THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS: THE DoMINICANFATHERS OF THE PROVINCEoF ST. JosEPH
Publishers:

VoL. XIII

The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

JULY, 1960

No.3

THE NOTION OF EXPERIENCE

A

AMBIGUITY OF THE TERM "EXPERIENCE "

THOUGH many could be found who would vigorously
affirm the importance of experience in learning and
education, few there are who would be able to definite
it without vagueness and ambiguity. Experience has been
called a weasel word. 1 It has many different meanings for many
different people. Some of these meanings are so similar as to
be almost synonymous; others are so contradictory as to be
almost mutually exclusive. In its widest conception, experience
is adequated to the whole of reality; to all that was, is and shall
be; to ignorance, knowledge and imagination. ·This seems to
make experience the most universal of all concepts, a reality
coterminous with everything, distinct from nothing. "It is in
this all-inclusive sense that experience is said to be the central
term in the philosophy of John Dewey when it functions as
1

John Dewey, Experience and Nature, (Chicago, 1925), p. 1.

315

816

JOSEPH L. LENNON

mind does for Hegel, substance for Spinoza, or being for
Aquinas or Aristotle." 2 In a narrower sense, men speak of
mystical and religious experience, of aesthetic experience, of
sense and intellectual experience. Many would make experience
so limited as to be something only intensely personal-private
and subjective experience. In popular usage the word generally
signifies wisdom or skill in knowing, doing or making. We have
our panels of experts on radio and television. We speak of
expert politicians, mathematicians, musicians and the like. It
seems that experience is more connotative of "knowing how"
than" knowing why"; but in current parlance the term is used
indiscriminately. Whatever way it is conceived by the majority
of men, experience always seems to imply a knowledge or skill
derived from direct personal impressions, from trials, sufferings
or the actual living through of events. In this sense, the meaning of experience is closely akin to its etymological signification.
ETYMOLOGICAL

MEANING OF EXPERIENCE

Looking at the root of the English term "experience," we
find that it derives from the Greek word" empiria" (£p:rre£p£a),
and the Latin word" experientia," or" experimentum." In the
Latin verb form, to experience (experiri) means to try, to put
to the test, to prove. St. Thomas and many classical authors
use the word in this sense, making it synonymous with proving
or testing. "To test (tentare) is, in the proper sense, to make
a trial (experimentum) of something. Now we make trial of
something in order to know something about it; hence the
immediate end of every tester is knowledge." 3 The observation
of everyday life provides many instances of the conception of
experience as a trying or testing whose proximate purpose is the
attainment of knowledge. The small child feels, touches, handles
and manipulates objects in his environment in order that he
might come to know them. By means of his senses, it is not
• Mortimer J. Adler, Ed. The Great Ideas, A SyntCYpicon of Great Books of the
Western WOTld, (Chicago, 1952), I, p. 469.
• I, Q. 114, a. 2.

THE NOTION OF EXPERIENCE

817

long before he learns that hot things bum, that sharp things
hurt, that not all things are edible. By experience he learns
the shape, size, hardness and position of things in space. He
learns the hard way, the way of trial and error, a way in which
progress is necessarily slow for it includes much fumbling and
stumbling and repetition. The etymological meaning of the
term " experience " as a trying or testing is verified in the explanation of the true nature of experience by Aristotle and
St. Thomas.
ExPERIENCE AccoRDING TO ARISTOTLE AND ST. TIIOMAS

Experience, says St. Thomas, is the result of " the comparison
of many singular things received in memory." 4 The process
takes place in this fashion. The external senses are stimulated
by external objects of environment. The impression of such
objects on the sense organs produces sensation. The internal
senses are then brought into play. Common sense (sensus communis) distinguishes the qualitative differences in external sensation, selecting, combining and organizing them into a pattern.
These sensations are transmitted to the imagination, where
they are stored as images or phantasms and from which they
can be recalled by memory as past products of sense experience.
In this way, man is able to know objects in the external world
even when they are no longer impinging on the external senses.
From many memories of diverse objects, which are similar in
some fashion,
results. Hence, experience, says the
Angelic Doctor, "seems to be nothing other than to receive
something from many things retained in memory." 5 Sense and
memory, therefore, cause experience, for out of sensation arises
memory; next, out of memory of the same often repeated
sensation arises experience, since many remembrances are
summed up into one experience.
Aristotle illustrates the genesis of experience by likening it
to an army in full rout. First, one runaway soldier stops in his
'In I Met. 1.
• In II Anal. Post.,

318

JOSEPH L. LENNON

flight and stands to battle the enemy; then another takes his
place by his side, then a third, until a cluster has been formed
about this one steadfast soldier. 6 In a similar manner is experience generated. Sensations, of themselves, are dispersive and
decentralized. They pass through the senses with amazing
rapidity-mixed and shifting, with varying degrees of intensity.
One sensation is firmly impressed upon the memory; another,
similar in some way to the first, associates itself with the first;
then another and another and another until the numerically
distinct sensations form an experience. It would be erroneous,
however, to assume from this example that experience consists
in a mere aggregate or an accumulation of sensations.
MATERIAL

AND FoRMAL ELEMENT

IN ExPERIENCE

Two elements concur in the formation of experience, one,
material; the other, formal. The material element comprises
the images or species retained in imagination and subject to
recall by memory. It is immediately evident, therefore, that
while all sense experience arises from sensation, it goes beyond
sensation in that it does not refer exclusively to particular
objects here and now present, as all sensations do. Hence those
animals, lacking the full equipment of the external and internal
senses, will be prohibited from realizing the fullness of experience. Thus the shellfish and other lower forms of animal life
which derive their subsistence from contact with their immediate environment have little or nothing of imaginal power.
Lacking imagination, they also lack memory and hence are
not able to profit by past experience. Indeed, they have no
need of imagination and memory for all things necessary for
their sustenance and propagation are immediately at hand. For
those higher animals who are capable of memory, the mere
addition of unrelated sensations in imagination, the pooling of
a heterogeneous mass of disparate images can never constitute
an experience. In experience there is a before and after, a retrospect and a prospect, a foresight gathered from a hindsight,
• Ibid., 19.

THE NOTION OF EXPERIENCE

319

a connectionbetween past and present. In short, experience is
unified and integrated. For example, in a crucial period of a
baseball game, an experienced pitcher confers with his catcher
and teammates to determine whether or not a particular batsman should be given a base on balls. He knows from past
experience with the same or similarly skilled batsmen that there
is a great danger of losing the game if he should attempt to
pitch to him. Since no one situation is totally identical with
another, he must draw upon his many memories of similar
cases in the past and confer with his fellow players before he
comes to a decision. This comparing of past and present, this
connecting and relating of memories, which results in a judgment about a particular thing constitutes the formal element
in experience.
The essence of experience, therefore, would seem to consist
in the collation or comparison of many memories. As comparison implies the existence of at least two or more facts; so also
experience demands the presence of many memories. Moreover, these facts in memory do not exist in isolation, nor are
they dissociated, unrelated and independent of each other;
rather they are stabilized around a core, merged into a unit,
interrelated, interdependent and integrated to form one apperceptive mass. It is in comparison, the formal element in experience, that we find the verification of the etymological meaning
of experience. Experience is truly a testing and trying, a sifting
and sorting, a rejection of irrelevant images and a selection and
combination of those phantasms connected with the object
under investigation. The work of associating, combining and
comparing relevant phantasms is attributed to a special faculty
in men called the cogitative sense.
THE FACULTY OF ExPERIENCE:

THE CoGITATIVE

PowER

According to its etymological signification, the cogitative
power may be considered as a power which drives, or constantly
moves things together with one another in order to make one

820

JOSEPH L. LENNON

out of many. 7 This nominal definition of the cogitative power
coincides with conception of experience explained by St. Thomas
as the unification or integration of many singulars received in
memory. The process of comparison resulting in the integration
of memories is something peculiar to man. In his Commentary
on the First Book of the Metaphysics (lect. 1), St. Thomas explains this chief characteristic of experience by contrasting it
with the sense cognition of animals and the discursive process
of reason. The animals that are zoologically inferior are restricted to the reception of singular impressions happening here
and now, they cannot retain these impressions except when
these latter have been very strong, and even then only for a
short time, nor can they integrate them and make use of them
for future conduct. In them (e. g. the shellfish) , we find sensation without a distinct imagination and so without memory.
They cannot profit from experience because their experience is
confined within the narrow limits of sensation. The higher
animals, however, easily retain and conserve past impressions
in the memory for a length of time; consequently, cognition in
these animals is not limited to the actually present impression,
but synthesizing past impressions they can provide for the
future, as if these animals in some way were rational. Thus St.
Thomas observes: "Because from many sensations and memory animals become accustomed to seek or avoid something,
hence it is that they seem to share something of experience,
even though but little." 8 Indeed, insofar as they provide in
some way for the future, animals are said to possess a kind of
prudence.
Strictly speaking, prudence proceeds from a reasonable deliberation about what ought to be done; as such it is found only
in man. By way of some instinct of nature, however, brutes
possess a natural estimation of those things which are suitable
or harmful to them. It is this natural instinct which causes
the lamb to follow its mother and avoid the wolf.
7 Thomas V. Flynn, 0. P., "The Cogitative Power," The Thamist, XVI (1958),
p . .'142.
• In I Met., 1.

THE NOTION OF EXPERIENCE

Above this degree of knowledge in brutes, man, however,
possesses experience properly so called, by means of which he
knows the useful or the harmful in his environment through
comparison of instances received in memory. "This kind of
comparison is proper to man, and pertains to the cogitative
power, which is called particular reason, because it compares
individual intentions, as the universal reason, universal
ones." 9 Experience in man and the brute will be ordained to
the same end: the suitability of objects relative to the wellbeing of the organism. There is a difference, however, in the
apprehension of suitability. Animals perceive their intentions
by natural instinct, man perceives them by a comparative process. Hence the natural estimative sense of animals is replaced
in man by the cogitative power.
EXPERIENCE

IN ANIMALS

In animal experience, St. Thomas observes there is a capacity
for apprehending certain data which are not immediately and
as such given by the external senses. 10 The usual example to
which St. Thomas repeatedly refers is the one of the sheep
being aware of the peril of the wolf. What the sheep senses is
merely a shape, a size, a color, a smell, the sound of a howl.
Danger does not appear in these features, nor is the awareness
of favorable or unfavorable environmental factors acquired by
experience; for even the young animal behaves in a suitable
manner. Since there is no rational capacity in animals, they
cannot conclude in any way from the sense-data that what they
apprehend is indicative of danger. One has, therefore, to
assume that the brutes are gifted with a particular faculty
enabling them to become cognizant of favorable and unfavorable environmental situations. This faculty is given the name
of estimative power.
The faculty of brute experience, therefore, is the estimative
• Ibid. The term " intention " is equivocal in signification. Its most reasonable
meaning seems to be that of "cognition" or "object known." Cf. George P.
Klubertanz, S. J., The Discursive Power, (St. Louis, 1952), pp. 281-282.
10 I, Q. 78, a. 4.

JOSEPH L. LENNON

power. Its object is the material singular thing insofar as it is
beneficial or harmful to the animal. Since the suitability of an
object for the organism is not sensed per se by any exterior
sense, it is called an insensate intention and is said to be sensed
incidentally or per accidens. 11 The sensible per accidens as a
specifying object of animal experience is constituted by the
following conditions: 1) it must be accidentally sensed by an
exterior sense; 2) it must at the same time be cognized per se
by the estimative power; 3) it must be cognized in this latter
way immediately, unhesitatingly, and without discourse; and
4) it must be cognized in the particular, not in the universal.
This last specification is necessary, since only the intellect can
know the sensible per accidens in the universal. 12 This object
of animal experience proceeding from the estimative power is
an insensate intention under a universal aspect. As St. Thomas
points out: " The sensitive powers, both of apprehension and
of appetite, can tend to something universally. Thus we say
the object of sight is color considered generically .... Accordingly hatred in the sensitive faculty can regard something universally because this thing, by reason of its common nature,
and not merely as an individual, is hostile to the animal-for
instance ... a sheep hates the wolf universally." 13 Moreover,
it is the insensate intention, or sensible per accidens in the
particular as present which is the object of experience. In this
way, brute experience, as the act of the estimative power, is
distinguished from sense memory which is the storehouse of
sensorial and factual experiences and of intentions apprehended
through the estimative power. 14 This attainment of the sensible
per accidens by the animal results from the fact that the particular thing is the principle or term of some action or passion.
It is ordered to the biological utility of the animal. " Thus a
sheep knows this particular lamb, not as this lamb, but simply
as something to be suckled; and it knows this grass just insofar
as this grass is its food." 15
In II De Anima, 6.
Ibid.; also cf. Flynn, op. cit., p. 546.
18 I-II, Q. 29, a. 6.
11
12

" I, Q. 78, a. 4.
In II De Anima, 6.

10

THE NOTION 0:1!' EXPERIENCE

Animal experience, like all practical knowledge, concerns the
end and the means to the end. In the brute, however, there is
an unvarying end and equally unvarying means to that end.
As St. Thomas points out: " Sense is found in all animals, but
animals other than man have no intellect: which is proved by
this, that they do not work, like intellectual agents, in diverse
and opposite ways, but just as nature moves them to fixed and
uniform specific activities, as every swallow builds its nest in
the same way." 16 And again: " Even in dumb animals there
are fixed ways of obtaining an end, wherefore we observe that
all the animals of a same species act in like manner." 11 Hence
it is that although animal activities sometimes manifest a
knowledge that simulates conceptual knowledge and induces
some psychologists fallaciously to attribute intellectual powers
to animals, nevertheless, animals do not determine their own
ends, nor do they think out the means to attain those ends.
Moreover, the brute's natural estimation about the usefulness
or harmfulness of some concrete singular object can be considered a judgment only in an improper sense. To predicate true
judgment of any animal activity would be to fall victim. to
humanizing the brute. For that reason St. Thomas observes:
" The name ' judgment ' according to its original imposition
means ' the correct determination of what is just.' It has been
extended to signify 'a correct determination' in any manner,
as well speculative as practical.'' 18 It is in this broad sense that
judgment is used in regard to the natural estimation of animals.
" Some things act with judgment, but not a free one, as the
brute animals, for the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it ought
to be avoided with a natural judgment, and not a free one,
because it judges this, not from a comparison, but from natural
instinct.'' 19
All this indicates that the quasi-experience of animals is
naturally determined. This determination is ultimately based
II Cont. Gent., 66.
11-11, Q. 47, a. 15, ad S.
18 11-11, Q. 60, a. 1, ad 1.
10 I, Q. 88, a. 1.
10

10

824

JOSEPH L. LENNON

on the necessary natural determination of the sensitive powers. 20
Animal experience, as the product of animal instinct, is based
on the fact that there is in the animal a power, the estimative,
which by its very structure apprehends some objects as suitable
or not, and thus moves the animal to pursue or to flee.21 Animals, then, are entirely dependent upon instinctive reactions
for adjustment to the environment. Reaction with them is
purely instinctive, the same stimulus or combination of stimuli
uniformly giving rise to the same adjustment. Lacking plasticity
and flexibility in choosing ends and means to ends, they are
incapable of being truly educated. It is true that they can
provide for the future and thus seem to possess an appearance
of prudence, but they are directed to fixed· ends through fixed
means. In such cognition, God supplies the judgment necessary
for action. " As light and heavy objects are not the cause of
their own movement, so also neither do brutes judge things by
their own judgment but follow the judgment given them by
God." 22
The reason for a quasi-experience and a quasi-prudence in
animals high in the zoological scale is found in the fact that:
" The divine Wisdom joins the ends of the first things with
the beginnings of the second, because every inferior nature in
its highest element touches the lowest element of the superior
nature, according as it participates something of the superior
nature, although deficiently: therefore in apprehension as well
as in sensitive appetite there is to be found something in which
the sensitive part touches reason." 23 It is not surprising, then,
that some of the activities of the higher animals exhibit a
startling resemblance to the intellectual functions of man.
Animal experience at best, however, has only biological value.
Although there may be certain animal cognitions which are not
immediately practical, nevertheless, in the last analysis all
animal experience is concerned with self-preservation, sex and
I, q.
a.
ad 8.
I-II, Q. 17, a. 2, ad 8.
22 I-II, Q. 18, a. 2, ad 8; De Ver., Q. 24, a. 1.
•• In II Sent., d. 24, Q. 2, a. 1; II Cont. Gent., 91; De Ver., Q. 25, a. 2.
20
21

THE NOTION OF EXPERIENCE

325

food. "F'or the usefulness of sensible things is gauged by their
relation to the preservation of the animal's nature ... for dogs
do not take delight in the smell of hares, but in eating them;
... nor does the lion feel pleasure at the lowing of the ox, but
in devouring it." 24 Thus St. Thomas points out that the ultimate direction of animal sensibility is purely practical; knowledge is never an end in itself. " Sensitive cognition has two
ends. In one way, as well in men as in other animals, its purpose
is the sustaining of the body, because by such a knowledge,
men and other animals avoid harmful things, and seek those
which are necessary for the sustaining of the body. In a second
way, in man it is especially directed to intellectual knowledge,
both speculative and practical." 25
ExPERIENCE IN MAN

Experience in man is unique because man is unique in his
being and operation. He rules himself through reason.
ing to the Dionysian principle of hierarchy that the highes1
power of the lower order is close to, and similar to, the lowest
power of the higher, experience in man will take on some of the
characteristics of reason. 26 Just as the estimative power of
brutes is somewhat similar to
inasmuch as brutes have
a certain natural prudence, 27 so also the cogitative power, the
highest faculty of sense experience in man, will participate somewhat in the activity of reason. As St. Thomas points out:
That power, which is called " cogitative " by the philosophers, is on
the boundary of the sensitive and intellective parts, where the sensitive part touches the intellective. For it has something from the
sensitive part, namely that it considers particular forms; and it has
something from the intellective, namely that it compares; and so
it is in men alone. And because the sensitive part is better known
than the intellective, for this reason, just as the determination of
the intellective part is denominated from the sense, as was said, so
every comparison of the intellect is named from cogitatio. 28
"'I-II, Q. 31, a. 6.

··n-Il, Q. 167, a. 2.
•• DeVer., Q. 25, a. 2; I, Q. 76, a. 5.

•• De Ver., Q. 15, a. 1.
•• In III Sent., d. 26, Q. 2, a. 2.

826

JOSEPH L. LENNON

. Thus human experience, proceeding from the cogitative
power, is an operation existing at the point of juncture between
sense operations and intellectual operation. It is concerned
with the particular, and so is a sense activity, but it does this
by comparison, which is from the intellect. Human experience,
therefore, is an operation in which reason is concerned. Whenever St. Thomas speaks of experience he will always relate it
to the cogitative power, which is called particular reason: for
it discourses about particulars as universals. 29 Quasi-experience
of animals is related to the estimative power. For that reason,
when St. Thomas speaks of sensibility as such, or of the infant
who has not reached the use of reason, he will not speak o£ the
cogitative power, because then the intellect is absent by definition, or is not operative by virtue o£ the concrete case. " Other
animals do not seek the suitable and avoid the harmful by
the deliberation o£ reason, but by the natural instinct o£ the
estimative power, and such natural instinct is also in children;
and so they take the breast, and take other suitable things,
Without anyone teaching them." Although estimative experience is found in animals and in men devoid o£ the use o£ reason,
nevertheless, collative experience is found only in men.
The distinctiveness o£ human experience is found in the fact
that the faculty of experience, the cogitative power, is never
unrelated to, but rather participates in some fashion in the
operation o£ reason. In man, sense is not £or its own sake, but
also, and even primarily, £or the sake o£ the intellect. "Senses
are given to man not merely to procure the necessities o£ life,
as is the case with other animals, but also in order to know." 31
Hence, human experience has not only a biological utility, but
also intellectual utility. The reason for this perfection in the
sensitive faculties o£ mq,n is found in the £act that the soul is
a functional whole, spreading its influence through the intellectual, sensitive and vegetative potencies. 32 "The senses, moreover, are a certain imperfect participation o£ the intelligence;
•• I, Q. 78, a. 4.
•• In II Sent., d. !W, Q. 2, a. 5.

•• I, Q. 91, a. 8, ad 8.
""I, Q. 77, a. 4.

THE NOTION OF EXPERIENCE

wherefore, according to their natural origin, they proceed from
intelligence as the imperfect from the perfect. But considered
as receptive principles . . . the more imperfect powers precede
the others in the order of generation, for the animal is generated
before the man." 83
Just as in the brute animals all the sensitive faculties are
concentrated and specified subjectively by the order they must
have in operating according to their own estimative power, so
also the sensitive faculties in man receive the influence of the
intellect which they must naturally serve. By reason of this
influence, the sense nature of man functions as if impregnated
with rationality and is not held to its own level. " The sensible
soul is more noble in man than in the other animals, because in
man it not only is sensible, but also rational." 34 Hence it is
that human experience can obtain results intrinsically superior
in value to the quasi-experience of brutes, since it touches the
region proper to intelligence. Experience without intelligence is
second-rate knowledge at best. By directing, modifying and
the activity of the senses, the intellect fertilizes experience with its vitalizing power, enriching it far beyond the
capacity of the inferior sense powers.
This does not imply in any way that human experience is
essentially rational or that it partakes of the immateriality of
the intellectual activity. Indeed, because the faculty of experience, the cogitative power, is specified by its object, the material
singular; and " such so-called intellect is the act of a corporeal
organ," it follows that experience itself is necessarily of a sensitive nature. 35 St. Thomas goes so far as to localize the cogitative
power in the middle part of the head. 36 He was merely expressing, however, the opinion current in his time. As this
organ is dependent for its well-being upon the vegetative potencies, it is clear that weak health will affect this faculty as well
as the other sensitive faculties, and through them, the intellect
81 1, Q. 77, a. 4.
•• De Anima, a. 11 and
•• I, Q. 79, a.
ad
•• I, Q. 78, a. 4.

828

JOSEPH L. LENNON

itself. Good health is the physiological condition for both good
experience and good intellection.
Unlike the animal which apprehends the individual only in
so far as it is the principle or term of some action or passion,
the cogitative power in man apprehends the individual as standing under a common nature; " and this because it is united to
intellect in one and the same subject." 31 Thus a sheep knows
this particular lamb, not as this lamb, but simply as something
to be suckled; and it knows this grass just in so far as this
grass is its food. Man, on the other hand is aware of a man as
this man, and this tree as this tree. Animal experience, therefore, is very limited in scope, extending only to those individual
things which are biologically useful to the animal organism.
The entire collection of singulars in many species will not fall
under animal experience, since the brute's practical operations
are limited. As St. Thomas observes: " Other individuals which
have no relation to its (the animal's) own actions or passions
it does not apprehend at all by natural instinct. For the purpose of natural instincts in animals is to direct them in their
actions and passions, so as to seek and avoid things according
to the requirements of their nature." 38 Human experience goes
further than this, for its object is not only knowledge of the
individual as useful for man's animal part, but also as it is useful
for his distinctively human part, his intellect.
The process by which man, after he has attained the use of
reason, makes his sensory judgments concerning sensory goods
is that of comparison. It is a kind of sensory discourse. This
discourse follows the movement of the intellect in its inductive
and demonstrative processes. In the first process, the cogitative
power's comparison terminates in a singular judgment called
an experience. This singular judgment is called by Cajetan a
quasi-confused universal. " It is so called because the actual
universal of the intellect is contained in the quasi-universal
potentially. Cajetan notes that this judgment is the result of
many and many a collation, in the course of which phantasms
•• In II De Anima, IS.

•• Ibid.

THE NOTION OF EXPERIENCE

329

obviously having nothing essential to do with the object in
question are discarded." 39 Upon the whole sense order devolves
the task of dematerializing the potential universal for abstraction by the intellect; but those senses which are closest to intellect will play the most important role in this process. Hence
the cogitative power's collative activity terminating in the experiential judgment will be the culmination of all sensory activity and will be the last act of the sense order preparatory to
intellectual abstraction. Indeed, experience has been called the
secondary, complete synthesis of the sense order because it is
perception in its fullest and most perfect realization. " For the
cognizant sense unifies the combined data of common sense,
the imagination, and the memory, relating the object of sensation to its situation as a whole, as in the first instances, and
to other experiences." 40
It would seem, therefore, that the convergence of all sensitive
cognitions is found in the phenomenon known as human experience. Thus its task in following the inductive process of the
intellect will be, not only to apprehend what in the singular
sensible is good or harmful, pleasant or unpleasant to man, but
also to dispose the entire sensible order to the good of the
intellect. From it will be derived man's first intellectual conceptions and the first principles of the intellect. It is by reason
of this ascent from experience to intelligence that the mind is
able to know singular things; for the object of the mind is the
universal and it is only by refl.exion on the proce$8 from sense
to intellect that man knows the singular .41
Moreover, experience follows the movement of the intellect
in its demonstrative process, that is, when the intellect is reducing its conclusions to first principles. Inasmuch as the first
principles come to the mind for the first time from the senses,
and the senses are in contact with external things, then in the
Thomistic scheme, the objectivity of knowledge is preserved in
•• Flynn, op. cit., p. 560.
•• George P. Klubertanz, S. J., "The Internal Senses in the Process of Cognition,"
The Modern Schoolman, XVill (1940-1941), p. so.
"DeVer., Q. 10, a. 5.

880

JOSEPH L, LENNON

its entirety-arising from experience and ending in experience.
Finally, it allows the man, reasoning deductively, to apply his
universal knowledge about things to be done to the particular
instance, which particular instance is known only through experience.42 In this we. find the value attribute of experience, of
which we shall speak. These functions of experience make it
indispensable both for life and for learning. Since experience
in man resembles in many ways the operations of the intellect,
it will be profitable to compare them.
ExPERIENCE AND INTELLECT

Experience, as the act of the cogitative power, may be compared to the cogitative power as intelligence is to the intellect.
Intelligence is distinct from the intellect as any act is distinct
from the faculty producing it. · Thus St. Thomas points out:
"The word' intelligence' properly signifies the intellect's very
act, which is to understand ... thus intelligence is not distinct
from the intellect as power from power; but as act from
power." 48 Similarly, ex}lerience is distinct from the cogitative
power as an act is distinct from its power.
Now the mind as engaged in a process of discursive reasoning
about universal intentions is called intellective reason (ratio),
in distinction to the mind as the faculty of universal principles,
which is known as intellectus or understanding.' 4 In a similar
fashion, the cogitative power, as engaged in a kind of discursive
reasoning about particulars, is called particular reason in distinction to the cogitative power using singulars as principles,
which is known as passive intellect. 45 The process of intellective
reason discoursing about universal intentions is called thinking
or cogitation; so also the cogitative power in discoursing about
particular intentions is a quasi-kind of thinking. Indeed, the
mental inquiry of the intellect is denominated as thinking
(cogitatio) by reason of its similarity to the collatio of the
'"Ibid.; also cf. fi-ll, Q. 42, a. S, ad S.
•• I, Q. 79, a. 10.

"I, Q. 78, .a. 4.

'"In VI Eth. 9.

THE NOTION OF EXPERIENCE

881

cogitative power rather than vice versa.46 Every process has a
beginning, middle and end. The beginning of intelligence is
from first principles (intellectus); its medium is the discourse
of reason about universals (ratio): its term is the judgment
of reason producing intellectual knowledge (scientia). In like
manner, the beginning of experience is from singulars retained
in memory. They are the principles of experience. The medium
of experience is the comparison of memories (collatio) ; its term
is the judgment of experience producing integrated sensitive
knowledge. The cognitional value of the conclusions of science
is certitude; of experience, suspicion. Suspicion is that species
of conjecture which deals with singulars. 47
Anything is said to be perfect in so far as it attains its end. 48
Thus science is the perfection of intellect; experience, the perfection of sense. Anything is denominated according to that
which is perfect in it. Hence, man is called a reasoning animal
and not an experiencing animal. Moreover, as the perfect virtually contains the imperfect, as the composite contains the
simple, as science contains the principles from which it is generated, so also experience, being the ultimate act in the order
of sense, virtually contains all those acts of the sensitive order
which are below it. 49 The word experience, therefore, can be
extended to include all those acts which go to make up the
phenomenon known as experience. It is in this general sense
that the word experience is most often used.
St. Thomas remarks that " what is of a superior nature cannot exist in an inferior nature perfectly, but only through a
kind of weak participation." 50 Experience and intelligence,
therefore, while exhibiting a marvelous similarity, are, nevertheless, very much different. No matter how high sensitive
knowledge ascends, it is still sense. It has to do with the particular and the contingent. Experience, as experience, never
rises above the level. The intellect on the other hand, deals
•• De Ver., Q. 14, a. 1, ad 9: 11-11, Q. !t, a. 1.
.. In VI Eth. 8.
•• De Ver., Q. 15, a. 1, ad 5.
50 Ibid., Q. 15, a. 1.
•• In V Met. 18.

JOSEPH L. LENNON

with the universal and necessary. Between sense and intellect,
between the universal and particular, there intervenes a tremendous gap. This gap, however, is somewhat filled by experience. As man stands as a link between animals and angels,
participating in some way in the nature of both, so also experience stands midway between pure sense knowledge and intellection.
That in itself poses a difficult problem. We are men, not
animals. Although we can logically separate the workings of
sense and intellect, in reality they are one, for in man there is
unity of operation and being. Human activity, proceeding
from man, while being unified, exhibits a great diversity and
variety. In order to gain knowledge of its nature it must be
analyzed. At the same time, the unity of operation must not
be lost sight of. Yet in the atomistic breakdown of the unity
of human operation, there is the danger, indeed, there is the
tendency to treat each aspect of man's activity as a separate
and isolated phenomenon. Intellectual knowledge itself, while
displaying a marvelous unity, at the same time presupposes the
cooperation of the external and internal senses, intertwined in
reciprocal influence, hierarchically ordered to one another, dynamically related in the process of cognition. To logically
precise from this dynamic order in order to discover its constituent parts is to run the risk of compartmentalizing man's
activity and of failing to see the whole in proper perspective
because one has become enmeshed in the parts. Thi)! must be
kept in mind in any study of experience; for experience, while
being a complex phenomenon and the foundation of all intellectual constructions, is itself but one part of the total learning
process.
Perhaps, if we were to understand properly the process of
experience on a purely sensitive level, we would have to study
it in children before the child began to operate on an intellectual
plane. Even then it would be hardly possible to give an intelligible account of it. 51 Human experience, as we know it, is
"'Klubertanz,

The Discursive Power, p.

THE NOTION OF EXPERIENCE

333

permeated with the influence of the intellect and it is difficult to
say exactly when this influence is absent. It is inevitable, then,
that our knowledge of experience will be analogical. We examine
it to find out how it is similar to, yet different from intelligence;
at the same time we show how it· is different from, yet very
similar to the sense knowledge of animals.
THE SUBJECT OF EXPERIENCE

Experience, as defined by St. Thomas, is something distinctively human. It is predicated of animals in an analogous
fashion insofar as they possess it in a rather feeble manner.
" Because from many sensations and memory animals become
accustomed to seek or avoid something, hence it is that they
seem to share something of experience, even though but little." 52
Angels and demons are also said to possess experience, but that
too only analogously. "Experience can be attributed to the
angels (and demons) according to the likeness of the things
known, although not by a likeness of knowing power. We have
experience when we know single objects through the senses;
the angels likewise know single objects ... yet not through the
senses." 58 Both angels and animals lack experience properly
so-called because they lack the essential element of experience;
they do not discourse about singulars as man does.54 In the
animal this is because of the deficiency and weakness of animal
nature; in the angel it is because of the perfection of angelic
nature and operation.
What is a perfection in man in comparison to animal nature
is an imperfection when considered relative to angelic and divine
activity. Man by his various powers of knowledge knows all
classes of things, apprehending universals and immaterial things
by his intellect, and things singular and corporeal by the senses.
The angel, however, knows both by his one mental power," for
the order of things run in this way, that the higher a thing is,
so much the more IS its power unified and far-reaching." 55
•• In I Met., I.
•• I, Q. 54, a. 5.

••I, Q. 58, a. Sad S.
""I, Q. 57,

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JOSEPH L. LENNON

Hence it is that: " through the species imparted to them do
the angels know things, not only as to their universal nature,
but likewise in their individual conditions, in so far as they are
manifold representations of that one simple essence." 56
As we have noted previously, the proximate subject from
which experience emanates is the cogitative power. St. Thomas,
however, extends the meaning of experience to include the intuitive knowledge of the intellect in apprehending its own acts. 5 7
Hence it is that the intellect in its operation knows itself experientially by its own acts, as do other powers of the soul. To
quote St. Thomas: " These things which are in the soul by their
physical reality, are known through experimental knowledge;
insofar as through acts man has experience of their inward
principles: thus when we wish, we perceive we have a will; and
when we exercise the functions of life, we observe there is life
in us." 58 Thus the spirituality of intelligence and its specific
distinctness from the operations of sense, or again the specific
difference between the will and the sensitive appetite, are known
experientially; This experiential knowledge of the intellect, however, is not clear and evident and is to be distinguished from
a second kind of knowledge which derives from an accurate
introspection of our thought processes and which is brought
about by the reflexive power of the intellect.
That is why St. Thomas takes great care in explaining how
the soul knows itself by its own act.
There is a difference, however, between these two kinds of knowledge, and it consists in this, that the mere presence of the mind
suffices for the first; The mind itself being the principle of action
whereby it perceives itself, and hence it is said to know itself by
its own presence. But as regards the second kind of knowledge,
the mere presence of the mind does not suffice, and there is further
required a careful and subtle inquiry. 59
This explains why men, having experimental knowledge of
the soul's activity, have, nevertheless, erred in their investiga•• Ibid.
.. I, Q. 79, a. 4.

•• 1-11, Q.
a. 5, ad 1.
•• I, Q. 87, a. 1.

THE NOTION OF EXPERIENCE

335

tion of its true nature. The intellect's reflexive investigation
of its own activity constitutes the art of introspection.
Introspection is distinct from observation and experimentation. Observation consists in the examination and collection
of facts and phenomena, with or without the help of instruments, and without changing the natural condition of the
observed phenomena. Experimentation consists, on the other
hand, not only in the examination of things, but also in the
subjection of one thing to another, the mixture and manipulation of phenomena, in order that new and unfamiliar effects
may be produced by work of art. 60 Such experience of experimentation is usually attributed to the physical sciences, but
the essence of the process, consisting in the comparison of individual things, is equally verified in the common experience of
all men. In any event, the predication of experience to any
kind of intellectual activity is accomplished only by extending
the meaning of the term; for in the Thomistic scheme, experience properly so-called belongs to the order of sense, and only
to the order of sense.
THE ScoPE OF ExPERIENCE

All persons, possessing the same human nature, coming into
contact with the same world of objects, are subject to the
process of experience. In one way, experience is unique to the
experiencing individual. All men do not have the same experiences. But, in another sense, since all men possess the same
specific powers and operations and since all experience takes
its rise from and converges at the same objects in the physical
environment, then, we can speak of public experience as well
as private experience, of shared experience as well as individual
experience.
Shared experience is common experience-using the phrase
" common experience " to " denote the whole set of experiences
which men have naturally through the ordinary operation of
•• Sanseverino Cajetano, Philosophia Christiana, (Naples, 1878), IV, p. 174.

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JOSEPH L. LENNON

their senses, their memories and imaginations." 61 Although the
experience of two men are never identical under all aspects,
nevertheless, experience is common to both to the extent that
they share experiences which have thus arisen naturally in the
course of their lives. Indeed, strange as it may seen, the common experience of men and even the crude experience of the
child is not too far removed from the refined experience of the
scientist. It is true that the experience of the child is a natural
process carried on by the ordinary operation of the senses in
daily life. The scientist, on the other hand, under controlled
conditions, is said to make an experience or experiment. Usually
by the use of instruments which enlarge and extend the power
of the senses, he contrives an artificial situation which discloses
to his senses things he could never derive from ordinary experience. His experience is deliberative investigation under controlled conditions; the child's experience is often non-deliberative, or if deliberative, devoid of technical apparatus and arising
in daily life under non-controlled conditions. The former is
special, refined and artificial experience; the latter is common,
crude and natural experience. The work of the scientist in his
laboratory is undoubtedly different from the gropings and
searchings of the infant, yet, fundamentally, they are both
doing the same thing. Both are probing, trying, testing, in
order to obtain knowledge of objects in the world about them;
and .this is the essence of experience.
Man can profit, not only by his own experience, but also by
the experience of other men. This includes the experience of
those men living with him in the present and the experience
of all men who have preceded him. In this sense, we can speak
of funded or race experience. It embraces all the accomplishments of mankind in the arts, literature and sciences, preserved
and handed down through the ages, and known as the culture,
social heritage or civilization of mankind.
Relative to the individual, experience, as the foundation of
and the propaedeutic to science, comprises all those things by
•• Mortimer J. Adler, What Man Has Made of Man, (New York, 1987), p. 180.

THE NOTION OF EXPERIENCE

887

means of which the intellect through induction can forlll.ulate
the principles of the various sciences.62 A diversity of experience is necessarily demanded according to the diversity of the
various sciences. Thus it will comprehend in its scope both the
facts or phenomena which the individual observes, explores or
meets with in his daily life and those things which are transmitted to him by word of mouth or which he derives from
books. Opinions current in the society in which he lives, historical facts and theories, conclusions based on faith and accepted upon the authority of his teachers, custom, literature
and the like-all go to form the warp and woof of his personal
experience.
Since it is a practical impossibility for man to come in contact with all aspects of reality or his environment, much of his
experience will be vicarious. For well or ill, the individual's
experience will influence his practical activity, form the starting
point in sense of his later intellectual constructions and permeate his whole life. In most cases, many sensations and many
memories of the same thing are required to form an experience
sufficiently elaborated so· that the intellect may abstract a universal concept. This is known as formal experience. In other
cases, virtual experience suffices. This type of experience may
be derived simply from one sensation or one memory, which in
itself may be equivalent to many memories.63 Thus universals
of mathematics presuppose virtual experience, but universals
of natural philosophy presuppose formal experience. Whatever
the case, experience will constitute the indispensable basis of all
life and learning.
THE VALUE ATTRIBUTE OF EXPERIENCE

Experience, as the act of the cogitative power, is concerned
with the particular thing under the aspect of being suitable or
non-suitable to man. The object of intelligence is the universal;
•• In I Eth. 11.
•• J. Hoenen, "De Origine Primorum Principiorum Scientiae," GTegoriamum, XIV
(1988). p. 168.

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JOSEPH L. LENNON

the object of experience is the particular. If the singular sensible
were not the object of experience, a person would never arrive
at the knowledge of this man and this lion and the like, but
would know only man or lion according to their universal conception. Moreover, if in experience, man did not make judgments concerning the suitability of particular things, he would
never act. We never do anything unless we desire something
or wish to avoid something. At the same time, we never desire
or avoid anything unless we judge it to be good or bad for ourselves. Hence certain judgments always precede our actions;
and these judgments are singular since our actions are always
concerned with singular things. It follows, therefore, that the
object of experience is the particular thing as good or bad for
man; for the proper object of intelligence is the universal.
Herein lies the value attribute of experience. Nor is this
perception of value in the particular thing confined only to
notions of convenience, usefulness, and suchlike, for there are
many values which do not· belong to these aforementioned
As Rudolph Allers points out:
The rational will can not consider (sic) any particular object without some intermediary function which forms, as it were, the connecting link between the immaterial faculty, and the material particular in which the values, as realized and desirable or as to be
realized by man's action, reside. Now there are many values which
do not belong to the classes of usefulness, convenience, damage or
danger. These values too must be brought close to the will by some
intermediary, which naturally can not be any other than the vis
cogitativa. . . . It seems, therefore, correct to define the proper
object, in this regard, of the vis cogitativa as any value whatsoever,
in so far as it is realized in a particular thing or situation and apprehended as such.64
Since acts are specified by their objects and experience is the
act of the cogitative power, then the proper object of experience
is any value apprehended in the particular.
This experienced value attribute is a pervasive and insepar•• Rudolph Allers, " The Vis Cogitativa and Evaluation," The New Scholasticism.
XV (1981), pp. !l00-201.

