THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS:

THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH

Publishers:

VoL.

XXIII

The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

JANUARY, 1960

No.1

REFLEXION ON THE QUESTION OF GOD'S
EXISTENCE IN CONTEMPORARY
THOMISTIC METAPHYSICS

T

INTRODUCTION

HE suggestion of the question of God's existence in its
philosophical development as a topic of fruitful discussion for the Thomistic philosopher might well meet
with the response: Not again! Apart from minor squabbles
over fine points, there is such unanimity on the matter
that anyone acquainted with Thomism can with comfortable
security take for granted "the quinque viae and all that sort
of thing." What possibility for a discussion can be unearthed
which has not already been considered and solved? Under
scrutiny, however, the supposed monolithic front crumbles
before the striking divergencies among current Thomistic presentations. The question does pertain to Thomistic philosophy;
on this point alone there is unanimity. Regarding every stage
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of its development, there are diametrically opposed views, witnessed by the following statement of some of them.
As to the place of the question of God's existence in
philosophy:
It is the natural introductory question establishing the subject of

Special Metaphysics, concerning uncreated being. ·
It is the term of Ontology or General Metaphysics, prior to the
development of Special Metaphysics.
It is the natural term of the one science of Metaphysics, which
admits of no division into General and Special.
It is to be treated at the outset of the unified science of Metaphysics, thus retaining the natural place it has in St. Thomas' own
development of the question in the Summa Theologiae.
As to the development of the question:
The approach to the question in general:
The procedure of the Summa Theologiae with but slight modification is to be followed.
This procedure is to be rejected.
The approach to the question, in particular:
A nominal definition of God is to be established. When this position
is accepted, however, there is yet a wide variety of nominal definitions proposed.
A nominal definition of God is not to be used as a vehicle of approach to the establishment of His existence.
The actual solution to the question:
The quinque viae of St. Thomas are suitable.
The quinque viae only approximate the solution.
The interpretation of the quinque viae:
In their process:
They are distinct proofs. They are formally one proof. They are
formally distinct in their starting points, but immediately reach a
that is formally one.

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In their conclusions:
There are five formally distinct conclusions, afterwards to be united
but without achieving God's unicity.
There is one real conclusion, the one God, Whose name is I am
Who am, the Creator.

Obviously the issues involved are more than verbal. Metaphysics rules at the summit of rational knowledge; its right
of primacy rests on the knowledge of God, the first cause, that
it yields. As a philosophical science, metaphysics is presumed
to be an organic development of the content, structure and
progress which emerge vitally according to the principles of
the science. Fundamental disagreement, then, in approaching
the terminal phase of metaphysics can only be the result of
equally radical differences as to the principles constitutive of
its nature.
Disputes among philosophers are to be accepted as proverbial; discussion is the normal sign of philosophy's vitality.
What is disconcerting about the incompatible positions outlined is that each is advanced with the claim of Thomistic
authenticity and of fidelity to the thought of St. Thomas. That
this is disconcerting presupposes such authenticity and fidelity
to be desirable; that they are desirable rests upon the supposition, sanctioned by the Church, that they are guarantees of the
truth. By profession dedicated to the pursuit of truth, the
Thomistic philosopher, confronted by the situation indicated,
can indulge neither in shoulder-shrugging indifference nor
hand-wringing despair. He has the obligation of striving to
attain the truth about the question of God's existence in
Thomistic philosophy.
Prefatory to such an effort is the recognition that the term
Thomistic philosophy itself admits of at least a duality of
senses. Taken in its intrinsic nature, Thomistic philosophy
should bespeak human wisdom as constituted in its systematic
totality by principles formulated, developed or inspired by St.
Thomas Aquinas. But Thomistic philosophy may also be
understood as an historic reality, since as an intellectual per-

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fection it can only reside in the minds of Thomistic philosophers. Nor is this residence a mere passive homage paid to
authority; the philosopher designating himself Thomistic does
so on the sole grounds of his own assimilation of and rationally
convinced assent to the thought of his master. Thomistic
philosophy in this concrete sense lies open to a wide diversity
of interpretation. While St. Thomas left no Summa Philosophiae as a record of the philosophical system that is distinctively his, the variety of interpretations is not primarily due to
this fact. Rather it is the necessarily personal assimilation of
his thought by Thomistic philosophers that must be recognized
as a source of confusion. The philosopher must by conviction
make that philosophy he embraces his own. When Thomists
present teachings that are drastically incompatible as Thomistic, e. g. the question of God's existence, then discernment
between the content which is truly Thomistic and that which
results from the historical or doctrinal conditions personally
affecting the proponents of such teachings is demanded.
Clearly such discernment implies the task of judging; judgment in turn demands a norm. The only valid criterion for
such a judgment is that which every Thomist professedly
regards as the motivation of his own assent to the truth: the
philosophical principles which are unquestionably those of St.
Thomas himself. In view of the confusion surrounding the
question of God's existence in Thomistic philosophy, the present study is undertaken as an attempt at such discernment.
The end desired is that the authentic Thomistic meaning of the
question will be distinguished from the ambiguities arising from
historical influences and personal commitments inherent in the
interpretations of current Thomistic philosophers. Consequently, this effort is designated as a Reflexion on the Question of
God's Existence in Centemporary Thomistic Metaphysics.
OF PROCEDURE

If the antinomies besetting the state of the question of God's
existence oblige the metaphysician to the task of discernment.
they should as well warn him of its hazards. The appropriate

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and primary precaution imposed is an awareness of the precise
character of the task of discernment to be undertaken. This
awareness involves the delineation of a suitable mode of procedure. For the present study, a declaration of the terms of its
title answers such a need; it is, indeed, a title that expresses
the mode of procedure imposed upon the metaphysician both
universally as a connatural feature of metaphysics, and particularly as exacted by the present problem.
REFLEXION:

THE PREROGATIVE

OF METAPHYSICS

Among all human sciences, metaphysics is properly self-conscious; to it, reflexion pertains pre-eminently. The reflexion
here required is not the introspection proposed as philosophy
when, in an attitude of Cartesian despair, wisdom surrendered
to the positive sciences the privilege of knowing things, and
became a knowledge of knowledge. The reflexion that belongs
to metaphysics is one of the many features and prerogatives
that it claims as the " first science " and " human wisdom."
Reflexion, first of all, is a characteristic of intelligence. 1 For
a consideration of its own act is proper to the intellect, not
only in the sense of an awareness of what is known-a trait
common to all knowledge-but also, because in any act of judgment, the intellect knows its own proportion to what is known.
The reason for this is that it knows its own nature, to which
it belongs to be conformed to things as they are. Ultimately,
the root of such self-knowledge is, of course, the spirituality of
the intellect. 2
Now a parallel can
drawn with regard to metaphysics.
As the supreme rational science, it is designated as most
" intellectual," for it is concerned with those things which are
most " intelligible," which by reason of their universality are
the source of the greatest certitude, which are the most immaterial.3 As most" intellectual," therefore, metaphysics must
also be most reflective, must enter most into itself, be most
1 Cf. In l Post. Anal., lect. 1, n. 1 (Ed. Leonina).
• Cf. De Ver., q. 1, a. 9; q. 22, a.
"In Met. Prooem.

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fully aware of its own nature and of its proportion to the things
which it attains. As a matter of fact, to reflect upon all the
speculative sciences belongs exclusively to metaphysics, as is
implied by St. Thomas when he states that neither natural
philosophy nor mathematics is capable of reflexion.4 Metaphysics, the supreme rational science, has something further,
namely, the prerogative of judging all the sciences, not excluding itself, with regard not only to conclusions, but even with
regard to first
By delving further into the manner of the intellect's selfknowledge, the parallel can be extended to indicate the manner
of metaphysics' reflective function. First of all, the intellect is
reflective because it is a spiritual faculty, having consequently
a universal object, within whose scope are embraced even the
act of the intellect itself and the nature of the faculty. 6 But
as a human intellect, the faculty of a soul which by its nature
is united to a body as form, the intellect itself is not always
in act. Since, however, anything is intelligible only insofar as
it is actual, the intellect is not always actually intelligible, but
only when it is actually functioning. As a consequence, it
knows itself only through its own act. In other words, reflexion
properly so called always presupposes an act of direct knowledge, and is always subsequent to such an act. 7 To be a
complete and perfect knowledge of the faculty and ultimately
of the nature of the soul itself, this reflexion must be an
investigation in terms of first principles. 8
In a parallel maner, metaphysics, whose object is universal.
being as being, has the power to reflect upon itself because its
own nature is embraced by this universal object_D But to
exercise this reflective role, metaphysics must also presuppose
• Cf. ibid., XI, lect. 1, n. 2165.
• Cf. Summa Theol., I-II, q. 57, a. 2, ad 1.
• Cf. ibid., I, q. 87, a. 3, ad 1.
7 Cf. ibid., corp. and II Contra Gentes, C. 98; Q. D. de Anima, a. 3, ad 4,
Marietti, 293.
8 Cf. Summa Theol., Zoe. cit.; De Ver. q. 19, a. 8.
• Cf. In II Met., lect, 1, n. 273.

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that there has been a development of the science.10 To be
effective, to be thorough, this refl.exionof metaphysics must be
developed in terms of its first principles as a science, in terms
of its natural constituents.
Further to explain the reflective role of metaphysics as
wisdom, it is helpful to recall that in the general workings of
human reason St. Thomas designates a kind of circular
process. Seeking for truth concerning existing things, the
human reason arrives in the order of discovery at conclusions
from principles, then in turn it examines the conclusions discovered by resolving them in the order of judgment into their
principles.1.1 In a more detailed explanation, the Angelic Doctor
assigns the elements of the process of discovery first to the habit
of intellectus, the habit by which first principles are apprehended, culminating the human ascent from sense knowledge
through memory and experiment to the intellect's grasp of the
terms of the first principles. The habit of science continues this
process of discovery, attaining conclusions by virtue of the first
principles. The ordering and judgment that belong to the
process of judgment are exercised by the habit of wisdom.12
By way of elaboration, it is to be noted that because its very
nature links it to the body, the human intellect always manifests in its functioning a process, a transition; it achieves its
perfection passing from utter potentiality to act, perfect knowledge. The general lines of this process are characterized by the
twofold phase, " the way or process of discovery " and " the
way or process of judgment." 18 The former is the movement
from the term of potentiality to that of possession; the latter
takes place once actual possession has been achieved. The
process of discovery, ascending from the sensible to the apprehension of first principles, attains conclusions concerning reality
in virtue of these principles, in the scientific stage of the process.
1

°Cf. De Ver., q. 15, a. 8; cf. also q. 17, a. 1; cf. also In I Post. Anal., 4, n. 5.

De Ver, q. 10, a. 8, ad 10; cf. also Summa Theol., I, q. 79, a. 8.
Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 79, a. 8, 9; In III Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 2; In I Met.,
lect. 1, nn. 14-18; In II Post. Anal., lect. 20, n. 11 ss.
13 Cf. Isaac, J., 0. P., "La Notion de Dialectiques
chez Saint Thomas," Revue
des Sciences Philosophiques et Thiologiques, XXXIX (1950), 481-506.
11

12

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THOMAS C. o'BRIEN

The attainment of such conclusions is perfect only when at
each phase there is a judgment about the conclusions in the
light of first principles. The entire process of discovery is itself
perfected when its whole development is ordered and judged
by the habit of wisdom, in the process of judgment.
Viewing metaphysics in terms of the whole structure of the
intellect's evolution, the following steps are to be traced:
First, there is the process from the singular sensible to the
constitution of the habit of intelleotus. This is connaturally
swift, furnishing as it does the very basis for all rational life.
This habit of first principles is a kind of natural, pre-scientific
metaphysics, that is sometimes referred to as sensus communis. It is not the science of metaphysics, for the primitive
apprehension of being involved does not reveal the fulness of
that notion, nor, consequently, are the first principles comprehended in all their vigor.
Second, the development of the habits of the rational sciences can take place. In this second phase of the process of
discovery, the reason is by virtue of first principles enabled to
investigate reality, attaining a fuller knowledge in conclusions,
and generating the habits of the sciences. Such conclusions are
grasped ultimately with certitude because they are analyzed
and judged in the light of first principles. 14 It is first of all in
the realm of the material and mobile that these conclusions
are attained; thus, the habit of natural philosophy comes first
in the genetic order of human science.
To this stage of the scientific evolution of the human intellect
(in the order of discovery) belongs ultimately the genesis of
metaphysics as a science. In virtue of first principles and its
native power, reason now attains reality on a higher level, the
level of being as being, whose properties and ultimate causes
it attains. In virtue of metaphysics the analysis of all reality
is completed, for not only are the first principles apprehended
by the human intellect seen in their full import, but all reality
is known scientifically, in terms of its absolutely ultimate
explanation, the first extrinsic cause of whatever is.
16

Cf. De Ver., q. 15, a. 1, ad 4; cf. ibid., q. 17, a. 1.

REFLEXION

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Third, the perfection of the process of judgment occurs.
The perfection of the order of judgment takes place insofar as
the whole ambit of intellectual discovery, both process and
conclusions, is viewed, ordered and judged in the light of absolute and ontological first principles. Thus metaphysics, now
exercising its prerogative as wisdom, looks back upon the entire
inquisitive process, even upon its own, and guarantees the
certitude of all, not by an appeal to some extrinsic norm, but
by what it posseses itself, by the principles it has come to penetrate and attain. 15
THE REFLECTIVE

PROCEDURE OF METAPHYSICS

PRESENTLY

REQUIRED

In the normal development of metaphysics, its reflective role
should be exercised over all its initial processes. The mere
cataloging of the vagaries of Thomists regarding the matter
of God's existence indicates the need for such a reflexion
on this point. By applying the general characteristics of metaphysics' reflective phase, the constituents of such a procedure
are revealed: the direct knowledge to be examined, and the
principled judgment, i. e. the formal element of the reflexion
concerning this knowledge.
DIRECT KNOWLEDGE:

THE AREA TO BE EXAMINED

The question of God's existence pertains to metaphysics.
This stands almost alone as a point of agreement among the
varied positions adopted by Thomists. Yet it is of some
moment to state its implications. To include the consideration
of God's existence in metaphysics is to follow the lead of St.
Thomas himself:
This first philosophy is wholly ordered to the knowing of God, as
its ultimate end; that is why it is called also divine science.16
15

II 1\l.{et., lect. 1, n. 278.

cf. III Contra Gentes, c. 25. Transl. by Bourke.

On the Truth of the
Catholic Faith, Book III, Part I, (New York: Doubleday, 1956).
16

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To affirm that the consideration of God's existence belongs
to metaphysics, without at this point sounding the precise
tenor of this statement, is to affirm more than a fact. It
is already to give a restricted sense to the question; it is in
fact to view the question as a scientific investigation, a doctrinal
inquiry about God in the strictly philosophical order. For
there are many ways of discussing God. St. Thomas himself
has already pointed out a " prescientific " knowledge of God. 17
The metaphysical context of the question, however, is scientific, one that is as distinctive as the science itself is distinct
both from non-scientific knowledge, and from the knowledge
proper to other sciences. Exaggeration of this point. is hardly
possible. For if the question of God's existence is understood as
pertaining to the context of metaphysics, then obviously its
development depends upon the organic evolution of the science;
this, in turn, is governed by the very constitution and nature
of that science. Since what is here involved is a delineation of
the area of investigation, it is. sufficient to point out, with an
awareness of a later need for examination, the sense of the
term " metaphysics."
Reference has already been made to the relative supremacy
of metaphysics, that is, its primacy among those sciences
concerned with truths attained in virtue of the power
of the agent intellect. 18 It is designated also as "first philosophy," "wisdom," "the divine science," or "theology."
Of these names it is " metaphysics " which is used commonly
to describe the supreme rational science. Arbitrary as the impo11 Cf. Ill Contra Gentes, c. 88,
For a discussion of this prescientific
knowledge of God's existence, cf. Del Prado, N., 0. P. "Quaestionem Secundam
Primae Partis Summae Theologiae An Deus sit Interpretatus est. Fr. Norbertus
Del Prado, 0. P." Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und Spekulative Theologie, XXIV
(1910), 115 ss; Maritain, Approches de Dieu (Paris: Alsatia, nd),
Fr. Del
Prado lists as the sources of this prescientific knowledge, the order of things, the
common consent of men and a kind of natural inclination of the intellect to affirm
what is true. (Vernm enim est bonum intellectus ad quod naturaliter ordinatur.
I Phys. lect. 9).
18 Cf. Summa Theol., III, q.
a.
sed contra: Humana sapientia est quae
humano modo acquiritur, scilicet per lumen intellectus agentis.

REFLEXION

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sition of the name may have been, 119 among scholastic philosophers it has come to signify "that science which investigates
being as being and the attributes which belong to it in virtue
of its own nature"; 20 "the science that invesigates the first
principles and causes"; 21j "the science to which it belongs to
consider being qua being." 22
In the scholastic tradition such formulae have perdured; the
name metaphysics has been accepted as signifying the science
of being as being. Summarizing the varied nominal designations of the science, St. Thomas has explained them in this
fashion:
According to the three characteristics above mentioned according
to which the perfection of this science is indicated, it receives
three names. For it is called the divine science, or theology insofar
as it considers the aforementioned separated substances; metaphysics, insofar as it considers being and those things which follow
upon being, for these are discovered subsequent to the physical
aspects of reality in the process of resolution, as the more common
after the less common. It is called in addition first philosophy
insofar as it considers the first cause of things. 23

Thus metaphysics signifies the science of being qua being
and of those things which either as properties or as causes
pertain per se to the consideration of being. To this area of
philosophic knowledge, the question of God's existence pertains.
To examine the question of God's existence in metaphysics,
then, is to examine its scientific pertinence. Belonging to metaphysics, the question indeed stands at the peak of an arduous
ascent. 2 ' To consider properly the question of the existence of
19 Cf. Copleston, F., S. J., A History of Philosophy (London:
Burns Oates and
Washbourne Ltd., 1947) I, 269.
2 ° Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics
IV, 1008a 28; trans!. Ross (Oxford Univ. Press:
1942).
21 Cf. ibid., V, 202b-8-9.
•• Cf. ibid., VI, 1026 a 82.
28 Cf. In Met. Prooem.
(Ed. Marietti. The numbers cited from this edition are
those of Cathala's enumeration).
•• Cf. I Contra Gentes, c. 4: Ad cognitionem eorem quae de Deo ratio investigare
p0test, multa praecognoscere oportet, quia fere totius Philosophiae consideratio
ad Dei cognitionem ordinetur. Propter quod Metaphysica, quae circa divina versatur, inter Philosophiae partes ultima remanet addiscenda.

THOMAS

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God as it occurs in metaphysics, is to submit to its exigencies
as a scientific question.
A further precision remains to be made. The question to
be examined is God's existence as it belongs to Thomistic
metaphysics. Since by name Thomistic metaphysics takes its
inspiration from the principles and writings of the Angelic
Doctor, it is important to advert to his scientific development
of the question of God's existence. While in his philosophical
works he did treat the question ex professo/ 5 actually it is to
the theological works of Aquinas that his followers, theologians
and philosophers alike, tum for his exposition of the question
of God's existence. Without expanding upon its theological
context, it is enough to mention that the renowned question
two of the First Part of the Summa Theologiae has become the
primary source of his thought on God's existence-the focal
point of every study and dispute on the point. It is consequently appropriate to take brief cognizance of the content of
this question:
Art. 1. Whether that God exists is per se known? 26
The proposition God exists is self-evident in itself, since God is His
own existence, the predicate thus being immediately contained in
the subject of such a proposition.
It is not self-evident to us, who do not know the divine essence;
thus it needs to be demonstrated, to be known mediately. No a
priori medium for such a demonstration is to be had, since there
are no principles prior to God, nor will St. Anselm's proposal of an
analysis of the notion " God " suffice.
Art.

Whether that God exists is demonstrable?

27

The a posteriori demonstration of God's existence is possible, however, since God is the creative cause whose effects are the things of
this world. Given the effect, the proper cause must exist, and thus
is demonstrable.
·
•• Cf. VII Physics., lect. I, 2; VIII, lect. 7-U; 2S; XI Metaphy., lect. !l, and
especially XII, lect. 5-U.
•• Parallel to Article I: I Sent. d. S, q. I, a. 2; De Ver. q. IO, a. 12; I Cont. Gent.
cc. IO, 11; III, c. 88 (27); De Pot. q. 7, a. 2, ad 11.
•• Parallel to Article 2: III Sent. d. 24, q. I, a. 2, qcla. 2; I Cont. Gent. c. 12;
De Pot. q. 7, a. S.

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Art. 8. Whether God exists, 28
God is demonstrated to exist by the quinque viae, which have their
inception respectively with motion; with the order of subordinated
efficient causes; with transient duration of certain things; with the
gradated share of things in simple perfections; with the teleological
orientation of things lacking knowledge.
The recollection of these articles traces the general outline
that the question of God's existence ex!libits in Thomistic metaphysics. With some such development Thomistic metaphysicians offer their doctrinal presentations of the question. Its
place in the context of the science of metaphysics has come
to be the beginning of that part of metaphysics which is commonly called "natural theology" or "theodicy." Neither
name is satisfactory;
what alone is important at this point
is the recognition of the place given to the question of God's
existence by Thomistic metaphysicians. In doctrinal presentations, it has received a definite, characteristic development, as part of that final phase of metaphysics designated as
natural theology. This has come to be traditional; it is verified
among contemporary Thomistic presentations.
The direct knowledge upon which the present reflexion of
metaphysics is made is the question of God's existence, for it
has been developed as part of the scientific context of metaphysics. In order to arrive at the end sought, the judgment
proper to metaphysics, this direct knowledge must be examined.
Its presentation by certain contemporary Thomists, significant
for trends they represent or for their influence, must be indicated. Because the influence of the development of the question
throughout the history of Thomism has its bearing upon the
•• Parallel to Article S: I Sent. d. S, div. primae partis textus; De Ver. q. 5, a. 2;
De Pot. q. S, a. 5; Comp. Theol. c. S (28) .
•• The name Natural Theology suggests the false classification of "Natural" and
"Sacred" under a genus "Theology.' Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2;
Alvarez Gonzales, Angel, Theologia Natural (Madrid: 1949), 9-11. The origin of the
name " Theodicy " in Leibniz in well known; cL Essai de Theodicee sur la Bonte de
Dieu, la Liberte de l'H omme et l' origine du mal (Amsterdam: 1710). Cf. also
Owens, J., C. SS. R., "Theodicy, Natural 'Theology and Metaphysics," Modem
Schoolman, XXVIIT (1951), 184-185.

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contemporary scene, something of this historical background
must receive attention. With the indication of the state of the
question of God's existence in Thomistic metaphysics understood in its concrete development by Thomists, the way will
be opened for the reflective judgment of metaphysics to evaluate the question in terms of the specific nature of Thomistic
metaphysics.
THE FoRMAL ELEMENT:

METAPHYSics'

REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT

As reflective, it pertains to metaphysics (from the vantage
point of the order of judgment) , to render an account of itself.
The formal constitutive of the reflexion of metaphysics is its
judgment concerning its own processes of discovery, viewing
them in terms of first principles, in terms of its own nature and
proportion to the truths attained. In the present case, it is the
presentation of the question of God's existence that needs to be
and is to be so examined. To insist upon the vantage point of
the order of judgment in this reflective activity is of some
moment. For it is not a question of reconstructing metaphysics.
The sapiential task of ordering is directed towards the body
of metaphysical truths and the developments that lead to their
discovery in order to certify and to stamp with the guarantee of
validity its discoveries, processes and conclusions. Concretely,
in the present instance, it is the question of God's existence as
it is presented in its pertinence to the body of doctrines designated as Thomistic metaphysics, that is to be examined.
From the place and the nature of the reflexion of metaphysics, the norms necessary for its judgment are readily
discernible. Pertaining to the order of judgment, this reflexion
is directed towards the question of God's existence as it is
presented in the order of metaphysics' discovery of the truth.
Regarding the presentation of the question among contemporary Thomists, it is to be presupposed that this process of
discovery is being indicated by them. The order ·of discovery
and the order of discipline are distinguishable; however, since
most men do not discover truth unaided but from the teaching

REFLEXION

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of others, the latter should correspond to the former. Only,
in fact, when the teacher recreates in the mind of the disciple
his own processes of discovery, can he be said truly to teach. 30
To reflect upon the question of God's existence as proposed in
contemporary Thomistic metaphysics, then, is to examine the
question as it pertains to the order of discovery. A norm is
here implied, for in the scrutiny of the doctrinal presentation
of the problem, the conformity of the presentation with the
order of_ metaphysical discovery must always be considered.
How finally is judgment to be rendered? To accomplish its
task, metaphysics must exercise its judgment in terms of first
principles, that is, in terms of its nature and consequent proportion to the discovery of the truth that God does exist. For
Thomistic metaphysics it is presupposed that such principles,
delineating the nature of metaphysics and its proportion to the
truth, are to be sought in St. Thomas himself. Happily, while
not elaborating in its fulness a tract corresponding to the
modern "natural theology," St. Thomas has expressed himself explicitly, autonomously, and precisely on the place of
God in metaphysics. His work has been constantly hailed
as characterized by a clear demarcation of the orders of faith
and reason. Perhaps this is why he has so sharply drawn
the lines of competence at this point which is the summit of
philosophy and the threshold of sacred theology. The point of
apparent contact is reason enough to mark off the area of competence for metaphysics. The proportion of metaphysics to the
natural truths concerning God, the sense in which it is to be
designated "divine science," "theology," affords the principles from which the reflective judgment of metaphysics concerning its own attainment of God's existence is to be rendered.
His enunciation of these principles, found in so many texts
of his works, is nowhere more plainly stated than in the Commentary on Boetius' De Trinitate. A methodology presupposes
a philosophy. Written in the earliest days of his professorial
career, this work of St. Thomas manifests a mastery of philo•• C£. De Ver., q. 11, a. 1; ibid., a. 8, ad 4; II Contra Gentes, c. 75; De Spirit.
Creat., a. 9, ad 7. (Ed. Marietti 404).

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sophical learning which belies the youth of its author. 31 All
found in questions five and six, devoted to the nature and
distinction of the speculative sciences, are not isolated observations, but reasoned assertions, consonant with his total conception of philosophical endeavor, conformed to the philosophical
system consistently present throughout his works. To choose
the text from this work, then, as a focal point for the reflective
judgment to be made, is simply to employ an expression,
outstanding for its precis_ion and forthrightness, of what is an
authentic element, characteristic of St. Thomas' cast of thought.
For this reason, it is a simple task to correlate and explain the
text employed with germane assertions found in other works
of the Angelic Doctor.
In accord, finally, with the mode of procedure indicated this
study will be developed in the following manner:
Part One: The Presentation of God's Existence in Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics.
Section I. Historical Background of the Contemporary
Scene.
Section II. The Question of God's existence in certain
Contemporary Thomists.
(These sections are presented in this issue)
Part Two: Reflexion on the Question.
I. Principles of the Reflective Judgment: St.
Thomas and the place of God in metaphysics.
(This section will appear in the April issue of THE THOMIST.)
II. The Reflective Judgment on metaphysics' Attainment of the Existence of God.
(This section will appear in the July issue of THE THOMIST.)
81 Cf.
Chenu, M., 0. P. Introduction a L'Etude de Saint Thomas D'Aquin.
In his critical edition of these questions, Wyser dates
(Paris, Montreal, 1950)
the work even earlier, 1255-1259. Cl. In Librum Boethii de Trinitate Quaestiones
Quinta et Sexta, Wyser, Paul, 0. P. (Freiburg, 1948), 18. References to these
questions in this work are according to this text.

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PART ONE
Section I. Historical Background of the Contemporary Scene

A. REMOTE BACKGROUND
From a thorough inquiry regarding the historical background
of the contemporary status of the question of God's existence,
what emerges as significant is not primarily a chronological
pattern. Rather it is the appearance and continuance of
doctrinal threads which crisscross to form the backdrop of the
tapestry, or perhaps crazy quilt, of the present day. Accordingly, with the nineteenth century Thomistic revival designated
as the proximate background, divided against the prior history
of Thomism, this part is to be developed as an exposition of
pertinent doctrines rather than a mere chronological or factfinding review. As indicated, the relevant doctrinal headings
are the place of God in metaphysics and the mode of considering His existence. Apropos of these points the historical background, remote and proximate, has its impact upon the current
state of the question of God's existence.
Thomism became a system with St. Thomas himself, and not,
as one writer has maintained, with Cajetan (1408-1534) and
John of St. Thomas (1589-1644), with Capreolus (1380-1444)
.as forerunner. 32 These very authors present and defend not
scattered aphorisms of their preceptor, but his developed system
of thought. St. Thomas is hailed at the end of the thirteenth
century as the "common doctor of all"; there is an acknowledged Thomistic school. 33 The philosophical endeavors of
the primitive Thomists, however, are found in single treatises
or within commentaries on the Book of Sentences. 34 They did
not devote themselves to the philosophical cursus.85 For pre•• Cf. Klubertanz, George, S. J., "Being and God According to Contemporary
Scholastics," Modern Schoolman, XXXII (1954), 4.
•• Cf. De Wulf, M., Histmie de la Philosophic Medievale, 6eme ed. (Louvain,
Paris: Vrins, 1936) II, 363.
"'Cf. ibid., 206 fl'.; 363 fl'.
•• Cf. Chenu, M., 0. P., "Les 'Philosophes' dans Ia Philosophie Chretienne
Medievale " in Revue des Sciences Philosophiques XXVI (1937), 28.

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sent purposes trends of significance are found in later periods,
namely, just prior, and subsequent to the Council of Trent,
which occasioned such a fruitful resurgence of scholastic
thought (1545-1563). That the resurgence faltered is witnessed
by the need for the restoration of Thomism in the nineteenth
century. Accordingly, the period of the remote background
embraces ages of both glory and decline between the fifteenth
and the eighteenth centuries. Because this background is
remote, a review of it has not so much the purpose of indicating
direct influence upon the present, as of profiting from the evaluation of the historical antecedents of trends currently affecting
the metaphysical development of the question of God's
existence.
GENERAL

VIEw

A superficial pattern is traceable in this remote background
in the gradual transition from the philosophical commentary
on the works of Aristotle to the manual. To be singled
out both as typical and as important in this pattern are
the commentators Dominic of Flanders (1500), professor of
Cajetan, Cajetan himself, and Chrysostom Javelli (1488-1556);
the authors of works departing from the commentary style,
Francis Suarez (1548-1617) and John of St. Thomas; :finally,
the manualists Antoine Gaudin (1639-1695) and Salvator
Roselli (1783) .
The commentators obviously follow the order and distribution of the corresponding works of Aristotle. Dominic of
Flanders' commentary In XII Libras Metaphysicorum is of
interest. 36 While he wrote many commentaries on the works of
Aristotle, Cajetan in his classic commentary on the Summa
86 Perutilis atque praeclaraeQuaestiones ... Dominici Flandrensis ... in Duodecim
Metaphysicae Libras Aristotelis: Secundum Processum et Expositionem Doctoria
Angelici Thomae De Aquino Ordinis Praedicatorum (Venice, 1499). Cf. also ed.
Morelles (Cologne, 1621).
Among the other commentaries of Dominic are: In Octo Libras Physicorum;
De Coelo et Mundo; Parva Naturalia; In Libras Ethicorum.
On Dominic's life and work, cf. Mahieu, L., Dominique de Flandres (XV siecle)
Sa M etaphysique (Paris: Vrins, 1942), (Bibliotheque Thomiste, XXIV).

