THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVI,EW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORS: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE oF ST. JosEPH Publishers: VoL. XXII The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. JULY, 1959 No.8 801\fE NOTES ON BEING AND PREDICATION R CENTL Y the nature of the so-called existential proposition has been the object of renewed discussion among logicians as well as metaphysicians. I say " renewed " because, as is recognized by at least some contemporary disputants, the problems involved have long been recognized. It is not surprising, then, that Thomists should feel moved to bring to the attention of others the thought of St. Thomas on existential propositions. Indeed those who profess to see in the metaphysics of St. Thomas a kind of existentialism have been especially drawn to his views on this matter and purport to find in his remarks a basis for some rather startling statements about the concept of being. In this paper I propose to consider some of the relevant passages in St. Thomas as well as an influential existential interpretation of them. I take it that this consideration will lay bare a number of historical inaccuracies and doctrinal flaws in "Thomistic Existentialism." 315 316 RALPH M. MCINERNY 1. The Existential Proposition It is not surprising that it is in his commentary on Aristotle's De lnterpretatione that St. Thomas speaks of what is called the existential proposition. In the course of a comparison of enunciations which include an" infinite noun," Aristotle distinguishes those in which is is predicated as tertium adiacens from others in which it is not. 1 Is is a tertium when it attaches to a noun or verb, e. g., "Socrates is just." Opposed to such enunciations are others, e. g., "Socrates is." In the latter kind, is is the principal predicate. In "Socrates is just," is is not the principal predicate but, together with just, forms one predicate. With regard to the first [i. e., that when the verb " is " is used as a third element in the sentence, there can be positive and negative propositions of two sorts], two things must be understood. The first of these is the meaning of his [Aristotle's] statement, 'Is is predicated as a third element (tertium adiacens) .' To understand this one must consider that the verb is is sometimes predicated in an enunciation according to itself, as when it is stated, Socrates is-by which we intend to signify no more than that Socrates exists in reality (in rerum natura). But sometimes is is not predicated per se as though the principle predicate, but as though conjoined to the principle predicate in order to connect it to the subject, as when it is stated, Socrates is white, it is not the intention of the one speaking to assert Socrates to be in reality, but to attribute whiteness to him through the intermediary of this verb is. And therefore in such cases is is predicated as adjacent to the principle predicate. 2 1 De lnterpretatione. 10, 19b "When the verb 'is' is used as a third element (tertium adiacens) in the sentence, there can be positive and negative propositions of hvo sorts. Thus in the sentence ' man is just ' the verb is used as a third element, call it verb or noun, which you will." (Oxford translation.) 2 In 11 Periherm., lect. 8, n. "Circa primum duo oportet intelligere: primo quidem, quid est hoc quod dicit, 'est tertium adiacens praedicatur.' Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod hoc verbum est quandoque in enuniciatione praedicatur secundum se; ut cum dicitur, ' Socrates est,' per quod nihil aliud intendimus significare, quam quod Socrates sit in rerum natura. Quandoque vero non praedicatur per se, quasi principale praedicatum, sed quasi conjunctum principali praedicato ad connectendum ipsum subiecto; sicut cum dicitur, 'Socrates est albus,' non est intentio loquentis ut asserat Socratem esse in rerum natura, sed ut SOME NOTES ON BEING AND PREDICATION 317 From this passage it is clear that in "Socrates is," is is the predicate; the existential proposition, like any other simple enunciation, is composed of a noun and a verb, a subject and a predicate. In propositions in which is is a tertium adiacens there are not two predicates but one, e. g. is-white. "And it is called third, not because it is a third predicate, but because it is a third expression (dictio) placed in the enunciation, which, along with the word predicated, constitutes one predi- · cate, in such a way that the enunciation is divided into two parts and not into three." 3 St. Thomas also notes the obvious signification of is in "Socrates is": when we make such an assertion, we mean that Socrates is in rerum natura. It is important to stress that St. Thomas asserts (I) that existence is a predicate, and (2) that existence, is, signifies something. Both of these assertions have been denied in the interests of an existential interpretation of St. Thomas' doctrine. M. Gilson tells us, in Being and Some Philosophers, that logic, apparently Aristotelian logic, cannot handle the existential proposition. " Propositions are usually defined as enunciations which affirm or deny one concept of another." 4 M. Gilson divides the proposition into " one-term " and " twoterm" propositions. "Man is rational" is said to be a two-term proposition. Man and rational are the terms; is is not a term " because it designates, not a concept, but the determinate relation which obtains between two terms." 5 "John is," is an example of a Gilsonian one-term proposition: John is the only term. This leaves is unexplained and M. Gilson pronounces the breakdown of logic. " In short, if all propositions entail either a composition or division of concepts, how can there be a proposition in which there is only one concept? " 6 One could attribuat ei albedinem mediante hoc verbo est; et ideo in talibus est praedicatur ut adiacens principali praedicato." • Ibid.: " Et dicitur esse tertium, non quia sit tertium praedicatum, sed quia est tertia posita in enunciatione, quae simul cum nomine praedicato facit unum praedicatum, ut sic enunciatio dividatur in duas partes ct non in tres." • E. Gilson. Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: 1949), p. 190. • Ibid. • Ibid., p. 191. 318 RALPH M. MCINERNY point out, of course, that the integral parts of the enunciation, according to Aristotle, are the noun and the verb, that " John is " clearly qualifies as an enunciation in Aristotelian logic. However, there are reasons for following further M. Gilson's analysis, for it leads us to the heart of his Existentialism. M. Gilson observes that logicians have a way of turning "one-term" propositions into "two-term." Thus, "Peter runs " can be rendered " Peter is running." Now, in such cases as I am or God is the transformation is not even possible, because in I am being or God is being, the predicate is but a blind window which is put there for mere verbal symmetry. There is no predicate even in the thus-developed proposition, because, while running did not mean the same thing as is, being does. In other words, is-running does not mean is, and this is why, in the first case, the verb is a copula, which it is not in the second case. The metaphysical truth that existence is not a predicate is here finding its logical verifications. 