THE NOTION OF· EXPERIENCE

889

able aspect of every experience. All human wants, urges, desires,
and aspirations are permeated with some value attribute. For
instance, a value attribute of a relatively low order is experienced in situations where physical needs are satisfied in a crude
and elemental way; whereas a higher, richer, subtler, more satisfying value attribute is experienced in concrete situations where
man's higher faculties are exercised and his higher aspiration
fulfilled. A job well done, helping a friend, the solution of a
highly a-bstract problem, the performance of a virtuous deed
and the like, all these activities of life contain value attributes.
Indeed, all the humble ordinary activities of life contain an
element of value: learning to read and write, mowing the lawn,
completing a crossword puzzle, liking and disliking, joy and
sorrow, disappointment and disturbance, these are the value
attributes of everything we do.
Since human experience is open to, and most often is under
the guidance of reason, its object extends to the whole field of
concrete suitability and man is able to perceive a value content
in every particular situation. This provides a plausible explanation for the many divergent types of activity men seek to
repeat. Man tries to recapture qualities he has experienced on
previous occasions-in satisfying his physical, intellectual, social
and cultural needs. He wants to recapture these experiences
simply because he enjoys the value attributes related to them.
The sensed value of any experience is crucially important, for
it is the catalyzer needed to produce all our actions.
Considered in itself, on a purely sensory level in abstraction
from the rest of man, human experience would be very imperfect. But when we consider it as in contact with and united
to reason we come to a very different result. Under the guiding
influence of reason it penetrates into all the innumerable fields
of human activity. 65 In this way man can increase the range
of his experience and attain an enhancement of the value
attribute of experience. It is the capacity man has to sense
added value in his experience that accounts for his ceaseless
•• De Virt. in Comm., Q. 1, a. 6.

840

JOSEPH L. LENNON

striving, for his characteristic unwillingness to have things
remain as they are. It explains, moreover, the anticipatory
quality of man's experience and points out the inadequacy of
trying to account for it solely in terms of influences operating
in the present.
Every experience of the present involves the future as well
as the past. Our experience in any immediate situation is related so indissolubly to our expectancies that one could hardly
exist without the other. The present and past act as a take-off
for the things expected or hoped for in the future. That is why
St. Thomas points out that experience is the cause of hope.
Hope is concerned with a future
difficult but possible to
obtain.
Consequently, a thing may be the cause of hope, either because it
makes something possible to a man: or because it makes him think
something possible. In the first way hope is caused by everything
which increases a man's power, e. g., riches, strength, and among
the faculty of
others, experience: since by experience man
doing something easily, and the result of this is hope. Wherefore
Vegetius says: No one fears to do that which he is sure of having
learned well. In the second way, hope is caused by everything
which makes man think that he can obtain something: and then
again experience is the cause of hope, in so far as it makes him
reckon something possible which before his experience he looked
upon as impossible. 66

Experience of many failures is also the reason why old people:
sometimes lack confidence or hope of success; while the young
because of their very lack of experience in suffering failure or
defeat sometimes abound in self-confidence and hope. 67 This
indicates the necessity of giving children tasks which can he
accomplished within the framework of their capabilities. The
experience of the value attributes of success and achieve:rnent
in a task well done will help develop the self-confidence }lecessary for hope of future achievement.
It is the nature of man to strive for an increase in the quality
of experience so long as there is some hope of success, even
•• I-II, Q. 40, a. 5.

67

I-II, Q. 40, a. 6, ad 2.

THE NOTION OF EXPERIENCE

341

though he may know full well it will involve sacrifice and
pain. And the reason that he does this is because he has an
intellectual appreciation of those values which are good in themselves and also good for himself. An increment of the value of
any experience is possible only if there is some standard, some
form to use as a springboard for emergence. We cannot sense
an enhancement of quality in experience if we have no standard
as a takeoff.
Abstractions permit men to check a present experience against
the past and potential future, against universal rules, commandments, laws. The practical principles of reason itself deal
with the universal. 68 These universal objects are outside the
field of operation; they are abstracted from space and time,
immobile in themselves. "Honor thy father and thy mother,''
says universal reason. This proposition is universal and necessary, and as such it cannot immediately lead to action which
is always in the realm of the particular. 69 Yet a transition must
be made, if reason is be to the guide of human action. Experience stands ready at hand. Its field is precisely the concrete
particular as it is good for men. Seeing the particular good
in the apprehension of the cogitative power, reason can relate
it to its own universal apprehensions. 70 It can then draw the
conclusion: " This good thing is to be done." Thus reason
provides the standard by which the concrete value can be
realized in the myriad instances of experience. Experience, then
is both permeated with the intelligibility of reason, and limited
by the particularity of sense.
A characteristic of human activity is the fact of purpose.
Human behavior is never random or chaotic. "Omne agens
agit propter finem," 71 say the Scholastics, and human activity
is inevitably bound up with the realization of some value. An
appreciation of value considered universally belongs to the intellect; a judgment of particular value is made by the cogitative
power. As St. Thomas points out: " The intellect or reason
•• II-II, Q. 47, a. I.
•• II-II, Q. 47, a. 8.

•• DeVer., Q. 10, a. 5.
71 I-II, Q. 1, a. 2.

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JOSEPH L. LENNON

knows in the universal the end towards which it ordains the
act of the concupiscible and irascible appetites, by commanding
them. This universal knowledge it applies to the singular by
means of the cogitative power." 72 The judgment of experience,
therefore, is about the value component of every experience.
In the process of living, man is constantly bombarded by a
flow of sensations from which he derives all his experiences.
These impressions received by man from his senses are
meaningless unless they become functionally related to his purposes. The very fact that man sifts and sorts, accepts and
rejects images of past sensations is dependent upon the fact
that the cogitative power recognizes them as contributing in
some way to human welfare. Thus it is that attention in man
becomes a problem of relating particular goods found by experience to the welfare of the individual. As Klubertanz asserts:
"Attention, therefore, in the sensory order is a function of
sense appetite, which is determined by the judgment of the
estimative or discursive power in its judgments." 73
The fact that the fleeting images of sense would stop, come
to rest, as it were, merge and coalesce with kindred images, be
integrated about a core, can be explained only by the recognition
that they serve the purposes of the individual who apprehends
some value in them. As the thing that is loved tends to remain
within the apprehension of the lover, so also the particular
sensible remains in the experience of the individual because
it has value for him. The significance anything in our environment has for us originates in some personal experience. The
meaning we relate to any sense impression is derived only
through past experience as we have tried to carry out our purpose. This has important implications for methodology in learning and teaching, for there is no starting or progress in learning
unless we start from the experience of the individual. Moreover, as the intellect and will influence each other reciprocally,
so also do the cogitative power and the sensitive appetite.
'12
78

DeVer., Q. 10, a. 5, ad 4.
Klubertanz, The Discursive Power, p. 290.

THE NOTION OF EXPERIENCE

343

In practical knowledge, universal principles are applied to
contingent operables by the cogitative power's apprehension of
the universal value concreted in the particular instance: This
function derives naturally from the proper act of the cogitative
power inasmuch as its object is the concrete sensible good. It
is different with those objects which are not operable or practical, which deal, not with doing, but with knowing. In other
words, how is the particular thing which is an object of speculative knowledge grasped through experience by the cogitative
power, since in itself the object of speculative knowledge is not
the good but the true? The plausible answer seems to be that
the particular truth is also a particular good for man; for every
truth is a certain good and every good is a certain truth. 74 Thus
the interest of the individual in this particular thing to be
known is bound up with the fact that it is good for him under
some aspect; the aspect being the perfection of the knower. As
Klubertanz shrewdly observes: " ... interest is the key to all
learning. But fundamentally there are two kinds of interest.
There is interest which flows immediately from the object, because it is known to be sensibly good or useful. There is another
form of interest, whose source is interior; it consists in this,
that the knowledge of an object which as such is outside the
field of value is looked on as the good and perfection of the
knower." 75
This accounts for the affective element in learning: the
particular thing ordained to speculative knowledge is apprehended by the cogitative power as contributing to the welfare
of the individual. The particular truth becomes a good-either
because the cogitative power under the guidance of reason
recognizes it as conducive to mental perfection, or because it
is according to what we are accustomed to hear, or because it
is proposed by a person whom we like, or it may be that it is
accompanied by certain rewards or advantages. Whatever, the
case, it has a distinct value attribute connected with it which
.. I, Q. 82, a. 4, ad 1.
75 Klubertanz, op. cit., p. 291.

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JOSEPH L. LENNON

makes it desirable in this particular instance. In this we find
the emotional overtones connected with all learning, for feelings
of liking or disliking always accompany the study of any
subject.
Because this is so, the teacher cannot disregard student
attitudes. If the student develops a liking to learn while he is
learning to learn, the interest in learning may continue lifelong.
Although many of the topics treated herein received no ex
professo treatment by St. Thomas, nevertheless, we believe that
they were treated in principle by the Angelic Doctor. His study
of the cogitative power in man, as the faculty of experience,
has laid the groundwork for the understanding of experience
within the total context of human activity. His insistence upon
experience as the foundation of knowledge and as the basis of
all practical activity points up its great importance in the
educative process and its extreme necessity for practical proficiency.

J. L. LENNON, 0. P.
Providence CoUege
Providence, R.I.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND THE APOSTOLATE
I
" TWENTIETH Century Apostle," 1 brief as it is, remains an enduring statement on the subject. In
recounting the three ways in which the first Apostles
worked their offensive strategy to bring happiness to unhappy
men, Father Farrell put first the living of the message; second,
the spoken word; and last, the written word. The supreme
apostolic weapon of the original bearers of the Good News was
in their very lives and actions:
Short of the grace of God, it was their life-exposition of the message
of Christ that made the western world Christian. The only limit
set to the use of this instrument was dictated by the Master of life
in setting a time for death. If their words portrayed temporal and
eternal peace on a fascinating canvas, their lives and deeds put
the same message in three dimensions, in a form that men could
view and handle from all angles, a sculpture carved so harmoniously
from the stubborn and diverse material of human lives as to leave
no doubt of the divine genius of the Sculptor. Men read and
doubted, they heard and argued, but when they saw they fell on
their knees.2
The great point made in Father Farrell's essay-which happens
to have been one of his last-is that the one apostolic instrument that has come down to us unimpaired is the glorious lifeexposition of the message of Christ by the apostle. The way
in which the important two instruments-the spoken and the
written word-have not only been rendered more or less useless
in our era but have bolstered the enemy's campaign also, is
what concerns us here. For the modern apostle scanning the
horizons of the fields outside the present cultivation of the
1 Walter Farrell, 0. P., "Twentieth
Century Apostle," The Thomist, X (1947),
188-158.
"Ibid., p. 189.

345

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M. WHITCOMB

HESS

Church sees those fields, Father Farrell tells us truly, as much
more humanly hopeless than in the days of the infant Church:
" The audience of the modern apostle is almost totally lacking
in the natural prerequisites for supernatural life. Sound notjons
of God and man are either already gone or moving rapidly to
the last stages of decay." 3 Thus the apostolic weapons have
become defensive rather than offensive; for the completeness
of the corruption of natural truths has rendered the ordinary
men and women of today invulnerable to the apostle's spoken
or written message. Though the fundamental attacks on man's
very nature have been left in obscurity, as the great Thomist
pointed out, the denial of, or agnostic indifference to, man's
spiritual essence is clear in the age's enthronement of relativism.
The demand of Father Farrell that we evaluate the spoken
and written word from the standpoint of apostolic efficiency is
a demand that they be used immediately to multiply the faithful apostle's own life-exposition in the lives of his hearers. Certainly, in our century, because of the hostile atmosphere toward
truth, the improvement in our communication-means as such
has only increased the fog of errors. The very art of printing,
as Kierkegaard had observed in the past century, is a" satirical
discovery " since it propagates falsehoods which might otherwise have died with the falsifiers. Not only has the notion of
God been lost so completely that a proud world feels it can do
without God and still base its pride on a caricature of man, as
Father Farrell pointed out; there is also being fed to our people
through press, radio, TV, a steady diet of distorted notions of
human beings and their powers. Men have thus developed
blind spots making it impossible for them to follow rational
processes. There is a vast expenditure of wasted effort in trying
to reason with them.
Nevertheless if the spoken and written word are to serve the
Christian who uses these instruments as brands to set the faithful on fire-in the vivid imagery of Father Farrell-instead of
showering their living sparks of truth on the modern fog to be
"Ibid., p. 144.

PHILOSOPHY AND THE APOSTOLATE

347

snuffed out by it, they are to be used according to the truths
of the philosophia perennis with no compromising with current
attitudes. Suppose that the Socratic doctrine of the soul as
consciousness has been supplanted by the doctrine of the subconscious which denies man personal responsibility for his
choices? Our revolt against reason which has inverted age-old
philosophic values has not changed the fact that man is a
reasonable and reasoning creature. The intimate interconnection of the life, the spoken word and the written word in the
apostle's career does, of course, make his work in an era of
enthroned relativism that of a spy in an enemy country; but
if he is still to be God's spy he cannot teach that truth is subject
to change even to get a foot in the door of the house of the
soul at which he stands, and knocks. He must continue to
challenge the leaders of our present " great war of ignorance."

II
The Yale physicist, Henry Margenau, speaks of the need for
a new philosophy, though its details, he tells us, elude him. 4
But he is sure that " its method will reflect ongoing concerns,
the dynamism of science itself." Dr. Margenau explained his
"perspectives-of-science"
philosophy in these terms:
Like science this philosophy will conceive its goal to be an ideal
one attainable only as a limiting answer to finite and often repeated
human questions. Knowing the tentative nature of postulates, it
will harbor no static certainties; while it will recognize meaningful
eternal questions, it will brook no eternal answers, nor will it entertain timeless truths.
The Key Reporter article in which the above statement occurs
had been based throughout on the PBK address which, as
Visiting Lecturer for the year 1957-58, the Yale professor gave
before Phi Beta Kappa audiences throughout America. This
• H. Margenau, "The Task of the Coming Philosophy,"
Autumn, 1959, pp.
fi.

The Key Reporter,

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M. WHITCOMB

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speech was enthusiastically received at Ohio University by
members of the learned Society and the faculty generally.
Such dogmatism as Margenau's, replacing metaphysics with
naturalism, is as unhappy as it is inevitable in our current cultural climate. Sense knowledge, on which science rests, is always
relative, of necessity; but sense knowledge is not maJl's only
source of knowledge. If it were so, there would be only what
is past, or passing, or to come, as Yeats sings, ending his " Sailing to Byzantium." And in that flowing stream what aims or
goals for man are possible, even of formulation, let alone realization? For man so far from being able to step twice into the
river of Heraclitus cannot, as it was. long ago recognized, step
into it even once.
In whatever formulation the new philosophy occurs it is
always reducible to the pre-Socratic Heraclitean flux; for in
the last analysis nature's ever-living bonfire is the proposed
thought-system of the modern relativist; and it is also the picture mirrored in all our current art forms of every genre. We
have its defenders in those who deny free will as intrinsic
necessity but insist paradoxically on freedom from any external
authority; we have them in our upholders of the idea of a
cosmic order without intelligent direction and in those who
seek explanation of conduct in biological drives and subconscious influences. And we have its defenders in theologians.
Reinhold Niebuhr, on the basis of the flux of the temporal
world, has made a radical distinction between nature and history. In the latter God is said to intervene from time to time
" to reconstruct the rational concepts of meaning which men
and cultures construct under the false assumption that they
have a mind which completely transcends the flux of history,
when actually it can only construct a realm of meaning from
a particular standpoint within the flux." 5 (Saint Thomas, Niebuhr has been saying over and over for years, simply did not
appreciate the finiteness of man's reason and its involvement
in the flux of the temporal world!)
5 R. Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems (New York:
1958). p. 200.

Scribner,

MODERN PHILOSOPHY

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The Niebuhr flux-philosophy is echoed in the demand of certain Catholic theologians who believe, as Father John L. McKenzie wrote recently, 6 that our new intellectual climate needs
a new philosophic language. In this article the Jesuit scholar
observed that St. Thomas' success " lay largely in the fact that
he so perfectly articulated his belief in terms apt for the intellectual world of his day." Commendable as this is to Father
McKenzie, those terms cannot be apt for the mid-twentieth
century " unless we realize that the intellectual world now does
not speak the language of the thirteenth century." He continues:
What I find lacking in the Thomistic synthesis-and in speculative
theology as a whole-are historical and critical methods and approach. In modern education and in the modern intellectual world
these have a place in the training of the educated man which they
did not have in the thirteenth century; our students will meet them
in their humanistic disciplines. The historical and critical attitude
exhibited by St. Thomas-and by most classic writers of theology
down to our own century-does not meet the standards of modern
historians and critics.7
What Father McKenzie says of the historical and critical
attitude of St. Thomas not meeting the standards of modern
historians and critics is true, of course. But the method here
suggested reads more like a compromise with ignorance than
the defense of truth-at least to the reader who sees truth
betrayed in the unsound historical and critical attitude of any
protagonist whatever of the flux-philosophy.
Both in American and in German universities there is cur·
rently a new concern and fascination with that philosophy. The
influence of the German rationalist who inaugurated the modern
philosophy of history had already spread darkly through our
culture. Hegel's absolute-state dogma with its many and varied
political forms; Hegel's subjectivism with its many varieties in
idealism, rationalism, existentialism, scientism, pragmatism;
•" Theology and Jesuit Education," Thought, XXXIV (1959), 345-357.
7 Ibid., p. 353.
The quotation occurs also in Father McKenzie's " Training
Teachers of College Theology," Juuit Educational Quarterly, XIX (1956), 101 ff.

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M. WHITCOMB

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and finally Hegel's historicism (appearing as it does in the
Toynbee view of history and the neo-orthodox Protestant
theologies) have somehow all appealed much to the modern
mind. The postulate which underlies the great idealist's System is deceptively simple: The world and all that happens in
it is a historically conditioned phase in the self-realization of
the W eltgeist for which all forms are passing afiairs as it
marches forever onward. All forms indeed pass by dialectic
necessity-dialectic since the rising takes place on a mental
ladder whose rungs are respectively art, religion and philosophy.
The whole System, nevertheless, destroys at the outset the
possibility of philosophical authority by its primal postulate
of the flux. At its heart stands a fundamental contradiction:
and the contradiction is itself the keystone of the whole structure.
Yet a German scholar told me recently of the eagerness with
which the young philosophers in his native land are " returning
to the study of Hegel." A young American Jesuit informed
me at about the same time of his own wish to do for Hegel what
St. Thomas did for Aristotle. Let us hope the young Jesuit
succeeds, all but impossible as the task appears. When Heinrich
Heine, the German poet who repudiated Hegel on his deathbed
after following him all his life, saw his former philosophy teacher
in a new light, he compared the Maestro's subtleties to those
of " the bluestocking without feet " in Eden. But, said Heine,
the tempter of our first parents put in a few words (" Ye shall
be as gods ") what Hegel had spun out so voluminously in his
spider-web labyrinths of dialectic. Not only Hegel but Marxto whose movement Heine first gave the name of Communistwas seen by the dying poet as bent on destroying all that is
precious to man: his personality, his freedom, his hope of
immortality.
The sophistries Heine was to see in Hegelianism, sophistries
that his Danish contemporary Kierkegaard fought against heart
and soul, have been visited on Europe and the whole world in
ways too obvious to need recounting. Hegel's philosophy of
history with its absolute-state doctrine afiected us disastrously

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from Bismarck's Germany to II Duce's Italy, and from Hitler's
Reich to Marxism's U.S.S.R. Kierkegaard, bitterest and keenest of critics of Hegel's System, saw the developmental pattern
of Hegel's philosophy of history as that of the spirit of the
world which must be repudiated by the Christian. But the
tares had already been sown among the good wheat of philosophical truth when both Heine and Kierkegaard indicted the
Hegelian historical method as not being a valid approach. I£
the serpent of Eden did work through the German idealist's
teachings, it would seem to be through a philosophy of relativism, holding no truth unchanged in changing time and place.

III
Hegel's idea that the world and all that happens in it is only
an historically conditioned phase has deeply infiltrated our culture even though this relativism is indicted from time to time
as diabolical. In his last Screwtape Letter, for instance, C. S.
Lewis has his "very experienced Devil" observing to his confreres: "Via Hegel (another indispensable protagonist on our
side) we easily contrived both the Nazi and the Communist
states." 8 Yet the Hegelian subtleties are named by such Catholic scholars as Walter J. Ong, S. J., as showing brilliant albeit
partial insight. 9 And Father Ong appeals in his own dialectic
to an historical and critical canon which, is nothing if not Hegelian in its nature.
Read what the St. Louis educator has written in American
Catholic Crossroads regarding the value of St. Thomas in the
light of his own theory of knowledge: "We know we can never
recapture the totality of St. Thomas' view of the universe, even
if we wanted to, if only because we cannot forget enough of
what man has thought and discovered since his time." 10 The
8 In The Saturday Evening Post, December 19, 1959.
• " A Dialectic of Aural and Objective Correlatives," Essays in Criticism, 8
(1958)' 166-181.
10 American Catholic Crossroads (New York:
Macmillan, 1959), p. 99. This
statement obviously rests on a theory which would destroy all philosophical authority
as fully as in the theory of the ancient Sophists.

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notion that all things pass by dialectical necessity has been
combined in Father Ong's " intense consciousness of knowledge's developmental pattern" (to use his descriptive for it)
with a new epistemological theory which would separate the
world of sound from that of vision. Indeed he seems to be
saying that the two avenues of sense, sight and hearing, affect
respectively what we know and affect it fundamentally. St.
Thomas, however, if I have followed his argument rightly, did
not concern himself with the eye and ear as anything other than
the extraordinary avenues of perception they are; what he did
was to relate perception to language by the use of the discoveries of the Father of Logic-discoveries which Father Ong
holds the work of eye-minded epistemologists. In fact, Father
Ong's criticism of Hegel is just that his dialectic is "too little
vocal in preoccupation, deflecting attention from the word as
word to a visualist analogue of the word." The Hegelian idea,
in short, is" that-which-is-seen, reflected in an equally visualist
(thesis-antithesis-synthesis) reduction of dialogue itself." 11
Father Ong looks on sound itself as " the ground of all verbal
communication," as he says in a popular essay/ 2 Pre-literate
man, Father Ong holds, lived in a voice-and-ear culture. But
the invention of the alphabet revolutionized thinking, since the
alphabet " breaks the sound itself up into little spatial parts
which it reassembles on a surface in countless configurations."
(Apart from the gratuitous thinking-power here granted the
alphabet as such, why should the parts of written language be
any less subserviently structural than those of speech?) The
alphabet, the writer goes on, resulted in a manuscript culture;
this was followed, after Gutenberg, by a typographical culture.
But now, and hopefully, Father Ong sees a drift back to the
world of sound. In philosophy, we read, "interest is veering
away from logic to dialogue, from thinking conceived as a
private, silent affair, to thinking seen in its full social and public
setting." (Why, we must ask, should logic be held so private
"A Dialectic of Aural and Objective Correlatives," p. 180.
Is Literacy Passe," a guest editorial in the Saturday Review, November 28,
1959. Our return to pre-literacy is here held a very good thing indeed.
11

12

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353

and silent as all that? Or dialogue be considered so much more
"social and public"?) The guest editorial-essay ends with the
thought that "printing's monopoly is broken." For the teleTV, our rapid transportation systems and the earth
satellites speaking to us in their "tiny beep-beeping voices"
have all helped effect our return to a voice-and-ear era.
The qualifying behavioral difference which Father Ong arbitrarily sets up between speech and writing affects deplorably his
whole knowledge theory. In his Saturday Review piece as elsewhere he declares dogmatically that now there is " a growing
awareness that science itself at any moment is only arrested
dialogue." In his special knowledge-:-and-communication theory
grammar is based on the written word, linguistics on the spoken
word; spoken language is an immediate response in time, but
writing is mediated and reduces " the evanescence of sound in
time to relative permanence in space." 13 Thus it follows for
him that the spoken word is the word at first hand; the written,
only at second hand.
But verbal reference does not differ essentially in speech and
writing; in neither form are symbols constitutive of meanings.
In the Oxford essay cited above, 14 Father Ong tries to persuade
us that sounds qua sounds enter integrally into the meanings.
He refers to the ineluctable interiority of literature's verbal
sounds, and makes a strong plea for knowledge and communication to be considered from the standpoint of hearing rather
than from that of sight which he relegates chiefly to science.
And here he makes an illogical cleavage not only in communication methods but in knowledge itself.
Nevertheless, "the oral-aural notion of knowledge" instead
of what he calls " the more visualist Hellenic notion " remains
in Father Ong's theory the only one for the critic no less than
for the artist. We read:
18 Ibid. Father Ong's confusion is shared by almost all the writers on the semantic
problem. The complex of relationships existing between the word-and-idea, the
idea-and-thing, involves categories that are distinct and difficult to maintain in
abstraction from the knoweldge-situation which is formulated and communicated in
the language in question.
u "A Dialectic of Aural and Objective Correlatives."

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M. WHITCOMB

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Just as a poem Ol' other work of art as word resists complete framing
as an " object " thought of as clearly and distinctly outlined in
space, so it resists complete framing in terms of types and genres.
For these represent an attempt to define, to delimit, to mark off,
and in this way conceal a visualist approach to knowledge, feeling,
and communication.15
In this debasing of logic Father Ong is not alone, of course.
But his criticism of the doctrine of universals as exemplified
in the above quotation reveals something less than understanding of the traditional "Hellenic notion" he decries. Neither
the Father of Logic nor any of his successors ever held that an
individual thing was completely framed in terms of types and
genres: quite the contrary. For the individual unit to exist at
all meant that it must exist as a universal and vice versa.
(When Plotinus said regarding truth that each fragment of it
which is present as a unit lives as a universal, he followed the
original Greek conception of reality, culminating in Aristotle's
metaphysical monism.) That it is impossible for truth to have
an antecedent framework has been the cry from Greek philosophy onward. The that and the what, or the particular and
the universal, are always mutually transcendent; a developing
knowledge situation, though it may show them as reconstructed
in the reconstruction of each stage, shows them always-precisely as poetry represents them-as identical at each stage.
Of course it is true as Father Ong says in the Saturday Review editorial referred to above, that written words seem to
have an essential space-order; spoken words, an essential timeorder. But the artificiality of such a division is shown by a
comparative study of the same thought in different languages.
We speak in English of a book lying on the table. The Germans
say das auf dem Tische liegende Buch or the on-the-table-lying
book. In either instance there is an all-at-onceness of knowledge; and neither sense-avenue, whether that of hearing or sight,
fundamentally affects it, any more than the varying wordorders in the examples above affect the way we know in English
and German. The logical process is above time and space as it
15

Ibid., p. 176.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY

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is above language-forms, as the latter appear in the temporalspatial category of all sense-perception.

IV
The -cause of the present semantic difficulty is the lack of
recognition of the epistemological fact that the symbols must
be of ideas and objects at once. Our symbol-problem is itself
the inevitable result of Kant's dichotomy of ideas and objects.
The answer to the problem may well lead the lost world of
philosophy back to the truth. Not only should it result in a
mortal blow to such absurd semantic notions as that of S. I.
Hayakawa 16 that " Definitions, contrary to popular opinion,
tell us nothing about things," but it should likewise put a stop
to the ultra-impressionism of our era. For our modern art is no
more and no less than the reflection of our subjectivist theories
in epistemology.
The wagers of the present war on words should, by their very
presuppositions that words are imperfect, non-precise communicables, maintain a Cratyluslike silence. This they refuse
to do, blithely ignoring the fact that their linguistic formulations undercut their arguments throughout. The complex of
relationships referred to earlier as it exists between words and
ideas, ideas and things, involves, it is true, two sides of verbal
meaning which belong to two different, distinct categories. Yet
these categories are subsumable under one principle of language function in communicating knowledge. That symbols
act as ideas (and then that the ideas, if valid, refer to both the
essence and the existence of the thing-referent) is actually a
rudimentary semantic axiom.
If the poet's procedure-as he telescopes words, ideas and
things into the immediacy of existence they show in poetryis a valid one from the standpoint of art, it must also be a
valid one from the standpoint of the semanticist. His use of
sound is, to be sure, his way of revealing beauty in his own art
medium of language; it is comparable to the sculptor's, the
10

Language in Action (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), p. 98.

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M. WHITCOMB

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painter's and every other artist's use of some relatively neutral
sense-material. Poetry, however, charged with meaning as it
is at the art-material level, shows the conceptual and existential
aspects of language as synthesized in the verbal symbols employed. Yet we may see (analogically to sculpture in the
creative process) the syllabic sounds as neutral art-stuff, the
first meaning level as the special subject-matter, and the final,
or crowning interpretation, as the tie-up of the three in one
indissoluble whole.
No more than any other artist can the poet claim firsthand
creativity. What he does is to mirror our way of synthesis of
universality and particularity in some specific instance, revealing language method and content at once, obviating such a
cleavage as Ong's between " aural and objective correlatives,"
and witnessing the truth of verbal reference.
In the epochal controversy in which St. Thomas triumphed
over Siger of Brabant, there was, says Chesterton, a ring in the
great philosopher's words going beyond the almost impersonal
patience he maintained in debate with so many other enemies.
What Aquinas would have to say about modern relativists'
hydra-headed truth-systems can only be imagined. He would
show, of course, 'what the relativist can not or will not admitthat a theory of multiple truth violates reason's first principle
(which is that a thing cannot be and not be at the same time)
at the very start. His famed denunciation of Siger ended
simply:
Behold our refutation of the error. It is not based on documents
of faith, but on the reasons and statements of the philosophers themselves. If then anyone there be who, boastfully taking pride in his
supposed wisdom, wishes to challenge what we have written, let
him not do it in some corner nor before children who are powerless
to decide on such difficult matters. Let him reply openly if he dare.
He shall find me there confronting him, and not only my negligible
self, but many another whose study is truth. We shall do battle
with his errors or bring a cure to his ignoranceP
17 De Unitate InteUectus, C. 41 n. 268. Ed. Marietti,
Opusc. Phil., p. 90; quoted
in G. K. Chesterton's St. Thomas Aquinas (London: Sheed and Ward, 1947), p. 74.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY

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St. Thomas' almost casual mention of the difficulties in the
study of truth (as well as his reference to his "negligible self"
in this philosophical field where he had already proved his full
attests the saint's great humility. For, as Jacques
Maritain writes in his little book, A.n Introduction to Philosophy, truth, in all matters transcending the data of common
sense, is as hard to retain as it is to attain. 18 It is not, adds the
Thomist scholar, given to man ready-made like a natural endowment; those who have had the good fortune to be born
into a culture formed by it are apt, nevertheless, to accept it
as matter-of-factly as the very air they breathe. Our civilization's present plight has shown how easily truth may be lost.
Facilis descenBUB A.verni. It is in the return that the toil and
difficulty appear.
Yet, as the magistral debater with Siger of Brabant suggests
in the quotation given above, truth's unity appears in the
"reasons and statements of the philosophers themselves." For
there is an immutable logical law, as Aristotle showed in his
report on the conditions of knowledge-dependability, that underwrites science in all fields. Appeal to that law is made unconsciously even by those who would deny its existence.
Furthermore, the word-art or poetry exhibits this unity as
suggested above; for it shows language both in power and in act
illustrating verbal reference.19 Thus poetry offers a testimony
of high though incidental value to the argument regarding the
objectivity of our human knowledge. For poetry reveals beauty
just through the indissociability of the verbal and logical forms,
an indissociability which proclaims the inviolable unity of idea
and object in the knowledge situation in question.

v
Music and meaning in poetry show par excellence, then, the
way that logical universality and particularity unite, and, in
18

J. Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy (New York: Sheed and Ward,

1947). p. 48.
19

See my "Poetry as Dlustrating Verbal Reference," The Modem Schoolman,

XXXI (1958), 1-9.

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M. WHITCOMB

HESS

the showing, confirm Thomistic epistemology. Our very conviction of certainty in science is due to the logic of universals.
A failure to understand this logic permeates the reasoning of
the modern objectors to Aristotle just as it did the logic of
the medieval nominalists. For instance we read in the book by
Father Ong referred to above that the Aristotelian " unqualified
endorsement of the superiority of the universal to the particular
does not sit well with him [i. e. the Christian of today] at all."
But the universal is not to be dismissed quite so facilely as this.
Of course it was the concept of the universality of the middle
term of the syllogism (that middle term to which the particulars rise and from which they flow) which led Aristotle to his
foundation for scientific certainty as well as to the actus purus
idea. Yet this purely human approach to the need for the first
cause does not, as Father Ong believes, militate against the
Christian belief in the Incarnation as " precisely a historical
Person, Jesus Christ, Who is Himself unique, not universal, and
yet is the Exemplar of all things, and for Whom a long history
of a speciai historical preparation, the Hebrews, was the foreshadowing preparation." 20
The foreshadowing preparation was shared by the Greek philosophers, just in their demand for the Man who would indeed
be " the measure of all things," and as part of that demand their
appreciation of the human knowledge problem. In a slight
article in Spirit, 21 I tried to show that Father Ong's suggested
solution to man's knowledge problem is more akin to that of
S. I. Hayakawa, on whom fell the Korzybski mantle of General
Semantics, than it is to that of a Catholic philosopher in the
line of the philosophia perennis. The General Semantics language theory, of course, is that the meaning of words is as
infinitely varied as the individual users of language, a theory
that never permits any ·mind to find its way out to liberty and
the light of day. Contrary to Cartesianism's fatal prejudgment
-from which the whole array of forms of modern subjectivism
and/or relativism stems-that thought being immanent cannot
•• American Catholic Cros8Toads, p. 4.

21

Spirit, XXVI (1959), 5't-56.

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know what is outside itself, the philosophia perennis shows that
this is precisely what it does know. Father Ong's now-visual
and now-aural theory of truth with its dichotomy between the
space-world of the scientist and the sound-world or the "1thou " where persons commune with persons (and what he holds
is the philosopher's and the critic's shuttling-activity between
them) is only a return to the subjectivism condemned by the
great Greeks, via Hegelian rationalism, which is, of course, the
German development of Cartesian subjectivism. And when
Ong sets knowledge by analogy with sight over against knowledge by analogy with hearing he gets the following anomalous
result:
The mind cannot get outside its limitations absolutely, but it
can get outside them to this extent: it can recognize its limitations
as limitations. Combined with an awareness that indefinite progress
in both empathic criticism and explicatory criticism is possible, we
must cultivate an awareness of the limitations within which both
types of criticism must ineluctably operate and we must develop
techniques of talking about these limitations. 22
This then is the result of modern philosophy's worry about
traditional philosophy's "a-historicism," an egocentric dilemma that thickens the fog for the twentieth-century apostle. Believing that the " historical outlook " is now to be taken for
granted " in the better studies of medieval scholastic philosophy
and of all philosophy," Father Ong equates philosophy with
the formulae of theoretical physics and its need to be complemented with a detailed account of the developmental process
whereby those formulae were evolved, citing Einstein as authority for the latter. 23
But the concern expressed in our century by Catholic writers
about what is called--often rather vaguely but always pejoratively-medievalism in Catholic belles-lettres 24 is itself a matter
22 "
28

A Dialectic of Aural and Objective Correlatives," p. 179.

In American Catholic Crossroads, p. 99.

2 • Cf. Thomas P. Coffey's diatribe against Catholic literature
(Saturday Review,
September 5, 1959), as stultified by the "medieval" limits of Catholic intellectual
effort. The writer's peevish generalities about restraints hampering the Catholic

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HESS

for the gravest concern. We must ask if our current philosophical problems have been faced or solved by these loathers
of medieval thought with any degree of success comparable to
the scholastics at their best as typified in St. Thomas. There
are just two questions in urgent need of an answer. One is:
Are the philosophical discoveries of Aristotle possibly related
(except as final answers to the Sophists' doubt about the power
of the mind to make true judgments) to a historical period?
The other question, really a corollary of the first, is this:
Is the historical and critical canon itself not a dated hypothesis which a proper understanding of the teachings of traditional philosophy must discard? An understanding or appreciation of the actual relation of sense-perception to language- 25
which is precisely what furnished the corrective to Heraclitusas it leads to the knowledge of how minds attain to things, and
as formulated in the work of Aristotle and his Christian interpreter, St. Thomas, is assuredly called for in our current Catholic scene. However, its apologists are challenged as never before
in the history of Catholicism since the Reformation.
If the Thomist report on the nature of knowledge has outlasted the centuries-and it has, and will outlast those to come
-as that report refined and extended the Aristotelian findings,
the reason is that the truth that we can know (and can know
that we can know) remains universally operative. What requires many a twist and turn of labyrinthine logic to declare
requires the firm line of the philosophia prima through the maze
of just how our reliable knowledge does attain to minds also
in the act of knowledge of things; and the very difficulty of
grasp of that philosophy proves a stumbling-block to our weak
ease-loving natures. But what other philosophy besides that
of St. Thomas has shown so lucidly the common-sense fact of
author in an otherwise free country are based, it is true, on his own Five-Inch Shelf
of those he holds cribbed, cabined and confined to the point of suffocation. His
over-all indictment is that Catholic literature wishes to return to another age rather
than make its home in the present world.
•• See my "Language and Sense Perception," The Thomist, X (1947), 56-74.

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the objectivity of knowledge? What other philosophy is available for the true apostle's personal or public use?
Now as always the truth of Father Farrell's own sure knowledge that "the apostle's harvest field is the heart of a man;
only God can enter there to sow and till and reap " is the cornerstone of the Christian Weltanschauung, the first and last wisdom of the worker in the apostolate who must come to the end
of his road knowing himself an unworthy servant. For "the
fruits of his apostolate are always so evidently much more
God's than man's." And this is true whatever the age, the risks
and difficulties, and whatever the apostle's labors. The thesis
of Father Farrell which is also the thesis of this paper is that
those labors are specially challenging ones in a world that lacks
the natural prerequisite for supernatural life in its loss of the
true philosophy; but if the would-be apostle in his endeavor to
bring joy to sad pagans compromises with pagan philosophy
he too can be only swallowed up in the quicksands that wait
the blind leader of the blind.
M. WHITCOMB HESS
Athens, Ohio

REFLEXION ON THE QUESTION OF GOD'S
EXISTENCE IN CONTEMPORARY
THOMISTIC METAPHYSICS

PART TWO
(Continued from previous number)
SECTION II.
REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT ON METAPHYSICS' CONSIDERATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
INTRODUCTION

M

ETAPHYSICS perfects the reflexion upon itself, proper
to it by right, in judgments regarding the attainment
of truths within the process of its own scientific discovery. Such judgments are advanced in the light of those
principles which are regulative of metaphysics' nature and
proportion to such truths. The consideration of God's. existence
is to be judged in conformity with the principles of extension
and limitation, contained in the statement that metaphysics
considers God not as subject, but as principle of its subject.
As is apparent from elements involved in the varied treatments
of the question of God's existence, this judgment must be
borne, first of all, upon the immediate approach to the question;
secondly, upon the actual attainment of God's existence in
metaphysics. This final section, consequently, will proceed
along these lines:
1: Judgment concerning the approach to the question
of God's existence.
II: Judgment concerning the actual attainment of
God's existence.

862

REFLEXION

I. JuDGEMENT

ON THE QUESTION OF GOD'S EXISTENCE
CoNCERNING

868

THE APPROACH TO THE QuESTION

oF GoD's EXISTENCE

A. On the General Order to be Followed
in This Approach
The principles regulative of metaphysics' proportion to the
attainment of truths about God indicate that such attainment
is the science's realization of its end. For in its search for
perfect knowledge of reality, the science must consider the first
cause of its subject, being in common. Since this subject is to
be understood in an exclusive sense, the consideration of God
as principle of this subject is the sole manner of considering
Him that falls within metaphysics' competence. This is the
position that must guide both the order of metaphysics' approach to the question of God's existence and the judgment
asserting the doctrinal place of this question. This judgment
must assess this approach by calculating its validity within
the process of scientific discovery made by metaphysics as it
seeks its end, the perfect knowledge of its proper subject.
Because of the status of the question as variously developed by
Thomistic authors, this judgment will be directed first towards
the general order of the approach of metaphysics to God's
existence, and then to the particular issue of the relevance of
the nominal definition of God in this approach.
1. Context of the question in the Summa Theologiae.

The focal point, both as source and as area of controversy,
for Thomist considerations of God's existence continues to be
question two of the First Part of the Summa Theologiae. The
familiar articles deal of course with the proposition God exists,
with regard to its evidence, its demonstrability and its demonstration. To view this question in its native theological setting
is of some importance to the judgment regarding its pertinence
to metaphysics.
About the proposition God exists (Deum esse; an Deus sit),
the constant single point of reference in the question in the

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THOMAS C. O'BRIEN

Summa, St. Thomas' comments are to be recalled. From the
prologue to question two, it is apparent that he locates it carefully within the framework of sacred doctrine, whose principal
intention is to develop knowledge concerning God. The
question of God's existence is to be dealt with in the part which
considers God in Himself, and specifically in connection with
the treatment of the divine essence. First among the questions
to be proposed about the divine essence is: An Deus sit, does
God exist? 1 From its context, then, in the Summa, question
two is properly a theological question proposed concerning
theology's proper subject, God. The proposition God exists
occurring throughout the question, has as its subject God, the
proper subject of sacred theology.
This theological context of the question is not simply a
matter of the logical order of the question; it includes as well
its doctrinal place as properly theological. This is evident from
the basis for the questions proposed concerning God's existence.
The whole question of God's existence is proposed by theology,
St. Thomas notes, for this reason:
Now among the inquiries that we must undertake concerning God
in Himself, we must set down in the beginning that whereby His
existence is demonstrated, as the necessary foundation of the whole
work. For, if we do not demonstrate that God exists, all consideration of divine things is necessarily suppressed.2
Since a rational demonstration of God's existence pertains to
theology, the bases for the discussion of the self-evidence of
the proposition, and of its demonstrability, are indicated. For
if the proposition is indeed self-evident, as some have alleged,
any demonstration of it is superfluous; if it can be known solely
by faith, no demonstration of it is possible, as others, moved by
1 Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 2, pro!.
• Inter ea quae de Deo secul}dum seipsum consideranda sunt, praemittendum
est, quasi totius operis fundamentum, consideratio qua demonstratur Deum esse.
Quo. non habito, omnis consideratio de rebus divinis necessaria tollitur. I Crmt.
Gent., c. 9. (Trans!., I, 78). The translation of Quo non habito is questionable, as
will be discussed later.

