., 25-:X-54.

16

THE IMMACULATE

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243

devotion. In 1855 18 for the first time the Holy See granted a
proper office to the Feast. Soon petitions for the new office were
most frequent; new associations of the faithful were dedicated
to Mary's Heart; the scapular of the Immaculate Heart and
the Sacred Hearts, and the " Green scapular," were approved;
dioceses, religious orders, nations, were consecrated to the
Immaculate Heart; new pertinent indulgences were approved
by the Holy See. 19 Petitions were made for the consecration of
the world to the Immaculate Hea:rt. 20 All this culminated in
the consecration made by His Holiness, Pius XII, on October
:n, 1942, and on December 8, 1942; and in the frequentlymentioned above Decree of the Sacred Congregation of Rites
of 1944, placing the celebration of the feast on the Octave of
the Assumption, giving a definitive redaction of the liturgical
cult and thus settling the precise use of the word " Immaculate "-whose meaning was made so dogmatically clear in 1854
-as far as liturgical cult goes. A final added touch was appropriately given in the Marian Centennial Year in the Encyclical
Letter " Ad Caeli Reginam," ordering the annual renewal of
the consecration of the human race on the Feast of Maria
Regina! 1 This extraordinary and felicitous development and
maturing of the devotion thus clearly owes much to the Definition of 1854.
The chief " a-liturgical " formulary of prayer of the devotion
to the Immaculate Heart is the Holy Rosary-" hie precandi
modus," says Pius XI, " quem S. Dominicus mirabiliter
provexit, non sine Deiparae Virginis instinctu supernoque
admonitu." 22 I.eo XIII spoke of the Rosary as " The prayer
for (Mary's) protection offered among all nations throughout
Cf. AAS, XXXVII (1945), 50.
Cf. H. Pujolras, C.M.F., Cultus Purissimi Cordia B.M. Virginia (Milan, 1943),
pp. 102, l'i!l.
•• Cf. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, 0. P., The Consecration of the Human Race to the
Immaculate Heart of Mary, trans. by Brown in The Dominican Bulletin (Oak
Park, June 1944) , p. 3.
21 Oss, Rom., 24-X-54; AAS, XXXXVI
(1954), 688.
22 AAS, XXIX (1987), 876.
18

19

244

TIMOTHY

M. SPARKS

the month of October to her Most Pure Heart."
Pius XII
began the act of consecrating the human race to the Immaculate Heart by saluting Mary as " Queen of the Most Holy
Rosary .... " 24 And, Our Lady herself, the riches of whose
Immaculate Heart have been particularly stressed at Fatima,
is at that blessed shrine, especially after October 13, 1917,
venerated above all as the Lady, or Queen, of the Rosary. 25
The use of this prayer so closely joined to the Immaculate
Heart devotion has grown marvelously since 1854. Our Lady
herself dearly wished this to happen when she-the " Immaculate Conception "-appeared at Lourdes to St. Bernadette with
a Rosary attached to her girdle, and let the beads glide through
her fingers as St. Bernadette said the Aves. Soon a great
Rosary basilica was begun at Lourdes; and another at St.
Dominic's favored shrine of Prouille not far distant. Monasteries were formed to pray the Rosary always-" perpetually."
The very learned Sovereign Pontiff who did so much for the
cause of Thomism with his " Aeterni Patris," did very much
also with his great Rosary Encyclicals and Letters, and with his
solid re-forming of the Rosary Confraternity in the Apostolic
Constitution " Ubi Primum " of October 2, 1898, making possible the great world-wide Rosary Crusades of our day, :reminiscent, indeed, of the Rosary Crusade of St. Pius V. The
modern Crusades cannot be less effective, we firmly trust, than
that of 1571: Our Lady of Victory/ 6 the Immaculate Heart,
will triumph. 27 Just as Mariology developed, once Mary's basic
prerogative was made " dear," so then also did the cult of
her Immaculate Heart, which is a synthesis of Mariology; 28
•• " Salutaris Illi," ASS (1883), 209.
AAS, XXXIV (1942), pp. 324, 345.
AAS,
(1955), 21o-2n.
26 Cf. Bulletino del Clero Romano
(Oct. 1954), 378.
27 It is interesting
to note this association not only in the Feast of the Rosary
but elsewhere, as in the Church of Notre Dame des Victoires in Paris-so dear to
Sainte Therese of Lis1eux-where Pere Desgenettes established his famous Archconfraternity of the Immaculate Heart.
•• Cf. Summarium, p. 80.
24

•• cr.

xxxxvn

THE IMMACULATE

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245

and so, too, did the universal use of the Holy Rosary, that
Marian prayer par excellence. 29

*

*

*

*

*

Our last consideration is with the relation, especially the
theological rapports, that exist between the Immaculate Conception and the Immaculate Heart.
It is well to recall here that the object of the Immaculate
Heart devotion includes the Immaculate Virgin Mary's physical
heart, living and glorious, a symbol indeed; but it (i.e., this
object) especially embraces everything that the Church venerates under this symbol: namely, "God's Mother's eximious
and singular holiness of soul, especially however, her most
ardent love for God and Jesus her Son as well as her maternal
affection (pietas) for men redeemed by the divine Blood." 30
Older theologians considered that the object of the devotion
was Our Lady's love for God. Perhaps this is why some earlier
pictures of the Immaculate Heart represent it surrounded only
with roses. The Decree of the Sacred Congregation of Rites
has made it clear for us that Our Lady's sanctity, too, is
included: and in the words of the Decree there is, as it were,
a hearkening back to the Ineffabilis Deus, in the adjectives
describing this holiness as "eximious and singular." Hence
Holy Mother Church in propagating the Immaculate Heart
devotion which, once understood, is so instructive for the faithful, insists that under this symbol we pay explicit homage to
the grace of the Immaculate Conception.
This is the grace that made Mary so wonderful in the sight of
God,S1 and which ever after He regards with such great complacency since it is His special masterpiece. This is the grace
which so pleases Our Lady that she chooses to be called by it:
"I am the Immaculate Conception"; and to be represented as
identified with it-on the Miraculous Medal, for instance, and
in the apparition, in St. Michael's Chapel at San Andrea delle
•• Cf. AAS. XXXIX (1947), 504.
8 ° Cf. Deeree of the S.C. Rit. and Sum-marium, p. 15.
"'Cf. lneffabilis Deus.

fl46

TIMOTHY

M. SPARKS

Fratte in Rome as the " Madonna of the Miracle." 32 This is
the sanctifying grace which so perfected and filled Mary's soul
at the first instant of existence: that grace which we lovingly
and with a certain majesty salute when we offer to her Immaculate Heart the " Ave, Gratia Plenas " of Our Rosary. This
is the grace, Christ's choicest redemptive grace-" intuitu meritorum Christi "-which does not heal, is not" sanans "-for it
is received in a subject without the malady of sin. Of Our
Lady's soul in her conception, we may say truly: "perfectissime
illustratur a lumine gratiae." 33 This is the grace which is in
itself most positive, most wonderful, even though we must
express it in a negative way, saying "the Im-maculate Conception." This is that marvelous, positive reality in Mary's soul
looking to God and Christ its cause: this implies the opposite
of macula "(quae) significat privationem quamdam nitoris
animae in ordine ad suam causam quae est peccatum." 34
Mary's Conception is Immaculate: there is in her that " nitor
animae ... ex refulgentia divini luminis." 35
When we lovingly admire the initial marvelous sanctity of
the Immaculate Virgin, we venerate not only that wonderful
quality of her soul by which she shared so greatly in the divine
nature, 36 i.e., her sanctifying grace which dwelt in a subject
entirely immune from sin and moral defect. We venerate also
that initial plenitude of grace as it included the very perfect
supernatural Virtues and Gifts of the Holy Ghost.
But in venerating the sanctity of the Immaculate Heart, we
go beyond Our Lady's initial sanctity. We venerate Mary's
consummate sanctity; we venerate her holiness now, as it is
now; we venerate a Queen whose holiness surpasses even that
which we can think of 37 a holiness marvelously increased by
Mary's exercise of exalted virtue during her life, a holiness now
gloriously crowned with eximious merits.
•• Cf. A. Bellantonio, La M eravigilia Romana dell' lmmacolata (Rome, 1953) .
•• Summa Theol., 1-U, q. Hi'l, a. 4.
•• Cf. II Peter 1:4.
••Ibid., q. 86, a. 1 ad 3.
37 Cf., e. g., Pius XII, "Ad Coeli Reginam."
36 Ibid., corp.

THE IMMACULATE

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247

The Immaculate Heart Decree adds the word "praesertim "
when it begins to speak of Our Lady's love for God and men
as the object of the Immaculate Heart devotion. That is, when
we honor Our Lady's Heart, we do recognize her great gifts
from God, what God has done for her, we join in her" Magnificat"; we honor not only her initial but also her consummate
holiness; but above all, praesertim, do we honor her " most
ardent love for God and Jesus her Son and her maternal piety
toward men redeemed by the divine Blood."
The earlier practice of the devotion stressed Mary's love for
God-a love most pure and unselfish, a love which on earth
resulted in the highest contemplation (notice the " Mary and
Martha " Gospel, in the rite of the Order of Preachers, of the
Feast of Saint Mary, the Assumption, August 15). But it is
this pure, unifying love Mary Immaculate has for God which
made her especially apt for her role of Mediatrix 38 and renders
her now, mystically, most" sensible" to the sins against God. 39
Mary's love for .Jesus her Son made her one in spirit with
Him. Its height, or depth as you will, made all the more profound her part on Calvary, her offering to God for our sakes
of her most loved Treasure effected, in its subordinate role, of
course, our salvation.
And it is this love for Jesus that accounts also for that object
of veneration in Cordimarian cult which is God's Mother's
" maternal piety for men, redeemed by the divine Blood." It
is because Mary sees Christ in us, sees souls for which her
divine Son died, that she loves us. In venerating the Immaculate Heart, we honor not only that maternal piety, which St.
Thomas calls the immediate effect of charity, 40 which wrought,
with Christ, our salvation on Calvary, but that maternal piety
88 Cf. Summa Theol., III, q. 26, a. 1; C. Larnicol, C.S.Sp., De Verbo lncarnato et
de B. V. Maria (Rome, 1948), p. 223.
89 Cf. Pius XII on the Virgin of Siracusa, in Oss. Rom., 19-X-54; AAS, XXXXVI

(1954), 660; Garrigou-Lagrange, "La Capacite de Souffrir en Marie Irnmaculee,"
Angelicum (Nov. 1954); Sparks, "Reparation to the Immaculate Heart of Mary,"
From an Abundant Spring (New York, 1952), p. 39 ff., and Italian edition, Rome,
1955.
' 0

I ad Tim., c. 4, lect. 2.

"I

248

TIMOTHY

Mo SPARKS

Mary has for us now in heaven" She, Suppliant Omnipotence,
is there, our Queen, always making unique intercession for us,
pleading her children's cause, imploring the graces she merited
for us at Calvary" For this maternal piety, exercised on earth
and now in heaven, Mary's Immaculate Conception and its
consequences of immunity from concupiscence and all moral
defect, was a most apt preparation. It :rendered her soul worthy
of the office of the New Eve, the perfect mother of all that live
in Christ, the ever most faithful consort of the New Adam in
the work of the Redemption of the human race. 41
Sin tends to " harden " our hearts, to dull our hearts to the
gravity of offenses against God. Mary's perfect freedom from
sin, her " immaculateness," enabled her to appreciate the
enormity and gravity of sino Her heart, filled with love for God
and men, was most "sensibile "; 42 and even now may we not
speak of that mystical " sensibility " which finds its expression
in such apparitions as that of the " Weeping Madonna " at La
Salette? 43
The consideration of Mary's Heart, of her great love for
God and man, of her most profound :realization of sin as an
offense against God and the greatest evil of man, naturally gives
rise to our desire to return that love by consec:ration, 44 and to
make amends to Our Lady's Sorrowful and Immaculate Heart. 45
This consecration the whole world will henceforth renew on
each 1\'Iay 3lo46 This reparation many souls make especially
41 We add this note on the physical heart of Mary, "Immaculate":
Mary's
immaculateness, in the beginning and through her life, included freedom even from
movements of concupiscence. Inasmuch as all movements of our soul are " reflected "
in the physical organ of the heart-the heart is thus the " manifestive " organ
(cf. P. Parente, ll Cuore lmmacolato (Rome, 1946), po 25)-there is a certain
cleanness, integrity, immaculateness in Mary's heart that we legitimately also
venerate.
•• Cf. Ench. lndulg., n. 383: "ll Vostro sensibilissimo Cuore."
•• Cf. also on the "Madonna of the Tears, of Siracusa," Oss. Rom., 19-X-54; AAS,
XXXXVI (1954), 660.
u Cf. Pius XI, Miserentissimus Redemptor, AAS, XX (1928), 169.
•• Devotion to the Immaculate Heart in us, in our souls, pertains to the virtue
of hyperdulia (ct Summarium, p. 29), and to the Holy Spirit's gift of piety.
•• Cf. Pius XII, Ad Coeli Reginam, Oss. Rom., 25-X-54; AAS, XXXXVI
(1954) > 688o

THE IMMACULATE

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249

on First Saturdays 47 and thus the practice of the reparation to
the Immaculate Conception on First Saturdays which St. Pius
X indulgenced 48 finds its complement in reparation to Mary's
Immaculate Heart.