7 In "John is," according toM. Gilson, is is neither predicate nor copula. Since is clearly is a predicate in " John is," one may well wonder what M. Gilson is getting at. The following remark, summarizing his denial that is is a predicate in such propositions as "John is" gives us the clue. "All the rest is mere verbiage calculated to make us believe that existence falls under the scope of conceptual predication." 8 M. Gilson's denial that is is a predicate is closely linked to his view on the manner in which the intellect grasps existence. 2. Existence and Conception If existence is not predicated in existential propositions this is because predicates are concepts and, M. Gilson contends, there is no concept of existence. What then is being asserted in existential judgments? Noting that there is no a priori reason to doubt that human thought at the very outset goes straight to what is the core of being,9 M. Gilson says that existence is attained in the judg, ment. And the judgment must. be distinguished from abstract 7 Ibid., p. 198. "Ibid. 8 Ibid., p .101. SOME NOTES ON BEING AND PREDICATION 319 representation. 10 What can be grasped and represented abstractly is essence; if then we assume that existence is not essence, it seems to follow that existence cannot be absractly represented. Intellect attains existence only by means of the judgmenL The concept which expresses an essence cannot be used as a complete expression of the corresponding being, because there is in the object of every concept something that escapes and transcends its essence. In other words, the actual object of a concept always contains more than its abstract definition. What it contains over and above its formal definition is its act of existing, and, because such acts transcend both essence and representation, they can be reached only by means of judgment. The proper function of the judgment is to say existence, and this is why judgment is a type of cognition distinct from and superior to pure and simple abstract conceptualization. 11 Touching on the theme of his book, M. Gilson notes that " essentialistic " metaphysics identify what can be understood, the essence of the thing, with the whole of reality gibility. Judgment, which has existence and not essence as its object, corrects this penchant and guards against abstract speculation. Philosophy "must use judgment to restore essence to actual being." 12 In judgments of existence, my mental act answers the existential act of the known thing. "Let us rather say that such a judgment intellectually reiterates an actual act of existing. If I say that xis, the essence of x exercises through my judgment the same act of existing which it exercises in x.'' 13 That all of this is the doctrine of SL Thomas is dear, M. Gilson feels, from In Boethii de Trinitate expositio, q. 5, a. 3. M. Gilson's analysis of existential propositions, then, involves the view that existence cannot be conceived, that it functions neither as copula nor predicate in such propositions as "John is!' However, existence, the core of being reached at the very outset of the intellectual life, can be attained in the judgment when we return the abstracted essence to its existence: we say that it is and our act of judging reflects in its structure the ,. lbid., p. 202. 11 lbid. 12 Ibid., p. 208. 13 lbid. 3!20 RALPH M. MCINERNY structure of reality where essence is composed with existence. It will be appreciated that all this has a decided effect on the question of the concept, not of existence, but of being. 3. The Concept of Being Being in the view of M. Gilson, cannot be the object of purely abstract cognition nor can essence be legitimately severed from its act of existence. 14 If, in existential judgments, we correct the essentializing tendency of our mind by restoring essence to existence, this will be a fortiori necessary when it is a question not of this being, but of Being. Describing the " abstract essence of being " as a " metaphysical monster," M. Gilson adds: For, indeed, there is no such essence. What is conceivable is the essence of a being. If the correct definition of being is " that which is," it necessarily includes an is, that is existence. To repeat, every ens, is an esse habens, and unless its esse be included in our cognition of it, it is not known as an ens, that is, as a be-ing. If what we have in mind is not this and that being, but being in general, then its cognition necessarily involves that of existence in general, and such a general cognition still entails the most fundamental of all judgments, namely that being is.15 What is surprising here, of course, is the introduction of "existence in general " which surely involves knowing in general what existence is, that is, having a concept of it. And, in " Being is," a judgment spoken of as necessary for metaphysics, to what existence would we be returning the essence of being (the "metaphysical monster")? Surely not to some existence outside the mind, as seemed to be suggested when existential propositions having singular subjects were being discussed, for there is no existence in general outside the mind. And, if existence in general is .general thanks to being in the mind, then abstraction, representation, indeed everything M. Gilson was concerned to rid metaphysics of lest it becomes " essentialistic," seem involved. As a matter of fact, if ens signifies id quod habet esse, it " Ibid., p. !!04. '"Ibid. SOME NOTES ON BEING Al\TD PREDICATION 321 would seem that in the concept of being we already have the esse to be introduced by the general existential judgment, "Being is." Is this to be taken to mean "Essence exists"? This would be a strange issue of M. Gilson's analysis, since being is then equated with essence. The real point, it emerges, is that being signifies " essence exists." Despite the fact that this makes of " Being is " a compound proposition, it is indeed what M. Gilson intends, something quite clear from the second edition of his book. There, in an appendix, M. Gilson considers a number of objections posed by Fr. Regis, 0. P. in his review of the first edition. 16 The appendix is particularly important since in it M. Gilson seems to reject what he had maintained in the first edition. Fr. Regis had noted that, in the commentary on the Peri Hermeneias, St. Thomas speaks of existence as a predicate, and, since 1\:I. Gilson's intention was to present the viewpoint of St. Thomas, the texts referred to by Fr. Regis are matters of serious concern. Faced with these texts, M. Gilson seemingly must make some adjustments in his earlier position if it is to be identical with that of St. Thomas. What he does is to reduce the difference between his views and those of St. Thomas to the level of language; the appendix' is introduced under the heading, Sapientis enim non est curare de nominibus. It soon becomes clear, however, that something more than language is at stake. The remarks of Fr. Regis are fully justified. No Thomist aiming to express the point of view of Thomas Aquinas as he himself would express it should write that existence (esse) is not known by a concept. Historically speaking, our own formulas are inaccurate, and had we foreseen the objections of Fr. Regis, we would have used another language, or made clear that we were not using, the language of Saint Thomas. We should avoid as much as possible unnecessary misunderstandings. The question is: can these misunderstandings be completely avoided? 