THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS:

THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PRoviNCE OF ST. JosEPH

Publishers:
VoJ.. XXV

The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.
APRIL, 1962

No.2

THE PHILOSOPffiCAL ASSUMPTIONS, IMPLICIT AND
EXPLICIT, OF ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE'S
PffiLOSOPHY OF ffiSTORY

0

INTRODUCTION

NE of the most characteristic elements in the worldview of contemporary man is the consciousness of
historical time. Over and above the consciousness of
physical time, shared by all rational creatures, the accelerated
.social transformations of the last two centuries have given the
man of today a peculiar awareness of the workings of the time
process mhumart institutions. It is for this reason that our age
shows an unprecedented interest in the historical sciences.
It is natural enough, therefore, that certain minds should
turn to " meta-historical " studies as they have been· called,
philosophical interpretations of man's historical .process as it
has been revealed by the labours of Palaeontology, Anthropology, Archaeology, and History. Among these studies, the
work of Arnold Toynbee is outstanding. 1
1 The present study is based upon Prufeaaor Toynbee'a principal work, A· Study
of Hiato'I"'J (London: Oxford University Press) as published in 1955 (2nd Edition

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JOHN THORNHILL

Toynbee's essay, it should be emphasised, is not formally an
historical work, but presupposes the labours of History properly
so-called. The relationship between History, in the strict sense,
and an interpretation of the historical process such as Toynbee
has undertaken may be understood if their formal objects are
compared. (Evidently, they are concerned with one and the
same material object.)
The formal object of History is the inteUigibility of the past,
inaofar as it remains particularized, in the individualized historical situation. 2 Meta-historical studies, on the other hand,
seek an . understanding of the inteUigibility of the historical
process which passes beyond the (}(Y(WTete historical situation to
the universal laws and principles which are realized in the
historical process.
_
The intellectual light employed by the historian-his historical wisdom, one might say-is not necessarily expressed in
universal philosophical principles, rathJ;!r it shows an affinity
with prudential knowledge, intuitively comprehending a concrete situation. It is, in brief, a cultural affinity withthe object
considered, with the ethos and outlook of the period under
consideration; 8 only indirectly, therefore, would the historian
employ the habit of philosophy.
An interpretation of the historical process, on the other hand,
precisely because it is seeking an understanding of the historical
process's intelligibility in itself, must invoke as its light the
principles of the intelligibility of all reality, namely principles
arising from
reflection.
for Vols. I-VI); 1st Edition for Vols. "'11-X). In a number of briefer works Toynbee
has presented various important aspects of his theoiy in essay form. This theory,
however, is found in its entirety in A Sttuly of Hiatory.
• The object of genuine historical scholarship is not, however, the superficial
factual chaos of the newspaper but a deeper attaining of reality, in which the
events of the past present an order, a hierarchy of significance, a pattern of casual
relations. The worth of historical study will be measured by the extent to which it
has comprehended this reality, and revealed the order which is to be found in it.
Outstanding among recent studies on the nature of history
the work of H. I.
Marron, De la Ctmnaiaaance Hiatorique (Louvain, 1954). Cf. p. 47.
. 8 It is the merit of Marron's work; just cited, to have established once and for all
the importance of this aspect of historical method. · Cf. Toynbee. ·A.. op. cit., pp.
287, 86, 66, 102, etc;

u;

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE's

PHILOSOPHY

OF HISTORY

It was only to be expected, therefore, that Arnold Toynbee's
study of history, begun according to an empirical method- ·
Professor Toynbee constantly calls his work an " empirical
study" 4-soon takes on a genuinely philosophical character.
In his comparative study of history, the brilliance of Toynbee's
powers of induction is recognized by even the most outspoken
of his critics. There can be no doubt that induction has a real
part to play in a comparative study of history, but its function
is to prepare for the formal considerations of such a study,
namely, the interpretation of the historical process in the light
of philosophical principles: that is, in the light of truths concerning the natures of those realities which are implicated in
the historical process, the nature of man and the perfection
towards which he is ordered, the nature of society, etc.
It is not an oversimplification to say that the basic weakness
of Professor Toynbee's essay is his confusion as to the function
of formal philosophy in an interpretation of history such as he
has undertaken. It is the purpose of this article to show the
nature of this confusion, and to point the way towards the true
role of philosophical principles in the philosophy of history.
On the one hand, as we shall see, our author mistrusts
philosophy as such. Since the post-Cartesian philosophies are
of no assistance to him in his intensely humanistic study, Toynbee endeavours to found his interpretation upon common sense
and upon the metaphorical expression of universal truths. On
the other hand, the inherent logic of the task he has set himself
forces him, willy-nilly, to adopt a certain standpoint on several
basic philosophical issues, and to carry out his .study in the
light of philosophical principles. We propose to set out and
evaluate the philosophical assumptions, both implicit and explicit, which underlie Arnold Toynbee's interpretative study
of history.
To set out immediately to criticize the ' ex professo ' philosophy of our author would misrepresent the richness of his
thought. His philosophy was born of a reflection upon the
'Cf., Ibid., I, 448. 146, 800, 425; ill, ll9, 129, 188, etc.

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JOHN THORNHILL

intuition of the social nature of man and true human values as
realized in history, and he himself bears witness that his efforts
to translate that intuition into philosophical terms has not done
justice to the realities it contained. Speaking of " the age-old
philosophical problem, never yet solved, of the (social) ' common will,' " he concludes: " We know with our minds that we
have encountered these civilizations simply as objects of our
thought-as intelligible fields of study-but we cannot express
our notions of them in words without treating them to some
extent anthropomorphically as ' men of like passions with ourselves.'" 5 We consider, therefore, that the exposition best
gauged to enable the reader to penetrate and appreciate the
mind which conceived A Study of History will be one which
first displays the dimensions·· and complexity of its guiding
intuitions. This conceptual framework having been traced, one
is prepared for an examination of our author's efforts to interpret and complete his concepts in a formal philosophy. These
two steps will constitute the principal members of the present
essay.

Basic Philosophical Insights
It would be true to say, as anyone familiar with Toynbee's
great work will recognize, that A Study of History is an immense investigation of the commonly accepted concept " civilization," seekillg to reveal the reality or realities it contains. In
his attempt tO define the concept of " civilization "-a concept
is often clear enough to permit its distinction from others before
it reaches that degree of clarity whereby it can be distinctly
defined-our writer makes use of certain philosophical insights.
First of all we intend to set out the manner in which a penetrating social insight is employed to prepare a definition of
civilization. The various elements of definition which have
emerged will then be synthesised. In the light of another ethical
intuition, this definition will be seen as providing a basis for
• Emphasis added. Cf. V, 18, note, where the same problem is implied for

Primitive Societies, described as " one and indivisible."

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE'S

PHILOSOPHY

OF HISTORY

the formulation of " laws " and " pathological norms " in the
consideration of the life of a civilized society.
Even at the outset of the investigation, the concept of " civilization" was not a confused notion, unworthy of a place in the
realm of the scientific. llluminated by a philosophic insight, it
made possible that sureness arid equilibrium in a painstaking
process of comparative history characterising the pre-war volumes of the Study. That intuition, admirable and profound,
was-as we have said-the intuition of man's social nature in
its concrete realizations throughout the course of history. 6
And, if the philosophic insight into the social nature of man
provided a basis upon which the study of history could be constituted, the clarification was reciprocal. Many times the
thought of Arnold Toynbee, as it scrutinized the historical realizations of man's sociability, returned to this mother-idea and
guiding concept, until the Aristotelian definition, " social animal," becomes almost a refrain in the pages of his Study. 7 The
intuition. becomes clearer and more deep, and little by little the
elements of a philosophy of society begin to group themselves
in the reflections shared with the reader as the author guides
him among the vistas of comparative history. 8
What is the nature of this principal insight which guided
Professor Toynbee in his attempt to clarify and define the con•
cept, " civilization "? When he speaks of " social action,''
" social life," " social heritage," his thought is cutting more
deeply than the jejune signification of these terms in common
parlance. This new philosophical dimension we wish to suggest
by coining the phrase: " primordial social fact." Though the
6 This soundness of social insight is admitted even by. those who reject the general
theory of A Study of History, e. g., Marron, op. cit., pp. 20!l-203.
7 Cf., Toynbee, A Study of History., I, 173 and 454, note.
8 In Toynbee, we have perhaps the most
of aJl criticisms of that
false liberalism which Rousseau bequeathed to the nineteenth century: not only is
" atomism " rejected as false, but the natural state ideal of the " noble savage "
associated with it is convincingly interpreted as a sign of a malady in the social
structure of those who conceive it (V, 377). In this, Toynbee acknowledges a
debt to Oswald Spengler, Df!Jl" Untergang des Abendlandf!Jl"s (Munich: 1920,
Vol. I, p. 286) .

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JOHN THORNHILL

term is not Toynbee's we have no doubt that he would immediately recognize the concept as his own.9 This concept is made
up of two elements: First, the recognition that basic social
reality lies much deeper than juridical forms of society/ 0 "That
mankind cannot exist and cannot be studied except in a social
environment, 11 or that there is no human activity which does
not connote social relations: in the words of a contemporary
sociologist, " the stress on the consciousness of the end of society
in some textbookS . . . makes it almost impossible to subsume
peoples as ethnological and cultural communities under . . . a
general concept of society, though there is no doubt that it
constitutes a community in the most radical sense of the
word." 12 The second element of this insight is the contingency
of this fundamental social reality-it is a " fact." All men are
social by nature, but the constructs which this sociality effects
are eminently contingent, dependent on countless circumstances
and antecedents of time and place. It was this primordial engagement in society, coming from the very constitution of
man's nature, and animated by the restlessness which the antinomy of an infinite end and finite, inconstant means itnplies/ 8
which Arnold Toynbee has utilized as a guiding principle in
seeking to define a civilization. In the pages which follow we
wish, by means of a series of illustrations, to- show the manner
in which our author has employed this intuition. 14
9 The term " social contract " has not been used, though it clearly is in the
same line of thought as our " social fact," since this term implies an exaggerated
liberalism.
10 Arnold Toynbee's view of political forms and institutions is reminiscent of
" Tonnies' distinction between " society " and " community " (Gemeinschaft and
Gesellschaft ") . But the similarity is such that if there were any dependence it
would be remarkable that a pen so ·adroit at marshalling authorities had omitted
to call upon that of the great sociologist. We find a similar conception in pages of
de Gobineau cited by Toynbee (le Comte, J. A.-" Essai sur l'lnegalite des Races
Humaines," Paris, 1858-5, 4 vols.) -Cf. I,
for a remarkable citation.
11 Toynbee, A., op. cit., I, 179.
12 Messner, J., Social Ethics: Natural Law in the Modem World (St. Louis:
1952, pp. 108-104). Emphasis added.
18 The place of finality 'in A Study of History will be considered at length in the
latter part of this article.
"It is not our
therefore, to review the whole theory of the Study, but

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE'S

PHILOSOPHY

OF HISTORY

207

The " primordial social fact " begins to exercise its illumi. native function in the Introduction to "A Study of History":
a quest for "the intelligible field of historical study."
A " parochial state " is excluded, for its history is unintelligible without appeal to social forces whose field ranges far
beyond its boundaries. 15 The higher community which begins
to take shape goes by the name of " civilization."
The most superficial observation recognizes certain traits
peculiar to civilized communities. Although the timespan of
man's habitation of the earth extends for some 800,000 years,
civilizations are comparative newcomers in our field of observation, having existed for about 6,000 years. 16 In comparison with
another easily recognizable social group, the " primitive society," civilizations are few in number. 11 The number of human
beings which a civilized society embraces dwarfs the tiny primitive society.l!t On an empirical level, the civilization begins to
assume tangible proportions as " an intelligible field of historical study.'!
In the reply to an objection that this concept is too vague to
be turned to practical account, our author leaves his investigation on inductive lines to make use of the philosophical, insight
of the " primordial social fact." After noting that " an intelligible field of historical study " is a social genus, of which " civilizations" and " primitive societies " are diverse species, he sets
out to determine the essential difference which exists between
them.
The generic feature colij.mon to the life of each of these
societies is termed" mimesis," and is defined: "the acquisition,
through imitation, of social ' assets '-aptitudes or emotions
or ideas-which the acquisitors have not originated for themmerely to draw upon a aufficitmtly TepTesentative series of illustrations to achieve
this purpose.
•• Cf., Toynbee, A., op. cit., I, 17 :If.
'"Ibid., I, 174.
17 A provisional survey will reveal 21 civilizations, liVing and dead, while the
number of extant primitive socities reaches the vicinity of 650, to B!J.Y nothing of
those without number which have perished with the passing of time (cf. I, 147 :If.).
18 Ibid., I, US.

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JOHN THORNHILL

selves, and which they might never have come to possess if they
had not encountered and imitated other people in whose possession these assets were to be found. 19
The differentiation of this " mimesis " introduces a specific
distinction between civilizations and primitive societies. In
primitive societies, as we know them, mimesis is directed " towards the older generation of the living members, and towards
the dead ancestors who stand, unseen but not unfelt, at the
back of the living elders." In a society in process of civilization,
mimesis is directed" towards creative personalities which command a following because they are pioneers on the road towards
the common goal of human endeavours." 20
The relatively recent appearance of civilizations poses the
problem of the Genesis of Civilizations, to which a special section of the Study is devoted. The empiric classifications of
civilizations has brought to light a certain diversity among
civilizations themselves. Some are "unrelated" to any earlier
civilized society, having appeared out of the historical gloom
of the primitives. Some, on the other hand, are " affiliated "
to previous civilizations. The problem of genesis, therefore,
becomes twofold, and Arnold Toynbee offers a twofold explanation in the light of the " primordial social fact."
The theory proposed for the origin of " unrelated " societies
need not detain us here, being merely an extension of the principle of" mimesis" already outlined.
The foundation of a new " affiliated " civilization on the
ruins of another member of the species merits our consideration
as revealing a new and penetrating application of the "social
fact" principle.
Our author points out that a student of Hellenic history and
a student of Western history, 21 occupied with identical periods,
19 "In this Study, the Greek words (p.•piuu from p.•p.e'iuOat) are used in order
to avoid the connotations of ' unintelligent imitation ' or ' satirical imitation '
which attached to the derivative English word 'mimicry.'" (I, 191, note).
20 Ibid., I, 192.
21 For Arnold Toynbee, HeUas (the Greco-Roman world)
and The West (our
own society) represent two distinct civilizations.

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE'S

PHILOSOPHY

OF HISTORY

209

will find that their studies include little common ground: " they
are concerned respectively with two histories which overlap
in time but which are nevertheless distinct from one another."
The student of Hellenic history follows a particular social stratum which first occupies the surface, then begins to disintegrate
and disappear. The student of Western history follows a social
stratum which lies below the Hellenic stratum and comes to the
surface after its disappearance. Each stratum enjoys a certain
historical autonomy. Not that it has no relationship whatsoever with the other; but those relationships which it does have
are as with something distinctly foreign. For Gibbon, the student of Hellas, both the Christians and the Barbarians appeared as alien underworlds, as cancerous growths, of relevance
only insofar as their agency hastens the dissolution of Hellas.
" I have described the triumph of Barbarism and Religion," he
writes as he brings his history to a close. Professor Toynbee
points out that the Barbarians and the Christians, considered
in this relation to Hellenic society, are best described as the
"External" and the "Internal Proletariat"; and, in the definition of a " proletariat " given in a note to this passage/ 2 the
illuminating part played by the " primordial social fact " is
made explicit: " The word ' proletariat ' is used here and hereafter in this Study to mean any social element or group which
in some way is ' in ' but not ' of ' any society at any given stage
of such a society's history.''
Indeed, here we are in the midst of the best thought of " A
Study of History," which Arnold Toynbee will unfold at length
in the sections, " Growth," " Breakdown," and " Disintegration." We propose to outline them here ' per modum unius '
because of the analogous manner in which the social insight is
used to interpret the vicissitudes of history in each of these
phases.
During the period of "Growth" of a civilized society, the
" social fact " is characterized by a sharing of the rank and file
-through mimesis-in the fruits of " creative " effort on the
•• Ibid., I ,41.

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JOHN THORNHiltL

part of a minority. 28 The" responses'' of this group of leaders
prove equal to the " challenges " presented to the society as a
whole and the social body moves forward as one, continually enriching its social patrimony with the benefits of successive
" creative responses " and " adaptation " 2 '
" Breakdown" comes to a society when the " Creative Minority " proves incapable of providing a solution to the challenge of a social situation. 25 The difficulty remains unsolved
and social disruption follows. The rank and file are no longer
drawn on by leaders who-' ex hypotheBi '-have proved uncreative. They begin to withdraw their mimesis. The process
of" DiBintegration" has begun. The leaders of society, finding
that the charming " music of
" has deserted them, turn
to the "drill sergeant's word of command" in an effort to ·
maintain order in the body social.26 The " Creative Minority"
of the period of growth is replaced by the " Dominant Minority" of disintegration. 27 The masses,
of being "robbed
of their social heritage," 28 deracinated in the disorders of a
society in crisis, become the" Internal Proletariat": the membership of which is by no means incompatible with the possession of material assets. 29 Disillusioned by the bankrupcy of the
social framework in which they find themselves, they are ripe
for the germination of a social movement of alien inspiration
in the bosom of the disintegrating society.80 In the language of
our term of reference, a new " social fact" is born. 81
•• Ibid., ill, !46.
•• Ibid., IV, lSI.
n Ibid., III, 19i fl.
•• Ibid., V, 19.
•• Ibid., V, 68.
•• Ibid., IV, 119 fl.
•• Cf., definition of a "proleto/riat," above. (The "External Proletariat" will be
considered below.)
80 Not necessarily alien to the civilization at large, but always alien at least to
the " W eltafi8Chau.u.ng" of thB Dominant Mitwritg. Cf. V, 888 fl., "Alien and
Indigenous Inspirations."
81 Cf. "Schism in the Body Social," V, 85-888, passim. Some of the many
reactions possible in the soul of those called upon to play their part in a society
" Schism in
in the process of disintegration· are acutely described in the
the Soul," V, 876-068. They are " attempts to step out of the ranks of a phalanx
whose 'social drill • has failed to work-with the result that the uncreative mass,
which formerly followed its leaders through intricate evolutions in orderly formation,

.ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

ill

The delicacy of Toynbee's "empiric" approach is in sharp
contrast with the dogmatism of Oswald Spengler.82 The Englishman is anxious however to glean what truth he can from
the work of his German predecessor,83 and we find the Ideaforce (Ursymbol) of Spengler's theory reflected in the considerations of the section entitled " Differentiation throo,gh
Growth." 8 ' For Toynbee the differentiation which characterises
distinct civilizations is accounted for by the concrete realization of the " social fact."
If we consider the various communities into which a civilized
society is articulated, we find that-by reason of varied reaction
to the common challenge of the society-they develop peculiar
traits. This process of differentiation is cumulative. " ' A fortiori,' " remarks Professor Toynbee, " a completely separate
society facing a series of challenges quite distinct and diverse
will develop characteristics which typify it and set it apart from
other civilizations." 86
For the author of A Study of HiKtory, the social heritage thus
differentiated, by the very reason of its organic genesis in the
frame of a particular body social, constitutes a coherent whole:
". . . it is one of the characteristics of civilizations in process
of growth that all the aspects and activities of their social life
are coordinated into a single social whole, in which the economic, political, and cultural elements are kept in a nice adjustment with one another by an inner harmony of the growing
now stands immobilized, irresolute and apprehensive: a helpless target for hostile
attack," pp. 877. The more extreme of these attempts are doomed to failure
because " it is intrinsically impossible for the Soul, insofar as it is living in
the outward life, to, extricate itself from its place in the current of the ' everrolling stream' by taking either a flying leap backward upstream into the past or a
flying leap forward downstream into the future. The archaistic and the futuristic
Utopias alike are Utopias in the literal sense of being localities which have no
real existence," p. 885.
•• DM Untergang., cf. Vol. I, 248 for Spengler's conception of the "Ursymbol."
•• Cf., Toynbee, op. cit., Ill, ISS; IV, 11.
•• Ibid., m, s77 ff.
as Ibid., m, s77-s78.

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JOHN THORNHILL

body social." 36 The elements of a definition of civilization are
beginning to emerge.
Our next consideration opens up a completely new aspect
of the Toynbee theory. The examples we have drawn upon so
far concerned the " primordial social fact" within the structure
of a civilized social body. Now let us look beyond the pale of
civilized society and allow the author to explain the function
of social engagement among those primitive peoples who come
in contact with a civilization at its periphery.
The social ' elan ' of a growing civilization cannot but attract the allegiance of the primitives with whom it is in contact,
and their mimesis is directed towards the civilized society's
creative effort "as a means of self-education for the party by
whom the act of mimesis is performed and as a tribute of admiration and token of friendship for the party towards whom
the mimesis is directed." 37 The gradual and peaceful absorbing
of these neighbours into the body social of the civilization is the
natural consequence. The process is by no means rapid because the inherent harmony of the social heritage 38 leads to its
integral assimiliation-a profound transformation. (V, 201).
The crisis which accompanies a " breakdown " introduces a
distinct change in the social pattern: " the estrangement of
the proselyte. 39 The stagnation of society is soon reflected in
the mood of its primitive neighbours. The elements of social
interaction, which before the " breakdown" were in nice adjustment among themselves: the cultural, the political and
military, the economic and technical, now become disjointed,' 0
36 Ibid., III, 152.
This coherence of elements in the patrimony of a civilization
and some of its consequences are considered in Parts IX and X of the Study in
considerable detail. Cf. VIII, 542 ff. We shall have further occasion to consider
this topic.
37 Ibid., V, 198.
88 As we have noted, the life of a society in growth displays a harmony of the
elements of its social interaction-were this not the case, the society would
have failed to meet some challenge in the process of self-determination and its
growth would have been impeded (V, 199).
39 Ibid., V, 194, 198.
40 Toynbee employs the apt simile of white light's diffraction into the components
of the spectrum.

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE's

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218

and the mimesis of the primitives is directed more and more to
the superficial: the economic, the political and military-a
militarism which within the society itself has undergone a rapid
and disproportionate evolution in the internal struggles symptomatic of a society in crisis! The brilliant period of expansion
which may follow by reason of this superficial mimesis soon
proves to be shallow and precarious. 41 The newly learned arts
of war will be employed in resisting the encroachments of the
"Dominant Minority," which resorts to force to maintain the
ascendency once assured by the charm of creativeness. 42 The
boundaries of the civilized society begin to harden, a " sure sign
that the Secession of the External Proletariat has taken place .
• • • " 43 The implications for the " primordial social fact " are
inescapahle. 44
A civilized society is apt not only to encounter other societies
around its confines, primitive and civilized, but also to come
into interaction with the social 'elan' of another society of a
past age. This encounter, called a " Renaissance," 45 provides
our final instance of the social insight.
In his criticism of "A Study of History," Peterim Sorokin
devotes many pages to the fundamental concept of the coherence of individual civilizations and their functions. 46 One of
the points he makes may serve to bring into relief the illuminative role of the "social fact" insight.
"None of the great civilizations," he says," is dead in toto";
and on a later page he further clarifies his point of view:
" Plato's Aristocracy, Timocracy etc., are perennial political
systems which ... never perish." 47
We meet here a problem to which Arnold Toynbee has deu Ibid., V, 201.
•• Ibid., V, 198, 199, 202.
•• Ibid., V, 194.
•• The " VOlderwanderung " and other typical phenomena which follow such an
estrangement are considered at length in Part XIII, "Heroic Ages," Vol. XIII.
•• For a discussion of Western shortsightedness in speaking of" The Renaissance,"
cf. IX, 1-4.
•• Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis, Boston, 1951, pp. liS ff.
•• Op. cit., p. 220, 227.

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JOHN THORNHILL

voted much thought, 48 and the position he assumes depends
precisely upon the " primordial social fact." The " social fact "
in process of concrete realization must not be identified with
ideologies and inspirations, communicated to the social process
by means of a "renaissance." Before their vital assimilation
into the " social fact," they are not social realities but social
"ghosts" (to use Toynbee's expression) and even after their
assumption into an alien social ' elan,' they retain a peculiarity
and display certain laws of operation: for example, they always
retain an affinity and attraction for those elements with which
they previously formed a social fabric. 49
To this point of Sorokin's critiCism, Toynbee would reply
that he has forestalled it in more than one place: appealing to
the social insight. Treating of a similar conception in the
thought of the nineteenth century historian E. A. Freeman, 50
he criticises his exaggeration of the continuity between Hellenic
history and Western history. 51 The ,"evocation of 'ghosts'
from the life of an ' apparented ' society . . . one of the outstanding traits in the morphology of history " can only be
appreciated when the nature of " apparentation " and " affiliation " is apprehended with reference to the " primordial social
fact." We have set out this doctrine on an earlier page. These
reappearing social and cultural ideologies are not "survivals"
as Freeman and Sorokin presume, but " revivals," living a new
life in a distinct social construction, in the " social fact" of
another civilization. 52
•• Particularly in Part X, " Contacts between Civilizations in Time: Renaissances."
•• Interest in the literature of another age leads to the investigation of its
political theories. A mere glance at the Index of Contents, Part X, will give some
idea of the erudition which has lead the author to his conclusions.
50 " The Unity of History," in Comparative Politics, London, 1873, p. 306.
51 Cf., Toynbee, op. cit., I, 43-44; 153; IX, 645-648.
52 The difference between the points of view of Toynbee
and Sorokin is not
without relation to what Paul Ricoeur has called the various " levels " of the study
of history (Histoire et Verite, Paris, 1955, pp. 80 ff.). Ricoeurs' "aspect anonyme
et abstrait de l'histoire des techniques et des arts de la
et de la conscience " (p. 87) corresponds more to the point of view of Sorokin-who sees a
continuation of Ottoman civilization in our own society in " such practices as poloplaying, the wearing of pajamas and the drinking of coffee" ("Social Philosophies

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE'S

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215

The empirical findings of comparative history, scrutinized
under the light of a philosophical intuition, have begun to yield
a clearer understanding of the nature of a " civilization." The
elements of a definition begin to group themselves. The pattern
of a civiiized society, now mMe surely perceived can provide
a basis for the fMmulation of certain laws and functions, the
ultimate quest of A. Study of History.58 We shall now attempt
to set out elements of a definition of civilization according to
the mind of Arnold Toynbee. Such a synthesis is not without
value in that nowhere has it been explicitly drawn up by our
author.
A civilization is the product of a certain process of growth.
Social bodies are in healthy growth when their life is more and
more interiorized: in the words of Professor Toynbee, " the criterion of growth " is the transference of the field of action
from the macrocosm to the microcosm." 5 The challenge which
occasions a response destined to give birth to a civilizationof the " first generation " 55-is of a gross physical kind, for
example, the desiccation of the Mediterranean basin. 56 The
social action which constitutes the successful response brings
in its train a new and more interior challenge: the ordering of
human relations within the nascent society, and so on.
For the student of Hellenic society-as Toynbee was..,-the
Greek city-states provide the classical example of the progressive interiorization of the Challenge-and-Response pattern.
Until the last decades of the eighth century B. C., social rela4,

..• ," p. 227) Toynbee's study is carried out on a level which would correspond
with Ricoeur's "niveau existential . . . de l'aventure historique de l'homme
concret " (pp. 82, 87) •
•• At least in the pTe-war writings; the change of emphasis in the post-war volume
as acknowledged by the author will be considered in a note below.
••Ibid., V, 894.
•• We have noted already, at the beginning of this section, the two-fold pToblem
of the genesis of civilizations.
•• Cf. the hypothetical reconstruction of the genesis of the Egyptian Civilization,
I, 802-815. We should note that, for our author, environment alone does not explain
the appearance of civilized life, any more than do peculiar racial characteristics.
Cf. "Race and Environment," I, 207-271. This problem will be considered in
relation to human freedom later in this article.