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Theologiae is to be examined. 87 Javelli, whose works span the
whole philosophical field, provides matter for record in his

Quaestiones Metaphysivae. 88
Instead of the technique of the Aristotelian commentary,
Suarez in his Disputationes M etaphysicae envisions a presentation of material disposed according to his conception of the
progress of doctrine. 39 This work has had a broad influence
both among later scholastics and for a time in the Protestant
universities of Germany. 40 John of St. Thomas' Cursus Philosophicus has had its influence felt especially since the nineteenth century Thomistic restoration. Never so entitled by the
author, the work, lacking both a metaphysics and ethics, is not
a complete cursus. A less radical departure than Suarez' work,
the Cursus Philosophicus in its logic and natural philosophy
presents a brief summary of the pertinent Aristotelian text,
then the treatment of the matter is developed according to
the author's own purposes. 41
In the following generation, Antoine Goudin produces a work
concise in comparison with its predecessors; it is a manual
in the present significance of the term. Not a commentary
following the order of Aristotle's works, it proceeds according
to the division of philosophy given at the outset; logic, natural
philosophy, metaphysics, moral philosophy. 42
•• Cajetan's commentaries on Aristotle include: In Praedicamenta; In Posteriora
Analytica; Super Tres Libros de Anima.
•• Quaestiones Metaphysicae (Venice, n. d.). Cf. also Chrysostomi Javelli Canapricii, Ord. Praed. philosophi et theologi nostri aetatis eruditissimi omnia (quae)
. . . inveniri potuerunt opera, quibus quicquid ad rationalem, naturalem, moralem
ac Divinam Philosophiam pertinet, breviter, simul ac dilucide summa cum eruditione complectitur. (Lyons, 1580).
•• Cf. Disputationes Metaphysicae (Cologne, 1614). "Ratio et Discursus Totius
Operis."
'° Cf. Copleston, F., S. J., A History of Philosophy, III, 878. The author mentions
that Suarez' work was admired by Leibniz and Wolff. Cf. also Gilson, E., Being
and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1949),
ff.
"Joannes aS. Thoma, Cursus Philosophicus, ed. Reiser, 0. S. B. (Turin: Marietti.
1980). The title Cursus Philosophioos does appear in the Rome edition of 1687
and that of Cologne, 1688. Cf. preface of Reiser, I, xii.
•• Goudin, Antoine, 0. P., Philosophia juxta Inconcussa Tutissimaque Divi Thomae
Dogmata (Paris, 1851), I,

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What is designated as " modern philosophy " is usually indicated by historians as formally beginning in the seventeenth
century. The various systems distinctive of this period find
their model, direction and method in the physical sciences; their
common enemy in scholasticism. Embarrassed with the philosophia perennis by such attacks, many Catholic thinkers sought
intellectual respectability in devising new systems patterned
after that of Descartes or of some other " modem." 48 While
not going so far, Salvator Roselli, in 1777, takes note of the
rampant anti-scholasticism in the preface of his work, and
throughout reflects a defensive mentality and an eagerness to
incorporate elements of the new systems into the Thomism he
professes.*4 He first sets out a division of philosophy like that
of Goudin.*5 This older division, however, is surrendered and in
favor of the" custom of the modems" speculative science and
metaphysics are identified, and divided into ontology, cosmology, psychology and natural theology. 46
DocTRINAL POINTS:

THE PLACE OF Goo IN METAPHYSICS

What is of present moment is not merely the evolution indicated in philosophical works, but the doctrinal developments,
whether simply concomitant with or consequent upon this
evolution, concerning the place of God in metaphysics and the
proof for His existence. The issues relevant to the former
point are the unity of metaphysics and, closely allied, the meaning of the subject of metaphysics.
To raise the point of its unity implies that metaphysics faces
a plurality of things to be considered. St. Thomas himself
confronts and resolves this issue in the Prooemium of his commentary.47 The authors designated, up to Roselli, all insist
upon the specific unity of metaphysics as a science.
•• For examples of such efforts, cf. Geny, P., S. J., Brevis Conspectus Historiae
Philosophiae, ed. Sa (Romae, 1928) 286-291.
44 Roselli, S. M., 0. P., Compendium Summae Philosophiae (Romae, 1837) I, 8.
•• cr. ibid., 9.
•• Cf. ibid., IV, 4.
.. Cf. In XII Met., Prooem.

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A glance at the articles in the very first question of Dominic
of Flanders' work reveals how closely he follows the Prooemium
of St. Thomas in determining the nature and unity of metaphysics.48 The unity of metaphysics is derived generically
from the immateriality of the various things it considers.
Specifically, however, the unity is derived from its one proper
subject, being. Metaphysics has no branches; it is not an
aggregate of separate parts; whatever it treats, it does so as
pertinent to its proper subject, being. 49
Javelli similarly affirms the fact of metaphysics' unity, based
upon the unity of its subject, being, in connection with which
everything touched on in the science is considered. 50
Advisedly departing from the commentary style, Suarez
makes a sharp division among metaphysics' elements. His
intention in the first part of the Disputationes is to develop the
doctrine concerning the universal notion of being; in the second
part, to treat of the inferiors contained under the general
notion, according to being's fundamental division into created
and uncreated. 51 This division, however, does not indicate a
division of the science; the author defends its specific unity on
grounds that there is no basis for diversity. The things considered in metaphysics are linked in their abstract character,
while the knowledge about God and the separated substances
•• The following is a list of the articles of this question:
I. Utrum necesse sit una esse scientia quae est rectrix aliarum

et

gubernatrix.
2. Si sit, qualis sit ilia scientia: an sit ilia quae versatur circa maxime intelligibilia.
3. Si sit, quae est ilia scientia: an, v. g., sit Metaphysica.
4. Si sit, an sit scientia una vel plures.
5. An Metaphysica sit de Deo tanquam de subiecto.
6. An substantia sit subiectum Metaphysicae.
7. An elis quod est commune Deo et creaturis sit subiectum Metaphysicae.
8. An ens quod immediate dividitur in decem praedicamenta sit subiectum
Metaphysicae (1, q. 1).
•• Cf. ibid., also Mahieu, op. cit., 61.
•• Est ergo titulus talis, utrum ens sub ratione entis sumptum universalissime
est subiectum adaequatum Metaphysicae, ita quod nullum participans rationem
entis subterfugiat considerationem Metaphysicae et metaphysicus nihil consideret
nisi ratione qua ens. Javelli, Quautiones Met., Lib. I, q. I.
11 Cf. Disp. Met .• loe. cit.

THOMAS

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contribute:; to that concerning the transcendental predicates
common to them and to all
John of St. Thomas, in connection with the specification of
the speculative sciences, asserts the specific unity of metaphysics. His development of the doctrine on specification, reproduced in many modern texts, insists upon the constitution of
the specifying subject in esse scibili according to its grade of
abstraction, or, more properly, of "abstractibility." Da Metaphysics, then, is the highest science, since its subject is defined
in terms of the utmost immateriality; it is one specifically, not
further divisible, because of the one formal aspect of its unifying and distinctive subject, being. 5 '
Goudin presents the doctrine concerning the specific unity
of the speculative sciences, according to their proper subjects
and principles, distinct in their respective grades of abstraction.55 Metaphysics is thus to be taken as one science, dealing
with being, with that whose act is to be.56
Embracing the Wolffian division, Roselli thus abandons the
unity o£ metaphysics. For in this new view, metaphysics and
philosophy are synonymous, coextensive; it is divided as a kind
of super-genus into the elements previously indicated. Not to
metaphysics, but rather to each of its parts as to a distinct
science is any unity to be attributed. In this, of course, there
is an abrupt departure, of which the author seems quite
unaware. 51
The authors mentioned agree that metaphysics extends to a
consideration of God; those who proclaim the unity of the
science see this consideration as integrated into this unity.
•• Cf. ibid., Disp. I, sec. iii, n. 9.
•• Cf. Curs. Phil., Logica, P. II, q. !'l2, a. 1, 818-830. John is at great pains to
emphasize the grades of abstraction as the objective aspect of things in their order
to human science; the grades are not subjective "lights." Cf. ibid., 822, a. 86.
In the light of these explanations concerning abstraction, it seems groundless to
set John of St. Thomas against Aquinas, as does Fr. Klubertanz .
•• cr. ibid., 825 b 22; 824, a 23.
"" Cf. Goudin, op. cit., Logica, q. 5, a. 3 I, 289.
56 Cf. ibid., Metaphysica,
q. 1, a. 1 IV, 169.
81 Cf. Roselli, op. cit., IV, 4.

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23

Yet there is a marked diversity in the sense of this integration.
stemming from the various meanings of the subject of metaphysics, which is the source of its unity. Does the community
of " being in common," subject of metaphysics, include God
and the separated substances?
Dominic of Flanders answers negatively. Having based the
unity of the science upon this, that all its considerations revolve
about " being," its proper subject, he proceeds to explain the
sense of this subject. It is not God; according to the Aristotelian-Thomistic canons of science, the existence of the subject
must be foreknown; for man God's existence can be known
naturally only by way of demonstration. Further, the subject
governs the entire inquisitive process of the science; metaphysics' investigations extend to more than what concerns
God. 58 For the latter reason as well, substance alone is not
the subject of metaphysics. 59
Then there occur the two principal articles in the question,
indicating Dominic's understanding of " being in common."
The community of being as the subject of metaphysics, does
not embrace both uncreated and created being. Such a conception would favor the univocity of being advanced by the
Scotists. Further, it would result in assigning as the subject of
metaphysics, a pure abstraction which,
because it
would have so much unity, would be found neither in God nor
in creatures and might just as well include the being of pure
reason. Thus metaphysics would cease to be a science of the
real. 6 ° Continuing, Dominic maintains that if being in common.
the subject of metaphysics, were such, it would destroy metaphysics as a science, as knowledge through principles. For
such principles could not mean principles in being, for God
has none; nor principles in knowledge, for being is the first thing
apprehended. 61
The result of his query leads the author to conclude that the
subject, in the strict sense of this term, can only mean being as
18 Cf. Dominic of Fl., op. cit., I, q. 1, a. 5.
•• Cf. ibid., a. 7.

•• Cf. ibid.
Cf. ibid.

11

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it is common to and divided into the ten predicaments. 62 His
argument in this article rests both upon his previous eliminations and upon the requirements of a subject in any science, in
accord with the nature of the human intellect. The latter point
is crucial in the thought of Dominic. He insists that in attaining those things which are entitatively superior to him, man in
the science of metaphysics, as in all his knowledge, does so only
through the proper object of the human intellect. Thus just as
God and the separated substances come under the object of the
intellect not as directly attained but as reductively attained,
so also they are attained through the proper subject of metaphysics, but are not directly contained in that subject. 68
In no way does the proper subject thus assigned to metaphysics derogate from the perfection of the science as supreme
in the human order. For being in common is not to be taken in
that vague, imperfect sense that it has as the first object known
by the intellect but in a scientific sense, the result of a difficult
process.64 Further, he shows his appreciation for this subject as
perfective of the human intellect inasmuch as it includes esse,
the perfection of all perfections, acording to St. Thomas' true
conception. 61
Summarizing his view of the unity and at the same time of
the community of the science, Dominic ends his consideration
by stating that metaphysics has indeed the greatest community
among those sciences which treat of created things as subject.
Thus its subject is most common: created reality. It does, however, also consider all being, material as well as spiritual, but
not all of them as subject; some it treats exclusively as cause
of its subject. As for Averroes' contention that since it is
divine science, it considers God, the First Cause, as its subject,
he is speaking of the subject in the widest sense, not of the
proper subject, " the subject of attribution or of adequation." 66
•• Respondeo dicendum quod ens in quantum ens, quod dividitur in decem
praedicamenta, est subiectum Metaphysicae. Ibid., a. 8 .
.. Cf. ibid., ad 7.
•• Cf. ibid., ad 8.
•• Cf. ibid., q. 4., a. !!, ad S.
•• Cf. ibid., q. 1, a. 6. Mention must here be made of Cosmus ·Alamannus, S. J.

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Chrysostom Javelli maintains that the "more proficient
Thomists" think the above position to be false.67 For Javelli
the adequate subject of any science is that under whose formal
aspect everything is considered in the science, while in tum
everything participating in this formal aspect comes under the
consideration of the science.68 This adequate subject for metaphysics is not merely predicamental being, but real per se
being, finite and infinite, or created and uncreated; thus, being
in its utmost universality .cu To substantiate this position he
advances first of all the statement that not only finite being
is real being, but God as well, since He is most real and most
perfect. Then a twofold proof is formulated. Real being in the
sense indicated is the subject because the properties primarily
and per se belonging to it are considered, and that is the
subject in any science whose properties are considered. Further,
since real being in the sense indicated has properties to be
demonstrated, it is truly apt as a subject of science; it is,
therefore, the subject of metaphysics, since this is first philosophy.70
While flatly rejecting Dominic of Flanders' teaching, Javelli
yet admits that there is a difference among Thomists, with
some favoring the former's position. He takes pains therefore
to reject it, in arguing against the point that since the subject
of metaphysics is that whose principles and causes are sought,
and God has none, then He is not included in the subject. 71 He
responds in the sixth book of his work, by defending the proposition that being as being, including God, does indeed have
(1559-1684) because of his close affinity with Dominic of Flanders. His Summa
Philosophiae is noteworthy for its development of authentic Thomistic doctrine
through the texts of St. Thomas himself, presented in the style of the Summa
Theologiae. Alamannus adopts the same position as Dominic of Flanders on the
true sense of the subject of metaphysics, defending it with the words of St. Thomas.
This teaching is in the Summa Philosophiae, Part IV, Metaphysica, q. 1, a. 6,
(ed. Ehrle, Paris: Lethielleux, 1891) III, Sec. vi, ll-18.
67 Cf. Javelli, Quaest. Met., Lib. I, q. 1.
68 Cf. ibid.
•• Cf. ibid., tertia opinio.
7 ° Cf. ibid.
n Cf. ibid.

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principles and causes, by extending the meaning of the terms to
principles and causes in knowledge, to whatever can serve as a
medium to demonstrate properties of a subject. 72 The rejection
continues with a refutation of the claim that St. Thomas, in the
De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 4, and in the Prooemium to the Metaphysics, supports the position that metaphysics' subject does
not include God. What St. Thomas is stating is simply the
diverse mode in which the diverse real beings are attained,
always as subject, in metaphysics. 73 The author points out the
inability of his opponents to perceive, in the sense he indicates
in Book VI, how being as such has principles and causes, and
yet God, Who is contained under being, the subject of metaphysics, does not have any principle in being. 74
Suarez also rejects the opinion of Dominic of Flanders.
Making practically the same point as Javelli on the sense of
" principles and causes," he maintains that what St. Thomas
taught is that while God is attained under the formality of
principle, He is nonetheless considered as included in the object
or subject of metaphysics. 75 Nothing, says Suarez, is taken
away from the character of the science in maintaining that its
subject includes all real being, even God. It is still a knowledge
of the principles and causes of its subject, taking the word
cause in a wide sense, to include both the principles of the being
of things, and of the knowledge of them. Thus even though it
be true that being as being, including as it does God, has no
cause in the strict sense, it does have certain formal reasons for
its properties, at least conceptually distinct from what these
Cf. ibid., Lib. VI, q. 1.
Cf. ibid., Lib. I, q. 1. Adverte quod inter Thomistas est discrepantia quoniam
aliqui tenent cum Flandrensi, alii autem cum tertia opinione, quam credo esse ad
mentem Beati Thomae. . . .
74 Cf. ibid., in fine.
75 Cf. Disp. Met., Disp. I, sec. i, n. 16. In both Javelli and Suarez there is a
certain ambiguity in their correction of Dominic of Flanders. The latter does not
deny that God pertains to the consideration of metaphysics, nor that He is the
object, principal by dignity; but that God is the subject in the proper sense. The
twofold sense of subject (or object) is apparent in St. Thomas himself, In Boet.
De Trin., q. 5, a. 1; a. 4.
72

73

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serve to demonstrate. This is true even of God and His attributes. Thus the position of Dominic of Flanders is unfounded. 76
Positively, then, it is obvious from the very disposition of the
Disputationes M etaphysicae that for Suarez God is included
in being as this is the subject of metaphysics. For him, being
as such, the adequate subject o£ metaphysics, includes all real
being. Only the being of reason and beings per accidens are
excluded. 77
The extension and comprehension of the subject are explained when the unity of metaphysics is discussed, especially
by showing how God fits into this subject. The perfect knowledge of God and the separated substances yields the knowledge
of all that is in them, and consequently of the transcendental
attributes which belong to them in common with all other
things. Since metaphysics is the supreme science, there is none
higher which would furnish this knowledge concerning God;
thus metaphysics must contain all that is necessary to a perfect
knowledge of what its subject, being, implies. Thus the one
science of metaphysics which considers special objects such as
God and the separated substances, at the same time considers
those predicates common to them and to all things. From this,
the content of the one subject of metaphysics is to be judged. 78
The need for the adequate subject of metaphysics to include
God is further emphasized in the discussion of the causes of
being. Here a twofold consideration of God in metaphysics is
recognized, one about Him as first cause, the other as He is
the primary being. Although the latter is a consideration
ontologically prior, according to the genesis of human knowledge the causal consideration is prior. For the human mind, it
must be remembered, arrives at a knowledge of God through
effects; the complete picture of being, moreover, demands a
discussion of its first cause. In this discussion nothing should
be said about God as He is the primary being, either about
His perfections, or even about His existence, which must be
presupposed. With the supposition that there is a universal
•• Cf. ibid., Disp. I, sec. i, nn.
"Cf. ibid., n. !!4.

•• Cf. ibid., sec. iii, n. 9.

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cause, uncaused, His causality with regard to the production,
conservation and operation of all other beings is treated. 79
In defining the total ambit of being, the subject of metaphysics, then, Suarez speaks of it as including being that is
immaterial both positively and negatively. 80 The first is being
in general; the second, God and the angels. 81 Thus it is true
to say that of the two parts of metaphysics, the one deals with
" being," the other with " beings." 82 This view of his concept
of metaphysics has its roots in his notion of being, the subject
of the science. When considering the point ex professo he affirms
that there is no difficulty in saying that the community of being
includes all beings, God among them. For this is a community
of predication; in this sense there is no hint of anything real
being placed prior to God, when He is included beneath the
adequate subject of metaphysics. This subject is abstracted in
such a way that it has this community .83
Much light is shed upon his notion of the unity of metaphysics, arising out of its subject, from his teaching concerning
the unity of the concept of being. The formal concept of being
is one, simply speaking, abstracting from those concepts which
represent particular beings. 84 To this formal concept, there
corresponds one adequate and immediate objective concept,
expressly bespeaking all beings insofar as they are one in
being. 85 This unity is further explained by insisting that all
the differences of beings are excluded; otherwise no unity would
be possible. 86 Thus the concept of being has perfect unity
precisively. Turning to the contraction of this one concept to
its inferiors, Suarez designates this not as a composition, but
as simply the clarification of some particular already contained
70 De Deo glorioso duplex est in Metaphysica
consideratio, scilicet, quatenus est
prima causa, et quatenus est primum ens ... ibid., Disp. XX, Prol.
8 ° Cf. ibid., Disp. I, sec. iii, nn.
81 Cf. ibid., nn.
82 Cf. ibid., Tom. I, Ratio et Discursus Totius Operis; Tom. II, Prol.
•• Cf. ibid., Disp. I, sec. i, n. 11.
•• Cf. ibid., Disp. II, sec. i, n.
•• Cf. ibid., sec. ii, n. 8.
•• Cf. ibid., n. 14; n. 20.

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under the notion of being. It is a process from the indeterminate and
to the determinate and distinct, not an
addition or composition. 81 How this is so, when the concept of
being actually excludes its inferiors, is not made clear, but it
is in this way that the author seeks a position straddling the
Scotistic univocity and the Thomistic analogy of being. 88
Anticipating such an explanation of the unity of being,
Suarez set out his notion of metaphysics and its unity arising
from its one adequate subject. Literally, metaphysics' subject
is being and beings. The first part is concerned with the
concept of being, perfectly one, absolutely precised from its
members; the second part, with these members, the distinct
expressions of. the one concept. In this way the science preserves its unity, for the members are determined not by addition, but by clarification. Thus the subject of metaphysics
has a supercomprehension; it is so abstract that it has a perfect
unity, perduring even when the science turns now to God, now
to substance, now to accident, now to the infinite, now to the
finite. These enter naturally into metaphysics as new expressions of the one concept, the one subject.
It has been said that Suarez did not make the distinction
between general and special metaphysics. 89 This is true,
speaking literally. But it will be seen that there is a marked
similarity between his procedure and that of those who later do
professedly maintain this division of metaphysics. To point this
out is not to criticize; it is simply to draw attention to the
character of the work of one whose influence in scholastic
thought has ben widespread.
As to John of St. Thomas' understanding of the subject of
metaphysics, there are only obiter dicta as clues. For example,
the author says that while not applied univocally as to their
entity, God and creatures are united univocally as regards
their knowability, namely in metaphysics. This simply means
•• Cf. ibid., sec. vi, n. 7.
89 For a discu&sion of the involved reconcilation, cf. Copleston, op. cit. III, 859860.
•• Cf. ibid., 856.

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that there is a connection of the truth concerning one with
that concerning the other. 90 In another place the author,
insisting that the immateriality by which sciences are distinguished is not merely the recession of the subject from matter,
but the resulting intelligibility, states that while sacred
theology, metaphysics and logic all leave matter behind, yet
the mode of immateriality attained is different in each.
Theology considers God through the light of revelation, while
metaphysics attains Him in terms of being, as it abstracts from
created and uncreated, an expression to be repeated in the
Thomistic tradition. 91
This expression seems in direct opposition to what Dominic
of Flanders maintains. Yet in view of other expressions the
opposition is not so emphatic ..For John of St. Thomas distinguishes the diverse manner in which theology and metaphysics attain God in this, that the former proceeds as a participation of God's knowledge of Himself; whereas the latter
attains Him only from natural effects. 92 More fully, he insists
on the unity of metaphysics, even though it attains things so
diverse as predicamental realities and God. The unity remains
intact because of the formal aspect of the one subject of the
science, resulting in the one mode of definition and one medium
of demonstration in the science. That formal subject is being;
by reason of it predicamental realities are attained since they
all share in being; God is attained because He is the first cause
of all being. 93 In addition, the demonstration of God's existence
is proper to metaphysics. The medium of demonstration must
then be something intrinsic to the science, namely the subject
itself. God is attained, not as subject, but as first cause. 94
This, of course, is an inference from various statements of the
author. Since no definitive discussion of metaphysics' nature
is to be found in his work, this mode of procedure is not
probative. There does, however, seem to be a basis for an
•• Cf. Joann. a S. Th. Cursus Phil .. Logica, II P., q. 21, a. 4, 678 b38; a. 2, 662
b44.
01 cr. ibid., q. 27, a. 1, 825 b7.
•• Cf. ibid., 829 MO.
•• Cf. ibid., q. 24, a. 1, 757 MO.
•• cr. ibid., 829 bio.

REFLEXION

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31

agreement between this author and Dominic of Flanders,
despite at least one statement that is directly opposed to the
earlier author.
From Goudin's procedure, it is apparent that he too includes
God iri being, the subject of metaphysics. 95 It is noteworthy
that he makes a point of substantiating the division of being,
placed in the beginning of the tract on metaphysics, into
created and uncreated by proving the existence of the latter.
Beings which clearly indicate that their existence is received,
show that there is a being that is self-explanatory, the cause
of all others, being per se and a se. This being is God, uncreated
being, from Whom all others participate in being. 96
In Roselli, of course, there is no question of the unity of
metaphysics, or consequently of a single subject. The rational
knowledge about God is a distinct science concerning uncreated
being, just as cosmology is the science concerning the beings of
the material world. 01 At the outset of his ontology, the author
also indicates the foundation of such a procedure, by justifying
the division of being into created and uncreated through the
necessity of
creation. Unless creation is admitted
God would not be the universal, uncaused cause of all, but
would presuppose something to His causality .98
THE ExiSTENCE

OF Goo

Because the question of God's existence has come to mean
in Thomistic metaphysics the quinque viae, interest regarding
the actual question in the era being considered centers around
these proofs as a term of reference. There are two features to
be noted, namely, arguments advanced for the existence of God,
and the conclusion claimed for them.

•• Cf. Goudin op. cit., Metaphysica, q. 1, a. 1, t. IV, 169.
•• Cf. ibid.
07 Cf. Roselli op. cit., t. IV, 4.
•• Cf. ibid., 58-54.

32

'fHOMAS
ARGUMENTS

C. O'BRIEN

FOR THE ExiSTENCE

OF Gon

Neither Dominic of Flanders nor Javelli employs the quinque
viae as such. While differing radically in their ideas of the
place of God in metaphysics, following the style of the commentary on Artistotle, each considers the existence of God in
examining Book Delta. Dominic actually advances his proofs
in reply to a twofold question, namely, whether there exists a
first separated substance and whether this is pure act.
To the first part of the question, the affirmative reply is
sustained by two arguments. The one is a simple paraphrase
of Aristotle's own words; 99 the need for an eternal, separated
substance rests upon the eternity of movement. 100 Dominic,
however, later on rejects this latter notion and also shows that
there is no valid philosophical reason establishing the eternity
of the world. 101 The other argument, resembling the tertia via
of St. Thomas, but credited here to St. Albert the Great, is
presented, the basic force of which rests in this, that all things
that are cannot be corruptible things. 102 Actually, the principal
concern of the author is God's pure actuality.
Javelli does regard the quinque viae as efficacious, but, as
a commentator chiefly concerned with the text of Aristotle,
does not reproduce them. 103 Among the points to be noted
concerning the existence of God, is the author's consistency as
to the reason for the question. Since God is included in the
adequate subject of the science, it is necessary to demonstrate
particularly, not just in the generic manner of the Physics,
His existence. 104
As to the proofs for God's existence, it is Aristotle's proof
from movement that is his chief interest. He maintains that
the proof as found in the Physics, or any proof based upon
•• Aristotle, Metaphysics Delta, c. 6, 1071b ff.
° Cf. Dominic of Flanders op. cit., XII, q. 5, a. 1.
101 Cf. ibid., ad !urn; a. 8, ad !urn.
102 Cf. ibid., a. 8, ad !urn.
108 Cf. Javel!i, op. cit., Lib. XII, q. 9, ad tertium principale; also q. 5, ad secundum
principale.
10 • Cf. ibid., q. S, prima conclusio.
10

REFLEXION

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33

physical movement, reaches " an unmoved mover " in that
order, reaches, for example, what is called the " soul of the first
heaven." To prove God's existence, Aristotle included in the
Metaphysics movement by way of even final causality, thus
reaching a first mover, absolutely unmoved. 105 He also mentions that from the principles of Aristotle's Metaphysics, St.
Thomas formulates the proof from the grades of being, truth,
goodness, and perfection. 106
There is much less emphasis upon questions arising out of
the text of Aristotle in Suarez and John of St. Thomas. In
Suarez, first of all, there is much that is significant to the stream
of scholastic thought about the exposition of the existence of
God. The second half of the Disputationes, as has been noted,
is devoted to a consideration of beings; it is here that God is
considered, not as first cause, but as the primary being. The
discussion of God in this sense is first pursued because of His
excellence; subsequently, the notes common to the rest of the
realm of being can be discussed. 101 Acknowledging this procedure to be a departure, Suarez justifies it as warranted by the
order of doctrine. God is the principal object of the science,
and knowledge about Him affords light upon all the rest. 108 He
advances what has already been said about being in general,
and its causes, as a sufficient preamble to natural theology. 109
The limits of this tract will be what the capacities of natural
reason indicate; the realm of revelation will not be invaded. 110
Naturally, the existence of God is the first question approached. By way of introduction, the author distinguishes,
for the sake of clarity, between demonstrating the existence of
Cf. ibid., q. 9, ad tertium principale.
Cf. ibid. Ubi datur magis et minus differre datur et maximum ex quo
trahitur quod in quocumque genere datur magis et minus. Constat autem quod in
rerum natura datur magis et minus ens, et verum et bonum et perfectum. Ergo
datur maxime ens et vemm et optimum et perfectissimum. Hoc aptem apud omnes
recte sapientes est Deus. Ergo. . . .
107 Cf. Suarez, Disp. Met., Disp. XXVIII, Prol., sec. i, n. 4.
108 Cf. ibid., n. 5. Suarez equates the order of doctrine with the ontOlogical
order.
109 Cf. ibid., Disp. XXIX, Prol.
11°Cf. ibid.
106

108

34

THOMAS

C. o'BRIEN

uncreated being, and demonstrating the existence of God. 111 In
either case, the first point to be settled concerns the suitable
medium of demonstration. He insists that it must be a metaphysical medium, rejecting the argument from movement as
insufficient. The key principle of this argument, " whatever is
in motion, is being moved by another," is not evidently universal; it is the product of an induction and it is not evidently
verified of all sorts of movements. 112 In any case, Aristotle's
proof from movement is insufficient to reach uncreated being,
and its attributes. 113
The principle of the demonstration, the universally valid
metaphysical principle, is rather to be this: " whatever is
produced, is produced by another, whether it be created, generated, or produced in any other way." 114 From this principle
Suarez concludes that, since all things in the universe cannot
have been produced, there must be some unproduced uncreated
being. The minor is proved by the impossibility of an infinite
regress in efficient causes, even only per accidens subordinated.115
In his Cursus Philosophicus John of St. Thomas, at the place
corresponding to the question in Aristotle's Physics, presents
an argument for the existence of God as the first unmoved
mover. First of all, however, he summarizes, according to his
custom, the text of the Stagirite, chapters 4 and 6 of Book
VIII. 116 Turning to his own development of the question, the
author commences by inquiring about the possibility of the
eternity of movement and of the first mover. 117 In the first
two articles of the question, setting out the doctrine of the
faith concerning the temporal beginning of the world, he
presents St. Thomas' explanation of the question of the possiC£. ibid., sec. i, n. 1.
C£. ibid., n. 7.
118 C£. ibid., nn. 7-19.
114 Omne quod fit ab alio fit, sive creetur sive generetur, sive quacumque ratione
fiat. Ibid., n. 20.
115 Cf. ibid., n. 21; n. 25.
116 Cf. Joann. a S. Th. Curs. Phil., Philosophia Naturalis P. I, 456 ff.
117 C£. ibid., q. 24, de aeternitate
motus et primi eius motore, 477 a28.
111

112

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35

bility of creation from eternity. 118 In article three, presenting
the argument for the existence of God, he leaves aside the
eternity of movement in Aristotle's argument and paraphrases
the argument from movement as found in the Summa Theologiae ·of St. Thomas. 119 In conclusion, he states that the fact
Qf movement in the world leads to a mover that moves others
in such a way as to receive neither movement nor the power
to be a mover from any other, but is immobile and a se.120 A
further point to be mentioned in connection with the author's
understanding of the argument from movement is his reply to
the first objection. Against the argument that a relatively
unmoved mover would suffice to explain any movement, he
insists that such a mover would explain only some particular
movement, and by reason of the principle involved in the
argument, the mind would be led to inquire whether this mover
itself was subject to movement. Only an absolutely unmoved
mover could ultimately explain even physical movement. 121
For Antoine Goudin the question of the existence of God
has as its reason, not a complete lack of this knowledge among
men, but the need to show that the truth can be demonstrated
scientifically. 122 The proof that it can is the demonstration
itself, or rather five demonstrations corresponding to diverse
divine attributes. These demonstrations are a kind of loose
paraphrase of the quinque viae. 128 Once it is established that
there is in reality a nature possessing these five characteristics,
then the matter is settled; God's existence is demonstrated.
Through these demonstrations, Goudin intends to refute the
atheists. 12 '
Roselli's natural theology is composed of two principal
questions, one on the existence and attributes of God, the other
on the divine operation with respect to the being and operation
118

Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 46, aa. 1-2.

° Cf. Joann. a S. Th., loc. cit., a. 8, 484 bl5-485 al9.
12 °Cf. ibid.

11

Cf. ibid., 485 a42.
Cf. Goudin, op. cit., Metaphysica, q. 8, De Ente Spirituali, 206.
123 Cf. ibid., and 211-212.
100 Cf. ibid., 206.
121

122

86

THOMAS

C. O'BRIEN

of creatures. The existence of God is approached as a confrontation of atheism. The name God is understood even by atheists
to mean a being greater and better than which none can
be thought; a being therefore consummately and infinitely
perfect. 125 To prove, against the denials of the atheists, that a
being involving such perfection is not impossible but really
exists, is the author's intention. To achieve this end five arguments, substantially similar to the quinque viae, are first
employed; then a sixth is added. The five arguments all have
a similar form, exemplified by the first: A first, altogether
unmoved mover exists; this is God; therefore God exists. 126
What is rather amazing, and significant, is that the Thomist
Roselli adds to these arguments a sixth, which is that of
Christian Wolff: If the most perfect being is possible, it exists.
Since there is no contradiction in a most perfect being, it is
possible; since existence is a perfection, from the possibility of
such a being, the existence follows. The author insists that
there is no ontological argument here, because, unlike limited
beings, the most perfect being has an essence which includes
existence. 127 This incursion of foreign thought into the mind of
a Thomist is quite striking.
CoNcLUSIONs

REACHED

BY THE ARGUMENTS

Both for reasons intrinsic to the authors of the era and
because of contemporary interest, this final point concerning the conclusions of arguments for the existence of God is
important. Contemporarily, the historian of philosophy, Carlo
Giacon, refers to the debilitation of metaphysics in this period.
This he exemplifies by referring to Cardinal Cajetan's observations about the conclusions of the quinque viae. Cajetan, he
says, judges the quinqu.e 'viae to be insufficient as demonstrations of God's existence. They reach some sort of superior being,
but the proofs for the unicity and infinite perfection subsequent
'"" Cf. Roselli, op. cit., IV, 292.

, •• cr. ibid., 291.
121

Cf. ibid., 294.

REFLEXION

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37

in the Summa Theologiae truly prove God's existence. This
historian remarks that Cajetan is thus adverting to a difficulty
previously seen by Scotus and Ockham, and subsequently to be
alleged by Kant. 128 Cajetan's remarks are indeed crucial in
this matter; they are not, however, unique.
Certainly Dominic of Flanders considers the proofs he offers
to be proofs of the existence of God. He makes no special
point of identifying the subject of the conclusion with God.
For him the pure act with which he is concerned is " being by
essence," God/ 29
Javelli does point out the difference between physics' generic
demonstration of the existence of separated substances and
metaphysics' demonstration specifically of these. He further
examines the proof for the existence of God, that is, of a
mover unmoved in any way. With reference to the proof
from the grades of perfections, it is interesting to note that he
employs the phrase," among all judging rightly, this is God." 130
It is Cajetan, however, who among the Thomists most
emphatically raises the question of the specific conclusion of
the quinque viae. The Cardnal's remarks have been a recurring factor in the history of the question ever since.
In his commentary on the quinque viae, Cajetan, after
discussing the objections directed against the propriety of
raising the question of the existence of God, the subject of the
science, states this about the proofs themselves: In the article
there is one conclusion, replying affirmatively to the question
at issue; that conclusion is: Deus est, God exists. As is apparent from the context, for the author this signifies that theology,
from principles " appropriated ministerially " proves that its
subject, God, exists. 131
Later the sense in which the proofs themselves reach such a
conclusion is questioned. In one sense they can be seen as
128 Cf. Giacon, Carlo, "La Seconda Scolastica," Storia deUa Filosofia a cura di
Cornelio Fabro (Rome: Coletti, 1954), 401-402.
129 Cf. Dominic of Flanders op. cit., XII, q. 5, a. 1 and ad Sum.
13 ° Cf. Javelli, op. cit., Lib. XII, q. 9, ad tertium principale.
181 Cf. Cajetan, Comm. in Summa Theol., I, q. 2, a. 8, comm. n. I, Ed. Leon.

