THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS:

THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PRoviNCE OF ST. JosEPH

Publishers:

VoL. XXV

The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

JANUARY,

No. I

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE
SACRAl\1ENTS

W

HETHER they agree with him or not, theologians
must acknowledge Dom Odo Casel, 0. S. B., as a
. primary influence in the development of contemporary sacramental theology. The fascination that his theory
exercises, even if only as a catalysing agent, is made evident
in the ever-growing bibliography which by now must have outpaced all but the most leisured theologian. 1 Because of Dom
Casel's unwillingness to express himself in Scholastic terms,
theologians have experienced a certain uneasiness in dealing
with his theories. To speculative arguments advanced against .
his
he invariably reverted to the authority of Tradition
and explained with untiring patience that all difficulties could
be overcome if the critics understood the presence of the his1 Th. Filthaut, Die Kcmtroverse uber die Mysteritmlehre, Warendorf, 1947 (French
tr., Paris-Tournai, 1954) gives an account of the first reactions to Case!. For more
recent developments cf. J. Gaillard, "Chronique de liturgie,'' Revue Thomiste 57
(1957). pp. 510-551.

I

COLMAN E. o'NEILL

torical mysteries which he proposed was sacramental. His
followers adopt the same appeal. Few theologians have succeeded in suppressing their conviction that the human actions
of Christ, being essentially sucessive and therefore temporal,
cannot be made present in their historical reality several hundred years after the event. At the same time, few theologians
have failed to be impressed by easel's undoubted insight into
the fact, attested to by Tradition, that the sacraments are not
independent, self-sufficient sources of grace but are essentially
related to the mystery of Christ into which they introduce the
believer. All serious contemporary sacramental theologians have
made and are still making, attempts to express the insight in
traditional Scholastic terms. Until recently, the principal sponsors of modifications of Casel's theory were more or less external
to the Thomistic school: SOhngen,W arnach, Monden and others.
In the last few years, however, a version of the mysterypresence theory has been proposed by Thomists, their number
apparently growing, claiming to find it in the pages of St.
Thomas himself. In this article we wish to examine the new
theory as developed in the works of its principal proponents,
evaluate its claim to be Thomistic, and, finally, propose an
alternative, more securely based, we believe, on Thomistic
principles, if further removed from the ideas of Maria Laach.

I. New Thomistic theory.
Rejecting the possibility of presence of the historical mysteries, some Thomists think to find in St. Thomas' teaching
on the instrumental efficacy of the mysteries of Christ a clear
basis for asserting a certain presence according to an element
of the mysteries which is supra-temporal.
Fr. H. E. Schillebeeckx, 0. P., while referring to the eagerlyawaited second volume of his work on the sacramental economy
of salvation for a full treatment of the matter, confidently gives
a preview of his position as pertaining to· his historical survey
of St. Thomas' teaching. 2 Since the mysteries of Christ, he
• H. E. Schillebeeckx, 0. P., De sacramentele keilseconomie, Antwerp, 1952, pp.
161 f.

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

3

states, when elevated by God, participate in the divine power
by reason of the instrumental power (virtus instrumentalis)
communicated to them, they become " interior mysteries " and
thus contain an element which transcends time (perenniteitsgehalte) .3 Since the divine creative action is eternal, giving
to effects not merely their substance but also their place in
time and space, the historical acts of Christ in the days of his
flesh can, therefore, according to their perenniteitsgehalte, efficiently produce gracetoday. 4 The sacraments receive this supratemporal -action of the mysteries and apply it to man. Christ
in heaven is not excluded from this action. "The sacraments
are not, therefore, new actions of Christ, but the mysteryactions of the Christus historicus, which, according to their
supra-temporal content, are still the present actions of the
Christus gloriosus." 5 This we take to mean that the virtus
instrumentalis, communicated to Christ on earth, preserves an
element of the mysteries in supra-temporal fashion in the
glorified Christ; and when this virtus is applied through the
sacraments it is the historical event, as so preserved, which is
active. Fr. Schillebeeckx explains further that, since the historical mystery of Christ involved his body as well as his soul,
its supra-temporal content makes available to us the external
action as well as the interior acts of soul (against Sohngen) .6
There was also a supra-temporal content in Christ's mysteries,
this writer continues, precisely as human actions, not as instruments of God, in so far as they were governed by his beatific
knowledge. The redemptive act of will, the heart of the hisIbid., p. 168.
• Ibid., pp, 164, 165.
5 Ibid., p. 165.
6 Ibid., pp. 166, 167. Fr. Schillebeeckx's conclusion of his historical study of St.
Thomas on this point is worth quoting: " S. Thomas aanvaardt dus in de sacramenten een mysterie-tegenwoordigheid van de historische heilsdaad, als menselijke,
geestelijke en lichamelijke daad, doch naar haar boventijdelijk, innerlijk mysteriegehalte, als Godefficientie. Hij spreek niet over de aanwezigheid van de daad zelf,
maar van haar efficaciteit, haar 'virtus.'" (pp. 167, 168; italics author's)-We may
be permitted a little surprize that St. Thomas was so explicit about a twentiethcentury problem.
3

4

torical mysteries, remains, therefore, unchanged in the glorified
Christ. Consequently, there is present in the sacraments, not
only the virtus instrumentalis of the historical mysteries, but
also the identical inner human act of redemption. 7 Further,
though external actipns are subject to time, they form a single
human act with the act of will commanding them, so that
the external sacrifice of Calvary forms an existential unit
with this interior act governed by Christ's beatific knowledge.
Excluding the possibility that the external event of Calvary can
be supra-temporal, Fr. Schillebeeckx defers his conclusion to
his second volume, while indicating that Thomistic thought
would suggest that we see a symbolic parallel to the expression
of Christ's inner sacrifice on Calvary in the ,sacramental sign.
Fr. M. Matthijs, 0. P., explains the identity of the Mass
with Calvary and the Last Supper by appealing to Summa
theol., III, q. 56, a. 1, ad 3, developing the same idea as Fr.
Schillebeeckx about the supra-temporal character of the virtus
instrumentalis. 8 In virtue of the divine power which attains
as present all places and times, the act of offering of Calvary
is active instrumentally in the consecrating priest so that the
sacrifice itself is made present in the symbols of the Church. 9
Of particular interest is a recent work published by, a Benedictine of Maria Laach itself, Dr. P. Wegenaer, which proposes
in Scholastic terminology a theory of the presence of the
mysteries intended to reconcile Dom Casel and St. Thomas. 10
As we intend to base our discussion of the new intetyretation
llJi4., pp. 166-171.
M. Matthijs, 0. P., '' 'Mysteriengegenwart' secundum S. Tomam," Angelicum,
84 (1957)' pp. 898-899.
9 The same interpretation is given
Summa tkeol., lll, q. 56, a. I, ad 8 by C.
Journet, La Mease, Brnges, 1057, ·pp. 105 f.; T. Kreider, 0. S. B., "MysteriengegenZ,a fii,r Phil. und Tkeol':, 6 (1959), pp. 4!!0-480; Cl.-J. Geffre,0. P.,
wart,"
in Bull. tkom., 9 (1956), pp. 81!!-817; J. Hamer, 0. P., "Bulletin de theologie
dogmatique," Rev. Sc. phil. et tkeol., 48 (1959), pp. 725, 7!!6; cf. below n. !!!!.
10 P. Wegenaer, 0. S. B., Heilagegenwart. Daa Heilawerk Christi und die virtua
divina in den Sakmmenten unter beaonderer Berii.ckaicktigung von Euckariatie und
Taufe. Liturgiewissenschaftliche Quellen und Forschungen, Heft 88. Miinster, Wf.,
7

8

1958.

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

5

of St. Thomas on Dom Wegenaer's important work, as being
the most recent and most fully developed presentation of the
theory, we give the following summary of his guiding principles.
Dom Wegenaer divides his work into three parts: I. The
presence of the passio in the sacraments per contactum virtutis
divinae (pp. 9-53) . II. The presence of the passio in the
Eucharist and baptism (pp. 54-86) . ill. The presence of the
passio in the Eucharist and baptism according to the teaching
of Odo Casel on the mysteries (pp. 87 f.).
The basis for the whole speculative structure is found in
the first part which, after general remarks on the relation
between First and secondary causes .. Dom Wegenaer develops
as follows.

1. The humanity of Christ is the instrument of the virtus
wholly sui generis, since, apart from
having dominion over its own acts, it is united hypostatically
to the Word. Thus the humanity as instrument participates
in the divine power, and in all the theandric actions of Christ
the divine saving activity is present. The conclusion drawn
from this common doctrine of the Thomistic school is crucial
and must be quoted in full:

divina, an instrument

If the virtus divina is active in the humanity of Christ, then the
redemptive action of Christ gains thereby an eternal power (ref. to
Summa theol., III, q. 52, a. 8; q. 22, ad 5, ad 2) for Christ acts
instrumentaliter through the power of the divinity (ref. to· III,
q. 48, a. 6; ibid., ad 2). On these grounds we may say: the historical
mysteries of Christ, especially his passion and death, are a universal
cause of salvation (ref. to C. 'Gentes, IV, c. 58; Summa theol., III,
q. 49, a. 1, ad 4; q. 51, a. 1, ad 2) and, as instrument of the omnipresent virtus divina are limited in their action by no spatiatemporal distance. 'All the mysteries of the life of Jesus on earth
are, therefore, a living present according to their action, and so they
act unceasingly on the supernatural transformation of men, and
until the end of time they will continue to act, unchanging, on
men's bodies and on the cosmos' ( cf. A. Hoffmann, German trans.
of Summa theol., vol. 28, p. 453) .11
11

Op. cit., p. 19.

6

COLMAN E. o'NEILL

Hence, continues Dom Wegenaer, we can understand how St.
Thomas could attribute to the passion, death, burial, descent
into hell, resurrection and ascension, efficient instrumental caurespect of our salvation, even though these acts, in
sality
their physical reality, no longer exist, since this is simply an
application of his general principle that the virtus divina uses
the action of Christ instrumentality.
2. Since this ever-active instrumental efficient causality must
be specified___,"action not determined by an idea (causa formalis
extrinseca) is a contradictio" 12-the historical actions of
Christ exercise exemplary causality in respect to the men on
whom they act. St. Thomas is quoted as attributing such
exemplary causality to the passion, death, burial, resurrection,
and ascension. In this way the faithful are conformed to the
historical mysteries of Christ. " The redemptive act of Christ
is, therefore, present by action everywhere it works salvation; and this is the historical act of redemption whichthough past in its physical being-is made present to all men
in need of redemption through the contactus divinae virtutis." 13
3. The sacraments possess a two-fold causality: exemplary
and instrumental efficient. To ·show that all the sacraments
are exemplary causes in dependence on the exemplary causality
of the passion and death of ·christ, Dom Wegenaer appeals to
the combined signification of the outer sacrament (sacramentum
tantum) and the inner sacrament (res et sacramentum). As
his reasoning is somewhat difficult, we shall follow' his argument closely.
For St. Thomas the sacramental character is both thing and
sign. As thing it gives a configuratio with Christ in his priestly
actions, and " there corresponds to this something similar in
the other sacraments " which is also " the mysterious form of
our configuratio cum Christo sacerdote." The inner sacrament
can give us this configuration because in the exemplary causality of the outer sacrament there is given the possibility of a

m

10

Ibid., p. 20.

1a Ibid., P· !!!!.

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

7

partieipatio per similitudinem. 14 A text of St. Thomas permits
us to say that the " exemplary efficacy of the humanity of
Christ has been transferred to the sacraments, which are the
exemplars of what happens to men in the sacramental image
[Abbild, eumplatum] of [his] saving action." 15 Consequently,
the sacrament is both exemplatum of the historical act of
redemption and instrumental exemplar of the conformation of
the faithful with the death and resurrection of Christ. This
conformation is indicated by the signification of the outer
sacrament; texts of St. Thomas are quoted (all of them, though
Dom Wegenaer does not point this out, referring to baptism).
It is not clear, however, considering the external sacramental
action alone, .that anything more than external likeness to
Christ is in question. But since the outer sacrament produces
the inner sacrament and communicates to it its signification it
follows that the res et sacramentum is also the exemplar of
Christ and of his redemptive death. 16 Since the res sacramervtum is also sign, an efficacious sign, " the res of the ' inner sign,'
namely, the signification of the redemptive death of Christ,
enters grace, and we can speak of a Christ-figuration [Christusbildlichkeit] of sacramental grace." 17
Since the res et sacramentum differs in each sacrament there
are correspondingly different forms of this likeness to Christ in
grace; but common to all is this essential relation to Christ and
his death. Consequently, the "redemptive action of Christ,
his suffering and death, belong essentially to sacramental,
10 Ibid., p. 86. Dom Wegenaer refers, presumably, to a participation in Christ the
Priest.
10 Ibid., p. 87. Dom Wegenaer cites Co1111p. tkeol., c. !!47. The quotation he gives
is from c. 289 (Marietta, 1954, n. 514) • In respect to justification St. Thomas states
that the death and resurrection of Christ are each causa effectiva instrumentaliter
and causa ea:emplaria aacTamtmtaliter. Based on St. Augustine, De Trin., IV, c. 8,
the passage does not refer to the sacraments. See below, n. 64 and text there.
18 Op. cit., pp. !J7, 88.
u Ibid., p. 88'. Dom Wegenaer's object in this argument is to prove that every
sacrament really incorporates into the death of Christ. Hence the appeal to the
rea et aacramentum and the attempt to show that in every sacrament it symbolizes
and confers participation in the death and resurrection of Christ.

8

COLMAN E. o'NEILL

exemplary causality." 18 By reason of the formal dependence
of exemplatum on exemplar, of the Christian on the passion,
in all
sacraments the passion is present in analogical fashion;
and, since the passion exercises its exemplary causality only
through efficient causality in virtue of divine power, this is
analogy of attribution. 19 The sacrament itself exercises the
required efficient causality in so far as it is subordinated as an
instrument to the virtus divina which is acting through the
historical mysteries of the life of Christ, the instrumentum
coniunctum divinitatis. The problem of the mode of presence
of the historical acts in the sacraments remains.
4. As a basis for his explanation of this mysterius reconditae
theologiae Dom Wegenaer cites the celebrated text of Summa
theol., III, q. 56, a. 1, ad 3, on the efficient causality of Christ's
resurrection in respect to the bodily resurrection of all men.
The key words are:
The resurrection of Christ is the efficientcause of our resurrection
by divine power which alone can give life to the dead. Now this

power attains as present all places and times. And such virtual
contact satisfies the notion of this efficacy.
Dom Wegenaer comments: " Thus the virtus divina is present
to every place and to every time. But the human nature also
of Christ, as the instrumentum coniunctum, spans in its instrumental activity all spatio-temporal distance, and this through
its hypostatic union with the omnipresent Logos and the consequent participation of the humanity of Christ in the virtus
divina." 20 The humanity of Christ is unlike other instruments
in that it lacks its own suppositalitas, this being supplied by the
Logos. But, quo aliquid est actu, eo agit; that is, " the causality
of the agent is measured by his being-in-act or by his perfection
of being"; hence," the divine activity, identified with the divine
substance, must, in its perfection of being, stand behind the
efficacy of the historical act of salvation and that of the sacraments and enter in to these." It follows that the historical act
18

Ibid., p. 88.

10

Ibid., p. 89.

•• Ibid., pp. 48, 44.

THE MYSTERIES

OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

9

possesses a supra-temporal saving efficacy and this is transferred to the sacrament. 21 This is sufficient to make the historical action present in the sacraments, not substantially but
according to activity, this activity
the exemplary and
the efficient instrumental causality of the mysteries of Christ
and also the subordinated exemplary and efficient
causality of the sacramt;)ntal sign.22
5. Dom Wegenaer develops logically the application of his
principle to baptism and the Eucharist. His exposition of the
sacramental theory of the Mass is
and in particular
his treatment of the
of Christ's act of offering, where
he maintains the idea of sacramentalism at a point where many
writers lose sight of it. He argues in the final part that his
theory provides the speculative elaboration of easel's teaching,
permitting the latter to make clear its right to the patronage
of St. Thomas.
It is only in his final summing-up that Dom Wegenaer mentions, as an after-thought, that the classical commentators of
St. Thomas explain the efficient causality of the mysteries of
Christ's life in quite another way, namely, in terms of the
heavenly Christ. It is too easily overlooked, concedes Dom
Wegenaer, that the glorification of Christ belongs, as the consummation of his passion, to the instrumental activity of his
humanity. "The glorified Christ brings it about that the
mysteria carnis are present to us today; he unites us to his
historical act of salvation which thus becomes present to us,
and we gain thereby full particpation ifi the glorified Christ
through participation in the historical act of salvation." 23 With
this enigmatic statement Dom Wegenaer concludes.
01 Ibid., p. 50.
•• Ibid., pp. 50, 51. Dom Wegenaer cites the following as holding for his interpretation of St. Thomas on the resurrection: A. Hoffmann, German trans. of Summa
theol., vol. 28, p. 45S; Th. Tschipke, Menscheit Christi ala Heil11.organ d61' Gottheit,
Freiburg i. Br., 1940, p. 187.-R. Tremblay, 0. P., appears to accept the new interpretation; cf. "Mystere de la Messe," Angelicum, 86 (1959), p. 199, n. 1, and p.
!tOO, n. 1.
•• Wegenaer, op. cit., p. US. Ibid., p. 122: "Die Frage nach der Wirkweise der
historischen Heilstat scheint den Kommentatoren dem ausfiihrlich erorterten Prob-

10

COLMAN E. o'NEILL

II. Traditional interpretation of St. Thomas.
Well aware of the texts of St. Thomas attributing efficient
causality to the passion, death and resurrection, the commentators interpret them as referring to the glorified Christ in whom
the mysteries remain virtually. They explicitly exclude the
possibility that past event could have an instrumental effect
at the present time. John of St. Thomas writes:
The resurrection operates efficaciously, not according as it no
longer actually exists, but according to the risen humanity. That
[... ] it attains all places and times does not signify that something
no longer existing attains the future [... ] but that the power is
applied by God for all times and all place, that is, according as
it coexists with a time or place (yet not as it is contained by that
place, but as it coexists with it) because, namely, the risen humanity
endures for all that time; and in this fashion the passive resurrection
enduring in the humanity causes for all time. 24
Sylvius also adverts explicitly to the problem of time:
The past actions of Christ do not serve as physical instruments in
respect to our justification or other effects, because the existence
of a physical cause is required if it is really to operate; but the
humanity itself, since it exists, retains physical causality; and this
is what St. Thomas means.25
The same position is adopted by Cajetan, the Salmanticenses,
Gonet, Billuart and others. 26
The formal point of this traditional teaching of the Thomist
school, it should be observed, is that an instrumental cause, as
physical cause, must be contemporaneous with its effect; therefore, only Christ as he exists at this moment can cause grace
now. If recent developments of theology suggest that in the
lem der philosophischen Moglichkeit einer instrumentalen physischen Wirksamkeit
der Menchheit Christi untergeordnet zu sein." What problem the question should
be subordinated to, he unfortunately does not inform us.
24 John of St. Thomas, De sacramentis, disp.
a. 8, dub. 8, n. 90; cf. disp. i4,
a. 1, dub. 9, n. 559.
25 Sylvius, Comment. in Ill, q. 18, q. 8.
26 Catejan, Commet. in III, q. 56, a. 1, n. II; Salmanticenses, De Incam., disp. 28;
dub. 4; Gonet, Clyp. thom., De lncarn., disp. 19, a. 2, n. 45; Billuart, De Incam.,
diss. 18, q. 2.-0thers cited by Dom Wegenaer, p. 122, n. 601.

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

11

glorified Christ there remains some element of the historical
passion, this assertion will not be contrary to traditional
Thomism. To justify the rejection, however, of the formal
element of the commentators' opinion, so :6rmly proposed and
considered the only possible reading of St. Thomas, a very
detailed examination of St. Thomas' writing would be necessary. This examination the upholders of the new theory do not ·
o:ffer.27 They simply, if not naively, quote the very text that
occasioned such detailed explanations and appear to think that,
by insisting that their interpretation is the obvious one, they
can establish its truth. This disregard for ordinary ·scientific
procedure is part of the legacy of enthusiasm left to sacramental
theology by Dom Casel. To propose difficulties to those who
have seen the light is to brand oneself blind; it is a risk that
we are prepared to run.

III. Criticimn of the new theOT1J.
The most important places in St. Thomas indicated as the
basis for the new theory are Summa theol., Ill, q. 56, a. 1, ad 1
and ad 8. The article solves the question whether the resurrection of Christ is the cause of men's bodily
The
reply is given:
The Word of God first attributes immortal life to the body
naturally united to Him, so that through it He may operate resurrection in all others.
·

The first objection argues from the principle:. Posita causa
sufjicienti, necesse est ejjectum poni. If, therefore, Christ's
resurrection is the cause of other resurrections the dead should
already have risen. To which St. Thomas replies that it is the
power of the Word, controlled by His will, which raises men
from the dead. Consequently,
•• Gaillard's indulgent reference, art. cit., p. 688, to this traditional teaching is
typical of many modem writers' casual dismissal of theologians who came to their
conclusions only· after an immense eftort of reflections and after having taken account
of difficulties and objections that do not even occur to their supplanters. Significantly, for Gaillard, the new theory "n'oftre aucune difficulte" (p. 640).

12

COLMAN E. o'NEILL

.it is not necessary that the effect follow at once, but according to
the disposition of the Word of God.

In reply to the third objection St. Thomas states that Christ's
resurrection is the cause of the general resurrection in two ways:
as exemplary cause and as efficient cause. The efficient causality he explains in terms of his general teaching that the
humanity of Christ is the hypostatically united instrument of
his divinity and that " what Christ did or suffered in his
humanity are, from the,power of his divinity, saving for us."
There follows the battle-cry of the new theory: Quae quidem
virtua praesentialiter attingit amnia loca et tempora. In attempting to understand thiS' somewhat sibylline utterance two
lines of Thomist thought must be followed: the notion of divine
instrument and the concept of divine action in relation to
created effects. After summing up the conclusions of these
inquiries we shall consider the texts of St. Thomas on the
mysteries, showing how they fit into the context of his general
theology.
(a) Thomist notion of divine instrument. An instrumental
cause is distinguished from a principal cause in that a principal
cause acts in virtue of its own inherent form, the effect bearing
a certain likeness, either analogical or univocal, to that form,
whereas an instrumental cause acts, not in virtue of its own
form, but·" solely in virtue of a motion by which it is moved
by a principal agent." It follows ·that the effect produced by
an instrument bears. a likeness to the principal agent, rather
than to the instrument. 28 The instrument is, nevertheless, truly
a cause of the effect, but only to the extent that it is moved
by the principal.agent, that. is to say, by reason of the virtua
instromentalis imparted to ,it by the principal agent.
notion
of virtua instrumentalis is an analogical· one, and though
commonly illustrated by the example of local motion-arm,
stick, stone-is realized in many different forms. This is
especially clear when the idea is applied to supernatural instru•• Summa tkeol., m, q. 6!!, a. !.

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

18

ments where a very real, if impossible to visualize, virtus is
required to produce an effect in the order of grace. What is
common to every virtus instrumentalis is that, compared to the
stable and adequate operative power of the principal agent,
it possesses only an incomplete entity essentially consisting in
a movement transmitted by the principal agent and directed
towards the production of the effect: esse transiens ex uno
in aliud, et incompletum. 29 Just as motion is imperfect act,
belonging strictly to no category, but being" reduced" to the
category of its term, so the virtus instrumentalis, being transient, cannot be defined in itself but cari simply be ascribed in
terms of its function, namely, the transmitting of the action of
the principal agent to the effect. In this sense it may be
reduced to the genus of either of the terms of the operation,
so that a virtus instrumentalis empowering a creature to cause
grace is_ to be said to be spiritual or supernatural virtually,
though, if received in a material instrument, it may be corporeal
entitatively .80 The term " transient" applied to the virtus has
nothing to do with duration; it denotes that the instrumental
power is not native to the instrument but is imparted to it only
in so far as it is actually subordinated to the principal agent
and is actually serving it in producing the effect.31 It is because
it has this essential function of transmitting the action of the
principal agent and actually, by the very fact of its existence,
producing here and now an effect proportioned to the principal
cause that the virtus instrumentalis is described by St. Thomas
•• Summa theol., ill, q.
a. 4.
80 Ibid., ad 1, ad
De Ver., q.
a. 4, ad 5. Cf. Johns of St. Thomas, CurBUB
theol., d. 15, a.
n. 48: [Cum virtus instrumentalis sit] "motio quaedam divina,
quae recipitur in instrumento, si instrumentum fuerit corporale, corporalis erit
entitative, spiritualis autem virtualiter, cum circa spiritum operari possit. Si autem
instrumentum fuerit spirituale, spiritualis etiam erit motio ilia entitative, cum non
distinguatur ut res a re ab ipso instrumento."
81 Cf. John of St. Thomas, CurBUB phil., Phil. nat., IP., q.
"lgitur virtus, quae
non datur ut per se operativa, sed ut continuativa cum alia principaliter operante,
dicitur dari per modum motus, quia licet operativa sit, non tamen hoc habet nisi
ex continuatione actuali ad virtutem principalis agentis cui ministrat et servit, dum
actu operatur, et ideo dicitur per modum motus dari."

14

COLMAN E. o'NEILL

as intentional, tending towards an effect, with the suggestion
of producing in that effect the intention of a principal agent. 32
Thomists have taken some pains to express precisely this
concept of St. Thomas. They distinguish between principal and
instrumental cause in terms of the premotion required for the
activity of each. A principal cause is, by reason of its complete
possession of operative powers, in first act (actu prima) or
natural potentiality, in relation to action. Premotion applies it
to second act (actus secundus), actual operation proceeding
from the operative power. An instrument, on the contrary, of
itself lacking any innate proportion, even potential, to an effect
of a higher order than itself, requires, if it is to produce such
an effect instrumentally, such premotion as first gives it actus
pri,mus in respect to that effect and simultaneously applies it
to production of the effect. The premotion, or virtus instrumentalis, elevates and applies the instrument. Consequently,
the virtus instrumentalis exists only for the time or at the
instant that the effect is being produced.88
The virtus instrumentalis is, like all premotion, always a
created reality, even when a supernatural effect is being produced. This St. Thomas points out explicity in the case of the
power by which the words of the priest effect transubstantiation
and by which the other sacraments are efficacious.34 Likewise,
the power by which Christ worked miracles was a created
entity, elevating his humanity to operate as the instrument
of God. This power, argues John of St. Thomas, was not divine
omnipotence, for this cannot be communicated to a created
nature: it follows that it must have been created. 35
81 Cf. De unione Ve,-bi inc., a. 5, ad U: "lnstrumentum,
inquantum movetur ab
agente, consequitur quamdam intentionalem virtutem per influxum agentis, qui per
inatrumentum transit in eflectum." Summa theol., ill, q. 66, a. 1: "Est ibi [in water
of baptism] quaedam sanctificationis virtus instrumentalis non permanens sed fluens
in komi1lf!lm." Ibid., q. 7l!, a. S, ad l!.
88 Cf. John of St. Thomas, CuTIIU8 tkeol., disp. 15, a. 5, n. 19: "Quare causae
instrumentales ut sic tantum constituuntur in ratione talium pro illo tempore, aut
inatanq temporis, quo instrumentaliter producunt efl'ectum." Ibid., nn. S1, SS, 56.
8 ' Summa tkeol., lli, q. 78, a. 4.
•• John of St. Thomas, loc. cit., n. 17: "Humanitas Christi constitutur in actu

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

15

The instrument, prior to its elevation by the principal cause,
possesses its own nature and the proportionate power of
operating. The corresponding proper, or native, operation, in
relation to which the instrument is itself a principal though
secondary cause, must be exercised in the production of the
common effect.36
Since, historically, this notion of instrument was elaborated
principally in a theological context, it requires very slight
adaptation to accomodate it to the case where the principal
agent is God. Unlike created causes, God is under no compulsion to use instruments; if He chooses to do so, it is only in
order to associate creatures in His supernatural activity. A
further difference follows: the native operation of the instrument used by a creature must be in some fashion adapted to
the use to which it is put; such proximate usefulness is not
required in divine instruments, though
in His wisdom,
may choose to employ instruments remotely or analogically
adapted to the effect which He produces through them, as He
does, for example, in the sacraments.
Further, when God imparts instrumental motion to a creature
it is not necessary that the instrument come into immediate
physical contact, contactus suppositi, with the subject of the
effect. The miraculous power which went out of Christ was
equally effective whether he touched an invalid, merely spoke,
or was far away. Since God is present everywhere, He can
apply the instrumental action of the subordinated cause to the
subject of the effect, contactus virtutis. It is of some consequence to insist that it is the instrumental action which is
applied. God does not produce His effect directly by His divine
power; that would eliminate the participation of the instrument.
The divine effect is produced by God through the instrument;
that is to say, it is the created entitas vialis, imparted to the
primo in ratione instrumenti physici eflectui gratiae et miraculorum per virtutem
creatam, quae est motio aut elevatio Dei, seu usus passivus receptus in ipsa humanitate quo movetur ad producendos eflectus supernaturales." Ibid., a. s; n.
•• Summa theol., I, q. 45, a. 5.

16

COLMAN E. o'NEILL

instrument, which is applied to the subject of the effect, and
it is through instrumental activity that the effect is caused.
Not to realize or to deny this is to deprive the Thomist theory
of instrument of coherence. Now, this vis instrumentalis by
which God elevates and applies the instrument is, of its nature,
intentional; it is transient action from agent in effect. Its very
existence depends on its being actually applied to the effect;
it cannot be conceived of if this is denied. The fact that the
elevating agent is in this case God is quite irrelevant; the nature
of the created vis instrumentalis remains what it is. So much
depends in sacramental theology on this point that it is worth
while examining it more closely, clear though it appears in itself.
Cardinal Cajetan in one text is not as explicit about this as
other commentators. He appears to suggest that the divine
principal agent can overcome all limitations of the instrument:
And since omnipotence is not confined to certain instruments,
place or vicinities, it is of no importance what thing God uses
instrumentally for any miracle. For, just as He can perform the
work without any instrument, so He can perform it, not only by
means of an instrument, but by means of any, wherever it exists
and at whatever distance it is.
.

He adds at once:
For the divine omnipotence is neither diminished nor restricted
to the limits of the instrument He assumes; rather the instrument
is raised so as to execute omnipotence in such miracle as it has
been destined to efiect. 37

This last statement, isolated from the context of Thomist
teaching on instruments, could be understood to say that God
in no way permits His action to be limited by the instrument
which He uses; and absurd consequences could be drawn, not
only in the question of the mysteries of Christ, but also in the
much more developed area of the theology of creation. The
question of creation is illuminating for our present problem
for when treating of it the Thomist theologians lay down very
·
clear limits to the use of creatures as divine instruments.
•• Comment. in III, q. IS, a. i, n. VI.

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

17

John of St. Thomas proposes the objection that, if an instrument according to its native operation need merely modify the
action of God,-then nothing prevents God using an instrument
in creation. He replies that the operation of every created
being is an accident, existing, therefore, only in a presupposed
subject and requiring a further presupposed subject in which
to terminate, action being that which proceeds from the agent
to the patient. 88 Consequently, if God chooses to use a created
instrument, He must adapt Himself to the mode of operation
of the instrument. He can apply it only to a pre-existing
subject. 89 It is the nature of instrument that determines the
question, not the power of God. A subsumption, pertinent to
the problem of the mysteries, is taken from Suarez: why could
not an immanent action of a creature be elevated by God to
create, for in this case no subject is required to receive the
instrumental action. John of St. Thomas replies that it is quite
possible that God could elevate a creature's immanent action
and apply it at a distance and that there should be no corresponding change produced in the distant subject; (that is, it is
not necessary that a corresponding immanent action 'be produced in the effect) . But it is quite impossible that such an
immanent action be elevated instrumentally without its producing, through the accidental vis instrumentalis, some change
in the subject of the effect. The principle governing this conclusion is again that if God wills to grant the dignity of divine
instrument to a creature, He thereby wills to adapt His mode
of operation to that of the creature. In this sense He freely
limits His omnipotence, conforming its execution to the
bilities of created action, which is essentially motion from the
agent in: the patient. If He wishes to make the creature His
38 Differing opinions on the subject of
action do not affect the
point at issue here, which is that transitive action for its existence requires a patient.
T. S. McDermott, 0. P., "The subject of predicamental action," ThCI'ITtist, iS (1960),
pp. 189-210, argues persuasively that action is " the proper act and an accident of·
the agent indeed, but nevertheless in the patient and differing from pBBIIion not
secundum rtnn but secundum ratiofiem" (p. !!02) •
'
88 John of St. Thomas, Our8U8 phil. Phil. nat., I P., q. !!6, a. !!: •

18.

COLMAN E. o'NEILL

instrument He can act only '' intra lineam aotionis immuta:ntis
aeu motua." It is this principle that is pertinent to our present
problem rather than the application to creation that John of
St. Thomas makes of it. His present conclusion is that, since
the native operation of the instrument is accidental action,
though immanent, God must produce His effect by way of
change, whether formal or total, in a presupposed subject;
otherwise, He is simply not using the instrument. 40 The principle is equally valid when applied to all cases where a created
via inatrumentalia is induced into accidental action, the action,
of creatures. This via is by definition a transient, transitive
action which exists only ll-t the moment of production of the
supernatural effect. God can, of course, produce effects when
He wills; but .if He chooses to produce them by means of
such a created via fluena, then He must do so by producing
the via fluena at the moment in time when He wills the effect
to come into existence. Eternal in Himself and in His uncreated
action, this operation is in time and the effects of His operation, including premotion of whatever kind, are in time and
governed by time even if they are produced instantaneously .41
It is further to be noted that the humanity of Christ, though
united hypostatically to the ,Person of the Word, is subject to
the same conditions in this respect as any other created instrument. The fact that Christ's personality and existence are
divine does not make his human actions as such any less
human in their-specification:
To operate is of the subsisting hypostasis, but according to a
form and nature from which the operation
its species. And
therefore from diversity of forms or natures spring diverse species of
operations; but from the unity of the hypotasis springs unity
according to number as to operation of a species.... 42
•• Ibid.
01 Cf. Cajetan, Comment. in III, q. 62, a. 1, .:tl· VI: "Nee etiam inconvenit Deum,
voluntarie utendo motu creaturae, agere in tempore; cum nullus adeo desipiat qui
ileget Deum posse localiter movere, quod est agere in tempore."·
•• Summa theol., ill, q. 19, a. 1, ad s.

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

19

The human nature has operation distinct from the divine, but
"the divine nature uses the operation of the human nature as
the operation of its instrument; and likewise the human nature
participates the operation of the divine nature as an instrument
participates the operation of the principal agent." 43 It is actions
elicited by Christ's human intellect and will that are elevated
and applied by divine power. This requires the creation of a
transient instrumental power (via inatrumentalia) no different,
as regards its essentially intentional or tendential character,
from that which elevates and applies ordinary creatures: agit
utraque natura quod proprium eat cum alteriua communione.
From this examination of the notion of instrument we conclude that an-instrument used by God exists as such only when
it is under the actual influence of the principal agent, receiving
from this agent a created entitaa vialia, consisting in motion
which at the same instant elevates and applies the native
operation of the instrument to the production in the same
instant. of a supernatural effect. The fact that the principal
agent is divine has for consequence that the native operation
of the instrument may be an immanent action-a direction
of the practical intellect, whether command or prayer-since,
as elevated, this may be applied efficaciously by God to a
locally distant subject. Since. however, the instrumental power
has no other reality than motion to the effect, it is impossible
that it exist in the instrument except at the instant of time when
it is actually productive of the effect in the subject. Consequently, if God wills to use a creature, including the humanity
of Christ, as a true instrument, He can do so only by elevating
the creature at the instant in time when He wills to produce
His effect. Instrument and effect must be contemporaneous.
(b) Divine action in relation to created effects. The second
line of investigation suggested by Summa theol., III, q. 56,
a. 1, ad 1 and ad 3, concerns the meaning given by St. Thomas
to the phrase:
•• Ibid., corp.

20

COLMAN E. o'NEILL

(virtus divina praesentialiter " ... this [divine] power by its presence is in touch with all places and times " attingit omnia loca et
tempora); and the similar declaration that divine effects result
"according to the disposition of the Word of God."

The examination of these ideas will corroborate our conclusions
concerning divine instruments.
The Thomistic sense of the presence of divine power to all
times and places is to be found in Summa theol., I, q. 14. All
created things "pre-eXist in God as in the First Cause," seen
by Him in His essence yet known in all their individuality .44
Chosen for existence by decree of the divine will, even what
are for us future contingent events are known to God with
certainty since He knows them, " not merely as they exist in
their causes, but as each one of them exists actually in itself."
And though contingent things come into actual being successively,
yet God does not known contingent things successively as they
exist with their own existence; which is how we know them; but
God knows them together because His knowledge is measured by
eternity, as is His being; but eternity, all existing together, surrounds all time. . . . Hence all things that exist in time are present
to God from eternity . . . since His gaze is directed from eternity
on all things, as they exist in His presence.45
Temporal events are present in the eternal being of God not
merely objectively as known, projected objects, but physically
as objects really present. To deny this would be to suggest
that God's knowledge changes when things come into created
existence. Creatures are present in eternity insofar as they
are contained in the eternal divine creative action. They exist
in themselves as effects ·passively produced only in time; they
exist in eternity insofar as the ever-actual divine creative
action connotes them as its terms. That is to say, they exist
in the divine essence as actually producing them. 46 Though
present in this fashion in eternity created things are not pas" Loc. cit., aa. 5, 6, 8.
'" Ibid., a. 18.
•• Cf. John of St. Thomas, Cur8U8 tkool., disp. 11, a. S.

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

!U

sively produced until the moment willed by God. In Summa
theol., q. 14, a. 8, St. Thomas puts forward exactly the same
objection as appears in the article on the causality of the resurrection of Christ: obj. 2: Once the cause is placed, the effect
is placed (Posita causa ponitur effectus) therefore, if the eternal
knowledge of God is the cause of things, creatures must exist
from eternity. The same reply is given in both cases; here:
The knowledge of God is the cause of things according as things
exist in His knowledge. But it wa.s not in the knowledge of God
that things should exist from eternity. Consequently, although the
knowledgeof God is eternal, it does not follow that creatures exist
from eternity.
This is developed in St. Thomas' discussion of creation and a
very pertinent distinction is drawn between the action of
creatures and that of God. Particular agents presuppose creation set in motion by God; they act on realities already in
existence and already subject to succession and therefore to
time. God, however, presupposes no subject to His operation;
He creates the thing itself which is subject to motion and to
time: He produces the thing and time. Consequently, time is
the result, not the presupposition, of His action; and He,
remaining unchanged, wills eternally that His effects be passively produced in such order as will best manifest His
omnipotence. 47
Distinguishing, therefore, active creation, identified with the
divine essence, and passive creation, the reality which creatures
have in themselves, we are led to conclude that all things, and
consequently all times and all places, are present eternally to
God in His creative action, but that in themselves, passively
created in the order willed by God, they are subject to sucession and to time. Since it is in the order of passive creation
that one being acts on another as the instrument of God, in
virtue of a passively-created via instrumentalis, it is impossible
that the humanity of Christ be elevated instrumentally two
thousand years ago and that the effect come into being today.
•• Summa theol., I, q. 46, a. 1, ad 6.

COLMAN E. O'NEILL

God is present also to passive creation as author of both
natural and supernatural being; but as far as the creature is
concerned this is a presence measured by time. The presence
of God consists in the immediate contact of the creature with
the active reality of God from which contact the creature draws
its being. It is a presence, therefore, which is conditioned by
the essentially successive nature of created things. So far from
liberating things from time, it places them in time.
(c) Concl't£11ions concerning divine instruments and time.,
We are now in a position to formulate certain conclusions concerning the humanity of Christ as an instrument of the divinity
and its relation, as such, to time.
1. The mysteries of Christ's humanity and all Christians,
present eternally to God in His act of active creation, are
passively created according to the order established by the
divine wisdom; hence " according to the disposition of the
Word of God."
2. The divine power is present to all times and all places,

hence to the mysteries of Christ and all Christians in a twofold fashion. (a) In the eternal act of active creation, in which
all creatures are present to GQd and to one another insofar as
they are identified with the divine essence. In this act of
creation is established that economy of salvation according to
which the mysteries of Christ precede in dignity, and cause,
the participation of men in Christ: ". . . [this] divine power
by its presence· is in touch with all places and times" (Virtus
divina praesentiaiiter attingit omnia loca et tempora). (b) Insofar as the humanity of Christ and all Christians depend
for their passive creation and conservation and operation on
God in their successive existence in time.
8. If God, in His Providence, chooses to elevate and apply
the temporal actions of Christ to the instrumental efficient
causality of supernatural effects, He can do 'SO only by the
creation of an " instrumental power." It being only in the order
of passive creation that there is causal inter-action among

THE MYSTERIES

OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

28

creatures, such ." instrumental power " in producing its effect,
is subject to all the conditions of passive_creation. That is to.
say: it is induced in the. humanity of Christ at a moment in
time, according to the disposition of the Word of God; and,
since it is of its nature actually productive of its effect, a vis
ftuens, it can exist only at the instant in which it is producing
.this effect.
Whereas, therefore, the divine principal agent could overcome limitations of local distance, applying the "instrumental
power" to beings existing at that instant, He could not, while
preserving the causal influence of Christ, overcome ljmitations
of time. Likewise, if supernatural effects are produced at the
present time through the instrumental activity of the humanity
of Christ, this can only be in virtue of an " instrumental power "
imparted to Christ as he exists at this instant, that is, to the
heavenly Christ.
4. Any theory which suggests that the" instrumental power"
imparted to the humanity of Christ two thousand years ago
could be applied to an effect today, in virtue of the fact that
the divine power is present to all places and all times, either
confuses the distinction between active and passive creation,
or fails to recognize that the presence of God to passive creation-in particular to the vis ftuens in Christ and to Christians
today-is temporal, this presence being that precisely which
gives creatures being in time. Giving esse incompletum, intentionale, to the power elevating Christ, God must produce at
once the effect.
(d) Texts of St. Thomas. The problem of the texts of St.
Thomas in which he attributes efficient instrumental causality
to the mysteries of Christ remains. Though we have shown
why we think correct the traditional interpretation of these
texts which refers them to the humanity of the risen Christ in
heaven (in whatever fashion modified so as to ensure the
sacrificial character of the Mass), the explicit reference by St.
Thomas to the efficacy of the mysteries themselves requires an
explanation.

COLMAN E. o'NEILL

As a preliminary, it must be observed that not every time St.
Thomas speaks of the virtus passionis is he referring to efficient
causality. The modus efficiendi of Christ's passion comprises
merit, satisfaction, sacrifice, " redemption," as well as instrumental causality. 48 Consequently, phrases like: "The passion
has, not a temporal or transient, but an eternal power," 49
refer primarily to the truth of faith that Christ has merited
our eternal salvation, as is emphasized by St. Thomas himself
when he notes that he is referring to explicit revelation in the
Scriptures. 50 Interpretation of such texts in terms of the specifically Thomistic theory of instrumental efficacy must be subordinated to the problem of theological, that is, metaphysical,
possibility. Further, the fact that moral and physical causality
are simultaneously attributed to the "power" (virtus) of the
passion does not necessarily mean that the Christian is subject
to each form of causality in the same way.51 Platitudinous as
this observation is, it is made necessary by the inconsiderate
use of St. Thomas' text found in some recent authors.
The issue in regard to St. Thomas' teaching on the instrumental efficacy of the mysteries is not, perhaps, quite so clearcut as discussions which center on Ill, q. 56, a.l, ad 8 sometimes
make it appear. In this article, it is true, St. Thomas attributes
to the resurrection of Christ efficient causality in respect of the
general bodily resurrection of both just and sinners.52 In the
following article he recognizes a like causality of Christ's resurrection in respect of justification. Justification he has already
attributed to the instrumental efficacy of all the actions and
suffering of Christ/ 8 to the passion in particular, 5 ' to the death
in facto esse,55 to the passion and resurrection together/ 6 and
'"Ibid., q. 52, a. 8; cf. ibid., q. 22, a. 5, ad 2.
•• Cf. Summa tkeol., Ill, q. 48, prol.
•• E. g., Heb., 10.14, loc. cit. in n. 49.
61 Cf. ibid., q. 8, a. 1, ad 1; q. 22, a. S; ibid., ad 1; q. 52, a. 1, ad 2; q. 62, a. 5.
Cf. ibid., q. 48, a. 2, ad S; q. 22, a. 5, ad 2; q. 49, a. 1, ad 4; q. 66, a. 9, ad I.
•• Cf. also IV Sent., d. 48, q. 1, a. 2, q1a. 1, ad S; Summa tkeol., lll, q. 54, a. 2;
q. 56, a. 1, ad 2.
•• Summa tkeol., ill, q. 48, a. 6; q. 56, a. 1, ads.
•• Ibid., q. 48, a. 6.
•• Ibid., q. 50, a. 6.
•• Ibid., q. 56, a. 2, ad 4.

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

25

to the ascension.57 Likewise, bodily resurrection is attributed,
not only to Christ's resurrection, but. also to death in facto
ease 58 and to death and resurrection together. 59 It is, in fact,
only in terms of the eXemplary causality of the mysteries that
St. Thomas makes any true distinction between effects: passion
and
are exemplary causes of the remission of sins,60 the
resurrection is the exemplary cause of gra<!e by which our souls
rise in conformity with Ohriatus reaurgena,61 the death is that
of the destruction of bodily death, 62 the resurrection that of the
restoration of bodily life at the parousia. 68 For St. Thomas,.
following St. Augustine, De Trinitate, IV, cap. 8, the death
and resurrection of Christ are in a two-fold fashion the exemplary causes of our restoration: causa exemplaria aacramenfuliter of our interior or spiritual death and resurrection, causa
exemplaria simpliciter of our exterior or bodily triumph over
death. 64
It would be difficult to coordinate all these texts of St.
Thomas if he did not indicate himself the central notion which .
gives unity to his thought. He takes the trouble to define for
us exactly what he means by the terms " resurrectio Christi "
and " Christus resurgens," indicating, moreover, the scriptural
background to his whole concept of the mysteries. Q. 56 is a
corollary of q. 58, a. 8, where St. Thomas asks whether Christ
is the first to rise. "Resurrection," he answers (the words
should be noted well) , " is restoration from death to
Perfect resurrection, he goes on, is when " a person is liberated,
not only from death but also from the necessity and, what is
•• Ibid., q. 57, a. 6, ad 1.
•• Ibid., q. 50, a. 6.
•• Ibid., q. 56, a. 1, ad 4.
60 Ibid., q. 56, a.
ad 4.
61 Ibid., q. 56, a.
ad 4; corp.
60 Ibid., q. 56, a. 1, ad 4.
68 Ibid., q. 54, a.
q. 56, a. 1, ad 8; q. 56, a. 1, ad 4.
6 ' Cf. Comp. tkeol., c.
(Marietti, n. 514); Summa tkeol., ill, q.
a. 5, ad 1 ..
Sacramentaliter means "figuratively," indicating the analogical characters of the
similarity between the historical resurrection of Christ and the spiritua.J.
of the Christian.

26

COLMAN E. o'NEILL

even more, the possibility, of dying." Considering, then, perfect
resurrection, Christ is the first of those who rise for "he by
his resurrection came first to life which is completely immortal;
according to Rom., 6. 9: " Christ having risen from the dead
dies no more " (Ohristua resurgena ex mortuis iq,m non moritur).
It is the Pauline Ohristus resurgens which is the key to St.
Thomas' thought.
There is, in St. Thomas' teaching on the causality of the
mysteries of Christ, the confluence of two principal currents of
thought: St. Paul's Christ-mysticism, as expressed chiefly in
Rom., 6 and I Cor., 15, and the Aristotelian metaphysical
principle: That which is first in any genus is the cause of those
which succeed it. Add to this the influence of St. Augustine's
explanation of conformation to Christ's Pasch, the pseudoDenis' concept of a hierarchy of causes and St. John' Damascene's notion of the humanity of Christ as the instrument of
his divinity, and q. 56 is seen to be a perfect model of Scholastic
theology where philosophical reasoning is used in the light of
Tradition to give logical coherence to revealed truth. In order
to discover something of the perfection of St. Thomas' solution
we shall examine briefly the scriptural sources of his ideas and
the theological interpretation he places on them.
(i) The Pauline Ohristus resurgens. St. Paul presents the
resurrection of Christ under a two-fold aspect: as the initiation
of the eschatological era, · establishing Christ as judge and
investing him with the glory in which he will appear at the
parousia (I Thess., 1.10; 4.14; I Cor., 15); and as the source
of our spiritual life in so far as the Risen Christ communicates
to us already the life-giving Spirit, as an anticipation of our
final resurrection to immortal life (Rom .., 1. 4, 6). The connection between the two aspects lies in the notion of the Risen
Christ as the Lord, the exalted " quickening spirit," Ohristos
pneumatikos (I Cor., 15. 45; Rom., 1. 4) . In the work of redemption St. Paul does not separate the passion and the
resurrection; they form one mystery, the Pasch of Christ, constituted by two parts, one temporal, the other definitive, each

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

27

of them necessary for salvation. The sacrifice of Christ, if it
is to redeem us from our sins, must be accepted by the Father.
The testimony of its acceptance is the resurrection which is,
therefo-re,the sign that Christ has conquered death, the penalty
for sin, and in conquering death has also conquered sin.65 The
Risen Christ is the "first-fruits of them that sleep," not merely
as a God-given pledge of fullness of life; but because he is now
the source of all life, his resurrection is the principle of all
resurrections, first of men's souls but finally of the whole man
raised up to the life of glory. There is an inner causal connec-'
tion between his resurrection and others; for, just as all men
contract sin from Adam by reason of their descent from him,
so, and by a like natural necessity, all those who are members
of Christ in his Second Coming (I Cor., 15. 28; Gk. text) shall
be raised by him to eternal life, conformed to the body of his
glory (ibid., v. 49; Phil., 8. 21). At this moment the resurrection of Christ will have assumed its full proportions, Christ will
have definitively destroyed the enemy, death, which represents
the victory of Satan and sin. Meanwhile, the Risen Christ
reigns as Head of the Church (I Cor., 15. 25), the principle of
spiritual resurrection. " We are buried together with him by
baptism into death, that as Christ is risen from the dead by
the glory of the Father, so we also may walk in newness of
life"
6. 4). The emphasis is on moral regeneration
achieved by symbolic association with the death of Christ.
In this interior, preliminary resurrection we are also conformed
to the Risen Christ and so, by moral effort, must live together
with him, " knowing that Christ rising again from the dead,
dieth now no more, death shall have no more dominion over
him" (Rom., 6. 9) . And we who are members of the Christua
resurgens must live as those who are " dead to sin but alive to
God in Christ Jesus our Lord " (ibid., v. 11) .
•• Cf. P. F. Ceuppens, 0. P., Quautiones aelectae ea; epistulia S. Pauli, Rome,
1951, p. 117; L. Cerfaux, Le Ch'l'iat dana la theologie deS. Paul, Lectio divina n. 6,
PariS, 1954 (fl ed.), pp. 57 f.; C. Spicq, 0. P., L'Epitre aw: Hebrew:, vol. 1, Paris,
195fl (!! ed.), pp. 811-816: The whole argument of Heb. rests on the analogy between
the Levitical rite of Expiations and the sacrifices of Christ, the point of comparison
being the entry through the veil into the Holy of Holies. Cf. Hb., 9; 5.9, 6.!!0, 7.26.