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365

the weakness of some proofs advanced, have alleged. 3 In connection with the latter remark, the reason for the actual
demonstration of God's existence in theology is also implied.
For there are valid, strong proofs, accessible to reason, for
God's existence. Such proofs fall within the scope of philosophical knowledge. But they pertain to theology as well, and in
virtue of the formal aspect under which theology considers all
matters, namely, insofar as they are divinely revealable.4 The
truth that God exists has certainly been revealed: it has also
been revealed that this truth is attainable by the power of
human reason alone. Thus in considering the rational demonstration of God's existence, theology is dealing with a truth
that is not foreign to its interest. 5
As wisdom, theology has the prerogative of judging concerning the findings of all purely rational science, insofar as they have
any bearing upon the proper subject of theology. 6 In approaching the question of God's existence the theologian is not doubting it even hypothetically, since the very principles of theology
are a " kind of impression of God's own knowledge." But these
same principles tell the theologian that the truth of God's
existence is within the competence of human reason. He is
obviously aware of the philosophical attitudes towards the
question. Thus it pertains to him to consider and to manifest
8 Cf. ibid., c. 10:
Haec autem consideratio qua quis nititur ad demonstrandum
Deum esse, superflua fortasse quibusdam videbitur, qui asserunt quod Deum esse
per se notum est, ita quod eius contrarium cogitari non possit et sic Deum esse
demonstrari non potest.
c. 12: Est autem quaedam aliorum opinio praedictae positioni contraria, per quam
etiam inutilis redderetur conatus probare intendentium Deum esse. Dicunt enim
quod Deum esse non potest per rationem inveniri sed per solam vim fldei et revelationis est receptum. Ad hoc autem dicendum moti sunt quidam propter debilitatem
rationum quas aliqui inducebant ad probandum Deum esse.
• Cf. Summa Tkeol., I, q. 1, a. 8: Quia igitur sacra scriptura seu doctrina considerat aliqua secundum quod sunt divinitus revelata, omnia quaecumque sunt
divinitus revelabilia communicant in una ratione formali obiecti huius scientiae. Cf.
also ad a. 1, ad
"In I Sent., d. 8, divisio -primae partis textus, the words of St. Paul, lnvisibilia
'
Dei, etc., are seen as regulative of the theological discussion of God's existence.
8 Cf. Summa Tkeol., loc. cit., a .. 6.

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the truth according to its rational mode of knowability by
adopting, judging and perfecting rational demonstrations of it.
Indeed, the weakness of some philosophical arguments advanced add urgency to this task. 7 The question of God's
existence does not" laicize" a whole section of theology. 8 The
function of the theologian to manifest " how what is said is
true," with regard to the matters he proposes, 9 places the
question of God's existence within the theological context.
The theological character of the question is apparent as
well from its origin and from its mode of procedure in the
Summa. The origin of the question as it is proposed in article
one indicates the theological character. For such a question as
that of the self-evidence of God's existence could never occur at
the outset of any purely philosophical investigation, rooted as
it is for its materials in what is available from the sensible
order. There is no experience which would warrant a question
about the objective immediacy, the self-evidence of a thing's
existence .
. . . to be (esse) is not perfectly included in the notion of any
creature, since the existence of any creature is diverse from its
quiddity; therefore of no creature can it be said that it is selfevident that it exists.10

For the theologian, concerned with the data of revelation,
the existence of God is a fact. As to his proper function regarding this truth, the manifestation of how it is true, there Is a
7 Cf. I Cont. Gent., c. 8; c. 9; cf. also note 8 above.
• Cf. Motte, A., 0. P., · "Theodicee et Theologie chez Saint Thomas d'Aquin,"
Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques (1987), p. 20.
• Cf. Quodl. IV, q. 9, a. 8 (ed. Marietti, 88; in older editions, Quodl. IV, a. 18, v. g
Parma; Mandonnet}: ·Quaedam vero disputatio est magisterialis in scholis non ad
removendum errorem sed ad instruendum auditores ut inducantur ad intellectum
veritatis quam intendit: et tunc oportet rationibus inniti investigantibus veritatis
radicem, et facientibus scire quomodo sit verum quod dicitur: alioquin si nudis
auctoritatibus magister quaestionem determinet, certificabitur quidem auditor quod
ita est, sed nihil scientiae vel intellectus acquiret et vacuus abscedet.
10 Hoc autem quod est esse in nullius creaturae ratione perfecte induditur, cuiuslibet enim creaturae esse est aliud ab eius quidditate, unde non potest dici de aliqua
creatura quod earn esse sit per se notum et secundum se. De V er., q. 10, a. 12.

REFLEXION

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OF GOD'S EXISTENCE

867

certain status already given to this question. There is reason in
the I am who am of Exodus for suggesting its self-evidence; St.
Paul's words invisibilia Dei ... indicate the natural knowability
of this truth. Thus in the origin of the development of the
question of God's existence revealed principles are very much
involved. The theologian as such must determine that rational
demonstrations are neither superfluous nor impossible; he must
seek to advance such demonstrations.
The theological character of the question in the Summa is
clear also from its mode of procedure. The reasons for the
need and the possibility of demonstrating God's existence advanced in articles one and two would be indeed incongruous in
a purely philosophical consideration. The need to demonstrate
God's existence is established because the objective self-evidence, by reason of identity of essence and existence in God.
is not available to human reason. The possibility of such a
demonstration, a posteriori, relies upon the truth that, since
God is the Creator, His effects are available to lead to His
existence as their cause. A purely philosophical search into
God's existence could hardly employ such truths in order to
prepare the way for the demonstration of that existence. But
to the theologian such a procedure is entirely consonant with
the nature and method of sacred doctrine, whose principles are
revealed, whose dominion extends over all natural truths, which
he can judge and employ in the manifestation of truths concerning its proper subject, God.
The theology of St. Thomas, consonant with the proper
theological order/ 1 begins with the consideration of God Himself. Because it pertains to the theologian to manifest how the
things theology teaches are true, he turns to the demonstration
11 Cf. II Cont. Gent., c. 4:
Exinde etiam est quod non eodem ordine utraque
doctrina procedit. Nam in doctrina Philosophiae quae creaturas secundam se considerat et ex eis in Dei cognitionem perducit, prima est consideratio de creaturis
et ultima de Deo. In doctrina vero fidei quae creaturas non nisi in ordine ad Deum
considerat, prima est consideratio Dei et posterior creaturarum. Et sic est perfectior,
utpote Dei cognitioni similior, qui seipsum cognoscenes alia intuetur. Cf. also In
De Trin., Prol.; and q. 2, a. 2.

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of God's existence. 12 The subject of the proposition God exists,
is the proper subject of theology. The inquiry is conducted
theologically, by reason of the principles of theology, and which
the sapiential employment of principles of reason to which
theology has an eminent right. The whole procedure of the
question is to be appreciated solely in its theological grounding
and context: it is a question that begins with God, that deals
with the truth that God exists, according to the demonstrability
of this truth to the human mind, per ea quae facta sunt.
2. Judgment on the philosophical procedure

a. On the "manualist" procedure
What then is to be said of the practice of incorporating
question two of the Summa Theologiae into metaphysics? The
principles governing the proportion of metaphysics towards the
truth about God indicate that He is not the subject of the
science or of any special metaphysics. Not having God as its
subject, no rational science should begin with Him after the
manner of sacred theology. As metaphysics approaches that
phase of its development labelled " natural theology " it is proceeding, not to begin to discuss God as its subject, but to search
for the ultimate principles of its subject, being in common. For
metaphysics to use the order and process of the Summa concerning the question of God's existence is abruptly to abandon
the only justifiable procedure and to assume the privileged
point of view of theology, appropriating a power and dignity
that belongs only to the theology that does have God as its
subject; that has revealed truths as its principles.
As a process of acquisition, approaching its term, metaphysics has no power beyond that granted by its proper subject
and the discoveries that subject's virtuality has yielded. For
metaphysics to assume the proposition God exists as a problem
'" Cf. ibid., I, c. 9. Contrary to the English translation of quo non habito, theology
does not depend for its very constitution and existence upon the demonstration of
God's existence. It obviously does depend upon God's existence, since it depends
upon Him for its principles, and since in its consideration of Him as its subject,
obviously begins with the truth of His existence.

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OF GOD'S EXISTENCE

369

to be dealt with in the way that it is developed in the Summa,
demands the use of truths not yet available to metaphysics, as
is clear from the implications of the theological process. For
metaphysics so to proceed is to cease to be philosophy.
Among contemporary works, of which the manual of Fr.
Gredt is one example, such a procedure remains, the heritage
from the nineteenth-century manualists, even as traces of their
conception of metaphysics remain.
In order to avoid the pitfall of stating truths about God
before His existence is known, Fr. Gredt begins his special
metaphysics on uncreated being with a nominal definition of
God, "being a se." Through his explanation of this term, the
author has a term of reference for the discussion, before God's
existence is proved, of the proposition God exists, as to its selfevidence and its demonstrability. As to the latter point, it
is to be remarked that the proof from the Summa for this is
not offered; rather the evidence for the demonstrability is the
actual, subsequent formulation of a posteriori proofs.
Procedures such as this cannot but be judged as foreign to
the nature of metaphysics as a process of discovery. Obviously,
when metaphysics begins with a division of the subject into
created and uncreated being, with God thus set aside as a
distinct scientific subject, there can be no serious intent to
discover His existence. Rather it seems to involve a preoccupation with the manner in which the proposition God exists is
attainable by the human intellect. An apparently apologetic
interest motivates the adoption of St. Thomas' procedure from
the Summa, as the most effective development of the question.
What is ignored, however, is the theological character of St.
Thomas' work, on the one hand, and his own conception of
the nature of metaphysics on the other. When the theological
development of the question of God's existence is incorporated
into metaphysics, St. Thomas' teachings are not followed on
the order of philosophy, on the nature of metaphysics as a
process of discovery whose findings are the result of the light
afforded by its proper subject, on the relationship of the consideration of God to that subject.

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The procedure involved is adopted because of a basic presupposition, namely, that God is the subject about which the
work of metaphysics proceeds. But this is not so. From
beginning to end metaphysics has as its subject being in
common; the knowledge about God that it attains is a knowledge of being in terms of its first cause. The subject of the
science, through the discoveries to which it leads, both gives rise
to the necessity of any inquiry concerning a first cause, and
must be the key to the consideration of that cause, which is
never
scientifically except formally as cause.
To deviate from the lines of development dictated by metaphysics' proportion to knowledge about God, is to sacrifice its
true character as a scientific process. A convenient distribution
of matter is not reason enough to jeopardize the development
of true science, which must be a movement from the known to
the unknown, from imperfection to perfection. The assumption
of the order and approach of theology into metaphysics deprives metaphysics of the one.authentic way open to it for its
fulfillment, the attainment of God, not as subject, but as
principle of its subject.
b. The procedure of Gilson
The above mode of procedure rests upou an unrecognized
inconsistency in making God the subject of inquiry, and then
seeking to proceed philosophically by incorporating question
two of the Summa as the beginning of natural theology. M.
Gilson is at pains explicitly and ex professo to present the order
of the Summa as St. Thomas' philosophical doctrine on the
existence of God. The basis for his position has been seen in
his understanding of the distinction between the revealed and
the revealable, as the key to the application of his general
thesis upon Christian philosophy to the presentation of the
Christian philosophy of St. Thomas. As revealable in the
Gilsonian sense, the existence of God is a philosophical matter
integrated into theology by its order to the common end of all
theological matters, the salvation of souls. It is a philosophical

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371

matter, however; to follow the order of its exposition in the
Summa is to manifest the authentic philosophical position of
St. Thomas on the point.
There can be no questioning of the right, vindicated by such
admirable labors, of the historian Gilson to view the question
of God's existence in its most mature and most fruitful expression by St. Thomas; or of his right to draw out the insights
that that expression within the framework of theology bestowed
even upon the philosophical aspects of the question. But that
the question in the Summa is to be called philosophy; that a
Thomistic metaphysics which does not follow the order of the
Summa in its consideration of God's existence cannot but betray St. Thomas and become Cartesian-these are points advanced by Gilson the philosopher, and are to be questioned.
The obligation of a metaphysics ad mentem D. Thomae to
follow the order of the Summa, has been sufficiently challenged
in connection with the principle of limitation and the nature of
metaphysics. Something needs to be said here, however, about
the interpretation of the question of God's existence as found
in the Summa, as philosophy. To confront such a position is
to touch on the notion of theology which it implies.
For M. Gilson, the revealable stands well for the authentic
Thomistic philosophical positions, since the principal philosophical interest of St. Thomas was directed towards those truths
which come under the Gilsonian understanding of that term.
Consequently, the authentic Thomistic philosophical position
regarding God's existence is to be advanced by following its
development in the Summa.
This position of Gilson is a philosophical position, or perhaps
it should be called theological, since only the theologian can
judge the nature of theology, and its formal object. Questionable in it, first of all, is the signification given to the term
"revealable." The context in which it is formulated (1, q. 1,
a. 3 and ad 2) does not justifly its exclusive application to
truths which, while de facto revealed, are in themselves accessible to natural reason. Rather it is a term embracing all the
truths which fall within the purview of theology, indicating the

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formal, specifying character of such truths as they are attainable by theology.
Because Sacred Scripture considers things according as they are
divinely revealed, therefore all things whatsoever which are divinely
revealable, communicate in the one formal aspect of object (formali
ratione obiecti) of this scienceP

From these words as they constitute the argument for the
unity of sacred doctrine or " sacred scripture," as St. Thomas
employs the terms, it is clear that he formulates the term
" revealable " in passing from the order of· exercise, to that of
specification; from esse ad posse, to put it another way. The
force of his argument for the unity of theology lies in this, that
from its exercise and its necessity, theology is known to deal
with things revealed. From its "operation," then the formal
aspect of whatever it considers is seen to be the " revealable."
Gilson's interpretation actually is quite irrelevant to the issue
involved in the context from which the term is taken. Further,
the term does not apply exclusively to philosophical truths
which are considered in theology, but indicates that theology's
specific constitution is derived from the formal aspect of whatever it considers-quaecumque sunt divinitus revelabilia. The
unity that theology retains because of this formality of whatever it considers, is intrinsic, since all share in the one formality
of object. There is nothing new here in St. Thomas' thought
relative to science; rather it is a proportionate application of his
usual doctrine concerning the specification of habits and
potencies by the formalis ratio objecti. The term revelabilia,
derived from what the exercise of theology is known to be, is
used to designate the formality of object. 15
18 Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. I, a. 8. Text in note 4 above. The published English
translation has been here set aside, since it completely confuses the terms revelata
and revelabilia, and thus destroys the illation in St. Thomas' argument.
"Cf. ibid., a. I, ad 2; a. 8, ad 2.
15 The response in article 8, ad 2, does not sustain the interpretation
of Gilson.
It presupposes the intrinsic, constitutional unity of sacred doctrine, by reason of
the latter's formal object. Wherever this formality is verified, theology extends,
even as sight extends to objects in themselves diverse, insofar as they are colored.

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378

Because of the unity it has from its proper formality,
theology remains theology when it is considering truths in
themselves philosophical. For it deals with them theologically,
that is as they communicate in its formality of object. The
exposition of such truths, then, is not to be advanced as the
authentic presentation of St. Thomas' philosophy. In all its
diverse procedures, theology remains one; it remains theology.
Concerned with whatever is divinely revealable, its principles
are revealed truths. Thus, because of its possession of knowledge that is a share in that of God and of the blessed, it is
wisdom above all human wisdoms. In its concern to manifest
truths about God, it has the right to assume and to use purely
rational truths. When it does so it remains theology; it bestows
upon the truths it employs a new dignity within its own unity
as it appropriates them to itself. 16
In this sense, the question of God's existence as it appears
in the Summa, has rulready been discussed, as has been the
diversity of its procedure from a purely philosophical consideration. To designate the question of God's existence in the
Summa as the philosophy of St. Thomas is to deprive it of its
theological dignity. To advance this procedure as the one way,
not fraught with dangers, to propose an authentic Thomistic
presentation of this question in metaphysics, is to set aside St.
Thomas' indications of metaphysics' natural way to its term,
the consideration of God as principle of its subject. Metaphysics is made the recipient of the apparatus of theology without its light and its power. Metaphysics should rather be
allowed a development more modest but consonant with its
position and nature. Theology ought to be allowed the place
of eminence which belongs to it. M. Gilson has advanced as
the philosophy of St. Thomas with regard to God's existence,
a treatment and an order which is theological. By the same
Natural truths are among these things of which the formality " revealable '' is
verified; theology can and does consider them.
16 Cf. Muniz, Francis, 0. P., The Work of Theology (The Thomist Press; Washington, 1953), pp. 27-28.

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token he has proposed for a truly Thomistic metaphysics an
approach to this question which the science as such is incapable
of sustaining, since its own proportion to the attainment of
God's existence is exceeded, insofar as this approach demands
that God be considered as subject. To neither sacred theology
nor metaphysics is such a proposal a service.
Any further particular aspects of the approach to the
question of God's existence, according to various doctrinal
positions already seen, can be considered in conjunction with
the following point: the pertinence of the nominal definition
of God to metaphysics' approach to His existence.

B. Judgment on the Nominal Definition of
God in Metaphysics
The particular point that seems to concentrate within itself
many of the ramifications of metaphysics' approach to God's
existence, is the nominal definition of God. The vicissitudes
this nominal definition has undergone historically, are reflected
in the various ways it has been used and its pertinence vindicated by contemporaries. The insistence upon its role has a
basis alleged to be that of St. Thomas in his statement that in
the demonstration of the existence of God as cause, a valid
medium of demonstration is the nominal definition of God,
the subject of the demonstration. 17 Before examining the use
of the nominal definition of God in metaphysics-and there is
need for such an examination-it is important to recall what is
involved in the employment of the nominal definition of God
by St. Thomas in the Summa Theologiae.

11 Cf. Summa Theol., I, q.
a. !l: Ad secundum dicendum quod cum demonstratur causa per effectum, necesse est uti effectu loco definitionis causae ad probandum causam esse; et hoc maxime contingit in Deo, quia ad probandum aliquid esse
necesse est accipere pro medio quid significet nomen, non autem quid est, quia
quaestio quid est, sequitur quaestionem an t!llt. Nomina autem Dei imponuntur
ab effectibus, ut postea ostendetur, unde demonstrando Deum esse per effectum,
accipere possumus pro medio quid significet hoc nomen Deus.

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1. Context of the nominal definition in the

Summa Theologiae
Since his employment of the nominal definition of God in
theology is for St. Thomas the application to a particular case,
of a familiar element in the logic of demonstration, it is of some
importance to summarize the sense and function of the nominal
definition.
Within the discussion of scientific demonstration, the function of the nominal definition is a requisite for a basic intelligibility of terms, a guarantee that every term employed have
a definite and distinctive meaning. 18 But the nominal definition
is not merely a matter of etymology. It is a definition to the
extent that it delineates and identifies by expressing precisely
the formality, the ratio, signified by the term it defines; it is
qualified, however, as merely nominal in that the ontological
value or status of that term as it pertains to the demonstration
is as yet unknown.
In both the perfect scientific process, achieving perfect conformity with the ontological order, terminating in propter quid
knowledge, and in the less perfect process, terminating in quia
knowledge, the nominal definition has its place. Science is not
the creation but the generation of new knowledge. It thus
proceeds from preknowledge in virtue . of which the intellect
moves itself to the acquisition of further perfection. The preknowledge of that element which is formally attained in the
conclusion is expressed by a nominal definition. As to the
ontological value of the subject in a quia demonstration, this is
known solely in the conclusion affirming either its existence, as
cause of some effect, or its essential nature, as subject of some
attribute. As to the ontological value of the predicate as such
in a propter quid demonstration, this is known formally only in
the conclusion, which asserts this predicate's necessary pertinence to the subject. In both processes, then, the preknowledge
of the elements truly discovered in the conclusion is expressed
18

Cf. IV Met., lect. 1, n. 611.

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by a nominal definition, since only that whose ontological value
is known can be defined by a real definition (non entium non est
de/initio) . Thus is to be understood the repeated formula that
the knowledge that a thing is (an sit) precedes the knowledge
of what it is (quid sit) . Yet the nominal definition is preknowledge sufficient for intelligibility and for inference in the
scientific process. 19
In the Summa Theologiae this specific point relative to the
demonstration of God's existence is made: that the effect takes
the place of the definition of the cause when the existence of
the cause is to be demonstrated, in such a way that the middle
term is the signification of a name imposed upon the causesubject from its effects. In demonstrating God's existence, a
nominal definition imposed from His effects serves as the
middle term. 20
Against the total background of the Summa, however, it is
evident that the function of the nominal definition of God is
wider than its application simply to the question of His
existence, and extends to the whole of theology as it is science.
Speaking of definitions, St. Thomas states that the term
definition refers in its primary sense to the real definition, and
is the formality which the name signifies.21 At its very outset,
theology, describing itself, in one of its aspects, as a science
whose subject is God, must face the difficulty of God's indefinableness, contrasted with the logical canon that science presupposes the definition, the quiddity of its proper subject. St.
Thomas replies, conceding that we cannot know God's essence,
yet affirming that in place of a definition, His effects, of nature
or grace, are available and can be used. 22 Throughout its
investigations theology uses such notions, imposed from effects,
•• Cf. I Post. Anal., lect. 1, n. and fl.
1 ° Cf. Summa Theol., loc. cit., and corp.
21 Cf. ibid., q. 18, a. 1.
•• Cf. ibid., q. 1, a. 7, ad 1: Ad primum ergo dicendum quod licet de Deo non
possimus scire quid est, utimur tamen in hac doctrina effectus eius vel naturae vel
gratiae loco definitionis ad ea quae de Deo in hac doctrina considerantur: sicut et
in aliquibus scientiis philosophicis demonstratur aliquid de causa per effectum
accipiendo efl'ectum loco definitionis causae. Cf. also In De Trin., q.
a.
ad 5.

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as nominal definitions which somehow signify the divine
nature. 23
With regard to any name used to refer to God, there can
be no real definition, since God's essence is not properly known.
Since the formality signified by a name is that conception
which the intellect forms of the thing named, 24 the names
imposed upon God, signify formalities derived from His effects.
This is true even of the name " God." 25 Thus when theology
exercises its scientific functions concerning its subject God, the
requirement of definition is satisfied by nominal definitions,
expressing the various formalities (ratio quam significat nomen)
signified by the name God as He is knowable by the human
intellect.
The necessity for such a clarification is even more acute when
the question of the demonstration of the very existence of God
arises. Added to the general impossibility of a real definition
of God, there is the problem that no real definition of a thing
whose existence is unknown can be given:
... before it is known of something whether it is, it is not possible
properly to know of it what it is; for there are no definitions of
non-beings .. .26

Thus against the demonstrability of God's existence there is
repeatedly alleged the objection that since the definition of
the subject is unavailable, there can be no medium for this
demonstration. 27
•• Cf. ibid., q. 13, a.
ad
•• Cf. ibid., a. 4: Ratio enim quam significat nomen est conceptio intellectus de
re significata per nomen.
•• Cf. ibid., a. 8: Quia igitur Deus non est notus nobis in sui natura, sed innotescit
nobis ex operationibus vel effectibus eius, ex his possumus eum nominare: unde
hoc nomen Deus est nomen operationis, quantum ad id a quo imponitur ad significandum. Imponitur enim hoc nomen ab universali rerum providentia. Omnes
enim loquentes de Deo hoc intendunt nominare Deum, Quod habet providentiam
universalem de rebus . . . ex hac autem operatione hoc nomen Deus assumptum,
impositum est ad significandam divinam naturam.
•• ... quia antequam sciatur de aliquo an sit, non potest sciri proprie de eo quid
est: non entium enim non sunt definitiones. Unde quaestio an est praecedit quaestionem quid est. I Post Anal., lect.
n. 5.
•• Some of the formulations of the objection are as follows: Summa Tkeol., I,

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St. Thomas' response to this objection embraces two points:
that in general when the existence of a thing is to be proved,
the signification of the name of the thing takes the place of its
real definition; and that specifically, in the proof for the existence of a cause, the effects take the place of the definition of the
cause. 28 Concisely, the proof for God's existence has as its
middle term that signification of the name God which IS
imposed from His effects.29
Both this objection and St. Thomas' response to it have as
their term of reference perfect science, acquired demonstratively. Such perfect sdence is the acquisition of knowledge
about the necessary pertinence of" properties" to a subject in
virtue of knowledge of the causes of that pertinence. Such
causes are expressed in the definitions of the subject, which is
consequently the ultimate principle of the science, its basic
medium of demonstration. The conclusion of the scientific
q. !!, a. !!, obj. !!: Praeterea, medium demonstrationis est quod quid est. Sed de
Deo non possumus scire quid est, sed solum quid non est. Ergo non possumus
demonstrare Deum esse. De Ver., q. 10, a. 12, sed contra 4: Praeterea non potest
sciri de aliquo ipsum esse nisi quid ipsum sit cognoscatur. Sed de Deo in praesenti
statu non possumus cognoscere quid est. Ergo eius esse non est nobis notum.
I Cont. Gent., c. 12: Item. Si principium ad demonstrandum an est secundum
artem Philosophi, oportet accipere quid significet nomen . . . ; ratio vero signijicata
per nomen est definitio, secundum Philosophum . . . nulla remanebit via ad demonstrandum Deum esse, remota divinae essentiae vel quidditatis cognitione.
•• As to the first point, cf. I Post. Anal., loc. cit.: Unde quaestio an est praecedit
quaestionem quid est: sed non potest ostendi de aliquo an sit, nisi prius intelligatur
quid significatur per nomen.
De V er., loc. cit., ad 4 in contrarium: Ad hoc quod cognoscatur aliquid esse non
oportet quod sciatur de eo quid sit per definitionem sed quid significetur per
nomen. Cf. also II Post Anal., lect. 8, n. 6.
As to the knowledge of the cause precisely, cf. Summa Theol., loc. cit., ad !!,
above, note 17. Also In De Trin., q. 1, a. 2: Et sic se habet cognitio eflectus ut
principium ad cognoscendum de causa an est, sicut se habet quidditatem ipsius
causae cum per forman suam cognoscatur.
•• Cf. Summa Theol., ibid. Also I Cont. Gent., c. 12: In rationibus quibus
demonstratur Deum esse, non oportet sumere pro medio divinam essentiam seu
quidditatem . . . sed loco quidditatis accipitur pro medio efl'ectus, sicut accidit in
demonstrationibus quia: et ex huiusmodi efl'ectu sumitur ratio huius nominis Deus.
Nam omnia divina nomina imponuntur vel ex remotione efl'ectuum divinorum ab
ipso, vel ex aliqua habitudine Dei ad suos effectus.

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process is the expression of the knowledge of the subject's
having some property because of the known cause. Since this
conclusion is truly derived from the process, the preknowledge
of the definition of the subject is necessarily required. The
objection against the demonstrability of God's existence proceeds according to this requisite preknowledge.
St. Thomas' replies to the various formulations of this objection retain the schema of the scientific process as consisting
of subject, predicate and middle term. The subject is God.
What is to be demonstrated is that He exists. That no real
definition of the subject is available, St. Thomas concedes.
But He denies that no middle term is therefore to be found,
and thus denies the alleged impossibility of demonstrating that
God exists. For there is available an adequate preknowledge,
namely, of the form or nature of the effects of God. 30 Thus in
the demonstration, the middle term will be the
in the
sense that the known content of the nominal definition of God
is drawn from His effects. Thus what St. Thomas evidently
envisions by his response can be expressed in this way:
God is the First Unmoved Mover (Nominal definition imposed from movement.)
But the First Unmoved Mover exists. (Effect, movement,
demands this) .
Therefore God exists.
While never explicitly delineating this process, it is clearly
in St. Thomas' mind when he speaks as he does of the nominal
definition of God, subject of the demonstrable conclusion God
exists. It is intended as well when, in article three, St. Thomas
states: " That God exists, can be demonstrated in five ways."
Historically, such a process has been explicitly advanced by
many authors within the context of Thomistic philosophy.
St. Thomas' determinations concerning the nominal defi•• Cf. Cont. Gent., ibid.: Patet etiam ex hoc quod etsi Deus sensibilia omnia et
sensum excedat, eius tamen effectus, ex quibus demonstratio sumitur, ad probandum
eum esse, sensibiles sunt. Et sic nostrae cognitionis origo ex sensu est etiam de his
quae sensum excedunt.

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nition of God, then, recognize that God is the subject of the
demonstration at issue; that some sort of determination concerning the term " God " is demanded in the demonstrative
process. Such a determination is the nominal definition. But it
is not a matter of philology, or of a dialectical determination
from widely accepted descriptions of God. The nominal definition is imposed from effects. For the name of God signifies
knowledge, and human knowledge about God must be derived
from effects. 31 Because such nominal definitions are derived
from effects, they can serve as efficacious middle terms in
demonstrating God's existence. For the effects are adequately
known and it is this knowledge which gives content and efficacy
as a middle term, to the nominal definition of God.
The examination of the function of the nominal definition of
God forcefully emphasizes its theological context. All the
elements revolving about this point are theological. God, the
subject of theology, is He whose nominal definition is involved.
In virtue of the principles of theology, revealed truths about
God, the theologian realizes that a real definition of God is
impossible, and that still there is the task of demonstrating
God's existence. The knowledge that God's effects are available
as a medium for demonstration enables the theologian to
indicate the function and availability of the nominal definition
of God in the demonstration of His existence. By reason of
the character of theology itself, then, the theologian makes
those determinations concerning the nominal definition of God,
which are necessary in order to deal properly with the scientific
question, an sit Deus, as this can be resolved by a demonstration.
81 This is true even of the name " God." Cf. note !'l-5 above. Also Summa Theol.,
I, q. 13, a. 10, ad 5: Ad quintum dicendum quod ipsam naturam Dei, prout in
se est, neque Catholicus neque paganus cognoscit, sed uterque cognoscit earn
secundum aliquam rationem causalitatis vel excellentiae vel remotionis. . . . Et
secundum hoc in eadem significatione accipere potest gentilis hoc nomen Deus, cum
dicit " idolum est Deus " in qua accipit ipsum Catholicus dicens: "idolum non
est Deus." Si vero aliquis esset qui secundum nullam rationem Deum cognosceret
nee ipsum nominaret, nisi forte sicut proferimus nomina quorum significationes
ignoramus. Also a. 8, ad 2; De V e:r., q. 21, a. 4.

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In conclusion, the theological context of the nominal definition of God can be stated in terms of the epistemological
canons of science as they are adapted to the scientific procedures of theology. The function of this nominal definition in
connection with the existence of God is intimately connected
with the formal scientific question: Does God exist? (an sit
Deus). It is a scientific question, whose subject is God, subject
of the science. This question itself, an sit, is one of the four
scientific questions which science as the search for the certain
knowledge of what is unknown, poses. For science may seek to
know with certitude that a subject is qualified by some attribute (quia est) ; why it is so qualified (propter quid) ; that it
exists (an sit) ; what it is (quid sit) . 32 All of these questions
are said to be questions of the medium of demonstration, since
they are posed in order to be resolved by demonstrated conclusions, with certitude. The questions will be so resolved only
when that which is the medium by reason of which subject and
predicate are necessarily joined, is discovered. 33 Further, the
questions an sit and quia est are said to be questions which
simply seek any efficacious medium (an sit aliquid medium),
while the questions quid sit and propter quid seek that which
is truly and properly the medium (quid sit medium) .34
With a view to the character and development of the perfect
process of science, there is a common adage that no science
proves its own subject. For it is through the definition (quid
sit) of this proper subject, which itself presupposes the knowledge of the existence of the subject, that the science proceeds.
Thus its investigations are concerned with the questions quia
est, et propter quid, with the discovery of the certain pertinence
of attributes to its subject and the ultimate reason for this
pertinence. Theology, however, is a special case. Among all
human sciences, it is the most exalted. Concerned with God
as its subject, it has its principles from revealed truth. As
wisdom it has the function of explaining, defending and mani•• cr. II Post. Anal., lect. I, nn. 2, 5.
•• Cf. ibid., n. 6 .
.. cr. ibid.

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festing these principles. It is against such a background that it
necessarily is faced with the scientific question: an sit Deus?
For this truth is not immediately evident; it is demonstrable.
The question is a question of the medium of demonstration, to
be found solely among the effects of God, from which the
nominal definition is formulated. It is not because God is the
first cause that the question of His existence arises. Rather
it is because God, the subject of such a science as theology, is
the first cause, that the question can be answered demonstratively, through a medium which is a nominal definition, imposed from God's effects.
Thus just as the scientific question concerning God's existence has its proper place in the context of theology, so also
does the nominal definition of God. It is a key to the solution
of the scientific question which cannot be resolved via a real
definition. With the medium of demonstration, the signification
of the name God, assigned in general, as the answer to the
problem of the demonstrability of God's existence, the scientific
question an sit Deus is resolved in the Summa by setting out
in the quinque viae the effects from which the various significations of the name God, the media of demonstration of His
existence as first cause, are derived. Each of the ways leads
from an effect to some signification of the name God-first
unmoved mover, first cause, etc.-" which all understand to
be God." 35
2. Judgment on use of nominal definition

of God in metaphysics
The logical exigencies urging the employment of a nominal
definition of God have been advanced as operative in metaphysics' approach to the question of His existence. Historically,
Suarez stressed the nominal definition as the key to guarantee•• Cf. Summa Theol., loc. cit., q. 18, a.
ad
Sic igitur dicendum est quod
huiusmodi divina nomina imponuntur quidem a processibus Deitatis: sicut enim
secundum diversos processus perfectionum creaturae Deum repraesentant, licet imperfecte; ita intellectus noster secundum unumquemque processum Deum cognoscit
et nominat.

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ing the demonstration of the existence of the one true God;
Wolff, to preserve the unity and rigid deductive character of
his natural theology, whose subject is God. Both these points
of view are reflected in the nineteenth-century scholastics'
natural theology, as they seek to give strict rational expression
to demonstrations of the subject, God's existence, refuting
atheists. Contemporary works in Thomistic metaphysics continue to insist upon the function the nominal definition of God
exercises in centering the demonstration of His existence upon
a precise term, one in which the proofs, especially the quinque
mae, converge.
Yet the variety of nominal definitions proposed, the various
grounds for their determination, together with the unquestionably theological context of the function of the nominal definition of God in the Summa Theologiae, give at least occasion
to question the use of this nominal definition as the key to
metaphysics' approach to the question of God's existence.
Such a use must be examined and judged in the light of the
principles of extension and limitation concerning metaphysics'
consideration of God.
a. The principle of extension and the
nominal definition of God
The principle of extension is an affirmation that metaphysics
does indeed consider God, and necessarily so, as its connatural
term. The proposal of the necessity of the nominal definition
of God in metaphysics by contemporaries is directed towards
assuring that metaphysics demonstrate God's existence. To
give this precise direction to the approach to His existence, the
determination of a nominal definition is advanced as a necessary prerequisite.
Striking in such determinations, however, in the variety of
nominal definitions advanced, are the non-philosophical grounds
upon which the nominal definitions are formulated. It is to
be remembered that the nominal definition is determined as
a necessary prerequisite to the demonstration of God's exist-

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ence. The various definitions proposed, however, rest upon
presuppositions concerning the divine nature or causality, or
upon other extraneous grounds. Fr. Gredt's division of metaphysics already presupposes the existence of " uncreated
being "; he chooses " being a se " as the nominal definition of
God, when the question <;>f demonstrating His existence is
proposed. Fr. Maquart seems actually to acknowledge that
the basis for introducing the nominal definition is extraneous
to his own position about natural theology and the quinque
viae. He is content with selecting "a being greater than the
beings of the world," on simple dialectical grounds, as the
nominal definition of God. Through it the conclusions of the
quinque viae can be reduced to a certain unity in the propositions "God exists," even while leaving the unicity of God
undertermined.
The Gilsonian thesis on the nature of a true Christian philosophy of St. Thomas, is involved in employing the "I am
Who am" or an equivalent, as in Fr. Smith's "cause of the
existence of things," as nominal definitions of God. For according to this thesis what is involved in the demonstration is the
direct establishment of the existence of subsistent being,
creator of all things; to this the Christian philosopher is committed.
Canon Van Steenberghen carefully chooses " provident
Creator of the universe " as the nominal definition in order
to assure the scientific answer to the religious and humanistic
aspects of the problem of God.
In one way or another, then, the choice of nominal definitions
is dictated by a non-philosophical motivation. The actual
determination of the nominal definition, since it is seen as a
prerequisite to the question of God's existence, must rely upon
sources other than philosophical knowledge, whether these be
faith, theology, common opinion. What all such determinations
fail to consider is that metaphysics' approach to the question
of God's existence is its connatural approach to the attainment
of its end. Whatever is involved in this approach must spring
from and be justified by the natural development of the

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science. Even when St. Thomas employs the nominal definition
of God in theology, he adheres to his own norm, that it be
imposed from effects. In the authors cited there is instead a
of the nominal definition of God, and the
more this predetermination is "scientifically" elaborated, the
more apparent becomes its extraneous character.
This is seen in Fr. Smith's determination of the nominal
definition, " cause of the existence of things," as imposed from
effects.36 He seeks to establish that "cause of the existence of
things " really means the effect and thus that it is truly the
effect that is the middle term of the demonstration. His
procedure evidences many questionable elements, over and
above the strain on the intelligibility of language which he
acknowledges. First of all, St. Thomas does not state that
the nominal definition is the effect, but that it is imposed from
the effect. He does state that the effect is the middle term in
the demonstration. What is meant shows that the author has
created a pseudo-difficulty. For the nominal definition as it
refers to the subject is the expression of the name of the
subject; it is only that, a nominal definition, since the subject's
existence is to be demonstrated. The nominal definition, however, is imposed from the effect; its content and force as a
middle term leading to the conclusion of the existence of the
cause, are derived from the effect, whose intelligibility and
existence demand what is expressed in the nominal definition. 87
Even granted that the difficulty raised were genuine, however, the author's solution is dubious. It involves a logical
fallacy based upon a misinterpretation of St. Thomas' doctrine
concerning passive creation in order to explain how the nominal
definition really means the effect when it says cause. The
logical fallacy is an equivocation with the term "creation."
" Cause of the existence of things " is shown to mean the effect,
•• Cf. Part One of this study, pp. 81 ff.
07 Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 2, a. 2, and ad 2; II Post. Anal., lect. 1, nn. 6, 8 and
especially the distinction between the search for the medium formally, and the
search for that which is the medium: id quod est medium est ratio eius de quo
quaeritur ... an simpliciter.

