HE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS:

THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE oF ST. JosEPH
Publishers:

VoL. XXII

The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

APRIL, 1959

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY

No.2

THE WORD

HE WORD was made :flesh, and dwelt amongst us!' 1
By these words the Holy Spirit has revealed to us not
only the mystery of the Incarnation, but also the
mystery of the human life of the Incarnate Word. By these
words we realise that the human life and the human love of
Jesus Christ are the human life and the human love of the
divine Person of the Son
God; and we are led to see
the
human activity of Christ, a personal and proper activity of the
Word, an activity in which the Eternal Father and the Holy
Spirit do not properly share, an activity, which, in a singular
and exclusive sense, belongs to the Person of the Word.
Recent discussion has raised questions of no little importance
in penetrating this aspect of the human activity of our Saviour.
H we wish to enter into the meaning of this mystery, we must
determine the precise way in which the human activity, the
human life, and the human love of Christ belong exclusively to
1

John, 1:14.

143

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

the Person of the Word. In attempting this precision, theologians have asked: Is the exclusive attribution of this activity
to the Word anything more than a simple relationship? Is
there not
a physical communication of the divine Person
of the Word, and of it alone, to this activity? Could such a
communication of the Word be thought of, not so much as a
static and inert conjunction with the human activity of Christ,
but rather as an active, dynamic influence exercised by the
Word over this activity? If this were so, could we go on to say
that the Person of the Word was the sole ruling, governing, and
dominating power over this activity, and its only ultimate
source? Is the human activity of Christ a radiation and a reflection of the exclusive personal beauty of the Word, a movement and an energy stemming from and produced by the Word
alone?
These questions are full of meaning for the theologian of the
Incarnation. They may open new vistas for many who instinctively wish to center their spiritual lives on the Person
and the virtues of the Redeemer. Above all, they come close to
the fundamental mysteries of our faith, those of the Trinity
and the Incarnation, and they demand a solution which the
faith that seeks understanding will ever strive to find.
The present study is not meant to be an exhaustive treatment of the problem. It will aim principally at three things:
to elaborate the issues involved in the problem itself, indicating
an avenue for fruitful investigation; to show the harmony
existing between the dogmas of the Trinity and Incarnation as
contemplated by St. Thomas Aquinas, detailing the application
to our question; and to recall and develop an often forgotten
element in St. Thomas' teaching on the Incarnation by which
most of the positive and inspiring values in the above questions
can be maintained in full vigour.
These three points will be presented in the three parts of this
study:
I. The problem of the dynamism of the Word.
II. The mystery of the presence of the Word.
m. The concept of pure formal actuation by the Word.

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WORD

I.

THE PRoBLEM

OF THE DYNAMISM

145

OF THE WoRD.

The question
The issues we
raised above may be summed up in this
brief formula: does the Person of the Word exert on the human
activity of Christ, a causal influence which is exclusive to Himself, divine, physical and active? Let us explain these terms.
We speak of the Person of the Word. It is of faith that
Christ the Man is the Person of the Word made flesh, 2 and that
He is a true Agent and Operator through His human nature. 3
The Incarnate
possesses a human activity.
By this human activity we understand every single operation
our Blessed Lord ever performed through His human nature.
We include every operation of which this nature is the"'"''"'"''"'
every movement, every thought, word, deed, and suffering
the Ecce venio of Mary's womb to the eternal act consummate
love by which He is united to the Father and to His Spouse, the
Church.
include the working of miracles
the suffering
of death; we
all those
actions He shares
us-eating and sleeping, working as a carpenter and conversing
with men. We include, then, every act and every movement
the humanity
Christ,
we include that humanity
with all its faculties and organs, in so far as they are principles
of
activity. 4
2 Cf. the dogmatic definition of Chalcedon:
"Sequentes igitur sanctos Patres . , .
docemus ... unum eundemque Christum Filium Dominum unigenitum, in duabus
naturis inconfuse, immutabiliter, indivise, inseparabiliter, agnoscendum, nusquam
sublata differentia naturarum propter unitionem, magisque salva proprietate
utriusque naturae, et in unam personam atque subsistentiam concurrente, non in
duas personas partitum aut divisum, sed unum eundemque Filium et unigentum
Deum Verbum Dominum Jesum Christum: sicut ante prophetae de eo et ipse nos
erudivit, et Patrum nobis symbolum tradidit." Cf. Denz,, n. 148; Mansi, VII,
coL 115.
3 Cf. Lateran Council:
" Si quis secundum sanctos Patres non confitetur proprie
et secundum veritatem duas unius eiusdemque Christi Dei nostri operationes cohaerenter unitas, divinam et humanam, ab eo quod per utramque eius naturam
operator naturaliter idem exsistit nostrae salutis, condemnatus sit." Cf. Denz.,
n. Q64; Mansi, X, col. 1155.
• The fact that we consider the sacred humanity directly as a
of

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KEVIN F. o' SHEA

We speak of a causal influence of the Word over this activity.
Since we are posing the problem of a dynamic role of the Word
in the exercise of the human activity of Christ, we must of
necessity speak of a causal influence of the Word. We ask leave
of the reader to introduce with this term a little academic
language and some scholastic concepts. We are not raising a
simple question which may be discussed in common terms, but
one whose delicate nuances require the accuracy of precise
philosophical language. In speaking, then, of a causal influence
of the Word, we understand the phrase in its wide philosophical
sense, inclusive of every type of true causality. 5
We speak of a causal influence which is exclusive to the
Person of the Word. No human person can share it; even more,
the Father and the Spirit of Love have no proper part in it.
It belongs to the Word alone, and we must look for its foundation in that which pertains exclusively to Him.
Again, we speak of a divine causality which is exclusive to the
Word. Certainly there is a human causality producing each
human action of Jesus Christ.
comes
human natu:re
of Christ, which is hypostatically united to the Word, and so
in a reai sense it comes from the Word. But
we speak
of here is more mysterious; it is a divine causality exercised
over the human action thus performed and over the humanity
of Christ as and while it performs it.
This divine causality of the Word we understand as something physical, not merely moraL We are not dealing directly
with the divine value, worth, and dignity which come to the
human activity of Christ from its union with the Word. This
would involve directly a moral influence of the Word. We are
raising a deeper issue: we mean a true physical influence
the Word physically exercises over this activity.
operation, does not prevent us, but :rather compels us, to consider it in itself as a
principle of being; for the order of operation presupposes and is explained by the
order of being.
5 John of St. Thomas has defined cause in this wide sense as:
" Causa est principium alicuius per modum influxus seu derivationis, e'l: qua natum est !!liquid
consequi secundum dependentiam in esse." Cf. Philosophia Naturalis, Ia, q. HI,
art. I. (in ed. Reiser, Taurini: 1933, tom. ii, p. 198).

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WO!m

147

Finally, we mean an active divine influence which is exclusive
to the Word. We have already insisted on a wide signification
for the word "influence." We must insist again that when we
speak of " active " influence, we do not limit ourselves to
efficient causality. In the physical order, passive causality is
that proper to matter; active causality applies alike to efficient
causality and to formal causality. The opposition of efficiency
to matter as something active to something passive is well
defined by John of St. Thomas. Speaking of the types of causes,
he notes that new being results when what is in potency is
reduced to act by that which is in act; and hence he assigns two
causes opposed to each other, namely, what is in potency to
act and receives it, and what causes by reducing this potency
to act, or " acting." The first is matter, the second is the
efficient cause. 6 Later, opening his discussion on formal causality, he sketches the opposition of form to matter; saying that
form is opposed to matter, matter being the potency which
receives form and form being the act or actuality which gives
being to a thing. Moreover, the reason or principle
which a
form gives being to a thing, is its own very act or actuality, and
so, the reason of its causality being its act, form itself is called
an active cause. 7 In our inquiry, therefore, when we ask about
• John of St. Thomas, op. cit., p.
"Vel ergo consideratur esse causatum
absolute et in se, vel ut accipitur et fit ab alio. Si absolute, causatur per formam,
quae absolute constituit in esse. Si ut accipitur et fit ab alio, oportet, quod de ente
in potentia fiat ens in actu; sic enim sequitur esse de novo, quatenus id, quod est in
potentia, reducitnr in actum ab eo quod est in actu, et sic oportet assignare duas
causas, scilicet, illam, quae est in potentia, ut susceptiva actus, et illam, quae
causat reducendo in actum seu agendo. Et prima est materia, quae causat recipiendo, et secunda est efficiens."
7 John of St. Thomas, ibid., p. 233:
" forma ex opposito se habet ad materiam,
quod, sicut materia est potentia receptiva formae, quae potentia non est superaddita entitati materiae, ita forma est actus, qui dat esse rei, sive substantialis
sive accidentalis, quae actualitas non est aliquid superadditum entitati formae,
sicut nee potentialitas materiae. Quare ratio seu prineipium causandi est ipsa
actualitas formae per seipsam, ita quod secundum se est actus primus seu principium
actuans et dans esse. Iuxta quod dicit D. Thomas, I, q. 76, art. 6 et 7 quod
" forma per seipsam faeit rem esse in actu, cum per essentiam suam sit actus, nee
dat esse per aliquod medium." Et in 5 Metaph., lect. 2 inquit, "quod haec est
ratio quare forma est causa, quia perficit rationem quidditatis rei." Igitur ratio
causandi in forma est ipsa actualitas quatenus perfectiva est quidditatis."

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

the active divine influence exclusive to the
we really ask
two questions: is there an efficient
influence exclusive to
the
and is there a
to
the Word. We are investigating
is the sole efficient mover producing
Christ, and whether or not He alone perfects it
His own exclusive personal
and splendour.
mqmre
the human acts
Christ stem from the
alone,
whether they shine

works ad extra
wherever no relation
8 lndivisa sunt opera SS. Trinitatis ad extm ubi non obviat relationis oppositio.
The formula we use here has not been explicitly canonised by the Magisterium.
None the less all its parts have been taken from the Councils. We have used the
comprehensive formula because of the difficulty of the problem, in order to face it2
full import. For the formula Cf. Cone. Toletanum XI, "Inseparabiles enim inveniuntur, et in eo quod sunt, et in eo quod faciunt: quia inter generantem Patrem
et generatum Filium vel procedentem Spiritum nullum fuisse credimus temporis
intervallum, quo aut genitor genitum aliquando praecederet, aut genitus genitori
deesset, aut procedens Spiritus Patre vel Filio posterior appareret." (Denz., n. 281;
Mansi, XI, coL 134) . And again in the same Council: "Incarnationem quoque
huius Filii Dei tota Trinitas operasse credenda est, quia inseparabilia sunt opera
Trinitatis."
(Denz., n. 284; Mansi, XI, col. 135). Cf. Cone. Lateranense IV:
"Et tandem unigenitus Dei Filius Jesus Christus, a tota Trinitate communiter
incarnatus, ... " (Denz., n. 429; Mansi, XXII, col. 981-982). Cf. Cone. Floren" (Dem;;.,
tinum, " ... omniaque sunt unum, ubi non obviat relationis

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WORD

149

influence of the Person of the Word on the human activity of
Christ seems to indicate a true divine operation ad extra and
does not seem to remain within the limits of the relative opposition between the Word and the Father. On the other hand, the
axiom seems to be so vital a bulwark in the defence of the
dogma of the Most Holy Trinity and indeed of the very unity
of the divine essence, that its denial seems necessarily to involve
a denial of the unity of the Triune God. Clearly, if there is a
divine operation ad extra which belongs to the Word and not
to the Father and the Holy Spirit, there must be a principle
of operation and so a nature which belongs to the Word and not
to the other two Persons. This leads to Tritheism.
Moreover, this difficulty seems to be valid whether we think
of an active influence of the Word in the order of efficient
causality or in the order of formal causality. That it applies
to the order of efficiency is obvious, for the principle by which
a thing efficiently produces, is its nature. That it applies to an
influence in the order of formal causality is also true, for nothing can inform and perfect except by reason of its perfection;
hence we would have to think of a divine perfection which was
exclusive to the Word, in which the Father and Holy Spirit
did not share.
On the other hand, if we deny every divine influence on the
human activity of Christ which is physical, active and exclusive
to the Word, we meet an equally formidable objection on the
score of the personal unity of Christ. In this case, there would
seem to be nothing which comes to the humanity of Christ,
precisely as a principle of operation, from the Person of the
Word in an exclusive way; nothing which is given to it from the
Word which does not come also from the Father and the Holy
Spirit. It is then difficult to understand how the Person of the
Word is the sole operator of the human activity of Christ,
n. 703; Mansi, XXXI (B), col. 1736). Cf. Pius PP XIII, M ystici Corporis Christi,
AAS, XXXV (1943), 231: "certissimum illud firma mente retineant ... omnia
esse habenda SS. Trinitati communia, quatenus eadem Deum ut supremam efficientem causam respiciant." The application of this axiom to the Incarnation may
be seen in St. Augustine, PL XL, col. 251, and in St. Thomas, Summa Theol.,
lli, q. 3, a. 4, ad 1.

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

difficult to see how He remains the sole Agent to whom this
activity must be attributed. For either we are forced to conceive an Incarnation of the Three divine Persons, or we fall into
the danger of conceiving the human nature of Christ itself as
an independent subject of operation, which places these actions,
an independent Operator, and an independent person. This
would be N estorianism.
This objection aims principally at the denial of every active
influence proper to the Word, that is, both efficient and formal.
If a formal influence only were admitted, and it were successfully explained how this could be exclusive to the Word, then
the objection could perhaps still be made that such an influence
would not have the personal unity of Christ as an Agent, without a further exclusive efficient influence of the Word. Its
denial might still seem to open the way to Nestorianism.
Should we return to the first position and try to save an
active influence of the Word, be it efficient or formal, we have
to cope with a further dogmatic objection concerning the integrity of the human nature of Christ as a principle of operation. Every nature, be it human or not, seems to postulate a
certain independence or autonomy as a principle of operation.
It should be able to act without the necessity of, and completely free from, every external influence except the divine
motion which gently moves it towards its object, which divine
motion is reduced to the divine government of all things, and is
common to the Three divine Persons. This independence seems
to be demanded by the very fact, that, as a nature, it is a true
and intrinsic principle of operation. If then we assert a physical, active, divine influence exercised over the humanity of
Christ by the Word alone, so that without it Christ's humanity
does not and cannot act, we seem to diminish that humanity
precisely as a principle of operation, to leave it weak, inert and
empty. Moreover, we seem to make Christ our Lord Himself
inferior to other men precisely in so far as He is a human Agent
and human Operator. Finally, each one of His operations seems
to be a conjunction of an action which is deficiently human with
an action which is mysteriously divine, so that His human

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WOim

151

activity is not perfect and integral in so far as it is human, and
His two operations, divine and human, no longer remain nnconfused and inconvertibk The result would be Monenergism,
Monothelitism, and Monophysitism.
This difficulty is urged principally against an efficient influence of the Word over the humanity of Christ as a principle of
operation. It is valid also for every kind of truly active divine
influence which might be attributed to the Word in an exclusive
way. It applies also then to a formal influence. And indeed,
the danger of Monophysitism is by no means avoided if we
speak of a formal influence, for it seems that such an information is impossible without reception of the informant by the
thing informed, with consequent limitation, determination and
coarctation of the informant. But to posit a limitation, determination and coarctation of the Word by the sacred humanity of Christ clearly leads to Monophysitism.
These are the chief dogmatic issues involved in our problem.
On the one hand, we have danger of Tritheism and of Monophysitism, on the other danger of Nestorianism.
must respect the difficulties on each side.

General trends among theologians
Though many aspects of our problem are present throughout the Christological discussions of recent decades, the
lem in its totality seems to have become explicit rather
It is natural then that theologians should express themselves
according to certain general modes of thought on the problem,
with the :result that we have trends or currents among them,
rather than strongly defined opinions. It is natural too that
these general trends should group around the chief and obvious
difficulties-those
of which we have just spoken. There is
among theologians an affirmative tendency, stating an exclusive
influence of the Word, and striving above all to maintain the
personal unity of Christ with all that it entails, and there is a
• We refer especially to the discussions concerning the theory of the AssumpiWIHomo, and those about the psychological consciousness of Christ and His psychological Ego.

152

KEVIN F. O'SHEA

negative tendency, denying any exclusive influence of the Word,
and striving to preserve at all costs the unity of the divine
action ad extra, and the absolute integrity of the humanity of
Christ as a principle of operation.
The negative tendency, denying every physical divine influence on the human activity of Christ which might be exclusive
to the Word, insists that where physical active causality is
concerned, the Word acts neither more intensely than, nor
differently from the Father and the Holy Spirit. It gives to
the human actions of Christ the divine concursus, common to
the three Divine Persons, but nothing more in the dynamic
order. Certainly it would affirm the absolute dependence of
the sacred humanity on the sole Person of the Word in the order
of being, and also in the order of operation, but at the same
time it would sustain that this dependence is something static,
and involves no exclusive active causal role of the Person of
the Word.
This tendency therefore evades entirely the difficulties concerning the unity of the divine operations, and concerning the
integrity of the human nature of Christ. It simply denies that
these difficulties exist. It says that the axiom Indivisa sunt
opera SS. Trinitatis is so absolute and universal that any exclusive active influence of the ·word in the physical order, even in
the case of the unique activity of Christ, is unthinkable. The
Father and the Holy Spirit together with the Word, in the same
way, and for the same reason, possess every dynamic control
over it. Moreover, such an exclusive influence of the Word
would necessarily destroy the integrity of the human nature of
Christ as a principle of operation, would necessarily make
Christ inferior to other men as a human Agent, and would
necessarily confuse the divine and human operations of Christ.
This negative tendency, however, does not meet so easily the
difficulty about the personal unity of Christ in the exercise of
His human activity. Its position is simply that an entirely
static explanation of the dependence of the sacred humanity on
the Word is sufficient to answer not merely all the objections
against the dogma of the Incarnation, but all the legitimate

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WORD

153

mqumes of the human mind attempting to penetrate the
mystery. Its ultimate standpoint is the concept of the hypostatic union as something purely static. It is easy to see how
the whole tendency stems radically from the absolute acceptance and universal application of the axiom of the unity of the
divine operations ad extra.
Against this tendency, however, another affirmative current
among theologians upholds an influence-which it confesses to
be very mysterious-which is physical, active, and divine, and
which is exerted over the human activity of Christ by the sole
Person of the Word. The principal intention of the tendency is
simply to stress the intimate unity between the Person of the
Incarnate Word, our Redeemer, and the human nature He has
assumed, especially in each human action He performs and
above all in the act of priestly oblation by which He achieved
our Redemption. Hence this tendency is especially directed
against extolling more than is due the qualities of the human
nature of Christ as a principle of activity, lest thereby a fatal
abyss be posited between the Person of the Word and His
human activity. For the affirmative tendency, then, the difficulty about the personal unity of Christ cannot exist.
The other two difficulties, however, become urgent against it.
In reply, it is inclined to say that, even if there were at present
no wholly satisfying solution to these difficulties, the doctrine
of the dynamic role and exclusive divine influence of the Word
must remain firm and unshaken, since its intimate connection
with the revealed dogma of the personal unity of Christ makes
it something which belongs at least implicitly to the deposit of
faith; which can in no way be denied or put in doubt because
the weakness of our human intellects in penetrating the
mystery. The ultimate standpoint of the affirmative tendency
is that we cannot satisfy all the inquiries of our minds about
the Incarnation unless we think o£ the Hypostatic Union as in
some way dynamic, involving an exclusive active causality of
the Word. It is easy to see how the whole tendency takes its
departure from considering the unique Person of Christ and
sees in that light the whole mystery of our salvation.

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

Each tendency has given a different point of departure, a
different concept of the hypostatic union, and a final acknowledgement of an unpenetrated aspect of a different mystery.
Our problem will be to try to harmonize these mysteries by
searching deeply into the hypostatic union itself.

Sources of divergence among authors
When we weigh more deeply the more express opinions of
theologians, and consider in their light the implicit tendencies,
we· are led to believe that the real cause of divergence among
them lies in basic attitudes towards the hypostatic union.
These attitudes will in turn depend on a concept of personality
and its analogical application to the Three Divine Persons and
to Jesus Christ.
Several times in the history of theology, there has been a
willingness among some writers to admit a duality of subjects
in Jesus Christ with respect to His dual activity; namely, the
divine subject which is the Person of the Word, and a human
subject with which He is hypostatically united. Thus they
would verbally maintain the unique and singular Person of
Christ, but propose a duality of acting subjects. This position
had already appeared among medieval authors; 10 it is seen
clearly in the writings of two Jesuits in the eighteenth century,
Jean Hardquin, and Isaac Joseph Berruyer; 11 it is the thought
10 The prima opVn.io placed by Lombard was that of those " qui dicunt in
lncarnatione hominem quemdam ex anima et carne constitutum, et ilium hominem
factum esse Deum, et Deum ilium hominem." (Cf. 8 Sent., dist. VI, titulus, apud
S. Thomam Aq. Scriptum super Sententiis Magistri Petri Lombardi, ed. M. F. Moos,
0. P., Parisiis, 1988, tom. iii, p. 211).
11 Bibliographical indications concerning Hardouin and Berruyer may be found
in B. M. Xiberta, 0. Carm., TractatUB de Verba lncarnato, Matriti: 1954, 707, 274277; in P. Parente, Nel Miatero di Cristo, apud Teologia Viva, I, Roma, 1954, 879882; in J. de Backer, Bibliographie des ecrivaina de la compagnie de Usus, I, Liege,
1858, 872-885, and Ill, Liege, 1856, 144-152; in C. Sommervogel, Bibliotheque de la
compagnie de Usus, I, Bruxelles-Paris, 1890, col. 1861-1870, and IV, col. 107-ID.
Their chief works concerning this question are: J. Hardouin, Com;mentariUB in
Novum Testamentum, Amstelodami: 1741 (opus posthumum); I. J. Berruyer, Hiatoire du Peuple de Dieu depuia son origine, jusqu'ala Venue du Messie, Paris: 1728;
idem, Histoire du peuple de Dieu depuia la Naiasance du Messie jusqu'a la fin de
la Sina{/{Jgue, Le Hague-Paris: 1758-1755; idem, Hiatoire du Peuple de Dieu,

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WORD

155

also of the·Franciscans Deodat Marie deBasly and Leon SeiHer
in the present century. 12 These authors, who have thus extolled
the independence and autonomy of the so-called secondary
human subject in Christ, can in no way conceive an exclusive
active influence of the Word over the human activity of
Christ. 13 Against them, however, the vast majority of Catholic
troisieme partie, ou Paraphrase des Epitres des Apotres d'apres le commentaire latin
du P. Hardouin, Lyons-Le Hague: 1757-1758. Indicative of their mentality are
the following citations:
"Necesse est aliud esse Christum in recto, aliud Verbum ... cum Christi nomine
intelligi oporleat principium agendi completum et merendi et quidem absque Verbo
... Christus homo qui duo in se complectitur, et Verbum nimirum quo subsistit
humanitas et ipsam humanitatem quae obedivit Patri, quae oravit, quae passa est,
quae ornata fuit donis ac dotibus omnibus necessariis ad agendum libere et meritorie;
ille inquam homo, qui ut homo est haec omnia egit et passus est, libere, iuste, pie,
sancte; ille ipse ex principio Verbum erat sine hurnanitate . . . secundum quod
Verbum est." (Hardouin, Commentarius, ed. cit., p. 249).
"Non sunt operationes a Verbo elicitae ... sunt operationes solius humanitatis."
(Berruyer, Histoire, pars iii, tom. viii, p. 53) .
12 Bibliography concerning de Basly may be found in H. Diepen, 0. S. B., " Un
scotisme apocryphe, Ia Christologie dn P. Deodat de Basly, 0. F. M.," in Revue
Thomiste, XLIX (1949), 428-492; in Xiberta, l. c., 286-287; in Parente, I. c., 275
seqq. De Basly had written:
"Nornme nne personne, ce tout ... est proprement cet homme et le Verbe
eternel unis ... il n'est rien autre chose et il n'est rien de pins ... l'assumptus
Homo, fait d'une chair vraie et d'une vraie arne intellective, et voluntaire, est une
autonomic que Dieu Trine ne pent pas, la faisant exister, empecher d'etre une
Agisseur autonome. (La France Franciscaine, 1929, p. 148). "L'autonomie dans
le Christ, appartient a l'Homo susceptus et n'appartient nullement au Verbe,
qua Verbum est." (La France Franciscaine, 1937, p. 35).
Seiller's writing concerning this point is contained chiefly in L'Activite humaine
du Christ selon Duns Scot, Paris: 1944, 24-29, and La psychologie humaine du
Christ et l'unicite de personne, Paris-Rennes: 1949, 9-H. This last article was placed
on the Index in 1951, as we discuss later in these pages. An exposition of his
opinion can be found in Xiberta, l. c. 286-7; Parente, l. c. 291 seqq; and in M.
Browne, 0. P., "Deviazioni sui terreno della psicologia umana di Cristo," in Osservatore Romano, 19 Luglio 1951. This last article is of great moment in so far as it
accompanied and explained a decree of the Holy Office and was signed Mautro
del Sacro Palazzo Apostolico.
13 This is not only clear from the position of our authors, but is explicitly stated
by them. A few citations: Berruyer: "Ad complementum autem naturae Christi
humanae in ratione principii agentis et actiones suas sive physice sive supernaturaliter producentis unio hypostatica nihil omnino conferat." (Histoire, pars iii.
L c. p. 22). de Basly: " .. les actions de l'Arne, de l'Homme subjoint au Verbe, le
Verbe, n'agissant ni par ni sur cette Arne, ni par ni sur cette Homme, le Verbe est

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

theologians have always maintained the unicity of acting subject in Christ, as being essentially bound up with the unicity of
Person itsel£.14 But the problem of an exclusive dynamic influence of the Person of the Word, who is this acting Subject, over
the assumed humanity, has not often been considered by them.
So far the root of divergence lies in different acceptations of
the common, every-day notion of person. For those who are in
accord in equating the idea of " independent subject of operation " with that of person, there is still room for disagreement
when they consider what formally constitutes a person, and
what, in consequence, formally achieves the hypostatic union.
The Scotist school has always refused to place the formal
constituent of created personality in anything positive distinct
from the individual nature concerned; the Thomist school, with
St. Thomas, has always maintained that it consists in something positive really distinct from that individual nature. The
Scotist school goes on to put its explanation of the hypostatic
union in a real relation between the humanity of Christ and
the Person of the Word, a relation which alone is enough to
dit Ies faire, mais in obliquo c'est a dire en vertu de Ia communication des idiomes."
Seiller: " . . il nous faut accorder a !'Homo Assumptus une veritable autonomie
dans Ie domaine de !'action. Cet Homo Assumptus ... n'est pas sous !'influence
dynamique du Verbe .. " (La psychologie ... pp. 6-7).
14 Against Hardouin
and Berruyer, two outstanding critiques are those o£ L.
Legrand, Tractatus de lncarnatione Verbi Divini, Parisiis: 1754, diss. XI-this work
was reprinted by Migne in his Theologiae Cursus Completus, Parisiis: 1841, IX,
col. 811-893; and of St. Alphonsus Mary de Liguori, in his Trionfo ddla Chiesa, cioe
Istoria delle Eresie, III, Napoli: 17n,-which has been translated from the Italian
into Latin by A. Walter, C. SS. R., De Ecclesiae Triumpho, seu Historia Haeresum,
pars 2, confutatio XV, Cf. on our question pp. 291-493, nn. 31-35. (The condemnations made of the errors of Hardouin and BelTuyer may be seen listed in Legrand,
I. c., coli. 825, 839 seqq., 959 seqq.; in Hurter, Nomenclator Litterarius, Oeniponte:
1910, col. 1417-1418; in Benedicti XIV Bullm·ium, Prati: 1846, III, pars. 1, appendix
altera, pp. 488-490; in Bullarii Romani Continuatio, Prati: 1842, IV, par. 1, pp.
67-68; in the Mandemant et Instruction pastorale de Monseigneur l'Eveque de
Soissons, 2 vols., Paris: 1740-pp. 225-249 are worth consulting on our point.)
The whole case of Hardouin and Berruyer seems to lack an adequate historicodoctrinal treatment.
The attitude of modern theologians towards the theories of de Basly and Seiller
may be seen from the articles of Xiberta, Diepen and Parente quoted above; the
bearing of recent decrees of the Holy See in their regard will be discussed later.

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157

place the fully integral humanity in a state of dependence on
the Word. 15 The Thomist school goes further, and posits not
only the real relation, but also a real and ontolobrical foundation
for it in the communication of the positive perfection of divine
personality to the sacred humanity in place of its connatural
human personality. 16 Both explanations satisfy the demands
of dogma, and preserve the essential meaning of the terms in
which the Church has taught the mystery of the Incarnation;
whether the Scotist explanation can equally meet the demands
of a mind that seeks a fully rational explanation of the mystery,
insofar as it can be given, remains a matter of long standing
dispute between the two schools. But the Scotists who see no
positive ontological communication of the Word to Christ's
humanity in the line of personality, have never acknowledged,
and have consistently rebutted, any suggestion of an exclusive
dynamic influence of the Word over this humanity. 17 For the
15 Scotism conceives personality
as adding to the individual substantial nature the
denial of aptitudinal and actual dependence on another suppositum. It remains,
however, in obediential potency to assumption. The sacred humanity, then, is not
a human person distinct from the Word, precisely because it is assumed by the
Word; and the relationship of belonging to the Word is sufficient to count out the
negative state of having no aptitudinal and actual dependence.
16 Thomism, for which personality
is a positive perfection distinct from the substantial individual nature, sees in the sacred humanity a positive supplying of the
positive perfection of connatural human personality by the positive perfection of
divine personality. This supplying must be achieved by setting up a positive
ontological foundation for the real relation of union between the sacred humanity
and the divine Person of the Word.
17 Pere Seiller, in L'Activite
humaine du Christ, p. 28, cites these words of Scotus:
"Verbum nullam causalitatem habet super actum voluntatis creatae in Christo
quam non habet tota Trinitas."
(Op. Oxon., III, d. XVII, q. 1, n. 4). And he
adds the following significant reflection: "En tout cela !'Ecole Franciscaine a
retenu l'enseignement du Maitre." (SeiHer, p. 29.) The same article also shows
the influence of this Scotist position on other questions of Christology, especially,
the impeccability of Christ, the meritorious value of His actions, His satisfaction,
etc. This Scotist view has been championed in recent years by Paul Galtier, S. J.,
especially in L'Unite du Christ, Etre, Personne, Conscience, Paris: 1939, and in
many articles especially in controversy with P. Parente. For the Scotist opinion
in general and in Gal tier, Cf. Diepen, "La psychologie humaine du Christ selon
S. Thomas d'Aquin," in Revue Thomiste L (1950) 515-542, especially p. 5f.l3 seqq.
Parente has described the mentality of the modern Scotists in N el Mistero di
Cristo, p. f.l73 seqq. It is to be noted that both the Scotists and Galtier, who differs

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

Thomists, however, there is a positive communication of the
Word in the line of personality, and as a result the question
may remain open whether or not there could be, in this communication or in its necessary consequences, any exclusive
active influence of the Word. Some of them, as we shall see,
have favored the idea.
The problem of the exclusive dynamic influence of the Word,
therefore, properly and directly belongs to those theologians
who with the Thomist school conceive the Incarnation not
merely as a real relationship but also as a positive ontological
communication of the Word to the sacred humanity. Among
them there is a basic unanimity in approach to the problem, in
so far as they begin with an inquiry into the positive sources
of the mystery of the Incarnation, and only later turn to a
speculative investigation of the data thus found. That their
conclusions are divergent, is indicative of the intricacy of the
question and the delicacy of judgment needed in its solution.
Many who have turned especially to the Oriental Councils
and the Greek Fathers, have suggested that the divine operation moving the sacred humanity to act, might be proper to the
Person of the Word, insofar as it is modified by the personal
property of the Word. 18 This manner of speaking is to be found
from them in some points, a!,>Tee on our precise question with Deodat de Basly and
Seiller. This is not to accuse either Scotism in general or the peculiar position of
Galtier of all the excesses of the Assumptus Homo theory. For the distinction
between them, Cf. Xiberta, Zoe. cit.,
18 This manner of speaking is to be seen in Parente, Xiberta, and E. A. Wuenschel,
C. SS. R., among modern authors. Parente, especially in Nel Mistero di Cristo,
p. 878, has spoken of a divine influence "attraverso ii verbo ": "Ma sotto un
certo vero aspetto appartiene personalmente al Verbo, in quanto quel influsso e
communicato, come l'essere o Ia sussistenza, attraverso ii Verbo, e l'azione umana
per conseguenza dice relazione reale alia Persona del Verbo e per essa alia natura
divina e quindi aile altre du persone." The force of this attraverso is to us not
altogether clear: it may mean only that the Word is the reason for the giving of a
singular influence common to the Three Persons, but it does seem to suggest that
an exclusive influence is communicated physically by the Word alone, an influence,
indeed, which is not co-terminous with existence and subsistence. Wuenschel, in
" De operatione Christi theandrica eiusque principio quod," in Doctor
11-45, writes on p.
" Talis influxus autem non pertinet ad ordinem causae
eflicientis, nam omne quod rationem eflicientiae habet in unione hypostatica, toti

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WORD

159

in Petavius, who seems to have influenced many after him. 19
These authors, then, would, implicitly at least, look on the
Trinitati commune est. Pertinet potius ad ordinem causae formalis, demptis omnibus
imperfectionibus, scilicet quatenus Verbum naturam humanam terminat et complet
subsistentia sua; atque exseritur virtute divina praecise ut est in Verbo, proprietate
sua personali afl'ecta." The phrase "exseritur virtute divina praecise ut est in
Verbo" is explained on p. 48: "Omnia enim in natura humana (Christi) evenerunt vi potentiae et concursus tribus personis communis. A Verbo procedebant vi
eiusdem potentiae et concursus, sed quatenus hoc attributum et haec actio sunt in
Verbo et proprietate sua relativa afficiuntur ... ". Xiberta had left room for his
mind to be understood in the sense of a divine efficient action exclusive to the
Word, by stressing the "active influence" of the Word over the sacred humanity.
Chapters 8, 4, and U of his Tractatus de V erbo lncarnato, .Matriti: 1954 could
be consulted. However, in reply to his critics, he has declared in more recent
articles that he means no more than a formal influence of the Word: Cf. "In
controversiam de conscientia humana Christi animadversiones," in Euntes Docete,
IX (1956) 98-109, and "Observaciones al margen de Ia controversia sobre Ia
conciencia humana de Jesucristo," in Revista espanola de teologia, XVI (1956)
!ll5-288.
Many commentators on Parente's work or on that of Xiberta have taken occasion
to approve the idea of a singular divine efficiency over the human faculties of
Christ which is physically exercised by the Three Person&-and such is in reality
the value of Father Wuenschel's article. On this point Cf. R. Spiazzi, 0. P., in a
review of Parente in Osservatore Romano, 14 Aprile, 1951; J. H. Nicolas, 0. P., in
"Chronique de Theologie dogmatique," in Revue Thomiste, Lill (1988) 421-428,
especially p. 425; M. Flick, S. J., in a review of Parente in Gregorianum, XXXII
(1951) 595-596; Diepen, in "La psychologic humaine du Christ selon S. Thomas
d'Aquin," in Revue Thomiste, L (1950) 515-542, cf. especially pp. 582-586; G.
Philips, in a review of Parente in Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses, XXVIII
(1952) 500; S. Garofalo, in Gem Orante, Rome, 1955; G. de Rosa, in "Una dissertazione cristologica inserita nell'Indice dei libri proibiti," in Divus Thomas (Piacenza)), LVII (1954) 262-279; Others have been critical of the idea of an exclusive
efficiency whiclt they read in the pages of Parente and Xiberta: Cf. L. Ciappi,
0. P., in "TI problema dell'Io do Cristo nella teologia moderna," in Sapienza, IV
(1951) 421-488, and in "Autonomia e independenza della natura umana di Cristo
secondo il Rev. P. Galtier, S. J., in Sapienza, V (1952) 90-96; J. H. Nicolas, in the
article and place quoted above; H. Diepen, I. c. especially pp. 586-541: A. Perego,
S. J., in "TI lumen gloriae e l'unita psicologica di Cristo," in Divus Thoma8
(Piacenza) LVIII (1955) 90-110 Cf. p. 98; F. de P. Sola, S. J., in Una nueva
explicacion del YO de Jesucristo," in Estudios Ecclesiasticos, XXIX (1955) 448-478,
cf. p. 459; J. Sweeney, S. J., in Theological Studies, XVII (1956) 888-897, "Recent
developments in dogmatic theology"; K. McNamara, in "The Psychological Unity
of Christ: A problem in Christology," in The Irish Theological Quarterly, XXill
xxm (1956) 60-69; Cf. p. 64.
19 Cf. Dionysius Petavius Aurelianensis, S. J., De lncarnatione Verbi, liber octa.
vus, ed. Vives, Parisiis: 1867, tom. 6, cp. 10. (Cps. 11 and 12 are also worth con-

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KEVIN F. 0 9SHEA

axiom Indivisa sunt opera SS. Trinitatis ad extra as having an
exception in the case of the human activity of Christ. On the
other hand, many other authors are slow to recognize in early
Conciliar and Patristic texts clear references to precisely a
causal influence which is physical, active, divine, and exclusive
to the Word. They are especially loathe to speak of such texts
as necessarily indicative of an efficient divine motion on the
human faculties of Christ which would be exclusive to the
Word. 20 The interpretation of these texts becomes then an
important point in our discussion.
suiting). Petavius, well aware of the difficulty concerning the personal unity of
Christ, thus stated his position:
" ... cum Persona Verbi humanae naturae conjungi dicitur, non aliud intelligimus, quam naturam divinam cum ea copulari: non absolute, praeciseque sumptam, sed quatenus determinata est et modificata personali Verbi proprietate. Eodem
modo divinitatis attributa omnia, etiam absoluta et communia, personis tribus, cum
eadem humanitate junguntur. Quare ipsa ivr!p'f<w. et operatio divina, secundum
interiorem substantiam, et ut est in Deo considerata, et proprietate modificata
Verbi ad humanam naturam applicatur, et fit ei peculiaris, ac lhavliptKi}v €v€p'f<Lav
Christi propriam efficit, quae perinde ex operatione ilia divina, per congruentem
Verbo subsistendi modum definita, et determinata, atque ex humana functione componitur: ut ex utraque natura persona ipsa Christi, quam compositam esse supra
docuimus. Ut autem natura divina humanae Christi naturae conjungitur; nee ex eo
sequitur totam ipsam Trinitatem uniri, etsi tota ipsa natura Trinitatis cum illa
societur. Sic operatio toti communis Trinitati cum humana operatione committitur,
non tamen eodem modo operari Trinitas ev<p'fela.s OeavoptK<is dicitur, quo Verbum
ipsum: eo quod non ut personis communis est tribus, sed ut proprietate personali
Verbi modificata est operatio ista, ad humanam i!v€p'fetav accommodatur."
N.
XV. p. £55.
We believe that the citations of Petavius in the writings of Parente and Wuenschel indicate an influence of his mentality. Others authors, older indeed, have
spoken of a unique efficient influence on the sacred humanity, but have not been
as clear as we would wish in determining whether it is exclusive to the Word or not.
Billot could be consulted, De Verbo lncarnato, Romae: 192£, p. 306.
2 ° Clear
opposition has come from Pere J. H. Nicolas, 0. P., in the Revue
Thomiste, loc. cit., who writes: "Une telle explication est irrecevable. Ce n'est
pas seulement a, propos de cet' influx ... c'est a propos de toute action ad extra
qu'on pourrait faire intervenir cette modification personnelle qui l'approprierait a
l'une ou a !'autre des trois Personnes ... et on se heurte dans tous les cas a
l'axiome canonique: In Deo omnia sunt unum ubi non obviat relationis oppositio."
(p. 4£5) . Besides the authors mentioned in the last note, we would single out the
opposition of the Jesuit Fathers in the universities of Innsbruck and Spain: Cf.
F. Lakner, "Eine neuantiochenische Christologie" in Zeitschrift fur Katholische
Theologie, LXXVU (1955) 212-228; K. Rahner, "Probleme der Christologie von

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161

Some who have maintained from the Patristic texts the
exclusive dynamic influence of the Word, and others who have
hesitated to give unqualified approval to this judgment, have
turned to a speculative consideration of the hypostatic union
explanation of the problem. Commencing from the idea of
Word to the
a positive communication of the Person of
humanity of Christ in the line of personality, and, as is commonly taught, also in the line of existence, they have considered
that, just as the divine existence, which is common to the Three
Persons, is communicated to the humanity of Christ in and
through the Word alone, so also the divine efficient promotion,
communiof itself is common to the Three Persons, might
cated to it in and through the Word alone. 21 The extension
seem to be justified from the common philosophical
heute," in Schriften zur Theologie, I, Einsiedeln: 1954; J. M. Dalmau, S. J., in
"La analogia en cl concepto de persona," in Estudios Ecclesiasticos, XXVIII (1954,
195-210, cf. p. 210; J. Solano, S. J., in Sacrae Theologiae Summa, III, Matriti: l!l53,
pp. 59, 182.
Most of this opposition has been made on the force of the Trinitarian axiom
rather than on an exposition of the direct sense of the Patristic texts alleged. The
chief of these texts are: Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, cap. !il (cf. Migne,
PG III, c. 643, and S. Thomas, In Librum Beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus
expositio, ed. C. Pera, 0. P., Taurini-Romae: 1950, p. 51-these two texts differ.);
Pseudo Dionysius, Epistola Quarta ad Caium (Cf. Migne, PG III, col. 1073-1074,
and S. Thomas, Summa Theologica, III, q. l!J, a. 1, ad. 1.-again these two texts
differ.); S. Leo the Great, Epistola dogmatica ad Flavianum, c. IV (Cf. Migne, PL
LIV, col. 767 and Mansi, V, col. 1375 (1!275)-1378 (1278), and Sermon UV
(Cf. Migne, PL LIV, col. 319)-the same text is also quoted by St. Thomas in
HI, q. 19, a. I, c.; and the exegesis of these three texts made the Fathers themselves: Cf. S. Leo the Great, Migne PL LIV, col. 767, 1163, and Mansi, V, col.
1375-1378, and XI, col. 266; S. Martin, Mansi, X, col. 886, 893-986; Concilium
Lateranense Mansi, X, col. 1155; S. Sophronius of Jerusalem, Migne, PG, LXXXVII,
col. 3167-3170, 3178; S. Maximus the Confessor, Migne, PG XCI, col. 95:98, col.
119, and especially Migne IV, col. 222-!il23; S. Agatho I, Mansi, XI, col. !267, 266;
the Fathers of the Third Council of Constantinople, Mansi, XI, col. 3711; and
S. Jolm Damascene, Migne, PG XCIV, 1059, 1079, 841.
21 It will be seen from the citations
'above that the force of the argumentation
from the Patristic texts is largely merged with this speculative argument. Some
have wished to connect this argument exclusively with the .Billot or Capreolus
explanation of the hypostatic union; we would rather see it as a possible extension
from the common Thomist position, which holds a positive communication of the
divine esse to Christ's humanity, even though it does not always sustain such a
communication as the formal constituent of the union.