COLMAN E. o'NEILL

It is this figure of Christus resurgens of St. Paul, already in
mid-thirteenth century solemnly celebrated by a post-vespers
procession in the Dominican Easter liturgy, who holds the contemplation of St. Thomas as he writes on the mysteries of
Christ. 66 Whether or not he averted to the fact that the Vulgate
mistranslates the Greek, Christos egertheirs, Christus suscitatus
ex mOTtuis,it is useless to speculate. In any event, his definition
of the resurrection of Christ as pervenire ad vitam penitus
immortalem and his development of the life-giving power of
the resurrection clearly indicate that for him it is Christos
Kyrios of St. Paul, rising indeed from the grave on a day in
history but seen as the Head of the Mystical Body, entering
first into glory, invested with the power of the Spirit now that
he has ascended to his Father, so that he can give life, and
thus containing already in himself the glory of the eschatological triumph, it is this risen, heavenly Christ who raises both
the sinful soul and the corrupted body to share in his glory.
The historical fact assumes a secondary importance in this
view of the resurrection as a stage in the participation of Life:
The resurrecton of Christ transcended common knowledge both
in respect of its terminus a quo, according to which the soul came
back from hell and the body emerged from the closed tomb, and in
respect of .its terminus ad quem, according to which he obtained
the life of glory.67
The mystery of the Christus resurgens was something " above
men"' because
Christus resurgens did not come back to a life commonly known
to all, but to a kind of life which was immortal and conformed to
God: in accordance with Rom. 6.10: " in that he liveth, he liveth
unto God." And therefore the resurrection itself of Christ ought
not to have been witnessed immediately by men, but to have been
announced to them by angels.68
•• Cf. Summa tkeol., III, q. 54, a. 2; ibid., q. 56, a. 2.
•• Ibid., q. 55, a. 2, ad 2.
•• Ibid., corp.

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

29

The same theme recurs again and again in Summa theol., q. 58q. 59, providing the true commentary on q. 56, a. 1, ad 8, and
indicating the obvious sense of the phrase in that reply: ". . .
Christ's humanity, according to which He rose again, is as it
were the instrument of his godhead" (humardtas Christi

secundum quam resurrexit est quodammodo instromentum
divirdtatis ipsius). If there is any doubt remaining as to St.
Thomas' meaning, it must be removed by his own commentary
on I Thess., 4. 14, 15, the description of the parousia. He first
refers to I Cor., 15 and develops the causality of Christ's
resurrection as he does in the Tertia Pars:
The resurrection of Christ is the [efficientinstrumental] cause of
our resurrection, not in so far as it belongs to a body, but in so far
as it is the resurrection of a body united to the Word of life.69
He himself goes on to offer the usual objection: the resurrection
of Christ is now past; why, then, has its effect not taken place?
The reply is also the usual one: God acts according to His
wisdom; therefore, our resurrection will take place when He
wills it. But, continuing the commentary on the text, St.
Thomas explains the precise· manner in which Christ's resurrection is the cause of ours. It is' when Christ returns at the
day of judgment that he will raise the dead:
... he shows that at the presence of Christ all the dead will rise.
Now a three-fold cause concurs in the common resurrection. The
first, the principal cause, namely, the power of the divinity; the
second, instrumental, namely, the power of the humanity of Christ;
the third, as it were ministerial, namely the power of the angels
who will have some effect in the resurrection [... ]
These three causes, therefore, he places: firstly, the glorious
humanity of Christ, saying: "for the Lord himself, etc." Acts 1.11:
"As you have seen him going into heaven, so shall he come." 10
Considering, further, that for·St. Paul the passion, death and
resurrection form the single mystery of the Pasch of Christ,
considering, in addition, the impossibility of supra-temporal
•• Com'TM'nt.m I Thesa., c. 4, lect. 2 (Marietti, n. 95).
•• Ibid., nn. 98, 99.

80

COLMAN E. o'NEILL

instrumental application of past events, it is reasonable, or
rather necessary, to conclude that St. Thomas attributes instrumental efficient causality to these mysteries in so far as they
pertain to the Christus resurgens. The resurrection of Christ
implies the passage through death to life; 71 that is why St.
Thomas can attribute the same effect to various stages of the
one complex mystery. He himself indicates, clearly enough,
why he splits up the mystery in this way. It is because each
event in the mystery presents its own exemplary significance
for the spiritual and bodily life of man.
(ii) St. Thomas' theological interpretation of Scripture.
The principle which controls St. Thomas' systematization of
St. Paul is that which he attributes to Aristotle: The first in
any genus is the cause of those that come after. He applies it
both to God and to the humanity of Christ, developing it first
in terms of efficient causality, then, as a corollary, in terms
of exemplary causality.
He denominates variously the first cause of our resurrection,
whether of soul or body: the resurrection of Christ, 72 the Word
of God,73 the justice of God/ 4 divine power/ 5 the substance of
God/ 6 the glory of the body of Christ. 77 These may be reduced
to two: the divinity and Christus resurgens; God is the source
of all life, principium humanae vivijicationis, 77 and the resurrection of Christ is the first in the genus of resurrection since
Christ is the first to have passed through death to a life which
is wholly immortal. Christus resurgens is, in fact, a secondary
principle, subordinated to the Verbum' vitae since to his body,
hypostaticallyunited to the Word, was first given immortality. 78
According to efficient causality, God (the Word by appro71 Cf. Comment. in Joann., c. 5, lect. 4: (of the Christian) "De hac vita transiet
in vitam, id est per mortem corporis reparabitur in vitam aeternam."
per
(Marietti, n. 777) .
•• Summa theol., q. 56, a. 1.
•• Ibid., q. 56, ad !.
•• Ibid.
•• Ibid.
77 Ibid.
•• Ibid., ad !.
18 Ibid., q. 56, a. 1.-ln terms of I, q. 108, a. 5, resurrection may be attributed to
the Word per exceaaum, to the humanity of Christ per proprietatem, to men per
participa.tionem.

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

81

priation) in whom are identified life, justice, wisdom and goodness, raises first to immortal life the body of Christ, thus
permitting the glory of Christ's soul to glorify his body, and
establishing him in his humanity as the judge, and as the
instrumental cause of the final resurrection, of all mankind,
a " quickening spirit." It is by the same decree 79 that the
divine wisdom provides for the resurrection of Christ and for
that of all men, a decree which takes effect " according to the
disposition of the Word of God," 80 elevating, at the parousia,
the humanity of Christ in which he died and was raised up
(mors et resurrectio) so that Christ, the Judge, may bring
before him the bodily presence of all mankind. Souls and
bodies thus reunited, the souls of the just, by reason of their
glory, spiritualize their bodies (cf. I Cor., 15, 44), while the
souls of the damned associate their bodies in their suffering ..
The consequences of this action of the Word of Life, through
the humanity of Christ, is that the bodies of the elect are
conformed to the glory of the body of Christ, and thus to his
Pasch. This is the sense of St. Thomas' exemplary causality
"which, indeed, is necessary, not on the part of Him who
raises, who has no need of an exemplary cause; but on the part
of those who are raised whom He must conform to that resurrection, according to Phil., 8. !ll." 81 The elect are in this fashion
perfectly and definitively conformed, not only to the resurrection of Christ, but also to his passion and death, since they,
too, have finally overcome the enemy and have won eternal
life: causalitas exemplaris simpliciter.
It is in function of this final resurrection that the Risen
Christ, reigning in heaven, is used as the divine instrument in
· the course of time to raise the souls of men from the death of
sin to the life of grace and glory, giving them faith and charity
and the helps necessary that they may walk, by moral effort,
in newness of life. In working in us this first stage of final
10
80

Summa theol., III, q. 24, a. 8; ibid., a. 4.
81 Ibid., q. 56, a. 1, ad 8. .
Ibid., q. 56, a. 1, ad 1.

COLMAN E. o'NEILL

resurrection, and in restoring us to life when we have fallen
again into the death of sin, the incarnate Word makes use also
of the sacraments, word making matter life-giving, as extensions
of his glorified humanity, subordinated in their tum to the
elevating instrumental action of God. The grace produced in
us by this divine action is a participation in the divine nature
itself and in the Sonship of Christ; it is not yet able to work
in us a participation in the glorified body of Christ. 82
The justification thus wrought in our souls and the moral
effort it implies produce in us a likeness w the Pasch of Christ;
but here exemplar causality is transposed from the historical
plane: the mysteries of Christ's death and life
figures of the
progress of our interior life: causalitas exemplaris sacramentalis.
The terminus a quo and ad quem of justification conform us
spiritually to the passion and death and to the bodily resurrection of Christ, 88 and the life of grace imposes on us a regenerated
moral life in imitation of the Risen Christ who " liveth unto
God." 84
It is the figure of Christus resurgens who " dieth now no
more " which dominates this whole scheme of complete rebirth.
It is the glorious humanity of Christ, triumphant in the_eternal
consummation of his Pasch, that is used by the Word of Life
as the instrument of life,85 so that men may be led in their
own lives through the successive stages, mystical and physical,
of their own paschs, so that they may be conformed to Christ
in his humanity and his divinity. Beyond the glorified Christ
is the true center of theological thought, the unchanging Trinity
with its single decree of giving life, the knowledge of Itself, in
the temporal order established by divine Wisdom, to Christ
and in Christ to his members.

are

•• Ibid., q. 56, a. !!, !!.d I; q. !!4, a. 8.
•• Ibid., q. 56, a. !!, ad 4.
"'Ibid., q. 56, a. 2.
•• Cf. ibid., q. 72, a. I, ad I: of confirmation: " ... in hoc sacramento datur
plenitudo Spiritus sancti, quae non erat danda ante Christi resurrectionem et ascensionem, secundum illud loan. 7.89..•. "

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

88

It appears, then, both from a· study of the theology of instrumental cause and from the Pauline background to St. Thomas'
teaching on the mysteries, that the traditional attribution of
instrumental efficacy to the heavenly Christ is correct. A final
possible difficulty remains, in the form of a " common-sense"
objection to all that has so far been said. Why, if he understood the resurrection as the definitive state of the glorified
Christ rather than a merely passing historical event, did St.
Thomas attribute efficient instrumental causality to the individual stages of Christ's Pasch, to the passion, death, descent
into hell, as well as to the resurrection? Since the new theory
is based on what is claimed to be the obvious meaning of the
text-though, we hope we have shown, isolated from its context-the immediate reply required is a simple gloss which can
be written over the line each time St. Thomas speaks of the
efficient causality of an historical mystery.
Before suggesting such a gloss, we make two observations.
Firstly, as we have already seen, St. Thomas, in some texts,
associates the separate moments of Christ's passage to fulness
of life in a common instrumental efficacy; and this suggests
sufficiently that he understands present effects to be produced
by the humanity of Christ as it exists at the present moment.
Secondly,
humanity of Christ was, throughout his life and
during the days of death, at all times actively an instrument
of the divinity. If for no other reason this is clear from the
common teaching that Our Lady progressed continuously in
grace; and a very significant meaning can be attached to the
instrumental causality in respect of our salvation exercised on
her by her Son as he hung on the cross and as he lay dead
in her arms. Finally, the gloss we suggest is based on St.
Thomas' specific teaching on instruments used by God in our
salvation. By an analogy with the sacraments we can obtain
a very satisfactory explanation of St. Thomas' mode of expression concerning the mysteries.
The sacraments gain their vis spi:ritualis,in virtue of which
they cause grace, from two sources: from the blessing of Christ

84

COLMAN E. O'NEILL

and from use by the minister. 88 The blessing of Christ is
explained as the institution of the sacrament by which Christ
gave it _power.87 The sacraments used by Christ when he was
instituting them require no blessing from the Church; from
Christ's use" they have received aptitude for the perfection of
the sacrament." 88 But from whatever source it derives, the
blessing is necessary if the matter is to be used as the instrumental cause of grace:
For just as an instrument acquires its instrumental power (virtutem instrumentalem) in two ways, namely, when it receives the
form of instrument and when it is moved by the principal agent,
so also the matter of a sacrament requires a two-fold sanctification,
by one of which it becomes the proper matter of the sacrament,
while by the other it is applied to the effect.89
Thus the aptitude for producing its effect, which the sacraments
gain through use by Christ or the blessing of the Church, may
be called in a broad sense virtus instrumentalis; the waters
of the world possess the spiritual power of baptism. 90
Applying the analogy to Christ, an important modification
must be made. The humanity .of Christ was already consecrated as an instrument of God by the Incarnation itself.
Nevertheless, the actions and sufferings of Christ in his body,
in particular his death and entry into eternal life, make his
humanity an apt instrument to raise men from the death of
sin to the life of glory. An Incarnation of the Word in which
He would not suffer and die according to His humanity is quite
conceivable; but; in the present dispensation, in which God
became man to redeem us, it is necessary that Christ " should
have suffered these things, and so to enter into his glory ";
Ibid., q. 61!, a. 4, ad S.
Ibid., q. 64, a. S; q. 66, a. !!.
88 Ibid., q. 71!, a. S; Suppl., q. 29, a. 5.
80 Ibid., m, q. 71!, a. s, ad 2.
•• Ibid., q. so,. a. 1. q. 78, a. 5: the historical action of Christ when he pronounced
the words of consecration is made parallel to his sanctifying the waters of the world
at his baptism. In each case the historical action gives to the sacramental element
" form of instrument "; it does not apply it to its effect.
86

87

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

85

necessary, not merely insofar as the passion is the meritorius
and satisfactory cause of our salvation, hut also that the Risen
Christ may instrumentally bring life from death. A comparable
case of a new aptitude for his mission being given to Christ
is that of his own baptism. Though he was " full of truth " he
went through this ceremony " as from that moment beginning
to teach and preach." 91 The Spirit descended on him in the
form of a dove and a voice from heaven proclaimed him as the
prophet of God. This was ad utilitatem Ecclesiae, a visible sign
of the inYisible mission of the Spirit to Christ, " made to him,
not at that moment, but in the beginning of his conception." 92
It is also ad utilitatem Ecclesiae that the humanity of Christ
should be consecrated anew by the historical mysteries of his
Pasch so that, in heaven, he should be constituted instrumentum efficaa; ad reiJ'UliCitandoshomines in vitam atemam. 98
In this sense the historical mysteries in their temporal reality'
were efficacious of our salvation.
So we return to the great commentators of St. Thomas. They
enshrine a tradition of interpretation which is the fruit of ·
centuries of reflection on the text of the Angelic Doctor. The
scientific demands of theology, even if respect for tradition
means nothing, require at least that serious reasons be proposed for rejecting the common opinion of the Thomistic
commentators.

IV. The sacramental "presence" of Christ's mysteries.
An illuminating passage as regards St. Thomas' thought on
the presence of Christ in the sacraments is in De Veritate, q. iJ,7,
a. 4. God uses the humanity of Christ as His instrument to
produce in us the grace won for us by the blood of Christ; and
this instrument is applied to us through faith and the sacraments. The degree in which this humanity of Christ is contained in the sacraments is the measure of their perfection:
Ibid., a. 8.
•• Ibid., I, q. 48, a. 7, ad 6.
•• Catejan, Comment. in III; q. 66, a. 1, n. ll.

81

86

COLMAN E. o'NEILL

Wherefore that is the most perfect sacrament in which the body
of Christ is really contained, namely, the Eucharist, and it is consummative of all the others ... [Denis]. But the other sacraments
participate something of that power by which the humanity of
Christ operates instrumentally in [ad] justification.
The suggestion is clear enough: the glorified body· of Christ
is contained in the supreme sacrament; only the power elevating
and applying the same heavenly Christ is contained in the
other sacraments. It does not seem to have occurred to St.
Thomas to designate as " presence " this instrumental application of Christ's native action through the sacraments. His
concern is to establish the nature of the connection between
the sacraments and the mysteries of Christ. Our principal
purpose here is to attempt to follow his thought. In order, by
way of corollary, to express our conclusions in terms of" presence " some working definition of the term is required. St.
Thomas notes two forms of presence:
Whatever is in place or in any thing, in some manner comes into
contact [contingit] with it: for a corporeal things is in something
as in place according to contact of extended quantity; while an
incorporeal thing is said to be in something according to contact
of power.94
Presence by action, per contactum virtutis, is attributed by the
writers we have discussed to the humanity of Christ when it
is used instrumentally by God to act on a substance not in
quantitative contact with it. Whether this is a legitimate
application of a notion proper to the action of spiritual agents,
might well be questioned. St. Thomas points out that it is
the whole humanity of Christ, body and soul, which has an
influence on man. 95 He also points out that the place in which
Christ's humanity is after the ascension is heaven; 96 that he has
removed from us his bodily presence and is present to the
faithful in his divinity. 97 Christ is in heaven in propria specie,
on our altars sub specie sacramenti. 98 Divinely-applied action
•• Contra Gentu, ill, c. 68, Item.
•• Summa thool., m, q. 8, a. !!.
•• Ibid., q. 57, a. I.

•• Ibid., ad 3 .
08 Ibid., q. 76, a. 5, ad I.

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

37

of corporeal realities certainly gives presence of action in the
patient; but action in the patient is precisely passion, an
accident of the patient. It will be understood, therefore, that
when we speak about a presence of Christ secundum actionem
(in sacraments other than the Eucharist) we are accepting for
the sake of convenience a proposed terminology, and are quite
prepared, and even inclined, to deny that it is any true presence
of Christ at all.99 Knowledge, it is to be noted finally, in general
does not procure real, but only intentional, presence since, its
term being immanent, it does not come into contact with the
reality of the object/ 00 The Eucharist is clearly a special case
and must be considered separately. It will not be necessary,
then, to point out each time that it provides an exception to
what is said about the other sacraments.
(a) Sacraments other than the Eucharist. Insofar as sacramental grace cleanses us from sin and prepares our souls
for Christian worship, the sacraments draw their power, virtus,
from the passion, the power, virtus, of which is connected to
us when we receive the sacraments. 101 What must be investigated is the nature of this connection. We have already seen
that the virtus efficiens of the passion, applying the merit and
satisfaction of Christ, is " connected " to us by the elevation of
the glorious Christus resurgens ex mortuis. Significantly, however, St. Thomas is not content with this simple explanation.
He is aware of the broader horizons of the economy of salvation
and inserts his notion of instrumental causality into the context
of Christian faith. He places the objection to instrumental
efficacy of the passion that
contact between instrument and effect would be necessary for such causality and is
•• Pius XII, Mediator Dei, indicating the teaching of the Doctors of the Church
on the "presence and operation " of Christ's mysteries, speaks of "models of virtue,"
"sources of divine grace " by reason of the merits and intercession of the Redeemer.
The mysteries live on "in their effects in us." There is no question here of the
presence of the mysteries themslves.
10 ° Cf. H. Stirnimann,
0. P., "Zum Begriffe der Gegenwart," Div. Thom. Fr., !l9
(1951)' pp. 7!l, 78.
101 Summa theol., lli, q. 6!l, a. 5.

88

coLMAN- E. o'NEILL

impossible in the case.102 In his reply he states that two factors
achieve the necessary contact, one on the side of Christ, the
other o_n the side of the Christian:
'
The passion of Christ, although it is bodily, yet has spiritual
power from the united divinity.
W have explained why this refers to the heavenly Christ. On
the part of man:
And therefore it obtains efficacy through spiritual contact:
namely, through faith and the sacraments of faith.
It is by faith in Christ that we are saved and this plays a part
in establishing contact with Christ, the instrument of God,
even in the sacraments. Sacramenta fidei is one of St. Thomas'
favorite phrases/ 08 the idea expressed being in direct dependence on the first principle of sacramental theology: that a
sacrament is signum rei sacrae inquantum est sanctificans
homines, which he develops with such care in Ill, qq. 60 and
61, and which he applies throughout the remainder of the
Summa. As signs of sacred realities, the sacraments must be
signs of faith; if they are also causes of grace, subordinated
to the humanity of Christ, this· must be regarded as a wholly
gratuitous gift of God, a bounty granted to the Church, a new
dimension given to the liturgical actions of the Christian community, which does not, however, destroy their basic nature as
signs of faith. So important is faith that it cannot be dispensed
with even in the case of infant baptism; but the child, " hom
in the womb of the Church" draWjs upon the life-blood of the
Church which is faith. 104 The faith required is not that of the
minister 105 or the recipient/ 06 but fides Ecclesiae.107 The essenIbid., q. 48, a. 6, obj. 1 and reply.
Cf. ibid., q. 60, a. 6; a. 8; q. 61, a. S; q.
a. 6; q. 68, a. 4, ad S; q. 64, a. S;
a. 9, ad 1; q. 66, a. 1, ad 1; a. S; a. 6; q. 68, a. 1, ad 1; a. 4, ad S; a. 9, ad 1; a. I!;
q. 69, a. 6, ad S; a. 9; q. 70, a. 1; etc., etc.
10 • Ibid., q. 68, a. 9, ad 1; ad.
a. U; q. 69, a. 6, ad S; q. 71, a. 1, ad S.
105 Ibid., q. 64, a. 9, ad 1; q. 68, a. 8.
108 Ibid., q. 68, a. 8.
107 Ibid., q. 64, a. 9, al 1; q. 68, a. 9, ad 1; ad
a. I!; q. 69, a. 6, ad S; q. 71, a. 1,
ad S; a. S, ad S.
101

108

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

89

tial function of faith is expressed very strikingly and explained
in the Sentences:
.
The principal and per se agent in justification is God as efficient
cause, and the passion of Christ as meritorious cause. Now to this
cause the sacrament is connected through the faith of the Church
which relates the instrument to the principal cause and the sign
to what is signified.108
Hence St. Thomas can say that the power of the sacraments
is principally from faith--praecipue
fide-in the passion and
in the resurrection of Christ. 109 The influi:mceof St. Augustine's
commentary on St. John's Gospel, tr. 80, 8, so often quoted by
St. Thomas, is very clear here:
Whence is this great power of the water that it should touch the
body and cleanse the heart unless it is the effect of the word, not
because it is pronounced, but because it is believed.110
For St. Augustine and St. Thomas faith is clearly prior to
sacraments. A precise notion of the essential part played by
the faith of the Church...,.-that is, of the believers who at any
given moment live in the Church-in the sacraments is necessary in order to establish the relation of the sacraments to
Christ. 111
Christ, when he instituted the sacraments as means of ap- ·
plying the fruits of his passion, established the relation of
signification between certain actions and the giving of grace.
The signatum is that all-embracing decree of God to bring
individuals to glory through the merits of Christ and through
the instrumentality of Christ's humanity and of the sacraments
themselves. Now, this act of institution is, of its nature, abIV Stmt., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. S.
Swmnna theol., q.
a. 5, ad ad S.
110 St. Augustine, CO'I1IIfTI,ent m Ioann., tr. 80, S.
Continues: "Hoc verbum fidei
tantum valet m eccluia Dei, •.• " (CCL 85,
.) .
111 I have already discussed this in The Thomist,
(1958), pp. !!74-!!76._Here
I correct some faulty expressions I used there.
108

100

40

COLMAN E. O'NEILL

stract or general. Each individual sacrament administered by
the Church to an individual recipient must be related to the
signatum (and consequently, though this is not directly in the
power of the Church, to the cause of justification). Christ's
act of institution cannot do this. Only the Church whose action
it is can make it a significant action, can relate it, that is, to
the signatum. This is where the faith of the Church is essential.
The immediate object of this faith is Christ as instituting the
sacrament; Christ said: " Do this and grace will be given."
The Church responds by faith and performs the action prescribed by Christ. ImpliCit in the faith which the Church thus
expresses externally in her ritual is acceptance of the whole
reve1ation of Christ, including the signification which he attributed to the sacrament. 112 Each sacramental action of the
Church, consequently, is, mediante fide Eoolesiae et mediante
institutione a Christo, a sign, of its nature efficacious, of the
divine will to give grace to the individual recipient and, in the
sacraments which bestow a character, to give him some functi'on in the visible life of the Church.
Basically, therefore, the sacraments are intentional, belong
to the mind of the Church, of Christians illumined by faith.
As significant they are based on knowledge which reaches into
the past, into the future and into eternity, giving intentional
" presence ,; to its objects. Though it can be said in general
that the sacraments signify the economy of salvation as applied
to an individual recipient-and consequently signify the eternal
divine decree, the historical redemptive acts, the efficacy of
the sacraments themselves, grace in its institutional or legal
context of the Church, and glory as the future consummationto gain a more precise idea of the signification and value of
an individual sacrament (the only kind that exists) the common
Thomistic distinction must be made between the antecedent
and consequent salvifi.c will of God. What the will of God is,
11 " Revelations may make clear to the Church the signification of the sacraments;
but this is not essential to the making of the sacraments. The Church does with
faith what Christ instructed her to do.

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

41

in respect of this individual recipient, finally determines the
signification of the sacrament administered to him on any
particular occasion. Christ, hanging on the cross, designated
in detail in his human mind, in accordance with his Father's
will, the grace, whether efficacious or suffibient, to be given to
each human person as preparation for receiving the sacraments,113 and further designated the grace to be given to each
of his members in each individual sacrament to be administered
by the Church. This same act of designation, as it remains in
the mind of the heavenly Christ, is an element of the native
action of Christ according to which the sacred humanity is
elevated and applied by God in the execution of His eternal
will.
It follows that, by the nature of the case, the Church does
not knmv the exact significance of the individual sacrament
which she administers. At most she can know with
that the sacrament signifies the antecedent will of God to save
this recipient through the merits of Christ and the Church.
It may be that the consequent will of God accords this individual at this moment only the res et sacramentum; it may be
that it accords him also grace; or the malice of the recipient
may prevent all effect.
We have now the elements with which to establish the mode
of Christ's presence in the sacraments other than the Eucharist.
There is a certain presence common to all sacraments; but to
go beyond this it is necessary to distinguish invalid, valid and
fruitful administration. Common to all the sacraments· is the
expression of the faith of the Church in the divinely-established
economy of salvation as revealed by Christ and, in particular,
in the institution of the sacraments. This presupposes in the
members of the Church conformation to the mysteries of Christ,
according to an exemplary, sacramental causality. They have
risen with Christ in soul and express this externally in favour
of the recipient. Here already is a presence of the effect of the
mysteries; a presence of the mysteries themselves according to
118

Cf. Swmma theol., ill, q. 69, a. 9, ad 2.

42

COLMAN E. o'NEILL

analogy: analogy of attribution (effect denominated by the
term proper to its cause) and analogy of strict proportionality.
The symbolic expression of this conformation to Christ achieves
an intentional " presence " of the mysteries of Christ, as objects
known. In the case of baptism revelation has· made explicit
the reference of the act of faith to the passion and resurrection
of Christ which is given symbolic representation in the ceremony precisely in so far as it is communicable to an individual.
The act of faith attains the Pasch of Christ in all its historical
actuality, either.as in the future 1 u. or in the past. 116 There are
special reasons why baptism, and not the other sacraments
excepting the Eucharist, signifies the passion and resurrection
in this explicit fashion. It is the sacrament of justification, by
which we die to the sin of nature and rise to a new life, the life
of the Christian. There can be only one such regeneration; we
cannot return to the womb of the Church; Christ died once,
nor can we crucify him again to ourselves.116 No penance is
imposed on the recipient of baptism because he has been "incorporated into the death itself of Christ," for to do so would be
" an injury to Christ's passion and death." 111 The unique
relation of baptism to the death of Christ is referred to again
. and again by St. Thomas with recurring references to Rom.,
6 118 and is always explained in term.S of the regeneration of
man achieved in this sacrament. In the Eucharist also the
death of Christ is
but whereas " baptism is
given to a man as one dying wtih Christ, the Eucharist is for
in it Christus passus
nourishing and perfecting " in so far
119
is shown to us as our paschal meal.
The other sacraments
offer no such explicit symbolism of the passion and death.
This is precisely because, with the exception of penance, they

as

1

u Ibid., q. 66, a. !!, ad 1.

"Ibid., q. 61, a. 4.
Ibid., q. 66, a. 9. ref. to St. Augustine on Jn., 8.4; to Rom., 6.8 and 10, Heb., 6.6.
117 Ibid., q. 68, a. 5.
118 Ibid., q. 69, aa. 1, !!. 8; etc.
110 Ibid., q. 66, a. 9, ad 5, and q. 79, a. 5, ad 1; cf. q. 79, a. 8, ad !!; q. 78, a. 8,
11

118

ad IJ.

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

48

are sacraments of the living, of those who have already risen
with Christ: confirmation gives the fulness of the Holy Spirit,
extreme unction perfects· spiritual health; 120 matrimony and
orders are directed towards the perfection of the Mystical Body.
Penance, finally, does not fit into the normal scheme of resurrection and life; it is per accidens, ex B'lllppolfitione peccati; a
second raft for the ship-wrecked.121 Though its efficacy is from
the passion and resurrection of Christ, it does not signify these
explicitly, does not regenerate us. It is de iure naturali that
man should repent of his sins and that he should show some
sign of sorrow. This natural impulse has simply been given
determination by the inst{itution of a sacrament. 122 Only in
baptism, therefore, and the Eucharist does the Church construct a symbol of the passion and thereby give explicit expression to her faith in this mystery, to its intentional presence in
the mind of Christians. The symbolism of the other sacraments
refers explicitly to the perfection or restoration of regenerated
man.
This common intentional presence of the historical acts of
Christ, under whatever modality, is proper t9 the sacraments
of the Church and abstracts from the efficacy of the
as
sacraments, being achieved even in invalid administration. To
determine whether the efficacy procures any further, and more
real, presence, the various grades of efficacy must be examined
separately.
A valid but unfruitful sacrament presupposes the normal
configuration of the Church to Christ and ·achieves the basic
intentional presence of the mysteries. To the ceremony is added
signification of the recipient's intention as well as signification
and specification of the action of Christ, instrumentally producing such effect as is possible,namely, the res et saeramentum.
There is here a real presence of the action of Christ and, in this
remote sense, of Christ himself according as he exists at the
Ibid., q. 84, a. 1, ad 1; q. 7!!, a. ·u, ad !B.
Ibid., q. 84, a. 6.
111 Ibid., q. 84, a. 7; ad 1.
110

111

44

COLMAN E. O'NEILL

moments of the sacrament: on earth in those sacraments
administered during his earthly life,123 in heaven now. The
mysteries themselves are only active and present in the measure
that they are consummated in the Risen Christ, having constituted his humanity an apt instrument. The resurrection,
understQod as the state of Christ in heaven, has the same
presence as Christ himself. In the case of baptism the explicit
symbol of Christ's death and resurrection specifies the instrumental action of Christ in such wise that the effect will be
incorporation into the Pasch of Christ; in an unfruitful sacrament only in whatever fashion the character gives this. The
res et saMamentum produces in the recipient an ontological
configuration to Christ. The value of this would have to be
determined for each of the sacraments. In the case of the
characters it gives the recipient power to participate in the
sacramental celebration of Christ's mysteries, and is, therefore,
only indirectly connected with the mysteries themselves.124
In a fruitful sacrament there is added signification and specification of Christ's present activity in producing grace as well
as signification of the adult recipient's workshop. Now the
exemplary causality of the sacraments (based on the faith of the
Church) is given full scope and the presence of the action of
Christ achieves in the soul of the recipient adequate conformity,
though of varying degree, to the mysteries of redemption.
Baptism conforms the soul to the death and resurrection, the
others grant fuller participation in the life of Christ, merited
by the mysteries. It might be suggested further that sacramental grace, by overcoming the effects of sin, as well as
equipping men for the Chritian life, increases the power of the
soul over the body and its concupiscence and, in this sense,
gives a measure of that dominion of spirit over matter which
Ibid., q. 66, a. ad I.
The characters are directed immediately, not to instrumental production of the
effects of the sacraments, but to the construction of signs of Church faith which are
valid so that, as a consequence, porlerioritatenaturae, they are used as instrumental
causes of grace. Cf. " The instrumentality of the sacramental character," Iriak Tkeol.
Quarterly, i6 (1928) J pp. !!11!-268.
188

18 •

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST :AND THE SACRAMENTS

45

will glorify the body after resurrection. The summation of this
section we defer until after our review of the sacramental system
is complete.
(b) The Eucharist. The Eucharist, too, is a sign of faith;
that is to say, the ordained priest, having the intention of
acting as the minister of the Church and following the ritual
of the Church, performs an action which expresses the faith of
the Church in Christ's command at the Last Supper: "Do this
in commemoration of me.'" Because the priest, the individual,
bears the character of Christ, this action of the community of
believers is, by the very fact of being placed, still a sign, but
an efficacious sign. Not the Church but Christ, whose minister
the priest is as well as the Church's, by divine power, gives
reality to what is symbolized in the action of human worship.
Because the action of Christ produces only transubstantiation
and not also transaccidentation (which would leave nothing on
the altar) , the glorified humanity of Christ, united to the Word,
is made present under the sacramental species, while remaining
· in heaven. The presence is real, no longer merely by action;
but it is utterly sui generis and it is pointless to compare it,
except to note the differences, with either symbolic presence or
the presence of Christ to his disciples when on earth.
On the level of symbolism, however, there is already, by
reason of the double consecration, a representation or image
of the external event of the Passion. After the consecration
until the communion this is all that there is; and this achieves
nothing more than an intentional presence of the historical act
of the passion, not essentially different from the presence
brought about in the invalid administration of baptism. Though
Christ is really present under the sacred species, the same does
not hold for the Passion. It is represented in symbol; it is only
the faith of the Church and of the individual which can attach
such signification to the two-fold presence of Christ in the
species of bread and wine. The double consecration produces
no change in the Risen Christ himself. At the moment when
the celebrant pronounces the words of consecration, however,

46

COLMAN E. O'NEILL

there is something more than intentional presence of the passion. Because, by reason of his character, he participates, for
sacramental purposes, in the priesthood of Christ, and because,
consequently, his words, in the area of the sacraments, are the
official, valid sign of Christ's words at the Last Supper, the
priest at this moment is truly the eikOn or imago Christi, 125 and
'the sacramental action is truly the imago of the Passion; 128 hut,
by the very fact, and through the power of Christ elevating
and applying the priest's native operation, what is signified is
realized. The faith of the Church is rewarded beyond all human
expectation. Now, not only does the sign of Christ's body
really contain the body, but the priest, offering the Church,s
sign-sacrifice, contains the actual act of Christ's offering. It is
by one and the same instrumental power, imparted by God
to the humanity of Christ in heaven, that Christ's native' action
and the native action of the priest are elevated and applied.
The native action of Christ thus brought to the altar, at one.
and the same instant, transubstantiates and offers. This is a
presence of the action of Christ (or, if the phrase is better liked,
of Christ vi actionis) . His native operation, elevated and
applied at local distance by divine power, specified and particularized by the words of the priest, changes tl}.e bread and wine.
Thus active within the sacramental order, Christ is able, by
his own native power, to offer the sacrament of his passion.
Like the Real Presence, the presence of Christ's sacrifice is
wholly sui generis. To speak of the Mass either as the Passion
(" the presence of the Passion ") or as a new sacrifice of Christ
is to introduce categories which have no significance in the
sacramental world. St. Thomas,· very shrewdly, confines himsell to saying that it is an imago quaeda:m repraeaentativa
passicmis Christi and that it makes us share in the fruits of
Christ's passion; and by reason of this we must say that Christ
is immolated in the Mass. 121 Pressed as to the mode of the
sacrifice itseH, he simply repeats that it is sacramental, the
1JI

8fimmG theol., m, Cl• 88, a. 1, ad 8.

1oe Ibid., corp.

:u.. Ibid.

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

47

priest the image of Christ, the ceremony the image of the
passion.128 The question, he says clearly enough, is irrelevant
in so far as the objector frames it in terms of temporal succession: a sacrifice now past, a priest no longer with us. Obviously,
the historical sacrifice with all its non-intellectual elements
(what is intellectual is, of its nature, supra-temporal) 129 is a
thing of the past; it is a degradation of theology to construct
theories positing what is impossible. The ·Mass gives to the
single sacrifice a new mode, not so much supra-temporal (in so
far as this term suggests an impossible withdrawal of realities,
essentially successive, from the laws of motion) as one that
combines temporal and atemporal elements. That is to say,
is in time, its connection with Calvary pertains
while each
to an order of reality which is not governed by time, namely,
to the intellectual order, the order of Christ's mind and of the
faith of the Church. Each day a new temporal expression is
given through signs to the faith of the Church in Christ instituting the Eucharist as a memorial of his passion. Because
of the mind of Christ the signs are efficacious, Body and Blood
are separated again and again sacramentally and are offered by
Christ, not as a new sacrifice, not as an old sacrifice of Calvary,
but as the single sacrifice transposed into a new realm of reality.
In this sacramental realm there are no new moral values as
far as the sacrifice of Christ the Head is concerned; but an
opportunity is given the Church to insert, through her transformed signs of
her own moral sacrifice into the single
&acrifice. It is within the context of faith, looking back to a
past event and looking up.to Christ in heaven who can transsubstantiate and offer, that the Mass
Theologians, as is well known, have attempted to determine
more precisely the exact nature of the native action of Christ
which is applied by divine power to the consecration. As
intellectual, this action escapes the passage of time and provides
the essential connection between the external rites of the Supper
Room, of Calvary and of the Church. The Salmanticenses see
118

Ibid., ad 2; ad 8.

111

Ibid., I, q. 86, a. 41, ad 1.

48

COLMAN E. o'NEILL

no difficulty in Christ's eliciting in heaven a new offering for
each Mass; and their position is arguable since such acts would
be only materially distinct but united formally in dependence
on Christ's intention when instituting the Eucharist. 180 Most
modem Thomists require a more absolute identity between the
offerings of Cenacle, Calvary and Mass, theorizing either that
the historical offering of the Supper Room is applied instrumentally in each Mass (we have shown why we think this
impossible) or that Christ in heaven maintains the self-same
act of offering which he elicited on earth. The more common
opinion among the latter group is that the offering is preserved
unchanging in Christ's beatific knowledge. A variation of this
which has not been sufficiently noticed makes a distinction
between the inner worship of Christ and the imperium of the
practical intellect which designated the killing of Christ as a
sacrificial externalization of his worship, that is, which designated what others were doing to his body as the sign of his
charity. While the worship is maintained for ever in the beatific
vision, the act of intellect is preserved until the end of the
world in the discrete time of Christ's infused knowledge, always
consisting in designation of a suitable sign of inner sacrifi.ce.131
The advantage of this last theory is that it takes account of
the scriptural and theological teaching that Christ's priesthood
and the sacraments will have achieved their purpose at the
parousia; and there is no reason for the act of offering to be
maintained beyond this point. 182
Granted that the offering is maintained in some fashion, a
further actuality is given the sacramental commemoration of
the passion. The native act of Christ which is made present,
vi actionis, in the Mass is itself an element of the historical
passion and supper room. The interior activity of Christ, his
charity, religion and intellectual act of offering are identical,
whether expressed by the immolation of Calvary or of the Mass.
Salmanticenses, Cv:rBUB theol., tr. iS, disp. IS, dub. S, nn. 49, 50.
Cf. W. Barden, 0. P., What kapptma at Masa, Dublin, 1960, pp. SS-86.
132 Summa. theol., ill, q. 22, a. 5, ad 1.

180

181

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

49

Granted that the passion-offering of Christ is maintained in
Christus resurgens, a certain modification must be introduced
into our whole concept of the "presence " of the passion
achieved, either sacramentally or extra-sacramentally, by the
divine use of Christ's humanity as a life-giving instrument.
The mediatorial offerings of Christ, as belonging to his humanity, will be applied to us and, therefore, be present vi
ootionis--that is to say, will be present in Christ acting on
us-whenever we receive grace or other supernatural gifts.
This does not mean, however, as some unwary Thomists,
seduced perhaps by the imaginative prose of Maria Laach, have
suggested, that Christ worships, offering his merits, in each
of the Church. Not even in the interests of theological peace can the theory of moral causality be combined
with the Thomistic physical theory. 188 Christ maintains his
worship of the Father in heaven; but he does not formally
worship Him in the sacraments other than the Mass. Again it
is question of considering the sacraments for what they are
and not introducing irrelevant categories. The deciding factor
is sacramental symbolism. Apart from the Mass, it is the
giving of grace that is signified. The Church makes an act of
faith in the application of the passion to the individual recipient.
The intervention of Christ is, therefore, limited to the designation of the effect of the sacrament (his native action) and
the instrumental production of it. It was in his sacrifice that
Christ merited this grace; the faith of the Church is directed
back to the historical event; the signification indicates that
the recipient is to benefit from it. Only in the Mass does the
symbolism require that Christ's native action be applied to
offer worship.
The desire to make each sacrament an act of worship by
Christ can be met while preserving the strict specification of
the symbolism and remaining within the Thomistic tradition.
188 John of St. Thomas, disp. 24, a. I, dub. 9 and the Salmanticenses, tr. !!!!, disp.
4, dub. 2, in spite of proposing conclusions verbally contradictory, agree that the
sacraments have no intrinsic moral worth; they signify the passion by reason of a
relation arbitrarily imposed on them at their institution.

50

COLMAN E. O'NEILL

The sacraments constitute a 81JBtem of worship in which Christ
the priest is the central figure. In this system there are two
integral parts, one the sacrifice of the Mass, the other the gracegiving sacraments. These two parts correspond to the two
moments of all worship: the God-directed submission of the
creature and the consequent enrichment of the creature, this
being procured by the act of submission itseH (which perfects
the creature, not God) and by the gift of grace merited. These
two moments are found in Christ's worship on the cross; but
in him they are both mediatorial: he offered the sacrifice for us
and it· is we who are enriched as a result. Ill the sacramental
representation of Christ's worship the two moments are given
distinct expression in the two integral parts of the sacramental
system. In the Mass Christ worships; in the other sacraments
we share in the fruits of his worship. On the level of sign-action
performed by the Church worship must be inserted in both
parts of the sacramental system. We offer with Christ in the
Mass; we submit in faith to the divine economy of salvation
in the grace-giving sacraments. The whole system, therefore, is
the worship of the Whole Christ. The liturgy is the eternal
worship of the Church, deriving from the conformation of her
members to Christ by faith a:pd charity. Into the sign-actions
performed by the Church enters the action of Chriatua TeauTgena, making the symbolic sacrifice of the Church his own
sacrifice and thus incorporating the worship of the Church at
Mass into the unique sacrifice, and making the other sacraments the channel through which he distributes the fruit of
that sacrifice. What is simple in Christ, who by one action
merited grace for individuals, is partkipated in multiple and
fragmentary fashion by the priesthood of the Church which
must perform distinct actions to offer sacrifice and to distribute
grace.
(c) Conclusion. It is noteworthy that in the extra-sacramental instrumental application _of the humanity of Christ
efficient causality p1'odtwea a likeness to Christ, as is most clear
in the act of justification of the sinner and' the bodily resur-

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

51

rection of all men (ca'U8alitaa exemplaris aacramentaliter and
simpliciter). In the sacramental order, on the contrary, efficient
causality of the humanity and of the sacrament pretmpposea
exemplary causality: the Church makes a sign-action which
specifies Christ's action, the result being further configuration
of the Church to Christ. The Church, in performing the signactions of her liturgy makes available to Christ the flesh of a
new form of Incarnation in the world of symbols. This is a new
mystery of Christ: Christ living and active in the sacraments
of faith of the Church. The presence of the past mysteries is
accordingly brought about in a manner proper to faith: a
sacrificial meal symbolizing the passion itself, a symbol of the
incorporation of an individual into the death and resurrection
of Christ, the various symbols related to the life of the regenerated Christian. What is fascinating in the sacraments is not
so much that they bring us grace; that is already implicit in
the mystery of the Incarnation. Rather it is the revelation
they make of the wisdom of God, of the delicacy of touch
with which He sanctifies man in accordance with the psychological demands of man's nature and of his virtue of faith-:
The sacramental actions themselves come from within the
believers of the Church. They place moral actions, do things,
perform liturgies, through their ministers, so expressing their
faith in Christ. Into this world of faith, the intentional order,
Christ enters with his divine power, not to rehearse past deeds
uselessly, but as a glorified, vivifying spirit to conform men's
souls to the mysteries symbolized in the faith-signs of the
Church.
Behind the whole mystery with its unique Redeemer, passed
definitively from death to life, from the mysteries of history to
their heavenly consummation, and with its multiform sacramental system, is the Verbum vitae, giving life to men so that
they may be conformed to the pattern of the Pasch and be
brought after resurrection into the immediate
of Christ
and in his divinity know the Father. Until that final triumph

52

COLMAN E. o'NEILL

over death the Church must progress through history, recalling
in faith the past mysteries of her Redeemer, and looking up to
him where he reigns already in heaven, the pledge of the things
to come and the source of life at every moment. The whole
faith of the Chruch rests on the fact that Christ has accomplished his Pasch, that his earthly mysteries are past, and that
he has risen to die no more, the first-fruits of them that sleep.
It is not Christ, but the Church, that must now die to sin and
rise to a new life that leads to glory; and her source of life
and hope is her glorified Saviour. If the Christian is baptized
into the death of Christ this does not mean that Christ's own
death must somehow be re-enacted or held suspended in some
imaginary yet paradoxically unimaginable world of shades. It
means that a new accident has been educed from the obediential
potency of the Christian's soul: he is justified interiorly in
which took place
virtue of the merits and satisfaction of
two thousand years ago. It means that something happens
within him that bears an analogical likeness-by analogy of
attribution and of proportionality-to the death and resurrection of Christ. Ontologically and morally the Christian is
changed, not Christ; to make the passion itself in any manner
present, apart from being impossible, is , pointless; what is
wanted and is given is a symbol of the passion being applied
to an individual. The faith of the Church looks back to the
earthly mysteries of her Redeemer; in her liturgy the Church
enacts symbolic-actions expressing her faith in what is past, so
instructing her children that the life she gives them was won
by death, and exhorting them to die daily to their evil moral
tendencies. The faith of the Church looks up to her glorified
Redeemer, knowing that now he is a vivifying spirit and that
he has promised to make her sacraments effective in her
children; knowing that he has promised, though raised up to
heaven, to dwell in her tabernacles; knowing that he has
promised that the sacrifice which she daily performs with the
symbols of his past passion will remain as his own sacrifice

THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS

58

until the time for sacrifice has passed .. The Church lives in
time, looking backwards to Christ and looking forward to his
Second Coming. Her future lies in her glorified Saviour who
from heaven makes her like himself, raising her first in secret
manner from sin so that she may live with his life, hid with
him in God, that, when the appointed day shall come, he may
" reform the body of her lowness, made like the body of his
glory" (Phil., S. !H).
CoLMAN E. O'NEILL, O.P.
Institute I68U8 MagiateT,
Pontifical UnivBTaity of the Lateran,
Rome, Italy

THE REDEMPTIVE ROLE OF CHRIST'S
RESURRECTION

The Development in St. Thomas' Teaching
F all the miracles of Our Blessed Lord the greatest is
that of His own Resurrection from the dead. From the
first preaching of the Apostles this has been appreciated.
In every age the heralds 'and exponents of the Gospel have
constantly appealed to the Resurrection of Jesus as to the
supreme and 'Unshakeable motive of credibility for the message
they brought. If Christ be not risen from the dead, they have
cried with St. Paul, your faith is vain.
It is to be noted, however, that for too many the meaning
and power of the Resurrection stopped short with that. It
was the mightiest proof of Christ's Divinity and Messianship.
It was, moreover, for Jesus Himself the moment of triumph
and glorification. But nothing more.
Such a manner of proceeding on the part of many Christian
authors is a cause of wonderment when one considers, for
instance, what the Resurrection meant to the Apostles themselves. Did the words of Paul which these men so confidently
cited mean just that and nothing more? Was he merely giving
proof of the general credibility of his doctrine? Even a cursory
reading of his words in their context will show that indeed he
was not. And modem scriptural scholarship is throwing more
and more light upon the cardinal role of the Resurrection in
Pauline theology and in the doctrine of the New Testament
as a whole.
This being so, it is very significant that in, the history of
Christian thought as regards this mystery, the doctrine of St.
Thomas Aquinas should stand out in the clearest relief. For

O

54

THE REDEMPTIVE ROLE OF CHRIST'S RESURRECTION

55

Thomas this mystery meant far more than a motive of credibility, far more than a personal glorification of the Saviour.
The Resurrection of Christ looms large in his theology as an
integral part of God's plan for human redemption. It follows
without saying that a study of his teaching on the Resurrection
will be at once interesting and rewarding.
When one thinks of St. Thomas Aquinas, one thinks immediately of his Summa Theologiae. This is, true enough, his
masterpiece, a sublime work of synthesis that embodies the
fruits of long years of theological thought. Yet Thomas wrote
many theological works besides the Summa, and in most of
them he gave some treatment to the mystery of Our Lord's
Resurrection. To treat in an adequate fashion of St. Thomas'
teaching on the Resurrection .and its redemptive role would
thus involve a study of his doctrine as it appears in these
other works as well.
Now such a study as this will reveal a very important fact:
that the teaching of Aquinas on this point was not something
fixed and unchanging. Throughout his years of teaching and
writing, St. Thomas' doctrine ever continued to progress
and develop. It was expressed more clearly; supported more
strongly, linked more closely to the rest of his teaching. In
some respects it changed altogether.
It is this progress and development that is to be proposed
in this present article.
A Soteriological Role

From the time of his first work in theology, the Commentary
on the Sentences, St. Thomas attributed to Christ's Resurrection a prominent role in our redemption. This is clear from
even a hasty study of this work, in which he states that the
Resurrection was necessary, not only from the point of view
of Christ Himself, but also ex paTte nostTa, and that the Resurrection of Jesus is indeed the cause of our resurrection from
the dead. 1
1

Cf. In Ill Smt., dist. XXI, q. i, a. I; In IV Sent., dist. XLIII, a. i, qla. 1.

