LETTER OF THE MASTER GENERAL Roma, (8-48) ............... Convento S. Sabina (Aventino) CASA QENERALIZIA DELL' DRDINE DEl FRATI PREDICATOR! It was with great pleasure that we learned of this special occasion to honor the Very Reverend William Humbert Kane, 0. P ., founder of The Albert us Magnus Lyceum at River Forest, Illinois. We were particularly pleased to hear that this homage on the part of brethren and Sisters of our Order as well as religious of various other Orders and a host of eminent laymen transcended nationalities and provincial boundaries. It is only by cooperative effort among learned men that the sublime ideal of St. Albert the Great can be realized in a troubled world. No one can view recent developments in atomic physics without grave concern not only for the future of humanity, but also for the very scientists who have merited the respect of their peers and the admiration of the masses and withal have come to feel a certain uneasiness of their own consciences. Scientists have become accustomed to the adulation· of the general public. This adulation, growing with every new discovery, led them to spurn the traditional channels of wisdom, and to close their eyes ever more to the legitimate claims of supernatural religion, moral principles, perennial philosophy, and other. elements of culture which contribute to a truly human life. In the nineteenth century certain specialists in a particular branch of physics, chemistry, biology or psychology lll . LETTER OF THE MASTER GENERAL lV were willing to be considered the oracles of all human wisdom. The narrow confines of a specialized branch of natural science, as we know, provided no vantage point. Consequently, whatever could not be comprehended by the specialized principles was misinterpreted, ridiculed or rejected. However, recent developments within many branches of science have shaken these imprudent positions. From the turn of the century to the present day an ever increasing number of scientists have found themselves asking questions which formerly were looked upon by them as purely " philosophical." Pope Leo XIII saw dearly that all social errors, and consequently a large part of social evils, are ultimately traceable to false philosophical principles. These are as erroneous today as they were in the nineteenth century. Throughout his encyclicals he used the principles of St. Thomas Aquinas, that " prince and master " of all Scholastic doctors, to analyze prevailing thought and to outline the rehabilitation of Christian society. In his immortal encyclical Aetemi Patris he observed: " If anyone will but turn his attention to the sad condition of our times, and contemplate thoughtfully the state of things which exists publicly and privately, he will surely perceive that the fertile cause of the evils which actually surround us, or of which we fear the coming, consists in this, that the wicked maxims on divine and human things which have recently sprung from the schools of the philosophers have invaded all classes of society, and are approved by a very great number." 1 Consequently, he urged all Bishops, teachers and students " to restore the illustrious system of St. Thomas Aquinas to its former glory " that the coming generations may nourish themselves "abundantly from those purest streams of wisdom that flow from the Angelic Doctor, as from an inexhaustible and precious fountain." 2 That same pontiff in the year 1880, by his Apostolic Letter Cum hoc sit,3 made and declared Thomas Aquinas, " who ever shone as the sun in his doctrine and virtue," the heavenly patron of all Catholic schools, commending him 1 AAS, XII (1879), 98. • Ibid., p. 112. • AAS, XIII (1880), 56-59. LETTER OF THE MASTER GENERAL v especially as the guardian, leader and master of philosophical and theological The call of Pope Pius XI, Ite ad Thomam, rings as clear today as it did in 1923 when he addressed Studio-rum Ducem to the whole Catholic Church. 5 In more recent times, a deep need was felt by many for a heavenly patron in the natural sciences. In the solemn Decree Ad Deum of December 16, 1941, the late Pope Pius XII wrote: " It is no wonder, then, that the universities and the more importan.t Catholic colleges, not only in Italy, but in Germany, France, Hungary, Belgium, Holland, as well as in Spain, America and the Philippine Islands, besides numbers of professors of physics and other natural sciences, at the present time look upon Albert the Great as a beacon shining in a world engulfed in gloom. To make sure of the help of Almighty God in their exacting researches into the world of nature, they eagerly desire to have for their guide and heavenly intercessor him who, even in his own day, when many, puffed up with a hollow science of words, were turning their eyes away from the things of the spirit, has taught us by his example how we should rather mount from the things of earth to the things above." 6 Speaking of the important role played by Our own predecessor, Father Martin S. Gillet, the late Holy Father continues: " It is, therefore, with sentiments of deepest pleasure that we accede to the wish expressed by the Catholic Academicians at their recent convention in Trier, by universities and by other international gatherings of scientists, and brought to Our notice by the Master General of the Order of Friars Preachers, who, on behalf of himself and of the Order over which he presides, adds a fervent plea that We may deign to constitute Saint Albert the Great the heavenly Patron of students of the natural sciences." 7 The Decree Ad Deum, constituting Albert the heavenly Patron of those who cultivate the natural sciences, was issued on the • Ct. Letter of Pius XII to Martin Stanislaus GiiJet, March 7,1942. AAS, XXXIV {1942)' 89. • AAS, XV (192S), S2S. • AAS, XXXIV (1942), 90. 'Ibid. LETTER OF THE MASTER GENERAL VI tenth anniversary of the Decree In thesauris sapientiae by which Pope Pius XI enjoined upon the universal Church the veneration of Saint Albert the Great, Bishop and Confessor, with the additional title of Doctor. 8 We have watched with paternal concern the growth of The Albertus Magnus Lyceum at the Pontifical Faculty of Philosophy in River Forest, Dlinois. Since its. small beginnings in the Autumn of 1950 under the inspiration of Father Kane and the support of the Very Reverend Edward L. Hughes, at that time Provincial of the Province of St. Albert the Great, it has grown in wisdom and prestige. This growth has taken place to a great extent under the care of the Very Reverend Edmund J. Marr, Provincial of the Province of St. Albert the Great. We have been particularly pleased to observe the .devotion of its members to the solid principles of St. Thomas and St. Albert, and at the same time the of its members with vital problems of modern science. Problems such as the relation of Thomistic philosophy to modern science, the foundations and nature of modern science, the true constitution of matter, the biological problem of evolution as distinct from evolutionism, the validity of depth psychology, the influence of physiological and, biochemica.l factors on mental diseases and many other problems, cannot be solved without the mutual cooperation of well trained minds. The Albertus Magnus Lyceum has gradually enlisted the cooperation of Our sons in other Provinces, the