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the creature, because creation is in the effect, is in the creature
and is a creature. The author argues: creation is an effect, is
a creature, therefore it is the effect, the creature. Since "cause
of the existence of things " means passive creation, the creature,
the effect, it is the effect and the difficulty is solved. The
logical fallacy consists in the passage from this, that passive
creation is a thing, to this, that it is the thing, the effect; the
passage from this that it is a creature, to this that it is the
creature.
That an equivocation is indeed involved becomes apparent
from its basis, the misinterpretation of St. Thomas' doctrine
about passive creation. Fr. Smith would see St. Thomas
identifying passive creation with the creature, with the effect.
Actually in one of the texts cited by the author,,. the Angelic
Doctor states:
Creation (passive) is nothing else really but a kind of relation
to God with a newness in being.
. . . Creation taken actively signifies the divine action with
a kind of relation co-understood, and in this sense it is uncreated;
but passively taken, as has been said, it is in reality a kind of
relation signified after the manner of a mutation, because of the
newness of being implied. But this relation is a sort of creature,
the name creature being understood commonly for everything
which is from God. . . . Nor is it necessary to go on to infinity,
since the relation of creation is not related to God by another
relation, but of itself. For no relation is related by another relation.
. . . But if the name creature be taken strictly for that alone which
subsists which properly comes to be and is created, just as it
properly has existence, then the aforesaid relation is not something
created but something concreated, even as it is not properly a
being, but something inherent. And the case is similar with all
accidents. 88
•• ... creatio (passiva) nihil est aliud realiter quam relatio quaedam ad Deum
cum novitate essendi.
Ad secundum dicendum quod creatio active accepta significat divinam actionem
cum quadam relatione cointellecta, et sic est increatum; accepta vero passive, sicut
dictum est, realiter relatio quaedam est significata per modum mutationis ratione
novitatis vel inceptionis importatae. Haec autem relatio creatura quaedam est,
accepto communiter nomine creaturae pro omni eo quod est a Deo. Nee oportet
procedere in infinitum quia creationis relatio non refertur ad Deum alia relatione

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The omissions made by the author from this text, the failure
to employ the precise distinction between " creature taken
commonly" and" creature taken strictly," could alone warrant
Fr. Smith's interpretation and explanation. Creation, taken
passively, is a relation, an accident whose subject is the
creature, the subsisting being; whose term is God, the Creator;
whose fundament is the creative action of God by which the
creature receives existence. The teaching of St. Thomas forbids
the equation of this relation, passive creation, with the beings
of this world, with creatures. Rather it is something in creatures, something concreated with all creatures. Passive creation
does not mean the creature, the effect; it is only a creature in
a wide sense of the term. The equivocation m Fr. Smith's
reali, sed seipsa. Nulla enim relatio refertur alia relatione. . . . Si vero nomen
creaturae accipiamus magis stricte pro eo tantum quod subsistit (quod proprie fit
et creatur sicut proprie habet esse) tunc relatio praedicta non est quoddam creatum,
sed concreatum, sicut nee est ens proprie loquendo, sed inhaerens. Et simile est
de omnibus accidentibus. De Pot., q. 8, a. 8, corp. and ad !!.
Cf. also IT Cont. Gent., c. 18: Non enim est creatio mutatio, sed ipsa dependentia
esse creati ad principium a quo statuitur. Et sic est de genere relationis. Unde
nihil prohibet earn in creato esse sicut in subiecto. . . . Apparel autem si creatio
relatio quaedam est quod res quaedam est: et neque increata est: neque alia relatione creatur: Cum enim effeetus creatus realiter dependet a creante, oportet
huiusmodi relationem esse rem quamdam. Omnis autem res a Deo in esse producitur.
Est igitur in esse a Deo producta. Non tamen alia creatione creatur quam ipsa
creatura prima quae per earn creata dicitur. Quia accidentia et formae, sicut per
se non sunt, ita nee per se creantur, cum creatio sit productio entis: sed sicut in
alio sunt, ita aliis creatis creantur.
Sumnna Theol., I, q. 45, a. 8, ad !!: Ad secundum dicendum ... creatio passive
accepta est in creatura et est creatura.
ad 8: Ad tertium dicendum quod creationis secundum quod significatur ut
mutatio, creatura est terminus; sed secundum quod vere est relatio, creatura est
eius subiectum, et prius ea in esse, sicut subiectum accidente; sed habet quamdam
rationem prioritatis ex parte obiecti ad quod dicitur, quod est principium creaturae.
Responsio ad Joannem Vercellensem, De Articulis CVIII Sumptis ex Opere Petri
De Tarantasio, q. 95: Quod vero nonagesimo quinto ponitur, creatio passio in
creatura est, et est accidens eius et posterius ea naturaliter secundum rem, verum
est quod creatio secundum rem nihil ponit in creato nisi relationem tantum, a quo
habet esse, quae est quoddam accidens: et haec quidem relatio quantum ad aliud
esse quod habet in subiecto, accidens quoddam est et posterius subiecto; sed inquantum est terminus actionis divinae creantis habet quamdam rationem prioritatis.
(Ed. Marietti, Opusc. Theol., I, 288).

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explanation is thus quite patently based upon a misinterpretation of doctrine.
Apart from this, the whole procedure is a strange approach
to the discovery of the existence of God in metaphysics. The
nominal definition as a prerequisite is explained and determined
through the doctrine of creation, and specifically through a
finely discerned point within that doctrine: a relation, passive
creation, whose intelligibility is as subtle as its entity. Certainly it should be supposed that if the nominal definition does
have a. role to play, it should aid the process of discovery and
thus be an element more known than that to whose discovery
it is offered as a key, the existence of God. Of no element that
depends for its determination upon the meaning of passive
creation, either in Fr. Smith's sense or in that of St. Thomas,
can this supposition be verified. Fr. Smith's elaboration of the
nominal definition of God, then, strongly emphasizes the philosophically questionable grounds which the predetermination
of this nominal definition as the approach to God's existence
seems to en tail.
A similar charge can be substantiated in Canon Van Steenberghen's determination of the nominal definition of God as
" provident creator of the universe." 39 In his own formulation
of the philosophical problem of God, perhaps the notion is
necessarily pre-established. For what philosophy is to establish,
he states, is the true God, the God of human destiny and
religion. That this is the formal function of the question of
God in regard to metaphysics' intrinsic and connatural finality,
has already been questioned. In terms of the Canon's position,
the nominal definition of God is explicitly necessitated in order
to establish scientifically, preconceived notions concerning God.
The nominal definition of God is not imposed from effects, as
St. Thomas states. But it is difficult to see how this nominal
definition of God can be an approach to the question of His
existence. The terms "provident" and "creator" both have
precise scientific meanings, eocpressing truths about divine
•• Cf. Part One, pp. 64 ff.

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causality which are not available prior to knowledge of the
existence and some knowledge of the nature of God. Perhaps
it could be alleged that they are not meant by the author in
their scientific sense but are broad, common acceptations which
will lead to the solution satisfying both humanistic and religious
connotations of the name God. But it is the author himself
who insists that the nominal definition must embrace terms
that are scientifically definable, since it is a scientific question
that is at stake. Thus it seems that the nominal definition
" provident creator of the universe "involves extraneous suppositions if it be taken strictly, scientifically, or that, if it be
taken to signify common preconceived notions, it cannot serve
the scientific purpose for which it was devised.
The proposal of the nominal definition of God as an approach
to the question of God's existence in metaphysics, is apparently
dictated by a desire to assure metaphysics' attainment of God;
by the alleged necessity of focusing the demonstration of His
existence. But the realization of the non-philosophical grounds
for the predetermination of this nominal definition provides
the occasion for the following judgment: in the light of the
principle of extension, the nominal definition of God is not
necessary as a prerequisite to metaphysics' attainment of His
existence. The principle of extension affirms that metaphysics
does indeed attain God, in stating that it considers Him as
principle of its subject. The reason for this extension is the
connatural finality of metaphysics as the highest of the speculative sciences. As such it seeks of its nature to attain, as
exhaustively as is possible to the human reason, the ultimate
intelligibility of reality, by gaining science of its proper subject,
being in common. As its term, then, it is ordanied to the
attainment of the first cause of being in common. Thus it
extends to a knowledge of God.
This latter identification or equation of metaphysics' attainment of the first cause with its attainment of God has been
made constantly in these pages. Such an identification is quite
different from the predetermination of a nominal definition of
God in order to guarantee the demonstration of His existence.

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Some such identification seems to be suggested by St. Thomas
in virtue of the term divine, in the text of the De Trinitate itself.
A synthesis of metaphysics' attainment of the principles common by causality to all beings is indicated. Then St. Thomas
points out that such principles are as such greatest in being,
most complete, most actual, immobile and immaterial.
And such things are divine realities, because if the divine exists
anywhere, it exists especially in such an immaterial and immobile
nature. 40

St. Thomas makes this identification of what metaphysics
attains at its end in conjunction with his observations about
the nature and extent of metaphysics, and of its right to its
historic denomination as " divine science." It is not without
significance that he indicates first the connatural acquisitive
process of metaphysics, proceeding in accord with its scientific
structure, and shows what sort of things the principles common
by causality to all beings must be, before making the identification of these as " divine."
The principle of extension rests for its validity upon the very
nature of metaphysics and its proportion to its discoveries.
Metaphysics is recognized as necessarily attaining the first
cause of being in common and some knowledge of what that
cause must be in order to fulfill its role as cause. In this sense,
metaphysics is said to consider God. The latter identification
can be justified through the signification of the term " divine,"
as equivalent to what the first cause of all being must be. It
can be based as well upon the concrete environment of Thomistic metaphysics, the Christian environment in which it
flourishes. To the Christian metaphysician the term reached
by metaphysics in attaining the first cause is obviously to be
identified with God. .This is evidently what prompted the
remark of Fr. Finili that it is the Christian who recognizes the
philosophical approach to God for what it is.41 Certainly the
•• Cf. In De Trin., q. 5, a. 4, ed. Wyser, 48. Cf. also Arist., Met., E (VI), 1026
al5-20.

"Cf. Part One, pp. 86 fl.

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early Thomists and St. Thomas himself made such a simple
identification of, for example, the first mover with
Such a simple identification of what metaphysics does attain
is a simple recognition of a fact. It is quite different from the
predetermination of a nominal definition of God before demonstrating His existence, ostensibly from the signification of the
name, but actually from extra-philosophical sources. Nor is this
simple identification proposed as the guarantee that metaphysics attain its end. This guarantee is the natural capacity
of the human intellect, the nature of the proper subject of the
science through which the ontological structure of reality, considered by the intellect in the light of that proper subject, is
seen to demand a first cause of all being. Left to itself, metaphysics connaturally will attain this first cause. Because its
valid connatural process is respected, the identification of this
absolutely first cause as God by the metaphysician who is a
Christian will be all the more meaningful. To this process of
metaphysics to its end, the predetermination of the nominal
definition of God is not necessary; the difficulties raised by such
predeterminations seem even to jeopardize this process.
To state the matter succinctly: in view of the background
seen, the nominal definition of God is not necessary to the
extension of metaphysics. For this extension means not that
metaphysics must attain God, who is the first cause of being
in common, but that it must attain the first cause of being in
common, which is God. It is theology itself of which it can
be said that it attains God, who, besides having a life proper to
Himself, being a complete nature in Himself, is also the first
cause of things, and about whom theology's scientific considerations proceed in virtue of the signification of the name God.
The difference in point of view is the difference between metaphysics as divine science and theology as divine science.
•• Cf. In VIII Phya., lect., !!8, n. 9: Et sic terminat Philosophus considerationem
communem de rebus naturalibus, in primo principio totius naturae, qui est super
omnia Deus, benedictus in saecula. Amen.
In XII Met., lect. !!!, n. 2668: Et hoc est quod concludit, scilicet primum movens
et primum intelligibile, et primum bonum quod supra dixerat Deum, qui est benedictus in saecula saeculorum. Amen.

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b. The principle of
and the nominal
definition of God in metaphysics
The principle of limitation governing metaphysics' attainment of God determines that God be considered
as
principle of the subject of the science, not as subject. Respect
for the restrictions involved must be verified in the extension
of metaphysics to God as its term. For the principle of limitation is founded upon the necessarily determined sense of the
true subject of metaphysics; it is this· subject which as the
formal concern of the science and the key to its discoveries
regulates the development and orientates the procedures of the
science. The propriety of any element in these procedures must
be judged in terms of its pertinence to and connection with the
scientific subject. In the light of this, that being in common,
not God, is the proper subject of metaphysics, the indicated
function of the norminal definition of God is inappropriate to
metaphysics.
The occasion for such a judgment is the realization that the
employment of the nominal definition of God is inherently
connected with the scientific question: an sit Deus? This is the
context of the nominal definition of God in the Summa Theologiae. As to metaphysics, historically it was concern with the
question not just of a first cause, but precisely of God's existence that gave the nominal definition of God its decisive function in the procedures of Suarez, of Wolff and the nineteenthcentury scholastics. Among contemporary Thomistic authors,
the employment of the nominal definition of God involves the
same presupposition, that metaphysics is formally confronted
with the question: an sit Deus?
Such presupposition is explicitly present in the procedure
of Fr. Gredt, since God, whose existence is to be proved, is
made the subject of a special metaphysics. Fr. Maquart, rejecting such a position, does not introduce the nominal definition
of God until after the exposition of the quinque viae, but then
does so precisely to show that the question an sit Deus has
been resolved. Obviously in the procedures of Canon Van

a

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Steenberghen this nominal definition assumes its prominence
because metaphysics is confronted with the task of providing a
scientific answer to the question of God's existence, suggested
by humanistic and religious considerations. Within the Gilsonian school, Fr. Smith's systematic elaboration of the nominal
definition of God is dictated by the intention of demonstrating
that God, I am Who am, precisely, exists. The subsequent
concern of the author to " extricate God from the categories "
shows that it is to assure the attainment through the proofs
employed, of ipsum esse subsistens that the nominal definition
of God, cause of the existence of things, is so carefully, albeit
so questionably, determined.
The proposal of the scientific question an sit Deus is the
presupposition that leads to the use of the nominal definition
of God by these authors. Yet in each case, the basis for this
presupposition is opposed to the force of the principle of limitation as to the place of God in metaphysics. In Fr. Gredt's work,
this basis is his conception of God as the subject of a special
metaphysics. 43 For Canon Van Steenberghen the basis is a
personal interpretation of the philosophical problem of God, as
a scientific justification of common knowledge. The implications of the Gilsonian imposition of theology's order upon
metaphysics are evidently operative in Fr. Smith's phrasing of
the question of God's existence in metaphysics. In the examination of the principle of limitation itself, its opposition to such
positions has been sufficiently indicated.
Since the placing of the question an sit Deus rests upon such
questionable grounds in these authors, and since the function
of the nominal definition of God is intimately connected with
this question, then the use of this nominal definition in metaphysics is at least questionable. Further, however, and in the
positive terms of the principle of limitation, the function of
the nominal definition of God is to be judged as completely
inappropriate in metaphysics. The reason for this judgment is
•• Father Maquart's proposal of the question an sit Deus is seemingly a concession to tradition. His procedure, however, raises a difficulty, to be pointed out
later.

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that in virtue of the principle of limitation, the question an
sit Deus is itself inappropriately injected as a scientific question
formally at stake in metaphysics. Since the nominal definition
of God functions properly in connection with this question,
then this nominal definition of God is out of place in the science.
The four scientific questions, previously indicated, as they
formally pertain to any science, adequately trace out the development of the science.44 Conclusions attained through
demonstration resolve such questions. The questions themselves are four, insofar as certain knowledge !s attainable concerning either the existence (an sit) or nature (quid sit) of a
thing; or concerning its having some attribute, either as to the
fact (quia ita est) or as to the cause of the pertinence (propter
quid ita est) .45 As to the formal relevance of such questions to
speculative science, the proper subject of the science is decisive.
For it is the knowledge of this subject as the basic subject of its
conclusions, that is the formal concern of the science; it is
through this subject, as the source of the basic medium of
demonstration in the science, tha:t the process of discovery is
both initiated and ultimately resolved with certitude. The
scientific questions formally regard the proper subject of a
speculative science, then, as the focal point of the scientific
inquiry. It is through this subject and the interpretation and
evaluation of experienced data concerning this subject, that any
of the scientific questions arise in the inquiry. The scientific
questions formally pertinent to the science, thus, are to be
judged in terms of the subject of the science. As to metaphysics,
this subject is not God; it is being in common. It is in this
sense that the scientific question an sit Deus is rejected as not
formally at stake in metaphysics' inquiry at that stage denominated" natural theology."
•• Cf. IT Pon. Anal., lect. I, n. 2: Aequalis est numerus quaestionum et eorum
quae sciuntur. Cuius ratio est quia scientia est cognitio per demonstrationem
acquisita. Eorum autem oportet per demonstrationem cognitionem acquirere, quae
ante fuerint ignota: et de his quaestiones facimus quae ignoramus. Unde sequitur
quod ea quae quaeruntur siut aequalia numero his quae sciuntur.
•• Cf. ibid., nn. 8-5.

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The questiqn of God's existence is proposed formally in
sacred theology, because God is the subject and because the
data proper to the theologian suggests and impose the question.
As metaphysics approaches its final state, its subject remains
being in common. The scientific questions pertinent here as
throughout the science are still concerned with this proper
subject. To introduce as the formal question involved, an sit
Deus, is to change the formal orientation of the science towards
it own subject; the grounds already seen for such an introduction reveal how arbitrary and unwarranted it is.
What then is the scientific question at stake, connaturally
arising at the outset of metaphysics' final stage? Among the
four scientific questions, the two whose implications are operative in the approach to " natural theology " are these: quia ita
est, that a subject is qualified in a certain way; and propter
quid ita est, the reason for this qualification. In terms of metaphysics, through the proper subject the process of the science
reaches the realization that there are beings which are limited
(quia). Such a realization imposes the corresponding scientific
question, the question of the propter quid.46 What is in detail
involved in the origin of this question will be subsequently indicated; here it is the significance of the scientific questions as
formally pertinent to metaphysics' development that is important.
As perfect science, metaphysics, beginning with the knowledge of its proper subject, seeks to attain with certitude all
that necessarily pertains to the subject, all its properties, in the
sense in which this term embraces whatever is involved in the
total intelligibility of the subject. 47 It seeks to know what
must be attributed to the subject in terms of the proper reason
for this attribution. As science of the real, metaphysics must
•• Cf. ibid., n. 4. Deinde cum dicit: cum autem scimus etc. manifestat consequentem quaestionem ... et dicit quod cum scimus quia ita est, quaerimus propter
quid ita .sit. Puta cum scimus quia sol est deficiens per eclipsim et quod terra
mota est in terraemotu, quaerimus propter quid sol deficiat aut propter quid terra
moveatur ....
•• Cf. In De Trin., q. i!, a. i!, ad S.

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consider the beings of experience in terms of the formal aspect
of the subject, habens esse. In virtue of this formal examina-·
tion and interpretation of experience, at the stage of metaphysics' development involved in " natural theology " certain
knowledge of beings as limited (quia) has been attained. Such
knowledge is derived from the realization of the real composition of essence and existence, as well as of more evident aspects
of an act-potency composition in the beings of experience. The
knowledge that such beings are so limited is the occasion for
wonder, for the scientific question of the ultimate explanation
of beings as so limited, the question of the propter quid. As
St. Thomas indicates, such a question is a question of the
medium, in that scientific knowledge, demonstrated knowledge,
is sought concerning that which is questioned. Such a medium
is the cause, since it is through the cause that perfect science
is achieved.49
To make explicit the basic points here involved, these words
of St. Thomas offer a key:
Though the relation to its cause is not part of the definition of a
being which is caused, still it follows as a consequence upon those
things which 'are of the very nature of such a thing: because from
the fact that something is being by participation, it follows that it
is caused by another. Hence such a being cannot be without being
just as man cannot be without having the faculty of
laughing. 50
.
·

The knowledge of limitation (quia), leading to the question of
•• Cf. ibid., n. 6.
'"Cf. ibid., n. 8: Manifestum est enim quod causa est .medium in demonstratione
quae fa.cit scire; quia scire est ca:usam rei cognoscere. Causa autem est quod
quaeritur in omnibus praedictis quaestionibus. . • . Cf. also I Pon Anal., lect. 4,
n. 6, in which St. Thomas eiplains that aciTe, the knowledge of something necessarily
pertaining. to a subject, requires the knowledge of the " actual application of the
cause to the effect," that is, the knowledge of the cause as causing what is known
concerning the subject.
•• Licet habitudo ad causam non intret definitionem entis quod est causatum,
tamen sequitur ad
quae sunt de eius ratione: quia ex hoc quod aliquid per
participationem est ens, sequitur quod sit causatum ab alio. Unde huiusmodi ens
non potest esse, quin sit causatum, sicut nee homo quin sit risibile. Su'11111na Tkeol.,
I, q. 44, a. 1, ad 1. The translation of the English edition has not been used here.

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the propter quid, is metaphysics' approach to the perfect knowledge of its subject in terms of the ramifications of its dependence upon the first cause. For ontologically the ultimate basis
for the limitation discerned among the beings of experience is
the dependence of all being upon the first cause. Because of
this, being is participated; in all being the basic ontological
structure is a real composition between essence and existence;
in all the levels of a being's total comprehension there are
potency-act compositions. 51 As it develops its process of discovery, however, metaphysics first comes to a realization of
limitation among the beings of experience. Through the scientific question, the question of the propter quid, as it is connaturally imposed upon metaphysics, the science is set upon
that stage of its development which will lead to the ultimate
reason, the propter quid of limitation in all being, namely as
dependent upon the first cause. Natural theology is this final
stage; it is formally concerned with the subject of the one
science of metaphysics. This final stage of metaphysics begins
with knowledge achieved concerning the subject and with the
corresponding scientific question concerning the same subject.
In conclusion, regarding the use of the nominal definition of
God in metaphysics, its inappropriateness is affirmed in order
to safeguard the formal point of view of the science in terms
of its proper subject. It is quite true that in answering the
question propter quid concerning that subject, metaphysics
attains to a knoweldge of the first cause; the question an sit
Deus, it does answer materially. Formally, however, its concern is with its proper subject. Its search for perfect
knowledge of that subject is not simply an ascent from effect
to cause; it must attain the first cause, something of the
nature of the cause as cause, through the exigencies of effects
depending upon this cause. But it must also make actual the
" application of cause to effect," 52 that is, the subject must be
known in what actually pertains to it because of its dependence
upon the first cause. The center of this inquiry remains always
"'Cf. ibid., q. 6, a. S.

•• Cf. I Post. Anal., lect. 4, n. 5.

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the subject of the science. The judgment that the nominal
definition of God is not appropriate to metaphysics' approach
to its final phase, is an attempt to reassert the formal point of
view, that the subject of the science is the radical subject of all
its conclusions; that the knowledge of the subject is what is
constantly sought in the process of science. Such a judgment
is consistent with the principle that God is attained in metaphysics, not as subject, but as principle of the subject; with
the principle of limitation that is rooted in the very nature of
the human intellect.
The function of the nominal definition of God is inherently
connected with the scientific question an sit Deus. But the
formal proposal of this question by metaphysics is based upon
positions adverse to the principle of limitation, and thus to the
nature of metaphysics as science. What the " question of God's
existence" truly, in virtue of the nature of the science, amounts
to is the institution of the process of solving the question
propter quid arising from the examination of the subject of
the science itself. This process should not suddenly propose
the problem of demonstrating God's existence, and accent the
need for selecting a nominal definition of God; rather it should
concentrate upon the significance of the aspects of composition
and limitation seen through the investigation of the subject
of the science. These impose the need for the further development of the inquiry; they impose the question of the propter
quid. Such a procedure respects the true nature of metaphysics
and serves to integrate " natural theology " with the whole
science whose subject is being in common and which considers
God exclusively as principle of its subject.
If metaphysics is allowed to remain faithful to its nature and
to be a true process of discovery, then the final result can only
make it more suitable to its extrinsic, but noblest destiny, the
use of its findings by sacred theology. If metaphysics is allowed
to attain to the existence of God as principle of its subject, by
concentrating formally upon the rigid exigencies of dependence
discovered through that subject, then theology has a more
perfect instrument in dealing formally with the question an sit

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Deus. Whether metaphysics be considered in its own order as
the height of philosophy, or as used in theology, it should concentrate upon its proper subject, not upon the formal scientific
question an sit Deus, or upon the nominal definition of God
inherently connected with this question.

II:

JuDGMENT

CoNCERNING

CoNSIDERATION

METAPHYSics'

oF THE " ExiSTENCE

AcTUAL

OF GoD "

Introduction
What was first in intention in undertaking this study, metaphysics' actual consideration of the question of God's existence,
comes finally to be examined. Obviously there has emerged
an understanding of this question quite different from its verbal
signification. The combined effect of the twofold principle seen
in St. Thomas' statement that metaphysics considers God not
as subject but as principle of its subject, has been therealization
that while the absolute primacy of metaphysics dictates and
justifies such a consideration, it is through the subject and
its exigencies that it must be prosecuted. Accordingly the whole
function of natural theology within the science, in view of what
has been said concerning the approach to its beginning, is to
be understood in terms suggested by these words of St. Thomas:
... the question why (propter quid) looks for a means to demonstrate that (quia) something is so, for instance, that there is an
eclipse of the moon; ... Now we observe that those who see
that something is so (quia) naturally desire to know why (propter
quid) .53

It is not the question an sit Deus formally that is involved as
the inception of a " natural theology " in metaphysics. The
knowledge (quia) of aspects of limitation discovered through
the investigation of its proper subject, imposes upon metaphysics the need to search for the medium through which these
•• III Cont. Gent., c. 50: Quaestio propter quid quaerit medium ad . demonstrandum quia. est aliquid, puta propter quod luna eclipsatur .... Videmus autem
quod videntes quia. est aliquid, naturaliter scire desiderant propter quid.

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aspects of limitation can be resolved into their ultimate explanation (propter quid). The question of God's existence as it pertains to metaphysics is the beginning of that search, so denominated because the search, formally concerned with the subject
of the science, is de facto not resolved until the first cause of all
being is discovered.
The focal point for instituting a Thomistic natural theology
is always the quinque viae of St. Thomas. This judgment concerning metaphysics' actual consideration of" God's existence"
is thus directed towards them. Their use and function relative
to the rise and the resolution of the question propter quid concerning metaphysics' proper subject will first be indicated.
Then the use of these classic ways by Thomistic authors who
for one reason or another formally investigate the question an
sit Deus will be considered.
A. Positive Judgment on the Use of the Quinquae Viae
in Metaphysics
1. General statement of their function.

To see the quinque viae as having a function to fulfill in
metaphysics is not a matter of accepting a traditional consensus
based on their use by Thomistic metaphysicians. Rather it is
their relevance both to the origin and the resolution of the
question propter quid concerning the subject of the science that
warrants their place in the science. Before indicating their
pertinence in detail, however, it is well to indicate the ontological elements involved in the ultimate phase of metaphysics.
The science is perfected when it knows its proper subject in
terms of its dependence upon the first cause. Then it achieves
the adequation with the ontological order that is the perfection
in truth to which the science is ordained. 54 Then it becomes
evident that as necessarily dependent upon the first cause,
unique subsistent being, all being is participated. It is thus
•• Cf. I Post. Anal., lect. 4, n. 5: eadem enim sunt principia esse rei et veritatis
ipsius.

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radically composed of essence and esse, really distinct from one
another as potency and act. Every being is therefore of limited
perfection; it must manifest act-potency compositions on all
levels of its realization. Thus the total perfection of any being
must include a real integration, a composition between the substance and its accidents. (Ens simpliciter est bonum secundum
quid; ens secundum quid est bonum simpliciter.) 55 Thus, as
well, there comes the ultimate realization that " every substance
is for
sake of its operation," as this means both potentiality
and dependence in the order of operation, as well as a teleogical
orientation towards the acquisition of its perfection. 56
Metaphysics must arrive at such a recognition of the truth,
however, according to its own process of discovery. The basic
elements involved in the truth of being's dependence upon the
first cause as this is discovered by metaphysics have been synthesized in St. Thomas' well known argument in his De Ente
et Essentia: whatever has being (esse) as really distinct from
essence is caused by the first cause, which as such is subsistent
being. 57 Through the realization of the basic aspect of limitation in beings, i.e., the real composition of essence and esse,
then, there is established the necessary dependence of being as
so limited upon subsistent being. Once such dependence is
evident, the ultimate ontological reason for the essence-esse
•• Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1.
Also I, q. 105, a. 5, in which
•• Cf. ibid., q. 6, a. 3; q. 65, a. 8; 1-11, q. 8, a.
these formally distinct aspects of dependence by reason of ontological limitation on
all levels, are indicated.
•• Cf. De Ente et Essentia, c. 4 (ed. Roland-Gosselin, 85): Omne autem quod
conuenit alieni uel est causatum ex principiis nature sue, sicut risibile in homine,
uel aduenit ab aliquo principia extrinseco sicut lumen ·in aere ex influentia solis.
Non autem potest esse quod ipsum esse sit causatum ab ipsa forma uel quidditate
rei, causatum dico sicut a causa efficiente, quia sic aliqua res esset · causa sui ipsius
et aliqua res seipsam in esse produceret, quod est impossibile. Ergo oportet quod
omnis talis res cuius esse est aliud quam natura sua habeat esse ab alio. Et quia
omne quod est per aliud reducitur ad illud quod est per se sicut ad causam primam,
oportet quod sit aliqua res que sit causa essendi omnibus rebus ex eo quod ipsa
est esse tantum: alias iretur in infinitum in causis, cum omnis res que non est
tosse tantum habeat causam sui esse, ut dictum est.

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composition itself in all being, with its further ramifications,
is also evident. 58
If such a direct argument from the fundamental aspect of
limitation in beings to the ultimate propter quid of all being
as limited is available, why the quinque viae? The answer to
the question is contained within the very argument of St.
Thomas. For it presupposes beings in which the real distinction
is verified. But this basic limitation in beings must be discovered by metaphysics, and the discovery is necessarily a
posteriori,59 from more manifest, more " superficial " aspects of
limitation. It is the virtue of the quinque viae that they in fact
epitomize such varied aspects of limitation found among the
concrete existents which metaphysics considers in the light of
its proper subject. They are thus admirably appropriate to
metaphysics as a process of discovery. The aspects of limitation from which the five ways begin are a crucial point in metaphysics' development. They can be well used in the discovery
of the real distinction, in which, indeed, their starting points are
basically rooted. 60 They serve as well to institute the question
of the propter quid concerning such aspects of limitation. The
resolution of this question regarding each of the aspects of
limitation from which the ways begin, actually leads to the
discovery of the ultimate propter quid of being itself as limited
and thus to the ultimate, a priori reason for the real distinction.
In a word, the quinque viae function in metaphysics by expressing its discovery of aspects of limitation among beings of
•• Cf. Del Prado, N., 0. P., De V eritate Fundamentali Philosophiae Ohristianae
(Friburg, H.; 1911): lpsum esse per se subsistens est unum tantum et primum:
in quocumque igitur praeter primum est ipsum esse tamquam actus et substantia
rei habens esse tamquam rei potentia receptiva huius quod est esse. En thesis lundamentalis totius philosophiae D. Thomae, quae philosophia Christiana iure merito
denominatur.
•• Obviously the sole a priori proof for the real distinction in all beings except
the first cause, must be through this extrinsic principle of being. Such a proof can
only be had after the attainment of the first cause.
•• Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 6, 8; q. 54, aa. 1, 2, 8; q. 77, a. 1, as examples where
St. Thomas, proceeding in theology from the order of jrdgment, employs the real
distinction as the basic ontological principle for other aspects of limitation in
created things.

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experience, and thus by instituting and leading to the resolution
of the question propter quid concerning being itself, subject of
the science, as limited. This function of the quinque viae, then,
can be judged insofar as their starting points, their processes
and their terminations, are suitable and relevant to metaphysics'
objective.
fl. Detailed judgment as to the suitability

of the quinque viae in metaphysics.
a. As to their starting points.
The relevance of the function of the quinque viae to metaphysics is first evident from the suitability of their starting
points to the science as a process of discovery. The development of the science under the light of its proper subject must
be not a pure deductive analysis, but the discovery of what
necessarily pertains to that subject in view of its realization
in the order of existent reality. Metaphysics is a science of the
real and the real that is at hand for the metaphysician is sensible reality. Simply to recall the starting points of the quinque
viae is to perceive immediately that they all proceed from the
existent order which is man's proper intellectual environment.
Immediately after pointing out the formality from which each
way proceeds, St. Thomas adds the evidence: "It is certain
and attested by sense ... ; we find in these sensible things ... ;
we see ... etc." 61 It is clear, then, that each of the ways begins
61 The commencement of each of the ways is to be noted:
Prima et manifestior
via est quae sumitur ex parte motus. Certum est enim et sensu constat aliqua
moveri in hoc mundo ....
Secunda via est ex ratione causae efficientis. Invenimus enim in istis sensibilibus
esse ordinem causarum efficientium. . . .
Tertia via est sumpta ex possibili et necessario, quae talis est. Invenimus enim
in rebus quaedam quae sunt possibilia esse et non esse: cum quaedam inveniantur
generari et corrumpi, et per consequens possibilia esse et non esse. . . .
Quarta via sumitur ex gradibus qui in rebus inveniuntur. Invenitur enim in rebus
aliquid magis et minus bonum, et verum, et nobile ....
Quinta via sumitur ex gubernatione rerum. Videmus enim quod aliqua quae
cognitione carent, scilicet corpora naturalia, operantur propter finem. . . . Ibid.,
q. !l, a. 8.

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with a fact concerning existent reality as attained by the
intellect.
More significantly, however, the starting points of the ways
are suitable to metaphysics' order of discovery precisely as
this is to result in the question of the propter quid concerning
the subject of the science. For the ways do not proceed merely
from facts, but from the formalities of the facts involved, which
formalities are interpreted metaphysically. This interpretation
emerges in the distinctive introductions of each of the ways:
The first, from movement.
The second, from the character of the efficient cause.
The third, from the possible and the necessary.
The fourth, from the grades which are found in things.
The fifth, from the government of things.
Because of the metaphysical significance of these formalities, 62
the starting points of the quinque viae indicate, in the order of
experience available to the metaphysician, aspects of limitation,
of composition, which as such institute a causal investigation,
one which does lead ultimately to the cause of being as such.
Many and valuable are the insights into the order, the number, the content of the quinque viae, advanced by penetrating
studies of illustrious Thomists. 63 But in keeping with the pres•• On the metaphysical character of the prima via, which is a frequent matter of
discussion, an excellent presentation of the metaphysical point of view of St. Thomas
in his various examinations of the proof from movement, is that of Paulus, Jean,
"Le Caractere Metaphysique des Preuves Thomistes de !'Existence de Dieu,"
Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moytm Age, IX (1984), 143-145;
the table on p. 146 is noteworthy. Cf. also Salman, D., 0. P. in review of this
article, Bulletin Thomiste, IV (1985), 604-610. Cf. also In De Trin., q. 5, a. 4, ad. 6.
68 Among such works may be noted:
Arnou, R., S. J., Quinque Viae S. Thomae ad Demonstrandam Existentiam Dei
apud Antiquos Graecos, Philosophos Arabos et ludaeos Praeformatae vel Adumbratae
(Rome,
Boehm, A., " Autour du Mystere des Quinque Viae," Revue des Sciences
Religiemes, XXIV (19.50),
Bougges, M., S.J., "Pour !'interpretation des Quinque Viae de Saint Thomas
d'Aquin," Recherches de Science Religii!'Ulle, XXXVI (1949), 598-601.
Del Prado, N., 0. P., "Quaestionem Secundam Primae Partis Summae Theologicae
An Deus Sit, Interpretatus est Fr. Norbertus Del Prado, 0. P.; Articulus Tertius An

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ent purpose what is to be emphasized is the significance of the
ways within the context of the development of metaphysics'
discovery of the principle of its subject.
Throughout, metaphysics is led to its discoveries in the light
of its proper subject. This is the source of its realization of
limitation among the beings of experience. For initially the
formality of the scientific subject, being, attained by reason of
the judgment of separation, is an expression of things according to their perfection. The value, the explicit content of the
subject, habens esse, as scientifically apprehended, is the definitive, the perfective aspect of the real. 64 And the real, examined
according to the formal point of view of the subject of the
science, leads the metaphysician to the realization of limitation.
For as the existent is examined in the light of the proper subject
of the science, things as they are reveal that they are not complete perfection and actuality. The metaphysician finds imperfection with perfection; beings which as such are perfect, yet
also include limitation. Thus St. Thomas states:
It must, therefore, be known that the diverse species of things
possess the nature of being (ens) in graded fashion. Thus, in the
first division of being we at once find something perfect, namely,
being through itself and being in act, and something imperfect,
namely being in another and being in potency.65
Deus Sit," Jakrbuck fur Pkiloaopkie uncl Spekulative Tkeologie, XXIV (1910),
114-152.

Giuliani, S., 0. P., "Perche Cinque le 'Vie' di S. Tomasso," Sapienza, I (1948),
851-160.
Muniz, F., 0. P., "La Cuarta Via,'' "Reviata de Filoaofia, ill (1944), 886-488;
IV (1946), 49-99.
--, "Introduccion a la Cuestion IT," Suma Teologiea (Madrid: Ed. B. A. C.,
1947).
The works of Fr. Muniz are particularly valuable in the mind of the present
author.
•• Cf. Summa Tkeol., I, q. 6, a. 8: Omne enim ens inquantum est actu, est in
actu et quodammodo perfectum, quia omnis actus perfectio quaedam est. As has
been noted, in chapter VI above, the scientific subject is attained by the apprehension of that which is formal, constitutive of it; cf. chapter VI, note 66.
•• Scire igitur oportet quod diversae rerum species gradatim naturam entis possident. Statim enim in prima entis divisione invenitur hoc quidem perfectum, scilicet
ens per se et ens actu: aliud vero imperfectum, scilicet ens in alio et ens in potentia.
IT Cont. Gent., c. 96.

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The limitation among beings is a true discovery for metaphysics. The composition of perfection and imperfection among
beings of experience which " we find " is expressed in the metaphysical division of being into potential being and actual
being. 66 For from their very origins in the Aristotelian system,
the notions of act and potency have the signification of perfection and imperfection. Because the necessity for this distinction between the actual and the potential is found in the
very first phase of man's scientific development, i.e., the investigation of mobile being, the notions are available and are
apt for metaphysics to express the discovery of perfection and
imperfection in its field of interest. The realization of actuality
and potentiality among the beings of experience is truly a
metaphysical consideration. 67 The supreme discovery of actpotency composition for the science is the discovery of the real
distinction between essence and existence. 68
But, as has been noted, there are other act-potency compositions, which, while in fact stemming from the very structural composition of essence and existence, are yet more superficial, more available in experience for the metaphysician. It
is from such aspects of limitation that the quinque viae proceed.
Because they do proceed from act-potency aspects of beings of
experience, the formalities of their starting points indicate in
a way connatural to metaphysics the aspects of limitation
•• Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 77, a. 1: Potentia et actus dividunt ens et quodlibet
genus entis.
07 Cf. In IX Met., lect. 1, n. 1770: Potentia et actus ut plurimum dicuntur in his
quae sunt in motu, quia motus est actus entis in potentia. Sed principalis intentio
huius doctrinae non est de potentia et actus secundum quod sunt in rebus mobilibus,
sed secundum quod sequuntur ens commune. Cf. also In De Trin., q. 5, a. 1 and
ad 7; II Cont. Gent., c. 54: Sic igitur patet quod compositio actus et potentiae
est in plus quam compositio formae et materiae. Unde materia et forma dividunt
substantiam materialem, potentia et actus dividunt ens commune. Et propter hoc
quaecumque quidem consequuntur potentiam et actum inquantum huiusmodi, sunt
communia substantiis materialibus et immaterialibus creatis: scilicet recipere et
recipi, perficere et perfici.
•• Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 3, a. 7, ad 1: Est autem de ratione causati, quod sit
aliquo modo compositum quia ad minus esse eius est aliud quam quod quid est.

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among such beings. They thus connaturally give rise to a
causal investigation.
All the quinque viae are concerned with actual facts regarding existent realities. Thus they begin with acts. What be.
speaks limitation is not the actuality as such, but the potency
which must be implied by reason of the limitation with that
actuality. All the facts from which the ways begin offer evidence of such limitation. They thus indicate act-potency compositions and consequently give rise to causal investigations.
The prima via takes as its starting point the actual and evident fact of movement, a direct and manifest instance of the
act-potency composition in beings. Those things which are the
subject of this act which is movement, are actual beings. 69 But
movement as such is an imperfect act and the act of the imperfect.70 The beings that are the subject of movement are such
because of potency in them, whether the movement be generation in the substantial order, or, in the accidental order, alteration as to quality, augmentation as to quantity, or local motion
as to place. With regard to operations, whether of a spiritual
•• Cf. In IX Met., lect. 8, nn. 1804-1805: Ostendit quid sit esse in potentia, et
quid esse in actu. Et primo quid sit esse in potentia, dicens, quod id dicitur esse
in potentia, quod si ponatur esse actu, nihil impossibile sequitur. Ut si dicatur
aliquem possibile est sedere, si ponatur ipsum sedere, non accidit aliquod impossibile.
Cf. In IX Met., lect. 8, nn. 1805-1806: Ostendit quid sit esse in actu, et dicit
quod hoc nomen actus, quod ponitur ad significandum entelechiam et perfectionem,
scilicet, formam, et alia huiusmodi, sicut sunt quaecumque operationes, veniunt
maxime ex motibus quantum ad originem vocabuli. Cum enim nomina sint signa
intelligibilium conceptionum, illis primo imponimus nomina, quae primo intelligimus,
licet sint posteriora secundum ordinem naturae. Inter alios autem actus, maxime
est nobis notus et apparens motus, qui sensibiliter a nobis videtur. Et ideo ei
primo impositum fuit nomen actus, et a motu ad alia derivatum est. Et propter
hoc moveri non attribuitur non existentibus; licet quaedam alia praedicta non
existentibus attribuantur. Dicimus enim non entia esse intelligibilia vel opinabilia,
sed non dicimus ea esse mota. Quia, cum moveri significet esse actu, sequeretur
quod non entia actu essent actu; quod patet esse falsum. Etsi enim quaedam non
entia sint in potentia, tamen ideo non dicuntur esse, quia non sunt in actu.
•• Cf. ibid., Xll, lect. 9, !t805: "Motus est actus quidam ... sed est actus
imperfectus, et huius causa est, quia illud cuius est actus est imperfectum, et hoc
est ens possibile sive ens potentia .... Unde actus. perfecti non sunt actus existentis
in potentia sed existentis in actu. . . . Unde relinquitur quod motus est actus
existentis in ootentia et sic est actus imperfecti. Cf. also In III Pkya., lect. i.