56

NICHOLAS CROTTY

St. Thomas treated significantly of the redemptive role of
the mystery in many of his works.2 A study of them shows
that his doctrine on this point can be subsumed under four
heads:
(a) The essential role of the Resurrection in the genesis of
faith and consequently in our justification.
(b) its ea:empla'f1J and moTal ca'U80.lity with respect to our
justification and our bodily resurrection from the dead.
(c) Its instrumental ca'UIJOlity with respect to these same
effects.

(d) The respective roles of the Passion and the Resu/rrecticm
in the work of our redemption.
We shall consider each of these points in tum and endeavour
to trace the progress and development in St. Thomas' thought.

Ca'UIJOlity Through Faith
If we study the history of Christian thought in the West,
we find great emphasis laid upon the role of the Resurrection
in the genesis of faith, whether as the principal motive of credibility of the Christian faith or as its very object. In this sense,
then, it can be said that the Resurrection is the cause of our
salvation because without it there would be no faith, hence
no justification and ultimately no resurrection in glory. It was
indeed in this way that the Western theologians tended to
interpret the words of Romans, 4., 25, which tell us that Jesus
rose for our justification. It was not so in the East where the
Christian authors made the connection between the Resurrection and our salvation far more intimate and intrinsic. For
• Fr. F. Holtz in his article "La valeur soteriologique de Ia Resurrection du Christ
selon S. ThomRil," Ephemmdes tkeoZogicaeLO'Vanienaes,XIX (1958), p. 610, n, 9,
makes the following strange observation: " S. ThomRil ne parle de Ia doctrine de la
resurrection du Christ qu'au Commentaire des Sentences et dans Ia llia Pars
Summae." If the writer intends these words to be taken strictly, we feel that our
treatment of this doctrine Rll it is found in many works other than these two will
prove him to be in error on this point.

THE REDEMPTIVE

ROLE OF CHRIST's RESURRECTION

57

them the Passion and the Resurrection were co-causes of
salvation. 8
But in the West there had always remained present that
tendency to limit the role of the Resurrection to its much more
extrinsic and indirect function as at once the motive of credibility and the object of justifying faith. And it was to this
tradition, naturally, that St. Thomas Aquinas found himself
heir. While even from the outset he never limited himself to
this function alone, but with ever increasing emphasis propounded the other soteriological aspects of the mystery, nevertheless, his insistence on this function-its role in the genesis
of faith-is obvious throughout, and we find him asserting it
in a progressively clearer and more complete fashion.
In the Commentary on the Sentences St. Thomas considers
the Resurrection from this point of view: it is the object of
faith, necessary, therefore, if we are to be justified by faith.'
And because the disciples were to be the witnesses of the faith,
it was fitting that the risen Jesus should give evidence of His
Resurrection by appearing to them, allowing Himself and His
wounds to be seen and felt, and even going so far as to eat
with them. 5
These points are to be found throughout Thomas' theological
writings, in most of them in a scattered and casual fashion as
their scope demanded. However, in the Compendium Tkeologiae and in the Summa Tkeologiae we are presented once
more with a systematic treatment of the Resurrection under
this aspect.
The first element of progress to be noted consists in this,
that Aquinas deals ex professo with many points that had been
mere obiter dicta in the Commentary. For instance, in shoWing
the need for Christ to prove His Resurrection by " arguments,"
he had stated that Jesus had to demonstrate three things
• Cf. D. M. Stanley, S. J., "Ad historiam exegeseos Rom. 4, 26," VMbum Domini,
XXIX (1951), pp. 2671f.; B. Vawter. C. M., "Resurrection and Redemption,"
Catholic Biblical Quarterly, XV (1958), pp. 11-28.
• Cf. In Ill Sent., dist. XXI, q. 2, a. 1, sed contra.
• Cf. In Ill Sent., dist. XXI, q. 2, aa. 8-4.

58

NICHOLAS

CROTTY

about it: the reality of His risen life, the reality of His riSen
body, and the glory of His Resurrection. 6 This passing reference
to the glory of the Resurrection is given great stress in the
Compendium Theologiae, where the holy Doctor is careful to
point out that it was as necessary to demonstrate the glory as
the reality of the mystery. 7 In the Summa, moreover, an entire
article is devoted to the glory of Christ's risen body, 8 and the
necessity of demonstrating the glory of the Resurrection is
stressed more than once.9
Similarly, in the Commentacy he mentions the role of the
disciples as the witnesses of the faith and consequently as the
witnesses of the Resurrection when showing the need for the
" arguments " of the Resurrection, and in particular for the
visible apparitions of the risen Saviour. 10 But the Compendium
Theologiae explicitly directs our attention to this point: using
the language of the A.cts of the Apostles, St. Thomas tells us
that, the Resurrection was manifested not to all men indiscriminately but to special witnesses pre-ordained by God.11
When we come to the Summa, we find no fewer than three
articles devoted to this question of the witnesses.12
Further examples of how Aquinas perfected his doctrine by
«fealing expressly and at length with points that had received
only passing treatment in the Commenta:ry are to be found in
the question of Christ's appearing in aliena effigie 13 and in that
of the sufficiency of the " arguments " for the Resurrection. 14
Another aspect of progress can be found in the patristic
citations ·with which Thomas confirms his teaching in the
8 Cf. In Ill Sent., diat. XXI, q. t, a. s, corp.
• Cf. Oomp. Tkeol., c. US.
8 Cf. Summa Tkeol., ill, q. 54, a. t.
8 Cf. Summa Tkeol., ill, q. 55, a. S, corp.; a. 6 corp.
1 Cf. In Ill Sent., diat. XXI, q. !, a S, sed contra; a. 4.
11 Cf. Oomp. Theol .• c. !88.
u Cf. Summa Tkeol., ill, q. 55, aa. I, !, 4.
18 Cf. In Ill Sent., diat. XXI, q. !, a. 4, qia. I, obj. Sa et adS; Summa Tkeol., ill,
q. 55, a. 4.
u Cf. In Ill Sent., diat. XXI, q. !, a. S, obj. t et ad i; Summa Theol., ill, q.
55, a. 6.

°

THE REDEMPTIVE

ROLE OF CHRIST'S RESURRECTION

59

Su'TTI/Tna. Almost every article and almost every reply to an
objection with regard to this aspect of the mystery are supported by one or more quotations from the Fathers. These can
be found in his Catena Aurea. Indeed, it would seem that he
had the Catena before him as he wrote: for example, he answers
one objection (q. 58, a. 8, ad 4m.) by quoting Ambrose, Eusebius and Augustine. Now these three quotations are to be
found in the Catena in connection with the same verse of St.
Luke's Gospel (24, 86) and in the same order in which they
appear here in the Summa.
It is clear, therefore, that throughout' these years of· theological thought St. Thomas was ever striving to strengthen his
doctrine on this matter. Keenly alive to the paramount importance of the mystery as the object of the Christian faith,
he did not rest content with the treatment he had already
accorded it. He gave more precise explanations and arguments,
developed points that had been treated only indirectly and
obscurely, and above all confirmed his teaching as often as
possible with apt citations from patristic authorities 15-in order
to show as perfectly as possible how the evidence for the
Resurrection of the Saviour is supremely adapted to achieve
its purpose: the leading of men to faith in this mystery and
in consequence to their eternal salvation.
Exempla'I"!J Causality
With regard to exemplary causality the most important
development lies in the extension of the Resurrection's exemplarity to the resurrection of the soul.16 In the Commenta'I"!J
on the Sentences it is proposed as the exemplar of the bodily
15 For St. Thomas' attitude towards and use of such authorities, cf. G. Geenen,
0. P., "saint Thomas et les Peres," DicticmnaiTe de theologie catholique, XV (1),
coil. 788-61; idem, "The Place of Tradition in the Theology of St. Thomas." The
Thomiat, XV (1952), pp. 110-84.
18 Right from the time of writing the Comnntmta"Y em the StmttmcflB Thomas
linked our justification and our final bodily resurrection by referring to them as the
resurrection of souls and the resurrection of bodies respectively. This was a distinction he took from St. Augustine. Cf. In Ill Sent., dist. XXI, q. 2, a. 1, obj. 2a.

60

NICHOLAS CROTTY

resurrection alone,17 but we find that St. Thomas in the De
Veritate-in explaining the manner in which the Resurrection
of Our Lord is the cause of our spiritual resurrection-invokes
for the first time in this connection the category of exemplary
causality. 18 By the time he comes to write the Summa Theologiae he feels free to place the bodily resurrection and justification in perfect parallel as twin effects of a single exemplary
cause, the Resurrection. 19
In commenting on St. Paul's epistles the Angelic Doctor
made still more of this exemplarity. The Resurrection of the
Redeemer, he taught, is not only the exemplar of justifiQation
itself, but also the pattern of the entire subsequent life of the
justified. It is mirrored, not only in the Christian's reception
of grace, but likewise in the whole Christian life and vital
supernatural activity flowing from grace.20 It was, moreover,
this same commentary on St. Paul that occasioned references
to our solidarity in Christ and in the mystery of His
Resurrection. 21
In the Summa Theologiae his thought on this question of
exemplarity has crystalized, and we find him setting down very
17 1t is true that in the Ooinmumta'l"!/ St. Thomas refutes au objection based on
Romans, 4, 25 (cf. In Ill Sent., dist. XIX, a. 1, sol. 1a, ad Sm; also a. 8, sol. 2a,
to the univocal character of Christ's activity. Because Christ
ad Sm.) by
was mau and His activity humau activity, we can relate His effects in us to those
mysteries of His life and death which resemble them. It is in this way, Thomas
then taught, that St. Paul attributed the remission of our sins to the Passion and
our justification to the Resurrection. This is, of course, appropriation rather than
exemplarity. It is only in the De Veritate that Thomas first speaks of the very
Resurrection as the exemplary cause of our justification.
18 Cf. De V 61"., q. 27, a. 8, ad 7m.
18 Cf. Summa Theol., III, q. 56, aa. 1-2.
•• Cf. In Rom., c. 6, lect. 1, vv. 4-5; c. 8, lect. 8, v. 17; In II ad 001'., c. 5, lect. 8,
v. 15; In Phil., c. 8, lect. 2, v. 11; In Ool., c. 2, lect. 8, v. U; In II ad Tim., c. 2,
lect. 2, vv. 11-12.
21 Although the phrase is a modem one, the theological reality of the " principle
of solidarity" was well-known to St. Thomas. Cf. In Rom., c. 7, lect. 1, v. 4; In
Gal., c. 2, lect. 6, v. 19; In Ephu., c. 4, lect. 7, v. 24; In Ool., c. 8, lect. 1, v. 1;
In Heb., c. 11, lect. 7, v. 85. Vide L. Ciappi, 0. P., "La solidarieta: Iegge di natura
e di grazia," Sapienza, Y (1952), pp. 121-40; 225-41. St. Thomas is cited throughout
this exposition.

THE REDEMPTIVE ROLE OF CHRIST's RESURRECTION

61

precisely the metaphysical principle on which it is based: that
which is most perfect in the exemplar is imitated by the less
perfect. 22
Development is to be noted also in regard to the nexus
between the exemplary and the efficient causality of the
Resurrection. Once again it is in his elucidation of the Pauline
texts that this progress is marked. Christ's Resurrection is the
exemplar of ours because it is the efficient cause of ours: an
effect is conformed to its cause.28 This is clearly stated also in
the Summa contra Gentiles 24 and is seen summed up in St.
Thomas' use in the Compendium Theologiae of the term
" sacramentaliter exemplaris." 25 His development is, in fact,
of great importance, for the principle it stresses enabled St.
Thomas to give his definitive explanation of Romans 4, 25.
Though St. Thomas continued to insist on the Resurrection's
exemplary causality, indeed giving it ever greater prominence
and using it as a source of further clarification,26 his increasing
preoccupation with the category of efficiency can be noticed.
An illustration of this is to be found in the distinction between
the resurrection of the just and that of the damned. In the
Commentary on the Sentences this distinction was founded
entirely on the basis of exemplarity: the conformity or lack of
conformity to christ. 27 This same point, when dealt with in
the Summa contra Gentiles, is given different treatment. Here
the holy Doctor teaches that Christ assumed human nature in
order to repair it: this He does perfectly in the case of those
•• Cf. Summa Tkeol., ill, q. 56, a. 1, ad Sm.
•• Cf. In Rom., c. 6, lect. !!, v. 10; c. 4, lect. S, v. !!5.
"' Cf. Ccmt Gent., L. 4, c. 8!!.
•• Cf. Comp. Theol., c. !!89. Vide Capmany Casamitjana, La rll8Urrecci6n del
Seiior, pp. 05-1>8, especially p. 56 where he says: " Esta sacramentalidad de Ia
ejemplaridad-eficiente de Ia resurrecci6n de Cristo, ya en sf ya en su representaci6n
en el bautismo y demas sacramentos, puede considerarse compendiada en Santo
TomW! cuando afirma que Ia resurreci6n de Cristo tiene una efica.cia instrumental
junto a \Ill& ejemplaridad sacramental."
•• For instance, in the Summa Theologiae he uses exemplarity in refuting the
objection from the delayal of our resurrection (ill, q. 56, a. 1, ad 1).
•• Cf. In IV Sent., dist. XLill, a. 1, q1a. !!, ad S; a. !!, qla. 1, ad 4.

NICHOLAS

CROTTY

united to Him and His mysteries, imperfectly in the case of
the others. 28 It is, it seems, a question of efficient causality
here. Thomas is replying to an objection against the thesis of
Chapter 79, in which efficiency is invoked: "omnes per Christi
virtutem resurgemus." Our Redeemer, then, will be the efficient
cause of the resurrection of all, but His efficiency will extend
in all its perfection only to those united to His mysteries. However, in the Summa Theologiae there is still further precision:
the Resurrection of Jesus is the efficient cause of the resurrection of all, but the exemplary cause only of the glorious resur·
rection of the just. 29
With this exemplarity may be linked what we may term the
moral causality of the Resurrection: its function as an incentive
to hope for and to tend towards our own resurrection. This
aspect is found throughout the works of St. Thomas, but
it is given increasing emphasis. In the Commentary on St.
Matthew's Gospel 30 and especially in the Compendium Theologiae,31 the Resurrection of Christ is presented as at once the
basis and the object of our hope, as the very "sign of salvation." It is this mystery, furthermore, as St. Thomas found
to be asserted strongly by the Fathers he cited, 32 that moves
us to the practice of virtue and to progress in virtue.
These, accordingly, are· aspects of true development in the
thought of the Angelic Doctor regarding the exemplary and
moral causality of Christ's Resurrection.

Instrumentally-Efficient Causality

In the development regarding the efficient causality of the
Resurrection lie the most important aspects of the progress
we are noting. The definitive position of St. Thomas' doctrines
as found in the later works is very different from what he
•• Cf. Cont. Gent., I. 4, c. 81.
•• Cf. Summa Theol., ill, q. 56, a. 1, ad 8.
so Cf. In Matt., 16, 4.
81 Cf. Comp. Theol., especially c. !!86.
•• Cf. Catena Aurea, In Matt., !!6, !!9; In Marc., 9, 80; 10, 84; In Joan., 7, 89.

THE REDEMPTIVE ROLE OF CHRIST's RESURRECTION

68

teaches in the first of his theological writings, the Cmnmenta'T'!J
on the Sentences.
In making this statement we are not without opposition.
Fr. Holtz, in his article" La valeur soteriologique de la resurrection du Christ selon S. Thomas," claims that as far as efficient
causality is .concerned, the doctrine is identical in the Commenta'T'!J and in the Summa:
Saint Thomas' concept of Christ's sacred Humanity's causality
certainly underwent changes. Nevertheless that evolution with
regard tQ his doctrine on the resurrection is scarcely worthy of
mention. As we have seen in the Commentary on the Sentences, he
attributes an efficient causality both for the resurrection of the
body as well as for justification. 83

Fr.'Holtz's article is not directly concerned with the development or lack of development in this doctrine, but he uses the
Cmnmenta'T'!Jto explain and confirm the doctrine of the Summa,.
and in so doing expressly denies that any real progress is to be
noted. 84 We intend to use a criticism of his assertions as the
basis of this section. In following this method we are not
guided by any preference for a more negative approach or by
a desire to introduce a controversial note here. We do so, on
the contrary, for two reasons. Firstly, Fr. Holtz is the only
author we have found who explicitly denies this point of our
claims, and as such deserves to be answered.85 Secondly,
•• Holtz, "La valeur ... ,'' p. 6!!9.
•• Besides the quotation given above, cf. Holtz, op. cit., pp. 610, n. 9; 621; 624;
680.
•• Fr. D. Van Meegeren (De causalitate imtrumentali kwmanitatia Christi iuxta
D. Tkomae doctrinam expoaitio eugetica, Venlo (1989), (cf. especially pp. 55-6)
concedes-though this is not his own personal view-that true instrumental causality
could perhaps be read into the words of the Expositio textua, In IV Sent., dist .
. XLVIII. He fails, however, to take into account the explanation given by St.
Thomas in Distinction 48 (a. 2, sol. 1a). Van Meegeren maintains that there is one
particular case in the Commenta'1'1J in which St. Thomas ascribes true instrumentality to the Sacred Humanity, viz., in connection with the poteataa excellentiae,
so much discussed by the medieval theologians. This, since the instrumental
causality is not ascribed to the Resurrection or to the mysteries in· general, does not
contradict our claims. It could, however, prejudice one of our arguments namely,
that from St. Thomas' early conception of justification as a creative' act or at least
as an act equivalent to creation as far as the exclusion of created instruments is

64

NICHOLAS

CROTTY

such an approach will very effectively underline the elements
we wish to propound regarding development in St. Thomas'
teaching on the Resurrection's efficiency.
An examination of Fr. Holtz's article will show that he makes
the following three assertions:
-both in the Commentary on the Sentences and in the
Summa Theologiae the Resurrection of Christ is proposed
as the instrumentally-efficient cause of the resurrection of
souls.
-in both these works the Resurrection of Christ is proposed
as the instrumentally-efficient cause of the resurrection of
bodies.
-in both these works it is to the Resurrection in fieri, and
not to the Resurrection in facto esse, that the actual salvific
influence is attributed.
We cannot agree with any of these assertions. The points contained in them are, in our view, true of the Summa but not
of the Commentary. Let us consider them in turn.
With regard to the first, we say on the contrary:
In the COMMENTARY OF THE SENTENCES the Resurrection of Jesus is not proposed as the instrumentally-efficient cause of
the resurrection of souls.

Fr. Holtz gives three arguments to defend his position here 36
One of these is simply a citation of the words from the
Commentary:
As Christ divinely received the first-fruits of grace and his grace
is the cause of our grace. 37

We shall see later that in the matter of grace there can be no
concerned. It suffices for us to say here that the potestas excellentiae attributed to
Christ in the Commentary involves once again, not instrumental causality, but the
meritorious and dispositive causality which we shall be. discussing later. (Cf. In IV
Sent., dist. V, a. 1, in corp; a. S, qla.
obj.
et Sm., ad
et ad Sm.)
•• Cf. "La valeur ... ," p.
87 In IV Sent., dist. LXIII, a.
sol. la: "Sicut Christus primitias gratiae suscepit
divinitus, et eius gratia est causa nostrae gratiae."

THE REDEMPTIVE ROLE OF CHRIST's RESURRECTION

65

question of true instrumentality in the Commentary, but even
were this not so, it is obvious that the citation is not ad rem:
Fr. Holtz is not trying to show the causality of Christ's grace 88
but the causality of the mystery of the Resurrection.
Secondly, the same author cites the sed cantra in which
Aquinas states quite simply that the Resurrection of
is the cause, not only of our resurrection from the dead, but
also of our justification, as is clear from Romans 4, 25.89 We
may point out that St. Thomas does no more in this argument
than simply state the fact of this causality. He gives no
explanation of its nature. However, his words in the Expositio
textus of Distinction 48 attribute the same type of causality
to the Resurrection of Jesus in each of our resurrections, the
corporal and the spiritual. It can be argued, therefore, that
the sense of this sed cantra is to be understood in the same way
as that of the Solutio 1a of the same article with regard to the
resurrection of the body. This, we shall show, is not instrumentally-efficient causality as propounded in the later works.
The words of this Expositio textus of Distinction 48 form
Fr. Holtz's third argument. Since they are to be understood
in the sense of the Solutio 1a referred to, this argument is not
valid, if we show that this solutio does not refer to true
instrumentality.
To argue more positively: it is impossible that Thomas
intends in the Commentary to attribute true instrumental
causality to Christ's Sacred Humanity or to its mysteries in
our justification. At this period the young professor at Paris
regarded the production of grace as an act of creation and
accordingly denied that there are any instruments co-operating
in this work, so that in our justification nothing created can be
posited as an instrumental cause.40 St. Thomas, therefore,
88 In connection with St. Thomas's reference in In III Sent., dist. XIII, q. 1, a. !i!,
sol. la, to the causality of Christ's grace, Van Meegeren thus describes its nature:
". . . haec causalis est causalitas secundae principalis dispositionem facientis . • ."
(De cauaalitate ... , p.
•
•• Cf. In IV Sent., dist. XLm, a.
sed contra.
•• Cf. J. Lecuyer, "La causalite efficiente des mysteres du Christ," Doctor Com-

66

NICHOLAS

CROTTY

reduces the function of Christ's Humanity and its mysteries to
a dispositive and meritorious causality :n
Hence the sed rontra, which Fr. Holtz adduces to show that
Christ's Resurrection operates instrumentally, not only in the
resurrection of bodies but also in the resurrection of souls,
proves to be an argument in which no true instrumental
causality is posited. If, on the one hand, we must place these
two effects in parallel as flowing from the same type of
causality, and if, on the other hand, there can be no question
of true instrumentality in the resurrection of souls, it is but
logical to exclude such causality in the case of the bodily
resurrection as well.
The following assertion must therefore be made in reply to
Fr. Holtz's second claim as outlined above:
In the COMMENTARY ON THE SENTENCES the ReB'Urrection of Christ is not proposed as the instrumentally-efficient cause
of the reB'Urrectionof bodies.

Besides invoking the words of the sed rontra just mentioned,
and those of the Ewpositio textus of Distinction 48, Fr. Holtz
relies also on the closing words of the Solutio 1a dealing with
the causality of the Resurrection:
munis, VI (1958) , pp. 98-5;. B. Lavaud, "S. Thomas et Ia causalite physique
instrumentale de Ia sainte humanite et des sacrements," Revue Tkomiste, XXXll
(19!!7), p. 804; T. Tschipke, Die Memckeit Christi ala HeilsOTgan der Gottkeit,
Freiburg-in Br. (1940), pp. 1!!1-!!!!; Hugon, La causalite instrumentale dam fOTdre
BUmaturel, Paris (19!!4) , p. !!19.
Some authors would question the statement that St. Thomas in the Commentary
conceived the act of justification as a creative act. Cf. M. Tuyaerts, " Utrum S.
Thomas causalitatem sacramentorum respectu gratiae mere dispositivam umquam
docuerit,'' Angelicum, Vlli (1981), pp. 149-86. Nevertheless, there is no need for
us to tarry on this dispute, for even these admit that he placed the act of justification (recreatio) on the same plane as the act of creat,ion as the exclusion of
instrumental co-operation is concerned. This he did expressly in In IV Sent., dist. V,
q. 1, a. !!: " Et quia recreatio animae rationalis creationi ipsius respondet, ideo in
emundatione ipsius immediate (Deus) operatur: nee aliquis ei quantum ad hoc
cooperatur tertio modo (i.e. instrumentaliter) sed quarto (i.e. dispositive)."
"Cf. Lecuyer, "La causalite ... ,'' pp. 98-4; Van Meegeren, De causalitate ..• ,
p. 58.

THE REDEMPTIVE

ROLE OF CHRIST's

RESURRECTION

67

But the very resurrection of Christ by the power of the conjoined
divinity is the quasi-instrumental cause of our resurrection; indeed,
the divine operations were achieved by means of Christ's flesh after
the fashion of an instrument, as the Damascene cites the example
of the leper cleansed by bodily contact, Math. 8.42
Taken alone and at first sight, these words seem indeed to be
referring to true instrumental causality. But a closer examination and above all a more careful study of the· whole solutio
which they terminate will lead to a very different conclusion.
In the' first place, Thomas here illustrates his doctrine by
placing in an evident parallel the causality of Christ's grace
with regard to our grace, and the causality of His Resurrection
with regard to our resurrection. From what we have already
seen to be Aquinas's view of the production of grace at this
time, it is clearly indicated that here it is not a question.
of true instrumental causality. Secondly, we are given the
example of the whiteness of a father causing whiteness in the
son. How? Not because the whiteness of the one generates
the whiteness of the other, but because what causes whiteness
in the father is likewise the generative principle causing whiteness in the son. Let us note how St. Thomas applies this precisely to the case of the resurrection. It is indeed in this wayper hunc modum-that the Resurrection of Our Lord is the
cause of our resurrection; for what causes His, i. e., the divine
power, likewise causes ours. If Fr. Holtz's view were correct,
it would be difficult to understand why this example, brilliant
and apposite as it is, is never again employed by St. Thomas,
even though his treatment of this point recurred repeatedly,
or why in the Summa Theologiae a completely different example
should be used: that of a fire heating the surrounding air and
•• In IV Sent., dist. XLill, a. 2, soL la: "Sed ipsa resurrectio Christi virtute
Divinitatis adiunctae est causa quasi instrumentalis resurrectionis nostrae; operationes enim divinae agebantur mediante came Christi quaso quod,am organo, sicut
point exemplum Damascenus . . . de tactu corporali quo mundavit leprosus, Math.
8."; cf. Holtz, .,"La Valeur ... ," p. 628.

68

NICHOLAS

CROTTY

through that heated air heating more distant bodies.43 The
causality of the whiteness in the first example evidently cannot
be identified with that of the heated air in the second.
When St. Thomas applies all this to the Resurrection in the
Commentary on the Sentences, we see that the resulting terminology differs from that used in the later works. True enough,
the Resurrection is styled in the Commentary the "quasiinstrumental cause of our resurrection." The divine operations
are said to have been wrought "by means of the flesh of
Christ." 44 And our resurrection is effected " as it were instrumentally through the operation of Christ's Humanity " 45-to
be understood (as are all the expressions used here) in terms
.of the explanation given: that the operation of the Sacred
Humanity-here, the Resurrection-acts as does the whiteness
of a man who generates another white man.
Let us examine the other works, however, and we find different
terminology indeed, terminology attributing virtue and activity,
not only to the Sacred Humanity itself, but equally to the
mysteries accomplished in it. The instrumental cause of our
resurrection is the virtus humanitatis Christi.46 Christ's human
nature was assumed by Him in order that it might effect
instrumentally operations proper to God alone.47 His flesh is
the instrument of the Divinity and an instrument acts in virtue
of the principal cause: hence His flesh vivifies by the power
of the Word. 48 So it is too with the mysteries of that Humanity.
The Resurrection, for instance, is the efficient cause of our
resurrection and our justification; it has instrumentally-effective
power.49 Its power is the resurrectio virtuosa facta propria
virtute. 50 It operates in virtute divina.51 Thus did Aquinas
•• Cf. Summa Tkeol., ill, q. 56, a. 1, corp.
" Cf. In IV Sent.; dist. XLIII, a.
sol. I a.
•• Cf. In IV Sent., dist. XLVIII, Expositio textus.
v. 14.
•• Cf. In I ad Thesa., c. 4, lect.
' 7 Cf. Cont. Gentea, L. 4, c. 41.
•• Cf. In Joan., c. 6, lect. 6, v. 51.
•• Cf. Summa Theol., ill, p. 56.
•• Cf. In Philip., c. 8, lect.
v. 10.
61 Cf. In I ad Thesa., c. 4, lect.
v. 16.

THE REDEMPTIVE

ROLE OF CHRIST'S RESURRECTION

69

attribute causality " undividedly and indivisibly " 52 to the
Humanity and to its mysteries. True, he reserved the word
instrumentum for the Humanity and preferred to call the
mysteries causae instrumentales, but this was quite simply
because the word instrumentum is applicable to something
stable and subsistent rather than to something transitory and
accidental. But as far as instrumental causality is concerned,
no division is to be made between the Sacred Humanity and
what it did or suffered, between the Humanity which rose from
the dead and the Resurrection itself. Because the Humanity
was the instrument of the Divinity, its actions and passions
not only affected the Humanity itself but exercised in our
regard an efficient and salvific activity. 53
All this is different from the terminology of the Commentary
in which there is no text which demands that actual power or
actual activity be ascribed to the Resurrection as far as its
effects in us are concerned, and in which, on the contrary, the
parallel with the grace of Christ, the elucidation of the doctrine
by the example of the white man begetting a white man and
the very terminology of the references to the mystery's causality
all combine to exclude such actual power or activity.
This is apparent enough in the reply to the first objection:
Christ's resurrection, moreover, is said to be the cause of ours,
as has been said, not because it (alone) achieves our resurrection,
52 "indivisement, indivisiblement."
Sic Lavaud, "S. Thomas et la causalite .•. ,"
Revue Thomiste, XXXll (1927), p. 415.
53 This is expressed in many places in St. Thomas' later works. Cf. e. g., In Rom.,
c. 4, lect. 8, v. 25; Oomp. Theol., c. 289; Summa Theol., I-ll, q. 112, a. 1, ad 1; ill,
q. 8, a. 1, ad 1; III, q. 48, a. 2, corp.; ill, q. 4S, a:. 6, corp.; ill, q. 49, a. 1, ad 1
et ad 2; III, q. 50, a. 6, corp.; III, q. 56, a. 1, ad 8; ill, q. 62, a. 5, ad I. As Van
Meegeren points out, " efficiens causalitas adscribitur formaliter mysteriis Christi
et non simpliciter Humanitati eius. Expressis tamen verbis S. Th. adnotat omnea
Christi acticmea et passiones instrumentaliter ad nostram salutem operari, quia eius
humanitas instrumentum est divinitatis. Unde nitro concludit quod passio Christi
et alia sua mysteria talem habuerunt functionem." (De causalitate . . ., p. 155.
Cf. also pp. 84, 86, 166, 172.) Cl. J. Geffre (Bulletin Thomiste, IX (1954-6), n.
1571, p. 814) affirms that the actions and passions of Christ are in themselves
instrumental causes, and continues: "En fait, ses actions et passions passees, bien
que transitoires, operent instrumentalement, de par la puissance divine. . . ."

70

NICHOLAS CROTTY

but through the mediation of its own principle, namely, the divine
power, which will effect our resurrection after the likeness of
Christ's.5 '
This very same objection occurs in the later works, but let us
note the different terminology of the replies:
It must be said that it (the Lord's resurrection) is the cause
of ours inasmuch aa it works by the divine power.u
As has been stated, Christ's resurrection is the cause of ours
through the power of the united Word. 56

No longer is it merely the divine power which acts, but also
the Resurrection itself. True enough, as an instrumental cause
it acts insofar as it is moved by the principal cause, but true
power and true activity must be attributed to it in itself. 57
We submit, therefore, that in the Omnmenta'I"JJ on the
Sentences true instrumentally-efficient causality is not attributed to the Resurrection of Our Lord. But just as the function
of the mysteries in our justification is to be explained as being
that of producing in the Sacred Humanity a real disposition
for our justification and salvation, 58 so too is the Resurrection's
role to be explained insofar as it bears upon our resurrection
from the dead: it produced in the Humanity of Jesus a real
disposition for our resurrection. The white man generates a
white man, not because his whiteness generates whiteness, but
because the generating power is the power of a white man.
n In IV Sent., dist. XLID, a. !!, sol. 1a, ad 1: "Resurrectio Christi autem dicitur
causa nostrae resurrectionis, ut dictum est, non quia ipsa agat Tll8Urrectionsm'IWBtTam, aed mediante principia BUO, scilicet virtute divina, quae nostram resurrectionem
faciet ad similitudinem resurrectionis Christ."
ss In ad Thess., c. 4, lect. !!, v. 15: "dicendum est, quod est causa resurrectionis
nostrae aooundum quod optratuT in viTtute divina."
so Summa Theol., ill, q. 56, a. 1, ad 1: "Ad primum ergo dicendum est, sicut
dictum est, resurrectio Christi causa est nostrae resurrectionis ptr viTtutsm V trbi
uniti."
67 "L'action de l'instrument, en tant qu'instrument, ne se separe pas de celle de Ia
cause principale; une seule passion resulte, un seul eflet procede de leur energies
combinees," Hugon, La cauaalite .•. , p. ss. Cf. Summa Theol., ill, q. 19, a. 1, ad !.
•• Cf. Lecuyer, "La causalite . • .," pp. 95-8, and the many texts from the
CommentaTy which he cites and elucidates.

THE REDEMPTIVE ROLE OF CHRIST'S RESURRECTION

71

So too the divine power of Christ which causes our resutTection
is the power of a man who rose from the dead.
Christ, inasmuch as He is God, is the first cause of our resurrection after the manner of an equivocal cause, but inasmuch as He
is both God and risen man, He is the proximate cause and quasiunivocal one.59
This explanation is surely in full accord with what St. Thomas
also wrote in the Commentary:
The Word made flesh is not the proximate disposition for our
resurrection, but the Word made flesh and as risen from the dead.60
We come, therefore, to the third assertion of Fr. Holtz, viz.,
that in the Commentary no less than in the Summa, Aquinas
is concerned with the Resurrection in fieri and not in facto esse
when he attributes salvific influence to the mystery. 61 The
Resurrection in facto esse is the glorified Humanity of Jesus;
the ResutTection in fieri, Fr. Holtz points out, is the historic
event. There ·are theologians who maintain that when St.
Thomas says that the ResulTection is the cause of our justification and bodily resurrection by way of efficient causality, he is
not attributing this . efficiency to the historic mystery but
directly to the glorified Humanity: the role of the mystery is
simply that of disposing the Humanity to our justification
and resulTection. Others hold that St. Thotnas is attributing
efficient causality to the historic mystery of the ResulTection.
Fr. Holtz's view is that from first to last Aquinas intends
the historic event when he speaks of the instrumental causality
of the ResutTection. However, he does distinguish, quite justly,
between two aspects of that historic event: the very Res'urrection co:Q.sidered formally, i. e., the action of rising from the
•• In IV 86'1/.t., dist. XLill, a. !!, sol. 1a: " Christus inquantum sit Deus, sit prima
causa nostrae resurrectionis quasi aequivoca: sed inquantam est Deus et homo
resurgens, est causa proxima, et quasi univoca."
•• In III Sent., dist. XXI, q. !!, a. 1, ad !!: "Verbum caro factum non est diSpositio
ad resurrectionen nostram, sed Verbum caro factum et a morte resurgens."
81 Cf. "La valeur •.. ," pp. 616-!!7.

72

NICHOLAS CROTTY

dead, and the BUppoaitumto which this action pertains (as Fr.
Holtz puts it, "le Christ dans l'acte de sa resurrection").
It is Fr. Holtz's contention that St. Thomas, in the
tary as much as in the Summa, is speaking of the Resurrection
in fieri, but the efficient 'causality is to be attributed to the
Christ Who rose, not to the formal Resurrection itself.62
Having posited these precisions we may proceed to give our
opinion, and we state it thus:
In the later works, when attributing to the Re8'Urrection an
instrumentaUy-efficient causality, St. Thomas is speaking of the
Re8'Urreetion'in fieri' and not' in facto esse'; in the COMMENTARY ON THE SENTENCES, however, when he attributes to
the Re8'Urrectionthe causality propounded in Distinction 43 of the
fourth Book, he prescinds from this distinction and does not exclude
the concept of the Re8'Urrecton' in facto esse.'

In dealing with the doctrine as found in the Summa Theologiae Fr. Holtz lays great stress on what he terms the
" objection from. distance," viz., the objection lound in Question
56 68 which argues that Christ's Resurrection cannot be the
efficient cause of ours, because it is separated from ours in
time and in space. Fr. Holtz argues that the very fact that
Thomas deals with this objection indicates that he is considering the Resurrection in fieri, and the reviewer of Fr. Holtz's
article in the Bulletin Thomiste points out that the objection
has no meaning at all, at least as regards separation in time,
if the Resurrection is being considered in facto esse.64 We agree
wholeheartedly with this line of reasoning. In the Summa,
Thomas is undoubtedly concerned with the Resurrection in
fieri, and as we have seen, he refers both to the mystery itself
(the Resurrection considered formally) and to the Humanity
that rose.
However, Fr. Holtz-still dealing with the doctrine in the
Summa-denies any efficient causality to the Resurrection
formally considered. Why? Because he has found St. Thomas
Ibid., pp. 6!!1-2•.
Summa Theol., ill, q. 56, a. 1, obj. 8.
•• Cf. Cl. J. Geffre, loc. cit., pp. 814-5.

81
88

THE REDEMPTIVE ROLE OF CHRIST's RESUlmECTION

78

doing so in the Commentary and has presumed from the start
that the same doctrine is being taught in both works. In the
Commentary, Aquinas does indeed distinguish between the
Resurrection considered formally and the Christus inquantum
est Deus et homo resurgens, and it is to the latter, and not
to the former that he attributes the direct causality, as far as
the effects produced in us are concemed.8 G Not so in the
Summa. We have already seen that instrumental causality is
there ascribed to the very mystery of the Resurrection itself.
Fr. Holtz, moverover, goes on to assert unequivocally that
Thomas, when dealing in the Commentary with the causality
of this Christus resurgens, understands by this term, not the
risen Christ, not the Resurrection in facto esse, but Christ in
the very act of rising from the dead, i. e. the Resurrection in
fieri. He asserts this because, he claims, the same objection
from distance is found in the Commentary as well as in the
Summa. 66 In this claim there lies a grave misunderstanding of
Thomas' words. Under the one heading of the "objection
from distance" Fr. Holtz has placed two distinct objections.
The true objection from distance, that described above, occurs
only in the Summa. The other objection, which is found in
both works,S7 is entirely different. Unlike the true objection
from distance, it does not rest on the philosophical principle
that " actio in distans repugnat." Instead it is based on the
truth that when a necessary cause is placed, the necessary
effect must follow. If then the Resurrection of Christ be the
cause of ours, our resurrection should have followed. How
explain the delay?
Perhaps an illustration will not be out of place here. Suppose
Cf. In IV BtJnt., dist. XLill, a. !!, sol. 1a.
•• Cf. "La valeur ... ," pp. 620-1.
•• Cf. In IV Stmt., dist. XLID, a.!!, obj. 1; Summa. Theol., ill, q. 56, a. 1, obj. 1.
Holtz ("La vale•.ll" ... ," p. 620, n. 48) refers us also to dist. XLID, a. S, obj. 1a
of the OommMta1'1J as to the "objection from distance" once again. This can be
summarily dismissed. It i$ not an objection to the Resurrection's causality at all.
It is simply the statement of a difficulty in asserting the fittingness of the delayal
in our resurrection.
"5

74

NICHOLAS

CROTTY

I am confronted by a row of switches and I wish to know
which of the switches will turn on a particular electric bulb.
I ask, "Is it the switch on the extreme left?" "No," I am
told by one man, " it cannot be that switch, for it is not
connected to the bulb." A second man tells me," No, it cannot
be that switch, because when I turned that one on, the bulb
did not light up straightway, but only after a considerable time.
Therefore, there must be another switch somewhere else." It
is clear that these are two distinct reasons for denying that the
switch I am seeking is the one I selected, and if I wished to
insist that I had chosen the right switch, I should have to
argue very differently with each of the men concerned. To the
first I should have to explain how the switch could affect an
electric bulb to which it is not. connected. To the second
I should have to give a reason for the delayed action.
In the case of the two objections against the causality of
the Resurrection with regard to our own· resurrection the position is the same. They are distinct objections and require
different answers. And St. Thomas does in fact give different
answers. To the objection from distance he replies by appealing
to the divine power in virtue of which the Resurrection acts:
this divine power can reach all places and all times. 68 To the
other objection he replies"that it is not a case of a necessary
cause but of a voluntary cause, since the divine power involved
always operates according to the divine will.69
Since the objection from distance is not found in the Commentary on the Sentences, no argument can be drawn from it
to show that St. Thomas is referring to the Resurrection in
fieri. But one must examine the other objection to see whether
it too can provide an argument to prove the same point.
Obviously not, for this objection appeals solely to the fact
that from the moment of the historic Resurrection there was
•• Cf. Summa Theol., ID, q. 56, a. 1, ad 8; Hugon, La causalite ... , pp. 108-11.
•• Cf. In IV Sent., dist. XLlll, a. ad 1m; Summa Theol., lll, q. 56, a. 1, ad 1m;
also In I ad Thess., c. 4, lect.
v. 15; In I ad Co-r., c. 15, lect.
v. 12. Vide Van
Meegeren, De causalitate ... , pp. 155-8; A. Minon, " Ressuscite pour notre justification," Revue ecclesiastique de Liege, XXXVIll (1951), p. !l49.

THE REDEMPTIVE

ROLE OF CHRIST's RESURRECTION

75

posited a sufficient cause of our resurrection, and this is true
whether one considers as that cause the Resurrection in fieri
or the Resurrection in facto esse, the historic mystery .or the
glorified Humanity of Jesus. In either case one can demand
an explanation for the delay in the effect. Fr. Holtz has erred,
therefore, in interpreting this objection as being likewise an
objection from distance and in claiming, as he does,70 that it
too is answered by an appeal to the transcendent efficacy of
the divine power.
The fact, however, that Thomas in the Commenta'T'!J does
not treat of the objection from distance forms a strong argumentthat he is not attributing the efficiencyof the Resurrection
to the mystery in fieri and excluding the concept of the mystery
in facto esse. This is, true enough, an argument ez silentio,
but in my evaluation an efficacious one, for once one ascribes
a real and actual efficiency to tlie Resurrection as a past
historic event, this is the first objection that comes to mind.
Indeed, if we examine carefully the objections at the head of
the articles of Question 56 of the Pars Sa in the Summa, we
shall find that this is the only objection that attacks the
Resurrection's causality precisely as efficient causality. 71
If, on the other hand, as we have shown, the causality
ascribed to the Resurrection in the Commenta'T'!J is a merely
dispositive causality, and if actual efficiency is there attributed,
not to the mystery itself considered formally, but to Christ
inquantum est Deus et homo resurgens, the distinction of in
fieri and in facto esse becomes of little moment. What is
important here is simply the existence of a risen Christ, Whose
divine power is to raise us up and in Whose Sacred Humanity,
because it is a risen Humanity, there is a real disposition for
the resurrection of those united to Him. There is nothing in
the words of the Commenta'T'!Jon the Sentences to justify the
statement that Aquinas· is referring to the Sacred Humanity
Cf. "La valeur ... ," pp. 6i8·4.
n St. Thomas, let it be noted, is careful to deal with this objection Ui. his treatment of the efficiency of the Passion as well. Cf. Summa Tkeol., ill, q. 48, a. 6,
obj. ia et ad i.
·

76

NICHOLAS CROTTY

in the moment of the Resurrection and not to the Sacred
Humanity in its risen state.
In order that our treatment of this point may be complete
we must consider another argument of Fr. Holtz: his appeal
to the teaching of Thomas' contemporaries or near-contemporaries. He seems content to show that these attributed an
actual salvific influence to the Resurrection in fieri and adduces
this as an argument to show that Thomas did the same. The
position, however, is not as clear-cut as that. It is surely not
too much to say that an author may attribute one type of
causality to the Resurrection in fieri and yet not be prepared
to attribute another. For example, an author could evidently
appeal to the historic mystery of the Resurrection as the exemplary cause of our own, and at the same time concede efficient
causality only to the glorified Humanity. In order, therefore,
for Fr. Holtz's argument to have validity and force, he must
show these writers attributed efficient or at least dispositive
causality to the Resurrection considered precisely as in fieri.
Let us examine his references to these authors.
First of all, he claims that Alexander of Hales, in the article
of his Summa Theologica entitled "An resurrectio Christi sit
causa coniuncta vel remota ad nostram resurrectionem " 72 is
professo of whether the influence of the Resurrection
treating
is to be attributed to the mystery in fieri or in facto esse.78 An
examination of this article, however, shows that this is not so.
The article mentioned is concerned simply with the fact and
with the fittirigness of the fact that our resurrection takes
place, not at the same time as Christ's, but at the time of the
innovatio mundi, and with the fittingness of any exceptions to
this, e. g., the Blessed Virgin Mary. It is true that when he
speaks here of the Resurrection, Alexander intends the mystery
in fieri, the historic fact, but it is in a context that does not
deal at all with ca1,1salityon the part of the mystery. Moreover,
a study of the other articles .and membra dealing with the
Resurrection shows that, on the one hand, its efficient cauI

01 L. ill, tract. VI, q. 1, m. 2, c. IV, a. I.
•• Cf. Holtz, "La valeur •.. ," p. 619.

THE REDEMPTIVE ROLE OF CHRIST's RESURRECTION

77

sality 74 is restricted to the bodily resurrection alone,75 and that,
on the other, this efficiency is attributed to the Resurrection
in faoto esse.76
The teaching of Alexander of Hales may well have been: one
of the initial influences on St. Thomas. 17 If so, contrary to the
claims of Fr. Holtz, he would have been inclined by Alexander's
doctrine to ascribe this causality, not to the Resurrection in
fieri, but to the Resurrection in facto esse. Certainly no argument can be drawn from Alexander's teaching to support the
view that St. Thomas in his Commentary on the Sentences
was excluding the concept of the Resurrection in facto esse
when he attributed to this mystery the causality described in
the Distinction 48.
Let us now consider Fr. Holtz's citation of St. Bonaventure's
teaching. He states that in this teaching the Resurrection is
posited as the exemplary and efficient cause of our resurrection,
and that St. Bonaventure answers the objection from distance
by appealing to the union between ourselves and Christ the
Head. This treatment of the objection from distance indicates,
he says, that the Resurrection is being considered as in fieri.78
Here, however, are the· words of the objection referred to, as
they are found in St. Bonaventure's Commentary on the
Sentences:
7 ' There is no need for us to expand upon the nature of the "efficient causality"
which Alexander attributes to the Resurrection. It was, we believe, a dispositive
causality such as St. Thomas propounded in his C0111111U1f/,tary. Cf. Alexander of
Hales, Summa Theologica,L. ill, tract. VI, q. 1, m. 1, c. I, ad 1.
TG Cf. Su'17111na Theologica,L. m, tract. VI, q. 1, m. !!, c. II.
TO Cf. Summa Theologica, L. m, tract. VI, q. I, m. !!, c. I, ad !!m: "Dicendum
ergo quod est in genere causae efficientis, scilicet per .modum operantis ipse Christus
resurgens. • • . Causa autem resurrectionis prima est ipse Deus; caUsa. media ipsa
humanitas Verbi seu Verbum humanatum; causa proXima est ipsa humanitaa Verbi
appartmB glorioaa in iudicio.'' Cf. also I. III, tract. VI, q. 1; m. 1, c.· I, ad lm.,
where he states that the 'JYI'o:r:ima dispositio for our resurrection is the Verbum·
pa.rmm in came et reBUrgtmB et venitmB ad iudicium; also m. !!, c. IV, a. I.
77 " It (the Summa) already existed about 1!!50, but what its composition may
have. been at that date is not known.'' E. Gilson, Hi6ttny of Chriman Philoaophy
in the Middle Agea, London (1956), p. 3!!7.
78 Cf. "La valeur ••• ," p. 619.

78

NICHOLAS CROTTY

Likewise, if it is a cause, I ask, in what genus? It is clearly not
that of efficient causality, because of the fact that Chrises resurrection is past; whatever is past does not produce that which is to
come. That it is neither final nor material should be clear; it
remains, therefore, that it is exemplary. But on the contrary: an
exemplary cause do"es not involve its effect, yet the resurrection
of Christ does imply our resurrection: therefore . . .
And here is how he replies:
With regard to the objection that an exemplary cause does not
imply its effect, we reply that this is the cause of an exemplar in
which the thing is known; an exemplar, however, in which a thing
has its begi'TI!Tting,where it cannot be left as imperfect, necessarily
involves its effect; accordingly just as the head cannot exist without
its members, so too neither can there be the resurrection of the
head without the resurrection of the members.7Q

It is clear that Fr. Holtz has misapplied the teaching of St.
Bonaventure. He has taken the words of the objection to.
efficiency on the part of the Resurrection and given as Bonaventure's reply to them the words in which he refutes the
objection to its exemplarity. Bonaventure, in fact, does not
deny the force of the objection from distance as regards efficient
causality: he does not claim that the Resurrection is the
efficient cause of ours, but attributes instead this type of
causality to the vox Christi.80 The most Bonaventure will say
of the Resurrection itself is- that it is a causa exemplaris relata
ad efficientem, inasmuch as the effect is found inchoatively in
the exemplar. By this inchoatio, as is clear from Bonaventure's
words, is indicated the simple fact that God will not leave His
78 St. Bonaventure, In IV Sent., dist. XLill, a. I, q. 6, obj. 2 and 2m: "Item,
si est causa, quaero, in quo genere? Non efjiciens; constat quia Christi resurrectio
est praeterita sed quidquid praeteritum est, non eflicit id quod futurum est. Nee
fonalia nee materialia; constat; ergo est eumplo:ria. Sed contra: causa exemplaris non
infert suum effeetum sed resurreetio Christi infert nostram: ergo, ... Ad illud quod
objicitur quod exemplar non infert, dicendum quod verum est de exemplari in quo
1'68 cogooscitur, exemplar, tamen, in quo 1'68 mckoattl4',ubi non potest relinqui imperfectum, de necessitate infert; unde sicut caput non potest esse sine membris, sic nee
resurrectio capitis, quin consequatur resurrectio membrorum."
8 °Cf. In IV Sent., dist. XLill, a. I, q. 8, corp.