216

JOHN THORNHILL

tions were successfully organized within the economic framework of independent agricultural communities. At that time,
the challenge of over-population began to make itselUelt. Some
cities responded by colonization; others by a more interior
change of their way of life. Sparta chose the ' cul-de-sac '
response of attempting a militaristic expansion at the expense
of her Hellenic neighbours. Athens, with her response of intercity trade became " the education of Bellas." 67 But economic
success poses deeper problems of the political order. To an economic problem, Athens devised an economic solution; this
solution gave rise to a new and more interiorized challenge,
the erection of a political framework of inter-city-state law and
order, in which the new economic life could evolve.68
The deepening of problems in the field of human relations
calls for a more and more perfected sense of . moral responsibility.69
We should note at this point that the benefits of civilization
are not confined necessairly to the period of growth. The Universal State, one of the phenomena " that stand out as landmarks in the histories of civilizations" (I, 162), marking a
rally in the process of disintegration, calls for a new achievement in the field of administration. The flowering of philosophies marks the period of crisis of a civilization!"'
Ibid., I, !U; III, 50 ff.; 122 ff.
•• " The Athenians failed to respond successfully to this political challenge which
arose out of their successful response to the foregoing economic challenge, and this
failure resulted in the breakdown and disintegration of the Hellenic Civilization."
•• Ibid., II, 211. In the West today, "when the challenge of Industrialism is
being transferred from the sphere of technique to the sphere of morals, the outcome
is still unknown " (ill, 215) . The place of morality will be considered in detail
presently.
80 " If the Roman administrator was an altruistic agent of the Hellenic dominant
minority's practical ability, the Greek philosopher was a still nobler exponent of
its intellectual power; and the golden chain of creative Greek philosophers, which
ends with Plotinus circa 208-62 A. D. in the generation that lived to see the Roman
public service collapse, had begun with what was already grown up in 481 B. C.,
when the Hellenic Civilization broke down. To retrieve, or at least to mitigate, the
tragic consequences of that Roman administrator's life work, and the philosopher's
labours produced a more valuable and more durable result than the administrator's,
17

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE'S

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217

Our brief synthesis brings us now to the very centre of
Arnold Toynbee's thought, where we come closest to the definition of civilization. Social life is evolved on three planes:
the" economic," the" political" and the" cultural":
". . . it is one of the characteristics of civilizations in process of
growth that all aspects and activities of their social life are coordinated in a single social whole, in which the economic, political, and
cultural elements are kept in nice adjustment with one another by
the inner harmony of the growing body social.
On the other hand, when a society breaks down and goes into
disintegration, it is one of the symptoms of this social malady that
the previous harmony between the economic, political and cultural
elements in the body social gives way to discord ... " (III, 152) .61
Elsewhere, we find a valuable extension of this thought.
These various planes of social life are widely divergent in
"value." 62 The" cultural element" is the" soul and life-blood
and marrow and pith and essence and epitome " of a civilization, " while the political and ' a fortiori' the economic elements
are, by comparison, superficial and non-essential and trivial
manifestations of a civilization's nature and vehicles of its
activity." 63
The overemphasis, for instance, of these superficial political,
economic and technological elements in our Western Society
today is a sign of malady, 64 and the far reaching effects of this
just because they were less closely woven into the material texture of the disintegrating society's life" (V, 89-40) .
"We have dwelt on this Babylonic philosophy of Determinism because it has a
greater affinity than any of the Hellenic philosophies with the still perhaps rather
callow philosophical speculations of our own Western World in its present Cartesian
Age. On the other hand there are counterparts of almost all the Hellenic schools
of thought in the philosophies of the Indic and the Sinic World." (V, 57-58)
This linking of periods of philosophical ferment with broader social patterns
is not without interest for the historian of philosophy. (Cf. also IX, 180 ff.-" The
Indices Vols. VI and X under "Philosophy").
Eclecticism of Congenialities "; V,
61 Ibid., III,
Emphasis added.
62 We would underline this use of the term "value" in the consideration of the
strnctural planes of social life. Its implications will prove 'important in the discussion of social finality in the latter part of this article.
68 Ibid., V,
u For considerations of Technology, cf. III, 185, 155 ff., 178-174; IV, 40.

!18

JOHN THORNHILL

discord in the whole body social extend even to the study of
history by Westerners, so that this discipline has become in
great part vitiated by a blindness to all but the economic and
political planes, upon which the West lives.66
To recognize certain values which transcend the purely economic and political planes and which may be grouped under a
generic title, " cultural," is one thing; 66 probing into the precise
nature of these cultural values is more difficUlt. Upon analysis,
however, the reflections and observations made during the
course of the Study bring to light some interesting principles.
We have a pointer in what we have already noted above: that
social cooperation shoUld provide conditions for realizations
which are continually more" interiorized," more" Human." Indeed, societies which (either by reason of the extreme nature of
the challenge they face, or because of their misdirected manner
of response) conform themselves to a way of life which renders
impossible further " interiorization " are condemned to abandoning the way of civilization and " reverting to animalilnn." 61
Their social functions resemble more the instinctive cooperation
of insect societies than human society, guided by norms of
adaptation and intelligence.68 The implications of this concept
will be examined more fUlly in the following chapter.
The fine arts provide the most delicate criterion of the ' elan '
•• Ibid., I, 149-150, 164.
•• Cf. ill, 195 for an example of Arnold Toynbee's shrewd reoognition of higher
spiritual values, in contrasl!ing H. G. Wells and Shakeapeare: the former failed to
understand "human character, in his positiVistic "classification and docketing of
the outer man," while the latter succeeds " by an intuitive sympathy of one soul
with another" transfering the "spiritual .treasure •.• from the macrocosm to the
microcosm."
"'Ibid., ill, 79, 87-88.
•• Thus the Esquimeaua:, by reason of the extremity of their
challenge evolved a pattern of life wh'ich rendered them slaves of that environment
and made all further civilized progress impossible (ill, 4) . Sparta, on the other
hand, set out to solve the Malthusian challenge by a militarization and self
discipline whiCh would enable her to conquer her neighbours in Hellenic society.
In so doing, she "sold her birthright" in that society (ill, 61). She became the
alave of her own militarism, and stagnated while other members of the society
gloried in their creative achievements (ill, 67, 70). Cf. Pericles' praise of the
Athenian "Commonwealth," ill,

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE's

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!l19

of civilization. The relationship of the characteristic styles of a
civilization with its extension is a commonplace;69 What is
more, relationship is found between the vagaries of artistic
endeavour and the patholow of society. A mania for the colosfor example, is associated with disintegration, when " a
declining society is apt to hasten the day of its dissolution by
squandering its diminishing store of vital energy in material
performances on an excessive scale, not so much out of a wanton
megalomania as in a vain effort to give the lie to its own unacknowledged but agonizing consciousness of incompetence and
failure and doom." 70
One of Professor Toynbee's greatest insights, and one to
which, it has been said, he does not remain faithful in the postwar volumes of the Study, 71 is his recognition of syncretism
as a cultural manifestation of the " schism in the soul" which
underlies the social 'disorders of disintegration:
" ... a negative sense of promiscuity then comes to pervade every
sphere of social activity.
In the sphere of social intercourse it results in a blending of incongruous traditions and in a compounding of incompatible values
(

;

in the media of language and literature and visual art it declares
itself in the CUITency Of a 'lingua franca' (KOLnJ) and Of a similarly
standardized composite style of literature and painting and sculpture and architecture;
in the realm of philosophical ideas and of religious beliefs and
practices it produces ritual and theological syncretism" (V, 881) .72

His categoric reassertion of the primary place of moral values
within the society's activities of the cultural level is characteristic of Toynbee's intellectual vitality: indeed, Ethics becomes
an " indispensable science, always and everywhere '' in the
•• Ibid., m, 878-879.
•• Ibid., m, 154.
71 Cf. Christopher Dawson, "Dr. Toynbee's Turning Away:
Changed Views,"
Tablet (London), March
1957.
70 Emphasis added. Cf. also IV, 51-5!ill; V, 158. (For another aspect of eclecticism,
cf. IX, 180 ff.)

JOHN THORNHILL

study of history. 73 The observation that dissolute morals often
presage social
or a deploring of the social consequences of moral irresponsibility on the part of promoters of
the press and cinema 75 is not remarkable; but we consider as
signal the judgment that " even a merely economic world order
can not be built upon merely economic foundations ": 76 moral
principles are declared to be the only foundations upon which
an international law and order can be founded/ 7
·The prominent place of religion in " A Study of History " is
well known. 78 In the pre-war writings, religion was seen as the
deepest foundations of the life of a society. The future of our
own civilization was seen as depending upon the restoration
of its Christian basis: " ' Man shall not live by bread alone ' ...
to offer bread alone is almost as uninviting as to offer stones
for bread." Although the social structure erected by Gregory
the Great, St. Benedict and the other founders of Western
Christendom was avowedly make-shift, it was built, not upon
economic sands, but upon the solid foundations of religious
"'"Ibid., IV, 195-196.
"'"Ibid., I, 446, note.
u Ibid., IV, 505.
•• Ibid., IV 184.
•• " Economic Nationalism may be defined as an exploitation of the apparatus
of the parochial state for the purpose of promoting the economic interests of the
population of that state at the expense of the rest of mankind. On the moral plane
such a policy is indefensible in any circumstances ... " (IV, 174).
The statesmen of Balance of Power politics " behave as idolatrous tribesmen; and,
in their worship of their prejudice, and covetousness, they . . . (are) prone to
break moral laws that they would never have dreamed of breaking, and to perpetrate crimes that they would never have dreamed of perpetrating, in their private
affairs" (IX,
Cf. X,
•• In his latter volumes-those published after the war--our author champions a
union of the best elements in all the higher religions. But is this not the very
syncretism which Professor Toynbee, _in a flash of genius had divined as one of the
most profound manifestations of disintegration? Such a criticism, in fact, is made
by Christopher Dawson (Tablet, March
1957) who, while declaring his
admiration for the thought in the pre-war volumes, detects in the later writings a
"profound residual Liberalism " which Professor Toynbee "unconsciously retains
in spite of the scorn 'he pours on Victorian Liberal fallacies." These remarks constitute in our eyes the most noteworthy criticism which has been made of A Study
of History. In fairness to our author, however, we must point out that he can
appeal to the very first volume of the Study for a passage which shows syncretism
was not without possible social benefits in his mind, even in the earlier writings:
on p. 88, Christianity itself is judged a syncretism.

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE'S

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OF HISTORY

flfll

rock. From being a tiny society in an out-of-the-way comer of
the world, it has grown like the grain of mustard seed into a
tree in whose branches all the other living societies have come
to lodge.79
In view of their special agency in social matters, it is evident
that political institutions must receive particular consideration
in the formulation of a definition of civilization. A review of
Arnold Toynbee's thought on this matter will greatly illuminate
the teaching we have just outlined: the social structure of a
civilized body, and the capital place of morality in the norms
ruling such a structure.
Just as the economic, so the political plane in a healthy body
social should be in vital contact with the values of the more
radical cultural plane. In disintegration, we have noticed,
mimesis has been withdrawn from leaders who, having proved
themselves incapable of the charm of creativeness, must resort
to coercion in order to maintain the unity of the body social.
Toynbee makes his own the words of Francis Bacon, " honours
in free monarchies and commonwealths had a sweetness more
,than in tyrannies, because the commandment extendeth more
over the wills of men, and not only over their deeds and
services." 80
The " parochial state," the name which ·so often designates
that familiar institution in the pages of A Study of History,
already tells us something of the limited nature of its function
in the life of a society. For Professor Toynbee, this -local segment is not a " perfect society " in the Aristotelian sense. It
is merely an institution on the political level of the life of a
civilized society (civilization) . It should take its place in the
whole gamut of values, the harmony of which is of the essence
of health in the body social.
If, by rights, the political institutions of local units should
play a comparatively modest role in the life of a society, in
point of fact, the enormity which most frequently manifests
itself in a decadent civilization is their exaggeration out of all
•• Cf. also V 198, 875 note.

80

Ibid., IV, 124, note.

JOHN THORNHILL

proportion to their prerogatives. The stage is reached where
"Great Powers" claim to be a universe in themselves, 51 and
demand a worship which does not fall short of idolatry. 82 Such
a situation soon degenerates into a militarism which devastates
the whole fabric of society .88
Arnold Toynbee sees an eloquent example in the history of
the Byzantine Civilization. From the eighth century onwards,
the spiritual forces which should have been envigorating the
life of that society on all levels, were " restricted to a single
institution-the East Roman Empire-which was confined to
one plane of social life (the political), and had been erected
there by its worshipper's own hands." As if that were not
ruinous enough, from the tenth century the " unworthy object
of worship" was further restricted by the aspirations of two
social segments of the Orthodox Society-the Greeks and the
Bulgars-to the honours of empire. The struggle which ensued
crippled the life of Byzantine society beyond recovery. 84 This
is " an aberration into which the Orthodox Christian Society
has not been alone in falling. Our own Western Society has set
its feet upon the same path of destruction after.having made a
promising start upon the path of Life." 85
The enormity of this exaggeration is shown by a recourse to
ethical principles of the cultural level. We have already referred
to this insight into the ethical foundations of social order when
assembling the elements of a definition of civilization. It is an
intuition, comparable to that of the " social fact," providing a
norm for the healthy functions of civilized society which has
proved invaluable to the author of A Study of History. Nationalism is condemned because, as idolatry, it is a perversion of the
right order of things 86 which calls for a " loyalty " extending to
the whole of the society of which one is a member, and " worship," not of the creature, but of the Creator.81 Idolatry is defined as: " an intellectually and morally purblind worship of
81 Ibid., I, 9; V, 189.
""Ibid., IV, 166, 848.
•• Ibid., m, 15o, 167-168.
••Ibid., IV, 404-405, 8!t0 if.

•• Ibid., IV, 405.
""Ibid., IV, 808.
87 Ibid., IV, 404.

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE's

PHILOSOPHY

OF HISTORY

the part instead of the whole, of the creature instead of the
Creator, of Time instead of Eternity." 88
In his condemnation of Auguste Comte, Toynbee's mind
is made clearest as regards the peculiar worship due to the
Transcendent Creator. 89 Would not the worship cease to be
idolatrous if it extended to the whole of human society, leaving
none but God " out in the cold "? A vital question, notes
Arnold Toynbee, to which not only Communists and Positivists
would give an affirmative answer, but also " the more numerous
adherents of a vaguer, yet perhaps just on that account more
representative, school of humanist thinkers and humanitarian
men of action whose outlook has become the dominant ' weltanschauung ' of our Western Society in its Modem Age." But,
demands our author, if the substituter of an "image of Humanity" for the presence of the Living God "'can proclaim:
" I am monarch of all I survey;
My right there is none to dispute; "

is the boast which Cowper has placed in the mouth of Alexander
Selkirk without bitterness? The monarch is a castaway; he
must " pay for his undisputed dominion by living in a spiritual
solitude which is an abomination of desolation." 90
Not that the author of A Study of History denies all place
and function within a society to local political institutions,
though one could wish for more clarifications on this capital
point. The writer becomes at times so engrossed in his thesis
of the enormity of disproportioned self-conceit in local segments
of a society, that he would give the impression of denying them
any legitimate place in the life of the society. Other pas'sages,
however, make it clear that this is not Professor Toynbee's
intention. In the period of growth, for instance, segmentation
of the body social is made a condition of social vitality and
progress. When a society is confronted with a challenge, the
88 Toynbee, A Study of Histo1'1J, IV,
Cf. Contents Vol.· IV, p.
ff., for
the many forms of idolat'f1J which can beset a society. The teleological implications
of this ethical thought will be considered below.
89 "The Religion of Humanity," IV, 800 ff.
DO Ibid., IV, 808-808.

JOHN THORNHILL

response is only effected by a" withdrawal-and-return" of one
of its parts in the role of a" creative minority," and the subsequent adoption of the creative response by the other parts
through mimesis. Thus, e. g., Athens became" the education of
Hellas " in finding responses to the common problems of that
society. Italy played a similar role in the Western Society when
Feudalism was no longer serving as an adequate political
framework. 91
The false step in both of the cases just cited was not the
setting up of a more evolved form of local government, but the
failure to respond to the subsequent formidable challenge of
establishing an oecumenic political order ruled by higher moral
values, within which the intensified life of these newly established units could unfold itself in peace and harmony. 92
In another context, the political institution is recognized as
an instrument for the establishing of social order within the
local community. 98
The object of our article to this point has been to set out the
philosophical concepts which guided the author of A Study of
History. We have seen that these concepts group around two
intuitions: " the primordial social fact," and the ethical foundations of social order. In the light of the forst, the concept,
" civilization," was progressively brought into relief and the elements of a definition were assembled. In the light of the second
insight, the definition was further clarified and norms for the
vitality of the body social were indicated. The truly philosophical nature of these guiding principles is not difficult to
recognize; and it was natural that, in the course of their application to comparative history, they would give rise to the formation of a body of philosophical reflections intended to explain
and complete them. Arnold Toynbee's philosophical interpretation of his concepts will be reviewed in the next section of
the article.
•• Cf. Indices, Vols. III and VI, under "Athens" and "Italy."
•• Cf. IV, 18, 175, 184, 819.
•• Cf. IV, 191, "The Impact of Industrialism upon Private Property"; V, 48-49.

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE'S

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9l9l5

Explicitated Philosophical Principles: A. Criticism
In the pages which follow, we intend to examine critically
the philosophical principles which guided Arnold Toynbee, seeking their origin and measuring their worth. This we shall do,
first by critically examining the individual elements of Professor
Toynbee's philosophy, and then by showing the illuminating
role a true philosophy of finality would have exerted in the
thought of our author: thereby giving the section a broad
division into two parts.
It is not long before the reader of A Study of History becomes aware of the influence of Henri
His authority
is tirelessly appealed to; his characteristic phrases are echoed
in the language of Professor Toynbee; 95 and more basically, his
reaction to· the universal application of the method of the
physical sciences is reproduced, 96 the very nature of the Creator's
intervention in the evolutionary ' elan,' 97 as well as its progress
towards a " superhuman " state, are exj>ressed in the language
of Bergson's "new philosophy." 98
•• The two works of Henri Bergson many times Cited by Professor Toynbee are

L'Evolution Oreatrice and Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion. Our
author prepared the notes for A Study of History between June 1927 and June
1929 (VII, p. vii), at which time L'Evolution Oreatrice (which first appeared in
1907) had gone through many editions. Lea Deux Sources appeared in 1982. From
an intimacy shared with the reader (IX, 898) we learn that it was our author's
custom to read one or two books at the time of writing the various parts of his
Study, to assist 'in the ordering of ideas, and we may conclude that the recently
appeared work of Bergson was on his table as he wrote the first volumes in 1988
(Cf. Preface to First Edition and Note on the following page). It certainly gets
a lion's share of the footnotes.
•• Notably "difference in kind not only in degree," sounding the cry of release
from the shackles of Positivism: I, 44, 46, 158 etc., etc.
•• Compare Bergson's "physico-morphic fallacy " with Toynbee's "a-pathetic
fallacy," I, 8, on which page our author notes as "conceivable" Bergson's conception of the nature of intellect as " specifically constructed so as to isolate our
apprehension of physical nature in a form which enables us to take action upon it"
(L'Evolution Great., 24th ed., pp. 64-179. The capital "Challenge-and-Response"
pattern is foreshadowed in Bergson's explanation of intellectual progress: in satisfying a need by intelligence man creates a· new one, so that consCious activity
remains open, free, and creative-as opposed to the hardened reactions of instinct.
(Cf. Collins, J.: A History of Modern European Philosophy, Milwaukee, 1954,
p. 886).
•• Ibid., I, 249.
•• Ibid., I, 159.

JOHN THORNHILL

Bergson's fundamental thesis, the debunking of Positivistic
pretensions, would have appealed to the Englishman whose
vigour_of spirit and Hellenistic formation had enabled him to
attain to a conception of reality which the bleak empiristic
tradition of his native milieu could not express. Moreover, how
congenial to the philosopher of history the evolutionistic conception of the new philosophy
its preoccupation with time
and duration!
But the genius of Arnold Toynhee is social and ethical, rather
than metaphysical. Whereas for Toynhee the metaphysical
bases of the Bergsonian philosophy were of secondary interest, 99
for its author, the Bergsonian system is a rigorous elaboration
of a primary metaphysical datum, the intuition of duration. 100
We shall see that individual philosophical elements reflecting
the influence of Bergson, of which Professor Toynhee makes use
in A Study of Histnry, are rarely associated with their metaphysical bases in the Bergsonian system.
We have already made reference to a key text in any philosophical study of the thought of our author in which he distinguishes things " encountered as objects of thought" and
their " expression in words," and in which he confesses the
inadequacy of his own philosophy to solve the fundamental
social problem of the " cori:unon will." 101 This philosophical
inefficacy may be accounted· for on two scores: one concerning
philosophy in general, and the other social and ethical philosophy in particular.
The first, touching upon a question as old as philosophy itself,
is the problem of universals and the validity of analogy in
philosophical expression. It is a problem which is perceived
by Professor Toynhee and with which he wrestles many times
in the course of his ten volumes.102 He inclines towards the
•• Cf. III, 90: " Bergson finds the same bent in the metaphysical as well as in
the social 8peculationaof the Platonic Aristotelian philosophy." (Emphasis added).
10 °Cf. Collins, A Hiat., pp. 819-820.
101 Ibid., I, 448.
102 In view of his keen sense of God's ineffable transcendence, Toynbee regards
Cf. VII, 467-468, for
all knowledge we can have of Him as "anthropomorphic":

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE's

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OF mSTORY

oplliion that all analogical expression is no more than metaphorical, and delights in describing his own notions in simile, in
parable, and in " the language of mythology " which " is an
intuitive form of apprehending and expressing universal truth "
in which " even the philosopher in · his highly sophisticated
quest might succeed in penetrating beyond the furthest limits
to which reason and logic could carry him." 103
This problem, not peculiar to the work of Arnold Toynbee,
is clearly too vast to receive particular consideration here.
Once more it is interesting however to notice the influence of
Bergson. On the one hand, this philosophical mentor opens the
way to the embracing of a reality richer than the atomized data
of· positivistic observations; but, at the same time, the French
philosopher's mistrust of conceptual knowledge and his exalting of an intuitive knowledge which seeks expression in metaphor and figure, incline the Englishman to the view that any·
expression of spiritual reality will be :ilo more than metaphorical. Artist that he is, the author of A. Study of History exploits
the figurative genius of the English language to the full.
Toynbee is at his best in the field of social thought. On this
account, we consider that the most valuable critique of his
philosophy will be one which bears upon this particular field.
To our mind, the social and ethical philosophy of A. Study of
History remains imperfect because of an ambiguous concept of
finality in the mind of its author.
a summary of Professor Toynbee's view of man's "anthropomorphic " knowledge of
God. In his final volume he summarises his viewpoint by likening our knowledge
of God to the dog's knowledge of man (X, 1). It is symptomatic of the rifts in
. modem culture, so well perceived by our author himself, that a man of his
imposing erudition has had very little contact with a whole world of philosophical
thought. That such a comparison as his has a long and venerable history in the
best Aristotelian tradition of analogy would probably oome as something of a surprise to our author. In this teaching, poetic intution, so precious to Bergson and
Toynbee, finds a very precise place.
10 " ill, 269, and note. Cf. I, 200, 278, 297 and note 442; ill, 222; X, 228, for
attempts to formulate a relationship between the poetic and the philosophical.
10 ' Bergson does not reject the " scientific method," but he limits the object of
intellect to a view of things in the function of mathematical regularities and spatial
stabilities (Collins, A Hist., p. 816). This conception cannot fail to recall to
mind the Kantianism which it was Bergson's dearest wish to overcome.

JOHN THORNHILL

The problem of teleology is one with which the philosopher
of history· must soon come to grips, for if his primary inspiration is the agency of Time in human realizations, the change
correlative with time only becomes intelligible in respect to
some direction and term. 105 In this matter, Professor Toynbee's
choice of philosophical guide in the interpretation of his concepts could hardly have been less fortunate. If finality had no
particular interest for Bergson, perhaps our author would have
been induced to look to other philosophical traditions and thus
have hit upon expressions much more connatural to his genius;
but teleology is a problem familiar to Bergson/ 06 a problem
badly formulated of which the issue remains confused/ 07 This
confusion is reflected in the mind of Arnold Toynbee. His
thought is too independent and realistic, as we shall see, to
succumb completely to the impasse of Bergson's decisive rejection of teleology, but this rejection haunts him throughout the
Study. 108
106 ln the words of a scholastic axiom: "motus specificatur a termino "-movement has its nature from the terminus towards which it is directed. Our author
recognized this truth when he wrote, " In order to obtain a value-scale for
civilizations which, instead of being simply relative, is in some sense absolute, we
must compare them, in respect of value not only with one another, but also on the
one hand with the common goal of their endeavours, and on the other hand with
the primitive. societies from which they are distinguished by a common specific
difference." (I, 176, emphasis added)
106 The philosopher of evolution, just as the philosopher of history, can not
long escape this problem.
107 Cf. Maritain, J., La Pkilosopkie Be:rgsonienne,Paris, 1914, Ch. IV and especially p. 885.
108 The conception of finality which Bergson so rightly rejects is, in reality,
a Leibnizian "bogey." (We shall have occasion to return to this rationalistic
conception) . Our subsequent exposition will show Toynbee's independence in the
details of this doctrine. We may conveniently summarize Be:rgscm:a mind on the
question of teleology. With regards to the whole movement of the elan, Bergson
was constrained to admit a certain finality Collins, A Hist., p. 887), which he
hastens to declare is not the Leibnizian one. In fact, he attempts to confine his
explanation of " directian " to the order of efficient causality (Maritain, La
Pkilos. B., p. 885). In a particular stage of the elan, he denies all finality,
whether it be considered ' qua elan' (Collins, p. 881) or whether it be considered
as an act of human freedom (Collins, pp. 824-825). ln the correlated question of
morality, teleology finds no place since Bergson's "closed morality" is infraintellectual, while his "open morality" is supra-intellectual (Cf. Collins, p. 845;
Maritain, Ibid., p. !t61 ff.) .

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE'S

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229

Let us now examine Professor Toynbee's conception of
finality, and the manner in which his Bergsonian inhibition
prevented that conception from coming to a philosophical maturity and exerting its true role as a guiding principle.
Though for the modem mind the term " finality " is immediately applied to the progressive movement of the universe/ 09
this application of the concept is a derived one. For Socrates
and Aristotle, the philosophers who :first attained to the notion
of finality, it finds its most intelligible realization, as far as the
human enquirer is concerned, in the individual act of man, the
intellectual agent. It is by analogy with this type that finality
is applied to the motion of the universe, under the direction of
the Supreme Cause, Intellectual ' par excellence.' Aristotle
formulated the classical definition of final cause as " that for
the sake of which a thing is." 110
As we have already noted, any essay in the :field of philosophy
of history is unintelligible without some finalistic principle o£
judgment, 111 and in fact .A Study of History is dominated from
the first volume to the last by the recognition of a " goal of
human endeavours." 112 Man's evolutionary progress is ensured
when his liberty is properly used to direct his social endeavours
Oxford Dictionary.
Aristotle, Met. V, !l, 1018aS!J; A certain confusion is introduced into this
particular question of finality by the general problem of analogy already referred
to. Professor Toynbee protests " ... the idea of 'direction' can have no literal
application except in the physical world, and we must be on our guard against
going astray when we apply the same idea metaphorically in the psychic field "
(ill, 124-1!l.?); which is true and well said. The Aristotelian would hasten to add
that, similarly, to speak of an end " moving " is to speak metaphorically: but
beneath that metaphor is had a clear concept of a peculiar form of causality (" for
the sake of which ") , distinct from the efficient causality of the literal meaning
of the metaphor. The Aristotelian moderate realist would maintain that this
concept could be expressed, if more awkwardly, in a non-metaphorical
We may note that this emphasis of the metaphorical character of finalistic expressions in A Study of History, leads to a certain equivocation in the use of the terms
" end " and " goal," which may signify either " finis " in the formal sense or
" terminus " in a purely physical sense.
111 Toynbee, op. cit., I, 176, already cited. Cf. I, 176.
110 lbid., 194; III, 172, 878, 888; IV, 5, US 128, 24.4 etc. This goal is described
109

110

as a " community of saints " OT a " superhuman" state.