*

*

*

*

*

The Immaculate Conception then and its dogmatic definition
are basic in the devotion of the Immaculate Heart. The
devotion rapidly reached its definitive development once the
dogma was declared; the use of its special formulary of prayer,
the Rosary, reached world-wide proportions. The rich import
of the devotion is only understood once Mary's fundamental
immaculateness is given its proper appreciation. May Maria,
Regina, further such understanding and appreciation.
TIMOTHY

Dominican House of Studies
River Forest, Ill.

Cf. Murphy, op. cit., p. 110.
•• Cf. AAS, IV (1912), 628.

47

M. SPARKS, O.P.

JAPAN, PHILOSOPHY AND THOMISM

T

HE history of mediaeval philosophy, largely in the sense
of Thomism, did not begin in Japan with the introductoin of Christianty in the sixteenth century. At
that time several seminaries were established by Jesuit and
Franciscan missionaries, but no active philosophical movements
seem to have followed. A Japanese translation of the De
lmitatione Christi appeared in 1596, only some forty years
after the arrival of St. Francis Xavier, and was one of the
outstanding literary productions of the period. There seems to
be special significance in the fact that this book was chosen.
Probably the Fathers thought it was a work most likely to
find sympathetic readers among the Japanese, and it is noteworthy that since then there have been at least four more
renderings. Unfortunately, religious persecutions, which began
at the beginning of the seventeenth century and lasted until
1870, wiped out virtually everything in Japan related to
Christianity.
Japan's acquaintance with mediaeval philosophy actually
begins with the re-introduction of Western thought in the latter
part of the nineteenth century. But the history of scholasticism
in Japan cannot be divorced, if it is to be understood, from the
progress in that country of western philosophy in general. And
so a synopsis of Japan's reaction to some important European
thinkers may helpfully preface a study of Japan's attitude
towards mediaeval philosophy in general and Thomism in
particular.
I
Five periods may be distinguished in the career of European
philosophy in Japan. Period I: 1878-1890-from the inception
of the department of philosophy in the Imperial University of
250

JAPAN, PHILOSOPHY

AND THOMISM

251

Tokyo 1 to the opening of the National Diet. This period was
marked by what may be called a Japanese equivalent of the
Enlightenment in political and philosophical thought. The new
government of Emperor Meiji, which overthrew the old and
entrenched feudal despotism in 1868, at least professed democratic principles and promised the people equal social, political
and economic opportunities as well as a share in government.
The spirit of the times was practicaL It aimed at destroying
feudalism, establishing democratic processes and accelerating
economic expansion. These objectives were manifest in the
European philosophical systems which, because of what they
might be expected to contribute to the new outlook, were seized
upon by Japanese intellectuals. Emphasis was on political,
economic, social and legal theories. Writers such as Jeremy
Bentham (1748-1832), J. J. Rousseau (1712-1778), and C. L.
Montesquieu (1689-1755) were read, studied, absorbed and
popularized. Translations appeared, and the doctrine of the
divine origin of human rights proved especially captivating,
spreading beyond academic walls into popular discussion. J. S.
Mill (1806-1873), with his Utilitarianism, and Herbert Spencer
(1820-1903) found ardent champions. Darwin (1809-1882),
with his theory of evolution, and Ernest Haeckel (1834-1919),
with his materialism, also won followers.
Period II: 1890-1905-from the opening of the National
Diet to the end of the Russo-Japanese War, is doubly ;ignificant. For one thing, philosophical and critical thinking becomes
more and more isolated from contemporary social and political
movements and more restricted to academic theorizing. The
other development is the cultivation of German philosophers,
such as Kant (1724-1804), Hegel (1770-1831), Schopenhauer
(1788-1860), Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906), Wilhelm
Wundt (1832-1920), Johannes Volkelt (1848-1930), Nietzsche
(1844-1900), and R. H. I.otze (1817-1881) . It is noteworthy
1 From the beginning, the Imperial University of Tokyo was, and continues to be,
preeminent in philosophical movements. Other Japanese universities tend to accept
and follow its leadership.

252

B. R. INAGAKI AND J. B. MCALLISTER

that the disassociation of philosophy from practical considerations parallels the introduction and cultivation of German
writers.
Period HI: 1905-1918-from the end of the Russo-Japanese
War to the dose of World War I. Japan's victory over Russia
touched off tremendous economic expansion. National industry
soared while in philosophy German idealism predominated.
Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel proved most attractive.
Their major works were translated; their doctrines were studied
privately and presented in formal university courses. Raphael
von Koeber (1848-1923) came to enjoy immense prestige
among the young students at the Imperial University of Tokyo.
For many of them, even generations after his death, von
Koeber's name was magic. Since this outstanding scholar
played a unique :role in calling the attention of Japanese
thinkers to mediaeval thought and in vindicating its value for
contemporary problems, something further will be said about

him.
Period IV: 1918-1931-from the end of World War I to the
Manchurian Incident. Japanese industry and trade, suffering
like the rest of the world an economic depression, began to
experience serious difficulties. Manifold and bitter conflicts
were rampant within the nation. Intolerable social conditions
begot radical ideologies and desperate panaceas which eventually drove Japan into a tragic war.
Most significant, perhaps, in this period is the fact that
Japanese philosophy showed signs of being less absorbent of
foreign systems and more mature in developing its own syntheses-even i£ they still owed much to Europeans. Excellent
and comprehensive dictionaries of philosophy appeared. This
type of publication, in addition to requiring long and persevering labor, also demands wide and critical knowledge,
accurate terminology and presupposes that there is a buyer's
market to make the venture feasible. Then there was a series
of text-books covering the whole field of philosophy (Philosophical Texts), which were produced by representative

JAPAN, PHILOSOPHY

AND THOMISM

253

Japanese authors from time to time. Noteworthy also in this
period is the cultivation of Greek philosophers. Up to this
time the general attitude seems to have been that only modern
thinkers had anything to offer. Now there is an awareness and
appreciation of the greatest among the Greeks. For example,
Plato's works as well as Aristotle's major treatises were translated directly from the original. A fourth sign of maturity is a
new attitude in studying philosophical, and especially modern
and contemporary, systems. There is more exactness and
thoroughness. Able translations of Kant, Hegel, Descartes,
Spinoza and Leibniz appeared. The Neo-Kantianism of Rudolf
Eucken (1846-1926), Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936), Emil Lask
(1875-1915) and Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) -the Phenomenology of Edmund Husser! (1859-1938) and Max Scheller
(1874-1928) -and finally the Lebensphilosophie of Wilhelm
Dielthey (1833-1911) and Georg Simmel (1859-1918) were
introduced, studied and variously accepted and championed by
students and intellectuals.
A fifth evidence of Japan's philosophical growth in this fourth
period is the effort of some of her philosophers to produce their
own systems out of western and oriental thought. Of these,
most famous and influential was Kitaro Nishida (1868-1945),
whose name became attached to his creation. Following are
some of his noteworthy writings: Treatise Concerning the
Good, Speculation and Experiment, Direct and Reflex Elements
of Consciousness, Main Problems of Consciousness, Art and
Morality, Basic Problems of Philosophy, Antithesis Between
Action and Pure Thought. 2
Because of Nishida's reputation as the first and foremost of
Japan's original thinkers, something further should be said
about his philosophy. He aimed to fuse the rationalism of
Cartesianism and German idealism on the one hand with
opposite trends as represented by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and
• English titles given to these and other Japanese works to be mentioned are
not always literal translations and sometimes are English equivalents to describe the
work rather than a simple translation of the title.

254

B. R. INAGAKI AND J. B. MCALLISTER

Bergson on the other. Harmony was Nishida's goal. So he
sought some metaphysical system in which the contradictions
between opposed principles of rationalism and irrationalism
might be resolved, such as between subject and object, spirit
and matter, being and non-being. His solution was to emphasize the need of radically and profoundly understanding
"the ultimate reality." In Nishida's thought this "reality"
apparently turns out to be a concept of" nothingness "-which
must be understood in its Buddhistic and tantalizing elusiveness. For whatever else it may mean, it does not signify
nothingness pure and simple. Nishida's terminology reveals
strong Hegelian influences. In fact his philosophy might be
said to be an attempt to explain oriental philosophical thought
in terms of European, and especially Hegelian, logic.
The final feature of this fourth period (1918-1931) which
surely deserves notice is leftist tendencies among some university students and popular writers. Marxism, however, never
achieved formal academic status in the sense that it was
presented in the universities as an acceptable philosophical
system-as, for example, Hegelianism had been. Marxism was
more of a popular movement, of which professional philosophers
and thinkers took a dim view. They did recognize, though,
the potent character of some of Marx's economic and social
theories, which were actually winning over more or less radical
students and writers and finding fertile soil among the lower
social strata and working classes. While leftist movements
reflected critical social and economic unrest and disillusionment
and impatience for some quick stop-gap, Marxism was shortlived-but only on the surface. For under military suppression,
it went underground, where it continued to exist, and blossomed
into fuller and more vigorous life than ever when the militaristic
regime fell in 1945, at the end of the war.
Period V: 1931 to the present-In 1934 some right-wing
revolutionaries, led by young officers, made a futile attempt
to overthrow the government and set up a socialistic regime.
In 1937, Japan moved into China and finally, in 1941, came war

JAPAN, PHILOSOPHY

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255

in the Pacific. War, race, nationalism, propaganda and victory
became the philosophers' assignment, and purely academic pursuits for the most part stagnated.
Yet, and astonishingly so, there were signs of philosophical
activity. During these years of all-out war, the new realism
of Martin Heidegger (1889-1949), Karl Jaspers (1883- ) ,
Nicolai Hartmann
and Max Scheler (1874-19Q8),
the existentialism of Kierkegaard
(1813-1855), Nietzsche
(1844-1900), and L. Shestow (1866-1938) either were introduced or were given more attention. It may also be mentioned,
that Pascal acquired an entirely new, if limited, popularity.
The major works of these thinkers were translated, seriously
read and discussed-while more in the order of a fad some
university students and intellectuals took up with nihilism and
Sartre's brand of existentialism.

II
Unfortunately, Western philosophies which came earliest into
Japan and were more or less favorably received represented
modern thinkers who for the most part ignored or rejected
mediaeval thought. Japanese students of philosophy absorbed
or uncritically accepted this supercilious attitude and dismissed
scholasticism as obsolete-to be classified with geocentric
theories of the universe or Aristotelian science. This attitude
still largely prevails. Few Japanese philosophers recognize
scholasticism and Thomism as having any meaning or value for
twentieth century life.
Raphael von Koeber (1848-1923), a Russian-born, Germaneducated philosopher, raised something of a storm when he
vigorously and brilliantly argued that mediaeval philosophy
was not extinct-was not the lifeless and pointless philosophical-theological synthesis, which it was the fashion to notice
only by way of condemning it. In Japan Koeber's views were
as remarkable as the man himself. A specialist on Eduard von
Hartmann and Schopenhauer (Philo8ophical Sy8tem of E. von
Hartmann, 1884; Philo8ophy of Schopenhauer, 1887-both in

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B. R. INAGAKI AND J. B. MCALLISTER

German) , Koeber came to the Imperial University of Tokyo
around 1893 and taught there until 1914, when he retired,
leaving behind enduring memories of his influence upon
students. His The Need of Research in Theology and M ediaeval Philosophy (1905) startled many a reader with its
incredible thesis, that understanding Western civilization
meant studying Christian theology and mediaeval philosophy.
Stimulated by Koeber, a number of students began to be
more scholarly towards Greek and mediaeval thought. Among
them was a Japanese named Soichi !washita (1888-1940),
who turned to scholasticism in earnest and with considerable
success. His dissertation on Augustine's philosophy of history
in The City of God, written for his degree at the Imperial
University of Tokyo, won high praise and was later published.
More than that, he was selected by the Ministry of Education
for further study in Europe-with astonishing results. I washita
became a Catholic and studied for the priesthood in Rome,
where one of his teachers was the famous Dominican, Father
Garrigou-Lagrange.
Back in Japan, Father !washita taught at the provincial
seminary in Tokyo and participated in various intellectual
movements. He founded a periodical devoted to philosophical
and theological discussion, which went simply by the name
Catholic and proved a valuable outlet for Japanese Catholic
intellectuals. Later Father !washita became head of a leper
hospital near Tokyo-an assignment which probably entailed
considerable sacrifice for a man of his scholarly bent. He died
in the hospital on the feast of St. Francis Xavier, December
3, 1940.
Father !washita's writings were popular as well as scholarly.
His The Catholic Faith (an explanation of the catechism) is
probably one of the best known and most widely read Catholic
publications in Japan. His more scholarly works were collected
and published after his death. Volume One, The Deposit of
Faith (1941), contains his theological and scriptural treatises.
The second volume, Studies in the History of Mediaeval Philosophical Thought (1942) , contains his philosophical essays.