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or a material kind, it is because essence and existence are distinguished as potency and act, that substance, faculty and
operation are distinguished and thus that the passage to actual
operation includes movement. 71 Beginning with the fact of
movement, then, the prima via manifests a most universal
aspect of the act-potency composition among beings of experience. Even in metaphysics it is "a more manifest way," that
is, of indicating the aspect of limitation among things. As such
it leads immediately to a causal investigation; thus St. Thomas
states: "Whatever is being moved is being moved by another,"
and indicates the necessary truth involved in terms of act and
potency. 72
While the prima via indicates an immediate aspect of limitation discovered in terms of the actus imperfectus and imperfecti, each of the other ways begins with a more particularized
aspect of limitation found in conjunction with " perfect acts "
and " acts of the perfect," in the order of being and of operation.
For the order of act properly so called, perfect act, embraces
these orders of being and of operation, and according to them
the other four ways may be grouped, the second and fifth
referring to the order of operation, the third and the fourth
to the order of being.
The secunda via, proceeding ex ratione causae efjicientis is
concerned with actual operation, efficiency, obviously a perfection.73 At the same time, however, this perfection is found
as limited, since an order of efficient causes is involved. 74 The
formal aspect, the ratio, of the efficient cause is its efficacy, the
efficiency by which it produces an effect. Such a perfection
11 Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 54, a. 8; 77, a. I.
•• Cf. ibid., q.
8: Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur. Nihil enim movetur
nisi secundum quod est in potentia ad illud ad quod movetur; movet autem aliquid
secundum quod est actu. Movere enim nihil aliud est quam educere aliquid de
potentia autem non potest aliquid reduci in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in actu ....
78 Cf. ibid., q. W, a. 1: Manifestum est enim quod unumquodque secundum quod
est actu et perfectum, secundum hoc est principium activum alicuius. Also III,
q. s, a. 5; II Cont. Gent., c. 6.
" Cf. ibid., q. !l, a. 8: lnvenimus enim in istis sensibilibus esse ordinem causarum
efficientium.

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does not bespeak limitation, but the per se order of efficient
causes does. For the only reason for such an order is efficiency
required to produce the effect involved. If the perfection of
any single cause involved in the order sufficed, the multiplicity,
the order itself would not be found. Thus the order of causes as
such bespeaks limitation. Such limitation is indicated by this:
" It is neither found nor is it possible that anything be the
efficient cause of itself." 75 True of the entitative order, the
principle is to be here applied in the context. In the order of
efficient causes, one is the cause of the other's causing; there is
thus limitation found in the very exercise of efficiency. A
causal investigation for the ultimate explanation of the efficiency thus found limited is consequently instituted. 76
The quinta via is also concerned with the realm of operation,
but according to another aspect, its finality. This aspect is of
the very nature of operation; operation is the expression of
the order of every being to its own perfection. It does not of
itself bespeak imperfection, limitation. This is rather verified
in what is expressed by the term " government," the formality
involved in the fifth way. For in the context this "government " implies a twofold lack in the subjects involved. Government actively taken means " to bring things to their end." 77
Passively understood, therefore, it means to be directed towards
an end, towards ultimate perfection. Things, especially those
completely lacking in knowledge, are already perfect in the
sense that they actually exist and are actually operating. But
at the same time, imperfection is evident. For they are observed to act for an end to be gained; they act to attain the
76 Cf. ibid.:
Non tamen invenitur nee est possible quod aliquid sit causa efficiens
sui ipsius quia sic esset prius seipso.
•• Cf. De Pot., q. 8, a. 7. From this place it. is clear that the ultimate reason
for the dependence upon the influx of the first cause upon every other efficient
cause is that only that which is esse can properly, and by right, produce esse:
since esse is attained whenever there is the exercise of efficient causality the universal dependence of all agents which are not identically their own esse is evident.
The particular aspect nf limitation and hence of dependence involved in the order
of efficient causes is thus also rooted in the real distinction.
77 Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 108, a. 1.

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optimu,m/ 8 They are thus good, perfect secundum quid, but
are seeking their perfection simpliciter/ 9 They thus evidence
the composition of act-potency. Consequently, they pose the
need for a causal investigation. In terms of the way itself, the
aspect of limitation is made the more evident in that beings
lacking in knowledge cannot explain precisely the direction that
is involved in the finality which they manifest. Thus the causal
investigation is instituted in terms of limitation which bespeaks
dependence upon intelligence, the adequate explanation of
finality. In the fifth way, then, operation is found but as
limited, directed, governed. 80
The tertia and quarta via have as points of departure the
actuality of being, but as discovered with limitation, compositertia via, taken from the "possible and the necestion.
sary," begins with things which are actual, which are, and yet
as they are do not explain the perfection of existing which they
exercise. For they are " possibles." In the context this connotes
a more particular and manifest limitation in terms of potentiality. The very intrinsic principles of the "possible" include
the composition between matter as potential and form. For
such things are generated and corrupt, and thus must be so
constituted. 81 Thus they bespeak a pronounced limitation; they
are possibles and as such " indifferent " to the being which they
actually exercise.82 Immediately, therefore, they pose the question of a cause:
•• Cf. ibid., q. !!, a. S.
•• Cf. ibid., q. 5, a. 1, ad 1; q. 6, a. S.
•• Cf. ibid., q. !!, a. S: Ea autem quae non habent cognitionem non tendunt in
finem nisi directa ab aliquo cognoscente et intelligente.
81 Cf. II Ccmt. Gent., c. 54:
. . . Quaecumque vero sunt propria materiae et
formae inquantum huiusmodi, sicut generari et corrumpi et alia huiusmodi, haec
sunt propria substantiarum materialium.
•• Cf. De Pot., q. 5, a. 8: lllae ergo solae res in sua natura possibilitatem habent
ad non esse in quibus est materia contrarietati subjecta. Aliis vero rebus secundum
suam naturam competit necessitas essendi, possibilitate non essendi ab earum
natura sublata.
II Ccmt. Gent., c. 55: Res dicuntur necessariae et contingentes secundum potentiam quae est in eis et non secundum potentiam Dei. Cf. In De Trin., q. 5, a. t,
ad 7.

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It is impossible that all things that are, be such as these (possibles): because what is possible not to be sometimes is not. If therefore all things are possible not to be, at some time there was nothing
existing in reality. But if this be true, even now there would be
nothing, because that which is not, does not begin to be except
through something which actually exists. 83

The quarta via begins explicitly with perfections immediately
consequent upon being, as found in existent things. At the
same time, however, it indicates aspects of limitation. For the
more and the less good, noble, true indicate that these perfections, which of themselves do not bespeak imperfection, are
yet found in varying degrees. There is thus evidenced limitation, composition of act with potency. The fact that such perfections are actual, yet limited, imposes the need for causal
investigation, as St. Thomas indicates:
The more and the less are said of diverse things according as they
diversely approach that which is in the most perfect way (quod
maxime est) .a4

In conclusion, then, the starting points of the quinque viae,
seen metaphysically in terms of act and potency, all indicate
from the order of existent reality, aspects of composition, of
limitation. They thus institute causal investigations. Because
of the metaphysical import of these facts, the subjects in which
•• lmpossibile est autem omnia quae sunt, talia esse, quia quod possibile est non
esse quandoque non est. Si igitur omnia sunt possibilia non esse, aliquando nihil
fuit in rebus. Sed si hoc est verum, etiam nunc nihil esset: quia quod non est,
non incipit esse nisi per aliquod quod est. Summa Theol., I, q. 2, a. S.
The Leonine edition lists the following texts as giving this, the accurate reading
of the text:
A (Vaticanus-lSth cent.)
D (Ottobonianus--lSth cent.)
C (Vaticanus-14th cent.)
a
(Venice--1478)
E (Regina Christiana-1462)
F (Urbanus--16th cent.)
G (Vaticanus--Palatinus--16th
cent.)
P (Ed. Piana-1570)
•• Magis et minus dicuntur de diversis secundum quod diversimode appropinquant
ad aliquod quod maxime est. Ibid.

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they are verified are not sufficient to explain them. Rooted in
the order of immediate experience, the quinque viae function in
metaphysics as eminently relevant to its process of discovery.
Instituted from evident manifestations of act-potency composition, they clearly indicate to metaphysics aspects of limitation
which pose the need for causal investigations appropriate to the
objective of the science in its final phase.
b. As to their process
The relevance and suitability of the quinque viae to metaphysics' discovery of the principle of its proper subject, as the
solution of the question propter quid concerning this subject,
are evident also in their process to their proper conclusions.
}'or in each case, the process is one of resolution, and it attains
to the proper cause of the effect involved in each case.
In the fact that the process of the ways is one of resolution
lies at least one reason why St. Thomas calls them viae. Discussing the " modes," the proper characteristics of the processes
of the speculative sciences, he says of the total scientific evolution of man:
The rational consideration terminates at the intellectual according
to the way of resolution, insofar as reason gathers from many things
one simple truth. 85

Thus the process of science is called a " way " by St. Thomas,
the way of resolution when multiplicity is reduced to unity; the
way of composition when from a simple truth, many other
truths are derived. 86 Concerning metaphysics itself he states:
" The whole consideration of reason's process of resolution, finds
its termination in the consideration of divine science." 87 For
it is in metaphysics that the resolution of all reality into its
•• Rationalis consideratio ad intellectualem terminatur secundum viam resolutionis, inquantum ratio ex multis colligit unam et simplicem veritatem. In De Trin.,
q. 6, a. 1, ad tertiam quaestionem, ed. cit. 60.
•• Cf. ibid.
•• Tota autem consideratio rationis resolventis in omnibus scientiis ad considerationem divinae scientiae terminatur. Ibid.

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ultimately intelligible aspects is achieved, through the consideration of the most universal aspects of the real, being in
common, in its principles common to all beings, both by predication and by causality:
Therefore the ultimate term of resolution in this way [that of
finding the extrinsic causes] is reached when one attains the
supreme, most simple causes, which are the separated substances.88
The quinque viae are in their process completely in accord
with the character of metaphysics as it is the ultimate term of
reason's way of resolution. For the process of each of them
is the resolution of an aspect of limitation, according to its
metaphysical significallce, into its ultimate, causal explanation.
Setting out from an evident, actual fact, each process ascends
through an analysis of the fact revealing it to be an instance
of limitation, to the proper cause which is the simple truth
through which the act-potency composition is ultimately explained.
The process of the quinque viae bespeaks a second aspect of
appropriateness to metaphysics. For the objective of metaphysics in seeking the propter quid of its proper subject is, as
it is throughout the science, to attain scientific knowledge of
that subject, knowledge through causes. The quinque viae have
this advantage, that theirs is a process proceeding along the
lines of proper causality in the resolution of the aspects of
limitation involved in each. As it is the highest of the sciences,
and thus perfect science, the specification of St. Thomas that
the cause involved is the proper cause, applies to metaphysics'
search for knowledge of its subject, and at the same time points
up the advantage of this feature of the process of the ways. 89
A cardinal indication of St. Thomas' own conception of the
process of the quinque viae is set out in these words:
88 mtima ergo terminus resolutionis in hac via est cum pervenitur ad causas
supremas maxime simplices quae sunt substantiae separatae. Ibid. In connection
with the present point, cf. Chenu, op. cit., 160-161.
8 ° Cf. In I Post. Anal., lect. 4, n. 11: Nam si propositiones demonstrationis sint
causae conClusionis,necesse est quod sint propria principia eius: oportet enim causas
esse proportionatas effectibus.

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From every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated ... because since every effect depends upon its cause, if
the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist. 90

Accordingly, each of the quinque viae starts from an actual
fact, which in its metaphysical significance is shown to be an
aspect of limitation and thus an effect. Thus in each " an
effect is given" (posito effectu). To find the ultimate explanation of such effects, the proper cause must be discovered. Thus
each of the ways as a process of resolution proceeds along lines
of proper causality. This first of all means efficient causality,
since the existence of actual effects demands an efficient cause. 91
As is apparent from the text of the ways themselves, efficient
causality is involved in each of them. 92
But in the resolution into the proper cause it is not any sort
of efficient cause whatsoever that is involved. To bring out
what such a resolution entails it is necessary to recall certain
00 Ex quolibet effectu potest demonstrari
propriam causam eius esse quia cum
effectus dependeat a causa, posito effectu necesse est causam praeexistere. Summa
Theol., I, q.
a. 2.
01 Cf. II Cont. Gent., c. 6:
Efficiens autem causa suos effectus ad esse conducit.
02 Cf. Summa Theol., loc. cit., a. 8:
Omne autem quod movetur ab alio movetur .... Movere enim nihil aliud est
quam educere aliquid de potentia in actum.
Nee tamen invenitur nee est possibile quod aliquid sit causa efficiens sui ipsius ....
Quod non est non incipit esse nisi per aliquid quod est. . . . Omne autem necessaribum vel habet causam suae necessitatis aliunde vel non habet. . . .
Magis et minus dicuntur de diversis secundum quod appropinquant diversimode
ad aliquid quod maxime est. . . . Quod autem dicitur maxime tale in aliquo genere,
est causa omnium quae sunt illius generis ....
(For the explanation of the efficient causality formally involved in this proof,
cf. Muniz, op. cit., "La Cuarta Via," 898; Soma Teologica, BAC I, 115)
Ea autem quae non habent cognitionem non tendunt in finem nisi directa ab
aliquo cognoscente et intelligente .... "
(That this direction is a matter of efficient causality is apparent from the following: Summa Theol., 1-11, q. I, a.
Considerandum est quod aliquid sua
actione vel motu tendit ad finem dupliciter: uno modo sicut seipsum ad finem
movens, ut homo; alio modo sicut ab alio motum ad finem, sicut sagitta tendit
ad determinatum finem ex hoc quod movetur a sagittante, qui suam actionem
dirigit in finem. Cf. also I, q.
a. I ad
q. lOS, aa. 1-4, from which places
it is evident that in St. Thomas' teaching ordinare is efficiency with intention,
pertains formally to the order of efficient causality.)

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truths concerning efficient causality. First of all, the process
of resolution has only the exigencies of the effect itself to direct
such a process. But a basic guiding point lies in this:
Effects correspond proportionately to their causes: so that we
attribute actual effects to actual causes, potential effects to
potential causes, and similarly particular effects to particular causes
and universal effects to universal causes .... 93

Concerned with actually given effects, the quinque viae as
processes of resolution are, then, directed towards the determination of actual causes.
It is to be further noted that the process in seeking the proper
cause, the cause proportioned to the effect, must proceed from
the form of the effect.94 For, in a word, it is the form of the
effect that supplies the search with the indication of what the
actuality of the cause must be in order that the effect be explained. Conversely, if any cause is not adequate, in terms of
the form of the effect, it does not sufficiently explain the effect.95
As to what has thus far been indicated, it is apparent that
the quinque viae do resolve effects into their corresponding
causes:
I. Ex parte motus. Since to be moved is to be reduced from
potency to act and to move is to reduce something from potency
to act: the efficient cause of movement, the mover, must be a
being in act.
II. Ex ratione causae efficientis. To be an efficient cause is to
exercise efficient causality, activity, in the production of an effect
since an order of causes is found, and the efficiency cannot be
•• Efl'ectus suis causis proportionaliter respondent: ut scilicet efl'ectus in actu causis
actualibus attribuamus, et effectus in potentia causis quae sunt in potentia: et
similiter effectus particulares causis particularibus, universalibus vero universales;
... II Cont. Gent., c. !'tl.
•• Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 19, a. 6: Cum effectus conformatur agenti secundum
suam formam, eadem ratio est in causis agentibus quae est in causis formalibus.
II Cont. Gtmt., c. !'t!'t: Omne agens agit inquantum actu est: secundum igitur
modum actus uniuscuiusque agentis est modus suae virtutis in agendo.
•• This is the constant way in which St. Thomas analyzes the explanation of any
effect, in terms namely of the form of the effect and the order of dependence upon
the cause demanded.

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exercised by a cause upon itself, the subordinated cause is at once
an effect, and demands a cause superior in efficacy.
III. Ex possibili et necessario. Of their nature existent things
which are generated and corrupt, are possibles. They thus demand
a cause superior in being, a necessary.
IV. Ex gradibus qui in rebus inveniuntur. Such grades in the
perfections indicated show that the perfections are limited, and
the cause demanded must be superior with regard to such perfections, a maximum.
V. Ex gubernatione rerum. Finalized operation as an effect
demands a proportionate cause, the ordered demands an orderer, an
intelligent agent giving the teleological determination to nature
and operation.

Thus in resolving the effects to their proper causes the
quinque viae exhibit this element: they assign a cause demanded according to the form of the effects. But to assign the
adequate causes, the proper causes of the effects in their absolute significance as they are viewed by metaphysics, more is
required. The cause of the form as such of the effect must be
reached. Such a cause is one whose excellence in actuality as
required according to the act-potency composition of the effect,
is such that to cause such an effect is proper to that cause,
belongs to it in such a way that it belongs to no other cause
save through this proper cause. This causality alone sufficiently
explains the effect, by explaining the form as such of the effect.96
To assign the cause of the form as such, the cause to which
the causing of such a form is proper must be discovered. Such
a cause cannot be a univocal cause, one of the same order or
•• Cf. II Cont. Gent., c. 15: Omne quod alicui convenit non secundum quod
ipsum est, per aliquam causam convenit ei, sicut album homini: nam quod causam
non habet primum et immediatum est. Unde necesse est quod sit per se et secundum
quod ipsum. Quod enim de aliquo secundum quod ipsum dicitur, ipsum non excedit:
sicut habere tres angulos duobus rectis aequales non excedit triangulum de quo
praedicatur sed est eidem convertibiliter. Si igitur aliquid duobus convenit, non
convenit utrique secundum quod ipsum est. Impossibile est igitur aliquid unum de
duobus praedicari ita quod de neutro per causam dicatur. Sed oportet vel unum
esse alterius causam, sicut ignis est causa caloris corpori mixto, quum tamen
utrumque calidum dicatur: vel oportet quod aliquod tertium sit causa utrique, sicut
duabus candelis ignis est causa lucendi.

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kind as is the effect, but must be " equivocal," analogical, or
of a superior order. The reason for this is that if a univocal
cause were the cause of the form as such, it would be the cause
of itself, since as univocal it has the same form as does the
effect.97
The analogical cause of the form as such of the effect, the
proper cause, is said to be the cause secundum esse of the effect.
As such it is distinguished against the cause secundum fieri
tantum et non directe secundum esse.
. . . For if an agent is not the cause of a form as such, neither will
it be directly the cause of being which results from that form; but
it will be the cause of the effect, in its becoming only ....
Thus whenever a natural effect is such that it has an aptitude
to receive froin its active cause an impression specifically the same
as in that active cause, then the becoming of the effect, but not its
being, depends on the agent ....
Sometimes, however, the effect has not this aptitude to receive
the impression of its cause, in the same way as it exists in the
agent: as may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce
an effect of the same species as themselves: ... Such an agent
can be the cause of a form as such, and not merely as existing in
this matter, consequently it is not merely the cause of becoming
but also the cause of being. 98
•• Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. IS, a. 5, ad 1: In actionibus agens non univocum
ex necessitate praecedit agens univocum. Agens enim non univocum est causa
universalis totius speciei ut sol est causa generationis omnium hominum. Agens
vero univocum non est causa agens universalis totius speciei, alioquin esset causa
sui ipsius cum sub specie continetur, sed est causa particularis respectu huius
individui, quod in participatione speciei constituit. Causa igitur universalis totius
speciei non est agens univocum. . . . Causa autem universalis est prior causa
particulari.
•• . . . Quia si aliquod agens non est causa formae inquantum huiusmodi, non
erit per se causa esse quod consequitur' ad talem formam, sed erit causa efl'ectus
secundum fieri tantum. Sed potest esse causa huiusmodi formae secundum quod
est in materia, idest quod haec materia acquirit hanc formam. Et hoc est esse
causa secundum fieri.. : .
Et ideo quandocumque naturalis effectus est natus impressionis agentis recipere
secundum eandem rationem secundum quam est in agente, tunc fieri efl'ectus
dependet ah agente, non autem esse ipsius. Sed aliquando efl'ectus non est natus
recipere impressionem agentis secundum eandem rationem secundum quam est in
agente: sicut patet in omnibus agentibus quae non agunt simile secundum speciem.
. . . Et tale agens potest esse causa formae secundum rationem talis formae et non

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The quinque viae assign the proper cause of the effect in
each case, because they assign the cause of the form as such of
the effect, the cause secundum esse of the effect wherever it is
found. This is apparent from a simple comparison of the terms
of the process of each.
I. From movement beyond moved movers to a mover
moved by none.
II. From subordinated, caused causes, to a first cause beyond
all median causes, uncaused as a cause.
III. From the possible to a necessary which has no cause of its
necessity in being, but is the cause of all other beings.
IV. From graduated perfections, limited perfections, to a maximum, the unlimited, cause of these perfections in all others.
V. From things which are determined and directed, in operating
for an end, to an intelligent governor.

In each case the form of the effect as such is transcended in
assigning a cause in which the same formality is not found, to
which thus the causing of the form as such is proper.
That the proofs proceed from effects to proper causes of the
form as such is also manifest in a further element: the exclusion
of the possibility of an infinite regress in explaining the effects.99
The repugnance of such a regress has its evidence on two scores:
on the part of the effect itself as actually given, an experienced
fact (posito effectu). To take away, for example, the unmoved
mover would mean that the actual fact of movement must be
denied, obviously an absurdity. To remove the first cause,
would demand a denial of the order of causes which is the evidence from which the secunda via begins, and similarly in all
the ways. Thus the evidence of the actual given facts witnesses
the necessity of finding a first proper cause, a cause of the form
as such of the effect.
On the part of the ·cause there can be no infinite series, not
because of any numerical
but because of the
solum secundum quod acquiritur in hac materia: et ideo est causa non solum
fiendi sed essendi. Ibid., q. 104, a. 1.
•• The rejection of an infinite regress as the explanation of the fact involved, is
explicit in the first three, implicit in the last two ways. Cf. Muniz, Soma Teol., 189.

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causality involved. Given the form of the effect, there must
be a proper cause, one that by right has the power of causing
the form as such of the effect. Whether there be one or a hundred causes secundum fieri, causes of the same level as the
effect, is inconsequential; the series of such causes only repeats
the demand for a proper cause, since they are, as having the
same kind of form as the effect, of the same order as that from
which the original need for explanation began. The form of
movement is in the moved mover with the same urgency for
explanation as it is in the merely mobile subject. 100 The cause
to which belongs the causation of the form as such of the effect
is the only adequate explanation. Thus it is the first cause, the
one which is completely proportioned to the total explanation
of the effect involved. From any effect its proper cause can
be demonstrated to exist, since given the effect, its very dependence as effect demands the proper cause.
The process of each of the ways, developed along the resolutory lines of proper causality, is appropriate to the scientific
character of metaphysics, and conducive to the successful conclusion of its quest to know its proper subject, as to its propter
quid, in terms of perfect scientific knowledge.
c. As to their conclusions
Finally, the quinque viae in their conclusions exhibit a relevance and suitability to the attainment of the objective of
metaphysics in its order of discovery. It is to be noted, first
of all, that as the ways proceed from distinct points of inception,
and adhere in their resolution to the lines of proper causality,
their conclusions are formally distincL That the starting points
are distinct is apparent from the formalities involved in each.
Movement is distinct from both being and operation, as imperfect act from perfect act. Being itself and operation, the
areas of perfect act at issue respectively in the third and fourth,
and in the second and fifth ways, are distinct. The two formalities, the very fact of efficiency (in the second way) and its
10

° Cf. Summa Theol., loc. cit., q. 46, a. 2, ad 7.

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THOMAS C. O'BRIEN

finality (in the fifth way), are formally distinct. The fact of
the possible status in existence involved in the third way is a
formality diverse from the grades of perfections instituting the
fourth way. Thus it is from five formally distinct aspects of
reality that the ways proceed. Each follows rigidly the analysis
of the aspect of limitation involved in its own starting point.
Consequently, the conclusion in each case as the result of the
process of resolution along the lines of proper causality affirms
the proper cause of the effect formally involved. The direct,
proper conclusions of the ways are, then, formally distinct.
At this point, the commentary of Cajetan, in the light of its
continued influence upon the interpretation of the quinque viae,
comes to mind. Speaking as commentator on the theological
question, Cajetan states that in the Summa the ·article concerning God's existence has one conclusion, an affirmative response to the question: God exists. 101 Examining the philosophic content of the ways, however, he insists that in terms
of the formalities involved, the conclusions affirm that certain
predicates are found in reality, which as a matter of fact are
proper to God. But the conclusions as such, from the philosophical premisses, are " not concerned with " establishing how
such "predicates" are found existing. 102 The phrase non curando occurring throughout the discussion is Cajetan's emphasis
upon the truth that the ways proceed according to the lines
of proper causality; that their demonstrative force as such is
limited to the conclusions warranted according to the exigencies
of the effects formally involved. Cajetan is acutely aware of
the importance of proper causality. 103 His comment has the
force of pointing up what precisely is the result of the direct
philosophic content of the ways. The strict, demonstrative
101 Cf. Cajetan, Comm. in I, "q.
8, n.
In corpore est una conclusio responsiva quaesito affirmative.
10 ° Cf. ibid., n. 8: ... alferri possunt ad concludendum quaedam praedicata inveniri in rerum natura, quae secundum veritatem sunt propria Dei . . . non curando
quomodo vel qualiter sint.
108 Cf. ibid., n. 9: Non assignatur causa in communi sed particulari materiae de
qua est sermo. Cf. also Comm. in I, q. 104, a. 1.

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value of the ways would be exceeded if the conclusion " God
as God exists " were to be alleged as the direct conclusion. This
one conclusion of the article is rather an identification made
in virtue of the theological context. What is strictly demonstrated is the proper cause in each case.104
As the ways function in metaphysics, their five proper conclusions afford to the metaphysician the ultimate explanation
of the distinct aspects of limitation which the investigation of
concrete reality has revealed. But even as these aspects of
limitation are a manifestation of the radical composition of
essence and existence, so also the five conclusions open the way
to the discovery of the propter quid, the first cause of all being,
subsistent esse. For the conclusions themselves lead to the
necessity of further investigation. Since the conclusions attained affirm the actually existent causes of the effects involved,
it is connatural to the metaphysician to examine such causes
in terms of the proper formality of the science, habens esse.
Such an inquiry leads to the unique, subsistent esse, which as
such is the cause of all being.
This process embraces two general steps: the first is an exemination of the conclusions of the quinque viae in the light
of the proper subject of the science, resulting in the realization
that each cause is a being without limitation, subsistent esse;
the second is the further conclusion that subsistent esse is necessarily unique. The elements of these two steps can be suggested
as follows:
The First Step:
1. The first unmoved mover is subsistent esse. For as such, the
first uncaused cause can in no way be caused. This would not be
so if it were not subsistent esse, since then there would be a subject,
a receptive, potential principle, of which esse would be the actuality.105
10 ' Cf. ibid., n. 3: . . . et ideo, concludendo haec inveniri in rerum natura, concluditur directe, quasi per accidens, quod Deus est, idest, Deus, non ut Deus, sed
ut habens talem conditionem, est: et consequenter ipsum substratum, scilicet Deus
ut Deus est.
10 " Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. S, a. 4; I Cont. Gent., c. 22.

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The first uncaused cause is subsistent esse. For as such, the
first uncaused cause can in no way be caused. This would not be
so if it were not subsistent esse, but there were a receptive principle
of esse. For then esse, as not identified with essence, the subject,
nor caused by the essential principles-an impossibility-must
needs come from an extrinsic cause. 106
3. The per se necessary being, cause of others, is subsistent being.
For that which is not per se, is not its own esse, by the same token
is not per se necessary, but rather if it is necessary at all, has
another as the cause of its necessity .107
4. The maximum being is subsistent esse, for as the cause it is
the explanation of those perfections which are limited precisely
because of their potential, receptive subject. The cause, the maximum, is as such subsistent esse, and thus the cause of esse, goodness, etc., in all others. 103
5. The intelligent being, governor, must be subsistent esse. For
as such, as supreme intelligence, it is supreme in actuality. Further,
this governor is not any sort of intelligent, directing cause, but a
cause of whatever seeks to gain an end. Such a cause must be
self-sufficient in perfection, in actuality, in esse, since the things
which act to gain an end, do so because of limitation in their
substantial perfection. The cause directive of all can evidence no
such limitation.

The Second Step:
The second step in the procedure consists in the realization
that subsistent esse is necessarily unique. For the perfection
of esse itself, even from the beginning of the science, is apprehended as perfection, as actuality. The apprehension of subsistent esse as unique is suggested by this argument of St.
Thomas:
Again, absolutely infinite being cannot be twofold, for being that
is absolutely infinite comprises every perfection of being; hence if
infinity were present in two such things, in no respect would they
be found to differ. Now., subsisting being must be infinite, because
it is not terminated in some recipient. Therefore, there cannot be
a subsisting being besides the first. 109
107 Cf. I Cont. Gent., loc. cit.
Cf. ibid.
Cf. Summa Tkool., I, q. 44, a. 1: Si enim aliquid invenitur in aliquo per
participationem, necesse est quod causetur in ipso ab eo cui essentialiter convenit.
100 Impossibile est quod sit duplex esse omninO' infinitum: esse enim quod omnino
108

108

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From these suggested continuations of the process of metaphysics, based upon St. Thomas' procedures in the investigations subsequent to the question of God's existence in theology,
the relevance of the conclusions of the proofs in metaphysics is
apparent. Since the conclusions themselves emerge from a
mode of investigation perfectly in accord with the discovery
and process of metaphysics, they fall properly within the competence of the science. As the investigation continues, it is in
the light of the proper subject's formal aspect, habens esse. In
terms of the fact that the conclusions arrived at are proper
causes of the aspects of limitation discovered, they are recognied as necessarily implying subsistent esse. This is simply an
affirmation of the perfection of such causes, with the denial of
the limitation of a receptive subject. It remains a knowledge
within the proper range of metaphysics. For if the subsistent
esse is discovered to be unique, and to be "positively separated" from matter and potentiality, this recognition is reached
in terms of the investigation of the proper subject of the science.
As the subsistent esse is recognized to be the unique first cause
of being, it is ever considered, not as subject, but as principle
of the subject of the science.
Employed within the context of metaphysics' order of discovery, in its investigation of its proper subject, the quinque
viae in their starting points, in their processes, and in their conclusions are eminently relevant. Through them a subsisting
being is discovered. Since the discovery is the result of the
causal investigation of aspects of limitation, and since the value
or significance of " subsisting being " as so discovered is totally
derived through the proper subject of the science, the proportion of metaphysics to the truth attained is preserved. 110 The
est infinitum omnem perfectionem essendi comprehendit; et sic, si duobus talis
adesset infinitas, non invenitur quo unum ab altero differet. Esse autem subsistens
oportet esse infinitum: quia non terminatur aliquo recipiente. lmpossibile est igitur
esse aliquod esse subsistens praeter primum. II Coot. Gent., c. 52.
110 On the positive and absolute value of the knowledge gained concerning even
positively separated, unlimited being, by reason of the value of the proper subject
of the science. Cf. Part Two, pp. 276-278.

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nature of metaphysics is respected, and the final achievement
of its objective, science concerning its proper subject, is placed
within its grasp.
From the knowledge of subsisting being derived through the
quinque viae, the necessary dependence of all being upon the
first cause can be attained a priori. Thus the intrinsic, structural composition of all being in terms of essence and esse really
distinct can be demonstrated. 111 The actual dependence of all
being in its production, conservation, and perfective development in the dynamic order, will also be discovered. The completion of such an investigation is the work of the whole of
natural theology. It is simply the development of the implications of the propter quid of being as it is dependent upon the
first cause, with all the necessary " properties " to be attributed
to it in terms of such dependence. To such a knowledge of
being the quinque viae open the way. Employed in terms of
their relevance to metaphysics, they will lead it along a line
of consideration that keeps being as the subject, that considers
subsistent being, God, exclusively as principle of this subject.
B. Judgment of the Interpretations of
Certain Contemporary Thomists
The evaluation of the development of the actual question of
God's existence as presented by the Thomistic authors considered consists in pointing out the influence of their precon111 Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 44, a. 1. The fundamental element in metaphysics
actual apprehension of the dependence of its subject upon the first cause is expressed
in this article of St. Thomas: In te1·ms such as those he employs, metaphysics' will
perfect its actual knowledge of the propter quid of its subject as limited and
dependent.
. . . Si enim aliquid invenitur in aliquo per participationem, necesse est quod
causetur in ipso ab eo cui essentialiter convenit. . . .
. . . Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens ....
. . . esse subsistens non potest esse nisi unum.
Relinquitur ergo quod omnia alia a Deo non sint suum esse, sed participant
esse.
Necesse est igitur omnia quae diversificantur secundum diversam participationem
essendi ut sint perfectius vel minus perfecte, causari ab uno primo ente quod
perfectissime est.

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ceptions concerning the nature of this question in metaphysics
upon their interpretations of the quinque viae. Such interpretations are profoundly determined by the various ways in which
the question: does God exist? is formally proposed as a scientific
question to be solved by metaphysics.
1. The manualists
In keeping with his conception of the place of God in metaphysics, Father Gredt proposes the formal question an sit Deus.
In connection with the nominal definition of God, necessary in
this procedure, there arises from the use of the quinque viae an
awkward point. Judging the ways to be formally distinct, he
equates the cause discovered in each with " being a se," the
nominal definition of God, and thus establishes the thesis:
God exists. But immediately he asserts that this does not mean
that the one God exists; the unicity of God is a subsequent
question. 112 In this qualification, the influence of Cajetan's
commentary is obvious. Yet the body of doctrine thereafter is
concerned with God as with one subject, following the order
of the Summa Theologiae, until the unicity of God, last among
the entitative attributes, is considered. 113 In such a process,
either the unicity is really presupposed before it is established,
which is bad philosophy, or a plurality of subjects is considered under one name "God," which is confusing.
Certainly neither Cajetan nor St. Thomas intended that a
similar state of suspension was involved from questions two up
to eleven in the Summa. The one God, subject of the science,
is the subject both of the question concerned with demonstrating His existence and of those concerned with demonstrating that certain attributes, among them unicity, belong to Him.
Precisely because God is the given subject of theology, there
is no possibility of imagining that, until the unicity of God is
demonstrated, there might perhaps be a plurality of " Gods "
involved. 114 What Cajetan excludes is the presumption that
llB

111

Cf. Gredt, op. cit., n, n. 789, 194.
Cf. ibid., n. 81!!,

tu Cf. Sumtma Theol., I, q. 8, prol.

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the philosophic content of the quinque viae as such establishes
the attribute of unicity. In seeking to utilize a remark which
does guarantee the formal procedure involved in each of the
ways, Father Gredt is led into a philosophically ambiguous position, because he has sought to deal formally with God as
scientific subject, and with the scientific question: an sit Deus.
The privileged place of theology is not given to metaphysics, to
warrant a presumption that God is involved in all questions
prior to that of the unicity; fidelity to the evidence and
premisses of the quinque viae precludes an assumption of the
unicity as immediately established by their conclusions.
In keeping with his position of the question of God in metaphysics, Father Maquart points out, after the development of
the quinque viae, how, in a kind of de facto manner, the question of God's existence is solved. The causes discovered univocally merit the name God; but the unicity of God is not
established. But like Father Gredt, he holds that the one God
is the subject of the questions prior to that of the unicity.
Both authors in their restrictions concerning the question of
the unicity of God are protecting themselves from the charge
that more is advanced in the conclusions of the quinquae viae
than their processes, when followed strictly, justify. Actually it
is a preconception that the question an sit Deus is formally involved in metaphysics, and the anticipation of knowledge concerning God's nature that both necessitate the restrictions and
lead to the difficulty pointed out. If the quinque viae are used
with fidelity to their process, they cannot but lead to such
difficulties whenever the preconceptions indicated are also operative. The function of the quinque viae suggested by the
positive judgment given above avoids any problem about God's
unicity. Such a process allows metaphysics to take its natural
course by keeping the proper subject of the science as its focal
point. Eventually it does reach, in such terms, the unique subsistent esse. There is no problem with the five formally distinct
ways, since there is no presumption of an obligation to establish the oneness of God. Rather, in terms of metaphysics' own

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competence and point of view, aspects of limitation are
properly resolved. The connatural protraction of this process
itself leads to the subsisting being who is as such unique. Into
such a process there is no need to introduce a difficulty which
is extraneous to it, nor a solution which is as unsatisfactory as
that of the authors indicated.
fl. Authors of special studies

The preconceptions governing the interpretations of the
quinque viae in the works of Canon Van Steenberghen and of
Gilsonian authors amount to presenting formally to metaphysics the question: an sit Deus. The resultant interpretations
of the quinque viae manifest details which need to be recognized.
a. Canon Van Steenberghen
The formulation of the nominal definition " provident creator
of the universe " as the key to the scientific question of God's
existence, the solution of the human and religious problem of
God, indicates the preconception of this author. It is this which
regulates his development of the question of God's existence
and his dismissal of the quinqu-e viae. The present rejection of
this author's position is based upon the principles regulative
of metaphysics' attainment of this truth. What has been
indicated concerning metaphysics' development of this question
is founded upon the unchanging and unchangeable terms in
which, as a human science, perfective of a human intelle<'t,
metaphysics can and should reach its objective. St. Thomas'
teaching and its ramifications guarantee a metaphysical approach to the problem of God; one that is genuine, true
to itself. Thus can it best serve any further apologetic ends
of the philosopher.
The rejection of the quinque viae by the Canon is totally
reducible to this: they do not prove the provident creator of
the universe; therefore they are not genuine metaphysical
proofs. With the antecedent, agreement is emphatic. Not even
the quarta via, for which the author ha8 some kind words,

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reaches what he demands. But his attempt to establish the
consequent, the rejection based upon his own questionable
preconception, is dubious. The only effective reason for this
rejection is the preconception itself; his actual criticisms of the
quinque viae are strained and flimsy.
The classification of the ways, saving the fourth, as "cosmological," signifiying their lack of the metaphysical import
claimed for his own genuineJ metaphysical proof, is quite
arbitrary. They can be called" cosmological" in the sense once
employed by many authors to distinguish them from any
argument based upon the universal consent of men, and indicating their basis m the things of the world. But that they
are authentically metaphysical in their philosophical content,
process, and also in their function in metaphysics has already
been sufficiently indicated. That they cannot be prolonged to
discover the formalities involved in the Canon's own "provident creator of the universe " is an arbitrary reason for dismissal, refuted by what St. Thomas has already done in the
Summa.
What the author has actually done has been to read into
the Summa his own conception of the philosophical problem of
God, and to interpret the procedure of St. Thomas accordingly.
He alleges that to reach God, i. e., the provident creator of the
universe, involves the whole process of questions three to eleven,
and that even then an addition would be required, a deduction
that all finite beings are changeable and that the infinite,
unique being is unchangeable, first mover. This is an evident
distortion of the formal point of view and content of these
questions. Theology does not have to wait until question eleven
to be aware that it is concerned with the one God. The
objective of these questions is theological, the manifestation of
how what is said of God is true. As St. Thomas indicates in
the prologue of question three, it is properly a matter of quomodo non sit Deus. Theology proposes questions concerning
God which arise either from revelation itself, or from purely
human sources, whether these be a logical dialectic, common
opinion, theological traditions, errors, attacks upon the truth.