cooperation of Our Sisters of various communities, and most important, perhaps, it has enlisted the cooperation of eminent laymen. We are aware that the inspiration for the Lyceum was due in large measure to the vision and zeal of its founder, Father Humbert Kane. Despite many difficulties and obstacles, he saw the need of cooperation within a specially recognized institute, and he did not falter. It is indeed a happy coincidence that the tenth anniversary of The Albertus Magnus • AAS, XXIV 5-17. LETTER OF THE MASTER GENERAL Vll Lyceum should coincide with the sixtieth anniversary of the birth of its founder. We take this opportunity to impart our paternal blessing to Father Humbert Kane, on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday, and to The Albertus Magnus Lyceum, founded by him ten years ago. We ask the blessing of St. Thomas Aquinas and of St. Albert the Great for all his associates concerned with problems of philosophy and science. Given at Rome, from the Convent of Santa Sabina, on the Feast of St. Margaret of Hungary, V. 0. P., January 19, 1961. FR. MICHAEL BROWNE, Master General O.P. DEMONSTRATION AND SELF-EVIDENCE I . I. SCIENTIFIC METHODOLOGY T can be forcefully argued that there is no place in phi.losophy for an " epistemological critique " of knowledge, as though the integrity of the intellect stood in doubt till it was somehow philosophically "cleared." 1 Surely, for reason to attempt to establish the trustworthiness of reason is for it to try to pull itself up by its own epistemological boot straps. The history of thought gives ample evidence that critical attempts to justify the philosophical effort are in vain. No matter how honest the epistemological critique in intention, it results characteristically in an unnatural imposition of artificial limits placed upon our capacities to know. Witness the divergent streams of extreme rationalism and extreme empiricism which find their source in the critique of Descartes. 2 Significantly, St. Thomas did not find it necessary to initiate his philosophical effort with a critique of knowledge. A Thomist speaks meaningfully of epistemology best in reference to a metaphysical inquiry into the character of intentional being. He takes epistemology as an attempt to understand what it is to know, not an attempt to defend the radical integrity of our 1 Cf., Gilson, Etienne, Realisme Thomiste et Critique de la Connaissance (Paris: J. Vrin, 1947); Realisme Methodique (Paris: P. Teque, 1935). • Gilson's frequently quoted remark on Berkeley and the Cartesian critique bears repetition here: " Everyone is free to decide whether he shall begin to philosophize as a pure mind; if he should elect to do so the difficulty will not be how to get into the mind, but how to get out of it. · Four great men have· tried it and failed. Berkeley's own achievement was to realize at last, that it was a useless and foolish thing even to try it. In this sense at least, it is true to say that Berkeley brought Descartes' ' noble experiment ' to a close, and for that reason his work should always remain as a landmark in the history of philosophy." The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1937), pp. 196-197. 189 140 EDWARD D. SIMMONS capacities for knowledge. That we can know is evident. It is both futile and unnecessary to attempt to prove this. 8 Although St. Thomas did not hamper his capacities for knowledge by imposing a priori restrictions upon them, he saw that, in a sense, they imposed restrictions upon him. There is no question, from the very start, as to the radical integrity of sense and intellect. Despite the fact that we are sometimes in error, it is evident that we can, and adequately, know what is. But our capacities for knowing are in no sense unlimited. Honest reflection upon the epistemological facts reveals that the human intellect is that lesser type of intellect which is at once a reason. For us all doctrine and discipline is from preexisting knowledge. 4 We learn by moving from what is already known to what follows from this. The fact is clear that, as far as learning is concerned, the human intellect is naturally discursive. Moreover, the price of discursive advance in knowledge is the construction within the intellect of logical artifices such as definitions and argumentations. The method of construction which is called for by the demands of discourse is in no sense arbitrary. As always, the final cause is the cause of the causality of the other causes. The end of the logical construct requires certain determinate rules according to which the objects known are to be ordered in knowledge in reference to one another. Thus, there are definite rules of procedure which constrain the intellect in its discursive progress. 5 These 8 Cf., Smith, Gerard, S. J., "A Date in the History of Epistemology," in The Maritain Volume of The Thomist (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1948), pp. 246-255. • In 1 Post. Anal., lect. 1, n. 9: " Omnis autem disciplinae acceptio ex praeexistenti cognitione fit." (The quotations from St. Thomas will be taken from the Leonine for the Summa, the Decker for the De Trinitate, the Lethielleux for the Sentences, and from the respective Marietti editions for each of the other works cited.) • The general rules of discursive procedure, we shall note, are one with the laws of logic. Logic is simultaneously an art and a science. As an art it is directive of a productive activity-precisely, for logic, the construction within the reason of the instruments of discourse, such as definition and argumentation. The character of any work-to-be-produced sets the standard according to which the artistic effort. is to be effected. Thus every art has its own determinate rules of procedure. In the case of logic, of course, these are the rules of sound discourse. And in the case of DEMONSTRATION AND SELF-EVIDENCE 141 can be said to constitute a method, and the reflexive investigation of them can be spoken of as methodology. It should be clear that this is not method in the manner of Cartesian method, nor is it methodology in the manner of epistemological critique. There is for man but one reason. Hence, there is generally but one method, that is, the discursive method which measures up to the demands of that one reason. But there are many different things to be known, on radically different scientifically relevant levels. As a consequent, the general method of the reason must be proportioned to each scientifically different object for each formally different scientific effort. The general method of the reason is logic. Logic is at best analogously common to every scientific inquiry. By itself it is inadequate to any particular scientific subject matter. Logic must be contracted, and in analogously different ways, to the needs of every scientifically different subject. This contraction of logic is realized in the particular scientific methods proper to each formally different scientific subject. 