THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS: THE DoMINICANFATHERS OF THE PRoviNCE OF ST. JosEPH
Publishers:

VoL. XXIV

The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

JANUARY, 1961

No.1

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, GALILEO, AND EINSTEIN

I

T is frequently said of St. Thomas Aquinas that the man
has been lost behind the voluminous quantity of his writing.
Commenting :further on this literary output of the Common Doctor, one could say that his valuable contributions to
the development of physical science have been lost in the great
mass of his writing on theology and philosophy. In this vein,
it might not be amiss to bring out of the shadows cast by
Aquinas' more famous works a few specimens of his thought
on the subject of scientific knowledge, contributions that, had
they been those of a lesser genius, might have been appreciated
the more by assessors of the medieval scientific tradition.
To those who are friends and admirers of St. Thomas, no
apology is needed for treating the question of his basic theory
of physical knowledge. But even should the reader make no
commitment whatsoever to Thomism, it could well be profitable to reconsider some of the perennial problems of the universe in the light of Aquinas' conception of physical science.
Such a consideration need not be anachronistic. As Burtt has
1

WILLIAM A. WALLACE

pointed out in his Metaphysical Foundations of Modern
Science, every age has its unconscious presuppositions, and
these can sometimes be brought to light by setting off current
views against those of an earlier period, when prevailing notions
were not so commonly entertained. 1 And if every age has its
hidden presuppositions, it is also true that every age has its
problems-not unconnected, possibly, with these same suppositions. We in America are now very much preoccupied with
the study of the physical universe: on the surface, great
progress is being made in science and technology, but at the
heart of the matter, when scientists ask how much is really
known about the world in which we live, there is a gnawing
doubt that makes itself increasingly felt about our ability ever
to reach any definitive answers. It is on such a problem of the
validity of scientific knowledge that Thomas Aquinas may
have something worthwhile to offer to the modem mind, and
this proposal will therefore be the burden of our study.
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS (U25-1274)

The intellectual atmosphere that Aquinas breathed at the
University of Paris in the mid-thirteenth century was not
sympathetic to natural science; in fact, it was markedly hostile
to the influx of Aristotelian and Arabian thought into Western
Europe-an influx that brought with it much of the scientific
learning of the ancient world. This attitude of hostility at
Paris, however, was not apparent at the other great center of
studies in medieval Christendom, Oxford University. There
the discovery of Aristotle's logical works, and particularly the
translation of the Posterior Analytics (with commentary) by
Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln (1175-1258) , had stimulated great interest in a type of mathematical physics which
accented studies in optical science.2 This had resulted in what
Baeumker has called a " metaphysics. of light," a philosophy
immediately put to the service of theology to develop the
E. A. Burtt, (London:
pp. 15-17.
A. C. Crombie, Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science,
(Oxford: 1958), pp. 91-184.
1

2

ST. THOMAS

AQUINAS,

GALILEO,

AND EINSTEIN

3

Christian Platonism of the Oxford school.3 What is of more
importance, however, in this scientific revival at Oxford was
its insistence on the role of mathematics in physical proof. In
this school a pure mathematical structure was commonly
conceived as objectively existing in things, before their physical
properties, and giving the only adequate explanation of observed reality. Possibly through Roger Bacon, the influence
of Grosseteste's work was gradually felt on the continent, and
provoked a decided reaction from the pen of St. Albert the
Great
the teacher of St. Thomas Aquinas. Albert
himself, unique among the Paris Masters, had been sympathetic
to the influx of Aristotelian thought, had done extensive observational and experimental work in biology, meteorology and
alchemy, and had reconstructed a physical theory from Aristotle's Physics that was opposed to the mathematical realism
of the Oxford schooU The young Aquinas then built upon
Albert's foundations, and elaborated this theory that was primarily physical, but at the same time allowed for a legitimate
use of mathematics in obtaining strict physical explanation or
proo£.5
For Aquinas, as for Albert, mathematical structure is not
imposed on reality by the mind, but rather is abstracted from
reality by a mental process that leaves aside all the irregularities of matter and the flux of movement and time. More basic
than this mathematical structure is the physical nature of the
reality studied, which is determined to express itself in a
certain figure-by which, for example, we can easily recognize
a horse, and distinguish it from a cow. The. quantitative
characteristics that are thus expressive of a type are not themselves mathematical entities, but rather are physical ones,
• C. Baeumker, " Der Platonismus im Mittelalter," in Studien und Charakteristiken zur Geschichte der Philosophie insbesondere des Mittelalters, Beitriige zur
Miinster-i-W.:
p.
Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Bd.
160 ff.
• J. A. Weisheipl, 0. P., "Albertus Magnus and the Oxford Platonists," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol.
(1958), pp.
1!l4-189.
• J. A. Weisheipl, 0. P., The Development of Physical Theory in the Middle
Ages, (London: 1959), pp.

4

WILLIAM A. WALLACE

although originative sources of the idealized static structure
studied by the mathematician. Thus, in Aquinas' view, the
insight afforded by mathematics is not deeper-or more
"divine," as the Platonists would have it-but actually is more
superficial than a physical insight. As a consequence, explanation through mathematics does not explain the physical nature,
but it does accurately describe that nature, and it can help in
discovering a physical explanation or proof. 8
The help that mathematics gives to the physicist was conceived by Aquinas as being of two kinds, one which functions
at the level of hypothesis to suggest possible physical explanations, the other which functions conjointly with physical reasoning to give conclusive explanation or proof. 7 An example of
the first would be the Thomistic evaluation of Ptolemy's explanation of the motion of the heavens through eccentrics and
epicycles. Viewed mathematically, Aquinas noted, the observed
appearances of the stars result" either from the motion of the
object seen or from the motion of the observer, ... it makes
no difference which is moving." 8 But as a physical explanation
he showed considerable reserve towards the Ptolemaic hypotheses, noting that while they do account for the stellar appearances, " we must not say that they are thereby proved to
be facts, because perhaps it would be possible to explain the
apparent movements of the stars by some other method which
men have not yet thought out." 9 His whole treatment of
astronomical and meteorological problems, in fact, seems aimed
at correcting a naive mathematicism among medieval Aristotelians, for he points out that Aristotle, in dealing with the
heavenly spheres, had mistaken a suppositional theory for
established fact. 10 He himself is at pains to elaborate the
reasons why we cannot have certain judgments about the
heavenly bodies; 11 yet, he observes, it is not stupid or neces• Cf. In I de Caelo, lect. 1, n.
and lect. 8, n. 6; In II Phya., lect. 8; Summa
Theologiae, I, q. 1, a. 1, ad
• Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q.
a. 1, ad 2; In II Phya., lect. 8, n. 9.
8 In II de Caelo, lect. II, n.
and lect. U, n. 4.
11 Ibid., lect. 4, n. 8.
10 Ibid.
• Ibid., lect. 17, n. 2.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,

GALILEO,

AND EINSTEIN

5

sarily precipitate to venture an explanation, for he holds that
a theory or supposition that does not conflict with the facts
is far better than no explanation at all.12
In addition to this first, or hypothetical use of mathematics
in seeking a possible explanation, Aquinas also conceived of
mathematics as functioning directly in physical argument to
furnish a conclusive explanation or proo£.13 This too can
best be illustrated by an example. 14 In discussing the shape
of the earth, he notes that the latter can be proved to be a
sphere merely by an analysis of measurements made on its
surface--essentially a mathematical proof. 15 But he regards
as more conclusive for the physicist a proof which arises not
simply from a mathematical description of the earth's surface,
but which leads to a knowledge of the physical causes that
make the earth to be a sphere. Thus he observes, " all gravitating bodies . . . approach the earth at the same angle, that
is, at a right angle . . . and not in parallel lines." 16 This
universal mode of gravitation " is what makes the earth to be
spherical by nature," he says, because the spherical shape alone
can satisfy the uniform tendency of all parts to a common
center of gravity. 11 "If the earth were naturally flat, as some
have said," he continues, " then bodies would not gravitate
everywhere towards the earth at the same angle." 18 It should
be noted in this proof that the physical cause Aquinas assigns
need not make the earth a perfect sphere-" irregularities such
as mountains and valleys arise," he concedes, although " not
of notable dimensions compared with those of the earth," and
he attributes them to " some other incidental cause." 19 Thus
pure or perfect mathematical shape, for Aquinas, does not exist
in physical reality: it is only the human mind, abstracting
12
13

Ibid., lect. 7, nn. 4-5; In I Meteorologicorum, lect. II, n. 1.
In I Po$/;. Anal., lect.
nn. 5-6.

10 For other examples, together with some applications to modem science, see my
"Some Demonstrations in the Science of Nature," The Thomm Reader 1957
(Washington, D. C.: 1957), pp. 90-IIS.
'"In II de Caelo, lect. 28, n. 4.
18 Ibid.
•• Ibid., n. I.

" Ibid .

18

Ibid.

6

WILLIAM A. WALLACE

from material irregularities such as mountains and valleys, that
can conceive of the earth as a perfect sphere. 20 But the earth
does have a natural or physical shape which is approximately
spherical, and this shape can reveal to the inquiring mind the
physical reason which makes the earth to have this shape in
the first place. 21
Space does not permit even a sketch of the historical consequences of this theory of physical proof developed by Albert
and Aquinas. It is indisputable, however, that this theory
made clear, at a critical period of medieval thought, the distinction between hypothetical explanation and proven fact,
while allowing for a legitimate use of mathematics in both
types of reasoning. To this one might add that some recently
edited texts can be used to argue to the existence of a " Dominican school" in optical science, beginning with encyclopedic
collections of data by Thomas of Cantimpre, Vincent of
Beauvais and Albert the Great, developing through the theoretical speculations of Thomas Aquinas, John of Paris and Peter
of Alvernia, and culminating in the brilliant experimental
researches and physico-mathematical theories of Theodoric of
Freiburg. 22 The historical import is not insignificant: in less
than a century, this line of thought, quite independent of the
Oxford school, furnished the first correct fundamental theory
of the rainbow-and this more than three hundred years before
the publication of Descartes' Discours de la Methode and Les
M eteores, where basically the same explanation of the rainbow
is cited as one of the brilliant achievements of the new
Cartesian methodology. 23
•• In II Phys., lect. 8, nn. 4-6.
21 Summa Theologiae, p. I, q. 1, a. 1, ad !2; In I de Caelo, lect. S, n. 6.
22 See my The Scientific Methodology
of Theodoric of Freiburg, Studia Friburgensia No. 26 (Fribourg: 19:59), pp. 182-!249. Newly edited texts are contained
in Appendix III, pp. 805-876.
•• The full title of Descartes' work on methodology reads: " Discours de Ia
Methode pour bien conduire sa raison, et chercher Ia verite dans les sciences. Plus
Ia Dioptrique, les Meteores, et Ia Geometrie, qui sont des essais de cette Methode,"
(Leyde: 1687). The explicit statement from Les Meteores is contained in
Descartes' Oeuvres, ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery (Paris: 1897-1910), Vol. VI,
p. 281.

ST. THOMAS

AQUINAS,

GALILEO,

AND EINSTEIN

7

GALILEO GALILEI

While not belittling the importance of Descartes' influence
on modern thought, we may turn now to one of his contemporaries, Galileo Galilei, to whom the accolade is commonly given
for having procured the" downfall of Aristotle" and the beginning of a new era in science. Some might quibble on the phrase
" downfall of Aristotle " and urge that this was more a downfall of a caricature of Aristotle drawn by third-rate scholastics, 24
but without gainsaying the point, the effect was pretty much
as popularly conceived. One of Galileo's admirers, Fr. Paolo
Sarpi, registered a not uncommon reaction when he said: " To
give us the science of motion God and Nature have joined
hands and created the intellect of Galileo." 25 In our own day,
the popular image is that of an indefatigable experimenter
climbing the leaning tower of Pisa to put the Aristotelians to
rout with his measurements of falling bodies. 26 Recent studies
point more significantly to the Renaissance reaction to Galileo's
Message of the Stars. Thus Koyre summarizes:
Mountains pn the moon, new' planets' in the sky, new fixed stars
in tremend'ous numbers, things that no human eye had ever seen,
and no human mind conceived before. And not only this . . . also
the description of an astonishing invention ... the first scientific
instrument, the telescope, which made all these discoveries and
enabled Galileo to transcend the limitation imposed by natureor by God-on human senses and human knowledge. 27

The experimental work of Galileo might easily-though
falsely-be interpreted as the beginning of modern scientific
method, with its accent on postulational procedures subsequently verified by experimental proof. Actually Galileo's
method was more closely patterned on that of the late Aristo9 ' Cf. G. de Santillana, The Crime of Galileo (Chicago: 1955), pp. !!4, 56, 69.
•• Cited by Burtt, op. cit., p. 74.
•• But see L. Cooper, Aristotle, Galileo & the Tower of Pisa (Ithaca: 1935); also
E. A. Moody, "Galileo and Avempace: The Dynamics of the Leaning Tower
Experiment," Journal of the History of Ideas, Ill (1951), pp. 163-193, 375-4!!!!.
01 A. Koyre, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, (New York:
1957)' p. 90.

8

WILLIAM A. WALLACE

telians of the Paduan school,28 and its most significant aspect
was not its insistence on experiment, but rather on the fact
that " the book of nature " is written only in the language of
mathematics. 29 "This book is written in the mathematical
language," wrote Galileo, " and the symbols are triangles,
circles, and other geometrical figures, without whose help
it is impossible to comprehend a single word of it; without
which one wanders in vain through a dark labyrinth." 30
Galileo was quite convinced of the absolute truth of the heliocentric theory, maintaining that it was not merely a possible
explanation, a " saving of the appearances," as Osiander had
indicated in his preface to Copernicus' work, 31 but rather that
it expressed a certain truth with which one could even contest
traditional interpretations of Sacred Scripture. " Although [a
theory that saves the appearances] satisfies an astronomer
merely arithmetical," he said, " it does not afford satisfaction
or content to the astronomer philosophical." 32 His own metaphysical option, according to Burtt, was for a much refined
Platonism that was actually a strict mathematical realism 38one could almost call it a revival of the Pythagorean doctrine
of twenty centuries previous. 34 Experiments had no probative
value for Galileo; they were meant to appeal to the popular
mind-those who knew mathematics really had no need of
them. But the popular mind also needed convincing, and here
Galileo's genius for stirring up trouble came to the fore. His
wit and sarcasm in controversy are well known, and on hearing
•• Cf. J. H. Randall, Jr., "The Development of Scientific Method in the School
at Padua," Journal of the HistOTy of Ideas, 1 (1940), pp. 177-206; P. R. Wiener,
" The Tradition Behind Galileo's Methodology," Osiris, 1 (19S6), p. 7SS ff.
•• See, for example, J. Collins, A History of Modern Eurupean Philosophy,
(Milwaukee: 1954), pp. 79-81.
•• Galileo, Il SaggiatOTe (Florence: 1842), p. 171.
31 For a detailed examination of the relations between. Copernicus and Galileo,
see P. Conway, 0. P., "Aristotle, Copernicus and Galileo," The New Scholasticism
2S (1949), pp. S8-61, 129-146.
•• Galileo, Dialogue on the Great W OTld Systems, Third Day, ed. G. de Santillana,
pp. S49-S50.
•• Burtt, op. cit., pp. 82, 84; cf. A. Koyre, .. Galileo and Plato," Journal of the
HistOTy of Ideas, 4 (194S), pp. 400-428.
•• Cf. G. de Santillana, The Crime of Galileo, p. 69.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,

GALILEO,

AND EINSTEIN

9

this brief excerpt from a letter, one can imagine the hot arguments he provoked. He writes:
Oh, my dear Kepler, how I wish that we could have one hearty
laugh together! Here at Padua is the principal professor of philosophy, whom I have repeatedly and urgently requested to look at
the moon and planets through my telescope, which he pertinaciously
refuses to do. Why are you not here? What shouts of laughter
we should have at this glorious folly! And to hear the professor of
philosophy at Pisa laboring before the Grand Duke with logical
arguments, as if with magical incantations, to charm the new
planets out of the sky! 35
In sober fact, Galileo Galilei never did prove that the earth
went around the sun, and not vice versa. Conclusive proof of
the type Aquinas would have sanctioned, such as is found now,
for instance, in our astronomy• textbooks, had to wait two
more centuries for the contributions of Foucault and
Galileo's real " crime " had nothing to do with revealed religion:
it consisted merely in this, that he saw proof too easily, and
thus obscured (in his own mind, at least) the distinction
between hypothetical explanation and proven fact already well
known to Aquinas. Yet there was much that was good in his
work-he had offered new evidence that should have been
taken into account by the
of his day. As de
Santillana remarks, " Had there been in Rome, at the time of
the first crisis of 1616, a youthful Aquinas ... instead of an
aged Bellarmine," history might have been written differently. 87
But " there was no Aquinas," 38 and well known is the unfortunate stand taken by those who were in Rome, to bring
about what history will always regard as a tragic ending in a
most unsatisfactory case.

•• Letter to Kepler, 1610; cited by Burtt, op. cit., p. 77.
as Cf. A. C. Crombie, · "Galileo's 'Dialogues Concerning the Two Principal
Systems of the World,'" Dominican Studies, S (1950), pp. 105-188.
87 The Crime of Galileo, p. ix.
""Ibid.

10

WILLIAM A. WALLACE
ALBERT EINSTEIN

(1879-1955)

Crombie has suggested that the great genius of Albert Einstein, working three centuries after Galileo to elaborate the
theory of relativity, consisted in his breaking away from the
spell under which the great Italian had put mathematical
physics from its inception. " Einstein was able to advance the
theory of relativity," Crombie writes, "because he acted on
the principle that the object of physical science is to' save the
appearances ' by mathematical abstractions postulated for no
other purpose than to 'save the appearances.'" 89 Einstein
seems to have had little hope of penetrating to the reality behind his equations, and there can be little doubt that recent
revolutions in physics, traceable in large measure to Einstein,
show a decided break with the Galilean concept of proof. In
fact, with Einstein ends the naive optimism of a classical
physics that saw the book of nature written in the language
of mathematics. 40 Proficiency in mathematics, it is true,
enabled this modern scientist to achieve brilliant successes in
theoretical physics, but the more he worked, the more he
doubted the exact correspondence of pure mathematics to
physical reality. "As far as the laws of mathematics refer to
reality," he says, "they are not certain; and as far as they are
certain, they do not refer to reality.'' 41 In fact, Einstein would
go even further; for him, fundamental principles cannot be
"abstracted" from, sensory experience-they are "free inventions of the human intellect.'' 42 Far from subscribing to
the striCt mathematical realism of Galileo, he oscillates between
positivism and idealism, while ever leaving a provisional cast
to his conclusions. 43 "Our notions of physical reality can never
89 A. C. Crombie, Augustine to Galileo, (London: 1952), p. 828 (italics added).
•• In writing this, we are aware that Niels Bohr and the Copenhagen school are
even more radical in their renunciation of classical physics than Einstein, but the
latter's position is sufficiently representative for our purposes.
"Geometrie und Erfahrung, cited in Albert Einstein, Philosopher-Scientist,
Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. Vll, (Evanston: 1949), p. 880.
•• Herbert Spencer Lecture, 1988 cited ibid., p. 278.
•• Cf. P. G. Frank, "Einstein, Mach and Logical Positivism," ibid., pp.

ST. THOMAS

AQUINAS,

GALILEO,

AND EINSTEIN

11

be final," he states. "We must always be ready to change those
notions . . . in order to do justice to perceived facts in the
most logically perfect way." 44
Compared to the physical views of Aquinas and Galileo,
those of Einstein stand in proper relief. Seven centuries ago,
Aquinas saw the possibility of a mathematical physics that
could provide both provisional explanation and conclusive proof,
although he had no illusions about the difficulties involved in
unveiling the ultimate secrets of the physical universe. 45 Three
centuries ago, flushed with his dramatic conquest over the
popular mind, Galileo saw proof too easily in the mathematics
he had learned to read in the book of nature; in his view,
conclusive proof was quickly had-all one need do was study
his new science of motion, and the Ptolemaic-Copernican controversy would perforce come to an end. In our own day,
Einstein went to the other extreme, for where Galileo saw
proof as too easy, he saw it as too difficult-hence an essential
relativism in his physical theory which permits no final answers
about the physical universe. Aquinas would look for the evidence of Bessel and Foucault to decide the Copernican controversy; Galileo would say that the mathematical simplicity
of his laws had already decided it; Einstein would say that his
general theory of relativity had made it forever undecidable. 46

The Problem
This brings us to the problem that is vexing modern science,
to the solution of which the physical theory of Aquinas might
be able to register a contribution. In the popular mind, science
V. F. Lenzen, "Einstein's Theory of Knowledge," ibid., pp. 855-884; H. Margenau,
"Einstein's Conception of Reality," ibid., pp.
••" Clerk Maxwell's Influence on the Idea of Physical Reality," cited ibid., p.
•• Cf. In I Meteorologicorum, lect. 1, n. 9.
u " The struggle, so violent in the early days of science, between the views of
Ptolemy and Copernicus would then be quite meaningless. Either CS [coordinate
system] could be used with equal justification. The two sentences, 'the sun is at
rest and the earth moves,' or ' the sun moves and the earth is at rest,' would simply
mean two different conventions concerning two different CS."-A. Einstein and L.
Infeld, The Evolution of Physics, (New York: 1942), p.

WILLIAM A. WALLACE

is making great strides forward, finding out new truths everyday that undermine traditional philosophies and even religious
beliefs, supplying definitive answers to questions that have
plagued men's minds since the dawn of civilization. But within
the scientific fraternity itself, there is no such optimism-at
least not so far as the question of conclusive proof is concerned.
" Proof," writes Eddington, " is an idol before whom the pure
mathematician tortures himself. In physics we are generally
content to sacrifice before the lesser shrine of plausibility."
Relativity and quantum theories are now the standards against
which scientific achievement is measured. One is not surprised
that some now hold that whether the earth goes around the
sun or vice versa depends strictly on one's point of view, and
cannot be proved one way or another. Not long ago, a methodologist told the writer that it was merely a theory that the
earth is round! Today the whole world is talking of " molecules" and "atoms" and "electrons" and "cosmic rays";
even high-school children can tell us of "evolving galaxies"
and the " expanding universe." Has science proved that such
things exist? Or are they merely " free inventions of the human
mind"? Is the hard core of scientific fact softer than we think?
Or is it possibly even an empty shell?
Einstein, we may presume, would want to disabuse the
modern mind of its confidence in the permanent achievements
of science. Galileo, no doubt, would be tremendously surprised
at the state of affairs that has arisen in the science that he
fathered, but one may surmise that he would still champion the
absolute power of mathematics to give certain truth. Aquinas,
we can be sure, would temper the optimism of Galileo, butrealist that he was-he would also temper the pessimism of
Einstein by bridging the gap between science and common
sense. While denying that mathematics is the skeleton key that
opens all the doors of knowledge, he would say that it has a
proper role to play in physical research, that it can lead to
conclusive physical proof, that some final answers can be given
about the world in which we live.
•• A. S. Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World, (New York, 19!t8), p. 887.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,

GALILEO,

AND EINSTEIN

18

Three divergent answers to a perennial question about the
physical universe. Which is correct? While recognizing that
the latter question would be regarded as unanswerable (if not
meaningless, in Wittgenstein's sense) by some philosophers of
science, and while conceding that the extreme polarity between
the positions of Galileo and Einstein is more by way of suggestion than by way of explicit commitment in the writings
of these scientists, we should like to propose a somewhat novel
evaluation of the three possible alternatives. It is this, namely,
that Aquinas' answer-the teaching of the analytical school to
the contrary-is still the one implicitly subscribed to by the
practicing scientist, and that the essential contribution of Einstein is to cancel out the excessive mathematical realism of
Galileo, while still leaving open the possibility of a type of
physical certainty and proof as conceived by Thomas Aquinas.
A Thomistic Proposal
The justification for this view may perhaps be seen if we
analyze the scientific evidence commonly adduced to prove (1)
that the earth rotates on its axis, and (2) that its shape is
approximately that of an oblate spheroid. In the interests of
rigor, and to facilitate discussion of the central issue, we shall
frame both arguments in the form of a syllogism, then answer
an objection that is commonly encountered against each argument, and with that draw some inferences about the current
status of physical proof in modem science.
The first argument may be stated as follows:
A body on which a freely swinging pendulum deviates at the rate
of one revolution per twenty four hours at the poles, decreasing
according to the sine of the latitude to zero deviation at the equator
is rotating on its polar axis once every twenty-four hours.
But the earth is a body on which a freely swinging pendulum
deviates at the rate of one revolution per twenty-four hours at the
poles, decreasing according to the sine of the latitude to zero
deviation at the equator.
Therefore the earth is rotating on its polar axis once every twentyfour hours.

14

WILLIAM A. WALLACE

The second argument then reads:
A body on which a freely swinging pendulum of fixed length has
periods of oscillation which increase slightly with increasing latitude
from the equator to both poles is an oblate spheroid slightly flattened at the poles.
But the earth is a body on which a freely swinging pendulum of
fixed length has periods of oscillation which increase slightly with
increasing latitude from the equator to both poles.
Therefore the earth is an oblate spheroid slightly flattened at the
poles (and here we add parenthetically...:._although this does not
follow logically-the flattening being caused by the centrifugal force
of its daily rotation).

Here, then, are two demonstrations which conclude to some
predication about the earth, namely, (1) that it is an oblate
spheroid, and (2) that it rotates on its axis of symmetry once
every twenty-four hours, both arguments using as the middle
term some aspect of the behavior of a pendulum on the earth's
surface, which is discovered to be caused by the shape and
rotation of the earth itself.
Some will object against the second argument-the one concluding to the shape of the earth-that this was regarded as
valid in the pre-Einstein period, when it was thought that
Euclidean geometry was uniquely applicable to the physical
universe. But in the present day, when non-Euclidean geometries have proved to be remarkably fruitful in explaining
physical phenomena, one cannot say for sure that the earth
is a sphere or an oblate spheroid; in another geometry it might
be another mathematical figure, and thus the argument no
longer truly demonstrates.
To this objection we answer that, if relativity theory has
shown anything, it has shown that the geometry used by the
physicist to describe the shape of the earth is basically immaterial. For dimensions as small as those of the earth, it is
of no physical importance whatsoever whether the geometry
is Euclidean, or Riemannian, or Lobatchewskian. But the very
objection reveals one thing that is quite important, namely,
that the objector is a mathematical realist who conceives pure
mathematical form as objectively existing in, and determining,

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,

GALILEO,

AND EINSTEIN

15

the universe to a particular geometry. As has been shown
earlier, this is not the Thomistic concept: physical quantity is
much too irregular, it is much too perturbed by physical
factors-such as matter and motion and time, and their means
of measurement-to
yield pure geometrical form, except
through a process of mathematical abstraction. Thus, when
the physicist says that the earth is an oblate spheroid, just as
he prescinds from the mountains and valleys and other physical
irregularities, so he prescinds from the slight differences associated with alternative pure geometries, to say something that
is physically meaningful about the shape of the earth.
The first argument also seems to be vulnerable-this time to
an objection drawn from the general theory of relativity. We
have argued that it is possible to demonstrate that the earth is
actually rotating on its axis once every twenty-four hours.
Now Einstein, and before him the great German physicist,
Ernst Mach-who undoubtedly gave inspiration to Einstein's
new theories-have held that it is impossible to detect an
absolute rotation in the universe. Thus they would argue that
the cause assigned above for the deviation of the pendulum on
the earth's surface (or for the bulge at the equator) need not
be the rotation of the earth: the same effect can be correlated
mathematically with the apparent motion of the " fixed " stars,
and thus one cannot be absolutely sure that the earth's
rotation is causing the pendulum phenomena or the bulge at
the center, since these might be caused by other forces connected with the diurnal motion of the stars. 48
A Thomistic answer to this difficulty is suggested by that of
.the English astronomer and commentator on general relativity
theory, Sir A. S. Eddington, who writes in this connection:
I doubt whether anyone will persuade himself that the stars have
anything to do with the phenomenon. We do not believe that if
the heavenly bodies were all annihilated it would upset the gyrocompass. In any case, precise calculation shows that the centrifugal
• 8 For a fuller statement of this position, see H. Reichenbach, Modem Philosophy of Science, (New York: 1959), p. 12.

16

WILLIAM A. WALLACE

force could not be produced by the motion of the stars, so far as
they are known. 49

As for the search for some unknown force that might explain
the phenomenon, Eddington becomes more caustic:
As we go further into space to look for a cause, the centrifugal force
becomes greater and greater, so that the more we defer the debt
the heavier the payment demanded in the end. Our present theory
is like the debtor who does not mind how big an obligation accumulates, satisfied that he can always put off the payment. It chases
the cause away to infinity, content that the laws of nature ...
are satisfied all the way. 50

In this matter, Thomas Aquinas, we may be reasonably sure,
would be content with a physical explanation of the motion of
the pendulum or of the bulge at the equator in terms of known
causes, and would be quite unhappy with an explanation, or a
methodology, that would remove a hypothetical cause to infinity. As to the mathematical correlation with the fixed stars
mentioned by Mach and Einstein, this would not disturb him:
he would say, as has already been pointed out, that mathematically it makes no difference whether either one, the earth
or the fixed stars, is conceived as moving. But once he saw the
physical evidence available today to show that the plane of
oscillation of a pendulum is independent of the motion of its
support and is determined uniquely by its point of suspension,
the center of gravity of its bob and the center of gravity of the
local region, or once he convinced himself that there are centrifugal forces connected with every rotation that we initiate, he
would look no further for a causal eXplanation in the remote
depths of space to account for the deviation of a pendulum
on the earth's surface, or for the observed bulge in the earth's
contour at the equator. He would conclude, as do most modem
scientists, that these are caused by the rotation of the earth,
and that the earth therefore is actually spinning on its axis.11
•• Space, Time and Gravitation (Cambridge:
p. 158.
•o Ibid.
"' This argument can be stated more technically by referring the motion of the
pendulum to the local inertial axes of the Copernican coordinate system. Thus

ST. THOMAS

AQUINAS,

GALILEO,

AND EINSTEIN

17

This conclusion, it should be noted, does not commit the
Thomist to the Newtonian conception of a subsistent absolute
space (or absolute time) in which such spinning motion is
executed. The notion of absolute space is again ·an extreme
of mathematical realism which attributes static, extra-inental
existence to an extension that has been abstracted by the mind
from bodies in motion. Space, for St. Thomas, does not exist
apart from bodies that are extended and in motion; itself based
on the relation of distance between bodies, it is rather a relative
thing, not an absolute. More properly it is a mathematical
con<;ept that abstracts from matter and motion, and as such is
conceived statically by us. This need not, therefore, be interpreted to mean that it also exists statically outside the mind
as an independent subsistent reality. 52
A similar observation might be made about the existence of
privileged frames of reference or inertial systems which correspond, in the language of relativity, to the absolute space of
Newton. Motions within the solar system-or in any local
region, for that matter-can be investigated without referring
them, in a larger context,· to the motions of other systems. The
difficulty arises only when space (or the space-time continuum)
is hypostasized to be a subsistent background, sometimes conceived physically as an "aether," against which the frames of
reference of various systems are actually moving. Operating
with such a supposition, the question can be raised as to which
system is " really " at rest, or what is the privileged frame of
reference in terms of which " absolute " motion and rest in the
universe can be detected. It is to the merit of Einstein that his
theories of relativity make clear how such a question, if raised,
is unanswerable in terms of the data available to the physicist
our analysis accords with the view of Whittaker, recently taken up by Polanyi:
"Sir Edmund Whittaker ('Obituary Notice on Einstein,' Biogr. Mem. Roy. Soc.,
1955, p. 48) points out that, contrary to widespread opinion, the physical significanCe of Copernicanism is not impaired by relativity. For the Copernican axes
are inertial, while the Ptolemaic are not, and the earth rotates with respect to the
local inertial axes."-M. Polanyi, Persurwl Knowledge, (Chicago: 1958), p. 147,
fn. I.
10 Cf. J. A. Weisheipl, 0. P. "Space and Gravitation," The New Scholasticism,
29 (1955)' pp. 175-228.

