THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS:

THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH

Publishers:

VoL. XXII

The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

JANUARY, 1959

No.1

ST. THOMAS AND THE ENCYCLICAL
MYSTIC/ CORPORIS

C

scholars are universally grateful to his Holiness,
Pope Pius XII, for the many clear and penetrating
statements which he issued on both dogmatic and moral
problems. It would be difficult to point to any one document
as the most valuable and timely contribution to come from his
pen; however, it is certain that the Encyclical Letter, Mystici
Corporis, is among the most significant pronouncements made
by his Holiness. Besides having given us a profound and
scholarly treatise on a controversial topic, the Holy Father has
succeeded in establishing a beautiful and delicate balance
between the internal and external bonds which unite men to
Christ in His Mystical Body. Therein lies the principal merit
of this great Encyclical.
In developing his treatise, the Pope is very generous in his
praise of St. Thomas:
ATHOLIC

1

MARTIN

HOPKINS

You are aware, Venerable Brothers, of the brilliant language by
the masters of Scholastic Theology, and chiefly by the Angelic and
Common Doctor, when treating this question; and you know that
the reasons advanced by Aquinas are a faithful reflexion of the mind
and writings of the Holy Fathers, who after all merely repeated and
commented on the inspired word of Sacred Scripture. 1
In the light of this eulogy, it would be incongruous that we
should find any irreconcilable discrepancies between M ystici
Corporis and the doctrine of St. Thomas. We should have no
anxiety, then, in submitting the works of the " Common
Doctor "-in particular, his tract on the capital grace of Christ
in the Third Part of the Summa-to a critical comparison with
the papal Encyclical. It is the aim of this paper to institute
such a comparison in order to offer solutions to certain real
difficulties which have arisen especially with regard to St.
'J'homas's notion of membership in the Mystical Body in the
wake of Jfystici Corporis. The following four points which His
Holiness makes in the Encyclical will provide the basis for this
companson:

1. The Roman Catholic Church and the Mystical Body of
Christ are one and the same thing; i. e., they are coextensive.
In fact, His Holiness offers the term " Mystical Body " as an
ideal definition of the Church of Christ. 2 If Mystici Corporis
has left any doubt as to the identity of these two terms, the
Encyclical, Humani Generis, has emphatically cleared it up:
Some say they are not bound by the doctrine, explained in our
Encyclical letter of a few years ago and based on the sources of
Revelation, which teaches that the Mystical Body of Christ and
the Roman Catholic Church are one and the same thing .... These
and like errors, it is clear, have crept in among certain of our sons
who are deceived by imprudent zeal for souls or by false science.3
2. The soul of the Mystical Body is the Holy Ghost. 4 We
1 AAS. XXXV
(1948), pp. 198-248. English
by National Catholic
Welfare Conference. (Washington, D. C., 1948), n. 85. This translation is used
throughout.
• Ibid., n. 18.
• AAS. XXXXII (1950), p. 571. English translation by Paulist Press. (New
York, 1950) nn. 42, 44.
'Myatici Corporis, n. 56.

ST. THOMAS AND THE ENCYCLICAL

"MYSTIC!

CORPORIS"

8

cannot admit that the body and soul of the Church represent
two different societies with diverse memberships. As His
Holiness says:
For this reason We deplore and condemn the pernicious error of
those who conjure up from their fancies an imaginary Church, a
kind of Society that finds its origin and growth in charity, to which
they somewhat contemptuously oppose another, which they call
juridical. But this distinction, which they introduce, is baseless....
There can, then, be no real opposition or conflict between the invisible mission of the Holy Spirit and the juridical commission of
Ruler and Teacher received from Christ. Like body and soul in us,
they complement and perfect each other, and have their source in
our one Redeemer.... G
8. True membership in the Mystical Body demands that one
possess three conditions: baptism of water, profession of the
true faith, and submission to the authority of the Church. To
be lacking in one or more of these qualifications excludes a
person from membership. 6 Here the Pope is merely repeating
the legislation of the Code of Canon Law:
By baptism a person becomes a subject of the Church of Christ
with all the rights and duties of a Christian, unless, in so far as
rights are concerned, there is some obstacle impeding the bond of
communion with the Church, or a censure inflicted by the Church. 7
4. There is definite evidence that His Holiness intends to
identify the Mystical Body (i. e., the Roman Catholic Church)
with the Church Militant. In the passage already cited from
Humani Generis, he specifies Roman ·catholic Church, the term
" Roman " ordinarily limiting the extension of Church to the
visible portion. In Mystici Corporis, he explicitly limits his
remarks on the Mystical Body to the Church Militant; 8 later
on in the Encyclical, he adds:
For nothing more glorious, nothing nobler, nothing surely more
ennobling can be imagined than to belong to the Holy, Catholic,
Apostolic, and Roman Church. In that Church we become members
6
8

Ibid., n. 64.
Ibid., n. 22.

Cf. C. I. C., Can. 87.

"Mystici Corporis, n. I.

4

MARTIN

HOPKINS

of one Body that deserves all veneration, are guided by one
supremely eminent Head; in it we are filled with one divine Spirit;
in it we are nourished during our earthly exile with one doctrine
and one Bread of Angels, until at last we enter into the one, unending blessedness of heaven. 9
POINT

I: Identification of the Roman Catholic Church
with the Mystical Body of Christ

In comparing the first of these four points with the doctrine
of St. Thomas, we find perfect agreement. At the very beginning of his tract on the capital grace of Christ, he states: " tota
Ecclesia dicitur unum corpus mysticum per similitudinem ad
naturale corpus hominis." 10 A little later on, he puts the two
terms together, thus: corpus Ecclesiae mysticum. 11 Like the
Pope, then, St. Thomas identifies the Church with the Mystical
Body: for him the terms are coextensive. Both authorities use
the words Church and Mystical Body interchangeably, and
they shall be used thus throughout this paper. 12
PoiNT

II:

The Holy Ghost as the Soul of the Mystical Body

In the Summa Theologica, St. Thomas describes the Holy
Ghost as the " heart " of the Church:
... but the heart has a certain hidden influence. And hence the
Holy Ghost is likened to the heart, since He invisibly quickens and
unifies the Church; but Christ is likened to the Head in His visible
nature in which man is set over manY

That this term has the same force as " soul," however, is
evident from St. Thomas's treatise on the Apostles' Creed,
where he actually uses the word soul:
• Ibid., n. 89. Italics mine.
Summa Theol., IU, q. 8, a. l.
11 Ibid.; aa. 3, 4.
12 This identification
of the Church and the Mystical Body of Christ must not
be confused with the fact, to be treated under the next two points, that St. Thomas
gives a much broader extension to the two terms than does the Sovereign Pontiff.
13 Summa Theol., lac cit., a. l, ad.
3. " ... sed cor habet qmimdam influentiam
occcltam. Et ideo cordi comparatur Spiritus Sanctus, qui invisibiliter Ecclesiam
10

ST. THOMAS AND THE ENCYCLICAL

"MYSTIC!

CORPORIS"

5

We see that in a man there are one soul and one body; and of his
body there are many members. So also the Catholic Church is one
body and has different members. The soul which animates this
body is the Holy Ghost. 14

Both the Pope and St. Thomas describe the Holy Ghost as
the internal bond uniting each member to Christ and to each
other. The Pope speaks of this bond as comprising faith, hope
and charity through the " communication of the Spirit o!
Christ" (the Holy Ghost, Who is) "the channel through which
flow into all the members of the Church those gifts, powers and
extraordinary graces found superabundantly in the Head as in
their source .... " 15 In regard to the first two points, then, it
is clear that there is no disagreement between the papal
Encyclical and the teaching of the Angelic Doctor. It is on
the third and fourth points that discrepancies appear, to the
extent that one writer has affirmed that St. Thomas " would
have written quite differently if he had the papal encyclical of
Pius XII to guide him." 16
PoiNT III:

Members of the Mystical Body

In general, St. Thomas includes more individuals in his
concept of the Church than does the Pope, as will be seen from
the comparison which follows: 17
vivificat et unit; capiti autem comparatur ipse Christus secundum visibilem
naturam, secundum quam homo hominibus praefertur."
u Opusc. VII, a. 9. " Sicut vidimus quod in uno homine est una anima et unum
corpus, et tamen sunt diversa membra ipsius; ita Ecclesia catholica est unum corpus,
et habet diversa membra. Anima autem quae hoc corpus vivificat est Spiritus.
Sanctus."
16 Mystici CorpOTis, n. 77. With regard to the use of "body" and" soul" in the
Baltimore Catechism cf. The Homiletic and Pastoral Review, LI (1950-1951), p. 86.
C£. also: Joseph C. Fenton in The American Ecclesiastical Review, "The Use of the
Terms Body and Soul with Reference to the Catholic Church," CX (1944), pp. 4857; "Father Journet's Concept of the Church," CXXVII (1952), pp. 870-880.
18 John L. Murphy, The Living Christ (Milwaukee, 1956), p. 51. Cf. also pp.
52-58.
17 The fir8t two of these points will be taken up in detail later, with relevant
texts.

MARTIN

COMPARATIVE

HOPKINS

EXTENSION OF THE TERJ.VI MYSTICAL BODY
(=ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH)

ST. THOMAS

Pros XII

1. Extends membership in the Mystical

l. Limits membership in the Mystical

Body to the angels and blessed souls in
heaven, and to the souls in purgatory.

Body to the Church Militant.

2. Includes the just of the Old Testament, along with the faithful of the New
Testament, in the Mystical Body.

2. Identifies the Mystical Body with
the Catholic Church, which came into
existence only with the death of Christ
on the Cross.

8. Includes all who possess charity,
without qualification. Hence, baptism of
desire admits a person to the Mystical
Body, and every one who is actually in
the state of sanctifying grace must be
included therein, whether Catholic, material heretic, or sincere pagan upon
making a perfect act of contrition.'" In
fact, St. Thomas admits incorporation
into the Church mentaliter as well as
corporaliter.10

8. Insists on baptism of water, together
with true faith and submission to Church
authority, as indispensable conditions of
membership. While granting that one
who lacks one or more of these conditions may be " unsuspectingly related "
to the Mystical Body " in desire and resolution," he adds that " they remain
deprived of so many precious gifts and
helps from heaven, which one can enjoy
only in the Catholic Church." ••

4. While listing faith as a title of membership, he is loath to admit sinners
(i.e., those with faith but not charity)
into the Church. He classifies them as
"potential " members, though, conceding that they may also be called " imperfect " (actual) members because , of
their unformed faith, united to Christ
only secundum quid. 21

4. Grants sinners who possess the three
conditions the status of members. His
Holiness nowhere concedes varying " degrees " of membership in the Mystical
Body, though he intimates that the
amount of life among the members may
vary.••

5. Designates those who lack both faith
and charity as potential members, with

5. Does not follow St. Thomas in the
use of the term " potential " members.

Summa Theol., III, q. 8, a. 8.
Ibid., q. 69, a. 5, ad 1.
so Mystici Corporis, n. 100.
21 Summa Theol., Ill, q. 8 a. 8, ad 2. In Ill Sent., d. 18 q. 2, a. 2, qcla. 2, sol.
2 ad 2 St. Thomas refers to sirmers as members of the Mystical Body aequivoce.
•• Mystici Corporis, n. 28: "It is the Saviour's infinite mercy that allows place
in His Mystical Body here for those whom He did not exclude from the banquet
of old (Cf. Matt. 9: 11). For not every sin, however grave and enormous it be, is
such as to sever a man automatically from the body of the Church, as does schism
or heresy or apostasy. Men may lose charity and divine grace through sin and so
become incapable of supernatural merit, and yet not be deprived of all life, if they
hold on to faith and Christian hope. . . ."
18
19

s•.r. THOMAS

AND THE ENCYCLICAL

the exception of those who are already
damned; these latter totalitcr desinunt
ease membra Christi.•• This phrase, together with its context, indicates that
St. Thomas is taking this potentiality as
something very positive--a quasi-membership-based upon (a) the merits of
Christ, which are sufficient to save all
men; and (b) man's free will."'

"MYS'l'ICI

CORPORIS"

7

All individuals who lack any one of the
three conditions are classed simply as
non-members, even though they possess
the extraordinary " relationship " to the
Church mentioned above. In other
w01·ds, the Pope does not consider this
relationship either as a type of membership in the Church or as its equivalent,
for he expresses the desire that they
"enter into Catholic unity," since otherwise " they cannot be sure of their
salvation." ••

In the light of this comparison, it becomes clear that the
Pope and St. Thomas are using different foundations for their
divisions of membership. St. Thomas is taking the capital
grace of Christ-especially charity-for l1is foundation; the
Pope is using the three conditions mentioned above. To put it
another way, St. Thomas defines membership in the Mystical
Body in terms of the internal bond (or invisible element),
whereas Pius XII designates membership in terms of the external bond (or visible element).
St. Thomas, it must be remembered;is not speaking formally
of the Church in the Third Part of the Summa; in fact, he has
left us no strictly ecclesiological treatise. He is discussing the
capital grace of Christ and its effects. He points out that the
principal effect of the flow of Christ's grace into the souls of
men is that it constitutes Christ as their Head, and makes them
His members. Arguing from the revealed principles (I) that
Christ is the Head of all men, and (fl) that the essential,
internal basis of their union with Christ is His capital grace,
St. Thomas proceeds to evaluate His headship in terms of that
grace. Quite simply stated, the Angelic Doctor's teaching is
this: Christ's headship-and, consequently, our union with
Him-will be in proportion to the degree of habitual grace we
possess. In line with this principle, he distinguishes three classes
or degrees of union with Christ: that of the blessed in heaven
•• Summa Theol., III, q. 8, a. S.
•• Ibid., ad 1.
•• Mystici Curporis, n. 100.

8

MARTIN HOPKINS

through glory; of the faithful on earth through charity; and
finally, of those united to Him through faith alone. 26
In grouping all of these individuals together and designating
them as members of the Mystical Body of Christ, St. Thomas
is following the example of some of the early Fathers of the
Church, who frequently used the Pauline metaphor of body to
describe the internal union of the soul with Christ. In using the
term with this supposition, neither the Fathers nor St. Thomas
meant to imply that no external, juridical bond was required
for membership in the Church. They were primarily interested
in developing the inner, organic aspect of our union with the
Redeemer; they wrote as theologians, not as apologetes or
canonists. It is a fact that, ever since St. Paul applied this
figure to the Church, it has been used in a variety of senses to
express several different types of Christ's headship over
creatures. The principal types are: 27
1. The universal headship of Christ over all creatures by reason
of His divine, exemplary causality as the Word of God.
2. His headship over the whole human race by reason of having
died to save all men from original and actual sins.
3. His headship over all men who have believed, or shall believe,
in Him as the Redeemer. This includes the Jews before the
Redemption, as well as Christians after it.
4. His headship over all intellectual creatures who share in His
grace in any manner whatsoever, whether essentially (as in the case
of men), or accidentally (as in the case of the angels).
5. The strict, juridical headship of Christ, constituted by baptism of water, profession of the true faith, and submission to the
authority of the Church.

It was quite common among the Fathers of the first five
centuries to speak of the fourth type of headship as the equivalent of the Mystical Body. St. Augustine, the great expounder of the mystical relationship between Christ and His
Church, refers to the " whole assembly of Saints ... from Abel
26 As is indicated in the comparative schema, St. Thomas is inclined to classify
those who possess faith without charity (i.e. sinners) as potential members.
21 John L. Murphy, op. cit. On pp. 45 ff. Father Murphy summarizes the types.

ST. THOMAS

AND THE ENCYCLICAL

"MYSTIC!

CORPORIS"

9

down to those who shall be born to the end " as members of
Christ's body, the Church. 28 Here he is using the Pauline metaphor in a broad sense,29-the sense in which St. Thomas also
used the term. And they do so with good reason, since the term
was coined primarily to designate the internal, organic, supernatural character of the Church.
For the next seven centuries this sublime doctrine saw little
theological development; in fact, scarcely any significant progress was made until the Scholastics took up their pens in the
thirteenth century. Although he was not the only one to write
on this topic, St. Thomas has left a greater imprint on subsequent thinking and writing about the Mystical Body than any
of his contemporaries. So beautifully and extensively did he
treat of it that not only Pius XII, but other modern authors
have been quick to recognize his contribution. The Abbe Anger
has gone so far as to declare:
St. Thomas took great care never to lose sight of the doctrine of
the Mystical Body. Taking his work as a whole, particularly its
most finished, maturest part, the Summa Theologica, one finds the
Christian doctrine in all its purity set forth with precision and in
such right sense that in many instances the Council of Trent had
but to confirm the doctrine and exposition. 30

The history of the Church gives us an insight as to why St.
Thomas and his contemporaries did not develop the juridical
aspect of the Mystical Body. At that time there were few, if
zs In Ps. 90, sermo 2; PL, XXXVII, 1159.
•• Cf. John C. Gruden, The Mystical Christ (St. Louis, 1986), pp. 105, 158. He
distinguishes between quasi-proper (strict, " mystical," juridical) sense and the
figurative (broad, " metaphorical ") sense of the term Mystical Body. In a paper
of this nature, it is impossible to trace the historical development of the doctrine
in any detail; nor is it necessary. This task has been ably performed by a number
of competent authors, among whom the work here referred· to-though written
seven years before the Encyclical appeared-is outstanding. Fr. Emile Mersch's
The Whole Christ (Milwaukee, 1986), Part I, is excellent for thf( development of
the concept in Sacred Scripture.
•• Abbe Anger. The Doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ According ta the
Principles of the Theology of St. Thomas. (New York, 1981), p. xvi. Cf. also J. T.
Dittoe, 0. P., "Sacramental Incorporation into the Mystical Body." THE THoMisT,
IX (1946), pp. 469-514.

10

MARTIN

HOPKINS

any, recognized material heretics. If a person denied an article
of faith or rejected the whole of Christianity, he was considered
to be a formal heretic or an apostate, guilty of sin before God. 31
\Ve can appreciate this attitude more readily when we consider
the seemingly inescapable visibility of the Church within the
civilized medieval world. Catholicism stood out as the overwhelming-virtually unique-embodiment of Christianity: the
Roman Catholic Church was Christianity. It was inconceivable
that a sincere individual, raised in such an atmosphere and
tradition, could inculpably withdrawfrom the Catholic Church,
or find God apart from it.
With regard to infidels, St. Thomas admits the possibility of
i.e., invincible ignorance of the true faith.
a negative
However, he conCludes that if such infidels die in that state,
" damnantur quidem propter alia peccata, quae sine fide remitti
non possunt." 32 Yet, he seems to be of the opinion that this
will never be the case in the concrete; for, in discussing the
question of what truths one must believe explicitly in order to
be saved, he answers with reference to the salvation
a man
brought up outside the pale of civilization:
Thus, if someone so brought up followed the direction of natural
reason in seeking good and avoiding evil, it certainly must be held
that God would either reveal to him through internal inspiration
what had to be believed, or would send some preacher of the faith
to him.S3
31 Cf. Summa Theol., II II, q. 11.
St. Thomas does not distinguish between
material and formal heretics; in fact, he concludes that pertinacious heretics are to
be put to death. But it should be carefully noted that he puts those whom modem
theologians designate " material heretics " within the Mystical Body, provided they
are in the state of grace. This is in accord with his use of grace as the foundation
of membership.
•• Ibid., q. Hl, a. 1.
•• De Vent., q. 14, a. U, ad. 1. "Si enim aliquis taliter nutritus, ductum naturalis
rationis sequeretur in appetitu boni et fuga mali, certissime est tenendum, quod
ei Deus vel per internam inspirationem revelaret ea quae sunt ad credendum
necessaria, vel aliquem fidei praedicatorem ad eum dirigeret." He lends further
weight to this conclusion when he states in the Smnma Theologiae I, H, q. 89,
a. 6 that in his first human act, a man either directs himself to his true ultimate
end (thus having baptism of desire), or else turns to a false ultimate end, thereby
committing mortal sin. In the former case, the individual would evidently fit in

ST. THOMAS AND THE ENCYCLICAL

"MYSTIC!

CORPORIS"

11

In the light of these points, it is evident that there wn.s not
a great need in the thirteenth century of delving into the
minimum external signs which a true Christian must possess.
Hence, we can see more clearly the reason why St. Thomas and
his followers devoted their attention almost exclusively to the
internal bond of the union between Christ and His members,
even to the extent of adjudicating membership in His Mystical
Body in terms of habitual grace, especially charity. For the
Scholastics, one's degree of grace provided an adequate (though,
as we can see today, not a precise) index of membership, which
-because of the nature of grace-would logically admit of
degrees.
It was not until the Protestant Reformation that the juridical
aspect of the Mystical Body was developed to a degree comparable to the progress made by the Scholastics on the internal
bond. In defending the Church against the Reformers, Catholic
apologetes-among whom St. Robert Bellarmine stands outwere obliged to concentrate on the external, visible bond of the
Mystical Body. Protestant Christianity furnished a palatable,
albeit incomplete, substitute for Catholicism, and gave rise to
a tradition which, with the passage of· time, made it possible
for large groups of sincerely erring believers (referred to now as
material heretics) to coexist in good faith with their orthodox
brethren. This shift of emphasis from the internal to the
external bond persisted down to the time of the Vatican Council
to such a degree that modern theologians have deplored the lag
in the development of the spiritual aspect of the doctririe.s•
However, the liturgical revival which the turn of the century
ushered in has been accompanied by a corresponding (perhaps
among those whom Pius XII classes as being1 "related" to the Mystical Body:
outside the Church, yet somehow united to it " in desire and resolution," and therefore capable of salvation. As we noted above, St. Thomas grants such a one the
status of a member. We shall have more to say in our conclusion about thi3
mysterious, extraordinary union with Christ by one outside of His Mystical Body.
•• Thus, Fr. Mersch speaks of a "resurgen('e" of the doctrine of the Mystical
Body, op. cit., p. 556; and Fr. Dittoe, op. cit., p. 469, refers to it as "a doctrinal
survival against naturalism and a spiritual revival in the face of indifferentism."
But see also Fr. Fenton, "An Accusation Against School Theology," American
Ecclesiastical Review, CX (1944), pp. 218-222.

MARTIN HOPKINS

one should say complementary) revival in this neglected area..
A flood of literature has appeared on the subject of the Mystical
Body-most of it sound, but some
entirely orthodox. 85 In
the Encyclical, Mystici Corporis, His Holiness corrects the
errors which have appeared. But his greatest and most enduring
contribution is the delicate, harmonious blending of the internal
with the external aspects of the mystery to give us the strict,
Pauline concept of the Church as the Body of Christ. Recognizing the great synthesis of the Fathers and Scholastics,
especially St. Thomas, the Pope integrates beautifully the
mystical elements with the juridical elements. In stressing the
unity of the Mystical Body, he shows that the visible ties
uniting the Christian to Christ, and the invisible bonds to which
they are ordered, are actually two aspects of the same organism.36 Finally, without underemphasizing the importance of the
Holy Ghost with His grace and Gifts as the soul of the Church,
His Holiness points out that membership in the strict, proper
and univocal sense is to be defined in terms of the external or
juridical bond rather than in terms of grace. 87
One can truly say that Pius XII has done for these two
aspects of the Church what St. Thomas did for sacramental
theology in carefully balancing the elements of sign and cause. 88
In fact, St. Thomas's tract on the sacraments offers a valuable
precedent to what the Pope has accomplished. Following the
medieval tradition, the Angelic Doctor distinguishes in each
sacrament between the external sign, or sacrament, and the
i11<visible grace conferred, or res. The Pope's analysis of the
•• Myatici Oorporia, n. 8.
80 Ibid., n. 64. "There can, then, be no real opposition or conflict between the
invisible mission of the Holy Spirit and the juridical commission of the Ruler and
Teacher received from Christ. Like body and soul in us, they complement and
perfect each other, and have their source in our one Redeemer, who not only said,
as He breathed on the Apostles: ' Receive ye the Holy Spirit (John !!0: 22) , but
also clearly commanded: 'As the Father hath sent me, so I send you' (John
20: 21); and again: 'He who heareth you, heareth me.' (Luke 10: 16) .'' Cf. also,
"Theology and the Laity," .Catholic Mind, Lill (1955), p. 580.
87 Mystici Corporis, n. 2!!.
88 Godfrey Diekmann, 0. S. B., "Two Approaches to the Sacraments," Worship,
XXXI (1957) , pp. 504-520;

ST. THOMAS AND THE ENCYCLICAL

"MYSTIC!

CORPORIS"

18

Mystical Body is along similar lines. Its members must have a
triple external bond: the washing with water in sacramental
baptism, public profession of the true faith, and submission to
the Supreme Pontiff. Corresponding to these external elements
is the invisible bond: the grace of justification together with the
infused virtues and Gifts, and the abiding intention of at least
being considered a member of the Church in union with the
.Pope. Finally, the state of membership in the Mystical Body
may be compared to the scholastic res et sacramentum, that
intermediate reality-sign found in each of the sacramentsespecially the indelible character of baptism, confirmation and
holy orders. 89
We must conclude, then, that St. Thomas and the Scholastics
used the terms " Church " and " Mystical Body " in one of the
analogical senses common to the pre-Reformation era. 40 To
say that the identification of Christ's headship of men through
grace with the Mystical Body is an analogical use of the term
is not to deny that Christ is the Head of all who possess grace;
it is simply stating that this headship is of a different kind from
that constituted by the triple bond spoken of by Pius XII.
Nor does it establish a conflict between the two headships, as
though the external bond were opposed to the internal bond.
The perfect Christian will possess both bonds; but the bond
which formally constitutes his membership in the Church is
the external bond. As we shall note further on, the headship
of Christ over those in the state of grace corresponds more
properly with what we term the Communion of Saints. 41
•• Summa Theol., Ill, q. 66, a. 1. Though the conferring of grace is the goal of
the sacraments, St. Thomas emphasizes that they pertain to the category of
sensible signs.
term applies only analogically to the
' 0 St. Thomas certainly recognized that
angels for he says in q. 8, a. 4 that they are members si=1itudmarie. In a. 8 he
says: " Christus est caput omnium hominum, sed secundum diversos gradus."
01 Fr. Emilio Sauras, O.P. in his work El Cuerpo Mistico de Cristo (Madrid,
1956) 2nd Ed., p. 16, distinguishes between the juridico-theological and the merely
theological aspects of the Mystical Body. However, from what he says on p. 15especially in the use he makes of the citation from the Summa Theologiae, ill,
q. 8, a. 6-it is not clear that he intends the same distinction which the Pope has
in mind in Mystici Corporis. While agreeing with Fr. Sebastian Tromp, S. J. in

14

MARTIN

HOPKINS

Now that we have the papal Encyclical to guide us, we can
readily see the same limited supposition of the term Body in
the Epistles of St. Paul, the originator of this historic metaphor.
The primary analogate is especially clear in his Epistle to the
Colossians, where the Apostle recapitulates the various headships of Christ. He brings in several different analogates (even
including Christ's headship over the demons), but emphatically
sets apart the Church as a special supposition by the phrase,
"Again, He is the Head of His Body, the Church .... " 43
Without reading too far between the lines, we can see St. Paul
insisting on the three conditions laid down by Pius XII. In the
next chapter, the Apostle declares:
For you were buried together with Him in baptism, and in Him
also rose again through faith in the working of God Who raised
Him from the dead. 48

A little further on, after warning the Colossians against Judaizing Christians, he concludes with these remarks directed
against false, self-appointed teachers:
Let no one cheat you who takes pleasure in self-abasement and
worship of the angels, and enters vainly into what he has not seen,
puffed up by his mere human mind. Such a one is not united to the
head, from whom th.e whole body, supplied and built up by joints
and ligaments, attains a growth that is of God.44

This passage, following upon St. Paul's earlier insistence that
he is an official minister of the true gospel " by the will of
God," 45 shows that submission to duly appointed ecclesiastical
classifying these two aspects as different formalities having the same material
object, he bases his division of membership on the internal (" theological ") bond,
habitual grace. Hence, he includes as actual members the blessed in heaven; all
the just who have ever lived on earth; sinners who retain faith; and the souls in
purgatory. (Cf. pp. 556 ff. and the index, Miembroa, p. 9!l2) Like St. Thomas,
then, Fr. Sauras is using the term Mystical Body analogically.
u Col. 1: 12-!lS, Confraternity Edition. This text is used as the epistle for the
Feast of Christ the King. Cf. the commentary on this text in the Confraternity
Edition.
•• Ibid., v. 12.
"Ibid., vv. 18-19.
'"Ibid.; vv. 1 and 28.

ST. THOMAS

AND THE ENCYCI,ICAL

"MYSTIC!

CORPORIS"

15

authority is required of a member of Christ's Body along with
baptism and true faith.
Perhaps the most serious objection which can be brought
against the Encyclical is that, whereas a person may be an
actual member of the Mystical Body through possession of the
three conditions, which are external and juridical, he may at
the same time lack the all-important, internal element of
sanctifying grace. On the other hand, an individual can have
the latter element, yet be excluded from membership by reason
of lacking one or more of the three conditions (e. g., in the case
of someone who has baptism of desire). The dilemma is a real
one; ultimately, it must be resolved back to the mystery
contained in the parables of the kingdom of heaven, in which
Our Lord insists that the wicked be not expelled until the day
of judgment. 46 St. Augustine gives us a clue when he states:
"For whatsoever yet adhereth to the body, is not beyond hope
of healing; whereas that which hath been cut off, can neither be
ir. the process of curing, nor be healed." 47 It is certain that, in
the sacrament of penance, a paralyzed (sinful) member can
regain grace with an imperfect act of contrition. But a nonmember in serious sin-even though at one time he had attained
habitual grace through baptism of desire-must evoke a perfect
act of contrition in order to regain the state of grace, and
remains " deprived of so many precious gifts and helps from
heaven, which one can enjoy only in the Catholic Church." 48
PoiNT IV:

Limitation of the Terms" Church" and" Mystical
Body " to the Church Militant

This last point is perhaps the hardest one to demonstrate
from the explicit teaching of the Encyclical. To some extent,
it is a corollary of the third point, since only the faithful on
earth possess all three conditions of baptism, faith and submission to ecclesiastical authority. Now, it is clear not only
•• Cf. Matt. 18. By way of example, Christ did not expel Judas from the Apostolic
College even after his treachery had been exposed at the Last Supper.
"Sermo 187. PL, XXXVIII, 754.
"Mystici Corpuria, n. 100.

16

MARTIN

HOPKINS

from the texts already cited from the Summa Theologiae, but
also from St. Thomas's In Symbolum Apostolorum Expositio,
that the Angelic Doctor uses the words " Church " and " Mystical Body" to include not only the Church Militant, but also
the Church Suffering and the Church Triumphant:
Concerning the third, it must be known that the Church is
Catholic, that is, universal, and firstly, relative to place since it is
worldwide .... The Church has three parts: one is on earth, the
other is in heaven, and the third is in purgatory. 49

This concept of the Church is in accord with his notion of
grace as the specifying element of membership. Logically, St.
Thomas admits that the angels are members of the Mystical
Body only by analogy (similitudinarie) ; they are ordered to
the same goal as men-the Beatific Vision-yet they lack the
primary fundament of Church membership, human nature
elevated by the· grace of Christ. Because they have not been
redeemed by Him, they do not depend upon His merits in any
essential way. 50 On the other hand, St. Thomas makes the
blessed in heaven the most perfect members of the Mystical
Body (prima et principaliter) since they share most fully in
His grace and merits through the Beatific Vision.51
Here again it is evident, especially in the light of the Encyclical, that St. Thomas is using the terms " Church " and " Mystical Body " analogically. The goal of all Christians is the
Beatific Vision: that most intimate, face-to-face union with the
Blessed Trinity in heaven. The Church is the divinely established medium which prepares us for this perfect union with
God through incorporation into Christ's Mystical Body. But
wonderful as it is, this union with Christ is nevertheless imperfect and incomplete, depending on faith, and lacking the
•• Opusc. VII, a. 9. "Circa tertium sciendur,n est, quod Ecclesia est catholica,
idest universalis, primo quantum ad locum, quia ,est per totum mundum .... Habet
autem haec Ecclesia tres partes. Una est in t£ra, alia est in coelo, tertia est in
purgatorio." It is interesting to note that in h s commentary on the Communion
of Saints in this same work St. Thomas does litt more than summarize the effects
of the seven sacraments in their role as channels of'-grace from Christ to
•• Cf. Su1nma Theol., loc. cit.; III Sent., 18, q. 2, a. 2; De Verit., q. 9!9, a. 7, ad 5.
•• Summa Theol., ill, q. 8, a. 8.

ST. 'THOMAS

AND THE ENCYCLICAL

"MYSTIC!

CORPORIS"

17

security of the life of heaven. Even more significant is the fact
that, whereas the Church Triumphant is an invisible society
(at least until the general judgment), the Church Militant is
essentially a visible society.
To deny the identity of these two societies is in no way to
deny that grace is the internal, vivifying bond in both of them.
Nor is it to deny that Christ is the Head of both societies. It is
simply asserting that Christ is Head of the blessed in heaven
in a way different from His headship over the Mystical Body.
In the latter case, a different formality is involved, namely, the
presence of external, visible bonds uniting men to Christ and
with each other. In the case of the Church Triumphant, on
the other hand, the blessed are joined immediately to the divine
essence in an essentially invisible union.
pwrgatory depend upon faith
While it is true that the souls
for their supernatural knowledge of God, still they have ceased
to be subjects of the Church Militant. It is for this reason that
indulgences are applied to them
way of suffrage rather than
52
way of absolution.
Lacking
condition :requisite
for membership,
too, may be classed as members of the
Mystical Body only in an analogical sense. We might sum it
up in this way: the blessed in heaven and the souls in purgato:r:l'
are virtually (and therefore eminently) members of Christ's
Mystical Body, but not formally so.
Actually, when we speak of the Mystical Body as including
the Church Militant, the Church Suffering, and the Church
Triumphant, we are referring mere precisely to the Communion
of Saints. Strictly speaking, this latter is not an organization;
rather, it is an interchange of spiritual goods among the friends
of God. 5 3 The" common denominator" among the" members"
52 C. I. C., Can. !Jll.
Cf. L. Fanfani, 0. P., Manuale Theorico-Practicum Theologiae Moralis, (Roma, 1951). IV, n. 74·0. It cannot be demonstrated from n. 98
of the
Corporis that the Pope in asking for a memento for the souls in
purgatory intends to include them as members of the Mystical Body since he also
includes a request for prayers in behalf of catechumens in the same paragraph.
53 This thesis is carefully elaborated
in Gruden, op. cit., pp. 313-319. On page
S5W he gives a comprehensive chart distinguishing the three " Churches," followed
by a detailed explanation.

