THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS:

THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH

Publishers:

VoL. XXI

The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

JULY, 1958

No.3

THE ROLE OF THE RECIPIENT AND SACRAMENTAL SIGNIFICATION
I
INTENTION

AND SACRAMENTAL

I

SIGNIFICATION

T is the teaching of the Church that, in the measure that it
is possible, the subject must have an intention of receiving
a sacrament, under pain of invalid reception. The purpose
of this article is to investigate in the light of St. Thomas' teaching the precise ontological connection between this intention
and the sacrament. It will be maintained that in virtue of his
intention and (in the sacraments othe:r than baptism) his
baptismal character the subject intervenes in the sacrament as
a material instrumental cause-a mode of causality that is to
be found only in the sacraments which are not merely efficient
causes but also, and primarily, signs of faith.
No such explicit conclusion is to be found in St. Thomas;
but it is, as it appears, indicated in his teaching that the char-

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acter is a participation in the priesthood of Christ and as such
reducible to the category of instrumental power. The Thomistic
commentators, with one exception, make little attempt to explain the instrumentality of the baptismal character. The
exception is John of St. Thomas who developed so fully the
symbolic concept of the sacraments. It is in dependence on the
notion that a sacrament is a sign, and therefore in dependence
on the first principle of St. Thomas' sacramental theology, that
he explains the character. Before developing this line of thought
an examination must be made of the explicit teaching of St.
Thomas on the part played by the subject in the sacraments.
Commentary on the "Sentences"

In the preliminary discussion on the sacraments in general no
question or article is devoted to analyzing the acts of the
subject in :relation to the sacrament. This is a matter that St.
Thomas reserves for treatment when he is dealing with those
sacraments that are perfected only when they are used. The
article on the constitution of the sacraments speaks of " use "
and its :relation to the essence of the sacrament; but it is clear
from the context that it is question of administration. 1
More precise ideas are formulated in the discussion on baptism. Distinguishing two effects of the sacrament, grace and
the character, St. Thomas says that, although the second is
given whether or not the will of the subject is disposed for the
first, even it demands " some desire of :receiving the sacrament." 2 It is to be noticed that, in conformity with the outlook
of the Sentences, it is the connotation of causality that here
predominates in the notion of sacrament and it is in this framework that the matter is solved. The same immediate recourse
to the demands of causality as a principle of solution is to be
1 IV Sent., d. l, q. 1, a. S, ad 2.
• Ibid., d. 4, q. S, a. 2, sol. 1: "Duplex est effectus baptismi. Primus qui est res

et sacramentum, sci!., character. Et quia character non imprimitur ad praeparandam voluntatem ut aliquid bene fiat cum non sit habitus sed potentia . . . ideo
hunc effectum voluntatis indispositio non impedit, dummodo aliqualis sit voluntas
sacramentum recipiendi."

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259

found in sol. 2 of this article and in the article on the constitution of the sacrament. 3
The part played by this desire of receiving the sacrament is
formulated explicitly when the question is answered: Whether
an intention or act of will is required in the subject of this
sacrament:
In baptism the subject receives two things, the sacrament itself,
and the effect of the sacrament. But for receiving these two things
there is no need for the intervention of any causality on the part
of the recipient. Nothing more is required than the removal of any
obstacles; obstacles, that is to say, which consist in opposition of
the will to either of the two things mentioned. 4

The same teaching is repeated in positive terms in the following
article:
The soul cannot be submitted to anything unless it be willing. The
purpose of the act of will, the intention, is therefore that man
should submit himself to the sacrament; but the purpose of faith
is that he should submit himself as he ought. Consequently, faith
is required only for the reception of the grace of the sacrament,
but the intention is required for the reception of the sacrament
itself. 5

What degree of intention-actual, habitual or (as modern
terminology has it) virtual-is required of subjects in various
states of consciousness is a psychological problem that St.
Thomas has already discussed when explaining how children
and others who have not the use of reason can receive the
effects of baptism. 6 His teaching does not differ from that given
later in the Summa.
St. Thomas formulates the principle that governs his conclusions on the part played by the subject in the sacraments
when he deals with penance:
• Ibid., d. 1, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1; d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1.
•Ibid., d. 6, q. l, a. 2, sol. 8.
"Ibid., d. 6, q. l, a. 3, sol. l, ad 3. For extreme unction, cf. ibid., d. 23, q. 1,
a. 4, sol. 2, ad l.
• Ibid., d. 4, q. 8, a. 1.

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COLMAN O'NEILL

Certain of the remedies used for bodily sickness require no action
on the part of the patient but consist in submitting to the curative
-for example, surgery or poulticing-while others consist in the
exercise of the patient-for example, the taking of a cure. In
just the same way certain of the sacraments require no act on the
part of the subject so far as the substance of the sacrament is
concerned, unless it be per accidens, for removing obstacles (as is
clear in baptism and confirmation and the like) ; others require
essentially and per se an act of the subject for the essence of tht)
sacrament (as is clear in penance and marriage). Thus in those
sacraments that are performed without any act of ours, it is the
matter that causes and signifies, in the fashion of a medicament
externally applied. But in those sacraments which demand our
acts, there is no such matter; instead it is the external actions
themselves that now take the place of the matter in the other
sacraments. 7
In this respect reception of the Eucharist is distinguished from
baptism in that the former demands faith:
For receiving baptism sacramentally nothing more is required of
the subject but that he submit himself to the action of the Church,
with the intention of receiving what she administers, even though,
on occasion, he may believe that she is doing nothing. But the
person who receives the Eucharist is not simply a receptacle or
passive subject; he is also an agent because he eats. Consequently
if he is to eat the Eucharist sacramentally, it is required that he
use the sacrament as a sacrament. 8
This means that, though the true Body of Christ is eaten by
all who receive the sacrament, only a believer (who has the
other qualifications demanded) can use it as a sacrament. It
should be observed, however, that there is not an exact parallel
between reception of baptism and Communion since, as St.
Thomas observes: " the perfection of the other sacraments consists in use ... the perfection of (the Eucharist) consists in the
consecration of the matter." 9 Consequently, what St. Thomas
calls" sacramental eating" corresponqs to fruitful reception of
• Ibid., d. I4, q. I, a. 1, sol. I, ad I. Cf. ibid., d. I7, q. S, a. S, sol. 4, and d. 84,
q. un., a. I, ad I (concerning matrimony).
• Ibid., d. 9, a. 2, sol. 2, ad 2.
• Ibid., d. 9, a. I, sol. S, ad 2.

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SIGNIFICATION

baptism rather than to reception of the sacrament as such.
Nevertheless, it is clear from what St. Thomas says here that
the Eucharist cannot be classed as a " remedy externally
applied." This is an indication that the medical parallel must
not be applied too rigidly as though some sacraments excluded
all acts of the subject.
What is said in these places about the part played by the
subject remains unrelated, at least explicitly, to the suggestions
already put forward by St. Thomas about the function of the
character of baptism which is said to deputize its bearer to
" participate in all spiritual receptions." 10
A hint of a wider frame of reference for solving sacramental
problems than that of the causality exercised by the sacraments
is given when faith is stated to play a role in the sacraments
preliminary to causality:
In the sacraments it is primarily faith that is operative [and not
any of the other virtues; see objection], for through it the sacraments are in a certain fashion connected with their principal cause
and also with the recipient. 11

In contrast to this the faith and hope of the subject are said
to "have nothing to do'' with the sacrament itself, though
they can either promote or impede the effect. 12 It is the faith of
the Church that establishes the connection between sacrament
and divine cause by " relating the instrument to the principal
cause and the sign to the thing signified." 13 In the Sentences
there is no suggestion that the subject as such plays any part
here.
In the Sentences, as appears from all this, St. Thomas :reduces
the participation of the subject to the minimum: for the majority of the sacraments it involves nothing more than an intention of :reception which is a removens prohibens; in penance
and matrimony it enters the essence of the sacrament. Given
the understanding of the sacraments St. Thomas defends in the
.Sentences, no other teaching would be possible. He looks on
10

11

Ibid., d. 7, q.
a. 1, sol. 1.
Ibid., d. 4, q. 3, a. !2, sol. 2, ad !2.

12

18

Cf. ibid., d. 2, q. !2, a. 4.
Ibid., d. l, q. l, a. 4, sol. 3.

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COLMAN O'NEILL

them merely as causes of the sacramental characters and of
grace-hence his division of them into two kinds of remedies.
If they are also signs, as he admits they are, they are signs
precisely of causes and of what is to be caused. If this view is
taken of the sacraments it is clear that, with the exception of
those that are obviously based on a human
they will be
thought of as requiring nothing more of the subject than the
removal of obstacles to their action. The possibility of a wider
view of the whole sacramental ceremony is only touched upon
in the Sentences when the role of faith is mentioned. This is an
idea that will be developed in the Summa where St. Thomas
brings to the foreground the idea of a cultural sign of faith.
A further hint of a more strictly sacramental approach is to
be found in the Sentences where St. Thomas explains why
orders may be given only to a man or boy, and extreme unction
only to a sick person. There are certain requirements on the
part of the subject if the sacrament is to be validly received:
Hence, even if a woman went through all the ceremonies of ordination, she would not receive orders; for since a sacrament is a
sign there is demanded for its administration, not only the effect,
but the signification of the effect; just as for extreme unction the
subject must be sick so that the sign of one who needs cure may
be complete. Since, therefore, the state of preeminence cannot be
signified in female sex, it being the state of subjection, a woman
cannot receive the sacrament of orders.H

When an objector tries to argue on lines parallel to these that
the irregularity of " bigamy " cannot be dispensed since its
absence is necessary for receiving the sacrament of orders, St.
Thomas makes a distinction. He admits that freedom from
such an impediment is signified by the sacrament. However,
not every signification is .of the essence of the sacrament, but only
that one which pertains to the office of the sacrament. 15

This is a distinction equivalent to that between requirements
for validity and for liceity in ordination.
"Ibid., d. 25, q. 2, a. 1, sol. I.
Ibid., d. 27, q. S, a. S, ad S; cf. also Suppl., q. 66, a. 5, ad 8.

15

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Summa Theologiae
Again in the Summa, when he compares penance with the
other sacraments, 16 St. Thomas uses the distinction between
medicines externally applied and cures that depend on the
patient's own resources, but he is careful to avoid any appearance of a mechanistic conception of sacraments that belong to
the former category.
The quotation from St. Gregory at the beginning of the
article reflects St. Thomas' awareness in his later years of the
inadequacy of the category of cause to deal with the sacraments
and his consequent adoption of the notion of sign as the primary
concept of sacramental theology:
A sacrament consists in a ritual action which is carried out in such
a way that we receive, under the form of a sign, something belonging to holiness.17
The reply to the first objection, again in reference to a statement of Gregory, explains the broad interpretation to be placed
on the idea of" the material element" (res corporales) in the
sacramental sign. It includes, besides the water of baptism and
the chrism of confirmation, the external actions of the subject
in penance. A material object, goes on St. Thomas, is used in
those sacraments " in which an exceptional grace is given, surpassing altogether the proportion of any human act." This is
the case in baptism, confirmation and extreme unction. His
concern here being solely with the manner in which the various
sacraments signify the efficient production of grace, St. Thomas
simply concludes that any acts of the subject in these three
sacraments are dispositions for the reception of grace:
Wherefore, if there are any human acts in these sacraments, they
are not the essential matter of the sacrament, but are dispositions
for the sacrament. On the other hand, in those sacraments whose
effect corresponds to some human acts, the human acts themselves
take the place of matter, as in the case of penance and matrimony. 18
Summa Theol., Ill, q. 84, a. I.
Loc. cit.
18 Loc. cit., ad 1.
18
17

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COLMAN o'NEILL

TJ!J.e emphasis of this text merits closer attention. It is on
signification, and specifically on the signification by the ritual
of the mode of production of grace in the soul. The matter of
a given sacrament is an external action of the subject or a
material object according as the effect of the sacrament corresponds more or less to the internal acts of the subject. In the
second case the ceremony signifies primarily the giving of
grace from outside the subject; the stress is laid on its gratuitousness. In the first case the sacrament emphasizes man's
necessary cooperation. This is all on the level of signification.
In both cases, on the ontological level, grace is from without
and is gratuitous; and in both cases man must cooperate in the
measure he is able. These are general principles that cannot be
laid aside. There is nothing to prevent the cooperation of the
subject being signified by the sacramental action even of baptism, confirmation and extreme unction; just as, conversely,
the gift of grace is signified in penance by the words of the
minister. (This indicates a possible explanation of what St.
Thomas implies in this text when he admits the possibility of
the acts of the subject being " in " these three sacraments.)
When the sacrament is considered strictly as a cause of grace,
however, the subject's acts, where they are not actually the
matter of the sacrament, can be thought of only as " dispositions for the sacrament," dispositions, that is to say, for the
effect of the sacrament.
That the sacramental sign in fact signifies more than the bare
efficient production of grace is made clear by St. Thomas in
several places. In his discussion of the constitution of baptism
he distinguishes sacramentum tantum, reset sacramentum and
res tantum, and explains the first in this way:
That which is " sacrament only " is something visible and outward;
the sign, namely, of the inward effect; for such is the very nature
of the sacrament. 19

Into this exterior sign he now introduces the subject. Hugh of
19

Summa Theol., III, q. 66, a. 1.

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265

St. Victor seems to say that baptism is water; but this opinion
is false,
for, since the sacraments of the New Law effect a certain sanctification, there the sacrament is completed where sanctification is
completed. Now, sanctification is not completed in water; but a
certain sanctifying, instrumental virtue, not permanent but transient, passes from the water, in which it is, into man who is the
subject of true sanctification. Consequently the sacrament is not
completed in the water itself, but in applying the water to man,
that is, in the washing 20

In reading this text the nuances of the word " sacrament "
for St. Thomas and the immediate context must not be forgotten. An appeal is made to the manner of the production of
grace by the sacrament in order to decide what elements are
to belong to the external sign (sacramentum tantum). Man
is the subject of the sacrament's causality; therefore, the sign
of his sanctification must be not merely water but water in the
act of washing man. 21
This says nothing more about the part played by the subject
in the sacramental sign than could be satisfied by mere physical
submission to the action of the minister; but the teaching of
the Church shows that more is needed; and St. Thomas modifies
accordingly his notion of the scope of signification of the
sacrament:
By the fact that a man offers himself to be cleansed by baptism he
signifies that he is disposed for interior cleansing. 22
•• Ibid., cf. IV Sent., d. 3, a. l, sol. 1, ad 2.
21 The same idea is to be found in Summa Theol., III, q. 66, a. lO: " De necessitate quidem sacramenti est et forma, quae designat principalem causam sacramenti, et minister, qui est causa instrumentalis, et usus materiae, scilicet ablutio
in aqua, quae designat principalem sacramenti effectum "; De forma absolutionis
poenitentiae sacramentalis: "In baptismo etiam verba prolata super aquam tantum
non faciunt sacramentum sed super aquam adhibitam baptizato, quod totum est
loco materiae." (Opusc. theol., Marietti, 1954, vol. I, pp. 169 f.; n. 708); I ad Cor.,
c. 11, lect. 5 (660); de Verit., q. 27, a. 4, ad 4; ibid., ad 17: "Actio naturalis
materialis instrumenti adiuvat ad effectum sacramenti, in quantum per earn sacramentum suscipienti applicatur, et in quantum sacramenti significatio per actionem
praedictam completur, sicut significatio baptismi per ablutionem."
•• Summa Theol., III, q. 68, a. 4.

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o'NEILL

Here St. Thomas makes no distinction comparable to that used
by theologians concerned with the practical administration of
the sacraments between " conditions " required in the subject
for valid, and those required for fruitful, reception of the sacraments. Taking for granted validity, he considers the act of
reception of the sacrament as a sign of faith of one in the
proper dispositions. The faith of the subject and of the Church,
he says again, operate towards the effect of baptism. 23 He is
more precise in the First Quodlibet:
In baptism something is required on the part of the minister,
namely, that he pour the water and utter the words, and something
is required on the part of the subject, namely, that he form an
intention and that he be washed. 24

The intention required of the subject in baptism is discussed in
III, q. 68, aa. 7 and 8.25 In the corpus of a. 7 St. Thomas
accounts for the necessity of this intention by indicating the
obligations undertaken in baptism. The new form of life that
they involve must be accepted willingly; and consequently the
ceremony that initiates a person into that life must be the
object of an act of will, an intention. The subject may be the
" patient " so far as justification goes, but he must adopt this
position willingly. 26 Article eight deals more precisely with
the amount of knowledge required for making this intention.
St. Thomas distinguishes between what is demanded for receiving the character and what is demanded for receiving grace
-this is a distinction between requirements for validity and
those for fruitfulness. For grace, faith is necessary, since without faith there can be no justification. On the other hand, for
the character:
true faith is not necessarily required in the subject for baptism, just
•• Ibid., q. 39, a. 5.
24 Quodl. l, q. 6, a. 1.
•• Cf. also Summa Theol., III, q. 69, a. 9, "Utrum fictio impediat effectum
baptismi."

•• Ibid., q. 68, a. 7, ad 1: "In justificatione
passio coacta, sed voluntaria."

quae fit per baptismum

non est

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as true faith is not required in the minister; provided that all the
other requirements for the sacrament are present. 27

When faith is lacking, goes on St. Thomas,
it is sufficient for receiving the sacrament to have a general intention of receiving baptism as Christ instituted it and as the
Church administers it. 28

The close parallel between the object of the subject's intention
and that of the minister's is to be noted. The minister's intention is required to direct the sacramental action to a determined
purpose. 29 It is not, however, necessary that the minister believe in that purpose, but simply that he place his actions at
the service of the Church:
.
Therefore he is required to make an intention of subordinating
himself to the principal agent; so that he intends to do what
Christ and the Church do. 30

The cooperation of minister and subject in completing the
sacramental sign and thus giving effect to the intention of the
Church is explicitly referred to in the same article:
In the words uttered (by the minister) the intention of the Church
is expressed; and this suffices for completing the sacrament, unless
the contrary be outwardly expressed on the part of either the
minister or the recipient of the sacrament. 31

If the subject has not placed an intention baptism must be
administered again. 32 Though children are clearly incapable of
such an intention, St. Thomas will not dispense the requirement
in their case. The intention is made for them, he says, by those
"' Ibid., a.. 8.
•• Ibid., ad 8.
•• Cf. ibid., q. 64, a. 8: "Ea quae in sacramentis aguntur possunt diversimode
agi: sicut ablutio aquae, quae fit in baptismo, potest ordinari et ad munditiam
corporalem, et ad sanitatem corporalem, et ad ludum, et ad multa alia huiusmodi.
Et ideo oportet quod determinetur ad unum, id est ad sacramentalem effectum, per
intentionem abluentis."
•• Ibid., ad l.
81 Ibid., ad 2.
•• Cf. III, q. 68, a. 7, ad 2.

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who offer them to be baptized 33 and who, in this, act on behalf
of the Church. 34
Besides the intention there is another requirement for the
reception of all the sacraments except baptism. This is the
baptismal character, an instrumental power, directed, as has
been seen, towards validity of the sacrament. Of confirmation
St. Thomas says:
The character of confirmation of necessity supposes the baptismal
character: so that, in effect, if one who is not baptized were to
be confirmed, he would receive nothing, but would have to be
confirmed again after receiving baptism. 35

St. Thomas does not explicitly correlate the two requirements
in the subject. He accounts for the necessity of the character
for confirmation by reference to the analogy of birth and growth
which he uses to distinguish the first two sacraments.
The study devoted in the Summa to the subject of the sacraments, it will be seen from what has been said, is considerably
more suggestive than that of the Sentences. It is not that SL
Thomas retracts or contradicts anything that he said in the
earlier work; but he has discovered the riches of a new dimension in the sacraments. He no longer feels himself constrained
to limit the participation of the subject to that of removens
prohibens. The sacraments are integral parts of human worship and in the realm of signification the subject may be
allowed a part that can be said to be" in the sacrament, always
without prejudice to the special part played by the minister
and the matter and form." Nor is this a purely physical subjection to the action of the sacrament; it demands willing
cooperation, without which the sacrament itself is void. In a
baptized member of the Church it involves a physical power
in the subject's intellect, a power that is instrumental. In the
•• Cf. a. 9, ad l.
•• Cf. ibid., ad 2. Cajetan, in Summam Theol., III, q. 68, a. 7, n. 7, argues
inversely: since the child forms no intention for baptism, neither, per se, need
an adult. This conclusion is explicitly rejected by all the principal succeeding
commentators. See below.
•• Ibid., q. 72, a. 6.

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context of causality or production of grace, however (which is
" posterior in nature " to signification) , it is the objective elements of the sacrament that are active; the subject's part is
"dispositive." St. Thomas does not explain in detail what this
implies; but it is clearly more positive than the solution proposed in the Sentences.
An attempt must now be made to draw out the implications
of St. Thomas' teaching by interpreting in the light of his key
sacramental concepts some of his apparently uncorrelated conclusions and thus discovering their hidden harmony.
Most of the commentators devote their discussion of the
subject's intention to refuting an opinion put forward by Cardinal Cajetan. They are concerned with showing the faults in
the arguments on which this opinion is based and it is usually
only in the briefest fashion that they say what the intention
does. This debate serves to indicate the way most theologians
think about the matter.
Cajetan and his opponents on the necessity of the subject's
intention.
The practice in the Church of baptizing children, together
with a letter sent by Pope Innocent III to the Bishop of Aries
in 1201 dealing with the consent required for receiving baptism,36 raises certain problems concerning the necessity and the
role of the subject's intention.
Cajetan, with this material, takes up the extreme position
that, " speaking per se, an intention or act of will is not required
of the subject of baptism." It is required, as St. Thomas
teaches in the Sentences, only as a removens prohibens to
remove a contrary will should it have ever existed. 37 He gives
two reasons for this. The first is based on the authority of
Innocent ill (" The sacramental action gives the character
since it finds no obstacle in the will ") . What is at issue here
is a question of psychology, namely, what constitutes an ob•• Innocent UI, Ep. Maiores Ecclesiae causas; cf. Denz. 410, 411.
07 Cajetan,
in Summa Theol., III, q. 68, a. 7, n. 7: "Dicendum mihi videtur
quod non exigitur intentio seu voluntas ex parte baptizandi."

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COLMAN O'NEILL

stacle, obex, in the will; and on these terms Cajetan's opinion is
discussed and refuted by later Thomists. Their arguments will
be considered later.
Cajetan's second reason is a strictly sacramental one. He
argues ·that what is not necessary in one subject of baptism is
not necessary for the sacrament, speaking per se, in any subject;
however, an intention is not necessary in a child; therefore, it is
not per se necessary for the sacrament. Nothing more is required than the absence of an obstacle in the will. He supports
the minor of the argument by denying an objection. The
intention of the child's parents provides no disposition; it
merely procures the approach of patient to agent. He gives
an example of a child presented for baptism by Jewish parents
for some human motive. The Church, he asserts, does not
intend that such a child should receive baptism; yet, in fact,
the sacrament is valid. As for the text of St. Thomas, in the
article he is commenting on where an intention is said to be
necessary, Cajetan declares:
This is to be understood of what always in fact happens in adults.
Such a subject will never be found neutral, but he will either
intend or refuse baptism, implicitly or explicitly, etc. Hence it is
true to say that " if an intention of receiving the sacrament is
lacking in an adult, he would have to be re-baptized" for the lack
of intention would be attached to a contrary intention. 38
The Salmanticenses oppose Cajetan, maintaining that precisely for the , validity of the sacrament there is required an
intention on the part of the subject. 89 This they characterize
as the common opinion of theologians 40 and as the teaching of
St. Thomas in the Summa, if not in the Sentences. 41 It is to be
noted that, whereas Cajetan confines his remarks to the sacrament of baptism (though his principles can be applied to other
sacraments), the Salmanticenses speak in general terms.
They reply to Cajetan's argument based on child baptism
Cajetan, loc. cit. n. 10.
•• Salmanticenses, Cur81UI theologicua,tr. 22, disp. 8, dub. I.
•• Ibid., n. 8.
"Ibid., n. 11.

88

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that, though· the requirements on the part of the sacrament
itself are always the same, this is not true of what is required
of the subject,
for it often happens that what is not required on the part of one
subject is called for on the part of another on account of diverse
dispositions or states of the subjects. 42

Consequently, just as children are justified without any act on
their
whereas adults must freely consent, so the requirements for validity of sacraments differ according to the powers
of the subjects. 43
The Salmanticenses are careful to note that the intention of
the subject does not intervene in the sacrament "actively, as
an efficient cause removing original sin or causing grace." They
say that it " intervenes dispositively " in relation to the validity
and effect of the sacrament; and this they appear to understand
in the sense of removens prohibens. 44
Billuart, who also opposes Cajetan, holds that the intention
is a conditio sine qua non. 45 This is the common teaching of
manualists. 46
It appears, however, that these theologians, though they correctly reject Cajetan's arguments, do not react sufficiently
against his position. Adequately though it may respond to the
•• Ibid.
•• Cf. ibid.: "Quoniam parvuli sunt incapaces talis consensus [ad valorem sacramentorum], adulti vero sunt capaces illius: unde oportet quod habeant diversam
applicationem ad sacramenta: sicut ob idem motivum diverso modo justificantur."
"Ibid.: " Sicut ille motus [voluntatis] concurrit dispositive excludendo oppositam
voluntatem, et carentiam debitae intentionis, sic etiam dispositive concurrit tam
ad valorem, quam ad effectum sacramenti."
•• Billuart, Summa, diss. 6, a. 1. Replying to Cajetan's argument: "Quod est
necessarium in uno ad substantiam sacramenti est necessarium in omnibus; ergo.
Resp. dist. ant. Quod est necessarium ut quid essentiale, cone.; quod est necessarium ut dispositio subjecti tantum et conditio sine qua non, subdistinguo: si
subjectum sit capax illius, cone.; si sit incapax ut sunt pueri et amentes, neg.
. . . Non dicimus intentionem subjecti requiri essentialiter ad sacramentum, sed
tantum ut conditionem ex parte subjecti."
'"E. g., V. Zubizarreta, 0. Carm., Tkeologia dogmatiqo-sckolastica, vol. 4, De
sacramentis (ed. 8, Bilbao, 1989), n. 175; L. Billot, S. J., De Ecclesiae Sacramentis, t. I, q. 64, th. 19 (Rome, 1898).

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broad requirements of the defined doctrine of the Church, their
conclusion with its single-minded concentration on essentials
sweeps aside the whole delicate system of man-centered sacramentalism constructed by St. Thomas. It is a conclusion that
depends, not on the first principle of St. Thomas' sacramental
theology, but on a false interpretation of that principle which
gives to it a formally non-sacramental sense. Those theologians
who teach it are concerned only with the fact that the sacraments cause grace, whatever be the mode of causality they
defend. They leave out of consideration the fact that the sacraments are primarily (by a primacy of nature) signs. 47 On this
basic, strictly sacramental level the participation of the subject
is more than a condition. The very idea of condition-something that is required for a cause to operate, while not itself
entering into the causality-belongs to the _order of efficient
causality, not to that of signification, nor to that of efficient
causality based on signification. These assertions must be
explained.

The essence of the sacrament.
A sacrament may be considered in its essential qualities as an
active principle, signifying the giving of grace and used as a
physical instrument by God in effecting what it signifies. As
such it abstracts from the requirements for its valid reception
which vary according to the condition of the individual subject.
Its essential parts are its matter and form which are united by
the intention of the minister. Hence result the three traditional
requirements for completing the sacrament. In this connection
St. Thomas' teaching in the short work De articulis fidei et
Ecclesiae sacramentis 48 has a particular interest because of
its use by the Council of Florence in drawing up the Decree for
the Armenians. The Council summarizes St. Thomas and
states:
47 Even Billot is concerned with the causality
of the sacraments. His theology
of sign does not involve the subject in the same way as does St. Thomas' concept
of signs of worship.
•• Opusc. theol., Marietti, 1954, vol. I, pp. 139 f. Date:
(cf. ibid.,
pp. 139, 140).

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All these sacraments are made up of three elements, namely, things
as matter, words as form, and the person of the minister who
administers the sacrament with the intention of doing what the
Church does. If any of these elements is lacking, the sacrament
is not completed. 49

It is to be noted that in the use of this hylomorphic terminology
there is question of an analogy taken from the physical order.
It is not to be understood in a physical sense of the sacraments
but in terms of signification. The form further determines the
natural- symbolism of the matter and gives it its specifically
Christian and sacramental signification. 50
The essence of a sacrament thus formed is what determines
the particular nature of its operation and effect. This is not
sufficient, however, to give concrete existence and activity to
a sacrament which is perfected only when it is actually being
received by a subject, that is to say, to any sacrament' other
than the Eucharist.
Even when considered in the abstract, according to its
essence, as an active principle of grace, signifying and causing
by material elements and by words, the sacrament is transcendentally related to a subject. This it has in common with
aU action (excepting creation) , which is essentially related to
a subject or patient and which draws its effect from the potentiality of the subject. Thus, in the concrete, there can be no
possibility of sacramental causality without a subject. This
is reflected on the level of signification. The adequate sign of
causality must include the application of the material elements
to a subject: not water, but washing, is required for baptism. 51
l\1ere physical submission to the sacraments on the part of
•• Cf. Denz. 695. Cf. 2Qnd. question proposed to Wycliffites and Hussites in the
Bull, Inter cunctas, 22 Feb., 1418 (Denz. 672); Council of Trent, sess. 14 (Denz.
895): " ... materia et forma quibus sacramenti essentia perficitur ... "; Leo XIII,
Ep., Apostolicae curae, 18 Sept., 1896 (Denz. 1968): "In ritu cuiuslibet sacramenti
... discemunt ... partem essentialem quae materia et forma appellari consuevit."
•• Cf. H. E. Schillebeeckx, 0. P., De Sacramentele heilseconomie, Antwerp, 1952,
Sectie II, Hoofdstuk II (pp. 855 f., esp. pp. 380-382) and Hoofdstuk III (pp. 893 f.,
esp. pp. 405-416).
61
Cf. Summa Theol., Ill, q. 66, a. 1 and places noted in. n. 21, above.

COLMAN O'NEII-L

one who has the use of reason is not, however, enough. 52 Man
is a free agent and he is moved by God to accept freely the
grace given him; so it is required that he freely submit himself
to the action of the sacrament. If he has no intention of receiving the sacrament his external acceptance of it is not a
true sign of his interior disposition. Consequently, the complete
sign-action of the administration of the sacrament is not true.
The sacrament such as it is performed and applied by the
minister is not received by the subject. It is reduced by the
fault of the subject to an unnatural state. It still signifies the
salvific will of God but no longer as concretely effective for this
individual subject. If, however, while not properly disposed
to receive grace, the subject seriously intends to receive the
sacrament, the external submission he makes is a true sign
and the sacrament is actually received by him and produces
whatever effects do not depend on his state of soul.
It is the primary submission of the subject that makes the
individual sacrament a practical sign of faith; and this even
when the subject himself is an unbeliever. Without this intention the sacrament is not properly a sign of the faith of the
Church. This idea must be examined.
The faith of the Church as a constituent of the sacrament
The faith of the Church is required for the very existence of
the sacraments. This is a consequence of their nature as signs,
existing, therefore, formally as relations imposed by an intelli. gence. Since they are practical signs and causes of sanctification
they can be set up only by God. 58 Thus the original imposition
of signification on certain ceremonies was effected by the mind
of Christ. The signs that He instituted can be recognized as
such only by faith since they are supernatural. Likewise the
.. Cf. ibid., q. 61, a. 1, ad 1: "Exercitatio per usum sacramentorum non est
pure corporalis, sed quodammodo est spiritualis: scilicet per significationem et
causalitatem," See also places noted above, nn. 24 f.
•• Cf. ibid., q. 60, a. 5; q. 64, a. 2. On the nature of the sacraments as signs, c:f.
John of St. Thomas, Cursu., theologicus, disp. 22, a. 1; H. Schillebeeckx, op. cit.,
pp. 181-148.

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reference of sacramental rites performed by the Church to the
institution of Christ and to His salvific will can be made only
by faith; and without this reference the rites cannot be sacramental, cannot, that is, exist as signs. 54 The faith of the Church
which imposes this relation of signification on individual ceremonies is based on the faith of the Apostles to whom Christ
revealed his intention. 55 This practical act of faith is what the
Church "does" (quod facit Ecclesia) in the sacraments; and
it is this that the intention of the minister serves 56 by pronouncing the form over specified matter. 57
St. Thomas' insistence on the intervention of the faith of
the Church demonstrates beyond any doubt that he regards the
intentions of those concerned in the sacraments as pertaining
directly and immediately to the order of signification-they
impose or cause the signification of an individual ceremony.
Efficient causality of grace comes after this as a consequence,
an entirely gratuitous complement granted by God, not essentially (thoughinfallibly) connected with the ceremonial of the
Church.
It is precisely for the perfection of the ceremonial of the
Church, as applied to an individual adult, therefore for the
perfection of a concrete sacramental sign, that the intention of
the subject is essential. The subject must signify genuine
acceptance of what the Church offers. Otherwise the sacrament
is not a concrete, practical sign; it is merely a speculative sign
•• Cf. IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. S: "Principale autem et per se agens ad
justificationem est Deus sicut causa efficiens, et passio Christi sicut meritoria. Huic
autem causae continuatur sacramentum per fidem Ecclesiae quae instrumentum
re£ert ad principalem causam, et signum ad signatum." See Schillebeeckx, op. cit.,
pp. 879, 404 f.
•• Cf. Summa Theol., 11-II, q. 174, a. 6: "Super revelatione facta Apostolis de
fide ... fundatur tota fides Ecclesiae "; III, q. 64, a. 2, ad 8: "Apostoli et eorum
successores sunt vicarii Dei quantum ad regimen Ecclesiae institutae per fidem et
fidei sacramenta "; ibid., ad 1.
•• Cf. ibid., III, q. 64, a. 8, ad 1; ibid., a. 9, ad 1: "Potest (minister) intendere
facere id quod facit Ecclesia, licet existimet illud nihil esse. Et talis intentio
sufficit ad sacramentum, quia . . . minister sacramenti agit in persona totius
Ecclesiae, ex cuius fide suppletur id quod deest fidei ministro "; q. 67, a. 5, ad 2.
"'Cf. ibid., ad 2; q. 60, a. 7, ad S.

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of the divine will to save all men. Faith is not required of
the subject. He simply accepts the sign of the Church's faith. 58
The willing cooperation of a subject who has the use of reason
is, therefore, an integral part of the sacramental ceremony.
Without it, those sacraments which exist only at the time of
use, even though they have their essential parts, lack something
required for their perfection. 59 It is only when they are perfect
as signs received by an individual that there is any possibility
of their acting as causes.
Certain difficulties remain to be solved concerning those who
are incapable of forming an intention.

Variations in the intention
What is required of the subject for the existence of a true
sacrament (sacramentum tan tum) varies according to his state
of consciousness. What is essential to the sacrament is that it
should signify the giving of grace to a subject. The state of the
individual subject to whom the sacrament is concretely applied
determines the signification of the complete sign-action. Thus
the administration of baptism to a child signifies justification
of an unconscious being whereas the willing submission of an
adult signifies justification of a
human person. The
dispositions of will required for valid administration of baptism
are discussed by the commentators in connection with Cajetan's
•• Cf. ibid., q. 68, a. 8, ad 8; l.V Sent., d. 4, q. 8, a. 2, sol. 2, ad 2: "In sacramentis praecipue fides operatur, per quam sacramenta quodammodo continuantur
suae causae principaliter agenti et etiam ipsi recipienti." The force of " quodammodo" has already been explained; viz., directly, by way of signification; indirectly,
by way of efficient causality (which is to be attributed to God as agent, not to
faith). It is to be observed also that if, as the Church intends, the subject does
believe, his faith is assumed under the faith of the Church and thus plays a part
in directing the intention of the minister.
•• Schillebeeckx, op. cit., appears to go too far when he asserts that without the
intention of the subject the sacrament is not an action of the Church. (Cf. p. 482:
" Zander de vrije ·beaming van het sacramentum kan de ritus geen symbooldaad
van de Kerk zijn, daar deze symbooldaden wezenlijk sacramentele, kerelijke
handelingen zijn die aan een menselijk subject en wei op menselijke wijze worden
voltrokken.") ·The Church authentically offers the sacrament and this is signified
by the ritual.

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interpretation o£ Innocent III's letter. The discussion resolves
itself into the purely psychological question: what constitutes
an obstacle in the will to reception o£ a new responsibility?
Though this formulation o£ the question reflects the pastoral
concern o£ the Church with the administration o£ fruitful sacraments and the speculative preoccupation o£ these theologians
with the efficient causality o£ the sacraments, the replies given
to it are valid £or determining the requirements o£ the sacraments as -signs.
The teaching o£ the Pope contains the following conclusions.
Those who accept baptism under duress, in the same way as
those who accept it while feigning good dispositions, receive the
character, since they are really, i£ conditionally, willing. On
the contrary,
a person who has never given consent, but persists in refusal, receives neither grace nor the character, since express refusal goes
beyond lack of consent .... Those who are sleeping or are mentally
unbalanced, if they persisted in refusal before they became unbalanced or went to sleep, do not receive the character even if
water is poured on them since their resolution to refuse is understood to remain. The effect is otherwise if they were preparing for
baptism and had the intention of receiving it; and so in these cases
the Church administers baptism if necessity demands. Then the
sacramental action gives the character since it finds no obstacle in
the will.60
All are agreed, including Cajetan,S 1 that a person with the
use o£ reason cannot be neutral in regard to the reception o£ a
sacrament. He will either refuse it or accept. In the second
case his intention is either actual or virtual; therefore exercizing
a real influence over his action. 62 Children and those who have
always been.o£ unbalanced mind are incapable o£ an intention.
The difficulty concerns adults who are unconscious (or whose
reception is not a human act, i.e., is not governed by an actual
60 Innocent
III, Ep. Maiores Ecclesiae causas, 1201 (Denz. 410, 411).
Ver., q. 28, a. 8, ad 2; Summa Theol., I-II, q. 118, a. 8, ad l.
61 ln Summam
Theol., III, q. 68, a. 7, n. 4.
•• Cf. Salrnanticenses, tr. 22, disp. 8, dub. 1, n. 8.