THE REDEMPTIVE

ROLE OF CHRIST's RESURRECTION

79

works incomplete: if He has raised up the Head, He will raise
up the members too. Therefore, Fr. Holtz is incorrect when he
sees efficiency expressed in the use of the word infert: throughout it is a question of exemplarity only.
. . . on our account Christ became incarnate, suffered and died
and likewise He rose for our sakes, and our resurrection in Him
began as in an exemplar: if therefore God's works are perfect, then
it befits the com.tptible to don incom.tption.81
Granted, therefore, that St. Bonaventure is considering the
Resurrectio in fieri (as is shown by the occurrence of the
objection from distance), nevertheless, Fr. Holtz's thesis can
glean no support from the doctrine of the Seraphic Doctor, since
he ascribes to th'e mystery not efficient causality but exemplary
causality only.
Finally, Fr. Holtz invokes the teaching of St. Albert the
Great. That Albert is ascribing an actual salvific influence to
the Resurrection in fieri is deducible, according to Fr. Holtz,
from his use of the phrase Christm remrgens and from the
presence of the objection from distance. 82
Now Fr. Holtz himself 88 identifies the distinction made by
St. Albert between the remrreotio Clvriati abstracta and the
Christm reiJ'Urgens with the distinction made by St. Thomas
in the oft-cited Solutio 1a, viz., that between the Resurrection
formally considered (ipsa remrrectio) and the Christm inquantum est Deus et _homo re8Urgens. What we have said above
regarding St. Thomas's Commentary-that it contains nothing
to indicate that he is excluding the notion of the Resurrection
in facto esse-we say likewise of the Commentary of St. Albert.
In both cases the phrase Christus remrgens is obviously employed in contradistinction, not to Christus resmrreotus but to
ipsa remrrectio, 84 and accordingly is no indication that by its
Ibid., Epilogus.
Cf. " La valeur ... ," pp. 619-!0.
88 Ibid., pp. 6!0, 628.
•• Alexander of Bales, we have noted above, also used the term Okriat'UIIreaurgens
when he W8J certainly referring to the Resurrection mfacto 611/le.
81

81

80

NICHOLAS CROTTY

use either Thomas or Albert intended to refer to the mystery
precisely as in fieri.
And what we have said regarding the absence of the objection
from distance in Thomas' Commentaru holds good for that
of Albert also. Fr. Holtz refers us to two objections in this
work of St. Albert as being examples of this objection.85 The
first is the very same objection from the delayal of our resurrection which we have found in St. Thomas' Commentaru and
which, being completely diverse from the true objection from
distance, is no argument that it is the mystery in fieri that
is being considered. The second, curiously enough, has no
reference at all to separation or distance, whether in time or
m space.
It is difficult, moreover, to see how Fr. Holtz reconciles his
claim that St. Albert attributed an actual salvific influence to
Christ in the very moment of His historic Resurrection with
the citation he himself makes of Albert's words:
Christ wearing the signs of our redemption in the day of judgment will be an actual, efficient and univocal cause; accordingly,
forthwith our resurrection will follow.86
That the Christus resurgens (and not the Resurrection formally
considered) is the habitual cause 87 of our J.'eSUrrectionand that
the Christus portans insignia redemptionis in iudicio will be
the actual cause, perfectly expresses the view of those who
maintain that the efficiency of the Resurrection is to be attributed to the mystery in facto esse.
We conclude, therefore, that Alexander of Hales and St.
Albert the Great did not exclude the concept of the Resurrection in facto esse and attribute efficient causality (in the sense
in which they understood it) to the Resurrection in fieri. We
85 Cf. Albert the Great, In IV Sent., dist. XLill, a. 5, abj. lm. et obj. 5. Vide
Holtz, "La valeur •.. ," p. 619.
88 St. Albert the Great, In IV Sent., dist. XLill, a. 5: " Causa efliciens univoca
secundum actum sive actualis erit Christus portans insigna redemptionis in iudicio:
unde statim sequitur nostra resurrectio."
Cf. Albert the Great, In IV Sent., dist. XLill, a. 5, ad I. Vide Holtz, "La
valeur ... ," pp. 6!el, 6!t8.

THE REDEMPTIVE ROLE OF CHRIST's RESURRECTION

81

conclude also that St. Bonaventure did not attribute any
efficient causality to the Resurrection, but only exemplary
causality. From these contemporaries or near-contemporaries
one can deduce no argument that would lead to an interpretation of St. Thomas' doctrine in the Oomrnenta1'1J on the
Sentences such as Fr. Holtz has made. On the contrary, the
study of the authors mentioned has confirmed us in our view
that at the time of writing this his first theological work, a
work which embodies his teaching activity as a Baccalaureus
at Paris, when he must needs have conformed in many ways
to current traditions, 88 St. Thomas Aquinas did not exclude
the concept of the Resurrection in facto esse and ascribe either
dispositive or efficient causality to the Resurrection in fieri as
such.
We may now sum up briefly what we have been saying on
this point:
According to Fr. Holtz, St. Thomas in the Oommenta1'1J on
the Sentences taught that the Resurrection in fieri, in the sense
of Christ in the very act of rising from the dead, but not in
the sense of the Resurrection formally considered, is the instrumentally-efficient cause of our spiritual and corporal resurrections. And this same teaching, he claims, is reproduced in the
Summa Theologiae.
In our view, however, St. Thomas taught in the Oommenta1'1J
that the Resurrection of Christ itself considered formally is the
dispositive cause, the Ohristus inquantum est l)eus et homo
resurgens (prescinding from the distinction between in fieri
and in facto esse) is the efficient cause of each of these resurrections. In the Summa, on the other hand, it is a question
of true instrumental causality, and this is ascribed to the
Resurrection in fieri, involving both the Resurrection formally
considered and the Sacred Humanity in the very act of rising.
This causality is exercised in respect to both the spiritual and
the corporal resurrections.
It is therefore our contention that between the Oommenta1'1J
88

Cf. Van Meegeren, De ca'U8alitate... , pp. !!6, 108.

82

NICHOLAS CROTTY

and the Summa there was a profound development in the
thought and teaching of Aquinas. This began with the De
Veritate and continued to be more and more clearly expressed
until in the Summa we are presented with the final crystallization of his thought in all its clarity and precision.89
In conclusion, it mut be noted that while we are in agreement with Fr. Holtz that in the Summa Theologiae Thomas
is referring to the causality of the Resurrection in fieri, we feel
that, because of his identification of the doctrine in the Summa
with that of the Oommentaey, his argumentation for the most
part lacks cogency. The force of the objection from distance
we have already admitted,. But Fr. Holtz's argument from the
·words of the Summa: "Resurrectio Christi est causa e:fficiens,
inquantum ·humanitas Christi, secundum quam resurrexit, est
quodammodo instrumentum divinitatis ipsius et operatur in
virtute eius " 90 is vitiated by his modus procedendi, for he
explains this phrase secundum quam _reaurrer:iit as expressing
the doctrine of the Oommentaey and its der.dal of actual causality to the Resurrection considered formally.91 Since we have
shown that the teaching is different in the two works and that
in the Summa, as in the other later ·works, the Resurrection
cause, this explanation is erroitself is posited as an
neous. This same phrase, however, can be shown to be referring
to the Resurrection in fieri by a comparison with a passage in
the Summa contra Gentiles where the same phraseology is
employed and where the Sacred Humanity is said to merit for
us.92 It is evid(:m,tlya case of the redemptive mysteries in fieri,
for there can be no question of merit, if we are regarding simply
the glorified Humanity of Christ.
A concise criticism of the in facto esse interpretation of
88 Cf. Lecuyer, "La causalite •• ," pp. 99 ff.; S. Lyonnet, De peccato et redem!ptione, Vol. I, Rome (1957), p. 18; Tschipke, Die Menacheit ••. , p. U9; Van
M:eegeren, De ca'll8alitate ... , pp. 67 ff., especially pp. 108-9.
•• Summa Theol., ill, q. 56, a. 1, ad s.
01 Cf. Holtz, "La valeur ... ," pp. 621-!!!l; Geffre, Bulletin Thomme, IX, n. 1571,
pp. 814-5.
•• Contra Gmtu, L. 4, c. 96.

THE REDEMPTIVE

ROLE OF CHRIST'S RESURRECTION

88

Thomas' definitive doctrine, as expounded for example by
Billuart, is to be found in these words of Fr. Van Meegeren:
Such an interpretation seems to us arbitrary and to twist the
text of Saint Thomas. He speaks constantly of the instrumental
causality of the very same mysteries of Christ; indeed, from the
fact that the humanity of Christ is the instrument of the Godhead,
he invariably concludes to the instrumental causality of the respective mysteries. In addition the causality of the sacraments is
ascribed formally and properly to Christ's passion, which interpretation Billuart views as improper. Furthermore nothing whatsoever
concerning this view is clear from the texts. 91

In the later works, accordingly, St. Thomas Aquinas attributed true instrumentally-efficient causality to the very mysteries
in fieri, so that ·the Resurrection of Jesus is proposed to us as
the instrumental cause of our justification and our resurrection
from the dead. Our considerations of Fr. Holtz's article have
cast into clearer relief the development that led to this
doctrine.

The Passion and the Resurrection: Their Respective Roles
Having ascribed from the outset a soteriological role to the
mystery of the Resurrection, St. Thomas would, we expect,
have ever kept before his eyes the question of its relationship
with the mystery of the Passion and Death and the problem of
explaining their respective functions. Hence we must needs
look to his words and endeavour to trace the progress he made
in stating this relationship and elucidating these functions.
In the Commentary on the Sentences 94 he stated that the
Passion was ordained to .the removal of evil by way of satis•• Van Meegeren, De cauaalitate ... : "Interpretatio illa nobis videtur arbitraria
et detorquet D. Thomae textum. Ipse enim continue loquitur de caus8litate instrumentali ipsorum mysteriorum ChriSt; immo, ex hoc quod humanitas Christi est
divinitatis instrumentum, semper concludit ad causalitatem instrumentalem singuuorum mysteriorum. lnsuper causalitas sacramentorum formaliter et. proprie
adscibitur passioni Christi; secundum tamen interpretationem quam habet Billuart
improprie tantum. lnsuper de hac interpretatione nihil omnino ex textibus constat."
•• Cf. In III Sent., dist. XIX, a. 1, sol. 1a, ad Sm.; a. S, sol. ia., ad Sm; dist. XXI,
a. 1, ad Sm. et ad 4m.

84

NICHOLAS

CROTTY

faction, while the Resurrection was ordained to perfecting in
good by the inauguratioa of the new life. We attribute the
remission of sin and the removal of the poenalitates vitae to
the Passion, justification and glorification to the Resurrection,
by a form of appropriation, since Christ, the cause of these
benefits, is like us in nature and hence His activity can in a
certain sense be said to be univocal causality.
In the De V eritate 95 he again posits this appropriation,
relating the remission of sin to the Passion and justification
to the Resurrection, as an example to explain the Augustinian
appropriation of spiritual resurrection to the Word simpliciter,
and bodily resurrection to the Word Incarnate. But here in
the De V eritate he has already ascribed true exemplary causality to the Resurrection with
to justification, so that
one would expect to see this latter development influencing
the question of the respective roles of the Passion and the
Resurrection.
We do in fact find a very significant advance in the Commentary on St. Paul's Epistles as regards this question. It was
above all Romans 4, 25 that occasioned this. 96 Confronted with
the problem of placing the two mysteries-the Passion and the
Resurrection-in parallel as causes and at the same time of
distinguishing between their effects, as is demanded by this
verse of St. Paul, he invoked the three types of causality that
are applicable: meritorious, efficient, exemplary. Only the
Passion of Jesus was meritorious, but both mysteries were efficient and exemplary causes. Hence the parallelism is explained
on the grounds of efficiency, the dichotomy of the effects by
exemplarity. Moreover St. Paul's teaching elsewhere led him to
extend this distinction in the effects of their twin causality to
corporal death and corporal resurrection: His death destroyed
•• Cf. q. !l9, a. 4, ud 1; q. !l7, a. 8, ad 7.
•• "De. fait, telle etait !'explication que S. Thomas avait donnee de ce verset qu'il
cite tres souvent dans ses oeuvres et qui semble avoir joue un role important dans
I'elaboration de sa synthese theologique de la redemption," Lyonnet, "La valeur
soteriologique de la resurrection du Christ selon saint Paul," Christua Victor Murtia,
Terza settimana teologica, Univ. Greg., Rome (1958), p. 101.

THE REDEMPTIVE ROLE OF CHRIST'S RESURRECTION

85

our death, His Resurrection inaugurated for us a new and
perpetuallife. 97
In the Summa contra Gentiles 98 the scope of the work limits
his observations to the question of the bodily resurrection.
Aquinas is preoccupied with the penal character of our death,
so that rather than relating the destruction of our death and
our resurrection to the Death and Resurrection of Jesus respectively on the basis of exemplarity between cause and effect,
he relates Christ's Death to the destruction of sin and His
Resurrection to the destruction of sin's penalty, viz., death.
It is once again a question of exemplarity but a different
exemplarity: this time the Death of the Redeemer is regarded
as the exemplar of victory over sin, His Resurrection as the
victory over death, rather than as being exemplars of the
negative and positive aspect of the one victory over death.
The Compendium Theologiae imposes no restrictions on St.
Thomas' treatment, and it is here that we are given an almost
perfect and certainly a very complete synthesis of the respective
functions of the two mysteries. This is how Thomas
up
the question:
Christ's death, therefore, is the cause of the remission of our sin:
the efficient cause instrumentally, the exemplary cause sacramentally, and the meritorious cause. In like manner, Christ's resurrection
was the cause of our resurrection: the efficientcause instrumentally
and the exemplary cause sacramentally, but it was not the meritorious cause.... 99
The Summa Theologiae 100 reproduces succinctly the satis•• Cf. In R<nn., c. 4.lect. S, v. !M; c. 14, lect. 1, v. 9; In II ad Tim., c. 1, lect. S,

v. 10.
Cf. L. 4, c. 79.
Tkeol., c. 289: "Sic igitur mors Christi est causa remissionis peccati
nostri et effectiva instrumentaliter, et exemplaris sacramentaliter, et meritoria.
Resurrectio autem Christi fuit causa resurrectionis nostrae eflectiva quidem instrumentaliter et exemplaris sacramentaliter, non autem meritoria."
10 ° Cf. ill, q. 58, a. 1, ad S; q. 56, a. 1, ad 4; q. 56, a. 1, ad 4; q. 66, a. 2, ad 4m.
XL
Vide A. Vandenberghe, "De resurrectione Christi," Collationea
(1940), pp. 118-17; Capmany Casamitjana, La re81/,rreci00 ••• , pp. 68-70; Vawter,
"Resurrection ..• ," p. 17.
08

08 Comp.

86

NICHOLAS CROTTY

fying treatment occasioned by the ClYmmentary on St. Paul's
Epistles and developed so fully in the ClYmpendium. It adds,
however, one important clarification. In the earlier works St.
Thomas taught that the Death and the Resurrection both act
He taught also that the one is the exemplary cause
of the remission of sin and of the destruction of death, the
other the exemplary cause of positive justification and of the
newness of life by grace. But obviously while we may distinguish in justification a negative and a positive element, these
aspects cannot be separated, so that the efficient cause of the
one must be the efficient cause of the other. 101 It is equally
obvious that the Passion of Christ must be the efficient cause
of eternal life, if it is the efficient cause of the destruction of
death, and· His Resurrection must destroy death if it is the
efficient cause of the newness of life. This difficulty is solved
very simply by St. Thomas in the Summa Theologiae. While
we distinguish the causality of the two mysteries on the basis
of exemplarity, we do not make this distinction in the case of
efficiency: under this aspect they act together as one causeper modum unius-and are together the single cause of the
two-fold effect.
Once again a tracing of doctrine through the works of the
Angelic Doctor has led· us to a fuller appreciation of the
perfection of doctrine and theological precision in his definitive
teaching.

The Resurrection in St. Thomas' Soteriology
While St. Thomas Aquinas treated the Incarnation itself
and the entire life of Christ from the soteriological aspect, it is
nonetheless clear how he stressed in particular what may be
termed the redemptive mysteries par excellence. The Passion,
for example, is given special treatment, because it was in
a particular way ordained to our redemption and salvation.
to all the
Though Thomas attributed a soteriological
101 Cf. Concilium Tridentinum, Sess. 6, c. 7 (Dens. 799-800); Minon, "Ressuscite ... ," p. 244.

THE REDEMPTIVE ROLE OF CHRIST'S RESURRECTION

87

actions and passions of Our Lord's Humanity/ 02 he pointed
out that for many reasons and from many points of view the.
Passion of Jesus and His death upon the Cross possessed ill
the plan of God a fittingness and a necessity in human redemption.108 And associated with the mystery of the Passion and
sharing in its unique and necessary role were the mysteries of
the Resurrection and the Ascension.104
Hence we are justified in restricting our considerations to St.
Thomas' treatment of these mysteries when we wish to study
the place the Resurrection held in his soteriology. We are
given a systematic treatment of the Redemption in the Commentary on the Sentences, the Compendium Theologiae and
the Summa Theologiae. A study of the position ascribed in
each of these to the Resurrection of Jesus will enable us
to highlight the development and progress in this matter.
That the Sacred Passion enjoyed in Thomas' teaching a
role such as we have referred to is clear from even a cursory
examination of the Commentary on the Sentences. His observations on this mystery are, however, followed by a treatment
of the Resurrection and the Ascension. This further treatment
was not demanded by the Sentences upon which he was commenting: Peter Lombard had but a passing reference to the
Resurrection here and he made no mention of the mystery of
the Ascension, and in this he was followed for the most part
by his commentators. Aquinas, nevertheless, intro!fuced into
his commentary an explicit treatment of both mysteries. Very
clearly, then, St. Thomas, even in this his fir!!lt work in theology,
was not content to ascribe the Christian redemption to the
Passion alone, but felt it necessary to point out the role of the
Resurrection and the Ascension as well.
••• Cf. av:pra, n. 58.
Cf. In Ill Smt., dist. XX,. q. 1, aa. S, 4; Comp. Tkeol., cc. US, !!29; Su11V11UJ
Tkeol., ID, q. 46, aa. 1-4.
10 ' This is expressly taught of the Resurrection. Cf. 8u1TIIIIUJ Tkeol., m, q. 56,
a. 1, ad 2m, where the same hypothetical necessity is attached to the Resurrection
as to the Passion. N. B. the Leonine editor's reference to q. 46, a. 2. St. Thomas'
doctrine on the Resurrection justifies the extension of this to the Ascension as well.
108

88

NICHOLAS CROTTY

If, however, we study the treatment of the role here attributed to the Resurrection, we find that the whole stress is
laid on its function in our bodily resurrection. True enough,
St. Thomas speaks of its role in justification by faith, but this
would pertain to the subjective redemption rather than to the
objective redemption which must form the object of soteriology.
And it' is true also that he extends the dispositive causality of
the Resurrection, expounded in the commentary on the fourth
Book, to the spiritual as well as the corporal resurrection.
This, however, was done in view of St. Paul's teaching in
Rmnans
25, and the references to this causality as regards
the spiritual resurrection are indirect and in passing.105 Thus,
as far as Thomas's soteriology is concerned, the Resurrection's
role is concerned before all and above all with our bodily
resurrection from the dead.
This role, as we have seen, is one involving exemplary. cau·sality and dispositive causality, and it is under this aspect
that Aquinas sees the necessity of the Resurrection ea; parte
nolftra:

... so that the resurrection in glory, which for the members was
yet to come, might have its start in the head.108

This being so, we need not be surprised that the soteriology
of the Commentary is almost entirely taken up with the role
of the Sacred Passion, that such meagre treatment is allotted
to the function- of the Resurrection and that its role in our
justification is almost ignored. For, on the one hand, St.
Thomas does not here extend the exemplarity of the Resurrection to our justification, and on the other hand the dispositive causality of which he speaks is united by him with
the concept of merit. It is an aspect of Christ's meritorious
activity, necessarily involved in it. This we can glean first of
105 Cf. In III Sent., dist. XIX. a. s, q1a. 2, ad Sm; In IV Sent., dist. LXIII, a. 2,
q1a. 1, sed contra; dist. XLVIII, Expositio textus.
108 In III Sent., dist. XXI, q. 2, a. 1: " ... ut scilicet in capite gloriosa resurrectio
inchoaretur quae in membris futura erat."

THE REDEMPTIVE ROLE OF CHRIST'S RESURRECTION

89

all from Thomas' invoking the doctrine of the Mystical Body,
as he does in the quotation just given. The
of the Head
upon the members which must found the ratio capitis is by
way of merit only:
Christ as man is our head. Accordingly he has some influx relative
to us, but only by way of merit. 10 7

This same point is to be gleaned secondly from the corpus of
the article here cited, which deals with Christ's meriting for us;
here Thomas founds the ability of Christ to merit for us upon
the activity of His Humanity as an instrument of the Divinity.
By this, as we have seen, was meant not true instrumentallyefficient causality but dispositive causality. In the following
Distinction he says:
A cause is said to be efficient in one way if it completes its effect
and this is the principal agent which brings about the form and thus
God alone blots out sin . . . in another way a cause is said to be
efficient by disposing the material for receiving a form: and thus
whoever merits the removal of sin is said to blot it out: because
from merit somebody is made like matter which is disposed for
the receiving of grace through which sins are blotted out .... Christ
alone, however, can merit sufficiently for others .... 108

Merit, accordingly, means more than an extrinsic ius ad praemium: the meritorious action disposes the subject of the action,
and because Christ's Humanity is the instrument of the
Divinity, His influence spreads over the whole human race and
the disposition produced by His meritorious activity affects
not only that Humanity itself but all mankind: 109
107 In III Sent., dist. XVII, a. 6, q1a. 1, Sed contra: "Christus secundum quod
homo, est caput nostrum. Ergo nobis aliquid infuit, sed non nisi meritorie."
108 In III Sent., dist. XIX, a. 1, sol. 1a: "Dicitur ·enim causa efficiens, uno modo
formam;. et sic solus Deus
perficiens effectum; et hoc est principale agens
peccatum delet . . . alio modo dicitur efficiens ruSponens materiam ad recipiendum
formam: et sic dicitur peccatum delere ille qui meretur peccati deletionem: quia
ex merito efficitur aliquis dignus quasi materia disposita ad recipiendam gratiam,
per quam peccata deleantur • . . Solus autem Christus aliis potest sufficienter
merer1.... "
109 Cf. Lecuyer, "La causalite ... ," pp. 98-8.

.

90

NICHOLAs

CROTTY

Grace comes forth from God through the mediation of the man
Christ: for He has disposedthe entire human race for the receiving
of grace.l1°
Here, then, in the Commenta1'1J on the Sentences, Aquinas
explained the influence of Christ upon His members as meritorious causality, involving a dispositive causality. Since His
merit is to be ascribed to the Passion and Death which He
endured, Thomas' soteriology is largely taken up with a discussion of this mystery: through the satisfactory merit of His
Passion, 111 Jesus freed us from sin, from the devil, from sin's
penalties, and reconciled us to God.112 Since it was the Passion
that merited Christ's Resurrection and hence ours also, it is
understandable why St. Thomas in this context gave but a
brief treatment of the Resurrection's causality with regard to
ours and no direct treatment at all of its causality in our
justification.
In the Compendium Theologiae the work of human redemption is regarded as the reparatio vitae nostrae. It was becoming
that God should repair human nature, infected as it was by
the sin of our first parents. 113 This infection consisted in a twofold death, spiritual and corporal, so that the Redeemer must
needs conquer both. This He did by His own death upon the
Cross and by His Resurrection, the former thus becoming the
ca.use of the destruction of death, the latter the cause of the
restoration of life.114
These two mysteries are thus placed side by side as twin
causes of man's redemption:
110 In III Sent., dist. XIII, q. 2, a. 1, ad 8: "Gratia fluit a Deo mediante homine
Christo: ipse enim disposuit totum humanum genus ad susceptionem gratiae."
111 St. Thomas here does not separate the concepts of satisfaction and merit as
clearly as he does in the Summa. Cf. In Ill Sent., dist. XIX, a. 1, sol. la, where
he says: ". . • satisfaciendo pro tota natura, sufficienter meruit peccatorum remissionem allis .•. "; also dist. XVIII, a. 6, qla. 8, ad lm.
11 " Cf. In Ill Sent., dist. XIX, aa. I, 2, 8, 6.
111 Cf. Oomp. Tkeol., c. 199.
110 Ibid., c. 289.

THE REDEMPTIVE ROLE OF CHRIST'S RESURRECTION

91

Christ, in whom the second death had no place, destroyed both
of these deaths in us, that is, the bodily and the spiritual, by the
:first death He underwent, namely, that of the body .... By his
bodily resurrection, therefore, Christ is the cause both of the bodily
and spiritual resurrection in us, ... Christ's death, therefore, is the
cause of the remission of our sin: the efficient cause instrumentally;
the exemplary cause sacramentally and the mertorious cause. In
like manner, Christ's resurrection was the cause of our resurrection:
the efficient cause instrumentally and the exemplary cause sacramentally, but not meritoriously..•. 111

The references to the Ascension are more indirect and less
explicit, but it seems clear enough that to this mystery as well
is ascribed a similar soteriological role.116
Clearly then the treatment given here to the mystery of
Christ's Resurrection, unlike the treatment in the Commentary
em the
is no longer overshadowed by that accorded
to the Sacred Passion, and equal emphasis is laid upon the
Resurrection's causality with regard to our justification and its
causality with regard to our bodily resurrection from the dead.
It is to be expected that in the Summa Theologica there will
be further evidence of this increasing emphasis on the Resurrection's role as a redemptive mystery and in particular on its
role in our justification. This latter point is clear enough: of the
two articles dealing with the causality of the Resurrection, 111
the first deals with the mystery as the efficient and exemplary
cause of the bodily resurrection, the second with the mystery
as the efficient and exemplary cause of the spiritual resurrection.
These two effects are therefore given identical treatment.
However, the position of the Resurrection compared with
110 Ibid., loc. cit., " Christus autem . . . per primam mortem quam subiit,
scilicet, corporalem, utramque in nobis mortem destruxit, scilicet, corporalem et
spiritualem .... Per resurrectionem igitur suam corporalem utriusque resurrectionis,
scilicet corporalis et spiritualis, nobis est causa. • . . Sic igitur mors Christi est
causa remissionis peccati nostri et effectiva quidem instrumentaliter, et exemplaris
sacramentaliter, et meritoria. Resurrectio autem Christi fuit causa resurrectionis
nostrae effectiva instrumentaliter, et exemplaris sacramentaliter, non autem meritoria .... "
118 Ibid., cc. !MO, !41.
' 17 Cf. Summa Theol., m, q. 56, aa. 1, !.

92

NICHOLAS CROTTY

that of the Passion can perhaps be somewhat obscured by the
detailed and lengthy treatment accorded to the latter mystery.
For instance, while St. Thomas devotes an entire question of
some six articles to the mode in which the Passion brings about
its effects and another entire question of six articles to these
effects themselves, 118 there is only one question of two articles
dealing with these points in regard to the Resurrection. One
could consequently be tempted to interpret St. Thomas as
though he were throwing almost the entire burden of our
redemption upon Christ's Passion and death and hence minimizing the function and influence of the Resurrection.
One would be led to do this the more easily, were one to
take as the principal factor in Thomas' soteriology a modus
causandi other than that of efficiency, for Aquinas attributes
to the Resurrection only efficiency and the exemplarity which
this efficiency begets. On the other hand, to the Passion of
Jesus is ascribed the causing of our salvation per modum
meriti, per modum satisfactionis, per modum sacrijicii, per
modum redemptionis, as well as per modum efficientiae. If the
paramount factor in our redemption were merit or satisfaction
or sacrifice, then the .Resurrection's role would be excluded:
it was not meritorious, for Jesus was no longer in statu viatoris;
it was not
for it bore no penal character; it was
not an integral part of Christ's sacrifice, for in the mind of
Thomas it was rather the fruit of that sacrifice. Hence, if any
of these be taken as the key to his soteriology, Thomas could
be accused of a lack of unity, of a confusion between the
objective and subjective aspects of our redemption, of a failure
to distinguish between what properly pertains to the work of
redemption and what is merely consequent to that work.119
Cf. Summa Theol., ill, qq. 48, 49.
Such criticism has in fact been levelled against St. Thomas' treatment of
Redemption. Cf. Adolph Harnack and A. Sabatier, cited by J. Riviere (" Redemption," D. T. 0., XIII, col. 1950} and by J. M. O'Leary (The Development of the
Aquinll8 on the Pll8sion and Death of Our Lord, Chicago
Doctrine of St.
(195!!), p. xii). Riviere himself takes L. Hardy to task because the latter in his
118

119

THE REDEMPTIVE

ROLE OF CHRIST'S RESURRECTION

98

Let merit, satisfaction or sacrifice be the prime factor in the
objective redemption wrought· by Christ, and it must at once
be admitted that this redemptive work came to a close with
His death upon the Cross. Yet there remains the disconcerting
fact that St. Thomas proposes the Resurrection to us as a
mystery ordained to the common salvation of all/ 20 as the
efficient and exemplary cause of our justification and resurrection from the dead. 121 · And to the Ascension is .·ascribed a
function which pertains to the objective redemption, according
to the Angelic Doctor himseH, for he states that the Ascension
is the cause of our salvation in two ways: ex parte nostra and
ex parte ipsius Christi-a distinction that is surely to be
identified with the theological distinction between subjective
and objective redemption. 122
However, a close study of this section of the Summa will
show that it is not merit or satisfaction or the notion of sacrifice
that is paramount in St. Thomas's soteriology, and that the
stress laid upon the mystery of the Resurrection in the Compendium has not been abandoned here. For the modus efjicientiae
of the Passion itself (the modus which is attributed equally to
the Resurrection and the Ascension) was certainly uppermost
in Thomas' mind when he spoke of the way in which the
Passion brought about its effects.
For Aquinas saw all redemptive influence in the context of
the doctrine of the Mystical Body. He himself states:
La doctrine de la Redmnpticm ekes 8. Tlunnaa (Paris, 1986) had devoted an entire
chapter (pp. liH-91) to what he termed the "prolongement& de Ia Passion" (viz.
the Resurrection, the Ascension and the Sacraments) . Riviere claimed that all this
was outside the scope of the subject and involved a confusion of the objective and
subjective redemptions. (Cf. J. Riviere, Le dogme dela redmnption dans la theologie
contempMaine, Albi (1949), p. 167). St. Thomas himself would be open to the
same criticism, as far as his treatment of the Resurrection and the Ascension is
concerned, if merit were intended to be the basis of his soteriology, In reality, of
course, it is Riviere himself who is to be criticized for his neglect of the role of the
Resurrection. Cf. Minon, "Ressuscite ... ," pp. 284 :If.
10°Cf. Summa Theol., ill, q. 55, a. 1, ad !!.
121 Cf. 8'1Jn11111W, Theol., III, q. 56, aa. 1, !!.
10 " Cf. Summa Theol., III, q. 58, a. 6, corp. et ad 2.

94

NICHOLAS

CROTTY

Now to save men and to be a propitiation for their sins belongs
to Christ as Head.U8
Thus when teaching that Christ's Passion caused our salvation
by way of merit, he rests this ability to merit for us upon the
fact that Christ is our Head. 124 Similarly with satisfaction: He
could satisfy for us through His Passion, because Head and
members form, as it were, one mystical person. 125 The Passion
also acted per modum redempticmis: it freed us from the bonds
of sin .
. . . Christ's Passion causes forgiveness of sins by way of redemption. For since He is our head, then, by the Passion which He
endured from love and obedience He delivered us as His members
from our sins as by the price of His Passion.126
Finally, the efficacy of His sacrifice presupposes our union with
Christ as members united to their Head. 121
Let us now examine the doctrine of St. Thomas on the
Headship of Christ, 128 and,,we shall find that His instrumentallyefficient causality in the production of grace is at its base.129
Our Lord is said, to be Head because He has primacy through
the superiority and primacy of His grace, because He has
perfection through the fullness of His grace, and because He
has power to infuse grace into all the members of His Church.
108 Summa Theol., ill, q. 8, a. 8, Sed contra; vide Van Meegeren, De cauaalitate
••. , p. 171; E. Sauras, "Thomistic Soteriology and the Mystical Body," The
Thomist, XV (1952), pp. 548-71) •
19 ' Cf. Summa Theol., ID, q. 48, a. 1.
118 Cf. Summa Theol., ill, q• 48, a. 2, ad 1.
10 " Summa Theol., ill, q. 8, a. 1. " ... passio Christi causat remissionem peccatorum per modum redemptionis. Quia enim ipse est caput nostrum, per passionem
suam, quam ex caritate et obedientia sustinuit, liberavit nos, tamquam membra sua,
a peccatis, quasi per pretium passionis suae."
107 Cf. ·Summa Theol., ill, q. 49, a. 4, corp. In this text St. Thomas demands
for the efficacy of Christ's sacrifice a union with Him " secundum modum praemissum." This surely refers us to the preceding article where the efficacy of Christ's
satisfaction for us is said to be dependent upon our incorporation into Him as into
our Head.
108 Cf. Summa Theol., ill, q. 8, a. 1, corp.
129 Ct Van Meegeren, De causalitate ... ," pp. 167-9, 179; Sauras, "Thomistic
Soteriology . . .," especially pp. 560-78.

THE REDEMPTIVE ROLE OF CHRIST'S RESURRECTION

95

By this latter point is undoubtedly meant efficient causality:
" Tertio, virtutem habuit influendi gratiam in omnia membra
Ecclesiae .... " Now it is this third point that is most important
and most fundamental, for it is the .basis of the other two.
Thomas tells us that Jesus possessed the fullness and perfection
of grace, not only because of His nearness to the very cause of
grace, but because it was conferred on Him in order that He
in turn might transmit grace to others. It was conferred on
Him " as upon a universal principle in the genus of those
possessing grace." 130 It was a principle with Aquinas that
what is first in any genus is the cause of ·what comes after it
in the genus, and he used it when affirming efficient causality .131
If then St. Thomas has recourse to the Headship of Christ
in order to explain the different ways in which the Passion
wrought our salvation, and if the efficient causality of His
Humanity is paramount in the ratio capitis pertaining to Him,
we are surely justified in seeing this efficient causality as the
prime factor in Thomas' treatment of the Passion's causality.
And this being so, the unity of his soteriology is obvious, for
the instrumental efficiency attributed to the Passion is ascribed
likewise to the Resurrection and the Ascension.
This same conclusion is confirmed by the fact that Thomas
often explicitly invokes efficiency when treating of the other
ways in which the Passion· achieves its effects. For instance,
the efficacy of Christ's sacrifice involves the instrumental causality of His Sacred Humanity:
Insofar as His human nature operated by virtue of the Divine,
that sacrifice was most efficacious for the blotting out of sins.182

Moreover, the Passion of Our Lord saved us per modum
redemptionis, insofar as it freed us from the bonds forged by
sin. But St. Thomas tells us, we are freed from sin
130 " tanquam cuidam universali principia in genere habentium ·gratiam." Summa
Theol., lli, q. 7, a. 9, in corp. Cf. also q. 7, a. 11, in corp.
181 Cf. Summa Theol., ill, q. 66, a. 1.
18 " Summa Theol., ill, q. 22, a. S, ad 1: "Et ideo, inquantum eius humanitas
operahatur in virtute divinitatis, illud sacrificium erat efficacissimum ad delenda
peccata."

96

NICHOLAS CROTTY

inasmuch as Christ's flesh, wherein He endured the Passion, is the
instrument of the Godhead so that His sufferings and action operate
with Divine power for expelling sin.188

Merit too is closely linked to efficiency, whatever must be said
about these two as distinct types of causality. 184 For Thomas
introduces the concept of merit into a context expressly dealing
with instrumentally-efficient causality:
... inasmuch as His manhood is the instrument of His Godhead.
And hence by the power of the Godhead His actions were beneficial,
namely, by causing grace in us, both meritoriously and effi.ciently.186

The mind of St. Thomas is clear enough. He was fully alive
to the fact that no matter what type of causality is invoked
in this connection, the effect will be in us and not in God. We
may speak of appeasing God's anger, of satisfying His justice,
of obliging Him to crown our merits, but these are really
metaphors. Properly speaking, God does not owe it to us to
accept our satisfactions or reward our merits. He owes it to
Himsel£.136
. . . since our action has the character of merit only on the presupposition of the Divine ordination, it does not follow that God
is made our debtor simply, but rather His own, inasmuch as it is
right that His will should be carried out. 187
181 Swmma Theol., Ill, q. 49, a. 1: "inquantum
caro, secundum quam Christus
passioniem sustinuit, est instrumentum divinitatis, ex quo eius passiones et actiones
operantur in virtue divina lid expellendum peccatum."
184 Cf. H. Bouesse, " La causalite efficiente et Ia causalite meritoire de l'humanite
du Christ," Revue Thomiate, XLIV (1988), pp.
181 Summa Theol., Ill, q. 8, a. 1, ad 1: " ... eius humanitas fuit instrumentum
divinitatis eius. Et ita actiones ipsius ex virtute divinitatis fuerunt nobis salutiferae,
namely, by causing grace in us, both meritoriously and efficiently." This text provides a further argument tllat Thomas is referring to tile efficient causality of tile
mysteries in fieri. Since merit and efficiency are here placed in parallel, and since
merit can be referred only to the mysteries in fieri, we must refer tile efficiency to
the mysteries in fieri likewise.
188 Cf. Lecuyer, "La causalite ... ," pp. 116-18.
187 Summa Theol., I-II, q. 114, a. I, ad 8: ". . . quia actio nostra non habet
rationem meriti nisi ex praesuppositione divinae ordinationis, non sequitur quod
Deus efficiatur simpliciter debitor nobis, sed sibi ipsi: inquantum debitum est ut
sua ordinatio impleatur "; cf. also ibid., I, q.
1, ad S.

THE REDEMPTIVE ROLE OF CHRIST'S RESURRECTION

97

Aquinas has not forgotten these principles when he comes
to treat of the causality of the Passion. Merit, satisfaction,
sacrifice, liberation-none of these brings about any real changes
on the part of God. They affect us. Their effect must be in us.
And in this context, obviously, the category of efficient causality
is to the fore. It pertains essentially to the objective redemption by Christ, 188 and it alone can give unity to St. Thomas'
soteriology in general and his treatment of the salvific role of
the Passion.
We see then that the Passion and the Resurrection and the
Ascension are placed side by side as causes of salvation.
Together these make up one complete mystery, a mystery
with three facets. 189 What Thomas expressly affirms of the
Passion and the Resurrection-that they act together as the
efficient cause of the same effects-can be extended to the
Ascension also. This threefold cause produces in us effects
that are patterned on the three mysteries it embraces: by it
we die to sin and to sin's penalities, we are renewed in spiritual
and corporal life, and we are introduced into the heaven that
is our destiny.
The development, as far as the Resurrection's position in
St. Thomas' soteriology is concerned, is clear from what has
been said. In the Commentary on the Sentences its role is
eclipsed by that of the Passion and it is regarded directly as
being the cause of our bodily resurrection alone. In the Compendium Theologiae and the Summa Theologiae, however, the
Resurrection is placed in parallel with the Sacred Passion as a
redemptive mystery, and it is proposed as bearing, not only on
our bodily resurrection, but equally upon our spiritual resurrection by the grace of justification.
Such then, is the position occupied by the mystery of the
Resurrection in the soteriology of the later works. To ignore
188 Cf. Vandenberghe, "De resurrectione ... ," p. 99; Minon, "Ressuscite ... ,"
p. 285; Lyonnet, "La valeur ... ," pp. 104-9; Van Meegeren, De causalitate •.. ,
pp. 150-55.
189 Cf. Capmany Casamitjana, La re.mrrecci6n.•. , pp. 64-5, 74-9.

98

NICHOLAS CROTTY

it or to minimize its importance is to warp our conception of
Thomas' doctrine. It is obvious that most authors have indeed
ignored its role and minimized its importance, and this may
well be ascribed to the reaction against the Protestant reformers.
These erred gravely in their concept of the redemptive merit
of Jesus, so that Catholic apologists had to emphasize the true
doctrine in this respect. Thus the spotlight was centered on
the aspect of merit in our redemption. In the context of merit
the Resurrection has no direct role, and so its function in our
salvation came to be neglected. 140 But the viewpoint of the
Angelic Doctor was not basically that of merit: it was the viewpoint of the instrumentally-efficient causality of the redemptive
mysteries. It is surely desirable that his rich and satisfying
doctrine should be exploited to the full.

The Causes of the Development
It remains for us now to attempt to spotlight the causes and
influences that led to this development. In this context we are
using the words " causes " and " influences " in the broadest
sense, for the teaching of St. Thomas seems to have been
singularly free from external influences in the strict sense of
the word/ 41 Apart from the progress occasioned by the works
upon which he was commenting or the works which he himself
was writing, any other development can be ascribed to the
internal evolution of Aquinas' own thought, and the seeds of
this latter progress were all present in his first theological work,
the CO'mmentary on the Sentences.
The thought and teaching of his contemporaries and nearcontemporaries would no doubt have influenced him at the
outset, but the fruit of this influence is already found in the
CO'mmentary. The body of doctrine in the CO'mmentary concerning the Resurrection of Christ is to a large extent the same
doctrine that was taught, for example, by Alexander of Hales,
St. Bonaventure and St. Albert the Great. But the progress
14

° Cf. Vawter, "Resurrection ... ," pp. 19-20.

141

Cf. Van Meegeren, De causalitate ... ," pp. 88-89, 109.

THE REDEMPTIVE

ROLE OF CHRIST'S RESURRECTION

99

we have traced through the later works of Aquinas cannot be
attributed to the influence of writers such as these, for it is
proper to him alone. We must, moreover, always keep in mind
the originality of St. Thomas' thought on so many points of·
his theology .iu
We submit, therefore, that the definitive doctrine of St.
Thomas emerged more and more clearly in the llltter works
which he composed, not because of such influences as these,
but simply because on the one hand he utilized to the full the
scriptur8.1and patristic data upon which he was commenting,
and because on-the other hand he was ever striving to plumb
the depths of the data already contained in the Ocnnmenta'I"JJ
on the SentenCes.
This is very clear as regards what we have been terming
causality through faith. As we have pointed out, the progress.
in this element of his teaching
in two things. Firstly,
he developed fully many points that had been referred to in the
Ccnnmenta'I"JJonly indirectly and in passing. Secondly, he made
the most of the patristic data placed at his disposal by the
compilation of the Catena Aurea.
Moreover, as regards the treatment of exemplary causality,
Aquinas was once again clearly influenced by the writings upon
which he was commenting, especially the epistles of St. Paul
and the works of the Fathers.- The extension of the ResurreCtion's exemplarity to embrace the resurrection of the soul was
made, it is true, in the first instance in the De Veritate and
seems to flow directly from the attribution of true instrumentally-efficient causality to the mystery, according to the principle that an effect is like its cause. Once again, however, we
find an instance of St. Thomas' utilizing the doctrine in the
· Ocnnmenta'I"JJon tke Sentences, for the seed of this particular
development was there. -He was aware even there of the principles governing univocal causes, viz., that they produce effects
10 " Cf. Geenen, "Saint Thomas et les Peres," D. T. 0., XV (1), coli. 751-52; P.
Mandonnet, SigM de BTabant, Fribourg (1899) , p. LXI. Vide also De Tocco's Vita
S. Tlwmae Aquinatis, c. XIV (cf. D. Pruminer, Fun.tea Vitae 8. Tkomae Aquinatia,
Toulouse (1911), p. 81).
·

100

NICHOLAS CROTTY

in the likeness of their own form.143 Therefore, as soon as he
had posited in the De V eritate that the Resurrection of the
Redeemer was the instrumental cause of our justification,
Thomas affirmed its exemplary causality as well. He then
proceeded to comment upon the Pauline epistles and to compile
the Catena Aurea, and from the teaching of the Apostle and
the words of the Fathers he extended this exemplarity still
further, making the Resurrection the pattern and incentive of
the Christian life and Christian virtue, a mystery in which,
through our union with Christ the Head, we have solidarity.
Thus, as regards exemplary and moral causality, the development in Thomas' thought and doctrine flows from the unfolding of the teaching already contained in his earliest work in
theology, together with the progress occasioned by the very
labours he undertook in the writing of the later works.
In the emergence of his doctrine regarding the efficient
causality of the Resurrection lies, we have said, the most
important (and it is also the most fundamental) aspect of
development as far as this mystery is concerned. Here again
the same points are to be noted: the more complete utilization
of the doctrinal riches in the Commentary and the fruits of his
scholastic labours in the writing of the later works.
Thus, in the first place, a study of the Commentary will
show that the Angelic Doctor already possessed a clear grasp of
the elements of the Aristotelian doctrine of instrumentality .m
St. Thomas, though ·aware of this doctrine, refrained from
applying it to supernatural effects. The reason for this we
have already seen. At the time of writing the Commentary on
the Sentences he regarded justification as a creative act and
hence as not admitting instruments. However, before the holy
108 Cf. e. g., In IV Stmt., dist. XLID, a. !!, sol. 1a. This was a constant point of
St. Thomas' teaching and a very important one. "·Few formulae recur as often
as the one that expresses this relation: since all that causes acts according as it is
in act, every cause produces an effect that resembles it: omne agens agit sibi simile."
Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, London (1950), p. 95.
1 " Cf. In IV Sent., dist. I, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1a et sol. 28.; also dist. XVlll, a. 1,

ad 4m.

THE REDEMPTIVE

ROLE OF CHRIST's RESURRECTION;

101

Doctor wrote his De Veritate, he had completed the writing
of two important philosophical works: the De Principiis naturae
and the De ente et essentia. These metaphysical pursuits led
him to distinguish precisely between substantial and accidental
forms. Not only did his precisions regard the nature of these
forms, but also their origin, so that he saw clearly that accidental forms have their origin not in creation but in a generation improperly so called.145 Hence it was that in the De
Veritate, when confronted with the objection that no creature
can be the cause of grace, since grace comes about through
creation, Thomas was able to reply by openly distinguishing
between creation and co-creation.146 The way was now open to
Thomas for the propounding of his doctrine of the instrumentally-efficient causality of Christ's Humanity and its mysteries.
And this he did, commencing with the De Veritate and reaching
his definitive clarity of expression in the Summa Theologiae.
For once having conceived the act of justification as something
other than a strictly creative act, he could admit the co-operation of instruments in this work.
But what led St. Thomas to posit immediately the instru- .
mentality of the Sacred Humanity and its mysteries? According
to Fr. Backes this was due to a direct influence of the Alexandrine school of theology, through the intermediacy of St,
John Damascene/" because St. Thomas continues to cite the
Damascene's formula: " The flesh of Christ is the instrument
of His Divinity." This view, however, is difficult to accept.
First, in the Oommenta'l"!Jon the Sentences, Aquinas quoted
this same formula in connection with the meritorious and dispositive causality of Jesus on our behalf.148 When therefore he .
continues to cite it, but uses it to affirm true instrumental
1 •• Cf. De principiis naturae; De ente et essentia, c. Vll.
Vide Lecuyer, "La
causalite . . .," p. 100.
108 Cf. De V 8'1'., q. 't7, a. 8, ad 9m.
1 .. Cf. J. Backes, Die Christologie des hl. Thomas von Aquin und die griechischen
Kirchenviiter, Paderborn (1981), pp. 116, 215-6, especially 271 ff.
118 Cf. In Ill Sent., dist. XVffi, a. 6, sol. 1a; In IV Sent., dist. XLIII, a. 2, sol.
1a; dist. XLXIII, Expositio textus.

lOft

NICHOLAS CROTTY

causality on the part of Christ's Humanity, this surely was
due, not to the direct in:Huenceof St. John Damascene's doctrine
or that of the school he represented, but rather to an internal
development of Aquinas' own thought.
Moreover, it is difficult to concede that Aquinas could have
interpreted the Damascene as teaching this precise doctrine.
Comparatively recent researches have claimed that his formula
did not ascribe a physical efficiencyto the flesh of the Saviour.149
Regardless, it is certainly true that he was not primarily concerned with the same question as St. Thomas. When he
ennunciated his formula, it was not in order to attribute ea;
professo an efficient and salvific in:Huenceto Christ's Humanity.
He was concerned, on the contrary, with the problem of showing
how in Christ there was a two-fold activity, and yet He retained
His unity· of person, there being the one principium quod and
each nature acting with the communication of the other. 150
And St. Thomas himself was fully aware of what St. John
Damascene was teaching and of the scope of his teaching.
When in the Commentary he himself treated of the hypostatic
union and its consequences, Thomas quoted from this same
book of this very work of the Damascene to show that in
Christ there is unity of hypostasis but duality of nature. 151
The formula Thomas took from St. John Damascene is, of
course, a pregnant one, and he saw clearly the doctrinal riches
latent in it. But when he took this formula and applied to it
108 Cf. J. Pierres,

FO'T'ITIAJla Sancti Joannis DamaBceni: ''H (Toii 1C11plov)

YJna.PoJI T;jf 9e6T'J1'TOf,' e Sancto Maximo ConfeasOTe enucleata, Rome

(1940).