230

JOHN THORNHILL

towards a state of perfection which is envisaged by certain
leaders. In other words, man's social striving is for the sake of
a certq,in end: it is finalistic.118
In the mind of the author of " A Study of History," man's
social ' elan ' is not directed solely by the human agencies involved, but the " First Cause" intervenes in some ineffable
way,114 directing the creature towards the goal of "superhuman " perfection. In the Part, " Law and Freedom in History," apropos of the cyclic phenomenon of the historical
process we find a splendid metaphor for this agency of the
Creator in History: these cycles are not vain repetitions, but
" wheels that God has fitted to his own chariot " for the purpose
of conveying it " towards the driver's intended goal." 115 True,
in its context this. passage is not unconnected with the new
emphasis the writer's thesis has received in the post-war volumes
-undoubtedly making him more susceptible to the idea of
. finality-but in the Parts published before 1939 we find the
same conception expressed in almost identical terms. 116 Indeed
in the very first volume, " the omnipresent power " of a " transcendent first cause " receives recognition as illuminating A
Study of History .117 What is more, the Creator Himself constitutes the goal of human endeavours. 118
118 We have noted that even Bergson found himself constrained to admit a certain
teleology in the course of .the " Elan Vitill "-towards the appearance of " selfconscious duration," man. But this cautious admission comes " post factum." He
would not concede a foreseeable goill, which he considers as necessarily involving a
Leibnizian predeterminism (Cf. Collins, A HiatOTy •.• , p. 881), and which would
not square with his understanding of intellectual knowledge.
1 " The interrelation
between human freedom and the universal agency of the
Firat Cat£Be is not discussed by our author. The coexistence of freedom and certain
necessities in the historical process in the section, " Law and Freedom in History "
is considered from a' de facto' point of view.
11 " Ibid., IX, 174.
116 Ibid., I, 169, "God's Work" is declared a necessary element in human progress
and necessary to the conception which will guide the author throughout the whole
Study. The figure of the wheels appeared already in IV, 85. On the previous page
the metaphor is the shuttle and the loom, " in which there is manifestly ' a progress
towards an end.' "
110 Ibid., I, 249. For a passage in which the Bergsonian inhibition is very evident,
cf. I, 801.
118 Ibid., Cf. lli, 890; X, 8. Perhaps the citation of the Koran in each of these

ARNOLD J'.

PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

28'1

Given such a constant undertone of finality in the thought
of Arnold Toynbee, it is bewildering to find what almost
amounts to its explicit rejection when it comes to be considered
philosophically. Such a consideration is essayed in the section,
" The Nature of the Growth of Civilization." 119 Its examination shows the ambiguity which exists in our author's mind, as
well as the confusing intrusion of Bergson.
" Is this element of direction an essential feature in the
process of growth? " asks Professor Toynbee. 120 " Direction" is
certainly only verified metaphorically in its present application.121 In the psychic field, we must lodk for a different metaphor, for" the movement of the Psyche is not' directed,' either
by a deterministic push or by a teleological pull " (ibid. 125) .
The Bergsonian inspiration of this declaration is put beyond all
doubt by the two long passages from Les Deux Sources de la
Morale et de la Religion which immediately follow. We quote
the significant central assertion: 122
"Pure mechanism" (and) "pure teleology" (are both rejected
because) "on both hypotheses alike the creations of Life are predetermined, since on the one hypothesis the future can be deduced
from the present by a calculation, while on the other it is delineated
in the persent by the form of an idea-with the consequence, in
either case, that Time is of no effect."

To the attentive reader of these passages, two things are
clear: firstly, that the teleology which Bergson rejects is the
degenerate form proposed by Leibniz,128 conceived after a
places indicates that we are passing from the field of reason to that of Faith,
acknowledged by our author (Cf. e. g., lX, 880 note). The Creator's intervention
just discussed is affirmed on rational grounds (Cf. IX, 174).
110 Ibid., ill, 1U-127.'
"" Ibid., m, 124.
121 Cf: note 108.
12 • Bergson, H. Lea Deua: Sources, pp. ll9-120, 288-289.
1 • 8 Cf. Bergson: L'Evolution
Creatrice (Paris, 1917, pp. 65-57) Leon Husson:
L'Intellectualiam de Bergaon (Paris, 1947, p. 81 note) Collins, A Hiat • ••. p. 881.
The conception of Leibniz is well summed up by F. Thilly (A Hiatory of Philoaophy,
revised by Ledger Wood, New York, 1958, p. 891). As bodies act according to
efficient causes or motions constituting "divine automata" (Monadol()gy, Sec. 64),
so " souls act according to the laws of final causes by means of desire, ends and

JOHN THORNHILL

mathematical model. And well does he reject it, recognizing
that it can not be reconciled with the creative function of human
liberty. He was in error, however, if he thought that in debunking the Leibnizian conception he had finished with teleology as
such. The second thing which will become evident to the reader
of these passages is the basing of Bergson's position (as so many
others in his philosophy) upon his doctrine of conceptual
knowledge as spatialized and imperfect in its representation of
reality, apt to assist making but not doing,124 and by means of
which it is impossible to " foresee the forms that Life creates: " 125 only by intuition, in which one assists at the creation
of these forms, can they be known.
When, therefore, Professor Toynbee states on the following
page, " a teleological formula may be adequate to express any
single term in the progression; but it may become misleading
when it is applied to the summation of the whole series," 126 a statement, certainly, which Bergson would not have admitted
-it becomes clear that his philosophical mentor has confused
rather than clarified the issue in his mind. The hesitant citations which provide an alternative " teleological formulation of
the transit from one integration to the next differentiation " 127
means" (Ibid., Sec. 79). " God ... has arranged his universe in such a way that it
works without interference from him" (Thilly-Wood, loc. cit.). It is to be noticed
that the passages quoted from Bergson already betray an ambiguity of conception
(Cf. Maritain, La Philos. B., p. 885). With regards to Toynbee, the philosopher
of history, we may recall that Hegel's reinstating of Rationalism-removing the
Kantian problem by the expedient of identification of subject and object in knowledge-introduced into the philosophy of history of the 19th century a notion of
finality which is not without affinity with the Leibnizian conception (Cf. Maritain,
On the Philosophy of History, New York, 1957, p.
. It was natural therefore
that Toynbee, striking away from the previous dogmatic tradition of the " new
science " (Cf. IX, 895), anxious to safeguard the precious element of human
freedom, would view with suspicion a dogmatic philosophy of teleology.
124 Cf. Collins, A Hist . ... , p. 846.
125 Bergson, Les Deux Sources .•• , p. 119.
126 Toynbee, A., op. cit., V. The text continues, " ... and in attempting
to
express this whole--in which the essence of growth consisttt-we shall find the
concepts of mastery and articulation more illuminating than any others."
127 Huxley, A., Brave New World (London, 1982, pp. 106, 209); Smuts, J. C.,
Holism and Evolution (2nd ed., 1927), pp. 185-7 (Cf. X, 285).

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE'S

PHILOSOPHY

OF HISTORY

288

from the pens of Aldous Huxley and General Smuts, can only
confirm this impression. The passage concludes on a note of
dissatisfaction: " Perhaps this is as far as we can penetrate
into the nature of the growths of civilizations ... " 128
So much for the whole movement of the ' elan ' of a civilization. One of the last passages quoted made reference to the
teleology of a "single term in the progression," and to this conception we now propose to turn our attention. Let us consider
Professor Toynbee's conception of, firstly: individual moments
of social progress in general, and secondly: individual moments
under the particular aspects of the exercise of liberty and the
implication of morality.
The most potent principles employed in A Study of History
are sociological ones. Clearly, finality (planning, " creating;'
cooperating, for the sake of an end envisaged) can not be refused a place in the concrete realizations of social activity. Indeed the all-important "Challenge-and-Response" pattern of
the growth of civilizations is basically a :finalistic one. How
often the author formulates the goals which were not achieved
by civilized societies-a failure which spelt their ruin! 129
Does our author recognize the profound :finalistic truth implied in his words when, discussing the plight of a Soul that has
" been called upon to play its part in life in the tragedy of social
disintegration," he writes: it " cannot repudiate all movement
or aim or purpose " for that would be " committing outright
spiritual suicide? 130
That the precise
in which this goal will be achieved,
and the concrete means which must be created by human genius
to reach it, can not be foreseen from the outset does not rule
out the presence of finality. The end is more or less clearly
128 Toynbee, A., op. cit., V, IS ... Cf. V, IS, " ... we hesitated to apply (the
convenient spatial metaphor of ' direction ') when we were attempting to comprehend the nature of growth."
109 " Arrested " civilizations adopted an abortive social pattern,
which did not
allow the development of human potentialities. " Broken down " civilizations fail,
for the most part, to construct an inter-state political order based upon principles
of morality, etc. (These questions have already been considered at length, above.)
180 Ibid., V, S8S-S84.

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JOHN THORNHILL

envisaged-though even this conceiving of the end, especially
in the first instances of civilized society, is a splendid creative
act! The means to the realization of that end must be found
in an heroic process of trial and error, in the pangs of creation.
Most profoundly understood, this magnificent creative effort is
only intelligible in virtue of the vision of the end, which at every
moment inspired and sustained it: to repudiate aim and purpose is to commit spiritual suicide! The Bergsonian alternative
of the deterministic " push " of mechanism and the deterministic " pull " of Leibnizian teleology is not complete: the creations of human progress germinate within the spirit of man, by
virtue of the conceiving of an end. 181
The social " values " which form the basis of a "pathology "
of society reviewed in detail earlier in this article, are-as their
name already implies-so many principles of the finalistic
dynamism of society.
We turn now to the particular consideration of the exercise
of liberty in individual moments of social progress-intimately
bound up with finality in the Aristotelian tradition, in the spirit
of which this critique is being conducted.
Arnold Toynbee is determined at all costs to preserve liberty
from the philosophies of Determinism, be they Babylonic, 132
Positivist/ 53 or Marxist. 134 But it is one thing to reject certain
deterministic explanations of history, and quite another to explain in what manner the free act distinguishes itself from the
determined one.
It is intellectually exhilarating to witness the powers of induction which are exerted to show forth in history the special
agency of human liberty. As a starting point Toynbee notes
the fact of the comparatively recent emerging of the phenomenon of civilization. The racial explanation of the rise of civilization is discredited in masterly fashion.m Nor can the uniformity
of human nature, reacted upon by environment alone explain
the rise of civilization;· an empiric survey shows the presence of
Creativity " will be considered in the laat pages of this article.
'"•Ibid., ill, 57.
'"•Ibid., III,
185 Ibid., I, 207
18 " Ibid., IV, 85, note.
cf. p. 288.

181 "

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE's PHILOSOPHY

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285

some other potent, intangible factor emanating from the human
agency. Civilization, the initial environmental challenge and
the material responses of which were almost identical, display
little similarity in their spiritual characteristics-religion, art
and even sociallife. 136
To determine the nature of this creative liberty, all important, if one is to comprehend the Genesis and Growth of Civilizations, Arnold Toynbee twice marshalls all the resources of
intellect and erudition at his command. 137 Is it the recently
published Les Deu:r; Sources, lying at his elbow, which keeps all
thought of finality from his mind? The truth is that he neglects
to consider liberty as something peculiar to man, and endeavours to explain it as a manifestation of the spontaneity common
to the whole ' Elan Vital.' This confusion, in fact, exists already
in Bergson who, not admitting an intellectual root of liberty,
has great difficulty in avoiding its identification with pure
spontaneity and vital determinism. 138
It is our opinion that, were it not for the intrusion of Bergson, Toynbee may have hit upon a more complete solution to
the problem. Is he not inclining towards it in his own mind
when he writes: " May (it) be that a certain faculty, latent in
all alike, was evoked in those particular members, and in those
only, by the presentation of a challenge to which the rest did
not happen to be exposed" ? 189 Certainly, when he returned to
the problem of liberty in the new context of the section "Law
and Freedom in History," in post-war Volume IX, he formulates a simple and profound definition of liberty. 140
" The distinctive gift of Consciousnessis a freedom to make choices
-between alternative courses of action for the Will, and between
alternative ideas and beliefs for the Intellect; and ... this path of
188 The Egyptian and Sumeric civilizations both faced the challenge of the desiccation of Afrasia and initiated their civilized societies by the constructing of an
irrigation system by way of :resPonse.
187 Cf. especially I, 27111.; ill, 11211.
188 Cf. Maritain, La Philos. B., p. 271; Cronan, E. P., Bl'3'gson and Free Will, in
"The New Scholasticism," XI (1987), 1-57; Collins, A Hist . ... , p. 826.
180 Toynbee, A., op. cit., I, 818.
uo Ibid., IX, 881.

JOHN THORNHILL

freedom has an inner law and other of its own which is manifest
from within to the thinking, . planning, and acting personality
itself ... "
The basis in intellectual knowledge and the finalistic ordering
now implied-precisely the elements which were denied him
by Bergson-now render liberty intelligible and distinguish it
from a blind spontaneity. 141
Morality in social activity is obviously linked with the problem of liberty which we have just considered. Men are free to
determine the future for themselves, 142 and as we have seen at
length in our previous section, this social activity must be
founded upon principles of morality; idolatry-the changing of
a relative into an absolute-is immorality of the most pernicious form as far as the social well-being is concerned. But,
apart from these valuable principles, the nature of morality is
not developed philosophically.
Our author's philosophical counsellor would have been of
small assistance. Bergson, to quote Maritain's pungent epigram, " preserves . . . all of morals except morality itself."
Intellectual knowledge, as Bergson conceives it, could not provide the foundation of a peculiarly human perfection, the
ordered self-making of the rational nature: morality in its
genuine sense.143
To this point, our critique has been directed to the analysis
of the philosophy which underlies the thought of A. Study of
History, and in particular, the ambiguous nature of the central
concept of finality. Now, we propose to put forth into the field
of constroctive criticism, evaluating the function finality could
play were this confusion removed.
101 To the end, Professor Toynbee is not satisfied with his conception of liberty.
He writes in one black moment of the "possibility-improbable
though he ·personally felt this to be-that the appearance of freedom in human affairs might be
dissipated one day by a progressive increase in the candlepower of Science's dry
light " (IX, 878) .
"" Ibid., IX 881.
"" Bergson's infra-intellectual
(" closed ") and supra-intellectual
(" open ")
morality are forced upon him by his distrust of conceptual knowledge and his
admission of only the intuition of duration ('in actu '). (Cf. Collins, A Hist • ..• ,
Maritain, La Philos. B .•• , pp. !WS-274.)

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE'S

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287

Professor Toynbee's attempt to express philosophically the
nature of society is not satisfactory in his own eyes, as we have
seen. The " common field of action '' has not sufficiently explained the unity existing between the various persons constituting a society: the " problem. of the ' common will ' " remains.144 We propose to demonstrate how finality can provide
a sound basis for the resolution of that problem.
This attempt to lay bare the ontological natUTe of society 145
is a witness to the keenness of the mind which conceived A
Study of History. The problem is aptly posed, the erroneous
extremes excluded, and a solution proposed whereby society is
constituted by relations between the members-relations arising from the activity of the members in a common field. Thus
society is defined" a relation between individuals ... (which)
consists in the coincidence of their common field of action." 146
We concede that the conjunction of individual activities is of
the nature of society, and that by reason of this activity many
social relations are constituted, but we maintain that if we look
more deeply into social re'ality we shall find a basis for this CO'Tir
junction of activities-making it more than the mere " coincidence of fields of action," as Professor Toynbee's definition
would have it. This basis consists in another order of relation:
the relation of coprdination-arising out of the pursuit of a
common end. Let US· develop this point, recalling the finalistic
tenor in the thought of A Study of History as regards to both
the whole movement of the body social and its individual
moments.
In the previous chapter we showed that, in our author's mind,
the health and growth of a society are only· ensured if its social
action is ordered towards the perfecting, in a human sense, of
the community: which is as much as saying that social activity
is for the sake of the pursuit of genuine human perfection.
Every individual who gives his allegiance to a civilized
society, in some way recognizes that membership in this new
community will be of more benefit to him than a life of isola1 ..

Toynbee, A., op. cit., I, 448.

HG

Ibid., m, 217 ff.

""Ibid., m, 28o.

JOHN THORNHILL

tion, or the old treadmill of primitive life. In some way, be it
ever so crude, 147 he knows that his spirit is expanded, that he
is perfected, and it is for the sake of that perfection he joins
the social ' elan.' ·
We may formulate a conclusion: the activity of each member
of a civilized social body is ordered-with more or less adequate
comprehension-to the formation of a body of social institutions which provide a means to the pursuit of unhampered
human perfection. This embracing of a common end specifically distinguished, e. g., from the cramped and static aims of
a primitive community of which these persons were previously
members-is the principle which unites their social activity.
It explains, to our mind, the phenomenon of the " common
will " and the unity of societies " encountered as objects of
thought." 148 It may also help to justify the coherence of a
civilized body social, above all in the period of growth, so important to the general theory of "A Study of History."
In the Aristotelian tradition, this integral, unhampered good
of man which is the end of society, constitutes the genuine sense
of that much abused term " common good.'' 149
1 .. Cf. "Mimll8is" as set out earlier in this article. In IV, liS note, we find a
discussion of a cognate question, tke more or lea11 perfect comprekenaionby various
men of the good, according to Plato.
us Ibid., I, 443.
ua This term will make for clarity of expression, rendering unnecessary a
laboured paraphrasing. But, because it is apt to assume a different signification in
each new theory of society, it may be well to define it carefully. Simply speaking,
social activity is for the good of the individual per110011 who are members of the
society. The "common good " is 60 called, not insofar as society constitutes some
entity taking precedence over the " good " of each member, but because
the individual member cannot attain to his integral kv:trw.n perfection except in-aofa't-aa ke becomea a member of a 11ociety. Toynbee quotes Plato as contending that
the personal happiness of a member of BOciety is of no account, " for the individual
human being exists, not for his own sake, but in order to promote the welfare of
the commonwealth of which he is a member " (ill, 95}. We must leave to specialists the interpretation of the mind of Plato in the context-the text cited, Republic
IV, 419A-4!UC, does not appear to exclude necessarily a more benign interpretation. Be that as it may, the special problem of the manner in which, in certain
circumstances, the particular good of some member must be sacrificed " for the
common good " of society helps to illuminate the true concept of the common good:
rather than being set aside for the sake of the collectivity, the good of the person

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE'S PHILOSOPHY

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ft89

The social " values " of the various levels of life of a civilized
society, recognized by Toynbee and set out in detail in the first
part of this article, now take their place in this conspectus. The
order which must exist in cultural, political and economic activities is dictated by the common good of the members: the elements of the cultural, pertaiiring more essentially to man's
proper perfection than technology and politics, must not be
impeded by the disordinate emphasis of these latter. If that
harmony is broken, if the institutional complex is so deformed
that the effectual pursuit of the common end becomes more
and more questionable, with it the :finalistic principle which
is the basis of unity in the society begins to perish. In time,
should the process of disharmony proceed far enough, members
of the society will begin to withdraw their membership-just
as they gave it: sensing the perfection they were receiving from
social communion-and give it to the distinct social movement
of a nascent society whose vitality, despite its rudimentary
character, offers greater promise of carrying them towards the
realization of the common good.
In Arnold Toynbee's mind, this integral good of mankind is
constituted in a certain manner by the Uncreated Good. We
have noted that God is declared the End of civilized endeavour.
In the condemnation of idolatry, we have implicit recognition
of the foundation of morality in this same finality.. Idolatry is
the directing of social forces towards the creature instead of
the Creator, to the relative instead of the absolute. 150 In finalistic terms, we could define-it as the converting of intermediate
ends-which should also be means towards the Supreme Endinto ends sought only for themselves. Such a perversion of_ the
right order of things stifles the spirit of man, deprives him of
the possibility of attaining the common good, and opens the
way to social
There are some loose ends in this doctrine of God as the
is Tealised in a splendid way in that act of virtue which the sacrifice requires. A
ultilitarian ethics, of course, is incapable of comprehending such a teaching, although
it be the only soiution to a problem posed continually in practical reality.
1ao Ibid., IV, !!6!!.

JOHN ·THORNHILL

End of man-symptomatic of the necessity, at all costs, of a
finalistic framework for the elaboration of a philosophy of history. God will be attained in the" communion of saints," that
is, when sociai progress has proceeded so far that " mimesis "a great weakness in the functioning of society/ 51 is rendered
unnecessary, since the whole of society has attained to the
mystical intuition of the Life-giving Creator. This conception,
of obvious Bergsonian inspiration, is gratuitous in its assumption of a universal evolutionary process, 152 and in its extension
of this evolution to embrace the possibility of mankind's arriving ' en masse ' to heights of mysticism similar to that of the
great Christian mystics. It is difficult to see how our author
escapes his own criticism of the Marxist Utopia as an irrational
relic of Judaic Messianism.1.58 Perhaps he would appeal to
faith/ 54 but though we cannot doubt his sincerity, if he is not
able to justify this faith, proving that it is more than a baseless
credulity, is not this too to be suspected as another irrational
relic of the Judeo-Christian tradition? 155
This unsatisfactory hypothesis of the " communion of saints ''
becomes unnecessary if one recognizes that the common good
is an analogous term which may be understood of the Uncreated
Good-communion with whom, whether individually or socially/56 man finds his supreme perfection-and a created order
which man must construct as a means to attaining this end.
In considering this created order, Arnold Toynbee's mind is
not clearly expressed, because he tends to conceive all created
Ibid., IV, 199 ff.
'"" The truth of this evolutionistic hypothesis is never questioned by Professor
Toynbee.
158 Ibid., v, 178-179.
1 .. Cf., op. cit., IX, 880 note.
155 Is t'here not a certain inherent weakness in the position of both Bergson and
Toynbee, proposing the Christian mystics as leaders who have far outstripped the
rank and file of mankind, and at the same time offering an explanation of their
mysticism which patently implies that the mystics' own explanation-prepared with
great pains, in the case of the Spanish mystics, e. g.-was very naive in its
"orthodoxy"?
158 This distinction
could be introduced with benefit into Professor Toynbee's
thought, without denying necessarily the intimate interdependence of the two.
151

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE's

PHILOSOPHY

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!l41

means as mere means, so that any valuing of them for their own
sake is frowned upon. His conception would become clearer
were he to introduce the distinction between mere means and
intermediary ends.151 The latter are willed for the sake of
attaining a higher end, and for the sake of their own inherent
perfection. The created institutional complex which bears man
on towards an ever more complete realization of human perfection is not a mere means; " relative " though it is and must
always be considered-as our author justly points out-it deserves to be prized in itself for the wealth of human achievement
it connotes. 158
This institutional complex-although it may be termed an
ultimate end within its own created order-is finite in itself.
Thus the very moment it ceases to open out onto the endless
vista of unrealized human perfection, and is sought for itself
alone, it ceases to possess the true character of COIIl!JlOngoodfor the spiritual nature of man knows no adequate end but an
unlimited object. 159
167 The application of this distinction will help determine the rightful place of
political institutions in the life of a body social. We have already drawn attention
to a certain confusion in our author's mind on this point.
158 The sober Aquinas who wastes no superlatives, remarks:
"Die autem qui
instituit civitatem, fuit causa hominibus maximorum bonorum " (In I Lib. Politicorum, lect. 1, ed. Marietti n. 40).
169 It may be objected that this conception of the created common good---Qf its
nature finite--and the positing of an infinite end as the only adequate end of man's
spiritual aspirations is contradictory. (Cf. III, 226 fl'., " ••• like so many intuitions
of the medieval scholastic genius, this answer to a practical question is no answer
for practical purposes.") Abstracting from the Transcendental Common Good
upon which social, as well as individual, life must open, we may observe that an
end does not "move" in so far as it exists, but in so far as it is kn01JJ11, ("finis
primus in intentione, ultimus in executions," is the scholastic tag). Now the
institutional complex of a society may be comprehended and ronsidered in itselfand thus it is a finite entity, and (in a secondary manner) it is willed for its
finite goodness. Or it may be considered under the formality of making possible
further unlimited perfecting of the human person-and considered in this way,
it is in a certa:in sense infinite, and connatural to man's spiritual nature (an ultimate end in its own. created order).
Let us hope that the " oracle of scholasticism " has now explained itself more
satisfactorily. It is to be regretted that Professor Toynbee's knowledge of scholastic
thought would seem, like that of so many moderns, only second hand. In the prewar volumes, he cites the work, The Medieval Mind, Taylor, H. 0. (London, 1911).

JOHN THORNHILL

It is interesting to note the functioning of this principle in
history. The former primitives who created the first rudimentary orderings of a civilized society on the Lower Nile, for
example, were effectively pursuing the common good: for their
responses were apt to carry them on towards an ever more rich
human perfection. The Spartans, by way of contrast, with
a social order and discipline which has captured the imagination
of every age, had 'renounced the true common good-for their
rigid institutional complex stultified the creative breath of the
human spirit, and thus proved a '' reversion to animalism."
To summarize our constructive criticism of Arnold Toynbee's
social philosophy: this critique is· founded upon the common
good, the finalistic principle of the unity of society; this common good is not the good of society which, as a higher organism, would take precedence over the hu:m,an " cells " which
compose it/ 60 but it is the. good of the member of society, precisely in so far as human beings could " not exist at all--or at
any rate humanly-without being in . . . social relation with
one another." 161 This common good of man is an analogously
realized term: in the Transcendental Order, it is the life-giving
Creator towards whom every spiritual activity must be directed,
while in the created order it is the institutional complex of a
healthy society, which-as an intermediary enc.l-is of immense
value in itself (end) , and has the function of opening the way
for the human members of the society towards the Unlimited
perfecting of human nature (intermediary). Men strive to
attain the common good, exercising their liberty in the adapting
Morality is that order which, according to the
of means to
He also knows E. Gilson's The Spirit of Medieval PkilOBOpky (Eng. translation
London, 1986). In Part Vll, "Universal Churches," the Catholic position is
upheld, somewhat unsatisfactorily, in several footnote comments by a "Catholic
friend."
18 °Cf. ill,
This passage corresponds substantially with our viewpoint.
We would criticise, however, the refusal to admit not only organic unity, but also
a certain " peracmolity " to society. Certainly society is a
in a metaphorical
sense only, but (in view of the unification of social activity by a common finalistic
principle) to call this a " jictitiow personification " must be suspected as
of the liberalistic social atomism which Professor Toynbee himself rejects.
1 " 1 Ibid., m,
..

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE'S

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very nature of things, should exist in this exercise of liberty,
and which alone can assure the attaining of the true end.
The philosophy of history could well be defined as the consideration, in a philosophical light, of human changes. Since
change is incomprehensible without reference to terms, finality
in some form or other is indispensable in such a study. Similarly, the nature of change as it occurs in a certain subject and
involves in some way the nature of that subject must capture
the attention of the philosopher of history. On this account it
may be well to conclude our article with the consideration of
this problem, which troubled Toynbee--and Bergson before
him-and which was of no small account in their embracing of
evolutionism as an alternative to teleology.
Both of these thinkers are at pains to emphasise the appearance of a new reality at each advance of the evolutionary
process, epitomised in the expression " creation." Their thought
can only be appreciated if it is borne in mind that they are
reacting against a mechanistic conception of the process of
thing, canonized in Rationalistic philosophy by the Leibnizian
conception of physical and intellectual causes functioning like
the running down of a piece of clockwork. They recognized
that the process whereby reality is continually enriched-particularly in the sphere of human realizations-whereby something comes into being which before was not, could find no
place in such a conception.
But like so many Kantians after him; Bergson neglected to
look beyond the unsatisfactory metaphysical system of Rationalism for the explanation of reality .162 The metaphysic of
Leibniz, conceived as it was according to a mathematical model,
did not fully appreciate what was probably the greatest metaphysical achievement of all times, Aristotle's recognition of the
distinction within BEING between ACTUAL BEING and BEING IN
POTENCY.

Rooted in this metaphysical distinction of reality lies the
181 One is reminded of Toynbee's oft repeated criticism of the illusion that all
progress proceeds in a straight line.

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JOHN THORNHILL

key to the true understanding of the great creations of civilized
man .. In the unformed psyche of primitive man there existed a
certain ordering towards self-perfection in social intercourse, of
which the ' totums ' of primitive society were only a caricature.
The tremendous effort which stirred these capacities out of a
millenia! slumber, which actuated what was potentially traced
in the configuration of the human psyche were acts of sublime
creation.
Is not this truth implicitly contained in a doctrine of social
progress which must always be directed towards man's genuine
perfection: namely one which follows the true configuration
of the potentialities of his nature, the primacy of the spiritual
over the material, the right ordering of economic, political and
cultural values? Even abstracting from the metaphysical basis
of such a conception, it certainly presents a more intelligible
doctrine of human progress. 163
Essential, too, to this understanding of creativity is human
liberty, the possibility 164 of accepting the elaborations of previous generations or of harnessing the tremendous energy
locked in man's spiritual nature-its thirst for the absoluteand driving that spirit to undergo the pains and toils of selfrealization and enrichment, forging in itself those relative realizations which will carry it towards the absolute. This is no
reading off of a predetermined blueprint; the possibilities of the
human spirit are almost unlimited in their varied perfection. 165
168 The supernatural OTder, in the strict theological sense of that word, the bestowing on man's nature of realities which surpass the connatural OTdering of its
creatt;d potentialities, raises a particular problem of " creativity " through what the
scholastics call "obediential potency," which we have no intention of entering here.
164 In liberty there is found a particular realization of the distinction between
potency and actuancy.
166 These possible lines of action conceived in the mind do not act
the w'ill
like so many forces of various "strengths " (the Leibnizian notion). They elicit
the will in so far as they are considered as good. Every finite object may be
considered as 'in a certain way good and desirable, or as in a certain way undesirable, arduous, etc. The secret of freedom lies in the mutual interaction of will
and intellect brought by the agent to dwell finally and efficaciously on one of
these finite means. The human agent can never renounce the willing of the
Absolute, the Infinite, in virtue of which every choice of means is made.