Cf. de

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COLMAN o'NEILL

or virtual intention) and those who have lost their balance of
mind after coming to the use of reason. Cajetan maintains
that Pope Innocent teaches that baptism can have an effect
on such as these if they have never at any time explicitly
refused to accept it. The absence of such refusal, he argues,
constitutes an absence of obstacle to the sacrament.
The Salmanticenses refuse to accept this argument. If baptism were independent in this way of the subject's consent, they
reason, the Church should not deny it to those who have become
of unbalanced mind after reaching the use of reason and who
have not, when they were capable, consented to accept it. 63
Their explanation of the practice of the Church is that
an adult who makes no positive act of consent to the reception of
the sacraments virtually refuses it and puts it away from him ...
because every person who has the use of reason.has the intention,
at least virtually and interpretatively, that nothing shall be done
concerning his person in matters of moment without his personal
and positive consent. 64
The meaning of obex is clear, they go on, from the whole of
Innocent's letter.
He does not at all mean that a neutral will, or a mere lack of
contrary intention, is sufficient for validity of the sacrament; he
means by " an obstacle of contrary intention " both an intention
formally and positively contrary and an intention interpretatively
contrary, as is to be considered the lack of consent in adults to
whatever is done to their persons in matters of moment. 65
The Pope's use of the phrase "contrary will" is accounted for
by the particular question he has in mind, namely, forcible
baptism.
From this it follows that a positive, habitual intention (in
the modern sense of the term) is required of the subject who
receives a sacrament in a state of unconsciousness or who is
•• Ibid., n. 8.
'14 Ibid., n. 9.
•• Ibid., n. ll. Cf. Billuart, diss. 6, a. 1. He defines obex: "non sol urn resistentia
positiva, sed etiam dissensus negativus seu carentia consensus, ita ut ex negatione
intelligenda et supponenda sit affirmatio contraria."

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so distracted at the moment of reception that he is not performing a human act.
Applying these psychological notions to the order of signification in the sacraments two possibilities are to be envisaged.
(Baptism is taken for granted in the case of the subject of
the other sacraments). The subject will be either conscious
or unconscious. In the former case, if his reception of the
sacrament is a human act, his intention will intervene actively
either actually or virtually. The sacramental sign, to be true,
demands such participation. If his intention is merely habitual
he is not placing a human act, and if he receives the effect of
the sacrament he receives it in the same way as an unconscious
person. If the subject is,unconscious (or unbalanced, whether
so from birth or after attaining the use of reason, or so completely distracted as not to be placing a human act) there is
no question of active intervention of his intention, even supposing that he has one habitually. If he actually receives the
sacrament-and one sacrament at least, matrimony, he cannot
receive-it will be in the fashion of a child, ad modum pueri,
that is, without any active cooperation on his part here and
now. 66 If the unconscious subject is a child or an imbecile from
birth, the sacramental sign will be true simply through physical
submission. If the subject, however, is one who previously
had the use of reason-whether he is now asleep, intoxicated,
completely distracted or mentally unbalanced-the sacramental
sign will be true only if his will habitually accepts the sacrament, since what is signified is justification of one who is
unconscious and who places no obstacle in the way of the
sacrament (and of sacramental grace, though falsehood as
regards this element does not imperil validity). The Church
has no means of knowing whether the sign is true or not, except
conjecture, based more or less firmly on what she
of the
subject's previous life; but the same may be said of administration of the sacraments to those who are conscious. There is
•• This idea is to be found in Schillebeeckx, op. cit. p. 488.

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always the possibility of deception and consequent falsity in
the sacramental sign.
There is, therefore, a whole scale of necessary participation
in the sacramental signs by the subject, depending on his state
of consciousness. Since the psychological truths on which this
conclusion is based are acknowledged by nearly all theologians
it is a matter for wonder that there is current among manualists
-and it appears even in Billuart-the phrase (or some variation on it): The subject does not require an intention of the
same degree as the minister; 67 as though to say that no subject
need have more than an habitual intention. This is true of
an unconscious or distracted subject but of no other. As much
is required for conscious reception of a sacrament as is required
for any human act. This would be true no matter what were
the function to be assigned the intention in relation to the
sacrament.

The baptismal character
A complete account according to the principles of St. Thomas'
theology of the role of the subject's intention requires the correlation of what has already been said with the teaching in the
Summa on the sacramental characters, in particular that of
baptism. St. Thomas himself does not do this in more than
very summary and indirect fashion when he indicates the
cultual purpose of the character. His analysis of the subject's
intention is placed in the discussion of baptism so that any
reference to. the activity of the character is excluded since it is
this sacrament that produces the character.
St. Thomas' teaching on the baptismal character is tantalizing in its omission of details. The account of it proposed by
John of St. Thomas appears to be the only one that faithfully
interprets its boldly drawn lines by consistent reference to the
nature of sacraments as signs. It is the only one that pro.. Billuart, diss. 6, a. 1: "Non requiritur tanta intentio in suscipiente ac in
ministrante." Of. Billot, loc. cit.; Zubizarreta, loc. cit.; D. Priimmer, 0. P., Manuale
theologiae moralis, t. ill, n. 68 (ed. 11, 1958).

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vides a satisfying explanation for St. Thomas' application of
the concept of instrumental power to the character of baptism
as well as to that of orders.
John of St. Thomas indicates the essential interdependence
of intention and character. The character itself-and this
applies to all characters-has no proper action. Man is able
through the character to subordinate his actions to Christ the
Priest. 68 Thus the character does not produce the intention of
submitting to the sacrament (an act of the will) nor does it
produce the act of the practical intellect by which the intention
is implemented. These are produced by the bearer of the character, whether minister or subject, as a principal cause. The
character gives to these acts a mode which makes them valid
sacramentally and by which they serve ministerially the priesthood of Christ. 69 Thus John of St. Thomas sees the character
as the means by which human activity enters the sacramental
order and thereby serves Christ in His priestly activity. The
character of orders permits its subject to enter as an active
principle, the character of baptism permits entry as a passive
principle; so that minister and subject, each in his own way,
serve in the sacraments as ministers and therefore instrumentally.70 As will appear below, this refers formally not to the
causality of the sacraments but to their existence as signs.
The minister in virtue of his character serves as the active
•• John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologiCUII (Paris: Vives, 1886, t. 9) disp. 25,
a. 4, n. 86: "Non ergo character habet aliquem actum proprium . . . sed solum
homo mediante charactere debet subordinare et conformare actus suos sacerdotio
Christi."
•• Ibid., n. 85: " Quid autem sit ministerialiter concurrere et habere actus
dicimus quod non est producere aliquem actum cognitionis aut volitionis, quia
totum quod est in volitione aut cognitione procedere debet a causa vitali et ad
modum principalis se habente, sed producere hos actus et dirigere actiones exteriores sacramentaliter et sceundum subordinationem ad sacredotium Christi."
N. 44: "Ad id quod dicitur, an sit operativus actus vitalis interioris, dico quod
neque exterioris, quantum ad substantiam et elicientiam, cum isti eliciantur a
subjecto ut a causa principali; sed tam interioris quam exterioris, quoad modum,
seu ministerialem rationem, qua servitur sacerdotio Christi."
70 Ibid., disp. 25, a. 2, n. 17: "Character
est potentia competens ministris
sacramentorum, ut solum ministerialiter concurrunt ad ilia, sive passive, sive active;
potentia autem ministerialis instrumentalis est." Cf. ibid., n. 80.

COLMAN

O'NEILL

element in the sign; the subject in virtue of his character serves
as the passive element in the sign. Activity is demanded of
each if he is to serve in his respective function.
The instrumentality thus attributed to the priest by reason
of his character is not directed immediately towards the production of grace. Formally it consists in making the priest's
actions valid in the sacraments, thus subordinating them to
Christ in the order of signification; and in this it differs from
the instrumentality attributed to the subject only in the function it procures for the priest in the sign-action. 71 The fact
that, according to the teaching of St. Thomas, the priest is
physically elevated as an instrument by God in producing the
effect of the sacrament is something that is to be distinguished
from this primary instrumentality which is procured formally
by the character and which is identified with the validity of
human actions in the sacraments. 72 In relation to the secondary
instrumentality the priestly character and, in fact, the priest
himself are evidently passive insofar as they are elevated and
applied by God to the production of grace; this aspect does not
concern us here. The precise function of the priestly character
is to introduce the priest's actions into the liturgy to serve
Christ actively; just as the function of the baptismal character
is to introduce the subject's actions to serve Christ passively;
in both cases the service is carried out on the level of worship,
of signs of faith. 73 It is as a consequence of the validity given
71 Ibid., disp.
a.
n. 143: "Character non est potentia instrumentalis primo
et per se ad gratiam producendam sed ad. conficienda sacramenta valide et per se
primo in genere sacramentali, ita quod sine illo sunt nulla." Cf. ibid., n.
" Per characterem non datur activitas ad effectum sacramentorum, qui producitur
instrumentaliter, sed validitas ad actus, ut non sint nulli, sed validi in genere
sacramentali."
72 On this interpretation
of St. Thomas, cf. C. O'Neill, 0. P., "The instrumentality of the sacramental character. An interpretation of Summa theol., III, q. 63,
a.
Irish Theol. Quart.,
(1958).
73 John
of St. Thomas, loc. cit., n. 124: " Si dices: ergo omnis character est
potentia passiva quia non habet activitatem respectu instrilmentalis concursus
et motionis; respondetur quod character non datur in ordine ad instrumentalem
motionem ut ad proprium actum (quia etiamsi non daretur physica motio instrumentalis adhuc daretur character) sed in ordine ad ea quae sunt protestationes

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to the priest's action by his character that the priest further
receives (if the subject is properly disposed) the vis fluens
which applies him physically to producing the effect of the
sacrament. 74
The sacramental characters bring it about, therefore, that
when priest and subject, acting as principal, secondary causes,
perform together certain acts of worship in accordance with
the prescriptions of the Church, their actions signify and consequently put into effect the divine decree of justification in
respect of an individual. The moral value of the acts of worship is from the devotion of the faithful; their sacramental
validity from the characters. 75
It is precisely because grace is given in the sacraments, not
by bare efficient causality, but sacramentally, that is, by efficient causality based on a sign-action, that the baptismal
character is needed. 76 If it were merely a matter of receiving
divini cultus et [ad] actiones sacras exercendas et in his vel passive se habet vel
active; ad operandum autem instrumentaliter [in the strict sense: in relation to
grace-production] semper passive se habet, sed non ad operandum ministerialiter
et sacramentaliter ['instrumentally' in the wide sense: in the order of signification].
Quia in aliquibus confignratur Christo agendo, in aliis recipiendo."
u Ibid., disp. 24, a. 1, n. 440: "Minister per characterem non praebet activitatem
quasi physicam ad efiectus supernaturales sed voluntarie utitur hoc charactere
ad hoc ut actus protestativi fidei sint vere sacramentales et valide atque in ordine
ad ea quae sunt cultus Dei ministerialiter ordinentur secundum ordinem ad
sacerdotium Christi; et ex hac validitate facit sibi debitum concursum elevativum
sacramenti aut ministri ad operandum supernaturalia." Disp. 28, a. 1, n. 15: "Id
quod assumitur ad instrumentaliter causandum in sacramentis non est ipsa forma
seu ratio signi, sed id quod naturale et sensible est in sacramentis." Cf. ibid.,
disp. 25, a. 2, nn. 51, 122, 147.
•• Ibid., disp. 25, a. 4, n. 22: "Ad characterem . . . pertinet ministerialiter et
sacramentaliter valide exercere signa sensibilia, habentia virtutem spiritualem, et
protestativa fidei Christi, in quo ei character ministrat." Ibid., a. 2, n. 146:
"Sacerdos habet se sicut minister, seu instrumentum animarum [animatum?] quod
confert gratiam non solum tamquam instrumentum pure efficiens ex motione sed
efficiens colendo seu faciendo ea quae sunt cultus divini, et ideo requirit potestatem
qua possit facere signa protestativa cultus huiusmodi; facit autem ea quae sunt
cultus non sub ratione morali, et moralis virtutis, sed sub ratione cooperatoris et
ministri Christi. . . . Moralitas huius cultus pertinet ad virtutem religionis."
•• Ibid., disp. 25, a. 2, n. 98: "Redditur ergo per characterem baptismalem
homo aptum subjectum ad sacramentaliter suscipiendum sacramenta quia suscipere
sacramenta non est solum corpoream et sensibilem actionem extrinsecus applicatam
suspiciere quasi materialiter, sed sub ratione sacramenti formaliter."

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directly from God the forms of grace and the other characters
the soul would of itself be disposed; but a special potency is
required for receiving these effects sacramentally, that is, as a
result of first participating in the sign-action the material elements of which are then physically applied by God to the
efficient production of these effects. 77 Hence the ambiguity
and the possibility of confusion: the conscious subject participates actively in the sign-action as the passive element of
the sign. In other words, his activity is required if the signaction is to have its passive element. It is in these perspectives,
according to John of St. Thomas, that St. Thomas' description
of the baptismal character as a " passive " power is to be
explained. Since a particular problem of textual interpretation
arises here this point must be examined more closely.

A " passive power "
The phrase" passive power" used of the baptismal character
by St. Thomas, in III, q. 63, a. 2, has caused a great deal of
confusion in his readers. The fault, as will be seen, does not
lie with him.
Taking the phrase in isolation and leaving out of consideration the whole theological fabric into which St. Thomas weaves
it, not a few readers of the Summa have asserted that the
baptismal character is a simple, inactive power of receiving
the effects of the sacraments. Why, if this were his meaning,
St. Thomas should not call it a. disposition of the soul they do
not say. Still less can they suggest any convincing reason why
he should call it instrumental. Any such material idea of the
character as a passive receptacle leaves no adequate reply to
Suarez' very pertinent question: Passive to what? It is hard
to conceive to what form the character could be passive. The
major commentators, in reply, recognize a limited force in the
77 Ibid., n. 182:
"Et licet ad recipiendum tales formas in genere en tis seu
accidentis sola natura animae aut potentiae sufficeret, sicut et ipsae suscipiunt
characterem, tamen ad recipiendum illas ex officio et sacramentaliter (etsi physice
suscipiantur) requiritur character, mediante quo valide suscipitur sacramentum et
gratia sacramentalis; ideoque etiam in suscipiendo ministerialis causa est, licet in
recipiendis illis in ratione entis nulla ratio ministerii attendatur."

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objection. They admit that the character is not itself passive
to grace which is received in the essence of the soul, and say
that for it to be called passive-at least in a wide sense-it is
sufficient that it make the subject able to receive grace. 78 They
suggest that it may be strictly passive to other characters in the
sense that it receive them as a subject. 79 They nearly all admit
that it must have some action of its own, whatever object they
assign to this. 80
•• Cf. Salmanticenses, tr.
disp. 4, a.
n.
"Ad hoc ut aliquid sit et
dicatur potentia passiva saltern minus proprie et rigorose . . . minime requiritur
quod in se recipiat actum, vel formam, respectu cuius dicitur potentia passiva:
sed sufficit quod. subjectum rigorose receptivum coaptet ad recipiendum act urn, vel
formam. . . . Quare concesso quod character baptismi non recipiat in se illos
effectus, ad quos homines aptat minime sequitur non' esse veram potentiam passivam et receptivam, licet minus proprie." Gonet, Clypeus theol. thom., De
n. 79: "Sufficit ad rationem potentiae passivae quod
Sacramentis, disp. 4, a.
reddat subjectum capax receptionis alicuius formae vel actus . . . Character
baptismalis licet in se proprie non recipiat ilia sacramenta aut alios characteres
eo ipso tamen quod hominem disponat ad illorum receptionem habet sufficienter
quod requiritur ad rationem potentiae physicae passivae." Contenson, Theol. mentis
et cordis, Lib.
p. 7, diss. I, cap.
Both Banez (in Summa Theol., III, p. 68,
a:
n. 8) and Sylvius (in Summa Theol., III, q. 68, a.
are led to propose that
the character simply gives a moral right to receive sacramental grace.
•• Cf. Salmanticenses, ibid.; Gonet, ibid., n. 88 (cf., however, n. 79, quoted
above, note 78); John of St. Thomas also admits this as a possibility, disp.
a.
n. 181, but this a secondary aspect of his teaching.
8 ° Cf. Cajetan, in Summa Theol., III,. q. 78, a. 5: "Patet etiam non sic intelligendam characterem esse potentiam passivam tamquam si poneretur pure passive.
Potest enim aliquem actum habere." Salmanticenses, disp. 5, dub. 8, n. 49:
" Character baptismalis non est niera potentia aut capacitas passiva, sed importat etiam activam virtutem, praesertim ad eliciendum actus sub ratione dispositionis congruae ad suscipiendum caetera sacramenta; quamvis enim non
insignitus eo charactere queat omnes illos actus secundum speciem elicere, non
tamen secundum quod ad sacramenta disponunt." (The " causal " bias of the
Salmanticenses is to be noted in the idea of disposition.) N. 50 they speak of the
character as " quaedam potentia executiva instrumentalis . . . praesertim quantum
ad susceptionem et administrationem sacramentorum. Quare. character et debet
esse participatio potentiae executivae Dei et recipi in potentia executiva animae.
. . . Ad characterem spectat exequi actiones sacras externas, elevando scilicet
intellectum practicum et concurrendo simul cum illo ad executionem et directionem
praedictarum operationum. . . . Perficit (character) intellectum practicum ut
efficiat operationes pertinentes ad cultum Dei et quantum ad hoc nos Christo facit
consimiles. . . . Unde facile intelligitur characterem baptismi recipi in intellectu
practico, communicando eius imperio efficaciam, ut alias potentia.s moveat ad

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In this they are merely reproducing what St. Thomas teaches
explicitly in III, q. 63, a. 4 where he asks whether the subject
of the character is a power of the soul:
The character is a certain seal impressed on the soul for receiving
or giving to others what belongs to divine worship. Now, divine
worship consists in certain acts. But it is the powers of the soul
that are directed towards acts, in the same 'vay as its essence is
directed towards existence. Consequently, the subject of the character is not the essence of the soul, but one of its powers.81
The reply to the first objection states that grace
bearers of the character only in order

IS

giVen to

that they may carry out worthily what they are deputed to. Hence
a subject is to be assigned to the character with reference to the
acts belonging to divine worship, rather than with reference to
grace. 82
Likewise the second reply defends the assignation of a power
as the subject of the character on the grounds that
whatever is directed towards action is to be attributed to a power. 83

It is, finally, in the reply to the third objection of this important
article that St. Thomas explains the new object given by the
character to the power which is its subject:
The character is directed towards what belongs to divine worship.
Divine worship is a certain profession of faith by external signs.
Consequently, the character must be in the intellectual power of
the soul, in which is faith. 84
St. Thomas makes no distinction here between the character
of the minister and that of the subject. This article, and in
particular the reply to the third objection, justifies fully the
validam receptionem caeterorum sacramentorum."
Dom. Soto, In IV Sent., dist.
1, q. 4, a. 6: "Susceptio et administratio est actus et exercitium divini cultus."
81 Summa Theol., III, q. 63, a. 4. Cf. IV Sent., d. 7, q. il, a. 1, sol. 2.
82 Ibid., ad l.
88 Ibid., ad 2.
84 Ibid., ad 3.
Cf. ibid., a. 1, ad 1: "Fideles Christi ... da actus convenientes
praesenti Ecclesiae deputantur ... "

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teaching of John of St. Thomas that the characters are directed
essentially towards giving sacramental validity to the worshipful acts of minister and subject. The distinction between the
two characters corresponds to the parts played by minister and
subject respectively in the sacramental sign-action and in the
production of grace to which this action is finally directed. 85
Hence the " passivity " of the baptismal character in no way
diminishes the personal activity of a conscious subject whose
intention of receiving the sacrament is thus given sacramental
validity and is enabled to complete the sign-action by making
the sacrament actually received and hence operative. It is
precisely because it is through the baptismal character that
this validity is imparted to the subject's intention and that
the sacrament is signified as "received" that this character
is said to be " passive." It enables the subject to provide the
passive element of the sign. It is because such validity implies
divine intervention in the sacraments that the character is said
to be instrumental. In other words, it can produce its formal
effect, validity, only when the sacramental action actually
signifies the divine decree of justification. These are conclusions
that are implicit in St. Thomas' article. 86
Some modifications are to be made in the case of reception
of the sacraments by an unconscious person. When one who
is baptized receives a sacrament in this condition his intention
-and he must have an habitual intention, whether implicit or
explicit--cannot intervene actively; neither, therefore, can his
character. As already explained, he receives the sacrament in
the fashion of a child, ad modum pueri. Nevertheless, his
character may be said to pertain to the perfection of the
sacramental sign insofar as it is itself a sign of deputation to
•• Cf. ibid., q. 68, a. 2: "Divinus cultus consistit vel in recipiendo aliqua divina,
vel in tradendo aliis. Ad utrumque autem horum requiritur quaedam potentia;
nam ad tradendum aliquid aliis, requiritur potentia activa; ad recipiendum autem
requiritur potentia passiva."
•• Note that it is immediately after he has said that the baptismal character is
a passive power that St. Thomas goes on: " Sciendum tamen quod haec spiritualis
potestas est instrumentalis . . . Habere enim sacramentalem characterem competit ministris Dei." (Ibid.)

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Christian worship. 87 Administration of a sacrament other than
baptism (unless qualified by a condition in the form) signifies
that the subject is a member of the Church. Here again, as
with the habitual intention that is required of those who previously had the use of reason, if the subject does not in fact
possess a character the sign-action is false and no effect can
follow.

An "instrumental

power" 88

This is the crucial point of St. Thomas' teaching on the
baptismal character which, it appears, can be adequately explained only in the light of what John of St. Thomas says about
the character as a passive power. The commentators follow
St. Thomas in saying of all three characters that they are
instrumental. 89 Since, however, they relate the instrumentality
of the priestly character directly to the production of grace 90
they are at a loss to explain the instrumentality of the character of baptism and are content simply to report St. Thomas'
own words. 91
87 Cf. ibid., ad 4.
This involves the knowledge that the Church has that a
person has submitted to baptism. Cf. also John of St. Thomas, Zoe. cit. disp.
25, a. 2, n. 181: "Datur enim potentia passiva ... ut [aliquid] sacramentaliter
recipiatur; est autem sacramentaliter recipere, cum debita intentione habituali, vel
virtuali, vel actuali recipere."
88 Cf. Summa Theol., III, q. 63, a. 2: "Sciendum
tamen quod haec spiritualis
potentia est instrumentalis."
89 Cf. Salmanticenses,
tr. 22, disp. 5, dub. 2, nn. 31, 37, 39, 51 (referring to
baptismal character explicitly); Gonet, De sacramentis, disp. 4, a. 2, nn. 59, 72;
Sylvius, in HI, q. 63, a. 2; Banez, in Summa Theol., III, q. 63, a. 2, nn. 6, 8
(referring to baptismal character explicitly); Billuart, diss. 4, a. 2 and a. 3;
Cajetan has no comment in Summa Theol., III, q. 63, a. 2.
9 ° Cf. Salmanticenses, ibid., nn. 34, 46; Gonet, ibid., nn. 60, 72; Banez, ibid., n. 7;
Billuart, ibid.; Sylvius, ibid., however, does not agree and quotes III, q. 63, a. 4,
ad 1: "Character directe
et propinque disponit animam ad ea quae sunt
divini cultus exequenda."
91 Banez, loc. cit., n. 8, is an exception:
"Potest dici instrumentalis," he explains,
" eo quod non est proportionata secundum se ad recipiendum sacramenta, sci!.,
gratiam quae est effectus sacramentorum, sed solummodo constituit hominem
communicatorem divinorum quantum ad jus quoddam quod adquirit ex eo quod
baptizatus est ad petenda et recipienda sacramenta. Et fortasse possemus dicere
quod ilia potentia dicitur instrumentalis moraliter, non physice, vel potius secundum

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For John of
Thomas instrumentality is implicit in the
very notion of a passive sacramental power. He refers to
Cajetan's teaching that the baptismal character is not a merely
passive power and explains that,
just as the minister is a living instrument who is not simply passively applied to producing the effect of the sacrament but who is
applied as a living being, so the baptismal character is given for
receiving as a minister who is a living instrument. 92
This is a form of reception to which no parallel is to be found
outside the sacraments; it is something that follows immediately on the nature of the sacraments as signs which are used
by God for producing grace.
The sacraments are received by the body " naturally," that is to
say, as corporeal entities; by reason of the character they are
received " sacramentally " and as valid sacramental actions. . . .
For this it is not required that the character itself receive the
reality of the sacramental action, since its purpose is not to receive
the sacrament " naturally" and as a physical entity, but that such
a sacrament should be received with sacramental validity and precisely as a sacrament. Though the character is in the soul it is
responsible for the whole man receiving the action sacramentally
and not merely naturally. 93
This is to say that the character is a " passive " power in that
its intervention enables the sacrament to exist formally as
received by the subject. John of St. Thomas goes on to develop
quamdam similitudinem ad facultatem quae proprie dicitur instrumentalis. Quae
similitudo consistit in hoc quod, quemadmodum facultas quae proprie dicitur instrumentalis non est proportionata ad effectum ad quem efficienter concurrit, ita
etiam ilia potentia ad recipienda sacramenta non est proportionata ad formam
quae est effectus sacramentorum, scilicet ad gratiam."
•• John of St. Thomas, loc. cit., disp. 25, a. 2, n. 129.
•• Ibid., n. ISO: "Sacramenta recipiuntur in corpore quasi naturaliter, seu ut
entitates quaedam corporeae, medio autem charactere sacramentaliter, et ut validae
actiones sacramentales. . . . Ad hoc non requiritur quod character realitatem
actionis sacramentalis suscipiat in se, quia non datur ad naturaliter et in genere
entis suscipiendum characterem [sio--for sacramentum: see following phrase] sed
ut tale sacramentum suscipiatur valide sacramentaliter et in ratione sacramenti.
Et licet character sit in anima tamen facit quod totus homo sacramentaliter
suscipit hanc actionem et non solum naturaliter."

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this further. "What is involved," he asks, "in 'receiving
sacramentally'?" He replies:
To receive the sacraments sacramentally, in other words, to receive
them validly by reason of the character, this is [what is implied on
the part of the subject by reason of the fact that] the sacraments
depend in their very existence as sacraments on a subject actually
receiving, in the category of a material

It is of paramount importance to take account of the modification attached to the idea of material cause. The sacraments
" in their very existence as sacraments " depend on the subject
as on such a cause; and this means primarily that the subject
acts as the passive element in the sign-action of the sacrament.
Again:
The action depends intrinsically for its sacramentality on the subject with a character, in the category of material cause.95
Therefore, before a sacrament can exist as applied to an individual subject, that subject must possess a character and, if
conscious, activate his character by forming an intention of
receiving the sacrament. The sacramental action of administration is intrinsically deficient if this submission is not made.
John of St. Thomas goes on to explain why this demands a
physical passive power by drawing an analogy with the activity
of the minister of the sacrament. Just as the minister requires
a physical, active power if the actions which he performs are to
be sacramental, that is, are to be valid sacramental signs, so
the subject requires a physical, passive power if, in his reception, he is to serve as a material cause on which the sacrament
depends, first of all in the order of signification, not as an
empty human action, but precisely as enriched by the power
of Christ. 96
•• Ibid., n. 181: "Et si quaeras, quid sit sacr.amentaliter suscipere ut ad hoc
requiratur potentia physica passiva, respondetur, quod sacramentaliter
sacramenta, seu valide suscipere ex vi characteris, est dependere sacramenta in
ratione sacramenti a subjecto suscipiente in genere causae materialis."
•• Ibid., n. 180.
•• Ibid., n. 181: "Et sicut ad operandum sacramenta non solum in quantum

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The character is not, consequently, itself receptive of the
effect of the sacrament. It serves rather to make the sacrament effective insofar as it gives sacramental validity to the
intention by which ·the subject completes the sign-action of
administration and reception. It is in virtue of this intention
that the subject acts as a term for the action of the sacrament,
on the human level of signification; but by this very fact, in
virtue of his character, the subject completes the application to
himself of the sacrament as an action of Christ, first of all,
and formally, on the level of signification, thus preparing the
way for consequent efficient causality.
It is only now that
there is any possibility of the sacrament producing an effect.
It is because the subject makes this final application of the
sacrament to himself-an application that is itself strictly
sacramental or on the level of signification and only consequently of causality-that he can be said to act as a minister
of God. Whether he receives grace from the sacrament that he
has helped to apply to himself in this way depends, not on his
character, but on his dispositions, in other words, on whether
he has used his character properly or not. 97
The passive power is consequently called instrumental,
not as though it were a movement and a power derived from the
principal agent; for that would make of it an active power [that is,
it is not an efficient instrumental power]. It is said to be instrumental insofar as it is ministerial and serving in ministerial fashion
so that the effect may be received in the subject, not entitatively
and materially, but sacramentally. For sacramental reception is
in a certain sense ministerial. And therefore the power for receiving
actiones naturales sunt, v. g., absolutionem, unctionem, ablutionem etc., sed in
quantum sacramentales sunt, indiget homo potentia quadam activa physica, quae
est character; ita ad suscipiendum eiusdem actiones in quantum sacramentales
sunt, indiget homo physica potentia passiva a qua in genere causae materialis
dependet sacramentum ut sacramentum sit, id est, non ut purum elementum, aut
elementalis actio, sed ut habet excellentias quas a Christi virtute participat
sacramentum."
•• Ibid., n. 132: "Potentia passiva debet esse susceptiva actus in se quando est
in principali agente; quando vero est in ministro, sufficit quod reddat ilium aptum
ad hoc sacramentum et collatum validum sit et valide susceptum, licet non
conferat ut digne et debite sit susceptum."

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effects in this way is not something perfect in the genus of power,
since it is not for perfectly [or materially] receiving those effects,
but for receiving them sacramentally and in ministerial fashion ...
insofar as a person moves himself to receive those things that
belong to divine worship, as a minister and a living instrument. 98
Though the baptismal character does not receive a transient
elevation from Christ, it can achieve its effect (that, namely,
of giving validity to the subject's intention) only when the
subject is actually subordinated as a material cause to the
sacrament. This is the normal inter-play of formal and material
causality. Hence the character is only " by reduction," reductive, a power.
Because it bears this power the intellect of the baptized
Christian is enabled, in producing connaturally an external
profession of faith, to serve as a minister the strictly sacramental action by which Christ sanctifies men. 99 The sign-action
of the sacraments of the Church to which the characters of
orders and baptism are directed has no other purpose than to
signify and to put into effect the divine will of justification. Indeed, their very existence as sacraments of Christ is dependent
less on the actions of men than on that of God and Christ.
What the minister and subject produce as principal causes by
that very fact is used by Christ as sign and as cause. Hence
the essentially incomplete nature of what they do as principal
•• Ibid., n. 185. Cf. ibid., n. 181. John of St. Thomas suggests that the baptismal character may also physically receive not only the other characters but
also sacramental grace precisely as sacramental and as perfecting the intellect in
the performance of acts of worship (cf. ibid., n. 184). As an accompaniment to
his main theme he argues that even in receiving these forms the character would
be a ministerial power since these all pertain to the subject's action as a
minister. Cf. ibid., nn. 181,
•• Ibid., disp. 25, a. 4, n. 25: "Potentia [he is referring to the intellect] est tota
inclinata ad actus, et inclinatio ad agendum, et ideo connaturaliter et juxta
modum proprium solum est capax activitatis, quae sit actus primus aut secundus;
ministerialiter autem est capax non solum activitatis quae sit actus primus, sed
etiam potentiae, sive activae, sive passivae in ordine ad actus, quos ministerialiter
debet exercere, si ministeriale illud exercitium habeat proportionem et convenientiam
cum actibus illius potentiae in qua subjectatur; sic enim character cum sit potentia
ad protestandum extefius fidem per signa sensibilia, convenienter in ipso subjecto
fidei ponitur."

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causes. It is something that must be brought to perfection by
Christ. The subject's role may therefore be described as that of
serving Christ ministerially or instrumentally as the person in
whom the sacrament is to produce its effect; that is to say, in
the category of material cause primarily in the order of signification, consequently in the order of causality. This is as far as
John of St. Thomas goes; but it appears to be possible to determine more precisely the relation of the subject's participation in the sacramental action to the physical causality of grace
by the sacrament.
In its strict and proper sense instrumental causality is verified only in the order of physical efficient causes. The instrument is active in producing the effect, not by reason of its own
form, but because it is moved by the principal cause, receiving
from it a transient efficacy, vis fluens. 100 The action of the
instrument as such is the action of the principal cause insofar
as the latter uses the proper action of the instrument. 101 Thus
the instrument produces the whole•effect,,in its own order and
in subordination to the principal cause.
This notion is transferred to other contexts. Thus a delegate
or a sign may be called an instrument, the one moral, the
other logical, since both draw efficacy in their actions from
some other source. Their separate relations to their " principal
causes " are clearly analogical.
Likewise, within the order of physical causality itself, not
all instruments correspond to the strict definition. Since God
operates in all actions, even secondary causes may be said to
be His instruments, though this does not involve any transient
elevation of the creature. 102 Nor do all entities that serve as
instruments attain the effect of the principal cause; some
produce only a disposition which calls for the final effect. 103 Of
instruments that attain the final effect, some do so by disposing
the material cause (dispositio operata), others modify the
10

° Cf. de Verit., q. 27, a. 4; ibid., ad 4. ·

Cf. Summa Theol., III, q. 19, a. 1.
Cf. de Pot., q. S, a. 7.
108 Cf. IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. I.

101
102

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COLMAN O'NEILL

action of the principal cause (dispositio operans) .104 An example of the latter is the imagination which is the instrument
of the active intellect in producing a species in the passive
intellect. 105 In all of these analogical applications the notion of
instrument maintains one connotation: the instrument always
attains some effect that lies beyond its natural power. 106
The sacraments are directed towards the production of grace
and, together with the minister and in subordination to the
humanity of Christ and God, intervene physically as instruments in the strict sense in causing this effect. The sign-action
which precedes (by a priority of nature) and regulates this
causal action is wholly attributable as a common act of worship to minister and subject insofar as they, as principal causes,
intend to do what the Church does. Their proper action ends
here; but it is to this action of theirs that God conforms His
sanctifying action which is signified and put into effect by
means of it. This constitutes the full instrumental intervention
of the subject and the primary instrumental intervention of
the minister. The subject does nothing more than provide a
term for the action of God by appropriating the sign-action to
himself. This is, strictly speaking, confined to the order of
signification; but, since the causality of the sacrament follows
on this order, the subject, by the action which his passive part
in the sign demands, may be said to " modify " the divine
action. The " instrumental " activity involved is that of dispositio operans, and it may be described by reason of its proper
effect in the order of signification as material instrumental
causality. (The subject, however, elicits the action in the
manner of an efficient cause.) It is to be noted that this is a
wholly unique form of instrumentality. In every other example
of efficient causality the
. material cause receives immediatelv
the effect. Only in the sacraments where efficient causality
follows upon signification must an instrumental material cause
intervene on the level of signification.
Cf. John of St. Thomas, disp. 24, a. 1, n. 577.
Cf. J. Gredt, Elementa philosophiae, vol. I, nn. 576-579, vol. II, nn. 765-768.
106 Cf. IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. L
10 •

105

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Notes on certain of the sacraments
In the sacrament of baptism it is clear that no character
intervenes on the part of the subject. 101 Here, however, the
simple intention of an adult plays the same part as does an
intention made valid by a character in the other sacraments.
This is because of the very nature of the sacrament which is
not for those who are already members of the Church, but
for those who are seeking entrance. 108 An analogy to the inhering instrumental power of the character might be found in
the case of baptism in the right won by Christ over all men
in His passion.
In penance and matrimony the acts of the subject take the
place of the matter of the sacrament and are used by God in
producing the effect.109 The character of baptism performs the
same function in these sacraments as in the others insofar as it
enables the subject to receive sacramentally. It is, therefore,
only at the moment of absolution that the character is active
in penance. The three acts of the penitent require its intervention only insofar as they are present at this moment. To
enter into the contract of marriage requires no special sacramental power since it is a natural act; but to participate in
the ceremony as a subject of a sacrament the baptismal character is required. 11° Consequently, though it might be said
that in a marriage of two baptized persons each partner is
" minister " of the sacrament in relation to the other, this must
be understood to be an analogical use of the term. The attempt
107 B. Durst, 0. S. B., De characteTibus aacramentalibus,
("Xenia thomistica,"
vol. 2, Rome, 1924, pp. 541-581) attempts to show that the baptismal character
intervenes in the sacrament of baptism itself. This is unnecessary; it was not
taught by St. Thomas and appears contrary to hjs notions of baptism as spiritual
generation and as the janua aacramentOTUm; cf. IV Cont. Gent., c. 59: " ... ad
susceptionem aliorum aacramentOTUm. • . ."
108 Cf. John of St. Thomas, disp. 25, a. 4, n. 40.
109 Cf. Summa Theol., ill, q. 84, a. 2; q. 86, a. 6; Suppl., q. 42, a. 1; q. 42, a. 3,
ad 2; Cajetan, in Summa Theol., III, q. 84, a. 2, n. 4.
11 ° Cf. John of St. Thomas, disp. 25, a. 2, n. 100: " ... matrimonium autem, quia
non fit per aliquam sacram actionem, sed per contractum naturalem; et ideo
specialem deputationem non requirit administrationem eius, ad susceptionem autem
requirit quod contrahentes sunt baptizati."

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of some theologians to explain the activity that is to be
attributed to the baptismal character by asserting that it is
required for contracting marriage is unacceptable. The same
is to be said of the suggestion that the baptismal character is
active when a layman baptizes in case of necessity. Such
efforts as these to extend the layman's participation in the
sacraments serve only to confuse the notion of the passive
cultual power by reason of which he plays an essential part in
the Church's liturgy.
Notion of OPUS OPERATUM
Nothing of what has been said takes away from the inner
power of the sacraments to justify and to bring increase of
grace quite beyond what the subject could merit for himself.
This is taken for granted as the teaching of the Church. The
whole discussion has been concerned with what is required on
the part of the subject for this power to be brought to bear on
the soul.
It is accepted from the Church, therefore, that the sacraments produce their effects ex opere operato, that is, because
of direct divine intervention; but what sense is to be given to
the term opus operatum? The difficulty in replying to this
question arises from the fact that St. Thomas does not use the
opits operans, opus operatum terminology in the Summa and,
consequently, nowhere interprets it in the light of his fully developed sacramental theology .111 Philologically and historically 112 the original sense of the terms makes a distinction
between two aspects of an action: first, as proceeding from an
agent and as morally imputable to him (opus operans), and
second, as having in itself a certain moralindependence (opus
111 26 occurrences of one or other or both of the terms, or some variant of them,
have been found in III Sent. and IV Sent. (Three at least of these texts reappear
in the Supplement.) Only two other texts have been found: in loan., c. 6, lect. 6,
and ad Heb., c. 8, lect. 8 (both reportationea).
,,. Texts may be found in A. Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte der Frnhscholastik, Ster
Teil, Band I (Regensburg, 1954), pp. 58 f., 145 f.; and E. Filthaut, 0. P., Roland
von Cremona, 0. P., und die Anfiinge der Scholastik im Predigerorden (Vechta i.
0., 1986)' pp. 161 f.