°Cf. De fide ortkodoxa, L, ill, cc. 15, 19 (PG 94, coli. 789-U!!S)). "La preoccupazione del Damasceno e certamente quella di voler salvare la distinzione delle
15

due operazioni nel Cristo, giacche, epitomatore del pensiero patristico greco, egli
dove necesssrimente interessarsi delle eresie monofisite e monotelete che finivano col
confondere le due nature. Collocate queste in una distinzione inconfondibilimente
chiara, egli doveva spiegare anche la comunione delle medesime nell'unica Persona
del Verbo. E' qui che si inserisce il concetto di operazione 'teandrica.'" G. Sciarretta, La C'TOCe e la chiesa, nella teologia di S. Paolo, Rome (195!il), p. 108, n. !il.
1111 Cf. In III Sent., dist, VI, q. 1, a. 1, qla. 1, sed contra. Thomas' familiarity
with this Book of the Damascene's De fide orthodoxa is clear from the numerous .
citations from it that can be found, e. g., In II Sent., dist: VI, q. 1, a. 1, q1a. 8,
obj. 1m et ad 1m; q. 1, a. !il, obj. 5m et in corp.; q. !il, a. 1, obj. 6m, etc.

THE REDEMPTIVE ROLE OF CHRIST's RESURRECTION

lOS

the Aristotelian doctrine of instrumentality (with which St.
John and the Alexandrines were not familiar and which even
St. Thomas' immediate predecessors did not invoke), the
resultant development in his teaching is not to be ascribed to
the direct influence of these Greek Fathers, but to his own
penetrating mind which saw the use that could be made of
this formula in expressing the doctrine he wished to propound.m
It is our contention that there were two influences at work
to occasion this development in Aquinas' doctrine .. These
were his own teaching on the Headship of Christ and the
teaching he found in St. Paul's epistles_regarding the salvific
influence of the redemptive mysteries.
St.·Thomas was concerned from the outset with the question
whether the ratio capitis pertained to Christ according to His
human nature. 158 He was unable, when writing the Commentary on the Sentences, to give an unqualified affirmative reply
to his own query: " Utrum Christ,us sit caput Ecclesiae secundum quod homo." He had to invoke the divine nature as well
as the human nature in order to explain Christ's Headship.
The reason for this was that the ratio capitis demands an
efficient influa;usof grace.upon the members, and-according to·
the doctrine of the Commentary-Christ as man did not exercise such an influa;us: the function of Christ as man stopped
short with dispositive causality exercised by way of satisfaction,
merit and intercession.154 Thus Aquinas had to invoke the
divine nature to explain the influa;us gratiae on the part of
159 " ••• concludere possumus doctrinam de causalitate inatrumentali Humanitatis
Christi a S. Thoma non sumptam esse ex theologia Graecorum per intermediam
Damasceni, prout Backes supponit . . . eius (i. e., Damasceni) enim doctrina de
communicatione naturarum, per conceptum .instrumenti expressa, a S. Thoma de
vera et efficiente instrumentali causalitate intelligitur, et sicut per participationem
divinae virtutis Christus tangendo leprosum sanavit, -unde inatrumentaliter miraculum patrasse dicitur, ita etiam ex divinae perfectionis participatione, actiones eius
et passiones nobis salutiferae sunt, id est, ita S. Thomas, instrumentaliter ad spiritualem elfectum operantur." Van Meegereit, De causalitate ..• , pp. 49,90. It is to
be noted that Backes himself pays tribute to the genius of Aquinas in developing
all the doctrine latent in the formula concerned, cf. Die Ckristologie ••. , pp.
188 Cf. In Ill Sent., dist. XID, q. i, a. 1.
•••Ibid., dist. XIII, q. 2, a. I, ad s.

104

NICHOLAS

CROTTY

Christ the Head, while on the other hand the conformitas in
natura which he likewise demanded in a Head could pertain
to Christ according to His human nature only.
It can be readily understood how this duality in the ratio
capitis was unsatisfactory to St. Thomas' mind. Hence when
his philosophical studies led him to admit the co-operation of
instruments in the work of justification, he found the solution
to his difficulty by applying instrumental causality to the
Sacred Humanity. Once this was done, he was able to teach
that Christ is the Head of the Church according to His hlun.an
nature, since His Humanity is the instrumentally-efficient cause
of our grace. And this is in fact what we :find to be his teaching
in the De Veritate. 155
In this way Aquinas' preoccupation with the doctrine de
Christo capite placed great emphasis on the question of the
causality of Christ's Humanity and led him to seek a more
satisfying solution than that expounded in the Commentary on
the Sentences. At the same time there was the role of the
mysteries of that Humanity to be considered: even in the
Commentary a soteriological role had been ascribed to these
mysteries under the influence especially of St. Paul's teaching.
Once again we must irisist on the important role of Romans 4,
25. This verse is cited in the Commentary in connection with
both the Pa-ssion and the Resurrection. 156 St. Thomas could
well propose to himself the task of explaining the function
which the Apostle obviously assigned to these mysteries themselves, to the very actions of dying for us and rising from the
dead. The explanation he had given in the Commentary would
not have satisfied him, for immediate salvific influence is there
ascribed, not to the ,mysteries, formally considered, but to
Christ Himself in Whose Humanity these mysteries exercised
a dispositive causality only. We have considered this point
166 Cf. De Ver., q.
a. 4, in corp. For the influence of this doctrine de Christo
capite, vide Van Meegeren, De causalitate . ••, pp. 6I-i.
168 Cf. In Ill Sent., dist. XIX, a. I, qia. I, obj. 8m et ad 8; In IV Sent., dist.
XLIII, a. 2, qia. I, sed contra; dist. XLVIII, Expositio textus.

THE REDEMPTIVE ROLE OF CHRIST's RESURRECTION

106

at great length above insofar as it bears upon the mystery
of the Resurrection.
But once again, as soon as the concept of instrumentality
in the work of justification was admitted by Aquinas, he was
in possession of a clear and satisfying solution. Since according
to the formula of John Damascene the Humanity of Christ is
the instrument of His Divinity, it follows that the mysteries
of that Humanity-all that it did or suffered-exercised a
salvific efficiency that reaches out to each one of us, because
they act in virtue of the divine power itself. Thus there came
about the development in this aspect of which we have treated;
the salvific influence-and it is now true instrumentally-efficient
causaJity-is attributed to the mysteries themselves, i. e. to the
Passion and the Resurrection in fieri.
Thus, through positing the instrumentality of the Sacred
Humanity and its mysteries St. Thomas was able to present an
explanation that gave unity to his teaching on Christ's Headship and at the same time explained the insistence of the
Apostle on the causality of the redemptive mysteries. Moreover, this particular development is the key to the most of the
progress visible in the later works in regard to the Resurrection.
On the basis of his teaching regarding univocal causes, Thomas
was able immediately to extend· its exemplary causality to
embrace the resurrection of souls as well as that of bodies.
And when he comes to comment on the Pauline letters, he can
explain the teaching of St. Paul in such a way as to lead
directly to his own definitive synthesis, wherein the Passion
and the Resurrection are at once the efficient causes of the
same supernatural effects and the exemplary causes of distinct
effects. Hence, too, from the more or less obscure position it
held in the soteriology of the Commentary on the Sentences,
the Resurrection-because it is, like the Passion itself, the
efficient cause of our salvation-is placed side by side with this
latter mystery in the scheme of redemption.

Ccmclusion
It seems evident, therefore, that the development we have

106

NICHOLAS

CROTTY

been studying in its various ramifications is to be attributed
to the genius of St. Thomas Aquinas in plumbing to the very
depths the theological data already contained in the Ccnnmenr
tary on the Sentences, in making the fullest use of the doctrine
placed at his disposal by the scriptural and patristic data upon
which he was commenting or which he was compiling, and in
viewing all theology as an organic whole, in which progress
and development in one element demand and beget progress and
development in another. He emerges, therefore, as a thinker
never content merely to present the doctrines of his contemporaries or even to present again the doctrine he himself has
given in earlier writings. He emerges rather as a thinker ever
striving to perfect his thought, to present it more persuasively,
to explain it more fully and precisely, to correct its weaknesses
and defects. And it was only the God-given realization that
he would never achieve the complete perfection he sought in
this matter that led him finally to lay aside his quill and write
no more.
NICHOLAS CROTTY,

St. Patd'a Retreat
Urrbrae, Mitcham,

Sooth At.t.Btralia

e. P.

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF
MORTIFICATION

A

L the classic works of the supernatural life devote great
attention to the practice of mortification. The great
writers in the field of Ascetical Theology assure us that
without mortification there can be no true striving after supernatural perfection. This study has been undertaken with the
idea of determining the place of mortification in the life of
virtue as proposed by St. Thomas. We wish to determine the
precise function of mortification in the life of virtue. Once we
have determined this fundamental point we hope to find therein
the solution to three other problems that arise from the doctrine
of the writers on asceticism concerning mortification. These
problems are: 1. Will the inflicting of pain lessen the desire for
pleasures of the flesh? 2. Is not mortification psychologically
dangerous? 8. Will ·mortification strengthen man's will for
future combat?
This question of mortification, however, we will treat neither
as a theological problem nor as a study in Ethics. Rather, we
will treat the various acts of mortification from a psychological
standpoint. We are to treat the acts of mortification, not as
measured according to a moral norm, but as they are in themselves. We are to consider these operations in themselves, their
very make-up, constitution, and mechanism. We are to probe
the iriter-dependence of the various human cognitive and
appetitive faculties and to study the acts of mortification as
contributing to the harmony and smooth functioning of the
human personality or as .destructive of this harmony and equilibrium. We aim to determine the psychological function of
mortification in the development of virtues. The point of determining the psychological function of mortification is this: to

107

108

RICHARD M. HOFFMANN

see if mortification, psychologically speaking, is capable of
attaining the purpose traditionally assigned to it by the great
masters of asceticism.
Regarding terminology, we will use mortification as a very
general. term signifying any kind of restraint and moderation in
activity. The other terms, control, denial, abnegation,
and self-discipline are merely more concrete and determinate
particularizations of this general term.
Our treatment is divided into four parts:
I. Psychological problems involved in the practice of
mortification.
II. Mortification, a requisite in developing intellectual and
moral virtues.
III. Mortification as a means of developing temperance.
IV. Proposed solutions to the psychological problems of
mortification.

I. PsYCHOLOGICAL

PROBLEMs

INvoLVED

IN THE

PRACTICE oF MoRTIFICATION.

The theologian, with St. Thomas, sees man with his two-fold
nature, sensible and intellectual, and the consequent danger of
the preponderance ·of the sensible over the spirituaV This
tendency of the sensible nature to predominate over the
spiritual is deepened and intensified by man's personal sins.
It is the role of mortification to eradicate in man the bad
habits contracted by a life of sin.
But its task goes still further. Not content with allaying in
man all disordered movements of his nature, mortification
combais his lower nature by acts contrary to its yearnings.
The purpose of these acts is to keep the lower nature under
1 " Non enim angelus est compositus ex diversis naturis, ut inclinatio unius naturae
impetum alterius impediat aut retardet; sicut in homine accidit, in quo motus intellectivae partis aut retardatur aut impeditur ex inclinatione partis sensitivae."
Th.eol., I, q. 6i, a. 6).

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF MORTIFICATION

109

perfect control. Mortification causes man to refrain from the
use of that which pleases, even when that use would not be a
hindrance to the love of God in the soul. The precise purpose
of this renunciation is to prepare man for future combats
wherein the practice of virtue will prove a real difficulty.2
Mortification demands the renunciation of the enjoyment of
lawful
This renunciation strengthens dominion over
pride and concupiscence. It prohibits and limits the enjoyment
of certain goods and requires the deliberate choice of· certain
bodily pains such as that inflicted by means of the cilicium and
discipline. This limiting of enjoyment and positive choice of
austerities is meant to interrupt normal comfort and physical
well-being to free the spiritual person from his weakness toward
his body and its instincts. The thoroughly legitimate use of
certain good things is renounced for the sake of purification or
liberation. By mortification the spiritual person is set free from
the life of instincts and acquires a mastery over the entire
domain of concupiscence.
These are formidable tasks assigned to mortification: keep-ing man away from sinful pleasures, overcoming the wounds
left by personal sin and gaining mastery over the violent movements of his sense nature. Because of the nature of these
tasks, acts of virtues appear not less formidable. The
authors of. the classic works on the spiritual life recommend
the discipline several times a week and the wearing of a chain
around some part of the body. The body is to be kept in
perpetual restraint. St. John of the Cross demands of his
followers a deep spirit of mortification. They should reject the
delight they might e:xPerience by looks, 'by conversation with
their neighbor or through any other of· their senses. If they
must of necessity use things which are agreeable to the senses,
they ought to avoid taking pleasure in them. · They should
• " Die Abt.Otung verzicht.et auch dann, wenn der Gebrauch in einzelen jetzt und
bier kein Hindernis der Gottesliebe ware, um sich einzuuben auf schwierge Lagen,
wo wirklick die Tugend auf dem Spiele stehen wurde." Bernhard Haring, Das
Guetz Christi, I Buch, VI Kap. pg. 5SS, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1954, Wewel.

110

RICHARD M. HOFFMANN

rather strive to extinguish and blot out the impression made
by the pleasure as if they had not experienced it at all. They
ought always to tend toward things that are hardest, least
tasteful, most disagreeable, and which cause them aflliction.8
According to the writers of ascetical theology, mortification
connotes a deliberate suppressing of a good, normal and reasonable desire to speak and communicate with others. It entails
· a constant giving-up of good, pleasing and even noble things for
which human nature craves. It demands a constant, ceaseless
surveillance of every conscious act, a holding in of the faculties
when they are clamouring to spring into action. It is a calculated war against the external senses of touch and taste and
hearing and sight, an even more determined checking of the
imagination and memory, a constant demand upon the will
to choose that which is hard and even difficult to do.
With this description of mortification in mind we may well
ask the following questions.
I. Will the infiicti.;,g of pain lessen the urge for sexual

pleasure?

Will the inflicting of pain by means of the discipline and
the cilicium .}essen and subdue .the cravings of the flesh for
sexual delights? Is it not a fact that some-of those who have
tried to subdue and repress the promptings of their sexual
desires by flagellations and fastings have ·experienced even
greater difficulty than before their voluntary maceration of the
flesh?
i. Is not mortification p81Jchologicdllydangerous?

Is it not probable that this war against one's natural instincts,
longings and desires will destroy the correct balance of an
individual? Will it not hinder the smooth and harmonious
functioning of his personality? Will it not leave a man drained
of all the vast, rich power of his personality?
8 San Juan de 1a Cruz, 8ubida. del Mtmte CM'IIU!lo, Liber I, Chapter Xll, Obras
Vol. II, pg. 80, 61.

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF MORTIFICATION

111

8. Does mortification strengthen man's will for future
combataf

Will the fact that a person represses his longing for a satisfaction of one kind strengthen him to deny urgings of another
kind? Will a man who denies himself daily in eating and
drinking and represses an intense desire to speak •strengthen
himself thereby. to overcome temptations of the flesh?

II.

A REQUISITE IN DEVELOPING
INTELLECTUAL

A. Mortification-The

AND MoRAL VmTUES.

Virtue of Temperance Taken in a

General Sense.
In several passages of the Summa Theologica St. Thomas
speaks of the cardinal virtues taken in a very general sense as
signifying a necessary condition and prerequisite for the attaining of an.y moral virtue. He. explains that we can consider the
cardinal virtues according to their common formal aspects. In
this respect they are said to be common to all the virtues.
Every virtue which causes good in reason's act of consideration
can be called prudence; every virtue which causes a rightness
in operation can be called justice. Similarly every virtue which
curbs the passions may be called temperance and every virtue
which strengthens the mind against any passion whatever may
be called fortitude.' In another passage prudence is described
as discretion in any matter whatsoever; justice, as a certain
rectitude of the mind whereby a man does what he ought in
any matter. Temperance is described as a disposition of the
mind moderating any passion or operation so as to keep
them within bounds; and fortitude, as a disposition by which
the soul is strengthened against any assault of the passions
and against the labor involved in operations of any kind.G
Applying this doctrine more specifically to the notion of
temperance we see that the virtue of temperance in this wide
signification governs the whole realm of human emotions and
4

Summa Tkeol., I-ll, q. 61, a. S.

il Sum7114 Tkeol.,J-ll,

q. 61, a. 4.

112

RICHARD M. HOFFMANN

actions. As a general virtue it is a disposition of soul which
imposes moderation upon the operations and upon the urgings
of t:b.e passions.8 Temperance, as a general virtue, is an element
found in each of the moral virtues. It is the element of control
over human passions and activities. Each act of a moral virtue
signifies a certain control over the soul's activity. No moral
virtue can be acquired without this control. The task of justice
is to see that man renders to everyone his due. This can be
done only at the price of controlling selfish interest and motives.
Fortitude strengthens the soul against fears that paralyze
virtuous action. Temperance, as a special virtue, controls
pleasures which are excessively alluring, governing the use of
food, drink and the sexual function. These virtues presuppose
a firm control over the passions and the soul's operations. This
control is the temperateness, the moderation which St. Thomas
calls the general virtue of temperance.
Temperance as a general virtue is the denial or control
exercised as a necessary prerequisite for the attaining of any
moral virtue. In the ascetical life, mortification would seem
from the definitions given of it to be not only temperance as a
general virtue, but also an intensification of this general virtue.
Writers, in treating of the supernatural life, usually employ the
word mortification to signify the more difficult intense and
arduous acts of the general virtue of temperance. To understand the place of these acts of denial and repression in human
striving we must inquire into the psychology of habit formation.

B. Mortification-Necessary
Habits.

for Developing Operative

An operative habit is a disposition, difficult to remove,
according to which a potency or a faculty is disposed well or
badly in relation to an act. It is a steady disposition of a
faculty of the soul by which the faculty's indeterminateness
in regard to its several possible ways of acting is given a
8 Nomen temperantiae significat quandam temperiem, idest moderationem quam
ratio ponit in humanis operationibus et passionibus. TI-ll, q. 14.1, a. !!.

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL

ASPECTS OF MORTIFICATION

118

dynamic, teleological ordination to a certain act, By it the
faculty is given a certain operative unification of its multiple
potentialties. A habit modifies a man, gives a definite channel
along which his almost limitless powers will flow. It is an
accidental form perfecting and determining the faculty.
Operative habits can be developed only in those faculties
which are not determined to one thing. Therefore they are
found in the intellect and in the will, in the imagination,
memory and cogitative power as serving the intellect in its
operation, and in the sensitive appetite as possessing an inborn
aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite, the will.
Except for the habit of first principles, all of our operative
habits, whether they reside in the intellect or in the will or
in those powers of our sensitive part which are susceptible of
habits, are the result of conscious, deliberate, repeated effort.
In the formation· of an operative habit almost all of our
human cognitive and appetitive faculties are involved in some
way, either positively or negatively. Each one of these faculties
has its own proper object toward which it tends by its very
nature. Each one of these faculties has a natural appetite for
its object. Each one of man's faculties or powers is a certain
nature. Each has an active inclination to act according to that
nature, to attain the proper object to which it is transcendentally ordered. This innate inclination of a form toward the
object to which it is ordered St. Thomas calls a natural
appetite. 7
Man possesses a two-fold nature. This nature is composed
of both spiritual and corporeal elements. The powers of both
these natures meet in the soul and therefore the human soul
abounds in a variety of powers.8 The vegetative powers, reproductive, augmentative and nutritive, give the body existence,
• Appetitus Jiaturalis est inclinatio cujuslibet rei in aliquid ex natura sua: unde
naturali appetitu quaelibet potentia desiderat sibi conveniens. I, q. 78, a. 1, ad Sum.
8 Est et alia ratio quare anima humana abundat diversitate potentiarum: videlicet
quia est in confinio spiritualium et corporalium creaturarum et ideo concurrunt in
ipsa virtutes utrarumque creaturarum. I, q. 77, a. 2.

114

RICHARD M. HOFFMANN

enable it to acquire due quantity and preserve it in existence
and in its due quantity.
In common with brute animality man possesses· sensitive
powers of motion, knowledge and appetite. For sense knowledge man is endowed with five external senses each limited to
its own particular object. Since each external sense is thus
limited to its particular object, some common center of sense
perception is necessary to distinguish between the various
external senses and between their various objects. This common
center of sense perception is the internal sense called 8entJ'U8
CO'ITI/m'Uinia.

The other three internal senses further elaborate the material
received from the external ·senses through the sensus communis.
The imagination has as its task to receive and to retain that
which comes to us through the external sense. Its specific act
is to represent objects previously sensed in their absence and
without the limitations of _time and space. The imagination
in man can also reconstruct new objects from the elements
which it has already received. The cogitative power has the
highest function among the internal senses. Its task is to
apprehend the individual as existing sub natura communi. It
formulates particular syllogisms and provides the minor of a
practical syllogism. It prepares the phantasm received from the
imagination for the working of the intellect. Memory in man
has as its task not only the sudden recollection of the past as
in other animals, but also, because it works in conjunction with
the cogitative power, it has the act of reminiscence by which it
quasi-syllogistically seeks for a recollection of the past by the
application of individual intentions. 9
The sense appetite in man follows upon the apprehension
of sense Imowledge. The concupiscible appetite tends toward
sensible goods simply as being suitable to the sensitive nature.
The irascible appetite tends toward goods under the special
aspect of their being attainable only with difficulty.
'I, q. 78, a. 4.

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF MORTIFICATION

115

Man's intellect is a spiritual faculty which knows the essences
of things, formulates universal concepts, judges and reasons.
The will is the appetite following-upon the knowledge of the
intellect.
Each human faculty then has its own propet object toward
which it tends. Yet all of these human faculties, vegetative,
sensitive, motor and spiritual are Wormed by one spiritual
soul. The human soul is the source and origin· of unity in the
human composite, a substantial as well as a dynainic unity.
Because all of man's faculties are informed by the same human
soul, they are inextricably interlocked and interwoven with one
another in their activity. In their operations they depend on
one another, influence one another and hinder or help one
another. The activity of the one affects the activity of the
other.
Because our various faculties are so closely related and intertwined in their operations, if one particular faculty is developed
and trained and cultivated in a special manner, the other
faculties will·be affected. They will, as a natural consequence,
be made to serve and to Ininister to the partictilar faculty
which is being given the preferential treatment. When the
operation of one potency becomes intense the operation of
another potency is hindered and the intense action of this one
potency leaves its effect by way of redundance upon the other. 10
The reason one power is hindered in its act when another is
intensely engaged is this, that one powet alone does not suffice
for such an intense action unless it be assisted by receiving
from the principle of life the infiow that the other powers or
members should receive.11
In their acts, .man's various powers mutually influence one
another. The same holds for the development of an operative
habit which is formed by a succession of acts. In the development of an operative habit, the will must exercise its power as
10 • • • quod cum operaUo unius potentiae fuerit intenaa, impeditur alterius
operatio et e contra. fit redundantia ab una potentia in aliam.
11 IV Sent. 44, i, 1, q. S, 4oum.

116

RICHARD M. HOFFMANN

governor of the whole man. It must exercise its authority to
take care that the executive and sensitive faculties are rendered
habitually subservient to the operations of the intellect and
will.

C. Mortification-and

the InteUectual Habits of Science.

Developing intellectual habits presents difficulties to man.
Nature gives man a foundation for intellectual habits in the
perfection of the senses. Those who by nature possess welldisposed sense organs of knowledge are better able to understand than others, because the sensitive powers are necessary
for the operation of the intellect. Keen sense organs are a
decidedly good start toward intellectual habits. Yet, though
nature gives a foundation for these habits, they must, nevertheless, be developed by repeated acts.
Of the three other speculative habits or virtues assigned to
the intellect the one with which we are concerned primarily
is science, the virtue which deals with truth known through
demonstration. The truth it seeks is that which can be deduced
from first principles or gathered from facts in the light of first
principles furnished by the virtue of understanding. It comprises what we would call knowledge. The acquiring of knowledge is a difficult, somewhat painful process. All of man's
cognitive faculties are involved in this process.
The intellect in acquiring knowledge is dependent upon the
senses. Success in learning then demands control over the sensitive cognitive faculties. The sight and hearing must be made
to concentrate on the matter at hand. It is especially from these
two senses that the imagination, via the sensus communis,
receives the material for its phantasms. Without an habitual
control over these two external sense faculties, the internal
senses will be constantly distracted and unable to serve the intellect in acquiring knowledge. The imagination, together with
the cogitative power and memory, must elaborate the phantasm, the material of which it has received from the external
senses. These three internal senses prepare the phantasm for the

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF MORTIFICATION

117

intellect. These internal senses are susceptive of habits because
they are possessed of a certain indetermination and can be
moved at the command of reason. They must be controlled,
must be brought to obey the will in producing the phantasm
of the matter one wishes to master. Other phantasms will
present themselves to distract the intellect's attention. Constant care is required to keep the proper phantasm presented
to the intellect so that this spiritual faculty can concentrate
solely on this particular bit of knowledge at hand. Because the
intellect is so dependent upon the internal senses both in
acquiring new knowledge and in recalling things already learned,
these three internal senses must be made to serve the intellect,
must be made to present the intellect with the proper phantasms. They must be made to reject other phantasms that come
forth and threaten to dispel the one the intellect is using. The
will, as possessing power over these faculties can acquire a
rather strict domination over them by repeated victories. Its
control is never absolute. Even the limited control it attains
must be continually guarded and kept up. The imagination,
the memory and the cogitative power tend by their nature to
their own objects. They are part of the equipment of our
sensitive nature. The internal senses, if left to' follow their own
inclination, will not present the intellect with the phantasms
it needs to conserve and increase its knowledge. Thus the
intellectual habits of scientific knowledge are weakened. Our
knowledge, laboriously acquired, disappears. This process St.
Thomas describes in speaking of the diminution of habits.
He states that all habits which are gradually undermined by
contrary agents are diminished or destroyed altogether by long
cessation from act as is clearly seen in the case both of virtue
and science. Thus when man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, strange imaginings or fancies which at times are
in opposition to these intellectual habits arise in the imagination. Unless a man check these fantasies or imaginings by
frequent use of his intellectual habits, he becomes less apt to
make correct judgments and sometimes is completely disposed

118

RICHARD M. HOFFMANN

to the contrary. Thus the intellectual habit is diminished or
even wholly destroyed by cessation from act. 12
The formation of the intellectual habits of knowledge, therefore, presupposes that the sense faculties, particularly the
internal sense faculties, be checked and controlled in their
operations and that their operations be made to serve the
operation of the intellect.

D. Mcwtifioation and the MMal Habits of Prudence, Justice,
and FMtitude.
Though the intellectual virtues demand as a condition a
certain subjection of the sense faculties to reason, yet they are
imperfect virtues. They perfect a man in a particular line of
activity. They can make a man a good mathematician or a
good architect without· influencing his conduct in other fields.
Developing perfect virtues, i. e., those habits which make the
whole man good, presents a greater problem and difficulty for
man. These perfect virtues which make the whole man good
belong to the will, or if found in another faculty, it is in that
faculty insofar as it is moved by the will.
Prudence perfects the whole man. Though residing in the
intellect, it is in a very real sense a moral virtue because it
deals with human acts. Its proper task is to enable a man to
reason well with regard to right conduct as a whole. Prudence
is wisdom about human affairs. The proper end of each moral
virtue consists precisely in conformity with right reason. It
belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in what manner
and by what means a man can in a concrete action attain that
mean of right reason. It applies to action the first principles
of the practical order. It is the virtue that gets things done
12 Similiter etiam est ex parte habitum intellectualium, secundum quod est homo
promptus ad recte judicandum de imaginatis. Cum igitur homo cessat ab usu
intellectualis habitus insurgunt imaginationes extraneae, et quandoque ad contrarium
habitus quodammodo
ducentes: ita quod nisi per freciuentem usum
succidantur, vel comprimantur, redditur homo minus aptus ad recte judicandum et
quandoque totaliter disponitur ad contrarium. · Et sic per cessationem ab actu
diminuitur vel etiam corrumpitur intellectualis habitus. I-n, q. 58, a. s.

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF MORTIFICATION

119

the way they should be done. Its perfection consists in excellence of command. Its principal act, therefore, is one of command whereby a man applies the knowledge he has to the
purpose of appetition and operation.
Such a habit is not easy to acquire. Its task is to apply
universal knowledge to particulars. It, therefore, presupposes
some knowledge. It uses knowledge already attained and by its
three acts of judgment, counsel, and command it applies this
knowledge to some particular act to be placed here and now.
St. Thomas states that prudence is corrupted by the passions.18
He gives an explanation of this in another part of the Summa,
showing how reason has four acts in matters of actions. The
first presupposed, to prudence, is the simple understanding
which grasps some end as good. The passions, by engaging the
attention of the internal senses, influence the intellect's work
of understanding and tend to hinder the formation of a habit
of knowledge and to diminish it if already acquired. The vices
are habits by which the passions have acquired mastery over
the will. Thus the passions, especially through the vice of lust,
hinder the act of understanding. The three acts of prudence,
judgment, counsel, and command, are also hindered by lust.
Counsel about what is to be done for the attaining of an end is
hindered by the concupiscence of lust and in this respect there
is rashness, which denotes an absence of counsel. Judgment
about things to be done is also hampered by lust and the
result is thoughtlessness. The reason's command about the
thing to be done is likewise impeded by lust in this, that a man,
carried away by concupiscence, is hindered from doing what
his reason ordered to be done.u
Justice can be practiced only by controlling selfish interests
and motives. It is not difficult to see that for a man to be
perfectly fair and just in each of his dealings with every one
of his fellow men presupposes and demands a strong control.
18 Prudentia non directe tollitur per oblivionem sed magis corrumpitur per passiones. n-n, q. 47, a. 16.
J' 11-ll, q. loS, a. G.

120

RICHARD M. HOFFMANN

But it is particularly in regard to the virtues of fortitude and
temperance that we see the need of strong control and denial.
It is the task of fortitude to guard the will against being
withdrawn from the good of reason through the fear of bodily
evil. Fortitude as a cardinal virtue has as its assigned role the
governing of the irascible appetite. The irascible appetite is
the sense appetite that· tends toward sensible goods under the
aspect of the good as difficult to attain. A consideration of the
difficulties involved in the attainment of this virtue illuminates
the doctrine on the dual nature of man and the consequent
need or mortification in striving for virtue.
In speaking of the angels, St. Thomas says that the angel
is not a combination or compound of different natures so that
the inclination of one part hinders or retards the tendency of
the other as in man in whom the intellective part is hindered
over his natural desire to possess and to use material goods,
and retarded by the inclination of his sensitive part. 15 Speaking
of the relation of these two natures to each other in man he
explains that the powers of the sensitive part, save for the
vegetative powers, are born to obey reason's command. 16 But
this power of the will over the movements of the sense appetite
is not a complete, absolute power. The soul rules the members
of the body by a despotic power because the members of the
body cannot in any way resist the rule of the soul. But reason
rules the concupiscible and irascible appetite by a political
power. This means that the sensitive appetite has something
proper to itself whence it resists the commands of reason. The
concupiscible and irascible powers resist reason insofar as we
sense or imagine something pleasant which reason forbids or
something unpleasant which reason commands. 17 In developing
I, q. 6!!, a. 6.
Et ideo voluntas per modum agentis movet onmes animae potentias ad suos
actus, praeter vires naturales vegetativae partis, quae nostro arbitrio non subduntur.
I, q. 8!!, a. 4.
17 Sic igitur anima dominatur corpori despotico principatu quia corporis membra
in nullo resistere possunt imperio animae. . . . lntellectus autem, seu ratio dicitur
principari irascibili et concupiscibili politico principatu; quia appetitus sensibilis
1"

18

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASP:ElCTS OF MORTIFICATION

121

the habit of fortitude the will's task is clear. It must strengthen
and tighten its control over the movements of the sense appetite.
Fortitude strengthens the reason to control the passions of
the irascible appetite. These passions, following upon sense
knowledge and following their own natural bent, incline the soul
to flee from every bodily harm, especially death. Fortitude
guards the will against being withdrawn from the good of reason
through the urgings of these passions, through the fear of bodily
evil. The will must override the promptings of the sense
appetite which shrinks from bodily harm, when reason sees this
bodily harm should be suffered for some greater good.
Habitual control by the will over all the movements of the
irascible appetite demands as a postulate previous strong acts
of the will, restraining, directing and controlling the movements
of this appetite. Each one of these single acts which begets the
virtue means a concomitant act of denial. It means that the
will has intervened in the natural movement of the sense
appetite toward an object convenient to it. It has allowed the
movement of the sense appetite toward a convenient object to
proceed only to a certain point, and then has restrained and
curtailed this movement so that its functioning would not
hinder but would rather assist the will's movement toward
another good it has chosen. Should reason see that it can only
effect this indirectly by removing the phantasm which has
caused the passion to arise, a complete removal of the passion
is necessary. The virtue of fortitude, therefore, is acquired by
repeated acts of denial, acts by which reason curtails the movements of sense or turns these movements to serve its own chosen
purpose.
We can summarize the findings of this section by stating
simply that some denial, repression and control are the necessary prerequisites for success in any field of human endeavor.
In acquiring knowledge, some persons, because of well-disposed
habet aliquod proprium unde potest reniti imperio rationis. Unde experimur, irascibilem vel concupiscibilem rationi repugnare per hoc quod sentimus vel imaginamur
aliquod delectabile quod ratio vetat; vel triste quod ratio praecipit. I, q. 81, a. 8,
ad2um.

RICHARD M. HOFFMANN

sense organs, enjoy an advantage. Yet, even for these talented
persons and aU the more for those less-gifted, habits of knowledge are devefoped only by a process of subordinating the sense
faculties to the work of the intellect. This involves a degree of
denial and control. Moral virtues which perfect the whole man
demand much greater control and denial. Thus we can state
that, excluding the habits of vice and the habits of first principles, a certain degree of temperance, control and repression
is a prerequisite and concomitant condition for the formation
habit and therefore for success in human
of every
endeavor.

III. MoRTIFICATION As A MEANs oF DEVELOPING TEMPERANCE.
It is in acquiring of the virtue of temperance that we can
see more vividly and more in detail how an element of mortification enters in to the development of a moral virtue. Temperance regulates the use of food, drink and venereal pleasure.
We consider this virtue more in detail because it is in constant
use in our daily lives. Comparing temperance to meekness, the
virtue which governs anger, St. Thomas notes that the impetuousness of anger is caused by some incident as a painful hurt
and that therefore it soon passes, though its impetus be great.
But the impetuousness of the desires for pleasures of touch
proceeds from a natural cause. Therefore this desire is more
lasting and more general.18 Pleasures of touch occur every day
so that temperance is in very general use.19
Temperance .is not only in constant use, it is also of vital
importance in the conducting of human life. For this we can
quote the authority of St. Thomas. He states that temperance
withholds us from those things which are most seductive, from
things which have a most disturbing effect on the souP' The
18 " Impetus irae causatur ex quodam accidente, puta ex aliqua laesione contristante: et ideo cito transit, quamvis magnum impetum habeat. Sed impetus concupiscentiae delectabilium tactus procedit ex causa naturali: unde est diuturnior et
communior." 11-11, q. 141, a. 7, ad !rum.
18 11-11, q. 141, a. 8, ad Sum.
so "· Ea ·circa quae est temperantia maxime possunt animum inquietare. • • ."
11-11, q. 141, a. i, ad ium.

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF MORTIFICATION

liS

things from which temperance withholds us pertain to the
lowest part in man, his animal nature, and therefore it is
natural that such things should defile him. Temperance withstands the vices ,that bring most dishonor on man. 21 Intemperance is opposed to man's clarity and beauty because the
pleasures which are the matter of intemperance dim the light
of reason from which all the clarity and beauty of virtue arises.22
Because this virtue is in such constant use and is so important
in leading a truly human life, and because it shows in a clear
way the mutual working of our dual nature, we use it as an
example to illustrate the function of mortification in developing
a virtue.
Temperance has as its task the regulating and controlling of
the concupiscible appetite. To discuss the virtue of temperance
we must first examine the passions which this virtue regulates.
A passion is an operation, a movement of the sense appetite
which follows upon sense knowledge and is necessarily accompanied by some bodily transformation. The soul alone is not
and cannot be the subject of a passion. The true subject of a
passion is the composite of both soul and body and the true
nature of a passion is both psychic and somatic. While a
physical transmutation is related to the act of sense knowledge
only per accidens, such a transformation is ordered per se to
the act of sense appetition, so that in the very definition of
passion there is included some natural transmutation of the
organ.
The word passion stresses the passive side of the movement
of the sense appetite. But a passion is an active thing as well.
The sense appetite, in operation, together with its concomitant
bodily reactions, is passive in the sense that it has been acted
upon by the attractive sensible good. Thus the organ may be
called the patient and the sensible good the agent. Nonetheless,
in its own right a passion is definitely active. For it is a tendency, a striving toward the agent, a positive aspiration to
possess the sensible good.
21

D-11, q. 141, a. t, ad Sum.

•• 11-11, q. 141, a. 4, c.

RICHARD M. HOFFMANN

The object of the concupiscible appetite is that which is
delightful to sense. The first movement of this appetite called
love is the attraction which the appetite receives from the
object itself. The object apprehended as good impresses itself
on the faculty and proportions the faculty to itself. Love
adapts the faculty to the object, creates in the appetite a
convenience with the object. Love is the active, vital reaction
of the appetite to the drawing force of the object.
Good causes in the sense appetite a certain inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in respect to itself. But if the good is
not yet possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement toward
the attainment of the good loved. And this is the passion of
desire or concupiscence. 23 Pleasure is that movement of the
sense appetite which follows the possession of the desired good.
At the moment of pleasure, the appetite rests and is quieted.
The virtue of temperance governs the pleasures of touch.
Because the pleasures of touch are the greatest of all bodily
pleasures and are so vehement, 24 the passions of love and
concupiscence moving toward these pleasures are likewise
vehement. The concupiscible appetite attains its greatest impetuosity and consequently its most dangerous excess at the
instant of desire. The effect of love, when the beloved object
is not possessed, is concupiscence. And as Augustine says, we
are more sensitive lo love when we lack that which we love.
Consequently, of all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence
is most felt. 25 And temperance must govern and control the
passions of love and concupiscence tending toward the vehement pleasures of touch.
To speak of developing temperance we must first treat of
the virtue of continence. St. Thomas uses the word continence
to describe the virtue whereby a man resists evil desires which
are vehement in him. It is the task of continence to regulate
•• I-II, q. !l8, a. 4.
•• "Quia manifestum est quod id quod est naturale in unoquoque, est potentissimum. Hujusmodi autem delectationes tactus sunt ad quas ordinatur concupiscentiae naturales, sicut cibi et venerea et hujusmodi." I-II, q. 31, a. 6.
•• I-II, q. 25, a. 2, ad lum.

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL

ASPECTS OF MORTIFICATION

lfl5

the pleasures of touch. But continence resides in the will and
not in the concupiscible power. In this it differs from temperance. In the continent man the concupiscible appetite breaks
out into evil and vehement desires. But the will chooses not
to follow them. With temperance residing in the concupiscible
appetite, this appetite is rendered submissive to reason in such
a way that ordinarily, vehement passions contrary to reason do
not arise in it. In the continent man the concupiscible appetite
is not submissive. It resists reason by its vehement desires.
Continence has something of virtue and in another way it falls
short of the idea of virtue. Continence can be compared to
temperance as the imperfect to the perfect.
The man who desires to practice continence and to develop
the virtue of continence into the virtue of temperance has a
difficult task facing him. For the married person continence
regarding veneral pleasure means using one's sexual function
properly and solely with one's married partner. For the
unmarried it means total abstention from deliberate sexual
pleasure. The contil,lent man must govern his reproductive
function according to right reason. This reproductive function
is numbered among his vegetative powers and is not under
the direct control of the will. The acts of the generative function are controlled by the will indirectly through its control
of the sense appetite. 26
This process we wish to describe more in detail. Neither the
intellect nor the will operates in a spiritual vacuum. Man
possesses besides his spiritual powers the inferior powers of
sensory and vegetative life. These lower faculties and their acts
are not in complete isolation from the operation of the intellect
and the will. There is a constant inter-action between the lower
and higher powers. Because all of the faculties are related to
the one soul as their principle, their acts are inextricably interwoven with one another. The absolute dependence of the
intellect upon the senses as the material and instrumental cause
of intellectual knowledge is a fundamental truth of Thomistic
•• I-II, q. 17, a. 8, ad Sum.

126

RICHARD M. HOFFMANN

psychology. Man must derive his knowledge by way of abstraction from sensible matter. The will is in a somewhat similar
position. The appetitive acts of the sensory part are constantly
affecting the acts of the -rational appetite. The will is an
appetite that finds itself, as it were, surrounded by other
appetites, each calling upon it to lend support to its inclinanations and to add its consent to the objects which have
moved it.
Because of his dual or two-fold nature man is in the unique
position of having a two-fold elicited appetite, the will and the
sense appetite. The movements of these appetites are sometimes parallel, often diverse. Each appetite is moved according
to its own object and according to the laws of its own particular
nature. When these objects conflict, there is an inward struggle.
It ends only when one appetite succumbs to the other. Therefore, in its activity, the will does not operate in the realm of
pure spirituality. It operates as existing in a being which
participates in both the world of spirit and the world of matter.
No other faculty of the soul can move the will by efficient
causality. The intellect can move the will by presenting it
with its object and by means of this object exercises formal
-and final causality on the will. The senses and the sense
appetite can move the will mediately through the intellect.
That which is apprehended under the aspect of the good and
the suitable moves the will in the manner of an object. But
an object appears good and suitable because of two factors,
the condition of the thing proposed and the condition of the
one to whom it is proposed. But a man is changed to a certain
disposition by reason of some passion so that something appears
suitable to him which would not appear suitable to him were
he not affected by that passion. In this way, by influencing
the condition of the one who is to make a judgment, the
passions influence the will which follows on the judgment. 27
•• " ld quod apprehenditur sub ratione boni et convenientis movet voluntatem
per modum objecti. Quod autem aliquid videatur bonum et conveniens, ex duobus
contigit: scilicet ex conditione ejus quod proponitur et ejus .cui proponitur ....

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL

ASPECTS OF MORTIFICATION

l!l7

The passions therefore influence the will through the intellect.
This they can do because of the nature of the intellect's activity
in presenting an object to the will as desirable. This can be
seen from a consideration of the mutual causality of intellect
and will.
The will enjoys an active indifference towards the objects
presented to it. It has the power to choose or refuse them. It
cannot be forced or coerced to choose any particular object
presented to it. The active indifference of the will must extend
to the judgment which. specifies the act of the will. Otherwise
the will would be coerced by the intellect and would not be
free. To say simply and without qualification that the will
follows the judgment of the intellect is to assign an extrinsic
determination to the will that destroys its freedom.
Yet we cannot say that the will is independent of the intellectual judgment, for the will is precisely the appetite that ·
follows upon the judgment of the intellect. If the intellect
presents an object which it has judged to be preferred over the
others, the will follows the judgment of the intellect. To understand how the will follows upon the judgment of the intellect
and yet retains its freedom of choice, we must understand the
nature of the judgment which the will follows.
Among the judgments of the intellect we distinguish speculative judgments and practical judgments. A speculative
judgment is an act of the intellect which simply affirms a
truth and which has no reference to any kind of action. A
practical judgment is a judgment ordered to action, either
remotely or proximately. If such a judgment merely exi>resses
a universal principle of action, it is called a " speculativopractical " judgment. It is remotely ordered to action. The
practical judgment proximately ordered to action is called
" practico-practical." It is a singular, particular judgment,
made in the light of all the present, individuating circumstances
and conditions in which the subject finds himself. Only this
Manifestum est autem quod secundum passionem appetitus sensitivi immutatur
homo ad aliquam dispositionem. Unde secundum quod homo est in passione aliqua
videtur sibi aliquid conveniens quod non videtur extra passionem existenti."

128

RICHARD M. HOFFMANN

practico-practical judgment is sufficiently particular to serve
as that knowledge from which an act of the will immediately
flows. Confronted with the particular situation in which this
particular subject finds himself and surrounded by all the conditions and circumstances which are unrenewable and unique
to this particular case, the intellect is able to consider the
possible courses of action with a complete indifference. It can
compare the various courses of action, each a particular good,
with the idea of the perfect good and can see in each no compelling reason for action.
To formulate a practical judgment, man must leave the
sphere of the abstract and the universal and must descend to
the realm of particular and individual. Only here can he lay
hold of the singular object which can serve as the end and
purpose of action. 28 But it is in this same sphere of concrete
and singular that the movement of the sense appetite arise.
These passions, aroused by the apprehension of sense and with
the bodily changes that accompany them, can alter the cognitive character of the senses, particularly of the imagination
and of the cogitative power because these are faculties using
bodily organs. Since these faculties are the means by which
the intellect can know the singular, any modification of their
cognitive operations will necessarily affect the judgment of the
practical reason. For this reason the judgment of the practical
reason is often at variance with the speculative judgment which
is not affected by the passions.
In De V eritate St. Thomas says that the good grasped by
the universal reason does not move the will except by a particular apprehension, because actions are in the sphere of
particulars. And because of passion there can be bodily change
in this realm of sense. This change, resulting from the passion,
hinders and can sometimes completely blind the particular
•• " ..• cum motus et operationes sint in singularibus, et ab universali propositione
non possit fieri descensus ad conclusionem particularem nisi mediante assumptione
particulari; non potest universalis conceptio intellectus applicari ad electionem
operis, quae est quasi conclusio in operabilibus, ut dicitur in VII Ethic., nisi mediante
apprehensione particulari." Q. D. DeVer., q. 14, a. 4, ad 3um.

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF MORTIFICATION

129

apprehension so that what the superior reason knows in the
universal it cannot apply to the particular case. Thus the will
is moved toward that good which the particular reason presents
and not by the good presented by the intellect. 29
In the Summa Theologica he treats the same problem. He
states that a passion of the sensitive appetite can move the
will only indirectly, first by a certain abstraction. All the soul's
powers are rooted in the one essence of the soul and therefore,
when one power performs an intense act, another power becomes
remiss or is even entirely impeded. This occurs because the
energy of the soul, being centered on one thing, is less able
to be directed to several, and the attention of the soul, being
fixed on one thing, is withheld from others. Secondly, a passion
affects the will indirectly because the judgment and apprehension of reason are impeded by a vehement and inordinate apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the estimative
power. The apprehension of the imagination and the judgment
of the estimative power follow the passion of the sensitive
appetite and therefore those affected by a passion do not easily
tum their imagination away from the object of the passion.
Thus the judgment of the reason often follows the passion of
the sensitive appetite and as a result, the will follows it also,
since it is natural for it to follow the judgment of the reason. 80
•• " Objectum enim voluntatis est bonum apprehensum, sed bonum apprehensum
a ratione universali non movet nisi mediante apprehensione particulari ut dicitur in
ill de Anima, eo quod actus sunt in particularibus. Ex ipsa autem passione appetitus
sensitivi potest esse interdum complexio corporis, quaecumque impressio corporalis:
quia ex hoc quod appetitus ille utitur organo, impeditur et interdum totaliter
ligatur ipsa particularis apprehensio, vel id quod ratio superior dictat in universali,
ut non applicetur actu ad hoc particulare. Et sic "oluntas in appetendo movetur
ad ilium bonum quod sibi nuntiat apprehensio particularis, praetermisso illo bono
quod nuntiat ratio universalis." De Ver., q. U, a. 9, ad 6um.
80 '' Passio appetitus sensitivi non potest directe trahere aut movere voluntatem,
sed indirecte potest; et hoc dupliciter: uno modo quidem secundum quamdam
abstrationem; cum enim omnes potentiae animae in una essentia animae radicentur,
necesse est quod quando una potentia intenditur in suo actu, altera in suo actu
remittatur, vel etiam totaliter in suo actu impediatur, tum quia omnis virtus ad
plura dispersa fit minor, unde e contrario quando intenditur circa unum, minus
potest ad alia dispergi; tum quia in operibus animae requiritur quaedam intentio,
quae dum vehementer applicatur ad unum, non potest alteri vehementer attendere

180

RICHARD M. HOFFMANN

We see, therefore, that the intellect must make use of the
internal senses to bring to act the knowledge that it possesses
in an habitual manner. Gripped by a passion which fixes the
imagination and the cogitative power exclusively upon the
delightful object, the subject is faced with great difficulty in
producing a contrary phantasm, a phantasm needed by the
intellect to actualize the habitual knowledge by which the
sensible object would be judged in a rational way.
The fact that there is a discrepancy between what the
intellect affirms as good in the universal and what it judges to
be good in the last practical judgment shows that there are
in the mind two universal judgments and consequently two
particular judgments deducible from them in the mind. The
passion which arises··can greatly hinder the reason in making
a practical conclusion under the one universal and can incline
it very strongly toward making the practical conclusion under
the other universal.
The freedom of the will depends upon the freedom of the
intellect to deliberate on the merits of the alternative courses
of action. The will's freedom demands as a prerequisite that
the intellect should not be so bound by a passion that it cannot
consider those things which are contrary to the object of the
passion. So long as the reason remains indifferent in the presence of passion and is able to judge that the object of the
passion is only a particular good, the will remains free to accept
or reject that object to whcih the passion inclines.
The will can move the sense appetite only through the
imagination and the cogitative power. Once the imagination
and the cogitative power have provided the sense appetite with
alio modo ex parte objecti voluntatis, quod est bonum ratione apprehensum. lmpeditur enim judicium et apprehensio rationis propter vehementem et inordinatam
apprehensionem imaginationis et judicium virtutis aestimativae, ut patet in amentibus. Manifestum est autem quod passionem appetitus sensitivi sequitur imaginationis apprehensio et judicium aestimativae, sicut etiam dispositionem linguae
sequitur judicium gustus; unde videmus quod homines in aliqua passione existentes
non facile imaginationem avertunt ab his quae afficiuntur; unde per consequens
judicium rationis plerumque sequitur passionem sensitivi, et per consequens, motus
voluntatis, qui natus est semper sequi judicium rationis." 1-11, q. 77, a. 1.

