THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDIToRs:

THE DoMINICAN

Publishers:

VoL. XX

FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH

The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

JANUARY, 1957

No.1

THE TOTALITY OF SOCIETY: FROM JUSTICE
TO
UMAN society has become for the modern world a very
complex reality, far too intricate for the mind of any
one man to know thoroughly. Consequently, it is
rarely understood in its totality, in the basic structure that
makes up its unity. Some know this phase, some that. Yet,
the basic structure of society can be grasped since man can
reflect on his experience and therefore can know the means and
ends of his
in the city. In reality, there are many ways
to discover the basic totality of society, but perhaps the clearest
way open for such a comprehension is by means of an analysis
of the various aspects of law as it was set down and understood
by St. Thomas Aquinas. It would be also possible to begin
with the notion of justice, or of the common good, or of friendship; but these problems, as we shall see, are one; the starting
point alone is different. In this analysis, the most striking
1

JAMES V. SCHALL

thing to note about the treatment of St. Thomas is that, within
the context of the problem as he saw it, he implicitly, if not
actually, uses the political definitions and distinctions between
state and society and their functions which have become such
an important part of the thought of such excellent thinkers
as R. M. Maciver, Jacques Maritain, Ernest Barker, J. T.
Delos, and Johannes Messner. 1
In treating of law, Aquinas uses several ideas and terms
which shall serve as our basic outline. Here, however, let it be
clear that we do not wish to treat of the essence of law. This
writer accepts the Thomistic doctrine as the true one consistent
with rational psychology and ethics; that is, " an ordinance
of reason for the common good, made by him who has care
of the community, and promulgated." 2 Rather we wish to
inquire about law as it exists in a society, what it commands,
what it does, what effects it has.
The most fundamental truth about human law is that it
deals only with external, human acts. 3 These external acts
must be ordered in such wise that the temporal peace and tranquillity of society be maintained. This is accomplished by
regulating and prohibiting anything that could distu:rb the conditions of concord in society. St. Thomas calls this peaceful
order the end of human law. "For the end of human law is the
temporal tranquillity o£ the state, which end law effects by
directing external actions, as regards those evils which might
disturb the peaceful condition of the state." 4 Here it is necessary to inject some thoughts on terminology, for SL Thomas
when dealing with the essence of law maintains in several in1 Cf. R. M. Maciver,
The Modern State (London: Oxford University Press,
1946), esp. pp. l-22, and passi11;1,; Jacques Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1951), ch. 1; Ernest Barker, Principles of Social and
Political Theory (Oxford, 1952), pp. 42 ff.; J. T .. Delos, 0. P., La Societe lnternationale (Paris, 1929), ch. 1; J. Messner, Social Ethics (St. Louis: Herder, 1949),

bk. 3.
2 Summa Theol., I-II, q. 90, a. 4.
3 Ibid., q. 98, a. I; q. 91, a. 4.
• Ibid., q. 98, a. 1.

THE TOTALITY OF SOCIETY

stances that the end of law is the common good. 5 His idea
seems to be this, that the principle according to which these
external acts are regulated is the objective order of just relations without which a society cannot at all exist. Consequently,
when speaking of the end of the law as the common good, he
means the common good as a final cause by which particular
external acts can achieve their end. ". . . Actions are indeed
concerned with particular matters: but those particular matters
are referable to the common good, not as to a common genus
or species, but as to a common final cause, according as the
common good is said to be the common end." 6 St. Thomas
identifies this common good in other places as the intention
of the legislator, meaning that it is the end for which he acts. 7
However, the end of law in the sense of temporal tranquillity
refers to the effect actually achieved by the order of just relations in an existent society,
The first and minimal :requirement of society, then, is the
de facto order of men such that their actions with respect to
one another be at least just. Consequently, law will command
the acts of those virtues which have either directly or indirectly
an effect on the external order. Those acts which have a relation ad aliud in the external order are the acts of justice. 8 The
precepts of law, therefore, will embody the external acts of
justice. "For the precepts of every law prescribe acts of
virtue." 9 And virtues other than justice are embodied in law
only insofar as their acts have an effect externally so that they
can be considered as relating to justice. 10 If any given society
establish and keep established this minimal order, it will have
Ibid., q. 96, a. 4; q. 90, a. 2.
Ibid., 90, 2, ad 2.
7 ". • • Legislatores ad hoc maxime tendere
videntur, ut procu:rent utilitatem
communem." In Etk., #1666. "Now the intention of every lawgiver is directed
first and chie:lly to the common good." Summa Theol., I-II, q. 100, a. 8.
• Summa Theol., II-ll, q. 58, a. 2; et a. 5; Ill Sent., d. 83, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 3, ad :3;
etc.
• Summa Theol., I-ll, q. 107, a. l, ad 2.
10 Ibid., II-ll, q. 58, !i!, 8, ad 3; a. !J, ad 2.
5

6

4

JAMES V. SCHALL

the basic requirement for a healthy society. The organization
or institution directly concerned with this order is the state
or in St. Thomas' terminology, the prince. The state, therefore,
is that section of a society which has the external order of just
actions and relations as its direct end. " For a prince is ordained
to this purpose that he keep justice, and as a consequence
equality .... " 11 It is interesting at this point to compare this
doctrine of St. Thomas with some more recent thought on this
subject.
If we remember that law finds its end, as was seen above,
in the external tranquillity and peace and that the state looks
primarily to this order, we will find the best modern thinkers
giving strikingly similar definitions. For instance, Professor
Mac! ver defines the state as " an association which, acting
through law as promulgated by a government endowed to this
end with coercive power, maintains within a community territorially demarcated the universal external conditions of social
order." 12 Professor Barker notes that the " ... state exists for
the great but single, purpose of law." 18 What he means by
this is that the area of " legal action " is that of the state:
... legal action is a mode of treating things in general, things of
all sorts and descriptions, religious or moral or educational or economic or whatever they may be, so far as they can be brought under
a rule of law and thus made a matter of compulsory uniformity.
Law touches and treats all acts-so far as acts are amenable to its
touch and treatment.
But it is only external acts which are amenable to such treatment.
A rule of law is an order (ultimately issued ... by the community
itself, but immediately issued by some organ which declares and
enforces the sense of the community), to do, or to abstain from
doing, a defined and definite external act: an order enforced, in the
last resort, by another external act of physical coercion. 14
11 "Ad hoc enim princeps institutus
est ut custodiat justitiam, et per consequens
aequalitatem .... " In Eth., #1009.
12 Maciver, op. cit., p.
18 Barker, op. cit., p. 44.
14 Ibid., p. 45.

THE TOTALITY OF SOCIETY

5

The state, however, will be more or less perfect; it can progress
or regress in its duty, for there is a whole range and hierarchy
of just actions stretching from the prevention of murder and
theft to establishing the norms for a universal just price. " ...
The intention of the law is to make all men virtuous, but in
a certain order, namely, by first of all giving them precepts
about those things where the notion of duty is most manifest .
• • • " 15 All problems of the external order may fall within the
competency of the state in some sense at least, but it may very
well be that in any given body of men very few of the factors
that really constitute the good life will be realized.
This total order of just relations in society is called the common good of the multitude, and it will be the end for which
all civil laws are primarily intended. 16 Laws get their meaning
and proportion from this end. "All laws are posited according
as they are conformed to the political end .... " 17 This is not
to deny, of course, that states de facto seek different ends and
consequently establish different laws according to the way
different peoples set up for themselves different goals or understandings of the common good; that is, virtue, or wealth, or
world domination, or pleasure. However, as a matter of fact,
the only legitimate understanding of the common good will
be the one that aims ultimately as virtue.

*

*

*

*

*

Human law, we have held, deals with the precepts of the
virtue of justice. But just how is law related to justice in
reality? A man becomes just by performing just acts which
performance involves both the intellectual act of specification
and the actual volitional exercise of an act according to this
specification. 18 This means that a man must see the objective
justum (just, or better, right relation) in any of his acts. Now
Summa Theol., II-II, q. 122, a. 1, ad 1; cf. a. 2.
Cf. Ill Cont. Gent., c. 80; and Summa Theol., II-II, q. 47, a. 10, ad 2.
17 " Omnes enim leges ponuntur
secundum quod congruunt fini politicae. . . ."
In Eth., #1030.
18 Cf. Summa Theol., I-II, q. 51, a. 2; and In Eth., #250.
15

16

JAMES V. SCHALL

these objective justa (right :relations) are in part determined
by nature, that is by reason itself, and in part by positive
ordination of society. 19 These relations which man recognizes
to be de facto existing and operative are facts, and he knows
that he did not make these relations solely by himselt He
must, therefore, take them into consideration in his every action
so that the action will be proportioned to his end. By seeing
and acting according to these just relations he will be able to
become a just and good man.
Law is just the other side of this same reality. It looks to
what man should do, not from the side of the individual person
himself but from the side of the legislator who establishes these
justa (right :relations) and debita (things due) for the common
good and which man in his tmn discovers to be factors in his
every action. What a man can discover from reason, therefore,
namely that there are natural limits and guideposts for his
actions in reason; he, ultimately, comes to see as commands of
a lawgiver, either human as in the case of civil law or divine
as in the case of natural or revealed law. In other words, a
man can see from reason that there are ways for a human
being to act, and he can discover in large measure just .what
these ways are. He may not know why this is so, but he cannot
escape the fact that it is so.
However, when he progresses and discovers that these limits
were not just accidental or arbitrary (assuming for the moment
just human laws) and further, when he has come to see that
they are commands of a lawgiver who in the case of natural
law not only made the law but also the man himself; then he
sees fully that the moral law is not simply a restriction or
impediment, but a definite order to man's end, a road by which
he travels and not a pit into which he has fallen. 2° Consequently, law commands that act be done which man from his
point of view sees that it is in accord with his nature to perform,
19 Cf. In Eth., #1004 and 1019.
•• Cf. Dom Odon Lottin, 0. S. B., Principeo. de Morale (Lonvain:
I.'Abbaye du Mont cesar, 1947), Vol. I, p. 125.

Editions de

THE TOTALITY OF SOCIETY

7

The formal cause of the human act is the dictate of reason
which at the same time is the law as received in the subject
and the ratio juris that man sees must be maintained in the
act. The ratio juris, then, and the law are the same thing except
that the law as such refers to the lawgiver. 21
The order of strict just :relations, therefore,
the same
reality will include the multiplicity of just human actions required for the existence of society and the basic laws by which
these acts are enforced and ordered.
I answer that, since the precepts of the law are ordained to the
common good ... the precepts of law must needs be diversified
according to the various kinds of community: hence the Philosopher
(Polit. iv, 1) teaches that the laws which are made in a state which
is ruled by a king must be different from the laws of a state which
is mled by the people, or by a few powerful men in the state. Now
human law is ordained for one kind of community, and the divine
law for another kind. Because human law is ordained for the civil
community, implying mutual duties of man and his fellows: and
men are ordained to one another by outward acts, whereby men live
in communion with one another. This life in communion of man
with man pertains to justice, whose proper function consists in
directing the human community. Wherefore human law makes
precepts only about acts of justice; and if it commands acts of
other virtues, this is only insofar as .they assume the nature of
justice .... 22

The principle or end according to which these acts can be
denominated just and good will, then, be the objective common
good of the multitude. The effect of this order will be concord,
the external peace. 23 And concord is the result of the effective
establishment of special justice, i.e., commutative and distributive, among men. 24 This is why, incidently, the principle
of revolution is found precisely here, in the failure to establish
justice, for men do not long endure their unequal lot.
We might ask at this point about the actual content of the
·•• Summa Theol., II-II, q. 57, a. l, ad 2.
•• Ibid., I-II, q. 100, a. 2. Cf. also In Eth., #904-5.
•• Ibid., I-II, q. 98, a. 1.
•• Cf. ibid., I-II, q. 180, a. 2, ad 2; and q. 128, a. 5, w.l. 8.

8

JAMES V. SCHALL

order of justa, what exactly does it embrace? The general term
that St. Thomas and Aristotle use for this order is justum
politicum or simpliciter justum. 25 The term is used to designate
the order of justice in a perfect and self-sufficient community,
a community looking to the fulness of human life. Such a community, however, can only be found among free and equal men
so that the primary function of justice and law must always
be the establishment and protection of equality and freedomthat is, the end and purpose of the justice that the law effects.
Law is the dictate of reason by which the problems of what
is just and what is right are settled, as it were, outside the contingent and turbulent exchange of ordinary human intercourse;
it is the attempt to apply pure reason, reason abstract from
passion and ignorance to human affairs.c6
Justum politicum, however, is a complex notion. It is a complex genus referring to an the just actions in the community
no matter how these acts obtain their ratio of justice. Now
these actions are subject to various divisions according to the
various ways this same reality taken as a whole can be considered. Thus we can consider the complexus of actions accordthis
ing to how the rightness in each action is
case, some will proportional, some arithmetical, some will find
their rightness measured in other ways, as in the instances of
the potential parts of justice. Only the first two of these, however, the justa distributiva and justa commutativa, strictly
pertain to society as such. 27 But we can also consider these
self-same actions according to their cause or origin-then some
will be just because they are natmally reasonable (justa
naturalia), others will be just only because the particular community establishes them as such (justa legalia) .28 The legal
justa (right relations) are always determinations of the natural
precepts. 29 Therefore, some justa can be distributiva et naturIn Eth., #1004.
Ibid., and 1009.
27 Ibid., #1005.
That is as regulated by law in a society.
28 Ibid., #1018.
•• Ibid., #10!'l3.
25
25

THE TOTALITY OF SOCIETY

alia, others distributiva et legalia, etc., but always justa legalia
must be in accord with the natural justa.

*

*

*

*

*

In the Summa Theologiae, St. Thomas makes a division of
the Old Law which proves very valuable in this regard. He
divides the Old Law into moral, caeremonial, and judicial precepts according to the type of justa they contain. The moral
precepts are the reasonable principles and their strictly reasonable conclusions both of which necessarily flow from the nature
of man. 30 These moralia in turn can be divided according to
the difficulty with which they are known-some are known to
all (do good, avoid evil), some are known by most men ( the
ten commandments), some are known only by the wise (no
divorce), and some only to God. These precepts embrace man's
relations both with God and with other men. Those which deal
with man's relations to God are very general and must be
determined by society to give unity and coherence to the acts
of worship-such positive determinations are called
alia. These sorts of justa, then, will be positive in cause, either
by society in the natural order or by God Himself in the case
of revelation. The determinations which deal with man's relations with one another are called judicalia. 31
There are, however, four types of relationships that men can
have to one another: 1) prince to people, 2) citizens to one
another, 3) people as a whole to another people, and 4) the
domestic relationships. 32 These justa which deal with these
relationships insofar as they are determinations of natural principles or conclusions will be positive in character. This, then,
gives a fairly good conspectus of the content of the basic structure of just relationships in a society, what they must contain
and deal with, the sources from which they will be designated
just.
Were this the sole meaning of the order of just relationships,
Summa Theol., I-II, q. 100, a. l; q. 102, a. l, ad 3.
Ibid., q. 101, a. 1; q. 104, a. l.
•• Ibid., q. Hl4, a. 4.

80
81

10

JAMES V. SCHALL

however, it would produce a barren and rigid society indeed.
But the order of justa is, as it were, the foundation or basis of
something far richer and more significant. Thus when a legislator commands, he primarily and initially commands an external act of justice in some sense, and the order of justa means
exactly the external, objective order and unity of objectively
:right relationships existing because of the efficient actions of
men. This suffices to maintain and define the objective and
minimal order of justice. But the legislator-be he the legislator of the natural or the positive law-has in mind not simply
this act of a virtue, but he intends that virtue itself, the habit,
be implanted in the citizen. This does not mean, of course, that
every lawgiver in Washington or in London must recognize
this truth and have it in his mind when making a law. St.
Thomas is speaking about the nature of the law as such, what
it must do from its very nature and what the legislator must
do as a simple consequence of making the law. Consequently,
that about which the law is given is an act of virtue-which
is at the same time the rule of society and the act which is
capable of inducing a habit in the man.
The end, however, to which the precept is ordained is not
simply that the citizen perform the act, but that he acquire
the virtue.
The intention of the lawgiver is twofold. His aim, in the first
place, is to lead men to something by the precepts of the law: and
this is virtue. Secondly, his intention is brought to bear on the
matter itself of the precept: and this is something leading or disposing to virtue, viz., an act of virtue. For the end of the precept
and the matter of the precept are not the same: just as neither
in other things is the end the same as that which conduces to the
end. 33
Therefore, under the strict precept of the law will be the virtuous acts that a man does, whether he does them willingly or
not. The principle intent of the legal structure of society,
none the less, is that man do these acts virtuously, that Is,
•• Ibid., q. 100, .a. 9, ad

THE TOTALITY OF SOCIETY

n

because he sees their worth and not because they are commanded by coercion. This virtue, then, is what the legislator
intends, though, strictly speaking, the external order of society
will be maintained if the external commanded acts be performed
from whatever motive.
An act is said to be an act of virtue in two ways, first, from the
fact that a man does something virtuous; thus the act of justice is
to do what is right, and an act of fortitude is to do brave things:
and in this way law prescribes certain acts of virtue.-Secondly, an
act of virtue is when a man does a virtuous thing in a way in which
a virtuous man does it. Such an act always proceeds from virtue:
and it does not come under a precept of law, but is the end at which
every lawgiver aims. 34

In this sense, then, the realm of virtue is very definitely a
matter for society.
Thus the existence of habitual moral virtue in the citizens
is itself a common good, the common good of the many.
There is also a human good, not common to many (in the sense
of one common end), but belonging to an individual by himself,
yet useful not to one only, but to many: for instance those things
which all and each one must believe and observe, such as the articles
of faith, the divine worship, and the like.35

This common good of the many is something which each one
personally possesses, but whose operation and effect is shared
by many. This is also sometimes called the order of (habitual)
justice and virtue. 36 The effect and end of the whole order
of justa, therefore, will be the making of men good, and in this
way we can see the truth of St. Thomas' dictum: " ... He who
seeks the common good of the many as a direct consequence
must also seek his own good." 37 For it is in and through the
order of external just relationships that men can become good,
but their goodness is their own perfection.
•• Ibid., q. 96, a. 8, ad 2; cf. also q. 92, a. 1. Cf. also LoUin, op. cit., p. 141.
•• Ill Ccmt. Gent., c. 80.
•• Summa Theol., q. 100, a. 8.
•• Ibid., II-II, q. 47, a. 10, ad 2: " ... qui qnaerit bonum commooe mul.titudinis
ex COiml!eqUenti etil!m quaerit bonum suum. . .. "

12

JAMES V. SCHALL

There are, however, some further things to remember about
this order of society. First of all, there are activities going on
within society which cannot be strictly considered under the
equality and debt due in strict justice. These activities have
a correct measure, of course, but it is a relative one, or a least
one that cannot be legislated accurately. For instance, we
cannot actually give back to God, or to our native land, or to
our parents all that is due to them. We must do something
certainly, but the return will never be equal. Most of these
relationships, in addition to the natural obligation, have further
determinations of the divine or positive law by which certain
definite acts must be placed so that they do in this sense fall
within the pale of the legal and just structure of society, but
the acts as such never fully repay the obligation really due. 38
Some human activities cannot fall strictly under justice for
another reason, i. e., because the thing due is only due from a
certain "goodness of virtue," or better, from the exigencies
of virtuous intercourse. Here we must see that some things are
absolutely necessary for human life on the part of the individual, such as the virtue of truth in man's words and actions.
The thing due in this case is not something that can be measured
or determined by a specific law, except perhaps in the case
of civil contracts, yet society cannot exist without this honesty.
Such is also liberality and affability which, while not absolutely
necessary, nevertheless are the perfections of human communication without which society could not last-though again the
thing due must be left to individual determination. 39

*

*

*

*

*

None the less, we still have not penetrated to the depth of
the Thomistic social position if we content ourselves with the
making of the good man, or better, if we simply permit the
man to make himself good. So if men are good, they will have
reached their natural perfection in the sense that their lives
•• Ibid., q. 80, art. unic.
•• Ibid., q. 80, art. unic; and III Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a.

THE TOTALI'fY

OF SOCIETY

13

are well-ordered, naturally speaking, should death come, But
in societal philosophy we look to the true perfection that society
itself effects; for there is, as it were, something beyond virtue
and that is friendship. In accord with our intention of exposing
the full meaning of society from the basis of law, we discover
that the principal intention of the law, as opposed to the intention of the lawgiver, is friendship. This is, ultimately, the most
beautiful and most powerful gift that God has granted to men
-and so it is that when we pass beyond human society we
find that Aquinas conceives of charity as nothing more than
friendship with God.' 0 Surely there is nothing which is at the
same time more noble and more humbling than this.
As the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1: 5) the end of the commandment
is charity; since every law aims at establishing friendship, either
between man and man, or between man and God, wherefore the
whole Law is comprised in this one commandment, Thou shalt love
thy neighbor as thyself, as expressing the end of all commandments:
because love of one's neighbor includes love of God, when we love
our neighbor for God's sakeY
As Christians and as men, we cannot find a more truly profound
and gratifying truth than this fact that our whole social and
personal lives are ordained to friendship; for, even from our
own limited experience, it is clear that friendship is the perfection of human living; and, as we believe, of divine living as well.
Human law, therefore, in the mind of SL Thomas has as
its ultimate intention, the friendship of men one to another.
" ... The principal intention of human law is to create friendship
between man and man .... " 42 The relationship between the
establishment of the order of just relations, the common good
of the multitude, and the existence of human friendship is, then,
a causal one; for friendship presupposes justice even though it
passes beyond it in its own sphere. The purpose of justice is
primarily to establish equality, either proportional or arithSumma Theol., loc. cit., q. 23, a. 1; and Ill Sent., d. f.!'7, q. f.!, a. I.
Summa Theol., I-II, q. 99, a. l, ad 2.
42 Ibid., a. 2.

40

41

14

JAMES V. SCHALL

metical, among the members of society. When this. equality
is established the function of justice ends, but that of friendship
begins.
And the reason for this diversity is this, that friendship is a
certain union or society of friends, which cannot exist among those
who greatly differ, but it should exist among those who approach
equality. Wherefore, it belongs to friendship equally to employ the
equality already established; but it belongs to justice to reduce
unequal things to equal ones. When, however, equality exists, the
work of justice is complete. And thus equality is the last thing
achieved in justice, but it is the beginning in friendship. 43

Both justice and friendship, therefore, deal with the same
reality, that is human communication, so that where there is
justice there is a possibility of friendship. " ... Justice and
friendship are about the same things. But justice consists in
communication. For every sort of justice is to another (ad
alterum) . ... Therefore,
consists in communication." 44 And this must mean that the perfection of human
societal communication is not justice, but friendship.
This conclusion, therefore, shows that the philosophy of
friendship and love is at the root of society; that is, it is the
goal of any real human life in the city (the Aristotelian city,
of course, not the modern monstrosities). Further, St. Thomas
with Aristotle distinguishes the kinds of friendship according
to two principles of logical division: 1) according to the kind
of communication the friendship is based upon, and 2) according to the end of friendship, i.e., utility, pleasure, or virtue. 45
Of course, friendship based upon virtue is the highest of these,
but we should not fail to understand the importance of the
friendship of business relationships or of pleasure even. For
example, commercial society in itself is a horribly cold and
impersonal deity as anyone who has ever walked into say
J. C. Penny's to purchase a pair of gloves can well testify.
•• In Eth., #16S2.
Ibid., .#1658.
•• Summa Theol., ll-ll, q. 25, a. 6.

u

THE TOTALITY OF SOCIETY

15

The exchange of money for the gloves is the just communication
involved and of itself it is a very insignificant and heartless
thing.
But suppose the clerk in the store sees the customer coming
and greets him with a smile and shows a real interest in the
man about to make the purchase. The two have a pleasant
exchange over the purchase or about a million other things, the
customer then leaves and the two never see each other again.
Yet, that exchange was a fine thing, it made something otherwise distasteful, a pleasant and human thing-society as a
whole benefited as did both men because there was a real friendship based on utility surely, but still a friendship which lessened
the tensions among men. Incidently, this is also a good argument for private property, especially in the form of human
sized and owned stores where this sort of exchange is more
likely to happen. Also such friendly communications
form
the starting point for the more perfect type of
and
a more real union among the members of society. In a
order Christian charity gives depth and meaning to such friendship. This is not to deny, of course, that men are naturally
friendly with one another in some sense, but it is difficult that
this be more than passing, given human nature as it is since
the Fall. 46
Philosophically, this type of utilitarian friendship is called
by St. Thomas the " amicitia, quae aflabilitas dicitur," or
friendliness. It is a potential part of the virtue of justice, having
an object distinct from the other forms of justice, namely, the
external requirements of human order and communication.
And it behooves man to be maintained in a becoming order
towards other men as regards their mutual :relations with one
another, in point of both deeds and words, so that they behave
•• " Potest enim esse aliqna amicitia cujnslibet hominis ad omnem hominem in
quantum possrmt rommnnica:re aliqua lege .... " ln Eth., #1700. "Quia enim
omnes homines conveninnt in natura speciei, omnis homo est naturaliter omni
homini amicus." De Perf. Vitae Sp. (Parma; Vol. XV, p. 87), c. 14. Also Summ,a
Theol., II-II, q. H4, a. l, ad 2.

16

JAMES V. SCHALL

towards one another in a becoming manner. Hence the need of a
special virtue that maintains the becomingness of this order: and
this virtue is called friendlinessY

There is a very definite distinction, of course, between friendliness and the friendship following on virtue. St. Thomas IS
dear on this point, following the position of Aristotle:
The Philosopher speaks of a twofold friendship in his Ethics.
One consists chiefly in the affection whereby one man loves another
and may result from any virtue .... But he mentions another
friendliness, which consists merely in outward words or deeds; this
has not the perfect nature of friendship, but bears a certain likeness
thereto, insofar as a man behaves in a·becoming manner towards
those with whom he is in contact. 48

Thus friendliness is not the friendship of virtue which stands
at the very summit of societal life, but it has a very vital part
to play in our daily lives.

*

*

*

*

*

However, the perfection of all human communication is
friendship based on virtue. This perhaps sounds a bit unusual,
but the truth of the matter is clear. A man who is, theoretically,
perfectly good will be a very unhappy man without the friendship which follows upon virtue. For as we know, man's true
happiness is not simply the possession of a good number of
habits but in virtuous activity and indeed in continuous and
pleasing activity. "But to be happy consists in continuous life
and operation. . . . For he would not be virtuous who would
not delight in the operation of virtue." ·49 And the peculiar
and distinguishing thing about friendship is that it consists
in the communication of virtue; that is, of all the highest powers
of man: " The friendship which consists in the communication
of virtue .... " 50 Thus the phrase of God that it is not good
for men to live alone is not solely pertinent to the
Summa Theol., II-II, q. 114, a. 1.
Ibid., ad 1.
49 In Eth., #1894.
Cf. also the whole first book of St. Thomas' Commentary.
50 Ibid., #1798.
Cf. also #1946, Hi98, 1702, and 1724.
47

48

THE TOTALITY OF SOCIETY

17

relationship, but in its own way it is of the very nature of
every human relationship including the divine one:
For no one would choose to live by himself always, that is alone,
even after he had all other things, because man is naturally a
political animal and is born with a natural aptitude to live with
others. Therefore, since the happy man has those things which are
naturally good for man, it follows that he should have those with
whom he may live. It is dear, therefore, that it is better to live
with friends and virtuous men than with strangers and people of
any sort. 51
Consequently, from the communication of virtuous activity,
there is established and secured the society of friends. 52
The communication in true friendship, therefore, is principally the one wherein man lives most fully since he operates
according to the highest faculty, reason .
. . . He [Aristotle] manifests that in which living consists. And
he says that in all animals to live is commonly determined according
to their sense potency. In men, however, it is determined according
to the sense potency as to that which man has in common with
other animals, and according to intellectual power as to that which
is proper to himself. Every potency, however, is reduced to its
operation, as to its proper perfection. Wherefore that which is of
greatest importance consists in the operation, and not in the bare
potency. For act is prior to potency .... And from this it is dear
that to live for an animal or for a man principally consists in sensing
or in understanding. 53
Thus in one sense, esse (to live) for man in this life is intelligere
(to understand) .54 And friendship implies the fact that we
come closest to the being and life of a friend precisely when
we communicate thought and ideas; for being is what we
Ibid., #1891.
Ibid., #1899; also Ill Sent., d. 28, a. l.
53 In Eth., #1902 and 1908.
51

52

•• This statement needs to be understood, however, in the light of Summa Theol.,
I, q. 18, a. 2, ad 1: " ... Philosophus ibi accipit vivere pro operatione vitae.Vel dicendum est melius, quod sentire et intelligere, et huiusmodi, quandoque
sumitur pro quibusdam operationibus; quandoque autem pro ipso esse sic operantium." The reference is to In Eth., #1908.