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operatum). Though by the middle of the thirteenth century
some liberty was taken in applying the distinction to more
complex situations, the formal idea of opus operatum as something, under one aspect at least, independent of the moral dispositions of the agent was undisputed. Applied to the sacraments the term denominates a sacrament in relation to the
minister and subject, denying its dependence for its powers
on their merit or virtuous activity. St. Thomas adopts this
usage in the Sentences, making opus operatum basically a
synonym for the sacramental ceremony. In one place he raises
this simple juridical idea onto a lofty plane by attributing the
opus operatum to God: quod est opus Dei. 113 This extended
use of the term leaves the way open ·for later theologians to
develop a derived, mystical sense of what was originally a
moral, not to say legal, term. 114
The sign-theology of the sacramental tract of the Tertia Pars
imposes certain refinements on our notion of opus operatum.
It has been shown that according to this theology the opus
operatum which is used as the vehicle of the divine action is
itself produced by the common action of minister and subject.
The opus operatum is their common act of external worship, in
which the minister plays the active, the subject the passive,
part. These parts, as has already been seen, are denominated
" active '' and " passive " by reason of their respective functions in the sacramental sign. To fulfil these symbolic functions
action is required of both minister and (conscious) subject.
The opus operans is therefore twofold, distinguished according
as the elements of the opus operatum are dependent on either
minister or subject. In the Sentences the opus operatum was
understood to be the result of the minister's action alone. The
development of St. Thomas' doctrine in the Summa requires
that the opus operans of the subject be also made partially
responsible for the opus operatum. In this article the essential
element of the subject's opus operans--his intention of reIV Sent., d. 4, q. 8, a. !'l, sol. 8, ad 1.
Dr. Schillebeeckx, op. cit., pp. 641 f., is not wholly faithful to the text when
he reads this derived sense into all the occurrences in the Sentences.
118

114

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COLMAN O'NEILL

ceiVmg the sacrament-has been indicated. It remains to
investigate what elements are required for integral or fruitful
participation in the sacraments, and what is their relation to
the opus operatum.
Conclusions
I In the Sentences St. Thomas reduces the participation of
the subject to the minimum: for the majority of the sacraments
it involves nothing more than an intention of reception which
is a removens prohibens; in penance and matrimony it enters
the essence of the sacrament. This follows on the point of view
of the Sentences according to which the sacraments of the
Church are considered merely as causes.
II In the Summa the sacraments are considered not as mere
causes but as integral parts of external worship; and in the
realm of signification the subject may be allowed a part that
can be said to be " in " the sacrament, always without prejudice
to the essence of the sacrament. This is no more than a hint;
but taken in conjunction with St. Thomas' whole sacramental
outlook-in particular his suggestions concerning the characters
and his insistence on the cultual nature of the sacramentsit is extremely suggestive. Under pain of invalidity the subject
must intend to receive the sacrament and must have the baptismal character for the sacraments other than baptism. In
relation to the causality of the sacrament the subject's acts are
dispositive.
III In common with all action except creation the causality
of the sacraments cannot be exercised without a subject. What
is peculiar to this form of action is that it is preceded (by a
priority of nature) and specified by a sign. It is therefore
quired that the concious subject signify his willing acceptance
of the sacrament before the latter can be actively applied to
him as a concrete, practical sign of the Church's faith used instrumentally by God in producing sacramental grace and the
characters. Thus the subject's intention forms an integral part

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of a true sacramental sign. Without it, those sacraments which
exist only at the time of use, even though they have their essential parts, lack something required for their perfection. It
is only when they are perfect as signs received by an individual
that there is any possibility of their acting as causes.
IV Variations in the intention of the subject. What is es:.
sential to the sacrament is that it should signify the giving of
grace to a subject. The state of consciousness of the individual
subject to whom the sacrament is concretely applied determines
the signification of the complete sign-action. Thus, although
all those who are unconscious (or wholly distracted) are incapable of any active participation and consequently receive
such sacraments as are administered to them and they are
capable of ad modum pueri, the sacramental sign differs according to the particular condition of the subject. If the subject
is a child or an imbecile from birth the sacramental sign-action
signifies as such and is true simply through physical submis··
sion. If the subject, however, is one who previously had the use
of reason (or who is temporarily distracted) the sacramental
sign will be true only if his will habitt.J.ally accepts the sacrament, since what is signified is justification of one who is unconscious and who places no obstacle in the way of the sacrament. A conscious subject whose reception of the sacrament
is a human act (this excludes one who is distracted and who
has only an habitual intention) must have at least a virtual
intention. Consequently, no generalization assigning the intention of the subject a lower degree than that of the minister
is acceptable.
V The baptismal character is required to give validity to the
subject's intention so that the common act of worship performed by minister and subject (as principal causes), the
actions of one forming the active element of the symbol, the
actions of the other forming the passive element of the symbol,
may be used by God and by Christ to signify and put into
effect the divine decree of sanctification as brought to bear

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COLMAN O'NEILL

on the individual subject. This is what is meant by calling the
characters " instrumental " powers. The subject provides a
term for the action of God by appropriating the sign-action to
himself. Acting thus on the level of signification he may further be said to have a certain part to play in relation to the
uausality of the sacrament since the causality follows on (posterioritate naturae) the signification. The subject may be said
to " modify " the divine action in this sense and hence to act
as an " instrumental " cause in relation to grace, producing a
disposition for the effect which is a dispositio operans, a disposition which consists in providing· by his actions the passive
element of the symbol. (This is not to be confused with the
material dispositions required in the soul of the subject for
receiving grace.) This is a wholly unique form of instrumentality. In every other example of efficient causality the material cause receives immediately the effect. Only in the sacraments where efficient causality follows upon signification must
an instrumental material cause intervene.
Thus, in summary, the subject as an efficient cause provides
the material or passive element of the sign-this action is " instrumental " insofar· as it serves to complete the sign of the
divine decree of justification as applied to the individual. Thus
the subject by way of the sign applies the divine sacramental
action to himself-therefore as an " instrumental " " material "
cause. In relation to the actual infusion of grace the subject
is a simple material-though human-cause.
VI The baptismal character is always a passive power in this
sense. To think of it as " active " in matrimony or baptism
administred by a layman is to confuse St. Thomas' notion
of it.
VII The opus operatum" from" which (ex) the effect of the
sacrament is produced is the common act of external worship
of minister and subject which is the sign of the divine decree
of justifying the individual. The opus operans is therefore twofold, distinguished according as certain elements of the opus

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301

operaturn are dependent on the minister, others on the subject.
The essential opus operans of the subject which is required for
valid reception is willing acceptance of the sacrament. This
involves the intention of receiving· and, for sacraments other
than baptism, implies the possession of the baptismal character.
(To be continued)
CoLMAN O'NEILL,

Dominican House of Studies
Tallaght, Dublin
Eire

0. P.

IS HEIDEGGER A NIHILIST?

T

HE shift in accent which occurs in the works posterior
to 1930 marks Heidegger's concentration on developing
the positive side of the doctrine of finite Being. Viewed
thus positively, the Being revealed by the Dasein's existence is
historical. Consequently, the sum-total of the historical destiny
of mankind composes the immeasurably rich treasury of concrete human possibility, which, in the form of the progressive
illumination of the things that are, can be called their Being.
But because the Dasein is finite, the negative element, so
strongly emphasized by Heidegger in Was ist M etaphysik?
cannot be ignored, but joins with the positive to weave a chiaroscuro picture of a revelation of the things that are that is
at the same time always a dissimulation.
In the Postscript to Was ist Metaphysik?, written in 19M3,
some 13 years after the Inaugural Lecture itself, Heidegger
seeks to equilibriate the black and the white of what was
said in the original discussion of the Nothing. After having
admitted that Was ist Metaphysik? is thought" in transition"
which has not borne its full positive fruit and which remains
too much in reaction against the traditional ontology, Heidegger seeks to show that what was written there is nevertheless
basically sound. To put the earlier doctrine into clear perspective, Heidegger proposes to allay three" misgivings" that have
arisen concerning the work, with the intention of showing that
the lecture may, and indeed should, in each case be interpreted
in a way that leads past the forbidding negative assertions to a
positive doctrine of Being. These misgivings are of particular
interest, for they not only show the points about which the
later Heidegger has become sensitive, but in the answers furnished to each problem we are provided with a· vivid demonstration of the advances which the later Heidegger has made in
coming into full, positive possession of the ontology he would
found in breaking with the past.
302

IS HEIDEGGER

A NIHILIST?

303

The three misgivings are these: (1) Having made "nothing" (das Nichts) the subject of metaphysics, the lecture becomes the last word in Nihilism; (2) A philosophy of "Angst "
paralyzes the will to act; (3) The anti-logicism of the lecture
leads to a philosophy of pure feeling.1 Let us examine the
author's answer to each misgiving separately.
1. After reviewing the analysis in Was ist M etaphysik? that
led to the affirmation of the Nothing, Heidegger seeks to
forestall any possible nihilistic interpretation of his intentions.
It would be immature ... to adopt the facile explanation that
Nothing is merely the nugatory, equating it with the non-existent
(das Wesenlose). We should rather equip ourselves and make
ready for one thing only: to experience in Nothing the vastness
of that which gives every being the warrant to be. That is Being
itself. Without Being, whose unfathomable and unmanifest essence
is vouchsafed us by the Nothing in essential dread, everything that
"is" would remain in Beinglessness (Sein losigkeit). But this is
not a nugatory nothing, assuming that it is the truth of Being that
Being never essentializes itself without Seienden, and Seienden cannot be without Being. 2

The opening of a transcendental horizon is not, indeed, a nugatory nothing, just as it is not either the work of a " something,"
-a Seiende in its Seiendheit. But when the philosopher wishes
to introduce into history the proper presence of the Presence
that opens an horizon, and he wishes to distinguish his conception of " Being " from the traditional metaphysical conception which always begins with things as things, then clearly
the first effort at expression is bound to be negative .... Being
is NOT Seiendheit. Even when Heidegger affirms that it is
Anguish which reveals that the Nothing is at the heart of the
transcendence of Being, this is not nihilistic in the visual sense.
Indeed, anguish is the grasp of the radical freedom of our
finitude, but it is that freedom in and through its finitude
which makes possible that presence of the things-that-are which
we call "Being." The accent then is positive when Heidegger
1

Was ist Metaphysik? p. 45.

Was ist M etaphyaik? p. 46.

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THOMAS D. LANGAN

declares that it is because we can grasp our own finite end in
death that we can stand-out, Ek-sist in a projection which
makes it possible to render a sense to things. The Nothing,
then, is " abgrundig " because it is not an infinite absolute and
because there is none necessary in order that Being might be;
it is " unfathomable " because of the vastness of our transcendence of the things that are and because of the vastness
of the sum total of things themselves, a vastness not of infinity,
but of great extent (W eitraumigkeit) . In a word, finitude does
not, for Heidegger, necessarily imply a nihilism, because Being
can be fully real, fully transcendent, without needing to be
infinitely Absolute. Both the Dasein's freedom and the totality
of the things that are are nonetheless " real " for riot being
either eternal or unmoving. They constitute a positive somewithout for all that breaking through the bonds of
finitude.
The second answer is basically prepared by the answer
to the third, so let us save it for last. Heidegger answers the
objection of illogicism by developing the notion that there is a
more originative thinking than logic, upon which logic depends.
Our author analyzes the derived, non-fundamental knowledge
that we use in everyday life in terms of " calculation." Calculation begins its operations upon a whole that is already
" given " and in which it does not interest itself as a whole, but
only in terms of its sums and parts, which it takes apart and
reassembles following the schemes it has erected out of the
necessities of daily life.3 The whole, however, of that which
it ignores " in its wholeness "-because it is incalculable-is
nevertheless "always closer to man in its enigmatic unknowableness than anything that ' is,' than anything he may arrange
or plan; this can sometimes put the essential man in touch
with a thinking whose truth no ' logic ' can grasp." '
The distinction which Heidegger develops here between the
consumptivity of calculation and the originality of "essential
thinking " is very central to his whole philosophy. As we shall
• Ibid., p. 48.

• Ibid., pp. 48-49.

IS HEIDEGGER

A NIHILIST?

305

see later, the same distinction-which declares that all hu'man
activity either gets to the root of things or not, either unfolds
in view of the originative freedom of the Dasein or not-is at
the heart of the authentic-inauthentic dichotomy, presented in
Sein und Zeit as the two horns of human existence, providing
the two poles of the necessary dialectic which must divide the
" undifferentiated structure of the Dasein " in all of its determinations. All thinking then must abound in the " calculative,'' _but there can be no calculative if it were not for the
fundamental originative unveiling; just as all existence must
abound in the inauthentic, though the inauthentic is only possible because we can project freely in view of our true natures.
" Calculation uses everything that is, as units of computation, ready in advance, and in the computation uses up its. stock
of units. The consumption of what-is reveals the consuming
nature of calculation." 5 Calculation achieves an appearance
of productivity only because its units can be multiplied or
divided indefinitely. The originative thinking (anfiingliche
Denken), by contrast, creates anew, adding to the richness of
the treasury of Being. In a very difficult passage of the Postscript Heidegger seeks to describe this thinking which is, in the
Heideggerian meditation, really the ultimate. Ultimates are
hard to describe precisely because there is nothing lying beyond
them in terms of which they can be described. The originative
thinking, through which Seienden come to light for the first
time, through which new ways of seeing things are invented
out of nothing, is the very act of freedom itself, pushing back
the darkness in an extension of the kingdom of light.
The thinking which does not only not calculate but is absolutely
determined by what is other than the Seienden is called "essential
thinking." Instead of calculating on Seienden with Seienden it
expends itself in Being for the Truth of Being. This thinking
answers to the demands of Being in that man surrenders his historical Essence to the simple, sole necessity (N otwendigkeit)
whose necessitation does not so much necessitate (notigt) by
simply constraining, but rather creates the Need (Not) which is
• Ibid., p. 48.

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THOMAS D. LANGAN

consummated in the freedom of the sacrificial offering. The Need is
that the Truth of Being will be verified and protected, no matter
what can happen to man and the things that are. The sacrificial
offering is freed from all constraint because it comes forth from the
abyss of freedom, as the surging abandonment of the human essence
to the veritative protection of the truth of Being on behalf of the
existing thing. 6

If Heidegger has recourse to religious language here it is because he is trying to express what religion has always spoken of,
and what he himself will speak of as das Heilige, in his analyses
of the poetic act of originative thinking. For religion has
always concerned itself with the ultimate in virtue of which
and for which we live. Sacrifice has always represented a willingness to accept the charge of this destiny intended for us by
the root of our existence. But just as metaphysics has always
looked meta-ta-phusika for the ground and reason of the
phusika, so religion has also sought the Heilige in a Transcendent that is beyond man. Heidegger here relates almost religiously the message of all his previous works. The ultimate
that is "beyond man" is Da-sein, the Being-there among the
things that are that is founded in the ultimate transcendence of
finite Ek-sistenz. In the language of the paragraph just quoted,
the sacrificial offering which we must :make lies in devoting our
existence to the Being achieved in the wedding of the things
that are and the temporal, transcendental horizon, which devotion in its purity would be the end of authentic ek-sistenz. The
authentic existent, grasping our nature as the place where
Being becomes, where the Light that lets the things that are be,
offers himself to the ultimate reality, the Wahrung der W ahrheit. The thinker sacrifices himself to think, the artist offers up
himself to his creation. As in all religious situations, the authentic religious grasp is founded in Need, for it is a freedom
grounded in necessity. All religions recognize such a necessity
as an expression of that given reality which is our " Essence."
The more advanced religions recognize that essence as free.
But this freedom, they realize, is not absolute, but finite. It
• Ibid., p. 49.

IS HElD EGGER A NIHILIST?

307

functions in terms of the necessity of the essence. Heidegger's
revolutionary step, following Neitzsche, lies in the proposition
that this Notwendigkeit is indeed a Wendung in the Not, which
Need is the Not of a thirst for Being of a finite Being-understanding.
Being, then, interpreted as the Light which shines on the
Seienden in the projection of a transcendental horizon, arises
from the exercise of freedom generated by this originative need.
When Heidegger insists that das Nichts is not a purely nugatory
nothing, he is thinking of the positive generation of light by
that Need which is a freedom seeking to fulfill its needs born of
finitude, from out its strictly finite resources. This generation
of light by Dasein is Being itself. The Being disclosed in the
Opening cleared by the nothingness of freedom is that for the
sake of which and that thanks to which we Ek-sist; it is just
this that the religious of the metaphysical epochs sought to
express in terms of its absolutes. In appropriating the religious
language of the past Heidegger would conceive himself as rendering the traditional religions their ultimate-their finitesignificance. I quote:
In sacrifice there is expressed that hidden thanking which alone
does homage to the grace wherewith Being has endowed the nature
of man that he might assume in his relationship to Being the
guardianship of Being. The originative thinking is the echo of the
favor of Being in which it illumined the unique occurrence and
lets itself prepare for Being's own advent, that the Seiende be.
This echo is man's answer to the soundless voice of Being. The
speechless answer of his thanking through sacrifice is the source of
the human word, which is the prime cause of language as the
enunciation of the Word in words.7

If one is still tempted to see in phrases which suggest that man
is related to Being an indication that Being transcends man in
the sense that a Transcendent Absolute founds the things that
are, then one has, I think, missed the point entirely. Being and
Dasein are, certainly, more than Man, but it is because they
involve both man and Seienden, and these within the scope of
• Ibid.

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THOMAS D. LANGAN

an historical horizon infolding a tradition that goes beyond this
particular individual man. The exact nature of the man-Being
relationship is very complex; Heidegger attempts to explain it
in recent essays as a four-fold fusion of the brute thing, the
ever escaping future, the past and the fusing presence of the
ek-sistent who projects the transcendental horizon. For now it
suffices in order to follow the discussion to see that it is to the
originative erection of the thing so that it can be by being in an
horizon to which man must devote himself. His thanking is
wordless because, as devotion, it is what precedes, wills and
thus makes possible, the Word, the Light, the Thing. The
Word " comes home " in the word of common language, the
term of most originative thinking.
In a continuation of the same paragraph Heidegger offers
more insight into the nature of the act of thanking sacrifice.
If there were not in the various times (i.e., ekstasis, my note)
a revealing thinking in the fundament of historical man, then it
would never be possible that there should be a thanking, assuming that there must be thinking (Denken) in all consideration
(Bedenken) and memory (Andenken), which thinking must originally think the Truth of Being. How else could mankind attain to
original thanking unless Being's favor preserved for man, through
his open relationship to this favor, the splendid poverty in which
the freedom of sacrifice hides its own treasure? The sacrificial
offering is the farewell from the things that are on the road to the
preservation of the favor of Being. The sacrificial offering can be
made ready by doing and working in the midst of the things that
are, but can never be consummated there. 8

For a finite thought the spirit of the Nothing can never be far
away. The originative thinking that lies at the root of temporality, and which, through founding a temporal horizon, makes
possible the truly revealing thought of each epoch, is rooted in
the " splendid poverty " of freedom. This is achieved only by
realizing freedom, through getting at the root of all Being,
which can only he 'achieved when the Dasein thinks out and
beyond the things that are. A thinking that remains a calcula8

lbid.

IS HEIDEGGER

A NIHILIST?

309

tive thinking among the things that are can never achieve the
goal which the traditional metaphysics established for itself.
Thinking and working among Seienden already revealed insofar as they are revealed prepare the way for an originative
thinking, just as the epochs and epochs of metaphysics prepare
the way for a thinking that thinks the. Truth of Being.
Heidegger terms originative thinking" sacrifice" to contrast
it all the more with the calculative thinking that can only work
within the light already won by previous " sacrifice." " Calculation always miscalculates sacrifice in terms of the expedient
and the inexpedient . . . the search for a purpose dulls the
clarity of the awe, the spirit of sacrifice ready prepared for anguish, which takes upon itself kinship with the imperishable." 9
What does Heidegger wish to signal by the term " the imperishable? " A key can be found by considering what our
author means when he speaks of the lnstandigkeit of existence
in its act of originative thinking. It is this standing-in the
things that are (the German word can suggest at the same
time an inwardness, a standing-in the things that are,. and the
instantaneity of the dense moment) 10 that doots the Dasein in
Being. The Dasein by its own freedom can plunge into the
incalculable, seeking no stopping place in this or that Seiende,
but rather seeking the ineluctable itself. 11 What the Dasein
wins in the heroic, sacrificing act of originative thanking is the
really-real and, as long as Dasein remains in earth to guard its
memory, the imperishable.
We can gain an even more vivid picture of what occurs when
the Dasein opens Being by rooting itself in the incalculable
mass of the things that are if we consider for a moment what
Heidegger says about the " Earth " in a lecture delivered in
1937, Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerkes.
• Ibid., p. 50.
And for Heidegger, all the structure of the Dasein is summed up in this
word. Cf. Introduction to Was ist Metaphysik? "Nur miissen wir zumal das
innestehen in der Offenheit des Seins, das Austragen der Innestehens (Sorge) und
das Ausdauern im Aussersten (Sein zum Tode) zusammen und als das voile Wesen
der Existenz denken," p. 15.
11 Was ist Metaphysik?
p. 50.
10

310

THOMAS D. LANGAN

In this article Heidegger seeks to show how it is possible
existentially that there should be such a thing as a work of art.
That Heidegger insists that art exists because man has absolutely need of it is not surprising in view of what has been said
about originative thinking. The work of art is the field of combat between a Dasein trying to open a world by casting forward
the light of intelligibility, and the material in which the Dasein
must root his efforts and from whose resisting mass he must
try to pull into light the thing known. The work of art is the
meeting of a World which endows it with all of its desires and
ideas and lights (which in turn find stability and expression and
accent in the work itself) , and the Earth, the material from
which the work is moulded, be it the stone of a temple, the
sonorous mass of the words and musical sounds or the colors
of a painting. The World absorbs these materials into its light,
so that they yield up a meaning and become Sein. But the
Earth does not want to give itself over completely. So it forces
the World to sink its tentacles into its resistant soil and become
a Da. Thus the temple takes its meaning from its site and is
rooted in it. The Sanctuary of Poseidon is Sounion and would
be essentially other in any other site other than this cape. But
conversely the temple brings the light of its World to Sounion.
Its Doric stability adds motion to the waves, its silhouette
vastness to the sky, its stone foundations life to the grey rocks
jutting into the Bay of Pyraeus. In the originative work of art
the Dasein forces the earth to render up meaning it would
essentially tend to keep to itsel£.12
The most fundamental work of art, according to the indication which we have noticed in the Postscript, is the Grounding
of the Word in language. For this reason the Postscript closes
on a poetical note, which it would not be unprofitable to understand in terms of the dialectic of World and Earth described in
the essay " On the Origin of Artwork." The maintenance of
the Word of Being in language grows out of Care (Sorge) in
the use of language (Es ist die Sorge fur den Sprach-Gebrauch).
12

Kann die Erde als das sich verschliessende in ein Offenes drangen.

IS HElD EGGER A NIHILIST?

311

Out of long-guarded speechlessness and out of a care-full clarification of the domain which it must illuminate comes the thinker's
"Sagen" (pronouncement). If like origin is the poet's" Nennen."
Because those things which are like can only be like because they
are also different, poetising and thinking are poles apart bu-t alike
in this respect: They both take great care of the Word. The
thinker pronounces Being; the Poet names the Holy (Der Denker
sagt das Sein. Der Dichter nennt das Heilige) .13
How thought in the essence of Being, poetising and thanking
and thinking exclude one another and are distinguishable is a
complicated question which we shall have to leave open for
now. Presumably thanking and poetising spring in different
ways from originative thinking, which uses them without yet
being able to be for itself a formal Denken.
3. The preceding discussions have presented something of
the positive richness of a doctrine of essential finitude. It is
only against this backdrop that the charges of Nihilism made
against Heidegger can be approached appropriately. The second
"misgiving" asks if the ensconcing of anguish at the heart of
such a philosophy does not paralyze the will to act. This is
one of those questions drawn from the order named by the
traditional philosophy " practical " that tends to go to the
heart of an ontological explanation in a way that tests as nothing else can its true human soundness. We are now in a position
to see why Heidegger puts anguish at the center of things, and
we begin to see quite well what it imports. It means that we
must grasp the meaning of our being viewed in terms of its
whole structure before we can pro-ject authentically, before we
can render to the act of originative thinking its full meaning
and true place, and before we can comprehend anything about
a possible answer to the " Being-question." Anguish must lead
to that grasp of the structural whole (which Heidegger names
" Sorge ") , because of what it is we are: finite freedom. The
grasp of a freedom that can peer into the abyss of its own
nothingness is not, in Heidegger's view, an invitation to in18

Was ist Metapkysik? p. 51.

812

'.rHOMAS

D. LANGAN

activity, but a call to render our activity its full responsibilityto itself and to Being-and thereby become an invitation to an
authentic activity. Anguish is not, then, a blind feeling but
the ultimate intentionality; for it represents the intentional
grasping itself in the roots of that finitude which conditions
.all intentionality.
_What has Heidegger accomplished in this extended footnote
added twenty years later to the famous lecture of 1929? What
conclusions can we draw from an analysis of the development
it represents concerning the present status of Heidegger's
thought? Is Heidegger not trying to save, within the bounds of
a conception that sees as its ultimate a finite freedom and a
finite totality of Seienden, all the rich values of human existence which man in the past has insisted require an infinite
Transcendent to render them their meaning and value? In
this vein, DeWaelhens writes in his study on Heidegger,
If up to now all values have appeared to humanity as linked to

God, the dismissal of God threatens to cause a collapse of values
which will throw man into a sink-hole of anarchy. This is why
the affirmation of the death of God must go hand in hand with an
effort to transform values, with the pretention of endowing them
with a sense which, in the older philosophy, then appeared to derive
only from God.14
Is Heidegger not saying that the totality of the things that are
is mysterious in its richness and the light which we cast to make
them be in our temporal horizon is mysterious because ultimate
-finite and ultimate, mysterious and limited are united in a
world-view that would incorporate all that is real within it
and cease the flight to a transcendent to explain things.
It is only in this sense that we can interpret the final lines
of the Postscript. '' One of the essential stages for speechlessness is anguish in the sense of the terror in which man, in the
abyss of the nothing, stands determined. The Nothing as the
Other to Seienden is the veil of Being. Each destiny of Seienden
has already been fulfilled originally in Being." 15 The two
1'
16

DeWaelhens, The Philosophy of MartinHeidegger, p. 854.
Was ist Metaphysik? p. 51.

IS HElD EGGER A NIHILlST?

313

aspects of finitude are revealed in this passage: The Nothingness as limit of totality, revealing the very possibility of the
opening of the light of Being, and the positive implication of
all for all. If we recall what has been said concerning authentic temporality, namely, that the nature of the authentic
past is to be a recalling of the concrete possibilities of Dasein,
then we shall understand: Every destiny is always already
fulfilled in the Being achieved by past Dasein. The Postscript
concludes in this way:
The last poem of the last poet of the originative period of GreeceSophocles' "Oedipus in Colonnus," closes with the Word that harks
back far beyond our ken to the hidden historical-destiny of these
people and marks their entry into the unknown truth of Being:
But cease now:, and nevermore lift up the lament:
For in all
and in all places it happens that the event
Protects a determination of the fulfillment (Vollendung) .16

The critic is obliged, I think, to admit that Heidegger has
scotched the effort to consider his thought nihilistic. If " nihilism " means a thought which, in abandoning recourse to a
transcendent absolute, affirms in its place the absoluteness of
the human will as arbitrary source of values· as, for example, in
the doctrine of the Will to Might, it is obvious from the recent
texts we have just been examining, that Heidegger is opposed
to the wholesale abandonment of traditional values and to any
philosophy that in Heidegger's sense of the word lacks respect
for the mystery of Being. The gist of our Author's recent
criticisms of Nietzsche is just that: Nietzsche, in declaring the
death of God, i. e., the end of all recourse to a supersensory
world for explanation of the Being of the things that are, came
close to discovering the roots of Being in freedom-he came
very close, but missed it essentially and tragically nevertheless.
Freedom is not will creating values to impose on things. Freedom, in the formula of V om W esen der W ahrheit, must be " a
letting be of the things that are." Originative thinking respects
mystery, protects transcendence, and this in two ways: by
16

Ibid.

314

THO:MAS D. LANGAN

being sensitive to and protective of the natures of the things
that are, and by guarding as a precious gain the illuminations
accomplished by past poetic revelations. The root of every
originative thinking (anfangliche Denken) is that Horen auf
dem Sein which the ancients named the thaumatzein of the
philosopher.
Because Heidegger holds that the things that are are at one
and the same time real and finite and because he believes that
the revelation of their sense is a matter of an active, progressive inclusion of their meaning within the suite of a temporal
horizon, authentic respect for Being becomes in this philosophy
inseparable from authentic temporality. In fact, I believe that
the difficulties inherent in. the Heideggerian interpretation of
the revelation of Being can best be brought out by a consideration of the temporal relationship in knowledge as it underlies
the texts we have just been considering.
My folding back the veil of Being should begin, if it is to
follow the needs of authentic existence, by an appropriation of
the riches already accumulated by the past. Hence any originativeness in my revelation will draw on and continue the accomplishments already worked on the things involved. It is
only by inserting myself in the line of past revelation and by
continuing it that I shall be able to hope to leap a bit ·beyond
the outer limit of the revelation to discover something new.
Authentic ek-sistenz begins in a grasp of its own historical conditions, so that it may cast down the dark corridor of the
future a beam continuing from the past. Being then is more
than just my confrontation with the brute thing. It is the brute
thing endowed with the imprint of accumulated historical
human existence, inserted in a tradition, establishing a vector
that cries out to be respected and prolonged.
We can say, then, that the Heideggerian doctrine removes
some of the ambiguity surrounding the visions of Nietzsche,
and does so in a way that secures the maximum advantage for
the elimination of the arbitrariness in human creativity. This
is a gain in stability and in respect for Being conceived as
something which goes beyond the moment when we bring to

IS HEIDEGGER

A NIHILIST?

315

bear on the things that are the arbitrary power of our finite
wills. It is a gain, but is it enough to establish phenomenologically the solid basis of explanation needed to found a philosophy of Being in a finite reality? We apply to the past, says
Heidegger, in view of the future, i. e., our making present a
past is accomplished in view of a pro-jection towards a future
whose horizon we create by our self-extension forward in eksistenz. The only reason that we can enjoy a past is because
of our ability to summon up out of our finite resources a capacity for self-propelling resolution. Past, present and future
depend essentially, then, on the originativeness of the finite
Dasein. What is Heidegger's explanation of the source and
nature of this properly originative element in Dasein, of the
really new, the really-real, the something-for-nothing that lies
at the roots of every line of phenomenological investigation
that Heidegger has published up to now?
This is the Need-the Not-of the finite Thirst for Being.
This is the ultimate Nothing of the finite illtimate.
The trouble is that this Nothing and this Need are not of
their nature self-sufficient explanation for everything that depends on them for explanation in the Heideggerian philosophy.
In Sein und Zeit, for instance, the appearance of the Nothing at
both terms of a human existence-as the ineluctable throwness
.of the origin, and as the anguished prospect of Being-towardDeath in the end-does not complete all investigation by
answering all of the pertinent problems which the phenomenology of the human birth-to-death span has itself insistently
raised. In fact, the appearance of the Nothing raises everywhere questions which Heidegger seems unwilling to pursue.
Consequently, resting on no firm base of finished investigation,
the Heideggerian philosophy as it has developed to date strikes
me as a thought that, while remaining everywhere partially
valid, yet remains partially but fundamentally open to serious
question.
Allow me to illustrate this state of affairs by considering
again the three " misgivings " with which the Postscript is concerned. The positive merit of each of Heidegger's answers to

816

THOMAS D. LANGAN

these misgivings was, I hope, evident in our exposition. The
positive respect for Being as it is developed within finite limits
is admirable, the richness of the conception of the sacrificial
thanking attendant upon the gift of originative thinking, the
beauty of the description of the awesome conception of the
world, these and like features contain a truth that presents itself
with something like the force of poetical evidence.
Yet I think that we can still legitimately re-raise each of the
misgivings which were supposed to have been completely
allayed. In closing, let us consider the sense which each misgiving retains as long as the Heideggerian phenomenology does
not succeed, as it has not up to the present moment, in penetrating beyond its self-imposed limitations.
1. The originative element in acts of interpretation and acts
of ek-sistence cannot be explained as Nothing, with or without
a capital" N," without running the risk of founding philosophy
in the absurd. All explanation must come to a point where
either all intelligibility is exhausted, or where mystery-genuine
mystery in the sense of a Source of Being surpassing finite
powers of explanation, is positively encountered. Das Nichts
is neither. It raises more questions than it solves, and hence
cannot pretend to terminate a line of investigation by revealing
the fundamental intelligibilities which that line of analysis is
seeking. Heidegger admits as much in invoking, in the context of his presentations of the Nothing, the mystery of Being.
But is Being as Heidegger presents it really mysterious, or is it
simply enigmatic? The fact that the originative element cannot be explained is not the result of a positive encounter witha real transcendent. It is rather an indication that the Heideggerian explanation simply fails to explain. It finishes in the
absurd. Consequently, it depends too much on Nothing to ever
insure itself adequately against the very charge of nihilism the
Postscript would belie.
The Postscript affirms that a philosophy of anguish does
not paralyze the Will to act because it serves to enhance the
nobility of Dasein responsible to his own freedom for the ex-

IS HElD EGGER A NIHILIST?

317

tension of the light of Being in the world. Further, anguish
directs Dasein to serve Being by devotion to its creativity out
of nothing which rolls back the curtain of Being. This explanation does not, however, succeed in banishing an embarrassing" Why." Perhaps it is the ghost of that final causality
of which modern philosophy has been having some trouble
divesting itself. Looked at in the perspective of the existentiale
my projections are all dependent for their authenticity on the
whole structure of my eksistenz which is directed toward death.
A consideration of that structure raises this question: Can man
find real meaning for life within the limits imposed by the
options of a philosophy finite by choice? It is not my intention
here to demonstrate that he cannot. But it is Heidegger's responsibility, if he wishes to come to grips· with the second misgiving, to convince us that he can. The arguments of the
Postscript to Was ist M etaphysik? do not, in my opinion,
achieve this. Granted we should act only in view of the full
possibilities of that thing which we ourselves are, this is not
sufijcient to assure that what we are,-as Heidegger conceives
the Dasein in any case-justifies courageous sacrifice in the
name of humanity. A finite freedom" thrown" into the world,
coming from nowhere and going toward death, i.e., toward
nowhere, passing by way of an " imperishable " Being founded
by the perishable acts of a Being-for-death does not provide an
adequate ground for an explanation of the phenomenon of true
sacrifice, of the total sacrifice of martyrdom, for instance; nor
does it provide any basis for resolving in the name of a higher
principle a conflict of several Dasein engaged in opposing acts
of revealing Being. Heidegger, though attacking the doctrine
of the Will to Might, leaves us with no basis fo:r resolving the
real conflicts which Nietzsche had in mind when proposing his
solution. Heidegger needs, then, to explain not only why we
should act, but why, sometimes, we should not.
3. Heidegger's philosophy is not, as the criticism presented
in the third misgiving charges, a philosophy based on feeling.
B11t its insufficient grounding of the aspects of its phenomen-

318

THOMAS D. LANGAN

ology which function where in the tradition purely intellectual
elements were to be found, invites the criticism that the description of originative thinking is more emotional than scientific. One can still agree with Heidegger's attacks on the notion
of science without presupposition, one can follow with approval
his analyses of the decisions underlying the scientists' division
of the object, and underlying the criteria of evidence, without
for all that being satisfied when it comes to the criteria of truth
provided by the philosopher's analysis of the act of interpretation. Heidegger is, of course, basically struggling with Kant's
problem ... and the Lord knows that there are no easy answers
in this domain. I do not intend to take anything away from
Heidegger's stature, consequently, when I admit, as I must
now, that I do not see that he has reached solid ground in the
effort to explain what and how the interpretative element is
brought to the thing-known by the knower. Heidegger's stature
in this regard is great because he has unswervingly tried to walk
the line of a perfect subject-object balance in his descriptions of
the interpretative act. His awareness of the necessity for doing
this, and his efforts to show the way to a more fundamental
analysis of the knower-known relationship than has heretofore
been attempted, are lasting contributions to the Western philosophical tradition. By establishing the emotive-voluntaryintellectual unity of the existent, Heidegger has passed beyond
the point where criticisms of his philosophy as emotive are
valid. To affirm this in approving terms amounts to affirming
confidence in the validity of the phenomenological way. But
our recurring criticism . . . that Heidegger's own phenomenology has not taken roots, i. e., has not uncovered any firm
positive principle upon which to ground the phenomena he has
uncovered, suggests once again that there is nothing automatic
about the use of phenomenological analysis. No more than the
analysis of Aristotle in the Nichomachean Ethics or of Plato
in the Thaetetus, contemporary phenomenologies are not exempt from the danger of foreshortening by philosophical options. If Heidegger's recent writings show no sign of circum-

IS HEIDEGGER

A NIHILIST?

319

venting the impasse that leaves every phenomenological analysis
since Sein und Zeit dangling over the edge of the nihilistic
abyss, it is because the recent Heidegger shares with the young
the same decision to protect the mystery of Being without
recourse to a Transcendent.
THOMAS

Saint Louis University
Saint Louis, Missouri

D. LANGAN

FREEDOM, RESPONSIBILITY AND DESIRE
IN KANTIAN ETHICS

A

student of Philosophy who is particularly interested in
moral questions need not be terrified by the ethical
philosophy of Kant, as he may so easily be by his
Critique of Pure Reason. It is indisputable that the latter work
as well as the other non-ethical writings of Kant are difficult to
follow especially by a student who has been trained in the
Scholastic tradition. However, I do not think that he will
come to the same conclusion when he has analyzed the first two
chapters of the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of
Morals. The third chapter will cause difficulty because it concerns the metaphysical problem of freedom and can only be
fully understood by someone who is acquainted with the
general philosophy Qf Kant. Work on the subject-matter of
this article-the problem of freedom-has compelled me to exercise myself on the broad philosophical principles of this German
philosopher of whom it has been said: " You can philosophize
with Kant or against Kant, but you cannot philosophize without him."
Kant lived in the Age of Reason, the age of Hume, Rousseau,
and Voltaire and during the revolutionary period in America
and France. In opposition to those who placed the roots of
morality exclusively in theology Kant believed firmly in the
rationality of man and sought to elaborate a rational morality.
Just as he upheld a rational science that would manifest a
knowledge valid and binding for all rational minds, so he
championed a rational.morality, a science of rational moral
principles that would present a moral code valid and binding
for all rational minds. From the very beginning of the Preface
to the Fundamental Principles he seems to presume that it is
in the very experience of moral obligation that an adequate
testimony is given of the a priori source of morality. He denies

820

FREEDOM,

RESPONSIBILITY

AND DESIRE

321

that the force of moral obligation is due in any way to empirical
elements and asserts that it cannot be explained in terms of
psychology, sociology or anthropology. Unless this conception
of Kant is presumed, namely, that morality is binding on all
men and is comparable in this respect to science, the elaboration of his reasoning is not understood. He clearly states at the
very outset:
Everyone must admit that if a law is to have moral force, i.e.,
to be the basis of obligation, it must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for example, the precept, ' thou shalt not lie,' is not valid
for men alone, as if other rational beings had no need to observe it;
that, therefore, the basis of obligation must not be sought in the
nature of man, or in the circumstances in which he is placed, but
a priori, simply in the conceptions of pure reason; and although any
other precept which is founded on principles of mere experience may
in certain respects be universal, yet insofar as it rests even in the
least degree on an empirical basis, perhaps only as to motive, such a
precept, while it may be a practical rule, can never be a moral law .
. . . For in order that an action should be called morally good, it
is not enough that it should conform to the moral law, but it must
be done for the sake of the law, otherwise that conformity is only
contingent and uncertain; since a principle which is not moral,
although now and then it may produce actions conformable to the
law, will also often produce actions which contradict it-1

Therefore a moral principle is true necessarily and always, without any reference to the reason why it is true, without any
reference to the conviction or denialof some one with regard to
the proposition, without any reference to the effects or consequences that might follow from the acceptance or rejection of
this moral principle. Kant therefore speaks of the categorical
nature of moral propositions and he seeks the radical truth in
them not from any command that God may have promulgated,
not from any correspondence between the propositions and
rational human nature, not from the consent of mankind, not
from any one of the multiple sources of morality that we find in
modern relativistic Ethics but solely in the one overwhelming
1

Abbott, Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on The Theory

of Ethics (Longmans, 199l7), pp. 3-4.