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It resolves such questions in terms of their proper mode of
knowability. Thus in dealing with the entitative attributes of
God, subject of the science, St. Thomas proposes certain conditions of finite being, which have been attributed to God by
one source or other, and with the predicates discovered through
the quinque viae as media, demonstrates the truth concerning
its reference of these conditions to God. This is, in particular,
what is involved in the matter of God's unicity. Whatever be
said for or against the Canon's own conception of the philosophical problem of God, to make it the norm for evaluating
the Summa Theologiae, is a mistaken projection which presumes that this problem is involved in the Summa. The
criticisms based on this projection, ignore the very words of
the Summa and its theological character.
As for the particulars of his rejection of the philosophic
validity of the quinque viae, it must be said, first, that his
charges are not justified. He says, for example, that the first
two of the ways not only do not reach the provident creator of
the universe, but that they do not even validly establish their
own conclusions. An analysis of finite being as such would
be necessary to reach the unmoved mover, or the first cause.
In the light of the metaphysical significance of the formalities
involved and of the character of the process of resolution in
terms of proper causality, however, any movement as such, any
hierarchy of subordinated causes as ·such, is sufficient to warrant the absolute character of the conclusions reached. Movement as such demands an absolutely unmoved mover, whether
or not there be a multitude of moved movers; subordinated
agents as such demand a first, an uncaused cause, whether or
not the subordinated causes be few or many. It is the cause
of the form as such of the effect that demands explanation, and
an explanation that is satisfactory to metaphysics' absolute
point of view.
The quinque viae in their function in metaphysics, and interpreted according to this function, permit the science to ascend
to its objective. An extensive study of the finite is not particularly urgent; rather the intensive and absolute view of reality

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as permitted by the proper subject of the science and its realizations in given experience, leads to the resolution of all reality
into a simple truth through which many things are known in
terms of the ultimate cause. 115 The quinque viae institute this
resolution by setting out the aspects of limitation discovered
in immediate experience. They respect the gradually perfectible
character of the human intellect in its process of discovery.
The Canon's own proof is nothing but a generalized formula,
which expresses the necessary investigation of the same ground,
static and dynamic, from which the quinque viae more concretely set out.
Further, the author's criticisms are rather flimsy. In connection with the fourth and fifth of the ways, he simply quibbles
about the examples employed. Obviously neither derives its
validity from the examples.
More serious is his charge against the quarta via. He claims
that it is a " metaphysical proof " because ostensibly it reaches
the provident creator of the universe. But its procedure is questionable because of the principles of causality employed. Yet
his own attack upon this principle does not even repeat the
principle as St. Thomas phrased it. The formulation of the
principle, nevertheless, is of some importance, especially in the
light of what the Canon himself concedes, that it is valid only
concerning absolutely simple perfections. For this is exactly
the point involved in the proof, as is clear from the very letter
of its content. Admittedly it is a difficult proof, because such
perfections can be fully appreciated only by metaphysics. The
principle of causality may not be immediately evident to the
man on the street, in the sense that it would be immediately
grasped. But it is evident once its terms are plumbed, which
of course is a metaphysical task, and one that demands respect
for the careful " propriety of words " typical of St. Thomas.
Its evidence does not, as is charged, depend upon the presupposition of the existence of what is to be proved. Rather it
depends upon an understanding of the metaphysical implications of diverse subjects diversely sharing some perfection. The
115

Cf. In De Trin., q. 5, a. 4; q. 6, a. 1, ad teTtiam quaut.

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text cited by the author himself 116 shows St. Thomas' understanding of the proof, and indicates that the formulation of this
principle is not haphazard. Of the other principle in the process,
(Quod autem dwitur maxime tale in aliquo genere est causa
omnium quae sunt illius generis), the Canon says that it is to
be understood only in. certain conditions. But why deny that
St. Thomas used such a principle because in fact such conditions were the point at issue?
Again, such a denial is based upon the author's preconception. By it he is almost forced to reject the quinque viae, and
then to find bases for this rejection. In spite of this rejection,
the quinque viae rightly understood and rightly employed serve
well in metaphysics' development. What is of value in his
criticisms is that his own dissatisfaction with them for his own
purposes suggests that in no condition should they be transferred bodily from their theological setting into philosophy.
Rather they are to be employed with due regard to the nature,
process and objective of metaphysics. So employed they are
pertinent and appropriate to the science: to the order of discovery, to the task of suggesting and of resolving the causal
explanation of the proper subject, as they lead to the discovery
of the principle of that subject, ipsum esse subsistens, which
is of course God.
b. The Gilsonian School *
Although each of them affirms the integration of natural
theology with the one science of metaphysics, M. Gilson, Fathers
Owens and Smith nevertheless set out formally to establish the
existence of God, and indeed, of the Christian God, subsistent
being, and Creator, as the immediate conclusion of the quinque
viae. Gilson does so, it may be said, on principle; the others,
obviously sharing in his preconception, do so in fact. Gilson
and Father Owens simply affirm that the conclusion reached by
the quinque viae is the ipsum esse subsistens; Father Smith, in
11

° Cf. De Pot., q. 8, a. 5.

* (Editor's

Note) The review article by Germain G. Grisez offers an expanded
criticism of Gilson's Elements of Christian Philosophy (p. 448).

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THOMAS C. o'BRIEN

keeping with the systematic nature of his work, employs the
apparatus of the nominal definition of God, " cause of the
existence of things " to show this.
The first thing to point out here is their preconception, since
it is essential to the evaluation of the interpretations, varying
only verbally, given by them to the quinque viae. It is a preconception expressed by Gilson's statement that in Christian
philosophy anyone who sets out to prove God's existence thereby undertakes the task of proving the Creator's existence; that
every proof necessarily includes creation. This is in fact the
presumption of all three authors. As part of the general historical and doctrinal thesis of Gilson, this position has already
been discussed.
Before descending to the details of the interpretation of the
proofs drawn from this presupposition, merely a brief remark
about the preconception itself is needed. The principles governing metaphysics' consideration of God would seem to demand
a process of discovery which precludes this position, and to
indicate as the objective of metaphysics a scientific question
dealing formally, not with God, but with its proper subject.
Undoubtedly, the process utilizing the quinque viae will finally
reach the ipsum esse subsistens as the first cause of all being;
just as surely, the assistance of revelation plays an important
part in channelling the interests of metaphysics. But the process itself must remain faithful to its own point of view and
its own competence. If this is done, the quinque viae can serve
well in the order of discovery, and can be followed according
to their own intrinsic character i.e., as processes from the dis:covered aspects of limitation to the explanation through the
proper causes which are demanded. Under the Gilsonian presupposition, however, this is not possible.
To descend to the particulars in the interpretation of the
quinque viae resulting from the indicated presupposition is to
examine the use of the thought of St. Thomas and even to
dispute over texts. Such an effort is not futile, however, since
a startling influence of the preconception upon the use

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of the ways clearly emerges. It serves to emphasize the importance of respecting metaphysics' proper proportion to the
consideration of the question of God's existence.
An ambiguous position is immediately seen in M. Gilson's
discussion of the ways. He does interpret them as distinct, insisting upon the proper causality involved; yet he seeks to
establish simultaneously that their immediate conclusion is the
" I am Whq am " of Exodus. To do so he advances several
texts of-St. Thomas, already cited, in support. 117 By such texts,
the author seeks to show that in the first two ways the production of esse as such is involved, and that therefore the conclusion is to esse subsistens as the proper cause of esse.
But it is apparent from the .texts that the full import of
God's causality of esse as such is not involved at all. The chapter of the Contra Gentes cited simply seeks to establish in a
general manner that God is a principle of the being of things.
He is an efficient cause; but any efficient cause brings its effects
into being; therefore so does God. He is first mover of the
heavens; they are involved in the production of things into
being; therefore so is God. St. Thomas gradually deduces the
truth of God's proper causality of being as such according to
the process of the human mind, until in chapter fifteen this
proper causality is formally established. Subsequently, in chapter sixteen, he show that God is properly the Creator. M. Gilson
remarks that to be the cause of the effects of the motion of the
heavens, is to be the cause of the existence of that motion, may
be quite true; but it is not the meaning of the text he cites in
support of his own attempt to make the prima via serve his
purpose.
The author relies heavily upon the fact that St. Thomas uses
the conclusions of the quinque viae, the first and second especially, in order to prove creation. From this one is to draw the
inference that creation is therefore to be understood as involved
in the ways leading to such conclusions. The use by St. Thomas
117 Cf. Part One, p. 76, n. 808. The texts of II Cont. Gent., c. 6 should be compared with those of II Cont. Gent., cc. 15, 16.

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is unquestionable; the inference is another matter. The very
fact that St. Thomas uses the conclusions as middle terms to
demonstrate that God is the cause of all being and that He
is the creator, indicates that these further truths are not the
immediate and proper conclusions of the quinque viae. Further
truths concerning God and His causality are virtually contained
in the conclusions of the ways, but not actually so. While in
God there is supreme simplicity of perfection, one does not
presuppose such truths nor indeed ignore the sole evidence, the
exigencies of effects, in interpreting and developing the ways.
The familiar meaning of the virtual minor distinction among
the divine attributes and aspects of divine causality, is that
each of them bespeaks an objective formality to the human
mind. By the same token, one truth discovered concerning
God serves St. Thomas as a true middle term in the demonstration of other truths. The procedure of M. Gilson would seem to
cut across all such distinctions and to remove the demonstrative
value of the texts he employs.
The author also uses the terms creation and creator in a way
foreign to St. Thomas' own usage, saying, for example, that
God is the cause of movement as the creator of movement.
Movement, first of all, is not properly created, since it is not
capable of existing in itself, but concreated. 118 Creation, in
addition, is always described by St. Thomas as the mode of
of things from nothingness, and it refers properly
to the first production of things by God.119 The activity of
God is regard to secondary causality or any act of already
existing things is called by St. Thomas motio or mutatio. 120
While this may seem to be just a matter of" splitting texts,"
it is in fact an indication of the author's preconception leading
him to take liberties with the thought of St. Thomas in order
to seek support. M. Gilson expresses his fundamental point in
118 Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 45, a. 4 : Creari est quoddam fieri. ... Fieri autem
ordinatur ad esse rei. Unde illis proprie cohvenit fieri et creari, quibus convenit
esse. Quod quidem convenit proprie subsistentibus. • ..
ue Cf. ibid., also a. 1; a. 2, ad 1.
11 ° Cf. ibid., q. lOS, a. 4.

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his citation from the Compendium Theologiae, chapter 68.121
Dealing with God's proper causality, this teaching of St. Thomas
is of paramount importance. But to use it as the basis for
presenting what St. Thomas intends in the process of the
qwinque viae is inadmissible. There can be no doubt that
ontologically the proper causality of God, the truth that His
proper effect is esse, is the reason for the universality of His
causality, and for the dependence of all other efficient causality
upon His. There can be no doubt that the reasons for the
diverse aspects of limitation and dependence utilized by the
quinque viae arise because everything receives esse, the actuality of all acts, and is thus permeated with ontological composition, with limitation and dependence entitatively and operatively. Finally there can be no doubt that the diverse aspects
of divine causality are not to be considered as so diversified on
the part of God Himself, whose operation is identical with
His utterly simple being. The proper effect, esse, is attained by
Him not as though it were something added as a final finishing
touch to the work of other causes. Rather in producing esse,
God is" mover";" agent";" cause of the necessity of others";
first intelligence, directing things to their ends."
All these are truths; but they are truths that can be discovered by metaphysics only on its own grounds. At the point
121 Cf. Compemdium Theologiae, c. 68:
. . . Primus autem effectus Dei in rebus
est ipsum esse, quod omnes alii efl'ectus praesupponunt, et supra quod fundantur.
Necesse est autem omne quod aliquo modo est a Deo esse. In omnibus autem
ordinatis hoc communiter inventur, quod id quod est primum et perfectissimum in
aliquo ordine, est causa eorum quae sunt post in ordine illo; . . . Ostensum est
autem supra quod Deus est primum et perfectissimum ens: unde oportet quod sit
causa essendi omnibus quae esse habent.
Adhuc. Omne quod habet aliquid per participationem reducitur in id quod
habet illud per essentiam, sicut in principium et causam .... Ostensum est autem
supra, quod Deus est ipsum suum esse; unde esse ei convenit per suam essentiam;
omnibus autem aliis convenit per participationem: non enim alicuius alterius
essentia est suum esse, quia esse absolutum et per se subsistens non potest esse
nisi unum .... Igitur oportet Deum esse causam existendi omnibus quae sunt.
Thus both these proofs proceed from reason prior ontologically, namely, about
God as most perfect, subsistent being. Such truths have first, however, to be
discovered.

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of its use of the quinque viae, metaphysics is restricted to the
evidence of limitation and thus of dependence which it has
discovered. Its resolution of such effects is governed solely by
the form of the effect itself, through which it must develop its
knowledge of what sort of cause explains such an effect. At
the termination of the ways, the metaphysician has an explanation of the effects through their proper causes, the causes
secundum esse, as this signifies the cause of the form as such
of the effect. Certainly the metaphysician is led further; he
does reach the unique subsistent being whose proper effect is
esse, because the quinque viae set him upon the ontological
lines which lead there. But he cannot anticipate the significance
subsistens in developing the quinque viae. Nor
of ipsum esse
\
does St. Thomas do so even in their theological context. The
metaphysician who follows the quinque viae according to their
properly metaphysical function and content, will eventually
and properly return along the same route, now considered from
the point of view of knowledge discovered concerning the first
cause, the subsistent being, who is God.
The agreement of Fathers Owens and Smith with the preconception of Gilson is accompanied by a similar share of its
influence upon their interpretations of the quinque viae. In
order to reach the subsistent esse, cause of the existence of
things, the one conclusion of all the ways, the proofs themselves
must revolve about esse as the effect to be explained. , Thus
both authors in fact remove the formal distinction among the
ways, and among their conclusions. While St. Thomas states
that the ways proceed ex parte motus; ex ratione causae efficientis, etc., Father Owens sees the first way as dealing with the
"existential act of sensible motion"; the second with substantial change as the production of esse. Father Smith discovers the more profound problem of the ways to be the
"subject-existing-as-moving,"
"the subject-existing-as-causing," etc. In both authors, then, the formal point of view of
each of the proofs is bypassed and the act of existence is brought
to the fore.

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The search for support for this interpretation leads also to
misappropriation of the words and teaching of St. Thomas.
Father Owens thus cites a text from the Commentary on the
111etaphysics which is simply irrelevant to his own position. 122
In his use of St. Thomas' distinction between the causa
secundum fieri and the causa non solum fiendi sed etiam essendi,
Father Smith ignores St. Thomas' own explanation of the distinction in terms of the form of the effect, as the key to the
discove:ry of its cause and the degree of its dependence. Father
Smith's interpretation is rather guided by the "form of the
cause," God as esse subsistens, the desired conclusion, in view
of which the effects involved in the ways are to be reappraised
in terms of esse. Even in the theological context in which he
explains this distinction, however, St. Thomas allows the form
of the effect to be the key to the discovery of its cause and the
degree of dependence upon this cause. In the order of discovery
the effect alone is available to metaphysics. Because metaphysics discovers that the form as such of the effects involved
in the quinque viae demands a cause, in terms of that form the
quest for the cause is imposed and guided. Ultimately that
quest must transcend the form of the effect, since it is that very
form which evinces dependence and the need for a cause. Thus
beyond any univocal cause, there must be an equivocal cause,
which as such is the cause secundum esse of the effect, insofar as
it is the cause of the form as such wherever it is found, whether
in the original effect or in any univocal cause. 123 The employment of this distinction of St. Thomas in the order of discovery
alone, would have obviated the specious problem of "extricating God from the categories"; it would have preserved St.
Thomas' sense of the distinction as well as the formal, metaphysical resolution proper to each of the ways.
The claim by both authors of support for their interpretation
of the ways in subsequent use of the conclusions by St. Thomas
is similarly unconvincing. Thus in the text from the De Po12 " Cf. above note 69, from IX Met., lect. 8, nn. 1805-1806; also III Cont. Gent.,
c. 66.
108 Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 104, a. 1; q. 18, a. 5, ad 1.

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tentia cited by Father Owens, St. Thomas himself states that
that God is subsistent esse is proved (probatur) by reason of
His being the unmoved mover; the same thing is said in the
text cited from the Compendium Theologiae.124 In simple rules
of logic, the formalities involved must be distinct in order that
there be a proof with sufficient terms. Again, the real identity
of all perfections in God cannot be read into a causal investigation which is totally dependent upon the formality of the
effect involved. Father Smith relies upon the text of the
quinque viae in the Summa, seeing St. Thomas' statement " this
all understand to be God," to be indicative both of the necessity
and the justification of the " existential " interpretation. The
theological context of the question of God's existence is itself
the reason for such a step by St. Thomas, and vindicates the
identification. But metaphysics ought not to be formally concerned with proving God's existence as such. Nor is it within
the competence of the science to use knowledge about God's
own being and causality as the index for interpreting both the
conclusion and, retroactively, the processes of the quinque viae.
A more basic issue, however, resultant from the preconception
of these authors, must be faced. The key to their interpretations is the emphasis upon the " existential act " as the real
focal point of the ways. This common emphasis can be seen
in connection with the first of the ways, as Father Owens speaks
of the " existential act of sensible motion " and Father Smith
extricates God from the categories as the cause of the" subjectexisting-as-moving."
There is need, first of all, to point out the distinction often
and explicitly made by St. Thomas between motus and esse.
Thus, for example, he says: " ... though motion may occur for
any existing thing, motion is apart from the being (esse) of the
thing." 125
Cf. De Pot., q. 8, a. 5, tertia ratio; Compendium Theologiae, cc. 8; 6; 11.
Licet alicui existenti accidit motns, tamen motus est praeter esse rei. III Cont.
Gent., c. 65. This text itself shows St. Thomas using the precise sense of God's
proper causality of esse from the point of view of what God is in Himself. Cf. also
IX Met., loc. cit.; Q. D. de Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. 11, on the distinction between
esse and operari.
12 '

125

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In speaking of causality, St. Thomas similarly distinguishes
the cause of motus from the cause of esse. "The movable does
not owe its being to its mover, but only its movement. . ..
" ... the movable does not depend on the mover for its being,
but only for its being moved." 126
With regard to the divine causality, in itself utterly simple,
St. Thomas preserves the formalities of its diverse effects.127
In an indication, of diverse aspects of dependence upon divine
causality from the ontologically prior point of view, he shows
that every secpndary agent depends upon God, on the part of
its operative form which He gives and conserves; on the part
of its end, as He is the source of all goodness; on the part of
the actual efficiency, as He is the first mover applying the agent
to act, and the proper cause of esse, bestowing the ultimate
complement to all other efficiency as it attains esse.128
When such formalities are eliminated, confusion is inevitable;
this is the case when the prima via is viewed as dealing with
esse to establish the subsistent esse as its cause. This is the
apparent intent of both Father Owens and Father Smith, resulting from their preconception. In the prosecution of their analysis, certain fundamentals, indicated in the following statement
of St. Thomas, have been obliterated:
In another way, esse bespeaks the act, of a being insofar as it is a
being, that is, that by which something is denominated an actual
being in reality. And in this sense, esse is attributed solely to those
things which are contained in the ten genera; . . .
128 Mobile non habet esse per suum motorem sed solummodo motum. . . . non
dependet mobile a motore secundum esse, sed secundum moveri tantum. II Cont.
Gent., c. 57.
127 Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 14, a. 6: ... quidquid perfectionis est in quacumque
creatura, totum praeexistit et continetur in Deo secundum modum excellentem.
Non autem solum id in quo creaturae communicant, scilicet ipsum esse, ad perfectionem pertinet sed etiam ea per quae creaturae ad invicem distinguuntur, sicut
vivere et intelligere, et huiusmodi, quibus viventia a non viventibus et intelligentia
a non intelligentibus distinguuntur. Et omnis forma per quam quaelibet res in
propria specie constituitur perfectio quaedam est. Et sic omnia in Deo praeexistunt,
non solum quantum ad id quod commune est omnibus, sed etiam quantum ad ea
secundum quae res distinguuntur.
128 Cf. ibid., q. 105, a. 4; De Pot., q. 8, a. 7; II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4.

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But this esse is attributed to something in two ways: In one
way as to that which truly and properly has esse, or is. And in this
sense it is attributed solely to substance as per se subsisting:
whence that which truly is, is said to be a substance. . . . But
all things which do not subsist per se but in another and with
another, whether they be accidents or substantial forms or any sort
of parts, do not have esse in the sense that they truly exist, but esse
is attributed to them in another way that is as to that by which
(quo) something exists; as whiteness is said to be not because it
subsists in itself, but because by reason of it something has existence as white (habet esse album) .
Esse therefore is attributed truly and properly solely to a thing
per se subsisting. But to such a thing, a twofold esse is attributed:
There is one esse which results from those things from which its
unity is integrated, and which properly is the substantial esse of
the supposit. Another esse is attributed to the supposit besides
those things which integrate it; this is an esse which is superadded,
namely accidental esse, as to be white (esse album) is attributed
to Socrates when one says " Socrates is white." 129

With regard to the implications of this statement as applicable to the interpretation of the quinque viae, it is clear that
their five starting points involve a certain ontological integration of actuality with subject. The third and fourth are con••• Alio modo, fl8se dicitur actus entis in quantum est ens, idest quo denominatur
aliquid ens actu in rerum natura. Et sic fl8Se non attribuitur nisi rebus quae in
decem generibus continentur; unde ens a tali esse dictum per decem genera dividitur.
Sed hoc esse attribuitur alicui dupliciter.
Uno modo (ut) sicut ei quod proprie et vere habet esse vel est. Et sic attribuitur
soli substantiae per se subsistenti: unde quod vere est dicitur substantia .... Omnia
vero quae non per se subsistunt, sed in alio et cum alio, sive sint accidentia, sive
formae substantiales aut quaelibet partes, non habent esse ita ut ipsa vere sint, sed
attribtiitur eis esse cdw modo, idest ut quo aliquid est; sicut albedo dicitur esse,
non quia ipsa in se subsistat, sed quia ea aliquid habet esse album.
Esse ergo proprie et vere non attribuitur nisi rei per se subsistenti. Huic autem
attribuitur esse duplex: Unum scilicet esse resultans ex his ex quibus eius unitas
integratur, quod proprium est esse suppositi substantiale. Aliud esse est supposito
attributum praeter ea quae integrant ipsum. Quod est esse superadditum, scilicet
accidentale; ut esse album attribuitur Socrati, cum dicitur: Sacrates est albus.
Quodl., IX, q. 2, a.
ed. Marietti, 180; cf. Summa Theol., q. 45, a. 4; q. 90, a.
III, q. 17, a. ft; II Cont. Gent., c. 28; In Met. IV, lect. 1, nn. 589-548; VII, lect. 1,
n. 1259; XII, lect. 1, nn.
De Ente et Essentia, c. 7; ill Sent., d. 6, q. 2,
a. 2; Q.D. de Unione Verbi lncarnati, a. 4.

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cemed directly with the esse as the substantial actuality of the
subject. The first, and the second and fifth ways are concerned
with actualities other than this esse. It is important to set
these starting points against the background of St. Thomas'
teaching concerning the ontological integration verified in the
beings of experience.
That which is, to which substantial, existential act belongs,
by which it is exercised as simply and primarily a being, is the
subsistent subject. Whatever pertains to the essential constitution of that subject also actually is by reason of this substantial esse.130 Whenever this esse is really distinct from the
subject, it is the ultimate actuality in the substantial order by
which the subject is, simply speaking. Being in which this real
distinction is verified evidences, then, a real integration and
composition in the order of substantial actuality; the essence
is as potency to its existential act, esse. Obviously in the beings
of experience this composition is always verified, since, as metaphysics eventually discovers, there is but one subsistent esse.
Thus a being simply, ens simpliciter, indicates a subject actual
by reason of its existential act.
Such existential act is neither the starting point nor the
formality involved in the first way (nor in the second or fifth).
Rather the subject is clearly given as an existent subject, since
moveri non attribuitur nisi existentibus (similarly unumquodque agit secundum quod est ens actu) .181 What the starting
point of the first of the ways involves as its problem is another
"actuality" verified of existent subjects, the actuality of movement. Like other actualities, movement is to be viewed as a
certain esse accidentale exercised by and integrated with the
subject. The ultimate significance of such an integration lies
in this, that simply in virtue of its existential act as really distinct, the subject does not exercise the total actuality either
belonging to it properly by reason of its nature or adventitiously
accruing to it. This, of course, is the basis for the truth involved in the aphoristic ens simpliciter est bonum secundum
18

°Cf. De Unione Verbi lncamati, loc. cit.

131

Cf. Summa Theol., lll, q. 8, a. 5.

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quid; ens secundum quid est bonum simpliciter. 132 Thus, generally, with regard to the nine predicamental accidents, by reason
of which substance "is in a certain way," 133 there is involved
the composition between the subject and an accidental form
by reason of which the subject exercises an accidental esse,
that is, an actuality by which it is in a certain way. 184
Within the ontological integration of an existent subject, then,
these elements are really distinct from each other: the subsistent
thing and its existential act, its substantial esse; the subsistent
thing and its accidents; the subsistent thing and the accidental
esse, the actuality exercised by reason of such accidents; the
accidents themselves as forms and the accidental esse exercised
accordingly by their subject.
Clearly the prima via is not concerned with the existential
act by which the subject is, simply speaking. Yet Father Owens
seems at times to be speaking of this; Father Smith seems ultimately to make the transition from "subject-existing-as-moving" to simply "subject existing: cause of existence." It is
hazardous to seek to isolate esse and to ignore the fundamental
distinctions necessary for intelligibility. 135 Against the background indicated, the motus which is the issue in the prima via
can be
viewed: by reason of it, the existent subject is
exercising a certain esse accidentale, it is in a certain way. The
explanation of such an actuality proceeds according to the
"definition" of motus, in the sense that only through the formality of motus is this actuality belonging to the subject either
distinct from others, or even an indication of the very problem
involved in the proof.
Of any actuality exercised by the subject, this much is true:
Cf. ibid., I, q. 5, a. 1, ad I.
Cf. De V er., q. 27, a. 1, ad 8.
••• Cf. I Cont. Gent., c. 2S: Omne subiectum accidentis comparatur ad illud sicut
potentia ad actum, eo quod accidens quaedam forma est, faciens esse actu secundum
esse accidentale .... Also In XII Met., loc. cit.
••• Cf. Cajetan, Co1TI!m. in I, q. 7, a. 1, n. 10:
Esse secundum se perfectionem quamdam dicit: sed non potest imaginari
quantam perfectionem dicat nisi alicui naturae intelligatur applicatum, puta
sapientiae aut Gabrielis. . . .
182

188

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it must be understood in terms of the form or formal principles
which it actualizes. Thus even with regard to esse as the substantial actuality of its subject, St. Thomas does not hesitate
to say:
For the esse of a thing, although it be diverse from its essence, is
not, however, to be understood as something superadded after the
manner of an accident, but it is, as it were, constituted through
the principles of the essence.136
For the ultimate bearing of the truth that there is a unique
subsistent esse is not only that it is impossible to isolate esse
as a form in thought, but that it is also impossible that esse be
found save as the actuality of a subject literally " defining" it.
Motion is that by which an existent subject is involved in a
certain kind of actuality apart from its esse simpliciter. The
first of the ways is not concerned with the " existential act of
motion " or with the existential act of the subject, either as
possessed or as the term of motion. Because of the real integration of such an actuality with the subject, over and above the
actuality conferred by its substantial esse, it would be much
more accurate to speak in this manner: for the subject to
be existing as moving is for the subject to be as moving,
rather than in the way Father Smith's exposition has reversed
the matter. For motus is a distinctive kind of actuality exercised by the subject: it is the " act of a being in potency insofar
as it is in potency," in the proper sense of this formulation of
what motion is. This is the formality involved in the first of
the ways, which establishes the very question of causality
involved.
The distinctive formality of motus must all the more urgently
be respected in the light of its precise formulation. For it is
an act of a subject which is neither merely potential nor simply
actual, as it is moved. With regard to substantial change, fieri,
136 Esse enim rei quamvis sit aliud ab eius essentia non tamen est intelligendum
quod est aliquid superadditum ad modum accidentis sed quasi constituitur per
principia essentiae. In IV Met., lect. !l, n. 558. Cf. also I Sent., d. 19, q. !l, a. !l,
ad 8: Sicut esse secundum rationem intelligendi consequitur principia ipsius entis
quasi causas.

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motus is the tendency to be simply, the via ad esse simpliciter.
With regard to accidental change, it is the transition to be in a
certain way, the via ad esse aliquale. Matus is not even an
accidental form; it is reducible to the predicament in which its
subject terminates. Thus to speak of the "existential act of
sensible motion " is to speak of the act of an act, when one
should speak of a certain imperfect kind of act pertaining to a
subject. For it is to speak of the existential act of that whose
whole character is to be distinguished against existential act,
either substantial or accidental.
Like all the ways, the first proceeds from that by reason of
which the subject is in act. Like the second and fifth ways,
the first proceeds from a certain actuality apart from the esse
simpliciter of the subject. Uniquely, it proceeds from an actuality by which the subject is involved in an imperfect actuality,
as motion is imperfect act. Because it is this, motus is the act
of the imperfect; it evidences limitation and places the problem
of the prima via. The resolution of the way is conducted along
the lines of what the formality of motus indicates. The wisdom
of recognizing the fundamental role of act-potency as expressive
of the various ontological integrations discovered in metaphysics, becomes apparent in the light of the unhappy results
of interpreting any actuality as "existential act," esse, indiscriminately.
The Gilsonian preconception involved in the interpretation
of the quinque viae is a commitment to establishing directly
subsistent esse as their proper conclusion. The truth of the
matter is that because there is a unique subsistent esse, whose
proper effect is thus esse-a precise point of doctrine not possessed at the outset of the ways-the composition ranges
through the actuality of all other existent realities from which
the quinque viae do proceed. This composition is true of the
esse substantiale by reason of which its subject actually exists;
the third and fourth ways concentrate upon aspects of such
composition. The composition affects other actualities accruing
to existent subjects, by which they are in act in a certain way;
the other ways are concerned with aspects of these actualities.

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All the proofs as philosophical processes resolve the formalities
with which they begin into a cause proportioned to the explanation which the formalities as they are found demand. What
demands and justifies a resolution into the absolutely first
cause of each effect involved, is the very character of metaphysics as it evaluates its discoveries in absolute terms of act
and potency. With regard to the first way, this evaluation,
and not any assumed vantage point, warrants the realization,
signified by the very term itself, that the first unmoved mover
is not a mover like any other mover. So much is warranted
and demanded by the resolution of the effect involved. What
the formality may be in itself by which the cause is constituted
such a cause is another question, one not immediately involved
in, or solved by, the resolution of the effect itself.
In conclusion, it is not surprising that within the Gilsonian
system there should be an assumption and appropriation of
truths not available to metaphysics at the point of its employment of the quinque viae. Given the Gilsonian concept of St.
Thomas' philosophy, such an assumption is inevitable. But the
misinterpretation, not of subtle nuances, but of the clear letter
of texts; the subversion of the order of discovery; the neutralization of much that is basic in St. Thomas' terminology-these
indicate the questionable consequences both of the total Gilsonian thesis, and of its application in the preconception of
the question of God's existence in metaphysics, with its resultant interpretation of the quinque viae.
GENERAL CoNCLUSION

Almost all of philosophy, St. Thomas has said, is ordered to
the attainment of the knowledge of God in metaphysics, whose
ultimate end such knowledge is. His teaching in the De
Trinitate yields a principle of extension, requiring that metaphysics attain God as its end; a principle of limitation, requiring
that it realize this achievement through the scientific consideration of its proper subject, being, while attaining God solely as
principle of this subject. Such an ordering of metaphysics' procedures, according to its strict scientific character, has not

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THOMAS C. o'BRIEN

always been evident in the works of Thomistic authors. In
fact the very nature of the science has been beset with traits
at variance with St. Thomas' own view of the case. Specifically,
the conditions fostering the wide divergency of views set out
at the beginning of this study, have been seen to spring from
the consideration of God as the scientific subject involved in
metaphysics' inquiry, and the formal position and resolution
of the question an sit Deus.
These conditions have arisen, not from the above-mentioned
principles of St. Thomas, but from points of view originating
in extrinsic sources, historical or personal. Their consequences
are clear in the divergent attempts to resolve the question of
God's existence. The manualists' presentation, seemingly along
strictly philosophical lines, of the quinque viae is fraught with
non-philosophical presuppositions in the formulation of the
nominal definition of God, and ambiguous consequences as to
the sense of the conclusion " God exists." The attempt by
Canon Van Steenberghen to formulate the question " scientifically " through the nominal definition of God leads to an
arbitrary rejection of the quinque viae, and to the substitution
of a formula which can become a proof only by using the very
evidence involved in the quinque viae. The attempt to proceed
" existentially," in the Gilsonian sense, is based upon a doctrinaire transformation of metaphysics into theology, a transformation which is applied by assuming knowledge concerning
God in order to present the dubious interpretations of the
quinque viae as discoveries of His existence.
The consequences of St. Thomas' own statement of metaphysics' proportion to the consideration of God, however, effectively eliminate such baneful implications. Metaphysics can
alone reach God as principle of its proper subject. It must
consequently do so, as any science, through the investigation
of that proper subject, ascending in a ·certain grade and order
to the first cause of all being. Paradoxically, therefore, metaphysics reaches God, not by formally placing the question an
sit Deus; or, consequently, by a careful formulation of the
nominal definition of God. Neither need it seek to guarantee

REFLEXION ON THE QUESTION OF GOD'S EXISTENCE

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its reaching God by determining its own process of discovery
through knowledge gained from non-philosophical sources, however lofty in themselves, which jeopardize that discovery.
Rather metaphysics reaches God by its inquiry concerning its
proper subject. The question connaturally imposed as a result
of this investigation is the question of the propter quid demanded by its subject in so far as it manifests limitation,
epitomized in the points of departure of the quinque viae. In
terms of being and the metaphysical resolution of these aspects
of limitation, the science will connaturally reach its term, esse
subsistens, which is of course God.
In order to accomplish the task of allowing metaphysics to
be true to its own scientific development, to reach its term
connaturally, its proper procedures, the experienced evidence
warranted by the subject of the science, must be respected. Such
a rigorous procedure is laborious; it has not often been executed
by Thomistic authors; it necessitates avoiding certain procedures that have come to be thought of as" traditional." Nor
is this process as attractive as the procedures of theology. But
it is philosophy; its culmination is science, not opinion. Before
the richness of the faith and the theology of the faith, such
science most assuredly offers but a meagre portion concerning
things divine. Yet the metaphysician who is true to his science,
is a wise man in his own order. The Thomistic metaphysician
who follows the process dictated by the principles of St.
Thomas, is a Thomist indeed. Above all the Christian metaphysician who has attained the knowledge of the first cause in
terms of metaphysics' proper ascent to such knowledge, will
then be prepared to become the Christian theologian. He will be
ready to bring to the service of theology a sound metaphysics,
which can thus effectively reach its highest dignity, to reign by
serving that Christian wisdom which is the theology whose
subject is God, because it is a " kind of impression of the divine
science, which is one and simple concerning all things."
Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.
THOMAS

c. O'BRIEN, 0. P.

REVIEW ARTICLE

Elements of Christian Philosophy. By ETIENNE GILSON. New
York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960. Pp. 860. $7.00.

O

NLY forty years ago, some historians doubted whether
any work of philosophic significance had been done
during the middle ages. Only forty years ago, some
Catholic scholars identified scholastic philosophy with the least
common denominator of the positions held by Alexander of
Hales, St. Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas
Aquinas, and Venerable John Duns Scotus; differences among
their positions were considered details, although a line was
drawn to exclude William Ockham from scholasticism. Only
forty years ago, many students of Aquinas could find no important distinction between his philosophy, that of Aristotle, and
that of Aquinas' various commentators. Only forty years ago,
many students were taught a so-called Thomism, the conclusions of which Aquinas might have uttered, but the principles
of which had more in common with the thought of Descartes,
Kant, or Hegel than with that of Aquinas.
·
Gilson appeared; medieval philosophy had found its competent historian and effective champion. Not only those who
studied with him but everyone interested in medieval philosophy learned from him. Not suddenly and not easily but by a
sustained and tremendous effort, Gilson and his students dispelled a darkness that had closed over the middle ages at the
renaissance. Gilson showed that genuine philosophic developments did occur during the middle ages and that modern philosophy could hardly be understood without studying the works
of the great scholastic doctors. Gilson showed that differences
among scholastic doctors were not mere details, that their
differences were at the heart of their philosophies, and that
least-common-denominator scholasticism was an invention of
incompetent historians. Gilson showed that Aquinas' philo448

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sophie thought is a genuine advance upon Aristotle's thought,
not a mere baptism of it, and that the agreement of Aquinas'
commentators with him in respect to conclusions masked their
divergence from him in respect to fundamental principles-the
reasons which are more characteristic of a philosophy than its
conclusions. Gilson showed that the proof of Thomistic theses
by employing principles indifferently-rationalist,
critical, or
idealist-did not represent Thomistic philosophy. In the academic world at large, Gilson established a new requirement for
talking about medieval philosophy and for teaching Thomismthat one should know what he is talking about, not by description but by acquaintance; Gilson set this generation of Thomists to reading Aquinas himself.
Knowing Aquinas and being aware of the requirements for
historical accuracy have not made it easier for us to teach
philosophy. The lazy devices of proof by the simplest principles-even if Cartesian, Kantian, or Hegelian-and refutation
of the most easily refuted adversaries-even if imaginary-no
longer are practiced in good conscience. Waves of textbooks
appear with increasing rapidity in recurring attempts to provide
an adequate means for introducing students to the thought of
Aquinas and for showing its significance without using strawmen for dialectical contrast. These efforts to present a Thomistic system have resulted in constructions showing more or
less philosophic merit and debt to Aquinas. I think we could
agree that most textbooks diverge sharply from Aquinas, that
they are philosophically incompetent, and that they are more
difficult to understand-although easier to image and memorize
-than almost any work of philosophic worth. We might wish
to make a few exceptions to this condemnation of the textbooks,
but we would differ about the exceptions, since they would be
the books from which we happen to have learned what we
individually call " Thomism " or the ones our diverse philosophic views happen to reflect.
Consequently, the announcement that Professor Gilson was
writing a textbook suitable to introduce students to the reading
of the actual texts of Aquinas aroused considerable hope that

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GERMAIN G. GRISEZ

some of the problems of teaching philosophy were about to be
eased. Elements of Christian Philosophy is an unusual textbook and an interesting book in its own right. It is an important book, since it presents in the most synthetic formulation
Gilson has attempted so far his interpretation of Aquinas as a
Christian philosopher and as a philosopher of God as subsistent
being.
In this article I shall describe first the content and order of
Gilson's book. Second, I shall comment on the book as a textbook. Third, I shall offer some comments on Gilson's conception of Christian philosophy.*

*

*

*

In a brief preface, Gilson explains the nature of this book. By
"Christian philosophy," Gilson designates the doctrine of St.
Thomas Aquinas; by " elements," he designates the basic notions
and positions which are not restated in every. question but
which always are required for an understanding of Aquinas'
answers. First and foremost among these philosophic elements,
in which the theologian
according to Gilson, is the specific
uses philosophy. The first of the four parts of the book, therefore, is devoted to this topic: " Revelation and the Christian
Teacher."
In the first chapter," The Teacher of Christian Truth," Gilson describes the context in which Aquinas worked-the rediscovery of Aristotle shortly before, the previous philosophic
eclecticism practiced by Christian theologians, and the personal
dedication of Aquinas to the vocation of student and teacher
of truth about God. According to Gilson's analysis, the relationship of Aquinas to Aristotle is defined by two conditions:
first, that Aristotle's philosophy represented for Aquinas the
best that reason can do without divine revelation; second, that
Aristotle's philosophy nevertheless was not adequate for Aquinas' purposes and needed to be completed by truths Aristotle
did not see, a completion that involved basic and far-reaching
* (Editor's Note) Fr. Thomas C. O'Brien's article concluding in this issue offers
criticisms of some of the chief substantive consequences of Gilson's concept of
Christian Philosophy (p. 431).