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF MORTIFICATION

181

its object, the appetite tends toward that object and the will
cannot destroy this natural movement of the sense appetite.
The task of the will, therefore, is clear. To maintain its
supremacy, to assure its predominance over the urgings of the
passions, the will must be able to cause the internal senses to
produce a substitute image for the one which is giving rise to
a passion which it wishes to remove. The will has the power
to move the intellect in the formation of the last practical
judgment by which the act of the will is specified. To make
this singular judgment, the intellect must revert to the sphere
of the singular. ·This it can do only by reverting to the internal
senses. Therefore the will can exercise unhampered control over
the practical judgment of the intellect only by controlling the
internal senses, by having them call forth the precise image it
wants. But the will's control over the imagination and consequently over the other internal senses of memory and cogi..
tative power is hampered by the passions.
It is a phantasm of the imagination further elaborated by
the conjoined working of the cogitative power and memory
that presents the passions with their object. The passions, upon
receiving their object, immediately function. And with the
awakening of the passions there occurs a connatural bodily
transformation. The imagination, cogitative power and memory
are also organic faculties. They are strongly influenced in their
operation by the bodily transformation caused by the passions.
The precise effect of the bodily transformation caused by the
passion is to rivet and to fix the attention of the imagination
and of the other internal senses on the object of the passions.
Being on the same organic plane with the passions, the internal
senses are greatly disturbed by the bodily movement caused by
the passions. The vehement movement of the passions focuses
the attention of these internal senses on the object of the
passions. Therefore, once the passions are aroused by an object
presented to them by the internal senses, the whole bent of the
internal senses is toward that object which they have presented
to the passions. Unless a higher power intervenes, the attention

RICHARD M. HOFFMANN

of these senses will remain riveted on this object. Profoundly
influenced by the bodily movement of the passions, they become
captivated by the object pleasing to the senses. Because the
intellect in making a practico-practical judgment must revert
to the sphere of the singular, must revert to the internal senses
and because these same internal senses, disturbed by the bodily
movement of 'the passions, have their attention fixed upon
the object pleasing to the passions, the passions hamper the
judgment of the intellect, the judgment which specifies the will.
This is the precise case of the continent man. In him vehement passions urging him, to illicit sexual pleasure arise. The
phantasm of the imagination further elaborated by the memory
and cogitative power presents the passions of love and concupiscence with their object. In this case the object is a venereal
delight. The commingled passions of love and concupiscence,
upon being presented with their object, immediately move
toward that object. The continent person has made by means
of his practical intellect a speculativo-practical judgment that
all deliberate sexual pleasures contrary to right reason are to be
avoided. Yet here and now he is confronted with a particular
situation and he must make a practico-practical judgment.
His judgment will either be a practical conclusion flowing from
the speculativo-practical judgment that all illicit deliberate
sexual pleasures are to be avoided, or it will be a practicopractical judgment flowing from another speculativo-practical
judgment that sexual pleasures are very delightful and therefore to be chosen.
The internal senses have presented the passions of love and
desire with an object pleasing' to them. The passions cause a
bodily transformation which in the case of venereal pleasure
is particularly vehement. The internal senses consequently
have their attention riveted on this pleasurable object. Profoundly disturbed by the movement of the passions, they are
captivated by the pleasing object. Now the intellect, to make
its practico-practical judgment, must revert to the phantasm.
But the phantasm that it finds present is that of the illicit,

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL

ASPECTS OF MORTIFICATION

188

sexual object, an object opposed to right reason. The intellect
need not make its practico-practical judgment in favor of that
object. The will can exercise its control and make the intellect
deliberate on the opposite object; abstention from sexual delight
here and now and can determine the judgment to choose this
abstention. But as long as the passions remain aroused they
disturb the internal senses and keep the attention of the internal
senses transfixed on their object. By their bodily transformation they continue to influence and to disturb the internal senses
which operate on the same bodily plane as the passions. Because
the intellect is so dependent upon the sensible phantasm, its
attention is also being focused on the sexual satisfaction. Consequently the will has a tremendous struggle to cause the
intellect to make its judgment contrary to sexual satisfaction.
The will is not necessitated by the urgings of the passions.· But
as long as they remain aroused, greater and special strength
of will must be expended to resist them. As long as they
remain awakened the struggle will continue.
The will can exercise a certain control over the passions· by
causing the internal senses to present a different phantasm to
the passions. The will does this by directing the attention of
the internal senses and the intellect to some other object.
Deprived of the phantasm which has caused them to arise, the
passions with their accompanying bodily transformation subside and the will can continue more tranquilly' in its resolve
to abstain from all illicit sexual enjoyment. But often the
offending phantasm, though rejected and dispelled, will continue to return unbidden into the imagination. Thus the
struggle continues. The will must continue to make strong
and determined acts, forcing the intellect to consider an object
different from that which aroused the passions.
This is precisely the plight of the continent man who must
resist desires in him which are vehement. For continence has
for its matter the desires for pleasures of touch, not as moderating them, but rather its task is to resist them.
Because continence is related to temperance as the imperfect

184

RICHARD M. HOFFMANN

to the perfect, the beginning of the virtue of temperance is the
virtue of continence. To convert continence into temperance
the will must repeat over and over its victories over the sense
appetite. By repeated victories it acquires control over the
concupiscible appetite. This must be a control of such a kind
that no longer will the passions rush vehemently toward the
object pleasing to them, but rather will submit calmly to the
command of the will, and will move toward an object pleasing
to them only insofar as the will permits.
Moral virtues are habits of choosing the means. Attaining
the mean of virtue is difficult. This is certainly true of those
virtues dealing with the passions. To decline from a mean is
easy. Following Aristotle, St. Thomas states that precisely
because of the difficulty involved in attaining the mean of
virtue, he who is striving to attain this mean should recede
more from that extreme which is more contrary to the virtue
desired. 31 Now it is stated in the Summa that the opposite of
lust is not found in many because men are more inclined to
pleasure. St. Thomas remarks also, in his Commentary on the
Ethics, that only infrequently does it happen that men fail by
defect in regard to pleasure, by enjoying less pleasure than they
ought, less than is required for health and good disposition of
the body and for fitting dealings with their fellow men.32 Sins
of intemperance are most common because they are connected
with the common use of human life and in these many happen
to sin.88
In the Commentary on the Ethics we read also that all are
naturally inclined to pleasures and delights. Therefore they who
are striving for virtue must be on their guard against these
pleasures because once something is apprehended as delightful,
it easily draws· the appetite. It is difficult to make a correct
judgment about pleasure because, while dwelling upon it and
considering it, the appetite is so strongly drawn toward it.
81 Ezpositio in Decem LibToa Ethicorum, Lib II, Lectio XI.
•• Ibid., Lib ill, Lectio XXI.
.
88 11-11, q. 14!!, a. 4, Objectio !!.

SOME PSYClBOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF :MO:RTfFiCATION

185

It is not difficult, therefore, to see that, if in striving for virtue
one must recede more from that extreme which is more contrary
to the virtue desired, then in striving for temperance, efforts
must be directed against unduly bodily pleasure and delights.
Aristotle illustrates this process. If we have a bent piece of
wood and we wish to straighten it, we must bend in quite far
in the opposite direction if we wish to restore it to its original
position. St. Thomas adds that this is the most efficacious way
of attaining a virtue and is the way marked out for those who
have a really strong desire to avoid vice and practice virtue. 8'
Because the pleasures of touch are so alluring, to attain the
virtue of temperance one must bend his energies in the opposite
direction. The first requisite for the practice of temperance is
a strict control over the external senses. Such
control
over the sense of ,sight is vital because the imagination relies
so heavily on the sense of sight for so many of its images.
Despite control over external senses, phantasms of forbidden
objects will arise in the imagination. Control of this faculty
is all important in the acquiring of temperance because ultimately it supplies the material for the object of the passions.
The will can never acquire complete control over this faculty.
But it can bring it to a certain subjection. The imagination,
if left to itself, will wander through the whole gamut of sensible
phantasms it has within its possession. It will take the phantasms it has stored up and by combining them, will form new
and varied phantasms. It is a ceaseless, tireless movie machine,
producing images delightful to the sensitive part of man since
it is to this realm in man that it belongs. The images it produces, because they are pleasing to sense, will be elaborated
by the cogitative power and will serve to arouse the various
passions of the sense appetite.
But the will can take this tireless faculty in hand, can bend
and mold its activity so that in its activity it will not serve
merely the sensitive part. The will can direct the imagination's
energy and activity to supply phantasms that the intellect
"' Ezpositio in Decem Libroa Etkicorum, Lib. ll, Lectio XI.

186

RICHARD M. HOFFMANN

needs in acquiring knowledge. By refusing to allow the imagination unlimited freedom, by harnessing its energy and making
it use its energy to serve the intellect, the will acquires a certain
control over this restless faculty so that it will obey the directions and commands of the will with a certain docility. By
means of study and judicious reading a person can direct his
imagination along proper channels, can see to it that it is occupied with objects not contrary to the demands of temperance.
A person can train his imagination too, so that as soon as an
unlawful phantasm arises and he becomes aware of it, immediately he can make his imagination fasten its attention on some
other phantasm chosen beforehand for precisely such an occasion, a phantasm the imagination and the whole sensitive part
will find pleasing, without its being representative of an object
contrary to the moral law.
Through controlling the operation of the imagination proper,
the will controls the workings of the other two internal sense
faculties of memory and the cognitative power. Thus indirectly,
it attains a certain mastery over the passions. When once it
has attained this mastery over the passions, the will is not
forced to fight and struggle against vehement sense desires.
By closely guarding the internal sense faculties in their operation and by refusing to choose the objects which the passions
find pleasing, the will begins to forge a control over the concupiscible appetite. This appetite, if left to itself, becomes
stronger, more vehement .and more impulsive until a very
insignificant stimulus suffices to awaken and arouse it. But if
the will checks and curbs and controls this appetite carefully
through controlling and checking the internal senses the concupiscible appetite loses some it its vehemence and impulsiveness. Gradually its movement and energy yield more easily,
calmly and submissively to the direction of the will.
This submissiveness of the concupiscible appetite, this control
exercised over it by the will is the fruit of self-denial, denial
of the external senses, denial of the imagination's desire for
uncontrolled freedom, denial of the concupiscible appetite as

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL

ASPECTS OF MORTIFICATION

137

it moves toward an object pleasing to it. A virtue such as
temperance is bought by constant curtailing of our faculties.
It is the result of mortification.
To attain the virtue of temperance, denial and mortification are especially requisite for certain persons. The concupiscence of pleasure thrives in the young on account of the
ardor of youth. 85 Youths therefore, because their passions are
so easily aroused and because, being unmarried, no sexual
satisfaction is allowed them, must practice an incessant and
stern brand of mortification if they hope to gain the virtue of
temperance. Among adults, in this matter, some have more
need of mortification than others. Some people have a natural
disposition for some particular virtue. 86 For some the practice
of temperance offers little difficulty. Hence for them, the practice of mortification is not of vital importance in attaining to
temperance. But many others have a special propensity to
difficulties in this matter. This is true especially of those who
have contracted a habit of lust. Venereal pleasures are impetuous and if one consents to them, this increases the force
of concupiscence and weakens the strength of mind. 87 St.
Thomas compares intemperance to a child's manner of acting.
He states that a child, if left to his own will, becomes more
self-willed. So too concupiscence, if indulged, gathers strength.
Therefore Augustine says: (Con£. VIII, 5) "Lust served, became a custom and custom not resisted became a necessity." 38
People addicted to a habit of lust can attain to temperance only
by a special and more severe checking of their sensitive .nature
according to the principle enunciated above.
Mortification, therefore, is ordinarily an absolute requisite
in attaining mastery over the concupiscible appetite that is
signified by temperance. When once this mastery has been
attained, this mortification remains necessary, lest habit be
corrupted by contrary passions. But this mortification becomes
easier to practice, since as an essential part of the virtue, it
•• 11-11, q. 149, a. 4.
•• 1-11, q. 68, a. 1.

"'11-11, q. 151, a. 8, ad 2um.
88 11-11, q. 142, a. 2.

188

RICHARD M. HOFFMANN

has become, with the virtue, a sort of second nature. It no
longer has the difficult aspect that. is presented at the beginning
of the habit's formation. Denial, and with it a submission of
the appetite to the will, has
a secand nature. Once this
battle has been won the soul is freed from vehement struggles
and has greater strength and freedom to push on to greater
victories over the sensitive part. By means of control and
denial, temperance can be developed and perfected until man
has acquired such a perfect mastery over the sensitive part
that as far as nature allows, it neglects the needs of the body .39

IV. PROPOSED SoLUTIONs

TO THE PsYCHOLOGICAL

PRoBLEMS

OF MoRTIFICATION.

A. Problems of Mortification in the Development of Virtue.
The purpose of this study is to determine the psychological
function of mortification in the development of virtue. We have
described in some detail the process of mortification involved
in the development of the virtue of temperance. This detailed
description shows how the external senses supply material for
the internal senses. The internal sense elaborate this material.
In doing so they supply the passions with their object. Once
the passions are awakened they tend to fix the attention of
the internal senses on the object pleasing to them. Consequently, reason experiences difficulty in choosing an object
different from the object which the passions find alluring. The
internal senses, disturbed and agitated ..by the bodily movement
of the passions, tend to be entranced by the object pleasing to
the passions. Since the intellect must rely on material presented
to it by the internal senses, the intellect's attention is drawn
to the object pleasing to the passions and reason experiences
great, difficulty in choosing another object. But the will is not
determined to choosing that object. Rather, it has the power
to cause the intellect to consider another object and can make
the intellect choose this other object. Also, the will can control
the workings of the passions by
a control over the
•• J-ll, q. 61, a. r;,

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL

ASPECTS OF MORTIFICATION

189

operations of the internal senses of imagination, memory and
the cogitative power. The description of this process brought
into strong relief the fact that man's cognitive and appetitive
powers, both rational and sensitive, are interwoven and interlocked in their operations. If the operation of one faculty is
to predominate, the other faculties must be brought to serve
that particular faculty.
All the powers of the soul are rooted in the one essence of
the soul. Hence it necessarily happens that when the intention
of the soul is strongly drawn toward the action of one power,
it is withdrawn from the operation of another power.40 The
various actions of the soul can hamper and impede one another.
When the attention of the soul is focused on one operation or
when one power of the soul i1J to be specially perfected, the
other powers of the soul lend their energy to that particular
favored potency. The other powers continue their own operation, at least up to a certain point. But their own proper
operation, their tendency to their own proper object, is directed
and controlled and·channeled toward helping and assisting the
particular faculty which is being specially favored and perfected. The operation of the other faculties ·continues. These
faculties move toward their own objects, but their movements
are controlled in such a way that these operations are brought
into line and made to serve and assist in developing a more
perfect operation of the favored faculty. When the operation
of one faculty is intense, the operation of the othet is remiss.
The reason for this is that when one potency is intensely
engaged, this one potency alone does not suffice for such an
intense operation unless it is assisted by receiving from the
principle of life the inflow that the other faculties or members
should receive.41 This process is necessary for even one act.
It is all the more necessary for the development of an operative
habit. In the development of an operative habit, a certain
' 0 Quia omnes potentiae animae in una essentia animae radicantur necesse est
quod, quando intentio animae vehementer trabitur. ad operationem unius poientiae,
retrahatur ab operatione alterius. 1-11, q. 87, a. I.
" Scriptum Super Libroa Sententiamm, IV, 44, 21 qu S, 4um.

140

RICHARD M. HOFFMANN

power of the soul is brought to a degree of perfection. But
developing an operative habit involves more than perfecting
one particular power. Other powers of the soul, as a natural
consequence, must become more remiss in their activity. Indeed, to develop an operative habit the other powers of the
soul are not merely allowed to grow remiss, They must be
positively checked in their own activity and made to serve
and minister to the activity of the favored potency.
This process is very apparent in the development of the
various intellectual habits. It is even more apparent, more
necessary in developing moral virtues. Our rational nature, as
reason, is composed of intellect and will. Because the intellect
is a spiritual faculty, it contains all reality within the scope of
its knowledge, has universal being and truth as its common
formal object. The will, as the appetite following upon intellect's knowledge, has a commensurate object, the universal
good. It has unlimited possibilities of choice. When once reason
has fastened upon some determinate end to be attained, the
will can use its own operation and the operations of the other
powers of the soul to attain that end. This it is able to do
because contained under its universal object are all of its own
operations and the operations of the other potencies of the
soul. Therefore, the will as an efficient cause, can move itself
and all the other potencies of the soul to their proper acts. 42
Habits are formed in the various potencies of the soul by
l'epeated acts. The habit can be formed directly in the will,
such as the habit of justice, or in the intellect, such as the habit
of prudence, or in the sensitive appetite as is the case with
fortitude and temperance. In the development of each operative habit the ·practical intellect exercises its control over the
operations of intellect and will and over the operations of the
other potencies of the soul.
The moral virtues of temperance and fortitude signify a
control of reason over the sensible part. Prudence presupposes
that degree of control over the sensitive part which will allow
•• Swmma Theol., I-II, q. 9, a. I.

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL

ASPECTS OF MORTIFICATION

141

it to choose well, undisturbed by any undue cravings for
sensible pleasures. Because it signifies a habit of right choice,
it presupposes likewise a control and care exercised for a long
time by the practical intllect over its own choices. Justice, the
virtue residing in the will, by which a man easily and as from
second nature gives everyone his due, results from a practice
of constantly subduing selfish interests as soon as they conflict
with the rights of others. All of the virtues contained under
the four cardinal virtues as integral, subjective or potential
parts, indicate a habit developed by repeated acts. In each act,
reason has had' to exercise its prerogative of control over its
own operations and over the operations of the other powers of
the soul. By repeated acts its control has become more sure and
certain; it flows more simply and easily.
This sure and certain control exercised in the operation of
intellectual and moral virtues is the result of restraint exercised
over the various human faculties and powers. This restraint
is not in the form of a complete repression by which the faculty
or power is denied its operation. But it is a channelling, a
directing of the faculty's operation toward an objective chosen
by reason. This control is a prerequisite, a concomitant of every
operative habit. It is a general condition of soul that is found
as a necessary part of each intellectual and moral virtue. It is
what St. Thomas means when he speaks of the general virtue
of temperance. Every good operative habit presupposes and
requires a rather firm control over human operations, potencies
and passions. This control is the temperateness, the moderation
which St. Thomas calls the general virtue of temperance. This
general virtue of temperance, when applied to the acquiring of
moral virtues, acquires the name of mortification. Mortification is then the self-denial and control that is a necessary
element in the development and growth of morai virtue. It is
a prerequisite and a concomitant of every moral virtue, a
general condition of soul found in all virtues, a necessary condition of virtue. With this idea of mortification in mind we
can proceed to consider the questions proposed in Part I.

142

RICHARD ¥. liOFFMANN

B. Relation of the Inflicting of Pain and Mastery Over Sense
Passions.

Will the in:Hicting of pain by means of the discipline and
cilicium lessen and subdue the cravings of the flesh for sexual
delights? What indeed is the precise psychological connection
between this in:Hictingof pain and victory over a yearning for
sexual delights?
The answer seems to be contained in the doctrine on the
passions and the control of the passions as exercised by the
virtues. It is precisely the task of temperance to govern and
control the passions of the concupiscible appetite. When an
object is presented to the passions as pleasing to them, the
passions of love and desire for that object arise. Love gives
the sense appetite a connatural affinity for the objects and
makes it proportionate to that object. Immediately upon this
first movement of complacency in the object there follows
desire for that object, a movement toward that object. If the .
object is attained, there results the passion of pleasure, a vital
adhering to the object. It is precisely these movements that
temperance must control in its struggle for mastery over the
concupiscible appetite. Corresponding to the movements toward a delightful object are the movements away from an
unpleasant object. If the object is presented 'to the passions as
harmful or unpleasant, there arises the movements of hatred
and flight from the unpleasant object and sorrow or sadness
at its presence.
The purpose of inflicting pain on one's body with the discipline or cilicium cannot be to suppress all feeling in the sense
of touch. It is impossible to do this; To strive for such a
purpose would almost inevitably cause serious psychological
difficulties. The purpose of discipline is rather to gain a control
over the movements of the concupiscible appetite. Ordinarily,
as soon as pain is felt in the sense of touch, the passions of
hate, aversion, and sorrow arise in the concupiscible appetite.
The passions, presented with an object distasteful to them,
tend· away from the object and if the object persists, sadness

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF MORTIFICATION

148

or sorrow arise in the subject. Reason, as the governor of the
whole body, can exercise its control over these passions and
over the will considered solely as a particular nature. The
passions and the will naturally shrink from sensible pains and
bodily suffering. But reason, can choose these things in relation
to an end. Sensuality and the will in man absolutely considered, shrink from burning. Yet will, as reason, may choose
this burning for the sake of health. 48 Thus reason can inflict
pain and accept this pain despite the opposite movements of
the passions. These movements continue during the whole time
of the inflicting or suffering of pain. Yet reason chooses the
pain. In so doing it is forging a stronger mastery over the
concupiscible appetite. By denying the movements of the concupiscible appetite away from an unpleasant object, reason's
control over this appetite becomes stronger, more secure. When
pleasurable objects are presented to the passions, pleasurable
objects to which reason does not want to consent, reason by
virtue of the control acquired by forcing the sensible appetite
to submit to the choice of pain, can more easily set aside these
cravings and yearnings of the sense appetite.
Ordinarily the passions, presented with a pleasurable object,
tend to fix the attention of the cognitive faculties on this object
and continue drawing reason toward that object. Reason can
acquire control over these movements so that immediately,
upon their mere appearance, it can step in and without difficulty
refuse their prompting and urgings and tum its atteiltion to
other things. This control is acquired, not only by denying the
passions of the concupiscible appetite objects pleasing to them,
but also by deliberately restraining the passions in their flight
from a displeasing object.
This then would seem to be the purpose of inflicting bodily
pain upon oneself, to gain a mastery over the passions fleeing
from that pain. It can be an effective means of acquiring
control. Yet, while stressing its effectiveness, we must also
admit its danger. It is a fact that for some the inflicting of
•• III, q. 18, a. 5c.

144

RICHARD M. HOFFMANN

bodily pains upon themselves is precisely a means· of causing
sexual delight or at least a means of arousing desire for sexual
delight. To examine into the psychological process involved
in masochism would lead us far afield. We merely mention the
fact that the suffering of physical, bodily pain can cause the
awakening of sexual desires in some persons. However, it is
not a universal phenomenon. We maintain that, in general,
a judicious use of the cilicium and the discipline can serve to
give reason a mastery over the concupiscible passions. If, in
a particular case, the inflicting of such pain causes sexual disturbance, this specific means must not be employed to attain
mastery over the concupiscible appetite.

C. Is Mortification Dangerous?
Our second problem concerns the danger involved in denial
and mortification as prescribed in books treating of the spiritual
life. Will not a continual, ceaseless war against natural instincts,
longings and desires destroy the correct and perfect balance of
an individual? Will it not hinder the harmonious functioning
of man's personality and deprive him of all the richness of his
personality?
Mortification can be a dangerous thing. The reason for this
is that it is a negative process, a withholding, a restraining,
a cutting down of natural movements and tendencies. We have
described mortification as the necessary prerequisite and concomitant of every good operative habit. Every operative habit,
excluding the vices, signifies a training, a
of a human
faculty. For this training, special attention must be directed
to that faculty. It must be developed and trained and made
to perform ever more perfect acts that will engrain more
deeply the habit that is being developed. This signifies a control, a checking, not only of the particular faculty developed,
but also of the other faculties that are being made to serve in
the formation of the habit. Each habit or virtue demands a
certain withholding, denial, mortification. This denial is the
negative aspect of the development of an intellectual or moral
virtue.

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL

ASPECTS OF MORTIFICATION

145

Mortification is a general virtue, a general condition of every
virtue. It is concomitant with the acquiring of every virtue, a
controlling and directing action by which the energy and the
functioning of various human faculties are directed toward the
development of a particular virtue. We have seen, for example,
how the passions, if left unchecked, are an obstacle to the virtue
of temperance. As long as these passions have their own way,
they disturb reason's peaceful possession. But by a checking
and controlling of these passions, they are brought into line.
Their functioning is made to serve reason's purpose and end.
Temperance is not a chaining of the passions but a directing
of them and their powers and energy to the higher good of
reason.
Each of our powers tends to assume an independent role,
to follow its own natural activity and thus to attain its natural
object. It is reason's task in the development of habit to
channel the various faculties with their operations and energies
toward the habit desired. Every faculty, every power of the
soul is made for activity. It is the task of mortification to
direct these activities toward a particular chosen good.
Control and denial must be used in this way, as serving
in the development of virtue and remaining as part of that
virtue. It is dangerous if made an end in itself. Self-denial
must not be destructive of nature, nor a denial of our essential
sensible nature. Mortification must serve solely as a means
of ordering, controlling and directing the faculties of our soul
toward the attaining of intellectual and moral habits. If made
an end in itself, mortification lacks any justifiable reason for
its practice. This is not to deny its importance but simply to
stress the fact that it must be practiced with some particular
end in view and not simply for its own sake. It must be used
as a means of fulfilling some duty or practicing some virtue.
That denial is necessary for the development of personality
is obvious. If each faculty and potency of the soul were left
to move with unrestrained freedom to its own object, the
result would be a disordered personality, one in which the

146

RICHARD M. HOFFMANN

sensible nature, by its very vehemence, would predominate, to
the detriment of reason. Without denial and restraint there is
little possibility of worthwhile accomplishment in any chosen
field of endeavor. St. Thomas, speaking particularly of the
. pleasure governed by temperance, maintains that though nature
has introduced pleasure into the operations that are necessary ·
for man's life, it is sometimes praiseworthy and even necessary
for the sake of an end to abstain from the pleasures which
result from these operations. Thus, for the sake of the body's
health, certain persons refrain from pleasures of meat, drink
and sex. Denial is also necessary for fulfilling certain engagements. Athletes and soldiers have to deny themselves many
pleasures to fulfill their duties. Penitents, to recover health of
soul, have recourse to abstinence from pleasures and those who
wish to give themselves up to contemplation and to divine
things need to refrain very much from carnal things.''
Thus we can see that denial and mortification are always
linked with accomplishing some purpase, fulfilling some duty,
developing some intellectuai or moral virtue. In the practice
of some virtues denial plays a far greater and more direct part
than in others. For example, in the practice of temperance as
a special virtue, denial is involved very directly, a greater or
less denial according to the intensity. to which the virtue is
developed. The same is true of the virtue of penitence, that
virtue which aims at the destruction of past sin considered as
an offence against God. This virtue, as a species of justice,
some kind of compensation to God for sin
seeks to
committed. This compensation the penitent strives to make
to God by abstaining from pleasure and submitting his body
•• Sciendam tamen quod ab hujusmodi delectationibus consequentibus hujusmodi
operationis quandoque laudabile, vel etiam necessarium est abstinere propter aliquem
finem; sicut propter sanitatem corporalem aliqui abstine11-t a quibusdam delectationibus ciborum, potuum et venereorum; et etiam propter alicujus officii executionem, sicut athletas et milites necesse est a multis delectationibus abstinere, ut
proprium officium exequantur.. Et similiter poenitentes, ad :tecuperandum animae
sanitatem abstinentia delectabilium quasi quaedam diaeta, utuntur; et homines
volentes contemplationi et rebus divinis vacare, oportet quod se magis a carnalibus
desideriis abstrahant. ll-ll, q. 14!, a. 1.

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL

ASPECTS OF MORTIFICATION

147

to certain corporeal punishments. In other virtues denial performs a less prominent task. But in every virtue there is
contained some denial, some mortification. No virtue, intellectual or moral, can exist without it.
With this thought in mind we can see how incorrect and
inaccurate it is to maintain that St. Thomas is not a strong
proponent of mortification. He devotes great attention to the
virtue of temperance, that special virtue most closely liiiked
with the practice of mortification. Moreover, in the practicing
and carrying out of each virtue there is involved necessarily
an element of mortification. The more intensely the virtue is
developed the greater is the degree of mortification involved
in its practice. According to the thought of St. Thomas, the
virtues can be developed to a very high and intense degree.
He speaks of perfecting virtues, virtues of men who are tending
toward divine similitude. Prudence counts as nothing all the
things of the world and directs all the
of the soul to
God alone. Temperance, as far as nature allows, neglects the
needs of the body. Fortitude prevents the soul from being
afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things,
and justice consists in the sours giving a wholehearted consent
to follow the way thus prepared. 45
each virtue,
developed to such an exalted state, demands as a concomitant
condition an equally intense degree of mortification and denial.
This consideration answers the difficulty of the danger involved in mortification. ,Certainly there is danger involved
because of the very negative aspect of mortification. To deny
oneself pleasure constantly and unremittingly, to practice
constant denial of the external senses, allowing them little
delight, choosing always food that is less palatable, eating not
because eating is pleasant but simply and solely because it is
God's will, keeping silence when there is a great desire to speak,
halting in the midst of an absorbing story, always choosing the
harder, the more unpleasant and less comfortable things, all
this can easily be dangerous and lead to difficulties if not used
•• I-II, q. 61, a. 5.

148

RICHARD M. HOFFMANN

properly and correctly. All of these practices can serve as a
means of developing the various virtues.
Virtue, even at its very lowest degree, demands a certain
amount of mortification. As the virtue increases and grows,
the practice of mortification likewise increases because it is part
of that virtue. Because this denial and restraint are part of the
virtue, they become second nature and are integrated into the
smooth functioning of the personality. If used in connection
with the developing of virtue, mortification undergoes growth
parallel to and concomitant with the virtue. Considered in this
way it is not dangerous. In one sense, it is a war against our
natural instincts, longings and desires. But if carried out as a
concomitant part of the development of virtue it is a wellregulated and gradual control of our human powers. It does
not destroy the correct and perfect balance of an individual
any more than does the development of virtue. With each
increase of virtue there is also an increase in the process of
greater control over our various faculties and powers. But in
this case, mortification is constantly serving merely to direct
the energy and functions of the human powers to a higher goal.
Therefore, mortification does not give us an individual drained
of all the richness of personality, but rather an individual whose
powers and energies are all directed toward the higher goal of
virtue and whose energies flow easily and effortlessly in that
direction. As we have seen in the passage quoted above, the
saint can practice a heroic mortification without an unbalancing
of the personality because this severe, seemingly fierce mortification is the concomitant part of the heroic virtue to which the
saint has attained. There is no void left in the personality.
Having arrived at a high state of perfection, the saint is rapt
in the things of God. The things of sensible nature hold little
interest for him. But if such severe mortification be carried out
by a person not so exalted in the ways of virtue, there is grave
danger involved. When by our own free choice we renounce
some particular good, there is a void left by that resignation.
If that void is not filled by some higher motive or good, there

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL

ASPECTS OF MORTIFICATION

149

is danger that some compensation, even a compensation of a
lower kind, will creep in to fill the void left by that renunciation.
This then is the answer to the question: " Is not mortification
dangerous?" Not if used correctly, not if practiced as the
natural concomitant of every virtue. It is dangerous if set up
as an end in itself. Moritification and denial, carried out to the
point described by St. John of the Cross, would be dangerous
for an ordinary soul, a beginner in the spiritual life. Mortifica- ·
tion, carried to this degree, seems to be that adapted to the
souls which have attained to that state of virtue described by
St. Thomas above. The various types of mortification proposed
in the books on Asceticism as for instance, repressing an urge
to speak or narrate a story, not gazing at some particularly
beautiful and absorbing scene. in nature, not reading letters
immediately upon receiving them, all of these deliberate calculated mortifications of every natural and good desire can be
dangerous psychologically if carried out too intensively. These
acts of denial can serve a good purpose of developing a particular virtue or accomplishing some specific task or duty. But
such mortification must be done calmly and gradually and
without great psychological disturbances. If directed toward
developing a virtue such as studiousness, temperance or penitence, acts of this kind performed calmly but steadily and
perseveringly become, as part of the virtue, a second nature.
Acts of this kind can be very valuable in the spiritual life.
But they can become too aggressive, too intense, too much
an attack on human nature with its inborn need for enjoyment and pleasure. In mortification of this type there is need
of great prudence.

D. How Mortification Strengthens the Will for Future
Combats.
The previous consideration leads us quite naturally into the
next problem. Mortification as proposed in the books on
Asceticism has as one of its aims the strengthening and reinforcing of the will. It is to prepare and to strengthen the will
for future attacks. Victory or defeat in some sudden and violent

150

RICHARD M. HOFFMANN

assault of passion, spiritual writers tell us, may well depend
upon whether one has practiced self-discipline in such small
matters as food or sleep or little acts of self-indulgence. Is there
such a thing as strengthening of the will? Will the fact that
a person denies himself, restrains his longings and desires for
a satisfaction of one
will this self control help him and
strengthen him to deny urgings of another kind? For instance,
will the fact that a man performs some acts of denial each day
at table, eats a bit less than he would like to eat, will that
denial strengthen him to overcome desires for sexual pleasures
when these desires press in upon him?
The answer to this question can be found in the doctrine
on the connection of the moral virtues through prudence. A
virtue is a good operative habit. A moral virtue is a habit
which makes its possessor good and renders his work good.
The intellectual virtues make a man good in this or that line
and are therefore incomplete virtues. We cannot properly speak
of the connection of the intellectual virtues. We do not observe
in them the connection to be found among the moral virtues. 46
The moral virtues are complete and perfect virtues. They
make the whole man good and not merely his faculties. The
moral virtues of which we are speaking are those acquired by
means of human works that are directed to an end not surpassing the natural power of man. These moral virtues, prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance, together with the
parts contained under them, are all connected. Each moral
virtue is bound to the others and so dependent on the others
that one cannot exist in a subject without the others.
St. Thomas distinguishes between imperfect and perfect
moral virtues. An imperfect moral virtue, temperance for
example, is nothing more than an inclination to do some kind
of good deed. The inclination can be either by natural temperament or by habituation. Moral virtues taken in this sense
are not connected. Thus we can see men who, by natural
temperament or by being merely accustomed to do so, are
•• I-II, q. 65, a. 1, ad Sum.

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL

ASPECTS OF MORTIFICATION

151

prompt in performing works of liberality but are not prompt
in doing works of chastity. 47 A man can exercise himself in ·
good deeds regarding one matter but not in regard to another.
For instance, by behaving well in matters of anger, but not
in matters of concupiscence, he will acquire a certain habit of
restraining his anger. But the habit will lack the nature of
virtue through the absence of prudence which is wanting in
matters of concupiscence/ 8 Likewise some people have a certain
temperance from a natural disposition insofar as certain imperfect virtues are natural to man or acquired by habituation.
However, these virtues, through lack of prudence;· are not
perfect virtues because they are not perfected by reason. 49
But the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines toward
doing a good deed well. And such a moral virtue cannot be
without prudence. Moral virtue is a habit of choosing well
and it makes a man choose well. It is proper to moral virtue
to make a right choice. Right choice requires not only an
inclination to a due end but also a correct choice of things
conducive to that end. This choice is made by prudence
which counsels, judges and commands in those things that are
directed to the end. 50
Likewise we cannot have prudence unless we have the moral
virtues. Prudence is right reason about things to be done, not
07 I-II, q. 65, a. I c.
•• Dicendum quod virtutum moralium quaedam perficiunt hominem secundum
communem statum, scilicet quantum ad ea quae communiter in omni vita hominum
occurrunt agenda. Unde oportet quod homo simul exercitetur circa materias
omnium virtutum moralium. Et si quidem circa omnes exercitetur bene operando,
acquiret habitus omnium virtutum moralium. Si autem exercitetur bene operando
circa unam materiam, non autem circa aliam, puta bene se habendo circa iras, non
autem circa concupiscentias, acquiret quidem habitum aliquem ad refrenandum iras,
qui tamen non habebit rationem virtutis, propter defectum prudentiae, quae circa
concupiscentias corrumpitur. I-II, q. 65, a. 1, ad 1um.
•• II-II, q. 141, a. 1, ad
50 Nulla virtus moralis potest sine prudentia haberi: eo quod proprium virtutis
moralis est facere electionem rectam, cum sit habitus electivus; ad rectam autem
electionem non solum sufficit inclinatio in debitum finem quod est directe per
habitum virtutis moralis; sed etiam quod aliquis directe eligat ea quae sunt ad finem,
quod fit per prudentiam, quae est consiliativa et judicativa et praeceptiva eorum
!1\lllt lld finem. I-II, q. 65, a. I.

RICHARD M. HOFFMANN

merely in general, but also in particular, because actions are
about particulars. Right reason demands principles according
to which reason can proceed. And when reason considers
particular cases, it needs not only universal but also particular
principles. Regarding universal principles of action, man is
rightly ordered or disposed by the natural understanding of
principles whereby he understands that he should do no evil,
or also by some practical science. But this is not enough for
man to reason correctly about particular cases. It can happen
that the universal principle known by means of understanding
or science is corrupted in a particular case by a passion. Thus,
when a person is swayed by concupiscence and is overcome
by it, the object of his desire seems good, although it is opposed
to the universal judgment of his reason. Consequently, just as
by the habit of natural understanding of principles or of science,
man is rightly disposed regarding universal principles of action,
so for him to be correctly disposed regarding particular principles of action, he needs to be perfected by certain habits so
that it becomes connatural for him to judge correctly as to the
end. This is done by moral virtue. For the virtuous man judges
correctly regarding the end of virtue because such as a man is,
such does the end seem to him. Therefore right reason about
particular things to be done, i. e., prudence, requires that man
have moral virtue. 51 Prudence, therefore, presupposes the moral
virtues as a prerequisite in the same way that principles are prerequisites for the conclusions obtained by the various sciences.
There can be rio true moral virtues without prudence nor true
prudence without the moral virtues. From this it follows clearly
that all the moral virtues are connected with one another. He
that has one perfect moral virtue has all of them.
A perfect moral virtue then, is one which through prudence
is perfected by reason. No such perfect moral virtue can exist
without prudence, for without prudence it is lacking in an
essential element of virtue, namely, that it be totally according
to right reason. But if one possesses prudence he necessarily
61

I-ll, q. 58, a. 5.

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL

ASPECTS OF MORTIFICATION

158

possesses all of the moral virtues. Those things to which the
moral virtues incline are as the principles of prudence. Therefore prudence, as right reason, needs all of the moral virtues
to supply it with its principles. Else it might be correct in one
matter or field, but lacking a certain moral virtue, it would be
incorrect in judging and commanding those things pertaining
to that moral virtue. Being deficient in that principle, it could
not be called right reason.
Mortification is a concomitant part of each moral virtue.
But the moral virtues are connected through prudence in such
wise that if one such moral virtue is acquired all of them must
be acquired. Also, by reason of their connection with prudence
if one moral virtue grows and increases, the other moral virtues
enjoy a simultaneous but proportionate growth. If a man sets
about to acquire some moral virtue, he must, as a prerequisite
to the attainment of that virtue, practice some type of mortification and denial. By practicing that denial he can acquire
that particular moral virtue toward which he is striving. When
a man places these final acts which by force of all the similar
acts which have preceded them change a dispostition into a
habit and produce a moral virtue, those acts also generate the
virtue of prudence. But prudence is not generated unless it
brings together with itself all the other moral virtues which,
together with synderesis, constitute the principles of prudence.
Thus, those acts of mortification performed with the precise
purpose of acquiring or increasing one particular moral virtue
indirectly work toward the acquiring and the increasing of the
other moral virtues as well. In this way with each act of
mortification by which a moral virtue is increased, the power
of the will is strengthened.
In this way we explain how denial in licit things strengthens
the will so that when illicit desires press in upon the soul,
the will can refuse to accede to these desires. This is a psychologically sound procedure, if denial and mortification are
used correctly, if they are used to develop and to strengthen
virtues in the soul. Each act of denial, if prudent and therefore
according to right reason, will aid and contribute to the

154
strengthtening and- growth of some virtue in the soul. With
the strengthening and growth of one virtue, there is a proportionate growth and strengthening of all moral virtues because of
their connection through prudence. Thus each act of denial and
mortification, performed according to right reason, strengthens
the will. It strengthens some particular virtue and consequently
all the virtues. This is merely another and perhaps more accurate way of saying that the will is strengthened to face future
combats. In this way it is psychologically correct to advocate
the practice of mortification as· a means of preparing for future
combat.
Conclusion.
In this paper we have established the role of mortification,
particularly in the attainment of moral virtue. Mortification
gives the denial and control which are necessary elements in
the development and growth of moral virtue. It is a prerequisite and a concomitant of every moral virtue, a general
condition of soul found in all virtues, a necessary condition of
virtue. With this fundamental point established we offer solutions to three problems:
1. The purpose of inflicting pain upon the senses.

Pain is inflicted upon the senses to acquire greater control
over the sense appetite. Reason acquires control over the concupiscible appetite· by restraining and checking the passions
of love and concupiscence and delight as they tend toward
and take pleasure in an object pleasing to them. It likewise
strengthens its control by restraining and checking the movements of the passions of hate and aversion and checking the
movements of the passions of hate and aversion and sorrow
as they tend away and flee from an unpleasant object an:d
register their distaste at its precence. Reason, by resisting the
movements of passion away from a painful object strengthens
its control over the sense appetite.
2. Is mortification dangerous?
Because mortification is an absolute requisite for reaching a
high degree of moral perfection, writers place great stress upon

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF MORTIFICATION

155,

it. There is a tendency to make it a virtue in itself. It is not
that. It is rather in the line of an instrument or a tool used to
develop a virtue. It is a very effective tool. But because it is
so effective it must be used with great care and caution. Just
as a powerful tool or instrument if used improperly can mutilate
and even destroy the product being fashioned by the worker,
so also with mortification. It must be used with great prudence
and always with the precise purpose of developing a particular
virtue. Acts of mortification directed toward developing a
particular virtue become, as part of that .virtue, a sort of second
nature. As the particular virtue increases, the acts of that
virtue become more intense. The denial inherent in these acts
becomes· likewise more intense. But all of this as a gradual
steady growth. After years of striving toward spiritual perfection, a man can place really intense acts of virtue without
great strain or difficulty. Such acts, if placed at the beginning
of his striving for spiritual excellence, would have been imprudent and psychologically dangerous. They would have involved
denial too great and too onerous for a nature unaccustomed
to denial. But practiced as part of a highly developed virtue
they are acts _to which \his particular nature has been gradually
accustomed and are acts placed under the direction of prudence.
As such they are not psychologically dangerous.
3. Hm.o does mortification strengthen the will for future
combats?

Mortification is a conc01nitant part of each moral virtue.
Each act of mortification and denial, if prudent and according
to right reason, will aid and contribute to the strengthening
and growth of some virtue in the soul. With the growth and
strengthening of one virtue there is a proportionate growth and
strengthening of all the moral virtues because of their connection through prudence. In this way mortification mcreases
virtue and strengthens the will for future combats.

RICHARD M. HOFFMANN, C.SS.R.
RedemptqriatFatkera,
Oconomowoc, Wiacomin.

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS
CoLMAN E. O'NEILL, 0. P., S. T. D., formerly a professor at the Dominican
House of Studies, Tallaght, Co. Dublin, Ireland and contributor to
The Irish Theological Quarterly, is presently Professor of Dogmatic
Theology at the Institute Jesus Magister in Rome.
NICHOLAS CROTTY, C. P., S. T. D. (Angelicum), contributor to the Australasian Catholic Record, is teaching Moral Theology and Experimental Psychology at the Passionist Studentate, St. Paul's Retreat,
Urrbrae, Mitcham, South Australia.
RicHARD M. HoFFMANN, C. SS. R., Ph. D., a graduate of the Angelicum,
Rome, is presently teaching Ethics and Moral Theology at Immaculate Conception College, Oconomowoc, 'Wisconsin.
NICHOLAS F. HALLIGAN, 0. P., S. T.D., presently preparing a manual of
Moral Theology which he formerly taught at the Dominican House
of Studies, Washington, D. C., is Professor of Fundamental Theology
at the Dominican House of Studies, Dover, Massachusetts.
MicHAEL E. STocK, 0. P., Ph. D., a frequent contributor to scholarly
journals, is Professor of. Psychology at the Dominican House of
Studies, Dover, Massachusetts.
DANIEL F. REILLY, 0. P., Ph. D., is Professor of History at Providence
College, Providence, Rhode Island.
JosEPH C. TAYLOR, 0. P., Ph. D., is Professor of Metaphysics and History
of Greek Philosophy at the Dominican House of Studies, Dover,
Massachusetts.
IGNATIUS J. McGUINEss, 0. P., S. T. D., is Professor of Theology at Marymount College, New York.
DENNIS C. KANE, 0. P., S. T. L. is Professor of Philosophy at Providence
College, Providence, Rhode Island.