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE's

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245

Let us resume the capital conclusions which have emerged in
the course of the second part of our article. The philosophy
of A. Study of History is not essentially dependent on the
thought of Henri Bergson. Its author, primarily interested in
social and ethical principles which may illuminate his investigation was not concerned with the metaphysics of the " new
philosophy," but found its concepts a welcome medium of expression for a body of thought which the positivistic philosophy
of his native milieu was incapable of formulating. It was unfortunate therefore that this philosophical counsellor denied
him the very doctrine which would clarify the all important
social and moral principles he employed so magnificently in his
study-a sound philosophy of finality.
The introduction of a finality conceived according to the
more congenial Aristotelian tradition does little more than complete the grand lines of thought traced already in the intuitions
of Arnold Toynbee.

APPENDIX: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY *
The preceding article has made it clear that the philosophical principles
employed in the interpretation of history must be social and ethical. Arnold
Toynbee's neglect of the finalistic nature of ethical and social truths has
led him to overlook their dependence upon the same philosophy of morality.
He recognizes that political institutions must be vivified by ethical principles, but he tends to consider this an extrinsic guidance, not recognizing
that, philosophically considered, morality is an essential property of social
activity according to its very nature. 1 In the Aristotelian tradition, ethics

* EDITOR's NOTE: The insights developed 'in the preceding article are further
applied by the author as he sees moral science as the keystone in the understanding
of history's meaning.
1 One will recall his division of the three planes of social activity:
"cultural,"
" political," and " economic," and his opposing of cultural activities on the one hand,
to political and economic on the other (V, 200). Unfortunately, it is only too true
that the politics of our own society are often divorced from any sense of moral
responsibility. Christopher Dawson has pointed out that in other ages a king or
noble was "good" or "bad," whereas today the office of the politicians of our

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JOHN THORNHILL

and social philosophy constitute the one science of morals. The activity
most proper to man is a purposeful activity. Moral philosophy is a normative science directive of human acts according to their proper finality. It
may abstract from social considerations, and consider purposeful human
acts according as they are personal; or it may consider a man's acts insofar as he is a member of society.
The special relationship of the philosophy of history towards moral philosophy in the integral. Aristotelian sense, is confirmed by a re-examination
of the object of the philosophy of history. Recent discussion concerning
the nature of historical method has drawn attention to the eminently
human character of the historical process.2 If it is not entirely the product
of human liberty-conditioned, as it is, by accidents of nature-free human
agency may be said to constitute its animating principle. Now, since that
which is most formal in the free human aCt is its purposeful character, its
ordering towards an end, it is evident
any attempt to understand the
historical process must invoke the science of human finality, moral philosophy. When modern man first became conscious of the time-process, his
spontaneous conception of " Progress," as directional, betrays the essential
part which the philosophy of human finality must play in an interpretation of the historical process. Moreover, the fSSential derivative of the
historical process, human culture, is only understood in the light of social
finality; our considerations of it have made it clear that the institutional
complex of a culture must function, and must be judged, in its relationship
to the true common good of man. The place of social finality in A Study of
History, as has been pointed out, is made clear in its dominating ideal of
the " Goal of Human Endeavours."
If the essential dependence of a philosophical interpretation of the historical process upon the normative judgments of moral philosophy is to be
admitted, does it follow that the philosophy of history must be identified
with moral philosophy?
Jacques Maritain would be inclined to answer in the affirmative, but
does not determine. the manner of the identification. 3 In a recent study,
bourgeois society is looked upon as a-moral: one· never speaks of a " bad "
politician as one spoke of a "bad" king. (Cf. Dynamics of World History,
editor Mulloy, London, 1957, p. 227).
2 Marc Bloch wrote, " ... I' objet de l'histoire est par nature l'homme.
Disons
mieux: les hommes . . . Derriere les traits sensibles du paysages, les outils et Ies
machines, derriere Ies ecrits en apparence Ies plus glares et les institutions en
apparence les plus detachees de ceux qui les ont etablies, ce sont les 'hommes que
l'histoire veut saisir. Qui n'y parvient pas ne sera jamais, au mieux, qu'un manoeuvre de !'erudition." Cited on the rear cover of the Toynbee number of Diogene,
1956 (13).
• On the Philosophy of History, pp. 37 ff.

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another author would identify the philosophy of history with moral philosophy in an unqualified sense: to the traditional branches, Monastic,
Domestic, and Political Ethics, he would add Historical Ethics. 4 D. B. ·
Richardson claims that, just as there is a good of state beyond the personal
good, so too there is a good of civilization and culture above and beyond
the good of state. The practical science directive of human acts towards
this good he calls Historical Ethics. 5
Now it is a well known Aristotelian principle that the practical sciences
are distinguished according to the diverse ends towards which they direct
human action. 6 Richardson is therefore right in recognizing that a new
branch of moral science must be founded upon a specific distinction of
ends; but when the original division of ends-providing the basis for
Monastic, Domestic and Political Ethics-is most formally understood,
it is difficult to see upon what grounds a new member may be mtroduced
into moral philosophy.
The fundamental distinction of moral sciences is clear. According to the
original division, Monastic or Personal Ethics is directive of human acts
towards the personal end of man: in so far as he is directly ordained to
God, the Transcendent llitimate End. Social Ethics is directive of human
acts, as it procures the end of a society, of which maD. is a member.
Social Ethics is further divided on the basis of social ends. Domestic
Ethics directs man's actions, insofar as they are ordered towards kuman
generation, and its natural consequences, in the society of the family.
Political Ethics directs man's actions, insofar as they are ordered towards
integral kuman perfection, in civil society. 7 Most formaily, considered, the
ends towards which the two members of social philosophy are ordered are
" esse simpliciter " and " perfecte esse." The first ordering, radicated in
man's biological nature, the second in his rational nature.
The name Political Ethics stems from Aristotle's erroneous judgment of
cultural reality, whereby he considered the city-state to be
perfect
organ of the common good. His principles, however, are clear.8 Aquinas,
who makes explicit reference to the threefold division of moral philosophy,9
is more far-seeing than Aristotle. Commenting on Aristotle's assertion that
Political Ethics constitutes the supreme practical science, by reason of its
ordination to man's most perfect created end, he declares that it is more
• Richardson, D. B., "The Philosophy of Instory and the Stability of Civilizations," in The Thomist, XX (1957), pp. 158-190.
• Richardson, D. B., op. cit., p .. 169.
• Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, in I Ethicorum, lect. 1 (Ed. Marietti, nn. 12 fl'.).
7 Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Ethic., lect. 1 (Ed. Marietti, n. 2), lect. 2 (n. 25);
In I Politicorum, lect. 1 (n. 11).
8 Cf. Ross, W. D., Aristotle (London, lith Ed., 1956), pp. 288-289.
• St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Ethic., lect. 1 (Ed. Marietti, n. 6) .

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JOHN THORNHILL

perfect to seek the good of a city than to seek the good of a particular
individual, and more god-like still to seek the good of a whole people
embracing many cities.1o
It must. be concluded, therefore, according to Aristotelian principles, that
the cultural good towards which Professor Richardson would order his
Historical Ethics is already included in the common good of the traditional
Political Ethics. We may recall our considerations of the created common
good in the preceeding article. It was shown that even in the created order,
the true common good of society is in a certain respect infinite. It is this
same common good which must rule the political institutions of a civilized
society and its cultural life. Their consideration belongs, therefore, to
the same part of moral science. In the modern age of what have been
called more than once " Machiavellian " politics, it is easy for one to form
the false idea of separate-even opposed!-political common goods of the
various nations, divorced from the cultural communion in which they all
share. Such a state of affairs, insofar as it exists, is an anti-social rather
than a social reality, and can in no way provide a basis for the scientific
division of moral philosophy.
It seems clear, therefore, that the status of the philosophy of history in
relation to the traditional moral philosophy must be determined in a manner
different from that proposed by Professor Richardson. We will agree with
him that the philosophy of history must be given a place within the corpus
of moral philosophy, for it is essentially a normative discipline. We have
made ·clear how the philosophical light employed in the understanding of
history is, most properly, the normative light of moral philosophy. Since
the light under which a philosophical discipline proceeds determines its
object and nature, it was natural that the moral philosophy which animates
the philosophy of history should impart to it the normative nature of a
practical knowledge. Arnold Toynbee's famous simile of the climbers of
the mountain, 11 the laws of Challenge-and-Response, bespeak the normative
nature of his work. When one of his critics says that the object of his
10 Ibid., op. cit., In I Etkic., lect. 2 (Ed. Marietti, n. 80). In the Ross translation,
Aristotle's text is rendered: " ... though it is worthwhile to attain the end merely
for one man, it 'is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for city-states
(l811e• Ka.l r6Xeul,)" (1094b9). St. Thomas may 'have seen an allusion in this
last phrase (translated: "melius vero et divinius genti et civitatibus " in the
medieval version) to a higher social order than that of the Polis. Ross makes clear
his ·interpretation of the mind of the Stagirite: " Though Aristotle stood at the
end of the golden period of Greek city life and was in close touch with Philip and
Alexander, it was 'in the city and not in the empire that he saw not only the highest
form of political life up to date, but the highest of which it was capable,"
Aristotle, p. 287.
11 Toynbee, A., A Study of Hiatory, I, 192-194, 196, 281 etc.

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE'S

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249

latter volumes is to champion the union of mankind in the love of God, our
author concedes that this is a true evaluaiton of his work.12 Christopher
Dawson's philosophy of history, to instance another recognized author, is
likewise of a practical nature. 13
If one examines the normative principles which constitute the conclusions
of the philosophy of history, it becomes clear that-by reason of their
nature--this discipline must be accorded a status in moral philosophy which
is quite distinct from that of the traditional body of ethics. In each case
the philosopher proceeds under the light of the practical intellect, turning
the realistic principles arrived at in speculative philosophy to account, as
directive of human self-determination. 14 For that reason, each discipline
must be allowed a place in the corpus of moral philosophy. One may
express the difference in the nature of their normative conclusions by
saying that those of ethics are essential norms, whereas those of the
philosophy of history are circumstantial norms. Social ethics considers the
essential ordination of man's actions to the common good of society; the
philosophy of history considers the vicissitudes whick condition man's social
strivings, and which must be taken into account in any realistic pursuit
of the genuine common good of human society at a determined moment in
its history.
The root of this difference is to be found in the matter which the practical understanding considers in each case. Ethics considers- human acts
according to their natures. The practical knowledge which it prerequires, 15
is ordained to providing the philosopher with an understanding of the whole
amplitude of human action so that he may grasp its complete moral structure and formulate its unchanging normative principles. The philosophy of
history, for its part, is not formally directed towards a consideration of
human actions according to their unchanging, universal natures, but
according as they have produced the contingent, precarious reality which
is the historical process. Ethics considers the ordination which is imprinted
:u Cf. Professor Geyl, Toynbee the Prophet, Journal of the History of Ideas,
1955 (16),
and Toynbee's comment in the same periodical, 1955 (16),
18 When he names one of his words " Understanding Europe," e. g., it is a
question of a practical understanding: on the first page we read: " Whatever may
be the ultimate cause of this crisis, it is certain that it is a spiritual one, since it
represents the failure of Civilized man to control the forces that he has created.
It is due above all to the loss of common purpose in Western Culture and the
lack of a common intelligence to. guide the new forces that are changing human life."
He concludes Religion and Culture with the declaration, " The recovery of moral
control and the return to spiritual order have now become the indispensable conditions of human survival." (p.
10 Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, in I Ethic. lect. 8 (Ed. Marietti, n. 85).
15 Ibid., op. cit., in I Ethic., lect. 8 (Ed. Marietti, n. 88).

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JOHN THORNHILL

in the rational nature of man and his actions. The philosophy of history
considers the existential order which human agency has imprinted in the
historical evolution of mankind. Ethics judges reality as it should be, universally. The philosophy of history judges of reality as it tends to proceed
in a typical moment of history. Moral philosophy judges with certitude.
The philosophy of history, provides norms which are always hypothetical
in character. 16
We could sum up our conclusions concerning the status ,of the philosophy
of history as a part of moral science by stating that, whereas social ethics
provides the major proposition of the prudential syllogism, the philosophy
of history is ordered towards the formulation of its minor proposition:
bringing universal moral norms into contact with an existential reality,
all important in the realization of the concrete human act which is the
end of all moral science. Christopher Dawson opens up the full dimensions
of our thought when he writes, " every social way of life may be a way to
God, so long as it recognizes its human limitations and does not' attempt to
.force its particular historical values into the place of universal divine
truths." 17
Let us conclude our considerations of the relation of the philosophy of
history to moral philosophy, by noting a valuable observation of Jacques
Maritain in his recent work.
·
If one is to admit the existence of certain necessary trends in the historical process, Maritain points out-viewing this necessity in the light of
human finality, which is the soul of Aristotelian morals-that this necessity
is more material than formal. It concerns the material circumstances in
which human beings are called upon to live their lives-and which, certainly, tend to limit the cultural achievements possible to them. The
16 Toynbee, sharp in his criticism of Spengler's misuse of the inductive method,
" attempting to mask the inadequacy of the evidential bwiis on which his tremendous induction has to stand, behind the (organic) simile ... " (IV, 11-U),
is careful to make clear the hypothetical and provisional nature of his Study:
" no synthesis or interpretation ·is ever final, because there .are always fresh facts
to be found after the first collection has been provisionally arranged " (I, 49) .
After the publication of his final volume, Professor Toynbee writes, " since it has
only recently become possible to present this panoramic view of history, the first
attempts (and mine among them) will certa:inly be revised, corrected, discarded,
with the passing of time and the dedication of a greater number of .thinkers to this
exciting intellectual undertaking" (Diogene, 18 (1956), p. 10.
Many of the critics of A Study af History have overlooked Toynbee's underlining
of the provisional nature of his study.
The conclusions of a philosophy of history will always retain a hypothetical
character by reason of their material dependence upon the findings of positive
history. In this sense they may be called "empirical."
17 Dawson, C., Religion and Culture," p.

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE's

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251

manner iri. which they make use of these circumstances, the spiritual or
rational meaniri.gwhich they will give to their lives, is still dependent upon
their freedom, upon the finality with which they. choose to animate
their lives.
If, as it would seem, the world is necessarily moving towards an oecumenical technological order, it is still open to human freedom whether man
is to be the drudge of the machines which he creates, or is to employ them
as a means towards a greater freedom of spirit. 18
·
This distiri.ction reaffirms the complementary functions of social ethics
and the philosophy of history. It. makes clear the primacy of the former;
and helps to dispel the air of pessimism so often associated with the latter.
JoHN THORNHILL,

St. Peter Ckanel SemiM:rg,
Toongabbie,
NtwJ South Walu

11 Maritain,

J., On the Philosophy of Hillt0'1"1J," pp. !!5-26.

S.M.

ACTION AT A DISTANCE

I

T

INTRODUCTION

HE explicit problem in action at a distance is: " Can
an agent body the substantial reality of which does
not in any way touch a patient body, e. g., at its surface, affect the patient without using a third body called a
medium? The problem must be understood in this way if the
following discussion is to become intelligible. To the imagination this proposition seems impossible or, at least, seems to
require some mysterious occurrence which once granted cannot
be explained. Besides, every action experienced in our universe
can 'be, or seems to be, adequately explained by means of surface contact, either directly between the agent and patient or
between the agent through a mediating body and the patient.
A legitimate question at this point would be: " Why does the
problem even arise; how, indeed, can there be a problem? "
Now, we might say that the problem appears because of some
physical phenomena investigated and explained during the history of physical science, for example, that of light. Although we
will have occasion to refer to some such scientific questions, the
philosophical problem, however arises from the nature
certain
notions used to describe corporeal reality and in particular
that corporeal activity which is called transient action, namely,
such notions as " action," " distance," " contact," " medium."
This paper rests upon the conviction that these notions, for the
most part, have failed to describe corporeal reality adequately;
more specifically, these notions fail adequately to explain transient action. To support this view we will examine the notions
and assumptions latent in the various types of arguments used
to prove the impossibility of action at a distance. Since Professor Van Laer has done a commendable job in surveying and
grouping these arguments and, moreover, has added one of his
252

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own to the list, we shall first consider his work, one of the latest
essays on the subject. 1

n
PROBLEM

It may be well to preface our consideration of Van Laer's
arguments with the opinion that his formulation of the arguments against action at a distance is well stated; moreover,
one may also argue that his criticisms of the proofs other than
his own are valid, for none of them demonstrates the impossibility of action at a distance. Some beg the question; others, as
Van Laer points out, deduce ambiguous conclusions. Therefore,
it seems unnecessary to reproduce here an analysis that is already quite clear. For our concern is not, in the first place,
with the logical validity of the arguments, but with a fundamental insight at the basis of all such arguments. This is the
principle that presence is necessary for action. It may be possible, indeed, to reduce all arguments to the use of the same
principle expressed in five different ways, corresponding to the
five typical groups of arguments which Van Laer examines.
The following table, to be read in conjunction with Van Laer
shows, on the left, a summary formulation of the principles on
which rest each of these" ways"; on the right is indicated how
presence plays an essential role in all of them.
1. An agent acts only where it
exists.
2. Distant bodies are not in
contact.
8. Accidents are only where
they exist.
4. The causal relationship im-

1. One body: As an agent it is

present to itself.
2. Two bodies: One as an
agent is not present to and
is distant from another as a
patient.
8. The accident of activity: As
inhering in a body it is present to itself and its substance.
4. Two bodies: If they are in

1 P. Henry Van Laer, Philosophico-Scientific Problems, trans., Henry J. Koren
(Pittsburgh, 1958), pp. 59-114, esp. pp. 79-94.

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JAMES TALLARICO

plies an intimate union, and
bodies are intimate only by
local contact.
5. Action at a distance, taken
as a propagation through
empty space, would prevent
direct action.

local contact they must be
and are present to one
another.
5. The accident of activity:
When it is between the agent
and patient, it is present to
neither.

The first argument obviously means that action at a distance
would require an agent to act where it is not; therefore, there
cannot be action at a distance. Besides, there is another difficulty: as Fr. Bittle says," no being exists at a distance." 2 Since
a being is present only where it exists, it is not possible for the
agent to affect a possible patient which is at a distance. The
argument requires, quite correctly, that presence be necessary
for action.
The second way disguises the same conception of bodily
activity. Since distant bodies are not in contact, they are not
present to each other. Lacking presence, influence cannot be
attributed to the agent. Van Laer, in relating certain arguments of. John of St. Thomas and Hugon to this formula, says
that they" emphasize that an agent which causes a new form
in the recipient must be present with the recipient." 3
The third way restricts the essence of the first formulation to
accidental being. In paraphrase, we might say that no accident
exists at a distl:!-nce. In his criticism of this view, Van Laer says
that, considered terminatively, the coming to be of the effect
is in the recipient as an accident. Surely, however, action is
not an absolute accident inhering in the agent as are, for example, quantity and quality. It is at most a relative accident
of the agent, so that its essence consists in a respect to something else. Action is truly one entity considered from two
points of view.4 The argument, therefore, is that where there
is no existence there is no presence and consequently no action.
The fourth way is quite simple; it hinges upon the supposi• C. Bittle, A ether to Cosmos (Milwaukee, 1948), p. 190.
• Van Laer, p. 84.
'Ibid., p. 85.

255

ACTION AT A DISTANCE

tion that presence is a prerequisite of intimacy. In fact the
minor premise of the argument explicitly states that " a causal
relationship between two bodies presupposes local presence." 5
The fifth way is also clear, though we must focus our attention on the words, " direct action," if we would not mistake the
argument to be based on a false conception of action at a distance. Van Laer's comment should be noted here. "The question is precisely whether this distance prevents such action or
not." 6 What is meant of course, is that once the activity as a
propagation has left the agent, it is present neither to the agent
nor to the patient. In such a case the agent would not act
directly on the patient because the agent would not be present
with the activity when it activates the patient. The activity
would in this case be only the activity of a third body travelling
to the supposed patient of the first body.
This brief summary is not meant to prove but only to indi.
cate that there is one principle, basic to all the arguments,
which may well be the stumbling block: " How can distant
bodies be present to each other." This indeed is the primary
question. The question immediately following upon it is precisely the one Van Laer asks: " How is an agent directed to a
subject? " His answer is: only by local contact can we understand the order of agent to patient and vice versa; for only by
local contact can we understand the presence of agent to patient that makes possible the influence of the one upon the
other, and only by local contact can we understand how a
bodily recipient is determined to have such a relation of dependence to the agent that it is able to undergo the action of the
agent. 7
Presence and determination are the two notions which fix the
necessary prerequisites for action; and Van Laer rightly uses
them to focus our attention on the heart of the problem of
action at a distance. But Van Laer believes that only local
contact provides these two prerequisites. It is to this question
that we will now tum.
• Ibid., p. 86.

• Ibid., p. 88.

• Ibid., pp. 89-90.

JAMES TALLARICO

By the very meaning of transient action, everyone would
agree that the patient must have a relation of dependence to its
agent. The problem is in the minor premise, which states, in
effect, that this relation of dependence arises only by local
contact. However the minor itself appears to rest upon two
prior views: (a) the potencies of bodies give them a certain
remote ability to exercise or undergo action, but action requires
that bodies be immediately capable of exercising their potencies; (b) the possibility, kind and intensity of material action
depend upon both the nature and qualities of agent and patient.
These bodies must be capable of co-determining each other.
Upon this the proof follows, and it may be well to quote it in
its entirety and to have it immediately before us.
" In order to obtain the necessary mutual conditioning mentioned
in the foregoing paragraphs, [summarized in a and b above] bodies
must have local contact. The proof is as follows. For the required
mutual conditioning it is necessary at least that agent and recipient
form one system. This system must belong to the order in which
the two bodies are agent and recipient; hence they must form one
system in the material order, one corporeal system, one quantitative whole. But in the order of extension agent and recipient cannot
form one quantitative whole unless they are locally related to one
another. Now such a local relation can be obtained only by means
of local contact, whether this contact be immediate or mediate,
i.e. through intermediary matter which is in immediate contact
with both agent and recipient. If such contact does not exist, two
bodies may have an existence of their own, but with respect to one
another they do not exist and therefore cannot influence one
another. Hence the conclusion follows that for the interaction of
bodies material contact is a necessary condition." 8

The goal of the argument is to show that local contact is
required for bodies to exist with respect to one another, because
bodies that exist in this way can influence each other. With this
as a background, the statements in the argument in support of
this are as follows:
I. A quantitative

whole occurs only by local relation.
Local relation occurs only by local contact.

• Ibid., pp. 90-91.

ACTION AT A DISTANCE

257

8. Bodies exist with respect to one another only by local contact.
4. Finally, for the interaction of bodies material contact is

necessary.
The argument, then, is as follows:
Definition: A quantitative whole is a whole composed of bodies
which exist with respect to one another.
Major:
A quantitative whole occurs only by local relation.
But local relation occurs only by local contact.
Minor:
Conclusion: A quantitative whole occurs only by local contact.
Two points are noteworthy: (a) that local relation makes
bodies exist with respect to one another and (b) that the
crucial point in this argument, which is the proof of the minor,
is that local relation occurs only by local contact. Keeping
these points in mind, here is the "thought-experiment" which
(a) supports the argument that bodily interaction requires
local contact and (b) helps to determine the role of the medium
between distant bodies. 9 A body, A, exists in a vacuum. Now
if a body, B, is introduced there are two possibilities. If we
maintain that A's activity was present in the vacuum prior to
B's entrance, we maintain that an accident can exist without a
substantial support. On the other hand, if we maintain that the
activity was present only at the time of B's arrival and that
only then did A by its activity influence B, then we have an
insoluble difficulty. For we seem to have no way to explain how
A, a non-knowing being, would know either of B's arrival or of
its capacity to be influenced by A. Van Laer implies that there
is no mutual conditioning or co-determination. In other terms,
there is by definition no communication between A and B in
the first place; therefore, there can be no further communication
between them. Certainly if there is no communication, to
maintain that A influenced B would be to maintain that there
is no reason why the action occurred. If A were travelling
through the vacuum and B were in its path, the collision would
have a reason for its occ.urrence. However, if the bodies are
completely isolated from each other by the vacuum and neither
is in locomotion, there is no possibility that an action could
• Ibid., pp.

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JAJdES TALLAErrCO

occur even if the potencies of both beings were perfectly suited
to each other. H the vacuum completely isolates bodies, it is
to speak of determination or action or the direcequally
tion of action from A to B or B to A between the bodies. Similarly were we to admit a medium which locates bodies,
them position relative to one another, yet which does not play
an active role in the activity among bodies by determining the
bodies with respect to one another, then our situation has not
changed at all. This type of a medium would isolate bodies just
as effectively as a vacuum. Bodies would have a position relative to one another but would not be present to one another;
they would not exist with respect to one another. There is,
apparently, no way to avoid this conclusion. The bodies are
related locally, yet they do not exist with respect to one another;
they are not present to one another as they were in the " quantitative whole " of the main argument. But does this not suggest that local relation and local contact in the main argument
are really synonymous phrases? H so, the argument begs the
point at issue, since it is maintained that only by a local
relation do bodies exist with respect to one another.
We are told, however, that this whole proof" has value only
for those who accept the contact theory as the explanation of
the localization of bodies." 10 . Is this true? In this theory of
localization the medium relates bodies and places them in
mutual contact. This is not enough, because bodies in an inert
medium are in contact and yet do not exist with respect to one
another. H neither local relation nor local contact of themselves
allows bodies to exist with respect to one another, the medium
must do so. But the medium is that which gives local relation and contact to bodies. In other words the question is:
"How can bodies exist with respect to one another? The hope
is that material, i. e., local, contact will be required but not
assumed. There are three ways that this can be accomplished
and they are implied in Van Laer's proofs.
1. By local contact:
10

Ibid., p. 9S.

This begs the question.

ACTION AT A DISTANCE

259

2. By local relation: This is not sufficientwhen we are concerned
S. By the medium:

with an inert medium.
This gives local contact to bodies and therefore also begs the question.

If it is replied that this is why the proofs have value only for
those who accept the contact theory of localization, this still
does not explain how bodies exist with respect to one another.
Rather it is the medium as operational that explains this.
The medium as operational, active or passive, makes one body
present to another. It does this by" passing on" the determinations of events from one body to another. This is the true
contact that is heing sought. Local contact, as in the theory of
localization, has no part in this operational scheme, except that
it allows for the distance between bodies ap.d the direction of
activity, since this contact is within a third body-the medium.
In other words, the medium as operational relates or carries
the determinations of one body to another body. By this means
the bodies are present to one another, exist with respect to one
another and can influence each other. In the proof quoted, the
notion, " to relate determinations," was the reason why local
relation made a quantitative whole. The parts of the whole
exist with respect to each other. The intention to make relation that by which bodies exist to one another is present; but
there is too much emphasis upon locality, contact and medium
to make the notion of relation sufficient for the mutual existence of bodies. Understood in this way, local contact, in order
to fulfill the role prescribed by the argument, cannot refer to
contiguity but rather to the determinate effect of one body
upon another. Bodies affect one another prior to action. This
effect is not an efficient effect; rather it is what we shall call
later a formal effect. However it is just this type of effect which
gives relations among bodies their significance. To try to understand action among bodies by means of surface contact robs
bodily relations of their reality and their ontological status.
It cannot be maintained at this point that relation is the
fundamental notion in Van Laer's argument for the reason that
a quantitative whole is a whole because the parts are related

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JAMES TALLARICO

and contiguous. We must either identify relation with contiguity or we must say that relation between bodies occurs only
by means of contiguity. In this case both alternatives must be
proven, especially in the light of traditional philosophy.
The proof as a whole and the notion of a non-inert medium
are based on conceptualizations which appear to be obscurely
implicit in the notion of relation, i. e., presence and determination. It is the local relation of bodies that binds them together
and brings about an interacting community. Instead of returning these notions to their proper place, the medium must support
them not by but at the surface of contact. Contact, at the point
of contact, must bring about presence and determination, the
primary properties of relation. This aspect is so important that
those arguments which conclude to the need for contact because
action can only occur at the moment of contact were criticized
by Van Laer for begging the point at issue.11 Those arguments
assume the conclusion that surface contact generates presence
instead of introducing a third factor, such as relation, to connect them. This is the reason why a theory of "place " is not
the most advantageous point at which to begin an argument
against action at a distance. For what value would a theory of
place have if it did not relate the places of bodies to each other,
not only according to position and direction but primarily
according to the existent body in each place? The theory which
accounts for relating the existents to each other would be a
different theory, just as it is in Van Laer's account. To transmit
determinations and to locate bodies in place are two separate
notions not necessarily related to each other.
Therefore the formula, " local relation," must not be understood as relating the localities but rather as relating the existent
bodies in their localities. It should not be understood as admitting other relations between the existents, but as allowing
that general, unspecified, fundamental relation of existence by
means of which relations of potencies, similarities and other
specific relations are possible. It is not itself a relation, but
11

Ibid., e. g., pp. S!l; 86.