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modifications. However, having learned what philosophy is
from Aristotle, Aquinas was forced to reinterpret previous theological work. In that work, Platonism had been a dominant
influence, but the philosophic elements of theology were selected
merely· according to their suitability to faith, not according to
any systematic requirements. Aquinas' entire effort, according
to Gilson, was devoted to the study and teaching of Christian
truth; the pursuit of philosophic speculation was for him a
contemplative approach to God, since he was committed wholly
by his vocation to study subservient to sacred doctrine.
In the second chapter," Sacred Doctrine," Gilson follows the
order of the first question of the Summa theologiae. In his
treatise, however, Gilson does not limit himself to a recapitulation of Aquinas' teaching or to a commentary on it. Gilson
emphasizes the necessity in the actual economy of salvation
that matters which could be known by natural reason should
be revealed. Then Gilson takes the position that natural reason
can never grasp in its full application to the God of the Christian faith even those truths which natural reason can establish
about God. Gilson argues that a Christian must believe in the
existence of the Christian God, although the existence of a
Prime Mover or a Necessary Being can be demonstrated.
Further, Gilson makes much of Aquinas' metaphorical comparison of sacred doctrine to common sense; he argues that sacred
doctrine is at the center of the philosophical disciplines, perceiving their objects, differences, and oppositions, dominating
them and uniting them in its own unity. On this basis, Gilson
delimits the class of the revealable in such a way that it is allembracing; it includes all truths known by natural theology,
physics, biology, and all other sciences. Toward the end of the
chapter, Gilson discusses the various ways in which Aquinas
used reason in his theology. According to Gilson, the way
Aquinas preferred was to improve the doctrines of the philosophers by bringing them as close as possible to the teaching of
true faith; the best contributions by Aquinas to philosophy
originated in his reinterpretation of past philosophies in the
light of revelation. Gilson's conclusion is that the Summa

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GERMAIN G. GRISEZ

theologiae is full of philosophy, although everything in it is
properly theological inasmuch as it is included within the formal
object of theology.
After this treatment of the first element of Christian philosophy," Revelation and the Christian Teacher," Gilson proceeds
in part two to a consideration of God. This part contains
three chapters: chapter three, " The Existence of God "; chapter
four, "Metaphysical Approaches to the Knowledge of God";
chapter five, "The Essence of God." The three chapters of this
part contain about one-third of the entire text of the book;
each of the chapters is divided into several sections.
The third chapter follows the order of the second question of
the Summa theologiae, with the addition of interpretative comment. In describing Aquinas' doctrine on the point that the
existence of God is not self-evident, Gilson tells us that Aquinas
was not so much interested in particular philosophical doctrines
as in pure philosophical positions. Gilson also insists that the
actual existence of any object can be experienced or deduced
from another actually given existence; he assumes that this
position is the only alternative to saying that actual existence
can be inferred from a definition. In describing Aquinas' doctrine on the point that the existence of God is demonstrable,
Gilson resumes the later statements from the previous point; he
interprets a posteriori demonstration as an argument proceeding from existence given in experience. However, Gilson insists
that the demonstrations of the proposition that God exists
require a previously-determined notion of the meaning of the
name " God," since this meaning must function as a middle in
the proof; moreover, Gilson holds that this notion must be
gained from previous knowledge about God. Consequently,
demonstrations of the ,proposition that God exists are merely
technical formulations of a knowledge already possessed. Again,
Gilson returns to his thesis that the existence of the Christian
God is indemonstrable. He argues that those who do not know
of it must believe it in any case; moreover, if the existence of
the Christian God were demonstrable, the philosophizing theo-

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logian would be decreasing his certitude by demonstrating it,
since the certitude of faith is greater than that of reason.
In describing Aquinas' doctrine of the five ways, Gilson considers a passage in Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei
which clearly is not a proof for the existence of God and compares it with the passage in chapter four of the De ente et
essentia which looks very much like a proof of that proposition.
Gilson says that critics who have attacked the proof of the De
ente et essentia have erred, because it was not intended to be a
proof that God exists. Gilson next lays down the dictum that
in interpreting Aquinas one must not take as a proof for the
existence of God any argument he does not expressly formulate
to support this conclusion. Gilson then proceeds to lay down
three conditions for a genuinely Thomistic proof. First, it must
start from some thing or experience empirically given in sense
knowledge; it can start from movement or some existing thing,
but not from an abstract consideration of the very act of being,
since the act of being by which a thing is, is the object of intellect, not of sense. Second, Gilson reports Aquinas' statement
that the meaning of " God " is the middle term, but Gilson does
not mention that Aquinas gives this condition because the
meaning of " God " is derived from an effect, which must function as the middle in the demonstration of the existence of a
cause. Third, Gilson insists again that a provisional notion of
God must pre-exist the proof. It seems that for Gilson the
believer can demonstrate the existence of the Christian God
only because he has a proper notion of God beforehand. In his
commentary on the five ways and in his additional note on the
significance of the five ways, Gilson argues at length that
Aquinas has taken up proofs derived from previous thinkers,
has purified them, and has united them together by means of
his own notion of being.
In the final section of the third chapter, Gilson explains the
meaning of the five ways. Having emphasized the historical
sources used by Aquinas and having supposed that Aquinas'
method here is a reinterpretation of the work of the philoso-

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phers, Gilson has the problem of explaining how Aquinas has
made the proofs of previous thinkers his own. According to
Gilson, this question is most important, since " the very meaning of the use made of philosophy in his theology is at stake "
(p. 82) . Gilson argues that Aquinas did not need to prove the
existence of God, since theology takes the existence of its subject matter for granted. Then Gilson argues that Aquinas did
not expect philosophers to prove the existence of the God of
Christian theology. Finally, Gilson argues at length that the
five ways do not embody any single philosophic viewpoint:
" It may not be easy or even possible to encompass all these
demonstrations within the limits of one philosophy ... " (p. 85) .
Rather, each of the ways gets its full meaning only within the
doctrine of Aquinas wherein all of them are considered under
the formal object of theology. Gilson concludes the chapter by
returning to the comparison of sacred doctrine to common sense;
while admitting limits to this metaphor, Gilson insists on its
validity in so far as the theologian sees that the determinations
of God discovered by irreducibly diverse philosophies belong to
a single object known as one only under the higher formality
that specifies theological consideration.
Gilson's fourth chapter, "Metaphysical Approaches to the
Knowledge of God," is a brief reconstruction of the history of
philosophy from the pre-Socratics, through Plato and Aristotle,
to Avicenna, based on some texts from Aquinas. (The text
that suggests the outline of the chapter is from De pot., q. 3,
art. 5.) According to Gilson, this. chapter is a metaphysical
meditation concerning the nature of God. For Gilson, Aquinas
used the history of philosophy for theological ends:
Having always seen philosophical progress as cumulative, he often
conceived his own function as that of a theological arbiter of philosophical doctrines. For this very reason, he often practiced a kind
of theological criticism of the data provided by the history of philosophy. One can also call this a critical history of philosophy conducted in the light of divine revelation (p. 90).
The point of this chapter, consequently, is twofold. On the one

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hand, it provides a historical background for the development
of the notion of God as pure act of being. On the other hand,
it displays Aquinas' philosophical method as critical history.
Gilson's fifth chapter, " The Essence of God," is divided into
four seCtions. The first of these is an exposition of Aquinas'
doctrine concerning the knowability of God; here Gilson follows
the order and content of the first two articles of Aquinas' exposition of Boethius' De trinitate. In the second section, Gilson
expounds Aquinas' doctrine that in God there is absolutely no
composition, not even of essence and being, but that God is
His own being. Here Gilson raises a difficulty. Inasmuch as
Aquinas' demonstrations are sound dialectically, why do they
fail to win universal approval? Gilson's answer is that they
presuppose Aquinas' proper notion of being as the ultimate act
in each thing by which it is. Gilson then notices that not all
of Aquinas' arguments rest on this notion. He explains that
the properly- Thomistic doctrinal positions rest on Aquinas'
own notion of being, but that Aquinas has not systematized his
theology around it; rather, he has used many other arguments
more acceptable to his contemporaries (pp. 121-122). The
point of this section is to show Aquinas' approach to his own
notion of being; therefore, Gilson concludes the section by emphasizing the relationship of creature to God as an analogous
participation in pure being. In the third section, " He Who Is,"
Gilson argues that Aquinas did not derive his notion of being
from previous philosophers, nor by argument, but from a
theological reflection on sacred scripture conducted with
full information on the philosophic history of the notion of
being. In proving this position, Gilson maintains that the apparent demonstration of the distinction between essence and
existence in the De ente et essentia is not really a demonstration
of this distinction, but only that whatever has an essence and
exists does so in virtue of an external cause (pp. 127-128). In
the fourth section, " Reflections on the Notion of Being," Gilson
argues that the notion of essence is maintained in application
to God only to provide a point of reference for the negation

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of essence when God is posited as a beyond-essence, or pure act
of being.
Following this treatment of God, Gilson proceeds in part
three of Elements of Christian Philosophy to consider being.
This part also contains three chapters: chapter six, " God and
the Transcendentals "; chapter seven, "Being and Creation";
and chapter eight, "Being and Causality." This order arises
from the fact that Gilson treats the transcendentals primarily
as divine names and treats causality as the structuring relationship of the hierarchy of beings, determined according to the
mode in which creatures participate analogously in divine being
and imitate divine creativity. Three main points fix Gilson's
interpretation of Aquinas' doctrine in these three chapters; in
each of the chapters, one of them receives its greatest emphasis.
In chapter six, Gilson emphasizes his position that inasmuch as
Aquinas is a theologian, the only analogy important for him is
that of creatures to God. The development of this point makes
Gilson's treatment of the transcendentals illustrate his view of
the method of negative theology. In chapter seven, Gilson emphasizes his position that for Aquinas all knowledge is theological inasmuch as it concerns the revealable. The development of this point makes Gilson's treatment of creation illustrate his method of determining the meaning of key philosophic
notions from positions depending on revealed truths in which
they are present. In chapter eight, Gilson emphasizes his position that for Aquinas essence is a possibility for being. The
development of this point makes Gilson's treatment of causality
illustrate his method of determining the meaning of esse by
reference to God. The treatment of being in part three thus
forms a repetition and extension of the view already presented
in part two. The same interpretative framework is filled in a
second time, as it were as a test; no alteration is found to be
required in it.
Gilson devotes the fourth and final part of the book to four
chapters, nine to twelve, concerning man. These chapters correspond more nearly than any of the earlier parts of the book

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to work that Gilson has published previously, especially in the
Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Even here, however, the interpretation Gilson offers has been developed in
accordance with the methods presented in the previous chapters. The effect is most striking in the last chapter; here Gilson
applies his view of causality as hierarchical to the relation between man and society, projecting a metaphysics of society
that is unprecedented in his earlier work.

*

*

*

In Elements of Christian Philosophy itself (pp. 228-229),
Gilson comments on the necessity of reducing metaphysics to a
set of syllogistically-linked and systematically-expounded abstract notions in order to make it teachable. In earlier writings,
Gilson discussed both the necessity of using textbooks and the
problems of teaching metaphysics. In History of Philosophy
and Philosophical Education (Marquette University Press:
Milwaukee, 1948, pp. 12-15) , Gilson stated his views about
textbooks. For beginners, a compendious course, of which the
textbook ad mentem divi Thomae is an example, is a necessity.
It provides an extrinsic description, which Gilson compared to
a map of an unknown country, that is a suitable first contact
with philosophy. Gilson also argued that an introductory work
of some kind is needed for the personal reading of Aquinas' own
works, since they were not written for beginners. He pointed to
the tremendous volume and success of such literature for evidence that it really is necessary.
In a lecture delivered at the Aquinas foundation of Princeton
University in 1953, Gilson pointed out texts in which Aquinas
clearly says that young people cannot learn metaphysics and
ethics; moreover, Gilson emphasized that " young " here includes all college and university students. Consequently, Gilson
asked himself how Aquinas and his contemporaries studied and
taught philosophy. His solution was that Aquinas and his contemporaries did not engage in studying and teaching pure philosophy, but in studying and teaching theology with a good deal
of philosophic content, or at least in studying and teaching

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philosophy without prescinding from faith and with a view
toward theology. While Gilson did not offer any simple or
general solution to the problems of teaching metaphysics and
ethics, and while he pointed out that the history of philosophy
is no easier to understand than philosophy itself, he thought
that communication between philosophy professors in Catholic
colleges and their students could be improved if philosophy
were done more nearly in the manner in which it was done in
the Summa theologiae itself:
But there is a great deal of straight rational speculation concerning
God, human nature, and morality included in the theology of St.
Thomas Aquinas. On this precise point, my sole conclusion has
been to the effect that, if we wish to introduce Christian students
to metaphysics and ethics, to teach them the relevant parts of his
theology will be to provide them with the best short cut to some
understanding of these disciplines. (" Thomas Aquinas and Our
Colleagues," A Gilson Reader, ch. 17, ed. A. C. Pegis; Doubleday &
Co.: Garden City, Long Island, New York, 1957, p. 292.)
In the light of these statements, made by Gilson himself,
Elements of Christian Philosophy takes on significance and the
criticism of it as a textbook has both greater importance and
greater difficulty than it would have otherwise. Moreover, this
book is part of a series to be published by Doubleday under the
editorship of Professor Pegis. Pegis himself promises an introduction to philosophy and others are preparing a four-volume
history of philosophy. Books of readings in paperback format
also are planned. If the entire series were available, the question could be posed whether the series could be adopted as a
whole. Any judgments made on this book as a textbook considered by itself might be altered significantly in such a consideration. Concerning Elements of Christian Philosophy as a
textbook, therefore, I offer only tentative criticism. Furthermore, I should like my remarks under this heading to be understood as suggestions for the consideration of those thinking of
adopting the book for use in undergraduate courses as a required textbook.

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The first point to be made in praise of the book is that it has
historical sense and that it treats genuine philosophical problems with a degree of complexity adequate to keep the:rii from
becoming spurious. In this respect, the book contrasts. sharply
with the ordinary manual's ineptness in its historical remarks,
inaccuracies in its references to philosophical sources, and
simple-minded reduction of all problems to visual schemata and
verbal manipulation. By this very virtue, however, Gilson
seems to have departed from the requirements which he himself
set for a textbook, since he is not merely presenting extrinic description, but is attempting to communicate a grasp on the elements that must be understood for an intrinsic understanding
· of Aquinas' positions.
Another point that Inight be argued in favor of the bookthis characteristic agrees with Gilson's own requirements for
teaching metaphysics to young people-is that it immediately
brings to bear notions which students may have acquired in
their religious education. Of course, if a teacher considers that
a most important point in beginning philosophy is to lead
students to understand that it is not what they call " religion,"
then this aspect of Gilson's effort will be considered a defect;
certainly, few teachers could lead many students to see a difference between what Gilson is offering and what is taught in
religion courses. A further difficulty arises if a class includes
non-Catholic students. Moreover, some may object, even in
the case of Catholic students, that the apparent familiarity
of the subject matter only will confuse a student who begins
with Gilson's book; students may feel that they understand
philosophy just as they feel that they understand their faith,
although it is clear that they understand neither. One real
advantage of attempting to teach metaphysics is that students
can discover that they do no understand it and this discovery
sometimes can be extended to include a realization that they
do not understand the Epistles or the Psalms either. It even
happens now and then that faith-aware that it does not understand-begins to seek understanding.

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However, I do not think that Elements of Christian Philosophy can serve as the basic text for a course in metaphysics
preceded only by logic. Gilson assumes much historical background, both because he constantly alludes to ancient and
medieval philosophic works for substantive points and because
his interpretation of Aquinas makes Aquinas' metaphysical
method appear to be a theologically-informed historical criticism of previous philosophy. With a beginning student, fundamental notions-such as potency, essence, substance--cannot
be treated lightly; _one must do something to convince the
student either that he understands these notions or that he
cannot understand them. Perhaps Elements of Christian Philosophy could be studied after an introduction and a history of
ancient and medieval philosophy; if so, the other books of the
series to which this one belongs might supply the needed
materials.
More serious, however, is that Gilson's book shows how
Aquinas' philosophy really is; if such an exposition is to be
understood, it must be read against a background of direct
acquaintance with Aquinas' works themselves, so that a student
at least will know how Aquinas' thought appears to be. Without such a background, a student could not appreciate Gilson's
insight into the real meanings which are hidden by what
Aquinas actually says, particularly in works such as the De ente
et essentia. (See pp. 121-122 where Gilson shows that Aquinas'
works are full of non-Thomistic arguments; pp. 127-128 where
Gilson shows that a central argument of the De ente et essentia
does not prove what it seems to prove.) Of course, Elements of
Christian Philosophy could be used in a graduate course; it
might be compared with other interpretations of Aquinas' work
to illustrate the difficulty of philosophic communication.
Another point against this book is that it is not written
clearly. The Summa theologiae itself is a model of what I mean
by "written clearly," since one has no difficulty in outlining
it and no doubt at any point concerning what the question is.
Gilson formerly followed this model, but I suggest that anyone

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considering using Elements of Christian Philosophy as a textbook might try to outline a chapter such as the :first or the
eighth. Also consider whether prospective students would be
able to follow the line of questions. The treatment moves
swiftly from substantive questions in metaphysics, to problems
of interpretation, to theological issues concerning the function
of metaphysics in theology, to historical questions. Considerable attention is devoted to controversies between Gilson and
his critics, and the critics are treated in such a way that previous acquaintance with them is necessary to understand Gilson's
apologiae. Of course, judgments on the clarity of any writing
are not likely to receive universal agreement, but it seems to
me that most of Gilson's earlier works-The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas is a good example--are more carefully written and are clearer than this book, although this is
his first textbook.
Even deeper than this lack of clarity, however, is the frequent difficulty one has in understanding Gilson in passages in
which his statements initially seem clear. There are many passages which convey simply what Gilson does not mean, but
which defy positive interpretation. For example, when Gilson
raises the question whether the Christian God " is identically
the same Whose existence can be demonstrated in five ways "
(p. 26) , we know immediately that he does not mean that there
are many Gods or that the existence of God is not demonstrable.
The apparent polytheism certainly is only a manner of speaking, but it is not easy to eliminate this manner of speaking and
to express what Gilson is saying. I do not deny that Gilson
could do so; I merely doubt that he provides the resources that
a student needs. Again, when Gilson speaks of potency as
" incomplete actuality considered in its aptitude to achieve a
more complete state of actuality " (p. 62) , we know that he
does not mean to essentialize being and to predicate existence
univocally, reducing differences between potentiality and actuality to different degrees of an essential nature of· being. But,
then. how are such statements to be construed? How would a

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student who is not aware of the implication of calling potency
'' incomplete actuality " understand anything else but what
Gilson does not mean? Again, when Gilson says that " the relationship of efficient causality is empirically given in sense experience" (p. 70), we know that he does not intend to reduce cause to action-passion. Gilson certainly would not deny
the point on which Aquinas insists, that it is proper to reason
to know order and that a knowledge of causes as such is attained in demonstration, not in sense experience (In I Eth.,
prologus; In I Post. anal., lect. xlii). Still, how would a student
understand Gilson otherwise than as maintaining that he finds
in his sense experience what Aquinas holds cannot be there?
Again, when Gilson says that the notion of being proper to
Aquinas is one with the notion of God and refers to God as
" the supreme Being qua Being " (pp. 85-86) , we know that he
does not intend his remark to carry the fullness of its pantheistic meaning. But, then, how would a student understand
such a remark if he were not aware of the separation Aquinas
insists upon between the subject matter of metaphysics and
that of sacred doctrine (In de trin., qu. 5, art. 4, c.) . Elements
of Christian Philosophy abounds in similar passages. Does the
method of negative theology involve denying true propositions
(p. 140)? Does essence mean esse when we attribute essence
to God (p. 188)? Does every knowledge of God require grace
(p. 181)? Yet it should be noticed that in many cases Gilson's
accurate summaries of Aquinas' explicit doctrine would provide
a really attentive and capable student with the means to control his interpretation of such ambiguous or difficult-to-understand statements.
Due to the many-leveled difficulty of Elements of Christian
Philosophy, I do not believe it can serve as a college textbook.
It is too metaphysical to avoid the fact that young people cannot learn metaphysics. Indeed, I do not think there is a genuine
solution to this problem. To teach a non-philosophic description of philosophy is possible, but I know of no good reason
for doing it. To teach an understandable but pseudo-meta-

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physical doctrine is possible; indeed, it was done by the sophists
of old and is done still by their modern counterparts. To teach
a theology without metaphysics in which matters accessible to
reason are emphasized is possible, but an unmutilated theology
is much better than a mutilated one. (I do not suggest that
Gilson offers a mutilated theology; he presents metaphysical
reasoning as well as historical argumentation.) I do not believe
the statements of Aquinas concerning the non-teachability of
metaphysics to young people can be escaped. If you ask how
Aquinas himself was able to learn metaphysics, although he
died before he was fifty, my answer is not that he studied theology insead of metaphysics, since I think he studied both and
that he could not have accomplished what he did in theology
without having accomplished what he did in metaphysics.
Rather, I should say that Aquinas' statements concerning the
teaching of philosophy are true in general, although they do
admit of exceptions. Some important figures in the history of
philosophy have been among the exceptions, but most college
students are not. I think it is this fact, rather than any innate
wrong-headedness, which accounts for the repeated misinterpretations to which Aquinas, together with other great philosophers, has been subjected.

*

*

*

One aspect of Elements of Christian Philosophy that will
provoke much discussion is the very view of Christian philosophy which Gilson presents here. The position is not new, since
he has been developing it through many years and many works,
but his view is developed more fully here than it has been previously. (One recent exposition is: "What is Christian Philosophy?" A Gilson Reader, pp. 177-191.) An adequate study
of this topic would extend beyond the limits of this article,
for it would require familiarity with a vast literature. Moreover, the problems involved in this question are many and
difficult; no brief treatment can deal with them. Nevertheless,
it may be helpful to indicate here what these problems are and
to suggest some points which I think are relevant to their
discussion.

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In the first place, I think it relevant to recall that Gilson has
argued long and effectively against the view that there is nothing philosophically significant in the thought of the middle ages.
Against the view that historians of philosophy can ignore the
whole medieval period on the ground that it is" only theology,"
Gilson has shown conclusively that Christian philosophy was a
historical reality which ought not to be ignored. Only those
who are so dogmatically committed to an anti-religious naturalism that they are willing to reject mountainous evidence against
their merely-contentious thesis can deny that philosophy was
alive and developing during the middle ages. Moreover, recent
research on the works of Aquinas and others, in which Gilson
played a leading role, has shown that any philosopher has, on
the whole, as much to learn from his medieval predecessors as
he has to learn from the ancients and from the moderns. In
short, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy and the History of
Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages proved their central
thesis. However, Gilson's present thesis concerning Christian
philosophy goes beyond his amply-demonstrated earlier position.
In the second place, I think it relevant to recall that Gilson
has solid ground for maintaining the need for attention to the
theological character of the Summa theologiae and the other
theological works of Aquinas. No adequate interpretation can
ignore the determining character of the work it interprets; to
extract selections from Aquinas' works and to rearrange them
in an order he never used, supplying connecting links he never
required, and directing them to purposes he never envisaged
surely is to construct a philosophy out of Aquinas' dead words,
not to understand the philosophy in Aquinas' living communication. Whatever is the way in which one can learn philosophy
from the Summa theologiae, one cannot learn it by pretending
that the treatise on the unity of God has nothing to do with the
treatise on the Trinity, or by pretending that the quotation
from sacred scripture often given in the sed contra has nothing
to do with the argument presented in the respondeo. Moreover,
although the question of Aquinas' commentaries on Aristotle

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is a complicated one that must be treated sentence by sentence,
not once for all, I think it is correct to say that these commentaries cannot be identified with Aquinas' philosophy and
that they cannot be used to control the interpretation of
Aquinas' other works in the same way that the other works can'
be used to control each other's interpretation. A statement in
a commentary is a comment unless it reveals itself to be a more
direct expression of its author's thought; comments reveal their
author's _thought only as a function of what is commented upon.
In the third place, I think it important to notice that it is
legitimate to call Christian faith itself " Christian Philosophy,"
as Gilson has stated ("What is Christian Philosophy?" A
Gilson Reader, pp. 177-179) . This mode of expressing ourselves
is honored by tradition and it agrees with the current use of
"philosophy" to designate the most basic and far-reaching
principles determining the view of life and reality that one
holds, regardless of the ground on which it is held. In this
sense, everyone has a philosophy of life, and the Christian's philosophy is his faith. But Gilson means more than this, or something other than this, when he writes "Christian philosophy."
In the fourth place, it is important to notice that it is legitimate to call any use of reason or borrowing from its proper
works a " Christian philosophy " in so far as it contributes to
the elaboration of a theology. This designation is well-grounded
in the Leonine restoration, as Gilson has 13aid ("What is Christian Philosophy?" A Gilson Reader, pp. 186-187; p. 191, n. 10).
Moreover, this manner of speaking agrees with another current
use of "philosophy," which sometimes designates the rational
elaboration of any set of beliefs-for example, " conservative
philosophy," "business philosophy," and "the American philosophy." In this sense, every theology and ideology is a philosophy, for each presents a clarification, systematization, and
apologetic for a faith, without the beliefs ceasing thereby to
be beliefs. However, Gilson means something different from
this too, for he distinguishes between philosophy and theology
in a way that this use of " philosophy " does not. Moreover,

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the topics and manner of Elements of Christian Philosophy are
not the ones a theologian would use. (See Gilson's explanation
-Elements, pp. 309-310-for treating the transcendentals in
the order: one, true, good.) If Gilson had treated theological
topics in a theological mode, it would be clear that he meant
to advocate that Christians should study theology and that
they should not study philosophy apart from integral theology.
But Gilson's position cannot be simplified in this way. For
Gilson, " Christian philosophy " designates a rational elaboration of the revealable which is knowable by natural reason; thus
it can be compared to non-Christian philosophies in its subject
matter but cannot be compared to them in its point of view.
Elements of Christian Philosophy reveals many vestiges of Gilson's wrestling with the historical phenomenon of philosophical
pluralism; Gilson's notion of Christian philosophy itself bears
such imprints most clearly.
In the :fifth place, it seems to me that it is a mistake to argue
against Gilson that faith ought to be only a negative norm for
Christian philosophy. A Christian philosopher is not hindered
by his faith, but helped by it. He cannot philosophize as though
he had no faith, nor would it be reasonable to try or to pretend
to do so. Faith does not provide a merely negative norm for
philosophy; in fact, in a way it cannot provide a negative norm,
since a philosopher as philosopher must accept evidence and
judge according to it. Consequently, a philosopher must be
willing to discard any belief if it should prove false. (Notice
that the beliefs of a Christian philosopher, even if they pertain
to matters of Christian faith, can and do prove false, since even
assuming that the Christian faith is true, material heresy does
occur. Incautious application of the norm of faith often has
led to positions inconsistent with faith itself or inconsistent
with evidence that is completely concordant with faith. Whenever a serious Christian thinker meets an apparent conflict between what he believes and what he thinks evidence requires,
he asks himself at least three questions: 1. Is there a conflict?
Does my belief really belong to the Christian faith? 3. Does

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this judgment really follow necessarily from the evidence?) At
the same time, a Christian philosopher benefits not only by
having revealed to him for serious philosophic consideration
many truths he would not discover otherwise, but also by being
stimulated by the needs of theology to develop the potentiality
of reason as fully as possible within its natural competence
without subverting it to technical, practical, or game-like ends.
Moreover, a Christian philosopher may receive from Christian
life an integration of personality without which intellectual
development is extremely difficult or impossible. Thus, even
if Gilson's notion of Christian philosophy should be rejected,
it seems to me that there is a meaning for "Christian philosophy " which goes beyond saying that philosophy has been
taught by Christians and that it does not conflict with Christian faith.
In the sixth place, I do not think one can argue from a
philosopher-either in his psychological, historical, or social
conditions-to his philosophy without falling into serious errors.
Gilson seems to attempt such an argument in Elements of
Christian Philosophy (ch. 1, esp. pp. 19-21; p. 283, n. 11).
Clearly, one cannot abstract from an author in interpreting
his communications; one cannot abstract from the personality
of a thinker in considering his acts of thinking; one cannot
abstract from the motives of one who assents in criticizing the
content of his beliefs or opinions; one cannot abstract from the
mind that does not know in examining the liinits of its knowledge. The impossibility of these abstractions renders plausible
doctrines which maintain the relativity of truth to psychological, historical, and social conditions. However, one must abstract from psychological, historical, and social conditions in
grasping the evident and in demonstrating scientific knowledge
by reduction to evidence. Otherwise, there is no such knowledge; moreover, if there were any, it could not be communicated, since the conditions of different knowers are never precisely the same.
" Knowledge " is ambiguous, since it refers either to an act

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of knowing or to what is known precisely in so far as it is known.
If I understand Gilson's position, he ignores this ambiguity.
If the ambiguity were taken into account, it seems to me it
would be clear that philosophic knowledge itself cannot be characterized from the historical conditions in which it is developed,
from the personality and motivations of the one who develops
it, or from social requirements-even from the requirements of
the Church in its teaching of sacred doctrine. It is clear that
Aquinas' personality was relevant to his philosophizing; it is
equally clear that Aquinas' personality was irrelevant to what
he philosophized. (The impersonality of Aquinas' style is a sign
of what he wished to convey.) Even if the philosophy Aquinas
philosophized were expressed only in his theological works, still
if it could be found there at all, it would have to be discovered
by extrapolating from statements made in the theological context the subject matter, method, principles, and internal ends of
the philosophy itself.
Moreover, if philosophy cannot be transformed by theology
unless it is constituted in itself by all that it requires to be
philosophy-as I think and shall explain next-then the only
way to understand the philosophy in a theology is by considering the conditions required by the philosophy itself in abstraction, but not separation or precision, from its theological transformation. I do not believe Professor Gilson makes such an
attempt, for the simple reason that he does not think it necessary. ·Indeed, the understanding of philosophy is not necessary
for history, which can rest in a consideration of human actions
and communication, but it is necessary for the dialectic which
uses what others have philosophized to further philosophy,
since the philosophy which is philosophized is not a human
action or communication but is an ordered group of verba
intellecta, which generally is called" a philosophic view." (This
metaphor is misleading, however, since philosophic knowledge
and the viewpoint from which a philosopher knows are identical; one cannot have or use a philosophic point of view without
having a philosophized philosophy. I do not think that revela-

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tion can substitute for a philosophic point of view, because in
so far as a truth is accepted on the authority of revelation, the
intellect is not determined by the evidence of the object itself;
nevertheless, given a philosophic point of view, other truths
which are relevant to it, although they remain inevident, may
be integrated with it.)
In the seventh place, I do not think that a philosophy can
be of use to theology unless it is constituted in itself by all that
is required of it to be philosophy. Gilson seems to be arguing in
Elements of Christian Philosophy that it can (pp. 130-133) .
According to his argument, the Thomistic distinction between
essence and existence cannot be demonstrated without presupposing the properly-Thomistic notion of being, and that
notion must have been attained first in interpreting the divine
revelation," I am Who am"; thereupon Thomistic metaphysics
became possible and began. Gilson has argued (pp. 127-128)
that the apparent demonstration of the distinction in the De
ente et essentia (ch. 4), really is not a demonstration of it at all.
It seems to me that the context of this passage reveals a radical
difference between it and the argument of Avicenna to which
Gilson wishes to assimilate it. Further, although this argument
is in a way similar to dialectical argumentation, I do not .think
it is dialectical; rather, it is an example of the metaphysical
method which Aquinas himself explicitly describes and distinguishes from dialectic (In de trin., qu. 6, art. 1 [a], c.). If
Gilson's argument concerning the derivation of the distinction
between essence and existence were sound, then perhaps it
would follow that Aquinas utilized in his theology a metaphysics which
not constituted in itself except in virtue of
that use, for the distinction does permeate Aquinas' metaphysical thought.
Now, it certainly is true that one can begin to study metaphysics while attempting to understand what one believes. One
need not be personally interested in, knowing metaphysics for
its own sake in the sense that he orders this knowledge to no
further end. Nor need a theologian first form a complete meta-

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physics, only afterwards beginning to use it in his theology.
Moreover, it is evident that no one need devote himself to
expounding philosophy; we should hardly expect that Aquinas,
who was committed to teaching theology, should have done so.
Finally, it is true that revelation, Christian teaching, and the
Christian's immediate religious experience are thoroughly integrated with other sources of knowledge, mediate and immediate, in the genesis of a Christian's thought; in his intellectual
development, notions are formed, truths learned, and knowledge is organized without the distinction among sources being
noticed. The distinction between philosophy and theology is
drawn by a Christian only after he has followed a via inquisitionis relevant to both of them. Nevertheless, it does not seem
to me that philosophy can be used in the light of faith to develop a science of theology unless that philosophy has in itself
what is required for it to be philosophy. Philosophy need not
be presented standing by itself, but it must be able to stand
by itself. Even in respect to the psychological genesis of the
notion of being, it does not seem to me that anyone would
interpret God's revelation of His proper name as Aquinas
interpreted it unless he had in advance the notion of being
which Aquinas had, since others did interpret it with other valid
interpretations.
(Although this matter involves theological
considerations which are beyond my competence, it may not
be impertinent to raise the question whether any new simple
notion can be acquired from revelation. If the answer is affirmative, a further question might be how interpretations involving such notions could be validated.)
My contention is that the via resolutionis required by philosophy as philosophy is not merely a matter of style or order
of presentation, but that it is essential to the constitution of
philosophy. Although sacred doctrine rightly treats all things
considered by all human sciences, it cannot include all verba
intellecta attained by all human sciences. On this ground, I
disagree with Gilson's statement: "In short, that which is
known of God to the philosopher qua philosopher is also known

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to the theologian qua theologian " (p. 88) . Of course, the theologian knows of God all that the philosopher knows of.Him. and
more, but the theologian cannot know qua theologian what the
philosopher knows qua philosopher, unless there is no distinction between the two knowledges. The distinction, of course,
is formal, but it is not merely verbal; formal distinctions are
distinctions among cognitive contents that cannot be ignored
without error. Thus, God's essence is ffis existence, but "essence " does not mean existence, even in predications concerning God. In short, I think that in his treatment of the relation
between theology and philosophy, Gilson consistently ignores
the distinction between knowledges and things; the fact that
sacred doctrine treats all things does not imply' that it includes
all knowledges. Although it is true that Aquinas was not concerned about this point for the protection of the integrity of
philosophy, we must be concerned about it if we seek from
Aquinas any philosophy or aid to philosophy other than the
philosophy in his very texts just as it is found in them. Gilson
remarks: " It is somewhat distressing that the same men who
preach that grace can make a man a morally better man refuse
to admit that revelation can make a philosophy a better philosophy " (p. 288, n. 11) . I would not deny that philosophy is
assisted by revelation, but I think the strict parallelism which
Gilson assumes is false, since a philosophy is not in rerum
natura and the structure of the intentional realm is not identical
with that of reality, except on Platonic assumptions which
Aquinas repeatedly rejects.
In the eighth place, I do not think that a criticism of the history of philosophy in the light of divine revelation is a philosophic method; moreover, I do not think that philosophic development occurs without the use of a philosophic method.
Gilson seems to think otherwise. He chaacterizes Aquinas' procedure as follows: " For this very reason, he often practiced a
kind of theological criticism of the data provided by the history
of philosophy" (p. 90). Gilson previously had used this view
to account for Aquinas' presentation of the five' ways (pp. 42

GERMAIN G. GRISEZ

and 85) • Again, he says: " The most original part of the
contribution made by Thomas Aquinas to philosophy has its
origin in this rational reinterpretation of the philosophies of
the past in the light of theological truth" (p. 41).
Now, it is true that Aquinas used the results of previous
philosophy in the course of his theological work. The question
is whether Aquinas did not achieve a philosophic advance upon
what his predecessors had done by having a better, or at least
different, philosophic method and by using its results to criticize the results of the methods others had used. To be sure, it
is possible for a theologian to criticize philosophy and to reinterpret it rationally in the light of divine revelation without
having a philosophic method. He can proceed with nothing but
faith and dialectic. The outcome of such a procedure is a type
of theology that always has been prevalent; it borrows from
philosophies in an eclectic manner. It is also true that a theologian who has a philosophical method and who uses it constantly need not reveal that method in his theological works.
To suppose otherwise would be to confuse philosophy and thewith their symbolic manifestation in language. I hesitate
to say that Gilson has fallen into this confusion.
Nevertheless, if the two Summae were Aquinas' only works,
how could we understand his metaphysics? Fortunately, these
theological masterpieces are not his only works. We have his
De ente et essentia and we have his exposition of Boethius' De
trinitate. In these works, I think that Aquinas wrote a metaphysics and explained in a clear and exact manner what metaphysics is and what its method is. On the principle of interpretation that an ex professo treatment takes precedence over all
others, I think these works should provide the point of departure for any attempt to explicate Aquinas' metaphysics. I
object to Gilson's account of Aquinas' metaphysics because he
has not given sufficient weight to the De ente et essentia, because he has not treated it as a whole and interpreted it systematically, and because he has ignored Aquinas' treatment of
the nature and method of metaphysics in his exposition of
Boethius' De trinitate.

*

*

*

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473

In view of Gilson's tremendous contribution to the work of
the Leonine restoration, I am sure there will be many who will
attempt to follow his interpretation of Aquinas' metaphysics
of existence and doctrine concerning philosophic knowledge of
God as far as possible, while parting with him on the question
of Christian philosophy. Yet for Gilson himself, his notion of
Christian philosophy is fundamental to his understading of
Aquinas' entire teaching. I think it would be a sign of disrespect for Gilson's competence to suppose that his interpretations on substantive points can be detached from his thesis
concerning the relation between revelation and philosophy in
Aquinas' work. Without his notion of Christian philosophy, we
must ask ourselves, how plausible is Gilson's interpretation of
the requirements for a proof of the proposition that God exists?
How true to Aquinas is his notion of essence, a notion he claims
is maintained in respect to God only to provide a referencepoint for knowing God as a super-essential pure act of being?
In answering these questions we must remember that they are
closely related to Gilson's treatment of all the key metaphysical
topics: potency, existence, analogy, causality, and the transcendentals. In every case one must assume the coherence of
Gilson's interpretation unless there is cogent evidence for denying. it, for Gilson himself forms the connections with plausible
lines of reasoning.
Furthermore, if we find that we must reject Gilson's notion of
Christian philosophy, then it seems to me we must find also
that the mode of interpretation he has followed is not adequate
to the task he has undertaken. The task set us by Leo XIII
included two elements: to restore Christian philosophy and to
augment it. It seems evident to me that a purely historical
procedure is not adequate to accomplish the second part of
this task. But it seems to me also that a complete restoration
of the achievements of the great scholastics cannot occur unless
we learn to philosophize from the very beginning of philosophy
with the methods and principles they used. Our office as philosophers is not to restore St. Thomas Aquinas; only God can

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GERMAIN G. GRISEZ

restore him come judgment day. Rather, our office is to restore
the order of truth he achieved by achieving it ourselves. History necessarily considers every statement in relation to its
author and his contingent conditions; therefore, history inevitably reduces all knowledge to opinion or transforms it into
faith. Consequently, a purely historical procedure not only restrains us from considering the new problems or new forms of
old problems which have arisen since the thirteenth century,
but even prohibits us from attaining fully the demonstrative
knowledge to which Aquinas and others attained. Without such
a full attainment, we shall fail to fulfill the task Leo Xlli
pointed out to us, a task even more urgent today than it was
one hundred years ago.
I do not suggest that we should represent the work of
Aquinas otherwise than it was in order to make his philosophy
attractive to our contemporaries. Philosophy is not apologetics
and rhetoric is not demonstration; we ought not to consider our
work from the point of view of rhetoric, since false opinions
always can be made more attractive than demonstrated truths.
We must enter into full communication with other contemporary philosophers only because such communication is an inherent attribute of our human way of learning. At the same
time, we should continue to learn from Aquinas to imitate fully
the method with which he philosophized; if we do learn his
method, we shall become able to present the truths he knew as
truths to be known in the light of evidence, not merely as
opinions to be maintained out of loyalty to a tradition. What
is important for philosophy is not what men have said, but
the truths which things require us to think of them.
Nor do I suggest that we should abandon historical study of
the works of Aquinas; such study always will be valuable, since
it is a necessary although insufficient condition for attaining a
knowledge of things such as he attained. I am maintaining
only that the meanings of " historical " and "existential" ought
not to be confused and that one cannot know Aquinas' philosophy without knowing things as he knew them. Since it is

ETIENNE GILSON:

ELEMENTS

OF CHRISTIAN

PHILOSOPHY

475

only natural for history to attempt to proceed in the opposite
direction, history as such is an insufficient discipline for learning philosophy. The texts of Aquinas belong in the most prominent place in the dialectical introduction to our philosophizing,
hut to know philosophic subject matters as Aquinas knew them,
we must use the method he used and begin from the principles
from which his philosophy began.
The argument of the De ente et essentia is involved very
peculiarly with logic; moreover, one method appropriate to
metaphysics is called " rational," inasmuch as metaphysics
properly hegins from principles taught by logic (In de trin.,
qu. 6, art. 1 (a), c.). Yet Aquinas' logic remains ignored almost
totally. An incapacity to achieve demonstrative knowledge of
a subject matter from the study of works of those who have
attained such knowledge is no fault of historical method, hut
it does show want of training in logic; consequently, it seems
to me that the time has come to study logic and to rediscover
the metaphysical method which Aquinas used. Aquinas' act of
philosophizing cannot he understood apart from history, hut
what he philosophized cannot he restored without logic; the
method of metaphysics is not a theological use of history. If
Aquinas' logic were studied and the method of his metaphysics
were acquired, perhaps the De ente et essentia could he understood. If the De ente et essentia were understood, I think it
might become clear to us how Aquinas' notion of being was
formed and how he became capable of interpreting " He Who
Is" in a new way.
Professor Gilson has made many great contributions to our
understanding of medieval philosophy. Elements of Christian
Philosophy no doubt is an important work; it deserves to he
studied and discussed thoroughly. I have commented upon it
in a manner that I hope will encourage careful reading and
stimulate serious discussion. Professor Gilson's tremendous
scholarship, brilliant insight, and intellectual integrity appear
on every page of this work, hut all of us have become accustomed to expect of him a measure of these qualities which would

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GERMAIN G. GRISEZ

startle us if we found evidence of it in the work of lesser men.
Without the work of Professor Gilson and without the teaching
he has carried on-not only of his auditors, but also of the
readers of his many published works-none of us would be
able to do what needs to be done next. I do not claim to see
clearly the priority of logic to history in the method of metaphysics. I merely suspect what we might see if we stand upon
the shoulders of this giant-Etienne Gilson.
GERMAIN G. GRISEZ

GeO'I'getoum University,
W118hington, D. C.