38

THOMAS

C. o'BRIEN

directly and immediately concluding to God as understood
by the faithful, with all His attributes. In this view the
difficulty arises that it is not immediately evident that the
proofs lead so high. The first proof, for example, need lead only
to a mover as unmoved as the intellective soul. In another
sense, the proofs can be seen as concluding to certain attributes
or predicates which in truth do belong to God, the proofs as
such, however, not being concerned with how these attributes
are found in reality. The author insists that it is in this sense
that they are to be understood as reaching the conclusion, God
exists. For, establishing that the predicates are indeed found
in reality, they establish directly but per accidens, as it were,
that God exists, since these predicates belong properly to God.
Not directly, but consequently, then, they are said to prove
that God as God, the subject, the substrate of these predicates
and of theology, exists. Thus, in brief, Cajetan teaches that
the quinque viae directly and immediately prove that these
five predicates exist; directly and per accidens, that God, as
having these attributes, exists; that consequently only, the
one perfect being such as we hold God to be " exists." 132
John of St. Thomas, in his Cursus Philosophicus, from the
outset clearly considers the proof from movement as concluding
to the existence of God. He places the question: What does
the philosopher demonstrate concerning God from movement?
His reply is that directly and immediately it is demonstrated
that there is a first mover, entirely unmoved; consequently,
certain attributes belonging to divinity and to pure act are
deduced. 133 In addition, he adds to the conclusion of the argument from movement, that there is a first mover, "and this we
call God." 134 In this way, he makes the conclusion specific.
In his Cursus Theologicus, it should be noted in passing,
John of St. Thomas
repeats Cajetan's remarks about the
132 Cf. ibid., n. III.
For a discussion of this commentary, cf. Bersani, S., C. M.,
"De Mente Cardinalis Cajetani circa Vim Conclusionum Quinque Viarum" in Divus
Thomas (PL) XXXVI (1933), 429-434.
133 Cf. Joann. a S. Th., Curs. Phil., Phil. Nat. P. I, q. 24, a. 8, 484 b8.
1 .. Cf. ibid.

REFLEXION

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39

conclusion of the quinque viae, with, however, the modification
of Dominic Banes who insists that movement in the prima via
is to be taken as any transition from potency to act; that
consequently it establishes an absolutely unmoved mover. 135
Suarez also raises the issue of the conclusion precisely of
God's existence. His solution is both different and indicative of
a new direction in the development of the whole question. As
has been noted, he distinguishes from the outset between the
demonstration of the existence of uncreated being, and of the
existence of God. To complete the demonstration of God's
existence, he deems the proof given for an unproduced being
insufficient. It could be alleged, for example, that in any given
order an unproduced being might be established, without the
establishment of God's existence being thereby made evident.
Thus the pagans hold for gods of grain, of wine, and other
things; the Manichaeans for principles of good and evil. For the
Christian the statement, " God exists " can admit of no such
plurality. Thus a demonstration that will show the unicity of
the unproduced cause will alone suffice to prove that God exists,
for then it will be clear that this being is the absolutely first
cause, one in number, one in nature and essence, corresponding
to what is meant by the word God/ 36 In this way Suarez
intends to solve the objection of Peter d'Ailly (Alliacus) (13501420), a nominalist, who said that to establish the existence of
an uncreated being is not to establish the existence of God. 137
In confronting the difficulty, Suarez by way of preliminary
indicates the necessity for a nominal definition of God; he then
establishes the appropriate nominal definition; finally he formulates the demonstrations.
135 Cf. Cursus Theologicus, in Primam Partem, Disp. 3, a. 2, Ed. Solesmes (1930),
I, n. 1, 419. Dominic Banes (1528-1604) repeats Cajetan's remarks substantially;
he insists contrary to the Cardinal that the predicates reached in the conclusions
are proper to God; that movement in the prima via is to be taken in the sense
explained in the text. Cf. Banes, Scholasticum Commentarium in Primam Partem
Summae Theologiae S. Thomae Aquinatis, Ed. Urbano, 0. P. (Madrid: Biblioteca
de Tomistas Espanolos, 1934), 113-115.
'""cr. Suarez, Disp. Met., Disp. XXIX, sec. ii, n. 1.
137 cr. ibid., n. fl.

40

THOMAS C. o'BRIEN

As to the first point, he says that it can indeed be demonstrated that the per se necessary being, the font, the efficient
cause of all things is and is consequently one; thus it can be
demonstrated that it is God. But to such a process the nominal
definition of God is the key. In other words, the sense of the
term God must be preestablished to any reasoning about
God. 138 In this predetermination, certain limits are to be
observed. The sense of the word cannot be so broad as to
include all the divine attributes. For then it would be necessary
to demonstrate, contrary to the usual mode of procedure, all
of these attributes before the existence of God would be established. Neither can the sense of the name be too restrictive. If
it were to stand for one attribute, for example, " most perfect
being," the illation from this to the conclusion God exists might
not be evident. To those, for example, who might think that
there is nothing besides the corporeal world, " most perfect
being " might signify man or the heavens. Then the identification of the " most perfect being " with God would not truly
mean God exists. Neither "first mover of the heavens" nor
Suarez' own " per se necessary being " fulfill " what we intend
by the name God." 139
Keeping such limits, a nominal definition is then set forth:
This name signifies a certain noble being, surpassing all others,
from which as from their first author, all other things proceed;
which therefore is the supreme divinity, to be worshipped and
venerated. 140

To demonstrate that such a being exists, then, is to demonstrate that God exists.
The actual demonstrations are two. One is a posteriori, from
the order and harmony of the universe, seen not in terms of
caused finality, but of vastness, concluding to the one first
being, God.141 The other is a priori, in the sense of a deduction
from the per se necessary being, to its being one and therefore
God.142
Cf. ibid., n. 4.

101

° Cf. ibid., n. 6.

119

188
18

"° Cf. ibid.

Cf. ibid., nn.
Cf. ibid., sec. iii, nn.

REFLEXION

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41

Suarez' handling of the demonstration precisely of God's
existence, achieving the desired conclusion through the use of
the nominal definition as the necessary vehicle of approach,
is significant. Such an approach has since become quite
common, as will be seen; at the time of its development by
Suarez, however, it comes as a new direction in the exposition
of the matter of God's existence.
For Goudin, also, the nominal definition of God is also of
some moment in establishing, according to his intention, the
truth that God's existence can be scientifically demonstrated.
In the fourth proof, concluding to an infinitely perfect being,
he adds that this is what all speak of as God, and thus God
exists. In the fifth demonstration, he points out that since to
be the first governor is the most notable mark of divinity,
to deny the existence of' this governor, even admitting the
other attributes reached, would be to deny the existence of
God.148 With reference to the conclusion that God exists, but
not as a vehicle of approach to the question, Goudin makes use
of the significance of the name God.
For Roselli, the nominal definition assumes almost the key
position in his procedure, because of his desire to establish a
common denominator admitted even by the atheists. What
they admit in the words used in their denial, he sets out to
prove to be real. He thus preestablishes the fact that the name
God is understood as meaning a being greater and better than
which none can be thought, consummately and infinitely perfect.144 Through this he establishes the conclusion God exists
in each proof by identifying the predicate reached through the
proof with this meaning of the name God. Thus the first
unmoved mover is such a most perfect being, otherwise it would
be in potency to some perfection. The first. cause is most
perfect because most independent. 145 As to the necessary being,
this must not be matter, for it is not the most imperfect but the
most perfect being that is the first necessary being. 146 The
"" Cf. Goudin, op. cit., Metaphysica, De ente spirituali, t. lV, !!18.
"' Cf. Roselli, op. cit., IV, !!9!!.
""Cf. ibid.
"" Cf. ibid., !!98.

42

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fourth and fifth arguments involve a similar process of identification with the most perfect being, and therefore with God, so
that the conclusion God exists is established.
CoNCLUSION

Remote as the era considered is from the contemporary
scene, it truly forms a background emphasized by its doctrinal
trends. Obviously the most radical point to be noted is the
divergence relative to the place of God in metaphysics, arising
out of attitudes towards the unity and subject of the science.
The variety of arguments advanced for the existence of God,
their function and direction in the respective authors, are all
highly significant for an evaluation of the role of such arguments in any consideration of God's existence in metaphysics.
The sense of the conclusion God exists as conceived and attained by the various authors points up a similar issue. In
short, the contribution of this period to any reflexion concerning the contemporary status of the question of God's existence
lies above all in its emphasis on the bearing of the context
upon the whole development of the question in metaphysics.

B.

PROXIMATE

HISTORICAL

RESTORATION

BACKGROUND:

IN THE NINETEENTH

THE

THOMISTIC

CENTURY

To speak of a restoration of scholastic philosophy in the last
century is to take cognizance of the prior and subsequent state
of that philosophy. By the end of the eighteenth century
scholasticism was accorded universal scorn outside the Church,
widespread oblivion within iU 47 The latter attitude, at least,
ever since the epochal encyclical Aeterni Patris issued by Pope
Leo XIII on August 4, 1879, has given place to a vigorous
state of Thomistic studies, a contemporary glory. The Thorn147 The editor of the 1851 edition of Goudin's work mentions that the Summa
Theologiae was incomprehensible to him until he discovered Goudin, because
even his professors were unacquainted with basic Thomistic terminology. Cf.
op. cit. Preface de l'Editeur (Roux-Lavergne), vii.

REFLEXION

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43

istic revival in its doctrinal character forms the proximate
background of the current state of the question being considered. Because that doctrinal character has an essential influence, its evaluation is a necessary prerequisite. For reasons
that will become obvious, the doctrinal aspect can best be set
forth in terms, first, of its extrinsic sources, then, of its intrinsic
traits. By extrinsic sources are meant both the motivation of
the restoration, and the condition of those who accomplished it.
1. The Motivation of the Thomistic Restoration

As supreme pastor, Pope Leo XIII evidenced in his encyclical
his characteristic awareness of the needs of the Church. He
sought to offset the evils caused by the breach struck between
faith and reason, theology and philosophy, religion and science. a breach left unspanned by any of the " modern " systems
to which even ecclesiastics had given their allegiance. The
Pontiff turned to the teaching of him who had so clearly shown
the relationship between the two orders, whose work had borne
reason to such heights while preserving its proper subordination
to divine authority, St. Thomas Aquinas. The encyclical emphasized at length the benefits accruing to the defense of sacred
truth from the use of the philosophical thought of the Angelic
Doctor.
The movement already initiated among Catholic philosophers, Pope Leo thus crowned and assured its success. From
its author and from its content the Aeterni Patris sponsored
the restoration of Thomistic philosophy for an apologetic end.
It is consequently not surprising that the philosophical texts
written both immediately before and subsequent to the letter
should reflect this defensive emphasis. Even in philosophical
matters, the proponents of Thomism were quite frankly on the
defensive. With desperate relief those who sought to serve the
cause of Christian truth rediscovered in St. Thomas a scientific
method and solid principles with which to defend the faith
against the confusion so rampant that it cast doubt even upon
man's ability to attain truth at all. One of the results of this
motivation was the occasional incorporation of foreign elements

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of thought that see:rp. to agree in some way with St. Thomas.
In this way a common ground could be sought with the adversaries of Christian philosophy. To point to such agreements
was a kind of apologetic, because to men's minds the modem
systems were philosophy. To show that some of the elements
of these systems were in agreement with Thomism, was a form
of argument for the latter's philosophical character.
2. Intellectual Condition of the Agents of Restoration

The rediscovery of St. Thomas was made by men trained
in ways of philosophy far removed from his thought. Matthew
Liberatore, S. J., for example, mentions that some told him he
was insane when he set out to present the philosophical
doctrine of St. Thomas.us Cajetan Sanseverino, S. J., was himself a convert from Cartesianism. 149 It is not surprising that in
the monumental task facing the restorers of Thomism, they
should have incorporated, perhaps even unconsciously, elements foreign to the doctrine they sought to reestablish.
The outstanding instance of such an alien influence is the
since frequently decried, universal adoption of Christian Wolff's
division of philosophy. Because this division forms the framework in which the nineteenth-century authors presented St.
Thomas' philosophical thought, it inscribes a distinctive mark
upon the character of the restoration. A scrutiny of this division in the philosophical context from which it springs is vital
to. an evaluation of the immediate antecedents of contemporary
Thomists.
ChriStian Wolff's Notion of Philosophy

The discomfort of many of the nineteenth-century authors
over the equivalence of " metaphysics " and " philosophy,"
and over the division into general metaphysics (ontology) and
special metaphysics concerning the world (cosmology), the
human soul (psychology) and God (natural theology) is evi"" Cf. Liberatore, M., S. J., lnatitutionu
auctoris, v.
148 Cf. Geny, Honsp. Hiat. Phil. 855.

Philoaopkicae (Prati: 1881), praef.

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dent. This is not surprising, for a methodology springs from
the soul of a philosophy and the methodology of Christian
Wolff (1679-1754) springs from a philosophy completely alien
to that of St. Thomas. This author of students' manuals, a
mathematics teacher turned philosopher, represents in his work
the Baconian mentality that seeks systematization, with a view
to mathematics as the prototype of all demonstrative science,
to its method as the desideratum of philosophy as well.150
. Dividing human knowledge into historical, philosophical and
mathematical, Wolff defines philosophy as " the science of possibles insofar as they can be." 151 Its function is to give an
intelligible explanation of historical knowledge, of those things,
namely, that are or happen in the material and immaterial
order. 152 Thus philosophy does not rest in mere facts, but seeks
to justify why they are facts by explaining their possibility. 153
Yet it restricts itself to facts, admitting as " possible " those
things which are evident by the experience of historical knowledge.154 For Wolff, then, philosophy means scientific demonstration, transphenomenal knowledge, of a body of truths
already empirically given.
Philosophy should be divided according to the kinds of being
known, the data of historical knowledge, namely, bodies, the
human soul, God. 155 To philosophize is to render an account
of what is previously, but confusedly known about
these things. 156 Another part, however, is necessary to phi150 Logicae
theoriam quam dedi praxi Geometrarum rigorem demonstrandi
servantium consentaneam deprehendi. . . . Wolff, Christianus, Philosophia Rationalis
sive Logica (Leipzig: 1740), Praef. b. 8. cf., Theologia Naturalis Pars Prior
(Frankfurt, Leipzig: 1789), § 6, 6-7.
151 Philosophia
est scientia possibilium, quatenus esse possunt. Logica, Discursus praeliminarius, s. 29.
152 Cf. ibid., § 8, I; s. 4, 2.
153 cr. ibid., § 6, 8; s. 7.
"'' Cf. ibid., § 10, 4. Wolff gives an example in the reason for a philosophy of
law. Laws are taught in jurisprudence; there are reasons why these rather than
other laws are passed in a nation. There is therefore a science of these reasons,
the philosophy of law. cr. ibid., s. 89.
165 Cf. ibid., § 55; s. 56.
156 Cf. ibid.

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losophy as a preliminary. Ontology, the science of being, deals
with general notions common to all beings, applied but not
explained in the other sciences. Thus, without ontology, philosophy could not proceed in strict demonstrative fashion. 157
The remarks of Wolff about ontology are revealing. As the
science of being as being, it is called ontology; as presenting
first principles and notions used in reasoning, it is called first
philosophy. It achieves for" natural" ontology, what artificial
logic achieves for " natural" logic, namely, makes clear and
distinct notions already confusedly possessed.158 His own protest that ontology is not a lexicon of philosophical terms is the
most telling commentary on his conception. He seeks to
counter the charge by the claim that ontology demonstrates,
and does not merely list the notions common to all things. 159
Metaphysics is the name that embraces all four parts of
philosophy; it is the science of being, the world, the human
soul and God.160 This order is necessary because the subsequent
parts depend upon the prior for the notions employed. 161

Wolff's Natural Theology
The existence of natural theology is demanded because God
is among the pre-philosophic data whose possibility must be
explained. The explanation consists in demonstrating those
things which according to Sacred Scripture are rightly taught
by reason concerning God/ 62 By demonstrating God's existence and attributes, the possibility of things known about God
and His action on the world is established. 163
Especially noteworthy in the treatment of God's existence
by Wolff is his long discourse on the necessity of a nominal
definition of God. The intention to demonstrate God's existence includes the preestablishment of what is to be pointed out
Cf. ibid., § 78, 84.
Cf. Ontologia, methodo scientifico pertractata qua omnia cognitionis humanae
principia continentur. (Frankfurt, Leipzig: 1780) Prolegomena, s .. 28, 12.
189 Cf. Theologia Nat., § 2, 8.
108 Cf. ibid., § 25.
188 Cf. Logica, loc. cit., § 57.
18 °Cf. Logica, loc. cit., § 79, 86.
181 Cf. ibid., § 99.
167
108

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by the word God, even if it be unknown whether the being
signified by this name is possible. 164 The basic requirement for
the nominal definition is that it suit the demonstration to be
fashioned. According to the canons of deductive procedure,
three rules must be observed. The nominal definition, since it
must be retained as the medium from which all divine attributes are deduced, must embrace these. Nor can it include
anything extraneous, any attribute not intended to be deduced.
Finally, it must be one, to avoid either a plurality of natural
theologies, or a multiplication of labor, deriving the same attributes from a diversity of nominal definitions. 165
Wolff's actual demonstrations, a posteriori and a priori, of
the existence of God, are not relevant here. 166
From this summary it is apparent that the operative key
word in Wolff's thought is demonstrate. He conceives of philosophy as a process through which he can write his Q.E.D.
concerning truths already given. Like mathematics, philosophy (or metaphysics, as he would have it) needs a body of primary notions and theorems, applicable to particular problems;
whence his ontology. The world, man's soul, God are the data
to be justified; whence the division of special metaphysics.
To establish deductively and to proceed rigidly in the consideration of God, a nominal definition, carefully tailored, is a
prerequisite and a governing influence.
In such a system, the division of philosophy in vogue among
nineteenth-century Thomists has its roots and meaning. The
strain of fitting St. Thomas' thought into this aprioristic framework will be reviewed later. The character of the restoration of
Thomism as an influence upon the contemporary scene cannot
be judged without an awareness of its own discomfort in its
Wolffian trappings.
3. Intrinsic Character of the Restoration
Even before the effective impetus of the Aeterni Patris, the
Cf. Theologia Nat., loc. cit., § 5.
Cf. ibid.; § 7; § 10.
166 Cf. ibid., c. I, s. 69, 55.

16 •

166

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Thomistic restoration had begun. By an examination of the
works of its more prominent protagonists both before and
after the encyclical, its intrinsic character is clarified, for they
are its spokesmen. Their work has received the crown of
success. While recognizing it as the presentation substantially
of the thought of St. Thomas, the extrinsic modifications must
also be recognized. This is not a detraction from their work,
but an aware approach to it. The relevant aspects of this
restoration are the place of God in metaphysics, and the
question of His existence.

The Place of God in .J."/111etaphysics
Little difficulty is encountered in discerning the lines of a
general pattern among the Thomistic authors of the nineteenth
century; they are the lines of the Wolffian division of philosophy o:r " metaphysics," generally adoped and acknowledged.167 With Wolff's conception of metaphysics as coextensive with philosophy, both being synonymous with any" metempirical" knowledge of reality, metaphysics perishes as the
science of things insofar as they are beings; rather it becomes
the science of beings: bodies, the human soul, God-insofar
as they are things considered nonexperimentally. Acceptance
167 The authors sufficient for an indication of the nineteenth-century
procedure,
and significant for their prominence are these:
Liberatore, M., S. J., op. cit.
Sanseverino C., S. J., Philosophia Christiana cum antiqua et nova compara fa
(Naples: 1862); Elementa Philosophiae Christianae (Naples: 1864); Philosophia
Christiana ... in C01npendium Redacta (Naples: 1873).
Zigliara, T., 0. P., Summa Philosophica in usum Scholarum (Rome: 1876). The
edition to be cited in this survey is ed. 13 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1902) I-II.
Schiffiini, S., S. J., Principia Philosophiae (Turin: 1886); Disputationes Metaphysicae Specialis (Turin: 1888) I, II.
De Maria, Michael, S. J., Philosophia Peripatetica Scholastica . . . (Rome: 1892).
The edition here to be cited is ed. 4 (Rome: 1913).
Remer, V., S. J., Summa Philosophia Scholasticae (Rome: 1893). The edition
here to be cited, ed. 5 (Rome: 1925) .
Lorenzelli, B., Philosophiae Theoreticae Institutionu secundum Doctrinam .4ristotelis et S. Th01na8 Aquinatis (Rome: 1890). The edition here cited, ed. 2
(Rome: 1896) .
Mercier, D. J., Metaphysique Generate ou Ontologie, ed. 7 (Louvain: 1928).

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of Wolff's division of philosophy has led inexorably into an
acceptance of the mentality from which it springs.
The trap appears most readily with regard to the philosophy
of nature. Zigliara, for instance, holds no brief for Wolff's
system; 168 he presents quite literally St. Thomas' doctrine on
the specification of the speculative sciences; 169 yet, using
Wolff's division, he assents to the notion of metaphysics
because it considers the corporeal world metaphysically, not
Liberatore makes a similar statement, since
cosmology is an incorporeal consideration of bodies. 171 Remer
explicitly recognizes such a practice as contrary to St. Thomas,
but accepts contemporary usage. 172 Lorenzelli finally rejects
the practice, removing all of natural philosophy except the
consideration of the rational soul from metaphysics. 173
The need for rationalizing the place of cosmology is inherent
in the notion of metaphysics proposed as the science of being,
immaterial both abstractly and positively, with the former
consideration belonging to general, the latter to special metaphysics in its three parts. 114 If there is any science of being
as being, it is ontology or general metaphysics, first of the
sciences of the real to be presented. But the description of
ontology likewise reflects Wolff's" guidebook" conception of it.
Liberatore credits Wolff and Bacon with the notion that
ontology embraces the common notes and attributes of being. 175
It could be called the "logic of reality," insofar as it, introduces
the mind to the philosophical sphere by explaining notions and
principles common to all the sciences. 176 Sanseverino speaks in
Cf. Zigliara, op. cit., Logica, I, lib. III, c. v., a. 2, n. iv, I, 175-177.
Cf. ibid., Log. II, lib. III, c. II, aa. 1-2, I, 296-302.
17 ° Cf. ibid., Cosmo!. Pro!., II, 8.
171 C:f. Liberatore, op. cit., I, 247.
172 Cf. Remer, op. cit., I, 7.
173 Cf. Lorenzelli, op. cit., II, 144.
174 Cf. Liberatore, op. cit., I, 245-246; Zigliara, op. cit., Cosmo!., Pro!. II, 7;
Schiffini, Disp. Met. treats of special metaphysics as distinguished from general in
Prine. Phil ; De Maria, op. cit., I, 291; Remer, op. cit., I, 7; III, 2; IV, I; Lorenzelli,
op. cit., I, 5. In all these authors, the phrase "ens inmateriale sive abstractive sive
positive," or its equivalent, occurs.
175 Cf. Liberatore, op. cit., I, 247.
176 Cf. ibid., 248.
168
169

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a similar vein. 177 For Zigliara it is first to be learned among
the real sciences, because it establishes the nature or object of
the universal principles discussed in logic.178 De Maria cites
St. Thomas for an identical statement, seeming to mistake the
primacy of dignity attributed by St. Thomas to metaphysics
for a primacy in discipline and a real subalternation of the
other sciences to it. 179 Cardinal Mercier, while not subscribing
to the Wolffi.an notion of metaphysics, still maintains that
ontology must be first in order. 180
Such positions were not elaborated without an awareness
that they were inconsistent with St. Thomas' very words.
Remer places the usual division of philosophy, i. e., metaphysics,
together with its usual objects, alongside the Prooemium of the
Metaphysics and question five of the De Trinitate. St. Thomas'
words, he notes, clearly state that metaphysics is one science,
distinct from and posterior to natural philosophy, considering
being iu common as subject and the separated substances as
principles of the subject. But against this taere is the prevalence of the current usage, to which he bows.181 Lorenzelli is
again more pronounced in his departure. He notes the error
of placing ontology before natural philosophy. 152 He states
that metaphysics, concerned as it is with being, does consider
things that are immaterial, both in concept, such as being,
cause and the like, and in reality, such as man's soul,
the angels, God. 183 But relying upon the Prooemium of
St. Thomas, he states that while metaphysics considers being,
the most immaterial things, and first causes, it does not
consider all as primary object. This can only be being; other
things are considered as the causes of being, and are not the
object but the end of the
Metaphysics is thus to be
Cf. Sanseverino, Phil. Christian. in Compend. I, S.
Cf. Zigliara, op. cit., Ontol. Prol., II, 809.
179 Cf. De Maria, op. cit., I, SOl, cites I Post. Anal. lect. 1.
18 °Cf. Mercier, op. cit., 1.
181 Cf. Remer, op. cit., IV, S; I, !!.
182 Cf. Lorenzelli, op. cit., I, 187. The author deems the idea of Prima Philosophia
as an introductory science to have come from Descartes.
188 Cf. ibid., I, 5.
1.u Cf. ibid., I, 198.
177

178

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defined as the science of being taken most commonly insofar
as it is naturally knowable. 185 By way of explanation, he states
that it is being by participation that is naturally knowable;
sensible being perfectly so; separated being, imperfectly, but
positively so; being which is subsistent, solely by way of
negation. 186 Cardinal Mercier, finally, insisting upon the unity
of metaphysics, places definite strictures upon the admission of
a division into general and special, in the light of St. Thomas'
doctrine. The object of metaphysics is first substance. 181 As
for the division of metaphysics, he maintains that there can be
for the human intellect no science properly of the positively
immaterial as such. The division into general and special is
rather a disposition of material, according to which the general
doctrines of ontology are applied in special considerations of
immaterial things as humanly knowable. This is especially
true of the natural study of God, about whom, proceeding
through effects, we have knowledge in terms of truths of
ontology concerning substance as such/ 88 There is in sum but
one metaphysics, since its object is formally one. 189
God, in the mode of procedure generally followed, then
falls within the realm of special metaphysics as this treats of
positively immaterial being. While recalling the qualifications
placed by Lorenzelli and Cardinal Mercier, and the insistence
of all the authors that God is known solely through effects, it
is still true that the general attitude sees God as the subject of
natural theology, the science of God acquired by the natural
light of reason. A rather common remark is that it is thus
distinguished from sacred theology, the science of God through
revelation. Eager to put reason's best foot forward in con185 Cf. ibid. Igitur scientia maxime intellectualis definiri poterit:
Scientia de ente
communissime sumpto in quantum est naturaliter intelligibilis.
LBo Cf. ibid. nota I.
Ens naturaliter intelligible est omne id quod est ens per
participationem, perfecte quidem intelligibile est ens sensibile; imperfecte quidem
sed positive intelligibile est etiam ens immateriale. Ipsum autem esse subsistens in
quantum est causa aliorum et secundum ea quae necesse est ei convenire tanquam
aliorum causa, est naturaliter intelligibile per viam negationis. . ..
187 Cf. Mercier, op. cit., 12; 14.
188 Cf. ibid., 23.
189 Cf. ibid.

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sidering God, the authors generally assume the order and
doctrine of the appropriate sections of the Summa Theologiae
into their works. 190

The Question of God's Existence
With God indicated as the subject of a specific part of
special metaphysics, it is especially relative to His existence that
the procedm;e of the Summa Theologiae is reproduced in
detail. With God as the subject of natural theology, the initial
motivation, the first scientific question for the science is
obviously the challenge of establishing His existence. Obviously, too, the strictly rational procedure in executing this task
demands the designation of the meaning of the name God, the
nominal definition of God.
The nominal definition among the authors assumes a variety
of versions. Always, of course, its necessity is dictated by the
exigencies of the task of establishing the conclusion, by reason,
that God exists. In some cases the nominal definition of God
is equivalent to the concept "first mover," "first cause"
and the like, according to the arguments used to establish the
conclusion. 191 In other cases, some one nominal definition is
contrived, and this in a variety of ways. God is said to signify
an absolutely necessary being, perfect in all ways, distinct from
the world and efficient cause of it. Then a notion, such as first
mover, resulting from the arguments employed, is shown to be
equivalent to this nominal definition. 192 Or, as the apologetic
influence becomes explicit in the proposal that the name be
accepted " as all men understand it," it is stated that the
variety and frequent inadequacy of such acceptations are to be
overcome by decreeing that whatever signification be accepted,
it be proper to the true God. 193 Somewhat similarly, another
19 ° Cf. Liberatore, op. cit., II, 488; Sanseverino, op. cit., II, 258 ff.; Zigliara, op.
cit., Theologia, II, 418 ff.; Schiffini, Disp. Met. Sp., II, 7 ff.; De Maria, op. cit., III,
5 H.; Remer, op. cit., VI. 1 fl.: Lorenzelli. op. cit., II, 450 fl'.
101 Cf. Liberatore, op. cit., II, 445 ff.; Ziglia.ra, op. cit., Theologia, lib. I, c. ii, a. 8,
11, 448; Lorenzelli, op. cit., II, 451.
192 Cf. Sanseverino, Phil. Christ. in Comp., II, 258; 266.
198 Cf. Schiffini, Disp. Met. Sp., I, 10.

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nominal definition settled upon is that signification denied by
atheists and admitted by the whole human race in recognizing
some primary causal being.m
As to the actual demonstration of God's existence, the
quinque viae are universally adopted, at least in some form.
What is noticeable is that while being advanced as establishing
the conclusion desired, God exists, there is a qualification to be
made. The conclusion does stand, because of the predetermined
But the conclusion is to be interpreted as
nominal
solely establishing the existence of God, not as an affirmation
of His unity or of any of the fulness of His perfections. It is
Cajetan who is invoked for his explanation of the conclusion, so
that Kant's charge of a repetition of the error of the ontological
argument in all the " cosmological " arguments is refuted. 195
CONCLUSION

The apologetic motivation of the Thomistic restoration
and the intellectual background of its spokesmen are linked
in the character of Thomistic philosophy of this period.
The authors, seeking to reassert the philosophical teaching of
St. Thomas, accept as the truly rational, philosophic format for
their work, the Wolffian division. The result is an acceptance
of metaphysics as synonymous with philosophy, a result against
which, however, a growing murmur is heard. According to this
sense of metaphysics, a necessary modification results regarding
" being " as subject of metaphysics. Once the division is admitted, a subject proportionately divisible must also be advanced. The traditional formula " being in common " can only
mean being abstractively immaterial, the subject of ontology,
for the sciences within special metaphysics treat of being
positively immaterial. Ontology seems indeed devoted to a
pure abstraction, even as in Wolff's system it seems a kind of
afterthought. The realization of being pertain rather to special
metaphysics.
1 ..
186

Cf. Remer, op. cit., VI, 14.
Cf. Zigliara, loc. cit., 441-2.