18

MARTIN

HOPKINS

o! this union is charity, so that all of those actually in the state
of grace participate in the exchange. Hence, mortal sin excludes
a person from this union, although it does not exclude him from
·the Mystical Body. Furthermore, the Communion of Saints
admits of degrees of "belonging," determined by one's proximity to salvation: the blessed in heaven are the most perfect
members, already possessing God; the souls in purgatory come
next, being assured of salvation in the inamissible possession of
grace and charity; finally come those faithful in the state of
grace, who possess the " seed of glory " and need but persevere
in this state until death. It is the peculiar role of that marvelous
organism which we call the Mystical Body to generate and to
nourish this seed unto final perseverance. Our physical incorporation into Christ's very own life is a kind of insurance against
anything which would separate us from Him, and provides a
means whereby His members may readily rise-should they have
the misfortune to fall into serious sin. 54
Finally, it should be noted that the Holy Ghost is present in
the Mystical Body in a more substantial manner than in the
Communion of Saints. As Fr. Gruden points out, He is present
in the Mystical Body as its soul or informina principle, whereas
He is present in the Communion of Saints through His Gifts
and graces to the individual " members." He is its " spirit " in
a loose sense, but it would not be accurate to call Him its soul.55
Nor can we admit, in the light of Mystici Corporis, that Abel
and the Patriarchs of the Old Testament were members of the
Mystical Body in a univocal sense. While it is true that they
had the same faith and charity as we do,56 they lacked the
threefold visible bond which unites Christians to Christ. Only
in a broad sense were the Patriarchs members of the Church
of Christ, for He said of the greatest of them:
•• Cf. John L. Murphy, op. cit., pp. 58-55.
•• Gruden, op. cit., pp. 160-16!l.
•• Summa Theol., ITI, q. 8, a. 8, ad 8. Since charity is the principal fundament
of his division of membership, he can state with perfect consistency: ". . . et ita
patres antiqui pertinebant ad idem corpus Ecclesiae ad quos nos pertinemus."
However, in q. 70, a. 4 he concedes that circumcision did not imprint a character
on the soul. Cf. also, III Sent., d. 18, q.
a.
qcla.
ad 4.

ST. THOMAS AND THE ENCYCLICAL

"MYSTIC!

CORPORIS"

19

Amen I say to you, among those born of women there has not
risen a greater than John the Baptist; yet the least in the kingdom
of heaven is greater than he.57
Here the comparison is not of individuals, but of categories:
the Old Testament is being compared with the New Testament.
Precisely as representing the Old Testament, St. John the
Baptist is said to be .less in dignity (but not sanctity) than the
least Christian, because of the generic superiority of the New
Testament over the Old. It is a question here not merely of
degree, but of kind. The New Testament was not to be simply
a continuation of the Old, but its fulfillment. 58 The contrast
between the two Testaments is shown very succinctly in the
Prologue of the Fourth Gospel: "For the Law was given
through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus Christ." 69
In his Epistles, St. Paul frequently emphasizes the dichotomy
between the Old and the New Laws. 6 ° Finally, the Holy Father
insists in his Encyclical, Mystici Corporis, that the
Body began with the death of Christ on the Cross:
For the divine Redeemer began the building of the mystical
temple of the Church when by His preaching He announced His
precepts; He completed it when He hung glorified on the Cross;
and He manifested and proclaimed it when He sent the Holy Ghost
as Paraclete in visible form on His disciples.61

*

*

*

*

*

07 Matt.ll:ll.
•• Cf. Dom Bernard Orchard & Others, A Catholic Commentary on Holy
Scripture. (London, 1958) . Col. 694d. This interpretation differs from that of St.
Thomas in his commentaries on this passage in the Gospels of St. Matthew and St.
Luke. Our Lord hinted at the implications of this fulfillment when he rejected
the Pharisees' fasting traditions with the comment: " No one pours new wine into
old wine skins; else the wine will burst the skins, and the wine is spilt, and the
skins will be ruined. But new wine must be put into fresh skins." (Mark
""John 1:17. In his St. John's Prologue, (Westminster, 1957), pp.
M. E.
Boismard, 0. P. concludes this meaning from the passage: "Grace and fidelity
began to be by Jesus Christ." Cf. also pp. 185-145.
•• Especially in the third and fourth chapters of his Epistle to the Galatians.
He compares the subjects of the Mosaic Law to slaves, and those under the New
Law to sons and heirs (Gal. 4: 1-7).
61 Myatici Corporis, n. 26. Cf. also nn. 27-88.

20

MARTIN

HOPKINS

Having considered in detail the four points listed at the
beginning of this article, we should, perhaps, make a brief
summary of our conclusions, all of which center around the
question, " Who are members of the Mystical Body of Christ? "
In the light of the clarification provided by Mystici Corporis
and treated of in these pages, I offer the following division,
which, I believe, answers the question according to the mind
of Pius XII:
THE MYSTICAL BODY OF CHRIST
(Division of members according to the Encyclical Mystici Corporis.)

I MEMBERS:62 Those who possess the triple bond: 1.) baptism
of water; 9l.) external profession of the true faith; 3.)
submission to the Roman Pontifi.
A. Active Members: Those just individuals who possess all
three of these conditions, together with charity (Catholics in the state of grace). "But if the bonds of faith
and hope, which bind us to our Redeemer in His
Mystical Body are weighty and important, those of
charity surely are no less so." (n. 72).
B. Paralyzed Members: Those sinners who, though retaining
the three conditions, have lost charity. (Cf. quotation
from n. 23 under Point III in connection with Pius XII's
inclusion of sinners.) " ... but if anyone unhappily falls
and his obstinacy has not made him unworthy of communion with the faithful, let him be received with all
affection
.. [as] a weak member of Jesus Christ."
(n. 24).
II NoN-MEMBERS:63 Those who lack one or more of the three
conditions of the triple bond.
•• Ibid., n. 22. " Only those are really to be included as members of the Church
who have been baptized and profess the true faith and 'who have not unhappily
withdrawn from Body-unity or for grave faults been excluded by legitimate
authority." His Holiness does not employ the terms "active" and "paralyzed"
members; however, they seem best suited to convey the important distinction he
makes between those who possess charity and those who lack it.
68 All persons in this division may be considered "potential " members of the
J.\!Iystical Body, in contrast to the true or "actual " members in the other division.
Following the example of the Pope, I have avoided these two terms.

ST. THOMAS AND THE ENCYCLICAL

"MYSTIC!

CORPORIS"

21

A. " Related " to the Mystical Body through an extraordinary
union.M
1. Material heretics and schismatics: Baptized non-Catholic Christians, so long as they reniain sincerely ignorant
of the true faith, and " follow the interior movements
of grace." (n. 100).
Infidels and Jews: Unbaptized persons who have turned
to God by a perfect act of contrition, but " who, not
yet perceiving the light of the Gospel's truth, are still
without the Church's safe fold .... " (n. 99).

B. Not "Related" to the Mystical Body:
1. Baptized persons who have severed their union with the

Church. 65
a.) Formal heretics and apostates who have severed
the bond of faith. 66
b.) Schismatics who have culpably "withdrawn from
Body-unity." (n.
c.) Excommunicated " vitandi." 67
Unbaptized individuals who culpably reject baptism.
" And so if a man refuse to hear the Church, let him
be considered,-so the Lord commands-as a heathen
and a publican." (n.
•• Surely Pius XII had those in this division in mind when he said: " ... We
have committed to the protection and guidance of heaven those who do not belong
to the visible organization- of the Catholic Church. . . . For even though unsuspectingly they are related to the Mystical Body of the Redeemer in desire and
resolution, they still remain deprived of so many precious gifts and helps from
heaven, which one can only enjoy in the Catholic Church." (Mystici Corporia,
n. 100).
65 Severance of union with the Church would seem to demand some external
mark of disbelief or rebellion, in keeping with the visible nature of the Mystical
Body, about which Mystici Corporia declares: "Now since this social body of
Christ has been designated by its Founder to be visible, this cooperation of all its
members must also be externally manifest through their profession of the same faith,
and the sharing of the same sacred rites ... " (n. 68). Cf. C. I. C., Can. 2242 § 1.
•• " It follows that those who are divided in faith or government cannot be living
in one Body such as this, and cannot be living the .life of its one divine Spirit."
(Mystici Corporia, n. 22). Cf. C. I. C., Can. 2314.
07 These are they who have the Pope says "for grave faults been excluded by
legitimate authority," n. 22. The more common opinion ill that not all excommuni<'ated Catholics, but only those designated as vitandi by the Holy See lose membership in the Mystical Body. Cf. H. A. Ayrmhac and J. P. Lydon, Penal Legislation in
the New Code of Canon Law. (New York, 1944), p. 86. _

MARTIN HOPKINS

CoNcLusiON

Are we to conclude that these clarifications and distinctions
are merely a matter of terminology, or, at best, little more than
technicalities? It would seem not, since His Holiness, Pius XII,
deemed the subject of sufficient importance to warrant a fiftysix page encyclical. In fact, the points raised by the Pope have
some rather profound dogmatic implications, revolving about
the defined truth that " outside the Church there is no salvation." To quote the classic words of Pope Boniface VIII:
Unam sanctam Ecclesiam catholicam et ipsam apostolicam
urgente fide credere cogimur et tenere, nosque hanc firmiter
credimus et simpliciter confitemur, extra quam nee salus est, nee
remissio peccatorum. . . . Porro subesse Romano Pontifici omni
humanae creaturae declaramus, dicimus, definimus et pronuntiamus
omnino de necessitate salutis.68
The distinction formerly made between the body and soul
of the Church was most convenient; it neatly harmonized the
necessity of the Church in general with the particular problem
of the salvation of sincere and invincibly ignorant individuals.
The only difficulty was that such a notion of the soul of the
Church usurped the function of the Holy Ghost, and destroyed
the unity of the Mystical Body. But now, in the light of the
Encyclical, Mystici Corporis, and a recent response of the Holy
Office, this distinction is neither helpful nor warranted. These
two documents furnish us with the following three clues to
what, in the final analysis, involves a mystery of faith:
1. There is no doubt but what one who deliberately refuses

to join or to remain in the Catholic Church, once he is convinced
of its necessity, cannot be saved. Thus, formal heretics, schismatics, and apostates who stubbornly die in their error, preclude
salvation for themselves. As the Holy Office puts it:
Therefore, no one will be saved who, knowing the Church to have
been divinely established by Christ, nevertheless refuses to submit
•• Bulla, Unam Sanctam, 18 November 1802 (Denzinger nn. 468-469).

ST. THOMAS AND THE ENCYCLICAL

"MYSTIC!

CORPORIS"

28

to the Church or withholds obedience from the Roman Pontiff, the
Vicar of Christ on earth. 69

2. Every individual who reaches heaven is saved through the
Roman Catholic Church, the Mystical Body of Christ. Here
the nature of the Church's necessity is positively stated. The
Mystical Body is not a luxury; it is not merely a convenience;
it is not even simply the " official " means of salvation (implying the coexistence of some other " unofficial " means) . The
Church is strictly necessary for salvation, by the necessity of
means as well as of precept. In other words, there is no salvation
apart from the Church:
Not only did the Saviour command that all nations should enter
the Church, but He also decreed the Church to be a means of
salvation, without which no one can enter the kingdom of eternal
glory. 70
8. Actual membership in the Mystical Body (via the three
conditions laid down in the Encyclical) is the normal and only
secure relationship to the Church whereby one can be assured
of salvation. However, the Church may-and does-reach out
in some mysterious way to those who, though not actually
members, bear an extraordinary relationship to her: those
whom the Pope describes as being " unsuspectingly related to
the Mystical Body .... " 71 This extraordinary relationship,
while not constituting membership, does nevertheless represent
a type of union with the Church, as the Holy Office indicates:

Therefore, that one may obtain eternal salvation, it is not always
required that he be incorporated into the Church actually as a
member, but it is necessary that at least he be united to her by
desire and longing.

The Holy Office goes on to explain this union of desire:
However, this desire need not always be explicit, as it Is m
catechumens; but when a person is involved in invincible ignorance,
•• Letter of the Holy Office to the Most Reverend Richard James Cushing,
Archbishop of Boston, August 8, 1949. Latin and English texts published in
American Ecclesiastical Review, CXXVII
pp. 807-815, Cf. p. SU.
71 Mystici Corporis, n. 100.
•• Ibid., p. SIS.

MAR'l'nll

HOPKINS

God accepts also an implicit desire, so called because it is included
in that good disposition of soul whereby a person wishes his will to
be conformed to the will of God. 72

This brings us to a final, practical note. Perhaps more than
ever before in the history of the Church is the apostolic nature
of Christianity being urged upon Catholics. They are being
reminded by Popes and prelates in season and out of season
of the obligation implied in the reception of baptism and confirmation to spread the kingdom of God. Now, the success of
this appeal for the " participation of the laity in the apostolate
of the hierarchy" will be conditioned largely by the demonstrated urgency of bringing non-Catholics into the true fold.
If material heretics (who comprise a good number of prospective converts) are looked upon as··" invisible members"
of the Mystical Body; or if their status as potential members is
considered to be an equivalent of membership,-or even a
positive, quite satisfactory relatibnship with Christ,-then the
impetus to work for their conversion will not be so compelling.
On the other hand, if we see them as the Pope pictures them in
the Encyclical, i. e., as non-members, very unsure of their
salvation, then our zeal will be more readily enkindled toward
apostolic action.
MARTIN HoPKINS, O.P.
/St. Peter Martyr Prio'l"!J,
Winona, Minn.

•• Letter, op. cit., p. SUI. Cf. also Francis J. Connell, C. SS. R., "The Necessity
of J.VIembership in the Mystical Body," Homiletio and Pastoral Review, Llll
(195ft-1958), p. 256; and "Invisible Members of the Church? ", American Ecclesiastical Review, CXXXVIII (1958), p. 67.

THE 'PROBLEM' OF INDUCTION

T

HE subject

of this paper is the various meanings which
the term "induction" may have, and the consequent
ambiguity of the so-called" problem of induction." We
shall attempt to distinguish many of these meanings from each
other, and on the basis of these distinctions to make some
suggestions concerning the nature of the " problem of induction" in each case.
In general, induction is the movement of the intellect from the
singular to the universal, or from the less universal to the more
universal. It is precisely this passage to the universal or the
more universal which poses the problem of induction. How
is one to justify such a passage? How can we see beyond these
particular contingents or these specific types to a more universal
necessary intelligibility?
First, we may note that this movement of the intellect takes
place on two distinct levels of knowledge: that of the nature,
cause, and other aspects of the thing-in-itself; 1 and that of the
appearance of this thing-in-itself in the order of operation.
Since the first level of knowledge concerns the underlying
nature, we shall call the induction which takes place at this
level transphenomenal induction. Since the second level con1 This is not the Kantian
thing-in-itself, which is perhaps most appropriately
characterized by its unknowability. Rather, we are thinking of the Thomistic being
which reveals itself to us through its phenomena, but which nevertheless is other
than these phenomena themselves, with an otherness which is subsumed under the
scholastic distinction between the order of being and the order of operation
It should also be noted that we are not distinguishing, in this paper, between
the order of essence and the order of existence. Flowing from this distinction are
certain fundamental differences within what we shall call transphenomenol induction
-differences between the induction proper to the philosophy of nature and that
proper to metaphysics. We prescind from this point as well as from the distinction
between the analogical arid the universal. All intellectual knowledge is here termed
" universal."

25

26

JOSEPH J. SIKORA

cerns the observable phenomena, we shall call the induction
which takes place at this level phenomenal induction. 2
I.

ThANSPHENOMENAL

INDUCTION

In our attempt to intellectually grasp the being of things, the
first necessity is the transphenomenal abstractive intuition of
the intellect. If there be no such intuition, the thing-in-itself
must become the Kantian thing-in-itself, unknowable to us.
But such abstractive intuition is the seeing of a universal necessary intelligibility in the individual contingent sensibles. This
is an inductive process, as Aristotle says in the Posterior Analytics.8 It is a movement of the intellect, confronted with the
singular, to the universal.
But this process of what we may call abstractive induction
is not properly the concern of logic, but rather of philosophical
psychology and metaphysics. Logic requires universal ideas as
already given. Its purpose is to. examine the relations between
such ideas, in formal logic, and their content, in material logic.
The work of abstractive. induction takes place according to its
own laws in the spiritual preconscious 4 life of the intellect.
The " problem of induction " here is the traditional metaphysical " problem of universals " and the psychological problem of
the agent intellect.
The ideas yielded by abstractive induction may, however,
fall into two classes. Some there are which bear evident necessary relations to each other. When we consider these, we
necessarily judge concerning these relations. The resulting
propositions may be regarded as a secondary derivative of
abstractive induction. No special movement of the intellect
beyond the mere comparison of such ideas is necessary for the
formation of these propositions. Such, for example, are propositions like " The whole is greater than its part." Also reducible
2 For an elaboration of the distinction between these two levels of knowledge, see
Maritain's La Philosophie de la Nature (Paris, 1937) or his Les Degres du Savoir
(Paris, 1932) .
8 Anal. Post., B 19, 100b 8-5.
• For this term see Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry (New York,
1955) ' p. 78.

THE ' PROBLEM ' OF INDUCTION

27

to this ·type are propositions like " Being is good," which are
not immediately evident until the ideas of being and good are
very much refined and clarified, but which become immediately
evident when the meaning of the terms is clearly seen. Propositions of the first kind are the traditional per se nota quoad
omnes propositions, while those of the second kind are the per
se nota quoad sapientes propositions.
We are not suggesting that such ideas fall into the mind as
isolated " atoms," which are then related to each other through
an entirely new comparison made by the intellect when stimulated by the sense experience of individuals. Rather, such ideas
would seem to be, usually if not always, clarifications of earlier,
vaguer ideas (and judgments) which contained implicitly the
content of both of the later distinct ideas. Thus we have (1)
the presence of a vague " atomic " object of thought; (2) the
clarified vision revealing that this "atom" is itself "molecular" with reference to other "atoms"; (3) the discernment
of necessary relations between some of these " atoms " within
the " molecule." This latter step is the per se nota proposition.
The distinction between the two kinds of per se nota propositions noted above arises from the varying degree of difficulty
involved in achieving sufficient clarification of the "atoms"
within the " molecule '' to see necessary relations between them.
Between other ideas, however, no such neeessary relation can
be seen. To establish such a relation it is necessary for reason
to discourse. Sometimes this discourse takes place through a
genuine universal middle term in a categorical syllogism. At
other times we can only establish the relation through direct
reference to the particulars themselves, in which these ideas
are realized. Such a process of establishing a universal proposition through the particular instances is called by Aristotle
" induction " 5 and the " syllogism which springs out of inducHon." 6 It is called " induction " because there is a movement
from the particular instances to the universal proposition. It
is called " syllogism from induction " because it can be ex• Anal. Priora, B !4!8, 68b 15.
• Anal. Priora, B iS, 68b 15-16.

28

JOSEPH

J. SIKORA

pressed in the form of premisses necessitating a conclusion,
thus falling under Aristotle's general definition of syllogism. 7
The structure of such a syllogism is outlined by Aristotle in
a brief text as follows:
Now induction, or rather the syllogism which springs out of
induction, com;ists in establishing syllogistically a relation between
one extreme and the middle by means of the other extreme, e. g. if B
is the middle term between A and C, it consists in proving through
C that A belongs to B. For this is the manner in which we make
inductions. For example let A stand for long-lived, B for bileless,
and C for the particular long-lived animals, e. g. man, horse, mule.
A then belongs to the whole of C; for whatever is bileless is longlived. But B also (' not possessing bile ') belongs to all C. If then
C is convertible with B, and the middle term is not wider in extension, it is necessary that A should belong to B. For it has already
been proved that if two things belong to the same thing, and the
extreme is convertible with one of them, then the other predicate
will belong to the predicate that is converted. But we must apprehend C as made up of all the particulars. For induction proceeds
through an enumeration of aU the cases. 8
The process of reasoning
put as follows:

Aristotle describes here may

Every C 1s A.
Every C IS B.
Therefore every B IS A.
Because this induction is a genuine discursive process, and
not intuitive as is abstractive induction, we can call it ratiocinative induction. But this ratiocinative induction is greatly
restricted in its sphere of application. Aristotle has pointed
out the necessity for a complete enumeration of all the particulars which are B in order to say " Every B is A." Except in
cases which are of no great importance such complete enumeration is usually impossible. Yet where we have only incomplete
enumeration, we cannot have a genuine formal consequence;
7 Anal. Priora, A 1,
"A syllogism is discourse in which, certain things
oeing stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their
being so." (Oxford trans.)
8 Anal. Priora, B
68b
(Oxford traus.).

THE ' PROBLEM ' OF INDUCTION

for the consequence here rests on the convertibility of C with B,
which in tum rests on complete enumeration.
It would appear that any incomplete enumeration is insufficient to draw a conclusion. If we are considering the formal
consequence, this must be conceded. Some have attempted to
save this formal consequence by resorting to the notion of a
"virtually complete enumeration." 9 This is a special condition
on the side of the matter, described by J\'laritain as follows:
It is apparent, then, that when the enumeration of parts is taken
as sufficient, the mind can and must conclude from the parts to the
whole. For J.n supposing that the enumeration is " sufficient" we
are in fact supposing that we know that the enumerated parts are
realey represented in relation to the predicate in question by the
universal which we are considering and not by another. (For this
reason the ancients considered induction by sufficient enumeration
as induction by virtually complete enumeration.) 10
But this does not save the formal consequence, as Maritain
believes. 11 If we now see that B is essentially related to C with
respect to A, we must also see the necessary relation of B to A.
But this brings us back once again to abstractive induction.
The presupposition of genuinely ratiocinative induction is that
the relation between subject and predicate in the conclusion is
"not seen but inferred (through particular instances, however,
and not through a middle term in the strict sense).
On the other hand, if we do not see that B is essentially
related to C with respect to A, we cannot be certain that we
have a sufficient enumeration in C unless we have included
every B. Thus there can be no valid inductive syllogism in
virtue of a " virtually complete enumeration."
Nevertheless, an incomplete enumeration may be sufficient
for a "probable proposition." But the degree of probability,
while resting on the number of instances enumerated, also rests
on the kind of matter with which we deal. The examination of
• Jacques ].\britain, Formal Logic (New Yorl::, 1946), p. fl75.

Ibid.
Ibid. It should be noted that no condition on the side of mattt:r can ever be
said to account for a formal co118equence.
10
11

30

JOSEPH

J. SIKORA

fifty random instances may be sufficient to state with some
probability that "Wood is combustible"; but it would not be
sufficient to state with much probability at all that a vaccine
actually prevents some disease. We are speaking here of probability in the sense of " expectancy," of our subjective conviction that the proposition is true. Objective probability is a
concept which is not applicable in\the discussion of transphenomenal induction. Thus in transphenomenal induction we
do not have a "logic of probability." Rather, we employ a
kind of speculative prudence, an analogue of the prudence
which we employ in the moral order.
There is one further type of transphenomenal induction,
which we may term constructi'Ve induction. When, in our study
of the physical universe, we reach the point where we are
unable to see the specific determinations of things, we construct
a philosophical myth, a representation of what the nature of
things might be like.12 This construction is not a mere dream
of the philosopher. At every stage of its development, there is,
or should be, close attention to the observable characteristics
of things. Aristotle's De Caelo may be taken as an excellent
example of such a " philosophical myth." 18 Today, it is of
utmost importance for the philosopher of nature to construct
such myths with close attention to the present state of physical
science. For this physical science approaches the nature symbolically, through the use of constructions which bear some
analogy to the real nature, although they themselves are
irreducibly perinoetic. The philosopher of nature should take
advantage of these oblique, analogous and symbolic views of
the nature of the physical world, thereby strengthening the
foundation in things (fundamentum in re) for his ideal construction (ens rationis) at the mythical level of the philosophy
of nature.
We have had numerous examples of such philosophical
12

See my article, " ' Integrated ' Knowledge of Nature," in THE THOMIST, XXI

(1958), pp. 171-188.
13 This does not mean that Aristotle himself realized the mythical character of
this work.

THE • PROBLEM ' OF INDUCTION

81

myths, most of them, unfortunately, from non-scholastic philosopher-scientists.14 Among scholastics, most of the work still
needs to be done. We have seen few attempts to provide a
worthy replacement for the long outmoded myths of the De
Caelo and its medieval counterparts. Some valuable work has
been done; but too frequently it is dominated by a tendency
to rehabilitate as much as possible of the Aristotelian myth
without the spirit of originality called for by the modern discoveries in the natural sciences. Sometimes too, the mistake of
Aristotle is repeated, and the mythical nature of the constructions is overlooked.
This mythical construction must be said to be an inductive
procedure. Here we are speculating about the nature of things,
but this speculation is always governed by our experience. Thus
we are rising, by a constructive method, from the particular to
the universaU 5 We call this process transphenomenal constructive induction. This type of induction presupposes both abstractive and ratiocinative induction.
To summarize the diverse types of transphenomenal
tion, we may use the following table:

See, for example, A. S. Eddington's The Expanding Universe (Cambridge,
and The Nature of the Physical World (New York, 19::!9); J. Jeans' The
Myste,-ious Universe (New York, 1930) and Physics and Philosophy (New York,
1943); F. Hoyle's F1·ontiers of Astronomy (New York, 1955).
We find philosophical myths especially concerning the findings of astronomy (and
astrophysics), that science which Aristotle tells us is, of all mathematical sciences,
the "nearest to philosophy." While his astronomy was a science entirely different
from modern astronomy, the same point might still be significant today.
15 Note, however, that this ascent requires the intermediacy of abstracted elements
of construction. Thus the constructively inductive ascent has a twofold dependence
on the experience of particulars. First, the elements of construction are abstracted
from particulars. Second, the direction of the constructive process is ultimately from
our experience of particulars. The same, of course, could also have been said,
mutatis mutandis, concerning the elements and direction of the ratiocinative
inductive process.
14

32

.JOSEPH

J. SIKORA

Transphenomenal induction
Abstractive induction
of universal ideas

__,. universal propositions

per se
immediately seen to be"-.,------7.·/propositions
/
'"nota to all
necessarily related
seen through reflective"""
_,./propositions per se
clarification to be
/
"'nota to the learned
/
necessarily related
not seen to be necessarily related
... but these are related through

I
induction
through complete enumeration ___ __, certain propositions
through incomplete enumeration _ __, probable propositions
Constructive induction of hypothetical natures, where abstractive
induction is blocked.

II.

PHENOMENAL

INDUCTION

Just as in our knowledge of the being of things, so also in
the study of their phenomena, we first need an abstractive intttition. If there is no abstractive intuition of the phenomenon,
there can be no possibility of relating the abstract theoretical
constructions of modern science to the concrete observable to
which they are meant to refer. Here again, such abstractive
intuition is not the concern of logic, but rather is presupposed
to logic.
But this abstractive intuition of the phenomenal flux, or, we
may say, abstractive induction from the phenomenal flux, yields
ideas which are not necessarily related to each other at alU 6
The constructive activity of the intellect is required to see a
pattern in the phenomena. Complex concepts are constructed
by the intellect out of the primitive simple concepts, e. g., the
concepts of mass or of energy insofar as these are resolvable into
16 "Ve may note the foundation,
in this domain, for the Humean conception of
human experience. See David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding,
ed. C. W. Hendel (New York, 1955), V, p. 56.

THE ' PROBLEM ' OF INDUCTION

38

measurable quantities given in sense-experience. These complex
concepts provide a framework in which to view the phenomenal
flux. But the complex concepts must be related to each other
by laws (e. g., the laws of mechanics, like F =rna), laws which
are in a sense the fruit of these somewhat arbitrarily constructed
complex phenomenal concepts. Given a set of concepts, a set
of laws will follow. But this set of laws itself must be arrived
at or confirmed by a ratiocinative induction through incomplete
enumeration from the comparison of the instances in which the
concepts are applied.
Such ratiocinative induction, however, as we see, presupposes
the constructive activity in the formation of the complex concepts. This introduces an a p1iori element into the very
materials of the ratiocinative induction. The probability attained is, from the point of view of science itself, a kind of
sttbjective expectancy, not an objective probability. It is on
this level of thought that we can locate the induction which the
canons of Bacon and Mill concern, after suitable criticism.
The dominance of speculative construction appears clearly
here in the consideration of the interaction between the processes of constructing concepts and reasoning to laws. We
ordinarily construct our concepts in order to obtain simple
laws which correspond to the flux of real phenomena. We may
say that both concept and law are constructed in the same
activity. The ratiocinative induction which takes place here is
a part of the overall process of construction.
We have another level of construction, in the study of phenomena, on the level of theory. The theoretical level is the most
artificial level in modern science. Here our principal materials
are not obtained in abstractive intuition of the phenomenal
real. 11 Therefore reality is normative in the construction of a
theory only in a very indirect manner. However, our experience
of the phenomenal flux still regulates the evolution of the
17 Here there is question primarily of logical and mathematical
conceptions, and
only secondarily of the qualitative images and conceptions which enter into the
construction of the physical model.

JOSEPH J. SIKORA

abstract theory, in that it is precisely this phenomenal flux
which the theory seeks to unify. 18
Thus, all of the constructive activity of the modern sciences
of phenomena is a movement to more and more complex
abstract structures, which are yet always subject to the regulation of experience. Thus, we may say that there is here a
passage from the particular to the universal, an inductive
process. But this inductive process in itself does not take place
by way of insight or by way of ratiocination, but rather by way
of a free constructive process-constructive
but not unregulated. We may term this form of induction phenomenal constructive induction.
Is there then a " logic of induction " for modern science,
outside of the ratiocinative induction which we have already
noted above? In so far as the constructive activity of the
intellect is here subjected to certain artificial rules, we may
have such a logic. But this is not a formal logic at all; rather,
it is a material logic, a logic the rules of which entirely concern
the matter of propositions.
However, side by side with this "logic of induction," there
must be a "logic of deduction " for modern science. For the
primary value of the constructions of modern science is that
they enable us to deduce the phenomena. But this logic of
deduction must be characterized by complex constructed premisses and perhaps even "conventional" rules of reasoning,
rather than by the rules of reasoning of traditional logic, which
have in some way a "natural place " in the mind. The modern
constructed logics have their special value in this domain of
constructed science.
18 Such regulation by the phenomena would at least exist historically, even if it
were possible to see now how i\11 the laws are deducible from certain primitive ideas
originating in our very approach to these phenomena. Such an a priori notion of
physical theory has been put forth by A. 8. Eddington in The Philosophy of Physical
Science (Cambridge, 1949). However, such a thoroughly a priori procedure must be
ruled out; for the phenomenal measurements represent a physical datum transcending
our intellects, at least in part, and controlling our conjectures. How many ugly
facts have destroyed beautiful theories! Yet, perhaps, Eddington's a priori has a
place on the most general levels of physics (in subordination-not subalternationto the philosophy of nature).

THE ' PROBLEM ' OF INDUCTION

35

The logic of modern science, however, cannot insist very
strongly on the sharp distinction between the inductive and
deductive movements of the mind, after the manner of traditional logic. In modern science, the constructive induction of a
theory is always accomplished with reference to the world of
individuals. This necessitates a back-and-forth motion of the
intellect, an induction followed by a deduction followed by
further induction, etc.
We can locate all the types of induction described above in a
simple scheme:
Abstractive
Constructive
Ratiocinative

Phenomenal,
simple concepts of
phenomena
complex concepts of
phenomena, theories
scientific laws

III.

Transphenomenal
concepts of natures,
per se nota propositions
constructed " mythical "
natures
universal propositions
which are not per se nota

" PROBLEMS " OF INDUCTION

We have then several distinct types of induction, each with
its own peculiar problems. Transphenomenal induction has, in
fact, been the chief concern of scholastic logic, metaphysics,
and psychology. Indeed, some scholastics have attempted to
account for all inductive procedures in terms of transphenomenal induction. 19 This can be traced to their rejection of an
intellectual knowledge terminating in the very phenomena
themselves.
The problems of transphenomenal abstractive induction have
already been identified with the metaphysical problem of universals and the psychological problem of the origin of ideas.
The problem of transphenomenal ratiocinative induction, once
the possibility of complete enumeration is set aside, is the
problem of how to judge when an enumeration is sufficient for
some degree of probability. This would seem to be the concern
18

168.