THOMAS

A. WASSMER

fact that moral propositions are true because they are true.
Just as there are attributes of universality, necessity, and objectivity in rational knowledge which Kant explored in his
Critique of Pure Reason, so these same qualities display themselves in every true moral proposition. Just as Kant did not
attempt to prove that there is such a thing as a priori knowledge, so he does not do anything but presume that there are a
priori propositions which no one will gainsay. He is willing to
say that rational knowledge and rational morality are facts
to be recognized and not hypotheses to be proved. Broad has
shown how this constitutes a fundamental difference between
the moral systems of Kant and Hume:
Ethics for Hume is concerned simply with mankind. It deals
with the purely contingent fact that men have a disposition to feel
emotions of approval and disapproval, and the equally contingent fact that in men this disposition is excited by contemplating
the happiness or misery of human beings. Kant, on the other hand,
holds that the fundamental laws of morality are the same for
every rational being, whether man, angel, or God, since the ultimate
criterion of rightness is deducible from the concept of rational being
as such. 2

So much for this a priori morality of Kant and the fundamental reason for his position. The problem of freedom with
which we are concerned in the moral philosophy of Kant becomes quite baffling. This is because Kant oscillates between
an attempt to demonstrate the reality of freedom and an
attempt to show that no one can make this concept intelligible.
Thus he holds that while there is no doubt about the freedom
of the will, we cannot possibly render compatible and consistent
the conflicting claims of moral experience and therefore we
must say that this concept is " a possible and thinkable, but
nevertheless empty notion." The question of freedom for Kant
is a question that has been hanging fire since his studies in the
problem of knowledge. In order to solve that problem, the
findings of the first Critique are summoned before Kant. From
the scientific point of view everything happens of necessity and
2

Broad, Five Types of Ethical The()T'JI (London, 1944), pp. 116-117.

FREEDOM,

RESPONSIBILITY

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328

yet, from the point of view of the moralist, Kant is honest in
admitting that the very notion of " ought " implies in its very
concept the notion of " can." Kant has the insight and tenacity
to hold on to the oughtness in a moral imperative and to claim
for it as much reality as the copula which he confronted in his
first Critique. Nevertheless he comes to the conclusion that
he is unable to solve the paradox involved in the acceptance of
both:
The difficulty is how predeterminism, by which voluntary actions as
events have their determining causes in preceding time (which with
what it contains is no longer in our power), can be consistent with
freedom, by which both the action and its opposite must be in the
power of the subject at the moment of its taking place; this is
what men want to discern. 3

From these words of Kant we can understand that the
problem of determination and freedom in the same volitional
act arose for him, whether it was the problem of reconciling
freedom with the concept of God as a necessary being or
whether it was the problem of reconciling man's responsibility
for evil with the perfection of God as man's creator. Kant's
approach to the problem in either form is a mere restatement of
his fundamental dual order of the phenomenal and the noumenal. According to him freedom belongs neither to the realm
of experience nor to the realms beyond experience which are not
accessible to our understanding. Freedom belongs to our reason
and Kant emphasizes this so very much that some others
among the Neo-Kantians make of it a fundamental category of
the mind similar to the categories of space and time. From the
celebrated formula of Kant: " You can because you should
(Du kannst, denn du sollst) ," we see that the reason requires
our obedience to the moral law but that such an imperative
would be meaningless if it were not possible for us either to
conform or not to conform to that law. Let us scrutinize how
Kant applies the dual order of phenomena and noumena to this
problem of freedom and determination.
• Abbott, op. cit., p. 859.

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THOMAS

A. WASSMER

Kant looks upon freedom as the power to effect absolute
beginnings. Under this aspect it is easy to understand that he
excludes this faculty of freedom from the field of phenomena,
since the latter field is governed by the principle of causality
and allows of only relative beginnings. According to Kant,
therefore, our freedom belongs in the noumenal order, in the
order of things in themselves. It is interesting to see how Kant
repeats the idea in his first Critique that each of us has a double
of his person, which, inasmuch as it is noumenal, dwells outside
of experience, outside of time, and to the extent that it is such,
it is free; whereas one's phenomenal self or one's phenomenal
person submits to the illusions of causality. Kant's consistency
is striking here in that he attributes this duality of aspect to
all phenomena. This duality of aspect constitutes one of the
most fundamental aspects of his entire philosophy. For him the
explanation of every phenomenon is dual: inasmuch as it appears in time, on the one hand, it is by necessity subject to an
association with an anterior phenomenon, and is hence determined; inasmuch as it is a thing-in-itself, on the other hand,
it has causes outside of time, which are not phenomena, and
its associations with these causes constitutes its freedom. Freedom, therefore, becomes a transcendent reality and Kant's
belief in freedom, like his belie£ in the existence of God and the
immortality of the soul, begins to exist in him by means of a
faith which he describes as " a moral state of the reason in the
consent it gives to things inaccessible to the understanding."
Kant once again asserts that he detaches himself from metaphysics, at least from such a metaphysics which laid claim to
knowledge of things-in-themselves. Freedom is ultimately inscrutable and unintelligible and it is not difficult to see why
Kant thinks it so plausible to pass from the inscrutable character of freedom to the 'consideration of the existence of God
and the immortality of the soul.
In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant sets before himself
the aim of showing that there is pure practical reason and that
from this faculty transcendental freedom is also established.
His interest is to explain how any action that takes place in

FREEDOM,

RESPONSIBILITY

AND DESffiE

time can be within the power of the person at the moment of
acting. He tells us that freedom is involved in the mere consciousness of duty, and that "the moral law, which does not
itself require a justification, proves not merely the possibility
of freedom, but that it really belongs to beings who recognize
the law as binding on themselves." 4 Kant says that the moral
law is the principle of the deduction of an inscrutable faculty
which no experience could prove, viz., the faculty of freedom,
for the moral law is in fact the law of the causality of free
agents. Nevertheless, the entire question of freedom is pronounced insoluble because it is impossible to show how any
action taking place in time can be within the power of the
person at the moment of acting.
We would like to review the consideration that -Kant has
given to freedom in his ethical works. Only in that way shall
we be able to make the conclusions that we shall draw at the
end of this study. · In his Fundamental Principles Kant treats
of the question of the manner in which duty is to be done and
he asserts that this is possible only on the assumption that the
will is autonomous. To prove that the will is autonomous he
exposes the concept of freedom in the following words:
The will is a kind of causality belonging to living things in so far
as they are rational, and freedom would be the property this causality has of being efficient independent of external causes; just as
natural necessity is the property characterizing the causality of nonrational beings, viz. that of being determined to action by the influence of external causes. The preceding definition of freedom is
negative and therefore unfruitful for the discovery of its essence;
but it .leads to a positive conception which is so much more full
and fruitful. Since the conception of causality involves that of
laws, according to which, by sbmething we call cause, something
else, viz. an effect, must be produced; hence, although freedom is
not a property of the will depending upon natural laws, yet it is not
for that reason lawless; on the contrary, it must be a causality
according to immutable laws, but of a peculiar kind: otherwise a
free will would be an absurdity. Natural necessity is a heteronomy
of efficient causes, for every effect is possible only according to this
• Abbott, op. cit., p; 187.

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THOMAS

A. WASSMER

law, that something else determines the efficient cause to action.
What else can freedom of the will be than autonomy, that is the
property of the will to be a law to itself? But the proposition: The
will is in every action a law to itself, only expresses the principle,
to act on no other maxim than that which can also have an object
itself as a universal law. Now this is precisely the formula of the
categorical imperative, and is the principle of morality, so that a
free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same. 5

You will notice in the statement above that Kant has said
that, although the philosopher may say that freedom is not a
property of the will depending on natural laws, he cannot say
for that reason that the will is lawless. Kant always is preoccupied with keeping the will unlimited by any object which
the will itself does not determine. Nevertheless he insists that
simply because the will is free it has to recognize as indispensably necessary a priori a law according to which its freedom
is circumscribed by conditions which make it consistent with
itself. Whatever confusion there may be in the mind of Kant
there is one locus in which he declares unreservedly that man
is free. This passage only serves to make the paradox so much
more profound for Kant because of his categorical insistence
upon freedom:
Now, I say, every being that cannot act except under the idea of
freedom is just for that reason in a practical point of view really
free, that is to say, all laws which are inseparably connected with
freedom have the same force for him as if his will had been shown to
be free in itself by a proof theoretically conclusive. Now I affirm
that we must attribute to every rational being which has a will
that it has also the idea of freedom and acts entirely under this
idea. For in such a being we conceive a reason that is practical,
that is, has causality in reference to its object. Now we cannot
conceive a reason consciously receiving a bias from any other
quarter with respect to its judgments, for then the subject would
ascribe the determination of its judgments not to its own reason,
but to an impulse. Consequently, as practical reason or as the will
of a rational being it must regard itself as free, that is to say, the
will of such a being cannot be a will of its own except under the
• Ibid., pp. 65-66.

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idea of freedom. This idea must therefore in a practical point of
view be ascribed to every rational being.6
At the first reading of this reference to Kant one may represent Kant as defending the position that men are free simply
because they feel free. However, we should appreciate the
reason that he advances for this conviction of freedom, because
it is the very one the Scholastics use in their own presentation
of the psychological argument for the demonstration of freedom. He asserts that we must attribute to every rational being
which has a will that it has also the idea of freedom and acts
entirely under this idea because we cannot possibly conceive
a reason consciously receiving a bias from any other quarter
with respect to its judgments. If the person were aware of
such a bias, he would ascribe the determination of his judgment
not to its own reason but to influences from without. Equivalently Kant is saying that reason may be influenced by environmental factors of one kind or another but it is not consciously
influenced by environmental extraneous conditions to such an
extent that it does not recognize these elements as external to
the freedom of the act. When the person becomes conscious of
these influences, to that extent he realizes that his act is not
free. This point is crucial in the ethical philosophy of Kant.
We hold a man responsible for his action only on the hypothesis
that his action expresses his free will in the matter. We all
become moralists contesting with one another when anyone
denies the cogency of the psychological argument for the existence of man's freedom. Such a denial would deprive our everyday ethical language of all meaning. It is accepted by all that
it is impossible to be a moralist about our own conduct without
consistently using the terms " ought, ought not, obligation,
responsibility, accountable, answerable, deserved, undeserved,
etc." Without freedom morality becomes a meaningless term.
Kant was so concerned with the reconciliation of freedom with
necessity that he spent 11 years thinking out a theory ofknowledge which would validate the conception of free will. In this
• Ibid., p. 67.

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THOMAS A. WASSMER

sense his Critique of Pure Reason was thought out with a view
to the Critique of Practical Reason. His argument reducing
freedom to the noumenal order brings us straight back to the
first Critique. At the conclusion of his reduction of freedom to
the noumenal order, Kant believes that the possibility of freedom is still open. His words are important because he claims
no more from his theory of knowledge in attempting a solution
of the problem. Is it possible to find an argument that can
possibly change for Kant this mere possibility into an actuality
of freedom? Kant himself shows us a possible way and then
declares that the indisssoluble paradox remains. The only point,
he says, is to change this possibility of freedom into actuality by
rigid proof. That is, to show, in an actual case, that certain
actions do imply freedom. Certainly, it is a duty to realize the
moral law in our acts. Therefore it must be possible. ("I
ought " implies " I can ") . Therefore, every rational creature
must assume whatever is implied by this possibility. Freedom
of the will, independence of causal necessity, is implied by this
possibility. The assumption is as necessary as the moral law,
in connection with which alone it is valid. Freedom and duty
reciprocally imply each other. It is the moral law, of which
we become directly conscious, that leads directly to the notion
of freedom. It is morality that first discovers to us the conception of freedom. The moral law " I ought " (which itself
does not require any proof) proves the actuality of freedom in
those who recognize it as binding on themselves. A man judges
he can do, or refrain from doing, a certain act, and this because
he is conscious that he ought to. No one would ever have been
so rash as to introduce freedom into science had not the moral
law forced it upon us.
Kant finally admits the paradox and says that morality
requires us only to be able to think freedom without selfcontradiction, not to understand it. It is enough that our
notion of the act as free puts no obstacle in the way of the
notion of it as mechanically necessary. Our notion is that the
act stands in quite a different relation to freedom from that in
which it stands to the mechanism of nature. From the point of

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view of the Critique of Pure Reason this is possible; the doctrine
of nature and necessity and the doctrine of morality and freedom
may each be true in its own sphere. How freedom is possible,
how we are to conceive it theoretically and positively, how
man is a member of two worlds, how man's moral actions must
always appear necessitated while they are nevertheless freeall this is not discoverable: Only that there is such a freedom
is postulated by the moral law. How freedom is possible no
human intelligence will ever fully fathom. That freedom is
possible, on the other ·hand, no sophistry will ever wrest from
the conviction of even the commonest man. Kant admits that
the solution here proposed to the problem of freedom involves
great difficulty. But he asks philosophers .whether there is any
other solution that is easier and more intelligible.
I would like to refer to the passage in which the problem of
freedom is explained by Kant because from this locus we shall
develop the considerations that follow:
Every rational being reckons himself qua intelligence as belonging
to the world of understanding, and it is simply as an efficient
belonging to that world, that he calls his causality a wilL On the
other side, he is also conscious of himself as a part of the world of
sense in which his actions, which are mere appearances of that causality, are displayed; we cannot, however, discern how they are
possible from this causality, which we do not know; but instead of
that, these actions as belonging to the sensible world must be
viewed as determined by other phenomena, viz., desires and inclinations. If, therefore, I were only a member of the world of understanding, all my actions would perfectly conform to the principle
of autonomy; if I were only a part of the world of sense, they
would necessarily be assumed to conform wholly to the natural law
of desires and inclinations, in other words, to the heteronomy of
nature .... And thus what makes a categorical imperative possible
is this, that the idea of freedom makes me a member of the intelligible world, in consequence of which, if I were nothing else, all
my actions would conform to the autonomy of will; but as I at the
same time intuit myself as a member of the world of sense, they
ought so to conform, and this categorical " ought " implies a
synthetic a priori proposition, inasmuch as besides my will as
affected by sensible desires there is added further the idea of the
same will, but as belonging to the world of understanding, pure and

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practical of itself, which contains the supreme condition according
to reason of the former wilU
We cannot agree with Kant that this explanation of man's
unfortunate position of being a member of two worlds helps in
the slightest to make duty intelligible. We cannot forget that
we are members of two worlds and the question can always be
asked just how a rational being who belongs to both the intellectual and sensible worlds is able to be convinced that he is
really free and that he is making some advance in freedom and
goodness. Kant certainly has no answer for us and in his own
words he admits it:
To explain how pure reason can be of itself practical without the
aid of any spring of action that could be derived from any other
source, . . . is beyond the power of human reason . . . There must
be here a total absence of springs, unless the idea of an intelligible
world is itself the spring, . . . but to make this intelligible is
precisely the problem we cannot solve.8
Kant in this referal to the theory of knowledge to validate
the concept of freedom ultimately asserts his incapacity to
legitimate the notion. With this admission of defeat in the
explanation Kant makes the transit from Moral Philosophy to
Theology. It is not difficult to see that the roots of Kant's
difficulties are in his epistemology according to which the intellect can know only the appearances of things, the phenomena,
but it cannot penetrate to the thing as such, the noumena. By
his reduction of freedom, God, the immortality of the soul to
the order of the noumena, Kant has given to the philosophical
world three important conceptions which are empty, just empty
hollow shells and anyone may choose to find any content at
all in these shells. Kant has done for intellectual and moral
concepts the very same irreparable damage. The words and the
formulas remain but their content and meaning become the
sport and whim of any philosopher.
For Kant, then, freedom, God, immortality are postulates
7

Ibid., p. 73.

8

Ibid., pp. Sfl-83.

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and they all proceed from the principle of morality which itself
is not a postulate but a law, an imperative. These postulates
are not theoretical doctrines, but suppositions practically necessary, i.e., required in the interests of practice. While they do·
not extend our speculative knowledge, they do give objective
reality to the ideas of speculative reason in general, and do
give it a right to conceptions the possibility of which it could
not otherwise venture to affirm. Thus respect for moral law
leads, through these postulates, to conceptions which speculation might indeed present as problems but could never solve.
However, these postulates represent nouemna that have contents which are unknown. Kant seems optimistic in concluding
that from unknown mysterious noumena so much other speculation can follow that in itself so barren and sterile.
Before we continue on the question of moral responsibility in
Kantian Ethics it might be well to summarize the basic ideas
in his argumentation. We see that he begins by assuming that
a rational morality is the only morality and that this carries
the characteristics of categorical and a priori. This permits him
to eliminate three misleading conceptions-that it is a matter
of feeling, that it is a matter of consequences, that it is a matter
of agreement with God's will, since on these grounds it would
be neither categorical nor a priori. Then he returns to the
notion of rational morality as categorical and a priori and
formulates its principle. This central principle he works over
in terp1s of ought or duty and in terms of the good will. These
considerations lead to the problem of free will for which he is
forced to reach back into the Critique of Pure Reason in order
to find a justification for the duality of necessity and freedom.
Such are the main theses of his moral philosophy and it can
be said that they engaged the attention of the most distinguished thinkers that followed him, from Jacobi, Schopenhauer
and Hegel to many of the rational moral philosophers of our
own day. Certainly in this department of Ethics it is impossible
to rationalize without considering Immanuel Kant.
It has been shown by Paton in his critical study of the moral
philosophy of Kant that the reduction of freedom to the nou-

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THOMAS A. WASSMER

menal order does not save freedom at all. In propounding this
doctrine of the application of the two orders to the problem
of freedom we are not being temerarious to suppose that Kant
wants to explain how freedom is possible. Two main and obvious objections to such a theory are exposed by Paton. The first
is that Kant appears to be claiming a knowledge of the intelligible world which he does not have on the principles of his own
Critique of Pure Reason, and the second is that even if this
knowledge were admitted his theory would supply a very inadequate explanation of the existence of freedom.
Even to call the world as it is in itself an " intelligible " world is
unnecessarily ambiguous, if by " intelligible " he means only that
although it must be conceived, it is inaccessible to our senses. He
has, however, already described it as an intelligible world, and so
presumably as one which is actively intelligent. There seems to
be little doubt that he conceives the intelligible world as " the whole
of rational beings" as things-in-themselves. Man, as he tells us
in the present passage, knows nothing more of the intelligible world
than this--than in it reason alone, and indeed pure reason, independent of sensibility, is the source of law; and it is added that
the laws of the intelligible world apply to man categorically because
only in the world is he his proper self.
All this suggests that Kant claims a surprising amount of knowledge about the intelligible world and is prepared to base his present
defence of freedom, and even his justification ·of the categorical
imperative, on such a knowledge. It is hard to see why he permits
himself to use language which he knows to be misleading.9
We have, therefore, justification on the authority of Paton in
saying that any attempt to explain how freedom is possible in
Kantian terms is bound to end with no explanation at all. All
that we can do in Kantian philosophy is to . defend freedom
against attack by showing that it must be conceived to belong
to a man as rational and so as a member of the intelligible world
and not as a member of the sensible world. Once we have
understood that two standpoints are necessary and that from
one of them we must conceive things-in-themselves to be the
9 H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative-A
Hutchinson's Library, London), p. 268.

Study in Kant's Moml Philosophy

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hidden ground of phenomena, there is no contradiction in supposing man to be both free and determined, free as a member
of the intelligible world and determined as a member of the
sensible world. But is this satisfactory as an explanation? At
the most it is negative in its assertion that it cannot be shown
to be impossible that freedom can belong to the noumenal
order. In much the same way we are confronted by theses in
Scholastic Philosophy in which the repugnance of certain propositions cannot be demonstrated. For example, we have the
thesis in Cosmology which states that it cannot be shown to be
repugnant or impossible that accidents may exist apart from
the substance which it usually accompanies. Again the existence of absolute mysteries in God cannot be shown to be impossible. Such negative proofs have a value but we are inclined
to question the efficacy of the negative proof of Kant when he
consigns freedom to the noumenal order. In every demonstration in which Scholastic philosophy uses the negative argument
there is an intelligibility vindicated for the concept but the consignment of freedom to the noumenal order by Kant reduces
it to the rank of the thing-in-itself which is always unknowable.
What satisfaction do we get by this resolution of the problem?

*

*

*

*

*

I would like to consider now after this analysis of Kantian
freedom another aspect of Kantian morality. It is frequently
said of Kant that the two most characteristic and startling
doctrines of Kant are his view that the rightness of an action
is to be determined a priori irrespective of the consequences
and his denial of value to all actions that are motivated by
desire. It is the second of these two characteristics that I
would want to consider in the remainder of this paper. Kant
frequently tells us that there is no greater harm to be done
people especially the young than to induce them to be good
from any other motive than duty.
To set before children as a pattern actions that are called noble,
magnanimous, with a view to captivating them by infusing an

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enthusiasm for such actions, is to defeat our end. 10 It is nothing
but moral fanaticism and exaggerated self-conceit that is infused
into' the mind by exhortation to actions as noble, sublime, and
magnanimous,· by which men are led into delusion that it· is not
duty, that is, respect for the law, that constitutes the determining
principle of their actions ... flattering themselves with a spontaneous goodness of heart that needs neither spur nor bridle, for which
no command is needed, and thereby forgetting their obligations
which they ought to think of rather than merit.U

Therefore, for Kant it is never sufficient to will what duty
or law prescribes. The will may operate because of mere
natural inclination or expectation of personal gain or advantage.
The morally determining element of the will, then, is its motive.
The will-act becomes simply good because its motive is solely
that of duty done for duty's sake. Now duty is the necessity of
acting from respect for the law and law and law alone can
determine the will-act. Neither this nor that particular prescription of law but law in general-this is to serve the will as
a principle. Any alteration in the purest motivation of this
will-act perverts the morality of our behavior.
Now it is certainly true that duty done for duty's sake is
noble and worthy of praise, but do we have to admit the
Kantian conclusion that only such acts are good? A person
who acts in conformity with his conscience out of a desire for
eternal beatitude or out of fear of losing it certainly acts
morally though his action may not be the most perfect. We
do not have to agree with Kant that every self-regarding
motive perverts the morality of the act. It seems that Kant
came to this conclusion on the single motivation of respect for
the law independent of any other motive from his long acquaintance with the works of Rousseau" He had become convinced
that moral education consists in encouraging one another in
the appreciation of moral obligations and in recognizing in
duty the sole and sufficient motive to moral action"
Before we attempt to criticize this characteristic in the moral
10

Abbott, op. cit., p.

11

Ibid., p. 178.

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philosophy of Kant, I would like to develop this idea in his
theory. He always maintains that to repel children from wrong
by appealing to pain and punishment and to attract them to
virtue by forms of enjoyment-this only leads children to
regulate their actions with reference to their own interest. It is
just as ridiculous for him to consider God looking upon such
moral education of the young with favor. Kant agrees that
some preliminary training of the child may compel parents to
use the technique which he deplores in the behavior of an adult,
but it should be put aside as soon as possible. " As soon as this
mechanical work, these leading strings, have produced some
effect, then we must bring before the mind the pure moral
motive, because it teaches a man to feel his own dignity, and
gives the mind a power unexpected even to itself/' 12
Children can be taught early to recognize the distinction between prudence and goodness, between regret and remorse,
between approbation and self-esteem, in order to foster a true
appreciation of duty and a true estimation of the worth a
person can give himself only by doing his duty. Kant believes
that children so guided will examine with ·great interest some
of the doubtful maxims that are passed down to them.
I do not know why the educators of youth have not long since made
use of this propensity of reason to enter with pleasure upon the
most subtle examination of the practical questions that are thrown
up; and why they have not, after first laying the foundations of
a purely moral catechism, searched through the biographies of
ancient and modern times with a view to having at hand instances
of the duties laid down, in which they might exercise the critical
judgment of their scholars. This is a thing in which they would
find that even in early youth, which is still unripe for speculation
of other kinds, would soon become very acute and not a little
interested. 13
Kant continues to reason along these lines until he makes
bold to say that morality must have more power over the
human mind the more purely it is presented. Kant does not
say that duty is a sufficient motive to good conduct if a person
11

Ibid., p. !USO.

13

Ibid., p. !M2.

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A. WASSMER

only examines the facts, but he is asserting that the pure
motive of duty is the most powerful of all human motives ·and
needs only to be purged of all empirical accretions and refined
in order to be appreciated as such.
The pure concept of duty, unmi..'Ced with any foreign addition of
empirical attractions, exercises on the human heart an influence
so much more powerful than all other springs which may be derived
from the field of experience that in the consciousness of its worth, it
despises the latter, and can by degrees become their master;
whereas a mixed ethics compounded partly of motives drawn from
feelings and inclinations, and partly also from conceptions of reason,
must make the mind waver between motives which cannot be
brought under any principle.14
Kant would never agree with Hume that reason is and ought
to be the slave of the passions and therefore should be satisfied in serving and obeying the passions. The law-giver in
him for Kant is always stronger than any human desire or
inclination, stronger than the ·sum total of desires and inclinations. He insists that anyone who does not appreciate this
fact of the stronger exercise of pure duty upon moral behaviour,
is just unaware of his own experience. The influence of duty is
not only a· difference in degree or grade of attraction but constitutes a motive essentially different from any other. The
very fact that we use such words to describe the influence of
desire-attraction, allurement, seduction, bewitchment-imply
that duty exercises a greater hold upon us than any transient
desire.
It has been pointed out that this conception of duty has not
been accepted in the history of philosophy with unstinted praise
but has been roundly condemned. What Schiller found objectionable in this theory of Kant is what every other serious person reflecting on the same point would find repugnant. It is not
that Kant maintains that duty for the person is respect for the
moral law but it is the great divorce which he places between
duty and desire, and his audacious insistence upon asserting
that the purest morality of respect for the law is testified on the
H

Ibid., p. 27.

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moral experience of all men. I do not think that any rationalization of the position of Kant has saved him from the severity
of the position that he takes. Professor Ewing introduces such
a possibility of redeeming Kant when he discusses this question
of the value or non-value of actions which are motivated by
some desire and not by," respect for the law." He says that it
is sometimes asserted that Kant supposed we could and ought
to perform moral acts without having any desire to do so. He
believes that while this is strictly accurate it is misleading since
this" respect for the moral law," though sharply differentiated
from other desires, is regarded by Kant as being analogous
to a desire insofar as it can serve as a motive for action.
It really makes very little difference whether we describe the tendency to find satisfaction in doing one's duty as a desire, and then
add, as we should have to do in any case, that it is different from
other desires, or we deny, like Kant, that it is a desire and then
add that it is something analogous to a desire. But it remains a
paradox that value is ascribed only to actions motivated by respect
for the moral law and not to actions motivated by a so-called
higher desire, especially love. A distinction ought, however, to be
drawn between (1) acting because of such a desire, and (2) merely
acting in accordance with the desire, and I am not sure whether
Kant meant to exclude all value from the latter or only from the
former actions. 15

Certainly most commentators on Kant interpreting his own
words have understood him to say that the proportion of moral
good in an action is perverted in direct relation to the amount
of desire that it contains and the correlative absence of respect
for the law. It is evident even in the acceptance by the Church
of an act of imperfect contrition in the Sacrament of Penance that the act is not vitiated by the presence of the fear of
hell and the desire to escape it. It is questionable whether
many persons would testify in their own moral experience to
the fact of Kant that consciously they appreciate the purest
'"A. C. Ewing, "The Paradoxes of Kant's Ethics, Philosophy," The Journal of
the
p. 50.

Institute of Philosophy. Edited by Sydney E. Hooper, vol. XIII (1988),

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THOMAS A. WASSMER

morality of their actions in the sheerest respect for the moral
law unaccompanied by any other human desires. This is Kant's
very statement. How many will bear him out?
Nevertheless it should never be overlooked that Kant does
say that duty is the fulfillment of the will and command of God
and if we keep this point in mind then the insistence of Kant
upon the performance of duty out of the purest respect for the
law acquires much significance. When Kant is speaking of
conscience he makes this very clear:
Now this original intellectual and (as a conception of duty) moral
capacity, called conscience, has this peculiarity in it, that although
its business is a business of man with himself, yet he finds himself
compelled by his reason to transact it as if at the command of
another person. For the transaction here is the conduct of a
trial (causa) before a tribunal. But that he who is accused by his
conscience should be conceived as one and the· same person with
the judge is an absurd conception of a judicial court; for then the
complainant would always
his case. Therefore, in all duties
the conscience of the man must regard another than himself as the
judge of his actions, if it is to avoid self-contradiction. Now this
other may be actual or a merely ideal person which reason frames
to itself. Such an idealized person (the authorized judge of conscience) must be one who knows the heart; for the tribunal is set
up in the inward part of man:. at the same time he must also be
all-obliging, that is, must be or be conceived as a person in respect
of whom all duties are to be regarded as his commands; since conscience is the inward judge of all free actions. Now, since such a
moral being must at the same possess all power (in heaven and
earth), since otherwise he could not give his commands their
proper effect (which the office of judge necessarily requires), and
since such a moral being possessing power over all is called God,
hence conscience must be conceived as the subjective principle of
a responsibility for one's deeds before God; nay, this latter concept
is contained (though it be only obscurely) in every normal selfconsciousness .16

It is true that Kant finds the conditions of the categorical
and the a priori in moral propositions in this divine source of
morality and perhaps it is imprudent to think that Kant is not
10

Abbott, op. cit., p. S!lft.

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considering the love of God higher and more noble than the love
of man when he proposes that morality should arise from the
purest respect for the law. Perhaps we should find his inadequacy in looking upon God as merely a Law-Giver and not as
a loving God. Perhaps the real error is in the Theology of Kant
and not in his Ethics. Perhaps it is extreme to say that Kant's
morality is so pure of all love that there is little difference
between his morality and the morality of the devil. N evertheless, his .utter regard for the law, the appeal to the purest
motive of respect for the law, the austerity, rigor, and almost
forbidding doctrine of morality has deterred many from Kant
and has made them question his practical psychology. The
sharpness of the divorce between duty and desire appears as so
much stoicism. Schiller accused him of this stoical strain but
Kant seems to deny that this is the correct reaction to his
rigorous principle.
Of what sort is the emotional characteristic, the temperament as it
were of virtue; is it spirited and cheerful, or anxiously depressed
and dejected? An answer is hardly necessary. The latter slavish
spirit can never exist without a secret hatred of the law, and the
cheerfulness of heart in the performance of one's duty is a mark
of the genuineness of the virtuous disposition, without which one
is never certain that he has taken a liking to good, that is to say,
adopted it into his maximY

Equivalently Kant is saying here that, unless a man applies
the Kantian principle with an unstoical mind, he cannot be
acting from a real sense of moral obligation. This may be very
plausible in the theoretical order, but once again we would like
to see its vindication in psychology.
Such is the mind of Kant on the application of the principle
of morality that a person must act out of pure respect for
the law. To perform an action out of personal inclination or
from a motive of self-interest renders the action only legally
good but not morally good even though the action be in conformity with the moral law. Now our own psychological ex17

Ibid., pp. 330-331.

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THOMAS A. WASSMER

perience argues that this is not so. We certainly do not judge
only those actions to be morally good which proceed exclusively
from a pure sense of duty and that personal inclination and
self-interest pervert the moral value of an act. We consider
almsgiving from a motive of compassion, neighborly assistance
from a motive of friendliness, conjugal affection of spouses for
each other and parental affection toward parents from a motive
of love, to be morally good acts, even though they are not performed from a motive of pure and strict duty. It has been
pointed out so often that according to Kant the motive of
charity would have no moral value at all and that acts performed from the motive of charity would not be morally good.
Everyone admits that many heroic acts in time of peace and
war go far beyond the call of duty because duty does not
demand such supreme sacrifices under the circumstances. Such
acts are considered to be of the highest moral character because
in the words of Our Divine Lord "greater love hath no man
than that he lay down his
for his friends." Is it not a distortion of the truth and the negation of common prudence to
consider such acts of supreme devotion and loyalty toward
one's country and fellow-men only " legally but not morally
good"? Kant's principle seems to be definitely at variance
with the common conviction of mankind, because mankind always judges acts performed out of love and charity to be of
greater moral value than those done merely from a sense of
duty.
I am not convinced that Professor Ewing is representing the
mind of Kant accurately when he asserts that he is in agreement with him on the non-value of the action of a person who
is motivated solely by desire without regard for the objective
goodness or wrongness of an act. The question to be decided is
whether, presuming that there is conformity of the act with
right conduct, a man is performing a moral act if his action is
motivated exclusively by desire without respect for the moral
law consciously present to him. Kant apparently answers in
the negative and the general conviction of mankind is opposed
to his position. The explanation of Professor Ewing, as far as

life

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I can see, does not make the Kantian position any the more
plausible. I am not impressed either with the distinction that
this same writer makes in saying that we might vindicate
intrinsic value for actions that are motivated by some other
motive than pure respect for the law, but that real moral value
belongs only to those actions to which Kant would ascribe it.
Is this not merely a hopeless retreat into vague and confusing
language? What is the meaning of something that has intrinsic
but not _real moral value? We are never told by Professor
Ewing but he seems only to be interested in creating a separate
species for those actions of Kant for which he ascribes moral
value.
There certainly seems to me to be something quite specific about
the nature of moral value as described by Kant sufficient to justify
us in making it a separate species distinct from other kinds. It is
also true that if a person possesses this kind of value he is in a fair
way to attain himself and produce for other people the remaining
kinds also, as far as physical obstacles permit, a circumstance which
gives it a special importance. Also besides being instrumentally
the most important, it is intrinsically the highest in some important sense of the word. 18

We might advert to the fact that the distinction that Kant
makes between the legal good and the moral good intimates the
complete cleavage that he establishes between the juridical and
moral orders. So complete is this dichotomy that scholastic
ethics finds the source of the difference in a quadruple division
-scope, obligation, origin and end. There is no rationalization
of Kant's strict rigorous doctrine on the value of the moral act
arising exclusively from respect of the law by the attempt of
Professor Ewing to which we have alluded above by defining
duty in terms of desire. Kant himself would be unwilling to
accept this interpretation which would ultimately adulterate
his ethical philosophy and would lead to the destruction of his
own morality in substitution for a doctrine of more or less
enlightened self-interest.
18

Ewing, op. cit., p.

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THOMAS A. WASSMER

We would like to conclude this study with the two propositions which we trust have received some clarification in the
moral philosophy of Kant.
(1) The reduction of freedom to the noumenal order does

not explain freedom at all.
(2) The denial of moral value to all actions that are in the
least motivated by desire is not consistent with the psychological testimony of the general run of mankind. No
reduction of duty in terms of desire nor any distinction
between intrinsic value and real moral value according
to Professor Ewing can save the rigorous stoicism of
Kantian ethics.
THOMAS A. WASSMER, s. J.
St. Peter's College
Jersey City, New Jersey

GENUS AND DIFFERENCE

I

WOULD like to give the reader a firm thread to hold
during his journey through the labyrinth which follows.
My aim is to investigate the relation between Genus and
Difference; and ,the whole of the discussion which follows is
subordinated to this one aim. In order to accomplish this
design I have to go abroad into the fields of grammar, logic,
analogy, and participation. The very extent of the problem
shows it to be a philosophical one, and shows, therefore, that
my inquiries here can do little more than skim the surface of
the subject. Nevertheless they may have value in leading to its
more systematic study.
An ambiguity presents itself at the very outset. We use the
words " difference " and " genus " in two different ways: one
as indicating a mode of predication, the other as indicating a
mode of being, the mode, namely, which determines the mode
of predication. So, for example, we can say that canine is a
difference, meaning either that the term " canine " is predicated
in the predicable of difference, or that the mode of canine being
is what differentiates dogs from cats and from all other animals.
In the former case, we are discussing modes of predication: in
the latter case, modes of being. But the important thing is
that the mode of being determines the mode of predication/'
for the only reason why the term "canine" is predicated in
the predicable of difference is because the canine mode of being
is what differentiates one type of animal being from another.
In other words, our descriptions of things refer to the things
as they are, and have truth value only insofar as they describe
things as they are. Evidently this same truth holds for the
predicable of genus just as it holds for all predicables. Now in
what follows I do not use any special expression to distinguish
1 ". • •

modus praedicandi proportionatur ipsis rebus de quibus fit praedicatio."
ad 1: cf. also V Metaphya., lect., 9, n. 890.

St. Thomas, 1 Sent., d. i9, q. 4, a.

848

344

MICHAEL

P. SLATTERY

between these two usages of the terms "difference" and
" genus." I leave it to the context to make clear to the reader
which particular usage is in operation at a given moment.
Perhaps the simplest thing to do will be to begin with some
grammatical or linguistic remarks, and then to work up ·from
them to the more technical aspects of our inquiry, namely, the
logical and metaphysical ones.
When we say that a dog is a canine animal, we use the term
"canine" as an adjective qualifying the noun" animal." Now,
from a grammatical point of view, adjectives are dependent
upon their nouns, and serve to qualify them, or to " modify "
them, as it is sometimes said. Nouns, on the other hand, are
grammatically independent of their qualifying adjectives.
Grammatically, generic terms are nouns, whereas differential
terms (terms, namely, which indicate the difference) are adjectives. And the parallelism between grammar and logic seems
to be such that the genus, indicated by the grammatically independent noun, is taken to be ontologically independent. This is
especially true in the case of the category of substance which,
being the category of what is primarily being, is therefore the
category where the genus and the difference are primarily to be
found. 2 On the other hand, the difference, indicated by the
grammatically dependent and modifying adjective, is taken as
indicating a special quality or modification of the ontologically
independent generic being.
Now there is no lack of authorities for the view that the
difference does tot signify the essence of the thing, namely,
what is basic and independent in the thing. Aristotle's authority is enough here, since if he asserted this view, there will
be a whole host of his followers who will repeat him. He says
that " ... a thing's differentia never signifies its essence, but
rather some quality, as do 'walking ·• and 'biped' ... ," 3 and
that " ... the differentia is always a quality of the genus." 4
Now there would be no difficulties in this view about the
• Cf. Metaphysics Z, c. 1, 1028a 80-86, c. 4, 1080a 18-27, c. 5, 1081a 1-14, etc.
• Topics IV, c. 2, 122b 16-17.
• Ibid., c. 6, 128a 28, and also 144a 19-21.