156

BOOK REVIEWS
The Law of Christ. Vol. I, General Moral 'J'heology. By BERNARD HXIuNa,
C. SS. R. Translated by Edwin S. Kaiser, C. PP. S. Westminster, Md.:
The Newman Press, 1961. Pp. xxxi, 615 with notes, bibliographies and
index, $8.50.
Father Haring's work has received high praise both in the original and
in translation. It is to be expected that his chosen approach to this important branch of theology will likewise gain the acclaim of a new audience.
The author lays down his guidelines in the Foreword. "A textbook or
manual of moral theology is written primarily to suit the purpose proposed
by its author .... Our purpose is an integration and synthesis of various
systems. . . . First, we shall endeavor to describe the perfect ideal of the
life in Christ and with Christ. This is the ideal of radical conformity with
Christ through the exercise of the Christian virtues. Secondly, in conjunction with the treatment of the virtues, we shall point out the limits of the
law . . . beyond which our conduct becomes a ·contradiction to the life of
of Christ. . . . This leads to our third
Christ and a hazard to the
point. Moral theology must reveal how the good, like an arch resting on
solid foundation, has its sound basis in law, but reaches to the summit of
perfection. The dynamic character of morality is explicitly treated in the
special chapter on conversion placed between the chapters on sin and virtue,
but it is implicit in all the chapters of our work. ... With this end in view,
the author attempted to keep the technical terminology at a minimum and
to provide a text within the grasp of the earnest layman and also suitable
for ready use by preacher and confessor for whom it should lighten the
burden of presenting the eternal truths in a manner befitting our times.
The very fact that a moral theology has been adapted to the capacity of
the interested non-theologian may prove to be its best recommendation to
the theologian and director of souls." (pp. viii-ix) How Father Haring
develops his purpose is first judged by a survey of the content of the book.
The first volume is divided into six parts with a total of fourteen chapters.
Part One: Introduction has two chapters, the first being an historical survey
of moral teaching from the time of Christ to the moral theology of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A relatively extensive treatment is
accorded to St. Thomas and the magnificent beginning. which he gave in
the Second Part of his Summa Theologiae to what is now known properly
as moral theological science. Beginning with Sailer and Hirscher in the
nineteenth century, the author concentrates on the German moralists,
especially of the Tiibingen school, of which he is an alumnus. He makes

157

158

BOOK REVIEWS

clear his sympathy with those authors who have reacted against the
emphasis upon law and duty or obligation (" minimal legalism " and " the
extreme bias of the juridical approach,") and who have approached moral
matters in the light of freedom in the grace of Christ, of conformity to
Christ, of love as at least an equal principle in moral theology. This outlook underscores the succeeding chapters.
The second chapter, Essential, Concepts of Moral Theology, considers
morality as responsibility, as fellowship, and as imitation of Christ. A grea\
role is assigned to the virtue of religion and responsibility is emphasized as
the concept which expresses the Christian moral life. " Hence responsibility
means that in a community between man and God, man responds to God's
word with the responsibility of his personal decision and action " (p. 46} .
The attention of the reader is arrested by the many lofty thoughts concerning religion, prayer and imitation.
Part Two: The Subject of Moral Values, Theological Anthropology,
devotes two chapters to the consideration of man, the subject of moral.
values, in his vocation as disciple of Christ-" the whole man with all that
he is and has from the standpoint of the call of Christ to man" (p. 61).
Chapter three, Christ Invites Man to Follow Him, has as its theme that
" moral value belongs to man in the integrity of his nature, body and soul
in their entirety ... [and] in the entire context of being and life, in the
texture of relations which enrich his life and which offer him the opportunity to develop his inner capacities fully " (p. 78) . Most interesting
insights are developed into the meaningful interrelations of person and community in the moral order which reach their highest expression in the
Mystical Body of Christ.
All of this is presented as " the background of tremendous dimensions
which provides the setting for moral decision and personal ;moral growth and
development" (p. 99). Thus chapter four, The True Basis of Morality,
first takes up at considerable length the doctrine of human liberty as the
foundation for morality. The traditional notions regarding human freedom
as the participation of the djvine freedom, its characteristics in man in this
life, the formation or education of freedom in the spirit of an enlightened
obedience are explained. The remainder of the tract considers intention,
the voluntarium and the enemies of the voluntarium. In this last is included
the influence of mass suggestion, so prevalent in modem societies, as well
as the influence of psychical defects and illnesses. Father Haring does not
attempt to dismiss culpability or the restriction of liberty of the human act
in these areas until it becomes rather evident. " In the fundamental
problem of the nature and degree of freedom essential for moral responsibility, the Church, not experimental psychology, has the authority to
make the final decision" (p. 120}.
A section on the knowledge of God as the basis of value opens up an

BOOK REVIEWS

159

extensive and stimulating treatment of the role of value in moral knowledge
-a Christian value ethics. Value is the good not simply as known but
especially as it is loved, longed for, appreciated in the fullness of awareness.
The ultimate value is God and all moral knowledge, taken in the dynamic
sense of the appreciation and love of values, .is a likeness to God's own
knowledge, (p. 1!!0) and thus is the basis of moral freedom. The emphasis
throughout on the right conduct, right affection, etc., would seem to be a
concentration upon the right ordering of the affective side of our nature
inasmuch as this has an influence upon the operation of the intellect and
the quality of knowledge.
The
consideration in chapter four is conscience as the subjective
source of moral good. Here Father Haring applies his purpose of composing
Thomistic and Scotistic attitude. " The comprehensive concept of conscience
which we adopt and propose is built on the double foundation of the
practical intellect .seeking truth and the natural yearning of the will and
heart of man for the true good. It is Thomism which stresses the practical
intellect as likeness to God, whereas the Augustinian-'Franciscan tradition
lays greater stress on heart and will tending toward the good. The comprehensive theory of conscience aims at a synthesis of the two, for the
ultimate dynamism of conscience is explained, not from the distinct nature
of intellect and will viewed in isolation, but from the profound unity of the
two in the depths of the soul. We view them in the light of their profound
likeness to God as He is active in the depths of the soul in a rich and
wonderful harmony of its whole being" (p. 148}. (By way of criticism here,
the Thomist teaching does not isolate the activity of the practical intellect
and conscience; on the contrary, it emphasizes their mutual influence and
dependence in human activity. An attempt to unite voluntaristic principles
to a Thomistic base must leave one -with a foggy impression.) In the
practical formation of the conscientious judgment and act in the realm of
uncertainties, the author not surprisingly is an avowed follower of St.
Alphonsus (equi-probabilism), yet states: "But nonetheless a moderate
probabilism or probabiliorism may not be set down as unecclesiastical.
These systems have outstanding theologians to propose and defend them.
Practically the differences between one system and the other do not
loom so large today" (p. 189). Father Haring is also a clear proponent of
the obligation to choose the better good, because, " if any individual should
form the judgment, clearly and prudently, that one specific choice or
course of action is manifestly better for him, that it is here and now the
wiser and more suitable, he would be obliged to follow this one course of
action or choose this one specific good" (p. 175} . Final considerations in
chapter four take up human act and action, the emotions and " the heart "
but the result is far from satisfying.
Part Three analyzes The Moral Duty of the Disciple of Christ. "This

160

BOOK REVIEWS

is determined by his actual existing nature and being to which in the present
order the endowments of grace also belong-and by everything with which
his activity can be concerned! This is the object or goal of his inner attitudes and his actions: God, neighbor, community, self, the world" (p. 225).
Chapter five considers the particular standards of morality under their legal
aspect of norm and law. The norm of morality is portrayed very clearly as
rooted in value, as there must be a value appeal to the will, a good which
obliges. Ultimately this good which is a value and thus a norm must be
good whether approached philosophically or theologically. In the latter
view, "the immediate or proximate norm of morality for us is the will of
God revealed in Christ, as it is presented by the Catholic Church (objective
norm) , and as it is understood by human reason submissive to supernatural
revelation and inwardly enlightened by the Holy Spirit (subjective norm)"
(p. 229). A warning is given that: "One who is exclusively concerned with
the normative formula without being taken up by the value which is its
foundation and source will inevitably descend to a moribund legalistic
morality " (p. 285) . The remainder of the chapter discusses the law with
its types and characteristics. Both the natural law and the positive divine
law in Old and New Testaments are extensively examined. A comparisonseldom made in moral theology texts-is drawn between the Catholic and
Protestant conceptions of law and its role. " However, nowhere in all
Protestant thought do we find the clear and simple notion of external law
which characterizes Catholic theology and according to which the law is
primarily the guide to the correct perception of the inner law of freedom
and love " (p. 264) .
Father Haring rejects the concept of a purely penal law. He reasons
that " to say a law itself [a true law] does not bind in conscience is tantamount to saying that it does not bind at all. . . . It is foolish to hold that
the legislator has no desire to affect the conscience simply because he tries
to attain his purpose by penalties regardless of the conscience of the
individual .... Finally, it is a universally valid proposition that when the
legislator fixes a sanction to a law, he is particularly intent on the observance of the law and looks upon the violator as deserving of punishment "
(p. 271). He will admit a justifiable introduction of penal law in moral
theology solely in the case of an obligation to submit to a penalty for
refusal to obey an unjust law (p. 278) . (But does not the obligation in
conscience to observe certain unjust laws or the penalty when there has been
no true guilt have its source in the higher law of charity and prudence
and not particular justice?)
Chapter six is concerned with The Moral Object in Itself and in the
Situation. This includes the usual treatment of objective value and the
circumstances influencing the morality of an action, together with cooperation in a twofold effect. A brief presentation contrasts the Catholic moral

BOOK REVIEWS

161

attitude toward the actual, practical and individual situation with situation
ethics. The concluding portion of the chapter on command and counsel,
command and vocation again opposes the so-called legalism: "Great is the
Church's concern to preserve and protect the freedom of choice in the vocation to sacerdotal or religious life. But it is not at all her mind that the
clearly recognized call of grace can be ignored as though it imposes no
obligation at all, on the pretext that surely there is 'no law' in this matter,
as though the guidance and directive of grace were not the most actual of
laws for the genuine disciple of Christ. Precisely on this point does the pure
'legal ' morality part ways with the morality of grace" (p. 301). "As to
the controversy on the point of obligation concerning the following of the
' evangelical counsels ' or a special vocation, which is not the object of a
universal law and demanded of all men, it is asked whether the counsel or
special vocation can become an obligation in conscience for any individual.
But the very question presented in this way insinuates the legalistic manner
of presentation of moral questions " (p.
Rather, for Father Haring,
the solution lies in the freedom of the children of God under grace, " for
whom deeds of love and the guidance of grace through the special divine
providence are actually the law" (ibid.). If the Christian in all docility
and prudence and loyalty to grace recognizes a divine vocation or special
mission, the counsel then becomes for him an obligation, an inescapable
duty. The question is tied to the problem of whether the Christian is always
obliged to choose the better good. The author answers in the affirmative,
in the sense that "every Christian, however, is bound to do that which
he himself, with the aid of God's grace, realizes to be most conformable
to his state and his powers. Should anyone with the help of divine grace
arrive at the prudential judgment that a particular action or choice of
vocation is, according to all evidence, the most suitable for him, he is not
truly prudent or truly submissive and docile toward the interior Teacher,
the Holy Spirit, if he still chooses what is obviously less suitable for him.
This holds good whether the object be the more perfect or the less perfect.
Quite frequently, however, there is question not merely of one particular
act or choice, but of a veritable multitude of possibilities with very little
to differentiate them. Where no clear and express differentiation can be
made, only personal initiative can be responsible for a decision without fear
of disobedience to God's guidance " (p. 306) .
Chapter seven on The Moral Motive is a fruitful analysis of the significance of the finis operantis in the moral action. Chapter eight covers The
Problem of Indifferent Actions, Coordination of Object, Circumstances and
Motive. As a possible domain of indifferent acts-although less properly
so-called-there is posited a realm " which is not penetrated by the clear
insight of the moral conscience or leavened by its influence, not fully taken
up with the spirit of moral responsibility, not yet placed fully in submission
to the vigilance of true moral freedom " (p.
.

162

BOOK REVIEWS

Part Four, The Following of Ckrist Placed in Jeopardy, surveys the
Nature and Consequences of Sin in chapter nine and the Distinction of
Sins in chapter ten. In the knotty question regarding the nature of venial
sin the author argues from the fallen nature of man. " Obviously one must
predominate, for two basic complete principles of equal force, two fundamental orientations, cannot co-exist in man. Whenever a fully clear and
deliberate decision has been made for good or bad, the other basic orientation ceases to be ultimate and free. ' From this it follows that venial sins
are acts of secondary orientation. They are not acts of complete departure,
sweeping aside the prior fundamental orientation to God, as it were casting
it into discard. In this sense they simply do not attain the fullness of the
act of human orientation" (p. 859).
Part Five, Conversion, analyzes the sinner's return to the grace and
imitation of Christ. The necessity, nature and dimensions of conversion are
the subject of chapter eleven as the Invitation and Response to tke Imitation of Ckrist. Tke Convert's Skare in Conversion, that is, the three free
acts of penance under grace: contrition, confession and satisfaction, are
exposed in chapter twelve. Clear distinction is made between true contrition
and religious sorrow on the one hand and" the comfortable fallacy of psychoanalysis " and mere ethical regret on the other. The points of departure
and the elements of value between the moral theology of contrition and
the guilt of psychoanalysis are pointed out (pp. 428-426) . The minimum
in the three acts of the penitent for removal of sin and for conversion and
for the sacrament, but especially the heights for which he should strive in
the way of perfection are highlights in the author's delineation of the true
imitation of Christ. (In view of the obligation to submit directly to the
keys all known grave sins, even though already indirectly forgiven, a greater
clarification would therefore be desired for the following: " It may occur
that an invalid confession is followed by a series of worthy repetitions of
the sacrament of penance, without any validation of the unworthy confession because the matter was overlooked or forgotten. In such a case
the penitent is not· required to repeat the confessions made in good faith,
though he must confess that he made one unworthy confession and reconfess the mortal sins included in that sinful reception of the sacrament.")
(pp. 466-467} •
Part Six: Growtk and Perfection in the Following of Christ, the Christian
Virtues, completes the first volume with chapter thirteen on The Virtues in
General and chapter fourteen on The Cardinal Virtues. In this connection
Father Hii.ring explains why he treats the cardinal virtues before the
theological. "At first blush it may seem a serious departure from the
exalted theological plan in the concept of St. Thomas to place the cardinal
virtues before the theological, as we do. Our presentation has the practical
purpose of placing all possible emphasis on the life in grace and the

BOOK REVIEWS

168

theological virtues. Therefore, the fundamental attitudes {cardinal virtues)
are treated in general moral theology, where they are described as general
attitudes or dispositions in the following of Christ. Special moral in its
entire content is presentation and explanation of the three theological
virtues " (pp. x-xi) . " In the Secunda Secundae Saint Thomas first treats
the three theological virtues and then takes up the four cardinal virtues.
This very arrangement in itself, and even more so the text as such, makes
it clear that the actual foundations, the ' hinges ' (cardines) of the Christian
life of virtue are not the four cardinal virtues, but the theological virtues.
(Our arrangement is not in opposition to this order of Saint Thomas. Here
we take up the cardinal virtues and explain them principally only as fundamental attit:udes. We treat their intrinsic tasks according to the theological
virtues.) " (p. 497) .
How grace and the theological virtues are highlighted by a previous consideration of the cardinal virtues is almost impossible to understand. In
the " life in
,. there can be no more " fundamental attitudes " than
faith, hope and love. In the hierarchy of supernatural human acts they are
supreme and give orientation and supernatural vitality and effectiveness to
the cardinal virtues (as is brought out in this very chapter). Moreover, ,
to suggest that the theological virtues are really the hinges and actual
foundations of the Christian life is to risk introducing confusion into traditional theological terminology that has come down from as early as St.
Ambrose. Virtues are called cardinal inasmuch as the whole Christian moral
life moves upon them (because they are concerned with the means through
which we move toward our end) and inasmuch as they are the entrance to
that higher life which is contemplative. The theological virtues put us in
possession of our end, the ultimate and unmovable goal and support of the
Christian life of virtue. They are indeed its foundation, anchor and root
but they are not movable or calculated to lead to anything further or to
serve as introduction to a more interior life. Although most principal and
excellent among virtues, the theologcial virtues are not susceptible of the
properties of the cardinal.
A like criticism must be made against the whole structure of this volume.
The procedure is too contrived; the " call and response " or " invitation and
following " theme does not readily lend itself to a systematic moral theology,
does not offer an intrinsic division of subject matter. Thus the unity of the
whole treatment is weak. So many thoughts, repetitions, Scriptural passages
and quotes or paraphrases from various modern writers (sometimes lacking
in cogent application) , indicate a need for more recapitulations and resumes.
Any eclectic attempt must inevitably expose its seams.
St. Thomas is clearly second to none in his respect for the preeminence
of love, for the primary role of supernatural charity in the Christian life.
But he is better known for his emphasis on the intellectual factors, since at

164

BOOK REVIEWS

all times love must be intelligent, properly directed and applied, having no
power of understanding of its own. It is true that the abuse of " legalism "
in morals (much more of a European concern) must be counteracted by
recourse to the vital force of divine love enlivening moral theology. But
it is not proved that this must be done outside the organic structure of
traditional theology or by a patchwork drawn from diverse sources that offer
support to a theme that purposes principally to inspire.
It is strange that a direct consideration of supernatural grace and its
workings is absent from this volume, since it is intimately involved in the
subject matter of almost every chapter. The law of Christ, which entitles
this work, expresses the law of conformity to Christ, which it is the burden
of this volume to set forth as the end of the Christian life, and as such is
the work of grace. Here also lack of clearly drawn distinction invites confusion or misunderstanding (cf. p. 61 and passim). Grace is a sharing in
the divine nature and thus the beginning of glory. The ultimate end of the
Christian life is beatitude in the inamissible possession of the divine vision
as the fruit of a faithful participation of the divine nature in the measure
of conformity to the Humanity of Christ, full of grace. Christ is not the
focal center of Christian moral theology and life in the sense of the ultimate
end. He is as man the exemplar end of all His followers, the way to God,
the Light that by His example illuminates our pathway to beatitude and by
His grace moves and quickens our human actions toward a conformity
with His in the pledge of a similar and proportionate reward. Man's
response to grace is a response to the leadership of Christ; the invitation to
fellowship with God is in the manner of Christ's. Christ as God is the
object and ultimate end of moral as well as of dogmatic theology. Christ
as man is the indispensable means of return to God and the necessary
exemplar cause of that return.
The Law of Christ is clearly animated by a sincere desire to inspire a
more perfect love and a more pure life of virtue. It succeeds in offering
religious motivation and encouraging genuine zeal. These are its positive
contributions. It is less· successful as a book of instruction. The lack of
clear-cut distinctions, such as have become necessary precisions in modern
moral works, does not recommend it as a textbook, but rather as supplementary reading. It is not written for the confessor, and this burdened
minister of God will not find it a prime reference book. Nor will the reader
interested in discussions and analyses of modem moral problems be satisfied with the extent of treatment given to those considered here. The
attempt of Father Haring to rethink and to present in a more vital manner
the perennial truths of morality with a view to modem trends, findings
and problems is very encouraging; but not, I am afraid, wholly successful.
NICHOLAS HALLIGAN,

St. Stephen's Priory,
Dover, Mass.

o. P.

BOOK REVIEWS

165

Evolution and Christians. By PHILIP G. FoTHERGILL, F.R.S. E. London,
Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1961. Pp. 840, with bibliography and
index. $9.50.
In his introduction, the author states that his book " brings together
information about evolution and its relation to parts of philosophy and
theology which is generally available only in separate and diverse volumes."
This represents, I believe, a succinct understatement of the excellence of
Dr. Fothergill's latest contribution to the field of evolutionary literature.
A complete account of evolutionary theory, simply as a scientific theory,
necessitates excursions into paleontology, geology, anthropology, anatomy,
embryology, biochemistry and genetics, to mention only the broader areas
of investigation; a study of the implications of evolutionary theory carries
the student on into Biblical science, theology, philosophy, the history of
ideas, sociology, etc., until the hope of ever arriving at a sufficiently balanced
and penetrating understanding of the matter begins to fade for all but the
professional evolutionist. Even within the strictest confines of evolutionary
thought itself, the grasp of the various sub-theories and hypotheses, the
particular or limited principles, laws, trends and generalizations already
present a formidable challenge to ordinary students. Dr. Fothergill attempts
and achieves a comprehensive summary of this extensive and heterogeneous
corpus of theory, fact and implication.
The book is frankly intended for the serious student rather than the
casual reader. It presumes familiarity with scientific terminology and does
not attempt to bypass intricate reasoning and complex analyses of data.
Nevertheless, for .the student who wishes a more than superficial knowledge
of evolutionary theory, or, more especially, for the teacher who wants a
thorough grasp of its many areas somewhere this side of the expertise of
the professional evolutionist, this is the book. To my knowledge, there is
no other book which covers the subject so broadly and competently.
The main strength of the book is in the presentation of the many facets
of the scientific endeavor vis-a-vis evolutionary theory. All the aspects of
the data are offered at least by way of example, and the variety of particular interpretations held by different evolutionists regarding different
points of fact or implication are presented very fairly and generously. Such
his broader
is not always the case in books of this sort. As the core
intellectual stance, Dr. Fothergill has indeed certain cardinal theological
and philosophical positions of his own, which he openly professes and ably
maintains. His merit is in this, that these positions do not color his
scientific judgments, leaving him able to sustain a fine deference towards
opposition opinion at the scientific level.
However, as has been indicated, besides the presentation of evolutionary
theory in its purely scientific dimensions, Dr. Fothergill wishes to place the

166

BOOK REVIEWS

contemporary state of the theory within a historical context, and within
the context also of philosophy and Catholic theology. The historical sections
of the book, however, are brief, especially for earlier periods, and in their
brevity sometimes timd to over-simplify a historical position. It does not
seem right, for instance, to say that Aristotle's theory of hylomorphism
precludes evolutionary theory because it entails an immutability of species.
Some contemporary Aristotelians hold that hylomorphism is an ideal
philosophical position within which to develop a scientific theory of evolution; St. Thomas Aquinas, in the thirteenth century, allowed the possibility
of the development of new species from old, within the framework of hylomorphism. It i11 true to say that some of the Church Fathers eSpoused
evolutionary theories, but these theories must be taken in their proper
context. The Fathers arrived at these opinions through theological considerations, because the exigencies of Scriptural interpretation led them to
conceive the possibility that all things were not created from the beginning
in their fullest, actual form. Their ideas, then, not being generated out of
a oonsideration of paleontological or genetic data, would seem to be of a
different genre from contemporary evolutionary theories. When we come,
then, to a consideration of St. Thomas' thoughts on evolution, it is not
precisely correct to say simply that he opposed evolutionary ideas. That he
did. not feel compelled to follow the Fathers in their theologically inspired
views of evolution is true, but he also respected these ideas and did not
contradict them. It seems more accurate to say that, not seeing these ideas
as necessarily true from the theological point of view, and not having at
hand the scientific data which support such views, he found no positive
reason for affirming evolution as an actual explanation of the development
of living forms. He did, however, expressly assert that the origin of new
species from old was not impossible.
It is perhaps unwelcome to stress philosophical points in a book whose
major impact is in the area of the scientific-theological confrontation, but
one more issue ought to be mentioned. In an early section of his book, Dr.
Fothergill accepts the position of Jacques Maritain regarding the need for
a philosophy of nature which is neither metaphysics nor science, but holds
a place midway between them. Later, however, under the heading " Evolution and Philosophy: the Faith of a Catholic Biologist," this position seems
to have been lost. Here there seems to be no middle ground between the
phenomenological and evidential view which belongs to science; and the
view of the ' essences ' of things, which belongs to metaphysics. The statement is also made that when science leaves the observable and measurable
levels it is no longer science, but philosophy. The anguish this statement
will cause philosophers is apparent: they might be willing to lose their roots
in the measurable, but if their foundations in the observable are also cut off,
all of their intellectual endeavors seem condemned to float unanchored in
the realm of fantasy.

BOOK REVIEWS

167

I doubt if it is Dr. Fothergill's intention so to sever the speculations of
the philosophers, even the metaphysicians, from reality. But I wonder
also if the notion of such a severance does not follow, or tend to follow,
from Maritain's division of knowledge. His dichotomy between empirical
science and the philosophy of nature is so sharp that it tends to relegate
the latter, and a fortiori, metaphysical knowledge, to the realm of the
unrooted, although this is far from his own understanding of these forms
of knowledge. A more realistic and integrated view would make empirical
science and the philosophy of nature not two separate and distinctively
qualified approaches to reality, but two stages of one single approach-the
first stage that of observation, classification, measurement, etc., and the
second stage that of reflecting on and findin_g the meaning of the observed,
classified and measured.
In the theological sections of his book, where he weighs the impact of
evolutionary theory upon traditional theological propositions, especially on
the interpretation of the First Book of Genesis, Dr. Fothergill, guiding himself on the pertinent pronouncements of the Church's magisterium, elaborates the many possible interpretations which fall within the grounds of
the theologically tolerable. He cites even the extreme positions, biologically
extreme or theologically extreme; his own preference leans towards the
explanations which least tax credulity. His intention seems to be, not so
much to propose and insist on any one explanation, as to propose all of
them, and allow the reader to find the answers which most conform to his
own intellectual bents. Probably in an area which is still so fiuid, this is the
only reasonable approach. The teacher of Christian doctrine who must
answer questions in this area, and satisfy a variety of minds, will find this
section a welcome resume of acceptable alternatives.
There is, finally, an intriguing idea which the author mentions in the last
pages of his book. He raises the point that Catholic doctrine puts a difficulty in the way of intellectual satisfaction with evolutionary theory,
because, even if it accepts all that science can prove, it insists on the
special creative act of God to account for man's spiritual soul. This introduces a dichotomy into nature, a gap in the continuity of things, which,
necessary as it might be, nevertheless irritates the mind which yearns for
perfect coherence. It is intellectually more reasurring to see things in an
unbroken continuum. The new idea suggested by Dr. Fothergill's text is an
alternative to the simple or homogeneous or undifferentiated continuum in
evolutionary progress. It is, nevertheless, a continuum. He suggests the
continuum constituted by the limited and its limit, a continuum of degrees
of evolving organic perfection approaching ever more closely to, but never
actually achieving the limit under its own powers. The limit marks a new
order of things, in this case, the human order. In this view, evolution is a
natural movement towards the human composite, obtaining its direction

168

BOOK REVIEWS

and finding its intrinsic meaning from the exigencies of the human
organism. All of evolving creation has a natural community with the huma.il.
composite when the latter has been produced, but none of the forces producing pre-human evolution is capable on its own account of producing
man. In support of this idea is the widely accepted thesis that, after the
advent of man on the scene, evolution seems to have become a qualitatively
different kind of thing, and perhaps evolution of the original kind has
ceased to operate.
The community of man with the rest of organic nature is emphasized in
the relation of the limit to the limited, for the limited is defined and terminated by the limit. It is as though the human organism is the crowning
point or keystone of the whole thrust of organic evolution. The uniqueness
of human nature is emphasized by the extrinsicness of the limit in relation
to the limited. Thus both the essential distinctiveness of the human comand its real community with the rest of nature are simultaneously
underlined. The idea seems to be worth further consideration.
MICHAEL STOCK, o. p.
St. Stephen's Priorg,
Dooer, Maaa.

Religion in American Life. Edited by JAMES WARD SMITH and A. LELAND
JAMISON. Vol. I: "The Shaping of American Religion," 514 pp. $8.50.
Vol. II: "Religious Perspectives in American Culture." 427 pp. $7.50.
Vol. IV: "A Critical Bibliography of Religion in America," 2 vols.,
1,219 pp. $17.50. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Fourvolume set (including Vol. III when published), $32.50.

Religion in American Life stands alone in conception and in high
accomplishment.

Religion in American Life sprang mainly from the upperclass seminar of
the Special Program in American Civilization offered at Princeton University between 1948 and 1958. Volume III of the series which is entitled
"Religious Thought and Economic Society: The European Background,"
is to appear very soon.
The worth of this ambitious project is twofold: the scholarship of the
historical presentation, along with the analysis of American religion and the
critical bibliography which makes it the American religion researcher's
dream.
One essay each has to do with those religions which have come to be
known in the United States as ' the major Faiths,' i. e., Protestantism,
Catholicism and Judaism. However, whereas "Catholicism in the United

BOOK REVIEWS

169

States " and "Judaism in the United States " are the titles of the studies
proper to these two religions, Protestantism is not so treated. The study
of Protestantism is presented under the title " The Protestant Movement
and Democracy in the United States" of which H. R. Niebuhr is the author.
With all proper respect to our cherished form of government, this lack of
' straight ' reporting on Protestantism will undoubtedly puzzle some readers.
A. Leland Jamison, one of the two editors of this great symposium, has
also contributed "Religions on the Christian Perimeter." His sixty-nine
pages of exposition and explanation of more than four hundred sects can
win for them a better understanding than that of" the lunatic fringe."
Speaking of the amorphous mood of American religious thought, Dr.
Jamison recalls Will Herberg's caustic remark about the state of mind
of these multitudinous sects, viz., " a creedless surrogate for a vital and
defined faith in the God of the Bible."
Two historical surveys trace American religion from the Revolution to
1914. Perry Miller's urbane essay examines American Protestant thought
from 1775 to the Civil War. Substantiation, clarity and gentle irony characterize his presentation of the great part of the church-related people in the
then existing American states. They viewed themselves as standing in a
contractual relationship with the "Great Governor" and Dr. Miller shows
that this federal theology was quite widespread.
In "Religion and Modernity, 1865-1914" Professor Stow Persons indicates the serious slackening of religion as an influence in American life
during the post-Civil War period. This was the era in· which the large rival
Protestant denominations in the United eStates learned to accept and get
along with one another and James McCosh, President of Princeton,
attempted to bridge the evolution-religion gap.
In one of Professor Persons' few remarks about Catholics he says that they
" must confess the shocking failure of their Church to come to terms with
modern culture" (i.e., with new ideas on freedom, democracy, progress,
science, etc.). He holds that "the militant anticlericalism of Western
Europe was the inevitable consequence of such folly." This may shake
the more complacent Catholics in the United States who think their
Church is meeting the problems of modernity rather well. But the critic
who makes the charge seems to want to be objective and fair.
Disclaiming statements in the Introduction of Volume. I try to ward off
criticism for neglecting Catholic influence in American life. One such statement points out that " for three centuries the main thrust of American
religion stemmed from the Reformation." This is indeed true. However,
to say that " a study of religion in American life a century hence would
need to place far more stress upon Catholic influence " does not suffice.
It is hardly sufficient reason to ignore the rising tide of Catholic influence
in the nineteenth century, however culturally humble that tide may have

170

BOOK REVIEWS

been. The very depth and breadth of the hostility and persecution directed
against Catholics of the United States in the nineteenth century show the
inadequacy of these disclaimers. Ray Allen Billington's The Protestant
Crusade is but one of the fairly numerous studies which support this point
of view.
Except in the essay of Henry J. Browne the writers in this symposium
show little understanding of Catholic influence in this country prior to the
early twentieth century. Surely the Maryland settlement, the colonial
Philadelphia Catholics, the earliest American city areas of St. Augustine
and Santa Fe, the California mission system and the settlements on the
water route between Quebec and New Orleans mean something.
Reverend Henry J. Browne, a Catholic priest and an historian, contributes 1' Catholicism in the United States," a forty-nine page summary
of the history of the Catholic Church in this country. It is almost certainly
the best such summary that has been offered to date.
This essay was written for a study sponsored by one of the country's
justly famous Protestant universities. Understandably Father Browne has
soft-pedaled the harassment and suffering visited upon Catholics by their
separated brethren. Though this was considerable during the past one
hundred twenty-five years, most of it has disappeared today.
A more adequate mention might have been made in Father Browne's
essay of the position of Catholics in the United States during the Mexican
War. Cahenslyism too, should have been explained. The Vatican ranking
the Catholic Church in this country as a mission church till 1908 helps
make clear why American Catholics were slow to awaken to a sense of
cultural maturity.
Educationally and culturally, Catholics are painted with most of their
warts showing. This is as it should be. That it can be done today without
defensive cries of anguish is a healthy sign in the Catholic body in this
country.
Midwestern Catholics may differ from and even reject Father Browne's
rather patronizing compliment for their " growing independence of clerical
dominance." Their forefathers lacking a chance for higher education chose
freely to trust their clerical leaders. Issues affecting them were often colored
by overtones of national background. To explain past Catholic solidarity
as " clerical dominance " is to seek too easy an explanation. Such a position
has not been demonstrated in American history.
Volume II, " Religious Perspectives in American Culture," is concerned
with the relation of religion (mostly Protestant) with education, law,
politics, Church-State relations, religious novels, the Bible in fiction, poetry,
music and architecture.
Willard Thorp, who writes "The Religious Novel as Best Seller in
Alllerica/' offers the
written piece, while Will Herberg

BOOK REVIEWS

171

seems to have brought the best insight to his work. Thirty-two pages -of
illustration make the study on architecture attractive.
Bibliographers may be excused for over-praising the two volume Bibliography. It serves not only those seeking books on religion but is also
an equerry to readers in related· fields.
In it a surprisingly large number of dissertations and studies on Catholic
education is noted. Peter Guilday's Life and Times of· Jokn England is
called the finest biography of an American Roman Catholic bishop. However, some Catholic encyclopedias seem to have been omitted, along with
some basic American Catholic biographical work. The section " Religion
and the Intellectuals " seems quite thin.
Some Catholic (or other!) graduate historical seminar could consider
what is pointed out on page 1042 in the second book of the Bibliography:
"The History of Roman Catholic Seminaries in the United States-still lacks
a scholarly and comprehensive work." It might also be noted that in the
two essays concerning theology, no attempt is made to assay Catholic
theology, either in historical survey or to judge its conclusions. This fact
seems to indicate that at least there should. be a beginning survey of
Catholic theology in the United States done by some competent scholar
or group.
In sum, all who hold religion to be vital to the United States are in debt
to the editors and authors of Religion in American Life.

DANIEL F. R.EILLY, O.P.
Providence OoUege,
Providence, B. I.

Anselm: Fidea Q'IUBrens InteUectum. KAiu. BARTH. Richmond, Va.: John
Knox Press, 1960. Pp. 178. $8.00.
Anselm: Fidea Qurerens lntellectum offers us Karl Barth's study of Saint
Anselm's search and discovery of what was to his mind an irrefutable proof
of God's Existence. The author confesses to a continued interest in Saint
Anselm, the theologian, particularly in the context of his famous proof.
The work, which is the second edition of a study originally made in 1981,
fulfills a twofold purpose. In the preface to the first edition Barth explains
the work as an apologia for his great interest in this catholic theologian
whose merit, he claims, has never been fully understood and appreciated.
But the thought of Saint Anselm also exercises its own attraction. " From
all this I cannot deny that I deem Anselm's Proof of the Existence of God
in the context of his theological Scheme a model piece of good, penetrating
and neat theology, which at every step I have found instructive and· edifying" (p. 9) . Underlying Barth's study and becoming more and more

BOOK REVIEWS

apparent with the progress of the work is the conviction that the so-called
ontological proof, a description he strongly resents (p. 171), has been almost
always wrenched from its proper setting and made to appear in a false garb.
Throughout the work Barth, whether wittingly or not, tends to create the
impression that no one, besides himself, ever approached the ansehnian
proof sympathetically, that the interest of others was to disprove rather
than to understand. His attitude towards catholic theologians seems to
proceed from such an assumption and from time to time he lends credence
to this suspicion by the curtness with which he refers to them. Frequently
he seems to question their appreciation of theology in rejecting Saint
Anselm's proof, rather than the grounds upon which they do reject the
argument. Surely, it would be more acceptable to presume that any theologian would be moved sympathetically towards every argument purporting
to prove the Existence of God. And if a proof be rejected, it could be
licitly assumed that the rejection was based not on the absence of sympathy
on the part of the theologian, but on the insufficiency, real or apparent,
of the proof. The very failure to approach Saint Ansehn with sympathy
which he charges and decries in other theologians, is perceptible in his
approach to them.
The study itself of Saint Ansehn's Proof begins with a rather extended
treatise on the Theological Scheme which constitutes the framework of the
Proof. In it Barth discusses the nature and necessity of theology, its possibility and aim. In his description of theology he lays
and proper
emphasis on the revealed character of its principles and exj>lains the source
of their attainment, faith. He gives an adequate characterization of
theology's function with regard to. its principles. He places great insistence
on the importance of inteUigere in theology, the understanding of what is
accepted through and by faith. This he designates as the terminus of the
mind's inquiry into the area where faith and revelation hold absolute sway.
In general one can agree with the description of theology given by the
author. Certain details, however, must evoke a dissent. His notion of faith
places the essence· of that infused Habit in the will, while relegating the
intellect's role to merely a passing glance. Though he speaks of the Church
as the authoritative source in matters pertaining to faith, his conception of
the Church is left hazy, but it is certainly not the catholic notion. Again
he appears to identify theology, at least the theology he prefers, with the
Gift of UNDERSTANDING, the divinely given insight into the articles of faith.
This is suggested by his account, filled with a sense of admiration, of the
manner in which Saint Ansehn came upon the discovery of his famous
concept of God, " aJiquid quo nihil maius cogitari potest." Of its genesis
he writes: " Is this a scientific report on an investigation or it is not rather
a-perhaps quite typical-account of a prophetic insight? " (p. 76) .
We do not have any quarrel with the theologian for whom theology is not

BOOK REVIEWS

178

simply a study but also a prayer for understanding. Saint Thomas Aquinas
is an eloquent witness to the fecundity of such a prayerful attitude in
theology. What we do object to is the implied criticism of the theologian
who eschews any outward revelation of his inward piety in the theological
work he writes. From the tenor of his · references to theologians whose
writings are devoid of outward signs of inward piety, it would appear that
Barth considers such to be theologians in a very minor key. This, I believe,
to be unwarranted. Again, when he speaks of the created things as a
pathway to the knowledge of God, Barth seems to actually close off this
pathway." There is nothing in the world which is simile to human reason
as such and per se, which is necessary to it and which quite independently
of anything outside itself is also a medium for knowledge of God " (p. 117) •
Are we to understand by this remark that there is no ontological link
between the Creator and the creature? that there do not exist any vestigia
which, if searchingly followed, could and would lead to a knowledge of,
not indeed the God of revelation, but the God of nature? Or is Barth
speaking exclusively of God of faith and revelation? This point is of more
than passing interest. On it depends the identity of God as the object of
the Proof offered by Saint Anselm and interpreted by Barth.
The principal portion of the book is taken up with the study of the argument of Saint Anselm which is drawn from the Proslogion, !! & 8. Together
these present the Proof which, in the opinion of Saint Anselm, not only
established the Existence of God as an incontrovertible fact, but further
proves that it is impossible to ever conceive God as not existing. The Proof
in its physical entity, and I use that phrase out of deference to the author,
is sufficiently known to every theologian and student of theology to make its
restatement here unnecessary. But the heartbeat, the vivifying soul of the
Proof is, according to Barth, a totally different matter. This is the x factor,
the element that has been passed over by generations of theologians. It can
be best expressed in the author's own words about the meaning of proof
in Saint Anselm's Proslogion. " He himself reminds us again of what he
understands by proof. Not a science that can be unravelled by the Church's
faith and that establishes the Church's faith in a source outside itself.
It is a question of theology. It is a question of the proof of faith by faith
which was already estabilshed in itself without proof. And both the faith
that is proved and the faith that proves-Anselm expressly understands
not as presuppositions that can be achieved by man but as presuppositions
that have been achieved by God, the former as a divine dOnare, the latter
as a divine iUuminare" (p. 179) .
In the light of such a conception of proof one can legitimately inquire
for whom is the proof instituted? for the man of faith? for the unbeliever,
the insipiensof Psalm xiii? If for the man of faith, then the purpose of the
proof cannot be to convince, for he already holds the conclusion prior to its

174

BOOK REVIEWS

being a conclusion and on much more convincing grounds. What the proof,
since it is a proof of faith by faith, achieves is what Barth describes as
intelligere. But it can achieve this only on the supposition that the original
presupposition, the sure knowledge of God's Existence through faith, is not
even momentarily set aside. But what if the proof is instituted for the
benefit of the insipiens, who rejects or will not admit the necessarily required
presuppositions? What possible results are we to expect? Barth examines
this qusstion by first detailing qualities of this inaipiens, and admits that
there is nothing to prevent "the person so informed (about the inner
consistency of Christian statements) from doubting, denying and despising
the whole thing as much as ever and, with the whole, the details too "
(p. 70). However, despite this very likely efiect Barth suggests that "it
may be, however, that Anselm could quite well have risked that astonishing
assumption because of the power of the objective ratio of the object of
faith that enlightens and is enlightened from above by the summa veritas
and which, according to Anselm, was able to teach and all along did teach
truths that are beyond the power of one human being to teach another "
(p. 70). This signifies that the destruction of his unbelief cannot be
expected when the insipiens is confronted with this proof of faith by faith,
since faith is not a matter of demonstration but a gift. But there is given
him in the proof an occasion of grace in virtue of the power of faith to
enlighten because it itself is enlightened from above by God.
But this places the efficacy of Saint Anselm's Proof outside itself. Its
ability to convince the mind of the insipiens that God does exist lay not
in any intrinsic merit but in its opportuneness as an occasion of grace.
But herein, too, lay its weakness, namely in its lack of intrinsic merit. As
Saint Thomas warns, the proof that is not really a proof might well be the
occasion for that ridicule which derides the faith for its supposed reliance
on proofs that are not proofs. And the argument of Saint Anselm does
suffer from an obvious weakness. For if we do not accept the theological
their light glowing brightly throughout the entire
presupposition and
course of_ the argumentation, we have simply an argument which on
philosophical grounds makes an unjustified transition from the purely conceptual or noetic order to the ontological or ontic order.
Anselm: Fides QureTens lntellectum of Karl Barth shows plentiful evidence of a thorough study of the thought of Saint Anselm, in the course
of which the author manifests a good understanding of that terminology
which is the daily fare of the catholic theologian. I particularly mention
this because such an understanding is not met with in protestant theologians
in general. His appreciation and evaluation of the famous Proof is, I
believe, a faithful echo of the mind of Saint Anselm himself. For there
can be no doubt that the Saint was convinced of the efficacy of his Proof.
Yet it is a proof that is inherently weak and vulnerable when viewed, as

175

BOOK REVIEWS

the majority of theologians do view it, as a rational proof of God's Existence. And when viewed as a proof of faith by faith, it might well be an
occasion of the gift of faith, but also an occasion for ridiculing the faith.
JOSEPH

c. TAYLOR, O.P.

St. Stepkm'a Priory,
Dovi?JI', Maaa.

The Spirit of Protestantism. By RoBERT McAFEE BROWN. New York:

Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. 254 with indices. $4.50.
In the Foreword the author prepares us for what is to come and answers
the questions which such a title naturally suggests. Whose Protestantism?
That of the age in which the salve of the conscience of the apostate friar
and the avaricious prince become the confessions of Augsburg and Westminster; that of earlier ages in the ideas of the Donatus, Pelagius, Acacius,
Photius, Leo the !saurian, John Wyklif; that of our times, the religion of
such varied ministers of a varied Gospel as Paul Blanshard, James Pike,
Adam Clayton Powell, Norman Peale, Billy Graham, Bromley Oxnam,
Dean Inge?
He addresses liis book to perplexed Protestants, wishful pagans, Concerned Roman Catholics, inquiring college students and beleaguered Protestant ministers. He chooses as Protestantism the " shared convictions " of
those inside the Protestant churches and, in the last analysis, what he
himself believes.
He ambitiously covers the whole of his field in three parts: past, present
and future. In Part One he disposes of what he considers false images of
Protestantism: that it is protest against something, that it is diluted
Catholicism, that it is " believing certain things," that it is " the right of
private judgement "; he then proposes that Protestantism was not a revolt,
nor an economic, political movement but a religious revival of the full
Gospel of the early church; he bravely sketches the denominations by
genera, by theological attitude, and by ecumenical family; and then in ten
pages expounds the spirit as " constant renewal· at the hand of God." ·The
Second Part is a systematized presentation of the ideas and practices, which
he thinks a good Protestant should hold on grace, faith, authority of Scripture, Sovereignty of God, Priesthood of Believers, worship and Sacraments.
The Third Part entitled Ongoing Protestant Concerns deals with the relation
of Protestantism to Roman Catholicism, to the doctrine of authority, to
culture, to the world and with tensions within Protestanism. Twenty seven
pages of notes which are simultaneously a rich and varied bibliography, and
two indices complete the work.

176

BOOK REVIEWS

This is a work of consummate art. Working with deceptive ease and
honesty; ingenuous, ready to blame as well as praise; erudite, but never
pedantic; didactic, but never prosy; fluent, urbane, but never glib; he has
produced an image of Protestantism with a skill that the best among
Protestant apologetes might wish he could match.
To say as much is only fair, but to continue is difficult because a reviewer
must have a point of departure. The Protestant insider and the Catholic
outsider cannot reasonably evaluate Rev. Brown's Protestantism in the
same way. And if the outsider is already disposed to be critical of Protestantism, then Rev. Brown's version will be subject to censure too.
This outsider admires the skill with which the fundamental and insuperable barriers between Protestant and Catholic unity are detected and
expounded, namely the notions of the Church and of authority, but he is
disappointed and irritated at the many ambiguities, equivocations, gratuitous assertions, some of which are due to Protestantism, some of which are
due to the author. For if the reviewer cannot abstract from his dogmatic
commitments, neither does Rev. Brown, for all his sincerity, rise above his
heritage.
A great part of the charm of this book, and the favorable impression that
it makes is due to the chaste, eirenic style. There is no innuendo, no
emotion-loaded adjectives. Rev. Brown is not of the school of Luther, Foxe,
or Blanshard; all is sweet reason. It is sad therefore to note one lapse.
In the spirit no doubt of Protestantism, Rev. Brown consistently refuses to
admit that the mother and head of all the churches should be called
Catholic. For him Catholic means the full Gospel, which Rome does not
possess, and so he cleverly reduces the Church to just another sect by
constantly employing the adjective Roman. We shall indulge him in this
orthodoxy?
Rev. Brown uses the common coinage of Christian religious thought, but
he arbitrarily, albeit consciously, gives them his own value and content.
Faith, grace, Church, Sacrament, and others, become equivocal terms. For
example even when he accepts, as a third definition of sacrament, the
Patristic phrase " outward signs of inward and spiritual grace " he blandly
ignores the Patristic meaning and gives it his own. Incidentally why must
he quote, of all the Fathers, St. Augustine, the perennial champion of
orthodoxy?
But this is to digress. The pivotal point of the whole book is the doctrine
of the Church. Rev. Brown first presents this in Chapter 4 of Part One
as the essence of the Reformation, and in Latin. " Ecclesia reformata sed
semper reformanda (the church reformed but always to be reformed)."
Let Rev. Brown speak for himself. " The notion that the Reformation is
complete, or can be completed, is a denial of what " reformation " in the
Protestant sense really means. This is perhaps the ultimate issue dividing

BOOK REVIEWS

177

Protestantism and Roman Cathlicism (p. 45.
Visser't Hooft points
out that Roman Catholicism can allow for . . . reforms in the Church, the
cleaning up of aspects in the Church's life that have gotten tarnished.
But it cannot allow for the possibility of reform of the Church, the recognition that at the very basis of its being the Church's ways need to be
shaken, judged, purged and re-made."
"Protestantism affirms . . . (that) its life must be a life of constant
renewal, for it is an ecclesia peccatorum, ' a church of sinners ' a church
that is constantly failing to fulfiill its high calling. The attitude that must
characterize the church, therefore, is the attitude of repentance. St.
Augustine, who used to describe the church on earth as being without spot
and wrinkle, realized toward the end of his life that the description was
incorrect, and the Church could only pray, 'Forgive us our sins.'"
And later in the chapter on Roman Catholicism " ... the Roman Catholic
position asserts that . . . the Pope (understood as the vicar of Christ and
the successor to Peter) ... speaks infallibly. That is to say dogmas proclaimed by him are irreformable and beyond possibility of error . . . a
position incompatible with the notion that the church is semper reformanda.
. . . Here then is the heart of the difference; the dogmas most distinctive
of Roman Catholicism, the infallibility of the Pope, is the dogma that most
separates it most decisively from Protestantism and the whole of nonRoman Christendom. The place where the Roman Catholic feels that the
voice of the Holy Spirit is most clearly discerned is the place where the
Protestant feels that the voice of the Holy Spirit is most surely stifled.''
And with the hearty fellowship representative of the whole book. . . •
" These may seem like harsh things to say about the beliefs of one's fellow
Christians, particularly when one sees the wonderful riches of grace and
humility which the Roman Catholic Church imparts to individual lives.
But there is nothing to be gained by refusing to say them, and there is
everything to be gained by saying them to try and locate the core of the
problem at the point of greatest disagreement " (p. 167) .
By way of criticism of this ecclesia reformanda, it must first be observed
that the facts seem to be otherwise. The reformers always spoke of the
Church as the Donatists did, the assembly of the saints, the godly, the
righteous, the elect. Augsburg, 1580, cap. VII, Of the Church: ... " one
holy Church will remain forever. Now this Church is the congregation of
saints, in which the Gospel is rightly taught and the sacraments rightly
administered .... " Westminster, 1648, which to this day is the formulary
of the Scottish Church; Art. III, of God's eternal decree, art XVII, of the
perseverance of the Saints, lead logically to Art. XXV. Of the Church:
" The Catholic or universal Church, which is invisible, consists of the whole
number of the elect .... " Baptist, First Confession, 1646, XXXIII: " The
Church is a company of visible saints, called and separated from the world

178

BOOK REVIEWS

by the word and Spirit of God.... " Of course, Rev. Brown is not unaware
of this, and so he answers this objection ... "We must acknowledge a
certain truth in the charge (that the Reformers themselves had no such
clear understanding of the " ongoing Reformation ") but insist that the
notion • . . was implicit in their concerns even if not always explicit in
their actions. . . ." (p. 46) . (It might be observed in passing that Rev.
Brown always controls his history with Luther-like serenity. Denifle and
Grisar, for example, are dismissed as out-of-date.)
Secondly, ari ecclesia reformanda seems a caricature of the Church presented in St. John and St. Paul. Rev. Brown quotes to his own purposes
the encyclical of Pius XII, Mystici Corporis, so he cannot be unaware of
the doctrine of the Mystical Body, the union of Christ and His members.
He chooses, however, to ignore all but one aspect of Christ's teaching.
" I am not come to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance." Mk. 2, 17
(Rev. Brown's version). It is only in this sense that the Church, holy in
its founder, purpose and very life-giving principle, is a church of sinners,
sinners called to be saints. Rev. Brown cimnot see the church for the
church-goers, which must give some pain to the ghost of Jean Calvin
wherever he presides in the assembly of the elect. Again, is it not strange
that the sacrament of penance, for which there is certainly scriptural warrant in the words of Christ, should shrivel into a perfunctory prayer in the
Protestant churches if they considered themselves sinners? Luther alone
clung to Penance, " the one and only remedy for troubled consciences,''
but the rest of the godly Reformers were not as troubled as Luther. The
irony of the evolution of Luther's sola fides into opera is repeated here in
the evolution of the Calvinist assembly: of the saints into an assembly of
sinners.
Now as to some of the relatively minor irritations. In the Foreword,
the word " protest ' is cleverly twisted with the aid of Webster to mean
affirm rather than dissent, and therefore Protestantism should be affirmative
rather than negative. Rev. Brown follows this line even when comparison
with Romanism wo!J].d suggest,itself. However, it cannot escape the reader
that in the exposition of his central thesis he is compelled almost in spite
·of himself to play the dissenter and compare his church with the historic
Church of Christendom. His second false image of Protestantism is a
dilute Catholicism. The absence of the derogatory adjective indicates that
Catholicism here is not to be taken for the Roman brand, but for the full
Gospel (p. 19). However, when he comes to expound )lis central Protestant
affirmations, and later to indicate the bases of Romanist-Protestant " creative dialogues," every single item was and is and will be found in the Roman
Church, so that Protestantism is again distinguishable by what it denies,
rather .than by what it affirms. " Grace," says he (p. 53) , " the most
important word in the Protestant vocabulary .... " It is· not based "on

BOOK REVIEWS

179

merit or need (on the part of God) or appeal." "Because it is mercy and
forgiveness, grace is also power." " The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ
is good news." The implication is that non-Protestants think otherwise.
In fact he states that the assertion of these truths by the Reformers " upset
the medieval world. But they saved the church " {p. 58) . The ambiguity
here is suspiciously deliberate. It is not grace that the Reformers discovered
but a novel way of obtaining it; it was not by affirming grace that they
upset the world, but by denying (Protesting) the established means of
increasing grace; the Church, the Sacraments, supernaturally good works.
For a systematic theologian like Rev. Brown to overlook the necessary
clarifications and distinctions is unpardonable.
That he can make distinctions is evident when he treats of faith. Among
the meanings of the word he lists " assent," and continues, " This seems to
have been the dominant understanding of faith among late medieval schoolmen, and a rejection of it was one of the reasons for the Reformation."
That is plain and clear, and so Rev. Brown discarding the intellectual
aspect of faith both as to object and act, describes the conversion of Martin
Luther, and takes faith "as a lively, reckless confidence in the grace of
God," unto salvation. So that from the Catholic point of view Protestants
have no faith, only a hope, which borders on presumption.
RomaD.ists assent to what God has revealed principally through Jesus
Christ. Faith is the act of assenting, and the body of truths assented to,
and the motive for this assent is the truthfulness of God. Romanists do not
believe the Church or the Council of Trent or St. Thomas AqUinas; they
believe God's Word proposed to them; or to use the technical word,
" defined " for them by the Holy Spirit working through human agencies.
The teaching of the Church is the rule of faith, not its object. Protestants
having changed the meaning of faith and the meaning of the Church, find
this incomprehensible and seek to find the word of God in Scripture alone.
There is another ambiguity in taking Scripture as the source and test of
faith, after denying any intellectual content to faith, but that is one more
among so many. The authority of Scripture is an area in which Rev. Brown
is evidently much at home and this is one of his better chapters. Romanists
can sympathize with problems of other Bible-readers, the more so becaUse,
although Rev. Brown does not mention this, it was by and in the Roman
Church that certain Scriptures were written, collected, declared canonical,
and preserved, because they and they alone were written under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. We do not share, however, the facile solution
adopted by modern Protestants to the problems raised by modern criticism;
we still preserve the notions of inerrancy and inspiration which they now
discard contrary. to the spirit of their forefathers. Romanists do not give
less authority to Scripture than Protestants; they giye more. Roman
worship does not use Scripture less, and Protestant preaching, to judge by