JAPAN, PHILOSOPHY

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257

His unpedantic, lively style as well as his solid scholarship
merited and have won the esteem of both Catholic and nonCatholic readers. But Father !washita's major objective must
be remembered. He worked and wrote to win students
and intellectuals to the Church-never simply for academic
purposes.
Yoshihiko Yoshimitsu (1903-1946), a disciple of Father
!washita, after graduating from the Imperial University of
Tokyo (1925), went to France and studied under Jacques
Maritain. Upon his return to Japan, Y oshimitsu translated
Maritain's Introduction to Philosophy and produced numerous
articles on the Thomism of Maritain. Later he taught ethics at
the Imperial University and although a layman lectured in the
provincial seminary in Tokyo, where Father I washita had
labored so successfully. Yoshimitsu took a prominent part in
intellectual affairs and, after Father !washita's death, became
the unofficial spokesman for Catholicism and Thomism in
Japan. He was especially able in the field of literary criticism,
evidenced by his papers on Dostoevski, Mauriac, Pascal,
Kierkegaard and others.
Yoshimitsu's collected works were published after his death
in four volumes-volume I, Culture and Religion (1947) ,
volume II, Studies in the History of Mediaeval Philosophy
(1948), volume III, Studies in the History of Modern Philosophy (1949), and volume IV, Mysticism and the Contemporary World (1952). Noteworthy especially for this article,
is his " The Metaphysical Structure of the Concept of God in
St. Thomas" now found in volume H, but originally published
in 1932. It typifies Yoshimitsu's preoccupation with Aquinas
and reveals his grasp of the Summa Theologiae; it accords
perfectly with his aim to win a place for mediaeval philosophy
in Japan-at least on a par with Kant and Hegel.
Among colleagues and disciples of Y oshimitsu s;hould be
mentioned another layman, Dr. Masao Matsumoto, who is
still living and the author of a notable work Studies on the
Ontological Basis of Logic. In its five hundred pages Dr.
Matsumoto seems chiefly engaged in working out a correlation

258

B. R. INAGAKI AND J. B. MCALLISTER

between logic and reality. Just as there are various modes of
being, real being, such as substance, accident, property, value
and validity, so, he appears to think, there should be appropriate recourse not to just one logic but to the logic most
appropriate to the subject-matter. One should not, therefore,
tie himself to one kind of logic, but, depending on the kind of
reality involved, have recourse to Platonic dialectics, Aristotelian deduction, modern scientific induction and to what he
calls a logic of value, since there are judgments of value.
In the course of the gradual recognition-if not acceptance
-of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas by Japanese intellectuals, the contribution of still another layman deserves mention.
Converted from Protestantism to Catholicism under the influence of Father !washita, Dr. Tanaka, who is presently the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, held distinguished posts
as professor of law in the Imperial University of Tokyo, as
Minister of Education, and as a member of the House of
Councillors of the National Diet. Dr. Tanaka has been and is
an outstanding spokesman for a Thomistic theory of natural
law. He has defended and expounded Thomas' juridical
doctrines in a monumental work, A Theory of World Law (3
volumes, 1932-1934), and in numerous other scholarly writings.
In 1954 a volume entitled Natural Law and World LaW' was
published in Japan to honor Dr. Tanaka. This work includes
contributions from distinguished jurists and lawyers from all
over the world and pays eloquent testimony to the reputation
of Dr. Tanaka as well as to his eminent accomplishments in
focusing attention in Japan on Thomas Aquinas and his philosophy of natural law.
A definite sign of encouragement and progress is evidenced
by the fact, that the 1946 Constitution of Japan accepted some
basic natural law principles relating to human nature and
social affairs. This was a radical improvement over the past
and helps to explain why there has been manifestation of
growing interest among jurists and students of political science
in conceptions of natural law. It is not being overly optimistic
to see in these developments some promise that more and more

JAPAN, PHILOSOPHY

AND THOMISM

Japanese thinkers will turn to the thirteenth century saint and
philosopher-not to raise antiquarian dust but to adapt the
wisdom of the ages to the critical complications of the present.

III
After some fifty years, Thomism, which is practically a
synonym for scholasticism in Japan, is far from being generally
received and farther still from playing a decisive role in the
nation's thinking. From what has been said, however, it should
be evident that the philosophy of St. Thomas is making headway and winning some champions among Japanese intellectuals.
It should be further noted that the Jesuit Sophia University
in Tokyo sponsors an a Aristotelian-Thomistic Society," which
was established to promote the study and growth of Thomism
in Japan. Other Catholic colleges and some State universities,
like KyQto and Kyushu, offer courses in the philosophy of
Aquinas, which a.re taught by Dominican professors-even
though they are State institutions.
As yet there is no complete Japanese translation of all of
Aquinas' major works, although there are renderings of the
following: Summa Theologiae (I, qq. 75-102) , by Keiji Kokubu,
1950; Summa Contra Gentiles (Book I), by Ryokichi Sakai,
1935; De Ente et Essentia, by Sumio Takakuwa, 1935. However, works on the philosophy of St. Thomas by Grabmann,
Maritain, Gilson, Roland Gosselin, and others, have been translated and are widely read.
At present there is a project to translate the entire Summa
Theologiae and other writings of Aquinas. Increased interest
in the teachings of St. Augustine and the Fathers of the Church,
of St. Anselm, St. Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure, Roger
Bacon and the mystics of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries
among Catholic as well as non-Catholic scholars may be taken
as a hopeful sign that these Christian writers may eventually
receive the recognition they deserve.
But it must be admitted that recognition and cultivation of
mediaeval philosophy in Japan suffers greatly in contrast to

260

B. R. INAGAR:I AND J. B. MCALLISTER

the attention modern European thinkers have received. But,
as the preceding review suggests, Japan's acquaintance with
Western thought has not produced in any sense a nationally
acceptable system of philosophy. Frankly eclectic, Japanese
philosophers have picked and chosen and in various degrees
assimilated what seemed to them to promise most in the way of
promoting academic goals or social and economic ambitions.
Today Japan faces not only new problems but the prospects
of an entirely new realization of human rights in a nation which
is gradually developing a new philosophy. What this will
eventually turn out to be is uncertain. But whatever it be,
it will mightily affect the Catholic Church in the Orient.
Thomas Aquinas has been said to have synthesized the best
of Greek thinking with Christian truth. What is needed now
in Japan is that Japanese Catholics assimilate the great
mediaeval saint and do with his teachings in their own day and
for their own problems what he did in his day for its problems.
It is not a matter of recovering the past to embalm it in ponderous tomes, but of using the best of the past to make the best
of the present. That some significant and courageous and
successful advances in this direction have been made in Japan
has been noted in this survey. One can only hope that they will
continue, that they will multiply and in the end make their
contribution towards winning Japan for Christ.
NoTE: For its bibliographical material, this article draws largely
from untranslated works in the Japanese section of the Library of
Congress. Instead of transliterating titles, it seemed more practical
to translate them and instead of naming publishers to give the
catalogue number of the Library of Congress, where most of the
works have been entered. Some, although in the Library, have not
been processed, while a few are probably not available in the U.S. A.

at all.
BooKs
I washita, Soichi: The Deposit of Faith (Tokyo, 1941: in Library of
Congress, uncatalogued).
---: Studies in the History of Mediaeval Philosophical Thought
(Tokyo, 1942: in L. C., uncatalogued).

JAPAN, PHILOSOPHY

AND THOMISM

261

Kada, Tetsuji: History of Social Thought in Japan (Tokyo, 1948:
L. C. number 309. 021. K 114).
Koeber, Raphael von: The Need of Research in Theology and
Mediaeval Philosophy (Tokyo, 1905: not in L. C.).
Kosaka, Massaki: Kitaro Nishida, His Life and Thought (Tokyo,
1947: in L. C., uncatalogued).
Matsumoto, Masao: Studies on the Ontological Basis of Logic
(Tokyo, 1948: in L. C., uncatalogued).
Nishida, Kitaro: Complete Works of K. Nishida, 16 vols. (Tokyo,
1949-1950: in L. C., uncatalogued).
Nogami, Yaichiro: Introduction of Western Thought into Japan
(Tokyo, 1940: not in L. C.).
Tanaka, Kotaro: A Theory of World Law, 3 vols. (Tokyo, 19321934: L. C. number 329. Tan-1).
---: Law, Religion and Social Life (Tokyo, 1932: L. C. number
J 1714. 6554).
---: Law and Morality (Tokyo, 1949: in L. C., uncatalogued).
Watsuji, Tetsuro: My Teacher Koeber (Tokyo, 1948: in L. C.,
uncatalogued).
Yoshimitsu, Yoshihiko: The Collected Works of Y. Yoshimitsu, 4
vols. (Tokyo, 1947-1952: in L. C., uncatalogued).
The Philosopher's God (Tokyo, 1947: not in L. C.) .
.ARTICLES

Hattori, Eijiro: "Introduction to Studies in Mediaeval Philosophy," Introduction to Philosophical Studies (Tokyo, 1949:
in L. C., uncatalogued).
Kaba, Toshio: "The Philosophy of Japan, "Dictionary of Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Kiyoshi Miki (Tokyo,
1936: L. C. number 103. M. 16).
Matsumoto, Masao: "The Contemporary Mission of Scholastic
Ontology," An Inquiry into Philosophy, edited by Somio
Takakuwa (Tokyo, 1948, in L. C., uncatalogued) .
Odaka, Tomoo: "A Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
Law of Nature," Natural Law and World Law (Tokyo,
1954: not in L. C.).
Catholic University
Nagoya, Japan

BERNARD

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

JosEPH

R. INAGAKI

B. McALLISTER

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS
WILLIAM AuGUSTINE WALLACE, 0. P., S. T.LR., S. T. L., M.S., professor of
Natural Philosophy at the Dominican House of Philosophy, Springfield, Ky., is a member of the Albertus Magnus Lyceum for Natural
Science, River Forest, Ill.
LESLIE DEWART, PH. D., studied at the
Institute of Medieval
Studies and at St. Michael's College, University of Toronto, where
he received his doctorate and also taught prior to joining the department of philosophy at the University of Detroit.
WILLIAM H. KANE, 0. P., S. T. M., is professor of philosophy at the
Dominican House of Studies, River Forest, Ill., and director of the
Albertus Magnus Lyceum for Natural Science.
HERBERT McCABE, 0. P., a contributor to Blackfriars and Dominican
Studies, took his degree in philosophy at Manchester University and
is presently at the Dominican House of Theology, Blackfriars, Oxford,
England.
TIMOTHY M. SPARKS, 0. P., S. T. M., is professor of philosophy at the
Dominican House of Studies, River Forest, lll., and the author of
Summarium de Cultu Cordis lmmaculati B. V. M.
BERNARD R. INAGAKI, PH. D., is a professor at the Catholic University of
Nagoya. A native of Japan, he was raised a Buddhist but became
a Catholic while studying for his Baccalaureate at the Imperial University of Tokyo. Subsequently he came to the United States, and
received the Doctorate in Philosophy at The Catholic University of
America, where Dr. McAllister is an associate professor.
DAVID A. O'CoNNELL, 0. P ., S. T. LR., S. T. D., the author of Christian
Liberty, is professor of theology at Providence College, Providence,
R. I., and at the Archbishop Cushing School of Theology, Boston, Mass.
JAMEs M. EGAN, 0. P., S. T. LR., S. T. D., formerly professor of Dogmatic
Theology at the ANGELICUM, Rome, and frequent contributor to THE
THOMIST, is a professor of theology at St. Mary's College, Notre Dame,
Indiana.
KIERAN CoNLEY, 0. S. B., S. T. L., is a member of the community of St.
Meinrad's Archabbey, and at present is pursuing graduate studies at
the University of Fribourg, Switzerland.
RoBERT F. CoNWAY, 0. P., S. T. LR., professor of theology at Trinity
College, Washington, D. C., is pursuing graduate studies in the Pontifical Faculty of Theology at the Dominican House of Studies in the
same city.

BOOK REVIKWS
Truth and Freedom. By Lours DE RAEYMAKER and Others. Edited by
ANDREW G. VAN MELSEN and HENRY J. KoREN, C. S. Sp. Duquesne
Studies, Philosophical Series, Vol. 5. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University
Press, 1954. Pp. 140 with index. $3.00, cloth. $S!.25, paper.
Academic Freedom.
S!lO with index.

By RussELL KIRK. Chicago:
$3.75.

Regnery, 1955.

Pp.