17 M. Gilson is now willing to admit that existence is known by 18 11 The Modern 'schoolman, XXVIII, 2 (January, 1951), pp. 121-127. Gilson, Op. cit., pp. 221-2. RALPH M. MCINERNY means of a concept. Indeed, he feels that his earlier distinction betwe:n conceptus and conceptio 18 indicates that in some sense of the word concept he had allowed that there is a concept of existence. He notes that Fr. Regis, 0. P. does not seem to honor this distinction. M. Gilson had earlier used the term conceptio to cover the composite act whereby essence is grasped and judged to exist. But the point at issue is not whether we agree that conceptio can be used to signify a judgment, but whether there is a conceptus of existence analytically prior to any existential judgment. It is difficult to interpret M. Gilson as affirming this. He notes that the more restricted term, conceptus, has been taken over by unidentified essentialists as their own and confined to the apprehension of essence. Because of the difficulties of making himself understood in the alleged essentialistic atmosphere of the day, he has restricted his use of concept to the " simple apprehension of an essence." Existence can be the object of conception. " Otherwise how could it be known? But it cannot be known by the simple conceptual apprehension of an essence, which it is not." 19 This is ous. It can mean either that the concept of the essence of any creature does not include its existence, or that there is no concept (conceptus) of existence. M. Gilson notes that anyone is free to reject his distinction of conceptio and conceptus, but the question is whether the use made of it here can be accepted as the thought of St. Thomas. "John is," can be the object of a conceptio; of John we can have a conceptus. But can there be a conceptus of existence? H not, it is dear that there will be no predication of existence and hence no conceptio of «John is." 20 Admitting that St. Thomas speaks of existence as a predicate, M. Gilson feels that such talk is nowadays misleading. "For, if we tell them (non-Thomists) that existence is a predicate, Ibid., p. 190, n. l. Ibid., p. fl28. •• Cf. In IV Metaphys., lect. 10, n. 664: 16 19 significatione nominum dependet. nomina aliquid significant. . . ." "Significatio autem orationis a Et sic oportet ad hoc principium redire, quod SOME NOTES ON BEING AND PREDICAriON 828 they will understand that, according to Thomas Aquinas, actual existence, or esse, can be predicated of its essence as one more essential determination." 21 If the meaning of predicate has changed, one might feel that a clarification of the old and new meanings would be of help in avoiding misunderstanding. M. Gilson, however, seems intent on questioning the adequacy of Aristotle's logic. In his commentaries on Aristotle does Saint Thomas always express his deepest personal thought on a given question? Unless we admit that logic is a strictly formal science wholly unrelated to metaphysics, it is hard to imagine that the true Thomistic interpretation of a logic applicable to habens esse can be identically the same as that of a logic applicable to a metaphysics of ousia.22 This is a most unfortunate turn in the discussion. M. Gilson's hint at the possibility of an "existential logic" can only be as valuable as his estimate of Aristotle's metaphysics, as his analysis of the logical intentions of proposition, predicate, etc., and as any indication he may be able to give that the difficulties he has raised are due to the logic of Aristotle. Of course, only the second and third points concern us here. 23 M. Gilson recalls 24 that St. Thomas assigns three meanings to esse: it can mean essence, the actuality of essence, or the truth of a proposition. (I Sent., d. 88, q. 1, ad I) Only the first two are real being. When we use est in logic, it is not a tertium praedicatum, for in "John is white," is-white is the predicate. So too in" John is," is is the predicate according to St. Thomas. Far from being the solution it is just this that remains M. Gilson's problem, a problem, according to M. Gilson, " whose solution is not to be found in the excellent texts so aptly quoted by Fr. Regis." 25 In "Socrates is," Socrates "refers to an 21 Gilson, Op. cit., p. 224. •• Ibid. On all this, cf. E. Trepanier, "Premieres Distinctions sur le mot 'etre,'" Laval Theologique et Pkilosophique XI, 1 (1955), pp. 25-66. •• On the first point, cf. John D. Beach, "Aristotle's Notion of Being," THE THOMIST, XXI, 1 (January, 1958), pp. 29-48. •• Gilson, Op. cit., p. 224. •• Ibid., p. 225. 324 RALPH M. MCINERNY essence, but does its predicate refer to an essence as in the case of albus? There is no problem as to its conceivability: I have the concept of 'existing Socrates' which is the intelligible import of this judgment. Our own question is: if est is a predicate, what kind of a predicate is it? "· 26 It has to be noted that an unexplained shift takes place here. We are told that Socrates refers to an essence and asked if is does? But the original question was: is there a concept of esse?-not whether esse is an essence. To identify essence and concept is simply to beg the question. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the conceivability of existence is only through the conception of " existing Socrates." That this is all that is meant by the conceivability of existence is clear from the following passage. Let us agree that in Thomas Aquinas the verb est is a predicate; what is the nature of the cognition we have of what it predicates? This is no longer a logical problem; it is a problem in noetics and i:n metaphysics, because it deals with the nature of being and of our knowledge of it. When we predicate est, we are not predicating the 'quidditas vel natura rei.' Nor for that matter do we predicate something which belongs to the essence of Socrates (such 'homo'), or that inheres in it (such as albus '). Logically speaking, it could be said that esse inheres in the subject Socrates, but metaphysically, it does not, because where there is no esse there if' no Socrates. Granting that est is a logical denomination of Socrates as existing, the metaphysical status of the denominated still remains an open question. Among those who refuse the composition of essence and esse, quite a few have been misled precisely by the fact that their metaphysical inquiries were conducted in terms of logic. I<'or, indeed, as soon as we do so, est becomes a predicate like all other predicates, and we imagine ourselves in possession of a distinct concept of esse in itself, apart from the concept which we do have of Socrates-conceived-as-existing. 27 6 Since the only way in which existence can be conceived is in such a conception as 6 existing Socrates/ it is dear that existence is attained only in the judgment, that there is no concept (conceptus) of existence. Surely, then, there is no point in speaking of existence as a predicate. If existence can only be "'Ibid. 27 Ibid. SOME NOTES ON BEING AND PREDICATION 325 conceived in a conception of an existential judgment (which does not involve a conceptus of existence), any talk of the predication of existence would be concerned with the predication of a proposition. 4. The Simple Apprehension of Being The contention of" Existential Thomism" that the concept of being is a judgment or proposition contradicts explicit remarks of St. Thomas. In order to see this is so, it must be made clear that this view on the concept of being has to do with what the intellect first knows, ens primum cognitum. M. Gilson, in the context of his argument that being involves at once apprehension and judgment notes that there is no a priori reason to doubt that reason " at the outset " goes to what is the core of being, i.e. existence. 