See, for example, V. E. Smith, Elements of Logic (Milwaukee, 1957), pp. 156-

36

JOSEPH

J. SIKORA

of some kind of speculative prudence-a mean between hasty
generalization and undue hesitancy in judging. Transphenomenal constructive induction has even more of the nature of
art than does the discursive portion of ratiocinative induction.
The problem here is to lay down rules to follow-rules which
will be somewhat akin to Newton's Rules of Reasoning in
Natural Philosophy. But these rules will concern precisely that
domain of" hypotheses" which Newton was unwilling to enter
at any great length in the Principia.
Phenomenal abstractive induction presents problems parallel
to those of transphenomenal abstractive induction. The problems of phenomenal ratiocinative and constructive induction
greatly concern the laying down of rules of procedure. But
perhaps the most provocative problem posed by these latter
types of induction lies in the fact that they work, that, after we
have made our constructions and reasonings, we are really able
to predict what we will observe and to verify these predictions.
It is the presence of this fact which links together transphenomenal and phenomenal induction. The presence of an order in
the phenomena is ultimately attributable to the order of nature,
which itself produces the phenomena. Transphenomenal induction enables us to attain to the ontological principles of the
order of nature, with clear vision of some principles and with
hypothetical construction of other more detailed principles.
Phenomenal induction enables us to unify, through extrinsic
constructed non-ontological principles, the manifold of phenomena produced by the order of nature. Thus, transphenomenal
induction provides the principles of ontological science of
nature, while phenomenal induction provides the principles of
empiriological science of nature.
JosEPH J. SIKORA
Loyola University
Chicago, Illinois

THE THOMISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE THREE
DEGREES OF FORMAL ABSTRACTION

T

THE PROBLEM

HERE is current controversy among Thomists as to
the Thomistic authenticity of the doctrine of intellectual abstraction as presented by Cajetan and John
of St. Thomas. 1 According to these traditional commentators
there is, first of all, a twofold distinction between total abstraction (abstractio totalis, the abstraction of a logical whole from
its subjective parts) and formal abstraction (abstractio formalis, the abstraction of an intelligible object from the matter
which shrouds its intelligibility). There is, further, a threefold
distinction between types of formal abstraction (each depending upon the distinct degree of matter from which the intelligible
1 It is not the purpose of this paper to trace the development of this controversy.
However, it may be fitting, for purposes of orientation, to indicate some of the
literature contributing to it. Principal among the earlier articles on it were these
three: L.-M. Regis, 0. P., "La Philosophie de Ia Nature. Quelques apories,"
Etude.' et Researches, Cahier I: Philosophie (1986), 1f!7-156; L.-B. Geiger, 0. P.,
"Abstraction et separation d'ap1·es S. Thomas," Revue des Sciences Philosophiquea
et Theologiques, XXXI (1947), 8-40; J.-D. Robert, 0. P., "La Metaphysique,
science distincte de toute autre discipline selon S. Thomas d'Aquin," Divus Thomas,
L (1947), 206-222. These were followed shortly by two significant articles: M.-V.
Leroy, 0. P., "Abstractio et separatio d'apres un texte controverse de Saint Thomas
(In Lib. Boeth. de Trin., V, 3 & 4) ," Revue Thomiste, XL VIII (1948), 828-389;
M.-D. Philippe, 0. P., "Abstraction, addition, separation dans Ia philosophie
d'Aristote," Revue Thomiste, XLVIII (1948), 461-479. More recent articles on
the subject include: F. G. Connolly, "Science vs. Philosophy," The Modern
Schoolman, XXIX (1952), 197-209, and "Abstraction and Moderate Realism,"
The New Scholasticism, XXVII (1958), 72-90; V. Smith, "Abstraction and the
Empiriological Method," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, XXVI (1952), 85-50; G. Van Riet, "La theorie thomiste de !'abstraction,"
Revue Philosophique de Louvain, L (1952), 358-398; P. Merlan, "Abstraction and
Metaphysics in St. Thomas' Summa," Journal of the History of Ideas, XIV (1958),
284-291; W. Kane, 0. P., "Abstraction and the Distinction of the Sciences," The
Thomist, XVII (1954), 48-68; E. Simmons, "In Defense of Total and Formal

87

88

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

object is abstracted) . Total abstraction is common to all the
sciences, while each type of formal abstraction is proper to a
distinct level of science as specificative of that level. Physical
abstraction, the first degree of formal abstraction, is proper
to natural science; mathematical abstraction, the second degree
of formal abstraction, is proper to mathematics; and metaphysical abstraction, the third degree of formal abstraction, is
proper to metaphysics. 2
Many have questioned the Thomistic authenticity of this
presentation on the basis of St. Thomas' own presentation of
the doctrine in the third article of the fifth question of his
Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius. In this highly
significant and somewhat controversial article St. Thomas
begins by distinguishing between abstraction, generally taken,
according to simple apprehension and according to negative
judgment. He calls the first an abstraction, strictly taken, and
the second a separation. He further distinguishes between
F. Cunningham, S. J. 1
Abstraction," The New Schola.stism, XXIX (1955),
"A Theory on Abstraction in St. Thomas," The Modern Schoolman, XXXV (1958),
A highly significant brief treatment of the problem is found in J. Maritain,
Exi.•tence and the Existent. trans. L. Galentiere and G. Phelan (New York, 1948),
pp.
note 14. Other notes are found in G. Klubertanz, S. J., The Philosophy of
Nature, p. 400, note 19; F. Wilhelmsen, Man.'s Knowledge of Reality (Englewood
Cliffs, N. J., 1956), pp. 194-195, note 8. Extended treatments are found in E,
Simmons, The Thomistic Doctrine of Abstraction for the Three Levels of Science;
Exposition and Defense (University of Notre Dame doctoral dissertation,
published by University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Mich.); F. Wilson, S. J., The Modes
of Abstraction According to St. Thomas Aquinas (Georgetown University doctoral
dissertation, 1949, unpublished) .
• Cajetan, In De Ente et Essentia, prooem., q. I (Marietti): " ... duplex est
abstractio per intellectum, scilicet qua formale abstrahitur a materiali, et qua totum
universale abstrahitur a partibus sujectivis . . . primam voco abstractionem
secundam vero voco abstractionem totalem, eo quia quod abstrahitur
prima abstractione, est ut forma ejus, a quo abstrahitur. Quod vero abstrahitur
secunda abstractione, est ut tottim universale respectu ejus a quo abstrahitur .. .
penes diversos modos abstractionis formalis scientiae speculativae diversificantur .. .
Abstractio autem totalis communis est omni scientiae. . .. " Cajetan treats particularly of the division of the
into natural science, mathematics, and metaphysics according to the three degrees of formal abstraction in In Summa Theol., I,
1, 8 (Leonine) (cf. infra, note 15). John of St. Thomas treats of both the general
distinctions and the division of the sciences into the three branches in Curs. Phil., I,
Ars Log., II, q.
a. 1 (Reiser).

THREE DEGREES OF FORMAL ABSTRACTION

39

abstractions, strictly taken, which are abstractions of a whole
(abstractio totius) and those which are abstractions of a form
(abstractio formae) . He then assigns the abstraction of a
whole to natural science, the abstraction of a form to mathematics, and separation to metaphysics. 3 On the basis of this
article it would seem perhaps that for St. Thomas the distinction between total and formal abstraction is in fact the distinction between physical and mathematical abstraction and not,
as the Commentators teach, a distinction between an abstraction common to all the sciences and that general type of
abstraction which in its specific manifestations respectively
specifies each level of science. It seems also that for St. Thomas
there are not three types of abstraction specifying respectively
the three levels of science, but only two abstractions of this
kind, plus separation. And it would seem, finally, that there are
• In Boeth. de Trin., V, 8, c. (Decker): " ... duplex est operatio iutellectus. Una,
quae dicitur 'intelligentia iudivisibilium,' qua cognoscit de unoquoque, quid est.
Alia vero, qua componit et dividit, scilicet enuntiationem aflirmativam vel negativam
formando. . • • Hac ergo operatione iutellect.us vere abstrahere non potest nisi ea
quae sunt secundum rem separata. . . . Sed secundum primam operationem potest
abstrahere ea quae secundum rem separata non sunt, non tamen omnia, sed aliqua.
. • . Si vero unum ab altero non dependeat secundum id quod constituit rationem
naturae, tunc unum potest ab altero abstrahi per iutellectum ut sine eo intelligatur,
non solum si sint separata secundum rem .•. sed etiam si secundum rem coniuncta
sint. . . . Sic ergo intellectus distinguit unum ab altero aliter et aliter secundum
diversas operationes; quia secundum operationem, qua componit et dividit, dis·
tinguit unum ab alio per hoc quod iutelligit unum alii non iuesse. In operatione
vero qua iutelligit, quid est unumquodque, distinguit unum ab alio, dum intelligit,
quid est hoc, nihil iutelligendo de alio, neque quod sit cum eo, neque quod sit ab eo
separatum. Unde ista distiuctio non proprie habet nomen separationis, sed prima
tantum. Haec autem distiuctio recte dicitur abstractio. . . . Et ita sunt duae
abstractiones intellectus. Una quae respondet unioni formae et materiae vel
accidentis et subiecti, et haec est abstractio formae a materia sensibili. Alia quae
respondet unioni totius et partis, et huic respondet abstractio universalis a particulari,
quae est abstractio totius, in qua consideratur absolute natura aliqua secundum suam
rationem essentialem, ab omnibus partibus, quae non sunt partes speciei, sed sunt
pa1·tes accidentales .... Sic ergo in operatione intellectus triplex distiuctio invenitur.
Una secundum operationem iutellectus componentis et dividentis, quae separatio
dicitur proprie; et haec competit scientiae divinae sive metaphysicae. Alia secundum
operationem, qua formantur quidditates rerum, quae est abstractio formae a materia
sensibili; et haec competit mathematicae. Tertia secundum eandem operationem
quae est abstractio universalis a particulari; et haec competit etiam physicae. . • .

40

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

not three, nor even two, formal abstractions, but only one,
namely, the abstraction proper to mathematics.
Must we then scrap, in the interests of Thomistic authenticity, the traditional distinction of the Commentators between
total and formal abstraction on the one hand and between
the three degrees of formal abstraction on the other? I suggest
that we need not do this. It seems to me that whatever
disparity there is between the Commentators and St. Thomas
on this point is more terminological than doctrinal. In a
previous paper I have attempted to show as much in reference
to the first distinction made by the Commentators, i. e., the
distinction between abstractio totalis (as common to all the
sciences) and abstmctio formalis (as specificative in its three
degrees of the three levels of science) .4 This distinction is
simply not the distinction that St. Thomas has in mind when he
distinguishes between abstractio totius, as belonging to natural
science, and abstractio formae, as belonging to mathematics.
In fact, it is not a distinction explicitly made by St. Thomas,
but it is a distinction legitimately called for by the Thomistic
notion of human science. Human science, strictly taken, is a
knowledge of the real effected in the demonstrative syllogism.
In order that the real be scientifically grasped, therefore, it
must be yielded to the intellect as intelligible-able to be
known-and as communicable-able to take on the logical interrelationships of superiority and inferiority through which
syllogism " works." Formal abstraction, the abstraction of the
intelligible object of thought from the matter which shrouds
its intelligibility, yields the object as intelligible; and total
abstraction, the abstraction of the logical whole from its subjective parts, yields the object as communicable. Accordingly,
both total and formal abstraction are demanded by the
Thomistic notion of human science, and this, though St. Thomas
himself never explicitly makes the distinction and never names
these types of abstraction, makes this distinction, explicitly
given to us by Cajetan and John of St. Thomas, authentically
a Thomistic distinction.
• Cf., supra, note 1, "In Defense of Total and Formal Abstraction."

THREE DEGREES OF FORMAL ABSTRACTION

41

There remains to be considered the second of the traditional
distinctions, i.e., the distinction between the three degrees of
formal abstraction as respectively specifying the three levels of
science. Can the Commentators legitimately speak of the first
degree formal abstraction as specifying natural science, the
second degree of formal abstraction as specifying mathematics,
and the third degree of formal abstraction as specifying metaphysics when St. Thomas, in the Commentary on the De
Trinitate, V, 3, speaks rather of a total abstraction (abstractio
totius) as belonging to natural science, a formal abstraction
(abstractio formae) as belonging to mathematics, and a separation (separatio as distinct from abstractio) as belonging to
metaphysics? The burden of this paper will be to show that
they can, that the traditional doctrine of the three degrees of
formal abstraction is completely consonant with the doctrine of
abstractio totius, abstractio formae, and separatio as proposed
by St. Thomas in the De Trinitate.
Inasmuch as the original difficulty seems to be of terminological genesis we will first examine the problem from
point
view in order to show that the carefully chosen expressions of
the De Trinitate in no way rule out the presentation of the
Commentators. Then we shall turn from
terminological
issue to the more important doctrinal issue in an attempt to
show that the doctrine of the three degrees of formal abstraction, rightly understood, faithfully represents the mind of SL
Thomas in reference to the specification of the speculative
sciences.
THE TERMINOLOGICAL

IssuE

The terminological differences between the presentation of
Cajetan and John of St. Thomas on the one hand and St.
Thomas in the Commentary on the De Trinitate,
3, on the
other are dearly apparent. That they seem to pose a problem
cannot be denied. The Commentators teach that there are
three degrees of formal abstraction (abstractiones). And St.
Thomas teaches, in this article, that there are three types of
intellectual distinctions (distinctiones), only two of which are

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

in the strict sense abstractions (abstractio totius and abstractio
formae). St. Thomas teaches that what corresponds to
Cajetan's third degree of formal abstraction is not an abstraction in the strict sense but a separation (separatio) . Because
St. Thomas carefully speaks of three distinctions rather than
three abstractions, and because he explicitly distinguishes behveen two abstractions and separation it would seem perhaps
that the traditional presentation of the doctrine in terms of
the three types of abstraction cannot be accepted as authentically Thomistic.
However, if we accept the fact that the precise terminology
of the De Trinitate repudiates the teaching of Cajetan and
John of St. Thomas, we must as well admit that it repudiates
the teaching of St. Thomas himself in many other passages.
For St. Thomas does not bind himself to the strict terminology
of the controversial article everytime he speaks on the subject
of intellectual abstraction. There are numerous passages in
which he shows little :regard for the precision of expression
stressed in the controversial article. These passages fit into
several types, including passages in which " abstraction " is
used in :reference to all three scientific levels, those in which
"separation" is used in reference to all three scientific levels,
and those in which "abstraction" and "separation" are interchanged indiscriminately. 1Ne shall take note of several of these
passages in what follows.
Perhaps the most obvious passage in which St. Thomas uses.
" abstraction " for all three scientific levels is found in the
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 85, a. 1, ad
Here, in answer to an
objection made concerning the abstraction especially proportioned to natural science, we find SL Thomas comparing this
abstraction with its mathematical and metaphysical counterparts.
The intellect therefore abstracts (abstrahit) the species of a natural
thing from the individual sensible matter, but not from common
sensible matter. . . . Mathematical species, however, can be
abstracted (abstrahi) by the intellect not only from individual
:oensiblematter, but also from common sensible matter; not however

THREE DEGREES OF

ABSTRACTION

48

from common intelligible matter, but only from individual intel·
ligible matter .... But certain things can be abstracted (abstrahi)
even from common intelligible matter, such as being, unity, potency,
act, and the like, which even can exist without matter, as is evident
in the case of immaterial substances. 5

If St. Thomas had intended in the De Trinitate, a work
earlier than the Summa, to eliminate the possibility meaningfully to speak of abstraction in reference to each of the .levels of
science he would certainly not have expressed himself as he
did in this passage of the Summa.
Another passage, typical of the context in which we find it,
in which St. Thomas speaks:of abstraction in reference to each
genus of science and not exclusively to the first and second is
found at the very beginning of the Commentary on the Physics.
Therefore, it must be known, since every science is in the intellect,
that something is intelligible in act insofar as it is abstracted
(abstrahitur) from matter; thus, insofar as things are diversely
related to matter, they pertain to diverse sciences.6
In this passage St. Thomas speaks of abstraction generally
in reference to each level of speculative science just as in the
passage previously quoted he speaks of abstraction particularly
in reference to natural science, mathematics, and metaphysics.
Certainly there is no indication in either passage that " abstraction " is used improperly in reference to metaphysics; rather
there is positive indication of the propriety of this usage in a
Thomistic exposition.
A good example of the second type of passage is found at
the beginning of the Commentary on the De Sensu et Sensato.
• Summa Theol., I, 85, 1, ad 2 (Leonine): "lntellectus igitur abstrahit speciem
rei naturalis a materia sensibili individuali, non autem a materia sensibili communi.
.. Species autem mathematicae possunt abstrahi per intellectum a materia sensibili
non solum individuali, sed etiam communi; non tamen a materia intelligibili communi, sed solum individuali. . . . Quaedam vero sunt quae possunt abstrahi etiam
a materia intelligibili communi, sicut ens, unum, potentia et actus, et alia huiusmodi,
quae etiam esse possunt absque omni materia, ut patet in substantiis immaterialibus.''
• In I Phys., I, n. 1 (Marietti): "Sciendum est igitur quod, cum omnis scientia
sit in intellectu, per hoc autem aliquid fit intelligibile in actu, quod aliqualiter
abstrahitur a materia; secundum quod aliqua diversimode se habent ad materiam,
ad diversas scientias pertinent.''

44

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

Here St. Thomas clearly reveals his willingness to speak of
separation in reference to each level of science. In this passage
he uses " separation " explicitly for metaphysics and mathematics and implicitly for natural science.
And since the habits of any potency are distinguished in kind
according to a difference in that which is formally the object of that
potency, it is necessary that the habits of science, by which the
intellect is perfected, be distinguished according to a difference in
separation (separationis) from rna tter. Therefore, the Philosopher
in the sixth book of the Metaphysics distinguishes the genera of
the sciences according to the diverse modes of their separation
(separationis) from matter. For those things which are separated
(separata) from matter insofar as they exist and insofar as they
are known pertain to metaphysics; those which are separated
(separata) insofar as they are known but not insofar as they exist
pertain to mathematics; and those which in their very meaning
include sensible matter pertain to natural science. 1

Not only does St. Thomas on occasion speak of abstraction
connection with each of the three genera of speculative
science, and on other occasions
separation
this same
general application, but sometimes he speaks indiscriminately
of abstraction and separation within the same passage. We
find an example of this type of passage in the preface to the
Commentary on the Metaphysics where St. Thomas uses a form
o:f " separare " in reference to each of the levels of science along
with a similar usage of a form of " abstrahere."
Those things are indeed separated (separata) from matter to the
greatest degree, 'which not only abstract (abstrahunt) from individual matter as the natural forms received in the universal about
which natural science is concerned,' but from aU sensible matter;
not only insofar as they are known, as is the case with mathematical
7 In De Sensu et Sensato, 1, n. l
(Marietti): "Et quia habitus alicuius potentiae
distinguuntur specie secundum differentiam eius quod est per se obiectum potentiae,
necesse est quod habitus scientiarum, quibus intellectus perficitur, etiam distinguuntur secundum differentiam separationis a materia; et ideo Philosophus in sexto
Zv!etaphysicorum distinguit genera scientiarum secundum diversum modum separationis a materia. Nam ea, quae sunt separata a materia secundum esse et rationem,
pertinent ad metaphysicum; quae autem sunt separata secundum rationem et non
secundum esse, pertinent ad mathematicum, quae autem in sui ratione concernunt
materiam s:msibiliem, pertinent ad naturam."

THREE DEGREES OF

ABSTRACTION

45

objects, but also insofar as they exist, as is the case with God and
the angels. 8

As a matter of fact we find this same indiscriminate use of
" abstraction " and " separation " in the very article which has
most of all occasioned the attack upon the traditional interpretation of St. Thomas by the Commentators. Early in the
controversial article in the De Trinitate, St. Thomas speaks
indiscriminately of abstraction and separation, precisely distinguishing between the use of " abstraction" and "separation"
only afterwards.
And since the truth of the intellect consists in a correspondence to
reality, it is evident that according to the second operation the
intellect cannot truly abstract (abstrahere) what is conjoined in
reality, because in abstracting ( abstrahendo) thusly there would be
an existential separation (separationem) signified, as when I abstract ( abstraho) man from white by saying ' the man is not white '
I signify a separation (separationem) in the real. ... By this
operation the intellect can truly abstract (abstrahere) only those
things which are separated (separata) in the real, as when I say
' the man is not an ass.' 9

Thus St. Thomas himself, not only elsewhere but even in the
controversial article itself, indicates a willingness not to restrict
himself to the strict terminology which limits " abstraction "
to natural science and mathematics and" separation" to metaphysics. In the light of this we must surely admit that we cannot question the Thomistic authenticity of the doctrine of the
Commentators simply because they speak of three degrees of
8 ln Met., prooem.
(Marietti): "Ea vero sunt maxime a materia separata, quae
non tantum a signata materia abstrahunt, ' sicut formae naturales in universali
acceptae, de quibus tractat scientia naturalis,' sed omnino a materia sensibili. Et
non solum secundum rationem, sicut mathematica, sed etiam secundum esse, sicut
Deus et intelligentiae."
9 In Boeth. de Trin., V, 3, c.:
"Et quia veritas intellectus est ex hoc quod con·
formatur rei, patet quod secundum hanc secundam operationem intellectus non
potest vere abstrahere quod secundum rem coniunctum est, quia in abstrahendo
significaretur esse separatio secundum ipsum esse rei, sicut si abstraho hominem ab
1\lbedine dicendo: homo non est albus, significo esse separationem in re. . . . Hac
operatione intellectus vere abstrahere non potest nisi ea quae sunt secundum rem
separata, ut cum dicitur: homo non est asinus."

46

EDWARD Do SIMMONS

abstraction without distinguishing terminologically between
abstraction and separation"
The apparent terminological difficulty can be resolved in
terms of a simple distinction between strict terminology on the
one hand and general terminology on the other" Speaking
generally we can legitimately use the terms, "abstraction" and
"separation," interchangeably, as SL Thomas usually does"
But because of a radical difference between the first two types
of abstraction or separation, speaking generally, and the third
we should be prepared to distinguish in the strict sense between
them" St" Thomas does this in the De Trinitate by speaking
of the first two as abstractions, strictly speaking, and the third
as separation, strictly speaking.
There is no doubt that St" Thomas is making an especially
strict distinction in the controversial article" To emphasize this
he repeatedly uses the term proprie when he speaks of separation as distinct from abstraction" The reason for the strict
distinction is dearly the fact that he is here bent upon showing
that it was precisely a failure on the part of the Platonists to
make this distinction which led them into the error of positing
the real existence of abstract fOli."IDS and universalso10 Whenever
SL Thomas sees fit pointedly to speak of the difference between
abstraction by way of simple and absolute consideration and
abstraction by way of composition and division; he does so in
a similar contexL 11 He speaks in each of these instances with
his mind on the error of the Platonists, an error best exposed in
terms of a strict distinction between types of abstraction
generally taken, or, as he expresses it in the De Trinitate,
10 Ibid.:
" Et quia quidam non intellexenmt differentiam duarum ultimarum
(namely, abstractiv totius and abstractio formae) a prima (riamely, separatio),
inciderunt in errorem, ut ponerent mathematica et universalia a sensibilibus separata,
ut Pythagorici et Platonici."
11 Cf., Summa Theol., 1, q. 85, a. l, ad l: here, it is interesting to note, St.
Thomas makes this distinction precisely in reference to the error of Plato without,
however, using the terms "abstraction" and "separation" but speaking rather of
a twofold abstraction ("o •. dicendum quod abstrahere contingit dupliciter. Uno
modo, per modum compositionis et divisionis. . . . Alio modo, per modum simplicia
et absolutae oonsiderationis. " . !')

THREE DEGREES OF FORMAL ABSTRACTION

47

between abstraction strictly taken and separation strictly taken.
There is nothing more than this to look for in this refinement
of doctrine and language. Certainly, the fact that St. Thomas
himself, whenever he is not aiming directly at the Plantonists,
is content to employ the general terminology, which is that
employed by Cajetan and John of St. Thomas, should be
guarantee enough that there is no conflict necessarily in evidence just because the Commentators do not choose to employ
the strict terminology used in the controversial article in the
Commentary on the De Trinitate.
THE DocTRINAL

IssuE

It seems evident that we cannot rule out the interpretation
of the Commentators on intellectual abstraction as lacking
Thomistic authenticity simply because they do not use the
terminology of the controversial article in the De Trinitate,
nor even because their terminology seems contrary to that here
used by St. Thomas. Otherwise we should rule out much of
what St. Thomas teaches elsewhere as being inauthentic for
the same reason; for, as we have seen, St. Thomas, even in his
latest work, the Summa Theologiae, chooses on occasion to
speak, like the Commentators after him, of three types of
abstraction analogously alike in that each is proper to a distinct
level of speculative science.
But admitting that the presentation of the Commentators
cannot be thrown out simply on the basis of some terminological
differences, should we not still discard the teaching of the three
degrees of formal abstraction as being doctrinally at odds with
that of St. Thomas? Let us see.
Cajetan and John of St. Thomas teach that the speculative
sciences are diversified according to differences in their formal
objects, and that these objects differ precisely as objects to the
extent to which they abstract differently from matter. Mobile
being is the formal object of one branch of speculative science,
natural science, as abstracting from individual matter. Quantified being is the formal object of a second branch of speculative
science, mathematics, as abstracting from individual and sensi-

48

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

ble matter. And being as such is the formal object of the third
branch of
science, metaphysics, as abstracting from
all matter. These three abstractions from matter are known
respectively as physical abstraction, mathematical abstraction,
and metaphysical abstraction; and they are, as yielding the
formal objects specificative of the types of speculative science,
the three degrees of formal abstraction. 12
The Commentators expose this doctrine very carefully with
the use of several illuminating distinctions. To begin with, of
course, they distinguish sharply between the material object
and the formal object. The material object is simply the thing
known. The formal object is the thing known precisely insofar
as it is an object of speculation. They then distinguish a twofold aspect (ratio) within the formal object itself. The first
of these is that formality or formal perfection in virtue of which
the object is rendered scientifically knowable. This formality
is defined as the" character (ratio) of the object known which
immediately terminates the act of a given scientific habit." It
is the scientifically characteristic aspect of the object "from
which flows the properties of the subject of this science, and
which is, in fact, the middle term of the primary demonstration
of this science." 13 It is precisely that in the object known in
virtue of which it is scientifically known. The second aspect
(ratio) of the formal object is its degree of freedom from
matter. This is the "mode of immateriality belonging to the
formal object as object, that is, the mode of abstraction and
definition proper to it." 14 Sciences are distinguished on the
basis of differences in formal objects. Formal objects are form12 Cf. especially Cajetan's exposition in In Summa Theol., I, q. 1, a. S. John of
St. Thomas treats the same matter in Curs. Phil., I, Ars Logica, II, q. 27, a. 1.
13 Cajetan, op. cit.: Cajetan here points out that there is a "duplex ratio obiecti
in scientia " and that the first of these is the "ratio formalis obiecti ut res" or the
" ratio formalis quae," which is the " ratio rei obiectae quae primo terminat actum
illius habitus, et ex qua fluunt passiones illius subiecti, et quae est medium in prima
demonstratione.''
14 Ibid.:
Cajetan teaches that the second aspect of the formal object is the
''ratio formalis obiecti ut obiectum " or the " ratio formalis sub qua," which is
" immaterialitas talis, seu talis modus abstrahendi et definiendi."

THREE DEGREES OF FORMAL ABSTRACTION

49

ally objects precisely insofar as they involve that intelligible
characteristic or formality in virtue of which they are formal
objects. And this formality is precisely a formality making the
object object insofar as it involves a distinctive abstraction
from matter and a characteristic mode of defining. Because
there are three abstractions from matter and corresponding
modes of defining (1. abstraction from individual matter and
definition' with sensible matter,
abstraction from individual
and sensible matter and definition with intelligible matter, and
3. abstraction from all matter and definition with no matter),
there are three types of speculative science. These three abstractions from matter, respectively specificative of the three
types of speculative science, are the three degrees of formal
abstraction. 15 They are three deg1·ees because each abstracts
differently, the one more intensely than the other, from matter.
They are degrees of formal abstraction because each determines a distinct formality in virtue of which being is precisely
an object of scientific speculation. This then, in brief, is the
doctrine of the three degrees of formal abstraction as presented
by the traditional commentators.
Nor does this presentation differ essentially from that of St.
Thomas himself. If we examine only some of his most significant texts in this regard we see that he teaches explicitly that
the distinction between the three genera of speculative science
(natural science, mathematics, and metaphysics) rests ulti15 Ibid.: Cajetan points out that for the physical, mathematical and metaphysical
habits of science the ratio formalis quae is respectively mGbilitas, quantitas, and
entita.q; the obie.ctum materiale in each case is ens; the obiectum formale quod is
respectively ens sub ratione mobilitatis, ens sub ratione quantitatis, and ens sub
ratione entitatis; and the ratio formalis
q1ta in each case is respectively modus
abstrahendi et definiendi cum materia sensibili non tamen hoc, cum materia intelligili tantum, and sine omni materia. Cf. John of St. Thomas, op. cit., SftOb ft2-40:
" Est autem triplex materia a qua potest fieri abstractio, ... scilicet singularis, quae
reddit rem individuam et singularem; sensibilis, quae reddit illam accidentibus
subiectam, saltern in communi; inteUigibilis, quae est substantia, et subiacet quantitati etiam aliis accidentibus. Et ex abstractione seu carentia diversa
huius materiae sumitur triplex genus scientiarum: Physica, quae abstrahit solum a
materia singulari et tractat de sensibili; mathematica, quae etiam a materia sensibili
et
de quantitati; metaphysica, quae etiam a intelligibili et tractat de
substantia seu ente."

50

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

mately on the degree of abstraction from matter and mode of
defining proper to each. And this, as we have indicated, is
precisely the position held by the Commentators in their presentation of the doctrine of the three degrees of formal abstraction.
In the first article of the fifth question in his Commentary on
the De Trinitate of Boethius/ 6 St. Thomas discusses the division of speculative science into three parts, namely, natural
science, mathematics, and metaphysics. He begins by pointing
out that a habit is distinguished by its object; however, not by
any object whatsoever, i. e., the object materially taken, but
only by an object precisely insofar as it is properly an object
of this habit, i.e., the object formally taken. Next he points
out that that kind of habit which is a speculative science must
be distinguished by an object precisely insofar as it is an
object of speculation, i.e., precisely insofar as it is speculatively
intelligible. Fmally, St. Thomas points out that the speculative
intelligiblity of an object is determined by its separation or
remotion from matter and motion. Thereupon, he concludes, in
18 In Boeth. de Trin., V, 1, c:
" Speculativarum vero scientiarum materiam
oportet esse res quae a nostro opere non fiunt. . . . Et secundum harum rerum
distinctionem oportet scientias speculativas distingui. Sciendum tamen quod, quando
habitus vel potentiae penes obiecta distinguuntur, non distinguuntur penes quaslibet
differentias obiectorum, sed penes illas quae sunt per se obiectorum in quantum
sunt obiecta. . . . Et ideo oportet scientias speculativas dividi per differentias
bpeculabilium, in quantum speculabilia sunt. . . . Sic ergo speculabili, quod est
obiectum scientiae speculativae, per se competit separatio a materia et motu vel
applicatio ad ea. Et ideo secundum ordinem remotionis a materia et motu scientiae
speculativae distinguuntur. Quaedam ergo speculabilium sunt, quae dependent a
materia secundum esse, quia non nisi in materia esse possunt. Et haec distinguuntur, quia quaedam dependent a materia secundum esse et intellectum, sicut ilia,
m quorum diffinitione ponitur materia sensibilia; uncle sine materia sensibili intelligi
non possunt, ut in diffinitione hominis oportet accipere carnem et ossa. Et de his
est physica sive scientia naturalis. Quaedam vero sunt, quae quamvis dependeant a
materia secundum esse, non tamen secundum intellectum, quia in eorum diffinitionibus non ponitur materia sensibilia, sicut linea et numerus. Et de his est mathematica.
Quaedam vero speculabilia sunt, quae non dependent a materia secundum esse,
quia sine materia esse possunt, sive numquam sint in materia, sicut Deus et
angelus, sive in quibusdam sint in materia et in quibusdam non, ut substantia,
qualitas, ens, potentia, actus, unum et multa et huiusmodi. De quibus omnibus est
theologia, id est scientia divina ... quae alio nomine dicitur metaphysica."