18

JAMES V. SCHALL

naturally love. " This, however, is natural, namely, that each
one should love his own being." 55 If the being of a friend is
good; that is, if he is a good man, the highest manifestation of
his being, his thoughts and his loves, will be most delightful
to us.
Therefore, just as someone delights in his own being and life by
knowing himself, so to this fact that someone delight in a friend,
he must simply know his being. 56 ••• If his own being is of its very
nature a thing to be chosen by a happy man, insofar as it is
naturally good and delightful; since, then, the being and life of a
friend are in one's affections the next thing to one's own life, it
follows that a friend is also a thing to be chosen by a virtuous and
happy man. 57

We do need our friends, then, for our very highest endeavors.
So it is that the principal act of friendship is. what St. Thomas
calls " convivere " which consists in the communication of
human ideas and ideals, and hence is the primary human stimulus to contemplation as well as the basic source of the new and
vital thinking .required for the continuance and development
of a people.
Which indeed happens by living together according to the communication of words and the consideration of the mind. For in
this manner men are said properly to live together, namely, according to the life which is proper to man, and not simply according
as they eat together, as happens in the case of animals. 58

The joy and comm.radeship of friends is, then, found in their
very intercommunication with one another. " ... True friendship desires to see the friend and causes a rejoicing in much
conversation, towards which end friendship is principally ordained .... " 59 Thus there is a truth of the deepest and most
profound nature in the observation that: " The supreme and
•• In Eth., #1846.
""Ibid., #1909.
•• Ibid., #1911.
58 Ibid., #1910. Cf. also Ill Sent., d. '!1.7, q. 2, a. '!l.; and Summa Theol., I-II, q. 28,
a. 1, ad !i!.

•• Ill Sent., d. £7, q. !i!, a. l, ad 11.

THE TOTALITY OF SOCIETY

19

ultimate product of civilization ... is two or three persons talking together in a room." 6 ° Consequently, society is absolutely
dependent for its vitality and existence on its ability to effect
adequate friendships among its people. This is why M. Maritain, following a suggestion of Father Phelan, has well said that
friendship is society's "life-giving form!' 61 Of course, friendship cannot be commanded, yet it remains that it is the perfection and beauty of society. And so it is that St. Thomas
beautifully remarks about law: " ... all precepts of law, especially those ordered to the neighbor, seem to be ordained to this
end, that men love one another." 62
The love of friendship, moreover, is the love required by
society because it alone of its very nature makes a society, a
real relation between persons.
But friendship adds two things (to amor): of which one is a
certain society of the one loving and the one loved in love, namely,
in order that they might have mutual love for one another and
that they might know of their mutual love; the second is that they
work from choice and not from passion .... Thus it is dear that
friendship is the most perfect of those things which pertain to love,
for it includes all the foregoing (loves, that is, desire of presence,
dilectio, benevolence, beneficium, concord, amatio) . Wherefore in
this category we must place charity which is a certain friendship
of man to God through which man loves God and God man; and
thus there is effected a certain association of man to God. 63

Friendship extends to the persons involved so that the terms
of the relations are real persons and not accidents. This shows
the nature of the real communication must be a mutual sharing
of love and life among rational creatures.
Friendship, however, cannot pertain (directly) to the virtues
nor to any accidents for two reasons: Firstly, because friendship
brings it about that man wishes to be a friend and to have good
60 In George Herbert
Palmer, Self-Cultivation in English (Boston:
Mifflin Company, 1909), p. 6.
61 Maritain,
op. cit., p. 10.
•• Summa Theol., I-U, q. 105, a.
ad 1.
•• Ill Sent., d. '1.7, q.
a. l. Cf. Summa Theol., I-II!, q. '1.8, a. l.

Houghton

20

JAMES V. SCHALL

things. Accidents, however, do not have being (esse) per se, nor
goodness per se, but their being (esse) and well-being (bene esse)
belongs to them in substances. Wherefore, when we wish virtues
and accidents to be, this is referred to the substances which we wish
to be or to be well under those accidents .... Secondly, because
friendship consists in a certain society, according to which the
ones loved exchange love among themselves and do the same things
and converse together. Wherefore friendship cannot be except towards something which is also capable of acting. And because
activity (agere) does not belong to accidents, but to substances,
therefore it is not possible that friendship be any virtue or accident.64

The ultimate and most perfect meaning of society, then, will be
the acts of men who are friends with one another.
Even on the material side of life friendship is necessary that
society be perfected. We have already no_ted how business
friendships are most valuable. On the other hand, friendships
cause the material welfare of society to be better achieved,
for they automatically proVide for the immediate relief of
citizens in distress so that the humiliation and degradation that
may come from say public and therefore impersonal relief is
avoided by the love and aid of friends. 65 Thus, as a point of
investigation, is not the need and existence of so much public
aid in our society a good indication of a serious lack of real
friendship among our people? Perhaps people do not have
enough to help others, but that is the fruit of another problem,
the problem of well-divided property in a modern nation.
Aquinas reveals his recognition of these problems when he
remarks that the intention of one of the Old Testament Laws
was ". . . to accustom men to its precepts, so as to be ready
to come to one another's assistance ... ," and he then adds
" because this is a very great incentive to friendship." 66 A
society, therefore, should actually have laws which command
men to aid one another in their necessities both in order that
•• Ill Sent., d. 9!8, a. I.
•• Cf. In Eth., #1936-49!.
•• Summa Theol., I-II, q. 105, a. 9!, ad 4. Also read ibid., ad I.

THE TOTALITY OF SOCIETY

21

friendships may arise from such natural aid, and in order that
society will not have to burden itself with an excessive amount
of works which in this life would be much better provided for
by human beings in their own small circle of life.
SL Thomas appears to make a distinction between what
he calls political friendship and the true friendship of virtue.
The problem is the one of the number of friends a man can
have and of the basis or communication on which the friendship
is founded. Obviously, men are not friends in the strict sense
with everyone in a society. Sheer human limitation prevents
this, for they neither know all of them, nor know them well
enough to be true friends with them. However, citizens of a
given state can be said to be friends none the less. Insofar as
all the citizens of a state agree about the form of their
ment and the nature of the society and culture in which they
dwell; they can be called friends. The best examples of this
are when two men totally unknown to one another sit down
together on a train, both completely diverse in occupation,
religion, place of residence, etc. Yet, both find themselves
staunch democrats to the core, and as a result they find it
easy to be friends. The same thing happens when two men of
the same nation chance to meet on a foreign soil; they become
as long lost brothers. Such agreement throughout society St.
Thomas calls concord:
... political friendship, whether it be of citizens of one state towards
one another, or among diverse states, seems to be the same as
concord. And so also are men accustomed to speak; namely, that
cities, or agreeing citizens, have friendship with one another. For
political friendship is about useful things, and about those things
which belong to human life, about which we say there is concord. 67

And such concord or friendship is something
no society can long exist.
Thus all political friendship is a
of justice called friendliness or affability
67

In Eth., #1836. Cf. also especially #1924.

JAMES Vo SCHALL

treated above, that part, namely, which is concerned with the
particularly political relationships, whereas friendliness includes
all relationshipso Concord, when not used as a simple substitute
political friendship, is a term generally attributed to
the whole society or people, designating
effect of political
friendship among the people, though it could also refer to the
existence of friendliness in generaL 68 The term, peace, adds
additional note of personal internal peace and order to external
peace or concordo69

*

*

*

*

*

his understanding of the nature of
SL Thomas, then,
has shown his deep and penetrating grasp of the societal probat least, revealing
the necessary distinclem by
tions modern theorists have come to
societyo He clearly
society,
life of the city, is
shows, following Aristotle,
the area that depends on human friendship; while the state,
area of authority and justice in the city, aims at the external
of human
is the
out
these
orders are both kept distinct and ordered to one another It
will be profitable, therefore, to set down some sort
diagram
that we have found, comparing the Thomistic terms with
of
some more modern ones:
0

ST. THOMAS' TERMS

REALITY

l. The end of the Temporal

law.""

CoNCERNED

tranquillity

MoDERN

TERMs

and The sphere of the
peace.
state.
The common good of the multitude.
The area of strict justice.

modern

2. The effect of the To make men personally virtu- The sphere of society; that is,
law or the in- ous and goodo
all the individual societies-"' Cf. above ftn. 23.
•• Cf. all St. Thomas' treatise de Pace, Summa Theol., esp. II-II, q. 29, a. l.
70 It should be remembered
that St. Thomas does not restrict himself always
to one and the same term for one and the same reality. He of all authors must
be understood in context. The point here is that he does use these specific terms
for. the realities indicated, though he can and does use the same term for one of
the other realities. Cf. ftn. 7.

THE TOTALITY OF SOCIETY
ST. THoMAs' TERMS

REALITY CoNCERNED
tention of the The common good of the
legislator.
many.

MoDERN TERMS
familial, economic, educational, fraternal, athletic, religious, etc., within the order
maintained by the state. 71

8. The intention of The area of habits and virtues. The bond of perfection of
society. The perfect societal
The friendship of men.
the law.
relation among men.

Thus we can see somewhat better, it is hoped, the totality of
societal life as it is found in all its ramifications.
In concluding, however, it might be well to add a few notes
about the function of the Gospel of Christ within the societal
system. Natural justice and friendship, even of the highest
sort, are simply not sufficient to the race of men as they exist
under the present dispensation. Indeed, any intelligent understanding of ourselves and of our fellows will tell us that some·
thing needs to be added to human beings to overcome the
insufficiency of motivation and the lack of universal love which
we find at the root of all societal friction. Some will, of course,
say that this needs to be proved, but we wonder sometimes
whether such objectors can really be serious. There is the whole
course of history, and if that be not sufficient, there is that
spectacle of potential destruction known as the modern world. 72
If more proof be needed, it is difficult to know what it could
be. Here, however, there is no intention of treating the Christian dispensation from the aspect of eternal salvation and ultimate friendship with God, but rather we wish to treat of it
from its effect on society-although it would
vain to try
to divorce totally the two considerations.
The three major failings of natural society appear to be:
1) the inability to make men good, 2) the inability to extend
71 Remember that it is in these lesser societies that men actually live and act
and hence acquire their perfection. The state is ordered to the maintenance of
these societies intact and not to destroy them. Cf. Yves Simon, The Philosophy of
Democratic Government (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 36-71.
72 For a very illuminating discussion of the reality of man's Fall as it actually
is seen in history see Herbert Butterfield's Christianity and HU!tory (London:
G. Bell and Sons Ltd., 1949), 146 pp.

24

JAMES Vo SCHALL

effective love and friendship to all men, and 3) the inability
to order rightly men's interior intentions as well as his exterior
dispositions" All societal evils can ultimately be placed under
one or more of these points" Now the Christian law does not
cease at the external act, but it passes beyond to order correctly
man's interior acts and ideas, placing order at the very root
of the matter"
Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters, of which
he is competent to judge. But man is not competent to judge of
interior movements, that are hidden, but only of exterior acts which
appear: and yet for the perfection of virtue it is necessary for man
to conduct himself aright in both kinds of acts" Consequently,
human law could sufficiently curb and direct interior acts: and it
was necessary for this purpose that divine law should superveneo 73

Also since man is a social animal needing other men, this relationship is most adequately attained by a mutual and sincere
love which binds all men to one another" "" " . Since man by
nature is a social animal, he needs assistance from other men
in order to obtain his own end" Now this is most suitably done
if men love one another mutually. Hence the law of God,
which directs men to their last end commands us to love one
another." 74
Moreover, the divine law is meant as a help to the natural
law which latter also demands that men love one anothero 75
Further. The divine law is offered to man in aid of the natural
law" Now it is natural to all men to love one another: a proof of
which is that a man, by a kind of natural instinct, comes to the
assistance of anyone even unknown that is in need, for instance
by warning him, should he have taken the wrong road, by helping
him to rise, should he have fallen, and so forth: as though every
man were intimate and friendly with his fellow-man (VIII Ethic.,
1, 3; 1155a). Therefore, mutual love is prescribed to man by the
divine law. 76
73 Summa Theol., I-II, q. 91, a. 14.
"'III Cont. Gent., c. 117.
75 " Sed praecepta
moralis ex ipso dictamine naturalis rationis efficaciam habent
... quaedam sunt certissima, et adeo manifesta quod editione non indigent; sicut
mandata de dilectione Dei et proximi .... " Summa Theol., I-II, q. 100, a. lll.
•• Ill Cont. Gent., c. 117"

THE TOTALITY OF SOCIETY

We must also notice that the contemplation of divine things
presupposes peace and tranquillity which are destroyed by a
lack of love.
Again. In order to apply himself to divine things, man needs calm
and peace. Now mutual love, more than aught else, removes the
obstacles to peace. Seeing then that the divine law directs men
to apply themselves to divine things, we must conclude that this
same law leads men to love one another. 77

Thus the highest effect of order on earth is true peace out of
which springs true contemplation of God/ 8 It can be truly
said, therefore, that a society of Christian men will come the
closest to a perfect civil body on earth, since among them the
sources of friction and hatred are most completely recognized
and controlled, while the sources of human and divine love are
most effectively encouraged and in operation. 79
In this whole matter of friendship and its perfection in the
communication of thoughts and ideals, of dreams and hopes,
we very often, it seems, permit ourselves to be confused and
deceived. We live our lives as if these friendships were mere
incidents or side issues to the main problems of human existence.
Yet, the reality is quite otherwise. We live our lives for our
friendships; they are the goals, not the means. Sometimes I
think that the only modern man who really saw this truth as
SL Thomas did was G. K. Chesterton, who in this as in so
many things reflects conclusions which Aquinas propounded
in a more philosophical, though certainly not more interesting
way. Indeed, Chesterton's book on Charles Dickens is perhaps
the best societal analysis ever written. It may be permitted,
then, to use the concluding lines of this masterpiece for our
own summation of the perfection of friendship in human life:
The hour of absinthe is over. We shaH not be much further
troubled with the little artists who found Dickens too sane for
77

Ibid.

Cf. Summa Theol., q. fl9, aa. 1-4; also Ill Sent., d. fl7, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5.
Cf. Hilaire Be!loc, Essays of a Catholic (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1931), pp. 2!15 and 297.
78

79

26

JAMES V. SCHALL

their sorrows and too clean for their delights. But we have a long
way to travel before we get back to what Dickens meant: and the
passage is along a rambling English road, a twisting road such as
Mr. Pickwick travelled. But this at least is part of what he meant;
that comradeship and serious joy are not interludes in our travel;
but that rather our travels are interludes in comradeship and joy,
which through God shall endure for ever. The inn does not point
to the road; the road points to the inn. And all roads point at last
to an ultimate inn, where we shall meet Dickens and all his characters: and when we drink again it shall be from the great flagons
in the tavern at the end of the world. 80

And again we see that Christianity has not been wrong in
proclaiming that the friendships of men are the very means to
the friendship with our God-he who loveth his neighbor hath
fulfilled the law. So too, when Christ Our Lord wished to show
to His Apostles His deep love for them, He could only say to
them," No longer do I call you servants .... But I have called
you friends, because all things I have heard from My Father I
have made known to you." 81 And here we have it! God sharing
His ideas and ideals with men-this is indeed the highest and
most perfect act of friendship possible to us, His creatures.
JAMES

V. ScHALL, S. J.

Georgetown University,
Washington, D. C.

80 G. K. Chesterton,
Charles Dickens (New York: The Press of the Reader's
Club, 194fl), p. !'ll2.
81 John 15: 15. Cf. also St. Thomas'
beautiful passage in Summa Theol., I-II,
q. 65, a. 5.

A COMPARISON OF THE THOMISTIC AND
SCOTISTIC CONCEPTS OJ;-. HOPE

HE problem of pure love is a recurrent one in
various branches of philosophy. Whether it be the
conflict between the ecstatic
physical concept of
love,' as derived from the philosophy of Aristotle and Plato,
or the " egoism "' and " altruism " of psychologists, or the
interested and disinterested love of the theologian,
problem
everything
remains the same. Must man seek his own good
he loves, or can he love something purely for its own sake
without any reference to himself? Theologians take their stand
in the matter according to
answer to whether man
love God in the impossible situation that He were not man's
good. St. Thomas says man could not love even God under
these circumstances. 2 Scotus, on the
hand, because
the love of benevolence is an act distinct from the love of
concupiscence, maintains that even if God were not man's
good, man would be able to love Him according to the affection
of justice. 3
Because of the similarities in the nature of charity and of
hope, both being acts of the will tending toward the good, any
radical change in the concept of charity is naturally reflected in
1 Cf. Dom
Gregory Steyens, 0. S. B., "The Disinterested Love of God," The
Thomist, XVI (1953), 307-333, 497-541; also, Rousselot's The Problem of Love
in the Middle Ages.
2 Summa Theol., II-II, q. !26, a. 13, ad 3:
"Dato enim per impossibile quod Deus
non esset hominis bonum, non esset ei ratio diligendi." Cf. I, q. 60, a. 5, ad 2:
"Non enim esset in natura alicujus quod amaret Deum, nisi ex eo quod unumquodque dependet a bono quod est Deus."
8 Joannes
Duns Scotus, Liber Ill Sententiarum, Opem, Tomus VII, P. I. II,
Durand (Lyons, 1639), d. 27, q. un., !2: "Haec virtus (caritas) distincta est , ..
similiter a spe, quia actus eius non est eoncupiscere bonum amanti, inquantum est
commodum amantis, sed tendere in obiectum secundum se, etiamsi per impossibile
circumscriberetur ab eo commoditas eius ad amantem. Hanc virtutem perficientem
voluntatem inquantum habet affectionem justitiae, voco caritatem."

27

SISTER MARY MICHAEL GLENN

the concept of hope. In its widest acceptation, hope is the
desire of something, together with the expectation of obtaining
it. The conflict of ideas as to the nature of charity resulted in
a difference of opinion as to which of these elements actually
determines the nature of hope. This is the aspect of the problem
that will be studied here. Traditionally, that is, according to
the Scriptures, the Fathers and St. Thomas, the element of
confidence or expectation is regarded as the distinctive characteristic of the virtue of hope. Within the last three centuries,
however, there has been a growing trend toward the identification of hope with the element of concupiscible love, that is,
the desire of God, not for His own sake, but because in Him we
find our own happiness and perfection. Father DeLetter, in his
study on "Hope and Charity," 4 attributes this change of
concept to the combined teaching of the theologians, Duns
Scotus, an English Franciscan, who lived from 1270 to 1308,
and Francis Suarez, a Spanish Jesuit (1548-1617) .
This new concept of hope identifying it with interested love
made the virtue of hope the object of the attacks of many overzealous Christians who exaggerated the love of charity peculiar
to the gospel. Although the basic Protestant doctrine of justifying faith, i. e., joyous confidence in the forgiveness of sin, would
seem to be motivated by self-interest, both Luther and Calvin
very illogically championed the cause of purely disinterested
love and rejected as sinful whatever was done only through
consideration of eternal reward, or "amor concupiscentiae." 5
There is, however, an inner connection between Luther's doctrine of justification and his view of love. Just as justification
is the exclusive work of God and the will to purify oneself first
by good works before taking refuge in Him is unwarranted
presumption, so Christian love is not strictly concerned with
the love with which we love God, but essentially with the love
4 P. DeLetter,
S. J., "Hope and Charity in St. Thomas," The Thomist, XIII
(1950) ' 204-248, 325-352.
5 Joseph F. Delany, "Hope,"
The Catholic Encyclopedia, VII (1913), 466. Condemned by Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. Sl, DB 841: "Si quis dixerit, iustificatum
peccare, dum intuitu aeternae mercedis bene operatur: A. S."

THE THOMISTIC

AND SCOTISTIC

CONCEPTS

OF HOPE

29

with which God Himself loves. Luther will not refine and
sublimate self-love but demands its total annihilation. Love,
therefore, has no place in justification, which depends only on
faith. 6 But this theory of love is less the triumph of absolute
disinterestedness than the negation of our merits in order to
exalt the merit of Christ alone. And because merit and reward
are corresponding terms, the horror with which he regarded the
pursual of meritorious works reflected on the pursual of a
reward! Justification and salvation, therefore, could be the
object of faith alone and our confidence in obtaining them must
have the absolute certitude that faith requires. 8 Such a theory
leaves no place for the virtue of hope as we know it.
The fanatical rigorism of the Jansenists was the result of the
strict application of the principle of completely disinterested
love. Although in opposition to Protestantism, Jansenius permitted the seeking of heavenly beatitude, even considered as a
reward, he insisted on the absolute disinterestedness of its
motive considering it as a supreme means of glorifying God,
and demanded of every Christian a perpetual act
disintersted
9
charity. He reached this conclusion from his interpretation 10
of St. Augustine, who often uses the word " charity " in a very
wide sense. He considered the love of hope, therefore, as
morally bad and incapable of becoming good until transformed
by charity into the love of friendship. 11
• Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros (London: S. P. C. K., 1953), p. 681.
7 S. Harent,
"Esperance," Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, V (1924),
col. 658.
8 Nygren, op. cit., p. 681.
9 Harent,
op. cit., col. 658.
10 " The vision of God ought not to be loved by a Christian
from any other
species of love; in all the works of Augustine, as in Holy Scripture, there is not
a trace of the idea that one may desire his salvation in virtue of a love different
from that of true charity "-Augustinus, III De gratia Christi, 1. v, c. X, p. fl24
(Rouen, 1643), cited by Harent, DTC, col. 607.
11 Condemned
DB 1300: "Intentio, qua quis detestatur malum et prosequitur
bonum mere, ut coelestem obtineat gloriam, non est recta nee Deo placens ";
DB 1303: "Quisquis etiam aeternae mercedis intuitu licet beatitudinis operatur ";
DB 1407: "Totum deest peccatori, quando ei deest spes; et non est spes in Deo,
ubi non est amor Dei."

30

SISTER MARY MICHAEL GLENN

The Quietists, on the other hand, conceding the goodness of
hope, denied its necessity. Molinos claimed that hope is altogether incompatible with pure benevolent love.12 Quietism so
concentrated on the imperfection of hope as to forget that the
coming of a perfection removes only those imperfections which
are its opposites. Since the imperfection of hope's love is not
opposed to the perfection of charity's love/ 3 there is nothing to
prevent us from loving God for two different reasons-both
because He is good in Himself and because He is good for us. 14
Fenelon and the Semi-quietists limited the necessity of hope
to the beginning stages of the spiritual life and claimed it is
entirely foreign to the advanced spiritual state_15 The Quietists
conceived of an habitual state of love of God so disinterested
that fear of punishment and desire of reward no longer had any
part in iU 6 St. Paul spoke of a desire to be " anathema " for the
sake of his brethren. 17 St. Therese of Lisieux tells how reluctantly she recited the verse of the Divine Office, "I have
inclined my heart, 0 Lord, to do Thy justifications for the sake
of Thy rewards." 18
No doubt an act of pure love is possible, but an habitual
"'Delany, op. cit., p. 466. Condemned DB 1332: "In hoc sanctae indifferentiae
statu nolurnus arnplius salutern ut salutern propriarn, ut liberationern aeternam, ut
rnercedern nostrorum meritorum, ut nostrum interesse omnium maximum; sed earn
volurnus voluntate plena, ut gloriam et beneplacitum Dei; ut rem, quam ipse vult,
et quam nos vult velle propter ipsurn."
18 Summa Theol., I, q. 62, a. 7, ad 1; II-II, q. 18, a. 1, ad 3.
"Peter Lurnbreras, 0. P., "Hope the Self-Seeker," Cross and Crown (June
1951)' p. 183.
15 Delany, op. cit., p. 467. Condemned DB 1337: "In hoc statu anima arnittit
omnem spern sui proprii interesse; sed nunquam amittit in parte superiore, id est
in suis actibus directis et intimis, spern perfectam, quae est desideriurn disinteressantum promissionurn."
16 M. Molinos, Spiritual Guid!J, cited by Delany, p. 466. Condemned DB 1327:
" Datur habitualis status arnoris Dei, qui est caritas pura et sine ulla admixtione
rnotivi proprii interesse. Neque timor peonarurn, neque desiderium remunerationurn
habent arnplius in eo partern. Non arnatur arnplius Deus propter rneriturn, neque
propter perfectionem, neque propter felicitatern in eo arnando inveniendam."
17 Romans 9 :13.
18 St. Therese of Lisieux, An Autobiography, trans.
Rev. Thomas N. Taylor
(New York, 1926), p. 817.

THE THOMISTIC

AND SCOTISTIC

CONCEPTS

OF HOPE

Summa Theol., II-II, q. 180, a. 8, ad 2.
Ibid., I-II, q. 34, a. L
21 Lumbreras,
op. cit., p. 189.
22 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 27, a. 8, ad L
•• R. Garrigou-Lagrange, 0. P., De Virtutibus Theologicis (Turin, 1949), p. 54,0.

10
20

SISTER MARY MICHAEL GLENN

I.

THE EXPECTANT

HOPE OF

ST. THOMAS

As a pre}iminary observation it may be well to note that
this study does not involve two hopes, but two concepts of one
reality, Christian hope, the essential notes of which are found
in :revelation. Variety of concept often follows variety of
approach to a subject, but the differences that result may
be only apparent differences, having their root not in the subject
itself, but in the point of view from which it is seen. In order
to correctly evaluate St. Thomas' concept of hope, then, the
virtue must be studied in its relation to man's progress toward
his last end, for the principles of finality are the integrating
factor of St. Thomas' moral system. 24 The act of hope, as
described by St. Thomas, therefore, may not always be verified
by conscious observance of our own psychological states, because his approach is on the deeper ontological level where real
finality plays. With this in mind, we shall examine especially
the texts of St. Thomas that deal with the act of hope that is
common to hope both as a passion and as a virtue, as well as
the formal object and the motive that specify theological hope.
Hope exists on three different levels: the passion of hope,
which resides in the sensitive appetite, hope which follows
cognition and exists in the rational will, and the theological
virtue of hope which elevates the will to a new mode of acting.
Strictly speaking, hope in the second sense is not a virtue, for
the will does not need a. special virtue to give it confidence with
regard to some object within the natural capacity of the one
willing. 25 Moreover, since hope pertains to things not possessed
and human power can be frustrated, reliance on it cannot be
sufficiently firm to establish natural hope as a virtue. 26 This
study, which is primarily concerned with the theological virtue
of hope, will be limited, therefore, to the consideration of its
•• Ill Sent., d. £3, q. l, a. 1: "Prima autem mensura et regula omnium est
divina sapientia; unde bonitas et rectitndo sive virtus uniuscujusque consistit
secundum quod attingit ad hoc quod ex sapientia divina ordinatur."
26 Summa
Theol., II-II, q. 'i!'i!, a. l, ad l.
•• Ibid., I-II, q. 62, a. 3, ad 'i!.