ACTION AT A DISTANCE

261

clearly if bodies do not exist with respect to one another, they
cannot be related by certain similarities.
Below are four syllogisms stated as simply as possible, which
carry the main points of the analysis.
(1)
A quantitative whole is made up of bodies which have a certain
respect to one another.
This certain respect is local relation.
A quantitative whole is made up of bodies which have local relation.
(2)
A respect to another is a relation.
Bodies only have a respect to one another if they have local contact.
Bodies are related only if they have local contact.
(3)
For bodies, to be related is to exist with respect to one another.
Bodies can only be related by local contact.
Bodies exist with respect to one another only by local contact.
(4)
Bodies which exist with respect to one another can influence one
another.
Bodies exist with respect to one another only by local contact.
Only by local contact can bodies influence one another.

If, thus, relation is explicitly recognized as the expression of
presence, the questions that immediately follow are: " Why is
relation an expression of presence? " and " What does relation
require in order to exist? "

III
RELATION

The conclusion implicit in the view that action at a distance
is impossible is that bodies are isolated. (At present it is of no
concern whether bodies are in fact isolated. This we will leave
until later. Our concern at present is only with the implicit
suppositions in the argument.) The fact of action requires the
explicit conclusion that beings in action are present to one
another. Most authors say that local contact gives presence.

JAMES TALLARICO

One of them gives the answer, relation, but he emphasizes
something else to the point of misinterpreting the basis for his
proof. Our task then is to understand relation, to see how it
allows presence and determination and to notice what conditions it requires. Then we will understand the truth which Van
Laer touches upon but does not fully honor.
Our procedure will follow three stages. First, we will give a
commonly accepted definition and then some introductory
remarks concerning relation. Next we will discuss two general
characteristics of relation, presence and determination. The
first of these is comprised of three primary properties: (a)
inherence, (b) modality of the foundation and (c) being to
another. The second is indicated by the property of specification. The third and last stage will present the conditions for the
existence of relation followed by a few possible difficulties
brought about only by a possible misunderstanding.
As John of St. Thomas says, if we understand relation in its
most general sense, no one doubts that relation is real. What
has been doubted is the ontological status of the relation which
the logician calls predicamental, which is defined as " a real
form whose whole to be is to something else." 12 The reason for
this doubt of course is that an accident must have a being of
its own, not in the sense that it can or does exist apart from a
substance, but in the sense that its being refers only to itself
and to itself as existing in a substance. On the contrary, the
entity (relation) referred to above seems to imply some thing
which exists and yet primarily exists to or with respect to
another. Its only reference is to another. It is a rather strange
being. Why not, say the objectors, be satisfied with the relation
as expressed with reference to beings because of the foundation
for the relation which exists in the beings? This relation is
called transcendental. It is not anything distinct from things
considered absolutely in themselves and for this reason is called
an absolute entity. It does not make up a separate category
10 The! Material Logic uf John of St. Thomas, trans., Simon, Glanville and Hollenhorst (Chicago, 1955), p. 816, v., p. 609; n. 12.

ACTION AT A DISTANCE

but enters into all categories. Because of this transcendence it
has the property of being embodied in the thing absolutely
rather than being distinct from it. 18 It seems superfluous to
demand any other type of relation.
In answer to the objection that we have no experience of
these relations, John of St. Thomas replies that no greater or
different kind of knowledge is required for relation than for the
other accidental forms. In the latter just as in the former, we
experience effects but not their distinction from substance; and
from the effects we can conclude to their distinction from
substance. In the physical world we experience things subject
to order, to resemblance, to dependence. "In these instances,
regarding,_which is the effect upon consideration, is not combined with any absolute essence: the whole being of resemblance, fatherhood, order, etc., consists in a respect." 14 They
cannot be understood in terms of sonie absolute entity. 15 It is
true that in most cases a predicamental relation such as the
relation of the effect to the cause, is founded on a transcendental relation; but if the term of the relation is removed and
destroyed, " the transcendental relatedness remains, not the
predicamental one." 16 This would be true only if they were
distinguished. ·This also indicates the reality of predicamental
relation. It .cannot be a mere construction of our intellect.
When the term of a relation stands before us, no mental trick
will make the intellect misunderstand or ignore the meaning of
its existence. There are new real possibilities because of the
existence of a term for relation. A stone travelling through the
air can hit something besides the air. This can takes on an
active meaning if something is there, near or in its path. For by
existing, the relation of effect to cause is meaningful just as it is
meaningful when the term is destroyed to call the other a cause.
A real predicamental relation requires a really existing term; 17
but once related, for example by actual causality, the removal
of either cause or effect will not remove the designation " cause "
or" effect" for the term which remains. 18
Ibid., p. 885.
" Ibid., p.

18

1"
10

Ibid., p. 808.
Ibid.,· p. 881.

17
18

Ibid., p. 865.
Ibid., pp. 888-84;

JAMES TALLARICO

The prime reason for the endurance of relation, or rather the
relatedness left behind by relation, is its character of being a
real form which exists in its subject as an inhering accident. 19
The reality of relation is derived from its foundation which
exists in the subject. 20 In fact " it is the function of the foundation to provide relation with existence by inherence. (This
existence by inherence is what relation has in common with the
absolute accident.)" 21 It is no surprise then that the related is
denominated by " what inheres in." 22 The transcendental relation chiefly refers to the absolute subject and only secondarily
to others. It grounds a relation more than it gives rise to one,
and the reason is that it " is not a form that accrues to a subject
or absolute thing; it is embodied in its absolute subject." 23
Nevertheless it connotes something extrinsic to itself with
which it is concerned. The transcendental relation first refers
to the foundation then to the relation. But since the point of
view of predicamental relation is first to something, and it exists
only as it proceeds from a foundation, 24 the foundation can be
called the root which is present in a subject. Upon the positing
of a term, a relation proceeds from its foundation as from a
root wherein it was precontained. 25 In this way a subject receives a new determination when a relation to this and that
term is posited. 26 Action certainly "marks" a power so that
after the action and even after the destruction of one of the
terms, there is still an " effect " in the agent or the effect in the
patient-in the agent because the being no longer regards the
effect in the patient as something it could produce, 27 and of
course in the patient since the action occurred there. Not all
relations occur by action however. There is an" effect" in the
subject due to the presence of the inhering form of the relation;
but upon destruction of the term this formal effect ceases. 28
This state of affairs is only intelligible if relation bears some
Ibid., pp. 808; 886.
•• Ibid., pp. 819; 818.
"' Ibid., p. 844.
•• Ibid., p. 810.
•• Ibid., p. 815.

19

•• Ibid., p. 854.
•• Ibid., p. 860.
•• Ibid., pp. 840; 841; 884.
•• Ibid., pp. 888-84.
•• Ibid., pp. 886-87.

9l65

ACTION AT A DISTANCE

significance for the things related. It can have it because the
order of the relations parallels the order of the related things. 29
As relation exists in a subject so also is it concerned with
other subjects. By definition its very being is in reference to
another. 30 Relation, indeed, receives its name because of the
referring to another.
" Relation derives its denomination not only from what inheresi. e., from its own entity as an inhering thing-but also from what
is external tv its subject, i. e., from its term and from its tendency
toward it. This does not rule out its inherence but, on the contrary,
presupposes it." 31
" Relation alone is both being and ' to being ' . . . The reality of
relation originates in one side, viz., in the foundation, and the
positive essence expressed by the preposition ' to ' originates in the
other side. This positive essence derives from the term, and the
term does not bring forth the property of being but that of being
relative to being." 82
As long as a foundation exists for a relation, this foundation will
bear a relation to whatever corresponds as a term to it. 83
A foundation is precisely that aspect of a thing which has the
property of relating one thing to another, and there is a necessary correspondence between it and the formal term of a relation.84 Take for example the relation of a possible agent to a
possible patient of this agent. The foundation just prior to
action concerns this effect which is to be produced by this
power in this agent. 35 "By proportion and power, the foundation contains the term in itself, for a foundation does not refer
to such and such a term unless it is itself such and such a foundation, and conversely." 36 It is for these reasons that we can
say that" this individual relation regards this individual term
determinately." 37 Further, since every relation depends upon
its formal term, not as upon a cause but as an opposition which
is co-related to it, the relatives if they are related in reality
•• Ibid., p. 854.
80 Ibid., pp. SIS; 355.
81 Ibid., pp.

•• Ibid., p. 819.
88 Ibid., p. 811.
•• Ibid., p. 824.

•• Ibid., p. 883.
•• Ibid., pp. 855-56.
37 Ibid., p. 35!1.

266

JAMES TALLARICO

must be interconnected, precisely insofar as they are related,
for" one cannot be without the other." 38 Among the relations
considered by logic, perhaps mutual relations are the best example of this because the relations are of the same order, are
present in both extremes and thereby connect the extremes
with each other; for example, father and son are mutually
related. 89
Scattered throughout the last section were quotations and
references to quotations which indicated the specifying and
determinative character of the term to which relation refers.
This was unavoidable considering how intimately joined are
these two notions and aspects of relation. We mentioned
that the foundation is of this effect to .be produced, that
the foundation is of such and such a term, that there is a
necessary correspondence between the foundation and formal
term /and that relation regards determinately. Now, speaking
from the viewpoint of the term, we can say that it is not something entirely absolute and concerned only with itself. As a
term it is of something, and of something distinct from itself.
As such it involves relativeness 40 and relative opposition, i. e.,
co-relation. In the specification of relation, it is true that the
relation does not derive its specification from its term; however
it is "specified (in relation) to it." The foundation specifies in
the capacity of a principle and cause but it does this " in relation to the term in which specification is completed and terminated." 41 The term, one might say, makes its influence felt
in an indirect
i.e., in such a way that those things
which are expressed in relation to others are distinguished
according to the distinction of the terms to which they refer.42
It should be recognized, however, that in relative opposition
such.as this, the work of neither foundation nor term is sufficient nor is one exclusive apart from the other. " One extreme
does not take away the other, but rather posits it or presupposes
it, so that the specification of the one may be relative to the
other," 48 which indicates the close inter-connection of the rela•• Ibid., pp. 861-6!!.
•• Ibid., p. 8!!8.

•• Ibid., p. 844.
" Ibid., p. 868.

•• Ibid., pp. 854-65.
•• Ibid., p. 857.

ACTION AT A DISTANCE

267

tives. The term then does prepare the way for this activity
rather than that activity, because it is the term of this thing
with this foundation rather than another thing and foundation.
The term specifies by completing and fulfilling {he relation
which is the very meaning of the foundation. Van Laer calls
this mutual conditioning and mutual determination. There is
only a difference in terminology.
These last few considerations are intended to show how relation can give presence and determination. By inhering, by
bringing about a new modality of the subject, by being to
another, by mutual implication of foundation and te:m:t and by
the mutual specification of foundation and term, relation, at
the very least, appears to bear the credentials of a communicating form/ 4 a form that would present beings to each other so
that they would exist with respect to one another. Of these
there is perhaps one characteristic which would pose the greatest difficulty. If something inheres and by inhering brings
about a new modality of the subject, there should be a change
in the subject. There are texts of St. Thomas which say that
a being does not change when it is related, and yet there must
be a change " cum nihil de novo adveniat alicui absque mutatione eius cui advenit." 45 This is important because the doctrine of presence and determination depends precisely upon ·a
new formal effect occurring in the thing related. It is this effect
which makes one being communicate with another. To understand " change " in this context we must answer two questions:
(a) How is formal effect possible? and (b) .What does it do for
bodies and for interaction in general?
The first thing we must remember is that relation is not,
strictly speaking, a thing; it is a mode of a thing. Therefore
the change that comes about in relation is not entitative, nor
a fortiori some type of physical change. St. Thomas brings
this out quite well. Since relation is usually considered in two
ways, as foundation and as to another, when the relation as
u Ibid., p. 887.
•• St. Thomas, In Pkysicorum, 5, 8, 0peTa Omm.ia,Vives edition, 84 vols. (Paris,
1884), Vol. !t2, p. 504.

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JAMES TALLARICO

foundation changes then there is change, physical entitative
change. Indeed the change is so real that there is a new relation.
A relation in causing a change removes itself and brings a new
relation to bear. This is strange only if we do not remember
that the relation-that whatever changes here-is not predicamental relation but is transcendental relation. Transcendental
relation is primarily the absolute entity itself. Therefore in
this situation relation does not cause a change; it is the change
wrought upon the subject which changes relations. St. Thomas
gives us an example of the genesis of a predicamental relation.
If something through its changing becomes equal to me while
I remain the same in quantity, that equality which now exists
between us existed in me in some way as in a foundation from
which it now has real being. The foundation which could express equality with all things equal to myself, at this moment
" determinatur ad istum." There is determination. Yet immediately following this he says: " et ideo nihil advenit mihi de
novo per hoc quod; incipio esse alteri aequalis per eius mutationem." 46 It seems obvious that by " mutatio " Thomas
means physical change. Even so something real occurs in me
without a physical change. St. Thomas seems to be saying
that for predicamental relation something real occurs in the
subject without a " mutatio." In other words we cannot hold
that relation is an intrinsic form, a predicamental accident, and
that relation brings about physical change, because in bringing
about physical change the relation which is concomitant with
it no longer exists. We have a new relation and this process
would go on ad infinitum as the change which occurs by reason
of the relation becomes now a basis for a new relation while
destroying the old. Neither can we hold that relation is extrinsic and still demand that it bring about a physical change,
because if it is something extrinsic it cannot bring about an
intrinsic change unless we are to identify relation with action.
Nor also can we make relation something extrinsic to a body
without making it a thing. Accordingly if relation is admitted,
' 8

Ibid., p. 504.

ACTION AT A DISTANCE

it must be an intrinsic' form which brings about a formal effect
without a physical change.
The greater part of the difficulty would vanish if we realize
that relation is not prior to a new way of existing but posterior
to it. Relation is b'ased upon the way a being exists; and, at
least among bodies, the way a being exists depends upon how it
can exist with respect to another, when the other exists. " Regarding" is the term used to indicate this existence to another.
Perhaps we can tie these threads together and at the same time
indicate the necessary conditions for relation. John of St.
Thomas poses this objection: " If relation is an intrinsic form,
it should cause an intrinsic change." 47 In his reply he says that
relation comes to its subject without any mutation whose direct
and immediate term would be the relation itself; but it certainly requires a mutation of which it is the mediate and indirect term. Just as the power of laughter comes into existence
through the action which produces man, so the production of a
white thing involves the production of resemblance with any
other existent white thing. If another white thing should not
exist, then as result of the production of the white thing, resemblance remains as it were in a state of virtuality from which
it will be brought into existence as soon as its term is posited. 48
Therefore while bodies do not in their substantiality exist at a
distance from themselves, they do exist with respect to one
another at a distance by regarding each other in a determinate
respect. This regarding or " reference " or " relativity " frees
bodies from isolation and thereby makes a unity of many-a
whole. Let us say once again that to describe a quantitative
whole, composed of many individuals which retain their individuality, in terms of surface contact is to beg the question at
issue. Bodies can compose a quantitative whole because bodies
are quantified; they can be a quantitative whole because they
are related. Bodies can become a whole while remaining in
actuality many, simply by being related, because in relation
•• John of St. Thomas, p. :no. This is a paraphrase of the first objection.
•• Ibid., p. 881.

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JAMES TALLARICO

they stand in each other's presence by the inherence of the form
of the other.
It should be clear to us by now that the foundations for real
relations are brought into existence by the very fact of the
production of a being and at the same moment of its production. Even if the generator of the being no longer exists, it has
left its power in the being in the form of a "foundation sufficient
for the emergence of a relation." 49 The term does not cause the
formal effect of relation in the subject. 50 The foundation does
this. The term, however, is the necessary condition for the
actual existence of the relation which brings about the formal
effecL51 Fundamentally the being is related. Only the existence
of the term is lacking. A new relation is brought about by the
mere positing of its term at any distance. " Distance is neither
an advantage nor an obstacle," precisely because the term does
not cause a relation in the other extreme, rather the term plays
the part of a condition. 5 2 Note that" term" here does not mean
the formal term but the material term. It is the physical
being considered as able to be a formal term, because the being
actually exists. Only a subject, foundation and term are required for relation. The existence of a being gives the first two
and the existence of another body will give the other if it is the
term of this foundation; and it is the term of this foundation,
not by something that must occur prior to the related thing,
but only by what is concomitant with the being's existence.
It is a term simply by what it is, not by some event that must
occur to it after it exists or by something outside it as an etherbody. Relation is the expression of the way things exist and
therefore the way they can exist to each other once the term
exists. Relation depends upon existence, not upon surface
contact. Notice that to the charge that" co-existence and distance determine an extrinsic denomination,'' John of St. Thomas
replies: " I see no reason why the character of real relations
should be denied to them." 58 Notice also that there could not
•• Ibid.
•• Ibid., pp. 887; 811.
•• Ibid.
•• Ibid., pp. 810-11.
•• Ibid., p. 881. This is a paraphrase of his reply to an objection on p. SiS.

ACTION AT A DISTANCE

271

be any intrinsic effects to beings in an inactive medium even
though the medium makes distance possible. 54 This is of course
because they are not related in Van Laer's inactive medium,
i. e., related with the true effects of relation. In the view here
taken beings can be intrinsically affected without reference to
an active or an inactive medium. It may bear repeating that
the fundamental point lies right here and that the real question
we must face at this point is: ·Does relation depend upon the
fact of existence or does it depend upon a certain kind of
medium or event, such as surface contact? Relation considered
in itself contains no reference to surface contact or to an intervening medium. Relation viewed as indicating something in
the real world, refers only to the way beings exist and therefore
how they exist with respect to one another.
In truth this question should be asked of those who maintain
that surface contact relates bodies: " What is your view of
relation, if it is true that the surfaces of bodies must touch in
order for the bodies to be related? " Is this touching an event,
an action? Is then an action required prior to transient action
in order that action may occur? Is it an event like the formal
effect of a relation? Perhaps they would not argue to that conclusion. But if not, then why does contact occur? Does it occur
for no reason or does it occur because there is a reason, a foundation in the being because of the way it exists potentially?
If it is this, then the event itself is foreshadowed, as it were,
in the being even when they are apart. If it is foreshadowed in
the beings because of what they are and when they are apart,
then they could exist in a vacuum, in isolation, and still foreshadow what will take place when they cease to exist in isolation. How else could we maintain that there are real relations
among bodies? Moreover, if real relation do not occur by
is there a motion towards the generation of relation?
If so, however, the end of the motion must be present to the
moved, and this is as much as to admit that a real relation is
a prerequisite to the motion whereby a relation can come into
•• Van Laer, p.

JAMES TALLARICO

being. Besides, a movement in itself terminates in a new entity,
a new mode which is the essential term of the mutation. To
reach the place where the places touch so that there is surface
contact is an achieved term. Relation, however, is something
produced through something else. It is a being obtained
through a foundation and a term. It terminates an emanation,
not a distinct production.
as accident certainly can be
the term of a mutation such as place or position, 55 but it is a
modal accident. It is the accident which exhibits the mode of
another accident such as place or position, to another being. It
can do this because it does not refer to itself but to another.
Place or position can refer to other places and positions only
because the modal accident, relation, relates this place to that
place and this position to that position. Of all the accidents,
relation has the lowest being. This is why it can "rest" upon
another accident. This also is why its effect is a formal not an
efficient effect as are the other accidents. It inheres in the
substance by means of a foundation and the foundation itself
is an accident of the substance. It is a mode of an absolute
accident and as such it completes an accident. Relation is a
modal being as well as a relative being. Therefore if it is a
modality of the foundation, and the foundation is the physical
being itself in one of its accidental aspects, then relation must
express the way in which one being exists with respect to
another.

IV
AcTION AND CoNTACT

We have dwelt upon the subject of relation and its characteristics in the opinion that relation brings about the community
that transitive action at a distance requires, for bodies are not
isolated from each other if they are related. If this is true, the
charge that action at a distance without the use of a medium
implies that bodies " suddenly and, as it were, out of nothing "
reveal their presence to one another/ 6 is no longer valid. How55

John of St. Thomas, pp.

56

Van Laer, p. 79.

ACTION AT A DISTANCE

278

ever, two objections to the position taken here may present
themselves: " How is it that the action of the agent passes
over into the patient? " 57 and " Why does action actually
occur?" These questions imply one another as well as certain
assumptions which must be brought out. The discussion will
not try to isolate them, but a view of the whole problem of
action at a distance should clear them up. Moreover, for the
moment we will touch only upon action and contact. Later
when it is time to discuss distance, direction, power and
medium, further light will be thrown upon all of these " separate " problems.
Now, Van Laer correctly observes that action is a relative
accident. From the point of view of the agent it is action: from
the point of view of the patient it is passion. Yet the action is
in the patient, since it is the patient that is affected and
brought from potency to act. Granting these characteristics of
action, where is there a necessary reference to surface contact?
There is none. In the light of what we have seen concerning
relation, the presence and determination required to make
action conceivable are already given. The question is now,
" Why does action actually occur? " There is only one possible
answer to this question. The action actually occurs, not only
because the potencies of agent and patient are mutually compatible, but because the compatibility has reached that state of
existence that allows the action to occur: action has an ignition
point, as it were, a kindling temperature. This is an obvious
everyday observation. The lighted match will make it possible
that a piece of paper will bum only if the dispositions within
the paper are such that the paper can burn. These dispositions
are dependent upon the nature of the body. (Experimental
science studies these dispositions mathematically and measures
them by the means at its disposal and in many cases defines the
bodies in terms of dispositions relative to various kinds of
activity.) Conversely, the reason why a lighted match would
not make it possible for a log to burn (grant that in this ex•• Ibid., p. 75, v., pp. 66; 88.

JAMES TALLARICO

ample it does not) is because its active power is not great
enough. In truth, by itself it is not disposed to this action.
What do we do? We light paper, which lights slivers of wood
and the total power available allows the log to burn. Therefore
it is not that the power of the lighted match is dispersed or
lost while being applied only to the log and not first of all to
paper and kindling wood. This may be partly true but it is not
the essential reason why the log fails to catch fire. Rather the
power of the match is not sufficient.
Here is one answer to the objection that those who maintain
action at a distance without a medium or with a medium which
does not participate in the action cannot explairi the loss of
energy or loss of intensity, e.g:, of radio-active propagation
when the distance increases. 68 If we want to indicate the distance as so many inches, feet or miles then certainly, if we
measure the amount of- energy present at various points of
inches, feet or miles, we will find various degrees of the power
of the agent. But we are not necessarily measuring the " loss "
of energy. We can only say that we are measuring a loss if we
take a standard e. g., the amount measured as close to the surface as our physical means allow. But what right have we to
take another amount of what appears as the same activity and
say that the difference is a loss? We can say this only if we
assume that there has been a loss. We can only validly conclude from this experiment (a) that there is a difference, and
(b) that if a body were at that distance it would be able to be
affected by so much power of the agent. Therefore if the power
present at a further distance is less than that present at a nearer
distance, the only conclusion that necessarily follows is that
the power of the agent at this moment is not great enough to
affect the farther object as strongly as the nearer object. 59
•• Ibid., p. 100.
•• Furthermore how can a conception of distance as implied in the above objection
of itself cause a change in intensity or a loss of energy? It cannot unless it is made
"into a thing. Also, if the medium does not absorb the part of the intensity called
"loss;, (Van Laer, p. 102) there is no ·reason which accounts for this "loss."
However the reason for the loss or apparent
i. e., the difference in intensity,

ACTION A'.lr A DISTANCE

Therefore the distance indicates what is the effect that can
be made upon an object, and the effect upon the object is dependent upon the power of the agent. Distance then has a
direct relation to the agent as agent, i. e., as acting or exerting
its power. Therefore it is not true that " nothing can change in
the agent by the mere increase or decrease of the distance." 60
Action and distance are related. True, there is no physical
change in the agent or patient but the agent as agent has a new
status. Its status is that the same power will not do as much
as before if the object is now farther away. Conversely, that
patient is less disposed to the same power of the agent than
it was before. Power and distance are related in some of their
notional aspects just as power and action are related. Further
whether or not w:_e admit that relation reveals the presence of
one body to another, still the relation between the bodies is
different. All four notions are related. Make the ·distance
smaller and the relation has changed with the result that the
same degree of power in the agent will effect a larger or perhaps
a different action. Strip a body of practically all its power and
regardless of how close geometrically we bring another body,
the latter will not be affected. Since no action can occur, the
relation of cause to effect cannot occur. Action, as the act of
a potency, cannot be divorced from any of these conditions.
Action, as an activity, obviously is not passed from hand to
hand as a third thing. It is an occurrence dependent upon conditions present in the individual bodies concerned. These conditions present themselves just as forcibly to those who require
surface contact for bodily action whether the surface contact
is between agent and patient or between agent and medium
then medium and patient. If we admit transient action as distinct from immanent action, to place bodies extremely close
together does not make' transient action more intelligible. If
the agent, patient and medium each remain substantially disis what must be discovered. The search for this reason is at the same time the
search for the understanding of action and why it occurs.
•• Van Laer, p. 100.

JAMES TALLARICO

tinct from each other, then transient action continues to retain
its essential characteristic, namely, the agent becomes the cause
of the act of a potency in another body. If those who admit
action at a distance were criticized because. there is not much
they can say about the manner in which the action is supposed
to pass over from the agent to the patient, it might be answered
that (a) the expression, "pass over," is unfortunate and misleading, and (b) the manner in which action takes place can
only be understood in terms of power, distance and relation,
the discussion of which will be resumed later. Besides, to speak
ad hominem, these objectors themselves, if they hold that
action can take place upon contact, do not trouble to explain
how action " passes over " from agent to patient once contact
is established. Van Laer himself, though he proposes to use
arguments based upon the nature of material action, 61 has
based his arguments, as we have seen, on the need for presence
and determination and these requirements for action he has
identified with surface contact.
Contact between bodies cannot mean that the two bodies are
continuous. If they were, (a) there would only be one body
not two, and (b) transient action would be reduced to immanent activity. Even if we grant that neither alternative is
true the problem still remains to show the necessary relation
between. the intelligible characteristics of " surface contact "
and action. We cannot appeal to simple sense experience because this experience does not give us a distinction between
surface contact and action. Contact, in sense experience, means
action. In fact we are certain that there is contact between
two bodies only when we have seen action occur. A rocket has
made contact with the moon when it has acted upon it. We do
say that two bodies are in contact when an action is imminent
but in this case the imminence means either of two things:
(a) that action will prove that they are in contact or (b) that
the conditions for the action we are referring to are, as far as
we know, at an optimum point. In the first case contact is
"'Ibid., p. 75.