THREE DEGREES OF

ABSTRACTION

51

terms not unlike those of the Commentators later, that the
speculative sciences are distinguished into three on the basis
of the degree of remotion, which is the same as abstraction,
from matter and motion evidenced in the mode of defining
proper to each. This is to teach the same doctrine later taught
by the Commentators that there are three degrees o£ objective
independence from matter which determine three distinct formalities respectively constituting objects specificative of the
three types of speculative science, natural science, mathematics,
and metaphysics.
Perhaps the most clear-cut and concentrated formulation by
St. Thomas of the doctrine later taught by the Commentators
is found at the very begining of the Commentary on the De

Sens·u et Sensato .
. . . just as things are separable from matter so also are they related
to the intellect. For each thing is intelligible to the degree to which
it is separable from matter. Thus those things which are by nature
separated from matter are in themselves intelligible in act; but those
which are abstracted by us from material conditions become intelligible in act through the light of our agent intellect. And since the
habits of any potency are distinguished in kind according to a
difference in that which is formally the object of that potency, it
is necessary that the habits of science, by which the intellect is
perfected, be distinguished according to a difference in separation
from matter. Therefore, the Philosopher in the sixth book of the
Metaphysics distinguishes the genera of the sciences according to
the diverse modes of their separation from matter. For those things
which are separated from matter insofar as they exist and insofar as
they are known pertain to metaphysics; those which are separated
insofar as they are known but not insofar as they exist pertain to
mathematics; and those which in their very meaning include sensible
matter pertain to natural science.H
17 In De Sensu et Sensato, 1, n. 1:
" ... sicut separabiles sunt res a materia, sic
et quae circa intellectum sunt. Unumquodque enim intantum est intelligible, in·
quantum est a materia separabile. Unde ea quae sunt secundum naturam a materia
separata, sunt secundum seipsa intelligibilia actu: quae vero a nobis a materialibus
conditionibus sunt abstracta, fiunt intelligibilia actu per lumen nostri intellectus
agentis. Et quia habitus alicuius potentiae distinguuntur specie secundum differentiam eius quod est per se obiectum potentiae, necesse est quod habitus scientiarum,
quibus intellectus perficitur, etiam distinguantur secundum differentiam separationis
a materia; et ideo Philosophus in sexto M etaphyaicorum distinguit genera scientiar-

52

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

In this passage from the De Sensu et Sensato St. Thomas
teaches that the sciences are divided into three genera according
to "diverse modes of separation from matter" (secundum
diversu1n modum separationis a materia). In the previous
passage from the De Trinitate he divides the sciences into three
genera on the basis of " the different orders of remotion from
matter and motion" (secundum ordinem remotionis a materia
et motu). Cajetan later divides the sciences into three according to " diverse modes of formal abstraction " (penes diversos
modos abstractionis formalis). Since formal abstraction is for
Cajetan the abstraction of that which is formal in respect to the
intellect from the matter which shrouds its intelligibility
(scilicet qua formale abstrahitur a materiali) it seems clear
that Cajetan is expressing the same doctrine as that expressed
by St. Thomas, and, as a matter of fact, in language not so
radically different from that of St. Thomas after all.
In the opening lesson of the sixth book of the Commentary
on the Metaphysics 18 St. Thomas treats at length the question
urn secundum diversum modum separationis a materia. Nam ea, quae sunt separata
a materia secundum esse et rationem, pertinent ad metaphysicam, quae autem sunt
separata secundum rationem et non secundum esse, pertinent ad mathematicam;
quae autem in sui ratione concernunt materiam sensibilem, pertinent ad naturalem."
18 ln VI Met., l, nn. 1155-1165:
... Cum enim definitio sit medium demonstrationis, et per consequens principium sciendi, oportet quod ad diversum modum
definiendi, sequatur diversitas in scientiis speculativis. . . . Et ex hoc palam est
quis est modus inquirendi quidditatem rerum naturalium, et definiendi in scientia
naturali, quia scilicet cum materia sensibili. . . . In hoc ergo differt mathematica
a physica, quia physica considerat ea quorum definitiones sunt cum materia sensibili.
Et ideo considerat non separata, inquantum sunt non separata. Mathematica vero
considerat ea, quorum definitiones sunt sine materia sensibili. Et ideo, etsi sunt non
separata ea quae considerat, tamen considerat ea inquantum sunt separata . . •
si est aliquid immobile secundum esse, et per consequens sempiternum et separabile
a materia secundum esse, palam est, quod eius consideratio est theoricae scientiae .
. . . Et tamen consideratio talis entis non est physica. Nam physica considerat de
quibusdam entibus, scilicet de mobilibus. Et similiter consideratio huius entis non
est mathematica; quia mathematica non considerat separabilia secundum esse, sed
secundum rationem, ut dictum est. Sed oportet quod consideratio huius entis sit
alterius scientiae prioris ambabus praedictis, scilicet physica et mathematica. . . .
Advertendum est autem, quod licet ad considerationem primae philosophiae pertineant ea sunt separata secundum esse et rationem a materia et motu, non tamen
solum ea; sed etiam de sensibilibus, inquantum sunt entia. . ... "

THREE DEGREES OF

ABSTRACTION

53

of the diversification of the speculative sciences and once again
concludes that this depends ultimately upon the diversification
in the modes of separation or abstraction from matter proper
to the various scientific subjects. He begins by arguing, as he
does elsewhere, that sciences are differentiated in terms of
formal differences in their principles. But the most significant
principle of scientific argumentation is the middle term of
demonstration. And the middle term of demonstration is the
definition of the subject of scientific inquiry. Accordingly, any
formal diversity in speculative sciences will follow from a formal
diversity in the mode of defining found in each. From St.
Thomas' discussion and in his examples it is clear that he
considers differences in definitions to be formal in respect to the
differentiation of the sciences when these differences reflect
distinctly diverse relationsips to matter. Because these diverse
relationships to matter are generically three he concludes that
these are three genera of speculative science, namely, natural
science, which defines with sensible matter a subject which can
exist only in matter; mathematics, which defines without sensible matter a subject which can exist only in matter; and metaphysics, which defines without any matter a subject which can,
but need not, exist without any matter. In other words, these
three sciences are, in the final analysis, distinct from one
another precisely insofar as the object formal to each is related
in a radically different way to matter, i. e., insofar as each is
differently separated from or abstracted from matter. This is
to teach, in equivalent terms, the same doctrine held by the
Commentators when they teach that speculative science is
divided into natural science, mathematics, and metaphysics on
the basis of the three degrees of formal abstraction.
In an equally significant passage in his Commentary on the
Posterior Analytics 19 St. Thomas argues in a similar fashion for
19 In I Post. Anal., 41, nn. 861-871 (Marietti):
... Scientia dicitur una, ex
hoc quod est unius generis subiecti. . . . Est autem considerandum circa primum,
quod cum rationem unitatis scientiae acceperit ex unitate generis subiecti, rationem
diversitatis scientiarum non accepit ex diversitati subiecti, sed ex diversitate principiorum. .Dicit enim quod una scientia est altera aB alia, quarum principia sunt
diversa; ita quod nee ambarum scientiarum principia procedent ex aliquibus

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

a principle of diversification for the sciences which reduces
itself to that of the degrees of formal abstraction. Here St.
Thomas notes, with Aristotle, that the diversification of the
sciences depends on the diversification of the principles whereby they proceed. Thus one science is distinct from another
whenever the principles from which it proceeds do not themselves depend on the same prior principles upon which depend
the principles of the other and when the principles of the one
do not depend upon the principles of the other. This is true
whether we speak of the complex principles of science or the
incomplex principles, though St. Thomas is here speaking of
the incomplex principle of demonstration, namely, the middle
term. Thus . the diversification of the sciences rests on a
diversity in middle terms. This is to say that the sciences are
distinguished on the basis of a distinction in the degree of
abstraction from matter proper to a given science. For the
middle term in a demonstration is a probative principle precisely inasmuch as it is the definition of the subject of the demonstration expressing the cause of the property to be proven
of the subject in the conclusion of the demonstration. Hence,
middle terms will be distinguished as principles of science
according to differences in them as far as mode of defining is
concerned. And, since the mode of defining of an object depends
upon its degree of abstraction from matter we must conclude
that St. Thomas here once again teaches that .the speculative
vrincipiis prioribus, nee principia unius scientiae procedent ex principiis alterius
scientiae. Ad huius ergo evidentiam sciendum est, quod materialis diversitas obiecti
non diversificat habitum, sed solum formalis. Cum ergo scibile sit proprium obiectum
scientiae, non diversificabuntur scientiae secundum diversitatem materialem scibilium,
sed secundum diversitatem eorum formalem. . . . Patet ergo quod ad diversificandum
scientias sufficit diversitas principiorum, quam comitatur diversitas generis scibilis.
Ad hoc autem quod sit una scientia simpliciter utrumque requiritur et unitas
subiecti et unitas principiorum. . . . Nee tamen intelligendum est quod sufficit ad
unitatem scientiae unitas principiorum primorum simpliciter, sed unitas principiorum
primorum in aliquo genere scibili. Distinguuntur autem genera scibilium secundum
diversum modum cognoscendi. Sicut alio modo cognoscantur ea quae definiuntur
cum materia, et ea quae definiuntur sine materia. . . . Et sic patet quod unitas
generis scibilis in quantum est scibile, ex quo accipiebatur unitas scientiae, et
unitas principiorum, secundum quae accipiebatur scientae diversitas, sibi mutuo
correspondent. • . ."

THREE DEGREES OF FORMAL ABSTRACTION

55

sciences are distinguished according to the degrees of abstraction from matter. That this is his point seems evident when he
indicates, by way of illustration, that the distinction between
natural science and mathematics :rests ultimately on the diverse
mode of defining proper to each, the one with sensible matter
and the other without sensible matter.
St. Thomas, following Aristotle, begins his discussion in this
lesson by distinguishing between the principle of the unity of
science and the principle of the diversity of the sciences. Yet,
ultimately, these two are the same, as St. Thomas indicates
later on in the lesson. The unity of a science rests on the unity
of its generic subject. But the subject of demonstration is
properly subject only insofar as it is speculatively intelligible.
And it is speculatively intelligible only insofar as it is free from
matter, the principle of non-intelligibility. Thus, scientific subjects are one only insofar as they identically abstract from
matter, this being :revealed in their identical mode of defining.
Accordingly, the unity of a science within itself, as well as the
distinction of a science from other sciences, is ultimately
pendent upon the same specifying principle, namely, the degree
of abstraction from matter proper to the science. Thus we find
St. Thomas teaching, both in :reference to the unity and the
diversity of the sciences, the doctrine presented later by the
traditional Commentators as the doctrine of the three degrees
of formal abstraction.
These several texts of St. Thomas, to which others could be
added/ 0 indicate the general agreement between the doctrine
St. Thomas on the specification of the sciences and that of the
traditional Commentators expressed in terms of the three
degrees of abst:raction. 21 There :remains, however, the task of
20 Notably, Summa
Theol., I, 85, 1, ad 2; ln l Phys. l, nn. 1 & 2; and In Met.,
prooem.
21 I have indicated
above that the Commentators discuss the division of the
sciences in terms of five notions, namely, l. the scientific habit itself, 2. its material
object,. 3. its formal object, 4. the ratio formalis quae of this formal object, and 5.
the ratio formalis sub qua of the formal object. St. Thomas expresses himself in
terms of these same notions. It might be worthwhile here in support of my thesis
to note the exact terminology of St. Thomas and his traditional Commentators as

56

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

particularly reconciling St. Thomas' abstractio totius with the
first degree of formal abstraction, his abstractio formae with the
second degree of formal abstraction, and his separatio with the
third degree of formal abstraction.
they express themselves in reference to these notions. J. Maritain has on several
occasions ably defended the traditional interpretation of the Commentators and in
doing so has happily introduced into modern Thomistic language his own illuminating terminology for these five notions. Because of the aptness of his expressions I
shall include his with those of St. Thomas and the Commentators. The expressionb
shall be numbered for each man according to the numbering already indicated above
in this note.

St. Thomas
l. Habitus scientiae. (used extensively throughout his works)
!i!. Obiectum materiale, id quod materialiter cognoscitur (Summa Theol., II-II,

1, 1, c.)
3. Subiectum scientiae, vel genus scibile. (In I Post. Anal., 41, passim).
4. Ratio cognoscibilis. (Summa Theol., I, 1, 1, ad !i!).
5. Remotio a materia et motu seu modus separationis a materia, et diversus
modus definiendi. (In Boeth. de Trin., V, l, c.; In De Sensu et Sensato, l,
n. 1; In VI Met., 1, n. 1156).
(These are not the only expressions used for these notions by St. Thomas,
but they are typical.)
Cajetan (Cf. In Summa Theol., I, l, 3; In ·Post. Anal., XXII; ln De Ente et
Essentia, prooem, q. 1).
l. Habitus vel potentia.
2. Obiectum materiale seu res.
3. Obiectum vel subiectnm formale quod.
4. Ratio formalis obiecti nt res seu ratio formalis quae.
5. Ratio fonnalis obiectum sen ratio formalis sub qua (modus abstrahendi et
definiendi respectu materiae).
John of St. Thomas (Cf. Curs. Phil., I, Ars. Log. II, q. 1, a. 3; q. 27, a. 1).
1. Ratio formalis sub qua parte habitus.
2. Obiectum materiale.
3. Obiectum quod seu ipsum totum quod constat ex obiecto materiali et
formalitate.
4. Ratio formalis quae ex parte obiecti.
5. Ratio formalis sub qua ex parte obiecti (diversa abstractio a materia et diversus
modus definiendi) .
Maritain (Cf. La Philosophie de la Nature, pp. HS-127, in English trans., pp. 125135).
l. Scientific habitus, or subjective light in the effective order.
!i!. Material object.
3. Formal object, i.e., sphere d'intelligibilitate fundamentale.
4. Inspect under which object presents itself to intellect, i. e., appel d'intelligi-

bilitate.
5. Mode of eidetic visualization and defining demanded by the object, or objective

light.

THREE DEGREES OF

ABSTRACTION

57

I. A.bstractio Totius
At first glance it would seem impossible to find Cajetan's
notion of formal abstraction realized in St. Thomas' abstractio
totius. The latter is literally a type of total abstraction, and
Cajetan himself sharply distinguishes between total abstraction
on the one hand and formal abstraction on the other. However,
the confusion here is basically one of terminology. In a very
general sense both Cajetan's abstractio totalis and St. Thomas'
totius are abstractions-of-a-whole, but without being
identified as abstractions of the same whole. In fact, both
Cajetan's first degree of formal abstraction and St. Thomas'
abstractio totius are both also generally abstractions-of-a-form,
and, in fact, are identified as being abstractions of the same
form.
Cajetan's abstractio totalis is the mental separation of a
logical whole from its subjective parts, the abstractum to be
considered precisely as being more general than that from which
it has been abstracted (est 'ltt tatum universale respectu ejus,
a quo abstrahitur). The whole-part composition on which this
abstraction depends is the composition o:f logical whole with
subjective parts. 22
St. Thomas' abstractio totius is the mental separation of the
specific essence of the physical thing from the individuating
characteristics which shroud its intelligibility, the abstractum to
be considered precisely insofar as it involves an intelligible
content determined by that point of intelligibility distinctive
of the natural sciences (in qua consideratur absolute
aliqua secundum suam rationem essentialem) . The . wholepart composition on which this abstraction depends is the
composition of essential whole with non-essential parts. 28
22 Cf., supra, note 2.
""Cf. supra, note 8. There is at this point a difficulty in the text of St. Thomas
which demands explanation. It seems clear in the controversial article that in
explaining the notion of abstractio totius as distinct from abstractio formae and
separatio St. Thomas intends to limit abstractio totius as explained to the natural
sciences. In pointing out that by way of this abstraction some nature abstracted as
a whole is considered absolutely in respect to its essential ratio (" abstractio totius,

58

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

Inasmuch as each is an abstraction of a whole from its parts
each is legitimately called an abstraction-of-a-whole or a total
abstraction, but insofar as the whole is a formally different one
in each case the abstractions in question are diverse. This is
true despite the fact that each might be exemplified in apparently the same example. The abstraction of man from this man
and from that man is an example both of Cajetan's abs_t]'JJ&tia
totalis and St. Thomas' abstractio totius. However, though
materially identical the example is formally diverse in each
case. It happens, on the physical level at least, that the matter
which individuates an essence is materially identical with the
matter which shrouds the intelligibility of that essence. This
is not formal identity, for it is not precisely insofar as a thing
is singular or individual that it is non-intelligible, or else an
individual angel would thereby be non-intelligible because it
is singular. The principle of individuation and the principle of
non-intelligibility are formally diverse principles. Yet in the
physical thing they do coincide, so that matter which individuates the physical essence is also that matter which makes it as
in qua consideratur .absolute natura aliqu.a secundum suam rationem essentialem ")
he cuts abstractio totius off from mathematics, where the abstraction is not of a
whole but a part, and from metaphysics, where the abstraction or separation reveals
its object not simply from the point of view of essential perfection but formally
from the point of view of the act of existing. Nevertheless it must be admitted that
at the end of the controversial article St. Thomas explicitly says that abstractio
totius not only belongs to natural science but is common to all the sciences (" competit etiam physicae et est communis omnibus scientiis ") . Since it is clear that as
explained throughout the article abstractio totius belongs properly to natural science
and neither to mathematics nor metaphysics it ·seems that here at the end of the
article St. Thomas, perhaps unhappily, switches the use of the term "abstractio
totius " so that in this instance it does not mean precisely what it has meant
throughout the article. "Abstractio totius" can be used in that general sense which
signifies any abstraction-of-a-whole, be it essential whole or logical whole. St.
Thomas' abstractio totius, explained as the abstraction of the essential whole and
hence proper to natural science, and Cajetan's abstractio totalis, explained as the
abstraction of the logical whole and hence common to all the sciences, are both
instances of abstractio totius explained generally as the abstraction-of-a-whole. Used
in this general sense, " abstractio totius " can be said of an abstraction belonging to
natural science and yet common to all the sciences. St. Thomas seems to use it in
this general sense at the end of the controversial article after having used it in the
restricted sense which limits it to natural science throughout most of the article.

THREE DEGREES OF FORMAL ABSTRACTION

59

concretized in matter to he non-intelligibile. Thus it is that the
mental separation of man from this man and that man is an
example both of Cajetan's abstractio totalis and of St. Thomas'
abstractio totius. Yet these abstractions remain formally distinct from one another, abstractio totalis being the abstraction
of a logical whole from its subjective parts, and abstractio
totius being the abstraction of the essential whole (of the physical thing) from its non-essential parts. 24
St. Thomas' abs.tractio totius is, therefore, the abstraction of
a whole from its parts- without being identical with total abstraction, which is also an abstraction of a whole from its parts.
But this does not explain the reason why abstractio totius can
be considered legitimately a type of formal abstraction.
Cajetan's formal abstraction, in contradistinction to his total
abstraction, is the mental separation of an intelligible form, i. e.,
a knowledge object of thought from the matter which shrouds
its intelligibility. And St. Thomas' abstractio totius is the
mental separation of the essential whole from the individuating
characteristics which are its non-essential parts. As such it is
precisely an abstraction of an intelligibile object from the
matter which shrouds its intelligibility, and, hence, is a valid
instance of Cajetan's formal abstraction.
St. Thomas is careful to point out on occasion that abstractio
totius yields a whole and not a form. But he means this in a
qualified sense. Abstractio totius frees for scientific investigation not just substantial form, but rather substantial form in
its transcendental relationship to prime matter. It yields a
form-matter composite rather than just form alone. Thus from
this point of view it is an abstractio totius and not an abstractio
formae. Yet the abstractum of this abstraction, the totum
composed of substantial form and prime matter, can be considered itself as a form in reference to the matter which individuates it. In fact, St. Thomas frequently makes this point
explicit, insisting that the essential whole is related as form to
the individual, despite the fact that it is already itself composed
•• For a more complete treatmel).t of this important point, cf. Simmons, op. cit.

60

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

through a form-matter relationship." 5 Thus, there should be no
difficulty in seeing why physical abstraction, on occasion labeled
abstractio totius, because it is an abstraction of an essential
whole from its non-essential parts, might also on another occasion be labeled a type of abstmctio formalis because it is an
abstraction of a form or intelligible object from matter. 26
Thus understood, Cajetan's first degree of formal abstraction,
yielding an object of thought abstracted from individual sensible matter and distinctive of the natural sciences, is identical
with St. Thomas' abstractio totius, yielding, as St. Thomas
teaches, an intelligible object mentally freed from individual
sensible matter and involving thereby that degree of intelligibility distinctive of the natural sciences.

II. Abstractio Formae
The purpose of this paper is to establish the legitimacy of
speaking authentically as a Thomist of three types of formal
abstraction proper respectively to natural science, mathematics,
and metaphysics. I have already tried to make the point that
it is certainly Thomistic to speak of St. Thomas' abstractio
totius as a type of formal abstraction. I will attempt shortly
to establish the same point in reference to St. Thomas' separatio. In the meantime it may seem pointless to spend time
on mathematical abstraction, for this is a type of abstraction
most obviously considered a formal abstraction by St. Thomas,
who calls it significantly abstractio formae. Nevertheless it
might be worthwhile to indicate briefly the reason why St.
Thomas might be moved to speak of this as an abstractio
25 In II Phys., 5, n. 179:
"Natura igitur speciei constituta ex forma et materia
communi, se habet ut formalis respectu individui quod participat talem naturam .
. ." Cf. also, Summa Theol., I, 85, 1, c. and Cont. Gent., IV, 81.
•• From the point of view of its intelligible content the object of natural science
corresponds to what is called the "forma totius "; cf. In VII Met., 9, n. 1467:
·· Forma paxtis dicitur secundum quod perficit materiam, et facit earn esse in actu:
Forma autem totius, secundum quod totum compositum per earn in specie collocatur." The abstraction which yields the object for natural science can be spoken of
either as an abstractio formae (i.e., abstractio FORMAE totius) or as an abstractio
totius (i.e., abstractio formae TOTIUS).

THREE DEGREES OF

ABSTRACTION

61

formae even though he does not use this terminology in reference to the other abstractions-of-a-formo
The fact is that even though abstractio totius and separatio
are legitimately thought of as formal abstractions, abstractio
formae is the formal abstraction par excellence. In its original
derivation the philosophically technical term, " form," in Thomistic terminology has reference to the specifying principle of
motion or change, that is, to that active principle in the
quidditative order which combines with matter to give us the
mobile composite. Thus "form," in its strictest sense, connotes
a part of a whole in the quidditative order. The formal ratio
abstracted in physical abstraction is not a part in the quidditative order but rather a whole. And the formal ratio abstracted
in metapyhical abstraction is not limited to the quidditative
order but is principally of the existential order. Yet the formal
ratio abstracted in mathematical abstraction, though it is not
the substantial form which combines with prime matter to
yield the mobile substance, is a part in that it is formally an
accidental determination of a substance, and is a part in the
quidditative order. Hence mathematical abstraction can be
considered more strictly an abstraction of a form than can
either physical or metaphysical abstraction. 27
Mathematical abstraction differs radically from the other two.
Physical abstraction yields an object of thought (mobile being)
inclusive of sensible matter-and mobile being exists extramentally in sensible mattero Metaphysical abstraction yields
an object (being as such) in separation from aU matter-and
being is able to be realized in strictly immaterial substances.
But mathematical abstraction yields an object (quantified
being) in abstraction from sensible matter even though quantifield being can extramentally exist only in sensible things. 28
The only existence that the mathematical entity has precisely
Cf. In Boeth. de Trin., V, 3, c. and ad 2.
In I Phys., l, n. 2: " ... curvum vero, licet esse non possit nisi in materia
sensibili, tamen in eius definitione materia sensibilis non cadit; et talia sunt omnia
mathematica, ut numeri, magnitudines et figurae "; also In VI Met., 1, nn. ll(H &
H62 (cf. supra, note 18); In Boeth. de Trin., V, 1, c. (cf. supra, note Hl).
27

28

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

in its characteristic as a mathematical entity, i. e., in separation
from sensible matter, is in the mind of the mathematician.
Accordingly, mathematical judgments must be verified in the
mind of the mathematician and not in the extramental real
as is the situation in the other sciences.29 Thus the total
rationale of the mathematical object is that of a form. It is a
real essence but not a real nature. It involves no inner principle
of activity and has no potentiality to become something other
than it is. It is wholly and totally its own formal actuality, an
actuality explicable only in terms of formal causality. 30 Accordingly, the mathematical object though originally abstracted
from concrete sensible things (and, hence, real) is in a special
sense a form enjoying a purely formal existence. Thus mathematical abstraction is, in this sense, the formal abstraction
par excellence.

III. Separatio
In my attempt to resolve the doctrine of the traditional
Commentators into the authentic doctrine of St. Thomas, I
have tried so far to show that the abstractio totius of the
natural sciences is a type of formal abstraction not to be conf"Qsed with the total abstraction common to all the sciences,
and that the abstractio formae proper to mathematics is not
necessarily the only type of formal abstraction, though it is,
in a certain sense, the formal abstraction pm· excellence. There
remains to be discussed the case of separatio.
To some Thomists separatio seems so radically different from
both abstractio totius and abstractio formae as to preclude any
possibility of considering it as one of three types of formal
•• In Boetk. de Trin., VI, !ll, c.: "Sed quia secundum rationem diffinitivam non
abstrahunt a qualibet materia, sed solum a sensibili et remotis sensibilibus condicionibus remanet aliquid imaginable, ideo in talibus oportet quod indicium sumatur
secundum id quod imaginatio demonstrat. Huiusmodi autem sunt mathematica. Et
ideo in mathematicis oportet cognitionem secundum indicium terminari ad imaginationem, non ad sensum, quia indicium mathematicum superat apprehensionem
sensus."
•• In I Pkys., 1, n. 5: "Nam mathematica non demonstrat nisi per causam
formalem .... "

THREE DEGREES OF

ABSTRACTION

63

abstraction. Nonetheless, there is community enough, albeit
tenuously analogical, to establish the classification. Separatio,
like abstractio totius and abstractio formae, is a mental separation of an intelligible object from the matter which shrouds its
intelligibility. And this object, precisely in this abstraction
separated from
matter, is so constituted intelligibly as to
specify the science of metaphysics, just as the respectively
radically different abstracta of abstractio totius and abstractio
formae in turn specify natural science and mathematics. Admittedly there are great differences between the first two types
of formal abstraction and this third, yet each is analogously an
abstraction and a formal abstraction.
Abstraction, as St. Thomas says, can take place in two ways.
First of all, there is the mental separation of one feature of
reality from another though these features of reality do not,
because they cannot, exist apart from one another. This abstraction is legitimately effected in an act of simple apprehension so long as what is conceptualized separately is ontologically
prior to
from
it has been mentally separated.
Secondly, there is the mental separation of one thing from
another when this one thing does, or at least can, exist apart
from the other. This abstraction involves a negative judgment
enunciating this existential independence of the abstractum
from that from which it has been abstracted. Each is generally
an abstraction or mental separation, but
former is less
radically a separation, involving
objective and not
ential separation, than the latter, involving even existential
separation, and is, when the intention is to stress this difference,
spoken of strictly as an abstraction while the latter is spoken
of as a separation. 31 The analogical notion of abstraction,
generally taken, is that of a mental separation of one thing
from another. This mental separation can be considered psychologically, when we speak of the act of mentally separating,
and/or objectively, when we speak of the ontological, sometimes
31

ln Boeth. de Trin., V, 3, c. (cf. supra, note 3).

64

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

even existential, independence of one thing from another; the
latter, of course, is the measure of the former. 82
Formal abstraction is the mental separation of an object,
precisely as intelligible, from the matter which shrouds its
intelligibility. Insofar as there are different degrees of matter
from which objects can be freed by abstraction there are different degrees of formal abstraction yielding objects knowable on
different levels of intelligibility. Since it is the intelligibility of
an object which constitutes it precisely an object, and since the
speculative sciences are specified precisely by objects insofar as
they are objects, it follows that the different degrees of formal
abstraction specify respectively the different branches of speculative science.
Separatio, according to St. Thomas, is the mental separation
of being from all matter, a mental separation revealing being
not only as ontologically prior to all matter-as is mobile being
to individual matter and quantified being to sensible matterbut even as existentially independent of, i. e., able to exist
without, matter. 88 This mental separation yields an object of
thought, namely, being as such, intelligible to the highest degree
and constitutive of a distinct science, metaphysics. 84 As a
mental separation yielding the formal object of a distinct
science, separatio is, like abstractio totius and abstractio
formae, truly a type of formal abstraction. This is not to ignore
at all the basic differences between sepamtio and the other two
formal abstractions which, we should remember, are as between
themselves radically disparate in nature. Separatio involves the
second type of abstraction, generally taken, namely negative
•• The two ways of viewing the modes of abstraction as specificative of the sciences
are in no way opposed to one another such that an interpretation from one point
of view must needs be at odds with an interpretation from the other. Rather, since
the real as known is the form ot the intellect knowing, they are but complementary
views of the same thing. It has been pointed out that the Commentators chose the
objective point of view and St. Thomas, in the controversial article at least, the
psychological (c£. Kane, op. cit.). This need not at all call into question the
Thomistic authenticity of the interpretation of the Commentators as some have
suggested (cf. Regis, op. cit.).
•• Cf. especially, In Boeth. de Trin., V, 3, c.
•• Cf. especially, In VI Met., 1, nn. 1162-1165.

THREE DEGREES

OF FORMAL ABSTRACTION

65

judgment. The object whose intelligibility is revealed in separatio is knowable on an entirely unique level. This object is,
moreover, only analogically realized in its instances,
paradoxically a whole which actually includes its inferiors and
not, as with the univocal whole, only potentially including its
inferiors. 85 Yet despite these differences separatio is still proportionally like abstractio totius and abstractio formae, since
each in its own way yields an object distinctively free from the
.restrictions of matter and accordingly proportioned to a given
level of scientific investigation. The difficulties involved in
accepting the abstraction proper to metaphysics as one of the
three degrees of formal abstraction disintegrate in the face of
a proper understanding of the traditional doctrine on the three
degrees. These are
as they are sometimes popularly misconceived to be, three univocal steps in progressively stripping
away outer layers of reality to reveal in turn different inner
layers. Nothing could
further from the trutho Rather they
are three
different mental separations of distinctly
different
matter. The three degrees
abstraction are only analogically
like one another, meaning of course, that
are basically
diverse in
and
the sameo Yet
this proportional sameness,
legitimacy of speaking of
degrees of :formal abstraction
determining respectively the three branches of speculative
sc1ence.
SuMMARY

The purpose of this paper has been to show that neither the
terminology nor the doctrine of the traditional Commentators
is at odds with the teaching of St. Thomas as far as the
of the specification of the speculative sciences is concerned. 36
Cf. especially, De Ver., ][, l, c.
The fact that the Commentators do not emphasize the difference in the strict
sense between abstraction according to absolute consideration (abstractio proprie)
and abstraction according to negative judgment (separatio) is no doubt a wealmess
in their presentation of the Thomistic doctrine of abstraction. For this refinement of
terminology and doctrine in St. Thomas underscores a point of major importance
85

36

66

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

I have tried to show, as far as the terminological issue is concerned, that St. Thomas himself in some texts has chosen to
speak of three different abstractions as proper respectively to
natural science, mathematics, and metaphysics despite the fact
that in other texts he speaks rather of two abstractions and a
separation. Further I have tried to show, in respect to the
doctrinal issue, that the general teaching of St. Thomas on
the specification of the sciences corresponds to the interpretation of the Commentators even though St. Thomas does not
speak, as do the Commentators, explicitly of three degrees of
formal abstraction. Both St. Thomas and the Commentators
teach that the specification of a science depends on its distinctive degree of abstraction or remotion from matter, and that
there are three generically different branches of science corresponding to the three different ways in which an object can be
free from the restrictions of matter. Lastly, I have tried to
show in particular the doctrinal identity of St. Thomas' abtotius, abstractio formae, and separatio respectively
with the first (physical) , second (mathematical) , and third
(metaphysical) degrees of formal abstraction rightly understood. To illustrate this last point-and, in fact, as a summary
of the whole paper-I would like to suggest the following
schema as an illustration of the terminological and doctrinal
community between St. Thomas and his traditional Commentators on the question of intellectual abstraction.

eb'Pecially in respect to the nature of metaphysical science. However, this is by no
means to say that this lack of emphasis on an important point suffices to vitiate the
entire interpretation of St. Thomas by the traditional Commentators. It does, in a
sense, leave the exposition of the Commentations incomplete. Nevertheless, their
exposition remains generally faithful to the teaching of St. Thomas and in fact
represents an admirably clear and pedagogically useful expression of the general
doctrine of St. Thomas on the diversification of the science.

ii:::

l
i;i•
It

fr ae

Abstraction in strict
sense (according to
simple apprehensionabstractio proprie)

0

1-

Abstraction in
general, i. e.,
Dlental separation
of one thing from
tr:l another
Separation in strict
sense (according to
negative judgmentseparatio proprie)

f

Mental separation of
intelligible form or
ratio from matter
formalis)

Mental separation of }
logical whole from
subjective parts
(abstractio totalis)

Common
to all the
sciences

Mental separation of
essential whole
from individual
matter
( abstractio totius)

Proper to
natural
science

Mental separation of}
form of quantity from
sensible matter
(abstractio formae)

Proper to
mathematics

Mental separation of }
ratio of being from
all matter
(separatio)

Proper to
metaphysics

REVIEW ARTICLE
Thomas and the Physics of 1958: A Confrontation. By HENRY
MARGENAU. The Aquinas Lecture, 1958. Milwaukee:
Marquette University Press, 1958. Pp. 6L $2.50.
The nature of this confrontation, by Professor Margenau of
Yale, a man of acknowledged competence both in the realm of
the contemporary philosophy of science and in applied science,
consists in a twofold view across the centuries: one a view of
modern physics from the outlook of St. Thomas; the other a
view of St. Thomas from the outlook of modern physics. Of
the former, Professor .IVlargenau says, " Thomas would, I think,
have seen remarkable justification for his Aristotelianism in the
methodology of present natural science." Of the latter, he says,
"The comparison of present scientific methodology
those
aspects of Thomas' system that are applicable to science is
more favorable today than at any time in the last two centuries,
if not indeed more favorable
ever, in the sense of showing
parallels and conjectures fulfilled in our epoch." In other words,
Professor Margenau finds the results of this confrontation most
auspwwus.
On what does this favorable and heartening confrontation revolve? It revolves principally on what Professor Margenau
makes out of St. Thomas' doctrine of the intellectus agens.
The quotations from St. Thomas' works which he employs are
taken from St. Thomas Aquinas: Philosophical Texts, selected
and translated by Thomas Gilby (Oxford Press, 1951). In the
light of Fr. Gilby's own declared purpose in that work, namely,
to produce" a compromise between a paraphrase and an exact
and literal :rendering," attention must be drawn to the fact that
the passages cited by Professor Ma:rgenau do not always
represent, by any means, the exact words of St. Thomas, but
rather a literate paraphrase by Fr. Gilby, where, in the synthe-

68

HENRY MARGENAU:

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69

sizing process, finer precisions of St. Thomas' text have been
passed over. Thus, in the first passage cited by Professor
Margenau (p. 7), where St. Thomas has the qualified statement, ... Intellectualis cognitio se extendit ultra sensibilia;
intelligimus enim QUAEDAM quae senS'u percipi non posrunt,
Fr. Gilby's version simply states unqualifiedly, " ... Intellectual knowledge transcends the things of sense." Further on,
... per participationem FORMARUM intelligibilium separatarum,
is rendered by, " ... shares in intelligible and bodiless ideas."
Where St. Thomas says, . . . Non per modum defluxionis, ut
Democritus poruit, sed PER QUAMDAM OPERATIONEM, Fr. Gilby's
version states," ... Not, however, in the manner of a discharge,
as Democritus had said, but in some other way." St. Thomas
then continues to show the extent of Democritus' doctrine of
everything, including knowledge, being caused by the influx
of the atoms, in the subsequent sentence, N am et Democritus
omnem actionem fieri poruit per INFLUXIONEM atomorum. In
Fr. Gilby's version this appears in what seems like a new and
not obviously related thought, " Democritus, incidentally, had
also held that all action is the upshot of atomic changes." It
would seem, then, that despite the eminent literacy of Fr.
Gilby's version, it would be a little too uncritical simply to
accept it without question as the exact rendering of the text of
St. Thomas, a claim which Fr. Gilby himself does not make.
The passage in St. Thomas to which the above excerpts refer,
namely, Summa Theol., I, q. 84, a. 6.-" Whether intellectual
knowledge is received from sensible things "-may be said to
provide the "frame of reference " for Professor Margenau's
confrontation. In it St. Thomas traces the two extreme attitudes with regard to knowledge, as typified in radical sensism
as attributed to Democritus, and an equally radical idealism as
attributed to Plato. Between them, combining both sense and
intellect, St. Thomas locates the theory of knowledge of Aristotle. Professor Margenau will use this threefold division in
apportioning off the various modern outlooks, and furthermore
will liken them respectively to the intellectus possibilis, the
intellectus agens, and the combination of both.

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PIERRE H. CONWAY

Speaking of the first of the three theories-that, namely,
which sees thought simply as the rigid product of sensible
realities-Professor
Margenau places under it both the unflinching sensism of the Humeans and even the detached computer-collated picture of the logicians, modern version. His
critique of this outlook is that it allows for no " novelty through
reason." " It is my own belief,'' states Professor Margenau,
" that novelty can enter through reason as well as through
sense , .. " (p. 14).
Fifty years ago it was felt to be merely a matter of time until
all the sciences would approach the mathematical predictability
being attained by the physical sciences, a predictability such
that " there was nothing empirical which in principle could not
be caught in the theoretical net, nothing theoretical that did
not have an empirical counterpart" (p. 16). "Quantum mechanics,'' says Professor Margenau, " has changed all that."
Now the same probabilities, the same statistical evaluations once
thought the property of the less exact sciences such as sociology
or psychology, have become true of the physical sciences: «
finite set of observations enables theory to predict the place
where an electron wiU strike a screen; quantum mechanics
restricts itself to the calculation of averages, of possibilities
indicating how many times in a great number of passages the
electron will hit a given spot. More than that, it gives convincing reasons why this resignation is necessary and why the
detailed determinism of classical physics must fail" (pp. 17-18).
From this, in place of the two basically identical pictures of
a single :reality-the purely sensory one, and the equally imone-there now emerges
personal mathematically-computed
two basically different pictures: one of the sensory world; the
other of a world of probabilities which are not directly sensed,
which cannot be computed in terms of the individual concrete
entities of the sensory world. This new break, between the
" historical " reality of individual events, personal decisions,
and the " physical " reality of physical bodies and systems in
space-time, is especially evident in the atomic :realm, "in the
domain of the very small, where physics has made its most
recent advances " (p. 20) .