GENUS AND

346

difference and genus, if another view were not also held by
Aristotle and his followers. This other view is that the full
statement of the essence of a thing is given, not by the genus
alone, but by the genus and difference together. Yet how precisely something which does not even signify the essence can
nevertheless contribute towards the full statement of the essence, is not easy to see; yet the difference is supposed to so
contribute. And the difficulties in this theory become further
apparent when we are told that the essence of a substance is
one, and that, for example, in a man there is only one substantial essence, just as there is only one in a horse or in a dog.
If there had been a multiplicity of
essences in a
given substance, following the old pluralitas formarum viewpoint, it might have been possible to provide something for the
difference to indicate, something other than what is indicated
by the genus. And even then, since the difference indicates
only a quality, in order to save the theory, it would be necessary to say that one essence was a quality of the other-a very
suspect method of description. But since the pluralitas formaium thesis is rejected in Aristotelian thought, the above
tentative interpretation is impossible. In Aristotelian terms,
the one substantial form in each substance is completely described only when it is described by the genus and the difference. So the difference, which only signifies some quality of
the thing, is a necessary element in defining the complete
essence of the thing. This position is, to say the least, not without its difficulties.
Evidently the genus alone is not sufficient to describe the
essence, since it does not serve to distinguish one species, say
dogs, from another, say horses. On the other hand, according
to Duns Scotus, the difference does not comprise the whole of
the essence, otherwise the genus would be superfluous. The
difference, for him, is merely " completive " of the substance
of the thing. 5 To say that the difference is "completive" does
• " ... non enim potest intelligi quod tota ratio quidditativa sit in ultima
differentia: tunc enim genus superflueret in diffinitione: quia sola ultima differentia totam essentiam rei exprimeret: sed debet intelligi, quod completive est

346

MICHAEL

P. SLATTERY

not answer the question whether the difference is substantial
or whether it is merely a property. Furthermore, Scotus gives
us no good reason for asserting that the genus does have some
independent predicable function after the difference has been
predicated. He fails to prove that, as an addition to the
difference, it is not superfluous.
What Fonseca has to say on the matter leaves things just
as completely in the dark as do Scotus' theories. Fonseca tells
us that the difference is· neither a substance nor an accident,
and avers that this is almost everyone's opinion on the
Taking this statement at its face value we would have to
invent an extra category of being in addition to that of substance and those of accident in order to house the differences of
things. But Fonseca goes on to avoid this consequence by
saying that the difference is an incomplete substance, and is
to be placed reductively in the predicament appropriate to
genus, namely, that of substance. So the difference is nearly,
but not quite, -a substance. I suppose that if it were the substance of the thing, then the genus would once more be superfluous, and we would return once more to Scotus' standpoint.
Now, if the difference were to be interpreted as a quality, 7 one
of the many results would be the raising of the unsympathetic
ghost of Russell's criticism, namely, why draw a distinction
between the difference and the property? But even as an intota substantia rei, sicut a forma ultima completive est tota essentia habentis
formam." In VII Metaphys., summ. II, c. 12, s. ·106.
• "Vera igitur et fere omnium communis sententia est, difierentias substantiarum
neque accidentia esse, neque substantias directo positas in hoc Praedicamento: sed
esse substantias incompletas, reductitie (sic) ad illud pertinentes." In V Metaphys.,
by Pedro da Fonseca S. J., (1528-1599), c. 8, q.
s. 8 (Cologne, 1615), vol. 1,
tome 2, p. 497 B: ". . . etsi nee substantiae completae, nee qualitates completae,
tamen habent esse substantiae non inhaerendo in subjecto, et modum qualitatis
in efficienda et specificanda (ut ita dicam) et quasi figuranda natura generum, et
ad suas species trahenda." ibid., s. 2, p. 496 EF.
• For example, Albertus Magnus interprets Aristotle's stateinents as meaning
that: ". . . nulla differentia in modo praedicandi dicit quid per se stans in natura
rei sicut fundamentum formarum, sed magis significat quale per qualitatem
essentialem, quae qualitas est perficiens potentiam generis." Liber IV Topicomm,
tract. I, c. 4 (Vives ed., vol. 2, p. 868).

GENUS AND DIFFERENCE

347

complete substance, the difference fails to give unity to the
essence. We cannot say that the genus refers to one part of
the essence, and the difference to another; firstly, because the
essence is a unity, and secondly, and more importantly, because
the difference refers in some way to the whole essence just as
the genus does. 8 And this latter assertion brings us to another
interpretation of the difference.
Aristotle in one of his mature writings, namely, the seventh
book of the Metaphysics, tells us that " ... it is plain that the
definition is the formula which contains the differentiae, or,
according to the right method, the last of these." 9 In the
same chapter twelve in which he tells us this, he also concludes
from his premisses that " ... clearly the last differentia will be
the substance of the thing and its definition," 10 a statement
which would seem to contradict what he says in the Topics
but which has the merit of completely vindicating his theory
of the unity of the essence. For he shows in this chapter how
the final difference contains all the other differences and, presumably also the ultimate genus. On this view of the difference,
the genus is strictly speaking superfluous, once you have given
the difference; and so we read in St. Thomas' Commentary on
this chapter that " the definition is the ratio from the differences only, since the genus is not outside the differences" 11
(my italics), and that " ... it is evident that the ultimate difference will be the whole substance of the thing, and its total
definition. For it includes in itself all the preceding particular
8 The following statement
by Ferrariensis is, I believe, an appropriate summing
up of the position: " ... bene dicit (i.e., St. Thomas) quod a materia sumitur
genus in rebus materialibus, aut a materiali: quia videlicet a tota natura speciei, ut
potentialis est, sumitur proxime, tanquam a natura per ipsum, nomen generis
significata; a materia vero sumitur remote et originaliter, tamquam a prima
origine potentialitatis naturae. Similiter et ab ipsa eadem natura specifica, ut
actualis est et determinans, sumitur proxime differentia, tamquam a natura nomine
differentiae significata; a forma vero remote et originaliter sumitur, tamquam
a prima actualitatis origine." In II Cont. Gent., c. 95, v, 3.
• Metaphys. Z, c. 12, 1038a 28-30.
10 Ibid., 1038a 19-20.
11 " Definitio est ratio ex differentiis tan tum, quia genus non est praeter differentias." VII Metaphys., lee. 12, n. 1561. (my italics)

348

MICHAEL

P. SLATTERY

differences." 12 Albertus Magnus tells us that ". . . thus the
difference is convertible with the species"; 13 and Suarez echoes
his words, saying that " ... these two are thought of as being
the same, since the difference constitutes the species." 14
Here, then, we have a totally opposite attitude towards the'
difference. It is no longer an adjunct to the genus, and is no
longer considered to be merely expressing a quality of the
thing. Rather, it renders the genus superfluous in definitions,
since the difference is by itself the substance of the thing; it
is its species and contains the genus within itself. St. Thomas,
for example, speaks of the genus as being material by comparison with the difference, the latter being formal/ 5 and also
of the genus being indeterminate and being made determinate
by the difference.16 Both these characteristics place the genus in
a position of inferiority to and dependence upon the difference.
From this point of view one might well wonder what purpose
is served by the predicable of Species, since the difference already fulfils whatever function was intended for the speciesevery function, that is, except the purely linguistic one of providing a grammatically independent term, a noun, to express
an ontologically independent status, that of a substance: for
we talk of dogs, not of canines, and of men, not of rationals.
It is significant to note in this respect that Aristotle himself
does not list Species as a predicable. He says:
10 " ••• palam est quod ultima differentia erit tota substantia rei, et tota definitio. lncludit enim in se omnes praecedentes particulas." ibid., n. 1555.
18 " Cum autem hie consideremus rei diffinitae unitatem,
et unitas non sit a
partibus potentialibus formae, sed ab ipsa tota ut est actus et terminus, hie consideramus earn prout est tota et actus et terminus; et llic convertitur cum specie
differentia." In VII Metapkys., tract. IV, cap. S, (Vives ed., vol. 6, pp. 469-470),
(my italics) .
14 " ••• differentiam seu speciem (hae enim duae pro eadem reputantur,
cum
differentia speciem constituat) .... " D.M., d. 6, s. xi, n. S.
10 "Semper autem id a quo sumitur differentia constituens speciem, se habet ad
illud unde sumitur genus, sicut actus ad potentiam," Summa Theol., I, q. S, a. 5,
resp.: and " ... ratio generis sumitur ab eo quod est materiale in re: sicut ratio
differentiae ab eo quod est formale." V Metapkys., lee. 7, n.
18 " ••• nihil prohibet idem genus in se continere diversas differentias, sicut indeterminatum continet in se diversa determinata." VII Metaphys., lee. U, n. 1550.

GENUS AND DIFFERENCE

849

Now every proposition and every problem indicates either a genus
or a peculiarity or an accident-for the differentia too, applying as
is does to a class (or genus) ' should be ranked together with the
genus. Since, however, of what is peculiar to anything, part signifies its essence, while part does not, let us divide the " peculiar "
into both the aforesaid parts, and call that part which indicates the
essence a " definition," while of the remainder let us adopt the
terminology which is generally current about these things, and
speak of it as a "property." What we have said, then, makes it
clear that according to our present division, the elements turn out
to be four, all told, namely, either property or definition or genus
or accident.U
Here, then, we get the equation of the difference and the
definition, so confirming our hypothesis. Ross says, a propos
the above passage:
This is Aristotle's classification of predicables which Porphyry later
muddled hopelessly by reckoning species as a fifth predicable. The
place of species in Aristotle's account is not as one of the predicables but as the subject; for it is (with reservation in the case of
judgments assigning accidental attributes) judgments about species,
not with individuals, that he has throughout in view.18
The species, on this interpretation, would never appear as
predicate but only as subject. Nevertheless, on the principle
that the definiendum and definiens are convertible, one can
merely convert the proposition and have the species as predicate. So the species would seem to function as a sort of predicaone. And in a posteriori
ble, even if only as a
arguments when we argue from sensible properties, e. g., " All
beings having such and such sensible properties are dogs," to
the essence, once more the species can function as a predicate:
though it can be argued that the theory of the Predicables
primarily concerns a priori propositions; but then it might very
reasonably be asked which of the two, namely, species or difference, is prior, for they are, in fact, identical.
Specific terms are descriptive, and therefore capable of serv10

18

Topics I, ch. 4, IOlb 16-25.
Aristotle, by W. D. Ross, 5th ed., p. 57.

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MICHAEL P. SLATTERY

ing as predicates, and differential terms, conversely, do correspond to some " differential " reality: for example, we do use
specific terms like "cat" to describe types of being; and there
is some reality referred to by differential terms like "feline."
Thus we give the same description to a dog whether we call
it a dog or whether we call it canine. The first description is by
means of a specific term, the second by means of a differential
one. Conversely the reality described in each case is the same,
namely, a dog-or a canine, if you so wish. The specific reality,
therefore, is the same as the " differential " one, just as the
specific description means the same thing as does the differential one. We are thus reduced once more to Albertus Magnus'
". . . the difference is convertible with the species," and to
Suarez' " these two are thought of as being the same . . . ,"
which statements, summing up as they do the doctrine that
Aristotle founded and that St. Thomas took up, are about the
best commentary upon the situation.
We might, in passing, make some mention of Fonseca's interpretation of the theory that the ultimate difference is the definition of the thing. Fonseca, for his part, asserts that the ultimate difference contains the whole of the substance apart from
the ultimate genus.19 It is difficult, however, to see how such
a view can be maintained, for presumably a first difference of
an ultimate genus implies its genus, and since the ultimate difference implies that first difference, so the ultimate difference
will imply its ultimate genus; and that means that it contains
it. For example, it is difficult to see how the first difference
" corporeal " of the genus " substance " fails to imply its genus.
If it does not do so, then presumably it will be possible for a
thing to be corporeal without being a substance-which is
logically impossible, just as it is impossible for something to
19 " Pro bat Aristoteles, ultimam differentiam esse substantiam
rei, et definitionem
probanda hunc
illius. Et quantum Iicet ex ipsa probatione colligere,
sensum habet: ultimam differentiam continere formaliter totum reliquum substantiae, sive essentiae rei, praeter primum genus; eamque solam esse primo generi
explanatio (Cologne, 1615),
adiungendam in definitione." In VII Metaphys., c.
vol.
tome 8, p. 858, s.o. (my italics) .

GENUS AND DIFFERENCE

351

be canine without its being animal. 2 ° Furthermore, if the first
difference is apart from the ultimate genus, then so are all the
others; and then the question arises as to how the genus and its
difference can both together indicate one substantial essence
while having no connection with one another. And if the difference and the genus are completely distinct from one another,
then how can the difference fail to become a predicable accident
as something lying quite outside the generic essence of the thing?
It only fails to do so if you maintain that there are two essences
in the thing; and then one can reasonably ask why there should
not be an essence corresponding to each difference, so that the
number of essences in a thing would amount to the total of
differential terms plus one for the ultimate genus. Furthermore
one can raise the linguistic question of what difference in meaning it makes if you call a substance by its first difference, namely,
"corporeal," (or "spiritual" as the case may be), or if you
call it by its intermediate genus (or species, according to which
end of the category-species chain that you start from) , namely,
body or spirit. If a thing is a body, it is corporeal: and if it is
corporeal it is a body. The two predicates mean the same
thing, yet on Fonseca's hypothesis, the one (i.e., "corporeal")
would apparently not imply that it was in the genus of substance, whereas the other, (body) would carry that implication.
Duns Scotus reverses Fonseca's procedure, though in his case
Scotus is talking about the univocal predication of being. Nevertheless, the same general principle is in operation, namely, that
one end of the generic-differential chain is unhooked from the
rest. With Fonseca, the ultimate genus is unhooked from the
whole chain of differences. With Scotus, on the contrary, it is
the ultimate difference which is unhooked from the rest of the
chain of intermediate differences and ultimate genus. So, according to Scotus, being is predicated univocally of all the dif20 One can, and does, of course, call accidents corporeal.
But in the present
context we are dealing with substantial differences, of which corporeal is one.
In this latter sense of the word accidents can never be corporeal since, being
accidents, they cannot belong to the essence. Even if they are proper accidents,
they are still outside the essence.

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MICHAEL

P. SLATTERY

ferences of being right up to the last one: but this last one
is apart, and being is predicated only analogically of it. 21 The
difficulty for Scotus is the same as it is for Fonseca, namely,
why unhook one end of the chain? In Scotus' case, why go to
the opposite end from Fonseca and unhook the ultimate difference? As a difference, it is just like any other difference: it
determines its predecessor to a more specific mode of being. It
is unique only insofar as, with it, one finally arrives at the ultimate species of things beyond which there are no more diversities in the kinds of being. But this uniqueness in being the
final difference in the series is no reason for saying that it is
not in the series. The contrary is rather the case, as we see
from the comments of Aristotle and St. Thomas.
When we inspect this second Aristotelian theory of the difference, we witness the revenge, as it were, that the difference
takes over the genus of the first theory. But the story is not
finished yet. The genus can regain supremacy by taking up
another position. Its first victory was gained on what look
like purely grammatical grounds but was lost as soon as the
discussion was transferred to the grounds of Aristotelian metaphysics. For, there, the substance of a thing is one and is
expressed by the ultimate difference. But it we go now to the
field of Platonic metaphysics, then the genus once more becomes supreme; for whereas the Aristotelian genus is something imperfect and determinable by the difference, the Platonic genus by contrast is something more perfect, something
which the differences imitate only imperfectly. Firstly, it possesses in a unity what is possessed only by a multiplicity of
species, each species possessing a part of what the genus has,
that is, participating in it. Secondly, it also possesses its being
in a higher way than do its species; for, keeping to our old
example, the latter possess the animal being in an imperfect
so that the species of a genus participate in
diminished
the genus not only quantitatively, as having some aspect of
01 " Quantum
ad primum dico quod ens non est univocum dictum in quid de
omnibus per se intelligibilibus, quia non de difierentiis ultimis nee propriis passionibus entis." Op. Ox., d. S, q. S, a. 2, n. 6.

GENUS AND DI.IfFERENCE

353

animal being, but also qualitatively, as having the aspect of
animal being in an inferior way to that in which the genus
possesses it.
Evidently you can make short work of this view by ranging
the whole artillery of Aristotelian criticism against it. But the
criticism will fail, so think some commentators, when confronted with an existential interpretation of participation. Such
an interpretation is to be found, we are told, in St. Thomas'
doctrine that all things participate in existence and receive it
from the Supreme Existent. The Supreme Existent contains
in Himself, in a higher way, all the perfections of existence
possessed partially by the various restricted modes of existence.
The Thomistic doctrine of participation, then, although it
accords with the Platonistic dialectic of participation in giving
more ontological value to the object of the more general term
than to that of the more specific, is not an ontology of Ideas.
It is an ontology of existents. For the Unparticipated here is
an existent: and the various limited modes of being participate
in the Unparticipated precisely as being existents. And an existent is not a universal idea. Furthermore, this opposition to
the Platonistic doctrine of participation is confirmed by St.
Thomas' giving priority in being to actual existence. As he
says: " existence is the most perfect of things ... the perfection
of perfections." 22
Under these conditions, then, so Geiger informs us:
the genus is no longer the matter to which a specific difference
comes to be added from outside as a formal element and principle
of determination. It is, on the contrary, the form which is charged
with virtualities more diverse than those in a simpler unity. . . .
If the species participates the genus, it is, and this is the sole hypothesis possible, because it does not express the whole of the
richness of the genus. And if it does not express it, this is necessarily due to the specific difference . . . it is necessary to conclude
that the specific element is itself nothing more than a determination of that which the genus contains more perfectly. We must
conclude in other words that the difference participates in the genus
•• " ... hoc quod dico esse est inter omnia perfectissimum ... et propter hoc
est perfectio omnium perfectionum .... " De Pot., q. 7, a. !i!, ad 9.

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P. SLATTERY

and that the genus possesses all the specific differences in a superior
unity. 23

Here, evidently, all virtue lies in the generic end of the genusdifference chain, just as in the Aristotelian view, all virtue lay
in the differential end. In each case one end of the chain contains in a higher way all the remainder. Naturally enough,
between these two theories, we can see, if not a direct conflict,
at least a certain tenson. And Geiger does not hesitate to say
that the Aristotelian logic is irreconcilable with the Thomistic
logic of participation. Yet he also says that they are both
necessary for human knowledge; and it is in discussing this
point that we have to go over into the field of analogy. For,
as Geiger says about the conclusion he drew in the abovequoted passage:
Such a conclusion is the ruin of univocity. It goes directly against
the most conscious efforts of Aristotle, who always refused to admit
that the specific differences participate in the genus. For to admit
this thesis would be to affirm in the same breath that the genus is
more perfect than the species. This preference for genera with
which Aristotle charged Plato, and his own preference for the most
determined species, spring from the irreducible opposition between
the two logical systems. 24
•• "Le genre n'est plus Ia matiere a quoi vient s'ajouter comme du dehors une
difference specifique, elt\ment formel et principe de determination. II est au contraire la forme qui est chargee de virtualites plus diverses dans une unite plus
simple. L'espece n'en explicite qu'une partie ... si l'espece participe du genre c'est,
seule hypothese possible, parce qu'elle n'exprime pas toute Ia richesse du genre.
Et si elle ne l'exprime pas, c'est necessairement en raison de la difference specifique
... il faut conclure que l'e!ement specifique n'est lui-meme qu'une determination
de ce que le genre contient plus parfaitement. II faut conclure en d'autres termes,
et que la difference participe du genre, et que le genre possooe toutes les differences specifiques dans une unite superieure." L.-B. Geiger 0. P ., "La Participation dans la Philosophic de S.·Thomas d'Aquin," Bibliotheque Thomiste, XXIII,
£nd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1953), !1!53-!1!54.
24 "Une
telle conclusion est Ia ruine de l'univocite. Elle va directement a
l'encontre de !'effort le plus conscient d'Aristote, qui a toujours refuse d'admettre
que les differences specifiques participent des genres. Car admettre cette these, ce
serait affirmer du meme coup que le genre est plus parfait que les especes, done
qu'il est nne realite subsistante, autant et plus que les especes. La preference pour
les genres, qu' Aristote a reprochee a Platon, sa propre preference pour les especes

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355

So we are to conclude that Aristotle's logic involves a logic
of the univocal genus, whereas the logic of participation, at
least in its Thomistic interpretation, involves the analogy of
the genus. Now there seems to be a certain ironic change of
position here between the opposing sides. For one of the arguments used by Aristotle against the Platonic ontology of participation was that key terms like being and good were not
univocal, as Plato took them to be, but analogical. Yet Geiger
looks on Aristotle as an opponent of participation precisely
because of the latter thinker's doctrine of the univocal genus;
and by contrast he invokes analogy in the genus as a necessary
ingredient in the Platonic-inspired logic of participation. It
might be interesting to speculate on how Plato and Aristotle
would have reacted to this development.
Yet there is a further twist to the story; for although these
two logics are in " irreducible opposition," they are, nevertheless, according to Geiger, both necessary and both true. He
tells us that: ". . . the univocal logic of Aristotle will be recognized as being better in reality ... ," 25 and goes on to speak of
''. . . recognizing with Aristotle the necessity for us of univocal logic. . . ." 26 Yet a few pages before this he says: " If
in fact the modes of the real take up an order following a formal
progression going from the inferior beings up to the Supreme
Perfection, we will never be in possession of an idea rigorously
and univocally common to several modes, unless one limits oneself to purely logical genera." 27 This assertion is perfectly
clear: generic community among real beings cannot be uniles plus determinees, tiennent a !'opposition irreductible des deux constructions
logiques." ibid., p. 254.
25 " ••• la logique univoque
d'Aristote sera reconnne comme mieux fondee en
realite." ibid., p. 285, n. 1.
•• " ... tout en reconnaissant avec Aristote Ia necessite pour nons de Ia logique
univoque, il nons fandra montrer dans la logique de Ia participation nne vue
plus objective encore .... " ibid.
27 " Si en efl'et les modes du reel s'echelonnent
suivant nne progression formelle
depuis les etres inferieurs jusqu'a la Perfection Premiere, jamais nons ne serous en
possession d'une notion rigoureusement et univoquement commune a plusieurs
modes, a moins qu'on ne s'en tienne a des genres purement logiques." ibid., p. 278.

356

MICHAEL

P.

vocal. The only time that we can speak of univocal genera is
when we are concerned with" purely logical" ones. This raises
the question as to how Aristqtle's logic can be " better in
reality," especially since Geiger asserts that: "Far from being
inferior to univocal definitions, real participation seems more
objective and more true"; 28 and in the sentence previous to
this he refers to participation as being " the most profound
view of the universe." 29 Now if these two logics are in fact
both true, and if the one seems to be " more objective and more
true " than the other, and if, furthermore, the one is " the most
profound view," reconciliation between these two logics becomes very difficult. And if it is possible, then we may very
well wonder why this same type of reconciliation cannot be
applied in the Scotist-Thomist controversy over the univocity
or analogy of being. Why, in fact, should Thomists, of whom
Geiger is one, quarrel with Scotists-or with Ockhamists 3 "
for that matter-over the latter's conceptual univocity of
being? 81 Why not allow the Scotist theory of being to play a
role analogous to that which the Aristotelian logic is given to
play here?
There is, of course, little doubt that one can find passages in
Aristotle's work supporting the view that the genus is predicated univocally,S2 namely, by real univocity as opposed to the
•• "Loin d'etre inferieure aux definitions univoques, Ia participation reelle semble
plus objective et plus vraie." ibid., p. 428.
•• "La vue Ia plus profonde de l'univers serait, nons l'avons dit, celle qui
l'envisagerait dans son ensemble et dans chacun de ses degres comme nne participation de Ia Perfection Premiere." ibid.
•• ". . . non est inconveniens Deum et creaturam parificari in aliquo conceptu
univoco, quia ille conceptus univocus non est de essentia Dei nee creaturae."
Comm. in Sent. (ed. Lug.) I, d. 2, q. 9, GG, by William of Ockham. See Matthew
Menges 0. F. M., The Concept of Univoeity Regarding the Predication of God and
Creatures According to Willia111; of Ockham. (New York: Franciscan Institute
Publications, 1952), especially pp. 72-ll8, for Ockham's theory of conceptual
univocity.
81 " Omnis inquisitio de Deo supponit intellectum habere conceptum eumdem
univocum quem accipit ex creaturis." Opus Ox., d. 1, q. 8, a. 2, n. 10, by Duns
Scotus. Compare this with: " Deus et creatura non sunt primo diversa in conceptibus tamen sunt primo diversa in realitate: quia in nulla realitate conveniunt."
ibid., d. 8, q. 8, n. ll.
•• See the Categories, c. 5 8 a 88-8b 9.

GENUS AND DIFFERENCE

357

logical univocity met with in the previous paragraph. Nevertheless-and as we saw with his views on the difference-he
puts forward another theory of the genus; and in this latter
theory it is predicated only analogically. 33 Once again it is
this second theory which seems to fit in better with his metaphysical system. St. Thomas, in commenting on this latter view
of Aristotle, also asserts that the genus is analogical, allowing
also that it might be logically univocal. 34 But as regards this
latter theory of the logically univocal genus, it is difficult to
find any passage in Aristotle showing that he held it; whereas
there is one passage which seems to indicate that he openly
rejected it. This passage appears in a general inquiry into the
problem whether all movements are commensurable, that is to
say, are all terms which are predicated of movements in general,
univocally predicable of them? Aristotle simplifies his problem
by studying some terms used in everyday life. Sharpness, for
example, is not univocally predicated of a pen, a wine, and the
highest note in a scale. Then he
whether this same. lack
of univocity holds for
like " quick," " much," " double,"
and" equal." His answer is that it does; and in his own words:
" In fact there are some terms of which even the definitions
are equivocal .. ," 35 of which the above-mentioned terms are
examples, since they do not carry exactly the same meaning for
every one of their subjects. Confirmation of this answer is
given shortly afterwards in a reply to the hypothesis that the
incommensurability between two things might apply only to
their real state of existence; perhaps you could nevertheless
think of them or describe them as being exactly alike. If this
were . the case then the term " dearness," to take his own
example, would have exactly the same meaning when predi•• See the Physics H, c. 4 248a l0-249a 24.
34 ". • • genus autem non est unum; quia secundum
diversas formas in rerum
natura existentes, diversas species generis praedicationem suscipiunt. Et sic genus
est unum logice, sed non physice." VII Physic., c. 4, lect. 8, n. 8. Cf. also:
" Quia ergo genus quodammodo est unum, et non simpliciter, iuxta genus latent
multa: idest, per similitudinem et propinquitatem ad unitatem generis, multorum
aequivocatio latet." ibid.
•• Op. cit., 248b 17.

358

MICHAEL

P. SLATTERY

cated of water and of speech, even though the clearness of the
one is, in reality, different from the clearness present in the
other. His answer is in the negative:
It would seem, however, that we must reject this solution, since
clearly we could thus make all equivocal attributes univocal and
say merely that that which contains each of them is different in
different cases: thus "equality," "sweetness," and " whiteness"
will severally always be the same, though that which contains
them is different in different cases.36
There is little room for doubt as to the interpretation of these
passages; evidently Aristotle was not prepared to accept logically univocal genera, or conceptually univocal genera, as they
are sometimes called. And, considering his insistence upon the
analogical nature of the fundamental terms like "being,"
" one," and " good," this is hardly surprising. If he had admitted logically univocal terms, the force of some of his criticisms of Platonic participation, and of the theories of other
philosophers might have been weakened. A logically univocal
concept of goodness, or oneness, or beauty, would, in fact, have
fitted in very well with the Platonic doctrine of participation,
and would have saved it from some at least of Aristotle's
criticisms.
A further conclusion we can arrive at from a study of the
above-mentioned passages in Aristotle is that, for him, generic
terms are not univocal: they are analogical. For, as he himself
says: " ... this discussion serves to show that the genus is not
a unity but contains a plurality latent in it ... " 37 ; and if we
adopt the view that Aristotle's genera are analogical, then the
" irreducible opposition " between Aristotle's logic and the
Thomistic analogical logic of participation disappears. There
remains, consequently, .no problem of how the two mutually
conflicting logics can both be true. Few people will doubt that
these results make such an interpretation of Aristotle worth
investigating. Furthermore, it fits in much better with the
Aristotelian doctrine of the unity of the substance.
•• Ibid., !l48b !l4-!l49a 2.

•• Ibid., 249a 22-28.

GENUS AND DIFFERENCE

359

On the latter point, we will recall that, in the AristotelianThomistic doctrine, the difference is not outside the genus but
is a determination of it. 38 Now if the genus were univocally
the same for all its species, then the only way in which the difference could differentiate the genus would consist in being
outside the nature of the genus. By contrast, if the genus is
only analogically the same for all its species, then the differences can differentiate one species from another, while at the
same time being no more than intrinsic determinations of the
generic nature to one mode of being.
To illustrate the former theory, if men and dogs were exactly
the same as regards animality-and this is what is required for
the univocal predication of the genus" animal "-then, in order
to differentiate the species man from the species dog, the
specific differences would have to be outside the nature of the
genus " animal "; and then the unity of the substance would be
impaired, and we would be reduced once more to the plurality
of forms. Furthermore, if the difference is outside the nature of
the genus, then the difference canine, for example, will not be
animal; and we will be left in a situation in which dogs, to the
extent that they are canine, are not animals. But since dogs
are totally canine, it will follow that dogs are not animals.
Putting it in general terms, since the specific difference is of
the essence of the species-identical with ·it in fact-if the
difference is outside the genus, then no species will belong to
its genus: no dogs, or cats, or horses, will be animals. Such
absurd consequences make the theory impossible.
It may also be noted that impossible consequences will likewise follow from trying to keep the genus univocal while never•• Cf. n. 16 and St. Thomas, VII Metaphys., lect.
n. 1549: " ... tota essentia
definitionis, in differentia quodammodo comprehenditur. Ex· hoc enim animal,
quod est genus, non potest esse absque speciebus, quia formae specierum quae
sunt differentiae, non sunt aliae formae a forma generis, sed sunt formae generis
cum determinatione. Sicut patet quod animal est quod habet animam sensitivam.
Homo autem est qui habet animam sensitivam "talem," scilicet cum ratione ....
Unde cum differentia additur generi, non additur quasi aliqua diversa
a
genere, sed quasi in genere implicite contenta, sicut determinatum continetur in
indeterminato, ut album in colorato." Cf. also II Cont. Gent., c. 95 in medio.

360

MICHAEL

P. SLATTERY

theless admitting that the differences are not outside the genus.
Such an interpretation will annihilate all the species of the
genus and will convert the genus into a unique species. For
example, it is granted that all animals are univocally animal,
i.e., animal in exactly the same way. It is also granted that
all the specific differences of the genus " animal " are present
in it. It follows, therefore, that all the differences belong to each
animal, that no species differs in any way from any other, and
that animal is converted into the unique species of all animals.
Such a consequence is hardly less absurd than the other one.
We need hardly say that St. Thomas rejects outright the doctrine of the plurality of substantial forms in one substance, and
maintains that it is by one and the same form that a being is
a substance, a body, an organism, an animal, and a lion,S9 and
following logically from this, that " the difference constitutes
the species." 40 Evidently, then, he will not admit that the
difference is something external to the nature of the genus.
To illustrate the latter theory, namely, that the genus is
analogical, if we ad:tnit that men and dogs are not exactly the
same as regards animality, so that "animal" cannot be correctly predicated of them univocally, it will follow that the
differentiating aspects which place them in diverse species can
already be present in the generic nature. For it is a characteristic of analogical terms that they indicate diverse modes of
being which are nevertheless similar in some way. Now such an
interpretation of the genus, and therefore primarily of substance, amounts in fact to the Aristotelian- Thomistic view of
the substance, since it is the one substance which is rational and
animal or canine and animal. The animality of man is different
from the animality of a dog precisely because it is rational
animality, which is animality of a special sort, while being at
the same time totally animal. And the same holds for the other
species of animal, or of any other genus. As Aristotle says:
•• " Patet etiam ex hoc, quod cuiuslibet speciei est una tan tum forma substantialis; sicut leonis una est forma per quam est substantia, et corpus, et animatum
corpus, et animal et leo." VII Metaphys., lect. H!, n. 1564: and also De spirit.
creat., q. un., a. l, ad 9.
•o "... differentia est quae constituit speciem." Summa Theol., I, q. 50, a. !l, ad 1.

GENUS AND DIFFERENCE

361

For not only must the common nature attach to the different
things, e. g., not only must both be animals, but this very animality
must also be different for each (e. g., in the one case equinity, in
the other humanity), and so this common· nature is specifically
different for each from what it is for the other. One, then, will be
in virtue of its own nature one sort of animal, and the other another,
e. g., one a horse and the other a man.41
We could hardly wish for a clearer statement and explanation
of the analogical nature of the genus. And St. Thomas says,
commenting on this passage: ". . . he excludes the opinion of
those who say that what pertains to the nature of the genus,
does not differ in species in man and in a horse." 42 In other
words, he excludes the univocal genus.
So, with the interpretation of the genus as analogical, we
seem to be expressing the true doctrines of both Aristotle and
St. Thomas, thereby getting rid of an uncomfortable disagreement between two logics both of which are supposed to be
correct. It may be maintained, however, that there is still a
tension between the logic of genus and species and the logic of
participation, since the former treats the genus as the inferior
member of the alliance whereas the latter delegates this role
to the difference. But maybe a reconciliation can be found
even here, since, at least according to St. Thomas' interpretation of him/ 3 Aristotle maintained that there is a gradation
u Metaphysics I,

c. 8, 1058a 1-9.
'" ". . . etiam excluditur opinio eorum qui dicunt quod illud quod pertinet ad
naturam generis, non differt specie in speciebus diversis; sicut quod anima sensibilis
non differt specie in homine et equo." X Metaph., lect. 10, n. !U19. As Descoqs
says: "La representation de I'animal generique est en effet assez semblable--sans
leur etre identique--aux diverses realisations specifiques pour pouvoir leur etre
attribuee sine addito, pourvu que !'attribution se fasse seulement par analogie."
lnstitutiones Metaphysicae Generalis (Paris, 1925), p. 246.
•• " ... propter quod Aristoteles dicit quod distinctiones ·rerum sunt sicut
numerus, in quo unitas subtracta vel addita speciem numeri variat; per quem
modum, in diffinitionibus, si una differentia subtrahatur vel addatur, diversa
species invenitur." II Cont. Gent., c. 95. Fabro says: "Per S. Tommaso il mondo
intelligibile delle ·essenze non e un " hortus conclusus," risultante di elementi
immobili che per un istante, che possiamo chiamare quello del pensiero categoriale
o predicamentale, quello cioe della predicazione logico-formale del genere a riguardo
delle sue specie, e della specie per gli individui. Ma nell'istante seguente della

MICHAEL

P. SLATTERY

between the species of a genus so that one species was more
perfect an expression of the generic mode of being than was
another. 44 Fr. Little tells us that:
Fr. Fabro argues that participation in St. Thomas is rather an
Aristotelian than a Platonic derivative because it was the logical
completion, illogically rejected by Aristotle, of the Aristotelian doctrines adopted by St. Thomas. But if both participation and those
Aristotelian doctrines are true and if all truth is a connected whole
it is undeniable that participation logically completes Aristotelianism.45

Leaving aside the question of inconsistencies in Aristotle's own
mind, there seems to be little reason for denying that the
riftessione metafiscia tutto quel mondo di perfezioni pure e formalita astratte e
indivisibili offre spontaneamente, anzi suscita lui stesso, il movimento dialettico
del pensiero, che relaziona la varie formalita fra di loro e rispetto alia formalita
suprema, l'essere che e soltanto "essere" ... le varie formalita ... si presentano
secondo un intensificarsi progressivo di perfezione e secondo un piano che ascende
a spirale per gradi, secondo una contiguita che possiamo chiamare metafisica. La
penetrazione del pensiero dello Ps.-Dionigi ha reso meno rigide le barriere che
Aristotele sembrava aver posto fra i vari elementi della <f>{uns: ••• S. Tomasso e
costi preso da questa suggestiva visione metafisica, aperta dalla speculazione dello
Stagirita, che la vuol gustare in tutta la sua profondita, quasi avesse trovato il
miele nella bocca del leone, e parla di un prius et posterius anche nelle cause
formali: " ... Dicendum quod secundum Philosophum, etiam in causis formalibus
prius et posterius invenitur ... (De Pot., VI, 5 ad 6um (sic))." La Nozione
Metafiscia Di Partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso D'Aquino (!i!nd ed.; Torino:
Societa Editrice Internazionale, 1950), pp. 194-195.
44 As regards the varying perfections exemplified by the diverse species of being,
the following observations of Fabro are noteworthy: " ... si puo osservare che S.
Tommaso applica quel principio (namely, that the higher contains all the
perfections of the lower in a simpler and more perfect way) senza riserve soltanto
quando si tratta dell' eminenza divina; per quanto riguarda gli altri esseri, Ia distinzione delle creature e come una ' divina discretio,' per la quale ciascuna formalita,
essendo uscita immediatamente da Dio, possiede se stessa 'primo et per se.' Anche
questa profonda osservazione mostrera come fosse acuto in S. Tommaso il considdetto 'spirito del concreto': . . . quaelibet creatura habet esse finitum et
determinatum. Uncle essentia superioris creaturae, etsi habeat quamdam similitudinem inferioris creaturae, prout communicant in aliquo genere, non tamen
complete habet similitudinem illius; quia determinatur ad aliquam speciem, praeter
quam est species inferioris creaturae. Sed essentia Dei est perfecta similitudo
omnium, quantum ad omnia quae in rebus inveniuntur sicut universale principium
omnium" (Ia, q. 84, a. 2 ad llum). op. cit., pp. 169-170.
•• Arthur Little 8. J. The Platonic Heritage of Thomism (Dublin: Standard
House, 1949), p. 22.

GENUS AND DIFFERENCE

868

Aristotelian doctrine of analogy, with its reference to one primary analogate/ 6 hears marked resemblances to Platonic participation; and the Aristotelian doctrine of the gradation of
species is not excessively dissimilar from a Platonic hierarchy
of.forms.
If this is in fact the case, then the apparent conflict between
the two doctrines would seem to disappear. In the logic of
participation, the various species in their diverse ways participate in the generic perfection; in the Aristotelian logic, these
species embody the generic nature at varying stages of perfection, one species of animal, for example, being animal in a
higher way than other species, while no species relaizes the
perfections of animal being in all its forms. In the logic of
participation the one supreme exemplar confers their varying
partial perfections upon the participants; in the Aristotelian
inspired logic of analogy, all the members of the analogy have
reference to one primary member. In Thomistic thought, the
supreme exemplar is the Necessary Existent; 47 and "the primary
member of the analogy of being is the Necessary Existent. 48
The various genera of being are &nalogous finally by analogy
to the Supreme Being, just as the various modes of participation themselves participate in the Supreme Being. The Supreme Being possesses eminentiori modo what the secondary
analogates possess only inferiori modo, and IS what the participants merely faintly imitate. So each species expresses a
particular mode of the limited analogical perfection of its
genus-a perfection expressed in a higher unlimited way by
•• See especially the doctrine of the categories of being where accidents have
being only by reference to substances. H we add to this the Aristotelian doctrine
that each species possesses a certain perfection of being, we are well on the way
to a hierarchy of being participating in the Supreme Being.
•• " ... Deus est prima causa exemplaris omnium rerum." Summa Tkool., I, q. 44,
a. 8, resp.
•• " ... Deum autem supra ostendimus hujusmodi ens esse cui nihil sit causa
essendi. Ab eo igitur est omne quod quocumque modo est. Si autem dicatur quod
ens non est praedicatum univocum, nihilominus praedicta conclusio sequetur: non
enim de multis auquivoce dicitur, sed per analogiam; et sic oportet fieri reductionem in unum." II Cont. Gent., c. 15.

