THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDIToRs: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PRoviNCE oF ST. JosEPH
Publishers:

VoL. XX

The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

OCTOBER, 1957

No.4

NOTES ON ARISTOTELIAN DIALECTIC IN
THEOLOGICAL METHOD

K

INTRODUCTION

y study of the evolution of theological methods must

depend upon the contributions of several sciences.
Critical texts of ancient and medieval authors are
needed. Historians must provide data and illumine the dyand the exact sciences must
namics of each age.
interpret their own histories. And advances in theology itself
throw fresh light on past procedures and opinions. Therefore,
to study this evolution from specialized points of view is a
necessary step if a more total synthesis is to be achieved. In
this article we shall try to outline the history of theological
method from St. Augustine to Abailard by bringing it into relation with the history of Aristotelian dialectic.
Although this procedure seems a worthy one, it has been
largely neglected by scholars. Two reasons for this are readily
888

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apparent. First, serious historical study of theological methods
is a relatively undeveloped field. The lack of exact texts and
critical tools has hindered its expansion. Secondly, a re-evaluation of Aristotelian dialectic is underway; and until the dialectic itself is better understood, its use as illuminating some
other subject matter is limited.
For these and other reasons this study is very modest in
intent. We propose to juxtapose some of the data and interpretations provided by historical and theological research with
what appear to be the most intelligent and carefully studied
views of Aristotelian dialectic. It will be readily seen that much
of the material presented here is from secondary sources. Our
main aim is to give a general picture of the interaction of two
disciplines, as seen in the works of a few important thinkers;
and to pose problems in the hope that scholarly effort may be
directed to their solutions. The central problem may be stated
thus: to what extent has Aristotelian dialectic entered into the
methodology of theology. The primary conclusion that can be
drawn from this study is that a tremendous amount of research
needs to be done. Yet the article will be of some value if it
accomplishes only two things: first, indicate a number of particular problems toward which research should be directed;
secondly, eliminate to some extent the vagueness and ambiguity
which surrounds the word " dialectic " when it is used by
theologians and historians of theology.
The article will be in four sections. The first will be an exposition of Aristotelian dialectic. The second will treat of St.
Augustine. The third will consist of a few notes upon St.
Augustine's immediate successors, the Carolingian renaissance,
and the siecle de fer. The fourth will be devoted to Abailard.
This last part will be the most extended, for indeed Abailard,
in one sense, is the subject of the article. As a major influence
on theology and as the ·most famous of the ,dialecticians of the
twelfth century, he is most deserving of study and provides
some of the most difficult problems.

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I
Dialectic for Aristotle is both a particular science having its
proper subject matter, and a method. 1 As a particular science,
it studies syllogisms whose premises are based on opinion and
whose middle term is a sign rather than a cause. 2 Thus it can
be considered as a branch of formal logic, and does not concern
us here. Dialectic as method, however, was of great importance
in Aristotle's philosophy. A brief description of this method
and of its context will be given. The latter is essential to our
purpose, for the dialectic of the Middle Ages was never coterminous with Aristotle's. In general it included part of Aristotelian dialectic and parts of other methods and sciences.
Dialectic is discussed by Aristotle primarily in the Organon.
Now the six books of the Organon can be considered as in three
groups. The Categories and the On Interpretation treat of the
types of concepts (defined in terms of grammatical function
a sentence), the elements of propositions, the problems of quantification,
use
negation (contraries
contradictories),
and other such matters. The two Analytics contain Aristotle's
notion of science and his theory of the syllogism. The latter was
called formal logic. Finally, the Topics and
Sophistical Refutations treat of dialectic and fallacious arguments. For Aristotle, then, dialectic is not one of the philosophical sciences
(metaphysics, ethics, etc.) , not a study of the foundations of
logic, not syntactics, and not formal logic. It does bear important relations to these things, and some of these relations
will be noted below.
Dialectic is useful for three ends: 3 intellectual training or
gymnastic, discussion, and the philosophical sciences. The first
end is to make the mind supple, disciplined, and possessed of a
In this controverted subject, we follow generally the lines laid down bv J. M.
LeBlond in Logique et Methode (Paris: Vrin, 1939). For a short
i 11 ,
similar vein, the reader may consult the Introduction to John Burnet's edition oi
The Ethics of Aristotle (Methuen & Co.: London, 1900), pp. XXXIX-XLII.
• See H. W. B. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic,
ed. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1916), pp. 398-400.
s Topics I 2; lOla, 25 ff.
1

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DOM DUNSTAN

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plan of inquiry about any subject. The second is to enable a
man to see questions from different points of view and to argue
problems on another's grounds. The third is to supplement the
scientific method in the construction of the philosophical sciences. This is done by the posing of apories, that is, by surveying beforehand the end to be attained and the difficulties involved; and by discussion of principles which cannot themselves
be demonstrated.
If the material cause be considered, it is clear that dialectic,
like the other parts of the Organon, is propositional. Its subject
matter is not things themselves but propositions about things.
Two points must be considered: 1) dialectic is concerned with
propositions which are in some sense based on opinion; 4 ;l)
dialectic has a universal subject matter since propositions can
be about anything. 5
In contrast with the scientific method, dialectic considers
propositions which are based on authority of some sort. It is
thus a method of utilizing received opinions. However, Aristotle seems to extend the meaning of ev3ogov to include not
only that which is in fact believed, but also that which is believable or conjecturable, 6 and even that which is plausible or
likely. 7 Such propositions may be admitted by everyone {'zrpomay be controverted by different wise men (rrp6f3'A.TJJLa),
or may be a statement by some wise man which conflicts with
8 The fact that dialectic deals specificommon opinion
cally with propositions which are based on opinion or which at
least are not demonstrated, would seem to limit its application.
Dialectic, however, is also defined by the generality of its object.
Every science indeed has a proper and determined domain-a
limited formal object. The dialectical method, on the other
hand, is not limited to ·any genus. " The dialectical argument
is not concerned with any definite kind of being, nor does it
show anything, nor is it even an argument such as we find in
• Ibid., I I; IOOb, !!1.
• Ibid., I I; IOOa, 18-!!1.
• 1 Analytica I I; !Mb, 11.

7
8

Topics VIU 11; I6Ib, 85.
Topics I 10, ll.

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the general philosophy of being." 9 It is as universal as rhetoric.10 Metaphysics, it is true, treats all being, but its universality is of a different sort. The metaphysician attains generality by abstracting from his experiences of real things. 11
Dialectic does not presuppose specific experiences and does not
abstract from them. To what then is it applied? " Every experience, every piece of knowledge is expressed according to the
forms of judgment, of reasoning, and these are more or less
independent of content. Consequently, the knowledge of these
forms can permit one to discuss any subject, without ha"ing
specialized information .... " 12
Dialectic is thus a formal method. It does not discuss facts
or their interpretation as such. The dialectician is familiar with
the behavior of language and the ways of predication. " He is a
dialectician who examines by the help of a theory of reasoning." 13 Or again, "He then is a dialectician who regards the
common principles with their application to the particular matter at hand." 14 By applying this knowledge to propositions,
he institutes an investigation that influences the statement of
facts and interpretations, and therefore influences the knowledge itself of reality. The degree to which dialectic is "real"
rather than linguistic will become clearer as its form is considered and its ends discussed at greater length.
The formal note of dialectic is that it is interrogative. The
dialectician functions by asking questions, 15 and in so doing
reveals the Socratic origins of his method. The things about
which the dialectician raises questions are propositions and
reasonings. The intellectual instruments he uses are called
organa and topoi.
Aristotle states that there are four elements from which
• Sophistical Refutations 11; 171m, 12. See also 9; 170a, 84.
Rhetoric I 1; 1855b, 8 ff.
11 Ethics VI 8; 114!i!a, 16 ff.
12 Le Blond, op. cit., p. 19.
18 Soph. Ref. 11; 17!i!a, 85; see also 17lb, 6 ff.
10 Soph. Ref. 11; 17Ib, 6 ff.
10 "A dialectical proposition consists in asking something .... " Topics I 10; 104a
8. The art of asking questions is discussed at length in book VIII of the Topics.
10

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DOM DUNSTAN HAYDEN

propositions are made: definition, genus, property, and accident.16 The dialectician considers these notions as they appear,
say, in a syllogism. For example, by considering the likenesses
and differences in two subjects, he can determine whether they
belong in the same genus; and this determination is essential to
any definition. 17 Similarly, he can apply his notions of identity
and the uses of copulative verbs to a given proposition. Again,
he can eliminate ambiguities and fallacies by distinguishing the
meanings of words, having recourse here to grammatical forms,
to contraries, and so forth.
Of the various sorts of reasoning in dialectic the most important is induction. Induction can indeed be put into syllogistic form (if it is complete), but that is the only sense in
which it belongs to formal logic.18 Induction is a method of
reaching principles, which by their very nature cannot be
demonstrated. Whether complete or not, induction can lead to
a universal/ 9 Besides induction the dialectician should have at
his command arguments from similarities and di:fferences.20
Aristotle discusses four o·rgana: 21 1) to choose propositions
well;
to distinguish different senses in a word (this assures
that people talk about the same thing) ; 3) to find the differences of things (such distinctions lead to a clearer knowledge
of essences); and 4) to observe and investigate likenesses
(necessary for analogies and definitions). The topoi 22 appear
to be simply more particular organa. They include such distinctions as past and future, whole and part, universal and
particular, possible and impossible.
The first of the ends of dialectic mentioned above requires
no further discussion. The skills developed by dialectical training are obviously required for any serious intellectual effort.
The second end, conversation, is also evident. To discuss a
problem with someone, one must find a common subject matTopics I 4.
19 See Topics VIII 8; 160b, 8.
See Topics I 18; I08b, 9-29.
18 See Le Blond, op. cit., pp. 125-8.
20 See Topics I 17 and 18.
21 In the last five chapters of bk. I of the Topics.
•• These are discussed in the Topics from bk. II to bk. VII.
16

17

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ter, use opinions, make comparisons, shift the grounds of the
argument, verify the other person's statements, and detect and
refute fallacies. This last rather negative aspect receives considerable treatment in the last two books of the Organon.
Although the reader of Aristotle can get the impression that
dialectic is concerned solely with these two ends, 23 it is clear
from other texts and from Aristotle's actual use of dialectic
that the third end-helping science-is of great importance.
From this point of view dialectic is a method of inquiry which
leads to knowledge about " res," not just " verba." There are
two aspects to this: the posing of apories, and the discussion of
principles. Aristotle states forcefully in the Metaphysics the
role of apories:
We must, with a view to the science which we are seeking, first
recount the subjects that should be first discussed. These include
both the other opinions that some have held on the first principles,
and any point besides these that happens to have been overlooked.
For those who wish to get clear of difficulties, it is advantageous to
discuss the difficulties well; for the subsequent free play of thought
implies the solution of the previous difficulties, and it is not possible
to untie a knot of which one does not know. But the difficulty of
our thinking points to a "knot" in the object; for insofar as -our
thought is in difficulties, it is in like case with those who are bound;
for in either case it is impossible to go forward. Hence one should
have surveyed all the difficulties beforehand, both for the purposes
we have stated and because people who inquire without first stating
the difficulties are like those who do not know where they have to
go; besides, a man does not otherwise know even whether he has at
any given time found what he is looking for or not; for the end is
not clear to such a man, while to him who has first discussed the
difficulties it is clear. Further, he who has heard all the contending
arguments, as if they were the parties to a case, must be in a better
position for
The following passage in the Topics declares unequivocally the
use of dialectic in the discussion of principles:
'"For example, Soph. Ref. 11; 172a, U ff; "No art that is a method of showing
the nature of anything proceeds by asking questions." Le Blond, in the work already
cited, pp. 24 f, remarks that dialectic is not infrequently used in the narrower sense
of wetpa.ITTuc6s.
"Metaphysica ITI 1; 995a, 2S-995b, 8.

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HAYDEN

[Dialectic] has a further use in relation to the ultimate bases of the
principles used in the several sciences. For it is impossible to
discuss them at all from the principles proper to the particular
science at hand, seeing that the principles are the prius of everything else: it is through the opinions generally held on the particular
points that these have to be discussed, and this task belongs
properly, or most appropriately, to dialectic: for dialectic is a
process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all
inquiries. 25

Dialectic is never a method of demonstration, but in the
processes just mentioned it appears as co-ordinate with the
scientific method. The premises of scientific reasoning are
themselves indemonstrable, as are an definitions introduced.
Any discussion of these must be dialectical in character. Aristotle did not discuss at any length the theory behind this aspect
of dialectic, and philosophers since then have often misunderstood it, ignored its presence or simply rejected it. 26

II
Having ascertained in a general way the meaning of dialectic
for Aristotle, we may now proceed to inquire as to its presence
in theological method, beginning with St. Augustine. St. Augustine is of particular importance in the evolution of theological
method: he summed up the predominant attitudes of early
Christian thinkers, he consciously organized these attitudes into
a coherent system, his works-found in numberless medieval
libraries-provided later Christians with content and method,
and he was recognized as the outstanding authority with :regard
to Christian intellectual activity. St. Augustine's quasi-official
•• Topics I 2; lOla, 86-lOlb, 4.
26 The following passage of Cicero in Boethius' In Topica Ciceronis Commentaria
(PL LXIV, 1044 C) indicates that the Stoics ignored dialectic, and suggests one
source of the confusion about the word's meaning. " Cum omnis ratio diligens
disserendi duas habeat partes, unam inveniendi, alteram jndicandi, ntriusqne
princeps, ut mihi quidem videtur, Aristoteles fuit. Stoici autem in altera elaboraverunt. Judicandi enim viam diligenter persecnti snnt, earn scientiam, quam
dialecticen appellant. Inveniendi vero artem quae Topicae dicitur, quae ad usum
potior erat, et ordine naturae certe prior, totam reliquerunt."

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determination of methods and of the place of learning in
Christian life continued unimpaired until the twelfth century.
There was continuous change during this period, of course, but
it was evolution within a fixed framework. The first radical
and influential departures from this tradition came in the
twelfth century.
The Augustinian rationale of secular and profane learning
was organized around the very basic distinction between faith
and beatitude. Christian life begins with faith; and it is faith
which characterizes life on earth. After death comes the reward
of faith-beatitude. This temporal pattern is paralleled in the
life of the soul: first come the shadowy knowledge of faith, and
the love that is never fulfilled; then, at last in Heaven, the full
The transition
enjoyment of truth and goodness-beatitude.
from the one to the other consists in the increasing of love and
knowledge, starting from faith and using human faculties aided
by grace. This transitional affective knowledge is called wisdom or understanding insofar as its object is God, science insofar as its object is created things. 21 The latter is a means to the
former. The focus of intellectual activity is Sacred Scripture:
" Furthermore, a man speaks more or less wisely as he has made
more or less progress in the Holy Scripture . . . in a thorough
understanding and careful searching into their meaning." 2 R
Secular learning contributes to the understanding of Scripture
and that is its justification. Meditation on the mysteries revealed in Scripture brings the Christian to understanding or
wisdom.
Three points should be noted in particular. First, the distinction between faith and unde.rstanding. 29 Faith is based on
21 Distat tamen ab aeternorum
contemplatione actio qua bene utimur temporalibns rebus, et ilia sapientiae, haec scientiae depntetur." De Trinitate XII, 14
PL XLII, 1009. For a list of the various meanings of "scientia " and "sapientia,"
see Henri-Irenee Marrou, Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique (Paris: de
Boccard, 1988), Appendice, Note B, pp. 561-69.
•• De Doctrina Christia1tfJ,,IV, c. 5.
29
" Nisi enim aliud esset credere, et aliud intei!igere, et primo credendum esset,
quod magnum et divinum intelligere cuperemus, frustra Propheta dixisset 'Nisi
aedideritis, non intelligetis.' " De Libero Arbitrio, II, c.

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DOM DUNSTAN HAYDEN

revelation which is found in Scripture. Understanding comes
from man's efforts aided by the illumination of grace. Faith is
the beginning; understanding is progress toward the end and
presupposes faith. Faith is certain, while understanding can
degenerate into vain reasoning.
Secondly, it is clear that "theology" for St. Augustine was
little like the thoroughly rationalized science that it became
in later centuries. The attempt to know God and his works was
centered on Scripture. " Theology " consisted in trying to penetrate the Christian mysteries by exegesis and contemplation.
Knowledge itself was not the real end, but that knowledge
which led to greater charity.
Thirdly, study of the secular sciences had no raison d' etre in
itself, but served as a preparation for the pondering of Scripture.30 Consequently, the subject matter of any of these sciences was completely controlled by the Christian's personal
intent. Love was the final end, and knowledge existed to feed
love. Once a science had assisted the scholar in reading Scripture, it held little further value. Such a view, of course, was
not likely to lead to any radical developments in the subordinate sciences. This indeed constituted one kind of Christian
synthesis, but it was achieved by attributing relatively little
value to the secular sciences/ 1 except insofar as they contributed to religious thought. 32
The organization of secular learning by Varro, Capella and
80 On grammar, for example, see De Doctrina Christiana, III, c. 29: "Quos tamen
tropos qui noverint, agnoscunt in litteris sanctis, eorumque scientia, ad eas intelligendas aliquantum adjuvantur." Similar passages could be found for each of the
seven arts.
81 Sometimes St. Augnstine seems to see no value in them at all. For example,
he says a propos of Scripture: "Nam quidquid homo extra didicerit, si noxium est,
ibi damnatur; si utile est, ibi invenitur." (De Doctrina Christiana II, c. 42). We
presume this is partly rhetorical exaggeration, and partly a way of expressing the
all-sufficiency of Scripture with regard to man's final end.
•• This common interpretation of St. Augustine can be found more fully explained
in the work of Marron cited above. " ... ii vent nne culture etroitement et directement subordonnee au christianisme; toutes les manifestations de Ia vie intellectuelle
doivent etre au service de Ia vie religieuse, n'etre qu'une fonction de celle-ci." (p.
889).

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Cassiodorus into the seven arts is too familiar to need any
description. Augustine proposed it anew. 33 The cultivation of
the seven arts became one of the two great determinants of the
evolution of theological method; 34 and throughout the entire
period under consideration it was St. Augustine who provided
its justification and much of its material. 0£ special importance
to this essay is the meaning that St. Augustine gave to the art
called " dialectica." 35 It was by no means identical with Aristotle's dialectic. Not until the thirteenth century did the term
begin to :resume, for some thinkers at least, its strict Aristotelian sense. We need to see, then, what Augustine's dialectic
included and how it was used in sacred studies.
Generally speaking, dialectic included the grammatical and
logical matters dealt with in the Categories and On InterpTetation, some traditional formal logic 36 (partly from the Peripatetic school and partly from the Stoic-Megarian school), and
some of Aristotle's dialectic. In other words Aristotle's distinctions had become blurred and various elements of logic and
method were grouped together. Marron has pointed out this
composite character of St. Augustine's dialectic. " His dialectic
presents a double aspect; a) as in Stoic usage, it is the science
of that method by which science is made ... the study of the
laws which rule the activity of reason, in a word, logic; b)
but as with Aristotle, it is also the science of discussion, no
longer theoretic but practical; the art of convincing or confounding an adversary." 37
33

The seven arts and their use in relation to Scripture are discussed at length in

bk. II of De Doctrina Christiana.
"'See J. de Ghellinck S. J., Le mouvemcnt theologiquc du XIIe siecle (Paris:
Desclee de Brouwer, 1948), pp. lG i.
35 For a justification
of dialectic, see De Doctrina Christiana II, c. 35: "Item
scientia definiendi, dividendi atque partiandi, quamquam etiam rebus falsis adhibeatur, ipsa tamen falsa non est, neque ab hominibus instituta, sed in rerum ratione
comperta." For a discussion of the Platonic aspects of Augustine's dialectic, see
Jean Pepin, " Univers dionysien et univers augustinien " in Aspects de la dialectique,
Recherches de Philosophie II (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1956), pp. 179-2!25.
36
" Hanc enim artem
quam dialecticam vocant, quae nihil aliud docet quam
consequentia demonstrare ... " (Contra Cresconium I, 20 (!25)).
87 Marron,
op. cit., p. 195.

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DOM 1>UNSTAN li:AY!>EN

St. Augustine was not a scholar in the fields of logic and
dialectic, 38 but these sciences and methods are, of course, widely
used. In particular, Aristotelian dialectic appears not infrequently. This method, as noted above, has three ends: intellectual exercise, conversation, and as a help to science. ·with
respect to the first end, St. Augustine uses dialectic as a means
of elevating his readers to that level necessary for the consideration of divine things. " Dialectic was a means of disciplining
the reader in the management of ideas, of abstract arguments,
of getting him accustomed little by little to the technique of
metaphysical research." 39 For example, in the De Trinitate his
general method (and this itself is Aristotelian dialectic) 40 is to
consider a number of images to discover which of them are fit
to express in some way the Trinity. Having found the best
image, he surprises the modern reader by :returning (from bk.
IX to bk. XIV) to the images already :rejected. Later he explains that he did this in order to exercise and purify the
reader's mind, and so make it capable of grasping the sublime
doctrine being presented. 41
The second end-discussion-finds its fulfillment in polemic
and apologetic. 42 Indeed, one of the most famous definitions of
dialectic was attributed to St. Augustine: Dialectica est bene
disputandi scientia. 43 He was perfectly frank about such a use
of dialectic. This is illustrated in a lively way by the following
passage written against Cresconius:
" What is dialectic but skill in disputation?

0

••

yet you reproach

•• " Tons les exposes de logique theoretique qu'on rencontre chez Augustin frappent
le lecteur par leur caractere elementaire et leur tour assez pen technique." (Ibid.,
pp.
•• Ibid., p. :!H!.
•• See Topics I 17, 18 on analogy, especially 108 a, 6 ff: "Likeness should be
studied, first, in the case of things belonging to different genera, the formula being
A:B=C:Do"
•• ". o o dilata est de Trinitate
disputatio, ut in ipsis etiam corporalibus visis
inveniretur trinitas, et distinctius in ea lectoris exerceretur intentioo" (De Trinitate
XV, 3 (5); PL XXXII, 1060)
'"For a bibliography on dialectic as polemic see Ghellinck, op. cit., p. 69.
•• De Dialectica l; PL XXXII, 1309.
0

••

ARISTOTELIAN

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dialectic in me, that you might lead astray those unskilled in it,
and praise those who would not enter into dispute with me. But
are you not using dialectic when you write against us? ... Looking
over the very work you sent me, I see that you explain certain
things artfully and at length-that is, eloquently-and that you
discourse upon certain things with cleverness and subtility-that
is dialectically-and yet you bemoan my use of eloquence and
dialectic." 44
As pointed out above, this dialectic of St. Augustine is rather
heterogeneous in character. In some places, however, one finds
him using dialectic in precisely the Aristotelian sense. 45
As regards dialectic as a positive method of inquiry, applied
to a subject matter for the sake of discovery, not a great deal
of it is to be found in St. Augustine. One cause for this was
obscurity about the nature of dialectic, and the lack of Aristotelian texts precluded improvement. Another cause-one of
equal importance-was the very nature of sacred studies. The
Christian thinker was confronted with mysteries, and hence it
was impossible for him to have "surveyed all the difficulties
beforehand." 46 There was no question of discovering fundamental notions or principles-those were given in revelation.
The possibility of deepening knowledge was recognized, but it
was done primarily by comparison of texts. The only important exception to this in St. Augustine appears to be his investigations in the second part of De Trinitate. There dialectic plays
its most creative role. "It is no longer a preliminary exercise,
a research useful for its effects upon the mind. It becomes
fruitful of itself and is nothing else but the very law· of re.. Contra Creaconium 1, IS (16).
'"Compare the following passages (from Aristotle and Augustine) a propos the
convertibility of definitions: " Whereas if any part of the expression do not apply
I to everything that falls under the same species, it is possible that the expression as
a whole should be peculiar; for it will not be predicated convertibly with the
object ... " (Topics VI S; 140 b, 21); "Si enim me rogares quid esset homo, et
eum hoc modo definirem, Homo est animal mortale: non continuo quia verum dictum
est, etiam definitionem probare deberes, sed superposita ei particula, id est, omnis,
convertere illam et intueri, utrum etiam conversa vera esset. . . ." (De Quantitate
Animae, 25 (47); PL XXXII, 1062.
•• Metaphysies of Aristotle, ill I; 995 a, 82.

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DOM DUNSTAN HAYDEN

search; it is the very movement of the depths of the soul, going
forward to the gradual discovery of truth." 47

Ill
Between the time of St. Augustine and the beginning of the
Carolingian renaissance there are only two figures that need be
considered here: Boethius and Cassiodorus. Like St. Augustine's, their works were widely disseminated and extremely
influentiaL Boethius is of interest here because of his logical
works and translations which were available before the thirteenth century. A list of these is most informative: two commentaries on the lsagoge; a translation of De Interpretatione
with two commentaries; a translation and commentary on the
Categories; an unfinished commentary on Cicero's Topics; three
original works on syllogisms; De Divisione and the treatise De
Dijjerentiis Topicis. One notiGes immediately that four books
of the Organon are missing. Apparently Boethius's translations
of them were lost soon after his death. The closest thing to
Aristotle's work on dialectic was the partial work on Cicero's
Topics. Like Cicero, Boethius saw dialectic as a mixture of
formal logic and the science of probable arguments, yet placeil
at times very close to rhetoric. 48
Cassiodorus furthered stiU more the influence of St. Augu.stine.49 The work of theology was again said to be the penetration of Scripture. "Happy is the soul who with God's help has
stored up in memory the secret of this great gift; but happier
•• Marron, op. cit., p. 825.
•• We have not succeeded in determining this question more precisely. The following quotations will give an idea of the complex nature of dialectic according to
Boethius and Cicero. " ... disputandi ratio et Ioquendi dialecticorum sit, oratorum
autem dicendi et ornandi."
(Cicero's Orator, 82, 18). "Patet igitur in quo
philosophus ab oratore ac dialectico in propria consideratione dissideat: in eo scilicet
quod illis probabilitatem, huic veritatem constat esse propositam."
(Boethius's
De Dijjerentiis Topicis, l, I; PL LXIV, 1181 lB-H82 A). "Quamque eodem nomine
[dialectica] Aristoteles, non totam disserendi artem, ut Stoici, sed earn tantum
nuncupet quae de proposita quaestione verisimilibus colligat argumentis.
(Boethius's ln Topica Ciceronis Commentaria, PL LXIV, 1047 C)
•• For Ill list of references to Augustine, see Marron op. cit., p. !itl!i!, n. 5.

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still, he who has discovered the paths of its meanings." 5 ° For
example, in his most celebrated work, the Institutiones, his
purpose in writing it was, according to van de Vyver, to furnish
his monks the bibliography and the means of their deepening
their study of Scripture. 51 The works written by the monks at
Vivarium were with very few exceptions commentaries on the
sacred text and translations of older commentaries and homilies.52 In other words, the material of theology was scriptural
and patristic texts. 53
The preparation for Scriptural study consisted in the seven
arts. " It should be noted that both in Sacred Scripture and in
learned expositions much can be learned through schemata,
definitions, the art of grammar, :rhetoric, dialectic, arithmetic
and astronomy." 54
For Cassiodorus the art called "dialectica" was an instrument for disputation 55 and the study of the syllogism-that is,
formallogic. 56 Dialectic, then, was one of the instruments used
in the study of Scripture, but more specifically in the propounding and upholding of Christian doctrine. Scripture itself determined theological study, while dialectic was merely usefuL In
view of the tremendous popularity of Cassiodorus in the following centuries, one is not surprised to see these ideas reappear
with great frequency. 57
De lnstitutione Divinarum Litterarum, Praef.; l'L LXX, 1107 C.
"' "Cassiodore et son oeuvre," Speculum, VI (1931), 272.
•• Ibid., pp. 264-271.
•• "In quibus [sacris Iitteris] non propriam doctrinam sed priscorum dicta commendo, quae posteris laudare fas est, et praedicare gloriosum." (De lnstitutione
Divinarum Litterarum, l'L LXX, 1107 A)
••Ibid., 1140 D.
55 " •••
[dialectica], quantum magistri saeculares dicunt disputationibus subtilissimis ac brevibus vera sequestrat a falsis." (De Artibus ac Disciplinis Liberalium
Litterarum, Praef.; PL LXX, 1151 D)
•• "Nunc ad logicam, quae et dialectica dicitur . . ." (Ibid., H67 B); "Sed
priusquam de syllogismis dicamus, ubi totius dialecticae utilitas et virtus ostenditur .
• . ." (Ibid., 1168 B)
•• For a list of authors who quoted him, and of libraries which we know listed
his works, see L. W. Jones, "The Influence of Cassiodorus on Medieval Culture,"
Speculum, XX (1945), 433-442.
50

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The century and a half that followed Cassiodorus were so
barren intellectually that they can safely be passed over. The
Carolingian renaissance, however, is generally recognized to be
of great importance in the evolution of theology. This is not
because there were any striking innovations in method or
changes of principles or subject matter, but because of the revitalization of intellectual life in generaL Charles Martel had
seen fit to pillage the abbeys. Charles the Great promoted
ecclesiastical establishments, founded schools, had texts copied,
issued capitularies regulating these and other things, and in
general caused a great increase in intellectual vitality. Theology, however, remained essentially what it had been in St.
Augustine's time. "There are scarcely any documents which
would permit us to assign any other end to the theological
instruction of this epoch than the enlightened reading of the
Bible, of the works of several of the Fathers, of liturgical rites
and prayers." 58 This fact is mirrored in the controversies of
the time-,--on grace and predestination, adoptionism, the cult
of images and the filioque-which were carried on not by
speculations on the problems but by endless references to the
auctores, culled mainly from the flo.rilegia. Secular studies followed the lines laid out in the De Doctrina Christiana. The
seven arts were justified as the proper preparation for the
sacred text. 59 Some of them were in addition very useful for
certain ecclesiastical functions, like plain chant and computation of feasts. 60
The seven arts were not given equal treatment. In general
the quadrivium received less attention than the trivium, especially in the monastic schools. 61 Again, in the trivium, it was
grammar that was emphasized. It was this discipline textuelle
•• Ghellinck, op. cit., p. HI.
••" Le but assigne a I' etude de Ia grammaire et des arts liberaux est tout entier
subordonne a !'intelligence de Ia Bible .... " (Ibid., p. 13)
•• Carolingian legislation demanded a knowledge of these. See MGH, Capitularia,
1, n. 116, VIII, and n. 117, V; p. 285, p.
61 See Dom Philibert
Schmitz, Histoire de l'ordre de Saint Benoit (Maredsous,
1942), ll, 59.

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which gave new impetus to sacred studies in the Carolingian
period. On the one hand, grammar was cultivated as a preparation for the two primary monastic activities: the opus Dei
and the lectio divina; on the other, grammar provided a technique that helped to understand the Bible 62 and thus, at least
in the cathedral schools, 63 pave the way for a discussion of
contenL Dialectic is of relatively little importance for most of
the Carolingian period. Indeed, we know of places-York, for
example; in the time of Alcuin-where it was not even taught. 64
From Alcuin until Abailard the use of dialectic was only occasional.65 Under the term dialectic was included principally
material found in the Categories and De Interpretatione, but
also the traditional treatment of syllogisms. 66
H little is said here about the tenth and eleventh centuries,
it is not because they were entirely static. Economically,
politically and socially they were times of tremendous change.
Yet in theology and in dialectic one finds nothing, with the
possible exception of St. Anselm, that was original and of real
influence on succeeding ages. While St. Anselm was indeed
important in some ways, he appears to have had little influence
on the development of theological method. No attempt is made
here to determine more precisely what influence he did have.
Ghellinck has found little or no difference between the
theology of this period and of the periods described above.
" Theology remained what it had been: the intelligent reading
of the Bible and of some of the Fathers, the knowledge of symbols, canons and ceremonies. Outside of the schools at least,
it appeared only in the form of an immediate practical preparation for sacred functions." 67 The literary productions of the
times were mainly glosses, books of sentences (i. e., patristic
•• For the nse of tropi etc. see MGH, Leges, Capitularia, t. 1, p. 79.
63 For a fuller statement
of this contrast, see Dom Jean Leclercq, "L'humanisme
oonedictin du VIII• au XII• siecle," Analecta Monastica, Premiere serie, Studia
Anselmiana, 20 (1948), pp. 8, 14-lli.
•• See Schmitz, loc. cit.
•• See DTC, "Theologie," XV, 360.
•• For example, see Alcuin's De Dialectica, PL CI, 951 ff.
•• Op. cit., p. 44.

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dicta, on religious topics, culled from the florilegia) , commentaries on Scripture, and toward the end of the eleventh century,
some monographic treatises on particular theological subjects.
We may note two things of some significance. First, with
regard to the seven arts, practice deviated somewhat from
theory. The program of the arts was indeed flourishing, but
not equal attention was given to each of the elements. 68 Thus,
for example, at the cathedral school of Rheims in the eleventh
century little or no attention was paid to the quadrivium, with
the exception of music. 69 Secondly, dialectic was becoming
more important as a theological instrument, if only in terms of
polemic. The term still means of course that collection of
logical doctrines traditional for many centuries. Berangarius
was responsible for much of the controversy of the time, for
his attitude toward dialectic was distinctly rationalistic. " It
is a sign of great intelligence to rely upon dialectic in all things;
for he who does not, since he is made in the image of God with
respect to his reason, relinquishes this honor .... " 70 Lanfranc,
though up in arms against Berengarius, took a moderate view
of dialectic. "For those who consider it carefully, dialectic does
not impugn the mysteries o£ God, but when there is need it
supports and strengthens them if rightly used!' 71 The net
result of this increased use of dialectic was a growing tension
between those who would apply it more extensively and those
who restrict its use to the more traditional functions.

IV
A few remarks about the tension indicated above will serve as
an introduction to this last section on Abailard's use of dialectic in his theological method. For to come to grips with the
questions later discussed one must keep clearly
mind the
•• Ibid., pp. 40 ff.
•• See John R. Williams, " The Cathedral School of Rheims in the Eleventh
Century," Speculum, XXIX (1954), 661-677.
70 Sacra Coena, cd. Vischer (Berlin, 1834), p. 101.
71 Glo.•sa in Epistolam Pauli, PL CL, 157 C.

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condition of dialectic in the twelfth century; that is, its place in
the educational system and its content.
As pointed out above, dialectic received more -and more
attention during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. In theory
the complete cycle of the seven arts remained the educational
ideal, but in practice various arts were not taught, nor was the
order of instruction always the same. 72 In theory the arts were
still grouped around and subordinated to sacred studies/ 8 but
in practice there was a growing independence in their cultivation. The arts were maturing, new materials were beginning to
flow into Europe from the Arabs, and the educational system as
a fixed synthesis was irrevocably shattered. The results were
specialization and rivalry. Dialectic was often cultivated without the proper foundation in grammar and rhetoric and without
any intention of subordinating it as an instrument to be used
in the artes reales. Such a procedure was, according to William
of Conches, " to be always sharpening the sword, but never
using it in battle." 74 There was rivalry not only between the
quadrivium and the trivium; but also between grammar and
rhetoric on the one hand, and dialectic on the other. Although
dialectic held the center of the stage, in not a few schools relatively little attention was paid to it. 75 Specialization in dialectic and the other arts led to difficulties in communication. Thus,
for example, when Abailard complained that St. Bernard did
7" For some examples see Pare, Brunet, Tremblay, La Renaissance du XII• siecle
(Ottawa: Institute d'etudes medievales, 1933), p. 102. For England in particular,
see David Knowles, The Monastic Order in England (Cambridge, 1940), p. 495 fl.
73 " Constat quod omnes artes naturales divinae scientiae famulantur, et inferior
sapientia recte ordinata ad superiorem conducit. Sub eo igitur sensu qui est in
significatione vocum ad res, continetur historia; cui famulantur tres scientiae sicut
dictum est, id est grammatica, dialectica, rhetorica. Sub eo autem sensu qui est in
significatione rerum ad facta mystica, continetur allegoria. Et sub eo sensu qui est
in significatione rerum ad facienda mystica, continetur tropologia; et his duobus
famulantur arithmetica, musica, geometria, astronomia et physica." Hugh of St
Victor, De Sacramentis, Prologus, c. 6.
74 De Philosophia Mundi, Prologus.
75 " Of the seven traditional branches of the old curriculum, Dialectic, the third
member of the Trivium, had little place in the monasteries compared with that
which it was beginning to hold in the schools and nascent universities. . . ."
(Knowles, op. cit., p. 497)

402

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not understand the vim verborum, he was not challenging St.
Bernard's theology but his competence to judge a dialectical
undertaking. The modern historian must admit that there was
some justice on both sides.
In discussing Abailard, one must keep in mind what the word
" dialectic " meant to him. First, it was not synonymous with
the term logica; for the latter was often used to describe the
entire trivium/ 6 Secondly, the content of dialectic underwent
a tremendous change in the middle of the century. In 1128
James of Venice translated again the Topics, Analytics, and On
Sophistical Refutations. 77 These works appear at Chartres
about 1140, being taught there by Thierry. They were certainly
known to his students--:-Gilbert, Richard, Otto of Freising, and
John of Salisbury. 78 By 1175 they were appearing in the catalogues of monastic libraries. 79 The important fact suggested
by these dates is that Abailard did not have the new translations. One can find in Abailard's works a small number of
quotations from the Topics and On Sophistical Refutations,
but these were probably taken from Boethius. 80
The discussion of Abailard will be in two sections. In the
first will be considered the principles upon which his method
depends. In particular, it will include his notions of faith and
authority, his justification of reason in theology and the meaning of intellectus fidei, and finally the question of his rationalism. The second section will be an examination of his actual
method, as seen in the ends for which he used dialectic. These
can be summarized under four heads: apologetic and polemic,
•• " La groupe des sciences du trivium, arts du language, est appele logica (logica
n'egale done pas dialectica), selon I'extension meme du mot grec M-yos, qui siguifie a
la fois mot, concept, discours (i.e. grammaire, dialectique, rhetorique) ." Pare op.
cit., p. 105.
•• See Amable Jourdain, Recherches critiques sur l'age et l'origine des traductions
latines (Paris, 1884), pp. 58 f.
78 See A. Clerval, Lea ecoles de Chartres au moyen age (Chartres, 1895), pp. 244 f.
•• Two examples are given in Martin Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholastischen
Methode (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1909), IT, 78.
80 See Jourdain, op. cit., pp. 29 fi, and p. 287, n. L. For a contrary view, see J. G.
Sikes, Peter Abailard (London, 1982), p. 272.