Truth and Freedom is the fifth work in the philosophical series titled
Duquesne Studies, edited by Andrew G. Van Melsen, D. Sc., D. Ed., and
Henry J. Koren, C. S. Sp., S. T. D. At the request of the authors, Father
Koren translated the seven essays in this collection directly from the manuscripts. The original French edition and the English translation appeared
at about the same time in 1954 as a contribution of the University of
Louvain to the bicentennial celebration of the founding of Columbia University. In a brief dedication to Columbia, Msgr. Honore von Waeyenbergh, Rector of Louvain, explains that these essays by outstanding professors of the Higher Institute of Philosophy at Louvain are in response
to the invitation to take part in Columbia's bicentennial by discussion of
"the ideal of full freedom of scholarly inquiry and expression, the right of
mankind to knowledge and to the free use thereof."
In the first essay, " Truth and Freedom according to Cardinal Mercier,"
Louis de Raeymaker, President of the Institute, provides an illuminating
Stressing the distinction
resume of the Cardinal's work at Louvain.
and " established science," the author
between " science-in-the-making"
points out that the organization of research for " science-in-the-making " is
one of the chief functions of the modern university and Mercier founded the
Institute in an effort to apply the concept to philosophy. This research was
to be under the guidance of St. Thomas, whose philosophy, Mercier said,
is not a kind of mummy but " an organism which is always rejuvenated
and always active and which by personal effort must be maintained and
nourished to secure its perpetual growth." (p. QO) The contact with the
physical sciences and other philosophies required for the development of this
organism could be ensured by the team-work of an institute. Cardinal
Mercier regarded truth and freedom as central to research in every field and
held that " the best service which researchers could render to religious truth
in the realm of science was to surrender themselves to their research with
all their powers." (p. 15) In a religious man fear of scientific, historical or
philosophical truth does not spring from faith, but from a lack of faith.

8

264

BOOK REVIEWS

" Truth and Freedom, A Philosophical Study " is a well-done summary
of traditional doctrine by Albert Dondeyne. The essence and structure of
human freedom and human truth are expounded before their relationship
is discussed. Freedom has three meanings, all closely connected. It means
" a certain ideal of existential perfection ... a certain maturity of mind
and personality arising from the fact that one has become a master in one
or other domain of life." (p. 80) It also means "free choice." And in its
sociological and political sense it means " the sum total of the economical,
social and political conditions that are necessary for the concrete exercise
of freedom and effective liberation of man's personality." (p. 88) The complexity of human truth is evident from: the fact that it exists on four levels:
" There is the truth of the familiar world around us; there is also the
distinct truth of positive science; there is the truth pursued by philosophy,
and, again, the distinct truth that religious Faith allows us to touch and
cherish." (p. 85) In explaining how freedom, in all three senses, is based on
truth, the author suggests that the principal cause for the decline of freedom
today is ignoring its foundation in reason. " It is characteristic of our times
that even philosophers labor under an ill-advised irrationalism and tend to
separate freedom and truth." (p. 89) Nietzsche, Gide, Sartre, and the
Marxists serve as examples.
Jacques Leclercq, President of the School of Political and Social Sciences,
treats "Freedom as a Moral and Social Value." He uses an abundance of
helpful illustrations. But in expounding morality's basis in reason and
freedom, he is misleading, to say the least, when he says that in some lives
dominated by lust or greed the function of free will is " almost nonexistent." (p. 54) He describes an action "performed under the pressure
of affective or sensitive tendencies, or under the pressure of emotions and
passions" (p. 52) as if it could never be more than an actus hominis.
The difference between antecedent and consequent passion is neglected also.
The first and most difficult problem of social science is determining the
degree of restraint and liberty. The solution lies in constraint for the sake
of freedom, on the principle that " whenever a constraint is established, it
must be justified by an increase of freedom." (p. 61) Traffic rules become
stricter, for example, for the sake of the fuller freedom of movement they
promote. No simple solution exists, however, for all the complications of
concrete cases. But if society aims to encourage " self-government " in the
individual rather than to produce conformity, a general orientation will
develop in favor of freedom.
The briefest essay, and one of the best, is Joseph Nuttin's "Freedom and
Psychological Truth." Since psychology influences man's view of himself
and every culture is primarily " the realization and concretion of man's
view of himself," (p. 69) freedom in this field both in research and teaching

BOOK REVIEWS

265

is very important. In research there is only one limit-truth itself. Aristotelians will be startled when they read that "science is not unqualifiedly
synonomous with truth," (p. 70) but Nuttin's meaning is clarified when he
later substitutes the better terms " scientific theory " (p. 7Z) and " Science
in-the-making." (p. 73) Nuttin appeals for prudence in the disclosure of
unproved theories, especially since every psychologist has philosophical
views which influence his interpretation of data. " A critical mentality
forbids us to confuse scientific theory and truth. . . . To present to the
public at large, which does not have enough critical sense, every psychological ' discovery ' as the last word in ' truth ' would amount to giving the
science of psychology an import it does not have. . . . It is therefore in the
name of truth itself that a certain amount of reserve is fitting, especially
in the domain of psychology .... On the level of research, however, and
within the framework of strictly scientific teaching, the rights of truth are
not violated by its mixture with error-a state of affairs that often obtains
in ' science-in-the-making '-because a man of science may be supposed to
have enough critical sense." (pp. 7Z-73) Since certainty is not easily
attained, " the psychologist will do well not to demand for each of his
' data ' and scientific theories the indisputable rights willingly granted to
'truth.' " (p. 75) With regard to academic freedom, Nuttin upholds the
right of a university not to tolerate in a teaching position a professor
whose philosophical and religious views of man are opposed to those of
the institution. But if his activity is confined to pure research, wider freedom can be justified.
Roger Aubert contributes an essay on " The Freedom of the Catholic
Historian," He shows that a Catholic should find no difficulty in observing
the two rules for every historian: "let him not dare to say anything false,
and ... let him not be afraid of saying anything that is true." (p. 80) Only
a false theology could lead him to think that his scientific freedom is impeded
by his religious convictions. Professor Aubert provides a number of excellent examples to support his position that faith in Christ's Church frees the
historian for that " tranquil research, without animosity or bias, by which
nowadays more than in former times the facts of the past are reconstructed " (Pius XII) . (p. 80)
In" Freedom of Research in the Physical Sciences," Jean Ladriere studies
the problem first from the viewpoint of the internal coherence of human
knowledge and then from the viewpoint of man's social organization. A
good treatment of the independence, interrelationships, and limitations of
the sciences is marred by awkwardness in the translation, which elsewhere
is adequate. Perhaps the author must share the responsibility, however,
since the translator presented the English version to each essayist for correction and approval. But to call salvation " the objection of theology "

BOOK REVIEWS

(p. 100) is more than a grammatical or typographical error. In treating of
the social organization of scientific research, Professor Ladriere issues the
customary warnings against the danger of external controls, especially of a
political nature. But he finds the universities are truly independent and
consequently can serve as worthy models for the great research laboratories
outside the universities which are inspired by the same desire for truth.
In the last essay Charles Moeller discusses " Freedom and Truth in
Literary Critique." His thesis is that the literary critic needs freedom in
order to fulfill his task of penetrating and judging a work. He holds with
Charles Du Bos, whose view of literature is contrasted here with Sartre's,
that the believing critic is freer than an unbeliever, since "religion enriches
the vision of the literary world, because it adds supplementary categories of
thought, new ' geometric dimensions ' in depth, the dimension of grace at
the top, and that of sin at the bottom." (p. l9l3) Here again, it may be
added, the translation is occasionally faulty, not so much unclear as annoying, e. g., " Where there is the most of love ... there is also the most of
truth." (p. 19l5)
These essays will be of value chiefly to those trained in other philosophical
traditions. Since theological considerations are touched upon but not emphasized, the general reader will have to look elsewhere for a fuller statement of the Church's doctrine on freedom and truth, in Leo XIII's Libertas
Ilumana, for example. These essays, with their unity in principle and consistency in application, suggest an interesting question: What sort of collection would emerge if Columbia University attempted a similar project to
honor Louvain?
Judging from the whole tone of Academic Freedom as well as several
clear statements of his philosophical and religious position, Professor Russell
Kirk would surely find little to disagree with in the essays of the Louvain
professors. Philosophically, he follows St. Thomas Aquinas, Hooker, and
Burke. Theologically, although " not a champion of any especial orthodoxy," he calls himself " a humble friend to religious principle," (p. 46)
maintains that "the fountain of learning, and of liberty, is religion," (p.
31) and holds with Newman "that theology is the queen of the sciences
and that religion is the most important of all subjects in the university."
(p. 121)
Dr. Kirk shares with the Louvain writers an awareness of the basic
dependence of liberty upon truth. He appreciates also the importance of
definitions and in his first sentence provides the best definition of academic
freedom he has found. It is "the principle designed to protect the teacher
from hazards that tend to prevent him from meeting his obligations in the
pursuit of truth." (p. 3) Perhaps a definition of freedom in general should
have been given too, since, as Burke wrote, " Of all the loose terms in the

BOOK REVIEWS

!il67

world, liberty is the most indefinite." But this is only an exploratory essay
in definition, not a comprehensive survey, and we cannot ask for too much.
Dr. Kirk traces the beginnings of academic freedom back to Plato's
Academy and to the medieval universities. He shows that these " rights "
are based on custom and moral prescription rather than on positive law.
In passing, he points out that those theorists who deny natural law must
in consistency deny academic freedom too.
Throughout the book Dr. Kirk crosses swords frequently with Robert
Hutchins and Sidney Hook. His first thrust is at their attempt to secularize
the origin and concept of academic freedom. He accuses them, among other
things, of bad history. "We ought not to endeavor to revise history
according to our latter-day notions of what things ought to have been, or
upon the theory that the past is simply a reflection of the present. The
medieval universities did indeed enjoy academic freedom, in a larger measure, than any academies before or since. But they enjoyed that freedom
because of their status as religious institutions, not in despite of it." (pp.
16-17) In America, as well as in Europe, the principal support of academic
freedom has been "the conviction, among scholars and teachers, that they
are Bearers of the Word-dedicated men whose first obligation is to Truth,
and that a Truth derived from apprehension of an order more than natural
or material." (p. 29)
Threats to academic freedom come from within the colleges and universities as well as from outside. Dr. Kirk dissects the doctrinaire secularists
and educational levellers, men like John Dewey, Alexander Meiklejohn, and
Sidney Hook, whose worship of Demos and dedication to democracy are
basically religious attitudes. " We all have our dogmas, deny them though
we wilL" (p. 48) Their secular dogmas of pragmatism and progress breed
an intolerance gravely dangerous to freedom. A case history, an account of
the dismissal of Dr. Frank Richardson by the University of Nevada in
1953, is presented in detail to illustrate the hostility to dissent among
educationists such as these.
There is far more freedom in private institutions than in public, Dr. Kirk
found, and bigotry is the basis of the charge of Dr. Hook that "there is no
academic freedom in Catholic colleges." (p. 43) In another camp too,
Dr. Kirk ' finds intolerance practiced while tolerance is preached. " As
among the pragmatists and progressivists, so among the conservatives and
scholastics of education there are men who talk a great deal concerning
academic freedom but fail to give reality to their words." (p. 74) He has
strong criticism here of Robert Hutchins for his role in the dismissal of
W. T. Couch as director of the University of Chicago Press in 1950 after
he published a book despite objections from the administration of the
University.