6 Note that while logic by itself is inadequate to any given scientific inquiry because of the special demands of the proper subject of that inquiry, there can, because of the demands of the reason itself, be no particular logic, because discourse is aimed ultimately at a fully defended scientific knowledge of things, the rules of the art must themselves be evident in themselves or demonstratively defended. Since only the most fundamental rules of logic are evident in themselves the majority of them must be demonstrated. Thus, in order for logic to be the art that it is, it must be at once the demonstrative science of the rules of discourse. As a matter of fact, the rules of discourse are the canons which express the demands of the second intentions which accrue to objects as known and in virtue of which these objects are to be ordered in discourse. Thus logic is simultaneously the art of sound discourse and the demonstrative science of second intentions or rules of discourse. For a more complete exposition and defense of this position, cf., Simmons, Edward, "The Nature and Limits of Logic," The Thomist, XXIV (January, 1961), pp. 47-71. 6 In In Boeth. de Trin., q. 6, a. I, St. Thomas distinguishes between the demonstrative method characteristic of natural science (rationabiliter), the method of mathematics (disciplinabiliter), and the method of metaphysics (intellectualiter). These represent different contractions of the general logic of demonstration in favor of formal differences in diverse scientific subjects. 142 EDWARD D. SIMMONS scientific method which is not generally logical. Clearly, the investigation into general logical method is methodology in one sense, while the investigation into the precise method of any given scientific inquiry is methodology in another (related) sense. We can refer to the former as general methodology and the latter as particular or special methodology. 7 In this paper we shall concern ourselves with the role of the self-evident proposition in the theory of demonstration. This is a study in general methodology. The point made will be of a common character, and the methodological principles uncovered will be only generally relevant for scientific inquiry. In every case an appropriate contraction of the doctrine presented will be necessary before it is proximately adequate to any given scientific effort. Before proceeding, however, there remains one more distinction to be made, the better to locate the discussion of this paper. General methodology is identical with logical theory, and, as such, admits of the distinction between formal and material logic. This is a distinction which is both legitimate and significant, but it is a distinction which is frequently misunderstood. Although it is a distinction which should be made within the limits of general logical theory, it is not infrequently understood in such a way that formal logic is identified with general methodology while material logic is associated intrinsically with particular scientific methodology. This mistaken view makes logic less than adequate to the demands of reason even in abstraction from the particular demands of any given scientific subject. And, while it may not positively vitiate the investigation into particular scientific method, it places an unreasonable burden upon it. Just as there are general rules of logical procedure to be followed if discourse is to be consistent or valid, so there are general rules of procedure to be followed if discourse is to be of some determinate scientific force. Categorical syllogism is defined in terms of validity. The rules which must be followed to make the syllogism precisely a syllogism (e. g., the middle term must be fully 'Cf., In II Met., lect. 5, n. 335; In II De Anima, lect. 3, n. 245. DEMONSTRATION AND SELF-EVIDENCE 143 distributed at least once) are canons of valid or consistent discourse. Demonstration, on the other hand, while presupposing validity, is defined in terms of scientific force. And there are general rules, able to be determined apart from any particular scientific subject, which must be followed if a syllogism is to be demonstration (e. g., the premises must be necessarily true) , and even more determinate general rules· which must be followed if the demonstration is to be of a certain type (e. g., explanatory demonstration must have a middle term which is related to the scientific subject as its real definition) . These rules, while quite clearly remaining of a general logical character (i. e., open to contraction in the face of special scientific subject matter, but not yet contracted ) are canons of properly scientific, and not simply consistent, discourse. Rules such as these are proper to material logic, while the rules of merely consistent discourse are rules of formal logic. There are reasons which explain why formal logic is sometimes confused with the whole of logic and why material logic is sometimes confused with particular scientific methodology. 8 But these reasons only help to excuse the man 8 The formal subject of the science of logic is the second intention. Second intentions are logical forms or relations of the reason which accrue to objects (first intentions) precisely as known. Some second intentions accrue to an object properly in virtue of its mode of signifying (e. g., predicate, middle term, and syllogism). Others accrue directly in virtue of the intelligible content of the object (e. g., species, immediate, and demonstration) . The former are second intentions in formal logic, and they set the demands for valid discourse. The latter are second intentions in material logic. and these set the demands for scientific discourse. Although St. Thomas explicitly distingnishes between formal and material logic only on the level of the logic of the third operaton (cf., In I Post. Anal., prooem., nn. 5-6), the distinction makes sense also on the levels of the first and second operations, as· the examples above illustrate. [Cf., Simon, Yves, "Foreword," The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas, translated by Yves Simon, John Glanville, and G. Donald Hollenhorst (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1955), pp. ix-xxiii.] The subject matter for logical· theory is always the second intention, and never directly the first intention to which the second intention accrues. Thus, there is a sense in which logic is only formal (investigating logical forms) and never material (discussing the intelligible content of first intentions, which is the matter of discourse)_. And even apart from this, it is clear that second intentions in material logic are more proximately connected with the intelligible content of first intentions 144 EDWARD D. SIMMONS who is confused. They do not defend the confusion as a noetic fact. The theory of demonstration in general remains, as much as the theory simply of syllogism, the concern properly of the logician. It must be assumed and contracted to the needs of the special subject matter for any given scientific inquiry. Thus the concern of this paper is within the limits of logic, but it belongs to that branch of logic which is material logic rather than formal logic. This brings us significantly closer to the area of particular methodology than a paper in formal logic would; but we remain in logic without trespassing beyond. II. SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITION- THE BASIC TRUTHS OF DEMONSTRATION Early in the Posterior Analytics, after determining the nature of scientific knowledge (in brief, certa cognitio per causas 9 ), than are those in formal logic. The connection is so intimate that Simon and his feilow translators suggest that the habitus of material logic is reduced in actual use to the science which employs it (ibid., note 39, pp. 594-595). Whether this is the case or not, it remains true that the formal subject of material logic as weii as the formal subject of formal logic is no more nor less than a logical form or second intention. This means, of course, that material logic is integraily a part of logic proper and is not, as a science, to be confused with any (and every) particular sicence of the real. (Cf., Simmons, E., op. cit.) • The Posterior Analytics, Book I, Ch. !'