ARISTOTELIAN

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textual analysis, investigation of mysteries, and the construction of theology. 81
Est quippe fides existimatio rerum non apparentium. 82 This
famous definition from the first book of the lntroductio ad
Sanctam Theologiam has been and continues to be a source of
controversy. St. Bernard condemned Abailard for
and
modern authors have tried to explain it in a variety of ways. 84
Most commentators have criticized the word existimatio, for in
the twelfth century (and indeed in Abailard's works, too) the
word often meant opinion. Cottiaux, however, has thrown new
light on the problem by calling attention to the other part of
the definition-rerum non apparentium-and to the context of
the sentence. In the beginning of the first book of the Intmductio, Abailard treats of faith, hope and charity; but an examination of his definitions makes it clear that he is not defining
the theological virtues, but rather certain habits in general.
With regard to the second and third of these virtues he states:
"Hope is the expectation of some good to be attained ....
Charity is disinterested love which is directed to a fitting end,
as, on the other hand, cupidity is called interested or base
love." 85 One may reasonably conclude that Abailard did not
intend to define supernatural faith either. Indeed, the term
must have a broader extension than that, for a little further
on he explicitly narrows its meaning.' "If one speaks for your
edification concerning faith, it is sufficient that only those
things be treated which, if not believed, bring damnation. But
these are the things which pertain to the Catholic faith." 86
To see in the word existimatio an expression touching the
81 The Tractatus will be quoted from the edition of Stoltze; the Dialectica from
that of Cousin; all others from Migne, v. CLXXVID: references to these will be
only the column number; titles will be abbreviated.
•• lntr., 981 C.
sa Adv. Abael., c. 4; PL CLXXXII, 1061.
•• For a brief resume, see J. Cottiaux, "La conception de Ia theologie chez
Abelard," Rev. Hist. Eccl., XXVIII (1982), pp. 291 ff. The entire article (pp. 247295, 588-551, 788-828) has been freely used here.
••zntr., 981 C, 982 C.
•• Ibid., 986 C.

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certainty of faith is to fly in the face of Abaila:rd's works, for
nowhere else does he voice such doubts. His problem was quite
different: to describe the kind of certain knowledge that faith
was. It was certainly not comprehensio, for no human can
know God completely. Nor was it scientia in the sense then
given to the word. For example, Hugh of St. Victor wrote:
" They know more perfectly who grasp the thing itself as it is
in its very presence; these are scientes." 87 The important note
of scientia was that the object was fully present to the knower.
The significance of Abailard's sentence now becomes apparent.
.Faith in general is the kind of knowledge one has about an
object that is not seen. "If someone says he has faith regarding
things seen, then he abuses the term." 88 Abailard, then, did
not reduce faith to opinion, but pointed out that in both types
knowledge the object is absent. That he repeated the phrase
in question in other passages. is an indication of his desire to
emphasize the transcendence of the ultimate object of faith.'"
It should be noted that faith is always the
of departure
and the end in Abailard's theology. This is clear from phrases
that keep recurring, phrases like "to support and defend the
faith," " to penetrate the reasons of faith," and " to elaborate
upon the faith." 90
Faith is based upon the auctores: Sacred Scripture and the
writings of the Fathers. Abailard's attitude toward these authorities was both respectfully submissive and intelligent. Theology has as ends to support these authorities and to help
understand Scripture. 01
was intelligent for he treated m a
De Sacramentis, Pars X, c. 2; PL CLXXVI, 330 D.
lntr., 984 D. See also Theol., 986 B: "His itaque testimoniis patet fidei nomen
proprie, modo improprie poni, cum videlicet non solum de occultis, verum etiam de
87
8"

fides dicatur ."
Par !'expression aestimatio non apparentium, il ne definit done pas Ia foi,
mais Ia rapproche d'un acte de connaissance, aestimatio, dont !'objet se presente a
!'esprit dans les memes conditions; il utiliscra done cette expression quand il voudra
souligner ce caractere .... " (Cottiaux, op. cit., p. 291; see also Pare, op. cit., pp.
299-300)
•• For reference to these and similar phrases, see Cottiaux, op. cit., p. 272 r.
' 11 See Tract., pp. 19, 21.
80 "

0

ARISTOTELIAN

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405

reasonable (if not entirely accurate) way the problem of errm·.
The Fathers, he states, in fact did make errors, even in matters
of faith; although canonical scripture never erred in such matters, yet it could be mistaken if there was no fidei dettimenturn.92 Granted that such errors were possible in these two
sources of authority, how was the Christian to discern them?
Clearly, by his reason. Although it is authority which establishes faith, reason must choose authorities, rejecting the
Fathers when they are in error. 93 Choice implies criteria, and
these
set forth in the Prologue to the Sic et Non. Revelation meant more than the Bible, for more than one doctrine of
faith was found nowhere in Scripture. This principle, accepted
by St. Anselm, 94 is clearly stated in the Theologia Chtistiana
of Abailard: " Many necessary doctrines of the faith were
added after the gospels by the Apostles or apostolic men which
cannot be proved from the words of the gospels; such is the
doctrine regarding the preservation of the virginity of the
Mother of God even after she bore a child, and perhaps a nmnmay
ber of other doctrines too." 95 In summary, then,
be said to have stressed the use of reason in the demarcation
of precisely what doctrines were to be believed. Yet reason is
never a substitute for the act of faith. " .Nien cannot be impelled by sense knowledge or by human reasoning to receive
and believe these doctrines of faith, but they are to be dravvn
by authority alone." 96
Abailard, however, did not limit reason to the function of
ascertaining the doctrines of faith in Scripture and the Fathers.
•• Sic et Non, 1346 D.
93 Abailard quotes with approval St. Jerome's commentary on Psalm 81: "' Videte
quod dicat: qui fuerunt, non qui sunt, ut exceptis aposto!is, quodcunque aliud
postea dicatur, abscindatur, non habeat postea auctoritatem. Quamvis ergo sanctus
sit aliquis post apostolos. quamvis disertus sit, non habet auctoritatem. . . .'
Non enim praejudicata doctoris opinio, sed doctrinae ratio ponderanda est, sicut
scriptum est: Omnia probate; quod bonum est tenete. Hoc tamen de commentatoribus dictum est, non de canonicis Scripturis, quibus indubitatam fidem convenit
adhibere." (Sic et Non, 1348 C-1849 A)
•• See De Concordia PL CLVIII, 528; and De Processione, ibid., :no-6.
•• Theol., 1802 B.
•• Ibid., U24 B; see also Cottiaux, op. cit., pp. 287 fl.

406

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He also strove for an intelligentia fidei. The question may
therefore be posed: what was his justification for this further
use? In one sense this was hardly a problem at alL That is
to say, throughout the entire theological tradition from SL
Augustine to Abailard, there was a clear affirmation of the
necessity for reasoning. Had not SL Augustine said: "The
discipline of disputation is extremely valuable for all sorts of
questions that must be solved in Sacred Scripture." 97 And this
encomium was repeated in every century afterward. Abailard
was in the same tradition in asserting: " A thing heard from
God but not understood, incites the hearer to inquiry!' 98
On the other hand, this tradition also included the dictum
of SL Gregory: " Faith has no merit in so far as it is based on
reasoned certitude!' 99 This trenchant statement was rather a
stumbling block for thinkers; and even in the thirteenth century
theologians were careful to give an interpretation of iL Abailard
commented on it in three of his works. 100 The burden of his
argument was that SL Gregory forbade us to substitute :reason
true faith, but
not forbid the use of reason based on
presupposing faith. In other words, the motive of faith ought
never to be conviction based on understanding-indeed
that
would not be faith at all-yet faith itself, once possessed, urges
us on to further knowledge, " Faith has no merit in the eyes of
God if one believes, not in God, who spoke through his saints,
but in human :reasonings which are frequently mistaken.
!' 101
Reason, however, is not excluded altogether. "A thing heard
from God but not understood, incites the hearer to inquiry;
but the hearing comes first. Inquiry easily brings about understanding, if devotion be present." 102 Perhaps the basic reason
for this further understanding, intelligentia, lies in the object
0

•

97 De Doctrina ChriYtiana, U, c. 31; PL XXXIV, 53 A.
•• Theol., 1225 C.
•• Homilia XXVI.
100 Trim., p. 28; Theol., 1226 A; lntr., 1050 D. The version in Cousin and Migne
of this last text is incorrect and misleading; the matter will be treated a little
further on, when we consider the question of Abailard's rationalism.
101 Tkeol., H!26 A.
10"Jbm., }2f!/) C.

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of faith. Man is presented ·with propositions to which he is to
give assent. If he does nothing but make the act of faith, he
runs the risk of professing empty formulae-a strange state of
affairs for a rational being. Thus Abailard excoriated those who
held that the prophets did not understand their own sayings,
and that therefore we should do likewise. "It they did not
understand what they themselves spoke, then they were not
wise. Therefore, if it is stupid to deny that the prophets were
wise, it follows that they understood what they spoke." 108
Granted that faith ought to be followed by the attempt to
understand, the question arises as to the type of intelligentia
fidei. Cottiaux has studied this ·question in considerable detail/04 and only a brief summary of his conclusions will be given.
In the Tractatus Abailard conceived this greater understanding in a neoplatonic sense as a form of divine illumination.
"Unless God manifest himself, our nature does not suffice to
see him, lest we mortals, deeply stained with sin, should try
with our petty reasonings to comprehend the incomprehensible." 105 In the Theologia,106 he places this understanding
somewhere between divine illumination and the results of pure
dialectic, but without being very specific. However, he does
stress the strictly analogous character of our knowledge of God.
"We transfer words from creature to Creator by a certain
similitude: for men made these words to designate creatures
whom they can understand, since they wished to manifest by
the words something they understood . . . yet man is not able
to understand God and has not dared to express by a word that
ineffable good." 107 Finally, in the lntroductio, he restricts
understanding to a limited grasp of revealed propositions. " He
reduces the intelligentia fidei to the proportions of an indirect
knowledge of the object of faith or of a comprehension of the
grammatical sense of the propositions of revelation." 108
One of the most striking things about this evolution of
thought is the restricted way in which Abailard used dialectic.
lntr.,
C.
Op. cit., pp. 588-551.
106 Tract., p. 9:1.
103
10 '

Theol.,
Ibid., 1246 D.
108 Cottiaux, op. cit., pp. 548-9.
108

107

408

DO:i\1 DUNSTAN

HAYDEK

In the first stage, granted that one must use his own faculties,
still the intelligentia fidei is a special gift of God. In the last
stage, dialectic is of greater importance, not as leading directly
to the reality expressed by propositions, but as capable of
explaining the literal meaning of these propositions. Although
this matter is still far from clear, it is apparent that no description of Abailard simply as a dialectician is adequate.
Twentieth century works on Abailard have tended more
and more to discredit the notion that he was a rationalist. The
question cannot be fully settled until his method is better understood. However, most attempts to make him a rationalist have
been centered on, or at least included, two of his dicta: his
phrase astruere fidem, and the text in the Introductio, column
1050 D in Migne. Both of these have been shown to have
different meanings from those previously assigned to them.
The verb astruere meant in the twelfth entury both to prove
and to support. Although Abailard used the verb in both
senses, the phrase astruere fidem apparently never had the
meaning of replacing faith by demonstrative reasoning. Thus
in the Tractatus it was connected with polemic, while in the
Theologia it included polemic and also apologetic and devotion,
and in the
there was the added note of elaboration
109
and amplification.
In short, the phrase astruere fidem, though
difficult and variable in meaning, has no probative force in this
question. The text in the Introductio referred to above would
indeed be a clear affirmation of rationalism of a sort: Man
does not believe because God has revealed something, but
because he himself is intellectually convinced of it. However,
investigation by Ligeard 110 has turned up the source of the
difficulty. The original printed version of Duchesne in 1616
contained some serious errors, and the faulty texts were reproFor texts, see Cottiaux, op. cit., pp. 1!73 f.
"Le rationalisme de Pierre Abelard," Recherches de science religieuse (1911),
Il, 394. Ligeard also gives his interpretation of Abailard's notion of faith. "Au
debut, interviendrait une demonstration strictement rationelle, oeuvre exclusive de
!'intelligence: la grace, survenante ensuite, transformerait ce premier acte et
engendrerait ainsi la foi surnaturelle ... " (p. 396). Such a view, however, is in
dear contradiction to numberless texts, some of which already have been cited above.
10 "

110

ARISTOTELIAN

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DIALECTIC

duced by Cousin and Migne. There is given below a rough
translation of the emended text; the Latin version of it may be
found in the periodical cited.
Could not the unbelievers, whom St. Gregory wished to lead by
argumentation to a belief in the Resurrection, could they not retort
by using his own principle, namely, that faith is not to be approached by reasoning .... But in fact St. Gregory never said that
one should not use reason in matters of faith, nor, on the other
hand, did he permit faith to be limited and controlled by human
reason. What he did say was that faith had no merit in the eyes
of God, if one did not accept it on the divine authority, but rather
was pressed into believing by the force of arguments: such would
be the case when a man believes not because God has spoken, but
because he himself has attained a reasoned conviction.

Such a statement is dearly in accord with the attitudes expressed elsewhere in Abailard's works: 111 reason is never a substitute for faith, but reason does have definite functions, basing
itself upon faith. The question of his rationalism is too complex
to be dealt with at any greater length. Although the twelfth
century was one
growth and experiment,
although
Abailard was sometimes bold in expression and not always dear
and consistent, still it serves no purpose and is seriously misleading to speak of Abailard as a rationalist.m

*

*

*

*

*

*

The discussion so far has concerned the principles which
underlie Abailard's method. The method itself can now be
111 For example:
" ... perpende quisquis es quanta praesumptio sit de eo, quod
cuncta transcendat humana, discutere ratione, nee aliter acquiescere velle, donee ea
quae dicuntur, aut ex sensu aut ratione humana sint" (Theol., 1221 D-1224 A).
Again, Abailard's emphasis on the analogous character of human knowledge of
God should be noted: " Uncle in Deo null urn propriam inventionem vocabulum
servare videtur, sed omnia quae de eo dicuntur translationibus et parabolicis
aenigmatibus involuta sunt et per similitudinem aliquam vestigantur ex parte
aliqua inductam, ut aliquid de illa ineffabili majestate suspicando potius quam
intelligendo potius quam intelligendo degustemus." (Ibid., 1246 D)
112 The question of Abailard's
rationalism leads into the further question of his
relation to later Protestant thought. For different views on this, the following may
be consulted: J. R. McCallum, Abelard's Christian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell,
1948), pp. 20-22, 30-44; Gonzague True, Abelard avec et sans Heloi'se (Paris:
Fayard, 1956), pp. 55-89.

410

DOM DUNSTAN

described and illustrated in terms of the ends for which
dialectic was used. The first of these--apologetic and polemicwas certainly the most traditional. This aspect of Abailard's
works was not particularly different, either in content or
method, from what had gone before.
" Learn what you would teach so that you may be able to
exhort in sacred doctrine and to vanquish those who contradict
you." 113 This injunction of St. Jerome was quoted by Abailard
in the Introductio, 113 and suggests the basis on which apologetic
and polemic were to be founded. No one can teach religion
unless he himself has a solid grasp of the material. He need not
necessarily have a profound understanding of the reality, but
he must at least grasp the immediate meaning of God's revealed
words. He can then establish the credibility of Christ's Church
and show that there is nothing absurd, nothing contrary to
reason in its doctrines. Such an apologetic occupied a relatively
small place in Abailard's first works, but seemed to assume a
greater importance in the later ones.114 Polemic, on the other
hand, received considerable attention in the early works and
then diminished in importance. In Abailard's statements of
purpose, the refutation of the philosophers is repeatedly mentioned. 115 Dialectic in polemic is simply the standard ars
disputandi-rhetoric and the logzca vetus. It was easily justified
by authority.
When He promised his disciples the virtue of wisdom, by which
they could refute the arguments of their opponents, saying: " I
will give you wisdom of speech which your adversaries will not be
able to resist " ... clearly He promised them that armor of reasons
by which they would be made most skillful in dispute. . . . Who
does not know that our Lord Jesus Christ Himself bested the Jews
in frequent disputes? 116
In the interpretation and conciliation of texts dialectic found
a role for itself that was certainly more original and in some
lntr., 1048 D.
•u See Cottiaux, op. cit., pp. 272 ff.
110 See Tract., p. 29; Theol., 1227 C; lntr., 1040 A.
118 Epistola 18; 866-866.
118

ARISTOTELIAN

DIALECTIC

411

ways more important than apologetic and polemic. The Fathers
of the Church had been concerned with the conciliation of the
Old and New Testament. Medieval thinkers had a far greater
task in the conciliation of the Fathers. They found themselves
with a great quantity of materials " culled from the most
disparate works, from all times and places, torn out of context,
and without care for their precise meaning or perspective." 117
The task could not be ignored, for the consensus patrum was
essential in the understanding and elaboration of doctrine.
From the time of Heriger of Lobbes 118 in the tenth century the
attempt to reconcile these texts was continuous. Different
methods were attempted. Rabanus and Erugena simply chose
those texts which were suitable for the task at hand. Hincmar 119
and Hugh of Reading 120 would have the authority of the
Church be the ultimate criterion. Hugh of St. Victor looked to
the faith itself for guidance. 121 Each of these methods was
useful, but minimaL Each left untouched the problem of understanding precisely what was said by the patristic texts.
The methods used by Abaila:rd and outlined
the introduction to the Sic et Non appear to derive mainly from the
canonists. During the second hal£ of the ninth century canon
law began to be organized according to rational methods rather
than chronology. The classified canons, not unmixed with
dogmatic materials, were for centuries a very convenient source
for patristic documentation. The canonists had to face the
problem of conciliating the texts, and by 1100 we find that
they had worked out very clearly defined methods. Bernold
of Constance listed the following principles: l) the context is
to be clearly grasped; 2) there must be a comparison of texts;
3) the circumstances of time, place and person must be exPare, op. cit., p. 284.
De Corpore et sanguine Domini, PL CXXXIX, 186 A; and see Ghellinck,
op. cit., pp. 60 fl.
118 De praedestinatione, c. 4; PL CXXV, 88 C.
120 Dialogorum VII, 1; PL CXCII, 333 A.
121 " Disce prius breviter et dilucide, quid tenendum sit de fide Trinitatis.
. . ."
(Didascalion, VI, c. 4, p. 20 in critical edition of Charles Buttimer [Catholic
Yersity of America, 1939]; PL CLXXVI. 804 A).
117

118

412

DOM DUNSTAN HAYDEN

amined; 5) general measures are to be distinguished from
particular dispensations. 122 An improved set of these principles
was widely circulated in the De Consonantia Canonum of Yves
of Chartres. 123 It was only a matter of time before theologians
began to adopt such principles. We shall see below how
similar were those set forth by Abailard.
If dialectic was to support the auctoritates/ 24 certainly these
authorities themselves had to be understood. It was with this
end in view that Abailard wrote the Sic et Non. " ... to collect
various sayings of the Holy Fathers, sayings which strike us as
containing conflicting views on certain questions, such as would
provoke students to great efforts at inquiry and would sharpen
their capacities by practice." 125 The conflict of authorities was
an occasion not for scepticism but for inquiry. The principles
of such an inquiry were to lead to a better understanding
the texts and hence to a resolution of the conflicts. These principles have been described as dialectical, where dialectic is used
in a very broad sense, containing many heterodox elements. A
prolonged study would be necessary to determine the sources
and types of disciplines amalgamated into this instrument of
textual analysis. Some of the principles were grammatical, some
purely textual (authenticity, interpolations, etc.), and some
dialectical in the sense of the logica vetus. The surprising thing
is that some were dialectical in the strictly Aristotelian sense.
Since Abailard did not have the logica nova, one must conclude that either he or the canonists or some of his contemporaries had arrived at the same insights and methods that one
finds in the Topics.
There is given below a list of the principles mentioned in the
prologue to the Sic et Non. 126 It would indeed be desirable to
See De excommunicatis vitandis, PL CXLVIII, 214.
PL CLXI, 47 fl.
12 ' See Tract., p. 19; Theol., 1171 A; and lntr., 1039 C, 1047 A.
125 Sic et Non, 1349 A. Various historians have claimed to see a different purpose
behind the Sic et Non; yet no convincing proof has been offered in support of such
conjectures, and therefore Abailard's own statement of purpose is repeated here.
For a resume of the question, see McCallum, op. cit., pp, !JS-106.
'""The summary used is that of Pare, op. cit., p. 2!11.
102

103

ARISTOTELIAN

DIALECTIC

413

discuss the origins of each to see how much was derived from
the. Patristic tradition and how much was truly original. However, such a discussion would require a great deal of research,
which apparently has never been attempted.
1) Words vary in meaning according to the language of the
writer, his skill, his audience and the flexibility of his thought.
Above all, the actual usage of words is to be considered. 127
Texts must be authenticated, corruptions emended, and
interpolations removed.
8) Meaning can be established only after comparison of one
passage with another and with retractions; concessions to the
taste and ideas of contemporaries must be estimated.
4) Distinctions must be made between law and dispensation,
universal precepts and particular decisions, laws and counsels
of perfection.
5) If necessary, a hierarchy of authorities is to be established.
The most striking thing about the principles is their spirit
of conscious scientific inquiry. " This first key to wisdom may
be defined as assiduous or frequent interrogation. . . . In
doubting, we come to inquiry; through inquiry we arrive at
truth." 128 The most fundamental principle is that words simply
do not have a static and universal meaning: "A quick solution
to many controversies would be at hand, if it were granted
that the same words can mean different things in different
authors." 1211
The following have been considered so far as ends of dialectic:
apologetic, polemic and the conciliation of texts. They have
this in common that they are operations upon something
already possessed. The doctrines of faith are presented and
explained; they are defended against attack; they are supported
1 " 7 "Quibus [verbis] quidem si ad doctrinam, ut oportet, loqui volumus, magis
eorum usus quam proprietas sermonis aemulandus est, sicut et ipse grammaticae
princeps et locutionum instructor Priscianus edocet." (Sic et Non), 1889 C.
128 Sic et Non, 1849.
110 Ibid., 1844 D.

414

DOM DUNSTAN HAYDEN

by authorities in which their origins are revealed. Apart from
these ends, there still remains a further confrontation of dialectic
and the faith, one more problematic and involving search rather
than possession. In this constructive side of dialectic, two aspects
may be distinguislfed. First, does Abailard see dialectic as an
instrument with which the Christian mysteries can be penetrated and their content further divulged? Or, on the other
hand, is he more interested in the statement of the mysteries
considered formally as propositions? Secondly, is dialectic to
play a part in organizing that vast body of doctrine and rational
elaborations of doctrine? In other words, what is the architectonic factor in theology? No one has yet produced a thorough
study of how Abailard treated these questions. We can therefore speak only of Abailard's general attitudes, giving particular
examples when possible.
With regard to the first aspect mentioned above, it is perhaps
easier to say what Abailard was against than to say what he
was for. He was certainly opposed to those who thought that
the Christian mysteries should be only believed, not investigated by human reasoning. Abailard's answer was simple and
to the point: the Fathers did it; so can we. The Fathers wrote
many tracts, for example, on the Trinity. One after another
wrote on it; and when one broached a problem, another
treated it still more widely/ 80 Human reason, therefore, could
certainly do something with regard to the mysteries; and since
the object, God, was the most worthy object possible, reason
should exert itself. 181
A more difficult question arises now. Precisely what did
Abailard wish human reason, that is, dialectic, to accomplish
in its consideration of the mysteries? Its most basic role is
to give some content to formularies, which would otherwise be
empty concatenations of sounds. " The intelligentia is not
See lntr., 1046 D.
"At vero perpauci sunt, quibus huius scientiae secretum, immo sapientiae
thesaurum divina revelare dignetur; quae quidem quanto subtilior est, tanto
difficilior; quanto autem difficilior, tanto rarior; quanto autem rarior, tanto pretiosior;
quanto pretiosior, tanto rnaioris studii digna exercitio.... " (Dialectica, p. 486)
130
131

ARISTOTELIAN

DIALECTIC

415

therefore a way of substituting for faith vision based on demonstration; clearly, it is first of all the understanding of the words
and formulas in which the faith is announced and expressed,
and so intelligere is distinguished from the simple dicere." 132
However, Pare would appear to be guilty of overstatement
when he adds: " The intelligentia fidei is also and especially
the penetration of the content of the words .... " 133 Abailard
was indeed not opposed to arguments and illustrations which
shed some light upon the mysteries. Yet his primary purpose
would seem not to be the penetration of the content of the
mysteries, but rather the relating of theological propositions and
other forms of statement. The object studied is the propositions
themselves-linguistic artifacts susceptible of analysis according to the rules of grammar and dialectic. Once the proposition
has been scrutinized with regard to the text (authenticity, etc.),
and the meaning of the words (taken individuaUy) explained,
then dialectic enters in. " It explains the dogma, either by
showing the equivalence of formulas by the rules on the extension of predicates and subjects, or in finding for it analogies
in objects which require similar modes of speech. In both these
ways, it proves the firm foundation of the faith without discussing its object. The method of Abailard, therefore, does not
presuppose an intrinsic knowledge of the mystery!' 134
Some examples will serve to clarify these assertions. Abailard
discusses the question of whether one may say that God existed
before the world and will exist after
The problem is basically
the grammarian's problem of the consignification of verbs.
"When \Ve transfer any words to the singular divine nature,
we must draw them into a certain singular signification and
construction .... Since God transcends all things ineffably, is
it to be wondered at that he exceeds
words of human
135
making? "
A more dialectical example would be his treatment of the
Trinity in the Theologia Christiana. From among the many
u• Pare, op. cit., p. 810.

'""Ibid.

... Cottiaux, op. cit., p. 822.
135 Theol., 1245 II, C.

416

DOM DUNSTAN

HAYDEN

questions there discussed, one will be singled out and the
various elements of his solution shown. The question is this:
is it correct to say that the Father is the Son? First, Abailard
introduces an analogy-a waxen image and the wax of which
it is made. Are these the same or different? " The materia and
the materiatum are the same in number, yet they do not share
their properties." 136 For the wax itself is not the image (the
wax is not made from itself) ; and the image is not its own
material, since nothing is a constitutent part of itself or naturally prior to itself. Therefore, the wax and the waxen :image
are the same essence, but their properties are distinct. Next,
he points out that this is a special case of a general rule in
dialectic. " If we take the words ' wax ' and ' waxen image '
absolutely, it is permitted to join them together by predication
on account of their identity of substance. . . . But if we take
these words relatively, as materia and materiatum, or constituent and constituted, or cause and effect, or generating and
generated, then it is not permitted to join them in predication
according to their properties." 137 Abailard then considers the
Trinity in the light of these rules and shows that we use
predication in an analogous way there. "And by the same
rule applied to the divine persons, the Father is not the Son
(for then God the Father would be generated by himself),
nor is the Son the Father (for then God the Son would generate
.
lf) .... "138
h1mse
During this discussion, Abailard brings in from time to time
other dialectical rules and shows how they relate to this one. 139
He also makes in passing a methodological comment that would
support the interpretation given above of his treatment of the
mysteries. He remarks: " When a question is put :regarding
words-that is, whether a word is taken to mean this or that
(as in this passage, for example, we ask why it cannot truly be
said that the Father is the Son) -then the whole controversy
is to be referred ad vim verborum." 140 It may be concluded,
Ibid., 1248 B, C.
Ibid., 1288 C, D.
138 Ibid., 1290 A.
136

137

See, for example, 1277 A, B, C.
u• Theol., 1273 C.

139

ARIS'£0TELIAN

DIALECTIC

417

then, that Abailard's end in the investigation of mysteries is
not to substitute demonstration for them, and not primarily to
deduce new knowledge by a penetration of their content. What
he attempts is to give a logical justification for the formulas in
which the mysteries are expressed, to show their continuity
with dialectic. 141
The second and final aspect of Abailard's dialectic considered
as inventive has to do with the structure of theology. Here
Abailard was less a striking innovator than a participant in an
evolutionary process. We have
mind the evolution away
from exegesis of texts toward a consideration of specific problems or topics, and ultimately toward the summa-the body
significant theological problems, arranged and related according
to principles.
The evolution of literary forms has been studied by many
authors/ 42 and only the briefest outline need be given here. The
pedagogical system of the lectio underwent continual elaboration until it finally gave way to a more topical method
presentation, The lectio contained introductory remarks about
the author and the text to be considered, which led into the
exposition of the text. According to Hugh of St. Victor, the
expositio contained three elements: littera, sensus, and
entia. The first concerned the syntax of the text; the second,
its immediate meaning; the third, some problematic passage,
of which a brief discussion was given. 143 Gradually these discussions or opinions came to be collected apart from the
original text (though following the same order) and thus
constituted a discussion of problems for their own sake. Just
at this point the logica nova began to circulate in Europe and
it proved a powerful instrument as the quaestio achieved
complete independence from textual commitments. The further
development toward the disputatio, the quaestio disputata and
the summa came after Abailard and need not be discussed here.
Abailard, as mentioned above, was but one figure in this
See Cottiaux, op. cit., p. 8UlL
See works already cited by Grabmann, Pare, Ghellin.ck, etc,
148 Didascalion III, c. 9.
141

149

418

DOM DUNSTAN

HAYDEN

lengthy process. One finds in him both the old and the new.
His Dialectica is not a speculative study of a subject matter,
but rather, at least in its form, a commentary on Boethius. On
the other hand, the I ntroductio is an original work: specific
problems organized according to the author's principles. It
is organized into three sections: faith, charity, and the sacraments. Faith is treated first because of its priority in the
Christian life; and within the section, God, the ultimate principle, is treated fi.rst.144 Again, one should note the limited
scope of Abailard's efforts. There is no attempt to organize
theology on the model of Aristotelian sciences, such as one
finds in some of his contemporaries 145 and especially in the
thirteenth century.
CoNcLuSION

As was suggested in the Introduction, the primary conclusion
to be drawn from this survey is that a great deal of research is
needed. Few authors have given more than passing notice to
the various points that have been touched upon. Not until
a great deal more work has been done, and from a variety of
points of view, can any greater certainty be achieved. Dialectic
in some sense has always been a part of theological method.
Yet, as has been shown, dialectic has assumed a great variety
of meanings even in the limited period under consideration.
In some cases the meaning given it by one author was representative of his age; in others, particularly in Abailard, the term
must be understood in function of an individual. Serious
historical study which allows for such complexity is indeed
needed if dialectic is to be used fruitfully in modern theology.
DoM DUNsTAN

HAYDEN,

0. S. B.

St. Anselm's Priory,
Washingttm, D. C.
1
caeteris .prior est, tamquam bonorum
" " Ac primum de fide, quae naturaliter
omnium fundamentum." " Primo itaque hanc fidei summam ponamus, de unitate
scilicet ac trinitate divina; deinde positam, prout Dominus dederit ·disseramus."'
(lntr., 984 B and 987 A)
105
We have in mind Gilbert, William of Conches and Thierry ol Chartres. See
Clerval, op. cit., pp. 246 ff; and Chenu, " Une essai de methode theologique au XII•
alecle," Jtevull de Sciences pkilosopbique et tkeologique, XXIV (1!985)
..

THE TWO SCEPTICISMS IN HOME'S TREATISE
MONG the many anomalies of Hume's thought one of
the most striking is the contrast between the limited,
philosophical scepticism which Hume set out to defend
at the beginning of the Treatise and the radical scepticism
which he was forced to admit at the end of the first book of
the Treatise. In the first three parts of Book One (and more
implicitly than explicitly in the second and third books) Hume
is sceptical of all attempts to construct a rational metaphysics.
He insists that custom and association alone explain our natural
certitudes, and that any rational (i.e., strictly logical) explanation of them is foredoomed to failure. He tells us that we
must accept our natural certitudes and be sceptical of any
rational explanation of them. But in the fourth part of Book
One Hume's argumentation leads him to a much different
conclusion; there he finds that, as a philosopher, he must reject
even our natural certitudes. 1
For years this second position, that of radical scepticism,
was considered the essential element of Hume's thought. With
this as their premise, Hume's critics suppressed the positive
elements of the first position, especially his trust in our natural
judgments-the naturalism which has been so much emphasized
in recent years/ and found that the Hume who. remained was
easily refuted. He was the complete sceptic, who used reason
to deny reason, and built up complex arguments to show that
1 Hume himself was aware of the anomaly of this position.
Early in part four of
the first book of the Treatise he tells us: " I begun this subject with premising that
we ought to have an implicit faith in our senses. . . . But to be ingenuous, I feel
myself at present ... more inclin'd to repose no faith at all in my senses .... " I,
iv, 2 (T, 217) [I, iv, :2 =Treatise, Book One, Part Four, Section Two; T =the
Selby-Bigge edition of the Treatise.]
• Kemp Smith is most responsible for the re-interpretation of Hume. His articles,
"The Naturalism of Hume," Mind, N. S. XIV (1905), 149-73 and 33.5-347 and his
The Philosophy of David flume (Edinburgh and London, 1941) are required reading
for any serious student of Hume.

419

JAMES

V. :MCGLYNN

no arguments are valid. Convinced that this was the real
Hume, the critics dismissed everything else in his writings as
inconsistency or as the clever dissembling of a revolutionary
who preferred to tone down his statements rather than enrage
popular opinion. Recent study of Hume has seen that this
simplistic view does not do justice to the complexity of Hume's
thought, and various attempts have been made to re-evaluate
Hume on the basis of the positive as well as the negative
elements of the Treatise and Enquiry. 8
But although this revaluation has led to a discussion of the
contrasts inHume's thought, most of the work done on Hume's
twofold scepticism has considered the relations between the two
fully developed theories and the possibility or impossibility of
reconciling the two. Not enough attention has been paid to
the inner development of Hume's thought and to the interesting problem of why Hume himself in the fourth part of Book
One of the Treatise felt obliged to abandon his naturalism and
accept a much more radical scepticism. It is the purpose of
this study to show that an investigation of this problem of
why Hume himself passed from one scepticism to the other can
throw much light on the nature of the Treatise itself and can
enable us to distinguish a number of separate questions which
Hume failed to distinguish. When we have sorted out these
questions, we will be able to point out the source of a series of
confusions which forced Hume to change the original question
and pose a new problem which never would have arisen had he
not abandoned his initial design.
The key to the solution of this problem lies in Hume's distinction between knowledge and belief. This is the thread
which goes through the first book of the Treatise, and it is
Hume's inability to give a satisfactory account of this distinction which, in our contention, explains his radical scepticism.
To see that this is so we need only follow him step by step
through the first book of the Treatise as he gradually (and for
8 Perhaps
the most penetrating of these is J. Passmore's Httme's Intentions
(Cambridge, 1952), a dense little book which discusses the several themes of Hume's
thought.

THE TWO SCEPTICISJ\IS

1.:-J H'l'l\lE J S 'b TREATISE "

421

the most part seemingly unconsciously) introduces the confusions which bring him face to face with a problem different
from that which he set out to discuss, and force him into the
sceptical conclusion of the fourth part of the first book of the
Treatise.
To avoid confusion we must treat two aspects of this problem
separately. First we must look into Hume's division of the
objects of knowing and believing into " relations of ideas " and
" matters of fact," 4 and then study the distinction between
knowing and believing. We have to treat the question of
objects first because Hume himself takes this as the more
basic fact and distinguishes the acts of knowing and believing
because he is convinced that their objects are distinct. Thus,
much that is pertinent to the discussion of knowledge and
belief is given to us in Hume's account of their objects. Following Hume's lead, then, we shall first discuss what he has to say
about the objects of knowledge and belief. Then, in the second
part of this article we shall discuss the distinction between
knowledge and belief. In the third part we shall attempt to
show how the manner in which Hume handles these two
problems explains the new type of scepticism which he introduces at the end of the first book of the Treatise.

I
Hume's division of the objects of cognition into " relations of
ideas " and " matters of fact " is fundamental to his thought.
With it he wants to propose a new philosophy, one which
restricts metaphysical speculation, and so also " knowledge,"
to the abstract study of the relations between ideas, and which
establishes a system of natural certitudes or beliefs. This
system of beliefs will be non-metaphysical in the sense that it
is not interested in " natures " or " essences " but only in a
description of our beliek Since it avoids the speculation of
• This disjunction is stated most clearly in the Enquiry, Section Four, Part One
(E, 25) : "All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into
two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact." Cf. also Treatise, I,
iii, 7 (T, 94) and HI, i, 1 (T, 463). [E = Selby-Bigge's edition of the Enqui,·ies.]