HENRY MARGENAU:

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At this point, at the point where the once purely sensory
scientific outlook has now been joined by an outlook transcending sense, Professor Margenau returns to St. Thomas and the
final words of the passage first cited by him: " The mere
impression of sensible objects is not sufficient to cause intellectual activity." Professor Margenau now continues this passage with the words of Fr. Gilby," A nobler and higher force is
required ... ," leading to the positing of the intellectus agens
as a necessary faculty "which by the process of abstraction
renders actually intelligible images taken from the sense " (pp.
20-21). It is upon this intellectus agens, called by Fr. Gilby in
this passage, first, factive intellect, then, active intellect, that
Professor Margenau now concentrates.
He finds the phrase, factive intellect, as a rendering of the
vovs 'ITOt7]T£K6s of Aristotle, particularly felicitous, because " this
happy wording calls attention to an element of epistemology,
an autonomous function of reason, which has long been buried
under layers of positivistic and language-analytic considerations" (pp. 21-22. Italics mine). Out of this one word
" factive," in the rendering of intellectus agens, Professor
Margenau will draw well-nigh all the flattering things he has
to say about St. Thomas' outlook as referred to the contemporary scene. Ironically enough, his reasons are perhaps the very
reasons why St. Thomas, while fully aware of this etymology
or the word, and while consistently using the word facere in
connection with intellectus agens, nevertheless did not choose
to call it intellectus jactivus or something similar, but rather
intellectus agens. For Professor Margenu, the factive intellect
now becomes that faculty which, side by side with the passive
(possible?) intellect in the realm of sense, operates in the newlyopened dimension of science which is beyond sense. The
" novelty of reason " has been introduced, and its " maker,"
suppressed until the breakdown of positivistic science under the
phenomena of quantum mechanics, is none other than the
" factive intellect " of St. Thomas. Alas for the credit bestowed
upon St. Thomas, his intellectus agens does not make in the
sense of producing a product, even a mental construct, but only

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PIERRE H. CONWAY

rnakes clem in the qualitative sense, transforming what already
is. Thus the process whereby the agent intellect renders the
sensible species actually intelligible is similar, not to the process
whereby a sculptor might rnake a statue, but rather to the
process whereby a statue already made, but unseen in the
darkness, is rnade visible by the rays of a light.
St. Thomas' exposition of the nature of lhe intellectns agens
is clear and consistent, and there is no possibility of misunderstanding it. Aristotle introduces the intellectns agens in De
Anirna III, c. 5, 430a 10. St. Thomas says that Aristotle shows
its existence there by an argument, and by an example: " He
lays down therefore . . . the following argumenL In every
nature which is sometimes in potency and sometimes in act, it
is necessary to lay down something which is as the matter in
each genus, which is, namely, in potency to all the things of
that genus. Likewise it is necessary to posit another, which is
an agent cause, and factive, which is with respect to making
all things, as art is to matter. But the soul according to the
intellective part is sometimes in potency and sometimes in act.
It is necessary therefore that there be in the intellective soul
these differences: that there be, namely, one intellect in which
all intelligible things a:re able to be produced-and this is the
possible intellect, concerning which it was spoken above [i.e.,
in c. 4]; and another intellect for the purpose of making all
intelligible things in act-which is called the intellectns agens,
and is as a certain habit." (In De Anirna, III, l. 10, no. 728.)
Having clarified the meaning of the word " habit " in this
context, as meaning a form or nature, in contrast to the status
of the possible intellect as in potency, St. Thomas goes on to
expound Aristotle's comparison of the intellectns agens to light
in the order of example: " Whence he states that it is a habit
after the manner of light, which in a certain way makes colors
which are in potency to be colors in act. . . . Now the inteUectus
agens causes the intelligible things to be in act, which previously were in potency, by the fact of abstracting them from
matter, for thus they stand intelligible in act, as was said [c. 4,
429b 20, 'To sum up .. .']." (Ibid., no. 729-30.)

HENRY MARGENAU:

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Finally St. Thomas adds that which prompted Aristotle to
posit the agent intellect: " Now Aristotle was led to posit the
intellectus agens in order to exclude the opinion of Plato, who
laid down the natures of sensible things to be separated from
matter, and intelligible in act-whence it was not necessary to
posit an agent intellect. But since Aristotle lays down that the
natures of sensible things are in matter, and not intelligible in
act, it was necessary for him to posit some intellect which
should abstract them from matter, and thus make them intelligible in act." (Ibid., no. 731.) This same description of the
function of the intellectus agens is found in Summa Theol., I,
q. 84, a. 6., from Fr. Gilby's version of vvhich, Professor
Margenau quotes. It is likewise found in II Cont. Gent., c. 77;
Q. D., De Anima, a. 4; De Sp,ir. Creaturis, a. 10.
Having adopted the factive intellect as a faculty capable of
introducting an element of reason in the form of mental " constructs," matching the passi-ve intellect which collates the data
of sense :in the form of "percepts," Professor Nlargenau illustrates the domain of these two intellects in tenus of "'"'-''"''"'"'-ton's two " desks " at which he sat and worked: One of them
was the macroscopic desk with its geometric shape, its smooth
surface, brown color, its sensed rigidity and its inert mass. The
other was the' desk of the physicist,' consistin;s' of" interlocking
space lattices of different molecules, each molecule containing
its atom and each atom its nucleons and electrons circulating
with tremendous speeds" (p. 24). Quantum mechanics has
added further that the fast-moving electrons may not even be
pictured as having definite positions at all times. Professor
Margenau likens this to the discontinuous motion of an angel,
save for the fact that whereas "St. Thomas leaves us free to
visualize, to intuit in terms of a discontinuous model of motion,
the passage of an angel, the electron should not be visualized
at all " (p. Yl5) . The two " desks " then, are different, and not
merely two views of the same-and St. Thomas has felicitously
provided the framework which has room for this new development: " The second desk is the product, very largely, of
Aquinas' factive intellect; the first :involves mere abstraction,

74

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H. CONWAY

collation of sensory material, performed by what Thomas calls
the passive intellect. The two desks are not identical; they are
related by a relatively new epistemological factor which I have
termed a rule of correspondence in previous writings . . . a
unique relation between ostensibly different kinds of experiences" (pp. 27, 29) .
What one must notice here is that in this conception the work
of one intellect is not simply the continuance and development
of the other. Rather, where one is a purely sensuous picture,
as organized as one may wish, but still sensuous, the other is a
picture into which new, non-sensuous elements, elements of
reason, not derived from sense, have been introduced. Passive
intellect presides over the purely sensuous or perceptory, organization; factive intellect over the :rational organization-on an
entirely different, non-intersecting although not irreconcilable,
plane. There is, of course, a middle-ground, boundary-lines are
crossed-" no actual determinate experience is, for instance,
wholly perceptory or wholly rational" (p. 30).
When, thanks to the « rules of correspondence," one links the
rational " constructs " to empirical verification in the domain
of sensory " percepts," one has what may be called " verifacts,"
which compose " within our experience the domain of physical
:reality" (p. 35) . Beyond this, is the " ontological " realm,
where constructs are validated, not by sense experience, but by
"metaphysical :requirements, which do not have their origin
in the sensory part of our experience, but spring from what
Thomas would call the nature of man's rational soul " (p. 33) "
Professor Margenau states that " most scientists do believe
that experience points to an ontological reality beyond the
physical which (latter) consists only of verifacts " (p. 35) .
This involves a "leap," and the leaving behind of empirical
verification (p" 36 and Note 7). In the meantime, :returning to
the realm of " constructs " related now to empirical " verifacts,"
Professor Margenau quotes with approval a very elliptical and
fluid :rendering by Fr. Gilby of Summa Theol., I, q. 85, a. 2, on
the object of the intellect being not mental states but things,
but quotes with reserve what is actually a very diluted passage

HENRY MARGENAU;

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75

from Q. D., De Ver., q. 11, a. 1, on self-evident principles adding: " The conclusion seems inescapable that no proposition,
fo:rmal o:r otherwise, carries within itself complete assurance of
truth" (p. 40). As a final compliment to St. Thomas, Professor Margenau terminates his perspective from St. Thomas to
modern times with a formula showing that " creation of matter
out of nothing contradicts no physical conservation law" (pp.
41-48)
What must one say of this flattering treatment of St. Thomas
at the hands of a competent and authoritative modern scientist?
It is with regret that one must state that the " factive " and
•• passive" intellects so graciously attributed to St. Thomas
have actually no resemblance to the intellectus agens and
possibilis in St. Thomas' work. The function of both these
faculties is clearly outlined in the places indicated above: that
of the intellectus agens to render intelligible the sensible phantasms or images received from matter; that of the intellectus
possibilis to :receive the imprint of these images once rendered
intelligible. The two constitute not two knowing processes, but
a single one in the process o£ going £rom potency to act: the
intellectus agens does not know, but solely "lights up" the
phantasm, which now, having passed f:rom singular materiality
to universal intelligibility, is imprinted upon the intellectus
possibilis, constituting actual intellection, or intellectual knowledge. .. . . . The intellectus agens does not make the species
intelligible in act in order that it may know through them ...
since it is not in potency, but in order that through them the
intellectus possibilis may know." (II Cont. Gent., c. 76.)
" ... Of the two intellects, namely, the possible and the agent,
there are two actions. For the act o£ the possible intellect is to
receive the intelligibles; while the act of the agent intellect is
to abstract the intelligibles. Nevertheless it does not follow that
there is a twofold intellecting in man-since for the one knowing
it is necessary that both of these actions concur." (Q. D., De
Anima., a. 4, ad 8.) " ... The same intelligible species is compared to the agent and the possible intellect-but to the possible
0

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H. CONWAY

intellect as to that which receives; while to the agent intellect
as that which makes such species by abstraction." (Ibid., ad 9.)
It is interesting to note the parallel between the merely
stimulating role o£ sense knowledge with respect to intellectual
knowledge in the Platonic scheme, and the merely suggestive
role of the "percept" with respect to the £active intellect's
" construct" in Professor Margenau's outlook. Thus, he states,
" There is a sense in which the constructs are ' suggested ' by the
percepts, but very little is gained by the use of that indefinite
phrase which merely adverts to the circumstance that when the
perceptory situation is present we are urged by psychological
predisposition or methodological habit to accept the presence
o£ the other " (p. 28) . In the same vein St. Thomas writes, in
the article first cited by Professor Margenau: " Thus, therefore, according to the opinion of Plato, neither does intellectual
knowledge proceed from sensible, nor even sensible knowledge
wholly from sensible things; but rather sensible things stimulate
(excitant) the sensible soul to sensation, and likewise the senses
stimulate the intellective soul to understanding"
Theol., I, q. 84, a. 6) .
How foreign a factive intellect conceived as transcending
sense data is from the intellectus agens of St. Thomas, may be
seen from the fact that it is precisely the need for abstracting
all knowledge from the senses that is the raison d' etre of the
intellectus agens; a theory of knowledge transcending sense
knowledge, where the knowable would be already in an intelligible state, as with the Platonic species, would not require an
agent intellect, as was cited above from St. Thomas. This
need for abstracting all knowledge from merely potentially
intelligible sense data is given consistently as the reason for
there being an intellectus agens. Thus, to quote only one other
passage, one has: " ... Since Aristotle did not posit the forms
of natural things as subsisting without matter-now the forms
existing in matter are not intelligible in act-it followed that
the natures or forms of sensible things which we understood
were not intelligible in act. But nothing is reduced from potency
to act except through some being in act, as the sense is rendered

HENRY MARGENAU;

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in act by the sensible in act. It is necessary, therefore, to lay
down some power on the part of the intellect which makes
things to be intelligible in act by abstraction of the species
from material conditions-and this is th«:> necessity for positing
the intellectus agens ,, (Summa Theol., I, q. 79, a. 3) .
To the extent that the £active intellect which Professor .M:argenau adduces would be " autonomous " of sense data-" It is
my own belief," he states, " that novelty can enter through
reason as well as through sense "-to that very extent such an
intellect could indeed be "£active" or "making" according to
the dictates of human creativity, producing an order in irrational
events where none existed before. On the other hand, to the
extent that the intellect, face to face with reality, was in the
position not of a "maker," but of an observer who views the
nature which he does not make, to that extent one would avoid
the possible ambiguity arising out o£ calling an intellect
" factive," which, although it makes things intelligible, does not
make the order in those things. Thus one understands why
St. Thomas, while using the word facere of this intellect, nevertheless does not call it jactivus. In effect, he consistently emphasizes that the intellect face to face with reality does not
make: ". . . There is a certain order which reason does not
make, but solely considers, as is the order of natural things ....
To natural philosophy it pertains to consider the order of things
which the human reason considers but does not make-including under natural philosophy also metaphysics " (In Eth. Arist.,
I, 1. 1, no. 1-!2). " ... Human reason of the things which are
according to nature is knowing only; but of those which are
according to art, it is both knowing and making ... " (In Pol.
Arist., Prooem., no. 2). " ... [Certain] sciences do not have a
product, but knowledge only, as is .the case with divine science
and natural science, whence they cannot have the name of' art,'
since art is called '£active reason'" (In Boet. De Trin., 1. !2,
q. 1, a. 1, ad 3) . Hence it is clear that in natural science or
physics, which is the science of which Professor Margenau
speaks, if his "£active intellect" is "making," it in no way
resembles the function of the intellect as understood by St.
Thomas.

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PIERRE H. CONWAY

Finally, mention must be made of the use of the word
"passive intellect" by Professor Margenau as designating the
counterpart of " factive intellect." Since the intellectus agens
becomes the " factive intellect," it is assumed that by " passive
intellect" is meant the intellectus possibilis. However, since St.
Thomas notes an intellectus passivus distinct from the intellectus possiblis, and since it is precisely the confounding of
these two which constitutes the Averroistic position, the position of St. Thomas should not be unknown. It is contained in
the very same lectio in which St. Thomas discusses the initial
positing of the intellectus agens by Aristotle, namely, In De
Anima, III, I. 10. The need for distingishing between "possible" and "passive" intellects arises from Aristotle's statement: " When mind is set free from its present conditions it
appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is
immortal and eternal-we do not, however, remember its former
activity because, while mind in this sense is impassible, mind as
passive is destructible-and without it nothing thinks " (430a
20, Oxford transl.). If the agent intellect is taken as" separated " not only from a sense organ but from the body itself, and
the possible intellect is identified with the " passive " mind
which corrupts, then one has the Averroist position of a single
separted active intellect for all men, and individual corruptible
possible intellects-and thereby corruptible souls-for individual men.
St. Thomas, in speaking of Aristotle's statement in this place
that " mind in this sense (i. e., the intellectus agens) is separable, impassible, unmixed . . . in its essential nature activity,"
has these four characteristics for a single reason: the agent is
more noble than the patient, and therefore the intellectus agens
more noble than the intellectus possiblis. But the intellectus
possibilis has already been shown to be the first three, i.e.,
separated, impassible and unmixed [in c. 4, 429a 15 sq.-' since
everything is a possible object of thought, mind ... to know,
must be pure from all admixture .. .']; hence this is all the more
true of the intellectus agens which is in act with regard to the
intellectus possibilis (In De Anima, Ill, I. 10, no. 732-3). This

HENRY MARGENAU:

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OF 1958

"separation" is separation from a bodily organ, since in order
to know material things universally the intellect itself cannot be
material. Both operations, that of abstracting the intelligible
species from sense knowledge, and that of receiving them,
terminate in a single knowing of the natures of material things:
they are both, as Aristotle says, « within the soul."
This whole intellectual section of man is separable, i.e., can
survive the body, for, as Aristotle states, " while the faculty of
sensation- is dependent upon the body, mind is separable from
it" (429b). St. Thomas then expounds the words, " ... this
alone is immortal and eternal . . . ," as follows: " And since in
the beginning of this book he [Aristotle] stated that if there
be any operation of the soul proper to it, the soul may be
separated [i.e., Book I, 403a, 10: 'If there is any way of acting
or being acted upon proper to soul, soul will be capable of
separate existence '], he concludes that this sole part of the
soul, namely, the intellective, is incorruptible and perpetuaL
And this is what he set down above in Book H, namely, that
this genus of soul is separated from others as the perpetual
from the corruptible [413b
' ... Mind or the power to think
. . . seems to be a widely different kind of soul, differing as
what is eternal from what is perishable .. .']. But it is called
' perpetual,' not because it always was, but because it will
always be. Whence the Philosopher states in Metaphysics XII
that form is never anterior to matter, but the soul remains
afterwards-not an ' soul, but the intellect [1070a 25: .
The soul may be of this sort-not all soul but the reason ']."
(In De Anima, Zoe. cit., no. 743.)
If the intellective part of the soul, the agent and possible
intellect, is " separable," i. e., immortal, while the body perishes,
what then of that mind which " as passive, is destructible,'' i. e.,
the "passive" intellect? Actually, the "passive intellect" in
this context represents the sense faculties, subject to the sense
passions, as the impassible agent and possible intellect are not,
and whose use is suspended with the destruction of the sense
organs, and " without which," since all natural knowledge
comes through the senses," nothing thinks" in the natural way.
0

•

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PIERRE H. CONWAY

Of this " intellect," which is really sense, St. Thomas says:
"And therefore he states here that we do not remember,
namely, after death, those things which we knew in life, since
• mind in this sense is impassible,' i. e., that part of the intellective soul is impassible [namely, the agent and possible intellect],
whence it is not the subject of the passions of the soul, such as
are love and hate, reminiscence and such, which arise from some
bodily passion. But the passive intellect is, corruptible, i. e.,
the part of the soul which is not without the aforesaid passions,
is corruptible; for they belong to the sensitive part. Nevertheless this part of the soul is called ' intellect,' as it is also called
' rational, in so far as it partakes in some way of reason, by
obeying reason and following its motion, as is said in Ethics I
[1102b 30: ' ... The vegetative element in no way shares in a
rational principle, but the appetitive, and in general the desiring
element in a sense shares in it ']. But without this part of the
corporeal soul, the intellect does not know anything. For it
does not know anything without a phantasm, as will be said
below [43la 15: ' ... The soul never thinks without an image].
And therefore, when the body is destroyed, there does not
remain in the separated soul knowledge of things according to
the mode in which it now understands. But as to how it then
understands it does not belong to the present intent to diRcuss."
(Ibid., no. 745.)
From his comparison of it with the " £active intellect "
(intellectus agens) it would seem that Professor Margenau must
have conferred the appellation of" passive intellect," not upon
the "passive intellect" of St. Thomas which Fr. Gilby does
not appear to treat (except to mention in a footnote, p. 237,
that the intellectus possibilis should not be translated as the
' passive intellect ') , but upon the " possible intellect," which
in one place Fr. Gilby calls the " receptive intellect,'' possibly
lending to Professor Margenau's tendency to call it the" passive
intellect." The interesting part, however, is that while Professor
Margenau's "passive intellect" which mechanically collates
sense data without the intrusion of the novelty of reason, in
no way resembles the intellectus possiblis which perceives, not

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sense-data, but the universal intelligible order implicit in that
data, it does very much resemble the "passive intellect" of
St. Thomas, which is not an intellect at all, but a sense power
under the aspect of a certain similarity to reason-for example,
as in the case of the cogitative power or " particular 1·eason,"
which collates sensible singulars into a single experiential knowledge somewhat after the manner of the universal reason collating universals. St. Thomas says, in effect: " ... Experience
is from the collation of several singulars received into the
memory. Now such a collation is proper to men, and belongs
to the cogitative power, which is called the 'particular reason,'
which is collative of individual intentions as is universal reason
of universal intentions" (In iVleta. Arist., I, l. 1, no. 15) .
"And that singulars are of the nature of principles is plain,
since from singulars the universal is derived. For from the fact
that this herb conferred health upon this man one derives that
this species of herb is able to heaL And since singulars are
properly known by sense, it is necessary that man should have
these singulars ... not
external sense, but
which he has called above' prudence,' namely, the cogitative or
estimative power, which is called 'particular reason.' Whence
this sense is called ' intellect,' which is concerned with sensible
or singular things. And this the Philosopher calls in De Anima
III the passive intellect, which is corruptible" (In Eth. Arist.,
VI, L 9, no. 1249. For a distinction between intellectus passivus and possibilis, Cf. Sumrna Theol., I, q. 79 a. 2, ad 2) .
The " passive intellect " of Professor J'\iargenau,
its
function of collating data in an unthinking positivistic way,
with a logic which shuts out inferences of reason, seems then,
whether by coincidence or not, remarkably like the " passive
intellect" of St. Thomas. But what can be said of his" factive
intellect"? It does not have any counterpart in that intellective
part of the soul, composed of the agent and possible intellect,
with regard to the observation of nature from which natural
science and metaphysics are derived, since the former in its
rational function "makes," while the
does not. Nor,
fundamentaHy, can Professor Margenau's "factive intellect,"

PIERRE H. CONWAY

to the extent that it implies a contribution of reason independent of the senses, be assimilated to intellect as conceived by
St. Thomas at all, since it is a rigid principle for St. Thomas
that aU natural knowledge originates through the senses: " ...
It is impossible that our intellect according to the state of the
present life in which it is conjoined to a passible body should
understand anything in act except by turning to phantasms "
(Summa Theol., I, q. 84, a. 7). So clear does St. Thomas make
the point of the sensible origin of all natural knowledge in this
life, that he is able to say, speaking of the very Questions on the
knowledge of the intellect from which Professor Margenau
borrows via Father Gilby: "Now the first thing which is understood by us according to the state of the present life, is the
nature of a material thing, as has been stated a number of
times above" (Ibid., q. 88, a. 3) .
Since St. Thomas is at pains to underline the point that in
this life all knowledge is initially derived from the senses,
necessarily depends upon sense phantasms or images, and terminates primarily at the natures or quiddities of material things,
it is perhaps well to list something of the dense sequence of
these statements in a relatively short space: "The body seems
necessary to the intellective soul most of all for its proper
operation which is to understand, since according to its existence it does not depend upon the body" (Ibid., q. 84, a. 4).
". . . Each one is able to. experience within himself that when
someone is trying to understand something, he forms certain
phantasms in the manner of examples, in which he considers, so
to speak, that which he is endeavoring to understand. Whence
it is also that when we wish to have someone understand something, we propose examples to him from which he may be able
to form phantasms in order to understand. . . . Now of the
human intellect, which is conjoined to the body, the proper
object is the quiddity or nature existing in a material thing;
and through such natures of visible things it rises also to a
certain knowledge of invisible things. . . . But we apprehend
the particular thing [in which the nature of any material thing
exists] by sense and imagination-and therefore it is necessary

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in order that the intellect actually understand its proper object,
that it should consider the universal nature existing in the particular thing" (Ibid., q. 84, a. 7). " ... The proper object
proportioned to our intellect is the nature of a sensible thing.
Now a perfect judgment cannot be given of any thing unless all
the things which pertain to that thing be known. This is
especially true should one be in ignorance of that which is the
term and end of the judgment. Now the Philosopher says,' Just
as the end of factive science is the product, so of natural science
the end is that which is seen properly according to sense knowledge [De Caelo III, 306a 15: ' ... That issue, which in the case
of productive knowledge is the product, in the knowledge of
nature is the unimpeachable evidence of the senses· as to each
fact ']. . . . The natural scientist does not seek to know the
nature of a stone and a horse except to know the notions of
those things which are seen by the senses. It is plain that ...
there cannot be a perfect judgment in natural science of natural
things if one does not know the sensible things" (Ibid., q. 84, a.
8). " ... Its (the human intellect's) proper function is to know
a form existing indeed individually in corporeal matter, but
nevertheless not as it is in this matter. But to know that which
is in individual matter, not as it is in this matter, is to abstract
the form from individual matter, which form the phantasms
picture. And therefore it is necessary to state that our intellect
knows material things by abstracting from phantasms; and
through material things thus considered we arrive at some
knowledge of immaterial things, just as conversely the angels
know material things through immaterial things" (Ibid., q. 85,
a. I). " ... The object of our intellect according to the state
of the present life is the nature of a material thing, as was said
above ... " (Ibid., q. 87, a.
ad
" ... According to the
judgment of Aristotle, of which we have more experience within
ourselves [than, namely, that of Plato whereby one knows
through immaterial subsisting ideas], our intellect according to
the state of the present life has its natural direction to the
natures of material things-whence it understands nothing
except by turning to phantasms, as is evident from what has

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been saido o o . It was shown above that the intellectus
agens is not a separated substance, but a certain power of the
soul, extending to the same things by act to which the intellectus pos:sibilis extends receptively: for, as it is stated [in De
Anima III, c. 5, 430a 10], the possible intellect is that which is
able to become all things, while the agent intellect is that which
is able to make all things. Both intellects, therefore, extend
according to the state of the present life solely to material
things, which the agent intellect causes to be intelligible in act,
and which are received into the possible intellecto .
Our
possible intellect is so disposed according to the state of the
present life as to be informed
the likenesses of material
things abstracted from phantasms" (lbido, qo 88, a. l, and
ad 2) .
In the following Question 89, on the knowledge
the separated soul, St. Thomas states unequivocally: " ... The manner
understanding by conversion to phantasms is natural to the
soul, as is to be united to a body; but to be separated from the
is out of
to
without conversion to phantasms is out
keeping with its
nature" (Ibid., q. 89, a. 1) . At
time the
knowlinnate
edge of the soul, says St. Thomas, " is not
species, nor through species then abstracted, nor solely through
species preserved [i. e., as habitual in the intellect, without
accompanying phantasms preserved in sense memory] . . . ,
but through species participated through the influx of the divine
the other sepalight, of which the soul is made partaker
rated substances, although in a lower way " (Ibid., ad 3) o "It
was stated that as long as the soul is united to the
it
understands by turning itself to phantasms" (Ibid., a.
the acts
the intellect by which in the present
is acquired are through the turning of the intellect to
are in the . sensitive powers " (Ibid., ao 5) .
Professor lVIa.rgenaulikewise quotes from F:r. Gilby a passage
from Question 85, a. 2,
initial pu:rport is not to give a
kind of primacy to the intelligible species themselves, as Professor Margenau would seem to favor, but whose conclusion,
0

0

•

0

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which is not included, goes as follows: " ... The likeness of the
thing understood, which is the intelligible species, is the fonn
according to which the intellect understands. But since the
intellect reflects upon itself, according to the same reflexion it
understands both its understanding and the species by which it
understands. And thus the understood species is secondarily
that which is understood, but that which is understood primarily is the thing, of which the intelligible species is the likeness" (Summa Theol., I, q. 85, a. 2), This is repeated: " ...
The human intellect . . . is neither its understanding, nor is
its essence the primary object of its understanding, but rather
something extrinsic, namely, the nature of a material thing.
And therefore that which is first known by the human intellect
is such an object; secondly is known the act itself by which the
object is known; and through the act is known the intellect
itself, whose perfection the act of understanding is. . . . The
intellect is able to know its act, but not first, since the first
object of our intellect according to the present state is not any
being and truth whatsoever, but being and the true considered
in material things, as was said [q. 84, a. 7], from which it arrives
at the knowledge of other things" (Ibid", q. 87, a. 3, and ad 1)"
From all of the above it is clear that there is nowhere to be
found in St. Thomas a counterpart of the " factive intellect .,
which Professor Margenau adduces, in the sense of an intellect
which can somehow produce thought independently of sensedata. Nor is it a question of whether such thought would be
valid and objective: for SL Thomas it is downright impossible.
There is no such thing, therefore in SL Thomas, as an
" autonomous function of reason " (po 22), capable of " injecting into the stream of knowledge . " . elements of its own .,
(Ibid.). Nor can there be "abstract principles-called metaphysical
do not have their origin in the
sensory part of our experience but spring from what Thomas
would call the nature of man's rational soul" (p. 33). There
can be no "leap " into an "ontological reality" (p. 36) where
what is drawn from the intelligible species, the" mental states"
(p. 37) , has any more content than that which may be strictly

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derived or inferred from sense data. While it is true that " the
intellect knows many things in the thing apprehended through
sense, which the sense is not able to perceive " (Summa Theol.,
I, q. 88, a. 4, ad 4), beginning with the nature of the material
thing, nevertheless this knowledge which arises from sense,
never in the state of the present life reaches a point where the
ties are cut with its sensible origin, where one may know without reference to phantasms: " ... Our intellect both abstracts
intelligible species from phantasms, in so far as it considers the
natures of thing in a universal way; and nevertheless it understands them in phantasms-since it cannot understand those
things whose species it abstracts except by turning to the
phantasms, as was said above" (Ibid., q. 85, a. 1, ad 5). Even
should one rise above a " discontinuous model of motion " (p.
to a description in " abstract mathematical terms " ( Ibid.) ,
one has not left the senses behind: " Our intellect is endowed
to know species through abstraction from phantasms-and
therefore those species of numbers and figures which one has
not imagined, one cannot know either actually or habitually,
except perhaps in general and in universal principles, which is
to know in potency and confusedly" (Summa Theol., I, q. 86,
From the foregoing it is clear, using the original citation from
Fr. Gilby derived from Summa Theologica I, q. 84, a. 6, concerning the three approaches to intellectual knowledge, as a
background, that just as Professor Margenau's "passive intellect," with its exclusion of reason, represents the mechanistic
sensism ascribed to Democritus, so his " factive intellect," with
its autonomous contribution to knowledge not extracted from
sense, tends to represent the knowledge by participation of
separated intelligible forms attributed to the Platonists. The
former of these two " intellects " might certainly be related to
the cogitative power or particular reason as understood by St.
Thomas, although whether it is Professor Margenau's intention
so to relate it, is not clear. The latter of the two, however, can
in no way be related to St. Thomas' understanding of the intellect per se, since where Professor Margenau makes it distinctive

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of the "£active intellect" ·Somehow to be independent of the
senses, St. Thomas could not be more explicit that it is the
natural function of the intellect to abstract the intelligible
species from sensible things as agens, and to receive those
intelligible species of sensible things as possibilis. As a mattei·
of fact, far from being a hindrance, the body with its senses is
that which enables the human intellect, weakest in the order
of intellects, to attain to a precision in knowing reality which
it would not have of itself. While the angelic intellect because
of its perfection does not require senses, the human intellect
does:
Now it is manifest that among the intellectual substances, according
to the order of nature, the lowest are the human souls. It is the
perfection of the universe which demanded that there should be
different degrees in things. If therefore human souls were so
instituted by God as to understand in the manner proper to the
separated substances [i.e., without sense phantasms], they would
not have perfect knowledge, but confused knowledge in common
[. e., they would have knowledge of equal universality but of inferior precision proportionate to an inferior intellect]. In order,
therefore, that they might have perfect and proper knowledge of
things, they are thus naturally instituted as to be united to bodies,
so that they may thus receive from sensible things themselves the
proper knowledge thereof-just as uneducated men cannot be
brought to science except through sensible examples. Thus, therefore, it is evident that it is for the greater good of the soul that
it should be united to a body and understand through conversion
to phantasms-and yet it can be separated and have another
manner of understanding. (Summa Theol., I, q. 89, a. 1.)