364

MICHAEL

P. SLATTERY

God-and, in so doing, occupies a certain grade in the hierarchy of being.
Summing up, then, we conclude that the difference is not
outside the genus. It is rather the determination of the genus
to one species of being: in fact the difference is the species. The
only distinction that can ultimately be drawn between the
difference and the species is apparently a purely linguistic one ·
depending upon the rules of grammar. The genus contains the
difference indeterminately, and is analogically common to its
various species. These species form a gradation of perfections
of the gerius and are thus a hierarchy of being through participation in the Unparticipated Being, the One to Whom the
whole analogy and hierarchy of being is referent.
MICHAEL

CoUege of St. Thomas
St. Paul,

p. SLATTERY

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS
·coLMAN O'NEILL, 0. P., S. T. Lr., S. T. L., a graduate of the Pontifical
Athenaeum Angelicum, is a professor of J\Ietaphysics at the Dominican
House of Studies, Tallaght, Co. Dublin, and a contributor to The Irish
Theological Quarterly.
THOMAS D. LANGAN, Ph. D., a member of the Department of Philosophy at
the St. Louis University, is a frequent contributor to scholarly publications and the author of a forthcoming book on Heidegger.
THOMAS A. WASSMER, S. J., Ph. D., a graduate of the Fordham University,
is a member of the Department of Philosophy, St. Peter's College, and
is engaged in the preparation of a text in Contemporary Ethics.
MICHAEL P. SLATTERY, Ph. D., a graduate of the London University, is a
professor of philosophy at St. Thomas' College, St. Paul, Minn., and a
frequent contributor to scholarly journals both here and aboard.
JoHN A. OEsTERLE, Ph. D., a frequent contributor to THE THOMIST, is a
member of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Notre
Dame.
DoMINIC RovER, 0. P., S. T. Lr., S. T. L., is engaged in graduate studies at
the Pontifical Faculty of Theology at the Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.
ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, J. U. D., Ph. D., S. J.D., a faculty member of
both the Law School and the Medieval Institute at the University of
Notre Dame, is a frequent contributor to THE THOMIST.
Loms A. RYAN, 0. P., S. T. Lr., Ph. D., a graduate of the Ohio State University, is a professor of sociology at Providence College and a frequent
contributor to scholarly and technical journals.

365

BOOK REVIEWS
Language: An Enquiry into its Meaning and Function. Planned and Edited
by RUTH NANDA ANsHEN. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. Pp.
366.

The present book is the eighth volume of the Science and Culture
Series. This series is aimed at an organic clarification of modern knowledge
with an attempt to achieve something of an encyclopedic synthesis. Past
volumes have dealt with· such topics as Freedom, Science and Man, The
Family, and Moral Principles of Action. The present volume, as the title
indicates., seeks to draw, in the words of the editor, "attention to the
mystery, the miracle, and the magic of language." A further twofold
purpose is suggested, one positive and the other more negative. The positive
aim is " to give a perspective on what language is, its variability in time
and place, its permanence, and its relation to the thought and history of
man." The negative aim is " to discuss both the errors and the ineptitude
of the exclusively empirical approach in understanding the problem of
language and the fallacy of the assumption that thought is the action of
language mechanisms." These are the words of Ruth Nanda Anshen in the
foreword to the book.
The volume divides into two main parts. Part One is " The Principle,"
Part Two is " The Application," pp. 155-355. The purpose of a
pp.
review will best be served, I believe, by indicating at least briefly the
content of each chapter (each chapter constituting an independent essay
by a different author), with a slightly more extended comment on several
of the contributions which seem to deserve special emphasis for the magazine
in which this review appears.
I

In the opening chapter on "Language as Idea," Ruth Nanda Anshen's
insistence is on the point that it is " by virtue of the procreative power of
language, which grasps, shakes, and transforms, that man is man." In
her anxiety to stress this point, the author identifies language and thought
by maintaining that words themselves are ideas. God, in fact, created
language and language exists ab aeterno. " The name is the person, the
expression of the mysterious essence of things, revealing or controlling the
inner reality." Throughout this essay, presumably
to be a fundamental consideration of language ·itself, one has the impression that more
attention should have been given to a literal analysis of langage as human
expression, particularly its distinction from and relation to human thought.
The value of language and its role in .human expression is not best

866

BOOK BEVIEWS

367

realized by an opening essay that tends to be more eulogistic and vaguely
ontological than analytic and expository.
Dr. Kurt Goldstein in" The Nature of Language" approaches his subject
from his experience in pathological treatment of patients. He notes that
the use of pathological material to gain understanding of normal behavior
is open to criticism, but his conviction is that the careful use of pathological material still has significance for understanding any human behavior
and language in particular. His starting point is the frequently observed
deviation of language which occurs in aphasic persons, the incapacity to
name objects. What makes a patient incapable of naming objects? The
patient can only assume a concrete approach; an abstract attitude fails
him. In the abstract attitude, language plays a primary role, and the
essence of human language is meaning. Goldstein thereupon arrives at the
basic principle which exhibits the nature of language: human language is
understandable only if " one considers it from the point of view that
language is not a simple tool but an expression of the nature of man .... "
The positive contribution of Goldstein is that, starting from particular facts
and observations about abnormal speech activity of man, he can still arrive
at a fundamental position with some reasoned assurance, namely, that
language is an expression of man's very nature and that it is an expression
of his symbolic power.
N. H. Tur-Sinai's essay is on " The Origin of Language." Generation
after generation, he notes, has been baffled by the problem of trying to
discover how language developed in a particular way. He decides, almost
at the outset of his essay, that "the road followed by the development of
language must have been a simple and primitive one, springing from the
very nature of man's mind, from psychical properties common to all the
human family." Two nineteenth-century theories on the origin of language
will not hold. One was the agglutenuation theory of F. Bopp, that roots
of words historically did not come first. The other was the adaptation
theory of A. Ludwig: words have adapted themselves morphologically to
the purpose of expressing such grammatical concepts as number, case, and
tense. The approach, rather, must start from the fact that when man
first spoke, categories and rules did not exist. Names originally denoted,
not the concrete things nearest to man, but merely a quality of a thing
(his examples suggest primarily sense qualities). Tur-Sinai also stresses
error as the productive factor in language, consisting in a new use brought
to the original short demonstrative words, occasioned by misunderstandings
between speaker and hearer. Consequently, the noun did not arise from
the verb nor the verb from the noun, but both arose from a different
understanding of one and the same primitive word, which word was
originally identified with a reality hinted at by a cry. The main line of
the development of language is therefore the following: from ungrammatical
cry to nouns and verbs which come to be governedby grammatical rules.

868

BOOK REVIEWS

The linguistic categories are the final result of an evolution, not an
origin.
Swami Nikhilananda in "Aum: The Word of Words" seeks to relate
Aum (the Hindu symbol of Ultimate Reality) with the Word as given by
St. John in the Fourth Gospel. Ac-cording to Hindu thought, the relation
between sounds and thoughts is a natural one, and Aum (rhyming with
home) is the generalized symbol of all possible sounds. Aum is therefore
the most effective symbol of reality, whereas a word like "God" has only
a limited function. Aum was not invented by any man; it is the primordial
and uncreated sound heard by mystics absorbed in contemplation. This
essay is brief and ends abruptly. I found myself impressed more by the
difference ill thought behind " Aum " and " Word " than by any likeness
or agreement.
Twenty years ago, Jacques Marit.ain wrote a general theory of signs in
Volume I of the Journal of the Warburg Institute. His present essay is an
application of that theory to some considerations on language, specifically
three points: awareness of the relation of signification, the magic sign, and
reverse or inverted signification. His essay comes as ·something of a relief
insofar as he provides some helpful and pertinent distinctions with respect.
to the nature of language itself, and particularly with respect to the manner
of signifying. The distinction he niakes between logic and magic signs is,
I think, a revealing and significant one, even if it should not classify as a
fundamental and formal one. The logic sign is the sign
the intellect,
any sign which speaks ultimately to the intellect. The magic sign speaks
primarily to the imagination, even though it might require some intellectual
grasping. It is the sign primarily for the primitive man. as he is under the
authority of the imagination. This sort of sign not only makes man know,
but makes things be, much in the manner in which the sand castles of
children· are truly castles for them, or as certain natural forces are human
or divine agencies for primitive man. Maritain sees this distinction as
throwing light not only on different modes of signifying, and therefore
revealing as to the nature of language itself, but as manifesting how
language began (at least for primitive man) in the form of "magical"
language. His other distinction between a direct sign (one denoting an
object) and an inverted sign (one manifesting a subject) is clearly a
psychological distinction relating, among other things, to the Freudian
symbol.
In" Symbols and History," George Boas maintains that it is the symbol
which provides the continuity of life and not the literal stuff which is
being symbolized. If tradition retains the past, it is only in the sense that
it is preserved there in symbolic form, and to this history must also be
reduced. A symbol cannot name a genuine persisting identity, for there is
none. Our desire for permanence is satisfied by our symbols, whereas our
need for change is accounted for by what the symbols represent. The symbol

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stands relatively unchanged from year to year, and history as dealing with
symbols becomes an illusion enabling us to escape from our dread of change.
This essay merely presents an assumed wholly nominalistic theory of
language and proceeds to use it as a principle to mal{e history illusory since
history can only be found on the level of symbols.
Paul Tillich in "The Word of God" is initially concerned to remove
literal misinterpretations of the term. The term, like everything else man
says about God, has symbolic character. As a symbol, rather than a sign,
it participates in the reality of that which it signifies. Tillich lists six
different ways "Word of God" applies symbolically to divine self-manifestation. The first three ways symbolize the transcendent foundation of
what is called "Word of God." The first is the inner word which God
speaks to himself, the second is the Word of creation, and the third is the
Word by which the world is created and appears in history, as inspiration
and incarnation. The second set of three meanings of " Word of God "
symbolize divine self-manifestation through the human word. The first
of these is reception, e. g., of the content of the New Testament, the witness
to the event Jesus the Christ. The second is the objective meaning to be
attached to the doctrine given wholly and without deviation by the
preacher, basing himself on scripture and tradition. The third meaning is
the subjective interpretation of " Word of God preached," i. e., it is
experienced as divine self-manifestation by one who actually experiences it.
Tillich concludes: "If the 'Word of God' necessarily includes a word
about God, its linguistic form must be the symbol; for every statement
about God is unavoidably symbolic." In revealing himself, God creates
symbols and myths through which he can be approached. The symbolic
background never disappears; even the application of the category of
causality to God is a symbolic way of speaking. Symbols are figurative and
are therefore safe from criticism by nonsymbolic language. Discursive
language (e. g., arguments for the existence of God) is unable to open up
the ultimate reality, "the level of the holy." Hence, "the 'Word of God'
is not a collection of propositions, but a symbol for the dynamic, everchanging encounter between man and what concerns him ultimately."
Tillich ably brings out the symbolic character that must attend to the term
"Word of God," and to theological language generally, and shows well
negatively the consequences of literal mistranslation. Yet he nowhere makes
allowance for legitimate literal meaning. Scripture and theology abound in
figurative imd symbolic expression, and for many and good reasons. Nevertheless, the symbolic cut wholly adrift from the literal can only lead to
ultimate unintelligibility or to wholly arbitrarily imposed meaning.
Christian tradition has continually held that, along with the necessary
symbolic character of much of scriptural and theological writing, everything necessary to faith is somewhere and always put forward clearly in a
literal sense. Our Lord made it clear that at times it is necessary to speak

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plainly and not only in symbols and parables, and in thus speaking He
is not less the Word of God.
R. P. Blackmuir in " The Language of Silence " makes, as the title
suggests, a plea for the silence that tries to speak. Indeed, it is the language
of silence which we translate into words, for words are only one medium for
expressing "our crying-out and our salutation, our discovery and our
assent." Blackmuir suggests as a parody of what he means by the language
of silence " the problematic image of a dozen Chinese understanding
perfectly each other's written words but unable to converse aloud." If
there were no language of silence, there could be no translation from
Arabic or French into English. "Meaning is what silence does when it gets
into words." Apart from some adaptions and applications to certain poetic
structures, Blackmuir's point basically is that there is thought as well as
language, a mental rhythm as well as a vocal one--in brief, understanding
and impression without vocalization.

II
Roman Jakobson, like Kurt Goldstein, approaches language from the
standpoint of linguistic disorder, specifically aphasia. Varieties of aphasia
are numerous and diverse, but all. of them oscillate between some impairment of the faculty for selection and substitution or that of combination
and contexture. Hence, " The Cardinal Dictotomy of Language " shows
how speech disturbances affect an individual's capacity for combination and
selection of linguistic units. This dichotomy between these two operations,
Jakobson holds, is more suggestive than the classical distinction between
emissive and receptive aphasia.
In a series of brief paragraphs, in the manner of aphorisms, and under
the title of" Squares and Oblongs," taken from Virginia Woolf's The Waves,
W. H. Auden offers some remarks on poetry by way of contrasts and
identities. As a verbal system, poetry is a natural, and not a historical
object; as a natural object, poetry is organic and not inorganic. The order
of a poem consists in the outcome of a dialectical struggle betweeu
feelings and the verbal system. The peculiarity of poetry as a verbal
system is the identity of meaning and being. The Aristocratic (classical)
principle regarding the poetic subject is: "No material shall be made the
subject of a poem which poetry cannot transform into its own universe."
The Democratic (romantic) principle is: "No material shall be excluded
from becoming the subject of a poem which can be poetically transformed."
The aphoristic style of writing in this essay tends to leave a reader with a
helpless feeling of being talked to rather than participating in a process of
communicated understanding. Notwithstanding the value of many of the
observations, Auden writes prose as a poet.
The reputation of Charles W. Morris as a semanticist is well established.

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In "Mysticism and Language," he wishes to extend the analysis of
semantics to include the language of mysticism. He approaches the problem
by noting that whereas a semanticist in the tradition of Korzybski would
have all men talk in the same way, the stress of the Zen Buddhist is on a
kind of experience wholly different from a scientific one, an experience
which gives rise to a language of paradox and contradiction. This is the
language of mysticism, and :Morris wishes to explain it as a complex process
amenable to analysis in terms of a theory of signs. Morris distinguishes
between a pre-language sign, such as a buzzer which signifies food to a
dog, and a post-language sign which, though not a language sign, requires
the operation of language for its signification, e. g., one's perception of a
star. Morris is convinced that "the notion of post-language sign is essential
to the understanding of art, myths, magic, the totem, religion, prestige, race
prejudice, and the complex types of perception." Now the mystic has a
primary and a secondary language. The primary language arises in the
words " wrung out " of the mystic by the experience he has had, and it is
here the language of paradox and contradiction is employed. The secondary
language arises from the mystic's attempt to explicate for himself and for
others his experience and primary signs. Trouble arises at this level, for the
secondary language must be made in terms of some conceptual system,
and this language will vary according to different cultures and traditions.
This relativity of conceptual systems expressed in the secondary language
must be recognized, as it has been by Zen Buddhism, and hence Zen
basically has no doctrine and no authoritative text. Still, the distinction
between the primary and secondary languages must be preserved. There is
not this relativity in the primary language. Such a language expresses
accurately the experience of the mystic, even though it may be paradoxical
and contradictory. The secondary language cannot "translate" the primary
language, and hence the secondary language is characterized by the use of
negations. Morris' conclusion from his brief exposition of mystical language
is that "mystical experience is not an emotional frenzy or the simple confrontation of a unique object, but rather the undergoing of a complex and
contradictory set of linguistic role-taking processes which finally eventuate
in post-language symbols carrying the meaning of this set of symbols."
This experience of the mystic is liberating. It is not incompatible with
science and does not take the place of science. " Semantically it is clean.
Humanly it is finely, and finally, satisfying." The attempt of an outstanding
semanticist like Morris to account for mystical language is commendable,
and it is gratifying to see linguistic analysis broadened from its original
highly restrictive method and scope. That Morris' remarks touch only a
small part of the important area of mystical language, and that he does
not seem to be aware of the work on this matter in the Christian tradition,
does not detract from the merit o£ this essay.
Erich Fromm writes in his professional capacity as a psychiatrist in

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"Symbolic Language of Dreams." The language of dreams is constituted
of accidental and universal symbols, but the meaning of symbols in dreams
has been variously analyzed. A tradition from Plato to Freud holds that
dreams express the lowest and most animal-like part of our nature. Another.
tradition, including men like Goethe and Jung, holds that dreams reveal
our highest and most rational faculties. Fromm disassociates himself from
either view in the sense that he thinks there is no kind of mental activity,
feeling or thought not capable of being expressed in dreams in symbolic
language. Fromm also thinks the difference between functions of sleeping
and waking is more fundamental than any difference between other kinds
of activity, which leads him to assert that there is also an incomparably
greater difference between the conceptual system of the two states. Mental
activity during sleep has a logic different from that of waking existence.
Furthermore, we can be wiser, more intelligent, and capable of better
judgment when we are asleep than when we are awake, even though the
reverse can also occur. Hence, to be awake is not exdusivly a blessing,
but also a curse. In sleep, we are better able to feel and to think our truest
and most valuable feelings and thoughts. Dreams· represent a language
with its own syntax and grammar, the one universal language which the
human ra.ce possesses. No doubt, as Fromm maintains, a study of dream
language cannot be omitted if we 'wish to understand language in its most
general and universal aspects. Nevertheless, it seems to me that it is easy
to exaggerate the significance of dreams and to attribute characteristics to
them which do not properly apply. As a purely personal observation, I
can only note that on the basis of a fairly rich dream experience, I am
not at all impressed by its logic (in any apt sense of the term) , nor do
I discover that I am wiser, more intelligent, and capable of better judgment
when asleep than awake. I yearn for a happier condition of these qualities
in me, but on the basis of dreams to date, I have no hope of finding thi.s
happier state realized in my dreams. And when Fromm suggests that
waking life is taken up with the function of action while sleep is taken up
with the function of self-experience, it seems to me evident enough that just
the opposite as frequently or even more frequently occurs. I do not wish to
deny, of course, a certain importance of dreams, especially as the dream may
be an important tool for psychotherapy or a means for understanding neurotic phenomena. But why is it necessary to parallel in importance the value
of the dream state and the waking state? A dream life and a dream
language, at best, can only be a " life " and a " language " in secondary
meanings of the term.
Language, Leo Spitzer tells us in " Language of Poetry " is not satisfied
with denoting factual contents, but forces the speaker to adopt certain
metaphysical or religious interpretations of the world. Even when such
underlying conceptions are obsolete, they can be used deliberately and with
great aesthetic effect in poetry. Hence, while poetry does not step outside

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of -the realm of language, it can turn language to its own account, that is,
poetry uses devices common to ordinary language, but it uses them so as
to produce a poetic effect. The poetic examples Spitzer cites show prosody
in service of a myth, and his point is that prosody in itself is able to suggest
a poetic atmosphere more fittingly .than myth alone can do. Spitzer's
general conclusion is to show that language is by no means a banal means
of communication or a means only to orienting us perfectly to this world,
as language in the service of science seeks to achieve. Language offers us
also a means of freeing us from this world thanks to its metaphysical and
poetic implications. Such language is the proper raw material of poetry.
Through poetry, language is able to transform itself "into the rainbow
bridge which leads mankind toward other worlds .where meaning rules
absolute."
In " Language of Jurisprudence," Huntington Cairns sees the linguistic
problem for legal theory in terms of the capacities of ordinary language to
meet the tasks of law. Three general questions have been raised in legal
thinking about language. The first concerns what the ideal forms of
expression are for conveying legal meaning, with answers oscillating
between the extremes of ornate and plain expression. Legal thinking has
also considered what the nature of a professional language foi: law would
be. Finally, legal thinking has dealt even with the general problem of the
connection between words and
Cairns notes, in passing, two
tendencies presently at work toward an accurate and adequate terminology.
One tendency is for scholars and scientists to confine themselves to a limited
number of languages for expressing results of research, and thus a precise
terminology might develop. The other tendency is a movement toward
mathematical symbolization, which ideally seems a solution but
appears impossible of realization for law. The logically perfect language
sacrifices communication for precision. Cairns goes into some detail to
sketch various attempts to clarify language in general, and language for
law in particular, and brings out fully the complexity of the problem. His
general conclusion can be put in the following terms. The theory of symbolization is a newly developing subject, but so far it has uncovered more
questions than answers. Modern linguistic studies have helped to show
relations between a language and the scheme of things. We must take into
account that no language fails wholly to distinguish between the noun and
the verb. " All this suggests a reexamination of such· matters as the
Aristotelian logic and the Kantian Categories, which took their departure
from linguistic forms. It also suggests that the subject-predicate logic may
not be as outmoded as the proponents of the relational logic have urged."
At the same time, symbolism as it increases the clarity of our thinking may
be helpful. The universe of legal discourse is clearly marked, but the
solution of many of its tasks lies beyond that realm.
In politics, language becomes the language of decision. Harold D.

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Lasswell (" Language of Politics ") classifies such decisions into those which
are authorized but not controlling, those which are controlling and not
authorized, and those which are both. We are only just beginning to
comprehend the richness of the language of politics and law. We need to
discern the unconscious as well as the conscious dimension of the problem.
Language becomes refashioned when it is. employed as an instrument of
power. The role of myth is coming to be recognized, in particular as it
can unify experience and inspire dedication to the goals of a community.
The complex function of myth is revealed especially in litigation, and a
recurring symbol in litigation is "law," a key symbol of the myth. Moreover, in a complex civilization the creative ambiguity of legal language
when employed in litigation helps the harmonious development of the
body politic to new circumstances. Through this and other means of
enriching the language of politics and law, we can clarify the goals and
institutions of a free commonwealth. Coming right after Cairns' essay on
more or less the same topic, Lasswell's essay seems almost inconsequential,
the impression perhaps arising from the much more restricted aim Lasswell
appears to have and from his emphasis on the role and significance of myth
to the exclusion of other relevant factors entering into the language of
politics and law.
It is the experience of stage fright, Francis Fergusson notes in " Language of the Theater," which a performer goes through just before the
curtains part that brings out most vividly the power of the language of
the theater. Such public performance is an important and perilous means
of communication. The stage invokes a kind of perception with a terrifying
formality. "It bids us gather, pause, and look." Although the theater
appears to have developed out of a primitive ritual which abstracted
constant aspects of human nature and destiny, the developed theater of a
Sophocles or a Shakespeare uses not merely the bodies or voices or concepts,
but the beings of the performers: " the human himself in the eye of the
audience." This, of course, is language of the theater at its best-the
ideal language-and theater at its best uses the performer for the disinterested purpose of contemplation and " to share the perenially absorbing
vision of man." It stands in sharp contrast to the restricted purpose of a
Hollywood, Moscow, or Nazi theater. "The ideal object which the ideal
language of the theater is fitted to indicate, or mean, is human nature and
destiny, not rationalizing man, or economic man, or mass-man, but the
mysterious creature, who may be viewed in many complementary perspectives." It is Fergusson's regret, and it is one we should all share, that
we do not cultivate the language of the theater at its best and in its most
fundamental uses.
The surrealists have brought attention to symbolic art along with their
stress upon the unconscious as the basis of creative direction. As a consequence, Margaret Naumberg observes in "Art as Symbolic Speech," the

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line between art and non-art became less certain. A new world became
created by many artists based on personal response to inner experience.
The contact with the unconscious gave added impetus to symbolic modes
of expression. She quotes the analysis of the French psychologist, G. H.
Luquet, who points out the way in which both the child and the primitive
select some elements to draw which they consider essential, exclude others,
and :finally include aspects which are not visibly or objectively real but
which belong to what he calls "mental realism." Margaret Naumberg
thinks that this general observation is broadly applicable to much of what
has developed in the greater sophistication of modern symbolic art. " Psychoanalysis has made both the artist and the general public increasingly
aware of the fact that man's unconscious thinks and feels in symbolic
images." After exhibiting some examples to illustrate this point, the author
concludes that because man's unconscious speaks today as well as in ages
past, the investigator of symbolism now has fresh psychological tools for
deciphering many as yet little understood aspects of human behavior.
Although this essay is revealing in exhibiting the connection between the
unconscious and some symbolic modes of artistic expression, it is unfortunate that no hint is given that a symbolic mode of artistic expression has
even more interesting connections with highly conscious and quite articulate
artistic purposes.
Jean P. de Menasce is well aware of the difficulty of trying to translate
poetry from one language to another, but in" A Philosophy of Translation,"
he is concerned to show that in poetic experience there is something so
fundamentally human that even poetry can be translated. He is also aware
that, apart from the problem of the meaning of words, the sounds of !1.
given language are essential to poetry and its effect; and, further, that
language sounds are bound up with meanings according to rules which are
proper to each language. Poetry deals with language sounds and meanings
in a creative manner, but still the translation of poetry from one language
to another is not precluded. The author goes on to consider other dimensions of language than the poetic, e. g., the language of philosophy and the
language of Revelation, thus extending his title to include translation of all
knowledge from one language into another. His general view of language isbroad and basically sound. Language has status in the natural law of
human relations and is not subject merely to laws of technique ·and art.
Language expresses the highest knowledge of man as well as the most
obscure emotional experience; it reflects both the intellectual and the social
nature of man. Presumably, this wide appreciation of language in all its
aspects is a necessary prerequisite for understanding a " philosophy of
translation."

m

The hope is expressed by the editor, Ruth Nanda Anshen, that through
the Science and Culture Series " a new vision of man has been articulated,"

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and that the Series " will manifest and cherish the spirit of scientia, which
has not been emptied of sapientia and which therefore makes the science of
culture possible in the conduct of human affairs." One can only applaud
these and other aims announced for this Series and hope for their increasing
realization. The editor is certainly to be congratulated for undertaking
and persisting in a task of such magnitude, and she can take justified pride
for a significant measure of success achieved.
The specific problem with which this volume has dealt is language, and
no one could quarrel with the importance and relevance of such a topic for
a series of this kind. It must also be acknowledged that an imposing list
of contributors have participated in the writing of this volume. On the
whole, they have contributed a great deal to the understanding of language
as a basic human activity and have variously shown the indispensable role
of language for human knowledge and culture.
Nevertheless, a few reservations about the over-all excellence of the book
should be noted. Some important aspects of language are not covered
which clearly deserve some attention in a book of this kind. The role and
function of language in contemporary science is too important and too
relevant for modern culture to omit almost entirely; the language of the
contemporary scientist certainly deserved at least one essay. Related to this
topic, but distinct enough for special treatment, is the language of mathematics and, in particular, the function of the symbol in mathematical
discourse. There is no explicit treatment of language from the point
of view of logic, nor is there sufficient recognition of the large part
semanticists have played in the analysis of language. A possible answer to
these omissions, (there are other omissions which might be noted, for
example, there is no essay devoted to a strictly philosophical consideration
of language) is that they might depart from the announced cultural aims
of the series. Moreover, such an answer might continue, limitations of space
necessarily involved selecting only some out of many important topics
concerned with the problem of language.
A reply, I think, could be made effectively to both of these points. With
regard to the first, essays on such omitted topics as are mentioned above
surely fall within the limits of human culture; indeed, the language of
mathematics, science and logic occupies a deservedly large place in human
culture in contemporary times. Concerning the second point, I think that
the problem of space limitation could be solved by eliminating several
instances of duplication in the present volume. For example, Kurt Goldstein
and Roman Jakobson both write on language from the point of view of
_speech disturbance. Huntington Cairns and Harold Lasswell both write on
the language of law and politics. Four of the essays are on the poetic
dimension of language. Even though these essays are quite worthwhile
and have independent merit, nevertheless the book would benefit from the
elimination of duplication of topics with a corresponding widening of
subject matter.

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37'i

One other difficulty about the book as a whole might be noted.
the announced aims for the book, there is no discernible underlying
acknowledgment of them manifested. The book appears to be more a
collection of wholly independent essays gathered together under a nominal
heading. One would suppose that the editor's essays, opening and closing
the book, would compare, contrast and relate the essays in some relation
to the announced aims. Although there are some passages in Ruth Nanda
Anshen's essays which suggest this approach, the fact of the matter is that
her essays are actually two quite independent contributions to the problem
of language, for the most part unrelated to the other essays except in a
manner so general as not to be significant or revealing.
Despite some reservations of this kind, the book still achieves a· considerable degree of success in showing " what language is, its variability in
time and space, its permanence, and its relation to the thought and
history of man."
JoHN A. OEsTERLE
Uni·versity of Notre Dame,
Notre Dame, Indiana.

.Aristotle on .Art and Nature. By M. J. CHARLESWORTH. Auckland University College. Pp. 40.
In a short paper published at Auckland University College as part of the
Philosophy Series M. J. Charlesworth adds a clear, rational voice to the
many voices now attempting clarifications in the field of an Aristotelian or
Thomistic Esthetic. His purpose is " to attempt to reconstruct a part of
the general theory of art presupposed to Aristotle's Poetics." He indicates
the possible sources of such a reconstruction in the other works of the
Aristotelian corpus, especially in the
and Metaphysics, the Politics,
the De .Anima, etc. Using these sources, he sets up an argumentation that
begins with the notion of art as a kind of knowledge, or, rather, the virtue
that perfects a certain kind of knowledge, the knowledge of how-to-make.
Art is a making or the virtue of making: this is his starting-point. He then
discusses the metaphysics of making, " the bestowing of a new accidental
and non-natural form on some matter which already exists in its own right
informed with its natural form." Thisexcellent chapter gives Mr. Charlesworth an opportunity to reprobate several misconceptions deriving from
the Romantic school of esthetics: the idea that the work of art is primarily
" the expression of the artist's personality "; the notion that the work of
art necessarily expresses the "essence of things" or some "ideal type";
the idea that the artist is by definition the sensitive man who " suffers "
experiences. He is "primarily a maker," Mr. Charlesworth insists, "all alse
is secondary."

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Yet this insight, so useful in resisting a Romantic esthetics, so helpful
in the work of connecting a general theory of art with the Poetics, is made
to dominate the author's treatise in a way that ultimately weakens it. In
Chapters IV and V Mr. Charlesworth takes up the matter of Imitation in
Art and particularly in the Fine Arts, at the same time calling our attention
to the fact that the theory of Imitation is " the heart and soul of Aristotle's
philosophy of art." Appealing to his original insight on art-as-making, he
maintains that the famous dictum " art imitates nature " should be read
in this fashion: " the operation of art imitates the operation of nature." In
other words, art imitates nature not in the sense of copying or representing
the appearance of natural forms but in the sense of bringing-something-tobe after the manner of nature, i.e., causing matter to assume some form or,
more specifically in the case of the Fine Arts, judging that certain natural
things or natural occurrences are " matter potential to a certain artistic
form." He insists that the theory of Imitation should be purified of its
preoccupation with the object, the artifact as representation. " It is not
a question of the work of art imitating natural things but of the artist,
in his causative power of making, imitating nature in its causative power
of bringing things into existence."
Yet it is precisely here that a general theory of art derived from the
Physics and Metaphysics proves inadequate. When it is a question of an
artisan "making" a chair or a hammer, then the imitation of nature is in
terms of efficient causality, the action of the maker causing a new
accidental form to be united to matter for some useful purpose. When it
is a question of a doctor " making " health to be in a patient through
medicinal art, the doctor tries to " imitate " the operation of nature from
without, strengthening natural operation with medicine, diet, exercise, etc.
In neither case is there "imitation" in terms of formal extrinsic causality,
except remotely in the case of the hammer which is a kind of extension of
the human hand or fist. But when we come to the "making" of a play
or a poem or a statue, the dictum " art imitates nature " most assuredly
signifies more than the conjunction of a new accidental form with matter
through the efficiency of the maker. The theory of imitation in the Poetics
is centered around the notion of formal extrinsic causality: the work of art
as an imitation or representation of human action, .passion, character,
thought. In this connection Mortimer Adler makes a valuable distinction
between the practical arts and the productive arts. In the former, arts like
navigation and medicine, the artist works by co-operating with nature,
effecting an accidental change in a substance, but a change that could occur
naturally, as natural healing powers could restore a body to health without
the intervention of the art of healing. The productive arts, on the other
hand, such as ship-building, shoemaking, work by operating on nature,
imposing an artificial form on matter capable of receiving that form.
Furthermore, the Fine Arts (as productive arts rather than practical arts)

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have a distinct relationship to nature in that the artificial forms they
impose on matter imitate natural forms. As Adler concludes: " The
practical arts imitate nature in the manner of their operation. The productive arts imitate nature by making objects which are like natural things
either in form or function." The mode of imitation proper to the Fine Arts
is " to imitate in form."
Mr. Charlesworth himself reads Aristotle in just this way. "Aristotle
also uses ' imitation ' to mean the direct representation of one thing by
another thing, and this is the sense in which the word is used, for the most
part, in the Poetics:" He draws the obvious inference from this-that his
own theory may be inconsistent with that advanced in the Poetics-but
resolves the dubium by maintaining that " imitation in the sense of representation presupposes and is subordinate to imitation in the sense in which
the causative action of the artist imitates the causative action of nature."
But how can the representative character of the artifact be subordinate to
the £active action of the artist when this action is directed precisely toward
the making of a representation? The work of art is not merely a made thing,
the purpose of which is to be made and to be beautiful; it is a made image
or sign which delights the mind by the skill and harmony with which
it signifies. Any work of art above the level of mere decoration is in the
genus of imitation or image-sign and is to be judged according to its
dignity and efficacy as a signifier. This is Mr. Charlesworth's own conclusion. " It is possible to show that some of the fine arts are better or
more noble than others in that the signs which they use are better ' signifiers' than the signs used by others."
What accounts, then, for the continued emphasis in this paper on the
operative rather than the representational interpretation of the dictum:
"art imitates nature "? For one thing, it seems to derive from an attempt
to make use of a general theory of art (any kind of making or causingto-be) in a way that does not account for the unique character of the
Fine Arts (the making of a delightful image-sign). Further, the otherwise
perceptive discussion of the artifact as an image-sign does not reveal the
analytical deficiency, because the work of signification is made to end when
the immaterial story has been signified by the selected material signs in the
medium. But the truth is that the immaterial story in the mind is itself
a sign, a sign of things: human action, passion, character, thought. And
so the material sign (the artifact) is related by way of signification not only
to the immaterial story in the mind of the artist but to that story as itself
significant of things. As John of St. Thomas puts it: "Because it happens
that the intellect forms an idea by receiving something from an object
outside itself in order that something may be made from it, the ratio of
exemplar and idea is sometimes, therefore, attributed also to the thing ad
extra, and so the blessed Thomas attributes the ratio of exemplar both to
the form which is in the mind of the artist and to the extrinsic object from
which he draws that form."

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When Aristotle, in the first book of the Poetics, speaks of the objects of
imitation, he is evidently speaking of the objects outside the maker from
which he derives his productive (and imitative) idea.
The fear that imitation in this representational sense would mean a mere
"copying" or a "crude mimicry " of reality (and so not " art " at all)
need not seriously concern us, for Aristotle never fails to emphasize those
elements of artistic construction which take the artifact out of the field
of history or photography and into the realm of art and pleasing probability. We need only remember his willingness to admit "the wonderful"
in Tragedy (more than that-" the element of the wonderful is required
in Tragedy ") and " the irrational " in Epic poetry. Nor can we forget
his classic dictum that the poet imitates " things as they were or are, things
as they are said or thought to be, or things as they ought to be."
There is no real ambiguity on this point in t.he Poetics and it is a pity
to find so many scholastics forced into some species of conventionalism in
order to avoid an interpretation of " imitation " which no sound theory of
poetics could maintain. Mr. Charlesworth's conventionalism is a very
scholarly sort that begins with a perfectly valid reading of " art imitates
nature" as it is found in the context of the Physics. In the context of the
Poetics, however, the dictum is clearly set in the area of formal extrinsic
causality and of a final causality in the cognitive order. In this context the
conventions of plot-making, word-making, song-making are directed toward
constructing a new and more intelligible presence for reality in the imagesign, i.e., a new significant presence for human action, passion, character,
thought. Everything in the artistic process-the techniques employed in
making the secondary judgment as well as the work of story-making in the
primary judgment--everything
looks to reality in its new significant
presence.
"Partly from nature, partly from convention "-this dictum, too, has to
be understood. Great art is dominated by nature, that is to say, by reality.
The work of the artist is to manifest nature by selecting its most significant
and revealing traits and embodying them in an appropriate medium of
imitation. The making of a work of art is not primarily the making of a
new being-to which " making " every other aspect of the work is subordinate; it is primarily the making of a new image-sign which then serves
to make reality present in a new way to the contemplator-and to this
function of signifying all else in the work is subordinate. Not the least
excellence of Mr. Charlesworth's paper is that its "rigorous argumentation
brings us very close to the great issue in contemporary esthetics: the
proper genus of the artifact. His discussion around this center has great
relevance and wit; it is merely unfortunate that his admirable knowledge
of Aristotle does not permit him to go one step further, one step only, and
to give his complete assent to the chief insight of the Poetics.
DoMINic RoVER, 0. P.

Dominican House of Studies,
W1J8hington, D. C.

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Order and History. Volume II: The World of the Polis. By ERIC VoEGELIN.
Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1958. Pp. 407.
$6.00.