ACTION AT A DISTANCE

277

reduced to action, because either is proved by the other. In
the second case to maintain that this optimum point is brought
about by surface contact is to beg the question. Moreover, it
must also be shown that surface contact is the only possible
means or point for action. This as yet has not been done. Also
how surface contact is able to bring about this optimum point
has not been described. Therefore if we should maintain that
surface contact is needed between the bodies directly or indirectly through or by means of a medium, the only reason given
and the only reason that can be given is that only by this
contact can bodies codetermine each other. But this d-etermination must be something; it must be some type of event, some
type of actuality. If it is something, it obviously does not
change the bodies in the manner in which an ordinary event or
actual occurrence does so. Yet it must leave its mark upon the
bodies concerned and in doing so it acts as a necessary precondition for action. Contact must bring about a conditioned
state within the bodies so that action is possible, intelligible and
imminent. This condition must be real. It does not effect a
physical change but makes possible a physical change. However this condition is the effect brought about within tht; bodies
by contact. Its reality is tenuous but real and absolutely essential. If it is absolutely essential it cannot be nothing. It must
be an effect of some kind and yet it is not like the efficient
effect brought about by action. Let us call it a determinative
effect due to the presence of the formal state of one body in
another body. Since form is determinative let us call it a formal effect. This however is precisely that which we described
earlier as the effect of real predicamental relation. In this
view of material action, contact is synonymous with relation.
As a result relation is ruled out of the categories applicable to
bodily being. There is no reason for this procedure unless we
assume that relation requires that the bodies which are related
must have their substantial being touch one another at the
limits of their extension or their substantial being must touch
some other type of bodily being as a medium. According to this

278

JA]dES TALLARICO

position bodies can be related only if being is bounded by being,
body by body. This is to make relation not something whose
formal defining characteristic is to being but rather something
which is being. Therefore, this view would reduce all relations
to transcendental relation, that is, to so-called relations which
are really no relations at all. For Thomists this is clearly unThomistic; and for them as well as others this amounts, in any
event, to the rejection of the observation that we can make
meaningful judgments concerning the " towardness " of bodies
to each other: This man is not to this man as father, nor this
human being to this human being as son. Rather, this human
being is and this man is. An effect, perhaps, has occurred, and
a man was a cause, but we would have to deny that there is a
meaning in the expression that the effect is the effect of a cause,
and the cause is the cause of the effect. We would have to deny
that an occurrence has taken place, and that the meaning of
the occurrence is fatherhood and sons4ip.
Contact, then, means that there is a determinative effect
which refers to another; it does not mean that body must be
bounded by body or, indeed, by any kind of being. Therefore
the formal element in the conception of " contact " presented
above is relation; this is precisely what was indicated from the
outset when we saw that relation as the foundation of action
at a distance was disguised under the name of contact and by
the definition " when surfaces touch."

v
DISTANCE,

DIRECTION

We have approached action at a distance slowly and by
inquiring whether a medium can give presence and determination. In other words a medium does not seem to be required
for action; but since action is over a distance and in a certain
direction, it is maintained that there must be a medium of
localization which gives distance and direction. Therefore
action cannot be " across " an absolute nothingness. The ob-

ACTION AT A DISTANCE

279

jection is not empty, and therefore demands an investigation
of distance and direction. Let us begin with direction.
The objection stated above obviously places the foundation
for direction between bodies (and perhaps places, even bodies
themselves), in imagination, upon a huge grid-like structure
by means of which we can see that bodies have a certain direction with regard to one another. We ordinarily understand by
" south " and " north " the reference that a body has to the
land and sea areas at zero latitude. Since these areas remain
relatively fixed they suit our purposes as reference points. If,
for example, an automobile is in motion on a road and-its distance is, at least on the average, decreasing with respect to the
North Pole, we say it is travelling in a northerly direction.
We correctly recognize that not only does distance require two
bodies but also there must be a direction of the distance either
as from A to B or B to A. When the distance to a point decreases we say that the activity is directed to that point, at
least for the moment, that is, we determine the direction from
the increase or decrease of distance; but distance requires direction before we can designate a distance. For example, to say
that the distance is 10 miles between A and B assumes that for
either direction, from A to B or from B to A the distance is
10 miles. Direction and distance seem to be interrelated but
they are not identical even though we can sometimes use them
interchangeably. For example, suppose we have two houses one
mile apart situated on a level plain and we decide to walk from
one to the other and then back again. The direction of our
walk and the distance to the house and back are the same,
i. e. in either direction the distance is the same. Similarly we
from a house on the
can say that the direction and
plain to the top of a hill and back to the house are the same.
The situation in the two examples however is quite different.
In the first we require very little change in the amount or type
of activity going to or from one house to the other. We only
have to tum around. In the second example, though the distance may be exactly the same in feet or yards, the energy and
type of activity and time needed to go up and come down are

JAMES TALLARICO

not the same. Going up the hill'we have to climb, perhaps, at
times, crawl. Coming down we may slide or trot. We may be
exhausted when we reach the top; when we arrive back on the
plain we may be refreshed and comfortable. It may take an
hour to climb but only a half hour to descend. Though this is
a homely example it reveals something very significant. Why,
if the distance and the direction are the same are there such
striking differences in the activity? The obvious reason is that
the direction is not exactly the same. We recognize this when
we say " It is one thing to come down, but quite another
thing to go up." Direction seems to add a factor beside the
notion " from this to that." What the " this " and the " that "
are is very important. In abstraction, as on a map, the reciprocal components of direction are identical except, of course, in
the fact that the point of origin of one direction is the termination of the other. In the world of existing bodies this is not
true. In reality, direction adds a third dimension, and often we
relate this dimension to the distance between bodies. As measured, i. e., as counted in so many feet or miles, there is no
difference in either direction; but to traverse that measurement in both directions results in a surprising difference. Direction not only specifies distance as from this to that but actually
influences the distance between bodies. Understood with this
qualification, real distance between bodies is directional distance.
Of course we may not care to understand distance in this
way; we may want it to refer to constants present in either
direction i. e., the number of feet or miles. Further one could
point to the long standing physical formula d=rt where d
stands for distance, r for the rate of travel and t for the time
of travel. Notice however that this formula abstracts from
both direction and the activity of bodies. Physics, when it
uses this formula, can only be concerned with what can be
reduced to the same type of numerical measurement, length,
whether circular or rectilinear. R in the formula means that
length which is to be the unit taken so many times e. g., in an
hour. The formula is only concerned with the total number of

ACTION AT A DISTANCE

fl81

unit lengths in a certain time. Direction is entirely discarded.
On the contrary the distance that a body must traverse is
directional, and the direction of its activity has a great deal to
do with the effort it will expend. Furthermore a body in
traversing a directional distance is in movement, and this movement is an activity. Activity cannot be understood in terms
of lengths and neither can directional distance. Rather they
must be understood in terms'of the meaning which they have
for the body; and one important aspect of that meaning is the
effort, the degree of power, needed to achieve that distance
and thereby reach the term of activity. Direction means a great
deal more to a body than merely " from this to that." Direction makes real to a body its own distance in terms of activity
from another body. It is significant that those men who compute the distance that airplanes must cover do not compute
it in terms of miles but in terms of fuel because the fuel represents power and much less power is required if the plane is
pushed along by a tail wind. For convenience the measurement
is made in terms of gallons but in fact each gallon represents so
much energy. Map miles are considered only to determine
approximately the amount of energy required in terms of gallons of fuel. The exact determination is made by examining
the weather conditions, mountain peaks, cruising altitude, the
fuel. required to climb to cruising altitude, and other factors. 62
In fact the present day rocket experiments measure the term
to be achieved in terms of power units, so many thrust units.
With greater power available the same distance, measured in
terms of lengths, becomes easier and easier to overcome. The
distance for a body cannot be divorced from its power to
achieve that distance. We need only recall the myth of Tantalus. The food may have been only a few inches away but it
was not the inches that kept him distant from it, rather he
lacked the power to reach it. Except for acting as an enticement, the food may just as well ha.ve been miles away.
62 There is a great deal of truth in the common opinion today that the world
has shrunk. Geometrically taken, it is false but for moving bodies the meaning is
rich and true.

JAMES TALLARICO

Thus, as we cannot divorce power and distance, neither can
we divorce direction from distance and power. Direction implies not only the " aim " of a body to another but what is
required to reach the other body. Considered in this way the
foundation for the direction of a body to another is not outside it but rather within it. So also is the power to achieve the
directional distance within the body. If these conclusions are
true then the distance does not refer primarily to something
outside the body. Distance, as well as power and direction,
refers (a) to the body which will act and (b) to the body which
will be affected. Distance, then, should really be conceived in
terms of the agent and the effect to be produced. The effective
distance, taking " effective " in the literal connotation as the
effect to be produced, is the real meaning of distance. There
is no reference to an outside medium nor need there be one.
Bearing in mind what we have said, we should understand
distance as being within a body. Distance is that which determines that a certain degree of power must be expended in order ·
that an effect be produced in another being. Distance does, of
course, refer to what is outside but it does so only in terms of
the disposition of the being concerned. The less power that an
agent must expend the shorter will be distance for it. (Conversely and more basically the shorter the distance the less the
power needed.) In other words the more efficient a body is the
less it will have to expend in order to affect another. Therefore
the more powerful the being, in terms of efficiency, the shorter
the distance between it and its possible patient. It is obvious
though that the type of effect must be considered. For this
reason distance must be understood in terms of (a) the type
of effect to be produced and (b) the efficiency of the agent to
produce it. This is why the proper effect of an agent is the
easiest for it because the proper effect flows from the nature
and in this sense the minimal aspects of its nature. So, for
living things, the easiest transient activity (not passivity) , is
reproduction, for radioactive substances, disintegration is
easiest. If we consider, then, only the proper effects of each
being, the greater its power (in terms of efficiency) to effect

ACTION AT A

288

an actuality, the shorter the distance between it and the new
actuality and also, therefore, the being of which this effect is a
new actuality.
It may well be, moreover, that this is what St. Thomas himself may have thought. In the Summa Theologiae, I, 8, objection 8, the argument is: "It is not necessary that God. be in all
things since God is the most powerful being and the more
powerful the agent, the greater the distance over which it can
act." In his reply St. Thomas compares the power of the most
powerful agent to the supreme power of God and concludes
that God's power is so great that He acts immediately·in all
things; 68 "Hence nothing is distant from Him, as if it could
be without God in itself." 64 If we interpret St. Thomas to
mean that nothing is distant from God because He acts immediately upon everything, this does not take away the implications pointed out, for He acts inimediately because of His
supreme power. The greater the power the shorter the distance.
It would seem, however, that since to create is a greater act
than merely to produce a form in another that God then would
have to expend the greatest power. Besides, to expend power
is to have no longer that power and therefore also to change,
but neither happens to God. Distance, then, such that which
" separates '' and " joins ,; bodies, is not predicable to God, for
He expends no power. This is true not only because God is
pure act but, more important for our purpose, because there is
nothing pre-existing God which He requires in order to produce ·
an effect, either in preservation or creation since the preservation of beings is the continuation· of their creation. 65 In sum,
He does not expend power because there is no distance for
Him to overcome. Therefore God, in this view, is the most
efficient being of all. God's efficient causality is so efficient that
•• We will discuss mediacY and immediacy in relation to power, agent and action
in a moment. For the present we are only concerned with the relation between
power and distance.
•• St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, 1, 8, 1, ad. 8, Piana edition, (Ottawa, 1958).
" Unde nihil est distans ab eo, quasi in se illud Deum non habeat."
•• St. Thomas, Summa contra Gent., 8, 65, 1-8; 2, 6; 2, 21, 9, Opera Omnia, Vives
edition, 84 vols. (Paris, 1894), Vol. U.

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JAMES TALLARICO

it becomes a totally different type of causality, creative causality. Further, since a body's action is a perfection of that body
and exists for the sake of its perfection, its " loss " or expenditure of power is only transmuted into a new perfection of itself.
God is all perfect however and no action perfects Him; He does
not need others in order to perfect Himself. The greater the
power (in terms of efficiency) the shorter the distance.
Returning to the quotation above, we can understand this
sentence to mean that God is not distant from bodies because
He is within them. But what does it mean to say that He is
within bodies? St. Thomas replies, " God is in all things by His
power, inasmuch as all things are subject to His power." 66
" God is said to be in all things by essence . . . because His
substance is to all things the cause of their existence." 67 "God
is in all things as an active cause." 68 "God is in all things ...
as an agent is present to anything upon which it acts." 69 In
fact "as long as a thing exists, God must be present to it,
according to its mode of existence. The existence of anything
is all the closer to it and all the more profoundly belongs to it
as the formal idea of all that is in it. . .. Hence it must be
that God exists intimately in all things." 70 St. Thomas is being
guided by the principle, " A thing exists wherever it operates."
Since God operates in all things, therefore He is in all things. 71
We can conclude, then, that at the moment of operation there
is no distance, and the measured distance prior to the operation
defines the power required to produce the effect. Notice that
the objection to which St. Thomas replies is the same argument
which Scotus will use some years after St. Thomas' death.
Perhaps the " conflict " between them is not concerning action
at a distance as Van Laer and others claim; rather it seems to
be about the notion, " distance." For Scotus the more perfect
the active form which produces the effect, the greater the
nature which acts and the greater the distance over which it
•• Summa Theol., 1, 8, Sc.
•• Ibid., ad. 1.
•• Ibid., Sc.

•• Ibid., l, 8, lc.
•• Ibid.
71 Ibid., sed ccmtra.

ACTION AT A DISTANCE

285

can act. 72 For St. Thomas the higher the nature which acts the
greater its power and the more dependent the effect and the
affected being are upon it. In the action of a lower nature the
effect is converted into the nature of the product and it will
remain after the agent's action ceases; but in a higher nature,
e. g., such as light or the action of the supreme power such as
God, the being does not last at all when the agent's action
ceases. Therefore the being, in respect of the effect that is
produced in it, is far less independent of the power of the agent.
Obviously, where the whole to be of the being is dependent
upon the agent, the agent must always be in it causing it to
be and therefore the agent cannot at any time be distant from
it/ 8 Distance
be understood apart from power.
Accordingly we can add a new notion to distance-independence. God is not distant from bodies because none of them
is independent of Him in any respect. Among bodies consequently, the distance "between" them· is not between but in
them. The distance is inversely proportional to the degree of
dependence of the affected being upon the cause. Since no body
is completely dependent upon another, bodies will always be
distant from each other even when they are at such a small
geometrical distance from each other that they are said to be
in contact. The substantial distinctness of bodies is itself a
distance. Independence therefore is the degree to which bodies
exhibit a resistance to being affected; and the degree of independence is the measure of the distance. Since independence
implies the presence of and a reference to another, distance
therefore refers to the way a being is independent with respect
to an other being, i. e., to a being outside it. Consequently the
distance for transient action is founded upon the independence
· and otherness of bodies, and more profoundly, upon whatever
in corporeal being brings about independence and otherness.
More specifically for our purposes here, distance is the degree
of resistance of the patient to the agent in a certain aspect of
n Joannes Duns Scotus, In Librum Primum Sententiarum, Dist. 87, q. 1, comm.
(a), Ope7a Omnia, Vives edition, 26 vols. (Paris, 1891), Vol. 10, pp. 596-97.
•• Sum. Contra Gent., 8, 65, 6; Summa Theol., 1, 8, 1c.

JAMES TALLARICO

their existence. Distance is therefore directional and relational
and when considered not as measured but in itself as a foundation for measurement, distance is this directional relation.
Obviously the effective distance will also be dependent upon
the type of effect that is to be produced and the power required;
but both will reflect the x·elative efficiency of the agent. For
a cause to produce a low order effect very easily does not make
it the most efficient agent. A higher effect may be completely
impossible to it, even in the same patient body. The cause will
be in the affected body as regards this effect but may be totally
distant from it as regards other ways in which the body can
be affected. Insofar as this effect is. concerned, the affected
body is dependent upon the agent. We can also say that since
only a part of the patient body is the effect of the agent that
therefore the agent is not immediate with the whole body but
only with the particular effect and my me3tns of the effect, with
the whole body. God, however, is immediate to the whole
body because the body as a whole is an effect of His action and
dependent upon Him. A bodily agent will be immediate with
the whole body only if the body is acting as a means to carry
the whole power of the agent.
It should not be surprising if this brief analysis of the text
of St. Thomas 'shows agreement with the view of distance that
has been taken here. For he concludes, proceeding from above,
to what may also be concluded from below: note that in the
text quoted (p.
he simply reverses the premise of the
objection. The greate:r the power of an agent does not imply
that it can act over a greater distance; rather it implies that
distances are shorter for it.H

VI
MEDIUM

Let us remain with St. Thomas in order to clarify one other
notion in action and action at a distance. That notion is
"Summa. Contra Gent., !l, 6, 6; !, 20, 4.

ACTION AT A DISTANCE

287

" medium." We hope to clarify further what has been said
about distance and at the same time see precisely what he
means by medium in those texts that are quoted to support
the view that St. Thomas rejects action at a distance without
the use of a medium. For example this text is often quoted:
"No action of an agent, however powerful it may be acts at
a distance, except through a medium." 75 At the same time we
should see (a) what he means when he says that God acts
immediately upon bodies and (b) how a bodily agent acts
immediately as well as mediately.
In Contra Gentes 3, 68, 4, St. Thomas says that " Whenever
an agent is present to only one of its effects, its action cannot
be transferred to another, except by using the first effect as an
intermediary, because the agent and the patient must be simultaneous." Van Laer understands and translates this passage so
that every agent is present only to one of its effects and thereby
must use it as a medium; 76 but the rest of the section in chapter
4 makes clear just what St. Thomas means in this passage.
He gives us an example. The heart is the first effect of the
motive power and by means of the heart the motive power
activates the various members of the body. In this situation,
when a first effect is used to affect others, that effect must be
proportionate to the entire power of the agent otherwise the
agent could not use its entire _power. In another passage he
says that if an agent could not use its entire power because
that upon which it acts is not proportionate to it, the unusable
power would be in vain; 77 and in another passage he implies
that since God made the total being God would act uselessly,
but He does not. 78 Now in the quotation above St. Thomas
Summa Theol., 1, 8, 1, ad. 8. "Dicendum quod nqllius agentis, quantumcumque
virtuosi, actio procedit ad aliquid distans, nisi niquantum in illud per media agit."
Van Laer, p. 77; Francis X. Meehan, Efficient Causality in Aristotle and St. Thomas
(Washington, 1940), p. 288.
Van Laer, p. 78. The text is: "Quodcumque agens est praesens tantum uni
suorum effectuum, eius actio non potest derivari ad alia nisi illo mediante, eo quod
agens et patiens oportet esse simul."
•• Summa Contra Gent., 2, 16, 7.
•• Ibid., 2, 22, 4. .

fl88

JAMES TALLARICO

does not say or imply that every action of an agent is immediate, as the motive power's action upon the heart, or mediate, as the operation of the motive power by the medium of the
heart acts upon the members of the body. He merely gives
us the conditions under which there must be a medium. There
may be other conditions which require a medium but we are
not told that there are such conditions. He then describes the
conditions under which this type of medium can be a medium.
It must be able to carry the whole of the agent's power. We
should note that his purpose in the paragraph is only to show
that no creature can act as a medium for God's power as it
would have to if He were present to only one of His effects.
The first effect in other words must function as a pure means;
no creature can do this for God. Therefore God acts immediately in all things. This is all that can be drawn from section 4.
In discussing the relationship of power, action and substance
in creatures and in God, he mentions that in those things whose
powers are not their substance, the powers themselves are
accidents. 79 The things he refers to are creatures. In them the
action is distinct from and a complement to the power.80 Active
power is the principle of acting upon another, because by its
power the agent is related and applied, in action, to an external
thing. 81 By power the agent exists in another. 82 Since no body's
substance is identical with its existence, neither can its power
be identical with its existence. Action follows upon what is in
act, for act is also the principle of action. 88 Since the essence
of bodies is not their existence, the action which is determined
by their essence requires a prior existent being upon which they
can act. Their action cannot produce being absolutely but only
this particular being or this particular way of being.84 They
can only bring a form into a matter. The matter acts as the
recipient of the form, the new actuality. 85 Nothing of this is
true of God. His power is His action and His action is His
•• Ibid., !il, 8, 4.
80 Ibid., 2, 9, 2.
81 Ibid., 2, 7, 1.
8 ' Summa Theol., 1, 8, 8, ad. 8.

Summa Contra Gent., 2, 6, 8 & 6.
Ibid., 2, !ill, 9.
85 Ibid., 2, 16, 5-7.
83

84

ACTION AT A DISTANCE

fl89

substance and His substance is to be. God therefore is immediate to all things, not only because no being can act as a
medium for His power, but also because He needs (a) nothing
in the thing upon which to act in order to affect a thing, i. e.,
no pre-existing matter to receive His effort 86 and (b) no principle of action, as do created agents, i. e., no power apart from
His substance. Power is attributed to God only in the things
as made, not as something distinct from His action as it is in
created beings. The being uses the power which uses the matter
in another in order to make a form present in it. In this sense
every body acts through a medium: (a) a medium of its own,
the power, because the body cannot act through its substance
and (b) the medium of the matter in another, because the
agent can only affect the other through its matter. In brief,
since a body must use a means which is based upon an act
which is other than its substance, then it requires a means in
the body upon which it will act in order to produce its effect
in the patient.
Now taking the sections 4-8 in Contra Gentes fl, 16 together
with the objections 11 and 14 of question 1, article 1, in the
De Potentia, St. Thomas' notion of medium in these contexts
should be quite clear. It does not refer to something outside
the agent body. The eleventh objection states that the power
which is assigned to the second species of quality cannot be
attributed to God. St. Thomas agrees. This type of power
" belongs to creatures who do not act immediately through
their essential forms, but through the medium of ac<;!idental
forms, whereas God acts immediately by His essence." 87 The
fourteenth objection states that "energy is a medium between
substance and work. But God does not work through a medium. Therefore He does not work by energy, nor consequently
•• Ibid., 2, 16.
•• St. Thomas, De Potentia Dei, 1, 1, ad. 11, Opera Omnia, Vives edition, 34 vols.
(Paris, 1894), Vol. 13. "Ad undecimum dicendum, quod potentia, quae est in
secunda specie qualitatis, non attribuitur Deo: haec enim est creaturarum, quae
non immediate per formas suas essentiales agunt, sed mediantibus formis accidentalibus; Deus autem immediate agit per suam essentiam." .

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JAMES TALLARICO

by power." St. Thomas replies, " God's power is not a medium
in reality, since it differs not from His essence except logically:
which is sufficient for our speaking of it as though it were a
medium. But God does not work through a medium that is
really distinct from Himself." 88 St. Thomas could not be more
explicit. The medium he refers to, as we do, is within the body.
He was concerned with the fundamentals of action in creatures
and creator. He points out that action in creatures occurs by
and through media, one in the patient, the other in the agent;
therefore the distance for the coming-to-be of a new actuality
is dependent upon the dispositions of both media. The distance is within beings. Viewing action, not as indicating the
new act in the patient but as indicating the required proper
dispositions of both of these mediums for the new act, action
is a pure means and as such there is no problem of it "passing
over " from agent to patient. Action is not a travelling accident. Distance, direction, medium, action and the new actuality engendered in the patient, presence and determination
are all within the agent and patient.

VII
CoNCLUSION

If the conditions for action are within the agent and patient,
then it follows that action at a distance is possible. In fact all
transitive action must be at a distance because all bodies are
related by a relation of distance, i. e., all bodies are to some
degree independent of one another and other than one another.
Of course we have had to recast such notions as distance,
direction, medium; but evidently, this can be done in such a
way that inherent absurdity and self-contradiction are removed
from the notion of " action at a distance without the use of a
88 Ibid., ad. 14. "Ad decimum quartum dicendum, quod potentia Dei non est
media secundum rem, quia non distinguitur ab essentia, nisi ratione; et ex hoc
habetur quod siguificetur ut medium. Deus autem non agit per medium realiter
dift'erens a seipso."

ACTION AT. A DISTANCE

.291

medium." Fundamentally, this has been the difficulty with
action at a distance: for if distance, direction and medium have
their foundation in some thing between or around bodies, then
obviously the only distant body which the agent can affect is
one which is mediately instead of immediately in surface contact with it. The same conclusion is reinforced if it is thought
that surface contact makes action possible because it relates
bodies and thereby makes them exist with respect to one
another by presence and determination. However no one has
yet shown that there is a necessary (or any other) relation
between surface contact and relation without (a) in effect,
reducing the latter to the former and (b) assuming that bodies
are isolated if they are not in surface contact.
Similarly, when power or efficiency to achieve an effect is
divorced from the distance that a body has to another, -then
the distance must lie outside the agent and patient. Distance,,
then can only mean the number of equal bodies which can be
placed end to end between the agent and patient instead of
the single medium which now separates them. This is very
strange because it is by the operation of the power of the agent
that an action occurs in another body. Why should the number
of the geometrical measurement be more important in determining the distance a possible agent is to its possible patient
than the agent's power to affect the patient and the patient's
passive power to resist the agent? In fact it is not, but it is
understandable why we tend to give to this geometrical measurement the title, " distance." It is very convenient. It is
based upon the relatively :fixed extension which bodies .exhibit.
This relatively :fixed extension can serve as the basis for a
divisional unit which we call " one," in terms of inches, feet or
miles; and this can give us a measurement upon the directional
grid-like structure which our mathematizing imagination facilitates for us. It becomes very easy then to designate the " distance " and " direction '' one body has from another. " This "
is three feet above" that." That is, it is very easy for us;
for the bodies themselves, the only distance that concerns them
is their ability to affect another or resist the power of another.

J AnlES TALLARICO

The distance for transient action is this mutually related resistive and affective status of the agent and patient. If the
whole universe were to remain exactly as it now is except for
one thirig-that there was a complete absence of power-each
being would be equally distant from every other in the sense
that each would be equally impervious to the influence of the
others, all geometrical measurements to the contrary. It is
power, active and passive, present and absent, that indicates
the true distance one body has to another. This is so because
power must overcome, not a certain number of geometrical
indicators which refer to something between bodies, but rather
those dispositions within bodies which prevent action; and
because it is power which overcomes this distance between
bodies, the natural, i.e., the proper, measure of distance is
power, not geometry.
JAMES TALLARICO

St. Michael's College,
Univeraity of Torrmto

THE UNIQUE CHARACTER OF MARY'S QUEENSIDP

E

VER since 1954, when an ailing Pontiff devoted some
of his failing energy to adding one-more star to Mary's
crown with the Encyclical Letter, Ad Caeli Reginam,
there has been no doubt in the minds of Catholics that Mary,
the Mother of God, is Queen of the Universe. This letter
marked a climax in the deep and chivalric devotion of the
people of God to the Lady Mary. While not a solemn definition, the Encyclical may well be taken as Pope Pius XII's
witness to the age-old and ordinary teaching of the Church;
certainly,. the fact that Mary is Queen of the Universe is
solemnly definable.
Even the slightest acquaintance with the theological literature that has appeared since 1954 makes it evident that two
major problems remain open for discussion by those who hold
firmly to the fact of Mary's Queenship. The first problem is
concerned with the exact nature of the queenship to be attributed to Mary. In what way do we build up the analogy
of queenship so that it will be verified of her? Especially, may
we, must we, attribute royal power to Mary? If so, to what
extent?
The second problem, though intimately linked with the
first, is formally distinct from it: in the exercise of her queenly
role, does Mary enjoy only moral power, or does she also serve
as a physical instrumental cause? Discussion of this second
problem will not engage us in this paper. We are concerned
rather with a possible solution to the first; hence the subjectthe unique character of Ma:cy's Queenship.
Some aspects of this Queenship are admitted by all. It has
been pointed out many times that the title " Queen " belongs
to Mary, as the title "King" belongs to Christ, in a metaphorical sense. This is in accord with the custom of recognizing excellence in any field by imposing the titles " king " or
" queen " on its possessor; so the lion is the " king " of beasts;

294

JAMES M:. EGAN

· the moon is the " queen " of the night; there are " home .run
kings" and" queens of beauty." In this line, Our Lord and
Our Lady, because of their supreme perfection in the order of
grace and of nature, are most fittingly called the King and
Queen of Creation.
While it is most important to acknowledge the ineffable
preeminence of Christ and Mary in the whole order of creation,
the concern here is with the proper or literal sense of these titles.
All agree also that there is no question of Mary's being a
queen regnant, as Queen Elizabeth II of England or Queen
Juliana of the Netherlands. These are" kings" who happen to
be women and hence are called" queens"; whatever there is of
royal power left in England or Holland it is in their hands.
But that Mary is· Queen in the kingdom of which Christ is
King must never be forgotten.
It is commonly agreed that Mary is Queen Mother, and in a
very special way. Ordinarily, the "queen mother" is the
woman who gave birth to a child who eventually becomes king.
She is not his queen. Now Mary gave birth to one who is king
by that very birth. The Church does not hesitate to accommodate to Christ the words of Sacred Scripture concerning
Solomon: " He was
by his own mother." The focus
here is on Christ's kingship as man. As man, he becomes king
first of all by birth right, by his birth from the Virgin Mother.
It was theoretically possible that God would ask no more of
Mary than to be the mother of her Divine Son. Clearly, all
he asked of Joseph was to be the husband of Mary and the
foster-father of Jesus. This function was confined to the early
years of Our Lord's life; this is why Joseph is no longer on the
scene when Jesus begins his public ministry (and his heavenly
Father makes his appearance). If Mary's task had been confined to that of mother, she too, in all probability, would have
disappeared from this earth before Jesus began his life-work.
She would still be Queen Mother. No greater dignity could be
conceived; yet, in· the strict sense, Mary would not be our
mother in the sense we know her to be, nor would there be any

THE UNIQUE CHARACTER OF MARY'S QUEENSHIP

295

further question about the character of her queenship. Mary
would have been the first subject in the Kingdom of Christ,
but he would have been the sole ruler.
But this is not the whole story of God's designs for Mary. In
some mysterious way, it was true of Christ, as it was true of
Adam and every man: " It is not good for man ·to be alone."
Obviously, the need is not really on Christ's part; rather it is on
ours. It was better for us that our salvation should be wrought,
obversely to our destruction, by a man and a woman. That is
why Mary's consent at the Incarnation was to the twofold
function of being the Mother and· the Helpmate of Christ.
Hence, she is Queen Mother and Queen Consort. The Kingdom
of Christ has a King and a Queen in the proper sense of the
terms. They possess a kingdom and subjects over whom they
actually exercise royal power.
A legitimate objection might be raised at this point: there
is no question but that Christ is King in the truest and most
proper sense of the word: he has a kingdom and subjects over
whom he exercises supreme dominion. Mary is truly Queen
Consort, but does it follow that she shares in a real way in
the king's regnative power?
Can an answer to this question be found by following
closely the analogy of earthly queenship? It seems not, or
rather, the evidence would incline to a negative answer. If
Mary's function is in line with that of earthly queens, then
she has only a negligible part to play in actually ruling the
kingdom. All the evidence points to the fact that the queen
has more to do with the myth of royalty than with its essence.
The queen consort is obviously essential to an hereditary
monarchy; she also contributes greatly to the myth of royal
blood. The blood of royalty has, in fact, no mystic quality, yet
human experience has shown that a woman with a special
family background and up-bringing makes the best help-mate
for the king. And certainly her most important function is to
provide an heir to the throne.
Another function of the queen is to provide a private life

JAMES M. EGAN

for the king, a family life for him and the children. While it is
true in a sense that the king has no private life, that he is
essentially a public person, this is true only in a symbolic way.
It is most important that the king have a private life, that
he be not exposed continuously to the public notice, at the
price of being less a public person,
it is the queen who has
the responsibility of providing this privacy.
As a public person herself, the queen has the important
function of contributing greatly to the social prestige of the
monarchy (another reason why she should be of " noble '·'
blood). She is the king's official hostess on state occasions
that are not formally political.
To the king, as king, she is presumed to be (in many cases,
I'm sure, mythically,) First Counsellor, for she too, in a
womanly way, holds the interests of the whole kingdom close
to her heart and her thoughts.
But does the queen in any real sense exercise royal dominion?
The evidence seems to indicate that in human kingdoms, she
does not. While we do not wish to pretend that the following
points are in any way exhaustive or rigorously probative, they
are indicative, and should be pursued further.
The Columbia Encyclopedia has no entry under the word
"queen." The Syntopicon, of The Great Book's series, does list
" monarchy " as one of the great ideas; yet neither in the article,
nor in the outline of references to the Great Books, nor in the
general index (in Vol. III) does the term "queen" appear.
The conclusion from this, it seems, is that a thorough exploration of the concept of monarchy is possible without reference
to a queen.
The Encyclopedia Britannica does devote a short article to
"Queen"; 1 it is concerned mostly with such nominal distinctions as used above, without suggesting in any way that the
queen plays an essential role in the ruling power of the king.
Another article is devoted to the term " Consort "; 2 this
proved most fruitful. " Consort, in general, a partner or asso1

Vol. XVIII, p. 840.