J AI\HCS V. ::\ICGL YXX

earlier thinkers, it will escape the contradictions which down
the ages have plagued even the most perspicacious framers of
philosophical systems. Instead of a primi speculations, Hume
intends to use " careful and exact experiments and the observation of those particular effects, which result from its [the mind's 1
different circumstances and situations." 5 This is the new " science of J\fAN," 6 which refuses to go beyond experience, but
which will nevertheless be " a compleat system of the sciences,
built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one
on which they can stand with any security." 7 The introduction
to the TTeatise tingles with the excitement of discovery as
Hume outlines his program. He is convinced that he at last
has found a way to keep to the facts and eliminate metaphysical
speculation, to deal with the facts of the world about us and our
natural mental operations without chasing the will-o-the-wisp
which is the " essence " of our mind or of things. 8 In a word,
he will analyze our beliefs without trying to turn them into
knowledge.
The young Hume, however, was a bit
in adopting his
disjunction between relations of ideas and matters of fact,
for the latter turn out to be unfortunately ambiguous. As
MacNabb points out, a matter of fact can be " (a) a proposition whose contradictory is intelligible (a synthetic proposition) and (b) a proposition which asserts the existence of
some object (an existential proposition)." 9 Hume's failure
to see this is a fundamental confusion and one which was
bound to cause trouble, for it committed Hume to consider
all propositions about relations of ideas as exclusively analytic,
and so all knowledge (in his strict sense) as exclusively analytic.
For if matters of fact include synthetic as well as existential
propositions, all that is _left for relations of ideas are analytic,
non-existential propositions. That analytic propositions are
non-existential had been the contention of empirical philoso• Introduction to the Treatise (T, xxi).
'Ibid., (T, xx).
• Ibid., (T, xix).
• ibid., ( T, xxi).
• D. C. G. MacNabb, David Hume, His Theory of Knowledge and Morality
(London, 1951), p. 45 note.

THE T'\VO SCEPTICISl\IS

IN HlJ:\1E'S

H

phers from Aristotle down through his Arabian and scholastic
disciples to Locke and Berkeley. They agreed that knowledge
of the relations of ideas, of itself, tells us nothing about the real
existing world. They did not, however, say that there could be
no synthetic knowledge. In his denial of this Hume goes beyond
his less :radically empirical predecessors.
But although Hume wants all knowledge to be analytic, he
is not so sure that ha wants it to be non-existentiaL For since
in his view aU ideas are derivative of impressions, they do tell
us something about the existence of their correlates. At least
we can say that there is an impression, existing now or formerly,
from which each idea is derived. 10 What this " existence "
means, however, is another question. Most of the time it is
the impression which exists for Hume. But ideas " exist " just
as much as impressions, and so Hume is led to consider impressions and ideas as two more or less parallel series of existents.
This gives him a double existence which will come back to
haunt him. For if his " relations of ideas " versus " matters of
fact " disjunction is to make sense, the relations
ideas must
be between the content of ideas and prescind from their
" reality " in any existential sense. But Hume never realized
the importance of this view of the disjunction. Very frequently
he wants to consider ideas as existents, or at least as including
existence. Thus, he tells us that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible and that everything we perceive includes
the idea of possible existence. 11 Although this could stand
if it were taken to mean that our ideas prescind from actual
existence, Hume, at times at least, understands it in a strange
way. While denying that we have a separate idea of existence/ 2
he introduces existence into all our ideas by suppressing their
representative character and making all ideas existing ideas.
We either have a perception or we do not, he tells us, and it
makes no sense to say that we have a non-existent perception. 13
Treatise, I, i, 1 (T, 3).
Ibid., I, ii, 2 and 4 (T, 32 and 43); I, iii, 6 (T, 89); I, iv, 5 (T, 233).
12 Appendix to Treatise (T, 623) and I, iii, 7 (T, 94).
13 Treatise, I, ii, 6 ( T, 66) .
10

11

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JAMES

V.

"The idea of existence then is the same with the idea of what
we conceive to be existent," 14 and " whatever we conceive we
conceive to be existent." 15 This makes it impossible for us to
conceive non-existence by means of perceptions, and since
Hume reduces all judgments to perceptions/ 6 it would seem to
make any conception of non-existence impossible. For, as Passmore says, it " would involve thinking simultaneously of an idea
as existing (the fact) and as non-existing (the negation)." 17
But even apart from such contradictions, which Hume might
find some way to avoid, this method of considering ideas plays
havoc with his disjunction between ideas and matters of fact.
For if ideas are to be called existents, and all judgments about
existents are to 'be judgments about matters of fact, ideas thus
become matters of fact. And it would seem that relations
between the matters of fact which are ideas should not be
different from the relations between other matters of fact. But
the whole point of Hume's distinction between relations of
ideas and matters of fact was to make it possible to distinguish
between relations of ideas, which were supposed to be analytical, and relations of matters of fact, which we learn from
experience.. And if it is impossible to distinguish these two
kinds of relation, it is consequently impossible to distinguish
between knowledge and belief.
If we approach this distinction between relations of ideas
and matters of fact from a different angle and ask what concretely Hume meant by relations of ideas and by matters of
fact, we find that the distinction between the two is just as
elusive. Hume took it so much for granted that everybody
knew what he meant by relations of ideas-he thought he was
using the term in the then current philosophical sense-that
he
does more than list them: " These four are resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportions in
quantity or number." 18 On the face of it these are logical
"Ibid.
'"Ibid. (T, 67).
18 Treatise, III, i, 1 (T, 456); I, iii, 7 (T, 96-97 note).
18 Treatise I, iii, 1 (T, 70).
11 Hume's Intentions, 27.

THE TWO SCEPTICISMS

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4'l5

relations between the content of various ideas, but in the only
study which he made of the relations of ideas, his abortive
attempt to explain space and time/ 9 Hume's inability to decide
whether he is studying logical relations, which can be known
analytically, or spatial and temporal relations learned from
experience, hamstrung him and led to his peculiar theory of
non-extended points, which added together produce extension,
and non-durational instants, which added together produce
duration. 20 In the end it is impossible to say whether these
relations are logical or factual, and whether the ideas involved
are " ideas " or " matters of fact."
Similarly, when we seek to determine concretely what are
matters of fact, Hume gives us no clear answer. For besides
confusing synthetic with existential propositions, as we have
seen, he never seems to have clearly determined what he wants
to be the object of belief, or exactly what it is
he wants to
21
exisL If, as T. H. Green did, we were to take Hume literally
at his word when he is speaking in his most sensationalistic and
sceptical vein, 22 we should conclude that all
exists is a
stream of atomized impressions, and that these are the only
real " matters of fact." This would make everything else
fictitious and would limit our legitimate belief to belief in a
stream of impressions. All our other beliefs-prescinding for
the moment from the oddity of having other beliefs, if all
that exists is a stream of impressions-all these beliefs would
be illusions, illegitimate extensions of true belief. This is Green's
conclusion. Hume, however, has too keen a sense of reality to
draw such a conclusion himself. For him, belief is almost always
belief in existing objects, and even when he is explaining his
theory of ideas, he insists that we believe in objects. He can do
this because he confuses perception and object, 23 and so can
'"Ibid., I, ii, l-5 (T, 26-65).
""For a study and criticism of this theory cf. Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of
David Hume, 288-90, or Passmore, llume's Intentions, lll-113.
21 In his introduction
to the Treatise in the Green-Grose edition of Hume's works
(London, 1874) vol. 1, pp. 161-68.
•• E. g., Treatise, I, ii, 6 (T, 67-68); I, iii, 5 (T, 84); I, iv, 2 (T, 210); etc.
23 Cf. Treatise, I, iv, 2 (T, 202) where the confusion is quite deliberate.

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JAMES V. MCGLYNN

pass from one to the other, now predicating something of our
perceptions, now predicating it of things.
This confusion is not critical in the first three sections of the
first book of the Treatise because there Hume presumes the
validity of our natural judgments. But even here, as Passmore
notes:
To make sense of Hume's theories, indeed we must read " things "
for "impressions," and "empirical propositions " for "beliefs"; it
is things which are constantly conjoined; it is propositions, not
"ideas," which are " associated with" the observations we have
made. 24

It is only in the fourth part of the first book, when Hume
finds that objects and perceptions have conflicting properties, 25
that he is faced with the dilemma which is the proximate cause
of his scepticism.
Such then is the ambiguous state of " matters of fact " and
" relations of ideas " in the Treatise. Since, however, this is
not the main point of our study, there is no need to point out
the further complications in the theory. 26 It is enough if we
have shown the inadequacy of the distinction and the more
important confusions involved. To these we shall return in the
third section.
II

The second part of our discussion is more complicated, for
when we pass from the objects to acts of knowing and believing,
the first thing which strikes us is that our very division of
cognitive acts into knowing and believing is premature. For
Burne's first division, in Part Three of the Treatise, gives us
not knowledge and belief, but knowledge and probability. 27
Later on, 28 Hume will tell us that at this point he wanted to
24 Hume's Intentions, 158.
•• Treatise, I, iv, 2 (T, 212).
•• Many studies of Hume consider this problem. The solutions usually involve
substantial modifications and/or expansions of Hume's ideas. Cf., for example, Kemp
Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, 856-57.
21 Treatise, I, iii, 2 (T, 69sq.).
•• Ibid., I. iii, 1 (T, 124).

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427

use probability to include all our arguments from causes and
effects, but that the more accurate distinction would be tripartite: knowledge, proofs, and probabilities.
The matter, however, is not as simple as Hume thought.
There are two problems here which Hume seems unable to
. separate. In one he wants to distinguish two kinds of certitude,
and in the other various degrees of certitude. 29 The confusion
centers around the meaning of " probable." When Hume distinguishes probability from knowledge, he frequently means
to distinguish natural from philosophical certitude, or to use
his more common expression, certitudes about matters of fact
from certitudes about relations of ideas. 80 Here there is no
difference of degree between the two certitudes. Both result
in full conviction, but one is certitude of the knowledge type
and the other is certitude of the belief type. In these contexts
the motive for the second kind of certitude is a " probable
reason." At other times, however, a " probable reason " can
be one which does not remove all hesitation. Then the proposition may concern relations of ideas or matters of fact. 31 In such
contexts " proofs " will give full certitude about matters of fact,
and " knowledge " will give full certitude about relations of
ideas, whereas " probable reasons " produce only partial certitude. In the third section I shall try to show how this ambiguity concerning probability played an important role in the
development of the scepticism of the fourth part of the first
book of the Treatise.
But to get on with our consideration of knowing and believing, let us see what Hume means by knowing, as a psychological
phenomenon. Ordinarily he distinguishes knowing from believing by distinguishing their objects, and we have seen how
difficult it is to apply this distinction. In his discussion of
•• In sectioris one and two of Part Three of the first hook Hume is distinguishing
kinds of certitude. In section one he is also dealing with probability (lack of
convincing evidence) in relations of ideas; in sections eleven and twelve he is
'considering this probability in matters of fact.
•• E. g., Treatise, I, iii, 6 (T, 89); I, iii,
(T, 69sq.); I, iii, 12 (T, 140).
•• Cf. sv:pra, note !1!9.

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JAMES V. MCGLYNN

knowing and believing themselves, Hume gives the clearest
distinction between the two when he contrasts knowing and
believing as thinking and feeling. 32 But although he says a
good deal about what he means by feeling, as we shall see in a
moment, he gives no description of knowing, as such. Sometimes he wants to say that knowing is consciously having an
image of an impression (or object) .33 This is correlative to his
notorious theory of ideas, and, like it, is left in the background
when Hume is discussing knowledge of objects and of relations.
In these discussions there seems to be no difference (as far as
the kind of act is concerned) between knowing an idea and
feeling an impression. Both are awareness of the other as other.
And Hume himself would seem to say as much when he makes
the difference between knowing and feeling merely a difference
of force and vivacity. 34
If knowing is left unexplained, almost too much is said
about belief. Hume gives us an official definition of :it in his
oft quoted: "Belief may be most accurately defin'd, A LIVELY
IDEA RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT IMPRESSION."

35

But, much as Hume likes this definition, it is not broad enough
to cover everything he wants to classify as belief. It can refer
only to inferential certitudes, and Hume, sometimes at least,
wants belief to cover the feeling of " an immediate impression
or a repetition of that impression in the memory." 36 The
difficulty is, of course, that in the long discussions of belief in
the third and fourth parts of the first book of the Treatise Hume
is considering only beliefs which fall into the causal patte:rn,
that is, beliefs which are derived from convictions resulting
from direct observations. Thus Passmore can say: " The question he really has before him is not • What is believing?' but
rather this: • Granted that our impressions are " real," what
else is "real"?'" 37 And Price is right when he says that
Hume never treats of belief, as such, but always of one kind of
32 Treatise, I, i, 1 (T, l-2).
•• Ibid., I, i, l (T, l-2 and 6); I, i, 7 (T 19); I; ii, l (T, 27); etc.
••Ibid., I, i, l (T, 2); I, i, 7 (T, l!l).
•• Ibid., I, iii, 5 (T, 86).
37 llume's Intentions, p. 100.
•• Ibid., I, iii, 7 (T, 96).

THE TWO SCEPTICISMS

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429

belief, limiting it to the inductively learned cause-effect type of
belief, which his billiard ball example typifies. 38 It is this
concentration on inferential certitudes which encourages Kemp
Smith to suggest .. de facto awareness" as a mean between
belief and knowledge, 39 and leads G. E. Moore to think that
Hume means to say that we know objects of direct observation.40
Despite this ambiguity Hume tries valiantly to explain what
he means by the feeling which is belief. He says that conceiving
a proposition and believing it cannot differ by their contentthe imaginary horse and its real counterpart are perfect twins.
The only difference must be in " the manner of our conceiving
them," 41 and this must be a difference of feeling. Insofar as
Hume is saying that we can distinguish in our consciousness
between the state of mind in which we think about an imaginary horse and that in which we think about one which is real
(existing) , what he says is dear enough. But whether we
should call this difference one of feeling is a different question.
The primary analogate of feeling is sensation, and especially
the sensations of pain and pleasure. Since this is so, Hume is
lured into the trap of thinking that belief is on almost the same
level as having a toothache or enjoying a chocolate bar. He
says in so many words that belief is "a species of sensation," 42
and that it is " more properly an act of the sensitive, than of
the cogitative part of our natures." 43 Conversely, however, if
belief is feeling, can reason be anything else? The logic of
Hume's thought allows him no real distinction between the
two, and so at the end of the first book of the Treatise he admits
that he must avow that reason, too, is only feeling. 44
Hume's Theory of the External World (Oxford, 1940), p. 17.
The Philosophy of David Hume, p. 356.
•• Philosophical Studies (London, 192!11), p. 148cq.
n Treatise, I, iii, 7 (T, 96).
•• ibid. I, iii, 8 (T, 103).
43 Ibid., I, iv, 1 (T, 183).
« " After the most accurate and exact of my reasonings, I can give no reason
why I shou'd assent to it; and feel nothing but a strong propensity to consider
objects strongly in that view, under which they appear to me." I, iv, 7 (T, 265).
38

39

430

JAMES

V. ::\iCGLYNN

In the Appendix to the Treatise Hume admits to dissatisfaction with his descriptions of belief, 45 and tries again to clarify
the notion of belief. He says there that it is " impossible to
explain perfectly this feeling or manner of conception," 46 but
he feels that there is no better answer than the one he had given
in the body of the Treatise. His difficulty is only that of giving
a clear description of the feeling which is belief. He sees nothing
wrong with making belief a kind of sensation, nor even with
.reducing reason to feeling. It is merely a question of how to
formulate his description.
Such hesitations, however, did nothing to shake Hume's conviction that he had hit upon the explanation of how belief
works. This is the theme of the third part of the first book of
the Treatise. The importance of this discussion is all too easily
overlooked, for it is in elaborating the mechanism of belief
that Hume makes the concessions which lead him into the
sceptical impasse of the fourth part of the first book.
When we speak of the mechanism of belief, we are of necessity talking about beliefs
the inferential type, since noninferential belief in an impression of sense or memory can be
only a brute fact. In such belief, impressions are more forceful
and so accepted as real. We cannot question how this happens,
but only accept it as a fact. 47 The mechanism of belief, on the
other hand, is designed to take us beyond our actual impressions
and beyond the objects of memory to the object of the " judgment." 48 For it is judgment which " peoples the world, and
brings us acquainted with such existences, as by their removal
in time and place, lie beyond the reach of the senses and
memory." 49 By means of judgment we build up our world and
give it a history. And the mechanism of belief is the system of
connections and inferences by which we construct this world.
Hume first explains the mechanism of belief in the context
•• Appendix to Treatise (T, 628).
•• Ibid. (T, 629).
01 Treatise, I, l, 2 (T, 7); I, iii, 5 (T, 84); I, iv, 2 (1', 190); ete.
•• Ibid., I, iii, 9 (T, 108).

•• Ibid.

THE 'l'WO SCEPTICISJVIS

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431

of his discussion of our reasonings concerning cause and effect.
The role of association and custom in the formation of our
beliefs is too well known for u.s to need to spend much time
explaining how they operate." 0 But it is important to note a
gradual change which Hume makes in his explanations. Early
in the discussion he tells us that belief "arises immediately,
without any new operation of the reason or imagination," 51
and is nothing but " a species of sensation." 52 As he goes on,
Hume has to make room for beliefs which arise from a single
experience. To justify such beliefs he appeals to a custom
which is produced "in an oblique and artificial manner," 53
and supplements our single experience. This means that we subsume our present experience under the general law, "that like
objects, plac'd in like circumstances, will always produce like
effects." 5 ' We have "many millions [of experiments] to con-.
vince us " of the validity of this principle, " and as this principle
has established itself by sufficient custom, it bestows an evidence and firmness on any opinion to which it can be applied." 55
We may
whether association can work in such a
complicated way with these beliefs and make the proper
generalization, but the task becomes even more difficult when
Hume admits that we have unjustified beliefs. For
a present impression and a ct!stomary transition are now no longer
necessary to enliven our ideas. Every chimera of the brain is as
vivid and intense as any of those inferences, which we formerly
dignified with the name of conclusions concerning matters of fact,
and sometimes as the present impressions of the senses.""

This is perhaps an exaggeration, for in the Appendix Hume
gives a new paragraph to be inserted at this point. In it he
suggests that there is a great difference between poetical
enthusiasm and serious conviction, and that " the great difference in their feeling proceeds in some measure from reflexion
5

° Cf. Treatise, I, iii, 8 (T, 90sq.)

Treatise, I, iii, 8 (T, 10£).
52 Ibid. ( T, 103) .
•• Ibid.
51

for Hume's discussion of this.

"'Ibid. (T, 105).
•• Ibid.
"" libid., I, iii, 10 (T, 1 't3J.

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JAMES V. MCGLYNN

and general rules." 57 Yet how association and custom could
make use of re:flexion and general rules he does not say.
From this point on Hume's custom and association become
very intelligent. Besides being able to use general rules, they
can also weigh the probabilities of chances and causes, 5 8 apply a
set of rules by which to judge of causes and effects, 59 and direct
the instinctive activity of animals. 60 It is true, of course, that
it is in these discussions that Hume puts the most extreme
demands on association in its most mechanical form, and it is
here that his appeals to association have the least plausibility. 61
However, the striking thing is that insofar as association explains why we believe in such situations, it involves a reflective
process which is much more than the associative mechanism
which Hume had in mind when he began his discussion of belief.
Now we have rules for evaluating evidence and for determining
whether to accept testimony and other evidence which is insufficient, of itself, to produce the associative type of belief. In
a word, association has become intelligent.
Another supplement to the associative mechanism appears
in Hume's frequent appeals to native "propensities " of the
mind to explain various features of his theory of belief. The
gradual introduction of these tendencies is one of the most
significant features of Hume's thought, for it shows how feeble
association is without outside help.
Hume's first propensity is innocent enough. It is simply
"that propensity, which custom produces, to pass from an
object to its usual attendant." 62 The next propensity is less
obviously legitimate and considerably more ambiguous. It is
Appendix to the Treatise (T, 681).
Treatise, I, iii, 11 and l!t (T, 124sq.).
59 Ibid., I, iii, 15 ( T, 178sq .) .
•• Ibid., I, iii, 16 (T, 176sq.).
81 Two extreme examples are
(1) our expectation that nineteen out of twenty
ships will return from a voyage because one in twenty have been lost on other
voyages, and (2) our stopping short of a river because of the association between
water, sinking, and suffocation. (Treatise, I, iii, 11 (T, 184) and I, iii, 8 (T, 10804)). The applications of association here are ingenious but hardly plausible.
•• Treatise, I, iii, 14 (T, 165).
67

58

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the tendency of the mind to " spread itself on external objects,
and to conjoin with them any internal impressions they occasion, and which always make their appearance at the same time
that these objects discover themselves to the senses." 63 We are
already far from mere differences of force and vivacity in ideas.
But we are only beginning. To explain why we postulate a
greater regularity in objects than we find in our perceptions
Hume finds a new propensity, a kind of inertia of the imagination, which "when set into any train of thinking, is apt to
continue even when its object fails it. . . ." 64 Even this,
however, while it fills all the " gaps," 65 does not explain our
attribution of identity to the stream of perceptions. To accomplish this Hume finds it "a general rule that whatever ideas
place the mind in the same dispoJ>ition or in similar ones, are
very apt to be confounded." 66 This still tells us only why we
" feign" continued existence. To get actual belief Hume
appeals to yet another propensity:
The mind falls so easily from one perception to the other, that it
scarce perceives the change, but retains in the second a considerable
share of the vivacity of the first. It is excited by the lively impression; and this vivacity is convey'd to the related idea ... by reason
of the smooth transition and the propensity of the imagination. 67

It is because of this that we accept the continued existence of
body. 68 Furthermore, this propensity is so strong that we
transfer the vivacity even to objects " which are perfectly new
to us, and even of w:tiose constancy and coherence we have no
experience," 69 and beyond this even to objects of which we
have no present impression from which to transfer the vivacity.70 These propensities would seem enough to construct
•• Ibid., (T, 167).
60 lbid., I, iv, 2 (T, 198).
65 Professor Price suggests this term in llume's
Theory of the External World, p.
83 and uses it to advantage throughout his book.
06 Treatise, I, iv, 2 (T, 203).
At other times Hume tells us that we cannot be
mistaken about the nature of our perceptions. Cf. ibid. (T, 190).
67 Ibid. ( T, 208) .
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
(T, 210).
•• Ibid. (T, 209).

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JAMES Vo MCGLYNN

almost anything we would wish, but Hume adds a final
tendency which lets us add even new relations" "We have a
strong propensity to compleat every union [of ideas] by joining
new relations to those which we have before observ'd betwixt
ideas"" 11
The upshot of all this is that Hume "can now draw upon
an unsystematized list of propensities, gradually accumulated
in the course of the Treatise; without their aid the associative
' cement ' would immediately crumble into sand"" 72 But the
help which Hume gets from these propensities is counterbalanced by the harm they do, opening as they do the door to
all sorts of illegitimate beliefs. In fact, in the final stage they
reduce everything, even understanding and :reason, to instinct;
for Hume finds that " reason is nothing but a wonderful and
unintelligible instinct of our souls." 73 And .at the end of the
first book of the Treatise he confesses:
After the most accurate and exact of my reasonings, I can give no
reason why I shou'd assent to it; and feel nothing but a strong
propensity to consider objects strongly in that view under which
they appear to me. " " . The memory, senses, and understanding
are therefore, all of them founded on the imagination or the vivacity
of our ideas. 14

We have come a long way from custom and association.
The development of Hume's thought would seem to be
something like this: He formulates his theory of belief as a
transfer of force and vivacity of ideas by means of custom
and association, but soon finds that it is much too narrow to
include all our beliefs. De facto, we do go beyond " experience,"
especially in the narrow sense of " experience " to which Hume
wants to restrict himself when he is faithful to his theory of
:ideas. At the very least we think of perceptions as continuing
to exist, which is sometimes for Hume to consider a series of
perceptions as one. And to consider a series of perceptions as
one, we need a propensity variously explained. He finds, too,
"Ibid. (T, 217).
'"Passmore, llume's intentions, p. 120.

"'Treatise, I, iii, 16 (T, 17!l).
"'Ibid., I, iv, 7 (T, 265).

THE TWO SCEPTICISMS

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435

that other relations besides causality, especially resemblance
and contiguity, influence our belief, and he has to call for a
new propensity to explain how they work. But this puts him
in the position of affirming contradictions in our perceptions,
for we affirm multiplicity and identity. To avoid this we have
a new propensity by which we affirm the multiplicity of perceptions and the identity of objects. Thus it is that these
propensities, which were at first intended to supplement Hume's
basic associative mechanism of belief now usurp the field. They
decide what is true and what is false (or rather what is to be
taken as true and what it to be taken as false). Association
becomes the tool of these propensities and Hume has to finish
with the half-despairing admission that all our mental processes
are directed by an unexplainable overall propensity.
We began by saying that Hume says almost too much about
belief. We can see now that he does in fact say too much about
it, for in the course of his discussion belief has shifted its
meaning to include all sorts of certitudes, many of which we
would normally call" rational," and Hume's associative mechanism is soon left behind for a system of propensities which
govern his transfer of vivacityo Hume continues to talk about
vivacity of impressions, but as we go on, it becomes more and
more clear that it is question of seeing reasons and not of
transferring vivacity. To speak of transference of vivacity in
the context of Hume's multiple propensities is to reduce it to
the level of a" gimmick," which can be manipulated as occasion
reqmres.
The conclusion of the present section, then, must be that
Hume did not succeed in distinguishing or describing knowing
and believing. In the end he is unable to keep the two separate,
and just as relations of ideas had the awkward tendency of
turning into matters of fact, so knowledge becomes confused
with belief. Belief becomes so reasonable as to be indistinguishable from knowledge, and knowledge turns out to be the
product of a faculty which operates just as irrationally as the
faculty which produces belief. In fact, it is the one faculty, the
imagination, which is at work in botho

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JAMES V. MCGLYNN

III
We now have to consider the bearing of all this on the two
types of scepticism which appear inHume's Treatise. We can
do this best by pointing out how Hume's thought on knowledge
and belief undergoes radical changes in the course of the third
and fourth parts of the first book. In these two parts of the
Treatise, as we have seen, Hume runs the full gamut I from a
complete separation of belief from knowledge to a practical
confusion of the two. Once this confusion is made, Hume finds
that he has to apply the same criteria to both knowledge and
belief. Then he sees that he cannot be sceptical about one without being sceptical about the other.
Before we see how this comes about and why, it will be
valuable to lay down a few principles of criticism. We have
mentioned Hume's naturalism, and the contrast between natural
and philosophical certitudes. Kemp Smith has certainly done
a great service by showing the importance of this naturalism
and Hume's dependence on Hutcheson/ 5 And his explanation
of the contrast between the adaptivity of instinct, derived from
Hutcheson, and the more mechanical association, derived from
Newton/ 6 has become a commonplace of Hume criticism. So,
too, has the suggestion that in turning belief into "feeling,"
Burne has taken Hutcheson's use of feeling in moral judgments
and extended it to all belief.77 But the contrast between the
influences of Newton and Hutcheson has been so much emphasized that commentators have tended to overlook the development of Hume's thought in the first half of the third
part of Book One of the Treatise, where he transforms Hutcheson's moral sense into a Newtonian associative process. The
fact that he does this shows that he did not see the contrast
between thetwo. And to the end he does not seem to have seen
Cf. his Philosophy of David Hume, especially the second chapter.
On Hume's aspirations to be the Newton of the "moral sciences" and his
ambition to make association .play the role there which gravitation played in
Newtonian mechanics, see Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, chapter
three, and Passmore, Hume's Intentions, chapter six.
77 Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, p. 8 sq.
76

76

THE TWO SCEPTICISMS

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that the two cannot work together. So, when Kemp Smith
thinks that the Newtonian element is recessive/ 8 I believe that
he is misled by the gradual transformation of the belief mechanism from an automatic, mechanical process to the reasoned
consideration, bolstered by various propensities, into which we
have seen it transformed. Hume, I would suggest, thought that
this was the fulfillment of his Newtonian associative process
rather than the substitution of a new Hutchesonian process.
That succeeding thinkers, less infatuated with the idea of
association, have found that the instinct-propensity elements
will not fit in with the basic associative process, does not all
show that Hume was aware of the difficulty or that it had any
conscious influence on the structure of his thought.
Another point which we must keep in mind is the opposition
between instinct and reason. Passmore, perhaps more clearly
than anyone else, has seen the importance of this. He rightly
insists that Hume wants to make his belief-connections purely
psychological and instinctive, and to keep them independent of
formal logical connections. 79 Furthermore, the psychology
which Hume uses tends to be mechanistic. 80 Passmore shows
why it is impossible to do away with all formal relations. 81
And since it is impossible, Hume's belief, whether he likes it
or not, must be reasonable, to some extent at least.
Given these preliminaries, let us work our way through the
third and fourth parts of the first book of the Treatise to see
what happens and where Hume is led. The third part is
entitled, " Of Knowledge and Probability," but knowledge is
disposed of in one short section, 82 so confident is Hume of the
clarity of this half of the disjunction. When he passes to
probability, his discussion begins with a study of the inferences
from cause to effect. The whole point of the succeeding sections
•• Ibid., 76.
•• Hume'a Intentions, p. 27.
•• Cf. for example: Treatise, I, iii, 8 (T, 103-04); I, iii, 11 (T, 128-SO); and I, iii,
12 (T, 184).
•• Hume's Intentions, chapter two, "The Critic of Formal Logic."
•• Treatise, I, iii, 1 ( T, 69 cq.) .

438

JAMES

V. ::VICGLYNX

is to show that the seemingly reasonable inferences involved
in causal connections cannot possibly be the work of " reason."
By the time Hume reaches section seven, this point is well
established:
Reason can never satisfy us that the existence of any object does
ever imply that of another; so that when we pass from the impression of one to the idea or belief of another, we are not determin'd
by reason but by custom or a principle of association. 83

In section eight the disjunction is just as neat: " Thus probable
reason is nothing but a species of sensation." 84 The contrast
between understanding and belief could hardly be clearer.
At this point Hume has found what he set out to seek in his
decision to " beat about all the neighboring fields," 85 but he
feels that he should " turn the subject on every side, in order to
find some new point:of view from which we may illustrate and
confirm such extraordinary and such fundamental principles." 86
Confidently he proceeds in his attempt to produce every argument and remove every object1on. But as he goes on, unlookedfor consequences appear and important modifications are made.
Thus, early in section nine Hume faces the objection that resemblance and contiguity, as principles of association, should
produce belief just as causation does. His answer is a bit
disconcerting. They do produce belief, but such belief is to be
rejected because it results from credulity or education. 87 But
Hume has admitted the existence of invalid beliefs. This is
the nose of the camel under the tent. If belief is a species of
sensation, an automatic associative process, why is not one
belief as good as another? Hume's solution is a surreptitious
appeal to experience as the norm of our beliefs.88 But whatever
principle he uses to distinguish between the two types of belief,
Hume is faced with two sets of beliefs and he has to find some
way to choose between them. His first tack is to say that one
83 Ibid., I, iii, 7 (T, 97) my emphasis.
•• Ibid., I, iii, 8 (T, lOS).
•• Ibid., I, iii, (T, 78).

•• Ibid., I, iii, 9 (T, 106-07).

81 Ibid. (T, 110-17).
For the proof and discussion of this see Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David
Hume, pp.
88

THE TWO SCEPTICISMS

IN RFl\iE's

"TREATISE"

439

set of them is " contrary to reason." 89 He continues this line
of thought in section ten, asserting that " truth " feels different
from falsehood when presented directly to our imagination, and
that we assent to other ideas not so directly presented insofar
as they " supply its place, and give equal entertainment to the
imagination." 90 Hume still sees no difficulty in distinguishing
truth from falsehood.
In section eleven and twelve (" Of the probability of
chances," and " Of the probability of causes ") he continues to
use his mechanistic explanation of the increased vivacity of
ideas, which produces (or is) belief, but it becomes increasingly
obvious that he is talking about the way
which we calculate
91
This introduces reflective consideration, which
probabilities.
becomes even more marked in the next section (section thirteen), "Of unphilosophical probability," in which Hume explains that the many intermediary links in historical evidence
ure of the same kind, and so
a long chain of argument has as little effect in
the
original vivacity, as a much shorter v.;ould have if compos'd of parts
which were different from each other, and of which each requi:r'd
a distinct consideration. 92

He tells us, too, that " general rules, which we form mshly to
ourselves," 93 give an illegitimate certitude. But here, too, conscious decision plays a part, though Hume insists that the
reasoning follows his associative pattern.
The ambiguity which has been developing strikes us very
forcibly in section fifteen, in which Hume lists the rules by
which we should judge of causes and effects. These are quite
plainly rules to be applied after conscious deliberation, and are
a far cry from the associative mechanism given earlier in the
third part. Hume talks now of carefully applied " experiments,"
which require " the utmost sagacity to choose the right way
among so many that present themselves!' 94 The process has
8 " Treatise, I, iii, 9 (T, 117).
"''Ibid., I, iii, 10 (T, lfll).
"'Ibid., I, iii, ll (T,

'"Ibid., I, iii, 13 (T, 146) my emphasis.
•• Ibid., my emphasis.
"'Ibid., I, iii, Iii ( '1', 175) .

440

.JAIVIES

V. ::\ICGLYNX

become so reasonable that in the next section (section sixteen)
Hume sees that it coincides with reason and that thus reason
itself is an instinct:
To consider the matter aright, reason is nothing but a wonderful
and unintelligible instinct in our souls, which carries us along a
certain train of ideas and endows them with particular qualities,
according to their particular situations and relations. This instinct,
'tis true, arises from past observation and experience; but can anyone give the ultimate reason why past experience and observation
produces such an effect any more than why nature alone shou'd
produce it? 35

Ostensibly, Hume is reducing reason to instinct, but notice
that it is to instinct in a very special sense-in many ways an
instinct which is learned. It would be interesting to see how
Hume would fit such an instinct into his basic causal pattern.
To do so would require clever tailoring both of reason and of the
associative mechanism to make them fit together. Hume might
continue to insist that this " reason " is nothing but sensation,
but it would be a queer type of sensation.
The type of problem which Hume has been dicussing in the
third part of the first book has kept him from worrying about
complete scepticism. And despite the fact that he has cut the
ground from under his distinction between natural and philosophical certitudes, he has no doubts about either and considers
them as independent of each other. As he passes to the fourth
part of the first book, the atmosphere is completely changed. In
his preoccupation with new problems he seems to forget about
his associative machinery.
In the very first section he proposes the much discussed
reduction of all our certitudes to probability and thence to
scepticism. 96 The skeleton of the argument is this: Although
the rules of the demonstrative sciences are certain, our faculties
which apply these rules are fallible, therefore we can never have
complete certitude about any application of them. But this
conclusion is also the work of our fallible faculties, therefore we
•• Ibid., I, iii, 16 (T, 179).

•• Ibid., I, iv, 1 (T, 180sq.).

THE TWO SCEPTICISMS

IN HUME's "TREATISE"

441

are less sure of it than we thought. These reflective judgments
continue, each diminishing the probability of its predecessor,
until we reach " a total extinction of belief and evidence." 97
A full discussion of all the difficulties in this proof would take us
too far afield; it is enough if we indicate that, whatever else
is involved, Hume sees now that knowledge in the strict sense
is impossible, for there is knowledge only when someone knows,
and that someone knows is a matter of fact and could be
otherwise. This is the point of bringing in the fallibility of our
faculties. And with the state of the question is changed completely. In the third part Hume was content with deflating the
ambitions of reason. Now he finds that there is no such thing as
reason, that any certitude is a natural certitude and that
reflection undermines every one of these natural certitudes.
The importance of all this for our present discussion is that
Hume thinks it necessary to justify our natural certitudes. This
shows how he has changed the problem. Earlier abstract reason
·was incapable of criticizing our natural certitudes. Now since
belief and knowledge have been fused into one, reason can
undermine our beliefs. For the moment, Hume finds a way out
of this difficulty with a new disjunction. Direct judgments are
now opposed to reflective judgments, instead of natural judgments to philosophical judgments. Here direct judgments are
valid of themselves and cannot be justified. Reflex judgments
seek to go beyond experience and so cause scepticism. Thus he
explains why the sceptical arguments have no lasting influence
and assigns the force of natural (i.e., direct) judgments to their
connaturality which holds our minds except when we are actually studying the sceptical arguments. 98 This, however, reduces
them to the status of de facto certitudes, which cannot be given
a de jure status. So far this causes no difficulty because Hume
is satisfied with the de facto character of our natural certitudes,
as long as he can still play off instinct in our direct judgments
against reason in our reflective judgments. Thus, while he is
willing to let belief be very reas.Onableand reduce knowledge to
•• Ibid. (T, 188).

•• Ibid. (T, 185-86).