This book is the second volume of a proposed six volume series, entitled
generally, Order and History, and given the specific divisions of Ismel and
Revelation, the World of the Polis, Plato and Aristotle, Empire and
Christianity, The Protestant Centuries, and The Crises of Western Civilizations. Since the present reviewer has read neither volume one nor
volume three, he might be at a serious disadvantage in discussing volume
two. Presumably volume one might have enabled him to gain a more
adequate grasp of the basic theme or scheme underlying Professor Vaegelin's
gigantic and erudite Order and History. But even if the present volume
were seen in relation to its predecessor and planned successors, The World
of the Polis would still remain in part a bewildering and even annoying
book. It is bewildering because it encompasses a vast range of controversial
detail; and it is annoying not only because of its (planned?) omissions or
distortions, but also because the reader cannot always be sure of the
author's real intention, unless it be the unwarranted and uncompromising
exaltation of " order " above all else.
In his introductory observations-Mankind
and History-which are
somewhat under the spell of Toynbee's (as well as Spengler's and Hegel's)
scheme of history or " historicism," Professor Voegelin insists that " the
struggle for the truth of order is the very circumstance of history." (p. 2)
Aside from its obscure meaning, this statement in its dogmatic-doctrinaire
content is open to challenge. The reviewer also has some difficulty in understanding Voegelin's "leap in being "-a term with which the author seems
to be enamored-and especially in grasping the significance of " [t ]he
initial leap in being, the break with the order of the myth." (pp. 3 ff.)
The elaborations of this " leap in being," which allegedly constitutes the
"break with the order of myth," appear to be somewhat labored without,
however, succeeding in clarifying its significance. One may raise the
question here whether in the continuity of the various "leaps in being"
every subsequent "leap " is not a "break with a myth." If this be so,
then everything preceding the "latest leap " would be "myth ": the " old
order" would always be "myth," and the new order always " truth," but
" truth " destined to suffer the fate of being relegated to the realm of
" myths " as soon as a newer " order " has been achieved by some " new
leap."
Voegelin's discussion of the transition "from myth to philosophy"
(pp. 111-240) is simply confusing. During its various stages, Greek philosophy, in the main, was a combination of two opposite theories about the
sources of human knowledge: the senses and what may be called a "profection " of the mind " outside " the body and " beyond the senses." This

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" projection " is something like an " apprehension " of that type of
" wisdom " or " truth " which can never be attained through the medium
of the senses alone. The pioneering work of the " sense perceptionalists "
presumably was done by the " School of Cos " (Hippocrates and his
disciples). As a matter of fact, it could be argued that this School of
Cos marks the real beginning of the " scientific method " and, hence, the
break-away from "myth." However, the problem is not that simple.
Plato, for instance, did not seek the basis for science or knowledge in the
sensible world. (In Plato's time not one of the present-day specialized
sciences, such as physics, chemistry, astronomy, etc., had any "scientific"
status or even any existence.) Hence, it cannot have been the purpose of
his theory of Ideas to provide science with a "methodology." Plato was, in
the first instance, attempting to give an account of that knowledge which in
his opinion must direct the conduct of human life. It was thus that his
theory of Ideas grew into a doctrine of the "intelligible nature of things,"
consciously opposed to "materialism." How, then, can man attain to the
proper knowledge of the " good " or the " true," especially since, according
to the Platonic Meno, knowledge of this kind can never be accounted for
by sense experience? (" Goodness " belongs to a " super-sensible world,"
accessible to our intelligence but not to our senses.) Plato argues that
such knowledge must come out of the mind itself. In other words, the mind
is raised into consciousness by some processes analogous to that procedure
whereby we recall certain objects with which we have formerly been
acquainted, but have forgotten. This is the basis of the Platonic doctrine
that "learning" is essentially "recollection"
(anamnesis). But such
" recollection " is a power also ascribed to " men and women wise in divine
matters," that is, to prophets, seers and hierophants, as well as to the
inspired poets of old. It is, so to speak, a kind of " projection " of the mind
which provides for a type of knowledge inaccessible to the senses. (As
a matter of fact, according to Plato the senses are frequently a hindrance
to true thought.) The soul that loves wisdom takes flight from all fellowship with the senses (and the body). This flight or, perhaps, "withdrawal" is also "purification of the soul" (of which Empodocles wrote so
eloquently), followed by a vision of truth. In the further elaboration of this
argument Plato insists that the good statesmen are guided not by some
kind of knowledge or wisdom (cf>pov1Jm>), but by a sort of inspiration-the
inspiration of the prophets, seers or poets, who in their rapt condition say
many true things, but do not really know what they mean. These statesmen
have no intelligence (voii<>), but are possessed by divine inspiration. They
are acting on true beliefs which arise in their minds, but have not been
coordinated and justified by reflection of th<J reason.
What Plato advances here Is essentially a sophisticated version of the
" mystical " foundation of all true knowledge through " projection " beyond
the sensible world. The mystagogues, hierophants, " wise men," seers or

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poets, no less thar, the "philosophers" of the sixth and fifth centuries B. C.
had felt no doubts about. their " apprehension " of absolute truth.
Lucretius, for instance, is quite correct when centuries later he compared the
utterances of pre-Socratic philosophers to the oracles of Apollo, or when
he saw in the statements of Empedocles the voice of an inspired genius.
(Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, I. 731 ff.) This analogy of the "philosopher " with the inspired prophet or poet also seems to apply to Plato.
According to Democritus the gods and the
have an extra sense, over
and above the five ordinary senses. (Aetius 4.10.4) But traditionally the
include poets, seers and philosophers.
is the inspired seer, the
" raving " poet and the thinker endowed with philosophical intuition. All
this should indicate that originally the prophet (seer), poet and philosopher
were one and the same person. Hence, the " tradition " from myth to
philosophy is by no means as clear-cut an " event " as Voegelin would have
us believe. The innermost core of so late a philosophy as that of Plato is
still myth; it is wisdom " projected " beyond the senses. Such " projection "
can assume a great variety of forms: divine inspiration, revelation, direct
conversation with the gods, etc. The Platonic anamnesis is but a sophisticated form of " projection," as is, for instance, the " contemplation of the
heavens" by the Platonic statesmen. Hence, in contradition to Voegelin's
theory, we must conclude that Plato merely rejects the. older myths
concerning the acquisition of true knowledge with a myth of his own:
the anamnesis.
The author states that "the Hesiodian poems [present] ... certain
difficulties. At first reading they seem to be neither well constructed stories
nor closely-knit phases of reasoning, but rather loosely jointed sequences
of myths, fables, philosophical excursions, apocalyptic visions. . . ." (p.
131) Then the author observes that "[t]he history of the Theogony is a
cardinal problem in the philosophy of history and order." (p. 132)
Voegelin completely overlooks here the fact that Hesiod's Theogony, which
is really a "Hymn to Zeus" prefaced by a relatively short cosmogony, is
strongly dependent upon the much older Babylonian (or perhaps Sumerian)
Hymn to Marduk (Enuma elis). There naturally exist some discrepancies
between the Hesiodian and the Babylonian Hymn, but these discrepancies
are less important than the obvious, not to say compelling, similarities, and
even less significant than might he expected if one realizes that the
Babylonian Hymn reached Hesiod probably in fragmentary form through
several intermediaries and wholly detached from the original symbolic ritual
which gave it coherence as well as meaning. The preserved form of the
Hymn to Marduk is only one of the many versions of this particular
Babylonian myth and, incidentally, a fairly late version of a still earlier
Sumerian version. The recent discovery of the Hittite-Hurrian Epic of
Kumarbi, which is really nothing more than a Hittite-Hurrian version of
the earlier Babylonian-Sumerian Hymn to Marduk, seems to provide the

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much needed link between the original Babylonian-Sumerian myth and the
Hesiodian adaptation. Minoan or perhaps Mycaenean travelers or traders,
who, as we know today, were in frequent contact with the Hittites at Ugarit
and later at al-Mina, probably carried the Hittite-Hurrian version of the
Babylonian-Sumerian Hymn to
to Crete (where it went through a
" Minoan phase," as indeed the Cretan legend of the birth of Zeus or the
Paliokastro Hymn to the Greatest Lord seems to suggest), and from Crete
to the Greek mainland where it became the model for Hesiod's Theogony or
Hymn to Zeus. In the light of these established facts many of Voegelin's
statements concerning the meaning and origin of Hesiod's Theogony are
irrelevant and even misleading.
Likewise obscure and somewhat incomplete are Voegelin's discourses on
the Greek meaning of history. The early accounts of historic deeds made
in the language of the poets according to tradition were a sort of " madness " induced by the Muses which aroused the soul to ecstasy in song and
poetry, marshalling the countless deeds of heroes of old for the instruction
of posterity. In" historical poetry" the vision of the Muses is turned to the
past and not, as in the case of prophetic inspiration, to the sources of
present calamities or, perhaps, to the future. The Muses, it should be
remembered, are the daughters of Memory. With this in mind the poet of
the Catalogue of Ships (Homer, Iliad 2. 484 ff.) calls on the Muses in their
Olympian abode to "put him in mind" of all who sailed for Troy. For
the Muses " are goddesses, and are present and know all things, while we
only hear the report of fame and know nothing." As a man among men
the early poet-historian knows nothing, and, hence, has to rely on hearsay.
But as a divinely inspired person, he has access to the knowledge of eyewitnesses--the Muses-who were present when the feats were performed
which the poet-historian illustrates. Hesiod, for instance, begins with the
Muses who tell of things present, past and future. (Theogony, 31; 38)
But these are also the words by which Homer describes the mantic gifts of
the seer Calchas. (Iliad, 1. 69) Hence, it is no mere poetic ornament when
Homer begins his epic poems with an invocation of the Muses: the poethistorian calls upon his traditional " authorities " or " sources of information." Homer no less than Hesiod is deadly serious when he implores
the Muses to tell him what he, as an ordinary mortal, could not possibly
know. He feels like Ion, the rhapsode in Plato's Ion, (534C fl'.; 535B) who
thought that " his soul, wrapt out of himself by inspiration," was present at
theevents in Troy or Ithica. 'Homer and Hesiod would fully have accepted
the story of inspiration which Socrates suggests to Ion: "The god deprives
men of their sober senses and uses them as instruments, like singers of
oracles and inspired seers, in order that we who hear them may know that
it is not they who speak things of such high worth, but the god himself
who speaks to us through them." This, then, is the original meaning of
" historical knowledge " during the early Greek period, a meaning which

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seems to have escaped the author. Here, as elsewhere, Voegelin, in order
to support his sweeping thesis about "order and history," greatly oversimplifies the problem.
Voegelin maintains (p. 171 :If.) that Xenophanes attacked the myths of
old, and that· his attack "was directed, not against poetry ... , but against
the form of the myth as an obstacle to the adequate understanding of the
order of the soul." Xenophanes, to be sure, rejected a purely anthropomorphic presentation of the gods, (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1399 b 6) complaining that Homer and Hesiod had attributed to the gods actions and
characteristics which even man regarded as shameful. What, then, are the
attributes of the one god or the one " divine universe " which Xenophanes
puts in the place of the Homeric pantheon? Xenophanes maintains that his
god is eternal, one, everywhere alike, limited, spherical in shape, and
capable of perception in every one of its parts. (Hippolytus, Refutatio
I. 14.
In other words, the world is a living being, divine and endowed
with consciousness; it is a finite body animated by a soul coextensive with
it. Since this eternal god is also the world, there can be no room for a
cosmogony or theogony. But because Xenophanes attacks the Homeric
gods for their immorality and unreasonableness, it does not follow that his
" divine world " or single cosmic god is moral or even reasonable. What
Voegelin fails to perceive is the fact that the god of Xenophanes, which
does not differ much from the world-stuff of the Milesians, is not an
object of religious worship or cult. Xenophanes merely wishes to convey
the notion that the world is alive, and that life implies some kind of awareness as well as some power of motion. Thus, when he condemns the myths
of Homer and Hesiod he merely rejects a particular type of myth by setting
up his own claim to some visionary but equally mythological insights
which happen to be in opposition to theirs.
Voegelin apparently does not grasp the true significance of the " Prologue " in Parmenides' Way of Truth, which contains a profession that the
whole of his didactic poem is actually a revelation accorded to him by
an unnamed goddess. ·Parmenides travels on a chariot, attended by comwhich
panions, the "daughters of the sun." He is on the way to the
guides (or instructs?) the man who knows, and leads him away from the
beaten track of ordinary man. Beyond the gates of Night and Day he meets
the goddess who is willing to instruct him. This introductory "episode"
contains a theme of great antiquity reaching far beyond the penumbra of
recorded history: Abaris, Salmoxis, Orphaeus, Epimenides, Aristeas, no less
than Democritus, according to tradition, were miraculously transported frolll
one place to another. The same feat allegedly was repeated by the great
Mongol shaman of the times of Jenghiz Khan, who is said to have ascended
to heaven on his steed. Such journeys were frequently undertaken to consult.
a deity. Even in our own time the Siberian shaman still claims that he
undertakes spiritual journeys to the gods. He rides on a black bird, a

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goose or a horse attended by one or several companions who assist him
in his long and perilous travels. When he reaches his goal, namely, the
seat of the deity, he receives some" revelations" which upon his return he
communicates to his followers. But this is exactly the " journey " of
stem from the
Parmenides: it does not, as Voegelin maintains, (p.
Orphism or Pythagoreanism of the sixth century, but is the restatement
of a theme quite common among Eurasiatic peoples.
Equally misleading at times are some of Voegelin's statements concerning Heraclitus of Ephesus. Judging from the content of the preserved
fragments ascribed to Heraclitus, it should soon become apparent that he,
who like the sybil " with raving mouth utters things mirthless," (Frag.
considers himself to be primarily an inspired hierophant. Hence, one may
also question the author's assertion that "[t]he line that is running from
(p.
The first preAnaximander to Heraclitus is unmistakable."
requisite for a more accurate understanding of such men as Xenophanes,
Parmenides, or Heraclitus is the realization that they speak as prophetspoets-philosophers who do not, and cannot, accept the modem gulf between
religion, poetry and philosophy (or " true wisdom ") . Their true spiritual
ancestors are not perchance the " Milesian physicists " or perhaps the
relatively late Homer, Hesiod or Pindar-the "philosophers of nature"
or the " poets of entertainment " elicit from them only words of scornbut are Orphaeus, Musaeus, Melampus, Abaris and Salmoxis, the prehistoric
representatives of the original prototype of the prophet-poet-sage combination that seems to live on in the Asiatic or Siberian shaman.
Voegelin, in a way, eschews the startling-at least to modem manbut nevertheless basis dichotomy of Themis and Dike. The notion that
" order " is of divine origin seems to have been deeply ingrained in the
Helladic as well as Hellenic mind. It was still repeated, for instance, by
Plato: Zeus gave men and men alone the Dike which prevents them from
destroying one another through "disorder." (Plato, Protagoras 322A ff.)
Naturally, this Platonic "myth," recounted in the Protagoras, is of a
relatively late date, but its original idea goes back beyond recorded history.
The Olympian Zeus, as the guardian of a specific order, is a relative latecomer in the Greek pantheon. Zeus worship, it should also be borne in
mind, among other things suggests that the primeval matriarchal kinship
orders or organizations had partially been superseded by new " political "
or "polis" orders. Zeus PoLeos, the "new political deity," in a way is the
guarantor of a new societal order which apparently came with the institution of the Polis. But the old myths no Jess than the relatively late
Homeric epics or the even later great tragedies of fifth century Greece also
refer to a pre-Olympian order, an ancient and sacred order which was
observed long before Zeus and the Olympian gods had been accepted.
This more ancient order is "Themis." But Themis is not merely a preOlympian concept of order; it is also a personal goddess or, better, a

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Titanic deity, a sort of "cosmic force" which watches over what is
"right." Themis, also called Aisa, Metis or Mnemosyne, is at the same time
Moira or Fate, and, incidentally, personifies the belief in a pre-ordained and
inextricable destiny. The newer Olympian or Zeus religion both adopted
and adapted the Themis-idea. But despite this assimilation, a conflict
between Themis-order and Zeus-order developed. Perhaps the classical
example of this conflict can be seen in the Orestes tragedy of Aeschylus
where finally the Zeus (Polis) -order triumphs through the intermediary
or intercession of " Polis-institutions." Zeus, the new ll).ale god who also
represents the principle of the patriarchate, is the lord of the Polis and of
the " new order "; Themis, the female symbol of matriarchate, remains the
governing notion of order in the older kin society.
Like the Themis, the Dike is ·both a " principle " and a personal goddess
who watches over "justice," or, better, sees to it that "order" is observed.
This Dike is one of the newer or Olympian deities: she is often called the
daughter of Zeus and Themis and as such she gradually replaces but never
fully eliminates her "mother," Themis. The Dike insists that everyone,
including the Themis, receives his or her due. (The notion of giving
everyone his due was subsequently taken over by the Stoics and ultimately
incorporated into the Justinian Corpus: suum cuique tribuere.) She also
enforces what either Zeus or Themis has ordained. Thus it is quite possible
that Dike might conflict with Dike, or for Dike to become the perdition of
what otherwise seems to be an " innocent " or even " righteous " person.
This is brought out eloquently in Sophocles' Antigone: Antigone observes
the Themis-order when she buries her brother, Polyneices. In doing so
she'' does Dike" from the point of view of the Themis or the Themis-order,
but at the same time she defies the Zeus-Dike or Polis-Dike represented by
King Creon. In this instance the Titanic Themis-Dike collides with the
Olympian Zeus-Dike. In this conflict, which is actually the" result" of two
clashing" orders," Antigone, who is but the tragic·pawn of mightier forces,
is crushed-a fate to which she submits without flinching. Creon, on the
other hand, is by no means a " villain " or, perhaps, the representative of
a vicious or immoral "positive law," while Antigone upholds an alleged
"natural law." Creon, too, "does Dike," namely, Zeus-Dike, which in this
case insists that, like any patricide, no citizen who had turned against
his native Polis may honorably be buried. Greek polytheism, especially the
"dualism" of Themis-Dike and Zeus-Dike, not only permits but actually
necessitates " disorder " in that it makes possible opposing or irreconcilable
forms of Dike. This conflict, incomprehensible to the Christian mind, is
at the basis of many Greek tragedies. In the final analysis, the truly tragic
element, therefore, is to be found in the" disorder of Dikai." Somehow, in
the opinion of the present reviewer, Professor Voegelin fails to make this
fully clear. He apparently prefers to dwell upon a host of interesting but
somehow irrelevant illustrative details (pp. fl43-fl66) rather than to deal

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with this fundamental problem, which, incidentally, would have lent some
indirect support to his major thesis.
Barring a few short references, Voegelin does not concern himself too
much with fifth century Greek speculations about law and the " positive
legal order," although" law," it may be presumed, is a much more tangible
and certainly a more effective instrumentality of " order " or of achieving
"order" than perhaps philosophical or politico-social theory. Like so many
political theorists or philosophers, he seems to have a congenital aversion to
paying any attention to the" law in action" which, perhaps from the lofty
position of his philosophy of history, is too pedestrian a subject to merit
consideration. On the other hand, the author seems to be acquainted with
some of the !ego-philosophical or jurisprudential notions that were advanced
by certain Greek philosophers or "sophists." Nevertheless, he apparently
does no more here than ransack at random Diels-Kranz, Die Fragmente der
Vorsokratiker, in order to find illustrations for his main thesis. Protagoras
had already announced that mutual protection and preservation of man
the first principle of every social order. In keeping with this
premise he insisted that the two terms, justice or injustice, " have no
existence of their own, but their truth rests on agreement and is valid
(Plato, Theaetetus 'I79lB)
only as long as the agreement lasts."
Protagoras' suggestion that in the struggle of life the various individuals, through reciprocal agreements, should enter and actually do
enter into permanent associations or " orders " for their convenience
and preservation, (cf. Plato, Protagoras 39l2A ff.) is definitely in line with
that type of Greek !ego-philosophical (or political) thought which came
much to the fore during the latter part of the fifth century B. C. The role
of the social order is actually limited to the safeguarding of certain individual interests. Not perhaps an innate "social urge," "the social nature"
of man, or, as in Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, the assumption that only
in and through " order " (or the Polis) man may achieve a truly moral
stature, but simply man's inability to defend, secure or enjoy his individual
interests " induces " man to form " associations " or " forms of order " which
are merely "associations of convenience." Hence, "order" is the result of
distress, rather than the product of an inherent " law of history " or perhaps
that of a " moral urge." But while man's entrance into associations with
others is necessitated by the actual need of protecting and promoting the
essentially selfish interests of individual man, the successful maintenance of
such associations and, hence, ·the guarantee of a continued full assertion of
man's individual interests, require certain sqcial or political " virtues."
Protagoras' attempt to balance the selfish interests or instincts of individual man and the " social " interests of societal man marks the beginning
of a social or legal philosophy of great and lasting importance. By superimposing a " collectivist " sense of social justice and social restraint on the
primary
aspirations of individual man, Protagoras initiated a

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definite trend of socio-political thought characteristic of an essentially
democratic form of life. The op.Ovata of Antiphon, for instance, is basically
but an elaboration of this theme: the active support of law and justice and,
hence, of " solidarity " even in an " open society " by one's personal
conduct is not only the very factor on which any well-functioning society
depends for its existence and flowering, but also that fundamental attitude
which promotes, more than anything else, individual prosperity as well as
the personal interests of every man. The most pernicious foe of individual
man and his personal well-being is the avop.ta; and the greatest danger
threatening man is an individual seeking advantages at the expense of
all others. Thus Anonymous Jamblichi 7.14 concedes in a Benthl!lllian flair
that the greatest happiness to the greatest number must be achieved by
society through eunomics. Nevertheless, society or "order" does not in
itself constitute the ultimate goal of social behavior. For even social
behavior or "social adjustment," in the final analysis, is merely a means to
promote more tellingly the personal interests of the various individuals
who in their sum total make ].lp "society." Any" a-social" conduct is not
so much to be condemned because it endangers "society," but because it
may become the source of danger or discomfort to the perpetrator insofar
as he will, sooner or later, have to face an outraged majority against
which he will prove to be powerless. (6.1 fi) Similar ideas can be detected
in the writings of Democritus when he maintains that the " laws do not
object to anyone living in accordance with his personal or natural inclinations or fancies, as long as no one injures another, because selfishness (or
greed) are the source of all civil discord." Aside from the fact that this
is but another way of davancing the notion that the o}Mlvow. constitutes
the basis of every successful social ord,w, Democritus does not acknowledge
any autonomous social or trans-personal ends or interests of society above
the particular interests of individual man. The ".social order" or, perhaps
better, the true "legal order," merely guarantees the individual a more
dignified life as an individual, without, however, creating a" trans-personal
order." Order, then, is the result of man's intelligence seeking after what is
useful and beneficial to him; and this instinctive striving after what is
useful and beneficial to man as an individual constitutes the key-note of
Democritus' social or !ego-political theory. The op.6vata, a term which he
might have borrowed from Protagoras (or perhaps from the author of
Anonymous Jamblichi, provided the latter could be dated around the year
425 B. C.) , on the other hand, is but that pragmatic notion which teaches
man that " social behavior " based on mutual agreement more than anything else guarantees the fullest attainment of man's eternal quest of
things useful to him.
Perhaps the most concise early formulation of this individualistic notion
of society can be found in Aristotle's report of Lycophron's statement that
"the law is ... a reciprocal assurance (or guarantee) of what is just."

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(Aristotle, Politics
b. 11.) In Lycophron the relationship of law
(v6p.os) to "what is just" (ra 8£Kata) is actually based on the primacy
of" what is just" or, as we would say today, on the primacy of individual
rights or interests. The v6p.o> merely guarantees these rights; it is an
instrument to secure these individual rights, and does so on the basis of
mutual agreement or consent. In this fashion Lycophron stresses the fact
that the real function of law or of the "legal order" consists in the reciprocity or correlativity of the various rights and duties enoyed by or imposed
on different individuals through reciprocal agreements. This more progressive notion about law and its social function, which is at the basis of
any "open democratic society," is a far cry from Voegelin's philosophical
conception of " order " which, in the final analysis, is a thoroughly " closed
order." It is, one may suggest here, an attempt to establish the greatest
possible harmony through intelligent " adjustment " within the greatest
possible dynamic diversity of individual interests and aspirations.
The main difficulty with Professor Voegelin's book, at least in the opinion
of the present reviewer, is simply this: The author starts out with a
preconceived "philosophy of history " (pp. Q, 7) -with a rigid ideological
frame of abstract reference obviously devised without too much concern
over historical fact-and then ransacks (not always successfully) a number
of historical sources in order to substantiate or illustrate his initial thesis
or hypothesis. Such a procedure, needless to say, is open to serious challenge.
Of necessity, important materials or facts of detail, and even larger contexts,
are at times distorted, misinterpreted or simply ignored. Although on the
whole Voegelin's is without doubt an important book, in the final analysis
it merely proves that, despite the author's erudite efforts, an assentially
Hegelian approach to history can no longer satisfy the critical scholar.
Professor Voegelin will probably reject the reviewer's objections with the
remark that " even a defective construction which had at least a grip on
the problem [presumably the author has this ' grip on the problem,' note by
the reviewer], was better than the dilettante smartness of phenomenal
argument." (p. 15) The present reviewer, however, emphatically denies
the truth of this broad statement, and this for the obvious reason that it
might easily lend itself to an eminent degree to proselytizing, propaganda,
and ultimately to the distortion and even suppression of all truth. Concomitantly, the abstract obsession with "order" for its own alleged "truth
value," especially if divorced from other important factors or " values," or
if given an unwarranted preferred position, might lead to the total
abolition not only of human freedom but of human dignity as well for
the sake of "order." Let us remember here that it was one of the greatest
"prophets" of the" supremacy of order," namely, Plato who stated: "The
greatest principle of all is that nobody, whether male or female, should be
without a leader. Nor should the mind of anybody be habituated to letting
him do anything at all on his own initiative; neither out of zeal, nor even

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playfully. But in war as well as in the midst of peace he shall look to his
leader and follow him faithfully. And even in the smallest matter he should
be under this leadership. For example, he should get up, or move, or wash,
or take his meals ... only if he has been told to do so. . . . In a word,
he should teach his soul, by long habit, never to dream of acting independently, and, in fact, should become utterly incapable of such independent
action."
(Laws
ff., cf. 739C ff.)
ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

University of Notre Dame,
Notre Dame, Indiana.

The Transformations of Man. By LEWIS MuMFORD. Volume Seven of
World Perspectives, planned and edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen.
New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956. Pp. 249. $3.50.
The series World Perspectives, of which this is one volume, is intended
to gain insight into the meaning of man, who, in the words of Ruth Nanda
Anshen, " not only is determined by history but who also determines
history," " to help quicken the ' unshaken heart of well-rounded truth'
and interpret the significant elements of the World Age now taking shape
out of the core of that undimmed continuity of the creative process which
restores man to mankind while deepening and enhancing his communion
with the universe." (xii, xviii)
After noting that " almost every people has fashioned a myth about its
origin, nature and destiny," Lewis Mumford purposes "to fashion a myth
that will be more in keeping with the science of our time, yet more ready
to venture into factual quicksand than the scientist, if true to his prudent
code, can let himself be." (p. 1) He states that we no longer ask for
some dramatic moment of creation that calls for an external and all-powerful creator, that man seems to have descended from a group of apelike
primates that lived in trees, and that the undifferentiated material for
symbols and fabrications which constitute thought rises out of man's " not
waiting for any external challenge, but prompted by his own maturation."
(p. 3) After describing what he considers the evolution of the human
from the animal, Mumford warns that sophisticated modern man is in
danger of succumbing to a degradation that primitive man must have
learned, after many lapses, to guard against: "the threat of losing his own
humanity by giving precedence to his animal self and his nonhuman
characteristics over the social ego and the ideal superego that have transmuted this original inheritance." (p. 22)
To implement the myth calculated to guard against modern man's loss
of humanity, the author traces the evolution of humanity in terms of the

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"archaic man," "civilized man," " axial man," "Old World man," and
"New World man," which presently exists; then he sketches the nature of
" post-historic man " and the prospects of a world culture.
Archaic man took form in the neolithic village; his communal life is
earthbound, with the family the social nucleus. Custom and law, education
and work, government and morality are all part of a carefully ordered
collective ritual that punctuates not merely man's works and days, but
the stages of life; the very restrictions of this environment increased man's
sense of adequacy. The archaic tradition, Mumford avers, has maintained
its hold, with varying degrees of tenacity, in every part of the world right
down to our own time, "least perhaps in North America, and most, it
seems likely, in India and China." (p. 39)
At a late moment in man's emergence, "an audacious minority, in a
handful of specially situated communities, made a daring thrust in a new
direction: the experiment of civilization." (p.
Again stating" we must
fashion a myth to make the whole process a little more intelligible," (ibid.)
the author shows how civilization brought a new kind of unity based on
division and specialization, a new uniformity imposed by deliberate repression, a new agreement that sprang out of a partial reconciliation of
opposites. " For civilization brought about the equation of human life with
property and power; indeed property and power became more dear than
life "; (p. 46) the other transformation of civilized man " moved precisely
in the opposite direction: toward the elevation of a unique personality,
possessing powers uncircumscribed by the usages of society." (p. 49)
Since civilized man, if more law-abiding, is likewise more calculating, if
more skillful and intelligent also more selfish, a further transformation was
necessary. This was brought about by the axial religions which redefined
the human personality. "The axial prophet both remakes the concept of
God and remints the human image. The personal takes precedence over the
social." (p. 74) A new self, purified from the close attachment to man's
animal nature, emerges. Axial religions appeal to those who are disoriented
or depressed by the hollowness of civilization's achievements to effect also
an emancipation from social attachments. " Through axial man there rise
to consciousness perceptions, feelings and aspirations, of a transcendent
order, probably long buried in the unconscious." (p. 79) Mumford
contends that axial religion, including Christianity, by treating the soul
alone, failed to do justice to man's whole nature; furthermore, the new
Church leaders " brought back into the heart of their religion, in an effort
to ensure its survival, the very elements from which they had sought sudden
deliverance: the routines of civilization." (p. 96) Here the author repeats
his fascinating theory of ideas and institutions in four stages: Formulation,
Incarnation, Incorporation, and Embodiment. He sees in the Church of
Rome the " oldest effective transnational political organization so far
recorded," only to note that the very superiority of the axial self produced

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393

a ne"' danger: "axial man took on the vices of the civilization he had
become so adept at controlling and extending, and in that very triumph
forfeited axial culture's chief reason for existence." (p. 101)
Old World man possesses a culture comprised of the three layers:
archaic, civilized and axial. The core of Old World culture was dedication
to the gods. " The discovery of the gods, the increasing clarification of
these possessive images, with their commanding visions of perfection, was
perhaps the central contribution of Old World culture." (p. 117) Civilization in itself, Old World man maintained, was not good enough to justify
the sacrifices it exacts: there must he a "beyond." "That beyond was
presented by religion as Heaven: at first only an image and a myth that
carried no viable promise of realization, except in so far as its illusory
presence made itself felt in every daily act." (p. HW)
The first radical breakthrough in this culture was achieved by New
World culture, which "has already displaced the archaic and axial components of Old World culture as ruthlessly as the cities of the ancient river
civilizations displaced the village culture of the neolithic period." (p. 122)
By New World culture Mumford refers to two radically different ideologies,
the "romantic" and the "mechanical." The first accompanied a general
resurgence of vitality and sexuality in Europe; the second traded vitality
for power. The New World was a product of rationalism, utilitarianism,
scientific positivism; subjectivity and teleology had no place in this new
framework of ideas; organization, standardization, regularity, control applied
to every manifestation of life. " Knowledge no longer merely served power;
it produced power." (p. 129) Wherever it penetrated, it created an
environment which was dehumanized, depersonalized, mechanically ordered,
uniform. Two traits which account for the continuous expansion and
ascendancy of New World man, and which are a necessary contribution to
the next phase of human development are: 1) the concept of human
equality, not as a promise for the axial afterworld, but as a necessary
demand of justice in every earthly society; 2) a fuller dedication to the
future.
Summing up the New World transformation, the author holds that its
teclmics brought the human race for the first time into a working unity,
a common law and order and often a common language; and it awakened a
new confidence in human powers. However, "this New World was only a
half-world, for the subjective side of the personality was not represented,
or rather, only so much admitted as entered into the processes of systematic
reasoning, experimental observation, mathematical symbolism, and technical
invention."
Mankind, Mumford avers, now lives under the threat of self-destruction,
facing the dark future of "post-historic man." Should New World
tendencies not be halted, post-historic man's existence will be focused on
the external world and its incessant manipulation; both man's aboriginal

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BOOK REVIEWS

propensities and his historic self will be finally eliminated as" unthinkable."
" The post-historic process began innocently by eliminating fallible human
impulses from science: it will end by eliminating human nature itself from
the whole world of reality." (p. 160)
Lest the reader be engulfed in a wave of pessimism, the author confides
that post-historic man is a theoretic possibility, not a historic probability.
"Let us make one basic assumption: the destiny of mankind, after its long
preparatory period of separation and differentiation, is at last to become
one." (p. 184) But no part of the past can enter " world culture " in the
form that it took independently in an earlier situation; all man's past
knowledge seems petty and his best achievements circumscribed, compared
to the world that now opens up.
The transformation will involve a leap from one plane to another, a
true emergent whose results cannot be predicted. The immediate object
of world culture is to break through the premature closures, the corrosive
conflicts, and the cyclical frustrations of history. " If ' Be yourself,' is
nature's first injunction to man, 'Transform yourself,' seems, at least up to
now, to be her final imperative."
(p. fl!i!Q) The sciences will have to
overcome the naive bias against teleology if they are to be at the service
of man's further transformation.
Anent finality, Mumford states that
theological dogma, which presumed to know the mind of God and the
ultimate destination of man, on the basis of " revelation,'' had (by the
seventeenth century) discredited itself by its very presumption." (p. 233)
The philosophy of the person is " the polarizing idea that will presently
radiate into every department of thought." (p. 237) "In his very completeness, One World man will seem ideologically and culturally naked,
almost unidentifiable. He will be like the Jain saints of old, 'clothed in
space,' his nakedness a sign that he does not belong exclullively to any
nation, group, trade, sect, school, or community .... Everything that he
does or feels or makes will bear the imprint of the larger self he has
made his own." (p. !i!48)
Those who have kept in touch with Mumford's writings will recognize
many familiar themes in this work. It has been his particular penchant
to survey huge eras of history, to note what he considers the underlying
principle or ethos of these periods and to weave the resultant elements
into a pattern which generally recommends cutting away from the past
(albeit preserving some of its gains), eschewing the rationalistic, mechanistic
and depersonalized culture of the present, and by a transformation of
universal proportions enter into a new world in which the person will be
supreme, the machine properly subservient, and a natural felicity achieved
through the ideals of wholeness and love.
The author's use of the word " myth " in this book is not perhaps
related to the above theory. That the "myth" is more a product of
Mumford's imagination than the elan of the respective cultures he studies

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395

seems indicated by his too facile handling of historical periods. Much as
we may need more theoretic analysis and penetrating insights to counteract
the sterility of scientism, sweeping generalizations such as abound in this
volume hardly seem the answer. This is not to deny the value of Mumford's
heartening emphasis on the recapture of human personality, his critique of
the deadening effects of mechanization and institutionalization, and the
dangers of science without a soul. The facile rejection, apparently, of a
definite creative act of God, the insufficiently qualified acceptance of
evolutionary theory, a negative cncept of grace, the peremptory dismissal
of theology and institutionalized Catholicism as civilizing agents, among
other positions, becloud and weaken the brilliant insights which one often
finds in Mumford's writings. His more realistic observations on the stages
of civilization would have everything to gain from a literary setting which
exemplified clarity of concepts, adequate documentation, and reasoning
unencumbered by specious assumptions, ultra-Freudian and otherwise.
A number of years ago the writer, in reviewing Mumford's The Condition
of Man (The Thomist VII, July 1944, pp. 544-55fl), called attention to his
concept of progress phrased in the words " we must create a new superego." In correspondence which followed upon this review, Mr. Mumford
promised that a subsequent work would present a more conclusive statement
of orientation for modern man. It is not at all evident, from his subsequent
The Conduct of Life and this book at least, that he has moved much closer
to a solution of the problem.
It is reprehensible enough for an author to quote himself, and perhaps
worse for a reviewer to quote an earlier review. Yet the wish is again
expressed, as in the comments on The Condition of Man, that Mr.
Mumford, for whom this reviewer holds a special affection, " will find the
true super-ego, not a Freudian projection which man creates, but God,
Who created man." Should this eventuate, his subsequent books will be his
best-and most lasting.
LoUIS A. RYAN, O.P.
P't'ovidence CoUege,
Pf'ovidence, R. 1.