28 The· composition ·of essence and existence in a judgment which is the. conception of being seems to answer to the being which, as St. Thomas says, primo cadit in intellectu. 29 Now, although it is certainly the thought of St. Thomas which M. Gilson wishes to expose, it is with St. Thomas that he seems to disagree. In many places, St. Thomas writes that being is what the intellect first grasps. 30 Moreover, being (ens) is said to be attained by simple apprehension, by the first operation of the mind, which is analytically prior to judgment. But it should be stated that those things which are more universal according to simple apprehension are the first known, for that which falls first upon the intellect is being.... 31 As evidence of this, it should be understood that since there is a two-fold operation of the intellect-one in which it knows " what something is " (quod quid est), which is called " the understanding' of indivisibles "; the other, by which it composes and divides28 Ibid., p. ftOl. •• Ibid., cf. p. 205. Cf. J. F. Anderson, Review of Metaphysics XI, 4 (June, 1958)' p. 557. 80 E. g. De Ent. et Ess., proem.; De Verit., q. 1, a. 1. 81 In I Metaphys., lect. fl, n. 46: ·• Sed dicendum quod magis universalia secundum simplicem apprehensionem sunt prima nota, nam primo in intellectu · cadit ens.... " . 326 R..-\LPH M. MCINERNY in both. there is some first thing. In the first operation, indeed, of the intellect there is some first thing which falls upon the conception of the intellect, namely, that which I name "being."-nor is anything able to be conceived by the mind in this operation unless "being" be 1.mderstood.32 Both Cajetan and John of St. Thomas have discussed this doctrine at length. Being as first known by our intellect is, Cajetan maintains, ens concretum quidditati sensibili. 38 The formula was carefully chosen. St. Thomas will often say that it is the quiddity of material things which is the connatu:ral object of the human intellect, since om concepts are abstracted from the sense image, the phantasm. The intellect is said to be able to know what the things are whose sensible qualities are attained by the senses, and, of course, what sensible qualities are. Since the whatness or quiddity, though not a per se object of sense, is intellectually attainable by us thanks to the instrumentality of the senses, it is denominated 'sensible.' The sensible quiddity, however, is not something which can be sensed per se. The concepts or ideas formed by the mind are first of all means of knowing sensible things-and nothing more. Of course, as it happens, knowledge of what sensible things are can lead u.s to the certainty that there are things which are not sensible, either per se or in the per accidens way sensible quiddity is. Whatever we come to know of such things will be by an analogy with sensible things, via the connatural objects of our intellect. That is why our knowledge of " separate substance " is always radically imperfect. At the outset of the intellectual life, there will be no question of forming a concept which will be applied to anything other than what is attained by the senses. And, if the first concept is that of being, as St. Thomas teaches, it will be sensible quiddity ""In IV Metaphys., lect. 6, n. 605: Ad huius evidentiam sciendum est, quod cum duplex sit operatio intellectus: una, qua cognoscit quod quid est, quod vocatur indivisibilium intelligentia: alia, qua componit et dividit: in utroque est aliquod primum: in prima quiddem operatione est aliquod primum, quod cadit in conceptione intellectus, scilicet hoc quod dico ens; nee Illiquid hac opexatione potest mente concipi, nisi intelligatur ens." •• Cajetan. De Ent. et Ess., proem., n. 5. SOME NOTES ON BEING AND PREDICATION 327 which is known as being. Concretum, in Cajetan's formula, is opposed to abstractum. He wants to insist that ens primum cognitum is not grasped by what he calls formal abstraction If it were, it would be ens commune, the subject of metaphysics. It is nonsense to say that being is known in this way at the outset of the intellectual life. By means of what Cajetan calls total abstraction, being is grasped as a universal whole predicable of its subjective parts. 34 It may seem odd that Cajetan will not allow that being is first known as a universal whole. Does not St. Thomas explain the priority of being in terms of magis unive1·salia? And, after all, it would seem that being can be predicated of whatever the senses attain. Cajetan in a very subtle, exhaustive and illuminating discussion 35 has argued that a nature must first be known as a definable whole, an integral whole, before it can be known as a predicable or universal whole. And, since confused knowledge precedes distinct knowledge of the same thing, Cajetan has concluded that ens primum cognitum is being grasped confusedly as a definable sensibili, then, is not whole. Ens concretum by total abstraction or by formal abstraction. But, as John of St. Thomas notes: " The intellect is said, nevertheless, to begin from that which is more universal, since it begins from that predicate which is disposed to sustain the greater universality." 36 We may object to this concretum on the grounds that intellectual knowledge is by definition abstract. If being is the first concept formed by the mind, isn't it, like any other concept, abstracted by the agent intellect from a phantasm? Cajetan, of course, has no intention of denying this. "In a third way, as l1aving neither of these conditions, yet nevertheless abstracted from singulars." 37 The first concept is freed from materiality •• Cf, Su·mma Theol., I, II, q. l!'lO, a. 2. •• Cajetan. loc cit. 36 John of St. Thomas. Cursus Philosophicus, T. !i!, p. !i!5a40-48: "Dicitur tamen incipere intellectus ab universaliori, quia incipit ab eo praedicato quod mairori universalitati substerni aptum est." 37 Cajetan. loc. cit.: "Tertio modo ut neutram istarum conditinum habens, abstractum tamen a singularibus." 328 RALPH M. MCINERNY and singularity and in that sense is abstract. But Cajetan, aware that even total abstraction implies distinct knowledge of what it is that is predicable of many, and wanting to retain the truth insisted on by St. Thomas 38 that the first act of our intellect is attended by a maximum of confusion and potentiality, speaks of the primum cognitum as concretum quidditati sensibili. John of St. Thomas, in discussing the same matter, :raises the objection that the singular or singularity is what the intellect first grasps. In handling this, he introduces an explanation of the first confused knowledge of being that "Existential Thomists" should find sympathetic. John answers the objection by pointing out that intellectual knowledge of singularity presupposes distinct knowledge of the nature of which this is a singular instance. The objector continues: let us say that at the outset the intellect grasps singularity, not as to its quid sit, but as to its an sit. John's reply is interesting. But let it be that the intellect begin to know the quiddity of its object not quidditatively, but as to "whether it is" (an est), in ina: Herder, 1946), I, nn. !i!Sl-284. 2 Pirotta, Angelus M., Summa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae, (Turin: Marietti, 1936), II, nn. 259-264. 