!, 7lb9-U: "We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing . . . when we think we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and of no other, and, further, that the fact could not be other than it is." [Translation from The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), p. ll1] There should be no need to insist that, in the face of current usage, this gives a highly restricted (and exceedingly strict) meaning to "science." As we begin to speak of this kind of science as demonstrated knowledge there is, of course, a proportionately strict understanding of the meaning of " demonstration." Still, the terms " science " and " demonstration " admit of analogous impositions, even as used by us in this paper. For example, demonstrations differ analogously from one genus of speculative science to another-so that mathematical demonstration is only proportionally like metaphysical demonstration (cf. In Boeth. de Trin., q. 6, a. 1; In I Post. Anal., lect. 41), and even within a given science--so that a propter quid demonstration in one science is only proportionaily like a quia demonstration in that same science (cf., ibid., lect. 23). Having introduced this strict meaning of science in the second chapter of The Posterior Analytics, Aristotle has set the stage to demand of the scientific syilogism that its premises be necessarily true and DEMONSTRATION AND SELF-EVIDENCE 145 Aristotle defines demonstration in terms of its final cause as a syllogism productive of science. Then, using this definition of demonstration itself as a principle of demonstration, he proceeds to demonstrate the definition of demonstration in terms of its matter. He argues that if a syllogism is to produce the kind of conclusion which is properly scientific it must proceed from premises which are true, primary, immediate, better known than, prior to, and cause of the conclusion. This is to say that it must proceed from necessarily true, absolutely first propositions, which look to no prior proposition for their evidence but are calculated to supply evidence for other propositions. We speak of these propositions as self-evident. Scientific knowledge is proven in a demonstration whose premises manifest the truth of the scientific conclusion. As principles of the conclusion these premises are properly premises. In any given case, however, they may also be conclusions from other premises. But it is impossible, of course, that every premise be itself a conclusion from a prior premise. We must arrive ultimately at premises which are only premises, at propositions which are not shown to be evident by way of prior propositions but whose evidence is found within themselves. These absolute premises are ultimately the complex principles 10 of scientific knowledge, themselves not properly scientific, but rather prescientific. They are self-evident propositions, the propositions spoken of in the Posterior Analytics as "the immediate basic truths of syllogism" or, more determinately, of demonstration. immediately so (Ch. 8) . It is important to note that, for the most part, the subsequent discussion of the requirements for demonstration is centered upon the strictest type of propter quid demonstration and is only proportionally relevant to other types. 10 The absolute premises of demonstration are significant principles of demonstrative discourse. So too is the middle term of the demonstration (which is not identical with any premise, though it is built into each) . The former are complex principles of demonstration. The latter is an incomplex principle. We are concerned primarily with the complex principles of demonstration in this paper, although, as we shall note, the definition itself plays a significant role in the discussion of these complex principles. As a matter of fact Aristotle lists the definition as a type of demonstrative principle in the very context of the discussion of immediate premises (cf., St. Thomas' explanation for this, op. cit., lect. 5, n. 9). 146 EDWARD D. SIMMONS St. Thomas speaks of these " basic truths " as per se nota propositions. Although this is an apt expression, there is some danger of confusion here .. First of all, St. Thomas may sometimes use the term per se nota of a proposition which is not evident in the way in which the basic truths of demonstration are self-evident. 11 Secondly, St. Thomas frequently speaks of the modes of perseity (the modi dicendi per se) / 2 and, despite the terminological suggestion to the contrary, it is not true that whenever we have a proposition which involves a mode of perseity we have a per se nota or self-evident proposition. These points will have to be clarified before we are through. For the premises of demonstration to be at all they must be true, for the esse of a proposition is an esse verum. For them to be principles of manifestation for the scientific conclusion they must be necessarily true, for necessity is of the essence of science. And for them to be basic truths, that is absolute premises, the premises of demonstration must be, at least reductively, immediate propositions. Here is precisely where the scientific proposition differs from its pre-scientific principle. The scientific proposition is necessarily true, and it is a conclusion. The scientific principle is necessarily true, but it can be (ultim-ately) in no sense a conclusion. The conclusion of a syllogism is characteristically mediate, for the connection between its extremes is manifested in a syllogism by way of a term commonly identified with both extremes, thus functioning as a middle. The basic truths of syllogism or the absolute premises must themsP-lves be evident without a middle. The predicate must belong immediately to the subject lest we admit the infinite regress which would make deduction totally ineffective. Two things, at least, should be pointed out here. First of all, there is a significant and not unrelated use of the term " immediate " which is not intended at this point. For example, having three angles equal to two right angles is necessarily 11 In II Phys., lect. 1, n. 8: "Naturam autem esse, est per se notum, in quantum naturalia sunt manifesta sensui." 