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

axiom, Agere sequitur esse. Thus, just as there might be a
tive communication of existence to Christ's humanity, which
is exclusive to the Person of the Word, so also there would be
a positive communication of the divine efficient operation ad
extra premoving the humanity of Christ to act, given to it in
and through the sole Person of the Word. It seems that we
must understand the Word as the sole Person " in and through "
which the efficient motion is given to the sacred humanity, in a
strictly physical sense: the Word is not merely the reason why
a singular efficient motion common to the Three Persons is
given to the sacred humanity, but is the sole Person who
physically communicates it. Against this argument, other
logians have objected that the extension of the philosophical
axiom alleged is invalid, and that a false similarity has been
placed between existence and efficiency. 22 The issue is
taut, as it could perhaps be alleged that only an exclusive
efficient action of the Word would be sufficient to found a real
relationship of the sacred humanity towards the sole Person of
the Word, and so its denial would be a step back into the way
of Scotism.
The argument in favour of the extension to an exclusive
ciency of the Word, appears to be strengthened if we accept the
opinion, shared by Billot and by many of the earlier Thomists,
that the formal constituent of the divine personality of the Word
is the absolute subsistence of the Deity, not as absolute and
common, but as modified and possessed by the divine relation
which is the Word. On that assumption, the communication of
the Word to the humanity of Christ, formally and directly in
the line of personality (and not merely in that of existence)
involves necessarily the giving of something, which in itself
would be common to the Three Persons, but which in this case
is given as the sole property of the Word. Have we not already
room for the extension to the idea of a communication of the
divine efficiency, which ordinarily should be common to the
Three Persons, in and by the sole Person of the Word? This
22

Cf. the articles quoted in notes (18) and

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163

insistence is deeper than the preceding argument; it has won
some favour, but many theologians either refuse to accept its
validity, or deny the premise from which it begins. 23
The value of this argument, depending as it does on a concept
of the hypostatic union itself, is a key point in our discussion.
We find a further basic issue of our problem in the consideration of the hypostatic union from the point of view of formal
causality. The question is raised, whether or not the positive
communication of the Word to the sacred humanity in the line
of personality verifies the concept of formal causality in the
stJrict sense. The replies of those authors who have consideJred
the question are as different as their ideas of formal causality
itself. There are some who, content with the Scotist explanation of the hypostatic union, have seen in the simple relationship of the sacred humanity to the Word a perfecting by the
Word in the line of formal causality. Others have demanded
more than a simple relationship for a true formal influence; they
have required some physical exercise of the perfection of the
.ll'-'''"'"'' cause,
it communicates its perfection to another. These authors have naturally turned to the positive
communication of the Person of the Word to the sacred humanity in the line of personality, and have asked whether or not
it could be called a formal influence. Some have replied in the
affirmative: thus the Word would possess over the humanity
Christ a formal influence which is divine and exclusively His own,
and the answer to our problem would remain in the affirmative. The explanation of how this can be, differs among authors.
Some have seen it verified through the means of something
created, formed in the sacred humanity, by which and through
which that humanity is perfected with the actuality and perfection of the Word. 24 Others insist that there is no created reality
23 Pere C. V. Heris, who accepts the Capreolist
explanation of the hypostatic
union, will have none of the proposed extension. Cf. The Mystery of Christ, Cork:
1950, p. 43. Cf. also G. D. Smith, "Notes on recent work," in Clergy Review, 1951,
p. 106.
•• Cf. the classic disputation on the created mean in the hypostatic union, F.
Suarez, S.J., De lncarnatione, pars prima, ed. Coleti, Venetiis: 1745, tom. XVI,
disp. 8, sect. 3, pp.
and John of St. Thomas, 0. P., Cursus Theologicus,

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

in the hypostatic union distinct from the humanity of Christ
and its relation of union, and explain how there can be a formal
influence of the Word by means of an uncreated conjunction
and identity of the sacred humanity with the Word in the line
of personality. This uncreated identity, they say, is the only
satisfactory foundation for the real relation of union itself.
They consider it not merely as something static and inert, but
as verifying in itself the idea of formal causality on the part of
the Word, by which the Word physically perfects the sacred
humanity with the perfection of His own divine personality. 25
tom. II, ed. Solesm., Parisiis-Tornaci-Romae: 1984, q. 12, disp. 18, art. 4, nn. 8 seqq.
Cf. also the view in more recent times of M. de la Taille, S. J., especially in his
a1·ticles, " The Schoolmen," in The Incarnation- Papers from the Sum1ner School of
Catholic Studies held in Cambridge (London: 1925); "Actuation creee par l'Acte
lncree," in Recherches des sciences religieuses, XVIII (1928), p. 260 seqq; and
"Etretien arnica! d'Euxode et de Palamede sur la grace d'union," in Revue Apologetique, XLVIII (1929) 5-26 and 129-145. Against de la Taille, there is a refutation at length by Father T. U. Mullaney, 0. P., "The Incarnation: de la Taille
vs. the Thomist Tradition," in The Thomist, XVII (1954) 1-42. There are perhaps
traces of the de la Taille mentality in J. Solano, S. J., in Sacrae Theologiae Summa,
III, Matriti: 1958, 58 seqq., cf. 59 and 182, and in J. Ternus, S. J., "Das Seelenund Bewusstseinsleben Jesu," in Das Konzil von Chalkedon, II, Wiirzburg: 1954,
81-287. Concerning the view of Ternus, cf. Parente, L'Io di Cristo, ed. altera, 1955.
25 We shall examine later
the thought of Cajetan concerning this uncreated
identity, which the Thomist school has followed and especially concerning the
verification of the idea of formal causality through it. The chief Thomist authors
who have thus spoken of a formal causality of the Word, are Cajetan, in I, q. 12,
a. 2, nn. 15-16, in III, q. 4, a. 2, and in III, q. 17, a. 2, nn. 18 seqq; John of
St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus, in lam Partem, q. 12, disp. 18 ,a. 4, ed. Solesm.
pp. 172-177, and in !Ham partem, q. 2, disp. 4, art. 2, especially n. 20 seqq., ed.
Metternich, Coloniae Agrippinae: 1711, p. 72, and also in his Cursus Philosophicus,
Philosophia Naturalis, tom. II in ed. Reiser, cit., p. 285; Bannez, in lam, q. 12,
a. 2, dub. 2 post 4am conclusionem in ed. apud Stephanum Michaelem, Lugdnni:
1588, p. 222; Salmanticenses, Tractatus Theologici, tom. 4, ed. Pauli Monti, Parmae:
1725, tract. XVI, disp. 2, dub. 2, n. 21; tract. XVI, disp. 8, dub. 8, n. 28; Gonet,
Clipeus Theologiae Thomisticae, disp. 2, art. 8, ed. Coloniae Agrippinae: 1677,
p. 140; Billuart, De Deo Uno, eliss. 4, a. 7, p. 124 in ed. Lequette, Parisiis: 1876;
and among more recent works, Del Prado, N., 0. P., De Veritate Fundamentali
Philosophiae Christianae (Friburgi: 1911), pp. 627, 628, 681, 682; Billot, L. S. J., De
Verba Incarnato, Romae: 1922, pp. 166-167; Michel A., in D. T. C. VII (2), 1928,
col. 1522-1528; Penido, M. T-L., Le Role d'Analogie et Theologie Dogmatique,
Paris: 1981, pp. 418-416; Hugon, E., 0. P., Tractatus Dogmatici, I, Paris: 1988;
Garrigou-Lagrange, R., 0. P., De Deo Uno, Torino-Paris: 1988, p. 278 and De
Christo Salvatore, Turino: 1946, p. 820; Ramirez, J. M., 0. P., De Hominis Beati-

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165

There are others, however, who admit this uncreated identity
but refuse to see in it any idea of formal causality, stressing
always that the Word with His divine personality is the term
of the union and not an exclusive active cause through the
union. 26 Still others have :rejected the thesis of a formal influence of the Word,
that the writers mentioned above have
not in fact escaped from the necessity of a corresponding material causality exercised by the sacred humanity over the Word,
by which the Word would be limited and received; thus they
have even abandoned the concept of uncreated identity as the
foundation of the relation of union, and, while remaining apart
from the Scotist school, have centered their explanation of the
Union in an appropriation and integration of the humanity by
the Word in the line of personality: an appropriation and integration from which they strictly exclude any formal influence
of the Word. 27
This is a third key point in our debate. It is all the more
delicate insofar as a negative answer to this query of a formal
influence of the Word must explain how it does not reduce its
explanation of the Union itself to a mere relation, and leave
itself open to the classic Thomist critiques of the Scotist position; and insofar as an affirmative answer seems to open the
way to objections coming from the unity and transcendence of
tudine, III, Matriti: 1947, pp. 488-490; Daffara, M., 0. P., De Peccato Originali
et De Verbo lncarnato, Turino: 1948, p. 263; and most recently Corvez, M., 0. P.,
"L'Unicite d'existence dans le Christ," in Revue Thomiste, LVI (1956) 413-426.
We shall examine this notion later.
26 Thus
many speak of a " terminative influence " to indicate the function
of the Word, not just as the term of a relation, but as positively communicated in
identity so that He may be the term of the relation. Cf. L. Ciappi, 0. P., "ll
problema dell'Io di Cristo nella teologia moderna," in Sapienza, IV (1951) 421-438.
We believe that very often such an expression is in complete harmony with the
views of the Thomist authors cited in the preceding note.
27 This view, to be discussed more fully later, is especially that of Dom. H. M.
Diepen, 0. S. B. in several articles in the Revue Thomiste: Cf. RT L (1950) ll2
seqq; RT L (1950) 291 seqq; RT LIII (1953) 41 seqq; and of Pere J. H. Nicolas,
0. P., in RT LUI (195:3) 427-428 and RT LV (1955)
An English presentation
exists in the article of Father Adrian Hastings, " Christ's act of existence," in
Downside Review, 1955, pp. 139-159.

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

the Godhead, and from the integrity of the human nature of
Christ.
To sum up, we have three questions:
a) Can we find in ancient Patristic texts clear indications
of an active causal influence of the Wo:rd ove:r the sacred
humanity?
b) Can we extend the idea of a positive communication of
existence and personality in and through the Word alone,
to the idea of a positive communication of the divine
efficient motion in and through the Word alone?
c) Can we see in the positive communication of the Word
to the sacred humanity in the line of personality and of
existence, a genuine concept of formal causality?
These questions seem to be meriting the increasing interest of
theologians.

Attitude of the Magisterium: the evidence.
"The Sacred l\1agisterium,
matters
must be the proximate and universal norm of
every
theologian, for it is to it that Christ our Lord has commissioned
the whole deposit of faith,-namely the Sacred Letters
divine ' tradition '-to guard and to preserve and to interpret." 28 In our present study we must never lose sight of this
fundamental truth enunciated by the late Pontiff, Pius XII, in
the encyclical Humani Generis. Because of the great moment
inherent in our problem for a better understanding of the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation, and because of the
dogmatic difficulties which encompass
it is not surprising
that it has in recent years come under the vigilance of
Holy Office and of the Supreme Pontiff Himself. Before determining the proper task of the Catholic theologian in relation
to the three questions we have placed; we must first find out
28 Sacrum Magisterium,
in rebus fidei et morum, cuilibet theologo proxima et
universalis veritatis norma esse debet, utpote cui Christus Dominus totum depositum
fidei-Sacras nempe Litteras ac divinam 'traditionem '---€t custodiendum et tuendum et interpretandum concredidit. Ct AAS, XLII (1950) 567.

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WORD

167

the attitude of the Holy See and the liberty of discussion
permitted and fostered by it.
On the 28th June 1951, the Sovereign Pontiff approved the
condemnation and insertion in the Index of Prohibited Books,
resolved the previous day by the Holy Office, of a dissertation
of Pere Leon SeiHer, 0. F. M., entitled, La psychologie humaine
du Christ et l'unicite de personne.29 In this work, Pere SeiHer,
developing the theory of the Assumptus-Homo of his master
Pe:re Deodat Marie de Basley, went so far as to say that the
man conjoined to the Word was a distinct "Some-one" possessed of a distinct psychological personality from that of the
Word, and hence admitted in Christ a dual personality while
maintaining the unicity of Person. It was in consequence a
denial of every exclusive dynamic influence of the
over
the human activity of Christ. 30
This action of the Holy Office cannot be interpreted as a
definitive solution of our precise problem. We believe that its
intention was principally to point out that the assignation
personality to Christ was
to
manner
a
speaking which had been formulated by the unanimous consent of Catholic doctors, and which for centuries
been
best means of obtaining some understanding of the dogma
the Incarnation, which indeed had been used by Ecumenical
Councils and especially by that of Chalcedon, even in dogmatic
definitions. This new phrasing therefore would not only be
imprudent, but would leave the dogma of the Incarnation itself
:regard to our precise
like a reed shaken by the wind.
problem, nothing direct is said, but we must understand this
action of the Holy Office as stressing the paramount necessity
a negaof being alive to every danger of Nestorianism latent
tive solution.
On the 8th September, 1951, in the encyclical Sempiternus
Rex Christus, commemorating the Council of Chalcedon, Pius
XII wrote:
•• This dissertation was first published in the periodical, Franziskanische Studien,
Miinster in Westfalen, 1948-1!)49; it was later published separately, Rennes-Paris:
].949.
•• Cf. Note 18 above.

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

Although nothing prohibits further investigation into the humanity of Christ, even by a psychological process and method, none
the less, in the arduous studies of this nature there are some who
leave the past more than is due in order to construct novelties, and
wrongly use the definition of the Council of Chalcedon to support
their own " elucubrations."
These so extol the state and condition of the human nature of
Christ, that it seems to be a certain subject in its own right, as
though it did not subsist in the Person of the Word itself. But the
Council of Chalcedon, entirely in harmony with that of Ephesus,
clearly asserts that each nature of the Redeemer comes together
" in one person and subsistence," and forbids that two individuals
be placed in Christ, so that a certain "Assumed-Man" endowed
with integral autonomy, be collocated beside the Word. 31
This cardinal text assigns clearly the phrases " AssumedMan " and " integral autonomy " as capable of, and bearing
actually in some modern writings, a sense dangerous to the
dogma of the Incarnation in so far as they open the way to
Nestorianism. However, it must be noted that the Pontiff does
not define the limits of that full autonomy which would leave
81 Quam vis nihil prohibeat
quominus humanitas Christi etiam psychologica via
et ratione altius investigetur, tamen in arduis huius generis studiis non desunt
qui plus aequo vetera linquant ut nova astruant ac definitione Chalcedonensis
Concilii perperam utantur ut a se elucubrata suffulciant.
Hi humanae Christi naturae statum et conditionem ita provehunt ut eadem
reputari videatur subiectum quoddam sui iuris, quasi in ipsius persona Verbi non
subsistat. At Chalcedonense concilium, Ephesino prorsus congruens, lucide asserit
utramque Redemptoris naturam ' in unam personam atque subsistentiam ' convenire
vetatque duo in Christo poni individua, ita ut aliquis ' Homo Assumptus' integrae
autonomiae compos penes Verbum collocetur. Cf. AAS XLIII (1951) 638. In the
text published in the Osservatore Romano, which of course is not official, the words
"saltern psychologice " were to be read after the words " sui iuris." These words
are not found in the official text just cited. Comments on this point may be found
in Galtier, Gregorianum, XXXII (1951) 525-568, esp. in note 68; in Parente, Nel
Mistero di Cristo, 392, note 1; and the article of Father Michael Browne already
referred to could be consulted, in which we read: " Psicologicamente si potrebbe
parlare della personalita umana di Cristo, rna solo riferendosi al Verbo stesso in
quanto sussiste e opera nella natura umana assunta ipostaticamente. Ma col fare
dell'Io umano di Cristo un soggetto autonomo, sia pure psicologicamente, escludendo dall'attivita della natura assunta il Verbo come principio agente, si corre
rischio di affermmare implicitamente anche un io umano ontologico .... "

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WORD

169

the way open to this danger. Hence there is no clear and
precise indication given on our question of the exclusive active
influence of the Word. None the less we may interpret the text
as implicitly bearing on our problem, by repeating the warning
that a negative solution to our question could leave
way
open to a N estorian concept of our Redeemer.
On the 15th May, 1956, in the encyclical Haurietis Aquas,
which treats of the Sacred Heart of the Most Holy Redeemer,
several paragraphs were included which seem to bear directly
on our problem. Speaking of the intimacy which exists between
the heart of Christ and the Person of the Word, the Pontiff
wrote:
(The divine and the human love of Christ) must be said to be
not only co-existent in the adorable Person of the Divine Redeemer,
but also mutually conjoined by a natural link, insofar as the human
and the sensible (loves) are subject to the divine, and bear its
analogicallikeness. 32
(The heart of Christ) although no longer subject to the perturbations of this life, lives none the less and
and is
'--V.HI\nHLu

in an indissoluble way with the Person of the Divine
in It and through It with Its divine will . . . 33
The most sacred heart of Jesus, participating as it is in a totally
intimate way in the life of the Incarnate Word ... 31
Wherefore the sacred heart of Jesus Christ, united hypostatically
to the Divine Person of the Word, without doubt palpitated with
love and even with the other impulses of the affections, which none
the less so absolutely agreed and harmonised with the human will
full of divine charity, and with the infinite love itself which the
Son communicates with the Father and the Holy Spirit, that never
32 Cf. AAS XLVIII (1956) 344. Hi enim amores non tantum una simul existentes
dicendi sunt in adorabili Persona Divini Redemptoris, sed etiam inter se naturali
nexu coniuncti, quatenus divino humanus sensibilisque subiciuntur, atque illius
analogicam similitudinem referunt.
33 Cf. Ibid., 336. Illud siquidem etsi mortalis
huius vitae perturbationibus iam
obnoxium non est, vivit tamen ac palpitat, atque indissolubili modo cum Divini
Verbi Persona et in Ipsa et per Ipsam cum divina volnntate eius coniungitur.
34 Cf. Ibid., 333.
. . . sacratissimum Cor Jesu, cum sit, intima prorsus ratione,
Incarnati Verbi vitae particeps .... In the official text at this point St. Thomas
is cited III, q. 19, a. I.

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

was there between these three loves anything contrary or dissonant.35
For (the heart of Christ) is a symbol of that divine love which
He communicates with the Father and the Holy Spirit, but which
none the less is manifested to us through His mortal body in Him
alone, as in the Word which is made flesh, for indeed in Him
inhabits all the fullness of the divinity corporally. 36
. . . as the Angelic Doctor teaches, the charity of the August
Trinity is the principle of human Redemption, in so far as, pouring
out most plentifully into the human will of Christ and into His
adorable heart, it induced Him, moved by that same charity, to
shed His blood that He might redeem us from the slavery of sin:
" I have a baptism with which to be baptised, and how am I
straightened until it be accomplished." 37

What is the significance of these texts to our problem? Without doubt they teach the integrity of the human nature of
Christ as a principle of operation. They insist that there is a
conjunction of that human nature directly to the Person of the
Word, so that in the Word and thro11ghthe Word it is in perfect
harmony with the divine will and the divine love for men. They
are unequivocal and maintaining at the same time that the
infinite divine love of the Word is shared and communicated
with the Father and the Holy Spirit, and that that same divine
love which inspired and premoved His human and redemptive
•• Cf. Ibid., 824. Quamobrem Jesu Christi cor, Divinae Verbi Personae hypostatice unitum, ob amorem etiam et ob ceteras affectuum impulsiones procul dubio
palpitavit, quae tamen et cum humana voluntate, divinae caritatis plena, et cum
ipso infinito amore, quem Filius cum Patre et cum Spiritu Sancto communicat, ita
congruebant omnino et consonabant ut numquam hos inter tres amores aliquid esset
contrarium vel dissonans. Here in the official text St. Thomas in cited in a note,
ill, q. U, a. 4 and q. 18, a. 6.
36 Cf. Ibid., 827. Syrnbolus enim est divini illius amoris, quem cum Patre et
Spiritu Sancto communicat, sed qui tamen in Ipso tanium, utpote in Verbo, quod
caro factum est, per caducum et fragile corpus nobis manifestatur, quandoquidem
in ipso inhabitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter.'
•• Cf. Ibid., 882. . . . ut Angelicus docet, Augustae Trinitatis caritas humanae
Redemptionis principium est, quatenus in humanam Jesu Christi voluntatem, et
in adorandum Cor eius, uberrime exundans, eum eadem caritate permotum induxit
ad suum sanguinem profundendum, ut nos a peccati captivitate redimeret: • Baptismo habeo baptizari et quomodo coarctor usquedum perficiatur.' Here after the
word 'redimeret ' there is a note to S. Thomas, ill, q. 48, a. 5.

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WORD

171

activity is common to the Three Persons of the August Trinity.
Finally they suggest a dual exclusive function of the Person of
the ·word underlying the sublime participation of the humanity
of Christ in His life. This dual function we may describe as
significative and presential; significative, in so far as in the
Word alone the divine love of Christ is manifest to us, and
presential, in so far as the Word alone, with all the fullness of
the divinity, that belongs to Him, dwells in Christ corporally.
· For those who would investigate the possibility of an exclusive dynamic influence of the Word on the human activity of
Christ, what is there in this teaching?
First, there is great insistence on the difficulties inherent in
the affirmative solution, namely the disruption of the unity of
the divine action ad extra, and the denial of the absolute
integrity of the human nature of Christ as a principle of
operation.
Secondly, in speaking of the common divine love, shared by·
the Three Divine Persons, which moves the human heart of
to act, the encyclical seems implicitly to apply and to
uphold the axiom indivisa su,nt opera SS. Trinitatis ad extra.
Although it does not expressly name efficient causality, it would
seem to be impossible to reconcile the affirmation of an exclusive efficient influence of the Word moving the humanity of
Christ to act, with the teaching of the encyclical.38
88 In his commentary on the Encyclical, Haurietis Aquas and Devotion to the
Sacred Heart, in Theological Studies, XVill (1957) 17-40, Father Malachy J.
Donnelly, S. J., raises this point and decides it in a way which differs from ours.
On p. 82 he asks, as we have done, " Is the divine love of which the Holy Father
speaks in this particular section of the Encyclical a love proper to the Word, or. is it
rather that love which the Word has in common with the Father and Holy
Spirit? " and on p. 88 he replies: " It is quite true that the hypostatic union as
such terminates at being, not operations (ad esse, non autem ad opemri), but it
is equally true that, when the Word Incarnate loves in a human way (with sensible
and spiritual love informed by charity) and divinely, it is the Word who loves, not
the Father or Holy Spirit? Hence, I hold that the divine love to which the soul
ascends through the symbolism of the Sacred Heart is first of all the personal hypostatic love of the Word alone. The Holy Father uses language which justifies one's
making this conclusion." (The text quoted in support of this last sentence is, we
understand, that which we have quoted in our note 86). We cannot agree with
Father Donnelly's interpretation; the clear references throughout the encyclical to

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

Thirdly, in proposing the ideas of the intimate participation
of Christ's humanity in the divine life of the Word, and of its
conjunction with the common divine will only in and through
the Word, the encyclical has certainly made use of perspectives
very dear to the affirmative solution. However, they do not
necessarily presuppose it. Participation in the divine life of the
Word, and conjunction with the divine will in and through the
Word, can be amply explained by the idea of the personal
presence of the Word to the sacred humanity in the hypostatic
union, and do not necessarily demand an exclusive active divine
influence of the Word. The fact that the sacred humanity is the
human nature of the Word, is ample reason for this participation and conjunction, and
this way the Word need have no
more than a moral influence over the humanity, one which
reduces to the order of final causality, the Word alone being the
subject and hence the fi.nis cui of aU the human actions of
Christ. 39 Hence while the encyclical uses perspectives dear to
the affirmative solution, it does not necessarily suppose that
solution.
the community of the divine love seem too insistent. (Cf. e. g. the texts in our
notes 35 and 37) . The important text which has caused Father Donnelly to
hesitate we discuss immediately in our own text. As yet we know of no other
extensive discussion on the encyclical which raises this point. Perhaps our final
conclusion will not be far from Fr. Donnelly's view.
39 Cajetan,
in his commentary in I-II, q. 3, art. 2-3-4, thus interprets the axiom
'Unumquodque est propter suam operationem' which St. Thomas had used in
art. 1!: " .•• potest dupliciter intelligi. Primo, sicut propter rem quae est eius finis.
et sic est verum. Ita quod unumAlio modo sicut proprium complementum:
quodque habens operationem esse propter suam operationem, nihil aliud est quam
esse propter seipsum in actu completu et perfecto." Taking this same doctrine from
Cajetan, Bannez says: " alter sensus est quod unumquodque est propter suam
operationem tamquam propter complementum proprium ipsius rei; et ita verificatur
ilia maxima, quoniam unumquodque est propter seipsum in actu completo, v. g.,
ignis est propter se ipsum operantem, id est, ut operetur. Atque ita substantia cum
operatione melior est quam substantia sine operatione." (in I-H, q. 3, a. 2, in ed. V.
Beltran de Heredia, 0. P., Madrid: 1942, tom. I, p. 85.) We believe that an
analogous application of this teaching to the human activity of the Word to be
valid, and to be most fruitful in coming to some understanding of the human life
of Christ and His function as Redeemer. It is to this point that we refer here.
We leave it, as outside the strict limits of the present study, which refers to
physical causality.

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178

Lastly, there seems indicated in the encyclical a reduction of
every exclusive physical role of the Word in the Incarnation to
the unique personal presence by which He inhabits corporally
in Christ with all the fullness of the Godhead.
A passing remark made by the Supreme Pontiff in His allocution to the Liturgists at the Vatican on 29th October, 1956,
seems to confirm the general impression of the encyclical with
reference to our question. Here he spoke of the act by which
Christ consummates the work of our Redemption, of that by
which He," that is, the Word subsisting in human nature," will
hand over the kingdom to God and the Father, and submit to
Him Who placed all things under His feet, that God may be
all in all. 40

Attitude of the M agisterium: general assessment.
The foregoing documents constitute the evidence. Let us
now assess its bearing on our problem. We may distinguish
general directives and special conclusions.
In giving general directives to theologians labouring in our
problem, these documents above all insist that the dogmatic
difficulties concerning the unity of the divine operation ad
extra, the personal unity of Christ in the exercise of His human
activity, and the integrity of the human nature of Christ as a
principle of operation, be justly appreciated. The dogmatic
definition of Chalcedon must be given paramount importance
as the guiding light of the whole investigation. The investigation itself must not begin from the untenable dualist position
of the Assumptus-Homo theory.
Beyond these general directives, we believe that two special
conclusions may be taken from the documents.
••" .. Le Christ est le Premier et le Dernier, l'Aipha et !'Omega, a la fin du
monde tous les ennemis auront ete vaincus, et la mort en dernier lieu, le Christ,
c'est a dire le Verbe subsistant dans la nature humaine, remettra le Royaume a
Dieu, son Pere, et le Fils lui-meme se soumettra a Celui qui lui a tout soumis, pour
que 'Dieu soit tout en tous.'" Cf. AAS XLVIII (1956) 728. Cf. M. Fabregas,
S. J., "Adnotationes in Allocutionem Pontificis super Liturgia," in Periodica, XLV
(956) 471.

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KEVIN Fo O'SHEA

First, there is no efficient physical divine influence exclusive
to the Person of the Word in relation to the human activity of
Christ. This is to be understood in the sense that a divine
efficiency would physically be exerted by the Word and not by
the Father and Holy Spirit. The reason seems to be the application of the axiom Indivisa sunt opera SS. Trinitatis
universally where there is question of the divine efficiency. This
presupposes that the difficulties concerning the personal unity
of Christ in the exercise of His human activity, are solved by
the concept of the exclusive physical presence of the Word to
the sacred humanity not only in the static order, but also in
the actual exercise of its activity.
Secondly, the problem of the existence of a formal causality
exclusive to the Word, and hence of the existence of any active
divine influence exclusive to the Word, in the mystery of the
Incarnation, remains undecided. However, if such an influence
be affirmed it will of necessity be co-terminous with the exclusive physical presence of the Word to the sacred humanity,
being implicitly
in
concepto
if it be denied,
it must be explained how this same unique personal presence
remains in all its perfection without ito The problem then rethe
duces to a consideration of the mystery of the presence
Word, and of the very idea of formal causality"
Therefore, in concluding this assessment of the attitude of
the Magisterium, we believe that it has wished simply to preserve not only the terminology sanctioned by the Councils and
by centuries of traditional theology, but also the immediate and
obvious sense of that terminology. It has abstained from any
definitive directive to theologians labouring to penetrate more
deeply into the meaning of the mystery, even though they may
see in their opposing solutions serious difficulties for the fully
satisfying understanding of the mystery itself. It will leave
:room for debate on our problem, and allow free discussion
between Scotists and Thomists, and among Thomists themselveso It will centre the efforts of all on the idea of the hypostatic union itself.

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175

The task of the theologian.
The Catholic theologian must attempt to unfold by his
labours a better understanding of the teaching of the living
Magisterium of the Church. What then is his task in relation
to the three principal issues of our problem?
In relation to the Patristic texts he must show by a sound
exegesis that their true sense is not in disaccord with the living
teaching of the Church.
In relation to the question of an exclusive efficient influence
of the Word over the human nature of Christ, he must attempt
to find the ultimate reason why such an influence is repugnant.
He must try to solve the arguments which seem to indicate the
contrary, and he must show how the personal unity of Christ as
a human Agent is in no way weakened by his position.
In relation to the possibility of a formal influence of the
Word alone over the sacred humanity, he may delve deeply
into the meaning of the hypostatic union in an attempt to solve
this problem, knowing that an affirmative solution, if satisfactorily maintained, will well harmonise with some of the great
perspectives of the encyclical Haurietis Aquas in regard to the
human activity and the human life of our Redeemer.
Our aims.
In the succeeding parts of this study, we wish to discuss the
second and the third of these tasks of the Catholic theologian of
today. We do so by expounding what we believe to be the
mind of St. Thomas Aquinas in regard to each of them. We do
so in the belief that St. Thomas, having made a personal
analysis of the chief patristic texts involved, expressly held
common influence of the divine efficiency over the human faculties of Christ by the Three Persons of the Trinity, 41 and ex41 To elaborate the exegesis made by S. Thomas of the chief texts especially of
Pseudo Dionysius and S. Leo, indicated above in note (20), would be too much
for a mere note. We content ourselves with the following citation from III, a. 47,
a. 8 ad 2.: " Christus secundum quod Deus, tradidit semetipsum in mortem eadem
voluntate et actione qua et Pater tradidit eum; sed in quantum homo, tradidit
seipsum voluntate a Patre inspirata. Unde non est contrarietas in hoc quod Pater
tradidit Christum et ipse tradidit semetipsum."

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

pressly held the exclusive personal presence of the Word to the
sacred humanity. We shall then see the mind of the Angelic
Doctor in regard to the mystery of the presence of the Word
to the sacred humanity, a presence which rules out an exclusive
divine
of the Word; and in regard to the mystery of
the hypostatic union, a mystery, which, we believe, includes
the concept of a " pure formal actuation " of the sacred humanity by the Word alone.

II.

TnE MYSTERY oF THE PRESENCE oF THE WoRD.

In concluding our discussion of the problem of the dynamism
of the Word over the sacred humanity and the human activity
of Jesus Christ, we were left with two basic questions, one concerning the efficiency of the Word and the other concerning the
formal causality of the Word over that humanity and that
activity. Our search for a solution focussed on the mystery
of the presence of the Word to the sacred humanity, and we
placed at the head of our investigation the Thomistic concept
of a positive communication of the Word to that humanity.
To prepare the way for a solution to each part, we must now
investigate three points which bring out the mystery of this
presence:
a) In what does this positive communication consist?
b) How does the divine personality of the Word include the
divine existence?
c) How does it include the absolute divine subsistence?

The positive communication of the Word
St. Thomas has clearly described what the Hypostatic Union
is not, and what it is. He has ruled out the idea of a union
in natura/ 2 one that is essential or accidental, and he has insisted that it be conceived as a substantial personal union. 43
This is merely an expression of the dogmatic teaching of
•• Cf. Summa Theol., III, q. fl, aa. 1 and 6.
•• Ibid., a. fl; a. 6, ad fl.

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177

Ephesus and of Chalcedon on which he relies. But he goes
further, and is at pains to fix the category of being into which
this unique union falls. In the Tertia Pars, he asks: "whether
the union of the human and divine nature is something
created?" It is here that we shall see his concept of the Hypostatic Union as a positive communication of the Word to the
sacred humanity. St. Thomas is trying to find the real category into which this real union falls, and his chief intention
in the article is to profess that it is a relation and indeed a
real relation:
The union of which we are speaking is a relation which we consider between the divine and the human nature, inasmuch as they
come together in one Person of the Son of God. Now, as was said
above, every relation which we consider between God and the
creature is really in the creature, by whose change the_relation is
brought into being; whereas it is not really in God, but only in
our way of thinking, since it does not arise from any change in God.
And hence we must say that the union of which we are speaking
is not really in God, but only in our way of thinking; but in the
human nature, which is a creature, it is really. Therefore we must
say it is something created. 44

To get to the full meaning of this text, we must read it in
the light of two parallel passages in the Commentary on the
Sentences. It is there that the Angelic Dictor expressly assumes
the doctrine of Aristotle on the foundation of a real relation,
and applies it to the real :relation in question.
In the Third Book of Sentences, dist. 5, q. I, art. I, qa. I, St.
Thomas states a dual foundation for any relation, either quantity or what reduces to it, or action and passion. 45 This is
"Ibid., a. 7.: "Unio de qua loquimur est relatio quaedam quae consideratur
inter divin&m naturam et humanam, secundum quod conveniunt in una Persona
Filii Dei.
" Sicut autem in prima parte dictum est, omnis relatio, quae consideratur inter
Deum, et creaturam, realiter quidem est in creatura, per cuius mutationem talis
relatio innascitur; non autem est realiter in Deo, sed secundum rationem tantum; in
humana autem natura quae creatura quaedam est, realiter est."
45 Cf. III Sent., loc. cit. " Omnis autem relatio, secundum Philosophum, fundatur vel supra quantitatem, aut quod reduciter ad genus quantitatis, aut supra
actionem et passionem."

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taken from the Fifth Book of Aristotle's Metaphysics, cp. 15,
1020b 26-82/ 6 and is explained by St. Thomas both here and in
his commentary on the Metaphysics. His meaning in both
places is that some relations immediately follow from action
and passion/ 7 while others follow immediately from a certain
unity, which reduces to quantity under a certain aspect. 48 This
unity may be threefold: it may be identity, which is unity in
substance, or equality, which is unity in quantity, or likeness,
which is unity in quality. 49 Although some action is always
required to establish this unity (which may therefore be called
a unitive action) , these relations do not follow immediately
from the action but from the unity which the action establishes.
We are faced therefore with three realities: a unitive or unifying
action, a unity which is the foundation of the relation, and a
relation of union. The foundation of this relation, co-existent
with the relation, is something real which does not belong to the
category of relation.
St. Thomas then goes on to· distinguish the movement which
is at the root of every relation, whether it belong to the first or
second group. This movement may be in one term, or it may
be in both. If it is in both, it will, differently for each group of
relations, give rise to a real relation in each term, to a real
mutual relation. If it is in one only, then this term will depend
on the other while the other does not depend on it, and there
will be a real relation in the depending term, and a relation of
reason in the term on which it depends. 50
His next step is to apply this doctrine to the Hypostatic
Union. Here he will see first the unifying or unitive action
which brings about the Incarnation. Next he will insist that
•• Cf. St. Thomas' commentary on the Metaphysics, I. 17, n. 1001-1005.
"In Metaphys. n.
•• Cf. Ill Sent. loc. cit.: " Unum autem reducitur ad genus quantitatis quasi
principium quantitatis discretae."
•• Ibid., " Et supra ipsam fundatur identitas, secundum quod est unum in
substantia;-aequalitas,
secundum quod est unum in quautitate;-si.militudo,
secundum quod est unum in qualitate."
50 Ibid., " . . quaedam
innascuntur ex motu utriusque; . . . quaedam autem
innascuntur ex motu unius sine immutatione alterius . . ."

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there can be no change or movement in the divine nature,
which is immutable, but only in the human nature. He will go
on to posit a drawing, or a traction in the human nature,
towards unity in the divine Person. And finally he will speak of
the relation thus engendered, which is real in the humanity
thus drawn and united, and a relation of reason in the divine
nature to which it is drawn and united. 51
The same teaching, based on the same triple real distinction
between -unifying action, unity, and union, may be seen repeated in the Third Book of Sentences, dist. 2, q. 2,
qa. 3,
ad 3, where he writes:
It is necessary that there be a union mediate between the human
and divine nature, not as a cause but as an effect following the
conjunction of the natures. For, as the Commentator says in the
XII Metaphysics, it is the nature of relation that it have a cause
in the other genera of being since it has the least of the nature
of being.

This text is valuable, because it expressly names the unity
of which we have spoken a " conjunction," and because it expressly gives this unity or conjunction priority in nature to the
relation of union, in so far as it is its cause; the relation of
union follows as a real effect.
It is the same teaching that we read a little further on in the
same quaestiuncula:
. . . although relation per se does not terminate motion, because
there is no motion to ad aliquid, as is proven in the V Metaphys.
. . . nevertheless because motion terminates per se at some being,
of necessity there follows some relation. Just as, because the motion
of alteration terminates at whiteness, there follows a relation of
similarity to all white things; and in like manner, since the motion
of generation terminates at form, there follows the relation according to which matter is said to be under form; so also from this that
the motion of the assumption of human nature terminates at the
person, there follows this relation which is called union. Whence,
61 Ibid., " Cum igitur in incamatione non sit aliqua mutatio facta in natura divina,
sed in humana quae tracta est ad unitatem in persona divina, erit haec relatio,
scilicet unio, secundum rem in natura humana, in divina autem secundum rationem
tantum ... "

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

union is a mean, not as causing the assumption, but rather following it; just as was said above, water is means in act between two
wet things that are touching. 52

Let us now return to the text of the Tertia Pars. We believe
that its sober formula is nothing more or less than a clear statement of this same teaching: " Union .... is a relation which we
consider between the divine and the human nature inasmuch as
they come together in one Person of the Son of God." 53
We believe that St. Thomas is distinguishing two senses of a
relation, namely union and the unity on which it is founded,
and we believe that in the case of the Mystery of the Hypostatic Union which he here treats, they differ more widely than
heaven and earth. 54 The union taken as a relation simply is
placed between the assumed nature and the divine Person of
the Word, and is in the real category of relation, and is something created. The union, however, taken not simply as a relation, but as a unity and a conjunction of the assumed nature
in the divine Person of the Word, is the divine unity of the
Eternal Word, infinite and uncreated, which is given to the
•• HI Sent., d. !l, q. 2, a. 2, qcla. 8: " ... quamvis relatio per se non terminet
motum, quia in "ad aliquid" non est motus, ut dicitur V Metaphys., tamen ex
hoc quod motus per se terminatur ad aliquid ens de necessitate consequitur relatio
aliqua. Sicut ex hoc quod motus alterationis terminatur ad albedinem, consequitur
relatio similitudinis ad omnia alba; similiter etiam, ex hoc quod motus generationis
terminatur ad formam, consequitur haec relatio secundum quam materia esse sub
forma dicitur. Ita etiam ex hoc quod motus assumptionis naturae humanae terminatur ad personam, consequitur haec relatio quae unio dicitur. Unde unio medium
est, non sicut assumptionem causans, sed potius earn consequens; sicut etiam aqua
est medium in tactu, ex hoc quod tangentia sunt humectata."
•• Summa Theol., III, q. it!, a. 7: "Unio ... est relatio quaedam quae consideratur
inter divinam naturam et humanam, secundum quod conveniunt in una Persona
Filii Dei."
•• Cf. Cajetan commenting on Summa Theol., III, q. it!, a. 7, n. III: "In hoc
articulo cautissime adverte distinctionem praedictum de unione: vel quantum ad
relationem, quam significat; vel quantum ad coniunctionem in persona, ad quam
consequitur. Quoniam plus differunt haec duo quam caelum et terra. Unio enim
pro relatione est in genere relationis, et est ens reale creatum, ut in littera dicitur.
Unio autem pro coniunctione naturae humanae in persona divina, cum consistat in
unitate quae est inter naturam humanam et personam Filii Dei, est in genere seu
ordine substantiae: et non est aliquid creatum, sed Creator."

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181

sacred assumed humanity by divine omnipotence; the 'Vord
and the assumed humanity are one and identical in this divine
personal unity, which belongs to no created category since it is
divine. Christ is God. These two senses of the Hypostatic
Union, distinguished in this text, are not disparate, but are
intimately connected, in so far as the relation of union follows
the conjunction in personal identity and is explained by it. It is
the simple statement of our Doctor: "The union of which we
are speaking . . . is a relation . . . between the divine and
the human nature ... inasmuch as they come together in one
Person of the Son of God." 55 We can sum all up in Cajetan's
phrase: " In a word, the union of natures in Christ is a created
relation, that is, following their personal uncreated unity." 56
Formally, the hypostatic union consists in the real relation
of union to the Divine Person of the Word, a relation of
dependence on the Word, and a relation of presence to the
'Word; but fundamentally, it consists in the personal conjunction, unity or identity of the sacred humanity to the Divine
Person of the Word. It is this identity which ultimately provides the key to the whole union, dependence and presence;
it is it alone which ultimately explains how the union is " of
an order most elevated above the common supernatural order,"
as the Salmanticenses put it; 57 and it is it alone which ultimately explains how the Word, with all the fullness of the
divinity, dwells in the humanity He has assumed. 58
This, for St. Thomas, is the concept of the positive communication of the Word to the sacred humanity. As is clear from om
layout of our problem, it must be the guiding principle of our
inquiry concerning an efficient or a formal causality exerted by
the Word in the hypostatic union.
55 Summa
Theol., loc. cit., " Unio de qua loquimur . . . est relatio quaedam
. . . inter divinam naturam et humanam . . . secundum quod convenient in una
Persona Filii Dei."
•• Cajetan, loc. cit.: "Est igitur ut in unico verbo dicatur, unio naturarum in
Christo relatio creata quaedam, hoc est, consequens earundem unitatem personalem
increatam."
57 Cursus Theologicus, tr. xvi, disp. !i!, n. 22, ed. Pauli Monti, Parmae, 1725, p. 207.
•• Cf. Haurietis Aquas, cited in n. 86.

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The divine personality of the Word and the divine existence.
So far we have established the basic concept of identity of
the sacred humanity with the Word in the order of personality
and the whole fullness of the Godhead. We must now ask
under what formal aspect the sacred humanity is thus united
and identified with the Word and the Godhead. Here we will
see the premisses from which deductions will later be made
concerning our precise problem of a causality of the Word in
the Incarnation.
There can be no doubt that neither the Father, nor the Holy
Spirit, but the Person of the Word alone is incarnate. 59 There
can be no doubt also that the divinity itself, that is to say, the
divine substance or divine nature, is incarnate. 60 This is not
to place two Incarnations, or two Unions, but one, for the
divinity is incarnate in the Son, 61 and the whole and entire
divine nature is united to the sacred humanity in the Person
of the Word. 62 Thus there is only one termination of the humanity, only one identity and union, which is the Hypostatic
Union to the Word. 63
This union, however, is solely with the Divine Word and with
the divine perfection which He is, as the Person of the assumed
humanity. 64 It is, therefore, a union formally in the line of the
exclusive divine personality of the Word, as communicated and
supplying the positive perfection of human personality in the
assumed humanity. Materially, it is a union with all the divine
•• Cf. the Profession of faith prescribed for the Waldenses by Innocent lll:
" Incarnationem divinitatis non in Patre, neque in Spiritu Sancto, factam, sed in
Filio tantum, corde credimus et ore confitemur." (Denz. n. 422; PL 215, col. 1511).
6 ° Cf. Concilium Rhemense: "Credimus
(et confitemur) ipsam divinitatem, sive
naturam dicas, incarnatam esse sed in Filio." (Denz. n. 392; Mansi, 21, col. 713) .
01 cr. the sources cited in nn. 59-60.
Theol., III, q. 3, a. 4: "Sicut dicimus personam Filii incarnatam,
•• Cf.
ita et naturam: ' Tota enim divina natura in una suarum hypostasum incarnata
est,' ut dicit Damascenus inS lib." For St. John Damascene Cf. De Fide Orthodoxa,
lib. lll, c. 6; PG 94, col. 1003.
•• Cf. John of St. Thomas, CurBUS Theologicus, in IIIam partem, l. c., q. 2,
disp. 6, art. 2, n. 5, n. 8.
•• Ibid.