442

JAMES V. :i\ICGLYNN

a kind of belief, nevertheless by opposing direct to reflex judgments, he can retain the rationality versus irrationality disjunction which is necessary to his limited scepticism. Irrational
direct judgments now give certitude, rational reflection leads to
scepticism, and there can be no rational justification of our
direct certitudes.
In the second section: " Of scepticism with regard to the
senses," the situation is quite different. Hume there wants to
determine " the causes which induce us to believe in the existence of body." 99 In the early sections of the third part such a
question could not even have been raised, let alone discussed.
There we could not get behind our beliefs. Now, however,
Hume has a whole set of beliefs about beliefs. But even if we
grant him these, what right does reason (or reflective belief, as
it is now) have to ask for more than a mere description of
which state follows which in the causal inferences? How can
reason decide that it is the imagination and not the senses or
itself which makes us believe in bodies? It would seem that
Hume is asking for a reasonable explanation of belief. Thus
far he has been able to disguise the reasonableness of belief by
contrasting it with understanding. Now, however, he finds
two sets of beliefs which are in conflict. His causal investigation
of why we believe brings him to the contrast between the
natural system of perception-objects 100 and the philosophical
system of beliefs, which distinguishes the world of objects from
that of our perceptions. 101 Hume finds that the relation between
these two systems is similar to that between the natural and
sceptical attitudes of the previous section. The natural system
is that of the unreflective man, the philosophical is held by the
philosopher in his study. 102 Hume sees the conflict as a struggle
between nature and reason:
•• Ibid., I, iv,

(T, 187-88).
Hume claims that the man in the street confuses perceptions and objects. Cf.
Treatise, I, iv,
(T, 192-98) and above p. -!2;).
101 Treatise, I, iv,
(T, 216).
100 ]bid. (T, 216).
100

rrHE T'VO SCEPTICISlVlS

IN

u

THEATISE

4·ij3

Nature is obstinate and will not quit the field, however strongly
attacked by reason; and at the same time reason is so dear in the
point that there is no possibility of disguising her. Not being able
to reconcile these two enemies, we endeavor to set ourselves at ease
as much as possible, by successively granting to each whatever it
demands .... 103

But reason is no longer just understanding; it now includes the
reason involved in causal inferences, the reason which was
supposed to be belief and a species of sensation. 104
The real opposition is between instinctive, direct beliefs and
reasonable, reflective beliefs. Hume cannot find a \vay to decide
between them; he falls into contradiction no matter which side
he takes. He concludes that we cannot be fully convinced of
the truth of either of the two systems, because if we were, " we
shou'd never run into" the opposite opinion, as we so obviously
do.1o5
Hume is more than a little bewildered by the predicament in
which he has become involved. He confesses his surprise at
the turn events have taken:
I begun this subject with premising that we ought to have an
implicit faith in our senses, and that this would be the conclusion
I shou'd draw from the whole of my reasoning. But to be ingenuous,
l feel myself at present of a quite contrary sentiment, and am more
inclin'd to repose no faith at all in my senses, or rather imagination,
than to place in it such an implicit confidence. I cannot conceive
how such trivial qualities of the fancy, conducted by such false
suppositions, can ever lead to any solid and rational system. 106

With this it is clear that Hume has hopelessly rationalized his
beliefs and has lost not only the neatness (deceptive though it
was) of his knowledge-belief disjunction, but also many of the
certitudes he could have as long as he kept causal inference
and understanding separate.
The remaining five sections of Part Four are hardly more than
Ibid. (T,
Ibid., I, iii, 8 (T, 103).
'"'Ibid .. I, iv, 2 (T, 215).
106 Ibid.
(1', £?17), my emphasis in the last sentence.
1 ""

101

444

JAMES

V. MCGLYNN

applications of the principle which Hume sets down
the first
two. Substance, the distinction between primary and secondary
qualities, personal identity, and the immateriality of the soul
are all banished as unreasonable. But they refuse to go into
exile. If they are fictitious, so are our most natural beliefs, for
they
are built on our unstable imagination. Hume has
fallen between two stools. Is he to follow reason or inngination?
Reason entirely subverts itself and all evidence. 107 But imagination,
is the only alternative he sees, is acceptable only as
proved so
:reason.108 "We have, therefore, no choice left but
betwixt a false reason and none at
" 109 Hume is trapped
rationality from
he had hoped to escape.
To recapitulate, Hume's limited scepticism-the conviction
that our causal inferences are natural certitudes and cannot
justified
reason-is dependent on the distinctions between
fact and relations
belief
knowledge and between matters
ideas. Hume, however, in his attempt to explain how belief
these distinctions, on the one hand reducing
by making it instinctive,
on
knowledge to
demanding that the explanation of belief be a reasonable
This gives
two sets of beliefs between which
is unable to choose, and it makes him admit that belief is
no longer non-rational, as he had desired, but irrational. Hence
every thinking man, at least as long as he is studying
problem, must be a complete sceptic.
This is the logic
Hume's thought, and
the Treatise he
can find no escape from it. Hence Hume's conclusion to the first
book of the Treatise is a lame sort of plea. Philosophy gets him
nowhere, it gives no satisfactory answers
cannot even
impose its sceptical conclusions. 110 But Hume feels that he
" would
a loser in point of pleasure," 111 if he were to give up
philosophy. This modest plea for philosophy is a far cry from
Hume's earlier confident boast:
Ibid., I, iv, 7 (T, !(!67-68).
Ibid. (T, 268).
109 Ibid.
107
108

110
111

Ibid. (T, 268-69).
Ibid., I, iv, 7 (T, Hll-92).

TilE T\VO SCEPTICISl\JS

IN

r.rREATISE

-k.tJ

In pretending therefore to explain the principles of human nature,
we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a
foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which
they can stand with any security. 112

The shining apple of a science of human nature 113 has turned
to dust.
CoNcLuSION

The puzzling inconsistencies of Hume's thought make it difficult to draw any positive conclusions from his ambivalent
scepticism. Once the latent ambiguities are brought to light
and his almost open contradictions are juxtaposed, one wonders
how any one could set Hume up as a guide in philosophy. The
empiricist can feel sympathy with his radical and almost fierce
empiricism, and the weary student of the history of philosophy
can admire 'Hume's ruthless debunking of his philosophical
ancestors, but anyone who studies the Treatise closely should
see that such sympathy and admiration have an emotional
:rather than philosophical basis. Hume's arguments, like those
of the sophists of old, dazzle the reader and tend to amaze him,
but the student will see that Hume's arguments are built on
the sands of ambiguity and contradiction. This perhaps explains why Hume has many followers and admirers but no
school. The more intelligent of his friends, men with keen minds
like Passmore, 114 pick his arguments to pieces. Then, unable to
salvage a doctrine, they see in Hume the embodiment of the
critical spirit, the mind which will " take no system as final,
nothing as ultimate except the spirit of enquiry." 115 It seems to
me that such a statement contains an important warningnamely, that since the human mind loves to jump to conclusions
long before all the evidence is in, the best philosophers will be
the most cautious, wary not to go beyond the evidence. However, our study of Hume's double scepticism would indicate that
Hume was one of the least cautious of thinkers and had an
to the Treatise

112

Introduction

113

Ibid. (T, xix).

(T, xx).

Cf. Hunte's Intentions.
""Ibid., p. 159.

114

446

JAMES

V. MCGLYNN

inordinate attachment to sweeping statements. In a word, if
the Humean spirit is the spirit of enquiry, Hume was one of the
least Humean of philosophers. To be sure, he was a revolutionary, but like most revolutionaries he was a young man in a
hurry and one of the least able to follow his own counsels.
Because of this it would seem that the value of Hume's scepticism has been much over-rated. It is not even the Teductio ad
absuTdum of Locke and Berkeley, which it is often claimed
to be, but a too enthusiastic generalization resulting from an
incomplete analysis of the psychological and epistemological
factors involved, abetted by a passion for a simplicity, which
unfortunately is not found in human cognition. There is room
for scepticism, but for the scepticism which refuses to accept pat
answers to the problems raised by the complexity of human
knowledge and beliefs. To such an enquiring mind Hume's
scepticism will look like just another pat answer. There are
few easy answers in philosophy, and Hume's sceptical theory
is not one of them.
JAMICS

University of Detroit,
Detroit, Michigan

McGLYNN,

S.J.

THOl\HSM AND POSITIVISM

I

N a report on the Eleventh International Congress of
Philosophy which took place in Brussels, Walter Ce:rf
makes the comment that,

Against the great mass of nondescript contributions, three grand
currents of contemporary thought are easily recognizable: the
empiricist, the existentialist, and the Catholic currents. The empiricist current is mainly British, American and Scandinavian; the
existentialist, on the whole, Continental and South American: and
only Catholicism is represented internationally, although its main
strength is in France, Germany and Italy. Catholicism always
surprises the outsider, not only with the variety of views permissible
within its dogmatic framework, but also with the energy it exhibits
in assimilating to itself the main tendencies of modem thought
and science. At the moment though, existentialism is its favorite
partner. 1

It is, of course, very
to
to
that
activities are judged by others to be on an international scale,
and he can modestly point out to his interlocutors that,
logically, the word "catholic" means "universal," which latter
word is not a very far cry
meaning from "internationaL"
No doubt Mr. Ced's hint that Catholic thinkers in Europe
have made more of a rapprochement with existentialist thought
than have their English-speaking brethren with the current
empiricism will be generally admitted. Yet it cannot be denied
that the influence exerted by the positivist current of thought
in English-speaking universities merits for it more attention
from Catholic thinkers than it always receives.
The humble aim of this article is to suggest certain fields in
which the thought of St. Thomas and that of at least one
influential brand of positivism might meet on common ground.
I also try to point out some important points in which these
two philosophies differ, and why they do so. Perhaps the
1

The Philosophical Review, LXIV, 2 (April 1955), 294-295.

4L_L7

448

MICHAEL

P. SLATTERY

following judgment delivered by John Bumheim will provide
some justification for these exploratory paragraphs:
Finally we must not let it escape us that there is a fundamental
objection to metaphysics which is independent of the particular
arguments we have been examining, and which is the driving force
of the whole attack on metaphysics. Nobody, in the opinion of most
contemporary philosophers, has ever devised a method whereby the
truth or falsehood of metaphysical propositions can be determined
with accuracy. Unless it can be shown that there is a methodology
which is quite as precise and well grounded as the methodology
involved in the positions we have been analysing (namely, the
positivist positions), the anti-metaphysical trend of contemporary
English-speaking philosophy will continue to rest secure, no matter
what be the fate of the other arguments on which it is based. The
importance, the urgency, and the difficulty of meeting this challenge
must not be underestimated. It is not only the most radical, but
also the most legitimate challenge that metaphysics has ever had
to face. 2

Now, owing to the fact that some of the researches into
mathematical logic have been made by thinkers of a positivistic
bias, there has developed among some Catholic philosophers
a belief that mathematical logic itself is inimical to metaphysics.
Such a belief is, of course, as unfortunate as a belief that
mathematical studies are pagan, since the Pythagoreans, the
founders of mathematics, were adherents of the Orphic religion.
Any dangers to metaphysics to be found in positivistic thought
are to be found in their theory of knowledge rather than in the
relatively innocent and interesting studies that some of them
have made in the foundations of mathematics and in symbolic
logic.8
2 " The Modern Attack on Metaphysics,"
Philosophical Studies II (June
16-17.
• In this connection it is instructive to compare the attitude towards symbolic
logic taken by Jacques Maritaln (cf. his Introduction to Logic, N. Y. 1946, pp.
222-233), with that taken by Lukasiewicz (cf. for example, his Aristotle's Syllogistic . . . , Oxford, 1951 and "In Memoriam ·Jan Lukasiewicz," by Boleslaw
Sobocinski, Philosophical Studies, December 1956, pp. 3-49). A comparison of such
books as Ancient Formal Logic, by I. M. Bochenski, 0. P. (Amsterdam, 1951),
Medieval Logic, by P. Boehner, 0. F. M. (Manchester University Press, 1952),

THOMISM

AND POSITIVISM

449

Both positivism and its Continental contemporary, existentialism, were reactions against Hegelian metaphysics. Both of
these reactions accepted Hegelianism at its word as being the
metaphysics; and in rejecting it, they tended to reject
these
metaphysics. 4 It was for the same general reason
two philosophies rejected Hegelianism, namely, for the reason
that in the latter system, the world of our experience got lost
in a cloud of intangible ideas. The existentialist stressed the
self of experience faced with its problems of relating itself to
existence as experienced. The positivist, on the other hand,
was interested in the validity of our knowledge,
stressed
in his turn the world of experience as being the sole source
our knowledge of things, and therefore the sole criterion of
informative character of our statements about things.
Whatever might be said about the vagaries of individual
representatives of these two schools, it
I think, be generally
admitted
the reaction towards
concrete
was a
healthy one. Of course, it is highly regrettable
there was
no realist
system in good public standing at the
of these reactions in order to provide an acceptable alternative to the
Hegel and the various anti-rationalistic currents which sprang up against iL 5 In the words of Fr.
Copleston:
Conventional Logic and Modern Logic, by J. T. Clarke, S. J. (Woodstock, Md.,
or of the articles on logic appearing in Dominican Studies (1948-1954) and
in La Revue Philosophique de Louvain, with the normal run of college textbooks
on the " traditional scholastic " logic, reveals two extremely different mental climates
existing among those who claim adherence to the scholastic tradition in logic.
• Though existentialism in fact does have its metaphysicians, and the positivists
have of late become less hostile to metaphysics, or at least less openly contemptuous
of it.
5 In his book of Essays entitled
Men and Tendencies (1937), E. I. Watkin says:
" That this realism has always been held by the Aristotelian philosophy accepted in
the Catholic schools and is not necessarily materialism, but realism, of which
materialism is but one variety, seems not to have entered the minds of the Marxists.
For when Marxism arose this scholastic philosophy was almost universally disand "For Plekhanov
credited." (Essay on "The Philosophy of Marxism," p.
that ' being determines thought ' not vice versa, is the ' fundamental thesis of
modern materialism ' . . . It is in fact, the fundamental thesis of realism, and
therefore, as Peter Lippert has pointed out, a fundamental principle of Catholic
philosophy." (Ibid., n. l).

450

MICHAEL P. SLATTERY

. . . it would have to be shown that ' empiricism ' and ' rationalism '
do not exhaust the possibilities and that we are not forced to choose
either the one or the other. And I think that in Aquinas' philosophy
we flnd an example of another possibility which is well worth
examination. I do not mean to suggest that his philosophy can
simply be taken over as it stands without development and without
prolonged examination of his fundamental positions. I mean rather
to suggest that it is an organism which is capable of growth and
development of such a kind as to reconcile on a higher plane the
sharp antitheses which have emerged in the subsequent history of
philosophic thought. 6
But St. Thomas' thought was more or less unknown at the
time and is only now beginning to exercise some influence. Now
in view of what Fr. Copleston says, it might be profitable to
discuss some of the basic points in logical positivist thought,
and to see how they relate to the philosophy of St. Thomas.
And since Professor Ayer' s book, Language, Truth and Logic,
has achieved the status of a textbook of positivism, it will be
convenient to use it in the following discussion.
In the ensuing paragraphs I will confine myself to certain
basic characteristics of empiricism, namely, to verification,
theory of analytic and synthetic propositions, and the semantics
of poetry. These are crucial points in the positivist system, the
first two, at any rate; and it stands or falls by them.

*

*

*

*

*

Beginning with the classification of propositions, I think that
St. Thomas would accept the division of all propositions into
the analytic and synthetic variety, for he himself distinguishes
propositions into those of accidental and those of essential
predication, which amounts to the same thing. But he would
certainly deny that all analytic propositions are non-factuaL
For example, he says that the proposition " God exists " is
per se notum (i.e., analytic), since the predicate is the same as
the subject; and he says that in the proposition " Man is an
animal," the predicate is contained in the essence of the subject.7 But he certainly does not intend to say that the propo• Aquinas (Pelican Books, 1954), p.
• ", .. contingit aliquid esse per se notum dupliciter: uno modo

et.

THOMISM

AND POSITIVISM

451

sition " God exists " is uninformative about the real world.
I believe that, for St. Thomas, all metaphysical propositions
are analytic. 8 Yet there is no doubt that he considers metaphysics to be a study of real beings. We could illustrate St.
non quoad nos; alio modo secundum se, et quoad nos. Ex hoc enim aliqua propositio
est per se nota, quod praedicatum includitur in ratione subjecti; ut Homo est
animal; nam animal est de ratione hominis. . . . Dico ergo quod haec propositio,
Deus est, quantum in se est, per se nota est; quia praedicatum est idem cum
subjecto." Summa Theol., I, q. 2, a. 1.
. 8 Fr. Copleston in his Aquinas says:
"Nowadays propositions which are claimed
to be both necessary and informative are frequently called 'synthetic a priori
propositions '; synthetic as giving information about reality and as not being purely
formal, a priori as being necessary and universal. This term seems to me to be a
convenient one." (p. 28, n. 1) He also says of the Principle of Causality: "Is it
an empirical hypothesis or is it an instance of what might be now called a ' synthetic
a priori proposition'? Aquinas certainly understood it in the latter sense." (p. 40)
Now leaving aside for the moment Fr. Copleston's own interpretation of the term
synthetic a priori, if we take " synthetic " in its ordinary sense in logic, then
synthetic propositions never have their predicates either identical with or included
in the essence of the subject. But if this is the case, some difficulties will arise when
we try to interpret the necessary and informative propositions of Thomistic metaphysics as being of the above description. For, as St. Thomas sees it, the proposition,
God exists, has its predicate identical with its subject (see n. 7). In modem
terminology, one would say that such a proposition was, if anything, analytic-certainly not synthetic, even with the a priori qualification added on. If we were
to say that this proposition is synthetic, even though it were also admitted to be
a priori, I fail to see how we could ever prove that God's essence is identical with
His existence. For in such circumstances, the predicate " exists " will be outside the
meaning or nature of the subject "God." On the other hand, however, if the
proposition, God exists, is analytic then so presumably are all the other metapyhical
propositions.
Furthermore the Aristotelian theory of the Predicables which St. Thomas also
subscribed to, seems to exemplify the distinction between the analytic and synthetic
propositions of modern positivism. The predicables of Genus, Difference and
Property seem in fact to be a classification of the general types of analytic proposition; and the predicable of Accident seems to be identical with the class of
synthetic propositions. St. Thomas himself seems to make this general distinction
between the analytic and the synthetic types in the following passage: "Unde cum
omne quod est praeter essentiam rei, dicatur accidens: esse quod pertinet ad
questionem 'an est,' est accidens." (II Quodl., q. 2, a. I). He makes the same
distinction by implication when indicating his views on the propositio per se nota.
(Seen. 7, and De Verit., q. 11, a. 1) I know of no context in which he mentions
anything like a theory of synthetic a priori propositions, at least in the current
acceptance of that term. And I fail to see how the positivist criticism of such a type
of proposition can be answered.

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MICHAEL

P. SLATTERY

Thomas' position from the example of the non-metaphysical
but analytic proposition, "Man is an animaL" He would say
that it tells you of one of the essential characteristics that a
man has:
it does not tell you whether there are any men
in existence. Now if the positivists were to mean by
factual " non-existential, then I think that, with the exception
of one class of proposition, St. Thomas would agree with them.
He would say that propositions about what God is are exceptional as being necessarily existential, since God exists by
His nature. But he would certainly admit that all other
analytic propositions are non-existential. Yet positivists seem
to wish to say of analytic propositions not only that they are
non-existential, but that they do not refer to the actual world
in any way at all, being merely the consequences of certain ways
of defining terms. And it is here that I think the disagreement
arises between their views and those of St. Thomas.
I would propose that a case can be made out for saying that
the propositions of natural science at least aim at being analytic,
namely, at arriving at necessary truth upon the given
matter; otherwise why should not a scientist be content with
the first true proposition that comes into his head?
It would seem, for example, that the proposition " W ate:r
boils at a hundred degrees centigrade at sea-level,'' aims at
being true for all possible cases of water, and that it would be
true whether any water existed or not. If it were true for all
possible cases, it would be analytic. Yet it would be ridiculous
to say that this proposition was thereby uninformative about
the physical world. On the contrary, it would be perfectly
informative in its role as a scientific proposition, since it would
inform you as to one of the universal characteristics of water.
Of course, in such circumstances the fact that water existed or
did not exist would be purely coincidental. The characteristics
of water would in any case be the same. Whether the
sitions of natural science ever reach the stage of being analytic,
we need not ask here. The fact is that St. Thomas believed
that metaphysical propositions did so. And he also maintained
that they gave information about things, even though, with

THOMISl\I

AND POSITIVISM

4M3

respect to non-divine beings, they did not assert that they
existed. In other words, the proposition that a non-divine
being, a physical being for example, exists, was a proposition of
accidental predication for St. Thomas, or in contemporary
terminology, a synthetic proposition. It was not a metaphysical
proposition in the full sense, but was part of the necessary
" raw material " from which human knowledge of metaphysical
truths took its origin.
It will be well here, before we inquire how it is possible to
establish analytic propositions which are informative about
things, to mention Professor Ayer's view that analytic propositions are tautologies. Now he uses the word "tautology"
in a non-pejorative sense. It is, in fact, another word for
" analytic," but it serves the useful purpose of bringing out the
fact that the predicates of analytic propositions do nothing
more than make explicit what is already contained within the
nature of their subjects. They are in fact a repetition of the
subject term. So in the proposition " One and one make two,"
the predicate " two " merely makes explicit what is already
contained in the subject " one and one." St. Thomas will agree
with this non-pejorative use of the word " tautology " in
respect of analytic propositions, and he would admit that
from a logical point of view, the whole of metaphysics and of
theology (at least of the Divine attributes) consists of tautologies. But of course, from a psychological viewpoint he will
deny this, just as Ayer will do. St. Thomas will say that only
God knows all the possible truths about His nature, and that
He knows them immediately; and he will say that only God
and angels know without reasoning all the basic truths of
metaphysics. His way of putting this is to distinguish between
the proposition in itself and the proposition as known to us;
and he says that because of the weakness of the human mind,
many propositions which are in fact analytic are not immediately known by us to be such. 9 To take a crude example, a
• Cf. n. 7, and the following: "Dico ergo quod haec propositio, Deus est,
quantum in se est, per se nota est. . . . Sed quia nos non scimus de Deo, quid est,

454

MICHAEL P. SLATTERY

human being, in assenting to the axioms of Euclid, will not
thereby be able immediately to understand an the theorems.
But God, on the other hand, would be able to know both
axioms and theorems in one act of understanding. Evidently
then, for the Divine Mind, there is no problem of consistency
and completeness. By one act of intellectual vision, God can
see both consistency of axioms and the complete set of theorems
derivable from those axioms. Speaking of derivation, or reasoning in traditional language, St. Thomas says,
our scientific knowledge contains both some perfection and some
imperfection. Its certitude pertains to its perfection, for what is
known scientifically is known with certainty. To it imperfection
belongs its progression from principles to the conclusions contained
in that science; for this progression happens only because the intellect, in knowing the premisses, knows the conclusions only potentially. If it actually knew the conclusions, there would be no need
of it to go further, since motion is simply the passage from potency
to act. Knowledge is said to be in God, therefore, because of its
certitude about things known, but not because of the progression
mentioned above, for, as Dionysius says, this is not found even in
angels! 0

We see, then, from this passage of St. Thomas, that he would
have no objection to Professor Aye:r's statement that all analytic propositions a:re tautologies in the non-pejorative sense;
and he would include metaphysics under this heading of tautologous propositions.
To introduce the discussion on the methods by which we
acquire the knowledge that we put into the form of analytic
propositions we can profitably dispel here the belief that metaphysics is bound to be anti-empiricaL As Fr. Copleston says:
it is a misconception to suppose that the fundamental role of senseperception in human cognition was a discovery of the classical
British empiricists. It had already been stated, and emphatically
stated, by Aquinas in the thirteenth century. It is true that the
latter was not the first to state it; for the doctrine was already
non est nobis per se nota, sed indiget demonstrari
quoad nos." Summa Theol., I, q. !i!, a. 1.
10 De Verit., q. 'i!, a. l, ad 4.

per ea quae sunt magis nota

THOMISM

AND POSITIVISl\1

455

present in Aristotle. . . . Furthermore, in a sense Aquinas laid more
stress than did the classical British empiricists on the part played
by sense-perception in human cognition. For while not excluding
introspection or reflection as a course of knowledge, he did not
mention sense-perception and reflection as parallel sources of knowledge. He did not think that introspection or reflection is an initial
source in the same sense in which sense-perception is. His point
of view was that I become aware of my existence as a self through
concrete acts of perceiving material things other than myself, inasmuch as I am concomitantly aware o£ these acts as mineP

I think that this point can still profitably be stressed, since the
tendency of positivists and empiricists in general has been to
equate metaphysics with rationalism, and empiricism with the
rejection of metaphysics. On the contrary, one can already see
in St. Thomas a first adumbration of the principle of verification
upon which the positivists lay so much stress. He says, for
example: " Because the first principle of our knowledge is
sense, it is necessary to reduce in some way to sense all things
about which we judge." 12 It is not such a far cry from this to
Professor Ayer's statement
"We say that a sentence is
factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he
knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to
express-that is, if he knows what observations would lead him,
under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being
true, or reject it as being false." 13 Furthermore St. Thomas
would never agree with the Socrates of the Phaedo that we
should leave the world of sense-experience and confine ourselves to the non-sensual regions of pure thought. No matter
how far we go in the investigation of immaterial beings we can
never, so thinks St. Thomas, do away with the use of senseexperience and images. To quote Fr. Copleston once more:
" ... it should be added that it is not only in the initial acquisition of knowledge that the mind depends on sense-experience.
11

Op cit., pp. 25-27.

Sed quia primum principium nostrae cognitionis est sensus, oportet ad sensum
quodammodo resolvere omnia de quibus judicamus." De V e:rit., q. 12, a. 3, ad 2:
cf. also Summa Theol., I, q. 12, a. 12.
13 Language, Truth and Logic (2nd, ed.), p. 35.
12 "

45()

::'viiCHAEL

I'. SLATTERY

For he held that we cannot use the knowledge we have already
acquired without the employment of images or< phantasmata ';
and images are the results of sense-perception." 14 As St.
Thomas himself says: " For the mind actually to understand
something there is required an act of the imagination and of
other (sensitive) faculties not only in receiving fresh knowledge
but also in using knowledge already acquired. 15 (my italics).
The question now arises as to how St. Thomas can build a
metaphysical system when he starts from such an emphatically
empiricist theory of knowledge. Why, in fact, is he not a logical
positivist? I think that the beginnings of an answer to this
question will appear if we investigate how Professor Ayer
explains our learning mathematics and logic. Since mathematics
and logic are, in Professor Ayer's view, sets of analytic propositions, it will be of some interest to see how he explains our
learning them. That Professor Ayer thinks this to be a serious
question is evident from the way in which he introduces it. He
tells us that:
Where the empiricist does encounter difficulty is in connection with
the truths of formal logic and mathematics, for whereas a scientific
generalization is readily admitted to be fallible, the truths of mathematics and logic appear to everyone to be necessary and certain.
But if empiricism is correct, no proposition which has factual
content can be necessary or certain. Accordingly, the empiricist
must deal with the truths of logic and mathematics in one of the
two following ways: he must say either that they are not necessary
truths, in which case he must account for the universal belief that
they are; or he must say that they have no factual content, and then
he must explain how a proposition which is empty of all factual
content can be true and useful and surprising.
If neither of these courses proves satisfactory, we shall be obliged
to give way to rationalism. We shall be obliged to admit that there
are some truths about the world which we can know independently
of experience .... It is clear that any such concession to rationalism
would upset the main argument of this book ... the whole force
of our attack on metaphysics would be destroyed 16 (my italics).
Op cit., p. 44.
Summa TheoL, I, q. 84. a. 7; cf. also In Boet. de Trin., q. 6, a.
10 Op. cit., pp. 72-73.
14

15

ad 5.

THOMISM

457

AND POSITIVISM

I am going to suggest that we learn the basic proposition of
metaphysics in the same general way as we learn those of
mathematics and logic, making allowances for the differences
in subject-matter. I will also suggest that Professor Ayer cannot succeed in explaining our Jmowledge of mathematics if he
confines himself to his own principles. In order to explain
this point I must quote his own words; and I justify this
multiplication of quotations by pointing out that we are dealing
here with the most crucial problem in the whole positivist
system, namely, the positivist explanation of how we can learn
the analytic propositions of mathematics and logic while yet
not being able to learn anything meaningful in the field of
metaphysics. Now Thomistic metaphysics consists of analytic
propositions; 17 and Professor Ayer must show why it is possible
to arrive at the one set of analytic propositions and yet impossible to acquire the other. The quotation we have just
given from his work shows that Professor Ayer is himself aware
of the vital importance of this issue.
He says: " It is obvious that mathematics
logic have to
be learned in the same way as chemistry and history have to
be learned. Nor are we denying that the first person to discover
a given logical or mathematical tr1:1th was led to it by an
inductive procedure." 18 This is a most important admission.
He says explicitly that we learn mathematics by the same
process as that which we learn the natural sciences, namely, by
induction. Now just previous to this statement he says that:
" The course of maintaining that the truths of logic and mathematics are not necessary dr certain was adopted by Mill. He
maintained that these propositions were inductive generalizations based on an extremely large number of instances." 19
One would have thought that it would be precisely Mill's
interpretation of mathematics that Professor Ayer would
accept, given his strong learnings towards Hume's inductive
theories. Surely if we learn mathematics in the same general
way in which we learn the natural sciences, and given that our
17

Cf. n. 8.

16

Op. cit., p. 74.

19

Ibid.

458

M!CliAl!;:L 1>. SLATTERY

propositions in the natural sciences are only statements or
probability, then so will be those of mathematics.
Surely
again, if we learn mathematics by induction, it follows, on the
theory of induction from sense-experience accepted by Professor
Ayer, that mathematics should be subject to the conditions
governing all inductive propositions. They should then be only
probable hypotheses. But this is not the conclusion that Professor Ayer draws. On the contrary, he says:
The contention of Mill's which we reject is that the propositions of
logic and mathematics have the same status as empirical hypotheses; that their validity is determined in the same way. We
maintain that they are independent of experience in the sense that
they do not owe their validity to empirical verification. We may
come to discover them through an inductive process; but once we
have apprehended them we see that they are necessarily true, and
that they hold good for every conceivable instance. And this serves
to distinguish them from empirical generalizations. For we know
that a proposition whose validity depends upon experience cannot
be seen to be necessarily and universally true. 20
I have italicised the phrase" once we have apprehended them"
since it is the crucial point of the whole argument. How,
given Ayer's principles, can we ever apprehend them as being
necessarily true? How, starting off from inductive premisses,
do we ever reach a necessarily true proposition? It is an
assertion :repeated almost ad nauseam by empiricists of the
Humean-positivist school that inductive propositions have only
probability value" If we learn mathematics by induction from
sense-experience, then there is no question of whose theory to
choose. Ayer is wrong and Mill is right. It would seem that
Professor Ayer is half aware of this since he continues: "In
rejecting Mill's theory, we are obliged to be somewhat dogmatic.
We can do no more than state the issue clearly and then trust
that his contention will be seen to be discrepant with the
relevant logical facts. . . ." 21 Whether Mill's contention is
discrepant with the logical facts or not, there is no question
that he is consistent with his basic principles. Ayer is not.
20

Ibid., p. 75.

21

Ibid.

THOMISM

AND POSITIVISM

459

Mill gives a false description of mathematical propositions; but
his description is in accordance with his basic theory of induction. Professor Ayer gives a correct description of mathematical
propositions-at least insofar as he describes them as being
necessarily true-but in doing so, he contradicts his own basic
theory of induction. He is quite right in saying that by rejecting
Mill's theory, he is obliged to be dogmatic, for, in the position
in which he has placed himself he can give no good :reason for
rejecting Mill's theory. He had to choose either to :remain
consistent with his Humean theory of induction or to admit
the irrefutable truth that mathematical propositions are necessarily true. He chose truth before consistency, which course,
while being laudable from the ethical point of view, is in complete contradiction to his own premisses. Arithmetic is the
Achilles heel of his and of any Humean-based theory.
Since we do learn the analytic propositions of mathematics
and logic through the aid of sense-experience, our only recourse,
if we wish to explain how we do it, is to posit some sort of
intuitive induction. We will just have to say, and experience
bears us out in this, that it is possible, after a certain amount
of thinking on sense-experience, to arrive at certain propositions
which are always true. This in general is the Aristotelian theory
of intuitive inductions; 22 and given Ayer's double admission
both that we learn arithmetic through sense-experience and
that arithmetical propositions are analytic, I don't see how he
can possibly fail to subscribe to it. But I can see why he should
not want to do so. If he admits Aristotelian intuitive induction,
he has left the door open to metaphysics. For, as he himself
admits, it will now be possible, in principle at least, to arrive,
from sense-experience, at propositions which are true for all
possible beings. And this is what metaphysics is about. And
this is what Professor Ayer does not wish to allow.
We might notice, in passing, that the failure of logical
positivists to give a satisfactory explanation of our knowledge
of mathematics is not unique in the history of philosophy. In
22

Post. Anal., II, c. HI.

460

MICHAEL

P. SLATTERY

fact it is almost a truism to say that the strength and weakness
of a philosophical system are shown up when it sets itself to
explain how we get to know the unsophisticated analytic propositions of arithmetic. The spectre of simple addition haunts
the graveyards of philosophy. One of the reasons given by
Plato for positing a state of pre-existence was the fact that we
know some mathematics. We could not, according to him,
have got to know it anywhere else. One need hardly say that
there are various implications of such a theory which fail to
recommend it to a large number of people. The historians tell
us how Aristotle, himself possessing no pronounced learnings
towards mathematics, had a busy time attacking both Plato
and " those thinkers who reduce all philosophy to mathematics"; yet even he has not escaped completely free from
energetic criticism of his own theory of " mathematical being.'' 23
In the early medieval period St. Augustine, for example, offered
as a proof of our knowledge of eternal truths our knowledge of
arithmetic. He then posited a special illumination from God
to explain how a changing fallible intellect like the one possessed
by man can attain to such infallible eternal truths. Critics did
not fail to notice how such a theory tends to smudge over the
distinction between the natural knowledge of the human mind
and divinely inspired truth, thereby tending towards epistemological scepticism and also raising problems of the relation
between Reason and Revelation. Taking an example from the
later modern period, part of Professor Ayer's refutation of
.Kant's basic theory of synthetic a priori propositions consists
in showing that, contrary to Kant's belief, arithmetical and
geometrical propositions are not synthetic a priori but analytic, so that no good reason is left for Kant's transcendental
aesthetic. 24 This weakness, then; in the positivist position is
at least a philosophically respectable one. Many of the " right
people " suffered from it.
As I have just suggested, the Aristotelian theory of intuitive
•• Cf. Professor Auguste Mansion, Introduction
(Louvain, 1946), pp. 166-170.
•• Op. cit., pp. 82-85.

a la Physique Ariatotelicienne

THOMISM

461

AND POSITIVISM

induction is about the only theory which will explain the above
facts, and this theory
an opening to metaphysics" It
is this theory that St. Thomas follows in his explanation of how
we acquire our natural knowledge, both in metaphysics and in
other scientific pursuits" He would maintain that, just as
through sense-experience we learn mathematics and logic, so
through the same means we learn certain general truths which
are applicable to all beings. In fact, he maintains that it is
ultimately from our considerations of the things presented to
us in sense-experience that we arrive at the conclusion that a
non-material being exists, namely, God" His argument asserts
that a proper consideration of the actual things with which we
are acquainted leads us to see that there must be an immaterial
being which is the source of existence of everything else" As
has been well pointed out/ 5 there is an experience relevant to
the truth or falsity of the proposition "God exists," namely,
that of having or of not having any experience at all. On St.
Thomas' principles, if there were no sense-experience whatever,
then it would be impossible to prove the existence of God. And
surely, the having or not having at least some experience is just
as" experiential" as having one type of experience rather than
another. Positivists tend to ask for a new type of experience
in the physical world 26 which will be relevant to the
sition " God exists." This misses the point. If God exists, it
will not be as one among a number of producers of varying
types of experience in the physical world. God is the foundation
of the mere possibility of any experience at all. The positivists
demand a relatively superficial type of verification, thinking
of God as just one more in the list of existing things. We offer
them in return a more fundamental type of verification, since
the being we are referring to is the foundation of all the other
beings and therefore the source of the possibility of all experience.

*

*

*

*

*

*

:By Fr. Corbishley, S. J., Master of Campion Hall, Oxford. (I hope my memory
here is not doing Fr. Corbishley an injustice.)
•• I do not intend to discuss mystical experience or experience in an after-life,
which latter, of course, will in Catholic belief give incontrovertible proof of the
existence of God.
25

462

MICHAEL

P. SLATTERY

I would like to turn now to the positivist rejection of poetry.
They say that poetry-and literature in general-is not meaningful to the extent that it employs language in a non-literal
sense. It is in fact beautiful or striking nonsense. This rejection
I consider to be an unfortunate consequence of a false semantical theory. Admittedly positivists can take the not inconsiderable credit for making contemporary philosophers aware of
the need to be able to explain their assertions by reference to
some definite sense-experience. But it would not be true to say
either that they were the first philosophers in history to investigate semantical problems, or that their whole theory is
acceptable. As regards the historical point-which Ayer in
fact admits-it is, for example, difficult to read either Aristotle's
Metaphysics or his Physics without coming across exhaustive
analyses of the meanings of various key words in his thought.
And St. Thomas' treatise on the Trinity is about as intricate a
piece of semantical analysis as anyone could wish for. 27 As
regards semantical analysis in pure metaphysics, if Aristotle's
theory of analogy, taken over and developed by St. Thomas,
is not a piece of semantics, it is impossible to say what it is"
In the words of Fr. Copleston:
I suggest that much of what is now called " linguistic analysis "
does not differ fundamentally from what Aquinas would have
thought of as metaphysical analysis. The descriptive names may
differ; but what is done seems to be often much the same sort of
thing. The results of the analyses of Aquinas and of a modern
analyst may often be different. But that is another mattero 28

As regards the truth of their theory, I would say that Ayer,
at any rate, puts forward an untenable thesis on poetry, one,
moreover, which has unfortunate consequences when applied to
his own philosophical position. He tells us that: " It is, in
fact, very rare for a literary artist to produce sentences which
have no literal meaning. And when this does occur, the
sentences are carefully chosen for their rhythm .and balance.
If the author writes nonsense, it is because he considers it most
27

Summa Theol., I, qq. 27-43.

28

Opo cit., Po 37, n. l.