180

BOOK REVIEWS

the admittedly inadequate norm of the published topics of their sermons,
does not use Scripture more than Sunday Mass with epistle, gospel and
sermon in the vernacular.
Nor do Protestants outdo Romans in their admiration of the Sovereignty
of God. Rev. Brown himself admits this in a later passage, when he quotes
with approval from Niebuhr " ... when Protestantism, or parts of it, tended
in the direction of humanism, it was Roman Catholicism which maintained
the principle of the sovereignty of God. Sometimes it was this Roman
Church, more than the Protestants, that resisted human authority when
this conflicted with the word of God." And, may we add, the Roman
Church still does in such matters as birth prevention, divorce, family life,
education, mercy killing, secularism, communism.
But the burden of this chapter is the Calvinist doctrine of predestination
and election. Here we must protest another deliberate ambiguity. "Calvin
had a great deal to say about election and predestination, to be sure, but
only because he found that the Bible said a great deal too. The doctrine,
particularly in its negative implications, had been systematically formulated
by St. Augustine, a thousand years before Calvin, and St. Thomas Aquinas
in the 13th century had stated it in ways just as severe as those of Calvin.
The doctrine was no invention of the Reformers." It is difficult not to see
a concealment of truth here. To take the last sentence first, what is the
"doctrine"? Election and predestination to heaven antecedent and independent of merits foreseen, is Augustine, Aquinas and Calvin; Election
consequent to merits foreseen is Semi-Pelagian; non-election which consists
in positive reprobation, antecendent and independent of sin and demerit
foreseen is not Augustine, is not Aquinas, but Calvin; non-election which
consists in reprobation consequent upon sin is Augustine, Aquinas, but not
Calvin. The invention of the Reformers was not election to be sure, but
positive antecedent reprobation was revived by them and again condemned
by the Council of Trent. Does Rev. Brown think that in the condemnation
of Calvin, Augustine and Aquinas are included? Or is he unaware of session
" St. Thomas Aquinas has stated it in ways just as severe
VI, Can. 6,
as those of Calvin." It cannot be found in the place cited in the works of
St. Thomas for the reason that there are only 163 Chapters in the III book
of the Contra Gentes. But aside from that, it is true that Aquinas and
Calvin are in general agreement that predestination to heaven is a gift of
God, because they read St. Paul; the doctrine of positive antecedent reprobation-supralapsarianism,
is no where in Aquinas nor Augustine, and is
condemned by the Councils of Carisiacum (D. 318), Valentium (D.
It is true that St. Augustine addressed himself to the negative aspects
of predestination, and his pungently imaginative phrase, " Massa perditionis " is classic, but Augustine taught negative reprobation, non-election, Calvin taught positive reprobation, antecedent damnation. It is also

BOOK REVIEWS

181

true that Calvin did not invent this; he simply revived a false doctrine
already condemned by the Church as repugnant to the plain sense of Holy
Scripture. Further on, Rev. Brown glowingly writes. "Since salvation is
God's gift ... it is not presumptuous to believe in our election." "The
presumptuous thing would be to doubt it." The Council of Trent says, Sess.
VI, Chap. XII," No one, as long as he is in this mortal life, ought so far to
presume as regards the secret mystery of divine predestination as to determine for certain that he is assuredly in the number of the predestinate;
as if it were true that he that is justified, either cannot sin any more, or
if he do sin, that he ought to promise himself an assured repentance."
Rev. Brown would do well to ponder which is more Pauline, "to work
out salvation in fear and trembling " (Phil.
or with reckless confidence.
With regard to the Priesthood of all Believers, Rev. Brown-makes the
point that the phrase does not mean " every man is his own priest," it means
" every man is priest to every other man." But to discover the meaning of
the word priest . . . " is perhaps the most difficult task we face in this entire
book, but it is essential " (p. 95) .
He sees that a priest is mediator between God and man, and that a priest
offers sacrifice to God. on behalf of men. He also sees that Christ, the great
high-priest in whose priesthood all believers share by baptism, is both
sacrificer and sacrificed. All of which is Romanist doctrine. But then he
concludes with striking originality, quoting T. W. Manson, "we may conclude then that the priesthood of all believers lies in the fact that each
believer offers himself . . . and that all these individual offerings are taken
up into one perpetual offering made by the one eternal high-priest of the
New Covenant." A Protestant priest apparently offers himself then, instead
of Christ, a poor substitute. " Christians are to offer themselves to one
another ... to sacrifice themselves on behalf of one another . . . so that ...
the high-priesthood of Jesus Christ may be more effectually communicated
to them all " (p. 97) .
In the light of this it is easy to see that Protestant worship will be
basically different from Romanist worship, however much the external forms
and even words might be retained. The Mass no longer matters, because
the sacrifice of Calvary is to be replaced by a trinity, Scripture and sermon
and sacrament.
Protestant worship, which Rev. Brown admits is chaotic, is characterized
by five things, the offering of prayer, congregational singing, scripture and
sermon, the offering of gifts (the collection) , and the sacraments. Here for
once, Romanist worship appears to be a diluted Protestantism, for we do
not today lay stress on the congregational singing, although Rome insists
that the congregation take more active part in liturgical worship. This
does not mean, however, that there are no Catholic hymns, nor does it

BOOK REVIEWS

mean as Rev. Brown seems to imply, that there were no Catholic hymns
or hymn tunes at the time of the Reformation. Hymnologists know that
many beloved Protestant hymns are set to traditional Catholic airs.
" The Bible permeates the whole of Protestant worship. Opening sentences and benediction, hymns and prayers, responses and litanies, all are
couched in Biblical language . . . Biblical imagery. At least one portion of
Scripture is read aloud, frequently two (Old and New Testament lessons)
and sometimes three (Old Testament, Epistle and Gospel) ." And later
" The conviction that word and sacrament belong together is a basic Protestant conviction.... Calvin's Genevan Liturgy, for example ... the
sacrament of the Lord's Supper was intended to be the culminating point
of the service. . . . The same intent is apparent in the Episcopal Book of
Common Prayer. The central expression of Episcopal worship is the . . .
Eucharist, . . . Churches in the Calvinist tradition . . . recognize that the
integrity of worship demands frequent . . . ·celebration of the sacraments,
and in Episcopal churches there is increasing emphasis on the Holy Communion as a family service which includes at least a brief sermon " (p. 144) .
This is certainly diluted Catholicism, and typical of the equivocations to
which Protestant principles lead. What they protest in Roman practice,
they surreptitiously re-introduce under another n¥IJ.e, as unscriptural as the
one they reject. " Priest " " clergy •: they discard; " an ordained minister "
replaces it. Prelacy they reject; elders they admit. Mass they reject; communion service they admit. Vestinents are popery; a Geneva gown is
evangelical. They deny authority to a Pope. They vest it in a stated Clerk.
When we read " ... the impetus for
Reformation came from the fact
that
like Wycliffe, Luther and Calvin read their Bibles •.. " (p. 128)
we must remember that Thomas Aquinas, Anthony of Padua, Robert
Bellarmine read the same Bible. Reading Bibles is not a Protestant invention, as Rev. Brown implies; but reading one's own religious convictions,
novel or imperfect they may be, into the Word of God is very
much so.
One can detect two pervasive'pattems in the author's thinking. Possibly
they are connected. The first is his evolutionism, wedded to the fallacy
that all change is for the better. For Rev. Brown, Christ did not found a
church; He could not have, because the Church is not. even yet formed.
He finds a possible good in the proliferating Protestant sects as each
denomination contributes " its own particular gifts tp the coming great
ckurck " (p. 218) . Besides this Hegelian dialectic, he suffers from an epistemological block. He repeatedly laments that we know and assent to words
and ideas instead of reality; that words cannot convey what a thing is;
it must be felt, experienced. Words are for him the quod, not a quo. Hence
in many words he
us to distrust the church, Scripture even, lest they
get between us and Christ. Hence his chapter on the study of theology,

BOOK REVIEWS

188

which is most appropriately called " loving God with the mind," is as great
an inconsistency as writing books for illiterates.
It is in this spirit that we allow Rev. Brown to assess his own work.
" These convictions are not my own creation. . . . None of us understands
them fully .... All our attempts to express our faith-excepting liturgy
and prayer, and perhaps occasionally even then, must include an echo of
laughter .... Authentic religious language is not the language of books
and arguments but the language of liturgy and prayer .... Protestantism
when all is said and done is more adequately represented by its hymns and
prayers than by its textbooks ... " (p. x). Having watched for 226 pages,
we must concur.
IGNATIUs McGuiNEss, 0. P.
Marymov:nt College,

New York, N.Y.

A History of Formal Logic. By I. M. BocHENSKI and translated by Ivo
THoMAS. Published by University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame,
Indiana, 1961. Pp. 567, with indices. $20.00.
Fr. Bochenski's history of formal logic, completed some five years ago
in the German language edition of Formale Logik, was intended to be the
"first comprehensive" history of the problems of formal logic. Aware that
a scientific study of logicians and their writings, extending over twenty
centuries, was more than one man could effectively accomplish, the author
readily admits that his Formale Logik really mirrors the collective efforts of
very many scholars. To such men and to such schools of scientific research,
especially those of the Warsaw and Munster he gives most credit for being
able to present and to interpret scientifically about a thousand original texts.
The author begins by defining the centre and scope of formal logic. In
so doing he hopes to avoid the mistakes and shortcomings of most historians
of formal logic in the past. After pointing out how he is going to proceed
in the telling of the history of logic, he narrates 'in capsule form its
geographical and chronological evolution. He next makes clear why he has
adopted the methodology employed throughout, because " logic shows no
linear continuity of evolution,'' and " the essential feature of the whole
history of logic seems then to he the appearance of different varieties of this
science separated both in time and space " (p. 12) . He pictures the four
distinctive varieties of logic (ancient, scholastic, mathematical and Indian)
as aspects of the same one reality and suggests that there are at least a
half-dozen empirical reasons" for speaking of one logic" {p.14). Despite the
" depressions " experienced in each variety of logic, over the years a noticeable and genuine progress has been made. Fr. Bochenski relies greatly on
the textual evidence of the logicians themselves. He explains that such a

184

BOOK REVIEWS

" documented history " will more perfectly and more scientifically delineate
" the history of the problematic together with the complex of essential ideas
and methods that are closely connected with it " (p. 18) . Realizing the
handicaps in adopting such a scientific methodology and a non-linear view
of logic's evolution, he frankly admits that he is aiming at a type of general
orientation in the specific problems, methods and notions characteristic of
each of the four varieties of logic. In this way, the author assures the
reader that a" general course of the history of logic and its laws" (p. 19)
will be presented in the succeeding :five Parts.
His methodology becomes more apparent in Part II. For the Hellenic
variety of logic, fathered by Socrates, the author has both respect and
praise. Strange as it may seem, it is " the relatively best-known period in
the development of formal logic " (p. 27) . Beginning with the pre-Aristotelians and some of their more important contributions, Fr. Bochenski
credits Zeno with fashioning an axiomatized system of logical inferences and
Plato as " the :first to grasp and formulate a clear idea of logic " and " that
his thought made possible the emergence of the science with Aristotle "
(p. 89).
His extensive treatment of " the :first formal logician," Aristotle, who
" was undoubtedly the most fertile logician there has ever been " (p. 27)
occupies the major part of the second period of antiquity. His careful
exposition of the principal features of Aristotle's systematic logic occupies
sixty-five pages. The more salient problems that should prove helpful and
interesting to logicians generally and devotees of Aristotelian logic in
particblar are the authenticity and temporal sequence of the Peripatetic's
treati.Jes on logic. Employing criteria involving the internal evidence of
the texts themselves, such as the presence of propositional variables and
degree of formal technique, he feels that these knotty problems will be
unraveled with " as high degree of probability as is ever possible in the
historical sciences " (p. 48) . He defends his lengthy study of Aristotelian
logic on the groul)ds that " within the short span of Aristotle's life formal
logic seems to have made more progress than in any other epoch " (p. 40) •
After a brief treatment of Theophrastus and his contributions to the
development of logic, the author takes up the doctrines of the MegarianStoic schools. His paramount reason for this is to counter the widespread
error " that there was a Stoic, but no Megarian logic " (p. 106) . In light
of the scientific interpretations of Peirce and Lukasiewicz, Fr. Bochenski
charges that it was " Prantl, most of all, who completely mistook the significance of this logic " (p. 108) . He concludes that the lack of originality
in the third period of antiquity was very evident and that for the most
part the more famous logicians, Galen, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Porphyry
and Boethius, directed their efforts towards the writings of commentaries
and manuals.

BOOK REVIEWS

185

In Part III the author now interprets and evaluates a new variety of
logic developed by the logicians of the Scholastic era. The time prior to
Abelard "is not remarkable for any logical novelties" (p. 149). During
the creative period, the middle of the 18th century, the essential elements of
Scholastic logic took definite shape, giving rise to manuals, of which " the
most authoritative " was the Summulae Logicales of Peter of Spain. Then,
in the twilight of the Middle Ages originality waned and logicians for the
most part discussed, subtly and at length, the problems and solutions of
the past. Yet, the author admits that this resulted in " an extremely comprehensive logic and semiotic" (p. 149), and praises the works of Ockham
and Paul of Venice as most representative of the 14th century. In its
serious " endeavor to abstract the laws and rules of a living (Latin)
langauge " and yet maintain a respect toward the entire realm of " the
semantical and the syntactical functions of signs " was the novelty of
Scholastic logic (cf. p.
Although semiotic problems become the center
of interest and the meta-language became a most popular vehicle of conducting this logic, nevertheless, by its dynamic interest in the problems of
propositional logic, modal logic, and semantical antinomies it made tremendous contributions to the growth and history of formal logic.
To this reviewer Part IV is too short. In his condemnation of " classical
logic," begun in and typical of the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, the author
seems to be somewhat severe. Suspicious of anything associated with formal
logic and disdaining everything medieval " as sheer barbarism " (p.
,
the intelligentsia of that period almost jettisoned logic as worthless. But,
if Vittoria and Cajetan and John of St. Thomas did carry on "deep and
of logical problems, then, it seems to this
original investigations " (p.
reviewer, they should have been given more documentary consideration.
He terminates this " transitional period " with an informative treatment
of Leibniz who made some excellent advances in the interpretation of the
Aristotelian syllogistic and is recognized historically as " the founder of
mathematical logic" (p.
This last is the subject of Part V.
Here the author is probably at his best in explaining elemental factors
of the mathematical variety of logic and its phenomenal growth up to the
Principia. After praising Boole, De Morgan, Peirce and others for their
contributions to the evolution and perfection of this type of logic, he is most
grateful to Gottlob Frege for his insights on logical problems and techniques and compares his Begrijfsschrift to Aristotle's Prior Analytics. However, the author points out that not a few of the "discoveries" of logical
entities since medieval times are really "re-discoveries": e. g. supposition
and the antinomies. Here, too, he strives to avoid excesses in the use of
symbols, but many non-symbolic logicians will find difficulty. Because of
the healthy state of research in this type of logic, Fr. Bochenski's textual
evidence throughout this section is numerous and varied.

186

BOOK REVIEWS

For many Part VI will be quite interesting for its panoramic view of
Indian logic. Yet the author admits quite readily that his study is incomplete and based mostly on translations of varied reliability. This variety
of logic sprang from discussion by Buddhist, Brahaminst and Jinist logicians.
It formally began with the editing of the Nyay(;8'Utra in the Second century, A. D. Though this constitutes the W,9&mental text for the whole
of Indian logic, there have been many other Commentaries and texts. He
claims Dignaga is the greatest Indian logician, but also praises the efforts
of Vasubandhu, Dharmakirti and Gangesa. After showing that Indian
logicians were not unaware of propositional logic and that their tendency
to employ examples as premises in syllogistic argumentation was quite
unique in the history of logic, he closes with the observation that " once
more then it can be said that we meet here an original and interesting
variety of genuine formal logic " (p. 447) •
Unquestionably this excellent work is a " must " for every library and
for all those who are occupied with logic and its contiguous sciences. Its
75 pages of bibliography and 81 pages of indices of proper names, logical
symbols, mnemonics and subject matter are noteworthy accomplishments
in themselves.
Fr. Thomas offers a very satisfactory translation. It is seldom difficult
to read even though at times it must subordinate literary excellence to the
exactness of logical meaning and the literal sense of terms. English speaking
philosophers must be grateful to author and translator for so necessary
and so rewarding an accomplishment.
DENNIS c. KANE, 0. P.
Providence College,
Providence, R.I.

BRIEF NOTICES
Introducing Tke Old Teatament. By FREDERicK L. MoRIARTY, S. J.
Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1969. Pp. xi, 268. $4.20.
Recent biblical research has cast new light upon Old Testament life and
literature. This book, incorporating modem Old Testament scholarship,
attempts to introduce its results to the educated non-specialist.
Father Moriarty has chosen to present the history of the Old Testament
in terms of its great, heroic figures: Abraham, Moses, Joshua, Saul, David,
Elijah; Amos, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezechiel, Second Isaiah, Nehemiah, Job,
Qoheleth, .and Daniel. The result is a highly dramatic account of the great
events and personalities of the ancient Israelites.
Father Moriarty must of necessity make a choice of solutions so far
proposed. His choice is generally a happy one: modem but never extreme.
The following points in the first study "Abraham Our Father," are of
interest in themselves and also indicate the tenor of the whole work: (1)
due to the work of the archeologists and linguists, the period known as the
Patriarchal :Age can no longer be treated " with a generous dose of scepticism"; (2) there cannot be the slightest doubt that our present biblical
text of Genesis is the result of a long process, beginning with orally transmitted material; (8) the he}>rew historian does not retell the past for its
own sake but for the very practical purpose of instructing, edifying, and
inviting men to see God's hand in their history; (4) the contents of our
Pentateuch are, in general, very much older than the date at which they
were finally edited (i. e., sometime after the Exile in the sixth century
B. C.); (6) it is extremely important to distinguish carefully between the
age of the biblical material incorporated into a work and the date of the
incorporation itself, for failure to appreciate this distinction can give rise
to misunderstandings which are entirely unnecessary. Some of these points
exert considerable ·influence on the remaining studies of this work.
Almost any serious student of the Old Testament will profit from the
careful .study of this book. We are indebted to Fr. Moriarty for giving us
a modem and well written introduction to the Old Testament.
THoMAS AQUINAS CoLLINS, 0. P.
Providence College,
Providence, R.I.

187

188

BRIEF NOTICES

What Is Philosophy? By DIETRICH VON HILDEBRAND. Milwaukee: Bruce,
1960. Pp. viii + 242. $4.25.
What Is Philosophy? By JosE ORTEGA Y GAsSET. Translated from the
Spanish by Mildred Adams. New York: W. W. Norton,1960. Pp. 252.
$4.50.
What is philosophy? In simplest terms, it is metaphysics, mathematics,
logic and the natural, moral and social sciences-all according to the mind,
method and principles of St. Thomas Aquinas. This is, of course, a rather
rigid and narrow view. A broader view would bring Descartes, Kant, etc.,
into the world of philosophy, and a still wider view would extend the notion
to include the hazy world view of the common phrase, " a philosophical
outlook." These distinctions and all the possible variations of them must
be kept in mind if we are to attempt any sort of evaluation of the two
works here being briefly noted, since both have the ambitious title, What Is
Philosophy?
Von Hildebrand's book has a curiously ambiguous character. The introduction is belligerently polemical (against those "betrayers of philosophy,"
the logical positivists), while the rest of the work contains a straightforward,
unemotional exposition of von Hildebrand's personal brand of phenomenology.
This type of phenomenology is openly proclaimed by von Hildebrand as
a philosophical novelty. While for him it was " at the basis of every great
philosophical discovery" of the past, it is yet "new, and even revolutionary " because all " former philosophers used this arch-method of philosophy only occasionally and always unsystematically" (p.
Ortega y Gassett also preaches a new philosophy, or rather, a novel
philosophy. For the work of this Spanish writer of extremely vigorous prose
(who died in 1955) has been known in this country for some thirty years.
His best known work is undoubtedly The Revolt of the Masses, published
in English in 1942.
In the present work the more theoretical aspects of his philosophy are
developed, but the main lines of his thought are more or less the same.
We find here at least a trace of anti-clericalism ("in the way of priests
There
everywhere, Japanese priests curse all that is earthly ... ," p.
is some arrogance toward idealism, which Ortega admires but claims to be
transcending ("We go beyond idealism ... ," p. 179), and even more toward
Greek and medieval philosophy ("Ancient realism ... is philosophic ingenuousness," p. 177) . But the main theme is an elaboration of Ortega's
own "new" philosophy, which can perhaps be best described as an existentialism of " life," by which he means human life lived to the full.
Even though Ortega's What Is Philosophy? must appear, to the Thomistic

BRIEF NOTICES

189

eye, as philosophically negligible, the book can be recommended (for
Catholics, with permission) as an exercise in amazingly vigorous W!jting.
Ortega can express himself with real power, and it is easy to see how he
managed to gain an ascendancy over the minds of his Spanish speaking
audiences. Von Hildebrand's book is more substantial. It presents a refutation of barren " analysis " that is cogent and sometimes eloquent, even in
those parts of the work that are purely expository. Yet it too suffers from
imperfections. The most notable (aside from basic disagreements with
phenomenology itself) is a constant usage of neologisms (" the how-it-is,"
"the such-being," "knowledge-thematicity and object-thematicity," and
many others) that may well confuse the reader. Nevertheless, beneath this
layer of difficult phraseology, one often suspects meanings that are not too
far from the realism of the traditional philosophia perennis.
PAUL R. DURBIN, O.P.
Dominican Ho'IUJe of Studies,
WMhington, D. C.

General Ethics. By KENNETH F. DouGHERTY, S. A. Peekskill, N.Y.: Graymoor Press, 1959. Pp. 188, with index. $8.00.

To his Logic and his Cosmology, Fr. Dougherty now adds General Ethics
in his Collegiate Philosophy Series. The author's aim is to give a Thomistic
presentation of the basic principles of moral life based on the threefold
division of End (called " Human Destiny " in the book) , Means (" Human
Conduct ") and Law. In many respects, Fr. Dougherty achieves a straightforward exposition of the important points in ethics. He distinguishes ethics
from moral theology even though ethics can give only a partial view of
morality; rather curiously, he maintains that " ethics demonstrates its own
proper principles as a philosophical science" (italics added). However, on
the question of man's ultimate end, Fr. Dougherty follows a theological
approach and order rather than a philosophical one, relying on St. Thomas
in the Summa Theologiae to prove that God is man's final end. Actually,
as far as an ultimate terrestrial end of man is concerned (which ethics,
as distinct from moral theology, treats and which Fr .. Dougherty presumably wishes to observe) St. Thomas does not depart from Aristotle's
understanding of such an end; natural happiness is not realized simply and
concretely in the natural contemplation and love of God, although this
knowledge and love enter into the constitutives of natural happiness. Given
the practical character of the science, its primarily compositive mode of
procedure, and the frequent reminders both Aristotle and St. Thomas make
with regard to the tentative character of so much of ethical knowledge,
the tendency to a didactic manner of writing and the occasional use of the

190

BRIEF NOTICES

thesis method with proof of major and minor hardly seem to be the appropriate way to develop ethics. On the other hand, Fr. Dougherty's references
to modem authors and problems help to make the study of ethics pertinent
and lively. Within the confines of a relatively brief treatise, he covers the
main topics of a standard course in ethics clearly and determinately. The
questions at the end of each chapter are also helpful for reviewing the
material.

Man and Morals. By D. J. B. HAwKINs. London and New York: Sheed
and Ward, 1960. Pp. 108. $8.00.
Father Hawkins' book might well be described as a series of informal
essays on some of the major topics in the ·field of ethics. His somewhat
easy manner of exposition in no way precludes sound and penetrating observations and reflections; indeed, his pleasant manner permits both a fresh
and forceful exposition. The chief attraction of this little book is that it
graciously leads any attentive reader, even a
one, to reflect
on the nature of moral experience, the problems of free will, the relation
of morality to intelligence and, finally, to see what Fr. Hawkins is most
concerned to nudge his reader into recognizing, a " view beyond morality "
in which moral relations are grasped as simply working out the loving
relationship between God and creature. It is a sympathetic contribution
toward recognizing, on the one hand, the respect which a natural morality
should command and, on the other hand, the necessary completion it must
have in the order of grace. Fr. Hawkins, philosophical grasp does not
always measure up to his style of writing. In his chapter on " Soul and
Body," he thinks Aristotle's arrival at the "undifferentiated substratum"
came by way of an easy inference from the " science of his day," i. e., from
the four elements manifesting characteristic pairs of contrary qualities
which, transmuted one into the other, demanded such a substratum of
change. Fr. Hawkins adds: " This line of argument is no longer open to
us." It wasn't to Aristotle either, for the four elements and their pairs of
contrary qualities of hot and cold, dry and wet, are entirely apart from
the investigation and analysis which led Aristotle to a prime matter-not
only apart from, but even irrelevant to what Aristotle sought, when in
Book I of the PkysiC8 by analogy he was arguing to the necessity of an
ultimate underlying subject of motion. Apart from matters such as these,
Fr. Hawkins succeeds admirably in showing how a study of morality
" retains its value both because it yields truth on its own level and because
without it we could not understand what is needed in order to go beyond
it."

BRIEF NOTICES

191

Problems of Etkics. A Book of Readings. Edited by Robert E. Dewey,
Francis W. Gramlich, and Donald Loftsgordon. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961. Pp. 488. $6.00.
This book of readings has a number of ·desirable features. First, and
perhaps most important, constructed topically rather than chronologically,
it permits a problematic and, especially for ethics, a more interesting
approach. Secondly, the original writings of philosophers rather than secondary texts are usually chosen. Thirdly, the editors have restricted themselves to brief helpful introductions. Fourthly, every major philosophical
position, with one exception, has an added selection which is critical of that
position. Some other features are perhaps not so desirable. The division
suffers from some lack of comprehensiveness and adequacy. The first
section on the preliminary problems (divided into Psychological Egoism,
Cultural Relativism, and Freedom vs. Determinism) is least interesting;
most of the authors selected are not commanding or representative enough.
The second section on The Search for a Moral Staiidard is too diffuse and
is uneven with respect to quality of choice of sources; the brief excerpt
from Cardinal Mercier's Manual of a
Scholastic Pkilosopky, for
example, is hardly sufficient as representing the position, from a Catholic
viewpoint, of the authority of God as a moral standard. Further, the inclusion of Aristotle in this section under " Self-realization " is ambiguous, to
say the least, and the excerpts chosen from the Nicomackean Ethics not
altogether the most relevant for discussing a moral standard. However, the
last major section, The Analytic Approach to Ethics, is particularly well
done. It is divided into Intuitionism, The Emotive Theory, and The" Good
Reasons " Approach. Each of these positions is well represented and so
well arranged that not only does one major part within this section lead to
the next, but frequently one author within a part leads to another. The
last part, The " Good Reasons " Approach is the one section to which no
critical selection has been added, but this omission does not detract from its
value. Indeed, the view put forth in this section by Hampshire and Toulmin
is especially interesting by way of seeing a return to ethics as a normative
science based on reason in its practical dimension derived appropriately,
though hardly exclusively, from Aristotle's practical syllogism. It is this
third section which gives the book special value, a value which this
reviewer has had occasion to verify in class use.
JoHN A. OESTERLE
University of Notre Dame,
Notre Dame, Indiana.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Ammonius. (Verberke, G., Ed;). Com,mentaire Sur Le Peri Hermeneias
d'.Aristote. Louvain: Editions Neuwelaerts, 1961. Pp. 516. $6.00.
Armstrong, D. M. Perception and The Pkysical World. New York:
Humanities Press, 1961. Pp. 196, with index. $5.00.
Armstrong, W. H. 87 Ways to Help Your Ckild In Sckool. Barron's Educational Service, 1961. Pp. 214 with index. $1.95.
Averroes'. (Zedler, Beatrice H., Ed.). Destructio Destructionum Pkilosopkiae .Algazelis. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961.
Pp. 496 with index. $8.50.
Bahm, Archie J. Types of Intuition (Social Sciences and Pkilosoplvy
Number 3). Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico
Press, 1960. Pp. 58. $1.25.
Barth, Karl . .Anselm: Fides QurerensIntellectum (Faitk in Searck of Understanding. Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1961. Pp. 178 with
index. $8.00.
Baumgardt, David. Cheat Western Mystics: Their Lasting Significance.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. 284 with index.
$4.50.

Bausola, Adriano. L'Etica di Jokn Dewey (Serie Terza, Scienze Filosofiche
-Vol. II) Universita Cartolica del Sacro Cuore, 1960. Milan, Italy:
Societa Editrice Vita e Pensiero, 1960.
Bender, 0. P., Ludovicus. Forma Iuridica Celebrationis Matrimonii: Commentarius in Canones 1094-1099. Rome, Italy: Desclee & Co. Pp.
844 with index.
Bettoni, 0. F. M., Ph. D., Efrem (Bernardine Bonansea, 0. F. M., Ph. D.)
Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles of kis Pkilosopky. Washington,
D. C.: Catholic University Press. Pp. 220 with index. $4.75.
Blass, F. and DeBrunner, A. (Trans. R. Funk) . .A Greek Grammar Of
Tke New Testament and Otker Early Christian Literature. Chicago,
Dlinois: University of Chicago Press, 1961. Pp. 825 with index.
$10.00.

Bochenski, I. M. (Donald Nicholl and Karl Aschenbrenner, Trs.) Contemporary European Philosophy. Berkeley, California: University of
California Press, 1961. Pp. 844. $1.75.
Bocheilski, I. M. (lvo Thomas, Trans. and Ed.) . .A History of Formal
Logic. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961.
Pp. 589. $20.00.

192

BOOKS RECEIVED

198

Bose, Jean; Guitton, Jean; Danielou, Jean (Olsen, Robert J., Tr.). The
Catholic Protestant Dialogue. Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961. Pp.
147. $3.50.
Bouyer, L. The Word, Church and Sacraments. New York: Desclee Co.
Pp. 80. $2.00.
Brant!, G. Catholicism. New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1961. Pp. 256
with index. $4.00.
Bredvold, Louis 1., and Ross, Ralph G. (Eds.). The Philosophy of Edmund
Burke: A selection from his Speeches and Writings. Ann Arbor,
Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1960. Pp. 284. $5.95.
Bresnahan, 0. S. A., J. E. The One True God. Villanova: Onterio, 1961.
Brillet, C. Or., Gaston (Jane Wynne Saul, R. S.C. J., Trans.). Meditations
in the Old Testament. New York: Desclee Co., 1961. Pp. 274. $3.75.
Brown, Robert McAfee. The Spirit of Protestantism. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1961. Pp. 284 with index. $4.50.
Butler, 0. S. B., Christopher. The Church and The Bible. Baltimore:
Helicon Press, 1961. Pp. 111. $2.95.
Butler, 0. P., Richard. Religious Vocation: An Unnecessary Mystery.
Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1961. Pp. 180. $4.00.
Callahan, S. J., D. (and others). Christianity Divided. New York: Sheed
and Ward, 1961. Pp. 335. $6.00.
Calvez, S. J., J. Y and Perrin, S. J., J. The Church and Social Justice.
Chicago: Henry Regenery, 1961. Pp. 441 with index. $7.50.
Caraman, S.J., P. and Walsh, S.J., J. (Ed.). The Fulton Sheen Sunday
Missal. New York: Hawthorn Book, Inc., 1961. Pp. 630. $7.50.
Carol, 0. F. M., J. B. (Ed.). Mariology Vol. III. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1961.
Pp. 456 with index. $9.50.
Carre, 0. P., A. M. The Everlasting Priest. New York: P. J. Kenedy and
Sons, 1961. Pp. 132. $3.50.
Chauvin, Remy. God of the Scientist, God of the Experiment. Baltimore:
Helicon Press, 1961. Pp. 159. $3.95.
Chisholm, R. M. (Ed.). Realism and the Background to Phenomenology.
Glencoe, lllinois: Free Press, 1961. Pp. 308 with index. $6.00.
Colledge, Eric (Ed. and Introduction). The Mediaeval Mystics of England.
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1961. Pp. 304. $4.95.
Collingwood, F. Philosophy of Nature. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice
·
Hall, 1961. Pp. 306 with index. $4.50.
Collins, J. Philosophical Readings in Card. Newman. Chicago: H.
Regnery, 1961. Pp. 436 with index. $7.50.
Congar, Yves, 0. P. (Donald Attwater, Tr.). Laity, Church and World.
Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961. Pp. 94. $2.50.
Conway, C. S. P. Catholic Catechism 2. New York: Herder and Herder,
1961. Pp. 96 with app. $.75.

194

BOOKS RECEIVED

Copi, Irving M. Introduction to Logic (Second Edition). New York: The
Macmillan Co., 1961. Pp. 525 with index. $5.25.
Daniel-Rops, H. Monaieur Vincent. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961.
Pp. 141. $8.95.
Danielou, Jean. Ckrist and Us. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp. 286.
$8.95.

Davis, Charles. Liturgy and Doctrine. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960.
Pp. 128. $2.50.
Dawson, Christopher. Tke Crisis of Weatem Education. New York: Sheed
and Ward, 1961. Pp. 252. $8.95.
Day, Jn. P. Inductive Probability. New York: Humanities Press, 1961.
Pp. 886 with index. $8.00.
de Gaultier, J. From Kant to Nietzscke. New York: Philosophical Library,
1961. Pp. 290 with index. $4.75.
de Grandmaison, Leonce. Jesus Ckrist. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961.
Pp. 281. $4.50.
Descalzo, Jose Luis Martin (Rita Goldberg, Tr.). A Priest Confesses.
Fresno, California: Academy Library Guild, 1961. Pp. 218. $8.95.
de Vinck, Jose (trs.). Tke Works of Bonaventure, I, Mystical Opuscula.
Paterson, N.J.: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1960. Pp. 278. $6.00.
Duffey, C. S.C., Felix D. Witk Anxio'UB Care. St. Louis: R Herder Book
Co., 1961. Pp. 184 with index. $2.75.
Dewey, Robert E., Gramlich, Francis W., Loftsgordon, Donald (Ed. by).
Problems of Etkics. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961. Pp. 492.
$6.00.
Eisenhofer, Ludwig Lechner, Joseph. Tke Liturgy of tke Roman Rite. New
York: Herder and Herder, Inc., 1961. Pp. 522. $8.50.
Eliade, M. Images and Symbols. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp.
189 with index. $8.50.
Eskow, Seymour. Barron's Guide to tke Two-Year CoUeges. Great Neck,
New York: Barron's Educational Series, Inc., 1960. Pp. 870. $2.98.
Participation et Ca'UBalite. Louvain, Bel.: :Editions
Fabro, C. P.
Nauwelaerts, 1961. Pp. 670. $8.90.
--. Partecipazione e Ca'UBaliea. Intemazionale: Societa Editrice. Pp.
698. $20.00.
Fandal, 0. P., Damian C. Tke Essence of tke Euckaristic Sacrifice. River
Forest, lllinois: The Aquinas Library, 1960. Pp. 126. $2.50.
Fanfani, 0. P., J. C. D., Louis and O'Rourke, 0. P., J. C. D., Kevin D.
Canon Law For Religio'UB Women. Dubuque, Iowa: Priory Press,
1961. Pp. 898 with index. $4.95.
Flood, J. M. (Ed.). Tke Mind and Heart of Aug'UBtine. Fresno, California:
Academy Library Guild, 1961. Pp. 106. $2.45.

BOOKS RECEIVED

195

Forestell, C. S. B., J. Terence (Commentary by) . The Book of Proverbs.
New York, New York: Paulist Press, 1960. Pp. 96. $.75.
Fothergill, P. G. Evolution and Chriatiana. London: Longmans, Green and
Co., 1961. Pp. 895 with index. $9.50.
Gardiner, S. J., Harold C., and Getlein, Frank. Movies, Morals and Arl.
New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp. 186. $8.50.
Gargan, Edward (Ed.). Leo XIII and the Modern World. New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp. 246. $4.50.
George, Charles H., and George, Katherine. The Protestant Mind of the
English Reformation 1570-1640. Princeton, New Jersey. Pp. 462
with index. $8.50.
Gerbert (tattin, H. P., Trans.). The Letters of Gerberl. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1961. Pp. 412. $7.50.
Gilbert, N. W. Rennaisance Concepts of Metkod. New Y'Ork: Columbia
$6.00.
Press,
Gilson, Etienne. Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages. New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1961. Pp. 114 with Indsx. $1.25.
Glanzman, S. J., G. S., and Fitzmeyer, S. J., J. A. An Introductory Bibliography For The Study of Scripture. Westminster, Maryland:
Newman Press, 1961. Pp. 185 with index. $1.50.
Gleason, S. J., R. W. To Live is Chriat: Nature and Grace in the Religious
Life. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp. 191. $8.00.
Goldbrunner, Josef. Teaching the Catholic Catechism with the Religion
Workbook, Vol. Ill. New York: Herder and Herder, 1960. Pp. 122.
$1.65.

--.

Teaching The Sacramenta. New York: Herder and Herder, 1960.
Pp. 141. $1.75.
Guardini, Romano (John Murray,
J., Trans.). Freedom, Grace, and
Destiny. New York: Pantheon, 1961. Pp. 251. $4.00.
-- (Elinor C. Briefs, Trans.). Power and Responsibility: A Course of
Action for the New Age. Chicago: The Shoe String Press, Inc., 1961.
Pp. 887 with index. $7.00.
.
Guillet, S. J., J. Themes Of The Bible. Chicago: Fides Publisher, 1961.
Pp. 279. $6.95.
Guitton, Jean. The Church and The Gospel. Chicago: Henry Regenery,
1961. Pp. 286 with index. $6.50 •
. Grant, R. Gnosticism. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961. Pp. 254.
$5.00.

Hamlyn, D. W. Sensation and Perception. New York: Humanities Press,
1961. Pp. 210 with index. $5.00.
Hii.ring, Bernard, C. SS. R. (Edwin C. Kaiser, C. PP. S., S. T. D., Trans.).
The Law of Chriat, Vol. I: General Moral Theology. "Westminster,
Maryland: The Newman Press, 1961. Pp. 646. $8.50.

196

BOOKS RECEIVED

Hawkins, D. J. B. Man and Morals. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961.
Pp. 111. $8.00.
Hill, Johnson D. and Stuermann, W. E. Philosophy And The American
Heritage. New York: Philosophical Library, 1961. Pp. 254. $8.50.
Hofinger, S.J.J. and Howell, S.J., J. Teaching All Nations. New York:
Herder and Herder, 1961. Pp. 421 with index. $6.95.
Hopper, Vincent F., and Gale, Cedric. Essentials of Effective Writing.
Great Neck, New York: Barron's Educational Series, Inc., 1961. Pp.
208 with index. $1.50.
--. Practice for Effective Writing. Great Neck, New York: Barron's
Educational Series, Inc., 1961. Pp. 160. $1.50.
Haunt, Ernest. Le Peche Contre la Chair. Paris: Beauchesne et Ses Fils.
Pp. 124. $9.90.
Huesman, S.J., Ju. E. The Book of Isaia, Part I & II. New York: Paulist
Press, 1961. $.75.
Hutchins, Robert and Adler, M. The Great Ideas Today. Encyclopedia
Brittanica Inc., 1961. Pp. 562. $8.95.
Johnston, Leonard. Witnesses to God. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961.
Pp. 185. $8.50.
Kingston, F. Temple. French Existentialism: A Christian Critique. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1961. Pp. 286. $5.50.
Klausner, N. W. and Kuntz, P. G. Philosophy, The Study of Alternate
Beliefs. New York: Macmlilan, 1961. Pp. 674 with index. $6.75.
Kovauch, F. J. Die A.sthetik des Thomas Von Aquin. Berlin: W. De
Gruyter & Co., 1961. Pp. 279 with index.
LaFont, 0. S. B., G. Structures et Methode Dans La Somme Theologique
deS. Thomas d'Aquin. Bruges: Desclee de Brouwer, 1961. Pp. 494
with index. $8.90.
Lauver, R. Z. The Mind of Voltaire. Westminster, Maryland: Newman
Press, 1961. Pp. 155 with index. $8.50.
Leclerg, J. Christians in the World. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961.
Pp. 174. $8.50.
Lefebvre, Dom Georges. The Well-Springs of Prayer. New York: Desclee
Co., Inc., 1961. Pp. 79. $1.75.
Lestapis, deS. Family Planning and Modern Problems. New York: Herder
and Herder, 1961. Pp. 826 with index. $6.50.
Levasseur, J-M. Le Lieu Theologique histoire. Editions Du Bien Public,
Trois Rivieres, 1961. Pp. 282. $4.00.
Lillie, Wm. An Introduction To Ethics. New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc.,
1961. Pp. 842. $1.25.
Luijpen, 0. S. A., Wm. Existential Phenomenology. Pittsburgh: Duquesne
Univ. Press, 1961. Pp. 875 with index. $6.75.

BOOKS RECEIVED

197

MacNutt, 0. P., Sylvester F. Gauging Sermon Effectiveness. Dubuque,
Iowa: The Priory Press, 1960. Pp. 154. $1.95.
Macquarrie, J. The Scope of Demythologizing. New York: Harper. 1961.
Maiano, Vincenzo. Problematicismo e Educazione. Istituto Superiore di
Pedagogia, 1960, Rome, Italy. Pp.
Makrr, 0. P. (Mary L. Trans.). The Hsiao Ching. Jamaica, New York:
St. John's University Press, 1961. Pp. 67. $8.50.
Marc, S. J., Andre. Raison et Conversion Chretienne. Bruges, Belgique:
Desclee de Bouwer, 1961. Pp. 806.
Maritain, J. On The Use of Philosophy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ.
Press. Pp. 71.
with
Masi, Robert. Cosmologia. New York: Desclee & Co., 1961. Pp.
index.
Masterson, 0. P. (Ed.) . Theology in The Catholic College. Dubuque, Iowa:
The Priory Press, 1961. Pp. 84. $8.95.
Mcinerney, R. The Logic of .Analogy. Martinus Nijhoff The Hague. Pp.
184 with index. $15.65.
Menne, 0. C. S. 0., Raymond. The Theory of Personality of Carl Rogers.
Rome: Angelicum. Pp. 67.
Miller, B. The Range of Intellect. London: G. Chapman, Ltd., 1960. Pp.
with index.
Murray, 0. C. S. 0., M. P. The Concepts of Self-Acceptance and SelfRespect in Karen Horney's Theory of Neurosis. Rome: Angelicum.
Pp.
with index.
O'Connor, C. S.C., Edward D. Faith in the Sy1Wptic Gospels. Notre Dame,
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961. Pp. 184 with index.
$4.00.

Ortega Y Gasset, Jose (Mildred Adams, Tr.). Wkat is Philosophy? New
$4.50.
York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1960. Pp.
Pepper, Stephen C. World Hypotheses. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1961. Pp. 861. $1.95.
Pflirtwer, S. Luther und Thomas im Gespriich. Heidelberg: F. H. Kerles.
Pp. 188. $8.80.
Pinsk, J. Toward the Center of Christian Living. New York: Herder and
Herder, 1961. Pp.
$4.50.
Pius XII. Teen-Age Purity. New Rochelle, New York: Salesiana Publishers,
1961. Pp.
Poole, Reginald L. Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought and
Learning (Second Edition, Revised). New York: Dover Publications, 1961. Pp. 886. $1.85.
Proceedings Fifteenth Annual Convention of Tke Catholic Theological
Society of .America, June 20-23, 1960. Washington, D. C., The
Catholic Theological Society of America, 1961. Pp.
with index.

198

BOOKS RECEIVED

Rabut, O.P., Olivier. Teilkard De Ckardin. New York: Sheed and Ward,
1961. Pp. 24'7. $8.95.
Ragusa, I. and Green, Rosalie (trs.). Meditations on the Life of Ckrist.
Princeton University Press. Pp. 465 with index. $15.00.
Rahner, S.J., H. Our Lady and The Ckurck. New York: Pantheon Books,
1961. Pp. 181 with index. $8.50.
Rahner, S. J., Karl (C. Ernest, 0. P., Trans.). Theological InvestigationB.
Batlimore: Helicon Press, 1961. Pp. 882. $10.95.
Ramirez, 0. P., Santiago. La Esencia de la Eaperanza Cristiana. Madrid,
Spain: Ediciones Punta Europa, 1960. Pp. 852 with index.
Ramsey, Ian. (Ed.). Prospect for Metapkyaics. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1961. Pp. 240. $6.00.
Raymond of Capua, Blessed (George Lamb, Tr.). The Life of St. Catherine
of Siena. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1960. Pp. 884. $4.95.
Rossi, C. M., G. F. La Filosofia del CoUegio Alberoni E Il Neotomiamo.
Sattler, C. SS. R., Henry V. (Ed.). Togetker m Ckrist, a Preparation for
Marriage. Washington, D. C.: Family Life Bureau, 1960. Pp. 804.
$8.50.

Togetker m Ckrist Teacking Manual. Washington, D. C.: Family
$.75.
Life Bureau, 1960. Pp.
Scanlan, S.M. A., Kevin. Ordination and the Canonical Statua of Clerics
mSocieties witkout Vows. Rome, Italy: Angelicum, 1960. Pp. 178.
Schlier, H. Principalities and Powers in the New Testament. New York:
Herder and Herder, 1961. Pp. 89.
Schoeck, H. and Others (Ed.) . Relativism and The Study of Man. Princeton: Van Nostrand Co., 1961. Pp. 259 with index. $6.50.
Sheerin, C. S. P., John B. The Sacrament of Freedom. Milwaukee: Bruce
Pub. Co., 1961. Pp. 178 with index. $8.50.
Shrady, M. L. (Ed.). In the Spirit of Wonder. New York: Pantheon Books,
1961. Pp. 147. $4.50.
.
Siegman, C. P. P. S. (Ed. Comment.). Book of Ezechiel. New York: Paulist
Press, 1961. Pp. 94. $.50.
Simmons (Ed.) . Tke Scientific Art of Logic. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co.
Pp. 881 with index. $4.80.
Singer, M.G. Generalization in Ethics. New York: Alfred A. Knopt, 1961.
Pp. 851 with index. No price.
Smith, S. J., Gerard and Kendzierski, Lottie H. The Pkilosopky of Being:
Metapkyaica I. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961. Pp. 425 with
nidex. $5.75.
Smith and Jamison (Eds.). Religion in American Life. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press,
Vol. 1: The Shaping of American Religion. Pp. 514. $8.50.
Vol. II: Religioua Perspectives in American Culture. Pp. 427. $7.50.

--.

BOOKS RECEIVED

199

Vol. IV: A Critical Bibliography of Religion in America (2 volumes).
Pp. 1219. $17.60.
Smith, V. E. (Ed.). Tke Philosophy of Science. Brooklyn: St. John's
University Press. Pp. 82 with index.
Stebbing, L. S. A Modern Elementary Logic. New York: Barnes and Noble,
1961. Pp. 214. $1.26.
Stein, Edith. Die Frau. Ihre Aufgabe nach Natur und Gnade. Louvain,
$1.50.
Belgique: Editions Nauwelaerts, 1959. Pp.
$5.96.
St. John-Stevas, Norman. Life, Death and tke Law. Bloomington, Indiana:
Indiana University Press, 1961. Pp. 876 with index. $6.96.
Stuhlmueller, C. P., Carroll (Commentary by). Tke Book of .LevitiC'U8.
New York: Paulist Press, 1960. Pp. 96. $.50.
Synave, P. and Benoit, P. Prophecy and Inspiration. New York: Desclee
Co., 1961. Pp. 186. $8.76.
Tavard, George H. (Royce W. Huges, Tr.). Two Centuries of Ecumeniam.
Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides Publishers Association, 1961. Pp. 250.
$4.96.

Taylor, A. E. Elements of Metaphyaica. New York: Barnes and Noble,
1961. Pp. 419. $1.96.
Taylor, Jerome. The Didaacalicon of Hugh of St. Victor. New York:
Columbia University, 1961. Pp. 254 with index. $6.00.
Thomas S. Aquinas (J. P. Rowan, Trans.). Commentary on tke Metaphyaica of Aristotle (2 Volumes). Chicago: H. Regnery Co. (set)
$25.00.
Tillich, Paul. The Shaking of tke Foundations. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948. Pp; 186. $1.25.
Tonquedec, S. J., Jos. La Critique de la Connaiaance. Pp. ·666 with index.
The New English Bible: New Testament. New York: Oxford University
Press and Cambridge University Press, 1961. Pp. 460. $4.96.
Vann, 0. P., Gerald. Tke Eagle's Word. New York: Harcourt, Brace and
World, Inc., 1961. Pp. 247. $4.60.
Van Noort, Mgsr. G. (Translated and Revised by J. J. Castelot and W. R.
Murphy). Dogmatic Theology Vol. Ill. Westminster, Maryland:
Newman, 1961. Pp. 420 with index. $7.60.
Van Steenberghen, F. Dieu Cache, Essaia philoloaphiques 8. Louvain,
Editions Nauwelaerts, 1961. Pp. 871.
Van Zeller, 0. S. B., Hubert. Approach to Calvary. New York: Sheed and
Ward, 1961. Pp. 128. $2.96.
Vawter, C.M., B. Tke Conscience of Israel. New York: Sheed and Ward,
1961. Pp. 808 with index. $5.00.
Von Balthasar, H. U. Prayer. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp. 246.
$5.00.

200

BOOKS RECEIVED

Von Leyden, W. Remembering. New York: Philosophical LibraJ:y, 1961.
Pp. 128 with index. $4.75.
Ward, C. S.C., Leo. God and World Order. St. Louis, Mo.: Herder, 961.
Pp. 222 with index. $4.00.
Watkin, E. I. The Church in Council. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961.
Pp. 227 with index. $8.95.
Weigel, S. J., Gustave. Catholic Theology in Dialogue. New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1961. Pp. 126. $2.75.
White, 0. P., Victor. God and the Unconscious. New York: Meridian
Books, 1961. Pp. 287 with index. $1.85.
Wilkin, S.J., V. From Limbo to Heaven. New York: Sheed and Ward,
1961. Pp. 145. $8.50.
Will, Garry. Chesterton Man & Mask. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961.
Pp. 252 with index. $4.50.
Wu, John {Trans.). Tao Teh Ching. Jamaica, New York: St. John's Univedsity Press, 1961. Pp. 118 with index.