THE THOMISTIC

AND SCOTISTIC

CONCEPTS

OF HOPE

33

supernatural aspect and to the act of the passion of hope
insofar as the activity of hope on this level forms the basis for
its supernatural activity and gives much valuable information
concerning its nature. " For although the virtue of hope has
a stability not found in the passion, it nevertheless remains
true that it is known only by its acts, the exterior characteristics
of which are stamped with the same frailty as those of natural
hope." 27
The Notion of Hope in General
Hope is a complex act that in some sense contains elements
of love, desire, courage and confidence. Each of these elements
is a response on the part of the subject to certain qualities that
the object hoped for must possess. Because the object of hope
appears as good, the subject tends toward it by love. This love
takes the special form of desire because the good is future, in
the sense that it is not yet possessed. Future is not to be
understood here in its :relation to time, for hope and confidence
can
for
object present or even
if
hoped-for event is not known with certainty. 28 For example, a
penitent sinner who has been forgiven but not yet absolved,
can still hope that
has been pardoned, because he does not
know with certainty that God has already forgiven him. So
the object of hope is loved because it is good, and desired
because it is absent.
The object that provokes the act of hope, however, cannot be
simply a good that is non-possessed, because hope rises in the
irascible appetite, while love and desire are acts of the concupiscible appetite. Love and desire must precede hope, for nothing
is hoped for which is not loved and desired, and thus the action
of the concupiscible appetite is always presupposed in that of
the irascible. 29 In order to arouse the irascible appetite, how27 Le Tilly,
0. P., L'Esperance, Saint Thomas D'Aquin, Somme Theologique
(Tournai, 1950), p. 6: "Et si Ia vertu donne a I' esperance une permanence que
ne comporte pas le sentiment, il reste cependant qu'elle ne se fait connaitre que
par ses actes, dont les caracteres exterieurs sont frappes de Ia meme infirmite que
ceux de !'esperance naturelle."
•• Summa Theol., I-II, q. 40, a. l, ad 2.
•• Ibid., I-II, q. 25, a. 1.

34

SISTER MARY MICHAEL GLENN

ever, the object must be not only good and non-possessed; its
pursuit must also have the quality of arduousness that calls
in the subject " a certain effort, and a certain raising of
the spirit to the realization of the arduous good." 30 Hope,
therefore, has a formal relation to difficulty, for at this point its
object takes on a character essentially different from that
the object of desire. Although difficulty, as such, can only
impede the action of hope as a tendency toward good, it is a
necessary quality of the good sought by the irascible appetite,
the nature of which is to overcome difficulties, as it is the nature
of
concupiscible to delight
good. And even for the
concupiscible appetite, the difficulty, if it is conquerable, adds
to the object a greater value, " un
gout," 31 because
the effort involved in attaining it.
Hope, by a certain " erectio animi," or courage, fortifies
soul against the discouragement that difficulty and uncertainty
tend to evoke. This response to the arduousness
its object is
the characteristic of hope that finds frequent
apt expression in the " Lift up your head! " of the Psalms. It differs from
the courage inherent in the moral virtue of fortitude, because
it is affective rather than effective. This follows from the
difference in their objects: hope tends toward the difficult
object to be attained, " arduum consequendum "; fortitude,
toward the difficult feat to be performed, "arduum faciendum." 32 That is, hope braces the soul against its own weakness
and despondency, rather than disposes it to attack exterior
obstacles. Then, too, the courage of hope strengthens the soul
in the pursuit of good, while that of fortitude assists in the
attack against eviL When hope is intense, this courage produces daring 33 which, though not a part of hope, is numbered
among its effects. 34 Thus the soul responds to a difficult good
that it does not possess by desire and courage.
30

Ibid.

31

Le Tilly, op. cit., p. 196.

82 De Potentia, q. 6, a. 9, ad 11:
"Ad undecimum dicendum quod objectum
spei est arduum consequendum, non autem arduum faciendum."
•• Summa Theol., I-II, q. 45, a. 3, ad 2.
•• Ibid., ad 8.

THE THOMISTIC

AND SCOTISTIC

CONCEPTS

OF HOPE

3.5

The act of
is not complete, however, unless the soul
sees the difficult good as possible of attainment and can thereby
toward it with confidence,
no man hopes for
is
impossible, no matter
much he may desire it. 35 The
formality of the act of hope, therefore, arises from the
possibility
its object, because a future difficult
that is
its opposite,
impossible of attainment, evokes not
despair.
when the object is seen as possible does it give
:rise to hope. 36 Possibility gives to
object its
goodness and draws the irascible appetite in pursuit; it constitutes
by explaining and limitarduous good formally as an
ing its other qualities,
makes it an
absolutely
irreducible to any other species. 37
This last quality of the object of hope
a
with that which makes it possible. Possibility supposes a force
capable
vanquishing the difficulties which oppose the possession of the object.
regard to the possibility
hope, a
two-fold movement can arise, depending on whether the
is possible to the
own power or
another's. In the first case, the movement is one simple hope
(spemre); in the second, it is better characterised as expectation (expectare) .38 This, however, is not a specific difference,
because the fact that the subject looks for help outside himself
contributes nothing new to the act, neither energy to the
tendency, nor certitude to the resulL Neither does it affect the
object. Expectation differs from simple hope only
an acci•• Ibid., q. 40, a. 1.
36 Ill
Sent., d. 26, q. £, a. 3, ad 1:

"Sed quia voluntas est possibilium et
impossibilium; neque aliquis operatur propter aliquid quod est impossibile adipisci,
quamvis illud appetat: ideo oportet quod voluntas ad hoc quod operari incipiat,
tendat in illud sicut in possibile et haec inclinatio voluntatis tendentis in bonum
aeternum quasi possibile sibi per gratiam, est actus spei."
37 Le Tilly, op. cit., p. 197:
"C'est cette possibilite qui donne a l'objet sa bonte
actuelle, et a Ia difficult!\ l'attrait special qui ebranle l'irascible vers la poursuite.
La possibilite, caractere dernier de !'objet, le constitue formellement comme objet,
explique et limite ses autres caracteres, et fait de lui un objet absolument irreductible
a toute autre espece."
38 Summa Theol., I-H, q. 40, a. 2, ad L

36

SISTER MARY MICHAEL

GLENN

in

dental determination
the subject, who keeps his eye not only
on the good he hopes for, but also on the person from whom he
looks for help. 39 The distinction is important, however, insofar
as it serves to constitute the theological virtue of hope as
expectant hope, because its object far exceeds the power of
the subject and makes him look outside himself for the assistance that will make the object possible.
The possibility of the object, moreover, enables one to hope
for it with confidence, which is so closely allied to hope that it
is often used interchangeably with it. " Such confidence we
have, through Christ towards God, not that we are sufficient to
think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency
is from God." 40 St. Thomas, however, assures us that confidence itself does not denote a virtue, but rather a certain mode
41
This
hope, i. e., hope strengthened by a strong
strong opinion may be based on our
another's promise,
(whence its name, "confides"), or it may denote the hope of
observed in ourhaving something because of what we
selves or in others.'"
St. Thomas is careful to specify that the object must
possible or probable, but not necessarily certain. 43 It is
quality of mere possibility which gives to the certitude of hope
its unique character. It is not the same as the absolute certiU1de
of faith/' which banishes doubt from the intellect, although
hope is certain because faith is certain. The certitude of hope
is rather an affective certitude which is opposed to mistrust or
hesitation.' 5 The contrast between
certitude
imparts and that derived from hope can be observed in the
39

Ibid.

H Cor. 3: 4-5.
41 Summa Theol., II-II, q.
a. 6, ad 3.
42 Ibid., a. 6.
•• Ibid., I-II, q. 67, a. 4, ad 3.
44 Council of Trent, sess. VI, cap. 13, DB 806:
"Nemo sibi certi aliquid absoluta
certitudine polliceatur, tametsi in Dei auxilio firmissimam spem collocare et reponere
omnes debent."
45 Ill Sent., d. :w, q. 2, a. 4:
"Q.uia certitudini fidei opponitur dubitatio; certitudini autem spei opponitur diffidentia vel haesitatio."
40

THE THOMISTIC

AND SCOTISTIC

CONCEPTS

OF HOPE

37

firmness by which a Catholic believes that if he dies in the
state of grace he will be saved, and hopes that he will die in
the state of grace. In other words, the certitude of hope
consists in the firmness and determination of the will to attain
salvation 46 and not in the determination of a judgment that he
will be saved. 47 This limitation is necessary in the certitude of
hope, not because there is any uncertainty or deficiency in
God's power or mercy, in which hope places its trust and on
which we can rely with absolute confidence, but
man is
able through his free will to place an obstacle to the reception
of grace. In other words, while the promise of the assistance of
grace is absolute, the promise of salvation is conditionaJ.48
The genus of hope, therefore, is established from the essential
qualities of the hoped-for object. 4 & If the object lacks any of
these special characteristics, it will evoke not hope, but some
related act. An evil object will call forth fear .•Joy follows if
the good is present to the subject. If the good is future, but
easy to attain, simple desire is the response of the soul. However, if the difficulty is so great as to be considered impossible
of attainment, it will be despaired of rather than hoped for.
The object of hope, whether it be considered as a passion or a
virtue, must be a future good, difficult, but possible to attain. 50

•• Harent, " Esperance," DTC
col. 613.
•• On this point the Council of Trent (Sess. VI) denied the Protestant contention that we can and must be altogether certain of our salvation. The horror
with which the initial Protestant position regarded the pursual of meritorious
works was reflected in their denial of any hope of reward. They therefore identified
faith and confidence (fiducia) and made hope rather an act of the intellect than
of the will. Since man could not hope for blessedness through good works, the
only thing left was to believe most firmly in the divine mercy and promises. Hope,
then, had to have the absolute certitude of faith. Joseph F. Delany, "Hope,"'
Catholic Encyclopedia (1913), VII, 466.
•• Summa Theol., II-II, q. 18, a. 4, ad 3.
•• Ibid., I-II, q. 54, a.
Garrigou-Lagrange, op. cit., p. 13: "Habitus et actus
specificantur et specie diversificantur ab objecto formali."
•• Ibid., q. 40, a. 1.

38

SISTER MARY MICHAEL GLENN

level,
the passion
under the influence of grace, tending
divine good, future because of the divine
arduous
because of the divine eminence and possible because of divine
help. 53
Light will be shed on the nature of hope as a virtue by
investigating its special role in the theological trio. St. Thomas
51
62

Ibid., q. 63, a. 3.
Ibid., q. 62, a. 3.

53 Joannis a S. Thoma, Tractatus de Spe, Cursus Theologicus (Paris, 1886), VII,
Q. 17, disp., IV, a. 1, n. 3.

THE THOMISTIC

AND SCOTISTIC

CONCEPTS

OF HOPE

89

bases the "deduction" of three distinct virtues on two
ciples: the faculty from which the acts of the virtue proceed
and the mode by which they adhere to the object. By the first
deduction, he considers the intellect ordained to supernatural
beatitude by faith; and the will, by hope and love. Faith gives
us knowledge of our supernatural goal, presenting it as both
good and possible of attainment, while by hope the will tends
toward the good seen as possible and becomes conformed to
it in the union of love. 54 Although in the natural order, the
very nature of the will suffices to direct it toward its end, both
as to the intention of the end and its conformity to it, 55 when
the will strives for its Supernatural End, no power of its nature
is adequate and the human appetite needs a virtue to enable
it both to tend toward this end and to be conformed to it. 56
Moreover, these two acts are distinct, since the soul can tend
to God by hope without being united to Him by charity, 57
for the act of hope is to expect future beatitude, whether from
merits already possessed or from merits to be acquired in the
future. This latter act, springing from unformed hope, is not
presumption, for by it one hopes without charity to obtain
salvation through charity, but not to obtain beatitude without
charity. 58
Elsewhere, St. Thomas gives the special function of the three
virtues, which each in its own way unite us to God, as:
Faith is necessary, which causes the end to- be known; and hope,
through which one is confident of attaining the last end, as something possible for the agent; and charity, which makes the end
appear as a good for him who strives after it, inasmuch as it causes
him to love it; otherwise he would never strive after it. 59
This manner of deduction makes us see the two sources from
which hope takes its origin. It has an origin of knowledge
•• Summa Theol., q. 62, a. 8.
•• Ibid., ad 1.
56 Ibid., ad 1 and 8.
•• Ibid., q. 65, a. 4.
58 Garrigou-Lagrange, op. cit., p. 7; also I-II, q. 62, a. 4, ad 2.
50 III Sent., d. 28, q. 1, a. 5.

40

SISTER MARY MICHAEL GLENN

derived from faith which makes us know the supernatural end
to which God has called us and the supernatural helps promised
to those who ask for them. In this sense, faith is the foundation
of hope 60 as it is the foundation of the whole process of justification. The judgment of possibility which faith supplies produces the confidence that is so characteristic of hope.
More important still, hope has origins of affection, by which
we desire God for ourselves, for good is never hoped for unless
it be desired and loved. Thus, knowing God by faith and desiring the good that comes through Him, the soul begins to love
God 61 and obey His commandments. The formal motive of
charity, God loved for his own sake, ennobles the imperfect
love of concupiscence by referring it to His greater glory and
purifying it of all disordered love of self. Then the soul by
hope relies upon Him more and more, abandoning itself to His
infinite goodness and mercy as a friend; 62 it thereby comes to
love Him more, not only because of the benefits He bestows or
promises, but also because He is good in Himself and better
than His gifts. Thus there is a mutual interaction between
hope and charity. 63 Hope by making the soul dependent on
God's goodness leads it to love Him for His own sake. Charity,
on the other hand, perfects hope, not only by making it meritorious, but also by freeing it from its imperfections by which
it confides too much in human help or remissly in divine.
The second " deduction " St. Thomas makes of the theological virtues brackets faith and hope according to their imperfect
Hebrews 11 : 1.
Summa Theol., I-II, q. 62, a. 4, ad 8.
•• Ibid., II-II, q. 17, a. 8, corpus et ad 2.
•• L'Abbe Combes in his penetrating analysis, "The Spirituality of St. Therese,"
(New York: Kenedy, p. 81) thus describes the reciprocal influence of the theological
virtues in the life of the young Carmelite, whose genius in spiritual science L'Abbe
Combes compares to the genius of St. Thomas in metaphysics and theology: "The
trial was continuous and in two phases: the first, in which her faith and her hope
defended, enlightened, purified, strengthened and preserved her love; the second,
the shorter, in which her love, now arrived at its perfection and unshakably centred
in its divine object, in its turn saves her faith and her hope. Thus did Therese
attain, ... to a condition analogous to her starting point, but now purified from
all mere sentiment and very nigh to heaven."
60

81

THE THOMISTIC

AND SCOTISTIC

CONCEPTS

OF HOPE

41

mode of adherence to the object and further highlights the
perfection of charity in this respect. Faith and hope adhere
to the object as to a principle from which certain things
accrue to us. Thus, faith makes us adhere to God as the source
of truth, and hope makes us adhere to Him as the source of
good. But by charity we adhere to God for His own sake. 64
By this deduction is seen the :real superiority of charity. This
deduction is very near the heart of the question whether hope
is a species belonging to the genus of concupiscible love or
whether it is a distinct genus in its own right, merely presupposing the desire of God. If St. Thomas
this article
meant to establish the mode of adherence to the object as the
absolute distinction between hope and charity, he would seem
to approve of the inclusion of hope
the genus of desire,
especially if one considers it in conjunction with article 8, where,
in giving the order of hope and charity according to their
generation, he elaborates upon the perfect love of charity and
the imperfect love to which hope pertains. This latter article,
connects hope
imperfect
purpose
establishing the superiority of charity and does not necessarily
identify the two. Article 6, however, does present the mode
of adherence to the object as a means of distinguishing hope
from charity, but St. Thomas clearly specifies that by hope the
subject adheres to the object in a mode peculiar to the virtue of
hope, that is, by reliance on divine assistance to attain the
good, and not merely by desire of that good. By hope we
tend to God as the source of perfect goodness, and so God is
the final cause of our hoping. But hope, which, even as a
virtue, regards a difficult object, is formally caused by trust
in divine assistance, which makes the object possible. This
deduction, therefore, does not mean that hope is the acquisition
of happiness o:r the desire for it; hope is rather reliance on
God's help to attain this beatitude. The union with God
produced by hope is the confidence we have in His helping
power, 65
•• Summa Theol., II-II, q. 17, a. 8.
65 Ibid., a. 6, ad 3.

42

SISTER MARY MICHAEL GLENN

It is this close connection of hope
concupiscible love
that occasioned the attacks of Protestants, Jansenists and
Quietists against this
In opposing these heresies, it was
necessary that the desire for a supernatural reward, whether
as hope or as concupiscible love, be established theologically
and canonically as both good and necessary, The love of concupiscence which pertains to hope is in no way inordinate since
it desires no created reward,
only the possession of God,
and this only as ordained to God. By it I desire God for
myself (mihi)
for
sake of God (propter Deurn) . It is,
nevertheless, distinct from charity, although it tends to God
as the last end and for God's sake. Charity loves God formally
for His own sake (formaliter pmpter Deum) ; concupiscence
loves God finally for His own sake (final iter propter Deum) .
In other words, by concupiscible love, I desire salvation only as
it i.s good for myself (ut bene sit solum mihi), while by charity,
I desire salvation not only as good for me, but also that God
may be glorified (non solus ut bonum nobis, sed ut bonum
Deo) .56 Thus the love
concupiscence for
has a twofold relation to charity: antecedently, by which we desire God
as our highest Good, and consequently, as a secondary act of
charity, by which we desire God in a perfect manner, referring
our salvation to Him as a friend, loved more than ourselves. 67
St. Thomas therefore says: " Hope presupposes a desire and is
intermediate between love and desire." 68
God is loved by the love of concupiscence for the sake of
something else (propter aliud) only in the sense in which the
less perfect subject loves the Supreme Good by which he is
perfected (propter finem ctti) . This is the sense of the words of
the Creed: "Qui propter nos homines descendit de coeliso"
The Incarnation is greater than our redemption and cannot be
ordained to it as a means subordinated to an end. But in
God's mercy, the Incarnation is ordained to our redemption as
an eminent cause to its effect and to us as a perfectible object
•• Garrigou-Lagrange,

•• Ibid., p. 386.
•• Ill Sent., d.

q.

op. cit., p. 3i'll.
a. 3, q. ll.

THE THOMISTIC

AND SCOTISTIC

CONCEPTS

OF HOPE

43

on which God bestows His favor. 69 Thus, the love of chaste
concupiscence seeks a reward, not so much as a reward, but, as
Billuart says, we wish to see God that we may glorify Him
eternally, being so disposed, that even if there were no beatitude
to be hoped for, we would love and serve Him none the less.70
These two " deductions " of the theological virtues show a
clearcut distinction between faith and hope, by reason of the
active principles from which they proceed. But the distinction
between hope and charity is not nearly so decisive, since both
are acts of the will tending toward the Infinite Good. The
ultimate specification of hope, therefore, can be arrived at only
by a consideration of its formal object. As a theological virtue
its object can be nothing less than God Himself, 71 which it has
in common with faith and charity. The specification of their
"habitus," therefore, will be determined not by a real difference
in their objects, but by the different aspects under which God,
the Supernatural End, is viewed and attained by them.' 2

The Specification of Hope
Hope as expectation has a two-fold object: the good for
which one hopes (quod) and the help by which that good
becomes possible (quo) .73 Hope is directed toward eternal
beatitude and all things necessary to attain it, e. g., grace, our
daily sustenance. But everything created that is sought, even
the beatific vision itself, is sought only that we might possess
God Himself. Therefore, God to be possessed is the principal
object, which arouses the movement of hope, orientates it and
•• Garrigou-Lagrange, op. cit., p.
" Sic Incamatio altior est redemptione
nostra, et ideo ad redemptionem non ordinatur, ut medium subordinatum, ad
finem cuius gratia, sed ex misericordia ad redemptionem ordinatur ut causa enimens
ad effectum et ad nos ut ad finem, cui Deus vult gratiam scil. ad finem perfectibilem,
non perfectivum."
•• Cited by Garrigou-Lagrange, op. cit., p. 471: "intendimus videre Deum, ut
eum in aeternum glorificemus, sic affectu, ut si nulla esset beatitudo speranda,
nihilominus diligeremus ilium atque illi serviremus."
71 Summa Theol., I-IT, q.
a. 1.
u Ibid., II-II, q. 17, a. 6, ad I.
78

Ibid., a. 7.

44

SISTER MARY MICHAEL GLENN

terminates iL It differs specifically from the object of charity,
which is God lovable in Himself, and from that of simple desire,
in that hope regards its object not merely as ou:r Supreme
Good that is infinitely desirable, but as the supreme arduous
good 74 which is impossible to any created power" Whatever
makes this arduous good possible, therefore, will provide the
ultimate formality of Christian hope. Divine assistance provides
the essential reason for hoping; it thereby animates, sustains,
directs, and therefore specifies, hope. 75 This intrinsic relation
of the tendency of hope to the means by which its object is
obtained can be observed in a sick man who desires health
because it is good, but hopes for it because he relies on effective
medicines or skillful doctors.
Just as faith does not have the aspect of a theological virtue
unless it adheres to the testimony of the First Truth, so hope,
also, takes its specification as a virtue from the fact that it
relies on the help of divine power to attain eternal life. It
would be a vicious act, and opposed to the virtue of hope, to
rely upon human
or one's own power
did
Pelagians) to attain the perfect good. Garrigou-Lagrange expresses
this principle in modern terms:
The formal object of faith is the Fh·st Truth, by reason of which
one gives assent to those things which are believed, and which constitute the materia! object of faith, so the formal object of hope is
the help of divine power and mercy, on account of which the motion
of hope tends toward the hoped-for goods which are its material
object. 76
74 Ill Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a. £, ad 2:
"Et secundum hoc spes est in homine
principium omnium operationum quae ad bonum arduum ordinantur, sicut caritas
omnium quae in bonum tendunt, et sicut fides omnium quae ad cognitionem
pertinent."
75 Summa
Theol., II-II, q. 17, a. l: "Inquantum igitur sperarnus aliquid ut
possibile nobis per divinum auxilium, spes nostra attingit ad ipsum Deum, cujus
auxilio innititur "; and a. 6: " Spes autem facit Deo adhaerere prout est nobis
principium perfectae bonitatis: inquantum scilicet per spem divino auxilio innitimur
ad beatitudinem obtinendam."
76 Garrigou-Lagrange,
op. cit., p. 328.

THE THOMISTIC

AND SCOTISTIC

CONCEPTS

OF HOPE

45

In
words, we hope to obtain God by the help of God, just
as by faith we believe in Him because of Him. 77
Hope, therefore, is characterised by our reliance on God's
help (Deus auxiliam), for we are not able to hope for beatitude
with firm confidence except from him who we know is able and
willing to give it. God alone can give eternal life and He must
be willing to do so, for He promised to give it to those who
believe in Christ 78 and He commands us to strive for it. For
as the Council of Trent says, rephrasing St. Augustine, " God
does not command the impossible, but commanding, urges us
to do what is possible to our own power, and to ask for what
is not, and then He helps that it may be possible." 79 In other
words, the only reason for hoping that we shall enjoy beatitude
is because God can give and wishes to give it to us.
Moreover God is the only source of this assistance that
brings us to beatitude, for the order of the agent must correspond to the order of the end, and only the supreme and supernatural agent can lead us to the ultimate supernatural end.
God's help may be transmitted to us by the sacred humanity
of the Savior and by Mary, the Dispensatrix of all grace, but
the formal motive of theological hope is God always willing to
help (Dieu toujours secourable), according to His goodness,
mercy, fidelity, and omnipotence. All these perfections in this
order are supposed by the formal motive: Deus auxilians. 80
However, since this help has the character of an efficient cause,S1
which implies the performance of an action and the bestowal of
active assistance, 82 it is to Divine Omnipotence especially that
we have :recourse in the very act of hope. All presupposed
things are not sufficient, however, if God is not positively
77

R. Bernard, 0. P., La Charite, Saint Thomas D'Aquin, Somme Theologique,

p. 315.
78 John 3: 16.
•• Cited by Council of Trent, DB 804.
80 R. Garrigou-lLagrange, 0. P., La Synthese
Th<Ymiste (Paris, 1!146), p. 518.
81 Summa Theol., II-II, q. 17, a. 4.
82 lLe Tilly, op. cit., p. 206: "c'est a la toute-puissance que nons avons recours,
car il s'agit a proprement parler d'une action a produire, d'un secours actif a nons
apporter."

46

SISTER MARY MICHAEL GLENN

so
efficacy of
far
motive
confidence, so that "hope
as
a certain good or end to be obtained
as a kind
help
EFFICACIOus in assisting." 86
This dual :regard of hope, tending towa:rd the good as well as
toward the necessary help that makes the good possible,
sions the di:ffe:renceof opinion as to what constitutes the virtue
of hope. On the one hand, with respect to its object quod,
is a movement of love, of search for the perfect good of the
88 R. Garrigou-Lagrange,
0. P., De Virtutibus Theologicis (Turin, 1949), p. 325:
" Sed formaliter innititur spes in Deo auxiliante, quia omnia praesnpposita non
sufficerent si Deus non esset insuper positive auxilians. Non snfficit quod Deus
possit dare anxilium, sed requiritm quod velit auxilium dare et hoc constat prout
impossibilia non jubet."
•• Ibid., p. 324.
86 Philippians
2: 13: " Dens est enim qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere
pro bona voluntate."
•• Summa Theol.,
q. 1!7, a. 6, ad 3.

THE THOMISTIC

AND SCOTISTIC

CONCEPTS

OF HOPE

47

subject. Perceiving by faith its connaturality with the object,
hope obeys the attraction of love and seeks possession of the
loved object. The arduousness of the object provokes the
irascible appetite and becomes a new incentive to love if the
helps are sufficient to triumph over the obstacles.
On the other hand, with respect to its motive, hope evokes
confidence. Overcoming the natural fear of a possible inadequacy between the means and the end in the face of a difficult
work, the subject abandons himself to the One Who will aid
confidence in
him and confides in His powerful help.
natural assistance always includes some uneasiness with regard
to the outcome, reliance on the help of Omnipotence appeases
the hesitation of the appetite and gives it firmness and the
absolute tranquillity of certitude. Hope is absolutely certain
because that which constitutes its formal motive, the divine
Omnipotence and Mercy, cannot fail. The possibility of defection, due to human freedom, produces in the subject a certain
uneasiness which is accidental to the act of -hope but essential
to the special action of the Holy Spirit in the gift of fear. 87 The
very consideration of his frailty, however, impels man to rely
still more firmly on Omnipotence, and thus he grows in hope.
It is clear, then, that hope, as St. Thomas sees it, although
related to love and desire, is characterised by a fum reliance on
the help of God to attain beatitude. For he says that, with the
knowledge of God's providence over human affairs, "stirrings
of hope arise in the soul of the believer that by God's help, he
may gain possession of the goods he naturally desires, once he
learns of them through faith." 88 Hope does not merely desire
the Good; it expects it through divine Mercy and relies on
Infinite Power to obtain it.
The anchor which for centuries has been the · traditional
symbol for the virtue of hope graphically portrays this very
•• Le Tilly,. op. cit., p.
" Cet element de crainte n'empeche pas Ia certitude
pratique, parce qu'accidental au mouvement d'esperance mais il determine une
certaine inquietude et laisse dans !'esperance une imperfection que vient combler
une motion speciale du Saint-Esprit dans l'exercice du don de crainte."
88 St. Thomas Aquinas, Compendium
of Theology, trans. Cyril Vollert, S.J.
(St. Louis, 1948) , p. 818.