18

WILLIAM A. WALLACE

in any system. The Thomistic position would rather seem to be
that the question should not be asked in the first place,
because of the uncritical supposition on which it is based.
Physical Proof

It is interesting that the view of St. Thomas that has been
urged in this paper, namely, that there can be some "final
answers " in physical science, is once again finding support
from scientists. Heisenberg, for example, who seemed to shake
traditional thought to its foundations when he enunciated his
"principle of uncertainty," has written in a recent work:
With respect to the finality of the results, we must remind the
reader that in the realm of the exact sciences there have always
been final solutions for certain limited domains of experience. Thus,
for instance, the questions posed by Newton's concept of mechanics
found an answer valid for all time in Newton's law and in its
mathematical consequences. . . . In the exact sciences the word
' final ' obviously means that there are always self-contained,
mathematically representable, systems of concepts and laws applicable to certain realms of experience, in which realms they are
always valid for the entire cosmos and cannot be changed or
improved. Obviously, however, we cannot expect these concepts
and laws to be suitable for the subsequent description of new realms
of experience. 58

With this, we think St. Thomas would heartily agree. In a
very real sense, in physical research one never knows what
the morrow will bring, but the scientist can know that if he
does his work well, and does not read into his results more than
the evidence warrants, he can gain new knowledge without
thereby destroying the science he has previously acquired.
This view, we would maintain, is the one implicitly held
by the practicing scientist. 54 Yet there remains the difficulty,
•• W. Heisenberg, The Physicist's Conception of Nature, (London: 1958translation by A. J. Pomerans of Daa Naturbila der heutigen Physik, Hamburg:
1955), pp. !l6-i7 (italics added).
•• It has also been stated explicitly by Oppenheimer, in his third Reich lecture,
as reported by Hall: "In its [science's] progress since 1800 the later discoveries
have always embraced the earlier: Newton was not proved wrong by Einstein, nor
Lavoisier by Rutherford. The formulation of a scientific proposition may be

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,

GALILEO,

AND EINSTEIN

19

continually raised by logical empiricists, that such a positionno matter how commonly it may be accepted-is still naive and
a priori, that it does not make sufficient allowance for future
discoveries, and in effect represents a nineteenth-century attitude of mind which is unprepared for revolutionary developments that may further advance scientific thought. They would
argue that to maintain anything as certain or final is to close
the mind to new knowledge, that the very possibility of someone's making a new discovery forces the scientist to be hesitant
about ever saying the " last word," or to despair even of
proposing a "final answer" in the area of his investigations.
Aquinas' concept of physical proof, surprisingly enough, is
not vulnerable to this objection, and in fact might even be said
to have anticipated difficulties of this type that await anyone
who would claim too facile a "final explanation" of physical
phenomena. For one thing, St. Thomas insisted that the
logical procedure that most characterizes physical science is not
a priori, but is rather a posteriori, based on a patient study of
the world of nature, not starting with any preconceived knowledge of essences, but rather arguing from effect to cause solely
on the basis of observed facts. 55 In this matter, he was insistent
that a basic and irreconcilable difference exists between the
canons for physical proof and those for mathematical proof.
He was aware that the mathematician could have absolute
certitude, and that the very abstractness and necessity of his
subject matter permit him to proceed a priori and with the
most exacting standards of proof. The certitude he ascribed
to physical science, on the other hand, was somewhat circummodified, and limitations .to its applicability recognized, without affecting its
·propriety in the context to which it was originally found appropriate. We do not
need sledge-hammers to crack nuts; we do not need the Principle of Indeterminacy
in calculating the future position of the moon: ' the old knowledge, as the very
means of coming upon the new, must in its old realm be left intact; only when we
have left that realm can it be transcended' (J. R. Oppenheimer) ."-A. R. Hall,
The Scientific
1500-1800: The Formation of the Modern Scientific
Attitude, (Boston: 1954), p. xiii.
•• Cf. In II de Anima, lect. 3, n.
for a full treatment, see M. A. Glutz, C. P.,
The Manner of Demonstrating in Natural Philosophy, (River Forest, Ill.: 1956),
pp. 84-102.

20

WILLIAM A. WALLACE

scribed: he referred to it as a "supositional certitude," and
gave detailed instructions for attaining it when working with
the contingent or non-necessary matter of the physical world.56
His methodological precisions need not concern us here, but
certainly one of its suppositions was entirely consistent with
Heisenberg's proviso, namely, that results are valid only for
the realm of experience from which they are derived. Thomas,
as a matter of fact, would go even further than Heisenberg,
and maintain that, even within this realm, final explanations
can only be expected, and are only valid, for events that happen
" regularly or for the most part," for these alone are sufficient
to manifest some type of dependence on the antecedents which
produce them, and thus induce a causal necessity into the
proof. 5 7
Implicit in Aquinas' treatment is also allowance for the
acquisition of new knowledge, either by way of refinement
within an existing realm of experience, or by revolutionary
extension to completely new realms, and both without jeopardizing explanations that have already been conclusively established in science. An example of the first type is the proof
already discussed for the sphericity of the earth. Thomas
argues that the earth is approximately a sphere because this
shape is caused by the uniform action of the gravitational
forces of its components; at the same time, he admits that
other causes are at work that further modify this shape from
that of a perfect sphere. In his day, science had not advanced
sufficiently to detect the earth's rotation or the resultant bulge
at the equator; yet this advance in knowledge does not nullify
his reasoning or his basic explanation. Modern science holds
that the earth is an oblate spheroid, and assigns this modification of the spherical shape to rotational forces which are
superadded to the gravitational forces, but which do not replace
them. And both Aquinas and the modern scientist would preIn II Phys., lect. 15, nn.
5 and 6.
•• In 11 Post Anal., lect. 7, nn.
57 The details of such a methodology, as applied to the late medieval theory of
the rainbow, will be found in my The Scientific Methodology of Theodo'l'ic of
Freiburg, pp.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,

GALILEO,

AND EINSTEIN

21

sumably be open-minded to the discovery of further irregularities in the observed shape of the earth's surface, which might be
traceable to yet unknown causes still awaiting our investigation, but would not force us to re-open our minds again to the
possibility that the earth is flat.
With regard to revolutionary knowledge applicable to completely new realms of experience, we can only surmise how
Aquinas would proceed because of the very rudimentary state
of science in his day. A not too far-fetched example may
perhaps be taken from his generalization, derived from empirical data, that material objects tend in a straight line
towards a center of gravity, elaborated mathematically by
Newton, over four centuries later, into the law of universal
gravitational attraction. It is possible, on the basis of this
generalization, to say that all matter is ponderable or massive,
a statement not inconsistent with the definition frequently
found in science textbooks to the effect that matter is whatever has mass and occupies space. Yet such a definition does
not close the physicist's mind to other possibilities: in theoretical cosmology, for instance, he will speculate about "antigravitation " as accounting for the recession of galaxies, while
in fundamental particle theory he will speak of " anti-matter "
(or anti-terrestial matter) as having properties radically different from the matter we observe macroscopically. The very fact
that he assigns new terms to such entities is evidence that he
regards the phenomena on which their existence is based as
constituting, in Heisenberg's phrase, a "new realm of experience," about which he can freely speculate, and for which he
can even seek hyper-generalizations, without relinquishing a
single theorem in classical mechanics. And St. Thomas' willingness to countenance such a procedure is at least implicit in his
recognition that celestial matter might be radically different
from terrestial matter, while allowing for some common features
and a diversity in the laws applicable to each-although there
is no doubt that he was mistaken on many details clarified by
subsequent investigators.
It would thus seem that the essentially philosophical sug-

WILLIAM A. WALLACE

gestion of Einstein, taken up by logical positivists, to the effect
that " our notions of physical reality can never be final," performs too radical a surgery on the corpus of scientific knowledge. Some surgery was undoubtedly necessary after nineteenth-century excesses in mechanism had pushed to further
extremes the mathematical realism sponsored by Galileo in the
seventeenth century. But scientific agnosticism is also an
extreme, and it can do more harm in the long run than an
over-acclerated mathematical or mechanist development, for it
eliminates the very possibility of organic growth within science
itself. Heisenberg's reaction is thus an encouraging one: it
stresses the continuity of science, the assimilation of the new
to the old, while insisting on a rigorous methodology that would
not over-assert the objective value of mathematical theorizing
in recent science. To those who appreciate the essential contribution of Albert and Thomas to medieval science, the parallel
between their correctives to the mathematicism of Grosseteste
and Heisenberg's emendations to the idealism of Einstein is as
interesting as it is unexpected.
Einstein does have a message for the modern mind, and it
is this, namely, that the mathematical realism of a Galileo, or
the space-time absolutism of a Newton, are antiquated notions
that can no longer function fruitfully for the modern scientist.
We propose that the same cannot be said for the theory of
physical proof proposed seven centuries ago by St. Thomas
Aquinas.
WILLIAM

Dominican Home of Phllosophy,
Dover, Mrus.

A. WALLACE, O.P.

HYLOMORPHISM, GRAVITY AND 'TERTIARY'
MATTER

T

o investigate the reasons for the divorce between the

physical sciences and philosophy would demand an
article in itself, but no one can deny the fact that such
a divorce exists. Yet without sound philosophical principles,
the physical sciences remain-as it were-suspended in the air,
since by their very nature they cannot penetrate beyond
phenomena, leaving their ultra-phenomenal foundations uninvestigated.
This limitation of the physical sciences seems to be recognised
by scientists today. Sir James Jeans, for instance, says ,"The
essential fact is simply that all the pictures which science now
draws of nature ... are mathematical pictures. Most scientists
would agree that they are nothing more than pictures-fictions
if you like, if by fiction you mean that sCience is not yet in
contact with ultimate reality. Many would hold that, from
the broad philosophical standpoint, the outstanding achievement of twentieth century physics is not the theory of relativity with its welding together of space and time ... it is the
general recognition that we are not yet in contact with ultimate
reality .... In brief, a mathematical formula can never tell
us what a thing is, but only how it behaves." 1
Yet what philosophy the modern scientist possesses is too
often of the post-Cartesian and Kantian brand for it to be
able to provide a reliable account of the ultimate realities
underlying his own science. On the other hand, scholastic philosophy should be capable of providing the principles for which
there is such crying need, with its more than two thousand years
of tested thought and the acknowledgment given to it by
the Church as the handmaid of her theology. And if there
1

The Mysterious Universe, pp. 127 &

(Italics added).

28

24

BRUNO WEBB

is one scholastic principle perhaps more than any other that
can provide an explanation of the facts coming to light in the
physical sciences, it is hylomorphism, which has an almost
indefinite capacity for this.
Hylomorphism, the system of form and matter, is first and
foremost a philosophy of material substance, yet at the same
time it presents us with a picture of the universe as a vast
hierarchy of specific natures. For by form is meant that which
gives the specific nature, and for this reason it is the first principle of limit by which the infinite Being of God is reflected in
this or that finite likeness. Each angelic nature is a pure form,
each one specifically unique, yet all of them together reflecting
in what appears to be a quasi-infinite number of finite ways the
infinite Being of God, like a vast spectrum whose colors collectively reflect the sun's colorless light.
What the scholastic means by matter is an altogether distinct
principle of limit. This does not limit God's likeness to this
or that specific nature in creation, but limits a specific nature
already existent to this or that numerical individual. This is
why in material natures, and in these alone, many numerically
distinct individuals can share one and the same specific nature.
These material species or grades of being are no more than
the few lowest grades in creation's quasi-infinite hierarchysentient, vegetant, mineral, subatomic, and perhaps others still
undiscovered; but it is with these only that we are now concerned. For common to all these grades of matter is the universal phenomenon of gravity, holding the material cosmos
together against its centrifugal forces and resultant chaos. It is
a phenomenon, the nature of which as yet has not received an
adequate explanation, yet one which can perhaps be explained
on the philosophical level by hylomorphic principles.
The distinction made by Jeans between what a thing is (its
essence) and its behavior is an important one, because, if we
venture to suggest here within the philosophical sphere what
may be the ultimate nature of gravity, we have no quarrel
with other explanations of it in the sphere of mathematics,
such as Einstein's crumpling of the space-time continuum. The

HYLOMORPHISM,

GRAVITY AND ' TERTIARY ' MATTER

25

reason is the theory of Einstein's seeks no more than to say
how gravity behaves within the sphere of quantity, extensive
and successive, and leaves it to philosophy to say what its
ultimate nature is. Since the time of Newton it has been
recognized that every particle in the universe attracts or tends
towards every other particle with a force which is directly
proportional to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of their distance apart. But, once again,
this only states how gravity behaves; it does not even begin
to tell us what it is in itself.
That gravity is a phenomenon which differs from all others
is generally recognized. To quote Jeans again, " Gravitation
has· always stood apart from the other phenomena of physics,
and has seemed to be of an entirely different nature." 2 All
other properties-chemical,
electrical, magnetic and radioactive-differ according to the specific nature of the matter
involved; gravity remains the same whatever the species of
the matter may be. It varies only according to the mass and
distance apart of the bodies concerned.
Writing in 1894 Fitzgerald held that " Gravity is probably
due to a change in the structure of the ether, produced by the
presence of matter." 3 He had in mind that structural ether
of the 19th century physicist which the negative result of the
Michelson-Morley experiment has proved to be non-existent.
Yet he scented the truth even if from afar. Gravity consists
in a tension between visible and ponderable matter and something still more ultimate in the grade of being. Later on, we
will restate this assertion of Fitzgerald in terms suitable to our
thesis. In place of this structural ether we will content ourselves
with sheer empty space, something which could not possibly
have supplied an ether wind such as Michelson was looking
for. Except for the radiations passing through it and which
in themselves are not part of it, space appears to be sheer
• Ibid., p. 94.
8 Scientific Writings, p. 818.

26

BRUNO WEBB

passive extension devoid of light, temperature or any other
quality known to us.4
Inter-stellar space is often regarded as being " immaterial,"
and admittedly it is not matter in the same sense as ponderable
and visible matter. It has also been regarded as an abstraction.
Yet astronomical space is so extensive that radiation of higher
frequency than light is reaching the new radio telescopes after
travelling from distant galaxies for several thousand million
years 5 at the rate of approximately 186,000 miles every second
of its journey-rather an extensive abstraction, one would
think! Again, in view of the fact that the amount of space
actually filled by bodies is almost infinitesimally small, the
mind must indeed be inventive, one may say almost Kantian,
to manfacture anything so vast from the extension abstracted
from something so small. Such a view was far more tenable in
the days when the Ptolemaic geocentric system of the universe was held with the sun and stars forming a tidy little
model round the earth and space was only slightly larger than
the bodies it contained. But now, when we know that relatively
speaking space is almost empty and the area occupied by
bodies almost insignificant, the supposed abstraction begins to
appear fantastic, so much so that it seems to be an altogether
arbitrary assumption to suppose, as some have done, that if
all bodies in space were removed the space which contained
them would cease to have any reality.
Therefore to suppose it to be essential to space that it be
actually the container of bodies is arbitrary and therefore misleading. Space has the aptitude to be the container of visible
and ponderable bodies, and more than that cannot be said.
Genesis tells us that the earth was "void and empty." Philosophical scrutiny seems to indicate here an objective reality
and, at the same time, the absence of bodies contained by the
void; else it would not be empty. It might be rather a good
• It would seem to have a single basic and universally homogeneous quality, but
of this later.
• Lovell, The Individual and the Universe, p. 106. (B. B. C. Reith Lectures, 1958).

HYLOMORPHISM,

GRAVITY AND ' TERTIARY ' MATTER

27

idea, in these days of space travel, that we should decide
whether space is really there or not.
Let us first consider space in relation to visible and ponderable bodies as the physicist sees it, since he is concerned with
phenomena only and not with ultimate and ultra-phenomenal
realities. By considering phenomena first we may thereby
arrive at a deeper knowledge of the ultimate nature which
gives rise to them. And in the first place it will help us to
remember that as the result of the discoveries of the twentieth
century physics the law of the conservation of mass has become
identified with the conservation of energy. For, as the physicist
sees matter today, there is nothing but centres of energy in a
vast expanse of space.
That the energy of a photon of light or other electro-magnetic
radiation is of the same physical nature as the energies within
the substantial molecule is made evident by so common a
feature as the absorption of radiant energy by an extranuclear electron which, as the result of this added energy, jumps
away from the nucleus to a wider energy level. In this way
radiation becomes part of a substantial molecule. Conversely,
if an extra-nuclear electron emits a quantum of energy, the
energy belonging to a material substance is converted into
radiation. Moreover, electron and radiant energy betray their
common nature by both producing diffraction patterns when
passed through a crystal.
Jeans significantly calls radiation 'unbottled' energy, and
the intra-atomic electrons and protons' bottled.' We are therefore happily clear of the incomprehensible ' solid ' nut of matter,
and have to deal solely with active energies and passive space.
At once we recognise in this an affinity with hylomorphism,
since energy units, whether inside or outside the atom, are
active principles, determining passive matter to be such and
such, which is precisely what the hylomorphist means· by
' form,' whether substantial or accidental; while the passive
/ reality of space is (apart from its inevitable determination by
some substantial form) what he means by primary matter and
extensive quantity, that which is determinable by form.

BRUNO WEBB

Therefore the sole difference between empty space and visible
matter, radiation included, as the physicist sees it, is a difference
between the absence or presence of energy in a space which
in itself remains entirely passive. He views space as permeating
all visible bodies without exception. So far as phenomena are
concerned, therefore, space is universal, while relatively minute
areas of it are ' informed ' with systems of atomic energies. The
radical difference, then, between space and all species of visible
bodies as viewed by the physicist is that, while space permeates
all of them, none of these visible bodies permeates another.
Space is a continuum, bodies are discrete.
The metaphysician, on the other hand, is concerned with the
ultra-phenomenal realities which account for the substantial
unity of these systems of extended energies, and already Jeans,
using popular language, has gone a long way when he distinguishes between ' bottled ' and ' unbottled ' energies. The
energies of any substance are' bottled' by the ultra-phenomenal
essence which is complete in each of them, as well as in every
part of the extensive quantity which belongs to the atomic or
molecular substance.
From the fact that space is evidently different from visible
and ponderable matter, it in no way follows that it is not
matter of some kind so as to satisfy the philosophical definition
of matter as the principle of individuation, which is, so far as
we can see, the only reason why matter exists at all. Neither
vjsibility nor ponderability is included in the metaphysical
definition of matter, which consists in its being a purely passive
principle receptive of substantial form which it limits to being
numerically this or that individual form, in conjunction with
which it constitutes a numerically individual substance of a
specific nature given by the form, which substance is the active
cause of its own extensive quantity and whatever qualities it
may possess. In order to deny that space is a material substance of some kind, it would be necessary to demonstrate that
this definition cannot apply to it.
Moreover, space is an extended substance. To deny this is

HYLOMORPHISM,

GRAVITY AND 'TERTIARY'

MATTER

29

to reject the universal evidence of the senses, a process which
leads to skepticism. For, although the senses by themselves
are unable to know the real nature of extension, it is within
their province to say whether extension (whatever its nature)
is or is not present. But according to scholastic principles
extension is an attribute of quantity, and quantity is the most
basic of all the accidents of material substance. Therefore,
extension is itself a property of material substance, and for this
reason must, it seems, indicate the presence of matter of some
kind.
We may note in passing that if it be objected that, as an
extended substance, space would demand some further container beyond itself and so on without end, the most convincing
reply seems to be that just as the curvature of one- and twodimensional extension eliminates one- and two-dimensional
boundaries, so the analogous curvature of three-dimensional
space eliminates all three-dimensional boundaries, while leaving
space as finite as before. If there be no boundaries there can be
no container, and wherever we might be in the universe we
could never approach its edge since there exists no edge to
approach. This curvature of three-dimensional space evidently
implies the beginning of a fourth dimension as the curvature
of a straight line implies the beginning of a second dimension.
With regard to this, Father Mark de Munnynck, 0. P., late
professor of philosophy at the University of Fribourg, in the
course of his article "Space" in the Catholic Encyclopaedia,
says " The intellect in its analysis goes beyond the data offered
to it by sense, and it is forced to conclude that space of more
than three dimensions implies no contradiction."
It is not often that Locke can be quoted with approval, but,
notwithstanding his ambiguity, he seems to have hit on a truth
when he proposes that space be regarded as a substance, provided that the word substance be understood differently from
its common meaning. It is accepted as having three different
meanings when used of God, of spirits and of material bodies;
perhaps, it may be used in a fourth sense when applied to

30

BRUNO WEBB

space. 6 In short, the word substance when used of God,
of spirits, of visible bodies and of space is in every case
analogous, not univocal.
Analogy of proportion consists in some identical reality
existing in different grades of being. In the present case the
identical reality is existence in se, inseity, while the different
grades are the divine and, among created grades, those of
pure spirit, of visible and of invisible matter. Within the grade
of visible matter the metaphysician recognizes specific differences among sub-atomic, mineral, living and sentient matter;
but the difference between invisible matter or space and visible
or ponderable matter of any kind is of an altogether different
order. For, as we have said, space is universal, whereas all
visible bodies are local; moreover space appears to be wholly
passive, whereas all visible bodies, in addition to their passive
extension, are systems of active energies. It is this fundamental
difference between space and all species of visible and ponderable matter, together with the fact that space must be matter
of some kind, which places it in a material category all its own.
This, it seems, can only mean substituting a three-fold
division of matter in place of the two-fold division so far held.
Primary matter remains as it was, the purely passive principle
of material essence. Secondary matter is the universal passive,
imponderable and invisible, yet substantial foundation to the
material universe, which until now we have spoken of as space.
'Tertiary matter' includes all visible, ponderable matter from
the subatomic grade upwards. 7
We can now proceed to examine the difference between
' secondary ' and ' tertiary ' matter from a philosophical standpoint. As primary matter is the potential base of both sec• Essay concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II, ch. IS.
7 The use of the term 'tertiary ' matter has the disadvantage that a certain confusion may arise when secondary matter is referred to by different writers. But the
alternative of, for instance, using the names Secondary A and Secondary B matter
is so ponderous that the disadvantage of employing it seems to outweigh the other.
It is simple to speak of light as tertiary energy passing through secondary matter,
but positively unwieldy to speak of Secondary B energy travelling in Secondary
A matter.

HYLOMORPHISM,

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MATTER

81

ondary and tertiary matter, so secondary matter is the actually
existing base of all tertiary matter. 8 Whatever we may suppose
to have been the origin of tertiary energies or' forms,' we may
regard them as supervening upon secondary matter. Genesis
I, 2-3, says "And the earth was void and empty and darkness
was upon the face of the deep. . . . And God said: Be light
made. And light was made." The cosmological reality underlying the literary account of the bible could be proposed in this
manner: the void, empty and dark, as secondary matter, light
as tertiary form.
S. Thomas, as we know, held ' materia quantitate signata '
as the principle of numerical individuation and multiplicity
within the same specific nature. But materia quantitate signata
is an abstraction; it can only have actual existence when the
primary matter is determined by a substantial form. What
materia quantitate signata is in the abstract, secondary (as
distinct from tertiary) matter is in the concrete, that is to
say, primary matter determined by the lowest of all possible
substantial forms, producing quantity wholly homogeneous
throughout its extent, consisting of potential parts and therefore indefinitely divisible into actual parts all of the same
species. Thus determined by its secondary substantial form,
secondary matter becomes an actually existing substance commensurate with the material universe, and the concrete principle of numerical individuation and of multiplicity within the
same species.
To picture the formation of tertiary out of secondary matter
by the superimposition of tertiary substantial forms, we may
borrow analogies from the accidental order. Sir Oliver Lodge,
for instance, likened the various kinds of ponderable matter to
vortices in the ether or knots in a piece of string. It is quite
evident that the knot, although made out of the string (or the
vortex out of the ether), is nevertheless something new over
and above the string. What is new is the 'form' of the knot
8 What we have said of space applies to secondary matter, that if endowed with
three-dimensional cur;vature it will be finite yet without boundaries of any kind.

82

BRUNO WEBB

(in this case an accidental form only). There are, moreover,
many kinds of knots, all of which can be successively made and
remade; and one knot differs from another by the different
'forms' that have been imposed upon the string. Or again,
if we impress a seal bearing some coat of arms upon a homogeneous sheet of wax an indefinite number of times, that which
was originally mere wax becomes a number of impresses bearing
a specific character. These analogies can now be translated
into the substantial order.
A tertiary substantial form-call it a substantial energy if
you will-takes possession an indefinite number of times of
potential parts of secondary matter, making of them actual
parts whose measure of extension is proper to the species of
the tertiary form-there is, for instance, a large difference
between the extension specific to a molecule of hydrogen and
of uranium. It raises these extended parts up from the specific
level of secondary matter to the specific level of tertiary matter,
to become the passive extended volumes of a multitude of
tertiary substances.
But in doing this the numerical identity of each extended
part of secondary matter that is assumed is changed-a change
of identity such as takes place in every substantial transformation. The tertiary substantial forms give new determinations to the primary matter underlying what until this
moment have been potential parts of secondary matter only,
and which hitherto have been informed by the substantial
form of secondary matter. They determine this primary matter
to the specific nature of tertiary matter and are in turn individuated by it to be numerically this and that form, thus producing
distinct tertiary substances which, as the active causes of their
accidents, 9 produce extensive quantities which are numerically
new although physically identical with those potential parts of
secondary matter which they have replaced. To the physicist
the extended volumes of these tertiary substances are indis• Cf. Summa Theologica, I, q. 77, a. 6, ad

causa quodammodo activa.

HYLOMORPHISM,

GRAVITY AND ' TERTIARY ' MATTER

33

tinguishable from what they replace, but to the philosopher
they are numerically new extensions.
For it must be realized that change in numerical identity is
taking place deep down at the root of material being every
time a substantial change occurs. To the physicist or chemist
this may seem quite unreal, because this change in identity
may involve no change in physical quality and is in the ultraphenomenal sphere. For instance, have the free atoms of
hydrogen and oxygen which go to make a molecule of water
maintained their identity within the molecule? The chemist
may say of course they have, since such a question does not
enter into the scope of his science. But the philosopher, who
is deeply concerned with it, insists that they have changed their
numerical identity even if their physical condition is the same
as before, since if it were otherwise the molecule would not be
a single substance but a mere federation of substantial atoms.
They are no longer independent substances of hydrogen and
oxygen, each one informed by its own substantial form; they
· are now integral parts of a single substantial molecule of water,
and so are informed by its single molecular form. Like all
integral parts produced by a new substance resulting from a
chemical change, they are numerically new. As S. Thomas says,
"All accidents share the fate of the form,'' 10 and this is true
both when the old form returns to potency and when the new
one becomes actual. The original substances of hydrogen and
oxygen have not persisted through the change; they have been
replaced.
Such questions do not come within the purview of chemist
or physicist, but they are commonplaces in philosophy. These
are deep waters, but the trained hylomorphist will follow our
meaning.
It should be observed at this point that when a chemical
reaction takes place between tertiary substances with consequent substantial change, the old tertiary substantial forms,
say of sodium and chlorine, educe a specifically new substanI

10

De pluralitate formarum: Difficultates ex philosophia. a.d 6.

34

BRUNO WEBB

tial form, in this case that of the compound. But in doing this
they do not stop short at the substantial form of secondary
matter since this is no longer existent within their matter, but
penetrate right down to primary matter on exactly the same
principle as is held by those who admit primary and secondary
matter only. The tertiary substantial forms contain the secondary form virtually according to the principle of the gradation
of forms by which a specifically higher form, for instance man's
rational soul, can itself do all that lower forms, namely sentient,
vegetant and mineral can do. If substantial change did 'not
reach right down to primary matter, the secondary base would
remain numerically identical throughout all changes, which is
precisely the error of hylosystemism.
That which originally was secondary extension, then, has
become subject to the superior authority of tertiary substantial
forms, and so is held up above its former specific level. Meanwhile secondary matter remains the most passive matter
capable of actual existence, and this passivity involves the
tendency to remain just what it is and no more. On the other
hand, tertiary substantial forms or energies are active; their
tendency is to prevent the secondary matter which they have
assumed from" remaining just what it is" as secondary matter
and to hold it up in the tertiary level. There exists, therefore,
universally a passive tendency for the extended volumes of
tertiary substances to return to the state of secondary matter
from which they are ultimately derived.
Fitzgerald's axiom quoted above may then be restated thus:
"Gravity is probably due to a tension in secondary matter
produced by the presence of tertiary matter." A piece of elastic
receives just such tension when stretched by some active agent;
then, as soon as released, it returns passively to its original
state. This tension in secondary matter is due to the active
tertiary up-pull which corresponds to the active stretching of
the
The tendency of the extended volumes of tertiary
substances to return to secondary matter is a purely passive
tendency; they do not ' pull ' down against the active up-pull

HYLOMORPHISM,

GRAVITY AND 'TERTIARY'

MATTER

35

of the tertiary energies (and in this the comparison of elastic
fails us, since its return to what it originally was is probably
not altogether passive). It is simply that, being purely passive,
they yield to the active up-pull of the tertiary substantial
energies to the extent that these hold them and cease to be
subject to this up-pull to the extent that the tertiary substantial energies leave them free.
It must be realized clearly that secondary matter is a single
substance integrated by its extensive quantity which we· call
space, and that like all substances it is complete in every part
of its extensive quantity. This means that the substance of
secondary matter is omnipresent throughout its extension, that
is to say in every part of space. From this it follows that the
tendency of the extended volumes of tertiary substances to
return to secondary matter is not towards this or that part of
the extension of secondary matter, but towards the omnipresent substance itself. And since this single substance of
secondary matter is omnipresent to all the extended volumes
of tertiary susbtances throughout the entire universe, there is
no question of the force of gravity being spacially transmitted
as all other forces are, not even at a velocity far exceeding light.
There is no transmission whatever, precisely because that to
which all tertiary substances tend to return is omnipresent
to them all.
The tertiary energies which hold the extended volumes of
tertiary substances above the specific level of secondary matter
are, as we have said, substantial energies or forms. Therefore
the essential character of gravity lies in the substantial order
and at the ultra-phenomenal level; yet this tension between tertiary substantial energies and the substance of secondary
matter manifests itself in the accidental or phenomenal order.
Substance cannot act except through its accidents, therefore
the tension caused by the tertiary substantial energies is translated into the accidental order in a visible and spatial manner.
Two or more things which tend to identity with one object
which is omnipresent to them all, tend to identity with each

36

BRUNO WEBB

other; and such a tendency when translated into the accidental
and quantitative order must be spatial. Since, therefore, this
tendency is common to all tertiary substances whatsoever
throughout the universe, it follows that all tertiary bodies tend
spacially towards each other, which is what is meant by gravity.
If this mutual approach could reach completion as it would

0

INDIVIDUAL
TERTIARY
SUBSTANCES

TERTIARY
MATTER

SECONDARY
MATTER

0

SINGLE SUBSTANCE OF
SECONDARY MATTER,
OMNIPRESENT THROUGHOUT ITS EXTENSION

TENSION IN SECONDARY MATTER
CAUSED BY UP-PULL OF TERTIARY
SUBSTANTIAL
ENERGIES

--------- ---PASSIVE TENDENCY OF EXTENDED
TERTIARY VOLUMES TO RETURN TO
SECONDARY MATTER

Fm.l.
do if the tertiary substantial energies released their hold on
their extended volumes, coalescence as secondary matter would
take place; but as long as the tertiary substantial energies retain
their hold upon their extended volumes, the nearest approach
to coalescence is contiguity, and more often than not, even this
is made impossible by contrary forces. Beyond this contiguity
the process cannot go, because the presence of the tertiary
substantial energies ensures the full complement of quantity
and of accidental energies, and so of solidity and resistance.