3 Hugon, E. Cursus Philosophiae Thomisticae, (Paris: Lethielleux, 1907), II, n. 262; Maquart, F.-X. Elementa Philosophiae, (Paris: Blot, 1937), II, .p. 104. 4 Van Laer, Henry. Philosophico-Scientific Problems (Duquesne Studies, PhiloSeries, No. 3), tr. by Henry J. Koren. (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1953), p. 67. 366 THE SUBJECT OF PREDICAMENTAL ACTION 367 teaching of St. Thomas and reconciles the opinions of opposing authors. To place the problem in perspective, the first main section will treat of action; the second section will consider the proper problem of the article-the subject of predicamental action; the final section will be a brief evaluation of the presented doctrine of John of St. Thomas. A. AcTION No doubt can exist as to the reality of efficient causality. The fact that one rabbit plus one rabbit can result in nine rabbits is explained only by the causal action of generation, not by any axiom of arithmetic. Yet the explanation of the nature of efficient causality (or, of the nature of action) is difficult. For an efficient cause is an extrinsic principle of the effect; it causes something new in the effect. The efficient cause does not give a part of itself, it causes something new and something intrinsic. How can the intrinsic be explained by the extrinsic? The answer, of course, lies in the notion of action, principally as realized in the participative action of God, and secondarily, but just as truly, as realized in the transient action of creatures. Accordingly, the first consideration will be of 'action as such; the second, of the participative action of God; the third, of the transient action of creatures. 1. Action as Such The realization that action ut sic is never found in a " pure " state is of help in grasping the precise concept of action. For · action is either joined to an operation of a higher type, or includes elements not essential to it as action, but only as it is talis actio. Spiritual substances, divine and angelic, are true causes with respect to things outside themselves; yet their causative action is not found " alone," but is identical with an operation of a different sort. The divine and angelic causative actions are immanent actions of intellect and will, as imperating the exterior effect to be.· On the other hand, action as it is talis actio requires mutation of the agent and mutation of the 868 DECLAN KANE patient. These two requirements hold both for angelic action and predicamental action, which is transient action formally. Now, what is it that belongs to the concept of action as such? Action, as signifying the exercise of efficient causality, implies only that the agent produce or emanate the effect, which accordingly depends on the And since action is the exercise of causality by the agent with respect to the effect, the immediate consequence is that the effect produced must always have something new in it as a result of the agent's action. 6 2. The Participating Action of God The fundamental explanation of how the extrinsic brings about the intrinsic, of how new being comes to be, lies in action as realized in the causality of God, and in the notion of the effects of this causality being participations from the divine being. There seems some value in using the notion of participation to explain the extrinsic-intrinsic difficulty mentioned above. For participation explicitly signifies both formal and efficient dependence: God efficiently participates to creatures that which is intrinsic to the creature--its form, which is a deficient, distinct, and partial possession of what is totally possessed by God. Participation of new being Created being is not a portion of the divine being, nor is it completely independent of the divine being. That is, a creature is not a participation of the divine being in the pantheistic sense, as a sharing of the same reality, but is a reality partici• Cf. Cursua Philosophicua Thomiaticus. cd. Reiser. (Turin: Marietti, 1988): ". . . de conceptu actionis est actualis emanatio seu emissio alicui us ab agente " (II, 805b 41-48); "De ratione ... actionis, ut causalitas est agentis, praecise est. quod sit actualitas per modum E'manationis seu originis ipsius effectus ab agente cum dependentia effectus ab ipso " (II, 806a 20-25). • Cf. Ibid., 26-82: "Et ista habitudo agentis ad effectum, mediante qua effectus dependet ab ipso, est de intrinseca ratione actionis, quae est causalitas et ita semper requirit aliquam novitatem saltern quoad modum et dependentiam in ipso termino respectu agentis." THE SUBJECT OF PREDICAMENTAL ACTION 369 pated from God. Yet it is not so wholly new and distinct in itself that after creation there is an increase in the totality of being. There are more beings, to be sure, but not more" being." The participated reality is distinct from the per essentiam reality, yet is not additional to it, When a group of men stand around a fire and are warmed by it, there are eleven warm things (the fire plus the ten men); yet there is no additional heat. Nor is the warmth in each man the heat of the fire, but something distinct from and caused by it. Again, when a professor explains a profound metaphysical principle to his the light o£ the professor's class, each of the students, planation, gains some insight into the meaning of the principle; yet there is no additional knowledge in the classroom. Thus created being is not something additional to its source, but is new being distinct from, derived from, less than, and constantly dependent on the causing action of God, who is the divine being. of c1·eated causes God not only causes other beings participating to them what is intrinsic to He also grants to creatures the dign.J.ty of causality, yet in such a way every cause, every action and every effect has its fundamental source and ultimate explanation in the divine causality. Furthermore, since no creature can create, every created efficient cause must exercise its causality by working on a subject. Thus, as giving an essential requisite for created efficient causality, God created potency, which is an inherent or intrinsic capability to be actualized. Thus God has created efficient, formal and material causes. Whenever a created efficient cause works, it must work on the material cause. How then can a created efficient (extrinsic) cause produce something intrinsic? By acting on the intrinsic, by acting on matter. " The operation of nature takes place only on the presupposition of created principles." 1 7 St. Thomas, Summa Theol., I, q. 45, a. 8, ad 4. 370 DECLAN KANE 3. Created and Predicamental Action Created action is predicamental action. Both corporeal and spiritual agents must act on some subject. Thus even the causative actions of angels, as virtually transient, share in the predicament of action. 8 Accordingly, whatever is said of predicamental action is to be applied to immanent actions as these are virtually transient, whether they be angelic or human spiritual operations. 