Consequently, it is necessary to say that the type of intellect
envisaged by Professor Margenau in his "£active intellect,"
which is, so to speak, stimulated by the senses, but basically
perceptive in a way transcending the senses, is really in St.
Thomas' terms a type of angelic intellect, the very type that
does away with the intellectus agens and its humble function.
Such being the case, that is, in a human intellect which
embraces not one, but both of the extremes envisaged by St.
Thomas, namely, the purely sensory, and the purely intelligible
-which sees the " desk " of Eddington as not one, but two-

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there arises indeed a problem when it is question of relating the
two. This problem is posed by Professor Margenau in terms of
relating intelligibile "constructs" to sensory" percepts'' in the
harmonious manner terminating in the experimentally validated
scientific knowledge of " verifacts." To relate the two extremes
harmoniously Professor Margenau proposes what he terms
" rules of correspondence," which while not described in detail
are basically understood as being connecting links between extremes, between " sense and reason . . . polar extremes of
activity within the cognitive process " (p. 30) . Such a situation
does not exist in the thought of St. Thomas, since not having
begun with the two extremes, but rather with the " middle
way " (p. 8) of Aristotle, he is not faced with the problem of
combining them. In effect, human knowledge properly speaking
is neither purely sensory, nor purely intelligible, but rather the
intelligible knowledge of sensible things. For St. Thomas the
same desk of Eddington is perceived in its sensible aspects by
the senses; in its intelligible aspects, subsequent to abstraction,
by the intellect. By the former it is perceived as a particular,
sensible, material thing; by the latter it is perceived in its
universal nature, not as a nature which exists apart, but as
existing solely in individual things, separated by abstraction
only.
Speaking of the two " desks " of Eddington, one sensible, one
abstract, Professor Margenau states that one cannot be understood in terms of the other: " To say that the desks are logically identical requires an understanding of A in terms of B
and such understanding is wholly lacking " (p.
. This St.
Thomas would deny, affirming that it is impossible to understand the abstract desk in terms of anything but the concrete
desk, since all knowledge of the former must be derived from
sensible knowledge of the latter. This is not a matter of a
priori proclamation: What does experience yield? Nothing
but the. confirmation of this. It is the statement of the possibility of being able to do without sense that requires proof and
confirmation. If one affirmed the abstract " desk" as different
from the concrete " desk," one would be in error; it is only

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because abstraction, in affirming the nature and leaving behind
the individual material characteristics, does not affirm the
abstract desk to be such in reality, but only in lmowledge, that
truth is maintained and the two " desks " are seen, not as two
independent realities, but as two views of the same reality-one
sensory and individual, one intellectual and universal.
Consequently, St. Thomas would not, as Professor Margenau
does, distinguish" a push or a pull from Newton's' mass times
acceleration'" as representing "ostensibly different kinds of
experience " requiring an additional " rule of correspondence "
to unite them (pp. 28, 29, 27) . The latter would be referred
to the former, not as that which is intellectual to that which is
sensible but simply as ' part ' to ' whole,' where, subsequent to
universal abstraction, whereby one abstracts the universal ' push
or pull ' from the singular sensible instances thereof, one then
proceeds by formal abstraction to consider one part of that
universal, e. g., the mass, separately from the others.
first of all one considers the common nature while leaving
behind, or " abstracting from," the sensible singular; then one
considers the universal part by part, while leaving behind, or
"abstracting from," other parts. If one affirmed this universal,
or this part, as separately existing independent entities, one
would be affirming a figment of the mind; but if one, for clarity's
sake, only considers one without the other, that is abstraction
-necessary for the dim mind of man. But the object of
contemplation still remains, not the abstract universal, but
ultimately the real singular, now better understood through the
universal. Thus the angels, with better intellects than man; do
not have a lesser knowledge of sensible singulars than men, but
a better one: " ... One must not say that just as sense knows
only corporeal things, so intellect knows only spiritual thingsbecause it would follow that God and the angels would not
know coroporeal things. . .. But the superior power does those
things which belong to the inferior power in a more excellent
way" (Summa Theol., I, q. 84, a. l, ad 2). "There is a
difference, nevertheless, in this [i. e., in the knowledge of sensible singulars] between angels and separated souls, for the

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angels, because of the efficacy of their intellect, are able through
such species [namely, infused species from God] not only to
know the natures of things specifically, but also the singulars
contained under the species; while the separated souls are able
to know through such species only those singulars to which they
are in some way determined ... " (Ibid., q. 89, a. 4). " ...
Since the nature of the soul is below the nature of the angel,
to which this manner of knowing [i. e., through infused species]
is natural, the separated soul does not receive through such
species a perfect knowledge of things, but a knowledge as
though in common and confused. Just as, therefore, the angels
are related to the perfect knowledge of natural things, so the
separated souls are related to an imperfect and confused knowledge. But the angels know through such species with a perfect
knowledge all natural things-since .,all thjngs which God
produces in their proper natures, he produces in the angelic
intelligence, as Augustine says" (Ibid., q. 89, a. 3). From all
of this, therefore, it is clear according to St. Thomas, that the
ascendancy of the intellect, far from removing one progressively
from the knowledge of sensible singulars, actually causes those
singulars to be known more and more clearly in their sensible
singularity-for the simple reason that the perfection of knowledge is not measured by the degree of abstraction, which necessarily must overlook certain aspects of a thing, but rather by
the closer and closer approximation to singular reality, which is
that which exists.
Clearly one cannot relate in matters physical Professor Margenau's "factive intellect," which substitutes its own insights
for those derived from sense, with the reason of St. Thomas
which, in natural science, "considers, but does not make " (In
Eth., I, I. 1, no. 1) the order of natural things. Nor yet would it
be fair to consider Professor Margenau's "factive intellect" as
entirely independent of sense, since Professor Margenau not
only decries a too hasty "leap " into the unfettered ontological
realm with possibly disastrous consequences (p. 36) , but likewise he does not fail to point out the experimental verifications
that have confirmed much abstract and mathematical reason-

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ing: " The force of relativity springs from its postulate of
invariance, quantum mechanics features principles of symmetry, and all these result in instances of empirical veridicality
that are amazing " (p. 39) . It would be true to say that such
verifications are not simply mere accessories, since, speaking of
the most successful " theory " of the moment, that of relativity,
it. is a fact that it had gained little currency even among the
cognoscenti until the total eclipse of 1919 when there appeared
to be actual verification of the curvature of space. The ultimate
test, no matter what one says, of any theory, whether practical
or seemingly most speculative, still tacitly depends upon some
verification in the realm of observable reality, some explanation
that adds intelligibility to observable things-" the unimpeachable evidence of the senses," as Aristotle says (De Caelo, III,
306a 15) . Thus Professor Margenau's " constructs " too, would
naturally require some confirmation in the world of "percepts "
before anyone would give much faith to their purely " ontological " buoyancy. Professor Margenau would possibly not be
so respected as a philosopher of science dealing with "constructs," if his competency were not based on a proven ability
to deal with " percepts," with practical scientific problems.
There is, of course, in the realm of the intellect as understood
by St. Thomas, an area where the" factive "element may enter.
In effect, while St. Thomas, in dividing the sciences according
to order in his introduction to Aristotle's Ethics, states of the
order of natural things which are the subject of natural or
physical science, that theirs is an order which reason" considers
but does not make," he very definitely accords a factive role to
reason in the other sciences mentioned: There is the order
which reason, while considering nature, " makes in its own act,"
producing Logic or Rational Science; " makes in the activities
of the will," producing JYioral Science; " makes in external
things," producing the Mechancial Arts (In Eth., I, I. 1, no.
. Such are the arts and sciences of things produced by men,
whether syllogisms, moral acts, or jet planes. With respect to
these, human reason is both "knowing and factive." These are,
in contrast to the speculative sciences of natural things, the

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PIERRE H. CONWAY

practical sciences of things done by men, which are " operative
according to the imitation of nature" (In Pol., Prooem., no. 2) .
Obviously there is in these an undetermined element initially,
which man then determines by his own judgment " according
to the imitation of nature." Examples of these would be, for
example, the rules of spelling or grammar in Logic; the form
of a state, whether monarchic, aristocratic or democratic in
Moral Science; the style of a house, whether angular or curved,
in the Mechanical Arts. Here the will, provided it does not
disregard what the intellect may say of the " unmakeable "
aspects of things, has an area in which it can" make" things to
its own conceptions. However, none of these areas in which a
legitimate " making " takes places under the impetus, not of the
" £active intellect," but of the will utilizing the powers of the
intellect in the production of something, appears to correspond
to that area where the " £active intellect " of Professor Margenau is at work, namely the realm of the understanding of the
physical world, where according to St. Thomas the intellect is
precisely not " £active."
However, there is an aspect of the physical sciences as
conceived of by St. Thomas where one finds something which
might satisfy the ·characteristics of the " £active intellect " of
Professor Margenau, and it is the preliminary inventive process
in science as a forerunner to scientific certitude. Thus the mind
is not able to go immediately and unerringly from problem to
solution but ordinarily must first cast around uncertainly for
the right answer. For example, in the case of the appearance of
the motion o£ the planets, it is not possible immediately to trace
out courses for them to which the appearances will then correspond. From the start of astronomy every astronomer tried to
"invent," in the root sense of "discover" (from the Latin
word invenire, ' to find ') some design or figure of the motion
which would satisfy the appearances. This " inquiry " or search
(from the Latin word inquirere, 'to look for') continued until
the 16th century when Copernicus produced the design which
has since continued to be accepted. In the fruitful process of
leading up to his system there were certainly, throughout

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the centuries, many previous " makings " and discardings of
designs.
This "inventive "-and one might well say "£active"process is very much a part of the physical science of Aristotle
and St. Thomas, an almost indispensable prelude to any eventual certitude. Thus St. Thomas describes the twofold process
whereby the mind proceeds first to a tentative conclusion in the
order of inquiry, and then subsequently puts that conclusion to
the test by seeing if it is in accord with what is known, and if
it is the only possible conclusion able to be derived therefromsince as long as there may be other explanations equally capable
of explaining the same appearances, one has not arrived at
certitude that the explanation in question must be the true
one: " ... Human reasoning proceeds along the way of inquiry,
or invention, from certain things absolutely understood, and
then again along the way of judgment returns in the process
of resolution to :first principles, in the light of which it examines
what has been found" (Summa Theol., I, q. 79, a. 8. Cf. also Q.
D. DeVer., q. 15, a. 1, c). This twofold process of" invention"
and " resolution " is further expounded when St. Thomas speaks
of one of the ways in which " rational " is said of the procedure
of natural science, namely, in the sense of proceeding by probable-or hypothetical-reasons:
Another way in which this procedure is called ' rational,' is derived
from the term at which one stops in the proceeding. For the
ultimate term to which the inquiry of reason should lead is the
understanding of principles, by the resolving of things into which,
we judge. When, indeed, this is done, the process or proof is not
called natural [or 'rational'?), but a demonstration.
Sometimes, however, the inquiry of reason does not reach the final
term, but comes to a stop in the inquiry itself-when, namely, there
remains still to the one inquiring a way open to either of two
contradictories. And this occurs when one proceeds by probable
reasons, which are fitted to produce opinion and belief, but not,
however, science. In this sense, then, the ' rational ' process is
distinguished against the ' demonstrative.' And one can proceed
' reasonably ' in this way in any science, so as to prepare the way,
through probable reasons, for necessary conclusions." (In De Trin ..
I. 2, q. 2, a. 1, c.)

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This " :rational " process, therefore, whereby one proceeds in
the way of " inquiry " or "' invention " by casting around for
possible explanations, which later will be put to the test by
seeing whether the explanation may be seen to proceed from
previously accepted principles, seems very much like Professor
Margenau's" factive intellect," which, to some extent independently of sense data-as would be the case, for instance, if the
intellect could not see in the sense data any necessary reference
to some given cause-searches and inquires for explanations or
" constructs," which, say what one will, will have currency and
acceptance almost wholly on their ability to explain what
appears, whether directly or indirectly, to the senses.
A classic passage on the " inventive or inquiring reason," to
which one has likened Professor Margenau's "factive intellect,"
at work is that in which St. Thomas speaks of the various
theories propounded to explain the apparent motions of the
planets:
One must take into consideration that certain anomalies, i.e.,
irregularities, appear in the motions of the planets-namely, to the
extent that the planets seem to be sometimes faster, sometimes
slower; sometimes stationary; sometimes in retrogression. Now this
indeed does not seem to befit heavenly motions .... And therefore
:first Plato proposed this difficulty to Eudoxu8., an astronomer of
his time, who then endeavored to reduce the irregularities of this
sort to a right order, by assigning diverse motions to the planetswhich likewise the subsequent astronomers have tried to do in
various ways.
Nevertheless it is not necessary for the suppositions which they
found (' invented ') to be true--for although, on the basis of such
suppositions, the appearances are saved, one cannot, nevertheless,
for that .reason state these suppositions to be true, since perchance
the appearances with regard to the stars may be saved in some
other way, not yet comprehended by men. (ln De Caelo, II, 1, 17,
no. 451.)

The relationship of "inventive reason " to " judicative
reason " is set forth by St. Thomas in his Prologue to the
Exposition of the Posterior Analytics, where, in the course of
dividing up the Organon of Aristotle, he also divides reasoning.

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Arriving at the third act of the mind, which is reasoning strictly
speaking, he proceeds to divide it into three processes which he
likens to three processes in nature previously described. In the
first, one arrives through necessary reasons at the certitude of
science; in the second, through probable reasons at belief or
opinion; in the third, through defect, at fallacy. He says
therefore of the first two:
That part of Logic which serves the first process is called Judicative,
since judgment [in the resolutory process] is with the certitude of
science. And since certain judgment of effects cannot be had except
by resolution to first principles, therefore this part is called the
Analytics, i.e., 'resolutory.' ...
The second process of reason is served by another part of Logic,
which is called Inventive. Now finding is not always with certitude.
Hence, concerning those things which are found [' invented '], judgment [by resolution] is required in order for there to be certitude.
Just as in natural things, in those things which occur for the most
part, there is a certain degree to be considered-since the stronger
the power of nature, the more rarely does it fail in its effect-so
also in that process of reason which is not with complete certitude,
there is found a certain difference of degree, accordingly as one
approaches more or less to perfect certitude. By means of this
process, occasionally, even if one does not obtain science, one nevertheless obtains belief or opinion because of the probability of the
propositions from which one proceeds. . . . (In Anal. Post., Prol.,
no. 6.)

In Professor Margenau's terms, in the case of calculations by
the " £active intellect " involving cases where " no finite set of
observations enables theory to predict the place where an
electron will strike the screen " (p. 17) , where " the motion of
the smallest particles was found to be subject to the laws of
large numbers, any individual instance showing evidence of
intractible caprice" (ibid.), where "the electron ... should
be described in abstract mathematical terms which suppress, in
general, the reference to a specifiable position " (p. 25) , in such
cases, then, it does not seem to be stretching a point to say that
such calculations, those, for instance, of the motions of the tiny
electron, in all their tentative uncertainty and vagueness, fall

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very nicely into the same area where St. Thomas locates the
equally tentative calculations of the courses of the much larger
planets, namely, in the realm of " inventive reason!' This is
the reason which frames hypotheses, the reason which casts
around for some kind of an intermediate figure or construction
such as that which links i:he squares on the sides with the
.square on the hypotenuse in the Pythagorean Theorem.
But how are these tentative solutions or conclusions, at the
moment at best only the probabilities of dialectics, turned into
the certitude of science? For Aristotle and St. Thomas they
must be resolved back to first principles. What does this mean?
It means that one must show that the answer one has arrived
at must be the only possible
there is no longer
a path " to either of two contradictories,'' that the solution is
necessary, i.e., cannot be otherwise" How is this done? This is
done by showing that the conclusion, first happily discovered
by the " inventive " process of trying various possibilities and
hypotheses, is now seen to be the one which necessarily follows as
the only possibility from certain, self-evident principles. " ...
The whole certitude of science arises from the certitude of the
principles: for the conclusions are then known with certitude
when they are resolved into the principles " (Q" D" De V erit",
q. 11, a. 1, ad 13)"
Such principles are known through themselves: " These immediate principles are not known through any extrinsic middle,
but through the knowledge of their own terms " (In Post" Anal",
I, l. 7, no. 8) " The terms, in turn, are known through the senses:
", " " From sensible things there is had memory, and from
memory experience,.and from experience the knowledge of those
terms which, once known, there is known those common propositions which are the principles of the arts and sciences "
(In 11leta", IV, L 6, no" 599)" «From the very nature of the
intellectual soul it befits man that immediately upon knowing
what • whole ' is and what 'part' is, he should know: 'Every
whole is greater than its part '-and likewise with other [first
principles]" But what ' whole ' is and what ' part ' is, he is not
able to know except through intelligible species :received from
phantasms" (Summa Theolo, I-II, q" 51, a. 1). Thus two

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things are involved in the Thomistic concept of science: 1)
That the principles from which the conclusions derive be the
ones from which they do so with necessity of consequence, as
the conclusion in the case of the Pythagorean Theorem necessarily follows from what has been previously established with
regard to the congruence of triangles; 2) That the principles
themselves be necessarily true, i.e., be derived from sense
knowledge and having a necessary relationship between subject
and predicate-as the concepts of ' whole ' and ' part' are
universals derived from material things, and the very nature of
'whole ' is to be greater than ' part.'
It is at this point, the point of resolution, that St. Thomas
loses Professor Margenau. For Professor Margenau does not
hold as irrefragable either that all propositions must be ultimately traceable for their data to the senses; or that the most
basic principle, namely, the principle of contradiction even
only on the purely logical plane, cannot be contradicated:
"The discovery of non-Euclidean geometries and their use in
physical explanation, the discovery of many different systems
of logic including those which affirm a tertium datur [as against
the 'excluded middle or third ' implied in the principle of contradiction], together with many of the abstract pursuits just
mentioned, have deprived us of confidence in a priori proofs.
The conclusion seems inescapable that no proposition, formal or
otherwise, carries within itself complete assurance of its truth "
(p. 40 Parenthesis mine). Professor Margenau has already
affirmed the possibility of the " £active intellect " introducing
" autonomous " elements of " novelty " not derived from sensedata, in which he has radically separated himself from St.
Thomas, and now, furthermore, he calls into doubt even the
purely logical irrefragability of first principles such as the principle of contradiction, making the separation, if possible, even
more complete.
At this point it would seem permissible to assess Professor
Margenau's presentation of St. Thomas and state that it cannot
be called representative. Professor Margenau's interpretation
represents an entirely different outlook. An outlook such as

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that in the first place natural intellectual knowledge need not
stem from the senses, and in the second place that the knowledge itself need not conform to first principles as classically
understood, is completely incompatible with St. Thomas,
whether as fact or only possibility. The "£active" and "passive " intellects which Professor Margenau presents as suggested
by St. Thomas in no wise represent the intellectus agens and
possibilis of St. Thomas. They do not do so most basically
because the " factive " and " passive " intellect thus presented
do not represent two stages-the abstractive and receptive-of
a single intellectual knowledge, but rather two different knowledges, deriving from two different potencies, namely, reason in
one case and sense in the other. Even should one assimilate
Professor Margenau's "passive" intellect, not to the intellectus
possibilis, but to the intellectus passivus of St. Thomas, " which
is the particular reason, L e., the cogitative power along with the
memorative and the imaginative" (Summa Theol., I-II, q. 51,
a. 3) , and the " factive " intellect with the " inventive " process
St. Thomas, there still remains
gulf between
of reason
the two outlooks. The gulf consists in the fact that for Professor
Margenau the whole natural content of the " factive " intellect,
no matter how understood, does not depend upon the data
received from the " passive " intellect, whereas for St. Thomas
all intellectual processes originate from the senses, which in
turn originate from external reality. This has as a consequence
that intellectual knowledge is fundamentally a knowledge of
external things, objective reality, and as a corollary that any
denial of first principles is not simply a piece of logical audacity,
but the denial of reality itself.
At this point, too, it seems permissible to speculate as to that
which appears to underlie the viewpoint exposed by Professor
Margenau. One point that is forcibly presented therein is the
dichotomy between knowledge derived from the senses and the
breadth of intellectual knowledge, resulting in what St. Thomas
would consider a Platonic attitude. This would appear to be
the outlook engendered by the initial Cartesian doubts as to the
reliability of the senses, and the subsequent Kantian affirmation

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as to the total incapacity of the senses to represent the true
nature of things. Thus, to scientists like Einstein, in the
Evolution of Physics, the true meaning of reality would seem
to be something impenetrable, lying beneath the unrevealing
surface of the senses, and the mind would be engaged simply
in building models or " constructs " to harmonize with the
appearances while remaining in the dark as to their objectivity
-to use the image of Einstein, we are like people looking at the
face of a clock and speculating as to what sort of internal
machinery makes it run, without ever being able to find out.
This sort of outlook, which not only leaves a free hand to the
intellect, but actually obliges it to act on its own, independently,
seems substantially that implied in the " £active intellect" of
Professor Margenau.
But possibly even more is implied in the " factive intellect,"
the intellect which because of the inadequacy of the senses is
necessarily " on its owno" In effect, if the senses do not reveal
the nature of things, and if one has no other direct contact with
the outside world, on what rational grounds may one presume
there is an intelligence behind the surface of things?
there
are none-and granted the supposition that the senses do not
necessarily represent the nature of things, there are none-then
one finds oneself in a world where the only known intelligence
is the human intelligence, where the first order introduced into
the ostensibly unordered universe is that devised by the human
intellect. Such an outlook is not optional, but unavoidable if
one considers the universe solely as material and as the selfsubsistent, self-explaining reality, devoid of intellect, but out
of which, in the course of random evolution, the human intellect
has now evolved at this particular stage of events. From such a
point of view, the universe is basically unknowable, unordered,
and all the order there is, is the order created artificially by the
human intellect and superimposed upon or attributed to the
basically amorphous and unintelligent cosmos. From such a
point of view, if things are unpredictable beyond a very short
range, it is not due to there being in an ordered universe some
things which a:re intrinsically contingent and vacillating, nor to

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PIERRE H. CONWAY

any weakness on the part of the intellect, but simply to the fact
that there is basically no order in the universe, no determined
sequence of things, to start with. If things happen as predicted
it is merely the result of a happy sequence in things which has
come about by chance for no particular reason, has no particular significance, nor any sure duration.
Although Professor Margenau does not deny nor affirm that
there may be a causative Intelligence responsible both for us
and the surrounding cosmos, nevertheless the picture he traces
in his final section of the outlook of modern science vis-a-vis St.
Thomas, seems compatible with such an outlook, the outlook
that the incertitude of knowledge and predictability is due primarily, not to weakness of intellect, but to the basic indeterminacy of an unintelligent universe itself.
Professor Margenau begins with a survey of the contemporary outlook, objecting to the pedestrian view of science and
science courses as no more than a " catalogue of dead but
certified facts" (p. 45); scientific laws as "inductive generalizations of observational experience, never as bold conjectures,
as ideas defying the knowledge of their day ... " (ibid.). To
such a view, research is "like the solving of a picture puzzle "
(p. 48), and the universe itself simply a somewhat larger puzzle,
which in the optimists' view some day" will be solved and the
happy millenium will begin" (ibid.).
This is, of course, the deterministic, 19th-century view of
science, to which Professor Margenau now opposes a concept
of science as " progressive, . . . a scientific problem is never
completely solved, ... research continually reforms and alters
the picture which was thought at an earlier time to be already
finished" (ibid,). Now the good teacher will strive to turn
this into a " quest for meaning " (p. 46) , meaning which goes
beneath the surface of the facts, illuminating them; he will," in
a spirit of adventure, suggest Joule's a:p.d 1_\,fayer'sexciting conjecture as a captivating idea and then verify it instance by
instance " (p. 49) .
How does science grow under such an impetus? Professor
Margenau devotes six pages, to describing the process according

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to the analogy of a crystal, starting from the liquid state:
" Every element of liquid moves in random fashion, and if the
pattern of motion is made visible it is observed to have the
existential beauty of irregularity and caprice " (p. 50) . Predictions do not attain detail; the order is "short-range order, a
correlation function falling to zero beyond the second or third
neighbor to a given molecule" (ibid.). When to the "amorphous liquid mass," " small crystalline fragments known as
seeds" are added, crystallization, with its pattern'' clear, orderly and predictable" may be stimulated (p. 51). Says Professor
1\fargenau in explanation: " I think of human experience as the
amorphous liquid mass, of science as a crystalline growth which
imparts order to the shapeless mass" (ibid.). To the unordered
liquid state which is human experience, and where predictability
extends only a few short steps, belong the " domains vaguely
formalized as ethics, politics, history and religion . . . a large
part of sociology, economics, anthropology and pyschology; it
is present in the so-called biological sciences and, in a certain
measure, in the physical sciences as well " (pp. 52-3) . Where
" short-range order "prevails, that is, in the experiential domain
as yet unregularized by science, the " philosophy adequate to
the character of primary experience is existentialism" (p. 53),
presumably in its role of branding any appeal to fictitious
universal law a cowardice, and sternly admonishing each to be
a law unto himself.
Btit to the extent that the crystallizing, regularizing effect of
science extends, even though in unpredictable directions, in the
amorphous experiential mass, what has one the right to expect?
" There is no end to the process of growth. The shapeless
matrix of our experience is unlimited, and the crystal will
never span it all" (p. 54). The puzzle will never be completely
solved; there will always remain uncrystallized areas as yet
impervious to science: " What I foresee is an infinite crystal
growth into an amorphous domain whose volume is likewise
infinite yet vastly greater" (ibid.). Beyond the regularized
world of the "rationalist " will always lie the unregularized
world of the "existentialist": no matter how far the former

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advances, the latter still stretches out beyond him; the knowing
is always encompassed by the unknowing. Sometimes the
wrongly crystallized even recedes back to the liquid state again:
" wrong " knowing returns to unknowing again.
How does St. Thomas fit into all this? How is he seen
through this vista? Professor Margenau in conclusion perceives
him " almost in an attitude of benediction " upon the concept
of an infinitely growing rationalization of things, always encompassed and contained, one might say, by an even more infinite
area which escapes rationalization. Why should St. Thomas
bless this concept? It is felt that he would because he, too, was
a great crystallizer, but at the same time, in dynamic fashion,
saw the trajectory of truth as always transcending the limits of
the present-in distinction to those who wish to " admire
nothing but the fixed structure of his system . . . invest him
with an aura of final and eternal truth " (p . .56) . Professor
terminates his Aquinas Lecture with an excerpt
paraphrased from Summa Theol., I, q. 14, a. 8, ad 3: "Natural
things lie midway between God's knowledge and ours. Human
science derives from them, and they derive from God's own
vision." These words indicate, says Professor Margenau, that
the saint himself ascribed final and eternal truth to God, " holding that man must search for it in indirect and derivative
fashion " (p . .56) .
Little exception could be taken to these words. According to
St. Thomas, this might be called the " way of discovery," or
via inventionis, at its best: " For according to the path of
discovery [or ' invention '], we arrive through temporal things
at the knowledge of eternal things, according to the word of the
Apostle, The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being
understood by the things that are nwde " (Summa Theol., I,
q. 79, a. 9). However,' St. Thomas does not stop there, but
rather affirms that once one has arrived at a knowledge of
eternal things through temporal things, one can then in the
" way of judgment," use that knowledge of eternal things to
judge temporal things with certitude: " Now in the path of
judgment, from eternal things once known we judge of temporal

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things, and dispose temporal things according to the notions of
eternal things" (ibid.). This reflexive certitude is noted again
elsewhere: " ... Sensible effects, from which natural [science]
demonstrations proceed, are more known to us in the beginning.
But when we shall have arrived by means of them at the knowledge of first causes, from the latter there will appear to us the
' reason for which ' [propter quid] of those effects from which
the demonstrations 'that it is so' [quia] are proved" (In De
Trin., 1. 2, q. 1, a. 1, ad 9) . In other words, having first proceeded from effect to cause in a quia demonstration, the intellect
through its knowledge of first causes, is now able to perceive
something of the proper reason of the original effects, to know
the propter quid. However, this does not mean that certitude
is not had until one has arrived at a grasp of divine science or
metaphysics, for it is already possible in the science of temporal
things, in natural science and mathematics: " ... Necessary
(and therefore certain) knowable things are also found in
temporal things, concerning which are natural science and
mathematics" (Summa Theol., Zoe. cit., ad 8. Cf. also Q. D.
De Ver., q. 15, a. 2, ad 8).
However, the certitude which can be had of natural things in
natural science or physics, and which applies to the cases where
the natures of things have been perceived, and necessary
relationships-as in the proposition, " All sensible change requires three principles: subject, form and privation "-need not
extend to all of those things, and especially to contingent things
which are intrinsically uncertain as singulars. When it comes to
such, one is in the " way of invention or discovery " again,
having only probability about the outcome of singular contingent effects: " Now there are certain things in which it is
not possible to have a resolution such that one arrive at the
nature [quod quid est], and this because of the uncertainty of
their being, as is the case with contingent things as contingent.
Whence such things are not known through their essence [quod
quid est], which is the proper object of the intellect, but in
another way, namely, through a certain conjecture about those
things concerning which full certitude· cannot be had " (Q. D.

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De Ve·r., q. 15, a. 9l, ad 3). But if one cannot have certitude
about contingent things as contingent, that is, for example, when
a contingent singular cause is in the process of producing a
singular contingent effect, one can have certitude not only about
necessary things, but also about contingent things in the universal order: " ... Contingent things may be known in two ways.
One way is according to universal notions; the other way, as they
are in particular. For the universal notions of contingent things
(as for example the concept of sensible change) are immutable,
and according to this aspect demonstrations are found and the
knowledge of them belongs to the demonstrative sciences. For
natural science is not only of necessary and incorruptible things,
but also of corruptible and contingent things " (In Eth. Arist.,
VI, I. 1, no. 1123) .
To return to Professor Margenau's original representation of
the status of human knowledge vis-a-vis the surrounding world
in terms of the analogy of a spreading crystal in an amorphous
liquid, it is clear that this analogy lends to the idea of a world
which is not just unknown and unordered to us, but unknown
and unordered in itself: reason is not in it, we impart reason
to it-" science ... imparts order to the shapeless mass."
In effect, Professor J\fargenau has referred-and just how
figuratively is not certain-to his subject-matter as having
" the existential beauty of irregularity and caprice." The idea
of the source of intelligibility that seems to fit best in this
picture is that of the human reason as a little island in the
midst of the irrational, gradually extending its rays into the
hitherto shapeless mass. It is true that Professor Margenau
terminates his lecture with reference to God as the source of the
natures of things, but it is not quite clear! whether he is affirming
an over-all divine order, or simply underscoring what he considers to be St. Thomas' denial of there being any final truth in
things. Needless to say, St. Thomas holds that there can very
definitely be final truth in things perceived, and not only in
the necessary things, but even in the contingent things. Thus
the truth once attained need never be modified: " ... The intelligible species which are in the possible intellect cannot be

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corrupted by anything contrary, since nothing is contrary to
the consideration of intelligible things. . .. The habit of science
in so far as it is in the intellect remains in the separated soul.
... Nothing prevents someone who is less good from having
some habit of science in the future life which someone who is
better does not have" (Summa Theol., I, q. 89, a. 5. and ad 2).
Plainly, then, for St. Thomas, things can not only be known
definitively in this life, but once known they are known for
good.
.
St. Thomas, therefore, has an entirely different picture, not
only of the human intellect, but also of the world around him,
than does Professor Margenau. Nor is this an accident. In
effect, the idea of an amorphous world of the senses to which
the human intellect imparts order, to which some of Professor
Margenau's images lend themselves, naturally implies two different levels of thought-a sense level devoid of intelligibility,
an intellectual level which adds reason to the basically irrational. On the other hand, the idea of a world of the senses
which represents an order already there, instituted by the divine
mind producing things according to a pre-conceived order,
naturally implies a single unity of knowledge-sense knowledge
which contains within itself in a potential state (actualized by
the agent intellect) the outlines of an intelligible order received,
upon abstraction, into the possible intellect.
Since the order is already in the universe, the unintelligibility, as states Aristotle, derives more from us than from the
universe: " Perhaps, too, as difficulties are of two kinds [i. e.,
subjective and objective], the cause of the present difficulty
[in investigating the truth of things] is not in the facts, but
in us. For as the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is the
reason in our soul to the things which are by nature most
evident of all " (Metaphysics, II, 993b 5, referred to by St.
Thomas in, for example, loc. cit., l. 1, no. 284; S. 11., I, q. 1, a. 5,
ad 1; Contra Gentes I, c. 3; II, c. 77; III, c. 25; In De Trin., I. 2,
q. 1, a. 4, c.; De Spir. Creat., a. 10, ad 7; In L. De Causis,
Proem., n. 4.)
But what kind of order is there in the universe? If it is not

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a random, unintelligent affair, but the product of a divine mind,
then must not everything happen with a rigid, undeviating
determinism? So the determinists thought, when they first
unearthed unsuspected order and predictability in the universe.
Such was the determinism of Laplace, although in a God-excluded world. But it was not the determinisim of St. Thomas,
which allowed for both necessary and contingent events, for
certainty and uncertainty. Consequently when the world of
Laplace toppled with the appearance of relativity, quantum
mechanics, the uncertainty principle, the non-rigid world of St.
Thomas did not topple. Ironically, however, the extremist
deterministic view which was to supersede the more easy-going
world of St. Thomas, has now, on the recognition that some
things, which it said were determined, were actually undetermined, led to a precipitation toward the opposite extremist
view, that nothing is determined, that everything is random.
But the system of St. Thomas, having had before, and having
still, adequate accounting for chance and indeterminism, had
no need for such drastic house-cleaning-which now, alas, has
to find a way to consider even what appear to be maddeningly
regular and determined events as somehow irregular and undetermined.
And what is the world-view, the Weltanschauung, of St.
Thomas that allows for the harmonious coexistence of both the
determined and the undetermined, the predictable and the
unpredictable, the certain and the probable? It is succinctly
expressed in the view of nature to which St. Thomas aptly
compares the matching processes of reason in his Prologue to
the Exposition of the Posterior Analytica:
In the acts of nature there is found a threefold diversity. For in
certain of them, nature acts with necessity, in such a way that it
cannot fail. In certain other acts nature operates for the most part,
although it can at times fail in its proper act. Whence, in such
circumstances there must be a twofold act: one which is for the
most part, as when from seed there is generated a perfect animal;
the other when nature fails in that which is according to it, as when
from seed there is generated something monstrous because of the
corruption of some principle.

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And these three are also found in the acts of reason. For there is
a certain process of reason which induces necessity, in which it is
impossible for there to be a defect of truth; and through such a
process the certitude of science is acquired. There is another process
of reason in which, as in the greater part, truth is arrived at, not,
however, having necessity. The third process of reason is that in
which reason deviates from the truth because of a defect in some
principle which should have been observed in reasoning. (In Post.
Anal., Prol., no. 5.)