HYLOMORPHISM,

GRAVITY AND 'TERTIARY'

MATTER

37

Since all tertiary matter, whether subatomic, mineral or
living, is constantly tending to return to secondary matter,
and since secondary matter is substantially one, the unifying
power of gravity permeates the entire universe. It is by
gravity that all tertiary matter is held together as an organic
whole, and this organic unity in the tertiary sphere is rooted
in the substantial unity of secondary matter.

0

''

O

' 0

j/ /

NON-SPATIAL TENDENCY
TO COALESCE AS SECONDARY
MATTER (UNREALISABLE)

/

TERTIARV
SUBSTANCES

/

OMNIPRESENT SUBSTANCE
OF SECONDARY MATTER

SPATIAL FULFILMENT
OF TENDENCY BY
CONTIGUITY

FIG. 2.

From the fact that gravitational pull consists in the tension
caused by the up-pull of tertiary substantial energies it can be
understood more easily how the law of the conservation of mass
has been absorbed into the law of the conservation of energy;
that is to say the mass or weight of bodies, which is the measure
of their gravitational pull, is the measure of the amount of
tertiary (phenomenal) energy in bodies.
It need come as no surprise, therefore, that even radiant
energy is subject to gravitational pull. This was proved by
the work of two expeditions in May 1919, one to Brazil, the
other to the Principe Islands, West Africa, both chosen for the
clarity of their atmosphere. Light coming from a certain star
was found to bend towards the sun several degrees out of a
direct line of star to earth; it was drawn towards the sun by
the latter's gravitational pull.

38

BRUNO WEBB

Now all electro-magnetic radiation travels at 300,000 kms. a
second which appears to be the specific velocity of secondary
matter, due, it may be suggested, to its possessing some single
basic quality which is universal throughout its extent and so
homogeneous. And since quanta of radiant energy (as distinct
from even free electrons which vary in velocity and never quite
reach that of light) always possess this constant velocity, it
seems that, unlike free electrons, they do not consist of tertiary
substances but of tertiary accidental forms inhering in successive parts of secondary matter as they travel through it, and
therefore 'unbottled' energy.
This is to say these radiant energies have their origins in
tertiary substances, as for instance when an electron jumps to
an energy level closer to the atomic nucleus and emits a
quantum; but as radiation they are travelling in secondary
matter. If this be the case, it seems that even an accidental
tertiary energy or form can raise the extension of secondary
matter which it is informing at any moment during its passage
accidentally above its secondary level, i. e. without this extension ceasing to be secondary extension. This accidental raising
of successive parts of secondary matter up to the tertiary level
is surely what we mean when we say that radiation successively 'charges' the medium through which it travels. This
charge is itself a quantum of tertiary energy.
In other words the passage of radiant energy through space
means that secondary matter is being interfered with by an
accidental tertiary energy which has invaded it from the sphere
of tertiary matter. Therefore so long as successive parts of
the extension of secondary matter are charged by tertiary
radiant energy, they are raised up by it accidentally above
their secondary level to the tertiary level so that, although
they do not become tertiary substances, they nevertheless bring
about a similar tension in the secondary matter and so have
the same tendency to coalesce with tertiary substances-in this
case with the sun.
This leads to a consideration of the nature of all motion

HYLOMORPHISM,

GRAVITY AND 'TERTIARY'

MATTER

39

through space, whether it be that of electro-magnetic radiation
or even of a substantial object like a rocket. This seems
sufficiently connected with our present subject to be considered
here, and is one of the mysteries of science upon which hylomorphic principles perhaps can throw light.
First consider a wave travelling across the surface of the sea.
Although it appears to be travelling forwards, the actual movement of the water consists in a succession of vertical movements. The initial energy raises a certain volume of water
vertically to a height indicl'l,tive of the intensity of the energy.
At the moment when this initial energy is expended it educes
from the potency of its matter, the water, a numerically new
energy which raises the next volume of water to exactly the
height of the first, while the initial energy falls back into
potency. The second energy does the same as the first, and so
on with the rest. Thus it is that the wave in one sense moves
forward, because it is in reality a continuous succession of
numerically distinct waves or vertical impulses.
Therefore it is possible to distinguish between the specific
energy belonging to every vertical impulse, and the numerical
identity of each successive vertical impulse. The former is the
' form ' which, in this case as in all others, determines the
specific energy or nature; the latter is the ' matter ' which individuates the specific form to this or that numerically individual
wave. And, as in all such cases, the specific nature (or energy),
like the universal idea, is complete in every individual, so that
the former is one and the latter multiple, nor is this in any way
altered by the fact that the process of eduction of each new
impulse is not discrete but an infinitely divisible continuum;
it is taking place unbrokenly, so that there are throughout one
specific energy and a potentially infinite number of individual
impulses.
The case of all electro-magnetic waves is analogous, being
the same as the above in that there is one specific energy
throughout, the ' form,' and an indefinite multiplicity of successive individual impulses, the ' matter,' the former being com-

40

BRUNO WEBB

plete in every one of the latter. But it differs in that the
impulses are in secondary, and no longer in tertiary matter.
These impulses consist in charges of specific intensity given
to the secondary matter and indicated by their frequency or
wave-length; and, analogously to the waves in water, the initial
charge reaches its maximum, educes a numerically new charge,
and itself returns to potency; and so on with each successive
charge. And this process, as before, is a continuum.
When therefore the physicists tell us rather mysteriously
that radiation is a quantum or corpuscle of waves, perhaps
what is meant is that a single wave or impulse or charge-all
mean the same thing-is itself the quantum, which remains
specifically the same throughout but is indefinitely repeated as
numerically new impulses. One specific impulse is indefinitely
repeated, and this one specific intensity is in every individual
impulse. It is the specific impulse which constitutes the quantum, which latter does not consist of waves (in the plural),
but of one wave indefinitely repeated.
Finally, consider a substantial material object travelling
indefinitely through space where there is nothing at all to
counteract and so change its velocity. For all motion per se is
perpetual motion, and only ceases to be so by reason of
counteracting energies. There is then this problem, that the
motion of a rocket sent out clear of all gravitational pull so as
to go on for ever in space has a finite impulse to start it, yet
the energy it expends as age succeeds age becomes increasingly
greater and, one may say, eventually quasi-infinite. How can
a finite impulse of definite specific value give rise to the expenditure of quasi-infinite energy, since no effect can exceed its
cause? M. Maritain has realized this difficulty when he says
" It may, for instance, be questioned whether the law of inertia,
as formulated since Galileo and Descartes, can be reconciled
with the axiom of philosophy: quidquid movetur ab alio
movetur. 11
This problem, it seems, can be explained by the same hylo11

An Introduction to Philosophy, p. Ill. Cf. Approaches to God, p. !!4 (d).

HYLOMORPHISM,

GRAVITY AND 'TERTIARY'

MATTER

41

morphic principle as in the cases just considered. The initial
impulse of specific intensity X is imparted to the rocket; this
initial impulse X educes from the potency of the matter of the
rocket a specifically identical but numerically new impulse X 1 ,
while X returns to potency. In the same way X 1 educes X 2 ,
itself returning to potency. And this process continues ad
infinitum as a continuous eduction of numerically new energies
specifically identical with the original impulse.
Thus it is that the specific value of the original impulse
remains the same throughout a journey which, theoretically
at least, goes on for ever; and the continued journey of the
rocket does not increase the original energy, precisely because
this original specific energy is being constantly renewed and
returning to potency. This problem can only be explained by
distinguishing between form and matter, the former giving the
specific degree of energy, the latter its numerical individuation
indefinitely repeated. It is one more example, it seems, how
universally applicable throughout the material universe hylomorphic principles are, and how they hold the key to otherwise insoluble enigmas in science.
There remains one last apparently baffling problem for which
we do not pretend to possess a fully adequate solution, but
perhaps the distinction between secondary and tertiary matter
may provide the basic answer. It may be demonstrated thus
far, which in turn may perhaps prepare the way for someone
else to work it out to completion. The problem is the apparent
contradiction between the absolute velocity of light and the
special principle of relativity.
The principle of relativity runs as follows: "We can only
speak of the mutual motion of bodies; we cannot attach any
meaning to absolute motion because it cannot be verified."
From this it follows that everything takes place within a closed
system which is in uniform rectilinear motion exactly as though
it were stationary.
For instance, two cyclists ride at exactly the same speed
from the center of a ship's deck, one towards the bow, the

42

BRUNO WEBB

other sternwards. In obedience to the principle of relativity
their speed as measured from the ship is identical; but if
measured from the shore one cyclist will be travelling with
the speed X+ V, the other with that of X-V, where
X= velocity of cyclist along the deck, and V = speed of ship.
The same will hold true if we replace the velocity of the
cyclists with that of sound sent out by a pistol fired amidships.
We would expect the same to be true of light sent out from
a moving star when measured from the earth, i. e. that the
velocity of the light would be found to be X V in the direction of the star's movement, and X-V in the opposite
direction, where X = velocity of light and V = speed of star.
Yet such is not the case. The velocity of light is entirely
unaffected by the speed of its source; it is absolute, and remains
800,000 km. a second under all conditions.
Accepting this fact of light's absolute velocity, then, it might
be expected that after, say, ten years of travelling out from
the moving star the light would be nearer to the star in the
direction of its motion, and further from it in the opposite
direction; yet in fact it will be equidistant. We would expect
either the principle of relativity to hold true or that of the
absolute velocity of light, but not both simultaneusly since
this seems to involve a direct contradiction. Yet it is maintained that both are simultaneously verified beyond question.
Einstein explained this apparent contradiction by saying that
the simultaneity of two events is relative to the conditions
under which it is measured, and this may be true mathematically where quantitative values alone are involved. But
this cannot explain the ultimate nature of the apparent contradiction; no ultimate truth can be relative.
In looking for an ultimate explanation in the ultra-phenomenal plane, let us start by restating . the principle of
relativity quoted above in terms of tertiary and secondary
matter. It will run thus: "The motion of one tertiary body
cannot be detected by any means whatever except by reference
tQ another tertiary body. If there is no other tertiary body

+

HYLOMORPHISM,

GRAVITY AND <TERTIARY'

MATTER

43

with which its motion can be related, it is in every way as
though it were stationary. The motion of a tertiary body
cannot be detected by its relation to secondary matter." For
instance, we cannot tell the earth's motion in relation to space,
but only in relation to sun and stars.
With this in mind, consider two stars, A and B, moving
towards each other (Fig. 3) . Then, taking the case of star A,
if b is the point reached by light from A travelling towards the
star B after ten years, and if b' is the point reached by light
from A in the opposite direction, also after ten years; and if
A' is the position of the star travelling towards B after ten
years-then the absolute velocity of light in both directions
(the first principle) would lead us to suppose that A'- b would
be a shorter distance than A'- b'. Yet this is not so, because
b'

--

...,. __

--+

A

A'

b

MOVEMENT

OF STARS

MOVEMENT

OF LIGHT

b

B'

8

FIG. 3.

the principle of relativity (the second principle) demands that
A- b and A- b' should be identical with A'- b and A' - b',
i. e. that ·everything should happen as though the star were
stationary. And all that we have said of star A is true in the
same way of star B.
Light has travelled out from A-as also from B-in all
directions at the same velocity, and after ten years it will be
at equal distance from the star in all directions. Yet all the
time the light has been travelling (a) in one direction with
the star (in the star's forward direction), and (b) in the other
direction dway from the star. How can we account for this
apparent. contradiction? Only by accepting the radical distinction between secondary and tertiary matter. The motion of
the two stars 'towards each other consists of two tertiary

44

BRUNO WEBB

motions, each of which is relative to another tertiary body (i. e.,
to each other). But remove either of these stars so that only
one tertiary body remains, and this relative motion is nonexistent. For each star taken singly is devoid of verifiable
motion, i.e., it behaves as though it were stationary, because
in each one singly the law holds good that " the motion of a
tertiary body cannot be detected by its relation to secondary
matter."
Therefore light emitted from each star taken singly obeys
both laws, of relativity and of the absolute velocity of light.
The super-imposition of a tertiary relation between the two
stars does nothing to change the intrinsic nature of the apparent
immobility of each star taken singly in its relation to secondary
matter, that is to say its absolute motion; the tertiary relation
between the stars A and B follows upon these two absolute
motions, and is extrinsic to them.
Therefore: (1) the motion of light and the undetectable
absolute motion of each star, although themselves tertiary
energies, are in secondary matter, while (2) the relation between the motions of the stars A and B is in tertiary matter;
and owing to (1) and (2) being in radically distinct grades of
being, (1) remains wholly unaffected by the subsequent imposition of (2) . It is precisely because the motion of light is
in secondary matter that it. does not vary with the speed of
its source as sound does, since sound is. normally the vibration
of air molecules and so is in tertiary matter.
How then can we account for the diminution of distance
between the two stars? Instead of regarding the stars A and
B as "moving through space" (since in relation to space or
secondary matter they both appear stationary) , it may help
to look upon this diminution of distance as a ' leakage of
secondary matter ' between A and B. For instance, a crevice
in the rock which forms the floor of a lake will cause water
from both sides to flow uniformly towards it, till it flows down
through it. If there are two corks on the surface of the water
on each side of the crevice these will be carried by the move-

HYLOMORPHISM,

GRAVITY AND 'TERTIARY'

MATTER

45

ment of the water towards each other so that the distance
between them diminishes. Yet each will remain stationary
with reference to the general mass of water which surrounds it,
i. e., neither
moves through the water but only with it.
If each of these corks is set vibrating so as to send out
concentric ripples representing the emission of light from each
star, these ripple-circles will travel with the corks as a single
whole and so remain equidistant from their sources of vibration
just as though the water were at rest. The two sets of concentric ripples, each with its vibrating centre, would behave as
though there were no converging movement of the water; yet
the distance between the two sets of ripples would decrease
until both met at the crevice.
We are not suggesting there is literally a ' leakage ' of
secondary matter between the stars A and B, but this illustration may help us to understand, however inadequately, how
a tertiary relation of distance can change without any change
taking place in the absolute motion of the stars and of the light
in secondary matter. And this can only be possible on the
principle that
and tertiary matter are radically distinct levels of material being. Moreover, the velocity of light is
absolute because it is the velocity proper to the species of
secondary matter, due, it may be supposed to some homogeneous quality characteristic of it, and so is, as Einstein held,
a fundamental law of the material universe.
it may be hoped, a mind trained in both physics
Some
and philosophy will succeed in discovering what the reality is
which we have illustrated as the' leakage of secondary matter.'
What the origin of tertiary energies may have been is quite
another question. If we accept the principle held by S. Gregory
of Nyssa and S. Augustine that the active potencies of all
visible bodies were in the primeval matter as it came from
God's creative hand, it might well be that at the initial creation
there was nothing more than a pin point of secondary matter
in which were rooted all these active potencies. For it is a
sound principle of scholastic philosophy that God will work

46

BRUNO WEBB

through created causes to produce any effect that does not
demand actually infinite power. What then were these potencies in primeval secondary matter but potential tertiary
energies? If, moreover, the universe really is expanding and
has expanded from a primeval pin point, then it seems the
active power to produce the full extension of secondary matter
-since this extension is no more than an accident-may alsoc
have been among these primeval potencies.
If, finally, we accept patristic, not to mention thomistic,
tradition voiced by S. Gregory the Great when he says
" Nothing takes place in this visible world without the agency
of the invisible creature," we may perhaps say that all subsequent development of the material universe, from secondary
to tertiary matter and throughout the successive levels of
tertiary matter, has taken place through created causality both
angelic and material, the former directing but never replacing
the latter, under the sustaining power of God's concurrence.

BRUNO WEBB, 0. s. B.
Pluscarden Priory,
Elgin, Moray,
Scotland.

THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF LOGIC

L

GIC, as logic, does not investigate its own nature.
Epistemology does this for logic. However, there is no
one for whom the epistemological knowledge of the
nature and scope of logic is more significant than for the man
who happens to be a logician. Yet it is clear from an examination of our treatises and textbooks in logic that the men who
author them disagree, sometimes rather significantly, on the
epistemological character of logic. In the face of sometimes
contradictory opinions about the nature of logic, it is clear that
some of our logicians rather thoroughly misevaluate the significance of logic. Because logic is universally and necessarily
propaedeutic to any scientific effort, it is not surprising that
this misunderstanding on the nature of logic has serious consequences for all the academic disciplines. It is easy to allow
more to logic than logic deserves, and the history of philosophy
yields more than one example of over-extended logicism. It is
easy too, in reaction to this, to allow less to logic than logic
deserves. Thus some would make of logic a highly restricted
instrument of the intellect for a very limited area of scientific
discourse. In truth, logic is not a universal science embracing
all other sciences (or any other science) either as integral or as
subjective parts, and yet it remains universally an instrument
of the reason for all scientific discourse. The intention of this
paper is to initiate an investigation into the nature of logic
which will make these points clear. This study will not be
exhaustive, and yet it will be developed in the light of those
distinctions in terms of which any exhaustive study should be
made. This paper is at best a preliminary work, yet it is
determinately in conflict with many current notions about the
nature and limits of logic.
.
The occasion for this paper is the widespread disagreement
on the nature and importance of logic. The immediate inspira-

47

48

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

tion for it is a footnote suggested by the translators of The
Material Logic of John of St. Thomas. 1 The footnote arises in
the context of a discussion on the speculative, but " useful,"
character of logic. In the footnote the translators broaden the
discussion and suggest "that the ideal noetic treatment (of
logic) would correlate these four frequently made distinctions
and divisions within logic: science and art, doctrinal and in
use, formal and material, and dialectical and judicative or
demonstrative." In our opinion, these are the fundamental distinctions in terms of which logic must be epistemologically
understood. This paper will attempt to meet the challenge
implicit in the footnote just quoted. It will be an attempt to
correlate these distinctions in order to lay at least the groundwork of an adequate investigation into the nature of logic.
Logic is both an art and a science. It is a strange kind of
art, and it is a unique type of science. It is an art without
being practical, and it is a science which is speculative, despite
the fact that its value lies only in its use. And it is one
discipline which is simultaneously both an art and a science.
It seems that almost every textbook in logic distinguishes
between the art of logic and the science of logic. But not all
of them agree precisely on the character of logic as an art and
logic as a science. To begin with, some would allow logic to
be treated either as a science or as an art, despite the fact
that logic is indivisibly art and science. Further, in most
, 1 The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas, translated by Yves R. Simon, John
J. Glanville, and G. Donald Hollenhorst (Chicago, 1955), pp. 598-594, note 85.
Although it is this particular footnote which has proximately inspired this essay,
we readily and gratefully acknowledge a larger debt both to John of St. Thomas
and to his translators. Perhaps the most helpful primary source for this study has
been John's analysis of the nature of logic in. the first two questions of the
second part of his Ara Logica. Certainly nothing could have been more constructively provocative than the notes appended to their translation of this part of the
Ara Logica by Professors Simon, Glanville, and Hollenhorst. We are especially
indebted to Professor Simon in ma:ny ways for an incalculable share of what has
gone into this paper. At the same time our indebtedness to Aristotle, St. Albert,
and St. Thomas is evident throughout the study. It should be noted that many
of the points developed in this paper have been treated in a chapter on the
nature of logic in a textbook in logic written by us soon to be published by Bruce
Publishing Company.

THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF LOGIC

49

textbooks in logic, distinctions are made between. speculative
and practical disciplines, between formal and material logic,
between doctrinal logic and " useful " logic, and between
general logical procedure and particular scientific methodology.
These distinctions are frequently confused with the distinction
between logic as a science and logic as an art. The science
of logic is said by some to be speculative and the art of logic
to be practical. Formal logic is characterized as scientific, and
material logic as artistic. The science of logic is spoken of as
doctrinal, and the art is said to be useful. The science of logic
is described as general, and the art of logic is identified with its
particular application in the other sciences. As a matter of fact,
the distinction between the art of logic and its science is neither
identical with nor even coincidental with any of these other
distinctions. Each of the several distinctions has its place in
the epistemology of logic, but no two of them have the same
place. To begin to see that this is. so, let us consider precisely
what it is for logic to be an art and for logic to be a science.
Reflection upon the method of the logician in logic reveals
the scientific character of the discipline.2 The simple fact is
that the logician in the pursuit of logic proceeds in the demonstrative mode. Thus it is clear that logic is a science. But, of
course, this is not enough. We are concerned not so much with
the fact that logic is a science as we are with the reason why
this must be so. The form of anything is ultimately determined
by its end. To see not only that logic is a science, but why it
must be so, we need only consider its end. As a matter of fact,
in the light of its end, logic is seen :first of all to be an art. It
is only after seeing what logic is as an art, that we see what
it is as a science, and why it is such. The end of logic is properly
the end of an art, but it is an end which cannot be achieved
save that the art of logic be simultaneously a science.
It is the nature of the human intellect to be a reason. For
• When we speak here of the scientific character of logic, we use the term
"scientific " in the strict sense to mean demonstrative. When we speak elsewhere
of logic as a universal instrument for science, we use the term "science" in a
broader sense, for·in a proportionately different fashion logic governs the development of both demonstrative and dialectical discourse.

50

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

man the intellectual life is a developing thing. It is evident in
our experience that all intellectual discipline comes from preexisting knowledge.3 The human mind is characteristically discursive. The end of the discursive act is knowledge, but the
discursive act is itself productive or constructive. The price of
learning for the human intellect is the construction within
itself of rationally sound divisions, definitions, and argumentations. The reason is, by nature, generally determined to the
constructive end of discourse. However, the reason is not so
inflexibly determined in this regard that each and every one of
its discursive constructions is guaranteed by nature to be sound.
The reason can divide and define badly; it can go astray in
argumentation. In itself the reason is a potency which stands
in need of a habit to overcome its native indeterminacy and
ready it for the discursive act. The intellectual virtue which
perfects the reason for discourse is logic. Because the discursive
act is characteristically productive or constructive, logic must
be an art. Because the works to be produced through the art
of logic are fashioned within the mind itself, logic is a liberal
art and, as we shall note again very shortly, a perfection of
the speculative rather than the practical intellect.
A work of art is created by the artist, but the truth of his
artistic judgment is measured. by the good of the work to be
produced. The productive effort of the artist must comply with
a determinate set of rules according to which the form of the
work to be produced is to be imposed upon the matter. The
end of the artifact determines its matter and form, just as the
final cause of a work in nature determines its intrinsic causes.
For example, given the purpose of a house it is clear that only
some materials are suited to its production. It is also clear that
the ways in which these materials can be put together are
accordingly limited. Art requires on the side of the matter to
be set in order that there be some lack of determination, some
8 No point is more fundamental for an appreciation of the need for logic. Thus
Aristotle opens his Posterior Analytics with the statement: "All instruction given
or received by way of argument proceeds from pre-existent knowledge." (The
Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon [New York, 1941] p. 100.)

THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF LOGIC

51

indifference to form, so that the matter is able to take on an
artificial form. Further, art requires on the side of the form
that the matter be organized in a certain and determinate way
so that the determinate end of the artifact may be
It is not enough that there be matter able to be artificially
determined. It is also required that the artist be somehow in
possession of certain and determinate rules according to which
the determination is to be given the matter. This is t}le reason
why loii.c must be both an art and a science. The objects which
are presented to the intellect in knowledge· are presented in such
a way that they are able to be ordered in reference to one
another in the constructive activity of discourse. But they can
be ordered well only if they are ordered according to the
determinate rules of logical procedure. Further, these rules of
logical procedure must themselves be scientifically grasped, if
logic is to be ad,equate to its end as a science. Of course, it
must be shown that anything less than a scientific understanding of the rules of logical procedure fails to suffice for the art of
logic. But once this is done, it should be clear that the art of
logic is achieved precisely in the scientific grasp of logical rules.
This is to say that logic can be the art it is, only if it is simultaneously a science.
The end of the art of logic is quite clearly sound discourse.
Thus the end of logic must be principally the most perfect
instance of discourse. This is, of course, the syllogism produc.,;
tive of science, which is the demonstration. The art of logic
must be adequate to demonstration or it is less than it must be
as an art. Demonstrated knowledge or science can be characterized as perfect knowledge. 5 But perfect knowledge· must'"i5ereflexively self-assured. Discourse is less than perfect, and
• Cf. John of St. Thomas, Ars Logica, p. II, q. I, a. !l (Reiser): "Unde duo
requiruntur ad artem: Primo ex parte materiae dirigibilis et formabilis, quod non
sit omnino determinata, sed habeat aliquam indifferentiam, alioquin non erit capax
regulationis et artis, sicut actus videndi et audiendi non sunt arte dirigibiles.
Secundo requiritur ex parte formae, quae se habet ut regula dirigens, quod
regulatio fiat per certas ac determinatas vias, alioquin si non sint certa et determinata media, sed contingentia, non per artem, sed prudentiam diriguntur. . . ."
• Cf. St. Thomas, In I Post. Anal., I. 4, n. 5 (Leonine-Spiazzi): "Circa quod
considerandum est quod scire aliquid est perfecte cognoscere ipsum. • . ."

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

hence less than scientific, for any intellect un&.ole reflexively
to defend its rational development. No work of art is completely arbitrary, and this is especially true of rational discourse,
which is sound only when it conforms to the rules which
determine its constructions. No one can handle himself adequately in the discursive act, especially on the level of scientific
discourse, unless ,he. can reflexively defend himself in terms of
these rules. Further, no one can adequately defend himself
in terms of these rules unless he understands the necessity that
imposes them upon his discourse. I£ a logical principle is
axiomatically self-evident, its necessity can be seen by way of
inductive analysis. If it is less than axiomatic, its necessity
can be seen only by resolving it deductively into a logical
principle which is self-evident. Most of the rules of logical
procedure are not self-evident, and so they must be resolved
into principles which are self-evident. For example, the several
·rules for the validity of the categorical syllogism (such as the
rules which prohibit an unextended middle term or an overextended term in the conclusion) are particular rules of logical
procedure which must be shown to be necessary insofar as
they follow necessarily from the self-evident principles of triple
identity and the separating third. Or again, the rule which
states that subcontraries cannot be false together can be seen
t'O be necessary only when it is resolved into the self-evident
principle of contradiction. Thus it is that the rules of logical
procedure, which must be possessed by the logician, can be
possessed in a mode adequate to the end of logic, only if they
are demonstratively resolved into the first principles of logical
procedure. Hence, the rules without which logic is not an art
can be adequately possessed only when they are known scientifically, so that if logic is to be the art of sound discourse, it
must be at one and the same time the science of logical rules.
Before pursuing this investigation, a practical observation
can be made. We remarked earlier that not everyone accepts
the thesis that logic is indivisibly art and science. Some suggest
that it is possible to consider the art of logic quite independently of its science and attempt to teach at least the elementary

THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF LOGIC

53

course in logic exclusively as an art. However, this procedure
involves a grasp and application of the rules of logic without
a reflexive assurance of their necessity, making logic less than
an adequate instrument at least for perfect or scientific discourse. The only alternative to a scientific grasp of logical
canons is an uncritical acceptance which gives promise of no
more than mechanical application. Many a student has described his logic course as consisting in two things: the sheer
memorization of rules and the mechanical application of these
rules. This complaint may be justified, if the logic teacher has
attempted to separate the art of logic from its science.
An art perfects the reason for making, and a science perfects
the reason for knowing. As an art logic directs the reason in
the production of such works as divisions, definitions, and
argumentations. As a science it consists in a demonstrative
knowledge of logical rules. Does this last point square with the
common teaching that the proper subject matter of logic is
the second intention? As a matter of fact, these statements
square perfectly with one another precisely because they represent the same point. The rules of logical procedure can be
identified with the logical relationships which exist between
objects in the mind and which govern the ordering of these
objects in discourse. As we shall note, logical rules are nothing
but canonical statements of logical relationships. These logical
relationships are what are spoken of as second intentions. Thus,
since logic demonstrates the rules of logical procedure, it can
be spoken of as the science of second intentions.
What is the nature of a second intention? To understand
this we must make several distinctions. 6 First of all, a nature
or essence can be understood simply according to its proper
meaning. This is to consider the nature as such, that is, to
take it absolutely. Taken in this way, a nature or essence is
understood without reference to its act of existing. However,
6 The classic treatment
of these distinctions is given in St. Thomas, De Ente et
Essentia, c. III. St. Thomas discusses the nature of the second intention in several
passages, including: In IV Met., I. 4, n. 574; In I Eth, I. 1, n. 1; De Pot. q. VII,
a. 9 and 11; Summa Theol. I, q. 13, a. 7.