9 The following discussion will concentrate en formally transient action. Created action necessarily has three connotations or references: 10 to the effect, to the patient, and to the agent since action connotes that the effect comes to be, is produced. For no agent is termed an agent before the effect is had, since if the agent acts, it ought to act or do something. Secondly, action connotes a movement or passion in the patient, for if the effect requires mutation of a patient, it will have movement connected with it; thus action regards movement in the patient only as the effect changes the patient. Thirdly, action connotes the mutation of the agent, that is, transition from idleness to operation; for the agent does not act unless it is in the second act of acting. Now, of these three connatations, which is it that signifies precisely what created action is? John o1 St. Thomas gives a direct answer: " Precisely as it is efficient causality, it regards only the effect, for only this is caused." 11 Thus far everything seems sufficiently clear. The precise cpnstitutive of created causality does not differ from what was said earlier on action as such. Action, including created action, produces the effect; the effect comes to be, and has real dependence on the agent. But when we consider the other • Cf. Curs. Phil., II, 264b 28-81; 265b 18-80. 9 Yet it should be remembered that such causative actions are also ,formally immanent, and so the beginning of the action and establishing of contact will be different than that had in formally transient actions. 1 ° Cf. Curs. Phil., II, 265b 42-266a 40. 11 lbid., 266a 85-88: Ut autem est causalitas efficientis praecise, solum respicit eflectum, quia solum hoc est causatum; cf. Ibid., 15-20: "Sed tamen per se et formaliter actio non constituit causalitatem; nisi ut tenet se ex parte agentis per ordinem ad terminum, quia oportet, quod denominet agens cansare et operari.'' THE SUBJECT OF PREDICAMENTAL ACTION 371 connotations of created action, difficulties develop. Yet such consideration is necessary for a dear understanding of how the created agent produces the effect. B. THE SuBJECT OF PREDICAMENTAL AcTION Created action is talis actio and brings in, as has been seen, mutation of the agent and mutation of the patient. There is second act in the agent, and movement (motus) in the patient. With regard to mutation of the agent, it is said that action is in the agent. 12 And as regards the mutation of the patient, action is in the patient. 13 Consequently we have the classic formula: « ••• action in a created agent ... is inchoatively in the agent and consummatively in the term. . . ." 14 Quite obviously, action must be in the agent and patient in different ways and" not according to the same modal entity or formality, for this is impossible, since there is a diversity of subjects . • • • " 15 Thus action is in both agent and patient '•... according to a diverse modal entity and formality, which by a certain order are one." 16 And, somehow, from this complexity of action in the agent and action in the patient, the effect is produced. Th:ree questions suggest themselves in the phrases, " inchoatively in agent . consummatively in patient . . . according to a diverse modal entity." First, is there anything that in any way " crosses over" from the agent into the patient? Secondly, how does the effect really come to be? Thirdly, how can action in the agent be only modally distinct from action in the patient? To answer these questions, and further to penetrate the formula "inchoatively in agent and consummatively in patient," three 0 • 12 Ibid., SH!a 44-b 4: ... actio, quae est causalitas emanans ab agente, quatenus reddit agens actuatum in actu secundo et transmutatum de otio in actum, relinquit formalitatem actionis in agente inchoantem ipsum effectum. 13 Ibid., b 5-12: Ut autem reddit effectum in actu secundo causatum et procedentem a causa, ponit formalitatem in effectu, qua redditur actio consummata, et inde fit denominatio agendi; neque enim aliquid dicitur agere ante effectum, et ratione huius simpliciter actio est in termino. "Ibid., Sl2a 27-28. '"Ibid., Sl2a 29-SL 16 Ibid., 3l2a 82-SS. 872 DECLAN KANE points will be covered in detail (each answering the above correspondingly-numbered question) : 1. action in the agent; 2. action in the patient; 8. comparison of action in agent to action in patient. 1. Action in the Agent Operative potency is rnoved, and receives its second act Since a creature is not the fulness of actuality, its substance, operative power, and operation are all really distinct. While the substance and operative powers are permanently in the agent, the actions are transitory and begin to be. Thus the agent must be changed in order that the change from not acting to acting be had, and this change is accomplished by the motion of a higher power. Some superior agent applies the operative power, and the agent begins to act. This second act which results in the agent from the application by the superior agent fullfills the capacity of the agent. The agent is now fully proportioned to cause the effect. For the operative power is, by its nature, a capacity to cause an effect in another, but is insufficient of itself to cause the effect. The operative power must be completed in itself; the second act is a form inhering in the power, actualizing and completing it. Consequently, and a point which will be capitalized on later, the second act is an accident inhering in the operative power. 17 The operative potency actively elicits its second act Is the operative potency only passive as to its passage from potency to second act? It might seem so, for the potency is rnoved by a superior agent; the potency is the subject of in17 Ibid., 814a 11-17: Sieut enim inb·insece agens est in potentia et in actu primo ad operandum, ita oporet, quod reducatur intrinsece ad actum secundum et mutetur in actum, dum in actu operatur; debet ergo ista actualitas actionis in agente esse. John of St. Thomas cites many references to St. Thomas in support of this: •· ... action is the actuality of power ... " (Summa Theol., I, q. 54 a. 1); "The action of a thing ... is a complement of its power" (II Cont. Gent., c. 9; tr. by James F. Anderson, (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Image Books, 1956), II, p. 40, n. 8); ". . . action . . . inasmuch as it is an accident, is considered in the subject actin!!" (De l'ot., q. 7, a. 9, ad 7). THE SUBJECT OF PREDICAMENTAL ACTION 373 hesion of the second act; and, since the second act inheres in the potency, it must be educed from the potency. In other words, does the second act come from the potency with the potency acting only as a material cause? If such were the case, then it seems incomprehensible how the operative power is truly operative and causative o:f the effect . .For unless it is an active principle (in its own order as a secondary cause) of its own operation, then the very notion of an active power is lost. The operat:ve power must be somehow active with respect to the first step in its causality of the effect; otherwise how can it be said to be active with respect to subsequent steps? Also, i£ the power is not active with respect to its own second act, what is the meaning of "eliciting an action"? It would in no wise differ from the emanation of a proper accident from a substance. For both the substance and the operative power would be in themselves inoperative; the only active causality exercised would be that of the superior agent (the generator of the substance, or the mover of the potency). The emanating substance, or power, would be" ... the principle of the passions [or second act], not as first eliciting their production, but as the medium and ratio of advancing the action [of the superior agent] to them." 18 Yet John of St. Thomas expressly excludes a substance from being an eliciting principle of its proper passions ", . . because, for the eliciting of an action, which is a true operation and action, there is required an operative potency, and it cannot be elicited immediately by the substance." 