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substance and perfection, which are materially united with the
Divine Person of the Word.
Neither the concept of a formal union with the divine personality of the Word, nor that of a material union with the
divine perfection which is one with
cause great difficulty to
the theologian. They are simply an expression of the central
mystery of the Incarnation, and an elaboration of the values of
the definition of Chalcedon: they remain mysterious, but they
involve no special theological difficulty beyond the fundamental
explanations of the mystery itself.
Many theologians, however, and with them the majority of
the commentators on St. Thomas, have asserted that in the
Hypostatic Union there is also a formal union of the sacred
humanity to the divine existence, their reason being. that such
a union is implied in the idea of a formal union with the divine
personality of the Word. 65 This concept is later used as a
premiss by some who maintain an exclusive efficiency of
Word in the Incarnation.
It brings
however, a difficulty concerning the
of the Three Divine Persons. The divine existence is one and
common to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit: how then
can it be formally communicated to the sacred humanity,
out the Three Divine Persons being formally communicated to
that humanity? In answer, those who maintain such a formal
union of the divine existence to Christ's humanity, in the place
of any human connatural existence, propose a distinction. They
state two formal aspects under which the one and same divine
existence may be considered: either in so far as it belongs to
the divine nature, or so far as it belongs to the divine Person
of the Word. They insist that these two aspects are formally
different.
The concepts of divine nature and divine person are analogous applications to the deity of the notions of nature and
person in general.
human things nature signifies formally
the principle by which a thing is specifically such, by which it
65

Cf. Cajetan, op. cit., IU, q. 17, a.

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is intelligible, and by which it operates. 66 When we apply this
to divine things, we say that the divine nature, precisely and
formally as a nature, is that real principle by which the divine
reality is divine in its specific character, in its intelligibility, and
in its power to operate. We know, too, that for St. Thomas, the
note which primarily and principally distinguishes the divine
nature from every other nature, is that the divine essence is
identical with its own divine existence. 67 Therefore, we can
validly say that the divine existence itself, the divine act of
standing extra causas, formally belongs to the divine nature,
or to that divine principle by which the divine being is divine.
Moreover, in human things, we say that a person is formally
not the principle by which a thing is specifically such, and intelligible and able to operate, but something distinct in human
nature, something properly susceptive of its own existence. 68
Person therefore signifies formally the nature as distinct and
susceptive of its own existence, and in a secondary way, it
formally signifies the proper existence of that nature as the
essential term of reference of the person. 69 In the notion of
person, therefore, personality is immediately and formally signified, and existence, that is, proper and substantial existence, is
secondarily and indirectly, but still formally, signified: the
former as the formal constitutive of the person, the latter, as
the extrinsic term necessarily and essentially connotated.
When we apply this notion of person analogously to divine
realities, we must say that a divine person does not signify
formally the divine principle by which the deity is divine, but
something distinct in the divine nature itself, something standCf. St. Thomas, In Vll Metapltys., 1032a, 12, lect. 6, n. 1381.
Cf. Summa Tlteol., I, q. S, a. 4; q. IS, a. 11.
•• Ibid., I, q. 29, a. S, "Persona est quid subsistens in rationali natura," and the
discussion of Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, De Christo Salvatore (Torino: 1945), pp. 87 fl'.
•• We do not defend in this essay any determined opinion on the formal constitutive of personality, beyond that common to thomism. We hold then that
it is a positive perfection distinct from the individual substantial nature, and that
it is either that nature as connotating and related actually to its proper existence
(Capreolus as interpreted by recent authors) or a substantial mode superadded
to the nature as a "terminus ut sic purus" which founds this connotation. (Cajetan
and the main line of thomist tradition.)
66

67

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185

ing in its own right as a divine reality. 10 Each of the Three
Divine Persons, then, precisely and formally as a person, signifies
formally and directly that distinct subsistence which is its own
distinct personality. Yet it signifies also-and again formallythe divine existence itself as the divine act towards which its
distinctness and its standing in its own right are oriented, not
indeed as a determinant of itself, but as a concomitant to the
full formal notion of being a distinct divine thing. The divine
existence then must pertain to the formal integral notion of
each of the Three Divine Persons. The fact that each of these
three Persons has its own distinct personality and subsistence,
and yet shares with the other Two the one common divine
existence, is simply the sacred enigma of the Mystery of the
Blessed Trinity.
There are then, two formal aspects under which the one
divine existence may be considered: as it formally belongs to
the divine nature, and as it formally belongs to the divine
person of the Father, Son, or Holy Spirit. In the Incarnation,
when we speak of the divine existence being formally and properly communicated to the sacred humanity, we can consider
it in two ways: either as it formally belongs to the divine
nature, and then we would have a union to achieve a common
divine-human nature, which is Monophysitism; or as it formally
belongs to the Divine Person of the Word, as a formal concomitant to the integral notion of " person " as applied to the
Word, as given to the sacred humanity in, with, and through
the Word itself-and then we would remain strictly within the
limits of a union to achieve full oneness of person between the
Word and the sacred humanity. This latter is the concept of
the positive communication of the Word to the sacred humanity in the line of existence. It is the teaching of many of
the classic commentators on St. Thomas after Cajetan. 11 It
•• Just as person is general is "quid subsistens in rationali natura," so person
analogously applied to divine realities signifies "quid subsistens in divina natura."
71 The classic commmentators
from Cajetan to Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange in an
unbroken line support the theory of a unique divine existence in Christ. In the
past decade this view has been subject to much criticism; the articles of Dom

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

appears also as the clear sense of St. Thomas himself, both in
the commentary on the Sentences, and in the Tertia Pars. In
the first work, he makes the objection:
There is one existence of the Son of God and of the Father; if, therefore, there is one existence of this man and of the Son of God, there
will be one existence of this man and of God the Father. But there
is no greater union than that by which things are one in existence.
Therefore humanity is united to God the Father. 72
And he replies:
It is different with God, and with all other things. Because in God
nature is subsisting; whence existence belongs to it secundum se:
indeed it is its own subsisting existence; and therefore the existence
of the nature is the existence of the person; and yet person and
nature differ in reason. Although, therefore, there is one existence,
yet it can be considered either as it is of the nature, and thus humanity is not united in divine existence; whence it is not united to
the Father; or it can be considered as it is the existence of the
person, and so it is united in divine existence.73
The teaching of the Summa appears to rely on the same
distinction:
It would seem that the union of the Incarnate Word did not take
place in the person. For the Person of God is not distinct from His
Nature. If, therefore, the union did not take place in the nature,
it follows that it did not take place in the person .
. . . although in God, Nature and Person are not really distinct,
Diepen, 0. S. R, in Revue Thamiste represent its most extensive and penetrating
form. We shall later discuss his thought, although the scope of our essay does not
require us to express our mind on this precise point.
"Unum est esse Filii Dei et Patris, si ergo unum
•• Cf. III Sent., d; 6, q. a.
esse est huius hominis et Filii Dei, unum erit esse huius hominis et Dei Patris.
Sed nulla est maior unio quam ea quae est aliquorum secundum esse unum. Ergo
humanitas est unita Deo Patri."
78 Ibid.: " . . . aliud est de Deo et de aliis omnibus rebus. Quia in Deo essentia
subsistens est; unde sibi secundum se debetur esse; immo ipsa est suum esse subsistens; unde essentia a persona non difl'ert secundum rem; et ideo esse essentiae est
etiam esse personae; et tamen persona et essentia ratione difl'erunt. Quamvis igitur
unum sit esse, tamen potest considerari vel prout est essentiae, et sic non unitur
humanitas in esse divino; unde non unitur Patri; vel potest considerari secundum
quod est esse personae, et sic unitur in esse Divino."

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yet they have distinct meanings, as was said above, inasmuch as
person signifies after the manner of something subsisting" And because human nature is united to the Word, so that the Word subsists in it, and not so that His nature :receives therefrom any addition or change, it follows that the union of human nature to the
Word of God took place in the person and not in the nature"74
In outlining this thesis, we have not intended to embrace it
or to present for it arguments which might be definitive in the
light of actual controversy among Thomists" Fully aware of
the discussions still going on among commentators on SL
Thomas, we have wished to give the dear basis of this view,
from which arguments vital to ou:r direct purpose in this essay
depart. We believe that its correct understanding, as the view
of the many Thomist authors who hold it, is vital to our
remarks concerning extensive applications of it to the divine
efficiency; and we believe that its key lies in the dual formal
signification of the divine existence, either as pertaining to the
divine nature, or as pertaining to the divine person of the Word"

and the absolute divine
The divine personality of
subsistence"
Though they may dispute about a formal communication of
the Word to the assumed humanity in the line of existence,
Thomists will be in accord in assigning such a formal communication in the line of personality itself" But when we ask
what constitutes formally and primarily the divine personality
of the Word, we ask a difficult question and we find even
Thomist authorities divided" It will be necessary to outline
these divergences of interpretation if we are to understand later
their application to our direct problems"
74 Cf. Summa Theol., III, q.
a. 2, ad. 2: "Videtur quod unio Verbi Incarnati
non sit facta in persona. Persona enim Dei non est aliud a natura ipsius " " " Si
ergo unio non est facta in natura, sequitur quod non sit facta in persona " " .
" . . " licet in Deo non sit aliud secundum rem natura et persona; di:ffert
tamen secundum modum significandi, sicut dictum est; quia persona significat per
modum subsistentis. Et quia natura humana sic unitur Verbo, ut Verbum in elll
subsistat, non autem ut aliquid addatur ei ad rationem suae naturae, vel ut eius
natura in aliqud transmutetur; et ideo unio humane naturae ad Verbum Dei facta
est in persona, non in natma!'

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

We must first introduce a term: " absolute divine subsistence." Thomists commonly admit such a subsistence in God
besides the relative subsistences or the relative personalities of
the Three Divine Persons. It signifies a substantial divine
perfection, a totality, and a completeness of the divine reality,
but it does not signify that perfection, totality
completeness as incommunicable with the ultimate incommunicability
of a person. A problem therefore arises, how does this absolute
divine subsistence enter into the constitution of the divine relative subsistence and personality of each of the Three Divine
Persons? That it is the radical explanation of these personalities, is dear; but the difficulty comes precisely from the view
of many Thomists that it is the precise formal constituent of
these personalities.
human
others who place the formal constitutive
existence itself, say that
relative subsistence
divine relations is constituted formally and
absolute divine subsistence, not indeed as
hardly leave a
persons-but as
possessed
contained by the divine relation itsel£.75 For
too the absolute divine subsistence which thus constitutes
personalities, is none other than the divine existence. 76
Many
Thomists, who differ from Billot on the formal
constitutive of created personality, at least according to authenticated modern research, 71 none the less retain a similar
manner of speaking in determining the divine personalities of
They sustain
divine absolute subsistence
is the whole reason of the subsistence of the divine relation,
Cf. Billot, De Verba lncarnato (Romae:
Thesis xi, p. 177 sqq.
Ibid. This follows from his concept of the formal constitutive of created
personality, which is placed in the act of existence Cf. op. cit., p. 139.
17 Cf. F. P. Muniz, 0. P., "El constitutivo
formal de Ia persona creada en la
tradicion tomista," in Ciencia Tomista, 70 (1945), pp. 5-89. G. Fraile, 0. P.,
Ciencia Tomista 67 (1944), pp. 129-199; R. Verardo, 0. P. in Divus Thomas
(Piacenza) 52 (1949), pp. 228 sqq. The import of these and other studies is that
the formal constitutive of personality in Capreolus (and the pre-Cajetan thomists)
is expressed by a real connotation of proper existence in the substantial nature,
by which it supports and holds that existence; not the act of existence itself.
75

76

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189

but that the relative opposition of the :relations one to the
other is the whole reason of their distinctness: so that the very
relativity of the subsisting relation is no more than a necessary
condition of its distinction from its relative opposite, and the
relation really and properly subsists by the absolute divine
subsistence. 78
Many other Thomists, largely after Cajetan, do not adopt
this expression. 79 They say that the divine relation subsists
precisely and formally, not by the common and absolute divine
subsistence, but by itself formally, in so far as it is a divine
relation. Through the divine nature and through its absolute
subsistence the divine relation has its own subsistence radically
but not formally; on the contrary, it itself vindicates to itself its
own subsistence in so far as it is a divine relation; that is, in so
far as it is a real divine relativity, it is a primary relative
reality, and a primary :relative personal reality. Thus the formal constituent of the divine relative personality is the divine
relativity itself, not simply as a relativity, not simply as divine,
but as a divine relativity. 80
If then, we say that that there is a positive communication of
the 'VVord to the assumed humanity in the formal line of personality, then we must accurately determine the exact proper part
of the Word, and the exact part of the common divine subsistence, in this communication. Neither Billot, nor the early
Thomists, nor Cajetan would contemplate any communication
other than of the Word and in the Word alone. 81 But their
explanations of what is the divine personality of the Word, can
in each case lead to difficulty concerning the mode of this
communication.
78 For a summary of these opinions Cf. A. Michel, in Dictionnaire de Theologie
Catholique, VII, coli. 159tO-l59t2, and Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, XV,
coli. 1814 sq.
79 Cf. Cajetan, in I, q. 40, a. 4, nn. 9-10.
80 Ibid., n. 9: " ... Et sic relatio ilia, non inquantum relatio (quia sic conveniret
omni relationi) sed in quantum illa, idest, in quantum res relativa hypostatica et
prima, constituit personam. . . ."
81 It is clear that theological explanation always follows and accepts the teaching
of the founts of divine revelation, proposed by the Magisterium.

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Billot and the early Thomists would invoke a formal communication in the line of the absolute divine subsistence. To
the objection that this involves a communication of the common divine essence and hence of the Three Persons, they
invoke the distinction outlined above concerning the divine
existence itself: the absolute subsistence has a dual formal
aspect, as pertaining to the divine nature, and as pertaining to
each of the three Persons" It is in the second way that they
ascribe it to the sacred humanity in the positive communication
of the hypostatic union.
however, has little need of this distinction, because
contemplates a positive communication of the proper distinct subsistence of the
formally and directly to
sacred humanity" If he posits at
a formal communication in
the line
the absolute subsistence, then he
make use
same distinction, between the absolute subsistence as common and belonging to the divine nature, and the absolute subdivine relative subsistence
sistence as belonging formally to
as
rooL
At first sight it would seem
any difficulty here is merely
an extension
the difficulty of which we have spoken already
concerning
divine existence,
is solved
every group of
Thomists with essentially the same distinction. However, there
are grounds for thinking that the difficulty here is deeper, precisely because of the explanation of Billot and of the early
Thomists"
consideration
the
subsistence as common and
belonging to the Three Persons, seems to be a consideration of
it as it is in itself. We add to this as a distinct formal considerdistinct
ation, the consideration of it as pertaining to
the view of BiHot and
the early
Person of the Word. But
Thomists,
subsistence, precisely according to
it is
the Word which
itself, constitutes the distinct subsistence
is its personality" Is it valid then to say that the consideration
itself, formally differs from the consideration of
of it as it is
it as it pertains to the Person of the Word? This difficulty
seems to be perfectly evaded by Cajetan; the
two views

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191

seem open to iL Hence we may suspect that there could be
here the root of a divergence later in extending the view of a
positive communication of the divine absolute subsistence to
a positive communication of the divine efficient premotion.
There is, however, a reply to the difficulty. It consists in
making dear what is meant by the absolute divine subsistence.
The early Thomists look on this as something prescjnding from
aU determined pertinence either to the divine nature as common, or to the divine relations as distinct. They know of the
Three Divine Persons from divine faith; and they accept as an
to this question the idenexplanation of sacred theology
the Three Divine Persons with the three
and
tification
distinct relations. 82 They have then, two distinct points
reference to which to refer their indeterminate concepts
divine absolute subsistence: either to
divine nature conceived as common, or to the divine relation conceived as distinct. Thus the common general notions of nature and person
to divine things appear to be the points of
a

tence, and the difficulty seems to be solved.
A parallel response could be made for those who
identify
absolute subsistence
the
ence. Again, a dual formal consideration would remain.
The
is that we can take as common Thomist
the satisfactory explanation of
the divine
and
absolute subsistence are communicated
to the sacred
can go on to use
as the
starting point of a possible extension to a communication of
the divine efficiency in the
alone.
Before we do so, we must sound one note of warning.
Despite all difficulties which could be raised, Thomist authors,
whatever their
explanations,
united
insisting
that the dual formal consideration of
existence
divine absolute subsistence is the conditio
qua non of any
82 Again, what is clear and common ground
among theologians is assumed and
accepted before particular theories which attemot to probe it further.

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

communication of them to the sacred humanity in and through
any one single Divine Person. VVc must therefore take as a
major premiss for the possible extension to the communication
of the divine reality under any other formal aspect, to the
sacred humanity in and through the Word alone, that no such
perfection canbe so communicated unless it too bears the same
dual formal consideration. We must find in any such perfection
under discussion a true pertinence to the Word, and to the
Word alone. It is distinctly possible that a false extension from
these premisses could be made if the initial difficulties of the
premisses themselves, and the basic explanations of the older
authors, are not fully appreciated.
We have now prepared the way for a direct discussion of
the problem of the exclusive causality of the Word in the
Incarnation. We can see in the light of the mind and principles
of St. Thomas what the mystery of the presence of the Word
to the sacred humanity involves; we can see its divine character, and its exclusive character. In this mystery of the
presence of the Word, St. Thomas has done nothing more
show us the harmony between the great mysteries of the Trinity
and the Incarnation; a harmony he has seen so clearly because
of his unqualified acceptance of each mystery-because he saw
as far as he could what it meant for a human reality to be the
Person of the Son of God, because he saw, again pro modulo
humano, what it meant for Three distinct subsisting divine
Persons to be One in the unity of the same divine nature.
From this mystery of the presence of the Word, St. Thomas
has, we believe, excluded any idea of an exclusive efficiency of
the Word. After resuming his teaching on this point, it will
now be our task to complete his picture of this presence, by
finding the ultimate reason which excludes from it this exclusive efficiency.

No exclusive infiuence: the teaching of St. Thomas.
We may now resume the direct teaching of Saint Thomas on
the divine efficiency common to the Three Divine Persons.

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WORD

193

The Angelic Doctor insists that every divine influence ad
extra always comes from the divine essence in so far as it is
something absolute, as from its principium quo. In the Prima
Pars the whole divine government and motion ad extra are
reduced to the divine providence and ultimately to the divine
will and science; these are clearly attributes of the divine
essence in so far a.s it is absolute. 83
Further, St. Thomas teaches that every divine efficient influence ad extra comes not merely from the divine essence as
absolute as from its principium quo, but from that essence as
common to the Three Divine Persons. The principle governing
St. Thomas' thought is none other than: Omnia sunt unum in
divinis ubi non obviat relationis oppositio; he merely insists
that where there is a question of the divine essence as absolute,
such a relative opposition cannot exist. 8 This doctrine is expressly applied to the human activity of the Word in the Tertia
Pars.85
Thirdly, St. Thomas goes on to teach that every divine
efficient influence, belonging as it does to the divine essence as
common as to its principium quo, belongs to the undivided
Deity as to its principium quod. Thus he says that " the divine
essence creates, governs and performs other functions of this
kind." 86 and that the creative divine action " is the work of
the divine essence, whence it is the work of the indistinct supposit, inasmuch as essence signifies that which is, as by the
4,

•• Cf. Sutnma Theol., I, qq. 14, 19,
passim.
•• Cf. Ibid., q. 45, a. 6: " .• creare est proprie causare, sive producere esse rerum.
Cum autem omue agens agat sibi simile, principium actionis considerari potest ex
actionis effectu: ignis enim est, qui generat ignem. Et ideo creare convenit Deo
secundum suum esse, quod est eius essentia, quae est communis tribus personis.
Unde creare non est proprium alieni personae, sed commune toti Trinitati ... "
•• We shall not attempt here the exegesis made by St. Thomas of the patristic
texts (Cf. note 41) concerning the premoving efficiency over the sacred humanity.
The conclusions of Cajetan, classic among thomists, express his mind: "Esse Redemptorem immediate est proprium Christi inquantum homo; ... Redemptio potest
attribui toti Trinitati ut primae causae." (In III, q. 48, a. 5, n. 1.)
•• Cf. I Sent., d. 5, q. I, a. 1: " ••• essentia divina creat, gubemat, et huiusmodi. •.. "

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

name " God." 87 The sense of this affirmation is neither that
the divine essence and not the Three Divine Persons is the
principium quod which acts ad extra, nor that the divine persons as distinct from one another are this principle, but that
the Three Persons, namely Father, Son and Holy Ghost, are
this principle inasfar as they are identical with one common
divine essence.88
It cannot be doubted then that the Three Persons equally
and with absolute indivision are the one divine principle which
acts ad extra. 89

No exclusive efficiency: the basic reason of St. Thomas.
The first two points we have outlined above from St. Thomas
depend on his concept of efficient causality itself. This notion
is well resumed by John of St. Thomas, when, in his Cursus
Philosophicus, he says:
Action as causality in the formality of causing is not a relation
but something absolute in the predicament of action.
Action formally is not the causality of an agent as it connotes
motion or order to the patient, although it includes it as it is
predicamental action; nor as it bespeaks becoming passively accepted on the part of the effect, but as it is the second act of the
87 Ibid., d. 29, q. 1, a. 4, ad 2: " ... est opus suppositi indistincti, prout essentia
significat id quod est, ut hoc nomine Deus."
88 Cf. Billuart, De Deo Trino (Parisiis: I876), p. 528. Cf. also M. Cuervo, 0. P.,
in Ciencia Tomista, 82 (I955) pp. 105-I28.
89 The Salmanticenses discuss the question, Tractatus Theologici, tom. iv, tract.
xvi, disp. 2, dub. 2, n. I9 sq. They are argning against two theologians of little
note, Carolus Franciscus Raconsi (Cf. Hurter, Nomenclator, tom. I, p. 408, not. I),
and Antonius de Ia Parra (cf. Ibid., tom. 2, col. 9). The question is "an Verbum
divinum praestet aliquem influxum activum specialem in hoc mysterium? " and
they reply: " ... pritno ... virtus per quam praestaret talem iufluxum, non est
absoluta, quia omne absolutum ·commune est tribus personis; nee relativa, tum quia
relatio ad intra non est virtus proxima influxus activi, sed intellectus et voluntas:
tum etiam quia relatio non constituit principium "quo, sed quod, operationis; ergo
nequit esse virtus qua praestet talem influxum. Secunda: nam virtus per quam
Deus proxime influit ad extra, est omnipotentia; ergo vel est eadem in Filio ac
in Patre, vel non? Si est eadem ergo influxus est idem. Si est diversa, ergo suut
tres omnipotentes" (n. 2I).

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WORD

195

agent, which is the emanation itself or the becoming actively taken
and according to the denomination " from." 90

If then the efficient causality of an agent, formally as such,
is something absolute, it follows that analogously the efficient
causality of the divine Agent is something absolute, and hence
is :reduced to the divine Essence as something absolute. If, too,
active efficient causality denotes the second act of an agent,
it follows that we may consider, all proportion guarded, the
active divine efficiency ad extra as the second act of the divine
Agent, which in God is nothing else than the unchangeable
divine essence', or the divine essence as immutable and absolute.
If, again, this causality denotes the second act o:f an agent
according to the denomination " from," it follows that the
divine efficiency is not only ascribed to the divine essence as
absolute, but also that it is ascribed to it precisely in the
denomination " from," that is, as to the principle from which,
(quo) , it comes. This is the basic reason for St. Thomas'
teaching on the unity of the principle quo of the divine
action ad extra.
The third point we made above from St. Thomas, namely
that this divine action must also be ascribed to the common
divine essence as its principle quod, the principle which produces it, and so cannot pertain to a distinct peroon to the
exclusion of the others, demands close investigation. From
what we have written concerning the divine existence and the
divine absolute subsistence, it is clear that this divine action,
and indeed the divine essence formally as its principium quo,
could in truth belong to a distinct person in this way, provided
it po;;sessed a twofold formal consideration: one as belonging
to the divine essence in itself as common, and another as be9 ° Cf. John of St. Thomas, Cursus Philosophicus, Philosophia Naturalis.
(ed.
Reiser) tom. ii, pp. 264-265. "Actio ut causalitas formalitate causandi non est
relatio sed aliquid absolutum, de p:raedicamento actionis .... Actio non est formalite:r causalitas agentis, secundum quod connotat motum, seu ordinem
passum,
licet illud includat, ut est actio praedicamentalis, neque ut dicit fieri ex parte
e:ffectus, passive acceptum, sed ut dicit actum secundum ipsius agentis, qui est
ipsa emanatio seu fieri active, et secundum denominationem 'ab '."

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

longing to the formal constitution of that divine Person. Hence
to penetrate into St. Thomas' negative attitude here, we must
show how and why such a twofold formal consideration is
impossible; we must see the reason why it cannot formally
pertain to the formal constitution of the Divine Persons.
\'Ve think the reason lies in the analogous application of the
universal concept of personality to
divine order. The mind
of all Thomist tradition is that action, efficient causality, indicates a perfection beyond the fully consituted order of being.
It is a perfection which does not belong to the constitution of
a nature in that complete and perfect mode of substantiality
which is personality; neither is it a perfection which places
that nature in a perfect state of existence. Supposing a nature
already complete in its species, personality, and existence, it
perfects it in a further and additional way which is called
accidental. It is the person which acts; but it is not by reason
of the personality, but by reason of its nature, that operation
may belong to it. By force of its nature the person has the
to further perfection which is operation"
as a person, by force of its personality, its potentiality is already
fully actuated by the act of actual existence. This is what is
meant when it is said thaf'it is a person which, properly speaking, acts, but according to its nature and by reason of its
nature. 91 The person, fully achieved in its formal constitution
already in the order of being, is the primum positum and the
radical supposition of the further order of operation.
When we speak, in divinis, of the divine absolute subsistence,
or of the divine existence, as going to make up divine personality in a formal way (either constitutively or integrally), we
are always speaking within the order of being; we are preserving the analogy with created personality which is fully achieved
formally in that order. ·But to suggest that the divine action
ad extra, or the divine essence as its principle quo, could bear
a twofold formal consideration, one as pertaining to the divine
nature, and the other as pertaining to the formal make-up of
"' Cf. Summa Theol., H, q. l!l, a. l, ad 4.

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WORD

197

the distinct divine persons, is to move outside the order of being
into the order of operation; it is no longer to preserve the
fundamental analogy in speaking of divine personality itself.
This, we think, is why Saint Thomas has constantly refused
to speak of a divine action ad extra, a divine efficiency ad extra,
which is proper and exclusive to one Divine Person.
We feel that this conclusion will stand, no matter what
division of thought among the followers of St. Thomas is preferred on the question of the constitution of the divine personalities. The restriction of the formal constitution of personality to the order of being is common to Thomism.
We believe then that there is no efficient divine influence
exclusive to the Word; we must now discuss the possibility of
a formal influence exclusive to Him.

III.

THE CoNCEPT OF FoRMAL Ac'I'UATION

BY THE WoRD.

We must now ask whether or not we may speak of a true
formal causality in the mysterious and hidden identity of the
sacred humanity of Christ with the Divine Person of the Word.
We must look into the wonderful conso1·tiu1n established between Christ's humanity and the Divine Word; we must investigate the way in which that humanity is perfected in
becoming the humanity of the Word.
A formal cause in the strict sense means intrinsic act determining and specifying material cause. Philosophers indicate
two kinds of formal cause: the substantial form, which is the
act of prime matter, and the accidental form, which is the act
of second matter. In each case we have an act received into
matter, into potency, and this act we call a form. Hence every
act received into potency, even though it be neither substantial
nor accidental form, may be called reductively a form, in so far
as it participates something peculiar to a form. In this way
existence, which is the act of essence, is called formal with
respect to its essence. We find therefore a twofold element in
formal causality: the element of perfectivity by intrinsic act

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

and perfection, and the element of Teception and limitation of
this perfection by the thing it perfects. 92
In the Mystery of the Incarnation, the divine Person of the
Word can in no way be called the substantial form
the sacred
humanity; nor is He an accidental form :received into that
humanity as in a subject: such ideas would be heretical. 93 N o:r
does the Personality of the Word come to the sacred humanity
exactly as created personality comes to its intellectual nature;
for created personality is in some way received and limited by
nature; and the Divine Personality of the Word can neither
be received nor limited, knowing neither limit or term in the
perpetual eternity in which it always is.
Thus it seems that there is no room for a formal causality on
the part of the Word in the mystery of the Incarnation.
Yet the opposite is true. And in attempting to grasp it, let
us remember that we are dealing with the highest mysteries of
Divine Revelation, and so we must not
limited
the
lowly modes and categories of earthly things,
must turn to
extensive
analogous amplifications of familiar concepts,
a feeble attempt to explain in some way the deep things of God.
Many commentators on Saint Thomas
spoken of a
causality
Word over the humanity of Christ,
present in that mysterious conjunction
which the Word and
the sacred humanity are one in the unity of Person. They
speak
a certain analogous mode of formal causality which
is sublime and supereminent. This is the thought of Cajetan,
Bannez, John of Saint Thomas, the Salmanticenses, Gonet and
Billuart; it is echoed among more recent writers by Del Prado,
Penido, Billot, Hugon, Michel, Garrigou-Lag:range, Daffara,
Ramirez, Gillon, and Corvez. 91 They propose this teaching as
Cf. Gredt, 0. S. B., Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae. (F:riburgi:
II, n. 751 sqq.; John of St. Thomas, Cursus Philosophicus, Philosophia
Naturalis, q. XI, a. II, p. 233 sqq.
•• Cf. Summa Theol., III, q. 2, a. 6.
nn. 15-16, on III, q. 4, a. 2, and es•• Cajetan, commenting on I, q. 12, a.
pecially on III, q. 17, a. 2, n. 18 sqq. We have already cited the other :references in
Note 25; to them we add the article of Pere L. B. Gillon, 0. P., in Dictionnaire de
92

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WORD

199

a profound contemplation of the mystery of God in human
flesh, entirely in accord with the thought of the Angelic Doctor.
These authors speak of a sublime, supereminent, analogous
mode of formal causality. In this mode, act or perfection is
said to perfect something distinct and other than itself in such
a way that it is in no way received by it; it is a pure perfectivity. The act is said to perfect the thing it perfects, without
depending on it in the exercise of its perfectivity; without, by
the fact of its perfectivity, forming with it a third nature;
without itself becoming more perfect by the fact that it perfects another. Hence this mode of formal cause retains everything which belongs to the element of perfectivity in commonly
conceived formal causality; while at the same time, it is entirely
cut off and purified from everything which savours of imperfection in this causality. Hence authors term this mode of
formal causality, "quasi-formal," 95 "reductively formal," 96 or
" in some way formal," 97 to show that it does not preserve all
the elements of common formal causality. It is also called pure
actuation, simpliciter perfective formal causality, purely terminative formal cause, to show the height of purity and nobility
which belongs to its way of perfecting; for it fulfills the offices
of a formal cause in a higher way. There are then likenesses
and unlikenesses between it and commonly conceived formal
Tkeologie Catholique, XV(!), 1946, coli. 659-660, which does not treat directly of
the Incarnation, but is most useful for the notion of pure formal actuation in St.
Thomas. The principal citation from Cajetan deserves at least partial transcription:
" Et quia humanitas Christi non est terminata propria personalitate, sed personalitate Verbi, ideo non convenit sibi actuari per existentiam. Et haec intellige, loquendo
de actuare et actuari per modum inhaesionis. Nam si de actuare et actuari infra
totam latitudinem suorum modorum sermo sit, non est remotum a philosophia divina
Deum posse actuare rem creatam. In cuius signum, divinam essentiam esse actum
cuiusque intellectus videntis ipsam, et theologi et philosophi · fatentur. Cum ergo
naturam humanam in Christo ex divina personalitate et esse divino perfici fateamur,
non est absonum fateri etiam, quod actuatur aliquo etiam modo per personalitatem
et esse divinum. . ...... Et ex hac personalitate communicata humanitati Christi,
perfecta est humanitas ilia multo plus quam quaecumque pars perficiatur per hoc
quod advenit suo toti; acquisivit enim perfectionem infinitam, acquirendo personalitatem infinitam .... " (III, 17,
n. 18.)
•• Cf. Billot, loc. cit.
•• Michel, loc. cit.
•• Cf. Ramirez, Zoe. cit.

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

causality; we can say that we are dealing with an analogous
mode of formal cause.
Our authors apply this notion of pure formal actuation to the
function of the Word in the Incarnation; but first of all they
show how it is applicable to the Deity itself.
Our minds can distinguish the concept of purely " perfecting," from the concept of "being received," which always
accompanies formal perfecting as we are accustomed to it in
the natural order. To have a concrete case of pure perfectivity,
of pure formal actuation, without any mixture of reception, our
minds demand that the form of act or perfection concerned be
absolutely and utterly perfect; further, that this form be so
perfect that it can be neither added to, nor taken from, by
being communicated to something else. Clearly, this perfection
can only exist in the Pure Act which is God. We can see then
the real non-impossibility of this mode of pure formal actuation
without any mixture of reception and dependence, if, by a
divine miracle, God Himself were to become immediately
present with His infinite perfection to something distinct from
and other than Himself, precisely as that thing's perfection.
This would in no way be repugnant to God, but would befit
Him in the highest degree in so far as He is the highest perfection; nor would it be a violation of the nature of the thing
perfected, but a mystery of unspeakable dignity and elevation.
In the Hypostatic Union, the Divine Personality ofthe Word
by which the humanity of Christ subsists, is that Pure Act
which alone can perfect by such a pure formal actuation. In
this union, although the Word is conjoined and communicated
to this humanity in an ineffable personal unity, It is in no way
received or limited, It is in no way restricted and It does not
inhere. On the one hand It leaves the sacred humanity integrally perfect as a nature and distinct and other from Its divine
self as a nature. On the other hand, It confers on it that
firmness, consistence, ontological completeness and standing
which the positive perfection of personality implies. The wonderful intimacy of the hypostatic union, or rather the very
identity of the humanity of Christ with the Word in indistinct

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WORD

201

personality, implies then a mode of perfecting on the part of
the Word, by which the Word, with the infinite perfection of
Its own divine personality, is immediately present to the assumed humanity and totally communicates Itself to that
humanity in the line of personality, leaving it at the same time
perfectly distinct and wholly integral as a nature, and not
Itself suffering any detriment by Its coming. This way of
perfecting is called by our authors a true mode of formal
causality; it is a pure formal actuation. 98
This view and this approach to the Incarnation may be illustrated by the likewise mysterious union of the blessed intellect
with the divine essence in glory. 99 The divine essence, which
the glorified intellect sees, is Pure Act. By the beatific vision,
this divine essence is joined to the glorified intellect by an
immediate presence in the intentional and intelligible order; it
replaces the intelligible species and the created verburn or term
of the vision; and so it is united to the mind in order to be its
positive perfection. It is not received as in a subjective potency;
it knows neither loss, nor mixture, nor limitation; but it comes
to the glorified mind to illustrate, determine, and perfect it
in an entirely pure way. It perfects the mind by a pure formal
actuation which is true formal causality.
Other examples, more concrete indeed, and therefore less apt
to express what must always remain mysterous, have been
proposed by our authors. They speak of the way the apex of
a pyramid terminates any line drawn on the surface of the
pyramid towards it; of light radiating through a transparent
medium; and of the ecstasy of the human soul, both in natural
rapture, and especially in mystical transforming union with
God.100 Just as the apex of the pyramid seems to perfect any
•• We have not found the phrase "pure formal actuation " as such in the authors
from whom we have worked. It seems however to express concisely the essence of
their concept: an actuation which belongs to formal causality, and which is purified
of all imperfection.
•• Cf. especially John of St. Thomas, Del Prado, and Ramirez, locis citatis.
10 ° For these metaphors-admittedly
deficient-d. Garrigou-Lagrange, loc. cit.
There is perhaps a hint of the metaphor of the transparent medium of St. Thomas,
IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a. 1. and De Verit., q. 8, a. I.

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

line which might be drawn towards it on the surface of the
pyramid, without being received into it or being changed by
it or perfected by it; just as the light of the sun resplendent in
transparent glass seems to perfect that medium with its own
dazzling splendour without being received or limited therein;
just as the object of a man's thoughts and love in human
ecstasy so occupies his mind and heart that he seems to become
that thing and to be graced with its perfection and beauty,
without that thing being changed or perfected itself; so also
in the mystery of the Incarnation, the divine Person of the
Word perfects without being in any way received or limited.
From this last example the view of our authors has been called
the " theory of ecstasy," in so far as it would contend that the
humanity of Christ is snatched up to the divine Person of the
Word in a singular ontological ecstasy of personality.
In the past decade, this view of so many eminent Thomists
has been subjected to many critiques. It has been said to be
inconsistent in itself, to take the real meaning out of the
mystery of the Incarnation, and to be foreign to the texts and
mind of the Angelic Doctor. 101 The difficulties raised against
it have been both speculative and historical; but principally
speculative.
The basic speculative difficulty is taken from the principles
expounded by Saint Thomas concerning the union of God with
creatures in general; it contends that all the inconveniencesand they are many-which St. Thomas shows to be present in
the pantheism of Almaric of Chartres are found again in the
101 This criticism has come chiefly from Dom H. M. Diepen, 0. S. B., Pere JeanHerve Nicolas, 0. P., and Father Adrian Hastings. Dom Diepen has published
many articles in the last decade on these matters, most of which have appeared in
Revue Thomiste; the following numbers should be consulted especially in the present
context: L (1950) pp. 112 sqq.; L (1950) pp. 291 sqq.; LID (1958) pp. 41 sqq.
Pere Nicolas' comments, also in Revue Thomiste, are by way of recension of this
work; Cf. LIII (1958) 427-428; and LV (1955) p. 182. Father Hastings has written
an English presentation of the case, with some original reflections, in DO'W'II8ide
Review, 1955, pp. 189-159. Other theologians have also noted the problem and its
nuances.

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WORD

203

theory of ecstasy. 102 Saint Thomas has indeed written that
God cannot be the act of any quiddity distinct from himself; 103
and yet this appears to be the cornerstone of the theory. Again,
Saint Thomas has clearly and rightly rejected the idea that
the Word and the sacred humanity might be parts of a composite resulting from the hypostatic union; yet the theory of
pure formal actuation in the Incarnation seems to make the
Word as it were a complement of the humanity of Christ,
seems to make it a perfection belonging to the humanity of
Christ, seems to postulate a whole, a totum, being formed
between the two, towards which the Word Itself would be in
potency. 104 Further, if a pure formal actuation of the sacred
humanity is sustained not only in the line of personality but
also in the line of existence, it seems difficult to preserve the
true notion of a temporal generation of Christ. For in this
case the Word, in uniting Himself to flesh, would not receive
a new existence, but a new mode of existing; and to receive
only a new mode of existing, and not a new existence, is not
generation but alteration. Finally, even if a true temporal
generation were sustained in this theory, the eternal God would
••• Dom Diepen has stressed this point many times. Cf. Revue Thomiate L
(1950) pp. 1U sqq.; L (1950) pp. 291 sqq; and LIII (1958) pp. 41 sqq. Pere
Nicolas mentions it on p. 428 of his 1958 note, cited above, and Father Hastings
on pp. 154-155 of his article. Dom Diepen always stresses the argument against
an actuation precisely in the line of existence. In our essay, we treat it from the
point of view of actuation in the real order, both of existence and personality.
Hence we have departed from the order of presentation used by him. His thought
may be gathered from the following condensation: "L'existence est le complement de !'essence creee. Mais L'Etre divin ne pent devenir le complement d'une
nature .•.. L'Existence est specifioo par !'essence, nons y reviendrons, forma dicitur
principium essendi. L'Etre divin aurait done nne cause quasiformelle. L'Existence
est terme de Ia generation .••• Sequetur quod sit terminus generationis, quod est
falsum, cum ipse sit aetemus. . . . Dirait-on, pour sauver Ia situation, que Ia
generation temporelle n'aboutit pas a nne etre neuf mais simplement a un nouveau
mode d'etre? Ce serait travestir l'idee de generation ... Entin, pour tout resumer,
!'existence, sans etre partie de I'essence, est pourtant quelque chose de Ia creature ....
Si Dieu est !'existence du Christ, en tant qu'homme, Dieu est quelque chose du
Christ en tant qu'Homme .•.. Deus in compositionem aliornm non venit." (1958,
pp. 42-8)
108 I Contra Gent., c. 27.
••• Ibid.

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

be its term: which seems impossible. These arguments are put
forward on their own intrinsic worth, and as the mind of St.
Thomas revealed in his texts.
Once the notion of pure formal actuation is clearly presented
according to the minds of the Thomists who speak of it, there
does not seem to be great intrinsic force in these arguments
against it. The inconveniences of Almarician pantheism come
from the compositive union of God with creatures, from the
reception and limitation of God by the creature; and this is
precisely what the theory of pure formal actuation avoids or
seeks to avoid by its very formulation. Perhaps the most
plausible of the arguments proposed is the insistence that there
is a true composition required for pure formal actuation; which
composition would be repugnant. This point has been seen
clearly by Ferrariensis 105 and dealt with extensively by John
of Saint Thomas. 106 The composition the latter sees between
the humanity of Christ and the Word actuating it, is called
composition as in number (secundum numerum), not composition as of parts (secundum partes). It is of the very essence
of composition according to number to leave the thing perfected whole and entire in its nature, rather, to suppose it fully
constituted in its nature. Moreover, this kind of purely perfective composition is not ordained to form a whole which is
106 Cf. Ferrariensis, commenting on this passage of the CG, nn. 8-9, " ....
Sed licet non oporteat id quo aliquid operatur tanquam complemento virtutis,
esse eius formam in essendo, oportet tamen ut aliquam cum ipso habeat unionem:
si enim esset omnino separatum, non posset esse illi ratio agendi. Nam et essentia
divina unitur intellectui Beati, inquantum utrumque est in anima; divina quidem
essentia sicut operans in ipsam intrinsece, quo modo dicitur Deus in rebus esse;
intellectus autem sicut eius proprietas." (n. 9) Perhaps the final phrase could be
used as a significant commentary on the expression of St. Thomas and the Fathers,
describing the sacred humanity as the instrumentum proprium et coniunctum
Verbi.
108 Cf. John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus, in I, q. 12: " ... Et appellatur
compositum ratione numeri, quando est compositio qua aliqua duo inter se communicant, sine ordinatione dependentiae ad unum tertium quod ex illis constituatur,
sed solum resultat quod alterum extremum maneat perfectum et attractum ad
esse alterius. Sic ergo . . . resultat communicatio unius extremi ad alterum, quae
est compositio ratione numeri . . ."