54

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

natures taken absolutely are open to a twofold act of existing.
They can exist as individualized in concretely real things in
a primary existence outside the mind, or they can exist in the
state of abstraction, as objects known, in a secondary existence
in the mind. In other words, they are open to a subjective
existence in the real and an objective existence in the intellect.
Nothing belongs to a nature absolutely taken which does not
fall within the definition of that nature. However, appropriately different accidents do accompany the nature in its subcjective and objective states. In itself man is animal and
rational, but in its concrete existence in Peter, it may also be
white, hungry, and running. The attributes that follow upon
the subjective existence the nature has in the real can be called
individuating characteristics. In the direct act of simple apprehension the intellect knows the nature without simultaneously
knowing any of the individuating characteristics without which
it can never exist outside the mind. In a reflex appreciation of
the nature in its abstract status as an object, the intellect
understands it to be determinately related to other objects.
In this reflex act the intellect actually brings these objective
relationships into existence as relations of the reason belonging
to an object precisely as an object. Thus, in its objective
existence in the mind, nature abstracts from individuating
characteristics, but takes on in their place other attributes
which are essentially relations of the reason. In the state of
abstraction as an object, man is neither white, hungry, nor
running, but in this state, man may be subject of a proposition
or minor term in a syllogism. The relations of the reason which
accrue to an object precisely as known are the second intentions
studied by the logician. They are spoken of as second intentions because they accrue in the mind to what is directly
known or first intended by the intellect in direct intellection.
They are spoken of as second intentions, too, because they are
relations belonging to the nature known in the second existence
the nature has in the intellect as an object. 7 As an object of
7 The clearest description of the second intention we know of is given by John
of St. Thomas in Ars Logica, p. II, q. II, a. fl: "Vocatur vero secunda intentio

THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF LOGIC

55

direct intellection, man is a first intention and not precisely the
concern of the logician as logician. What it is to be a man is
properly the concern of the psychologist or the anthropologist.
The logician is properly concerned only with the logical relationships which can accrue in the mind to man, and to any
other first intention. The logician does not attempt to define
man; he defines subject of a proposition, minor term in a
syllogism, and the like, for these are the second intentions
which comprise the subject matter of logic.
We have made the point that because of its end, the art of
logic must be simultaneously the science of logical rules. We
have also suggested that this is the same as to say that the
art of logic is at once the science of second intentions. The
reason for this is that there is an identity between logical
rules and second intentions. We have defended this by saying
that logical rules are nothing but canonical statements of
ista secundum differentiam a prima, quasi dicatur secundus status seu conditio
obiecti. Potest enim obiectum considerari in duplici statu: Primo, secundum quod
est in se, sive quantum ad existentiam sive quantum ad quidditatem. Secunda, ut
est in apprehensione, et status iste essendi in cognitione est secundus respectu
status essendi in se, qui est primus, quia sicut cognoscibilitas sequitur ad entitatem,
ita esse cognitum est post illud esse, quod habet in se. lllae ergo affectiones seu
formalitates, quae conveniunt rei prout in se, vocantur primae intentiones, quae
conveniunt rei prout cognita, vocantur secundae. Et quia pertinet ad Logicam
dirigere res, secundum quod sunt in apprehensione, ideo per se considerat Logica
intentiones secundas, quae conveniunt rebus ut cognitis."
It is significant to note that we have spoken of first and second intentions from
the objective point of view. We have said that the object of the direct act of
intellection is the first intention and that the relation of reason known and imposed
in the reflex act of the intellect considering its object precisely as known is the
second intention. From the psychological (or even epistemological) point of view
the direct act of the intellect is sometimes itself called the first intention, and the
reflex act the second intention. The science of logic has for its object the second
intention objectively, rather than psychologically, understood. It is also important
to note that the second intention as we have understood it is a relation of the
reason accruing to a nature known. It cannot be identified with that nature. In
this sense it is more like a predicamental relation than a transcendental relation.
The intention of species is not "built into " the object man after the fashion of a
transcendental relation. If it were, any attempt to know human nature as something real would be futile. Man would only be a being of reason. The intention
of species is distinct from man and is taken on by the object man. The object
itself remains a first intention and is, as an object, subject to the second intenti<!ll.
of species. Man remains essentially real and is only denominatively species.

56

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

second intentions. Perhaps this last point stands in need of
further explanation. What do we mean when we say this? The
point is a simple one. We know how logically to handle an
object which is possessed of a given logical relation or second
intention precisely insofar as we know what that second intention is. Thus the rules according to which we must order
objects in logical discourse simply state, in the form of rules
or canons, the natures of the various second intentions. Logical rules are nothing more or less than regulative expressions
stating the demands of second intentions for rational discourse.
Illustrations come easily. For example, to know what definition
and division are, is to know how to define and divide terms.
The rules of legitimate definition and division simply state the
demands of the intentions of definition and division. Similarly,
to know what a syllogism is, is to know how to deduce a conclusion from premises; and this is to know the rules of deduction.
To know what a demonstration is, is to know how to use a
syllogism as a strict proof, that is, to know the rules of scientific
argumentation. Whenever it engages in discourse, the reason
must order its objects according to the demands of the logical
relations or second intentions which belong to these objects
as know_n. Without a reflexive understanding of these second
intentions the reason may go astray in its attempts at discourse, and it most certainly will not be able adequately to
defend itself. Clearly, then, the scientific grasp of the rules of
logical procedure, demanded by the end of the art of logic, is
identically the scientific understanding of second intentions.
Logic is simultaneously the art of rational discourse and the
science of second intentions.
Logic is, paradoxically, a real science but not a science of the
real. It is a real science in the sense that it is genuinely a
science, that is, genuinely scientific in its method. We have
seen that logic is scientific in its method precisely insofar as
it establishes the particular rules of logical procedure by resolving them into self-evident principles in the order of logic.
However, even though logic is a real science, it is not a science
of the real. Logic does have an object concerning which it

THE NATURE AND :LIMITS

OF LOGIC

57

proceeds scientifically. This object is not a real being but
only a being of reason. Second intentions are at best accidents
of reason. They are relations which accrue to natures taken
precisely as objects. They exist only with an existence conferred by the mind. Thus, they are not in the strict sense real.
Because it is contradictory to think of them possessing anything but an objective existence, they are beings of reason.
Although they are not real beings, second intentions are, in
no. sense, wholly arbitrary. They may not be real, but they
are founded upon what is real. Consider, for example, the
second intention of predicate. The relation of predicate is a
being of reason. It comes into existence only insofar as one
object is understood to be related to another as its predicate.
No nature in the real is a predicate of any other. However, no
nature in the mind can be understood to be a predicate for
another unless something in the real determinately grounds the
relation in the mind. In the proposition Peter is white, white
is related to Peter as predicate only because in the real, whiteness is an accident inhering in Peter's substance. This foundation in the real, enjoyed by second intentions, enables them
legitimately to qualify as a genuine science despite their status
as beings of reason. 8
Sciences are either practical or speculative, useful or of value
quite apart from their actual use. Ordinarily we think of
practical sciences as useful and speculative sciences as of value
quite apart from use. However, logic is a speculative science
which is at the same time usefuJ.O A science is practical when
it finds its value in something other than knowledge. Logic is
not of this character. The logician investigates second intentions only because a knowledge of them enables him to reason
well. The end of the science of logic is sound discourse. This
is an end entirely within the sphere of knowledge, for discourse
is nothing unless it be productive of knowledge. Thus logic is a
8 Cf., ibid., p. II, q. I, a. 3, where John of St. Thomas defends the scientific
character of logic in the face of the difficulty expressed in the proposition: "Ens.
rationis non potest esse obiectum scientiae primo et per se."
• Cf. Richard J. Connell, "Some Notes on Whether Logic is a Speculative or
Practical Science," The New Schalasticism, XXX (1956), pp.

58

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

speculative rather than a practical science. However, logic
differs from most speculative sciences. Ordinarily the worth
of a speculative science is found in the knowledge of the subject
matter precisely of the science in question. For example, metaphysics is of value because being is worth knowing for its own
sake. But logic is different. The logician studies second intentions, not because it is good to know about second intentions
for their own sake, but to acquire knowledge of other objects
in the other sciences. Second intentions are a type of being
of reason. They are nothing but instruments for discourse.
They are in no sense the type of thing calculated to satisfy
the appetite of the intellect for truth. The logician studies
second intentions only because a knowledge of them will
enable him to proceed with scientific effectiveness in those
disciplines which seek knowledge of the real. Logic is in no
sense an end; it is only a means. But it is a means for knowledge. Although it is. useful, it remains speculative precisely
because it is knowledge for the sake of knowledge.10
Although there is generally agreement that logic should precede the other disciplines in the order of learning, there are
sometimes suggestions to the contrary. We cannot escape the
fact that logic is a difficult discipline to acquire. The second
intention is not the kind of subject matter originally proportioned to the human intellect. Second intentions do not have
metaphysical status, but like the object of metaphysics the
second intention is an object definable on the third level of
abstraction. It is an object not nearly so familiar to us as the
subject matter of physical science, nor so clearly grasped as the
subject matter of mathematics. Because of this, and because
of its rigorously scientific character, logic is a discipline ac10 In Boeth. de Trin., q. V, a. 1, ad
(Decker): "Ad secundum dicendum quod
scientiae speculativae, ut patet in principio M etaphysicae, sunt de illis, quorum
cognitio quaeritur propter seipsa. Res autem de quibus est logica, non quaeruntur
ad cognoscendum propter seipsas, sed ut adminiculum quoddam ad alias scientias.
Et ideo logica non continetur sub speculativa philosophia quasi principalis pars,
sed sicut quoddam reductum ad philosophiam speculativam, prout ministrat speculationi sua instrumenta, scilicet syllogismos et definitiones et alia huiusmodi, quibus
in scientiis speculativis indigemus."

THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF LOGIC

59

quired only with difficulty. It is, in fact, in itself more
difficult than some of the disciplines for which it serves as
a tool. If the general pedagogical principle that the less difficult
should come before the more difficult could be applied here,
there might be some argument for deferring logic in the order of
learning. But this principle is not relevant here. When one
discipline is necessary for another, it must precede that other
no matter how difficult it might be in itself. Logic is necessary as a tool for the other sciences and, for this reason must
precede them-regardless of the difficulties involved in acquiring logic. In truth, were logic not needed for the acquisition
of the other disciplines, it would have no excuse for being
, placed within the order of learning at all, for as we have seen,
it is nothing apart from its usefulness.
At this point there are two difficulties to be faced. The first
is textual. In his Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius,
St. Thomas, approving the statement of Boethius, remarks that
logic is not itself a science but is reduced to this status in virtue
of the fact that it is a tool for the sciences.11 Does this conflict
with our contention that logic is genuinely a science? If the
term" science" is used in a strict sense to mean science-of-thereal, logic is not a science. But because it is the art of rational
discourse, it is related to science as an instrument. In virtue
of this relationship it can be called " science " by an analogy of
proportion. However, the term "science" can be extended to
any genuinely demonstrative discipline. This is the sense of
the term as we have understood it throughout this paper. In
this sense, logic is properly a science. Admittedly logic is not
univocally a science even in this sense, but it is a science by
way of analogy of proper proportionality. The second difficulty
arises in the face of an obvious objection. There seems to be
a contradiction involved in saying that logic is itself a science
and at the same time a prerequisite for any science. This is a
legitimate objection, but it can be answered in the light of two
distinctions, namely, the distinction between natural logic and
11 Ibid.: " Unde secundum Boethium in Comm. super Porphyrium non tam est
scientia, quam scientiae instrumentum."

60

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

the acquired virtue of logic and the distinction between science
in an imperfect state and science in a perfect state. 12 Natural
logic is our native ability to reason with some accuracy. It is
fallible and unreflexive, but it can suffice for the acquisition of
science in an imperfect state. This means that science in its
embryonic stage can be acquired without the art of logic and
that isolated demonstrations can be achieved prior to the acquisition of logic. But natural logic will not suffice for the acquisition of science in its perfect state. If we are to achieve many
demonstrations within a given scientific area, know the relationships between these demonstrations, and adequately defend
this science against objections, we must be already possessed
of the reflexive science of logic. The science of logic itself must,
of course, be acquired in its early stages through the use of
natural logic. We can acquire the science of logic in its perfect
state only if we constantly make use of the very rules of logical
procedure we achieve in our progress towards the acquisition
of logic in its perfect state. We shall have more to say about
logic as a necessary tool for the other sciences. Suffice it here
to note that logic in its perfect state is necessary for the
acquisition of any other science in its perfect state.
The proper subject of the science of logic is the second
intention. Some second intentions accrue to objects on the level
of apprehension (e. g., species), some of the level of composition or division (e. g., subject) and some on the level of
reasoning itself (e. g., middle term). The end of logic is sound
discourse, with the emphasis upon reasoning. The three operations of the intellect are so interdependent that good order on
the level of the third presupposes good order in turn on the
levels of the second and first. This imposes a natural order
upon the logician in his investigation of second intentions. He
must study them first on the level of the first operation, then
on the level of the second, and finally on the level of the third.
The science of logic is naturally divided in a threefold way into
the logic of the first operation, the logic of the second operation,
10

Both distinctions are given by John of St. Thomas, op. cit., p. II, q. I, a. 1.

THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF LOGIC

61

and the logic of the third operation of the intellect. 18 In the
classroom any pedagogical approach at variance with this
natural 'progression of logic runs the risk of violating the discipline itself. There is no shortcut to the logic of the third
operation despite the fact that many teachers of logic are
impatient to reach it. Certainly the logic of the first and second
operations demands completion in the logic of the third. But
there can be no soundly scientific basis to a logic of the third
operation without adequate preparation in the logic of the first
and second operations.
We have noted that logic is simultaneously the art of sound
discourse and the science of second intentions. The soundness
of discourse is measured differently from the point of view of its
form and from the point of view of its matter. From the point
of view of form, an argumentation is sound when it is consistent
or valid. From the point of view of matter, an argumentation is
sound when the character of its premises is such as to guarantee
some determinate truth-status to its conclusion. Material
soundness presupposes formal soundness but adds something
different to discourse. Second intentions generally of one
type are required for the soundness of discourse from the
formal point of view, while second intentions generally of
another type are required for material soundness. The second
intentions which determine the validity of discourse accrue
to their objects in respect to the logical "position" of these
objects in discourse, that is, from the point of view of their
mode of signifying. Those which determine the probative
force or scientific status of discourse accrue to their objects
more proximately in virtue of their intelligible content.
A scientific grasp of the first type of second intention is
adequate, of course, only for the art of valid argumentation.
Since the scientist must be able to defend more than the consistency of his discourse, a scientific grasp of both types of
second intention is necessary in order that logic be a totally
adequate instrument of the intellect for rational discourse. The
18

Cf. St. Thomas, In I Post. Anal., I. 1, n. 4.

62

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

first type of second intention specifies the branch of logic called
formal logic, and the second type specifies material logic. It is
clear that neither branch of logic alone (despite the fact that
formal logic can be acquired without material logic) is adequately logic.
The difference between a second intention in formal logic
and a second intention in material logic can be illustrated quite
simply in the two propositions Every man is rational and
Every man is capable of speech. Rational and capable of
speech are both predicates in virtue of an identical" position"
within the formal pattern of thought. But rational is related
to man as a difference, while capable of speech is related to
man as a property. This difference between the two rests
proximately upon an essential difference in intelligible content
between them. The relation of predicate is a second intention
in formal logic, and the relations of difference and property are
second intentions in material logic. It is important to note
that one cannot reflexively defend the validity of a syllogism
without knowing what it is to be a predicate, but that one
could defend the validity of a syllogism without knowing the
difference between a difference and a property. However, one
must know the difference between these to be able to distinguish between an explanatory and an a posteriori demonstration. This example helps us to see that the logical relations
proper to formal and material logic differ respectively in terms
of the ratio according to which they accrue to objects and in
terms of the end for which each is investigated.
The distinction between formal and material logic is most
significant on the level of the third operation. Nevertheless, we
can distinguish between second intentions of both formal and
material import on all three levels. For example, term and
universal are of formal significance on the level of the first
operation, while genus and definition are of material significance
here. Proposition and converse are of formal import on the
level of the second operation, and immediate and commensurately universal are of material import. On the level of reasoning, conclusions and syllogisms are of formal significance, while

THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF LOGIC

68

explanatory demonstration and dialectical argumentation are of
material significance. It is evident that the distinction between
formal and material logic cuts across the distinction between
the logic of the first operation, the logic of the second operation,
and the logic of the third operation. It is true that material
logic in a sense presupposes formal logic, but it is not true
that material logic in a sense presupposes formal logic, nor
is it true that the investigation of second intentions in
material logic must be deferred until all those in formal logic
have been studied. One must surely investigate what it is to
be a syllogism before one investigates what it is to be a demonstration, but one can investigate the nature of definition before
one studies the syllogism. Courses in logic have frequently
been more faithful to the distinction between formal logic and
material logic than they have to the prior distinction between
the logic of the first, second, and third operations. Thus there
have been numberless introductory courses and textbooks in
formal logic alone, and some (but considerably fewer) courses
and textbooks in material logic alone. Because of this many
students have been scandalized into considering a course in
forU].al logic alone to be adequately a course in logic. Or
perhaps more correctly, they have been led to believe that the
course in formal logic alone is supposed to be adequately a
course in logic. Of course it is not, since the ability to argue
validly is by itself only an inadequate instrument for scientific
discourse. Suspecting as much, these students have quite
understandably taken a dim view of logic itself. It seems
pedagogically more sound to order the course in logic basically
according to the division of logic into the logic of the first,
second, and third operation. Then on each of these levels the
appropriate second intentions of both formal and material
import can be investigated in the order that they themselves
would indicate.
The names " material logic " and " formal logic " sometimes
are the occasion of some difficulty. There is a legitimate sense
in which both branches of logic are formal and neither of them
material. Both formal and material logic are specified by the

64

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

second intention, and the second intention is a logical form.14.
Second intentions of both formal and material import are
logical relations accruing to objects as known. The material
logician, just as much as the formal logician, directly concerns
himself with the intelligible structure of the second intention
and not the intelligible content of the object to which it accrues.
They leave this, of course, to the other sciences. The intention
of predicate belonging to man as an object is investigated in
formal logic. The intention of species belonging to man as an
object is investigated in material logic. But human nature is
investigateP. in psychology or anthropology. Even though
second intentions of material import depend proximately upon
the intelligible content of the objects to which they accrue, not
even material logic can make judgments properly in respect to
this intelligible content. Material logic determines the logical
conditions which are generally necessary for an argumentation
(in any scientific area) which is to yield a fully explained and
certainly true conclusion. However, no logician, as logician, can
ever say that this ,or that proposition (in a scientific area other
than logic) is certainly true. Logic is related to the other
sciences simply as an instrument to be used by each one of
them, without doing the work precisely of any one of them.
This is true for material logic just as much as it is for formal
logic.
Discourse differs in terms of its material disposition according
to the force of its conclusions. Some discourse is so rigorously
disposed that it generates a certainly true conclusion. Other
14 In his "Foreword"
to The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas (p. xii)
Professor Simon remarks, " To be sure, logical matter, in relation to the real
content of science, retains the nature of a form." This entire foreword is a brilliant
exposition generally of the nature of logic and particularly of the distinction
between formal and material Jogic. It seems to ·have been written with a full
appreciation of the fact that none of the divisions relevant to the noetic of logic
is as consistently misunderstood as the division .of logic into formal logic and
material logic. Formal is frequently confused with the whole of logic, while
material logic is variously identified with applied logic, particular scientific methodology, the sciences-of-the-real, meta-logic, or epistemology. Though a line of
demarcation between some of these is questionable, no one of them is the whole or
any part of material logic.

THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF LOGIC

65

discourse is less rigorously disposed and can generate only a
probable conclusion. This difference in the material disposition
of discourse is the foundation for a further division of logic into
demonstrative or judicative logic and dialectical or inventive
logic.15 Demonstrative logic is that branch of material logic
which investigates the intentions which guarantee a certainly
true or scientifically established conclusion. Dialectical logic
investigates the intentions which determine discourse calculated
to yield something less than a scientific conclusion.
Because the knowledge to which logic is ordered in virtue of
its end is not a knowledge of its own subject matter, but rather
of the subject matter of other sciences, logic is frequently
spoken of as the tool of the other sciences.16 This is correct
enough, although it might be more accurate to speak of it as
the tool of the reason as the reason looks to the other sciences.
Each of the sciences has its own proper subject matter, but
in all cases those subjects are investigated by but one intellect
or reason. Because there is one reason which is common to
each different scientific effort, there is one general mode of procedure for them all. This general mode is common to all the
sciences because it is proper to the reason, which is common to
'" Cf. St. Thomas, op. cit., n. 5 and 6. In general St. Thomas divides the logic
of sound discourse into the branch of logic which looks to the process of reason
which yields a scientifically necessary conclusion (" rationis processus necessitatem
inducens, in quo non est possibile esse veritatis defectum [per quem] scientiae
certitudo acquiritur ") and that branch of logic which yields a conclusion true
for the most part (" rationis processus, in quo ut in pluribus verum concluditur,
non tamen necessitatem habens ") . He calls the former judicative logic and
the latter inventive logic. He further divides inventive logic into the logic
of probable discourse yielding opinion ([" per quem] fit . . . opinio propter probabilitatem propositionum, ex quibus proceditur "), the logic of persuasion yielding
suspicion (" [per quem] fit ... suspicio "), and the logic of literary discourse which
yields conjecture ("[per quem] existimatio declinat in aliquam partem contradictionis propter aliquam repraesentationem ") . He speaks of these respectively as
dialectics, rhetoric, and poetics. Judicative logic and demonstrative logic are
unequivocally one. However, in the strict sense, dialectical logic is distinguished
from judicative or demonstrative logic as a part of inventive logic. Nevertheless
there is a general use of the term " dialectical" which would allow it to be identified
with " inventive." Understood in this general sense, dialectical logic is, as a
whole, distinct from demonstrative logic while retaining its own subdivisions.18 Cf. supra, note 10.

66

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

all the sciences. At the same time, in virtue of formal differences in scientific subject matter, there must be distinctly
different particular modes of procedure for each distinctly
different science. The general method of the reason must be
appropriately contracted to the needs of a given scientific subject matter before it can be proximately adequate to the
particular science specified by that subject matter. The science
of logic is nothing more or less than a grasp of the common
mode. The contractions of logic which are proper to the various
sciences are the appropriate methodologies respectively £or
those sciences.17 Thus there is a distinction between logic and
the method of mathematics, between logic and the method of
physics, between logic and the method of metaphysics. But
at the same time there is a relationship between logic and the
various different scientific methodologies. Each scientific
methodology must be generally logical, but each must be logical
in its own way.
Failure to distinguish in practice between logic and its particular contractions has serious consequences. Because of the
demands of the reason, mathematical method is inadequate to
the science of mathematics if it is not logical, and because of
the special character of the mathematical subject matter,
mathematical method is inadequate to the science of mathematics if it is only logical. Mathematical method is adequate
to mathematics only if it is logical in the mathematical mode.
Similarly the methodology of physics must be logical in the
physical mode, and the methodology of metaphysics must be
logical in the metaphysical mode. It is a fact that logic lends
itself more easily to some particular methodologies than to
others. Thus logic is more easily contracted to mathematical
methodology than it is to the metaphysical mode of discourse. 18
This is one reason why more progress can be made in mathematics prior to the reflexive study of second intentions than in
Cf. St. Thomas, In II :Met., l. 5, n. 335; In II De Anima, l. 3, n. fl45.
It should be noted that when we speak of mathematics throughout the paper
we have principally the classical mathematics, rather than modern mathematics,
in mind.
17

18

THE NATURE AND LIMITS

OF LOGIC

67

metaphysics. It is also the reason why examples of mathematical discourse come more easily and serve more profitably than
others in teaching an elementary course in logic. Examples of
being logical are better known to us in mathematics than in
metaphysics. 19 But this is no excuse for identifying logic with
mathematical methodology. To do so is to destroy the significance both of logic and of mathematics. And to do so, of course,
is to rule out the possibility of being logical in any discipline
other than mathematics. In itself, logic is open to all scientific
discourse. It can, even though with difficulty, be contracted
to the needs of the subject matter of metaphysics. However,
mathematical method, though applied logically, encompasses
only the subject matter of mathematics, and is in no sense able
to be used properly in metaphysics. To equate logic with
mathematical method is to cut metaphysics off from logic. And
if metaphysical method is not basically logical, it is difficult to
see how it can in any adequate sense be scientific. The distinction between logic as a common mode and its contractions in
the various scientific methodologies must be recognized, understood, and respected for the sake of logic itself and especially
for the sake of the sciences for which logic serves as a tool. 20
We have seen that although logic is a speculative science, it
is essentially useful. This fact is the foundation for a distinction
between doctrinal logic (logica docens) on the one hand and
logic in use (logica utens) on the other. Logic is an intellectual
discipline which consists in the scientific grasp of second intentions. As such, logic can be said to be doctrinal. To put this
10 Several worthwhile suggestions in this reference were offered by Rev. William
Baumgaertner in an unpublished paper, " Demonstration," given at the 1959
Philosophical Institute in the Teaching of Philosophy at Marquette University.
One practical difficulty in the teaching of logic arises from the fact that there are
no examples simply of proceeding logically. We must use examples of proceeding
logically in a definite discipline, even if that discipline is itself logic. Thus we
constantly run the danger that our students will confuse general logic procedure
with some particular scientific methodology.
20 It is not the business of the logician to determine the methodology of any
given science. But it is the responsibility of every scientist to be aware of the
demands of logic and to introduce his proper investigation with a proemium in
which he determines the contraction of logic which constitutes his own method.

68

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

another way-there are propositions which are properly logical,
not only insofar as they fit into a logical pattern of thought, but
precisely insofar as they express a truth within the area of logic
itself. Together these propositions comprise the body of what
might be spoken of as logical theory or doctrine. It is from this
point of view that we speak of doctrinal logic. In a similar
fashion we would speak about the psychologist's speculative
knowledge of man as doctrinal (psychologia docens) . However,
unlike psychology, doctrinal logic is essentially useful. In any
given case it may not be used, yet its use' remains its raison
d'etre. We can say that doctrina:llogic is virtually useful, but
we must distinguish between this and logic actually put to the
use of the reason. Logic actually put to the use of the reason
can be spoken of as logic in use (logica utens) and distinguished
from doctrinal logic (logica docens).
There are three different uses to which logic can be put.
When it is used in its most -characteristic fashion, it is used to
direct the reason in the exercise of rational discourse. This can
happen in two ways: first, when it directs the intellect in discourse terminating in the real through an analysis to self-evident propositions; and second, when it directs the intellect in
the tentative and unterminated discourse productive of a probable conclusion. There are the two uses of logic to which we
pointed when we distinguished between demonstrative and
dialectical logic. These are the methodological uses to which
logic as a general instrument of discourse can be put. However,
logic can be put to a third use, which differs radically from the
first two insofar as it is not methodological. Logic, like
metaphysics, is a common science in the sense that its subject
matter extends to all being. 21 Because it is a common science in
this sense, it can supply propositions which are properly logical
but which can be used as premises in a particular science. A
commonly proposed example of this is the logical principle that
21 The subject matter of meta.physics embraces all being ("ens commune ") . Since
logical relations can accure to any being qua known, the subjects of metaphysics
and logic are coextensively universal. They differ, of course, as first and second
intentions.

THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF LOGIC

69

contraries are in the same genus when used as a premise in an
argumentation calculated to manifest the ps.ychological truth
that the contrary passions of love and hatred flow from the
same appetite. In this example a proposition from logic (logica
docens) is used (logica utens) as a part of an argument in
psychology (psychologia docens). In other words, logic is used
to supply a doctrinal principle built into psychological discourse instead of a methodological principle governing the
integrity of discourse without becoming a part of it. Thus
there are three manifestations of logic in use: first, as a methodological instrument for demonstrative discourse; second, as a
methodological instrument for dialectical discourse; and third,
as a source of doctrinal propositions for discourse in particular
sciences.22
In the first article of the sixth question of the Commentary
on the De Trinitate of Boethius, St. Thomas speaks of three
meanings of rational method. 28 The first of these corresponds
to logica utens considered as logic-supplying-premises-to-theother-sciences. The second corresponds to logica utens considered as logic-directive-of -the-reason-in-probable-discourse.
The third refers to the demonstrative method characteristically
called for by the particular scientific structure of the subject
matter of natural science. As such this third meaning of
rational method would seem to belong to logica utens in the
sense of logic-directive-of-demonstrative-discourse, and it belongs to this branch of logic precisely insofar as this branch of
logic is contracted to the requirements of the subject matter
of natural science. In other words, the third meaning of rational
method (rationabiliter) 'belongs to the proper,methodology of
natural science. In similar fashion, the method of learning
(disciplinabiliter) spoken of by St. Thomas in this same article
in the De Trinitate as characteristic of mathematical discourse,
and the method of intellect (intellectualiter), spoken of as
•• For a more complete discussion of the significance of logica utem, cf. John
of St. Thomas, op. cit., p. II, q. I, a. 5.
•• In Boeth. de Trin., q. Vl 1 a. 1, resp.

70

EDWARD D. SIMMONS

characteristic of metaphysical inquiry, belong respectively to
the proper methodologies of mathematics and metaphysics. 24
It was noted at the beginning of this paper that it was to be
at best a preliminary work. This brief summary fulfils that
intention. 25 In the light of its end, we have seen that logic is
both an art and a science. It is the liberal art of sound rational
discourse. It is the speculative but useful science of second
intentions. Although it is genuinely a science, it is not a
science of the real. Although it has an object which it seeks
to know scientifically, it is not for the sake of the knowledge of
this object that it exists. The end of logic is sound discourse
in the other sciences, and it is only for this that it concerns
itself with second intentions. Logic confronts second intentions
on the levels proper to each of the three operations of the
intellect, and on each level it concerns itself with intentions of
both formal and material import. Thus logic can be divided in
one way into the logic of the first operation, the logic of the
second operation, and the logic of the third operation; and in
another way into formal and material logic. Logic is an instru••zn Boeth. de Trin., q. VI, a. 1, St. Thomas does not fully explicate the
methodologies proper to the three genera of speculative science. He distinguishes
among these particular methods of demonstration in this article only by pointing
out what is especially characteristic of each. ThE:re is no intention in my remarks
to find more in St. Thomas' text than this, which is sufficient to indicate for St.
Thomas a distinction between scientific methods respectively proportioned to
diverse scientific subject matter.
•• We have chosen not to raise the problem of the "rivalry" between mathematical or symbolic logic and what is frequently referred to as Aristotelian logic.
We have attempted to discuss logic as it is in itself, quite apart from any of
its accidents (e. g., the fact that it is or is not susceptible of symbolization or
the fact it has been discovered and taught by Aristotle or by some one else) . The
discipline we have discussed and called logic is the discipline which is determined
in its essential character by the end of sound discourse. It is a science whose
formal subject is the second "intention. If either Aristotelian or mathematical logic
measures up to this end because it adequately confronts this subject matter, it is
logic in the sense in which we have understood logic. We think that this is the
case for Aristotelian logic and that it is not the case for mathematical logic. If we
are right, then these two are only equivocally logics, and whatever the character
of mathematical logic, it is in no sense a rival to Aristotelian logic. In support of
uur view we recommend: Henry Veatch, "Aristotelian and Mathematical Logic,"
'l'he Thomist, XIII (1950), pp. 50-96.

THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF LOGIC

71

ment of the intellect for the terminated discourse of demonstrative science and also for the unterminated discourse of probable
argumentation. Thus there is a division of material logic into
demonstrative and dialectical logic., Logic is an instrument of
the reason in the scientific effort of the reason. Yet it cannot be
identified with any given scientific methodology. Logic is a
common methodology which must be contracted to the needs
of a given scientific subject before it is proximately adequate
as an instrument in that science. Because logic is an intellectual
discipline itself a science, it can be said to be doctrinal. Doctrinal logic is virtually useful; and when it is put to use we can
distinguish between doctrinal logic and logic in use. Logic is
used in several ways. It is used as a methodological instrument
when it supplies general methodological principles for either
demonstrative or dialectical discourse. And it is used in another
way whenever as a common science it supplies a premise for
argumentation in some particular scientific area.