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God's place, since He is presupposed as a positively immaterial being, is guaranteed in such a system. The thought cannot but suggest itself that there is a definite basis for amenability to Wolff's concept in the mineteenth-century mind. For
Wolff natural theology is a justification of data about God,
as He is known previously in factual, " historical " knowledge.
For the authors of the restoration, God, His existence, and
attributes are also " given " in the data of revelation concerning
the natural truths of religion. Natural theolo6'Y is a rational
exposition of these truths. The rational, philosophic apparatus
prominent in Wolff's system is the nominal definition of God
as the indispensable approach and the guarantee of deductive
consistency. The nominal definition is also significant in Thomistic authors, who assume as their task the rational vindication
of the conclusion God exists, and use as the effective means to
accomplish this the pertinent doctrines of the Summa Theologiae. Through the nominal definition, the arguments advanced are reduced to the conclusion desired, at least in the
sense admitted by Cajetan.
This much is evident from the Thomistic restoration's handling of the question of God's existence: it is a conclusion
explicitly to be proved as the first function of natural theology.
This is so because God is the subject of this science, and His
existence is not scientifically evident beforehand. That God is
the subject of natural theology, in turn, results from this, that
God is positively immaterial and as such is to be considered by
a special part of metaphysics. Contemporary attitudes can now
be evaluated in view of these preliminaries.
Section II. The Question of God's Existence in Contemporary
Thomistic ;.l[etaphysics
At the outset of this study, reference was made to the
divergent attitudes currently besetting the question of God's
existence in Thomistic metaphysics. In the light of the historical background, it is clear that the status of the question
invariably stems from the total context within any conception

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of metaphysics. The Thomistic restoration of the last century
is the heritage of contemporary Thomism. To some degree the
present situation results from varied reactions to that heritage.
Largely these are reactions of opposition, but it should not be
surprising in view of the history reviewed that the opposition
does not blend into a unanimously accepted resolution.
To catalogue exhaustively all contemporary positions would
be a vain effort. A selection must be made. The basis for this
selection, because of the great variety of presentations, should
be twofold. Some authors will be selected particularly because
of the extent of their influence in forming current Thomism.
Others will be selected, not because their influence has been
extensive, but by reason of the significance of the teachings
they propose. There will be a general classification of authors
into "manualists" and, with a rather arbitrary designation,
authors of " special studies." Because of the already illustrated bearing of context, each author will be presented in the
totality of his teaching regarding the place of God in metaphysics and the actual question of God's existence.
MANUALISTS

The authors of Thomistic manuals assume an importance
attendant upon the very use of their works as students' textbooks. The restoration of Thomism in the last century was
largely accomplished by such authors. While their works are
still in use, the present century has seen works appear which
gradually resolve points of dissatisfaction felt by some even of
the earlier authors. While the Cursus Philosophicus of Edward
Hugon, 0. P. is an early example of this trend, 196 the manuals
of Joseph Gredt, 0. S. B. and F.-X. Maquart are of wide
current influence.
106 Cf. Hugon, Ed., 0. P., Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus
(Paris: Lethielleux,
1935) I-III. First published in 1913. The author rejects Wolff's division, restoring
natural philosophy to its rightful place. Cf. I, 10-11. There is a consequent clarification of metaphysics' proper subject. For surviving confusions, however, cf. III,

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Joseph Gredt, 0. S. B.
A pronounced, yet not complete break with the nineteenthcentury procedure is found in the widely circulated manuals
of Father Gredt. 197 Wolff's division of philosophy is rejected,
for natural philosophy is not to be included in metaphysics, nor
is ontology a preliminary science. But the division of the nineteenth-century authors is accepted as being reducible to his
own. 198 Thus the author retains the division of metaphysics
into general and special with its parts. The basis for the
division is the subject of metaphysics, immaterial being as it
abstracts from created and uncreated. 199 Abstracts apparently
signifies includes, since in general metaphysics being in general
is treated, while created being and uncreated being divide
special metaphysics. 200 Since metaphysics per se looks to immaterial being, the consideration of any material accidents is
per accidens to the discussion of created being. 201 As in the
nineteenth-century manuals, God enters metaphysics as the
subject of a part of special metaphysics. 202
Since God is the subject of natural theology, and His existence is neither evident nor given, it is to be demonstrated at
the outset. 203 The points embraced by the pertinent consideration in the Summa Theologiae are included. St. Thomas' proof
for demonstrability, the key being that creatures are God's
effects, is, however, replaced by a simple statement that there
are indeed a posteriori proofs. 204 The first point in the question
'"'' Gredt, Jos., 0. S. B. Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae, ed. 10
(Friburg, Breslau, Barcelona: Herder, 1953) I-II. Reducible to Fr. Gredt's mode of
procedure are the following: Boyer, S. J., Cursus Philosophicus (Paris: Desclee,
1937) I-II; Grenier, H., Cursus Philosophicus (Quebec: 1937) I-II; Phillips, R. P.,
Modern Thomistic Philosophy (London: Burnes, Oates, 1939-1940) I-II.
198 Cf. Gredt, op. cit., Ii, n. 615, 2.
m Cf. ibid., 1.
•oo Cf. ibid.
201 Cf. ibid.
202 It is noteworthy that after the manner of Suarez and others, Fr. Gredt establishes the division of being into uncreated and created at the outset of special
metaphysics. Cf. ibid., II, n. 704, 104.
203 Cf. ibid., n. 789, 194.
•o• Cf. ibid., n. 784, 186-190; n. 789, 198.

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of God's existence is the nominal definition of God as
a se, and the meaning of this. 205 Again, as an immediate' introduction to the proofs, the nominal definition is emphasized as
meaning uncreated being, known as distinct from created being.
The proofs conclude to God's existence, then, by establishing
the reality of what the name " God " signifies in the concrete
expressions "first mover," etc. 206
The proofs themselves are the quinque viae, faithfully reproduced and Thomistically interpreted. A sixth argument, the
author's own, is added. 207 With the nominal definition functioning, the conclusion God exists is established. The nature
of God, even that there is only one being a se, however, is not
involved. The voice of Cajetan echoes in the relegation of such
points to subsequent questions. According to the six distinct
proofs offered, there are six sorts of first cause, identified with
being a se, the nominal definition of God. 208
F.-X. Maquart
Frequently voiced protests 209 and unfavorable comparison
with the teaching of St. Thomas culminate in the definitive
rejection of Wolffian incursions, as in Fr. Marquart's work. 210
The Wolffian division is totally rejected, in its inclusion of
natural philosophy in metaphysics, in the general and special
partition based upon a subject that means both a vague
Cf. ibid., n. 784, 187.
Cf. ibid., n. 789, 193.
207 Cf. ibid., n. 790,
208 Cf. ibid., n. 789, 193.
209 Early issue was taken by such writers as:
205

206

Geny, P., S. J., Questions d'enseignement de philosophic scolastique (Paris: 1913).
Ramirez, J., 0. P., " De Ipsa Philosophia in Universum secundum Doctrinam
5-35, (Wolff is
Aristotelico-Thomisticam" in La Ciencia Tomista, July-Dec.,
considered on 16 ff.); Jan.-Feb.,
Garrigou-Lagrange, R., 0. P., " Dans que) ordre proposer Ies sciences philosophiques" in Revue Thomiste, XXIX
18-34.
Sertillanges, A. D., 0. P., "La Science et
Sciences Speculatives d'apres S.
Thomas d'Aquin," Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques, X
210

Maquart, F.-X., Elementa Philosophiae (Paris: Blot, 1988) I-ll.

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THOMAS C. o'BRIEN

"being" and detennined beings. 211 Positively, the author's
own view sees metaphysics embracing being in common, as its
subject, and God as the extrinsic cause of this subject. 212
The subject, being in common, is explained as real being,
common as abstracted in the order connatural to man, the
order of sensible reality. 213 This subject is not the prescientific
being that is man's primum cognitum, nor being as attained by
a mere total abstraction. The fonner is non-scientific, the latter
simply a universal, a prerequisite to all science, but not sufficiently distinctive to constitute the supreme speculative
science.214 Being in common means being as attained by the
supreme degree of fonnal, scientific
perceived with
difficulty as the ultimate aspect of' reality. The author emphasizes St. Thomas' inclusion of esse in this subject of metaphysics as the most fonnal aspect of reality. 215
In the course of the investigation of this proper subject, God
comes within the purview of the metaphysician. Gone is the
constitution of natural theology as a distinct science dealing
with God. Now it is an integral part of metaphysics, concerned
with the first cause of being in common. 216 God is considered
solely as the cause of being; there can be no properly philosophical science with God as its subject, for the knowledge
required about the subject of science is unattainable regarding
God. 217 What is formally involved in natural theology is not
the investigation of God in tenns of being, but the investigation
of being in tenns of its cause, God. 218
Dedication to this view characterizes the presentation of
011 Cf. ibid., Pars I, Introductio ad Metaphysicam, III, 8-9. These points are
made in opposition to the Snarezian author, P. Descoqs, S. J., Cf. Descoqs, P.,
S. J. lnstitutionea Metaphysicae Generalis (Paris: Beauchesne, 19i.5) I, 17.
"'" Cf. ibid., 9.
013 Cf. ibid., Tract. 1, q. 1, prooem., 7.
"" Cf. ibid., 7-9. Fr. Maquart regards Suarez as designating being attained by
total abstraction as metaphysics' subject.
01 " Cf. ibid., 10-11.
018 Cf. ibid., Tract. II, Introd., !!48.
mer. ibid.
018 Cf. ibid., . . . haec autem consideratio est quidem materialiter consideratio
Dei, formaliter vero creaturarum.

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God's existence. The need and possibility of the demonstration
are not treated positively as in the Summa Theologiae, but as
refutations of varied forms of ontologism and agnosticism. 219
The nominal definition of God is not predetermined as a vehicle
of approach to the demonstration of God's existence. Rather
the quinque viae are immediately presented and studiously
explained, with emphasis on their procedure as distinct resolutions of effects to their proper causes. 220 As indicative of an
appreciation for this point, Cajetan's remarks are quoted and
explained. 221
Upon the completion of the proofs the nominal definition of
God is introduced, in connection with the question, not of
God's unity, but of the univocity of the five proper causes
attained, in the name" God." 222 Although the point does touch
on God's nature, it is raised lest there remain unresolved the
query: does God exist? That is, does some being greater than
the beings of this world, as all who acknowledge the name God
agree, exist? 223 More precisely, in distinction to the beings
of this world, the name God is to be taken for a being in whom
essence and existence are identical. Maquart resolves the
question by showing that the causes affirmed in the five conclusions agree univocally in the name God as it signifies a being
in whom essence and existence are identical. 224 The conclusion
to this entire procedure is that, essence and existence being
identical, the five proper causes attained are analogical causes,
and that the name God in its given signification belongs univocally to them. Thus do the quinque viae conclude to the truth:
219
22

Cf. ibid.,

° Cf. ibid., !291. Again, the chief opposition of Fr. Maquart is to P. Descoqs'

Praelectiones Theologiae Naturalis (Paris:
1935) I-II.
221 Cf. ibid.
222 Cf. ibid., 328-9.
Ex quinque viis S. Thomae supra expositis ad has conclusiones pervenimus. . . . Utrum autem mereatur idem nomen Dei, illud ens ad quod
pervenit unaquaeque via, an designet, non dico quinque entia vel unum ens,-hoc
infra dicetur . . .-sed quinque entia naturam specifice diversam vel eamdem
habentia, ita ut hoc nomen Deus eis conveniat aequivoce vel univoce.
223 Cf. ibid.
••• Cf. ibid., 330. Has causas univoce nomen Dei mereri, quippe quae habent
essentiam cum esse identificatam.

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God exists. They do not yet, however, affirm that the one God
exists, but that there is a univocal meaning to the statement,
God exists, no matter which of the causes reached is transferred
into the statement via the nominal definition. The truth that
one God exists, is brought out by the demonstration of God's
unicity. 225
AUTHORS OF SPECIAL STUDIES

From the vitality of contemporary Thomism, there flows an
unending stream of literature on philosophical matters; it is
widely characterized by an opposition to the procedure of the
"manualists." Under the general designation" special studies,"
a few writings concerning the question of God's existence in
metaphysics are here selected by reason of their significance.
First to be considered is Canon Fernand Van Steenberghen,
whose name immediately connotes the University of Louvain,
and whose work expresses a distinctive line of thought among
those authors who classify themselves as Thomists. 226
At the outset, let it be stated that for this eminent
author there is no distinct philosophical science dealing with
God as its subject. " For the philosopher God forms the object
of a conclusion to general metaphysics." 227 Indeed "the existence of God is the principal conclusion which this science
establishes." 228 Rejecting St. Thomas' thought on the specification of sciences, however, the Canon places ontology as the
fundamental philosophic discipline, not as the apex of speculative science. It is to be placed immediately after epistemology, a necessary preliminary, and to be followed by a twofold
special metaphysics, concerned respectively with man and the
material world. 229 Save then for restoring God to ontology,
the Canon retains Wolff's division.
••• Cf. ibid.,
••• Cf. Van Steenberghen, F., Ontology, tr. Rev. Martin Flynn

(New York:
Wagner, 1952), 5. Here the author proposes St. Thomas as guide.
•n Cf. ibid., 157-158; also the author's Epistemology, tr. Rev. Martin Flynn
(New York: Wagner, 1949),
••• Cf. Ontol., 14.
110 Cf. ibid., Introd., 16-17.

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Ontology's fundamental role rests on the basic character
of its subject, being as being. Contrary to some scholastics,
this is not to be understood as a vague abstraction, something
"above" the physical or sensible. 230 Nor does ontology's subject mean being materially taken (ens materialiter sumptum),
abstracting from actually exercised existence, denoting any
subject apt to exist. 231 The idea of being does not primitively
connote a subject-act, essence-existence duality. 232 Positively,
a general expression of being, the subject of ontology, is "the
concrete real, taken in all its richness." 233 Actually, it is the
primum cognitum; forced upon the mind in an analysis of the
data of consciousness, being is seen in epistemology as a first
undeniable datum. 234 By his characteristic mode of procedure,
reflection on the content of consciousness, the author determines the sense of the primum cognitum as the subject of
ontology, in terms of material and formal object. The
material object is any and all data _of experience, as facts,
complex, and unstable. 235 The formal object is the common
value hidden in every object of experience, synthesized, universalized, stabilized in the idea of being which represents this
common value. 236 Thus ontology is concerned with the reality
of the real, the existence of the actual existent, being as it is
being. 237
Metaphysics will undertake to study precisely this common value,
to find out what it implies in the real, and what value this synthetic
representation has. In other words, the formal object of metaphysics is the value of being, which is
in every object
of experience. 238

It is in the investigation of the implications of the common
value of being in the real that ontology is led to God, as the
ultimate ontological condition for the existence of things. This
is the reason for the integration of the consideration of God
into ontology as the latter's necessary complement.

••• cr. ibid., 1.5.

••• Cf. Ontol., 21.
••• Cf. ibid., 43-44.
••• Cf. ibid.
••• Cf. ibid., 28.
••• Cf. ibid., 42.
••• cr. ibid., 15.
••• cr. ibid., 22.
••• Cf. ibid., 19; Epistemology, ch. VI, 108 fi.

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The mind of Canon Van Steenberghen about ontology's attainment of God's existence is revealed in his presentation
both of the actual attainment and of the sense of the scientific
question involved in this attainment. Regarding the attainment itself, it seems justifiable to discern a distinction made by
him between the conclusion to an absolute reality, and to the
unique, infinite being who is God. The former is derived at
the outset of ontology from an analysis of the idea of being
resulting in an apprehension of its transcendence, then on
through the analysis of the experience of conditioned beings, to
the realization o£ the impossibility of total reality's being conditioned. This is the process initiative of the realization of an
absolute reality, at least in the sense that some element in the
sum total of reality must be unconditioned. The nature, unicity
or plurality, of the absolute are not at this point to be sought. 239
The initial realization is the apprehension of a fact; the
scientific explanation of the fact is the proof for the existence
of an infinite being, God. This e}rplanation consists in the
realization of the notion of finiteness in being, and of the order,
the relation of dependence, among the finite, viewed both
statically and dynamically. 240 This order is shown to be metaphysical, so that finite beings as such are totally relative and
the order of the finite, totally relative. 241 The necessary sequel
is the existence of an infinite being, thus expressed by the
author:
The metaphysical inference which reveals the existence of the
Infinite Being to us is very simple. An absolute reality forces itself
upon us; we cannot find this absolute reality in the order of finite
beings; consequently it must transcend the order of finite beings,
and is therefore non-finite or infinite. In this way we pass from
proper but confused knowledge of the unconditioned being to the
improper or analogical but distinct knowledge of the Infinite Being,
by means of the proper and distinct knowledge which we have of
the essentially relative finite being. 242
••• Cf. ibid., 40-41.
••• Cf. ibid.,
"" Cf. ibid., 140.
••• Cf. ibid., 141. The "logical schemata" of the process are on

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The author's remarks about this procedure express his attitude towards the sense o£ the scientific question o£ God's existence. The proof £or the existence o£ an infinite being is a
reevaluation o£ the data o£ experience in terms o£ being; the
infinite being is to be reached as a metaphysical implication o£
experience. 243 Only a metaphysical proof establishes the existence o£ God; only the proof he offers, or one reducible to it, is
metaphysical and as such success£ul.2 u The basis £or this claim
is the signification of the name " God," the establishment o£
whose reality is the philosophical problem o£ God:
The term " God " is, indeed, ordinarily taken to designate the
Creator of the universe, that is the first unique cause of everything
which exists. Any nominal definition which did not express this
point would be insufficient because it would not indicate the true
God, the first principle and last end of all things, especially of man.
Now in order to show the existence of the first unique cause, one
must go beyond the limits of the finite as such, we must show the
relativity of the finite as such, and that can only be done by a
critical metaphysical evaluation of its existence and activity. 245

What is implied regarding the meaning o£ the philosophical
question o£ God's existence is expatiated elsewhere by the
Canon, who resolves the following three questions: 1) Is there
a problem about the existence o£ God; fl) i£ so, in what terms
must it be framed; 3) by what method is there hope o£ a
solution. 246
1) That there is a philosophical problem in regard to God's
existence is clear £rom the difficulties o£ those who from
religious or personal conviction wish to affirm an absolute
being. The problem consists in the need to overcome such
difficulties by supplying a scientific reason for the certain
knowledge o£ God's existence. 247
Cf. ibid., 144.
Cf. ibid., 146.
••• Cf. ibid.
••• Cf. Van Steenberghen, "Le Probleme Philosophique de Dieu," Revue Philosophique de Louvain, XLV (1947),
141-168; 301-313. The questions
indicated are the burden of this article.
••• Cf. ibid., 6-8; 141.
243
2"

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2) The terms in which the problem is to be framed are
dictated by the nature of the problem itself. That which is
sought must have a definite meaning; thus a nominal definition
of God as unique, provident Creator of the universe, must be
accepted. The problem can then be advanced in terms of a
search for scientific certitude concerning the existence of God
so designated. 248
Such a formulation is demanded because the terms of a scientific problem must be scientifically determined. " Provident
Creator of the universe " is the signification of the term God
which alone satisfies the requirements of the present problem.
For the problem of God has three senses, as a human problem,
as a religious problem, as a scientific problem. " Unique,
provident Creator of the universe " is determined in such a
way that the shades of meaning involved in the uncritical
acceptance of the common understanding of the name God are
eliminated. 249
As scientifically determined, however, the nominal definition
encompasses what is involved in the human and religious sense
of the problem of God. In general it pertains to science as
organized human knowledge, to systematize and view critically
the data of ordinary knowledge. Thus the scientific problem
of God takes into account the question of God met on the level
of human aspirations and of religion, in order to situate the
question in some particular science, and to determine its exact
formulation and solution. 250 To be formulated properly, the
problem of God demands the nominal definition of God as
indicated. For this nominal definition envisions the human
overtones of the question of God as a transcendent being, the
explanation of human life, destiny and moral obligations. It
embraces religion's sense of a personal being, with attributes
determined according to Jewish, Christian or Mohammedan
tenets. Formulated in terms of the nominal definition given,
the scientific problem of God takes into account the human
••• Cf. ibid., 141.
••• Cf. ibid., 10.
••• Cf. ibid., 18-14.

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problem, the search for God's reality, and the religious problem,
in terms of reason's need to examine the fundamental presuppositions for religion, the need for an apologetic.m With
the nominal definition of God so determined as to express the
monotheistic connotations of the name God, then, the scientific
problem is thus to be formulated: To what extent can it be
known with certitude that a unique, provident Creator of the
universe exists? 252
3) The method to be employed in solving this problem has
already been indicated. Only his metaphysical argument can
cope with the problem as so formulated. The scientific problem
of God, then, is a metaphysical problem and demands a metaphysical solution. This point is made negatively by the rejection of all the other arguments advanced historically to prove
God's existence. The general condemnation lies in this, that
such proofs are either non-metaphysical, as are those from the
consent of mankind or from empirical grounds, or they are
mere approximations to the metaphysical argument. Consequently, none of the arguments thinkers have offered leads to a
certain knowledge of the one true God, provident Creator of
the universe. 253
In the light of Thomistic procedures already indicated, the
author's reduction of the quinque viae of the Summa Theo-,
logiae to mere approximations to the metaphysical argument
required is significant and that indeed seems to be the principal
occasion for the expression of his own views. The lack of
progress in natural theology is the result of an intellectual
servility to the letter of St. Thomas, to an uncritical repetition
of the quinque viae that sacrifices his spirit. 254 Actually the
quinque viae fall short because the one metaphysical argument, the quarta via, is intrinsically defective, and the other
arguments are cosmological and as such insufficient to establish
the existence of the provident Creator. 255
••• Cf. ibid., 10-11.
••• Cf. ibid., 149-150.
••• Cf. ibid., 16-17.
••• Cf. ibid., 5.
255 Cf. Ontology, 148-149. Since the critique of the quinque viae is identical with
that of the article previously cited, the Ontology will be used here, as available in

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In detail all the cosmological arguments need to be prolonged.
The prolongation of the prima via, if it is to establish the
unique first mover, requires the establishment of the changeableness of finite being as such; then the unique, infinite being
will be seen as alone unchangeable. 256 The secunda via fails by
not establishing the hierarchy of cause and effect so that the
dependence of finite being as such would be clear, and lead to
a unique first cause. 257 The tertia via is questionably formulated in the Summa; 258 in any case it only establishes the need
of one or more absolute beings, necessary of themselves. 259 The
quinta via, in using the example of the directed arrow which
lacks a determined nature, does not bring out the need of
natures that are determined still to be directed by an extrinsic
intelligence. What needs to be shown is that the finite as such
demands an intelligence, directive because of the finite's relative teleological orientation, and creative because the finite
is conditioned. Only then will the provident Creator be
attained. 260
The only metaphysical argument, the quarta via, is defectively formulated. The principle, " the more and the less are so
called with respect to a maximum," as the Canon phrases it, is
not universal. The more or less hot, in the example, is said with
reference to a thermometer, not to some most hot reality, "as
St. Thomas claimed on the basis of a physics which is today
English. These words of the article in the Rev. Louv., however, are significant
with reference to the 'J0ma via as reaching God: . . . deduction difficile, du reste,
lorsqu'on part de la conclusion logique de la prima via, car il s'agit de passer du ou
des principes de devenir a .Ia cause creatrice: pour le faire legitement il faut
etablir que tout etre fini est "mobile" au moins dans son activite, et que des lors
etre infini et unique cause creatrice de tons les etres finis. . . . Le Probleme Phil.
163-164; cf. also 310-311.
••• Cf. Ontol., ibid.
257 Cf. ibid., 149.
258 For a full examination
of the Canon's views on the tertia via, cf. "Reflexions
sur les Quinque Viae," Acta III Congressus Thomistici Internationalis (Rome:
1950). An analysis of this opinion is to be found in Connolly, T. K., 0. P. "The
Basis of the Third Proof for the existence of God," THE THOMIST, XVII (1954),
281-349.
259 Cf. Ontol., 150.
••• Cf. ibid., 152.

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outmoded." Even restricted to the absolutely simple perfections, the principle, while true, is not evident immediately
but only subsequent to the proof for the existence of the
"maximum reale." 261 The other principle, that the greatest.
in any order is the cause of all in that order, is true only in
precisely determined conditions. 262 The modification of the
proof as found in the De Potentia q. 3, a. 5, is approved by the
Canon, but in any event it coincides with his own valid metaphysical proof. 263
From the viewpoint of the elaboration of his theory, the
final remarks of the Canon anent his own proof should be
noted. He affirms that this proof, by reason of its premisses,
the totality of finite reality as relative, reaches a Creator, the
total cause of the order of finite being. 264 " To create " means
"to give existence to that which does not exist of itself." 265
Secondly, the proof reaches the unique, infinite being, possessing the other required attributes. God, thus understood in
terms of the determined nominal definition, does exist, and is
known with certainty.
From the works of Canon Van Steenberghen a distinctive
attitude is evident. The difficulties besetting the place of God
in metaphysics are solved in a manner which integrates natural
theology with the consideration of being and rejects the sense
of being attendant upon the consideration of natural theology
as a distinct science. The problems connected with the establishment of God's existence, especially the unity of the conclusion as reached through the quinque viae, are eliminated,
by the disposal of the quinque viae. The establishment of
God's existence is guaranteed by an argument that befits the
exigencies of a predetermined nominal definition of God, which
261 Cf. ibid., 151. In the original edition, the author thus states this principle:
" le pius et Ie minus se disent par rapport a un maximum." Ontologie (Louvain:

Hl52), 161.
262 Cf. ibid., 151-152; De Potentia q. 3, a. 5.
The Canon paraphrases the prima
ratio of this article, it seems, as he finds it identical with his own proof. Cf. ibid.
••• Cf. ibid.
••• Cf. "La Probleme Phil.," 808.
••• Cf. Ontol., 185.

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itself synthesizes the total meaning of the problem of God in
human knowledge. The metaphysical argument of the author
establishes definitely the existence of the one God, the unique,
provident Creator of the universe.
THE GILSONIAN

ScHOOL

For anyone familiar with current Thomistic literature,
especially in North America, designation of M. Etienne Gilson
as head of a school needs no explanation. To the lay mind he
is recognized as a kind of official spokesman of Thomism. 266
Among Catholic philosophers his influence is pervasive in its
distinctive mark, suggestive of the Pauline phrase he often
quotes: Non enim erubesco Evangelium. Difficulties have been
seen in conjunction with the desire of Catholic philosophers to
defend the natural truths concerning God, yet to do so in a
strictly rational framework. Such difficulties are evident in the
notion of natural theology as a distinct science, and especially in
the treatment of the existence of God relative to the variety of
nominal definitions and the unification of the quinque viae.
The thought of M. Gilson, denoted by the Pauline phrase
because of its frank appraisal of Christian philosophy, and
especially of Thomism, in its intimate connection with revelation, is therefore of the highest pertinence to the status of the
question of God's existence. Its significance is to be seen from
what can be called a general thesis evaluating Thomism in its
philosophic character, and from the application of this thesis
to the present question by M. Gilson himself and by others.
The Thesis of Gilson
The thesis of M. Gilson extends generally to all Christian
philosophy, and to his particular application to Thomism. 281
••• Cf. Time, Jan. 10, 1955, 81; Newsweek, Feb. 7, 1955, 80-81. The impression
that Gilson's point of view creates is indicated in the latter review's report of his
ideas: Thomism as a philosophy has as its initial premise the existence of God;
it builds a logically coherent system thereon, and even finds logical arguments in
support of the initial presupposition.
••• The occasion for a statement of these views was the dispute concerning
"Christian Philosophy." For a view of this dispute, cf. La Philosophie Ckretienne

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It is this: the assistance of revelation to the human intelligence has been responsible for the constitution of all scholastic
philosophies, Thomism included. Consequently, the most fruitful prosecution of scholastic philosophy, especially metaphysics,
will be assured by its restoration to its native environment.
As historian, the author establishes the antecedent. He first
of all defines Christian philosophy as that which, while keeping
distinct the two orders, considers nonetheless Christian revelation as the indispensable aid to reason. 268 The assistance given
reason consists both in the choice of objects or problems,
whereby the philosopher is directed to those matters which
influence his religious life; and in the very exercise of intellectual activity, in which the moral support indispensable to
philosophical success is bestowed. 269 History proves the contention of the author:
The research in medieval thought which began by being concerned
with the philosophies of the Middle Ages, is tending more and more
to restore these philosophies within the theologies which contain
them. 270

Since, however, res eodem modo conservantur quo creantur, the
inference is clear: to be restored to itself, any scholastic philosophy must return to theology. This is not to deny the formal
distinction of objects " so dear to the dialecticians"; but to
distinguish these objects is not to separate them in the order
of exercise.
The historian can safely state by whom scholastic philosophy will
be given a true life in the future: the scholastic philosophers will
always be the theologians. 271
(Paris: Ed. du Cerf), a resume of the meetings held Sept. 1933 at Juvisy. A
bibliography on the issue is found in Baudoux, N., 0. F. M., "Quaestio de Philosophia Christiana," Antonianum, XI (1936), 487-552. M. Gilson has voiced his
views in many of his works, to be noted in due course.
268 Cf. Gilson, Spirit of Medieval Philosophy
(New York: Scribner's 1940), 37;
cf. also 35.
••• Cf. ibid., 37-41.
••• Cf. Gilson, "Historical Research and the Future of Scholasticism," Modern
Schoolman, XXIX (1951), 4. This is the author's adaptation of his own address,
delivered at the International Scholastic Congress, Rome, Sept. 10, 1950. Cf. "Les
recherches historico-critiques de la Scolastique," Antonianum, XXVI (1951), 40-48.
Hl Cf. ibid., 9-10.

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In reference to the philosophical thought of St. Thomas, the
same thesis is discussed. 272 Under the chapter heading Le
Revelable the understanding and activity devoted to philosophical matters by St. Thomas are discussed. The term
" revealable " for M. Gilson signifies truths in themselves
accessible to unaided reason, but de facto revealed because of
man's de facto need. Since theology considers revealed truth,
it includes, not only what is properly revealed as surpassing
reason's power, but also the revealable, in the sense explained.
Theology treats of both sorts of revealed truth, all the while
retaining its proper unity, since in all cases its end remains the
same, the salvation of souls. 273 The author maintains that while
theoretically St. Thomas did not identify the revealable and
philosophy, in fact the saint's philosophical thought is primarily
found in his theological works. 214 As historian, then, M. Gilson
claims the right to expound the thought of the Angelic Doctor
along the lines of its original development, as the revealable. 215
But it is likewise apparent that the author as philosopher is convinced that the sole way to construct a philosophical exposition
ad mentem D. Thomae is to proceed from God to creatures, not
from creatures to God. The latter process would necessitate the
inversion and dislocation of texts, and would result rather in a
philosophical system ad mentem Cartesii.276
Obviously this general thesis has implications in the context
of the question of God in philosophy. Agreeing that for
Aristotle metaphysics deals with a definite type of actual
beings, 277 M. Gilson sees St. Thomas' concept of metaphysics
Cf. Gilson, Le Thomisme (5eme ed., Paris: Vrin, 1947).
Cf. ibid., 15-25.
270 Cf. ibid., 26.
275 Cf. ibid., 16; 37-39.
276 Cf. ibid.; also 26, note 3. ·So effective is the author's
influence on this point
that there is a widespread refusal to admit the philosophical commentaries of St.
Thomas as expressions of autonomous thought; they are often regarded as mere
historical arrangements of Aristotle's doctrine, to which the commentator does not
commit himself. Cf. Le Thomisme 15; History of Christian Philosophy in the
Middle Ages, (New York: 1955), 367. Cf. also, however, Chenu, 0. P., Introduction
a l'Etude deS. Thomas, ch. VI, 173-190.
277 Cf. Owens, J., C. SS. R., The Doctrine of Being in Aristotle's Metaphylics,
preface of Gilson, v ., vii.
272
273

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as profoundly changing this notion, because of the influence of
the word of God: "I am Who am." (Exod. 3: 14) 278
In raising our thoughts to the consideration of Him Who is,
Christianity revealed to Metaphysics the true nature of its proper
object. When with Aristotle a Christian defines Metaphysics as the
science of being as being, we may rest assured that he understands
it always as the science of Being as Being, id cuius actus est esse,
that is to say, God.27 9
Similarly, the author paraphrases the opening chapter of the
Summa contra Gentiles, therein seeing St. Thomas maintain
that the true object of metaphysics is not any truth, but first
truth. 280 While being in general is not set aside from the immediate attention of the metaphysician, it is not his true end.
When St. Thomas speaks autonomously, he leaves aside the
metaphysics of being in general, and defines the science in
terms of the supreme object, the supreme principle of being,
which is God. 281
The core and the genius of St. Thomas' metaphysical thought
lie in his penetration of the revelation of God as He Who is. 282
The Angelic Doctor hails this revelation as hanc sublimam
veritatem. 283 Through it, says M. Gilson, he raises metaphysics
from the level of a logic of essences to the contemplation of the
existential truth which has two facets: God is His own existence; of nothing else is this verified. In recognizing God as
ipsum esse St. Thomas surpassed his predecessors, perceiving
esse as the ultimate reality of all. The being of his metaphysics
never loses sight of this existential note. 284
In his exposition of St. Thomas' metaphysical thought along
the lines of the revealable as already explained, the author first
••• Cf. Gilson, Sp. of Med. Phil., 51.
••• Cf. Gilson, ibid., 80.
28 ° Cf. Le Thomisme, !t7-!t8.
281 Cf. ibid.
••• This theme is the underlying motive of such works of the author as: The
Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York: Scribner's, 1937); Being and Some
Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Inst. of Medieval Studies, 1949).
••• Cf. I Cont. Gent., c. 22.
••• Cf. Le Thomisme, 185-189.

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considers God's existence. The approach to the question consists in an elaboration of the existential sense of being, which
leads to the very position of the need of a cause of finite
existence. 28 G The key to the whole question in the Summa
Theologiae is seen as the sed contra, " I am Who am," of article
three. The first two articles are viewed as an existentialist
metaphysician's confrontation of "essentialist" attitudes. 288
For St. Thomas the process to God is not from essence to existence, but a posteriori from concrete existents to the conclusion
of God's existence. 287
Influence of Gilson's Thesis
M. Gilson's thesis has been taken up by others, who seek to
apply it to the formulation of a true Thomistic metaphysics.
Prominent among these is his protege, Joseph Owens, C.SS.R. 288
A general outline of Fr. Owens' view of metaphysics and God
is thus stated:
If the present day developments in interpreting the metaphysical

doctrines of Aquinas from the viewpoint of existential act are to
achieve success, they would seem to prohibit any science of being
in general which is not thereby the science of the real principle of
being, God. The act of existing is attained by the human intellect
not through conceptualization but through judgment, and immediately in finite things only. In these things the existential act lacks
the character of necessity that is required for any scientific treatment. How can such an act be scientifically grasped except in
reference to the Being whose essence is to exist, in whom the act of
existing is absolutely necessary? 289
The author proceeds to explain that for St. Thomas the
corporeal world, the proper area of man's knowledge, considered
as to its essences, is the subject of natural philosophy; considered as to existential act, the subject of metaphysics. Since
••• Cf. ibid., ch. I, "Existence et Realite."
••• Cf. ibid., 71-85.
, •• Cf. ibid., 85-87.
288 Cf. Owens, op. cit . ... preface of Gilson.
••• Cf. Owens, J., C. SS. R., "Theodicy, Natural Theology and Metaphysics,"
Modern Schoolman, XXVIII (1951), 186-187.