THOMISM

AND POSITIVISM

468

suitable for bringing about the effects for which his writing is
designed." 29 It is to be noted here that Professor Ayer implicitly equates meaning with literal meaning. Anything which
goes into the realm of metaphor falls into the class of nonsense.
I suggest that to equate meaningfulness with literal meaningfulness is to give a false theory of meaning; and furthermore,
that as soon as meaning is allowed to figurative expressions,
then poetry comes into the class of meaningful and informative
expressions. I propose to illustrate my point by discussing the
meaning of two vital words in the positivist vocabulary, namely,
" analytic " and " synthetic."
What does the word '' analytic " come from? It comes, so
the Liddell and Scott Abridged Greek-English Lexicon informs
us, from the Greek verb ava.ll.vw meaning " to unloose, undo
again ... to set free." The second meaning of this verb is " to
do away, get rid of: to stop, put an end to." &.vai\v(n<;, the
same source informs us, means " a loosing, releasing: dissolution, death." It is evident that the literal meaning of the word
"' analysis " is " a freeing, or a releasing," for if anything is the
literal meaning of a word it is that meaning which the word
was originally given. Something, then, is analytic when it
accomplishes this action. Now I would like to see how the
positivists can show that they are using " analytic " in the
above sense. The fact is they cannot do so. The term refers to
a physical loosening, whereas whatever "loosening" a logician
does with his analytic propositions, we can be sure that it is
not of the physical variety. The simple fact is that philosophers
have extended the meaning of the word "analysis" to cover a
form of loosening which is not at all physical in nature. Compared with the original loosening meant by the term, philosophers' and logicians' loosening is of a highly metaphorical fo:rm.
In which case-applying Professor Ayer's rules of meaningthe positivists, in talking about analytic propositions, are
talking nonsense.
They will object, no doubt, that they have defined the term
•• Op cit., p. 45; d. also ibid., pp. 44-45.

464

MICHAEL

P. SLATTERY

" analytic " in a given way; and it therefore has the literal
meaning that they have decided to give it. But unfortunately
for their argument, the term was not chosen entirely at random.
It appears already in the works of Kant, and can be traced
back-at least to the logical writings of Aristotle-and always
with the same general meaning of "freeing" the elements of
something from the whole.
Philosophers, of course, are not unique in this respect. We
can find examples of terms used in the natural sciences with
technical meanings different from yet still bearing some similarity to, their original ones. Take, for example, " root " in
mathematics, " moment " in physics, or " current " (of electricity) in the same science. And it needs no gr.eat knowledge of
the history of philosophy to realize that "analytic" is merely
one of a whole host of philosophical terms taken out of ordinary
language and given a slightly different meaning. One need
merely mention words like "logic" (from A.Eyw meaning "to
lay in order"), "idea" (from i8ea meaning "the look, or
appearance of a thing"), or Plato's StK7] which originally may
have meant " a path or track." 30 It is surely not surprising,
when people look for words in which to express new knowledge,
that they should tend to make use of the words they already
have, choosing those whose meanings already bear some resemblance to the new ideas. One could say with truth that these
words like " idea," " analytic " and the rest, already contained
their new meanings potentially; they were already inherently
capable of expressing those new meanings.
We can illustrate what we mean by this last sentence if we
take for example the old-fashioned metaphor of the smiling
meadow. Though the word " smiling " was no doubt used to
mean only a certain kind of expression on a human face, what
in effect gives the empirical justification for talking about a
smiling meadow is the fact that some meadows in early summer
do express to an observer a certain state of well-being similar
3 ° Cf. W. K. C. Guthrie's
The Greek Philosophers (Methuen, 1950), pp. 5-11;
cf. also Burnet's Early Greek Philosophy, passim.

THOMISM

AND POSITIVISM

465

to that expressed by a certain kind of smile on a human face.
Now although this similarity between what a given meadow·
expresses and what a human face expresses was probably not
noticed when the word " smiling " was first used, it was nevertheless there in reality: and so the reason for extending the
meaning of the word " smiling " to the meadow was already
there and waiting to be recognised.
Now if we deny that the technical words of philosophy were
already in readiness to take on their additional meanings,_then
the consequences of this denial are sufficiently ridiculous. For
since the philosopher is practically forced to take his terms
from ordinary language, we will have to conclude that the new
meanings he gives to these terms bear no relation at all to their
old meanings. In that case, the philosopher's choice of one
word rather than of another will be purely arbitrary; and his.
reason for making any use at all of ordinary language as
opposed to making up his own language jabberwocky-style
will boil down merely to a question of imagination and effort.
Very few people would find themselves competent to explain
how such a conclusion squares with the facts either of the
history of philosophy or of the every-day psychology of learning. And very few philosophers would find such a language of
any value to themselves or to anyone else.
No one will deny that philosophers aim at clarifying the
total meaning of each term that they use, as far, at least, as
they can do so. This follows from the expressed aim of philosophy, which is to provide an understanding of reality in
general; and understanding without clarity is of a low order.
And here, since poets presumably do not aim at this sort of
technical clarity, lies the difference between poets and philosophers. But when it cames to the initial widening of a word's
meaning in order to give expression to new experience, then
philosophers and poets are on all-four together-and along with·
them, the rest of humanity.
There is, nevertheless, another position that the positivists
might wish to take up. They might wish to object that the
meaning of" analysis" remains the same as it always was, but

466

MICHAEJ,

P. SLATTERY

that its application is widened. To this the short reply is that
such a defense is equally available to the poet when he uses his
metaphors. Furthermore such a method of arguing has its own
difficulties. For since one sort of analysis is physical and the
other is logical, we can always ask, To which kind of these two
does the term "analysis" apply? I£ they say: "To neither;
it is neutral," they will be getting close to saying that the word
has no meaning at all. What in fact becomes of the theory,
very popular to positivists, that the meaning of a word is the
way in which you use it? How can you use a positive term like
"analytic" without applying it to something? I£ you apply
it to nothing then you are not using it. Consequently, on the
above theory of meaning, the word has no meaning. 1£, on the
other hand, they say that it applies to both the physical and the
logical forms of loosening, then why cannot the poet say the
same for his smiling morn? And in any case doesn't the meaning
of the word " analysis " get stretched through such an application?
Consequently, if the use by poets of metaphor, simile, and
other figurative expressions, results in nonsense, then positivism
is complete and utter nonsense; and so is the whole of philosophy. For you will hardly find a key word in any philosophical
system which is not taken from ordinary language and given
a meaning, wider than its original one. Now poets do this very
often; so do prose writers, as the phrase " purple patch " indicates when used of their more ambitious efforts. And of course,
the positivists, when they are en famille, make playful use of
metaphorical expressions with the intention of conveying information to one another. When they talk about a portmanteau
word, or about unpacking the meaning of a word, they would
feel unhappy if you told them they were talking nonsense; but
they would be pleased if you said that you understood "what
they were getting at."
It is a simple empirical fact that can be established by listening to almost any band of philosophers, positivists above all,
that the metaphorical use of terms can be a highly informative
m2.11ner of talking, successful sometimes in communicating ideas

THOMISM

467

AND POSITIVISM

when no other way will do so. And this, I suggest, is also what
the poet does. He is gifted with a rare insight into reality and
sometimes expresses that insight by means of metaphors. Of
course, there may be the case of a person who is unable to
express in words the experience he has had. This can be due
to one of two things: either he himself does not possess the
poetic faculty, or else words themselves are unable to express
the experience he has had. And I see no reason why the latter
should not sometimes be the case,-but that is another question. When the poet does give expression to his insights by
using metaphorical terms, he is doing something of the same
sort as the positivist does when the latter uses the term
" synthetic." 81 Both see the wider usage of the respective terms
they use, but one group, the philosophers, decide that the
wider meaning that they see in the term will, for their technical
purposes, become its literal meaning. The poets do not in fact
take this last step.
To conclude this discussion on positivism and poetry, it would
seem that the limiting of meaning to literal meaning is an unnecessarily rigorous procedure even on positivist principles, for
the positivist could apparently still achieve his main aim of eliminating metaphysics while yet allowing meaningfulness to poetry.
He need only have rejected such poetry as referred to modes of
being that transcend the world of sense-experience. This rejection would not be on the grounds that the terms are not
literally meaningful, but that they are not in any sense about
the things to which they intend to refer, there being no such
things. They would in fact be meaningless for the same reasons
that metaphysical terms are claimed to be meaningless.

*

*

*

*

*

*

We might profitably finish this whole discussion with a
remark on " going beyond the world of sense-experience."
31 Liddell and Scott tell us that uvviJeTLK6s means "skilled in putting together,"
and that it comes from uvvTliJ'f/p.L meaning " to place or put together." And the
positivists would have a hard time showing that the putting together which they
accomplish in their empirical propositions is of the same form as the putting together
meant by the first use of this term.

468

MICHAEL

Po SLATTERY

Surely we are doing this at nearly every moment of our
conscious experience" What in fact does the reader see when
he reads these pages? He merely sees black marks on a white
background" Yet he goes beyond these immediate sense-phenomena to the ideas that I am trying to convey to him" Conversation is just one more case of this process we engage in
every day of " transcending the phenomena"" We hear noises,
and make noises which, scientists
tell us, are soundwaves
of varying frequencies" Yet we go beyond these noises to the
ideas and intentions of thinking beings, and the world in
general approves
us for doing so" And
dismeans" Now I fail to see
seminate their ideas by
what is considered to be an unmistakeable sign of intelligence
in a young child, and a sine qua non for a tolerable
life,
should suddenly become a sign of ineptitude_ in a philosopher.
The young child who strays beyond the immediate visual and
the auditory sensations which he gets when someone is talking
to
Is
say: "
clever
standing us at his age! "
is applause for his going
the immediate noises, movements,
colors which he experichild
interprets the whole of
senseences. And
experience in terms of the empiricist " contiguity
succession" of sense-phenomena, or, in other words, who fails to go
beyond them by saying to himself in some way: " Someone is
talking to me," generally ends up in one
the categories of
the mentally deficienL To my
a child
refuses
or fails to see any causal connection between the various senseline of vision has never been singled
impressions which cross
out by his elders, be they positivist or metaphysician, as an
outstanding example of the proper use of one's intellectual
powers" In the same way I see no exceptional maturity of mind
in the counsel that we shou]d not stray beyond immediate
sense-experience in seeking an explanation of the whole
that we get from experience is "conof sense-experience" If
tiguity and succession," then all those signs of awakening
intelligence
children are really the beginnings of a most
pernicious method of thinking, namely, of seeing what isn't

THOl\IISM

A:ND POSITIVIS:!.\1

469

there, of jumping to conclusions when the evidence does not
warrant it; and any person who succeeds in reading a line of
what is written on this page--or any other page for that matter
-is merely showing how enslaved he has become to this
pernicious habit. The whole of this ultra-empiricist way of
thinking reminds me of the solipsist who wrote to the London
Times wondering why, considering how eminently reasonable
was the philosophy of solipsism, more people didn't adopt it.
I suggest in fact that that same ability which enables us to
transcend the phenomena connected with reading and conversation, also leads us to go beyond the phenomena of everyday
experience to affirm the existence of a non-material supreme
being as the only possible explanation of why there should be
any phenomena at all. If the latter activity is in principle
nonsensical, then so is the former.

M. P. SLATTERY
St. Thomas College,
St. Paul, Minnesota

A PROLEGOMENA TO THE STUDY OF
HERACLITUS OF EPHESUS
I

I

T may be well to remember at this point that many of the
early Greek fragments-poetic,
" orphic," hieratic or
"philosophical "-are cast in a language difficult and perhaps impossible for us to understand. The vocabulary of these
fragments, to be sure, seems to be our own; the diction sounds
somewhat familiar; but the mold, the literary formulas in which
they are cast are definitely alien to the ideological mold in
which modern secular thought is advanced. Thus, apparently
familiar words become symbols of unfamiliar ideas with the
result that we are little qualified to grasp the traditional, as
distinguished from the lexographical, meaning or value of word
and phrase-to interpret properly the traditional figurative
diction, or to know when the author does, or does not, intend
us to place a literal interpretation on his words.
The task of properly interpreting the figurative diction of the
earliest transmitted Greek" sayings" is further complicated by
the fact that many of these " sayings " belong to, or at least
are carry-overs from, the twilight zone of myth and history.
In addition, it must be borne in mind that " the wise men " of
early Greek lore include seers, poets, sages and " philosophers."
It is even permissible to maintain that "the wise man" of old
was a seer (prophet) , poet and sage ("philosopher")
all in
one. Suffice it to recall that the " philosopher " Democritus
was called by his disciples a prophet, the Voice of Zeus; that
he allegedly prayed that he might meet with favorable specters
of the gods; that he invoked his Sicilian 1\Iuse (poetic) to
speed his chariot from the Abode of Holiness; and that tradition has depicted him as a contemplative ascetic, subject to
fits of "madness.'' But "madness " is traditiondly the divine
470

STUDY OF HERACLITUS OF EPHESUS

471

inspiration of poets and, hence, links Democritus to the poet.
For does not Plato insist: " He who knocks at the gates of
poetry untouched by the madness of the Muses . . . will be
denied access to the mysteries, and his sober compositions win
be eclipsed by the creation of inspired madness." 1 And Democritus himself is said to have stated: "Truly noble poetry is
written with the breath of divine inspiration." 2 Unfortunately,
in keeping with the nineteenth (and twentieth) century obsession to pit science (philosophy) against religion, scholars have
only too wen succeeded in creating a complete though wholly
unwarranted cleavage in the originally homogeneous work of
Democritus. Hence the first prerequisite for 'a fuller understanding of Democritus is emphatically to deny that there is
or ever was a gulf between his religious beliefs, poetic inspirations, and scientific views. The work of Democritus, it must be
remembered, is, and always has been, a single uniform whole in
which religion, poetry and philosophy are indissolubly one.
Early Greek traditions make abundantly clear the essential
association, close affinity and ultimate identity of the visions
the prophet, the inspirations of the poet, and the intuitive msights of the original sage or "philosopher."
Prophetic " madness," we are told, reveals the means by
which men may be delivered from evil and be absolved from
their sins, a theme which is still reflected in the religious poem
of Empedocles, the Purification. Thus Epimenides, 3 the Cretan
'Plato, Phaedrus 245A. Cf. also Ion 534B and ibid. at 535C, where we are told
that poets work by divine possession: " The god deprives them of their sober senses
and uses them as instruments, like the singers of oracles :md inspired seers [here we
have the association of the poet and the seer or prophet, note by the author], in
order that we who hear them may know that it is not they who speak things of
such high worth, but the god himself who speaks to us through them."
2 Diels-Kranz,
Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (6th edit.) 2.146, frags. B 17;
B 18. Cicero also maintained that there cannot be a good poet without a fiery spirit
touched with madness. De divinatione 1.80. Cf. also De oratore 2.194. Similar ideas
can be found in Horace, Ars poetica 295.
3 According to ancient legend the Nymphs not only gave him magic food which
dispensed him from eating for the rest of his life, but they also revealed to him, liS
they had done to Melampus, the secret healing powers of certain plants. He is said
to have slept in a cave, an incident that calls to memory the conversations which
Rhadamanthys and Minos had with Zeus in the Idaean cave on Crete.

4 "''C)

ANTON- HERl\fAXN

CHROUST

prophet-seer and mystagogue, is above all a purifier and absolver who uses divination not so much in order to reveal the
future, but to unveil the forgotten sins of the past of which
the present evils are the consequences. The Athenians, in order
to expiate and be absolved of the murder of Cylon, on the
advice of the Delphic oracle called upon the Cretan purifier
\vho appeased the Erinyes and thereby delivered Athens from
the plague. And Orestes, driven mad by the " ancient wrath "
which has haunted his ancestors, is purified and absolved by
Loxias, the "physician-seer (larp6p.avnr;;)/ reader of portents,
and purifier of houses." 5 The Hyperborean Abaris prophesied
and delivered Sparta from the plague, while Bakis, inspired by
the Nymphs, purified and delivered the women of Sparta from
madness.
Poetry was the language of prophecy in the wider sense of
the term: early oracles, we know, were delivered in verse."' It
is not without significance that the Muses, who rouse the soul
to ecstacy in song and poetry, at Delphi had their shrine next
to the old oracular temple of the Earth; they were the " assistants of prophecy." This fact alone should attest the affinity
of prophecy and poetry. Prophecy, like inspired poetry, cannot
dispense with exalted language, simply because it expresses an
exalted subject in an exalted mood. And it is this exaltation
which is always identified with the inspiration of the Muses.
But while the poet of the logic and, incidentally, the postheroic age is primarily concerned with his imaginative and
inspired visions of the past, it is the prophet's business to pronounce the intentions of the gods and interpret them. Hence
his inspirations are concerned, or gradually become concerned,
with the future, although this was not always so. In this sense
he becomes the prophet-seer in the narrower sense of the term,
• Naturally, the physician-seer is here the "physician of the soul" or the healer
of the soui "ho by using his mantic art purifies and, hence, heals the soul. The
concept of the "physician of the soul" can also be found in later Greek philosophy.
Cf. this writer's "The Meaning of Philosophy in the Hellenistic-Ruman World,"
The Thomist, XVII (1954), pp. 197 ff.
5 Aeschylus, Eumenides 62.
6 Plutarch,
Defensio oraculorum XVII, 402C.

STUDY OF HERACLITUS

OF EPHESUS

473

that is, the foreteller of things to come. It might also be well
to remember that the prophet-seer could foresee the future
either intuitively, that is, by inspiration or direct communication with the gods, or by inferring the intentions of the gods
through the interpretation of their signs. 7
The original assumption, then, was that all knowledge which
lies beyond the reach of the senses or everyday experience is
knowledge especially revealed to certain chosen, that is, inspired
persons. These chosen people not only have access to the world
beyond, but they are in communion with spirits and gods. They
understand and interpret the divine intentions which have been
communicated to them by the gods either directly or indirectly.
They know the past, the present and the future; and they
understand what transpires beneath, above and upon the earth.
Hence they are not only prophets (and poets), but also savants
or sages. In short, they are "those who know." The theogonies and cosmogonies of the post-heroic age, which use the
solemn diction of poetry, for instance, are not based on, or
perhaps
result of, immediate observation. They retain, as
in the case of Hesiod, the sacred character of divine inspiration; they are primarily mythological revelations and didactic
in nature.
this they differ basically from the "literature of
entertainment."
According to tradition, the mystical figure of Orpheus, the
founder of mysteries, combined all the forms of " divine madness" or, perhaps better, personifies all the attributes of the
original prophet (seer) , poet and sage combination. Musaeus,
whose" ancestry" is said to have been Thracian, reputedly was
the author of a theogony and of oracles in verse. Probably even
more interesting is Salmoxis, the legendary figure in Thrace,
who like Rhadamanthys, Minos and Epi.menides, retired into a
subterranean cave to receive inspired wisdom from the gods.
The figures of Orpheus and Salmoxis are of great antiquity, and
they seem to have come from the far north. In the case of
7 This latter form of divination must clearly be distinguished from intuitive or
inspired divination.

474

ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

Salmoxis it is alleged that he taught the Celtic Druids and perhaps the " bards " of the Germanic tribes. In any event, the
origin of the Orpheus and Salmoxis legends points in the direction of Siberian Asia .. Also of great importance is the fact that
Salmoxis was a Thracian, and that the Thracians, who had
contacts with both the Celtic and Teutonic peoples, in earliest
times probably formed a connecting link between the religious
cult systems of the North-Aegean basin and those of NorthCentral Asia.
The prophet (seer), poet and sage combination, which we
encounter during the heroic and post-heroic age of Greek civilization, together with the belief that true wisdom is the sole
possession of the divinely inspired person, existed far beyond
the horizon of ancient Greece and certainly long before the
dawn of the heroic age. It was probably the Thracian peoples
who brought this tradition into the Greek orbit where it was
accepted, in some instances modified to suit particular instances, and carried into the " philosophical age." It was also
in Greece that this tradition came in contact with Near-Eastern
influences which also account for certain changes. But everywhere, it seems, the gift of divine inspiration is combined with
the gift of poetry and the gift of exceptional wisdom. This
exceptional wisdom, which is but inspiration uttered in poetic
and, usually obscure (hieratic) language, is "knowledge,"
whether of the future (as prophecy in the narrower sense of the
term), of the past (as "history" or genealogy), or of the
hidden present (as "science"). But more than that: the
lofty claims of the prophet-poet-sage-combination are accepted
without challenge, and he himself is held in high esteem by all
peoples, whether as the Celtic Druid, the Greek 1uivn<;, the
Roman
(later the less spectacular augur), the Old-Irish
fiJi, the Old-Welsh awenithion, the Norse thulr, the Siberian
shaman, or as one of the " Seven vVise l\1en." These prophetpoet-sages also seem to use a common solemn vocabulary of
" technical " terms quite distinct from the ordinary everyday
language, as well as a common store of ritualistic formulas.
Both this vocabulary and these formulas go back to very

STUDY OF HERACLITUS OF EPHESUS

475

ancient times. They are handed down from generation to generation among the initiated; and their secret and perhaps obscure
symbolism is certainly unknown to the uninitiated. And finally,
they are used in a ritualistic mold that is alien to the noninitiated and, certainly, wholly unknown to us.
Perhaps the common ancestor or the prototype of the
prophet-poet-sage-combination
is what has survived into our
own time as the shaman; and it is not impossible that the
inspired wonderworker, the prophetic seer or the didactic poet
of the earliest Greek period is nothing other than an offshoot of
the original shaman. It is, therefore, the shaman who claims
our special interest-who, if we are at all able to grasp his
particular function and role, might help us to understand some
aspects of early Greek philosophy and, incidentally, of early
Greek didactic poetry. 8
The shaman, who can still be found among the peoples of
N o:rthern Asia as well as among the Eskimos and certain NorthAmerican Indians, has aptly been described as a poet, diviner,
purifier, priest, doctor and savant-as the guardian of religion,
the preserver of social institutions and the teller of ancient
legends. The whole of the intellectual and much of the artistic
life of the community in which he operates is vested in him"
Within the community his prestige or status, which is accepted
without challenge, is based on the assumption that he is the
recipient of divine inspirations, and that he has the power of
communimting directly with the gods or spirits. This power
manifests itself in what is presumed to be unusual spiritual,
intellectual and artistic gifts, especially the gift of poetry" His
exceptional knowledge, which is knowledge beyond the senses
and everyday experience, includes not only " historical " information or" scientific" explanations, but also an understanding of the past, the hidden present, and the future. In other
words, this knowledge embraces not only the whole of human
8 Cf., in general, Hector Munro Chadwick
(and Nora Kershaw Chadwick), The
Growth of Literature, vols. 3 (Cambridge, 1932-40); Nora Kershaw Chadwick.
Poetry and Prophecy (Cambridge, 1942); F. :Mr. Cornford, Principium Sapientiae,
edit. W. K. C. Guthrie (Cambridge, 1952) pp. 88 ff.

476

ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

consciousness and experience, including knowledge of native
natural science and a skilled use of poetic diction, but also the
mysteries beneath and above the earth. In this the shaman is
definitely the prototype of the prophet-poet-sage-combination.
The Siberian shaman of modern times proclaims: " God has
appointed me that I must wander beneath and upon the earth,
and has '9estowed upon me such power that I can comfort and
cheer the affiicted, and on the other hand I can cast down
those who are too happy .... I am a shaman who knows the
future, the past and everything which is taking place in the
present, both above and beneath the earth." 9 But is this not
exactly what such figures of the Greek heroic or pre-historic
age as Salmoxis, Orphaeus, Musaeus, Melampus, Epimenides,
Aristeas or Abaris claimed for themselves? And are not the
past, present and future also revealed to the seer Calchas 10
and to the didactic poet Hesiod? 11 The formula " above and
beneath the earth " to some extent is still preserved, for instance, in the Clouds of Aristophanes or the decree of Diopeithes (c. 429 B. C.).
The Siberian shaman also undertakes frequent spiritual journeys to the gods or spirits. He rides on a black bird, a goose,
or a horse, with one or several companions who assist him in
his long and difficult travel. When he reaches his goal, namely,
the seat of the god or spirit, he addresses the god or is addressed by the god who reveals to him mysteries, prophecies,
some particular instruction, or some bit of wisdom or truth.
But is this not reminiscent of the " introduction " to Parmenides' Way of Truth which contains a profession that the whole
of his didactic (or " philosophical ") poem is really a revelation
accorded to him by the goddess? As in the heavenly journey of
the shaman Parmenides travels on a chariot, attended by companions, the "daughters of the Sun." He .is on the "way of
the deity " which guides the man who knows and leads him far
• M. A. Castren, Nordiscke Reisen und Forsckunge:n vol. IV (St. Petersburg,
1856)' p.
10
11

Homer, Iliad 1.69.
Hesiod, Tkeogony 81 and ibid. at 88.

STUDY OF HERACLITUS OF EPHESUS

477

away from the beaten track of men. Beyond the gates of
Night and Day Parmenides meets the goddess who is willing
to instruct him. The remainder of the poem reports what the
goddess revealed to Parmenides. Also, it is no accident that
Parmenides wrote in verse. In so doing he merely followed a
tradition which saw in poetry the language of revelation. The
shaman, too, speaks in the solemn form of rhymed diction when
he recites the divine message he has received.
According to tradition Abaris, Musaeus, Aristeas, Orphaeus,
Epimenides, Salmoxis, Parmenides, Democritus and others were
miraculously transported from one place to another: Abaris
flew around the world on his magic arrow; Musaeus flew through
the air by the favor of Boreas; and Aristeas traveled in spirit
far from his body, a feat which is still claimed by the modern
shaman when he sinks in a trance-like sleep. The great Mongol
shaman of the time of Jenghiz Khan is said to have ascended
to heaven on his horse. The legends of Asia abound with tales
of "flying steeds " which took their riders everywhere, include
ing to the " world beyond."
When Empedocles, for instance, claims that at one time or
another he had been " a boy and a girl, a bush and a bird, and
a dumb fish in the sea," he speaks like the Old-Irish Mongan
whose father had foretold him that he, Mongan, would be a
wolf, a stag, a salmon in a full pool, a seal and a swan-or like
the Welsh bard who, according to his own testimony, was an
eagle, a sword, a shield and a string in a harp. The shaman has
always claimed, and still claims, the power of transforming
himself into any form he desires-a power, incidentally, which
is part of his supernatural knowledge. Metempsychosis (the
faculty of the soul to detach itself from its own body and enter
the body of another creature) or metamorphosis is part of both
shamanic lore and of the tradition of the Greek heroic age, as
may be gathered from the legends of Proteus or Thetis.

478

ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

II
In his own way Heraclitus of Ephesus, who like the Sibyl
"with raving mouth utters things mirthless," 12 also claims to
be a prophet-poet-sage. Diogenes Laertius reports that "he
was of a proud and high spirit beyond all other men"; ]3
that " in his youth he knew nothing, but when fullgrown he
came to know everything. 14 He was no man's pupil, but asserted that he had searched himself and learned everything
from himself." 15 The Siberian shaman, too, or for that matter,
any early representative of the prophet-poet-sage-combination,
claims that his knowledge and power come from within himself
and not by his own deliberate efforts, but rather from inspiration. The Kirghiz minstrel or shaman of modern times still
maintains: "I can sing any song whatever; for God has implanted this gift of song in my heart. He gives me the word
on my tongue without my having to seek it. I have learned
none of my songs. All springs from my inner self." 16 But this
the inspired Homeric minstrel Phemius meant
is
when he said: "I am self-taught, for a god himself infused into
my heart all the modes of song"
when Demodocus was
"impelled by the god" to tell the story of the Trojan horse
without ever having heard about the incident. 18
Diogenes Laertius goes on: "Finally he [scil., Heraclitus,
note by the author] became a misanthrope, withdrew from the
world, and lived in the mountains to feed on grass and plants."
Such traits and actions are often found among " holy men,"
that is, among men who like the prophet-poet-sage of old or
the Siberian shaman claim to be favored by the gods with
Heraclitus, frag.
(Diels) .
Diogenes Laertius 9.1.-It is presumed that the report of Diogenes Laertius on
Heraclitus goes back to Theophrastus by way of a lost doxographical collection of
the first century B. C. which H. Diels has called the Vetusta Placita.
14 The " call " of the shaman, we are told, often comes in adolescence.
15 Diogenes Laertius 9.5.
16 V. V. Radlov,
Proben der Vollcslitteratur der tiirkischen Stiimme (St. Petersburg, 1866-1907), vol. 5, pp. 16 fl.
17 Homer, Odyssey 22.347.
16 Homer, Odyssey 8.492 fl. Cf. also note 1, supra.
12

13

STUDY OF HERACLITUS OF EPHESUS

479

special gifts which they frequently receive while in solitude
and through asceticism. Heraclitus is also said to have been a
"melancholic." But according to Aristotle, melancholies are
" quick and excitable people . . . who . . . are apt to follow
their imagination." 19 This, again, fits the general " mood " of
the prophet-poet-sage. The Siberian shaman also is described
as being given to solitude and as having a strange look in his
eyes which betrays excitement and imagination.
Tradition has it that Heraclitus belonged to the Androclid
family. 20 The descendants of Androclus, the son of Codms and
legendary founder of Ephesus, were " kings " or hereditary high
priests who, among other ceremonial privileges, were also in
charge of the secret rites connected with the Eleusian Demeter.
These mysteries were of great antiquity, antedating the heroic
age of Greece; they point beyond the Aegean horizon. Hence
it appears that a certain prophet-poet-sage tradition, which in
this case centered around the mysterious Demeter cult, was
" hereditary " with Heraclitus.
utte:rances are said to
been "obscure,"
among later generations he acquired the surname of oU'KOTEwo<;,
" the obscure one." 21 The fact that he considered himself a
prophet-poet-sage may also be gathered not only from the
" obscurity " of his sayings, but also from the oracular style in
which they were pronounced. It was said that he did not wish
to be understood by the many, but only by the initiated: "He
dedicated his book 22 in the temple of Artemis, 23 and according
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics U50 b
Strabo
21 Aristotle,
De mundo 396 b
Cicero, De finibus 9!.5.15-The sillogranher
Timon of Phlius (c.
B. C.) first summarized the "obscurity " of
which was later repeated invariably by others.
22 It is extremely
doubtful whether Heraclitus ever wrote a book in our sense of
the term. His original utterances were oral, and the " fragments " have the
appearance of being isolated statements. At a later time they might have been
compiled into a " collection." In any event, many of the connecting particles which
these fragments contain belong to a later period. The generally attributed title
"On Nature" is a standard title applied to all writings by or attributed to those
" philosophers " to whom the Peripatetics subsequently referred to as <f>vtnKoi.
•• The Ephesian Artemis may be a modified version of the gre!ilt Mother-Goddess
19

20

480

ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

to some he deliberately made it more obscure in order that
only those who were capable [the initiated?, query by the
author] could have access to it. ... " 24 Also of interest are two
epigrams on Heraclitus, the authenticity of which is extremely
doubtful, however: " I am Heraclitus; why do you uncultured
people drag me to and fro (avfu Kchru-bother me) ? Not for
you did I toil, 25 but for those who know me .... " 26 The other
epigram, which definitely reflects the imagery of certain mysteries in which the novice was led from darkness into the brilliantly lit scene of revelation, reads as follows: " Do not be in
a hurry to unwind to the center-stick the roll of Heraclitus, the
Ephesian; the path is hard indeed to traverse. 27 There is gloom
and unrelieved darkness. But if an initiate lead you, it shines
more brightly than the shining sun." 28 Not unimportant is also
the remark recorded by Diogenes Laertius, that the title of his
book was " Muses." 29 For the prophet-poet-sage of Greek antiquity is traditionally associated with the Muses. Hence Heraclitus might have dedicated his work to these powers which inspired him and to which he owed all of his knowledge. But the
same could be said about the story that he dedicated his book
to Artemis.
Although Heraclitus, by dedicating his work to the Muses or
to Artemis apparently credits the Muses (or Artemis) with
having inspired him or with having given him certain revelations-in this he seems to follow the old tradition which insists
that the Muses or some god communicate real truth-he could
nevertheless maintain that his knowledge and wisdom came
from within himself. For his is inspired rather than acquired
of Asia and, hence, is a deity of very great antiquity. She is the huntress (this
would point to a pre-agricultural culture) and the goddess of wild nature. Originally
she was associated with the tree-worship before the introduction of agriculture, and
with the fertility of men and animals, but not of crops.
•• Diogenes Laertius 9.6.
25 This " toil " may be akin to the toil of Parmenides who undertook a perilous
journey beyond the gates of Night and Day in order to visit the goddess who
revealed to him the truth.
•• Diogenes Laertius 9.7.
•• Diogenes Laertius 9.7.
27 Cf. note
supra.
•• Cf. also Plato, Sophist

STUDY

OF HERACLI'I'US

OF EPHESUS

4.81

knowledge or wisdom. This would also explain the pronouneed
"dogmatism" which he manifests to a very large degree: only
inspired persons,
is, people who speak with the
of direct divine inspiration or revelation, and who believe that
the deity speaks through them can be convincingly dogmatic.
Judging from the content of the preserved fragments ascribed
to Heraclitus it also becomes apparent
he considered himself to be primarily an inspired hierophant: " Of the Logos,
which is as I describe it [or, which stands forever], [ordinary J
men always prove to be uncomprehending, both before
have heard it and when they have heard it. For although all
things happen according to this Logos, men are like people
no experience, even when they experience such words
deeds
audience:
as I explain .... " so In another place he extolls
" Listen not to me but to the Logos ... ," 31 implying thereby
that it is the Logos which speaks through him, in other words,
that he is prophetically inspired by the Logos.
Logos certainly means here something more than "
or "
course": it signifies something like "eternal truth" or, to
more exact,
which does not come from
man but
interesting to note here that
the Eleusian hierophant-and, as we have seen, Heraclitus,
belonged to a family which were hereditary hierophants or
high priests of the Eleusian mysteries-also admonished his
audience that they must understand the language and not
merely hear it; they must be initiated into
mysteries, for
otherwise they remain uncomprehending even after they have
heard the words. Like the Eleusian hierophant, the Ephesian
hierophant insists that ordinary men cannot understand. the
real although hidden meaning of his revelation, for they cannot
possibly grasp the message veiled in ritualistic language
mystic symbols. But according to Heraclitus, the Logos, which
is often identified with nature or God, speaks in a clear and
unmistakable language: only the non-initiated, although they
have eyes to see
ears to hear, fail to understand the lan3

° Frag. 1 (Diels).

01

Frag. 50 (Diels).

ANTON-HER.:VIANN

CI-IROl7ST

guageo This recalls Pindar's statement: "I have many arrows
in my quiver; they have a voice that speaks to men who can
understand, but for the many they need interpreters. ·wise is
he who knows much by his own genius .... " 32
Heraclitus, then, claims for himself a prophetic knowledge; he
claims to be a prophet endowed with unique insights-unique,
because these insights have been revealed to him and to him
alone. The revealed Logos is to be discovered within as well
as without man, although this discovery goes far beyond the
ordinary senses or perhaps everyday experience. The Logos is
common to all men, if men only had the gift to understand and
apprehend it. Perhaps Heraclitus' notion of the Logos contains
the idea that the human intellect, properly employed and sufficiently instructed, partakes in the divine intellect or Logos and,
hence, is capable of understanding not only nature as it is
governed by the Logos, but also the Logos and, through the
Logos, itself. Thus Heraclitus seems to establish the affinity of
the human mind to the divine mind, and it is perhaps this
affinity, this " revelation," which justifies his claim to prophetic
wisdom and inspired knowledge-to the fact that he is above
an an inspired visionary prophet-poet-sage rather than a prosaic " philosopher " or
But unlike the older poets
whom he deprecates, he is not merely inspired by the Muses or
perhaps by Apollo, but by the Logos itself.
The prophet-poet-sage Heraclitus, too, understands the unity
of all existence as well as the unity of all lifeo Prophetic-poetic
vision enables him to see the ultimate kinship of all existence
and all life; and by losing the sense of separate existence in the
Logos as well as in a common experience of the whole of nature,
he knows how to free himself from the limitations of time and
spaceo33 This is exactly yvhat the 'Velsh bard experiences when
""Pindar, Ol. 2.83.
301
Cf. frag. 51 (Diels): '' ... they [the uninitiated, note by the author] do not
comprehend how being at variance it [the Logos, note by the author] agrees with
itself."-The connection between the many and the single underlying unity, which
is elsewhere described as Logos, is maintained by the maintenance of a tension
between opposites which exists as a result of their inevitablt; .;;h;mge,
or later,
from one extreme to another.
··

STUDY OF HERACLITUS

OF EPHESUS

48S

he claims that at one time or another he was an eagle, a sword,
a shield, and a string in a harp-when Mongan is foretold that
he will be a wolf, a stag, a salmon, a seal, and a swan; or when
Empedocles maintains that he was " a boy and a girl, a bush
and a bird, and a dumb fish in the sea." And this is what
Heraclitus wishes to convey when he announces that " the sea
is the most pure and the most polluted water"; 34 "that neither
darkness nor light, neither good nor bad, are different, but are
one and the same thing"; 35 that "good and evil are one"; 36
that" the way up and down is one and the same"; 39 that" for
the bow the name is life, but the work is death"; 40 that "as
the same thing there exists in us living and dead and the waking
and the sleeping and young and old; for those things having
changed round are those, and those things having changed
round [again] are these ones"; 41 that" cold things warm themselves, warm cools, moist dries, parched is made wet"; 42 that
"night and day ... are one"; 43 that "things taken together
are whole and not whole, something which is brought together
and brought apart, which is in tune and not in tune ... "; H that
"to God all things are beautiful and good and just ... "; 45 that
".God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace,
satiety and hunger . . ."; 46 and that " [the mortal nature]
scatters and ... gathers . . . comes together and flows away
... approaches and departs .... " 47
The Siberian shaman, as we have seen, proclaims: "God has
appointed me ... and has bestowed upon me ... power ....
I am the shaman who knows .... " But this statement does not
substantially differ from what Heraclitus proclaims about him•• Frag. 48 (Diels).
•• Frag. 61 (Diels).
41 Frag. 88 (Diels).
•• Frag. 57 (Diels).
•• Frog. 58 (Diels).
•• Frag.
(Diels).
37 Frag. 59 (Diels).
•• Frag. 57 (Diels).
38 Frag. 108 (Diels).
.. Frag. 10 (Diels).
•• Frag.
(Diels).
•• Frag. 60 (Diels).
•• Frag. 67 (Diels) .-Judging from this fragment, God is inherent in the world.
He underlies all things including all changes, and He provides the essential unity of
all things, a unity which elsewhere is called Logos. Cf. also note 88, supra.
•• Frag. 91 (Diels).