BRIEF NOTICES
Exposition of the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle. By ST. THoMAs AQUINAS.
Translated by Pierre Conway, 0. P., revised by William H. Kane, 0. P.
Quebec: Librairie Philosophique M. Doyon, 1956. Pp. 465. $6.00.
This competent and complete translation from the Latin of Aquinas'
commentary on the Posterior Analytics is done in mimeograph form, and
comprises, in order, a historical note, a translator's note, table of contents
and outline, the prologue and exposition or commentary proper-forty-four
lectures on Book I and twenty lectures on Book II, and an index of terms.
The translation is based on the Leonine text of St. Thomas. Though the
Leonine also gives the text of Aristotle, divided into sections appearing at
the head of the corresponding lectures of Aquinas, this practice has not
been followed by Father Conway. No doubt practical considerations
necessitated its omission. But if, in the spirit of the close translation of
the commentary, a similar rendering of the Latin of Aristotle on which
St. Thomas was directly working could be provided, perhaps in a future
printed edition, the general utility of the volume would be greatly enhanced,
as in the Yale translation of the text and commentary on the De Anima.
But in lieu of this, numerical references to the text of Aristotle are given
thJ:oughout, and St. Thomas' brief lead-in quotations from Aristotle are
given in the Oxford version. The format and job of typing are good and
clear, except that the hyphen at the margin, to show that a word has been
divided, is sometimes invisible. It is a pity that such a· generally competent
translation of a work so important should not have the benefit of a regular
printing.
The historical note serves to bring out that importance. St. Thomas
wrote his commentary on the Posterior Analytics around Hl69, when he
was about forty-four, at the height of his matured faculties as theologian
and philosopher, and during the most critical intellectual struggle of his
career, his contest with latin Averroism. During these central years at
Paris he was, as theologian, writing his chief Summa, facing the dark
problem of evil in Job, and the mysterious light of the Word Incarnate
in John; simultaneously, as philosopher, he was composing his greatest
commentaries on the Stagyrite, on the De Anima, the Metaphysics, etc.,
including this one on the Posterior Analytics. In less philosophical times
and places than Paris in the mid-thirteenth century and against adversaries
less keenly trained than the Averroists, the inferior and more popular modes
of communication, dialectic, rhetoric, poetic (discussed by St. Thomas in
the prologue to this work, as well as in his prologue to the commentary on

896

BRIEF NOTICES

397

the Peri Hermeneias) might avail and might attract more study and
commentary. But, for those who know or who wish to know, the Posterior
Analytics is the central work on scientific knowledge and demonstrative
communication. Today, though philosophy be popularly the work of
dialecticians, rhetoricians, misplaced poets, not to mention power-conscious
sophists, there is also a gradual resurgence of competent, non-Christian,
scientific philosophy of Greek inspiration, more diffuse, but in quality such
as was concentrated at Paris in mid-thirteenth century. One might call it
a neo-Averroism, and its main task is to "rescue" Plato and especially
Aristotle from their Christian, Augustinian or Thomistic interpretations,
first of all in practical areas such as the question of natural right, but
eventually in theory itself. Thus not only among Thomists proper, but for
all Aristotelians of whatever stamp, the present appearance in English of
this commentary on the theory of science and demonstration is of timely.
significance for genuinely philosophical
Father Conway's historical note confines itself to locating St. Thomas'
commentary in the context of his life. Since this Exposition by St. Thomas
is, after all, a commentary on another .great work, something could have
been said about the latter. The translator here, as in several other respects,
seems to take the view that he is addressing only the initiate. A little more
effort to contact those who are " without the law " might be in order. It
is a well-known fact that even in studies for the doctorate in most American
universities the Posterior Analytics itself, let alone any commentary on it,
goes completely unread. All that is known in most instances is a corrupt
version of the formal syllogistic. Aristotle's Posterior Analytics is one of the
profoundest works in any field that has ever been brought forth by man.
Unlike the Metaphysics or the Categories, it is also very well written, its
order is certain, and {only unproved statements to the contrary, cf. I. M.
Bochenski, 0. P., Ancient Formal Logic, Amsterdam, 1951, p.
it clearly
bears in every part the stamp of the master. Yet because of the rare and
abstract rigor of the subject matter, an equally masterful commentary
such as Thomas' will in all ages be of great service to the student. This
commentary of St. Thomas on the Posterior Analytics and the one by his
teacher, St. Albert, on the Prior Analytics, are, perhaps, the two greatest
works of logical exposition of the Latin Middle Ages.
The translator's note attempts to take a balanced view, emphasizing first
the importance of Latin and the need for deliberate closeness to the
scholastic Latin terminology, and, secondly, the independence of the thought
of St. Thomas from the language he used. On the whole, however, the
translator leans toward the former and even sets as his ideal the sort of
translation for which his predecessor and confrere,· the great Hellenist
William of Moerbeke, was justly famous. Now at this point the difficulty
will be raised that the genuis of the English language is quite other than
that of the twin classicallanguages,-the great difference being the plasticity

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BRIEF NOTICES

of the word order in the latter, owing to their inflected character. Thus
the feat of Moerbeke's rendering, whose " accuracy was such that if
independently retranslated into Greek, it would match the original
Aristotle," (p. iii) , will, it may be charged, just not be repeatable in
twentieth-century English. The test is to take the present translation and
examine it closely. The wonder is, considering the difficulty of the feat,
that it has come off so well. Upon a rare occasion one finds a clumsy
sentence such as this, in the title to Book I, lecture 27: "First how
concerning first and immediate principles that ignorance is caused by virtue
of which that is thought to be which is not." Similarly, one finds unhappy
phrases whose closeness to the Latin makes them indeed retranslatable in
their very word order. But the question is, " have they ever really gotten
out of latinity and into English?" In Book I, lecture 1, no. 7, where St.
Thomas is dividing the contents of the two books of the Posterior Analytics,
he is made to say in English that " in the first, Aristotle shows the necessity
of the demonstrative syllogism, concerning whick is this book." This, no
doubt, is " de quo est iste liber," but is it twentieth-century English?
Why not the unbookish, perfectly idiomatic " which this book is about " ?
Being able to retranslate such renderings verbatim into Latin would seem
to be a curious exercise anyway, reserved exclusively for those who already
know scholastic Latin. And in nine cases out of ten, by conservative
estimate, such an attempt to plaster English word order to that of the
Latin model tells us nothing of the logic of either Aristotle or St. Thomas.
Most of these · difficulties could have been avoided by having had an
intelligent reader who knew no Latin and therefore could not mentally
supply a stylistic justification for such phrasing. Besides such a control
the next best thing is for the translator to break his work from time to time
with readings from strictly modern logicians of good English style· like
Mill and Russell.
However, it may be rejoined, the ,merit of this method as employed in this
translation is that it. has, so far as I can see, nowhere distorted the meaning
of St. Thomas. This, in the last analysis and from a philosophical point of
view, is the supreme test of any translatj.on of such works. In short, the
substance of this translation has a splendid solidity. But if accidents are
real enhancements, they also require attention.
As to technical terminology, some of the chief expressions have been kept
in their original dress. Among them are per ae, propter quid, quia, dici de
omni, dici per ae, and quod quid eat. These are simply reprinted where they
occur in. the original, without benefit of notes. In the translator's preface
an argument is advanced against the need of any notes. Since, if granted,
it would hold for all translations of similar materials, it must be examined:
" In view of St. Thomas' deliberateness, one hesitates to ' clarify ' obscurities which, on a more perspicacious reading, often emerge as opaqueness
on the part of the reader rather than the author. In view of that same
deliberateness, it is considered that if St. Thomas sets out to expound a

BRIEF NOTICES

399

passage of Aristotle, he must do so adequately, and that, consequently,
footnotes of this translator to that end are somewhat presumptious." (p. iii)
This argument seems to hold perfectly well against philosophic notes to
supplement the commentary, but terminological notes may still be in order,
at least to meet the pet inadequacies of the moderns. And especially if
one is to keep certain technical Latin terms no longer recognizable in
America outside a very select circle, they, at least, must be given some
provisional renderings in a footnote.
One word which was not kept in its latin form and perhaps should have
been, is habitus. It is translated by the false friend "habit," e. g., Book I,
lesson 41, no. U. The rendering of
and habitus by the now English
word " habitus," is becoming standard practice throughout the whole range
of classical and mediaeval scholastic studies, not only in works on the
Latins but even on the Jewish and Arabian scholastics, e. g., Professor M.
Mahdi's Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of History, London, 1957, pp. 90-91.
See especially p. 180 where " habit " and " habitus " are used to translate
two different Arabic words.
However, the translator does give (ibid.) a substitute for notes: "In
lieu of this [notes], an Index has been appended in order that the reader
may consult parallel passages in the text and derive englightenrnent from
St. Thomas himself rather than from one of his less apt followers." This,
so humbly expressed, is the excellent motif of Sanctus Thomas commentator
sui ipsius. The index is quite adequate to nearly all the main ideas. Dici
de omni, however, seems not to be listed. And a few terminological notes
might, still in aU, be helpful.
As to the content of the work itself, among its many treasures it may be
stimulating to call special attention to the rigorous analysis of Book I,
lectures 33-35 showing that there is no regress or progress ad infinitum in
the principles or conclusions of a demonstration, i.e., that the process of
reason must be terminated at both ends by understanding or intellection
proper; the beautifully subtle lecture 41 of the same book, on the specification of the sciences; and the elusive, challenging, and all-important
question of the
lesson of Book II, " How the first principles of
demonstration are known to us."
Let us choose one of the above, for brevity and suggestiveness the fortyfirst lecture of Book I. St. Thomas explains in no. 7 how a science, like
a motion, derives its unity from its term. For a science its term is its
subject genus; thus a science terminates in its subject genus: the genus
taken, of course, extensively in all its specific subjective parts as subjects
or minor terms of all the intrinsic subalternate demonstrations of the
science. In no. 10 he states what appears to be a paradox: that a science
derives its unity from the unity of the subject genus, whereas its diversity
from the other sciences is derived from the diversity of the [types of]
principles they severally employ. If the factors whereby a science is one

400

BRIEF NOTICES

in itself. and something otker than other sciences are not formally the same
factor, how can we be sure that we will not have the anomaly of a science
being one in itself because of the presence of the one factor, and not distinct
from another science because of the absence of the other factor? After
explaining in no. 11 that the material diversity of object does not diversify
the habit [habitus] but that only the formal diversity does [i.e., diverse
formal objects, diverse types of formal principles], St. Thomas goes on in
no. 13 to explain: " That the indemonstrable principles are of one genus
is had by the sign that when those things which are demonstrated through
them are in the same genus and cogenious, i. e., conriatural or proximate to
each other according to genus, they have the same principles. Thus it is
evident that the unity of the scientifically knowable genus, as scientifically
knowable, from which the unity of a science is taken, and the unity of
principles from which the diversity of [one] science [from others] is taken,
mutually correspond."
The unity of type of formal principles, which is the uniform way of
defining or type of middle term employed, being a form, as such is in
opposition to other forms, as all formal, limiting potencies are: but such
an intentional and explanatory form is also the form of the material object
or subject genus as the latter is att.ained by the demonstrating mind. Thus
two object-terms, the formal or middle, and the material or subject genus,
are brought together again in the process of demonstration. Granted that
the former does secondarily give formal unity to the science, it must be
insisted that the latter, despite its being in a way logically material, is
something more: ontologically it is the actual, because it is the extensively
existent in its subjective parts. The latter are, by the wholeness of essential
being, in the case of the species; and by the act of existence, in the case
of the ultimate subjective parts, the individuals. And their being makes
the type of definition of the middle, when applied to them, a type of real
definition instead of just a nominal definition. (We see here one of the
facets of the strange concurrence of material causality and existence
throughout philosophical history.) Taken in this way, the subject genus
primarily gives the positive oneness of act to the science itself and makes
it one science, because all the things that are {or can be) in the subject
genus already have, each of them, its positive unity, of which the formal
unity expressed by the explanatory middle term has been all along ontologically true in superior, more unified way, even before it was abstractively envisioned by us. Thus they are, each one itself, the true source and
cause of the positive unity of the science.
To express this more fully: the actual existence and actual unity of the
specific subjective parts, and ultimately the unity of each of the individuals,
of the scientific genus, has all along been exercising or fulffiling, and more
than fuimling, in actuality, but in a state of negative unity or negative
community (lack of division by formal principles), the formal and diversify-

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ing principles of the science. The generic unity was already present in a
negative state (lack of division by generic principles) in the specific unity,
and the specific unity was already present, also negatively (lack of division
by any formal principles) , in the positive unity of the individual. This
formal principle was made formally one (by positive community) only
later, and in the intentional order, by virtue of the mind's abstractive act.
As so conceived, the potentiality of the form was made a positive UJ1ity
only by the mind and only for the sake of the mind's range of vision, by
crosscutting all the individuals and leaving out of focus the only unities
that are actually in being, i. e., by leaving out the factors that make each
one in itself, matter and existence. But the potentiality of the form is still
only a potentiality. Now the scientific task is to redeem that potentiality
by the demonstrative return or termination: to make good and fast that
formal principle (positively one only in the intentional order). by seeing
it fulfilled in the members of the subject genus. Thus it is seen to be in
them an, but in the higher, indeed the only, unpotentialized, unabstracted,
actual unity ·of each concrete one of them.
What is interesting in St. Thomas' treatment of all this is that in addition
to the analogy of the formally diversifying fac.tor and the unifying factor
of a science to the principle and term, respectively, of motion in physical
philosophy, which analogy is, of course, explicit in the natural Philosopher,
the Parisian doctor subtly goes beyond commenting and furthers the cause
of the philosophy of logic, by the very vocabulary he uses, in suggesting
two other analogies: one, to syllogistic proper, where the formal and
distinctive principle is to the middle term as the material and unifying
principle is to the minor terms or subjects of the conclusions, the subjective parts of the subject genus; and another, to the metaphysics of the
transcendentals, where the formal principle of a science is to aliquid as the
material principle is to unum. And as unum is ontologically prior to
aliquid and closer,
to speak, to being itself, as actual, we owe to it (i.e.,
to the unity of each species in the scientific genus, ultimately to the
individual unity of each thing in itself that is reached by a science) the
unity of that science. Were this better understood, the formalist difficulties
of Scotus, Ockham, and Hegel, would all be resolved.
The treasures of the Exposition of the Posterior Analytics are beyond
reckoning. Fr. Conway, with the diligent concurrence of Fr. Kane, has
faithfully brought them all to us in readable English.
JoaN

Lewis College,
Lockport, Illinois.

J. GLANVILLE

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BRIEF NOTICES

God and the Ways of Knowing. By JEAN DANIELOU, S. J. Translated by
Walter Roberts. New York: Meridian Books, 1957. Pp.
with
notes. $3.75.
With Origen's statement that it is always dangerous to speak about God,
the foreword of this work begins; its ensuing chapters make it frequently
clear that it is perennially advantageous to do so, as well. Fr. Danielou
sets as his primary aim: "to place religions and philosophies, the Old
Testament and the New, theology and mysticism, in their proper relationship with the knowledge of God." (p. 8) Through six chapters dealing in
turn with the God of the religions, of philosophers, of the Faith, of Jesus
Christ, of the Church and of the mystics, he pursues this aim. Obviously
it is a process of enormous range, touching upon the capital themes of all
of theology. For the virtuosity of the author there is provided a vehicle
which he employs to advantage in considerations valuable for their appraisal
of theological questions, and in reflections penetrating in their insights and
criticisms. His renowned advocacy of the necessity of the Biblical orientation of theological questions resounds throughout the present work. His
erudition puts at the service of his task scriptural exegesis, the writings of
the Fathers, as well as a cross-current of contemporary literature, Catholic
and non-Catholic, pertinent to the divergent topics confronted. There are
many evidences of the author's profundity of
such as his
contrast of the transcendence of God as He reveals Himself with anything
reason could anticipate (p. 124) ; the apologetic appraisal of the notion of
Tradition, against the thesis of the Protestant theologian, Cullman (pp.
176 ff.); the exploration of the fidelity of God in His covenants. (p. 105)
A book about God that is the product of a mind so imbued with the
Revealed Word of God, of so broad an acquaintance with the perennial and
contemporary literature bearing on its subject matter, warrants by its
value braving any of the hazards attendant upon the amplitude of its
argument, and the ineffability of its subject.
By its title and in the structure formed by its chapters, this work
assumes the task of reflection upon the proportions of the human mind,
on the indicated levels, to the Divine Reality. Such a function belongs by
right to the wisdom that is Sacred Theology. It is, first of all, unfortunate
that the translation frequently falls short of the proprietas verborum indispensable to theological expression. A few such inept phrases may be noted:
On created being: " The existence of a reality before God which yet has its
own existence." (p.
On the Eucharist: "the cup full of wine transubstantiated in His blood." (p. 100) The love of friendship is said to have
"a person as its object and compels him to will for himself the good."
(p. 118) The Church as the recipient of the Apostolic communication of
(p. 189) On the Trinity: "The
Tradition, is called its "subject-matter."
Word of God is a Person, i.e., possesses a substance distinct from that of

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408

the Father. (p. 198; cf. Summa Tkeol., I, q. 30, a. 1, ad 1) Perhaps it is
a typographic& error that is responsible for the substitution of the word
" possession " for " procession " in the following: " This order of mission
is a reflection of that of possession." (p. 173)
A certain want of precision of language is, however, not wholly attributable to the hazards of translation. It is not, for example, a happy phrase
that is applied to created being as " entirely gratuitous, or rather entirely
under grace." (p. 91) Nor is it accurate to state that "my existence is
in its very essence a relationship." (p. 91) Notwithstanding the primatial
role of charity in the supernatural order, it is still untrue to claim that
justice is no longer to be defined by reference to the claims of man, -but to
the will of God; that Christian justice surpasses that of the Scribes and
Pharisees "in that it is identified with charity." (p. 117) Discussing the
Blessed Trinity, it is regrettable to speak of " dependence," (p. 171) the
possession of divinity by the Son and the Holy Spirit in a " secondary and
derivative manner." (p. 205); or to say "they are not three identical
persons, if each has a unique nature," (p. 209) or to refer to "the divine
processions like unity and divinity." (p. 211)
To decry such ambiguities of language is not to engage in word-splitting.
From their character it is clear that they touch upon fundamentals. The
very dignity of Theology imposes upon it the obligation of a precision that
must be carried over even into non-systematic expositions of theological
matters. As the author himself so clearly puts -the case: " To despise
theology is only to introduce a poor theology." (p. 195) Certainly it
would be totally unfounded to suggest that Fr. Danielou, because of a
few isolated phrases, despises theology. But the very nature of this work
does point to a deeper area, since it inevitably brings into play the author's
attitude towards the nature of theology. Specifically with regard to what
may be designated as theology's " epistemological canons,'' this book raises
questions.
The author from the outset proposes to foster love of the Bible without
depreciating theology, the study of theology, the study of theology without
neglecting mysticism. The rationalistic excesses of speculative theologians,
the consequent dislocation of theological questions from the cast their
Scriptural fonts demand, the interested promotion of " systems " to the
detriment of the pursuit of sanctity through theology, afford the occasion
for seeing as a danger the divorce of the three levels noted. The author
admirably serves the cause of their unification, the need for the scriptural
orientation of theological thought, the kerygmatic character of ..
But it is to be pointed out that it is the one theology in its total dignity as
Sacred Doctrine, Wisdom, to which it belongs to reflect upon its revealed
principles as such; to maintain its own relevance to sanctity, as a science
that is practical; and as speculative, to seek to deepen the understanding
of mystery, with all the powers of reason that it can command as its

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BRIEF NOTICES

ministers. Apparently for the author, theology, as it has been, means
primarily speculative theology. To it he pays the highest homage of
recognizing the service made of it even by the magisterium of the Church.
Yet because of the excesses mentioned, it is apparent that he sees theology,
as it ought to be, as something quite different, indifferent indeed to
" conceptual instruments " distinctive of different theologians and their
"system." (p. fllO)
Instead of being taken as the " sum total of speculation on the datum of
Revelation," theology is to be taken in its strictest sense, concerned solely
with God, in Nature and Persons. (p. 203) Reveloping its mode of procedure regarding the Trinity, Fr. Danielou would have it be a faithful
repetition of the history of the revelation of the mystery, and an echo of
the tentative formulations concerning the Divine Persons that are afforded
in the history of dogma. Subsequently, the various analogies, as conceptual
instruments, would be employed. In discussing these analogies, it would
see:(ll that he assigns their inadequacy to express the mystery to this, that
they are arbitrary, subjectively significant, but rather irrelevant to the
divine reality to which they are referred. In the tensions that the author
has seen among the various levels of knowing God, it is apparent that it
is speculative theology that is expendable to the search for harmony and
the achievement of sanctity. And speculative theology is largely identified
with " systems."
Currently the depreciation of systems both in theology and philosophy
finds widespread, vocal support among Christians. Many will echo Fr.
Danielou's sentiments, defending the legitimacy of expressing Revelation
in terms of Greek philosophy, while yet hoping that the same thing will
be done in terms of other cultures; (p. 197) echoing his hope that the
theologia perennis will give rise to new syntheses. (p. 211) But is it a
question of " legitimacy "? Are the intelligible values of Revelaticn utterly
indifferent in their expression to any so-called system of human thought
whatsoever? Are these expressions no more than "conceptual" instruments? Is it a question of systems at all?
Sacred Theology is one intellectual habit; rightly exercised, the Vatican
Council attests, it yields a fruitful understanding of revealed mysteries.
In its search, in all its functions, it uses the resources of human reason; in
its speculative phase, it will be fruitful in its analogies to the extent that
it uses the best that reason can administer to this service. Neither seeking,
nor intending to dispel the essential obscurity of Faith, Theology has a right
and an obligation to recognize the evidence, the certitude of the truths,
the principles that reason provides, the validity of the canons of thought
and method that reason must follow. It is precisely such certitude that
constitutes the aptitude of natural truths to serve speculative theology
fruitfully, not only in its purely deductive, strictly scientific role, but also
in its reflection upon revealed principles, in examining the harmony and

BRIEF NOTICES

405

meaning within and among mysteries, which if incomprehensible are not
unintelligible. While recognizing the ineffability of the mystery of the
Trinity, for example, theology can and should be certain that the exposition
of the Divine Processions cannot be expressed in any save in terms of the
immanent operations of intelligence and love. Such analogies are fruitful
in what they affirm; they are inadequate, not because they are arbitrary,
but because the divine reality exceeds their mode of signifying. While
recognizing in all its analogous considerations of divine things the infinite
distance between the analogates, theology has a right and an obligation to
be aware that analogy is not pure equivocation. When it indicates the
intelligible .order in the elements of mystery, or affirms that a mystery
involves non-contradiction because it is not unintelligible, it must be aware
of its own justification. A first step towards such an awareness· is a recognition oJ the absolute values to which the native power of the human intelligence is oriented; to employ philosophical truths and above all first
principles, not as slogans of systems, but as founded and grounded in being
itself, and ultimately in Divine Being. The order which St. Thomas'
Summa places in the consideration of Divine Truth is not to be adhered to
out of loyalty to a system, but out of conviction that the intelligibility of
the Truth itself demands such as order.
Theology is a habit, distinct from Faith, distinct from mystical knowledge. It is Wisdom to which it pertains to judge concerning Divine
Realities, not by way of connaturality as does the Gift of the Holy Spirit,
but by way of knowledge, acquired by study and discipline. (Summa
Theol., I, q. 1, a. 6, ad 3) The judgment proper to such wisdom is not
intended as a subjection of divine things to the dominance of reason, but
it is the subjection of human reason to the service of Faith. That subjection
demands, as one element at least, a domination of reason over its own
resources and powers. This it can do, not in the name of any system, but
in the name of truth to which the One God of Truth has ordered it. Neither
God nor Revelation needs theology, but man does. That need will be fully
served to the degree that man comes to a deeper understanding not only
that certain truths are revealed, or how they have been revealed, but also
how they are true. (Cf. IV Quodl., q. 9, a. 3) The role that natural truths
can serve in this task will never be complete if such truths are considered
as mere conceptual instruments; if the order and intelligiblity that can
be perceived in the realm of dogma is adjudged arbitrary, and less desirable
than an historico-positivist cataloging of dogmatic truth.

T. c. O'BRIEN, 0. P.
Dominican House of Philosophy,
Dover, Mass.

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BRIEF NOTICES

Dogmatic Theology. Vol. H. Christ's Church. By G. VAN NooRT. Translated by John J. Castelot, S. S. and William R. Murphy, S. S. Westminster: Newman, 1957. Pp. 456. $7.00.
This second volume of a projected ten volume translation and revision of
Msgr. Van Noort's work is divided into two main sections. The Church
viewed from outside, apologetics, is the first part. It deals with the founding
of. the Church, its nature, the properties of the Church and the marks.
Section two treats the Church viewed from inside, dogma, and deals with
the Mystical Body, members of the Church, the Pope, the bishops, Church
and State. There is an appendix on the primacy text in Matthew and three
sets of indexes.
The deserved praise and slight censure in our review of volume one
(THE THOMIST, XIX, July 1956, p. 410 sq.) is valid for this present work.
We would note regarding this volume that the well-written preface anticipates almost every objection, and would serve as a critical review. The
bibliographies, general and particular, are excellently contemporary; and the
revising translators have introduced (if not always digested) into the text
and footnotes worthy recent contributions to theological thought.
This reviewer would wish that in view of recent development the revision
were carried still further, and that the entire work would have been
made dogmatic with the apologies inserted as arguments of aptness or illustration. How can we adequately discuss the properties and marks of the
Church from the outside when they flow from the very nature of the
Church, Christ's Mystical Body? We do, however, realize that this might
call for a fundamental revision of the very order of the whole set, for the
Church would be considered after Christology.
Since the" slogan" (that is what it is called), "Outside the Church there
is not salvation," is discussed in the dogmatic part, it might have been
well to translate the axiom double-meaningly: " Without the Chmch
there is no salvation." A more explicit use of the stated, (but not enough
applied) "membership in desire " would have clarified several issues. For
example, note four on page Sl68 should or could read: " they are not
actually members, but members in desire."
The chapter on Church and State, which leans heavily on Bender,
scientifically and truthfully leaves many an unanswered question after the
clear presentation of principles. One might wonder, however, why a work
that has faced and professed a solution or solutions to other problems of
history has ignored the doctrinal problem of Boniface VIII and Church and
State relation. Undoubtedly the fine terminology of the Church's "Precedence" rather than the State's indirect " Subjection " is an excellent
clarification.
A generation that might be inclined to substitute statistics for judgment
might well be grateful for the statistics given in the text and notes concern-

BRIEF NOTICES

407

ing the marks of the Church. But some may be confused when they find
on page 179 the text saying that Calvinism flourished, while Calvinists are
ignored in the list of statistics.
The book is beautifully, but perhaps too expensively, set up. (There is,
however, a :flaw on page
does the quote end?).
Fathers Castelot and Murphy and the publisher deserve grateful praise
and hopeful encouragement for their work accomplished and projected.
JuNIPER

CUMMINGS, O.F.M.Conv.

Aaaumption Seminary,
Chaaka. Minneaota.

The Doctrine of Eternal Punishment. By IIARRY BUis. Philadelphia:
Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1948. Pp. 148. $2.75.

This work on the doctrine of hell by an American Protestant theologian
is an historical study of the dogma as expressed in Sacred Scripture and
in Christian theological writing, Catholic and Protestant, through the
centuries. Although the author writes as a historian, the book is not merely
a chronological collection of texts. There is matter here of interest to the
speculative theologian, particularly in the arguments in defense of the
orthodox teaching of eternal punishment against universalism, which is
proposed in varying degrees of explicitness by such influential Protestant
theologians as Emil Brunner, Karl Barth, and Paul Tillich, and against
annihilationism, defended by the Russian Orthodox thinker, Nicholas
Berdyaev.
There are occasional ambiguities in the representation of the Catholic
position. For example, the statement in the Preface that there are some
in the Roman Catholic Church who question the doctrine of eternal punishment which is " commonly accepted teaching," suggests that this is a
matter open to dispute. Deficiencies of this kind are surely outweighed
by the array of Scriptural and Patristic evidence for the orthodox doctrine
and the cogent discussion of contemporary perversions of the revealed
teaching. The value of the book as a scholarly effort, however, is weakened
by failure to go to primary sources. The quotations from the Fathers, for
example, although they are most important sources for the belief of the
early Church, are for the most part taken from Pusey's What is of Faith as
to Everlasting Punishment. St. Thomas is subjected to this kind of treatment also. The one quotation attributed to him is taken from the New
Schaff-Herzog Encycyclopedia of Religious Knowledge and no clue is given
as to the actual locus in St. Thomas' own works. This would not be serious,
except for the fact that in this case the statement is taken out of context
and used to put St. Thomas in the unhappy company of Tertullian who
considers hell to be a beautiful sight to the redeemed. The difference

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between the representation of Thomistic doctrine and what in fact it is,
is subtle enough to make the misunderstanding understandable, but big
enough to make it harmful.
The author begins with a study of the Old Testament. Even without the
" apocryphal " II Esdras and II Maccabees he finds enough texts, principally from the Psalms, to support the thesis that there is in the Old
Testament the beginning of a differentiation between the lot of
unbeliever and that of the believer in the afterlife, although he does not
find in these passages any direct teaching in re_gard to the eternal punishment of unbelievers. In a separate chapter on the Intertestamental Period,
he presents texts from II Esdras and II Maccabees which confirm the
differentiation. It is pointed out that the Rabbinical teaching at the time
of Christ was of ptmishment for sin after death. This is taken to be a
development of Biblical principles.
Turning to the New Testament, the author substantiates his claim that
the bulk of the statements concerning hell are from Christ Himself. If the
Old Testament passages were sufficiently unclear concerning the everlastingness of punishment to permit diversity among the Rabbinical schools, Christ
is not ambiguous on this point. The principal conclusion drawn from this
Scriptural exegesis is that the orthodox doctrine of inspiration and the
doctrine of eternal punishment stand 6r fall together. The only way to
escape the doctrine of eternal punishment is to deny the infallibility of
Sacred Scripture.
The next part of this book is concerned with the history of the doctrine
in extra-Biblical Christian writings. The interest here lies not merely in the
collection of quotations but in what they suggest: that the post-Reformation reactionary denial of the teaching is at least in part a denial of the
caricature of revealed doctrine )Vhich had been so widely disseminated in
the medieval and reformation eras. The naive lack of recognition of the
metaphorical nature of the language used in the Bible produced absurdities
which the more sophisticated modem mentality naturally rejects. The
Catholic reader might, in objection to his claim that even in the nineteenth
century the Roman Catholic Church continued to propagate a.n extremely
physical version of hell, point out that the Church has defined nothing
regarding the temperature and furniture of that region. Intellectual
honesty, however, demands the recognition of the existence of injudicious
and grotesque writing on this and other theological subjects by Catholics
who are more zealous than speculative by temperament, often accepted by
non-Catholics as authoritative spokesmen for the Church. The burden of
guilt, in this matter is, not to be borne only by over-imaginative Calvinists
and Swedenborgians.
Mr. Buis does not hesitate to challenge the theological double-talk about
hell by such neo-Orthodox writers as Emil Brunner, who apparently
manages unblushingly to hold two contradictory propositions as· true at
the same time. His answers to the universalist and annihilationist theories

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are cogent and to the point. For example, it is pointed out, in almost
Thomistic fashion, in regard to the universalist doctrine that sooner or
later all will be saved, that a merely subjective reference of an act is not
sufficiently indicative of its weight. The objective reference of a personal
act must be considered, and this consideration reveals the sentimentalism
of the claim that " a just God would not give infinite punishment for a
finite sin." Another argument proposed against universalism is that the
denial of eternal punishment is inevitably connected with the denial of
other important Christian doctrines, e. g., of the atonement, of the divinity
of Christ (without the atonement there is no need that men's Savior be
more than a man) , and of Biblical inspiration. If the subtlety and originality of the great modern Protestant theologians are missing here, there
is nevertheless a keen logic which goes directly to the heart of the problem,
a refreshing contrast to the maze of over-sophisticated ambivalence characteristic of so much Protestant theological work done today.
MARY

F. DALY

Archbishop Cushing College,
Brookline, M aaaachusetta.

De Sacramentis in Genere. By W. VAN Roo, S. J. Rome: Gregorian
University, 1957. Pp. 390 with index and bibliography.
This is not strictly a textbook of the theology of the sacraments in
general. It was designedly written for students studying for the Licence
in Sacred Theology at the Gregorianum. The material included and the
order followed have been selected for that purpose. It thus proceeds in
thesis form with prenotes, statement of the question and resolution. Findings of recent scholarship, especially of an historical nature, have been
incorporated. Clear definition of terms, fixing of the problems and the
opinions thereon, together with pertinent theological notes attached to the
theses, are valuable elements in the structure of this work.
Several personal products have also been included by the author, such
as his definition of a sacrament and the theory concerning· the instrumental
causality of the sacraments. Many features found in a more complete
treatment of the sacraments in general, especially concerning individual
sacraments, have been eliminated by the author in order to conform to
his purpose. Only the principal aspects and major questions of this tract
have been included.
The book is divided into questions and then into articles: I: What is a
Sacrament (its definition and nature); II: the Causes of the Sacraments
(their institution, the role of the Church, the power and intention, faith
and probity of the minister, the subject of the sacraments); III: the Effects
of the Sacraments (sacramental grace and the character); IV: the Efficacy

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of the Sacraments (ex opere operata, instrumental causality); V: the
Number of the Sacraments. The resolution of this material is summarized
throughout in the statement of eight theses.
In the first question there is an extensive survey of the evolution of the
terms " mystery " and " sacrament," and the definition of a sacrament.
The author's own fuller definition (which relates to his theory of sacramental causality) states: "A sacrament of the New Law is an exterior act
of cult by which Christ tln:ough His Church and His minister, in representing the mysteries of His flesh, signifies and effects ez opere operata
the sanctification of a man aptly disposed." {p. 63)
The second question clearly and fully exposes . the elements of the
controversy concerning the institution of the sacraments. The thesis
defended is the immediate institution by Christ who, however, did not
determine immutably all those things required for validity in the essential
rites. The author notes that the question is still open to judgment and
lacks a certain consensus among theologians. His interesting analysis of
the role of the Church in the sacraments-which differs from that of her
ministers-is completed in his explanation of the causality of the sacraments. A helpful note is the description of the development of theological
teaching on the intention of the minister.
In the third question the author holds for the opinion that sacramental
grace is a special mode or perfection of habitual grace requiring actual
graces. The teaching on the character reveals its nature and efficacy,
although it is .pointed out that the objective efficacy of the sacraments
of the New Law ez opere operata does not depend upon the sacramental
character as upon an active power.
The major tract of this work, in the fourth question, discusses instrumental causality in the sacraments. The issue is clearly singled out and
the three principal theological positions stated: the Thomistic theory of
physical, perfective causality, moral causality (Franzelin), intentional dispositive causality (Billot). The author merely states his rejection of the
Thomistic teaching in the arguments .of those holding for an exclusive
moral causality, quoting the words of Lennerz. He refutes moral causality
on the ground that it is not efficient but final causality. The opinion of
Billot is more carefully analyzed, though ultimately rejected for its serious
inherent defects.
Father Van Roo's own theory is contained in the statement: " A
sacrament of the New Law is a true instrumental cause by which Christ,
in manifesting His divine command (imperium), effects ez opere operata
sacramental grace itself in a subject who places no obstacle." (p. 306}
For him a sacrament is an instrument in the genus of sign and not an
instrument of art, a conventional sign which by the ordination of the one
instituting leads to a knowledge of something else. In the case of a
sacrament the sign is an instrument by ·which the divine command is
presented. God works His effects, not by applying the natural powers of

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secondary causes in the manner of art, but by manifesting His command,
which is unlimited in power. Instrumental power is formally a relation.
(p.
A sacrament is therefore a sign which is related to the divine
command. As the sign is sevenfold, each sacramental sign indicates the
way the divine command operates its effects of grace. The true causality
of the sacraments is thus explained: the external act manifests the internal
act; " although God is supremely independent of every instrument so that
He can infuse grace invisibly, yet, if God wishes to manifest His operation,
if He wishes to confer grace in a human way, He must use a sign. In the
sacramental economy, as in the whole mystery of the Incarnation, the
external act, the sign of the divine command, efficaciously attains to the
very effect of grace." (pp. 880-881)
Thus the instrumental power of the sacraments is the very divine
ordination impressed in them by divine institution and by the application
of the minister according to the intention of Christ. (p. 848) As instruments they have their own action and modify the action of the principal
agent. The author holds that this latter consists in manifesting the divine
command or representing the mysteries of Christ's flesh and the whole
mystery of salvation through Christ in this economy. Moreover, he holds
that these signs hear upon the effect in that they confer the grace which
they signify.
It is difficult to see where and how the author makes the step from the
sacraments as instruments which manifest the divine command-whose
whole being as signs is a relation to the divine imperium-to instruments
which contain the grace they confer and cause it immediately or directly
produce the effect. This theory does not seem to avoid the basic objections
levelled against the theories of moral and of intentional causality, as well
as the charge of a formal extrinsic causality and not a true efficient
causality with respect to the term of the effect or the grace produced in the
soul. No authority other than the author's is cited in support of this
theory, although the teaching of de Ia Taille is too germane to be passed
over without mention.
The treatment of the number of the sacraments in the fifth question lists
the errors of the Reformers and states the positive teaching on this point.
The author shows that the fact of seven sacraments is evidenced in the
seven sacred rites always present in the .Church, while the notion and
properties and effects of the sacraments were late in being clarified.
This book is written in a clear and easy Latin style and will not prove
a hazard for students. It is a concise and orderly exposition, accomplishing
its purpose as an aid for Licence candidates. It will be profitable for all
students of the theology of the sacraments in general.
NICHOLAS HALLIGAN,

Dominican HOU$e of Studies,
Washington, D. 0.

0. P.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Aradi, Zsolt, Pius XI: The Pope and the Man. Garden City: Hanover
House, 1958. Pp. Q6Q with index. $4.50.
Bowman, A. A. The Absurdity of Christianity and Other Essays. New
York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. 6Q. $.75.
Calvin, John. On the Christian Faith. New York: Liberal Arts Press,
1958. Pp. 246 with index. $.95.
Cushman, Robert E. Therapeia (Plato's Conception of Philosophy).
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1958. Pp. 322 with
index. $6.00.
Cuttaz, Canon F. (Angeline Bouchard, tr.) Our Life of Grace. Chicago:
Fides Publishers, 1958. Pp. 327. $6.95.
Diringer, David. The Illuminated Book: Its History and Production. New
York: Philosophical Library, 1958. Pp. 524 with index. $25.00.
Gardeil, 0. P., H. D. (John A. Otto, tr.) Introduction to the Philosophy of
St. Thomas Aquinas. Vol. ll-Cosmology. St. Louis: Herder Book
Co., 1958. Pp. 218 with index. $3.75.
Guste, Robert. For Men of Good Will (Segregation and the Archbishop of
New Orleans). New Orleans: Confraternity of Christian Doctrine,
1958. Pp. 71. $.35.
Hayen, S. J., Andre. La Communication de l'tl:tre d'apres Saint Thomas
d'Aquin. Paris:
de Brouwer, 1957. Pp. 191. 120 F.
Huysmans, J. K. (Keene Wallis, tr.) Down There (A Study in Satanism).
New York: University Books, 1958. Pp. 339. $5.00.
Jung, Carl Gustav. (R. F. C. Hull, tr.) Psychology and Religion: East and
West. New York: Pantheon Books, 1958. Pp. 699 with index. $6.00.
Lefebvre, C. SS. R., Eugene. A Land of Miracles. Quebec: Ste. Anne's
Bookshop, 1958. Pp. 185. $2.00.
Macintyre, A. C. The Unconscious. New York: Humanities Press, 1958.
Pp. 100 with index. $2.50.
Margenau, Henry. St. Thomas and the Physics of 1958: A Confrontation.
Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1958. Pp. 80. $2.50.
Mora, .Jose F. Unamuno: Bosquejo de una Filosofia. Buenos Aires:
Editorial Sudamericana, 1958. Pp. 141.
Oberman, Heiko A. A_rchbishop Thomas Bradwardine (A Fourteenth
Century Augustinian) . Utrecht: Drukkerij en Uitgevers Mij., 1958.
Pp. 246 with index. f. 10.
O'Brien, C. SS. R., Kevin J. 1'he Proximate Aim of Education. Milwaukee:
Bruce Publishing Co., 1958. Pp. 267 with index. $5.00.
Perreault, 0. P., A.-M. Les Echelles de Mesure en Psychologie de la
Sensation. Rome: Pontificium Athenaeum Angelicum, 1957. Pp. 84.

BOOKS RECEIVED

413

Peters, R. S. The Concept of Motivation. New York: Humanities Press,
1958. Pp. 166 with index.
Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Convention of the Catholic Theological
$3.50.
Society of America. Pp.
Professoren Philosophischen Institutes in Salzburg. Salzburger Jahrbuch
fur Philosophie und Psychologie. Salzburg: Philosophisches Institut,
1958. Pp.
DM
Rothstein, Jerome. Communicat-ion, Organization and Science. Indian Hills,
Col.: Falcon's Wing Press, 1958. Pp. 206. $3.50.
Rowley, H. H. (Ed.) Eleven Years of Bible Bibliography. Indian Hills,
Col.: Falcon's Wing Press, 1958. Pp. 804 with index. $7.50.
Siegle, Peter E. New Directions in Liberal Education for Executives. White
Plains: Fund for Adult Education, 1958. Pp. 74. $.25.
Siwek, S. J., Paul. The Two Stigmatists: Padre Pio and Theresa Neumann.
(An Answer to Fr. Carty). Reprint from the Revue d'Universite
d'Ottawa. New York: Fordham University, 1958. Pp.
Spinoza, Baruch. On the Improvement of the Understanding. (The Library
of the Liberal Arts, No. 67) New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958.
Pp. 60. $.50.
Ullmann, Stephen. The Principles of Semantics. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1958. Pp. 346 with index. $10.00.
Welte, Bernard. La Foi Philosophique chez Jaspers et Saint Thomas
d'Aquin. Bruges: Desclee de Brouwer, 1958. Pp. 290. 129 F. B.
Williamson, Claude (Compiler). Letters from the Saints. New York:
$6.00.
Philosophical Library, 1958. Pp.
Windelband, W. History of Ancient Philosophy. New York: Dover
Publications, 1958. Pp. 393 with index. $1.75.
Wolter, 0. F. M., Allen B. Summula Metaphysicae. Milwaukee: Bruce
Publishing Co., 1958. Pp. 189 with index. $3.50.