12 Cf., In I Post. Anal., lect. 10; In II De Anima, lect. 14, n. 401; In V Met., lect. 19, nn. 1054-1057. DEMONSTRATION AND SELF-EVIDENCE 147 true of both triangle and iso$celes triangle. But it is true of isosceles triangle only insofar as isosceles triangle is triangle. Thus we might well say that this property belongs immediately to triangle and mediately (through triangle) to isosceles triangle. However, the proposition Every triangle has three angles equal to two right angles can be demonstrated as the conclusion of a syllogism employing the essential definition of triangle as its middle term. Insofar as it is able to be proven through a middle, it is clearly not immediate in the sense in which self-evident propositions are immediate. "Immediate" here means, rather, commensurately universal or convertible (primo or possessed of the intention spoken of as dici ut universale). As a matter of fact, not every proposition which is commensurately universal is self-evident and not every self-evident proposition is commensurately universaJ.13 Secondly, even though we understand the self-evident proposition to be immediate in such wise as to lack a demonstrative middle, it is not the case that every proposition which is immediate in this sense is self-evident. A self-evident proposition is a proposition with a subject and a predicate in necessary matter, and with a subject and predicate so proximately connected with one another that the necessary truth of the proposition can escape no one who understands this subject and predicate. Hence, propositions are said to be self-evident precisely insofar as they can be seen necessarily to be true once their terms are known. 14 These 13 For St. Thomas' position on the dici ut universale, cf., In I Post. Anal., lect. 11. We shall see that the prime instance of the self-evident proposition has a predicate which is of the definition of the subject. If the predicate is the whole of the definition of the subject it is, of course, convertible with the subject, and we have a commensurately universal proposition. ,Every man is capable of speech is commensurately universal without being self-evident, and Every man is animal is selfevident without being commensurately universal. u Only this type of proposition is so necessarily true, while being at the same time immediate, that it can ground the necessity of a scientific conclusion. In IV Met., lect. 5, n. 595: "Ad huius autem evidentiam sciendum, quod propositiones per se notae sunt, quae statim notis terminis cognoscuntur .... " De Malo, q. 3, a. 3, c.: " Uncle intellectus ex necessitate assentit principiis primis naturaliter notis. . . • Uncle in intellectu contingit quod ea quae necessariam cohaerentiam habent cum primis principiis naturaliter cognitis, ex necessitate moveant intellectum, 148 EDWARD D. SIMMONS propositions are not totally non-empirical, for, as we shall note, they are known by way of an immediate induction from sensible data. Yet they do not depend directly upon empirical data for verification. Assent to them is founded upon an intelligibility built into them such that it is impossible to think the opposite. Thus, if one understands the meanings of the terms in the proposition The whole is greater than any of its parts one immediately assents to this proposition quite apart from the existence of this or that sensibly existing whole or part. The motive for assent is, in a sense, built into the proposition itself. The self-evident proposition is immediate because it looks to no prior proposition for its evidence, but there are propositions which are evident in this way without being self evident. These are the factually evident propositions which are true, because they report accurately on the way things happen in fact to be, whether they could be otherwise or not. Examples of propositions this are This pencil is yellow, The weather is pleasant today, and I feel great. These propositions are immediate since they do not depend on prior propositions to manifest their truth. The evidence for them is found immediately in the factual situation. Insofar as a factually evident proposition is formally characterized by its commitment to what happens to be the case, the factually evident proposition cannot intend the necessity needed for an absolute premise of demonstration. Thus, though each is immediate, the factually evident proposition differs radically from the selfevident proposition. 15 In the Commentary on the Physics St. sicut conclusiones demonstratae, quando apparent; quae si negentur, oportet negari prima principia, ex quibus ex necessitate consequuntur." Cf., among other texts of this type, In I Post. Anal., lect. 5; lect. 19; De V er., q. 11, a. 1; Summa, I, q. 17, a. 8 ad 2; q. 82, a. 2; q. 85, a. 6; De Malo, q. 16, a. 7 ad 18; Quodl., VIII, a. 4. 15 What I refer to as the " factually evident" proposition is usually spoken of simply as "evident," but since the self-evident is (at least) evident it seems better to use a more determinate expression. There is nothing highly sophisticated intended by my use of "factually," despite the fact that the word "fact" does frequently take on a very specialized meaning in philosophical discussion. Note that none of my examples involves necessary matter in any sense. This helps to make the notion of the factually evident quite clear. Nonetheless it seems oto me that This whole DEMONSTRATION AND SELF-EVIDENCE 149 Thomas says that it is per se notum that nature exists because natural things are manifest to the sense.16 Natural things exist is an immediate proposition. But it is not self-evident-for, since natural things are existentially contingent and need not be, we cannot assent to the proposition Natural things exist simply because we understand the meaning of its terms. It is immediately evident only on the basis of the empirical fact unmistakably given in our sensory-intellectual grasp of the existence of sensible existents immediately present to the external sense. This is clearly a factually evident proposition. It is of significant relevance for the philosophy of nature, but it is not relevant in the way in which a self-evident proposition is relevant/ 7 despite the fact that St. Thomas describes it as per se nota. One more clarification at this point. The immediacy of the self-evident proposition makes it indemonstrable. But not all indemonstrable propositions are immediate (consider conclusions of dialectical or probable argumentation). Nor even, of course, are all immediate and indemonstrable proposiis greater than its parts can be taken as a proposition which intends simply a report on a concrete situation. As such this is factually evident, and it is not the same as the proposition Every whole is such that it must be greater than any of its parts. This second proposition is, of course, self-evident, and it is certainly known by anyone who can express the former proposition (because the terms which must be known in order that the former be expressed immediately make evident the latter). Although the most perfect instance of propter quid demonstration involves two premises each of which is self-evident, there is no reason why less strict demonstration cannot include one factually evident premise. The necessity needed in the antecedent of a demonstration would be lacking if every premise were factually evident, but it can be supplied by one self-evident proposition coupled with a factually evident premise. As a matter of fact, demonstration makes sense only in reference to scientific subjects known to exist. Where both premises are self-evident it is a requirement that the existence of the scientific subject be known prior to demonstration and presumed within demonstration. The existence of the scientific subject can be expressed within a demonstration when one of its premises is factually evident. 