484

ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

self: "
the Logos which is as I describe it
and declare
48 [but J listen not to me but to the Logos 4 u • o o
how it is
[whichl is the wise thing [to do ]o ... " 50 Both Heraclitus and the
shaman speak in the first person; they speak with that inspired
authority which only the first person can adequately express.
Heraclitus insinuates here that the Logos has especially " appointed " him by revealing itself to him, and has empowered
him to announce the Logoso But actually, it is not he who
speaks here, but the Logos which speaks through him. Hence
51 And as
he insists: "Listen not to me but to the Logoso
the appointed prophet of the Logos he is also one who knmNs
without fail. Now we can also understand why, like a prophet,
he speaks disdainfully of the " uncomprehending," of those who
refuse to believe or understand " even when they experience
such words and deeds as I explain." 52 And " although the
Logos," of which he is the inspired prophet, " is common to aU
men [as it is common to all things, note by the author], the
many live as if they had a private understanding" 53-as if they
had some private revelation of their owno
Obviously, such "proud" words can be uttered only by a
man
is convinced that he is inspired and, hence, has a
divine mission; that he does not actually speak for himself but
for the deity which speaks through him. In short, these are
" revelations " of a hierophant, of an inspired prophet-poet-sage
rather than the sober statements of a philosopher in the traditional sense of the term. 54 Hence the first prerequisite for a
better
more accurate understanding of the "obscure" Herao

0

0

0

•

0

•• "

° Frag. 50 (Diels) .

Frag. l (Diels) .

5

° Frag. 114 (Diels).

51

48

o

•

Frag. 50 (Diels).
(Diels) .-Cf. also frag. 34 (Diels) where Heraclitus says about the
many that they are deaf to the message of the Logos; they are like people " who
although they are present are
See also Psalm 115: 6: "They have ears, but
they hear not ..
Mark 8:18 " ... having ears, hear you not?"
53 Frag. Sl (Diels) .-What
Heraclitus wishes
convey here seems to be this:
The Logos is what it is, even if men refuse to recognize it as such; it is the
constituting principles of all, even though all reject it.
•• It is interesting to note here that Parmenides, to mention just another instance,
in his Way of Truth also speaks with the same " haughtiness." For he, too, is the
messenger of the deity which proclaims its truth through him.
4

52

Frag. l

o

."

to

STUDY OF HERACLITUS

OF EPHESVS

485

clitus is the realization that he speaks as a prophet-poet-sage
who does not, and cannot, accept the modern gulf between
religion, poetry and philosophy. Heraclitus' true spiritual ancestors are not perchance the " Milesian physicists " or perhaps
the relatively late Homer, Hesiod or Pindar-the "poets of
entertainment" or the "philosophers of nature" elicit from
him only words of contempt-but are Orphaeus, Musaeus,
Melampus, Abaris and Salmoxis, the pre-heroic representatives
of the original (or shamanic) prophet- (seer) -poet-sage combination.

III
With the possible exception of some very doubtful references

in Parmenides and Epicharmus, Heraclitus, to be sure, was not
understood by his ancient critics or reporters. Plato probably
contains the earliest doxographical evidence about Heraclitus. 5 "
But Plato's knowledge of Heraclitus, which he might have
derived from Cratylus, was at best extremely scanty. As st
matter of method, Plato recites earlier views and opinions, including those of Heraclitus, only whenever he believes that they
may be relevant to his own position. In addition, his references
are often, and perhaps too often, plainly distorted for humorous
purposes.
Aristotle, on the other hand, manifests what seems to be a
more detailed knowledge of Heraclitus than Plato. His references to the Ephesian, on the whole, are, however, incidental
and meant primarily to illustrate or set off some view of his
own. As a necessary result, these references are frequently distorted into outright errors. 56 It may be contended, however,
that Aristotle probably originated fewer misconceptions about
Heraclitus' teachings than Plato did, although he too, in order
to reconcile Heraclitus' views to his own theories, seriously
falsified some of Heraclitus' views. Also, Aristotle's general
•• The Hippocratic De victu, which in the first chapter possibly contains some
references to Heraclitus, is probably post-Platonic.
aa For instance, Aristotle accepts without reservation the ridiculous Platonic interpretation of Heraclitus 71'a11Te pe'i doctrine.

486

ANTON-HERMANN

CH.ROUST

deficiencies as well as his unreliability as a historian of philosophy should be taken into account here. Hence his references
and reports, in the main, are of very little value: they are often
misleading rather than illuminating. These deficiencies to a
very large extent were responsible for the unreliability of the
subsequent doxographical tradition concerning the teachings of
Heraclitus.
The primary source for the whole doxographical tradition,
including that of Heraclitus, in all likelihood is the «Pva-ucwv
S6tat of Theophrastus. 57 Theophrastus, in turn, was strongly
under the influence of Aristotle and many of Aristotle's misapprehensions. This influence is illustrated by Theophrastus'
views on Heraclitus. Aside from the Aristotelian influence,
many of Theophrastus' views and judgments about the Ephesian in the main are plain conjectures rather than objective
reports-conjectures, it seems, which were made primarily in
default of reliable evidence. In any event, Theophrastus,
though he might have had access to more materials than Aristotle, to a large extent depended on Aristotle; and Theophrastus'
successors, 58 in turn, relied on Theophrastus, Thus the whole
doxographical tradition regarding Heraclitus is not necessarily
concerned with Heraclitus himself, but rather with what Theophrastus (and Aristotle) thought about Heraclitus. In short,
like so many doxographical works, this particular tradition
deals with what may be called the typical doxographical attior otherwise-towards Heraclitus rather than
with Heraclitus himself.
In conclusion it may be stated that both Plato and Aristotle
refer to Heraclitus primarily in the light of their own philosophical re:fl.ections. The majority of these references are of a
general or generalized nature which as often as not are sheer
Cf. H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci (Berlin, 1879);
H. Diels, op. cit., supra at 57, has shown that the original .Pva-tKwP
of
Theophrastus was transmitted, in a greatly condensed form and w1th some Stoic
additions, through a lost compilation of about the first century B. C. (the Vetusta
Placita of Diels) , to the surviving doxographical works, such as the Placita of Aetius
the "Doxography" of Diogenes Laertius.
57

58

OF HERACLITUS OF EPHESUS

487

Platonism 59 or plain Aristotelianism. 60 They are introduced by
both Plato and Aristotle more or less incidentally, presumably
to illustrate by contrast some points of their own. The result
of this " method " is that Heraclitus' views are often grossly
distorted in order to serve a" didactic" or illustrative purpose.
In the course of this process the hierophant Heraclitus was
gradually turned into a "philosopher" in the Platonic-Aristotelian sense of the term-something he most decidedly was not
and never intended to be. It might even be permissible to
point out that Plato and Aristotle, through their distortions
and misconceptions of the true nature of the Ephesian-distortions which are primarily self-revelatory statements about
themselves rather than objective historical reports-in a way
created and perpetuated the " philosophy " of Heraclitus according to their own standards and "in their own image."
The doxigraphical tradition, which subsequently was permeated
by Stoic ideas, especially by the Stoic subdivisions of philosophy, continued this process with the result that Heraclitus, the
prophet-poet-sage who still spoke with the voice of the old
hierophant, ultimately found his permanent though undeserved
resting place among the early Greek "philosophers" or, to
be more exact, among the early" physicists."
ANTON-liERMANN

CHROUST

University of Notre Dame.
Notre Dame. Indiana

•• Cf., for instance, Plato. Symposium 187A.
•• Cf., for instance, De coelo 298 b 25; ibid. at 279 b 12; Eudemian Ethics I'i!S5 a
25; Topics 159 b SO; Metaphysics 1005 b 28; ibid. at 1062 a 81; ibid. at 1012 a 88;
ibid. at 1005 b 85: ib-id. at 1068 b 24: ibid. at 1012 a 24: ibid. at IOI'i! b 26.

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS
DoM DuNSTAN HAYDEN, 0. S. B., is an instructor in the Priory School at
St. Anselm's Priory, Washington, D. C. and is engaged in postgraduate work in logic and mathematics.
JAMES V. McGLYNN, S. J., PH.
an instructor in philosophy at the University of Detroit, is a graduate of the University of Louvain and
the translator of the English text of the second volume of the De

Veritate.
MICHAEL P. SLATTERY, PH. D., a graduate of the London University, is
a professor of philosophy at St. Thomas' College, St. Paul, Minn.
and a frequent contributor to scholarly journals both here and
abroad.
ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, J. U. D., PH. D., S. J.D., a faculty member
of both the Law School and the Medieval Institute at the University of Notre Dame, is a frequent contributor to The Thomist.
WILLIAM A. HINNEBUSCH, 0. P., S. T. LR., PH. D. {Oxon.) is the professor
of Church History of the Pontifical Faculty of Theology at the
Dominican House of Studies, Washington, D. C.
DoM GREGORY STEVENS, 0. S. B., S. T. D., a graduate of the Angelicum
in Rome, is a member of the faculty of The Catholic University
of America, Washington, D. C. and a frequent contributor to The

Thomist.

488

BOOK REVIEWS
The Spirit and Forrns of Protestantism. By Loms BouYER. Trans.
A. V.
LITTLEDALE. Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1956. Pp. 234. $3.75.
This is an original and valuable book. We can commend its purpose
and its broad outlines. Unfortunately, we cannot subscribe to some of its
detailed statements and propositions. The book is original because the
author directs attention to a basic conflict within Protestantism that does
much to elucidate the trends and developments of Protestant history.
Events and movements that puzzle the outside observer, that appear to
him to be disparate and unrelated, take on meaning and fall into place
in a broad picture when interpreted by Fr. Bouyer's formula. In spite
of the defects that we shall have to point out (and there may be others
we have overlooked) , Fr. Bouyer's study is provocative and stimulating
and should be a starting point for further original research into the Protestant problem.
Like all human things the book labors under the limitations that plague
the human mind. Its problem is complex and must be treated step by step.
The two segments of the Protestant problem must be discussed successively
in the two parts of the volume. For this reason the Catholic reader, before
he reaches the second part, might begin to tell himself that the author has
been too benign in his interpretation of the religious feeling of Luther,
Calvin, Barth, and other Protestant leaders. In the second half the Protestant reader, who will probably be delighted with the first half of the
book, will begin to experience a mounting disappointment as the author
uncovers one after the other the inherent and mortal weaknesses of Protestantism. But the book must be read in its entirety and it must be read
slowly and attentively. Justice to the author demands that his thesis
be judged only after a complete study of what he holds. This is a book
that cannot be sampled by browsing without risk of misunderstanding what
the author is trying to do. But no serious reader, as Fr. G. de Broglie, S. J.,
writes in an introductory letter to the author, "provided he takes the
trouble to read the entire work with attention, could entertain any doubt
that it has been inspired throughout by a constant care for sympathetic
understanding and frank objectivity. Nearly all will ultimately be grateful
to you for having obliged them to reflect on a problem one or more of
whose aspects had doubtless escaped their attention, and so for bringing
a better understanding between Catholics and Protestants."
Father Bouyer's book is an example of the best type of Catholic-Pro-

489

490

BOOK REVIEWS

testant discussion. It analyzes the depths of both Catholicism and Protestantism. It shows where they are in agreement, where they diverge, why
they disagree, why in the final analysis they should be one. No heat is
engendered. There are no polemics. Rather tl)ere is understanding, sympathy and love. Step by step the volume illuminates Protestantism for
Catholics, Catholicism for Protestants, enables Catholics to understand
what is good and positive in Protestantism, shows Protestants that their
own positive and negative principles are in perpetual conflict that can never
be resolved, that the negative principles are a denial rather than an authentic
expression of the true aspirations of Protestantism, that Catholicism i.n no
way involves a denial of anything that is genuine and positive in Protestantism.
Fr. Bouyer has a background that explains his ability to make his
analysis. He was raised a Protestant, became a Lutheran clergyman, spent
a number of years in the ministry. A desire to explore Protestantism to
its depths led him inexorably to discover the incompatibility that exists
as a genuine spiritual
between the two types of Protestantism-Protestantism
movement deriving from the Gospel and Protestantism in the formulas
and systems that make it an institution hostile to Catholicism. This study
did not lead him to reject the profound religious values in which he had
been nurtured but only what is negative in Protestantism. He ended by
giving adhesion to the Catholic Church as the only Church in which the
full flowering of the positive elements found in Protestantism could be
possible. He is now a priest of the French Oratory and professor of spiritual
theology at the Institut Catholique in Paris.
Fr. Bouyer maintains that there is a fundamental agreement between
Catholicism and the authentic Christian aspirations of the Protestant movement, that in Protestantism as an institution there is a deep conflict between
positive Christian values retained by Protestantism and negative elements
originating in sixteenth-century polemics and opposition to the Catholic
Church. He finds that the negative elements constantly corrode and corrupt
the positive values and prevent them from reaching mature development.
Always the negative elements win the victory and stifle the positive values.
This conflict is inherent and will not be resolved until Protestantism surrenders its negative elements, which disfigure it, and returns to Catholicism.
Only in the Catholic Church can the positive values of Protestantism find
their full flowering and development.
The author builds up this thesis by exploring Protestantism i.n its depths
and in its full scope. The book falls into two parts. In the first part,
almost half the book, the author examines and discusses what he calls the
positive principles of Protestantism-helie£
in the absolutely gratuitous
nature of grace, the absolute supremacy of God and the Divine Majesty,
the sovereign authority of Scripture, the necessity of an individual response

BOOK REVIEWS

491

to God, to Christ, to grace, in which the human being enters into a living,
sublime relationship with God, His Creator, and with Christ, His Redeemer.
The author holds that these positive affirmations, rightly understood, are
the genuine core of the Protestant movement. These chapters portray what
is positive in Protestantism. The reader realizes the values of these sublime
concepts and grasps that they are the hidden springs that have kept
Protestantism alive. In concluding each section of the discussion, the
author takes up the Catholic position on each point and maintains that
Catholics have no quarrel with these positive principles, rightly understood;
that they share them, that they derive them from the same pure source of
the GospeL
In the second part of the volume, the author deals with the negative
elements of Protestantism, chiefly: l) Luther's doctrine of extrinsic justification; 2) as a consequence of extrinsic justification, the denial of any
objective, intrinsic value to good works, to the sacraments, to the liturgy;
3) equation of the supremacy of the Scriptures--God speaking by his
Word-with denial of Tradition, the Teaching Church, pope, councils and
hierarchy; 4) the crushing and annihilation of man as a necessary consequence to the positive assertion of God's absolute sovereignty and majesty;
5) personalized religion and response to God is equated to worship without
intermediary except Christ and the Sacred Scriptures.
The underlying source of these negations was the Nominalism of Occamthe philosophy of decadent Scholasticism which corrupted Christian thought.
The Reformers used uncritically material drawn from that decaying brand
of Scholasticism, becoming its prisoners to a degree they never suspected.
Luther was nourished on this system and, despite all his contempt for
Scholasticism, was never able to think outside the framework it imposed.
These negations in Protestantism, the author maintains, are by no means
bound up essentially with the positive values the Reformation derived from
the Scriptures. They do not flow from them, are not implied in them,
are not useful nor expedient for them, in fact they are in basic opposition
to and corrupt them. They rose by no intrinsic necessity but from the
polemical use of the positive elements.
This is the tragedy and dilemma of Protestantism. Its genuine values
are caught in a web that continuously involves them and brings on inner
conflicts that remain inherent to and will ultimately destroy Protestantism.
These conflicts have plagued Protestantism throughout its history. There
is a constantly recurring cycle that passes through two main phases. In
the first, the negative elements suffocate the positive values. This process
began during the very earliest days of Luther's estrangement from the
Church. Ultimately the Christian conscience rebels against the corrosive
action of the negative elements and the second phase begins. This is the
Revival. Individuals endeavor to throw off the implications of the negative

492

BOOK REVIEWS

elements and to return to the positive value but do not go far enough;
they stop short of rejecting the negative elements. In fact, they ding to
them with all the ardor of the original Reformers. Thus the fatal cycle
starts once more, since the conflict between positive and negative elements
is inherent. Unfortunately, each time that the cycle runs its course the
end-product is more harmful, more distant from the true message of the
GospeL
Protestantism ends by embracing the very things it sought to reject.
When it emphasized grace and the Divine Majesty to the annihilation of
man and his works, the human spirit soon rebelled and began to glorify
human efforts. Today, in many respects Protestantism glorifies good works,
brotherhood, humanitarianism. When it rejected the divine authority of the
Catholic Church, the authority of popes and councils, it left a vacuum that
Luther filled by substituting civil authority for the authority of the
taking to the bosom of Protestantism the great enemy that medieval
Catholicism had resisted unto blood. Calvinism filled the vacuum with
rampant individualism, that multiplied churches according to the systems
of human contriving, or with subjective authoritarianism that resulted
when minister or particular congregation imposed their selected doctrines
on their following. Human liberty was more surely stifled than it ever
was or can be under Catholic authority. Extreme Biblicism, setting the
Bible on a high pillar unhedged
the protecting authority of the Teaching
Church and the balance of Sacred Tradition, ran a course that led to
complete rejection of the Bible as the inspired Word of God. These and
many other examples are treated by the author. Protestantism will continue to pass through these phases. Ultimately it will die from the inner
conflict that it has set up and nourishes within its own bosom.
After detailing the mournful history of the Protestant dilemma, the author
shows in another chapter that the Catholic Church is necessary to the full
flowering of anything positive in Protestantism. To do this he is obliged
to discuss many Protestant misconceptions concerning Catholic teaching.
He concludes that when Catholic doctrine is rightly understood there is
no conflict, rather complete agreement, between it and the positive values
of Protestantism. He brings out how these values are better safeguarded
and better realized in the Catholic Church, the goal to which modern,
scientific, Biblical exegesis points, the only institution in which all that is
positive in Christianity is given full play and scope. He calls on Catholics
to make a genuine effort to understand the legitimate strivings and aspirations of Protestants, to grasp anew the full nature and deeper significance
of their own Church, to realize that they themselves are not absolved
from the duty of seeking to apprehend the fulness of Christian faith. In
a concluding chapter the author devotes much space to an examination of
Barthianism and brings out very well that it, too, (for aU that is positive

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in it) is nothing other than "a striking accentuation of the fundamental
defect of Protestantism." In Barthianism the inner conflict of Protestantism
rages in full vigor. Barth's system runs the risk of becoming "the poison,
rather than the remedy, of the faith of Protestantism."
Painful necessity now compels us to criticize certain points and statements in this excellent book. We shall first take up those that are less
important and terminate with others more serious.
Occasionally the author appears to exaggerate the abuses which existed
in the medieval Church. This is done in passing and perhaps it is a quibble
to refer to it. For example, he says in one passage that the Reformers
" used uncritically material drawn from that decaying Catholicism they
desired to elude .... " (p. 153) Obviously he is referring to Nominalism
and would have done better to say " decaying Scholasticism." Elsewhere
he speaks of "an exhausted Christianity."
(p. 223) H this refers to
Nominalism, which truly was "a decadent medieval system" (p. 228),
it is unobjectionable. But we should always be careful in our phraseology
to avoid giving the impression that the essential work of Christ could
ever fail.
In discussing the ravages of Nominalism Fr. Bouyer seems oblivious of
the fact that not aU the late medieval theologians were Nominalists. In
the Dominican Order there was a flourishing Thomistic school that had
recently rejuvenated itself under the guidance of Francisco de Vittoria at
Salamanca and was producing theologians of first rank such as Dominic
and Peter de Soto, Melchior Cano, and Dominic Banez. In Italy the
Order had produced such Thomistic giants as Thomas de Vio, the celebrated Cardinal Cajetan, and Francis Sylvester of Ferrara. At Cologne
during the latter half of the fifteenth century and well into the sixteenth,
there was an excellent Thomistic school that enrolled both Dominican and
secular masters. There was also a school of " Albertists " at the same
University.
While the meagre success of the Catholic defense during the early days
of Protestantism can be attributed in part to the fact that Nominalism
had caught many of the Catholic apologists (as the author emphasizes,
p. 155 seq.) in the same meshes in which it had ensnared Luther, it was
also owing to other factors, and to a great extent to the very negative
elements that Fr. Bouyer describes-the Protestant hatred and intolerance
for everything Catholic-that made calm theological sifting and discussion
impossible. Though the author is right when he outlines the ineptness of
Erasmus in defending the ·Catholic position and the harm done by his
bungling attempt, this Humanist is hardly an example of a theologian,
much less a competent theologian, of the Reformation period.
The basic vitality of Catholic theology during the lifetime of Luther,
in spite of the ravages of Nominalism and the decadence of Scholasticism,

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is illustrated no better than during the deliberations of the Council of
Trent in its three periods. Several hundred bishop and priest theologians
(the Dominican Order alone sent well over a hundred) met to reexamine
the whole body of Catholic truth. They had all been trained during the
years when decadent Scholasticism is said to have been rampart. They
were secular and regular theologians from the various universities, religious
from the different Orders. A large number were men of high caliber and
first rank. They manifested a profound theological knowledge and culture,
displayed a wide knowledge of the positive sources of theology and a sane
theological judgment capable of distinguishing the certain from the uncertain, what was to be held of obligation from what was open to difference
of .opinion. They were well-acquainted likewise with the opinions of the
Reformers. AU of this can be verified by consultation of the decrees, the
acts, the diaries, the letters, the tracts that emanated from the Council of
Trent.
This scholarly excellence and theological preparation are inexplicable if
we suppose that Catholic theology at the end of the fifteenth and during
the early-sixteenth century was in a state of complete decay and collapse.
In every country, immediately that Protestantism arose, there were outstanding theologians who wrote and spoke in defense of the Catholic cause.
The names of St. John Fisher in England, James Latomus of Louvain,
John Eck in Germany, Cardinal Cajetan in Italy (to mention only the
best known) come immediately to mind. The Dominican Order alone, in
Germany, in spite of the progressive ravages of the Reformation which
destroyed its houses and scattered its men, produced over thirty polemicists
against Lutheranism. In other words, if we except Nominalism, the decadence of Catholic theology at the opening of modern times is largely
a figment of the imagination; at least it has been grossly exaggerated.
On page 207 Fr. Bouyer makes a statement about Our Lady that is
either a faulty translation, a lapse of the pen, or erroneous. " To say that
Mary is holy, with a super-emient holiness, in virtue of a divine intervention previous to the first instant of her existence is to affirm in her case
as absolutely as possible that salvation is a grace, and purely a grace, of
God." The objectionable words are those we have italicized. The Church
teaches that Mary was preserved free from original sin and sanctified in
the first instant of her existence, at the moment of conception, not
" previous " to the first instant.
The most dangerous feature of Fr. Bouyer's book and most open to
misunderstanding are the pages he devotes to the position qf Sacred Scripture in the Catholic Church. The same can be said of the appendix contributeq by Fr. G. De Broglie: "On the Primacy of the Argument from
Scripture in Theology." In the book and in the appendix there is a straining
(perhaps unconscious) to give a primacy to Scripture at the expense of

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Divine Tradition and the Magisterium-the Teaching Authority of the
Church. This is unfortunate for such a " primacy " cannot be sustained
in view of the definite teaching of the Church.
However laudable may be the aim of the two authors, they run the
risk of error in the subtle distinctions they make, and the language they use,
in establishing the " primacy " of the Sacred Scriptures. In these passages
the book is a dangerous book, misleading, to say the least, to the unwary
reader-Catholic or Protestant-who fails to read these sections with clear
knowledge of what the Catholic Church holds regarding the Magisterium,
the Sacred-Scriptures, and Divine Tradition.
The statements of Fr. Bouyer concerning the attitude of St. Thomas
(and also of Duns Scotus) toward the Scriptures present an incomplete,
if not erroneous, idea of the Saint's position. The author is misled, I
think, in failing to take into account the medieval theologian's concept of
" auctoritas "-an authority in theological argumentation. He speaks as
follows of St. Thomas:
The scriptural books alone, in and by themselves, enjoy absolute authority, since
the Christian faith rests entirely on the revelation made by God to the apostles,
and before them to the prophets; it is handed down to us with the direct authority
of God only in the canonical books. All other writers, including the doctors of the
Church, can by themselves only be the basis of probable arguments. Arguments
drawn from Scripture are alone by themselves conclusive. Therefore, the Bible
alone provides the real foundations for sacred science. (p. 130)

He is summarizing the first question of the Summa Theologiae. In a
footnote he also refers the reader to the IV Contra Gentes, c. 1 and VII
Quodlibet, q. 6, aa. l, 2, 3.
The important point in the first question of the Summa is that St.
Thomas anchors theology in Revelation. Furthermore, in this question
he is discussing theology as a science and not the relative positions of
Scripture, Tradition, and the Magisterium. He does not explicitly mention
Tradition in this question because he is practicing the science of theology
according to the medieval technique that based itself on the "auctoritas."
(For a fuller discussion of these points, cf. G. Geenan, "The Place of
Tradition in the Theology of St. Thomas," The Thomist, XV [19M!;],
110-35). "Auctoritas" for the medieval theologian was a text, a word,
a formula, au adage of an author, but always a text. Tradition, therefore,
by the nature of the case could not be an " auctoritas " in the medieval
sense since Tradition is not a text. In medieval theological technique it
was question of a written text, of the value recognized in it and the weight
it carried due to the official recognition which the text possessed. Tradition
as such (as an unwritten source of revealed truth) could not enter into
a theological technique that was practiced with the written "anctoritas."

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But as a matter of fact, St. Thomas and other medieval theologians do
have recourse to Tradition as a source of theological argument, i.e., as an
" auctoritas " when it is enshrined in the form and the manner of a text.
They do this by appealing to the written documents of the Teaching
Authority of the Church, to the statements and teachings of popes and
councils, to the statements of the Fathers and Doctors who have repeated
and taught the doctrines of the Teaching Authority.
A competent examination of the writings of St. Thomas, the Summa
and his other works, shows conclusively that he places Tradition on an
equal plane with Scripture as a source of Revelation and of theology.
Revealed truth is found according to him in Scripture and in " the Tradition
of the Apostles," in the " Tradition of the Church," and is taught by the
Universal Church. In the final analysis it is to the pope as head of the
Church that we must have recourse in order to know what is revealed
doctrine, for it is his teaching authority which is the authentic and definitive
norm.
St, Thomas bases his sacramentary theology, his doctrine on original sin,
his teaching on the Assumption of Mary, almost exclusively on the teachings
of Tradition, since, as he notes, certain truths are taught us by the " hidden
veils of words, that is, of the Holy Scripture and the ' Tradition of the
hierarchies,' that is, of the other dogmas which the apostles and their
disciples handed down, which are not contained in Holy Scriptures, as
for instance those things which pertain to the rites of the sacred mysteries."
Briefly, the attitude of St. Thomas to Scripture and Tradition as found
in his statements and procedures is as follows: Tradition has a real and
indispensable place in theology as containing Revelation. It is on the
same level and enjoys the same title to consideration as Sacred Scripture,
i.e., as a source of Revelation. However, it enters theological argument
indirectly because it is not a written text-an " auctoritas " in the medieval
sense. It enters in the form and manner of a text, i. eo, through the
definitions of the solemn Magisterium or the teachings of the ordinary
Magisterium of the Church. The argument from Tradition is bound up
with that derived from Scripture. The both are so intimately connected
that it is impossible to understand the one without appealing to the other.
The text of Scripture is already an expression of Tradition since the meaning
of Scripture, the truth expressed, is the very one which Tradition gives
it through the dictates of the Teaching Authority of the Church. Sometimes
through Tradition alone can we gain a true understanding of Scripture.
Following his statements concerning St. Thomas, Fr. Bouyer makes a
summary in several sentences which demand comment. He says: " It is
nonetheless true that no Catholic theologian worthy of the name, today
any more than in the Middle Ages, would place· any doctrinal authority
on the level of Scripture." (p. 130) If by "authority" he means "auctori-

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497

tas " in the medieval sense, there is some truth in his proposition, at least
in reference to the medieval theologian. This is clear from what we have
already said. However, this cannot be applied to the modern theologian.
Both he and the medieval theologian place Tradition on an equal level
with Sacred Scripture as a source of Revelation. As a doctrinal authority
in the usual modern sense of the word, the Magisterium would rank first.
J\'Iodern theology does not employ the medieval technique of argumentation,
and the modern reader does not understand this technique nor the position
of the "auctoritas." Hence it seems misleading to speak as Fr. Bouyer
docs here.and as :Fr. De Broglie does in his appendix.
The author follows immediately with another sentence that needs qualification:
If the authority of the Church be declared necessary to judge between the different
interpretations of theologians, it is by no means because she claims for herself an
authority superior to that of the Bible, but because her magisterium is necessary
for our submission to Scripture, as well as hers, to be real as well as intended. The
Church in her magisterium is the first to recognize that she is subject to the Worlj,of God as contained in the Bible: She claims no more than to assure, by the ways
chosen by God, the constant submission of the whole Church to this Word. (p. 130)

Cf course the Church and her children must submit to the Scriptures. She
and they are "subject to the Word of God as contained in the Bible," in
the sense that she cannot, in her teaching, contradict the Scriptures, must
go to them as to one of the sou1·ces of Revelation, must depend on them
and on Tradition as the source of all she believes and teaches. But the
word "submission" in this context-when talking about the J:li[agisterium
and the sources of Revelation-is misleading because it is not sufficiently
precise and runs counter to standard, theological terminology.
In addition, we must remark that the Church does claim for herself
an authority superior to the Bible, inasmuch as she claims to be its
guardian, its interpreter, its guarantor.
Fr. Bouyer also mars his presentation and reduces the role of Tradition,
when he states that revealed truths contained only in Tradition " are not
important as additions to the facts and truths contained in Scripture, but
as maintaining these clear and precise in the living Church." (p. 202)
'In the light of this proposition are we to believe that Fr. Bouyer holds
that the veneration (not adoration) of images, the doctrine concerning
original sin, the institution and essential rites of some of the sacraments,
many points of Mariology (all points of doctrine not found in the Scriptures)) are unimportant additions to the Revelation contained in the
Scriptures?
In reference to the Fathers and Doctors-while there is no doubt whatsoever that they entertained the highest veneration for the Scriptures, as

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is well illustrated by the passage quoted by Fr. Bouyer from St. Augustine's
19th letter to St. Jerome-it is questionable whether they would subscribe
to the affirmation (certainly they would not in an exclusive sense, reducing
Tradition to a subordinate role) that he makes them share with the
Protestant Reformers: " that the Bible and in one sense the Bible alone,
is the 'Word of God' more directly and fully than any of its other
expressions, since it alone is so inspired by God as to have him for its
author." (p. l£9)
Fr. Bouyer goes on to elaborate these ideas in two further passages that
we shall quote at length:
This process of development [definitions of Councils and the work of theologians] has
established once and for all the distinction between the inspiration of Scripture and
the supernatural assistance granted to the magisterium in its various forms. Consequently, it is now absolutely clear, not only that Scripture is inspired, but that
there is no other ecclesiastical document of which the same may be said, even a
solemn definition of Pope or Council. Thus in the Catholic teaching of today, the
truth appears more clear-cut than ever that the Bible alone [italics his] can be said
to have God for its author. (p. 131)
... the Church, in her ordinary and extraordinary magisterium, is assured by the
Spirit of never teaching anything not taught by the apostles. But none of the
formulas, even the most solemn, in which she may convey or elucidate this te11ching,
is or will ever be strictly speaking the 'Word of God.' Only the inspired books of
the two Testaments are that; that is why there is not, nor will there ever be, any
definition (or still more, any ordinary teaching) of the Church which does not
refer to these books of the 'Word of God,' in the strict sense, that is, the only
word of whose existence God can be said to be the literal author. He is not the
author, in this sense, even of the most solemn definitions of the Church, and he
guarantees them, with the charisma of infallibility, only as guaranteeing their conformity, both
the letter and its meaning, with the Word given once for all by the
apostles. (p. 203)

in

It seems to the reviewer that Fr. Bouyer confuses the issue by making
distinctions where there is no fundamental difference. He also uses the
word "author" too strictly. It is true that the Bible alone is a written
word and that God alone is its sole principal author. In this sense we may
say that the Bible is " unique of its kind " (p. 132) and has a " unique
excellence." (p. 131) It alone is a written word, it alone is inspired, but
it is not " unique " as the sole source of Revelation, nor does it have
preeminence over Tradition. We might add, moreover, that Tradition
also is "unique of its kind," i.e., it alone is a divinely guaranteed " unwritten source " of Revelation. In a broader sense, Tradition also has God
for its author, since all the Revelation that Tradition contains comes from
God as the sole principal source. Fr. Bouyer to be complete should have
added to the above statements that the " word given once and for all

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the apostles " was not
a " written word " but also an " oral word,"
that the solemn definitions of the Church reduce this " oral word " to
writing, that in the ultimate analysis this " oral word " thus enshrined in
a solemn definition of the Church does not cease to be the" Word of God."
The decree of the Council of Trent " Concerning the Canonical Scriptures" (which Fr. Bouyer quotes only in part) is very illuminating on
these points. We shall cite this important text at some length:
The (Gospel) of old promised through the prophets in the Holy Scriptures, our
Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, promulgated first with His own mouth, and
then commimded it to be preached by His Apostles to every creature as the source
at once of all saving truth and rules of conduct. It [the Council] also clearly perceives that these truths and rules are contained in the written books and in the
unwritten traditions, which, received by the Apostles from the mouth of Christ
Himself, or from the Apostles themselves, the Holy Ghost dictating, have come
down to us, transmitted as it were from hand to hand. Following, then, the
examples of the orthodox Fathers, it receives and venerates with a feeling of piety
and reverence all the books both of the Old and New Testaments, since one God
is the author of both; also the traditions, whether they relate to faith or to morals,
as having been dictated either orally by Christ or by the Holy Ghost, are preserved
in the Catholic Church in unbroken succession. (Session IV, April 8, 1546. Trans.
from H._J. Schroeder, Canons and Decree., of the Council of Trent [St. Louis, 1941],
pp. 17.)