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WORD

20.5

greater and better than its parts, but produces a ' composite '
precisely by drawing the thing perfected to an already existing
and unchanging perfection. The only new reality which comes
from such a perfective union is the new relation and habitudo
of the perfection to the thing it now perfects. 107
The argument drawn from the veracity of generation in
Christ seems best answered by saying that we do not speak
univocally of earthly things and of the deep things of God.
The Word, in uniting Himself to flesh, acquires a new manner
of existing in the creature, and this is sufficient to verify analogously the idea of generation; although in other merely human
cases a new existence and not merely a new mode of existing
would be required. The Word is sufficiently made the term of
generation by being that to which the divinely generated humanity is drawn. This is the reply of Ferrariensis. 108
But the arguments objected to the theory of pure formal
actuation appear to have a basis in the texts and mind of St.
Thomas, especially in the Summa Contra Gentes where he
refutes the pantheism of Almaric. In his commentary on these
passages, we believe that Ferrariensis touches principles which
107 Cf. Ibid., "Et
ita cum natura humana conjungitur
Filio Dei,
non advenit novum esse personale; sed solum nova habitudo esse personalis
praeexistentis ad naturam humanam. Eodem modo, quando unitur esse intelligibile
increatum intellectui, non resultat aliqua tertia natura, sed nova habitudo ipsius
divinae essentiae ut intelligibilis, quatenus perficit illo esse intelligibili intellectum;
et sic resultat intel!ectum esse perfectum intelligibiliter, sicut in Incarnatione quod
humana natura sit terminata substantialiter."
108 Cf. Ferraricnsis
in I Cont. Gent., c. 9!6: " Dicitur quod, cum nondum sit facta
mentio de trinitate divinarum Personarum, loquitur hie Sanctus Thomas de
generatione secundum quod a philosophis accipitur.
Apud ipsos autem dicitur
aliquid simpliciter generari cum incipit in aliqua natura subsistere .... Hoc autem
in naturalibus est cum res simpliciter incipit esse novumque esse accipit .... Apud
theologos vero, aliquid incipit esse suppositum alicuius naturae et tamen non
incipit simpliciter esse, sicut suppositum divinum incipit esse suppositum humanae
naturae in eaque subsistere, et tamen non incipit simpliciter esse, cum aetemum
habeat esse. . . . Unde ilia propositio Sancti Thomae de mente philosophorum
assumpta, non est vera nisi aliquid accipiat novum modum essendi, sive novam
habitudinem, per hoc quod incipit esse suppositum alicuius naturae cuius prius
non erat suppositum. Quod sane apud philosophos, inferiora haec considerantes,
impossibile esset: apud theologos vero in Christo verum est. . . ."

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

are valid to explain satisfactorily everything St. Thomas says.
Ferrariensis tries above all to find out what St. Thomas really
means by the phrases he uses in the present context. Since we
always attribute to the Angelic Doctor a formal way of speaking, we must remember that in replies to difficulties and in
controversial writings he will look always to one formal point
of difficulty and reply; and to one formal difficulty he will
assign one formal reply. At times also he will use terms according to their ordinary meaning, in which they are clearly used
by those with whom he argues, and he does not therefore deny
that these terms may have a deeper analogous sense unsuspected by those whose opinions he now weighs. Hence, when
he says that God cannot be the act of any quiddity distinct
from Himself, or that God cannot come into composition with
other things, or that God cannot be the term of generation, or
that to receive a new manner of existing and not a new existence is not sufficient for generation, we believe that he is always
speaking according to the common signification of the terms
he uses; we can see no more than a use of these terms in the
common sense in which the pantheists had used them; we cannot believe that he is here excluding the much deeper sense
which might lie hidden in the terms when they are used in
an attempt to explain the divine secrets of the Hypostatic
Union. We believe then that the whole difficulty coming from
an apparent likeness with Almarician pantheism can be adequately answered by those who profess that there IS a pure
formal actuation in the Incarnation. 109
109 Father Garrigou-Lagrange has also treated the difficulty in his De Deo Uno,
where he speaks of the actuation of the divine essence in the beatific vision. He
follows the explanations of Ferrariensis. From a close textual study of the passages
where St. Thomas refutes Almaric and the closely related and equally inacceptable
views of David de Dinando, in the light of the passages on the beatific vision
where he seems to conceive the pure formal actuation, it could be suspected that
St. Thomas, by the propriety of his expression, framed his replies to the pantheists
so as to leave room for the further concepts of actuation; at least ihe texts taken
in strict sense objectively seem to leave such room. The works of G. Thery, 0. P.,
Autour du decret de 1210, I; David de Dinant (Le Saulchoir: 1925) and of Capelle,
idem, II, Amaury de Bene, (Paris: 1982) are of value in this study. We prefer
however to restrict ourselves to the traditional reply of Ferrariensis.

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207

A second difficulty alleged against our theory is the danger
of monophysitism. If the sacred humanity is so actuated, it
must then be lacking in what goes to make a true human
nature. This is urged especially against those who hold such
an actuation in the line of existence. Its existence, it is said,
cannot be truly human, unless it be determined, specified and
exercised by a human essence which limits
To say with the
theory of ecstasy which sustains a pure formal· actuation :in
the line -of existence, that there is in Christ no such created
human existence, seems to rob Christ of any existence at all,
or to place a phantasmal Christ with a human nature lacking in
a human existence. 110
This difficulty was well known to the classical commentators
of the Thomist school, and is treated by Cajetan 111 and by John
of Saint Thomas. 112 They reply by defending the possibility of
created personality and
supplying the positive perfections
created existence by the divine transcendent perfection, which
and formally contains
perfection these
created things imply. We feel that the possibility
supplying
human personality
the Divine Person of
Son
God, can, in the case of Christ, hardly be denied while the
faith defined at Chalcedon remains intact. 113 It
even
seem to be implicitly taught by the Gospels themselves. The
11

° Cf. Diepen, art. cit., (1953), p. 46.

Cf. Cajetan, commenting on Summa Theol., III, q. 17, a. 2: " ... quoniam ex
assnmptione ad divinum esse perfecta est potentialitas ad existentiam Ionge excellentius quam fuisset per propriam existentiam; sicut posse personari in propria
persona Ionge excellentius perfectum est per personam Verbi quam fuisset perfectum
per propriam personalitatem."
112 Cf. John of St. Thomas, loc. cit.
113 Of the Chalcedon definition Pope Pius XII wrote in the encyclical Sempitemus
Rex Christus: ". . . Chalcedonensi definitione, vocibus personae et hypostasis
eadem notio subicitur; nomini autem naturae alia vis inest, neque unquam eius
significatio pro illis nominibus sumitur."
(AAS 43 (1951) pp. 635-636). In
accordance with this definition of Chalcedon, we must hold that the sacred humanity
is not a human, but a Divine Person, that of the Word made flesh; and we must
also hold that the Divine Person of the Word can take the place of a connatural
human person by the miracle of the Incarnation. This supplying by the divine
Person, seems necessarily to demand a supplying of personality.
111

KEVIN F. O'SHEA

possibility of supplying created human existence by the divine
existence is at present a matter of dispute; 114 we shall not enter
here into the controversy, being content to speak of the divine
actuation in the line of personality itself, which must remain
unassailed by the present objection. 115
A third difficulty brought against the Thomist theory of pure
formal actuation is drawn from the Thomist teaching on the
analogy of being. If the divine act can actuate the humanity
of Christ, and actuate it in its proper constitution as a real
being (that is, in the line of personality), the divine act seems
to belong equally to two different natures, in a proper way,
and so the way appears to be open to univocity of being, or at
least to univocity between the divine nature and the human
nature of Christ. 116 Once again, we think that when the concept
of pure formal actuation is grasped, there is little force in the
objection: the divine act comes to the assumed humanity in
such a way that it leaves it wholly and perfectly constituted
as a nature. 117
A fourth difficulty often alleged against the theory of pure
formal actuation comes from the difficulty of assigning its
proper formal effect. For this effect must be either created or
uncreated. If it be created, it would not come formally from
·God but efficiently, and this would destroy the whole idea of
actuation. If it be uncreated, it cannot be received by a created
quiddity, even by a composition secundum numerum, because
what is uncreated can be caused in no genus of cause.118
110 In entering the question of the divine actuation
as such in the real order,
we have none the less touched very closely the question of the act of existence in
Christ. Since, as will be seen, we shall uphold the divine actuation in the line
of subsistence, and see no difficulty in defending its applicability to the real order,
the whole question for us in this: in the absolute power of God, can a created
essence exist without existing by its connatural created act of existence?
115 This will be sufficient for the purposes of the essay; we shall be content to
show that the Word truly has a unique causal influence over His sacred humanity,
and we can do this without entering directly the controverted question of Christ's
existence.
116 Cf. Diepen, art. cit. (1951!), pp. 45 sqq.; Hastings, art. cit., pp. 156-157.
117 Cf. John of St. Thomas, loc. cit.
118 We have proposed the argument as given in John of St. Thomas.
We think

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209

Cajetan and John of Saint Thomas, in reply, both insist that
the formal effect is strictly and properly uncreated, although by
participation it is created and in time. 119 For them pure formal
actuation consists most formally in the identification of the
thing perfected with the thing which perfects, according to the
order in which the actuation and communication take place;
an identification, indeed, which means the transformation of
the thing perfected into the thing which perfects in the precise
order of the actuation. In this way, in the beatific vision, the
glorified mind becomes intelligibly and intentionally God Himself; and in the hypostatic union the humanity of Christ becomes personally the Divine Word. Both, truly, are transcendent mysteries; yet they do not seem to involve contradictions.
They even have a feeble parallel in the natural order, where
the soul, through the intellect, is and becomes quodammodo
omnia. 120 We shall return to this difficulty in discussing the
mind and texts of Saint Thomas.
it is this difficulty that Pere de Ia Taille has raised in his articles on created
actuation by Uncreated Act; Cf. our note 24. Although we here propose the
teaching of Cajetan and John of St. Thomas, and not that of de Ia Taille, none
the less we acknowledge that in defending the idea of an actuation in the Incarnation, we are at one with what we believe was de Ia Taille's ·basic insight into the
mystery. We disagree in explaining how this was brought about, we do not reject
the basic truth which both explanations try to penetrate and 00 xplain. For an
analysis of the position of de Ia Taille in the light of Thomist teaching, see
T. U. Mullaney, 0. P., The Thomist XVII (1954) pp. 42 sqq.
We have thought that this difficulty was prominent in the mind of Diepen
from the outset of his critique on Cajetan's position. In suggesting, from the
first, (cf. 1950, p. 116) that in speaking of a "sustaining" of the sacred humanity
by the divine esse, the thomists were in reality departing from formal causality
and speaking of efficient, he seems to have assumed the impossibility of an uncreated
formal effect: which, for ns, is not proved.
119 Cf. Cajetan,
loc. cit., q. 2, a. 7 (concerning the nncreated personal identity);
John of S. Thomas, loc. cit.: " Et sic effectus formalis qui resultat, est increatus
formaliter: sed participative communicatio eius creata est, et in tempore; sicut enim
ex unione Personae divinae, resultavit hunc hominem esse subsistentem in. persona
increata, sibi tamen creato modo communicata: ita ex unione divinae essentiae
ad intellectum, resultat esse intelligibiliter deificatum intellectum, modo tamen
creato et finito; immo est ipsemet Deus intelligibiliter talis intellectns, eo modo
quo cognoscens dicitur ipsnm cognitum intelligibiliter, et quasi transformative."
12 ° Cf. De V erit., q. 2, a. 2.

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

A last speculative difficulty raised against the actuation
theory would concede the explanations given, including that
of the uncreated formal effect, in the intentional order, but
refuse to admit its validity in the real order. 121 It concedes the
validity of the theory to explain the union of the glorified mind
with the divine essence; here the whole mystery is summed up
in saying that the blessed intellect intelligibly is God; there is
nothing more to be said. But in the real physical ontological
order of the Incarnation, actuation does not seem to cover the
whole case: the whole mystery does not consist in the fact that
the flesh of Christ becomes personally the very Son of God,
but it implies-even chiefly implies-that the Son of God
appropriates to Himself the humanity thus hypostatically
united to Him, that He is made the subject of attribution of
everything which belongs to that nature, that He is constituted
the true quod and agent of that nature, without thereby suffering any detriment. The
of actuation would then be
inadequate to explain the fullness of the mystery; and it could
even be alleged that it would be invalidly applied to explain
any aspect of it, in so far as the added concept of the perficient
appropriating to itself and acting through the thing perfected,
seems incompatible with what essentially and totally consists in a transformative identity of the perfected with the
perficient. 122
How then could we express the core of the mystery of the
union? Relinquishing the theory of pure formal actuation, we
could speak ·of an appropriation or integration of the sacred
humanity by the Person of the Word. The entering of the
humanity into personal union with the Word would imply, not
121 Cf. Diepen, art. cit., (1953), where much more is made of this point than
previously.
122 In an attempt
to extend the thought of Diepen to the entire order of real
actuation, and not merely leave it in the order of existence, we have ourselves
formulated this critique. We think there is some basis for saying that it has been
inspired by what he has written, although we do not propose it directly as his
express view. Cf. what he writes in his 1953 article on pp. 5S-56, and 49-51,
treating of the impossibility of actuation in the line of subsistence, and of the
way of conceiving the mystery of the personalisation of Christ.

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY QF THE WORD

Ul

a perfectivity of the humanity by the Word, but a coaptation
of the humanity to the Word, which would elevate it to the
personal dignity of the Word without direct actuation, and
further imply the capacity of the Word to act through the
humanity It thus possesses, and to perform through it a human
activity which would be truly the human activity of the Word.
Where the union is bilateral, and implies not only an elevation
of the inferior, but a possessive acquisition by the superior,
the conc_ept of actuation is said to fail; and another concept,
that of a real possessive relationship, is substituted for it.
We shall reserve our comments until we come to a direct discussion of Saint Thomas.
To complete the picture of the theory of actuation and all
it implies, we must mention several historical difficulties raised
against it in as far as it might be ascribed to Saint Thomas.
First, the disputed question De Unione Verbi Incarnati,
to-day accepted by historians as authentic and written in the
last years of Saint Thomas' life, contains passages which seem
to indicate a twofold existence in Christ, one divine and another
human, and so seems to preclude any idea of a divine actuation
in the line of existence. 123 Some have thence argued that the
entire concept of pure formal actuation is foreign to the mind
of the Angelic Doctor, at least in its application to the mystery
of the Incarnation. In view of the uncertainty of the texts,
date of composition, and interpretation, we shall make no
comment on the actuation in the line of existence; but shall
confine our treatment to that in the line of personality itself.
128 The work of F. Pelster, S. J., published in Archives de Philasophie Ill (1925)
pp. 198-245. La Questio Disputata de Saint Thomas De Unione Verbi Incarnati,"
is fundamental in this accepted modern view. Other bibliographical indications
can be found in Diepen's article, Revue Thomiste 1950, p. 297, note 1, where
the views of Cajetan, Billot, Mandonnet, Synave, Roland-Gosselin, d'Ales, and
Garrigou-Lagrange are cited. It would be interesting to know whether this work
comes before or after the Tertia Pars. It seems almost impossible to know. Father
Hastings in his article cites Mandonnet and Grabmann, and Chenu with some
probability, for the view that it is before the Tertia Pars; and Pelster, Synave,
and Glorieux for the view that it is later. The question of the interpretation of
this work is even more important, and in a sense even more difficult. Cf. M.
Corvez, 0. P., in Revue Thamiste 1956, pp. 413-426.

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

A similar difficulty comes
the position
the Compendium Theologiae in the historical development of
teaching of St. Thomas on the Incarnation. Historians nowadays are
inclined to date it before the
Pars
the Summa; and so
it cannot be used as some
attempted to use
as a reply
to the apparent position of the
Unione. 124
can side-step
this point, as we concern ourselves only
actuation in the
line of personality.
a twofold existearly Thomists have
Again, some of
ence in Christ; 125
this too is a difficulty if we uphold an
actuation precisely in the line
existence. Again, it
no
direct bearing on our approach.
A final historical difficulty, which argues
our intenapparently knew of pure
tion, is this: Saint Thomas,
formal actuation and used it in
of the beatific
seems never to have expressly applied it to
mystery?
Was it because he considered it inapplicable to
On the other hand, whenever he describes this mystery, he
causality,
seems to depart
and to prefer the formula
possession
concepts of appropriation
by
as its Personal
IS
reason for this preference?
In the light of the beauty of the Thomist view sustaining
pure
actuation in the mystery of
Incarnation, and
the light
the
coming from some
arguments
brought against
we
now turn to Saint Thomas
and see what pure formal actuation signifies
he stands concerning its application to
124 Cf. Hastings,
article quoted. After this article there has recently appeared
an erudite study on the matter by R. Guindon, 0. M. I., in Revue de
d'Ottawa, 26 (1956), pp. 193-214-whose conclusion we have resumed. He cites
Backes, Mandonnet, Synave, Grabmann, Lottin, VValz, Motte, Dondaine and
Chenu.
125 Pelster
in his article has collected the evidence among the early thornists,
stressing Hervaeus Natalis. Reference is made to this by Diepen, 1950, p. 295
(without much emphasis), and by Hastings.

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WORD

fllS

We may state at the outset that we think that the view of the
classic commentators of the Thomist school is a faithful and
penetrating interpretation of the thought of their Master; and
that we believe we can find in it a solution to the problem of
the exclusive causal influence of the Person of the Word over
the human activity of Christ.

The idea of pure formal actuation in Saint Thomas.
Saint 'Thomas has expressly taught the idea of pure formal
actuation in treating of the union of the divine essence with
the intellect of the blessed. In the beatific vision he teaches the
absence of every created intelligible species, which is repugnant
to that vision because it is absolutely useless to express and
represent the infinite and uncreated perfection of God. N"one
the less, he is aware that this vision demands some union of the
intellect with the divine essence itself in the intentional and
intelligible order, just as in natural understanding there can
be no act of intellection unless the object to be understood
is first united to the knowing subject. It is necessary therefore
for Saint Thomas to describe and explain this union which he
demanded between the mind of the blessed and the essence of
God, and from which he excluded every created mean. The
difficulty was to find a kind of union which while remaining a
true union, would exclude every trace of imperfection and
would be sufficient to determine the created intellect to see
the very essence of God.
St. Thomas treats the point several times, 126 but does not
appear to reach his definite formulation before the third book
oi the Summa Contra Gentes. In the fourth book of Sentences,
where his real originality is to seek for a solution in the terms
of the philosophers, 127 he looks to the two parts of his problem
separately. First he asks can such a union of the divine essence
with the mind be explained at all. To this he says that the
••• The chief places are IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, aa. 1, 6; De VMit., q. 8, a. 1;
III Cont. Gent., c. 51; Summa Theol. I, q. 12, a. 2. To these texts could be added
others before the IV Sent., namely III Sent., d. 14, q. I, a. 1; Quodlibet 7, q. I, a. I.
••• Cf. Pere Gillon, art. cit. coli. 659-660.

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

divine essence is related to the intellect " as a form " (ut
forma) not because it forms an unum simpliciter with it, but
because its proportion to the intellect is as the proportion of
form to matter. In support of this he quotes a principle of
Averroes, stating that whenever two things, of which one is
more perfect than the other, are received into the same subject,
the proportion of the more perfect to the less perfect is as the
proportion of form to matter. This is a reference to the mode
of union of the intellect with separate substance, proposed by
the Arab philosophers, namely a mode of simple copulation or
conjunction. 128 It might be doubted whether the force of St.
Thomas' thought lies in the Averroistic principle, or rather
in the direct proportion of one thing to the other as its greater
perfection, without any reference to reception; at all events this
is hardly a definitive solution to the problem, In answer to the
second part of his problem, Saint Thomas shows that such a
union is sufficient to determine the blessed mind to understand
the divine essence, by sayin'g that the object united to the
mind, namely God himself, is absolutely above all matter and
may be called a pure form, a forma tantum, capable thereby of
determining the intellect.
These two distinct questions of the Commentary on the Sentences are reduced to one in the De Veritate. 129 A single reply
is sufficient to show the nature of the union, and its sufficiency
to determine the mind to see God. The divine essence is related
to the intellect as a form (ut forma); and the reason seems to
lie in the proportion of one element to the other, which is said
to be like the proportion of form to matter. 130 And the basic
128 Cf. Gillon, Ibid.
Capreolus, in III Sent., d. 5, q.
a. 1, tertia conclusio,
ed. Paban-Pegues, p. 65, quotes this principle and seems to hinge his case on it:
"Quandocumque duo principia unius operationis, vel concurrentia sicut unum
perfectum principium unius operationis, habentia se ut formalius et actualius,
et minus actuale et formale, recipiuntur in eodem susceptivo, unum eorum se
habet ad aliud quasi forma ad materiam, vel actus ad potentiam." The later commentators have not used the principle.
129 De Verit., q. 8, a. 1.
180 Ibid., "Non autem oportet quod ipsa divina essentia fiat forma intellectus
ipsius, sed quod se habeat ad ipsum ut forma; ut sicut ex forma, quae est pars

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF l'HE WORD

215

:reason which establishes this proportion is that the divine
essence is itself a pure form, a forma tantum. Again there are
indications that St. Thomas has not yet reached a final answer
to the difficulty; there seems a conscious attempt in the reply
to the sixth argument to determine more accurately what the
proportion is that establishes the likeness to that between
matter and fo:rm.131
The approach to the question just seen in the De V eritate is
preserved in the Contra Gentes. The two parts of the problem
are treated as one; Ferrariensis resumes them thus: " But
against this conclusion St. Thomas places a doubt. For that
by which the intellect understands something, is the form of
the intellect reducing it into act. But the divine essence is
per se subsisting and cannot be the form of anything, as was
had in the first book ... " 132
Saint Thomas begins
reply with the distinction we have
rei, et materia e:fficitur unum ens actu, ita, licet dissimili modo, ex essentia divina
et intellectu creato fiat unum in intelligendo, dum intellectus intelligit, et essentia
divina per seipsam intelligitm. Qualiter autem esseutia separata possit conjungi
intellectui ut forma, sic ostendit Commentator in III de Anima. Quandocumque
in aliquo receptibili duo quorum unum est altero perfectius, proportio perfectioris
ad minus perfectum est sicut proportio formae ad suum perfectibile; sicut lux est
perfectio coloris, quando ambo recipiuntur in diaphano. Et ideo, cum intelledus
creatus, qui inest substantiae creatae, sit imperfectior divina essentia in eo existente,
comparabitur divina essentia ad ilium intellectum quoddammodo ut forma . . .
quodammodo essentia divina, quae est actus purus, quamvis habeat esse distinctum
omnino ab intellectu, e:fficitur tamen ei ut forma in intelligendo. Ideo dicit
Magister in II, dist. ii, Sententiarum, quod unio corporis ad animam rationalem
est quoddam exemplum beatae unionis spiritus rationalis ad Deum."
'" 1 Ibid. ad 6um: " ... proportio, proprie loquendo, nihil est aliud quam habitudo
quantitatis ad quantitatem, sicut quod aequalis sit una a!teri vel tripla; et exinde
translatum est nomen proportionis, ut habitudo cuiuslibet ad rem alteram proportio nominetur; sicut dicitur materia esse proportionata formae inquantum se
habet ad formam ut materia eius (italics ours) non considerata aliqua habitudine
quantitatis. . . ." This hint is perhaps reflected in the ad 15 of the same
article: ". . . intellect us creatus nunquam pertingit ad essentiam divinam, ut sit
eiusdem naturae cum ea; pertingit tamen ad ipsam ut ad formam intelligibilem."
(italics ours) .
132 Cf. Ferrariensis
in HI Cont. Gent., c. 51.: "Sed contra hauc conclusionem
movet Sauctus Thomas dubium. Id enim quo intellectus aliquid intelligit, est forma
intellectus per quam fit in actu. Sed divina essentia est per se subsistens, et
nullius potest esse forma, ut in primo libro habitum est ... "

216

KEVIN F. O'SHEA

already seen to be basic in his mind on the problem: sc., that
between a forma which is a pure form, a forma tantum, and a
form which is not a forma tantum. But here he makes express
a new condition he had not previously put forward explicitly:
for something to be as a form (ut forma) to something else, not
only must it be a forma tantum, but: " However, that which
is so subsisting that it is yet from above, can be the form of
something else provided that its being be such that it can be
participated by something else." 188
He demands a sharing, a participation in the one common
esse by force of the very union effected between the two. With
his conditions then placed, he goes on to show in the vision of
the divine essence the verification of all the conditions needed
for such a thing to happen.
We believe that what the Angelic Doctor here describes is
nothing else than the pure formal actuation realised by Cajetan,
John of St. Thomas and the Thomist commentators who follow
them. But there is more in the conditions laid down here by
the Master than we might think. Are we to say that the proper
function of the pure form, the forma tantum, in this actuation
is to communicate to another its own esse? We do not think
so. From the parallel references in this chapter of the Contra
Gentes/ 84 and from the analogy of Saint Thomas' explanation
of the function of the intelligible species in knowledge, we think
rather that what the actuating form most properly gives, is
a share in its own .proper formal perfection; which formal perfection, as shared, is the proper reason why the thing perfected
can share with the thing which perfects its own peculiar and
proportionate esse. And if we ask further, what is it fGr the
actuating thing to be for the thing actuated the formal ratio
of its share in the same esse, without there being a tertium quid
formed between the two natures, then we think we must appeal
133 III Cont. Gent., c. 51: "Illud tamen quod sic est subsistens ut tamen solum
sit forma, potest alterius esse forma, dummodo esse suum sit tale quod ab aliquo
alio participari possit."
u• Especially the reference to II Cont. Gent., c. 68--the teaching of the union
of soul and body.

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WORD

217

to what may be called a tmnsformative identity of the thing
actuated with the actuating perfection in the order of the esse
communicated. 135 Thus in the mystery of the union of the
glorified mind with God, the mind becomes through the union
intentionally and intelligibly God Himself; God Himself in
the perfection of His own form is the formal reason for the
mind's sharing with Him in the one divine intelligible esse. To
sum up, then, the deep thought of Saint Thomas here seems
to propose four elements which go to make up the actuation;
namely
l) that there be some esse in which the actuating form and
the thing perfected can share;
2) that the actuating form be in itself a pure form, a forma
tantum at least in the order of the esse to be communicated;
3) that the actuating form be to the thing actuated its
formal reason for its share in the esse communicated to it;
4) that the
perfected become
actuating form
a
transformative identity in the order of the esse communicated.
And these four elements are connected; the first seems to be
a conditio sine qua non for the actuation; the second the root
and source and ultimate explanation of its possibility; the third
and fourth express its formal essence, the third m a more
135 We have
taken the adjective "transformative" from three sources. First,
from the general concept of formal causality which all authors holding the actuation have preserved; secondly, from a phrase of St. Thomas, in Summa Theol., I,
q. 12, a. 5, ad 3: " ... dispositio ad formam ignis non potest esse naturalis, nisi
habenti formam ignis. Uncle lumen gloriae non potest esse naturale creaturae, nisi
creatura esset naturae divinae, quod est impossibile. Per hoc enim lumen fit
creatura rationalis de:iformis ... " To become deiform, is in some sense transformative; and to become deiform is what the actuation achieves, in a far higher way
than by the objective participation of the lumen gloriae. Finally, there is the
expression of John of St. Thomas, loc. cit.: speaking of the intellect under the
divine actuation, he says "immo est ipsemet Deus intelligibiliter, talis intellectus,
eo modo quo cognoscens dicitur ipsum cognitum intelligibiliter, et quasi transformative.'' We shall later make one reserve on this when applying the notion to the
Incarnation.

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

general way, the fourth more definitely. Thus the thought of
our Doctor is that pure formal actuation consists radically and
fundamentally in the pure perfection of the form which in the
order in which it is communicated is nothing but form; while
essentially it consists in the transformative identity by which
the thing perfected becomes the perfecting form in the order
in which it is communicated, so that the formality of the perfecting form is the reason for the community in esse. We may
say then, that, since such a form cannot be conceived except it
be the divine Pure Act, pure formal actuation is a quasiproperty or proper passio of this Pure Act as such. This represents the perfection--or perhaps the perfect explication--of St.
Thomas' previous writing on this point,
no longer betrays
any dependence on the Arabian concept of simple copulation·.
with separate substance. 136
Finally in Question 12 of the Prima Pars St. Thomas returns
to this teaching, without great modification. It is interesting
to note that here he wishes to put forward his teaching under
the patronage of Pseudo Dionysius, and refers definitely to the
Dionysian doctrine of the essential transcendence of the divine
order. In reply to the third difficulty, he writes: " ... the divine
essence is existence itself. Hence as other intelligible forms
which are not their own existence are united to the intellect
by means of some existence by which they inform the intellect
and make it in act, so the divine essence is united to the created
intellect as the object actually understood, making the intellect
in act through Itself." 187
This is a simple statement of the position which was gradually worked out in the previous works. We have but two comments. St. Thomas seems to look more and more on this kind
188 The Averroistic formula is no longer cited, and the whole case rests on the
entirely Thomist concept of God as Pure Act, and on the concept of real
communication.
187 Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. H!, a.
ad 8.: " ... divina essentia. est ipsum esse.
Unde sicut aliae formae intelligibiles quae non sunt suum esse, uniuntur intellectui
secundum aliquod esse, quo informant ipsum intellectum et faciunt ipsum in actu,
ita divina essentia unitur intellectui creato ut intellectum in actu, per seipsum
faciens intellectum in actu."

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WORD

219

of actuation as something proper to the divine, to the order
where essence and esse are one; and, by that very fact, he makes
less insistence on the part played by esse in the actuation
itself. What he would really demand, we believe, as the condition of the actuation is a real communicability of the form
in the order of the actuation; the share in esse, precisely because it is in the divine order, will be a share in an esse identified divinely with the divine actuating form, not a share in an
esse distinct from the form which actuates. 138
We have then the essentials of St. Thomas' notion of pure
formal actuation. 139 We can express them in the following
schema:
Pure formal actuation:
its conditio sine qua non: real communicability of the perficient
in the line of some positive perfection.

its root and principle of explanation: the fullness of perfection
of the divine Pure Act.
138 It is here, perhaps, that the full force of the Thomist synthesis is seen.
Not
only does the case rest on the idea of God as the Actus Purus, but also on the
concept of Him as lpsum Esse Subsistens: so that His subsistent esse is the reason
for His divine ability to perfect, and is the reason why He is communicable precisely and strictly as a formal actuation: He is the esse which can be given to
another.
130 We believe that St. Thomas
has thus come to a concept of pure formal
actuation which is objectively valid in general, and contains no mere limitation to
the order of the beatific vision. It is interesting to note that a contemporary
writer, the Franciscan John Peckham, seemed to interpret his thought in this way,
even if he did not agree with it: he writes: " dicunt aliqui, quod ad visiouem
Dei non plus requiritur quam dispositio mentis per lumen gloriae, quo facto,
videt Deum Qui per se ipsum informat intellectum sicut praesens non inhaerens.
Contra: oculus corporalis bene dispositus non videt colorem etiam praesentem, nisi
informet pupillam similitudine sua. Amplius, dicat quod lux increata est forma
intellectus gloriosi informando eum quodammodo active. Quaero: utrum ex ista
informatione activa relinquatur aliqua formatio passio? Si non, nihil fit in intellectu
et non videt. Si sic, non est passio sine aliquo immisso ipsi passo et ita habeo
(Cf. Antonianum, 81
propositum: hoc enim dico similitudinem supradictam."
(1933), p. 452). It is interesting to see so early, not merely the general sense of
formal actuation so clearly seen, but also the difficulty we believe basic to the
whole concept. Cf. our note ll8. Cajetan could have replied to Peckham that
there was something immissum into the intellect: the uncreated formal effect of
the actuation.

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

its essence, expressed
in a more general way: that the perficient to be formal
ratio of the sharing in the positive perfection communicated to the thing perfected;
in a more definite way: that there be a transformative
identity of the thing perfected into the thing that perfects, in the line of the positive perfection communicated. 140

In first speaking of pure formal actuation, we called it a
certain analogous mode of formal cause. It is clear now that
it both resembles and differs from the commonly known formal
cause; and it is important to clarify the analogy.
First of all, the condition of actuation, namely the communicability of the perficient according to some positive perfection,
hints at a manner of existing on the part of the perficient itself
by which it is not closed in itself, but open as it were to communication to another. Thus it becomes in the actuation a true
principle of the communication of its perfection to what it
perfects. In this way it bears a certain and clear likeness to
commonly known formal cause, which demands as a condition
on the part of the perficient such an open manner of existing.
Secondly, both the purely actuating form and the commonly
140 We may perhaps add to this description two further
points, which may be
put down as conveniences of the notion. First, as actuation is a quasi-property of
the supreme good, which is diffusive of itself in a supreme way, we may think
that the actuation is greater and more befitting the actuating form when what is
actuated is the more humble. In this way, is it not in some ways a greater
actuation when given to human nature, than if it were given to angelic nature
hypostatically assumed? Secondly, we should not forget that the idea of "divine
form " for St. Thomas " competit nominibus propriis Filii tripliciter. Filius enim
est qui generatur, et finis generationis est forma. Et ideo ut ostendatur perfectus
Dei Filius, dicit ' in forma' quasi habens perfecte formam Patris. Similiter verbum
non est perfectum, nisi quando ducit in cognitionem naturae rei; et sic verbum Dei
in forma Dei dicitur, quia habet naturam Patris. Similiter nee imago dicitur
perfecta, nisi habeat formam cuius est imago." (In Ad. Phil., c. 2, lee. 2) . Appropriatively, there is something special in having a formal actuation-and an Incarnation-of the Word. Cf. Cajetan's beautiful remark on lll, q. 8, a. 8 (n. I):
" ... supra participationem divini Verbi, in qua propria perfectio hominis secundum
mentem consistit, convenientissime apponitur ut ipsum Verbum Dei personaliter
uniatur naturae humanae, ut consummata sit hominis perfectio; ut scilicet quae
inchoatur in participatione ipsius Verbi humana perfectio, consummetur non in
participatione, sed in personali adeptione ipsius Verbi." (Italics ours.)

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WORD

known form derive all their power to perfect from the fullness
of perfection already inherent in them.
Thirdly, we must investigate the likeness between the two in
the very essence of the formal causality displayed in each.
For there is a difficulty, and a grave one: in pure formal actuation, the essence of the causality consists in the
tive identity of the thing perfected with the perfecting form;
but in commonly known formal causality, although the form
is the formal ratio of the sharing of the perfection given, there
is no transformative identity established between the form and
its matter. The difference is clearly in the different union between the perfecting form and the thing perfected; the commonly known form is received by a receptive union into matter,
and the divine actuating form is united by a
identity to the thing it perfects. But therein lies the real
problem: if the union in each case is diverse, do the causality
and the perfecting really remain similar? Wherein precisely
lies the analogy between the received form and the actuating
form precisely as formal causality? And if it
only an
analogy, how can formal causality be yet considered as an
ultimate specific type of causality?
We think we can solve the difficulty by saying that the
function of union in commonly known formal causality is that
of a condition, not an essential part of the causality as such.
This appears to be the thought of John of St. Thomas, when
he writes:
In form intrinsically denominating, formal causality or second
act is not distinguished from first act by the addition of something
intrinsic, but only by the extrinsic conditions which it connotes
and requires. The reason for this is, that as the formal effect is not
distinguished intrinsically and entitatively from the form itself as
communicated, it does not therefore require any mediate causality
as a formal reason of actuating and communicating itself, for if the
effect is not distinguished from the cause, neither does it need any
mean causing it. Nor is the form more in act through any other
second causality than through itself, for it immediately actuates and
is communicated through itself,· yet regaining something extrinsic
as application which changes the form that it might be communi-

KEVIN F. O'SHEA

cated to matter, just as union is formally made through the being
of the extremes immediately, although it requires active and passive
change that the extremes be conjoined. 141

According to John of Saint Thomas, then, a form causes
. . . through actuality which secundum se is determined to actuating and immediately actuates by itself, when it is received in and
conjoined to matter; nor does it need a new actuality added to
it in order to render the matter actuated and the composite constituted; and so it is not necessary that the form be constituted in
second act
anything intrinsically added to
as a formal reason
of causality. 142

of SL Thomas therefore gives to union
formal
causality no essentially causative function, but merely the place
of a
The dependence of the
on matter is wholly
on the part of the matter,
no way on the part of the
or
the proper causality of the form. If then
difference
between
actuating formal causality and the inhering
causality reduces itself to a difference
the
that acit means
and not a difference in the ""''''"'·'"'
If we consider each precisely
formal causality, we can say
141 John of Sl. Thomas, CuTsus Philosophicus,
lac. cit., p.
"Quod in forma
intrinsece denominante, causalitas formalis, seu actus secundus non distinguitur ab
actu primo, superaddendo aliquid intrinsecum, sed solum penes extrinsecas conditiones quas connotat et requirit. Cuius fundamentum est, quia effectus formalis
non distinguitur intrinsece entitative ab ipsamet forma ut communicata, non ergo
requirit aliquam causalitatem mediam tanquam rationem formalem actuandi et
communicandi se, si enim effectus non distinguitur ab ipsa causa, neque indiget
medio causante ipsum. Nee per aliquam causalitatem secundam est magis in actu
forma, quam per seipsam, sed per seipsam immedate actuat et communicatu:r,
requirit tamen aliquid extrinsecum tanquam applicationem, quod immutat ipsam
formam ut communicetur materiae, sicut unio formaliler fit per ipsam entitatem
extremorum immediate, licet requirat immutationem activam, vel passivam, ut
ipsa extrema conjungantur."
142 Ibid. " ... per actualitatem
quae secundum se est determinata ad actuandum,
. . . et seipsa immediate actuat, quando recipitur et coniungitur materiae, neque
indiget nova actualitate superaddita ut materiam reddat actuatam, et compositum
constituat, et sic non oportet quod in actu secundo constituatur per aliquid superadditum entitative ipsi formae, tamquam per rationem formalem causalitatis."

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WORD

each actuates, fonnalizes, and perfects exactly and wholly in
the same way as the other. None the less because in the pure
formal actuation there is no receptive union or reception by
matter, but rather a union by identity, the state proper to the
exercise of the causality differs in each case-and, to reflect the
saying of Cajetan, differs more than heaven and earth. 143 Although the strict causality does not differ from that of any
other formal cause, nonetheless because of its unique state pure
formal actuation remains in the sphere of mystery; it would
require a divine miracle to produce that union needed for it,
and so we must leave its existence and its positive possibility
where they belong-in the divine order of mystery.
Following the thought of John of St. Thomas, which we
believe to be faithful to that of the Angelic Doctor, we think
that pure actuation and inhering formal causality are, in essence, univocally the same. We add, however, that the form
which actuates in the case of the pure actuation, namely the
divine form, is analogous to other forms both with analogy of
attribution and analogy of proper proportionality. We believe,
too, that the description of pure formal actuation as an eminent
and analogous mode of formal cause can be retained; because
when we consider the state and the conditions of exercise of
this and other formal causes, we see a clear and definite analogy. This position detennines still more our notion of this
actuation; and it shows it to be clearly a true and proper form
of causality, and indeed a true and proper fonn of active
causality.
It only remains to apply this notion to the mystery of the
Hypostatic Union.
We shall first consider its implicit application according to
the principles and great lines of St. Thomas' teaching on the
Incarnation. Later we shall speak of an explicit application in
his writings.
It will not now be difficult to show the verification of the
full notion of pure fonnal actuation, as we have expounded it,
us Cf. supra note 54.

KEVIN F. O'SHEA

in the hypostatic union. Let us take up the conditio sine qua
non of this actuation, that is, real communicability in the order
of a positive perfection; here we are dealing with personality,
which in the clear doctrine of St. Thomas is a positive perfection, and we must also confess that the divine personality
of the Word is not only communicable but actually communicated to the assumed humanity as its own personality. Moreover, we are thus dealing with a divine perfection, with Pure
Act itself, and so we have the root and source of pure actuation.
Further, the Divine Word is, according to the principles of St.
Thomas, the formal reason for the sharing of the sacred
humanity in the positive perfection of the Word's personality;
and this cannot be done, again according to his principles, without an identity, which, as it were, transforms that human
nature into the Word in the order of the positive perfection
of personality. 144 Thus we find verified all the conditions and
elements of pure formal actuation in the mystery of the Hypostatic Union as conceived by St. Thomas. 145
There remains one serious difficulty against this application.
It has been argued that such an actuation is invalidly applied
to the case, because the appropriation and integration of the
sacred humanity by and into the Divine Word is foreign to
the notion of pure formal actuation, which by definition is
nothing more than actuation. In reply, let us note first that
when St. Thomas discussed the idea of actuation in the context
of the beatific vision, he in no way restricted its possible extension beyond the intentional order, but placed general conditions which in themselves had no necessary restriction to that
order. 146 Still, it is necessary to show as far as possible that the
added notion of appropriation and integration does not destroy
"' There is a difficulty in using the word " tranaformative " in the case of the
hypostatic union. It normally implies priority of the thing transformed. And the
sacred humanity does not exist prior to the coming and the actuation of the Word.
But we think we can preserve the phrase, on the ground that the sacred humanity,
the same as it would have been prior to the actuation.
as a nature,
146 We may note that the two conveniences of pure formai actuation
noted in
Note 140 are verified also here: it is the Word who aclulldies a huiDIIll nature.
1 •• Cf. •WJI1'a p. !tiS.

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WORD

225

the valid use of the notion of actuation; we think we can do
this, and even suggest that without the idea of actuation, that
of appropriation can hardly be applied to the Incarnation with
full force.
freely concede that there is in the mystery of
the Hypostatic Union the aspect of appropriation of the sacred
humanity by the Word as Its own. This appropriation can be
nothing else but the real relation of possession
which the
human nature of Christ pertains to the Word. It indicates
strictly the relation of
of the human nature thus elevated.
Actuation on the other hand is merely one expression of the
ontological unity and identity on which this relation of union
IS founded; it looks to the human nature, not as united and
to the Word precisely, but as one and identified with
in personal unity, although secondarily it connotes
relation of union. It seems then that it is difficult to sustain
the appropriation without appealing to the identity which for
ratio of the actuation. Truly,
us is the very essence and
it seems
to insist on the concept of appropriation alone,
to
the analogical
one
way to the idea
sense
cause which opens
ation, or to posit a
of union
its requisite
identity on
it is founded. The first point seems
against the mind of St. Thomas as we understand it; while the
second is not merely against his explicit texts, 147 but really
seems to be a step into the way of Scotism; and, while maintaining
general that personality is a positive perfection,
would not seem to appreciate that teaching sufficiently in
applying it to
Incarnation.
We think then that the opinion
the great authors of the
Thomist school is a faithful interpretation of the thought of
SL Thomas and is fully vindicated by the general principles of
his teaching on the hypostatic union.
St. Thomas, none the less, has not said in so many words
that there is pure formal actuation in the mystery of the Incarnation. Many times he seems to come close to this notion;
147

Cf. supra pp. l76s.