48

SISTER MARY MICHAEL GLENN

quality of finn reliance. Just as the ship riding at anchor is
able to withstand the shifting forces of tide and current, so the
soul that hopes in God stands with unshaken confidence against
the obstacles from within and without that threaten its salvation. The anchor gives no indication of the urgent forward press
of desire; it speaks only of the subject's trust and dependence
on a force outside itself.
Father De Letter gives a well-documented exposition 89 to
prove that the pre-Thomistic concept of hope was essentially
the same as that of the Scriptures and of St. Thomas. Both
the Greek and Latin Fathers, as well as the great Scholastic
Doctors unite with St. Thomas in seeing hope as " trust in God,
reliance on Him from whom we expect the reward of the future
life ... trust (which) makes the soul stand up, gives it courage
and firmness." 90 They all agree that the essence of hope is, as
Peter Lombard says: "The certain expectation of future beatitude, coming from God's grace and from the merits that precede
either the hope itself (which in the order of nature comes after
charity), or the hoped for thing, that is, the eternal beatitude." 91

II.

THE CoNcUPISCIBLE

HoPE

oF ScoTus

The concept of concupiscible hope, as indicated by Scotus
and developed by Suarez, differs from the Thomistic concept
in three respects: the habitus from which it springs, the nature
of its object, and its motive. The act of hope, according to
the Scotistic-Suarezian concept, has no proper habitus; it is
merely the most difficult and noblest act of the habit of concupiscible love. The object of the habitus is good as such;
arduousness acts only as the mode or condition that distinguishes hope from other acts that flow from the same habitus.
The motive of hope is the Goodness of God toward us; the
Omnipotence of God moves only extrinsically to the act as a
•• P. De Letter, S. J., "Hope and Charity in St. Thomas," The Thomist, XIII
(1950),

•• Ibid., p.
91 Sententiarum Liber Ill, d.

THE THOMISTIC

AND SCO'l'ISTIC

CONCEPTS

OF HOPE

49

prerequisite conditiono This is the notion of hope that, due
to the influence of Suarez, has been most commonly accepted
by theologians until the :recent Thomistic revivaL 92
Only the barest outline of this concept is found in Scotus who
gives merely a statement of the principles that hope is desire,
that its object is good, and its motive the Goodness of God
toward uso He makes no attempt to reconcile these principles
with the traditional concept of hopeo Perhaps the explanation
of Scotus' stand can be found in the nature of the theories he
was :refutingo
At the time that Duns Scotus wrote his Commentary on the
Sentences in which he treats of hope, theologians were involved
in a controversy as to whether or not hope is a theological
virtue distinct both from faith and charityo This difficulty
arose from the consideration of the act of hope, which, according to accepted tradition, was " expectare," to expecL And
because expectation seems to include the certitude of the
intellect and the desire of the will, the conclusion was
that hope is a composite act :resulting from the habits of faith
and charityo The object
Scotus, then, was to refute
opinion of Ockham that hope is nothing more than, while
believing, to desire beatitudeo This he does
the first part
of the tract and then proceeds to develop the concept of hope
as he sees iL Three characteristic notes may be observed in his
approach to the subjecL
First of all, in spite
the fact that at the head of the tract
is inscribed the definition of Peter Lombard that hope is the
virtue "by which spiritual and eternal goods are hoped for,
that is, expected with confidence," 93 Scotus always uses
verb desiderare, to desire, instead of expectare, to expect, to
designate the act of hope. He evidently does this to avoid the
erroneous connotations attached to expectationo Lycheti, his
commentator, however, claims that it was the common opinion
92 De Letter, op. cit., p. 348.
•• Joannes Duns Scotus, In Liber Ill Sententiarum, Opera, Tornus VII, P. lo H
(Lyons, 1639), do !'l6o

50

SISTER MARY MICHAEL GLENN

of the Doctors, except for a few Thomists 94 that the act of
hope is " to desire." 95
Secondly, Scotus' concept of hope is derived not so much
from the consideration of the role that hope plays in the
achievement of man's last end, as from the observation of the
various psychological factors that enter into its act. For example, when he establishes hope as a virtue, he does so by
referring to the testimony of human experience as to the existence of such an act, 96 and then proving that the circumstances
of this act, of which all men are conscious, are the circumstances due a virtuous act. Suarez, too, arrives at the nature of
hope more by the experimental observation of psychological
facts than by consideration of the role it plays in man's orientation to his last end, as, for instance, when he proves that " to
expect" is nothing more than " to desire," "if we attend to the
common way of conceiving things." 97
Thirdly, the nature of hope is arrived at by the negative
process of determining what it is not and from these principles
determining what it is. This is seen most clearly in the passage
in which Scotus distinguishes hope from charity. All three
distinctions are made by asserting that charity is thus and so,
and since hope lacks these special characteristics, hope is not
charity. The deduction thus made gives very little positive
information as to what really constitutes hope.
Although Scotus himself does not explicitly use this line of
reasoning, both Harent 98 and 'Suarez 99 in explaining Scotus'
•• Ibid., p. 636.
Later, however, Suarez, in refuting the objection that to conceive hope
desire is against the common opinion (III, n. 12, "Nam videtur hoc esse contra
communem modum concipiendi de spe ") , does so, not by denying that hope is
commonly held to be expectation, but by claiming that " to expect " is the same
thing as " to desire."
•• Scotus, III, d. 9!6, n. 10: "experimur in nobis hunc actum, scilicet desiderare
bonum infinitum inesse nobis bonum."
•• Franciscus Suarez, De Triplici Virtute Theologica, Opera Omnia, Tomus XI
(Venice, 1749!), Sect. III, n. 19!.
98 Harent, DTC, col. 640.
•• Suarez, op. cit., n. 14; also n. 21: "Ex quo tandem concluditur esse spem:
quia virtus haec Theologalis est cum proxime versetur circa bonum, et increatum,
05

THE THOMISTIC

AND SCOTISTIC

CONCEPTS

OF HOPE

51

these factors, the identification of
position, justify the first
hope with desire, by a process based on the second and third
factors. They argue in this manner: We experience
ourselves
the desire to possess the infinite goodness that is God, the
author of grace, as He is revealed to us
faith. This is not an
act of the intellect and therefore, cannot be an act of faith.
This act tends
God that He might be good to
therefore cannot be charity,
tends to God as He is Good
in Himself. This desire, however, because it has
as its
object, must proceed from a theological virtue. If it is not the
act of hope, then there must be a
theological virtue,
conclusion
be opposed to revelation, for the
Apostle explicitly speaks of " these three." 100 Therefore, the
desire of God as our highest good is hope.
Having thus established the existence
the act of desire of
God, and having identified it
hope, Scotus proceeds to
examine its circumstances. Its object is good; therefore it is an
act
the wilL The fact
the
is an absent
and
therefore imperfectly possessed, merely qualifies the love as
desire. Because the good that is desired is a supernatural good,
God Himself, the act must proceed from a theological virtue.
But these circumstances are not sufficient to distinguish hope
from charity because they are common to both virtues.
Charity, too, is an act of the will tending toward the Infinite
Good, which in this life is imperfectly possessed and therefore
the object of desire.
The Specific Difference between Hope and Charity
In seeking the ultimate principle of distinction between hope
and charity, Scotus rejects the opinion of Henry of Ghent, who
based the difference in the distinction between the concupiscible and irascible powers of the will and claimed that charity
rose in the concupisdble part, the " potentia," and hope in the
et non est fides, neque charitas; ergo spes; nam secundum veram Theologiam, non
sunt nisi tres virtutes Theologicae."
100 I Cor. 18: 18.

52

SISTER MARY MICHAEL GLENN

irascible part, the "vis." Scotus does this, not because he
rejects absolutely such a distinction
the will, for he uses this
very distinction in specifying the moral virtues, but because
hope, thus considered as the force, vis, emanating from the
power, charity, would thereby be superior to charity, which
is contrary to revelation. " And the greatest of these is
charity." 101 Under this aspect, hope would be endowed with
all that charity has and possess in addition something that
charity does not have. Scotus, therefore, preferred to distinguish hope from charity by the two kinds of love operative
them. He feels that -the difference between these loves is so
great as to justify the infusion of two distinct virtues. These
two loves, the love of friendship and the love of concupiscence,
although materially the same and directed toward the same
object, Infinite Good, are distinct moral species, because of
their " finis cui," the one to whom the good is referred. The
love of friendship loves the good for its own sake; the love of
concupiscence loves the good as it is good
the subjecL
Scotus defends this referring oi the good to self as a virtuous
and commendable act because the act of willing terminates
immediately and primarily in the Infinite Good and only
secondarily desires that good for itself. Not all referring of
the will's object to another object is the love of use, which
would be repugnant with respect to God, the Highest Good. 102
God cannot be referred to self as to a proper and principal end,
for the end is always of greater importance than the means
ordained to it. But God can be loved and desired as our good
in the same way that " matter desires its fonn, not to make
itself the ultimate end of form, but to become enriched by
the form, a completed principle of being and operation/' 103
Thus, when God came down from heaven to redeem us, the
proximate end of His coming was the good of mankind, but
ultimately, both the Incarnation and man enriched by its
101

Ibid.

Scotus, III, d. 9<!6, n. H.
P. Lumbreras, 0. I'., "Hope the Self-Seeker," Cross and Crown (June 1951),
p. 180.
102

103

THE THOMISTIC

AND SCOTISTIC

CONCEPTS

OF HOPE

53

benefits are :referred to God. 104 Thus, there is no subordination
of God to self in the act of concupiscible love. God is loved
above all else as the Highest Good, but loved in order that
His Goodness may be in us. As Scotus puts it, " the will sees
the object as an abundant good from which flows the lesser
good which contributes to its own perfection." 105 The aspect
of the object is thus changed from an objective good, one that
is lovable in itself, to an advantageous one, which is lovable
for another. This change, however, takes place in the disposition of the subject and effects no real change in the formal
object. It does, however, put concupiscible love outside the
limits of charity, for to desire the Infinite Good as my good
is not an act of friendship. 106 Charity, as the supreme habitual
love, 107 cannot be the imperfect love of concupiscence.
Scotus places these two loves in the will according to its
twofold tendency, the" affection of justice" (affectio justitiae),
whose object is the objective good, and the "affection of
advantage" (affectio commodi), whose object is the useful
good. These terms he borrows from St. Anselm. 108 In the
rational appetite, the affectio commodi is the natural tendency
of the will to seek its own perfection; the ajfectio justitiae is a
free act of choice that follows cognition. The superiority of
the latter lies in its love for the inner values of other goods as
known in the light of reason, independent of, or even contrary
to, the good of the ego, while the former of necessity seeks the
good of the ego. On the supernatural level, the affectio commodi
is perfected by hope, by which it seeks its proper supernatural
104 I Cor. 3: 22-23:
" Omnia enim vestra sunt, vos autem Christi, Christus autem
Dei." Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, La Synthese Th01niste, p. 519.
105 Scotus, HI, d. 26, n. 14.
10 • Ibid., d. 27, n. 17:
" Desiderare bonum infinitum esse bonum meum, non
est amor amicitiae."
107 Scotus, II, dist. 6, q. 2:
"supremus amor habitualis."
108 St. Anselm, De Casu Diaboli, Cap. 4 and De Concordia, Cap. 9. "It (Charity)
arises from supreme affection of justice and honesty, the other (concupiscible love)
from the affection of benefit to self; i. e., the one from excellence of reason and
free will; the other, more from the inclination of nature." Quoted also by Suarez,
III, n. 5.

54

SJISTER MARY MICHAEL GLENN

109 Santa
Barbara Mission, The Virtues According to ihe Franciscan SchGol,
(Santa Barbara, 194'7), po 3!e,
110 Scotus, HI, d, !e7, no 18:
"Ita erunt distinctae virtutes non tan tum ex actibus,
qui sunt amare et desiderare, sed etiam ex susceptivis, quae sunt voluntas, secundum
il!am dup!icem affectionem affectao"
lH Ibid", no :go,
" 2 lbido, n, 21:
" Principium enim actus recti est principium omnium actmnm
1:eflexorum tendentium in finem ultimum sub eadem ratione,"
113 From this principle Suarez concludes that one can, by the virtue of charity,
hope for the neighbor's salvation, if the act proceed from the love of friendship,
The act of hope, therefore, can be elicited either by the virtue of hope or by the
virtue of ch:nity,. depending on the kind of love that motivates it: "efficadtel.'
proximo bonum supernaturale ut bonum ejus, ad gloriam Dei, et sperare illud eE

THE THOMISTIC

AND SCOTISTIC

CONCEPTS

OF HOPE

55

eodem motive; sed illud desiderium, sme dubio, est charitatis; ergo et haec spes
charitas erit." (Suarez, IV, n. Hl.)
114 Scotus, IH, d. 2'7, n. 21: "forte est necessarium
... amentem ordinate illud,
quod est ad finem, utendo simul frui fine." Perhaps in this principle can be found
the solution to the apparent incompatibility between hope and perfect contrition.
Since perfect contrition must be motivated by perfect love, it would seem at first
glance to exclude any self-seeking and consequently become impossible to make
concomitantly an act of hope with an act of perfect contrition. This is one of the
difficulties consequent upon the identification of hope with concupiscible love.
According to the traditional concept, hope is essentially reliance on God's Power,
and the desire of beatitude which precedes it can be motivated by the pure love
of charity. There is, therefore, no opposition between expectant hope and perfect
contrition. In fact, the closer we are united to God by charity, the more we
confide in His help, for we always hope for more from our friends. (GarrigouLagrange, De Virtutibus Theologicis, p. 317.)
115 Scotus, d.
n. 18,
116 Ibid., d. 26, n. 12.
117 Ibid., n. 13.
118 Modern theologians
use the term " relative Goodness of God " as the motive
of hope, to distinguish it from the motive of charity which they designate the
"absolute Goodness of God."

56

SISTER MARY MICHAEL GLENN

The Scotistic Concept of Charity
The effects of such a distinction will be even more profound
in the realm of charity than in hope. Scotus distinguishes a
three-fold aspect of the object of charity: God as the desirable
good of the lover invites to love; God as beatifying good of the
lover completes the act of love without specifying it; and God
Himself, considered under no relative aspect, in Whom the act
of charity terminates. 119 Desire and joy, therefore, are conditions that will always accompany the act of charity but,
according to the Scotistic formula, they do not enter into its
formal constitution. Such is not the case with St. Thomas who
holds that charity loves God for what He is, the last end, Who
alone deserves to be loved for His own sake, and the only
source of happiness. 120 In this respect, St. Thomas makes the
classic disinction between the end of charity and the nature of
charity in the loving subject. Although God's goodness to us
cannot be the end of charity, it is a necessary condition to
charity, since if God were not our good, there would
no
relation between His goodness and our faculty of loving, and
the love of God would be impossible to us. 121 Thus His goodness is a twofold cause of our love: first, as being the reason for
love; and secondly, as being a way to acquire love. 122 Therefore, by charity we desire the favors He bestows, the rewards
He promises, because by them we are disposed to advance in
His love. 123 For Scotus, moreover, the act of the love of friendship will be a distinct act from that of the love of concupiscence,
and any desire for union compatible with it is altruistic to the
point of excluding from the object of desire the enrichment
following on the acquisition of our supreme good. St. Thomas,
on the other hand, holds that the love of friendship, by one and
the same act, loves the friend and desires His company. WellScotus, III, d. 27, q. un., n. 7.
Summa Theol., I, q. 60, a. 5, ad 4; II-II, q. 23, a. 5.
121 Ibid., I. q. 60, a. 5, ad ll.
122 Ibid., II-II, q. 27, a. l, ad 3.
'""Ibid., a. 3.

119
120

THE THOMISTIC

AND SCOTISTIC

CONCEPTS

OF HOPE

57·

wishing alone does not constitute charity; return of love is
essential, and hence the wish for it cannot be excluded/ 24
Surrender to the friend is only one aspect of love; such an act
implies and virtually includes the possession of the beloved, 125
This difference of concept, in charity as in hope, seems to
derive from a difference of viewpoint in St, Thomas and Scotus,
As Father De Letter points out: 126 " Psychologically they
(love of desire and love of benevolence) may appear isolated,
but in reality (that is, ontologicaHy), union with God is both
supreme surrender and supreme enrichment!' While Scotus
regards the act of charity as a psychological phenomenon by
which the mind is able to concentrate on one of the aspects to
the exclusion of the other, St, Thomas sees the attainment of
the Last End by charity as a metaphysical reality necessarily
implying a double relation of the love of friendship to the
object and to the subject. 127 In this sense charity is prompted
by the divine goodness, lovable for itself and as it establishes
a friendly communication of divine life and eternal beatitude,
and the desire of sharing in this beatitude is subordinate, but
essential, to the act of charity/ 28 both in order that charity may
preserve its character of friendship and because unless a man
loves his own perfection, he does not rightly love God, 129
Whence charity is formally the love of benevolence and of
friendship, but concomitantly and consequently occasions a
certain love of concupiscence, by which we wish God for ourselves, referring the whole to God as a friend, 130 St, Thomas
refers to this concupiscible element in charity again when he
speaks of the twofold joy which arises in charity: i. e., joy in
the divine good considered in itself, and joy in the divine good
as participated by us, He says that the former proceeds chiefly
124
125

Ibid., a. 2.
Cf. Father De Letter's

treatment

of " Charity According to St. Thomas,"

op. cit.
Ibid., p. 231 ff.
Summa Theol., II-H, q. 27, a. 3.
128 Ibid., q. 26, a. 3, ad 3; also II-II, q. 28, ad 4.
129 Ibid., q. 25, a. 4, ad 3 and a. 7.
130 Garrigou-Lagrange,
op. cit., p. 386 fi.
126

127

58

SISTER MARY MICHAEL GLENN

from charity, while the latter proceeds from hope, as well as
from charity. 181
Scotus' teaching, therefore, differs from that of St. Thomas
as radically in charity as it does in hope.

III.

LATER DEVELOPMENT

OF THE Two CoNCEPTs IN THE

WoRKs OF JoHN OF ST. THoMAS AND SuAREZ

Having established the fundamental positions of St. Thomas
and Scotus with regard to the virtue of hope, we can arrive at
a better understanding of the two concepts by an examination
of the works of two later theologians, John of St. Thomas and
Francisco Suarez, who developed the respective principles of
St. Thomas and Scotus in their treatment of hope. The juxtaposition is valid in spite of the fact that both claim to be
interpreting St. Thomas, because the Suarezian concept of hope
emerges as full development of the concupiscible love outlined
by Scotus, 182 while John of St. Thomas finds in the text of St.
Thomas only the expectant hope described by the Master of
the Sentences. The comparison is interesting, moreover, in
showing how the same text is used to support two such
discordant ideas.
The interpretation of three controversial texts serve to illustrate the main points of difference between the ScotisticSuarezian concept and the traditional concept as defended by
John of St. Thomas. The fundamental difference is found in
their stand on the relation of hope to concupiscible love, which
St. Thomas indicates by saying, " Hope pertains to imperfect
love." 133 The other texts are cited in support of the two quite
different ideas as to what consitutes hope formally. These
sentences-" Hope makes us tend to God as to a good to be
obtained finally, and as to a helper strong to assist," m and
"Now the good which a man hopes to obtain has the aspect of

a

Summa Theol., II-II, q. 28, a. 1, ad S.
Suarez cites Scotus when determining the object of hope but contends that
such is also the mind of St. Thomas. III, n. 4) .
188 Summa Theol., II-II, q. 17, a. 8.
18 ' Ibid., a. 6, ad 8.
181

182

THE THOMISTIC

AND SCOTISTIC

CONCEPTS

OF HOPE

59

a final cause, while the help by which one hopes to obtain that
good, has the character of an efficient cause," 135 -establish
the object of hope for Suarez as good simply, for John of St.
Thomas as an arduous good.
Suarez' problem, in order to make the principles of St:
Thomas and Scotus compatible, was how to account for the
arduousness of the object and the motivating power of Divine
Omnipotence, which in concupiscible hope were no longer
intrinsic elements of the virtue. He does so by distinguishing
between the act and the virtue of hope. Arduousness and the
Omnipotence of God then become necessary conditions of the
act but do not enter into the formal constitution of the virtue.

The Object of Hope according to Suarez
Since Suarez accepts Scotus' thesis that hope is concupiscible
love/ 36 he must show that the object of hope is good as such,
and not an " arduous but possible " good. He therefore explains
that arduousness, " which for some constitutes the formality of
the object of hope " 137 can result either from the absence of
the object or from the excellence it has because it exceeds all
the powers of man. But in both these cases it produces desire
and is merely a condition of the good toward which both hope
and charity tend, and not the specifying quality of the object
of hope. Arduousness cannot mean a special difficulty in
obtaining the good, for difficulty cannot constitute the reason
for the will's tending toward the good. The will rather flees
from a difficult good than seeks it, and if such a difficulty exists,
it is the goodness of the object that moves the appetite to
conquer the difficulty, and not the difficulty itself. The arduousness of the object of infused hope, therefore, is merely a
certain excellence, the eminence of the Infinite Good, which
makes the Object more desirable, and, as such, adds nothing
to the object that would require another habit than that of
desire or concupiscible love.
Ibid., a. 4.
Suarez; III, n. 4.
••• Ibid., n.

185
186

60

SISTER MARY MICHAEL GLENN

The fact that the object is possible produces in the soul, it
is true, a certain confidence and expectation. But to expect
and to confide are, in the will, merely modes of desire that
follow a judgment of possibility in the intellect. 138 Hope, therefore, requires a preamble of " hope-ability," which faith supplies
the judgment that the necessary help of God
be forthcoming; but hope is properly the tendency of the will toward
the good
its Author. Suarez claims 139
Cajetan supports this opinion that generically hope is desire from his
words, " to hope is nothing more than to desire the arduous good
possible to one's self." 140
Thus conceived, neither the arduousness nor
possibility
of the object is sufficient to make the formal object of hope
differ from
of desire. Suarez, therefore, concludes that
both desire and hope are rooted in love, and
it pertains to
same virtue both to love the good and to hope for it if it
is absent. By the same virtue, whether it be the love of
regards the
friendship or the love of concupiscence, the
141
end simply, its intention, and the choice of means.
Therefore,
the same virtue
loves, also desires and hopes.
If it be objected that someone can desire the good
not
hope to obtain it, Suarez answers that although hope
desire spring from the same habit, i.e., concupiscible love, the
188 Ibid.:
" Confidere ergo in aliquo, erit velle ab illo habere aliquod bonum,
quod judico ilium mihi daturum vel absolute, vel sub aliqua conditione, et haec
eadem voluntas comparata ad bonum ipsum erit expectatio ejus." Harent sees
even greater difficulties in excluding desire from the habit of hope (col. 636) .
If, as St. Bonaventure says, hope makrs us expect the thing and confide in the
person, this expectation and confidence must be acts of the will. How explain
these acts without referring them either to love for .the person who makes the
good possible, or joy at the prospect of obtaining the desired thing? How can
the will, whose object is good or evil, he asks, attain an object without either
loving or hating it? Therefore, apart from joy or love, confidence becomes an
intellectual, not an affective act.
139 Suarez, HI, n. 10.
140 Tommaso De Vio, Commentaria in Summam Theologicam, II-II, q. 18, a. I:
" dicit sperare nihil aliud esse, quam velle bonum arduum possibile sibi, et in
ilia arduitate includitur absentia."

,., Suarez, III, n. 18.

THE THOMISTIC

AND SCOTISTIC

CONCEPTS

OF HOPE

61

act of hope is distinct from the act of desire. Desire has a much
broader extension than hope, for it applies to all appetition of
absent good, whether it be arduous or easy, procured by one's
own power or another's, by the mode of perfect or imperfect
willing. But hope is the perfect act of the efficacious will
tending to a difficult good and often to the good that depends
on the help of another/ 42 and thereby involves a relation to
that other in the manner that the intention of the end involves
the willing of the means. Moreover, desire requires as a prerequisite only a judgment of the objective goodness of the
object, while the perfect motion of hope requires, in addition, a
conviction of the possibility of obtaining the good and of the
willingness and fidelity of Him from Whom the necessary
assistance is to come. Therefore, while all hope is desire, not
all desire is hope.
John of St. Thomas summarizes Suarez' opinion as follows:
Hope does not have an adequate habit itself, but the habit by which
the act of hope is elicited is common to other acts, such as love of
concupiscence, desire, delight, etc., which acts coincide in one formal
motive by which this habit is specified. This formal motive is the
divine goodness lovable by the love c.f concupiscence and for the
benefit of the lover. The most difficult and special act of this habit
is the act of hope, because it regards this good under the aspect
of arduous and difficult, from which act the habit takes its name,
although it extends itself to other acts. Therefore, the divine goodness, as it terminates the love of friendship, can be the formal
motive of hope, because even by charity one can hope for something
from God for oneself, or for another, if it hopes from the love of
friendship; if, however, from the love of concupiscence, it will be an
act of hope, not charity .143
Although the object of the act of hope must be an arduous
good, the object of the virtue of hope is merely good. 144 For
u• Suarez, HI, n. 12: "uncle saepe tendit in bonum, quod non tam ab sperante,
quam ab alio pendet."
14 " Disp. IV, A. 1, n. 4.
144 Suarez,
HI, n. 15: "Bonum arduum posse dici objectum actus
non
vero totius virtutis spei."

62

SISTER MARY MICHAEL GLENN

arduousness is not the reason for the will tending to its object,
but merely an occasion or condition that arouses the will to
a perfect act, from which the whole virtue takes its name.
Because it changes neither the power itself nor the virtue,
arduousness does not necessarily enter into all the acts of the
virtue, which, nevertheless, belong to the virtue of hope, providing they tend to the object under the aspect of good sought
for the benefit and perfection of the lover.
God as our highest good, therefore, is an adequate object of
the virtue of hope and needs no further specification. Certain
conditions of the good-that it be absent or acquired with
difficulty-account for the diversity of acts proceeding from
the virtue on account of the diverse modes of attaining the
object. The habitus, however, remains the same, and, as a
more general principle, tends to the object merely as good. 145
Thus Suarez explains the manner by which we tend to God
"as a good to be obtained finally." This goodness is regarded
by hope not merely as good, but as good to be obtained-this
distinguishes hope from charity. Moreover, it is to be obtained
finally, as the highest good and last end of man, and is therefore,
not merely the material object, but the formal and specifying
object of hope, for the intrinsic end must coincide with the
formal object. 146

The Motive of Hope according to Suarez
Having established God as our good as the formal object of
hope, Suarez shows in what sense God as our helper is attained
by hope as an efficient cause. He says that although some see
in Article 6-" by hope, we trust to the Divine assistance for
obtaining happiness "-the reason for considering the Omnipotence of God as the formal motive of hope, he feels that St.
Thomas clearly excludes the help of God from the formal
145

146

Ibid., n.
Ibid., n. 3: " idem scribit in articulo 5, quibus locis palam excludit Dei

auxilium a ratione formali spei, bonum autem in tali ratione includit, cum . . .
finis intrinsecus sub ratione formali, cum objecto sub ratione etiam formali
coincidat."