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God is the principle, efficient and final, of being, He must be
treated in this science of ens commune. There is thus no
possibility of distinguishing general metaphysics, from philosophical theology. 290
Confronting a particular philosophical problem, Fr. Owens
elaborates upon his conception of being as metaphysics' subject.291 Being means the act of existing, esse, a complete nature
in God alone; everything else is something other than its
esse.292 The Thomistic acceptance of the subject of metaphysics, being as being, means that this subject contains no
other ratio than that of being. It is common being, extending
to God and to creatures. God is its principle. How is being,
thus understood, the subject of science? It is nowhere grasped
as a nature, because in sensible existents it is other than the
nature; in God it is a nature, but is not attainable as such
by man. Positively, being is grasped by an act of judgment
concerning the concrete individual. Then it receives conceptual
expression in the common ratio "being." This common quidditative concept is not severed from the basis of real and
actually exercised existence, but is proportioned to the existent
thing which is grasped as individual by the senses. As such,
the ratio of being is the basis for metaphysical conclusions, as
in the quinque viae. 293
Metaphysics' process of investigation in accord with this
subject should thus manifest these general lines: begin with
being as immediately grasped by judgment as the act of
sensible things; continue by isolating that act, thus showing
it to come from extrinsic causes; ascend to God, ipsum esse;
••• Cf. ibid.
291 Cf.
Owens. ''Note on the Approach to Thomistic Metaphysics," New
Scholasticism, XXVIII (I954), 454-467. The occasion of. this article is the
question: whether the establishment of the subject of metaphysics depends upon
natural philosophy as a necessary preliminary. The question is raised by the paper
of Dr. Vincent E. Smith, " The Prime Mover: Physical or Metaphysical Consideration," Proceedings of The American Catholic Philosophical Association,
XXVIII (I954), 78-94.
••• Cf. ibid. The author cites I Cont. Gent., c. !l2; II Sent., d. I, q. I, a. 1.
••• Cf. ibid., 458 ff.

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terminate by perfecting its process in the light of God as
principle. 294
Fr. Owens thus indicates the familiar formulae regarding
metaphysics' nature, in terms of M. Gilson's doctrine, and
suggests the mode of adaptation of the doctrine to a process
of metaphysics ad mentem D. Thomae.
The Natural Theology of Gerard Smith, S. J. is an example
in a systematic presentation of the influence of M. Gilson's
thesis. 295 Natural theology is to be understood as integral with
metaphysics; it is the consideration of God as first cause of
being. 296 Approaching the question of God's existence in terms
of the need for its being demonstrated, the author reflects M.
Gilson's influence by viewing the various positions upon the
matter through the classification " essentialist " and " existentialist" already seen. Attention is called to the revelation of
creation as the key to the existential thought of Christian
philosophers. 297 St. Thomas' own emphasis on the existential
sense of being is pointed out relative to the criticism of St.
Augustine's proof from truth in the human mind. 298 There is
constant insistence, in contrasting existentialist and essentialist
attitude, upon metaphysics' concern not solely with essence,
but above all with existence. 299
Noteworthy concerning the Gilsonian thesis, then, is the
integration of the consideration of God within the one met!lphysics. The existential character of being in Thomistic
thought, indeed, depends upon this. The revelation of the
God Who is ipsum esse is the boon conferred upon Thomism,
and is so distinctive that M. Gilson recognizes as truly
Thomistic a metaphysics which follows the presentation of the
"revealable" in St. Thomas' theology. The existentialist emphasis makes for a sharp contrast, by its roots in the sensible
existent, with the being of metaphysics as presented by the
••• Cf. ibid., 466.
295 Cf. Smith, Gerard, S. J., Natural
Theology (New York:
vii-197.
••• Cf. ibid.,
••• Cf. ibid., 17.
297 Cf. ibid., Sl.
••• Cf. ibid., 65.

Macmillan, 1951),

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manuals of the nineteenth century, their precursors and their
imitators.

Application of the Gilsonian Thesis to the Question
of God's Existence
The application of M. Gilson's thesis to the actual development of the question of God's existence amounts in general
to this: St. Thomas and the truly Thomistic philosopher, because of the indicated influence of revelation, see the quinque
viae as concluding immediately to God as ipsum esse, the" I am
Who am " of Exodus, the God Who in the beginning created
heaven and earth and all things. according to Genesis 1 :1. 300
This application is seen verified in M. Gilson's own works, and
in those of Frs. Owens and Smith.
M. Gilson, considering the privileged conspectus given the
Christian philosopher, surpassing Aristotle's understanding of
the universe, thus states the transcendent commitment of the
beneficiary of revelation:
Whoever undertakes to prove the existence of God per ea quae
facta sunt undertakes in advance to prove His existence as Creator
of th.e universe; in other words he is committed to the view that the
efficient cause to which the world testifies can be none other than
a creative cause, and thus also that the idea of creation is necessarily implied in every demonstration of the existence of the
Christian God. 301

The point is applied to the quinque viae of St. Thomas.
Surveying the general outlines of these proofs, the author shows
that beginning with distinct starting points, the process proper
to each renders the existence of the starting point intelligible
through the application of the principle of causality. 802 It is
in terms, not of the numerical aspect, but of the proper cause
necessary that the possibility of the infinite series of causes
is rejected in favor of the necessity of a cause to which all
others are secondary. 303
••• Cf. Gilson, Sp. of Med. Phil., 64-68.

••, cr. ibid., 7!!-78.

••• Cf. Le Thomisme, 118-115.
••• Cf. ibid., 114. The author refers to Summa Theol., I, q. 104, a. I; 11 Cont.
Gent., c. !U.

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The distinct starting points and processes notwithstanding,
however, the quinque viae all conclude immediately to Him
Who is. The point is made by raising the question in regard
to St. Thomas' first mover as it surpasses Aristotle's in signifying not merely a cause moving by being desired, but by being
the efficient cause of movement. 304 The same sort of question
is posed regarding the other proofs. 805 The general response
considers St. Thomas to have transported the proofs to the
plain of a creative, efficient causality by reason of his deeper
insight into being. 306 The author's verification is carried out
with respect to the prima via. That the relationship of effect.
to cause linking up nature with God rests upon the level of
existence, esse, is supported by the author with texts of St.
Thomas about God's universal causality. 307 Basing himself
upon another text, the author states concerning the prima via
together with the secunda:
The first efficient cause cannot cause the existence of effects which
other causes produce unless it causes first of all the existence of
these causes. The first unmoved mover cannot cause the existence
of the effects of the movement of the heavens unless it first causes
the existence of that movement. 308
Cf. ibid., 99.
Cf. ibid., 101; 105; 111; 1111. Regarding the author's analysis of the proofs,
the following are to be noted:
The secunda via is explained not in terms of the order of efficient causes as
such, but in terms of the existence of the causes and their effects, i. e., the principle
of causality in the porof is understood solely in the entitative order, not in the order
of causes as such (cf. 99). Thus the conclusion is to the first cause, not of
causality as such, but of existence.
The tertia via is explained according to a text which, while found in the
Leonine edition, is admittedly not the preferred reading, and which raises serious
difficulties in interpreting the proof. The text accepted by the author is: Impossible est autem omnia quae sunt talia semper esse. The preferred reading:
Impossible est autem omnia quae sunt, talia esse. The Leonine itself notes that
the good codices omit the word semper. Cf. Connolly, "The Basis for the Third
Proof," cf. also Summa Theologica, Ed. Ia Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos (Madrid:
1947) Muniz, F., 0. P., "lntroduccion a Ia Cuestion II," 126-127.
808 Cf. Le Thomisme, 116.
101 Cf. Sp. of
Phil., 78-77. The author refers to Compendium Theol., c. 68.
808 Cf. Le Thomisme, 119. The author refers to II Cont. Gent., c. 6: Ostensum
est enim supra per demonstrationem Aristotelis, esse aliquam primam causam
80 '

305

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From the same text, the author more fully interprets the
prima via:
It is obvious that if God creates things solely because He moves the
causes which produced these things by their movement, God must
be a mover as Creator of movement. In other words, if the proof
by the first mover suffices to prove creation, then this proof must
of necessity imply the idea of creation. Now the idea of creation is
wanting in Aristotle, and so the Thomist proof of the existence of
God, even if it merely literally reproduces an argumentation of
Aristotle's, has a meaning altogether of its own, a meaning that
the Greek philosopher never intended to give it.
Even if we admit that the first mover is the first of the motive
causes which move by transitive causality, the very being of the
movement would still escape his causality. But the case is very
different in a Christian philosophy, and that is why St. Thomas
when he would demonstrate creation, needs only to recall the conclusion of his proof of God by movement. 309

Summing up his opinion as to the conclusion of all the viae,
M. Gilson states:
It is necessary to admit that the Thomist proofs for the existence
of God are developed upon the existential plane, as the demonstrations that there exists a first cause of the existence of movements
. . . a first existential cause of all causes and their efficiency; a
necessary existent, cause of the actualization or all possibles; a
first term in the orders of being, truth, goodness, cause of all in
that order; a final end, whose existence is the reason for all, the
reason for anything at all existing. 310

The heart of all the proofs is summed up in the argument
for the subsistent esse in the De Ente et Essentia. 811 What this
proofreaches, so do the quinque viae:
efficientem quam Deum dicimus. Efficiens autem causa suos efl'ectus ad esse
conducit. Deus igitur aliis causa essendi existit. Item ostensum est in primo libro
per rationem eiusdem, esse aliquod primum movens immobile, quod Deum dicimus.
Primum autem movens in quolibet ordine motuum est causa motuum qui sunt
illius ordinis. Cum igitur multa ex motibus coeli producantur in esse, in quorum
ordine Deum esse primum movens ostensum est, oportet quod Deus sit multis rebus
causa essendi.
••• Cf. Sp. of Med. Phil., 76. The author refers to the same text of the Cont.

Gent.
81 ° Cf. Le Thomisme, 119.
111 Cf. ibid., 120. He refers to the De Ente et Essentia, ch. v, n. 4.

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God is existence pure and simple, without any addition, distinct
from all other existents in virtue of this very purity .... Such is
the God which the proofs of St. Thomas, by five different ways,
envision and finally reach. 312

The interpretation of M. Gilson is followed by Fr. Owens
in a detailed examination of the conclusion of the prima via. 313
The entire quinque viae are not diverse proofs but five expressions of the one proof, each isolating existential act in sensible
things and proceeding to its source, subsistent esse.814 The
prima via in this sense is more manifest and efficacious, for the
last three viae are difficult, while the second, although more
apparently proceeding from esse and its cause, is actually less
manifest, since substantial change is less evident than change
in general, the starting point of the prima via. 315 After an
exposition of St. Thomas' surpassing of Aristotle/ 16 the author
endeavors to establish that the Angelic Doctor viewed the
proof from movement from the following standpoint:
A thing cannot be moved except through acquiring new existential
act, and this ultimately can proceed only from the substantial act
of existing. 317

This point is sustained by textual support and by the refutation
of Cajetan's observations concerning the conclusion of the
proof.
au Cf. ibid., 121; cf. also

185.
Cf. Owens, "The Conclusion of the Prima Via," Modem Schoolman, XXX
(1958)' 88-58; 109-121;
aa Cf. ibid., 214.
315 Cf. ibid. It must here be noted that to interpret the secunda via in terms of
substantial change, is to ignore the words of the very text: Secunda via est ex
ratione causae efficientis. Invenimus enim in istis sensibilibus esse ordinem
causarum efficientium. . . . Attending to the properiety of St. Thomas' words, the
following interpret the proof in terms of efficiency:
Dafarra, M., 0. P., Cursus Manualis Theologiae Dogmaticae (Turin: Marietti,
1945)' 67.
Del Prado, N., 0. P., De Veritate Fundamentali Philosophiae Christianae
(Freiburg: 1911),
Garrigou-Lagrange, R., 0. P., God, His Existence and His Nature (St. Louis:
Herder, 1949) I,
fl'.
Maquart, Elementa Phil. III, 800.
Muniz, "lntroduccion ... ,"
317 Cf. ibid., 116.
310 Cf. Owens, ibid., 87-55.
313

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The textual arguments follow. In the Summa contra
Gentiles: the passage from non-being to being, non-esse to
esse, is coupled with the passage from potency to act; the
argument from movement is later used to establish the identity
of essence and existence in God. 318 In the S'umma Theologiae:
the argument reaches the unique, creative God of Christian
revelation because of its existential base. 319 In the De Potentia: " being moved " and " receiving esse " seem to concide as
far as reaching the entirely immobile mover; the notion of
act as entirely free of potency is the act of esse. Thus the
argument reaches a being which is ipsum esse because it is pure
act. 320 In the Compendium Theologiae: the immediately attained conclusion to the argument, which is the only proof used
in this work, is employed to establish that God exists necessarily. Again the transition from potency to act is coupled with
that from non-esse to esse.m That God's esse is eternal is also
attained from the same immutability of the argument's conclusion.322
The author summarizes the evidence advanced:
The act and potency envisaged in the prima via, accordingly,
include essence as potency to the act of esse. Just as goodness or
humanity, so the motion of sensible things seems to be looked
upon as being act through its esse. 323

Regarding the conclusion of the proof, then, this is to be
inferred:
On the basis of an analysis of sensible motion as ultimately made
actual by existential act, 324 the movement that is not being moved
by anything, in the sense explained in the text, oi not being
actuated by anything in imparting its motion, can only be the
ultimate act which does not actuate an essence and so is the substantial act of existing, esse, without addition or possibility of
318 Cf. ibid., liS, cites I Cont. Gent., c. 13; c. 16; c. 22.
••• Cf. ibid., li4.
82 °Cf. ibid., li5, cites De Potentia, q. 3, a. 5, Tertia ratio.
821 Cf. ibid., cites Comp. Theol., c. 3; c. 6.
••• Cf. ibid., cites Comp. Theol., c. 8; c. li.
323 Cf. ibid., liS.
••• These texts are cited: IX Met. lect. 3, n. 1806; III Cont. Gent., c. 66.

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addition. Evident at once to Christian, Jew or Moslem is the
identity of this act with Him Who in Exodus revealed Himself as
I am Who am. Such is the immediate conclusion of the prima
via.ssG

Fr. Owens charges Cajetan with overlooking the real distinction between essence and esse as it is involved in the proofs,
and of consequently regarding them as attaining an essence or
predicate, later to be shown to be proper to God. But this
would demand either an invalid passage from the essential to
the existential order, or else the reconsideration of the proof
which would find what was there all the time, the divine esse.
The latter reevaluation would merely confirm what St. Thomas
meant by saying " this all understand to be God." 326
Contrary to Cajetan, the immobile mover in subsequent
questions is not further determined as the act of existing;
as pure act is shown to preclude its being the actualization of
either matter or essence.821 ;Neither could the predicate, immobile mover, be common to God and to other movers. For
then only by the addition of a different, proper element, could
this predicate be shown as proper to God. The different
element is already present, but neglected by Cajetan, who
overlooked the existential character of the proof. It is this
element that renders all of the proofs efficacious in reaching
Him Who is.828 To see the pure act of the prima via as applicable indifferently to the Aristotelian movers and to God, is to
reach an entity based upon finite essences without granting to
existential act the role it enjoys in Aquinas' metaphysics. No
matter how far protracted, the argument viewed without this
existential element will never express the divine essence in
terms of " genuine existential act." 329 If act is taken in the
argument in the Aristotelian sense of form, the pure act will be
form only.
If, on the other hand, the form towards which motion tends is
treated as part of an essence in potency to existential act, then the
m Cf. Owens, loc. cit., 215.
ass Cf. ibid.

••• Cf. ibid., 205.

""" Cf. ibid., 205-207.
••• Cf. ibid., 215.

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elimination of all potency whatsoever will result immediately in a
subsistent existential act. Such a pure act cannot at any state be
looked upon as indifferently an intellectual soul or a finite separated
substance or as the Christian God. It is seen at once to be identified with the" I am ·who am" of Exodus. 330
Last to be mentioned is Fr. Smith's application of the
Gilsonian concept to the systematized procedure of natural
theology concerning God's existence. The author maintains
that the quinque viae are not merely different processes to a
first cause in each category of effect. This is but the immediate
terminus of each. 331 In a profounder sense their one term is
pure being, unqualified by any categorization:
If being (the act of existence) did not apply to God differently
from the way it applies to His effects, we should have included in
His being the meaning of creatures' being. Now this is not to prove
that God exists, it is to prove that something like a creature
exists.882

Proceeding along systematic lines Fr. Smith lays down the
requirements, logical and metaphysical, for the quia proof of
the existence of cause through effects. Logically, a foreknowledge of the nominal definition of the subject is required. Not
merely the etymology of the subject's name, the nominal
definition is rather the common and true acceptation of the
subject as induced from experience. In the proof for the existence of a cause the nominal definition is in itself the effect of
the subject, and the middle term in the demonstration. 888 As
indicated by St. Thomas in I, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2, the nominal definition of God imposed from effects is required in the proof for
His existence. The nominal definition designated by Fr. Smith
is " cause of the existence of things," so that the proof amounts
to this:
God is the cause of the existence of things. (M)
The cause of the existence of things (M) exists.
Therefore, God (S) exists (P) .834
Cf. ibid.
Cf. Smith, Nat. Theol., 86-87.
181 Cf. ibid., 87-88.
101

181

••• Cf. ibid.,
... Cf. ibid., 76.

.

THOMAS

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This nominal definition of God, however, seems to violate
the canon that the nominal definition be the effect of the cause
whose existence is to be demonstrated. Fr. Smith fashions an
intricate reply. God's creation as it is in some sense transitive,
is in the thing produced. 335 Thus as transitive action is the
effect as referred to its cause, so, according to St. Thomas, the
creative action of God is the dependence of the creature upon
its principle. Creation is thus something (res quaedam est),
an effect (neque increata est) and not created by any other
relation. 336 The " cause of the existence of things " is in this
sense the middle term desired; it is passive creation, is in a
creature and is a creature. 337 "In this sense 'the cause of the
existence of things' is creatures, effects of God's creation, which
are causes of our knowledge that God is their cause. . . ." 338
To clarify what seems " to strain the intelligibility of language to the breaking point," 339 Fr. Smith adds the explanation of the metaphysical basis fqr· the validity of the proof.
This amounts largely to an insistence upon the formal acceptance of effect as effect and cause as cause, that it is not a
question merely of an effect's not being able to exist without a
cause, but of the impossibility of an existing effect actually existing without a cause. 340 The proof for the existence of God thus
demands, not only that participated beings which exist be
caused, and that therefore a cause exists, but demands the
realization that nothing short of the cause of their existence
will account for the existence of that whose existence is caused.
Only then will the existence of God, the cause of the existence
of things, be proved. 341
Turning to the quinque viae, the author seeks to establish
the profound unity of their conclusion, both textually and by
••• Cf. ibid. The author cites Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, c. 8, 1050 a28.
336 Cf. ibid. Cited are II Cont. Gent., c. 18; De Potentia, q. 8, a. 5; also ad lum.
337 Cf. ibid. Cited is Sum11W Theol., I, q. 45, a. 8, ad 2um.
888 Cf. ibid., 77.
••• Cf. ibid.
••• Cf. ibid., 81. Cited is II Cont. Gent. c. 16. Actus autem agentis ut a quo,
est patientis ut in quo. . . . Cf. also 88; 88.
"'! Cf. ibid., 88.

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his own doctrinal exposition. Textually, the name viae implies
that for St. Thomas they all arrive at the one ipsum esse.
Then the phrase " this all understand to be God," or its equivalent, suggests a reftexion by which the existent attained is
seen as ipsum esse; otherwise St. Thomas would not have employed such a concluding phrase. Furthermore, from the proofs
is drawn ip.mm esse, or its equivalent, in the demonstrations
about the divine nature. 342
The doctrinal exposition points out first of all, as a general
feature of the proofs, the import of St. Thomas' distinction
between the cause of becoming (causa secundum fieri et non
directe secundum esse) and the cause of the being of an effect
(causa non solum fiendi sed etiam essendi) .343 While this
distinction is not explicitly mentioned by Fr. Smith, preparation for its application is apparent in the explanation of
causality as involved in the proofs. 344
The particular exposition of each of the viae endeavors to
show how each reaches the subsistent esse, cause of the existence of things. The process can be illustrated in terms of the
prima via. The proof is reduced to four propositions:
I) There are things in motion.
2) Things in motion are moved by another.
3) The "other" which moves things in motion cannot adequately explain motion unless it be itself unmoved.
4) Therefore, there must be an unmoved mover, whom all understand to be God. 345

It is with regard to the fourth proposition that the author
makes his distinctive point. There is no difficulty, by reason of
the process, in admitting the conclusion regarding the unmoved
mover; but why is this understood to be God? If it is not
conceded that God is a mover in a more excellent way, the first
mover cannot be understood to be God, for the first mover
would then be left within the category of effects.
au Cf. ibid., 88.
••• Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 104, a. I.
au Cf. Smith, loc. cit., 90-100.
••• Cf. ibid., 102.

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The intricacies of the extrication of the first mover from the
categories, seem to encompass the tracing out of the following
steps:
1) To exist in a category of being is for the being in that
category to exist.
2) It is a composite, a subject with accruing qualifications that
does exist.
3) In the case of movement it is a subject-existing-as-changing
which exists.
4) Since dependence is involved, it is the whole which is being
caused to exist, inasmuch as the cause is causing the composite, thus to be. Thus water being caused to be hot is being
caused to exist precisely because water caused to be hot is
for that water to exist as becoming hot.
5) The cause then is:
a) not the subject before it is a composite existing as changing, because then it does not exist;
b) nor movers which presuppose an existent subject to move
or change. The subject existing as becoming cannot be
presupposed; it is this that needs to be caused. The very
problem is about a subject existing as becoming; this, not
a subject existing as a potential subject of actual change,
needs explanation. Thus secondary movers, those which
presuppose an existing subject, are insufficient.
6) The only answer is a cause which does not presuppose the
existence of a subject of becoming, but causes that existence .
. . . The cause is a cause which cannot presuppose a subjectexisting-as-moved (there is no such subject before its movement) but causes the subject-to-be-existing-as-moved. 846
Thus is God extricated from the categories. For as first
cause of a thing-existing-as-moved, God is His own existence;
He cannot acquire the act of existence as moved things acquire
their existence from Him. The only category in which God
could be situated would be the category of existence. For He
is His being. But the act of existing cannot be a category.
Further, since the act of existing does not belong to God as to
a distinct subject, there is no " different " subject by which

'°

8
Cf. ibid., 110-118. The process with regard both to the prima and aecunda via
is later summarized, ibid., 159-160, note 1.

REFLEXION

ON THE QUESTION

OF GOD'S EXISTENCE

85

God could he in a distinct category. Thus the existence reached
by the proof is unqualified, ipsum esse.341
In such a manner, then, the prima via is explained as reaching God, the sole cause of existence. Final emphasis is placed
upon the involvement of the cause of existence in all the proofs
by the remarks concluding their exposition. The causality of
the causa non solum fiendi sed etiam essendi is unfolded.
An efficient cause of being is one whose proper effect is the act of
existing. Jn default of such a cause there would be nothing:
nothing antecedent to the subject of becoming, nothing which
remains achieved after the process. Sometimes a cause of becoming
is called a qualified (secundum quid) cause of being. This means
only that a cause of becoming is the cause of the qualification,
accidental or substantial, of a subject of an act of existing .... 848

As the cause of existence, God is outside the order of His
effects. In all the proofs God is so attained; He is ipsum esse.
The quinque viae are, then, different ways, hut one proof, a
proof concluding to God, the cause of existence of things.
The Gilsonian mentality is perhaps the most prominent and
vocal position in Thomistic metaphysics on this continent. It
cuts through many of the procedures previously reviewed regarding God's existence. In its constant reference to the text
of St. Thomas it proclaims its authenticity, and emphasizes the
need for reflexion on the opposing trends concerning the
question of God's existence. 349
••• Cf. ibid.
"'" Cf. ibid., 154.
••• Cf. also Klubertanz, G., S. J., "Being and God According to Contemporary
Scholastics," Modern Schoolman, XXXII (1954), 1-17. He also maintains that
the conclusion of the proofs of St. Thomas is He Who is, God as subsistent act of
existing. Paramount in Aquinas' thought, the author maintains, is the judgment of
separation by which the act of existing is attained as not identified with material
essence. This is the point of departure for metaphysics. From this the metaphysician is led to a subsistent act of existing, about which all that can be said
is: It is. He finds it ironical that Cajetan should have made his remarks about the
proofs; for though there are many valid proofs for a being which is first, ·necessary,
infinite, provident, and who happens to be God, only St. Thomas' proofs attain
Him Who is. Cf. 15-17. Cf. also his "St. Thomas and the Learning of Metaphysics"; "The Teaching of Metaphysics," Gregorianum, XXXV (1954), 8-17;

86

THOMAS

C. o'BRIEN

ANTONINUS FINILI,

0. P.

An approach toward the question of God's existence suggested by Antoninus Finili, 0. P., though much less widely
publicized or adopted, is noteworthy in what it advances as a
truer philosophical orientation of the question. The tenor of
the suggestions of Antoninus Finili, 0. P. is to be gauged from
his concluding remark:
If asked to answer the question at the head of these notes, we

should be tempted to reply: Yes, there is a philosophical approach
to God, but only the believer knows it for what it is.350
This conclusion, so startlingly opposed to the Gilsonian attitude, stems from the author's challenge of the propriety of
metaphysics' assuming to pose the question of demonstrability
regarding God's existence. He sees natural theology's incorporation of this point from the Summa Theologiae to have
resulted in a non-philosophical procedure. The whole question
of God's existence in the Summa is theological-theology's
examination of a proposition which the theologian knows to be
true, from the very Credo which is his first principle. The
theologian examines this truth as demonstrably evident. For
the philosopher to set out expressly to prove God's existence
would be a petitio principii.351 Yet this very thing is done
implicitly by posing the matter of the demonstrability, which
includes the determination of a nominal definition of God. St.
Thomas states that God's existence can be proved a posteriori,
because as Creator God has effects from which the necessary
nominal definition can be imposed. 852 Because these effects are
evident to reason, the theologian can formulate the rational
demonstration and through the nominal definition point out
that the first cause of the philosopher is the Christian God. 353
187-205. But cf. also Mcinerney, R., "A Note on Thomistic Existentialism,"
Sapientia Aquinatis (Rome: Catholic Book Agency, 1955), 509-517.
05 ° Cf. Finili, A., 0. P., "Is There a Philosophical Approach to God? " Dominican
Studies, IV (1951), 101. An author who presents similar thoughts with reference
to the Summa Theologiae is White, Victor, 0. P., "The Prolegomena of the Five
Ways," Dominican Studies, V (1952), 184-158.
851 Cf. ibid., 81.
111 Cf. ibid., 86.
••• Cf. ibid., 84-85.

REFLEXION

ON '.rHE QUESTION

OF GOD'S EXISTENCE

87

Philosophy cannot rightfully be interested in establishing
a priori theses; it is a process oi discovery and resolution of its
discoveries in terms of first principles. 354 The author recognizes
the inclusion of the issue of God's demonstrability to be the
result of the a priori Wolffian division of philosophy with
natural theology a distinct part about God. 355
Positively, the search of metaphysics is a process in which
the philosopher must be led by the exigencies of the investigation to an ultimate explanation of reality. 356 The existence of
God, then, will not be attained as a by-product of philosophy,
but will constitute the heights of its discovery, the ultimate
explanation of all that is. But " it is the believer, not the
philosopher as such who sees in this supreme being the God of
the Creed." 357 To be excluded from natural theology, then, is
the question: utrum Deum esse sit demonstrabile? The philosopher can presuppose neither the existence of the first cause
nor of its effects. When he does discover the first cause, then he
will recognize the immediacy or mediacy of the evidence of its
existence. As believer he will also recognize the God of the
Creed.
Fr. Finili, then, puts still another construction on the
question oi God's existence in metaphysics, one that challenges
a whole line of procedure common to the other contemporary
authors just considered. For Fr. Finili, the order of the Summa
Theologiae of St. Thomas is to be avoided, and no nominal
definition should be predetermined. There are no presupposistions in the process of discovery. The process rises from effects
which are known to the highest cause which was previously
unknown.
CoNCLUSION

TO PART ONE

The historical background has emphasized the bearing oi the
context of any author's conception of metaphysics upon his
treatment of the question of God's existence. In terms of this
orientation the contemporary status of the question can be
summarized in the following manner:
••• Cf. ibid.
Cf. ibid., 89-110.

11 "

••• Cf. ibid., 91 ff.
ibid., G7.

111 Cf.

88

THOMAS

The Place of God in
Metaphysics:
Gredt:
Subject of special metaphysics, the uncreated being.

Maquart:
As cause of the subject of one
metaphysics, the science of
being as formally abstracted
in sensible reality.
Van Steenberghen:
As cause of subject of ontology, being, the primum cognitum in its note of existence.

Gilson:
As true object of metaphysics,
ipsum esse, first to be considered in the Christian philosophy of St. Thomas.
Owens:
Included in consideration of
being (esse) as its cause.
Smith:
Natural theology integral with
the metaphysics of existential
being.
Finili:
As cause of subject of metaphysics.

C. o'BRIEN

The question of God's
existence:
Order of the Summa Theol. Approach by nominal definition,
ens a se.
Quinque viae, distinct proofs.
Conclusion one in the nominal
definition.
Quinque viae, five distinct
proofs.
Posterior question on univocal
application of name " God " to
five proper causes attained.
Nominal definition of God essential to placing the question.
Nominal definition, "unique,
provident Creator."
Quinque viae not satisfactory,
merely approximate because not
metaphysical, i. e., not reaching
God as defined.
Order of Summa Theol.
Quinque viae.
One conclusion, " I am Who
am."
Quinque viae.
One conclusion, " I am Who
am."
Order of Summa Theol.
Nominal definition as approach,
" cause of existence of things."
One conclusion for Quinque viae,
God as ipsum esse.
Order of Summa to be avoided.
No nominal definition predetermined.

REFLEXION

ON THE QUESTION

OF GOD'S

EXISTENCE

89

The statement of the views concerning the question of God's
existence currently advanced as Thomistic has been set forth
so as to achieve some appreciation of the foundations of such
views. There is thus emphasized the historically verified truth
that the question of God's existence will depend in its development upon the intellectual organism, the scientific framework
in which it is set. The diverse historical settings and influences
do account for a wide variety of opinion as to the nature and
development of Thomistic metaphysics with special reference
to the question of God's existence. In the face of this diversity,
however, the problem is forced on the Thomist: who, as
Thomist, is right? The answer to this question can be given
after the problem of God's existence is appraised in the light of
the principles of St. Thomas himself. Only then can judgment
be made as to which of these is the authentic Thomistic presentation of the question of God's existence in metaphysics.
THOMAS

Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

(To be Continued)

c. O'BRIEN, 0. P.

EMPIRICISM

AND AESTHETICS

I

T is not strange that an age that marks its greatest
achievements in the physical sciences should be tempted
to re-examine traditional philosophical statements about
the nature of truth and goodness and beauty with the tool
that has been revealing so many other secrets of the universe.
Consequently, in an effort to delimit the terms of a discussion
of values in the humanities, one encounters innumerable
aesthetic positions, each approaching man and art differently
and, therefore, each analyzing the relationships of empiricism
and aesthetics in its own way. Even a simple definition of
terms must be defended since it inevitably will favor one or
another point of view. Instead of assuming an eclectic approach
or discussing only one opinion, this study will examine three
positions: Positivism, Pragmatism, and Thomism. Their solutions to the problem of the significance of empiricism, in terms
of disparate aesthetic positions are, to a certain degree, substantially different. If there is any common ground here, it is
not in aesthetic definitions or in the relevance of empiricism.
Moreover, even within the ranks of these philosophies there are
minor squabbles. Thomists, Pragmatists, and Positivists have
their own family arguments. But, in general, the positions are
representative of various approaches that have been assumed.
At any rate, the subject matter involves the acts, powers,
and habits of man and his " art." At this point it is safer to
omit any discussion of " values " since this word is a signal to
spring to the defence of one's philosophical position; it is wiser
to look for agreement at the start.
It seems that one can begin by defining empiricism and evoke
fewer objections from various stands. In its broadest meaning,
empiricism is the study of phenomena and changing dimensions
in the region of particular experiences. This definition is so
wide as to include any kind of self-analysis, either the intro90

EMPIRICISM

AND AESTHETICS

91

spection that observes what is common experience shared by
all men, the type used by Aristotle or Aquinas: spontaneous
utterances of everyone's sense of reality; or introspective
analysis of a special experience, a scientific tool developed by
Kiilpe and the Wiirzburg school of psychology: In order to
avoid the objections generally leveled at introspective methods
by behaviorists or structuralists, this paper will exclude any
kind of self-analysis from the meaning of empiricism.
Obviously, observation of experience can be of various kinds.
For example, in 1938 a New York radio station polled its
listeners and discovered that Beethoven's fifth and seventh
symphonies were first and second among favorite compositions
requested in 23.9 and 18.3 per cent of letters received. Tschaikovsky's fifth, sixth, and fourth symphonies took third, fifth,
and seventh place; and Beethoven's ninth, third, and seventh
ranked fourth, sixth, and twelfth, respectively. Wagner and
Brahms just about tied for third in these tabulations. 2 However, despite the huge populations and percentages which seem
to lend a certain amount of authority and scientific aura, any
conclusions from such a loosely organized popularity poll are
suspect. Of what significance is the poor showing of a composer
like Bach or of a form like opera? A more rigorous control of
subjects and materials is needed for a study to qualify as topdrawer empiricism. More must be known about the subjects
than that they are " music lovers " who listen to serious music
on their radios.
A more ideal empiric approach is represented by Charles
Morris' study of human values." In his research he attempted
to determine the values basic to human nature by means of
statistical investigation. Morris submitted a questionnaire
describing different "ways of life," Christianity, Buddhism, et
1 Robert
Brennan, Thomistic Psychology (New York: Macmillan, 1941), pp.
58-9; and John Dashiell, "Introspection," Encyclopedia Americana, 1958 ed., XV,

•wallace Brockway and Herbert Weinstock, Men of Music (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1989), p. 194n and p. 481n.
• Charles Morris, Varieties of Human Value (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1956) .