Eow ARD D. SIMMONS
Marquette Uni-versity,
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

"ABSTRACTIO TOTIUS" AND "ABSTRACTIO
TOTALIS"

T

HE topic o£ abstraction has probably attracted more
attention in recent years than ever previously in the
Thomistic tradition. I do not intend to recapitulate
here the history o£ the controversy/ but rather to go back to
its source.
It seems that this difference o£ opinion on the topic of
abstraction takes its origin from the distinctions o£ certain
traditional commentators on the writings o£ Saint Thomas.
These commentators are Thomas de Vio Cajetan and John
o£ Saint Thomas. 2 It can be said, with some degree o£ probability, that without their interpretations, the doctrine of Saint
Thomas on abstraction would not have been subjected to the
amount of critical examination that has come to it, particularly
in more recent years.
In itself, this preoccupation with the topic of abstraction is
beneficial to the Thomistic tradition, and this for two main
reasons. Firstly, such criticism and controversy preclude the
purely passive acceptance of an important element in the traditional philosophy. Secondly, and not entirely separated from
the first reason, abstraction is the basis of intellectual knowl1 An extensive list of the recent literature
on this topic is to be found in the
first foot-note of Edward D. Simmons' article--" The Thomistic Doctrine of the
Three Degrees of Formal Abstraction" in The Thamist, XXII (1959), 87-67.
2 For present purposes, the following quotation may be taken as summarizing the
doctrine of John of Saint Thomas on abstractio totalis with which we will be
concerned here--" Et non loquimur de abstractione ' totali ' quae abstrahit aliquid
ut praedicabile ab inferioribus; sic enim ista abstractio est communis conditio
sCientiarum, quae non agunt de singularibus sed de universalibus." (John of St.
Thomas-Ars Logica. (Reiser ed.), S!i!!i!b, 17-!i!O, q. XXVII-" De Unitate et
Distinctione Scientiarum "). In this article I will be concerned only with Cajetan's
doctrine. In any case, of the two, it was Cajetan who first introduced " abstractio
totalis" to the traditional philOsophy.

" ABSTRACTIO

TOTIUS " AND " ABSTRACTIO

TOTALIS "

73

edge and the question of the distinction of the speculative
sciences. As principle in both respects, its importance is manifest-" a small error in the beginning is great in the end." 3
In its general outlines, the traditional doctrine on abstraction
has certain essential features. By virtue of the cognoscitive
power called intellect, man can know the quiddity of material
things as represented in the phantasms of the higher internal
senses.4 Such intellectual knowledge, of its nature, abstracts
from the hie et nunc inasmuch as it is knowledge which lays
aside the individuating material conditions of the thing known
and considers only the quiddity or essence. This act of abstraction is attributed to the agent intellect. 5
An essence or quiddity is therefore capable of being understood according as it is abstracted from individuating material
conditions, which is to abstract it from individual matter. But
individual matter is twofold-sensible and intelligible. 6 All
understanding abstracts from individual sensible matter inasmuch as it abstracts from the individual sensible appearances
as represented in the phantasm, which is to abstract the universal from the particular. 7 What remains as the object of
intellection, is a quiddity in whose definition is put common
sensible matter, but not individual sensible matter. For instance, man is known as a being composed of rational soul and
a human body of flesh and bones, but not, however, as this
being (i.e., Socrates) composed of this rational soul and this
flesh and these bones.8 Man is known in this latter fashion by
reflection, which is in a certain way the reverse of abstraction.
It is also possible for the intellect to abstract from all sensible
matter in its understanding. Therefore even the above common
sensible matter is left aside. So the intellect can understand
triangle, not only apart from this color (i.e., green) and this
• De Ente et E$sentia, prooemium.
4 Summa Theol., I, q. 85, a. 1, corp.; In d.e Anima, Lib. ill, lect. viii, (Marietti
ed.).

"Ibid., I, q. 79, a. 8, corp.; In de Anima, Lib. ill, lect. x; Q. de Anima, a. iv.
8 Ibid., I, q. 85, a. 1, ad
QQ. Disp. de Verit., q. II, a. vi, ad 1.
I, q. 85, a. 1, corp.
8 In Boetii de Trinitate, q. V, a. iii, corp.

74

LEO FERRARI

material of which it is made (i.e., plastic), but even apart from
all sensible qualities. Corporeal matter is excluded and also
·the sensible qualities which inhere in it, such as color, hardness,
etc. Such an abstraction is of a higher order than that whereby
the universal is abstracted from the particular, for it abstracts
from all sensible matter, both individual and common. This
is the abstraction of mathematics with which we will not be
concerned here.
Turning our attention to the first manner of abstraction,
we note that this is usually described by Saint Thomas as
abstraction of the universal from the particular-abstractio
universalis a particulari. However, in one notable treatise he
does refer to this same abstraction as abstractio totius. 9
Cajetan, in commenting on some of Saint Thomas' works, had
occasion to consider the topic of abstraction. In so doing, he
describes this first manner of abstraction, not as an abstraction
of the universal from the particular, but of a universal whole
from its subjective parts-totum universale a partibus subjectivis. To this process he gives the name abstractio totalis.
The purpose here is to compare the abstractio totius of Saint
Thomas with the abstractio totalis o£ Cajetan to see if they are
identical. Certainly the similarity in names, as well as the fact
that they both seem to be applied to the same manner of
abstraction, would incline one to the belie£ that these two
abstractions are really one and the same. Notwithstanding
such similarities, attempts at complete reconciliation have not
been sufficiently convincing to win universal approval. On the
contrary, a sharp difference in opinion is manifest.
In comparing the conclusion of this controversy over the
doctrines of Cajetan and Saint Thomas on the first manner of
abstraction, it is evid,ent that two opposed views have been
reached. Firstly, there are those who maintain that Cajetan is
in substantial agreement with Saint ·Thomas. 10 Secondly, and
• Ibid.
Jacques Maritain maintains that the difference is merely one of vocabulary and
not of doctrine. However, he then proceeds to distinguish the two abstractions as
pre-scientific (Cajetan's) and scientific (St. Thomas') . Furthermore, Maritain gives
10

" ABSTRACTIO

TOTIUS " AND " ABSTRACTIO

TOTALIS "

75

opposed to them, there is a smaller group who deny identity
between the abstractio totalis of Cajetan and the abstractio
totius of Saint Thomas. 11
As a first observation on Cajetan's abstractio totalis, there
are two words in his description which seem to be most significant. These two words are partes subjectivae. We find them in
his commentary on an article of the Summa Theologiae:
" ... he distinguishes abstraction, and applies it to divine matters.
Indeed he distinguishes in abstraction total and formal: that is by
which the universal whole abstracts from subjective parts, and by
which form abstracts from matter." 12

The same words occur in his commentary on the " de Ente et
Essentia " of Saint Thomas:
" ... there is a twofold abstraction by the intellect, namely, that
by which the formal is abstracted from the material: and that by
which the universal whole is abstracted from subjective parts." 13

We are here faced with what would seem to be an inconsistency. The intellect abstracts a whole from its subjective
parts. Therefore abstraction presupposes the existence of subto St. Thomas' first manner of abstraction Cajetan's title of "abstractio totalis,"
instead of using St. Thomas' own name: " abstractio totius." This hardly clarifies
the issue. Jacques Maritain, Philosophy of Nature, Philosophical Library, New York
(1951) especially pp. 15-23. Other authors make a more explicit identification of
the two types of abstraction. This is the case with the following: F. G. Connolly,
"Abstraction and Moderate Realism," The New Scholasticism, XXVII (1953)
72-90 (especially pages 86-88); Georges Van Riet, "La Theorie Thom1ste de
L'Abstraction," Revue Philosophique de Louvain, tome 50, (1952), 353-393.
11 Among those who deny this identity are:
L.-M. Regis, 0. P., "La Philosophic
de Ia Nature. Quelques apories," in Etudes et Rechecherches, Cahier 1: "Philosophie," (Dominican College of Ottawa, 1936), pp. 127-156; Francis A. Cunningham, S. J., "A Theory on Abstraction in St. Thomas," The Modern Schoolman,
XXXV (1958) 249-270; Edward D. Simmons, op. cit., and also "In Defense of
Total and Formal Abstraction," The New Scholasticism, XXIX (1955) 427-440.
12 Cajetan, In Summa Theol., I, q. 40, a. 3, ad 1, " ... distinguit
abstra<'tionem,
et applieat earn ad divina. Distinguit quidem in abstractionem totalem et formalem;
idest qua totum universale abstrahit a partibus subjectivis, et qua forma abstrahit
a materia." (Italics added).
18 Cajetan,
In De Ente et Essentia, Proeemium, Conclusio ad Questionem I,
paulo a principio: " ... duplex est abstractio per intellectum, scilicet qua formale
abstrahitur a materiali: et qua totum universale abstrahitur a partibus subjectivis."
(Italics added) .

76

LEO FERRARI

jective parts. But how can the whole have subjective parts
prior to abstraction if this relation of whole to parts is attained
only after the process of abstraction? In other words, if Peter,
Harry, James, etc. are posited as subjective parts of "man,"
then the process of abstraction which gave birth to the concept
"man" is already a fait accompli.
Perhaps the point is more clearly explained as follows:
1. From individuals, by the process of abstracting the uni-

versal from the particular, the intellect understands what
man Is.
fl. As a consequence of (1) it is now possible to make the

following identification:
Peter is a man
Harry is a man
James is a man etc.
3. As a consequence of (2) it is now possible to conceive of
"man" as a universal whole of which the parts are Peter,
Harry, James, etc. This conclusion may be represented
by the following diagram:
UNIVERSAL WHOLE •••• "MAN"

//I""

SuBJECTIVE PARTs: Peter Harry James etc.
Only now are we in a position to enact Cajetan's abstractio
totalis, because only by this third process does the universal
become a whole with subjective parts from which it can be
abstracted.
Nor are the above distinctions invalidated by the fact that
the initial understanding of what man is, is necessarily a most
confused notion. So long as the intellect understands even
most confusedly what the essence is, apart from individuating
accidents, it is in a position to predicate it of individuals, which
thereby become related to it as subjective parts. 14
"The particular example used here differs from that of Cajetan in which

" .ABSTRACTIO TOTIUS " AND " .ABSTRACTIO TOTALIS "

77

There is no question of the individual nature as it exists in
reality having this relation of universal whole to subjective
parts. The nature can have a twofold existence-one in individual matter, the other in an immaterial manner in the intellect. It cannot have the intention of universality according to
the first manner, for it is singularized, but it can and does have
it according to the second manner of existing wherein it is
abstracted by the intellect from individual matter. 15
It is obvious, therefore, that to consider a nature with the
relation of one to many of which it can be predicated is to
consider it after the process of abstraction whereby it is known.
Therefore to propose abstracting a universal whole from its
subjective parts is to consider abstraction as it can be realized
in something quite posterior. 16
On the other hand, and in strong contrast, the abstractio
totius of Saint Thomas is something quite prior. In its fulfillment it is the fait accompli; it is the process by which we
understand what man is, to continue the above example.
Moreover, the whole, the totum which is abstracted in abstractio totius is the nature" man"; the parts from which it is
abstracted are not partes subjectivae, but partes materiaethe nature " man," as it is partitioned or singularized in this
or that individual and consequently with these or those individual characteristics has peculiarities which pertain to the individual bU:t not to man as man. By the abstractio universalis a
particulari which is also abstractio totius, the nature " man "
is known apart from those accidental parts which would baffie
understanding-singulare est ineffabile.
The nature: " man," as it exists in intellect is indeed a whole
"animal " is abstracted from "ox " and "lion," its subjective parts. I don't think
that there is much point in arguing that this difference would alter the conclusion
reached. I chose this example because that or' Cajetan would obscure the issue,
since " ox " and " lion " can also be considered universal wholes with subjectivt>
parts. I realize that Cajetan stipulates that he does not intend that abstractio
totolia he from singular, but from species and genera- "non dico a singularibus sed
a speciebus et a generibus" (Ibid.). However, my concern here is with the
" partes subjectivae," which would seem equally justified in either example.
16 In de Anima, Lib. I, lect, i, n. 18 and Lib. II, lect. xii, n. 878.
18 In de Anima, Lib. I, lect. i, n. 18 and also S. T., I, q. 85, a. 8, ad I.

78

LEO FERRARI

with parts-rational soul and human body. But these are
essential parts-essential to the understanding of what man is,
for just as man cannot be without these parts, so also he cannot
be understood without them. From such parts there is no
abstraction in the understanding of what man is. These parts
therefore are quite distinct from the partes materiae. They are
partes speciei-essential parts of man as man, not as this or
that man. 17
Against the above distinction which I have made, which is
really a criticism of the expression partes subjectivae, it could
be argued that the individuals in reality can be denominated
subjective parts on the ground that they become such via
the abstraction of intellect. Therefore it differs little as to
whether one speaks of individuals or of subjective parts.
The reply to this would be that in speaking of subjective
parts, we are assuming that the process of abstraction is already
a fait accompli, as has been explained. Only after abstraction,
via judgments and a certain collation can one speak of " subjective parts." Moreover, in using such an expression, one
designates an area of mental experience which is quite posterior
to the basic operation of abstraction whereby the intellect
comes to know what something is. To thereby superimpose
one domain of intellectual activity on another is to invite
confusion.
As far as can be ascertained, Saint Thomas does not explicitly make this distinction between abstraction of a universal
from the particular and abstraction of a universal whole from
its subjective parts. Yet, on the other hand, never does he
speak of such abstraction from subjective parts. In the cases
where he might have used abstractio universalis a partibus
subiectivis, he uses instead- abstractio universalis a particulari,
or abstractio totius a partibus (materiae) .18
17

In Boethi·i de Trinitate, q. V, a. iii, corp.

is To

my knowledge, the latter occurs only once; in the celebrated q. V, a. iii,
corp. of the In Boethii de Trinitate, it is here that we also find the former expression unive-rsalis a particulari. This is the expression which Saint Thomas uses
when describing the first manner of abstraction. Thus we find it in a. ii, corp. of
the above work, as well as S. T., I, q. 40, a. 8; ibid., q. 85, a. ad 1, as also in
other treatises.

" ABSTRACTIO

TOTIUS " AND " ABSTRACTIO

TOTALIS "

79

What is important to point out, however, is that in practically
every case it is possible to read into the text the familiar
abstractio universalis a partibus subjectivis, with the result
that one is attempting to ride two horses. In such a case, it
would seem that basically one is entangled in a confusion
between the things which intellect knows, on the one hand,
and on the other, the ideas and consequent mental relations
by which such things are known and set in order.
Admittedly, it is not an easy matter to make the necessary
distinction, for it concerns the internal experience of intellectual
activity, a complex activity in which direct and reflex knowledge are in constant communion. The intellect knows its ideas
indeed, but in a posterior fashion, indirectly and by a certain
reflection. First and directly, it knows the things of extramental reality, which are the object of science. It pertains to
logic, the instrument of science, to study concepts and their
mental relations. 19
With these distinctions made, it is seen that the totum in
Cajetan's abstractio totalis is not a real whole, but a mental
whole with foundation in reality-ens ratidnis cum fundamento
in re. That universal whole " animal " of which the parts are
"ox" and'·' lion," does not exist as such in extra-mental reality.
In fact, Saint Thomas, following Aristotle, takes issue with
Plato over this same point. Animal, the universal, can be
considered as a one respecting many, or as it is animal. In
this latter case, it can be considered as existing in the nature
of things, or as existing in intellect. Plato maintained that as
a one respecting many, it exists actually and is something prior
to, and apart from the individual animals, after the fashion of
an exemplar. Aristotle denied this, saying that it does not exist,
or if it does, it is in a posterior fashion (i.e., in intellect) .20
By strong contrast, the totum of Saint Thomas' abstractio
totius does exist essentially in reality, for this is the totum of
which the parts. are rational soul and human body. Every
existing man has a rational soul and human body, for just as
In de Anima, Lib. lli, lect. viii, n. 718.
•• Ibid., Lib. I, lect. i, n. 18.

19

80

LEO FERRARI

man cannot be understood without the understanding of these,
neither can he exist in reality without them. The parts from
which there is abstraction are not parts of this whole, but
partes materiae-parts, not of man as man, but of man the
individual. In abstracting from man the individual, what
pertains to him as an individual is left aside, and what is
considered is that which pertains to him as man. This is to
abstract the universal from the particular, and which Saint
Thomas also calls abstractio totius. 21
The totum of Cajetan is something posterior-an ens rationis
cum fundamento in re. The totum of Saint Thomas is something quite prior, and an ens reale-something really existing
together with the accidental parts from which intellect abstracts in understanding it.
There is another way in which the abstractio totalis of
Cajetan has engendered confusion, a manner which is reminiscent of the ancient conflict between the One and the Many.
The totum of Cajetan's abstractio totalis is a universal whole
with respect to the subjective parts from which it is abstracted.
In his commentary on the de Ente et Essentia of Saint Thomas,
having described formal abstraction, then total abstraction,
he says of the latter:
"What is really abstracted by second abstraction is a universal
whole in res:pect to that from which it is abstracted." 22

This poses a problem, for if the totum is a universal whole
with respect to the parts from which it is abstracted, how can
it be such if it has been abstracted from them? If one
the subjective parts, then there no longer remains the universal
whole which must respect a many (unum-versus-alia: one
respecting many). On the other hand, if the universal element
is eliminated there remains a whole indeed, but not the universal whole which Cajetan's doctrine requires. In the resulting
dilemma one cannot be quite sure as to whether ox and lion
21

20

In Boetkii de Trinitate, q. V, a. iii, corp.
Cajetan, In de Ente et Essentia, loc. cit. " Quod vero abstrahitur secunda

abstractione, est ut totum universale respectu eius a quo abstrahitur."

" ABSTRACTIO

TOTIUS " AND " ABSTRACTIO

TOTALIS "

81

really do or do not pertain to the understanding of the essential
nature of animal.
By contrast, no such perplexity arises with Saint Thomas'
abstratio totius. The partes materiae from which abstraction is
made are indeed parts of the individual, but not parts of man
as man-" for these parts are ·indeed parts of the essence of
Socrates and Plato, not however of man precisely as man." 23
What then of the many? We do not deny the knowledge of
many singulars as such. This, however, is the function of the
vis cogitativa, which is in the sensitive part of the soul. 24
From the collecting of many singulars the experimentum is
obtained. 25 For this reason, the vis cogitativa is also named
ratio particularis, because it gathers together many singular
intentions, just as the ratio universalis collects universal intentions.26
What is denied here is the belief that a plurality is essential
to the nature understood by the abstraction of the intellect.
This is quite beside the point, for as Saint Thomas says
repeatedly, the intellect understands by abstracting from the
singular. Consequently, to be in one or many singulars is, by
the very abstractive process itself, excluded from the understanding of the nature of the thing being considered. 27
Nor is it denied that the intellect itself knows singulars.
While such knowledge is precluded in the process of abstraction,
nevertheless it can be had in a posterior fashion and by a
certain reflection: " Whence preserving the understanding of
the nature of the species, it can be understood as existing in
many." 28
Moreover while such knowledge of singulars pertains to the
23 In Boethii de Trinitate, q. V, a iii, corp. "Hae enim partes sunt quidem partes
1
essentiae Socratis et Platonis, non autem hominis in quantum homo."
•• In de, Anima, Lib. II, lect. xiii, nn. 896-8.
•• In' Metaphysicorum, Lib. I, lect. i, n. 15, (Marietti ed.).
•• Ibid.
•• S. T., I, q. 13, a. 9, corp.
28 Ibid. and In de, Anima, Lib. III, lect. viii, nn. 712-8. "unde servato intellectu
naturae speciei, potest intelligi ut in pluribus existens."

LEO FERRARI

practical sciences, it does not belong to science in the speculative order. 29
The language of Saint Thomas reflects a careful exclusion of
the plurality which comes from singulars. When speaking of
abstraction, his well-known phrases are-abstractio universalis
a particulari and abstractio universalis a singulari.30 Sometimes
we meet with the double piural-universalia a singularibus.31
We do not meet with the phrase-abstractio universalis a particularibus, but it could happen (perhaps through a rare slip
of Reginald's quill), without completely disproving the point.
To return to Cajetan's abstractio totalis, consider next those
properties which he imputes to this manner of abstraction when
contrasting it with his abstractio formalis. There are some
interesting observations which can be made on the properties
of abstractio totalis, and which will further enable us to appreciate the difference between this manner of abstraction and
that of Saint Thomas.
The first characteristic which Cajetan imputes to abstractio
totalis is that each concept does not remain after such abstraction, but the concept only of that which is abstracted:
" In fact in total abstraction each complete concept does not remain
separately so that one does not include the other." 32
For instance, in abstracting " animal " from man, the concept
" man " includes that of animal, but not vice versa. It is therefore possible to abstract the latter from the former by total
abstraction. Since " man " has been removed in the process of
abstraction, only "animal" remains in the intellect. This
example (which is used by Cajetan), reminds us immediately
of the famous article 3 of question 40 in the prima pars of the
Summa Theologiae. Here Saint Thomas says almost the same
thing, using also the same example of abstracting "animal"
•• S. T., III, q. 11, a. 1, ad 3.
•• See footnote 18.
81 For instance in In Metaphysicorum, Lib. XII, lect. ii, n. U!!6, as also In de
Anima, Lib. I, lect. iv, n. 48.
32 Cajetan, loc. cit. " In abstractione vera totali non remanet seorsum uterque
conceptus completus, ita quod alter alterum non includit."

" ABSTRACTIO

TOTIUS " AND " ABSTRACTIO

TOTALIS "

83

from "man." He calls this act abstractio universalis a particulari.
In commenting on this article, Cajetan on this occasion
definitely identifies his abstractio totalis with the above abstraction of Saint Thomas, of which he says:
" He distinguishes indeed in total abstraction . . . that is, by
which a universal whole is abstracted from subjective parts." 33

We have already seen the difficulties involved in identifying
the two types of abstraction. The example can be interpreted
in Cajetan's manner, when it is abstraction of a universal
whole (animal) from its subjective parts (one of which is
animal) . It can also be understood as abstraction of the universal (i. e., " animal ") from the particular (i. e., the particular animal-man) . To interpret it according to the former
way is to superadd to the text of Saint Thomas some extraneous elements.
The second characteristic of abstractio totalis is that it
produces a concept full of the confusion of potentiality and less
intelligibility:
" there arises in that which is abstracted the confusion of potentiality and less intelligibility." 34

In regard to this, it must be admitted, along with Saint
Thomas, that to know some whole without a distinct knowledge
of the many which it contains, is to have a confused knowledge
of the whole.35 However, to consider a nature as a whole with
subjective parts, or of greater or less extension is for the intellect to reflect upon its own concepts vis-a-vis extra-mental
reality. This is a perfectly legitimate operation indeed, and
most necessary; but it is by nature quite posterior to the abstraction whereby the intellect directly knows what something is.
•• Idem., In Summa Theol., I, q. 40, a. 3. " Distinguit quidem in abstractionem
formalem.

. . . idest qua totum universale abstrahit a partibus subjectivis."

•• Idem., In de Ente et Essentia, " ... oritur in eo quod abstrahitur potentialitatis
confusio et minor intelligibilitas."
•• S. T., I, q. 85, a. 3, corp.

84

LEO FERRARI

As to the third property of abstractio totalis, it consists in
this: to the extent that a concept is more abstract, so much
the better k:llown is it to us, 36
About this characteristic, several pertinent observations can·
be made. firstly, it implies degrees of abstraction inside abstractio totalis-the concept " animal " is more abstract than
that of "ox" or "lion"; while the concept " animate" is again
more abstract than " animal." The question may well be asked
then, in what way are these concepts more or less abstract in
the opinion of Cajetan. Quite obviously the extent of abstrac-.
tion in Cajetan's understanding of abstraction does not depend
upon the degree of separation from individual matter. For him,
to be more abstract means to be more separated from specific
actualities. 37
This underlines again, the difference between abstractio
totalis and abstractio totius. The latter consists in separation
from individual matter and its consequences. Cajetan's abstractio totalis seems to consist in abstracting more ·universal
concepts from less universal ones. As such, it is not an abstraction exercised by the mind on reality, as is abstractio totius,
but is rather an abstraction by the intellect on the concepts by
which it understands reality.
Moreover, it is secondarily and by reflection that the intellect
knows its own ideas. Primarily and directly it knows the
things. 38 It is in this area of intellectual activity that Saint
Thomas' abstraction is to be found. Cajetan's total abstraction
is concerned with what comes secondarily and by reflection.
Another observation which can be made on the third characteristic of abstractio totalis is that it essentially involves
degrees of abstraction-" animate " is more a:bstract than
" animal " which in its turn is more abstract than " ox " and
"lion." By contrast, Saint Thomas would admit of no varying
degrees of abstractio totius, for this is the first degree of ab•• Cajetan, In de Ente et Essentia, loc. cit. " ... in abstractione vero totalis
quanto est abstractius, tanto est notius nobis."
87 Ibid. " Abstractio totalis fit per separationem. a specificis actualitatibus."
•• S. T., I. q. 85, a. S, corp.

" ABSTRACTIO

TOTIUS " AND " ABSTRACTIO

TOTALIS "

85

straction. For a concept to be more abstract, it must belong to
the second degree, or manner of abstraction-mathematical
abstraction. From such considerations, it is evident that by
" abstraction " Saint Thomas means something quite different
from Cajetan.
WhatSaint Thomas does admit on the same level of abstraction is the possibility of varying degrees of clarity of knowledge. Our intellect goes from a confused to a distinct knowledge of the thing, while still remaining on the same level of
abstraction. Thus we know first what animal is, before we
know man. The reason for this is that the understanding of
man requires the understanding of animal plus something
else.39
This raises another aspect in which the two notions of abstraction differ radically. Cajetan's abstractio totalis proceeds
from what is less confused to what is more confused, or from
distinct knowledge to confused. Saint Thomas' ·.abstraction
proceeds in the very reverse .direction-from confused to distinct knowledge; and this has the advantage of being the natural
direction in which the human intellect moves in knowing. 40
The fourth characteristic of abstractio totalis which Cajetan
gives is that it is .common to all the sciences.41 But this is what
Satnt Thomas says of abstractio totius- " it belongs also to
physics and is common to all the sciences." 42 Perhaps this
common property of the two abstractions is one of .the principal reasons for identifying the two.
According to Saint Thomas, other sciences use the first
manner of abstraction which belongs to physics, because in
every science it is necessary to put aside what is per accidens
and consider what is per se.43 However, with Cajetan it would
seem that abstractio totalis is not permanently borrowed from
physics by the other sciences. Physics appears to have its own
•• S. T., I, q. 85, a. S, ocrp.

•• Ibid.
Cajetan, loc. cit. "communis est omni scientiae."
•• In Boethii de Trinitate, q. V, a. iii, corp:, ad finem. "Competit etiam physiroo

41

et est communis omnibus scientiis."

'"Ibid.

86

LEO FERRARI

proper manner of abstraction, while the common denominator
of the sciences is abstractio totalis. Cajetan maintains that the
sciences are diversified according to diverse manner of abstractio formalis, and which he has carefully distinguished from
abstractio to'talis:
" with the different modes of formal abstraction, the speculative
sciences are diversified." u

In going to the appropriate reference in the Metaphysics, we
find that according to Saint Thomas, following Aristotle:
" there are three parts of theoretical philosophy:
physics and theology which is first philosophy." 45

mathematics,

Therefore it would seem that in Cajetan's doctrine, there are
three degrees of formal abstraction, each degree being proper to
one science. The abstraction which is common to every science
is abstractio totalis, making a total of four different manners
of abstraction in his doctrine.
By contrast, Saint Thomas admits of only three manners of
abstraction. 46 Therefore, if the abstractio totalis is to be identified with the abstractio totius of Saint Thomas, one would have
to eliminate one of the four manners of abstraction which
Cajetan requires, or identify the abstractio totalis with the first
degree of abstractio formalis, an identity which Cajetan has
taken care to preclude. If the abstractio totalis is eliminated,
then one is nearer the doctrine of Saint Thomas. On the other
hand, if this manner of abstraction is to be identified with the
•• Cajetan, loc. cit. ". . . penes diversos modos abstractionis formalis scientiae
speculativae diversificantur, ut patet VI Metaph. in principio."
•• In Metaphysic!Yfum, Lib. VI, lect. i, n. 1166. " ... tres sunt partes philosophiae
theoreticae, scilicet mathematica, physica et theologia, quae est philosophia prima."
•• In Boethii de Trinitate, q. V, a. 1, corp. Here Saint Thomas also restricts this
division to a tripartite one. This tripartite division is consistently maintained by
Saint Thomas in other places: In Metaphysicorum, Lib. VI, lect. 1, nn. 1144-1170;
In Physicorum, Lib. I, lect 1, nn.
(Marietti ed.); In de Sensu et Sensato, Lib.
Un., lect, 1, n. 1, (Marietti ed.), etc. It is to be observed here that Saint Thomas,
with few exceptions, speaks of only two manners of abstraction. The third manner
he calls, not abstractio, but separatio, (In Boethii de Trinitate, q. V, a. 3, corp., ad
finem) . For present purposes we will speak of three manners of separation, or
abstraction from matter (cf.: S. T., I, q. 85, a. 1, ad !l).

" ABSTRACTIO

TOTIUS " AND " ABSTRACTIO

TOTALIS "

87

abstractio totius of Saint Thomas, then one is faced with the
difficulties already explained.
However, a little further on in the text, it would seem that
Cajetan intends the above identification, for we read:
" Total abstraction is common to all science. On this account
metaphysical matters as such are not compared to natural things
in the manner of a universal whole to subjective parts, but as
formal things to material things." 47

This would pose an inconsistency with his reference to the
sixth book of the Metaphysics, wherein the three sciences are
distinguished by diversity of degree of formal abstraction. On
the other hand, it is consonant with his interpretation of Saint
Thomas' abstractio universalis a particulari in I, q. 40, a. 3,
corp.
What then of Cajetan's abstractio totalis? It is certainly not
to be identified with the abstractio totius of Saint Thomas,
notwithstanding the similarity in names and the fact that both
abstractions are common to all the sciences.
It seems that it cannot pertain to that manner of intellectual
knowledge which is primary and direct and wherein the intellect
by abstraction knows the quiddity of a thing. On the other
hand, it may well belong to the domain of secondary reflex
knowledge, wherein the intellect reflects upon its own concepts
with a view to ordering and extending the knowledge it has
acquired. Here it is possible to consider the universal together
with the intention of universality. Under this aspect the universal can be a principle of knowledge, just as abstraction is
the principle in the order of direct knowledge. 48
In actual fact, it is possible to find passages in Saint Thomas'
works which seem to imply an abstraction reminiscent of some
features of Cajetan's abstractio totalis. What is noteworthy in
such passages, is the important fact that secondary, reflex
knowledge is implied in addition to the direct knowledge in
47 Cajetan, loc. cit. "Abstractio enim totalis communis est omni scientiae. Propter
quod metaphysicalia ut sic non comparantur ad naturalia per modum totius universalis ad partes subjectivas, sed ut formalia ad materialia."
•• S. T., I, q. 85, a. 3, ad 4.