THE THOMISTIC

AND SCOTISTIC

CONCEPTS

OF HOPE

63

motive in Article 5-" (hope) attains the supreme rule of
human actions (God) ... both as the first efficient cause, inasmuch as it relies on His assistance, and as ultimate final
cause, inasmuch as it expects happiness in the enjoyment
thereof." When St. Thomas here qualifies hope as a virtue, he
points out two ways by which it tends to God, as good and as
help. Suarez thinks that since hope is an act of the will, its
motive would have to be good under some aspect and therefore,
the object itself, God's Goodness, is an adequate motive of
the act. Divine help is merely the means by which man attains
the Good, and as such does not pertain to the motive.
We do not hope in God, he says, in the same manner in
which we believe in Him. For in faith the whole " reason " of
the virtue, its object and its certitude, depends on the testimony
of God and from this rises the whole species of faith. But in
hope, the fact that the good is obtained by the power of God
does not give the whole " reason " why it is lovable and hopable,
that is, its motive. 147 Divine help, then, is a necessary condition
of infused hope that makes us see the good as possible and
thereby desire it efficaciously. Moreover, Suarez points out 148
that although St. Thomas 149 makes faith and hope equal as
attaining God as the principle of beatitude and truth, he is
thereby merely contrasting the imperfection of faith and hope
because of their mode (i. e., ordained to us) to the perfect mode
of charity, and does not confuse the virtues by giving them the
same formal object. Hope, like faith, therefore, tends to God
as the principle of these goods, not as its formal object, but
as the cause and as one of the desired goods. The fact that
infused hope tends to the supernatural Good that is procured,
not only by its own powers, but also by God's help, gives the
Omnipotence of God the character of an efficient cause, it is
tme. But in this way, Divine Omnipotence can be said to be
147 Ibid., n. 17:
"Tamen in spe, quod bonum aliquod fit a Deo, vel per Deum,
non inde accipit totam rationem boni, et amabilis, vel sperabilis, sed solum illud
adjungitur, ut conditio necessaria."
148 Ibid., n. 18.
140 Summa Theol., II-II, q. 17, a. 6.

64

SISTER MARY MICHAEL GLENN

the efficient cause also of faith, and even of charity, insofar as
these virtues tend to God as supernatural good which is effected
or given by God. 150 The Power of God, therefore, as the
efficient cause remains extrinsic to the motive and does not
specify the object of hope, which :remains God as a final cause
and as a good to be desired.
Suarez concludes his treatment of the object of hope and its
distinction from charity 151 by affirming that if the traditional
concept of expectant hope, motivated by the Omnipotence of
God, be accepted as a theological virtue, it will be necessary
to invent a fourth one to provide for acts of supernatural love
of concupiscence. He is willing to admit, however, that,
although we know from Sacred Scripture and Tradition that
hope and charity are really distinct, we do not know with
certitude in what this distinction actually consists. 152 In
spect, the interpretation of the texts of St. Thomas according
to the Scotistic formula of hope presented two difficulties for
Suarez: the exact relation of hope to concupiscible love and
the precise connection of arduousness and the Omnipotence of
God with the formal object.

The Refutation

of Suarez by John of St. Thomas

John of St. Thomas, in defending the traditional Thomistic
concept of expectant hope, examines these same problems and
directly refutes Suarez' theories. He states unequivocally that
Suarez is wrong when he admits of one common habitus for
the acts of hope, love and desire. 153 In thus interpreting St.
150 Suarez, HI, n. 17:
" Pertinet etiam hoc speciali ratione ad spem infusam,
quia tendit in objectum, ut supernaturale bonum est, in quo includitur, ut non
solum propriis viribus, sed Dei auxilio comparetur; quomodo etiam charitatis est
tendere in supernaturale
atquo adeo ut a Deo principaliter efficiendum,
vel dandum."
151 Ibid., Section III.
152 Ibid., n. )!\!: "quantum vero ad distinctionem
realem non est tanta certitudo."
153 Disp. IV, A. l:
"Utraque sententia patris Suarez, et patris Vasquez est
contra D. Thomam et contra veritatem ... quod ponit unum habitum non solum
pro actu spei, sed etiam pro aliis actibus desiderii et amoris."

THE THOMISTIC

AND SCOTISTIC

CONCEPTS

OF HOPE

65

Thomas' statement that hope " pertains " to concupiscible love,
Suarez has not taken into account other references he made to
the subject, as when he teaches that hope presupposes love and
desire and rises from it. 154 These acts, moreover, cannot flow
from the same habitus, because a.lthough joy and desire do not
have an object
requires a habitus distinct from love," 155
the object of hope, insofar as it is an arduous and possible
good, is specifically distinct from the aspect of absolute good,
and hope is therefore not only a special act, but a special
far as St. Thomas is concerned, only the specific
virtue. 156
ratio
hope constitutes the virtue, and not the
which
is common both to arduous and non-arduous good. 157
This can be proved
an analysis
despair, the sin directly
opposed to hope and which, therefore, dissolves its formal
motive. Although the despairing man has ceased to hope for
salvation, he has not ceased to desire it, because a man can
neither
nor despair of that which he does not desire.
then, were merely an act
desire,
not
destroy the
but only impede one of its acts. 158 But it
is commonly agreed
theologians that despair destroys hope
""""''-'"'''", just as infidelity destroys faith. H, therefore, despair
destroys the virtue of hope while the soul continues to desire,
the fonnal motive of hope cannot be something common to
acts of hope and desire. The virtue of hope, then, requires its
own special habitus which can be lost by despair without affecting the fonnal reason of desire. l\1:oreover, according to such a
theory, Suarez himself
have to admit that
habitus
of hope remains
the souls of the blessed, at least as far as the
act of joy and concupiscible love, although not with regard to
the act
hope itself. St. Thomas, however, clearly says that
neither hope nor faith are in the blessed since an ::trduous
154 Ibid.: "ideo omittenda sunt plura loca D. Thomae, in quibus docet spem praesupponere amorem, seu desiderium et ex illo oriri."
155 Summa Theol., II-II, q. !'!8, a. 4.
156 Ibid., ad !'!.
157 John of St. Thomas, Disp. IV, A. l:
(De Spe, A. l, ad 6).
158 Ibid., n. 9.

66

SISTER MARY MICHAEL GLENN

possible good that is present " is incompatible with the virtue
of hope " 159 and not only with the act of hope.
And how does John of St. Thomas account for this concupiscible love, which he says is not hope, and which Suarez says
must be a fourth theological virtue if it isn't hope? John of
St. Thomas finds the motivation for perfect hope in charity,
the love of friendship, by which the soul wishes good to God
and good to self as something of God. 160 The soul in sanctifying
grace desires to possess God as a friend and relies on His assistance in the special way one looks to a friend when in difficulty,
and thus charity forms and perfects the movement of hope.
This can be inferred from the words of St. Thomas," Not every
kind of hope proceeds from charity, but only the movement of
living hope." 161 Garrigou-Lagrange 162 describes the influence
of charity on hope by pointing out that living hope springs from
an efficacious love of God above all things. The love of the soul
in mortal sin, however, though it esteems God as the Highest
Good and desires Him as such, remains inefficacious as long as
it is opposed by a disordered love of self.
The Nature of the Love at the Root of Hope
What is this inefficacious love that precedes charity? By
what principles does the soul desire the Infinite Good in unformed hope? John of St. Thomas says that the substance of
hope, when unformed, is elicited by the habit of pious affection
which is not a fourth theological virtue, but inchoate faith. 163
Summa Theol., II-II, q. 18, a. 2.
John of St. Thomas, De Caritate, D. 14, a. 1, n. 6: " Charity cannot elicit
love of imperfect concupiscence, i. e., which wishes good for itself staying in itself
(sistendo in se); it can, however, elicit perfect concupiscence, that is, not staying
in itself, but related to friendship; so it desires God, enjoying Him as present,
because this is proper to friendship. The enjoyment of charity can desire God for
itself, insofar as the soul secondarily loves itself, but refers this totality ultimately
to God as a friend."
161 Summa Theol., II-II, q. 17, a. 8, ad 2.
162 La Synthese Thomiste, p. 520.
168 Disp. IV, A. l, n. 21:
"Et quod hoc principium sit habitus piae affectionis,
qui non est quarta virtus Theologica sed inchoatio fidei." Cf. XIV De Veritate,
A. '1, ad 10.
150

160

THE THOMISTIC

AND SCOTISTIC

CONCEPTS

OF HOPE

67

For although faith is an act of the intellect, it requires in the
will a certain love and desire of supernatural goods which cannot proceed therefrom without a proportionate principle. This
principle must precede both hope and charity, for faith can
exist without them. From this appetite for " boni repromissi,"
the promised good, is elicited the desire both for the truth that
is believed and for the good that is hoped for. This habit of
pious affection is a concupiscible love, supernatural because it
is directed to God, but imperfect because not formed by charity,
and by it man both wills God imperfectly before he believes
Him, and wills the promised good imperfectly before he hopes
for it. 164
This same principle suffices for both acts because the love of
concupiscence has no special difficulty, since one naturally loves
oneself and wishes good to himself. And although the supernatural character of the good requires a higher principle by
which to desire it, the imperfection of the habit allows it to be
reduced to some other virtue, in this case, faith. This habit of
pious affection pertains reductively to faith, as the foundation
and the imperfect beginning is reduced to the perfect thing. 165
And from this same principle proceeds .the imperfect love of
concupiscence for God, which precedes the love of friendship. 166
Having thus eliminated the necessity of choosing between the
identification of hope with concupiscible love and the invention
of a fourth theological virtue, John of St. Thomas very
pointedly remarks that when St. Thomas said that hope pertains to concupiscible love, he did not say that concupiscible
love pertains to hope, as if that love were elicited by hope, but
that hope pertains to imperfect love as having its foundation
in love and presupposing it. 167
'"' Ibid.: "et sicut prius vult Deum imperfecte quam credat Deo, sic prius
vult imperfecte bona repromissa quam speret ilia, et ab eodem principio elicitur
appetitus concupiscendi id quod creditur, et quod speretur."
268 Ibid.,
n. 22: " ad eamque reductive pertinet, sicut inchoatio et initium
imperfectum reducitur ad rem perfectam."
260 Ibid.:
"Quare ab eodem principio sufficienter elicitur amor concupiscentiae
imperfectus erga Deum, quo antecedit amicitiam charitatis." (A relation is suggested here to the famous " diligere incipiunt" of the Tridentine decree, DB 798.)
••• Ibid., n. 29: " Quando autem dicit St. Thomas in ista quaestione 17, spem

68

SISTER MARY MICHAEL

GLENN

John of St, Thomas then, having established hope as a habit
distinct from love and desire, reaffirms the true character of the
arduousness of its object and the reason why the Omnipotence
of God as the efficient cause is also the motive that specifies
hope. Arduousness is the specifying aspect of the object of
hope, not because of the excellence of such an eminent good,
nor because of the difficulty itself, but because, not being easily
obtained, the object has a special aspect of goodness in its
ability to overcome the obstacles that threaten it. 168 Whatever
it is then, that constitutes the object as good under this special
aspect of arduous and possible, will be the motive of hope. And
this is the office of the Divine Omnipotence. However, it is
not the fact that God is the agent who effects the hoped-for
good in us that supplies the formal specification of hope. The
assistance of God, specifies hope, not in the order of execution,
but in the order of intention. Although it is true, as Suarez
claims, that God is the Principle which effects this good in us;
nevertheless, it is not in this sense that His efficient causality is
considered the formal motive. The power of God is also the
efficient cause of the hoped-for object by bestowing on it that
certain denomination of mode which changes it from the good
considered absolutely (i.e., attractive) to the good considered
as triumphing over obstacles, and then-supposing this triumph
-attractive. 169 And in this sense, the efficient cause cannot be
extrinsic to hope. Since it is a means not only of attaining
the object, but also of constituting it as good under the specific
aspect peculiar to hope, Divine Omnipotence cannot pertain to
hope accidentally as indicating the mode. Divine Assistance,
pertinere ad amorem concupiscentiae, notanda sunt verba; non enim dicit amorem
concupiscentiae pertinere ad spem quasi ab ea elicitum, sed dicit e contra, spem
pertinere ad amorem concupiscentiae quasi in eo fundatam, et ilium praesupponentem."
168 Ibid., n. 30:
" Ista specialis ratio non consistit in sola excellentia, et magnitudine boni, neque in ipsa difficultate, ut tenet se ex parte laborum, et difficultatum,
sed in ipsa ratione boni, ut est repulsivum, et vincense opposita impedimenta, ut
explicatum est."
169 Ibid., n. 18: "intra
lineam ipsius rationis boni constituit specialem rationem
bonitatis, id est, non bonitatem absolute ut est attrahens et alliciens, sed ut est
vincens, et supposita victoria, etiam alliciens, et sic est objectum spei."

'l'HE

'l'HOMIS'l'IC

AND SCO'l'ISTIC

CONCEPTS

OF HOPE

69

therefore, pertains intrinsically to the specification of the good
which is the object of hope. 170
So, although John of St. Thomas and Suarez both claim to
interpret St. Thomas, they, nevertheless, conceive hope quite
differently. For John of St. Thomas, hope is reliance on God's
assistance to attain the final end; it is specified by the arduousness of its object and motivated by the omnipotence of God.
This confidence and expectation necessarily presuppose a
desire for the hoped-for good. Suarez, on the other hand, sees
hope as the desire to possess God as our highest Good, specified
by the goodness of its object and motivated by the
tion of God as the source of beatitude. Various acts flow from
this one habit of desire i. e., concupiscible love, insofar as the
good is absolutely lovable; hope, insofar as it is absent and
acquired with difficulty; and joy, insofar as it is attained.
Thus the writings of John of St. Thomas and of Suarez give
us a fuller development of the concepts of expectant and concupiscible hope, the foundations of which were laid by St.
Thomas and Scotus.

IV. CoNcLusiON
The two concepts of hope which have been compared, both
in their source and in their later developments, are patently
irreconcilable. There cannot be two formal objects for one
habitus. The aspect of the object of hope that specifies the
virtue cannot be both its goodness and its arduousness. And
although St. Thomas often speaks of hope tending to God as to
a good, the aspect by which Scotus specifies the object of hope,
there are many instances where he clearly states that hope is
constituted a virtue by the arduousness of its object. He says,
for example: "The theological virtues have the same object
under different aspects: God as the First Truth is the object
of faith; as the Supreme Good, the object of charity; as the
Highest Arduous Good, as the object of hope." 171 "WhosoIbid., Ji. 30:

"Sicut est omnipotentia divina auxilians, tale medium non
sed intrinsece se habet ad specificationem boni, ut specificati."
111 Ill Sent., d. 26, a. 3, sol. l, ad X.
170

accidentaliter,

70

SISTER MARY MICHAEL GLENN

ever has hope, hopes to attain God and through Him all things
that are necessary, insofar as they are difficult"; 172 "Hope
proceeds from love even as joy does, but hope adds on the part
of the object, a special character, viz., difficult and possible to
obtain; for which reason it is accounted a special virtue." 173 So,
although the object of hope must be a good in order to attract
the will, it is not necessarily presented to the will under the
aspect of absolute goodness. An arduous good has a special
kind of goodness because of the difficulties encountered in
acquiring it and it is this aspect that distinguishes the object
of hope from that of charity.
This distinction is clearly seen in St. Thomas' discussion of
the passions of hope and love, and although the distinction
between irascible and concupiscible acts is not as dear-cut with
regard to the will as it is in the sensitive appetite, nevertheless,
there is an analogy in the diversity of acts produced by the
will 174 that would not justify attributing the acts of desire and
hope to the same habitus in the will.175 One must conclude,
therefore, that the Suarezian interpretation is not in accord
with the mind of St. Thomas.
It is more difficult to determine the exact role St. Thomas
gives to the goodness of the object and the desire it evokes in
the concept of hope. John of St. Thomas notes 176 that something other than the form may pertain to the essence and to the
constitution of the species, but it need not pertain to it as the
formal reason, except insofar as it is the material toward which
Ibid., q. 2, a. 2, ad 2.
Summa Theol., II-II, q. 28, a. 4, ad 2.
1"
Ill Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1: "ideo dicendum, quod snbjectum spei, prout
dicitur virtus theologica, non est vis irascibilis, sed voluntas, inquantum actum
spei dici potest; nisi forte ipsam voluntatem, inqnantum habet actus similes actibus
irascibilis dicamus irascibilem; st<d tunc irascibilis et concupiscibilis non erunt diversae
potentiae, sed nominabunt eamdem potentiam, scilicet voluntatem, secundum
diversos actus."
175 Ibid., ad 3: " spes in voluntate
dicitur ad similitudinem spei quae est in
irascibili, ut prius dictum est. Sed spes quae est passio irascibilis, difl'ert a
cognitione quae est fidei, et amore qui est caritatis. Ergo spes quae est in voluntate,
differt a fide et caritate."
176 Disp. IV, q. 17, a. l.
172

173

THE THOMISTIC

AND SCOTISTIC

CONCEPTS

OF HOPE

71

the power is drawn by means of the formal reason. In accord
with this, St. Thomas seems to make goodness an essential
condition of the object of hope on the part of the thing hoped
for, that is, the material object, without making it, however,
the specifying aspect of the object, since goodness is a quality
common to the objects of both charity and hope. The character
of arduousnes which specifies the object, however, does not
complete the reason why one hopes, and therefore the Omnipotence of God, which makes the arduous object possible,
provides the ultimate resolution of hope. The only adequate
response to the query: Why do you hope for beatitude? is
not because it is good, or even because it is arduous, but
because God can and wishes to give it, just as the only adequate
response to: Why do you believe there are three persons in
God? is because God who is Truth has revealed it. Thus the
ultimate resolution of hope, as of faith, is in its formal object
quo, or motive 177 which, however, constitutes the specific aspect
of the object quod.
Since goodness is an essential quality of the object, desire,
which goodness evokes on the part of the subject, is at least a
necessary prerequisite to hope. St. Thomas says that when
charity is absent from the soul, hope proceeds from desire, 178
but he adds that this imperfect love, which as desire, is the first
movement of the appetite toward virtue, does not of itself
suffice to produce acts of virtue. 179 Desire, therefore, is rather
an inchoate love 180 which grows into hope but which is not
hope, because it lacks the essential notes of confidence and
expectation.
So, although St. Thomas' treatment of hope in the Summa is
not so definite in this respect as that in his Commentary on
Garrigou-Lagrange, op. cit., p.
q. 2, a. 8, sol.
ad
"Spes informis non est ex amore,
sed ex desiderio."
170 Ibid., ad 8:
".ibi accipitur amor large pro amore imperfecto, quod est
desiderium, quod est primus motus appetitivae virtutis; desiderium autem non
sufficit ad formandum actus virtutum."
180 Ibid., ad 2: " et ideo desiderium est quaedam inchoatio amoris, et quasi
quidam amor imperfectus."
177

178

III Sent., d.

72

SISTER MARY MICHAEL GLENN

the Sentences, the combined evidence is clear enough that St.
Thomas does not identify hope with desire and does not regard
the goodness of its object as its ultimate specification.
The difference between the position of St. Thomas and
Scotus, then, is one of emphasis. Scotus sees hope as a conditioned desire, while St. Thomas sees desire as a condition of
hope. In other words, the problem is whether the aspect of
arduousness and the consequent dependence of God's help
introduce a difference into the definition of hope that involves
a difference of species, or is this condition so nonessential as to
be extrinsic to the virtue? Scripture and Tradition, as well as
the accepted formula of the act of hope in use among the
faithful-" 0 my God, relying on Thy almighty power and
infinite goodness, and promises, I hope to obtain the pardon
of my sins and life everlasting "-seem more in accord with
the Thomistic formula. Moreover, if to hope is merely to desire
everlasting life, the most grievous sin against hope would be
committed by those who are so strongly attached to worldly
goods that they would like to live forever in this world. But
the sins against hope, presumption and despair, are manifestly
not against the desire of heaven, but against the confidence
due to God, and since the habit of hope is destroyed radically
by these sins, the essence of hope must be confidence, and not
desire.
Furthermore, both Scotus and Suarez very obviously rest
their case for the identification of hope with desire on the
necessity of accounting for supernatural acts of love of concupiscence. St. Thomas, on the other hand, who attributes
this love of concupiscence either to charity as its secondary act
by which we love ourselves in God, or in the absence of charity,
to a certain inchoate love (which John of St. Thomas further
reduces to inchoate faith), is free to draw the logical conclusions
to the metaphysical principles he so consistently applies in his
schema of the virtues.
So although the proximate cause of the two concepts of
hope is a difference in their respective stands on the nature of
love, the antithesis has its :roots in an even more fundamental

THE THOMISTIC

.AND SCOTISTIC

CONCEPTS

OF HOPE

78

concept, for St. Thomas and Scotus take divergent views on
the will itself and on its tendencies. St. Thomas teaches that
just as the intellect necessarily adheres to self-evident first
principles of reasoning, so too the will necessarily cleaves to its
last end which is happiness. 181 Duns Scotus categorically rejects
this parity between the intellect and the will because for him
" natural necessity is incompatible with freedom." 182 The will
is never necessitated to will the good, or happiness, or any
end proposed by the intellect, for the same reason that it is
never compelled to choose any means to an end. The will can
always compel the intellect to turn to the contemplation of
some other object than the one that lies before it. 188 The root
principle underlying this teaching is that the will has but one
act, an elicited act, by which it both chooses the means and
wills the end. The natural will, which Scotus identifies with the
affectio commodi, is merely the inclination of the will as a
power to receive its proper perfection, which is happiness or
beatitude. This natural desire is not an operation, nor a
movement of any kind, but only a relation of the will to its
perfection, which might be described as a" passive tendency."
In otherwords, Scotus gives us a psychology of the will rather
than a metaphysics. His method is that of introspection/ 54
Because we do not experience within ourselves this natural
appetite, he comes to the conclusion that it cannot be an
elicited act, but only an inclination (in the sense of a relation)
in the will toward its perfection, in the same way that there is
a natural inclination in a stone towards its perfection. 185
Summa Theol., I, q. 82, a. 1.
I Sent., d. 1, q. 4, n. 1.
188 Ibid., n. 8.
184 William R. O'Connor, The Eternal Quest (New York:
Longmans, Green &
Co., 1947), p. 46.
186 " Praeterea, non experimur talem actum esse in nobis, cum tamen inconveniens
est nobilissimos habitus naturaliter esse in nobis, et latere nos; quod etiam verum
est de operationibus . . . ergo sequitur quod appetitus naturalis non sit nisi
inclinatio quaedam ad perfectionem suam; nee est magis actus elicitus in voluntate
quam in lapide. Quid ergo? Dico quod est inclinatio ad propriam perfectionem
suam, scilicet voluntatis, sicut in aliis non habentibus appetitum liberum; et de
illo appetitu loquitur Philosophus I Physicorum quod materia appetit formam, et
181

182

74

SISTER MARY MICHAEL GLENN

Beginning with this concept of the will, Scotus logically
concludes to man's ability to love something independently of
its relation to himself. This determines for him the nature of
charity and leads him to identify hope with concupiscible love,
which is entirely excluded from charity thus conceived. St.
Thomas, on the other hand, since for him the will cannot move
except toward an object that appears as its good, sees a natural
relation between charity and man's attaining of his last end.
Charity, therefore, is not disinterested in the same sense for St.
Thomas as it is for Scotus, and hope is not essentially interested
love, but a :reliance on God's help to attain both the end and
the means to that end for which man was made.
This thought is beautifully expressed in the compendium of
hope which St. Thomas was writing for his beloved Frater
Reginald when overtaken by death. He finds in the Lord's
Prayer all that relates to the hope of Christians-the person in
whom we ought to place our hope, and why, and what we
should expect from Him. We must hope in God because we
belong to Him as an effect belongs to its cause. Thus, Our
Savior, knowing how necessary hope is for our salvation,
thought it well to carry us on to a living hope by giving us a
form of prayer that mightily raises up our hope to God, our
Father in heaven. We sufficiently express our conviction that
the divine will is ready to help us when we proclaim that God
is our Father, but to exclude all doubt as to the perfection of
His power, we add " Who art in heaven "-not as though He
were contained by heaven, but we hail the power of God which
sustains and transcends the heavens and enables us to hope. 186
SISTER MARY MICHAEL GLENN,

C. D.P.

Providence Heights,
Allison Park, Penna.

universaliter imperfectum suam perfectionem."
Cited by O'Connor, op. cit., p. 46.
106 Compendium of Theology, p. 315 :ff.

(In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 10, n. 2-8.)

SEPARATE ENTITY AS THE SUBJECT OF
ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS

I

N The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics 1
Fr. Joseph Owens, C. SS. R., presents an original and
highly challenging interpretation of that work. Opposing
the view that First Philosophy bears upon the Being proportionately common to all things, he maintains that the true
subject of the science is immobile or separate Entity. The view
that common Being is the subject of Metaphysics, he holds,
must ultimately attribute to Aristotle .an " ontological " notion
of the science. But, he states,
The " ontological " conception of the science . . . is nowhere to
be found in the Metaphysics. A science treating universally of
Beings which is not identified with the science of a definite type of
Being, the primary type, is foreign to the Stagirite's procedure.
The object of such a science would be the concept " Being." Aristotle is well aware of the presence of such a concept. He expressly
teaches that it is not Entity. Entity-Being qua Being-, however,
is what the Primary Philosophy treats. The concept " Being,"
therefore, cannot be its object. 2

In addition to its negative content, this passage contains, in
summary form, the principal elements of Fr. Owens' thesis.
Its ultimate basis is found in the reference to Entity (separate
Entity is actually meant) as the primary type of being. For
he contends that Being is a pros en equivocal which has, as
its primary instance, not Entity in general but separate Entity.
In different words, this substance and all other things are held
to fall under a certain unity solely by virtue of an analogy of
attribution. From this he concludes that the nature of separate
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1951.
• P. 299. Henceforth reference to Fr. Owens' work will be by page alone.

1

75

76

JOHN D. BEACH

Entity alone is signified by the word "Being," that it alone
possesses the nature of Being.
The belief that separate Entity alone contains the nature of
Being leads him to equate it with " Being qua Being." Verbally, this is perhaps the most decisive argument in support of
the assertion that this Entity is the subject of the Primary
Philosophy. For Aristotle consistently speaks of the doctrine
as the science of Being qua Being.
The author's position on the pros en equivocal character of
Being also permits him to account for 'the universality of First
Philosophy. For the science of separate Entity will treat of all
those things which are called Being by reference to this Entity.
It will, indeed, treat of them qua Being. For this reason, too,
the science can be called the study of" Being qua Being."
However, Fr. Owens holds that those things which are Being
by reference to separate Entity do not truly fall within the
subject of Wisdom. As secondary instances of Being they cannot. Rather, to
them qua Being is
to study
separate Entity. For when "Being" is predicated of them,
it is really the nature of the immobile substance which is thereby signified. Separate Entity is thus the "universal Being"
dealt with in First Philosophy. The ground of this view is
again the assumption that this Entity alone has the nature
of Being.
A detailed presentation of this position is found in Fr. Owens'
commentary on a famous passage in Book Epsilon. There
Aristotle explicitly relates the science of the immobile Entity
to the universal consideration of Being qua Being. He writes:
For one might be in aporia about (Oxford-" might raise the
question ") whether the Primary Philosophy is universal or concerned with a particular genus and one particular nature (for not
even the mathematical sciences are all alike in this respect-geand astrology are concerned with a particular nature, while
universal mathematics is common to all). If, then, there is no other
Entity above those constituted by Nature, natural science will
be primary science; but if there is an immobile Entity, the science
of this must be prior and must be primary philosophy, and uni-

ARISTOTLE'S

METAPHYSICS

77

versal in this way, because primary; and it will belong to this to
consider Being qua Being,-both what it is and what pertains to
it qua Being. 3

Fr. Owens' commentary is as follows:
Being qua Being, accordingly, is now seen as the nature which
constitutes separate Entity. In studying this definite nature, one
studies the Being found in everything else. The " Being " expressed
in regard to anything else seems the Being of the separate Entities.
The science of the separate Entities, therefore, treats universally
of all Beings insofar as they are Beings. Just as the "health"
studied in all the instances of " healthy " is the health in the bodily
organism, so the Being studied in anything whatsoever is the Being
of the separate and divine Entities.
. . . The question is, how can this definite nature be universal
in regard to all things? The reason given is its priority. This needs
no further explanation when considered in sequence to the doctrine
in Book Gamma regarding a science that deals with pros en equivocals. Aristotle does not give any further elucidation. He proceeds
as though none were required. The simple reference to the " primary " nature of separate Entity is sufficient, in the context, to
show the " hearers " that the science of separate Entity will deal
universally with every instance of Being insofar as it is Being .
. . . The Being of separate Entity and the manner in which that
Entity exercises its primary role, are not investigated. All that has
been done is to "solve" the aporia. The "conception" binding
the intellect was that a science of a definite nature could hardly
treat other natures universally. A reference back to the character
of a science that deals with pros en equivocals suffices to untie
the "knot"; this character has already been explained in detail
by the preceding treatment. The intellect is now free to study
separate Entity with the full assurance that in studying this Entity
it is learning the first causes of all things, the causes of Being qua
Being. It is dealing universally .with all Beings.4

The rigor and originality of Fr. Owens' thesis are amply
revealed in this commentary. Its validity, however, is another
matter. This can alone be ascertained by an analysis of its
principal themes in the light of Aristotle's own text. Our im8 Metaphysics, Epsilon 1, 1026a28-82. Fr. Owens' trans.
•p, 176.