Clearly, \vith such a concept of the universe as this, and with
types of reasoning to parallel it, allowing both for certain and
rigidly predictable events, and uncertain and at best only
probably predictable events-and, as the exceptions which
destroy the unanimity of the latter, the absolutely unpredictable accidents-one is able to assimilate and integrate all
the varied events which cross the threshold of human consciousness. Such is the world of St. Thomas, a world where the
necessary and the unpredictable live side by side, and in which,
ii one is attentive, one need not be thrown into a panic by
failing to distinguish one from the other.
But does not such a world, with its frank admission of random
and chance alongside the determined and the necessary, introduce an element incompatible with the tenets of divine omniscience? For divine omnipotence does not require of those who
acknowledge it the denial of their senses or reason-and reason
reveals the presence of chance or hazard. In effect, to deny it,
to deny the possibility of something occurring which has no
predictable per se cause, is to place oneself in the impossible
situation resulting from the deterministic position that every
effect must follow from some definite given cause, such that,
the adequate cause having been posited, the effect must necessarily follow: the history of every event is a sequence of per se
causes. This is described by Aristotle as follows: " Will A exist
or not? It will if B happens; and if not, not. And B will exist
if C happens. And thus if time is constantly subtracted from a
limited extent of time, one will obviously come to the present.
This man, then, will die by violence, if he goes out; and he will
do this if he gets thirsty; and he will get thirsty if something

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PmRRE H. CONWAY

else happens; and thus we shall come to that which is now
present, or to some past event. For instance, he will go out
if he gets thirsty; and he will get thirsty if he is eating pungent
food; and this is either the case or not; so that he will of
necessity die, or of necessity not die " (Meta., VI,
. In
other words, if an ultimate event may be traceable to the causes
which immediately preceded it, as necessary causes, conversely
the one who posits the first cause is, by this per se chain.
the cause of the ultimate event: the one who puts the condiment
in the food which makes one thirsty, is the cause of the death
of the man who meets his end when he walks out of the door to
get a drink and runs into robbers.
It is necessary, therefore, if one is not to involve oneself in
the unrealistic system entailed by determinism-the very determinism of Laplace who theorized that if one knew the exact
position of every particle and every force in the universe at a
given moment, one could predict with absolute certainty the
state of things at the succeeding moment-that one recognize
alongside the necessary, the contingent: alongside that which
cannot not be, that· which is able not to be-for example, a
cause which, though acting may not produce its effect. As St.
Thomas concludes from .the situation expounded by Aristotle,
"Now this is impossible, namely, that all future events come
about with necessity. Therefore those two suppositions are
impossible from which this situation follows: namely, that every
effect whatsoever have a per se cause; and that once the cause
is posited, it be necessary that the effect be posited. For from
this would follow what has already been stated, that of any
future effects certain causes would have already been posited
(since future events would not only be reduced to the present,
as in the example given; but likewise, present events would be
reducible to causes in the past: thus the future has already been
caused in the past with iron-bound necessity" (In Meta., VI,
l. 3, no.
Therefore the overthrow of determinism by the
introduction of uncertainty is a triumph possible only for a line
of thought previously wedded to determinism, a triumph denied

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Aristotle and St. Thomas since they had already definitively
excluded determinism from the start.
But having excluded determinism from the start, how then do
Aristotle and St. Thomas arrive at a predictable ordered
universe? They do this in a progressively ascending process.
In effect, they first point out that events which may be chance
and unrelated on a lower level, may be intended on a higher
level: thus, the simultaneous blooming of two flowers in a
flower-bed is accidental and unpredictable so far as the relation
of the two flowers to each other is concerned-there is nothing
in one flower that allows one to pre<lict that when it blooms
another flower should bloom-but from the point of view of
a higher, more universal cause, such as the sun, shining equally
and simultaneously on both flowers, such a thing is predictable
(Ibid., no. 1206) . Thus one has the traditional example of the
master independently sending two servants to the same place
by different routes: their meeting will be unpredictable so far
as any prevision on their part is concerned, but it will be
according to plan so far as the master is concerned. (Cf.
Summa Theol., I, q. 116, a. 1). But such impredictability is
the sort which would be eliminated by the universal knower
of determinism. And therefore Aristotle and St. Thomas do
not fail to mention that even universal causes in the natural
order may be fallible in their effects: the sun may shine and one
flower may bloom, and the one beside it may not because a
worm has done away with its roots. In other words, even if the
cause should work properly-which is not necessary in every
case-the indisposition of the matter being acted upon may
thwart it. Likewise the rational soul, not being subject to
material causality, may counteract the normal procedure of
material causes even on a universal plane: the two flowers may
not bloom simultaneously because John Doe has decided to
uproot one of them. Finally, there is in less universal causes the
possibility of weakness on the part of the agent itself, and of
the chance concurrence of two unrelated causes on the same
plane, as when a hungry bird should arrive on the spot just at
the same moment the flower seed has fallen on the earth. These

110

PIERRE H. CONWAY

various possibilities are thus outlined by St. Thomas: " If
therefore we should reduce those things which are here contingent to their proximate particular causes only, many things are
found to come about accidentally. This may be either because
of the concurrence of two causes, one of which is not contained
under the other-as when outside of my intention robbers come
upon me: for this concurrence is caused from a twofold motive
force, namely, mine and the robbers.' Or it may be because of
the deficiency of the agent, to which weakness happens so that
it is not able to arrive at the intended end-as when someone
falls on the way because of exhaustion. Or it may be also
because of the indisposition of the matter, which does not
receive the form intended by the agent, but of another sort, as
occurs in the monstrous births of animals., (In Meta., VI, I. 3,
no. 1210).
So effective is Aristotle's statement for the need to recognize
chance in things, that St. Thomas, after expounding and concurring with it, goes on to say: " One must take notice of the
fact that the things which the Philosopher here transmits
appear to eliminate certain things which are laid down by
some according to philosophy, namely, fate and providence "
(Ibid., no. 1203) . In effect, according to those who hold for
fate in the present context, all things may be traceable to per se
causes in the heavenly bodies; according to those who hold for
providence, everything is ordained by God and therefore
nothing is the result of chance. While conceding that the
Aristotelian outlook, which admits both of the indisposition of
matter and of the intervention of human free will as thwarting
the effect of the heavenly bodies on things below in a given case,
does away with ·fate, St. Thomas proceeds to show that it
nevertheless harmonizes with providence. He begins with a
principle:
Now in evidence of these things it should be considered that the
higher a cause is, to so much the more does its causality extend. [Cf.,
Summa Theol., I, q. 14, aa. 5, 11; q. 9l2, a. 2.] ... The ordination,
then, which is in the effects from some cause, extends only so far
as extends the causality of that cause. For every per se cause has

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determined effects which proceed according to a certain order. It
is therefore plain that effects related to some lower cause appear
to have no order, but coincide with each other accidentally, which,
should they be referred to a higher common cause, are found to be
ordered and not conjoined accidentally, but produced simultaneously by one per se cause [as in the case of the two flowers blooming
together]. (Loc. cit., :ho. U05.)

What is the hierarchy of higher and lower causes?
Now ther-e is found in things a threefold gradation of causes. There
is first of all the incorruptible and immutable cause, namely, the
divine cause. Secondly, under this is an incorruptible but mutable
cause, namely, the heavenly bodies. Thirdly, under this are the
corruptible and mutable causes.
The causes, therefore, in the third degree are particular and determined to their proper effects according to each species: for fire
generates fire, and man generates man, and a plant, a plant.
But the cause in the second degree is in a certain way universal,
and in a certain way particular. It is particular, indeed, since it
extends to a certain determinate genus of beings, namely, to those
things which are produced in being through motion-for it is a
cause which moves and is moved. It is universal, however, since its
causality does not extend to one species of mobile things only, but
to all, which are altered and generated and corrupted: for that
which is the first moved thing must be the cause of all subsequent
mobile things.
But the cause in the first degree is absolutely universal: for its
proper effect is being-whence, whatever is, and in whatever way
it is, is properly contained under the causality and ordination of
that cause." (Ibid., no. ao7-9.)

As has been seen, the lowest causes can fail in their effects for
various reasons, such as the collision with another opposite
cause on the same level; and this can even happen in the case
of the more universal causes, not through any defect on their
part but because of indisposition of the matter or human independence. The effects, however, which per se causes are intended to produce, do come about for the most part, as the
regularity of nature attests. It is the unforeseeable exceptions
which make such things " for the most part " and not " always,"
which constitute the accidents that have no per se cause: as

PIERRE H. CONWAY

St. Thomas says, ' No per se nature can bring this about, that
someone intending to dig a grave, should find a treasure"
(Surnrna Theol., I, q. 116, a. 1). Chance, therefore, very definitely exists, What, then, of divine providence?
. . . If contingent things are further reduced to the highest cause,
nothing can be found which escapes its order, since its causality
extends to all things in so far as they are beings. Its causality
cannot be impeded, therefore, by the indisposition of matter, and
the dispositions of the latter do not escape its order, since it is an
agent in the manner of conferring being, and not solely in the
manner of moving and altering ....

It remains, therefore, that all things which come about here, as
referred to the first divine cause, are found to be ordered and not
to exist accidentally-although by comparison to other causes they
may be found to be accidental. And because of this it is stated
according to the Catholic Faith that nothing takes place randomly
or fortuitously in the universe, and that all things are subjected to
divine providence. Aristotle, however, is here speaking of the
contingent things which take place here in relation to particular
causes. . . . (Ibid., no. 1215-6.)

But lest the affirmation of the inability to predict what will
happen in every case as to the action of lower and intermediate
causes on the one hand, and the absolute ordination and control
o£ all things by the highest divine cause on the other hand,
should seem to reduce contingency and unpredictability to subjective human ignorance, St. Thomas continues:
Now, however, it remains to see how the laying down of fate and
providence does not remove contingency from things, as though all
things were to come about through necessity. And concerning fate
it is already plain from what has been said. For it was shown that
although the heavenly bodies and their motions and actions as
regards themselves have necessity, nevertheless their effect upon
these lower things can fail, either because of the indisposition of
matter, or because of the rational soul, which has the free choice of
following the inclinations deriving from the impression thereof or
not-and so it remains that such effects come about not by
necessity but contingently ....
But with providence there is a greater difficulty. For divine providence cannot fail. These two things are impossible of co-existence:

HENRY MARGENAU:

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that something should be foreseen by God, and that it not be done.
And so it seems that from the fact of providence having been laid
down, that its effect must necessarily follow.
But one should realize that there depend from the same cause both
the effect and all the per se accidents of that effect. For just as
man is from nature, so also all his per se accidents, such as to have
the power to laugh, and to be susceptible of teaching of the mind.
But should some cause not produce man absolutely, but such a
man, it will not belong to it to constitute the per se accidents of
man, but pnly to make use of them. For the political scientist make
man civic; nevertheless he does not make him susceptible to teaching of the mind--but rather he uses this property in order to make
man civic.
But as it was said, being as being has for its cause God himself,
Whence, just as being itself is subject to divine providence, so also
all the accidents of being as being, among which are the necessary
and the contingent. [Cf. Summa Theol., I, q.
a. 4, ad 3]. Therefore it belongs to divine providence not only that it should produce
this being, but that it should confer upon it contingency or necessity, it has prepared mediate causes for it, from which it follows
with necessity or contingently. Therefore the effect of each thing
is found to have necessity accordingly as it is under the order of
divine providence. From which it occurs that this conditional is
true: 'If something is foreseen by God, it will be.' [Cf. Summa
Theol., I, q. 14, a. 13, ad 3].
But accordingly as a certain effect is considered under the order of
a proximate cause, thus not every effect is necessary--one is
necessary and another contingent according to the analogy of their
causes. For effects in their natures resemble proximate, not remote,
causes, to the condition of which latter they cannot attain.
Thus, therefore, it is evident that when we speak of divine providence, we should not say only, ' This is foreseen by God that it
should be,' but 'This is foreseen by God that it should be contingently or that it should be necessarily.' Whence it does not follow
according to the reasoning of Aristotle here presented that from the
fact of the laying down of divine providence, all effects be necessary
-rather it is necessary that the effects be either contingently or
necessarily.
This indeed is peculiar to this cause, namely, to divine providence.
For the remaining causes do not constitute the law of necessity or
but use it as constituted by a
cause. Whence
there is subjected to the causality of any other cause only that its

114

PIERRE H. CONWAY

effect be. But that it be necessarily or contingently depends upon
a higher cause, which is the cause of being as being, from which the
order of necessity and contingency in things derives. (Ibid., no.
1217-22.)

Professor Margenau's final words, taken from Fr. Gilby's
version of Summa Theologica I, q. 14, a. 8, ad 3, were:
"Natural things lie midway between God's lmowledge and ours.
Human science derives from them, and they derive from God's
own vision." We have already seen that God's vision, God's
knowledge combined with will extends to all things, causing
their very being, and in absolute order and clarity. To quote
the very article from which the original excerpt is taken: " ...
It is necessary that God's knowledge be the cause of things,
accordingly as it has the will conjoined to it " (loc. cit.) . How
minute is this knowledge, does it embrace the minute electron
·wholly and completely? Obviously it does, since whatever is
in the electron and continues to be in the electron, is put there
by God and maintained there by Him: God knows things
because He makes them out of nothing and they exist only to
do His bidding. " ... Since God is the cause of things by His
knowledge, as was said (a. 8 above), the knowledge of God
extends so far as His causality. Whence ... it is necessary that
the knowledge of God extend to singulars which are individuated through matter" (Ibid., a. 11) . What of the predictability
of these singular in their uncertain future? " ... Since it has
been shown above (i.e., in a. 9 of q. 14) that God knows all
things, not only those which are in act, but also those which are
in His power, or that of the creature, and some of these are with
respect to us future contingent things, it follows that God knows
future contingent things .... Now God knows all contingent
things, not only as they are in their causes, but also as each of
them is in act in Himself [i. e., in His knowledge, in which all
things past, present and future to us, are present to His
eternity]" (Ibid., a. 13, c.). Thus all being, actual and potential, is known by God, because made by God, and follows
the infallible course and order that He has laid down for it.
Finally, why has He chosen to create contingent, fallible

HENRY MARGENAU;

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115

being, as well as necessary, incorruptible being? The answer
is dear: ". . . God has produced things in being in order to
communicate His goodness to creatures, and have it represented
in them. And since it could not be adequately represented by
one creature, He has produced many and diverse creatures, that
what may be lacking in one with respect to representing the
divine goodness, may be made up for by another .... Formal
distinction is of higher dignity than materiaL But formal distinction always requires inequality, since, as is stated (Meta.,
VIII, l043b 30), the forms of things are as numbers, in which
the species vary through the addition and subtraction of unity .
. . . Just as, therefore, the divine wisdom is the cause of the
distinction of things because of the perfection of the universe,
so, too, of inequality" (Summ,a Theol., I, q. 47 aa. 1, 2).
How are we in knowing things in this universe which, even in
its most contingent, indetermined aspects, is absolutely known
and ordered by the First Cause? According to Aristotle and St.
Thomas necessary things may be known even in the natural
sciences: " ... It is necessary that he who lives shall one day
die; for already some condition has come into existence, e. g.,
the presence of contraries in the same body" (Meta., VI, 1027b
5) . With this statement of Aristotle, St. Thomas agrees: ". , .
We say that a living thing will die is necessary absolutely, since
it follows by necessity upon that which has already taken place,
namely, the presence of two contraries in the same body through
a mixture. For this conditional is true: ' If any body is composed of contraries, it will corrupt'" (In Meta., VI, L 3, no.
1199). At the same time some things are contingent: thus
Aristotle continues: " But whether he is to die by disease or
by violence is not yet determined." And St. Thomas: '' But
that this man should die through sickness o:r violence, does not
yet have any cause laid down from which it follows with
necessity" (Ibid., no. 1200) .
What then of predictability? Necessary things, when known,
do not vary either in the present or in the future. Things that
happen for the most part, probable things with varying degrees
of probability depending upon the power of the cause to impose

116

PIERRE H. CONWAY

itself upon matter, may be known in their causes with respect to
the future_. "If future things are in their causes as that from
which they proceed with necessity, they are known with the
certitude of science-as the astronomer foreknows a future
eclipse. But if they are thus in their causes that they proceed
from them ' for the most part,' they may be accordingly known
through a certain conjecture which is more or less certain
accordingly as the causes are more or less inclined towards their
effects" (Summa Theol., I, q. 86, a. 4) .
But what of the senses themselves, through which the knowledge of the universe reaches us? How penetrating and far-reaching are they? Already, as has been seen, Aristotle and St.
Thomas place the difficulty in knowing not in any basic
unintelligibility in things, but primarily in the weakness of the
human intellect, the lowest in the scale, while the angels " know
with perfect knowledge all natural things" (Summa Theol., I,
q. 89, a. 3). Although the senses of man are well-adapted to
give him that precise knowledge of particulars which his universal knowledge might otherwise lack (ibid., a. 1, c.), nevertheless they are not all-powerful. If St. Thomas does not speak
of our inability to perceive the smallest bodies or particles, he
does speak of our defects in contemplating even the largest
bodies. Thus " the shakiness which happens to our sight
because of distance) , makes it seems as though a star is in
motion ... since it is no different so far as something seeming
to move, whether the sight is moved or the thing which is
seen-as is evident with those who sail along the shore that,
because they are in motion, it seems to them that the mountains
and the land are moving" (In De Cael., II, I. 12, no. 405) .
In conclusion, then, one is forced to say that the universe of
Professor Margenau is not that of St. Thomas Aquinas. In
effect, where the former seems to see an amorphous, infinitelyextending, indetermined mass, with, at its center, like a little
island, the human reason making sense out of it from itself
as a base; the 'latter sees the universe as wholly purposeful,
ordered, significant, leading to God through the process of effect
to cause-" through the divine effects we are led to the contem-

HENRY MARGEN AU:

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plation of God" (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 180, a. 4) -in which
the order that is already there awaits perception by
intellects, blinded like the eyes of the owl or bat when turned to the
blaze of the sun. How can modern science say it is detached,
and not anthropocentric, if it seems to affirm the universe is
obscure because it may happen, at the moment, to appear
obscure to us? The order which the " factive intellect " of
Professor Margenau would impart to things in the physical
sciences, _is not the order which the reason of St. Thomas "
would not make, but solely consider" [In Eth., I, l. l., no. 1],
and order luminous in itself even when obscure to us, since even
though, unlike God, we do not know in it the changing sensible
singulars in their singularity, nevertheless we do know the
universal, immutable essences of material things, and through
them attain to an inchoative vision of divine things, which
" scanty conceptions . . . give us, from their excellence, more
pleasure than all our knowledge of the world in which we live "
(De Part. Animal., I, 644b 30; Summa Theol., I, a. 1, a. 5, ad 1;
I-II, q. 66, a. 5, ad 3; II-II, q. 180, a. 7, ad 3; In De Anima L
1, no. 5; In Lib. De Causis, Prooem., no. 5) .
Perhaps the most explicit summary of the divergence of the
views of Professor Margenau and those of St. Thomas may be
found in the passage where St. Thomas elaborates on the meaning of the Aristotelian expression, appearing in the Physics,
that " art imitates nature." For Professor Margenau there is
in the contemplation of nature, in addition to the knowledge of
the senses, an additional, independent creative intellectual
knowledge deriving from man's " active intellect." The resultant knowledge tends to be a composite of the objective and the
subjective. In keeping with the role of this independent " agent
intellect," one finds order in nature not so much as something
already existing there, which the mind discovers, but rather as
something which the mind constructs and projects upon an
otherwise unordered universe. St. Thomas is at odds with both
of these related views as his exposition of " art imitates nature "
succinctly shows. By ' art ' he means all¥ 'sure ordination of
reason whereby, through determinate means, human acts attain

ll8

PIERRE H. CONWAY

to a due end' (In Post. Anal., I, L 1, no. 1) . Why must this
intelligent process whereby means are consciously ordered to an
end imitate nature? It must do so for two :reasons: 1) All
knowledge derives initially from nature via the senses; 2) The
intelligent process of art derives from the perception of the
already existing intelligent, orde1·edprocess in nature, which art
then parallels and copies in harmony with nature:
Now the reason why "art imitates nature" is because the principle
of artificial activity is knowledge. But all our knowledge is received
through the senses from sensible and natural things.
art, because the
Therefore, then, are natural things imitable
whole of nature is ordered by some intellectual principle to its end,
in such a way as for the work of nature to be seen as the work of
intelligence, as it proceeds through determinate means to certain
ends-which art likewise imitates in acting. (In Phys., II, 1. 4,
no. 171.)
PIERRE

Do1ninican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

H. CoNWAY, 0. P.

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS
MARTIN HoPKINs, 0. P., S. T. Lr., Ph. L., is a Professor of Theology at the
College of St. Teresa, Winona, Minn.
JosEPH J. SIKORA, Ph. D., a graduate of Notre Dame University, is a
member of the Department of Philosophy at Loyola University.
D. SIMMONs, Ph. D., a graduate of Notre Dame University, is an
Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Marquette University.

EDWARD

PIERRE H. CoNWAY, 0. P., S. T. Lr., Ph. D., a graduate of Laval University
of Philosophy at the Pontifical Athenaeum
and formerly a
Angelicum, Rome, is a Professor at the Xavierian College, Silver
Springs, Md .
.JoHN P. McCORMICK, S. S., Ph. D., is the Rector of the Theological College
at The Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C.
VINCENT M. MARTIN, 0. P., S. T. Lr., Ph. D., a graduate of Laval University, is the Lector Primarius of the Dominican House of Philosophy, Dover, Mass.

119

BOOK REVIEWS
The Advancement of Theological Education. By H. RICHARD NIEBUHR,
DANIEL DAY WILLIAMs, JAMES M. GusTAFSON. New York: Harper,
1957. Pp. 239 with index. $4.00.
This work forms the second and final part of a study of the Protestant
major seminaries of the United States and Canada which, set in motion
by the American Association of Theological Schools and financed by the
Carnegie Corporation of New York, began intensively on July 1, 1954 and
continued over a period of fifteen months. The first part was published
in April 1956 under the title The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry,
Reflections on the Aims of Theological Education . . The director of the study
was H. Richard Niebuhr, of the Divinity School of Yale University; the
associate director, Daniel Day Williams, then of the Federated Theological
Faculty of the University of Chicago; and the assistant director, James
M. Gustafson, then pastor of the Congregational Church of Northford,
Connecticut, and graduate student at Yale. These men were assisted
by an advisory board consisting of a Methodist bishop, three officers of
theological schools, a professor of theology, and three men in the active
ministry. Information for the study was gathered first by questionnaires
from all the accredited members of the American Association (apparently
75), from almost all the associate members (the statistics show 29), and
from a considerable number of seminaries not affiliated with the Association;
a supplementary inquiry was conducted by means of visitations to ninety
of the schools, where interviews with administrators, teachers, and students
made possible a deeper insight into the material already available in the
questionnaires.
The study is very thorough and is clearly and interestingly presented.
It is kept strictly within the limits of the Protestant seminary pattern
with no reference, for purposes of comparison, to our Catholic seminaries
and, indeed, except for the treatment of general educational problems, in
which we could well learn from each other, such as the selection of students,
testing procedures, pedagogical methods, and several other points, there
is little common ground for comparison. The introduction of women students, for example, and the increase in the number of married seminarians
(averaging about 60 per cent of the total present enrollment and running
as high as 80 per cent in some schools), along with their concomitant
problems, create a situation so far different from our own that comparisons

I flO

BOOK REVIEWS

121

would be nugatory. Above all, the dogmatic unity and the central teaching
authority to preserve that unity, which are of the essence of our seminary
training as of every phase of our life, are not only absent from the picture
but are considered abhorrent to " the Protestant principle of the freedom
of the Christian man." (p. 44) Severe criticism is expressed of the "too
many schools (which) are subject to a close guardianship by defenders of
a faith once and for all delivered to some special group of saints. Their
faculties find themselves under the suspicious scrutiny of groups or parties
or, less frequently, whole denominations, that are unimpressed by the
wisdom of Gamaliel; certain that they possess not only a truth but the
truth and nothing but the truth." (p. 44)
The first two chapters, written by Niebuhr, discuss" Some Recent Trends
in Theological Education " and " Trends in the Economics of Theological
Education" and are, as might be expected, heavily statistical. We learn
that the study classifies 180 institutions as Protestant theological schools,
twenty-nine of which are in Canada; Bible colleges and institutes and some
other schools which prepare men for the ministry bu.t are less formally
theological are not listed. In the twenty-year period under survey considerable improvement has occurred in the previous education of entrants:
in recent years most have completed college before entering the major
seminary. The major seminary course in most schools comprises three
years; some have an extra year of internship or field work; there is a strong
feeling in favor of lengthening the course. Problems arise from the disparity
of philosophical training received by entrants and, in general, there are
the usual difficulties about the selection of candidates. Testing procedures
are increasingly used. The enrollment in Protestant theological seminaries
is estimated at not less than
as of 1954-55, or two and a half times
larger than it was twenty and thirty years earlier. The age, rank, academic
and professional preparation, and salaries of faculty members are studied
in detail; the development of the course of studies, the physical equipment
of the institutions, and the sources of income complete the material investigated in these first two chapters. It is interesting to note that, on the
basis of a study of · twenty-six " typical " schools, the expenditure per
student in 1954-55 is set at $1,033.
It is in reading the third chapter, on " Problems of Government," also
done by Niebuhr, that a Catholic reader feels especially grateful for a
Congregation of Seminaries and Universities. Denominational institutions
but
are able to approach some kind of uniformity in doctrinal
one can only sympathize with the many situations where the rule is " every
man for himself," whether he be professor or student.
The associate director, Daniel Day Williams, gives the report on faculties,
courses of study, and teaching methods in .chapters four, five, and six. There

BOOK REVIEWS

is much in these chapters that is relevant to the work in our own seminaries:
the type of professor, his professional preparation, the professor with
ministerial background versus the one who elects the teaching life with little
or no experience in the field, the extent to which the faculty member should
b.e allowed to do outside work in parishes, in preaching engagements, etc.,
all these topics strike a familiar chord for the reader who is in Catholic
seminary work.
In the discussion of the eourse of study, the problem raised by the
diversity of interpretations of Christian faith is noted but the solution is
left to the individual professors " with the confidence that the teacher who
can show the relation of his field to the Christian cause will communicate
this relationship to his students." (p. 83) It is in this chapter, too, that
the possible need of a department of philosophy is implied when Williams
writes: " ... one of the common complaints of professors of theology today
is the lack of adequate philosophical training among students. Further,
with the present reign of positivistic philosophy in many universities, one
is driven to ask whether it may not' devolve upon theological schools to be
among the centers which preserve the humanistic and spiritual tradition
of Western philosophy against its dissipation." {pp. 87-88) The detailed
discussion of the courses in this chapter is interesting and thought-provoking.
Chapter six, on " Theological Teaching in Classroom, Field, and Library,"
treats at great length of field work in its various forms, internship, and
clinical training. In the light of Pius XII's observations in Menti Nostrae
on the transition ·from seminary to pastoral life (p. 102 ff.) and of the
Sedes Sapientiae there are many points of interest to us here.
The next two chapters are by the assistant director, James M. Gustafson.
The first of these chapters has a special appeal because of the ten categories
of student there described. Authorities of Catholic seminaries will, mutatis
mutandis, recognize most of these types from their own experiences with
seminarians. The second describes the school as community and gives
considerable attention to the selection of students and to testing procedures.
The religious worship of the students is also discussed.
.
Completing the study is a chapter on " The Line of Advance," giving
a summation and reeommendations. Dr. Niebuhr here expresses the opinion
that " a new conception of the minister as pastoral director is emerging
in the Protestantism of the United States and Canada." (p. 200) He sees
the key problem in Protestant theological education here and in Canada
as " that of providing and maintaining the most able corps of teaching
theologians and theological teachers possible." (p. 201) As regards the
students, he calls for improved selection procedures. In the matter of
improvement of teaching, the result of the observations of the investigators
and of the comments of administrators, teachers, and students is set forth,

BOOK REVIEWS

in italics, thus: " The greatest defect in theological education today is that
it is too much an affair of piecemeal transmission of knowledge and skills,
and that, in consequence, it offers too little challenge to the student to
develop his own resources and to become an independent, lifelong inquirer,
growing constantly while he is engaged in the work of the ministry."
(p.
Methods of strengthening the faculties are proposed, and reorganization of the curriculum is recommended, with considerable attention given
to lengthening the period of study and the ways in which this may be done.
The chapter and the study are concluded with several pages on " Financing
the Advance."
There is an appendix on" The Theological Education of Negro Ministers"
in which Gustafson faces the picture of " the appaling shortage of welltrained Negro ministers, the financial plight of the dominantly Negro
seminaries, the unattractiveness of the ministry to many of the best Negro
college graduates, the relatively slow rate of increase of Negro B. D. enrollment, and many other factors (which) call attention to a major problem
that American Protestantism as a whole must deal with." (p.
Some
suggestions are made for meeting the needs.
If there emerges from this study the impression of a tighter organization
of Protestant theological schools than Catholics may have thought existed,
credit for such organization would seem to be due in large measure to such
an agency as the American Association of Theological Schools. This association, principally an accrediting agency, has taken a very frank and
honest look at Protestant seminaries; it has depicted the good and the bad;
and it has made forthright recommendations. In the face of the manifold
doctrinal divergencies found in the schools it would be fatuous to expect
uniformity, nor does the Protestant wish such uniformity. But surely
there should result from this study, if its recommendations are hearkened
to, a better prepared beginner, a greater effectiveness in teaching and in
learning, an improved community atmosphere, and a more effectual minister.
It would be good if our American Catholic seminaries could look to such
an agency of our own for a similar frank appraisal and pointed suggestions.
True, we have the specific directives of the Holy See, communicated through
the Sacred Congregation of Seminaries and Universities, which insure
doctrinal unity and correctness and prescribe many of the details of the
discipline and life of the seminary. But the Holy See still leaves much
for the bishops to determine in the light of varying needs and customs.
Furthermore, not only because of the seminarians who discontinue their
studies for the priesthood and are faced by the scholastic requirements of
outside schools and for the priests who go out from our seminaries to
teach and supervise, but because of the obligation which our orthodoxy
and centuries-old traditions iii;l.pose upon us to meet the highest educational

BOOK REVIEWS

standards, we should constantly re-evaluate our work and stand ready
for comparison with any other school, public or private. We cannot afford
to go our own self-satisfied way, leaving it to our deposit of faith and our
hoary traditions to see us through somehow or other. We have every reason
to rejoice in the true faith that is ours but we can be recreant to that
faith if we grow careless about the manner of its transmission, especially
when our work is to train the future teachers of the faith. Why should
we not then have an agency of our own which can, within the pattern set
by the Sacred Congregation, propose minimum standards, check their fulfillment, make suggestions, and grant accreditation? We already have instruments at hand in the affiliation program of the Catholic University of
America and in the potentialities of the National Catholic Educational
Association. Why not plumb the possibilities? Then surely we can make
great strides in the advancement of Catholic theological education.
JOHN P. McCoRMICK, S. S.

Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. C.

The Tragic Philosopher: A Study of Friedrich Nietzsche. By F. A. LEA.
New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. Pp. 354. $6.00.
This is an interesting and useful one-volume introduction to the thought
of Nietzsche. Written by one who is well aware of Nietzsche's power to
attract the modern mind as well as repel the more traditional thinker,
the book is a successful attempt to trace briefly the development of his
thought from his philosophical conversion to Schopenhauer in 1865 to his
mental breakdown after 1888.
The author, following the historical flow of Nietzsche's life, views this
intellectual development as one of three stages: (1) Romanticism; (2) The
Conquest of Nihilism; and (3) The Transvaluation of All Values. The
dominant features of each stage are shown by analyzing the more important
ideas of the major works pertinent to each of the three periods. In this
analysis Lea allows Nietzsche a good deal of self-expression by giving a
large number of texts judiciously chosen from his books and letters. The
work thus becomes a nicely arranged tapestry of Nietzsche texts interwoven
with Lea criticism. The Nietzsche who emerges from these pages. is not a
new one; those who know his works will readily recognize the
but the story is told with an engaging sympathy by an author determined
to treat Nietzsche as a serious thinker who must be reckoned with in our
day. Although not primarily interested in the external facts of the phi-

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125

losopher's life, the author gives enough of these to sustain the intellectual
growth.
Lea emphasizes, and rightly so, the decisive effect Schopenhauer had
on young Nietzsche at a critical moment in his life. Numbed by several
painful experiences and without principles to guide him, for he had lost
faith in his Protestant belief, Nietzsche was struggling to form for himself
a philosophy of life when he began to read the "gloomy philosopher."
Schopenhauer's concern with the harsh realities of existence, his denial
of God, the analysis of the world as will to live, his glowing encomium
of art-all these found an attentive response in the young reader. Quite
naturally Lea designates this period as the Romanticism of Nietzsche, for
it is during these years that he is absorbed in art and the philosophy of
culture. And art, of course, at this period of his life meant the music of
Wagner in whom Nietzsche saw "such an unconditioned ideality, such a
noble seriousness, that near him I feel as if I were near the divine."
It is during this romantic period, too, that Nietzsche became fascinated
with the myth of Dionysus. In the story of the dismemberment of
Dionysus' body, its distribution, and ultimate reconstitution he saw a
constant drama of all human life in which a primal parcellation could be
restored to unity through the agency of art.
But Nietzsche was not one to remain long the disciple of any master
nor long the friend of any man. Abandoning Schopenhauer and breaking
with Wagner, he started a new stage in his life, his nihilism. Sick in body
and isolated in soul, he passed through a period of haunting loneliness
and intellectual torture which forced him to reconstruct his thought. Reexamining the ethical, religious, and artistic experiences which the romanticists had declared led to a supreme metaphysical entity, he accepted the
experiences as real but explained them in a completely naturalistic fashion.
As he now saw life, all human activity is derived more or less immediately from the simple instinct of self-preservation, that is, from the pursuit
of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. What is useful for life becomes the
true, while the harmful is the false or evil. Because reality is in constant
flux, all human science is but unstable uncertainty. Truth is the creation
of each man, a selecting of certain facts that make life more livable, an
eliminating of others that might hurt and restrain human activity. But it
is a selecting and eliminating that really explain nothing; the only true
position, the only real truth is the truth that there is no truth.
His moral indifference follows quite naturally from this intellectual
nihilism. All our actions are determined and hence free will is but the
conflict among rival desires, with victory going to the strongest. As to good
and evil, " there is nothing good, nothing beautiful, nothing sublime, nothing
evil, in itself, but rather these are states of soul in which we bestow such

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epithets on things." Thus one must decide good and evil for himself, and
the critical norm for the judgment is each man's personal pleasure or pain,
which at this stage of his philosophical life often seem identified with bodily
health or sickness. But if there is no- trans-subjective morality, if there is
no objective good, neither is there any blame for evil. " All is innocence."
This is the mark of the new freedom, this is his conquest of nihilism: to
understand that there is no truth but our truth, no morality but our
morality.
It is during this second period that he becomes more and more enthralled
with the notion of the Will to Power as the ultimate constituent of reality.
Described in terms of activity or energy or striving, the Will to Power is
seen by Nietzsche to be man's authentic being, his inner self, his deeper
reality.
The Will to Power had engendered among the Greeks, men of strong
characters, fierce passions, and brilliant intellects. Because it was an
aggressive energy it had often led other men to find satisfying fulfillment
only in violent and savage wars. Now it should be employed in the war
of ideas, in the battle of thought against the slave morality of Christianity,
for the Will to Power had become increasingly debilitated by the nay-saying
doctrine of Christianity with its denial of the passions, its cry of pity
for the unfortunate, and its insistence on love for one's neighbor.
From this revolt against theism, especially in its Christian form, Nietzsche
foresaw the rise of the new man, the new nobility, Superman. Superman
is the man who will no longer endure the fetters of an externally imposed
morality; he is the one who has lost all patience with the restraints of
old traditions and customary ways; he is the man whose Will to Power
surges to a fullness of power and a confidence of strength, a confidence
and power that give him a persistent and perceptive consciousness of
mastery over others; he is the man who judges all things in relation to
himself and thus has that self-love and self-will that Nietzsche termed
" the healthy and holy selfishness."
Now this self-love expresses itself in the creation of morals especially,
for Superman is the man who for himself and by himself establishes his
own good, his own morality. Emancipating himself from all subjection
he sees virtue as his own self and his own self as his Will to Power. No
longer stifled by decadent Christian morality, the new man will have the
courage to use lesser men as instruments for his own purposes, he will be
ready to enslave the weaker, he will be willing to exterminate" the physiologically bungled and botched." As Nietzsche boasted: "We, after all,
are the nobles. It is much more important to maintain us than that cattle."
It is all so calloused, all so brutal, all so prophetic of Nazism and Communism.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Men, the new men, the coming supermen making laws for themselves
or transvaluating values, this becomes the master idea of the remainder
of Nietzsche's life. His later works, e. g., Beyond Good and Evil and The
Genealogy of Morals, are concerned with the problem and are sustained
attempts to work out some of the historical, philosophical, and religious
implications of the new doctrine.
Such is the study given us by the author, and, on the whole, it is a
successful one. There are times when Nietzsche's doctrine could have been
analyzed in sharper detail and there are occasions when Lea's criticism
becomes fumbling and inept. But there is much to be recommended: the
texts chosen to delineate the various stages of Nietzsche's thought show
a discriminating judgment based on sympathetic study of the philosopher;
the comparisons made of the different writings of Nietzsche bring out a
surprising unity in his fundamental theses; and finaHy, Lea makes a constant
endeavor to indicate his relevance to modern existentialism, especially
that of the atheistic variety. In this regard Lea understands well that
Nietzsche's atheism is the principle of his epistemology, not its conclusion.
Thus the concluding pages of his book show how Nietzsche's loathing for
God increased in crescendo until it became sheer hysteria hopelessly
floundering in incoherent contradiction. But this might have been expected,
for his atheism, like so many others, was not so much an intellectual
as a moral persuasion, as Zarathustra makes all too dear:
1f there were Gods, how could I endure it to be no God:-Therefore
no Gods.
VINCENT M. MARTIN,