92

EDMUND J. DEHNERT

cetera, to carefully screened groups from all parts of the world.
Each individual in the survey ranked these ideologies according
to his own feelings about moral standards. A similar study was
made of the relative aesthetic values of several paintings.
Although there may be argument about the particular questionnaire statements regarding the various ways of life chosen by
Morris or about the study's failure to distinguish between what
is value and what is preference, Morris attempts a clear
delineation of his subjects and test materials. Whether this
method can study intrinsic moral and aesthetic values and is
not merely a better controlled popularity vote, remains to be
established. In general, in this paper, empiricism will mean
studies which use a rigorous scientific method, that is to say,
inductive verification. Empiricism, therefore, is a way of approaching a problem based on disciplined observation and, to
whatever degree possible, experimental evidence. 4
The crux of the problem at hand is to determine to what
extent aesthetic considerations are within the scope of empiricism. Each of the aesthetic systems under consideration involves some notion of " value," be it relational preference,
pleasurable emotion, beauty, or whatever. The determination
of what is " value " in a particular system is its key to the
solution of this problem.
However, this is not the only aspect of aesthetic systems.
Both the examination and appraisal of the aesthetic significance
of empirical data presuppose a general position that involves
a psychology, concerning the nature of human perception, and
a philosophy, concerning the specification of "beauty" and
" value." Moreover, in such a critique of empiricism one must
first decide whether the focus of aesthetic discussion is to be on
the art object, or on the individual's purely subjective estimation and reaction, or on a balance among all the related
considerations of object, subject, and enveloping culture. Going
one step further, the analyst must commit himself to an act
of faith in definite philosophical and psychological criteria
'Max Otto, "Scientific Method and the Good Life," Science and the Moral Life,
ed. E. C. Lindeman (New York: New American Library, 1949), p. 96.

EMPIRICISM

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98

which spring from the root of his over-all system of values.
He must answer these questions. Is there anything in the work
of art beyond what can be seen at the sense level, beyond or
beneath or implicit in tangible reality? Can one dismiss speculation about the essential nature of the work and objective
beauty and concentrate on considerations of what is latent in
the observer's direct experience of the work of art? Is there
a final or relatively stable specification of aesthetic significance?
Where does one look to find it? The problem is basic to any
philosophy:
If other entities do exist which by their very nature are inherently
incapable of being given in sense experience ... there is no apparent
reason why we should not be able to refer to them intelligibly. No
reason, that is, apart from some initial metaphysical bias as to the
capacities of the human mind. Positivism starts out by denying the
philosophy of being, and assumes the metaphysics of flux from the
beginning.5

The fundamental issue in any psychology is the view taken
of the " body-soul " problem. Many: solutions in various forms
of monism and dualism have been proferred from Plato to
Langer. In a consideration of empirical methods this issue is
important since it colors thinking about perception, observable
behavior, and their interpretation. None of the positions under
consideration holds the monistic idealism that only the psyche
exists, such as might be found in the psychology of Berkeley or
Hume. 6 The conceptions of the empirical natural sciences are,
to a degree, opposed to idealism since they are based on the
relations of particular phenomena in reality, on their mechanisms.1 Susanne K. Langer expresses the monism of materialism,
that the only existent is the soma:
That man is an animal I certainly believe; and also, that he has
• Bernard Phillips, Being and Process (New Haven: Yale University, unpublished
Ph. D. dissertation, 1940), p. 81.
8 George Berkeley, "Of the Principles of Human Knowledge," Age of Enlightenment, ed. Isaiah Berlin (New York: New American Library, 1956), pp. 182-142;
David Hume, "0£ Modes and Substances," Age of Enlightenment, p. 176.
'James E. Creighton, "Idealism," Encyclopedia Americana, 1958 ed., XIV, 668-4.

94

EDMUND

J. DEHNERT

no supernatural essence, " soul " or " entelechy " or " mindstuff,"
enclosed in his skin. He is an organism, his substance is chemical,
and what he does, suffers, or knows, is just what this sort of
chemical structure may do, suffer, or know . . . if we ask how
physical objects, chemically analyzable, can be conscious, how ideas
occur to them, we are talking ambiguously; for the conception of
" physical object " is a conception of chemical substance not
biologically organized. What causes this tremendous organization
of substances, is one of the things the tremendous organisms do not
know; but with their organization, suffering and impulse and awareness arise.s

This position is completely compatible with the last of
Auguste Comte's three stages of development of knowledge,
i.e., Positivism: whatever is real can be investigated by the
scientific method. 9 Practically speaking, this is also the attitude
of Pragmatism as represented by William James: it makes
little practical difference whether matter or spirit is dominant
since the behavior of the biological organism is to be the basis
of pragmatic psychology/ 0
On the other hand, there are various dualistic explanations
of human nature. For Plato, later followed by Descartes, body
and soul are two separate substances in a kind of " rider on a
horse" relationship. 11 The dichotomy is substantially absolute
but there is interaction in operation. There are those, for
example the school of Wundt and Fechner, who would grant to
the soul at least a theoretical existence: the parallelists. Ultimately, the problem of how or why there is this parallel
operation is, for them, an insoluble one. Their interpretation
of " mind " or " soul " is obscure: psychic activities may be
only one aspect of physical activities. 12
St. Thomas Aquinas opposes any interaction or parallelism
• Susanne K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (New York: Mentor Books,
1954)' pp. 81-82.
3 Henry D. Aiken, The Age of Ideology
(New York: New American Library,
1956)' pp. 120-122, 125.
10 William James, "·what Pragmatism
Means." The Age of Analysis, ed. Morton
White (New York: New American Library, 1955), pp. 160-173.
11 Brennan, op. cit., pp. 76-77.
11 Ibid., pp. 77-80.

EMPIRICISM

95

AND AESTHETICS

in which the soul is considered some mysterious supernatural
" other thing " independent of the body though fitted into its
operations in some " rider-horse " manner or in some unknowable way. 13 He follows Aristotle in his adaptation of hylomorphism. For Thomists, soul is the principle by which an
organism is alive. It is the informing principle of organization
from which flow all vital activities of the body. 14
Though it is often difficult to assign absolute positions, pragmatist opinion seems to lie either within materialistic monism
or parallelistic dualism. Positivists are materialistic monists.
But even here it is difficult to arrange neat " pigeonholes." For
example, " the ' minq-stu:ff ' enclosed in his skin " that Langer
denies seems to be the sort of soul of interactionism or parallelism that Aquinas dismisses in his hylomorphic position. 15 The
biological organization that Langer appeals to does not seem to
be as far removed from the Thomistic theory as her declaration
that there is no soul or supernatural essence implies.' 6 Obviously, semantic difficulties obscure the problem. But generally
these are the premises of the psychologies involved. As a
psychology tends toward the monist position that only matter
exists, mind, which in this consideration is a certain neural
organization of matter, is completely within the scope of
empirical investigation. The traditional philosophic concepts
of value, human destiny, truth, morality, and beauty in art are
disregarded as fossils of a defunct metaphysical methodology
or, at best, re-explained in mechanistic accounts of how these
"misconceptions " arise. Problems which are incapable of
mechanistic solutions are called "pseudo-questions " insoluble
by any method. 17 This is as blatant an a priori assumption as
the " castles in the air " that the mechanists accuse metaphysicians of building.
18 St. Thomas
Aquinas, Summa Theologica (Madrid:
Cristianos edition, 1952), I, q. 75, a. 2.
"Ibid., I, q. 75, a. 1; and Brennan, op. cit., p. 69.
15 Aquinas, ibid., I, q. 75 and q. 76.
18 Langer, op. cit., p. 31.
17 Langer, op. cit., pp. 68-69.

Biblioteca

de Autores

96

EDMUND J. DEHNERT

It is beyond the scope of this paper to try to establish which
philosophical attitude solves the ultimate question of value in
a consideration of aesthetics. Nevertheless, there are several
solutions offered. Positivism must either deny value or accept
it as only a mistaken notion of the meaning of related subjective preferences. Pragmatism and Thomism recognize its
existence hut in terms of different premises. If man's final
objective consists in the meaning of his attempt to " in some
way, however slight, carry the universe forward" by entering
into " the moving unbalanced balance of things " in order to
bring about the existence of the better; 18 or if values are
involved in a hierarchy of being and a recognition of related
objective natural and supernatural goals, empiricism cannot
specify what the ultimate significance is. Each individual's
thinking about aesthetics will be determined by his honest
choice from among these three disparate positions: there is no
final goal; such a goal probably exists but is unknowable; there
is in fact a goal that can be known and it is the responsibility
of human nature to aspire to it.
These different concepts of the principles and goals of man's
acts and powers are reflected in different psychological approaches. Two distinct disciplines are involved: one approaches
psychology from the point of view of science (the materialist
would maintain that this is the only valid approach); 19 the
other approaches from the viewpoint of philosophy (the
Thomist holds that both approaches are valid and both are
directed toward knowledge of the corporeal reality, each, however, in a different way) . As Robert Brennan puts it:
Philosophic psychology ... studies the nature or essence of man,
whereas scientific psychology is confined to an analysis of the acts,
powers, and habits of this essence. There is another distinction
... namely, that philosophic psychology studies the essence of
man's acts, powers, and habits; whereas scientific psychology analyzes the accidental modes and quantified correlations of these acts,
powers, and habits.
19 John Dewey, Experience a.nd Nature
(New York:
1929). p. 419.
10 Otto, op. cit., pp. 90-109.

W. W. Norton and Co.,

EMPIRICISM

AND AESTHETICS

97

The relation . . . is simply a concrete instance of the broader
relations that obtain between natural science as a whole and the
philosophy of nature as a whole."0

Science is perinoetic, studying the " mobility of corporeal
substance"; philosophy is dianoetic, analyzing the "nature,
origin, and destiny of mobile being." 21
The philosophies of Pragmatism, Positivism, and Thomism
each assign various roles to scientific and metaphysical
methods. A brief examination of the various conflicting views
on methodology will clarify the place that empiricism finds in
each system.
The concept of development in Hegel, Darwin's evolution
theories, and the motor concept of learning accenting activity of
William James are summed up in Dewey's idea of thinking as
a tool for overcoming obstacles. His biological theory of art
hinges on his idea of mind and of the conditions occasioning
thought. The ultimate discipline of Dewey's Pragmatism
depends on a logical theory, the method of inquiry. 22 Consequent from this proposition is the thesis that all first principles
are precluded; no metaphysical and epistemological a priori
assumptions are presupposed as foundations of inquiry. 23 If
there are to be any such conclusions resembling those of traditional metaphysics, they must be the outcome of the process of
inquiry. All knowledge is the result of conscious inquiry; and
the most concise and inclusive knowledge is the sum total of
what makes up science, according to the means available for
inquiry at a certain time. However, for Dewey, any inquiry
into human values is philosophical and, at best, proposes
hypothetical solutions to the problems implicit in the data
culled by science. Philosophy cannot propose final solutions
Brennan, op. cit., p. 61.
Ibid., p. 62.
22 Donald A. Piatt, "Dewey's
Logical Theory," The Philosophy of John Dewey,
vol. I of the Library of Living Philosophers (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern
University, 1989), p. 109.
23 John Dewey, Logic: the Theory of Inquiry
(New York: Holt and Co., 1988),
pp. 20-21.
20
21

98

EDMUND

J. DEHNERT

which overreach the realities touched by science without becoming propagandistic. 24
The Pragmatism of John Dewey analyses perception in terms
of a fluctuating natural continuum in which organism and
environment are distinguishable only to the extent that there
is tension between them. But even this distinction is meant to
stress interdependence.
Integration [i.e., of organism with environment] is more fundamental than the distinction designated by interaction of organism
and environment. The latter [interaction] is indicative of a partial
distintegration of a prior integration, but one which is of such a
dynamic nature that it moves (as long as life continues) toward
re-integration. . . . There is no such thing as a final settlement,
because every settlement introduces the conditions of a new unsettling.25
Humans do not have experiences; they are part of an
experience in which the only distinctions are logical, not real. 26
This interaction of organism and environment becomes inquiry
through consciousness or control.
Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent
distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original
situation into a unified whole.27
Aesthetic experience-experience at its best-does not per se
involve control of formation and development of the experience; it involves, rather, being the organism that is formed and
developed in the experience. Inquiry, which includes empirical
study, is therefore distinct from aesthetics.
The problem
remaining is to determine whether the ultimate significance of
aesthetic experience can be specified by empiricism.
It seems that if aest4etics is an account of values implicit in
•• John Dewey, "The Determination of Ultimate Values," The Thirty-Seventh
Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part II, p. 474.
•• Dewey, Logic: the Theory of Inquiry, pp. 34-35.
•• Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1929),
p. 8.
27

Dewey, Logic: the Theory of Inquiry, pp. 104-105.

EMPIRICISM

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99

art or the experience of it, Pragmatism holds that such an
account must be a hypothetical critique of empirical discoveries.
The bare culling of the facts concerning experience, if that is
where one places the burden of his aesthetics, or even of objective structural features of the art work, can be thorough and
exact, within the techniques available for present-day empirical
study. To take into account the consequences of these facts on
human welfare, to determine their bearing on success or failure
in improving our living or attaining valued ends, one must
philosophize. And, although one may hold with Pragmatism
that a final definition of " pure truth " and ultimate objectivity
is illusive and always a hy;pothetical answer, nevertheless, in the
very attempt to maintain this position one must transgress the
bounds of empirical fact. 28
It is at this point one must decide: either " pure truth " and
ultimate objectivity do not exist or they do. If they exist in
terms of some ontological goal or destiny, either one can know
what this truth is or one cannot. John Dewey did not deny this
goal, but he did issue the challenge that we have yet to know
what it is:
We agree that we are uncertain as to where we are going and where
we want to go, and why we are doing what we do.29
According to the Thomistic position, without a hierarchy of
being a philosophy must dispense with any intrinsic hierarchy
of value. The Positivist is quite satisfied to do just this. It is
inevitable that conflicting tendencies will arise in formulating
channels of action. The Pragmatic approach, based on the
notion of interactive operation which organizes the indeterminate, confronts a fundamental difficulty in trying to discover
ultimate goals, a difficulty which a metaphysics of being does
not find insuperable. 30 This is a primary criticism generally
leveled against an exclusively Pragmatic approach. For only
Dewey, Expmence and Nature, pp. 51-52.
Dewey, "Challenge to Liberal Thought," Fortune, XXX (1944), 155.
30 Paul
K. Crosser, The Nihilism of John Dewey (New York: Philosophical
Library, 1955), p. 20.
28
20

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J. DEHNERT

the determination of the general aims of society and the individual will establish the guides for subordinate aims. 31 However, Pragmatism and Thomism are agreed that this is a
function of philosophy and is beyond empiricism.
Rudolf Carnap furnishes an expression of the logical positivist or materialistic position. Traditional metaphysics is considered meaningless; and the ultimate criterion of any valid
meaning is the logic of mathematics and empiricism. Concepts
of metaphysics such as essence or substance which are not
touched directly by these tools are considered illusory. 32 Dewey
objects to the opinion that discussion of reality independent
of measure is meaningless. 33 This awareness of the importance
of aesthetic and moral traits in experience and of their meaning
in a philosophy distinguishes Dewey's Pragmatism from Logical
Positivism. 34 Carnap's stand is based on an admiration for
empiricism as a unified body of knowledge compared to the
apparent confusion supplied by conflicting metaphysical analyses. There is a potential fallacy of division lurking here. If
a search for a common denominator in conflicting views results
in confusion or general incompatibility of opinions, one cannot
logically conclude that no one particular metaphysical approach
is sound. 35 The evidence supplied by empiricism (though not
necessarily every interpretation of it) is incontrovertible fact.
However, disagreement among various metaphysical schools
is not a proof of universal fallibility of metaphysics as a science.
The Thomistic position on the methodologies involved can
be best clarified by a consideration of its doctrine of the three
degrees of abstraction. 36 Knowledge begins with various indi31 Robert J. Hense, "Hutchins
and Dewey Again," The Modern Schoolman, XV
(1988),
82 Morton
White, "Logical Positivism: Rudolf Camap," The Age of Analysis,
pp.
3 ' Dewey, "Nature in Experience,"
Philosophical Review, XLIX (1940),
"'Anne Mary Tamme, A Critique of John Dewey's Theory of Fine Art in the
Light of the Principles of Thomism (Washington D. C.: Catholic Univ. Press,
1956), p. 18.
•• Ibid., p. 85.
•• Jacques Maritain, The Degrees of Knotvledge, trans. Bernard Wall and Margot
R. Adamson (Glasgow: Maclehouse and Co. Ltd., 1988), pp. 44-58.

EMPIRICISM

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101

vidual concrete experiences. At the first degree of abstraction
are the physical sciences, which consider the mobile and sensible
aspects of bodies as bound up in matter and experimentally
verifiable. This is the level of empiricism: phenomena and
behavior. The second degree deals with quantity abstracted
from sensible matter. This is the level of mathematics, whose
theorems exist conceptually, divorced from concrete bodies.
:Finally, metaphysics, at the third degree, abstracts from the
quantities and considers only the being of things. To each of
these levels, and to each of the sub-sciences within these levels,
an individual method is appropriate.
Nothing could be more incorrect than to regard these differing
methods as isolated, for the method of a more abstract science
dominates that of the more concrete sciences, and extends to their
domain: but they are specific methods and remain distinct, inasmuch as every order of the real requires by reason of its very
distinctness an appropriate mode of investigation. Thus Wisdom,
or first philosophy, or metaphysics, lays down the guiding principles
of all other sciences, and humanly depends on none of them: as the
others study different modes of being, so it studies being itself, in
its essence and its properties: it is the science of being as being;
mathematics is the science of quantity; physics is the science of
beings as subject to motion, biology of living beings, psychology
of rational beings, and sociology of human beings living in society .37

The determination and control of quantitative functions is
doubtlessly the backbone of the scientific method. Fundamentally biological theories of the nature of human intelligence
and the conditions occasioning thought, such as William James'
conception of the psyche and Darwinian scientific notions,
stress this method for analysis and regulation of distinctly
human activities. If one holds that all qualitative notions
involved in the problems of human experience are ultimately
reducible to quantitative determination, then aesthetics is
simply the field of inquiry about the highest level of empirical
data. Only the absolute materialistic viewpoints take this
stand. As a matter of fact, in this context, the term "value"
17 Etienne
Gilson, "The Distinctiveness of the Philosophic Order," A Gilson
Reader. ed. Anton C. Pegis (New York: Doubleday, 1957), p. 60.

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EDMUND J. DEHNERT

has little meaning beyond " complex data that is difficult to
quantitize." More modified theses, among which seems to be
that of John Dewey, withhold this final decision and posit
ultimate value concepts as unsolvable or, at best, hypothetical
determinations. For Thomists, the data of empiricism are valuable for interpreting how art works. But to discover the
ultimate regulators of this activity or to go beyond relational
preferences and investigate value, a discipline of a higher order
of abstraction is required. J. W. N. Sullivan quotes Sir Arthur
Eddington, British astronomer and physicist, in illustration of
a realization that contradicts the extreme Positivist position:
Leaving out all aesthetic, ethical, or spiritual aspects of our
environment, we are faced with qualities such as massiveness, substantiality, extension, duration, which are supposed to belong to the
domain of physics. In a sense they do belong; but physics is not
in a position to handle them directly. The essence of their nature
is inscrutable; we may use mental pictures to aid calculations, but
no image in the mind can be a replica of that which is not in the
mind. And so in its actual procedure physics studies not these
inscrutable qualities, but pointer-readings which we can observe.
The readings, it is true, reflect the fluctuations of the world-qualities; but our exact knowledge is of the readings, not of the qualities.
The former have as much resemblance to the latter as a telephone
number has to a subscriber. 38
There is a limit to the scope of empiricism. Alfred North
Whitehead notes this especially in regard to aesthetic needs:
the " materialistic basis " of science " has directed attention to
things as opposed to values." 39 Concretely there is no antithesis, but at a certain level of abstraction (what Maritain
describes as the first degree) "ultimate values" are excluded. 40
This is apparent to some of the scientific world and a new outlook is replacing the old logical positivism:
•• Sir Arthur Eddington, " The Domain of Phy_sical Sciences," Essay in Science,
Religion and Reality, quoted by J. W. N. Sullivan, The Limitations of Science
(New York: New American Library, 1956), p. 141.
•• Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: New
American Library, 1925), pp. 202-203.
•• Ibid., p. 203.

EMPIRICISM

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108

Science has become self-conscious and comparatively humble. We
are no longer taught that the scientific method of approach is the
only valid method of acquiring knowledge about reality. Eminent
men of science are insisting ... on the fact that science gives us
but a partial knowledge of reality, and we are no longer to regard
as illusory everything that science finds itself able to ignore ....
The universe of science, if accepted as the final reality, made of men
an entirely accidental by-product of a huge, mindless, purposeless,
mathematical machine. And there are men of science sufficiently
human to find such a conclusion disconcerting.H
Consequent on this outlook is the rejection of the arguments
that aesthetic, metaphysical, or religious interpretations of
reality are
illusory. 42
Science studies phenomena inductively and consequently is
restricted to certain" scales of observation." 43 Laws are formulated according to observations made at a certain level. At
the base of these laws is a system of probabilities. For example,
laws of pressure have at their base the fluctuations of billions of
molecules. These laws apply only according to what is true" on
the average" of these billions and do not predict what each
individual molecule might do by chance. But since the minimal
differences of individual fiuctatioils are not important on a
higher scale of observation the law is relatively valid. 44 The
subjectivity of these laws is the reason for the revisions necessitated by newly discovered phenomena on other levels of
observation.
Our scientific laws are always a posteriori, and governed by the
facts to which they must submit. They are relative to man, who
is the thinking-recording instrument, and merely express a relationship, or a series of relationships, between him and the external
cause. They only describe the succession of psychological states
determined in us by these causes. They are, therefore, essentially
relative and subjective and their validity is strictly limited to
"Sullivan, op. cit., pp. 138-139.
•• Ibid., p. 147.
"Lecomte Du Noiiy, Human Destiny (New York:
1947), p. 17.
"Ibid., pp.

New American Library,

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EDMUND J. DEHNERT

man and depends on the identity of the reactions of the other
individuals to the same external stimuli. 45
Consequently, any empirical study of art by its very methodology is confined to examining the technical structure of the art
work or the behavior of the observer of the work. Obviously
this knowledge is valuable; and ever since Bacon and Hobbes
and the whole school of British Empiricism many have claimed
that the philosophy of sensible experience is the only one which
can formulate valid conclusions. The deductive method of
Scholasticism was rejected and philosophy, therefore, was
limited to the methods of the natural sciences. An insistence
on this position makes any resolution of questions of value,
beauty, or goals only a relative one, valid at a certain "scale
of observation" as described by Du Noiiy. J. W. N. Sullivan,
in the conclusions to his study, observes:
The fact that science is confined to a knowledge of structure is
obviously of great "humanistic" importance. For it means that
the problem of the nature of reality is not prejudged. We are no
longer required to believe that our response to beauty, or the
mystic's sense of communion with God, have no objective counterpart. It is perfectly possible that they are, what they have so often
been taken to be, clues to the nature of reality. Thus our various
experiences are put on a more equal footing, as it were. Our
religious aspirations, our perceptions of beauty, may not be the
essentially illusory phenomena that were supposed to be. In this
new scientific universe even mystics have a right to exist. 46

If one denies that essence or the objective ontological order
studied by metaphysics has a significant bearing on value judgments or in estimating what is " beautiful," then one says that
the highest level value decision can be investigated and solved
through empiricism, that is, through a consideration of the
experience that the individuals of a certain culture have of art
objects developed in the frame of the stylistic practices of the
culture. Positivism insists on this through its rejection of
metaphysics and deductive syllogistic inquiry.
•• Ibid., p. !lS.

•• Sullivan, op. cit., p. 14!l.

EMPIRICISM

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105

I£ relationships, reactions, and experience at the highest are
art, then empiricism gives most of the answers. John Dewey
tried to construct a practical philosophy which could guide
choices and furnish a theory of value. But a philosophy which
restricts itself to a process perspective faces a serious difficulty
in the inability of these methods to scale values.
Thomism assigns special roles to each methodology.
If
beauty is one aspect of being or substance, then the empirical
data function to explain how art works. A metaphysical
approach is necessary to tell us what art and human nature
are and how art is valuable for achieving the goals of that
nature.
Philosophy is the study of wisdom. It includes then within itself
the sum of the sciences, each of which is trying to forge the instrument adapted to the order of the real which it undertakes to
explain; but beyond the problems raised by the different modes of
being, there is the problem raised by being. And it is not: How
does such-and-such a thing exist? It is: What is it "to exist"?
In what does existence consist? Why is there existence at all, since
that given to us does not appear to contain in itself a satisfactory
explanation of itself? Is it necessary or contingent? And if it is
contingent, does not it postulate a necessary existence as its cause
and its explanation? Such, then, is the object of the ultimate
science to which the human mind rises in the order of purely
natural knowledge--the science of existence beyond the sciences
of ways of existing. It is called "metaphysics "-a science which
was founded by the Greeks, who clearly realized the need for it,
and one which Christian philosophy will never allow to die . . .
because its object is the problem without which there would be no
other problems! 7
EDMUND

Chieago, Illinoia

•• Gilson, op. cit., p. 68.

J. DEHNERT

OCKHAM AND EFFICIENT CAUSALITY

S

OME four hundred years before David Hume wrote his
Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding a fourteenth
century philosopher and theologian had already encountered amazingly similar difficulties with the validity of the causal
proposition. William of Ockham had consistently attacked the
arguments for the existence of God which he found in the works
of his predecessors. The underlying basis for that attack is to
be found in the theory of causality which Ockham held. It is
the purpose of this article to explain that theory and to investigate the reasons which led Ockham to accept it. It will be
evident, I think, that these reasons not only anticipate the
difficulties of Hume concerning causality, but that they are at
the root of many modern attacks on the validity of the causal
proposition.
In the second place Ockham's theory of causality makes it
quite clear what happens to our knowledge of the metaphysical
structure of reality, when the human intellect is restricted to
an intuition of singular, sensible existents. St. Thomas had left
no doubt about man's capacity to know the existing, sensible
thing. He, however, had also made it quite clear that the mind
could come to a certain knowledge of principles and relationships, which could not be directly intuited, but which were
necessary for the existing sensible thing to be and to function
the way it did. Thus he was able to assert the reality of such
principles of being and operation. As a result, the universe of
Aquinas is one composed, not only of things, but of real principles of things which necessarily co-exist to make the thing
what it is and which explain, not only the whatness of the
thing, but also the reason for its presence in the realm of
limited existents. Such a universe can be validly approached
from the viewpoint of philosophy and can be given a philosophically valid explanation.

106

OCKHAM AND EFFICIENT

CAUSALITY

107

Such, as will be made clear from what follows, is not the case
with William of Ockham. Reality for him is no such composite
structure. There are no realities which compose the real. There
are just singulars, unique and uncomposed. The mind can and
does abstract various aspects or formalities from these singulars,
but such formalities cannot possibly be conceived as having any
reality of their own outside of the abstracting intellect. For
Ockham there is only one way to get at existence, and that is
in an intuition of the sensibly existing singular. Any further
intellectual activity prescinds from existence. Such an intellect
can never again assert the extra-mental reality of any of its
formulations or abstractions.
It is not surprising, then, that in examining the question of
the possibility of proving the existence of God, Ockham had
decisively rejected the validity of the ontological argument.
If one could prove that God did exist, there was only one way
to do it. That was to start with that world of experience which
was the primum cognitum and from that world build an argument which would prove conclusively that such a world was
unintelligible, unless there existed a God. It would seem that,
if ever there was a man capable of arguing from the data of
experience to the existence of a first cause of such data, that
man was William of Ockham. With his theory of intuition of
the singular existent, he had placed himself in direct contact
with the existing world. He insisted on the contingency of
that world and on its complete dependence on God. Did not
that contingency demand necessity somewhere for its ultimate
explanation? And was not causality a fact in that world of
facts with which Ockham was concerned? And if the mind
intuits the existing, contingent singular, does it not see in that
contingent singular the evidence that marks it indelibly as an
effect?
It is a bit startling, then, that Ockham not only answers in
the negative but proceeds to attack the traditional arguments
which had been used to prove the existence of God. It is
impossible to understand that attack, unless one first understands Ockham's teaching on the nature of causality. In his

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HARRY R. KLOCKER

treatment of causality Ockham willingly admits the Aristotelian division into four genera of causes. To each of these genera
there corresponds its own proper type of causality. To be an
efficient cause is to effect something or to act. The material
cause gives being in a material sense. The formal cause communicates being formally to the composite. About the nature
of the final cause he expresses some doubt, since he finds
difficulty with the definition which is given: the causality of the
final cause consists in moving the efficient cause to act. 1 We
shall restrict the present investigation to the nature of efficient
causality.
In the Summulae in Libros Physicorum 2 the efficient cause
is divided and subdivided into various kinds. At the start, we
may consider an efficient cause in the strict sense, in a wider
sense, or in the widest possible sense. In the last sense the term
efficient cause may be applied to anything which moves another
thing, and it is called an efficient cause for no other reason than
it is in some sense a mover. In the less wide sense an efficient
cause is that which gives another thing a definite determination,
as, for example, the builder does to the house he is building.
In the strict sense an efficient cause is that which brings something new into existence, as when fire produces fire. This last
type of efficient cause can be subdivided into various kinds.
There is the sufficient cause as opposed to the insufficient, the
1 Il Sent., 8, G. (Lyons Edition, 1945).
"De motione finis notandum est: quod
sicut sunt quattuor causarum genera, sic cuilibet causarum correspondet propria
causatio. Causatio autem efficientis nota est satis quod est efficere quodlibet vel
agere."

" Causatio causae materialis est dare esse materialiter."
" Et causatio causae formalis est dare esse formaliter composito. Sed de
causatione causae finalis est magis dubium. Dicitur enim communiter quod
causatio ejus est movere efficiens ad agendum. Istud movere non est realiter
aliud nisi ipsum finem amari ab agente vel saltern ipsum amari vel aliquid fieri
vel aliquid velle propter finem amatum."
2 Summulae in Libros Physicorum, pars 2, c. 8. (Venice, 1506).
"Causa efficiens
tripliciter accipitur: stricte, large et largissime. Dicitur stricte quando causat rem
noviter existentem, ita quod nihil illius rei praecessit, sicut quando ignis causat
ignem. Dicitur large quando est ilia quae facit aliquid esse aliquale, et sic artifex
est causa domus. Dicitur largissime causa efficiens pro omni movente, nee propter
aliud dicitur efficiens nisi quod movet."

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109

universal as opposed to the particular, the immediate as
opposed to the mediate, and the first cause as opposed to
secondary causes. The sufficient cause is identified with what is
termed a total cause, and it is defined as " that which, when
given all the proper conditions, is sufficient to produce its
effect," or more exactly, perhaps, "a total cause is that which
is sufficient to produce some effect and without which such an
effect would not be produced." 3 Elsewhere the completely
sufficient cause is described as that which produces the whole
effect. 4 A universal cause is a cause which concurs with other
causes in the production of their effects, while a particular
cause produces just one effect, or at least only a few. 5 An
immediate cause is one which, when placed, produces an effect
and without which there can be no effect. God, we are told, is
such a cause with regard to creatures. 6 Here in the immediate
cause we find real and proper efficiency. It is the causa efjiciens
in stricto sensu.
So far, then, we can say that according to Ockham an efficient
cause in the strict sense of the word must be an immediate
cause. It must here and now be responsible for the effect, and
that effect must depend on it to the extent that without this
cause there would be no effect. Such an efficient cause need not
be the total cause of the effect, although it can be; and it will
3 Quodlibeta, I, 1.
(Argentine, 1491). "Causa totalis dupliciter describitur.
Primo causa totalis est illud quo posito omne alio circumscripto potest effectus
sufficienter produci. lllo modo causa totalis est sufficiens. Secundo causa totalis
est illud quod potest aliquem effectum sufficienter producere et sine eo non potest
produci talis effectus, et sic causa totalis et praecisa sunt idem. Primo modo dico
quod idem effectus numero potest simul habere duas causas totales, sicut idem
color potest produci a sole et igne aut duobus ignibus. Secundo modo duae causae
totales sunt contradictio. Effectus habens duas causas totales primo modo non
dependet essentialiter ab altera."
• 11 Sent., r, 5 Z. "Esse causa totalis est producere totum effectum. Deus
concurrit cum creatura et de facto non est causa totalis, quamvis potest esse."
• Summulae in Libros Physicorum, 2, 8. •• Causa universalis est ilia quae cum
diversis causis concurrrit ad effectus illarum causarum."
" Causa particularis est ilia quae non potest. nisi in unum effectum vel saltern
pauciores effectus."
11 II Sent., 4-5. "Causa
immediata est ilia qua posita habetur effectus et qua
non posita non habetur effectus. Deus est hujusmodi respectu cujuslibet creaturae."