88

LEO FERRARI

abstraction. 49 Nor is this unusual. It would be an over-simplification to maintain that direct knowledge alone is used in the
understanding of the quiddity of a thing. This has not been my
position here. Both kinds of knowledge are necessary, but
concomitance does not prove identity.
SuMMARY
The abstractio totius of Saint Thomas and the abstractio
totalis of Cajetan are held to be distinct for the following main
reasons:
I. They differ as prior and posterior. Cajetan's abstraction
per se presupposes previous abstraction by the intellect. Saint Thomas' abstractio totius does not per se
presuppose such abstraction.
II. The tatum in Cajetan's abstractio totalis does not exist
in reality with the parts which it has in intellect. That
of Saint Thomas' abstraction does exist in reality with
the parts which it has in being understood.
III. Cajetan's tatum seems contradictory in that it intrinsically involves a many from which it has already been
abstracted. That of Saint Thomas does not encounter
any such difficulty.
IV. Cajetan's abstractio totalis applies to the domain of reflexive intellectual knowledge. Saint Thomas' abstraction pertains to direct knowledge.
V. Cajetan's abstraction is concerned with the concepts
by which the intellect understands. Saint Thomas' abstractio totius bears upon the thing being understood.
VI. Cajetan's abstractio totalis involves degrees of abstraction, while Saint Thomas' abstractio totius does not
admit of such degrees.
VII. Cajetan's abstraction is from actual specifics; Saint
Thomas' is from individual sensible matter.
•• For instance-In de Anima, Lib. II, lect. xii, n. 879; Q. Un. de Anima, a. iv,
a genus from species.
corp., where Saint Thomas speaks of

" ABSTRACTIO

TOTIUS " AND " .ABSTRACTIO TOTALIS "

89

VIII. Cajetan's abstraction proceeds from the distinct to the
confused. Saint Thomas' moves in the opposite direction: from the confused to the distinct.
XI. Cajetan seems to require four different manners of abstraction, while Saint Thomas admits of only three.
LEO FERRARI

Mount Saint Vincent College,
Halifax, N. S., Canada.

THE KANTIAN UNITY OF PURE
APPERCEPTION*

T

HERE is in common use in ordinary conversation, the
expression "I think," whose meaning is as difficult to
analyze as its uses are manifold. We propose to examine one of the meanings of this phrase, namely, that
assigned to it by Immanuel Kant in the Critique of Pure
Reason. Kant claims that it can refer to the synthetic unity
of pure apperception. Our task is to discover what he means
by that impressive concatenation of words. Since Kant is by
no means as clear on this point as could be desired, we shall
have to choose between several possible meanings. Our guide
will be the necessity of an interpretation that is consistent with
the relevant texts, with the entire Kantian philosophy, and
with what we conceive to be the purpose of introducing a
" synthetic unity of apperception " as a necessary condition of
knowledge.
The Transcendental Analytic of the Critique commences
· with a plan for the discovery of the Categories, a priori concepts which not only are applicable to experience, but without
which objective experience, as distinguished from a purely subjective welter of unconnected sensations and impressions, would
be impossible. The Categories are defined as "concepts of an
object in general by means of which the intuition of an object
is regarded as determined by one of the logical functions of
judgment." 1 Each Category is a mode or manner according to
* (Editor's Note): The exposition here presented by Fr. Wassmer may be
complemented with previous articles published in THE THOMIST which offer a
Thomistic critique of Kantian theory. See "Kantian Theory of Sense Intuition:
A Critique," by Sister Mary Aloysius, S. S. J., XIX, Oct. 1956, 506-515; "Kant and
Aquinas," by Germain G. Grisez, XXI, Jan. 1958, 44-78.
1 Ewing, A. C., A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), p.

90

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which passively received sensations are ordered into a system.
a network of connected, related elements. Unless sensations
were so ordered, there could be no experience of an intersubjective, predicable sort. Kant believes that to each different way of arranging data in space and time there corresponds some Category, and this correspondence is specified by
the schemata, referential rules governing the application of
the Categories to the sensory manifold. The Categories are
also logical features of judgments. The connection between the
two apparently different functions served by the Categories will
be made clear by a brief look at Kant's views on the nature
of the mind.
The only cognitive faculties of the mind are, according to
the Critique, sensibility and understanding. Sensibility is the
faculty of receiving sensations in a passive manner. About the
understanding, Kant says:
Independently of sensibility, we cannot possibly have any intuition,
consequently, the understanding is no faculty of intuition .... But
we can reduce all acts of the understanding to judgments, so that
understanding can be represented as the faculty of judging . ...
All the functions of the understanding therefore can be discovered,
when we can completely exhibit the functions of unity in judgments.2

These functions of unity in judgments are the Categories.
And when we see just how broad are the tasks performed by
the versatile Kantian understanding, we shall grasp why Kant
considers the Categories to be equally versatile. They are both
the logical features· of judgments and the a priori conditions to
which objective experience must conform. The following selection of knarred prose shows just how protean the Kantian
understanding is.
The same function which gives unity to the different representations
in a judgment, gives also unity to the mere synthesis of different
representations in an intuition; and this unity we call the pure
conception of the understanding. Thus the same understanding,
• Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (London:
Ltd., 1934, 2nd ed.), p. 79.

J. M. Dent and Sons,

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THOMAS A. WASSMER

and by the same operations, whereby in conceptions, by means of
analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a judgment, introduces, by means of the synthetical unity of the manifold in intuition, a transcendental content into its representations, on which
account they are called pure conceptions of the understanding and
they apply a priori to objects .... 3
Kant continues his sketch of the understanding and mentions
the crucial idea of conjunction of the elements in consciousness
as follows:
But the conjunction of a manifold in intuition never can be given
us by the senses; it cannot therefore be contained in the pure form
of sensuous intuition, for it is a spontaneous act of the faculty of
representation. And as we must, to distinguish it from sensibility,
entitle this faculty understanding; so all conjunction-whether
conscious or unconscious, be it of the manifold in intuition, sensuous
or non-sensuous, or of several conceptions-is an act of the understanding. To this act we shall give the general appellation of
synthesis, thereby to indicate at the same time, that we cannot
represent anything as conjoined in the object without having previously conjoined it ourselves.4
The above words introduce the possibility that unconscious
acts produce the synthetic unity of the manifold, and elsewhere
Kant suggests that in these unconscious acts the understanding
may be the same as what he calls " a blind but indispensable
function of the soul " the imagination, or faculty whereby
sensory elements are ordered in space and time. On the introspective, conscious level there seems to be no hint of this. The
diverse functions mentioned in the above quotation are all
allocated to the understanding. This is apparently so because
Kant's aprioristic delimitation of the cognitive faculties to the
two, sense and understanding, and his belief that sensibility is
a purely passive faculty, force him to make the understanding,
the only remaining faculty, responsible for all these diverse
operations. The convenient result is that the latter faculty js
thus shown to be responsible both for the logical properties
of judgments and the spatio-temporal arrangements of mani3 Ibid., p. 79.
• Ewing, op. cit., p. 81.

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98

folds, that Erfahrungen (sense experiences) are characterized
by certain spatio-temporal groupings of data, and to each of
these modes of arrangement corresponds a Category.
If there is to be any grouping or synthesis of sensory data,
then there must be conjunction of these given in some consciousness. Kant analyzes the idea of conjunction and finds
that it involves "besides the conception of the manifold and
of the synthesis of it, that of the unity of it also." He goes
on to say:
Conjunction is the representation of the synthetical unity of the
manifold. This idea of unity, therefore, cannot arise out of that of
conjunction; much rather does that idea, by combining itself with
the representation of the manifold, render the conception of conjunction possible.5
Kant is here talking about the logical relations between different ideas and claiming that the idea of conjunction presupposes that of unity, rather than vice versa. After distinguishing this sort of unity, presupposition of all Categories,
from the specific Categm:y of the same name, he makes the
point that:
We must therefore look still higher for this unity (as qualitative),
in that, namely, which contains the ground of the unity of diverse
conceptions in judgments, the ground, consequently, of the possibility of the existence of the understanding, even in regard to its
logical use.6
The logical use of the understanding is that use wherein it
unites diverse concepts into single judgments, and the Categories, viewed as logical entities, are the ways in which these
concepts can be so united. The necessity of a unity is deduced
by an examination of the term "single consciousness." This
latter is a presupposition of all knowledge and experience, since
we would not know how to make sense of either of these terms
without conceiving them as denoting something that happens
or takes place within a single consciousness.
• Critique, pp. 98-4.
• Ibid.

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THOMAS A. WASSMER

For the ,manifold representations which are given in an intuition
would not all of them be my representations, if they did not all
belong to one self-consciousness, that is, as my representations
(even though I am not conscious of them as such), they must
conform to the condition under which alone they can exist together
in a common self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not
all without exception belong tome. 7
Several phrases are introduced to characterize this unity, the
" I think," " pure appreception " and the " subject."
All the diversity or manifold content of intuition has, therefore, a
necessary relation to the I think, in the subject in which this
diversity is found .... I call it (the representation I think, which
is also referred to by Kant as an " act of spontaneity," recalling the
active synthesis of the manifold), pure apperception, because it is
a self-consciousness which, whilst it gives birth to the representation
I think, must necessarily be capable of accompanying all our representations. (Parenthesis added.) 8
This distinction between pure and empirical apperception is of
fundamental importance, for it manifests Kant's belief that
there is more to the self or ego than simply an empirically
derived impression of permanence in consciousness. Such an
impression would result from an association of ideas. But any
association of ideas logically presupposes a unity in the consciousness which entertains either idea. The association of two
or more ideas presupposes that the previous occurred singly,
or at least could so occur. Both the entertaining of a single idea
and the associating of this idea with another entail that the
consciousness which entertains or associates has a unity which
is logically prior to either of these operations.
A further terminological convention is introduced by Kant
in the following words:
It (the. I think) is in all acts of consciousness one and the same,
and unaccompanied by it no representation can exist for me. The
unity of this apperception I call the transcendental unity of selfconsciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of a priori cognition arising from it. (Explanatory parenthesis added.) 9
Ibid., pp. 94-5.
• Ibid.

7

• Ewing, op .cit., p. 81.

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The first sentence looks ambiguous. Does Kant mean that in
everybody's acts of consciousness there is something common,
some sort of agent intellect or absolute consciousness which is
shared by all mankind? The second clause implies that Kant
means only that the phrase " pure apperception " refers to
something which is common to all the acts of a particular mind
(" mine " or " yours ") , but not shared by other minds.
Further, this common factor may be purely abstract, such as
uniformity of laws operating in consciousness and necessary to
it. Or perhaps what is common to all acts of any mind is the
possibility which all of them have of being accompanied by an
empirical apperception of themselves. We have not yet established that the I think must refer to a particular existent or
Pure Ego. Kant would certainly say that there is not a directly
apprehended datum which is denoted by the "I," since if there
were, we would then have direct awareness (Anschauung) of
an individual existent, and this intuition would be non-sensory.
But Kant repeatedly states that the only intuitive faculty
possessed by humans is the sensory. Ewing brings out this
point very neatly as follows:
The transcendental unity of apperception is to be distinguished
sharply from any object of ordinary empirical perception. Kant
wavers between maintaining that we are always conscious of it in
some way and maintaining merely that we can become conscious
of it at any time in connection with any representation. In either
case we are conscious of it in a very different way from that in
which we are conscious of empirical objects, for we are conscious of
it as a presupposition and not as an object of knowledge. To be
conscious of it as an object we should require another transcendental act of apperception to make the former its object. Hence
it is irrelevant to retort that our representations are in a ceaseless
flux and none of them remain identical: skepticism about the transcendental unity of apperception arises from looking for it where it
couid not possibly be found even if it exists. 10

So I must have a sensory manifold in order to become aware
of the unity of pure apperception, and the belief in such a
unity is justified by simple analysis of what is meant by a
10

Ibid., p. 81.

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THOMAS A. WASSMER

manifold's being present to a single consciousness. But we
have the belief before we engage in the analysis. Kant says
that the fundamental principle of the necessary unity of apperception is analytic.
This fundamental principle of the necessary unity of apperception
is indeed an identical, and therefore analytical proposition, but it
nevertheless explains the necessity for the synthesis of the manifold
given in intuition, without which the identity of self-consciousness
would be
I assume that the principle referred to could be enunciated as
follows: " If there is a manifold in consciousness, then that
consciousness must be characterized by the unity of pure apperception." This seems reducible to " If there is a manifold in a
single consciousness, then it must be in a single consciousness."
That brings out the analytic quality. Now it might be thought
that since this principle is analytic it cannot give knowledge of
any existing entity other than the elements of the manifold,
for analytic propositions have no existential import. But I
wish to leave open the possibility that the unity of pure apperception somehow involves a Pure Ego, an existent of some sort
which is not a sensory datum and not a part of the manifold.
I think that this is consistent with the analytic quality of the
above principle. For the principle would contain as one of
its terms " single consciousness," and the analysis of this term
may reveal that it surreptitiously contains the idea of a pure,
non-sensory, existent ego. So if we say "Here is a manifold
synthesized within a single consciousness," we would have a
synthetic statement asserting the existence of the data comprising the manifold and the existence also of a pure ego, an
existent which is not among these data but whose presence is
presupposed if they are to be unified within a single consciousness, for it is responsible for this unity. If we say, "The
presence of a manifold in a single consdousness entails a unity
of pure apperception," then we certainly have a non-existential
analytic statement, and this is, I believe, the principle to which
Kant refers above.
11

Critique, p. 96.

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97

Certain distinctions, formulated by C. D. Broad, may help
us find out what the unity of pure apperception involves. The
latter is invoked to explain and constitute the unity characterizing a single consciousness. Broad suggests that all such
theories about the mind's unity or lack of it can be divided
into two general classes, "Centre-Theories" and "Non-centreTheories." Since Kant's talk about unity and his belief that
the " I think " is for all acts of consciousness one and the same,
seem to suggest that he is introducting a Centre-Theory, we
shall focus our attention on this possibility first.
Broad's definition is as follows:
By a centre-theory I mean a theory which ascribes the unity of
the mind to the fact that there is a certain particular existent-a
Centre-which stands in a common asymmetrical relation to all
the mental events which would be said to be states of a certain
mind, and does not stand in this relation to any mental events
which would not be said to be states of this mind.12
The unity in question can be either one or both of two sorts.
It can be" transverse unity," i.e., the unity which characterizes
a given consciousness at any particular moment of its history,
or" longitudinal unity," i.e., the unity through time characterizing the different mental states of a particular person or mind.
Kant is certainly referring to transverse unity and perhaps to
longitudinal unity also.
Since most centre-theories of mind have posed as the requisite centre a pure ego, and since they have most often supported
this contention with speculative metaphysical arguments, we
shall consider Kant's condemnation of these arguments in the
Transcendental Dialectic in order to eliminate some possible
views as to what he may have meant by synthetic unity of
pure apperception, or rather, some possible views as to how he
reasoned to it. But first let us give the definition of a pure ego
from the Dictionary of Philosophy.

Ego, Pure: The self conceived as a non-empirical principle, ordi12 C. D. Broad, The Mind and Its Place in Nature (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1925), p. 558.

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THOMAS A. WASSMER

narily inaccessible to direct introspection, but inferred from introspective evidence. 13

Let us remark that the principle can be some sort of an existent
entity, and therefore need not be simply an abstraction. Furthermore, need the pure ego necessarily be inferred? Perhaps
one could maintain that it is postulated, that knowledge of it is
gained by direct contact, intuition, and/or that it is known
only discursively, (as the subject of certain propositions) but
not inferentially. We owe the latter suggestion to Doctor
Broad. The pure ego can be conceived to be a temporally
persistent, qualitatively uniform particular, a qualitatively uniform but timeless particular; or a completely unknown X.
Kant's attack in Book II, Chapter I of the Transcendental
Dialectic is directed against Rational Psychology, or that science which attempts to deduce the existence and properties
of the pure ego through a priori premises, sometimes supplemented by empirical ones. Kant's delimitation of the initial
data of this science is rather strict, since he says, " The I thinlc
is, therefore, the only text of rational psychology, from which
it must develop its whole system." This is held because of
Kant's view that the least use of empirical data would "immediately change the rational into an empirical psychology."
Kant considers the possible objection that the I think reports
an intuited, introspective experience of a pure ego, and replies
that this phrase is
... nothing more than the mere apperception I think, which in
fact renders all transcendental conceptions possible, in which we
say, I think substance, cause, etc. 14

Kant thus rejects what the Cartesian argument (Cogito, ergo
sum) would probably have to mean in order to establish the
conclusions which are deduced from it. Kant claims that we
simply do not have an intuitive experience of a pure ego, for
the only intuitions which we have are sensory ones, and there
is no sensory datum serving as pure ego.
13 Dagobert Runes, Dictionary of Philosophy (Ames, Iowa:
& Co., 1955), article " Ego, pure," by Ledger Wood.
u Critique, p.

Littlefield, Adams

THE KANTIAN UNITY OF PURE APPERCEPTION

99

The essential conclusions of rational psychology are declared
to be the following: that the soul is a substance which is simple
as regards its quality, numerically identical at all moments of
the existence of the person whose self-identity it constitutes,
and in relation to any spatial objects that may happen to exist.
Notice that Kant's objections are levelled principally against
the sort of argument by which these propositions are allegedly
established, that is, speculative, metaphysical deduction.
Kant launches his attack:
We can, however, lay at the foundation of this science nothing but
the simple and in itself perfectly contentless representation I, which
cannot even be called a conception, but merely a consciousness
which accompanies all conceptions. By this I, or He, or It, who or
which thinks, nothing more is represented than a transcendental
subject of thought = x, which is cognized only by means of the
thoughts that are its predicates, and of which, apart from these,
we cannot form the least conception. 15

It appears evident that Kant wishes to make the I think as
contentless as possible. When he uses the word " contentless "
he means only that there is no direct awareness (Anschatwng)
of an individual existent which is denoted by the I. But when
he says the I cannot even be called a conception, he may be
going too far, because we have at least the idea of it as a
necessary condition of singleness of consciousness, the use of
the understanding in any of its functions, the awareness of a
manifold, and so on. Now perhaps we shall have to ascribe
certain properties to this I, if it is to serve the function for
which it was introduced. Perhaps, in other words, we can
develop a fuller conception of what it means.
The error of rational psychology consists, according to Kant,
in the supposition that because the I can function only as the
logical subject of propositions, its mode of existence must therefore be that of a substance. It is then held to be an entity
whose existence is independent of all thought, and its properties,
simplicity, immortality, and so forth, are deduced. It is conceived to be the ultimate basis of personal identity, to persist
11

Critique, p. 286.

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THOMAS A. WASSMER

through time, to exist whether or not the person who owns it
is thinking, and to be the ultimate reason why all my thoughts
can be called mine. The root of the entire venture can be seen
to be the tendency to predicate both existence and the Category
of substance of anything which in thought functions only as
the logical subject of propositions. Kant believes himself to
have demonstrated that the Category of substance is known to
be applicable only in the case of sensory experience. This is
because the same function by which a manifold is ordered in
a certain way is responsible for the conception of substance in
the understanding, and the predication of this Category of
something can be known to give rise to a true judgment only
if the subject of the judgment denotes a manifold.
Now it might be objected that when we say" I think" we
do relate this " I " to an ordered manifold, as, for example,
when we say, " I am presently warming myself by the fire."
That we are referring to an ordered sensory manifold is demonstrated by the fact that another person could verify the statement by making the relevant observations. And the Category
of substance would be applicable to what he would see warming
itself by the fire. However, Kant has limited the initial data
of rational psychology to the I think of pure apperception, and
the I in the example above would be at best the I of empirical
apperception. The subject in each case denotes something different, assuming that the I of pure apperception denotes anything at all. We should have to establish the meaning of pure
apperception before we could hope to determine its relation to
empirical apperception.
Is it possible that what is denoted by the I of pure apperception is nothing more than the characteristic functions of
minds, the qualitative similarity of logical and categorical
operations, regardless of the particular mind in which they are
performed or the particular empirical self by which this mind
is given personal identity? Pure apperception would thus refer
to that which distinguishes mind or consciousness from anything else. Kant does say:
And thus the conception of the simple nature of substance, which

THE KANTIAN UNITY OF PURE APPERCEPTION

101

is connected with the objective reality of this conception, is shown
to be alsoinvalid, and to be, in fact, nothing more than the logical
qualitative unity of self-consciousness in thought; whilst we remain
perfectly ignorant whether the subject is composite or not. (Italics
added.) 16

On this view, the I think would mean" thought is taking place,"
and the unity involved would be the uniformity of logical
operations whenever and wherever they take place. By "logical
operation" would be meant any use of the understanding.
This interpretation would give meaning to Kant's previously
quoted statement that pure apperception is "in all acts of consciousness one and the same."
However, this interpretation would mean that pure apperception and its unity referred simply to those notes which distinguish mind from whatever else there may be. There would be
no reference to that which makes a single consciousness single.
In this case Kant's talk about the "identity of the subject"
and the "transcendental subject of thought=x" would apparently have nothing to do with pure apperception. But the
contexts in which these expressions appear make clear that
they constitute what is meant by pure apperception. We are
forced to conclude that this expression does have something
to do with a theory of what constitutes the unity of particular
minds.
Could we not suggest that pure apperception refers to both
a necessary condition and a possibility? The necessary condition is that which must be met if perception of or thinking
about a determinate object is to take place. The manifold in
question, or the ideas in question, must be synthetically unified
in a single consciousness. The possibility is that any being
which is conscious of a determinate object can produce a true
proposition stating that the diverse elements which constitute
that object are presently within a single consciousness, namely,
his own. Such a statement would always take the form " I
think .... "
•• Critique, p. 240.

THOMAS A. WASSMER

This view of the nature of pure apperception seems to be
what Korner has in mind when he says:
For this unity (of pure apperception) it is not necessary that I
should permanently think about my presentations. Nor is it necessary that when I think about them I should be aware of them as
my thinking and my presentations. All that is required for the
unity of myself in thought and perception is the possibility of this
self-consciousness. 17

The trouble with the view outlined above, to which Korner's
words do not fully commit him, of course, is that it says either
too little, or else it says the wrong thing. It says too little
if it is interpreted as follows. Part of what is meant by " unity
of pure apperception " is " necessary condition of awareness
of determinate objects." There is no explanation of the nature
of this necessary condition, or of how much can and cannot be
known about it. The interpretation just gives one of the
functions served by the term " pure apperception " in the
Kantian theory, this is, the function of substituting for the
clumsy phrase " necessary condition of the awareness of determinate objects," whenever this phrase occurs. But it does not
tell me what other terms could be substituted for "pure apperception." How about "pure ego "? " substantial soul "? Or
perhaps "mere qualitative logical uniformity of thought"? So
this interpretation would tell me nothing about how and why
pure apperception is a necessary pre-condition, but only that it
is. It also says too little about pure apperception as a possibility. Pure apperception is held to mean only that consciousness of a determinate object by a given mind entails the
possibility that this same mind can produce a true proposition
of the form" I think . . . (the object in question)." However,
the theory gives me no information regarding the nature of the
nominatum denoted by I. It could mean" this particular substantial soul," " this aggregate of mental states," " this particular empirical self," or as many different things as there are
theories concerning the nature of the mind. Since Kant's unity
17

S. Korner, Kant (Hammondsworth, Middlesex: Penquin Books, 1955), p. 61.

THE KAL"'IITIAN UNITY OF PURE APPERCEPTION

103

o£ pure apperception involves a particular theory as to what
constitutes the singleness of any mind, explanations of pure
apperception must indicate the peculiar distinguishing properties of the theory.
Consider again the formula " Pure apperception refers both'
to a necessary condition and a possibility." This could be
interpreted as saying quite enough, that is, as giving us a
theory about the mind's unity, but not what I believe to be·
Kant's position. This new interpretation would first of all
identify the possibility and the condition, by saying that " The
necessary condition of the mind's unity is the possibility that .
. . ." Arld the possibility would be of an empirical apperception
of the subject, no more. Thus, all that we should mean by
" This is a single consciousness " would be " this is an ensemble
of representation which can be accompanied by the apperception of an empirical self." What is meant by the apperception
of the empirical self is simply another ensemble of representations bearing the name " I." The sentence " I am standing
next to the desk" reports an apperception of an empirical self.
The nominatum of" I" in this case is a manifold of sense data,
those next to the desk, and perhaps also some other data, such
as memories. So this view of pure apperception would simply
mean that any ensemble of representation synthesized must be
capable of being accompanied by an apperception of an empirical self. It would mean nothing more than this. If there were
no empirical apperception which could be called into consciousness in conneCtion with any ensemble of representations, then
these representations could not have any connection among
themselves and could not be said to be in a single consciousness.
It is evident that this interpretation is a non-central theory
of mind. What is held to constitute the mind's unity is a particular sort of event-apperception of an empirical self, or rather,
the possibility of it. This empirical self is not a particular
existent which stands in a relation of ownership to all states
o£ a given mind, and what is referred to by the " I " is not
always the same thing whenever a given person uses it to
report different' apperceptions of his empirical self. He would

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THOMAS A. WASSMER

actually have apperceptions of different empirical selves at
different times, all of these " selves " being his. We shall attempt to show that Kant's theory involves something which is
a bit more permanent and substantial at the core of the mind;
that his theory is, in fact, a centre theory.
The difficulty with this is that it is not easy to produce a
centre theory which does not involve a substantial pure ego,
in the sense in which rational psychology uses the term. But
Kant wishes both to advance a pure ego theory and to reject
that proposed in rational psychology, as is indicated by these
words:
The proposition of the identity of my Self amidst all the manifold
representations of which I am conscious, is likewise a proposition
lying in the conceptions themselves, and is consequently analytical.
But this identity of the subject, of which I am conscious in all its
representations, does not relate to or concern the intuition of the
subject, by which it is given as an object. This proposition cannot
therefore enounce the identity of the person, by which is understood
the consciousness of the identity of its own substance as a thinking
being in all change and variation of circumstances.18

If the subject is a substance, as rational psychology would have
it, then it must be in principle capable of existing independently
of any representations. This independence is part of what is
meant by calling it a substance. Now the Kantian ego is defined as that which exists only to constitute the unity of a single
consciousness. It does exist, to be sure. But we cannot know
whether it can or does exist independently of conscious states
unless we can prove that there is some identity between it and
the noumenal self of the Critique of Practical Reason. What
would be required of it, if it were capable of " enouncing the
identity of the person," would be its numerical identity in all
the conscious states of the same person and the unconscious
states as well. This is so because what we generally mean by a
person is something that can be either conscious or unconscious, and is both at different times. The Kantian pure ego,
we believe, can be known only as that which is the principle of
18

Critique, p. 248.

THE KANTIAN UNITY OF PURE APPERCEPTION

105

unity in a single state of consciousness, the principle of "transverse unity." Whether it is the same in different conscious
states of the same person, and whether it persists throughout
his unconscious states, is something which cannot be known.
Kant's argument comes to this. If I am to discuss knowledge,
I must discuss it as existing in a single consciousness. This
is shown to be an analytical proposition. If I am to talk about
a single consciousness, I must be capable of offering distinctions
between consciousness in general and non-conscious things, and
also between this consciousness and that consciousness. In
practice, of course, the latter distinction is made on the basis
of empirical apperceptions of the selves in question. This,
however, will not do for the theory, because the very concept
of an empirical apperception implies the presence, within a
single consciousness, of those representations which constitute
an empirical apperception. Therefore, what I do in practice by
means of empirical appreception, is distinguish my particular
consciousness from your particular consciousness and from his
particular consciousness. However, before the idea of empirical
apperception can ever be given any meaning, I must have given
meaning to the concept of a single consciousness in general,
for an empirical apperception is something which, by definition,
must occur, like any other conscious event, within a single
consciousness; therefore, the definition of empirical apperception presupposes the definition of a single consciousness. I
cannot invoke the former to give meaning to the latter, for
this would be plainly circular.
" Single consciousness " implies conjunction of a manifold;
conjunction implies an ensemble of elements with a principle of
unity. The principle of unity in question is a Pure Ego which
actually exists. It stands in a common asymmetrical relation.
to all elements which are said to be " within a single consciousness now," a relation of " ownership." That is what we mean
when we say " Pure Apperception." The only positive thing
that we can know about it is that it is a particular which is
the subject of all these relations; this is what Kant means when
he says that it is a "transcendental subject of thought=x, which

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THOMAS A. WASSMER

is cognized only by means of the thoughts that are its predicates, and of which, apart from these, we cannot form the least
conceptions." It is what Marechal refers to when he says:
Perception of objects shows me their relation to the unity of a
single consciousness. I know that this unity, as is the case with
every synthetic unity, is "a priori": I know myself, then, as
the " a pr!qri " condition of all these phenomena of which I am
conscious, that is, in my formal relation to their diversity. In this
sense I .have " consciousness of self," if you wish, but only as a
" unifying point of synthesis for the phenomena." 19

It must provide some sort of "longitudinal unity" (unity
through time) , for any single conscious state must, on Kantian
principles, have duration. At the same time, it need not provide
the longitudinal unity which connects the different states of
the consciousness of a single person, for its only function is to
act as the necessary condition of the existence of a single consciousness, and " a single consciousness " does not imply "composed of several successive states " as it would have to be, if
the Pure Ego were interpreted as necessarily providing this
sort of longitudinal unity. While the Ego does provide some
sort of unity through time, it is not itself temporal, because
only intuitions can be temporal and we have no intuition of
the Ego. It, is therefore, best described as a timeless particular.
What are its relations to personal identity? Few and far
between must be the reply. In addition to the differences
already brought out between the two, we should note the
following similarity. At any moment of time, if there are two
single consciousnesses, there must be two numerically different
particulars, Pure Egos, each of which serves as the principle
of unity for one of the minds. The two Egos need not be qualitatively, but only nu:rJl.erically different, assuming that this
10 La perception des objets me montre leur rapport a l'unite d'une conscience; je
sais que cette unite, comme toute unite synthetique, est a priori: je me connais
done comme Ia " condition a priori " de tous les phenomenes dont j'ai conscience,
c'est a dire dans mon rapport forme! a leur diversite. En ce sens j'ai "conscience
de moi," si !'on veut, mais seulement comme "unite de synthese des phenomenes."
J. Marechal, S. J., I.e Point ... , (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, Troisieme Edition,
1944), Cahier III, La Oritique de Kant, pp.

THE KANTIAN UNITY OF PURE APPERCEPTION

107

can be the case between any two entities. We can say therefore,
that at any given time there must be at least as many Egos as
there are separate minds in operation, though, of course, there
may be more, since we can neither assert nor deny that the
Ego exists independently of consciousness.
The Ego of Pure Apperception must stand in the relation of
ownership, not only to all the elements present in that particular consciousness at that particular time, but also to the subconscious activity by which the manifold is produced. For to
say that an activity produces this particular manifold is to
imply the distinction of this particular manifold for any other.
This means referring to its synthetic unity, which means referring to the principle of this unity, which is, of course, the Self
of Pure Apperception. As Kant has said:
The supreme possibility of it (all intuition, and therefore, all consciousness) in relation to the Understanding is: that all the manifold in it be subject to conditions of the originally synthetical
Unity of Apperception. 20
THOMAS

St. Peter's College,
Jersey City, N. J.