19 Similarly St. Thomas distinguishes emanation of a proper accident from the eliciting of a second act: " The 10 Ibid., !i!69a 47-b !i!!i!: Respondetur emanationem esse veram et physicam causalitatem, non tamen distinctam ab ipsa generatione, quae, ut attingit substantiam, dicitur generatio, ut autem mediante ipsa substantia progreditur ad passiones ratione debiti et connexionis cum ilia, dicitur emanatio. Et sic substantia est principium passionum, non ut prima eliciens pmductionem illarum, sed ut medium et ratio progndiendi actionem ad illas, ita quod generatio non sistat in ipsa, sed mediante ipsa ulterius transeat ad passiones. . . . vere agit actionis generationis, non elicita a se, sed terminata ad se et ratione sui ulterius progrediente. (Italics added) . 19 Ibid., 268b 374 DECLAN KANE emanation of proper accidents from their subject is not by way of transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance." 20 And for St. Thomas, the coming forth of the second act of the agent is only by way of transmutation of the agent.u Thus the eliciting of the second act is more than the mere continuance and passing on of the active causality of the superior mover. The operative power, in eliciting, is itself active. Yet would not the eliciting be a prior act of the power? Or, to re-phrase the question, does not the active eliciting of the second act suppose the causality of the operative power? 22 But the second act is, as we shall see, the causality of the operative power, for by it the effect is produced. The answer in the very nature of an operative power. 28 There is no intervening entity nor" act" of eliciting. Rather, the operative power, having been moved by a superior agent, actively and immediately elicits its second act. We do not say that an operative power is only " " to its act; rather it is "moved." An operative power is not merely potency, but actuality (" ") in potency. When, by the motion of the .higher cause, it is further actualized, it actively elicits its second act. 24 In other words, the operative potency has the actuality of its nature, and its nature is to be the active principle of its act and of its effect. To look at the same process from the aspect of the second act coming from the potency, there is no intervening entity nor" act" of eliciting, hut rather, when the power has been moved, the second act" emanates by itself." ·25 The " by itself " does not deny an active influence by the power, but means that nothing mediates between the •• Summa Theol., I, q. 77, a. 7, a. 8. II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 5, ad 11: ... agens agit actione media, quae non est essentia ipsius operantis, et in talibus non potest sequi effectus novus sine nova actione, et novitas actionis facit aliquam mutationem in agente prout est exiens de otio in actum. 21 Cf. Curs. Phil., II, 809a 84-41, for this argument in reference to immanent action. 18 Cf. above (footnote 19), where John of St. Thomas excludes a substance from eliciting, because it is not an operative power. •• As we shall see, by this second act the power produces the e:llect. 11 Ibid., S09a 17-19. 11 THE SUBJECT OF PREDICAMENTAL ACTION 375 potency and its second act in the coming-forth of the second act. Difficulties yet remain. If the operative power is active with :respect to its second act, then it would seem that " ... the same thing acts on itself, and thus is at the same time in act and in potency with respect to the same thing, in act toward acting [emanating], and in potency toward receiving." 26 John of St. Thomas does not deny that the potency is active in emanating its second act. Rather he indicates that it is not precisely the same thing that is active and passive. The potency emanates its second act as it has been moved by the superior agent, it receives its second act as it is in pure potency. 27 lnchoative causality of effect The discussion thus far of the potency and its second act could be summarized as " the subjective evolution of the potency." 28 The present treatment considers the second act as it looks toward the effect. It was seen above that John of St. Thomas not deny that potency is active in emanating its second act. Yet he does qualify his response by pointing out that the active emanation of the second act is not the efficient causality of the power. For it would seem that the second act would emanate as a term or effect. But this is expressly excluded: " That actuality in the agent" emanates from it, not as a term or effect, but as a mode or causality initiated." 29 Here is met a point of capital importance for understanding the Ibid., 3llb 13-18: ... ilia actio, quae est in agente, emanare debet ipsa, ergo idem agit in seipsum, et sic semel est in actu et in potentia respectu eiusdem, in actu ad agendum, et in potentia ad recipiendum. 27 Ibid., 315a 7-21: ... respondetur, quod ilia actualitas in agente emanat ab ipso non ut terminus sen effectus, sed ut modus sen causalitas inchoata. Et talis modus non emanat ab ipso agente, ut est in potentia pure, sed ut est in potentia mota a Deo et aliis causis superioribus, quibus inferiores determinantur et actuantur, ut emanet ab illis actualitas actions, quae rmsus in ipsa potentialitate actus prirni recipitur actuando illam per modum actus secundi; et sic non est in potentia et actu secundum idem. •• Cf. DeAndrea, M., Praelectiones Metaphysicae, H, p. 351 (Rome: Angelicurn, Ad usum privatum auditorum. 1957). All references to DeAndrea will be from the 1957 ed.; for 1954 ed., see p. 196-Hl9; for 1951 ed., see p. 184-187. •• Cf. Footnote 27. 376 DECLAN KANE efficient causality of the created agent. Granted the necessity of the agent's actively emanating its second act, this active emanation is not the exercise of the agent's efficient causality. 80 Rather, the whole purpose of the emanation of the second act is to enab,le the agent to exercise efficient causality. The agent, as an efji6ient cause, causes the effect. But since the agent is created, it cannot act immediately but only by an added act which assists in the production of the effect. The potency consequently does not regard its second act as an effect (a thing produced), but rather as a kind of medium, or, more precisely, as a mode or ratio of producing the effect, as causality initiated.31 Since the second act itself is only the beginning of the causality of the effect, everything leading up to the second act is merely a prerequisite for causality. The prerequisites for causality may be summarized as follows: 32 I. existence of operative potency in agent. (passive) the operative potency (as operative potency) is moved by a superior agent. 3. (active) the operative potency (as an applied operative potency) actively elicits its second act. 4. (passive) the operative potency (as subject of its completing accident) receives its second act. •• The difficulty is to maintain both that the potency activdy emanates its act, and efficiently causes its effect. Both are true, yet cannot be confused. The difficulty seems one of language; we are here at the roots of efficient causality, and run out of terminology. The inclination is to say, "If it is active, it is efficient," but such would be an oversimplification. Rather, the potency actively emanates its initial exercise of efficient causality (namely, its second act). 