16 Cf., supra, note 11. 17 would be no reason for a philosophy of nature if natural things did not exist; but since they need not exist, the proposition which reports on the fact of their existence cannot be used as a necessary premise manifesting the scientific necessity of any conclusion. 150 EDWARD D. SIMMONS tions self-evident (consider the examples given above for the factually evident proposition) . Certainly true propositions in contingent matter are indemonstrable because of a deficiency in matter. Self-evident propositions are always in necessary matter, and their indemonstrability springs from their excellence rather than from some deficiency in matter. Demonstration makes evident something which is not already evident. To be demonstrable entails a privation. Because they are evident in themselves, self-evident propositions do not have this privation. 18 Self-evident propositions are necessarily true and immediate. This makes them at once primary: they have no propositions prior to them (upon which they depend for evidence), and they are presupposed to the mediate propositions which look to them for evidence. Insofar as they supply evidence for these mediate propositions they cause them to be conclusions. And they can be related to the conclusion as cause to effect only insofar as they are prior to and better known than the conclusion. The " basic truths of syllogism " are basic insofar as they admit of no prior propositions necessary to make them evident. They are truths of the syllogism insofar as they are principles from which conclustions can be generated. III. THE TYPES OF SELF-EVIDENT PRoPosiTION We have noted that a self-evident proposition is one which is known to be necessarily true once its terms are understood. The most perfect instance of this is found in the proposition in which the predicate is of the definition of the subject. 19 Once 18 Though scientific or demonstrated knowledge is spoken of as perfect knowledge (cf., In I Post. Anal., lect. 4, 'Q.. 5), it is clear that it is inferior to the pre-scientific absolute premises of demonstration. 19 Summa, I, q. 17, a. 8 ad "Nam principia .per se nota sunt ilia quae statim intellectis terminis cognoscuntur ex eo quod praedicatum ponitur in definitione subiecti." As Cajetan points out in his Commentary on the Posterior Analytics (Book I, Ch. 19), St. Thomas does not intend in texts such as this one strictly to define the self-evident proposition but to manifest the principal case. An example of a self-evident proposition which does not have its predicate within the definition of its subject is Every rational animal is capable of speech. DEMONSTRATION AND SELF-EVIDENCE 151 the subject is understood in its definition the identity of subject and predicate is grasped, and the intellect is moved to commit itself irrevocably to the truth of the proposition. If a proposition has a predicate within the definition of its subject, but this subject defies definition by any man, then this proposition can be described as self-evident in itself, but not self-evident to us. If, on the other hand, its subject can be defined by us, it is self-evident both in itself and to us. If the subject is able to be defined only by those who are habituated to operate within a given scientific field, the proposition is said to be selfevident only to the learned. But if is is a common concept understood by every one, it is, of course, self-evident to all. Thus, it is rather easy to see, at least apropos of the prime type of self-evident proposition, the rationale of the traditional division of the per se nota proposition into the per se nota in se and the per se nota quoad nos, and the subdivision of the latter into the per se nota quoad sapientes and the per se nota quoad mnnes. 20 St. Thomas appeals to the fact that the proposition God is is not self-evident quoad nos even though it is self-evident in itsel£.21 Were we to know the essence of God we could notnor would we need to-demonstrate His existence, for His essence is His existence. Yet, since we do not know His essence we are able from His effects, which are known to us, to prove His existence. Aristotle and St. Thomas supply several examples of per se nota propositions which are known to all because their terms are common conceptions easily and surely grasped by all men. These examples include: The same thing cannot be and not be; The same proposition does not admit simultaneously of affirmation and denial; The whole is greater than any of its parts; Things equal to one and the same thing are equal to one another; Equals taken away frmn equals leave •• This traditional division of the self-evident proposition is explained by St. Thomas in several texts, including: DeVer., q. 10, a. U; In IV Met., lect. 5, n. 595; In I Post. Anal., lect. 5, nn. 6-7; In Boeth. de Hebd., lect. 1. Cf., also Cajetan, op. cit., Ch. s. 21 Summa, I, q. !!, a. 1; De Ver., q. 10, a. 1!!. 152 EDWARD D. SIMMONS equals.22 These propositions are called dignitates or axioms because they are the absolutely ultimate and common principles which guarantee the integrity of all discourse and into which all discourse is resolved. Discourse would be impossible for anyone ignorant of these axioms. Propositions per se nota quoad sapientes are related to the axioms as the proper is related to the common. They can be known only by the learned because the terms involved are more determinate than the common notions which alone are able to be understood by the academically unskilled. St. Thomas illustrates this by suggesting the proposition All right angles are equal. This is a proposition which is immediately evident only to one who knows that equality enters into the definition of right angle; and this is a definition, of course, which escapes the knowledge of many. Another example which is traditionally offered is the proposition Incorporeal substances are not situated in place. We can add to these any proposition in which the essential definition or some part of it is predicated of a specific subject, such as Every man is a rational animal. A proposition of this type is known as a positio or thesis. 23 The axioms are necessary if we are to demonstrate in any scientific area, but the theses proper to a given area are necessary only for demonstrations properly within this area. Axioms may or may not be used explicitly as premises in demonstration, but theses are principles of demonstration only if they appear explicity as premises. Axioms can be distinguished generally into those which are ontological in character (e. g., the principle of identity) and those which are logical in character (e. g., the principle of contradiction) . Those which are ontological in character are In I Post. Anal., lect. 5, n. 7; In IV Met., lect. 5, n. 595. St. Thomas considers the division of the immediate principles of demonstration especially in lessons 5, 18, and 19 in the first book of his Co1TI!mentary on the Posterior Analytics. We have already noted the inclusion of definition as a principle (although incomplex) of demonstration. St. Thomas also speaks of a proposition taken as though it were immediate in one science, but proved in another (lect. 5, n. 7). This proposition is called a suwositio or hypothesis. We are not concerned properly with this proposition in this paper. 