78

JOHN D. BEACH

mediate interest is in the positive arguments which the author
presents in support of his interpretation. Later, we will take
up his rejection of common Being as the subject of Wisdom.

A.

THE

pros en EQuivocAL

" BEING."

In Book Gamma, Aristotle treats of the vanous ways m
which" Being" is said of things. He writes:
" Being " is expressed in many ways, but pros en, that is, in
reference to one definite nature. It is not purely equivocal but as,
for instance, "healthy." Everything which is healthy is referred
to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another
in the sense that it produces it, another in the sense that it is a
symptom of health, another because it is susceptible of it .... In
this way " Being," too, is expressed in many ways, but always in
reference to one primary instance. For some things are called
" Beings " because they are Entities, others because they are ways
towards Entity or corruptions or privations or qualities or productive or generative principles of Entity or of the things expressed
by reference to Entity, or the negations of any one of these or of
Entity itself; for which reason we say that even not-Being is notBeing.

His purpose in determining these truths is then stated by
Aristotle:
As, then, there is one science which deals with all healthy things,
the same applies in the other cases also. For not only in the case
of things which have one common notion does the investigation
belong to one science, but also in the case of things which are
related to one common nature; for even these in a sense have one
common notiono It is clear then that it is the work of one science
to study the things that are, qua being.

Following this, he adds an important qualification:
But everywhere science deals principally with the primary instance, on which the other instances depend and by virtue of which
they are expressed. If this, then, is Entity, it will be of Entities
that the philosopher must grasp the principles and causes. 5
• Gamma

trans.

l003a$3-hl0,

Fro Owens' trans.; blO-Hl, Oxford; bl6-19, Fr. Owens'

ARISTOTLE'S

METAPHYSICS

79

Now it is Fr. Owens' belief that the above treatment of the
various significations of " Being " is radically deficient. He
adopts this view even though the analysis was ordered to the
precise determination of the things considered in the science of
Being qua Being. For, he holds, the truly primary instance
of Being is separate Entity. It is actually by reference to this
Entity that all other things, including material substances, are
called Being. Such, he maintains, is clearly implied in subsequent passages in Book Gamma. Among them is one that
deals with the relationship between Wisdom and the first principles of Being.
But since there is one kind of thinker who is above even the
natural philosopher (for nature is only one particular genus of
Being) , the consideration of these principles also will pertain to
him whose inquiry is universal and deals with the primary Entity.
Physics is also a kind of Wisdom, but it is not primary. 6
Commenting on this, Fr. Owens states:
Evidently Entity is being regarded as a pros en equivocal. As
Entity extends to all Beings, so the primary Entity extends to aU
Entities. 7
This judgment provides the foundation of the author's interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics. Its true significance is
revealed in what Fr. Owens sees as the characteristic of all
pros en equivocals. He calls attention to this characteristic in
his commentary on Aristotle's treatment of" Being" in Gamma
2:
The point empasized is that the true nature concerned in this type
of equivocal is located as such only in the primary instance. The
nature or form designated by the word is found in the first instance
alone.8
The position taken here is the decisive factor in the development of the author's thesis. As the primary instance of Entity,
• Gamma 3, l005a33-b2, Fr. Owens' trans.
• P. 164.

• P. 152.

80

JOHN D. BEACH

separate Entity will be the primary instance of Being. Thus
its nature alone will be signified by " Being "; it alone will have
the nature of Being. From this assumed principle are derived
the arguments which immediately bear on the subject of Wisdom. There will be occasion later to deal with the principle
in itself, but first the stated consequences.
B.

BEING

qua BEING AND SEPARATE

ENTITY.

Following the assertion that the nature or form signified by
any pros en equivocal is found
the primary instance alone,
Fr. Owens states:
Health as such is found only in the disposition of the bodily
organism. Medical art is found only in the habit of the physician's
mind. 9

Of relevance here is the use of the phrase " health as such "
to designate the primary instance of "healthy." This manner
of speaking has an important role to play. The primary uww'"·"'"'
of "Being" is dealt with in similar fashion. Noting that the
examples of " healthy " and " medical " were " brought forward
by the Stagirite precisely
order to introduce the explanation
of Being," the author states:
In the light afforded by the illustrations, Aristotle's teaching on
the pros en nature of Being should be probed. According to these
examples, the nature of Being as such-and this is Being qua Being
-is to be found only in Entity. 10

This is the desired conclusion. A more complete formulation
of the argument is also offered:
As such, Entity is declared to be the primary instance of Being.
Through reference to Entity all other things are Being. So the inference that Entity alone contains in itself the nature of Being seems
fully legitimate. The examples used to illustrate the doctrine stress
the presence of the "nature" in the primary instance alone. The
nature involved is found only in the first instance. Being in its
• P. 152.
P. 153.

10

ARISTOTLE's

METAPHYSICS

81

own nature, Being according as it is Being, Being qua Being, should
be found only in Entity. "Being qua Being" should be synonymous
with Entity-" Beingness." 11

The true goal of this reasoning is the identification of " Being
qua Being" with separate Entity. This presents no problem.
On the assumption that this Entity is the truly primary instance of Being, it follows that it " alone contains in itself the
nature of Being." Whence the statement in the author's commentary on Epsilon 1: "Being qua Being ... is now seen as
the nature which constitutes separate Entity."
The importance of the argument is beyond dispute. As Fr.
Owens reads him, Aristotle simply equates " Being qua Being "
and separate Entity. And this
appear to justify the
author's principal contention: when Aristotle states that there
is a science of "Being qtta Being," he is to be understood as
saying that there is a science of separate Entity.
There is, however, one striking :flaw in this last sequence.
has an
term. The meaning Fr.
assigns "Being qua Being" is not Aristotle's. As used by the
author, the phrase means " the nature of the primary instance
of Being." But for Aristotle it means "Being with respect to
the formality-that of Being itself-under which the intellect
views it and under which certain principles, causes and attributes pertain to it." This is readily established. Many texts
are available for the purpose, but one from Book Kappa will
suffice. There Aristotle compares First Philosophy to the other
sciences precisely in relation to the different formalities under
which various things are considered. One of these is mathematics, which, he notes, deals with the attributes of the quantitative and continuous in a manner peculiar to it, namely " qua
quantitative and continuous." And, he states,
the same is true with regard to being. For the attributes of this
insofar as it is being, and the contrarieties in it qua being, it :is the
business of no other science than philosophy to investigate; for to
11

P. lliS.

82

JOHN D. BEACH

physics one would assign the study of things not qua being, but
rather qua sharing in movement; while dialectic and sophistic deal
with the attributes of things that are, but not of things qua being,
and not with being itself insofar as it is being; therefore it remains
that it is the philosopher who studies the things we have named,
insofar as they are being. 12

The opposition between Fr. Owens and Aristotle on this point
is clear. In Fr. Owens' lexicon, "Being qua Being" signifies
simply the nature of separate Entity. Aristotle, on the other
hand, distinguishes two elements in the phrase. One " Being,"
signifies the nature to which certain principles and attributes
relate; the other," qua Being," signifies the aspect under which
these principles and attributes pertain to the nature. Thus the
argument so carefully fashioned by the author comes to naught.
He cannot attribute to Aristotle the identification of " Being
qua Being " with separate Entity-thereby to equate the science of " Being qua Being " with the science of separate Entity
doing violence to the very letter of the Metaphysics.
There is, to be sure, one text which does appear to justify the
author's position in this :regard. In Book Kappa, he asserts,
there is an " explicit " identification of " Being qua Being "
with Entity: " ' Being qua Being ' coincides with Entity as
opposed to accident." 13 The passage from Kappa reads:
So in the same way every Being is expressed. For it is by being
an affection or habit or disposition or motion or whatever such else
of " Being qua Being " that each of these is said to be.14

Considered materially, these words of Aristotle do lend support to Fr. Owens' interpretation. Apparently, "Being qua
Being " here simply designates Entity as the primary instance
of Being. However, the actual structure of Aristotle's thought
12 K 8, 106la35-bll,
Oxford. It is interesting to note that Etienne Gilson holds
that St. Thomas equates " being qua being " and God: " The science of being
qua being passes into the science of the first causes, which itself passes into the
science of the first cause, because God is, at one and the same time, both the
first cause and being qua being." Being And Some Philosophers, p. 157.
'"P. 153.
24 K S, 1061a7-10, Owens' trans.

ARISTOTLE's

METAPHYSICS

88

is not difficult to make out. First, it is clear that by " Being "
in " Being qua Being " he here means Entity; this restriction
of the term within the context is proper since Entity is the
primary Being. Nor is it unclear why he says that it is as
inhering in this primary Being, considered under the formality
of Being, that accidents are called Being. For the aspect under
which we view their subject determines the way in which we
speak of accidents. For example, the affections and habits of
that Entity which is Man, considered precisely as Man, would
be spoken of as human. Were this subject viewed under a
different light, our way of speaking would vary accordingly.
This is the reason for Aristotle's statement that the accidents
of Being, qua Being, are said to be.

c. BEING AND SEPARATE ENTITY.
We will now consider the second use to which Fr. Owens
puts the judgment that the nature signified by " Being " is
found only in separate Entity. Its function stands out best
when viewed in relation to a problem that arises from the text
of the Metaphysics.
Aristotle's purpose in determining the various significations
of" Being" was to establish the scope of the science of Being.
Noting that one science dealt with all "healthy" things, he
stated that the same applied to the study of Being. First
Philosophy will thus consider not only Entity but also those
things in whose notion there is a reference to Entity. In view
of this, Fr. Owens must propose a similar doctrine relative to
those things-the sensible Entities-which are said to have
Being by reference to the immobile substances. He did so in
his commentary on Epsilon 1:
The science of the separate Entities, therefore, treats universally
of all Beings insofar as they are Beings ... the science of the
separate Entities will deal universally with every instance of Being
insofar as it is Being ... in studying this Entity, it (the intellect)
is learning the first causes of all things, the causes of " Being qua
Being."

84

JOHN D. BEACH

As his words indicate, it is in this way that the author
accounts for the universality of Wisdom. However, the extension of the science to things other than separate Entity poses
a serious problem. In the light of this, what are we to make
of his contention that Wisdom is concerned with separate
Entity in an altogether exclusive manner? He does, of course,
propose a way out
this difficulty, but consideration of that
will be deferred until the problem has been more deeply probed.
One notable aspect of the above words of Fr. Owens is that
a new meaning is assigned the all-important phrase "Being
qua Being." It is now taken to signify sensible things under
the formality of Being. Certainly such is his meaning when he
speaks of the science of separate Entity as dealing " universally
with every instance of Being insofar as it is Being " and with
"the causes of Being qua Being."
must ask
he chose
to use the phrase in this second sense, and then regards it as
the only proper sense. What relation can
have to the text
as
speaks
the science of " Being qua Being," he means the science of the
nature which constitutes separate Entity?
The answer is found
another notable aspect of these same
words. They serve as a fairly accurate summary of Aristotle's
first formal statement on the subject of First Philosophy. In
Gamma 1 he writes:
There is a science which considers "Being qua Being," and what
belong to it per se. Now this is not the same as any of what are
called the particular sciences; for none of these treats universally
of "Being qua Being." They cut off a part of Being and consider
what happens to pertain to this part, as, for instance, the mathematical sciences do. Now since we are seeking the first principles
and the highest causes, clearly there must be some nature to which
these belong in virtue of that nature itself. If then those who
sought the elements of Beings were seeking these same principles,
it is necessary that the elements must be the elements of Being
not per accidens but qua Being. Therefore it is of Being qua Being
that we also must grasp the first causes. 15
15

Gamma 1, l003a2l··32, Owens' trans.

ARISTOTLE'S

METAPHYSICS

85

We now see why, in his commentary on Epsilon 1, Fr. Owens
said that the science of separate Entity treats universally of
all Beings and seeks their causes qua Being. The text of Aristotle demands precisely this language. His understanding of
" Being qua Being " is too evident to be ignored. It is also
evident that he sees it as the task of Wisdom to learn the causes
of Being insofar as it is Being.
But more important is the theme of Gamma 1. In the mind
of Aristotle, that whose principles, causes and attributes we
seek is precisely that of which we have science. This is" Being
qua Being" in the one proper sense, or, as Fr. Owens at times
interprets the phrase, sensible Entity under the aspect of Being.
And yet, he maintains that this Entity does not truly fall within
the subject of First Philosophy. The rigorous thesis that he
has imposed upon the Metaphysics demands this negative
judgment.
Fr. Owens offers two solutions to the above difficulty. The
first rests on something already familiar to us. This is his
unique understanding of the phrase" Being qua Being." Initially, his commentary on Gamma 1 reveals a proper grasp of its
meaning. He notes, for example,
What pertains to "Being qua Being," in accordance with the
Posterior Analytics, should
a) belong to it per se,
b) belong immediately to the Being found in anything whatsoever,
c) pertain to any chance instance of Being,
d) belong universally to all Beings,
e) belong necessarily to all Beings.
The science of Being described in the qua and per se terms, the
science which treats Being universally, should therefore possess the
other characteristics given in this list.l 6

However, other passages is this same commentary turn upon
a different interpretation of the phrase. These have to do with
the relationship between Aristotle's statement on the causes
10

P. 148.

86

JOHN D. BEACH

sought by Wisdom and the difficulties posed in Book Beta
concerning the unity of the science. Fr. Owens writes:
The four causes had to be understood in a unity sufficient to bring
them under a single science. Here they are shown to belong to
one nature, " Being qua Being." How that unity provides the basis
for a single science, remains to be examined.17
And again:
... the intellect has seen that the four causes must belong to one
nature, and should therefore be all treated by the science which
deals with that nature. That nature is " Being qua Being." The
intellect can proceed to study " Being qua Being " in full confidence
that it is thereby studying the four causes.18
The reference to "Being qua Being" as the one nature
studied in the science reveals the meaning nqw assigned these
words. As in the commentary on Epsilon 1, they are here taken
to signify separate Entity. This presumably enables him to
maintain the position that the science which seeks the causes
of " Being qua Being " is really concerned with but one nature,
that of the immobile substances. But again, the sequence is
vitiated by the ambiguity in" Being qua Being." The difficulty
posed by Gamma 1 remains. That whose causes we seek in the
Primary Philosophy is, for Aristotle, that of which we have
science-namely, Being under the formality of Being. Whatever the subject's ultimate scope, it certainly includes natural
substance considered precisely as Being. The stated universality
of the science assures this. What then of the author's thesis?
One path remains open to him. He must somehow reduce
the Being of natural things to that of separate Entity. Only
iii this way can he justify the restriction of the science of Being
to its primary type.
The necessary reduction is effected by the assertion that when
" Being " is predicated of sensible things, separate Entity is
signified by the word. This Entity is thus the one nature
17

18

P. 149.
P. 150.

ARISTOTLE'S

METAPHYSICS

87

studied in all things. The conclusion follows: First Philosophy
is, simply speaking, the science of separate Entity.
Behind the present argument, of course, lies the assertion that
a pros en equivocal term only designates the nature of the
primary instance. The principle is first applied to " Being "
as said of Entity and accident.
The accidents will not possess the nature of Being in themselves.
The nature according to which they are Being will not be their
own natures. It will be the Entity of which they are the affections.
This should mean that when we say " The man is pale," the man
alone really is. It is he who is-pale. The paleness itself, considered
just in its own nature apart from the Entity of which it is the
affection, could not be said to be. If we say, with any meaning,
" Paleness is," we are really saying " The man is-pale." The Being
as such is that of the man. But " paleness " is by its very nature
an affection of man; and so it is, but only through and in the Being
of the man. The nature of the man alone is in itself. When " paleness " is said to be, the nature of the man-the Entity-is denoted
by the word.19
Much of this, if understood properly, is entirely acceptable.
The questionable doctrine is that found in the last proposition:
" When ' paleness ' is said to be, the nature of the man-the
Entity-is denoted by the verb." Here he clearly proposes that
"Being" as predicated of an accident actually signifies Entity.
In other words, "Being" predicated of accident has the same
meaning as "Being" predicated of substance. Its corollary
is apparently found in the ambiguous statement that in the
case of paleness "The Being as such is that of the man"the Entity.
The same doctrine will of necessity be applied to " Being "
as predicated of natural and immobile substance. As the sole
possessor of the " nature of Being as such " and the truly
primary instance of " Being," separate Entity must always be
that which is signified by the term. In his commentary on
Epsilon 1, the author drew this very inference:
•• P. IllS.

88

JOHN D. BEACH

The " Being " expressed in regard to anything else seems the Being
of the separate Entities.
The relevance of this to the science of Being was then noted:
Just as the "health" studied in all the instances of "healthy"
is the health in the bodily organism, so the Being studied in anything whatsoever is the Being of the separate and divine Entities.
Both these positions are further developed in the final chapter
of Fr. Owens' work. Noting that the separate Entities are
the final cause of natural generation, he adds,
Being is derived to all other Entity and all other Beings according
to the degree in which the actual permanence of the separate
Entities is shared or imitated. All sensibile things strive to attain
as best they can that actual permanence. They are Being according
to the degree in which they attain that perpetuity .... The sensible
thing, in striving after the permanence of separate Entity, imitates
and expresses the permanence, the Being of the separate Entities
themselves ... When sensible things are called by their own names,
their proper nature is expressed. When they are called Being, it
is not their own nature, but the nature of the separate Entities
which is primarily designated, just as the health in the body is
expressed when a medicine is called healthy. Separate form is Being
and is universal to all Beings.
As in his commentary on Epsilon 1, this position is immediately
related to the Being studied in the Primary Philosophy:
As a science of pros en equivocals, the primary Wisdom contemplates form without matter-which is the nature of the separate
Entities-in itself and as it is expressed in every other instance
of Being. But this nature which it studies in every case is the same
-separate Entity, which is Being qua Being in its highest instance.
Wisdom is therefore correctly designated " the science of separate
Entity," without any further addition. 20
In its apparent form, the argument developed by Fr. Owens
is coercive. If "Being" always signifies separate Entity, it
certainly follows that Wisdom, the science of Being, is correctly designated " the science of separate Entity," without
•• Pp. 294-5.

ARISTOTLE's

METAPHYSICS

89

any further addition. If " Being " were thus limited in its
signification, there would be no other Being to serve as the
subject of the science.
However, the antecedent in this sequence can hardly be
granted. To begin with, it makes of " Being " a univocal term.
For it is said to be a word which, in every instance, signifies one
and the same nature. This alone should be sufficient ground
for its unqualified rejection-particularly
for one whose interpretation of the Metaphysics is based on the fact that "Being "
is a pros en equivocal.
In addition, it implies that all things are separate Entities.
That Aristotle would draw such an inference is dear from a
passage in Book Kappa. There he takes up the position
Being and Unity are the most unchangeable principles of things.
He is quick to note the absurd consequence of this view.
If, on the other hand, we are to set up what are thought to be
the most unchangeable principles, being and unity, firstly, if each
of these does not indicate a " this" or substance, how will
be separable and independent? Yet we expect the eternal and
primary principles to be so. But if each of them does signify a
" this" or substance, all things that are are substances; for being
is predicated of all things (and unity also of some); but that all
things that are are substances is false. 21

These :remarks are directly applicable to Fr. Owens' position.
If, as he contends, "Being " always signifies the nature of
separate Entity, then all the things that are are separate Entities, since "Being " is predicated of
things. But this is
dearly unacceptable to Aristotle, whose " Doctrine of Being "
Fr. Owens purports to expose.
It may be, of course, that the author will not accept the
argument attributed to him. This is indicated by a qualification he introduces when speaking of " Being " in relation to
separate Entity. In the selection from the final chapter of his
work, he said that "Being" as predicated of sensible things
primarily signifies immobile substance. This manner of speak21

K

l060a35-b5, Oxford.

90

JOHN D. BEACH

ing is repeated some few pages later, where he states that" the
Entity expressed in all sensible things ... is primarily the
Being of the separate Entities." 22 This last formulation suggests a further qualification. It could be his contention that
separate Entity finds expression in every instance of Being as
any cause finds expression in its effect. Or, possibly, he means
that " Being " predicated of other things involves a reference
to separate Entity as the primary instance. In any case, he
would be enabled to turn aside the charge that he has converted a pros en equivocal into a univocal term.
However, other difficulties await him. If as predicated of
sensible things "Being" primarily signifies separate Entity,
such things are primarily separate Entities. If, on the other
hand, his true position is only that the Being expressed by other
things is that of separate Entity, on what basis would he
restrict Wisdom to this Being? The same difficulty arises if he
is to be interpreted as holding only that " Being " predicated of
sensible things involves a reference to separate Entity. This
simply means that immobile substance is the primary instance
of Being. It hardly implies that we do not seeks the principles
and attributes-and thus science-of sensible things as the
secondary instances of Being. And therefore it does not justify
the assertion that Wisdom is to be designated " the science of
separate Entity " without qualification.
But more important is the fact that the argument attributed
to him is one that he actually adopted and one that follows
from his own principles. In the two previous cases where he
applied his theory of pros en equivocal predication no qualifications were introduced. In his commentary on Gamma 2 he
said that "Being" predicated of accident signified the nature
of Entity. In his commentary on Epsilon 1 he said that the
" ' Being ' expressed in regard to anything else seems the Being
of the separate Entities!' And in both cases the ground of the
assertion lay in his notion that the nature signified by a pros en
equivocal is found in the primary instance alone. This can only
mean that the signification of the term is restricted to its

ARISTOTLE's

METAPHYSICS

91

primary instance; for if its meaning extends beyond the primary
instance, the nature-or natures-signified could not possibly
be that of the primary instance alone. Thus if one holds that
the nature signified by the word is found only in the primary
instance, he must also hold that, however used, the word signifies this primary instance; otherwise it would be mere sound.
The source of the author's difficulty here is readily seen. He
should have said that in all pros en equivocal predication the
nature primarily signified by the word is found in the first
instance alone; or, that the nature to which there is a reference
in every instance of the word is found only in the first instance.
This is an evident but at times a very pertinent truth. It is
not, however, a characteristic of analogy of attribution (the
author's pros en equivocal) as such, but of all reasoned ambiguity. If the nature of the primary instance were realized
properly in the other instances, we would not have equivocation
of any sort, but univocity. Wherever there is a deliberate
extension of a word, there is a primary instance by reference to
which the others are named, the meaning of the word varies
and the natures signified are diverse. This is true of both
analogy of attribution and analogy of proper proportionately.
In the latter case all the instances are proportionately one and
are grouped under a common concept, but of necessity the
nature primarily signified by the word is that of the first instance alone. This does not mean that the secondary instances
are not properly signified by the word; they are. On the other
hand, it is not only in such analogy that the word is properly
applied to the secondary instances. This is true as well in
analogy of attribution; for it is not by chance that the word
is thus extended.
Fr. Owens apparently does not accept this last point. In
pros en equivocal predication, he would hold, the primary
instance alone is properly signified by the word. Thus, in the
case of Being, separate Entity alone is thought to be really
Being. And therefore it alone should be the nature studied in
the science of Being qua Being. Some of the difficulties en-

JOHN D. BEACH

countered in the development of this position should have
suggested the initial error; they undoubtedly account for the
wavering in his concluding chapter. It is fair to assume, however, that he would not take this position as regards analogy
of proper proportionality. Here he would no doubt grant that
the secondary instances are properly signified by the common
word. However, he denies that Aristotle held to such an analogy
in the case of Being. We now turn to that question.

D.

CoMMON

BEING.

Fr. Owens asserts that a "science treating universally of
Beings which is not identified with the science of a definite
type of Being, the primary type," must have for its subject the
concept "Being." At other times we are told that such a
subject would be something " abstract," in contrast to the
"definite nature" of separate Entity. 22 His argument may be
formulated as a disjunction. Being is common to all things
either as separate Entity is "universal to all Beings" or in
the manner of a concept. And so, the universal Being studied
in First Philosophy is either that of the immobile substances
or that of the concept. No other mode of community is thought
•• P. 176. On this point Etienne Gilson offers Fr. Owens direct support: " ..•
let us leave aside the consideration of being in general as the 'formal object '
of a possible metaphysics. Although many things which have been said by Aristotle
may bear such an interpretation of his thought, he himself has certainly not
reduced the highest of all sciences to the abstract knowledge of a merely formal
object." Op. cit., p. 155. The historian of contemporary Catholic philosophy will
no doubt have detected in other places a similar distaste for the " abstract " character of metaphysics. It is apparently felt that if an " abstract nature " be posited
as the subject of a science, the doctrine will bear upon the conceptual rather than
the real. To overcome this presumed problem, those of the above philosophical
persuasion will insist that, in the case of Metaphysics at least, the subject must
be something "definite" or concrete. Thus Fr. Owens asserts that, for Aristotle.
" Being qua Being " is " looked upon as a definite nature." And though " separate
Entity " designates a class of Beings, on p. 295 he says of this class, " like any form,
it is actually individual, and not abstract." As regards Thomistic Metaphysics, fear
af the " abstract " may well be the sourc-e of the position that esse, rather than em,
is the subject of that science. Esse, perhaps, is seen as more concrete than ens.
Certainly it would be if the Esse in question were that of God, as is implied in
M. Gilson's identification of God and " Being qua Being."

ARISTOTLE'S

METAPHYSICS

98

to be possible. Being as something univocally common is excluded because it could only be a genus, and Aristotle is explicit
in his rejection of this. 28 The only other community in the real
order is that of an analogy of proper proportionality, and, as
was pointed out, Fr. Owens denies that it is applied by Aristotle
to Being.
His argument against analogy secundum esse is found in his
commentary on H 2. There Aristotle applies " Entity " in an
analogous fashion to accidental composites, and Fr. Owens concedes that " Analogies of this sort run through every category
of Being." But, he states,
Analogy ... is not found among the Aristotelian ways of expressing
Being. The analogies are seen among Beings already constituted
in their proper nature. But Being in its own nature is not constituted by analogy. The Aristotelian Being lacks the four-term
relation necessary for analogy of the latter type. 24

The author's first point is that for an analogy of Being
secundum esse " Being in its own nature " must be " constituted
by analogy." On the truth of this depends the relevance of the
second point-that Aristotle lacks the four-term relation required by this type of analogy. More specifically, Aristotle
is said to lack the notion of existence which would permit an
analogy between different things based on a similar relationship
of each nature to its proper act of existence. 25 Fr. Owens does
grant that Aristotle holds to an analogy" among Beings already
constituted in their proper nature." Presumably, however, this
is not a real non-univocal community among Beings.
But what are we to make of the stated opposition between
an analogy which constitutes the nature of Being and one that
holds among Beings already constituted in their nature? Is this
other than a purely verbal distinction? Does either mean more
than that a given thing is called Being because it is constituted
•• B 8, 998b21-27.