81 Curs. Phil., II 806a 6-12: In causis ... creatis actio seu effiuxus est medium inter agens et efl'ectum quasi accidentaliter, et non substantialiter illi conveniens, non tamquam res producta, sed tamquam modus seu ratio ipsa producendi. Cf. footnote 29; and Iibid., 809a 41-b 29 for the same answer with regard to immanent actions. •• Contrast this analysis of the active and passive aspects to the more simplified analysis of DeAndrea (Praelectiones Metaphysicae, II, p. 854-5, Scholion 8°). For a complete analysis, to the above prerequisites for efficient causality there should be added the two active elements of efficient causality: 5. the second act of the agent as acting on the patient; 6. the motus in the patient from the agent culminating in the effect. THE SUB.JECT OF PREDICAMENTAJ" ACTION 377 The question remains as to how the second act of the agent can be causadve of the effect. This second act is an accident inhering in the agent, and one and the same numerical accident cannot cross from subject to subject. 33 But if the second act of the agent cannot cross into the patient to produce the effect, it might seem that action is impossible. To use the argument attributed to Leibnitz; "If transient action is admitted, there should likewise be admitted either action on a distant thing, or the crossing of an accident from subject to subject." 34 St. Thomas had long before considered the objection: ... certain exponents of the Law of the Moors are reported to adduce in support of this argument [that natural agents have no active role in the production of effects] that even accidents do not come from the action of bodies, because an accident does not cross from subject to subject. Hence they regard it as impossible for heat to pass over from a hot body into another body heated it.35 For St. Thomas, such an objection borders on the ridiculous: . . . it is laughable to say that a body does not act because an accident does not pass from subject to subject. For a hot body is not said to give off heat in this sense, that numerically the same heat passes over into the heated body. Rather, by the power of the heat which is in the heating body, a numerically different heat is made actual in the heated body, a heat which was previously in it in potency. For a natural agent does not hand over its own form to another subject, but it reduces the passive subject from potency to act. 36 We will now turn our attention to the consideration of action as it is in the patient. The following will hardly be more than a development of the above :response of St. Thomas. 33 Cf. Boethius, Comment. in Categ. Arist., 1. I; quoted in Summa Theol., III, q. 77, a. l. •• As stated by Hugon, Cursu.y Philosophiae Thomisticae, VI, n, 154. 86 Ill Cont. Gent,, c. 69 (tr. p. !l!29, n. 11). •• Ibid., (tr. p. 284-!i!35, n. 28). 378 DECLAN KANE 2. Action in the Patient In investigating the manner in which the agent causes the effect, the focus might be placed only on the second act of the agent and the new form it causes. One would be left imagining some type of formal emanation as the explanation of efficient causality. To show that the composite agent causes the composite patient, and that the new form is truly caused by the agent, we will first consider the coming-to-be of forms. Then, in discussing the coming-to-be of the effect in the patient, we will be in position to consider how action is in the patient; The coming-to-be of forms The question might be asked, " How does the form of. the effect come to be? " But the question would be an improper one, proceeding from a false notion of natural forms. Natural forms do not come to be by themselves, for a form is a quo, not a quod, and so does not have being by itself. That is caused which has being. Accordingly natural agents do not cause only the form, but rather the composite; for the composite has being, having it through its form. 37 Since the composite is what is properly caused, it is caused by a composite, for a like thing is made by its like. Accordi11,gly, "corporeal forms ... are not caused as an emanation from some immaterial form," 38 that is, from a subsisting form, as Plato held, nor from a form in the intelleCt of a spiritual creature, as Avicenna held. To the contrary, " corporeal forms . . . are caused . . . by matter being brought from potentiality to act by some composite agent." 39 Can it then be said that the second act of the ;agent causes only the form of the effect, and causes it 'immediately? The •• Summa Theol., I, q. 45, a. 4: ... to be made is directed to the being of a thing. Hence to he made ... properly belongs to whatever being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to subsisting things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of separate substances, or composite, as in the case of ·material substances. (Cf. Ibid., q. 45, a. 8; q. 65, a. 4). •• Ibid., ·q. 65, a. 4. •• Ibid. THE SUBJECT OF PREDICAMENTAL ACTION 379 process, as is clear from the words of St. Thomas, is more complex than that. The composite agent causes; that is, both the matter of the agent and its second act are involved, for the action is an accident, inhering in matter. The composite patient is caused; there is a disposing of the matter anq the educing of the form. The second act of the agent does not cross into the ma11ter, but as it were remains " outside," remains in the agent, and acts in conjunction with its own matter in which it is as an accident. If the second act remains wholly outside the patient, and effects no new disposition of the matter of the patient, there is only a " push," only local motion; the change in the patient is extrinsic to the patient, a change in ubi or place. The second act can work an intrinsic change in the patient only by redisposing the patient's matter, and this basically is local motion re-locating a part of the patient. 40 The matter of the patient thus being redisposed, it is no longer apt for the form it possessed, but is made apt for a new form which corresponds to its present dispositions. But matter is by its very nature the potential aptness for all forms. When this aptness is actualized according to the dispositions of its second matter (materia secunda), then the matter has been reduced from potency to act; the form which it contained in potency is now contained in act. The form has been educed from the matter. Thus it is seen that the form does not come to be by itself; rather the composite comes to be, the matter by being redisposed, and the form by being educed, which are two aspects of the same process. The process is the causality of the effect by the agent. Nor is such an explanation of efficient causality to be confused with Occasionalism. Although the difference between the Thomistic and Occasionalist explanations is at the first sight subtle, they are in reality poles apart. The Occasionalists hold that created agents only dispose to an effect, and that God •• Thus Aristotle and St. Thomas say that all natural changes (local motion, alteration, augmentation, generation) are founded on local motion; Cf. Physics, VIII, c. 7, 260a !l9, b 4; St. Thomas, lect. 14, n. !l305 fl. 880 DECLAN KANE causes the effect, thus placing in one order both the causality God of creatures. The Thomistic explanation is that there are two o1·ders of causality, divine and created, both which really and totally attain the effect. 41 For created