KEVIN F. O'SHEA

he speaks of the nobility, the amelioration, and the perfection
which come to the sacred humanity from the union; 148 he
speaks of a function of principality and of perfectivity which
belong to the Word in the union. Many times too he deliberately excludes the idea of a :received formal causality from the
union, without making any mention of another mode of this
causality. His discussion of the analogy between the union of
soul and body and the hypostatic union is most interesting; 149
many would see in it no evidence for consideration on his part
of an actuation by the Word, while others, with whom we are
much at one, incline rather to see such an actuation implicitly
but still equivalently expressed in what he says in these passages.150 We shall not enter here into a minute exegesis of
these texts, important though it be to a full understanding of
St. Thomas' mind on the Incarnation. The fact that St.
Thomas has perhaps been silent about an actuation in this
mystery, or the fact that he has not accentuated it in so many
words, does not alter the fact, which we believe we have established, that it is in conformity with and indeed an illuminating
interpretation of his certainly admitted principles. Moreover,
many reasons could be alleged for such a silence or lack of
accentuation; we can mention the context of his writing in the
framework of the three opinions mentioned by Lombard/ 51 his
approach to the problem of personality, simpler and more direct
than that of Cajetan and John of St. Thomas, and his endeavours to form a truly theological synthesis of Christology,
using as his principle the integral concept of the Incarnate
Cf. Summa Theol., III, q. 2., a. 6, ad 1.; a. 10.
Cf. especially De Rationibus Fidei, c. 6; IV Cont. Gent., c. 41; De Unione
Verbi, a. 4. Summa Theol., III, q. 2., a. l, ad 2; a. 6, ad 2.
150 The triple
comparison of soul: body, Word: sacred humanity, and divine
essence: glorious intellect, wouid bear an interesting study in St. Thomas. We
feel perhaps that the idea of actuation underlies St. Thomas's thought here, and
that it is at the root of his concept of the instrumentum coniunctum et proprium
Verbi. But that is matter for extended study.
151 This could perhaps have been a reason for caution in speaking of actuation.
Easily misunderstood, it could have been taken as equivalently monophysist, and
put down as the reason for opposition to the two opinions branded as leading to
Nestorianism.
148
149

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WORD

Word as Redeemer. 152 One consideration we may add: no
special and proper order of union, in the last analysis, belongs
to pure formal actuation as such. It involves identity in the
line of a positive perfection; but that identity may be in the
intentional as well as in the ontological order. Thus a description of the hypostatic union as a union by pure formal actuation would not ultimately determine and distinguish this
union; to do that St. Thomas needs to classify it as a unio
secundum hypostasim; which, we believe, is what he intends to
do; and which is what he does.153
St. Thomas then by virtue of his principles on the Hypostatic Union must favour the theory of a pure formal actuation
of the sacred humanity in the mystery of the Incarnation.
Is this actuation exclusive to the Person of the Word? We
cannot doubt that it is exercised by the fullness of the divine
perfection, in the way that is communicated to the sacred
humanity by hypostatic union. And the fullness of the divine
perfection is communicated to the sacred humanity in this
union, only in so far as it goes to make up the divine relative
subsistence of the Word. Thus the pure actuation of which we
have spoken in this mystery is in the strict sense exclusive to
the Person of the Divine Word, which alone is incarnate. 154
We can therefore maintain in the hypostatic union a physical
active causal influence which is strictly divine, and which Is
exclusive to the Person of the Word.
152 It is in the union of the idea of Verbum lncarnatum with that of Redemptor
that St. Thomas has found the principle of his Christological synthesis. This does
not directly involve the idea of actuation. But it could well be that that notion
lies closer to the basis of Thomist Christology than we might think.
153 Cf. IV Cont. Gent., c. 41; Summa Theol., III, q.
a. 1, ad
154 The various shades of opinion among Thomists concerning the formal constitutive of the relative personality of the Word, do not alter the conclusion reached
here on their common principles. But there will be a difference in explaining the
actuation as it pertains to the Word alone; those who put the formal constitutive
in the absolute subsistence as possessed by the relation, say that the Word perfects
and actuates through something common to the Three Persons, not as common, but
as forntally proper to the Word; while those who put the formal constitutive in the
divine relativity as such think that the Word thus actuates by His own relative
divine subsistence, and only indirectly and materially and secondarily by the divine
essence which is one with Him.

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KEVIN F" 0 9 SHEA

If we ask why there can be such a formal influence, while on
the other hand we believe that an efficient influence of this
kind would be repugnant, we must say that we have explained
the formal actuation entirely within the orda of being, wherein
lies the formal constitutive of personality" Thus we were able
to find a sense in which the undivided fullness of the divine
pure act pertained in an exclusive way to each distinct Person
of the Most Holy Trinity. The divine efficiency, however,
could not be so reduced to the order of being, and considered
as part of the formal make-up of personality, because it is
necessarily of the order of operation. Thus there is not in it
any formal aspect by which it can be attributed exclusively to
a distinct divine Person"
And yet a difficulty remains: formal causality, precisely as
causality, denotes the second act or the exercise of a first act or
cause, and pertains thus to the order of operation; efficient
causality denotes likewise a second act. It seems then that our
distinction is invalid, that we must either admit that the pure
actuation is common to the three Persons, or open the way to
speaking of an efficiency which is also proper to the Word.
It is true that both formal and efficient causality denote a
second act or exercise of a cause" But in formal causality, the
second act is not distinguished from the first by anything
intrinsic super-added, but only by extrinsic conditions which
it connotes and requires. 155 Efficient causality, however, in its
second act denotes an emanation or active production by the
causal agent, and implies a relationship of derivation from the
agenL 156 Thus we may speak even of the second act or proper
exercise of formal causality, without departing from the order
of "first act," without then leaving the order within which
personality is formally c.onstituted"
There can still be an insistence: although this is true in the
causes of the natural order, it is hardly true when we come
within the divine order. For there even the " second act" of
efficient cause is identified with the infinite perfection of the
'"' Cf. supra. Note Hfl.

156

Ibid.

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WORD

229

first cause. Hence even there, by a special prerogative of the
divine transcendence, it seems that the way is open for the
attribution of the divine efficiency to distinct Persons in a
distinct way.
It is true that the divine efficiency in its "second act" is one
with the perfection of the first cause. But none the less, when
we speak of efficiency, we must note the distinction not merely
between second and first act as such, but also between action
and the principle of action, or active potency, as such. And if
in the divine order these too are identified, still according to
our way of understanding, the divine essence can be taken
under the aspect of action and under the aspect of active
potency. 151 When we speak of the divine efficiency, we must
think co-relatively of the divine active principle which is its
whole explanation; mindful always that they are one in God.
And when we think of the divine essence under the aspect of
an active principle or potency, we think not merely of the
divine principle from which (quo) the divine efficiency comes,
but also of the divine principle which (quod) is co-relatively
implied with it. This divine principle quod must be the divine
essence itself with its absolute subsistence: that is the natural
and direct term of reference as a principium quod for divine
efficiency as such: and indeed it is the divine essence absolutely subsisting as such, again by force of the direct proportion to divine action. In no Thomist view does the absolute subsistence as such enter the formal constitutive of the
relative personality of the distinct Persons. This seems to be
why we can speak of a formal influence exclusive to one Person
and not of an efficient influence: because the source of the
formal influence is the relative personality of that Person as
such, and the source of an efficient influence cannot be this
relative personality as such. We may, and we must, maintain
the one without the other.
But if we must exclude, as we have done, any divine efficiency which is proper to the Word and not shared by the other
157

Cf. Summa Theol., I., q. !lll, a. 1, ad 8.

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KEVIN F. O'SHEA

two Persons of the Most Holy Trinity, we believe we may
appropriate in a very special sense to the Word the special
divine efficient influence which moves the sacred humanity of
Christ to act, and the immense divine charity which is its
source. For we do maintain a true physical and active causality
of the Word alone over the sacred humanity and over every
action performed by the sacred humanity. This causality is
formal, but in our human language we speak of it in terms
that cannot be entirely removed from connotations of efficient
causality. Hence there seems to be a special basis for the
appropriation of the divine efficiency here to the Word: it
consists in the fact that the Word is in an exclusive way an
active influencing cause in every act of Christ. Hence we think
it right to modify the true statement that every efficient influence over the sacred humanity is common to the Father, Son,
and Holy Spirit; we think we should add that it connotes the
exclusive formal influence of the Word, and for this reason may
be attributed to the Word in a unique appropriation.
We have asked: does the Person of the Word exert on the
human activity of Christ, a causal influence which is exclusive
to Himself, divine, physical and active? We answer: the Person
of the Word exercises such an influence in the order of formal
causality, by a pure formal actuation which takes place within
the hypostatic union and is explained by it; every efficient influence of the deity on the sacred humanity and the human
activity of Christ comes equally from the Three Persons, but
connotes especially the formal influence proper to the Word
and for that reason may be attributed to the Word in a unique
appropriation.
We shall not linger in showing how the dogmatic difficulties
originally pointed out in the problem, are fully satisfied by this
solution. It is enough to say that it in no way violates the
axiom Indivisibilia sunt opera SS. Trinitatis ad extra, by remaining faithful to the interpretation of this axiom given by
Pope Pius XII in the encyclical Mystici Corporis: certissimum illud firma mente retineant, ... omnia esse habenda SS.
Trinitati communia, quatenus eadem Deum ut supremam effi-

THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WORD

231

cientem causam respiciant." 158 It is enough to say that the
danger of monophysitism is avoided by the concept of pure
formal actuation, which remains entirely within the terms of
hypostatic union, and is no more, and no less, than the dogmatic formula of Chalcedon, asserting that utramque Redemptoris naturam in unam personam atque subsistentiam convenire." 159
This solution, too, seems to preserve what each of the two
general tendencies concerning the problem strove to hpld
sacred: namely, the indivision of the Three Divine Persons
in action, and the full implications of what it means for the
human activity of Christ to be the human activity of the Word.
Positively, we believe that the solution we have offered has
value in appreciating the unique human life of our Saviour.
While it keeps in view, on the one hand, the common divine
love which, in the words of St. Thomas quoted in H aurietis
Aquas," 160 "is the principle of human Redemption," it opens
the way, on the other, to a contemplation of the "absolutely
intimate way " in which the human love and the human
activity of Christ" share in the life of the Incarnate Word." 161
In saying that the divine efficiency moving the human
activity of the Word is common to the Three Persons but
retains a special extrinsic connotation to the Word and is
thereby attributed to Him appropriatively, we can explain, at
least a little, many intriguing passages of the Scriptures and
the Fathers. We can see a little of what the Word Incarnate
Himself taught us when he said: " I lay down my life, that
I may take it again. No man takes it away from me but I lay
it down of myself. And I have the power to lay it down: and
I have power to take it up again. This commandment I have
received from my Father." 162
102

John, 10:17-18.

We can, too, in saying that there is a pure formal actuation
AAS, 85 (1948), p. 281.
AAS, 48 (1951), p. 688.
160 AAS, 48 (1956) , p. 882.

168

110

181Jbid.

KEVIN F. O'SHEA

of the sacred humanity by the Divine Word, penetrate a little
into some of the most beautiful descriptions of the Redeemer.
Taking up the word of Isaias, St. Thomas has written that
Christ is formosus: ". . . first, because gleaming with the
splendor of divinity; second, because configured by the conformity of union . . ," 163 and we feel we can express the basic
conviction of this essay in saying that the sacred humanity is
resplendent with the clarity, purity and perfection which are
the glory of the Word.
KEVIN

F. O'SHEA, c. ss. R.

Redemptor-ist Monaster-y,
Ballarat, Victoria, Austr-alia

'"" l.n l.11aiam, c. 68: " ... primo, quia rutilans splendore divmitatis; §ecundo, quia
oon:liguratus oonformitate mmionis . . ."

DE LA TAILLE vs. THOMISTIC TRADITION
A REPLY

0

NE of the most intriguing developments in speculative
theology during the first half of the twentieth century
was the theory of Maurice de la Taille called " Created
Actuation by Uncreated Act." 1 The theory aimed at shedding
light on the metaphysics of the supernatural order, with particular applications to the Incarnation, the inhabitation of the
Holy Spirit in the souls of the just, and the beatific vision.
It has won favorable acceptance by not a few distinguished
theologians who have attempted to extend the area of its applicability.2 Not aU, of course, have been so enthusiastic
1 De Ia Taille's
theory is expressed in three essays: " The Schoolmen," published in The Incarnation (199!5 session of the Summer School of Catholic Studies,
Cambridge, England) edited by Cuthbert Lattey, S. J. (Cambridge: W. Hefler &
Sons, 199!6), pp. 152-189; "Actuation creee par Acte incree," Recherches de Science
Religieuse, XVIII (1928), pp. 9!53-268; and "Entretien arnica! d'Eudoxe et de
Palamede sur Ia grace d'union," Revue Apologetique, XLVIII (Jan.-June 1929),
pp. 5-26 and 129-145. All three essays, the first as a reprint, the other two
translated into English by Cyril Vollert, S. J., are united in a single brochure,
The Hypostatic Union and Created Actuation by Uncreated Act (West Baden
Springs, Indiana: West Baden College, 1952).
• The following list is by no means exhaustive: Cyril Vollert, S. J. in his
translator's note, The Hypostatic Union, p. 9!8; William R. O'Connor, "A New
Concept of Grace and the Supernatural," The (American) Ecclesiastical Review,
XCVIII (Jan.-June, 1938), pp. 401-413; Malachi J. Donnelly, S. J., "The Theory
of R. P. Maurice de Ia Taille, S. J. on the Hypostatic Union," Theological Studies,
II (1941), pp. 510-59!6; idem., "The Inhabitation of the Holy. Spirit: A Solution
according to de Ia Taille," Theological Studies, VIII (1947), pp. 445-470; Prudence de Letter, S. J., "Sanctifying Grace and Our Union with the Holy Trinity,"
Theological Studies, XIII (1952), pp. 33-58; Franc;ois Bourassa, S. J., "Adoptive
Sonship: Our Union with the Divine Persons," Theological Studies, XIII (1952),
pp. 309-310 and 330; Joseph Triitsch, SS. 1'rinitatis inhabitatio apud theologos
recentiores (Trent: Editriee Mutilati e Invalidi, 1949), pp. 97-107. Father Triitsch
in this dissertation also indicates the theory of Karl Rahner, S. J., "Zur scho-

234

WILLIAM

MACOMBER

welcoming the new interpretation of traditional theology. 3
Recently, however, the entire foundations of the theory have
been challenged by Father Thomas U. Mullaney, 0. P., in his
article, " The Incarnation: de la Taille vs. Thomistic Tradition." 4 Father Mullaney concludes with this grave warning:
It can never be with pleasure that one concludes that a work
built by a great man, and at the cost of tremendous labor, is seriously deficient. Therefore, one could not undertake a rigorous criticism of de la Taille's theory of "created actuation by uncreated
act" merely for the sake of intellectual exercise. But that theory,
weak and objectionable in its very foundations, is being embraced
and hailed today as " an introduction to the purest scholastic tradition," " a fine supplementary text for the De V erbo course," " an
outstanding exposition of the metaphysics of sanctifying grace and
the beatific vision," and so forth. Sadly, it is none of these things.
It is novel, opposed to tradition; it is doctrinally dangerous; it is,
metaphysically, rooted in and built upon confusion. 5
lastischen Begrifllichkeit der ungeschaffenen Gnade," Zeitschrift fur katholische
Theologie, LXIll (1989), pp. 187-156, as closely resembling de Ia Taille's (Cf. J.
Triitsch, op. cit., pp. 107-116).
In addition to the above theologians who discuss de la Taille's hypothesis at some
length, others can be mentioned who refer to it briefly, but with approval: Emile
Mersch, S. J., "Filii in Filio: Le surnaturel," Nouvelle Revue Theologique, LXV
(1988), p. 817; and G. Philips, La grace des justes de !'Ancient Testament:
Fondements scripturaires; Etude theologique," Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses,
XXIV (1948) , p. 45.
A new treatment of de la Taille in the light of the various objections that have
been raised, Father Mullaney's in particular, appeared too late to be included in
this present study: Prudence de Letter, S. J., " Created Actuation by the Uncreated Act: Difficulties and Answers," Theological Studies, XVIII (1957), pp.
Father de Letter gives other references not included here.
• Again the list is admittedly very incomplete: M. Retailleau, La Sainte Trinite
dans les ames justes, a doctoral thesis presented to the theology faculty of the
Catholic University of Angers in
pp.
(cited by J. Triitsch, op. cit.,
pp. 101-106. Retailleau, with Father Mullaney, also believes that de Ia Taille's
theory is inconsistent with Catholic teaching, but for different reasons; these
reasons do not appear convincing to T1·iitsch); Lucien Chambat, 0. S. B., Presence
et union: Les missions des Personnes de la Sainte Trinite selon saint Thomas d'Aquin
(Abbaye S. Wandrille: Editions de Fontenelle, 1948), p. 88, n. 85; Dom Herman
Diepen, 0. S. B., "La· critique du basilisme selon Saint Thomas d'Aquin," Revue
Thomiste, L (1950), pp.
.
• THE THOMIST, XVII (1954)' pp.
• Ibid., p.

DE LA TAILLE VS. THOMISTIC

TRADITION

235

In view of the warm encomia that other theologians have
heaped on de Ia Taille's analysis of the supernatural order, this
is a most sweeping condemnation. One naturally fixes on the
verdict "doctrinally dangerous." This would seem to be the
equivalent of the theological censure doctrina non tuta. 6 If this
verdict should be objectively justified, it would render de la
Taille's theory untenable for all Catholic theologians. It should
be important, therefore, to examine carefully the evidence on
which Father Mullaney bases his verdict.
The further accusation that the theory "is, metaphysically,
rooted in and built upon confusion " is also a serious charge
that would be well worth investigating; it, too, if verified, would
make de la Taille's analysis untenable. However, limitations of
space require that it be left for subsequent treatment. As for
the judgment that de la Taille's doctrine is " novel " and " opposed to tradition," it does not seem so necessary to treat it at
any great length. A theological theory is not false merely
because it is novel, nor is Thomistic tradition the only legitimate tradition allowed by the Church to theologians. 7
The reasons on which Father Mullaney bases his contention
that the hypothesis of a created actuation by uncreated Act is
doctrinally dangerous amount to this, that it so obscures and
minimizes the distinctions between the natural and super• I would distinguish between a dogmatic and a theological censure. A dogmatic
censure would be one imposed explicitly or implicitly by the Magisterium of the
Church, or .else one commonly accepted by theologians as certain. A theological
censure, on the other hand, would be one imposed by a theological school or by
individual theologians. It is clear that Father Mullaney does not intend a dogmatic
censure, but that he does intend a theological censure is confirmed by what he says
elsewhere (art. cit., p. !lO): "In all restraint may we not say that de Ia Tallie's
supposition is not alone un-Thomistic; it is, in addition, self-contradictory, and
perilous at least to one basic point of faith." Cf. also p. 41.
• When Father Mullaney says " opposed to tradition," it is not altogether clear
whether he is referring to Catholic or to " orthodox " Thomistic tradition. However,
iri view of the fact that he nowhere cites Church or patristic documents, confining
himself to Saint Thomas Aquinas and his interpreters, it seems safe to presume that
he intends Thomistic tradition. Of course, de Ia Tallie does claim to be at least
in harmony with St. Thomas and his school, but a consideration of this claim and
Father Mullaney's rejection of it are beyond the scope of this article.

236

WILLIAM

MACOMBER

natural orders and between creature and Creator, that faith is
thereby endangered. " . . . de la Taille's position ... is
trary . . . to the distinction, basic in all Christian thought,
between Creator and creature . . . it is . . . perilous at least
to one basic point of faith." 8
If in the shadows of confused thinking the distinction between
God and creature be obscured one cannot marvel that the distinction between diverse orders of creaturely things grows dim ...
The tendency to destroy or lessen the distinction between the
natural and the supernatural is older than human kind ... 9

There are two principal reasons why Father Mullaney thinks
that the supposition of a created actuation by uncreated Act
implicitly denies the distinction, most basic to all Christian
thought and Catholic dogma, between God and the creature,
between the supernatural and natural orders. One objection is
that any such created actuation "springing from the union of
God as Act and creature as potency must be a hybrid of the
uncreated and the created, the supernatural and the natural,
the infinite and the limited. It would be necessarily a medium
10
between God and
The other difficulty is that a
created actuation by uncreated Act makes a created nature
contribute positively to a supernatural effect. Since Father
Mullaney has confined his discussion of the first objection to the
special case of the hypostatic union, it will be well to consider
the second difficulty first, since it finds a more general application to all aspects of the theory.
A created actuation by uncreated Act implies a positive
tribution by a creature to a supernatural effect. Father Mullaney develops this thesis at length in connection with sanctifymg grace:
Here ... de la Taille, whatever his intention, does implicitly
deny the distinction between the natural and the supernatural
• art. cit., p. £0.
• Ibid., p. £6. Does this last statement refer to the fall of the angels?
10 Ibid., loc. cit.

DE LA TAILLE VS. THOMISTIC

TRADITION

287

orders. He teaches that habitual grace is a created actuation produced in the human soul by God's own essence. This Act-Godcomes that " actuation may arise in the soul," habitual grace is a
reality " informing its proper subject," an " actuation of the potency
by the Act." There is involved then, on the side of the potency
or the created nature, material causality in the true sense, with
respect to a supernatural entity; the natural is a true cause of the
supernatural, this time in the order of accidents. . . . It implies ...
a positive proportion between the essence of the soul as a thing of
nature, and the life of God as supernatural; it implies that the soul
by its natural " resources " or its " good offices " positively contributes to the essential constitution of a supernatural reality; for,
according to de la Taille, that is what a material cause does.11

From this and from parallel passages 12 it is clear that
Father Mullaney considers the supposition of a creature as a
true material cause of a supernatural reality to be doctrinally
dangerous on the grounds that the distinction between the
supernatural and the natural orders is thereby implicitly compromised. That de la Taille does hold this supposition cannot
be denied. He speaks unequivocally of sanctifying grace and
the light of glory as informing their created subjects, that is,
the essence of the human soul and the human intellect, respectively.18 Correlatively, therefore, the human soul and intellect
lbid., p. 21. The citation is from The Hypostatic Union, pp. 88-84.
art. cit., pp. 15-18 and 28-24.
18 The Hypostatic Union, pp. 82 and 84.
I am confining my discussion of Father
Mullaney's objection to the case of sanctifying grace because the teaching of the
Church is more explicit on this point. From the point of view of the objection,
moreover; the light of glory is basically similar, so that what is said of grace may
be transferred, mutatis mutandis. The grace of union, however, is not strictly
covered by the objection because, as an actuation in the line of existence, it
cannot, properly speaking, be said to inform the humanity of Christ; the humanity
is not the material cause of the created grace of union, except in the very improper
sense that essence can be called a material cause in relation to existence. De Ia
Taille does speak of the human nature of Christ as exercising material causality
with respect to the grace of union (Ibid., p. 85), but it is not clear that he is
there using material causality in the strict sense, any more than John of St. Thomas
is to be accused of speaking strictly when he describes the divine Word as informing
His humanity (Cursus Theologicus, Vol. 7, De lncarnatione, disp. 8, n. 20; cf. The
H1JPostatic Union, pp. 68-69).
11

12

288

WILLIAM

MACOMBER

are material causes of supernatural realities: "the natural is a
... cause of the supernatural," as Father Mullaney claims.14
However, this teaching of de Ia Taille is by no means an innovation peculiar to himself but the common teaching of St.
Thomas and all Catholic theologians. 15 Indeed, it is implicitly
contained in the solemn teaching of the Council of Trent that
grace is the formal cause of our justification and that it inheres
in our souls.16 Hence, habitual grace is an accident inhering in
the soul as in its substance, so that the soul, to the extent that
it is the subject of inhesion for grace, is truiy its material cause.
In other words, the soul is a true material cause of the supernatural entity that is sanctifying grace in the sense that grace
truly inheres in the soul. To deny this would be to teach
implicitly the heresy of justification by imputation.
Consequently, the "material causality in the true sense"
that Father Mullaney objects to in de la Taille must mean
something more than that supplied by a substance to its accidents. What that inadmissible sense is, is indicated somewhat
indirectly in the following passage:
Now a cause is a principle whence something originates or proceeds, with dependence in being. A material cause, in common with
other true causes, actually contributes to the constitution and
conservation of the effect. Thus, if de la Taille be correct, (the
soul) positively contributes by its natural powers to the being of
a . . . supernatural entity. . . .
The point of the difficulty is clear. Material causality involves
an intrinsic positive proportion between the material cause and
its formal complement. The material cause is subjective potency
with regard to that form. Obediential potency on the contrary involves no such positive proportion between it and the form; there
is only that objective capacity which is mere non-impossibility,
non-repugnance.
How, then, does a Thomist conceive the function of an obediential
art. cit., p. 21, cited above, p. 237, note ll.
Summa Theol., I II, q. 110, a. 2; II II, q. 171, a. 2.
16 Sessio VI, Decretum de justijicatione, capp. 7 and 16 (Denzinger-Bannwart,
Enchiridion Symbolorum, nn. 799 and 809).
10

15

DE LA TAILLE VS. THOMISTIC

TRADITION

289

potency? To be sure, that potency ... is the subject in which the
supernatural form is, but not a subject out of which it becomes,
or is. Hence the substantial subject does have its existence, as it
were, communicated to the supernatural form: but that subject
in no sense contributes to the intrinsic constitution of the nature
or essence of the form in question, for it cannot. Could it do so there
would be no disproportion between the two, hence no supernaturality on the part of the form. Carefully, then, the Thomist distinguishes between essence and existence, between the form's esse tale
and inesse. By divine power the esse tale is constituted, constituted
as resident in this existent: between the existent and the form
there is not repugnance-but neither is there that procession of the
latter from the positive potentiality of the former, which constitutes
the exercise of material causality properly so-called.17

We are here at the heart of the difficulty. The inadmissible
" material causality in the true sense " involves a " positive
proportion between the material cause and its formal complement," in this case between the soul, as material cause, and the
supernatural form that is sanctifying grace. Explaining his
meaning further, Father Mullaney distinguishes between a
" subject in which the supernatural form is " and a " subject
out of which it becomes, or is." The former type of subject is
admissible in the case of a supernatural form; such a subject
communicates merely its existence or inesse to the form, and it
could be called, I presume, a material cause in only a loose
sense. A subject out of which its form becomes or is, on the
other hand, communicates not only inesse, but esse tale as well,
that is, it " contributes to the intrinsic constitution of the
nature or essence of the form"; the form proceeds "from the
positive potentiality " of the subject. This " constitutes the
exercise of material causality properly so-called," and this,
presumably, is what Father Mullaney understands de la Taille
17 art. cit., pp. 15-17, passim. Father Mullaney is discussing, in this passage, the
created grace of union. Since this is the only complete discussion of the objection,
I have been compelled to adapt it slightly so that it applies. to sanctifying grace,
for the basic reason indicated above (n. 18). Parentheses and dots indicate the
changes.

240

WILLIAM

MACOMBER

to mean whenever he talks of the human soul or intellect as
being the material cause of a supernatural entity.
One could have wished at this juncture, since we are touching
the heart of the most serious objection against de la Taille's
entire doctrine, for extensive documentation of the positions
that are being ascribed to him and for an exegesis of the pertinent passages sufficient to make certain that his doctrine is not
being misinterpreted or taken out of context, especially since
the point of the objection turns on the precise sense of the term
material causality. This, like all metaphysical terms, is radically analogous and cannot mean exactly the same thing when
applied to different levels of being. Furthermore, the notions
of the four Aristotelian causes are derived from a consideration of changes in this material universe. Therefore, they
cannot be applied tale quale to spiritual realities, let alone
supernatural realities, whose very possibility Aristotle could
not have suspected. If, then, a competent theologian does apply
such notions to the supernatural order, it is reasonable to presume that he uses them in an analogous sense that respects the
exigencies of revelation.
I have indicated that the use of the term material cause in
regard to sanctifying grace is not only legitimate but necessary
to safeguard Catholic dogma. What proof does Father Mullaney offer for his contention that de Ia Taille is using the term
in an unacceptably strict sense, namely, that the human soul
is the cause out of which grace arises, and that it communicates
to grace both inesse and esse tale, with the result that there is
a positive proportion between the soul and the grace that
inheres in it? The nearest thing to a proof that I have been
able to find occurs in the following passage:
Therefore, Pere de la Taille's position that (the soul) is the
material cause of (sanctifying grace) involves a denial of the
proposition that (the human soul) is merely an obediential potency
with respect to a supernatural reality Note that de la Taille himself
never conceived this material causality, of which he writes, as mere
non-repugnance. Writing of formal and material causality he says
very clearly, "There is a reciprocity of good offices, an exchange of

DE LA TAILLE VS. THOMISTIC

TRADITION

resources ... there is mutual indebtedness and interdependence."
He himself creates the difficulty: the difficulty of a supernatural
effect dependent for its being on the " good offices . . . the resources" of a merely natural thing. 18

Unfortunately, Father Mullaney does not give the context of
his citation. De la Taille is talking about the relationship between material and formal causes in the natural, not the supernatural, order. This is evident from the two examples he uses
of the souls of a lion and a man and also from the statement
that follows almost immediately: " In the natural order, every
actuation is information." 19 In other words, actuation in the
supernatural order cannot be judged by actuation in the natural
order.
Furthermore, even
the case
a supernatural form, there
is still a "reciprocity of good offices, an exchange of resources ,.
that every Catholic theologian is obliged to recognize. The
human soul does give sanctifying grace a subject of inhesion,
it does give inesse, as Father Mullaney admibL He does not,
however, offer evidence that de la Taille meant anything more
than that in calling the soul the material cause of grace. The
most, therefore, that Father Mullaney is authorized to conclude
against de la Taille on the basis of his evidence is that he has
not clearly defined his terms.
De la Taille has, unfortunately, not expatiated on his understanding of obediential potency, nor has he made use of Father
Mullaney's valuable distinctions between a subject in which
and a subject out of which, between inesse and esse tale. There
is, however, an illuminating passage that characterizes the relationship between the natural and the supernatural as de la
18 Ibid., p. 18.
I would emphasize that it is perfectly correct to say that supernatural effects depend for their being on merely natural things. This is the teaching,
at least, of Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, 0. P., De Gratia: Commentarius in Summam Theologicmn Sancti Thomae zae nae q. 109-114 (Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1946),
p. 9!45: " Gratia est accidens inhaerens animae, ergo dependet a substantia animae
.m esse .•. "
10 The Hypostatic
Union, p. 29.

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Taille understands it. On the basis of this discussion we can
form some judgment on whether he really means to assert the
positive proportion that Father Mullaney rightly rejects.
In the first place, it is most evident that the pure Act (God)
cannot be the connatural act of a receptive potency. If, in His
gracious kindness, God makes Himself the act of such a potency,
this will be an occurrence surpassing all connaturality, and will
therefore be supernatural. Correlatively, the potency will not be
natural with respect to the Act, but will be obediential. And that
the desired correspondence or proportion between the potency and
the Act may be established, a divinely infused adaptation will be
needed: substantial actuation, if there is question of the order of
being, as in the hypostatic union; habitual adaptation or disposition,
if there is question of the order of intelligibility, as in the beatific
vision.
Moreover,, every ultimate disposition for the Act, being introduced by the Act Itself to which it is accommodated, is found to
be indissolubly joined to the Act within the potency which it
actuates. This disposition, top, cannot but transcend the whole
order of connaturality. 20

Thus, de la Taille explicitly rejects all connaturality, not only
between the uncreated Act and the created receptive potency,
but also between the same created potency and the divinely
infused adaptation that accommodates the potency to the Act.
This disposition, a created actuation by uncreated Act, is infused by the Act as it unites itself to the potency. Its entire
being is relative to the uncreated Act, precisely as gratuitously united to the potency, for it can only exist if, and to the
extent that, the uncreated Act condescends to become the Act
of the created potency.
Consequently, human nature is in obediential potency, not
only to uncreated Act, but also to the ultimate disposition for
the Act, namely, sanctifying grace, light of glory, or grace of
union, depending on the case. " And everything that is connected with it as a disposition, whether proximate or remote,
•• Ibid., p. 87. Emphasis added.

DE LA TAILLE VS. THOMISTIC

TRADITION

243

whether habitual or actual, will likewise be supernatural." 21
There is no connaturality or positive proportion between the
potency of nature and any positive disposition for uncreated
Act. The potency does have a passive aptitude for elevation,
in that it is not repugnant to such an elevation as a stone or
animal would be, but it cannot have an exigence for elevation.
This much is equivalently contained in the words of de la Taille
that I have cited, so that it is legitimate to conclude that his
concept of obediential potency in no way offends against the
severest demands of Catholic theology.
When, therefore, de la Taille speaks of nature as being a
material cause of the supernatural, we are amply justified in
giving the term a broad, analogous, and benign interpretation.
He does deny most explicitly that grace is connatural to nature,
which is another way of saying that nature has no positive
proportion to the supernatural. Hence, it seems to me, we must
admit that we do not have here an objective basis for censuring
his doctrine as theologically dangerous.
Father Mullaney has a second reason for contending that
de la Taille's hypothesis of a created actuation by uncreated
Act is doctrinally dangerous:
... any " created actuation " springing from the union of God
as Act and creature as potency must be a hybrid of the uncreated
and the created, the supernatural and the natural, the infinite and
the limited. It would be necessarily a medium between God and
not-God. It is a contradiction. 22
21

Ibid., Zoe. cit.
cit., p.

Although the objection that de Ia Taille's created actuation
is a medium between God and not-God is not justified (Cf. infra, p. 247), a more
valid objection would be that it is a medium between act and potency. For, in
any supernatural union, God is Act, and nature is potency; the created actuation
does not seem to be either, despite the fact that act and potency divide being.
Of course, if a choice must be made, the actuation would have to be assigned to
act rather than potency. Yet, this would seem to make of it a subordinate act
that would mediate between the divine Act and created potency and thus destroy
the immediacy of the union, contrary to de Ia Taille's intentions and the teachings
of the Church, at least with regard to the beatific vision. To me, this is by far
the strongest objection to the concept of a created actuation by uncreated Act.
•• art.

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Although this is proposed as a general objection to the entire
theory, a difficulty intrinsic to the very concept of a created
actuation by uncreated Act, Father Mullaney discusses it only
in connection with de la Taille's application of his theory to the
hypostatic union. The human nature of Christ, according to
d_e la Taille, is actuated in the line of existence by the very
existence of the Word of God. The eternal existence of the
Word is thus the (existential) Act of His humanity, but the
actuation, the grace of union, since it occurs in time, must be
created, substantial, and supernatural. 23 Against this position
Father Mullaney. argues:
... de la Taille's position ... is contrary ... to the distinction, basic in all Christian thought, between Creator and creature ... For what is "the supernatural" to which, according to
de la Taille, the" created substantial actuation" postulated belongs?
If " supernatural " signifies anything at all, as for Christians it must,
it signifies that which is above created nature, and is proper to the
Divine. . . .
·
Thus the supernatural exceeds created nature, and is proper to
the divine order: a created substance or principle does not exceed
created nature, cannot do so if it is created. Thus a supernatural
created substantial reality as supernatural would pertain to the
divine: as created to the non-divine. Hence infinite distinction
between the Divine Creator and limited creature would be annihilated-there would be a medium. In all restraint may we not say
that de la Taille's supposition is not alone un-Thomistic; it is, in
addition, self contradictory and perilous at least to one basic point
of faith. 24
The argument as presented is incomplete. It says that a
created, substantial, supernatural reality is a contradiction in
terms, because it would be both divine and non-divine: divine,
as being supernatural; non-divine as being created. Such an
argument as it stands, however, is invalid, since it proves too
I do not think that it is intrinsically unanswerable, even though I am not able
to offer a satisfactory solution.
•• The Hypostatic Union, pp. 84-41.
•• art. cit., p. !'lO.

DE LA TAILLE VS. THOMISTIC

TRADITION

much. It implies that all created supernatural realities are
contradictory, an evidently untenable conclusion for a Catholic:
grace is certainly a reality that is both created and supernatural; one can say that, as created, it pertains to the nondivine, and that, as supernatural, it pertains to the divine.
Thus, the equivocation latent in Father Mullaney's use of the
word " divine " is clear when his argumentation is transferred
to the case of habitual grace.
Consequently, I judge that what Father Mullaney means to
say is that a created supernatural reality is a contradiction if
it is a substantial reality. 25 In attempting to define Father
Mullaney's objection with greater precision, however, a difficulty arises. In some passages dealing with this objection he
speaks of a substantial reality, but in others he speaks of a
substance. For example, he attributes to de la Taille " the repeated assertion of a created substance of the supernatural
order-which as we have shown implies the denial of the real
distinction between the supernatural and the natural orders." 26
In another place he says:
Thus if we suppose anything substantial, created, and supernatural, then the supernatural-which is above all creatures-enters
in as an intrinsic constituent, as matter or form, of the creature.
One and the same substantial principle is and is not above the
created order. 27

Father Mullaney seems to be interpreting de la Taille's
substantial, created actuation as being a partial substance, a
substantial form that would enter into composition with
Christ's human nature as form with matter and would make a
tntium quid, a created, supernatural substance. I admit that
•• Therefore, Father Mullaney's objection ceases to be a general difficulty, against
the very concept of a created actuation by uncreated Act. There is question of a
substantial actuation only in the case of the hypostatic union.
•• art. cit., p. 39.
27 Ibid., p. l!l; d. also pp. !i!0-!!1.
In defense of his rejection of a created supernatural reality of the substantial order, Father Mullaney cites Billuart and St.
Thomas (p. 11l). However, both Rl.'e talking about complete
partial substance
and not about any sort of substantial reality.

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this is a bizarre supposition,
it is the nearest to a coherent
interpretation I have been able to
from Father Mullaney's
different discussions of his objection. 28
In any case, whether Father Mullaney's objection is directed
against a complete or a partial substance
would be both
created
supernatural, we must reject it as inapplicable.
Substance, complete or
pertains to the order of essence;
de la Taille's substantial created actuation pertains to the order
of existence. Furthermore, de
Taille explicitly denies that
his created grace of
is a substance or a part of a
substance:
The grace of
on the contrary, belongs to the substantial
order, without being substance or
of substance: just as your
own existence is substantial,
it is not you or any part of
an actuation of your essence in its capacity of
you but it is
substantial potency to existence. This is why St. Thomas refuses
to call our existence an accident,
in the order of affirmations the
of existence either to our nature or to our
person IS
since existence is not essential to any
created substance. But in the order of realities our existence is not
any less substantial for an that. 29

the face of this explicit statement
a loss to explain Father
" the
repeated assertion of a created substance of the supernatural
order ... "
had made a greater effort to document his
interpretation
de la Taille, the purport of
objection might
have been a
dearer.
it is, I can
of
one
possible way in which the objection might still
valid: perhaps the reasons why a created
substance m a
contradiction
also to a created
the
substantial existence.
and 39-40.
•• art. cit., pp. 18->ll,
•• The Hypostatic Union, p. 47; d. also p. 35. It is curious to find that Father
Mullaney, in his positive exposition of de Ia Taille's theory, implicitly quoted the
second citation (art. cit., p. 5) . When he came to his criticism, he apparently
forgot what he had previously written, unless, perhaps, he is convinced that every
reality of the substantial order is a substance, a most un-Thomistic position.

DE LA TAILLE VS. THOMISTIC

TRADITION

I do not think that this can be proved. A supernatural
created substance by nature would pertain to the created order.
At the same time, however, the beatific vision and its principle,
sanctifying grace, would be connatural to it, despite the fact
that the beatific vision is a knowledge proper to God alone. In
other words, the nature of a supernatural substance would be
at the same time divine and non-divine; such a substance would
be a contradiction. 30
This line of argumentation cannot be applied to de la Taille's
created grace of union. It is a created actuation in the line of
existence, not essence. Consequently, it neither is a nature nor
essentially changes the nature of which it is the existential
actuation. It can, indeed, like sanctifying grace, be called
divine and non-divine, but not under the same aspect. Entitatively, it is created and, therefore, non-divine; terminatively,
however, it is truly divine, because it adapts the humanity to
the uncreated existence of the Word of God. A created actuation in the line of substantial existence is not, therefore, selfcontradictory.
As far as I am able to judge, Father Mullaney's second main
argument for proving that de la Taille's theory of the supernatural is doctrinally dangerous rests on a misunderstanding
of the true nature of the created grace of union, which is not an
actuation in the line of essence. It is quite possible that his
objection has some other basis, but, if so, he has not stated it
clearly. In any case, Father Mullaney has thus far failed to
adduce anything solid on which to base his censure doctrina
non tuta.
In addition to the two main objections Father Mullaney
80 This argument is basically similar to the one used by Billuart (Summa Sancti
Thomae, Tractatus de Incarnatione, diss. IV, a. 5, par. 4) and quoted by Father
Mullaney (art. cit., p. 19). He also quotes (loc. cit.) St. Thomas (In II De
Anima, lect. 1, n. !US) to prove that "a supernatural, created reality of the substantial order is impossible," because " in defining substance 'nothing extrinsic is
included .. .'" Paradoxically, this passage, when seen in its context, proves, on
the contrary, that there are some realities of the substantial order in whose
definitions something extrinsic must be included, namely, substantial forms, which
cannot be defined without reference to matter.

WILLIAM

MACOMBER

offers two other theological objections against de la Taille's
theory as applied to the special case of the hypostatic union.
Since they are mentioned only in passing, it does not seem so
necessary to treat them at great length. Both refer to de Ia
Taille's contention that two existences, at least in some sense,
must be admitted in Christ. Of these, one is the divine, uncreated esse of the Word of God, which becomes the existential
Act of the human nature in the Incarnation. The other esse is
the created actuation of the human nature by the divine esse
of the Word. 31 Against this position Father Mullaney first
protests that, according to de la Taille's own principles, existence and personality are so intimately connected that he
should logically conclude from two existences to two persons
in Christ:
. Interestingly in this very paragraph quoted by de la Taille,
Cajetan asserts the similarity between a potentiality's being perfected by assumption to divine existence, and by assumption to
divine personality. Now if, as Cajetan-the author of de la Taille's
own selection-expressly says, these two are similar; and if assumption to divine existence implies a created existential actuation, as
de la Taille says it does; should not the second-assumption to
divine personality-similarly require a created actuation in the line
of person? De la Taille concludes, as we have seen, to two existences in Christ, from the point of view of actuation. He should
have concluded to two persons also, from the point of view of
actuation.
81 The Hypostatic
Union, pp.
40, and
I myself would prefer not
to call the created grace of union a secondary, created existence (esse), despite
the fact that it is an actuation in the line of existence, because it can be called an
esse only in a very improper sense. Meaning, of course, is more important than
terminology; yet, to speak of two esse's in Christ gives the impression of dividing
Him into two beings. For, "ens denominatur ab esse," and "ens et unum convertuntur." Nonetheless, there is a growing opinion among some Thomists favoring
the doctrine of two esse's in Christ, although not in quite the same form as de la
Taille's. To mention a few: Dom Herman Diepen, 0. S. B. "La critique du
basilisme selon saint Thomas d'Aquin," Revue Thomiste, L (1950), pp.
Jacques Maritain, " Sur la notion de Subsistence," Revue Thomiste, LIV (1954),
n. l; Adrian Hastings, "Christ's Act of Existence,"
esp. p.
pp.
The Downside Review, LXXIII (1954-1955), pp. 139-159; and J.-H. Nicholas,
0. P., "Chronique de Theolegie dogmatique: Discussions autour de l'unitk psychologique du Clwlst," Revue T#tomilte, LID (1958) , pp. 4!7-428.

DE LA TAILLE VS. THOMISTIC

TRADITION

Father Mullaney continues his discussion in a footnote:
This point has special force in view of the peculiar view of personality adopted by de la Taille and erroneously ascribed by him to
Capreolus. He writes " of the two terms, humanity and existence,
the one that holds the other is the person" and again for de la
Taille the whole problem of personality has a satisfactory solution
"drawn from one principle only: namely, the equation between
created personality and ownership of created being." ...
The whole point of de la Taille's theory is that the human nature
of Christ does have, or own, its existential actuation distinct from
the esse Verbi as creature from Creator. Thus in the same sense in
which he predicates two existences of Christ he ought to predicate
two persons.32
As to de la Taille's citation of Cajetan, it should be clear that
a mere quotation does not automatically imply approval of
everything contained therein, much less of the doctrine presupposed by the citation. Cajetan holds that created personality is
constituted by a substantial mode distinct from existence, a position that de la Taille explicitly rejects. 33 Granted, if he held
Cajetan's theory of created personality together with his own
theory of created actuation, de la Taille would be led to suppose
a created actuation of the humanity of Christ in the line of
personality. Similarly, if de la Taille identified created existence with created personality, he would again be forced to
conclude to a created personality in Christ distinct from the
Person of the Word. As it is, he holds neither of these hypotheses and is, therefore, not obliged logically to draw the
erroneous conclusion.
Turning to Father Mullaney's footnote, I fear that the whole
point of de la Taille's theory is not " that the human nature of
Christ does have, or own, its existential actuation." Rather,
the whole point of what de la Taille is saying is precisely the
contrary, that the human nature of Christ does not own anything, but is, instead, entirely owned by the divine Person of the
Word of God. The sacred humanity of the Word is, indeed,
•• art. cit., p. 28 and n. 45.
•• The Hypostatic Union, pp. 17-19.