268

BOOK REVIEWS

In a chapter on " The Professor in Politics " Dr. Kirk has many sound
and sensible comments on current issues. He holds that " the community
of scholars " is not a law unto itself and that " limitations may be imposed
upon academic freedom for the sake of preserving academic freedom."
(p. 17) As regards investigations of subversion in education, he writes,
" There is no reason to suppose that the average professor is a better judge
of what affects the security of the United States than is the average legislator." (p. 142) "Just how dangerous the Communists in our colleges have
become is a matter for debate; but legislative bodies are neither tyrannical
nor hysterical in looking into the matter." (p. 46) Use of the Fifth Amendment by professors according to " principles of home-made constitutional
law " is severely criticized. On loyalty oaths he remarks, " Oath-taking
is anything but the mark of servility .... A man ought to feel honored,
in most circumstances, that his fellows ask him to take an oath. . . . I do
not see why any teacher should feel humiliated at being requested to
promise loyalty." (p. 149)
William Buckley's God and Man at Yale comes in for sharp criticism.
Dr. Kirk strikes at Buckley's most vulnerable point, his support of individualism. Perhaps he might have mentioned also the highly relevant
distinction Mr. Buckley emphasized between the larger freedom required
by the scholar in research and the more limited freedom of the teacher in
the classroom. But Mr. Buckley has already called attention to the oversight in his own review of Academic Freedom (The Freeman, vol. 5, no. 18,
July, 1955, p. 576).
In his final chapter the author suggests some practical methods of
promoting academic freedom among members of a profession more concerned, he says, with security than independence. Among improvements
of an institutional character, some administrative, others financial, he proposes that college and university executives be scholars first and administrators second. " The domination of a body of learned men by a corps of
administrative technicians is a ... standing threat to academic freedom."
(p. 167)
He adds his voice to the swelling chorus of men like Arthur Bestor,
Mortimer Smith, Albert Lynd, and Bernard Iddings Bell now demanding
reformation of the educational system on every level. The policies which
are turning colleges into degree-mills and " custodial institutions " do not
promote freedom, or education either. "What most colleges are doing
nowadays is simply what inferior high schools were doing thirty years
ago. . . . In our anxiety to give everyone a college degree, we are giving
no one an education." (p. 179)
Though he has generally side-stepped the traps set for the unwary by
the verbalizing of liberals and relativists, Dr. Kirk slips into a snare when

269

BOOK REVIEWS

he condemns " indoctrination " without explaining what it means (What
does it mean?) and without differentiating between desirable and undesirable forms, if there is such a distinction.
Though readable and often eloquent, the book suffers somewhat from its
overly professorial diction. Kinder editing might have rescued the author
from the occupational hazard of using words like " vaticinations," " energumen," and "caducity." On the purposes of education, the limits of academic freedom, the true meaning of democracy, Dr. Kirk is an outspoken
defender of traditional positions. He is especially effective in showing that
the real root of the danger to freedom lies in " a degradation of the democratic dogma." (p. 57) He exposes the Deweyites' misuse of" democracy"
as a " god-term," i.e., an expression " drained dry of any objective significance, but remaining an empty symbol intended to win unthinking applause," (p. 45) and points out many of their inconsistencies. For example,
Dr. Kirk, like many others, cannot understand " how certain professors who
are doctrinaire equalitarians at the same time deny the right of a democratic
government to make even the most limited inquiry of them." (p. 146)
Dr. Kirk writes that " democracy finds its best defenders in the men
who think there is something higher in the universe than pure democracy,
and academic freedom its most able champions in men who believe in just
authority." (p. 185) This helps to explain why this book is a notable
contribution to the cause of democracy and academic freedom. American
education needs more men like Russell Kirk.
DAVID

A. O'CoNNELL, 0. P.

Providence College
Providence, R. l.

The Self and the Dramas of History. By REINHOLD NIEBUHR.
Scribner's, 1955. Pp. fl55 with index. $3.75.

New York:

Is the "self" the creator or creature of history? If not the creator, can

it have any effective influence in the dramas of history? If not the creature,
how can it preserve its inviolability? Such, it seems, are the questions the
well-known Protestant theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, sets himself to answer
in this volume. Raised in his mind by Martin Buber's I and Thou, they
have played a subordinate part in the author's other works: here they are
faced in themselves and receive some excellent answers. Within welldefined limits, the "self," man, is both the creature and creator of history,
according to Niebuhr, and it is imperative that he be aware of this, especially in our time. " But more ultimately considered, this political
problem is merely a version of the more general problem of how man is to

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be aware of his status as both creator and creature in history. If he forgets
that he is a creature and imagines himself purely a creator, he will lack
reverence for the achievements of the past, which are beyond his competence, and for the mysterious providence under which an order has been
established which blesses his life. . . . On the other hand, if man does not
acknowledge his status as creator, his freedom over the historical flux, his
right and his duty to challenge the inherited traditions of the community,
his obligation to exercise discriminate judgment in rearranging or reconstructing any scheme of togetherness which has been faulty in providing
justice, he will merely become the victim of the past which accentuates its
vices when it is studiedly preserved into the present." (pp.
Niebuhr's work is divided into three main sections. The first section is
a careful study of the self, caught, as it were, in its characteristic activity
of conversing. "We may safely say that the human animal is the only
creature which talks to itself." (p. 6) Four chapters are devoted to
overhearing the dialogue of the self with itself. Four more chapters explore
the dialogues of the self with its neighbors. The author wisely distinguishes
between the dialogue of the self with other selves and with the various
communities to which it belongs. Lastly, there is a chapter of a rather_
tentative character on the dialogue of the self with God.
In the course of these chapters Niebuhr has many penetrating things
to say, e. g., about the incapacity of depth-psychology to explain the unity
of the self (c.
conscience (cc. 3-4)-although there seems to be a
one-sided emphasis on conscience as a source of anxiety, whereas it can
also insure peace-the conditions of communication with others (c. 7) , the
relation of the self with its communities (c. 8), and especially with history
(cc. 9-11). There is an excellent critique of both the cyclical and progressive theories of history.
Central to this section, and to the whole work, is the author's concept
of the self. He is right in insisting that the self must not be identified with
only a part. He is particulauly averse to the identification of the self with
" mind," as the rational faculty of understanding. Yet, the fact remains
that it is only the intellect and will of man that are capable of acting for
the whole self. Perhaps the distinction made by St. Augustine in Book XII
of De Trinitate between the superior and inferior reason might be of help
here. Niebuhr has the tendency to identify rational activity with the
activity of the inferior reason. But the reason of man imbued with eternal
principles (especially when aided by divine revelation) can transcend itself.
The citation from Charles Lindbergh (c. 6) enforces this notion; it might
well be cited as an example of the activities of the inferior and superior
reason: " It seems I'm made of three personalities, three elements, each ,
partly dependent and partly independent of the other. There is my body

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which knows that what it wants most in the world is sleep. There is my
mind constantly making decisions, that my body refuses to comply with.
And there is something else, which seems to become stronger rather than
weaker with fatigue, an element of spirit, a directive force which has taken
control of both mind and body. It seems to guard them as a wise father
guards his children ... when my body cries out that it must sleep the
third element replies that it may get what relaxation it can but that sleep
is not to be had. When my mind demands that my body stay awake it is
informed that alertness is too much to expect under these circumstances.
. . . But while it must not expect alertness on the body's part, it can be
confident that there will be no sleep." (p. QS) Lindbergh has made no
explicit reference here to the " superior reasons " why the spirit takes
command of the situation; yet they can be deduced from the whole story
of his adventure. They are the high-hearted motives that impelled him to
set out on it in the first place and they are not going to be thwarted by
the temporary demands of the body.
The second main section is an historical survey of the positions taken
within Western culture on the self and the dramas of history. Niebuhr
starts with a study of the two components of Western culture, Hebraic and
Hellenic. While, as a Protestant, he is obviously more sympathetic to the
Hebraic element, and, in fact, to the earlier elements in it, he admits the
importance of the Hellenic, but in a very limited way. " It is commonly
asserted that we have our religion, and possibly our ethics from the Hebraic
side, and our philosophy from the Hellenic side, of our heritage. This
generalization is, broadly speaking, correct, but it does not point accurately
to the peculiar virtues and defects of each part of our heritage. It does
not do justice to the fact that there is a yearning after the ultimate in the
Hellenic, as in the Hebraic culture; and that there are ethical and religious
concepts in both. But the Hellenic is defective in understanding the self
and its dramas because it tries to understand both rationally and ontologically. The Hebraic, on the other hand, is defective in analysing any
permanent structure in the flow of temporal events." (p. 77) Catholic
scholars would, I believe, agree with this statement of the characteristics
of the two components of our culture. However, Niebuhr has a tendency
to reduce the Christian religion to these two, without making sufficient
allowance for its own originality. " But this does not change the fact that
when it is true to itself, it is Hebraic rather than Hellenic." (p. 78) Rather
is it not true to say that Christianity brought the light that was needed
by both cultures and that the Christian Church has assimilated the truth
of both.
As evidence of this, take the author's statement opposing the immortality
of the soul and the resurrection of the body: " It is therefore Hebraic

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rather than Hellenic in its essence, even though in popular piety the Greek
idea of the immortality of the soul has usurped the Hebraic idea of the
'resurrection of the body.' This usurpation is significant because the idea
of the resurrection dearly implies the finiteness of historical man and the
wholeness of the person in his finiteness and freedom. That there should be
a transmutation of that person ' in the resurrection ' can clearly be held
only ' by faith.' On the other hand, it is supposedly more rational to believe
that an immortal soul flees from a mortal body upon death. It may seem a
more rational belief, but it rests upon a very dubious distinction between
an immortal ' mind ' and a mortal body. This distinction is the key to
the Greek understanding of the seH." (p. 78)
There are several things that can be noted about this paragraph. First
of all, we agree that Christianity is closer to Judaism in its essence, since
they are both revealed religions and one is the completion of the other.
Secondly, the notion of the resurrection of the body is a late development
in the Hebraic tradition; the first indication of it is in Daniel and the
Maccabees. A little later, in the Book of Wisdom, there is evidence for
the concept of the soul and the eternal reward that will be given to the
just. Christ Himself makes it quite clear that there is a principle in man
that is worth more than his body; or the whole visible universe for that
matter. "How is a man better for it, if he gains the whole world at the
cost of losing his own soul? For a man's soul, what price can be high
enough?" (Mt. 16:
When Christ said to the thief on the cross:
" this day thou shalt be with me in Paradise," what did He mean? Was it
a promise of an anticipated resurrection? Or a promise that his soul would
enjoy the companionship of Christ in the heavenly kingdom, there to await
the resurrection of the body on the last day? Lastly, we may concede that
the Greeks were unable to comprehend the part that matter played in the
destiny of man. They did believe that the body was an obstacle and that
the perfect state was a disembodied one. While they were wrong, we must
recognize that they had plenty of evidence for their position. Man does
experience, since original sin, the terrible tension between the spiritual and
material components of his unique being.
It is not surprising to find the author accusing the Catholic Church of
over-hellenizing the Christian message. It is to be expected that he will
object to the doctrine of Papal Supremacy. But the consequences he
deduces are unexpected. First of aU, " It made a religious experience of the
ultimate, which must remain a matter of personal commitment and repentance, into an article of faith which could be enjoined by political
authority." (p. 103) Now, while there are instances of peoples being forced
into the Christian church by their leaders, this has always been condemned
by the Church herself. It was only after the Reformation that the ex-

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273

pression, Cujus regia, illius religio, became an accepted rule for determining
the "free" acceptation of the Gospel. Again, the author states: "The
derivation of political power from the pretensions of sanctity was very
effective in a religious age ... ". (ibid.) This point is made several times;
but it is scarcely fair. H the Church had followed the Donatists, she
might be accused of acting on pretensions of sanctity. Thanks to that
aberration, it became clear very early that holiness was not the title to rule
the Church lay claim to, but the power of orders and jurisdiction communicated to her by Christ. Once again, it was the followers of Calvin who
lay claim to rule because of their "election."
One more of the author's strictures against the Catholic way of uniting
the Hebraic and Hellenic elements in our culture deserves to be mentioned.
"Ironically the empiricism on which Bacon insisted ... had to be asserted
against the authority of a Christian Aristotelianism, though the idea that
reality is not totally rational and that it is necessary to account for ' the
irrationality of the givenness of things ' is derived from the Biblical doctrine
of creation as contrasted with the classical idea of creation through the
rational forming of the formless matter or the unformed stuff. But this
idea of creation was corrupted so that a divine act becomes in each particular instance an explanation of an event, which obviates the necessity
of finding a particular cause for it." (p. 104) There may be some representative of Christian Aristotelianism that could be cited in support of the
above ideas, but he would not be a very good representative. Certainly
Aristotle and St. Thomas were mistakenly convinced that perfect necessity
reigned in the celestial spheres; they were correctly aware that the events
of nature and history that fell within their ken were not " totally rational."
They made every effort to elucidate wherein they were rational, and discussed the methods for handling the " irrational givenness of things," not
in the sense of " rationalizing" it, but of ever being aware of it and its
limits. In this, I am sure, St. Thomas is much more akin to Reinhold
Niebuhr than the latter realizes. This is why a Thomist will find himself in
agreement with many points made by the author in the final section of
his work.
The third section discusses the possible role of the self in the contemporary dramas of history, especially in the political field, the economic,
the international. The author has many fine insights in each of these fields;
we should like to give the reader an indication of their caliber by citing
some of his observations regarding the integration of the world community.
(c.
The veto power of the U.N. was founded primarily on the illusions of the past decade that the free world could establish community with
communism. "But the veto power has anotherjustification beside the one
furnished by this illusion. It is based upon a shrewd insight which the

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idealists who would abolish the veto do not understand. This insight is
that the world community is not sufficiently integrated to permit a majority
to be victorious over a minority in the councils of the nations. For in that
case the minority, having the power and the inclination, would merely
challenge the majority by the arbitrament of war."
Despite his warnings against relying too much on the power of prediction
in the field of history, Niebuhr attempts one himself that has hopeful
possibilities. He foresees the possibility that the Communist bloc " would
gradually lose its power to challenge the world. . . . Such a loss of historical dynamic is not unprecedented. Mohammedanism was once a
dynamic politico-religious movement. It has not ceased to exist, but it now
lacks the power to challenge any established unity." Lastly, I think we
can all ponder the very wise summing up of America's position in the world
community today. "We are in an unusual position, in fact, of having been
very reluctant to acknowledge both the power and the responsibilities we
now bear. This virtue is of course not a clear gain. For the absence of the
lust for power grants no immunity against pride in its possession. We may,
in fact, aggravate that pride by the pretension that we do not have it."
(Italics added) . The self has a valiant defender and the dramas of history
a keen observer in Reinhold Niebuhr.
JAMES M. EGAN, 0. P.
St. Mary's College

Notre Dame, Ind.