22 23 DEMONSTRATION AND SELF-EVIDENCE 153 presupposed to any demonstration, even when they are not explicitly expressed as premises, precisely because the knowledge of proper concepts which is required for theses presupposes and in a sense depends upon a prior grasp of common concepts.24 Those which are logical in character function necessarily as methodological principles which guarantee the integrity of discourse without being built into it as doctrinal principles. For example, the principle of contradiction is an absolutely common methodological principle without which there could be no discourse at all. No proposition can function properly as a principle of demonstration except that it be firmly accepted that the affirmation of its opposite is excluded in the face of its own affirmation. 25 Of course axioms of an ontological character (when illumined by the light of metaphysical abstraction) can be used as premises in metaphysical discourse, just as axioms of a logical character must be built into proofs in logical theory as explicit premises. The reason for this is that metaphysics and logic are common sciences, so that the principles common to the other sciences are proper to them. As a matter of fact, these common propositions can even be used as explicit premises in the particular sciences, though here they become principles of dialectical rather than demonstrative discourse. 26 .. Consider the relation of being to all other concepts. De Ver., q. 1, a. 1, resp.: " lllud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quo omues conceptiones resolvit, est ens;" In III Met., lect. 5. Cf. Cajetan, Comm. In De Ente et Essentia, q. 1. 25 In IV Met., lect. 6, n. 603: "Si igitur quis opinetur simul duo contradictoria esse vera, opinando simul idem esse et non esse, habebit simul contrarias opiniones: et ita contraria simul inerunt eidem, quod est impossibile. Non igitur contingit aliquem circa haec interius mentiri et quod opinetur simul idem esse et non esse. Et propter hoc omnes demonstrationes reducunt suas propositiones in hanc propositionem, sicut in ultimam opinionem omnibus communem: ipsa enim est naturaliter principium et diguitas omnium diguitatum." Cf., also In I Past. Anal., lect. 6, n. 7. 26 Though the direct use of logic is methodological, supplying either the rules of demonstrative or dialectical discourse, logic can, along with metaphysics, because of the correlatively common character of the formal subjects of each, supply premises for argumentation in the particular sciences. Since demonstration requires premises appropriate to the conclusion, the argumentation in some particular science with a premise from metaphysics or logic will be dialectical at best. 154 EDWARD D. SIMMONS IV. THE GENESIS OF THE SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITION As St. Thomas teaches, the self-evident absolute premises from which scientific conclusions are generated are natural to the human intellect. 27 However, this does not mean, on the one hand, that they are possessed from the very start as fully formed conceptions dependent in no sense upon experience or, on the other, that they are no more than mental constructs fabricated by the intellect totally out of its own " stuff." In the final lesson of his Commentary on the Posterior Analytics St. Thomas finds fault with those who suggest that we already possess the principles but do not know this from the beginning. This is absurd since the principles of demonstration must be better known than the conclusions they generate, and it is impossible to know demonstratively and not be aware of this. St. Thomas also disputes with those who say that self-evident propositions arise in us from nothing. Experience indicates and reason demands that they come from something. But they cannot come from prior intellectual knowledge, for then they would not be immediate. They are generated from previous sense knowledge by way of an immediate induction. 28 However, to say this is not to imply that they are easily achieved. 29 This is simply not the case for the large majority of self-evident 27 Summa, I, q. 117, a. 1: "lnest enim unicuique homini quoddam principium scientiae, scilicet lumen intellectus agentis, per quod cognoscuntur statim a principio naturaliter quaedam universalia principia omnium scientiarum." 28 I say immediate induction to distinguish this from the mediate induction of a conclusion whose evidence is supplied by a sufficient enumeration of singulars. •• Our students seem to be easily misled into identifying the self-evident with the easily understood. This may be because in our classroom approach to them our examples of the self-evident proposition are almost exclusively axioms which are self-evident to all (e. g., The whole is greater than any one of its parts.), or it may be because of a tendency on the part of a student to give a psychologically subjective reading to what must be understood objectively (i.e., to think "selfevident " means evident to myself rather than in itself) . This confusion is not limited to our students. For example, Joseph Brennan, in The Meaning of Philosophy (New York: Harper and Bros., 1958), p. 94, suggests two meanings to "self-evident," namely, indemonstrable or completely clear to me. That the typewriter I am using is gray is both indemonstrable and completely clear to me. But it is in no sense self-evident. DEMONSTRATION AND SELF-EVIDENCE 155 propositions. It takes a sufficient experience (spoken of by St. Thomas as an experimentum which comes about from many memories) 30 of the singular manifestations of a universally necessary truth before we are ready to penetrate beyond the accidentals of these singulars to the underlying necessity. This experimentum is not always easily achieved. And the intuitive insight (into the necessity potentially in the experimentum) effected by the possible intellect through the light of the agent intellect is difficult as a matter of course. More often than not, it seems, propositions which are self-evident in themselves are not seen to be self-evident by us; and when they are, it is only by way of a tremendously difficult dialectical procedure. 31 To grasp the truth of a self-evident proposition one must first grasp the meaning of the terms involved. Hence, the search for In II Post. Anal., lect. 20, n. 11; In IV Met., lect. 6, n. 599. Thus far I have used the expression "dialectical " to refer to probable argumentation. This type of dialectical discourse is supplementary to demonstration. "Ve can also speak of a pre-demonstrative dialectic--which prepares the way for demonstration by manifesting the absolute premises of demonstration. This is the way the term is used here. There is no question of a proof, in any strict sense of the word, for a self-evident proposition. Assent to the self-evident proposition depends upon and comes with an insight into the intrinsic intelligibility of the proposition itself. The assent is automatic with the insight, but the insight may be difficult to achieve. The way to insight may require long and complicated discourse involving division, definition, and even argumentation. For example, one typical dialectical device for manifesting the truth of a self-evident proposition is the reduction of its contradiction to absurdity. (Cf. In III Met., lect. 