• Op. cit., Vol. VI, pp.

THE UNIQUE CHARACTER OF MARY'S QUEENSHIP

297

ciate, but more particularly a husband or wife. The word is
also used in conjunction with some titles, as ' queen consort,'
' prince consort.' " There is also an express reference to the
status of the queen consort, at least in British law. "Under
the law of Great Britain, the queen consort is a subject, but
has certain privileges." Historically, there have been several
ways of providing finances for her needs: " Provision now is
made for the queen consort by statute." Of equal interest
is the status of the prince consort. " In the cases of queens
regnant in English history, the positions of the husbands
differed. When Queen Mary I married Philip of Spain it was
provided by every safeguard that words could suggest that the
queen alone should exercise all the powers of the Crown; official
documents, however, were to issue in their joint names. William III occupied the throne jointly with his wife, Mary II.
. . . . . After the accession of Queen Elizabeth II, it was announced in a royal warrant that her husband, the Duke of
Edinburgh, would hold precedence next to the queen."
The key in both cases is " particular statute." We shall see
that this concept may help us to determine the unique character of Mary's queenship.
It may very well be that the analogy of human queenship
is not to be followed too rigorously in trying to determine
Mary's status as Queen in Christ's kingdom.
What, for instance, is the function of Mary in regard to the
royal descendance of Our Lord? Is he the Son of David through
his mother? While Catholic Scripture scholars maintain that
Mary is also of the house of David, the Synoptics are obviously
concerned to establish this through St. Joseph. This seems to be
an important aspect of his role in the
it is a matter
·of indifference whether Mary is also a lineal descendant of
David. Even if she was, the title could not be claimed through
her according to Jewish law.
This does not in any way clash with her function of messianic
maternity, 8 but is a much more profound aspect of God's plan
than carnal descent.
• Cf. Introduction a la Bible, Robert-Feuillet. Vol. I, p. 854.

298

JAMES M. EGAN

The Jewish mentality does not seem to be concerned with
the myth of "royal blood"; David's blood was not mysteriously transmuted when he was consecrated king.
Moreover, it was not Mary's function to produce an heir
to the throne, for it was occupied by an eternal King. She had
the more awe-inspiring function (and this was part of her
messianic maternity) of conceiving and giving birth to all the
people of the Kingdom, communicating to them, in her own
way, the royal blood of divine grace, making them all a kingly
people.
Mary did, for many years, provide a private life for the
King, a family life. And, certainly, her presence in heaven at
the side of the King adds "social" prestige to the monarchy.
To designate her as " first counsellor," in the proper sense
of the word, is probably too strong: " Who has been his counsellor?" Perhaps" confidante'' would be better, for she shares
completely in all the plans of the King for his people.
These functions, although analogical, do not go beyond those
ordinarily assigned to earthly queens. Can we assert that Mary
is unique, as Queen, inasmuch as she shares intimately in the
ruling power of Christ? It would seem so, if we examine the
particular statute of her appointment, the eternal decree of
her predestination, which we are assured, is the same decree as
the one that determines the Incarnation of the Son of God.
As we have already suggested, Mary is destined to be both
Queen Mother and Queen Consort. In,_ this she is unique, unlike
any other mother. Ordinarily, a mother does not share, except
from afar, from the sidelines, as it were, in the life work of her
son. She conceives him, brings him into this world, feeds and
clothes him, accompanies him to the threshold of life, and then
hands him over to another woman, who will be his helpmate.
Mary did for Jesus what every mother does for her son; she
too accompanies him to the threshold of life, but it is her
destiny to pass over that threshold and share intimately in his
life work. A casual glance at the Gospel story might lead one to
suspect that Mary too had only a peripheral part to play in
Christ's public life. She only appears on the edge of the crowds

THE UNIQUE CHARACTER OF MARY'S QUEENSHIP

299

that surround him. Yet one must remember that Christ's real
work was accomplished on Calvary and Mary was there.
Obviously only a mother could have shared in this work, for
only a mother could have suffered together with her own flesh
and blood; only a mother could have sacrificed her rights to
the life of her Son, which he had received from her. There are
solid theological reasons for maintaining that Mary's share in
the redemption is real, that she has made a real contribution to
the generation of the people of God. If this is so, who can deny
that she now enjoys real power in the Kingdom of God?
This point is made quite strongly by Pope Pius XII in his
encyclical Ad Caeli Reginam 4 in which he explicitly makes a
parallel between the two titles of Christ as King and of Mary
as Queen. The first title has the reality of the hypostatic union
for its basis; the second has the reality of the Redemption.
"Now, the most Blessed Virgin Mary is to be called Queen, not
only by reason of her divine maternity, but also because by the
will of God she has had an outstanding part in the work of our
eternal salvation " (p. 8) . " Hence we may certainly conclude
that just as Christ, the new Adam, must be called King, not
only because He is the Son of God, but also -because He is our
Redeemer; so, by a certain kind of analogy, the most Blessed
Virgin is Queen, not ·only because she is the Mother of God,
but also because, as the new Eve, she was associated with the
new Adam" (p. 9) .11
• October 11, 1954. Citations from the translation published by NCWC.
• Or must we accept the startling conclusion expressed· by Yves M.-J. Congar,
0. P. in an article originally publiShed in Suippl6mtmt de la Vie Spirituelle (1959),
translated under the title: " The Theology of Religious Women," and appearing in
Review for Religious, XIX (Jan. 1960), I, 15-89? The eminent French theologian,
many years ago, expressed soine concern about the analogy of the term " queen,"
as applied to the Blessed Virgin. Cf. Congar, "Royante de Marie," Retnte des
Sciences Pkil. et Theol., 25, 1986}, p. 76i. The position expressed in thiS article
seems to be a logical consequen<:eof limiting oneself to the prototype of the earthly
queen. The Church can be looked upon as reality-grace and. sanctification (the
culmination of holiness in all the predestined is the eschatological status of the
Church) ; or as sacrament-the means of grace or sanctification. The Church as
sacrament obviously will pass away; the Church as reality will remain forever.
There is no question but what Mary is at the pinrui.cle of grace. " In the Church

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JAMES M. EGAN

In 6 the Kingdom of Christ, there is a King and a Queen,
both of whom exercise royal power; we must now ask, how do
Christ and Mary exercise this power? We all know that ruling
power (royal or not) has a threefold aspect. It is generally
divided into legislative power, executive power, and judicial
power. In our country such powers have been distributed
among various individuals or groups of individuals; thus some
have legislative power-Congress; the executive power rests
with the President; the judicial power rests ultimately in the
Supreme Court. In a kingdom, all that power rests in the one
person-the king. He may communicate it; he may delegate it,
but ultimately it rests in him. In the Kingdom of God, all
power has been given to Christ. So Christ, as King, has the fullness of legislative, executive, and judicial power.
Now, if Mary is Queen in the proper sense of the word, with
real power,. she too must rule. Otherwise she is no different
from an earthly queen. Hence, we must also ask ourselves:
Can we say that Mary shares in the legislative, executive and
judicial power that is Christ's? In what sense has he given her
a part in actually ruling the kingdom? The exercise of regal
power is ordered to the good of the subjects, to lead subjects
of this world she had neither a function or a hierarchical qignity. It could readily
be said of 'her that she is a member, the first member, of the laity, if there were
not danger of belying by this way of speaking her perfection as a consecrated
member of the faithful" (p. 17). At this point the author quotes Mons. Journet,
quoting St. Thomas, to the effect that Mary is highest in holiness, not highest in
hierarchical dignity. He then continues: "She is the type, or better, the perfect
personification of the Church, but the Church as a final end, not as a means. Mary
is 'the eschatological ikon of the Church' (L. Bouyer, Le Culte de la Mere de
Dieu)" (ibid.).
The ambiguity here lies in the notion of hierarchical dignity. Of course, Mary
is not a member of the hierarchy; she is something incredibly more. The hierarchy
as a temporal aspeCt of the Church, has relatively particular competence. It is
precisely
she has attained the utmost of her perfection that she is, not only
an ' eschatological ikon ' of the Church, but also the Mother of the Church here
on earth and its Queen. Mary has a universal competence in the life of the Church
in 'history. Her recent appearances, especially at Lourds and Fatima, bear witness
to the fact that she does have a role to play in the Church as means.
8 The following paragraphs appeared originally as part of article published in
Integrity, December 1955, of which there is a Marian Reprint.

THE UNIQUE

CHARACTER OF MARY'S QUEENSHIP

801

so to act in harmony, in community, that the common good of
the whole kingdom may be preserved and advanced. Certainly,
everything comes from Christ as the source. Can we say now
that Mary is associated with Christ in a special way, that she,
too, has a ruling function to perform?
The answer, I believe, is yes: Mary is Queen in the Kingdom
of Christ, and she shares in His royal power because of peculiar
statute and in each of its three aspects. First of all, the legislative power. At first glance, we would be inclined to say that
Mary does not share in the legislative power, for this is the
power that initiates everything, the power that requires the
fullness of prudence, of justice, of fortitude, of temperance, of
all the virtues, the power that is capable of foreseeing all the
needs of the common good and then laying down the regulations, the rules, the laws that all subjects must follow if they
are to gain the common good. Certainly all the laws of the
Kingdom of God here on earth are enacted by Christ. We know
of no law that Mary has determined, no law of which she has
been the source. As far as legislating for the Kingdom of God,
that is totally in Christ, and, in a minor way, in the hierarchy
of the Church. The fundamental laws of Christianity have been
established by Christ himself, and Mary has had no part in
initiating the legislation. We can say that she has approved it,
has embraced it wholeheartedly. We can also say that she was
its first subject. She was the one who manifested most perfectly
what complete submission to the law of Christ will do.
However, it is important to realize that there is a tremendous
distinction between the New Law of Christ and the Old Law
(as well as all civil law). St. Paul alludes to it frequently.
The Old Law was a law written on tablets of stone. The Old
Law indicated what was to be done; it did not give the means
to do. The New Law is a law of
and truth, a law of love.
It has not been written down by its legislator; Christ wrote
no code of laws. It is true that much of it is written down in
Sacred Scripture: Christian laws abound there, but we know
that the New Law has been handed down principally by tradition, by the living voice of the Church, and that it is a law of

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JAMES M. EGAN

love, a law of the spirit. It is a law that, in a sense, can only be
promugated by the Holy Spirit, for it must be written in the
hearts of men. Promulgation is necessary if a law is to bind its
subjects. Promulgation is definitely an aspect of legislative
power. It is from this aspect that Mary shares in the legislative
function of her Son. Under the direction of the Spirit of Truth
and Love, Mary fulfills her role of instilling the law of Christ
into the hearts of men, helping them to understand it and to
apply it in every event of their lives.
Once the law has been promulgated, it must be carried out,
and here Mary enters into the executive aspect of her Queenship. She certainly possesses a share in the executive power in
a very special way: this is a way that is most fitting for a
queen, who is also a mother, for, in a certain· sense, Mary
initiates things. God has left to her the task of being conscious
-not that he himself is not conscious-but he has left to her
the task of being aware, first of all, of what has to be done.
Christ knew that the Wine was giving out: He knew it in the
beatific vision, as well as by his infused knowledge; He probably even knew it by his acquired knowledge, for he could guess
what was going on, he could note the disturbance, sense the
embarrassment. Yet he never said a word; he left it to Mary
to call attention to it. That is what is meant by saying that
Mary initiates things in the order of execution.
It can be said that in every case Christ leaves the initiative
to Mary. She is the one who is conscious o1 what is needed.
Her vision is such as to embrace all mankind, everything that
pertains to the Kingdom of God, here and hereafter, from
beginning to end. Mary, therefore, is always aware of the needs
of all, and she is the one who initiates by her intercession. Her
prayer is all powerful.
In the beautiful Matins hymn for the feast of Our Lady,
Mediatrix of all Graces, occur the following words:
These sacred fountains of God's saving water
Who shall direct them for a people purchased?
Given to Mary is this loving office
As Mediatrix.

THE UNIQUE CHARACTER OF MARY'S QUEENSHIP

808

Mary, Our Mother, all the graces garnered
By Our Redeemer unto us dispenseth;
Freely at her prayer her Son gladly raineth
Gifts of his bounty.'

This is the function of Mary, sharing in a special way the
executive power, seeing to it that the fruits of the Redemption
are applied to every soul. So we know that every grace we
receive, every grace that anyone receives, has been first of all
noticed, asked for, interceded for, by Mary. It is a special gift
of Mary's motherly love for us, which she can easily bestow,
because she is Queen. She is rightly called Omnipotentia supomnipotence; not omnipotence itself-that is
God-but the next thing to it.
This is a wonderful aspect of Mary's function in our lives,
because, even though she is joined to Christ in the work of
redeeming us, in acquiring everything that is necessary for the
full perfection of the Kingdom, it is also up to her to share in
his executive power in a peculiarly maternal way. One of
Mary's most precious titles is Almoner of God; this means that
Christ has placed everything in Mary's hands so that she,
knowing God's designs and God's will, dispenses them to all
of us.
The third aspect of royal power is judicial power. Theologians seem hesitant to allow Mary any share in :the judicial
power of her Son. Yet the doctrine of St. Thomas would seem
to demand that Mary have a share, for he explicitly admits
others to participate in judging. One reason given by theologians for excluding Mary is that judgment is a manifestation
of justice; hence, the judge is a symbol of justice, whereas 1\!lary
is the Mother of Mercy. St. Thomas, on the other hand, tells
us that in all the works of God justice and mercy are intertwined. He finds in the most unexpected works of God this
intimate conciliation of justice and mercy. It is true that the
justification of a sinner is most perfectly a manifestation of
• Byrnes, A., HymtnB of the Dominican Missal and Breviarg, St. Louis, 1948,
p. 298.

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JAMES M. EGAN

God's mercy; the condemnation of a sinner to punishment is
primarily a manifestation of God's justice; yet God rewards,
and in rewarding satisfies the ultimate demands of his justice;
God condemns, yet he never condemns as much as he might.
There is always mercy in every judgment; hence, we can be
sure that Mary too is present at every judgment. She is the
Advocate of Mercy, and God knows how much we need her.
St. Thomas also tells us that there are three judgments.
There is, first of all, the judgment that is going on continuously
throughout our life, the rewards and punishments, the favors
we receive and the favors we do not receive, here and now.
We often wonder why people who seem to ignore God, who have
no use for religion, prosper in a worldly way. Perhaps, that is
the result of a judgment to grant them a certain amount of this
world's goods, even though they have ignored the rights of God.
Another person, who has sincerely tried to please God, seems
to have one trial after another. That is also a question of
judgment-to discern what is going to be given to each man;
Really there is no ultimate problem in this apparently unequal
dealing with men. What God is doing in the one case is giving
the first man a reward for what little he has done, so that he
will have nothing to hold against God when the end comes:
" Behold, you have received your reward." ·In the other case,
God is giving the man every opportunityto build up treasure in
heaven. Here we have a form of judgment, and we can hardly
doubt Mary's connection with it; witness the judgments she
announced at Fatima. The principal judgment from the viewpoint of the individual man, is that which we call the particular
jadgment. This takes place at the instant of death, when each
one will be judged by Christ. The faithful have always believed
that Mary would be present then as the Advocate of Mercy.
What of the general judgment? Is Mary going to be there,
not merely as a spectator, but actively taking part? The notion
that Christ has saved all judgment, and particularly the last
judgment, to himself is not quite accurate. As a matter of fact,
he himself has promised some that they are going to sit in
judgment with him. Recall the incident when St. Peter said to

THE UNIQUE CHARACTER OF MARY'S QUEENSHIP

305

Our Lord: "We have given up all things and have followed
thee." As the author of a homily on this passage remarks:
" Look what he gave up; an old boat and some worn-out fishing
nets. In any event, he gave up everything he had; so he asks:
"What reward are we going to have?" And Our Lord said
to him: "On the last day, on the day of regeneration, you are
going to sit together with me, judging the twelve tribes of
Israel," which, the theologians say, includes everybody. So the
fact of the matter is that some are going to share judgment
with Christ; and, according to Christian tradition; not only the
Apostles. Referring to this passage, especially to the close link
between: "We have given up everything," and" The reward
is: you shall judge," St. Thomas very beautifully explains why
the reward will be: " You shall judge." The people who will be
judged-if they have failed-have failed because they have not
given up the world. They have tried to enjoy the good things
of this world; they refuse to detach themselves from creatures.
Who else except one who has practiced detachment, has given
up all things, will have the necessary balance, will be able to
judge accurately, will be able to assist the Judge? So all those
who have practiced voluntary detachment, especially those who
have taken a voluntary vow of poverty, will assist in the last
judgment. If this is true of the Apostles, if it is true of the poor
in spirit, then it is eminently true of Mary, who is the most
detached of all.
Others then are going to be associated with Christ in the
final judgment. What are they going to do? St. Thomas maintains 8 that the detached will judge by cooperating in the task
of revealing to each individual the cause of the damnation or
salvation, both of himself and of all others, somewhat in the
way the higher angels are said to illuminate the lower angels
and men.
A word of explanation is needed to understand this function.
The purpose of the final judgment is to justify the ways of God
8

Summa Tkeologiae, Suppl., q. 89.

806

JAMES M. EGAN

to man and to manifest the ultimate glory of God. As each
one leaves this life, he receives his reward. St. Thomas is of
the opinion that two groups will not be subjected to the final
judgment-the very good and the very bad. All will recognize
the justice of the reward or punishment meted out to them.
The ones who will be judged are those that have a mixture,
that were not too bad, or not too good. Perhaps, they were
good enough to get to heaven, but not very far up; they were
bad enough to get to hell, -but not too far down. Here there
might be a question, either in their own minds, or in the minds
of others. There is no question of changing the sentence; there
is merely the task of explaining it. Certainly, we will wonder
about the fate of those we· have known on earth. We will have
made judgments about them, yet we may find that in the end
they do not have the place we thought they should have. We
will like to know the ele:tnents that entered into the final judgment. That is the task assigned to the poor in spirit. Throughout the whole mass of men gathered together for the final
judgment, there will be passing the Apostles, the voluntary
poor, the poor in spirit. They will go about and explain to men,
helping them to understand both the justice and the mercy of
Christ's judgment of themselves and others. If that is true of
the Apostles and others, then it must be even truer of Mary;
for no one has been so detached as she, no one so deeply poor
in spirit.
Mary, then, in a proper, though very special sense, is Queen
of the Universe, possessing real power in accordance with the
stipulations of the decree predestinating her, exercising it in a
truly feminine manner in the legislative and judicial spheres
as well as in the executive; indeed, Mary is Queen of the
kingdom in which Christ is King.

JAMES M. EGAN, O.P.
School of TheolOfl'!l,
St. Mar'/1'11 College,

_Notre Dame, Ind.

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS
JoHN THoRNHILL, S.M., S. T. L., PH. D., a graduate of the Pontifical
Athenaeum " Angelicum," Rome, is presently teaching philosophy
at St. Peter Chanel Seminary, Toongabbie, New South Wales, Australia, where he is continuing his work in the philosophy of history
and culture.
JAMEs J. TALLARico, Ja., M.A., whose contribution in this issue is his
M.A. thesis in the Department of Philosophy, St. Michael's College,
University of Toronto, continues his studies and preparation of a
doctoral dissertation on the philosophical concepts of inertial in preNewtonian natural philosophy at the University of Toronto, Toronto,
Canada.
JAMEs M. EoAN, 0. P., M.A.,
T. D. (Angelicum), Director & Professor
of Dogmatic Theology at St. Mary's College, Notre Dame, Ind.,
of Magister, author & lecturer in the fields of dogmatic. and
spiritual thealogy, contributes frequently to such journals as The.
TlwrrUat; Angelicum, and Cross &: Crown.
WILLIAM A. WALLACE, 0. P ., M. S., PH. D., S. T. D., an associate member
of The Albertus Magnus Lyceum, author of Scientific Methodology
of Theodoric of Freiberg, lecturer on philosophy and modem science,
is Professor of Natural Philosophy at the Dominican House of
Studies, St. Stephen's Priory, Dover, Massachusetts.

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BOOK REVIEWS
Faith in tke Synoptic Gospels: A problem in tke correlation of Scripture
and Theology. By EnwARD D. O'CoNNOR, C. S.C. Notre Dame, Ind.:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1961. Pp. xx, 164, with index.
It is well-known that there is a real divergence between the Protestant
notion of faith and the traditional Catholic notion. Protestant and Catholic
biblical scholars (especially biblical theologians) have found areas of agreement in their interpretations of the Word of God and have become more
sympathetic to each other's position. But it is not likely that, using only
the scientific instruments they have in common, they will ever succeed in
eliminating the divergence. For the Protestant scholar, besides his scientific tools, has his own personal faith in the Word of God, or the faith that
he shares by agreement with the believing community to which he belongs.
An intrinsic principle in the scientific approach of the Catholic scholar is
the age-long infallible teaching of the community to which he belongs.
Much (should we say, all) of this teaching, while in direct line with the
biblical revelation, is expressed in formulas that have been freed from the
very peculiarities of thought and expression which are the concern of the
biblical theologian, formulas that have been prepared by the work of
speculative theologians, although they are now clothed with the infallibility
of the Church's judgment.
In doing their work, the speculative theologians have employed what
are commonly referred to " as the greek modes of thought." Since the
approach to reality of the " semitic " mind and the " greek " mind is considerably different, it is not surprising that there is a growing tension
between the biblical and the speculative theologians, especially since the
Fathers of the Church and the scholastic theologians elevated the " greek
modes of thought " into powerful instruments for the development of
biblical thought. It should be pointed out here that there is a tension within
the biblical theologian himself. For it is undoubtedly true that the universalizing of the biblical revelation began with the revelation itself under
the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, taking advantage of the contact with
the Hellenic mind even before the coming of Christ. This is a constant
embarrassment to Scripture scholars.
It is the tension between biblical and speculative theologians that has
dictated the form of the study by Fr. O'Connor. In defense of the speculative theologian, he states: " ... it is his goal to abstract from all that
is contingent in the scriptural presentation, and to seek to grasp the divine

308

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309

realities as tkey are in themselves (insofar as this is possible) .•. it involves
a transmutation of ideas and doctrine to a new intellectual level.... "
{p. xiii) • True enough; but is this the term of the speculative theologian's
task? And is the tension between the speculative theologian on the one
hand and the biblical theologian, the patristic theologian, the missionary,
the artist, the poet, and others on the other hand, not due in great part to
a failure of the speculative theologians?
Paul Tillich has finely indicated the two basic tasks of Christian theology:
" a theological system is supposed to satisfy two basic needs: the statement
of the Christian message and the interpretation of this truth for every new
generation " (Systematic Theology 'I, p. 3, The University of Chicago
Press, 1951). If the second task were taken seriously by speculative theologians, at the present moment a substantial number of them, -with a host
of scholars from many disciplines, would be devoting full time to a profound and sympathetic study of the currents of secular thought in the
western world, of Protestantism, Communism, Orthodoxy, lslamism, Buddhism and Hinduism.
It may seem absurd to turn from this global vision to the simple book
under review. Yet its author has taken a step in the right direction.
Catholic speculative theology can never accomplish its task unless it is
vitally rooted in Sacred Scripture and the Fathers of the Church. The
speculative theologian should be grateful to his colleagues for their thrilling
restoration of biblical revelation to its own setting and of the rich witness
of the Fathers to the consciousness of the Catholic community today.
Fr. O'Connor had hoped to make a comparative study of the biblical
and Thomistic notions of faith, but when he could find no complete treatment of the biblical notion, he decided on the present study. As the
title indicates, he has severely limited its scope, confining himself to the
Synoptic Gospels and to the passages in them where some form of the
word " faith " appears. He does devote a few pages to the Old Testament
notion of faith (with the promise of a longer study); and throughout the
work he makes good use of light thrown on the New Testament use of
words connected with " faith " and the Septuagint translation of Hebrew
terms for the same concept.
The author gives convincing reasons for limiting his investigations to
the Synoptic Gospels. "The first is that, of all theN. T. documents, they
pose most acutely the objections raised by Protestants against the scholastic
conception of faith." And, secondly, "the Synoptics have largely been
neglected . . . since the Synoptic teaching is meager in comparison with
that of St. John or St. Paul. Nevertheless ... it constitutes a transitional
stage between the 0. T. notion and that of theN. T. in its fullest development " (p. xvii) . These words make it clear that this is an essay in
biblical theology and not a biblical theology of the notion of faith. It

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BOOK REVIEWS

almost clamors for the complementary studies of the Old Testament and
the rest of the New Testament.
Perhaps a note of caution could be inserted here. Fr. O'Connor seems
ready to settle for an Old Testament notion of faith that is predominantly
trust and confidence. He says: " Belief played an inconspicuous role in
the religious·life of the Israelite " (p. 103. Vd. also p. 23) . Several years
ago, Dr. Louis Finklestein contributed an article to the Maritain Volume of
The Thomist (V Jan. 1943) entitled: " The Role of Dogma in Judaism."
Recently, Fr. Carroll Stuhlmueller, C. P. has been publishing work on the
interrelation of the liturgy and latter works of the Old Testament that
seems to me to indicate quite clearly that it was their belief that dominated
the lives of the chosen people. Their trust and confidence in God has its
ups and downs, but their belief grew steadily more and more enlightened.
It might be that this minimizing of ·belief is due in part to the methodological choice of confining this· study ohly to passages in which the word
" faith " in its many forms appears. Can the biblical notion of " faith "
be completely attained without a careful analysis of the revelatory situation?
This particular difficulty is brought into focus by the very lengthy discussion of whether the Synoptics " relate faith to Christ as belief of what
He taught" or" rather as belief about Him" (p. 89). While Fr. O'Connor
has no difficulty in showing that actually the Synoptics most frequently
speak in terms of belief in Christ, he seems determined to minimize unnecessarily the acceptance of Christ as a teacher. He cites Peter's confession: "Thou art the Christ" (Lk. 9:20) as a typical example. Yet
we have the witness of John to a prior confession: "Lord, to whom shall
we go, thou hast the words of eternal life and we have come to believe and
to know that thou art the Christ, the Son of God" (John 6:69-70).
It is true, as the author maintains, that Christ teaches little about
Himself in the Synoptics. His whole concern is with the Father. But this
is to overlook the extremely subtle pedagogical work of Christ in gradually
revealing a unique relation of the Father to Himself.
The question might not seem to be of major importance, except that the
author offers a theoretical justification of it which is, to say the least, startling: In Appendix III, Fr. O'Connor offers an interpretation of the Vatican
Council's definition of faith (D. 1789) : "Divine revelation is normally
made to man by means of a twofold activity: an exterior proclamation of
the word of God, and an interior illumination which enables the word to be
recognized as coming from God. The preacher or minister of the word
serves only to propose it to the potential believer; it is the divine light,
communicated interiorly, that moves the latter to assent ..... Of these two
elements which go to make up the locutio divina or teatimonium Dei to
which ·faith assents, it is the interior light which is principal, and which
specifies faith as divine. For the external I?roposal, God can use creatures

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311

as ministers, and He can replace one with another without affecting the
quality or nature of the believer's faith; ... " (p. 124-5). Now does not
this explanation omit the crucial point? What is the word of God? What
is its constitution, its permanent status? Is the subjective faith the only
intrinsically divine factor in the revelatory situation? The definition of
faith given by the Council is controlled by a more fundamental statement:
" Furthermore, the perpetual universal belief of the Catholic Church has
held and now holds that there are two orders of knowledge, distinct not
only in origin but also in object. They are distinct in origin, because in
one we know by means of natural reason; in the other, by means of divine
faith. And they are distinct in object, bei:!ause in addition to what natural
reason can attain, we have proposed to us as objects of belief mysteries
that are hidden in God and which, unless divinely revealed, can never be
known" (D. 1795}.
It is the intrinsically supernatural character of the word of God that
requires the movement of supernatural faith. True, the mode of proclamation is accidental, yet there must be (ordinarily) proclamation. The
teaching situation is an integral element of revelation to us. That I believe
Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, it must be revealed to me, not only
by a hidden movement of faith (which is only analogously called revelation} but by an objective presentation of this truth as God's word. St. Paul
doesn't seem to have had any difficulty in reconciling the two attitudes of
faith: " Faith then depends on hearing, and hearing on the word of
Christ " (Rom. 10: 17} .