Liturgical Piety. By Loms BoUYER. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1955. Pp. fl94 with index. $4.75.
If it is not immediately evident why such a book such as Liturgical Piety
is reviewed here, one need only refer to Father Bouyer's own significant
statement: " ... any liturgical renewal is doomed to fail which is not, in
its very beginnings, soundly theological." (p. 49) Here is the crying need
in our contemporary liturgical movement-the lack of an adequately articulated theology of liturgy. In this first of Notre Dame's new series on
liturgical studies the author attempts to fill that lacuna in modern liturgical
writing. Unhappily, Liturgical Piety is not the answer to the problem.
The book presents a series of more or less integrated chapters, ranging
from historical criticism of various periods in liturgical history to historicodoctrinal ventures in the Christian Mystery. After judging Baroque Christianity as the villain responsible for a purely externalistic idea of liturgy,
Father Bouyer discusses the Romantic reaction to Baroque, then the
'?atristic liturgical ideal. From there he uncovers the Jewish Qehal, " the

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275

assembly of God," as the prototype of the Christian ecclesia and sums up
the unity and perfection of the liturgy as "the meeting of God's People
called together in convocation by God's Word through the apostolic
ministry, in order that the People, consciously united together, may hear
God's Word itself in Christ, may adhere to that Word by means of the
prayer and praise amid which the Word is proclaimed, and so seal by the
Eucharistic sacrifice the Covenant which is accomplished by that same
Word." (p. Q9) There follows a section on the modern and contemporary
liturgical movements in which the author evaluates the work of Dom
Gueranger -as well as that of Abbot Herwegen and Dom Casel of Maria
Laach. He shows a preference for the liturgical school of Laach and also
praises very highly the work accomplished by Dom Lambert Beaudouin,
an unpublicized monk of Mont Cesar, who led Belgium's liturgical revival
after the turn of the present century.
With liturgical history brought up to date in the first five chapters
Father Bouyer turns his attention to the " Catholic tradition concerning
the shape of the Eucharist." He then sympathetically presents Dom Odo
easel's theory of liturgy and mystery, while denying the positive link made
by Das Christliche Kultmysterium between the pagan mystery religions and
Christianity.
Under the title, " The Pauline Mystery and Its Proclamation: From the Synagogue Service to the Missa Catechumenorum," the
meaning and liturgical significance of "God's Word" is then discussed.
As final offering in this general Eucharistic section the reader finds an
examination of the relation between the Jewish and the Christian Eucharistic celebrations and a note on Epiclesis and Verba Consecrationis.
In chapters eleven, twelve, and thirteen Father Bouyer expounds and
expands the notion of the Christian Mystery in the Sacraments and Sacramentals before discussing the Mystery in the Liturgical Year. The Divine
Office is then treated as the Praise of the Mystery, followed by a comparison of" Liturgical" and" Non-liturgical" devotion, and the book ends with
a defense of an eschatological mentality among Christians. An appendix on
liturgical studies is added, together with an index of subjects and names.
There are, of course, many things in Liturgical Piety which can be unqualifiedly recommended to its readers. High among them is the emphasis
placed upon the communal significance of liturgy. Throughout the book
but especially in Chapter H, the historical observations of early Christian
practice are especially enlightening on this point. Also of genuine consequence is the denial of any opposition between so-called " subjective " and
"objective" piety, an echo of Our Holy Father in Mediator Dei. Father
Bouyer adds an important determination here by going beyond the mere
negation of any opposition to point up " the inherent and mutual relation
of the 'subjective' and 'objective' in piety." (p. 17) The

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of " archaism and archeologism " shows an intelligent appreciation of the
"exaggerated and senseless antiquarianism" censured by Mediator Dei,
as does also the author's constant rejection of liturgy as merely external
formalism. In stressing the truth that God's Love does not find goodness
in us but rather creates that goodness Father Bouyer accurately and
beautifully portrays the reality of the " divine agape." The Divine Office
is elegantly expressed as " The Praise of the Mystery " with the excellence
of Lauds and Vespers emphasized as the perfect morning and evening praise
of God.
Worth noting, also, is the close relationship established between
dom, virginity, and monasticism from an historical viewpoint, and in the
same context, the identification of Mary's lifelong fiat as a bloodless martyrdom. Finally, devotional practices are critically examined and brought into
the stream of liturgical awareness-a point of interest for anyone aware of
the danger of peripheral Christianity.
All these beautifully colored and nicely shaded pieces are parts of a
whole, however, and as all wholes, this one, too, has other parts. Unfortunately, the other parts of Liturgical Piety are occasionally colored not with
beauty but with somewhat untempered phrases and innuendo, such expressions as: "the sham scholarship ... the amateurish kind of scholarship of Dom Gueranger," (p. 13 and p. 65) "the highbrow intellectualism
of the great masters of the (Dominican) Order." (p. 245} They are
shaded, too, but only because the author has a peculiar ability to lose
himself at times in rather vague theologizing. H only Father Bouyer could
combine accurate theology with his penetrating historiography, his reader
would be far more receptive of his message.
At the heart of Liturgical Piety's conception of the Christian Mystery
is God's Word, but each time the subject of God's Word is discussed the
reader is forced to grope his way through ambiguity. (d. p. 29; pp. 105-10)
When using the phrase," God's Word," does the author mean the Word of
God as the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, that same Word as
Incarnate, or the message of revelation given to man by God? Is it too
unreasonable to expect that a book, purporting to be " soundly theological,"
would avoid such confusion in supposition? Further, as Father Bouyer
evolves his Word-puzzle, he becomes, unconsciously no doubt, slightly .
Nestorian in his expressions; as examples in point: " ... the Word,
incarnate in Jesus ... ," (p. 27) " ... when God sends His Word to us,
He is Himself present in Him Whom He sends," (p. 106) " ... as God
was present in Him Whom He sent, so the Word is and ever will be
present in those who have been sent in their turn," (p. 107) " ... the
Word of God in Christ .... " (p. 139)
A second vital position of the author, namely, that thanksgiving is a more

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basic element than sacrifice in the Mass (p. 131), seems difficult to reconcile with the doctrine of Mediator Dei. It is also curious in this context
to find Father Bouyer basing his ideas on the Eucharistic liturgy upon
those of a Swedish protestant, Ingve Brilioth. (pp. 75 ff.) It is regrettable
that the notion of communion, well-phrased as " a common share in common goods," (p. 76) was not developed further; for a true theology of
liturgy seems to demand centralization around the concept of God as
our supernatural Common Good.
The concept of " Mystery " is given a thorough consideration throughout
the book. When it is set forth finally as the entire depositum fidei which,
after all, it really is, although I do not believe Father Bouyer would agree
to have the Mystery expressed so laconically, there is a conspicuous absence
Such an oversight should be benignly
of the Holy Trinity. (cf. p.
interpreted if there were no other passages creating the same impression
that the author has forgotten the Trinity. In those instances where Christ
is pneumaticized the reader finds the same disregard for the central mystery
of Catholicism. Christ is "made life-giving Spirit." (cf. pp. 192, 198)
This rather strange conception appears even more incredible in the passage:
" . . . through the Christ Who has now Himself became Pneuma, life-giving
Spirit .... " (p. 88) Besides this lack of an adequate Trinitarian theology,
Father Bouyer in citing Dom Casel apparently wants to identify even
numerically Christ's grace with our own (cf. pp. 88, 158) -all this while
"using light of Mediator Dei." (p. 69)
There are other exceptions one might take to Liturgical Piety deserving
mention here. The clarification given by our Holy Father in Mediator Dei
to the traditional phrase, Legem credendi statuat lex supplicandi, seems to
have been overlooked. (cf. p. 30) The author's order of the liturgical year
which would place Advent, Christmas, and Epiphany at the end of the cycle
instead of at its beginning, though interesting, appears a bit curious when
compared with the ordering of Mediator Dei. Father Bouyer also makes a
rather unfair appraisal of the " Incarnational " position of many Catholic
writers when their aim of effecting a Christian society in the world is
assumed to be their "final end." And finally, the author's denial to the
science of theology of a voice in presenting the " theology of liturgy "
indicates a lack of appreciation for scientific theology, a characteristic overtone of other passages in the book.
It is always a difficult and unhappy task to criticize adversely a book
whose subject is close to one's heart. But surely not everything written
on liturgical piety merits an unqualified acceptance by those who are enthusiastic for liturgical piety. In fact, the reader who seeks to understand
liturgical piety, or in other words, seeks a theology of liturgy, must be
critical by reason of his purpose. In the present case, Father Bouyer's

BOOK REVIEWS

work, though certainly of genuine merit in many respects, too often betrays
the lack of solid theological foundation to fulfill the purpose.
KIERAN CoNLEY, 0. S. B.
St. Meinrad Archabbey
St. Meinrad, Ind.

Aquinas on Nature and Grace. Edited by A. W. FAIRWEATHER. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954. Pp. 386 with indexes. $5.00.
This book constitutes Volume XI in the Protestant-sponsored Library
of Christian Classics. In all, the series embraces twenty-six volumes, and
these, according to the General Editors' Preface, are designed to present
" a selection of the most indispensable Christian treatises written prior to
the end of the sixteenth century." The first thirteen volumes deal with the
writings of the Fathers, Doctors, and the Scholastics, with St. Augustine
given, numerically at least, the preference. The last thirteen volumes, with
the sole exception of a section given over to Erasmus, deal with the works
of the Reformers, especially Luther and Calvin.
In the present volume, the Edi.tor, the Reverend A. M. Fairweather, of
Edinburgh University, contributes an interesting Introduction, and then
sets himself to the selection and translation of those parts of the Summa
Theologiae which for him illustrate the distinction between the orders of
reason and revelation or " nature and grace." From the Prima Pars of the
Summa the Editor chooses the first four Questions, dealing with the nature
of theology, the mind's ability to prove the existence of God and His
attributes; and Questions
dealing with the prefatory elements to and
the nature of Predestination. From the Prima Secundae he singles out Question
on original sin, its essence, causes and effects. :From the Secunda
on Hope, toSecundae he selects Questions l-7, on Faith; Questions
gether with those sections of special interest to the Reformers, the Gift of
Fear, and the vices opposed to Hope, Despair and Presumption. The virtue
of Charity is considered rather summarily in Questions
and
The
volume contains an excellent Bibliography, together with a complete Index
to the Biblical citations and authors quoted by St. Thomas in the sections
here included.
For the most part, the translation is well done. Mr. Fairweather has
tried to render St. Thomas in crisp, simple style. The result reads much
better than the current stilted English translation in use by Catholic
scholars. The Scriptural quotations however are from the King James
version. Footnotes, where needed, explain possible misconceptions for nonThomists in the text.