2

°Critique, p. 96.

A. WASSMER, s. J.

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS
WILLIAM: A. WALLACE, 0. P., M.S., Ph. D., S. T. D., an associate member
of The Albertus Magnus Lyceum for Natural Sciences, author of
The Scientific Methodology of Theodoric of Freiberg, and lecturer
for a Newman Club series on philosophy and modem science, is
Professor of Nat ural Philosophy at the Dominican House of Studies,
St. Stephen's Priory, Dover, Massachusetts.
BRUNO WEBB, 0. S. B., Ph. L. (Subiaco Congregation, 0. S. B.), a graduate
of Cambridge University, author of the book Why Does God
Permit Evil? and a frequent contributor to The Downside Review,
is assigned now to Pluscarden Priory, Elgin, Moray, Scotland.
EDWARD D. SIMMONS, Ph. D., a frequent contributor to scholarly journals,
is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
LEo FERRARI, B. Sc., Ph. D., a graduate of Laval University, began his
studies of philosophy at the Aquinas Academy, Sydney, Australia,
and is now on the faculty of Mt. St. Vincent College, Halifax, Nova
Scotia, Canada.
THOMAs A. WASSMER, S. J., Ph. D., a graduate of Fordham University and
contributor to many American and European journals of philosophy
and theology, is engaged in the preparation of A Phenomenological
Study of Guilt at St. Peter's College, Jersey City, New Jersey.
RUDOLF ALLERs, M.D., Psychologist and author of many scholarly works,
a frequent contributor to THE THOMIST and other philosophical
journals, is a Professor at Georgetown University, Washington, D. C.
THOMAS GILBY, 0. P., Ph. D., of Blackfriars, Cambridge, England, author
Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, has been Visiting Professor in
the Graduate School of Philosophy, Notre Dame University, Notre
Dame, Indiana.
RAYMOND J. NoaAR, 0. P., Ph. D., associate member of The Albertus
Magnus Lyceum for Natural Science, recent guest lecturer at the
Philosophy of Science Institute, St. John's University, is a Professor
in the Faculty of Philosophy, Dominican House of Studies, River
Forest, Illinois.
JoHN A. OESTERLE, Ph. D., former Fulbright Research Scholar, member of
the Department of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame,
who contributes frequently to THE THOMIST and other scholarly
journals, is author of Ethics: The Introduction to Moral Science.
PAUL VAN K. THOMSON, Ph.D., author of the recent book, Why I Am a
Catholic, also of essays and studies on Lord Byron and Francis
Thompson, is an Associate Professor of English at Providence
College, Providence, Rhode Island.

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BOOK REVIRWS
Psyclwanalysis, Scientific Method and Philosophy. Edited by SIDNEY HooK.
New York: New York University Press, 1959. Pp. xiv, 870, with
index. $5.00.
This symposium was held at the Institute of Philosophy at New York
University in March 1958. Three topics were discussed: Psychoanalysis
and Scientific Method, Psychoanalysis and Society, Psychoanalysis and
Philosophy. On each of these topics three reports were presented. There
are, furthermore, eighteen contributions by other participants, submitted
after the close of the Institute, whose length varies from one to twenty-six
pages. It is regrettable that there is no report on the discussion itself;
it would have been interesting to know how the psychoanalysts and their
friends replied to the several critical objections.
Two papers on methodology were read by psychiatrists, H. Hartmann
and L. S. Kubie; the third by E. Nagel; "Methodological Issues in
Psychoanalytic Theory" examines critically the logical structure of Freud's
doctrine and the nature of the empirical. evidence supposedly supporting
this theory. Nagel finds fault with psychoanalysis in both respects; his
remarks deserve serious consideration on the part of anyone desiring to
arrive at an objective appraisal of the theory; they do not, however, deal
with questions of a strictly philosophical nature 11-nd, therefore, cannot be
summarized here. The same applies to the papers on psychoanalysis and
society by A. Kardiner, E. van den Haag and A. Inkeles.
M. Lazerowitz spoke on the " Relevance of Psychoanalysis to Philosophy." The paper reproduces, in an abbreviated form, ideas which the
author has developed in his Structure of Metaphysics (New York, 1955).
" There is evidence . . . for supposing that the philosopher, despite all
appearances, does not use language to express scientific propositions but
instead uses it in such a way as to create the illusion of doing so, while in
fact he gives expression only to his unconscious fantasies." (Italics L.'s.)
One is not a little astonished to hear such a confession of unadulterated
psychologism sixty years after the publication of Husserl's Prolegomena.
Even if it could be demonstrated, per impossible, that the ideas of a
philosopher originate from " unconscious fantasies," such a demonstration
would have no bearing on the validity of the ideas themselves. Newton,
too, may have been motivated by some such fantasies, but they do not enter
into the structure of his physics and neither enhance nor diminish the
significance of the law of gravitation.
Having thus made a methodological principle out of the "genetic fallacy,"
Lazerowitz proceeds to analyse the philosophies of Bradley and Spinoza.

1.09

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The latter's statements "that all things are in God" and "without Him
could neither exist nor be conceived" justify, in the eyes of the speaker,
the assumption that Spinoza's curiosity concerning the problem of birth
had remained unsatisfied. And so on. It does not seem, so far as one may
judge from the printed statements, that this performance, which is as naive
as amazing, created a favorable impression on the audience. Although
there is a rather halfhearted defense by J. Hospers (in one of the appended
papers), one finds only severe criticism of Lazerowitz, especially in the two
reports by D. C. Williams of Harvard and A. Flew of North Staffordshire,
England. S. Hook and R. Demos, too, view the ideas of Lazerowitz as quite
unacceptable. Williams points out that another philosophizing analyst or
psychoanalyzing philosopher, L. Feuer, has proposed a different interpretation of Spinoza as a " cringing masochist." It is not, says Williams, our
part to marvel that men can " read through Spinoza and come out with
such scraps of junk, but only to comment on the farcialness of the logic
to which philosophical psychoanalysis drives its devotees." A harsh judgment, but one which is perfectly justified by the vagaries of men like
Lazerowitz.
One has reason to be grateful to the participants of this symposium for
having made clear the illegitimate use of psychological procedures-whether
they be empirically well founded or not-in discussions on things philosophical. Philosophers, of course, will not be disturbed by such opinions;
they can afford to brush them aside. But there is more to it. This mode of
looking at intellectual achievements penetrates everywhere. The concluddeserve to be quoted in length:
ing words of
It used to be that a teacher reading a Ph. D. thesis with whose ideas he disagreed
would say to himself: " Of course, this is nonsense; what I want to know is
whether it is the right kind of nonsense." Now, it seems, we are to say that an
opponent is not just a fool, but a neurotic and a schizoid to boot. . . . Why
argue with my opponet if I have no respect for his intellect? Let us return to the
honorable tradition of philosophical discussion. And if psychoanalysis is to be used,
let us apply it to ourselves, searching our hearts for secret motives and vanities;
but let us leave the other fellow alone.

These are words of wisdom on which to meditate.
If one looks at the outcome of these reports and discussions, one may
feel that a notable step has been made forward to a clarification of our
ideas on psychoanalysis .and its significance. One realizes, on one hand,
that Freud's original ideas will have to be modified and clarified in more
than one respect if psychoanalysis is to justify its claim to be a scientific
discipline; on the other hand, that philosophy will have to take account
of the empirical findings, so far as they can be shown to be just this and
not statemenls cast in the language of a preconceived theory. Such theory
cannot be considered relevant in the field of philosophical endeavor. It
must be noted, though, that this symposium is concerned exclusively with

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111

Freudian ideas and that other schools of medical psychology, be they
dependent on Freud or not, are hardly mentioned. In regard to Freudian
psychoanalysis, however, the perusal of these papers will certainly further
understanding and critical appraisal.
.
RUDOLF ALLERs

Georgetown Dniverllity,
Washington, D. C.

We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition.
By JoHN CoURTNEY MURRAY, S.J. Sheed and Ward. Pp. xiv, 886.
$5.00.

Were politics merely to treat of the morally permissible, as Vincent
McNabb once declared, the dispute between the temporal and spiritual
powers would go scarcely deeper than or be different in kind from accomodations between the village policeman and the parish priest. In fact,
however, the indifference of politics towards morals, including religion, has
rarely been a working theory, though manifestly hostility has been a
frequent practice. For when the community is truly civil, that is not merely
a collection of people making the same noises or enclosed, as Aristotle said,
by the same wall, it will reach for ends which politics assume and which
can be discussed only by asking and attempting to answer psychological
and theological questions about the nature 6f man and his destiny. Some
of these appear in the Report of the Commission, appointed by President
Eisenhower, on National Goals.
The political history of the classical world and most of the world's
great cultures is not a tale of two cities. That began only with the
entrance of Christianity into the Roman Empire, and even so, it was
developed only in the West, in one direction by the Augustinist contrast of
the civitas terrena and the Civitas Dei, in another by the Thomist distinction of functions within a single polity. Moreover when this last was
so pressed that State and Church became separate legal corporations, it is
slapdash to represent the differences between them as being that the State
.is concerned only with what we do ·with our bodies while the Church is
concerned only with what we do with our souls; and the dualism becomes
all the more confused when it is put into the categories of public and
private life, of penal and moral law, of natural and supernatural virtue, of
the profane and the sacred, and of this world and the next. These slip
into cliches which can cOnceal the State's possession of rights which engage
Christian obedience as objects and not merely as occasions of virtue. The
believer is left with a divided mind, the size of each half depending on the
ratio of his " worldliness " to his " church-going,'' while the secularist is well

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content to reckon only with the one and be good-mannered and incurious
about the other.
One great merit of Fr. Murray's essays is to challange this state of
affairs, and less on religious grounds than from the high political position
of his own country. He does that courteous and most difficult thing, he
conducts a dialogue with those who differ with him on the principles where
they agree, and keeps to the medium of proper aonversation within the
City and under the law. In logical terms, he raises contraries rather than
contradictions, for he seeks the continuance of argument, not its closure.
What lies at the root of agreement is reasonable assent and unfeigned
loyalty to a set of constitutional principles declared at the independance
of the American Nation and augustly maintained and developed ever since.
To this" proposition," as it was called by Abraham Lincoln, and justly, for
it is at once a doctrine and a project, Catholics are not late adherents,
whatever may be the findings of historical sociologists. For though the
Natural Law of the Fathers of the Republic may have been clad with the
verbiage of the Englightenment it was rooted sturdily in layers formed
by the Church, namely the English Common Law and the Christianized
philosophy of Greece and Rome.
It is ·a strength of America to represent a very old world, older than
the era of Concordats, and older than those Latin politico-ecclesiologists
dominated by memories of religion either privileged by the King or
dispossessed by the Assembly. The very notion of a free Church in a
free State is foreign to their experience, and, while not disposed to seem
ungrateful for the advantages that follow across the Atlantic, they can
appear as nonplussed as the Nuncio at Paris was in 1783 when he
, sounded Benjamin Franklin about the establishment of a bishopric and
was told that the States did not conceive themselves to have the authority
either to permit or refuse such an exercise of spiritual jurisdiction.
Some see the dangerous error of indifferentism in a State not pledged to
protect the prerogatives of the Church. They include those who treat the
Imperium, and the Studium too, not as principal causes but as merely
instrumental to the Sacerdotium, or who recognize in a Nat ural Law agreement no more than a minimum basis or conventional framework extrinsic
to virtue. Not all of them notice that. because nobody has the right to
propagate error it does not follow that nobody has the legal right to
stop them .. They do not belong to the tradition which can be traced through
Bellarmine, John of Paris, and Aquinas back to the ideal of a free State in a
free Church.
So. Fr. Murray may find critics behind· him as well as in front ·of him
among the ·people to whom he addresses· himself. His argument is set
forth both clearly and at depth, and with a dignity and modesty that
deserve debate, not denunciation. Some may think that he hits out rather
wildly at Locke, but then he is already in his thirteenth round, and perhaps

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losing his puff. He offers variations on two themes, that civil government
should practice the virtue of self-denying ordinances, and that true democracy is not the rule by the majority of the minority.
As to the first, it may be remarked that nowhere in the American
structure is there accumulated the plentitude of legal power possessed in
Great Britain by the Queen in Parliament. Fr. Murray shows that the
American limitation of governmental powers guarantees the Church a
stable condition of freedom as a matter of law and right. Historically it
springs from no spirit of Jacobin secularism nor of religious indifference,
such as Gallio's, " who cared for none of these things," but of solicitude to
compose the articles, not of religious dogma, but of civic peace. If there is
neutralism, then it is rather like that of those Irishmen in the Great War
who professed that they were belligerent neutrals. In fact, however,
America is officially committed to the affirmation of God's sovereignty,
of human rights antecedent to positive law, and to the principle of consent.
As to the second, that is really the heart of the book, a reasoned plea
for Americans to look into the moral and political philosophy on which their
country is built. The res publica is less extensive than the bonum commune;
the State is not the whole of society, nor does it seek to absorb the citizen
completely; it maintains an active tolerance of personal values and free
associations, even when, as they inevitably do, they form power groups.
The E Pluribus Unum is not a fiat conformity but an agreement in
pluralism, a manifold in analogy such as calls for metaphysics if it is to be
explicated and poetry if it is to be sung. It is not for a stranger to harp
on the substitutes that are offered and exported instead, for Americans
themselves are the best critics of these infantilities and banalities. But
he can say this, that their prestige is never higher than when they are
searching their own minds and hearts, and a book such as Fr. Murray's
provides one of the reasons why they will always keep their staunch
friends abroad.
THOMAS

GILBY,

O.P.

Blackfriara, Cambridge.

The Scientific Methodology of Theodoric of Freiberg. By WILLIAM A.
WALLACE, 0. P. Fribourg, Switzerland: University Press. 1959. Pp.
895. FR./DM 22.
This· scholarly case study of the relationship between science and philosophy is an important.addition to the Studia Friburgen.ffa.published under
the direction of the Dominican Professors at the University of Fribourg.
The relationship of modem science and philosophy is, first of all, very
much the proper object of the study of a competent historian, that the
history of science might be read forward and not backwards. This book

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is a highly competent historical treatment of scientific method. A corollary
to this is the necessity, in a case study approach, for accurate, detailed
biographical material on the intellectual development of the scientist's
thought. This book is an effective biography of the great Dominican
experimental scientist of the 13th Century, Theodoric of Fribourg (12501310). To understand the philosophical tradition which formed the context
of Theodoric's scientific work, it is further necessary to get an accurate
and intelligible understanding of the Aristotelian methodology of the natural
sciences, a task not always successfully accomplished by those treating of
the work of the experimental scientists of the Middle Ages. THE
SciENTIFIC METHODOLOGY is a thorough treatise on Aristotelian methodology.
Furthermore, it is necessary to the case study approach to the sciencephilosophy problem that there be a professional treatment of a truly significant scientific contribution. This book is a fascinating treatise on the
rainbow and related optical phenomena. The reader is offered not only
a detailed account of the magnificent contribution of Theodoric himself,
but also a fully documented record of the progress of optical science from
the time of Theodoric, through Descartes and Newton, to the present.
Finally, and this is the unifying motif of this multi-dimensional case
study, the author takes his singular position among Thomist philosophers
of science, attempting to answer the question: Is " science " in the
modern understanding of the word, specifically distinct from " natural
philosophy " as conceived in the Thomistic tradition? Though this book
may fruitfully be read from any one, or all, of these points of view, it is
impossible, in a short review, to reproduce the sense of organic unity which
the author intended by his case study approach.
THE SciENTIFICMETHODOLOGYis the mature work of a graduate physicist
who spent two years in test laboratories doing research in magnetic and
acoustic field theory, four years in pure research in ultrasonics, qualifying
him to judge competently in matters of modern scientific methodology.
Fr. Wallace is also a graduate philosopher of science and professor of
natural philosophy at the Dominican House of Studies, giving him title to
speak authoritatively about his specialty, Aristotelian methodology in the
natural sciences. He spent four years in post graduate studies on historical
techniques, combing the libraries of Europe for original source materials
on the medieval origins of modern science, concentrating on the life and
works of Theodoric. Consequently, no matter how the reader may evaluate
the results of Fr. Wallace's work, he must grant that the multi-leveled
treatment of the science-philosophy problem could not be successful without
the rare qualifications of the author of THE SciENTIFIC METHODOLOGY.
In the first chapter, Fr. Wallace explains his choice of the case study
method of presenting the problem and carefully defends his selection of the
work of Theodoric; he has found in Theodoric's life work an excellent

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115

example of great simultaneous scientific contribution to the problems of
optics and rigorous application of detailed Aristotelian methodology of
natural science.
Because the foundations of Theodoric's scientific methods are vital
to his thesis, Fr. Wallace then proceeds, in chapter two, to explain
Theodoric's methodology. This chapter is one of the best treatises on
Aristotelian dialectics available.
In chapter three, the author introduces one of the most crucial elements
of Aristotelian natural science, the qualitative aspect of Theodoric's approach to scientific questions.
In chapter four, Fr. Wallace takes up the scientific question with which
Theodoric was preoccupied: optical phenomena. After a brief history of
optical studies, the reader is introduced to the problem of the rainbow
and radiant phenomena which confronted Theodoric. The application of
Theodoric's methodology to the issue is described in detail, with a summary
analysis of the " scientific " and the " philosophic " aspects of Theodoric's
method. It is at this point that the author is able concretely to relate
and document his thesis that experimental science in its best historical
tradition combined a thorough qualitative, causal analysis of sense data
with the use of quantitative, experimental procedures in the modern vein.
Chapter five traces the problem of optics through its later developments,
from Theodoric to Descartes, Descartes to Newton, Newton to the present,
with the very interesting observation, (highly challenging from the standpoint of historical interpretation of scientific work) that Newton's contribution to the optical problem, now accepted as most stable, was based
rather on the Aristotelian tradition in which Theodoric worked than on the
hypothetical and purely quantitative approach stemming from the Cartesian
tradition.
From this scrupulously documented analysis of the work of Theodoric
(the author adds an appendix of previously unedited opuscula of Theodoric) ,
and from the scientific history of the development of this optical problem
through the 14th, 15th and 16th Centuries, the author defends the reliability of the method and permanent contribution to the understanding
of the rainbow resulting from Theodoric's analysis. Descartes introduction
of a method based upon a misunderstanding of the use of hypothesis added
nothing to the understanding of the scientific problem. Newton's return to
the causal ap.alysis of Theodoric, by which, contrary to Descartes, he
thought he could arrive at demonstrable certitude concerning the nature
of the rainbow, advanced the science of optics toward its present respectable state .. The methodology by which this scientific development was
assured was not the method of mere hypothesis and statistical, quantified
experimentation, but rather the method of drawing qualitative inferences
of a probative character.
So, the author argues, we are brought logically to the final conclusion to

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be drawn from this case study. Both Theodoric and Newton regarded their
" science " as a specialized application and continuous development of
" natural philosophy " in the traditional issues of the phrase. Some historians of science rashly drive a wedge between " scientific methodology "
and " philosophical reasoning " in explaining the developments of the 17th
century, reading history backwards from the jaundiced view of a positivistic
philosophy of science. The postulational and hypothetical approach was
used by Theodoric and Newton, but only in the sense of a preliminary
dialectic or investigative technique. Both Theodoric and Newton thought
that their methodology ultimately arrived at, not merely conjecture, but a
permanent contribution: demonstrative certitude about the nature of the
reality of the world they studied.
Thus, so far as the history of this scientific question is concerned, the
author concludes, the simple contemporary assertion that science answers
the question " how " and philosophy answers the question " why " breaks
down; the assertion that science seeks only a functional, empiriological
intelligibility whereas philosophy seeks essential causal intelligibility also
finds little documentation in the scientific history of optics. The scientist
may, if he wishes, settle for provisional answers based upon hypothetical
procedures, and many cosmic questions may ever remain in this state, but,
the author concludes, the most realistic solution of the science-philosophy
problem today, is to integrate them at the same level that Theodoric and
Newton did, using a methodology which, whenever possible, aims at demonstJ,"ationand permanent solution concerning the nature of the world in
which we live.
Fr. Wallace's thesis is rigidly argued and documented with tireless
scholarship. Many, no doubt, will not find every page equally convincing,
every inference equally compelling. But even if the reader finds room for
serious disagreement with the author's thesis, he will be rewarded by a
refreshing kind of science history, one which dispells many myths about the
early stages of the development of modern science, one which inspires
the reader to ask that the scientific methodology of great scientists of the
past be examined with more patience. Modern science may have lost more,
in all its development, than it has gained. The Scientific Methodology is
a bold attempt to assure us that science need not lose the wisdom of the
past as it discovers daily a new way to press forward.
RAYMOND

Dominican House of Studies,
River FOTest, IUinois.

J. NoaAR, 0. P.

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117

Word and Object. By WILLARD VAN ORMAN QuiNE. New York: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., and The Technology Press of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 1960. Pp. 294, with index. $5.50.
Words about words can apparently be written without end, and one is
tempted to pick up any current book on the subject with something of a
resigned sigh. Still, there must be abiding interest and philosophical value
in writing words about words; the Greeks, after all, started it and there
is no end in sight. Nevertheless, the Greeks (and the Medievals, for the
most part) focussed their attention, not primarily on words and symbols
for their own sake, but on the function of words to convey thought about
things. Many contemporaries leave the impression that dissection of
verbal and symbolic expression is an end in itself and perhaps the highest
of philosophical pursuits.
But Professor Quine's book bears the title Word and Object and thereby
purports to be " an inquiry into the linguistic mechanisms of objective
reference." And it must be said at once that in many important respects
Quine lives up to his title. On topics and issues taken up, the patient
reader finds a thoroughness of investigation and exposition, starting with
the modest but necessary " beginning with ordinary things " in the opening chapter of " Language and Truth." The author initially and soundly
recognizes that since language is a social art, not only is it acquired by
intersubjectively available clues, but it must accordingly be investigated in
a similar fashion. Thus we reflect on how we start with single words as
wholes--one-word sentences-and then learn words as parts of longer
sentences and so build up our use of language and thereupon generate our
knowledge of the world.
With this quite elementary and therefore quite sound beginning, and with
an interesting second chapter on the difficulties of retaining meaning in
translation, noting in particular an inevitable factor of indeterminacy in
any translation, we then: come to something of a switch in approach. The
third chapter, entitled" The Ontogenesis of Reference," leads one to expect
the sort of relating of word to object that the title and opening chapters
suggested; instead, in order to study a " semantics of reference," we are
forced to direct our attention to the study of language from within. Such
a method, of course, has much to commend it, but the suspicion arises at
once that we may become, as we usually do in studies of this kind, encased
in language and linguistic structure. The word may become the object after
all, with forms of language and symbolism becoming the forms of reality.
Professor Quine's intent, to be sure, is to treat both word and object
(despite the ambiguity of the word "object ") but starting with the third
chapter, the preoccupation with the development and structure of our
referential or linguistic apparatus makes it difficult to retain the distinction
as well as relation between word and object which we have been led to
expect and which Quine himself seems always to have in mind.
.

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Nonetheless, the ensuing chapters offer many illuminating remarks and
penetrating investigations of language, both as analyzed and as used. The
exposition of the referential function of language in Chapter Three is of
particular interest. Quine speaks of phases of referential function of
language. Thus, in the first, phase, terms like "Mama" and "Water " are
learned as names of spatiotemporal objects. The second phase introduces
general terms and demonstrative singular terms. The third phase brings
compound general terms, i. e., the attributive joining of general terms.
The fourth phase, in applying relative terms to singular or general terms,
e. g., "smaller than that speck,'' serves principally to give access to new
objects. This widening of the referential horizon is continued in further
phases of relative clauses and abstract terms. Discussion of these phases
along with apt illustrations makes this chapter rewarding and instructive
reading.
The following chapter, "Vagaries of Reference," is a study of the indeterminacies and irregularities of reference which pervade language as a going
concern. Quine sensibly does not view vagueness as something intrinsically
evil that should be eliminated as far as possible. He recognizes that vagueness is a natural consequence of the mechanism of word learning, noting
further that vagueness is not incompatible with precision. Ambiguity, which
he discusses next, differs from vagueness: "vague terms are only dubiously
applicable to marginal objects, but an ambiguous term such as ' light '
may be at once clearly true of various objects (such as dark feathers) and
clearly false of them" (p. 129). A good deal of this chapter is devoted
to various ways in which ambiguity of terms arises, and also ambiguity of
syntax and scope. Curiously enough, the most important feature about
ambiguity is almost completely overlooked, namely that type of ' systematic
ambiguity ' which consists in the analogical naming of words. Quine refers
to words which are
in this way (" true,'' " light ") but fails to
note or bring out how different such ambiguity is from other types of
ambiguity. The failure to note the significant role analogical words have
in our coming to know objects is, it must be said, a serious omission
in a study devoted to language and reality. Indeed, nothing widens
our referential horizon as much as recognizing that many, if not most, of
our important words are analogical. Their deliberate ambiguity testifies to
our progress in knowing, that is, to our being able to come to know unknown objects from what we already know.
We might note, in this connection, that it is in just this respect that the
Greeks and the M:edievali;;ts were especially perceptive in understanding
words and objects. St. Thomas, for example, (in Summa Theologiae, I, q.
67, a. 1) uses the same word ("light") as Quine to show how it can be
considered in two ways. First, in its primary or original imposition it
signifies that which produces clarity in the sense of sight; secondly and
afterwards, it was extended to produce clarity in any sort of knowledge,

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119

e. g., in the " light " of the evidence. In this second and common usage,
the word "light" is no longer metaphorical (as it would be if understood
only in the first sense) but is deliberately ambiguous. Hence we are led
from the narrow, but very evident, meaning of "light" in its original
meaning to the knowing of objects less evident to our understanding. The
history of our important words, thus analogical in meaning and which
especially characterize philosophical terminology, testifies to our progress
in acquiring knowledge of objects through words. Perhaps no other feature
of words signifying objects is more important than this.
Since Quine recognizes only the kind of ambiguity which is simply
unclear or misleading, his concern in the next two chapters is to remedy
the various " anomalies " and " conflicts " in our linguistic apparatus by
means of techniques of modern logic. The paraphrasing of a sentence of
ordinary language into logical symbols, he points out, is not unlike what
we do everyday in paraphrasing sentences to avoid ambiguity. "The main
difference apart from quantity of change is that the motive in the one
case is communication while in the other it is application of logical theory "
(p. 159). In a rather interesting touch, Quine entitles this chapter "Regimentation," wherein is described how logical theory is developed for the
sake of paraphrasing ordinary sentences into " convenient canonical " form.
To be sure, techniques of symbolic logic serve admirably to avoid the
ambiguity we encounter in ordinary language; and for certain prescribed
situations, this kind of rigor of symbolic formulation is necessary. At the
same time, the specialized and restricted view this analysis offers for the
vast topic of Word and Object should be recognized. For most of the
literature in philosophy, "regimentation" in this way is of little value
however great its value is in mathematical and certain scientific endeavors.
From the point of view of much of philosophy, deliberate ambiguity, i.e.,
analogical naming, is indispensable to progress in philosophical knowing,
and this type of ambiguity we need and want to keep.
Apart from this point of emphasis we have laid upon systematic
ambiguity, which we think need special stress at this time, Quine's book
remains an especially acute analysis of some of the important aspects of
the broad topic of Word and Object. The final question of its value as
resolving basic philosophical issues is undertaken in his closing chapter on
"Ontic, Decision." He recognizes that a resort to canonical notation as an
aid to clarifying ontic commitments has a limiting effect, but within that
framework the question may still be faced as to what to admit to the
universe of values with respect to varia'bles of quantification. In this
context, Quine disavows being a nominalist, but what he finally avows is
not wholly clear. Perhaps this difficulty stems from the fact that even in
a chapter devoted to " ontic decision " he has had, as he says, to talk more
of words than of objects even when most concerned to decide what there
really is. However, Quine does not wish to subscribe to Carnap's view that

BOOK REVIEWS

questions of philosophy are in effect simply questions of language. Quine
hopes to avoid this position by a " semantic assent," a shift from talking
in certain terms to talking about them, e. g., from talking of miles to
talking of "mile."
This is the attempt, finally, to reach the object. This question of the
object, of what there is, is shared by philosophy with geography and
astronomy, by physics and even pure mathematics. All that distinguishes
the " ontological philosopher's " concern is breadth of categories and a
scrutiny of an uncritical acceptance of the realm of physical objects or of
classes. The philosopher's task, then, can differ only in detail. But this
view of Quine once more leaves the philosopher only as an analyst, a
critical commentator, of what others have said. The philosopher has the
task " of making explicit what had been tacit, and precise what had been
vague; of exposing and resolving paradoxes, smoothing kinks, lopping off
vestigial growths, clearing ontological slums" (p.
The value of such
work cannot be denied. How it will resolve into any " ontic decision "
worthy of the name is another question.
JoHN A. OEsTERLE
University of Notre Dame,
Notre Dame, Indiana.

Christianity in Conflict: A Catholic View of Protestantism. By JoHN A.
HARDoN, S. J. Newman Press, Westminster, Maryland, 1959. Pp.
300. $4.50.

In this sequel to his excellent descriptive manual, which was entitled
The Protestant Churches of America, Father Hardon has attempted to
provide Catholic readers with a comprehensive and readable appraisal of
contemporary Protestant thought and practice. The result is a book which
is certainly readable but something less than comprehensive, for the focus
of attention is upon the author's special area of competence with regard
to Protestantism in the United States.
Father Hardon rightly argues that Protestants and Catholics should
cooperate against the rising tide of secularism. If they are to do this
intelligently, they must have more than a superficial knowledge of their
respective points of view. Furthermore, the rising interest in Christian
unity among Protestants and the emphasis given to it by Pope John's
convocation of the approaching general council call for more studies of the
kind which Father Hardon has undertaken. In addition, the apostolate of
good will on the part of Catholics, which is a vital obligation for both laity
and clergy, requires a knowledge of the extent and the limits of the common
ground which Catholics and Protestants hold together.