5, n. 892.) The important point is that once the threshhold of insight is achieved the assent is made in virtue of the intrinsic intelligibility of the proposition itself. The dialectic is a scaffolding which can now be torn down, for it is not needed as a defense of the self-evident proposition once seen (no matter how instrumental it might in fact have been prior to insight) . Here precisely is where the immediate induction of the principles of demonstration differs from the mediate induction of a conclusion from a sufficient enumeration of singulars. The induced conclusion is assented to precisely in virtue of the enumeration of singulars and cannot be known without pointing to them for evidence. This is not the case for the induced principle. No matter how many singular wholes and parts have to be observed before a man sees into the meaning of whole and part so that he knows the whole must be greater than its parts, the proposition is seen to be true independently of each and all of these singular wholes and parts. (In III Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 2, q. 1 ad 2: "Termini principiorum naturaliter notorum sunt comprehensibles nostro intellectui: ideo cognitio quae consurgit de illis principiis, est visio. . . .") 30 31 156 EDWARD D. SIMMONS self-evident propositions is at least as difficult as the search for definitions. Cajetan suggests that it is more difficult than this. At the end of his Commentary on the Posterior Analytics he discusses the induction of the per se nota proposition. He contends that induction is necessary, not only as the source of the incomplex terms of the complex principles, but that it is necessary as well for the composition of these terms in the proposition. He argues that we would not know that equals taken from equals leave equals if we knew only the meaning of "equal," "to be taken from" and "to leave." For this reason he holds that for the genesis of this self-evident proposition there must be induction, not only of the meanings of the terms, but even of their conjunction in this proposition. In some texts at least, as we have seen, St. Thomas indicates that the i:1duction of the terms is sufficient for the intellectual grasp of first principles. Appeal to personal experience, after the suggestion of Cajetan, seems to indicate that sometimes the induction of the terms alone suffices (as, for example, with the selfevident proposition Every man is a rational animal) , and that sometimes more is required (as in the example cited by Cajetan). The self-evident proposition is not simply a report on a factual situation. Yet it is not a priori, and it does have an empirical reference. If it were not the case that some things happen to be such and such precisely because they cannot be auG. not be such and such, we would never grasp the self-evident proposition. It is only through sufficient contact with the things in question that an insight into the necessity which dictates the facts (that is, the way in which these things are) is achieved. 32 It is true that we can be sure that the whole is greater than any of its parts even though we are not presently confronted by a concrete whole and its parts. The truth of this proposition is guaranteed by the very meanings of whole •• There is no intention here to suggest that all facts are necessitated. I refer simply to the necessity that belongs to those facts which are necessary (e. g., that this whole is greater than its parts). DEMONSTRATION AND SELF-EVIDENCE 157 and part. Still I would never know the meaning of whole and part if I never knew any concrete whole and its parts. And, what is more important, there is no intelligibility at all to whole or part except that there are (at least possibly) concretely existing wholes and parts. The whole is greater than any of its parts precisely because that's the way wholes and parts are. For every whole and its parts there is the fact that this whole happens to be greater than each of its parts-and behind this fact is the necessity which demands it, a necessity which is one with the intelligible structure of whole and part. The fact and the necessity which dictates it are equally real. Yet they differ. The fact is incommunicable, and it alone can be expressed in a factually evident proposition. The necessity behind the fact is impervious to sense. Yet it is potentially in what is sensed (and in what is reported on in a factually evident proposition) , and it is, of course, fundamentally universal. It can be known only by an intuitive insight which is the result of an abstractive induction, and when known it is expressed in a formally universal proposition. The self-evident proposition comes into being only when it is inductively achieved from an experience of singulars-and it is meaningful only insofar as it bears finally upon singulars. However, the self-evident proposition is only materially dependent on experience for its verification. It is directly verified in its own intrinsic intelligibility, which precludes the possibility even of conceiving the opposite. V. Per Se Nota AND Modi Dicendi Per Se There is a temptation to identify per se nota or self-evident propositions with propositions involving a modus dicendi per se or a mode of perseity. However, such an identification can be seen to be erroneous once it is noted that the conclusion of a strict propter quid demonstration involves the second mode of perseity. As conclusion, and not premise, the proposition in the second mode of perseity is obviously not a self-evident proposition. Hence, not every per se proposition is per se nota 158 EDWARD D. SIMMONS or self-evident. The modes of perseity of concern to us here are the first, second, and fourth. A proposition involves the first mode of perseity when its predicate falls in the definition of its subject, the second when its subject falls in the definition of its predicate, and the fourth when the subject is related to the predicate as a necessary and proper cause. 33 In a strict propter quid demonstration the major premise has the fourth mode of persetity (e. g., Every rational animal is capable of speech), the minor premise the first mode of perseity (e. g., Every man is a rational animal) , and the conclusion the second mode of perseity (e. g., Every man is capable of speech) .34 "Per se" here indicates an essential rather than accidental connection between subject and predicate, and it refers exclusively to the objective structure of the propositions. Per se nota, on the other hand, refers rather to intelligible structure apropos of our knowledge of it, i. e., with or without a middle term, on the basis of intrinsic intelligibility or empirical data) . A per se nota proposition is one known immediately on the basis of its intrinsic intelligibility. Every proposition (including the conclusion) in a strict propter quid demonstration must be per se, but only the premises must (and can) be per se nota. Yet the case of the proposition in the second mode of perseity cannot be easily disposed of. True enough, as conclusion this proposition cannot be self-evident-at least not to us. But why isn't it self-evident to us? And is it, while not self-evident to us, self-evident in itself? It is necessary prior to demonstraation that we know something about the subject and predicate