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HARRY R. KLOCKER

always be total in this sense that without it there will never be
any effect. Such a cause is by its nature a sufficient cause, and
it is universal or particular as the case may be.
There may also be and there frequently are many efficient
causes at work in the production of an effect. They all may be
necessary and immediate causes to the extent that, if any are
absent, the effect would not be produced. Hence we can talk
about primary and secondary causes. The primary, or first
cause, however, is not necessarily unique and primary in all
orders of causality. Here we have the first hint of a break in
the causal line short of God; and, as we shall see later, it was a
break which Ockham never managed to bridge. A cause is
defined as primary or first in various senses. It can be a first
cause according to primacy of perfection, as, for example, the
sun is in relation to fire, when they both concur to produce an
effect. Secondly, a cause can be called a first cause according
to a primacy of non-limitation, as when one cause concurs in
producing many effects. Thirdly, a cause may be a first cause
with regard to a primacy of duration. This priority may be
one of understanding, natura prius, or one of fact, duratione
prius.1

Order between Causes
Between these first and secondary causes an order of some
sort exists. At times this order is an accidental one; at other
times it is essential. The latter type of order is defined as that
according to which the secondary cause depends on the first
cause in its very act of causing. It also may mean that the
secondary cause requires the first cause in order that the
secondary cause may act as a cause. Lastly, it may mean that
the secondary cause receives some power or influence from the
7 I Sent., 45. "Causa prima vel est prima primitate
perfectionis: sic si sol et
ignis concurrunt ad causandum effectum, sol erit causa prior primitate perfectionis.
Vel est prima primitate illimitationis: haec est ilia scilicet quod concurrit vel concurrere potest ad plures effectus producendos .... Vel causa dicitur prima primitate
durationis et hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel quod procedat secundum suam naturam
vel quod prius duratione causat."

OCKHAM AND EFFICIENT

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111

first cause. Here it is interesting to note that Ockham seems to
mean that this conferring of power by the first cause on the
second cause may take place previously, so that the secondary
cause may operate afterwards only by reason of this power
conferred and not in strict conjunction with the first cause.
. . . God may cause some effect and afterward permit another
secondary cause to conserve it and consequently to act, although
this is not universally true; in fact, it rarely or never happens. 8
This again seems to break the link between a series of ordered
causes going back necessarily to a supreme first cause. Even if
this never happens, the fact that it could happen is enough to
throw some disturbing doubts upon any proof that attempts
to demonstrate God as the first cause.
Nor does Ockham stop there but proceeds to question the
analogical character of such essentially ordered causes. Scotus
had stated that essentially ordered causes were specifically
different and of diverse orders because one was superior to and
more perfect than another. Ockham replied that superior can
be taken to mean either a priority of perfection or a priority
according to non-limitation. To take it in the first sense is
to beg the question. It is to say that one cause is in a different
order than another cause because the more perfect is the more
perfect. The statement, therefore, must be taken in the second
sense and must mean that every more universal cause is more
perfect than a less universal cause. This, however, is simply
not true. The more universal cause is sometimes more perfect
and sometimes less perfect. A heavenly body, for example,
which is not living, is less perfect than a living animal. But
it concurs with an animal in producing another living animal.
Here is obviously a case wherein a cause which belongs to a
superior order is less perfect than its subordinate cause in an
8 Ibid., H. "Secundo dicit (Scotus) quod Deus est causa prima primitate illimitationis et pri.mitate durationis primo modo dicta. Patet quod Deus est perfectior
omnibus, concurrit etiam ad omnem effectum, quod non facit quaecumque alia
causa. Negativa etiam patet, quia quamvis Deus possit causare aliquem effectum
et postea permittere aliam causam secundam conservare et per consequens agere,
non tamen hoc est universaliter verum, imo raro vel numquam accidit."

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HARRY R. KLOCKER

inferior order. Neither is it necessarily true that where essentially ordered causes are concerned, one can never act without
the other. Animals are produced, not only in conjunction with
a heavenly body and a particular agent, but also by putrefaction without the aid of a particular agent. 9
Ockham's discussion of essentially ordered causes comes
down to this: the essentiality of such an order seems to be a
merely factual one. There is no intrinsic necessity demanding
that all work in unison. In fact, at times the superior cause
can and does skip an i11feriorcause in producing an effect which
is in other circumstances connected with the inferior cause.
Secondly, the superior cause is superior only in the sense that
it is more universal; that is, it can reach to more effects. It is
not superior in the sense that it has a higher order of perfection.
Now in a series of causes where there is not necessarily a difference of perfection, where all may be of one order, or where
the various orders may be mixed indiscriminately, there is no
longer any reason for a neces.sary ordering of one to another.
The only real connection seems to be that they must all exist,
but it is not clear that even this existence must be simultan,eous.
Certainly it is clear that not all of these causes necessarily
enter into the effect; hence, not all of them need be immediate
causes. The distinction between essentially ordered causes and
those only accidentally ordered fades away almost to nothing.
This will become clearer, when we turn to a consideration of
how Ockham comes to a knowledge of causality. In the meantime there is one more fact to be noted. Nowhere in his
discussions of efficient causality does Ockham mention anything like a causal influx. Nowhere does he speak of the
universal cause of the existence of things. There is no reference
to a divine causality which has something strictly proper to it
and which only such a cause can give to every effect. The
effect is always one singular thing, and, while many causes
may concur to produce that thing, there is no room in the thing
itself to admit of various effects which can be traced to various
• I Sent., !l, 10.

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CAUSALITY

118

causes. To say that one cause gave existence, while another
produced specification, would be meaningless to Ockham. Not
only would it be to destroy the unity of the existing singular,
but it would be an explicit denial of the previous identification
he had made between the essence of a thing and its existence. 10

Knowledge of Causality
That Ockham admits that there are causes actually operating
in the real order seems evident enough. There has been some
discussion about whether he admits causality as a universal
metaphysical law. Manser thinks that it is undeniable that Ockham doubted the validity of causality in this sense, and he argues
from Ockham's denial of the proposition: Omne quod movetur
ab alio movetur. 11 Gilson seems to say that, while Ockham
admitted the validity of the causal proposition, his understanding and explanation of what it signified are, in reality, a denial
of the proposition. 12 Abbagnano states that Ockham's denial
of the proposition, Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, was a
denial of a physical principle and does not necessarily include a
denial of causality itself. 13 Let us tum to Ockham himself and
learn, if we can, how a cause is known and what validity the
causal proposition possesses.
We can begin by recalling two principles of which Ockham
was very fond, and of which he makes constant use in his
10 Summa
Totius Logicae, (Venice, 1506). "Unde quando homo non dependet
sicut tunc non est, ita tunc non est homo: et ideo non est plus imaginandum quod
essentia est indifferens ad esse et non esse, quam quod est indifferens ad essentiam
et non essentiam. Quia sicut essentia potest esse et non esse, ita esse potest esse
essentia et non esse essentia; et ideo talia argumenta: essentia potest esse et non
esse, ergo esse distinguitur ab essentia, non valent sicut nee talia valent: essentia
potest esse essentia et potest non esse essentia, igitur essentia distinguitur ab
essentia; essentia potest esse sub opposito essentiae, igitur essentia distinguitur ab
essentia."
Cf. Quodlibeta, 2, 7. "Unde idem omnino significatur et consiguificatur per
unum et reliquum (essentia et esse)."
11 Manser, "Drei Zweifler am Kausalprinzip,"
Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und Spec.
Theologie, 1912.
12 Gilson, E., Unity of Philosophical Experience, Charles Scribner's
Sons, New
York, 1946, pp. 87 seq.
13 Abbagnano, N., Guglielmo di Occam, Lanciano, 1981.

114

HARRY R. KLOCKER

discussions, not only o£ cognition, but also o£ causality. The
first principle is that only intuitive knowledge brings the mind
into contact with the real order o£ things. It is in this way that
the mind grasps the singular existent and grasps it in its singularity. All other knowledge is necessarily abstract. The second
principle is that this real order consists o£ concrete singular
things and o£ them only. These things, furthermore, are
absolutely distinct £rom one another and are known as such.
I£ there are actually causes at work, and i£ causality is something real, these will be known only in the mind's intuitions of
existing objects. In these intuitions o£ the real order, what the
mind apprehends is either a conjunction o£ two things or a
succession o£ one thing after another. We know fire. We see
that, when fire is brought into contact with wood, the wood
gets hot. Take the fire away and the wood cools off again.
Because in our experience this is always so, we say that fire is
the cause o£ heat.
We have seen that £or Ockham the real and proper efficient
cause was an immediate cause. He had defined such a cause as
one at the presence o£ which an effect was produced, and at the
absence o£ which no effect was produced. That he is defining
a proper cause in terms o£ being present, he makes quite clear.
Properly speaking any cause is called a real cause at whose presence
the effect is produced. From this it follows that a remote cause is
not really a cause because its presence is not enough to produce an
effect. Otherwise Adam could be called the cause of me. But that
is false because non-being cannot be called the cause of being.' 4

What he means is that not only must cause and effect exist
simultaneously, but that they must also be experienced simultaneously. But is even this simultaneous experience o£ what he
calls cause and effect enough to guarantee that the one thing
"II Sent., 5, K. " Proprie loquendo quaelibet causa proprie dicta ad
praesentiam potest poni effectus, et ipsa non posita non potest poni effectus, potest
dici causa immediata. Ex hoc sequitur quod causa remota non est causa quia ad
ejus praesentiam non sequitur effectus: aliter Adam potest dici causa mei, quod non
est verum: quia non ens non potest dici causa entis et similiter causa et effectus
proprie loquendo simul sunt . . . et si Deus concurrat cum causa secunda utraque
est immediata. (Italics are the author's.)

OCKHAM AND EFFICIENT

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115

is really the cause of the other? The answer is No. When I
say, for example, that God is an immediate and principal cause,
I can mean one of three things: first, that God could produce
all effects without the aid of any creature; secondly, that when
God co-operates with a creature, He does so only because He
does not wish to produce the whole effect Himself; thirdly, the
creature could not produce any effect, unless it were helped by
God. 15 Accordingly, it cannot be demonstrated that any effect
is produced by a secondary cause. Although in my experience
it always happens that, when fire is brought near to something
inflammable, that inflammable thing always burns, it could still
be true that fire is not the cause of that combustion. God could
so have arranged things that He Himself would cause the
burning, when fire was brought near to something burnable. 16
All that the cognitive intuition gives me is the same sequence
of events, when two things are brought into proximity with
one another. There is no intuition of a causal influx. Hence, I
can never assert with certitude that the one thing is the cause
of the other.
In all this Ockham seems to be admitting that there is such
a thing as causality, but that it is impossible to know concretely
in what particular things causality is verified. Add to this the
fact that the things which I experience, I experience as distinct
one from another. The apprehension of one such object contains in itself no knowledge of another object. However perfectly I may know one thing, that knowledge will never lead
me to the knowledge of another thing distinct from it. 17 Even
II Sent., 5, Q.
Ibid., R. " Ex hoc sequitur quod non potest demonstrari quod aliquis effectus
producitur a causa secunda; quia licet semper ad approximationem ignis ad
combustibile sequatur combustio, cum hoc tamen potest stare quod ignis non sit
ejus causa, quia Deus potuit ordinasse quod semper ad praesentiam ignis passo
approximato ipse solus causaret combustionem."
17 Quaestio P1·ima Prologi, 9.
(Edited by P. Boehner, 0. F. M., Paderborn, 1939.)
"Inter causam et effectum est ordo et dependentia maxime essential is, et tamen
ibi notitia incomplexa unius rei non continet notitiam incomplexam alterius rei.
Et hoc etiam quilibet in se experitur, quia quantumcumque perfecte cognoscat
aliquam rem, numquam cogitabit cogitatione simplici et propria de alia re, quam
numquam prius apprehendit nee per sensum nee per intellectum."
15

16

116

HARRY R. KLOCKER

if it were granted that one particular thing did cause another,
it still is not necessary to say that the knowledge of the one
must cause in me the knowledge of the other. 18 As a matter
of fact, it can never be known with certainty that one thing
is the cause of another. As we have seen, the real and only
cause may be God. Not only can God do whatever any existing
object can, but there is also the possibility that in created
nature an effect can be produced by another and unknown
cause. 19
To the objection that once an effect is known, we can know
the cause from which such an effect naturally depends, Ockham
answers that we can only know that in general there is a cause
and that that cause must have some proper characteristics.
What that cause is in particular, however, we can never know. 20
From the existence and the beauty of a painting, we can argue
to the existence and the ability of a painter. But we can never
know directly the particular painter who did the work. The
correspondence which is required between knowledge and its
object to have objective validity is of an entirely different
nature from that which exists between an effect and its cause. 21
Nor is the similarity which exists between cause and effect
enough to lead to a knowledge of the cause. The similarity will
be meaningless, unless we already know that thing or person
18 In
Prolog. Sent., 9, L. "Non obstante quod entitas unius rei sit causa
entitatis alterius, non tamen oportet quod notitia esset causa notitiae."
10 II Sent., 5, R.
"Unde per null urn effectum potest probari quod aliquis sit
homo, maxime per nullum effectum quod apparet in nobis, quia omnia quae videmus
in homine, potest angelus in corpore facere. . . . Ideo non est mirabile si non
potest demonstrari quod aliquid sit causa."
20 I Sent., 1, 4. "Quocumque
causato cognito potest cognosci quaelibet causa in
universali, puta quod habet finem et efficientem, et multae conditiones illarum
causarum possunt ex ilia re cognosci. Sed illud quod est causa non potest ex
quocumque causato in particulari cognosci vel cognitione propria sive equivalenti."
21 Giacon, C., S. J., Gulielmo di Occam, Milano, Societa Editrice, Vita e Pensiero,
1941, T. 1, p.
"Daii' esistenza e daiia beiiezza di una pittura possiamo
argomentare all' esistenza e I'abilita di un pittore; rna Ia pittura non fa conoscere
direttamente il determinato pittore che l'ha eseguita. La correspondenza, che e
richiesta tra cognizione e oggetto per avere cognizione oggetiva, e di tutt' altra
natura da queiia esistente tra effetto e causa. La causa puo restare un ignoto
'Nournenon di tipo Kantiano.' "

OCKHAM AND EFFICIENT

CAUSALITY

117

whose similitude is expressed in the effect. If one should see a
statue of Hercules and had never before known Hercules, he
would still know no more about Hercules than about Achilles. 22
It does not seem to have occurred to Ockham that from a
statue of Hercules one could, perhaps, learn something about
the sculptor. Practically the same answer is given to the
objection that, at least if the cause is known as cause, then
the effect proper to such a cause will also be known. To know a
cause as _cause according to Ockham already presupposes that I
know the effect. 23 The argument here has been turned around,
but he is still insisting on the same thing. From an existing
effect I cannot know the particular cause. Neither from a
knowledge of a given cause can I know that it must have this
or that particular effect. Cause and effect are distinct things
and always remain distinct. The knowledge of one never
includes the knowledge of the other, just as the existence of
one .never includes the existence of the other.
In attemptingto evaluate Ockham'sposition on causalitytwo
points seem to be fairly clear. The first is that he seems to
have held the existence of causality. Not only does he affirm
frequently that there are such things as cause and effect, but
he actually attributes universal causality to God. He speaks
of the heavenly bodies as causes, and he thinks that, in many
cases at least, we can safely conclude to the fact that created
things exercise causality upon one another. It is true that he
questions whether such statements can be demonstrated in the
philosophical sense, but we are not at present concerned with
that. In view of what Ockham himself says it would be
difficult to deny that he admitted the validity of causality.
In the second place, it is equally clear that his analysis of
how we come to a knowledge of causality leaves something to
be desired. By the time he has finished that analysis there is
little left to causality except a mere sequence of events. Be•• Pt·olog. in Sent., 9, L. "Quando notitia similitudinis cansat notitiam illius
cujus est similitudo, ilia non est causa sufficiens cum intellectu, sed necessario
requiritur notitia habitualis illius cujus est similitudo."

•• Ibid., F.

118

HARRY R. KLOCKER

cause of his theory of cognition Ockham had to restrict knowledge of cause and effect to what could actually be experienced
in the real order. Since the things which could be experienced
were absolutely distinct and were apprehended as such, he was
forced to admit that causality could mean no more than the
. constant succession of one thing after another. To admit an
intuition of a causal influx distinct from A and B by which A
could be called the cause of B would have involved him in
great difficulty. To have an intuition of something meant that
the particular thing in question existed in its own right as a
distinct singular. It could then be known in its own right
distinct from everything else. It could even be created by God
and maintained in existence as distinct from everything else.
Obviously there was no hint in our experience of any such
thing. There was nothing left for him to do but to deny that
the causal relation was really distinct from the thing itself.

Reduction of Causality to a Contingent Predicable
In answer to the objection that what comes to a thing
accidentally must be really distinct from that thing, Ockham
replied that an accident can sometimes mean only a contingent
predicable. Causality is this sort of an accident, and as such
does not signify anything really distinct from the thing itself.
If accident is to be taken here as something really inhering in
a subject, then causality cannot be called an accident. 24 Besides, to make causality something real in its own right would
involve a contradiction. He argues from one of his favorite
principles viz., that God can do anything by Himself which He
ordinarily does through the medium of secondary causes. Now
God can through the medium of secondary causes bring it
about that a certain thing becomes an agent, and then there
will come to that agent the relation of efficiency. God, therefore
•• Quodlibeta, 6, 12. "lllud quod accidentaliter con venit alicui non est idem cum
illo. Sed respectus cfiectivus est hujusmodi. Ergo, respondeo quod accidens
aliquando accipitur pro predicabili contingenter. Et sic respectus causalitatis est
accidens; sed tale non significat aliquam rem distinctam a rebus absolutis. Aliquando
accipitur pro accidente inherente subjecto extra animam, et sic non est accidens
ista relatio.''

OCKHAM AND EFFICIENT

CAUSALITY

119

could bestow upon that same thing the relation of efficiency
without the help of any other created cause. Now consider
what has happened. We have something which God has made
an efficient cause. But the only thing it can possibly have
effected is that relation of efficiency. However, we have already
said that God had done that. Hence, either we have an efficient
cause that has effected nothing, or God cannot really do everything that secondary causes can do. In either case we end up
with a contradiction. 25
Similarly in the following question of the Quodlibeta, Ockham proceeds to reduce all relations to identity with some
absolute. Aristotle, he tells us, did not really mean to say that
relations exist outside the mind. In the predicaments the Philosopher is treating of the terms of propositions. Some of those
terms are absolute, as those employed to signify substance and
quality. Some terms are connotative, as those used to signify
quantity, and some are relative. These signify a relation because they are coined to signify one thing and to consignify
another without whose existence such terms could not be
verified. 26
Causality as such is a term of this kind. When we say a
thing is a cause, we mean to signify the thing directly and to
consignify another thing which we call an effect. The converse
is also true. He is insisting again that what is apprehended is
first one thing and then another. Because they are apprehended
25 Ibid., " Omnem rem quod Deus potest facere mediante causa secunda efficiente,
per se potest facere sine omni causa efficiente. Si ergo in ista efficiente ponatur
respectus efficientiae causatus a Deo mediante ista efficiente, Deus potest ilium
respectum facere sine causa secunda. Ponatur ergo in esse et tunc impossibile
sequitur. Quia Deus efficit ilium respectum in ilia efficiente. Ergo istud est
efficiens . . . et non est efficiens nisi illius respectus. Ergo non solus Deus efficit
ilium respectum. Et ita ex ilia propositione sequitur contradictio."
26 Quodlibeta, 6, 16. "In predicamentis
philosophus tractat de terminis propositionum. Quia isti termini aliqui sunt absoluti sicut termini in genere substantiae
et qualitatis. Aliqui sunt connotativi sicut termini in genere quantitatis; et aliqui
relativi. Qui ideo significant ad aliquid, quia. sunt instituti ad significandum unum,
aliquid aliud consignificando, sine cujus existentia et cognitione non potest talis
terminus de aliquo verificari. . . . Et ideo isti termini proprie sunt in ad aliquid
et condividuntur contra illos terminos quod absolute significant substantiam et
qualitatem et nihil aliud significant."

HARRY R. KLOCKER

habitually in association with each other, or as following one
upon the other, we can call one a cause and the other an effect.
Neither cause nor effect signifies anything in the real order
distinct from the things themselves. Cause and effect are contingent predicables which have meaning only in the mind.
It can be admitted, I think, that Ockham's analysis of
causality was taken from the physical order. In that sense it
was, as F. Copleston points out, a completely empirical investigation.27 We can admit, too, that in this order it is often
impossible to tell just what is the particular and immediate
cause of a given effect. We do experience many effects the
causes of which are hidden from us. But when we say, even if we
do not know the particular cause of the effect, there is a cause,
then we are going beyond the mere physical order and asserting
a conclusion that is valid in all orders of being. This conclusion
is based on and follows from fundamental principles, such as:
From non-being cannot come being; whatever is moved is
moved by something else; potency can be reduced to act only
by something already in act. We are saying, further, that in our
experience of one thing acting on another we come to a knowledge that there is more here than just the association-however
constant and habitual it may be--of those two things. In other
words, we are affirming as something real a causal connection
which makes understandable the constant association we actually experience. It is because of this that we can assert that the
same reality must be at work in other orders where change and
becoming also take place.
Ockham, however, made no such claim. His apprehension of
change and becoming was limited to the world of empirical
knowledge, and in that experience he admits nothing beyond
the physical. In all of his analysis causality means nothing
more than association, sequence, and succession. He knows
only the things themselves which are associated, or which
succeed one another with habitual regularity. Again it is his
theory of knowledge which forbids him to go any further. All
07 Copleston, F., S. J., A HistO'T'fl of Philosophy, vol. ill, p. 72, Newman Press,
Westminster, Maryland, 1955.

OCKHAM AND EFFICIENT

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121

abstractive cognition presupposes an intuition of the singular
existent. Such abstract knowledge differs from the intuitive in
that it tells us nothing about the existence or non-existence
of things. Furthermore, this abstract knowledge cannot go
beyond the data of intuitive knowledge, but can only combine,
relate, and draw conclusions. Now if the data acquired from
intuitive knowledge, from experience of the existing world,
give only association and sequence as far as causality is concerned, then how are we justified in asserting that causality is
something real which transcends mere association in its metaphysical implications? And if some of those metaphysical
implications are actually denied, as they were by Ockham, can
we say that he meant any more by causality than the actual
experience which he describes?
Conceivably it could be answered that, while all that is
actually apprehended in e;x:perience is association and succession, it is still possible to justify causality metaphysically by
reasoning on the data of experience. Yet such an answer would
have its difficulties for Ockham. For him to admit this would
alsq entail admitting that there was something in reality which
was not and could not be intuited. In itself this is not an
insurmountable difficulty, since Ockham is willing to admit as
much of God or an angel. What seems to make such an
explanation impossible is the fact that to admit it is to admit
also that a causal influx, since it is real, is a singular existent in
its own right. As such it would be absolutely distinct from
every other thing. We have seen, however, that Ockham denied
the reality o£ such relations as distinct from the things which
are related. He made o£ them mere contingent predicables
existing as such only in the mind. In the light o£ this it is very
difficult to see how causality could have meant any more for
Ockham than did the experiential fact. Gilson's conclusion
seems to be entirely valid.
Since the origin of causality cannot be found in the thing itself,
or in the intuition of the thing by the intellect, it must be explained
by some reason; and there is but one: it is what Ockham called
habitualis notitia, and what Hume will simply call habit.

HARRY R. KLOCKER

True enough there are such things as relations of causality, and
there is an essential order of dependence between effects and their
causes, for their regular succession never changes; but since there
is nothing more in causality than the habitual association of ideas
caused in us by repeated experience, there is nothing more than a
regular sequence of events in physical causality. 28

It is little wonder, then, that we find Ockham refusing to
build an argument for the existence of God on the foundation
of the universal validity of the causal proposition. In the light
of what we have seen, it is difficult to understand just what
Ockham means when he refers to God as a universal cause.
Certainly, there is nothing in his experience which makes
such an affirmation possible. This Ockham realized. Whatever
affirmations he may make about the divine causality-and he
makes many-he was never able to accept any of them as
really demonstrative. He gives many reasons for his refusal
to accept them. Almost all of them will return later to keep
modern philosophy, or at least much of it, locked within the
limits of physical experience.
It is evident, too, I think, what a tremendous difference there
is between the realism of a philosopher like Ockham and the
realism of St. Thomas. In the long run Ockham can be certain
of only one reality-the concrete, material singular which is·
present to the knower and grasped by him in a singular intuitive act of the mind. When all relationships are identified with
the ontological reality of the singular existent, the result is a
universe of such startling uniqueness and independent realities
that very few conclusions can be drawn philosophically about
their origins. The result for metaphysics is disastrous. It can
no longer be-as it was for St. Thomas-the expression of an
insight into the existential structure of the real. Metaphysics,
as Ockham conceived it, can only represent the mental relationships which the mind itself establishes between its various
conceptualizations of a myriad of concrete singulars. This is a
science of concepts, a logic, which enables one to think consistently and coherently about reality, but which gwes one no
•• Gilson, E., op. cit., pp. 87 seq.

OCKHAM AND EFFICIENT

CAUSALITY

123

assurance that reality is in any way like the concepts which
one forms of it.
It comes as no surprise, then, to find Ockham asserting that
much of what was once considered philosophically demonstrable is really in the realm of faith. It simply became impossible for him to separate philosophy from revelation and
theology and retain any certainty. As far as any truth which
transcends experience is concerned, that truth can be substantiated only by a revelation or an infallible authority. Take away
that revelation and that authority, and man is left with sensible
experience and probability. In such a situation there can be
only one possible approach to certainty-the method of investigation and verification employed by the natural sciences.
Ockham would find himself much more at home in the philosophical milieu of today than he did in that of the fourteenth
century.
St. Thomas had given philosophy its charter, asserting that
intellect was made for being and capable of achieving an understanding of being in its own right. Experience was necessary,
of course, but it was possible to transcend experience because
the mind could understand what was demanded to make
experience itself possible. In understanding what lay behind
experience the intellect gained a valid insight into the metaphysical structure of reality. Ockham recalled that charter.
Philosophy might be able to get at being, but it was only
sensible being with which it could adequately deal. In the last
analysis it became apparent that philosophy could no longer
deal adequately even with that.
HARRY

Regis College,
Denver, Colorado

R. KLOCKER, s. J.

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS
THOMAS C. O'BRIEN, 0. P., S. T. Lr., is a professor of Moral Theology in
·the Pontifical Faculty of Theology, Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.
EDMUND J. DEHNERT is currently a teacher in the Department of Music,
University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois where he is completing
doctoral studies in Musicology.
HARRY R. KLOCKER, S. J., is Chairman of the Department of Philosophy,
Regis College, Denver, Colorado.
JAMES R. CoFFEY, 0. P., Archivist for the Dominican Fathers, Province of
St. Joseph, is stationed at the Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.
QUITMAN F. BECKLEY, 0. P., J. C. B., LL.D., long-time Director of Catholic
Activities at Princeton University, is at present stationed at the
Dominican House of Studies, Washington, D. C.

U4

BOOK REVIEWS
The Meaning and Matter of History-A Christian View. By MARTIN CYRIL
D'ARcY, S. J. New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1959. Pp. 309,
with appendix and index. $5.50.
" History started off under the protection of Clio, one of the Muses; it
was under the inspiration of one who would give mortals insights into the
meaning of man's drama ....
"Today, books on the philosophy of history are constantly appearing,
but they are all open to the criticism of trying to generalize and find laws
of behaviour on insufficient data. Either they have to fall back on the
broadest generalizations or they omit facts or force facts in applying their
laws. It may be, therefore, that a philosopher should be more modest in
his claims, that he should confess to the historian that he cannot compett>
with him and has no intention of competing with him. He is an artist as
well as a scientist, relying, if need be, on poetic truth to make an intelligible
theme out of his vast material."
The above quotations from the present work might well serve as a
thumbnail review for they sum up what the author has been trying to
do in this book. Fr. D'Arcy does not attempt to formulate a philosophy of
history although he does suggest the lines that should be followed if a sane
and solid " philosophy " of history is to be arrived at. The author himself
does not like the term "philosophy " of history. He is more than doubtful
that systems based upon reason alone, systems such as those contrived by
Hegel and Toynbee, can provide a solution to the multifarious riddles of
history and really bring order into the seemingly chaotic movements of
man upon the earth. And he is certain that for the Christian no such
philosophy can exist. Without certain concepts for the knowledge of which
man must depend upon Divine Revelation, and therefore, Faith (e. g. the
doctrine of original sin), any interpretation of the past or attempt to
provide a possible pattern for the future, must be in vain. Therefore, in
common with C. S. Lewis (The Screwtape Letters) he prefers the term
"historicism." But he does not use the word (as Lewis uses it) with overtones of contempt.
In an introductory chapter to this study of the different systems which
historicists have invented ranging from Thucydides to Toynbee, Fr. D'Arcy
examines the nature of historical knowledge to determine what right history
has to claim any truth at all. He refutes the arguments advanced by certain
scientists that history can never arrive at truth but only an approximation
to truth, since it is impossible for it to proceed by the methods used by the

U5

126

BOOK REVIEWS

physical sciences to discover truth. Fr. D'Arcy admits the obvious
(although many historians do not) and concedes that while history can
and does use the physical sciences as auxiliaries, it cannot itself make use
of the methods of the laboratory in arriving at its own peculiar certainty
which differs from the certainty of the theologian, the metaphysician and
the physical scientist-but it is none the less certain for all that. It is, if
you will, a moral certainty, but moral certainty as used in the philosophic
sense. For the certainty of history is surely as valid as the certainty of the
law courts, and the evidence of history is no less convincing than much of
the evidence upon which cases are decided at law. Fr. D'Arcy thinks that
we can know more about the characters of history than we can know about
the people who live next door and we can judge the times in which they
lived better than we can judge our own because our judgment is not
fogged by passion. If you would call this " only moral certainty " Fr.
D'Arcy has no quarrel with you as long as you realize that it is as good
and as great as any man has in conducting his social life in the present. To
the objection that the conclusions of history rest ultimately to a great
measure upon human faith, Fr. D'Arcy would reply that so, too, does
much of human relationship in the present. And the nature of that faith
and the certainty it produces, he believes, has never been adequately dealt
with by the philosophers.
Having treated the problem of the possibility of obtaining certainty from
history the author devotes the next section of his work to a discussion of
" History and Historicism," the relative merits of history as mere bare
chronicle (which the scientists and the historical positivists claim is the
only history) and history as it is worked over by the minds of men of
genius such as Gibbon and Momsen. It is Fr. D'Arcy's opinion that the
chronicle, far from being the best and/or only history, is not worthy to be
called history at all. He claims that it leads to no conclusion and might
be compared to experiments in the laboratory which lead to no result. And
this, while it might be the work of a skilled technician, is not the work
of a scientist. It is only by passing through the mind of man that history
can have any meaning or even cogency and clarity. It is only the mind
of man that gives the world itself any meaning: " ... for it is man who
has slowly built up this new world of knowledge, putting the disparate
together and tracing out processes which give meaning and unity to an
otherwise senseless world. If we take away mind there is nothing left which
could be recognized as true, beautiful and dynamic. The Signs of the
Zodiac, the Milky Way and even the satellites have their names taken from
them; gone are the moon-goddess and the months of the year, the names of
the flowers of the field, and the virtue of fire and water. The circulation of
the blood, the nervous system, the pharmacopeia are unrecorded, and we are
left with blobs of matter, processes, death and life to which one can hardly
attribute meaning, law, order or unification without implying mind. It is

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not surprising that at various times philosophers have plumbed for a form
of idealism, according to which the material world is nothing but latent
mind. Without belief in God it is easy to fall back upon such a supposition." History needs the historicist as matter needs the scientist; as nature
needs the poet; as the created cosmos needs the philosopher.
For wimt of a better name, the historicist, might be called a philosopher
because he attempts to do for the matter of history what the philosopher
tries to do for all of creation, i.e., put some order into apparent chaos and
meaning into the seemingly meaningless. And, although man has been
trying to do this for history for a very long time no one has succeeded in
presenting a system that is satisfying to the mind and in accord with the
facts. Despite his unquestionable genius, Hegel failed in his theory of thesis,
antithesis and synthesis as an explanation of universal history. The best
that can be said for it is that it does show the working of an extremely
fine mind but it serves more as an intellectual exercise than as a working
theory to explain history. It requires a constant forcing of the facts to fit
the theory, but this, of course did not at all disturb Karl Marx when he
penned his mystic "Das Kapital.'' Hegel's theory, robbed of mind and
reduced to matter, served Marx very well indeed. The same inadequacy
can be charged to Toynbee's theory of challenge and response. In the words
of Pro. E. H. Carr, "J\1r. Toynbee soars above the facts.' And this same
critic levels the same charge against Oswald Spengler, another great modern
historicist.
It is Fr. D'Arcy's opinion that only a Christian thinker can produce
an acceptable philosophy of history and that such an endeavor cannot be
a mere "philosophy." History can have no meaning unless the philosopher
(or historicist to use the better term) bases his philosophy upon Divine
Revelation. The theological concepts of Original Sin and the Redemption,
the Divinity of Christ and the continuation of Christ in world history
through His Church are absolutely essential if one is to get any meaning
at all from the story of man on this earth. Unfortunately, the great
Christian thinkers of the past paid practically no attention to the need
for a "philosophy " of history. Augustine, in his " City of God " is the only
one who even touched on its fringes and he was acting more as a polemicist
with a case to state than as a philosopher when he did so. And his outlook
is very limited since he is interested only in proving, in answer to pagan
attacks, that Christianity was not the cause of Rome's decline but rather
that the seeds of that decline had always been present in paganism and
just happened to fructify co-incidentally with the rise of Christianity. And
other theologians of the minor sort, such as Bossuet, fail because they
knew too little of both theology and history. Bossuet, in his famous
" Discours " written for the benefit of the Dauphin of France ties up the
whole of history (meaning the Graeco-Roman, Judaic and Christian medieval) into a neat package which might well be labeled "The Workings of