Dominican House of Philosophy,
Dover, Mass.

there are

0. P.

BRIEF NOTICES
Ethics: The Introduction to Moral Science. By JoHN A. OEsTERLE. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1957. Pp.
$5.35.
" There are two basic reasons for having moral philosophy in a Catholic
college. The first reason is for the benefit of the moral theologian, who
must have this knowledge to know and teach moral theology. The second
reason is that moral philosophy is needed for the moral theology course,
or its equivalent, that is required in all Catholic colleges. On the college
level, students should be expected to have a rational basis for the important
truths of the Faith which they hold, perhaps especially, in these times, in
moral matters. Moral Philosophy accomplishes this important function
for the college student."
These words were spoken by John Oesterle at a meeting of the North
Central Regional Conference of the American Catholic Philosophical Association at the St. Paul Seminary, St. Paul, Minnesota. His evaluation was
later published in The Thomist (XVI (1958), 470-471). Dr. Oesterle
presents to professor and student a good practical and well ordered text
book for a course in General Ethics.
Dr. Oesterle's aim is "to recapture ethics as it was originally conceived
to be--a practical science based on reasoning derived from common experience, though considering speculative truths as any science must necesdo." (p. ix) This aim is definitely and successfully accomplished in
this work.
The author accomplishes this aim in many ways. First, by clearly
delineating the role of Moral Philosophy and Moral Theology, and keeping
this distinction constantly before him as he discusses the question of human
acts. There are a sizeable number of textbooks in the field of Ethics that
make this distinction and then proceed to reject it by giving a theological
explanation of moral philosophy, confusing theological and philosophical
elements to a degree where the clarity of the thought is lost in the process.
Secondly, Professor Oesterle has followed closely the order of Aristotle
in his Nicomachean Ethics and just as closely the order of St. Thomas'
commentary on this work. At the end of each chapter are found suggested
readings in Aristotle's Ethics and the commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas,
as well as in other representative works. Too often the authors of many
other Ethics books appeal to the theologicai reasoning of St. Thomas in
the Prima Secundae and the Secunda Secundae. In this text book even
though Dr. Oesterle does not quote from St. Thomas' commentary on
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics he is definitely giving us the philosophical
reasoning of St. Thomas and Aristotle. To anyone who has read the

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BRIEF NOTICES

Nicomachean Ethics and St. Thomas' commentary this fact will be
immediately evident.
Thirdly, this text does not explicitly cover material contained in what
is often called "Special Ethics." Professor Oesterle throughout the text
remains faithful to his aim of giving a specific scientific consideration of
General Ethics.
Fourth, the material treated, e. g. The ffitimate End, The Problem of
Happiness, Virtue in General, The Voluntary, Freedom, etc., is not labored
by long and involved syllogisms that make for confusion rather than
demonstration. Dr. Oesterle presents the truth of Ethics in the same basic
manner that Aristotle and St. Thomas did, appealing for the most part to
the experience of mankind. He has placed after each chapter a section
entitled "Review Questions." These questions when answered will give
the student a very thorough knowledge of the moral philosophical truths
treated in the chapter. This will be far more beneficial to the student then
memorizing confused and perhaps illogical syllogisms that are soon forgotten.
Fifth, in discussing human acts, he is fully aware of the amount of matter
that must be covered in a one semester course. A preliminary version of
this book was used for several years at the University of Notre Dame.
This valuable period of experimentation enabled Dr. Oesterle to see just
how much matter could be covered in the time available. Planning his
material accordingly, he divides his book into fourteen chapters. Eleven
of these chapters are of fifteen pages or less. Each chapter contains a logical
outline of the development of the matter and this enables the text to be
workable for the professor in his lecture and the student in his study.
One defect could be mentioned here. In the following pages, viii, 8, 40, 77,
95, 108, 188, 189, 148, and 168, where Dr. Oesterle considers various schools
of thought pertinent to the matter under his discussion, it is the opinion
of this reviewer that it would be more scholarly if he would give footnote
reference to these schools.
Sixth, the author is well aware of the pedagogical fact that it is necessary
to create interest in the minds of the student of any science. Conscious
of this fact Dr. Oesterle terminates each chapter with his "Points for
Discussion." These problems will be thought-provoking for most students
and if they are discussed, whether in class or over cafeteria tables, will
of necessity tend to intensify a student's interest in a science that is most
practical for his individual as well as social life.
This is Dr. Oesterle's second text-book in Thomistic Philosophy. His
text in Logic was well received both by professor and student. I am
confident that this text in General Ethics will be even more acceptable.

T. C. KANE, 0. P.
Trinity OoUege,
Washington, D.O.

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BRIEF NOTICES

Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas .Aquinas. Vol. II. Cosmology.
By H. D. GARDEIL, 0. P. Translated by JoHN A. OTTO. St. Louis:
Herder, 1958. Pp. 218 with index. $3.75.

For anyone attempting a general introduction to the philosophy of St.
Thomas Aquinas, his philosophy of nature (popularly known as Cosmology)
looms as a major problem. It is to Fr. Gardeil's credit that he has successfully faced so many of these difficulties and has produced a text which
when supplemented by lectures will meet many of the requirements of the
college professor.
The body of the book, beginning with chapter two, gives a lucid and
brief summary of Aristotle's natural philosophy. Chapter two itself is
devoted to the Hylomorphic Theory. The succeeding chapters in turn
take up the problems of quantity and quality (chapter three), nature
(chapter four), the causes (chapter five), motion (chapter six), the concomitants of motion (chapter seven) , the existence of a Prime Mover
(chapter eight) and Aristotelian astronomy (chapter nine). Finally there
is a general summary followed by an appendix in which the author supplies
the reader with key texts from the works of St. Thomas.
These sections of Fr. Gardeil's Cosmology are well presented. He adheres
faithfully to the texts of St. Thomas except possibly for one instance: privation as a principle of mobile being even in esse. Benignly interpreted, Fr.
Gardeil means that the
privation in fieri is of course opposed to
the substantial form in esse. Certainly these two cannot co-exist. But
should he mean to exclude all privation as a principle in esse, then he is
manifestly against the express doctrine of St. Thomas in his Commentary
on the Physics of .Aristotle: " One can object that there is no privation
in a subject when it is under a form; and hence privation is not a per
accidens principle in esse. And so it must be said that matter never is
without privation; because when it has one form, it is with a privation of
another form ... when the form has already come, then there is found in
it (matter) a privation of another form." (Book I, lesson 13, paragraph 4).
It is with the initial introductory chapter, however, that this reviewer
expresses dissatisfaction. Here Fr. Gardeil investigates the problems of the
nature of cosmology and the distinction between philosophy and modern
science. It is obvious at once that everything hinges on these questions,
for unless we can establish the relationship of modern science to Thomistic
cosmology there is little profit to a study of that cosmology. If modern
science has superseded philosophy, or at least the philosophy of nature,
then it should be removed from the college curriculum and treated merely
historically. On the other hand, if cosmology as St. Thomas understood
it is the foundation of all modern science, then should it be mandatory. In

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BRIEF NOTICES

any case, one cannot intelligently treat of cosmology until some solution to
these problems has been attained.
But Fr. Gardeil does not solve them. He cites the well-known position
of M. J. Maritain: "The philosophy of nature, he observes, does not
disregard the objects perceived by sense (objects corresponding to the
first degree of abstraction) , but it explains them by principles that are
broadly speaking ontological or metaphysical; for it employs such notions
as corporeal substance, quality, active and passive potency, material and
formal cause, and others of similar ' ontological ' content. The sciences
of nature, on the other hand, generally stick to more concrete notions.
Theirs are the concepts of what is physically measurable, of things that
lend themselves to verification by experience. And when the sciences go
a step further, they do not resort to ontological but to mathematical principles, which fall short of the ontological degree of abstraction." (page six
of text). Then Fr. Gardeil offers some difficulties to this position, and
fails to conclude definitively. How, one may ask, can a review of cosmology
be made until this problem is solved, at least in the mind of the writer?
It is not to our purpose here to criticize M. Maritain's position. Yet
it seems that Fr. Gardeil's entire book is weakened by his failure to give
a clear and Thomistic answer to the relationship of science and philosophy.
Interestingly, the author does give a brief comment on the makers of the
modem scientific world at the end of his book. Why does he not compare
Galileo's Dialogue, for example, with Aristotle's Physics? In both works
we observe a blending of observed data and conclusions drawn from that
data. The accuracy of the data varies, but the method is the same. Can
we not say that Aristotle is a scientist as well as a philosopher; that
Galileo is both scientist and philosopher, too? Mere collection of data is
not science; it is rather the interpretation of that data by inductive and
deductive processes that is both science and philosophy. Whatever their
distinction be (perhaps there is none), it must be clarified before one can
undertake any intelligent summary of cosmology for modern man.
A word of commendation to Fr. John Otto for his fine translation and
informative foot-notes which clarify several points in the text.
EuGENE BoNDI,

Dominican HOU!ie of Philo11opky,
Dover, Mass.

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132

Social and Cultural Dynamics. By PITIRIM SoROKIN. Boston: Extending
Horizons Books-Porter Sargent Publishers.
1957. Pp. 727 with
indexes. $7.50.
When Sorokin's Social and Cultural Dynmnics first appeared it was,
with reason, hailed as a major work in the philosophy of history. In the
four volumes now presented in abridged form, and from which we quote in
the current review, Sorokin took as his hypothesis that the integrating
factor of human culture is its " logico-meaningful " content and this, he
thought, forms the core common denominator of a culture: " it is the
identity (or dissimilarity) of central meaning, idea, or mental bias that
permeates all the logically related fragments" (p. ll). "Meaningful and
logical integration," he continued, " by definition can only exist where
there is mind and meaning" (p. 13). It was with the idea of discovering
the mind and meaning evident in man's way of life from Greek times to
the present that Sorokin in the 1930s set himself the task of analysing
forms of art, music, literature, ethics, philosophy, religion, general social
relations and many other cultural phenomena [his definition of human
cultures: " In its broadest sense it may mean the sum total of everything
which is created or modified
the conscious or unconscious activity of
two or more individuals interacting with one another or conditioning one
another's behavior." (p. 2)] He set himself a series of questions about
human culture which are to be found on p. 65.
The result of Sorokin's impressively lengthy researches showed three
conceptions of reality and truth: ideational culture whose needs and
ends are mainly spiritual, non-sensate and non-material
27); sensate
culture which is materialistic but efficient and leads to great external
changes (p. 28); and idealistic culture, a mixed type which contains both
material and spiritual elements (ppo 28-29).
By profession, sociologists are scientists and not philosophers. Their
aim is to be specialists concerned only with the observation, description,
and classification of facts concerning the structure and function of social
relations and the culture established through these relations. Sociologists
seek to understand social and cultural phenomena for the establishment
of statistical laws, and for the formulation of theories which will account
for these laws and which will aid in predicting future social change within
the limitations of all the socia] sciences which deal with human beings whose
actions are not always predictable. Although some philosophers and theologians deplore this narrow specialization for one reason or another, arguing
with sociologists that they do not know their own business and its limitations, the fact is that some sociologist are sometimes influenced by a
design it is usually
philosophy which they hold, and although this may be
Wl.intentional. Christians are often influenced
their other-worldly ap-

BRIEF NOTICES

188

proach to life on earth; positivists think that the whole of truth may be
known by observable facts of social relationships; Freudians consider that
much of social behavior is conditioned in early childhood; followers of
Hegel give inner mystic meanings to a synthesis and antithesis of ideas in
a constant condition of flux until truth is eventually attained.
In considering that the measurable manifestations of social relations and
culture are determined by fluctuation according to the core content, now
ideational, now sensate, and again idealistic, Sorokin was undoubtedly influenced by Hegel, and essentially idealistic in the Hegelian sense of the
term (which obviously differs from his own). Sociologists in general have
been concerned to ascertain if Sorokin's theories were indeed supported
by the wealth of facts he provided-the thousands of erudite allusions
to the meanings which he adduced to the history of art, music, literature,
philosophy and the rest from early Graeco-Roman times down to the
present sensate trough to which he thinks we in America have descended.
They usually consider that his work, while interesting as a philosophy of
history, impressive in its erudition, and undoubtedly helping to forward
what is known as the sociology of knowledge, is philosophical rather than
sociological. As a philosophy of history, Sorokin's work may be compared
with Toynbee's ten volumes, and their theory that social change develops
by means of challenge, response, withdrawal, and return. Sorokin, of course,
has a true sociological conception of the interaction of culture and its
integration (and disintegration, at times) and, too, of the cultural aspects
of human thought and philosophy. He considered his own work especially
valuable because he aimed precisely at a unified cultural system (Fads and
Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences, 1956, p. 164; cf. reviews
in The Critic (Books on Trial) Vol. IV, No.8, June-July 1956; The AmeriJune 1957, pp. 148can Catholic Sociological Review, Vol. XVIII, No.
149). All Sorokin's works are original and the volume herewith reviewed
most certainly provides many insights for those concerned with the sociology
of knowledge, yet the net evaluation of the sociologists, perhaps unwisely,
seems to give more sociological importance to othel" works of his.
This new 1957 edition omits most of the numerous footnotes in the
earlier volumes, all the paragraphs and pages of secondary importance, and
all the appendixes showing source material. Although mention is made of
bringing the material up to date, this reviewer can only find five lines
added on page 547, and mention of seven or eight new books. Those who
have access to the original four volumes will not need to purchase the
abridgment; new readers may well find this edition valuable, to discover
for themselves what Sorokin has to say and
of his method.
Trinity College,
Washington, D. C.

EvA J. Ross

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BRIEF NOTICES

Towards A. Critical Naturalism. By PATRICK RoMANELL. New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1958. Pp. 103. $3.25.

The first four essays of the six which comprise this small volume were
originally delivered by the author when he was a Fulbright Visiting Professor of Philosophy at the University of Turin in 1952-53. The same
lectures were given later at the Casa de la Cultura Ecuadoriana in Quito,
when, under a Smith-Mundt grant from the State Department, the author
served as Visiting Professor at the Central University of Ecuador.
Italian and Spanish versions have already been published under the titles,
Verso un naturalismo critico (1953) , and El neo-naturalismo norteamericano
{1956). The supplementary two essays reflect the author's interest in
defending an ethical theory founded on the " new " naturalism. The earlier
essays consider the general tenets of contemporary American naturalism,
a naturalistic defense of metaphysics, an examination of the logic, a critical
naturalism, and a critique of Dewey's ethical theory.
Professor Romanell's work is interesting in that it repudiates the dogmatic
materialism of his predecessors, while conceding contemporary naturalism
to be a derivative of that materialism.
He calls his method " critical," not in contradistinction to a naive or
uncritical acceptance of unsubstantiated theory, but because of what he
calls a " continuity of analysis " foreign both to the thought of older
materialism and the anti-metaphysical bias of the logical positivist. It is
critical too in that it is a " crisis " naturalism invested with a " tragic
sense of life " and an acute awareness of man's contemporary dilemma.
The author sees naturalism, realism and pragmatism as three currents
of American thought which have arisen as a protest against both the
truculence of nineteenth-century materialism, and the Roycean idealism
which was so influential on the American scene at the end of the last
century.
The new naturalism as described by Professor Romanell is not only
much more reserved in its espousal of the cause of empiriological science
(physics he holds to be the stronghold of the old naturalism) , but considers
spiritual experience a legitimate way of organizing the facts of natural
experience. Spiritual experience, which is not described, is held to be an
experience of nature which alone " quickens and inspires living."
Science is not repudiated ill the new naturalism, but like art and religion,
it reveals to man but a facet of nature's possjbilities. Thus the basic and
indemonstrable assumption of naturalism, " Nature is all there is," despite
its apparent crudity, includes a reverence for beatuy, sanctity, justice
and wisdom. The author believes that naturalism alone avoids the fallacy
of exclusivism to which dualism and phenomenalism, as well as materialism
and idealism, are inclined.

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185

Although the author says that Bradlley may be right when he identifies
metaphysics as " the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon
instinct," he agrees that the finding of those reasons is itself instinctual.
There follows an unconvincing attempt to reconcile the " dogmatic stand
of traditional metaphysics and the equally dogmatic stand of agnostic
positivism." Professor Romanell makes a spirited defense, but, as he seems
to consider metaphysics merely a methodology that sees in its entirety
what science sees partially, it is highly questionable that it is really metaphysics that he is defending.
In his interesting comments on a naturalistic ethic, the author acknowledges a debt both to British utilitarianism and American pragmatism, but
feels that a science of ethics cannot be constructed on Dewey's suppositions.
Man, to him, is more than a seeker of happiness; " he is also a maker
and keeper of obligations." Thus man's moral life must consider both the
eudaemonistic, which concerns the pursuit of happiness, and the juristic,
which concerns man's obligations and duties.
It is unfortunate that Professor Romanell does not consider the claims
of traditional metaphysics, the natural law, nor the object of religious
experience, aH of which would be relevant to his subject matter. The new
natmalism in its preoccupation with new answers, has forgotten to ask
some old questions.
RoBERT PAuL MoHAN, S. S.
The Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. C.

Mariology IL Edited by JuNIPER B. CAROL, 0. F. M. Milwaukee: Bruce,
l!M7. Pp. 618. $9.50.
This is the second volume of a projected trilogy. The announced purpose
of the series is to present "a comprehensive symposium, in the vernacular,
covering the entire theological tract relative to Our Blessed Lady." In
pursuit of this purpose, the first volume dealt largely with the sources
of Mariology; the second is concerned, for the most part, with the individual
doctrines within Mariology; the third, now in the writing, will treat of
Marian devotion. One deviation from this plan should be noted: the discussion of Mary in the writings of the Eastern Fathers is included in the
second volume; while the doctrines of the Immaculate Conception and
Mary's immunity from actual sin are included in the first. The effort to
achieve the purpose of the symposium has succeeded admirably. Under
the inspiration and editorship of Father Juniper B. Carol, 0. F. M., the
first two volumes represent a solid achievement in the presentation of a

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major work in English. The present volume, with fourteen articles by
twelve authors, is a smooth, readable and soberly scientific work.
Father Cyril Vollert, S. J., contributes two introductory chapters. The
first, dealing with the scientific structure of Mariology, sets the careful,
scientific tone of the volume and effectively vindicates the position of
Mariology as a distinct, but not isolated, part of the science of theology;
it is suggested that Mariology be located between the tract on the Redemption and the theological tract on the Church. In the second article,
the much debated question of the fundamental principle of Mariology is
discussed at length. Father Vollert sets out eight of the more prominent
and more promising of the tentatives, and then comes out firmly for the
Divine Maternity as the fundamental principle. The pivot of his very
convincing argument is that the connection among the prerogatives of Mary
is not derived from the nature of things, but from divine decree; we are
to look for a theological and not a metaphysical unity in a theological
discipline.
Father Walter J. Burghardt, S. J., provides a concise, stimulating and
rewarding study of the Eastern Fathers. He regards the Fathers' vision
of Mary as the New Eve as their original insight into her role in the
Redemption. This role, as they saw it, was cooperation in the objective
Redemption; and although this role was r-Jgularly reduced by them to
Mary's mothering of the Redeemer, there are some significant indications
of a more proximate cooperation being attributed. His discussion of the
virginity of Mary is noteworthy for his description of the development
of the doctrine of virginitas in partu, and his discussion of the divine
maternity for the history of Theotokoif before Ephesus. He carefully
considers the problem of the contrast between the Fathers' teaching of
Mary's holiness and their apparent conviction that she had sinned. With
regard to the Immaculate Conception, he points out that the Fathers
formulated the major premises of this privilege, "but it is only incidentally,
almost accidentally, that a few ... formulate the prerogative in explicit or
equivalent terms." He emphasizes the role of Epiphanius in the development of the doctrine of the Assumption, showing that Epiphanius, despite
some hesitations, had an intuition of the doctrine.
The predestination of Mary is discussed by Father John Bonnefoy,
0. F. M. He makes a vigorous presentation of his own theory, differing
from both the Thomistic and Scotistic systems, but leaning rather heavily
on the latter. Father Gerald Van Ackeren, S. J ., provides a complete and
searching treatment of the divine maternity. In addition to a full presentation of the positive data, he considers at some length the question of
the essence of this maternity. He makes a strong defense of the view that
this maternity is a formal participation in the fecundity of the Father,

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and tentatively solves the difficulties of this view by placing it in the framework of De la Taille's theory.
Father Philip J. Donnelly, S. J., offers a complete discussion of the
virginity of Mary, particularly worthwhile for the detailed description of
the historical development of the doctrine of virginitas in partu and post
partum. Fathers Frank P. Calkins, 0. S.M., and Francis J. Connell,
C. SS. R., present shorter (by reason of the subject matter) treatments
of Mary's fullness of grace and her knowledge; both chapters provide
thorough discussions of the topics. Father Wenceslaus Sebastian, 0. F. M.,
gives a complete and sound treatment of the spiritual maternity.
The discussion of the coredemption is handled by Father Carol, editor
of the series and recognized authority on this aspect of Mariology. This
chapter is particularly rich in information regarding the historical development of the doctrine and the contemporary discussion of it; the explanations
of concepts and the solutions of difficulties are painstakingly clear. Father
Armand J. Robichaud, S. M., offers a full picture of Mary as dispensatrix
of all graces; he maintains that this thesis is now de fide divina et catholica
from the ordinary magisterium.
The discussion of the death and assumption of Mary is very soundly
presented by Father Lawrence P. Everett, C. SS. R. The consideration
of her death is comparatively brief and the discussion of the assumption is
organized as an extended commentary on Munificentissimus Deus. Father
Firmin Schmidt, 0. F. M. Cap., gives a complete presentation of the evidence for and a solid analysis of the fact of Mary's queenship. Since Ad
Coeli Reginarn had not appeared at the time of the writing of the chapter,
it is briefly discussed in an appendix. The final chapter, by Father Vollert,
deals with the pressing and complicated problem of the analogy of Mary to
the Church. He presents an outline of the elements of the problem and a
very pereceptive examination of perspectives of development. Rejecting
the tentatives of Koster, Semmelroth and Miiller, he argues that the
analogy is to be explained within the framework of Mary's "productive
coredemption."
This volume can be judged to have met the standard set by its predecessor and to be, therefore, a definite success. It will be significant
reading for any serious student of Mariology and a distinct boon for those
interested in theology but limited in their range of reading to works in
English. Projects such as this are long overdue.
wILLIAM:

Immaculate Conception Seminary,
Darlington, N.J.

F. HOGAN

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BRIEF NOTICES

The Scholastic Analysis of Usury. By JOHN T. NooNAN, JR. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957. Pp. 482. $9.00.
At the outset, a reader is inclined to be struck by the style of the author.
It is an extraordinary feat to discuss usury doctrine over seven centuries
and come up with a book so fascinating that it is difficult to lay it down
until it is finished. The author achieved this facility of style almost exclusively by the lucidity of his presentation and the forcefulness of his views.
This is not a popularization. Latin terms are used freely, as are philosophical and economic concepts. Yet the overall impact is remarkable.
Content keeps pace with style. The main purpose of the book is a clear
presentation of the development of scholastic doctrine in regard to usury.
Primarily this is done by quotations and succinct summaries from the
works of the major theologians and canonists. There is, however, an abundance of references to economic conditions underlying these analyses, and
also to papal and other decrees affecting Catholic practice in regard to
usury.
An incidental, but important, aim of the book is the correction of
erroneous yet common misconceptions regarding scholastic usury doctrine.
The author is not reluctant to take on big names. James Westfall ThomPson, Max Weber, R. H. Tawney, and Rev. Bernard Dempsey, S. J., are
among the respected writers taken to task for inadequate insight into
traditional doctrine and its development.
The documentation offered is formidable. Over a hundred theologians are
cited, and nearly all their major works noted. St. Thomas, for example,
is presented in terms of four of his works, with the main quotation taken
from his De Malo rather than the Summa Tkeologica.
According to the author, the overriding objection to usury was that, in
the lending of money, one is "selling" an object whose only purpose is
consumption. Hence to charge for the use of money is, in effect, to sell
the same object twice. It was this concept only, not the idea that money
was barren, that dominated the thinking of the philosophers and theologians.
The early writers did permit, to a limited degree, a return based on such
extrinsic titles as loss incurred or gain foregone. But these titles were
highly restricted, and would be most inadequate to support a modern
banking system. Medieval writers did permit profit upon investment, the
partnership contract, and rent of real property.
As the commercial revolution expanded the need for credit, scholastic
writers began a searching re-examination of the usury doctrine. The montes
pietatis, the trinus contractus, and finally the legal interest rate were
accepted as means for providing funds, yet assuring a return to the lender.
The author concludes by citing a 1950 discourse of Pope Pius Xll, to

BRIEF NOTICES

189

employees and directors of the Bank of Rome, as indicating present views
that the banking system performs a, useful social function.
Such a succinct summary hardly does justice to the admirable way in
which the author handles his complex subject. We can see, in page after
page, the soul-searching efforts of the scholastics to meet the needs of
economic life in a way compatible with justice and other tenets of the
moral law. While the book makes no plea for the theologians and philosophers, yet their efforts come through admirably as· realistic and sincere
attempts to apply social ethics to the complex world of commerce and
business.
This work should prove a definitive treatment of the scholastic analysis
of usury. Its author is a lawyer who holds a doctorate in scholastic philosophy, has edited the Harvard Law Review, and has worked in policy
planning for the National Security CounciL It is almost unbelievable
that a man with so many other preoccupations upon his mind could have
found the time to write this book. Its obvious excellence must give him
great satisfaction. He has contributed notably to America's reputation in
the field of scholastic philosophy.
JoHN F. CRONIN, S. S.
National Catholic Welfare Conference
Washington, D. C.

Eleven Years of Bible Bibliography. The Book Lists of the Society for
Old Testament Study 1946-1!)56. Edited by H. H. RoWLEY. Indian
Hills, Colorado: Falcon's Wing Press, 1957. Pp. 804. $7.50.
These lists actually include most of the books published on the Old
Testament since 1940. Although the Society did not publish any lists
during the war years, the 1946, 1947 lists have been brought up to date.
The volume is an invaluable aid for all students of the Old Testament.
Beginners, facing the task of acquainting themselves with the vast amount
of literature in this field-and in all languages-will find it indispensable.
The lists not only classify the books according to subject-matter, but,
more importantly, contain short notes on each book giving the general
contents, original contribution of the various authors, new theories about
old problems and judgments as to quality which are very helpful in
emphasizing the more important works. The classification suffers from
being a bit too general in character, a11d, understandably, the lists do not
include any reference to the vast amount of important periodical material
that has appeared since 1940. The volume is provided with a complete
author index, a subject index, and a key to the initials of the reviewers
among whom are such experts as G. W. Anderson, W. F. Albright, G. R.
Driver, 0, Eissfeldt, etc. Of course, the work is essential for any general
theological library.

BOOKS RECEIVED
A Catholic Catechism. New York: Herder & Herder, 1958. Pp. 455
with index.
Adler, Alfred. The Education of the Individual. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1958. Pp. 156. $3.50.
Afran, Soheil M. Avicenna-His Life and Work. New York: Macmillan,
1958. Pp.
with index. $6.75.
Ashley, 0. P., Benedict M. Aristotle's Sluggish Ea1·th: The Problematics
of the DE CAELO. River Forest, Ill.: Albertus Magnus Lyceum, 1958.
Pp.Sl.
Bergson, Henri. The World of Dreams. New York: Philosophical Library,
1958. Pp. 58.
Claude!, Paul. (Tr. by W. Fowlie) A Poet Before the Cross. Chicago:
$6.50.
Regnery, 1958. Pp.
de Tonquedec, S. J., Joseph. La Philosophie de La Nature, ler Partie: La
Nature en General. Paris: Lethielleux, 1958. Pp.
1800 Fr.
D'Arcy, S. J., Martin C. The Nature of Belief. St. Louis: Herder, 1958.
Pp.
$3.95.
Danielou, S. J., Jean. (N. Abercrombie, Tr.) The Lord of History
Chicago: Regnery, 1958. Pp. 383 with index. $5.00.
Dondeyne, Albert. (E. McMullin & J. Burnheim, Trs.) Contemporary
European Thought and Christian Faith. Duquesne Studies, Phil. Series,
with
No. 8. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1958. Pp.
indexes. Paper, $5.00. Cloth, $5.75.
Donlan, 0. P., Thomas C. & Others. Christ and His Sacraments: College
Texts in Theology. Dubuque: Priory Press, 1958. Pp. 648 with index.
$4.95.

Gentile, Giovanni. Opere Complete, XXXVII, Discorsi di Religione.
Firenze: Sansoni, 1957. Pp. 184 with index. 1800 L.
Gleason, S. J;, Robert W. The World to Come. New York: Sheed & Ward,
$3.00.
1958. Pp.
Henry, 0. P., A. M. (ed.) The Historical and Mystical Christ. Theology
with indexes. $7.50.
Library, Vol. V. Chicago: Fides, 1958. Pp.
--. Christ in His Sacraments. Theology Library, Vol. VI. Chicago:
Fides, 1958. Pp. 481 with lexicon and indexes. $5.95.
Higgins, S. J., Thomas J. Man as Man: The Science and Art of Ethics.
Milwuakee: Bruce, 1958. Pp. 598 with index. $4.50.
Hilpisch, 0. S. B., Stephanus. (Leonard J. Doyle. Tr.) Benedictinism
Through Changing Centuries. Collegeville: St. John's Abbey Press,
1958. Pp. 180 with index. $3.00.

140

BOOKS RECEIVED

141

(Sr. M. Joanne Muggli, 0. S. B., Tr.) History of Benedictine Nuns.
Collegeville: St. John's Abbey Press, 1958. Pp.
with index. $3.00.
Hirschberger, Johannes. (A. N. Fuerst, Tr.) Tr.e History of Philosophy, I.
Milwaukee: Bruce, 1958. Pp. 530 with mdex. $8.00.
Jacoby, J. E. Across the Night. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958.
Pp. 119. $3.75.
Jolivet, Regis. Aux Sources de L'Existentialisme Chretien-Kierkegaard.
Paris: Fayard, 1958. Pp.
900 Fr.
Kneller, George G. Existenialism and Education. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1958. Pp. 181 with index. $3.75.
KUhner, Hans. Encyclopedia of the Papacy. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1958. Pp.
$6.00.
Lombardi, S. J., Richard. Towards a New World. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1958. Pp.
$6.00.
Marc, S. J., Andre. L'Etre et L'Espirit. (Museum Lessianum) Bruges:
Desclee de Brouwer, 1958. Pp. 194 with index.
Fr. b.
Meersseman, G. G. (Tr. & Ed.) The Acathistos Hymn. Fribourg: University Press, 1958. Pp. 80. 3.85 Fr. Swiss.
O'Connor, C. S.C., Edward D. (Ed.) The Dogma of the Immaculate
Conception. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1958.
Pp. 663 with index. $10.00.
O'Dea, Thomas F. American Catholic Dilemma: An Inquiry into Intel·
lectual Life. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1958. Pp. 188. $3.00.
Oesterreicher, John M. (Ed.) The Bridge: A Yearbook of Judaeo-Christian
Studies, III. New York: Pantheon, 1958. Pp. 383. $4.50.
Proceedings: Fourth Annual Convention of the Society of Catholic
College Teachers of Sacred Doctrine. Notre Dame: The Society, 1958.
Pp. 138. $3.00.
Pfiirtner, 0. P., Stephanus. Triebleben und Sittliche Vollendung. (Studia
with index.
Friburgensia) Freibourg: Universitlitsverlag, 1958. Pp.
18.69 Fr. s. I DM 18.
Piemontese, Filippo. Lezioni di Filosofia dell'A-rte. Torino: Pontificio
Ateneo Salesiano, 1958. Pp. 175 with index. 1000 L.
Powell, 0. P., Ralph A. Truth or Absolute Nothing. River Forest, Ill.:
Albertus Magnus Lyceeum, 1958. Pp. 59.
Ritz, Maria. Le Probleme de L'Etre dans l'Ontologie de Maurice Blondel.
(Studia Friburgensia) Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 1958. Fr. s.
1M5/DM a.

Runes, Dagobert D. Concise Dictionary of Judaism. New York: Phi$5.00.
losophical Library, 1958. Pp.
Schopenhauer, Arthur. (E. F. J. Payne, Tr.) The World as Will and
Representation. Vol. I, Pp. 541. Vol. II, Pp. 687 with index. Indian
Hills, Colo.: Falcon's Wing. $17.50.
Sciacca, Michele F. Acte et Etre. Aubier: Editions Montaigne, 1958. Pp.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Severino, Emanuele. La Struttura Originaria. Brescia: Editrice " L11,
Scuola," 1958. Pp. 415. 2800 L.
Sloyan, Gerard S. (Ed.) Shaping the Christian Message- Essays in
Religious Education. New York: Macmillan, 1958. Pp. 840 with index.
$5.50.

Smith, Vincent. The Gene1·al Science of Nature. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1958.
Pp. 418 with index. $5.25.
Sullivan, R. S.C. J., Kathryn. God's Word & Work. Collegeville: Liturgical
Press, 1958. Pp. 164. $3.00.
TaHet, Jorge. The Absolute Being. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958.
Pp. 74. $3.00.
Tulane Studies in Philosophy, VII: The Nature of Philosophical
Enterprise. New Orleans: Tulane University, 1958. Pp. 146. $2.00.
Weiser, 8. J., Francis. Handbook of Christian Feasts and Customs. New
York: Harcourt, Brace, 1958. Pp. 384 with index. $4.95.
Wikenhauser, Alfred. (Joseph Cunningham, Tr.) New Testament Introduction. New York: Herder & Herder, 1958. Pp. 593 with indexes.
$7.80.