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS
JosEPH L. LENNON, 0. P., Ph. D., a graduate of Notre Dame University,
author of Knowledge About College, was formerly Dean of Men and
is presently Dean of Studies at Providence College, Providence, R. I.
M. WHITCOMB HEss, M.A., a graduate of Ohio University, author of The
Name Is Living, is a frequent contributor to many scholarly journals,
including Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Review, THE THOMIST,
New Scholasticism, and The Modem Schoolman.
THOMAS C. O'BRIEN, 0. P., S. T. Lr., is a Professor of Moral Theology in
the Pontifical Faculty of Theology, Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.
GERMAIN G. GrusEz, Ph. D., a graduate of the University of Chicago, and
past contributor to THE THoMIST, is at present an assistant professor
of Philosophy at Georgetown University, Washington, D. C.
EAMoN R. CARRoLL, 0. Carm., S. T. D., a graduate of the Gregorianum,
Rome, former president of the Mariological Society of America, is an
assistant professor of Sacred Theology at Catholic University _of
America and Director of its Summer Program in Mariology.
MATTHEW KELLY, 0. P., S. T. L., is a professor of Natural Theology and
Modem Languages at the Dominican House of Studies, Dover, Mass.

477

BOOK REVIEWS
Die Gedanken des heiligen Albertus Magnus iiber die Gottesmutter. (Thomistische Studien. Schriftenreihe der " Freiburger Zeitschrift fiir
Philosophie und Theologie" VII. Band.) By ALBERT FRIES, C.Ss.R.
with indices.
Freiburg Schweiz: Paulusverlag, 1959. Pp.
Swiss Francs.
It is now several years since two scholars, working independently, showed
that St. Albert the Great did not write the famous Mariale super missus est.
Through more than half a century of critical studies, the Albertine authorship of the M ariale had never been seriously called into question, even
when other writings were recognized as inauthentic, e. g., De laudibus (actually Richard of St. Lawrence), and the Biblia mariana. St. Albert was
declared a Doctor of the Church in
that he was also doctor marianus
was usually demonstrated from the Mariale, with its stress on Mary's role
in the redemptive work of Christ, not only through her consent at the
Annunciation, but also by her compassion on Calvary. Up to the midfifties, many studies on the mediation and spiritual maternity of Mary
invoked the authority of St. Albert, chiefly on the strength of the Mariale.
In 1954 Albert Fries, C. Ss. R., a member of the St. Albert Institute for
the new Cologne critical edition of St. Albert (in publication since 1951),
reported on his researches. After examining the Mariale, Biblia mariana,
Compendium super Ave Maria, and other shorter Marian titles attributed
to Albert, he came to the verdict that all these expressly Marian works
were not written by St. Albert. (Cf. Die unter dem Namen des Albertus
Magnus iiberlieferten Mariologische Schriften, literarkristische Untersuchung, in the series Beitraege zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie
des Mittelalters, Band XXVII-Heft 4, Muenster Westf., Aschendorffsche
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1954.)
In the same year, and on the same basis of internal evidence, Bruno
Korosak, 0. F. M., published Mariologia S. Alberti Magni eiusque coaequalium, in the Bibliotheca Mariana Medii Aevi, fasc. VIII, Romae,
Academia Mariana Internationalis, 1954. Korosak also excludes the Mariale
and a number of other titles from the list of genuine Albertine writings,
although he admits as probably authentic some of the smaller works refused
by Fries.
It is no wonder that the question began to be asked, " What then remains of the Marian theology of St. Albert the Great? " At the end of
his 1954 volume, Fries published a list of authentic Marian writings of
St. Albert with capsule indications of their content. Now, in his new book,

478

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479

Die Gedanken . . . Fries shows that a great body of Marian doctrine is to
be found in St. Albert's exegetical and theological writings. Rather than
being a " maverick," St. Albert was very much a theologian of his time:
he did not essay a systematic treatise in Mariology: that was not to be
effectively done until Suarez in the seventeenth century. Rather, he studied
our Lady; her privileges, her place in the plan of salvation, in the context
of the rest of theology and of sacred Scripture. Many of the positions on
Marian doctrine taken by Albert became classic-to be adopted by St.
Thomas as his own, and to provide the solid and sober groundwork for
further scholastic development.
Fries arranges his materials in chronological order-twenty-four titles,
both printed and manuscript, which contains Marian passages. They
cover ascetic theology, systematic theology (e.g., commentaries on the
Sentences of Peter Lombard, but also De incarnatione, and even Quaestiones mariologicae), and exegesis (as the Postilla super Isaiam, but especially the gospel commentaries). The commentary on St. Luke receives the
most attention-pp.
a small book in itself. In addition to the
Lucan commentary, the Super III Sententiarum and the Commentarium
super Matthaeum rank as the most important sources of Albert's Marian
theology.
The central element in Albert's Mariology is its Christological orientation. Fries puts it well "Not the Mariology of a system, but Mariology in
a situation, as a function of Christology." Nonetheless, Marian theology
may be called a preoccupation of the saint, who uses every opportunity
to speak of Mary in connection with other truths of the faith or in
commenting on sacred Scripture. The Eucharist and our Lady are the two
areas in which Albert excelled in his use of Scripture and the Fathers.
Albert follows the Aristotelian notion of the purely passive role of the
mother in the origin of her child's body. He considers Mary's maternity
as also entirely passive, with the Holy Spirit miraculously causing the
effects normally produced by the male seed. Physically, our Lady's
maternal contribution was her blood, from which Christ's body was formed.
Albert's uniform insistence on this point for the formation of Christ's body,
even when he had come to admit in a late work (super Joannem) that
there was some special material for generation (Keimstoff) supplied by
the woman in ordinary human generation, served Fries as a clue to the
inauthenticity of the M ariale, which speaks of the Christ-Child as formed
from Mary's " flesh and blood."
As mother, Mary supplied everything to the formation of Christ's body
that all normal mothers supply. The virginal conception of Christ does
not mean that Mary received, even miraculously, a biologically active
role in the forming of her Son's body. But that conception should occur
in a virgin is so much a sign of divine power that Albert uses a contempo-

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rary comparison over and over again: it is as if a blind man should see
without having his faculty of sight restored.
The Annunciation is commented on by Albert three times. He painstakingly investigates the possible sense of every phrase, " for everything is
full of significance when it comes to this great Virgin Mother of God:' The
saint never tires of exploring our Lady's consent to God's invitation. So
much does her perfect freedom mean to him, so taken is he by the fact
that faith is a reasonalile agreement (ratio1Wbile obsequium) that he
does not speak of Mary as confirmed in grace, and will not have even
concupiscence perfectly quelled, until after the Annunciation. In discussing the manner in which Gabriel's message was conveyed, Albert rejects an
intellectual illumination as prejudicial to the full liberty of Mary's consent.
God had prepared Mary for the divine maternity, yet it must be said that
the Annunciation was " by way of inducing to consent."
In St. Albert's opinion, biologically Mary was passive in the generation
of her Son, but psychologically and spiritually she was intensely active.
Each order, natural and supernatural, receives its full due. Mary's faith
deeply impresses the saint: " of such faith, that by faith she merited to
conceive, and by faith became the foundation and support of the entire
Church." Her faith was constant even on Calvary; Saturday is kept as
Mary's day because she did not hesitate, when the others wavered at
Christ's death and burial. St. Albert's analysis of Mary's maternal relationship to Christ emphasizes its personal character. Her maternal consent was
a fully human act, and at the same time a supernatural one. Her act of
faith and act of generation have the same goal-the Eternal Word.
In considering the Annunciation, as frequently throughout his writings,
St. Albert discusses all aspects of the virginity-vow or conditioned vow
before the Annunciation, virginal conception of Christ, virginal childbearing, and lifelong virginity. He extols the spiritual values of our Lady's
virginity, as well as the corporeal integrity, miraculously preserved in the
conception and bringing-forth of the Christ-Child. This reviewer finds
Albert's treatment a sober defense of the miraculous meaning of virginitas in
partu, about which Rev. Dr. Albert Mitterer has raised certain questions
in recent years. (Cf. A. Mitterer, Dogma und Biologie der heiligen Familie,
Wien, Verlag Herder, 1952.)
Even granting that medieval theologians were sometimes mistaken in
their biology, as St. Albert· was in holding the purely passive role of the
maternal contribution to conception, I fail to see that incorrect biological
notions significantly distorted St. Albert's thoughts on the virginitas in
partu. With many of the Fathers, and the majority of his contemporaries,
he holds an absence of labor pains at Bethlehem and the physical integrity
of Mary in terms of preservation of the sigiUum virginitatis. Both factors
he regards as quite miraculous. And although he uses the comparison of

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481

Christ's body emerging from the still-sealed tomb, he expressly rejects
the view that Christ's body was somehow " spiritualized " in order to be
born, and simply avoids the mass of apocryphal details that pried into the
mystery. More significant still, and this is the factor that seems to be
neglected in some of the questions Dr. Mitterer has raised, St. Albert is
concerned with the theological sense of the mysterious virginitas in partu.
He applied the " tamquam sponsus procedens de thalamo suo," to Christ as
bridegroom, and the womb of Mary as the bridal chamber. "And he came
forth as the bridegroom from the bridal chamber of the womb, when born
of her he did not spoil the integrity of the body of his mother, but rather
consecrated and loved her as his spouse without spot or stain."
As "new Eve "-another frequent comparison of Albert's-Mary was
spared at Bethlehem the curse laid on the first Eve and her descendants of
bringing forth children in sorrow, even though she was to learn the cost
of her motherhood of Christ in the delayed labor pains of her compassion
at the foot of the cross.
The temporal birth of the Word should imitate his timeless generation.
Like the eternal coming forth from the Father without change or corruption,
so the birth of the Word-made-man should be without harm even to
Mary's corporeal integrity. And, citing St. Augustine, Albert shows the
virginitas in partu as a type of the virginity of the Church, which in
baptism brings forth without sorrow its children according to the spirit.
What is our Lady's place in the plan of salvation? The question is
relevant after excluding the Mariale from Albert's writings. The Mariale
applies to our Lady the principle of consortium: Mary, new Eve, is the
" helpmate like unto himself " to Christ, and soteriological value is assigned to her compassion on Calvary. Fries fails to find any of these
M ariale notes in Albert's authentic writings, and argues emphatically that
Albert did not attach to the blessed Virgin's association with her Son any
soteriological import that would bear directly on the properly redemptive
act consummated on Calvary. In modern terminology, she did not share
proximately and directly in the objective redemption, but only remotely
and indirectly; but she had and retains a significant place in subjective
redemption, which is the application to individuals of the fruits of Christ's
passion. Albert's strong sense of the spiritual maternity, and his emphasis
on Marian mediation, include neither the later notion of a " proximate and
direct share in the actual redemptive work of Christ," nor the recent theory
of our Lady's representative role on Calvary. Unlike St. Thomas, St.
Albert does not speak of a representative role of our Lady even at the
Annunciation.
The stages of Mary's spiritual maternity and mediation are three: chiefly,
the maternity of Christ himself, which she consented to as redemptive, and
in which she became mother of the head and members of Christ's mystical

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body (floruit gravidatione cordis, quo nos concepit, et corporis, quo :filium
Verbum incamatum suscepit). The labor pains of the woman of Apocalypse
12 are Mary's suffering that Christ be born in men. Secondly, through her
example she encourages men to imitate Christ. Albert has much to say
about our Lady's example. After Christ himself, she is the standard according to which we will be judged. "We must walk in her footsteps." She is
"the way, through which we go to Jesus." Her request at Cana shows her
motherly perception " for the future children of the Church."
The third stage is her heavenly intercession, a most effective one, by
which " she conceives in heaven and continually brings forth her onlybegotten Son, whom she forms in all that they may come to the throne of
God." Her fullness of grace, in its consummation as on earth, puts her
at the service of sinners (plenitudo beatae virginis ad intercessionem peccatorum) . How can men profit from this intercession? The answer is that
Christ " gives those things necessary for salvation to all who honor his
holy mother."
By her Assumption the blessed Virgin has been elevated to a share in the
royal reign of Christ himself. She is queen of mercy-a favorite way
Albert has of describing her. No one is excluded from her royal mediation.
As illuminatrix, enlightener (one of the meanings given for the name,
" Mary ") she transmits to the angels and blessed the divine light that
beatifies them. She protects the Church militant against enemies of salvation, communicating God's gifts of grace. The souls in purgatory look to
her as the reconciler in whom God brought about salvation. She is the
great sign that appeared in the heavens, the woman clothed with the sun,
crowned with stars (the blessed), the moon (the Church militant) under
her feet, for all divine light and life of the Church in heaven and on earth
can be traced back to the Mother of the Redeemer. The suffragium of the
glorious Virgin is as wide as the assistance (adjutorium) of the graces
of God.
Is it any wonder then that for St. Albert devotion to the blessed Virgin,
as he almost invariably calls her, is not an optional extra of Christian life?
"Just as we wish to receive from her, so we must greet her." Therefore
we will honor our queen and mother all the days of our life." Frequently
he accomodates to our Lady Romans 16, 6, "Greet Mary who has labored
much among you."
Die Gedanken des keiligen Albertus Magnus iiber die Gottesmutter sets
forth many further points not covered in this review-aspects of the
Assumption and Mary's glory in heaven, the true marriage of Mary and
Joseph, Mary's holiness, her sanctification before birth (for St. Albert
did not hold an immaculate conception), and a number of references to
Mary's life of prayer. After surveying one by one the Marian content of
the twenty-four writings, Fries concludes with a chapter on" The Mariology

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483

of Albert the Great" (pp. 345-390). The saint himself essayed no such unit
arrangement, but it flows without forcing from his theological reflections
on the mystery of Mary. A shorter version of the conclusions of the final
chapter can be found in the article by A. Fries, " Albert der Grosse," in
Lexikon der Marienkunde (1957}, Lieferung I, cc. 111-121.
The present excellent book is completed by a list of manuscript sources, a
table of scriptural references, a list of authors mentioned (the study is
full of cross-references to writings that influenced Albert, as well as to his
influence on others), and finally a subject-index. In view of the use of this
book as a reference tool, the indices are quite valuable. Few readers will
have occasion to read Die Gedanken . . . straight through, so that the final
extended summary chapter can well be read by itself.
If it seemed that Albert Fries, C. Ss. R., was playing an unwilling iconoclast in striking the Mariale super missus est and other titles from the
authentic writings of St. Albert, the current assessment of the saint's theological thought on the Mother of God is an amende lwnorable to the devout
genius who regarded theology as a science, " which chastely lives within
the limits of the faith and does not fall into the dissolution of mere
phantasy " (quae casta stat intra limites fidei nee luxuriatur per phantasias).
EAMON R. CARROLL, 0. CARM.

The Catholic UniveTsity of America,
Wa8hington, D.C.

Metaphysics and Ideology. By WM. OLIVER MARTIN. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1959. Pp. 104. $2.50.
Karl Marx once said, " the point is not to know the world; the point is
rather to change it." This is an utterance of ideology. Whether there is
or is not an objective truth-we do not really care. Our vital interest and
concern is to agree on that set of ideas and thought patterns which most
aptly answers the present need as pre-defined by the ideological system
itself.
Mr. Aiken echoes the same refrain: "Whether such answers are 'cognitive ' and ' true or false ' in the scientific sense is unimportant. What
does matter is that the pictures of reality which they present to us may
enable us to organize our energies more adequately for the satisfaction of
our total needs as men. Then they will be ' true ' in the only sense of
the term which is worth considering."
In this book, Dr. Martin warns us that we ought not to confuse ideology
in this sense, with philosophy or Metaphysics (for the most part he uses
the two terms interchangeably). All philosophy, even a false philosophy is

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an endeavor to analyse, to know, to explain. Ideology, in accord with
its own confessed purpose, disdains any attempt at knowing. To know
is unimportant. Hence, an ideology is not really a false philosophy at all.
To consider it as such, is to refuse to take is seriously. Ideology is antiphilosophy.
Dr. Martin then sharpens the contrast between philosophy and ideology.
What is philosophy? he asks. How may it be recognized? The author
answers this question by laying down four marks which, he insists, ought
to characterize true philosophy. The marks are: a) autonomy b) continuity
c) system d) ade'iuacy.
a) Autonomy. This means that Metaphysics (here the word is used to
signify the specific branch of philosophy) must possess "its own data, its
own formal object." That is to say, it does not derive its subject matter
from some other science. Moreover, Metaphysics is grounded in the experiential order of things, though it is not what we would term today, an
"experimental" science. Without this first mark, Dr. Martin tells us,
Metaphysics lapses into what would more properly be called ideology.
b) Continuity. In true philosophy some principles and truths will be
recognized and upheld through whatever changes the system may undergo.
There is at the same time an allowance for change and even improvement.
Thus for example, through the course of time there may occur in the minds
of the proponents of this " true philosophy " a gradual growth in the perception of the nature of man. If this development were to reach the
point where the definition of man is substantially altered, then either the
former is true and the latter false, or conversely. We would have an alternative between a correct understanding of what man really is, and a misconception. In Dr. Martin's words: "the revolution is within philosophy;
it is not as yet the overthrow of philosophy in favor of ideology, which is
anti-philosophy. . .• ideology (and hence anti-philosophy) would arise
if one were to argue as follows; The concept, manl, was useful in the
process of organizing current impressions and interests of certain past ages,
i.e., such interests as those of Heaven and Hell, the eternal perpetuating
of one-self, etc .... Now the interests of contemporary man are in this
world, not the next, and hence the urgency of secularizing religion demands
more useful concepts than the traditional ones. For this reason the concept,
man 2 , is 'truer' today."
c) System. True philosophy must bear the mark of "system," i.e. it
must manifest an inner coherence. There ought to be no contradictions in
data, nor in the principles rooted in the data. Yet the system is not
"closed at both ends." By this Dr. Martin implies there must be room
for variation, but the variation is not absolute. Some principles are immutable and essential; others are provisional. The " system " rises and

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485

falls with the former; the latter may change " within the system." The
author exemplifies his point: " For example, a first principle in moderate
realism is that act accounts for potency. The denial of this destroys the
whole system. On the other hand, consider the proposition: ' Accidents
always actually inhere in any substance.' This may be denied, for some
good reason, in favor of a proposition containing 'potentially inhere '
rather than ' actually inhere.' In this way we ' make room ' in our system
for the mystery of the Eucharist.'' I think his point could have been more
suitably illustrated without recourse to data outside the realm of reason,
but at any rate his point is clear. Quite simply," system" refers to a fundamental " sameness " with allowance being made for limited change. Historically, the "sameness" is termed continuity. Within the science itself
it is system.
d) Adequacy. The last of the marks is tri-dimensional. Adequacy implies first of all that a true Metaphysics must be able to account for other
kinds of knowledge, or at least allow for their possibility. A Metaphysics
which would deny the possibility of material reality, for example, would
succumb to the indictment of inadequacy. In addition to accounting for
others forms of knowledge, Metaphysics must also be able to reflect back on
its own data and processes by way of explication and defence. This is required because Metaphysics is '' first philosophy " and hence can look to
no other for defence. Lastly, Dr. Martin underscores what he refers to as
the "existential criterion of adequacy." By this he means, metaphysical
knowledge is not some ideal which can never be in fact achieved. It is
not a non-existing norm the philosopher projects in order to judge the
worth of the various existing systems. To assert this is to reduce Metaphysics to ideology. "For if metaphysical truth is always 'ideal,' then
the so-called metaphysics that exiata is not really that at all. It is really
ideology.''
Having established the four marks by which true metaphysics may be
recognized, the author, as a good " apologete " now applies the criteria to
the various claimants, to see if any might be found to " pass the test.''
First he warns us, the work of no individual philosopher can fulfill the
requirements. In such a case we would not have the mark of " system.''
No one man has all the answers in a totally final and decisive manner. In
the work of any single man, the provisionary principles await improvement
and possible development. In keeping with the note of " system " we are
constrained to broaden our view to include streams of thought.
Next, Dr. Martin gives what in his mind is the only candidate found to
measure up satisfactorily to the requirements. " We would suggest that
what best meets the test of metaphysics as a science is the classical realistic
tradition, or, to be more exact, what is sometimes called ' moderate realism,'
the system that has had a development from Aristotle through St. Thomas

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to the present." The best evidence for this judgment, he says, is the intuitive vision that it is so. There is also a negative approach. This entails
an examination of the several more predominant brands of philosophy,
noting how they each fail in one respect or another to " pass the test."
Pragmatism and positivism offer no difficulty, for they do not pretend to
be metaphysical systems.
What of Platonism? The author rejects this on the grounds that it
fails to comply with the mark of "adequacy." He admits however, that
this point is debatable, and he prefers not to pursue the matter in this work.
Next in line comes "idealism," in the sense of Berkeley, Kant or Hegel.
" The essence of modern idealism has consisted in identifying knowing and
making or creating." This form of philosophy is found wanting in " autonomy." It is not experiential; it does not approach a subject of study;
rather it produces it.
With regard to Naturalism or Materialism we must distinguish before
passing judgment as to whether or not it merits the name of philosophy.
If we mean by " materialism," the work of Democritus and his early
followers, we may correctly refer to it as a metaphysics. It is of course,
relatively inadequate; indeed it is a false metaphysics in the light of later
development. We would not however term Democritus an ideologist. "He
sought truth about what he conceived to be being, even going so far as
to explain in terms of his atomism, the nature of that intuition whereby
we see Reality as it actually is, and not merely as it is given to us in a
distorted manner through sense experience."
When we look at the materialism of today, the· situation is quite different. Here we find not a philosophy, but ideology. "'Matter' and
'method' (the scientific method) are relevant to cognition only in the
positive sciences. Otherwise, on a philosophical level, they are only instruments for ideological strategy and have nothing to do with cognition or
with metaphysics as a science." This, Dr. Martin insists, is the verdict
of the modern materialist on his own system of thought. " They do not
confront the moderate realist with an alternative metaphysical system,
they are not even talking about the same thing, they do not have the same
purpose. Philosophically they only confront the realist with an ' attitude '
of being against him."
After this hasty review of the principal streams of thought as they appear
in history, Dr. Martin now feels he has vindicated the claim of" moderate
realism " by the process of elimination. ". . . metaphysics as a science is
to be found only in classical realism, and that the moderate realism of the
Aristotle-Aquinas tradition can be considered the most adequate expression."
True philosophy, true metaphysics is to be found only in moderate
realism. What do we say of all the thinkers in history, and especially of
the modern era who work outside the camp of moderate realism? On the

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487

basis of what has been shown so far, they are not proponents of true
philosophy. Are they therefore to be gathered under the one broad
heading of" false philosophy"? The answer is no. Once again the distinction must be carefully drawn between philosophy, even if false, and ideology. " ... an inadequate metaphysics is still metaphysics, and the proponent is a metaphysician, not an anti-philosopher. For example, Descartes,
Spinoza, and Locke were philosophers, ... " Their concern was to know, to
explain. From the standpoint of realism we see their great errors. We
could not however, in all justice, deny they were interested in knowing.
They were philosophers.
Ideology is altogether different. Here there is not merely error in judgment. There is no attempt at judgment. Truth and error have worth to
the extent that they are useful. Ideology denies the possibility of philosophy. Moreover, on the impossible supposition that there were such a thing,
it would still be without value.
The author sums up " Was David Hume essentially a philosopher or an
ideologist? He was a philosopher. Given the premises of Locke and Berkeley, that what we know are our ideas and that to be is to be perceived,
Hume showed that the consequences land one in skepticism. And other
things follow too, such as reason being the slave of the passions. And who
will disagree? This is philosophical analysis of a rather keen sort. It does
not make of Hume an ideologist. Even from the standpoint of Hume's
intention the most that can be said is that Hume, among others, established
the philosophical foundations of ideology. But if, instead of rejecting
the premises, a person accepts the conclusions of Hume, thus denying all
metaphysical truth, and then uses his reason as a slave of his feelings in
order to construct a world in idea to satisfy some practical purpose, then
that person becomes an ideologist and not a philosopher."
Existentialism in the pejorative sense is written off by Dr. Martin as
" ... the outcrying of a sick soul ... and ... prove nothing about, for,
or against metaphysics as a science, or moderate realism in particular." He
does admit that the school of moderate realism has been assigned the task
of answering some of the questions raised by certain existentialists, and of
pursuing certain of their leads. In this connection he reminds the reader
that true philosophy is " open at one end," is able to absorb new ideas
and develop new insights without prejudice to the required basi<: " sameness."
Dr. Martin concludes his "apologetic" with an appeal to present-day
philosophers who find themselves outside the school of moderate realism.
He calls upon them to study the claim of the philosophia perennis,
assuring the prospective " convert " there will be no surrender of freedom.
To guarantee this he invites a critique. "He may, if he so wishes, attempt
a radical critique of Thomistic realism in the hope that his beginnings
may in the future result in an alternative scientific metaphysics even more

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BOOK REVIEWS

adequate." He is quick to warn that " .•. a potential metaphysics is not
as yet a live alternative to an actual one, namely, the twenty-five hundred
years of realism."
In closing, the author reiterates his conviction that the distinction between philosophy and ideology must be maintained. Though the terms
used by the one may materially coincide with those of the other, there is
never a rapport.
Dr. Martin's attempt to show moderate realism as the only candidate
possessing the " marks " requisite in any true philosophy may appear less
than convincing to some. Is it really possible to " conclude " that realism
is the only genuine form of philosophy? Is it not rather necessary to " see "
that it is so? This is, of course, the epistemological problem. The realist
may defend his system by showing up the defect in any argumentation
opposing it. But he cannot appeal to anything as evidence for the justification of his position. There is no evidence for the evident. It seems any
attempt at this sort of epistemology must ultimately beg the question,
as the author himself admits.
The apologetic has value in the approach to Faith. Here the direction
traveled is from the evident on one level of knowledge to an assent on
another. It does not seem legitimate however, to employ this technique in
the hope of bringing a " convert " to a recognition of the validity of what is
in itself evident.
Dr. Martin's distinction between philosophy and ideology is, I think, an
important one. It is a theme which merits more attention. Because of the
limitation imposed on the author in a work of this type, some of the points
in the course of his development are unfortunately unclear, and at times
appear even facile. Despite these understandable shortcomings, his basic
point emerges successfully with clarity.
REV. MA'M'BEW

Dominican HCYUBe of Philosophy,

Dover, Maaa.

KELLEY,

O.P.

BRIEF NOTICES
SYMPOSIUM ON EvoLUTION (held at Duquesne University, April 4, 1959).
By FREDERICK C. BAWDEN, GoTTFRIED 0. LANG, ANDREW G. vAN MELsEN and CYRIL VoLLERT, S. J., with an introduction by Bernard J.
Boelen. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1959. Pp. 119. $8.00.
Dr. Boelen opens this stimulating little series of lectures in commemoration of the centenary of Darwin's Origin of Species with the general
theme of the Duquesne Symposium. Today," this controversial book is no
longer a menace, but has become a challenge," and the Symposium " was
conceived to meet this challenge."
The first lecture of the Symposium, " Evolution and Viruses," is presented
by Dr. Frederick C. Bawden, director of the Rothamsted Experimental
Station for botanical research. After discussing what is presently known
about the nature of the virus, he gives his reasons why viruses must be
late products of evolution rather than primitive forms near the origin of
life on the earth. He then theorises about the origin of viruses based upon
their changes in transmissibility. The main contribution of viruses to evolutionary theory is their manifestation of the operation of natural selection.
As a consequence, there is the possibility of discovering, with better techniques, a rich collection of transmissible factors like viruses but nonpathogenic, that is, beneficial to organisms in their development.
In his lecture "Human Organic Evolution: Fact or Fancy," the anthropologist Dr. Gottfried 0. Lang reviews the contemporary fossil';evidence for
the evolution of the human body, and carefully describes the more common
genetic interpretation of the fossil record. Accepting the record as it stands,
and the modern nco-Darwinian evolutionary interpretation as the best
explanation of the phenomenon of human bodily change both past and
present, he excludes human psychological development from among those
questions of origins which anthropology can legitimately consider. Finally,
he evaluates this evolutionary theory in terms of predictability, simplicity
and elegance, giving it a favorable, though not uncritical, judgment.
Dr. Andrew G. van Melsen, in his lecture "Philosophical Aspects of
Evolution," discusses a host of important problems (1) the special nature
of evolutionary theory and the limited value of " historical " arguments,
(2) mechanistic versus vitalistic interpretation in biology, (8) the abstract
nature of science, (4) the distinction between the animate and inanimate,
brute animals and man, and (5) evolution and finality. His critical precision in isolating the problem of reconciling specific natures and differential
behavior with an apparent gradual undifferentiated process of genetic
origins is not matched, unfortunately, by a solution of equal force and
clarity.

489

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BRIEF NOTICES

He proposes that our traditional method of defining matter, life, sensation, growth, intelligence, spirit, etc. by mutually exclusive categories is
faulty and a result of our incorrect schematizing way of thinking. His
illustration of the way in which we should think, by a kind of analogous
extrapolation, of all matter " knowing " how to act and react, creates more
problems than it solves. To say that " higher forms in nature (plants,
animals and man) are not higher because of the addition to matter of
entirely new principles or factors, they are higher forms because of the
unfolding of something already present in matter " (p. 73) raises the issue
of monism, as the author notes. This view becomes especially critical in
discussing the advent of the human spirit. His solution of the problem by
the use of extrapolation and vague analogy will not altogether satisfy
traditional philosophers.
The final lecture entitled "Evolution and the Bible " by Father Cyril
Vollert, S. J. is a very thorough and competent treatment of the biblical
account of the origin of man and woman and the relationship of the Christian revelation to the evolutionary hypothesis. He discusses in clear
detail the biblical view of the origin of the universe, the origin of the first
man and woman, and, bringing all the recent papal documents to bear on
the questions, carefully distinguishes the religious truths there presented
from the manner in which they are proposed.
He concludes that Sacred Scripture neither teaches nor rejects evolution,
and he adds that the same can be said for the Fathers: they observe
strict neutrality. There are, however, some zones of obscurity and discord
between science and
still unsettled. Open to discussion are (I)
the manner of the " special creation " of man and the adaptation of the
body, (2) continuity versus discontinuity in the advent of man on the
cosmic scene, (3) the infusion of spirit into adult or embryo, (4) paradise
man versus primitive man, and finally, (5) monogenism versus polygenism.
In his conclusion, Father Vollert reiterates the theme of the Symposium,
that though caution should be exercised in these deep and important
matters, evolutionary theory should not engender in the Christian either
disquiet or alarm. This is a peaceful arid reassuring note, to be sure, but
in looking back over the entire Symposium, the reader may wonder at the
absence from the discussion of those issues which caused the late Pope
Pius XII such disquiet and alarm. There is a false, but easy, step from
biological evolution to evolutionism, that " monistic and pantheistic opinion
that the world is in continual evolution," and thence to those erroneous
philosophies which are inspired or augmented by this opinion, namely,
materalism, existentialism and historicism (Humani Generis).
RAYMOND

Dominican House of Studies,
River Forest, IUinoia

J. NoGAR, 0. P.

BRIEF NOTICES

491

Modern Gloom and Christian Hope. By lln.DA GRAEF. Chicago: Henry
Regnery Co., 1959. Pp. 143. $8.50.
From the plan of this very timely book, it is seen that Miss Graef indicates modern gloom as represented notably in existentialism (especially
in the writings of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre, Camus, Anouilh, Simone
de Beauvoir, and Fran'>oise Sagan), the "angry young men" (especially
in the writings of John Osborne and Colin Wilson) , and three Catholic
authors (namely Gabriel Marcel, Mauriac, and Greene), and then shows
that .Christian hope is the basic answer to this problem.
Possibly the most important point established by the author is that
modern gloom is traceable to neurosis, since thereby she suggests that the
writings of the existentialists and similar authors may be clinical syndromes
rather than sources of information about any reality other than the truth
concerning mental illness. Indeed, these writings are examples of logical
supposition and judgment in the mind of the neurotic or the psychotic
and can thereby aid the psychologist towards specific definition at least of
neurosis and psychosis. Miss Graef does not pursue this point, since it is
not directly related to the question of Christian hope as a remedy for
modern gloom.
However, a more precise investigation of the sources of this gloom may
have revealed that modern warfare is quite accidental to its development. A
more direct occasion is found in the luxury and sophistication existing before
and after wartime, since these more directly attack hope, the absence whereof is a characteristic of both neurosis and psychosis. The reason for this is
that luxury and sophistication remove the desire for the arduous good.
When war and its aftermath come, then, the luxurious and sophisticated
person has no sufficient purpose for sustaining the difficult evils of war. A
neurosis or psychosis initiated in the time of peace, therefore, becomes more
intense in the time of war; it does not, however, begin in the circumstance
of war.
In the final chapter, entitled " Modern Gloom and Christian Hope,"
Miss Graef indulges in a rhetoric wherein the observations have little,
if any, coherence. Had she pursued her subject more thoroughly, she
could have indicated the commonly applicable therapies aimed at the development of Christian hope. In this way, she could have maintained her
purpose of writing for the general public and yet provided some practical
directive for coping with the problem of modern gloom.
Nevertheless, from' the foregoing it is clear that Miss Graef has indicated
the basic answer to the problem of modern gloom, since the aim of the
spiritual director and the psychiatrist must be the establishment of hope.
In this regard, she is to be congratulated upon her excellent choice of texts
indicating the basic ill, as well as her interspersed, sagacious observations

BRIEF NOTICES

on matters in these texts, and especially upon her consideration of two poets
who passed from an existentialist status to the status of Christian hope,
namely, T. S. Eliot and Paul Claudel.
CHRISTOPHER

Aquinas College,
Grand Rapids, Mich.

M. LEHNER, o. p.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Adler, Joshua. Philosophy of Judaism. New York: 'Philosophical Library,
Inc., 1960. Pp. 160. $8.00.
Altaner, Berthold. Patrology. New York: Herder and Herder, Inc., 1960.
Pp. 684 with index. $10.00.
Baur, Benedict. (Elisabethe Corathiel-Noonan, Tr.). In Silence with God.
Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1960. Pp. 245. $8.75.
Brown, Brendan Francis. (Compiled & Edited by). The Natural Law
Reader. New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1960. Pp. 240 with
index. $8.50 cloth; $1.85 paper.
Caponigri, A. Robert. (Ed.). Modern Catholic Thinkers. New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1960. Pp. 686. $15.00.
Cerfaux, Msgr. Lucien. (Donald D. Duggan, Tr.). Apostle and Apostolate.
New York: Desclee Co., Inc., 1960. Pp. 184. $2.75.
Coleburt, Russell. The Search for Values. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1960.
Pp. 185 with index. $8.00.
Diamond, Malcolm L. Martin Buber-Jewish Existentialist. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1960. Pp. 240 with index. $4.50.
Dutt, K. Guru. Existentialism and Indian Thought. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1960. Pp. 92. $2.75.
Erling, Bernhard. Nature and History: A Study in Theological Methodology with Special Attention to the Method of Motif Research.
Lund: C W K Gleerup, 1960. Pp. 286 with index.
Fanfani, Amintore. (Rev. Henry J. Yannone, Tr.). Catechism of Catholic
Social Teaching. Westminster: The Newman Press, 1960. Pp. 285
with index. $2.95.
Greenwood, David. The Nature of Science. New York: Philosophical
Library, Inc., 1959. Pp. 108 with index. $8.75.
Hamm, Victor M. Language, Truth and Poetry: The 1960 Aquinas
Lecture. Milwaukee: The Marquette Universtity Press, 1960. Pp.
88. $2.50, cloth and board cover.
Rardon, S. J., John A. Christianity in Conflict (A Catholic View of
Protestantism). Westminster: The Newman Press, 1959. Pp. 800
with index. $4.50.
Henry, S. J., Paul. Saint Augustine on Personality: The Saint Augustine
Lecture 1959. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960. Pp. 44.
$U5.
Heris, 0. P., Ch.-V. Le Mystere de Dieu. Paris: Les Editions du Cerf,
1960. Pp. 295. 10,50NF.
Hock, M.D., Alfred. Reason and Genius. New York: Philosophical
Library, Inc., 1960. Pp. 188. $8.75.

498

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Kaufman, Gordon D. Relativism Knowledge, and Faith. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1960. Pp. 154 with index. $8.75.
Kendzierski, Ph. D., Lottie H. (Tr.). Saint Thomas AquinM on Charity
(De Caritate). Milwaukee: The Marquette University Press, 1960.
Pp. 115 with index. $8.00 paper cover.
King, Peter D. The Principle of Truth. New York: Philosophical Library,
Inc., 1960. Pp. 110. $8.75.
Knox, Msgr. Ronald. PMtoral Sermons. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1960.
Pp.
with index. $8.50.
Lawler, Justus George. The Catholic Dim,ension in Higher Education.
Westminster: The Newman Press, 1960. Pp.
with index. $8.95.
Lefebvre, 0. S. B., Caspar. (Edward A. Maziarz, C. PP. S., Tr.). Redemption through the Blood of Jesus. Westminster: The Newman Press,
1960. Pp.
with index. $4.00.
Lynch, S. J., William F. Christ and Apollo: Dimensions of the Literary
Imagination. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1960. Pp.
with 4
supplements. $5.00.
Meseguer, S. J., Pedro. The Secret of Dreams. Westminster: The Newman
Press, 1960. Pp.
with index. $4.75.
Morrissy, Una. (Tr.) . The Sermons of the Cure of Ars. Chicago: Henry
Regnery Company, 1960. Pp. 195. $4.00.
O'Connell, S. J., Robert J. Citadel of Wisdom. Bayshore: Montfort Publications, 1960. Pp. US. $8.00.
Orynski, Wanda (Ed.). Hegel: An Annotated Selection. New York:
Philosophical Library, Inc., 1960. Pp. 877. $4.75.
Palmer, S. J., Paul F. Sacraments and Forgiveness: Sources of Christian
Theology, Vol. II. Westminster: The Newman Press, 1960. Pp.
410 with index. $6.00.
Pope John XXTII. Christmas Message, 1959. District of Columbia:
National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1960. Pp. 10.
Proceedings of The American Catholic Philosophical Association Thirtythird Annual Meeting March 31 and April 1, 1959, Contemporary
American Philosophy. District of Columbia: The Catholic University of America. Pp. 184 with list of members. $3.50.
Quine, Willard Van Orman. Word and Object. New York: John Wiley &
with index. $5.50.
Sons, Inc., 1960. Pp.
Redpath, Theodore. Tolstoy. New York: Hillary House Publishers. Ltd.,
1960. Pp.
St. John's University Studies, Philosophical Series 1. Jamica: St. John's
University Press, 1960. Pp. 164.
Scharp, Heinrich. How the Catholic Church is Governed. New York:
Herder and Herder, Inc., 1960. Pp. 168.
Schwarz, Balduin V. (Ed.). The Human Person and The World of Values.
New York: Fordham University Press, 1960. Pp.
$5.00.

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495

Seely, Charles S. Modern Materialism. New York: Philosophical Library,
Inc., 1960. Pp. 83. $2.50.
Sih, Paul K. T. Should We Recognize Red China? District of Columbia:
National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1960. Pp. 10.
Simmel, George. (Curt Rosenthal, Tr.). Sociology of Religion. New York:
Philosophical Library, Inc., 1959. Pp. 86. $3.75.
Stein, Edith. (Hilda Graef, Tr.). The Science of the Cross. Chicago:
Henry Regnery Company, 1960. Pp. 265 with index. $4.75.
Tresmontant, Claude. (Michael Francis Gibson, Tr.). A Study of Hebrew
Thought. New York: Desclee Company, 1960. Pp. 198. $3.75.
Vallon, Michel Alexander. An Apostle of Freedom: Life and Teachings of
Nicholas Berdyaev. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1960.
Pp. 370 with index. $6.00.
Valori, S.J., Paolo. Ill Metoda Fenornenologico e la Fondazione della
Filosofia. Rome: Desclee & C., 1959. Pp. 222 with index.
Weyergans, Franz. (Joseph Cunneen, Tr.). The Long Adventure. Chicago:
Henry Regnery Company, 1960. Pp. 122. $3.50.
Winn, Ralph B. (Ed.). A Dictionary of Existentialism. New York:
Philosophical Library, Inc., 1960. Pp. 122. $3.75.
Wyman, Mary A. The Lure for Feeling. New York: Philosophical
Library, Inc., 1960. Pp. 204 with index. $4.75.