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279

The brief Introduction is divided in terms of the passages chosen, explaining St. Thomas's thought in sympathetic fashion. Nevertheless, the
Editor continues to propagate some erroneous notions, which, because of the
amplitude of their allegations, can be hardly more than briefly answered
in the limits of this review. And these are in a sense traditional difficulties.
First, the intellectual cleavage between St. Augustine and St. Thomas is
declared to be fundamental and unbridgeable. Augustine from this point of
view never lost the Manichean notion of cosmic evil, which affects all nature
and especially human nature. For him, man indeed possesses the power
of reason, but because of the Fall it is incapable of activity in the face of
the weakness of the sinful will. Reason, even though in contact with the
evidence of the physical, external world, can tell us nothing of the existence
and nature of God. The only way to achieve this awareness is through the
" inward way " of spiritual, religious experience, and grace is the necessary
condition. " Reliance on the ontological argument to divine existence automatically follows." This argument through religious experience depends on
knowledge of divine entities entirely unrelated to sense experience.
Now it is true that St. Augustine did say some of these things, but they
must be read in the context of his entire thought. He was a courageous
thinker, striving to draw from his convictions their deepest content. As
his mind grew, he modified many of his earlier positions, and even denied
some, as is evident in his Retractationes. Philosophical speculation, far
from being despised by Augustine, reached a new peak through his efforts,
and, as he himself admits, much of his thought is tentative, more of an
essay at an answer than the answer itself. It is true, too, that he was, in
the words of St. Thomas, " imbued with the doctrines of the Platonists."
Nevertheless, he was too serious a thinker to go against common sense and
adopt uncritically the neo-Platonic notions. Consequently, St. Thomas
continues, when he "found in their writings anything consistent with the
faith, he adopted it; and whatever was contrary to the faith, he rejected."
Because of his preoccupation with the soul St. Augustine appears to
neglect the body. Yet both in his Contra Academicos and his De Trinitate
he vigorously defended the validity of sense kJ!owledge against the sceptics
of his day. For him, sense is not as important as the mind, since the
body is not as important as the soul. But, absolutely speaking, the body
and its knowledge are not to be despised. Moreover, Augustine felt he
could prove, and indeed had proved the existence of God. In De Libero
Arbitrio II, he advanced the argument from finality and the moral argument from the testimony of conscience. Yet granted that the ones he preferred rested on the nature of truth and goodness, even in these the
existence of the First Truth and the Supreme Good is achieved by causal
arguments. In regard to Mr. Fairweather's allegation that St. Augustine

9

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BOOK REVIEWS

never completely freed himself from the Manichean preoccupation with evil,
it suffices to quote the able scholar, Etienne Gilson: " An obvious metaphysical optimism pervades the whole doctrine of Augustine. He never
admitted that matter was evil, nor that the soul of man was united to the
body in· punishment for his sin. Having overcome the gnostic dualism of
the Manicheans, he never relapsed into it." (History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 78.)
In dealing with the Anselmian argument for God's existence, for which
the Editor appears to have a marked preference, he notes that: " most
commentators are agreed that the criticism offered (by St. Thomas) is not
valid against Anselm." (p. !i!5) The names of these commentators escape us.
Copleston states: "In the Schools (Anselm's argument) is generally rejected, though some individual thinkers have maintained its validity."
(History of Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 164) And the precise reason why it was
rejected was" its question-begging form." It assumes what must be proved.
It makes concept-existence identical with real-existence. That Anselm considered it a true argumentative proof is clear from his reply to Gaunilo's
criticism of it. However, since he appears to have held the position of the
ultra-realists in regard to universals, namely, that our higher ideas are in
some manner existent realities, he was prepared to maintain that the idea
of an infinitely perfect being necessarily has objective reality. His faith
got in the way of his reason. In this respect, Descartes understood the
implications of his own thinking more clearly than did St. Anselm.
The most serious objection to St. Thomas's rejection of the ontological
argument and his insistence on an a posteriori mode of proof, evidenced
in the Five Ways, lies in Mr. Fairweather's charge that, although St.
Thomas throws St. Anselm's proof out· the front door, he smuggles it in
the back door, and even makes it the basis of his own proofs. The Editor
especially finds this implied in the concluding words of the Five Ways:
" and this we call God." " The argument to a First Cause cannot therefore be said to have proved anything, unless it is supplemented by the
ontological argument, which depends on the mind's direct awareness."
(p. !il6) Now, strictly speaking, one of the prerequisites of any exchange
of views, of any advance in knowledge, is that we know what we are
talking about. St. Thomas considers that before we begin any discussion
as to the quid rei, we must have common intellectual ground, we must
agree, that is on the quid nominis, the meaning of the terms we are to use.
This is essential in any discussion of the Deity. We use the term God; it
has signification for us. The problem to be solved is that of the source of
this signification for us.
Man's knowledge of God is in a very real sense reflexive. Bearing the
divine impress in his intellectual soul, and urged by a deep seated, inarticu-

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281

late, natural drive to be conjoined. to his Source, man has his own created
condition ever more clearly brought home to him by the impact of his
daily life. He may be scarcely aware of the logical process involved in his
acknowledgment of a first transcendent cause of nature. It is a prephilosophic understanding of causality, and of the impossibility of an infinite
regress in causation. To the inquirer, nature, on every hand, seems to
re-echo the words of the Psalmist: " He made us, and not we ourselves."
Our acknowledgment of. this is the crystallization of many impressions, and
eventually it takes for us the form of an obvious fact. Because the truth
is forced upon us by experience, the only way we can reject it is by making
a barrier of our will at the instigation of our passions. For this reason
St. Paul castigates the pagans, then and now; they knew Him,
the constant impact on them of the things which He has made, and because
they repulsed Him " they are without excuse." (Rom. 1:
Yet, even if we were to aver that the intellectual acceptance of the Divine
existence rests upon a fundamental intuition, this intuition would have been
born of causal experience, an imperfect, prephilosophic notion, and it would
still have to be explained and justified by recourse to the scientific argumentation of St. Thomas. The technical apparatus he utilizes in the Five
Way rests upon this primary certitude which is gained by experience and
not by the mind's direct awareness. The argument of the Five Ways is
probative; it offers new grounds for certitude. It deepens the initial conviction, and gives it intellectual stature by enabling us to probe its content,
making the acceptance of God's existence an act worthy of a wise man. To
utilize the notion of intuition as a mystical, super-certitude which does
away with the necessity of reasoning, is to distort man's true place in the
hierarchy of being. The Editor's difficulties arising on this score can be
traced to his failure to grasp the fact that in the Summa, a summary of
Theology, St. Thomas necessarily presupposes what he has written elsewhere, both in a theological and a philosophical vein. The Summa does not
stand alone, and it can be understood only by a Christian who has had a
thorough grounding in Scholastic philosophy.
The Editor's observations on the section on Grace again lead one to
suspect that he has read St. Thomas materialiter. St. Thomas speaks of
the " infusion " of grace; this is a " magical " process. He is surprised to
find that St. Thomas teaches the gratuity of salvation and justification.
In this the Angelic Doctor is simply echoing the teaching of the Catholic
Church. Yet in his explanation of St. Thomas's view, he places him in the
camp of Luther: " It is recognized that justification is by faith and not of
works, and it is quite clear that Aquinas held no brief for the notion that
salvation could be merited by good works." (p. 80) Actually the tract on
Grace can ·be understood only in the light of the entire Prima Secundae,

BOOK REVIEWS

for it is the culmination of this part. Grace builds upon nature, human
nature, and perfects it. It is not only sanctifying but also healing. After
stating that man achieves happiness or loses it by his own human acts,
St. Thomas does not intend to deny it in this section. He quotes with
approval the words of St. Augustine: " God perfects in us by our cooperation that which He initiates by His operation. For He operates first to make
us will, and co-operates with those who will, to make them perfect."
(Q. Ill, a. 2) Certainly the initiation of the process is from God; this the
Scriptures clearly teach. But merit would be a mockery if man did not
enter intimately into the work of his own salvation. This is in keeping with
the constantly-repeated dictum of St. Thomas: "God acts in every being
according to the nature of that being, to move it necessarily, if it be of the
non-intellectual order; to move it freely, if it be an intelligent agent."
Salvation is wholly in the hands of God, and, marvelous mystery, it is
wholly, too, in the hands of man. For the action of grace does not destroy
man, in any phase of his specifically human life.
The discussion of Grace doses with this observation of the Editor: " The
whole treatise causes one to wonder what would have happened at the time
of the Reformation if Aquinas had been universally understood in the
Catholic Church, and if aH parties used the same terms with the same
meanings. The Reformation would still have been inevitable, but it might
have taken a different course." (p. 31)
Lest the readers of this volume should consider that they now understand the Summa, we should like to point out that they will have seen 31
Questions and 183 Articles out of the 631 Questions and some 3000 Articles
of which it is composed. H the Summa be compared to a banquet, the
sections here assembled may be likened to the hors d'reuvres, which are
intended to whet the taste for the main fare. It is sincerely to be hoped
that this brief sampling may draw our separated brethren to the masterwork itself, that they may appreciate one more of the treasures of the
Christian spirit, of which they were despoiled by the Reformers. What the
Editor has included is all to the good, but what he has omitted of the
Summa constitutes the very core of the Christian teaching, the most satisfying to mind and heart of all the endeavors which mortal man has made
to fathom " the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge
of God." (Rom. 11: 33)
RoBERT

Trinity College
Washington, D. C.

F. CoNWAY, 0. P.

BRIEF NOTICES
Aquinas. By F. C. CoPELSTON, S. J. Baltimore:
Pp. 268. $0.85. (paper).

Peguin Books, 1955.

The distinguished Jesuit has contributed this volume on Aquinas to the
Pelican Philosophy Series. It is a thought provoking volume intended
mainly for the general student of Philosophy but not without great interest
to the specialist. It contains an introduction of sixty-nine pages and subsequent chapters on" The World and Metaphysics"; "God and Creation";
" Man (I) Body and Soul "; Man (2) Morality and Society "; and
Thomism. Appended to these chapters are Biographical Notes and an
Index.
The method of approach is multiple. The author essays, and not without
success, the difficult task of giving a synthesis of the basic philosophical
principles of Thomism. In this he seems to be unnecessarily troubled on
the one hand by the fact that Aquinas wrote no ex professo course in
philosophy and on the other by the presumption that St. Thomas' philosophy is theological in its import.
Dr. Copleston is eminently an expert in the history and development of
philosophical thought and in this area this volume is very enlightening.
The historical antecedents of Thomism are presented in proper perspective
with emphasis on Aristotelianism. Likewise the contrasts between Thomism
and a variety of modern and contemporary philosophies are relevant and
suggestive. It seems, however, that the author, as in the question of Essentialism and Existentialism, is a victim of the popular confusion about the
Thomistic interpretation.
The reader will be especially intrigued by the author's analysis of the
nature and the survival of Thomistic metaphysics. Many Thomists will
find it difficult to accept the text's explanation of being as being and the
emphasis on the intuition of being.
Dr. Copleston gives a broadening survey of contemporary Thomism and
pays great and just tribute to Maritain and Gilson in this connection.
He might have elaborated more the excellence of American Thomists and
American Thomistic centers. Some of these, incidentally, will not be pleased
with the implications of the term " Thomistic Agnosticism," even though
he explains his use of it. Again many will not take without question the
author's pessimism about the possibility of reducing Thomistic philosophy
to certain fundamental propositions.
Despite these debatable points the work is valuable and helpful.

283

BRIEF NOTICES

In Librum de Causis Expositio. S. THOMAE AQUINATIS. Cura et studio
CEsLAI PERA, 0. P. Turin: Marietti, 1955. Pp.
with index.
In Aristotelis Libros Peri Hermeneias et Posteriorum Analyticorum Expositio. S. THOMAE AQUINATIS. Cura et studio RAYMUND! M. SPIAZZI,
0. P. Turin: Marietti, 1955. Pp. 457 with index.
In Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio. S. THOMAE AQUINATis.
Cura et studio P.M. MAGGIOLO, 0. P. Turin: Marietti, 1954. Pp. 675
with index.
In these latest releases, the publishing house of Marietti gives us two
more manual editions of the Leonine text, viz., St. Thomas' commentaries
on Aristotle's Physics and on parts of the Organon, and also a good working
text for St. Thomas' exposition of de Causis.
Though smallest in size, the edition of de Causis is by far the most interesting of these volumes. Lacking the definitive text being prepared by
the Leonine Commission, and recognizing that previous versions border on
the unintelligible, Fr. Pera and his associates have prepared an interim
edition that removes most of the obscurities and gives a readable presentation of St. Thomas' commentary. They also furnish good historical introductions through which the reader can acquaint himself with the evolution
of the text on which St. Thomas commented, and its doctrinal content as
compared with neo-Platonic and Arabian sources.
In accordance with the opinion common in his day, St. Thomas evidently
first viewed de Causis as a work of Aristotle, and cited it quite frequently
in the various Quaestiones Disputatae, although with some reservations on
the authority which should be accorded it. Critical study of the text
gradually convinced him of a twofold element in its composition, and this
led to the suspicion that the doctrine of the original had been tampered
with by Arabian commentators to align it with nco-Platonism. Thus he
undertook a detailed exposition of the book to lay bare its genuine teaching,
and particularly to refute the spurious elements being used by followers of
Averroes and Avicenna. Internal evidence would seem to indicate that
apart from the text of de Causis, which was a translation from the Arabic,
St. Thomas also had at hand a translation of Proclus' Elementatione Theologica recently prepared (probably at his behest) by William of Moerbecke.
Thus from a comparison of the texts he was able to conclude that de Causis
was excerpted from Proclus' work by some Arabian philosopher who interposed his own commentary. Recent scholarship identifies the sequence
more accurately, but there are still doubtful elements. Probably the best
account would have the original work, Proclus' Elementatione Theologica,