God is the author of the Holy Scriptures, but the Council also states that
Tradition is " dictated either orally by Christ or by the Holy Ghost." One
who dictates is also an author; the message he dictates emanates from
him as from an author. There is ultimately between Scripture and Tradition, as far as their purpose to transmit Revelation is concerned, only the
difference of medium chosen by God through which to communicate His
truth.
Tradition, then, is in no wise subject to or inferior to Scripture. In fact,
in a wide sense, it contains Scripture-the Old Testament, in determining
which books constitute the canon; the New Testament, because originally
only Tradition existed. The Gospel at first was communicated orally. Only
after an interval of years were the inspired books of the New Testament
written. Till then their doctrinal content was preserved and communicated
orally. In effect, the Revelation of the Gospel, now contained partly in
the books of Sacred Scripture and partly in Tradition, was originally
contained only in Tradition. To reverse the metaphor of Fr. De Broglie
(p. 233), Sacred Scripture gravitates around Tradition rather than (as
he puts it) vice versa. More accurately, both Scripture and Tradition
gravitate around the Magisterium of the Church, receive their guarantee,
their interpretation, their clarification from it. Whenever the theologian

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forces Scripture or Tradition out of their orbits, forces them beyond the
gravitational pull of the Magisterium, he falls into error and heresy.
The weakness of this section of Fr. Bouyer's book is indicated further
by the fact that he felt impelled to publish the supplementary note of
Fr. De Broglie. He himself must have felt uneasy about what he had
written concerning the Catholic position on Scripture and Tradition.
Unfortunately the note labors under a similar weakness. It sets up an
imaginary opposition between Sacred Scripture and the Magisterium.
Fr, De Broglie labors the point that an infallible pronouncement of the
Magisterium is different from a text of Scripture. No one denies this.
One is inspired; the other is guaranteed from error
a special divine
assistance. Fr. De Broglie writes as follows:
Tme, the Church's teaching is divinely guaranteed to be free from error; none the
less, it remains, in the various acts which constitute it, an aggregate of testimonies
which are merely human, bearing on a past revelation made by God to men;
whereas the sacred text presents us with a formal and direct testimony from God
himself, in the very form in which it originally appeared. (p_. 230)

This text demands comment. When we
into consideration the guidance
of the Holy Ghost, which the Church always enjoys in the functioning of
its
and solemn
can we say that " the Church's
teaching is . . . in the various acts which constitute it an aggregate of
testimonies which are merely 1mman "? The guidance of the Holy Ghost
lifts this teaching above the " merely
" even though human acts
are involved in its
and definition. Tradition operating in the Church
either the ordinary or the solemn Magisterium) is never " merely
human." Also, in speaking of the sacred text of the Scriptures Fr. De
Broglie passes over entirely the role of the human author. The human
author is a complete instrumental cause of the whole sacred book that
he writes. Here too, in the contribution of the inspired human author
there is " an aggregate of testimonies which are merely human." Inspiration
keeps the hagiographer from error, makes him write only what and all
that God wishes, but still his are human acts. Hence in interpreting the
sacred book, the purpose, the times, the person, and the personal idiosyncrasies of the sacred author must be kept in mind.
Fr. De Broglie, in speaking of the theologian's function to transmit the
divine message in its entire purity, notes that
if Scripture is in fact the sole immediate [italics his] source at his disposal whence
he can derive that message in the very words of the God who sent it, his primary
concern must needs be to recur continually to that source to the fullest possible
extent, and so to refer in the first place to the testimony of Scripture in preference
to any other. (pp. 280-81)

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The theologian certainly must recur continually to Sacred Scripture, but
Tradition is also an immediate source whence he can derive the divine
message, and some truths can only be derived from Tradition. That those
derived from Scripture are in " the very words of God " is certainly matter
for awe and reverence. The fact that Tradition does not record " the very
words of God" is owing to the medium chosen. The essential thing, however, is the divine message; Tradition contains this equally with Scripture.
Concerning St. Thomas, it is not true that he always sees in " infallible
ecclesiastical documents" "simply a means of defence" of dogma against
heresies, or an auxiliary which makes more accessible to the unlearned
the content of Scripture and Tradition." (pp.
italics his) For St.
Thomas the Magisterium is intimately and indissolubly linked to Scripture
and Tradition. It is indispensable because it alone has the exclusive right
to give us an exact and authentic knowledge of what Scripture and Tradition teach. In the last analysis, for St. Thomas, it is to the pope as head
of the universal Church that we must go in order to know what is revealed
doctrine. His teaching authority is the authentic and definitive norm of
faith for all theological argumentation.
In view of these attitudes of St. Thomas and of what we have said
earlier, it is certainly erroneous to write that "the argument based on
ecclesiastical documents (even infallible ones) cannot be considered by
him as having a right, in theological ' science,' to a superior or an equal
role to that of the argument from Scripture {even to that from Tradition)."
{p.
As a matter of fact, whereas St. Thomas gives himself full
liberty to criticize the statements of individual Fathers, Doctors, or theologians, he never criticizes the expressions of the Scriptures, the popes,
or the councils. Indeed, he always considers them as being the best and
therefore the sufficient expression of revealed truth. The pronouncements
of the popes and councils {enshrining Tradition) are for him an '' auctoritas " of equal yalue with the " auctoritas " drawn from Scripture.
Fr. De Broglie does a further disservice to his reader when he states
that the theologian would fulfill his office:
in the best possible way by establishing all the 'defined ' truths without direct
recourse to the argument drawn from the definitions themselves. The 'definitions'
lose none of their value by being considered by the theologian in the light of
'confirmations' which he could, sh·ictly speaking, dispense with; on the contrary,
that would be the best way to justify their existence, to arrive at their proper
understanding, and to shed the clearest light on the study of the meaning and
application of each. Seen from this standpoint ' infallible definitions' in no wise
affect the primacy which the argument from Scripture enjoys and must retain in
the science of theology. (p. 282, italics his)

As a suggested procedure for discussions with Protestants,

no one would

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quarrel with this technique, but Fr. De Broglie is proposing it as a technique of theological argumentation.
The text in effect, if r..ot in intent,
puts the theologian and his interpretation of Sacred Scripture above the
Teaching Authority of the Church, or at least, assigns the .Magisterium a
very subsidiary :role which in no wise corresponds to its true importance.
Its role is not merely negative as this procedure would make it. Rather
it has primarily a positive function-it expounds and teaches Revelation;
it guides and instructs the faithful. Even the theologian must first hearken
to its voice before he begins his work. Fr. De Broglie's procedure is full
of danger and is one which in so many times in past history has led its
practitioners into heresy. The theologian is never capable of justifying
the existence of " definitions." Their justification is found in the divine
authority that the Church possesses. Certainly the spirit of this procedure
does not harmonize with the decree of the Council of Trent which gives
a primary role to the .Magisterium:
Furthermore, to check unbridled spirits, it decrees that no one relying on his own
judgment shall, in matters of faith and morals pertaining to the edification of
Christian doctrine, distorting the Holy Scriptures in accordance with his own conceptions, presume to interpret them contrary to that sense which holy mother
to whom it belongs to judge of their true sense and interpretation, has
held and holds, or even contrary to the unanimous teaching of the Fathers, even
though such interpretations should never at any time be published. (Session IV,
Decree concerning the edition and use of the sacred books: trans. Schroeder, op. cit.,
pp. 18-19).

Fr. De Broglie also confuses issues when he uses the word "inspiration"
in a loose sense: "However, the recognition of this primacy [of Scripture]
should by no means lead to undervaluing the argument from Tradition
and its necessity. For, unless we take a singularly narrow view of 'inspiration,' we are obliged to acknowledge that the apostles were not ' inspired '
only when they took up the pen. Does not St. Paul assure us that his
oral teaching, once given, is to prevail over any other? " (pp. Q33-34)
Fr. Bouyer, likewise, on page SWQ, uses the word in a loose sense when he
speaks of " the ' inspiration ' proper to the Apostles." The word " inspiration " and " inspired " in Catholic theology are used exclusively in their
technical sense to refer to the precise type of divine assistance which was
enjoyed by the writers of the Sacred Books and should not be applied,
even in a loose sense, to the different type of assistance enjoyed by the
apostles when they taught orally.
WILLIAM A. HINNEBUSCH, 0. P.
Dominican Houlfe oj' Studies,
Washington, D. C.

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Man and His Happiness, Theology Library, vol. HI; The Virtues and States
of Life, vol. IV. Ed. by A. M. HENRY, 0. P. Chicago: Fides Publishers, 1956-1957'. HI, pp. 459. $6.50. IV, pp. 790. $8.75.
The present volumes are translations of the third section of the series
Initiation Theologique, published in 1952 by a group of French Dominican
theologians under the direction of Fr. A. l\1. Henry. They are the third
and fourth volumes of the English translation, under the title: Theology
Library, directed by Rev. Louis Putz, C. S.C. of the University of Notre
Dame. The volumes deal with the entire matter of the Secunda Pars of the
Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas, and are thus concerned with
moral theology in its entirety.
In attempting a review of such a work one must discuss several aspects
of the volumes. First of aU, the purpose and organization of the books;
secondly, their translation; and above all, their content and presentation.
The French original aimed at presenting the thought of St. Thomas in a
way attractive to the intelligent, well-informed Catholic adult. As we
shall have occasion to note in some detail, the volumes present the work
of many different authors, so that the reader is struck by the differences
in approach of the various collaborators. In some sections one finds a
fairly direct resume of the Summa itself with little particular reference
to modern thought or to the developments in scriptural and patristic
theology. Other sections owe much to modem biblical investigations, with
the doctrine of St. Thomas being presented as a scientific form of the
revealed data. The success with which this confrontation of Scripture and
Thomistic thought is carried out varies greatly in different parts of the
volumes. Other sections seek to effect a rapprochement between St. Thomas
and modern thought and attitudes, or better, to restate Thomistic concepts
in terms and notion which are current to-day. This diversity of approach
damages the unity of the whole work and may well leave the reader
rather confused. It seems that the editor of the series, Fr. Henry, sought
to keep a thread of unity in clear view by appending to each chapter
a brief section entitled "Reflections and Perspectives." These sections
seek to emphasize points mde in the chapters, or to open up for the
readers' consideration new avenues of thought not contained expressly in
the chapters. In most cases they go beyond a mere summary and one
wonders if they should not have been incorporated into the chapters themselves or else omitted. The reader has the impression that Fr. Henry is
trying to make up for the omission of some points he feels should have
been discussed in the articles themselves. The general tendency of these
" Reflections " is to point out applications of Thomistic thought in the
modern world. In those articles in which the author himself has sought
to do the same thing, the added sections are not always helpful.

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The difficulties which have been mentioned are natural, perhaps, to any
work of collaboration, yet the reader cannot help but have a variety of
reactions to the diverse points of view. We must applaud, however, the
purposes behind the volumes, and, in great measure, the successful achievement of this purpose. To present St. Thomas to the modern reader without
watering-down his thought is no easy task. To go further and, by taking
cognizance of new movements in the theological world, to attempt a
rapprochement of Thomistic theology with modern scientific thought and
modern biblical scholarship is a far more difficult matter. The editor and
various authors are to be commended for undertaking so ambitious a
progTam. It is one which is sorely needed in Catholic theological writing,
especially in moral theology. The usual method of studying St. Thomas,
or Thomistic thought as presented in manuals, pays little attention to
the great advances in biblical study made by modern exegetical science.
The presentation often fails to move the minds of modern students because
of a failure to be aware sufficiently of modern approaches or scientific
advances. The present volumes represent a surprisingly successful attempt
to remedy these defects.
We cannot, however, be totally condemnatory in the face of such real
achievement, although we may hope that the defects of this attempt will
urge others to contribute to a more living theology. The way to do this
is pointed out in these volumes. It involves two "directions": one, the
more fruitful and scientific contact with Scripture and tradition from which
no theologian can divorce himself with impunity; the second is the enrichment of theology, especially moral theology, by a sound grasp of modern
work in the behavioral sciences and the application of theological prin.ciples to urgent problems of modern life. If this series had no other value,
it would be a great contribution, because it does seek to follow these
"directions" while remaining faithful to Thomistic doctrine, so often
upheld by the Magisterium as the basis of a genuine synthesis.
Another observation on the organization of the volumes may be made
here. Each section ends with a good bibliography which usually does not
merely list books and articles but comments on their value and merit.
For some unknown reason the translators have seen fit to leave these in
French, so that the English reader is deprived of their value. Even more
strange is the addition of a new bibliography section which lists works
in English without comment. The French bibliographies have the great
advantage of listing works which really harmonize with the chapters, while
the English constantly refers to volumes which have totally different and
often contrary points of view.
It would not be out of place to note that the present two volumes in
English represent one volume in French. The combined English price is
$15.25, while the French volume sells for about $7.00. We know, of course,

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505

the high price of printing in this country, but it does seem that some
more successful efforts could have been made to keep down the price of
this series. The printing costs in France are almost as high as ours at
the present. It is unfortunate that so many fine European books, especially
Catholic works, are so highly priced in the United States. The common
practice of expanding a one volume original into several translated volumes
seems somewhat unnecessary.
Finally, the English translators consider these volumes as suitable for
use in theology courses in Catholic colleges. It seems that it would be
difficult to employ them as texts for that purpose. First of all, many
articles are just too difficult for the usual college student. Secondly,
the divergence of viewpoint on the part of the authors would be more
confusing to students than to others. However, the books would be most
useful as necessary collateral reading. This reviewer has found them of
great value as required supplementary reading to the Summa in a seminary
course in moral theology. With the proper group and leader, the volumes
should prove useful to lay, adult study-groups which have sufficient
determination and background to study them with the concentration and
understanding demanded.
Our second point concerns the quality of the translation itself. The
best that one could say is that the English in general is adequate as a
of
rendering of the original. It rarely rises to the fine style and
many of the French articles. Unfortunately, it is often banal and not at
all infrequently, it is inaccurate. Space does not allow for a very detailed
discussion of the constant flaws of translation, yet a few typical examples
may be given. Vol. III, on p. 154, "Friendly conversation" is given as
a translation of " commerce de l'amitie "-a much broader and more
realistic phrase. On p. 167, in the last paragraph one reads: "The union
of the lover and the beloved is at once the cause of love; love itself is
its effect." This is quite different from: "L'union de l'aimant et de l'aime
est a la fois la cause de l'amour, l'amour lui-meme et son effet" (French
ed., p. 213) , which is a true statement of St. Thomas. Similar examples
are often found in the volume. If anything, Volume IV is worse, with
many more errors and frequently with the quality of a high-school boy's
work based on an over-confident and too literal use of a poor dictionary.
The resulting " English " is often difficult, and the English itself poor.
On p. 266 one reads about the" just deed in reduction and in similitude"an unhappily literal rendering. The tract on Justice refers constantly to
"the just," or "the legal just " (p. 300) instead of to the just act, mean,
ideal or whatever. There is no need to use the word "just " as a substantive in these cases. Paragraph two on p. 280 states: "We see that
we are far from the acceptable definition ... of Ulpian," with " acceptable "
translating accueillante! Such faults of translation are even more apparent

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to one acquainted with the original. '!hey force the reader to refer to the
French constantly to see if the English actually renders the author's
meaning. It may be hoped that a new edition will remedy some of these
defects which seriously impair the value and readability of the English.
Of greatest importance is the discussion of the actual matter and content
of the volumes. It will be necessary to limit this to some of the more
important aspects for a detailed critique would become another volume.
The reader may keep in mind the divergence of points of view of the
authors of the different chapters for this greatly affects the presentation of
the material.
The third volume, corresponding exactly to the Prima Secundae, begins
with an excellent preface by P. Chenu which outlines the mentality which
St. Thomas brought to a study of the moral life. The scientific aim of
Thomas is mentioned, but above all it is the unity of the Summa, the
unity of " dogma " and " moral " that Chenu emphasizes. This point is
carried over and developed in what is perhaps the finest and most important
single article in the volume: the Introduction by P. Jean Tonneau on the
relation of morality and theology in St. Thomas. The eminent moralist
and theologian speaks of the place accorded to moral considerations in
the Summa, and shows how truly theological is the entire Secunda Pars.
The first section of the article is a profound commentary on the Prologue
to the Prima Secundae which modern manualists have pretty well forgotten. Not only is the Summa organized around the Dionysian theme of
the going-out from God and return to Him, but the precisely theological
consideration of man's return to God is that of man and his life seen
as the development of the image and likeness of God. The theology of the
"image" becomes the foundation for the study of morality, and methodologically is the way by which St. Thomas preserves the specific unity of
theology as a study of God. P. Roger, 0. :M. I. in a recent work (Beatitude
et Theologie Morale chez saint Thomas d'Aquin, Ottawa, 1956) notes
especially the different treatment of morality by St. Thomas in the Contra
Gentiles and in the Summa. The former is wholly " theological," the latter
more strictly " moral." Perc Guindon feels that Tonneau has overemphasized the" theological" aspect of the Secunda Pars (pp. 272 ff.). This
could be a just criticism, but really does not seem to apply, particularly
when one realizes that the article of Tonneau is inspired directly from
St. Thomas' own Prologue. The strictly " moral " outlook is hardly
neglected by Tonneau who constantly refers to the precisely moral work
of St. Thomas.
Of even more importance to-day is the second part of Tonneau's introduction which discusses the originality of Thomistic moral theory. Tonneau,
together with such other noted theologians as Frs. Sertill:.mges and Deman,
is particularly concerned with the meaning and outlook of moral theology

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507

in contrast to that form of the science developed since the 16th Century.
He comes quickly to the point by showing how different is the Thomistic
system from the modern view of the moral life as a conflict between freedom
and obligation, with its over-emphasis on liberty, conscience, the restrictive
aspect of law, and its failure to see moral life as a pursuit of the good
under the rule of reason. Tonneau's position is similar to that of the
late P. Deman in his well-known studies on" Probabilisme" (in Dictionarie
de Theologie Catholique) and "Prudence" (Editions de la Revue des
Jeunes-French edition of the Summa), but more it is the outlook of St.
Thomas himself. The author goes to special pains to make clear the
mentality which give rise to the modern view, as weH as to stress the
advantages of Thomistic thought. Of all the parts of theology, moral has
been the most separated from a Thomistic inspiration. We can hardly
imagine going to a manual of moral theology for guidance in our Christian
life except for particular points, for resolving doubts centering on freedom
and obligation. The idea of the will as a power of pursuing the good which
is manifested by reason and pointed out by law is alien to the moral theology
of to-day-a theology allied to the age of casuistry which gave rise to the
moral "systems." The over-emphasis on obligation and conscience stems
from the misunderstanding of law and the forgetfulness of prudence. The
view of the moral life as a struggle between unfettered liberty and restrictive obligations is philosophically immature, and Tonneau points out, as he
has done for years, that this is hardly the position of St. Thomas. His
analysis of the present mentality stresses its " sociological " origins and
brings out the " unexamined " nature of its assumptions. The reader will
find in P. Deman's article, "Probabilisme " (Dictionaire de Theologie
Catlwlique), an outline of the historical origins of modern" moral theology."
This introduction has been given special consideration because it is not
only necessary and valuable for its own sake but needed for a proper
understanding of the rest of the volume which retains both the full
Thomistic inspiration as well as the structure of the Summa. The Thomistic
notion of moral theology and its contrast to the more modern outlook
cannot be appreciated without a thorough reading of this introductory
article.
Fr. Spicq, 0. P., the noted biblical scholar, gives us next an outline of
the great themes of New Testament morality which is of particular value
because of the neglect of any scriptural basis in our manuals. The author
does not attempt to relate explicitly the exposition of the New Testament
with St. Thomas but the reader will be able to do this with more intelligent
insight after studying this article. Spicq ends his discussion with a few
fine paragraphs on the relation of biblical to speculative theology. The
reader can be referred to his Commentary on Hebrews for a fuller discussion of this point.

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In keeping with the plan of following the arrangement of the Summa,
the first chapter deals with " Happiness," or better translated, " Beatitude."
It is good to see some reference-necessarily brief, to the Old Testamentin the adequate scriptural introduction.
The second section is really a
modernized commentary on the first two question of the Prima Sec1mdae,
especially on the second. J\Iodern wriiers are introduced in a dialogue
somewhat resembling the excellent work of P. Andre Jlvlarc, S ..J., La
Dialectiq1te de l'agir (Paris, 1()49). The third section comments on the
third to sixth questions and completes the theology of beatitude. The
only criticism of this section is that insufficient attention has been given
to the basic place of finality and its nature in the moral life and in St.
Thomas' tract on beatitude. This leads to somewhat of an over-emphasis
on subjeclive (formal) rather than objective (material) beatitude. The
fact that the pursuit of the good-the end, good in itself-is the key to
the moral life does not receive enough emphasis, especially as related to
the pursuit of happiness. In fact, the title of the English translation,
"]\fan and His Happiness," is rather unfortunate from this point of view.
The second chapter deals with human acts (Questions 7-17) and their
mortality (Questions 18-21). The analysis of human acts was written
before the final stages of the recent discussion involving Frs. Deman, 0. P.,
Gauthier, 0. P., Pinckaers, 0. P., and Lottin, 0. S. ll., and will need reof this controversy.
The discussion of the
vision in the
of human acts is not as clear as could be, and should be related more
closely to Tonneau's introduction.
These questions of St. Thomas have
always been considered extremely difficult. It is not easy to establish
clearly the meaning of " right reason," especially in light of the many
controversies on this point. The nature of practical truth, involving its
relation to speculative truth is a particularly difficult concept especially
for those raised in the spirit of casuistry. These notions call for more
emphasis and clearer explanation than they receive in this chapter. A
welcome omission is that of the varieties of conscience, its nature and
types, and of the whole question of the moral "systems." The Thomistic
theory takes care of the practical direction of life by a union of charity
and prudence.
The well-known writer, P. Pie, 0. P. contributes a good chapter on the
emotions (a better word than "passions" for the English reader). Two
points are of special value. First is the attempt to indicate the need for
enriching our knowledge of human emotional life by recourse to the sound
findings of modern dynamic psychology. It is too much to ask that a full
synthesis be given-that is not yet possible. What is to be encouraged is
a willingness on the part of the theologian to rewrite, or at least to enlighten the treatment on the emotions by reference to modern behavioral
science. The present article indicates some ways of doing this, pointing

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509

out problems and possibilities. While quite tentative, it is certainly more
valuable than the rather silly and out-dated discussions found in many
manuals.
Secondly, the article has the value of presenting the emotional reactions
themselves as possessing moral goodness or evil. Usually the emotions are
treated of only as antecedent or consequent to a free decision. If, however,
as Tonneau pointed out in the introduction (" the voluntary act has
all that is necessary to be moral" p. xxx) , St. Thomas stresses the voluntary
and not the free, it can be seen clearly that the emotions themselves,
insofar as they are voluntary, enter ipso facto into the moral order. This
is quite in keeping, too, with the neglected Thomistic doctrine on the
"sin of sensuality." The references on p. 158 to III Sent. d.
q. 1, a. 1,
c., and on p. 161 to de Verit., q.
a. 6 are not apposite.
The one defect in this discussion is the lack of a treatment, however brief,
of the relations of the " super-ego " with its unconscious "morality " and
right reason. The emotional development of the human being involves
the acceptance of moral standards and preferences, of patterns of behavior
quite unknown to the individual. These remain to affect his human activity
and must then be considered in relation to the fully rational standards of
moral theology. This is connected with a failure to emphasize the place
of the emotions-not so much in reference to a particular human act-as
to the integral development of human life and personality. The Thomistic
moral theology is-to overstate the case-less interested in particular acts
than in the full growth of the moral life by a cultivation of virtues. The
role of the emotions and of the unconscious dynamisms of human nature
should be seen in this general context.
It is clear that the next two chapters on Virtue and Sin are essential
to an understanding of the integral moral life. The chapters are well done
and follow quite closely the divisions of these tracts in the Prima Secundae.
No special effort is made to relate the Thomistic doctrine to a full biblical
background or to modern thought. In this sense, the chapters are what
we expect, viz., clear and intelligent summaries of the Summa. Future
writers can enrich these chapters especially by solid biblical introductions.
Nowhere more than in the discussion of the moral and theological virtues
can the reader get a clearer picture of St. Thomas' view of the continual
development and growth of the whole person which is the Christian life.
The attitude which is adopted in regard to the tract Dn sin is also of
particular help to-day, when we so naturally tend to consider individual
acts of evil rather than examine the sources of evil and its roots in our
human nature. The real understanding of the nature of sin and of vice
is certainly required for a rational pursuit of the good. These chapters
will be of real assistance in developing a power of moral insight and
judgment. They will enable the reader to see the difference between a good

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or sinful act in itself, and the same act proceeding from virtue or vice.
The chapter on sin is noteworthy for recalling the Thomistic teaching on
the sin of sensuality which is so rich in psychological meaning and so
revealing of the notion St. Thomas had on the voluntary and· on the moral
life as a whole. The distinction between mortal and venial sin is well
presented, but there is no discussion of the " imperfection," but this is
understandable since St. Thomas did not have room for an imperfection
in the true sense which was not a venial sin.
The chapter on law is one in the series which gives quite a complete
scriptural introduction, as well as a very brief indication on the contribution of ancient thought to the Thomistic synthesis. Especially valuable
is the summary of Old Testament doctrine. For the New Testament, we
could say that the exposition of St. Paul's teaching does not bring out as
clearly as might be the great apostle's conviction that the Christian is
free not only from the prescriptions of the Mosaic law but from any law
except that of the Spirit. The whole orientation or attitude of the Christian is quite different from those who see " law " as an external constraint.
St. Thomas, both in the Summa and in the Commentaries on the Epistles,
is so close to the Pauline inspiration that we regret not seeing the full
force of Paul's position (cf. S. Lyonnet, S. J., "Liberte chretienne et loi de
!'Esprit," in Christus, n. 4, Paris).
The rest of the chapter is excellent and reinstates the fascinating study
of the Old and New Laws to which St. Thomas devoted much attention,
but which modern manuals pass over completely in their more legalistic,
less theological approach. The delicate matter of the natural law and its
real meaning is not quite as well done as could be hoped for. This is
especially true of the explanation of the principle of seeking good and
avoiding evil. The author correctly points out that from this principle
the theologian does not deduce anything, but only applies it, just as the
metaphysician does with the principle of non-contradiction. However, he
does give as much attention to a real penetration of the meaning of this
first practical principle as is required. The analysis of this principle is as
fruitful for morals as is the analysis of the principle of non-contradiction
for the metaphysician. Some indication of how this principle is arrived at,
some discussion of its elementary and basic meaning, would be most helpful
even for the audience to which this volume is addressed. The main point
would be to stress the idea that the principle concerns the rational pursuit
of the good and that it is not first and foremost a statement of moral
obligation.
The tract on grace can receive only brief mention. First of all, let the
moral theologian rejoice that a book of moral theology even discusses the
subject. The modern tendency to take grace away from its proper setting
not only injures the tract on grace but removes from the study of the

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Christian life the examination of its very principle. There is a good
scriptural introduction; this is followed by a section entitled " conciliary
data." The English adjective to describe a council is "conciliar," and
the adjective here used is not to be found even in large dictionaries. In
any case, the section is too brief to do justice to the development of
the doctrine of grace in these expressions of the extraordinary magisterium.
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the chapter is the section " Grace
outside of the treatise on Grace." This recalls the aspects of grace, in its
various meanings, which are properly discussed in "dogma." In the discussion as to where to place the tract on grace, the plan followed here
seems to be helpfuL The moralist is primarily concerned with grace " as
assistance," and all that concerns grace in this context should be an integral
part of moral theology. Grace in other contexts will be treated in the
appropriate places. Thus, the modern question of the " assimilation " to
the divine Persons may well be discussed in the treatise on appropriations
in the Trinity. Some aspects of the problem of grace and predestination
could be treated in regard to the divine nature. In any case, the study
of the Christian life cannot be complete without this tract, and it is
gratifying to see it restored to the position given to it in the Prima Secundae.
Volume Four is entitled Virtues and the States of Life, which covers
the material of the Secunda Sec1mdae. The three first chapters cover
more than two hundred pages and are devoted to the three theological
virtues. This again is a great delight to the Thomist who is accustomed to
seeing these essentially moral treatises discussed with grace in " dogma,"
with the moralist being content to discuss the positive precepts and sins
against these virtues in the usual legalistic and casuistic sense. Each of
the three essays in its own way seeks to give a full picture of the place
of each of the virtues in the entire Christian life. Much attention is given
to the biblical development and to the modern, even phenomenological,
approaches. JI.Iore than in the other sections, these three essays represent
personal syntheses by the authors (charity and hope are by the same
writer). The treatise on faith, for example, opens with a discussion of the
commitment to God which is involved in any true adherence to the
" Veritas Prima." There follows a good exposition of signs and miracles
as leading to faith, the psychological conditions of faith, and the development of the life of faith. The actual discussion of the essence of theological faith is too limited, but the reader has had the advantage of seeing
the role of faith, and of understanding that the faith must ever grow in
the depth of its influence on the Christian life.
The chapter on hope gives one of the best summaries of biblical doctrine
to be found in the entire series. In addition to this, the author, P. Olivier,
brings out the relation, often puzzling to students of St. Thomas, of the
emotion of hope (which belongs to the irascible appetite) and the theo-

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logical virtue of hope. l<urihermore, the existentialist thought of Marcel
is used to give the treatise a new meaning for the modern world. Olivier
speaks of horizontal hope, emphasizing the biblical eschatalogical expectation of the Kingdom, and of vertical hope, reaching directly upwards to
the omnipotent God. The exposition of the Thomistic theology of hope
is full and dear. It seems, however, that the author over-emphasizes the
self-centered, "interested " aspect of the love which hope involves. True,
hope is not charity, and does include desire. Yet, though we cannot
discuss this fully, it does not seem correct to make hope purely and simply
a matter of the love of concupiscence, for God would only be an " intermediate " object sought for the good of the human person himself. Such
a traditional Thomist as Cardinal Gotti protested against this one-sided
view of hope.
The most important virtue, that on which the entire Christian life
depends, is charity. The constant vitalizing influence of charity, its place
at the center of the Christian life as the form of all the virtues is not
sufficiently developed in most manuals. The fine chapter on charity by
P. Olivier presents an excellent exposition of Christian doctrine on this
virtue. The first part contains a fine summary of revealed truth as found
in the Old and New Testaments. The exposition could be changed in
minor details as a result of more recent studies, but the author has wisely
chosen the method of word-study so fruitfully employed by P. Spicq. The
exposition is clear, benefitting from modern exegesis, and takes into account
such important modem works as that of Anders Nygren on Agape and
Eros. The Synoptics, Sts. Paul and John receive special treatment which
is detailed enough to give a truly adequate picture of biblical teaching.
This is followed by a good, if rather too brief, summary of Patristic thought.
Clement of Alexandria's union of agape and gnosis is mentioned, and several
paragraphs are devoted to St. Augustine. The advantage of such a section
is largely to indicate what a rich source of doctrine is contained in the
Fathers, and how necessary it
for the theologian to become acquainted
with their teaching. The follower of St. Thomas knows that the master
cannot be studied in vacuo: St. Thomas was as much the intelligent
recipient of a tradition as he was the bold innovator in thought and
method. One may look forward to the day when the biblical and historical
treatment of such theological topics as Charity, or the Trinity, or Grace
are integral parts of the theo,logical course itself. The advantages of such
a method can be guessed by such articles as the present one.
The third part quite logically takes up the theology of charity as found
in the Secunda Secundae. The author summarizes the previous work of
P. Simonin. To this, to-day, we must add the excellent little volume by
P. L.-B. Geiger, 0. P. (Le probleme de l'amour chez saint Thomas d'Aquin,
Paris-Montreal,
The advantage of Olivier's treatment is to relate

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St. Thomas more closely to his biblical sources, while not forgetting the
influence of Aristotle and Cicero in their analyses of friendship. A section
on the pagan background would be useful for a fuller understanding of
the Thomistic synthesis.
The great purpose of these volumes is to present the moral life in all
its -richness as examined by St. Thomas. This chapter is one of the most
important for charity is the virtue of the Christian. The author constantly
emphasizes the role of charity in regard to the other virtues, both theological
and moral, and rightly gives to charity the positive preeminence which is
its due. This is one of the very few " textbooks " of moral theology in
which we find the theological virtues receiving their proper attention. It
is of far greater importance for an understanding of the Christian life to
know the theological virtues than all the casuistic details of contracts and
the minutest .problems of the sexual life. The chapters devoted to these
virtues deserve the highest praise, for a moral theology in which they are
not prominent is little more than natural ethics. As minor questions, we
may raise some doubts as to the author's explanation of charity as the
form of the virtues. (pp. 174 ff.) Historically we know that in the Secunda
Secundae, St. Thomas reversed his earlier position on the exemplary causality
of charity, to insist on its efficient causality (II-II, q. 23, a. ad 1). Also,
it is unfortunate that two problems relating to charity are treated in the
section of " reflections " rather than in the body of the discussion. The
first of these is the problem of disinterested and interested love. The
answer to this question seems to lie more in the direction outlined by
Geiger, based on the rational guidance and element of love, than in its
" ecstatic " character. (p. 196) The second problem is more clearly practical, and is left without real solution. What place do human friendships
have in the life of charity? Very briefly, one could say that Christian
tradition offers different answers in practice: witness the contrast on this
question between the Desert Fathers, St. John of the Cross and such saints
as Bernard and Aelred. The discussion of charity in St. Thomas could
certainly offer some light on this problem which has so many practical
applications.
The chapter on prudence introduces the discussion on the moral virtues.
Prudence, for St. Thomas, is the virtue which, when "informed " by faith
and charity, guides the entire human life in its active manifestations. The
importance and position of this virtue are quite lost in· modern manuals,
and therefore we look eagerly to such a work as the present one to provide
a·full discussion of the role of prudence. The chapter is a competent summary of the treatise in the Summa, with a very brief biblical introduction.
It is particularly regrettable that the chapter does not contain a real
treatment of several important points. First of these is the nature of
practical truth, with particular attention given to the reason for the in.

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fallibility of prudence as opposed to conscience in the direction of action.
Less important is the omission of any explicit confrontation of the analysis
of the acts of prudence with the analysis of the structure of the human
act in the Prirna Secundae. Above all, however, there should be a full
discussion of the relations of prudence and conscience; or, at least, a fuller
explanation of the role of prudence throughout the moral life. The modern
reader is not prepared to accept the de-emphasis of conscience without
understanding how prudence can be expected to guide moral activity
infallibly and effectively.
P. Tonneau makes another fine contribution in the chapter on justice.
It is one of the most difficult sections in the volume, but remains profoundly Thomistic in the penetrating analyses of right and justice and
judgment. Tonneau explains the key notions of justice in a manner not
often found in such volumes, but study will be repaid by a real penetration into the meaning of the essence and structure of the virtue of
justice. We may note, as one point among many, the discussion of general
or legal justice in which Tonneau gives an explanation which is not the
common interpretation of this form of justice. The section depends on a
proper understanding of that very difficult and complex notion: the " common good." The reader may be surprised to find that general justice,
concerned with the common good, is not the social justice of modern writers
but a quite different thing. It is perhaps unfortunate that Tonneau, with
his vast knowledge of sociology, did not see fit to include some discussion
of the moral issues involved in modern society. Yet he has given us a
new insight into the meaning of St. Thomas especially as this concerns
general or legal justice. We may call attention also to the author's proper
emphasis on the duty of restitution as applying to all forms of justice, and
to the explanation of the gravity of all forms of injustice. Of note also
is the fine exposition of the questions in which St. Thomas deals with the
act of judgment as the act proper to justice. There is an excellent section
on rash judgment in its sources and consequences.
The chapter on religion by P. Mennessier is dear and solid. There is,
unfortunately, no exposition of biblical doctrine. Such a section would have
helped to gainsay the not-uncommon notion that St. Thomas failed to
recognize the proper preeminence of religion among the moral virtues.
This point is adequately dealt. with in the first paragraphs, but a substantiation of the Thomistic position in light of biblical study would have been
helpful. This chapter is followed by another w.elcome " innovation " from
the point of view of modern moral theology: a full discussion of the social
virtues annexed to justice. For one who has given serious thought to·
the moral implications of our daily dealings with other human beings this.
chapter
fail to be of real interest, For the reader
vvoiJ\l1lliketo

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observe
Thomas' " humanism " in its most practical application this
chapter will be most enjoyable.
The chapter on fortitude is written by A. Gauthier, whose superb work
on magnanimity (Magnanimite, L'ideal de la grandeur dans la philosophie
pa'ienne et dans la theologie chretienne, Paris, 1951) has been universally
acclaimed. That volume is summarized here. It is a remarkable study
of the history and development of a concept originally Greek, but completely taken over and elevated by Christian tradition, and finding its
full development in St. Thomas, who did not hesitate to uphold t.he
seeming paradox of a life uniting the virtues of magnanimity and humility.
Gauthier presents us here with a fine historical introduction, the only one
in the volume which gives full expositions of both the pagan and the
Christian traditions together with an account of their harmonious union.
This chapter is a fine example of the way in which sound historical study
can .enrich a notion and make much more profound and clear the teaching
of St. Thomas. This has not always been done in these volumes even
in chapters where a good biblical introduction has proceeded the theological
analysis. Here history sheds light on theological science, and theology unites
and integrates the traditional concepts. The theological exposition of
fortitude as a " theology of dynamism " is excellent, although it leaves out
much of what St. Thomas discusses under the virtue of fortitude. Gauthier
gives most attention to magnanimity, so that other aspects of fortitude
(e. g., patience, except for the New Testament study) are not treated of.
One could, perhaps, go further and suggest another integration which would
complete the chapter. This would be to show the relation of the virtue of
fortitude to the irascible appetite and its emotional reactions especially
as studied and known in modern psychology. We might also suggest that
this chapter would be a good place to give explicit attention to man's facing
of the problem of evil and suffering. Some of this latter is attempted in
the "Reflections" following the chapter, but as with other such sections,
the matter would be integrated into the body of the discussion itself. The
chapter is generally excellent and will be a fine model for study, as well
as a real revelation of the richness of Thomistic moral thought.
The discussion of temperance is well done and balanced, expressing
theological principles in a way particularly suited to modern needs and
mentality. The contrast with the previous chapter brings out the divergencies
of approach to be found throughout these volumes. This chapter leaves
out any consideration of the historical and biblical background which we
found so valuable in the treatment of fortitude. The volume ends with
several chapters covering the remaining sections of the Secunda Secundae:
the charismata, the active and contemplative life, the states of life, and
the life of perfection. This latter, by P. Mennessier, is well seen as the
normal development of the Christian life, lived on the basis of the three

.516

BOOK REVIEWS

theological virtues. The author makes dear that the life of perfection is
not reserved in its essence to the few but is the Christian life itself, lived
fully in accord with the inspirations of grace.
We have spoken of the faults of these two volumes. These were: definite
flaws in the English translation, and the lack of unity which is found in
the original and is owing to the different points of view of the several
authors. In spite of these difficulties, which need not be minimized, it
would be false to say that this is the best series in English on moral
theology. It could not be used alone as a regular textbook in the seminary
or even less in the college, but it does give a generally excellent presentation of Thomistic moral thought. Its value is enhanced by the frequent
attempts to make the two integrations we have mentioned: with biblical
and historical sources and with modern science and mentality. It can
provide a fine remedy for many notions unfortunately prevalent in modern
moral manuals. The work is not complete, but the values it does offer are
quite sufficient to give it a very high recommendation to priests, theologians
and seminarians as well as to the lay person who is truly interested in
serious theological learning. The volumes are excellent as required collateral
reading on the college level and above.
DoM

St. Anselm's Priory,
Washington, D. C.

GREGORY

STEVENs,

0. S. B.

BRIEF NOTICES
Joseph Most Just. By FRANCIS L. l<'ILAS, S. J. Milwaukee:

Bruce, l9.'i6,

Pp. 150. $3.50.