250

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MACOMBER

actuated by His personal Act of existence, and that actuation
is distinct from the divine existence as creature from Creator.
However, de la Taille nowhere says or wishes to imply that the
humanity possesses its existential actuation as its own. On the
contrary, he says that " the humanity is . . . no longer a
person, because no longer self-contained, no longer the autonomous owner of being; but it is owned itself by One, Who being
His own existence, imparts to the lower substance fellowship
in being with Himself. 34
This is the reason, therefore, why the assumption to divine
personality does not, in de la Taille's view, involve a created
personality: the essential note of personality lies in the autonomous ownership of being, but assumption to divine personality
means precisely the negation of all autonomous ownership, save
by the Person assuming. Hence, it does not follow that, because
there are in some sense two existences in Christ, two persons
must also be asserted.
Father Mullaney's final theological difficulty with de la
Taille's theory of the hypostatic union centers on the problem
of the special relationship that must exist between the divine
Person of the Word and the created actuation which is the
grace of union, such that the humanity is thereby united to the
Word alone as to its Act of existence, and not to all three divine
Persons:
Now according to what order of causality does this created actuation proceed from the esse V erbi? . . . Obviously Pere de la Taille
would not be satisfied with assigning to the Word merely efficient
causality of this communication because all Catholics admit the
efficiency of any one divine Person is the efficiency of the divine
nature, common to all three Persons: if this were the Word's only
causality of the actuation in question, Christ's humanity would be
that of all three divine Persons. Absit! No, for Pere de la Taille the
"actuation" must be a quasi-formal effect of the Verbum. Very
well-what is a quasi-formal cause in this theory? Is it an intrinsic
or an extrinsic cause? The divine Word can be an intrinsic cause of
no creaturely reality, or, stated the other way, no creature can be
intrinsically divine, or non-creaturely. For intrinsic causes are two:
u Ibid., p. 19.

DE LA TAILLE VS. THOMISTIC

TRADITION

251

formal and material. It is according to faith that God can be the
intrinsic form of no creature; and it is according to faith that He
can be subject or matter of no compound. Thus the dilemma: if the
Verbum is an intrinsic cause of the " actuation," then God has
entered into creaturely composition, and a creature is intrinsically
divine; if, contrarily, the Verbum is only an extrinsic cause of the
" actuation," then either that actuation unites the humanity of
Christ to all three divine Persons-a clear heresy-or it does not.
If it does not, then the extrinsic causality in question is no different
in kind from God's extrinsic causality of any other creaturely effect,
with the result that the union of Christ's human nature to the
Verbum could not be different in kind from any other creature's
"union" with God, for every created thing, is, in its creature1y
being, from God efficiently. On any reasonable supposition, then,
de la Taille's position offers rather uncomfortable consequences. 35

Father Mullaney's argumentation is long and rhetorical.
The essential is contained in the next-to-last sentence, because
it is evident that, for de la Taille, the special causality is neither
intrinsic nor such that the humanity is united to all three divine
Persons. 36 Father Mullaney maintains that, if the special
causality exercised by the Word of God in regard to the created
grace of union is extrinsic and such that the humanity is not
thereby united to all three divine Persons, " then the extrinsic
causality in question is no different in kind from God's extrinsic causality of any other creaturely effect, with the result
that the union of Christ's human nature to the Verbum could
not be different in kind from any other creature's ' union ' with
God, for every created thing, is, in its creaturely being, from
God efficiently." I must confess that the logic behind this line
of reasoning escapes me. Father Mullaney seems to be saying,
equivalently: if the causality is extrinsic and does not unite the
humanity to all three divine Persons, then, as in the case of any
creature's " union " with God, it does unite the humanity to all
three divine Persons. Of course, the union that is being denied
is a hypostatic union to the Trinity, whereas the union that is
affirmed of aU creatures is not hypostatic, so that the argumen35

36

art. cit., pp. 40-41.
The Hypostatic Union, pp.

30, 35, and 68-69.

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MACOMBER

tation is not a contradiction. Nonetheless, the consequence of
the apodosis from the protasis of his conditional sentence is
just not evident as it stands in the text.
does the added
that "every created thing is, in its creaturely being,
efficiently" helped particularly, since the special
is not efficient. Perhaps Father Mullaney is
presupposing something that makes his argumentation flow
logically. However, it seems futile to speculate what that
something might be, since it is not expressed in the actual text,
as far as I can determine.
In
to Father
original question,
" according to
order of causality does this created actuation
from the esse V eTbi?," it is simple enough to say
it proceeds according to "quasi-formal causality." 37 In
to the query, "Very well-what is a quasi-formal cause
", it is again easy to state that it is not an
m this
cause nor an efficient cause. Final causality must like37 The concept
of "quasi-formal causality" goes back to Saint Thomas in the
Quaestio Disputata De Veritate, q. 8, a. l and in the Supplementum Partis Tertiae,
q. 92, a. 1, and ad 8. Its application to the hypostatic union is by no means
peculiru· to de la Taille, but is common to many outstanding theologians: Louis
Cardinal Billot, S. J., De Verbo Incamato: Commentarius in Tertiam Partem S.
Thomae (Rome: Gregorian University, 6th edition, 1922), pp. 148-151 and 166167; Karl Rahner, S. J., "Zur scholastischen BegrifHichkeit der ungeschaffenen
Gnade," Zeitsch,-ift fur katholische Theologie, LXIII (1939), p. 147 with n. Hi;
Pietro Parente, De Verbo Incamato (Rome; Marietti, !Znd edition, 1939), pp. 100101. It also appears implicitly in Matthias Joseph Scheeben, llandbuch der
/catholischen Dogma tile (2nd edition of Carl Feckes), vol. 5, part 1 (Freiburg im
Breisgau: Herder, 1954), pp. 188-189 (par. 223, III, nn. 399-400). "Quasi-formal
causality " does not seem to be de Ia Taille's own way of expressing the special
relationship between the Word and the created grace of union; it does not appear
at all in his expository article " Actuation creee par Acte incree," and only occurs
in the following article, " Entretien arnica! d'Eudoxe et de Palamede sur Ia grace
d'union," in connection with the discussion of John of St. Thomas, who talks about
the divinity informing the humanity in Christ (The Hypostatic Union, p. 8!J).
De
Tail!e's
term is more vague (Ibid., p. 35 and n. 8): "On the part of the
V'l'ord as term, therefore, what we have to consider is not only a causal activity
of a peTfecUve Act, 'Which is
for aU that, an informing Act.
saying that on the side of the VVord these two functions
peT.-(ective Act ,are not really distinct; they denote two
created
distinct.'}

DE LA TAILLE VS. THOMISTIC

TRADITION

253

wise be eliminated, since that, too, is common to the Blessed
Trinity. That leaves exemplary causality or a causality that is
sui generis. Since I would not readily admit the latter alternative, I am personally inclined to opt for the former. I realize
that most Thomists are inclined to reduce exemplary causality
to either efficient or final, but their reasons have never appealed
to me as convincing. Nor is it evident to me that exemplary
causality must also be always common to the three Persons of
the Trinity, and, indeed, if the theory of some that the souls
of the just are related to each of the three divine Persons by a
distinct relation be admitted, the conclusion of an exemplary
causality that is not common
However, this
last is admittedly personal speculation not contained in de la
Taille's writings. Suffice it for the present that Father Mullaney's questions and dilemma are not unanswerable. 38
From this investigation I must conclude that Father Mullaney's condemnation of de Ia Taille's theory of the supernatural as " doctrinally dangerous " is not solidly founded on
evidence. He objects that de Ia Taille implicitly obscures the
distinction between the natural and supernatural orders because
he makes nature a material cause of the supernatural and
because he holds for a created supernatural reality of the substantial order. Furthermore, de Ia Taille's doctrine of two
existences in Christ logically leads, on the basis of his own
principles, to the affirmation of two persons in Christ. Finally,
de la Taille cannot explain the special causality that the Word
of God alone exercises in regard to the created grace of union
without being forced logically into a doctrinally untenable
position.
In reply to these objections, I have indicated that the im•• It seems to me that this difficulty can be raised against any Thomistic theory
of the hypostatic union that posits something created distinct from the humanity
(cf. Summa Theol., III, q. 2, aa. 7 and 8: " ... oportet dicere quod (unio naturae
divinae et humanae) sit quiddam creatum . . . Omnis autem relatio quae
incipit esse ex tempore, ex aliqua mutatione causatur . . .") . One can ask with
Father Mullaney, "Now according to what order of causality does this created
something (actuation, mutation, passion, relation, esse, etc.) proceed from the

esse V erbi? "

254

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MACOMBER

plicit obscuring of the distinction between the natural and the
supernatural follows only if the material causality of the
natural be understood in a very strict and univocal sense;
Father Mullaney has given no solid evidence that de la Taille
intended that very strict meaning of the term" Similarly, the
confusing of the two orders would follow if the created supernatural reality of the substantial order were a complete or a
partial substance; de
Taille explicitly denies
his created
grace of union, posited for the hypostatic union, is either" As
for Father Mullaney's reasoning, two existences-two persons
de Ia Taille's
in Christ, this rests on a misunderstanding
doctrine, as though the humanity of Christ possessed the created existence as its own" Finally, Father Mullaney has not
offered a clear proof of his contention that de la TaiHe cannot
give an explanation of the special causality of the Word of God
required by his theory that does not logically lead to theological
erroro
Thus, Father Mullaney's theological criticism of the theory
"
by
"
my
very
He has pointed out two lacunae
Taille's treatment, the failure to discuss in detail the nature of
divine quasi-formal causality and created material causality in
the supernatural order" However, this is not the same as proving the theory to be doctrinally dangerous" The imposition of
theological censures is a serious thing. Therefore, it seems to me
that, before a verdict such as Father Mullaney has passed
against de Taille be arrived at, a most painstaking investigation into the evidence should be required" I do not find that
Father Mullaney has taken a scholarly care proportionate to
the gravity of his undertaking"
WILLIAM

Pontificial Oriental Institute,
Rome, Italy

MACOMBER,

So J,

DE LA TAILLE AND THE INCARNATION:
A REJOINDER

I
HE THOMIST, in January, 1954, published an article
in which I proposed some criticisms of Father de la
Taille's theory
created actuation by uncreated Act. 1
Those criticisms were directed both at the theory in general
and also at
three applications made by its author, namely,
to sanctifying grace, to the light of glory, and to the Incarnation.
This issue of THE THOMIST carries the reply of Father
comber, S. J. to my criticisms; a reply which the editors kindly
permitted me to read in advance of
publication. Other discussions of my criticism have also been published
the five
appearance. 2
years since
For my own part, I think that for two reasons such discussion
is distinctly valuable. First, de la Taille's theory merits serious
attention. In the judgment of some thoroughly competent
theologians it constitutes an impressive contribution to theological development. Therefore, the elucidation of points conceded by all to be somewhat obscure in de la TaiUe's own
presentation, and the spelling out of the implications of the
theory are necessary and useful as aiding
the formation of a
more or less wise judgment.
Secondly, both the theory and discussions centering about it
are part of the larger context of modern theological orientation.
Clearly the characteristic theological preoccupation for a very
long time has been the great mystery of God's dealings with
His rational creature, and that creature's stumbling approach
1

Mullaney, T. U., 0. P. The Incarnation: de la Taille vs. Thomistic Tradition,

THE THOMIST, XVII (1954), pp. l-41.

• Cf. De Letter, P., S. J., "Created Actuation by Uncreated Act," TheologicaJt

Studie8, 18, pp.

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THOMAS U. MULLANEY

to God. 3 Quite possibly discussion of Father de la Taille's particular theory might help shed light on that broader mystery,
because his theory does touch on the fundamental problem of
the relation of the natural to the supernatural.
Certainly, however, Father Macomber and l-and our
readers-will agree that in such discussion between us everything else must be secondary to the two central questions:
I) What did de la Taille teach? 2) Is that teaching acceptable
in light of certain theological tradition? In this answer to
Father Macomber, therefore, I shall not attempt a line by line
answer to his criticisms of my original article. To points in his
article which seem to be immediately concerned with the procedure of my criticism rather than with the content and validity
of de la Taille's theory I shall not attempt a reply. 4 This,
of course, implies neither a reflection on Father Macomber's
treatment of those points nor an implication that I consider
them unassailable; I simply hope we can avoid any needless
shifting of the focus of discussion.
Three distinct criticisms of the theory of created actuation
by uncreated Act were urged in my original article, namely that
1) it " denies by implication the distinction between the supernatural and the natural orders; 2) it rests upon a confusion
between being and becoming, between formal and efficient
causality; 3) it is therefore inherently unacceptable and certainly un-Thomistic." 5
3 To this very
general mystery pertain, for example, Mariology, Josephology,
Ecclesiology, and sacramental theology, etc., all of which have been for some time
areas of very vital discussion and development.
• On this ground I shall not answer, for instance, Father Macomber's assertions
a) that my original paper was poorly documented; b) that some of my argumentation is obscure, or incomplete, or inadequate; c) that I sometimes poorly
state my own position-for example, "Father Mullaney means to say " d) that
my terminology amounts to a theological censure, and so forth. Candor urges me
to confess that I think these points can be refuted; on the other hand, to go into
them might quickly divert discussion from de Ia Taille's doctrine. In any case,
since interested readers can make their own judgment on such questions, I shall
not deal with these and several other rather minute criticisms of my paper, lest
discussion become " bogged down."
• Cf. Mullaney, op. cit., p.

DE LA TAILLE AND THE INCARNATION

257

Father Macomber 1) answers the first point at some length;
2) leaves the second "for subsequent treatment"; 3) dismisses
in one sentence the judgment that de la Taille's theory is unThomistic. " A theological theory is not false merely because
it is novel, nor is Thomistic tradition the only legitimate tradition allowed by the Church to theologians."
My second point, therefore, is not now under discussion; the
third is quickly dismissed; the first is the major area of present
disagreement. Father Macomber and I agree that certain
" minor " points are also controverted between us.
II

The problem of the relevance of de la Taille's theory to the
doctrine of Saint Thomas (the third point of my original criticism) is not, I think, a minor consideration that can be adequately dismissed by merely stating that other traditions are
allowed by the Church to theologians. For very many theologians the question, " Is this theory opposed to Thomistic
tradition?", will be an important factor in any more or less final
judgment they shall make. Therefore, it seems to me that more
must be said on this point than the single sentence Father
Macomber offers.
In point of fact the theory with which we are concerned is
contrary to St. Thomas and to Thomistic tradition. This I
showed at length in my earlier article: this Father Macomber
does not question. 6
Now is that fact-undisputed by Father Macomber-of importance?
First of all, de la Taille considered this question to be of such
considerable importance that he made very extensive efforts6 Father De Letter,
S. J. in the article referred to above (footnote
differs
considerably from Father Macomber in his answer to this and other points of my
original criticism of de Ia Taille. My intention to consider his and Father Macomber's article simultaneously proved quite impractical, among other reasons because
it would certainly have made this paper much too lengthy. Especially since Father
De Letter's paper appeared in another journal my own discussion of it would
less properly belong in THE THOMIST.

THOMAS U. MULLANEY

however unsuccessful-to
relate his theory to traditional
Thomism. The entire approach of his third (and most lengthy)
exposition of the theory is to show its " Thomistic " roots; in
his earlier two expositions page after page is given over to an
exegisis of Saint Thomas and some few of his commentators.
To the theory, then, as understood, developed and taught by
its author, its relation to Thomism was not a matter of relative
indifference; he did not consider that his doctrine might equally
well be opposed to Thomism.
But, secondly, is doctrinal harmony with the teaching of St.
Thomas important to this or any other theological theory?
Quite apart from the intention of a given author, such as de la
Taille, is consonance with St. Thomas' teaching important in
itself?
Only the teaching of the Church is the standard or measure
of doctrinal soundness; if any particular Christian doctor enjoys real authority, the weight of such authority is wholly derived from the teaching authority of the Church. This St.
Thomas himself states, " The teaching of Catholic doctors has
its authority from the Church." 7
Now what authority does the Church bestow on Saint
Thomas? Among all Christian doctors his authority is unique
as the legislation of the Church makes clear; 8 but unique not
just in the sense that his doctrine alone is "canonized" but
even in the sense that, according to the Supreme Pontiff Saint
Pius X: " If the doctrine of any other author or saint has ever
been approved at any time by Us or Our predecessors with
singular commendation joined with an invitation and order to
propagate and defend it, it may easily be understood that it
was commended only in so far as it agreed with the principles
of Aquinas or was in no way opposed to them." 9 Hence, even
as to those authors approved by the Holy See the extent of
their agreement with St. Thomas' principles (or at least their in
no way opposing him) is the measure of the Church's approba• Summa Theol. II-II, q. 10, a. U.
C. I. C. c. 1366, § 2.
9 Motu Proprio,
Doctoris Angelici,' 29 June 1914 AAS, 6 (1914).
8

DE LA TAILLE AND THE INCARNATION

tion of them. And for this there is most serious reason: namely,
the certain and considered judgment of the Holy See that
" St. Thomas is the surest rule of Christian doctrine " 10 so that
those who depart from him, especially in theology, " seem to
effect ultimately their own withdrawal from the Church." 11
The fact-unchallenged by Father Macomber-that de la
Taille's theory is opposed to St. Thomas' teaching and to
Thomistic tradition does seem to be of moment in forming a
judgment about that theory. It is of moment not because a
particular disputant may have a predilection for Aquinas; it is
of moment because of the incomparable authority with which
the Church has invested Saint Thomas. One can say, and say
truly, "other traditions are allowed by the Church to theologians "; but one must add " Yet no other doctrine, as other,
that is, in so far as it is opposed to St. Thomas, is approved by
the Holy See: and this for the very grave reason that (according to Pope Saint Pius X) those who depart from Saint Thomas,
especially in theology, seem ultimately to effect their departure
from the Church herself." To adhere to St. Thomas out of
one's personal enthusiasm or preference would be a mere human
prejudice more harmful perhaps than helpful to one's growth in
doctrine; but to adhere to St. Thomas on account of the
authority of the Roman Church and out of obedience to that
Church is to be most sure of adhering to the Church itself. So
teach the Supreme Pontiffs.
We cannot therefore dismiss in one sentence the significance
of the fact that the theory of created actuation by uncreated
Act is un-Thomistic. That fact is of primary importance in any
theological judgment of the theory; of primary importance, I
may be permitted to repeat, not because one may happen to
like St. Thomas, but because of the unique authority given him
by the Catholic Church.

10 Pope Benedict XIII, Bull, Demissas preces, 6 Nov. 1724 Cf. Berthier, J. J.
Sanctus Thomas Aquinas-Doctor Communis Ecclesiae. (Rome: 1914), p. 147.
11 Letter to Fr. Pegues, 17 Nov. 1907. Cf. Berthier, op. cit., p. 276.

260

THOMAS U. MULLANEY

III
The conclusion that de la Taille's theory denies by
tion the distinction between the natural and the supernatural
orders Father Macomber refutes throughout most of his article;
with it he is chiefly concerned.
Yet in his representation of my criticism, a preliminary
fication is, unfortunately, necessary. Father Macomber writes,
" There are two reasons why Father Mullaney thinks that the
supposition of a created actuation by uncreated Act implicitly
denies the distinction . . . between the supernatural and the
natural orders. One objection is that any such created actuation ' springing from the union of God as Act and the creature
as potency must be a hybrid of the uncreated and the created,
the supernatural and the natural .. .' The other difficulty is
that a created actuation by uncreated Act makes a created
nature contribute positively to a supernatural effect.'' The first
objection, Father Macomber adds, I confined " to the special
case of
hypostatic union"
"
second
finds a
more general application to aU aspects of the theory.'' Elsewhere, Father Macomber repeats, the first of these two
tions I " proposed as a general objection to
entire theory
... " but that I actually discussed it " only in connection with
de la Taille's application to his theory to the hypostatic union."
Very gently, may I suggest that Father Macomber has not
quite grasped the unity of my argumentation? In every alleged
instance of created actuation by uncreated Act we would encounter" a hybrid of the supernatural and the natural " because
according to the implications of de la Taille's doctrine the
natural element as a true material cause would positively and
intrinsically contribute to the constitution of a supernatural
reality. That was and is my point. There is but one objection
here, not two: the difficulty, namely, that on the supposition
of a natural thing's being the true material cause of a supernatural actuation that actuation, because intrinsically caused
by a natural reality, would bridge the divine and the
divine, the supernatural and the natural orders.

DE LA TAILLE AND THE INCARNATION

261

This difficulty I applied not alone " to the case of the hypostatic union" but also to de la Taille's teaching on the light of
glory and on habitual grace. 12 The applications of the objection
differed slightly in each case, to be sure, as the particular instance under discussion required; but the same principle of
argumentation was used throughout that portion of my discussion. Thence I concluded that the one difficulty is intrinsic to
the very notion of created actuation by uncreated Act as the
notion is proposed by de la Taille.
On this point, then, I think that the question argued between
Father Macomber and myself can be thus stated: Does de la
Taille implicitly teach that the natural potency is, in each
instance of " created actuation by uncreated Act," a true material cause of the supernatural actuation, intrinsically entering
into its essential constitution?
On one phase of the question there can be no disagreementnamely that de la Taille expressly maintains that the natural
potency is the material cause of the supernatural actuation;
and that, conversely the actuation informs the natural potency.13 What is controverted is how de la Taille understood
12 Relative to the light of glory I wrote, " There is immediate evidence of de Ia
Taille's breakdown of the distinction between the natural and the supernatural
orders; for here, too, a mere creature is presented as being true and intrinsic cause
Mullaney, 0. P., op. cit., pp. 9!8, 9!4.
of an effect which is properly supernatural."
With respect to de Ia Taille's account of habitual grace, I wrote, " Here ...
de Ia Taille, whatever his intention, does implicitly deny the distinction between
the natural and the supernatural orders . . . there is involved on the side of the
... created nature, material causality in the true sense, with respect to a supernatural entity; the natural is a true cause of the supernatural."
Ibid., !ill. With
reaard to the treatment of Christ's grace of union, I wrote, "Pere de Ia Taille ...
by implication, the real and vastly important distinction between the
natural and the supernatural orders. For, note that the created actuation of
Christ's human nature by the Word is supernatural ... yet this eminently
supernatural reality informs the human nature of Christ, according to de Ia Taille;
conversely, the human nature is the material cause." Ibid., p. 15. To me it seems
evident that here one same objection is urged in three different areas.
1s Speaking of the supposition of a creature as a material cause of a supernatural
reality Father Macomber says " that de la Taille does hold this supposition cannot
be denied ... the natural is a ... cause of the supernatural."
He adds that
this is the common teaching of Saint Thomas and all theologians; that it is

THOMAS U. MULLANEY

" material causality " and " information of the potency " in this
context. Did he mean that the natural potency positively contributes by its own resources to the supernatural effect? My
position is that he means just that, according to the ordinary
sense of his words; Father Macomber thinks that de Ia Taille
meant something other than that. Maintaining that de Ia
Taille did not use his terms in the sense in which he, de Ia Taille,
had already defined them, Father Macomber in turn leaves the
terms, at the end of his discussion, still undefined.
In order to determine what de Ia Taille did teach one must
reread his own words. Here, in order to show that nothing is
taken out of context, I must quote a fairly lengthy passage at
the outset of de la Taille's second exposition of his remarkable
theory. Having indicated what he means by actuation he
writes,
Such actuation is called information if the act is dependent on
the potency either for its existence, as in the case of a lion's soul,
or at any rate for the integration of its radical energies as in the
case of the human soul. In this event we see that, if the act gives,
it also receives ... There is reciprocity of good offices, an exchange
of resources, however unequal they may be; there is mutual indebtedness and interdependence. This is what we mean to convey
by the terms, formal causality and material causality. The potency

is then called matter, the act is called form, and the actuation of the
one by the other is called information.
In the natural order, every actuation is information.
implicitly contained in the solemn teaching of the Council of Trent. At least, then
there is agreement as to the fact of de la Taille's teaching on the matter.
Father Macomber's statement that this position of de la Taille is the common
teaching of theologians, implicit in defined dogma, with the consequence that to
question it is implicitly to question divine truth is, let me say, misleading. What
is commonly agreed and what is of faith is that grace, a supernatural accidental
reality, inheres in the soul. But de la Taille's teaching that the natural "good
offices" and " resources " of the soul are an intrinsic cause of such realities is not
of common agreement nor of faith, implicit or explicit. And, without offense to
anyone, I must say that it is striking that Father Macomber nowhere in his
paper explicitly states what he conceives to be the role of a natural power with
respect to supernatural modification, such as grace. While he expresses approbation
of my position, in stating that the distinctions I made (p. 17 of my original article)
are " valuable," he does not at any time express his own position, nor even what he
thinks was de la Taille's position irl this most crucial question.

DE LA TAILLE AND THE INCARNATION

263

Is the same true in every possible order? The answer is clearly in
the negative if the uncreated Act of being or of intelligibility or of
life ever unites itself, as such, to a created potency. If this takes
place, there will be actuation, but there will be no information in
the sense just defined. The uncreated Act cannot be dependent on
a creature in any way whatever. It will give itself and will receive
nothing. Therefore, no material causality will be found on the side
of the creature . . .
What, then, will happen? There will be a communication of the
Act to the potency; there will be a reception of the Act in the
potency; there will be a perfecting of the potency by the Act, an
amelioration, a change. This ' change ' is not nothing; it is something. It is assuredly not the uncreated Being, which is changeless;
it is not the created potency which is its subject and which it informs. It is something created, within the potency: an infused
adaptation of the potency by the Act: hence created actuation by
uncreated Act. If the question is asked what particular relation
this change bears, as such, to the Act, the answer must be that,
since it is a joining of the potency to the Act, it is the relation
essentially inherent in the union with reference to the term of the
union. 14

Here we find, it seems to me, three closely related propositions: I) Actuation is information if the act is dependent on
the potency. "In this event ... if the act gives, it also receives"; there is "reciprocity of good offices, an exchange of
resources . . . mutual indebtedness and interdependence "
2) Of God, conceived as uniting Himself as Act to a created
potency, this dependence is not verified. In this case " no material causality will be found on the side of the creature "
precisely because God " cannot be dependent on a creature."
3) Nevertheless, in the case of God's uniting Himself to a
creature there is produced in that creature " an infused adaptation" which is "created actuation by uncreated Act"; it is
"something created" whose subject is the creature (potency)
" which it informs."
In summary: Information as a special kind of actuation in10 de Ia Taille, The Hypostatic Union and Created Actuation by Uncreated Act.
franslated by Rev. Cyril Vollert, S. J. (West Baden Springs, Indiana: 1952),
pp. 29, 80.

264

THOMAS U. MULLANEY

eludes dependence on a material cause. Because God (uncreated Act) cannot be dependent on a creature He does not
inform the creature to which He is joined; but whenever God is
united to a creature there arises in the creature a created actuation which does inform (depend upon, as upon a material cause)
the creature.
It is worth noting that when Father de la Taille comes to
treat in particular of each alleged instance of created actuation
by uncreated Act he, in most explicit terms, affirms either that
the actuation informs (depends upon, as upon a material cause)
the natural potency, or that the potency is the actuation's
material cause, or both. For instance, only a few paragraphs
after the passage quoted above we read that the light of glory
is such an actuation; and then " of course this created actuation
of the potency informs its subject; it is dependent on the latter
as on its material cause." 15
The question is clear: in asserting that the natural potency
which informs
is the material cause of the created
that potency, does de la Taille by "material cause" mean a
passive principle which positively contributes from " its own
resources" and by its own "good offices" to the intrinsic
constitution of the effect? I see no real possibility for a negative
answer. In the context, de la Taille having defined a material
cause as including positive contribution to the effect, and positive dependence of the effect immediately applies these notions
to the supernatural order and draws two conclusions: 1) with
respect to the Act (God) the creature does not exercise such
causality, there is " no information in the sense just defined."
Here, then, in the application, to the supernatural order, of the
notion of information there is no shift of meaning; 2) with
respect to the created actuation the creature does exercise
material causality and is therefore informed by that actuation.
In the same context the same author uses the same already
defined terms in applications to the same (supernatural) order
and asserts that he is using those terms in the sense defined!
15 de Ia Tallie, op. cit., p. 8!!. Relative to sanctifying grace Cf., p. 84; to the
grace of union, p. 85.

DE LA TAILLE AND THE INCARNATION

265

To say then that in the second conclusion he means by his
terms something totally different from what he (in the first conclusion) says he means, seems to me simply unjustified. Father
Macomber writes that the meaning of the terms in the second
application is so different from their meaning in the preceding
application (that is, "in the sense just defined") that the
former cannot even be judged by the definition de
Taille has
given his own terms. "Actuation in the supernatural order
cannot be judged by actuation in the natural order."; so says
Father Macomber. But de la Taille, by his own testimony, did
(in the first conclusion) apply hi8 term8 to the supematural
order "
the sense just defined," that is, as including intrinsic
dependence of the effect on a natural creature as a material
cause. And that by "material causality " and " information "
even as related to the created supernatural actuation de la Taille
meant the terms " in the sense defined " is very clear from his
own statement that the supernatural actuation contracts "a
dependence with respect to the potency as does every created
actuation." 16 Of at least one created
that dependence on a material cause which was the sole reason
for excluding information and material causality "in the sense
defined " with :respect to God. Pure Act then cannot inform
because it cannot be dependent; b'llt the created actuation " is
dependent on the latter," i.e. the potency, "as on a material
cause." Hence material causality is here taken " in the sense
defined "-that is, the ratio of a created actuation by uncreated
Act does not exclude, but includes intrinsic dependence on a
merely natural element or potency.
Granted that this is the meaning of de la Taille, what is
objectionable in it? The alleged created actuations by unc:reated Act are, according to de la Tai.lle, essentially superactuation's "inhering " in
' 6 de Ia Taille expressly states that by the supernatural
the subject he does mean " contracting a dependence with respect to the potency
as every created act does" (op. cit., p. 67. Emphasis added). Therefore when he
asserts that natural potencies are informed by, and are material cause of supernatural actuations he implies that the supernatural is as intrinsically dependent on
its potency as is every other created act, even natural actuations.

THOMAS U. MULLANEY

natural. 17 All agree that he so teaches; Father Macomber in
particular strongly and effectively insists that this is explicit
in de la Taille. But a material cause" in the sense defined"upon whose " resources and good offices " the formal cause is
" dependent "-enters into the intrinsic constitution of the
effect, according to the constant tradition of Scholasticism.
Therefore we have a hybrid of the supernatural and the natural
orders, something that bridges the distance between the two:
one reality intrinsically constituted by positive contribution
from each of these orders. Between the orders there is positive
proportion; their mutual " good offices " coalesce in " created
actuations by uncreated Act."
This conclusion, so justifiably rejected by Father Macomber,
is implicit in de la Taille's teaching.
Father Macomber grants that de la Taille asserts that the
natural is the material cause of the alleged supernatural actuations but suggests that "material causality" here has some
special sense. He does not claim that any indication can be
found in de la Taille's text of what that sense is, but says
rather that de la Taille does not clearly define, in this context,
how he uses the term. Father Macomber, omitting to state
what, in his interpretation, the definition would be, says merely
that from the natural order we cannot reach judgments about
the supernatural order in this question of actuations.
May I point out, without any offense to anyone, that this
position is more destructive of de la Taille's work than is my
own? For, as we have seen, de la Taille first defines his terms;
then immediately applies them to the supernatural order. I£, in
that application, the meaning of the terms is so different from
the defined meaning-and Father Macomber says it is-that
from the defined meaning we simply "cannot judge" about
their meaning in their application then de la Taille was 1) simeven
ply foolish to give the definitions he does give, and
worse, the whole exposition of his theory is meaningless for he is
using terms, natural words, in a sense that " cannot be judged "
11

de la Tallie, op. cit., pp. 86, 87.

DE LA TAILLE AND THE INCARNATION

by any natural analogue. If the meaning of such words as
"information," "actuation" and "material causality," key
terms in de la Taille's entire theory, cannot be ]udged from
the natural order, then no one can ever know, nor could de la
Taille himself know, what de la Taille was talking about. Such a
conclusion, Father Macomber and I would agree, is intolerable.
The alternative-de la Taille's doctrine implies positive proportion between the supernatural and the natural orders, a
hybrid of the two-may seem to be rendered doubtful by de la
Taille's explicit statements, quoted by Father Macomber, that
there is no such proportion. One must conclude, I think, merely
that what de la TaiHe explicitly says and what he unwittingly
implies may conceivably be quite different. Many an author,
many a theologian, has at some time defended a position whose
real but hidden implications were contrary to that author's
explicit convictions. This is a human danger, quite common.
That one fall into it is no more a reflection upon one than is
one's general limits; for what is involved is human limitation.
Should another happen to see and point out the implication,
he must be aware that he may in the very act fall into the
same trap. But one gets up.
For the sake of testing de la Taille's theory so far as we can,
within the limits of the present discussion, we might profitably
investigate a possible interpretation suggested, but not adopted
o:r defended, by Father Macomber. Let us prescind from the
created potency's role of true material cause (materia ex qua)
of the alleged created actuations by uncreated Act; let us
consider the potency merely as subject in which the actuation
is (materia in qua); a point of view which is not alien to Father
Macomber's interpretation of de la Taille. 18
18 The " subject " of a form may be either a true material cause ex quo resultat
effectus--<Jr merely a subject in which the form resides, as I pointed out in my
paper of five years ago. Father Macomber seems to suggest, though he does not
state, that when de Ia Taille speaks of a natural thing as the material cause of a
supernatural actuation he should be interpreted to mean merely a subject in which
and not a true material cause. In this sense I say that such a consideration is
not alien from Father Macomber's interpretation-though,
as I should have shown,
I do think it is alien to the real implications of de Ia Taille's theory.

THOMAS U. MULLANEY

Even here we encounter difficulty which seems to me to be
very substantial.
First as to habitual grace, as one instance of " Created
actuation by uncreated Act"; then as to the light of glory;
thirdly as to Christ's grace of union.
Grace according to Saint Thomas and de la Taille is a quality
in the essence of the soul; a habit, an entitative habit. But
according to de la Taille it is also the potency's " union with
the subsistent Act"; 19 a "possession of the Act by the
potency," a "deep-seated union underlying love itself" 20
whereby " the essence of the soul . . . finds itself united and
henceforth wedded to the divine essence and associated with
divine life." 21 It is, in short, " the relation essentially inherent
in the union with reference to the TERM of the Union." 22
Now can any entitative habit of the soul be a" deep seated
union " whereby " the essence of the soul ... finds itself united
... wedded to the divine essence"? Short of a hypostatic
union God can be united to a creature in two ways: a) as
agent cause and in this way He is always present to all creatures;
b) as object of the creature's activities, and in this way God
is present to the rational creature in so far as He is object
known and loved. Very explicitly St. Thomas writes that the
special presence of God through grace is the union with God
achieved by the operation of faith and hope. 23
The first of these presences is of the natural order; only the
second is supernatural. Yet the second kind of union is intentional, affective, a union not in being (for the soul of the just
man is not God) but in knowledge and in love (the just man
loves God).
Now if habitual grace, a habit in the essence of the soul
(prior, in nature, to faith and charity) achieves a union of
the created " essence of the soul . . . to the divine essence "
God is as term either of the soul's essence or of its activities.
But, de la Taille says, grace unites to God not the soul's activide Ia Taille, op. cit., p. 84.
•• Ibid.
Ibid., p. 88.

19

•• Ibid., p. so.
•• Cf. Summa Tkeol. I, q. 48, a. 8.

DE LA TAILLE AND THE INCARNATION

269

ties but its essence. Not its activities, we might add, exactly
because grace is in the essence of the soul, and that essence is
not, cannot be, immediately operative with respect to any
object; if it were, for the soul esse est operari-which is true
only of God.
So, de la Taille says, grace, as prior in nature to faith and
love, unites the soul's essence to God as term. Now, the only
terms to which substantial essence is uniteable are person, and
existence (if one distinguishes between them), because between
a thing terminated (soul as to its essence) and its formal termination there must be correspondence; the substantial essence
of the soul demands the substantial termination which is personality or existence. Therefore, if de la Taille be correct,
sanctifying grace is a union to a substantial term; it is hypostatic union to divine person or persons; or else a substantial
entitative union to divine existence. In any case, every man
in the state of grace would be substantially divine.
Now certainly de la Taille wished to teach nothing so absurd.
But if we accept St. Thomas' and de la Taille's teaching that
habitual grace is in the essence of the soul; and if we add de la
Taille's original contribution that grace is the union with God
as term, then I think that absurdity must follow.
A similar difficulty suggests itself with regard to the light of
glory as an instance of created actuation by uncreated Act.
This lumen, de la Taille describes as " precisely the means
whereby the intellect is raised to the divine object immediately;
or better, it is this immediate union itself." 24 And again,
" The disposition for both Act and the operation which at the
same time is the change of the potency and the union of the
potency with the Act-all this is the light of glory." 25 So de la
Taille formally identifies " these two things in the blessed: the
union of the intellect with the uncreated ' Form ' and the
'mutation' (which is assuredly created) of the intellect." 26
Thus for de la Taille the light of glory is the union of the intel•• de Ia Taille, op. cit., p. 49.
•• Ibid., p. 82.
•• Ibid., p. 66.

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THOMAS U. MULLANEY

lect with the divine intelligible; which union gives the power to
see God for "the divine essence will not have the function of
the intelligible form in my intellect unless my intellect is
affected by this Act . . . to the point of being endowed with
the power to see and penetrate that Act." 27 At once the union
and the power to be united-" all this is the light of glory."
The effective divine producing of a power in the creature isso we are told-precisely the same reality as the creature's
union, through its created action, with the term of that operation; hence the power is the operation; posse operari est operari.
For, note, it is the 'mutatio ' in the creature that is identical
with the union; and 'mutatio ' here names the power, the
lumen as received, or as proceeding efficiently from God. So
God's infusing the lumen to which corresponds reception of
the power or lttmen: this is the operation of knowing by the
lumen. Truly posse est operari in this account.
Again we have a choice. If we shall accept from Saint
Thomas and from de la Taille the teaching that the light of
glory is effectively from God present to the mind as agent cause,
and that from this lumen and the mind proceeds the vital act
of vision we have (in very incomplete fashion) some notion of
traditional teaching. If we shall add de la Taille's original
contribution-the light of glory is the immediate union to the
Act-we have an impossibility.
The hypostatic union is the third instance of an alleged
created actuation by uncreated Act. Here, too, let us prescind
from de la Taille's implicit doctrine that this substantial actuation, ("at the summit of the supernatural") is intrinsically,
materially caused by a natural thing. We simply inquire,
therefore, whether any difficulty arises from de la Taille's
teaching as now interpreted to mean nothing more than that
the grace of union is in Christ's humanity as in a subject in
quo sed non ex quo.
Patently difficulty arises from de la Taille's own words. The
hypostatic union he describes as a union which is" inhering in
•• Ibid., p. 64.

DE LA TAILLE AND THE INCARNATION

the humanity." 28 Taken in the obvious sense this is equivalent
to saying that the hypostatic union is a created accident whose
subject is Christ's human nature. St. Thomas expressly teaches
that this is one secondary but legitimate meaning of the phrase
"grace of union." 20 Had de la Taille stopped here there would
be no problem.
To any :reader of de la TaiHe it is very apparent-Father
Macomber agrees-that de la Taille also taught that the grace
of union_is 1) of the substantial, not of the accidental, order;
2) of the order of existence, not of essence. De la TaiHe wrote
"Here again we have an actuation by uncreated Act: a created
actuation as before, but this time of a substantial order, not
an accidental order, because it brings the human nature into
existence, and into an existence that is not of an accidental, but
of a substantial order. This substantial actuation is precisely
the grace of union; created grace, ... but a truly substantial
adaptation and conformation to the
yet not a substance
nor part of a substance; no more so than the substantial existence of creatures forms part of their substance ... " 30
Grace of union in Christ is then a created, existential actuation of the substantial order, " at the summit of the supernatural." This is the passive actuation in the substantial
human nature of Christ; it is also the immediate union itself
to divinity for by it " in His very humanity Christ is Son, the
only Son of God, by nothing else than the eternal generation
. . . there is not, and there cannot be, on the part of God, a
fuller donation of Himself than that by which He becomes
the very act of existence whereby the created substance
exists 0" 31
Here difficulty multiplies.
There is first the difficulty that the grace of union is said to
be both of the order of existence and also something caused by
the divine li.ct of existence. Now the Act of existence coming to
a nature causes in it precisely nothing: for the existence is to the
nature as term, not as cause. Existence gives itself: it gives the
0

28
29

Ibid., p. 68.
Summa Theol. III, q. 2, a. 7.

80 de la Taille, op. cit., pp. 34, 35.
"'Ibid., p. 4H.

••

272

THOMAS U. MULLANEY

perfection of being: from it no effect can possibly proceed. As
John of St. Thomas points out, a principle that terminates
formally as terminative cannot be formally as cause to that
whose term it is. 32 In particular, existence cannot cause an
effect in the nature because it is precisely that by which a thing
is placed outside its cause, not that from which proceeds some
effect into the nature, an effect distinct from existence and
dependent, as to its being, on that existence. Existence is term,
not cause. Therefore, that the grace of union be simultaneously
an effect of the existential Act and union of the created nature
to its term (divine existence) 1s impossible. From existence
no-thing proceeds.
There is a second difficulty,
that given de
Taille's
into
supposition the grace of union must-impossibly-enter
some kind of substantial union with Christ's created nature, or
else be a mere accident. For de la Taille supposes 1) that personality does not precede, in nature, the advent of existence:
ownership of existence constitutes the person so that the
of personality and of existence are one; 2) that the grace of
union is dispositive to divine existence: it is "adaptation
conformation to the 'Word "; 33 it is " a disposition," 34 " a
divinely infused adaptation" needed in order that" the desired
correspondence or proportion between the potency and the Act
may be established." 35 Hence as a disposition or proportion,
previous in nature to the fonnal union, (with which it is formally identical!) its subject is the humanity not yet personalized or existing only nature, substance, precedes the person.
Therefore the actuation must enter into substantial union with
the nature; or if it is conceived as a disposition subsequent to
the Person (and the existence) then it is accidental for modifications following suppositality are predicable accidents. We
have already seen that de la Taille implies, in fact, that the
actuation is an accident which " inheres " in the human natureo
In summary: if one takes into account de la Taille's various
John of St. Thomas, Cursus Philosophicus, II, p. 200. (Reiser edition).
•• de la Taille, op. cit., p. 35.
35 Ibid., p. 37.
•• Ibid., p. 34.
32

DE LA TAILLE AND THE INCARNATION

273

descriptions of this " created actuation " which is grace of union
one must conclude that it is a) of the existential o:rder, as 'de
la Taille maintains, yet b) not of the existential order but an
effect produced by the existential act; although existence is not
a cause producing effects; c) it is not a substance nor part of a
substance, as de la Taille maintains; yet d) since it is a "disposition ... to the Word" it must enter into substantial
composition with the human nature, and so be substantial; or
else e) it is an accident following the personified nature although f) de la Taille teaches it is not an accident.
The confusion arises, may I suggest, from de la TaiHe's
statements, taken in their obvious sense. I do not create it;
I indicate it.
Nor can we escape the confusion by saying, for example,
"the actuation is neither prior nor subsequent to the Wo:rd:
it is concomitant with His advent, for it is of the existential
order, and He comes to the humanity as its existential Act
communicating, bestowing, the created actuation." This 1 I say,
is no escape: for even as an existential actuation the grace
union is, according to de
Taille, " a mutation " of the
manity, "a disposition," "an adaptation." None of these,
namely, to change, to dispose, or to adapt nature is the function
of existence: nor is existence " a union " " inhering " in the
human nature it actuates. The point is simply that the real
distinction between created essence and created existential
actuation-a distinction de la Taille strove to maintain- will
not permit de la Taille to confuse that which pertains to the
essential order (such as changes, dispositions, and so forth)
with that existence which is outside the order of essential alteration or disposition.
There is the third difficulty that this alleged created substantial actuation which is Christ's grace of union, is supernatural, even " at the summit of the supernatural." My article
of :five years ago sufficiently proves, I think, that such a conception involves a contradiction in terms. 36 With the general
•• Mullaney, op. cit., pp. 18-20.