BRIEF NOTICES

285

in Greek, then put into a Syrian compendium under the name of Aristotle,
and finally commented upon by Alfarabi under the title de Essentia Bonitatis Absolutae, or de Expositione Bonitatis Purae, and otherwise known in
Middle Ages as the de Causis of Aristotle.
To facilitate the reader's understanding of this complex origin, the editors
have prefaced the work with a doctrinal exposition which makes explicit the
relationship between Proclus' text and the version of de Causis used by St.
Thomas. This is done by giving a schema of the propositions of the
Elementatione, and then delineating where these occur in de Causis. The
texts used for the two latter works are not definitive, but are the fruit of
modern critical scholarship and better than those heretofore available; these
are Steele's de Causis (Oxford, 1935) and Dodd's Elementatione (Oxford,
1933) . The text of St. Thomas' exposition itself is an interim edition prepared by the editors; it is given with critical apparatus relating it to the
variant readings of the first Venice edition, the Antwerp edition, and the
Parma edition.
After fifty-eight pages of historical and critical introduction, the exposition of St. Thomas ·is presented, proposition by proposition. With each
proposition, the editors have first prefixed a summary outline, then given
Steele's text of de Causis, followed this by their version of St. Thomas'
commentary, and finally appended a section entitled Observationel!. In the
latter section they furnished variant readings of the de Causis text, the
Greek and Latin versions of the relevant citations from the Elementatione,
and the doctrinal uses by St. Thomas of the particular proposition in his
other works. At the conclusion of the entire work there are five indices
completely referencing the content, the authorities mentioned or cited,
and the uses of de Causis.
Even this brief description should serve to indicate the amount of work
that went into the preparation of this small volume, its value in casting
light on the complex historical relationship between Thomistic and neoPlatonic thought, and its utility as a doctrinal text for study and reference.
The other two releases are more in line with the previous manual editions
of Marietti. The commentaries on the Organon, entitled In Aristotelis
Libros Peri Hermeneias et Posteriorum Analyticorum Expositio, give the
Leonine text of St. Thomas' exposition of these major logical works of Aristotle, the only ones on which he commented. These were done in the same
period as de Causis, towards the end of his life, the Peri Hermeneias never
being completed by the Angelic Doctor. The editors have furnished what
is available of Thomas' commentary (up to and including Book II, Lect. 2) ,
and have taken the rest from Cardinal
commentary on the same
work. The introduction furnishes a good evaluation of the modern import
of these works. A schematic outline is given for each lesson, together with

BRIEF NOTICES

a synopsis of the doctrine, and there are adequate notes indicating parallel
places and the opinions of other commentators.
The commentary on the Physics is likewise the Leonine text. Critical
apparatus and the Greek text of Aristotle have been omitted, but valuable
schematic outlines have been inserted before each lesson, and the Leonine
summary at the end of each lesson is retained. The preface and notes are
not so extensive as in previous volumes, possibly deliberately abbreviated
in order to limit the size of the work.
All three volumes are valuable additions to Thomistic source material.
The commentaries on Aristotle could have been improved for English
readers by insertion of the Bekker numbers, for without these numbers it
is impossible to have ready reference to Ross' English text of Aristotle.
Also, the footnote references are at times confusing, since the authors have
adopted a continuous paragraph enumeration throughout each work, and
then have neglected to use their own numbering in the cross-references.
The reader who is acquainted with the Leonine folio editions will have no
difficulty, however. And such slight limitations certainly will not interfere
with the enthusiastic reception of these volumes by American readers.

On Authority and Revelation. By SoREN KIERKEGAARD. Translated by
WALTER LowRIE. Princeton University Press, 1955. Pp.
with
index. $4.50.
Reason and Existenz. By KARL JASPERS. Translated by WILLIAM EARLE.
New York: Noonday Press, 1955. Pp. 157.
American philosophers have a peculiarly heavy debt to Walter Lowrie
and the Princeton University Press. To the one as translator, and to the
other as publisher, they owe almost all of the many Kierkegaard works
available here in English. The present book has never been published in
Denmark, except as part of the twenty volume Papers, and the only other
translation of it is in the German by Haecker. It is characteristic of the
very pure scholarship of Lowrie that he felt he ought to read the works of
the intrinsically insignificant Adler with whom this book deals before translating it. Fortunately that turned out to be impossible, since there are no
copies of Adler's works anywhere except Kierkegaard's copy now in the
Royal Library at Copenhagen. This book is not, as Lowrie notes, one of
the most important works of Kierkegaard; but it reveals so much of his
mind, proposes so modest a thesis, dusters his characteristic themes around
that thesis so closely, and repeats thesis and themes so often, as to be an
ideal introduction to him, if that is still needed.

BRIEF NOTICES

The thesis is that an apostle, a man with a divine revelation, one who
speaks with the authority of God Himself, is not to be confused, by himself
or by others, with any other category of man, e. g., with the genius. In
developing this thesis, the themes we expect are sounded: the attacks on
"Christendom" (never on Christianity), on Hegelianism, on the press;
the pleas, not for subjectivity, but for inwardness, for contemporaneity with
Christ, for "becoming a Christian." There are three titles to this book, and
three " Prefaces " by Kierkegaard. There is also a great deal of repetition,
sometimes within a single paragraph. But Kierkegaard is Kierkegaard, and
one does not quarrel with flaws that are merely " objective."
Jaspers' Reason and Existenz (the latter term refers to authentic human
existence, existence as the Existentialists understand that term-hence the
retained German spelling) is a series of five lectures first published in
Holland in 1935 and now translated into English for the first time. During
the intervening twenty years, American philosophers have become reasonably familiar with Jaspers' positions, thanks to translations of other, usually
later, works of his. Yet the present translation is invaluable for two
reasons: the masterful presentation of Jaspers' fundamental themes in
Earle's "Introduction," and Jaspers' penetrating presentation of the meaning of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in the first lecture.
Like each of the other existentialists, Jaspers gives his own interpretation
of the shared central intuition of existentialism. That central intuition is
phrased thus by Jaspers: "When in philosophizing the point is reached
where everything stops, where the self sees itself before nothingness or the
divinity, then it is important for the movement of thought, as far as it can,
not to sink through the vacuum into the absolutely groundless, but rather
to hold the thinker open for the encounter with Being which only becomes
perceptible to each when he comes upon himself, does not leave himself
out, and, so to speak, is given to himself." (p. 126) The danger "at this
point where everything has become empty, nothingness " is that the understanding will " substitute a particular real thing from the world of finite
knowledge " for " the authentic being of Transcendence " discoverable in
Existenz. (p. 126) The understanding should rather " hold itself free for
Transcendence, and preserve itself from the empty understanding and the
endless formalization of speech which no longer comprehends." (p. 126)
The particular schematization in terms of which Jaspers interprets this
existentialist intuition is the polarity of reason and Existenz. " There is
always a polarity of reason and Existenz, a polarity which is only an
abbreviated formula for a complex of interrelated modes of the Encompassing as that which we are and which being is for us." (p. 132)
The mid-twentieth century is a time of peculiarly sharp contrasts in
philosophy. There is, on the one hand, an intense preoccupation with

9l88

BRIEF NOTICES

method and meaning on the part of the analytic philosophers, the pragmatists and the phenomenologists. There is, on the other hand, the vast
sweep of Marxism and of existentialism with Olympian detachment, not to
say scorn, for minutiae which intrigue analysts. There are further sharp
conflicts in the fundamental attitudes of Marxists as against existentialists
(e. g., the objective as against the inward, the social as against the personal)
and even of existentialist as against existentialist. Yet if he is going to do
significant work in his own time, the Thomist must make his way through
each of these contemporary types of philosophy with scholarship, respect
and justice, but without losing his own centr@.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Brown, James. Subject and Object in Modern Theology. New York:
Macmillan, 1956. Pp. £14 with index. $3.75.
Brownson, Orestes. Selected Essays. Chicago: Regnery, 1956. Pp.
$.95, paper.
Burke, Edmund. Reflections on the Revolution in France. Chicago:
Regnery, 1956. Pp. 350, paper.
Carpenter, Frederic L. American Literature and the Dream. New York:
with index. $4.75.
Philosophical Library, 1956. Pp.
Clarkson, S. J., John F. & Others. (trs.) The Church Teaches. St. Louis:
Herder, 1955. Pp. 414 with index. $5.75.
Culler, A. Dwight. The Imperial Intellect. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1955. Pp. 340 with index. $5.00.
D'Arcy, S. J., Martin. Communism and Christianity. Baltimore: Penguin,
1956. Pp. 191. $.65, paper.
Drummond, S. J., William F. Social Justice. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1955. Pp.
142 with index. $2.00.
Enderbrock, Donald. The Parental Obligation to Care for the Religious
Education of Children Within the Home. Washington: The Catholic
with index. $3.00.
University of America Press, 1955. Pp.
Fleckenstien, M. M., Norbert J. A Critique of John Dewey's Theory of
Nature and the Knowledge of Reality in the Light of the Principles of
Thomism. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press,
1954. Pp. QOO with index. $2.25.
Frankel, Charles. The Case for Modern Man. New York: Harper, 1956.
Pp. 340 with index. $3.50.
Gallois, 0. S. B., Mother Genevieve. The Life of Little Saint Placid. New
York: Pantheon. $1.75.
Hallett, Paul H. What is Catholicity? Cleveland: World Pub., 1955. Pp.
254. $3.50.
Hauret, Charles. Beginnings. Dubuque: The Priory Press, 1955. Pp. 319
with index.
Henry, 0. P., A. M. (ed.) God and His Creation. Theology Library, Vol.
with index. $6.50.
II. Chicago: Fides, 1955. Pp.
Hordern, William. A Layman's Guide to Protestant Theology. New York:
Macmillan, 1955. Pp. 230 with index. $3.50.
Korner, Stephan. Conceptual Thinking. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1955. Pp. 309 with index. $5.50.

289

290

BOOKS RECEIVED

Kunzle, O.P., Pius. Das Verhaltnis der Seele zu lhren Potenzen. Freiburg:
Universitatsverlag, 1956. Pp. 269 with index. DM 15.
Leclercq, Jacques. (tr. by the Earl of Wicklow) The Religious Vocation.
New York: Kenedy, 1956. Pp. 185. $3.75.
Lumbreras, 0. P., Petrus. De Spe et Caritate. Madrid: Ediciones Studium
de Cultura. Pp. 256 with index. 75 ptas.
--. De Fine Ultimo Hominis. Madrid: Ediciones Studium de Cultura.
Pp. 129 with index. 55 ptas.
Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Ruler: A Modern Translation of ll Principe.
Chicago: Regnery, 1956. Pp. 155. $.85, paper.
Macquarrie, John. An Existentialist Theology. New York: Macmillan,
1955. Pp. 264 with index. $3.75.
Manheim, Ralph & Hull, R. F. C. (trs.) The Mysteries-Papers from the
Eranos Yearbooks. Bollingen Series XXX Vol. 2. New York: Pantheon, 1955. Pp. 482 with index. $5.00.
Merlan, Philip. From Platonism to Neoplatonism. The Hague: Nijho:ff,
1953. Pp. 226 with indexes. 12 guild.
Michener, N. W. Maritain on the Nature of Man in a Christian Democracy. Hull, Que.: Edition" L'Eclair," 1955. Pp. 162 with index. $4.25.
Mitchel, Walter & The Carisbrooke Dominicans. Christian Asceticism and
Modern Man. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. Pp. 273. $6.00.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. (tr. by Marianne Cowan) Beyond Good and Evil.
Chicago: Regnery, 1956. Pp. 254. $.95, paper.
O'Neil, Charles J. Imprudence in St. Thomas Aquinas. The Aquinas
Lecture, 1955. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1955. Pp.
176. $2.00.
Parrot, Andre. (tr. by Edwin Hudson) The Tower of Babel. New York:
Philosophical Library, 1955. Pp. 75 with index. $2.75.
--. The Flood and Noah's Ark. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955.
Pp. 76 with index. $2.75.
Prior, A. N. Formal Logic. New York: Oxford, 1955. Pp. 338 with index.
35s.
--. Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Convention. The Catholic Theological Society of America, 1955. The Secretary c/o The Sign, Union
City, N.J. Pp. 336. $3.00.
Rice, Philip Blair. On the .Knowledge of Good and Evil. New York:
Random House, 1955. Pp. 299 with index. $4.50.
Robert, A. & Tricot, A. (tr. by Edward P. Arbez, S. S. & Martin R. P.
McGuire) Guide to the Bible. Vol. II. New York:
Pp. 649
with index. $6.00.
Runes, Dagobert D. On the Nature of Man. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1956. Pp. 105. $3.00.

BOOKS RECEIVED

291

Strasse, S. Das Gemut. Utrecht: Uitgeverij Het Spectrum N. V., 1955.
Pp. 810 with indexes.
--. Studies in American Philosophy. Tulane Studies in Philosophy,
Vol. IV. New Orleans: Tulane University, 1955. Pp. 92. $2.00.
Van Noort, G. (tr. by John J. Castelot, S. S. & William R. Murphy, S. S.)
Dogmatic Theology, Vol. I.-The True Religion. Westminster: Newman, 1955. Pp. 882 with index. $6.00.
Von Hildebrand, Dietrich & Jourdain, Alice. True Morality and Its
Counterfeits. New York: McKay, 1955. Pp. 188. $8.00.
Voll, 0. P., Urban. (ed.) Proceedings of the First Annual Convention of
the Society of Catholic College Teachers of Sacred Doctrine, 1955.
The Secretary. Washington, D. C.: Dumbarton College. Pp. 116.
$8.00.
Wolfson, Harry A. The Philosophy of the Church Fathers. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1956. Pp. 668 with index. $10.00.
Wood, Ernest. Yoga Dictionary. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956.
Pp. 189. $8.75.