At first sight it might seem that Fr. Filas has said just about all there
is to say about Saint Joseph in his two previous books, The Man Nearest
to Christ and Joseph and Jesus. But no; as a matter of fact, while he has
added very much to our knowledge of St. Joseph, there still remains much
more to be written in English about Our Lady's husband.
Joseph Most Just is a very orderly and concise discussion of some
theological questions about St. Joseph. You might call it a busy theologian's guide to St. Joseph. The first chapter explains briefly four introductory notions about St. Joseph. First, the purpose of a study of St.
Joseph is to determine his true status and thus to foster a greater devotion
to him based on the knowledge of his dignity and holiness. Secondly, there
is an explanation of the theological propriety of the terms "Josephite
theology," "Josephology" and "thedogy of St. Joseph"; for such a study
considers St. Joseph first in relation to Mary, secondly in his fatherly relationship to Jesus and then, by reason of the graces and privileges of this
double vocation, his relationship to us. Thirdly, there is a brief treatment
of the sources for Josephology: the Scriptures; the Fathers, admittedly a
rather meager source in this matter; and papal documents, especially of
the last century. Finally, Fr. Filas brings up what is perhaps the most
serious difficulty in regard to devotion to St. Joseph: why did the Church
neglect him so long in its public veneration? Various solutions have been
proposed, based on a distinction between " cultns " and " devotion " or
Newman's "doctrine" and "devotion." Perhaps the best reason is simply
that it appears to have been the will of God that such devotion should be
postponed until these latter days. This much can be said, at least, the
Church herself never refused to honor St. Joseph.
Following these introductory notions, the major portion of the book
is simply an exposition of the latter part of the statement in the encyclical
Quarnquam Pluries of Pope Leo XHI: " Blessed .Joseph ... was indeed
the hu,sband of Mary and father, as was supposed, of Jesus Christ. From
this arise all his dignity, grace, holiness, and glory. . . . [The Church] is
his numberless family ... over which he rules with a sort of paternal
authority, because he is the husband of Mary and the father of Jesus
Christ." (Italics mine.) Fr. Filas does not give an extended treatment of
St. Joseph's marriage and fatherhood, for these have been discussed in his
previous works. He does, however, present the key notions necessary for

517

518

BRIEF NOTICE.<;

an understanding of the theological deductions which follow in the rest of
the book.
In the theology of St. Joseph, Fr. Filas explain1., conclusions are reached
either by direct deductions or indirectly by means of arguments from
analogy and fittingness. " Properly used, such logic can lead and does
lead to reliable information. For example, with respect to the argument
from analogy, we know of the existence of certain privileges of the saints.
What belongs to the saints in general, must by a stronger reason-granting
Joseph's exalted position-belong to St. Joseph. Yet this does not mean
that all the particular privileges of all the saints will be attributed to the
virgin father of Jesus. God bestows special graces suited to the needs
of special apostolates, and Joseph was given all the helps he required.
He might have lacked the special gift of miraculous preaching which the
Apostles needed and received for their first tasks; but he must have been
given in outstanding measure every generic gift which every saint would
receive.
" By a converse use of this analogy we can also ask whether or not the
sublime privileges of Mary belong to Joseph in a lesser degree. Many of the
graces of Mary were granted to her specifically to help her in her parental
task. Reasonably, then, God must have bestowed similar graces on
Joseph because Joseph's task was also that of a parent. Joseph's fatherhood in the moral order is unique; hence, his graces like 1\/[ary's must also
be unique. Nevertheless,' in reasoning this way we must be most diligent
lest any grace given exclusively to l\1ary would seem, by improper logic, to
be shared with even so holy a man as Mary's husband." (p. 18) (Italics
his.)
Or, if you wish, Fr. Filas draws it up in the form of a syllogism:
According to H()lY Scripture and official documents of the Church, St. Joseph
was chosen to be the virginal husband of our Lady, the virgin father of Jesus,
the head of the Holy Family and the patron of the Universal Church. However,
implicitly included in this vocation because required by it are various privileges and
gmces. (Italics his.) Hence, these privileges belong to St. Joseph. (p. 19)

St. Joseph has a very great dignity from several titles: husband of Mary,
father of Jesus, head of the Holy Family and patron of the Universal
Church. In dignity he is higher than the angels, higher than John the
Baptist, and higher than the. Apostles. Fr. Filas gives good reasons for all
these. We might mention in passing that theologians are gradually coming
to speak of Joseph simply as "father of Jesus," because there is not much
danger now that such a term will be misunderstood among Catholics.
Pope Leo used the term in the encyclical cited above, St. Ephrem called
.Joseph the " father of God."
The fact of his dignity implicitly i!ldicates the holiness which St. Joseph's

BRIEF NOTICES

519

position demanded, Fr. Filas notes that "the doctrine that St. Joseph surpasses all creatures except Mary in holiness is becoming more and more
commonly accepted in the Church." (p. 41) The fundamental principle
used here was laid down by St. Thomas with regard to the Blessed Virgin:
" Those whom God chooses for an office, He prepares and disposes in such
a way that they become suited to it" (Summa Theol., III, q.
a. 4).
It was St. Bernardine of Siena who is generally credited with applying
this principle to St. Joseph, although historically Bernardine may have
depended on Ubertino of Casale. Since most hold that St. Joseph pertains
to the hypostatic union, another principle can be used here: " To the
degree that something approaches its source, by so much does it more
participate in the effect of that source. Christ is the source of grace "
(ibid., a. 5). Since Joseph is closest after Mary to Christ, he is therefore
highest in holiness after Mary. Once the relation of holiness to dignity is
established, this doctrine can be said to be confirmed by Pope Leo XIII in
his encyclical: " There can be no doubt that more than any other person he
approached that supereminent dignity by which the Mother of God is
raised far above all created natures."
As for the privileges of St. Joseph, Fr. Filas readily admits that there
exists very little explicit evidence. Here more than anywhere else we must
depend on the principle of deducing the saint's prerogatives from the
requirements of his office. This means that the answer to most of the
questions to occur will have to be, " It is fitting," " It is only probable " or
simply "We don't know." Of course, arguments of convenience do have
a place in theology, as is well known. Fr. Filas presents reasonable answers to several of the most discussed privileges that have been claimed
for St. Joseph. Was he immaculately conceived? No; this was the" singular
privilege" of his wife. Was he sanctified in the womb? We don't know.
Did he have freedom from sin and temptations of concupiscence? This
would seem to be demanded by his dignity. Fr. Filas believes that "if we
were to delay Joseph's freedom from actual inclination to sin, and, more
so, if we were to delay Joseph's freedom from all sin until the time of his
marriage to our Lady, we would be forced to admit the presence of a disgraceful fact [sic] in his youth-an element that seems to make him unworthy to become husband and father of the Holy Family." (p. 70)
Finally, was Joseph assumed bodily into heaven. Again the true answer
must be, we do not know. Fr. Filas can only conclude reasonably that
it would appear that if anyone in addition to our Blessed Mother has
ever been taken up into heaven in body and soul, that person would be her
virginal husband.
In the chapter on the patronage of St. Joseph, Fr. Filas traces the historical development and explains the univer<>ality of the patronage. He
believes that the title of Patron of the Universal Church is a happier choice

520

BRIEF NOTICES

than Patron of the Catholic Church, because of the connotations of the
terms.
St. Joseph's great dignity and holiness, once established, would seem
logically to demand for him a more prominent place in the liturgy. In the
last chapter Fr. Filas discusses the petitions for St. Joseph's advance in
the liturgy. Since 1815 thousands of petitions have been sent to the Holy
See by all ranks of clergy and faithful requesting increased honors for St.
Joseph in the liturgy. In particular, they have asked that his name be
invoked immediately after Mary's in the Confiteor and in three places in
the canon of the Mass. There are many objections offered to such additions, and Fr. Filas exposes and answers them all. Especially strong seems
to be the decree of the Sacred Congregation of Rites in 1892 which indicated that the Holy See wished no changes; unfortunately most objectors
seem to overlook the fact that the tenor of that document implies that it
was merely not expedient at that time. A more hopeful sign is in the
Mediator Dei of Pius XII. Here the Holy Father distinguishes in the
liturgy the divine and human elements. The divine elements, instituted by
God, cannot be changed in any way by man. The human components, however, do admit of modifications, "as the needs of the age, circumstances,
and the good of souls may require, and as the ecclesiastical hierarchy under
the guidance of the Holy Spirit may have authorized." The Pope cites
as examples the spread of devotion tn the Eucharist, the Passion, the Sacred
Heart, "to the Virgin Mother of God, and to her most chaste spouse."
A first appendix traces summarily the development of devotion to St.
Joseph during the past four hundred years. We can certainly pardon Fr.
Filas for relating mostly the truly great work of the Jesuits in the various
aspects of this development; Cardinal Lepicier did likewise for the
Servites, and any religious should be expected to do the same for his
own order.
A second brief appendix summarizes eight resolutions adopted at the
session of studies at St. Joseph's Oratory in Montreal in August 1955. Perhaps the most important for readers of this review are the second: "That
a series of courses or a study club on questions pertaining to St. Joseph be
introduced in all major seminaries and scholasticates, or at least that
special mention be made of these prc,blems in the treatise on Mariology ";
and the third: "That theological, biblical, and Marian societies take
greater interest in these questions concerning St. Joseph."
There is very little to criticize adversely in this book In fact, it is to be
heartily recommended to all theologians, professional and amateur.
Preachers also should find it immensely helpful. To be sure, Thomists will
be disappointed to read that God in His ineffable providence chose blessed
Joseph to be the spouse of His most holy Mother because He foresaw
Joseph's cooperation and bestowed on him the position in the Holy Family

BRIEF NOTICES

5'21

(p. 9l5; similar interpretations pp. 46, 68). They will undoubtedly find
greater consolation in the statement of Pope Pius IX that God " enriched
him and filled him to overflowing with entirely unique graces in order that
he might execute most faithfully the duties of so sublime a state." (p. 51)
Once again the interesting problem of Jesus' knowledge enters in passing.
:Fr. Filas says on p. !il6: "The dignity of the Saint continues to appear
from the fact that Jesus was subject to him. This means that Joseph
taught Jesus much of the experimental knowledge Jesus deigned to learn in
His human nature." It is to be hoped that soon some Josephologist will
take up this problem and try to explain it a little more in detaiL It has
been neglected so far, and yet it is important not only for a better understanding of Jesus but also of Joseph.
JAMES J. DAVIS, 0. P.
Dominican House of Philosophy,
Dover, !Ylass.

Summa Theologiae. By ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. Ottawa:

Commissio Piana.

5 Vols. Pp. 3960. Set $!il4.00 (Canadian).

Any effort to make a good text of St. Thomas readily available and within reasonable financial reach is always welcome to students of the Common
Doctor. The Canadian Piana Commission has given us the best text of the
Summa Theologiae that can be obtained-outside of the Leonine text itself.
In editing the works of St. Thomas, in particular, the Summa Theologiae,
the Leonine Commission chose the Piana edition (published by order of
Pope St. Pius V in 1570) as the basis of comparison of codices. " ...
though the Piana is not the oldest edition, nor has it the corroboration of
the manuscript tradition, nor is it free from interpolations, nevertheless
it is indisputably the best of all the other editions and manuscripts "
(Gundisalvus Grech, 0. P., "The Leonine Edition of the Works of St.
Thomas: its Origin, Method and Published Works," From An Abundant
Spring, p. 228).
This Piana Nova does not claim to be a critical text in the sense uniquely
enjoyed by the Leonine, but it does supply us with the traditionally best
authentic text, improved, revised and augmented by the large number of
specialists comprising the present commission. The modern edition of the
Piana was first published between 1941-1946. The present new edition,
with better paper and binding, has incorporated the revision and corrections
in the text, notes and bibliography that a decade of use has brought to
light.
The five volumes comprise 3,960 pages; the text itself is in two columns
with numbered lines. A volume each is devoted to the traditional four-part

BRIEF NOTICES

division of the Summa, with the fifth volume (not yet received) containing the Supplement. The Piana Commission has noted that every quotation by St. Thomas has been checked, and that unnamed authors referred
to by St. Thomas and the unmarked quotations have been identified, except
in a few instances. The clarity and preciseness of t.he footnote references in
each question and article, especially regarding the Migne citations, are a
valuable aid to those wishing to pursue the relevant positive theology. The
bibliography of texts and studies introducing each volume are a unique
contribution of the Piana Nova.
Students and professors who have used this manual Summa text have
been pleased and rewarded, which is the best recommendation for any book.
A newer and improved edition of the Nova Piana is therefore heartily
applauded.
NICHOLAS HALLIGAN, 0; P.
Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

Diderot and Descartes: A Study of Scientific Naturalism in the Enlightenment. By ARAM VARTANIAN. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1958. Pp. 886. $6.00.
This erudite, but readable, work is not so much a study of either Descartes or Diderot as a chapter in the history of the idea that all things
may be explained by means of matter and its properties, an idea that may
be expressed as materialism or scientific naturalism. For us moderns, the
crucial period in the development of this idea is that extending from 1650
to 1750, one that begins with Descartes and ends with Diderot. By about
1750 scientific naturalism in its modern form was being proposed by the
more advanced among the group of the Pkilosopkes of the French Enlightenment, such as Buffon, La Mettrie, D'Holbach, Maupertius, and
especially Diderot. The latter has been selected as the more important and
typical figure of this group " for it was in his thought that all the different
phases and facets of the period's materialism found their most integrated
and synthetic expression." (p. 808) The evolution of his own thought is
an epitome of the history of materialism during the period under review. His
early intellectual formation was cartesian (cf. pp. 40-48); he then came
under the influence of English empiricism, especially that of Locke, and of
Newtonian science and scientific method; finally, the cartesian influence,
both as to doctrine and to method, became once more predominant in
shaping his mature thought.
Historians have tended to exaggerate the influence of Lockean psychology
and Newtonian science in the formation of the materialism of the French

BRIEF NOTICES

528

Enlightenment. Mr. Vartanian recognises that Diderot's group drew, for
their ideas, from many sources, such as Gassendi, Hobbes, Spinoza and,
among the ancients, Epicurus and Lucretius. They adopted the sensualist
and atomistic psychology of Locke, but this was precisely because they
were materialists; and it is the thesis of Mr. Vartanian that their materialism was the direct result of the influence upon them of Descartes. They
themselves did not speak of themselves, at least primarily, as Cartesians;
and this fact may have deceived the historians. They did not wish to do so,
because the official cartesian school continued to cultivate metaphysics, and
to defend the innatism of ideas, and was used by the apologetes of religion.
On the other hand, those in whom the influence of Locke and Newton was
strongest, such as Voltaire and Condillac, were definitely opposed to the new
scientific materialism. The cartesianism of Diderot and his companions may
be called unofficial, even secretive, but Mr. Vartanian sets out to prove,
and, I think, succeeds in doing so, that it is the more authentic expression
of the spirit and aims of Descartes, at least in his natural philosophy.
The essential elements of Diderot's mature position are well summarized
as: " (I) the decision to explain all phenomena, from the broadest cosmic
outlines to the most intricate organic details, by ultimate reference to
determinable laws of matter in motion; (2) the elimination of all vestiges
of finalism, providential design, plastic natures, hylozoistic schemes, and
other concepts adaptable to apologetic use, from the program of the investigator of nature; (3) the demand that the scientist give an account not
merely of the operations, but of the origins as well, of the external order."
(p. 291) The elements in the philosophy of Descartes that inspired these
intentions were various. That his rationalism and his demand for mental
clarity and simplicity should lead in that direction is evident. His cosmic
dualism lifted matter from its lowly position in the aristotelean scheme of
things to the status of an independent substance which could be the
object of an autonomous science. The method of such a science, being
mathematical, set a mechanistic ideal before the investigator of nature,
who was encouraged to seek for explanations of natural events in terms
solely of extension and local motion. This was to free scientific procedure
from any dependence on metaphysics, and from any control by theology;
and this was the aim that above all inspired Diderot and his group.
Descartes had himself indicated· the line of development that his philosophy
of nature was later to take. In the " Du Monde " he had set himself the
task of giving a mechanistic account of all natural events, and envisaged
the possibility of giving a like explanation of the origins of the world. In
the "De l'Homme," he proposed that man should be studied, like other
animals, as mere automata, if a scientific psychology and physiology are to
be possible.
The demonstration of the fact that there is a historical link between these

524

BRIEF NOTICES

cartesian elements and the fully elaborated scientific naturalism of Diderot
and the Philosophes is the main •purpose of this book. To prove his thesis,
the author draws on an amazing amount of material, writings from the
period in question, some of them hitherto unpublished, as well as recent
literature on the topic. The good bibliography (pp. 323-332) gives one an
idea of the extensive reading necessary. to produce such a well-documented
book as this. Having stated his thesis and some of its difficulties in the
first chapter, the author traces in the second chapter the persistence of the
cartesian tradition both in those who defend it, such as Fontenelle and
Bayle, and in those who, by opposing it, such as Cudworth, Ray, P. Daniel,
bear witness to its continuance. The difference between the newtonian outlook and the cartesian is dealt with; the latter, by stressing the activity of
nature, and the problem of development, fostered interest in cosmogony,
geology and biology, and came to be accepted as the basis of the new
scientific naturalism.
The influence of Descartes in regard to scientific method was as active
on the Philosophes as his mechanistic interpretation of nature. The third
chapter is an interesting account of the varyi11g fortunes of the two main
schools of thought in relation to scientific method, the cartesian and the
newtonian, and of how Diderot came to champion Descartes against Newton, even though the cartesian vortex-physics had been abandoned. In
chapter four, the object of discussion is the historical connection between
the " Du Monde " and later naturalistic theories on the origin of the
universe, and between the " De l'Homme " and the later vitalistic materialism. Various discoveries in biology gave a great impetus, about 1750, to
pre-lamarckian theories of transformism, and fostered the growth of evolutionary materialism, again upon the basis of cartesian mechanism.
Mr. Vartanian, summing up the results of his investigations in his last
chapter, maintains that the materialism of Diderot was not so much
doctrinal as methodical; that his intention was not to deny spiritual reality
or values, but to assert the legitimate authority of natural science which
should assume, as determining its method, mechanism and materialism.
This implied that any attempt of the metaphysician or theologian to control
or dictate to the scientist should be resisted; and Mr. Vartanian has some
hard things to say, in this connection, of the Church in France during this
period as being the center of the forces of intolerance and bigotry, and as
maintaining a rigid and authoritarian position. (cf. pp. 34-38) One may
doubt, however, that Diderot's materialism was merely methodic; he seems
to have been understood by his contemporaries as advocating a system that
not merely abstracted from but denied the existence of God, of divine
providence, and of a spiritual soul in man. On such questions, both the
Church and philosophy have every right to intervene. A Church which
daims to be supernatural must, of its nature, be authoritarian in matters

BRIEF NOTICES

525

of faith; Descartes himself could be a faithful Catholic-though our author
seems to doubt his sincerity (p. 34) -and yet claim independence for
science in its own field; and he certainly intended to buttress his natural
philosophy with a metaphysics that would justify his method and his
mechanism. But it would be ungraceful to quarrel with Mr. Vartanian on
a point that is not essential to his thesis, and which would lead one far
afield. He has given us a work of thorough schoiarship not only on Descartes and Diderot, but on the crucial period in the formation of the mental
outlook of the modern European, and on the history of scientific method in
relation to its underlying philosophic ideas. It is works such as this, in
which extensive research and information are allied to a spirit of synthesis,
that can contribute most to building up the history of ideas.
AMBROSE

Me NxcnoLL, 0. P.

Collegio Angelicum,
Rome, Italy.

Existentialism and Religious Belief. By DAVID E. RoBERTS. Edited by
Roger Hazelton. New York: Oxford University Press, 1957. Pp.
$5.00.

At the time of his death in 1955, Prof. David E. Roberts occupied the
Marcellus Harte Chair of Philosophy of Religion at Union Theological
Seminary in New York. This book was substantially completed at
time although, as the editor relates in his preface, it remained for him to
put the " Introduction " into final form, to deal with one or two chapters
that were not quite finished, and to write a concluding section. This last
task was accomplished by re-working material written by Prof. Roberts for
other purposes, but which could be brought to bear upon the theme of the
present book.
The book contains an " Introduci,ion " which lists four or :five of the
general characteristics of existentialism, and offers a brief comment on
each; a chapter on Pascal; two chapters on Kierkegaard; a chapter each on
Heidegger, Sartre, Jaspers and Marcel, in that order; and an "In Conclusion " which offers a five-part answer to the question "what claim does
existentialism rightfully exert upon religious people and what should be the
character of our response to it? " (p. 333) The book has, in addition, all
of the usual apparatus of scholarship--copious footnotes, a short bibliography of English-language general introductions to existentialism, and a useiul
Index.
Prof. Roberts did not interpret his title in any narrow sense, for this
book offers a faithful and comprehensive introduction to existentialist

BRIEF NOTICES

philosophy in all of its phases. The author was too conscientious a scholar
to entertain the idea of isolating the religious, or anti-religious, positions
of the existentialists from the context of their thought as a whole. He has,
rather related the whole of existentialist thought to the Christian faith.
There is a surprisingly large number of scholarly introductions to existentialism in English, but this book seems to me the most satisfactory of those
that I have read on four counts: l) the exposition of the thought of each
of these six men is masterful; £) the author never merely reports, he recognizes the philosopher's duty to judge. Yet his judgments, while evergenerous, are also ever-balanced. He is his own man, he has his own center;
3) some of the individual insights are memorable, for example, the sug!!estion that, quite possibly, the prospect of apostasy was constantly present
to Kierkegaard's mind all of his adult life (p. Jl39); 4) he knows how to
write philosophy in English: how to be technical without being grim, and
how to be vivid without being cheap. Here is a book in which an accomplished philosopher faithfully recreates existentialism in his own mind; in
which a deeply faithful Christian evaluates that philosophy; in which an
accomplished communicator reports the result of the faithful encounter in
his own mind between existentialism and Christianity.
Inevitably, there are reservations, and I note three. l) I am quite sure
that a competent Catholic theologian would be forced to disagree with
some of Prof. Robert's understanding of Christianity.
I am not convinced, after reading the book, that the inclusion of Pascal in a study of
existentialism is anything more than an arbitrary whim. 3) There is one,
and only one, lapse from the tone of generous and incisive scholarship, and
that is a shrill paragraph attacking the " detractors " of Kierkegaard, some
of whom are: " ... rationalists, disciples of John Dewey, provers of God
and immortality, pro-Freudians, anti-Freudians, Fundamentalists, the Pope,
Boston personalists, behaviorists, Buchmanites, socialists, and capitalists."
(p. 14£) The paragraph is so hysterical as to be devoid of meaning, and
therefore it needs no comment. The same care should be taken to delete it
from future editions as to retain everything else.
JAMES

v. MULLANEY.

111anhattan CoUege,

New York, N. Y.

Christ in Prophecy. By PAuL HEINISCH. Translated by W. G. HEIDT,
0. S. B. Collegeville, Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 1956. Pp. 290 with
index. $6.00.
During his long and frui•ful career as an Old Testament exegete, Dr.
Paul Heinisch won for himself an enviable reputation for sound, sober

BRIEF NOTICES

527

scholarship. English readers became better acquainted with him through
Fr. Heidt's translation of his History of the Old Testament (1952) and
Theology of the Old Testament (1950). Both these works were well received and widely recommended. Fr. Heidt has now given us another
excellent translation of a work published after the author's death and one
which measures up to the high standards Dr. Heinisch set for himself
during his long and distinguished scholarly life. The format of the book
is pleasing, though this reviewer regrets that publication costs require so
high a price on a book of not quite 300 pages.
In his introduction, Dr. Reinsch traces the attempts of man to wrest
from the future its secrets. We learn that in times past the Babylonians,
Egyptians, Canaanites, Greeks, Romans and Germans all tried their hand
at penetrating the mist of the future. Modern man, of course, is no
exception. In Israel there were those who imitated the practices of their
Canaanite neighbors and their soothsayers, but the Law and the Prophets
took a dim view of soothsayers and necromancy. (p. 10) On Sinai Yahweh
had made a covenant with Israel. When it was necessary, Yahweh would
reveal His will through divinely illumined men.. How different was Israel's
revealed religion from that of her pagan neighbors! What an amazing
difference between Israel's prophets and the fortunetellers of antiquity and
modern times! (p. 12) From the very beginning it was God's plan that
Israel's religion become matured and deepened through a theology concerning her Messiah, and thus matured, to become the religion of mankind. (p. 16) This book is concerned with the Old Testament prophecies
concerning the person or the work or the times of that Messiah.
Dr. Heinisch divides the body of his work as follows: Prophecies Prior
to the Eighth Century; The Pre-Exilian Literary Prophets; The Period of
the. Exile; Post-Exilian Messianic Prophecy; The Apocrypha and Christ;
Prophetic Form and Fulfillment; Christ in Type; The Messiah's Mother;
Biblical Messianism-A Unique Phenomenon; Non-Jewish Messianic Hopes.
There follows a short conclusion which considers the rejection of Him who
fulfilled the Messianic prophecies of the Old Testament books.
Into this obviously chronological framework, the author fits his consideration of all the Messianic prophecies from Genesis 3: 14-15 to Daniel
9: 24-27. The treatment of each prophecy is fairly uniform: the text is
set in its historical and literary context, various opinions as to its proper
interpretation are presented, a choice is made and defended by the author.
Dr. Heinisch very definitely is in the conservative tradition. His exegesis
reflects what is best in the Catholic scholarship of the first quarter of the
present century. In presenting in one volume all the commonly accepted
Messianic prophecies (accepted as Messianic in one sense or another),
he has done a great service to both theology and the study of Sacred

528

BRIEF NOTICES

Scripture. In English we have had nothing at all since F'r. Maas' Christ
in Type and Prophecy (1893-96). It is unfortunate that Christ in Prophecy
suffers from one glaring defect: it is almost 20 years out of date. Biblical
scholarship has come a long way during the past 20 years, especially in
the study of Messianism. Its results are not often evident in this book.
I would suggest that a future edition of the work contain references either
to the current opinions worthy of consideration or to source material
wherein the student may read for himself the more recent thought on the
various prophecies.
THOMAS AQUINAs CoLLINs, 0. P.
Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D. C.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Burghardt, S. J., Walter J. The Image of God in Man According to Cyril
of Alexandria. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press,
1957. Pp. 165 with index. $3.00.
Campbell, C. A. On Selfhood and Godhood. New York: Macmillan, 1957.
Pp.
$6.00.
Connolly, F. G. Science Versus Philosophy. New York: Philosophical
Library. Pp. 90 with index. $3.75.
Crawshay-Williams, Rupert. Methods and Criteria of Reasoning. New
$5.00.
York: Humanities Press, 1957. Pp.
Donlan, 0. P., Thomas, Cunningham, 0. P., Francis, Rock, 0. P., Augustine.
Toward Marriage in Christ-A College Text in Theology. Dubuque:
Priory Press, 1957. Pp. 173 with index.
Doronzo, 0. M. I., Emmanuel. De Ordine, Tom. I. Milwaukee: Bruce,
1957. Pp. 961. $19.00.
Fichter, S. J., J. H. Sociology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957.
Pp.
with index. $5.00.
Fox, Adam. Plato and the Christians. New York: Philosophical Library,
1957. Pp. 193. $6.00.
Gardner, Martin. Fads and Fallacies in the Name of Science. Second Revised Edition. New York: Dover Publications, 1957. Pp. 394 with
bibliography and index.
Geach, Peter. Mental Acts. New York: Humanities Press, 1957. Pp.
Giovanni Dominici, 0. P., Beato (Arrigo Levasti, Ed.). Trattato della
Dieci Questioni. Firenze: Libreria Editrice Fiorentina, 1957. Pp.
156. L. 950.
Guardini, Romano. Prayer in Practice. New York: Pantheon, 1957. Pp.
$3.50.
Hamlyn, D. W. The Psychology of Perception. New York: Humanities
Press, 1957. Pp. 115.
Locke, John. The Second Treatise of Government & A Letter Concerning
Toleration. Oxford: Macmillan, 1957. Pp.
McKeon, R., Merton, R. K., Gellhorn, W. The Freedom to Read. New
York: R. R. Bowker, 1957. Pp. 105 with index.
O'Brien, John A. (Ed.). Winning Converts-A Symposium. Notre Dame:
Notre Dame Books, 1957. Pp. 250. $.35.
Oesterle, John A. Ethics: The Introduction to Moral Science. New York:
Prentice-Hall, 1957. Pp. 279. $5.35.

529

530

BOOKS RECEIVED

Piemontese, Filippo, Introduzione alla Metafisica Classica, Milano: Morzorati, 1957, Pp, 230, L, 750,
Runes, Dagobert D, A Book of Contemplation, New York: Philosophical
Library, 1957, Pp, 149, $3,00,
Van Roo, S, J,, Gulielmus, De Sacramentis in Genere, Roma: Pontificia
Universita Gregoriana, 1957, Pp, 374 with bibliography and indexes,
$3,00,
Von Wright, G, H, The Logical Problem of Induction, New York: Macmillan, 1957, Pp, 184 with index, $4,00,

THE GENERAL INDEX TO THE THOMIST
Vor.. XX (1957)
INDEX OF AUTHORS

PAGE

BEACH, J. D. Separate Entity as the Subject" of Aristotle's Metaphysics.
75
BECKLEY, Q. F. Review of An Historian's App1·oack to Religion by
207
A. T9ynbee.
CnRousT, A.-H. A Prolegomena to the Study of Heraclitus of Ephesus. 470
CoLLINs, T. A. Review of The Two-Edged Sword by J. L. McKenzie. 355
DEFERRAIU, R. J. Review of The Philosophy of the Church Fathers
by H. A. Wolfson.
3til
FARRELL, P.M. Sources of St. Thomas' Concept of Natural Law.
237
FARRELL, P. Review of True Morality and Its Counterfeits by D. von
Hildebrand.
.
106
HALLIGAN, N. Review of De Extrema Unctione by E. Doronzo.
103
HAYDEN, D. Aristotelian Dialectic in Theological Method ..
383
HrNNEBUSCH,W. A. Review of The Spirit and Forms of Protestantisnt
489
by L. Bouyer.
KANE, W. A. Introduction to Metaphysics.
121
---. Review of Intitiation a la Philosophic d'Aristote by l\L D.
Philippe.
370
---. Review of The Physical World of the Greeks by S. Sambursky. 370
LAUER, R. Z. The Philosophy of Christian Science.
191
McGLYNN, J. V. The Two Scepticisms in Hume's Treatise.
419
MciNERNY, R. The Teleological Suspension of the Ethical.
295
?v!uLLANEY, J. V. Review of Being and Nothingness by J.-P. Sartl·e
97
O'SHAUGHNESSY, T. Review of Ftmdamentals of Mariology by J. B.
Carol.
lOll
RICHARDSON, D. B. The Philosophy of History and the Stability of
Civilizations.
158
ScHALL, J. V. The Totality of Society: From Justice to Friendship.
l
SHEA, G. W. Review of Principles of Sacramental Theology by B.
Leeming.
850
SrsTER M. ALOYSIUs. Toward a Thomistic Theory of Sensation.
143
SisTER M. ANNICE. Considerations for a Philosophy of Action.
311
SISTER MARY MICHAEL. A Comparison of the Thomistic and Scotistic
Concepts of Hope.
27
SIKORA, J. The Philosophy of Nature and Natural Science from a
Thomist Viewpoint.
380
SLATTERY, M. P. Thomism and Positivism.
447

581

532

INDICES OF VOLUME XX

(1957)
PAGE

SMITH, R. Review of An Introduction to Deductive Logic by H.
Leblanc.
Review of Essays in Conceptual Analysis by A. Flew (ed.) .
Review of Essays in Conceptual Thinking by S. Kroner.
Review of Logic and Nature by M. C. Swabey.
Review of Nature and Judgment by J. Buchler.
SPRINGMANN, L. A. Review of The Life of Man with God by T. V.
Moore. .
STEVENS, G. Review of Theology Library Vol. III: Man and His
Happiness; Vol. IV: The Virtues and States of Life by A. M.
Henry. .
WALLACE, W. Review of The Manner of Demonstrating in Natural
Philosophy by M. A. Glutz.
WARD, L. Review of Ethical Value by G. Hournai.

217
217
217
217
217
212

503
365
222

INDEX OF ARTICLES
Action, Considerations for a Philosophy of --. SISTER M. ANNICE
Aristotelian, Notes on -- Dialectic in Theological Method. D.
HAYDEN.
Aristotle's, Separate Entity as the Subject of -- Metaphysics.
J.BEACH. .
Christian, The Philosophy of -- Science, R. LAUER.
Civilizations, The Philosophy of History and the Stability of --.
D. RICHARDSON.
Comparison, A -- of the Thomistic and Scotistic Concepts of Hope.
SrsTER :MARY JYhcHAEL.
Concept, Sources of St. Thomas'-- of Natural Law. P. FARRELL.
Concepts, A Comparison of the Thomistic and Scotistic -- of Hope.
SISTER MARY MICHAEL. .
Considerations, -- for a Philosophy of Action. SISTER M. ANNICE.
Dialectic, Notes on Aristotelian -- in Theological Method. D.
HAYDEN.
Entity, Separate -- as the Subject of Aristotle's Metaphysics. J.
BEACH.
Ethical, The Teleological Suspension of the --. R. MciNERNY.
Friendship, The Totality of Society: From Justice to--. J. ScHALL
Heraclitus, A Prolegomena to the Study of -- of Ephesus. A.-H.
CnRousT.
.History, The Philosophy of -- and the Stability of Civilizations.
D. RICHARDSON.
Hope, A Comparison of the Thomistic and Scotistic Concepts of -- .
SISTER MARY MICHAEL.

311
383
75
191
158
27
237
27
311
383
75
295

470
158
27

OF VOI,UME XX

(1957)

533
PAGE

Hume's, The Two Scepticisms in -- Treatise. J. McGI.YNN.
W. KANE.
Introduction,, -- to Metaphysics.
Justice, The Totality of Society: From-- to Friendship. J. ScHALL
Law, Sources of St. Thomas' Concept of Natural--. P. FARRELL.
Metaphysics, Introduction to --. W. KANE.
---, Separate Entity as the Subject of Aristotle's --. J. BEACH
Method, Notes on Aristotelian Dialectic in Theological --. D.
HAYDEN.
Natural, Sources of St. Thomas' Concept of -- Law. P FARREI.L.
---, The Philosophy of Nature and -- Science from a Thomist
Viewpoint. J. SIKORA.
Nature, The Philosophy of-- and Natural Science from a Thomist
Viewpoint. J. SIKORA.
Notes on Aristotelian Dialectic in Theological Method. D. HAYDEN.
Philosophy, Considerations for a -- of Action. SISTER M. ANNICE.
---, The -- of Christian Science. R. LAUER.
---, The -- of History and the Stability of Civilizations.
D. RICHARDSON.
---, The -- of Nature and Natural Science from a Thomist
Viewpoint. J. SIKORA.
Positivism, Thomism and--, M. SI.AT'l'ERY.
Prolegomena, A -- to the Study of Heraclitus of Ephesus. A.-H.
CHROUST.
St. Thomas', Sources of-- Concept of Natural Law. P. FARRELL.
Science, The Philosophy of Christian --. R. LAUER.
---, The Philosophy of Nature and Natural-- from a Thomist
Viewpoint. J. SIKORA.
Scotistic, A Comparison of the Thomistic and -- Concept of Hope.
SISTER MARY MICHAEL.
Sensation, Towards a Thomistic Theory of -- . SISTER M. ALOYSIUS
Separate, -- Entity as the Subject of Aristotle's Metaphysics. J.
Scepticisms, The Two -- in Hume's Treatise. J. McGLYNN.
Society, The Totality of--: From Justice of Friendship. J. ScHALL.
Sources, -- of St. Thomas' Concept of Natural Law. P. FARRELL.
Stability, The Philosophy of History and the -- of Civilizations.
D. RICHARDSON.
Study, A Prolegomena to the -- of Heraclitus of Ephesus. A.-H.
CHROUST.
Subject, Separate Entity as the -- of Aristotle's Metaphysics. J.
BEACH.
Suspension, The Teleological -- of the Ethical. R. MciNERNY.

419
H!l
1
237
121
75
383
237
330
330
383
311
191
158
330
447
470
191
330
27
l43

419
1

158
470
75
295

534

INDICES OF VOLUME XX

(1957)
PAGE

Teleological, The -- Suspension of the Ethical. R. Mcl:>iERNY.
Theological, Notes on Aristotelian Dialectic in -- Method. D.
HAYDEN.
Theory, Towards a Thomistic-- of Sensation. SISTER
ALoYSIUS
Thomism, -- and Positivism. M. SLATTERY.
Thomist, The Philosophy of Nature and Natural Science from a-Viewpoint. J. SIKORA.
Thomistic, A Comparison of the -- and Scotistic Concepts of Hope.
SISTER MARY
.
---, Toward a -- Theory of Sensation. SISTER M. ALoYsiUs.
Totality, The-- of Society: From Justice to Friendship. J. ScHALL.
Toward, -- a Thomistic Theory of Sensation. SISTER M. AI"OYsms.
Treatise, The Two Scepticisms in Hume's --. J. McGLYNN.
Viewpoint, The Philosophy of Nature and Natural Science from a
Thomist --. J. SIKORA.

383
143
447
330
27
143
l
143

419
330

INDEX OF BOOK REVIEWS
BouYER, L., The Spirit and Forms of Protestantism. (W. A. Hinnebusch)
BucHLER,
Nature and
CR. Smith)
CAROL, J. B., Fundamentals of Mariology. (T. O'Shaughnessy)
DoRONZO, E., De Extrema Unctione. (N. Halligan)
FLEW, A. (ed.), Essays in Conceptual Analysis. (R. Smith)
GLUTZ, M.A., The Manner of Demonstmting in Natural Philosophy.
(W. Wallace) .
HENRY, A. M., Theology Library. VoL HI: Man and His Happiness;
Vol. IV: The Virtues and States of Life. (G. Stevens)
HouRNAI, G. F., Ethical Value. (L. Ward)
KRONER, S., Essays in Conceptual Thinking. (R. Smith)
LEBLANC, H., An Introduction to Deductive Logic. (R. Smith)
LEEMING, B., Principles of Sacramental Theology. (G. Shea)
McKENZIE, J. L., The Two-Edged Sword. (T. Collins)
MooRE, T. V., The Life of Man with God. (L. Springmann)
PHILIPPE, M. D., Initiation
la Pht?osophie d'Aristote.
Kane)
SAMBURSKY, S., The Physical World of the Greeks. (W. Kane)
SARTRE, J.-P., Being and Nothingness. (J. Mullaney)
SWABEY, M. C., Logic and Nature. (R. Smith)
ToYNBEE, A., An Historian's Approach to Religion. (Q. Beckley)
VON HILDEBRAND, D., True Morality and Its Counterfeits. (P. Farrell)
WoLFSON, H., The Philosophy of the Clmrch Fathers. (R. Deferrari)

a

END OF VoLUME XX

489

217
101
103
217

365
503
217
217
350

355
370
370

97
21'1
207
106
361