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THOMAS U. MULLANEY

truth that a created substance cannot be supernatural Father
Macomber seems not to quarrel; but he does vigorously deny
that any such concept is involved in de la Taille's theory, on
the ground that the created grace of union is not, according to
de Ia Taille, a substance at all.
Here would seem to be the place then to consider the more
limited problem whether, in fact, the theory expounded by the
great French Jesuit implies that Christ's grace of union is something of the order of created substance. Expressly de la Taille
says that it is neither a substance nor a part of a substance; but
do the implications of his teaching sustain that conviction?
I think not.
Of alleged created actuation by uncreated Act, taken generally, de la Taille says that it will be "a reception of the Act
in the potency " " a perfecting of the potency " " an amelioration, a change " which change " is not nothing: it is something
... an infused adaptation"; "it is the relation essentially
inherent in the union with a reference to the term as of the
union." 37 These descriptions apply to created actuation by
uncreated Act as such; therefore to the grace of union as one
such " created actuation." This grace of union in particular de
la Taille, as we have seen, describes as "a disposition," "an
adaptation," a union which is " inhering " in the human nature,
" a mutation " and so forth. This we have seen above.
Now while the terms used are multiple they have this in
common: every one of them in its proper sense designates some
category of essential being. Union, for example, is in the category of relation: it is not existence. M utatio, "change," "reception," " adaptation " in the context are all equivalent to the
category of passio--which, again, is not existence but a category
of essential beings. Basically, de la Taille describes his created
actuation including the grace of union, as being simultaneously-1) relations of union and 2) passiones. Both are categories of essential, accidental created being. Existence cannot
possibly be a relation of union, nor a mutatio, pertaining to
•• de Ia Tallie, op. cit., p. 89.

DE LA TAILLE AND THE INCARNATION

275

efficient causality. Therefore, if the grace of union really is
union at all, it must essentially be some-thing and not nothing: 38 it must be some essential reality. It is-by de la
Taille's own words-also created, substantial, and at the summit of the supernaturaL It would be a created supernatural
substantial reality-which, as I showed in my earlier article,
is quite impossible. Father Macomber's point, borrowed from
de la Taille, that it is existential actuation only compounds the
impossibility.
Created, essential (because predicamental)
being such as union which is substantial, which is existence, and
which is supremely supernatural-at least one may wonder if
such n self-contradictory juxtaposition of concepts really sheds
light on the divine mystery of the Incarnation.

IV
Lastly, I should like to discuss directly a point raised by
Father Macomber against my paper of five years ago. It is a
point too important, I think, either to omit or to imprison in
a mere footnote.
I wrote: " in this very paragraph, quoted by de la Taille,
Cajetan asserts the similarity between a potentiality's being
perfected by assumption to divine existence and by assumption
to divine personality. If, as Cajetan,-this author of de la
Taille's own choice-expressly says, these two are similar; and
if assumption to divine existence implies a created existential
actuation, as de la Taille says it does; should not the
assumption to divine personality-similarly
require a created
actuation in line of person? De la Taille concludes, as we have
seen, to two existences in Christ, from the point
of
actuation. He should have concluded to two persons, also, from
the point of view of actuation." 39
Father Macomber rejects both my conclusion and my premise; my premise on the ground that the mere fact of quoting
30 Of created actuation
by uncreated Act, in general, de Ia Taille says it "is not
nothing ... it is something," op. cit., p. 30.
•• Mullaney, op. cit., p.

276

THOMAS U. MULLANEY

from an author need not imply approval of everything said by
the author in that place. This I must concede: my argument as
proposed assumes too much.
But, for other reasons, I cannot concede to Father Macomber
his rejection of my conclusion, namely, that de la Taille should
have taught that there are in Christ two persons in the same
sense that he teaches two existences in Him. That conclusion,
it seems to me, lies implicit in the theory of created actuation
by uncreated Act.
First, de la Taille certainly teaches that in some real sense
Christ has two existences: the uncreated existence as the Word,
and that created existence, or existential actuation, which is the
grace of union. 40 But he also holds that the created nature that
has, or possesses, created existence is a created person, for, he
maintains, the questions of what created nature is a person and
what is not "receive ... satisfactory solutions drawn from
one principle only: namely, the equation between created personality and ownership of created being." 41 He also states that
it is the nature that "possesses" being or existence, not vice
versa, for he describes as a human person " the humanity
(which) is possessed of an existence all its own"; 42 and again
he writes, "Have that (connatural existence), I would say to
the nature, and at once you are a man, you are somebody," 43
that is, a person. In form, then, de la Taille teaches:
A created nature is a created person when it possesses created,
proportionate existence.
But the created nature of Christ has, in some real sense, a created
existence, proportionate to it.
Therefore-but who shall say it?

The major is but a regrouping of de la Taille's own words.
The second premise is clear: for, according to de la Taille 1) a
created, existential actuation inheres in the humanity of Christ:
•• de la Taille, op. cit., pp. 40, 78.
Ibid., p.
•• Ibid., p. 19.
•• Ibid., p.
41

DE LA TAILLE AND THE INCARNATION

CJ.77

therefore Christ's humanity possesses it, 2) this possessed
created existence is proportionate to the humanity at least in
the sense that it is a "substantial adaptation and conformation" of the humanity; temporal, like the humanity, not
eternal; created, not uncreated; defectible, not changeless. In
short, there is no point to de la Taille's theory at all save to
insist that every union of uncreated Act to a created potency
communicates to the creature created perfection proportionate
to that creature; the hypostatic union in particular communicates supernatural, existential created actuation.
So the conclusion seems inescapable: in the same sense that
de la Taille so clearly teaches that Christ has a created existence he ought also to teach that Christ has a created personality.
Father Macomber's position that de la Taille teaches that
the Word as existing possesses Christ's humanity, not the
humanity an existence is not without justification; but, unfortunately for de la Taille's theory, its author also implies the
reverse. Here, as elsewhere, it is the unanalyzed, but quite
clear, implication o£ de la Taille's teaching that makes one
pause, rather than what is explicitly stated.
It may be permissible for me here to add that it is no pleasure
to criticize the work o£ a theologian like de la Taille, nor do I
enjoy disagreement with Father Macomber. Criticisms of one
another's work by priest-theologians has never been matter for
rejoicing. Yet such criticisms are inevitable, for men normally
progress in knowledge o£ truth only by probings that necessarily start from different viewpoints, and so, £or a while,
produce quite different results. But beneath the disagreement
lies, please God, something of splendid value: love for God's
truth such that we are willing even to disagree for a while, in
our mutual hope of serving that truth. May the honesty of
criticism be, Deo adjuvante, one indication of the love.
THOMAS

Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

U. MuLLANEY, 0. P.

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS
KEVIN I!'. O'SHEA, C. SS. R., is at present engaged in teaching Dogmatic
Theology at the Redemptorist House of Studies of the Australasian
Province in Ballarat, Victoria, Australia.
WILLIAM F. MAcoMBER, S. J., a graduate of Harvard University and
Weston College, is now engaged in Oriental Studies at the Pontifical
Institute of Oriental Studies in Rome.
THOMAS U. MuLLANEY, 0. P., S. T. D., S. T. Prael., a graduate of the Angelicum, Professor of Dogmatic Theology in the Pontifical Faculty of
Theology at the Dominican House of Studies, Washington, D. C., is a
frequent contributor to scholarly publications.
RALPH M. MciNERNY, Ph. D., a graduate of Laval University, is a member
of the Department of Philosophy at Notre Dame University, Notre
Dame, Indiana.
MARY DALY, a frequent contributor to the Book Review Section, received
her M.A. from Catholic University and her Ph. D. in Theology from
St. Mary's College, Notre Dame, Indiana, where she teaches on the
Summer School Faculty. She is on the faculty of Cardinal Cushing
College.
WILLIAM PAUL HAAs, 0. P., S. T. L., S. T. Lr., is Professor of Sacred Theology at Emmanuel College, Boston, Mass., and lecturer at the Cardinal
Cushing School of Theology.

278

BOOK REVIEWS
Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy. By WILLIAM BARRETT.
Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1958. Pp. %!78 with
Index. $5.00.
Professor Barrett, in a book long awaited by those who profited from a
reading of his post-war PARTISAN REVIEW pamphlet, What is Existentialism?, has chosen his subtitle if not his title well. His book is an essay in
as well as on existentialism. This is not to say that it consists of independent
elaborations on the recognized existential themes: its form is that of the
historical essay. But as history it differs from the general run of such
works because a lengthy and serious attempt is made to locate existentialism in the history of western philosophy and because Barrett's approach
is one of profound sympathy and general agreement with the existential
attitude. Existentialism is, he feels, the authentic philosophy of our times.
The book is divided into four parts. Part one examines the contemporary
context in which existentialism appears as a new and formidable philosophical force; part two is concerned with ancient, medieval and classical
modem sources and anticipations of existentialism; part three consists of
chapters devoted to Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre respectively; part four, one summary chapter, appears to be a correction of the
title. Its concern is "Integral vs. Rational Man." Appended to the work
are two short pieces, the first treating of the negative as revealing human
finitude, a complement to the chapter on Heidegger. The second, " Existence and Analytic Philosophers," returns to something discussed in the
text, the existential proposition.
The chapters of part one amount to a perceptive analysis of the factors
of our times which have, so to speak, given rise to existentialism. The
philosopher, as academic specialist, is remote "from the ordinary and
concrete acts of understanding in terms of which man actually lives his
day-to-day life." (p. 6) This specialization has led to a morbid preoccupation with technique and method reflecting the philosopher's feeling
of guilt at not being a scientist. The reaction of American philosophers,
taken as academic specialists, to the advent of existentialism after the
war was, Barrett feels, symptomatic: they dismissed it as a fad, a thing of
mood. Thereby they exhibited " the view that philosophic truth can be
found only in those areas of experience in which human moods are not
present." (p. 9) Although involving "moods," existentialism is not merely
a postwar fad. We see that it is a philosophical movement which comprises
Protestants, Catholics, Jews; Spaniards, Frenchmen, Germans, Russians,

279

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BOOK REVIEWS

etc. Barrett is plainly irked by what he takes to be the continuing rejection
of existentialism on the part of American philosophers. His examination of
European existentialism is intended to show that this philosophy is a
response to what is most definitive of our epoch.
There has been, Barrett argues, a genuine encounter with nothingness
by contemporary man. Our whole civilization, our very planet, is threatened, and our lives are without the support of religious commitment. Man's
view of himself, of his society, of his science, has changed utterly: having
become "problematic in his own essence," man despairs of rationalism's
ideal of the state. Moreover, the foundations of the sciences, even of
mathematics, have been called into queston. " There is no system possible
for human existence, Kierkegaard said a century ago, differing from Hegel
. . . the system is impossible for mathematics, Godel tells us today."
(p. 34) In a word, the bottom has dropped out of every area of human
existence; the rationalist dream is repudiated: man becomes aware of his
essential finitude in becoming aware of Nothing. (In an aside, Barrett
attributes thomism's lack of appeal nowadays to the "radical evolvement "
of the " total psychic condition of man.")
Special attention must be drawn to Barrett's remarkable third chapter:
" The Testimony of Modern Art." The fine arts today reflect the disintegration of man's image of himself. The structure of the modern novel,
for instance, is its lack of structure. Shakespeare could write that life is
a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing, but
the remark occurs in a play whose intelligible structure is clear. (It is
perhaps an oversimplification to say, as Barrett does, "in which evil is
destroyed and good triumphs.") Faulkner, on the other hand, gives us the
meaningless sound and fury: "a world opaque, dense, irrational." The
reader misses a reference to Camus' L'homme nivolte here. If Camus had
been taken into account, I think Barrett would not have said that the
Greek artistic form left no room for the irrational. The Poetics teaches
that the mythos which involves tyche, in which peripety and discovery
are accomplished by chance, is the best. But, of course, the irrational in
the play cannot be such for the viewer; even it must participate in the
intelligible structure of the mythos. So too, as Camus points out, the
intelligible meaning of the" absurd novel" is that life is absurd: the events
have to be selected and presented in such a way that the reader under. stands that life has no meaning. Thus, meaninglessness is the intelligible
import of such a novel. (Camus' L'etranger, for example, becomes doubly
delightful read against the background of Le mythe de Sisyphe and
L'homme revolte.) Despite the superficiality of his remark about the
Greeks, Barrett's point is clear. There is today a type of art which can be
said to feed on nothing-and it captures our imagination. His example is
Beckett's Waiting for Godot. Why are we intrigued by such works?

BOOK REVIEWS

281

Because they express what we all feel, and: " In our epoch existential
philosophy has appeared as an intellectual expression of the time, and this
philosophy exhibits numerous points of contact with modern art." (p. 56)
In part two, Barrett makes use of Arnold's dichotomy of Hebraism and
Hellenism to find in antiquity a presentiment of existentialism. For
Hebraism, the human ideal is the man of faith, the " whole man." So too
existentialism's ideal man. The Hebrew ideal as involving faith, the
whole man, passionate commitment, distrust of reason and the sense of sin
prefigures existential man. The Greek ideal, on the other hand, is the
man of reason, concerned with universals, speculatively detached, logical
and innocent-all more or less pejorative in Barrett's analysis.
The treatment of the Greek ideal is a trifle facile, too patently ordered
to providing historical fanfare for existentialism. It is nonsense to suggest
that Aristotle thought the difficulties of human action disappeared before
the sweep of pure reason. Books six and seven of the Ethics are surely
disproof enough of that contention. Moreover, the image of the Greek as
one whose sunny, untroubled countenance was forever raised to a blue,
intelligible sky has long since been discarded as a scholarly fiction. (Cf.
the works of Jane Harrison and the recent, The Greeks and the Irrational,
by E. R. Dodds.)
In discussing Christian sources of existentialism, our author touches
on the faith-reason problem, essence and existence, voluntarism, and concludes with a sketch of Pascal. As more immediate precursors, Swift, the
English Romantic Poets (Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge), Dostoievski and
Tolstoy are discussed. Chapter Five, " The Flight from Laputa," seemed to
me to attain the heights of the earlier treatment of modern art.
After so much preparation (half the book) , the section on the existentialists may initially disappoint. The four thinkers treated are the
usual ones: Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre. Too, a quick
glance suggests that the treatment of them is like too many others. Nevertheless, and doubtless because of the lengthy route he has taken to these
men, Barrett's analyses are not run-of-the-mill. Moreover, his obvious
sympathy with existentialism is more often an aid to him than a blind spot.
The treatment of Kierkegaard is incisive and generally excellent. The
Works of Love or Training in Christianity are recommended as good
starting books, and the suggestion is defensible. (Perhaps the Point of
View and the Journals before these would be best.) Allusion is made to
the pseudonymous character of many Kierkegaardian works, but the
significance of this is not stressed. Barrett notes correctly that it is " our
ordinary human existence" that interests Kierkegaard, but it is Barrett,
not Kierkegaard, who confuses this existence with that at issue in discussions of existential propositions. " If existence cannot be represented in a
concept," he (i.e. Kierkegaard) says, it is not because it is too general,

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BOOK REVIEWS

remote and tenuous a thing to be conceived of, but rather it is too dense,
concrete and rich. I am; and the fact that I exist is so compelling and
enveloping a reality that it cannot be reproduced thinly in any of my
mental concepts, though it is clearly the life-and-death fact without which
all my concepts would be void." (p. 144) This curious melange of problems
is peculiar to Barrett. I think it is true to say that Kierkegaard was
never-except once, tangentially, actually in a footnote-concerned with
existence as discussed in existential propositions. Barrett's presentation
of the Kierkegaardian doctrine of the " stages " is one of the best I have
read; that of subjective and objective truth not so good.
The chapter on Nietzsche succeeds in giving form and direction to his
thought; the chapter is particularly well constructed in its backward reference to Kierkegaard and forward reference to Heidegger. The treatment
of Heidegger, however, is disappointing. Heidegger's concern with etymology is cogently defended, and this is welcome. (Barrett sees Heidegger's concern with language as completely different from that of British
philosophers; perhaps there is greater affinity than one would at first expect
between Heidegger and the later Wittgenstein.) Heidegger's view of truth
is wrestled with, but Barrett has difficulty trying to make it jibe with
what he takes to be existential truth. His suggestion on p. 211 seems a
wilful twisting of the (obvious?) meaning of Heidegger's own remarks.
Barrett seems much more at ease with the Heidegger of Sein und Zeit,
with the existential analysis of dasein. The remarks on the Heideggerian
Being are, if possible, more obscure than those of the master. The chapter
on Sartre is noteworthy for its stressing of the basic cartesianism of
Sartre. The famous statement that " existence precedes essence " is discussed well (my qualifications will follow); the section on existential psychoanalysis is extremely good.
Barrett's book is an excellent one for its historical depth as well as for
its provocative analyses of selected existentialists. Its value, however,
does not lie in what it is about, but rather in what it is. Irrational Man
embodies a view of philosophy that has to be reckoned with. True, it will
be thought by many to be a gross simplification of the tenor of existential
philosophy, but perhaps with its jargon and ponderous self-importance
stripped away, existentialism is, at least in part, what Barrett takes it to
he. And what is that? "In comparison with traditional philosophy, or with
other contemporary schools of philosophy, Existentialism, as we have seen,
seeks to bring the whole man-the concrete individual in the whole context
of his everyday life, and in his total mystery and questionableness-into
philosophy." (p. 244) Its central passion is for "a truth for man that is
more than a truth of the intellect." (p. 222) It is precisely this notion
of truth as well as those of existence and essence, however, which seem most
confused in this book-and in several existentialists-particularly
when
more traditional meanings of these terms are referred to. Sartre's rejection

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283

of an essence of man which would precede existence can only be understood in terms of a Leibnitzean essence which would contain my history
and destroy freedom. The essence with which Sartre is concerned is
really man's moral whatness, and this is indeed a result of existence, i.e.
of free choices. The discussion on pp. 89-97 indicates the confusion that
has crept into Barrett's thinking-as well as the responsibility some
thomists bear for confusion with respect to essence and existence. (This
weakness of Barrett's book is also present in Wild's Challenge of Existentialism.) Gilson's Being and Some Philosophers is, Barrett feels, a great
book. That it is an influential one is clear from these pages. Barrett
takes existence (in the thomistic sense of actus essendi) to be the history
of our actions, what makes us to be the kind of person we are. Gilson, of
course, had earlier reduced all differences between this man and that to
esse. (Cf. op. cit., p. 186) Whether he realizes it or not, it is not esse
substantiate which concerns Barrett; if essence in its primary sense were
what concerned him, he could take comfort in the adage: lwmo non est
humanitas. But he is not interested in essence so considered. It is quite
true that what is accidental to " humanity " is of the essence of my moral
character. The here and now in which I must make the choices which will
contribute to my moral whatness are not accidental to those choices: as
circumstantiae they in their fashion define my choices and consequent
character. If I ask what Socrates is, the answer given will not decide what
Socrates is to do here and now. Neither his essence nor his esse substantiale
have immediate relevance for his prudential choices. There is little point
in berating Barrett for his remarks concerning scholastic thought, however;
his source is Gilson. To Barrett's credit, he rejects the attempt to use
St. Thomas' distinction of essence and existence in the area which concerns existentialism. The distinction, he notes, is " too abstract and schematic. The medieval conceptions of essence and existence do not do justice
to the full concreteness of modern experience, particularly to our experience of man himself." (p. 97) Which translated means, I think, that
they do not have immediate practical relevance-and that is forever true.
It would be difficult to document the view that it is the practical impact
of philosophy which constitutes Barrett's chief interest. Nevertheless, at
crucial points in his book, it seems dear that his predilection for existentialism is founded in the belief that it is a philosophy which assesses our
present predicament, the plight of western civilization, that it promises
us the hint of a way out of our difficulties. It does this by depriving us of
any rationalistic optimism, as if all we had to do is think things out
clearly and distinctly. This, I think, explains Barrett's plea for a truth
which is more than correctness of thought. Is it not the case that the truth
of the whole man, that which engages appetite as well, is prudential truth,
practical truth, the truth which is moral goodness? What else is "being
authentic " than being as one ought to be? Barrett sees existentialism as a

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peculiarly forceful reminder that man is contingent, that action requires
more than thought, that the passion and obscurity of faith define us when
we act. To deny all this is to be guilty of what Sartre calls mauvaise foi,
self-deception. It is a major achievement of his book that Barrett has
seized upon this facet of the existential philosophies. However, this interpretation of existentialism leads to great difficulties.
To see existentialism as concern for the whole man, as the search for
a truth which will engage more than intellect, perhaps even as a hortatory
endeavor to lead men to choose the good rather than talk about it-this
demands greater continuity with Kierkegaard on the part of later existentialists than seems to be there. The case of Heidegger is particularly
difficult; perhaps we must take seriously his disavowal of existentialism.
As have so many others, Barrett dismisses the denial. But if there is no
continuity-or precious little-with Kierkegaard, particularly with regard
to the meaning of " existential thought," something extremely odd happens.
For Kierkegaard, the order of existence (the arena of action, choice) is
separate from philosophy. A philosophical discussion of existence (choice)
is forever different from choosing. The truth of philosophy is one thing;
existential truth is another. Nowadays, however, and Barrett is the case
in point, we find a demand that philosophy itself strive to attain the truth
which is more than a truth of intellect. This is what Jaspers asks; this
is what Barrett asks. It is the reverse of the error Kierkegaard attacked.
Hegel, Kierkegaard thought, made action simply something of thought,
as if, we might say, knowledge were virtue. The current tendency is not
to reduce action to thought, but to reduce philosophy to action, to demand
of it the truth of action. Thus, in the section on Pascal, Barrett writes,
" In any case, God as the object of a rigorous demonstration, even supposing such a demonstration were forthcoming, would have nothing to do
What is important here is not
with the living needs of religion." (p.
Barrett's doubt that a valid metaphysical proof of God's existence can
be given; rather it is his impatience with such activity. What difference
does such a proof make? That is, what does it mean for me here and
now, faced with these unique tasks? With St. Thomas, we must admit that
it can have only an accidental relevance for prudential decisions. Philosophy, even practical philosophy, will never settle the existential difficulties
Barrett has in mind.
If one accepts Barrett's view of existentialism, it becomes a philosophy
which has set itself an impossible task. Looked upon as followers of
Kierkegaard, later existentialists would then appear to have done what
the Danish thinker said Cratylus did with respect to Heraclitus: taken the
step beyond the master which destroys the master's teaching.

RALPH M. MciNERNY
University of NotrtJ Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana

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285

Resurrection and Historical Reason: A Study of Theological Method. By
RICHARD R. NIEBUHR. New York:

Scribner's, 1957. Pp. 184. $3.95.

Professor Niebuhr states in his Preface that " this book represents an
attempt to understand the connection between the biblical proclamation of
the resurrection of Jesus Christ and the order of theological thought." He
expresses the fundamental conviction that Christ and the Resurrection
are inseparable. Despite the fact that there is a tension between Christ
as the object of historical consciousness, and that consciousness itself, the
common Protestant dichotomy of "Jesus of history-Christ of Faith" does
nothing to solve the problems connected with the Resurrection. On the
contrary, Niebuhr contends, it succeeds only in dissolving Christ Himself
as Well as the Church.
The first of the six chapters of the book is an acute analysis of attempts
of the modern Protestant mind to cope with the Resurrection, a doctrine
which was central to the faith of the early church, but which has been
moved to the periphery of Protestant teaching. The reason for the change
is that " the primitive resurrection faith conflicts disastrously with modern
canons of historicity." (p. l) The history of recent Protestant theology,
Niebuhr points out, can be read " as a series of attempts to halt the
conflict between the insistent canons of historical criticism and the unquenchable resurrection tradition." (p. £) The study of these modern
attempts, which fail insofar as they seek to reduce the Resurrection faith
to the dimensions specified by preconceived philosophy of history or by
psychology, illuminates the nature of historical thought. Oddly enough, as
Niebuhr points out, there cannot be a final victory of historical reason
in its conflict with more or less "Biblical" faith, for such a victory, by
destroying the orthodox recollection upon which criticism feeds, would be
destructive of criticism itself.
Strauss, Hermann, Harnack, and Schweitzer, who " did much to create
the mold of all subsequent theology that has taken seriously the problem
of the historical character of the New Testament" (p. 12), are first
analyzed. For Strauss, the assumption of all historical criticism is that the
" absolute cause " never intervenes by single arbitrary acts in the chain
of secondary causes. Hence the a priori impossibility of the apostolic
encounters with the risen Jesus. Philosophical reason compensates for the
deprivation by perceiving a " larger kind of resurrection," enacted in the
drama of absolute spirit. Hermann, like Strauss, upholds the inviolability
of nature, and for Harnack, " religion must transcend nature because nature
is the realm of death." (p. 10) Schweitzer differs in that he fails to compensate for his criticism with a philosophy of transcendent spirit, but
rather leaves us with a Jesus who has revealed Himself in death to be no
more than a man. The significance of these typical theologians, we are

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told, is that, united in their loyalty to the canons of nineteenth century
criticism, they face the resurrection as an insoluble problem. Such
assumptions have driven many thinkers (e. g. William Adams Brown and
John Baillie) to the double truth theory in various forms, more or less
subtle. An oddity common to all of them is the attempt to substitute
the crucifixion for the resurrection as the focus of faith and surreptitiously
invest it with the significance of the resurrection.
The regrettable consequences of the disintegration of the New Testament pattern is reflected in Renan's Life of Jesus, wherein the Biblical
account is seen as a sort of Aramaic copy of the Crito. Deterioration into
sentimentality is inevitable in such a work, for an adequate ratio cognoscendi has been made impossible by ignoring the resurrection tradition.
Not all Protestant thinkers, however, have made the resurrection peripheral.
There is a " metaphysical " approach, represented by Lionel Thornton,
for whom the risen body of Christ is the Church. The fallacy of such an
approach, Niebuhr succinctly states, is that we do not have the option of
thinking either historically or metaphysically, but we have only the option
of thinking historically about historical events, or historically about the
metaphysical implications of such events. By the " metaphysical " approach the Jesus of history is dissolved. Other recent thinkers have
attempted to come to grips with the nature of historical fact as both
questionable in a sense and yet admitting of positive Christian interpretation. For Emil Brunner, Niebuhr says, confidence in the death of Christ
" for me " does not alter the description of His death as " probable " by
historical science.
A final point made in this chapter regards the apostolic encounters with
the risen Christ, which have so generally been explained away. Niebuhr
strikes at the heart of this matter when he remarks that " the witness of
the primitive community as a whole was called forth by the particular
testimony of the Apostles." (p.
Thus we do not gain the right to
declare ourselves free of apostolic witness. Psychologizing the apostolic
encounters with the risen Lord is a denial of the content of the faith of
the early Church; and it is precisely this faith which the psychologizers
hold to be normative.
The second chapter considers " Resurrection and Historical Method."
The influence of Kant upon Protestant theology is here illustrated in the
case of Albert Ritschl, who, in adopting Kant's distinction between theoretical and practical reason, changes what was simply a distinction to
an irrevocable divorce. The result of Ritschl's bad Kantianism, Professor
Niebuhr claims, is a denial of a positive value to the created order at the
level of nature. How does this affect his Christology? Briefly, the transcendence won by Jesus over the world is not in any sense a re-creation
of the natural order. His victory does not consist in resurrection from the

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287

dead, but in patience in suffering. Not unlike some of his contemporaries,
Ritschl moves on two levels simultaneously. As a biblical theologian he
cannot label the resurrection as a mere myth, but as a systematic theologian he cannot think of it as being of any consequence. Thus, " the
resurrection itself shrinks to a meaningless miracle in a world so rigidly
stratified into discrete levels of nature and spirit." (p. 41}
In a sense, the opposite extreme of Ritschl's position is to be found in
Karl Barth's Die Kirchliche Dogmatik. For Barth, theology must speak
about the concrete, about history, and abjure Ritschl's "things in general."
Historical reality, however, means the total historical import of an event.
The historical import of Jesus thus understood achieves its greatest intensity in the passion, crucifixion, and resurrection. The resurrection event,
moreover, is the supreme moment of revelation. Niebuhr, as in the other
instances, penetrates to the essential weakness of the theory. The "historically real " has been purchased at the price of ignoring historical fact.
The constant epistemological attitude demanded of the Christian, according to Barth, is wholly passive; the acting subject is Jesus Christ, the encountered Lord. Problems of theological method become inconsequential
in this personal encounter. As Niebuhr expresses it: "In actuality Barth's
realism must enlist a subjective idealism, in which the sole acting subject is
Jesus Christ." (p. 49)
Bultmann, who next comes under scrutiny, is said to conceive the task
of theology to be the utterance of a genuinely existential understanding
of man's lot in the twentieth century. Theology for him is to be implemented by existential philosophy, specifically that of Martin Heidegger.
The extreme subjectivity which results in the restriction of meaning to
statements derived from a phenomenological analysis of the inner self is
described by Niebuhr: "Under this treatment, the historical Jesus emerges
as the Socratic teacher whose essential role is that of mid-wife to. our
recognition of internal reality." (p. 58) Like Ritschl, Bultmann completely
separates theoretical from practical reason and the double truth theory
is again operative. Since Bultmann accepts the idea of nature as a closed
system, he " reconciles " theology with natural science by translating the
resurrection into the " wonder of faith."
Finally, the approach of John Knox becomes the focus of attention.
For Knox, the historical Jesus is the Christ of faith. The criterion for this
judgment is the remembering church, which recalls Jesus in this manner.
He is criticized by Niebuhr for his " partial failure to establish the independent reality of the historical Christ." (p. 69}
The conclusion drawn at the end of this chapter, based upon the
analysis of the three representative thinkers of Protestantism, Barth,
Bultmann, and Knox, is that it is impossible to reach an independent
theological method without broaching the fundamental question about the

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conditions of our knowledge of historical events. The lesson of this examinatiQn, Niebuhr says, is that an independent theological method can be
achieved .only " through · a willingness to face the problems of how the
Christian community knows its own history, and how it can constructively
criticize its OWl). knowledge." (p. 71)
The third chapter examines the question of " The Possibility of an
Historical Reason." Professor Niebuhr develops in the first section the
thesis that Protestant theology tends to approach the problem of historical
knowledge almost exclusively on the basis of presuppositions ultimately
derived from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Practical
Reason. Kant, he maintains, by his dichotomy of theoretical reason and
practical reason " enabled a Protestantism imbued with the spirit of
rationalism and respect for the canons of natural science to find a positive
gospel once more in the New Testament." (p. 76) This Kantianism among
Protestant theologians, which still persists today, is understandable, for it
enables them to escape from the intellectual hegemony of natural science
without rejecting its validity. As Niebuhr points out, however, the reconciliation of the method of natural science with metaphysical theology is
not the whole problem. There remains the question of the significance
of history, and here there is a real disparity between the demands of
biblical history and Kantianism. The former demands that the individual
event or person be considered for its own sake, whereas for Kant the
historically given individual is meaningful only in relationship to some
independently grounded norm or by virtue of his membership in a class.
Often the solution of the Protestant theologians has been to relegate
biblical history to the realm of the non-cognitive " practical reason." This
solution is illustrated very well in the case of Bultmann's works, in which
Heilsgeschichte is considered as belonging to a different order of knowledge
from Historie. The " sacred event," e. g. the resurrection, is independent of
temporal history. Niebuhr thinks this procedure highly unsatisfactory, for
then " the faculty for the apprehension of sacred history can deal only
with timeless, static ideals utterly remote from the concrete experience in
which the historically conditioned subject is able to participate." (p. 87)
Having amply illustrated his thesis that biblical history should not be
understood within the framework of natural science or of idealistic metaphysics, Professor Niebuhr asks what is really meant in theology by the
historicity of an event. In attempting to grasp the distinctive character of
the material with which historical interpretation deals, he repeatedly emphasizes his belief that there is no " neutral pastness," that is, that there
cannot be such an entity as the past in general. Events that have transpired become part of the past only insofar as they become the past for
some mind or group of minds, " only insofar as they become actually
appropriated by our historical selves." (p. 93) Thus the resurrection tra-

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289

clition would not belong to any past at all if it were not known by the
church. Two things follow from this notion of historical reason: (1) the
Christian community is indispensable for knowledge of all that pertains
to Jesus of Nazareth, including, obviously, the resurrection; (£) the mode
of historical cognition is remembering, which cannot belong to a neutral
observer, but only to one who has " internalized " the past event. There
is, however, a danger which Niebuhr perceives in the idea of a communal
memory. It might become "a collective consciousness that is itself the
creative source of the content of the particular memories of its members."
(p. 99) The corrective for this danger will be found, however, in the
science of criticism, which presupposes that the Christian church is not
merely a supra-personal consciousness, but a community of selves interacting upon one another. The aim of criticism should be to uncover the
many different layers of interpretation upon which the biblical authors
have drawn.
The foregoing sketch of historical reason is not claimed as original
Professor Niebuhr. Rather, he says that it is based upon ideas of which
Protestant biblical theology has been making use-but not systematically
and selfconsciously. The explication of these principles of historical reason
has been impeded by the ideas of nature which theology has uncritically
borrowed from philosophy and the natural sciences, and the resultant
and Nature " is the
of the entire fourth
" Conflict or
chapter.
The first idea of nature imbedded in the Protestant mind is that of a
"static arena or causal network in the midst of which history takes place
and by which historical possibilities are strictly defined."
10.5) This
requires the discovery of a wholly transcendental kind of history, as a home
for the miracles that have been exiled from mundane history. A second
and equally pernicious notia'n of nature belongs to the familiar dualism of
spirit and matter, formulated in modern times
Descartes. This forces
an artificial distinction between man's " natural and
existence and
forces us to 'Confine our religious interests entirely to the latter." (p.
So it happens that the Heilsgeschichte-theologian can speak of the "objective fact " of the resurrection as being obscure', but discounts this as
irrelevant, since the "meaning" of the resurrection is dear. Niebuhr
rejects such ambivalence on the basis that " all human knowledge is dependent upon the subject-object situation and' requires in its constitution
both an element of immediate experience and an element of subjectivity."
(p. 114)
If one's concept of history is so profoundly affected by his ideas about
nature as aU this would seem to indicate, it is equally apparent, the author
points out in the concluding section of the fourth chapter, that there is a
of nature." The scientist's
of the so-called

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BOOK REVIEWS

objective world is based upon assumptions which are subject to gradual
re-modifications. Thus it happens that " the mind is always confronted
by nature in a social, historical context, and consequently the nature that
we know is never a pure nature, but a socialized, historically conditioned
nature." (p. 1!t8) The relevance for "historical reason" of a realization
of all this lies in the fact that it liberates the biblical historian from the
obligation of desperately resorting to a concept of " sacred history " (i. e.,
non-factual, non-cognitive historical knowledge) in order to find a place
for phenomena which appear to conflict with the " absolute laws " of
nature. The author summarizes the effect which this outlook upon nature
is supposed to have upon theology: "Biblical theology, however, need not
limit itself to the alternatives of an empty transcendental history or a
history rigidly defined by the immutable laws of nature, if it can see that
nature also shares in the historicity of the self and is indispensable to it."
(p. 1!t6)
In the fifth chapter, the author is concerned with "The Power of the
Past." The explicitly stated presupposition of this chapter is that the
relation between Jesus Christ and history "is best approached through
an analysis of the present situation of the people for whom the resurrection most directly bears on history: the people who, to use John Knox's
words, together remember Jesus." (p. 1!t9) Niebuhr maintains in this
chapter that the church has always been intensely critical of its own interpretations of historical events, but that this is especially characteristic of
the church today. Although there is a temptation to engage in a " reductionist research," which " treats the past as though it could be introduced into a laboratory where all the attending conditions have been
carefully defined and refined in advance" (p. 141), this approach is unsatisfactory. The past is given to us, but not on our terms. It is problematic,
because it has a vitality of its own. Niebuhr maintains that the interaction
of past and present demands a continual re-creation of the historical Jesus
Christ. The relevance of the past to the present is elicited by the new
situations into which the Church is thrust.
In the final section of this chapter, Niebuhr puts biblical criticism into
a broader context, claiming that it is merely the most recent phase of
the Church's criticism of itself. Indeed, " it can be identified as the
contemporary counterpart of the Reformation of the church that culminated
in the sixteenth century." (p. 149) In both cases, it is claimed, self-criticism
and historical criticism are inseparable, and in both instances the impetus
came from the whole society of Christendom. It is interesting that the
author sees the resurrection as central to the Church's self-criticism. In
that phase of self-criticism which was the Reformation, for example, the
Reformers are said to have selected the doctrine of justification by faith
as the chief formulation of the
and " the moment of history behind

BOOK REVIEWS

the doctrine of justification is the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ."
(p. 151) Again today, Niebuhr maintains, the church is being forced to
re-appraise its past, particularly the resurrection of Jesus Christ. Any
attempt to give the church status independently of its origin in the resurrection must fail. There is no law of nature or of history that can account
for the resurrection, which is the basis of the existence of the church,
although the proponents of Heilsgeschichte or of psychological explanations
of the fact seek to find one. The conflict today, in fact, can be seen as
between the interpretation of Christendom's history in terms of law or
resurrection. The latter, the author asserts, may be used as an analogy
or interpretative key, but "cannot be converted into a generalization; it
remains a single and arbitrary and wholly spontaneous event." (p. 155)
Yet it is an unrecorded event, for although the New Testament cites
witnesses to the post-resurrection appearances, it cites none who was a
witness to the rising itself. " The appearances of Christ as risen are the
points at which the resurrection touches the memory of the church."
(p. 161) Thus the center of the "total event" can only be inferred from
the circumference.
The final chapter is concerned with "History, Resurrection, and Law."
The author first distinguishes " nature " from the capitalized form,
"Nature." "Nature" stands for the system of law by which we interpret
and organize the events of our environment, whereas " nature " stands for
the peculiar mode and existence which characterizes any individual. It is
confidence in the interpretation of history by the idea of Nature which
makes the event of Jesus' resurrection seem unacceptable, although there
is no necessary conflict with " nature " as the term is used here. Overconfidence in Nature, however, is unwarranted, when two of its predominant features are examined. First, all laws of Nature are highly
abstract, " because they have to do only with aspects of total events, but
never with the totality of a single event." {p. 166) We cannot look to laws,
therefore, to explain specific individual events. A second feature of these
laws of Nature is their historical genesis; in fact, their historical character" the human factor "-makes it necessary eventually to revise them. Thus,
" these laws do not represent a vision of the ultimate structure of being,
but rather arise out of our daily intercourse with the environment."
(p. 169) If made 'the key of history, they deprive it of its constituent
spontaneity.
What then is the clue to an understanding of history? "Such a clue
will be forthcoming only insofar as we interpret the particular events of
history for their own sake, and in their own light." (p. 171) The resurrection of Jesus Christ shares in the arbitrariness and independence which
characterize all events to some degree. Yet, insofar as it is not the
logical implicate of any other event or events, it is unlike any other. "It

BOOK REVIEWS

runs directly counter to our contemporary understanding of history, because it represents the unfathomable and irrational power of history itself.
In the resurrection of Christ the spontaneity, particularity, and independence of historical events rise to the surface in a single eruption." (p. 177)
A question which may well have been plaguing the reader throughout
is, of course, whether Professor Nebuhr thinks the resurrection is a
miracle, or not. He answers the question at the very end of the last
chapter, but not unexpectedly it is a qualified and ambiguous answer. He
says that it is a mistake " in one sense " to treat the resurrection as a
miracle, or as a problem deserving to be discussed in terms of miracle in
general, because this implies a negative relationship to nature. " But the
Resurrection of Christ does not violate Nature, but only death. It epitomizes the original creativity that informs all history and underlies every
conception of Nature." (p. 177)
This book is one well worth the careful attention of Catholic readers.
The acuteness of the author's analysis of the modern Protestant mind
would perhaps be difficult for a Catholic theologian to match, for Professor Niebuhr approaches nineteenth century and contemporary Protestant thinkers with a kind of " empathy " of one who shares their
intellectual problems, and with the insight of one whose acceptance or
rejection of ideas is part of a personal intellectual quest. The Catholic
reader, in his attempt to understand a Barth or a Schweitzer, for example,
may lack this kind of insight if he approaches such authors with the
conscious or unconscious attitudes of a heresy-hunting apologist.
Niebuhr's emphasis upon the importance of the role of the " remembering church " in the interpretation of the Biblical account might, with a
superficial reading, sound somewhat like an argument in favor of the role
of tradition as rule of faith. Such an interpretation would be mistaken,
for he expressly states (p. 136) that the hotion of infallible tradition,
like the Hegelian logic of history or the rules of psychology is merely a
device " bent toward the end of reducing the past to an absolute certainty of the present." Despite his rejection of the Kantian-born dualism
of other Protestant theologians, Niebuhr's logic in his own positive theory
does not generate a very certain sort of certainty; he seems, in fact, to
have evolved a species of dualism of his own. One gets a clue to this in
his comparison of biblical criticism to the Reformation, both of which are
seen to be phases of the Christian community's self-criticism. In both
cases the new circumstances in which the church found itself forced it to
re-appraise its interpretation of its origins. For Niebuhr, the very vitality
of the Church seems to consist in a tension between past and present,
which results in a continual re-creation of the past, in fact, as he himself
tells us, there is a "continual re-creation of the historical Jesus Christ."
(p. 143) The past-present dualism is expressed in other dimensions, as

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when, for example, Niebuhr speaks of the tension between subject and
object in historical knowledge. In a certain sense, of course, all of this is
true. It is quite clear, however, that Niebuhr is not merely stating that
each generation must appropriate the knowledge of the past to itself, nor
is he merely saying that theological knowledge continually becomes more
explicit when the insights of each new generation are brought to bear upon
revelation, and when theological conflicts stimulate the development of
dogma. With all of this one might readily agree. According to Niebuhr,
however, not only is the principle of selectivity present in the knowledge
of the church, but there is also " refraction and distortion " present.
For Niebuhr, then, the conditions of human knowledge are always there,
" belying any claim the church may advance to an absolutely comprehensive and indisputable knowledge of the gospel history." (p. 142) As is
painfully obvious in this statement, the author has a way of qualifying
many statements to such an extent that it is impossible to either fully
accept or reject his assertions. One might be inclined to agree that the
church does not have comprehensive knowledge, but the indisputability
·of the knowledge which it does possess is another matter. If the import
of the statement quoted above is clouded by its ambivalence, however, the
effects of Niebuhr's brand of dualism are quite clear in the following sentence: " The useful notion of a normative tradition associated with
apostolic sees was, for instance, perVerted into the principle that whatever
had found its way into approved doctrine must be rooted in the actual
history of Jesus and his disciples." (p. 186) The church, we are told, was
guilty of trying to find an a priori certainty about the past. (p. 186)
Finally, at the risk of being obvious, it may be pointed out that the
terms which are most crucial for an understanding of Niebuhr's positive
theory are seldom defined. The use of the term " miracle " is a case in
point. We are told that it is a mistake "in one sense" to treat the
resurrection as a miracle, because this would imply a negative relationship
to Nature. It never becomes clear what is meant by a" negative relationship," but one soon discovers that " the miraculous quality of the resurrection cannot be effaced, for it is an event that cannot be assimilated to
the image of death." (p. 178) It "stands outside the compass of all law"
and is " contradicted by the experience of dying." (p. 178) Although the
author's criticisms of his contemporaries are quite precise, an attempt to
understand his own thought is indeed a challenge to the resourcefulness of
the reader. The alternatives are clear: One may either try to match
Professor Niebuhr's terms against the meanings which he brings with him
to a reading of the book, or one may use the invisible antennae of the inveterate reader to seek out the intent behind qualifications of qualifications.
MARY

Cardinal CUIIhing CoUege
Brookline, MassachUIIetts

F. DALY

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The Conflict with Rome.
Presbyterian

By GznmTT C. BERKOUWER. Philadelphia:

& Reformed, 1957.