"'P. 287.
•• P. 896, note 14.

94

JOHN D. BEACH

in a manner analogous to that in which the primary Being is
constituted? Or that a thing is constituted as a Being because
its constitution is analogous to that of the primary Being?
Certainly in either case the analogues are given as constituted
in their proper natures. I£ they were not, we would not see
them as analogously the same. Of course, if Fr. Owens insists
that the phrase " constituted by analogy " signifies real causality on
part of analogy, his argument will have some merit.
However, an explanation of this causality would be in order.
As well, he should defend the assertion that the universal or
common Being studied in Wisdom is either that of separate
Entity or that of the concept "Being." Clearly, though his
theory of analogy might differ from that of Fr. Owens, Aristotle
held to another notion of common Being.
This may be seen in a passage from Gamma 3. Aristotle's
purpose is to establish that the consideration of the first principles of things pertains to the Primary Philosophy. He writes:
We must state whether it belongs to one or to different sciences
to inquire into the truths which are in mathematics called axioms,
and into Entity. Evidently, the inquiry into these also belongs
to one science, and that the science of the philosopher; for these
truths belong to everything that is, and not to some special genus
apart from others. And all men use them, because they are true of
being qua being and each genus has being. But men use them just
so far as to satisfy their purposes; that is, as far as the genus to
which their demonstrations refer extends. Therefore since these
truths clearly belong to all things qua being (for this is what is
common to them), to him who studies being qua being belongs the
inquiry into these as well. 26

Two points are of relevance here. That upon which the first
principles follow is precisely the subject of the Primary Philosophy-Being under the formality of Being. And that nature,
Being, of which, as such, we seek the first principles-and
causes and attributes-is common to all things. What is meant
by" common Being" here? Is the concept" Being "the subject
•• Gamma 3,

Fr. Owens' trans.

ARISTOTLE'S

95

METAPHYSICS

of such an inquiry? Is separate Entity the "universal Being"
dealt with? Is " Being " said of its secondary instances precisely
in the way that " healthy " is predicated of medicine? The
answer would appear to be evident. It follows that real Being,
proportionately realized in all its inferiors, is that considered
by the Philosopher. Only if this be the case can the principles
and attributes of Being qua Being pertain to all things. This
conclusion alone is justified by the text of Aristotle.
JOHN

4761 Broadway,
New York 34, N.Y.

D. BEACH

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS
JAMES V. ScHALL, S. J.,' M.A., formerly a professor at the University of
San Francisco, is engaged in graduate studies in government at
Georgetown University.
SR. MARY MicHAEL GLENN, C. D.P., M.A., a graduate of Notre Dame
University, is engaged in secondary education and is the Director of
Vocations for the Sisters of Divine Providence.
JonN D. BEACH, Ph. D., is a graduate of Laval University and was formerly
a member of the staff of Marquette University.
JAMES V. MuLLANEY, Ph. D., a frequent contributor to THE TnoMmT,
is the Director of the Liberal Arts Program at Manhattan College.
TERRENCE O'SHAUGHNESSY, 0. P., S. T. D., a graduate of the Angelicum in
Rome, is a member of the teaching staff at the Dominican House of
Studies and Dunbarton College, Washington, D. C.
NICHOLAs HALLIGAN, 0. P., S. T. D., is the Professor of Pastoral Theology
at the Dominican House of Studies, Washington, D. C.
PAUL FARRELL, 0. P., S. T. D., the author of "The Theology of Religious
Vocation," is a Professor of Moral Theology at the Dominican House
of Studies, Washington, D. C.

96

BOOK REVIEWS
Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. By
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE. Translated with an introduction by Hazel E.
Barnes. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. Pp. 657. $10.00.
Sartre's major philosophical work, L'Etre et le Neant, appeared in French
in 1943. Until now, the American image of Sartre has been based largely
on his literary, rather than his philosophical, output. It is a matter of some
importance that his major philosophical work should now be available in
English. Catholic theologians and philosophers will recall the injunction
of Pope Pius XII in Humani Generis that the works of the atheistic existentialists, among others, should be mastered by competent Catholic
scholars, with a view to criticism of errors, appropriation of such truth as
they may contain, and a deepening of one's own hold on truth.
This English translation opens with an analytical and reasonably detached " Translator's Introduction."
Prof. Barnes, while sympathetic to
Sartre, is no mere worshiper. The author's "Introduction " follows, and in
it Sartre raises gradually the dominating questions of this book: What is
the relation of the For-itself to the In-itself? And how are both related
to being?
The body of the book is divided into four parts. The first, " The Problem
of Nothingness," deals with "The Origin of Negation" and "Bad Faith."
Part Two, entitled " Being For-Itself," analyzes first " Immediate Structures of the For-Itself," then "Temporality," and finally "Transcendence."
Part Three," Being-For-Others," takes up three problems: "The Existence
of Others," " The Body " and " Concrete Relations with Others." Part
Four analyzes " Having, Doing and Being." It is here that the well-known
Sartrian exploration of " Freedom " is found. The " Conclusion " reverts
to the questions raised in the author's " Introduction " and answers them
succinctly in the light of the intervening analyses. Sartre concludes with
a promise of a further volume devoted to the ethical implications of his
conclusions in ontology, but this promise has not been kept in the intervening thirteen years.
Prof. Barnes has done a very competent translation. There are a few
typographical errors, most of which can be corrected from the context;
there are probably fewer errors in the English than in the French. In
addition to her translation and her introduction, she has drawn up a " Key
to Special Terminology " (pp.
in which the definitions of Sartre's
key terms are drawn from Sartre, and usually from this very book. There
is also an index of proper names.

97

98

BOOK REVIEWS

It would be a duplication of effort to summarize Sartre's teaching in this
review. This has been splendidly done in James Collins' The Existentiand in Kurt Reinhardt's The Existentialist Revolt
alists (Regnery,
(Bruce,
as well as in numerous studies by non-Catholics, and in the
" Translator's Introduction " to this volume. But the most efficient way
to get an introductory understanding of Sartre, if that is still needed,
would be to read his "Introduction" and "Conclusion" to Being and
Nothingness.
Neither do I intend to attempt a Thomistic critique of Sartre, nor the
construction of Thomistic answers to his problems. Both of these tasks
were magnificently achieved in Maritain's Existence and the Existent (Pantheon, 1948) .
Instead, I shall list six lines of study which might profitably be applied
to this book. The first method of study might well be that of the logical
analysts. It will be recalled that in 1903 G. E. Moore published a famous
study of Idealism, the point of which was to determine what meaning, or
meanings, if any, the sentence Esse est percipi may have. Moore's own
philosophical position was weak, to say the least; but his criticism of Idealism was so devastating that Idealism has been a dead issue in England
and America for fifty years.
Sartre's key terms all need that kind of attention. His use of the words
" being," " is," " distance," but above all " not," " nothing " and every form
of the negative, is highly ambiguous. My suspicion is that the terms
" nothing " and " distance," at least, are devoid of meaning in Sartre; or are
used so equivocally as to invalidate all of his conclusions. Interestingly,
Sartre has called attention to the same kind of equivocation in Heidegger's
use of the phrase " outside of self." (p. 9!50)
The second type of study might well be an appraisal of his phenomenological method. This book is well sub-titled " An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology." Now leaving aside Sartre's peculiar understanding of
, there still remains the
ontology as distinct from metaphysics (p.
problem of "phenomenology."
To date, Catholic thinkers both in Europe and in America have been
most hospitable to this method. But it is suspicious that, half a century
after Husserl first announced this method, it is still so sprawling and vague.
Even after one has read the major practitioners of it-Husserl, Scheler,
Heidegger, Sartre-one still f-aces these basic questions: l) what, exactly, is
how precisely, does it differ from the philosophical method
this method?
described in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics? 3) insofar as it may be a
distinct philosophical method, what are its advantages? 4) is it separable
from the absolute Idealism of its founder? 5) is it, as a method, valid or
invalid?
Sartre's method is that of phenomenology. If that method is a mere

BOOK REVIEWS

99

piece of pomposity, devoid of meaning or of validity, his conclusions would
be, to the extent that they depend upon his method, in question.
The third line of inquiry might well be historical. Descartes, Hegel,
Husserl and Heidegger are the men referred to most frequently; Spinoza,
Kant and Freud often, but less frequently. One has the uncomfortable
suspicion that Sartre's handling of these philosophers is never dispassionate,
never altogether accurate. What he takes from them is not in them; and
what he criticizes in them is that they are not Sartre. This misuse of
sources is, of course, a common fault among philosophers and, worse still,
even among some historians of philosophy. Cherniss has made out a
plausible case for saying that the first book of Aristotle's Metaphysics is
just such a mishandling of his (Aristotle's) predecessors. But a common
fault is still a fault. And if Sartre has this fault, it becomes a matter of
justice to disengage Descartes' Descartes, for example, from Sartre's
Descartes.
A fourth line of investigation would be to look closely at Sartre's starting
point which, put in traditional terms, is the duality of subject and object
(roughly For-itself and In-itself) implied by consciousness. This is not an
uncommon starting point for the builders of massive philosophical structures; witness Plotinus, Hegel and Husserl; and, possibly, Descartes, Kant
and Spinoza. But it may well be that what begins in consciousness remains
in consciousness. As the ontological proof for the existence of God winds
up, not at the feet of the living God, but merely at the analysis of the
content of an idea, so, I suspect, any theory of reality which begins with
the author's consciousness winds up as a merely vulgar exhibition of one's
own mind. Such an exhibition may be of interest to psychiatrists, but it is
devoid of philosophical significance.
Distinct both from starting point and conclusions are the unexamined
dogmas which Sartre lays down incidentally to reaching his conclusions;
and the enumeration and examination of these would be an instructive
fifth procedure. For despite the " presuppositionless " method of phenomenology, Sartre makes numerous assertions which are neither selfevident nor demonstrated; they are merely laid down as true. Here are a
few examples, quoted at random: " There is only intuitive knowledge."
(p. 172) " Quality is nothing other than the being of the this when it is
considered apart from all external relation with the world or with other
thises." (p. 186) " Thus original sin is my upsurge in a world where there
are others; and whatever may be my further relations with others, these
relations will be only variations on the original theme of my guilt." (p. 410)
" ' Having ' ' doing ' and ' being ' are the cardinal categories of human
reality." (p. 431)
The sixth line of study is the obverse of the fourth. If it is necessary to
examine closely where Sartre is starting from, it is equally necessary to
examine closely where he is going to. What is his theme? What is the goal

100

BOOK REVIEWS

of this lengthy inquiry? What is the conclusion, the new insight, he has
labored to establish?
This insight broods over Sartre's book for several hundred pages before
it is ever stated. It gathers slowly, opressively, from the very first page.
It is a twofold conviction.
The first part of the conclusion is that the meaning of man is to be
God. " Thus the best way to conceive of the fundamental project of
human reality is to say that man is the being whose project is to be God."
(p. 566) "Man fundamentally is the desire to be God." (p. 566) "Every
human reality is a passion in that it projects losing itself so as to found
being and by the same stroke to constitute in In-itself which escapes contingency by being its own foundation, the Ens causa sui, which religion
calls God. Thus the passion of man is the reverse of that of Christ, for
man loses himself as man that God may be born." (p. 615) " Man makes
himself in order to be God." (p. 626) '
It is not sufficient that .I should be God viewed simply in myself. Love
means that" the other" [in this case, my lover] knows me to be God. "But
if the other loves me then I become the unsurpassable, which means that
I must be the absolute end ... I am the absolute value ... [To my lover]
I must no longer be seen on the ground of the world as a ' this ' among
other ' thises,' but the world must be revealed in terms of me ... I must
be the one whose function is to make trees and water exist, to make
cities and fields and other men exist .... " (p. 369)
I must, then, be God. But the second part of Sartre's conclusion is that
God cannot be. It is not that man cannot become God; that is, the fault
is not on the side of man. It is rather that God cannot be at all; the
fault, the impossibility of existence, is on the side of God. " Of course this
ens causa sui [throughout the book, Sartre so defines God] is impossible,
and the concept of it, as we have seen, contains a contradiction." (p. 622)
" But the idea of God is contradictory and we lose ourselves in vain. Man
is a useless passion." (p. 615)
This is Sartre's final position. He is nauseated, in despair, and anguished
because he is not God; and he is not God because God cannot be.
Philosophy has nothing to say to such a position, because this is not a
philosophical position. This pining to be God, this sickness at not being
God, is, on the psychological side, madness. On the theological side it is
satanic pride. The philosophy of Sartre is an extrapolation on man's
attempt to evade the first commandment.
I do not mean that Sartre has not written !1 serious philosophical work;
he has, and it merits the attention of competent Catholic scholars. I mean,
rather, that his whole philosophy is an incidental by-product of a nonphilosophical disorder.
JAMES

Manhattan College,
New York, N.Y.

v. MULLANEY

BOOK REVIEWS

101

Fundamentals of Mariology. By JuNIPER B. CARoL, 0. F. M. New York:
Benziger, 1956. Pp. QQ3 with index. $3.75.
The desire of an author to present an acceptable study of the theology of
the Mother of God is a commendable desire indeed. When that desire is
coupled with a determination that such a study should be useable as a text
on the seminary level and even as an adjunct to the theological enlightenment of the layman, then the project is to be commended for its vision
and daring as well as its zeal. Father Carol deserves respectful praise for
just such determination.
His work, the fruit of a series of mariological lectures given at St.
Bonaventure University during the Summer sessions, is presented in a
textual format; and the clarity and logical order of the presentation are
enviable. The book is of particular value to those who have been irritated
by a too cursory consideration of Patristic witness in regard to Mary and
her privileges. The Fathers have been judiciously selected and their texts
have been adequately exposed to satisfy those who seek doctrinal roots of
Mariology in the Fathers.
We find here unfortunately, there is much too often an attempt to present
questionable opinion as dogma. The work is, by intention of the author, a
text which would be used in seminaries and religious institutes. Consequently the presentation of opinion and the frequent, off-handed dismissal of all
opposition seem inexcusable. In short, Fr. Carol presents his theses and
fails to inform the impressionable mind that these theses represent only
one school, one side of a problem.
Again, courage in conviction is always praiseworthy, but disregard for
major traditions in the theological investigation of mariological doctrine
seems uncalled for. As an example
point up the reviewer's complaint,
Fr. Carol spends much of his book exposing opinions which have as their
point of origin the thesis of the priority of the predestining decree in regard
to Mary. It is a thesis which is representative almost entirely of the
Franciscan school, as the author openly admits. (p. fll) Yet the attempt. to
defend it is but cursory; its opponents are hardly mentioned. Such gratuitous definition of primary concepts and off-handed disregard for opposing
and strong traditions would seem out of place in a work of the textbook
type.
One might also object to the work's completely apodictic rejection of St.
Thomas' teaching in regard to the Immaculate Conception. The various
questions as to whether the Angelic Doctor accepted or rejected the doctrine, as to whether there is a certain evolution in his thought and conviction, are far from obvious in their solutions. But Father Carol would
leave his students with the unchallenged impression that the Doctor of the
Schools should be patronizingly pitied for the shortcoming of theological

102

BOOK REVIEWS

fraility. Nor is this a question of mere fraternal pique. The authority of
St. Thomas, the respect owed him in the Church, and the far from obvious
decision as to what he held (and when and why) would, or should, make
a textbook author hesitate in his temptation to cursory dismissal.
Another defect is to be found in Father Carol's discussion of Mary's sinlessness and the " debt to sin." This discussion suffers from both brevity
and understated arguments. The opinions favoring the debt are dismissed
with a casual remark that they " sufficiently safeguard the truth that Mary
was redeemed by the merits of Christ; although at times this is done at
the expense of her unparalleled holiness." (p. 115) His own opinion is
defended by some remarkable arguments. This theory " not only does not
withdraw Our Lady from the salutary influence of the Redemption, but it
makes her all the more indebted to it. The efficacy of Christ's redemptive grace was so overwhelming in her case that it not only preserved her
from the contraction of sin, but even placed her beyond the reach of the
law of sin. In the order of God's intention, Our Lady's original grace was
foreseen with a logical priority to the Redemption. However, in the order of
execution, God decreed that the conferring of this grace would be merited
for her by the Savior's Passion and Death. Hence, it remains true ... that
Mary was truly ' redeemed by Christ.' " (p. ll7) It is difficult to see, even
granted " that the word redeemed as used here, is taken in a less strict
sense than when applied to us," (ibid.) how the redemptive character of
the grace of Christ could be univocally predicated of Mary's sanctification
and that of the rest of the children of Adam. Fr. Carol skirts the difficulty
by maintaining that " as the concept of ' redemption ' loses some of its
strict connotation, it also gains in sublimity and perfection, thus redounding to the greater glory of the Savior.'' (pp. 117-118) Be that as it
may, the meriting death of Christ was essentially redemptive and sanctificative of the children of Adam. Its effects in Mary's regard are more
sublime and more perfect, but the efficiency was still in the order of
redemption, both in the order of divine intention and execution.
One also regrets the impression which might well be made on the minds
of students by an unnecessary and, perhaps, inaccurate footnote reference:
"in our humble opinion, the widespread notion that descent from Adam
by way of 'ordinary generation,' of itself and necessarily, brings about
original sin, is theologically inaccurate. The fact that this notion, like
many other stereotyped formulas, has been handed down from generation
to generation through our· manuals does not make it acceptable. Fortunately in recent years a growing number of theologians have become
aware that the so called ' traditional ' views on this point call for a
thorough revision. They rightly point out that, of itself, " ordinary generation is only an occasion with regard to the contraction of original sin; it
is the moral headship of Adam which alone causes it in us. Thus, in the

BOOK REVIEWS

103

hypothesis that a child were conceived through a physico-chemical process
of generation, he would still have to be baptized to be cleansed from
original sin, because of his inclusion in the moral headship of Adam."
(p. 88)
The value of this footnote in a textbook may well be questioned. The
opinion concerning moral headship expressed in it, an opinion characterized
by Janssens as "an innovation introduced at the time of the reformers ...
gratuitous fiction . . . , useless, hardly intelligible and hardly consonant
with the justice of God," can hardly be reconciled with the traditional
teaching of St. Augustine and St. Thomas. Needless to say, the whole
tenor of Trent's declarations in this regard seems to demand more than
can be explained by the mere moral headship which Fr. Carol would teach
his students in this footnote.
In his chapter on the knowledge of Our Lady, Father Carol sets down
some preliminary notions. While this reviewer does not relish the role
of the iconoclast, mention should be made of the glaring inaccuracy in
the presentation of the ideas of acquired and experimental knowledge. It
is a strange innovation to define experimental knowledge in this fashion:
"it (acquired knowledge) is called experimental when things previously
known through infused knowledge are learned through one's own experience .
. . ." (pp. 159-160) Such an explanation seems surprising and disappointing
to this reviewer. One can understand slips in reference citations (n. Q77)
but confusion in basic definitions causes hesitation in accepting the work
as desirable on the textbook level.
There is, of course, a great need for a work which would present Mariology in its fundamentals for teaching purposes. Father Carol certainly
deserves our praise for attempting what is certainly necessary for the continued success of the theological movement of our times. However, this
reviewer cannot share the enthusiasm of those who would say that this
attempt has been entirely successfuL
TERENCE O'SHAUGHNESSY, 0. P.
Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

De Extrema Unctione. By EMMANUEL DoRONZO, 0. M. I. Milwaukee,
Bruce. I De Causis lntrinsecis, 1954. Pp. 634 with indexes. H De
Causis Extrinsecis, 1955. Pp. 881 with indexes. Set $17.50.
Following upon his four volumes on the sacrament of Penance, Fr.
Doronzo logically takes up Extreme Unction, which is called by St. Thomas,
poenitentiae consummativum. A previous evaluation of the quality of De
Poenitentia (THE TnoMIST, vol. XVII, pp. 120-121) is valid likewise for
the present work, De Extrema Unctione. The extensive and balanced use

104

BOOK REVIEWS

of positive theology under the primacy of the speculative, the consideration
of Protestant and Orthodox teachings, the valuable aids provided by the
many outlines, indexes and bibliographies are characteristic of each new
publication in this dogmatic series. A statement concerning the previous
volumes bears reaffirmation: that the student of theology who is not
acquainted with this comprehensive treatment of Extreme Unction denies
himself the fuH breadth of view of the subject; the professor of sacramental
theology will find among modern manuals no more satisfying source-book.
The first volume embraces the intrinsic causes of this sacrament. After
an extensively documented introductory chapter the author takes up the
institution or existence of the sacrament. The exposition of this dogmatic
question, especially against the heresies, is followed by a more historicotheological treatment of the mode, which ends with a brief note on the
time of institution. Fr. Doronzo denies in this sacrament also the opinion
of a generic institution by Christ.
The succeeding chapter on the matter of Extreme Unction soundly
establishes that oil blessed by a bishop for this sacrament pertains to
validity. Only by special deputation of the Holy See may a simple priest
participate in this episcopal power as extraordinary minister. Demonstrating the validity of a single anointing the author notes the gravity
of the sacramental necessity to supply the other anointings when possible,
as long as the same danger of death perdures.
Finally, regarding the sacramental form, Fr. Doronzo analyzes at length
the various formulas and concludes that the so-called indicative formulas
are de facto equivalently deprecative, and that the short Latin formula
also suffices for validity. As a consequence of Christ's specific institution of
the sacraments (cf. De Sacramentis in genere, pp. 408-419), the author
holds that the Church very probably does not have the power to determine
the matter and form.
The four chapters of volume two consider the extrinsic causes,-Effects,
Properties, Subject, Minister. The principal or specific effect of Extreme
Unction is stated as the cme or healing of the remains of sin-proneness to
evil and difficulty in good-explained in terms of the teaching of St.
Thomas. Fr. Doronzo's position on the reviviscence of the sacraments (op.
cit., art. ll) leads him to maintain that Extreme Unction, if received
informe, may revive during the same danger of death.
Repetition of an anointing, especially in the same illness, merits a long
discussion in the chapter on Properties and is resolved in five practical
norms of administration.
The mode of necessity of reception of this
sacrament is investigated, and the chapter ends with a delightful comparison of the three sacraments of spiritual healing-baptism, penance,
extreme unction.
Regarding the subject of the priest's ministrations Fr. Doronzo, on the

BOOK REVIEWS

105

basis of the state of moral opinion, holds that this sacrament can be given
up to one half hour from the time of apparent death and up to two or
three hours in sudden or violent death.
As previously promised (De Poenitentia, vol. IV, p. 600) the author
has completed his consideration of absolution of the dying non-Catholic
and of the unconscious in conjunction with the same cases regarding
Extreme Unction. The positions adopted are summarized in two long
conclusions.
Conclusion 1 (p. 697) : Extreme Unction and Penance cannot be administered lawfully to a dying and conscious person who is either a formal
heretic or schismatic, or a contumacious sinner, since the requisite disposition is lacking and likely also the necessary intention.
These sacraments probably can be given to a dying conscious person who
is a non-Catholic only materially or in good faith. Controversy over the
lawfulness of such sacramental administration still prevails among theologians. Fr. Doronzo attempts to establish the intrinsic probability of his
opinion by showing that the required disposition and intention are easily
present at least implicitly, and that the practice does not necessarily
violate any pertinent ecclesiastical documents. At the same time certain
safeguards and norms are insisted upon.
Conclusion 2 (p. 712): Probably (more or less) these sacraments can
be administered to any unconscious dying unbaptized person. Such
individuals, even though they may have given no previous sigu of good
disposition, would include formal heretics and schismatics, those who have
obstinately continued in formal infidelity or impenitence, material nonCatholics or those in good faith, Catholics who have lived pagan lives
without, however, having denied the faith, those who have refused the
priest or the sacraments, those who have lapsed into unconsciousness in
the very act of sin or while in the habitual state of sin or whose lives
have been hardly Christian or who are entirely unknown.
The divergence of opinion here is, of course, much sharper. In his discussion Fr. Doronzo lays down certain clear principles: the sacraments
cannot be administered to those certainly lacking the required intention
and disposition; failing this certitude and lacking a positive ecclesiastical
prohibition, a priest may administer the sacraments of necessity, at least
conditionally; however, the possibility of the presence of intention and
disposition does not suffice, as some probability, however slight, must be
possessed; even so, the present state of theological
does not urge
a clear obligation upon the minster in most of these cases.
Without using greater space for a detailed criticism it does appear that
a very wide interpretation is given to the terms in some ecclesiastical documents. Moreover, the necessity for probability as a basis for lawful
administration in these controverted cases does not seem to be properly

106

BOOK REVIEWS

and adequately grounded. The probable reasons alleged are in fact rooted
in the operations of divine grace after loss of consciousness or, in other
words, in the divine mercy, as well as in the possible and variable human
factors attendant upon the unconscious state. The sacraments have been
instituted as sensible signs; especially in the case of Penance some sensible
communication of interior disposition is a sacramental necessity, according
to the Thomists. From the viewpoint of the sacraments the probabilities
alleged in the explanation of Fr. Doronzo's position are merely possibilities
and thus an insufficient basis for sacramental administration.
The final chapter on the Minister of Extreme Unction includes a treatment of the sources and extent of the priest's obligation to administer
the sacrament of the dying.
NICHOLAS HALLIGAN, 0. P.
Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

True Morality and its Counterfeits. By DIETRICH voN HILDEBRAND with
ALICE JouRDAIN. New York: David McKay Co., 1956. Pp. 181. $3.00.
Since the publication of this work, Roma locuta est concerning its principal subject matter, situation ethics. This apparently modem position,
but really nothing more than an emotionally charged version of the ancient
heresy of Illuminism, has received the censure of the Supreme Sacred
Congregation of the Holy Office (Acta Apostolicae Sedis, XXXXVIII, pp.
144-145). The condemnation was presaged by the allocution of the Holy
Father given in April of
to the Federation Mondiale de Jeunesses
Feminines Catholiques. Dr. Von Hildebrand has wisely based his analysis
and criticism of situation ethics upon the doctrine contained in this allocution. While not cast in the form of a commentary on the papal pronouncement, reductively True Morality and its Counterfeits, insofar as it treats
of situation ethics, amounts to just that, a very lucid, penetrating presentation of the Pope's verdict on the "New Morality."
Eminently successful in its principal goal of criticizing circumstance
ethics in such a way as to refute in detail its disastrous errors while safeguarding and, to the extent possible, profiting from the truth it exploits,
the book has not attained the same degree of success in its secondary and
subsidiary aims. Spawned by existentialism, circumstance ethics, like its
progenitor, is a form of protest, specifically a protest against mediocre,
conventional Christians, our modern Pharisees. Dr. Von Hildebrand has
treated the various aspects of this revolt in several chapters by drawing
caricatures of the classical moral Pharisee and the mitigated derivatives
of Pharisaism, the diverse types of self-righteous people. An air of unreality