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Divine Providence." Providence holds no mystery for Bossuet. It is like
a legend written on a wall and he who runs may read. Bossuet has no
trouble at all in showing forth what was the real intent of the Divine
Mind in all the events of such history as he knows.
Of all the historicists who have formulated theories of history Fr. D'Arcy
considers Gianbattista Vico (1668-1744), facile princeps. Not because Vico
had greater genius than Hegel or greater erudition than Toynbee, but
because Vico had the inestimable advantage of being a convinced theist and,
perhaps, a believing Christian. Vico, in accordance with the scholarly
temper of his age, professed himself to be a strict scientist in his approach
to history and claimed to use no method of which the most scrupulous
scientist could not approve. But nonetheless the backbone of his work
(upon which he labored for forty-five years) is the Christian concepts of
Original Sin (which Vico thought he arrived at through logic-as the
modern scholar Heard thought he discovered it through psychology), the
Redemption (also a logical conclusion) and the Christian conception of
Providence. With these tools to work with, the industrious Vico turns out
a work that comes close to being a true and satisfying " philosophy " of
history.
He has not yet, in Fr. D'Arcy's opinion, been even approached by
modern theologians who have treated the subject. Of these Karl Barth
has written the most, but with the principal end in view of proving that
there can be no Christian philosophy of history, since the gap separating
the City of God from the City of Man is unbridgeable. And the laws that
apply in one city do not apply in the other. They cannot because each city
is in a different world. Of the Catholics who have done some work on the
subject, Pere Yves Congar, 0. P. seems to stand with Barth but Pere
Leopold Malevez, in an article in the Nouvelle Revue Theologique of
March, 1949, holds that those who accuse Cougar of holding for the
Barthian dichotomy are mistaken. Pere Malevez believes that is it a
surface likeness only and it does not go very deep. To Barth this world
is an exile and has no communication with the world of faith. But to
Pere Congar, as to all Catholics, Christ will be with us all days and the
kingdom comes to be secretly perhaps, but sacramentally, and is ever
operative in the souls of the just. However, Fr. D'Arcy thinks that Pere
Congar has little to offer for a true philosophy of history.
He finds of more interest the theories of Joseph Pieper, the German
Thomist (at least I believe ;pieper considers himself a Thomist) who offers
the beginning of a philosophy of history in his work, tJbner das Ende der
Zeit. It is Pieper's opinion that neither philosopher nor historian is
capable of formulating a "philosophy of history." "Theology," he says,
"must take up the task of interpreting history, where science and philosophy come to the limits of their understanding." Pieper takes as his
source-book for a philosophy of history the most mystical of the books of

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the Bible, the Apocalypse of St. John, where the image of the two cities
originated. Pieper does not hesitate to call what he has written a philosophy of history. "He holds," says Fr. D'Arcy, "that a Christian has
an advantage because he knows from divine revelation the beginning and
the end .of it. Without such an aid from theology a so-called philosophy
is bound to become nothing more than a sociology of culture."
Fr. D'Arcy, as I said in the beginning, does not present his own philosophy of history. But in the final section of this work he does indicate
what he considers to be the basis of such a philosophy and gives a general
description of the lines along which it should develop. He thinks that
Cardinal Newman was on the right track when, in his Essay on Development, he explained the continuance of Christ in history by use of the
Pauline figure of the Mystical Body. "A liason exists,'' says D'Arcy,
" in that the Christian Religion is historical through and through and.
reaches out to all nations. Furthermore it has in every stage of its existence appropriated to its purposes the contemporary ideas, arts and organizations, and in turn breathed its own spirit into those native forces.
Perhaps in this cross-fertilization we can find a clue to that Headship in
all things of which St. Paul wrote."
It would seem from all this that the " philosopher " of history will be
neither a philosopher nor a theologian but a mystic. For the Christian
philosophy of history, as D'Arcy sees it, will have to be every bit as
mystical as the mysterious workings of Hegel's unholy trinity of thesis,
antithesis and synthesis. And, since everybody and his brother seems to
be suggesting a philosophy of history, or at least a basis from which such
a philosophy might. be worked out, may I suggest that a much sounder
basis than any treated by Fr. D'Arcy in this present work might be found
in the tract " De Trinitate " as it is developed by St. Thomas Aquinas
in his Summa Theologica. It would seem to me that sound principles would
be (and are) easier to find there than in a prophetical book such as the
Apocalypse, which is replete with the language of prophecy, the meaning
of which we probably will not know until the events it foretells come to
pass. The Pauline doctrine of the Mystical Body has but recently begun
to be systematically explored and developed. Further it could never, by
its very nature, supply the key to universal history (even used in conjunction with the Apocalypse and the Book of Job) that is latent in the
principles by which Aquinas develops his doctrine of the Trinity.
Fr. D'Arcy brings to this work all the resources of his great erudition
and the keen mind of the philosopher. In my opinion the early part of the
book suffers from lack of re-working. It reads like a lecture delivered
from notes. The result is often obscurity of thought. The chapter on the
history of Israel and those on Christianity and Historicism have too much·
repetition. I think once would be sufficient to review the Old Testament.
Fr. D'Arcy manages to get in three or four reviews using, for the most

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part, the same material each time. There is also, in my opm10n, much
material not having any particular bearing on a philosophy of history in
these chapters, no matter what might be its interest for the moral theologian
(practical moral, that is). It makes for heavy reading especially when one
is plowing through it hoping to find something that looks like a philosophy
of history. But these are the flaws in the diamond. The book is the best
presentation of the subject of a Christian philosophy of history to appear
recently in the English-speaking world.
JAMES R. CoFFEY, 0. P.
Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

World Crisis and the Catholic. A Symposium. New York:
Ward, 1958. Pp. 245. $8.00.

Sheed and

It is the reviewer's opinion that World Crisis and the Catholic is an
important book. A symposium of monographs written for the most part
by distinguished scholars in connection with the Second World Congress
for the Lay Apostolate (Rome, October 5-13, 1957), the book covers the
whole field of Catholic Action, in such a way as to present a reasonable
apologetic for the Faith, as well as a source of inspiration to the reader.
No educated Catholic, priest or layman, who would understand the problems posed by the present world crisis, can afford to miss reading these
pages. As one of the contributors expresses it: "the years we are living
through-even the very months-are those of our last chance! " (p. 126)
Vittorino Veronese points out in his admirable preface that the book is
written by men and women who differ in race, culture, language, profession,
and, at times, opinion. There is no unity in the book save the common
purpose of the writers to represent the Church as the last hope in an
imperiled world. As Veronese declares in his preface: ". . . for the first
time in history the world is beginning to feel and think itself as a world
... where only the Catholic-the Univeral-Church can satisfy man's
deepest longing for unity." This hunger for world unity in the midst of a
gigantic struggle for political power by nations with conflicting political
ideals is the consequence of man's realization that the forces of destruction
brought to light by the development of physical research and technology
will mean either a better wor1d for all or no world at all.
The first chapter on The Christian Statesman presents an interview given
by Chancellor Adenauer of the German Federal Republic. Mr. Adenauer
is fully aware of the role of the Christian both as an individual and a
member of society. He believes that since the instrument for achieving
political aims in the modern democratic state is the political party,
Christians, if they want to suffuse public life with Christian principles,

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131

must do so through the political party. In this he carries on the tradition
of the old Centre party in pre-Hitler Germany. The idea of a political party
founded on comomn religious sentiments finds acceptance in many places
throughout the world, but the idea does not appeal to American Catholics.
Our two _party system, thus far, has made unnecessary such political blocs
in Congress.
Respecting the threat of atomic warfare on the one hand and dictatorship
and technocracy on the other, the Chancellor says that the general
condition of the whole world demands a developing rapprochement between
free peoples leading " to a world seeking genuine peace and a sound
ordered way of life." (From an allocution of Pope Pius XII to a German
delegation on the Pope's 80th birthday).
Dr. Karl Stern, German-born convert from Judaism and an internationally recognized neuro-pathologist and psychiatrist, has succeeded in
presenting Group Psychology in the Atomic Era in the Light of Christian
Philosophy in language intelligible to the layman. Discussing briefly the
destructiveness of nuclear energy and its terrifying implications, Dr. Stern
sets up a parallel between the potential destructive energy of matter and
the potential destructive forces in man's soul. "All this may sound
gloomy," he remarks, " but it is no exaggeration to say that there exists
an ocean of hostility and, if one was able to add all these elements of human
aggressivenes and hatred up to one single whole, one would arrive at a force
which is just as cosmic as that of nuclear energy." (p. 12) He points out
" there is such a thing as collective hate, a collective tension and so on.
And the same laws which govern the relations between individuals seem
to govern also the relations of groups of people, social groups and groups
of nations." (p. 18)
We are all aware of what propaganda can do to develop group hostility,
as in Germany, Italy, Russia. Why could not the same instrument be
employed for good? Certainly we can engender preferences. But can we
foster love by such means? Dr. Stern quite correctly points out that love
is intimately associated with the mystery of individual personality. It
cannot be mass-produced. It mul!t spring from personal conviction of the
importance of this neighbor of mine. With modern means of communication, we can create group tensions, opinions and a favorable or unfavorable
atmosphere, but adjusting " relationships between individuals is a matter
of conscience." And here Christian love must operate with greater effectiveness from the personal, individual conviction of its necessity for integrating man and his society. While acknowledging that it is necessary to
revise the moral theology of war owing to technological developments, Dr.
Stern declares: "No group (of nations) can be psychologically integrated
by a mere fear of danger from outside." Fully aware that love is the
strongest bond of union, he says: " ... it belongs to the noblest traditions
of the Church that the love of the good should be stronger in us than fear

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of the bad" (p. flO). He has no doubt about the ultimate triumph of
Christianity.
Dr. Kotaro Tanaka, in his article, World Peace and World Law, expresses
the opinion that " ... there is no way of attacking this problem (world
crisis) than the application of the methods required in social sciences
generally speculative and empiric, theoretical and historical, spiritual and
realistic, idealistic and positivistic and so on. We cannot agree with any
so-called monism where method is concerned. Man with his flesh and blood
and instincts which belong to the realm of nature, as a rational being
belongs to the world of the spirit and the noble mission of the human
being is nothing other than the spiritualization of nature. The peace so
eagerly desired is inseparably connected with this mission in that peace
means the termination of the struggle in which men are wolves towards
one another and each wages war upon all the rest. There is no peace in
the jungle. The human being alone has the privilege of striving for peace."
While stressing the importance of law in the quest for peace which is
related to justice, Tanaka says we must be wary of falling into the error
of believing in the omnipotence of law as did the legists in ancient China
and the Western positivist school from Machiavelli and Hobbes to the
thinkers of the latter part of the nineteenth century.
Dr. Tanaka's thesis is an answer to the enigma: evolution or revolution
and it is comprehensive and convincing. With the idea of co-existence
among nations of different ideologies, he has no sympathy. "Ideologically
speaking, compromise and neutrality between ' two worlds ' are unthinkable: "tertium non datur."
Dr. John Ching-Hsiung Wu has one of the finest essays in the book.
Chistianity the Only Synthesis Really Possible Between East and West
is, in this reviewer's opinion, the best thing that has been written on the
subject.
As the title suggests, Dr. Wu attempts to reconcile the East and the West
by pointing out the moral and religious ideals common to both. Referring
to the so-called non-Christian saints, (the pagan moralists), Dr. Wu
remarks that it is no mere coincidence that these men should have flourished
within the six centuries immediately preceding Christ. " Their doctrines
... are not unmixed with errors, and even where they are not erroneous,
they were inadequate and led the human mind to an impasse. But the
very impasse underlined the necessity of the Revelation." The brotherhood
ideal of the New Testament recognizes neither Jew nor Gentile, neither
East nor West. What we have to synthesize are certain qualities of mind,
patterns of thought and feeling acquired by tlie peoples of East and West.
Anent the natural and pantheistic mysticism of the East, Wu regrets that
more attention is not given to this branch of theology in the West. A
devoted follower of Aquinas, he is aware of the importance of the intellectual approach to theology, but he believes that Sts. Bernard, Bonaven-

BOOK REVIEWS

133

ture and John of the Cross
be better known by those who would
present the truths of Christianity to the East. The Oriental has a mystical
outlook towards the infinite and a fear of any attempt to define the
Supreme Being-Qr as Wu states it "to confine the Infinite in the finite."
(p. 160) The West, he thinks, quite differently leans towards a dogmatic
expression of religious truths, lest while plunging into the mysterious " its
clear cut notion of justice and right be lost." " Let me say that in order
to convert the East we must know how to " baptize " the Eastern culture
and philosophy of life. But since the most representative Eastern sages
are all mystically inclined, we shall not be able to " baptize " them unless
we first delve into a much neglected part of the Christian heritage, the
inexhaustible mine of Christian mysticism." (pp. 160-161) "If we want
to convert the East we must first find the real East in ourselves." " I
venture to think that the real East is securely in the bosom of our
Christian heritage." (p. 154)
Dr. Wu sees in today's crisis a challenge to East and West-(to) "the
East in that we must show it that the Kingdom of God within us (is) the
reality of which all its past philosophies have been but foreshadowings;
(to) the West in that only (by) developing our interior life in proportion
to our material civilization can we transmute the deadening weight of
matter into a vessel of the Spirit." (p. 161)
Christopher Dawson gives an eminently satisfactory reply to the question
he proposes: "Is the Churcli too Western to Satisfy the Aspirations of the
Modern World?" As Mr. Dawson sees it the demand for the nationalization of the Christian Churches in many parts of the Orient is in conformity
with the demand for territorial independence of foreign political control.
But such a national Christian church would be in conflict with the fundamental principles of Catholicism. " If nationalism, whether East or West,"
says Dawson, " denies the right of the Church to exist as an autonomous
spiritual society, it is a challenge to the law of God and the Kingship of
Christ." (p. 164) The mission of the Church is essentially universal and
supranatural. The rest of Mr. Dawson's essay is an elaboration of this
thesis. Insisting upon the supernatural character of the Church, the author
says the Church is not subject to the limitations of human culture but
transcends human cultures and conforms them to her ends. This has been
going on throughout the world since the establishment of the Church and
it is evident today in the non-European world. The rise of nationalism in
many parts of the modern world does not necessarily mean a conflict
between East and West. "Rather," says Mr. Dawson, "it is the age-old
conflict between the spiritual and temporal powers • . • which has now
emerged as a vital question in the East."
Mr. George Meany, veteran labor leader and President of the A.F.L.C.I.O., reviews briefly the labor movement in the United States in the light
of Catholic moral principles and the history of unionism. Mr. Meany sees

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little difference between conditions which led to Pope Leo's encyclical in
1891 and conditions in industry today. Of course conditions are not exactly
the same. He notes: " A new development of science and technology is
spreading across the industrial scene and reaching into places not affected
. Mr. Meany thinks this
by mechanical devices of former years " (p.
is good. He says: "we do not fear this power developed by men. . . .
We think it is a sign of the future and a realization of God's plan to have
man discover ways to control the wealth of the world for the betterment
of all peoples." He knows that the new instruments of production will
not automatically cause a fair distribution of products. " Human beings
themselves," he says, " will have to make conscious effort to safeguard
. Men must not
progress by making it work for their betterment " (p.
be put into competition with machines, because to do so would " destroy
the very purpose these inventions should serve-to work for the good of
man " (p.
.
Francesco Severi in his article, Science and Religion Yesterday and
Today, by contrasting certain statements of the scientists, Laplace, Einstein, and Poincare, attempts to show the progressive turning of scientific
thought towards the transcendent. " All this," he says, "may be viewed
as a precursor to the teaching of Pius XI, on the occasion of the renewal
of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, that Science is one of the most
beautiful of all harmonies, an instrument used by God for man's elevation,
and can never be in contradiction with faith " (p. 35) .
In the treatment of medicine in this book, Dr. Lopez-Ibor points out that
changes are taking place in modern medicine in three directions: a technical
progress to a truly wonderful degree, the socialization of medicine following
the "social spirit. of the age," and the emphasis on psychology.
The threefold change in medicine, argues Dr. Lopez-Ibor, discloses a
basic truth that " sickness is not a purely physical, chemical or even biological event but a personal one " (p. 56) .
Herman Baur in his Christian Art in the Modern World expresses the
belief that ars sacra must be progressive in this sense that it be au courant
with the times. If it clings to traditional forms it becomes outmoded,
stagnant. He believes that whatever is sound in Catholic Art must be
en rapport with the age in which it is created. He also maintains that
modern Christian art is not so far removed from tradition as many people
think. For example, abstract painting is said to run counter to the
Christian spirit. "And yet," says Mr. Baur, "this particular genre, the
representation of abstract concepts has had the right of entry into Christian
churches from time immemorial. One has only to think Byzantine and
Ottonian art ... " (p. 79).
The last article in this book was written by Joseph Folliet. It is a
fine analysis of the world crisis, in fact a synopsis of the book's content.
He points out that " the world is today passing through one of the most

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135

profound and serious crisis in its whole sublunary existence, a cns1s
aggravated by the phenomenon known to sociology as the acceleration of
history .... " He also points out, however, that the church has faced crises
before and to the amazement of her enemies and of not a few Christians
unaided by hope she survived the storms that threatened her. In the
history of the Church, says Folliet, there are falls and risings as in the
via crucis. "We must keep to the way of the Cross but we must go on
hoping and seeking for the Resurrection and the life of glory."
What Joseph Folliet has to say on the present crisis and the Church
could not, in the opinion of the reviewer, have been better said. His
apologetic for the Church is convincing.
With her inimitable artistry Gertrude Von La Forte gives us a fitting
epilogue to World Crisis and the Catholic, a book which should be a best
seller on any Catholic book list.
QUITMAN

Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

F. BECKLEY, o. P.

BRIEF NOTICES
Reflections on .Art: A Source Book of Writings by Artists, Critics, and
Philosophers. By SusANNE K. LANGER (Ed.). Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1958. Pp. 88fl.
This anthology is the work of one of our most notable philosophers in
the field of aesthetics. From her own very wide reading she has selected
some 26 essays, many of them from French and German periodicals. For
the most part they are not philosophical in character but rather supply
material for philosophical reflection. The writers are critics interested in
pointing out certain aesthetic phenomena which are sometimes overlooked
by aestheticians. It is this wealth of observation and example that will
make the anthology useful, and set it apart from the usual collection of
excerpts from formal treatises on aesthetics.
The weakness of the collection is that it gives us a good deal on the
psychological aspects of the work of art, but very little on the work of art
in its own proper character. The Aristotelian will feel that most of the
writers are concerned with peripheral, rather than central aesthetic problems. However, he will find much here of interest on the role of time and
of place in the arts, on imagery, aesthetic distance, emotive response, and
illusion.
BENEDICT M. AsHLEY, 0. P.
Dominican House of Studies,
Ri11er Forest, IU.

The History of Philosophy. By JoHANNES HmscHBERGER. Translated from
the German by Rt. Rev. ANTHONY N. FUERST, S. T. D. Milwaukee:
Bruce. Volume I: 1958. Pp. 516. $8.00. Volume II: 1959. Pp. 752.
$9.50.

Since 1955 the English-speaking world has benefited from significant
advances in the study of the history of philosophy. Chief among these
has been the periodic publication over the past four years of the first
five volumes of Fr. Copleston's monumental work .A History of Philosophy.
The translation in 1955 of Fr. Thonnard's Precis d'Histoire de la Philosophie
under the English title .A Brief History of Philosophy was received with
well-merited enthusiasm. One of the most recent contributions to the
rapidly expanding literature in this field is the translation of Professor
Hirschberger's excellent two-volume study Geschichte der Philosophie. The
German edition of Volume One was first published in 1949. This was
followed by the publication of Volume Two in 1952.

186

BRIEF NOTICES

187

In his Preface to Volume One the author distinguishes between the
History of Philosophy as "a science of history" and as "philosophy."
In the intricate manner typical of German scholarship he explains that
the goal of the History of Philosophy as a science of history " is accomplished by examining the origins of both the men and their works, by
placing them in their proper relation to greater spheres of thought, by
correlating them with other contributions and with the all-pervading
spiritual and cultural currents among peoples of various eras, and finally
by unfolding for us the fundamental suppositions and the ultimate assumptions from which the concepts, the problems, and the teachings of
philosophy have originally sprung as from a matrix."
As Philosophy, the author envisages the History of Philosophy as "an
arduous and honorable search for truth ... possessing inner continuity."
Perhaps the most notable characteristic of Professor Hirschberger's work
is that it brings together these two aspects of the History of Philosophy
into a synthesis which can accurately be described as remarkable. While
stating, as every History of Philosophy must, the facts concerning the life
and thought of each philosopher, Hirschberger's book adds, as few Histories
of Philosophy do, a third transhistoric dimension to a science too frequently drawn upon the bidimensional plane of time and place. The author
intends his book to serve as a basic text and standard reference work for
students of philosophy. He is not content, however, to compile and classify
facts as do the authors of most Histories of Philosophy. He interprets
the facts which he presents, and he makes no apology for doing so.
More than most, this author is likely to suffer from the pens of reviewers
adept at quoting out of context. Speaking of Aristotle's relationship to
Plato, for example, Hirschberger asserts that Aristotle " personally was
basically in accord with his master's thought." In another instance he tells
us that there are many traces of Neo-Platonic doctrine in the writings of
St. Thomas Aquinas. But Hirschberger, proceeding scientifically, constructs
a cogent case for each of his conclusions, not neglecting to state whatever
restrictions the evidence places upon them.
The highly original character of this work has resulted in certain
imbalances in the amount of space allotted to some of the philosophers it
treats. While devoting fourteen pages to Nicholas of Cusa, for example,
the author concedes only six to William of Ockham. Similarly, he judges
Master Eckhart deserving of eight pages, while he dismisses Eckhart's
contemporary, Henry of Ghent, in eight lines. Nicolai Hartmann is allotted
ten pages in contrast to less than a single page for Gabriel Marcel. But
this is to criticize the author, however legitimately, for what he does not
say rather than for what he says. And what he says is extraordinarily
well said. His treatments of the British Empiricists and of Immanuel Kant
are particularly penetrating. Generally speaking, Professor Hirschberger
appears to be more at home in the Modem than in the Contemporary
Period.

138

BRIEF NOTICES

Appended to the English edition of Volume Two are four final chapters
introduced under the title: American Philosophical Thought and the
Western Tradition. These seventy pages have come from the able pen of
Professor Donald A. Gallagher of Villanova University. He gives us here
a clear, concise survey of the development of philosophy in the United
States from its inception in the early 18th Century until the present day.
It is to be hoped that Dr. Gallagher's contribution will eventually be given
a separate publication. As a paperback it certainly would be more than
marketable.
Although relatively expensive, these two volumes give good value for the
price. They are sturdily bound and most readably printed on a good
quality paper. They are calculated to withstand a great deal of handling
by the student.
The translation into English is expertly done. Translations from the
German are usually easy to recognize. This one is not. In fairness to the
translator it should be pointed out that no other sentence in the entire
work is as long or as involved as the one which we have quoted in this
review from the Preface of Volume One.
Sectional bibliographies are interspersed throughout the work, a device
which the student will find most convenient. Although some of these
bibliographies could be more complete, they are all adequate for the use of
undergraduate students of philosophy. Taken together they certainly
constitute a more complete bibliography than is usually appended to similar
works in this field.
It is to be hoped that Hirschberger's The History of Philosophy will
receive a wide circulation in the United States. Such would certainly give
added impetus to the advances which are now being made so rapidly in
this field.
RoBERT O'DoNNELL, C. S. P.
Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. C.

The Visible Words of God. An Exposition of the Sacramental Theology of
Peter Martyr Vermigli A.D. 1500-1562. By JosEPH C. McLELLAND.
Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1957. Pp. 300
with index. $4.00.
Although he was one of early Protestantism's leading polemicists
(Bellarmine often notices him), surprisingly little has been published,
particularly in English, about Peter Martyr Vermigli (named after Peter
Martyr, 0. P.), the ex-Austin canon who, influenced by Juan Valdes, Bucer,
Zwingli, Melanchthon and Erasmus, left the Church and his native Italy
in 15M2, and became a chief actor in the Protestant Revolt both on the

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BRIEF NOTICES

Continent (at Ziirich and Strassburg, 1542-1547, and 1558-1562, and at the
Poissy Conference, 1561) and in England 1547-1558, where he influenced
Cranmer, lectured at Oxford, took part in the famous Oxford Disputation
of 1549 on the Eucharist, managed to introduce into the Book of Common
Prayer the Eucharistic doctrine still found there (the Second Edwardian
Prayer Book, 1552), and probably inspired-via the Forty-Two Articles
of 1558-the sacramental theology embodied in the Thirty-Nine Articles.
Dr. McLelland's study of this strangely neglected key figure is, therefore, despite many shortcomings, a definite contribution. After a 68-page
biographical introduction (which tends to paint the book's hero all white,
his opponents all back), The Visible Words of God expounds, in the ten
chapters of its three ifarts, Vermigli's teaching on the sacraments, which
"is not only the fullest expression of his theology, but also its key doctrine"
(p. 71). Four appendices (bibliography; Vermigli's patristic sources; Bucer,
Calvin and Vermigli; Definitive Statements of Vermigli's Eucharistic Teaching) , and an index-quite inadequate-round out the volume.
It turns out that the Florentine who was so influential in shaping the
theology of the English Reformation was a Calvinist rather than, as has
been widely supposed, a Zwinglian. (For that matter, neither was Zwingli
himself, McLelland contends, a " Zwinglian," in the usual sense of that
term) . Indeed, we must interpose after comparing the present work with
R. Wallace's, Calvin's Doctrine of the Word and Sacrament (London,
1958), so faithfully does Vermigli echo Calvin that one must deny to the
former the great originality claimed for him by McLelland.
In the course of his account of Vermigli's history and teaching, the
author, a minister of the Presbyterian Church of Canada, engages in
polemics on several fronts, inveighing with equal vigor against Catholics,
Lutherans, Anglo-Catholics, and Anabaptists. Often he is needlessly offensive, and frequently he is thoroughly mistaken about Catholic positions,
sometimes on his own, sometimes in accepting without protest Vermigli's
gross distortions of Catholic doctrine and theology.
So abrupt is the movement of thought, so terse and turbid is the style
of this book, which originated as a doctoral thesis written under the
guidance of Prof. T. F. Torrance, of New College, Edinburgh, that even
McLelland's fellow-Calvinists, however well versed in the subtleties and
terminology of Reformed theology, will find the work difficult to follow.
GEORGE

lm'I'TWculate Conception SMninary,
Darlington, N. 1.

w. SHEA

BOOKS RECEIVED
a Kempis, Thomas (Msgr. Ronald Knox & Michael Oakley, Trs.). The
bnitation of Christ. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1959. Pp; 217 with
index. $2.50.
Bergson, Henri {Wade Basken, Ed.). The Philosophy of Poetry: The
Genius of Lucretius. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1959.
Pp. 83. $2.75.
Bickel, Lothar {Walter Bernard, Long Island University, Er. & tr.}. The
Unity of Body and Mind. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc.,
1959. Pp. 167 with Bibliography. $3.75.
Bocxe, 0. E. S. A., Winfried. Introduction to the Teaching of the Italian
Augustinians of the 18th Century on the Nature of Actual Grace.
Heverle-Louvain: Augustinian Historical Institute, 1958. Pp. - with
Preface, Bibliography & Index. 100 Francs.
Bordeaux, Henry. Edith Stein. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1959.
Pp. 87. $3.50.
Brillet, C. Or., Gaston. (Kathryn Sullivan, R. S.C. J., Tr.}. Meditations
on the Old Testament: The Narratives. New York: Desclee Co., Inc.,
1959. Pp. 289. $3.50.
Brousse, Jacques (Ed. by Anthony Birrell from Robert Rookwood's translation of 1628). The Lives of Ange de Joyeuse and Benet Canfield.
New York: Sheed & Ward, 1959. Pp. 194 with Index. $4.50.
Canavan, S. J., Francis P. The Political Reason of Edmund Burke.
Durham: Duke University Press, 1960. Pp. 222 with Appendices &
Index. $5.00.
Cervantes, S.J., Lucius F. And God Made Man and Woman. Chicago:
Henry Regnery Co., 1959. Pp. 294 with Index. $4.00.
da Vinci, Leonardo {Tr. and with Introduction by Wade Baskin) . Philosophical Diary. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. Pp. 87. $2.75.
Donohue, S. J., John W. Work and Education: The Role of Technical
Culture in Some Distinctive Theories of Humanism. Chicago: Loyola
University Press, 1959. Pp. 288 with Index. $4.00.
Doronzo, 0. M. I., s. T. D., Ph. D.,. Emanuel. DE ORDINE, TOM. n. De
Institutione (Cont.), De Materia et Forma. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1959. Pp. 897 with Indices. $19.00.
Earl of Wicklow (Ed.) Rame is Home: The Experience of Converts
Fresno: Academy Li_brary Guild, 1959. Pp. 155. $2.95.
Fonseca, Jaime. Latin America: A Challenge to Catholics. District of
Columbia: National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1959. Pp. 36. 25
cents-$20.00 per 100, plus postage.

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141

freund, Hans. The Balanced Life: An Essay in Ethics. New York:
Philosophical Library, 1959. Pp. 186 with Notes. $4.50.
Fujisawa, Dr. Chikao. Zen and Shinto: A History of Japanese Philosophy.
New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. Pp. 92. $2.75.
Gilleman, S. J., Gerard. The Primacy of Charity in Moral Theology.
Westminster: The Newman Press, 1959. Pp. 420 with Notes, and
Bibliography. $5.50.
Rardon, S. J., Rev. John A. Christianity in Conflict: A Catholic View of
Protestantism. Westminster: The Newman Press, 1959. Pp. 300 with
Notes & Index. $4.50.
Hegel, Wilhelm {Tr. & Annotated by Gustav Emil Mueller). Encyclopedia
of Philosophy. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. Pp. 287.
$6.00.

Jentges, 0. S.B., Abbot Damian. Search for Sanctity. Fresno: Academy
Library Guild, 1959. Pp. 203. $3.95.
Langan, Thomas. The Meaning of Heidegger. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. Pp. 247. $4.50.
Luff, S. G. A. Silent Bedes: Practical Meditations for the Mysteries of the
Rosary. New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1959. Pp. 93.
$2.25.

McAuley Lectures, The, 1958. West Hartford: St. Joseph College, 1959.
Pp. 39 (225-293) •
Mageean, Robert, C. SS. R. God's Infinite Love of Ours. Fresno: Academy
Library Guild, 1959. Pp. 183. $2.85.
Maritain, Jacques. The Responsibility of the Artist. New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1960. Pp. 120 with index. $2.95.
Mouroux, Jean, {Michael Turner, Tr.). I Believe: The Personal Structure
of Faith. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1959. Pp. 109. $2.75.
Naus, S. J., John E. The Nature of the Practical Intellect According to
Saint Thomas Aquinas. Rome: Libreria Editrice dell Universita,
Gregoriana, 1959. Pp. 220 with Bibliography & Index.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. (Kurt F. Leodecker, Tr. and Ed.). Unpublished
Letters. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. Pp. 156. $3.75.
Piersol, Wesley. La Valeur dans la Pkilosopkie de Louis Lavelle. Paris:
Emmanuel Vitte, 1959. Pp. 172 with Bibliography.
Pope John XXill. (Rt. Rev. Msgr. Joseph C. Fenton, Tr.). The Cure of
Ars: Encyclical of His Holiness Pope John XXIII on the Priesthood.
District of Columbia: National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1959.
Pp. 38 with Notes.
Proceedings of The American Catholic Philosophical Association ThirtyThird Annual Meeting, Marek 31 & April 1, 1959. Vol. XXXIII.
District of Columbia: The Catholic University of America, 1959. Pp.
184. $3.50.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Proceedings of the First Precious Blood Study Week. Carthagena: The
Messenger Press, 1959. Pp. 359 with index.
Reidy, 0. P., Stephen J. Civil Authority According to Francis de Vitoria.
River Forest: Aquinas Library, 1959. Pp. 44.
Sister M. Elizabeth, 0. P. The Diplomatic Relations Between the United
States and Mexico, as Affected by the Struggle for Religious Liberty
in Mexico, 1925-29. District of Columbia: The Catholic University
of America Press, 1959. Pp.
Siwek, S. J., Paul. Lercas Therese Neumann: En reponse au Pere de
Munter. Bruxelles: Ad. Goemaere, 1959. Pp. 10.
Spicq, 0. P., C. Ce Que Jesus Doit a Sa Mere Selon la Theologie Biblique
et D'Apres les Theologiens Medievaux: Conference Albert-le-Grand,
1959. Montreal: Inst. d'Etudes Medievales, 1959. Pp. 55. $1.!l5.
Tulane Studies in Philosophy, Volume VIII, Centennial Year Number.
New Orleans: Tulane University, 1959. Pp.
Ward, Maisie. Saints Who Made History the First Five Centuries. New
York: Sheed & Ward, 1959. Pp. 377 with index. $4.50.