319. $5.95.

The Reformation is a process, an unendi!lg one which leads either back
to Rome or further away from even its own starting point. For this
reason any record or commentary on the relationships between Protestantism
and Catholicism is bound to have a certain incompleteness about it. Dr.
Berkouwer's discussion of the areas of coHflict with Rome, offered with
the authority of a recognized theologian, has this natural limitation also,
but he is -objective and thorough enough to >:.cknowledge it. His thesis
seems to hinge on this precise fact of growing opposit;on on the one hand
and growing affinity on the other, not so much in social and political
activity, but in the understanding of the fundamental principles of Christianity. The Conflict with Rome shows the Catholic and Protestant
theologian just what has happened to the original issues of protest.
This work has many merits, not the least of which is its sober and
charitable consideration of every subject discussed, but then what else is
expected. Moreover, the author does not hesitate to call a conflict a
conflict: there is no artificial attempt to resolve aU differences, but rather
an honest, if sometimes incomplete, presentation of those differences which
he considers to be worthy of conflict, nt least
Dr. Berkouwcr
understands well the consistent refusal of lhe Catholic Church to compromise her teaching for the sake of a broader Christian unity which would
be proportionately less Christian as it became more compromised. He sees
the differences as more than different views of the same basic truths, but
as " different religions " radically opposed ou all fundamentals.
'When it comes to the actual analysis of the conflict with Rome on such
fundamental issues as the authority of the Church, grace, predestination,
the communion of saints, the Incarnation and
sacraments there is much
to be criticized both positively and negatively. Before uudertaking such
brief observations as are here warranted, this much must be acknowledged.
Berkouwer is obv;ously interested in delineating the fundamental points
of dispute: he does not attempt an extensive exposition of the doctrines
of both sides ,vith their own exhaustive defenses. He chooses, as he naturally
must, what he understands to be the critical issues, exposes them in their
own authoritative texts and shows the opposition. Granted, it would be
impossible to admit every argument and rebutal, yet Berkouwer does fail
to represent many of the fundamental principles of Catholicism which
would color the exact points of difficulty. This defect most likely comes
from his more constant interpretation of the teaching of the Church in the
context of its own condemnation or opposition to the Reformation. This
is not sufficient.

BOOK REVIEWS

When the Church condemned the Reformation, it did not condemn those
truths which the Reformers retained. When the Church did not explicitly
recognize such truths as the value of the individual's conscience, the absolute necessity of Faith (as fundamental to) justification, the place of
Scripture as a source of divine personal communication, as they were
proposed by the reformers, she was not minimizing their importance. She
already possessed them in the unity of the Faith and preserved them in
the proper context. Because this is true of the Chruch's view of her own
mission, though the Protestant, consistent with his own principles, would
not concede this, one must understand the teaching of the Church universally. For example, the history of doctrinal disputes within the Church,
valuable as it is, does not reveal the depth of the Faith with its proper
order and balance. Not even Denzinger's "Enchiridion Symbolorum,"
studied from cover to cover, would yield a comprehensive picture of the
Faith especially its intrinsic harmony. The most revered ecclesiastical
writers, however approved by the Church, have their limitations. Hence
the Church must be judged by her whole teaching mission, using Scripture
to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice, to entreat and to rebuke in
all patience and doctrine, as St. Paul encouraged Timothy to do.
The presence of the Holy Ghost in the Church, not as in
institution,
but in the souls of the justified is a matter which Dr. Berkouwer considers
critical, and rightly so. Perhaps it is more the fault of Catholic apologetes
than his own that the full extent of the teaching of the Church here is
not more clearly (though not necessarily more extensively) presented.
The Catholic who submits to the authority of the Holy Spirit speaking
through popes and councils is moved by that same Sanctifying Spirit to
freely accept such authority and to find his personal salvation in the
consoling direction of that same Spirit. The individual's experience of the
saving grace of Christ is not sacrificed to an institution, nor is it strictly
speaking subordinated to it, rather it is found in union with that sacramentally constituted institution. The institutional structure and authority
originate within the sacramental system which
instituted personally
by Christ for the sanctification of the individuals who would freely avail
themselves of that personal communion wherein the " promise of the
leading of the Holy Ghost " begins to be fulfilled. Sacrarnenta sunt propter
hornines, and everything else. in the organization of Church is for the sacraments. It is unfortunately true, however, that some individual Catholics
are more enthusiastic about their identification with the organization of
the Church than with participating in its life of grace; and this is what
misleads non-Catholics.
It would be helpful for Protestant theologians in their justifiable concern
over the individual's critical acceptance of the promise of Christ if, after

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analysing the dogmatic teachings of the Church on the Incarnation, grace
and Hope, they would relate them to the theology of Faith and Charity
and the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, remembering that what is separately
defined and defended by the Church is not necessarily separately experienced by the individual Catholic in love with his Savior. Never is the
Faith as the object of belief preserved in the teaching of the Church to be
confused with or substituted for the supernatural gift of personal insight
revelation. Similarly, it is disastrous to confuse
into the veracity of
the abiding presence of the Holy Spirit in the Church preserving it from
misrepresenting the Gospel with the individual's certain expectancy of
the fulfillment of the promises of the Gospel tempered by the Gift of Fear.
A consideration of St. Thomas' remarkably simple explanation of the
correspondence of Hope and Fear would have thrown some light on the
chapter, The Problem of the Assurance of Salvation. Though men must
work out their salvation in fear and trembling, they ought not fall into
the anguished state of blind desperation bequeathed to them by Kierkegaard. The object of fear is man's own vacillating will, whereas the object
of Hope is the omnipotent and merciful God who can make man as
understood this, he would not have
" perfect " as Himself. If
said with Ruckert that the discussions at Trent were " an unbalanced
striving between distrust and trust, between a torturing anxiety of conscience and religious enthusiasm, between fear and hope."
Considerably more insight was shown in Berkouwer's discussion of the
teaching of the Church on the Incarnation and Christ's sacramental presence in the Church. He points to an area of agreement between Catholics
and Anglicans in their understanding that the whole of the created order
is affected by the Incarnation especially through the sacraments which
draw the material world into the divine plan of salvation and are used
by God to effect the presence of Christ in the just. This is spoken of as
a "progressive incarnation." Berkouwer reverses the charge against the
Reformers that they have limited the importance of the Incarnation to
Christ Himself and His salvific sacrifice and insists that actually the
Reformers have preserved the true universality of the redemptive Incarnation by insisting that all was accomplished and merited in Christ. The
differences are clearly delineated, but one fact is overlooked. The problem
is not ultimately to determine which understanding of the enduring effect
of the Incarnation gives proper emphasis to the supremacy of Christ in
the Church. No sensible Christian is going to deny that anyway. The
problem is, more exactly, how did God will to effect the presence of the
Incarnate Word among us. If He willed to do it through the material
symbolism of the sacraments, then His grace must be accepted on those
terms regardless of the " ontological " complications, possible abuses by

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29'7

men, and the restriction of individual freedom that may follow. Here the
Catholic reverses the charge of the Reformers that the synthesis of the
Incarnation with sacramental grace has limited the freedom and preeminence of Christ.
It follows quite naturally that Dr. Berkouwer should have to consider
the place of Mary in the economy of salvation as a related issue. The
growing interest in Mariology among Catholic theologians is drawing the
attention of Protestants to the real impmtance of Mary as a key to the
redemptive Incarnation. As elsewhere, Berkouwer is careful to separate
the teaching of the Church from the sometimes untheological statements
of Catholics about Our Lady. It is to be remembered that the Reformers,
including Luther, treated the subject of l\iary with great reverence, recognizing her as most blessed among women. But they feel that her position
has been greatly overextended, especially with any suggestion that Mary
merited salvation for the Church in any unique way. This follows from
the natural difficulty that Protestants have in admitting any element that
seems to limit the unique position of Christ. However, they all seem well
aware that Mary's vocation, as it appears in the Bible, was to dedicate
herself consciously to the saving mission of her Son, for which they honor
her. Strangely, l\fary has become a symbol to the Protestant theologian
of all that is dangerous in Catholicism, which confirms the Catholic's
devotion to her as a
of all that is distinctly Catholic.
The original position of the Reformers with regard to the effect, or
rather, lack of effect, of justification is reappraised by Dr. Berkouwer as
another critical issue, and so it is. He shows some concern for the ontological compulsion of Rome to assert little supernatural realities wherever
there is need for an explanation not found in Scripture. Contrasted with
this is the absolute simplicity of the Biblical theory of the Protestants who
see the economy of Salvation as a merciful promise of a transcendant God
through the merits of Christ alone. The Protestant rejection of the
duction of Logic and Metaphysics into theology is itself well founded
in Luther's hatred for human reason and its product, Philosophy. If
anything will be clear to the Catholic theologian who reads this book it
will be the futility of appealing to the discipline of clear definitions and
distinctions and logical reasoning. Berkouwer does not acknowledge that
Catholics are as much aware of the limitations of logic as he is: far from
trying to impose a logical necessity on God's actions, the Scholastics use
logic to see the wisdom of what God has already done and to isolate the
very aspects of God's activity which transcend logic. Still, the Reformation
theologian sees all this as unseriptural, complicating and obscuring the true
meaning of Christ as each individual's personal redeemer.
Dr. Berkouwer traces this attitude back to a rejection of aU metaphysical

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speculation together with the notion of the analogy of being. The rejection
of any real effect in the supernatural order, as well as the idea that God
can only be discovered by the individual in the confrontation with his
own existence is nothing more than nominalism. Hence, the affinity between
Protestantism and Existentialism. That this attitude is still important to
thinking Proestants is made quite clear in Berkouwer's reference to Karl
Barth's vehement rejection of all possible ontological entanglements between nature and supernature. He quotes Barth thus: " I consider the
analogia entis to be the invention of the anti-Christ, which makes it impossible for us to become Roman Catholics." By way of explanation,
Berkouwer observes: "Barth opposes the analogia entis because it implies
the indestructible continuity between God and man constituting the
foundation of grace." The Thomistic concept of the obediential potency
in nature is of little help to Barth and Berkouwer, who see it as mere
verbiage. But then some Catholic theologians have obscured the real
meaning of the obediential potency by making it as actual as it is really
potential, hence the confusion.
It is not surprising, then, that the existence of sanctifying grace, sufficient
and efficacious actual grace and meritorim .•s human activity are still sources
of conflict. Berkouwer assumes that all the unscriptural wrangling between
Thomists and Molinists led Pope Paul V to terminate the controversy
de auxiliis, thus revealing his hand. This " indecision of doctrinal authority "
he takes to be clear evidence of the lack of a comprehensible Roman doctrine on the power of God working on the believer by Faith alone. Here
and in the discussion on merit, Berkouwer shows lamentable indifference
to the doctrine that God no more loses His transcendent freedom and
goodness by incorporating man into the process of meriting his own reward
than He did by creating man to His own image in the first place. Would
that the Reformers could see the greater mercy of God in accepting man
into the scheme of salvation of cour .•e totally merited by Christ, cooperation
and all! If it seems that this makes the redemption all too human, it should
be remembered who was being redeemed. At stake here is the radical
concept of secondary causality, which L.:rkouwer considers to be a fundamental issue, but he does not consider it adequately. This is most likely
because of his natural distaste for philosophical speculation.
One characteristic of this work which win dissatisfy the Catholic theologian is that much of the debate is carried on with sources that do not
enjoy primary authority in Catholic theology. This is not meant as an
insult to Cardinal Newman, Karl Adam or Dr. de Vogel and others whom
Berkouwer quotes with greater frequency and familiarity than he does St.
Thomas, Suarez, Bellarmine or Cajetan. Such a remark would be expected
from a Thomist, would it not? The issue is simply that there is danger,

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299

to which Berkouwer falls victim, that onE would confuse the personal
discoveries and directions of converts to the Church with the Church's own
apologetics and theology. For example, one should not confuse de Vogel's
understanding and dependence upon the consistency of Catholic doctrine
with that of the ancient Church with the true nature of Apostolic authority
and Apostolic tradition which antedate the New Testament and the commentaries of the earliest Fathers.
The Conflict with Rome will be of greater value to Catholic
than it will be to non-Catholics who look for a comprehensive view of tlie
Roman difference, for this reason, that the Catholic will see in the very
defects of the picture of Rome a true picture of what modern, well-informed
Protestant theologians understand of Rome, whereas the non-Catpolic will
be only partially enlightened about the true nature in Catholicism, but
will be confirmed in many of his abiding suspicions.
WILLIAM PAUL HAAs, 0. P.

Dominican House of Philosophy,
Dover, Mass.

BRIEF NOTICES
Psychology-The Study of Man's Normal Mental Life. By FRs. CHAHLES P.
BRUEHL and WILLIAM E. CAMPBELL. Villanova, Pa.: Villanova Press,
1957. Pp. 384 with index. $5.50.
The science of psychology seems to be, at the present time, in the difficult
but not unenviable position of an enormously rich man who would like
to take an accounting of his holdings. Decades of laboratory research,
masses of clinical reports, the results of widespread application to practical
purposes, the revelations of psychoanalysis and the cogitations of philosophies new and old have produced quantities of pertinent data and
varieties of interpretations, almost beyond what any one man can any
longer hope to assimilate. The cry is now for synthesis-for the far reaching
and deep probing formulae which will organize and coordinate the multitude of facts. The ground needs dearing for more fruitful research and
study. The beginning student, and the average man who wants quick
and thorough psychological information, stand in need of a basic summary
of sound and acceptable psychology.
Psychologists are certainly responding to the felt need, according to the
annual testimony of the book lists, but, to date, no one book has appeared
which threatens to sweep the field before it. It is not easy to synthesize
a science as complex as psychology, and especially a science whose frontiers
fade almost imperceptibly into ethics, religion, sociology and a host of
other disciplines in which value judgments more or less dominate. Neither
is it satisfactory to try to delimit psychology from its natural tendency
to impinge. For the present, psychologists have to be satisfied with the
best that they can do, until the generally satisfactory synthesis can be
achieved.
The authors of the book under review have taken the general principles
of scholastic psychology as their synthesizing principles, and, for their
purpose or aim, the integration of contemporary psychological findings
with these and by these principles, in a form more descriptive than analytical, and definitely oriented toward practical application. From this account,
some of the virtues of the book might be surmised. It is orderly and it
has depth. Its order is simplicity itself, beginning with the general introductory notions and then proceeding through the range of psychological
activities from the lowest and external to the highest and most internaL
Adequate account is taken throughout of the relative positions of the several
psychological schools. The concluding section deals with the inferences

300

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301

which may validly be drawn from the evidences of activities to the nature
of the principles of these activities.
The integration of philosophical principle and empirical finding is smooth
-a smoothness which bears out, in practice at least, the authors' contention
that psychology is not a dualistic but an integral science. This is a defini- .
tion towards which the reviewer also leans strongly, and he only regrets
that its validity is not always sufficiently safeguarded in the text, and
never demonstrated. If, however, the definition is ample enough in this
respect, it is less than ample, from a traditional point of view, in limiting
the subject of psychology to ' mind,' to the exclusion of broader considerations of 'life,'-an exclusiveness which has no particular philosophical
virtue, and which must sooner or later be abandoned in any event in order
to describe many mental processes adequately. Otherwise, however, the
matter is presented very completely, within the limits expected of an
elementary text, and is especially good in the coverage of more general
psychological states and processes, such as perception, attention, suggestion,
etc. The summary technique is used successfully, and the occasional digressions into more or less homespun " appreciations " and practical counsels
lighten and enrich the course of the exposition.
The real strength, however, of this text is description. The authors have
not only taken their stand on principles of realistic doctrine, but also on
the principles of realistic exposition. It is one thing to make realistic judgments of facts, and another thing to present them in a style which conveys
a sense of their reality, a sense of the data consonant with everyday experience. In no science is this more important than in psychology, whose
supject matter is daily present to everyone. Often enough, however, the
expositions of realistic psychology are couched in a form so abstract and
technical that the total impression given fails to bear out meaning originally
intended. Fathers Bruehl and Campbell are determined to avoid this
defect and avoid it they do. It is a tribute to their years of study and
teaching experience that the text never loses its flavor of everyday psychological experience.
Nevertheless, devotion to this ideal or realistic description, of expounding
data in an experimental context, is not enough to make a text superlatively
good, and in the present case, something of scientific perfection seems to
have been sacrificed for descriptive color. In places it seems that accuracy
of expression gives way to vigor. In other places, the evidence, experiential
and inferential, is passed over in favor of fuller description and practical
application, leaving the reader (or teacher) the burden of supplying the
premisses for the conclusions. Often, in fact, matters are presented as simple
assertions without the benefit of any supporting data.
In the majority of instances, these defects are of small moment, being
easily supplied for by the reader. They assume, however, more importance

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when controversial conclusions are presented in a one-sided manner without
the evidences and reasoning processes which have led to them. Perhaps
this is complilcated further by an eclectic use of scholastic philosophy.
While, by and large, the authors adhere to the Thomistic synthesis, in
several instances they depart from it radically, and generally without
expressing their reasons. As a result, it is often difficult to assess their
position. A striking instance of this is the identification of the common
sense and the estimative sense (Chapter XIII), an identification which
not only does away, to St. Thomas' way of thinking, with the essential
function of either sense, but also departs from the fundamental principle
of distinguishing powers by their formal objects. The whole function of
the common sense as an integrating power for the external sensations
depends on its not producing an express species, since such a species would
impede this sense's orientation to hie et nunc reality. The estimative sense,
on the other hand (or better, the cogitative sense in man) operates
precisely by collecting and organizing experience and expressing the collation in images (the data of experience) for the abstractive work of the
intellect. It may be that the authors have cogent reasons for identifying
these senses, but it is hard to justify their appeal to St. Thomas' authority,
as they cite his description of the estimative sense and apply it to the
common sense. (p. 148) It would seem also that the evidences of perceptual disorders from brain lesions (p. 151) argues for a real distinction
between these two powers. In another place, indeed, a distinct capacity for
estimation is described, although most briefly, but this more compounds
than solves the problem. (pp. fl22-fUl8)
Again the authors identify the active and possible intellects, which is
also a notable departure from St. Thomas' principle of distinguishing
powers. The active intellect, in fact, would not seem even to pertain to
the order of powers formally cognitive, in as much as it knows nothing,
but rather effects the knowability of material things.
There are also other instances in which the authors would have served
better the reader's wants by presenting their own line of argument more
fully. So, for instance, they argue for a' one consciousness' in man (p. 240),
and for the pre-eminence of the will over the intellect. It would seem,
as a matter of fact, that the general exposition of the nature and activity
of the will would have profited from a more thorough analysis of its relation
to and dependence on the intellect.
There are other minor points also with which one might take issue,
particularly if an opinion personally favored seems to be dismissed with
too little hearing. That, however, is a criticism to which any text book
is subject, and especially a text in psychology. And, in spite of the objections to,this or that conclusion, the content as a whole ought to be widely

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303

acceptable, not only for the maturity of judgment exhibited but also, as
has been remarked, for its readable, not to say homely, style. It is a
pleasure to read a text which reads as though it were written to be read.
MICHAEL STOCK, 0. P.
Dominican House of Philosophy,
Dover, Jl,fass.

Socrates: Man and Myth. By ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST. Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1957. Pp. 336. $6.75.
There was once a schoolmaster who maintained that once in each
semester his class should stand on their heads to get a new look at the
world. Those many readers who have been accustomed to take the
Platonic picture of Socrates substantially at its face-value will feel that
Dr. Chroust's book is just such an exercise. Not that it is directly about
the Platonic Socrates; still less directly does it attempt to treat of Socrates
himself, and in this respect the title is rather misleading. What is under
examination is the literary and historical background to the two Socratic
apologies of Xenophon, the Defence of Socrates and Mernorabilia Ll.l1.2.64. Those used to thinking of Xenophon's Socratic writings as more
down-to-earth and matter-of-fact than Plato's will find themselves in a still
more topsy-turvy world, for these are characterised as "primarily the
product of creative writing and unfettered imagination."
The basic authority is considered to be a lost work, the existence of which
is attested by several ancient authors, the Accusation of Socrates by Polycrates, to the presumed contents of which nearly 100 pages are devoted.
The attempted reconstruction (not the first) of this work, ancient accounts
of which are admittedly uncertain and contradictory, has so captured the
author's imagination that he seems at times (cf. pp. 71, 74) to refer to it
as actually in being. The effort may also have caused him to lose sight
of its purpose in the main scheme and to have made Polycrates the real
subject of the book. This is perhaps responsible for an apparent trace of
circularity in the argument. For we read on p. 70 that " neither Plato nor
Xenophon make any direct reference to Polycrates, despite the fact that
his Accusation of Socrates made a profound impression on both." Yet two
pages later it is only " assumed that Xenophon and Libanius had read "
the work. (The subsequent statement that Hirzel's contrary conjecture has
been refuted is a rare instance of non-documentation, uncommon indeed in
a book of this size with 1476 footnotes.) It is, then, with this presupposition that Xenophon and Libanius are used to help reconstruct Polycrates
and he in turn used to interpret Xenophon. But we think that the
minutely probative form in which the argument is cast does not do justice

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to the genuine evidence under review. The basic idea may be thought to
be that the apologies of Libanius and Xenophon show certain correspondences in the points selected for defence. As the former is certainly at
least indirectly dependent on Polycrates's attack, there is the possibility of
conjecture that the latter was similarly motivated. To the extent that
we accept the conjecture, Xenophon's work will be seen not as an attempt
to give a historical portrait, but as a rejoinder to a pamphlet written
some six years after the death of Socrates.
Behind the no longer extant Polycrates, the author tries to estimate a
further influence, that of the scarcely extant Antisthenes, a personality
whose lines are themselves shrouded by subsequent overlay. We might
have expected that Polycrates would have been first considered in relation
to Antisthenes, then Xenophon in the light of this further analysis of
his presumed source. But the reverse order is adopted, so that the two
investigations are brought into no evident relationship. This re-inforces our
suspicion that the proper subtitle should be not " The Two Socratic
Apologies of Xenophon " but rather" The Socratic Accusation of Polycrates."
Dr. Chroust's declared principles leave little room for hope that any
just estimate of Socrates as a historical personage can be reached. Yet
behind the pamphleteering and the contending schools of Sophists in the
early fourth century there certainly lay some genuine memories of the
man who was condemned to death in 399 B. C. Is it in any way at aU
possible to penetrate the veil of sources whose content and motivation can
be hardly more than guessed at? (Lest it be thought that the author is
generally over-assertive, be it said that we have counted eighteen phrases
of hesitant qualification on a single page.) In his penultimate chapter Dr.
Chroust argues (even from the very silence of the extant tradition) to a
Socrates who was more of a politician than a philosopher, condemned in a
democratic purge of conspicuously aristocratic elements. The evidence for
this is extremely weB marshalled, and while one may think the negative
side of the conclusion a little exaggerated, and suspect the presence of a
prejudice against any kind of a philosophic Socrates, the political picture
drawn does avoid what has always seemed to us the grotesque unlikelihood of Socrates being condemned because he was some kind of grandfather
of Plato's Academy.
We recently saw this book displayed on a shelf labelled General NonFiction. It was certainly misplaced under the first heading, for the wealth
of minute erudition in it challenges the appraisal only of the finest scholarship. But the second? "Nearly every Socratic has modelled his 'Socratic
legend' after his own image" (p. Hl6) and in this new version there are
certainly subjective elements which it will take time for the conspectus of
learned opinion to evaluate.
Ivo THOMAs, 0. P.
University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana

BRIEF NOTICES

DANTE LIGHTS THE WAY. By RuTH Fox. Milwaukee:

805
Bruce, 1958. Pp.

389. $4.95.
Pope Benedict XV, in the only encyclical ever issued to commemorate
a literary figure, wrote that " among the topics we find treated in the
various works of Dante, some have particular value for our own times."
He then listed among these his " insistence on the supreme reverence due
from all men to Holy Scripture," to the Councils and the Fathers, and his
" wonderful reverence for the power of the Roman Pontiff," in spite of his
bitter experience with the Popes of his time. Furthermore, says Benedict
XV: "We need not wonder that this poem, rising like a temple from such
broad religious foundations, is found to be a rich storehouse of Catholic
doctrine, containing not merely the distilled sweetness of Christian philosophy and theology, but also a summa of those laws, divinely wise, which
guarantee success in creating and governing political societies ... We need
not dwell on the wonder and delight that elevate the reader of this transcendent poetic creation. But this artistic enjoyment, we must insist,
lead the reader up and on, not merely to a profound appreciation of all art
and culture, but also to a keen longing for manly virtue in his own life,
though prejudice, of course, and deficient love of truth may nullify this
prospect. Other poets there are, too, great and good, who lead men on from
enjoyment to virtue. But none succeeds as Dante."
Some modern critics, Elder Olsen for example, have questioned whether
Dante's Divine Comedy ought to be considered a poem at all, since its
purpose is so manifestly didactic. Is it not rather rhetoric since it aims to
move us to virtue? Benedict XV seems to answer this
a distinction.
The immediate and proper end of the work is artistic enjoyment and hence
the work is truly a poem. Nevertheless this enjoyment leaves behind it
a deep moral impression, a delight in and longing for the perfection of
virtue.
The author of this work states her own purpose clearly: " This book is
not an exegesis of the text of the Divine Comedy. It is not an attempt to
deal with Dante's poem primarily as poetry, though many of his poetic
images will be discussed. It is planned as a general handbook for those
who are not familiar with Dante as a man. or with his times or with his
mental climate. It is an effort to clear away a few of the difficultiesphilosophical, theological, and liturgical-which have interposed for many
readers between his time and ours."
As a professor of English in a state university for many years she well
understands just what these difficulties are, and she has succeeded remarkably in her task. The first part of the book traces Dante's life, the history
of the composition of his masterpiece, and outlines its structure. Part Two
discusses in detail several of the central themes of the work: the angels,

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BRIEF NOTICES

the Virgin, the Trinity, the Saviour and His Mystical Body. The third
part shows how Dante's poem can be a light to guide the individual in
the road of spiritual progress, and our troubled society on the road to
peace. Technical difficulties are discussed in the very interesting notes to
each chapter, and the book is completed by a brief pictorial appendix, and
an index.
The author has carefully informed herself on the immense literature of
scholarly controversy which concerns this poem, but she does not trouble the
reader with such matters. Rather she seeks to show how a wonderfully
rich and unified conception of God and of man's relation to God and to
the whole universe penetrate every detail of the poem. As one reads, a
splendid and marvelously articulated vision is opened like the unfolding
of a flower, the mystic white rose of the empyrean heaven.
The special contribution made by this book to our understanding of
Dante is that the author has had the patience really to enter into Dante's
theological point of view. She has not merely matched Dante's remarks
and symbols with the corresponding passage in St. Thomas, St. Augustine,
or St. Bonaventure, but has tried to show us how Dante's own living desire
to understand the reality of heaven and of earth and of the human soul
is the inspiration of all the details
his poem. This she has communicated
in a style that is free from sentimentality, with both radiant warmth and
a precision of detailed analysis.
The most original thing in the book is probably chapter IX, " Purgation
for Perfection," which is of really practical help for omr spiritual life today.
In it the author shows how Dante has given poetic embodiment to the
whole doctrine of the way of Christian perfection and the states of prayer.
Beginners in the spiritual life need a vision of their goal, yet they can gain
such an insight only in poetic terms. Consequently God has given imaginative visions to some beginners in the spiritual life to awaken their earnest
striving. Sometimes mystics have themselves written poetry to communicate this insight to their readers. Yet such communication will fail if the
mystic is not a skilled poet. Dante (whether he was raised to mystical
prayer or not) was a supreme poet who was able to lend his art to the
presentation of the spiritual doctrine which he has found in the writings
o£ the great mystics and theologians of the Church. We who are sometimes
repelled by the literary form of such mystics or theologians, can find in
Dante great spiritual doctrine communicated through the greatest poetry.
Miss Fox has unfolded this fascinating vision for us aH to see, even for
those who are not yet within the fold.
BENEDICT M. ASHLEY, 0. P.
Dominican House of Studies,
River Forest, Illinois

BRIEF NOTICES

807

AesthetiC8: Lectures & Essays. By EnwARn BuLLOUGH. Edited by Elizabeth M. Wilkinson. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957. P.P.
201. $4.50.
This book is both a sampling of the work and a memoir of Edward
Bullough, Professor of Italian at Cambridge University in the early part
of this century and a many-sided man. Miss Wilkinson, apparently inspired
by a student of Bullough, has performed a service by rescuing his thought
from private printing and the files of old journals and adding an introduction, a biographical note and a list of his publications.
The framework of Bullough's thinking about aesthetics is contained in
"A Modern Conception of Aesthetics" a series of lectures given in 1907
at Cambridge on his " intellectual hobby." Here he puts forward the view
that aesthetics should be concerned with the impressions created by beautiful objects on individual persons, as against the traditional idea that this
branch of knowledge should start by defining Beauty and working downward to application. He is not abashed to discover that impressions differ
widely, not only from culture to culture but even from person to person,
and indeed it is precisely this variety that he envisions as the subject
matter of the discipline. He proposes that there is such a thing as " aesthetic
consciousness "-as distinguished from the practical, scientific or ethical
consciousness-which is contemplative and " invests all things it touches
with a charm and interest ... [and] discovers that innumerable acts are
daily done, not for the sake of practical utility nor in conscious observance
of ethical postulates, but because the doing of them was accompanied by
that peculiar sense of enjoyment in doing them well, with all the strength,
perfection and grace that could be imparted to them." (p. 75) He confesses indeed that he believes in " Aestheticism " but is quick to distinguish
his position from that " atmosphere heavy with
exotic scent,
effeminate finickingness and general decadence " which W. S. Gilbert had
satirized in his time.
Bullough is a clear, patient thinker with an easy but exact style and he
has a great many perceptive things to say about art, the artist and the
recipient of art. A convert to Catholicism (and a Dominican tertiary
whose son is the Rev. Sebastian Bullough, 0. P.), his speculations are not
derived from Thomistic philosophy, but might be said to be Thomistic
in spirit because of his fearlessness in confronting the complexities of his
subject. When it comes to the purpose and function of the " aesthetic
consciousness " he is content to hand over the problem to the metaphysician.
The essay on " Psychical Distance " deals well and thoroughly with a
concept that has become widely accepted in recent years and which has
pertinence to some of the recent discussion on the effect of art in the moral
realm, and the final chapter " Mind and Medium in Art " reveals a

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sympathetic insight into the relationship between the artist and the conditions which govern his attempt to impose his intuitions on his material.
Bullough is especially respectful of the art of acting, by the way (a rare
note in aesthetic writing) possibly because his marriage to the daughter
of Eleanora Duse brought him into a close association with the great
Italian actress.
The book contains a great deal of common and uncommon sense about a
tricky subject and deserves a high place among other recent investigations
by Maritain, Vann, Gardner, Murray and Kerr. Miss Wilkinson sees certain
correspondences between Bullough and Suzanne Langer, but I find it difficult to follow her here.
LEO BRADY
Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. 0.

The Word of Salvation. By ALFRED DuRAND, S. J. and JosEPH RuBY, S. J.
Vol. I, Translated by John J. Heenan, S. J. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1957.
Pp. 965 with index. $1UO.
A translation is not to be scorned or minimized simply because it is a
translation. A translator truly produces a new work, at greater effort, often,
than that of the original author, for the translator must possess not only
the art of writing but also the art of conveying concepts in a new language.
Here, then, is a work of prodigious scholarship, and congratulations are in
order for the translator, Fr. Heenan. This is the first of a two-volume commentary on the four Gospels originally published in French a little over
thirty years ago under the title Verbum Salutis. The commentary on
Matthew was done by Fr. Durand and on Mark by Fr. Ruby. Since the
work was intended to offer a simple and accurate explanation of the text
for the general reader, the authors reduced to a minimum all technical
discussions and avoided controversial and strictly exegetical questions; yet
they did not forbid themselves " any of the theological, ascetical and
mystical reflections " that seemed apt to aid in " penetrating to the marrow
of the Gospel teaching and in tasting its savor" (p. v).
The procedure is simple. First there is given a short section of the Gospel
(usually a few verses or a pericope), with references to the parallel places
in the other sacred books. The commentary follows. Then a few more
verses of the text and their explanation; and so on through each Gospel.
The Gospel text itself is really a new English version, for the translator
did not take any of the current Catholic versions but rather adapted his
own from the French for the sake of uniformity. The commentaries, in

BRIEF NOTICES

809

general, are quite reasonable, and the authors do not force the text; doubts
are still doubts. Fr. Durand's explanation of Matthew is clear, not too
long, and suitable for preaching and meditation. There are many footnotes,
mostly from other places in the Bible; this is sometimes misleading, since
these references are not always to be taken according to the literal sense
and consequently they really do not substantiate the statements in the
commentary. Fr. Ruby's exposition, on the other hand, is a bit more
drawn out, and dwells more on theological points (at least in the early
chapters of Mark) than does Fr. Durand's; the notes are taken from a
of authors, ancient, medieval and modern.
wide
Especially praiseworthy are Fr. Durand's explanation of the Our Father
(p. 101, ff.), the problem of the staff for the apostolic journey (p. 174),
the least in the kingdom being greater than John the Baptist (p. 193) ,
the basis of the evangelical counsels (p. 333), and the purpose of the
parables (p.
ff.) , together with the distinction between allegory and
parable (p. 236). Fr. Huby gives a good theological explanation of our
Lord's temptations (p.
ff.), the meaning of" Son of Man" (p. 557, ff.),
and the parable of the sower (p. 610, fl'.); but the treatment of the purpose
of the parables (pp. 604-610) is poor in comparison with the other. The
proofreaders have done very well, too, in eliminating all but a few errors:
pp. xxi, 190, 255, 475, and one ambiguous reference on p. 660.
For all its good points, this book leaves much to be desired. Its value
certainly would be increased if only the translator had edited a little, to
bring it up to date. The translation of the Gospel itself retains thee, thou,
girdle, didst, wouldst and similar outmoded words which are being discarded in the newer English versions. In the light of the Qumran discoveries
the explanation of the Essenes could be improved (p. 28) . So also the
statement about divorce (p. 88, note) could be made dearer by at least
a mention of the interpretation of Fr. Vaccari, who wrote that the " exception " of th!i case of fornication means simply that such a union is always
unlawful and therefore the man must put away the woman. It would be
theologically inaccurate to say, " All-the Evangelist, the multitudes, the
Pharisees, and Christ himself-believe that the malady of [the] poor
unfortunate blind and dumb man [Mt.
2ft] is the result of diabolical
possession" (p. 210, italics mine); but it would seem from the context that
this is not to be taken in the strict sense. Fr. Huby reconciles the difficulties of the hour of the crucifixion (p. 899) and the two thieves insulting
our Lord (p.
, but passes over the problem involved in Peter's denials.
He seems also to accept the authol"ity of the Codex Washingtoniensis
(Freer) among others on p. 666, but rejects it on p. 671.
Of particular interest to this reviewer is the rather large number of Greek
words and references to Greek texts in this work-well over fifty. If there

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be any foundation to the recent complaints that there are no Catholic
scholars in America, then the use of Greek words in a word intended for
the'general reader seems rather vain. If, on the other hand, the publishers
feel that these words will be understood, then why not perform a really
good service by printing a complete Greek text, with a commentary on
that? In the meantime we do hope that Fr. Heenan will continue his
services to scholarship by bringing us translations of the best French works,
old and new.
JAMES J. DAVIS,

0. P.

Dominican House of Philosophy,
Dover, Massachusetts

Words and Images: A Study in Theological Discourse. By E. L. MASCALL.
New York: Ronald Press, 1957. Pp. 18Q. $8.50.
In this closely reasoned little book, containing only six chapters, the
noted Anglican cleric gives us a valuable restatement of the traditional
Christian philosophy of knowledge. In clear and simple language, with the
barest minimum of technical terminology, he states the case effectively
for truly objective perception. These essays are within the reach of many
students of thought, who may not have mastered scholastic method or
style, though they are seriously concerned with the doctrine of human
knowledge. For this reason the work is to be recommended as a valuable
text for general reading and as a collateral source book in our epistemology.
The central aim of the author is to present a rational justification for
our thinking and talking about God. As necessary preliminary he defends,
altogether convincingly, the belief in the existence of real things, objects
outside the mind, the mind itself, other minds. To clear the ground he
exposes the uncritical assumptions in " certain widely publicized positions,
which if accepted would dismiss (his) task as irrelevent and doomed to
futility from the start." (p. 121) The statement and defence of our
perception is logically followed by a brief and trenchant exposition of " the
relation of theological thought and knowledge to its communication."
(p. 122) In this chapter the writer has some very enlightening lines on
the value of images involved in revelation and theological thought, suggesting by its very brevity and pointedness a vast field of theological work
in the area of words, concepts, symbols, and images. This reviewer feels
that theologians are only beginning to exploit and popularize the possibilities in this amazingly interesting realm of philosophy and theology.
In the brief statement of background, Mascall notes that it is the dominant school of Anglo-Saxon philosophy which extended the " ideal of cognitive process," because of its remarkable success in the limited field of

BRIEF NOTICES

311

scientific and mathematic experience, to cover experience as a whole,
" looking upon the ideal of knowledge as detached, discursive and arrested
at the level of phenomena." Over against this he sets the " ideal of knowledge as involving committment, contemplation and penetration beneath
the phenomenal level," for this is essential if one is to discover and explore
the "realities with which Christianity is concerned." With remarkable
freshness and cogency he states the traditional position: perception is in
its essence not mere sense-awareness but intellectual apprehension which
takes place through the medium of sensation. The intelligible object
is not something whose existence is deduced from that of sensible phenomena, as Locke thought, but something grasped through them.
Similarly the linguistic fonnulae are not objecta quae of communication
in which case conversation would terminate in mere flatus vocis, nor are
they mere structural replicas, more or less accurate, of the thought which
has been coded into them, but the means through which (objecta quibus)
two minds are enabled to enter into a sharing of common intellectual life.
The book is distinguished for many valuable insights, notably in the
historical contexts, for the cavalier and calm presentation, and even for a
certain wryness of humor. There is a good bibliography, a brief index of
proper names. The summary of the essays in chapter six is excellent.
Except for the rather clouded expression of opinion on the five ways of
Saint Thomas (p. 84) the work seems uniformly good.
EDWIN

Saint Joseph's College
Rensselaer, Indiana

G. KAmER, C.PP.S.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Bender, 0. P., Ludovicus. De Matrimonio. Torino: Berruti, 1958. Pp. 128.
Buis, Harry. Historic Protestantism and Predestination. Phila.: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1959. Pp. 142. $2.75.
Caffarena, S. J., Jose. Ser Participado y Ser Subsistente en la Metafisica
de Enrique de Gante. (Analecta Gregoriana, Vol. XCIII.) Roma:
Pontif. Universita Gregoriana, 1958. Pp. 288 with indexes. $8.50.
Charlesworth, Maxwell J. Philosophy and Linguistic Analysis. (Duquesne
Studies. Phil. Sr. n. 9) Pittsburgh: Duquesne University, 1959. Pp.
245 with index. $5.50, cloth. $4.75, paper.
Christian, William A. An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics.
New Havel}.: Yale University Press, 1959. Pp. 419 with index. $6.00.
Clark, R. S.C. J., Mary. Augustine: Philosopher of Freedom. New York:
Descltie, 1959. Pp. 278 with indexes. $4.50.
Culleton, James. A Key to the Apocalypse. Fresno: Academy Library
Guild, 1959. Pp. 40. $1.50.
Dawson, Christopher. The Movement of World Revolution. New York:
Sheed & Ward, 1959. Pp. 179. $8.00.
Dugmore, C. W. The Mass and the English Reformers. New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1959. Pp. 276 with indexes. $8.50.
Eliade, Mircea. The Sacred and the Profane. New York: Harcourt, Brace,
1959. Pp. 256 with index. $4.50.
Fagothey, S. J., Austin. Right and Reason. St. Louis: Mosby, 1959.
Pp. 627 with index. $6.00.
Ferguson, John. Moral Value in the Ancient World. New York: Barnes
& Noble, 1959. Pp. 256 with index. $4.50.
Fraigneau-Julien, P. S. S., Bernard. L'Eglise et le Caractere Sacramentel
selon M.-J. Scheeben. Bruges: Descltie de Brouwer, 1958. Pp. 292
with index. 147 Fr. Bel.
Gibson, John M. Soldiers of the Word. New York: Philosophical Library,
1959. Pp. 804. $8.75.
Guardini, Romano. Prayers from Theology. New York: Herder & Herder,
1959. Pp. 65. $1.50.
Hart, Charles. Thomistic Metaphysics. E'nglewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, 1959. Pp. 481 with index. $5.50.
Hughes, Archibald. A New Heaven and a New Earth. Phila.: Presbyterian
& Reformed, 1959. Pp. 288 with index. $8.75.
Ruppe, Bernard F. Doctrine and Poetry. New York: State University of
New York, 1959. Pp. 254 with index. $6.00.

812

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818

Langer, Susanne K. Reflections on Art. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1959.
Pp. 373 with index. $6.50.
Lazzarini, Andrea. Pope John XXIII. New York: Herder & Herder, 1959.
Pp. 145. $3.25.
Lippert, Peter. The Jesuits. New York: Herder & Herder, 1958. Pp. 131.
McGinnis, 0. Carm., Thomas. Thoughts for Tertiaries. New York:
Scapular Press, 1959. Pp. 143.
Mainberger, 0. P., Gonsalv. Die Seinsstufung als Methode und Metaphysik.
with index. 17 DM.
Freiburg: Universitatsverlag, 1959. Pp.
Martinez, N. L. & Gil, V. P. Symbolum pro lnformatione Manichaeorum
. par Juan de Torquemada, O.P. Edicion critica. Burgos: Seminario
Metropolitano, 1959. Pp. 147 with index. 90 Pt.
Morse, J. Mitchell. The Sympathetic Alien. New York: New York University Press, 1959. Pp. 178 with index. $4.00.
--. Priest's Manual for Forty Hours Devotions. Paterson: St. Anthony
Guild Press, 1958. Pp. 103.
Rasolo, S. J. Louis. Le Dilemme du Concours Divin. (Analecta Gregoriana,
Vol. LXXX) Roma: Ponti£. Universita Gregoriana, 1956. Pp. 134.
$2.25.

Rochford, Vincent & Others. Pattern of Scripture. (Canterbury Books)
New York: Sheed & Ward, 1959. Pp. 96. $.75.
Rushdoony, Rousas J. By What Standard? Philadelphia: Presbyterian &
Reformed, 1959. Pp.
$3.95.
Sitwell, 0. S. B., Gerard. (Tr. & Ed.) St. Odo of Cluny. New York:
Sheed & Ward, 1959. Pp.
with index. $4.50.
Tizard, Leslie J. Preaching. New York: Oxford, 1959. Pp. 106.
Vann, O.P., Gerald. The Paradise Tree. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1959.
Pp.
with index. $4.00.
Vawter, C. M., Bruce. The Bible in the Church. (Canterbury Books)
New York: Sheed & Ward, 1959. Pp. 95. $.75.
Various Authors. Christus Victor Mortis. Terza Settimana Teologica, 1957.
Roma: Ponti£. Universita Gregoriana, 1958. Pp.
Weigel, S.J., Gustave. Faith and Understanding in America. New York:
Macmillan, 1959. Pp. 170. $3.75.
Wetter, Gustav A. Dialetical Materialism. New York: Fred. A. Praeger,
1958. Pp.
with indexes. $10.00.
White, Morton. Religion, Politics and the Higher Learning. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1959. Pp. 150 with index. $3.50.