BOOK REVIEWS

107

hovers about the delineation of these characters- and the attempt to analyze
their psychology of moral conduct, for the characters have been too overdrawn; so much so that they are definitely unreal, the author's own mental
fictions. It seems that the author in this case has been carried away from
diligent and careful observation of real persons by his own rhetorical
creations. As a result, the fundamental reason for treating these moral
types: to discover the element of sin that makes them reprehensible and
a foil to portray the humility of the publican, the humble sinner, lacks
the emphasis that a brief and concise statement would have made possible.
Real threats to moral integrity should be treated realistically without
rhetorical device or substitute.
Again, situation ethics pleads its case for moral acceptability on the
grounds that it gives full respect to the spirit of the law in preference to
the letter and as a result more perfectly enjoys the true freedom of the
spirit of the Christian life. Both claims are considered by the author in
separate chapters and both are soundly refuted. But the mode of refutation gives reasons for pause. As in his previous works, Dr. Von Hildebrand is not content to approach the problem from the established principles of formal moral theology or ethics .. Instead, his phenomenological
bent of mind demands long and detailed investigation of single instances
where letter and spirit may be distinguished, where they coincide, where
they may be antithetical, etc. While this method may well produce, under
ideal circumstances, good results, obviously the fruits cannot be imparted
to others without complete presentation of the analysis undertaken, step
by tedious step, to prepare the mind to see the necessity of accepting a
particular conclusion. The book, however, despite the length of treatment,
omits the steps and presents the conclusions without any reason for their
necessity. As a result, the force of the conclusion is lost on the reader,
who has neither reasons to recognize their necessity (which is excluded
by the method) nor the requisite intellectual preparation to understand
or intuit their full import. Briefly, while the treatment gives many indication of the author's great power of understanding of the matter of the
letter vs. the spirit, his more plodding readers, who could well be more
interested in truth than in a display of the author's intellectual capacity,
might still require to be guided through the maze from the more general
knowledge to particular applications. That is the more natural way,
although at times far less dramatic than the unfolding of the evidence o£
a brilliant intellect. Obviously, the more prosaic approach to the matter
through the general principles of epieicheia and the principles determining
the binding force of various kinds of law are applicable here and are
more conducive to generate science than a disjointed array of brilliant
insights.
Again, the author has chosen to treat the question of Christian freedom

108

BOOK REVIEWS

of spirit from the phenomenological, analytic view rather than from the
traditional theological view. Deprived of the initial starting point of
Faith, the method, of course, is doomed to failure; for the reality establishing the Christian freedom of spirit is supernatural, grace. But to judge
the results of his inquiry, the method involved thoroughly confuses the
whole problem by making problems and more problems where no problem
existed really in the first place. Thus, in the traditional view, freedom
of spirit is the result of grace operating in the soul of man in such a way
that the instinct of grace prompts a man to perform works which are
neither prescribed nor prohibited in the New Law (Summa Theol., I-II,
q. 108, a. 1) but still retain morality insofar as they fall within the scope
of the virtue of prudence. The matter is definite, clear, unequivocal, easily
stated, and authoritative, ultimately with the authority of Sacred Scriptures. In short, all morality is not a matter of precept; all obligations do
not fall under legal justice or obedience. The author's methodology leads
him into uncharted waters to sound the depth of Christian freedom of
spirit with an instrument of his own making, specifically his personal
distinction between " formal " and "material " obligations. As a result,
he must postpone to a later publication the ultimate determination of the
relationship between " formal moral obligation " and "juridical bonds."
A second more obvious result is an obscuring of what is a thoroughly
dear matter. This chapter on " Freedom of Spirit," while revealing the
original inspiration of the author (which occasionally makes for interesting
reading) , might very well be an indictment of his methodology as an
obscurantist instrument.
Like existentialism, situation ethics has found the medium of the novel
and the drama an excellent vehicle to communicate through action what
cannot be communicated through words. Spiritual crises involving man's
desires for God and for His rivals have proved most effective themes to
present the fundamental thesis of this new morality. On the European
scene Catholic literateurs have been so productive in this field and have
so frequently exploited and glorified the theme of man's sinfulness that their
works are now summarily categorized as specimens of " Sin Mysticism."
A serious threat to morality in Europe, the excesses of " Sin Mysticism "
were the subject matter of a pastoral letter of the German Bishops in
December of 1955. The letter reveals the extent of the movement, the
favored themes of the authors, the fundamental moral errors involved,
and the legitimate role of sin in dramas and novels. Surprisingly, in his
treatment of "Sin Mysticism," Dr. Von Hildebrand makes no mention
of this letter and does not avail himself of its authoritative doctrinal
content. But by abandoning his methodical analysis in favor of straight
narration, he has managed to present an authentic picture of the essential
teaching of this school. He has also shown its rather limited influence

BOOK BEVIEWS

109

in America through the novels of Frant;ois Mauriac and Graham Greene.
Considering the popularity of the latter author and his favorable reception
by some of the more outstanding American Catholic book reviewers, one
regrets that Dr. Von Hildebrand has not chosen to give us, in this instance
where he is far more competent, a more detailed analysis of the extent
of circumstance ethics and sin mysticism in Greene's novels.

PAUL FARRELL, 0. P.
Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

BRIEF NOTICES
The Bridge, A Yearbook of Judaeo-Christian Studies. Ed. by John M.
Oesterreicher. New York: Pantheon, 1955. Pp. 349. $3.95.
It is a sublime fact that we cannot ignore: God once spoke to His
people and gave them a Law. He had chosen them for a great purpose: to
prepare the way for His Son. This choosing placed them above all the
peoples of antiquity. It not only made them our spiritual ancestors, but it
placed us under an eternal obligation to these precursors of the Word.
When He came among them, He uttered the divine verdict on their status:
not a jot or tittle of that Law was to be destroyed, but all was to be fulfilled in the New Covenant.
This is the imperishable glory of the Jewish people. Their tragedy was
that historical circumstances and temporal considerations made it difficult
for them to accept Him when He appeared among them. Hence the ambivalence of the Christian toward the Jew: with respect for their historic role
goes sorrow for the rejection by the majority of the Savior for whom all
their history had prepared. The Epistles of Saint Paul are weighted
with his mingling of admiration and regret which leads to a sense of tremendous responsibility that the Gospel be first preached to the Jews, and to the
prophecy of the final conversion of the first-chosen people.
The same spirit animates this volume, which is the first of what will be
a yearbook of Judaeo-Christian studies. It is titled The Bridge to indicate
its purpose. It makes no attempt to find a least common denominator, nor
does it attempt to conceal the essential fact which separates the Christian
from the Jew-the divinity of Jesus Christ. On the contrary, it sees Him
as the Bridge which now links us to them and which one day they shall
cross into His Body, the Church. As an ancillary objective, it hopes to
lessen anti-Semitism among us, which it sees as a derivative of scriptural
and historical ignorance and an obstacle to the appeal of Christ. It is over
the chasm of misunderstanding that the Bridge must be built.
The volume is a series of studies of varying length on subjects of interest
to Christian and Jew. In addition to these essays by specialists in their
respective fields, there are five reviews of serious books. The authors have
been carefully selected, and write with solid scholarship and usually with
literary grace. As a group, they fulfill the promise of Monsignor John L.
McNulty, president of Seton Hall University, in the introduction: "These
volumes will explore the basic unity of Old and New Testaments, confront
the rabbinical tradition with the teaching of the Church, examine the
relationship between Christians and Jews on the temporal plane, review

110

BRIEF NOTICES

111

Jewish thought and life down the ages, weigh recent attempts by Jewish
thinkers and artists to interpret the Christian revelation, sift modern views
of Jewish existence by Jews, Christians, and writers who are neither, and
discuss many other apposite topics. Thus the work of The Bridge will
extend from theology, philosophy, and history, to literature, art, and
sociology."
The essay of Raissa Maritain, " Abraham and the Ascent of Conscience,"
explores a mystery which is familiar to any reader of the Old Testament.
Abraham, the father of his people and the special friend of God, was unquestionably a man of sanctity who accepted the divine will even at great
personal loss. Generations of Christian preachers and artists have been
inspired by his response to the call of God at Ur and his obedience to the
demand that his son be sacrificed. Yet he married his half-sister, took a
second wife, and deliberately lied to Pharoah. These acts would have been
sinful under the law of Nloses and certainly seem shocking to one brought
up under the New Law. But Abraham was conscious of no fault and was
called to no repentance. His conscience was certainly operative, but it was
not sufficiently informed to reach positions that later were to be engraved
on tablets of stone and in the hearts of men. In a word, Abraham lived
in the first, and most immature stage, of man's perception of the moral
law which lasted from Adam to Moses. The latter inaugurated the second,
and higher stage, and the third stage began with the Gospel. This unfolding of revelation was accompanied by man's growing perception of the
natural law and by his growing sensitivity to moral imperatives. Man not
only slowly accumulated data on the physical universe; he equally grew in
awareness of moral law.
An outstanding contribution is the essay of Fr. John M. Oesterreicher
on Simone Weil. The author is thoroughly familiar with the writings of
this mystic Jewess whose love for Christ brought her so close to the Church.
She understood His passion profoundly, and wished to unite her tragic
life with His. She was pained by the denial of Peter and the flight of the
others. But her concept of God and the world made it impossible for her
to accept the Resurrection. Deeply attached to Christ as Victim, she felt
that the Christ of Glory distorted the image of His suffering, which is
man's greatest strength in a world of sin. Hence she embraced the Cross
passionately, but it was not the Christian Cross, for it lacked the essentials
of hope and victory. She was a product of the despair of the war and
its aftermath. Had she lived, she might have found the integral Christ
she sought.
The other contributions approach this high level of intellectual excellence.
Together, they are in the best tradition of Catholic apologetic: they are
rational, positive, and aim to persuade rather than to win an argument.

112

BRIEF NOTICES

Integration of Religion and Psychiatry. By W. EARL BIDDLE, M.D., F. A.
P. A. New York: Macmillan, 1955. Pp. 165. $3.75.
This book represents " the culmination of sixteen years effort in attempting to bring Freud's work into conformity with my own Christian beliefsto integrate religion and psychiatry." (p. x) In order to do this, however,
the author states: " It was necessary to construct a new system of depth
psychology which would explain normal and abnormal behavior and restore
imagination to its rightful place as a function of the total personality."
(p. x) From these comments it would seem that the author had found
Freudianism unsatisfactory inasmuch as he found it necessary to develop
a new psychology to replace it. However, on page 9, he states, " When the
truth in Freud's discoveries is brought to light it will be found that they
do not conflict with religious principles. To the contrary, Freud discovered
that man is by nature religious and that the concept of the Supreme Being
is experienced (emphasis given by author) in childhood." In any case we
see here the beginnings of the author's attitude throughout the text that
Freud did not really mean what he said, that he was in fact a misunderstood man and a religious one. This has been a very popular trend lately,
with Maryse Choisy taking the lead.
The impression which we get is that the author has learned his scholastic
philosophy by discussion rather than by study. As a consequence many of
his principles are incompletely stated and consequently only half true. It
would be impossible to discuss all instances of this, but a few examples
might be cited. His concept of religion, for example (p. 2-4) , seems to be
equated with ethics. Certainly ethical concepts are necessary for religion
but religion is much more than ethics. This may be noted in the meanings
of the words themselves, ethics from Wo> meaning rule of behavior and
religion from religio meaning bond, i. e., the bonds which tie mankind to its
creator.
The author's discussion of God as a father-image (p. 37 fl'.) seems to
overlook the frequently overlooked fact that God's authoritarianism is only
a corollary which follows from His nature as a self-existent being. To
equate God with authority is to lose the whole point of proof for the
existence of God. Authority, eternity, infinity, transcendence, etc., aU
follow from self-existence. Again, the
discussion of imagination is
extremely difficult to understand because the author does not set forth
definitions or clarifications. He simply begins to discuss imagination. (p.
55) When he is speaking of the role of imagination in conjunction with
intellect he is not too certain in his exposition. When the intellect is working, imagination is usually furnishing sense images to accompany the act
of intellection. But the sense images need not be those of objects-they
may be merely words. For example, in my own case, when I hear the

BRIEF NOTICES

118

principle of identity enunciated I usually see the words printed on a page
or on a blackboard: " A thing which is itself, is itself." On page 57 the
author seems to confuse the roles of sense memory and imagination. On
this same page, in discussing space relationship Doctor Biddle fails to
mention that the imagination is controlled by the intellect. His notions of
imagination at times approach those of David Hume.
On page 59 the author's failure to define emotion leaves the reader at a
disadvantage. He fails to distinguish between emotion and feeling. In fact
he equates the two which adds to the confusion in this section of the book.
On page 61 the author states: "Logical thinking is possible only when
phantasy life is in order and under the guidance of the intellect." This is a
good example of the many sentences which are difficult to understand.
What he probably means by logical thinking is " thinking which is compatible with reality." Any logician knows that a syllogism could be constructed on premises which were unreal and which would lead to a perfectly logical conclusion insofar as the conclusion followed consistently
from the premises.
On page 67 there is another similar faulty expression: " The act of
taking the life of a human being is, in itself, neither good nor bad." The
author seems to deny any basis of morality in the natural law and makes
morals a matter of local custom. " Behavior is good when it is directed
toward goals which are socially or individually regarded as good, or
toward the improvement or annihilation of that which is considered bad.
The means by which the goal is attained must also be regarded as good."
(p. 67) These are a few examples cited from many possibilities which
show the difficulties of easy reading of the book. There are numerous minor
inaccuracies, e. g., on page 10 it is stated that there are 6,500 psychiatrists
in the United States which is about one-half the actual number.
The author states that his theory of depth psychology was verified for
him in a dream. He states in a footnote (p. 37-38): "While I was in the
process of trying to correlate the concept of the phantastic bad mother
with an analogous religious concept I had a significant dream. . . . The
dream terrified me so that I awoke .... On going back to sleep the continuity of the symbols was the same, but this time I was hovering over
a deep pit .... Upon awakening I realized that at last I had found a
solution to my problem." It is of such dream stuff that Doctor Biddle's
theory is made.
The author's own theory of depth psychology which had its confirmation
in his dream is based on the following ideas of the child's relations with
his parents. In the author's own words this theory briefly is as follows:
" The small child under age three views his parents and other adults as
gigantic, all-powerful people. They can do infinite good or infinite harm
to him. In the child's mind the parents have the power to gratify every

114

BRIEF NOTICES

wish, or to annihilate him. But according to the logic of the child, a good
person cannot do anything bad, and a bad person can do no good. When
the father gratifies the child, the parent is regarded as ail-good; when he
frustrates or displeases the child he becomes totally bad in the mind of
the child. The child does not regard the gratifying father and the frustrating father as the same person. The same is true in the relationship of the
child and the mother. Besides being real people the parents represent
phantastic, illusory, or imaginary persons. The child, then, has, in addition
to his real parents, a phantastic father and mother who are preposterously
good, and a phantastic father and mother who are preposterously bad.
No real person could ever hope to be as good as the phantastic good
parents. The real parents, when invested with the qualities of the phantastic parents, become alternately extremely good or bad depending upon
whether they are at the moment pleasing or displeasing to the child. The
preposterous phantasies of the child are in a constant state of flux. When
his gigantic real mother pleases and satisfies the child she is endowed with
all the preposterous good qualities of the imaginary good mother. When
she deprives or frustrates him she becomes in his imagination an annihilating bad mother. The real father is treated in a similar manner. When he
does something which the child thinks of as good, the father is regarded as
preposterously ail-good. When he is frustrating he becomes preposterously
bad in the child's imagination."
The .author himself raised the question as to whether his theories are
merely gratuitous assumptions or whether they can be proven scientifically.
He does not answer this question but states merely that they have proven
practical as a means of therapy. His theory of the influence of childhood
experiences which covers some twenty-one pages in the book is offered
without any supporting evidence or attempted proof.
In the opinion of this reviewer the author has failed to achieve his
purpose. From the standpoint of scholastic philosophy the discussion is
weak and at times faulty. From the standpoint of depth psychology
nothing helpful is added and no attempt at proof is made. From the standpoint of at least the Catholic Religion the religious views presented are
on the whole unacceptable.

Beatitude. By REGINALD GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE,0. P. Translated by Patrick
Cummins, 0. S. B. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1956. Pp. 381
with index. $6.00.
In these days when we are reaping the fruit of philosophical relativism
in ethical nihilism, it is of absolute necessity that we review constantly
that philosophy of life which alone can perfect man socially, and that

BRIEF NOTICES

115

theology which alone can show man the road to eternal life. It is therefore without hesitancy that we hail this translation of Fr. GarrigouLagrange's On Beatitude, Human Acts and Habits, which is his commentary on the first fifty-four questions of St. Thomas' Prima Secundae.
The venerable figure of the author needs no introduction to Thomistic
circles. Grown old in the fight to present St. Thomas in himself and not
in the trappings of nineteenth century experimentalism, Fr. GarrigouLagrange has rendered signal service to Thomism, the Church, and to all
who strive to preserve their sanity and integrity in an intellectual world
gone mad.
Yet, although we heartily welcome this most recent contribution by the
eminent theologian, let us not err by excess, lest by injudicious zeal we
betray the author's intention. This book is certainly a compilation of Fr.
Garrigou-Lagrange's class notes for his lectures on the Prima Secundae.
Since, then, their origin cannot be divorced from the text of the Summa,
surely their purpose is not that they should be used as a text-book or
manual apart from the same Summa Theologiae of the Holy Doctor. For
thus to make use of this volume would be to render a grave disservice to
the student of moral theology, and a betrayal of the author's life-long
dedication to the Saint of the Schools. Used with the words of St. Thomas,
the student or reader will benefit greatly from the explanations of more
abstruse passages, the inclusion of positive theology, the opinions and
controversies that have arisen, and the traditional interpretation of St.
Thomas in their regard. This is the value and wisdom of Fr. GarrigouLagrange's Beatitude.
In his commentary the author simply follows the course of the Prima
Secundae from question one to question fifty-four. There is prefixed an
introduction in which Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange exposes the nature of Moral
Theology in its connection with the dogmatic part of the one science, as
well as its relationship with other moral systems. Then he treats of
beatitude as man's ultimate goal and purpose. Human acts are considered
in their psychological and moral entities. Next is inserted a section on
conscience, its nature and divisions, which summarizes the considerations
of manuals in practical moral theoolgy. Finally there is a brief treatment
of passions and habits.
This is a work that could prove of inestimable value to the student or
scholar, layman or cleric, who wishes to discover through the eyes of St.
Thomas the true notion of moral theology and the only sane explanation
of man. For this thanks are due to Fr. Cummins who has faithfully, if at
times too literally, translated the amazingly clear latin of Fr. GarrigouLagrange.

116

BRIEF NOTICES

The Role of the Laity in the Church. By MoNSIGNOR GERARD
Chicago: Fides Publishers Association, 1956. Pp. 175.

PHILIPS.

Fathers Gilbert and Moudry have performed a real service for American
Catholicism in translating this work of Monsignor Philips. The book is
one that does not contain much that is new, yet it is a synthesis that is
not readily available in English. Profound and extensive in treatment is
this product of a speculative theologian, professor of dogmatic and mystical
theology at the University of Louvain, and promoter of Catholic Action.
That this is the hour of the
the prelate establishes. He then proceeds to lay down the principles of Catholic Action, applying them to the
laity's field of action. The chapter on the laity's power of Orders is
thorough, but scientifically silent on many practical questions. The treatment of the laity and the magisterium is as concise and deep as any scholar
could wish for. When dealing with the laity and Church government the
author gives helpful indications for cooperation between the hierarchy and
faithful. Catholic Action is something that never took hold in the United
States as it did in the Belgium of Monsignor Philips, yet the chapter
dealing with it is something that could benefit every active Catholic and
worthy priest. The chapter on the Lay Apostolate and Allied Contacts
sheds needed light on Church and State relations. The chapter concerning
a lay spirituality leaves admittedly much to be demanded as does the
conclusion.
From this book every American cleric, religious, and intelligent layman
could profit. It evinces a
intellectual insight and prudential approach
which we need in the United States in order to come of age or continue to
flourish. This broad-mindedness is a reproach to a theology that is as
narrow as a paper bound catechism.
The jacket of the book states that it is theological not sociological.
Y at Philips himself writes on page fourteen: " Our starting point is not
purely sociologicaL" There is much of a sound sociological nature in this
work.
There is a noticeable lack of reference to an awakening of the laity
in the United States. The interest shown in real theology
the laity is
proven by the success of the theological institutes conducted by the
Dominicans in many places in the United States, by the Conventual Franciscans in Richfield, Minnesota, and
the Institute of Adult Education
at Catholic University. The students at the institutes are proving what
Monsignor Philips writes on page 79: "No sincere intellectual will be
content with a grammar school acquaintance of the vital questions, nor will
anyone expect encyclopedic knowledge from him. The intelligence of an
adult Christian is all that is required." A recurring theme in the work is
the fact that theology is hard work because it must seek the truth avoiding
extremes.

BRIEF NOTICES

117

The translators deserve a word of praise as well as thanks. They have
rendered a very readable translation and have given the data for English
translations of foreign language references when possible.

What is Catholicity? By PAUL H. HALLETT. Cleveland and New York:
The World Publishing Company, 1955. Pp. Q54.
This relatively slender volume, whose purpose in the words of its author
is " to explain the principles that guide Catholicity and interlace its
doctrine, worship, and discipline," (p. 30) contains a veritable mine of
information about Catholicism. In the pursuance of his plan Paul H.
Hallett, Associate Editor of The Register of Denver, states that he has
closely followed Catholic textbooks on philosophy, moral and dogmatic
theology used in seminaries for the training of priests.
The range of topics covered is indeed wide, including the meaning of
Catholicity, the origin and nature of the Church, "Catholic philosophy,"
Scripture, Dogma, Morals, the Sacraments, and Church Government.
Plainly intended for the interested layman, Catholic as well as nonCatholic, and not for the professional scholar, the work necessarily runs
very hurriedly through some points. Yet, some of the sections are noteworthy for their clarity and succinctness as well as for their accuracy. Of
particular note in this regard are those dealing with the Commandments
(Ch. XIV), Matrimony (Ch. XVII), and Tolerance (Ch. XX).
However, the approach to many serious and profound matters is frequently simpliste and this detracts from the effect of the work. Chapter
III, entitled "Between Faith and Reason: Thomism," undertakes an
explanation of some of the fundamental philosophical tenets of Thomism,
and it is here that the basic weakness of the work becomes apparent. Referring to Thomism as " simply sublimated common sense," the author
insists that once a reader has become familiar with the technical terms
of Aquinas " he will never fail to understand his meaning." (p. 53) Such
optimism, though laudable in intent, can hardly impress those who have
long sought correctly to interpret the teachings of the Angelic Doctor.
Moreover, it is discouraging to see a recurrence of the equation of Thornism with Scholasticism and to find it defined as " the philosophy elaborated
by Aristotle and perfected in the service of Christian truth." (p. 5!2)
The discussion of some of the leading philosophical principles of Thomism
is so compressed as to be almost unintelligible and is not calculated to
impress favourably the careful reader. What, for example, are we to make
of such a passage: " Every being is good. For every being is true, that is,
is an object of the mind. A being that is not good for doing or receiving
something could not be known. Moreover, every being, since it has some

118

BRIEF NOTICES

degree of perfection, is desirable as an end or means, either by the human
will, or at least by God as willed and approved by Him. Hence the axiom;
good is being, being is good." (pp. 56-7)
In connection with the problem, What is the best form of government?,
there is another profoundly ambiguous and misleading statement. After
stating (correctly I think) that such a question cannot be decided in
the concrete by recourse to the natural law, the author goes on, without
further clarification, to say: "In the abstract, however, the natural philosophy and tradition of Catholicity have certainly a preference for monarchy (in the United States the federal government is essentially a monarchy)." (p. 73) Certainly such a statement betrays "the precision of
definition and tightness of logic and clarity of language " which the author
holds to be the trademark of Catholic philosophy and theology. (p. 55)
In the wealth of facts about Catholicism presented clearly and accurately
in this work, it is perhaps not wholly fair to single out for mention some
of the more obvious defects. Yet it is these defects which detract from
the fulfilment of the basic aim of the book. From beginning to end this
work emphasizes the reasonableness of all aspects of Catholicism, and the
ease with which these reasonable aspects of our faith can be accepted and
presented. Yet when some of the more fundamental problems are so ill
presented in the work itself, it is difficult both to demonstrate their reasonableness or to obtain reasonable acceptance of them. Such inaccuracies as
exist may have little direct ill effect upon the majority of readers of this
book, those untrained in theology and philosophy, but they will gain little
understanding of certain fundamental principles after a careful reading of
the text. And those who have some training in theology or philosophy,
whether Catholic or non-Catholic, cannot but be disappointed or
pressed at these serious shortcomings. Perhaps a future edition of the work
can correct or eliminate such portions as tend to defeat the basic and highly
laudable purpose of such a book.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Bouyer, Rev. Lo·.1.is (tr. by A. V. Littledale). The Spirit and Forms of
Protestantism. Westminster: Newman, 1956. Pp. 245. $8.75.
Bruckberger, 0. P., Raymond Leopold. Toward the Summit. New York:
P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1956. Pp. 150. $2.75.
Brunner, S. J., August (tr. by Ruth Mary Bethell). A New Creation.
. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. Pp. 148. $4.75.
Ellis, John Tracy. American Catholics and the Intellectual Life. Chicago:
The Heritage Foundation, 1956. Pp. 68 with index of Proper Names.
$1.25.

Ferm, Vergilius. Encyclopedia of Morals. New York: Philos. Library,
1956. Pp. 669. $10.00.
Glutz, C. P., Melvin A. The Manner of Demonstrating in Natural Philosophy. Des Moines: St. Gabriel Monastery, 1956. Pp. 197. $8.00.
Heinisch, Dr. Paul (tr. by Wm. G. Heidt, 0. S. B.). Christ in Prophecy.
Collegeville; Minn.; The Liturgical Press, 1956. Pp. 277 with index.
$6.00.

Hourani, George F. Ethical Value. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1956. Pp. 275. $4.50.
Johnston, Herbert. Business Ethics. New York: Pitman Publishing Co.,
1956. Pp. 864 with index. $4.75.
Kelly, David. The Hungry Sheep. Westminster: Newman, 1956. Pp. 260
with bibliography. $4.00.
Leeming, S. J., Bernard. Principles of Sacramental Theology. Westminster: Newman, 1956. Pp. 704 with index. $6.75.
McKenzie, S. J., John L. The Two-Edged Sword. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1956.
Pp. 817 with index. $4.50.
Marcel, Gabriel (tr. by Virginia and Gordon Ringer). Royce's Metaphysics. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1956. Pp. 198 with notes.
$4.50.

Michalson, Carl (ed.). Christianity and the Existentialists . . New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956. Pp. 219 with index. $8.75.
Murphy, 0. Carm., Roland E. The Dead Sea Scrolls and the Bible.
Westminster: Newman, 1956. Pp. II9. $1.50.
Pontificia Universidad Ecclesiastica de Salamanca. El Evolucionismo en
Filosfia y Teologia. Barcelona: Juan Flors, 1956. Pp. 252.
Revesz, G. The Origins and Prehistory of Language. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. Pp. 288 with index. $7.50.
Sciacca, M. F. Saint Augustin et le Neoplatonisme. Louvain: Editions
Nauwelaerts, 1956. Pp. 69. 65 Frs. b.

119

120

BOOKS RECEIVED

Simard, Emile. La Nature et la Portee de la Method Scientifique. Quebec:
Les Presses Universitaires Laval, 1956. Pp. 408 with index.
St. Thomas Aquinas (tr. by Pierre Conway, 0. P.) Exposition of the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle. Quebec: La Librairie PhiL M. Doyon,
1956. Pp. 449 with index. $6.00 paper.
Tamme, 0. P., Sr. Anne Mary. A Critique of John Dewey's Theory of
Fine Art in the Light of the Principles of Thomism; Washington:
Catholic University of America Press, 1956. Pp. 139 with index.
Todd, John M. (ed.). The Springs of Morality. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1956. Pp. 327. $6.00.
Toynbee, Arnold J. An Historian's Approach to Religion. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1956. Pp. 327 with index. $5.00.
Van Laer, P. Henry in collaboration with Koren, C. S. Sp., Henry J.
Philosophy of Science. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University, HM6. Pp.
180 with index. $3.75 bound, $3.00 paper.
Weiser, S. J., F. X. The Holyday Book. New York: Harcourt, Brace &
Co., 1956. Pp. 208 with index. $3.00.