JAMES M. EGAN, O.P.
St. Mary's College
Notre Dame, Ind.

Ca1J,8ality. The Place of the Causal Principle in Modem Science.. By MAm:o
BuNGE. Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University Press, 1959.
Pp. xx + 380, with bibliography and index. $7:50.
This work is a paradigm of scholarly research, crammed with references
to everything that has ever been written on the subject of causality, together with suggestive. insights as to how to relate all of this material to
the problems of modem science. It is a provocative and challenging' work
for the Thomist, of which much will have been written before its full
import for the revival of interest in a realistic philosophy of science will
be exhausted.
Bunge identifies himself generally with" scientific philosophy," but states
that he is expressly affiliated with " no orthodoxy " (p. vi) . His main
interest is the problem of determinism, to which he believes " no single

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BOOK REVIEWS

philosophic school has ever afforded a satisfactory provisional solution,"
although he is willing to argue " that we owe no single contemporary
philosopher an analysis and systematization of the categories of determination comparable to Aristotle's '' (p. vii) . The main thesis of his book
is his final conclusion: " The causal principle is neither a panacea nor a
myth" but is "subsumed under the universal principle of determinacy."
(p. 353) • To show this, he divides his presentation into four parts, the
first dealing with the meaning of his terms, the second with a statement
of what causal determinism does not assert, the third with what it does
assert, and the fourth with his interpretation of the function of the causal
principle in science.
In the first part, where Bunge defines his terms and thereby specifies the
nature of causality, it is clear that he is diametrically opposed to the
Humean doctrine on causality and is unimpressed by the Kantian approach
to this subject. He does not feel that modem quantum theory eliminates
causality and cleverly observes that so-called " quantum indeterminacy is a
consequence of the idealistic hypothesis inherent in modem positivism "
(p. 16). Perhaps unfortunately, he limits his usage of· the terms 'cause'
and ' causation ' to efficient causality at the very outset: "As has been
usual since the beginnings of modem science, we shall hereafter restrict
the meaning of the term ' cause ' to efficient cause, or extrinsic motive
agent, or external influence producing change . . .'' (p. SS) , a restriction
that greatly influences his final conclusion. This becomes strikingly apparent when we read his definition of determinism, under which he eventually subsumes causality as a special case: " Determinism in the large sense
is that ontological theory whose necessary and sufficient components are
the genetic principle, or principle of productivity, according to which
nothing can arise out of nothing or pass into nothing; and the principle of
lawfulness, stating that nothing happens in an unconditional and altogether
irregular way.... Everything is determined in accordance with laws by
something else, this something else being the external as well as the internal
conditions of the object in question" (pp. 25-26). With such definitions, it
is not surprising to the Thomist that he concludes that causation can only
be one of several categories of determination.
The negative statement of the meaning of causal determinism, which is
the burden of the second part, is a well-reasoned polemic against the
empiricist and romanticist critiques of causality. He cites with approval
the Thomistic analysis of causality, and actually employs Aquinas' notion
of suppositional necessity to refute fatalistic determinism: "Statements
of causal laws and, in general, scientific laws, do not assert that something
will inevitably happen under all circumstances, regardless of past or present
conditions; quite on the contrary, statements of causal laws assert that if,
and only if, certain conditions are met, certain results will follow " {p. lOS) •

BOOK REVIEWS

313

His sympathy for the realistic approach to efficient causality is further
apparent when he remarks " the undeserved oblivion into which scholastic
philosophies (which are causal but not mechanistic) have fallen ... "
(p. 107).
.
It is while attempting to clarify exactly what is involved in causal
determinism, the work of Part III, that Bunge parts company with some
basic peripatetic notions. The author takes his illustrations almost exclusively from contemporary science, and, while this procedure is extremely
interesting from the viewpoint of the philosophy of science, it leads Bunge
to a rejection of such axioms as " omne quod movetur ab alio movetur "
(p. 175), "causa cessante cessat efjectus" (p. 190), and " quidquid est in
efjectu debet esse prius aliquo modo in causa " (p.
.
Bunge reserves his own special interpretation of the place of. the causal
principle in modern science for the fourth part of the work. He admits that
this is a " philosophical principle," but his general thesis is that " philosophy
neither towers above science nor stands at its basis, but is instead part of
the very stuff of scientific research " (p.
. He disagrees both with
the positivists and with the antipositivists. On the subject of scientific
explanation, he defends a thesis that is " neither the traditional nor the
positivistic one, but a third position, namely, that answers to why-questions
need not be causal in order to be scientific, although causal explanation does
constitute an important ingredient of scientific explanation in many cases "
(p.
. Some of the non-causal explanations that he recognizes are clearly
ones that the Thomist would classify as explanations through formal,
material or final causality, but once again we should recall that Bunge uses
the term cause exclusively in the place of causa efficiens. He rejects the
logical-empiricist analysis of causal explanation and denies that prediction
is of the essence of causality, or even of scientific investigation. He is not
disturbed that the word " cause " does not figure prominently in the
scientist's vocabulary: this is a "a generic concept" that "need not occur
explicitly in any particular scientific statement " (p. 845) . This again hints
at Bunge's unexpected affinity with Aristotelian thought, which is somewhat
confirmed when he urges, as his final conclusion, that perfect science may
still be regarded as ' knowledge through causes,' although with the added
reservation that such knowledge will ever remain provisional '' this peripatetic norm may still be regarded as the paradigm of science,-but, paradoxically enough, with the following essential qualifications:
the link
between causes and effects need not always be causal (that is, unique,
unsymmetrical, constant, external); (b) nothing warrants the presumption
that we shall ever attain more than a hypothetical (but improvable)
knowledge of causes,
and their links (whether casual or not) "
(p.
In all, Causality is a highly interesting book from the point of view of

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BOOK REVIEWS

the Thomist specializing in the philosophy of science. Bunge clearly manifests no prejudice against Aristotelian or Thomistic thought, and he gives
evidence of understanding that thought remarkably well, considering that
he is primarily a theoretical physicist. H some of his statements about St.
Thomas defy benign interpretation, in general his references are scholarly,
intelligent, and to the point. Moreover, by raising some difficulties about
agent-patient relationships and the effi.ciency involved in • self-sustaining '
processes to which there are no ready answers available in Thomistic
manuals, he offers the material for serious studies in these areas.

WILLIAM A. W.A.LLA.CE, 0. P.
Dominican HOU8e of Philosophy,

Dover, Matis.

BRIEF NOTICES
Themes of the Bible. By JACQUES GuiLLET, S. J. Translated by Albert J.
LaMothe Jr. Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides Publishers Association, 1960.
Pp. 279, $6.95.
First published in 1951, Fr. Guillet's semantic history of key themes from
first appearance to full blossom in the New Testament was received well
by Biblical theologians.
The translation is adequate. However, transliteration of Hebrew words
follows French rather than English phonetics, 'e. g., ,mickpat, p. -47 and
passim, instead of miskpat. Too, direct translation of Guillet's French
Biblical texts in toto would have been preferable to the use of English
versions in: such a semantic work.
The author's -interpretations are, at times, quite personal, yet he shows
close acquaintance with the other attempts at Biblical Theology. He does
not pretend to present an exhaustive treatment of Biblical Theology, but
his selection of themes is a happy one. The step by step development of
such concepts as .grace, justice, loving-kindness and truth; sin and death;
the devil and damnation; the breath or spirit of Yahweh affords the diligent
student at least a basic grasp of the divine evolution of these important
themes.
Along with many other Biblical scholars, Fr. Guillet overstates the case
for the Hebrew· pre-logical, non-conceptual, concrete rather than abstract
use of words and ideas. Such betrays his and their misunderstanding of
what he would call an abstract, and, therefore, lifeless, use of universals.
Actually, his method shows that he is trying to introduce some type of
universal predication into a systemization of matter-based concepts. He,
therefore, is continually using the process of abstraction proper to the human
intellect. If the process of abstraction is essentially a lifeless or a lethal
thing, then, so is intellection, be it Hebrew and poetic, or Western and
scientific. Unless Biblical theologians discover that there are many modalities to human abstraction, they will continue to ride their chargers against
the wind-mill of " deadly essentialism."
Whatever be the reasons for it, the price of the book is rather high.
Perhaps a paperback edition would be more practicable for those who are
interested in or have need of the matters of Biblical Theology.

J. E. FALLoN, O.P.
Dominican, HO'U8e uf Studies,
Was/Wngtoo, D.C.

815

316

BRIEF NOTICES

Cosmologia. By RoBERT M.As1. Rome: Desclee & Cie., 1961. Pp. 582.

This manual developed from the lectures of the author in the Lateran
University and at the Propaganda. In the work of revising and preparing
his material for publication, the author was assisted by Henry Nicoletti of
the Lateran. It is intended for university students, but it has been composed in a manner that makes it adaptable for seminaries; certain historical
parts and particular questions can be omitted at the discretion of the
teacher.
The objective is to present the natural philosophy of Aristotle and St.
Thomas, brought up to date in accord with modem developments of philosophy and science. The scholastic method is followed, but with refreshing
modem features. There is an adequate historical introduction to the various
topics, opinions about each question are often expressed in the very words
of their originators, and the author's own conclusions emerge naturally
and logically. These conclusions are stated as summary theses at the end
of each topic, rather than as propositions laid down at the beginning. Thus
the impression of invention, rather than of dogmatism, is given. One of the
valuable features of the book is the generous bibliographies given after
each chapter; these are placed in chronological order, so that at a glance
the reader can find the most recent treatments of a topic.
After a short survey of Aristotelian physical method and of the rise of
the new physics with Galileo, Boyle, Newton and Huygens, the author
claims that the unified Aristotelian physics has been divided into two
distinct sciences because of the new experimental method, which creates
a new formal object (pp. 12, 13). Natural philosophy is said to consider
the ultimate causes of the corporeal world (" causas scilicet metaphysicas ")
and the intelligibility of corporeal being, whereas science considers the
proximate and experimental causes. The object of science is " corpus prout
est ens experimentabile." (p. 13) , that is, body with measurable properties.
Not all will agree with this position that Aristotle's physics has been
divided into two distinct sciences. Modern sciences fit into the category of
middle sciences known to the ancients, formally mathematical and materially physical. It is a further question whether the findings of mathematicized sciences can and should be given strictly physical explanations.
These explanations would be at the same level of knowledge as the philosophy of nature, where Aristotle and St. Thomas put them. For philosophy of
nature belongs at the first degree of abstraction. It is dependent on sensory
experience and induction, and defines its concepts with matter and motion.
However, since it is at a general and vague level, its observations are so
evident that we tend to overlook the fact that the science is truly founded
on sensory experience. It is natural motion as sensibly experienced and
intellectually interpreted that is the source of intelligibility of material

317

BRIEF NOTICES

beings. The formal object of the science is not material being as being,
but as mobile.
There are close mutual relations between philosophy and science, and the
author's recognition of this accounts for some quite valuable parts of his
text where he treats philosophically of atomic theory, mass and energy,
relativity, quantum mechanics, non-Euclidian geometry, and other pertinent
topics. An eight page index of proper names shows many references to the
great names in science.
The exposition of philosophical theses is always clear and of adequate
length. It is regrettable that there is no treatment of alteration and the
process of substantial generation. Nonetheless; there is a wealth of useful
material in the book and a translation into English would be of considerable
value to philosophy in our country.
.
MELVIN

A. GLUTZ, 0. P.

Paasionist House of Philosophy,
Chicago, Illinois

Philosophy of Nature. FRANCIS J. CoLLINGWOOD. New Jersey: Prentice
Hall, Inc., 1961. Pp. viii + 306 with index. $4.50.
This is not a text book; it lacks the didactic stringency of argumentation
and the strictly logical form, but this in no way takes away from the
intrinsic value of the book. Francis Collingwood has given us what we so
badly needed: a simple, very readable and living presentation of natural
philosophy as seen in its historical inception and evolution and in its vigorous encounter with problems of both primitive perception and scientific
theorization.
Here is a book ideal for background reading. Its clear and unaffected
style makes for swift and effortless reading. It is geared to the undergraduate student or to the completely uninitiated layman. It is a penetrating work for all its simplicity and the reward for a few hours of
pleasurable reading is an insight into the spirit, methodology and objective
content of the philosophy of nature.
Chapters 10 and 11 are especially worthy of mention. The first, entitled
" Practical and Experimental Science," presents a coherent review of the
exact nature of instruments, hypothetical reasoning as well as the role of
mathematics, with reservations, as a true instrument of interpretation. The
final chapter offers what its title infers: " Conclusions." The author
underlines the importance of unshakable principles as the cornerstone of all
science, compares common sense and scientific knowledge, stressing their
complimentarity and continuity and then reviews the opposition and corelation of the platonic and aristotelian explanations of reality. Following

818

BRIEF NOTICES

a scathing criticism of Positivism he concludes with a meaningful warning
not to lose sight of the distinction between the symbolic and the real.
These last are I think the highlights of his book. Positivism he describes
as essentially negative, in that it negates the necessary prerequisites for any
real science: objective causal connection and formal abstraction. His reflections on the need to avoid confusing symbols and reality, since symbols
are and must always remain " mental artifacts," put into bold relief the
aristotelian exigency for concrete reality as the touchstone for truth.
On the next to the last page, the author states how the synthesis of the
mental concept and the existent is achieved in the judgment without any
further elucidation of this important point. This incompleteness, along with
several other instances of insufficient data (for example, bringing the
explanation of gravity and inertia no further than Newtonian physics and
the failure to do more than simply equate mass with " quantity of matter ")
left this reviewer unsatisfied and wondering. However, there is mention
made of a second volume which promises a more complete coverage of the
epistemological and methodological principles of the philqsophy of science
and a more detailed explanation and evaluation of the mathematical instruments and extra-sensible realm of contemporary science. If this forthcoming
volume is written with the same simplicity, precision and consistency as
this present one, we look forward to it impatiently.

THoMAS D. FEEHAN, M.S.
La Salette Seminary,
Ipswich, Massachusetts

The Philosophy of Physics. Edited by Vincent Edward Smith.
St. John's University Press, 1961. Pp. 82 with Index.
The Nature of Physical Knowledge. Edited by L. W. Friedrich, S.J.
Milwaukee:
University Press, 1960. Pp. 152 with Index.
Lecture series and symposia on the philosophy of science-for the past
decade a favorite bloom at secular universities-have been transplanted,
as these slender volumes attest, to the campus of Catholic Universities.
Considerable success has attended the task for, while in common with symposia from Plato's time onward, these papers raise more problems than they
solve, they exhibit distinct signs of intellectual life.
The lectures at St. John's University face up to familiar but important
issues: Rev. Benedict Ashley, 0. P. and Charles DeKoninck controvert,
each in his particular way, the idealistic and positivistic conceptions of
physical knowledge; the paper of Yves Simon explains Maritain's position
on the relation of philosophy to physics. The lecture by Karl Herzfeld

BRIEF NOTICES

819

illustrates that previous authors are not attacking dead issues: it validates
Scholastic " potentiality " by mathematical probability functions and apparently favors the Bohr complementarity principle to explain the mindbody problem.
Scientists at the Marquette Symposium evidence less restraint: Bridgman asserts that all knowledge, even that subject to " operational verification," remains uncertain; Margenau concludes that inductive knowledge
only affords probability, that deductive knowledge (which he symbolizes
as S >T • T >S) always entails the fallacy of consequent. Two subsequent
papers contest these authors: Raymond Seeger underlines several weaknesses in Bridgman and Margenau; Adolph Grunbaum makes several observations relative to these authors, but effectively criticizes, by means of the
Hempel-Oppenheim paradigm, the more basic thesis of Duhem that a vast
theoretic network can always be adjusted to preserve a favored thesis in
the face of observational evidence that contradicts it. Frank Collingwood,
in a fine paper, justifies the limitations which axiomatic mathematics enrelate only tangently
counters at the physicist's hand. Two other
to the general problem: Alfred Lande attacks the Copenhagen (indeed, every
dualistic) interpretation of quantum mechm;tics; Rev. George Klubertanz,
S. J. relates physical knowledge to the moral sphere.
In brief, if symposia reports are to be assessed not by their unity of
viewpoint but by the vigor of the papers presented, the proceedings which
these books record qualify as successful.
THoMAs CuNNINGHAM, O.P.
University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin

BOOKS RECEIVED
Adler, Mortimer, The Idea of Freedom. New York: Doubleday, 1962.
Vol. I, pp. 689 with index. $7.50; Vol. IT, pp. 754 with index, $7.50.
Armas, 0. R. S. A., G. La Morel de San AugUIJtin. Madrid: Difusera del
Lisbre, 1962. Pp. ll81. $6.00.
Ballard, E. G. Studies in Whitehead's Philosophy. New Orleans: Tulane
University, 1961. Pp. ll3.
Barth, Karl & others. Christianity Divided. New York: Sheed & Ward,
1961. Pp. 335. $6.00.
Berti, 0. S.M. C. & others. De Ratione Pondera:ndi,Documenta Magiaterii
Ecclesiastici. Roma: Edizioni "Marianum," 1961. Pp. 48.
Binkley, L. U. Contemporary Ethical Theories. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1961. Pp. 203 with index. $4.75.
Bosworth, Wm. Catholicism & Crisis in Modern France. Princeton: Princeton University, 1962. Pp. 407 with index. $8.50.
Bouyer, L. Introduction to Spirituality. New York: Desclee Co., 1961.
Pp. 321 with index. $5.75.
--. The Seat of Wisdom. New York: Pantheon Books Inc., 1962.
Pp. 212 with index. $4.59.
Bredvold, L. & others. The Philosophy of Edmund Burke. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan, 1961. Pp. 276 with index. $5.95.
Brennan, B. P. The Ethics of Wm. James. New York: Bookman Associates, 1961. Pp. 183 with index. $4.00.
Brillet, C. Or. G. Meditations on the Old Testament. New York: Desclee
Co. Inc., 1961. Pp. 249. $3.75.
--. The New
Bible. New York: Oxford University Press &
Cambridge University Press, 1961. Pp. 447. $1.45.
Carol, O.F.M., J. (Ed.) Mariology. Vol. III Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1961. Pp. 456, with index. $9.50.
Calvez., S. J., J. Y. & Perrin, S. J., J. The Church and Social ]Ulltice.
Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1961. Pp. 466 with index. $7.50.
Danielou, J. ·Christ and Us. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1961. Pp. 236.
$3.95.

Dansette, A. ReligioUIJ History of Modern France. Vol. I & IT. New York:
Herder & Herder, 1961. Pp. 467, 362, with index. $16.50.
D'Arcy, E. Conscience and Its Right to Freedom. New York: Sheed &
Ward, 1962. Pp. 277. $3.50.
Davis, H. Worship & Theology in England. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1962. Pp. 390 with index. $7.50.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Day, C. B. The Philosophers of China. New York: Philosophical Library,
Inc., 1962. Pp. 426 with index. $6.00.
De Fraine, S. J., J. The Bible and The Origin of Man. New York:
Desclee Co., Inc., 1961. Pp. 88. $2.50.
De Gennare, A. A. The Philosophy of Benedetto Croce. New York: Philosophical Library, 1961. Pp. 108 with index. $8.00.
De Menasce, G. C . .The Dynamics of Morality. New York: Sheed & Ward,
1961. Pp. 858 with index. $6.00.
Desan, W. The Planetary Man. Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University Press, 1961. Pp. 182. $2.00.
Ehr, S. V. D., D. J. The Purpose of The Creator and Of Creatures. Techny,
Ill. 1961. Pp. 158, with index.
Ewing, U. C. The Essene Christ. New York: Philosophical Library Inc.,
1961. Pp. 488 with index. $5.75.
Flew, A. Hume's Philosophy of Belief. New York: Humanities Press,
1961. Pp. 286 with index. $6.00.
Giblet, J. (ed.). The God of Israel and The God of Christians. New York:
Desclee Co., Inc., 1961. Pp. 261. $8.95.
Gilson E. & Pegis, A. St. Thomas Aquinas & Philosophy. West Hartford,
Connecticut: St. Joseph College, 1961. Pp. 29. $1.00.
Gleason, S. J., R. W. Grace. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1961. Pp. 240.
$8.95.

Grant, R. M. Gnosticism. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961. Pp. 254
with index. $5.00.
Gregory of Nyssa, St. From Glory to Glory. New York: C. Scribner's
Sons, 1961. Pp. 298. $4.95.
Hillmann, Sister M. V. The Pearl. The College of St .. Elizabeth Press:
Distributed by University Publishers, Inc., New York. 1961. Pp.
175 with index. $5.00.
James, E. 0. Comparative Religion. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1961.
Pp. 884 with index. $1.95.
John XXIII. Mater at Magistra. New York: Paulist Press, 1961. Pp.
96. $.25.

Kung, H. The Council, Reform and Reunion. New York: Sheed & Ward,
1961. Pp. 208 with index. $8.95.
LaFont, 0. S. B., G. Structures, Methode dans La Somme Theologique deS.
Thomas d'Aquin. Desclee de Brouwer, 1961. Pp. 512 with index.
Laver, R. The Mind of Voltaire. Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1961. Pp.
155 with index. $8.50.
Lewis, S. J., J. Le Gouvernment Spirituel. Bruges: Desclee de Brouwer,
1961. Pp. 188. 75 Fr. B.
Lynch, S.J., W. F. The Integrating Mind. New York: Sheed & Ward,
1961. Pp. 181. $8.95.

BOOKS RECEIVED

MacManus, F. St. Columban. New York: Sheed & Ward,

Pp. 240.

$8.95.

McGlynn, S. J., J. V. & Toner, S. J., J. J. Modern Etkical Theories.
Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1961. Pp. 167 with index.
McManus, S. S. J., E. P. Studies in Race Relations. Baltimore: The
Josephite Press, 1961. Pp. 168 with index.
Moriee, H. The Apostolate of Moral Beauty. St. Louis: B. Herder Co.,
1962. Pp.
$2.95.
Newman, J. H. On Consulting the Faithful. New York: Sheed & Ward,
1961. Pp. 118. $tJ.OO.
Oesterreicher, J. M. (Ed.). The
New York: Pantheon BookS Inc.,
1962. Pp. 883. $4.50.
O'Brien, J. A. The Catholic Way of Life. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, 1962. Pp. 211 with index. $2.95.
O'Meara, J. Charter of Christendom. New York: Macmillan Co., 1961.
Pp. 120. $2.50.
Pegis, A. C. The Macauley Lectures. West Hartford, Connecticut: St.
Joseph College, 1961. Pp. 886 with index. $4.85.
Pezeril, D. Blessed and Poor. New York: Pantheon Book Inc., 1961. Pp.
255. $4.00.

Piolant, A. The Holy Eucharist. New York: Desclee Co., Inc., 1961. Pp.
154 with index. $2.50.
--. Proceedings of the XV Annual Convention, The Catholic Theological Society of America. Pp.
with index. 1961.
Pruche, 0. P., B. Histoire de l'Homme Mysterr de Dieu. Desclee de
Brouwer, 1961. Pp. 451.
Ramirez, 0. R., S. La Esencia de la Esperanza Cristina. Madrid: Ediciones Punta Europe, 1961. Pp. 852 with index.
Runes, D. The Art of Thinking. New York: Philosophical Library, 1961.
Pp. 90. $2.75.
Ryan, I. E. The Notion of Good in Books Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta of
the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Copenhagen: E. Munksgaard, 1961.
Pp. 57. 14 D. Kr.
Ryan, J. K. (Ed.). Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy.
Washington, D. C.: Catholic University Press, 1961. Pp. 221 with
index. $5.00.
Sabourin, S. J., L. Redemption Sacrificielle. Bruges: Desclee de Brouwer,
1961. Pp. 487, with index. !i!80 Fr. B.
Schmaus, M. The Essence of Christianity. Chicago: Scepter Press, 1961.
Pp.
with index. $8.95.
Schoeck, H. & Wiggins, J. Relativism and The Study of Man. New York:
Van Nostrand, 1961. Pp. 259 with index. $6.50.
Scholz, H. Concise History of Logic. New York: Philosophical Library,
1961. Pp. 140 with index. $8.75.

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Schonfield, H. J. A History of Biblical Literature. New York: New American Library, 1962. Pp. 223 with index.
Singer, M. G. & Ammerman, R. Introductory Readings in Philosophy,
New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1962. Pp. 89S with index. $8.25.
Stace, W. T. Tke Concept of Morals. New York: Macmillan Co., 1962.
Pp. 807 with index. $1.75.
Stein, E. Die Frau. Louvain: Editions Nauwelaerts, 1961. Pp. 226.
150 Fr. B.

Sticco, M. Tke Peace of St. Francia. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1961.
Pp. 288. $5.95.
Swabey, W. C. Ethical Theory From Hobbes to Kant. New York: PhilosophicOl Library, 1961. Pp. 2S4 with index. $4.75.
Tauler, 0. P., J. Spiritual Conferences. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co.,
1961. Pp. 2S8. $4.25.
Thomas Aquinas, St. (J. F. Anderson, Trans.) Treatise on Man. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962. Pp. 17S. $2.75.
Toulmin, S. & others. Seventeenth Century Science .and tke Arts. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1961. Pp. 187. $8.00.
Van Melsen, A. S. Science and Technology. Pittsburgh: Dusquene University Press, 1962. Pp. 878 with index. $6.95.
Weigel, S.J., G. & Madden, A. G. Knowledge; Its Values and Limits.
Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961. Pp. liS with index.
$8.75.

--.

Religion and the Knowledge of God. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1961. Pp. liS with index. $8.75.
Wilhelmsen, F. D. Tke Metaphysics of Love. New York: Sheed & Ward,
1962. Pp. 159. $8.50.
Wilkin, S.J., V. From Limbo to Heaven. New York: Sheed & Ward,
1961. Pp. 145. $8.00.
.
Wittgenstein, L. (D. B. Pears & B. F. McGuinness, Trans.} Tractatus
Logico-Pkilosopkicus. New York: Humanities Press, 1961. Pp. 166
with index. $4.50.
Wolfson, H. A. Religious Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961. Pp. 17S with index. $6.00.