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121

That common ground has been much reduced since the sixteenth century,
and nowhere is this mdre evident than in the liberal Protestantism which
prevails so widely in the United States. When Luther insisted upon the
supreme authority of the Bible as the inspired Word of God, he was not
taking a stand against Catholicism's traditional view so much as he was
opposing the antinomian assertions of the Anabaptists. Yet, the end of
the matter was the separation of the inspired Word from its roots in the
community of the faithful and an increasing rejection of the place of
tradition. As Father Rardon says, the real point of difference between
Protestants and Catholics was not the authority of the Word of God, but
the question of who has the right to interpret it. Insistence upon the grace
given to the individual believer to make his own interpretation led finally
to the dichotomy which today separates the fundamentalist minority from
the liberal majority of Protestants in the United States. Among the latter
the Scriptures are not infrequently thought of as the mythological manifestation of developing religious insights but hardly as necessary channels
of salvation.
Father Rardon points out that in recent years a certain reversal of
trends in Protestant Biblical studies has led, as in the work of Cullmann,
to at least a greater appreciation not only of the role of the Church in
its historical relation to Scripture but also of the way in which the New
.Testament establishes the idea of the Church's organic unity from its first
foundation by Our Lord. If this trend continues, it may do much to regain
part of the common ground which was lost in the religious revolt of the
sixteenth century and its aftermath.
The conditions for a true dialogue require that the present extent of this
common ground should be carefully explored. They also call for the clear
enunciation of existing differences. It is in this area that Father Rardon's
book has a certain informative, if somewhat limited, apologetic usefulness.
For the whole approach of Christianity in Conflict is that of the rapid
survey rather than the study in depth.
The author's language cannot be described as being notable for its irenic
tone. At times it is frankly polemical, and it seems improbable that Father
Rardon will be accused of being soft on Protestantism. He has, for
example, a most forthright chapter on the shortcomings of the various
notions of the ministry which prevail in the churches of the Reformation.
More than anything else, perhaps, it is the question of the nature of the
Church and the role of the priesthood which continues to divide Christians
into Catholics and non-Catholics. As Father Rardon says, " Differences in
doctrine and ethical values were disruptive ... but the breach would have
been less radical and even possibly healed if the principles of Reformed
theology had not become fixed in a clerical system that was tailored to fit
the new heresy."
He then goes on to examine what he calls " the most serious aspect of

BOOK REVIEWS

modern Protestantism " from the Catholic point of view. This is its
drive, especially in Latin America. The history of Protestant
missions is recent, . for until the. nineteenth century the churches of the
Reformation shovred little concern for the heathen world. In the past one
hundred and fifty ·years, however, the missionary movement among
Protestant churches has become " phenomenally" successful, to the point
where it seriously hinders the apostolate of the Catholic Church." Whether
the m,ission agencies stress the social aspects of Christianity or direct
evangelism and
indoctrination, whether they are liberals of the
Y. M. C. A. variety or fundamentalists of the type of Billy Graham,
Protestant" IJ,lissions today are concentrating· m\Jre and more upon Spanish
America in spirit of competition with the traditional Catholicism of that
area. It is clearly a challenge that arises from a view of the Church that is
completely antithetical to that which Catholics hold.
Here, as on the question of marital morality, Father Hardon clearly
shows how the practical situation reflects the essential cleavage; The
modern inheritors of the Reformation, he points out, " are as hostile to
Catholic morality in marriage as their ancestbrs were against the Church's
teaching of faith." Their disagreement with Catholicism in this regard calls
into question not so much theological creeds and dogffias as the existence of
an objective moral order based upon the natural law itself.
Protestantism's moral teaching reflects the influence of modern relativism,
just as its handling of Church and State relations reflects its original
relationship to the rise of nationalism and capitalism. Promoting their
religion as a national concept and using the civil power to promote their
beliefs, as in the case of Prohibition, American Protestants in particular
have ·demonstrated that their idea of " separation of church and state "
means nothing so much as the separation of the Catholic Church from
American civil government.
•
This is particularly reflected in their attitude toward Catholic schools.
These schools they see as authoritarian, divisive, anti-democratic, and
representing principles that are against the teachings of the Bible. It is
not too much to say that the growth of the ecumenical movement among
some powerful American Protestant groups is the result of a sense of the
need for protective action against the influence of the Catholic Church in
general and its schools in particular.
The future of Protestant ecumenicism is obscure, for Protestantism is,
according to Father Hardon's useful formula, "subjective Christianity,
whose positive contents are derived from Catholicism and whose radical
error is a denial that faith belongs essentially to the intellect." Subjectivism
and negativism alone are sufficient to produce a fluidity which no amount
of good will can channel into a united life. The positive aspect of what
moves Protestants to unity must be, in part, an " unwitting instinct to
regain what they had lost by their separation from Rome." Knowing this,
the obligation of Catholics toward them is seen to be very great in charity.

a

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BOOK REVIEWS

The deepest motivation for such charity, however, Father Rardon's
book does not supply. He is learned in Protestant thought and skilled in
the use of primary documentation. What he lacks is the experiential
knowledge of Protestant piety. This has been supplied for Catholic readers
by the far more penetrating work of Father Louis Bouyer in his The
Spirit and Forms of Protestantism {1956). If it is true that the positive
aspects of Protestantism-its emphasis upon grace and the authority of
the Word of God-are indeed remnants of Catholicism, it is still incumbent
upon Catholics to seek a deeper understanding of how it is that so many
Protestapts lead a Christian life. Only out of such an understanding can
we begin to move to help them to realize the fullness of the unity of Christ,
Who is Our Lord and theirs.
PAUL VAN

Providence College,
Providence, Rhode Island.

K. THOMSON

BRIEF NOTICES
Redemption Through the Blood of Jesus. By DoM GASPAR
0. S. B.; trans!. by Rev. Edward A. Mazarz, C. PP. S.

LEFEBVRE,

This volume is a translation of "La redemption par le sang de Jesus"
(Desclee de Brouwer, Bruges, 1944) written by Dom Gaspar Lefebvre.
The translation has appeared at the right time to implement our Holy
Father's appeal for the promotion of the Devotion to the Most Precious
Blood of Our Lord Jesus Christ.
One fourth of the book, deals with the Person of the Redeemer, His
two Comings, His name, and His helpers, viz. His Mother, His foster
father, the angels, the Precursor, and the aged Simeon. The rest of the
book is dedicated to the treatment of the work of redemption, (and this
part makes good Lenten reading and meditation material.)
The emphasis is on the Passion of Christ. The author is at great pains
to explain the idea of redemption, and especially the four key notions of
merit, satisfaction, sacrifice and ransom, together with their corresponding
virtues of love, obedience, religion and patience. The whole humanity of
Christ is divinity's instrument of redemption. The precious blood is the
material instrumental cause of our redemption, for the profuse outpouring
of this Blood was directly connected with the death of the Son of Man.
The body being dependent on the soul, the redeeming blood of Christ
cannot be separated from the acts of the soul of Christ which form the
formal element of the work of redemption. The blood of Jesus is, therefore, the most eloquent symbol of the acts of meritorious love, reparative
obedience, sacrificial religion, and heroic ransoming patience under sufferings submitted to in our stead.
In what does the devotion to the precious blood consist? " This
devotion is centered in the notion of sacrifice. It is centered in the Holy
Sacrifice. One of its characteristics is to consider the divine Sacrificer, the
divine Sacrifice, and the divine Sacrificed One. The sacrifice of Calvary and
that of the altar, which is but a replica of Calvary, constitute the vital
center of true devotion to the precious blood."
It is sixteen years since this book first appeared in French. Much
research has been done concerning the Blood of Christ, especially the
studies conducted by the Society of the Precious Blood. However, until
the results of these studies find their way into devotional-theological
literature this volume will prove a great help for all to appreciate and love
the great Mystery of the Most Precious Blood.

REv. ANDREW PoLLAcK, C. PP. S.

124

125

BRIEF NOTICES

The Book of Mary. By HENRI DANIEL-ROPS. Translated by Alastair
Guinan. New York: Hawthorn Books. Pp. 224. $4.95.

In this volume, M. Daniel-Rops succeeds in presenting a knowledgeable,
clear and uncluttered theological picture of the Mother of God. Proposing
to investigate " the circumstances and conditions of her historical existence," he examines the sources of her history, working his way through
the Gospels, the Apocrypha and the writings of the Fathers. As the
examination develops he sets for himself the task of explaining the growth
of our knowledge of Mary from its apparently sketchy beginnings in the
Gospel narratives.
His presentation of the Gospel data is characterized by the ease with
which he handles the New Testament background and for the warm and
balanced picture of Mary sketched out against this background.
In order to describe the growth of the popular image and to provide
a reasoned evaluation of it, he discusses the Apocrypha with care and at
some length. He takes up the question of their psychological origin in
Christian piety and natural curiosity, presents samples of their sometimes
absurd and shocking stories, explains the severe limitations that have to
be placed on their value, and then very sensibly outlines and defends the
values they do have.
The writings of the Fathers are presented as witnesses to the mainstream of Christian tradition. The problems involved in explaining the
development of doctrine are faced frankly and in working out an explanation of development the author emphasizes the spontaneous surge of
devotion in the believing soul as a significant factor.
A sizable second section is given over to the citation of documents used
in presenting the theology of Mary. All of the relevant Gospel texts are
quoted, a few from the Fathers and a fairly generous sampling from the
Apocrypha. These last include selections from the Protoevangelium of St.
James, the Pseudo-Matthew, the Ascension of Isaiah, the History of
,'foseph the Carpenter, and the Transitus Mariae literature. Because they
are not ordinarily discussed or quoted and because they are not easily
available, these selections are of special interest and value.
Like all of his other work, this volume shows the author's eye for
contemporary questions and needs and his genuis for meeting these needs
at a fundamental level in a refreshing, graceful and eminently satisfying
way.
WILLIAM

Immaculate Conceptt"on Seminary,

Darlington, N. 1.

F. HoGAN

BRIEF NOTICES

Saint Augustine on Personality. By PAUL HENRY, S. J. New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1960. Pp. 44. $Q.Q5.
This little book is the first in " The Saint Augustine Lecture Series "
sponsored by Villanova University and edited by Robert P. Russell, 0. S. A.
Its thesis is that Saint Augustine is " the first thinker who brought into
prominence and undertook an analysis of the philosophical and psychological concepts of person and personality." It is maintained, first of all, as a
working hypothesis, that no philosophy before Saint Augustine developed so
satisfactory a concept of personality. Neither Greek philosophy nor primitive religion affords such a concept. Father Henry finds Saint Augustine's
most elaborate discussion of the subject in the treatise On the Trinity,
where, instead of using the Platonic tradition, Saint Augustine utilizes an
Aristotelian concept to describe the substantial relation existing among the
Divine Persons. As Saint Augustine describes this relation, God is seen as
" the only perfect prototype of that which all love between persons tends
to achieve ... absolute unity and yet distinction." The technicalities by
means of which this concept is developed may be left for those who wish
to pursue Father Henry's penetrating analysis in detail. It will suffice to
indicate here that Saint Augustine's use of Aristotle in this connection, and
his refinement of Aristotelian ideas of mutual relations, amply demonstrate
his flexibility and independence of mind. His concept of personality was
developed, as Father Henry goes on to point out, as a result of the challenge
presented to Christian thought by the paradoxical dogma of the consubstantiality of the Persons of the Trinity, which had been previously defined,
but not explained. The solution to this problem led simultaneously to a new
concept of human personality, elaborated on the basis of analogies, not
between God and the world, but between God and man. In the closing
pages of his lecture, Father Henry traces the doctrine of the Divine
Persons as subsisting relations in the official pronouncements of the Church
and considers the relevance of Saint Augustine's concept of personality in
terms of contemporary philosophy. The lecture is followed by a series of
careful and helpful notes. Altogether, this is a stimulating book, presenting
in a very satisfactory way still further evidence of the richness, variety,
and enduring significance of Saint Augustine's thought. Those who read
it will undoubtedly look forward to the publication of succeeding lectures
in the series.

D. W. RoBERTSON,

JR.

BRIEF NOTICES

Contemporary American Philosophy, Proceedings of The American Catholic
Philosophical Association Volume XXXIII.
The papers found in this volume were delivered at the thirty third annual
meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association in New York
City on March 31, and April I, 1960. The issue was dedicated to the late
Msgr. Charles A. Hart, for many years the secretary of the association.
In his presidential address, Lawrence Lynch used the symposium of Plato
as a point of departure for some trenchant remarks concerning contemporary philosophy and the nature of the philosophic enterprise itself. Conferring
the Cardinal Spellman-Aquinas Medal on his friend Gerald Phelan, Jacques
Maritain noted the wisdom of Father Phelan's insistence on the existential
character of true philosophy. Maritain went on to comment upon Farther
Phelan's high reputation among those who share neither his faith nor his
philosophy. In his response Father Phelan stressed the need of our times
for metaphysics and proceeded with his usual clarity and cogency to a
detailed examination of the vast difference between esse and esse-habens.
In one of the morning symposia Fulton H. Anderson spoke on some
Platonic elements in epistemology which have had effect on contemporary
philosophizing. On the same panel Professor Herbert Spiegelberg discussed
the meaning of the term subjective in the philosophy of Husser!. Husserl's
tendency to transcendental idealism was noted as well as his dependence on
Kant and Descartes. He concluded that phenomenology may be considered
subjective in the sense that its objects are subject-related. Professor
Spiegelberg warned that phenomenology was not a finished philosophy and
would be a rebellious handmaiden if expected to serve such " ambitious "
enterprises as metaphysics and metaphysical theology.
In a paper on ,the axiology of John Dewey, Ralph W. Sleeper stressed
the role of experience in the philosophy of Dewey and the fact that Dewey
equated the experience of " things " with the experience of " values." Some
agreements between doctrines of St. Augustine and positions of Dewey
were also noted.
Many other informative papers were given which cannot be taken into
account here. Those on the philosophy of science, the naturalistic theory
of ethics, social pluralism, and the philosophy of law were especially worthwhile.
JESSE

Georgetown University.
Washington, D. C.

A. MANN

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BRIEF NOTICES

The Search for Values. By RussELL CoLEBURT. New York: Sheed and
Ward, 1960. Pp. 135. $3.00.
Among the best features of this work are the author's sensitivity for the
difficulties and sufferings of current " thinkers," his confidence that he has
ground on which to stand, and the comprehensive character of so small a
book.
What we encounter in many spokesmen from many areas is anxiety and
uncertainty. Men are valuing, seeking, aspiring for all they are worth, but
in a world of uncertainty. At least in the practical order, their world may
be said to be a world of uncertain values.
Mr. Coleburt is aware of the situation and of men's sufferings. At least
he is well aware that they do suffer, above all, those of them with an awareness of the kind of thing that man is.
Just as clear to his own mind is his reply and recipe for getting over the
suffering. As he says, the basic aspiration of these tortured souls is precisely
the basic aspiration of man at any time. It is the aspiration to live and to
feel sure that life's values are grounded in what is real and true. This is
just where the men in question stick. What is real and true is not obvious
to them, and whether Mr. Coleburt ever makes the foundations of the
universe convincing to them is, of course, a question for them to answer.
It would be remarkable if he did.
What he does not take seriously enough is how they got into the fix.
He is zealous to get them out, and good, so far, for him. It is another
question how they happen to be in and how he happens to be out. Just
here there seems to be quite a gulf between him and them, and our query
is whether he has really offered them a plank they can accept and trust
to get them across the gulf.
LEO

R. WARD

University of Notre Dame,
Notre Dame, Indiana.

Cities in Crisis. By DENNIS CLARK. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960.
Pp. 177. $3.50.
Into the making of this apostolic-minded work there is a mixture of
history, sociology and social philosophy, permeated with Christian zeal and
the practical knowledge which the author has derived from several years
of service on the Commission on Human Relations for the City of
Philadelphia. The disparate footnotes and the relatively lengthy appendix
on the history of cities make one wonder if it is not a doctoral dissertation
in Catholic social action. But the appendix does not have to be read, and
the rest of the book does merit the thoughtful attention of Catholics, who
are chiefly to be found in urbanized areas.

BRIEF NOTICES

Family life and housing are the author's main concerns. The urban
family is reduced largely to a consumer unit, he says, with decisions increasingly directed by advertising and corporate expedients (p. 55) ; and
strains upon family life are not provided for by religious organizations (p.
71). The strong social ties in some urban parishes merely prove, perhaps,
the exception to the rule. Yet one senses that many bishops and priests are
..
aware of family needs within the parish community.
The most important section of this book is the chapter entitled: "The
Christian Response" (pp. 117-142). Mr. Clark rightly points out that
technicians are taking over urban planning, and there is an urgent call for
Christians to have a knowledgeable part in this.
Almost certainly the author would agree that while pointing up family
and housing needs in particular, he really wishes that the Catholic lay
apostolate would embrace large numbers of Catholics, willing to acquire
both the professional and the political knowledge to be effective. To this,
the Catholic Bishops' Statement of November 1960 adds the necessity of
promoting a society where the ideals of freedom, personal responsibility,
and the equality and dignity of all men are assured. This is a large
program, and while some Catholics are already trained, or partially so, the
paucity of their numbers can only be added to by well-planned programs
for future recruitment and the lengthy training and learning processes
involved. Political and social leaders are not developed by crash programs:
more Catholics might be zealous enough to give their time and abilities
to the needs to which the author rightly calls attention, but one must
not forget rural, mission, and other apostolic calls. One must realize, too,
that possibly only a relatively few of our members have the qualities of
leadership.
EvA J. Ross
Trinity College,
Washington, D. C.

The Idea of Catholicism: An Introduction to the Thought and Worship
of the Church. Edited by WALTER J. BuRGHARDT, S. J., and WILLIAM
F. LYNCH, S. J. New York: Meridian, 1960. Pp. 479. $6.00.
This volume is an anthology in two parts. The first section, a series of
essays by modern European and American theologians, presents the
structure of Catholic theology. Among the contributors are the long
familiar Cardinal Newman, Karl Adam, Edward Leen, Alban Goodier, M.
D'Arcy, and Gerald Vann. Selections from Cardinal Suhard, Celestin
Charlier, P. Benoit, Yves de Montcheuil, A.M. Roguet, and the two editors
are also included. The introductory and concluding essays treat the.notion
that religion is a relation between God and the soul. Within this framework

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BRIEF NOTICES

the various authors discuss the mind's assent to the existence of the one
God, the bible and history, Christ, the Trinity, the Church, Mary, the
sacraments, the papacy, and the episcopacy.
The second part deals with worship and shows how the teaching of the
Church is complemented and intensified by the action of faith. Various
confessions and creeds, the text of the midnight Mass at Christmas, the
ritual for the sacraments, prayers of the Church, teaching of the saints,
and modern papal pronouncements are presented.
The purpose of the work is to put the serious student, Catholic or nonCatholic, in basic and solid contact with the theology and prayer of the
Church. In it this class of reader will find much of interest. The Catholic,
priest or layman, can come to a fuller understanding and appreciation of
his faith. The non-Catholic will meet the Church's teachings treated in a
manner which is firm but devoid of spirited polemics. Points of controversy are handled with Christian charity.
In the organization of such a diverse group of authors around a central
theme there are difficulties. The total impression, however, is that of a
well-chosen, well-organized presentation of the Church's teaching.
Some of the selections are inspiring, as when Karl Adam considers Christ
as man's brother, or when Goodier exhorting the Christian to the imitation
of the Savior proposes the Gospels for this purpose: "It is important for
us to bear always in mind that we learn our Lord as he was and therefore
as he is, wholly from the Gospels. Other lives may help us to interpret
him but in the end they must be referred back to the Gospels."
There are also examples of modern trends in biblical exegesis and
theological speculation.
The Bible and History " by Charlier throws
light on the problem of messianism and the fulfillment of Old Testament
prophecy in Christ. Fr. Benoit in "The Holy Eucharist" mentions the
necessity of re-thinking and deepening traditional terminology in terms of
biblical thought.
The editors' familiarity with the field of Catholic thought and worship
is attested by the number and diversity of their selections. Their experience
has enabled them to present a work of value, one highly recommended for
the audience intended.
EDWARD

DeSales Hall,
Hyattsville, Maryland.

J. CARNEY, o. s. F. S.

BOOKS UECEI\'ED
Barale, Paolo & Muzio, Giuseppe. Il Divino nella Natura e nella Intelligenza: Secondo S. Tommaso. (Quaderni di Sodalitas Thomistica,
No. 1). Rome, Italy: Scuola Tipografica Halo-Orientale, 1960. Pp.
55, with index.
Bonifazi, Duilio. Immutabilita e Relativita del Dogma Secondo la Teologia
Contemporanea. Rome, Italy: Editrice Laterano Pontificia Universita Lateranense, 1959. Pp. 137, with index.
Bourke, Vernon J. (Ed.). The
Aquinas. New York: Washington
Square Press, Inc., 1960. Pp. 398, with index. 60¢
Browne, C. S. C., Joseph P. Some Moral Implications of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrim'lnation in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. District of Columbia: Holy Cross
College, 1960. Pp. 101, with index.
Bunge, Mario. Causality: The Place of the Causal Principle in Modern
Science. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959. Pp. 380, with
index. $7.50.
Buschmiller, Rev. Robert J. The Maternity of Mary in the Mariology of
St. Albert the Great. Fribourg, Switzerland: The University of
Fribourg, 1959. Pp. 110.
Butler, R. S. M., Sister Mary Marguerite, Hrotsvitha: The Theatricality
of Her Plays. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1960. Pp.
$6.00.

Cerfaux, Lucien. (Patrick Hepburne-Scott, Tr.). The Four Gospels: An
Historical Introduction. Westminster: The Newman Press, 1960.
Pp. 167. $3.00.
Classics in Philosophy and Ethics: A Course of Selected Reading. New
York: Philosophical Library, 1960. Pp. 338, with index. $6.00.
Collectanea Theologica Al R. P. Joaquin Salaverri, S. J., en el Cincuentenario de su Vida Religiosa. (Miscelanea Comillas, XXXIVXXXV). Spain: Universidad Pontificia Comillas (Santander), 1960.
Pp. 706, with index.
Collins, James, Ph. D. (Selected with Introduction and Commentary by).
Readings in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. {The College Readings Series, No. 6). Westminster: The Newman Press, 1960. Pp.
355.

Conway, 0. P., Ph. D., Pierre H. Principles of Education: A Thomistic
Approach. District of Columbia: The Thomist Press, 1960. Pp.
with index. $5.00.
Cristiani, Leon and Rilliet, Jean (Joseph I. Holland, S. J., and Gilbert V.
Tutungi, M.A., Trs.) . Catholics and Protestants: Separated

181

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Bmthers. Westminster: The Newman Press, 1960. Pp. 176. $8.95.
D'Elia, S. J., Pasquale M. (Rufus Suteer and Matthew Sciascia, Trs.).
Galileo in China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. Pp.
180, with index. $4.00.
DeVault, S. J., Joseph J. (Commentary by). The Book of Josue. New
York: Paulist Press, 1960. Pp. 96. 75¢.
Dougherty, S. A., Kenneth. General Ethics. (Collegiate Philosophical
Series: Vol. III). Peekskill: Graymoor Press, 1959. Pp. 188, with
index. $8.00.
Durrwell, C. SS. R., F. W. The Resurrection: A Biblical Study. New York:
Sheed & Ward, 1960. Pp. 871, with index. $6.00.
Erling, Bernhard. Nature and History: A Study in Theological Methodology with Special Attention to the Method of Motif Research. Lund,
Sweden: CWK Gleerup, 1960. Pp. Q86, with index.
Friedrich, S. J., L. W. (Ed.). The Nature of Physical Kno1vledge. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1960. Pp. 156, with index.
$4.50.
Furnia, Arthur H. The Diplomacy of Appeasement. District of Columbia:
The University Press of Washington, D. C., 1960. Pp. 468. $6.00.
Gilbert, Neal Ward. Renaissance Concepts of Method. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1960. Pp. Q81, with index. $6.00.
Glanzman, S. J., George S. (Commentary by). The Book of Deuteronomy,
Part Q. New York: Paulist Press, 1960. Pp. 96. 75¢.
Glenn, Paul J. A Tour of the Summa. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Company, 1960. Pp. 477, with index. $5.00.
Guzie, S. J., Tad. The Analogy of Learning: An Essay Toward a Thomistic
Psychology of Learning. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1960. Pp. Q58.
$5.00.
Hackforth, R. (Tr.). Plato's Examination of Pleasure. (The Library of
Liberal Arts #118). New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1960.
Pp. 150. $1.00.
--. (Tr. Plato's Phaedrus. (The Library of Liberal Arts #119). New
York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1960. Pp. 179, with index. $1.15.
Hausmann, S. J., Bernard A. From an Ivory Tower: A Discussion of
Philosophical Problems Originating in Modern Mathematics. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1960. Pp. 1Q9, with index.
$8.50.
Hayen, S. J., Andre. La Communication de L'P.tre D'Apres Saint Thomas
D'Aquin: L'Ordre Philosophique de Saint Thomas. (Museum Lessianum: Section Philosophique No. 41). Bruges, Belgique: Editions
Desclee de Brouwer, S .. A., 1959. Pp. 853, with index.
---. La Communication de L'P.tre D'Apres Saint Thomas D'Aquin: La
Metaphysique d'un Theologien. (Museum Lessianum: Section Philosophique No. 40). Bruges, Belgique: Editions Desclee de Brouwer,
S. A., 1957. Pp. 191, with index.

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133

Heidegger, Martin.. (Kurt F. Leidecker, Tr.). Essays in Metaphysics:
Identity and Difference. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc.,
1960. Pp. 82. $2.75.
Hoenen, S J., Peter. (Paul Conen, S. J., Tr.). The Philosophy of Inorganic Compounds. (Part Three from Book Four of the Cosmologia). West Baden Springs: West Baden College, 1960. Pp. 129.
$1.45.

Journet, Charles. The Meaning of Grace. New York: P. J. Kenedy &
Sons, 1960. Pp. 139. $3.50.
Kierkegaard, Soren. (Gerda M. Andersen, Tr., & Peter P. Rohde, Ed.).
The Diary of Soren Kierkegaard. New York: Philosophical Library,
1960. Pp. 255. $4.75.
King, Rev. Philip J. (Commentary by). The Book of Judges. New York:
Paulist Press, 1960. Pp. 96. 75¢.
Kissane, E. J. (Foreword by). The Word of Life: Essays on the Bible.
Westminster: The Newman Press, 1960. Pp. 131. Paper, $1.75.
Lebacqz, S. J., Joseph. Libre Arbitre et Jugement. (Museum Lessianum:
Section Philosophique No. 47). Bruges, Belgique: Desclee de
Brouwer, 1960. Pp. 168. 120 FB.
Leeming, S. J., Bernard. The Churches and the Church: A Study of
Vv'estminster: The Newman Press, 1960. Pp. 350,
with index. $6.50.
Luijpen, 0. S. A., Ph. D., William A. Existential Phenomenology. (Duquesne Studies, Philosophical Series 12) . Pittsburgh:
Duquesne
University Press, 1960. Pp. 375, with index. Paper, $6.00; bound,
$6.75.

McCall, Raymond J. Basic Logic. New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc.,
1960. Pp. 235, with index. $1.25.
Mihalich, Joseph C. Existentialism and Thomism. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1960. Pp. 91. $2.75.
Morgenstern, Irvin. The Dimensional Structure of Time Together with
the Drama and Its Timing. New York: Philosophical Library, 1960.
Pp. 174. $3.75.
Murphy, 0. P., Richard T. A. The Sunday Gospels. Milwaukee: The
Bruce Publishing Company, 1960. Pp. 279, with index. $5.00.
Nicholas, 0. P., J. H. The Mystery of God's Grace. Dubuque: The
Priory Press, 1960. Pp. 102. $1.25.
Nicolas, 0. P., Marie-Joseph. L'Eucharistie: Je Sais-Je Crois. (Encyclopedic du Catholique au XXEme Siecle, Cinquieme Partie). Paris,
France: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1959. Pp. 119. 350 francs, one
volume.
Padoin, Giacinto. Il Fine della Creazione nel Pensiero di S. Tommaso.
Rome, Italy: Editrice Laterano, Pontificia Universita Lateranense,
1959. Pp. 129.

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Pegis, F.R.S. C., LL.D., Anton C. Christian Philosophy and Intellectual
Freedom. (The Gabriel Richard Lecture). Milwaukee: The Bruce
Publishing Company, 1960. Pp. 89. $2.75.
Peil, Rudolf. A Handbook of the Liturgy. New York: Herder and Herder,
1,960. $5.95.
Piekoszewski, Rev. Jan. The Religious Problem of Refugees in U. S. A.
London, Canada: Veritas Foundation Publication Center, 1960. Pp.
128. $2.75.
Pieper, Josef. (Richard & Clara Winston, Trs.). Scholasticism: Personalities and Problems of Medieval Philosophy. New York: Pantheon
Books, Inc., 1960. Pp. 192, with index. $3.00.
Portalie, S. J., Eugene. (Ralph J. Bastian, S. J., Tr.) . A Guide to the
Thought of St. Augustine. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1960.
Pp. 428, with index. $6.50.
Proceedings Sixth Annual Meeting of the Society of Catholic College
Teachers of Sacred Doctrine, April 18-19, l960, Chicago, Illinois.
Brookline: Society Cardinal Cushing College, 1960. Pp. 144.
Quasten, Johannes. Patrology: Vol. III, The Golden Age of Greek Patristic
Literature. Westminster: The Newman Press. Pp. 630, with index.
$6.75.
Reardon, S. T. D., Maurice E. (Ed.). The Mind of an Archbishop: A
Study of Man in the Writings of The Most Reverend Karl J.
Alter, D. D., LL.D., Archbishop of Cincinnati. Paterson: St. Anthony's Guild, 1960. Pp. 425. $6.00.
Ryan, Mary Perkins. Perspective for Renewal. Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1960. Pp. 98. Cloth, $2.25.
Smith, H. Shelton; Handy, Robert T.; Loetscher, Lefferts A. American
Christianity: An Historical Interpretation with Representative Documents. Volume I, 1607-1820. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1960. Pp. 630, with index. $10.00.
Smith, Vincent Edward. The School Examined: Its Aim and Content.
Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1960. Pp. 314, with
index. $5.75.
Spinoza, Baruch. How to Improve Your Mind. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1960. Pp. 90. $2.75.
Streller, Justus. (Wade Baskin, Tr.). Jean-Paul Sartre: To Freedom
Condemned. New York: Philosophical Library, 1960, Pp. 163.
$3.00.
Studies in Hegel. (Tulane Studies in Philosophy, Volume IX). New
Orleans: Tulane University, 1960. Pp. 187. $2.00.
Terruwe, M.D., A. A. A. The Neurosis in the Light of Rational Psychology.
New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1960. $4.50.
Thalheimer, Alvin. Existential Metaphysics. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1960. Pp. 640, with index. $7.50.

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Thomson, Paul van K. Why I am a Catholic. New York: Thomas Nelson
& Sons, 1959. Pp. 204, with index. $2.75.
Van Riet, Georges. Problemes d'Epistemologie. Louvain, Belgium: Universitaires de Louvain, 1960. Pp. 4:'H. FB 150. -.
Van Wesep, H. B. Seven Sages: The Story of American Philosophy. New
York: Longmans, Green.& Co., Inc., 1960. Pp. 463, with index.
$6.95.

von Hildebrand, Dietrich. Wliat Is Philosophy. Milwaukee: The Bruce
Publishing Company, 1960. Pp. 250, with index. $4.25.
Walgrave, 0. P., J. H. (A. V. Littledale, Tr.). Newman The Theologian.
New York: Sheed & Ward, 1961. Pp. 389. $8.50.
Wikenhauser, Alfred. Pauline Mysticism: Christ in the Mystical Teaching of St. Paul. New York: Herder and Herder, Inc., 1960. Pp.
256, with index. $4.50.